src/leap/mx/vendor/pgpy/packet/fields.py
class ECDHPriv(ECDSAPriv, ECDHPub):
    def __bytearray__(self):
        _b = ECDHPub.__bytearray__(self)
        _b += self.s2k.__bytearray__()
        if not self.s2k:
            _b += self.s.to_mpibytes()

            if self.s2k.usage == 0:
                _b += self.chksum

        else:
            _b += self.encbytes

        return _b

    def __len__(self):
        # because of the inheritance used for this, ECDSAPub.__len__ is called instead of ECDHPub.__len__
        # the only real difference is self.kdf, so we can just add that
        return super(ECDHPriv, self).__len__() + len(self.kdf)

    def _generate(self, oid):
        ECDSAPriv._generate(self, oid)
        self.kdf.halg = self.oid.kdf_halg
        self.kdf.encalg = self.oid.kek_alg

    def publen(self):
        return ECDHPub.__len__(self)

    def parse(self, packet):
        ECDHPub.parse(self, packet)
        self.s2k.parse(packet)

        if not self.s2k:
            self.s = MPI(packet)

            if self.s2k.usage == 0:
                self.chksum = packet[:2]
                del packet[:2]

        else:
            ##TODO: this needs to be bounded to the length of the encrypted key material
            self.encbytes = packet
src/leap/mx/vendor/pgpy/packet/types.py
class Packet(Dispatchable):
    __typeid__ = -1
    __headercls__ = Header

    def __init__(self):
        super(Packet, self).__init__()
        self.header = self.__headercls__()
        if isinstance(self.__typeid__, six.integer_types):
            self.header.tag = self.__typeid__

    @abc.abstractmethod
    def __bytearray__(self):
        return self.header.__bytearray__()

    def __len__(self):
        return len(self.header) + self.header.length

    def __repr__(self):
        return "<{cls:s} [tag 0x{tag:02d}] at 0x{id:x}>".format(cls=self.__class__.__name__, tag=self.header.tag, id=id(self))

    def update_hlen(self):
        self.header.length = len(self.__bytearray__()) - len(self.header)

    @abc.abstractmethod
    def parse(self, packet):
        if self.header.tag == 0:
            self.header.parse(packet)
src/leap/mx/vendor/pgpy/decorators.py
def sdproperty(fget):
    def defset(obj, val):  # pragma: no cover
        raise TypeError(str(val.__class__))

    class SDProperty(property):
        def register(self, cls=None, fset=None):
            return self.fset.register(cls, fset)

        def setter(self, fset):
            self.register(object, fset)
            return type(self)(self.fget, self.fset, self.fdel, self.__doc__)

    return SDProperty(fget, sdmethod(defset))
src/leap/mx/vendor/pgpy/packet/fields.py
class ElGPub(PubKey):
    __pubfields__ = ('p', 'g', 'y')

    def __pubkey__(self):
        raise NotImplementedError()

    def parse(self, packet):
        self.p = MPI(packet)
        self.g = MPI(packet)
        self.y = MPI(packet)
src/leap/mx/vendor/pgpy/packet/fields.py
class SubPackets(collections.MutableMapping, Field):
    _spmodule = signature

    def __init__(self):
        super(SubPackets, self).__init__()
        self._hashed_sp = collections.OrderedDict()
        self._unhashed_sp = collections.OrderedDict()

    def __bytearray__(self):
        _bytes = bytearray()
        _bytes += self.__hashbytearray__()
        _bytes += self.__unhashbytearray__()
        return _bytes

    def __hashbytearray__(self):
        _bytes = bytearray()
        _bytes += self.int_to_bytes(sum(len(sp) for sp in self._hashed_sp.values()), 2)
        for hsp in self._hashed_sp.values():
            _bytes += hsp.__bytearray__()
        return _bytes

    def __unhashbytearray__(self):
        _bytes = bytearray()
        _bytes += self.int_to_bytes(sum(len(sp) for sp in self._unhashed_sp.values()), 2)
        for uhsp in self._unhashed_sp.values():
            _bytes += uhsp.__bytearray__()
        return _bytes

    def __len__(self):  # pragma: no cover
        return sum(sp.header.length for sp in itertools.chain(self._hashed_sp.values(), self._unhashed_sp.values())) + 4

    def __iter__(self):
        for sp in itertools.chain(self._hashed_sp.values(), self._unhashed_sp.values()):
            yield sp

    def __setitem__(self, key, val):
        # the key provided should always be the classname for the subpacket
        # but, there can be multiple subpackets of the same type
        # so, it should be stored in the format: [h_]<key>_<seqid>
        # where:
        #  - <key> is the classname of val
        #  - <seqid> is a sequence id, starting at 0, for a given classname

        i = 0
        if isinstance(key, tuple):  # pragma: no cover
            key, i = key

        d = self._unhashed_sp
        if key.startswith('h_'):
            d, key = self._hashed_sp, key[2:]

        while (key, i) in d:
            i += 1

        d[(key, i)] = val

    def __getitem__(self, key):
        if isinstance(key, tuple):  # pragma: no cover
            return self._hashed_sp.get(key, self._unhashed_sp.get(key))

        if key.startswith('h_'):
            return [v for k, v in self._hashed_sp.items() if key[2:] == k[0]]

        else:
            return [v for k, v in itertools.chain(self._hashed_sp.items(), self._unhashed_sp.items()) if key == k[0]]

    def __delitem__(self, key):
        ##TODO: this
        raise NotImplementedError

    def __contains__(self, key):
        return key in set(k for k, _ in itertools.chain(self._hashed_sp, self._unhashed_sp))

    def __copy__(self):
        sp = SubPackets()
        sp._hashed_sp = self._hashed_sp.copy()
        sp._unhashed_sp = self._unhashed_sp.copy()

        return sp

    def addnew(self, spname, hashed=False, **kwargs):
        nsp = getattr(self._spmodule, spname)()
        for p, v in kwargs.items():
            if hasattr(nsp, p):
                setattr(nsp, p, v)
        nsp.update_hlen()
        if hashed:
            self['h_' + spname] = nsp

        else:
            self[spname] = nsp

    def update_hlen(self):
        for sp in self:
            sp.update_hlen()

    def parse(self, packet):
        hl = self.bytes_to_int(packet[:2])
        del packet[:2]

        # we do it this way because we can't ensure that subpacket headers are sized appropriately
        # for their contents, but we can at least output that correctly
        # so instead of tracking how many bytes we can now output, we track how many bytes have we parsed so far
        plen = len(packet)
        while plen - len(packet) < hl:
            sp = SignatureSP(packet)
            self['h_' + sp.__class__.__name__] = sp

        uhl = self.bytes_to_int(packet[:2])
        del packet[:2]

        plen = len(packet)
        while plen - len(packet) < uhl:
            sp = SignatureSP(packet)
            self[sp.__class__.__name__] = sp
src/leap/mx/vendor/pgpy/packet/fields.py
class DSAPriv(PrivKey, DSAPub):
    __privfields__ = ('x',)

    def __privkey__(self):
        params = dsa.DSAParameterNumbers(self.p, self.q, self.g)
        pn = dsa.DSAPublicNumbers(self.y, params)
        return dsa.DSAPrivateNumbers(self.x, pn).private_key(default_backend())

    def _generate(self, key_size):
        if any(c != 0 for c in self):  # pragma: no cover
            raise PGPError("key is already populated")

        # generate some big numbers!
        pk = dsa.generate_private_key(key_size, default_backend())
        pkn = pk.private_numbers()

        self.p = MPI(pkn.public_numbers.parameter_numbers.p)
        self.q = MPI(pkn.public_numbers.parameter_numbers.q)
        self.g = MPI(pkn.public_numbers.parameter_numbers.g)
        self.y = MPI(pkn.public_numbers.y)
        self.x = MPI(pkn.x)

        del pkn
        del pk

        self._compute_chksum()

    def parse(self, packet):
        super(DSAPriv, self).parse(packet)
        self.s2k.parse(packet)

        if not self.s2k:
            self.x = MPI(packet)

        else:
            self.encbytes = packet

        if self.s2k.usage in [0, 255]:
            self.chksum = packet[:2]
            del packet[:2]

    def decrypt_keyblob(self, passphrase):
        kb = super(DSAPriv, self).decrypt_keyblob(passphrase)
        del passphrase

        self.x = MPI(kb)

        if self.s2k.usage in [254, 255]:
            self.chksum = kb
            del kb

    def sign(self, sigdata, hash_alg):
        signer = self.__privkey__().signer(hash_alg)
        signer.update(sigdata)
        return signer.finalize()
src/leap/mx/vendor/pgpy/packet/types.py
class Primary(Key):
    pass
src/leap/mx/vendor/pgpy/types.py
class Fingerprint(str):
    """
    A subclass of ``str``. Can be compared using == and != to ``str``, ``unicode``, and other :py:obj:`Fingerprint` instances.

    Primarily used as a key for internal dictionaries, so it ignores spaces when comparing and hashing
    """
    @property
    def keyid(self):
        return str(self).replace(' ', '')[-16:]

    @property
    def shortid(self):
        return str(self).replace(' ', '')[-8:]

    def __new__(cls, content):
        if isinstance(content, Fingerprint):
            return content

        # validate input before continuing: this should be a string of 40 hex digits
        content = content.upper().replace(' ', '')
        if not bool(re.match(r'^[A-F0-9]{40}$', content)):
            raise ValueError("Expected: String of 40 hex digits")

        # store in the format: "AAAA BBBB CCCC DDDD EEEE  FFFF 0000 1111 2222 3333"
        #                                               ^^ note 2 spaces here
        spaces = [ ' ' if i != 4 else '  ' for i in range(10) ]
        chunks = [ ''.join(g) for g in six.moves.zip_longest(*[iter(content)] * 4) ]
        content = ''.join(j for i in six.moves.zip_longest(chunks, spaces, fillvalue='') for j in i).strip()

        return str.__new__(cls, content)

    def __eq__(self, other):
        if isinstance(other, Fingerprint):
            return str(self) == str(other)

        if isinstance(other, (six.text_type, bytes, bytearray)):
            if isinstance(other, (bytes, bytearray)):  # pragma: no cover
                other = other.decode('latin-1')

            other = str(other).replace(' ', '')
            return any([self.replace(' ', '') == other,
                        self.keyid == other,
                        self.shortid == other])

        return False  # pragma: no cover

    def __ne__(self, other):
        return not (self == other)

    def __hash__(self):
        return hash(str(self.replace(' ', '')))

    def __bytes__(self):
        return binascii.unhexlify(six.b(self.replace(' ', '')))
src/leap/mx/vendor/pgpy/packet/fields.py
class ECDHPub(PubKey):
    __pubfields__ = ('x', 'y')

    def __init__(self):
        super(ECDHPub, self).__init__()
        self.oid = None
        self.kdf = ECKDF()

    def __len__(self):
        return sum([len(getattr(self, i)) - 2 for i in self.__pubfields__] +
                   [3,
                    len(self.kdf),
                    len(encoder.encode(self.oid.value)) - 1])

    def __pubkey__(self):
        return ec.EllipticCurvePublicNumbers(self.x, self.y, self.oid.curve()).public_key(default_backend())

    def __bytearray__(self):
        _b = bytearray()
        _b += encoder.encode(self.oid.value)[1:]
        # 0x04 || x || y
        # where x and y are the same length
        _xy = b'\x04' + self.x.to_mpibytes()[2:] + self.y.to_mpibytes()[2:]
        _b += MPI(self.bytes_to_int(_xy, 'big')).to_mpibytes()
        _b += self.kdf.__bytearray__()

        return _b

    def __copy__(self):
        pkt = super(ECDHPub, self).__copy__()
        pkt.oid = self.oid
        pkt.kdf = copy.copy(self.kdf)
        return pkt

    def parse(self, packet):
        """
        Algorithm-Specific Fields for ECDH keys:

          o  a variable-length field containing a curve OID, formatted
             as follows:

             -  a one-octet size of the following field; values 0 and
                0xFF are reserved for future extensions

             -  the octets representing a curve OID, defined in
                Section 11

             -  MPI of an EC point representing a public key

          o  a variable-length field containing KDF parameters,
             formatted as follows:

             -  a one-octet size of the following fields; values 0 and
                0xff are reserved for future extensions

             -  a one-octet value 01, reserved for future extensions

             -  a one-octet hash function ID used with a KDF

             -  a one-octet algorithm ID for the symmetric algorithm
                used to wrap the symmetric key used for the message
                encryption; see Section 8 for details
        """
        oidlen = packet[0]
        del packet[0]
        _oid = bytearray(b'\x06')
        _oid.append(oidlen)
        _oid += bytearray(packet[:oidlen])
        # try:
        oid, _  = decoder.decode(bytes(_oid))

        # except:
        #     raise PGPError("Bad OID octet stream: b'{:s}'".format(''.join(['\\x{:02X}'.format(c) for c in _oid])))
        self.oid = EllipticCurveOID(oid)
        del packet[:oidlen]

        # flen = (self.oid.bit_length // 8)
        xy = bytearray(MPI(packet).to_mpibytes()[2:])
        # xy = bytearray(MPI(packet).to_bytes(flen, 'big'))
        # the first byte is just \x04
        del xy[:1]
        # now xy needs to be separated into x, y
        xylen = len(xy)
        x, y = xy[:xylen // 2], xy[xylen // 2:]
        self.x = MPI(self.bytes_to_int(x))
        self.y = MPI(self.bytes_to_int(y))

        self.kdf.parse(packet)
src/leap/mx/vendor/pgpy/packet/fields.py
class ECDHCipherText(CipherText):
    __mpis__ = ('vX', 'vY')

    @classmethod
    def encrypt(cls, pk, *args):
        """
        For convenience, the synopsis of the encoding method is given below;
        however, this section, [NIST-SP800-56A], and [RFC3394] are the
        normative sources of the definition.

            Obtain the authenticated recipient public key R
            Generate an ephemeral key pair {v, V=vG}
            Compute the shared point S = vR;
            m = symm_alg_ID || session key || checksum || pkcs5_padding;
            curve_OID_len = (byte)len(curve_OID);
            Param = curve_OID_len || curve_OID || public_key_alg_ID || 03
            || 01 || KDF_hash_ID || KEK_alg_ID for AESKeyWrap || "Anonymous
            Sender    " || recipient_fingerprint;
            Z_len = the key size for the KEK_alg_ID used with AESKeyWrap
            Compute Z = KDF( S, Z_len, Param );
            Compute C = AESKeyWrap( Z, m ) as per [RFC3394]
            VB = convert point V to the octet string
            Output (MPI(VB) || len(C) || C).

        The decryption is the inverse of the method given.  Note that the
        recipient obtains the shared secret by calculating
        """
        # *args should be:
        # - m
        #
        _m, = args

        # m may need to be PKCS5-padded
        padder = PKCS7(64).padder()
        m = padder.update(_m) + padder.finalize()

        km = pk.keymaterial

        ct = cls()

        # generate ephemeral key pair, then store it in ct
        v = ec.generate_private_key(km.oid.curve(), default_backend())
        ct.vX = MPI(v.public_key().public_numbers().x)
        ct.vY = MPI(v.public_key().public_numbers().y)

        # compute the shared point S
        s = v.exchange(ec.ECDH(), km.__pubkey__())

        # derive the wrapping key
        z = km.kdf.derive_key(s, km.oid, PubKeyAlgorithm.ECDH, pk.fingerprint)

        # compute C
        ct.c = aes_key_wrap(z, m, default_backend())

        return ct

    def decrypt(self, pk, *args):
        km = pk.keymaterial
        # assemble the public component of ephemeral key v
        v = ec.EllipticCurvePublicNumbers(self.vX, self.vY, km.oid.curve()).public_key(default_backend())

        # compute s using the inverse of how it was derived during encryption
        s = km.__privkey__().exchange(ec.ECDH(), v)

        # derive the wrapping key
        z = km.kdf.derive_key(s, km.oid, PubKeyAlgorithm.ECDH, pk.fingerprint)

        # unwrap and unpad m
        _m = aes_key_unwrap(z, self.c, default_backend())

        padder = PKCS7(64).unpadder()
        return padder.update(_m) + padder.finalize()

    def __init__(self):
        super(ECDHCipherText, self).__init__()
        self.c = bytearray(0)

    def __bytearray__(self):
        _bytes = bytearray()
        _xy = b'\x04' + self.vX.to_mpibytes()[2:] + self.vY.to_mpibytes()[2:]
        _bytes += MPI(self.bytes_to_int(_xy, 'big')).to_mpibytes()
        _bytes.append(len(self.c))
        _bytes += self.c

        return _bytes

    def parse(self, packet):
        # self.v = MPI(packet)
        xy = bytearray(MPI(packet).to_mpibytes()[2:])
        del xy[:1]
        xylen = len(xy)
        x, y = xy[:xylen // 2], xy[xylen // 2:]
        self.vX = MPI(self.bytes_to_int(x))
        self.vY = MPI(self.bytes_to_int(y))

        clen = packet[0]
        del packet[0]

        self.c += packet[:clen]
        del packet[:clen]
src/leap/mx/vendor/pgpy/packet/fields.py
class RSASignature(Signature):
    __mpis__ = ('md_mod_n', )

    def __sig__(self):
        return self.md_mod_n.to_mpibytes()[2:]

    def parse(self, packet):
        self.md_mod_n = MPI(packet)

    def from_signer(self, sig):
        self.md_mod_n = MPI(self.bytes_to_int(sig))
src/leap/mx/vendor/pgpy/symenc.py
def _encrypt(pt, key, alg, iv=None):
    if iv is None:
        iv = b'\x00' * (alg.block_size // 8)

    if alg.is_insecure:
        raise PGPInsecureCipher("{:s} is not secure. Do not use it for encryption!".format(alg.name))

    if not callable(alg.cipher):
        raise PGPEncryptionError("Cipher {:s} not supported".format(alg.name))

    try:
        encryptor = Cipher(alg.cipher(key), modes.CFB(iv), default_backend()).encryptor()

    except UnsupportedAlgorithm as ex:  # pragma: no cover
        six.raise_from(PGPEncryptionError, ex)

    else:
        return bytearray(encryptor.update(pt) + encryptor.finalize())
src/leap/mx/vendor/pgpy/packet/fields.py
class ECDSASignature(DSASignature):
    def from_signer(self, sig):
        seq, _ = decoder.decode(sig)
        self.r = MPI(seq[0])
        self.s = MPI(seq[1])
src/leap/mx/vendor/pgpy/packet/types.py
class Private(Key):
    pass
src/leap/mx/vendor/pgpy/packet/fields.py
class String2Key(Field):
    """
    3.7.  String-to-Key (S2K) Specifiers

    String-to-key (S2K) specifiers are used to convert passphrase strings
    into symmetric-key encryption/decryption keys.  They are used in two
    places, currently: to encrypt the secret part of private keys in the
    private keyring, and to convert passphrases to encryption keys for
    symmetrically encrypted messages.

    3.7.1.  String-to-Key (S2K) Specifier Types

    There are three types of S2K specifiers currently supported, and
    some reserved values:

       ID          S2K Type
       --          --------
       0           Simple S2K
       1           Salted S2K
       2           Reserved value
       3           Iterated and Salted S2K
       100 to 110  Private/Experimental S2K

    These are described in Sections 3.7.1.1 - 3.7.1.3.

    3.7.1.1.  Simple S2K

    This directly hashes the string to produce the key data.  See below
    for how this hashing is done.

       Octet 0:        0x00
       Octet 1:        hash algorithm

    Simple S2K hashes the passphrase to produce the session key.  The
    manner in which this is done depends on the size of the session key
    (which will depend on the cipher used) and the size of the hash
    algorithm's output.  If the hash size is greater than the session key
    size, the high-order (leftmost) octets of the hash are used as the
    key.

    If the hash size is less than the key size, multiple instances of the
    hash context are created -- enough to produce the required key data.
    These instances are preloaded with 0, 1, 2, ... octets of zeros (that
    is to say, the first instance has no preloading, the second gets
    preloaded with 1 octet of zero, the third is preloaded with two
    octets of zeros, and so forth).

    As the data is hashed, it is given independently to each hash
    context.  Since the contexts have been initialized differently, they
    will each produce different hash output.  Once the passphrase is
    hashed, the output data from the multiple hashes is concatenated,
    first hash leftmost, to produce the key data, with any excess octets
    on the right discarded.

    3.7.1.2.  Salted S2K

    This includes a "salt" value in the S2K specifier -- some arbitrary
    data -- that gets hashed along with the passphrase string, to help
    prevent dictionary attacks.

       Octet 0:        0x01
       Octet 1:        hash algorithm
       Octets 2-9:     8-octet salt value

    Salted S2K is exactly like Simple S2K, except that the input to the
    hash function(s) consists of the 8 octets of salt from the S2K
    specifier, followed by the passphrase.

    3.7.1.3.  Iterated and Salted S2K

    This includes both a salt and an octet count.  The salt is combined
    with the passphrase and the resulting value is hashed repeatedly.
    This further increases the amount of work an attacker must do to try
    dictionary attacks.

       Octet  0:        0x03
       Octet  1:        hash algorithm
       Octets 2-9:      8-octet salt value
       Octet  10:       count, a one-octet, coded value

    The count is coded into a one-octet number using the following
    formula:

       #define EXPBIAS 6
           count = ((Int32)16 + (c & 15)) << ((c >> 4) + EXPBIAS);

    The above formula is in C, where "Int32" is a type for a 32-bit
    integer, and the variable "c" is the coded count, Octet 10.

    Iterated-Salted S2K hashes the passphrase and salt data multiple
    times.  The total number of octets to be hashed is specified in the
    encoded count in the S2K specifier.  Note that the resulting count
    value is an octet count of how many octets will be hashed, not an
    iteration count.

    Initially, one or more hash contexts are set up as with the other S2K
    algorithms, depending on how many octets of key data are needed.
    Then the salt, followed by the passphrase data, is repeatedly hashed
    until the number of octets specified by the octet count has been
    hashed.  The one exception is that if the octet count is less than
    the size of the salt plus passphrase, the full salt plus passphrase
    will be hashed even though that is greater than the octet count.
    After the hashing is done, the data is unloaded from the hash
    context(s) as with the other S2K algorithms.
    """
    @sdproperty
    def encalg(self):
        return self._encalg

    @encalg.register(int)
    @encalg.register(SymmetricKeyAlgorithm)
    def encalg_int(self, val):
        self._encalg = SymmetricKeyAlgorithm(val)

    @sdproperty
    def specifier(self):
        return self._specifier

    @specifier.register(int)
    @specifier.register(String2KeyType)
    def specifier_int(self, val):
        self._specifier = String2KeyType(val)

    @sdproperty
    def halg(self):
        return self._halg

    @halg.register(int)
    @halg.register(HashAlgorithm)
    def halg_int(self, val):
        self._halg = HashAlgorithm(val)

    @sdproperty
    def count(self):
        return (16 + (self._count & 15)) << ((self._count >> 4) + 6)

    @count.register(int)
    def count_int(self, val):
        if val < 0 or val > 255:  # pragma: no cover
            raise ValueError("count must be between 0 and 256")
        self._count = val

    def __init__(self):
        super(String2Key, self).__init__()
        self.usage = 0
        self.encalg = 0
        self.specifier = 0
        self.iv = None

        # specifier-specific fields
        # simple, salted, iterated
        self.halg = 0

        # salted, iterated
        self.salt = bytearray()

        # iterated
        self.count = 0

    def __bytearray__(self):
        _bytes = bytearray()
        _bytes.append(self.usage)
        if bool(self):
            _bytes.append(self.encalg)
            _bytes.append(self.specifier)
            if self.specifier >= String2KeyType.Simple:
                _bytes.append(self.halg)
            if self.specifier >= String2KeyType.Salted:
                _bytes += self.salt
            if self.specifier == String2KeyType.Iterated:
                _bytes.append(self._count)
            if self.iv is not None:
                _bytes += self.iv
        return _bytes

    def __len__(self):
        return len(self.__bytearray__())

    def __bool__(self):
        return self.usage in [254, 255]

    def __nonzero__(self):
        return self.__bool__()

    def __copy__(self):
        s2k = String2Key()
        s2k.usage = self.usage
        s2k.encalg = self.encalg
        s2k.specifier = self.specifier
        s2k.iv = self.iv
        s2k.halg = self.halg
        s2k.salt = copy.copy(self.salt)
        s2k.count = self._count
        return s2k

    def parse(self, packet, iv=True):
        self.usage = packet[0]
        del packet[0]

        if bool(self):
            self.encalg = packet[0]
            del packet[0]

            self.specifier = packet[0]
            del packet[0]

            if self.specifier >= String2KeyType.Simple:
                # this will always be true
                self.halg = packet[0]
                del packet[0]

            if self.specifier >= String2KeyType.Salted:
                self.salt = packet[:8]
                del packet[:8]

            if self.specifier == String2KeyType.Iterated:
                self.count = packet[0]
                del packet[0]

            if iv:
                self.iv = packet[:(self.encalg.block_size // 8)]
                del packet[:(self.encalg.block_size // 8)]

    def derive_key(self, passphrase):
        ##TODO: raise an exception if self.usage is not 254 or 255
        keylen = self.encalg.key_size
        hashlen = self.halg.digest_size * 8

        ctx = int(math.ceil((keylen / hashlen)))

        # Simple S2K - always done
        hsalt = b''
        hpass = passphrase.encode('latin-1')

        # salted, iterated S2K
        if self.specifier >= String2KeyType.Salted:
            hsalt = bytes(self.salt)

        count = len(hsalt + hpass)
        if self.specifier == String2KeyType.Iterated and self.count > len(hsalt + hpass):
            count = self.count

        hcount = (count // len(hsalt + hpass))
        hleft = count - (hcount * len(hsalt + hpass))

        hashdata = ((hsalt + hpass) * hcount) + (hsalt + hpass)[:hleft]

        h = []
        for i in range(0, ctx):
            _h = self.halg.hasher
            _h.update(b'\x00' * i)
            _h.update(hashdata)
            h.append(_h)

        # GC some stuff
        del hsalt
        del hpass
        del hashdata

        # and return the key!
        return b''.join(hc.digest() for hc in h)[:(keylen // 8)]
src/leap/mx/vendor/pgpy/packet/fields.py
class ElGPriv(PrivKey, ElGPub):
    __privfields__ = ('x', )

    def __privkey__(self):
        raise NotImplementedError()

    def _generate(self, key_size):
        raise NotImplementedError(PubKeyAlgorithm.ElGamal)

    def parse(self, packet):
        super(ElGPriv, self).parse(packet)
        self.s2k.parse(packet)

        if not self.s2k:
            self.x = MPI(packet)

        else:
            self.encbytes = packet

        if self.s2k.usage in [0, 255]:
            self.chksum = packet[:2]
            del packet[:2]

    def decrypt_keyblob(self, passphrase):
        kb = super(ElGPriv, self).decrypt_keyblob(passphrase)
        del passphrase

        self.x = MPI(kb)

        if self.s2k.usage in [254, 255]:
            self.chksum = kb
            del kb
src/leap/mx/vendor/pgpy/constants.py
class HashAlgorithm(IntEnum):
    Invalid = 0x00
    MD5 = 0x01
    SHA1 = 0x02
    RIPEMD160 = 0x03
    _reserved_1 = 0x04
    _reserved_2 = 0x05
    _reserved_3 = 0x06
    _reserved_4 = 0x07
    SHA256 = 0x08
    SHA384 = 0x09
    SHA512 = 0x0A
    SHA224 = 0x0B

    def __init__(self, *args):
        super(self.__class__, self).__init__()
        self._tuned_count = 0

    @property
    def hasher(self):
        return hashlib.new(self.name)

    @property
    def digest_size(self):
        return self.hasher.digest_size

    @property
    def tuned_count(self):
        if self._tuned_count == 0:
            self.tune_count()

        return self._tuned_count

    def tune_count(self):
        start = end = 0
        htd = _hashtunedata[:]

        while start == end:
            # potentially do this multiple times in case the resolution of time.time is low enough that
            # hashing 100 KiB isn't enough time to produce a measurable difference
            # (e.g. if the timer for time.time doesn't have enough precision)
            htd = htd + htd
            h = self.hasher

            start = time.time()
            h.update(htd)
            end = time.time()

        # now calculate how many bytes need to be hashed to reach our expected time period
        # GnuPG tunes for about 100ms, so we'll do that as well
        _TIME = 0.100
        ct = int(len(htd) * (_TIME / (end - start)))
        c1 = ((ct >> (ct.bit_length() - 5)) - 16)
        c2 = (ct.bit_length() - 11)
        c = ((c2 << 4) + c1)

        # constrain self._tuned_count to be between 0 and 255
        self._tuned_count = max(min(c, 255), 0)
src/leap/mx/vendor/pgpy/errors.py
class PGPDecryptionError(Exception):
    """Raised when decryption fails"""
    pass
src/leap/mx/vendor/pgpy/constants.py
class SymmetricKeyAlgorithm(IntEnum):
    """Supported symmetric key algorithms."""
    Plaintext = 0x00
    #: .. warning::
    #:     IDEA is insecure. PGPy only allows it to be used for decryption, not encryption!
    IDEA = 0x01
    #: Triple-DES with 168-bit key derived from 192
    TripleDES = 0x02
    #: CAST5 (or CAST-128) with 128-bit key
    CAST5 = 0x03
    #: Blowfish with 128-bit key and 16 rounds
    Blowfish = 0x04
    #: AES with 128-bit key
    AES128 = 0x07
    #: AES with 192-bit key
    AES192 = 0x08
    #: AES with 256-bit key
    AES256 = 0x09
    # Twofish with 256-bit key - not currently supported
    Twofish256 = 0x0A
    #: Camellia with 128-bit key
    Camellia128 = 0x0B
    #: Camellia with 192-bit key
    Camellia192 = 0x0C
    #: Camellia with 256-bit key
    Camellia256 = 0x0D

    @property
    def cipher(self):
        bs = {SymmetricKeyAlgorithm.IDEA: algorithms.IDEA,
              SymmetricKeyAlgorithm.TripleDES: algorithms.TripleDES,
              SymmetricKeyAlgorithm.CAST5: algorithms.CAST5,
              SymmetricKeyAlgorithm.Blowfish: algorithms.Blowfish,
              SymmetricKeyAlgorithm.AES128: algorithms.AES,
              SymmetricKeyAlgorithm.AES192: algorithms.AES,
              SymmetricKeyAlgorithm.AES256: algorithms.AES,
              SymmetricKeyAlgorithm.Twofish256: namedtuple('Twofish256', ['block_size'])(block_size=128),
              SymmetricKeyAlgorithm.Camellia128: algorithms.Camellia,
              SymmetricKeyAlgorithm.Camellia192: algorithms.Camellia,
              SymmetricKeyAlgorithm.Camellia256: algorithms.Camellia}

        if self in bs:
            return bs[self]

        raise NotImplementedError(repr(self))

    @property
    def is_insecure(self):
        insecure_ciphers = {SymmetricKeyAlgorithm.IDEA}
        return self in insecure_ciphers

    @property
    def block_size(self):
        return self.cipher.block_size

    @property
    def key_size(self):
        ks = {SymmetricKeyAlgorithm.IDEA: 128,
              SymmetricKeyAlgorithm.TripleDES: 192,
              SymmetricKeyAlgorithm.CAST5: 128,
              SymmetricKeyAlgorithm.Blowfish: 128,
              SymmetricKeyAlgorithm.AES128: 128,
              SymmetricKeyAlgorithm.AES192: 192,
              SymmetricKeyAlgorithm.AES256: 256,
              SymmetricKeyAlgorithm.Twofish256: 256,
              SymmetricKeyAlgorithm.Camellia128: 128,
              SymmetricKeyAlgorithm.Camellia192: 192,
              SymmetricKeyAlgorithm.Camellia256: 256}

        if self in ks:
            return ks[self]

        raise NotImplementedError(repr(self))

    def gen_iv(self):
        return os.urandom(self.block_size // 8)

    def gen_key(self):
        return os.urandom(self.key_size // 8)
src/leap/mx/vendor/pgpy/constants.py
class TrustFlags(FlagEnum):
    Revoked = 0x20
    SubRevoked = 0x40
    Disabled = 0x80
    PendingCheck = 0x100
src/leap/mx/vendor/pgpy/symenc.py
def _decrypt(ct, key, alg, iv=None):
    if iv is None:
        """
        Instead of using an IV, OpenPGP prefixes a string of length
        equal to the block size of the cipher plus two to the data before it
        is encrypted. The first block-size octets (for example, 8 octets for
        a 64-bit block length) are random, and the following two octets are
        copies of the last two octets of the IV.
        """
        iv = b'\x00' * (alg.block_size // 8)

    try:
        decryptor = Cipher(alg.cipher(key), modes.CFB(iv), default_backend()).decryptor()

    except UnsupportedAlgorithm as ex:  # pragma: no cover
        six.raise_from(PGPDecryptionError, ex)

    else:
        return bytearray(decryptor.update(ct) + decryptor.finalize())
src/leap/mx/vendor/pgpy/packet/fields.py
class UserAttributeSubPackets(SubPackets):
    """
    This is nearly the same as just the unhashed subpackets from above,
    except that there isn't a length specifier. So, parse will only parse one packet,
    appending that one packet to self.__unhashed_sp.
    """
    _spmodule = userattribute

    def __bytearray__(self):
        _bytes = bytearray()
        for uhsp in self._unhashed_sp.values():
            _bytes += uhsp.__bytearray__()
        return _bytes

    def __len__(self):  # pragma: no cover
        return sum(len(sp) for sp in self._unhashed_sp.values())

    def parse(self, packet):
        # parse just one packet and add it to the unhashed subpacket ordereddict
        # I actually have yet to come across a User Attribute packet with more than one subpacket
        # which makes sense, given that there is only one defined subpacket
        sp = UserAttribute(packet)
        self[sp.__class__.__name__] = sp
src/leap/mx/vendor/pgpy/packet/types.py
class Sub(Key):
    pass
src/leap/mx/vendor/pgpy/packet/fields.py
class OpaquePrivKey(PrivKey, OpaquePubKey):  # pragma: no cover
    def __privkey__(self):
        return NotImplemented

    def _generate(self, key_size):
        # return NotImplemented
        raise NotImplementedError()

    def decrypt_keyblob(self, passphrase):
        return NotImplemented
src/leap/mx/vendor/pgpy/packet/fields.py
class RSAPriv(PrivKey, RSAPub):
    __privfields__ = ('d', 'p', 'q', 'u')

    def __privkey__(self):
        return rsa.RSAPrivateNumbers(self.p, self.q, self.d,
                                     rsa.rsa_crt_dmp1(self.d, self.p),
                                     rsa.rsa_crt_dmq1(self.d, self.q),
                                     rsa.rsa_crt_iqmp(self.p, self.q),
                                     rsa.RSAPublicNumbers(self.e, self.n)).private_key(default_backend())

    def _generate(self, key_size):
        if any(c != 0 for c in self):  # pragma: no cover
            raise PGPError("key is already populated")

        # generate some big numbers!
        pk = rsa.generate_private_key(65537, key_size, default_backend())
        pkn = pk.private_numbers()

        self.n = MPI(pkn.public_numbers.n)
        self.e = MPI(pkn.public_numbers.e)
        self.d = MPI(pkn.d)
        self.p = MPI(pkn.p)
        self.q = MPI(pkn.q)
        # from the RFC:
        # "- MPI of u, the multiplicative inverse of p, mod q."
        # or, simply, p^-1 mod p
        # rsa.rsa_crt_iqmp(p, q) normally computes q^-1 mod p,
        # so if we swap the values around we get the answer we want
        self.u = MPI(rsa.rsa_crt_iqmp(pkn.q, pkn.p))

        del pkn
        del pk

        self._compute_chksum()

    def parse(self, packet):
        super(RSAPriv, self).parse(packet)
        self.s2k.parse(packet)

        if not self.s2k:
            self.d = MPI(packet)
            self.p = MPI(packet)
            self.q = MPI(packet)
            self.u = MPI(packet)

            if self.s2k.usage == 0:
                self.chksum = packet[:2]
                del packet[:2]

        else:
            ##TODO: this needs to be bounded to the length of the encrypted key material
            self.encbytes = packet

    def decrypt_keyblob(self, passphrase):
        kb = super(RSAPriv, self).decrypt_keyblob(passphrase)
        del passphrase

        self.d = MPI(kb)
        self.p = MPI(kb)
        self.q = MPI(kb)
        self.u = MPI(kb)

        if self.s2k.usage in [254, 255]:
            self.chksum = kb
            del kb

    def sign(self, sigdata, hash_alg):
        signer = self.__privkey__().signer(padding.PKCS1v15(), hash_alg)
        signer.update(sigdata)
        return signer.finalize()
src/leap/mx/vendor/pgpy/packet/fields.py
class OpaquePubKey(PubKey):  # pragma: no cover
    def __init__(self):
        super(OpaquePubKey, self).__init__()
        self.data = bytearray()

    def __iter__(self):
        yield self.data

    def __pubkey__(self):
        return NotImplemented

    def __bytearray__(self):
        return self.data

    def parse(self, packet):
        ##TODO: this needs to be length-bounded to the end of the packet
        self.data = packet
src/leap/mx/vendor/pgpy/packet/types.py
class VersionedPacket(Packet):
    __headercls__ = VersionedHeader

    def __init__(self):
        super(VersionedPacket, self).__init__()
        if isinstance(self.__ver__, six.integer_types):
            self.header.version = self.__ver__

    def __repr__(self):
        return "<{cls:s} [tag 0x{tag:02d}][v{ver:d}] at 0x{id:x}>".format(cls=self.__class__.__name__, tag=self.header.tag,
                                                                          ver=self.header.version, id=id(self))
src/leap/mx/vendor/pgpy/packet/fields.py
class RSAPub(PubKey):
    __pubfields__ = ('n', 'e')

    def __pubkey__(self):
        return rsa.RSAPublicNumbers(self.e, self.n).public_key(default_backend())

    def verify(self, subj, sigbytes, hash_alg):
        # zero-pad sigbytes if necessary
        sigbytes = (b'\x00' * (self.n.byte_length() - len(sigbytes))) + sigbytes
        verifier = self.__pubkey__().verifier(sigbytes, padding.PKCS1v15(), hash_alg)
        verifier.update(subj)

        try:
            verifier.verify()

        except InvalidSignature:
            return False

        return True

    def parse(self, packet):
        self.n = MPI(packet)
        self.e = MPI(packet)
src/leap/mx/vendor/pgpy/packet/fields.py
class RSACipherText(CipherText):
    __mpis__ = ('me_mod_n', )

    @classmethod
    def encrypt(cls, encfn, *args):
        ct = cls()
        ct.me_mod_n = MPI(cls.bytes_to_int(encfn(*args)))
        return ct

    def decrypt(self, decfn, *args):
        return decfn(*args)

    def parse(self, packet):
        self.me_mod_n = MPI(packet)
src/leap/mx/vendor/pgpy/packet/types.py
class Public(Key):
    pass
src/leap/mx/vendor/pgpy/packet/fields.py
class DSASignature(Signature):
    __mpis__ = ('r', 's')

    def __sig__(self):
        # return the signature data into an ASN.1 sequence of integers in DER format
        seq = Sequence()
        for i in self:
            seq.setComponentByPosition(len(seq), Integer(i))

        return encoder.encode(seq)

    def from_signer(self, sig):
        ##TODO: just use pyasn1 for this
        def _der_intf(_asn):
            if _asn[0] != 0x02:  # pragma: no cover
                raise ValueError("Expected: Integer (0x02). Got: 0x{:02X}".format(_asn[0]))
            del _asn[0]

            if _asn[0] & 0x80:  # pragma: no cover
                llen = _asn[0] & 0x7F
                del _asn[0]

                flen = self.bytes_to_int(_asn[:llen])
                del _asn[:llen]

            else:
                flen = _asn[0] & 0x7F
                del _asn[0]

            i = self.bytes_to_int(_asn[:flen])
            del _asn[:flen]
            return i

        if isinstance(sig, bytes):
            sig = bytearray(sig)

        # this is a very limited asn1 decoder - it is only intended to decode a DER encoded sequence of integers
        if not sig[0] == 0x30:
            raise NotImplementedError("Expected: Sequence (0x30). Got: 0x{:02X}".format(sig[0]))
        del sig[0]

        # skip the sequence length field
        if sig[0] & 0x80:  # pragma: no cover
            llen = sig[0] & 0x7F
            del sig[:llen + 1]

        else:
            del sig[0]

        self.r = MPI(_der_intf(sig))
        self.s = MPI(_der_intf(sig))

    def parse(self, packet):
        self.r = MPI(packet)
        self.s = MPI(packet)
src/leap/mx/vendor/pgpy/constants.py
class TrustLevel(IntEnum):
    Unknown = 0
    Expired = 1
    Undefined = 2
    Never = 3
    Marginal = 4
    Fully = 5
    Ultimate = 6
src/leap/mx/vendor/pgpy/constants.py
class SignatureType(IntEnum):
    BinaryDocument = 0x00
    CanonicalDocument = 0x01
    Standalone = 0x02
    Generic_Cert = 0x10
    Persona_Cert = 0x11
    Casual_Cert = 0x12
    Positive_Cert = 0x13
    Subkey_Binding = 0x18
    PrimaryKey_Binding = 0x19
    DirectlyOnKey = 0x1F
    KeyRevocation = 0x20
    SubkeyRevocation = 0x28
    CertRevocation = 0x30
    Timestamp = 0x40
    ThirdParty_Confirmation = 0x50
src/leap/mx/vendor/pgpy/packet/fields.py
class DSAPub(PubKey):
    __pubfields__ = ('p', 'q', 'g', 'y')

    def __pubkey__(self):
        params = dsa.DSAParameterNumbers(self.p, self.q, self.g)
        return dsa.DSAPublicNumbers(self.y, params).public_key(default_backend())

    def verify(self, subj, sigbytes, hash_alg):
        verifier = self.__pubkey__().verifier(sigbytes, hash_alg)
        verifier.update(subj)

        try:
            verifier.verify()

        except InvalidSignature:
            return False

        return True

    def parse(self, packet):
        self.p = MPI(packet)
        self.q = MPI(packet)
        self.g = MPI(packet)
        self.y = MPI(packet)
src/leap/mx/vendor/pgpy/packet/fields.py
class ElGCipherText(CipherText):
    __mpis__ = ('gk_mod_p', 'myk_mod_p')

    @classmethod
    def encrypt(cls, encfn, *args):
        raise NotImplementedError()

    def decrypt(self, decfn, *args):
        raise NotImplementedError()

    def parse(self, packet):
        self.gk_mod_p = MPI(packet)
        self.myk_mod_p = MPI(packet)
src/leap/mx/vendor/pgpy/constants.py
class PubKeyAlgorithm(IntEnum):
    Invalid = 0x00
    #: Signifies that a key is an RSA key.
    RSAEncryptOrSign = 0x01
    RSAEncrypt = 0x02  # deprecated
    RSASign = 0x03     # deprecated
    #: Signifies that a key is an ElGamal key.
    ElGamal = 0x10
    #: Signifies that a key is a DSA key.
    DSA = 0x11
    #: Signifies that a key is an ECDH key.
    ECDH = 0x12
    #: Signifies that a key is an ECDSA key.
    ECDSA = 0x13
    FormerlyElGamalEncryptOrSign = 0x14  # deprecated - do not generate
    # DiffieHellman = 0x15  # X9.42

    @property
    def can_gen(self):
        return self in {PubKeyAlgorithm.RSAEncryptOrSign,
                        PubKeyAlgorithm.DSA,
                        PubKeyAlgorithm.ECDSA,
                        PubKeyAlgorithm.ECDH}

    @property
    def can_encrypt(self):  # pragma: no cover
        return self in {PubKeyAlgorithm.RSAEncryptOrSign, PubKeyAlgorithm.ElGamal, PubKeyAlgorithm.ECDH}

    @property
    def can_sign(self):
        return self in {PubKeyAlgorithm.RSAEncryptOrSign, PubKeyAlgorithm.DSA, PubKeyAlgorithm.ECDSA}

    @property
    def deprecated(self):
        return self in {PubKeyAlgorithm.RSAEncrypt,
                        PubKeyAlgorithm.RSASign,
                        PubKeyAlgorithm.FormerlyElGamalEncryptOrSign}
src/leap/mx/vendor/pgpy/packet/fields.py
class ECDSAPub(PubKey):
    __pubfields__ = ('x', 'y')

    def __init__(self):
        super(ECDSAPub, self).__init__()
        self.oid = None

    def __len__(self):
        return sum([len(getattr(self, i)) - 2 for i in self.__pubfields__] +
                   [3, len(encoder.encode(self.oid.value)) - 1])

    def __pubkey__(self):
        return ec.EllipticCurvePublicNumbers(self.x, self.y, self.oid.curve()).public_key(default_backend())

    def __bytearray__(self):
        _b = bytearray()
        _b += encoder.encode(self.oid.value)[1:]
        # 0x04 || x || y
        # where x and y are the same length
        _xy = b'\x04' + self.x.to_mpibytes()[2:] + self.y.to_mpibytes()[2:]
        _b += MPI(self.bytes_to_int(_xy, 'big')).to_mpibytes()

        return _b

    def __copy__(self):
        pkt = super(ECDSAPub, self).__copy__()
        pkt.oid = self.oid
        return pkt

    def verify(self, subj, sigbytes, hash_alg):
        verifier = self.__pubkey__().verifier(sigbytes, ec.ECDSA(hash_alg))
        verifier.update(subj)

        try:
            verifier.verify()

        except InvalidSignature:
            return False

        return True

    def parse(self, packet):
        oidlen = packet[0]
        del packet[0]
        _oid = bytearray(b'\x06')
        _oid.append(oidlen)
        _oid += bytearray(packet[:oidlen])
        # try:
        oid, _  = decoder.decode(bytes(_oid))

        # except:
        #     raise PGPError("Bad OID octet stream: b'{:s}'".format(''.join(['\\x{:02X}'.format(c) for c in _oid])))
        self.oid = EllipticCurveOID(oid)
        del packet[:oidlen]

        # flen = (self.oid.bit_length // 8)
        xy = bytearray(MPI(packet).to_mpibytes()[2:])
        # xy = bytearray(MPI(packet).to_bytes(flen, 'big'))
        # the first byte is just \x04
        del xy[:1]
        # now xy needs to be separated into x, y
        xylen = len(xy)
        x, y = xy[:xylen // 2], xy[xylen // 2:]
        self.x = MPI(self.bytes_to_int(x))
        self.y = MPI(self.bytes_to_int(y))
src/leap/mx/vendor/pgpy/packet/fields.py
class ECDSAPriv(PrivKey, ECDSAPub):
    __privfields__ = ('s', )

    def __privkey__(self):
        ecp = ec.EllipticCurvePublicNumbers(self.x, self.y, self.oid.curve())
        return ec.EllipticCurvePrivateNumbers(self.s, ecp).private_key(default_backend())

    def _generate(self, oid):
        if any(c != 0 for c in self):  # pragma: no cover
            raise PGPError("Key is already populated!")

        self.oid = EllipticCurveOID(oid)

        if not self.oid.can_gen:
            raise ValueError("Curve not currently supported: {}".format(oid.name))

        pk = ec.generate_private_key(self.oid.curve(), default_backend())
        pubn = pk.public_key().public_numbers()
        self.x = MPI(pubn.x)
        self.y = MPI(pubn.y)
        self.s = MPI(pk.private_numbers().private_value)

    def parse(self, packet):
        super(ECDSAPriv, self).parse(packet)
        self.s2k.parse(packet)

        if not self.s2k:
            self.s = MPI(packet)

            if self.s2k.usage == 0:
                self.chksum = packet[:2]
                del packet[:2]

        else:
            ##TODO: this needs to be bounded to the length of the encrypted key material
            self.encbytes = packet

    def decrypt_keyblob(self, passphrase):
        kb = super(ECDSAPriv, self).decrypt_keyblob(passphrase)
        del passphrase

        self.s = MPI(kb)

    def sign(self, sigdata, hash_alg):
        signer = self.__privkey__().signer(ec.ECDSA(hash_alg))
        signer.update(sigdata)
        return signer.finalize()
src/leap/mx/vendor/pgpy/constants.py
class CompressionAlgorithm(IntEnum):
    #: No compression
    Uncompressed = 0x00
    #: ZIP DEFLATE
    ZIP = 0x01
    #: ZIP DEFLATE with zlib headers
    ZLIB = 0x02
    #: Bzip2
    BZ2 = 0x03

    def compress(self, data):
        if self is CompressionAlgorithm.Uncompressed:
            return data

        if self is CompressionAlgorithm.ZIP:
            return zlib.compress(data)[2:-4]

        if self is CompressionAlgorithm.ZLIB:
            return zlib.compress(data)

        if self is CompressionAlgorithm.BZ2:
            return bz2.compress(data)

        raise NotImplementedError(self)

    def decompress(self, data):
        if six.PY2:
            data = bytes(data)

        if self is CompressionAlgorithm.Uncompressed:
            return data

        if self is CompressionAlgorithm.ZIP:
            return zlib.decompress(data, -15)

        if self is CompressionAlgorithm.ZLIB:
            return zlib.decompress(data)

        if self is CompressionAlgorithm.BZ2:
            return bz2.decompress(data)

        raise NotImplementedError(self)


Question: import abc
import binascii
import calendar
import copy
import hashlib
import os
import re
import six
from datetime import datetime
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import constant_time
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import padding
from .fields import DSAPriv, DSAPub, DSASignature
from .fields import ECDSAPub, ECDSAPriv, ECDSASignature
from .fields import ECDHPub, ECDHPriv, ECDHCipherText
from .fields import ElGCipherText, ElGPriv, ElGPub
from .fields import OpaquePubKey
from .fields import OpaquePrivKey
from .fields import RSACipherText, RSAPriv, RSAPub, RSASignature
from .fields import String2Key
from .fields import SubPackets
from .fields import UserAttributeSubPackets
from .types import Packet
from .types import Primary
from .types import Private
from .types import Public
from .types import Sub
from .types import VersionedPacket
from ..constants import CompressionAlgorithm
from ..constants import HashAlgorithm
from ..constants import PubKeyAlgorithm
from ..constants import SignatureType
from ..constants import SymmetricKeyAlgorithm
from ..constants import TrustFlags
from ..constants import TrustLevel
from ..decorators import sdproperty
from ..errors import PGPDecryptionError
from ..symenc import _decrypt
from ..symenc import _encrypt
from ..types import Fingerprint
        return self.keymaterial.verify(subj, sigbytes, hash_alg)

    def parse(self, packet):
        super(PubKeyV4, self).parse(packet)

        self.created = packet[:4]
        del packet[:4]

        self.pkalg = packet[0]
        del packet[0]

        # bound keymaterial to the remaining length of the packet
        pend = self.header.length - 6
        self.keymaterial.parse(packet[:pend])
        del packet[:pend]


class PrivKeyV4(PrivKey, PubKeyV4):
    __ver__ = 4

    @classmethod
    def new(cls, key_algorithm, key_size):
        # build a key packet
        pk = PrivKeyV4()
        pk.pkalg = key_algorithm
        if pk.keymaterial is None:
            raise NotImplementedError(key_algorithm)
        pk.keymaterial._generate(key_size)
        pk.update_hlen()
        return pk

    def pubkey(self):
        # return a copy of ourselves, but just the public half
        pk = PubKeyV4() if not isinstance(self, PrivSubKeyV4) else PubSubKeyV4()
        pk.created = self.created
        pk.pkalg = self.pkalg

        # copy over MPIs
        for pm in self.keymaterial.__pubfields__:
            setattr(pk.keymaterial, pm, copy.copy(getattr(self.keymaterial, pm)))

        if self.pkalg == PubKeyAlgorithm.ECDSA:
            pk.keymaterial.oid = self.keymaterial.oid

        if self.pkalg == PubKeyAlgorithm.ECDH:
            pk.keymaterial.oid = self.keymaterial.oid
            pk.keymaterial.kdf = copy.copy(self.keymaterial.kdf)

        pk.update_hlen()
        return pk

    @property
    def protected(self):
        return bool(self.keymaterial.s2k)

    @property
    def unlocked(self):
        if self.protected:
            return 0 not in list(self.keymaterial)
        return True  # pragma: no cover

    def protect(self, passphrase, enc_alg, hash_alg):
        self.keymaterial.encrypt_keyblob(passphrase, enc_alg, hash_alg)
        del passphrase
        self.update_hlen()

    def unprotect(self, passphrase):
        self.keymaterial.decrypt_keyblob(passphrase)
        del passphrase

    def sign(self, sigdata, hash_alg):
        return self.keymaterial.sign(sigdata, hash_alg)


class PrivSubKey(VersionedPacket, Sub, Private):
    __typeid__ = 0x07
    __ver__ = 0


class PrivSubKeyV4(PrivSubKey, PrivKeyV4):
    __ver__ = 4


class CompressedData(Packet):
    """
    5.6.  Compressed Data Packet (Tag 8)

    The Compressed Data packet contains compressed data.  Typically, this
    packet is found as the contents of an encrypted packet, or following
    a Signature or One-Pass Signature packet, and contains a literal data
    packet.

    The body of this packet consists of:

     - One octet that gives the algorithm used to compress the packet.

     - Compressed data, which makes up the remainder of the packet.

    A Compressed Data Packet's body contains an block that compresses
    some set of packets.  See section "Packet Composition" for details on
    how messages are formed.

    ZIP-compressed packets are compressed with raw RFC 1951 [RFC1951]
    DEFLATE blocks.  Note that PGP V2.6 uses 13 bits of compression.  If
    an implementation uses more bits of compression, PGP V2.6 cannot
    decompress it.

    ZLIB-compressed packets are compressed with RFC 1950 [RFC1950] ZLIB-
    style blocks.

    BZip2-compressed packets are compressed using the BZip2 [BZ2]
    algorithm.
    """
    __typeid__ = 0x08

    @sdproperty
    def calg(self):
        return self._calg

    @calg.register(int)

Answer:     @calg.register(CompressionAlgorithm)