GHSA-9mm9-rqhj-j5mx repomix Vulnerable to Command Injection (RCE) via `--remote-branch` Argument Injection
Vulnerability Metadata| Field | Detail |
| --- | --- |
| **Affected Component** | `src/core/git/gitCommand.ts` (`execGitShallowClone`) |
| **Impact** | Arbitrary Command Execution / Security Control Bypass |SummaryThe `--remote-branch` CLI option in `repomix` is vulnerable to argument injection. User-supplied input is passed directly to `git fetch` and `git checkout` subprocesses via `child_process.execFileAsync` without sanitization, `--` delimiters, or validation.An attacker can inject arbitrary git command-line options. By injecting the `--upload-pack` option and specifying an SSH (`git@...`) or local (`file://`) remote URL, an attacker achieves arbitrary command execution with the privileges of the user running `repomix`. This bypasses the existing `dangerousParams` blocklist implemented in `validateGitUrl()`.Vulnerable Code Analysis**File:** `src/core/git/gitCommand.ts`The `remoteBranch` parameter is appended directly to the arguments array for git subprocesses without the `--` positional delimiter.**Sink 1 (Lines 118-127):****Sink 2 (Lines 148-151):****Bypassed Security Control (Lines 192-197):**
The application attempts to prevent this exact vulnerability class by blocking dangerous parameters (`--upload-pack`, `--receive-pack`, `--config`, `--exec`) within the `validateGitUrl` function. However, this validation is exclusively applied to the `url` variable and omitted for `remoteBranch`, creating a direct bypass.Attack FlowProof of Concept (Steps to Reproduce)**1. Create the Payload**
Create an executable bash script that writes system execution context to a file.
*(Reference: Screenshot_2026-05-18_13_02_16.png)***2. Trigger the Vulnerability**
Establish a dummy remote and trigger the fetch operation, injecting the `--upload-pack` argument.
*(Reference: Screenshot_2026-05-18_13_08_36.png)***3. Verify Execution**
Execution occurs prior to git protocol validation. The script executes successfully despite the fetch operation returning a `128` exit code.*Expected Output:***End-to-End Execution via Repomix:**Impact**Remote Code Execution:** Complete system compromise with the privileges of the user executing `repomix`.**CI/CD Compromise:** If `repomix` is utilized in automated pipelines where `--remote-branch` is populated by external triggers (e.g., webhook payloads, PR titles), attackers can compromise build servers and exfiltrate secrets.Remediation**1. Implement Positional Delimiters (Primary Fix)**
Append the `--` delimiter to explicitly separate options from positional arguments in all git subprocess calls utilizing `remoteBranch`.**2. Apply Existing Blocklist to Branch Parameter (Defense in Depth)**
Update `execGitShallowClone` to validate `remoteBranch` against the existing `dangerousParams` array.Attachments**Screenshot 1:** Payload script created with executable permissions.
<img width="1920" height="1080" alt="Screenshot_2026-05-18_13_02_16" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a0ada9de-c689-4ed8-9937-dd7faf6e6cc0" />**Screenshot 2:** Vulnerable Code 
<img width="1920" height="1080" alt="Screenshot_2026-05-18_13_03_44" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b72c7e05-d857-497a-9ae5-0822f86fa032" />**Screenshot 3:** Verifying RCE.
<img width="1920" height="1080" alt="Screenshot_2026-05-18_13_08_36" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f153545e-e5e8-4165-ac1a-f84efbb1c135" />CreditsThis vulnerability was discovered and responsibly disclosed by:**Researcher:** Abhijith S.**GitHub:** [@kakashi-kx](https://github.com/kakashi-kx)**HackerOne/Bugcrowd:** [kakashi4kx](https://hackerone.com/kakashi4kx)
CVSS v3.1 score: 8.8