":43, 15 January 2010 (UTC)

I disagree with the analysis of John Z. Remember, in 1967 Israel agreed to UN Resolution 242 while Arab states rejected it... I think it is futile to draw conclusions about the outcome of the war based on what different leaders of Egypt and Israel agreed to at different times, if only because these decisions have as much to do with domestic and global situations as with the bi-lateral and regional conflict itself. In case of Sadat's peace initiative, the Israeli postion was also largely determined by the style in which it was presented. But, again, I agree with you completely that one-word interpretations have no place in the infobox or lead, and arguably, in the article. Instead, arguments from different sources and on different aspects need to be all presented and contrasted. No conclusion is warranted.  
 That simply isn't true about SC 242, though it is a common misapprehension.  See our article (or more comprehensible, less battleground-like old versions). Egypt and Jordan immediately accepted SC 242, while Israel neither accepted nor rejected it. During 1968 it at first privately to the UN Secretary General, and later publicly, gradually accepted SC242. A clear Israeli public acceptance including the word ""withdrawal"" was not made until August 1970 as part of the Israeli-Egyptian-Jordanian acceptance of the Rogers B plan; it was controversial enough to induce Begin to resign from the cabinet.  See Shlaim's Iron Wall, p. 260 & p. 296.  

Yet again; this complex issue needs to be properly explored within the article body. I think that certain strategic benefits were seen by Israel (along with some drawbacks, as noted - mostly prompting renewed negotiation). Israel successfully defended itself, and held off joint armies again - this has probably prevented additional military adventures against Israel.
Constantly ""grandstanding"" in the infobox is a futile exercise, editors should use their energies more effectively by creating a comprehensive explanation.   

This User Talk Page message concerns me. First, it accuses me of POV-pushing when I was reverting POV-pushing by an editor who has been changing a number of conflict infoboxes to ""Israeli Victory"". More importantly, it could be regarded as Canvassing, and also suggests a strategic calculation to identify and sway ""sidelines"" editors to a particular side. Might I remind editors that Wikipedia is not a battleground. Respectfully,   

=In battlefield terms the war ended with a clear Israeli victory.
After the 3rd army became trapped, Egypt's situation was desperate.
Among all warring parties, Egypt was the only one that asked desperately for a truce.
Not Israel.
Not even Syria whose capital was shelled.
This was confirmed not only by Israeli and American sources but also by the Soviet ambassador in Cairo that time.

=In regarding to political achievements gained by Egypt as a direct result of the war, 
I am quite not sure there is a consensus about this.
Not any one in Egypt saw the Camp David accord positively.
Shazly claim that this was a humiliating deal that caused the expulsion of Egypt from the Arab league.
If it was up to him, or up to the assassins of Sadat, this accord was never to be signed.

=Some may claim that only as a result of the war Israel accepted an Egyptian offer that it refused to accept earlier.
This statement is also problematic.
The peace accord was signed 5 years after war ended.
There were many other events that took place during those 5 years which made Israel agree giving back the entire Sinai Peninsula.
For example:
Before the war Israel offered Egypt a partition of the Sinai Peninsula.
Egypt will get the western Sinai in condition for peace with Israel and Israel will have the eastern part, from the 1967 border to Sharm El Sheich.
More than a year after the war ended the U.S. secretary of state Henry Kissinger threatened Israel that the US will not deliver F-15 airplanes to Israel unless it would agree to withdraw unilaterally from the western Sinai Peninsula.
Thus the Sinai Interim Agreement of 1975 made Israel losing a fundamental play card in the negotiation with Egypt, but receiving the F-15 and more arms in the future.
The US also started to deliver arms to Egypt in 1976 and Israel had to accept counter balancing guar