POV 
I removed:

"Many fewer would have been shot down if not for poor planning and inflexibility by the mission planners of Strategic Air Command. Specifically, SAC ordered B-52s to attack from highly predictable, precisely-timed, repetitive positions and altitudes. This eliminated the element of surprise. The NVA were able to aim their Soviet-built SA-2 Guideline Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs) by simple timing and azimuth prediction. Further complicating the situation for the B-52s was the fact that SAC had used the same jamming (electronic countermeasures) techniques for years, thus enabling the NVA to develop counter-countermeasures.

SAC ordered the B-52s to make a steep turn after dropping the bombs. This resulted in an interruption in the electronic jamming of NVA radars because the B-52s' jamming antennas, which were located on the bottom of the aircraft, were then pointed away from the radars. To make matters worse, the turn made the B-52s face into a 100-mph headwind, which slowed their escape. The NVA were surprised at first, but after a few nights of these repetitive tactics, they figured it out. The NVA blasted several B-52s with direct hits. Two were damaged severely and crashed near U-Tapao Royal Thai Air Force Base. The situation would have been even worse for the B-52s if not for the inaccuracy of the SA-2 system and the inexperience and errors of its NVA operators.

SAC refused to change its tactics even when shown that the existing tactics were ineffective and highly dangerous to the aircraft and crews. In part, this was due to indecision on the part of SAC's commander. Also, because of a "top-down" culture which had been originally established for nuclear war by General LeMay refused to listen to the suggestions of its aircrews. The LeMay culture had discouraged open and frank discussion to the point that only "yes men" made it to the top of the SAC organization where, potentially, they might have been able to prod the SAC commander into a change of tactics. (Surprisingly, NVA records and interviews with former SAM operators show exactly the opposite culture. Realistic discussion and innovation were encouraged among the batteries' commanders.)

Ironically, although the NVA had run out of missiles by Day Four of the campaign, and the B-52s could have bombed an undefended Hanoi, SAC was so rattled by its losses that it directed the B-52s to targets outside Hanoi, thus giving the NVA time to reload. After that, B-52 losses mounted again.

SAC commanders did their best to suppress revelations about their incompetence, even going so far as to suggest that one of their critics was mentally unstable. SAC has rewritten history in its official account of Linebacker II. This semi-fiction is still taught at the USAF's Air University at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama."

It lacks NPOV or sources.