GHSA-2v5f-5r6w-p67r MCP Registry: OCI validator skips ownership check on upstream rate limits
OCI ownership validation fails open on upstream rate limits, allowing attacker to claim arbitrary public OCI images under their own namespaceSeverity: Low (re-scored post-triage; see Maintainer triage note below)
Affected: `modelcontextprotocol/registry` main branch at commit `fe0cb3b` (current HEAD as of 2026-05-09).
Live deployment: `https://registry.modelcontextprotocol.io` (per repo README).
Route: GitHub private security advisory (per repo SECURITY.md).TitleOCI ownership validation skips label-match check when upstream OCI registry returns HTTP 429, letting any authenticated publisher bind their `io.github.<user>/*` namespace to OCI images they do not control.Summary`internal/validators/registries/oci.go:104-119` fails open on `http.StatusTooManyRequests`: when the
registry's anonymous fetch to the upstream OCI registry is rate-limited, `ValidateOCI` returns `nil`
and the publish is accepted without ever running the
`io.modelcontextprotocol.server.name` label-match check at lines 122-141. That label check is the
only cross-system ownership proof the registry applies to OCI packages — every other registry type
(NPM, PyPI, NuGet, MCPB) treats a non-200 upstream response as a hard error.The fail-open trigger is attacker-controllable. The registry uses `authn.Anonymous` against Docker
Hub, which is rate-limited to 100 manifest pulls per 6 hours per egress IP, and the production
NGINX rate limit allows 180 publishes/minute (3 RPS, burst 540) per source IP. A single attacker
from a single IP can exhaust the registry's shared anonymous quota in roughly 33 seconds, then
submit a final publish that points `packages[].identifier` at a Docker Hub image they do not own.
The validator hits the 429 fail-open branch, returns `nil`, and the registry stores a record under
the attacker's namespace claiming the unrelated image as its package payload, with no label proof
in evidence.The fail-open is also reached without an attacker present. Docker Hub routinely 429s busy egress IPs
during organic traffic, so publishes during those windows skip OCI ownership validation silently.Vulnerable code`internal/validators/registries/oci.go:97-142`:The fail-open returns before any of the three label-match guards run.The validator is reached on every publish per `internal/service/registry_service.go:151-158`, gated by
`cfg.EnableRegistryValidation`, which defaults to `true` in `internal/config/config.go:18`.Reachability and authorization`POST /v0/publish` (and `/v0.1/publish`) is registered with bearer-JWT auth in
`internal/api/handlers/v0/publish.go:30-50`. JWTs are issued by `/v0/auth/github-at`
(`internal/api/handlers/v0/auth/github_at.go:46-67`), which exchanges any GitHub OAuth access token for
a 5-minute registry JWT carrying `Permission{Action: Publish, ResourcePattern: "io.github.<login>/*"}`.
Any free GitHub account can mint such a JWT, so the publish path is reachable to anyone on the
internet at the cost of a GitHub account.Trigger conditions`internal/validators/registries/oci.go:97`: anonymous Docker Hub auth, subject to the 100
manifest-pulls/6h/IP unauthenticated rate limit Docker Hub publishes.`deploy/pkg/k8s/registry.go:330-331`: production NGINX limits incoming requests to 180/minute
per source IP with a 3× burst multiplier (540).A single source IP at 3 RPS exhausts the registry's anonymous Docker Hub quota in roughly 33
seconds. Each `/publish` against an allowlisted OCI identifier in
`internal/validators/registries/oci.go:29-42` (docker.io / registry-1.docker.io / index.docker.io
/ ghcr.io / quay.io / mcr.microsoft.com / `*.pkg.dev` / `*.azurecr.io`) consumes one slot,
including publishes that go on to fail with the missing-annotation error after the manifest is
fetched.Once Docker Hub starts returning 429, every subsequent publish hits the fail-open branch until
the quota replenishes.Attacker chainFree GitHub account `attacker` → `POST /v0/auth/github-at` → registry JWT with
`Permission{Action: Publish, ResourcePattern: "io.github.attacker/*"}`.From a single IP, send ~100 publishes whose `packages[].identifier` references real public
Docker Hub images that lack the `io.modelcontextprotocol.server.name` label
(e.g. `docker.io/library/alpine:latest`, `docker.io/library/nginx:latest`, …). Each publish
fails with "OCI image is missing required annotation" but consumes one anonymous-quota slot
from the registry's shared egress IP.While the egress IP is rate-limited by Docker Hub, submit the final publish:
`name = "io.github.attacker/<typo-squat-name>"`,
`packages[].registryType = "oci"`,
`packages[].identifier = "docker.io/<reputable-org>/<reputable-image>:<tag>"`.`ValidateOCI` calls `remote.Image(ref, authn.Anonymous, …)`; Docker Hub returns 429;
`transportErr.StatusCode == http.StatusTooManyRequests` matches the fail-open branch;
`ValidateOCI` returns `nil`; `ValidatePackage` returns `nil`;
`validateRegistryOwnership` returns `nil`; the publish proceeds and `CreateServer` writes the
record. The registry now publishes a server record under `io.github.attacker/<typo-squat-name>`
that asserts the reputable image as its package payload, without ever inspecting that image's
labels.Boundary delta| | Starting capability | After exploit |
|---|---|---|
| Identity | Holder of a fresh `io.github.<attacker>` GitHub account | Same |
| Publish scope | `io.github.<attacker>/*` only | `io.github.<attacker>/*` only (unchanged) |
| OCI claim scope | OCI images the attacker controls and has labelled with `io.modelcontextprotocol.server.name = io.github.<attacker>/<name>` | **Any public OCI image** at any allowlisted registry, regardless of label |The attacker's namespace stays bounded. What changes is that the registry's claim "this OCI image is
the package payload of this MCP server" is no longer backed by any cross-system proof. The label
check at `oci.go:122-141` is the only ownership proof for OCI packages; bypassing it lets a
publisher under `io.github.attacker/*` bind a server record to an unrelated image such as
`docker.io/microsoft/<some-tool>:latest` without ever touching that image. Combined with how MCP
clients render server-list entries — image identifier shown next to the namespace — the result is
typo-squat / impersonation in registry search and discovery surfaces, with the actual image content
delivered untouched from its real owner.The same fail-open is reached without any attacker action whenever Docker Hub rate-limits the
registry's egress IP for organic reasons. In that mode, the OCI ownership check is effectively
non-functional for the duration of the limit window, even for legitimate publishers.Cross-validator comparison (negative control)The other registry-type validators do not fail-open on rate-limit responses:`internal/validators/registries/npm.go:72-74` — `if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK { return error }`.`internal/validators/registries/pypi.go:76-78` — same shape; 429 surfaces as
`"PyPI package '%s' not found (status: %d)"`.`internal/validators/registries/nuget.go:253` — non-OK response paths return
`"NuGet README request returned status %d"`, the publish fails closed.`internal/validators/registries/mcpb.go:84-91` — a HEAD that does not return 200 or a 3xx with
`Location` is treated as inaccessible.OCI is the only validator that converts an upstream rate-limit into a successful ownership
attestation.Suggested fixTwo options, either alone, or both for defence-in-depth:Remove the fail-open. Replacewith an error of the same shape the other validators use (`return fmt.Errorf("OCI registry is
currently rate-limiting validations for '%s'; please retry shortly", pkg.Identifier)`). The
handler call sites in `validateRegistryOwnership` already propagate the error to a 400 response.Replace `authn.Anonymous` at `internal/validators/registries/oci.go:97` with an authenticated
token whose quota is isolated from organic anonymous traffic to the registry's egress IP. Docker
Hub authenticated pulls are 200/6h per token; ghcr.io / quay.io / `*.pkg.dev` / `*.azurecr.io`
each have their own auth flows. This removes the easy attacker-side trigger and reduces organic
fail-open windows.If a fail-open path is retained for UX reasons, queue the publish for re-validation when the
upstream registry recovers, instead of marking it accepted on first attempt.Proof of conceptThe refreshed PoC drives the publish path, not only the validator branch:It runs inside the checked-out module, uses the real service and validator code, and substitutes only
the database with a minimal in-memory implementation so the proof can run without a local Postgres
stack. To keep the proof localhost-only, the runner temporarily adds the in-process mock OCI host to
the unexported OCI allowlist. It does not contact Docker Hub, the production registry, or any
external service.To run:Captured transcript:Exit code 0. SHA-256 values:The end-to-end attacker flow against production was not executed. No publish was sent against
`registry.modelcontextprotocol.io`. No attacker namespace was registered on the live service. The
local proof shows the critical property: when the actual publish validator sees an OCI 429, the
service proceeds to create a server record containing the unverified OCI package identifier.Severity rationale**Maintainer triage (2026-05-13):** after review the maintainer settled on Low (3.5, `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N`). Impact stays within the attacker's own namespace and image bytes delivered to clients are unchanged. See the comment thread for reasoning. Reporter's original write-up preserved below.Medium. Auth-bypass class — the attacker bypasses the only ownership proof for OCI packages, and the
fail-open trigger is attacker-controllable from a single IP at modest cost. The blast radius is
bounded to publication misrepresentation under the attacker's own namespace; the actual image
content stays under its rightful owner. Combined with normal MCP-client search and discovery
surfaces, this is sufficient for impersonation / typo-squat where the rendered image identifier
implies authorship the registry could not actually attest.The fail-open also activates under normal traffic when Docker Hub rate-limits the egress IP, so the
OCI ownership check is in practice intermittent rather than absent — both modes are bug states.Disclosure preferencesReport through the GitHub Security Advisory process per repo SECURITY.md. Happy to keep details
private until a fix is in motion. If a public GHSA / CVE / release note is published, please credit
the report to **Ryan Vonbrubeck / @dodge1218**.
CVSS v3.1 score: 3.5