GHSA-c969-5x3p-vq3v PraisonAI: IMAP Command Injection via Unsanitized Email Search Parameters
SummaryThe email search tool in `src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/email_tools.py` constructs IMAP SEARCH commands by interpolating LLM-controlled parameters (from_addr, subject, query) directly into IMAP protocol strings using f-string formatting with double-quote delimiters. An attacker who can influence the arguments to the `search_emails` or `reply_email` tool (via crafted agent prompts) can inject arbitrary IMAP commands, potentially exfiltrating email data from other folders, deleting emails, or performing other unauthorized IMAP operations.Details**Vulnerable code (lines 493–502):**The `from_addr`, `subject`, and `query` parameters originate from LLM tool call arguments (the `search_emails` public function at line 665). These values flow through without any sanitization or escaping. The double-quote (`"`) characters in these parameters allow breaking out of the IMAP SEARCH quoted string context.**Additional injection points:**Line 416: `mail.search(None, f'HEADER Message-ID "{search_id}"')`Line 447: Same pattern in `_smtp_reply_email`Line 542: Same pattern in `_smtp_archive_email`The `search_id` / `message_id` parameter in these functions is also LLM-controlled via the `reply_email` and `archive_email` public tool functions.**Reachability:** The `search_emails`, `reply_email`, and `archive_email` functions are exposed as agent tools. They are reachable when an agent is configured with email tools (EMAIL_ADDRESS + EMAIL_PASSWORD environment variables set). This is a documented deployment scenario for email-capable agents.PoC**Setup:** Requires an IMAP server (not run here — this is a static proof). The vulnerability is demonstrated by tracing the data flow.**Positive trigger — IMAP injection via `search_emails`:**
An LLM agent processing a crafted prompt calls:This produces the IMAP command:The `LOGOUT` command is injected after the prematurely closed quoted string, causing the IMAP connection to be terminated.**More severe injection — exfiltrate emails from another folder:**Produces: `TEXT "" SEARCH RETURN (MIN) ALL"` — injects a secondary SEARCH command.**Negative control — legitimate search:**Produces: `FROM "user@example.com"` — correct, no injection.**Cleanup:** No persistent changes for read-only injection. For destructive injection (DELETE, EXPUNGE), impact persists.ImpactAn attacker who can craft prompts that cause an LLM agent to call `search_emails` with injection payloads can:**Terminate IMAP connections** (denial of service)**Inject arbitrary IMAP commands** — including LIST (enumerate folders), SELECT (switch folders), FETCH (read emails from other mailboxes), STORE (modify flags), COPY/MOVE (move emails), DELETE/EXPUNGE (permanently delete emails)**Exfiltrate email contents** from folders the user did not intend to expose to the agent**Permanently delete emails** via injected DELETE + EXPUNGE commandsThe attack requires the IMAP backend to be configured (EMAIL_ADDRESS + EMAIL_PASSWORD env vars), which is a documented and common deployment for email-capable agents.Suggested remediation**Escape double-quote characters** in IMAP parameters. Per RFC 3501, literal strings use `{n}\r\n` format or quoted strings with `\` escaping:Use IMAP literal syntax (`{n}\r\ndata`) instead of quoted strings for all user-controlled parameters. This prevents any injection regardless of content.Apply the escaping to all IMAP search criteria parameters: `from_addr`, `subject`, `query`, and `search_id`/`message_id`.
CVSS v3.1 score: 8.1