"I think the following better captures the nature of the Investigations. The first two pargarphs have not been changed but the final three are completely different. Comments please.

Although the Tractatus is a major work, Wittgenstein is mostly studied today for the Philosophical Investigations (Philosophische Untersuchungen). In 1953, two years after Wittgenstein's death, the long-awaited book was published in two parts. Most of the 693 numbered paragraphs in Part I were ready for printing in 1946, but Wittgenstein withdrew the manuscript from the publisher. The shorter Part II was added by the editors, G.E.M. Anscombe and Rush Rhees. (Had Wittgenstein lived to complete the book himself, some of the remarks in Part II would likely have been incorporated into Part I, and the book would no longer have this bifurcated structure.)
It is notoriously difficult to find consensus among interpreters of Wittgenstein's work, and this is particularly true of the Investigations. Very briefly, Wittgenstein asks the reader to think of language and its uses as sets of language-games within which the parts of language function and have meaning in order to resolve the problems of philosophy. This view of language represents what many consider a break from the Wittgenstein in the Tractatus and, hence, meaning as representation. In the carrying out of such an investigation, one of the most radical characteristics of the ""later"" Wittgenstein comes to light. The ""conventional"" view of philosophy's ""task"", perhaps coming to a head in Bertrand Russell, is that the philosopher's task is to solve the seemingly intractable problems of philosophy using logical analysis (for example, the problem of ""free will"", the relationship between ""mind"" and ""matter"", what is ""the good"" or ""the beautiful"" and so on). However, Wittgenstein argues that these ""problems"" are, in fact, ""bewitchments"" that arise from the philosophers' misuse of language.
On Wittgenstein's account, language is woven into the fabric of life, and it is within this ordinary everyday context that language actually operates. Philosophical problems arise, on this account, when language is forced out of the everyday context that is its proper home, and is forced into a new, metaphysical, environment, where all the familiar and necessary landmarks have been deliberately removed. Removed for what appear to be sound philosophical reasons, but which are, for Wittgenstein, the very source of the problem. Wittgenstein describes this metaphysical environment as like being on frictionless ice; where the conditions are apparently perfect for a philosophically and logically perfect language (the language of the Tractatus), and where all philosophical problems can be solved without the confusing and muddying effects of everyday contexts; but where, just because of the lack of friction, language can in fact do no actual work at all. There is much talk in the Investigations, then, of “idle wheels,” and language being “on holiday”, all of which are used to express this same idea of what is lacking in philosophical contexts. To resolve the problems encountered there, Wittgenstein argues, philosophers must “bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use.” That is, philosophers must leave the frictionless ice and return to the “rough ground” of ordinary language in use. 
Returning to the rough ground is, however, easier said than done. Philosophical problems having the character of depth, and running as deep as the forms of language and thought that have become habitual for the philosopher. Wittgenstein therefore speaks of “illusions” and “conjuring tricks” performed on our thinking by our forms of language and tries to break their spell by attending to differences between the superficially similar forms of expression that can lead to this type of confusion. For much of the Investigations, then, Wittgenstein tries to show how philosophers are led away from the ordinary world of language in use by misleading aspects of language itself. He does this by looking in turn at the development of various philosophical problems, from the general problem of language itself, through the notions of rules and rule following, and then on to some more specific problems in epistemology and philosophy of mind. Throughout these investigations, the style of writing is conversational with Wittgenstein in turn taking the role of the puzzled philosopher (on either or both sides of traditional philosophical debates), and that of the guide attempting to show the puzzled philosopher the way back: the “way out of the fly bottle.”  
Much of the Investigations, then, consists of examples of how philosophical confusion is generated and how, by a close examination of the actual workings of everyday language, the first false steps towards philosophical puzzlement can be avoided. By avoiding these first false steps, philosophical problems themselves simp