My argument for a god will be more convincing than my opponents.

Thanks to Unstobbaple for the quick response. Objections Anslem's Modal Ontological Argument argues for a maximally great being. For a being to be maximally great, it must have God-like attributes. For example, the greatest possible attributes of existence are to be tri-omni, omnipotent, omniscient, transcendent, and the source of moral authority. It therefore does not simply argue for any creative force, but for a maximally great being that has maximally great attributes (i.e., the Judeo-Christian God). Also, an advanced knowledge of physics is not required to understand such an argument; the only area any form of mathematics is involved is in the mathematical representation of Godel's Mathematical Proof, which has been proven correct [1], which has been translated into words, and which only supports the argument and is not an argument itself. The rest of the argument is purely modal logic, which is outlined in the logical proofs provided. With regards to many physicists not believing in a God: this has no bearing on whether the MOA makes sense, and is merely an argumentum ad verecundiam -- the appeal to authority -- due to physicists' thoughts being irrelevant to philosophical/modal thought. As well, of those most-qualified (being philosophers) to understand the arguments often debate this topic, showing that some do indeed believe it correct. For example, Dana Scott argued in favor of the Proof, and any objection to it rests solely in debating the definition of a positive existence [2], but this definition can be implicitly conveyed through the axioms of the Proof [2]. Simulation Argument My opponent provides Bostrom’s Simulation Argument (henceforth SA) as his support for the existence of a God. One immediately evident problem is that the argument assumes a simulation that ultimately results from a post-human civilization, which the simulation we may currently be in replicates, that existed in an actual universe [3]. The problem here is that the title of God does not apply to this civilization, since the definitions of civilization [4], human [5], and post-human [3] are not synonymous with the provided definitions of God [6]; therefore, my opponent’s argument is irrelevant. However, for sake of argument, I will illustrate why the SA is false. Before I delve into the SA, I would like to point out that the conclusion of the SA is that any of the 3 possible scenarios are likely [3,7], but Pro asserts that the third is most likely, thus it is his burden to prove so. Summary The SA has two basic parts: the Foundation and Core. The Foundation is that an extremely advanced posthuman civilization would be capable of running perfect or nearly-perfect simulations of the universe, with f1 being the fraction of civilizations that would be interested in running these simulations, and N1 being the number of simulations run by the civilizations. The Core is where Bostrom calculates this fraction of simulations being run: (3) implies that we live in a computer simulation, so we can conclude that: With F being reliant on the laws of physics and conjectures on the technical feasibility of computer simulations [7]. Incompatibility of (3) with Foundation Suppose there exists evidence (S) that leads us to think (1) and (2) false while (3) true, then: If a theory makes a prediction, then it is logical that the prediction can be known, and thus the confidence of the theory doesn’t waver; however, (**) is doubtful argumentation because, if (S), then our confidence in the laws of physics is greatly reduced. In the SA, Bostrom asserts that the laws of physics may be very different than what we know -- if we are simulated -- and that it is “very possible that there is an automatized procedure that detects any human-made experience which would reveal an intrinsic granularity of space or time…” [3,7]. Such a granularity violates Lorentz invariance, as minimal lengths cannot be Lorentz contracted [7,8,9], and such predictions have been made via experimentation [7,9]. Therefore, according to the SA, these results were forged by the simulator, so skepticism naturally follows, and any prediction about what can happen in the future is unreliable; i.e. the rising of the sun can be disrupted at any time. In light of this, the credibility of (**) is significantly less than that of (*), so (*) becomes even less credible as its predictions are realized [7]. Simulation would only be contingent on (S), not the SA. It appears the SA is false if (1) and (2) are false. Of the possible truth values (1), (2), and (3) can take, one of them (false, false, true) is false. This doesn’t necessarily disprove the SA, but it shows that it is flawed, for instance: This is perfectly logical; however, this disjunction is incomplete and misleading as it forces us to consider an impossible scenario, but once the incompatibility is found, the conclusion can be refined. So too with the SA: every step is compatible with (1) and (2) being false, but perhaps this is not the case. If so, then the SA can be refined to point where (1) and (2) are true, therefore removing (3) from the SA, doing away with the idea of simulation altogether. There is then a flaw within the argument that is somewhat reminiscent of the liar’s paradox. Problems with the Core To calculate all variables in the main equation, we must find the cardinality of all sets, and must ask if these sets are finite. The largest set is that of all possible civilizations, which can be called the multiverse (M). (M)'s structure doesn’t need to be known if it is finite, but if it is infinite we would have to place a law of probability on it, so its structure needs to be known. It is crucial for the SA that (M) be finite, but in some cases it isn’t. Based on the recursive application of the SA within simulated civilizations, (M) would be shaped like a forest: Bostrom says we can’t know for sure what the laws of physics at each point (being civilizations/simulations) are. If they differ from we know, the possibility that a simulation can generate infinite branches can’t be dismissed. In this case (M) is infinite and the SA is flawed [7]. Suppose (M) is finite, then the amount of simulations that can stem from (M) is finite as well and there is no path of infinite progression in the simulation. The simulation has finite computing power as it can’t uphold an infinite simulation or an infinite progression of simulations. The definition of (M) has no reference to time, so the root simulation could run a simulation (s1) from its begining to its end, then a simulation (s2) ad infinitum. The resulting tree (representing all the simulations ever generated by the root simulation) would have infinite branches. The root simulation could also simulate an infinity of infinitely long lasting simulations, just by running (s1) for a unit of time, then (s1) and (s2), etc. The simulations would run slower as the progression continues, but nothing could be suspected from within the simulation itself. There is no reason to exclude the possibility that a post-human civilization can live forever, so (M) is again infinite [7]. We conclude that an infinite computing power and infinite existence are the same for a post-human civilization. The SA fails. ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ 1: http://www.spiegel.de... 2: https://plato.stanford.edu... 3: http://www.simulation-argument.com... 4: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com... 5: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com... 6: See opponent’s R1 7: fabien.besnard.pagesperso-orange.fr/pdfrefut.pdf 8: fias.uni-frankfurt.de/~hossi/Physics/sb03.pdf 9: https://arxiv.org...