::::You're assuming far more about my views than I've actually said. I have two related points. First, that the topic in question is not necessarily bound to an adherence to the concept of self-reported identity, and that to do so is unencyclopaedic. Second, that it is absurd to assert the logical invalidity of all other definitions of the word "man" but that based on self-reported identity.

I agree that the example is conceptually difficult. My view is that a range of interally consistent interpretations of that situation are possible, such that the choice betweeen these arguments cannot be made on a strictly logical basis. The arguments must admit of some strictly non-deductive premises (adductive, inductive etc.) It should be clear then that I'm certainly not advocating a "definitive, binary and absolute" definition of "man". And my reference to Wittgenstein is based upon his fundamental recognition that any word is a "social construct"; indeed it is precisely because of this that Wittgenstein argues that nothing that is exclusively self-defined (such as his example of the 'beetle' in the box) can have meaning.

 To conclude, whilst there legitimate arguments for doing so, we don't have to "wade into the mud" of self-identity, and basic encylopaedic principles demand that.