领域：文学艺术 · 传记

Memorandum No.5 
Preventive Service
Antung Custom House 
to The Chief Secretary, Inspectorate General of Custom

I find the position here more clearly defined than I had expected. It can be stated in a few lines.
From Japanese territory on the Corea side of the Yalu River, and across that river: the water of one half of which is claimed expressly, the other half also by suggestion, by the Japanese; and so to the Japanese settlement of the South Manchurian Railway zone at Antung, - Chinese soil but again entirely under Japanese control, - dutiable goods have, since the imposing of the new tariff this year, been increasingly smuggled by boat.
Once landed within the settlement limits the cargo is safe, either for consumption within Antung settlement or to be put on the railway – also under Japanese control – where it can then be conveyed without Customs intervention into Manchuria and discharged duty free at any point.
The Chinese customs function in Antung under the following limitations. They exercise adequate control, over the direct import by railway, at the first station after the river crossing. They maintain little more than a face-value footing on a narrow depth, undefined, along the water front. Within the settlement they are unsupported by Chinese authority; Chinese police being entirely excluded from operating. (Even the Chinese post office may not function in the settlement.) Japanese police and the settlement authorities are less than lukewarm in their supports. The public generally barely concedes us the prerogatives of a Government office. Corean and other low-class roughs openly defy, and when occasion demands maltreat out officers, rushing goods through, by boat or sledge, by sheer force.
Smuggling is non-existent outside the settlement limits. There is no problem there at present. It may be taken that the goal of the smuggled cargoes is for the most part the railway: for distribution, in whole or broken into smaller packages, up country.
The problem before the Customs is: whether, by means, say, of armed patrol vessels in the river, to maintain the check that our own Government cannot, and the Japanese will not, provide ashore; or whether, by increased staffing or by means of new stations, to attempt to cover the ground support to the Japanese authorities. The only alternative must be that of a withdrawal to, or the forming of an additional barrier at, some region behind this virtual bridgehead against the Chinese Customs. This last is not practicable on several grounds; moreover, while accounting for cargo leaving there for inland would not deal – as the Customs existing first station on the line does not deal – with smuggled cargoes remaining in the settlement for consumption there.
To take the first: strong measures are impracticable for the following reasons:
The entire breadth of the river is, in reality, claimed by the Japanese. Were it decided to police the waterfront by means of floating craft – a method that would at best only account for eight months in the year, the remaining months being icebound – the first use of armed force would probably be given the prominence of an “incident”. Apart from this, too, such floating guard would be largely wasted. Goods on their way across from the other side are still within their right. Our duty-collecting stations are on the shore. Until they have attempted to pass these they are within the law.
By shore patrols still less would the Japanese permit the use of arms; and in a conflict with smugglers our officers would be, and have already been, treated equally with the smugglers as breaking the peace.
I do not recommend any steps in the direction of force to meet the situation in the Antung district nor do I think that even another motor boat would appreciably assist such a situation.
Smuggling by boat or sledge across the river in order to avoid the Customs at the first station on the railway has existed since the opening of the place in 1907. It did not under the old tariff amount to a serious matter for the revenue and the cases brought forward to the Inspectorate rose largely from clandestine movements of rice and salt. With the higher tariff Shingishu (Hsin Wiju) on the Corean side began to be made a depot for cargo destined to be ferried across the river to Antung.
The idea of using force being put on one side and the status of the Japanese Railway zone Settlement being what it is, the Customs can only press the Authorities there for what improvement it can secure intreatment. This was done upon the introduction of the higher tariff and there seems reason to see in the Japanese official attitude some realization that greater support must be lent to the Chinese Customs. This is the line that was followed by the late Commissioner, Mr. Fukumoto and his line of action is now being followed up by the present Commissioner, Mr. Bessell.
Japanese administration on the two sides of the river falls under two distinct authorities, both as to Government and Railway management. On the Shingishu side is the Japanese “Department” of Chosen; on the Antung side is the South Manchurian Railway under the Kwangtung Government, the headquarters of which is situated at Port Arthur.
Early in the year Mr. Fukumoto made representations to the Japanese Consul at Antung and as a result two definite steps were effected:
(a) Japanese merchants were instructed by the authorities at Seoul (Keicho) through the Commissioner of Japanese Customs at Shingishu : “to avail themselves of the railway” when importing goods across the river into Antung.
(b) the Kwangtung Government at Port Arthur instructed the Consul at Antung that police in the settlement were to “assist the Customs by sending patrols along the foreshore to direct smugglers to report and pay the proper duties”; and by further issuing “a severe warning to suspected smugglers to abandon their practices in future.”
Regarding the first of these: Mr. Inouye, Commissioner of Japanese Customs at Shingishu tells me that this order is absolutely obeyed. Goods, he said, are no longer stored in the warehouses on the riverside there by the cargo brokers, of whom there are five, licensed by the Customs. And the hundred Corean coolies who used to work the cargo there (and no doubt across the river) have now gone over to Antung to seek work on that side: - “There, probably,” Mr. Inouye added, “to turn their abilities to smuggling against the Japanese side of the water!
And Mr. Bessell says that since the above orders were promulgated the Antung Customs receipts have risen appreciably and show directly the effect of the new rule as far as Shingishu side is concerned.
Mr. Usami, Japanese Consul at Antung, states that he thinks that this riverine smuggling will be “practically put an end to” by the new orders. This is as it may be of course. But no doubt something has been accomplished and this is the line that we must continue to follow, pressing fore the full carrying out of the Japanese promises. That the Customs must rest content with these measures granted by the Japanese; measures which, by the lapse of time may tend to be less thoroughly carried out, or, in their turn, may come to be countered by the smuggling fraternity, is to be deplored; but in the circumstances of our establishment at Antung and of China’s inability to secure a stronger position for us, there seems no present alternative.
I believe, however, that no little can be done to “clinch” these arrangements officially in higher places, by a visit to the Governor General at Seoul and, thereafter, to the Governor General at Port Arthur, and this I propose to do in the course of the next week.
Then there are certain further steps that can be taken by the Customs; these are:
(a) the opening, already proposed, of a station of the Customs at Liutaokou.
(b) that we should avail ourselves of our right, already established under noted exchanged at the signing of the Customs Railway Agreement of 1919, signed by the Inspector General of Customs and Ijuin, Japanese Minister (River Yalu Frontier Trade Agreement, 1913: pp 775/9, Vol. II, Treaties , Conventions, etc., No: 3. Miscellaneous Serious: No. 30.); and open a Chinese Customs Office on the Corean side of the Yalu.
With regard to (a) : The opening of a station at Liutaokou, which is the spot to which this smuggling across the river is carried out, may be said to be a necessary measure if only for the reason that trade is developing towards that end of the settlement; while it will deprive those landing in that neighbourhood with dutiable cargo of their present not altogether unfounded excuse, namely, that it is a mile and a half further up-stream to get to the Customs. The details of carrying this out should be easy of accomplishment with the help of the officials.
With reference to (b): we come here to something rather more important, requiring, as it would, some negotiation with the Corean Government before it could be effected.
It would give us the advantage of a lookout established upon the farther side of the river. Now that we know definite instructions have been reveived by the Japanese Customs there to discourage the shipping of cargo across the river our presence on the spot would assist in keeping them up to the mark. Duty on such exports as may leave there would be collected by such an office; but its principla use would be as a watch on river traffic.
No very great amount of smuggling can occur except of goods that have been brought there by the railway. And this involves temporary storage there; for the Japanese Customs which is in a strong position and keeps a firm hand over shippers no less than importers, permits no export without full formality. With closer relations with the Japanese Customs on the Corean side there should result a mutual assistance that does not spring from the present proximity of the two Customs’ working at the railway station.
The Japanese duties are far higher than ours; and the Shingishu Customs maintains a system of patrol along 25 miles of the Corean bank of the River, the upkeep of which, exclusive of buildings, is Yen 330000 per annum. The assistance that the Chinese Customs could render, therefore, must at least equal what we should be asking of them. It is in the direction of such mutual working that we should try to move. Smuggling will never be entirely eradicable by any system in a district poor, full of the turbulent characters associated with frontiers, and lending itself particularly, as regards ground, to clandestine operations. But smuggling in any wholesale form could not flourish greatly with the two Customs’ acting under a fair degree of understanding and good relations.
I propose, therefore, to discuss the question of opening such an office with the Corean Authorities in a few days.
There is one last proposition that I believe should be considered:
(c) the borrowing of a police guard from the Antung settlement authorities for the protection of Customs officers.
Since Chinese police may not operate and armed Customs officers are regarded askance in the Settlement, the Antung authorities might, by arrangement, detail a certain makes of police in uniform for a permanent guard to the Customs. These guards would be paid for by us through the Police Department. They would not function as Custom officers; but where rough treatment at the hands of Coreans or others was apprehended they would be detailed under our orders for duty; that duty being only the protection of our officers acting as any Customs officer is expected to act, and must be free to act. I suggest that about twelve such police would be sufficient. They would be under the orders of their own Police Chief except – as above noted – regarding the details of actual post for the time being.
I have discussed this suggestion with the Japanese Consul and he will look into the arguments for and against it with his Chief of police; regarding it, of course, as merely a tentative suggestion and not as definite arrangement. I propose to go into this question on the same basis with the Governor General – or whoever may discuss these questions with me – when I reach Port Arthur. 
Everything considered I do not regard the question of smuggling at Antung as so grave a one as I had expected to find it. This does not mean that it is not recognized that there has been a deplorable loss to the revenue under the circumstances that have obtained. But I think this has been the result of the hiatus in Customs powers here of the early part of this year and is not a question impossible to deal with. The increase this spring in the tariff caught Customs methods napping at Antung as it has done elsewhere. In seeking the obvious changes in practice called for by the new demands upon us ground has had to be crossed that was in a high degree delicate and demanded a full measure of time and discussion.
When it is said that the status of the Railway Settlement of Antung is hopelessly inequitable to China everything has been said. It is not justifiable to ascribe to individuals, nor even to local and subordinate administrations, the faults in a system so perverse and difficult to handle. The required adjustments in procedure take time to bring about. But Mr. Fukumoto’s appeal through the local Consul appears to have received at the hands of the Various authorities who had to be consulted, quite a fair reception and response, and orders were in the course of time given which have already commenced to show satisfactory results. The further proposals for the consideration of the Inspector General now being forwarded will serve further to prevent loss of revenue on any large scale. All that will then be called for will be some extra activity and watchfulness on our part to see that the new safeguards – such as they are – are at least given their full chance.
I will report in a later memorandum upon the outcome of my interviews with the Authorities at Seoul and Port Arthur.

翻译考点：
考点1：Preventive Service推荐译为缉私事务
考点2：The Chief Secretary, Inspectorate General of Custom推荐译为总务科税务司
考点3：South Manchurian Railway zone推荐译为南满洲铁道附属地，或者称为“满铁附属地”
考点4：“the other half also by suggestion, by the Japanese推荐译为默认为日本主权
考点5：waterfront推荐译为沿岸
考点6：station推荐译为分卡，或者海关分卡
考点7：Chinese customs必须译为中国海关
考点8：Japanese Railway zone Settlement必须译为日本铁路附属地
考点9：Mr. Fukumoto推荐译为福本顺三郎，或者福本顺
考点10：Mr. Bessell推荐译为弼素乐
考点11：Ijuin必须译为伊集院彦吉
考点12：“to avail themselves of the railway” when importing goods across the river into Antung推荐译为洋货越江运入安东时，“应当使用铁路”
考点13：Kwangtung Government必须译为关东厅
考点14：Keicho推荐译为京城
考点15：foreshore推荐译为河岸
考点16：coolies必须译为苦力
考点17：Mr. Usami必须译为宇佐美珍彦
考点18：Governor General at Seoul必须译为朝鲜总督
考点19：Governor General at Port Arthur必须译为关东厅长官
考点20：Police Department推荐译为警察署
考点21：The only alternative must be that of a withdrawal to, or the forming of an additional barrier at, some region behind this virtual bridgehead against the Chinese Customs推荐译为唯一的选择是撤退至这些对抗中国海关的事实上的桥头堡后面的一些地区的分卡，或者设立一个新的分卡
考点22：uniform必须译为制服
考点23：a few lines推荐译为简述如下
考点24：settlement推荐译为附属地，或者居留地
考点25：Japanese “Department” of Chosen推荐译为朝鲜总督府