GHSA-g23j-2vwm-5c25 local-deep-research has an SSRF bypass in `safe_get`
SummaryThe URL checking logic in local-deep-research has a logical flaw that could be bypassed by attackers, leading to SSRF attacks.DetailsThe current project uses `validate_url` to validate the input URL. The main logic is to perform security checks on the host portion of the URL extracted by urlparse to prevent SSRF attacks.However, there are indeed differences in parsing between urlparse and the library that actually sends the request. For example, in `safe_get`, `validate_url` is first used to perform an SSRF check, and then `requests.get` is used to send the actual request.The core issue: urlparse() and requests disagree on which host a URL like `http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1` points to:urlparse() treats \ as a regular character and @ as the userinfo-host delimiter, so it extracts hostname as `1.1.1.1` (public)requests treats \ as a path character, connecting to `127.0.0.1` (internal)Below is a test code I wrote following the code.When an attacker uses `http://127.0.0.1:6666/`, the existing detection logic can detect that this is an internal network address and block it.However, when an attacker uses `http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1`, the detection logic resolves the host to `1.1.1.1`, which is a public IP address, thus passing the verification. But in the actual request process, this URL is forwarded by requests.get to `http://127.0.0.1:6666`, bypassing the detection and achieving an SSRF attack.PoCImpactSSRFMaintainer note (2026-05-15)Thanks @Fushuling and @RacerZ-fighting for the detailed report. The remediation
spans four PRs, all merged to `main` and shipped in **v1.6.10**:**#3873** (merged 2026-05-08) — the load-bearing fix for the parser-differential
bypass:New `RFC_FORBIDDEN_URL_CHARS_RE` in `security/ssrf_validator.py` rejects
URLs containing backslash, ASCII control bytes, or whitespace — RFC 3986
forbids these and their presence signals a parser-differential attempt.Host extraction switched from `urllib.parse.urlparse(url).hostname` to
`urllib3.util.parse_url(url).host`. `urllib3` is the parser `requests`
uses internally, so the validator and the HTTP client now agree on the
destination by construction — closing the `\@` divergence that drove the
PoC.Same two-layer defence applied to `NotificationURLValidator.validate_service_url`.53 new tests across `test_ssrf_validator.py`, `test_notification_validator.py`,
`test_safe_requests.py`, and `test_ssrf_redirect_bypass.py`, including the
advisory PoC `http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1` and the post-prepare canonical
form `http://127.0.0.1:6666/%5C@1.1.1.1`.**#3882** (merged 2026-05-08) — hardens the metadata-IP block and redacts
userinfo from log output so rejected URLs don't leak credentials to logs.**#3889** (merged 2026-05-09) — locks in real-world URL fixtures and behavior
invariants from #3873/#3882 as regression tests.**#3932** (merged 2026-05-10) — blocks IPv6 transition prefixes (`2002::/16`
6to4, `64:ff9b::/96` NAT64, `2001::/32` Teredo, `100::/64` discard) so private
IPv4 destinations cannot be reached via an IPv6-wrapped form. NAT64 has an
operator opt-in (`LDR_SECURITY_ALLOW_NAT64=true`) for IPv6-only deployments,
but cloud metadata IPs remain blocked regardless.Affected versions**The specific parser-differential bypass** described above exists from
**v1.3.0** (when `validate_url` was first introduced) through **v1.6.9**.
The validator used `urlparse(url).hostname` for that entire span.**Versions before v1.3.0** had no SSRF validator at all — requests went
directly to `requests.get()` without any host check. Those versions are
vulnerable to SSRF via this URL and any other internal address; the
parser-differential trick is unnecessary.In both cases the remediation is the same: **upgrade to v1.6.10 or later.**
CVSS v3.1 score: 5