GHSA-7hgr-7h44-33w2 CamoFox MCP: Unauthenticated HTTP MCP browser-control surface
Unauthenticated HTTP MCP browser-control surface in `camofox-mcp`Summary`camofox-mcp` exposed a Streamable HTTP MCP endpoint at `/mcp` with rate limiting but no inbound MCP-layer authentication. When HTTP mode was enabled, any client that could reach `/mcp` could list and invoke browser-control tools.If `CAMOFOX_API_KEY` was configured, the server then forwarded that server-side key to the underlying `camofox-browser` backend. That means an unauthenticated MCP caller could exercise the server's browser authority without knowing the backend browser API key.Reviewed vulnerable commit: `10e3ac08cb50d830eb4ee00a789229f02f28a1a4`
Fixed commit observed on main: `599f56ee40f8062aeca541c251ed1d39fb437f50`
Fixed release observed: `v1.13.2`
Suggested severity: High, with the caveat that default loopback-only deployments reduce practical exposure.Root causeIn the reviewed commit, `src/http.ts` creates the Express MCP app and applies only a rate limiter to `/mcp`:The `POST /mcp` handler then creates a server and `StreamableHTTPServerTransport` and passes the request body into the MCP transport without checking `Authorization`, an inbound API key, allowed hosts, or public-bind safety:`src/config.ts` made HTTP mode configurable and defaulted the HTTP host to loopback, but it did not require an inbound HTTP client secret:Separately, `src/client.ts` forwarded `CAMOFOX_API_KEY` server-side to the browser backend:So `CAMOFOX_API_KEY` protected the MCP server's outbound requests to the backend browser service, but did not authenticate inbound HTTP MCP clients.Auth boundaryThe vulnerable boundary was the HTTP MCP endpoint. The client did not need to provide `Authorization` or any `CAMOFOX_API_KEY` value to call MCP tools.The default bind was `127.0.0.1`, which lowers severity for default local-only deployments. The risky cases are documented HTTP/remote-client deployments, Docker/port-forwarded deployments, or any environment where a browser page, local network client, reverse proxy, or another user can reach the `/mcp` endpoint.Proof of conceptI used a fake `camofox-browser` backend so no real browser was launched and no external navigation occurred. The harness starts the reviewed `dist/http.js` server with `CAMOFOX_API_KEY=server-side-secret`, connects an MCP SDK client to `/mcp` with no auth headers, lists tools, then calls `create_tab` and `navigate`.Observed output:This demonstrates both parts of the issue:The MCP client used no inbound authentication.The server still used its configured backend browser secret when forwarding the tool calls.ImpactAn unauthenticated client that can reach the HTTP MCP endpoint can exercise browser-control tools as the MCP server. Depending on the user's active browser profiles and configured backend, that can allow page navigation, tab creation, interaction with authenticated browser contexts, screenshot/content observation, and other browser-automation actions exposed by the MCP tool surface.The impact is strongest when HTTP mode is intentionally exposed for remote MCP clients or through Docker/reverse-proxy deployment and the operator assumes `CAMOFOX_API_KEY` protects the whole control plane.Fix notesThe public issue indicates this has been fixed in `599f56e` and released as `v1.13.2` by adding dedicated inbound `CAMOFOX_HTTP_API_KEY` Bearer auth, public-bind startup validation, auth before `/mcp` JSON parsing, loopback Host-header protection, and optional allowed-hosts handling. Those are the right mitigation directions.
CVSS v4.0 score: 7