GHSA-frh3-6pv6-rc8j Bandit's unbounded WebSocket inflate causes BEAM OOM with a single frame
SummaryWhen a Bandit-fronted server has explicitly enabled WebSocket permessage-deflate (`compress: true`), an unauthenticated client can OOM the BEAM with a single ~6 MiB WebSocket frame. Bandit's inflate step has no output-size cap, so a small high-ratio compressed frame (e.g. zeros, ~1024:1 ratio) decompresses unbounded into the connection process before any application code runs. Phoenix and LiveView are **not** vulnerable by default — they ship with `compress: false`. Affected apps are those that have deliberately opted in to permessage-deflate.DetailsIn `lib/bandit/websocket/permessage_deflate.ex:111-115`, `:zlib.inflate/2` is called without an output-size limit, and `IO.iodata_to_binary/1` then materializes the entire decompressed payload as one contiguous binary in the connection process's heap.`websocket_options.max_frame_size` only bounds the on-the-wire (compressed) frame, not the decompressed output. With ~1024:1 compression on uniform data, an attacker can stay well under any wire-size cap while still forcing GiB-scale allocations. There is no `{:more, ...}` resumable path on inflate, so upstream callers cannot interpose a 413/close before the allocation completes.The bug is gated by two server-side flags being true at the same time:Bandit's global `websocket_options.compress` (defaults to `true` per `bandit.ex:198-201`).The per-upgrade `connection_opts.compress` passed to `WebSockAdapter.upgrade/4` (defaults to `false` per `websock_adapter.ex:42-43`; Phoenix's default is also `false` per `phoenix/lib/phoenix/transports/websocket.ex:33`).Both must be true for the handshake at `bandit/lib/bandit/websocket/handshake.ex:22` to negotiate permessage-deflate. So the bug is only reachable on apps that explicitly opt in (e.g. `socket "/ws", MySocket, websocket: [compress: true]` in a Phoenix endpoint, or `WebSockAdapter.upgrade(conn, ..., compress: true)` in a plain Plug app).**Suggested fix:** thread a maximum-output-size through to inflate and either error out or return resumable chunks once exceeded, mirroring how the HTTP content-length path bounds reads via `:length`.PoCA fully self-contained reproducer is attached below. It boots a local Bandit server that performs a `WebSockAdapter.upgrade(conn, EchoSocket, %{}, compress: true)`, opens one WebSocket connection, and sends a single text frame whose ~6 MiB compressed payload inflates to 6 GiB of zeros. Run it with `elixir ws_permessage_deflate_bomb.exs`.Observed on a 16 GiB Mac (Bandit 1.10.4, Elixir 1.18, otherwise default config):Frame on the wire: ~6 MiB.BEAM RSS climbed from ~80 MiB to ~12 GiB peak during inflate (6 GiB inflated payload + a transient 6 GiB copy held by `IO.iodata_to_binary/1`), then settled at ~6 GiB until the connection process was GC'd.Tuning `@target_decompressed_bytes` upward, or opening N parallel connections, OOM-kills the BEAM outright.A separate observation worth flagging: in the default setup, something upstream caps wire-side frames at ~8 MiB even though Bandit's documented `max_frame_size` default is `0` (unlimited). The bug is reachable below that cap regardless, but the source of that effective cap is worth confirming.ImpactUnauthenticated, pre-application-code denial-of-service via memory exhaustion. A single frame from a single client is sufficient to drive a small host to OOM; concurrent connections amplify linearly. The attacker needs only that the server accepts a WebSocket connection — no authentication, no valid route, no application cooperation.Affected: any Bandit-fronted application that explicitly enables permessage-deflate on its WebSocket upgrade. Stock Phoenix and LiveView apps are **not** affected — both default to `compress: false`. Apps that opt in (typically for bandwidth savings on large payloads) inherit an unbounded-inflate DoS that the documentation does not warn about.Logs
CVSS v4.0 score: 8.2