Resolved: Abortion should stay legal in the U.S.A.

I’m also thrilled that my opponent doesn’t dread engaging in philosophy for such a difficult question. Objections to the Fetus and Personhood Argument: It seems like my opponent has chosen an arbitrary definition for personhood without really explaining why this definition resolves the problem of a fetus being a person or not. He uses three components to define personhood which are (1) morally conscious (2) capable of complex thought and (3) possessing the capacity (but not necessarily the ability to communicate). He further states that newly born babies satisfy these criteria, but it is evident that newly born babies are not yet morally conscious. My opponent may take a potentiality route which would severely undermine his case since he needs to draw line as to when this potentiality to be a morally, conscious agent begins. Going a potentiality route on this argument, would essentially be a concession to my second argument. For the next objection, Pro has not defined what exactly he means by “capacity” for communicating. Does he mean a well developed Wernicke’s and Broca’s area in the brain? If so, he would need to show that these areas are sufficiently developed at birth so that they are very distinguishable from a pre-birth fetus. He could also argue that these areas are not well-developed for the capacity for communication; nonetheless, the newborn has the potential to communicate. Once again, Pro will not have answered the question of personhood because an eighth month fetus may also have the same chances to communicate as newborn baby in that both have little to no well-developed Wernicke’s and Broca’s areas. Pro must offer an objective or better definition of personhood free from any ambiguity if he wishes use this argument. Objections to the Self-Ownership Argument: This argument seems to inform most of Pro’s case. First, Pro suggests self-ownership is an intrinsic/natural property of a person, but if it is, one can wonder why a fetus is excluded from having this property. It may be the case that both the mother and fetus possess self-ownership; however, this leaves itself open to possibility that the fetus’ self-ownership affords it the right to life. If Pro wishes to argue that the fetus does not have the property of self-ownership, then I can press him as to when one acquires this contingent property. If he concedes that the fetus has self-ownership only of itself but not of the mother’s body, then we may move on to the next objection. It’s important to note that Pro is pushing forward a case for formal self-ownership not a substantive self-ownership [1]. Here’s a thought experiment proposed by philosopher Edward Feser. If someone strangles you to death, then according to the self-ownership principle, this is morally wrong because the murderer invaded your self-ownership (your space, your trachea, your life, etc. ). This would be a formal self-ownership because your own physical health was violated. However, suppose this person was a mad scientist and built a sort of machine that sucked in all the oxygen. You, along with many other people, die from a lack of oxygen. In a court of philosophy this person could argue that your formal self-ownership was not invaded since your body parts were left untouched and nothing concerning your physical body was done against your will [3]. Under a substantive self-ownership view, one could certainly argue that self-ownership entails having the sufficient conditions to carry out formal self-ownership. As Libertarian philosopher Eric Marck points out, “One’s self-owned powers, abilities, capacities, and so forth, are inherently world interactive it is of their essence that they are directed upon the environment external to one’s body. ” This will thus be called the Self-Ownership Proviso (SOP) [4]. Here’s a clearer example. Suppose I removed your hand, I would then violate your formal self-ownership because your hand belongs to you. But, suppose I removed all objects that you could possibly grasp with your hands without doing anything physical to you. I would violate your SOP. Feser aptly summarizes the SOP: Even non-invasive use of one’s property and powers can violate another’s self-ownership if it effectively nullifies or disables the other’s ability to bring his self-owned powers to bear on the world, that is, if it renders another’s ownership purely formal, not substantive[5]. Pro also acknowledges that that even if we conclude that the fetus is a person, if the mother does not want it, according to her formal self-ownership, she may remove the fetus. This argument parallels Judith Thomson’s famous Cellist Argument of a famous cellist being attached to you and dependent on your body for his/her survival [6]. Person or not, according to Thomson, you may end the life of the Cellist by removing them from your body. Here we can look at one more thought experiment as a counter example: Adam’s Island. Suppose Adam is shipwrecked in an island, which he later claims for himself. Days later, Jim is also shipwrecked on the island as well, but Adam refuses to let Jim enter the island even though Jim’s formal ownership is not violated. If the SOP is true however, Jim’s SOP is effectively nullified by Adam [6]. Adam can argue until he is blue in the face that it is not his fault that Jim landed shipwrecked on his island (it may be an incompetent captain’s fault or maybe he was fleeing from evil pirates); however, it is Jim receiving the brunt of the punishment [7]. Or it may even be that Adam allowed Jim on his island but now reconsiders his presence there for some reason or another. Likewise, we can parallel this to a fetus in the sense that in the decisions of the parents, it is the fetus or person (Pro has granted this possibility in his Self-Ownership argument) being punished for actions it was not a part of. Abortion thus removes the SOP of fetuses. Pro insinuates that we should accept purely formal self-ownership instead of the SOP but he has not yet provided an argument demonstrating this to be true. Objections to Overpopulation Argument: Pro’s final argument deals with population growth in the U. S. Unfortunately, his argument about immigration is a red herring because the resolution concerns the legality of abortion in the U. S. not the abortion laws in the countries of these foreign-born children. It is out of the scope of the resolution. I would happily engage it if the resolution was not restricted to the U. S. The first point he makes is that the population growth in the U. S. and the negative impact that will have on the environment. Even though the population of the U. S. is growing, the actual rates are lowering. For instance, the birth rate average for Latinos the previous decade was at 3.6% down to 2.5% for the 2010-2011 year. Asians also went through a similar drop in growth rate from 3.6 to 2.2% [8]. Across the board, the growth rate in the U. S. is actually declining even in fertility rates. In 2009, the birth rate in America was at 2.1 and 4.2 million added to the U. S. population between 2005 and 2006; however, between 2010 and 2011, only four million were added with a fertility rate of 2.0 suggesting population growth may be slowing [9]. Even if I conceded that population growth is so exponential that it will inevitably cripple the human civilization, abortion needn’t be the primary solution. Indeed, there is no inherent contradiction in the use of contraception and careful family planning with being pro-life. Education and preventative measures are crucial. Sources: [1, 2, 3] Edward Feser. “Self-Ownership, Abortion, and the Rights to Children: Toward a More Conservative Libertarianism. ” P. 98. . http://mises.org...[4,5] Ibid, p.99[6] Ibid, p. 100[7] Ibid, p. 102[8,9] . http://www.prb.org...