GHSA-rwjr-qjj3-mq2f Admidio module-administrator can delete or reorder categories owned by other modules via dead authorization check in `modules/categories.php`
Summary`modules/categories.php` checks that the supplied `type` parameter (`ANN`, `EVT`, `ROL`, `USF`, …) corresponds to a module the actor administers. The follow-up "is this specific category editable by me" check at lines 56-61 is dead code because it compares `$getType` (a category-type code) against mode names (`edit`/`save`/`delete`); the condition is permanently false, so `$category->isEditable()` is never invoked. The `delete`, `sequence`, and `save` switch cases load the category by the supplied UUID and act on it without re-checking that the category belongs to a module the actor administers. A user holding only one module-administrator right can therefore destroy or reorder empty categories belonging to *other* modules — for example, an announcements administrator can delete role categories, profile-field categories, or weblink categories that they have no right to touch.Detailsvulnerable code`modules/categories.php:40-61`:The `in_array($getType, array('edit','save','delete'))` test compares the category-type code to mode names. `$getType` can only be `ANN`, `AWA`, `EVT`, `FOT`, `LNK`, `ROL`, `USF`, or `IVT` (it is rejected by `admFuncVariableIsValid` if it is anything else), so the array intersection is permanently empty. The intended check was probably `in_array($getMode, array('edit','save','delete'))`. As written, `$category->isEditable()` is never called from this entry point, and the `$category` symbol is not defined here at all (it is local to other code paths), so even if the operator were corrected the body of the if would throw an undefined-variable warning before doing anything useful.`modules/categories.php:99-110` — the `delete` switch case just loads the category by UUID and deletes it, with no per-record permission check:`modules/categories.php:112-123` — the `sequence` switch case has the same shape.`Category::delete()` blocks deletion of the system / default category and of categories that still have referenced records (events, announcements, role assignments, etc.), but does *not* check whether the category's `cat_type` matches a module the actor has rights over.exploitation flowAttacker has `Announcements administrator` (or any other single module-admin right) but is **not** a roles / inventory / weblinks administrator.Attacker observes the UUID of a target category by listing categories of any type they DO have rights over (the listing returns category UUIDs of their own type), or simply enumerates by visiting `modules/categories.php?type=<their_type>&mode=list`.Attacker requests `POST /modules/categories.php?mode=delete&type=ANN&uuid=<UUID-of-foreign-category>` carrying their valid `adm_csrf_token`. `type=ANN` satisfies the rights gate at line 47-58 (they are an announcements admin). The dead `if` at line 56 does not fire. The switch falls into `case 'delete':` which deletes the category without re-checking the type.Server replies `{"status":"success"}`. The cross-module category is gone.The same primitive applies to `mode=sequence` (reorder), and to `mode=save` for editing the category's name and description.PoCTested on a fresh install of HEAD `c5cde53` running on PHP 8.4 + MariaDB 11.8 at `http://127.0.0.1:8085`. Reproduces in two requests. `testadmin` is the bootstrap administrator created during install; `annadmin` is a freshly-created user whose only role is `Association's board` with `rol_announcements=1` (no roles / inventory / weblinks rights).The same chain with `mode=sequence&direction=UP` reorders a foreign category. With `mode=save`, an attacker can rename the foreign category and (via the unprotected `cat_type` rebind in `CategoryService::save()` line 210) re-tag it to a different module type, breaking referential consistency.ImpactAny user with at least one module-administrator right can delete or reorder admin-managed categories of other modules:Role categories (the structural grouping of all roles in the organisation)Event calendars (each calendar is a category of type `EVT`)Profile-field categories (the grouping of which fields are shown on which profile tab)Weblink categoriesForum categories (`FOT`)Inventory categories (`IVT`)`Category::delete()` blocks categories with active rows, so the attack lands on currently-empty categories, but a malicious announcement-admin can also delete the *default* category for a module immediately after the legitimate admin deletes its last record, eliminating the implicit "Default Category" before a new record can re-create it. The target organisation loses the structural grouping for an entire module and must rebuild it by hand from a fresh database state.The CVSS reflects: any user with a single module-admin role can permanently destroy structural metadata for every other module. `PR:L` because module-admin rights are routinely granted to non-administrative users (chairs of subgroups, content editors). `I:H` because data is destroyed and there is no in-product undo. `A:N` because the system stays up; only the affected module's metadata is gone.Recommended FixReplace the dead `if (in_array($getType, array('edit', 'save', 'delete')))` block with a real check on `$getMode` plus a per-record `isEditable()` test that re-derives the module from `cat_type`:Additionally, `CategoryService::save()` should refuse to mutate `cat_type` when editing an existing record (drop the `$this->categoryRessource->setValue('cat_type', $this->type)` at line 210, or set it only when `isNewRecord()`).A regression test should call `categories.php?mode=delete&type=ANN&uuid=<ROL-category>` as a user with only `isAdministratorAnnouncements()` and assert the response is `SYS_NO_RIGHTS` rather than `success`.
CVSS v3.1 score: 6.5