GHSA-qj68-9gpw-8pq2 
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:bcache: avoid oversized read request in cache missing code pathIn the cache missing code path of cached device, if a proper location
from the internal B+ tree is matched for a cache miss range, function
cached_dev_cache_miss() will be called in cache_lookup_fn() in the
following code block,
[code block 1]
  526         unsigned int sectors = KEY_INODE(k) == s->iop.inode
  527                 ? min_t(uint64_t, INT_MAX,
  528                         KEY_START(k) - bio->bi_iter.bi_sector)
  529                 : INT_MAX;
  530         int ret = s->d->cache_miss(b, s, bio, sectors);Here s->d->cache_miss() is the call backfunction pointer initialized as
cached_dev_cache_miss(), the last parameter 'sectors' is an important
hint to calculate the size of read request to backing device of the
missing cache data.Current calculation in above code block may generate oversized value of
'sectors', which consequently may trigger 2 different potential kernel
panics by BUG() or BUG_ON() as listed below,BUG_ON() inside bch_btree_insert_key(),
[code block 2]
886         BUG_ON(b->ops->is_extents && !KEY_SIZE(k));BUG() inside biovec_slab(),
[code block 3]
51         default:
52                 BUG();
53                 return NULL;All the above panics are original from cached_dev_cache_miss() by the
oversized parameter 'sectors'.Inside cached_dev_cache_miss(), parameter 'sectors' is used to calculate
the size of data read from backing device for the cache missing. This
size is stored in s->insert_bio_sectors by the following lines of code,
[code block 4]
  909    s->insert_bio_sectors = min(sectors, bio_sectors(bio) + reada);Then the actual key inserting to the internal B+ tree is generated and
stored in s->iop.replace_key by the following lines of code,
[code block 5]
  911   s->iop.replace_key = KEY(s->iop.inode,
  912                    bio->bi_iter.bi_sector + s->insert_bio_sectors,
  913                    s->insert_bio_sectors);
The oversized parameter 'sectors' may trigger panic 1) by BUG_ON() from
the above code block.And the bio sending to backing device for the missing data is allocated
with hint from s->insert_bio_sectors by the following lines of code,
[code block 6]
  926    cache_bio = bio_alloc_bioset(GFP_NOWAIT,
  927                 DIV_ROUND_UP(s->insert_bio_sectors, PAGE_SECTORS),
  928                 &dc->disk.bio_split);
The oversized parameter 'sectors' may trigger panic 2) by BUG() from the
agove code block.Now let me explain how the panics happen with the oversized 'sectors'.
In code block 5, replace_key is generated by macro KEY(). From the
definition of macro KEY(),
[code block 7]
  71 #define KEY(inode, offset, size)                                  \
  72 ((struct bkey) {                                                  \
  73      .high = (1ULL << 63) | ((__u64) (size) << 20) | (inode),     \
  74      .low = (offset)                                              \
  75 })Here 'size' is 16bits width embedded in 64bits member 'high' of struct
bkey. But in code block 1, if "KEY_START(k) - bio->bi_iter.bi_sector" is
very probably to be larger than (1<<16) - 1, which makes the bkey size
calculation in code block 5 is overflowed. In one bug report the value
of parameter 'sectors' is 131072 (= 1 << 17), the overflowed 'sectors'
results the overflowed s->insert_bio_sectors in code block 4, then makes
size field of s->iop.replace_key to be 0 in code block 5. Then the 0-
sized s->iop.replace_key is inserted into the internal B+ tree as cache
missing check key (a special key to detect and avoid a racing between
normal write request and cache missing read request) as,
[code block 8]
  915   ret = bch_btree_insert_check_key(b, &s->op, &s->iop.replace_key);Then the 0-sized s->iop.replace_key as 3rd parameter triggers the bkey
size check BUG_ON() in code block 2, and causes the kernel panic 1).Another ke
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CVSS v3.1 score: 5.5