Input: Under the Constitution, high-level leadership positions in the executive branch are filled through appointment by the President "by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate." These posts include most of the approximately two dozen that form the President's Cabinet. Because of the importance of these offices to the implementation of the President's policies and the leadership of federal departments and agencies, they are usually among the first to be filled at the outset of a new Administration. The President may nominate individuals to fill these posts at any point during his time in office, however. From time-to-time, Presidents have made new Cabinet appointments in the midst of a term in response to unexpected resignations or deaths. In recent decades, it also has become customary for each two-term President to reshuffle his Cabinet during the inter-term transition—the transition that takes place at the end of a President's first term in office and beginning of his second term. This process of filling Cabinet vacancies at the beginning of a second term has not been as extensive as the staffing at the beginning of the first term; typically about half the Cabinet members change. Nonetheless, the pace at which these nominations and confirmations are carried out could affect the implementation of the President's policies during his second term, as well as the leadership of the departments and agencies affected. This report discusses nominations to Cabinet positions during inter-term presidential transitions. It begins with a discussion of the positions that make up the Cabinet and the process by which nominations to such positions are considered in the Senate. Following this discussion, the report provides data on, and analysis of, the pace of Senate consideration of inter-term transition nominations to Cabinet positions since 1984. The President's Cabinet is an institution established by custom, rather than by law. The Constitution provides that the President "may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices," but it does not establish any requirement that he meet with them or seek their counsel. Nonetheless, beginning with George Washington, Presidents have met with department heads and other top officials as a formal group. The Cabinet comprises the heads of each of the departments, currently numbering 15, the Vice President, and other positions that have been accorded Cabinet rank by the President. This last group varies according to the preferences of each President. At present, it includes the following positions: White House Chief of Staff; Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency; Director of the Office of Management and Budget; United States Trade Representative; United States Ambassador to the United Nations; Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors; and Administrator of the Small Business Administration. Other positions that have been accorded Cabinet rank by past Presidents include, for example, Director of National Drug Control Policy, Counselor to the President, Director of Central Intelligence, and Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency. At times, a President has changed the composition of his Cabinet during his presidency. For example, President William J. Clinton added four positions to his Cabinet over the course of his time in office. Presidents have used their Cabinets in various ways. In some Administrations, the Cabinet has been a key advisory and decision-making body. In other Administrations, the Cabinet as a collective body has been a mostly symbolic institution, even as each individual exercises considerable influence over his or her department or agency. Regardless of a President's use of this group, the membership in the Cabinet conveys high status. Consequently, nominations to Cabinet-level positions are among the highest priority for consideration by the Senate. The appointments process for advice and consent positions, and therefore for most members of the President's Cabinet, is generally considered to have three stages: selection and nomination by the President, consideration in the Senate, and appointment by the President. This section of the report provides an overview of these three stages. In the first stage, the White House selects and clears a prospective Cabinet appointee before sending a formal nomination to the Senate. There are a number of steps in this stage of the process. First, with the assistance of, and preliminary vetting by, the White House Office of Presidential Personnel, the President selects a candidate for the position. During the clearance process, the candidate prepares and submits several forms, including the "Public Financial Disclosure Report" (also referred to as the Office of Government Ethics (OGE) 278), the "Questionnaire for National Security Positions" (Standard Form (SF) 86), and the White House "Personal Data Statement Questionnaire." The Office of the Counsel to the President oversees the clearance process, which often includes background investigations conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), OGE, and an ethics official for the agency to which the candidate is to be appointed. If conflicts of interest are found during the background investigation, OGE and the agency ethics officer may work with the candidate to mitigate the conflicts. Once the Office of the Counsel to the President has cleared the candidate, the nomination is ready to be submitted to the Senate. A nominee has no legal authority to assume the duties and responsibilities of the position. Authority to act comes once there is Senate confirmation and presidential appointment, unless the individual is recess appointed or temporarily appointed under another authority. In the second stage of the appointments process, the Senate determines whether or not to confirm a nomination. Primarily, the Senate has shown particular interest in the nominee's views and how they are likely to affect public policy. Much of the Senate confirmation process occurs at the committee level. Administratively, nominations are received by the Senate executive clerk, who arranges for the referral of the nominations to committee, according to the Senate rules and precedents. Committee nomination activity on Cabinet nominations generally includes investigation, hearing, and reporting. As part of investigatory work, committees have drawn on information provided by the White House, as well as information they themselves have collected. Hearings provide a public forum to discuss the nomination and any issues related to the agency for which the nominee would be responsible. Even where confirmation has been thought by most to be a virtual certainty, hearings have provided Senators and the nominee with opportunities to go on the record with particular views or commitments. Senators have used hearings to explore nominees' qualifications, articulate policy perspectives, or raise related oversight issues. After a nomination is referred to committee, the committee may decline to act on the nomination at any point—upon referral, after investigation, or after a hearing. For Cabinet nominations, however, inaction is unusual. If the committee votes to report the nomination to the full Senate, it has three options: it may report the nomination favorably, unfavorably, or without recommendation. A failure to obtain a majority on the motion to report means the nomination will not be reported to the Senate. After a committee reports a nomination, the nomination is assigned a calendar number by the executive clerk, placed on the Executive Calendar , and, if taken up by the full Senate, would be considered in executive session. The Senate imposes no limitation on floor debate on nominations, so cloture may be required to end debate and reach a vote on the nomination. Based upon a precedent set by the Senate on November 21, 2013, a simple majority of those voting would be required to invoke cloture on all nominations to executive branch positions, including Cabinet nominations. The Senate historically has confirmed most, but not all, Cabinet nominations. Rarely, however, has a vote to confirm a Cabinet nomination failed on the Senate floor. Following Senate confirmation, the confirmed nominee is given a commission bearing the Great Seal of the United States and signed by the President. The nominee is then sworn into office. The President may sign the commission at any time after confirmation, at which point the appointment becomes official. Once the appointee is given the commission and sworn in, he or she has full authority to carry out the responsibilities of the office. The remainder of this report examines all Cabinet nominations made during inter-term transition periods of recent Presidents. The Appendix of this report lists nominations to Cabinet positions during inter-term transitions for the four most recent Presidents who served two terms in office (Ronald W. Reagan, William J. Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack H. Obama). The data included in the Appendix are nominations to Cabinet positions submitted during the inter-term transition period, which is defined as the period between November 1 of a President's re-election year and December 31 of the first year of his second term. In total, there were 48 such nominations, 46 of which the Senate confirmed—two of the inter-term Cabinet nominations made by President Clinton were withdrawn during Senate consideration. A previous version of this report, written prior to the completion of President Obama's inter-term transition, set April 30 as the end of the inter-term transition period. The earlier version included data on nominations received in the Senate prior to this date for Presidents Reagan, Clinton, and G. W. Bush. That six-month period from November 1 to April 30 covered the submission of, and Senate action on, almost all of the inter-term Cabinet nominations of those three Presidents. However, a number of President Obama's inter-term Cabinet nominations had not yet been received in the Senate as of April 30, 2013. As discussed above, the positions that the President chooses to include in his Cabinet vary across Administrations. The data provided in the Appendix include nominations to traditional Cabinet positions as well as nominations to those positions given Cabinet rank by the nominating President. (See section above titled " The Cabinet " for a list of the positions that recent Presidents have accorded Cabinet rank in addition to the heads of the 15 executive departments.) Table A-1 in the Appendix provides information on all the Cabinet nominations made during inter-term transitions for the four Presidents covered by this report, listing the dates of relevant actions from the President's official announcement of the nomination to the date of final Senate action upon each nomination. The table provides (1) the date the President made his announcement; (2) the date the Senate received the nomination; (3) the date(s) the committee held hearings; (4) the date the nomination was ordered reported; and (5) the date on which the Senate confirmed the nomination. For two nominations made during the Clinton Administration, the nominations were withdrawn and not confirmed, as indicated in the table. Table A-2 in the Appendix provides the number of days elapsed between each of the steps listed in Table A-1 . The final two columns in the table present two different measures of the total duration of the appointments process. The first is the number of days elapsed from the President's official announcement of his intention to nominate the individual to Senate confirmation of the individual, provided he or she was confirmed. This number is provided in the second to last column of the table. The final column lists the second measure of the duration of the appointments process: the number of days from the Senate's receipt of the nomination to confirmation of the nomination. Sometimes there was a lapse between the President's announcement and his submission of the nomination, so including both measures is a more comprehensive approach. Finally, the rows at the bottom of the table present the mean (average) and median duration across all confirmed nominations for both measures. Ideally, a true measure of the duration of the appointments process would begin as soon as an individual is selected as a candidate for nomination and the vetting process commences. However, for a variety of reasons, data are not publicly available on timing of the early stages of the vetting process. Often the public may not be aware that an individual is being vetted for a position until the vetting process is partially or entirely compete, at which time the President makes a formal announcement of his intention to nominate the individual. Because of this lack of opportunity for measurement of the entire vetting process, the earliest publicly available point to begin measurement is the date on which the President formally announced his intention to nominate the individual. Sometimes the number of days elapsed during the Senate's consideration of a nomination is used as a proxy measure for how controversial a nomination is considered to be, or for the level of opposition to a nomination. However, the number of days elapsed during the Senate's consideration of a nomination may be affected by other factors as well, such as the Senate's or committee's overall workload, other legislative priorities, and committee and floor scheduling decisions. As the data in the Appendix tables demonstrate, the duration of the Senate's consideration of inter-term Cabinet nominations varied considerably during the presidencies covered in this analysis. As discussed above, several methods might be used to measure the duration of the appointments process. One method is to count the number of days elapsed from the President's announcement of his intention to make a nomination until its confirmation. A second method is to focus only on Senate consideration by counting the number of days elapsed from a nomination's receipt in the Senate to its confirmation. These first two methods provide alternative measures of the total duration of the nomination and Senate consideration process. A third method is to examine the number of days elapsed between individual steps within the process. Table 2 provides a summary of the information in the Appendix tables, by President, using the two different methods of counting the total duration of the nomination process. As shown in the first set of numerical columns in Table 2 , measuring from the date of announcement to the date of confirmation, the mean (average) number of days to confirm was 61.6, while the median was 53.0. In other words, approximately two months elapsed from the President's announcement of his intention to submit a nomination until Senate confirmation of that nomination during this period. Measuring from the date on which each nomination was received in the Senate, rather than from the date of announcement, the mean number of days elapsed before confirmation was 34.8. The median number of days from receipt to final action was 32.5. In other words, nominations to Cabinet positions during these inter-term transitions typically proceeded through the Senate confirmation process in just over a month, once the nomination was received in the Senate. While there was some variation among the four Presidents listed here, the duration of the nominations included in Table 2 does not, on average, tend to vary widely across Administrations as measured from the date of announcement. For each President, an average of approximately two months elapsed from time of announcement of the nomination to confirmation. The medians were lower than the means in all four cases, suggesting that the means were influenced, in each case, by at least one outlier (extreme value). There was more variation, however, in the second set of columns in the table: the measure of days to confirmation once the nomination was received in the Senate. The lowest average number of days for Senate consideration was for President Reagan, whose nominations were under Senate consideration for 22.2 days on average. The highest was for President Obama, whose nominations were under Senate consideration for 57.3 days on average. The median ranged from a low of 16.0 days for President Reagan to a high of 49.0 days for President Obama. The various methods of quantifying the length of Senate consideration of nominations are discussed more in detail in the sections below. As measured from date of announcement to confirmation, President Reagan's nomination of Edwin Meese III to be Attorney General had the longest duration: 156 days. This was in large part due to the fact that between the President's announcement and his submission of the nomination to the Senate, 105 days elapsed. Notably, the duration of Meese's nomination process for Attorney General was even longer than indicated by Table A-1 : Meese had been originally nominated to the post during the previous congressional session on February 3, 1984. The Senate Judiciary Committee held hearings on the nomination, but did not report it to the full Senate. In accordance with Senate rules, the nomination was returned to the President when the Senate adjourned sine die on October 18, 1984. Meese's confirmation was delayed by an investigation related to his financial relationships with some individuals who had obtained federal jobs with his assistance. An independent counsel, appointed by then-Attorney General William French Smith at Meese's request, cleared him of any violations of criminal law. President Reagan first mentioned his intention of renominating Meese on September 7, 1984, under the assumption that the report of the results of the investigation would not reveal any incriminating new information. The President formally announced his intentions on September 20, 1984, after the report's release, and Meese was confirmed to the post by a vote of 63-31 on February 23, 1985. Meese's 1984 nomination falls outside the transition period discussed in this report, and it is therefore not included in the Appendix tables. Using the same measurement of the duration of the consideration of nominations—from the date of announcement of the nominee until the nominee is confirmed—the nomination that took the least number of days was President Reagan's nomination of James A. Baker III to be Secretary of the Treasury. Presidential Reagan announced his intention to nominate Baker on January 8, 1985, and 21 days later, the Senate confirmed Baker by a vote of 95-0. Another measure of the duration of Senate consideration of nominations is to count the number of days elapsed from receipt of a nomination, rather than from the President's announcement of his intention to nominate. Using a measure of the Senate's receipt of the nomination to confirmation, the inter-term Cabinet nomination that took the longest to be confirmed was President Obama's nomination of Regina McCarthy to be Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency in 2013. A total of 133 days elapsed from the receipt of McCarthy's nomination on March 7, 2013, until confirmation of her nomination on July 18, 2013. McCarthy was confirmed by a vote of 59-40. The Cabinet nomination made during an inter-term transition that proceeded most quickly from receipt to confirmation was also made by President Obama in 2013—the nomination of former Senator John F. Kerry to be Secretary of State. Seven days elapsed between the Senate's receipt of the nomination on January 22, 2013, and the confirmation vote on January 29, 2013. Kerry was confirmed by a vote of 94-3. Approximately one month elapsed after the President's announcement before he submitted the nomination to the Senate (32 days), and it is possible that the Senate committee may have begun preparing for its consideration of the nomination before the President formally submitted it. Another way to measure the duration of Senate consideration of nominations is to calculate the length of particular stages within the confirmation process—for example, the number of days elapsed from receipt of the nomination in the Senate (at which point it is immediately referred to committee) to the date on which a nominee's first hearing is held. The longest period that elapsed from the date a nomination was received to its first hearing was President Clinton's nomination of Alexis M. Herman to be Secretary of Labor in 1997. Seventy days elapsed from when the nomination was received on January 7, 1997, until the hearing was held on the nomination on March 18, 1997. In total, Herman's nomination was under consideration in the Senate for 113 days. Some of the discussion surrounding her nomination was related to her alleged involvement in campaign fundraising activities while employed at the White House. Herman was confirmed by a vote of 85-13. Tied for the fewest number of days elapsed from receipt in the Senate until the first hearing date was President Clinton's nomination of Madeleine K. Albright to be Secretary of State and President G. W. Bush's nomination of Carlos M. Gutierrez to be Secretary of Commerce. Both of those nominations received a hearing one day after they were received in the Senate. Albright's nomination was ultimately confirmed by a vote of 99-0, and Gutierrez was confirmed without a roll call vote. In other cases, a nomination might move through one or more stages of Senate consideration on the same day. For example, President Clinton's nomination of William S. Cohen to be Secretary of Defense had a hearing, was ordered reported, and was confirmed by a vote of 99-0, all on the same day. Two of President George W. Bush's nominations, the nominations of Mike Johanns to be Secretary of Agriculture and Margaret Spellings to be Secretary of Education, both had a hearing and were ordered reported on the same day. The Johanns and Spellings nominations were confirmed without a recorded vote two weeks after their nominations were reported.

Output: Under the Constitution, high-level leadership positions in the executive branch are filled through appointment by the President "by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate." These posts include most of the approximately two dozen that form the President's Cabinet, which is an institution established by custom, rather than by law. In recent decades, it has become customary for each two-term President to reshuffle his Cabinet during the inter-term transition—the transition that takes place at the end of a President's first term in office and beginning of his second term. Typically about half the Cabinet members change during this transition period. The appointments process for Cabinet and other advice and consent positions is generally considered to have three stages. In the first stage, the White House selects and clears a prospective appointee before sending a formal nomination to the Senate. In the second stage, the Senate initially relies on its committees to investigate each nominee and conduct hearings before taking up and deciding whether to approve the nomination. The Senate historically has confirmed most, but not all, Cabinet nominations. In the final stage of the appointments process, the confirmed nominee is given a commission bearing the Great Seal of the United States and signed by the President. Since 1984, four two-term Presidents—Ronald W. Reagan, William J. Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack H. Obama—made 48 nominations to Cabinet positions during inter-term transitions. For the purposes of this report, CRS considered an inter-term nomination to be one made between November 1 of each President's reelection year and December 31 of the first year of his second term. In total, the Senate confirmed 46 of these 48 nominations; two nominations submitted by President Clinton were withdrawn during Senate consideration. The duration of the appointments process, including the pace of Senate consideration, of these Cabinet nominations during inter-term transitions varied considerably. The mean (average) number of days elapsed from Senate receipt of Cabinet nominations during inter-term transitions to final action was 34.8. The median number of days from receipt to final action was 32.5. The Appendix of this report lists the data used to calculate these statistics. As measured from the date of receipt in the Senate until the date of confirmation, the inter-term Cabinet nomination under Senate consideration for the shortest period was President Obama's nomination of former Senator John F. Kerry to be Secretary of State in 2013, which was confirmed after seven days. The nomination under Senate consideration for the longest period was President Obama's nomination in 2013 of Regina McCarthy to be Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, which was confirmed after 133 days. Another method of measuring the duration of the appointments process during inter-term transitions is to measure the number of days elapsed using, as a starting point, the date of the President's announcement of his intention to nominate the individual, rather than receipt of the nomination in the Senate. The mean (average) number of days elapsed using this methodology was 61.6, and the median was 53.0. This report will be updated as events warrant.


Input: The ability of unauthorized aliens to claim federal refundable tax credits has received considerable scrutiny. In a July 2011 study, the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) reported that individuals who were not authorized to work in the United States received $4.2 billion by claiming the refundable portion of the child tax credit—the additional child tax credit (ACTC). The ACTC is available to working families with children under age 17. This issue is complicated by the differences in legal classifications of foreign nationals/aliens (e.g., "employment-authorized alien," "legal permanent resident," "resident alien," and "qualified alien") across the federal immigration, tax, and welfare laws. The TIGTA audit was based upon analysis of tax returns filed by persons with Individual Taxpayer Identification Numbers (ITINs). The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issues ITINs to individuals who are required to have a taxpayer identification number for tax purposes but are not eligible to obtain a Social Security number (SSN) because they are not authorized to work in the United States. The number of tax forms filed with ITINs has increased from 1.55 million in 2005 to 3.02 million in 2010. It is unclear how many of these individuals who filed with ITINs were unauthorized aliens or part of mixed-status families that included U.S. citizens or legally present aliens as well as unauthorized aliens. This report opens with an explanation of refundable tax credits and follows with an overview of unauthorized resident aliens. The report proceeds to analyze the federal tax status of unauthorized aliens and their eligibility for refundable tax credits, including a legal analysis of whether refundable tax credits are "federal public benefits" under Section 401 of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA). The report concludes with a discussion of selected policy options. Tax credits allow taxpayers to reduce their tax liability dollar-for-dollar up to the value of the credit. Credits are either nonrefundable or refundable. By definition, the value of nonrefundable tax credits cannot exceed a taxpayer's income tax liability. In contrast, refundable tax credits can be larger than a taxpayer's income tax liability, with the taxpayer receiving the difference (or part of the difference in the case of partially refundable tax credits) as a cash payment from the IRS. As a result of this distinction, refundable tax credits can be claimed by taxpayers with little or no income tax liability, which includes many low-income tax filers. The existing refundable tax credits include the earned income tax credit (EITC); the additional child tax credit (ACTC), which is the refundable portion of the child tax credit; the American opportunity tax credit, which is a partially refundable credit for tuition and related expenses; the health coverage tax credit, which provides a credit for health insurance costs of qualifying individuals who receive trade adjustment assistance (TAA) or pension benefits under a plan taken over by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC); the credit for tax withheld on wages; the credit for tax withheld at source for nonresident aliens and foreign corporations; the credit for fuel excise taxes paid on fuel used for nontaxable uses; and the credit for overpayment of tax. Additionally, a premium assistance credit, provided under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ( P.L. 111-148 ), will go into effect in 2014. There are also several refundable credits that have recently expired. These are the first-time homebuyer credit, the "recovery rebate" credit in the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 (2008 stimulus credit), the Making Work Pay credit available in 2009 and 2010, and the adoption expenses credit, which was refundable for 2010 and 2011. Selected credits are summarized in Appendix A . The credits listed in the last four bulleted points above are essentially methods by which taxpayers receive refunds for overpayment of taxes. The other refundable credits can be broadly categorized into those whose value depends on the taxpayer's earnings and those whose value is based on the taxpayer's expenditures for a particular action or good, such as higher education or homeownership. Currently, the two largest refundable tax credits—the EITC and ACTC—fall into the former category and comprise an estimated 95% of the total amount of refundable credits claimed in 2009. These credits effectively subsidize low-wage work, providing additional money for each dollar of wages. In addition, both credits help mitigate the federal taxes that low-income workers pay. In many cases, these workers may not have sufficient income to incur an income tax liability, but they do pay payroll taxes (i.e., the taxes on wages that fund Social Security benefits under the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) program and the Medicare hospital insurance (HI) program). For extremely low-wage workers, these credits may result in a net increase in income. For example, in 2011 (when the two-percentage point payroll tax reduction was in effect), taxpayers were directly subject to a payroll tax rate of 5.65%. If a taxpayer had $20,000 of earnings and one child, the taxpayer would owe $1,130 of payroll taxes and $410 of federal income taxes, for a total federal tax liability of $1,540, as illustrated in Figure 1 . This same taxpayer would be eligible for a $1,000 refund from the ACTC and a $2,565 refund from the EITC. Hence, in this example, the taxpayer would receive $2,025 as a refund. Figure 1 also highlights that while taxpayers begin paying payroll taxes on the first dollar they earn, the total amount of refundable credits they receive is greater than their total federal tax liability (net the non-refundable portion of the child tax credit) until taxpayers earn approximately $26,000. Hence, in this example, taxpayers making under approximately $26,000 actually see a net increase in their income as a result of these credits. For reference, in 2011 the poverty level for an adult under 65 with one child was $15,504. The migration and family patterns of unauthorized aliens residing in the United States are central to the question of their ability to claim refundable tax credits. Through the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), foreign nationals enter the United States in two main categories: as legal permanent residents (LPRs) and temporary nonimmigrants. Unauthorized resident aliens are foreign nationals who overstay their nonimmigrant visas, foreign nationals who enter the country surreptitiously, or foreign nationals who are admitted on the basis of fraudulent documents. In all three instances, these unauthorized aliens are in violation of the INA and subject to removal. The actual number of unauthorized aliens in the United States is not known, as locating and enumerating people who are residing in the United States without permission poses many methodological problems. Estimates derived from the March Supplement of the U.S. Census Bureau's Current Population Survey (CPS) indicate that the unauthorized resident alien population was 11.2 million in 2010. The Pew Hispanic Center reported that 35% of unauthorized adults have resided in the United States for 15 years or more and that 28% have resided for 10 to 14 years. The report also found that the proportion of unauthorized aliens who have been in the country at least 15 years has more than doubled since 2000. Pew researchers have also found that unauthorized aliens tend to be younger than the U.S. population overall and more likely to be in the child-bearing and child-rearing years. As a consequence, nearly half—an estimated 46%—of unauthorized adults are parents of minor children. A significant portion of the households headed by unauthorized aliens may have U.S. citizen children, as well as spouses who may be legal permanent residents (LPRs). Researchers at the Pew Hispanic Center estimated that at least 9 million people were in "mixed-status" families that included at least one unauthorized adult alien and at least one U.S.-born child in 2010. Along with the approximately 1 million unauthorized aliens who are minor children, Pew researchers estimated that 4.5 million minor children were born in the United States to a family in which at least one parent was an unauthorized alien. As Figure 2 shows, the number of U.S.-citizen children with at least one unauthorized parent has more than doubled since 2000. The implications of these demographics for the refundable tax credits heighten the complexity of the debate to restrict such tax credits to those persons legally authorized to work in the United States. In a widely cited 2002 study of federal benefits that may have gone to households headed by unauthorized aliens, Steven Camarota concluded, "[M]any of the costs associated with illegals are due to their American-born children, who are awarded U.S. citizenship at birth ... greater efforts at barring illegals from federal programs will not reduce costs because their citizen children can continue to access them." Whether an unauthorized alien who is head of household is permitted to be the payee of a federal benefit for U.S. citizen children varies across programs. Another group of foreign nationals that adds a level of complexity are the "quasi-legal" migrants. More precisely, not all unauthorized aliens lack legal documents giving them permission to work in the United States, which leads many observers to characterize these documented aliens as "quasi-legal" migrants. There are certain circumstances in which the Department of Homeland Security issues temporary employment authorization documents (EADs) to aliens who are not otherwise considered authorized to reside in the United States. Foreign nationals with EADs, in turn, may legally obtain Social Security cards. These "quasi-legal" unauthorized aliens fall in several categories: The government has given them temporary humanitarian relief from removal, such as Temporary Protected Status (TPS). They have sought asylum in the United States and their cases have been pending for at least 180 days. They are immediate family or fiancées of legal permanent residents (LPRs) who are awaiting in the United States for their legal permanent residency cases to be processed. They have overstayed their nonimmigrant visas and have petitions pending to adjust status as employment-based LPRs. None of the aliens described above have been formally approved to remain in the United States permanently, and are not necessarily considered lawfully present. Many with pending cases who are ultimately denied LPR status may have legally obtained SSNs for the temporary periods they were permitted to work in the United States. In addition, some may also be part of mixed-status families who include persons with ITINs. The Internal Revenue Code (IRC) does not have a special classification for individuals who are not lawfully present in the United States. An unauthorized alien is, like all other foreign nationals, classified for tax purposes as a resident or nonresident alien. Resident and nonresident aliens are both subject to U.S. taxes—resident aliens are generally taxed in the same manner as U.S. citizens, while nonresident aliens are subject to special rules. In general, an individual is a nonresident alien unless he or she is a lawful permanent resident or is present in the United States for a sufficient number of days during the current and previous two years ("substantial presence test"). Thus, an unauthorized alien who has been in the United States long enough to meet the substantial presence test is classified as a resident alien; otherwise, he or she is generally classified as a nonresident alien. This classification is for tax purposes only and does not affect the individual's immigration status. For further information on classes of noncitizens eligible to work and possibly qualify as a resident alien, see Appendix B and Appendix C . Since aliens, including unauthorized aliens, are subject to federal taxes, they need a taxpayer identification number. A taxpayer identification number is a unique number that identifies an individual for tax administration purposes. For most individuals, their taxpayer identification number is their Social Security number (SSN). Under current law, SSNs may be issued to lawful permanent residents, aliens who are authorized to work in the United States, and other aliens who are required by federal or state law to have an SSN in order to receive certain public benefits. In FY2011, the Social Security Administration (SSA) issued 5.4 million new SSNs. Of those, 1.3 million were issued to noncitizens allowed to work in the United States and 28,622 were issued to legally present aliens who were not authorized to work. Prior to 1996, unauthorized aliens generally obtained SSNs for nonwork (tax administration) purposes from the SSA or were assigned temporary taxpayer identification numbers by the IRS. In 1996, due to inefficiencies with the temporary numbers and plans by the SSA to tighten the rules under which aliens could obtain nonwork SSNs, the IRS began issuing permanent individual taxpayer identification numbers (ITINs) to alien taxpayers who are not legally able to obtain SSNs. Thus, individuals who are ineligible for SSNs are supposed to file their federal tax returns using ITINs as their identifying numbers. For a discussion of trend data on SSNs issued to noncitizens, see Appendix D . As Figure 3 shows, the number of taxpayers filing with ITINs has increased over the past decade. A 2009 TIGTA audit reported, "(T)here has been a significant increase in the use of ITINs since the IRS began issuing them in Tax Year 1996." This audit specifically found a 246% increase from 530,000 in 2001 to more than 1.8 million in 2007. The 2011 TIGTA audit reported further increases in tax returns filed with ITINs. The initial rise in ITIN filings coincides with provisions in the various comprehensive immigration reform bills of the 2000s that would have required unauthorized aliens to demonstrate that they had paid taxes if they sought earned legalization or "amnesty." As Figure 3 shows, the 2011 audit captured a larger number of ITIN filers for 2007 than the 2009 audit did for 2007. The TIGTA offered this explanation that may account, in part, for the difference: Another reason for the increase is that a significant number of individuals are filing multiple claims to obtain the ACTC [Additional Child Tax Credit] for prior year tax returns (e.g., filing Tax Years 2007, 2008, and 2009 returns at the same time). In Processing Year 2010, approximately 238,000 ITIN filers submitted more than 608,000 tax returns for multiple years at the same time and claimed just more than a billion dollars in ACTCs on those returns. The ACTC claims for these individuals for the combined tax periods can be substantial. However, not all of these claims were refunded because of the statute of limitations rules that apply. These figures may not capture all tax payments by unauthorized aliens. Notably, unauthorized aliens who entered the country legally and had work authorization but who overstayed the terms of their admittance may have a valid SSN that was assigned to them. In addition, the Social Security Actuary estimates that 75% of unauthorized aliens who are working are paying the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) tax, and thus are using—either their own, someone else's, or a fraudulent—SSN. As a result, some unauthorized aliens appear to be paying federal income taxes using an SSN rather than an ITIN. In determining whether unauthorized aliens may claim the refundable tax credits, two questions arise. The first is whether these individuals are able to claim the credits under the federal tax laws found in the Internal Revenue Code (IRC). The second is whether any refundable tax credits are "Federal public benefits" under Section 401 of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA). If so, it could then be argued that the credit should be disallowed to any unauthorized alien even if the IRC does not contain any restriction. As illustrated in Table 1 , there are two ways in which the Internal Revenue Code restricts the eligibility of aliens to claim certain refundable tax credits. First, for some credits, Congress has expressly provided in the applicable IRC statute that nonresident aliens are prohibited from claiming that particular credit. Second, Congress has included express statutory requirements in the IRC that taxpayers provide their SSNs when claiming certain credits. For these credits, any alien—whether resident or nonresident—without an SSN would be ineligible to claim the credit. As shown in Table 1 , only the EITC currently requires that taxpayers provide their SSNs, along with those of their spouses (if filing a joint return), and any qualifying children. The SSNs must have been issued for work purposes. The 2008 stimulus credit and the Making Work Pay credit, both of which have now expired, contained a similar requirement, although they did not specify that the SSN be issued for work purposes. As discussed above, individuals who enter the United States illegally may not lawfully obtain SSNs, and therefore they would not be able to claim a credit with an SSN requirement. However, some resident aliens who are currently in the country without proper immigration documents were once lawfully admitted, but have overstayed their visas. These individuals may have lawfully received SSNs while they were authorized to be in the country, and could attempt to use the SSN to claim a credit. The statutes for the EITC, 2008 stimulus credit, and Making Work Pay credit do not make explicit reference to the SSN's current validity, although it appears Congress intended to restrict the credits to taxpayers with valid SSNs. Regardless, at this point in time, the IRS does not determine an individual's immigration status or whether a taxpayer with a facially valid SSN has overstayed his or her visa. The extent to which residents of the United States who are not U.S. citizens should be eligible for federally funded public aid has been a contentious issue since the 1990s. Title IV of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996 ( P.L. 104-193 ) established comprehensive restrictions on the eligibility of all noncitizens for means-tested public assistance, with exceptions for legal permanent residents (LPRs) with a substantial U.S. work history or military connection. The 1996 welfare law divided noncitizens into two general categories for purposes of benefit eligibility. The least restrictive category is that of qualified aliens , legal permanent residents, refugees, aliens paroled into the United States for at least one year, and aliens granted asylum or related relief. The 1996 immigration law added certain abused spouses and children as another class, and P.L. 105-33 added Cuban-Haitian entrants. The other, more restrictive, category is that of non-qualified aliens . It consists of other noncitizens, including unauthorized aliens, nonimmigrants (i.e., aliens admitted for a temporary purpose, such as education or employment), short-term parolees, asylum applicants, and various classes of aliens granted temporary permission to remain. Regarding unauthorized aliens in particular, Section 401 of PRWORA barred them from any federal public benefit except the emergency services and programs expressly listed in Section 401(b). This overarching bar to unauthorized aliens hinges on how broadly the phrase "federal public benefit" is construed. The law defines this phrase to be (A) any grant, contract, loan, professional license, or commercial license provided by an agency of the United States or by appropriated funds of the United States; and (B) any retirement, welfare, health, disability, public or assisted housing, postsecondary education, food assistance, unemployment benefit, or any other similar benefit for which payments or assistance are provided to an individual, household, or family eligibility unit by an agency of the United States or by appropriated funds of the United States. So defined, this bar covers many programs whose enabling statutes do not individually make citizenship or immigration status a criterion for participation. Thus, unauthorized aliens are statutorily barred from receiving benefits that previously were not individually restricted—Social Services Block Grants and migrant health center services, for example—unless they fall within the 1996 welfare act's limited exceptions. PRWORA also amended the IRC to impose an SSN requirement for claiming the EITC. The provision is aimed at preventing unauthorized aliens from claiming the credit by requiring EITC recipients (and spouses) to file their taxes with SSNs that are valid for employment in the United States. The question has been raised whether any of the refundable tax credits are federal public benefits under PRWORA Section 401. If so, then the argument could be made that unauthorized aliens should be ineligible to receive them, regardless of whether the Internal Revenue Code restricts their eligibility. There is no indication that the IRS considers any refundable tax credits to be subject to PRWORA Section 401. It does not appear the agency has issued any regulations, rulings, or other guidance on this issue. If the IRS were to permit unauthorized aliens to claim any refundable credit that does not include a statutory SSN requirement, as appears to be the case currently, then there is a serious question as to whether that position could be challenged in court. Judicial review of such interpretation would be possible only if challenged by a person with sufficient standing. So long as no taxpayer is denied a credit, it seems unlikely anyone would have standing to sue since it appears doubtful that anyone would be personally injured (a necessary prerequisite for standing) by the IRS's decision to allow the credit. Further, taxpayers generally do not have standing to bring suit by alleging that they, as taxpayers, were harmed by the government's payment of funds from the public fisc in violation of law. Therefore, if the IRS does not interpret Section 401 to apply to refundable tax credits, it is unlikely that this interpretation could be challenged in court. If, however, the IRS were to deny a refundable tax credit to an unauthorized alien due to PRWORA Section 401, then that individual would theoretically have standing to challenge the denial in court. Assuming an unauthorized alien were willing to challenge the denial, a key question would likely be whether the IRS took such a position through a regulation promulgated through notice-and-comment rulemaking or by some other method (e.g., through issuance of a revenue ruling or internal agency memorandum). This is important because courts grant varying levels of deference to agency interpretations of statutes when examining questions such as whether an agency's rulemaking is in excess of its delegated statutory authority or whether the agency interpreted a statute correctly when promulgating a rule. When a statute is open to differing interpretations, as some may argue is the case with PRWORA Section 401 (as discussed below), the level of deference given to the agency's interpretation often plays a pivotal role in determining whether a reviewing court upholds it. The highest level of deference that a court may afford to an agency interpretation is known as Chevron deference, after the case in which the Supreme Court first articulated the standard. It applies when an agency's interpretation is the product of a formal agency process, such as notice-and-comment rulemaking, through which Congress has authorized the agency "to speak with the force of law." A court conducting a Chevron analysis first looks at whether Congress has "directly spoken to the precise question at issue." If the court determines that Congress has done so, then that is the end of the matter because the "law must be given effect." But if the statute does not directly address the issue, then "the court does not simply impose its own construction of the statute," but rather determines whether the agency interpretation is a permissible construction of the statute. If so, the court will generally defer to the agency's position, regardless of whether "it is the only possible interpretation or even the one a court might think best." A court would likely give a lower level of deference to an IRS interpretation of PRWORA's applicability to refundable tax credits if done through some other means, such as issuance of a revenue ruling or other guidance. Courts generally give a lower level of deference to less formal agency interpretations, largely because they are typically not subject to a notice-and-comment period. The level of deference given agency interpretations such as revenue rulings varies, depending on such things as "the degree of the agency's care, its consistency, formality, and relative expertness, and … the persuasiveness of [its] position." Looking at these factors, revenue rulings, which are official interpretations of the tax law by the IRS, are generally provided some deference. However, a court that found a ruling's reasoning unpersuasive would not be bound by it. An IRS position expressed in other types of documents might receive even less deference. A court faced with the issue of whether refundable tax credits are federal public benefits under PRWORA Section 401 would likely begin by examining the statutory language at issue. The Supreme Court often recites the "plain meaning rule," that, if the language of the statute is clear, there is no need to look outside the statute to its legislative history in order to ascertain the statute's meaning. Generally, statutory text is the ending point as well as the starting point for interpretation. Looking at the statutory language of Section 401, the definition of "federal public benefit" lists several types of payments or benefits (e.g., grants, contracts, and loans), but does not expressly include any refundable tax credits or other tax benefits. Thus, the question here seems to be whether refundable tax credits are included in any of the items expressly listed—specifically, whether they would be considered to be a "grant" provided by a federal agency under Section 401(c)(1)(A) or a "benefit" that is "provided to an individual, household, or family eligibility unit" by a federal agency under Section 401(c)(1)(B). When the meaning of specific statutory language is at issue, courts often need to consider the meaning of particular words or phrases. If the word or phrase is defined in the statute or elsewhere in the U.S. Code, then that definition governs if applicable in the context used. If not, courts typically look to see if the term has an accepted meaning in the area of law addressed by the statute, was borrowed from another statute where it had an accepted meaning, or had an accepted and specialized meaning at common law. In each of these situations, the accepted meaning governs and the word or phrase is considered a technical term or "term of art." Here, there appears to be no statutory definition applicable to the law's use of "grant" described in Section 401(c)(1)(A) or "benefit" described in Section 401(c)(1)(B). None of the key terms are defined in PRWORA, and they do not appear to be terms of art. Furthermore, while language similar to Section 401 is found in several other statutes, it does not appear any court has examined whether those statutes apply to refundable tax credits. Under the principles of statutory interpretation, words and phrases that are not terms of art or defined by statute are customarily given their ordinary meanings, often derived from the dictionary. Assuming that a court does not find "grant" or "benefit" to be terms of art, the court may be inclined to give them their ordinary and customary definitions. The Oxford Dictionaries, for example, define the term "grant" as "a sum of money given by an organization, especially a government, for a particular purpose." The language used in Section 401(c)(1)(B) is similarly defined (e.g., the Oxford Dictionaries define "benefit" as "a payment made by the state or an insurance scheme to someone entitled to receive it" and "assistance" as "the provision of money, resources, or information to help someone"). Looking at these definitions, it seems likely a court would find that at least some of the refundable tax credits would not be treated as federal public benefits. To the extent that the definitions of the key terms in PRWORA Section 401 evoke the concept of the government providing some type of assistance, it seems unlikely they would be interpreted to include the refundable credits in IRC Sections 31, 33, 34, and 37. This is because the taxpayers claiming these credits have essentially paid more tax than required, and the credits are merely the means by which the government gives the taxpayer his or her money back. Thus, they seem fundamentally different from the types of payments or benefits listed in Section 401, and it seems unlikely they would be treated as "grants" or "benefits." Furthermore, the government's refusal to pay over the refunds might be challenged as a violation of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which could also influence a court's reading of Section 401 since courts generally try to interpret statutes to avoid constitutional issues. For the other refundable tax credits, it might be argued that their refundable nature could justify their falling within the plain language meaning of "grant" or "benefit." In such case, it seems that a court, having concluded that a refundable credit is a "grant" under Section 401(c)(1)(A), could then determine that the provision's other criteria are met (i.e., that the payment was "provided by" a federal agency since it came from the Treasury Department). Similarly, a court concluding that a refundable credit is a "benefit" under Section 401(c)(1)(B) might find that the provision's other criteria are met, including that it be "provided to an individual, household, or family eligibility unit by" a federal agency. Furthermore, it seems possible that a court could find that at least some refundable credits could be classified as a type of listed benefit (e.g., welfare, health, or postsecondary education). A court might find support for such a conclusion in case law where courts have looked at whether refundable tax credits are welfare-type benefits for purposes of other laws. For example, some courts have found the EITC to be public assistance for purposes of state law because of its refundable nature and purpose of assisting low-income families. However, other courts have held that the child tax credit is not such a benefit since, unlike the EITC, it is not limited to assisting low-income families. As these cases illustrate, a court might not reach the same conclusion with respect to each credit, finding that some would meet the criteria while others would not. On the other hand, it is possible a court could determine that no refundable tax credits are federal public benefits under Section 401 based on the fact that the provision does not explicitly include refundable tax credits, and, as discussed below, there is no clear evidence in the legislative history that Congress intended such credits to be treated as federal public benefits. This could lead a court to conclude that Congress did not include them in the list of named federal public benefits because it understood them to be excluded (i.e., that the express inclusion of specific types of benefits or payments on the list means Congress intended to exclude anything not listed). Furthermore, one could argue that refundable tax credits are not federal public benefits because tax benefits are not traditionally thought of as the types of "grants" or qualifying "benefits" referred to in Section 401. Additional support for the argument that the credits are not federal public benefits could be found in PRWORA Section 432(a), which directs the Attorney General to consult with the Secretary of Health and Human Services when promulgating regulations for verifying the immigration status of applicants for federal benefits. Because the section does not require consultation with the Treasury Department, it could be evidence that Congress did not intend any tax provisions to be considered federal public benefits. Finally, additional support might be found in other congressional action, specifically the fact that Congress included in PRWORA an SSN requirement for the ETIC and subsequently enacted legislation to impose an SSN requirement for the 2008 stimulus credit and Making Work Pay credit. It might be argued that these actions would be unnecessary had Congress believed that the PRWORA Section 401 applied to refundable tax credits. To the extent that a court reaches the conclusion that any refundable tax credits are not federal public benefits under PRWORA Section 401, then it would appear that unauthorized aliens would be able to claim such credits absent a provision in the Internal Revenue Code explicitly requiring an SSN or disallowing the credit to those individuals (e.g., the IRC expressly disallows some credits to nonresident aliens). In light of the statutory silence, it is possible, although not guaranteed, that a court might look to the provision's legislative history for evidence of congressional intent. PRWORA's legislative history does not clarify whether refundable credits are federal public benefits. The report language describing the law as it existed prior to PRWORA refers to one refundable credit—the EITC: Current law limits alien eligibility for most major Federal assistance programs, including restrictions on, among other programs, Supplemental Security Income, Aid to Families with Dependent Children, housing assistance, and Food Stamps programs. Current law is silent on alienage under, among other programs, school lunch and nutrition, the Special Supplemental Food Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC), Head Start, migrant health centers, and the earned income credit [emphasis added]. This statement shows that Congress was aware of the EITC's existence, but does not offer solid evidence of congressional intent to treat it as a federal public benefit, particularly since the statute has been interpreted not to include some of the other programs listed (e.g., Head Start) as benefits under Section 401. It does not appear that there are any other references to the EITC in the legislative history of Section 401. Section 451 of PRWORA intends to disallow the credit to unauthorized resident aliens by amending the IRC to require that EITC claimants provide the SSNs of themselves, their spouse (if filing a joint return), and qualifying children. Thus, Section 451 explicitly addresses the issue seemingly raised by the above report language concerning the eligibility of unauthorized aliens to claim the EITC. This is arguably not responsive to the question of whether the EITC is a federal public benefit under Section 401. On the one hand, it may be unclear why Congress would have felt the need to include Section 451 if Section 401 had already precluded receipt of the EITC by unauthorized aliens. On the other hand, it is possible to interpret Section 451 as an enforcement mechanism—that is, Congress intended for Section 401 to cover the EITC and enacted Section 451 as a way to prevent unauthorized aliens from claiming the credit. The legislative history is silent on this matter. In light of the legislative history's silence, it is uncertain the extent to which a court would find the history to be useful in addressing the issue at hand. This might be especially true in light of the modern view of statutory interpretation that focuses on the language of the statute itself, which would appear to marginalize whatever insight legislative history or other extrinsic aids might provide. Thus, a court might be hesitant to place any significance on the statute's minimal and ambiguous legislative history, particularly since it does not clearly evidence congressional intent one way or the other. In conclusion, until the IRS or a court addresses this issue, it is not possible to say whether any refundable tax credits are federal public benefits under PRWORA Section 401. Thus, at this time, the only clear restriction on the ability of unauthorized resident aliens to claim any refundable credits is the one provided in the IRC for the EITC since it includes a SSN requirement (the now-expired Making Work Pay and 2008 stimulus credits contained a similar requirement). Unauthorized nonresident aliens, meanwhile, are also expressly prohibited in the IRC from claiming those three credits, as well as several others (e.g., the American opportunity tax credit). If there are concerns with the implementation of current law, there are a variety of policy options that could address them. These options could range from clarifying that unauthorized aliens are permitted to claim refundable tax credits to enacting a categorical bar preventing unauthorized aliens from obtaining refundable tax credits. Potential policy options include the following: Amending the IRC to require SSNs of all filers claiming refundable tax credits. A related option would be to amend the IRC to require SSNs of all filers claiming tax credits, not just those that are refundable. This may be particularly relevant to tax credits, like the child tax credit and the American Opportunity Tax Credit, that have both refundable and non-refundable components. In either case, the scope of the SSN requirement (i.e., who would be required to provide the SSN—the taxpayer, the spouse if married filing jointly, and/or the qualifying dependents, if applicable) could impact the ability of some families—especially mixed status families where certain members have SSNs and others do not—to claim the credits. Amending the IRC to absolutely bar unauthorized aliens from claiming refundable credits (similar to the existing IRC provisions that deny eligibility for certain refundable tax credits to nonresident aliens). Amending the IRC to enable mixed immigration status families to obtain a partial amount of refundable tax credits for those members of the filing household who are legally authorized to reside and work in the United States. For example, the value of the credit could be prorated for the proportion of taxpayers who meet the specified criteria (e.g., if three of the four individuals claimed on a tax return have SSNs, the taxpayers would be eligible for 75% of the total value of the credit). Amending Section 401 of PRWORA to clarify that refundable tax credits are not "federal public benefits" and therefore the only bar to unauthorized aliens claiming such credits would be those found in the IRC. Amending Section 401 of PRWORA to expressly include refundable tax credits among the listed "federal public benefits" so that unauthorized aliens would be ineligible to claim the credits even if the IRC were silent on the matter. Authorizing and appropriating funds to the IRS and DHS to facilitate the cross-checking of data on immigration status and tax returns to identify unauthorized aliens claiming credits for which they may not be eligible. When considering these policy options, it should be noted that the existing refundable tax credits are not monolithic and serve different purposes. There may be policy or other reasons to distinguish among them with respect to the eligibility of unauthorized aliens to claim them. In particular, the refundable credits which are effectively refunds of overpayment of taxes would probably have to be treated differently than the others since denying them could raise constitutional concerns. Appendix A. Overview of Selected Refundable Tax Credits Appendix B. Classes of Noncitizens and Their Eligibility to Obtain Social Security Numbers and to Qualify as a Resident Alien Appendix C. Selected Categories of Nonimmigrants Who Are Permitted to Work There are categories of foreign nationals who are not LPRs but who may be working and residing in the United States for periods of time sufficient to qualify under the Internal Revenue Code's "substantial presence" test (and thus are classified for tax purposes as resident aliens , unless there are specific treaty agreements between the United States and their country of citizenship). The classes of nonimmigrants who are expressly permitted to work in the United States include the following: E treaty traders and investors; H temporary workers; NAFTA temporary workers; Certain F foreign students who have obtained permission; J and Q cultural exchange visitors; L intracompany transfers; K fiancés of U.S. citizens; O and P extraordinary athletes, entertainers, and performers; R religious workers; T trafficking victims; U crime victims; and V family members waiting for more than three years. Spouses and minor children of the qualifying nonimmigrant may accompany the alien on a related visa, but in most instances are not given permission to work. Appendix D. Social Security Numbers (SSNs) Issued to Noncitizens As Figure D -1 shows, in FY2011 there were 1.3 million original SSNs issued to noncitizens. The total number of original SSNs issued to noncitizens peaked at 1.8 million in FY1996. In the previous decade, the number of SSNs issued to noncitizens ranged from a peak of 1.5 million in FY2001 to a low of slightly less than 1.2 million in FY2005. Over time, there has been a substantial change in composition of the noncitizen population receiving SSNs. For example, in FY1992, SSA issued SSNs to 200,136 aliens who had permanent work authorization (e.g., LPRs) comprising 12% of the total number of SSNs issued to noncitizens. In FY2011, there were 619,577 aliens with permanent work authorization who received SSNs, which accounted for 49% of all SSNs issued to noncitizens. In addition, as discussed previously, in FY1996 and FY2001, SSA tightened the rules under which aliens could obtain nonwork SSNs. Corresponding with these changes, large declines in the number of nonwork SSNs issued can be seen between FY1996 and FY1997 (325,629 to 141,472), and between FY2001 and FY2002 (72,224 to 25,169). In FY2011, SSA issued 28,622 nonwork SSNs.

Output: In 2011, the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) reported that individuals who were not authorized to work in the United States received $4.2 billion by claiming the refundable portion of the child tax credit—the additional child tax credit (ACTC). The ACTC is available to working families with children under age 17. The report sparked considerable concern that unauthorized aliens were obtaining refundable tax credits. The TIGTA audit was based upon an analysis of tax returns filed by persons with Individual Taxpayer Identification Numbers (ITINs). The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issues ITINs to individuals who are required to have a taxpayer identification number for tax purposes but are not eligible to obtain a Social Security number (SSN) because they are not authorized to work in the United States. All aliens, including those who are in the country illegally, are generally subject to federal taxes under the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), and even income illegally obtained is subject to taxation. A refundable tax credit is one where the taxpayer may receive a payment from the IRS that exceeds his or her tax liability. Examples include the earned income tax credit (EITC), the additional child tax credit, the American opportunity tax credit, and the health coverage tax credit. While the EITC requires SSNs of all recipients, the other existing credits, including the ACTC, do not. Similarly, several now-expired credits included an SSN requirement, while others did not. Apart from any SSN requirement, the IRC also expressly prohibits nonresident aliens from claiming some refundable credits. In addition to the specific provisions of the IRC, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996 (P.L. 104-193) bars unauthorized aliens from any federal public benefit except certain emergency services and programs. So defined, this bar covers many programs whose enabling statutes do not individually make citizenship or immigration status a criterion for participation. The legal question arises as to whether any refundable tax credits are federal public benefits, which under PRWORA unauthorized aliens should be barred from receiving. There is no indication that the IRS considers any refundable tax credits to be subject to PRWORA Section 401. Looking to the statutory text, it is arguably unclear whether refundable credits should be treated as federal public benefits, although there is a strong argument that at least some should not (e.g., the credit for taxes withheld). It does not appear that any court has examined this issue or that the IRS has issued guidance on it. The EITC and ACTC are the largest refundable tax credits—in 2009 taxpayers claimed $53.0 billion and $27.5 billion of each credit, respectively—and primarily benefit working families with children. Estimates derived from the March Supplement of the U.S. Census Bureau's Current Population Survey (CPS) indicate that the unauthorized resident alien population was 11.2 million in 2010. The Pew Hispanic Center reported that two-thirds of the unauthorized resident alien population have resided in the United States for 10 or more years. The report also found that the proportion of unauthorized aliens who have been in the country at least 15 years has more than doubled since 2000. Pew researchers have also found that unauthorized aliens tend to be younger than the U.S. population overall and more likely to be in the child-bearing and child-rearing years. As a consequence, an estimated 46% of unauthorized adults are parents of minor children.


Input: T he National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was created in 1958 by the National Aeronautics and Space Act (P.L. 85-568) to conduct civilian space and aeronautics activities. It has four mission directorates. The Science Mission Directorate manages robotic science missions, such as the Hubble Space Telescope, the Mars rover Curiosity, and satellites for Earth science research. The Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate conducts research and development on aircraft and aviation systems. The Space Technology Mission Directorate develops new technologies for use in future space missions, such as advanced propulsion and laser communications. The Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate is responsible for human spaceflight activities, including the International Space Station and development efforts for future crewed spacecraft. In addition, NASA's Office of Education manages formal and informal education programs for school children, college and university students, and the general public. While Congress is generally supportive of most NASA programs, government-wide fiscal constraints make funding decisions challenging. This report presents an overview and selected highlights of NASA's proposed FY2017 budget and the FY2017 appropriations legislation reported by the House Committee on Appropriations ( H.R. 5393 , H.Rept. 114-605 ) and the Senate Committee on Appropriations ( S. 2837 , S.Rept. 114-239 ). Pending final action on FY2017 appropriations for NASA, the Further Continuing and Security Assistance Appropriations Act, 2017 ( P.L. 114-254 ) provides continuing appropriations at 99.8% of the FY2016 level through April 28, 2017. This report will be updated as Congress takes additional action on FY2017 appropriations legislation. The Administration has requested $19.025 billion for NASA in FY2017. This amount is 1.3% less than the FY2016 appropriation of $19.285 billion. The House bill would provide $19.508 billion. The Senate bill would provide $19.306 billion. See Table 1 . Unusually, the FY2017 request includes $763 million in mandatory funds. The Administration explains this as follows: The President believes that arbitrary funding caps are harmful to the economy and the Nation. Although the recent Bipartisan Budget Act provided important relief from sequester cuts, the constrained top line for discretionary funding, especially in FY 2017, has made it difficult to appropriately fund important national priorities, including research and development. In the FY 2017 Budget, the President proposes fully-paid-for one-year mandatory funding to accelerate progress in Science, Aeronautics, Space Technology, and Exploration, as well as additional multi-year mandatory funding for Aeronautics to support research and development for low carbon emission aircraft, including associated transportation systems, as part of a multi-agency effort to enable a 21 st century clean transportation system. Typically, NASA receives no more than a few million dollars per year of mandatory funding. In FY2015, for example, it received $2 million for Space Operations from the Spectrum Reallocation Fund and $1 million from the Science, Space, and Technology Education Trust Fund. The discretionary portion of the FY2017 request, $18.262 billion, would be 5.3% less than the FY2016 appropriation. The House and Senate bills include no mandatory funding. There is no authorized level for NASA appropriations in FY2017. The most recent authorization act (the NASA Authorization Act of 2010, P.L. 111-267 ) authorized appropriations through FY2013. The NASA Authorization Act for 2016 and 2017 ( H.R. 2039 , ordered reported by the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology in April 2015, but not yet reported) the NASA Transition Authorization Act of 2016 ( S. 3346 , passed by the Senate on December 10, 2016), and the NASA Transition Authorization Act of 2016 ( H.R. 6531 , introduced December 20, 2016) include proposed authorization amounts for FY2017. The FY2017 request for the Science Mission Directorate is $5.601 billion, an increase of 0.2% from FY2016. Within this total, funding for Earth Science, Astrophysics, and Heliophysics would increase, while funding for Planetary Science and the James Webb Space Telescope would decrease. As shown in Table 1 , the House bill would provide $4 million less than the request, while the Senate bill would provide $206 million less. Relative to the request, the House bill would shift more than $300 million from Earth Science to Planetary Science. In contrast, most of the Senate bill's decrease would be in Planetary Science. Within Earth Science, the request includes $131 million (up from $100 million in FY2016) for the Landsat-9 land imaging satellite. Launch is anticipated "as early as" 2021. NASA previously proposed the Thermal Infrared Free Flyer, a lower-cost satellite intended to reduce the risk of a gap in data availability prior to the launch of Landsat-9. Congress rejected funding for the Thermal Infrared Free Flyer in the FY2016 appropriations cycle, and the mission is not included in the FY2017 request. The House report directs NASA to prioritize funds for Landsat-9 and to evaluate commercially available data in the event of a data gap in the Landsat program. The Senate report recommends the requested amount for Landsat-9 and directs NASA to provide a plan detailing the technical and schedule progress needed for a 2020 launch date. Within Planetary Science, the request includes $50 million (down from $175 million in FY2016) for a mission to Jupiter's moon Europa. Although a mission to Europa was a high priority of the 2011 National Research Council (NRC) decadal survey of planetary science, the NRC expressed reservations about its anticipated cost. For several years, Congress has appropriated more for formulation of a Europa mission than NASA has requested. As directed by the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, NASA's FY2017 congressional budget justification includes a five-year estimate of the funding required assuming a 2022 launch (see Table 2 ). The justification states that "the notional outyear profile in the Budget may support a launch as early as the late 2020s, assuming the mission concept and scope remain stable.... Acceleration of the launch to 2022 is not recommended, given potential impacts to the rest of the Science portfolio." The House report recommends at least $260 million for Europa orbiter and lander missions, with the orbiter launch no later than 2022 and the lander launch no later than 2024. The Senate report calls for "an expeditious launch and reduced travel time" in order to maximize the scientific return of a Europa mission, but it does not specify a funding level or a launch date. It directs NASA to provide a report on options for the mission "to assist the Committee in evaluating potential mission configurations." The FY2017 request for the Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate is $790 million, an increase of 23.5% from FY2016. The request includes New Aviation Horizons (NAH), a new initiative of experimental aircraft and systems demonstrations. NAH projects on subsonic aircraft would receive $100 million in mandatory funding from the President's proposed 21 st Century Clean Transportation Plan. An additional $56 million in mandatory funding would fund a low-boom supersonic flight demonstrator. As shown in Table 1 , the House bill would provide $78 million less than the request for Aeronautics, while the Senate bill would provide $189 million less. The House committee's recommendation includes $61 million (of discretionary funds) for a low-boom flight demonstrator. The House and Senate committee reports both direct NASA to work with the Federal Aviation Administration on research related to the integration of unmanned aerial systems in the National Airspace System. The FY2017 request for the Space Technology Mission Directorate is $827 million, an increase of 20.4% from FY2016. Space Technology was first established as a separate account in FY2011. Each year since then, the Administration has proposed to increase Space Technology funding. Congress has provided increases each year except FY2014, but always less than the Administration's request. Proposed mandatory funding of $136 million would account for almost all of the requested increase in FY2017. The bulk of the mandatory funding would support technology demonstration missions, including the Restore-L satellite servicing mission for which Congress appropriated $133 million in FY2016. As shown in Table 1 , the House bill would provide $88 million less than the request for Space Technology, but more than the FY2016 appropriation, while the Senate bill would provide the FY2016 amount. The Senate committee report recommends $130 million for Restore-L. The House and Senate committee reports both identify nuclear propulsion research and a small launch technology demonstration platform as funding priorities. The Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate (HEOMD) is funded by two appropriations accounts: Exploration and Space Operations. The FY2017 request for Exploration is $3.337 billion, a decrease of 17.2% from FY2016. The request for Space Operations is $5.076 billion, an increase of 0.9%. As shown in Table 1 , the House and Senate bills would both provide significantly more than the request for Exploration and somewhat less than the request for Space Operations. The Exploration account primarily funds development of the Orion Multipurpose Crew Vehicle and the Space Launch System (SLS) heavy-lift rocket, the capsule and launch vehicle mandated by the NASA Authorization Act of 2010 for future human exploration beyond Earth orbit. The account previously also funded development of a commercial crew transportation capability for U.S. astronaut access to the International Space Station (ISS), but Congress transferred this activity to Space Operations in FY2016. Within Exploration, the FY2017 request for Orion, the SLS, and related ground systems (known collectively as Exploration Systems Development) is $2.860 billion, a decrease of 22.3% from FY2016. The bulk of the reduction would be for SLS launch vehicle development, which would receive $1.263 billion, down 35.2% from $1.950 billion in FY2016. According to NASA, the SLS program remains on track for a first test flight carrying Orion but no crew (known as EM-1) in November 2018. The launch readiness date for the first flight of Orion and the SLS with a crew on board (known as EM-2) continues to be FY2023. The increases for Exploration in the House and Senate bills, relative to the request, would fund the SLS at the FY2016 level (in the House bill) or higher (in the Senate bill). The House and Senate reports both recommend funding for development of the SLS Exploration Upper Stage (EUS)—$250 million and $300 million, respectively—which is not included in the Administration request. The House report specifies that none of the funds in the House bill are for the Asteroid Redirect Mission, which was first proposed in the FY2014 budget and which has faced ongoing opposition in Congress. The Space Operations account primarily funds operational human spaceflight: the ISS, transportation of crew and cargo to and from the ISS, and formerly the space shuttle program. It also funds the Space and Flight Support program, which consists of launch site operations, space-to-ground communications, and other support activities. Because Congress gave limited direction about how the FY2016 appropriation for Space Operations should be allocated, it is difficult to determine how the allocation of the FY2017 request compares to FY2016. The FY2017 budget is the first to highlight Space Transportation (to and from the ISS) as a top-level item within Space Operations. In previous budgets, the cost of U.S. commercial cargo flights to the ISS and payments to Russia for Soyuz flights carrying ISS crews were subcategories within the ISS budget. Meanwhile, the program to develop a U.S. capability for commercial transportation of ISS crews was funded in the Exploration account. These functions are now combined in the request for Space Transportation. The House and Senate bills would provide $186 million less and $125 million less, respectively, than the request for Space Operations. For the most part, the committee reports do not specify how the recommended funding should be allocated. However, the Senate report does note that its total includes $1.185 billion for Commercial Crew, the same as the request. The balance of funding between Exploration Systems Development and the Commercial Crew program has been contentious. Before the FY2017 request, recent Administration budgets proposed to decrease funding for Exploration Systems Development while increasing funding for Commercial Crew. NASA argued that the amounts it requested for the Commercial Crew program were necessary to maintain the scheduled availability of commercial crew transportation to the ISS starting in 2017. It noted that without a U.S. commercial capability, it would need to pay Russia for additional Soyuz flights (although it has also stated that it will likely purchase some additional Soyuz flights in any case). Meanwhile, NASA officials stated that the schedule for the EM-1 test flight would be difficult to accelerate, even with additional funding, because it depends on technical requirements such as engineering design and manufacturing schedules and the need for adequate testing. Congressional supporters countered that the Orion and SLS programs were not receiving the funds they needed, and many saw this pattern as demonstrating a difference in human spaceflight priorities between Congress and the Administration. Congress has generally appropriated less than the Administration's request for Commercial Crew and more for Exploration Systems Development. In the FY2017 request, the Administration is again requesting a reduction for Exploration Systems Development, especially the SLS, but it appears to be requesting approximately the FY2016 amount for Commercial Crew (although the FY2016 allocation of Space Operations funds is not yet clear). The House and Senate bills would again provide more than the request for Exploration Systems Development, but the Senate bill would provide the requested amount for Commercial Crew. The House report does not specify a recommended allocation for Commercial Crew. The FY2017 request for the Office of Education is $100 million, a decrease of 13.0% from FY2016. Programs of particular congressional interest include the National Space Grant College and Fellowship Program ($24 million), the Experimental Program to Stimulate Competitive Research (EPSCoR, $9 million), and the Minority University Research Education Program (MUREP, $30 million). Note that not all NASA education activities are managed or funded by the Office of Education. For example, the request for Astrophysics in the Science Mission Directorate includes $25 million for science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education. However, recent Administration initiatives to consolidate and reorganize STEM education activities across the government (see CRS In Focus IF10229, The Changing Federal STEM Education Effort , by Heather B. Gonzalez) appear to have reduced NASA's efforts outside the Office of Education. Most notably, the previous Science Mission Directorate policy, under which 1% of all Science mission funding was allocated to education and public outreach, is no longer in effect. As shown in Table 1 , the House and Senate bills would both provide more than the request for the Office of Education: $115 million and $108 million, respectively. Within these totals, both would provide the FY2016 amounts for Space Grant ($40 million), EPSCoR ($18 million), and MUREP ($32 million). For education activities in the Science Mission Directorate, the House report recommends $37 million, while the Senate report recommends $42 million. The three remaining NASA appropriations accounts fund cross-cutting, supporting, and oversight activities. The FY2017 request for Safety, Security, and Mission Services, which funds management and operations at the NASA centers and NASA headquarters, is $2.837 billion, an increase of 2.5% from FY2016. In part, this increase reflects the transfer of funding from other accounts to support the consolidation of NASA information technology services. The request for Construction and Environmental Compliance and Remediation is $420 million, an increase of 7.9%. The request for the Office of Inspector General is $38 million, an increase of 1.9%. The House and Senate recommendations for these accounts are shown in Table 1 .

Output: The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was created in 1958 by the National Aeronautics and Space Act (P.L. 85-568) to conduct civilian space and aeronautics activities. It has four mission directorates. The Science Mission Directorate manages robotic science missions, such as the Hubble Space Telescope, the Mars rover Curiosity, and satellites for Earth science research. The Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate conducts research and development on aircraft and aviation systems. The Space Technology Mission Directorate develops technologies for use in future space missions, such as advanced propulsion and laser communications. The Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate is responsible for human spaceflight activities, including the International Space Station and development efforts for future crewed spacecraft. In addition, NASA's Office of Education manages formal and informal education programs for school children, college and university students, and the general public. While Congress is generally supportive of most NASA programs, government-wide fiscal constraints make funding decisions challenging. The Administration has requested $19.025 billion for NASA in FY2017. This amount is 1.3% less than the FY2016 appropriation of $19.285 billion. Unusually, the FY2017 request includes $763 million in mandatory funds. The House bill (H.R. 5393) would provide $19.508 billion. The Senate bill (S. 2837) would provide $19.306 billion. Neither bill includes mandatory funding. The FY2017 request for the Science Mission Directorate is $5.601 billion, an increase of 0.2% from FY2016. Within this total, funding for Earth Science, Astrophysics, and Heliophysics would increase, while funding for Planetary Science and the James Webb Space Telescope would decrease. The House bill would provide $5.597 billion for Science, while the Senate bill would provide $5.395 billion. Within these totals, the bills differ considerably in their allocation of funding between Earth Science and Planetary Science. The FY2017 request for the Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate is $790 million, an increase of 23.5% from FY2016. The request includes New Aviation Horizons (NAH), a new initiative of experimental aircraft and systems demonstrations. The House and Senate bills would provide $712 million and $601 million, respectively, for Aeronautics. The FY2017 request for the Space Technology Mission Directorate is $827 million, an increase of 20.4% from FY2016. The House and Senate bills would provide $739 million and $687 million. For the Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate, the FY2017 request for Exploration is $3.337 billion, a decrease of 17.2% from FY2016, while the request for Space Operations is $5.076 billion, an increase of 0.9%. The Exploration request includes $1.263 billion, a decrease of 35.2%, for Space Launch System launch vehicle development. Funding for the Commercial Crew program (formerly requested in Exploration) is combined with funding for operational cargo and crew transport to the International Space Station in a new Space Transportation item within Space Operations. The House bill would provide $4.183 billion for Exploration, including $2.000 billion for SLS development, and $4.890 billion for Space Operations. The Senate bill would provide $4.330 billion for Exploration, including $2.150 billion for the SLS, and $4.951 billion for Space Operations. The FY2017 request for the Office of Education is $100 million, a decrease of 13.0% from FY2016. The House and Senate bills would provide $115 million and $108 million, respectively. The request would reduce funding for the National Space Grant College and Fellowship Program, the Experimental Program to Stimulate Competitive Research, and the Minority University Research Education Program. Both bills would fund these programs at their FY2016 levels.