GHSA-rmx9-2pp3-xhcr Tekton Pipelines has VerificationPolicy regex pattern bypass via substring matching
hey guys,triage contract
this is a first-screen summary; deterministic proof is in the proof bundle (canonical.log/control.log/witness.txt).summary
trusted resources verification policies match a resource source string (`refSource.URI`) against `spec.resources[].pattern` using `regexp.MatchString`. in go, `regexp.MatchString` reports a match if the pattern matches anywhere in the string, so common unanchored patterns (including examples in tekton documentation) can be bypassed by attacker-controlled source strings that contain the trusted pattern as a substring. this can cause an unintended policy match and change which verification mode/keys apply.pinsrepo: https://github.com/tektoncd/pipelinecommit: 0133513db03dadb3cb08801d6b0330badcb63830callsite: pkg/trustedresources/verify.go:118-137 (getMatchedPolicies)severity
MEDIUM (provisional CVSS 5.3–6.5) (signing request tampering)repro (canonical)command: unzip -q -o poc.zip -d poc && cd poc/poc-F-TEKTON-REGEX-001 && make canonicalexpected: cap not reached; canonical does not emit the vulnerability markers.actual: cap reached; canonical emits the vulnerability markers.canonical markers (mandatory): [CALLSITE\_HIT] + [PROOF\_MARKER]negative controlcommand: unzip -q -o poc.zip -d poc && cd poc/poc-F-TEKTON-REGEX-001 && make controlexpected: cap not reached under the same harness; control emits the control marker and does not emit the vulnerability markers.control markers (mandatory): [CALLSITE\_HIT] + [NC\_MARKER]fix
consider making matching safe-by-default by requiring full-string matches (or validating patterns and documenting substring semantics clearly). one option is to anchor patterns before matching (e.g., wrap `pattern` as `^(?:pattern)$` when not already anchored), or to provide a separate field for exact match vs regex match.
fix accepted when: under the same harness, canonical still hits [CALLSITE\_HIT] but does not emit [PROOF\_MARKER].proof bundle pointersbundle: poc.zipbundle convention: zip extracts under a single top-level folder (poc-F-TEKTON-REGEX-001/) to avoid collisionscontains: canonical.log, control.log, witness.txtextracted paths: after extraction, see ./poc/poc-F-TEKTON-REGEX-001/canonical.log, ./poc/poc-F-TEKTON-REGEX-001/control.log, ./poc/poc-F-TEKTON-REGEX-001/witness.txtverify: compare shasum -a 256 for canonical.log/control.log/fix.patch/test source against witness.txtsupported-mode note: if your supported integration uses verified https app-links/universal links only, provide the supported tag/branch and we can retest on that pin.[poc.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/24833926/poc.zip)impact
an attacker can craft a trusted resources source string that embeds a trusted substring and still matches an unanchored verificationpolicy `spec.resources[].pattern`, even if the policy is intended to constrain matches to a specific trusted source. this occurs because `regexp.MatchString` succeeds on substring matches, so patterns like `https://github.com/tektoncd/catalog.git` match attacker-controlled sources such as `https://evil.com/?x=https://github.com/tektoncd/catalog.git`.affected: deployments using trusted resources verification with unanchored verificationpolicy patterns, where an attacker can influence the `refSource.URI` value used for policy matching.not affected: deployments that anchor all patterns (`^...$`) or otherwise enforce full-string matching; deployments where attackers cannot influence `refSource.URI`.steps to reproducesuggested patch options:make matching safe-by-default by anchoring patterns before matching (or by validating and rejecting unanchored patterns).document the substring semantics explicitly and update documentation examples to include anchors.workarounds
anchor verificationpolicy resource patterns so they must match the full source string. example:`^https://github.com/tektoncd/catalog\\.git$`best,
oleh
CVSS v3.1 score: 6.5