GHSA-v5jw-96jm-7h2c Stanza: Remote Code Execution via Unsafe Pickle Deserialization in Model Loaders
SummaryStanza 1.12.0 attempts to safely load PyTorch checkpoint files using `torch.load(..., weights_only=True)`, but automatically falls back to the fully unsafe `torch.load(..., weights_only=False)` when the safe load raises `pickle.UnpicklingError`. Because the `UnpicklingError` condition is fully attacker-controllable, any `.pt` file that contains a single unsupported pickle global will trigger it.An attacker who can place a malicious pretrain or model file on disk (via supply-chain compromise, a poisoned model repository, or a shared model cache) can achieve arbitrary code execution on any machine that loads a Stanza NLP pipeline.Code execution occurs inside the Stanza pretrain-loading API, not merely by calling `torch.load` directly.DetailsThe vulnerable code is in [pretrain.py#L59-L67](https://github.com/stanfordnlp/stanza/blob/main/stanza/models/common/pretrain.py#L59-L67) (Stanza 1.12.0):When `weights_only=True` is passed, PyTorch's deserializer raises `pickle.UnpicklingError` for any object whose class or callable is not on the safe-globals allowlist. This is the intended safety mechanism. However, Stanza catches that exception and immediately reloads the **same attacker-controlled file** with `weights_only=False`, which invokes Python's full pickle deserializer and executes any `__reduce__` method in the file without restriction.The fallback is triggered reliably and intentionally: an attacker embeds one unsupported pickle global (e.g., `builtins.open`) anywhere in an otherwise structurally valid Stanza pretrain state dict. The safe load rejects it; the unsafe reload runs it.**The same try/except pattern exists in at least five additional loaders in Stanza 1.12.0:**| File | Lines |
|------|-------|
| `stanza/models/common/pretrain.py` | 64–66 |
| `stanza/models/coref/model.py` | 251–253, 329–331 |
| `stanza/models/classifiers/trainer.py` | 80–82 |
| `stanza/models/constituency/base_trainer.py` | 94–96 |Additionally, `stanza/models/lemma_classifier/base_model.py:127` calls `torch.load(filename, lambda storage, loc: storage)` with no `weights_only` argument at all, which defaults to `False` on any PyTorch < 2.6.The call chain from the public API to the vulnerable fallback is:PoC**Environment:** Python 3.11, `stanza==1.12.0`, `torch==2.12.0`**Step 1: Install dependencies:****Step 2: Save the following as `exploit.py`:****Step 3 : Run:****Expected output (confirmed):**The sentinel is created exclusively by the Stanza pretrain-loading API invoking the unsafe fallback : not by a direct `torch.load` call in the PoC.Impact**Vulnerability class:** CWE-502 : Deserialization of Untrusted Data**Who is impacted:** Any user, researcher, CI/CD pipeline, or production NLP service that loads a Stanza model pretrain file from a source that is not under the victim's exclusive cryptographic control. Concretely:Developers who run `stanza.Pipeline(lang)` after downloading models from HuggingFace or GitHubCI pipelines that automatically refresh Stanza models during buildsResearch environments that share pretrain files over shared network storage or model repositories**Attack prerequisites:** The attacker must be able to place a malicious `.pt` pretrain file at a path that Stanza will load. Realistic delivery vectors include:Compromise of a HuggingFace model repository hosting Stanza pretrain weightsPoisoning of a shared model cache directory (NFS, S3, artifact store)A malicious pretrain file distributed via a third-party fine-tuning hub or research repo**What an attacker achieves:** Arbitrary code execution with the full privileges of the process running `stanza.Pipeline()`, typically a developer workstation, a Jupyter notebook server, or a GPU training node. This allows credential theft (HuggingFace tokens, cloud IAM keys from environment variables), persistent backdoors, data exfiltration, and lateral movement in multi-tenant training infrastructure.**Recommended fix:**Remove the unsafe fallback entirely. If `weights_only=True` raises `UnpicklingError`, fail closed:If legacy NumPy-containing pretrain files must be supported, use PyTorch's `add_safe_globals()` API to allowlist the specific NumPy dtypes required, rather than disabling all safety checks. Apply the same fix to all six affected loaders listed above.
CVSS v3.1 score: 7.5