Individuals have a moral obligation to assist those in need

My opponent makes a few key misinterpretations of the resolution, as well as my case, which are his biggest downfalls and will by why you're voting Aff this debate. 1. The resolution specifically states "Individuals have a moral obligation to assist". Furthermore, my opponent accepted my definition of moral obligation which specifically states "A duty which one ought to perform but is not legally bound to fulfill". Both specifically point to the fact that all I have to do is prove that there is such an obligation, not how I actually go about it, not which obligation is greater. It's highly ironic that my opponent's telling me "No caveats and cop-outs Aff" while trying to force me to defend something that the resolution doesn't ask me to. So let me be perfectly clear: Under the resolution, I do not have to defend anything other than does the obligation exist. Anything else is non-topical.2. My opponent provides no other alternative framework or weighing mechanism to evaluate the round under. This means that you automatically default to my framework of naturalism. This also means you can cleanly extend out my value and criterion, and evaluate the round under an empathetic mindset. I'll run through my opponent's arguments now:Argument One: KantFirst: There's absolutely no impact to this argument at all. My opponent essentially just says "According to Kant, there are Categorical Imperatives and Hypothetical Imperatives. WHICH ONE DO WE GO TO!?!?" and then moves on. There's no actual point to this argument. All of the evidence he posted for it was just explanations of what each one was. With no impact, there's no reason to listen to it.Secondly: It's irrelevant to the debate. It doesn't matter which of these I have to follow, but rather that I just show that one exists.Thirdly: You can turn any talk of the Categorical Imperative since that affirms the resolution. The entire basis of the CI, as stated in my opponent's own source, is "‘I ought never to act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law’"(1). Assisting others in need fits since I can will others to help me to be a universal law with no harmful reprocussions. Fourthly: My opponent makes the statement "But insofar as nearly all ostensible categorical imperatives can be placed into a situation in which, if acting in accordance with the imperative, an actor would violate the rights of others, especially Kant's most important imperative, then the action should not be committed. ", but never warrants why assisting people violates their rights. You can safely ignore this one since it has no warrant to it. Argument Two: Humans as Tribal AnimalsFirst: The argument is pointless. Even if you buy that I have a "greater" obligation to my mother than to a Nicaraguan child, that doesn't mean the obligation to assist the child goes away or is invalid and doesn't exist anymore. Insofar as all I have to do is prove that the obligation exists, and not whether or not we act on it, this argument doesn't negate and has no weight in the round.Second: My opponent states that just because empathy is about feelings and stuff means that I need to make some sort of jump between that and an obligation. This is exactly what my entire case is talking about. To point to specfics:1. You can extend Olson which explicitly explains why empathy requires a moral obligation. He never responds to this.2. You can extend Gintis et all, which explicitly explains why we cannot reject the obligation empathy imposes. His only response is that a part of the wording looks weird but that's not a response against the actual warrant of the evidence, which remains untouched. I'll get to the supposed contradiction in a minute.3. You can extend Ruse which explains how our empathy makes us altruistic. This goes unresponded to by my opponent. Third: This entire group system that my opponent sets up here is entirely irrelevant. What group people in need belong to have absolutely no impact on whether or not we have an obligation to assist them. My opponent never warrants why we have no obligation to assist those outside of our "group", only saying that we have a "greater obligation" to help those close to us. This "greater obligation" argument actually would imply that if we have a greater obligation to those closer to us, that we do indeed have an obligation to those farther. If true this conceeds that we have obligations to assist others, which essentially concedes the debate to the affirmative. Fourth: My opponent's evidence doesn't lead to his conclusion. Just saying that we prefer to help those closer to us does not mean that we have a greater obligation to help them, but rather that if given the choice and equal obligation, we will choose to help those closer to us. If my mother is in need of a few dollars to go get a shake from McDonalds and a Nicaraguan child needs medication to cure his tuberculosis, it doesn't instantly mean the greater obligation is to my mother because she's closer to me. There needs to be a link between this preference and why it represents a greater obligation, and my opponent does not provide this link. But even if you do buy his argument here that the link is there, that doesn't diminish the fact that the obligation still exists. Argument Three: Rights vs. DutiesFirst: This entire argument is my opponent cherry-picking examples where obligations, when acted on could force us to violate other people's rights. There's no warrant for why assisting others will always violate this Principle. There's not even a warrant for why it will more likely than not violate the PPH, or why it would normally violate the PPH.Second: This argument is non-unique. The aff can follow the PPH just as well as the Neg can.Third: If you don't buy my second response, then you can go ahead and just turn this argument in favor of the affirmative. I follow the PPH better than my opponent does. The negative world denies these obligations to assist exist, which leaves people in need to rot without so much as a "greater good" in mind. The affirmative is at least acting toward the greater good, whereas the negative isn't even doing that. This means if you buy his argument, it flows affirmative if it flows anywhere.Fourth: His argument here assumes that we act on those obligations. Insofar as I don't have to defend acting on the obligation, the argument here has no link into the debate and no impact in terms of the affirmative case. Argument Four: ContradictionsFirst: My opponent continues the trend of cherry-picking examples. The only difference between this fallacy and the previous fallacy is that these examples don't even have anything to do with one another. My obligation to help someone is independent of crimes or things like that. If anything that's just the state's way of giving that man a home and punishing him for his crime at the same time. Second: My opponent massively strawmans what Gintis et al is saying here. Just because people are needy, that doesn't mean they are exempt from the law. Criminals are prosecuted as criminals would normally be. All Gintis is saying by that quote is that we help those who are in need and justly punish those who are causing problems (like murderers, rapists, etc.). There's no contradictionArgument Five: Individuals vs. Society (while I await my opponent's expansion of this point, I will respond to what he has said this round regardless)First: There's no warrant as to why society and the individual can't both have obligations. My opponent is just setting up this false dichotomy that either the society can help or the individual can, but ignores the possibility of both helping. In his example, the citizen merely calling the fire department is helping. Second: My opponent claims I need to warrant why individuals still have the obligation even if the state can provide the assistance better. This is, again, making the faulty assumption that I have to defend implimentation of the obligation. All the resolution asks me to defend is that the obligation exists, and there's no warrant for why that invalidates the individuals obligation to help. Imagine a person is drowning in a pool and both myself and a lifeguard are in a position to help the person drowning. Just because the lifeguard may be better equipped to save the drowning person, that doesn't warrant why I don't have an obligation to help the drowning person (I could just call out to the lifeguard to direct his attention to the drowning person and/or call 911 so that paramedics can be here when the lifeguard gets the drowning person out of the pool, ensuring that person receives proper medical attention as quickly as possible). As such, this debate breaks down really simply:1. My opponent accepted my definition of moral obligation. This means that I just have to defend whether or not the obligation exists, not on how we actually go about fulfilling the obligation.2. My opponent concedes my entire naturalism argument. You can thus extend that out as the default framework for the round.3. My opponent provides no other weighing mechanism for the round. You thus have to default to my value and criterion. This means that whoever is best engaging empathetically with others wins the round. Since my opponent is making no attempt to prove he does such a thing, you default to voting affirmative, even if you don't buy a single argument I've made this debate, as I have the best chance of engaging empathetically with others.4. All my opponent has responded to are hasty generalisations of my arguments, and not the warrants behind my arguments. As such you can extend out each of my contentions (Olson, Gintis et al, Ruse), which prove how I best fulfill my criterion.5. There's numerous turns to vote affirmative off of on my opponent's side of the flow if you don't buy my case.