Does God Exist: An Ontological Argument

Hello and thanks. In this debate I will be arguing that the OA is not a sufficient argument for God’s existence. Existence. The ontological arguments presented essentially boil down to, God must exist by definition. God is defined as the greatest conceivable thing, and God can’t be great unless it exists. Kant pointed out the problem with this. You can’t just claim existence is an attribute, existence is something that allows attributes, not an attribute in and of itself. For example, I can define a “Realicorn” with all the properties as a unicorn, but existing. It has one horn, it is a magical equine, and it exists. However, this isn’t adding a property. Kant’s point becomes clear, existence is not a predicate. One can argue that the modal ontological argument presented isn’t touched. However, in order for God to exist in all possible worlds, he must be great, because existing is what it means to be great. William Lane Craig himself admitted this [video http://www.youtube.com...] Greatness. The arguments must assume a standard of what is great in order to state God is the greatest. The problem is an objective standard of what is and isn’t great can’t fit with God. If the standard of great is subjective, then the argument can’t objectively prove God exists, since subjectivity is only in the mind. So, a simple question, where does the standard of great comes from to say that God is the greatest possible being? I can think of 2 ways 1. The standard is above God 2. The standard comes from God/God’s nature/created by God. Both ways can’t fit with the Ontological arguments. 1. The standard is above God This can’t be true under a theistic world view, because it would undermine a God, by saying there’s something above him that he’s subject to. It also means the source of such a standard must be the ultimate of great thing, which God is suppose to be. For example, if great is set by a tree, it must be the greatest thing, because it’s the compass of which we determine what is great. The alternative option is, 2. The standard comes from God/God’s nature/created by God. This however would mean the arguments are committing the fallacy of begging the question. Since God, being the greatest must necessarily exist, but “great” is set by God. It’s like trying to prove a maximally fast car exists, but you say “fast” is set by how fast the car you’re trying to prove is going. If “great” is set by the being, then saying God necessarily exists because it is the greatest, is saying God must necessarily exist, because God is most like himself. Which assumes its existence in the first place. Modal Argument for the Impossibility of God. At best this argument demonstrates it’s impossible for God to exist (meaning the OA is wrong) and at the very least it shows the OA is equal to this argument, thus is not sufficient evidence. This was proposed by philosopher Ryan Stringer [http://www.infidels.org...] A. It is possible that p. B. Necessarily, if it is possible that God exists, then it is necessary that God exists. C. Necessarily, if God exists, then it is not the case that p. D. Therefore, it is not possible that God exists. (from A, B, & C) We can use various plugins for P, like 1. Minds can only exist in the physical world. 2. An evil deity exists 3. Omnipotence is impossible 4. Being morally perfect is impossible 5. Omniscience is impossible The only way to try to defeat this argument is to use the Modal Ontological Argument. However, Ryan Stringer writes “P = It is possible that God exists ...contesting our A-premises by appealing to the modal ontological argument fails to defeat modal arguments for atheism. First of all, P and any given A-premise are, at best, equally plausible—it would be absurd to claim that P is more plausible than any of the A-premises. For even if P is intuitively plausible, and God is a conceivable, coherent thing, the same can be said of the objects or states of affairs said to be possible in the A-premises. Now the equal plausibility of P and any given A-premise implies that the modal ontological argument and any given modal argument for atheism are on an equal footing—…” This would make the ontological argument insufficient evidence, thus my case is proven. However, Stringer also says since there is more A premises, then A is more plausible than P. Conclusion I have given three objections that show the Ontological arguments are insufficient evidence for the existence of a great being. Existence is not an attribute, great is either objective or subjective, and the modal argument for atheism shows at very least; there’s an equal argument.