Martial Law in Iraq Would Have Been a Sound Strategy, #2

Per my declaration in round #1, I will proffer my argument from the prior debate:IntroductionAs stated in round #1, we are assuming the invasion of Iraq has already occurred. The matter at hand is how to handle the occupation. I will now paint a picture, unfortunately with 20/20 hindsight, as to how the occupation could have been handled via martial law, how there is historical precedence for my scenario, how it would have been actionable, and how it would have been preferable to the status quo. I do not need to prove that martial law is the best strategy, only that it is a sound strategy, i. e. "feasible, actionable, and would have forwarded US interests. "Martial Law in IraqML1) First and foremost, cultural sensitivity would have been a top priority. To think Washington had anything close to enough analysts and linguists to get an actual feeling for circumstances in the Middle East is unfortunately not realistic. The consequences of the counter-culture movement stemming from Vietnam created a black-hole in Washington's understanding of foreign affairs, particularly in the Middle East:"There are many colleges and universities that offer instruction in a wide range of Middle Eastern languages, as well as Islamic history and culture. .. Yet over time, as the meager number of actual majors in those languages shows, the focus of Title VI subsidies has shifted to area studies. "The result, writes Kenneth Whitehead, who supervised Title VI during much of the '80s, was that "we were not getting a good value for our dollar. Many of those who studied 'hard' languages (e. g. , Arabic, Persian, Chinese) in Title VI-supported programs turned out to be less proficient than they needed to be to work effectively in diplomacy, intelligence, aid-related work, and even international business. ""Perhaps the bigger problem has been Title VI's success in its second mission, to support what has proved to be a thriving academic trend in area studies. The effect has been to discourage government service as a career choice for students in the Middle East field. The radicalization of college campuses during the 1960s dramatically reshaped Islamic studies in particular. [1]It is worrisome when you realize that MacArthur had it easy in east Asia compared to the US in the Middle East in a post 9/11 world. All MacArthur had to do was to recognize the Emperor of Japan as the sovereign over his people, and by doing so unite the country and make it pliable to US influence. Such a gesture of respect went a long way in shaping Japan's post-war peaceful transition into one of the world's most prominent economies, while enduring years of martial law, while adhering to a constitution the US wrote for them, and while hosting a permanent US occupying force. To implement a similar gesture of respect, a mandate under this plan would have been to do whatever it took to get these counter-culture academics and especially linguists to reside in Iraq and oversee the diplomatic and cultural policies of the US occupation, and dramatically increase their salaries to compensate. Such a treatment would have been appropriate, as by far the most effective paradigm established in the three examples I brought up in round #1 (Japan, Korea, Taiwan) was the cultural respect paid to the Japanese by MacArthur, and is one very important reason why Japan was by far the most successfully reconstructed state in the region after WWII. That these Middle-Eastern academics were "peaceniks" would have gone far in establishing the US's intent of securing the region following 9/11, as opposed to what had readily been perceived as vindictiveness and retributive justice by the US against most of the Arab world. This is probably not the first thing most people think about when they first hear the phrase "martial law". Typically, people associate the phrase with juntas, corruption, and political assassinations and cullings. While I do not dismiss that these would also occur in an occupied Iraq under martial law, I emphasize the definition proffered in round #1, that martial law is merely the stop-gap provided whenever the civilian sector is unable to accomplish their duties. There is nothing inherently "evil" or "unjust" with a state of martial law, something MacArthur aptly demonstrated in his 5 years of military governance in Japan. ML2) Second, and concomitant in importance to [ML1], a state of martial law would recognize the need of providing the necessary security detail as requested by the Chief of Staff of the US Army in 2003. (video) This cannot be overemphasized. While many may envision that with more soldiers comes more death, ironically the opposite is true. By following Gen. Shinseki's advice, the US would have been adhering to the Powell Doctrine of utilizing overwhelming force to minimize casualties on both sides - against such a force, opponents typically capitulate. Furthermore, with such a force, resistance to the US presence would have been minimized out of fear. This would have been the "stick" aspect of persuasion, with [ML1] being the "carrot" aspect. With a minimized resistance, threats to soldiers on the ground would also have been minimized, meaning fewer IEDs, fewer snipings, and fewer ambushes. With fewer casualties amongst the US contingent, there would have been less fear amongst the troops, less nervousness, and less vindictiveness, leading to a smoother occupational experience. There would also have been more accurate accountability and more precise use of force against the proper parties, as intelligence and investigative units on the ground would have been less strained and thus more able to assess the tactical situation on the ground. Such a contingent has precedence, as Gen. Shinseki had experience with an occupation involving ethnic strife in Bosnia - "his estimate. .. had been based on experiences as a commander in postwar Bosnia, where the United States sent 50,000 troops to quiet five million people, a population one-fifth that of Iraq. " [2]Such a contingent would also have heeded Gen. Shinseki's own warning (video) that Iraq contained "the kinds of ethnic tensions that could lead to other problems [such as sectarian violence and civil war]", which itself was echoing the advice of generals during the first Gulf War:"Had the United States and the United Kingdom gone on alone to capture Baghdad [in 1991]. .. we would have been considered occupying powers and therefore would have been responsible for all the costs of maintaining or restoring government, education and other services for the people of Iraq. " [3]Instead of following this advice, the Bush Administration threw Gen. Shinseki under a bus. With enough troops, instead of the tiny "green zone" established in Baghdad following the invasion, we may have been able to secure the entire city. That alone would have given insurgents much fewer opportunities to conduct guerrilla tactics in an "urban jungle", as there would have been far fewer places for these insurgents to hide in Baghdad proper. This would have given the Iraqi police forces more time to train, and with fewer disruptions or casualties. This would have hastened an orderly transition to a viable Iraqi government and police force, thereby decreasing the duration of our occupation, and accomplishing the goal of "nation-building". ML3) This point is relatively simple - while the costs of such a policy would have been orders of magnitude more expensive than what was actually incurred (which was already monolithic), occupational costs would initially have been covered through 9/11 war bonds sold to the public. While I do not question that Saddam Hussein was not involved in the planning and execution of 9/11, it is unquestionable that Saddam took any and every opportunity to threaten US interests in the region, to include sponsoring jihadist extremists whenever possible, and so such a tangential linking of 9/11 to Iraq would have been appropriate. Such a policy would have inspired the typically profound self-sacrifice in America that typically accompanies acts of war, which would have led to less of the profligate behavior in the US that resulted in the 2008 financial crisis that also occurred under Bush's watch. By 2003, the American economy had already recovered from the dot-com bust, which by itself wasn't a large hit to the economy as a whole, the stock market notwithstanding. The American populace, given Bush's 90%+ approval ratings and a healthier balance sheet, would have been accommodating to such a policy. With a viable occupation force, the costs of the occupation would have decreased going forward, instead of increasing as occurred during Bush's term. The occupation itself would also have been shorter, thereby lowering the overall costs of war. This covers the feasibility aspect of implementing martial law. ConclusionThe policy that the Bush administration forwarded did NOT advance US interests. It left an Iraq "at the brink," too weak to defend itself from neighbors such as Iran, thereby strengthening the hand of our enemies. [4] It directly contributed to an explosion in oil prices, even though the US is the world's largest oil consumer and importer by far, thereby weakening our economy. It was funded not by debt sold to the American people, but debt sold to China, thereby weakening our global economic clout. My strategy (admittedly with 20/20 hindsight) rectifies these failings and replaces it with a sound strategy - "feasible, actionable, and would have forwarded US interests. "I await CON's rebuttal. [1] . http://www.slate.com...[2] . http://www.nytimes.com...[3] . http://www.cnn.com...[4] . http://www.globalpolicy.org...http://www.youtube.com...