GHSA-6rmh-7xcm-cpxj PraisonAI ships and generates a legacy API server with authentication disabled by default, allowing unauthenticated workflow execution
SummaryPraisonAI ships a legacy Flask API server with authentication disabled by default. When that server is used, any caller that can reach it can access `/agents` and trigger the configured `agents.yaml` workflow through `/chat` without providing a token.DetailsThe vulnerable server is the shipped `src/praisonai/api_server.py` entrypoint.`AUTH_ENABLED = False` and `AUTH_TOKEN = None` are hard-coded at [[src/praisonai/api_server.py](https://github.com/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/api_server.py:15)](/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/api_server.py:15).`check_auth()` returns `True` whenever authentication is disabled, so both protected routes fail open by design at [[src/praisonai/api_server.py](https://github.com/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/api_server.py:18)](/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/api_server.py:18).`POST /chat` only checks that the request JSON contains a `message` key and then runs `PraisonAI(agent_file="agents.yaml").run()` at [[src/praisonai/api_server.py](https://github.com/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/api_server.py:31)](/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/api_server.py:31).`GET /agents` is guarded by the same no-op authentication check and returns agent metadata at [[src/praisonai/api_server.py](https://github.com/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/api_server.py:55)](/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/[src/praisonai/api_server.py](https://github.com/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/api_server.py:66):55).When launched directly, the same script binds to `0.0.0.0:8080` at [src/praisonai/api_server.py](/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/api_server.py:66).The deploy subsystem keeps the same insecure authentication default:`APIConfig` defaults `auth_enabled` to `False` in [[src/praisonai/praisonai/deploy/models.py](https://github.com/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/deploy/models.py:23)](/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/deploy/models.py:23).The generated sample API deployment YAML recommends `host: 0.0.0.0` together with `auth_enabled: false` in [[src/praisonai/praisonai/deploy/schema.py](https://github.com/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/deploy/schema.py:108)](/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/deploy/schema.py:108).For scope clarity: the newer `serve agents` command is safer by default, because it binds to `127.0.0.1` and supports `--api-key` in [[src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/serve.py](https://github.com/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/serve.py:155)](/Users/shmulc/Stuff/tmp/first-cve/scans/variant-hunt/PraisonAI/src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/serve.py:155). This report is about the shipped legacy API server and the generated/sample API deployment path above.Version scope:`v2.5.6` already ships the same `src/praisonai/api_server.py` implementation.The current PyPI release on May 1, 2026 is `4.6.33`, and it still ships the same unauthenticated server logic.PoCThe following route-level reproduction was verified locally and proves that the shipped `api_server.py` exposes `/agents` and `/chat` without authentication.From the repository root, create a throwaway environment with the server's direct Flask dependencies:Execute the shipped `src/praisonai/api_server.py` under a minimal stub for `praisonai.PraisonAI` so only the server auth logic is exercised:Observed result:Both endpoints succeed without any `Authorization` header.ImpactAny reachable caller can invoke the legacy API server's protected functionality without a token.At minimum, this allows:unauthenticated enumeration of the configured agent file through `/agents`unauthenticated triggering of the locally configured `agents.yaml` workflow through `/chat`repeated consumption of model/API quota and any other side effects performed by that workflowexposure of whatever result `PraisonAI.run()` returns to the unauthenticated callerThis is not the same as arbitrary prompt injection by itself, because the current `/chat` handler ignores the submitted `message` value and simply runs the configured workflow. The impact therefore depends on what the operator's `agents.yaml` is allowed to do, but the authentication bypass is unconditional in the shipped legacy server.
CVSS v3.1 score: 7.3