GHSA-wgpv-6j63-x5ph Flowise Cloud and Local Deployments have Unauthenticated Password Reset Token Disclosure that Leads to Account Takeover
SummaryThe `forgot-password` endpoint in Flowise returns sensitive information including a valid password reset `tempToken` without authentication or verification. This enables any attacker to generate a reset token for arbitrary users and directly reset their password, leading to a complete **account takeover (ATO)**.This vulnerability applies to **both the cloud service (`cloud.flowiseai.com`) and self-hosted/local Flowise deployments** that expose the same API.**CVSS v3.1 Base Score:** **9.8 (Critical)**
**Vector String:** `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`DetailsThe endpoint `/api/v1/account/forgot-password` accepts an email address as input.Instead of only sending a reset email, the API **responds directly with sensitive user details**, including:User ID, name, email, hashed credential, status, timestamps.**A valid `tempToken` and its expiry**, which is intended for password reset.This `tempToken` can then be reused immediately in the `/api/v1/account/reset-password` endpoint to reset the password of the targeted account **without any email verification** or user interaction.Exploitation requires only the victim’s email address, which is often guessable or discoverable.Because the vulnerable endpoints exist in both **Flowise Cloud** and **local/self-hosted deployments**, any exposed instance is vulnerable to account takeover.This effectively allows any unauthenticated attacker to **take over arbitrary accounts** (including admin or privileged accounts) by requesting a reset for their email.PoC**Request a reset token for the victim****Response (201 Created):****Use the exposed `tempToken` to reset the password****Expected Result:** `200 OK`
The victim’s account password is reset, allowing full login.Impact**Type:** Authentication bypass / Insecure direct object exposure.**Impact:**Any account (including administrator or high-value accounts) can be reset and taken over with only the email address.Applies to **both Flowise Cloud and locally hosted/self-managed deployments**.Leads to full account takeover, data exposure, impersonation, and possible control over organizational assets.High likelihood of exploitation since no prior access or user interaction is required.Recommended Remediation**Do not return reset tokens** or sensitive account details in API responses. Tokens must only be delivered securely via the registered email channel.Ensure `forgot-password` responds with a generic success message regardless of input, to avoid user enumeration.Require strong validation of the `tempToken` (e.g., single-use, short expiry, tied to request origin, validated against email delivery).Apply the same fixes to **both cloud and self-hosted/local deployments**.Log and monitor password reset requests for suspicious activity.Consider multi-factor verification for sensitive accounts.Credit⚠️ This is a **Critical ATO vulnerability** because it allows attackers to compromise any account with only knowledge of an email address, and it applies to **all deployment models (cloud and local)**.
CVSS v3.1 score: 9.8