GHSA-xggw-g9pm-9qhh AVideo has PHP Code Injection via eval() in Gallery saveSort.json.php Exploitable Through CSRF Against Admin
SummaryThe Gallery plugin's `saveSort.json.php` endpoint passes unsanitized user input from `$_REQUEST['sections']` array values directly into PHP's `eval()` function. While the endpoint is gated behind `User::isAdmin()`, it has no CSRF token validation. Combined with AVideo's explicit `SameSite=None` session cookie configuration, an attacker can exploit this via cross-site request forgery to achieve unauthenticated remote code execution — requiring only that an admin visits an attacker-controlled page.Details**Vulnerable code** — `plugin/Gallery/view/saveSort.json.php:20-25`:The `$value` variable from `$_REQUEST['sections']` is interpolated directly into the string passed to `eval()` with no sanitization — no allowlist, no regex validation, no escaping. Normal Gallery usage sends section names like `'Shorts'`, `'Trending'`, etc. from jQuery UI sortable, but the server enforces no such constraint.**CSRF enablement** — `objects/include_config.php:134-137`:The session cookie is explicitly set to `SameSite=None`, which instructs browsers to send the cookie on cross-site requests. This is also reinforced in `objects/functionsPHP.php:330-333` where additional cookies are set with `SameSite=None; Secure`.**No CSRF protection** — The endpoint performs no CSRF token validation, no Origin header check, no Referer header check, and no `X-Requested-With` header check. There is no global CSRF middleware in AVideo's bootstrap chain.**Exploit chain:**Attacker crafts a page with an auto-submitting form targeting `saveSort.json.php`Admin visits the attacker's page (e.g., via a link in a comment, email, or message)The browser sends the cross-site POST request **with the admin's session cookie** attached (due to `SameSite=None`)`User::isAdmin()` passes because the admin's session is presentThe injected PHP code in the `sections` array value is passed to `eval()` and executesPoC**Step 1:** Host the following HTML on an attacker-controlled server:The base64 decodes to `id;hostname`.**Step 2:** Lure an authenticated AVideo admin to visit the page.**Step 3:** The eval on line 24 executes:This breaks out of the property assignment, calls `system()` with attacker-controlled arguments, and comments out the rest of the line. The response JSON will contain the command output, but even without seeing the response, the command executes server-side.**Expected result:** The `id` and `hostname` commands execute on the server under the web server's user context.Impact**Remote Code Execution** — An attacker achieves arbitrary PHP code execution on the server by luring an admin to visit a malicious page. No prior authentication or account on the target is required.**Full server compromise** — The attacker can read/write files, access the database, pivot to other services, install backdoors, or exfiltrate data.**Stealth** — The attack is a single form submission that completes in milliseconds. The admin may not notice anything unusual.**Blast radius** — Any AVideo instance running over HTTPS (which triggers `SameSite=None`) where an admin can be lured to click a link is vulnerable.Recommended Fix**Primary fix — Replace `eval()` with an allowlist check:**In `plugin/Gallery/view/saveSort.json.php`, replace lines 20-26:This eliminates `eval()` entirely, validates `$value` against a known allowlist of section names, and uses dynamic property access (`$object->$property`) instead of code generation.**Secondary fix — Add CSRF protection** to all state-changing endpoints, or at minimum set `SameSite=Lax` on session cookies instead of `SameSite=None` in `objects/include_config.php:135`:This prevents session cookies from being sent on cross-site form submissions, blocking the CSRF vector for all endpoints.
CVSS v3.1 score: 8.8