Evil proves God does not exist (4)

Before I begin, Pro joined 8 months ago but this is their first debate ? what's up with that ? Just out of curiosity Definitions I accept the definitions/descriptions that Pro makes to Gods omnipotence and Gods moral goodness. Countering Pros first argument --- 1b) Countering David Humes argument --- Allowing me to give a possible answer to David Humes question where they say "3. if God is willing and able to prevent evil, then why is there evil? " Possible answer: Cause God has moral sufficient reason to allow evil to exist ---1c) Countering Pros first argument expanded --- Premise 4 of Pros argument states "4) if an agent is morally good, then that agent would desire to prevent evil, all things being equal. " But are all things equal ? that is the question. But what if all things aren't equal ? , a world where evil exists is different than a world where evil doesn't exist (this is trivially obvious). Within the differences between these two worlds could be the moral sufficient reason/s that a moral being could have for allowing evil to exist. Until it is proven that any differences between the two worlds would not allow for any moral sufficient reason/s to allow evil, it must be conceded that the existence of evil does not prove that God or a morally good being capable of preventing evil does not exist. Countering Pros second argument Pro says "Peter Singer points out that there are instances of "evil" in world - namely, the suffering of non-moral entities such as animals and severely handicapped humans. The argument is very basic - to willingly permit unnecessary suffering is evil. " Notice the foundation that this argument is built on as Pro says. .. "The argument is very basic - to willingly permit unnecessary suffering is evil. ", this equates unnecessary suffering with evil. But this raises two questions. .. .. .. 1) What is the difference between necessary suffering and unnecessary suffering ? as this distinction is implied in the argument. 2) On what basis is unnecessary suffering evil ? Now, this may seem like a strange counter argument, after all no one likes suffering, but you see, you can't get a moral value just from describing something that happens in the world. For instance, imagine I describe that an apple is red. This would be a description statement (the "is") Now imagine I describe a situation with lots of suffering, again an "is" statement. But I then say or imply this should not happen. But the claim or implication that something "ought" or "ought not to be" from the "is" (the description statement) is very problematic as Wikipedia explains David Humes "Is-"Ought" problem. .. .. .. .. "Hume calls for caution against such inferences in the absence of any explanation of how the ought-statements follow from the is-statements. But how exactly can an "ought" be derived from an "is"? The question, prompted by Hume's small paragraph, has become one of the central questions of ethical theory, and Hume is usually assigned the position that such a derivation is impossible" Now if Peter Singer and Pro argue that suffering in some way "ought" not to happen, then they must have some reason for this as Pro says "Indeed, we are more reasonable to believe that outside of the conduct of a moral agent, the suffering of non-moral agents such as animals ought to be avoided. " As no reason has being provided why suffering "ought" not to happen, I look forward to Pro giving one. Countering Pros third argument Now Pro tries to justify this claim that If God is incapable of telling a malicious lie that this makes God not all powerful. But as Pro says being all powerful only means being able to do the logical possible, not the logically impossible (eg contradictions) For example can God both exist and not exist ? and if not, doesn't this show that God is not all powerful ? The answer is no cause it is asking God to do a contradiction. Now consider, Can an all morally good God commit an evil action ? and if not, doesn't this show that God is not all powerful ? The answer is no, cause it is asking God to do a contradiction. If God is good due to its own good nature/essence, and to have a good nature/essence means that God is unable to tell a malicious lie due to that being a contradiction, then Gods omnipotence is left in tact, as the argument rests on getting God to do a contradiction. Pro also argues that Gods inability to choose and do evil some how makes God "lesser" moral agent than a being such as human who can choose and do evil. But there is a hidden assumption that the ability to do evil is of greater value than the ability to only do good. Well maybe its of greater value to only do good than to be able to do evil. I look foward to Pros reply. Sources [1] . http://en.wikipedia.org...