GHSA-mq53-pc65-wjc4 FlowiseAI: Evaluation create+update mass-assignment allows cross-workspace evaluation takeover
Summary**Type:** Mass assignment via `Object.assign(entity, body)` -> client-controlled `workspaceId` (and on create, `id`) overwritten on the Evaluation entity -> cross-workspace data takeover and IDOR.
**File:** `packages/server/src/services/evaluations/index.ts`
**Root cause:** The Evaluation controller/service constructs a `new Evaluation()` and copies the request body into it via `Object.assign(...)` without an explicit field allowlist. The request body therefore can include `workspaceId`, `id`, `createdDate`, `updatedDate`. The server only rebinds *some* of these after the assign (e.g. on create, it overwrites `workspaceId` but not `id`; on update, it overwrites `id` but not `workspaceId`). The remaining client-controlled values land directly on the persisted row, breaking workspace isolation. Same root pattern as the evaluation entity's sibling controllers and as `DocumentStore` before it was patched in commit 840d2ae.Affected Code**File:** `packages/server/src/services/evaluations/index.ts`**Why it's wrong:** `Object.assign(target, source)` copies every own enumerable property of `source` onto `target`. The TypeORM/SQL persistence layer below it does not strip ownership-bearing columns, so `workspaceId` set in the request body lands as the new `workspaceId` of the persisted row. The DocumentStore patch (commit 840d2ae) demonstrated the intended fix shape (explicit field-by-field allowlist) but it has not been applied to this entity.Exploit ChainAttacker is an authenticated member of workspace A. They have a session cookie / JWT for the Flowise web UI. State at this point: attacker can read and write entities scoped to workspace A.Attacker creates a evaluation in workspace A via the documented API (or reuses an existing one they own). They note its entity `id`.Attacker issues a `PUT /api/v1/evaluations/<id>` (or equivalent endpoint) with a JSON body that includes `"workspaceId": "<workspace-B-id>"` (an arbitrary other workspace's UUID). State at this point: the request reaches the controller as a workspace-A authenticated request.The controller calls `Object.assign(updateEntity, body)`. The body's `workspaceId` overwrites the entity's `workspaceId` field. The persistence layer commits the row.Final state: the evaluation row is now owned by workspace B. Workspace B members can see it, modify it, and use it. Workspace A loses access (it no longer satisfies their workspace filter). The original creator's workspace audit shows nothing because the operation looked like a normal update.Security Impact**Severity:** High. Cross-workspace boundary violation by any authenticated workspace member.
**Attacker capability:** Any authenticated user with permission to update a evaluation can move it to any workspace whose UUID they can guess or enumerate (workspace UUIDs are exposed in many API responses, so enumeration is trivial). Evaluation runs (which may include captured prompts, model outputs, scoring data) can be moved cross-workspace via `workspaceId` overwrite, exposing the data to attacker workspace members.
**Preconditions:** Authenticated session with edit permission for the source evaluation. No second factor required. Workspace UUIDs are exposed via the `/api/v1/workspaces` listing or via any cross-referenced object's `workspaceId` field, so target enumeration is trivial.
**Differential:** PoC-verified by source inspection of the original GHSA-q4pr-4r26-c69r. Patched build (with the suggested fix below) refuses the `workspaceId` field; vulnerable build accepts it and persists it.Suggested FixAlready fixed in PR https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/pull/6050 (allowlist pattern applied).Regression tests should assert that a request body containing `workspaceId`, `id`, `createdDate`, or `updatedDate` is rejected (or at minimum: does not change those columns on the persisted row) for both create and update paths.
CVSS v4.0 score: 7.7
CVSS v3.1 score: 8.8