GHSA-35c4-rvc8-frhm Budibase: POST /api/attachments/:datasourceId/url is unauthenticated and lets anonymous callers mint S3 PUT pre-signed URLs using stored datasource IAM credentials
SummaryThe Budibase server route `POST /api/attachments/:datasourceId/url` ([`packages/server/src/api/routes/static.ts`](https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/blob/56d2a984/packages/server/src/api/routes/static.ts)) is registered with **only** the `recaptcha` middleware. There is no `authorized(...)` middleware in the chain. The controller (`packages/server/src/api/controllers/static/index.ts::getSignedUploadURL`) looks the requested datasource up, instantiates an AWS S3 client with the datasource's stored `accessKeyId` / `secretAccessKey`, and returns an AWS Signature V4 pre-signed `PutObjectCommand` URL for the caller-supplied `bucket` and `key`. The `bucket` is not pinned to the datasource's configured bucket.The workspace context required by `sdk.datasources.get` is sourced by `getWorkspaceIdFromCtx` ([`packages/backend-core/src/utils/utils.ts`](https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/blob/56d2a984/packages/backend-core/src/utils/utils.ts)) from any of: the `x-budibase-app-id` header, the JSON body `appId`, a path segment that begins with the workspace prefix, or `?appId=`. `auth.buildAuthMiddleware([], { publicAllowed: true })` runs before any of this and explicitly allows anonymous requests. The `currentWorkspace` middleware's "deny access to dev preview" branch only triggers under `isBrowser(ctx) && !isApiKey(ctx)`; `isBrowser` checks the parsed `User-Agent` for a recognised browser, so any non-browser client (curl, the supplied PoC, any tool not setting a browser UA) is neither and reaches dev workspaces too.Net effect: an anonymous attacker who knows or can enumerate a workspace id (`app_...`) and an S3-source datasource id (`ds_...`) can call this endpoint with no auth and obtain a 15-minute pre-signed PUT URL minted on the victim's IAM identity. The endpoint also returns the `publicUrl` so the attacker knows exactly where their PUT lands. Because `bucket` is attacker-controlled, the attacker can write to any bucket those IAM credentials can write to, not only the bucket the datasource was configured for.Affected code[`packages/server/src/api/routes/static.ts`](https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/blob/56d2a984/packages/server/src/api/routes/static.ts) at HEAD `56d2a984` (`master`, 2026-05-18):Note the asymmetry: every other mutating endpoint on this router carries an `authorized(...)` middleware. The signed-URL endpoint does not.[`packages/server/src/api/controllers/static/index.ts:595-645`](https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/blob/56d2a984/packages/server/src/api/controllers/static/index.ts#L595-L645):`sdk.datasources.get(datasourceId, { enriched: true })` ([`packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/datasources/datasources.ts`](https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/blob/56d2a984/packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/datasources/datasources.ts)) does the workspace DB read and **also** substitutes `{{ env.* }}` references in the config via `processObjectSync`, so even if the operator stored credentials as environment-variable references, those values are resolved before the S3 client is built.`recaptcha` ([`packages/server/src/middleware/recaptcha.ts`](https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/blob/56d2a984/packages/server/src/middleware/recaptcha.ts)) short-circuits to `next()` whenever the workspace either is not a production workspace or does not have `features.recaptchaEnabled = true` on its metadata. Neither is set by default. Even on workspaces with recaptcha enabled, builders carrying the `x-budibase-type: builder` header skip the check, but that branch is irrelevant here — the broader case is that an anonymous attacker simply chooses a non-prod workspace (which is the default for any in-development app) and the middleware no-ops.ReproductionProof-of-concept Node.js script (no AWS SDK dependency, no external libraries):Wire-level request:Response:The attacker then PUTs arbitrary bytes to `signedUrl` and they land at `publicUrl`, signed by — and IAM-scoped to — the victim's stored S3 credentials.The existing test that exercises the endpoint, [`packages/server/src/api/routes/tests/static.spec.ts:123-146`](https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/blob/56d2a984/packages/server/src/api/routes/tests/static.spec.ts#L123-L146), sends the same request with `config.defaultHeaders()` (a builder auth cookie). That confirms the request shape; no negative-auth test (`.set({})` or `publicHeaders()`) exists for this route, which is how the missing `authorized(...)` slipped past code review.Impact**Confidentiality / Integrity**: any anonymous internet user can write arbitrary objects to any bucket the configured IAM credentials can write to. The `bucket` parameter is attacker-controlled, so the blast radius is the full IAM policy attached to the credential, not just the bucket the operator wired into the datasource. Typical realistic outcomes: planting HTML/JS that the bucket serves at a known path (the response gives back `publicUrl`), overwriting an existing key the application later reads back as trusted data, racking up S3 storage / PUT cost.**Availability**: storage / cost exhaustion. Repeated PUTs of large objects to attacker-chosen keys cost the victim.**Authorization scope leak**: the endpoint discloses (a) whether a given `datasourceId` exists and is S3-typed (200 vs 400 'not found'), and (b) the resolved `publicUrl` which includes the region.No MFA / OAuth / per-user check exists between the request and the issued pre-signed URL. The credentials are not returned in plaintext, but the pre-signed URL is functionally equivalent to a 15-minute capability to PUT to the chosen `bucket`/`key`.Suggested fixAttach `authorized(PermissionType.TABLE, PermissionLevel.WRITE)` (or a higher gate, e.g. `BUILDER`, depending on intended audience) to the route, mirroring the sibling `/api/attachments/:tableId/upload` registration. Additionally, validate that the requested `bucket` matches `datasource.config.bucket` so the IAM blast radius is reduced to the configured bucket only.Minimal patch shape:And in the controller, before calling `getSignedUrl`:CreditReported by `tonghuaroot` (`tonghuaroot@gmail.com`).Fix PRA candidate fix has been prepared on the temporary private fork that was created from this advisory:PR: https://github.com/Budibase/budibase-ghsa-35c4-rvc8-frhm/pull/1Branch: `fix/attachment-url-auth-and-bucket-pin`Commit: `Require builder auth and pin bucket on POST /api/attachments/:datasourceId/url`The patch is the canonical two-part fix:Attach `authorized(BUILDER)` to `POST /api/attachments/:datasourceId/url` on [`packages/server/src/api/routes/static.ts`](https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/blob/56d2a984/packages/server/src/api/routes/static.ts), mirroring the surrounding `POST /api/attachments/process` and `POST /api/pwa/process-zip` registrations. Anonymous callers now receive 401 regardless of whether the `recaptcha` middleware fails open.Pin `Bucket` to `datasource.config.bucket` inside `getSignedUploadURL` ([`packages/server/src/api/controllers/static/index.ts`](https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/blob/56d2a984/packages/server/src/api/controllers/static/index.ts)) and ignore any `bucket` value supplied in the request body. If the datasource has no bucket configured, the route now returns 400 instead of issuing an unbounded pre-signed URL.Two regression tests are added in [`packages/server/src/api/routes/tests/static.spec.ts`](https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/blob/56d2a984/packages/server/src/api/routes/tests/static.spec.ts):`should reject unauthenticated callers` (anonymous request with `config.publicHeaders()` now returns 401, was 200 before).`should ignore a client-supplied bucket and pin to the datasource's configured bucket` (authenticated request with body `{ bucket: "other-bucket", key: "bar" }` returns a signed URL bound to `foo.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/bar`, not `other-bucket`).Test run on the patch (Jest, `packages/server`):
CVSS v4.0 score: 8.2
CVSS v3.1 score: 9.4