A Maximally Great Being is Possible

Hey, Geo, thanks for this discussion. Most philosophers agree that if God’s existence is possible, then he must exist. That is, God's existence is necessary, which is a property. I'm dubious. Why would anyone who wasn't committed to this particular transparently-false argument make such a claim? "Most philosophers? " Hardly. A well known and well defended argument is below where steps 2-5 are uncontroversial. The key premise is 1. Plantinga’s Argument 1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists. 2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world. 3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world. 4. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world 5. If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists. 6. Therefore a maximally great being exists. All of those steps are controversial. Greatness is subjective, a matter of opinion. (It seems obvious to me that gods non-existent are greater than gods existent. ) And "maximal" is a hedge word. Any step involving either will necessarily controversial: controversial in every possible world. There are two ways to refute an argument. You can show errors in the reasoning, or you can show that the conclusion is wrong. I might lose readers by tackling the specific errors in Plantinga's abstruse argument. It's easier and clearer just to show that Plantinga's conclusion is wrong: 1: Possible worlds are those without logical contradictions. 2: There is no inherent contradiction in godless worlds. 3: Therefore, some godless worlds (those without contradictions like square circles) exist. 4: Therefore, no god exists in all possible worlds. 5: Therefore, no god-who-exists-in-all-possible-worlds exists in this world. 6: Therefore, no "maximally great" god exists. Now these steps are uncontroversial. They aren't tricky. They just make sense. And they prove that Plantinga's conclusion is false. Plantinga's argument stands refuted. But we don't have to stop there. We can use Plantinga's tricksy logic against him. We'll show that the same logic can be used to "prove" gods don't exist. Allow me to introduce my demon, Xal-xe. (Pronounced Zal-zee. ) Xal-xe has only two properties. 1. Like Plantinga's maximally great god, Xal-xe exists in every possible world if he exists in any possible world. 2. Xal-xe is logically incompatible with gods: In worlds in which Xal-xe exists, no gods exist. So, right away, Xal-xe is greater than Plantinga's "maximally great" god, because Xal-xe is entirely defined. He is not hedged, and is not at all subjective. Pretty "great," hey? Now, let's apply Plantinga's logic to Xal-xe. And remember, Pro has stipulated that this screwy argument is noncontroversial. He is therefore estopped from arguing against it. Plantinga’s Logic, as applied to Xal-ze: 1. It is possible that Xal-ze exists. 2. If it is possible that Xal-ze exists, then Xal-ze exists in some possible world. 3. If Xal-ze exists in some possible world, then Xal-ze exists in every possible world. 4. If Xal-ze exists in every possible world, then Xal-ze exists in the actual world 5. If Xal-ze exists in the actual world, then Xal-ze exists. 6. Therefore Xal-ze exists. Great! Plantinga's logic proves that Xal-ze exists in this the real world. And what do we know about Xal-ze? We know that no gods exist in worlds in which Xal-ze exists. Therefore, according to Plantinga's logic—-which Pro endorses and says is uncontroversial—-no gods exist. Now Pro is free to reverse himself, to point out the obvious errors in Plantinga's logic, so as to avoid the conclusion that gods don't exist. But, if he does so, he'll be refuting the logic on which his own argument is based. He'll be refuting himself. A maximally great being is intuitively coherent & therefore possibly instantiated. Nonsense. "Maximally great" is partly subjective and partly undefined. And nothing that must-exist-in-all-possible-worlds-if-it-is-to-exist-in-any can be instantiated if there are possible worlds in which it does not exist. Plantinga says that if we “carefully ponder” 1, & objections to it & if we consider its connections with other propositions we accept / reject & we still find it compelling, then we’re within our rational right to accept 1. No, because it's obvious nonsense. Any "logic" that proves both that god exists and that god doesn't exist is patently worthless. It weighs zero on the scales of persuasion. we’re rational in accepting 1 [1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists. ] by a posteriori warrant from successfull arguments like the; ℵ Cosmological Argument: Metaphysically necessary being who grounds contingency ℵ Moral Argument: Moral value locus that’s as necessary as the values which it grounds ℵ Conceptualist argument: Omniscient, metaphysically necessary intellect grounding abstract objects. Those arguments are none of them successful. (Note that Pro hasn't made those arguments. He's merely named them. Therefore my merely pointing out that they don't work is sufficient refutation. ) Even if they were successful, they wouldn't even tend to support Plantinga's contrived maximally great god. Pro introduced talk of possible worlds. So long as there are possible worlds which didn't begin, which don't have god-given morality, and which don't have abstract objects grounded by Plantinga's contradictory and impossible god, then these three arguments fail to support that god. Conclusion: - Plantinga's argument is refuted because its conclusion is false. There are possible worlds in which maximally great beings don't exist. Therefore, maximally great beings cannot exist in any world. - Plantinga's argument is also refuted because the same logic can be used to reach the opposite conclusion. I illustrated this by repeating the same argument, but substituting Xal-xe for "maximally great being," and "proving" that no gods exist.