GHSA-5993-7p27-66g5 Langflow vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery
**Vulnerability Overview**Langflow provides an API Request component that can issue arbitrary HTTP requests within a flow. This component takes a user-supplied URL, performs only normalization and basic format checks, and then sends the request using a server-side httpx client. It does not block private IP ranges (127.0.0.1, the 10/172/192 ranges) or cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254), and it returns the response body as the result.Because the flow execution endpoints (/api/v1/run, /api/v1/run/advanced) can be invoked with just an API key, if an attacker can control the API Request URL in a flow, non-blind SSRF is possible—accessing internal resources from the server’s network context. This enables requests to, and collection of responses from, internal administrative endpoints, metadata services, and internal databases/services, leading to information disclosure and providing a foothold for further attacks.**Vulnerable Code**When a flow runs, the API Request URL is set via user input or tweaks, or it falls back to the value stored in the node UI.https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/fa21c4e5f11a697431ef471d63ff70d20c05c6dd/src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/endpoints.py#L349-L359https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/fa21c4e5f11a697431ef471d63ff70d20c05c6dd/src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/endpoints.py#L573-L588Normalization/validation stage: It only checks that the URL is non-empty and well-formed. No blocking of private networks, localhost, or IMDS.https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/fa21c4e5f11a697431ef471d63ff70d20c05c6dd/src/lfx/src/lfx/components/data/api_request.py#L280-L289https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/fa21c4e5f11a697431ef471d63ff70d20c05c6dd/src/lfx/src/lfx/components/data/api_request.py#L433-L438On the server side, it sends a request to an arbitrary URL using httpx.AsyncClient and exposes the response body as metadata["result"].https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/fa21c4e5f11a697431ef471d63ff70d20c05c6dd/src/lfx/src/lfx/components/data/api_request.py#L312-L322https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/fa21c4e5f11a697431ef471d63ff70d20c05c6dd/src/lfx/src/lfx/components/data/api_request.py#L335-L340https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/blob/fa21c4e5f11a697431ef471d63ff70d20c05c6dd/src/lfx/src/lfx/components/data/api_request.py#L364-L379PoC**PoC Description**I launched a Langflow server using the latest `langflowai/langflow:latest` Docker container, and a separate container `internal-api` that exposes an internal-only endpoint `/internal` on port 8000. Both containers were attached to the same user-defined network (`ssrf-net`), allowing communication by name or via the IP 172.18.0.3.I added an API Request node to a Langflow flow and set the URL to the internal service (`http://172.18.0.3:8000/internal`). Then I invoked `/api/v1/run/advanced/<FLOW_ID>` with an API key to perform SSRF. The response returned the internal service’s body in the `result` field, confirming non-blind SSRF.**PoC**Langflow SettingExploitImpactScanning internal assets and data exfiltration: Attackers can access internal administrative HTTP endpoints, proxies, metrics dashboards, and management consoles to obtain sensitive information (versions, tokens, configurations).Access to metadata services: In cloud environments, attackers can use 169.254.169.254, etc., to steal instance metadata and credentials.Foothold for attacking internal services: Can forge requests by abusing inter-service trust and become the starting point of an SSRF→RCE chain (e.g., invoking an internal admin API).Non-blind: Because the response body is returned to the client, attackers can immediately view and exploit the collected data.Risk in multi-tenant environments: Bypassing tenant boundaries can cause cross-leakage of internal network information, resulting in high impact. Even in single-tenant setups, the risk remains high depending on internal network policies.
CVSS v3.1 score: 7.7