GHSA-hr5v-j9h9-xjhg OpenClaw has Sandbox Media Root Bypass via Unnormalized `mediaUrl` / `fileUrl` Parameter Keys (CWE-22)
Fixed in OpenClaw 2026.3.24, the current shipping release.Advisory Details**Title**: Sandbox Media Root Bypass via Unnormalized `mediaUrl` / `fileUrl` Parameter Keys (CWE-22)**Description**:SummaryA path traversal vulnerability in the agent sandbox enforcement allows a sandboxed agent to read arbitrary files from other agents' workspaces by using the `mediaUrl` or `fileUrl` parameter key in message tool calls. The `normalizeSandboxMediaParams` function only checks `["media", "path", "filePath"]` keys, while `mediaUrl` and `fileUrl` escape normalization entirely. Combined with `handlePluginAction` dropping `mediaLocalRoots` from the dispatch context, this enables a full sandbox escape where any agent can read files outside its designated sandbox root.DetailsThe vulnerability exists in two files within the messaging pipeline:**1. Incomplete parameter key coverage in `normalizeSandboxMediaParams`:**In `src/infra/outbound/message-action-params.ts`, the function iterates over a hardcoded allowlist of parameter keys to validate:The `mediaUrl` and `fileUrl` parameter keys are not included in this array. These keys are actively used by multiple channel extensions (Discord, Telegram, Slack, Matrix, Twitch) for media attachment handling, but they completely bypass the sandbox path validation performed by `resolveSandboxedMediaSource`.**2. Dropped `mediaLocalRoots` in `handlePluginAction`:**In `src/infra/outbound/message-action-runner.ts`, the `handlePluginAction` function dispatches actions to channel plugins but omits `mediaLocalRoots` from the context:Despite `ChannelMessageActionContext` defining `mediaLocalRoots?: readonly string[]` (in `src/channels/plugins/types.core.ts` line 478), plugins receive `undefined` and fall back to `getDefaultMediaLocalRoots()`, which permits reads of the entire `~/.openclaw/` directory tree — including all agents' workspaces.**Attack chain:**A sandboxed agent (Agent-A at `~/.openclaw/workspace/agent-a/`) calls the message tool with `{ mediaUrl: "~/.openclaw/workspace/agent-b/secret.txt" }``normalizeSandboxMediaParams` skips the `mediaUrl` key (not in allowlist)`handlePluginAction` dispatches without `mediaLocalRoots`Plugin calls `loadWebMedia` with default roots, which allows `~/.openclaw/workspace/**`Agent-B's secret file content is read and sent as a channel attachmentPoC**Prerequisites:**Docker installedOpenClaw Docker image built (`openclaw-gateway:latest`)**Steps:**Start the vulnerable gateway container:Run the exploit:The exploit writes a secret file to `~/.openclaw/workspace/agent-b/secret_key.txt` inside the container, then invokes `normalizeSandboxMediaParams` with Agent-A's sandbox policy and `{ mediaUrl: <agent-b-secret-path> }`. The `mediaUrl` key bypasses normalization, and `loadWebMedia` reads the file successfully.Run the control experiment to confirm sandbox works for checked keys:Log of Evidence**Exploit output:****Control experiment output:**ImpactThis is a **sandbox escape** vulnerability. An attacker who can influence an agent's tool calls (via prompt injection, multi-agent interaction, or malicious plugin instruction) can read arbitrary files from other agents' workspaces. This includes:API keys and secrets stored in other agents' sandboxesSession data and conversation logsConfiguration files with sensitive credentialsAny file within the `~/.openclaw/` directory treeThis completely defeats the purpose of the multi-agent sandbox isolation feature, which is documented as a security boundary in the project's Docker and sandboxing documentation.Affected products**Ecosystem**: npm**Package name**: openclaw**Affected versions**: <= 2026.3.14 (current latest)**Patched versions**: <None>Severity**Severity**: High**Vector string**: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:NWeaknesses**CWE**: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')Occurrences| Permalink | Description |
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| [https://github.com/moltbot/moltbot/blob/main/src/infra/outbound/message-action-params.ts#L206-L227](https://github.com/moltbot/moltbot/blob/main/src/infra/outbound/message-action-params.ts#L206-L227) | The `normalizeSandboxMediaParams` function with incomplete `mediaKeys` allowlist — `mediaUrl` and `fileUrl` are not checked. |
| [https://github.com/moltbot/moltbot/blob/main/src/infra/outbound/message-action-runner.ts#L684-L697](https://github.com/moltbot/moltbot/blob/main/src/infra/outbound/message-action-runner.ts#L684-L697) | The `handlePluginAction` dispatch call that omits `mediaLocalRoots` from the context passed to `dispatchChannelMessageAction`. |
| [https://github.com/moltbot/moltbot/blob/main/src/channels/plugins/types.core.ts#L478](https://github.com/moltbot/moltbot/blob/main/src/channels/plugins/types.core.ts#L478) | The `ChannelMessageActionContext` type that defines `mediaLocalRoots` but never receives it from `handlePluginAction`. |
CVSS v3.1 score: 7.7