Input: T he Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) is a violent criminal gang operating both in the United States and abroad—namely Central America. U.S.-based members have committed both local and transnational crimes ranging from extortion, homicide, and drug distribution to human and drug trafficking. The gang has a reputation for committing particularly violent crimes, which has generated attention from law enforcement, policymakers, and the public. This report provides a brief background on MS-13 with a focus on its structure and criminal activities in the United States. It highlights U.S. law enforcement initiatives and other federal resources used to counter the gang's illicit activities. It discusses how the gang is conceptualized by the federal government and how this conceptualization may drive specific policy responses to the gang's activities. The report also provides an overview of selected domestic policy issues Congress may examine as part of its efforts to counter MS-13. MS-13 was born on the streets of Los Angeles, CA. It was formed in the 1980s by refugees who were fleeing civil conflict in El Salvador. When these Salvadoran nationals moved into the Los Angeles area, some youth coalesced to form MS-13, in part for protection from existing Latino gangs, such as the 18 th Street gang, as well as for a way to connect with other Salvadorans. By the 1990s, MS-13 had reached the East Coast, particularly Washington, DC, and Long Island, NY. Historically, MS-13 members were mostly Salvadoran nationals or first-generation Salvadoran-Americans, but the group has expanded to include other Central and South American immigrants. MS-13 has largely focused on creating an identity and community, though members do engage in activities that generate revenue for the gang. MS-13 became a transnational gang as members who were deported from the United States to Central America established gang ties there. Legislation enacted in the mid-1990s increased the number of foreign nationals subject to detention and removal from the United States. From 2001 to 2010, nearly 130,000 foreign nationals were deported to Central America because of a criminal conviction, primarily to the Northern Triangle countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. The exact number of these deportees who were gang members is unknown, as is the number of deported gang members who were affiliated with MS-13. However, some of these deportees helped to establish MS-13 gang ties in their home countries (where gangs were already present) and assisted in the spread of U.S. gang culture in Central America. In recent years, law enforcement, the media, and policymakers have shown interest in MS-13 and its violent criminal activities. High-profile incidents of violent behavior committed by gang members have raised questions about whether this reflects a developing organizational structure, increasing size, or changing criminality. In the United States, MS-13's organizational structure largely consists of loosely organized cells, or "cliques." These cliques vary in size and in the number that may exist in a particular locale, but each clique typically has ties to a particular territory. Researchers have noted that this territory serves two purposes: (1) it contributes to a clique's sense of neighborhood and community, and serves as a place where they can recruit, and (2) it is an area where the gang generates money from illicit activities such as extortion or charging "rent" on local businesses. In some areas of the country, MS-13 cliques are more organized, and several operate as part of a larger "program." In some instances, in "places where the MS13 is very organized, such as Los Angeles and El Salvador," there may be an additional organizational layer where programs answer to a ruling council. Generally, the U.S. MS-13 structure of relatively diffuse cliques differs from the gang's more organized structure in El Salvador. Some have suggested that MS-13 may try to consolidate its power structure to exert more direction over the U.S. cliques; this has been attempted unsuccessfully at various times, and the extent to which such control may take hold has been debated. In some instances, leaders in El Salvador, including prison-based leaders, have tried to exert more direction over activities of U.S. programs and cliques; however, researchers have indicated that leadership in El Salvador may have little or no direction over activities of the powerful MS-13 programs and cliques in the United States. While some have suggested that the size of MS-13 has grown in the United States, since at least 2005 the FBI has consistently estimated the domestic size of the gang to be around 10,000 members. Of note, it appears that federal law enforcement may be moving away from generating regular estimates of gang membership in the United States, both in aggregate and for specific gangs. For instance, after 2009 the National Gang Threat Assessments ceased including MS-13 membership estimations. As of June 2018, the FBI had removed from its website the reference to the total estimated number of gang members in the United States. In the United States, MS-13 gang members have been involved in local crimes including extortion, drug distribution, prostitution, robbery, and murder, as well as in more transnational illicit activity such as drug trafficking and human smuggling and trafficking. While some of the illegal activities help support the gang's criminal finances, others facilitate the maintenance of territory as well as gang brand and unity. MS-13 has a reputation for particularly violent criminal activity. Some experts see this violence as serving both internal and external purposes. Internally, violence may help recruit—it serves a brand-identifying purpose—in addition to providing discipline and cohesion. Externally, it can help establish territory as well as social and political control. In recent years, this violence has been demonstrated in a reported wave of violent homicides and other criminality attributed to MS-13 in certain locales. For example, authorities have been investigating a spate of killings and other violent activities on Long Island, NY, attributed to MS-13. In May 2017 testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, the Suffolk County (NY) police commissioner estimated that since 2016, 38% of murders in the county were attributable to MS-13. In a series of five superseding indictments, federal prosecutors with the Eastern District of New York have indicted two dozen MS-13 members with crimes including at least 15 murders, as well as assaults, arson, and drug distribution. The series of indictments includes charges in the high-profile killings of teenagers Nisa Mickens and Kayla Cuevas. Illustrating a potential increase in MS-13 activity in the Washington, DC, metro area, some suburban jurisdictions have seen an increase in the number of MS-13 members in their county jails. As of February 2018, the Montgomery County, MD, jail reported a 20% increase in the MS-13 population over the previous year. During that same time, the number of MS-13 members in jail increased by 32% in the Prince William County, VA, jail and doubled in the Fairfax County, VA, jail. Countering gang crime is generally the purview of state and local law enforcement. However, given that gang activity is not constrained by jurisdictional boundaries, and that local law enforcement agencies may not have the capacity to investigate complex gang crimes, federal law enforcement has had a long-standing interest in contending with gangs, including MS-13. There is no single federal agency charged with investigating crimes committed by gangs, and federal resources for confronting this threat are allocated across several departments and agencies including the FBI, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF), and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), among others. As the FBI and ICE are often seen as having leading roles in federal gang enforcement efforts, this section largely focuses on their activities. Within the Department of Justice (DOJ), the FBI is charged with investigating violent gangs and runs a number of anti-gang initiatives. One of the primary tools the FBI uses to counter the gang threat is Violent Gang Safe Streets Task Forces, which focus on countering violent gangs and violent crimes. The FBI established the Safe Streets Violent Crime Initiative in 1992 and, through this program, administers Violent Gang Safe Streets Task Forces across the United States. These gang task forces include federal, state, and local law enforcement officers that investigate crimes ranging from racketeering to drug conspiracy and firearms violations. In addition to domestic law enforcement initiatives to counter violent gangs such as MS-13, the FBI has transnational policing partnerships. In 2004, the FBI launched an MS-13 National Gang Task Force (NGTF) to coordinate federal, state, and local investigations of MS-13. This has since evolved into the Transnational Anti-Gang Task Force (TAG) initiative that targets transnational gang threats—with a current focus on MS-13 and the 18 th Street gang. The FBI has established TAG task forces, comprised of FBI agents and vetted local officers, in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. In addition to being operational task forces, these TAGs facilitate intelligence and information sharing. The TAG initiative also includes the Central American Law Enforcement Exchange (CALEE) program, which helps train local law enforcement in the United States and Central America on gang-related issues and techniques for countering the gang threats. Work of the TAG units can be seen in a number of investigations. For example, in September 2017, through Operation Regional Shield, over 3,800 gang members—from MS-13 and the 18 th Street gang—in the United States, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras were charged with crimes including murder, arson, racketeering, and conspiracy to distribute marijuana; the FBI's TAG units were involved with the investigations in Central America. In the United States, over 70 individuals were charged, including 17 MS-13 members who were alleged to have committed murder and other crimes on Long Island, NY. The FBI, through the direction of Congress, established the National Gang Intelligence Center (NGIC) in 2005. The NGIC was established to coordinate intelligence information from federal, state, and local policing agencies. It supports law enforcement investigations by providing strategic and tactical analysis of intelligence. Agencies contributing to the NGIC share gang information and resources to identify and respond to the greatest gang threats. Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), ICE Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) has a National Gang Unit (NGU) that works to deter and disrupt domestic gang operations—specifically those of transnational criminal gangs, prison gangs, and outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMGs). The NGU also "identifies and develops intelligence on gang membership, associations, activities, and international networks." One ongoing HSI gang initiative is known as Operation Community Shield, which ICE launched in 2005 to disrupt and dismantle transnational criminal gangs. ICE HSI reports that in FY2017 it arrested 796 MS-13 gang members and associates (up from 434 in FY2016) through this program. To put these 796 MS-13 arrests in the context of other gang-related arrests, during the same time, "HSI made 4,818 criminal arrests related to gang activity and 892 administrative arrests as a result of gang investigations. Additionally, [ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations] administratively arrested 5,225 gang members and associates" in FY2017. Operation Community Shield has included a number of operations that specifically target MS-13. Through Operation Raging Bull, ICE and its domestic and international law enforcement partners arrested 267 MS-13 members and associates from September through November 2017. Of the 267 arrests, 214 were in the United States; of those, 93 suspects were arrested for criminal violations—such as murder, robbery, and drug possession and trafficking—and 121 were arrested for administrative immigration violations (e.g., unlawful presence). Elsewhere, federal law enforcement initiatives that are generally not focused on countering gangs could potentially be leveraged to address certain gang threats, such as those posed by MS-13. For instance, led by the DEA, the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) program targets major drug trafficking, money laundering, and transnational criminal organizations. Attorney General Sessions has directed the OCDETF program to make countering MS-13 a priority. However, some have suggested that investigating MS-13 may not truly be an OCDETF priority because the gang is more involved in small-scale drug distribution rather than the larger distribution that is traditionally the target of OCDETF investigations. One challenge in determining the appropriate policy responses to tackle threats posed by MS-13 is developing a clear conceptualization of the gang. There is a range of law enforcement tools and other resources that the federal government could leverage to counter the illicit activities of MS-13. Having a clear conceptualization of MS-13 may help to determine the most appropriate and effective tools and resources to counter their criminal activity. Researchers and authorities have primarily described MS-13 as either a criminal street gang or a transnational criminal organization (TCO); however, policy discussions of the gang often blur these lines. The federal government has offered descriptions of gangs and transnational criminal organizations that may help facilitate both the conceptualization of MS-13 and policy responses to the gang's criminality. These concepts are working definitions to describe criminal phenomena that sometimes overlap in structure, motivation, and criminality. DOJ describes a gang as (1) an association of three or more individuals; (2) whose members collectively identify themselves by adopting a group identity which they use to create an atmosphere of fear or intimidation frequently by employing one or more of the following: a common name, slogan, identifying sign, symbol, tattoo or other physical marking, style or color of clothing, hairstyle, hand sign or graffiti; (3) the association's purpose, in part, is to engage in criminal activity and the association uses violence or intimidation to further its criminal objectives; (4) its members engage in criminal activity, or acts of juvenile delinquency that if committed by an adult would be crimes; (5) with the intent to enhance or preserve the association's power, reputation, or economic resources; (6) the association may also possess some of the following characteristics: (a) the members employ rules for joining and operating within the association; (b) the members meet on a recurring basis; (c) the association provides physical protection of its members from other criminals and gangs; (d) the association seeks to exercise control over a particular location or region, or it may simply defend its perceived interests against rivals; or (e) the association has an identifiable structure; (7) this definition is not intended to include traditional organized crime groups such as La Cosa Nostra, groups that fall within the Department's definition of "international organized crime," drug trafficking organizations or terrorist organizations. DOJ has described MS-13 as an example of a prominent criminal street gang operating in the United States. In addition to DOJ's definition of a gang, 18 U.S.C. §521 defines a "criminal street gang" as an ongoing group, club, organization, or association of 5 or more persons" with three elements: One of its primary purposes is committing crimes including (1) a federal felony involving a controlled substance for which the penalty is at least five years imprisonment, (2) a violent federal felony that uses or attempts to use force, or (3) a conspiracy to commit one of these felonies. In the past five years, its members have engaged in a continuing series of these felony crimes. Its activities affect interstate or foreign commerce. In July 2011, the Obama Administration released the Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Addressing Converging Threats to National Security (strategy) . The strategy provides the federal government's first broad conceptualization of transnational organized crime (TOC), highlighting it as a national security concern. It notes the following: Transnational organized crime refers to those self-perpetuating associations of individuals who operate transnationally for the purpose of obtaining power, influence, monetary and/or commercial gains, wholly or in part by illegal means, while protecting their activities through a pattern of corruption and/or violence, or while protecting their illegal activities through a transnational organizational structure and the exploitation of transnational commerce or communication mechanisms. There is no single structure under which transnational organized criminals operate; they vary from hierarchies to clans, networks, and cells, and may evolve to other structures. The crimes they commit also vary. Transnational organized criminals act conspiratorially in their criminal activities and possess certain characteristics which may include, but are not limited to: In at least part of their activities they commit violence or other acts which are likely to intimidate, or make actual or implicit threats to do so; They exploit differences between countries to further their objectives, enriching their organization, expanding its power, and/or avoiding detection/apprehension; They attempt to gain influence in government, politics, and commerce through corrupt as well as legitimate means; They have economic gain as their primary goal, not only from patently illegal activities but also from investment in legitimate businesses; and They attempt to insulate both their leadership and membership from detection, sanction, and/or prosecution through their organizational structure. The strategy noted that TOC networks include transnational gangs. Pursuant to Executive Order 13581, which accompanied the 2011 strategy, the Department of the Treasury can sanction listed transnational criminal organizations. In 2012, the Treasury Department designated MS-13 as a significant transnational criminal organization, noting the gang's "involvement in serious transnational criminal activities, including drug trafficking, kidnapping, human smuggling, sex trafficking, murder, assassinations, racketeering, blackmail, extortion, and immigration offenses." More recently, Executive Order 13773, issued in February 2017, directed federal law enforcement to strengthen efforts to combat transnational criminal organizations, including criminal gangs. This indicates that federal enforcement efforts aimed at TOC may also target various forms of criminal gangs, including street gangs. Table 1 provides some highlights of these definitions of gangs and TOC. There can be overlap in the criminal activities of TCOs and gangs, which can make distinguishing the two difficult. For example, drug distribution is often a source of income for both TCOs and gangs. As noted by the DEA, "[a]lthough gangs are involved in all avenues of criminal activity, the major source of income for most street gangs remains the trafficking of illegal drugs." While TCOs are more involved in wholesale-level drug distribution, gangs are more often involved in retail-level distribution; alliances between the two facilitate product movement. MS-13 has mostly been involved in local drug peddling, and these retail-level drug sales are the "most important revenue stream for the gang." Cliques have developed relationships with transnational drug trafficking organizations to facilitate the flow of drugs within the United States. MS-13's involvement in criminal activity similar to that of TCOs—such as drug distribution—is one factor that may lead to uncertainty in conceptualizing the gang. Further blurring the lines between gangs and TCOs is the fact that both may have similar motivations. As DOJ notes, a gang's purpose is, in part, to engage in criminal activity "with the intent to enhance or preserve the association's power, reputation, or economic resources." Similarly, as the 2011 strategy notes, TCOs operate for the "purpose of obtaining power, influence, monetary and/or commercial gains" and economic gain is their primary goal. As noted, MS-13 has engaged in various forms of violent criminal behavior; however, the gang has focused more on establishing and maintaining identity, community, and turf than on generating money. These definitional issues have contributed to inconsistencies in the conceptualization of MS-13, both within the federal government and among researchers. While the gang has been officially designated by the Treasury Department as a significant transnational criminal organization, federal investigative agencies such as the FBI, DEA, and ICE vary on whether they investigate MS-13 under programs targeting violent gangs or those targeting TCOs. In addition, some researchers argue that MS-13 has evolved into a "fully functional transnational criminal organization," citing the gang's expansion into drug production and trafficking in Central America. Others disagree with this categorization. These dissents generally relate to MS-13's structure and criminal capacity. For instance, some contend that "while the group may play a peripheral role in international crimes such as drug trafficking, at its heart it remain[s] a loose-knit network of street gangs." In addition, those contending that MS-13 has not risen to the level of a TCO note that the gang has not been able to establish a consistent role in international drug distribution, in part because it has been more focused on developing identity, camaraderie, and turf than on creating profit. Given the difficulties of clearly distinguishing between gangs and TCOs with existing definitions, policymakers may question whether drawing a distinction and placing MS-13 into just one of these categories is necessary or important for developing policies and strategies to counter the gang. In some ways, it may not matter whether the federal government classifies MS-13 as a TCO, a gang, or a hybrid of the two. One argument for why it doesn't matter is that federal law enforcement often divides investigations by criminal violation rather than by actor. Being a gang member in and of itself is not a crime (nor is being a member of a TCO). However, engaging in illicit activities on behalf of or in association with a gang or TCO is a crime. As such, members of MS-13 will generally be investigated and prosecuted for crimes committed, not for affiliation. Another factor in why it may not matter whether MS-13 is consistently categorized as a gang or TCO is that, as noted, the federal government does not have definitions that clearly distinguish criminal gangs from TCOs. There are hazy lines. Categorizing MS-13 as one or the other may demand a more precise distinction between gangs and TCOs—something that may or may not be possible, necessary, or desirable. Because of the differences between each criminal organization—gang or TCO—it may be more important to understand a criminal entity rather than to label it. For instance, the NGIC notes that among the spectrum of gangs, "[u]nderstanding the specific mentality of each gang type is integral to disruption and dismantlement." While there are arguments for not strictly categorizing MS-13 as either a TCO or a criminal street gang, there are some policy-focused arguments for doing so. One such discussion involves how federal resources are oriented toward countering TCOs and gangs. Domestic resources aimed at thwarting TCOs are largely enforcement-based. However, there is a mix of enforcement and prevention resources allocated to thwarting gangs. For example, enforcement resources for domestic efforts to counter TCOs include funding for federal law enforcement agency investigation and prosecution priorities, interagency enforcement activities such as the OCDETF program, and Treasury Department efforts to implement sanctions against TCOs. Resources to counter gangs include not only federal investigations, prosecutions, and interagency enforcement activities, but include grants that support prevention and suppression activities like the violent gang and gun crime reduction program and the juvenile justice grants for gang and youth violence education, prevention, and intervention. Following from this, different conceptualizations of a gang—in this case MS-13—implicate different resources available. If officials view MS-13 as a TCO, law enforcement initiatives may be the chief means to counter MS-13. However, if MS-13 is viewed as a criminal street gang, this may open up a range of federal resources, both law enforcement and prevention resources. Defining MS-13 as a criminal street gang or a TCO may also affect federal investigations and prosecutions of gang members. For instance, 18 U.S.C. §521 provides a penalty enhancement on certain convictions if a defendant is found to be a member of a criminal street gang. There is a no similar enhancement for members of a TCO. However, authorities are not constrained by which criminal statues they can prosecute members of gangs or TCOs. In countering the danger posed by MS-13, a foundational challenge is understanding the scope of the threat. Key questions focus on whether the gang is growing in number or in territory. Debate over the number of MS-13 members in the United States raises a question about how U.S. officials determine these numbers. In the past, the NGIC has produced estimates of the number of gangs and the membership numbers. For instance, in 2011 it estimated that there were "approximately 1.4 million active street, prison, and OMG gang members comprising more than 33,000 gangs in the United States." However, since 2011 the National Gang Report has not made estimates on the number of gangs and gang members in the United States. It is unclear whether the federal government is tracking these data in another manner. In this context, some have wondered whether federal law enforcement should maintain a centralized database on gang membership/affiliation that could provide counts of gang membership across the country. A number of federal entities collect related information on gangs; however, federal agencies do not appear to maintain databases that exclusively collect information on gangs. Some databases used by the FBI and ICE, for example, contain information on gang membership, but the databases are not limited to gangs and gang membership. A few examples are discussed below. Federal Bureau of Investigation . The FBI has noted that "[t]he databases of each component agency are available to the NGIC, as are other gang-related databases, permitting centralized access to information." The FBI's website notes that the NGIC shares "timely and accurate information." However, it is unclear whether law enforcement officials from the component agencies who are assigned to the NGIC have automatic access to each agency database or what the procedures may be to access gang-related data. Policymakers may examine the merits of various forms of gang-related intelligence and information sharing—be it through a centralized database or access to various sources of information. In addition to the NGIC's information sharing efforts, law enforcement agencies may be able to obtain certain gang-related information through the FBI's National Crime Information Center (NCIC). Law enforcement agencies nationwide can query and submit information to the NCIC database, which contains 21 files—7 property files and 14 persons files. One of these files is a gang file, containing information on violent gangs and their members. In looking at gang information sharing, policymakers may have questions about how gang intelligence information is collected, the completeness of the gang file, how data may be removed from the file, how often law enforcement partners query the file, and how the information is used. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement . DHS maintains at least two databases in which gang-related information may be stored and accessed. One is the Investigative Case Management (ICM) system, which "serves as the core law enforcement case management tool primarily used by [HSI] special agents and personnel supporting the HSI mission.... Additionally, ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) personnel use ICM to manage immigration cases that are presented for criminal prosecution ... and will also use ICM to query the system for information that supports its civil immigration enforcement cases." Agents can link records and documents associated with particular cases, and ICM has a field to notate an individual's gang membership/affiliation and role within the gang. A second system is the Enforcement Integrated Database (EID), which contains "information related to the investigation, arrest, booking, detention, and removal of persons encountered during immigration and criminal law enforcement investigations and operations" primarily conducted by ICE and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). It has records created, modified, and accessed through several software applications including the EID Arrest Guide for Law Enforcement (EAGLE), used by ICE. EAGLE allows officers to process biometric and biographic information of arrested persons, and it contains specific information fields to notate an individual's gang membership and role. Policymakers may be interested in how the information in these databases may be used by ICE and other law enforcement partners. There are a number of federal enforcement initiatives, task forces, and centers to counter violent gangs such as MS-13 that are coordinated efforts. Reviews from oversight bodies such as DOJ's Office of the Inspector General (DOJ OIG) and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) have critiqued areas in which these efforts could be improved. When the NGIC was established to coordinate intelligence information from federal, state, and local policing agencies, P.L. 109-162 directed that it create a database that would "collect, analyze, and disseminate gang activity information" from participating agencies. In DOJ OIG's November 2009 review of DOJ's anti-gang intelligence and coordination centers (including NGIC), it concluded that the NGIC had not created a gang information database, as had been directed by Congress pursuant to P.L. 109-162 . It also noted that the "NGIC is perceived as predominately an FBI organization, and it has not developed the capability to effectively share gang intelligence and information with other law enforcement organizations." There has not been a subsequent report that speaks to whether these criticisms still hold true, and it is unclear whether there is a centralized database at the NGIC that contains information on gang members and associates. A July 2009 GAO report reviewed, among other things, the roles of DOJ and DHS in countering gangs—including their collaborative efforts, and the departments' assessments of these efforts. While DOJ and DHS implemented the majority of GAO's recommendations that resulted from this report, one was left outstanding. GAO recommended that DOJ "develop a department wide, strategic-level performance measure for the department's anti-gang efforts." However, DOJ informed GAO in 2014 that it ultimately could not develop such a department-wide measure because of the differences in the missions and functions of its component agencies. Policymakers may look into whether or how federal agencies such as DOJ and DHS have changed their approaches and roles in coordinated efforts to counter violent gangs such as MS-13 in response to these critiques. The relationship between transnational gangs such as MS-13 and unaccompanied alien children (UAC) arriving in the United States has received interest from researchers, policymakers, Administration officials, and the public alike. Some observers have suggested that MS-13's evolution in Central America—including challenging government legitimacy, committing crimes with impunity, and expanding into more sectors of the global criminal economy—could continue to drive unauthorized migration into the United States by those seeking to escape the gang and its violence. For instance, in 2013 the United Nations High Commission for Refugees interviewed over 400 UAC from all over the world on factors surrounding their displacement to the United States. Of the 104 UAC from El Salvador, 63% reported that they had experienced or been threatened with gang-related violence. More recently, a number of reports suggest that the increased flow of Central American families seeking asylum at and between U.S. ports of entry at the U.S.-Mexico border stems in part from gang violence. In addition, there have been concerns that MS-13 may exploit the U.S. Southwest border in order to bring gang members from Central America to the United States as UAC or may recruit some of the vulnerable UAC to join the gang's ranks once in the United States. Understanding the nuances of these potential relationships between MS-13 and UAC can be particularly challenging. For instance, CBP data indicate that in FY2017 it apprehended 310,531 individuals not lawfully present in the United States. Of those, 228 were identified as affiliated with MS-13. (This number was down from 437 MS-13 affiliated individuals apprehended in FY2014, the year in which the number of UAC apprehended at the Southwest border reached a peak.) CBP data also indicate that in FY2017 it apprehended 41,435 UAC along the U.S. Southwest border. However, publicly available CBP data do not reflect whether any of these UAC were affiliated with MS-13 at the time that they arrived in the United States. When CBP has provided data regarding UAC gang affiliation, they have only been estimates that are not based on confirmed gang membership. For instance, CBP indicated in June 2017 congressional testimony that since October 2012 there had been about 5,000 individuals apprehended with "confirmed or suspected gang affiliations" and that 159 (3%) of these were UAC. Of these 159 UAC with gang affiliations, "approximately 56 UACs were suspected or confirmed to be affiliated with MS-13." Additionally, even if an MS-13 member arrested in the United States is confirmed to have originally arrived in the country as a UAC, it may be difficult to determine whether he or she arrived as a gang member or was recruited once in the United States. Moreover, it remains unclear the extent to which immigrant youth in the United States join MS-13 on their own for a sense of community or brotherhood or whether they are coerced to join to avoid the consequences of being unaffiliated in a gang environment. In their oversight of federal efforts to counter gang activity, policymakers may be interested in exploring how officials are determining and classifying UAC gang membership and affiliation as well as how this information is tracked. As policymakers debate the best path to tackle threats posed by MS-13, a key challenge is developing a clear conceptualization of the gang, including potential changes in its organizational structure, size, and criminality. This conceptualization may help in understanding the scope of the threat and identify the resources available to counter it. Policymakers may then be poised to evaluate law enforcement's tools and techniques to gather and share gang-related information, conduct anti-gang enforcement initiatives, and respond to evolving threats posed by MS-13 and its affiliates.

Output: The Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) is a violent criminal gang operating both in the United States and abroad—namely Central America. MS-13 was formed on the streets of Los Angeles, CA, in the 1980s by refugees who were fleeing civil conflict in El Salvador. It became a transnational gang as MS-13 members who were deported from the United States to Central America helped establish gang ties and spread U.S. gang culture abroad. In the United States, MS-13's structure largely consists of loosely organized cells, or "cliques," that each control specific territory. While some have suggested that the size of MS-13 has grown in the United States, since at least 2005 law enforcement officials have consistently cited its membership to be around 10,000. Domestically, MS-13 has been involved in local crimes including extortion, drug distribution, prostitution, robbery, and murder, as well as transnational illicit activity such as drug trafficking and human smuggling and trafficking. The gang is known for its particularly violent criminality, which has been demonstrated in a reported uptick in violent homicides attributed to MS-13 in certain locales. Countering gang crime has often been the purview of state and local law enforcement. However, given that gang activity is not constrained by jurisdictional boundaries, and that local law enforcement agencies may not have the capacity to investigate complex gang crimes, federal law enforcement has had a long-standing interest in countering gangs, including MS-13. One element in determining the appropriate federal policy responses to tackle threats posed by MS-13 may be to have a clear conceptualization of the gang. Researchers and criminal justice system authorities have primarily described MS-13 as a criminal gang or a transnational criminal organization (TCO)—concepts that have some overlap in structure, motivation, and criminality. Whether MS-13 demonstrates elements that are uniquely gang or TCO may help inform the federal policy response to its illegal activities. Another challenge in countering the danger posed by MS-13 is understanding the scope of the threat. Key questions focus on the validity of existing estimates and whether the gang is growing in number or in territory. Thus, policymakers may question how officials define and determine gang membership. While there is no centralized database to track gang membership, a number of agencies maintain datasets that contain gang-related information. Policymakers may also question how this information is shared and utilized. Oversight bodies such as the Department of Justice's Office of the Inspector General (DOJ OIG) and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) have recommended means by which federal law enforcement could enhance its enforcement efforts against violent criminal gangs such as MS-13, and policymakers may take interest in whether some of these recommendations are still relevant. There is also a current debate about the relationship between gangs such as MS-13 and unaccompanied alien children (UAC) arriving in the United States. Some have suggested that MS-13's presence in Central America could continue to drive unauthorized migration into the United States by those seeking to escape the gang and its violence. There are also concerns that MS-13 may exploit the U.S. Southwest border by bringing young gang members from Central America to the United States as UAC or may recruit some of the vulnerable UAC to join the gang's ranks once in the United States. Policymakers may seek more data from officials in order to understand the nuances of these potential relationships between MS-13 and UAC.


Input: Since 2007, violence perpetrated by warring criminal groups has wreaked havoc on Mexico, partially as a result of the weakness of the justice sector institutions responsible for combating them. Ineffective and often corrupt police forces, weak and unaccountable prosecutors, and an overcrowded and disorganized prison system have undermined anticrime efforts. Recent spikes in violence and criminality have overwhelmed Mexico's justice sector institutions, with record numbers of arrests rarely resulting in convictions. On average, fewer than 20% of homicides have been successfully prosecuted with convictions, suggesting high levels of impunity. Over the last five years, Congress has devoted considerable resources—close to $2 billion—and oversight attention to supporting Mexico's efforts to address a security crisis that has been fueled in part by U.S. drug demand and illicit southbound flows of weapons and money. U.S. assistance under the Mérida Initiative has increasingly focused on supporting Mexico's efforts to reform its justice sector institutions in order to reduce corruption and impunity. Judicial reform is one part of that effort. Policy analysts contend that until Mexico's judicial system is able to prosecute and punish crime, the effects of law enforcement efforts against criminal groups will be limited. The U.S. government is providing significant support for judicial reform efforts in Mexico at a time when those reforms are at a critical juncture. Progress has moved forward in many states, but is stalled at the federal level. Without political will and investment from the new Enrique Peña Nieto Administration, both the federal government and the states may not meet the 2016 constitutional deadline for implementing judicial reforms enacted in 2008. Should the reforms move forward, the U.S. Congress may consider how best to support them. Should the reforms falter, Congress may question the value of continuing U.S. assistance for judicial reform. Mexico's traditional criminal justice system evolved during a period when Mexico experienced 70 years of one-party rule under the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and presidential power predominated over a weak Congress and judiciary. Although the 1917 Mexican Constitution contained individual guarantees (for victims and the accused) and provided for the presumption of innocence and jury trials, many of those provisions were never implemented. Mexico developed a hybrid criminal justice system containing elements of inquisitorial criminal procedures but with the public prosecutor, rather than a judge, taking a central role in overseeing investigations and in determining a suspect's guilt or innocence. Without due process guarantees and an independent judiciary, some argue that the executive branch, acting through the public prosecutor, used the courts as a means of political control (i.e., a way of punishing its opponents). Under the traditional system, prosecutors have wide latitude during the investigatory stage of a case to gather evidence however they deem appropriate that is then submitted to judges in a written dossier that is rarely challenged. Dossiers often center on the confession of the accused, with potentially coerced confessions frequently occurring , or on unverified eyewitness identifications. Judges then render their decisions behind closed doors. Although 85-90% of crimes brought to trial result in a conviction, in fact, less than 25% of crimes in Mexico are reported and, of those, only a small number are investigated and prosecuted, implying that only a small portion of the country's crimes are seriously addressed (see Figure 1 ). The likelihood of a guilty verdict is particularly high for cases involving poor people who have committed minor offenses. The Mexican criminal justice system has been widely criticized for being opaque, inefficient, and corrupt. Two of its key actors—police and public prosecutors—are viewed by 66% and 43% of Mexicans respectively as frequently engaged in corruption. The judicial system itself has long been plagued by long case backlogs, high pre-trial detention rates, and an inability to secure convictions for serious crimes (see Figure 1 ). On average, fewer than 13% of cases are resolved at the state level (where more than 90% of cases are prosecuted). During the Felipe Calderón Administration (December 2006-November 2012), Mexico extradited record numbers of criminals to the United States, but its Attorney General's Office (PGR) proved unable to convict any major leaders of Mexican drug trafficking organizations. The PGR has also been unable to secure charges in many high-profile cases involving the arrests of politicians accused of collaborating with organized crime. Dysfunction in the judicial system has resulted in overcrowded prisons, particularly at the state level, that are in significant need of reform. Increasing arrests have caused prison populations to swell, as has the use of preventive detention. (See " Provisions on Organized Crime "). Some 40% of inmates in Mexico's prisons are awaiting trials, as opposed to serving sentences. As of July 2011, prisons were at 23% over-capacity. These problems in Mexico's judicial and penal systems are not new. They have been problematic for decades, but have been exacerbated by the recent uptick in violence and criminality in the country. For example, crime victimization surveys that have typically shown that fewer than 25% of crimes are reported in Mexico, evidence of the Mexican people's lack of faith in their justice system (see Figure 1 ). Surveys from 2012 show an even lower percentage of crimes being reported—just 13%. Communities in some states where the police and judicial systems are particularly weak have begun to form armed "self-defense" groups, which many, including Mexico's National Human Rights Commission, view as a worrisome development. The push for judicial reform in Mexico began in the 1990s at the federal and state level. Reforms enacted by President Ernesto Zedillo in 1994 aimed to strengthen the power and independence of the federal judiciary vis-à-vis the other branches of government. At the state level, reformist lawyers became increasingly concerned about the lack of due process in Mexico's judicial system, particularly for poor individuals who lacked access to legal counsel. The movement included lawyers, academics, and human rights advocates. It proved to be particularly strong in Nuevo León, which became the first state to introduce adversarial procedures in 2004. Chihuahua and Oaxaca states soon followed. Each of those early reform states received significant technical assistance from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). In 2004, the first National Action Party (PAN) Administration of Vicente Fox (2000-2006) proposed comprehensive federal judicial reforms. Those reforms failed to pass, but drew popular attention to the weaknesses in Mexico's traditional criminal justice system. Support for federal level judicial reform grew over the next few years until it was enacted with broad, multiparty support in March 2008 under the PAN Administration of President Calderón. The reforms, which involved several constitutional changes, took effect on June 18, 2008. Both U.S. and Mexican officials assert that fully implementing the 2008 judicial reforms is a key goal and a focus of bilateral efforts under the Mérida Initiative, the bilateral security program begun in FY2008. (For more on the Mérida Initiative, see: " U.S. Assistance " section below). Under the judicial reforms, Mexico has until 2016 to replace its trial procedures at the federal and state level, moving from a closed-door process based on written arguments to an adversarial public trial system with oral arguments and the presumption of innocence until proven guilty. These changes should make the system more transparent, participatory (including a greater role for victims, judges, and defense attorneys), and impartial. In addition to oral trials, judicial systems are expected to adopt means of alternative dispute resolution, which should help make them more flexible and efficient, thereby relieving backlogs and ensuring that cases that go to trial are for serious crimes. In order to be successful, Mexico's transition to this New Criminal Justice System (NCJS) will require structural, cultural, and systemic changes to Mexico's law enforcement and judicial institutions, including fundamentally retraining justice sector operators. The transition could take decades to fully take hold. The NCJS will have to be carefully adapted in states with indigenous populations that have their own traditional justice systems. Mexico's judicial reforms seek to create a system that involves a more equal balance of power between prosecutors and defense attorneys and a more active role for judges. The reforms aim to check some of the discretionary power formerly held by public prosecutors. Under the NCJS, prosecutors are expected to present and defend the evidence they and the police whom they oversee have gathered at a public trial where it may be challenged by the defense. Defense attorneys are given the opportunity to challenge the evidence presented by the prosecution, cross-examine witnesses, and present evidence to support their client's innocence. The reforms also envision a more active and high-profile role for judges by, for example, requiring sentencing judges to arbitrate trial proceedings and then render their decisions out in the open. Key elements of the reforms include: Investigation . A greater role will be given to police in investigations under the guidance of the public prosecutor; evidence gathered can be contradicted in an oral, public trial, and convictions can no longer be made based upon confessions alone. This phase of the judicial process will be abbreviated and less formal. Pre-trial detention. The use of this will be limited to violent crimes. Creation of new judgeships for each stage of criminal proceedings. This aims to strengthen judicial impartiality by ensuring that the judge who decides that there is enough evidence to send a case to trial (the due process judge) is not the same judge who presides over the trial phase and issues the final verdict (the sentencing judge). While one judge will preside over most trials, some will function as grand juries and have three judges presiding. The reforms also create a sentencing implementation judge who is to determine when a prisoner has fulfilled the terms of his or her sentence and to monitor processes of restorative justice (including agreements between victims and perpetrators reached through alternative dispute resolution). Individual judges can play all three roles as part of their duties, but not on the same case. A lterna tive methods of resolving cases. This includes plea bargaining and alternative justice mechanisms that may result in compensation agreements between victims and perpetrators. Hearings and trials. Under this reform, hearings and trials are to be conducted in public; attended by judges, prosecutors, and public defenders; based on oral arguments; and videotaped for the record. Open trials and decisions. This reform requires judges to render decisions in public based on evidence presented at a public trial rather than issuing decisions behind closed doors based on written dossiers. Victim rights. This gives greater procedural rights to victims (including the ability to participate in the prosecution and/or to challenge a prosecutor who has declined to take up a case in court); requires that a victim be consulted before a case is suspended or concluded; makes restitution a requisite for alternative justice to be pursued; creates specialized units to protect and assist victims; and prioritizes efficiency. Defendant rights. introduces the presumption of innocence, prohibits torture, guarantees access to public defenders and requires that those defenders be lawyers, provides that only judges can issue search orders, excludes evidence obtained through illegal means, states that confessions made without the presence of a defendant's attorney lack evidentiary value, and provides for alternative sentencing (such as probation) with the goal of rehabilitating prisoners and reincorporating them into society. Mexico's 2008 constitutional reforms also included a number of measures aimed at strengthening the government's ability to combat organized crime that paved the way for subsequent legislation allowing wiretapping and asset forfeiture. Article 16 of Mexico's Constitution defines organized crime as an organization of three or more individuals whose goal is the commission of crimes in a permanent or repeated way, "as provided by the law on the matter," a reference to Mexico's Federal Statute Against Organized Crime. Under the constitutional reforms, those suspected of involvement in organized crime can be held by the authorities for 40 days without access to legal counsel, with a possible extension of another 40 days, a practice known as arraigo which has led to serious abuses by authorities. The law also permits prosecutors in organized crime cases to submit evidence gathered from witnesses during the investigatory phase of a criminal process; that evidence does not need to be presented in front of the judge and defense attorney at trial. Some analysts maintain that these new reforms created a system in which "normal" criminals have their rights protected, whereas those suspected of organized criminal activity have few constitutional rights or guarantees. Many analysts had predicted that progress in advancing judicial reform in Mexico was "likely to be very slow as capacity constraints and entrenched interests in the judicial system delay any changes." Others expressed concerns that the Calderón government appeared to be devoting more funding and political will toward modernizing the police than strengthening the justice system (including the courts and the PGR). Some analysts questioned whether it would be feasible to revamp the judicial system at a time when the government was under pressure to get tough on organized crime since accountability and due process within the judicial system are sometimes portrayed as impediments to law enforcement efforts. Almost five years into the reform process, judicial reform efforts at the federal level remain stalled. Former President Calderón did not propose a new federal criminal procedure code—a key element needed to guide reform efforts—until September 2011, three years after the reforms were enacted. The Mexican Congress did not enact a criminal procedure code during his term. Funding for the PGR lagged behind that of other agencies, as did budgetary support for SETEC, the Technical Secretariat of the Interior Ministry charged with overseeing implementation of the reforms. SETEC responded to requests for assistance from the states, but did not have the authority to push federal and state institutions to support the reform effort, although it did provide $34 million in subsidies to states to support judicial reform in 2012. Inaugurated in December 2012, President Enrique Peña Nieto of the PRI has vowed to advance judicial reforms at the federal level by introducing legislation to establish a new unified penal code (so that crimes would be classified uniformly across the country) and a code of criminal procedure that would annul all state codes. During Peña Nieto's governorship, the state of Mexico became one of only three states fully operating under the NCJS, albeit with some problems. According to the Pact for Mexico agreement that Peña Nieto signed with the two main opposition parties in December 2012, the President plans to introduce legislation to create a unified penal code and code of criminal procedure during the first legislative session of 2013, which runs through April 30, 2013. President Peña Nieto also included a budget increase for 2013 for SETEC's efforts to coordinate implementation of the NCJS and support states with their transitions to the new system. The Mexican Congress is also drafting legislation that would restrict the use of preventive detention for organized crime cases ( arraigo ) and the granting of amparos during this legislative session . In contrast to this lack of progress at the federal level, reforms have moved forward in many Mexican states. Since 93% of crimes in Mexico are prosecuted at the state level, observers have welcomed this progress as a positive sign. As of December 2012, 22 of Mexico's 32 states (67%) had enacted new criminal procedure codes, the first major step in the reform process (see Table 1 below). According to SETEC, the only two entities that did not have a criminal procedure code reform bill in their legislatures as of October 2012 were Nayarit and the Federal District that encompasses Mexico City. The Federal District may be waiting to enact its own code until a federal code passes, as some legal experts maintain that the federal code might cover the local courts there as well. According to an index developed by Professor Matthew Ingram of the University at Albany, while only 12 states (36%) had begun operating at least partially under the new system as of December 2012, most of those states are roughly on track to follow Chihuahua's pace to reach implementation (see Figure 2 on the next page). Chihuahua is often considered a model state in terms of implementing judicial reform due to its early adoption of a criminal procedure code and related reforms, its comprehensive approach to the reform process, and the speed at which it implemented the reforms across the state. From start to finish, Chihuahua's transition to the NCJS took roughly two and a half years. Some may consider Ingram's assessment too optimistic, however, given that there have been significant implementation delays in several states (such as Durango, Nuevo León, and Zacatecas) that have now been partially operating under the system for many years. A study commissioned by USAID, released in November 2012, compared the performance of five states that had operated under the reforms for at least one year (Chihuahua, Oaxaca, Zacatecas, State of Mexico, and Morelos) to states that had not yet implemented the reforms. Although outcomes have been uneven among states that have implemented the reforms, the study found positive effects of the new system on certain key indicators. The study found: Pre-trial detention rates have been reduced in reform states, while they have risen in non-reform states. Some 25,000 individuals have avoided pre-trial detention under the new system in the five reform states. Prosecutors in Chihuahua, Oaxaca and Zacatecas proved twice as efficient at resolving criminal cases as in non-reform states (40% of cases resolved vs. 20%); Reform states have been able to significantly reduce the time it takes to resolve a case. It takes less than 40 days to resolve a case through alternative justice mechanisms and 100 days to resolve a case in the courts compared to 170 days in non-reform states. Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) settlements are being fulfilled (89% in Oaxaca and 93% in Chihuahua) and are freeing up the courts to handle more serious crimes. Some 52% of rulings in reform states are for serious crimes compared to 37% in non-reform states. The system has helped increase the role of public defenders in trials and resulted in 100% of judges being present at trials, including at initial hearings. (Some 71% of victims in non-reform states say that a judge was not present at their initial hearing). Significant obstacles to state-level reform remain, both in terms of the level of support that the federal government has provided to back state-level efforts and in how the reform is being implemented in the states. In general, a lack of progress and leadership at the federal level has left states without clear guidance on how the reforms should be implemented. A failure to communicate the goals and prepare the Mexican people for the likely outcomes of the new system—including the possibility that some criminals would plea for lesser sentences—has led the public to believe the new system has been too "soft" on crime. Some commentators suggest that opposition to the new system from some justice operators, including judges and prosecutors fearful that the new system will cut into the power they now hold, has also proved challenging. At least until recently, federal funds available for the construction of new courts and other infrastructure and for technical assistance to states implementing the reforms had been limited. Implementing these judicial reforms has brought major challenges, including the need to revise federal and state criminal procedure codes, build new courtrooms, retrain legal professionals, update law school curricula, and improve forensic technology. At the state level, since there is no re-election in Mexico, some governors have been reluctant to invest in new court systems that they will not be around to see in operation. Others have delayed implementation of the new system due to concerns that it may hurt their popularity if it is perceived as being too "easy" on crime. This perception is understandable given that several state legislatures have rolled back aspects of the reform by, for example, broadening the scope of crimes that require pre-trial detention. There have also been some operational challenges in states that have implemented the new system. A reluctance to use plea bargaining and to refer even simple cases to ADR is overwhelming the court systems in some states. Weak police and prosecutorial capacity to gather the type of evidence required to build strong cases, combined with various institutions' unwillingness to work together, has kept conviction rates low. Courts are particularly ill-equipped to handle large numbers of serious crimes. For example, due to capacity constraints, Chihuahua can only process a few hundred homicide cases each year. The prosecution rate for homicide has actually declined in that state in recent years. Recent survey data gathered from the Mexican public as a whole, and from justice sector operators (judges, prosecutors, and public defenders) in nine states, provide important insights into the challenges facing the reform effort. In general, the surveys revealed a need for more public awareness campaigns, as well as outreach to system operators, on why the reforms were enacted and what positive changes they seek to bring about. While the general public expressed questions about what effects the reforms will have on violence and criminality, justice sector officials were divided about whether they would help reduce crime. The public seemed less concerned about protecting the rights of the accused (presumption of innocence and pre-trial release) than about protecting victims' rights and ensuring that guilty criminals are punished. The general public survey also revealed that 74% of those polled had little or no faith in the criminal justice system and that a similar percentage did not cooperate with law enforcement by reporting crime or participating in crime prevention programs. Some 89% of those surveyed knew nothing about the 2008 judicial reforms, much less how they seek to rectify problems in the old system. In Chihuahua and Morelos, two states that have already implemented the NCJS, the percentage of respondents who did not know their states had implemented a new justice system stood at 30% and 60% respectively, still rather high. When people are told about some of the key elements of the reforms (such as oral trials), 80% of those surveyed said they think the new system will function better than the old. However, there is still a perception that the new system favors the rights of the accused over those of the victims. Some 64% of victims surveyed who had been through the NCJS said that they did not feel treated in an impartial way as compared to 54% who had experienced the old system. Victims also expressed concern that the NCJS moved slower at the beginning than the old system, another challenge that needs to be addressed. Ensuring that people know how to access the justice system and that those whom they encounter when they do so are professional and courteous is another issue that merits attention. A majority of justice sector operators surveyed thought that the traditional system functioned adequately, with judges more likely to express that sentiment than prosecutors or public defenders. In fact, 40% of justice operators thought that the passage of judicial reforms in 2008 was the result of pressure from "foreign governments and organizations" that sought to discredit the old system. While those findings are disconcerting, 84% of those surveyed expressed some level of support for the 2008 reforms, with 79% of respondents agreeing with the importance of oral trials and 94% approving of the use of alternative dispute resolution. Although 70% of justice sector operators felt that the NCJS would help reduce corruption, they were evenly divided about whether the reform will help reduce criminality. Since the 1980s, Congress has provided significant funding for judicial reform projects in Latin America, with Mexico being one of the last countries to seek U.S. assistance. Mexico's federal structure makes its transition from an inquisitorial to an accusatorial system more complicated than in other countries where the United States has previously supported reform efforts. Some view Mexico's federalism as an advantage, however, as states can serve as incubators for reform, with successful experiences in certain states serving as models for others to follow. Mexico's middle income status also means that it is better equipped to scale up U.S.-funded efforts than other countries in Latin America should it choose to make judicial reform a top priority. Although USAID has been providing judicial reform assistance to Mexico since the late 1990s, U.S. support for judicial reform has increased significantly as a result of the Mérida Initiative, a bilateral security effort for which Congress appropriated $1.9 billion from FY2008-FY2012. The strategy behind the Mérida Initiative has evolved over time. That initial strategy was designed in response to the Calderón Administration's request for specific forms of U.S. equipment, training, and technical assistance to help Mexico combat drug trafficking and organized crime. In 2009, U.S. and Mexican officials began to revise the strategic framework underpinning bilateral efforts in order to seek to address some of the deeper causes of criminality in the country— institutional weakness, corruption, and a weak social fabric. The Mérida strategy now focuses on four pillars: (1) disrupting organized criminal groups; (2) institutionalizing the rule of law; (3) building a 21 st century border; and (4) building strong and resilient communities. Funding for "institutionalizing the rule of law" (pillar two) now dwarfs other types of U.S. assistance provided to Mexico under the Mérida Initiative. Nevertheless, while spending plans state that $590.5 million of the $1.9 billion in Mérida funding appropriated from FY2008-FY2012 went to support the purchase of aircraft and helicopters for security forces, it is difficult to parcel out how much of the $1.9 billion in aid has gone to support judicial reform. According to the State Department, total deliveries under pillar two of the Mérida strategy (which includes support for judicial reform) stood at $146.2 million as of November 2012. That total does not include the $104 million in Mérida pillar two aid that USAID is administering (discussed below). Ensuring that U.S. agencies are supporting judicial reform as part of broader justice sector reform efforts in Mexico has been a priority for congressional appropriators. In the first appropriation for the Mérida Initiative, for example, Congress earmarked funding to support Mexico's transition from an inquisitorial justice system to an accusatory system. Congress has since increased funding for rule of law programs; asked the State Department to report on how U.S. programs are helping to achieve judicial and police reform in Mexico ( H.Rept. 112-331 ), and expressed support for future rule of law funding. Congress has also conditioned Mérida assistance to the police and military on ensuring that the Mexican government is enforcing prohibitions against using evidence obtained through torture that were codified in Mexico's 2008 judicial reforms. U.S. rule of law programming is now focusing on supporting Mexico's transition to an oral, accusatorial justice system and helping Mexico address institutional weaknesses in its justice sector institutions. U.S. assistance is geared toward: 1) helping the federal and state governments adopt legislative frameworks to underpin the reform process; 2) providing in-depth training for justice sector operators on their roles in the new system at all levels of government; 3) building support for the reforms in Mexican civil society; and 4) addressing institutional and operational problems at all levels of government that may not directly relate to the reform process. It is also focusing on improving the analytic and quality control capacity of justice sector institutions and on expanding access to justice and victims' assistance. Since high turnover rates of personnel in justice sector institutions has limited the effectiveness of past U.S. training programs, future assistance may focus on helping institutions change their incentive structures, policies, and cultures so that the reforms can be sustained. The three main implementing agencies for the U.S. rule of law programs in Mexico are the State Department, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and USAID. The State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) is the lead funder and coordinator of rule of law programs. INL also implements law enforcement reform (police, forensics, and prisons) and anti-corruption efforts (helping institutions install better vetting and internal controls), while DOJ and USAID have been the lead implementers for justice reform. U.S. law enforcement training and equipment efforts initially focused largely on the Federal Police, but then expanded to support the Attorney General's police force and state-level academies in Chihuahua, Nuevo León, Puebla, and Sonora. State Department funding has helped provide training and equipment to build the forensic capacities of the Federal Police and the Attorney General's Office and to expand and improve the country's federal penitentiaries. The State Department is training Mexican federal and state police for the new investigatory roles they will be called upon to play in the NCJS. Anti-corruption efforts have spanned the full range of Mexican law enforcement and judicial institutions. DOJ is administering some $46 million in State Department funding. DOJ has supported justice reform at the federal level, including the adoption of a federal criminal procedure code. In 2012, DOJ worked with the PGR to design and implement a national training program known as Project Diamante through which prosecutors, investigators, and forensic experts were trained to work as a team rather than in isolation (as was customary). Upon completion of Phase I, in August 2012, 7,700 PGR prosecutors, investigators and forensic experts had been trained to work together to manage cases in the current inquisitorial system as well as together to function once Mexico transitions to an accusatorial system.  Project Diamante also established a cadre of over 200 instructors capable of replicating this and other training to new PGR personnel.  Until recently, U.S. assistance did not provide significant training and assistance for judges, a key constituency that must be convinced about the value of the reforms. DOJ has recently established the Judicial Studies Training Institute, a training program in Puerto Rico for Mexican federal judges. The nine-day training program focuses on building practical experience in the accusatory system with the goal of educating judges about the advantages that it provides. The future of DOJ programming in Mexico may depend upon the extent to which Mexico's Attorney General Jesús Murillo Karam embraces the Diamante model that began late in the Calderón Administration. Some states have reportedly expressed an interest in DOJ replicating the training they provided to federal officials at the state level, but it remains to be seen whether that will take place. Training for federal judges could also potentially be increased. USAID has concentrated most of its work in support of justice reform at the state level, but also sought to strengthen the capacity of SETEC, the federal entity coordinating the federal and state reform efforts, and ProVíctima, the federal entity providing victims' assistance services under the NCJS. USAID had been supporting code reform, judicial exchanges, alternative dispute resolution, and Citizen's Participation Councils, as well as training justice sector operators in five Mexican states since 2004. USAID has helped law enforcement and attorney generals in those states form partnerships with their U.S. counterparts that have involved training and mentoring. USAID expanded its rule of law efforts with roughly $104 million in FY2008-FY2012 Mérida assistance, a significant portion of which is supporting comprehensive judicial reform programs in seven of Mexico's 32 states. USAID has provided more limited help with drafting legislation and implementing policy changes in four additional states. USAID has also provided support to the American Bar Association to help Mexican law schools and bar associations change their curriculums and professional standards to reflect the new system. USAID appears to be trying to strike a balance between providing enough assistance to certain key states to demonstrate the merits of the NCJS and providing more limited assistance to a larger number of states to help Mexico reach its 2016 implementation targets. Although some have urged USAID to continue concentrating its efforts in key states, the agency is in the process of expanding its programs and activities into no less than 20 states. This state-level work will be accompanied by continued technical assistance to SETEC and ProVíctima, as well as increased support for civil society organizations. Mexico enacted historic judicial reforms in 2008 that have the potential to dramatically revamp the country's criminal justice system. Whether or not those reforms are fully implemented is ultimately up to the Mexican government and Mexican society as a whole to decide. The depth and breadth of U.S. assistance provided for judicial reform will in part depend upon whether the Peña Nieto government makes judicial reform a priority. Should Mexico make judicial reform more of a priority, as security experts have long recommended, U.S. technical assistance and training could play a significant role in supporting the reform process. During his confirmation hearing, Secretary of State John Kerry vowed to try to protect U.S. assistance under the Mérida Initiative from budget cuts, including support for judicial reform. However, if Mexico does not prioritize the judicial reforms, Congress may question whether funding for such programs in Mexico should be discontinued, scaled back, or made contingent upon the federal and state governments demonstrating political will to implement the reforms. Should the reforms continue to move forward, congressional funding and oversight of judicial reform programs in Mexico could continue for a number of years. As Congress considers President Obama's FY2014 budget request for Mexico, it may question how funding for judicial reform in particular, and justice sector reform more broadly, fits into bilateral security priorities, including efforts to combat criminal groups and punish corruption. Is the new criminal justice system more effective than the old system at convicting DTO leaders and corrupt politicians? Have any emblematic cases been resolved that might help improve Mexicans' perception of their criminal justice system and its capacity to deter and sanction crime? When faced with funding decisions, Congress may seek to balance the need to ensure that U.S. funds are provided in a way that is flexible enough to respond to changing events in Mexico, while also retaining adequate control over the way those funds are being spent. Congress may also consider weighing in on how implementing agencies divide the assistance provided for judicial reform between the federal and state level reform efforts. Finally, Congress may examine the extent to which U.S. agencies are balancing "top down" support for government entities engaged in the reform process with "bottom up" support to civil society groups. Many argue that the award-winning documentary film, Presumed Guilty , which was theatrically released in 2011, did more to galvanize support for the reforms than any government-sponsored efforts. The State Department used roughly $100,000 in International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funding to help promote the film in Mexico. Another area that could be expanded is U.S. support for culture of lawfulness programs that seek to educate all sectors of Mexican society on the importance of upholding the rule of law. Congress has closely monitored human rights conditions in Mexico and compliance with human rights conditions on Mérida assistance. Congress has an oversight interest in ensuring that, as implemented, the new criminal justice system is strengthening human rights protections. Some have urged Congress to make future conditions more specific by, for example, conditioning aid on whether Mexico is videotaping confessions and interviews with witnesses so as to prove that torture or other ill treatment is not occurring. Others have argued against changes to the conditions on U.S. assistance, preferring that the current conditions be more strictly enforced. Congress may also examine how best to ensure that U.S. implementing agencies correctly sequence and coordinate support to key actors within the criminal justice system (police, prosecutors/defense attorneys, courts). At the federal level, is the amount of assistance being provided to the PGR and the courts adequate when compared to the aid provided to the Interior Ministry (which now includes the Federal Police and penitentiary system)? If one federal entity seeks U.S. cooperation more aggressively than another, should that entity receive more assistance? At the state level, are USAID's judicial reform efforts being coordinated with the police assistance that the State Department is providing? Are police in states that have adopted or are close to adopting the new criminal justice system being adequately trained to carry out investigations in support of the public prosecutor? As foreign aid budgets tighten, congressional scrutiny of U.S. programs in Mexico may intensify. Past reports by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Inspector General of USAID have criticized U.S. agencies for failing to develop "outcome" rather than "output" measures to gauge the efficacy of U.S. programs. USAID has adjusted its indicators in response to those criticisms and the State Department is in the process of establishing a Metrics Office in Mexico City that will develop indicators for its ROL programs. The results of those efforts to improve metrics may prove useful for congressional appropriators as they oversee current programs and consider future support for judicial reform in Mexico. Congress might also consider providing funding for more polling and surveys regarding attitudes toward the reforms, since this is an important means of evaluation and assessment of progress toward the reform. In sum, policy experts continue to recommend that Mexico hasten implementation of judicial reforms enacted in 2008 that are aimed at making its judicial system more transparent, efficient, and impartial. Implementing the reforms is a stated priority of both the Mexican and U.S. Administrations. Nevertheless, nearly five years into the reform process, implementation has lagged at the federal level and faced significant challenges in states that have begun operating under the new system. Congress is likely to closely monitor the actions taken by the Peña Nieto government and state governments in Mexico to advance the reform process as it oversees current U.S. justice sector programs and considers future support to Mexico.

Output: Fostering security, stability, and democracy in neighboring Mexico is seen by analysts to be in the U.S. national security and economic interest. Reforming Mexico's often corrupt and inefficient criminal justice system is widely regarded as crucial for combating criminality, strengthening the rule of law, and better protecting citizen security and human rights in the country. Congress has provided significant support to help Mexico reform its justice system in order to make current anticrime efforts more effective and to strengthen the system over the long term. U.S. and Mexican officials assert that fully implementing judicial reforms enacted through constitutional changes in June 2008 is a key goal. Under the reforms, Mexico has until 2016 to replace its trial procedures at the federal and state level, moving from a closed-door process based on written arguments presented to a judge to an adversarial public trial system with oral arguments and the presumption of innocence until proven guilty. These changes are expected to help make the system less prone to corruption and more transparent and impartial. In addition to oral trials, judicial systems are expected to adopt means of alternative dispute resolution, which should help them be more flexible and efficient, thereby ensuring that cases that go to trial involve serious crimes. More than halfway into the reform process, judicial reform efforts in Mexico are at a critical juncture. As of December 2012, 22 of Mexico's 32 states had enacted new criminal procedure codes (67%), but only 12 states (36%) had begun operating at least partially under the new system. Reform states have seen positive initial results as compared to non-reform states: faster case resolution times, less pre-trial detention, and tougher sentences for cases that go to trial. Daunting challenges remain, however, including counter-reform efforts and opposition from some key justice sector operators (including judges). Although reform efforts have lagged at the federal level, President Enrique Peña Nieto, inaugurated in December 2012 to a six-year term, has said that advancing judicial reform will be a top priority. U.S. policymakers are likely to follow how the Peña Nieto government moves to enact a unified penal code and code of criminal procedure to hasten reform at the federal level and to increase support to states transitioning to the new system. The United States has been supporting judicial reform efforts in Mexico since the late 1990s, with assistance accelerating since the implementation of the Mérida Initiative in FY2008, an anticrime assistance program for which Congress has provided $1.9 billion. While the Mérida Initiative initially focused on training and equipping Mexican security forces, it now emphasizes providing training and technical assistance to help reform Mexico's justice sector institutions. Funding for "Institutionalizing the Rule of Law" now dwarfs other types of U.S. assistance to Mexico. This report provides an overview of Mexico's historic 2008 judicial reforms and an assessment of how those reforms have been implemented thus far. It then analyzes U.S. support for judicial reform efforts in Mexico and raises issues for Congress to consider as it oversees current U.S. justice sector programs and considers future support to Mexico. Also see CRS Report R41349, U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond, by [author name scrubbed] and Kristin M. Finklea.