GHSA-rgrr-p7gp-5xj7 Netty Redis Codec Encoder has a CRLF Injection Issue
Security Vulnerability Report: CRLF Injection in Netty Redis Codec Encoder1. Vulnerability Summary| Field | Value |
|-------|-------|
| **Product** | Netty |
| **Version** | 4.2.12.Final (and all prior versions with codec-redis) |
| **Component** | `io.netty.handler.codec.redis.RedisEncoder` |
| **Vulnerability Type** | CWE-93: Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences (CRLF Injection) |
| **Impact** | Redis Command Injection / Response Poisoning |
| **Attack Vector** | Network |
| **Attack Complexity** | Low |
| **Privileges Required** | None |
| **User Interaction** | None |
| **Scope** | Unchanged |
| **Confidentiality Impact** | High |
| **Integrity Impact** | High |
| **Availability Impact** | None |2. Affected ComponentsThe following classes in the `codec-redis` module are affected:`io.netty.handler.codec.redis.RedisEncoder` (encoder - no output validation)`io.netty.handler.codec.redis.InlineCommandRedisMessage` (no input validation)`io.netty.handler.codec.redis.SimpleStringRedisMessage` (no input validation)`io.netty.handler.codec.redis.ErrorRedisMessage` (no input validation)`io.netty.handler.codec.redis.AbstractStringRedisMessage` (base class - no validation)3. Vulnerability DescriptionThe Netty Redis codec encoder (`RedisEncoder`) writes user-controlled string content directly to the network output buffer without validating or sanitizing CRLF (`\r\n`) characters. Since the Redis Serialization Protocol (RESP) uses CRLF as the command/response delimiter, an attacker who can control the content of a Redis message can inject arbitrary Redis commands or forge fake responses.Root CauseIn `RedisEncoder.java`, the `writeString()` method (lines 103-111) writes content using `ByteBufUtil.writeUtf8()` without any validation:The message constructors (`InlineCommandRedisMessage`, `SimpleStringRedisMessage`, `ErrorRedisMessage`) inherit from `AbstractStringRedisMessage`, which only checks for null:Comparison with Similar Fixed CVEsThis vulnerability follows the exact same pattern as two previously acknowledged Netty CVEs:| CVE | Component | Fix |
|-----|-----------|-----|
| **GHSA-jq43-27x9-3v86** | SmtpRequestEncoder - SMTP command injection | Added `SmtpUtils.validateSMTPParameters()` to check for `\r` and `\n` |
| **GHSA-84h7-rjj3-6jx4** | HttpRequestEncoder - CRLF in URI | Added `HttpUtil.validateRequestLineTokens()` to check for `\r`, `\n`, and SP |The Redis codec has **no equivalent validation** in either the encoder or the message constructors.4. Exploitability PrerequisitesThis vulnerability is exploitable when **all** of the following conditions are met:The application uses Netty's `codec-redis` module to communicate with a Redis serverUser-controlled input is placed into `InlineCommandRedisMessage`, `SimpleStringRedisMessage`, or `ErrorRedisMessage` contentThe application does **not** perform its own CRLF sanitization before constructing these message objects**Important context**: Most production Redis clients built on Netty use the RESP array format (`ArrayRedisMessage` + `BulkStringRedisMessage`), which uses binary-safe length-prefixed encoding and is **not** affected by this vulnerability. The vulnerability specifically affects the text-based inline command mode and simple string/error response types, which use CRLF as protocol delimiters.**Affected use cases include**:Custom Redis clients or proxies that use `InlineCommandRedisMessage` for simplicityRedis middleware/proxy layers that forward `SimpleStringRedisMessage` or `ErrorRedisMessage` responsesApplications that construct Redis monitoring or diagnostic commands from user inputRedis Sentinel or Cluster management tools using inline command format5. Attack ScenariosScenario 1: Redis Command Injection via Inline CommandsWhen Netty is used as a Redis client or proxy, and user-controlled data is placed into `InlineCommandRedisMessage`, an attacker can inject arbitrary Redis commands:**Attack input**: `key = "foo\r\nCONFIG SET requirepass \"\"\r\nFLUSHALL"`**Result**: Three commands sent to Redis:`GET foo``CONFIG SET requirepass ""` (removes authentication!)`FLUSHALL` (deletes all data!)Scenario 2: Redis Response PoisoningWhen Netty is used as a Redis proxy/middleware, a malicious upstream Redis server (or MITM attacker) can inject fake responses:**Malicious upstream response**: `"OK\r\n$6\r\nhacked"`**Client sees**:Simple String: `+OK` (expected response)Bulk String: `$6\r\nhacked` (injected fake data!)Scenario 3: Error Message Injection**Attack input**: `errorDetail = "unknown\r\n+FAKE_SUCCESS"`**Client sees**:Error: `-ERR unknown`Simple String: `+FAKE_SUCCESS` (injected fake success!)6. Proof of ConceptFull Runnable PoC Source Code (RedisEncoderCRLFInjectionPoC.java)How to Compile and RunPoC Execution Output (Verified on Netty 4.2.12.Final)7. Impact Analysis| Impact Category | Description |
|----------------|-------------|
| **Confidentiality** | HIGH - Attacker can execute `CONFIG GET` to extract sensitive Redis configuration, use `KEYS *` to enumerate all data |
| **Integrity** | HIGH - Attacker can execute `SET`/`DEL`/`FLUSHALL` to modify or destroy data, `CONFIG SET` to change server configuration |
| **Availability** | Can be HIGH - `FLUSHALL` destroys all data, `SHUTDOWN` stops the server, `DEBUG SLEEP` causes DoS |
| **Authentication Bypass** | `CONFIG SET requirepass ""` removes authentication |
| **Data Exfiltration** | Lua scripting via `EVAL` enables complex data extraction |8. Remediation RecommendationsOption 1: Validate in Message Constructors (Recommended)Add CRLF validation to `AbstractStringRedisMessage`:Option 2: Validate in Encoder (Defense-in-Depth)Add validation in `RedisEncoder.writeString()`:Option 3: Both (Best Practice)Apply validation in both the constructor and the encoder, following the pattern used for SMTP:`SmtpUtils.validateSMTPParameters()` validates in `DefaultSmtpRequest` constructorThis provides defense-in-depth against custom `SmtpRequest` implementations9. Resources[RESP Protocol Specification](https://redis.io/docs/reference/protocol-spec/)[CWE-93: Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/93.html)[GHSA-jq43-27x9-3v86: Netty SMTP Command Injection](https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-jq43-27x9-3v86)[GHSA-84h7-rjj3-6jx4: Netty HTTP CRLF Injection](https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-84h7-rjj3-6jx4)
CVSS v3.1 score: 6.8