Your point about lack of coverage of some of the longer term consequences occurred to me too. I find the trouble with this article is that there is such a vast amount of source material it is hard to get a good overall picture. i think it was Gordon (anyway someone I was reading recently) who made the point that had there been a real battle after Jutland this battle would have been consigned to histories inconsequential near-misses, just as with the other earlier raids. Gordon's thesis is also very much that failures at Jutland were a consequence  of systemic training failures within the British navy, which is touched on with the issue of signallling mistakes. I don't know what authors think about the efficiency of the German fleet, but the overall impression of the British one is poor. Incidentally, and while on the subject of consequences, Gordon also made the point that while there may have been deficiencies in British shells, this was also one of the explanations which Beatty et al. found acceptable to explain his inability to damage the German ships. His bigger difficulty was managing to direct them at anything other than sea. I suspect we are still propagating one of his self-defence red herings.