" 

 == Revision of a paragraph in mind-body section == 

 The following paragraph appears in the section on mind-body problem 
 ::Incompatibilism requires a distinction between the mental and the physical, being a commentary on the incompatibility of (determined) physical reality and one's presumably distinct experience of will. Although  substance dualism offers such a distinction, a less extreme form of naturalism known as non-reductive physicalism may also suffice. Although one might suppose that mental states and neurological states are different in kind, that does not rule out the possibility that mental states correspond to neurological states. Under non-reductive physicalism, although physical states do cause mental states, they are not ontologically reducible to them. In one such construction, mental events supervene on physical events, describing the emergence of mental properties as correspondent to physical properties. This relationship is known as causal reducibility. Non-reductive physicalism is therefore often categorised as property dualism rather than monism, yet other types of property dualism do not adhere to the causal reducibility of mental states - such as epiphenomenalism. 

 I understand the urge to recast the preceding discussion in a form more similar to the rest of the article. But I don't find this paragraph, although superior to its predecessor, has quite made the grade. I'd like to try to do this in a manner reverse to that of the paragraph; that is, go from the simple viewpoint to the technical rather than vice versa. A single paragraph won't do it. Here is a possible substitute (please take it as a suggestion to be tinkered with): 
 ::One may choose as a starting point the point of view that mind and matter constitute different things. One may then take several views about how or even whether they interact. At one extreme there is no interaction at all. At another extreme, mind completely controls matter or the other way around. In between, one may say mind and matter each influence each other to a degree, in some cases one is more in control and sometimes the other. 
 ::We might attempt to establish which of these choices is best, but that seems to be out of reach at the moment. Instead, we will simply connect these possibilities with various identifying labels of historical importance.  If one takes the extreme view that mind completely controls matter, or vice versa, in effect the controlled aspect is simply an appendage of the controlling aspect, and may be considered simply as a property of the controlling aspect. The two substances are then simply one, albeit perhaps with some additional attributes, and this viewpoint is called monism, which takes on several forms as described in that Wikipedia article.  
 ::An example, is epiphenomenalism, that mind is just a peculiar side effect of matter. Thomas Huxley described the relation between mind and matter as follows: 
 :: 
 ::Huxley goes on to say he sees no difference from humans in this regard. Very similar to this point of view is reductive physicalism adopted by some neuroscientists: 
 ::{{quote|...consciousness is a biological process that will eventually be explained in terms of molecular signaling pathways used by interacting populations of nerve cells... |Eric R. Kandel|In Search of Memory: The Emergence of a New Science of Mind}} 
 ::The view that mind and matter are different is called dualism, and it again takes on several forms described in that Wikipedia article. Within this description are various degrees of control of one entity over the other, ranging from complete autonomy of one or both entities, to some degree of interdependence. Considerable interest attaches as to what forms of interdependence might arise. 
 ::For example, even if mental states and neurological states are different in kind, that does not rule out the possibility that mental states bear some correspondence with neurological states. Under non-reductive physicalism, physical states do cause'' mental states, but they are not ontologically reducible to them. In one such construction, mental events exhibit emergence from physical propertie