GHSA-gf9r-m956-97qx zebrad has consensus divergence via P2SH sigop undercount in pure-Rust disabled-opcode parser
Am I affectedYou are affected if:You run any version of `zebrad` up to and including `v4.4.1`.Your node validates blocks on mainnet, testnet, or any network where both Zebra and zcashd nodes participate.All default configurations are affected. No feature flags, non-default settings, or special build options are required.SummaryZebra's P2SH sigop counter uses a pure-Rust code path that short-circuits on disabled opcodes (such as `OP_CODESEPARATOR`), returning a partial count of zero for any sigops following the disabled opcode. The reference implementation (zcashd) correctly counts through disabled opcodes in its static sigop analysis. This produces a consensus divergence: Zebra accepts blocks that zcashd rejects when the block-wide `MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS = 20,000` threshold is crossed on one side but not the other.An attacker can exploit this without mining capability. Broadcasting transactions that spend P2SH outputs with malicious redeem scripts is sufficient; any Zebra miner who includes those transactions in a block triggers a chain split between Zebra and zcashd validators.DetailsThe P2SH sigop counter at `zebra-script/src/lib.rs:399` calls `script::Code(redeemed_bytes).sig_op_count(true)`, which is a pure-Rust path through `zcash_script-0.4.4`. The legacy (non-P2SH) sigop counter at `lib.rs:282-289` correctly uses the C++ FFI via `interpreter.legacy_sigop_count_script()`. Only the P2SH path bypasses the FFI.The Rust parser in `zcash_script-0.4.4/src/opcode/mod.rs:1247-1260` treats 16 disabled opcodes (0x7e through 0xab, including `OP_CAT`, `OP_SUBSTR`, `OP_AND`, `OP_OR`, `OP_XOR`, `OP_2MUL`, `OP_2DIV`, `OP_MUL`, `OP_DIV`, `OP_MOD`, `OP_LSHIFT`, `OP_RSHIFT`, and `OP_CODESEPARATOR`) as `Err(Error::Disabled(...))`. The `sig_op_count` function at `iter.rs:104-115` uses `try_fold`, which terminates on the first `Err` and returns the partial sum accumulated so far.zcashd's `GetOp2` (`script.h:514-562`) returns `true` for all non-push opcodes including the disabled range. Its `GetSigOpCount(true)` (`script.cpp:152-174`) continues counting through disabled opcodes. zcashd rejects disabled opcodes at execution time in the interpreter, not during static sigop analysis.A redeem script of `[0xab, OP_CHECKMULTISIG x 50]` produces: Zebra = 0 sigops, zcashd = 1,000 sigops. Across 21 inputs in a block, Zebra computes 0 while zcashd computes 21,000, crossing the `MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS = 20,000` threshold on one side only.PatchesPatched in Zebra 4.4.2. The fix routes the P2SH sigop counter through the same C++ FFI already used by the legacy sigop counter.WorkaroundsThere is no configuration-level workaround. All Zebra nodes validating blocks on a network shared with zcashd are affected. Upgrade as soon as the patched version is available.ImpactA chain split between Zebra and zcashd validators. The attacker broadcasts spending transactions referencing P2SH outputs whose redeem scripts contain a disabled opcode followed by `OP_CHECKSIG` or `OP_CHECKMULTISIG` opcodes. When a Zebra miner (estimated ~30% of current network hashrate) includes these transactions in a block, Zebra validators accept the block while zcashd validators reject it with `bad-blk-sigops`. The two halves of the network diverge and every subsequent block extending the Zebra-side tip inherits the divergence.The attacker does not need mining capability, RPC access, or any special privileges. The cost is the transaction fees for the funding and spending transactions.CreditReported by `@samsulselfut` via a private GitHub Security Advisory submission.
CVSS v4.0 score: 9.3