GHSA-vmw2-qwm8-x84c Marten has an injection vulnerability in its full-text search regConfig parameter
SummaryMarten's full-text search APIs interpolated the user-supplied `regConfig` parameter directly into the generated SQL without parameterization or validation, making every code path that exposes `regConfig` to untrusted input a SQL injection sink.Affected APIs`IQuerySession.SearchAsync<T>(string searchTerm, string regConfig, ...)``IQuerySession.PlainTextSearchAsync<T>(...)``IQuerySession.PhraseSearchAsync<T>(...)``IQuerySession.WebStyleSearchAsync<T>(...)``IQuerySession.PrefixSearchAsync<T>(...)``IQueryable<T>.Where(x => x.Search(term, regConfig))` and the matching `PlainTextSearch` / `PhraseSearch` / `WebStyleSearch` / `PrefixSearch` extension methodsDetailsIn the affected versions, [`FullTextWhereFragment`](https://github.com/JasperFx/marten/blob/master/src/Marten/Linq/SqlGeneration/Filters/FullTextWhereFragment.cs) renders the WHERE-clause SQL by string interpolation:`_regConfig` arrives unchanged from the public API surface above. Any value containing a single quote terminates the SQL literal and lets an attacker append arbitrary PostgreSQL.Confirmed exploit shapes (with `regConfig` set to attacker-controlled input)| Goal | Payload |
| --- | --- |
| Time-based blind | `english'::text); SELECT pg_sleep(5); --` |
| Information disclosure | `english'; SELECT version(); --` |
| DDL execution | `english'; DROP TABLE mt_doc_article; --` |All five overloads listed above produced SQL containing the verbatim payload.Impact**Confidentiality**: an attacker can append arbitrary `SELECT` statements and exfiltrate database contents through error channels, response timing, or — if the application surfaces query results — directly.**Integrity / Availability**: DDL, `UPDATE`, `DELETE`, and `pg_sleep`-style denial-of-service payloads succeed under the same vector. Concrete impact depends on the database role used by the Marten connection string.**Precondition**: the calling application must forward attacker-controlled input into the `regConfig` parameter (e.g. a `?lang=` query string mapped to `regConfig`). Applications that hard-code `regConfig` to a compile-time constant are not exploitable.PatchesFixed in **Marten 8.36.1** (and forward) by [#4343](https://github.com/JasperFx/marten/pull/4343).`FullTextWhereFragment` now validates `regConfig` against `^[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*(\.[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*)?$` (a simple PostgreSQL identifier, optionally schema-qualified, capped at `NAMEDATALEN-1` per side) and throws `ArgumentException` for anything else. The default value (`"english"`), schema-qualified configs (`"pg_catalog.english"`), and the standard PostgreSQL text-search configurations all continue to work.WorkaroundsIf users cannot upgrade immediately, do **one** of the following at the application boundary:Hard-code `regConfig` to a compile-time constant (`"english"`, `"simple"`, …) and never accept it from request input.Validate any externally-sourced `regConfig` value before passing it to Marten — e.g. against the same regex as the patch (`^[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*(\.[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*)?$`) or against an allowlist of PostgreSQL configurations the application actually uses.Drop the `regConfig` argument from the call site so Marten falls back to the safe default.ResourcesPatch PR: [JasperFx/marten#4343](https://github.com/JasperFx/marten/pull/4343)Patched file: [`FullTextWhereFragment.cs`](https://github.com/JasperFx/marten/blob/master/src/Marten/Linq/SqlGeneration/Filters/FullTextWhereFragment.cs)Regression tests: [`full_text_regconfig_sql_injection.cs`](https://github.com/JasperFx/marten/blob/master/src/LinqTests/Bugs/full_text_regconfig_sql_injection.cs)CWE-89: <https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/89.html>CreditReported privately to the JasperFx team with a working proof of concept covering all five affected overloads.
CVSS v3.1 score: 9.8