GHSA-2h64-c999-c9r6 SiYuan Affected by Stored XSS via Attribute View Name to Electron Renderer RCE
SummaryThe kernel stores Attribute View (AV / database) names without any HTML escape, then a render template uses raw `strings.ReplaceAll(tpl, "${avName}", nodeAvName)` to embed the name in HTML before pushing to all clients via WebSocket. Three independent client paths (`render.ts:120` → `outerHTML`, `Title.ts:401` → `innerHTML`, `transaction.ts:559` → `innerHTML`) consume the value without escaping. Because the main BrowserWindow runs `nodeIntegration:true, contextIsolation:false, webSecurity:false` (`app/electron/main.js:407-411`), HTML injection in the renderer becomes Node.js code execution.Payload is stored on disk under `data/storage/av/<id>.json`, replicates via every sync transport (S3 / WebDAV / cloud), survives `.sy.zip` export-import, and triggers for any role (Administrator / Editor / Reader / publish-service Visitor) opening a doc bound to the AV.Details**Kernel write — no escape.** `kernel/model/attribute_view.go:3244-3255`:**Kernel template — raw replace.** `kernel/model/attribute_view.go:3242,3283-3284`:**Sink #1 — AV body header → outerHTML.** `app/src/protyle/render/av/render.ts:120` (returned from `genTabHeaderHTML`, written via outerHTML at `render.ts:596`):Same pattern in `kanban/render.ts:227` and `gallery/render.ts:142`.**Sink #2 — Doc title attribute strip → innerHTML.** `app/src/protyle/header/Title.ts:396-403`:**Sink #3 — WebSocket `updateAttrs` push → innerHTML.** `app/src/protyle/wysiwyg/transaction.ts:549-562,659`:The four sibling cases use `Lute.EscapeHTMLStr` — proving the team knows the right pattern; only `av-names` was missed.**Renderer posture — RCE multiplier.** `app/electron/main.js:407-411`:**Reachability.** Route `/api/transactions setAttrViewName` requires `CheckAuth + CheckAdminRole + CheckReadonly`. On default install (`Conf.AccessAuthCode == ""`), `kernel/model/session.go:261-287` auto-grants Administrator to local-origin requests. The Origin check accepts `localhost` / loopback only **but `chrome-extension://` is explicitly allowlisted** (`session.go:277`), so any installed browser extension calls the API as admin. Local clients with no Origin header (CLI tools) also pass.Suggested fix`kernel/model/attribute_view.go getAvNames` (line 3283-3284): replace the two `strings.ReplaceAll` calls with `template.HTMLEscapeString(nodeAvName)` for the `${avName}` substitution.`transaction.ts:559`: wrap with `Lute.EscapeHTMLStr` to match siblings at lines 549-557.`render.ts:120`: use `Lute.EscapeHTMLStr(data.name)` for both `data-title=` and the text content.`Title.ts:396`: escape `item.name` via `Lute.EscapeHTMLStr` and `item.id` via `escapeAttr`.*(Defense-in-depth)* Switch the main BrowserWindow to `contextIsolation: true` with a preload bridge — caps every future renderer XSS at "DOM only," not RCE.Reproduction (copy-paste-ready)Tested on Linux/macOS with SiYuan v3.6.5 (re-verified against `master` HEAD on 2026-05-03). Windows users: replace `python3` with `py` and use Git Bash / WSL for the shell snippets, or translate to PowerShell.Prereqs**Install SiYuan v3.6.5** from https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/releases. Launch it once so the workspace at `~/SiYuanWorkspace` is initialized. Do **not** set an Access Authorization Code (default).**Verify the kernel responds:**Expected output (single line of JSON):**Pin shell variables** for the rest of the PoC:Expected: a 14-digit-timestamp + `-7chars` ID like `20240101120000-abc1234`. If you get an empty string, you have no notebooks — open SiYuan and click "New notebook" once.Step A — Create the AV via the SiYuan UI (one-time, ~10 seconds)The kernel's `setAttrViewName` requires the AV file to already exist on disk (`av.ParseAttributeView` returns an error otherwise). The simplest way to create one is via the editor:Open SiYuan. In any document, type `/database` and press Enter (or open the slash-command menu and pick **Database**).The editor inserts an Attribute View block. The kernel writes a JSON file to `<workspace>/data/storage/av/<av-id>.json`.Capture the AV ID — the most recently written file in that directory:Expected: same 14-digit-timestamp + `-7chars` shape, e.g. `20260503160000-aaaaaaa`. If empty, the AV file wasn't created — repeat the UI step. (If your workspace already has many AV files, this picks the newest by mtime; alternatively right-click the inserted database block in SiYuan → Inspect Element to read its `data-av-id` attribute.)Capture the doc ID that hosts the AV: right-click the doc tab → **Copy ID**, or read it from the doc's `data-node-id` in DevTools (Ctrl+Shift+I). Set:Step B — Plant the XSS payload as the AV nameThe payload is written directly inside an unquoted heredoc so bash expands `$AV_ID` while preserving the `\"` JSON-escape sequences literally. Single-quote chars (`'`) in the inner JS need no escaping inside a JSON string.Expected response:Step C — Verify the unescaped storageExpected output (the raw HTML as stored — `print` does not escape `"`, so they appear as literal quotes):Step D — TriggerIn the SiYuan desktop client:Switch away from the doc that contains the AV (open another doc, or close the tab).Re-open the doc containing the AV (`$DOC_ID`).The AV body header is rendered via `genTabHeaderHTML` → `outerHTML` at `app/src/protyle/render/av/render.ts:596`. The browser parses the `<img>` tag, fails to load `src=x`, and fires `onerror`.**Calculator (or `xcalc` / `open -a Calculator`) launches.**If nothing happens, open DevTools (Ctrl+Shift+I / ⌘⌥I) → Console; you should see the error from the failed `src=x` load. If the AV is in another doc you haven't opened recently, the cached render may be stale — close all tabs and re-open.Step E — Browser-extension attack vector (the realistic remote path)A malicious or compromised installed browser extension's content/background script runs with `chrome-extension://<id>` Origin, allowlisted by `session.go:277`. The extension can run Steps B's curl-equivalent via `fetch()`:The extension can also enumerate AV IDs by first calling `/api/notebook/lsNotebooks`, then walking notebook trees.A page from `https://attacker.com` is rejected — `IsLocalOrigin` only matches localhost/loopback. Realistic remote vectors are: **browser extensions**, **localhost-served webpages**, **shared `.sy.zip` imports**, **sync replication from a co-author's compromised device**.CleanupImpact**RCE on the victim's desktop** with the user's privileges, no extra prompt after the trigger condition is met.**Persistent** — payload survives restart, syncs across devices, rides in `.sy.zip` exports and Bazaar templates.**Triggers for any role** opening a doc bound to the AV (incl. Reader-role publish viewers).After RCE: full filesystem read (incl. `~/.ssh/`, `~/.aws/credentials`, workspace `conf/conf.json` — kernel API token + AccessAuthCode hash), persistence (`.bashrc` / Startup folder / LaunchAgent), cloud-account pivot.**Attack vectors:** browser extensions (`chrome-extension://` Origin allowlisted); shared `.sy.zip` files; Bazaar templates; sync peers; co-authors on a shared workspace; publish-service planters infecting Reader viewers.
CVSS v4.0 score: 9.4