GHSA-mw26-5g2v-hqw3 DeepDiff Class Pollution in Delta class leading to DoS, Remote Code Execution, and more
Summary[Python class pollution](https://blog.abdulrah33m.com/prototype-pollution-in-python/) is a novel vulnerability categorized under [CWE-915](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/915.html). The `Delta` class is vulnerable to class pollution via its constructor, and when combined with a gadget available in DeltaDiff itself, it can lead to Denial of Service and Remote Code Execution (via insecure [Pickle](https://docs.python.org/3/library/pickle.html) deserialization).The gadget available in DeepDiff allows `deepdiff.serialization.SAFE_TO_IMPORT` to be modified to allow dangerous classes such as `posix.system`, and then perform insecure Pickle deserialization via the Delta class. This potentially allows any Python code to be executed, given that the input to `Delta` is user-controlled.Depending on the application where DeepDiff is used, this can also lead to other vulnerabilities. For example, in a web application, it might be possible to bypass authentication via class pollution.DetailsThe `Delta` class can take different object types as a parameter in its constructor, such as a `DeltaDiff` object, a dictionary, or even just bytes (that are deserialized via Pickle).When it takes a dictionary, it is usually in the following format:Trying to apply class pollution here does not work, because there is already a filter in place: https://github.com/seperman/deepdiff/blob/b639fece73fe3ce4120261fdcff3cc7b826776e3/deepdiff/path.py#L23However, this code only runs when parsing the path from a string.
The `_path_to_elements` function helpfully returns the given input if it is already a list/tuple:
https://github.com/seperman/deepdiff/blob/b639fece73fe3ce4120261fdcff3cc7b826776e3/deepdiff/path.py#L52-L53This means that it is possible to pass the path as the internal representation used by Delta, bypassing the filter:Going back to the possible inputs of `Delta`, when it takes a `bytes` as input, it uses pickle to deserialize them.
Care was taken by DeepDiff to prevent arbitrary code execution via the `SAFE_TO_IMPORT` allow list.
https://github.com/seperman/deepdiff/blob/b639fece73fe3ce4120261fdcff3cc7b826776e3/deepdiff/serialization.py#L62-L98
However, using the class pollution in the `Delta`, an attacker can add new entries to this `set`.This then allows a second call to `Delta` to [unpickle an insecure class](https://davidhamann.de/2020/04/05/exploiting-python-pickle/) that runs `os.system`, for example.Using dictUsually, class pollution [does not work](https://gist.github.com/CalumHutton/45d33e9ea55bf4953b3b31c84703dfca#technical-details) when traversal starts at a `dict`/`list`/`tuple`, because it is not possible to reach `__globals__` from there.
However, using two calls to `Delta` (or just one call if the target dictionary that already contains at least one entry) it is possible to first change one entry of the dictionary to be of type `deepdiff.helper.Opcode`, which then allows traversal to `__globals__`, and notably `sys.modules`, which in turn allows traversal to any module already loaded by Python.
Passing `Opcode` around can be done via pickle, which `Delta` will happily accept given it is in the default allow list.Proof of ConceptWith deepdiff 8.6.0 installed, run the following scripts for each proof of concept.
All input to `Delta` is assumed to be user-controlled.Denial of ServiceThis script will pollute the value of `builtins.int`, preventing the class from being used and making code crash whenever invoked.Remote Code ExecutionThis script will create a file at `/tmp/pwned` with the output of `id`.Who is affected?Only applications that pass (untrusted) user input directly into `Delta` are affected.While input in the form of `bytes` is the most flexible, there are certainly other gadgets, depending on the application, that can be used via just a dictionary. This dictionary could easily be parsed, for example, from JSON. One simple example would be overriding `app.secret_key` of a Flask application, which would allow an attacker to sign arbitrary cookies, leading to an authentication bypass.MitigationsA straightforward mitigation is preventing traversal through private keys, like it is already done in the path parser.
This would have to be implemented in both `deepdiff.path._get_nested_obj` and `deepdiff.path._get_nested_obj_and_force`,
and possibly in `deepdiff.delta.Delta._get_elements_and_details`.
Example code that raises an error when traversing these properties:However, if it is desirable to still support attributes starting and ending with `__`, but still protect against this vulnerability, it is possible to only forbid `__globals__` and `__builtins__`, which stops the most serious cases of class pollution (but not all).
This was the solution adopted by pydash: https://github.com/dgilland/pydash/issues/180
CVSS v4.0 score: 10