Libertarian free will is false.

Thank you, wjmelements, for responding. I believe that my argument from quantum mechanics has been properly refuted, so I shall instead shift entirely to my argument from pain. My opponent gives a long explanation of the biology of pain. This is nice, but it doesn't contribute to his argument in any significant way at all, as it does not explain the problems that have been raised by my criticisms and hypotheticals. I shall go directly to his explanations of these situations. While the brain may be a system, it is only truly connected by the signals that the individual parts send to each other, assuming no super-physical connections. This raises questions about what happens when the brain is split into numerous parts, which wjm tries to answer. I ask whether individual neurons, when separated and tricked into "thinking" that they are still part of a single brain, would process pain as they would when "together." My opponent claims would not, as they would send the right signals to the wrong audience." However, I stated that signals are being sent and received to trick the neurons into acting as if they are in a brain. If all of the signals that are received by the computer in charge of this process are then re-sent to the intended target, would pain still be felt? If so, would it still be felt by the entire original entity, as it was originally, or split up among the neurons? My opponent seems to think that the pain would be split up, with the human consciousness not feeling the overall pain. However, originally, the brain cells were connected only by electronic signals, and the consciousness could still feel pain; in this example, they are still connected by electronic signals. How is it that while neurons are physically in a brain, they can create an overall consciousness, but while separate, they cannot? A computer could even learn the exact signals that a neuron could be sent, so that an individual neuron could be part of a virtual brain without the rest of the neurons. If this is done separately for each neuron, would a consciousness feel pain? If not, why must the neurons be stimulated simultaneously or together? If so, how does this consciousness receive pain from every neuron, despite a lack of physical connection between them? I am again accused of committing the fallacy of composition, but I have set up each neuron as if it were in the brain; the only difference from a regular brain is the extreme distance between the cells and the computer that receives then resends the electronic signals, two factors which don't seem as if they should matter, although my opponent inexplicably thinks that they do. Continuing to the "artificial brain," my opponent claims that with the use of the supplemental brain, a consciousness would be produced that could feel pain. However, both halves of the original brain are now receiving and sending the same signals; they're just no longer physically connected. As the two separate brain halves are in essentially the same state as they were before, only having a greater distance and also having supplemental brain halves that supply these same electric signals as before, one would think that they are still part of the same consciousness. Is there really an explanation for why they are no longer the same conscious without assuming super-physical properties of life? To conclude, while my opponent claims that living bodies behave with the same properties as nonliving bodies, life processes such as pain cannot be answered by physical laws without introducing serious paradoxes. Thank you, wjmelements, and good luck with your final round. I hope my points are comprehensible enough.