사차원주의

철학에서 사차원주의 (시간적 부분의 교리와 "접속" 개체 이론으로도 알려져 있다)는 시간을 통한 객체의 지속성은 공간과 차지하는 시간의 전체 영역의 다양한 하위 영역 속 시간적 부분을 가진 시간 속에 존재하는 객체를 통한 그것의 확장과 같다는 존재론적 위치이다.

**같이 보기**
 이 위치를 옹호하는 논쟁인 리트델릭–퍼트넘 논쟁.- 세계선

**출처**
 Armstrong, David M. (1980). "Identity Through Time". In Peter van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause, 67-68 Dordrecht: D. Reidel.- Hughes, C. (1986). "Is a Thing Just the Sum of Its Parts?" Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 85: 213-33.- Heller, Mark (1984). "Temporal Parts of Four Dimensional Objects". Philo-
	sophical Studies 46: 323-34. Reprinted in Rea 1997: 12.-330.- Heller, Mark (1990).	The Ontology of Physical Objects: Four-dimensional Hunks of Matter.
	Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.- Heller, Mark (1992). "Things Change". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52: 695-304- Heller, Mark (1993). "Varieties of Four Dimensionalism". Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71: 47-59.- Lewis, David (1983). "Survival and Identity". In Philosophical Papers, Volume 1, 55-7. Oxford: Oxford University Press. With postscripts. Originally 	published in Amelie O. Rorty, ed., The Identities of Persons (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 17-40.- Lewis, David (1986a). On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.- Lewis, David (1986b). Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press.- McTaggart John Ellis (1908). "The Unreality of time" in Mind: A Quarterly Review of Psychology and Philosophy 17 (1908): 456-473. - Lewis, D. 1976: Survival and identity. Pp. 17-40 in Rorty, A.O. (ed.) The identities of persons. Berkeley: University of California Press.  Google books- Markosian, N. 2004: A defense of presentism. Pp. 47-82 in Zimmerman, D.W. (ed.) Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Volume 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  Google books- Muis, R. 2005: Review of Four-dimensionalism: an ontology of persistence and time. By Theodore Sider. Ars Disputandi, 5 1566-5399  PDF- Robinson, D. 1985: Can amoebae divide without multiplying? Australasian journal of philosophy, 63(3): 299–319. 10.1080/00048408512341901

**외부 링크**
Rea, M. C., " Four Dimensionalism" in The Oxford Handbook for Metaphysics. Oxford Univ. Press. Describes presentism and four-dimensionalism.
*" Time" in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
T Sider - 2003 - arsdisputandi.org, Four-dimensionalism: An ontology of persistence and time, Cited by 744 https://web.archive.org/web/20110928014437/http://www.arsdisputandi.org/publish/articles/000200/article.pdf. In analytical metaphysics, there are three, closely related, debates about time and the nature
of change and persistence. The first is about what there is. Presentists believe that only present
things exist, whereas eternalists think that also past and future things exist, even though ...- MICHAEL C. REA- The Oxford handbook of metaphysics, 2003 - books.google.com, Four-dimensionalism,
CHAPTER 9 FOUR-DIMENSIONALISM i. INTRODUCTION. Cited by 48  . FOUR-DIMENSIONALISM, as it will be understood in this chapter, is a view about the ontological status of non-present objects. Presentists say that only present objects exist. There are no ...- K Koslicki - Philosophical Studies, 2003 - Springer, The crooked path from vagueness to four-dimensionalism. Cited by 37 
How do the familiar concrete objects of common-sense – houses, trees, people, cars and the
like – persist through time? According to the position known as 'four-dimensionalism' or 'the doctrine of temporal parts', ordinary concrete objects persist through time by perduring, i.e., by ...- Markosian - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2004 - Wiley Online Library
2, Two Arguments from Sider's Four‐Dimensionalism, Cited by 19  . The Argument from Vagueness Sider's argument from vagueness for Four-Dimensionalism is adapted from his reconstruction of David Lewis's argument for the following conclusion about fusions.2 ... The Principle of Universal Fusions (PUF): Every class of objects has a fusion.- Miller - Erkenntnis, 2005 - Springer, The metaphysical equivalence of three and four dimensionalism. Cited by 15  . ABSTRACT. I argue that two competing accounts of persistence, three and four dimensionalism, are in fact metaphysically equivalent. I begin by clearly defining three and four dimensionalism, and then I show that the two theories are inter- translatable and equally ...
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