GHSA-q6rr-fm2g-g5x8 Scriban: array * int (ScriptArray<T>.TryEvaluate) bypasses LoopLimit — incomplete fix for GHSA-c875-h985-hvrc, missed sibling of GHSA-24c8-4792-22hx
SummaryThe array multiplication operator (`array * integer`) in Scriban allocates a result whose size is the product of the attacker-controlled integer and the array length, with **no `LoopLimit` / `LimitToString` check and no overflow-safe arithmetic**. A ~40-byte template forces a multi-gigabyte allocation, producing a denial-of-service.This is the unguarded sibling of operations that *were* hardened against the same class of abuse: `string * integer` (gated by a `LimitToString` pre-check), `array.insert_at` (gated by `StepLoop`/`LoopLimit` — the **GHSA-24c8-4792-22hx** fix shipped in 7.2.0, scored 8.7 High), and the range/iteration paths covered by **GHSA-c875-h985-hvrc** ("Built-in operations bypass LoopLimit", fixed 7.0.0). The same `LoopLimit`-based hardening pattern was applied to those operations but never to `array * integer`.This can be observed directly in 7.0.0, the release where GHSA-c875 was patched: `(1..5) * 50000000` (and `1..N | array.size`) correctly throws `Exceeding number of iteration limit '1000'`, while `[1,2,3,4,5] * 50000000` allocates ~2 GB with no limit. The `LoopLimit` control is enforced on the iteration path but not on the `array * int` allocation path, side by side, in the same version. The bug has been present since the operator was introduced in **3.0.0**, survives all of the 6.6.0 / 7.0.0 / 7.2.0 DoS-hardening passes, and is still present in 7.2.0 (current) — i.e. it is both a missed sibling of GHSA-24c8 and an incomplete coverage of GHSA-c875's `LoopLimit` hardening.DetailsThe `array * int` operator is handled in `ScriptArray<T>.TryEvaluate`:`intModifier` is the attacker-supplied integer (`context.ToInt(...)`, `ScriptArray.cs:399`). Two problems:**No resource limit.** Neither `new ScriptArray<T>(intModifier * array.Count)` nor the `AddRange` loop consults `LoopLimit`, `LimitToString`, or calls `context.StepLoop(...)`. A grep of the entire `TryEvaluate` method (`ScriptArray.cs:360-560`) finds no `StepLoop` / `LoopLimit` / `Limit` reference. `LoopLimit` (default 1000) is therefore not enforced: a template that requests 250,000,000 elements creates them all without any "iteration limit" error.**Integer overflow in the capacity.** `intModifier * array.Count` is unchecked `int` arithmetic. The overflow-safe `long` cast used by the string sibling is absent here.The DoS-hardening passes guarded the two sibling operations but not this one:`array * int` (`ScriptArray.cs:504`) received neither guard.When the oversized allocation fails as a managed exception, it is wrapped by the binary-expression evaluator:So a host that wraps `Render()` in `try/catch` sees a `ScriptRuntimeException` carrying the original `OutOfMemoryException` message (or `ArgumentOutOfRangeException` on the integer-overflow path).PoCA single console project reproduces it on the released NuGet package.`poc.csproj`:`Program.cs`:Run:Measured peak working set on Scriban 7.2.0 (net8.0, .NET 9 runtime, Linux), varying only the multiplier:| Multiplier | template size | elements | peak working set |
|---|---|---|---|
| 100,000 | 38 B | 500K | 49 MB (not a DoS) |
| 50,000,000 | 40 B | 250M | 1,958 MB |
| 200,000,000 | 41 B | 1B | 7,681 MB |
| 400,000,000 | 41 B | 2B | 15,313 MB |
| 429,496,730 | 41 B | — | integer overflow in `intModifier * array.Count` → wrapped `ArgumentOutOfRangeException` |`LoopLimit` (default 1000) is demonstrably not enforced: 250,000,000 elements are created with no "iteration limit" error. Reproduced identically on released NuGet **6.6.0, 7.0.0, 7.1.0, and 7.2.0**, and on **3.0.0, 4.0.0, 5.0.0, 5.10.0, 6.0.0, 6.2.1, 6.5.8** (~2 GB at multiplier 50,000,000). Version **2.1.4 and earlier are NOT affected** — the operator did not exist (`Unable to convert type ScriptArray to int`).Impact**Type:** Denial of service via uncontrolled memory allocation (CWE-789 / CWE-1284). The result size is `intModifier * array.Count`, attacker-controlled, with no limit and no overflow-safe arithmetic.**Severity:** CVSS 4.0 `AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N` = **8.7 (High)** — the same vector and score GitHub/Scriban assigned to the sibling advisory GHSA-24c8-4792-22hx. CVSS 3.1 equivalent `AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H` = **7.5 (High)**.**Who is impacted:** any application that renders a template whose text is wholly or partially attacker-controlled (the documented server-side template scenario), or that passes attacker-controlled strings to `object.eval` / `object.eval_template`. No `MemberFilter` interaction is required — this is a pure language operation.**Outcome (deployment-dependent, stated honestly):** On systems with sufficient memory, the runtime catches the allocation failure and the host sees a `ScriptRuntimeException` wrapping `OutOfMemoryException` (or `ArgumentOutOfRangeException` on the integer-overflow path) — recoverable per request. On systems where the multi-GB allocation exceeds available memory, the OS OOM-killer can terminate the process before the managed exception fires (this outcome is deployment-dependent and was not reproduced in our 20 GB + swap test environment). In all cases, a ~40-byte template forces a multi-GB allocation and seconds of pegged CPU/GC — a real per-request availability degradation and resource amplification.**Why the existing mitigation does not help:** `LoopLimit` (default 1000) is the documented control for unbounded iteration/allocation, but the `array * int` path never consults it, so a defender running default configuration is not protected.**Affected versions:** 3.0.0 – 7.2.0 (every release containing the `array * int` operator). 2.1.4 and earlier are not affected.Suggested remediationApply the same hardening already used on the sibling operations, in `ScriptArray.cs` (Multiply case, `:504-508`):**Mirror `array.insert_at`:** call `context.StepLoop(span, ref loopStep)` inside the fill loop so `LoopLimit` is enforced; or**Mirror `string * int`:** pre-check the result size with overflow-safe arithmetic before allocating, e.g. `if (context.LimitToString > 0 && (long)intModifier * array.Count > context.LimitToString) throw new ScriptRuntimeException(...)`, and compute the capacity as `long` (or reject negative/overflowing products) to remove the integer-overflow path.Add a regression test that asserts a graceful `ScriptRuntimeException` for a large multiplier (e.g. `[1,2,3,4,5] * 50000000`) rather than allowing the allocation to proceed.
CVSS v4.0 score: 5.5