GHSA-37h2-6p4f-mp3q Serena: Unauthenticated Flask dashboard on fixed port enables DNS rebinding → memory poisoning → RCE
SummarySerena's built-in web dashboard exposes an unauthenticated Flask API on a fixed, predictable port (TCP 24282, hardcoded as `0x5EDA` in `constants.py`). The server has no authentication, no CSRF protection, and no Host header validation. A DNS rebinding attack allows a malicious webpage to reach this API from any browser and write arbitrary content to the agent's persistent memory store — which the agent reads and acts on autonomously. Combined with `execute_shell_command` (enabled by default in all contexts via `shell=True`), this creates a full remote code execution chain requiring only that the victim visit a malicious webpage while Serena is running.Details**Root cause 1 — Unauthenticated dashboard (`src/serena/dashboard.py`)**The Flask server starts automatically (`web_dashboard: true` by default) on a fixed, predictable port with no auth middleware:Flask does not validate the `Host` header by default (no `SERVER_NAME` set), which is the prerequisite for DNS rebinding.**Root cause 2 — `execute_shell_command` uses `shell=True` (`src/serena/util/shell.py`)**This tool is enabled in **every** default context YAML: `ide.yml`, `vscode.yml`, `claude-code.yml`, `copilot-cli.yml`, `codex.yml`, `jb-ai-assistant.yml`, `junie.yml`, `antigravity.yml`.PoC**Step 1 — Verify missing auth (no DNS rebinding needed):****Step 2 — Full chain (DNS rebinding → persistent memory poisoning → RCE):**Attacker hosts a page at `attacker.com` with DNS TTL = 1 secondVictim visits `attacker.com` while Serena is runningAttacker immediately rebinds DNS: `attacker.com` → `127.0.0.1`JavaScript on the page POSTs to `attacker.com:24282/save_memory` — which now resolves to Serena's local dashboard. Because the browser considers this the same origin after rebinding, CORS does not block the requestMalicious memory is written to disk with content such as:On the next agent session, Serena reads this memory and calls `execute_shell_command``subprocess.Popen(cmd, shell=True)` executes — **full OS command execution**Confirmed with standalone Python PoC (attached): all four endpoints (`/heartbeat`, `/save_memory`, `/get_log_messages`, `/shutdown`) respond successfully with zero credentials.ImpactAny user running Serena with the default configuration is affected. The dashboard is enabled by default (`web_dashboard: true`) and the port is fixed and predictable — no scanning required.An attacker who tricks the victim into visiting a malicious webpage can, with **no credentials and no other preconditions**:**Achieve OS-level RCE** by chaining: memory poisoning → prompt injection → `execute_shell_command(shell=True)` (enabled in all default contexts)**Write persistent prompt-injection payloads** into the agent's memory store (survives agent restarts)**Read all agent activity logs** including conversation history, file paths, and active project details**Overwrite the Serena configuration file** via `/save_serena_config`**Shut down the agent** via `/shutdown` (denial of service)A standalone Python PoC (`verify_vuln.py`, attached) reproduces all findings
against a local Serena installation with a single command:
`python verify_vuln.py`
[verify_vuln.py](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/27755382/verify_vuln.py)
CVSS v3.1 score: 8.3