GHSA-vp2f-cqqp-478j AzuraCast has Path Traversal in `currentDirectory` Parameter that Enables Remote Code Execution via Media Upload
SummaryThe `currentDirectory` request parameter in the Flow.js media upload endpoint (`POST /api/station/{station_id}/files/upload`) is not sanitized for path traversal sequences. When combined with a local filesystem storage backend (the default), an authenticated user with media management permissions can write arbitrary files outside the station's media storage directory, achieving remote code execution by writing a PHP webshell to the web root.DetailsIn `backend/src/Controller/Api/Stations/Files/FlowUploadAction.php`, the `currentDirectory` parameter is read directly from user input at line 79 and prepended to the sanitized filename at line 83:While `$flowResponse->getClientFullPath()` is sanitized via `UploadedFile::filterClientPath()` (which strips `..` segments), the `$currentDir` value is prepended **after** this sanitization, reintroducing traversal capability.This `$destPath` is passed to `MediaProcessor::processAndUpload()` at line 95-98. The critical issue is in the `finally` block at `backend/src/Media/MediaProcessor.php:114-117`:The `finally` block writes the file to the traversed path **regardless** of whether the file passes MIME type validation. A `.php` file triggers `CannotProcessMediaException`, but the `finally` block still copies it to the destination before the exception propagates.For local storage (the default), `LocalFilesystem::upload()` at `backend/src/Flysystem/LocalFilesystem.php:45-57` resolves the path via `getLocalPath()`:`getLocalPath()` delegates to `PathPrefixer::prefixPath()` (League Flysystem), which performs simple string concatenation without normalization. This **bypasses** the `WhitespacePathNormalizer` that would catch traversal if the path went through the standard `Filesystem::write()`/`writeStream()` methods. The OS-level `copy()` then resolves `../` sequences, writing outside the media root.Note: `RemoteFilesystem::upload()` uses `$this->writeStream()` which DOES go through the normalizer, so S3/remote backends are not affected. Only local storage (the default configuration) is vulnerable.The route at `backend/config/routes/api_station.php:399-405` requires `StationPermissions::Media` — a permission granted to DJs and station managers, not only admins.PoCAssuming AzuraCast is running locally with a station (ID 1) using local filesystem storage and the attacker has a valid API key with Media permissions:**Step 1: Upload a PHP webshell via path traversal**Where `shell.php` contains:Expected response: An error JSON (because `.php` is not a processable media type), but the file has already been written by the `finally` block.**Step 2: Execute commands via the webshell**Expected output:Impact**Remote Code Execution**: An authenticated user with DJ or station manager privileges can write arbitrary PHP files to the web root and execute arbitrary system commands as the AzuraCast application user.**Full Server Compromise**: The attacker can read configuration files (database credentials, API keys), access all station data, modify application code, and potentially escalate to root depending on system configuration.**Privilege Escalation**: A DJ-level user (lowest privileged role with media access) can achieve the equivalent of full system administrator access.**Data Exfiltration**: All station data, user credentials, and application secrets become accessible.Recommended FixSanitize `currentDirectory` in `FlowUploadAction.php` using the same `filterClientPath()` method used for filenames:Additionally, harden `LocalFilesystem::upload()` to normalize paths before use:Also sanitize `flowIdentifier` in `Flow.php:67` to prevent secondary traversal in chunk directory creation.
CVSS v3.1 score: 8.8