" in their various border clashes. 

 This article needs an immediate and complete re-write.  —Preceding unsigned comment added by     

 :Why don't u do it then? Find some reliable sources on the net and edit the article. You have to be neutral tho, and not let ur own personal thoughts effect the article. I will say tho, your statement;  

 :""their inability to defeat poorly armed and largely unorganized rebels gives a clear indication of their combat effectiveness."" 

 :is flawed, the United States has one of the biggest militarys in the world with top notch technology, and they have been unsuccessful in defeating rebels in Iraq, Afghanistan & Vietnam.    

 I disagree with Ryan4314.  The rebels in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Vietnam (when we were fighting them), number in the thousands, and are organized, experienced troops.  The Mujahideen of Iraq and Afghanistan receive money and training from foreign powers, and have a lot of experience.  Compare that to the untrained, unorganized, unfinanced rebels faced by the Tatmadaw.  There is a big difference, and one that clearly shows the incompetency of the Burmese Armed Forces.  Remember, Johnny and Luther Htoo's God's Army had only 150 men, and yet was able to resist the ""might"" of the Tatmadaw for years! 

 I agree with Ryan4314. 60 years fighting the junta is not experience? I beg to differ.  Guerrilla warfare is not about fair play - it's about winning. If the Taliban stood toe to toe against the Marines on an open battlefield, they'd probably be dead before they can press the trigger on their RPGs. Same goes for rebels against conventional armies. Another thing is the presence of a border - fighting in the middle of a country and on the border of another is different, since international law comes into play. 

 It is true that the Burmese army appears quite pathetic in confronting apparently tin-pot rebel groups - but it's also amazing to see the romanticism of your view on rebels. On one hand, there are people saying how rag-tag the gurrillas are and on one side, saying how the rebels will defeat them with their weapons (esp. KIO and UWSA). 
 Still, it is unfair to say they are pathetic because they cannot defeat a group of rebels - it is a) gross generalisation and b)most media reports we get are almost always from rebel sources - we rarely know the other side of the story, and we cannot trust apparently biased news sources to give exact figures. Most information sources concerning Myanmar have special interests behind them - both from the junta and those opposing it. So...every single fact must be taken with a whole lot of salt.  

 By taking your view, then the Police Departments in the US are a failure because isolated, under-armed and out-numbered miscreants are able to resist the law for some time! I'm not against telling the truth. But I can't stand ideology mongering which most articles concerning Myanmar contain.     

 Article from Irrawaddy which states KNLA is using ""Western Special Forces Advisers"".     

 == Proposal for deleting non-informative passages == 
 The article seems overloaded with propaganda-like material that has little content and almost no informational value. The title is ""Myanmar Armed Forces"", but it seems that a more appropriate title, the way this article is written now, would be ""Doctrine and Organizational Structure of Myanmar Military"". To fix this, I propose cutting, or greatly simplifying the following passages: 
 * ""Threats to the national unity, territorial integrity and sovereign independence of the Union of Myanmar are the most important security objectives and considered as threats to the security of state."" - how about ""... to deal with internal and external threats"". 
 * ""In the process of formulating Defence Policy and Military Doctrine from a strategic perspective, Tatmadaw has undergone three phases."" - how about ""The development of Myanmar Military can be divided into three phases"". 
 * ""''At the 1958 Tatmadaw's annual Commanding Officers (COs) conference, Colonel Kyi Win submitted a report outlining the requirement for new military doctrine and strategy. He stated that 'Tatmadaw did not have a clear strategy to cope with insurgents', even though most of Tatmadaw's commanders were guerrilla f