GHSA-78h3-63c4-5fqc WeKnora has Command Injection in MCP stdio test
Vulnerability **Description****Vulnerability Overview**This issue is a command injection vulnerability (CWE-78) that allows authenticated users to inject stdio_config.command/args into MCP stdio settings, causing the server to execute subprocesses using these injected values.The root causes are as follows:**Missing Security Filtering**: When transport_type=stdio, there is no validation on stdio_config.command/args, such as allowlisting, enforcing fixed paths/binaries, or blocking dangerous options.**Functional Flaw (Trust Boundary Violation)**: The command/args stored as "service configuration data" are directly used in the /test execution flow and connected to execution sinks without validation.**Lack of Authorization Control**: This functionality effectively allows "process execution on the server" (an administrative operation), yet no administrator-only permission checks are implemented in the code (accessible with Bearer authentication only).**Vulnerable Code****API Route Registration** (path where endpoints are created)
****https://github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/blob/6b7558c5592828380939af18240a4cef67a2cbfc/internal/router/router.go#L85-L110
https://github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/blob/6b7558c5592828380939af18240a4cef67a2cbfc/internal/router/router.go#L371-L390**User input (JSON) → types.MCPService binding** (POST /api/v1/mcp-services)
****https://github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/blob/6b7558c5592828380939af18240a4cef67a2cbfc/internal/handler/mcp_service.go#L40-L55**Taint propagation (storage)**: The bound service object is stored directly in the database without sanitization.
****https://github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/blob/6b7558c5592828380939af18240a4cef67a2cbfc/internal/application/repository/mcp_service.go#L23-L25**Sink execution**: /test endpoint loads the service from the database → executes TestMCPServicehttps://github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/blob/6b7558c5592828380939af18240a4cef67a2cbfc/internal/handler/mcp_service.go#L323-L325
 https://github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/blob/6b7558c5592828380939af18240a4cef67a2cbfc/internal/application/service/mcp_service.go#L238-L264**Ultimate sink (subprocess execution)**: The command/args values from stdio configuration are directly used in the subprocess execution path.
****https://github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/blob/6b7558c5592828380939af18240a4cef67a2cbfc/internal/mcp/client.go#L120-L137
https://github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/blob/6b7558c5592828380939af18240a4cef67a2cbfc/internal/mcp/client.go#L158-L160PoC**PoC Description**Obtain an authentication token.Create an MCP service with transport_type=stdio, injecting the command to execute into stdio_config.command/args.Call the /test endpoint to trigger the Connect() → Start() execution flow, confirming command execution on the server via side effects (e.g., file creation).**PoC****Container state verification (pre-exploitation)****Authenticate via /api/v1/auth/login to obtain a Bearer token for API calls.****POST to /api/v1/mcp-services with transport_type=stdio and stdio_config to define the command and arguments to be executed on the server.****Invoke /api/v1/mcp-services/{id}/test to trigger Connect(), causing execution of the stdio subprocess.****Post-exploitation verification (container state)**Impact**Remote Code Execution (RCE)**: Arbitrary command execution enables file creation/modification, execution of additional payloads, and service disruption**Information Disclosure**: Sensitive data exfiltration through reading environment variables, configuration files, keys, tokens, and local files**Privilege Escalation/Lateral Movement (Environment-Dependent)**: Impact may escalate based on container mounts, network policies, and internal service access permissions**Cross-Tenant Boundary Impact**: Execution occurs in a shared backend runtime; depending on deployment configuration, impact may extend beyond tenant boundaries (**exact scope is uncertain** and varies by deployment setup)
CVSS v3.1 score: 9.9