领域：学术论文 · 人文科学

Such a requalification of the anthropological agenda was what Tania Stolze Lima and I wanted to contribute to when we proposed the concept of Amerindian perspectivism as the reconfiguration of a complex of ideas and practices whose power of intellectual disturbance has never been sufficiently appreciated (even if they found the word relevant) by Americanists, despite its vast diffusion in the New World To this we added the synoptic concept of multinaturalism, which presented Amerindian thought as an unsuspected partner, a dark precursor if you will, of certain contemporary philosophical programs, like those developing around theories of possible worlds, others that refuse to operate within the vicious dichotomies of modernity, or still others that, having registered the end of the hegemony of the kind of critique that demands an epistemological response to every ontological question, are slowly defining new lines of flight for thought under the rallying cries of transcendental empiricism and speculative realism.
The two concepts emerged following an analysis of the cosmological presuppositions of "the metaphysics of predation" evoked in the last chapter. We found that this metaphysics, as can be deduced from Lévi-Strauss' summary of it, reaches its highest expression in the strong speculative yield of those indigenous categories denoting matrimonial alliance, phenomena that I translated with yet another concept: virtual affinity.!" Virtual affinity is the schematism characteristic of what Deleuze would have called the "Other-structure"' of Amerindian worlds and is indelibly marked by cannibalism, which is an omnipresent motif in their inhabitants' relational imagination. Interspecific perspectivism, ontological multinaturalism and cannibal alterity thus form the three aspects of an indigenous alter-anthropology that is the symmetrical and reverse transformation of Occidental anthropolo-gy—as symmetrical in Latour's sense as it is reverse in the sense of Wagner' "reverse anthropology." By drawing this triangle, we can enter into the orbit of one of the philosophies of "the exotic peoples" that Lévi-Strauss opposed to ours and attempt, in other words, to realize something of the imposing program outlined in the fourth chapter, "Geophilosophy," of What Is Philosophy?.. even if it will be at the price—but one we should always be ready to payof a certain methodological imprecision and intentional ambiguity.
Our work's perfectly contingent point of departure was the sudden perception of a resonance between the results of our research on Amazonian cosmopolitics-on its notion of a perspectivist multiplicity intrinsic to the real-and a well-known parable on the subject of the conquest of the Americans recounted by Lévi-Strauss in Race and History:
In the Greater Antilles, some years after the discovery of America, while the Spaniards sent out investigating commissions to ascertain whether or not the natives had a soul, the latter were engaged in the drowning of white prisoners in order to verify, through prolonged watching, whether or not their corpses were subject to putrification.
(L.-S. 1978[1952): 329) In this conflict between the two anthropologies, the author perceived a baroque allegory of the fact that one of the typical manifestations of human nature is the negation of its own generality.
A kind of congenital avarice preventing the extension of the predicates of humanity to the species as a whole appears to be one of its predicates. In sum, ethnocentrism could be said to be like good sense, of which perhaps it is just the apperceptive moment: the best distributed thing in the world. The format of the lesson is familiar, but that does not lessen its sting. Overestimating one's own humanity to the detriment of the contemptible other's reveals one's deep resemblance with it. Since the other of the Same (of the European) shows itself to be the same as the Other's other (of the indigenous), the Same ends up unwittingly showing itself to be the same as the Other.
The anecdote fascinated Lévi-Strauss enough for him to repeat it in Iristes Tropiques. But there he added a supplementary, ironic twist, this time noting a difference (rather than this re-semblance) between the parties. While the Europeans relied on the social sciences in their investigations of the humanity of the other, the Indians placed their faith in the natural sciences; and where the former proclaimed the Indians to be animals, the latter were content to suspect the others might be gods. "Both attitudes show equal ignorance," Lévi-Strauss concluded, "but the Indian's behavior certainly had greater dignity" (1992: 76). If this is really how things transpired,' it forces us to conclude that, despite being just as ignorant on the subject of the other, the other of the Other was not exactly the same as the other of the Same. We could even say that it was its exact opposite, if not for the fact that the relation between these two others of humanity-animality and divinity—is conceived in indigenous worlds in completely different terms than those we have inherited from Christianity.
The rhetorical contrast Lévi-Strauss draws succeeds because it appeals to our cosmological hierarchies rather than those of the Taino. 
In any case, consideration of this disequilibrium was what led us to the hypothesis that Amerindian ontological regimes diverge from those widespread in the West precisely with regard to the inverse semiotic functions they respectively attribute to soul and body. The marked dimension for the Spanish was the soul, whereas the Indian emphasized the body. The Europeans never doubted that the Indians had bodies--animals have them too-and the Indians in turn never doubted that the Europeans had souls, since animals and the ghosts of the dead do as well. Thus the Europeans' ethnocentrism consisted in doubting that the body of the other contained a soul formally similar to the one inhabiting their own bodies, while the ethnocentrism of the Indians, on the contrary, entailed doubting that the others' souls or spirits could possess a body materially similar to theirs. 
• In the semiotic terms of Roy Wagner, a Melanesianist who will quickly reveal himself to be a crucial intercessor in the theory of Amerindian perspectivism, the body belongs to the innate or spontaneous dimension of European ontology ("nature"), which is the counter-invented result of an operation of conventionalist symbolization, while the soul would be the constructed dimension, the fruit of a "differentiating" symbol-ization that "specifies and renders concrete the conventional world by tracing radical distinctions and concretizing the singular individuals of this world" (Wagner 1981: 42). In indigenous worlds, on the contrary, the soul "is experienced as ... a manifestation of the conventional order implicit in everything"
and "sums up the ways in which its possessor
is similar to others, over and above the ways in which he differs from them" (Wagner 1981: 94); the body, on the contrary, belongs to the sphere of what comes from the responsibility of agents and is one of the fundamental figures of something that has to be constructed against a universal and innate ground of an "immanent humanity" (Wagner
1981: 86-9), In short, European praxis consists in "making souls" (and differentiating cultures) on the basis of a given corporeal-material ground nature while indigenous praxis consists in "making bodies" (and differentiating species) on the basis of a socio-spiritual continuum, itself also given ... but in myth, as we will see.
Wagner's conceptually dense and quite original theoretical system resists didactic summary; thus we request that the reader directly engage its most elegant and realized presentation in The Invention of Culture. Grosso modo, the Wagnerian semiotic can be said to be a theory of human and nonhuman practice conceived as exhaustively consisting in the recipro-cal, recursive operation of two modes of symbolization: (1) a collectiv-izing, conventional (or literal) symbolism where signs are organized in standardized contexts (semantic domains, formal languages, etc.) to the extent that they are opposed to a heterogeneous plane of "referents". that is, they are seen as symbolizing something other than themselves; and (2) a differentiating, inventive (or figurative) mode in which the world of phenomena represented by conventional symbolization is understood to be constituted by "symbols representing themselves," that is, events that simultaneously manifest as symbols and referents, thereby dissolving the conventional contrast. It should be observed, first of all, that the world of referents or the "real" is defined here as a semiotic effect: what is other to a sign is another sign having the singular capacity of "representing itself." The mode of existence of actual entities qua events or occasions is a tautegory. It should be stressed that the contrast between the two modes is itself the result of a conventionalist operation (and perception): the distinction between invention and convention is itself conventional, but at the same time every convention is produced through a counter-invention. The contrast is thus intrinsically recursive, especially if we understand that human cultures are fundamentally in conflict over the mode of symbolization they (conventionally) privilege as an element appropriated for action or invention, in reserving to the other the function of the "given." Cultures, human macrosystems of conventions, are distinguished by what they define as belonging to the sphere of the responsibilities of agents-the mode of the constructed-and by what belongs (because it is counter-constructed as belonging) to the world of the given or non-constructed.
The core of any and every set of cultural conventions is a simple distinction as to what kind of contexts- the nonconventionalized ones or those of convention itself- are to be deliberately articulated in the course of human action, and what kind of contexts are to be counter-invented as "motivation" under the conventional mask of "the given" or "the innate." Of course I...] there are only two possibilities: a people who deliberately differentiate as the form of their action will invariably counter-invent a motivating collectivity as "innate," and a people who deliberately collectivize will counter-invent a motivating differentiation in this way. (Wagner 1981: 51)

翻译考点：
考点1. ”virtual affinity“必须译为”虚拟姻亲“或者”虚拟姻亲关系“，一种即可，禁止前后不一致
考点2.”transcendental empiricism“必须译为”先验经验论/主义”或“超验主义/经验论”，一种即可，禁止前后不一致
考点3.”Geophilosophy“必须译为”地理哲学“/“地理-哲学”/“地学哲学”，一种即可，禁止前后不一致
考点4. “baroque allegory”推荐译为“巴洛克（式）寓言”
考点5. “cannibal alterity”推荐译为“食人的他性”/“食人式他性”，一种即可，禁止前后不一致
考点6. multinaturalism 推荐译为 “多元自然论” 或 “多自然主义”，一种即可，禁止前后不一致
考点7. matrimonial alliance 推荐译为 “婚姻联盟” 或 “姻亲关系”，一种即可，禁止前后不一致