GHSA-6rvw-7p8v-mjfq AVideo: Unauthenticated User Enumeration in objects/users.json.php via isCompany Parameter Allows Bypass of the Admin-Only Listing Restriction
Summary`objects/users.json.php` exposes two unauthenticated paths that disclose the full set of registered user accounts. The `isCompany` request parameter causes the handler to set `$ignoreAdmin = true` for any non-admin caller (including unauthenticated visitors), which defeats the admin-only guard inside `User::getAllUsers()`/`User::getTotalUsers()`. A second path accepts `users_id` and calls `User::getUserFromID()` directly with no permission check, producing a single-user oracle. Both paths return `id`, `identification` (display name), channel URL, `photo`, `background`, and `status`, plus the total account count.DetailsRoot cause #1 — `isCompany` admin bypass`objects/users.json.php:13-53` (HEAD, v29.0):`User::isACompany()` with no argument (`objects/user.php:1629-1646`) returns `!empty($_SESSION['user']['is_company'])`, which is `false` for unauthenticated visitors. So the anonymous-attacker branch takes the `else` arm: `$isCompany = 1; $ignoreAdmin = true;`.The admin-only guards in `User::getAllUsers()` (`objects/user.php:2315-2321`) and `User::getTotalUsers()` (`objects/user.php:2480-2484`) are now short-circuited:Note: when the attacker supplies `isCompany=0`, the `else` branch is taken because of PHP's operator precedence (`!empty($isCompany) && ...` short-circuits to false), and the SQL filter becomes `is_company = 0 OR is_company IS NULL` — i.e. **every non-company user**. Combined with the bypass, this returns the entire user table in chunks controlled by the attacker-supplied `rowCount`.Root cause #2 — `users_id` single-record oracle`objects/users.json.php:20-29` calls `User::getUserFromID($_REQUEST['users_id'])` with no auth check. `User::getUserFromID()` (`objects/user.php:2028-2075`) queries `SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ?` and returns `id`, `identification`, `photo`, `background`, `status`, `channelName`, `about`, `tags`, with only `password`/`recoverPass`/PII stripped for non-admins. The handler then wraps this in the standard BootGrid envelope with `total = 1` when the user exists and `total = 0` otherwise — a perfect sequential-ID existence oracle.Why there is no blocking mitigationNo router-level auth: the `.htaccess` rewrite (`.htaccess:317`) maps `/users.json` directly to this file.No CSRF/origin gate: the file is explicitly listed in `objects/functionsSecurity.php:893` under “Read-only endpoints that accept POST params”, meaning the same-origin/CSRF middleware is skipped by design.The output-filter block (`objects/users.json.php:66-77`) only limits **which** fields are echoed — it does not suppress existence or display-name leakage, and `total` is always echoed on line 97.`rowCount` is attacker-controlled with no upper bound (line 17-18 only sets a default of 10).PoCTarget: a default AVideo 29.0 install at `http://target/`. No session cookie, no CSRF token, no API key required.Path 1 — bulk listing via `isCompany` admin-check bypassThe same call with `isCompany=1` returns the subset of company-flagged users; `isCompany=0` returns all non-company users. Both branches set `$ignoreAdmin = true`.Path 2 — sequential-ID existence / display-name oracle`total=1` → ID exists; `identification` field leaks the login/display name; `status` reveals active (`a`) vs inactive (`i`).Verification of the branch logicImpactAn unauthenticated remote attacker can:Enumerate every user account on the platform (display names, numeric IDs, channel URLs/usernames, active/inactive status, profile photo/background URLs).Obtain the total registered-user count, useful for platform sizing and post-compromise reporting.Build a targeted username list for credential stuffing, password spraying, or phishing against AVideo’s login/password-recovery endpoints.Cross-reference leaked display names against the known password-recovery oracle to identify valid targets.No auth is required, the request is a single unauthenticated `GET`, and `rowCount` is unbounded, so the full user list can be harvested in one request.Recommended FixRequire authentication at the top of `objects/users.json.php`, and gate the bulk-listing path to users who legitimately need to search:Remove the `isCompany`-driven `$ignoreAdmin = true` branch (users.json.php:41-48). It served no purpose that the explicit `canSearchUsers()` check above does not already cover, and its only observable effect is the bypass described here.Gate the `users_id` path behind the same check, or restrict its output to the caller’s own record when the caller is not an admin:Consider clamping `$_REQUEST['rowCount']` to a sane ceiling (e.g. 100) and removing `objects/users.json.php` from the CSRF-bypass list in `objects/functionsSecurity.php:893` unless there is a specific mobile-client requirement — and if there is, route it through an authenticated API token instead of making the endpoint anonymously reachable.
CVSS v3.1 score: 5.3