GHSA-8cmm-j6c4-rr8v Vikunja has Cross-Project Information Disclosure via Task Relations — Missing Authorization Check on Related Task Read
SummaryWhen the Vikunja API returns tasks, it populates the `related_tasks` field with full task objects for all related tasks without checking whether the requesting user has read permission on those tasks' projects. An authenticated user who can read a task that has cross-project relations will receive full details (title, description, due dates, priority, percent completion, project ID, etc.) of tasks in projects they have no access to.DetailsThe vulnerability is in `addRelatedTasksToTasks()` at `pkg/models/tasks.go:496-548`. This function is called by `addMoreInfoToTasks()` (line 773) during every task read operation — both project task listings (`GET /api/v1/projects/{id}/views/{id}/tasks`) and single task reads (`GET /api/v1/tasks/{id}`).The function fetches all related tasks directly from the database without any permission filtering:The `a web.Auth` parameter is received but only used for determining favorites (line 519), never for access control on the related tasks themselves.In contrast, `addBucketsToTasks()` (line 550+) in the same file correctly filters enrichment data by calling `getAllRawProjects(s, a, ...)` to scope results to projects the requesting user can access.While task relation **creation** properly enforces authorization (`task_relation_permissions.go:32-52` checks write access on the base task and read access on the other task), the relation **display** path does not re-check permissions for the current reader. This means a privileged user can create a relation that then leaks data to all other users who can read the base task.PoC**Setup:** Two users (User A, User B), two projects (Project-Shared, Project-Private).User A has access to both projects.User B has access only to Project-Shared.Task 1 exists in Project-Shared, Task 2 exists in Project-Private.**Step 1: User A creates a relation between the two tasks**Expected: 201 Created (User A has write on Task 1, read on Task 2).**Step 2: User B reads tasks from the shared project**Expected: Task 1 should be returned, but related_tasks should NOT include Task 2.**Actual result:** The response includes Task 1 with the `related_tasks` field containing the full Task 2 object, including its `title`, `description`, `due_date`, `priority`, `percent_done`, `project_id`, and other metadata — despite User B having no access to Project-Private.Impact**Information disclosure**: Any authenticated user can read the full metadata of tasks in projects they do not have access to, as long as a relation exists from a task they can read.**Leaked fields include**: title, description, due dates, start dates, priority, percent completion, project ID, hex color, task index, done status, repeat configuration, cover image attachment ID, and creation/update timestamps.**Project structure disclosure**: The `project_id` field reveals the existence and IDs of private projects.**No user interaction required**: Once a privileged user creates a cross-project relation (which is intentionally allowed), the data leak is automatic for all readers of the base task.**Blast radius**: Affects all Vikunja instances with cross-project task relations. In multi-tenant or team environments where projects have different access scopes, this undermines project-level access control.Recommended FixFilter related tasks by the requesting user's read permissions before adding them to the response. In `addRelatedTasksToTasks()`, after fetching full task objects, check that the user can read each related task's project:This checks project-level read permission once per unique project ID (cached in `allowedProjectIDs`) and skips related tasks from projects the user cannot access.
CVSS v3.1 score: 6.5