GHSA-ffw8-fwxp-h64w WWBN AVideo has Multiple CSRF Vulnerabilities in Admin JSON Endpoints (Category CRUD, Plugin Update Script)
SummaryThree admin-only JSON endpoints — `objects/categoryAddNew.json.php`, `objects/categoryDelete.json.php`, and `objects/pluginRunUpdateScript.json.php` — enforce only a role check (`Category::canCreateCategory()` / `User::isAdmin()`) and perform state-changing actions against the database without calling `isGlobalTokenValid()` or `forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest()`. Peer endpoints in the same directory (`pluginSwitch.json.php`, `pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php`) do enforce the CSRF token, so the missing checks are an omission rather than a design choice. An attacker who lures a logged-in admin to a malicious page can create, update, or delete categories and force execution of any installed plugin's `updateScript()` method in the admin's session.DetailsAVideo's CSRF defense is not applied globally — each endpoint must explicitly call `isGlobalTokenValid()` (defined in `objects/functions.php:2313`), which verifies `$_REQUEST['globalToken']`. A search across the codebase shows 18 files that correctly invoke `forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest()` or `isGlobalTokenValid()`, while the three endpoints below do not.1. `objects/categoryAddNew.json.php:18` — CSRF create/overwrite category`Category::canCreateCategory()` (`objects/category.php:620-630`) returns true for any admin. Because the row is loaded via `new Category(intval(@$_POST['id']))`, a non-zero `id` causes the existing row to be overwritten, not just created — the same primitive can mutate existing categories. No CSRF/Origin check precedes the write.2. `objects/categoryDelete.json.php:10` — CSRF delete categoryNo token check. An attacker can force an admin browser to POST any `id`, deleting rows from `categories`.3. `objects/pluginRunUpdateScript.json.php:9` — CSRF forced plugin update`AVideoPlugin::updatePlugin()` (`plugin/AVideoPlugin.php:1452`) looks up the plugin by name and, if it defines an `updateScript()` method, invokes it and then records the new plugin version via `Plugin::setCurrentVersionByUuid`. No CSRF or Origin check precedes this. By contrast, the sibling endpoint `objects/pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php:16` does call `isGlobalTokenValid()`, and `objects/pluginSwitch.json.php:12` also calls it — confirming this file is an omission.Why no global mitigation blocks this`isGlobalTokenValid()` is not invoked from `objects/configuration.php` or any other bootstrap; it must be called per-endpoint.`isUntrustedRequest()` (`objects/functionsSecurity.php:146`) is only triggered via an explicit call to `forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest()`; none of the three endpoints call it.The handlers use `$_POST` directly without any framework-level CSRF middleware (AVideo does not use one).`Category::canCreateCategory()` is purely a role check and does not examine request origin or tokens.PoCAll three require the victim to be a logged-in AVideo administrator who visits the attacker-hosted page. Cookies are sent automatically by the browser.PoC 1 — Create/overwrite categoryExpected: a new row appears in the `categories` table, returned as `{"error":false,"categories_id":<n>,...}`. Changing `id=0` to an existing category id overwrites that row's fields.PoC 2 — Delete categoryMultiple hidden iframes with different `id` values can walk the category id space and wipe the category tree.PoC 3 — Force plugin updateScript()Expected: server logs `AVideoPlugin::updatePlugin name=(Live) uuid=(...)` and the plugin's `updateScript()` runs in the admin's session, with execution time extended to 300s.Impact**Integrity:** An attacker can silently cause the admin's browser to create, mutate, or delete rows in the `categories` table. Overwrite is especially damaging because field-level state (parent, privacy, allow_download, clean_name, iconClass) is changed without any UI feedback to the admin. Combined with any view that renders `description` without escaping, this becomes a vector for stored XSS propagation.**Availability (partial):** `categoryDelete.json.php` is a pure destructive primitive that allows category rows to be removed one by one by iterating ids; there is no recovery flow.**Privileged code execution trigger:** `pluginRunUpdateScript.json.php` lets the attacker force execution of any installed plugin's `updateScript()` method (with a 5-minute execution window) in the admin's context. When chained with other primitives that influence plugin state or the plugin's own update logic, this is a foothold for deeper compromise.**Blast radius:** Each vulnerable endpoint requires only a single admin visit to any attacker-controlled page (XSS on a third-party site, a phishing link, a forum post with an auto-submitting form). No interaction beyond loading the page is required.Recommended FixAdd an explicit CSRF token check (and ideally an Origin check) to each endpoint, matching the pattern already used by `pluginSwitch.json.php` and `pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php`.The long-term fix is to apply `forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest()` to every state-changing JSON endpoint via a shared include (e.g., a mandatory bootstrap file loaded by all `*.json.php` endpoints), so that future handlers cannot forget the check.
CVSS v3.1 score: 7.1