GHSA-2rp8-mm9q-fp49 TypeORM: migration:generate template-literal code injection
Summary`typeorm migration:generate` embeds database schema metadata into JS/TS template literals, escaping backticks but not `${...}`. An attacker who can write schema metadata (column comments, defaults, view definitions) achieves arbitrary code execution on the host that loads the generated migration.Details`MigrationGenerateCommand.ts` (L117-138) wraps each SQL statement in a JS template literal, escaping only backticks:Introspected schema strings reach this sink through driver query runners:| Driver | Metadata source | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Postgres | column `DEFAULT`, `COMMENT`, `CHECK` constraints, view definitions | [`PostgresQueryRunner.ts:1782`](https://github.com/typeorm/typeorm/blob/bf47c9f/src/driver/postgres/PostgresQueryRunner.ts#L1782), [`L1898`](https://github.com/typeorm/typeorm/blob/bf47c9f/src/driver/postgres/PostgresQueryRunner.ts#L1898), [`L2287`](https://github.com/typeorm/typeorm/blob/bf47c9f/src/driver/postgres/PostgresQueryRunner.ts#L2287), [`L4125`](https://github.com/typeorm/typeorm/blob/bf47c9f/src/driver/postgres/PostgresQueryRunner.ts#L4125) |
| MySQL/MariaDB | `COLUMN_DEFAULT`, `COLUMN_COMMENT` | [`MysqlQueryRunner.ts:2873-2974`](https://github.com/typeorm/typeorm/blob/bf47c9f/src/driver/mysql/MysqlQueryRunner.ts#L2873-L2974), [`L3580-3583`](https://github.com/typeorm/typeorm/blob/bf47c9f/src/driver/mysql/MysqlQueryRunner.ts#L3580-L3583) |
| CockroachDB | Same patterns as Postgres | [`CockroachQueryRunner.ts`](https://github.com/typeorm/typeorm/blob/bf47c9f/src/driver/cockroachdb/CockroachQueryRunner.ts) |`escapeComment()` on each driver strips only null bytes, leaving `${...}` intact:When the migration file is loaded (`migration:run`, `import`, or `require`), the JS engine evaluates `${...}` as live interpolation.**Affected source:**| File | Lines | Role |
|---|---|---|
| [`MigrationGenerateCommand.ts`](https://github.com/typeorm/typeorm/blob/bf47c9f/src/commands/MigrationGenerateCommand.ts#L117-L138) | 117-138 | Template-literal construction (sink) |
| [`PostgresDriver.ts`](https://github.com/typeorm/typeorm/blob/bf47c9f/src/driver/postgres/PostgresDriver.ts#L1886-L1891) | 1886-1891 | `escapeComment()` — Postgres |
| [`MysqlDriver.ts`](https://github.com/typeorm/typeorm/blob/bf47c9f/src/driver/mysql/MysqlDriver.ts#L1322-L1328) | 1322-1328 | `escapeComment()` — MySQL |
| [`CockroachDriver.ts`](https://github.com/typeorm/typeorm/blob/bf47c9f/src/driver/cockroachdb/CockroachDriver.ts#L1236-L1241) | 1236-1241 | `escapeComment()` — CockroachDB |**Confirmed injection vectors (MySQL):**| Vector | Result | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Column `COMMENT` | Confirmed | Proven in PoC below |
| Column `DEFAULT` | Confirmed | Attacker sets `ALTER TABLE ... DEFAULT '${...}'`; payload appears in generated migration |
| `CHECK` constraint | Not exploitable | MySQL `information_schema.CHECK_CONSTRAINTS` strips content from `CHECK_CLAUSE` |
| View definitions | Not tested | Requires PostgreSQL `ViewEntity` introspection; likely exploitable via `pg_get_viewdef()` |**Suggested fix:** Escape `${` to `\${` (and `\\` to `\\\\`) before embedding query strings into template literals, or switch to emitting the SQL as a `JSON.stringify()`-encoded regular string argument.PoC**Prerequisites:**Any supported RDBMS (PostgreSQL, MySQL, MariaDB, CockroachDB, SQL Server, Oracle, SAP HANA, or Spanner) accessible to the developer running `migration:generate`The attacker has DDL/write access to the database, **or** the application exposes a feature allowing users to set column `COMMENT`, `DEFAULT`, or view definition text**Steps:****Inject payload into schema metadata.** Set a column comment or default containing `${...}`:**Run migration generation** on the developer/CI machine:**Inspect the generated file.** The output `.ts` file contains unescaped `${...}`:**Run or revert the migration:**Output confirms code execution — `id` ran on the host and its output was interpolated into the SQL:The payload appears in whichever migration direction restores the DB's current state. A malicious DB comment with a clean entity comment places it in `down()`. Attacker-influenced entity metadata places it in `up()`. Either direction executes the code when the method runs.Impact**Code injection / RCE.** An attacker with DB schema write access executes arbitrary JavaScript on any machine that generates and loads the migration. This crosses the DB-to-host trust boundary.CI/CD pipelines that auto-generate and run migrations are the highest-risk target. Any TypeORM user running `migration:generate` against a database with attacker-influenced schema metadata is affected.
CVSS v3.1 score: 5.7