GHSA-f6ww-3ggp-fr8h xmldom has XML injection through unvalidated DocumentType serialization
SummaryThe package serializes `DocumentType` node fields (`internalSubset`, `publicId`, `systemId`) verbatim
without any escaping or validation. When these fields are set programmatically to attacker-controlled
strings, `XMLSerializer.serializeToString` can produce output where the DOCTYPE declaration is
terminated early and arbitrary markup appears outside it.Details`DOMImplementation.createDocumentType(qualifiedName, publicId, systemId, internalSubset)` validates
only `qualifiedName` against the XML QName production. The remaining three arguments are stored
as-is with no validation.The XMLSerializer emits `DocumentType` nodes as:All fields are pushed into the output buffer verbatim — no escaping, no quoting added.**`internalSubset` injection:** The serializer wraps `internalSubset` with ` [` and `]`. A value
containing `]>` closes the internal subset and the DOCTYPE declaration at the injection point.
Any content after `]>` in `internalSubset` appears outside the DOCTYPE in the serialized output as
raw XML markup. Reported by @TharVid (GHSA-f6ww-3ggp-fr8h). Affected: `@xmldom/xmldom` ≥ 0.9.0
via `createDocumentType` API; 0.8.x only via direct property write.**`publicId` injection:** The serializer emits `publicId` verbatim after `PUBLIC` with no
quoting added. A value containing an injected system identifier (e.g.,
`"pubid" SYSTEM "evil"`) breaks the intended quoting context, injecting a fake SYSTEM entry
into the serialized DOCTYPE declaration. Identified during internal security research. Affected:
both branches, all versions back to 0.1.0.**`systemId` injection:** The serializer emits `systemId` verbatim. A value containing `>`
terminates the DOCTYPE declaration early; content after `>` appears as raw XML markup outside
the DOCTYPE context. Identified during internal security research. Affected: both branches, all
versions back to 0.1.0.The parse path is safe: the SAX parser enforces the `PubidLiteral` and `SystemLiteral` grammar
productions, which exclude the relevant characters, and the internal subset parser only accepts a
subset it can structurally validate. The vulnerability is reachable only through programmatic
`createDocumentType` calls with attacker-controlled arguments.Affected code**`lib/dom.js` — `createDocumentType` (lines 898–910):****`lib/dom.js` — serializer DOCTYPE case (lines 2948–2964):**PoCinternalSubset injectionpublicId quoting context breaksystemId injectionImpactAn application that programmatically constructs `DocumentType` nodes from user-controlled data and
then serializes the document can emit a DOCTYPE declaration where the internal subset is closed
early or where injected SYSTEM entities or other declarations appear in the serialized output.Downstream XML parsers that re-parse the serialized output and expand entities from the injected
DOCTYPE declarations may be susceptible to XXE-class attacks if they enable entity expansion.Fix Applied**⚠ Opt-in required.** Protection is not automatic. Existing serialization calls remain
vulnerable unless `{ requireWellFormed: true }` is explicitly passed. Applications that pass
untrusted data to `createDocumentType()` or write untrusted values directly to a
`DocumentType` node's `publicId`, `systemId`, or `internalSubset` properties should audit
all `serializeToString()` call sites and add the option.`XMLSerializer.serializeToString()` now accepts an options object as a second argument. When `{ requireWellFormed: true }` is passed, the serializer validates the `DocumentType` node's `publicId`, `systemId`, and `internalSubset` fields before emitting the DOCTYPE declaration and throws `InvalidStateError` if any field contains an injection sequence:**`publicId`**: throws if non-empty and does not match the XML `PubidLiteral` production (XML 1.0 [12])**`systemId`**: throws if non-empty and does not match the XML `SystemLiteral` production (XML 1.0 [11])**`internalSubset`**: throws if it contains `]>` (which closes the internal subset and DOCTYPE declaration early)All three checks apply regardless of how the invalid value entered the node — whether via `createDocumentType` arguments or a subsequent direct property write.PoC — fixed pathThe guard also covers post-creation property writes:Why the default stays verbatimThe W3C DOM Parsing and Serialization spec §3.2.1.3 defines a `require well-formed` flag whose **default value is `false`**. With the flag unset, the spec permits verbatim serialization of DOCTYPE fields. Unconditionally throwing would be a behavioral breaking change with no spec justification. The opt-in `requireWellFormed: true` flag allows applications that require injection safety to enable strict mode without breaking existing deployments.Residual limitation`createDocumentType(qualifiedName, publicId, systemId[, internalSubset])` does not validate `publicId`, `systemId`, or `internalSubset` at creation time. This creation-time validation is a breaking change and is deferred to a future breaking release.When the default serialization path is used (without `requireWellFormed: true`), all three fields are still emitted verbatim. Applications that do not pass `requireWellFormed: true` remain exposed.
CVSS v4.0 score: 8.7