GHSA-xmjm-86qv-g226 AVideo Affected by Arbitrary File Deletion via Path Traversal in CloneSite deleteDump Parameter
SummaryThe `deleteDump` parameter in `plugin/CloneSite/cloneServer.json.php` is passed directly to `unlink()` without any path sanitization. An attacker with valid clone credentials can use path traversal sequences (e.g., `../../`) to delete arbitrary files on the server, including critical application files such as `configuration.php`, causing complete denial of service or enabling further attacks by removing security-critical files.DetailsIn `plugin/CloneSite/cloneServer.json.php`, the `$clonesDir` variable is set to the application's storage path appended with `clones/` (line 11). When a `deleteDump` GET parameter is provided, its value is concatenated directly into a path passed to `unlink()` with no validation:The intended functionality is to delete SQL dump files generated during the clone process (named via `uniqid()` at line 58). However, because `$_GET['deleteDump']` is never passed through `basename()`, `realpath()`, or any other path normalization function, an attacker can supply directory traversal sequences to escape the `$clonesDir` directory.Given a typical `$clonesDir` of `/var/www/html/videos/clones/`, the payload `../../videos/configuration.php` resolves to `/var/www/html/videos/configuration.php`.The authentication guard `thisURLCanCloneMe()` at line 38 requires a valid URL and matching key for an admin-approved clone entry (status `=== 'a'`). This is a service-level credential, not an admin session — any approved clone partner possesses these credentials as part of normal operations.The legitimate clone client at `cloneClient.json.php:275` only sends server-generated `$json->sqlFile` values (produced by `uniqid()`), but nothing prevents a holder of valid credentials from crafting a manual HTTP request with an arbitrary `deleteDump` value.PoC**Prerequisites:** A valid clone URL and key pair registered and approved by an admin.**Step 1:** Verify the target file exists (e.g., the application configuration file).**Step 2:** Send the path traversal payload via the `deleteDump` parameter.**Expected response:**`"error":false` confirms `unlink()` returned `true` — the file was successfully deleted.**Step 3:** Confirm deletion.**Step 4:** At this point the entire AVideo application is broken, as `configuration.php` contains database credentials and is `require_once`'d by nearly every endpoint.Impact**Arbitrary file deletion:** An attacker can delete any file readable by the web server process, including application source code, configuration files, uploaded media, and database dumps containing credentials.**Complete denial of service:** Deleting `configuration.php` renders the entire AVideo installation non-functional. Every page load will fatal-error on the missing `require_once`.**Security control bypass:** Deleting `.htaccess` files or other access-control configurations can expose otherwise-protected directories and files.**Data loss:** Uploaded videos, user photos, and SQL backups stored under the videos directory can be permanently destroyed.**Potential escalation:** Deleting specific files (e.g., plugin configurations, auth modules) may weaken the application's security posture and enable further attacks.Recommended FixApply `basename()` to the `deleteDump` parameter to strip any directory traversal components, ensuring the deletion is restricted to files within `$clonesDir`:The fix applies defense-in-depth: `basename()` strips path components, and the `realpath()` check ensures the resolved path is still within the intended directory even if `basename()` behavior changes across PHP versions.
CVSS v3.1 score: 8.1