God most likely exists

Thanks for the excellent rebuttal. Remember that my argument isP1 Mind is mentalP2 Nothing mental can interact with what is non-mentalC1 Nothing mind interacts with is non-mentalP3 Mind interacts with realityC2 Reality is mentalAs I expected, my opponent has attacked only P1. Remember, that if I can defend P1, the conclusion follows necessarily and inescapably.GodMy opponent claims that even if the above argument is true, it doesn’t prove God. Let me explain.Materialism argues that there is only one type of substance, and that this type of substance is physical stuff. The mind, therefore, is reducible to physical matter.Idealism, on the other hand, states that there is only one type of substance, but this substance is “mental”. Mind is not irreducible to physical matter for the idealist, but physical matter is reducible to mind.Let’s say you’re baking a cake. You take ingredients and mix them up, put it in the oven, and out comes the cake. The materialist says that these ingredients you made the cake out of are physical in nature. The idealist says that these irreducibly ingredients are mental in nature.So if I can show that the mind is irreducible, then I have shown that “mind stuff” is the basic ingredient. P1: Whatever is mental is either (i) a mind or (ii) caused by a mind.P2: Reality is mentalC: Reality is either a (i) mind, or (ii) caused by a mind.For the sake of this debate, either option will do, since in either case, there’s a mind behind reality.My opponent also objects that reality could be caused by a CPU which is physical and not mental. But once again, this doesn’t work, since the interaction between this CPU and our minds would be impossible as I have shown.MaterialismMy opponent, as you will recall, is arguing for materialism. This means that he is not arguing that physical matter has other “mental” properties, but rather that our minds are, in some way or another, the same thing as physical matter. To put this in philosophy terms, he is arguing for a reductionist form of the mind, not an emergent one. He’s not saying that if you mix up certain physical parts then poof! Out comes a non-physical mind. He’s saying that the mind just is physical.He also argues that materialism makes sense of the world better than idealism, and gives examples of the mind’s dependency on the brain, and optical illusions. He claims that materialism makes more sense of the necessary connection between brain and mind. But who is to say that there is a necessary connection between brain and mind? He surely hasn’t shown this. In our world, yes, there is a connection between the two. But is this the case in all worlds, which is what it means for something to be “necessary”? We haven’t been given any reasons to think this. Remember the diagram above? Well I’ll admit there is a relationship between mind/matter in our physical world, but not necessarily in all metaphysical situations.In regards to optical illusions, he is also mistaken. Idealism doesn’t say that science needs to change how it functions. All it says is that the philosophical presuppositions science assumes need to change. So under idealism, there are still atoms, quantum particles, black holes, etc. The difference though, is that materialism says these things are, in their philosophical nature, physical. Idealism says that in their nature, they are mental. So science works exactly the same on idealism as it does on materialism. The difference between the two is the ontological nature of reality.My opponent also says that materialism is favored by Occam’s razor. Under materialism we don’t need God, but under idealism we do. So materialism makes less assumptions, right? Once again, this is assuming that idealism and materialism are on equal footing as far as explanatory power goes (which they’re not, as I’ve shown) and that reality can go on without a mind. I am intending to show that it cannot. So if my argument succeeds, this is completely irrelevant. Occam’s razor might favor the position that there’s no black holes, since that is an unnecessary assumption, but we have evidence that they exist, and positing black holes explains things much better.And remember, the only part of my argument Con has disagreed with is the premise that mind is irreducible to matter. The heart and soul of this entire debate rests upon that one premise.Consequences of materialismMy opponent argues that if materialism is true, then we don’t have any free will, and that's just the way it is.The problem is that we most definitely do experience something like free will. Free-will seems obviously true. Sure, it might end up being false, but we do experience at least the illusion of it. Materialism needs to explain why we experience such an incredibly strong illusion of something that doesn’t exist, and it has a lot of trouble doing so. But idealism can easily explain why we think there is free will. Because we have it!So I shall argue that there are numerous reasons to believe that the mind is immaterial, and it able to explain things, such as free will and the self. Materialism fails on both accounts.Defending P1Let’s get into the main part of the disagreement. Strap on your seatbelts because this might be a bumpy ride.Dissimilarities of mind and matterSuppose you had never before seen or even heard of a rabbit. Suppose you also had never seen or heard of chewing tobacco. Now suppose I showed you a picture of both. "Now" I ask you, "how do you know that these aren’t the same thing?"You laugh at first, but then realize I am completely serious."How do you know?" I repeat."THAT" you point at the rabbit "is a small fuzzy cute animal. But THAT is a paper package filled with black shredded stuff."I still insist "But how does that mean they're different things? They still might be the same thing for all we know."At this point, I think most people would be frustrated and flabbergasted. They'd probably throw up their hands and say "Look, dude, they're completely dissimilar. They're just completely different types of things."And you would be perfectly justified in making that inference. If I wanted you to believe otherwise, I should show you that a rabbit and chew are actually the same.What is physical matter, the brain, composed of? Grey tissue. Neuron firing. Stimulation of C-fibers. Shifting in voltage. Chemicals releasing.But what is "mind"? The self. Sensations. What something feels like. Beliefs. Desires. Thoughts. Let me put it this way. How much does my belief that "it is raining today" weigh? How many centimeters "long" is the self?Since we are justified in making the inference that a rabbit and a pouch of chew are not the same thing, we are also justified in making the inference that neural patterns and what I feel when I step on a lego are different things.If the rabbit and the chew were the same things, then when we look at the picture of the rabbit, we’re also looking at the chew. But if the mind is the same as the physical matter of the brain, then every time I introspect, or look inside myself, I am looking at neurons.We can identify the rabbit as much as we like, and we will never be aware of the pouch of tobacco. The thought will never enter our heads. This makes absolutely no sense if they’re the same things.But we can do the same with the mind! We can understand everything there is to know about neuron firing patterns, but this won't tell us what something actually smells like to that person. So if the C-fiber stimulation and the pain I feel when I step on a lego were the exact same thing then they wouldn't be such completely dissimilar things. But you could scan my brain however many times you like, identify neurons, but you will never “feel” my pain.In other words, mind is inherently first-person, while matter is inherently third-person. They’re completely dissimilar.My opponent isn’t comparing apples to oranges.He’s saying apples just are oranges.SolipsismMy opponent claims that solipsism might be metaphysically possible, but we don’t know for sure. He compares it to Goldberg’s Conjecture. Since we can’t know whether or not Goldberg’s Conjecture is metaphysically possible, we can’t know that solipsism is metaphysically possible as well.But there’s a problem here. Unlike in Goldberg’s Conjecture, we can analyze the properties of physical matter, and the properties of the mind, as we have done above. We can compare the two, and see that they are actually quite different in their nature. Thus, we can conclude that it’s perfectly metaphysically possible for the mental states to exist apart from the brain states, and it’s also perfectly conceivable.Contrast this to Goldberg’s Conjecture. In the case of Goldberg’s Conjecture, we cannot yet analyze the properties of an infinite amount of numbers. We just don't know. This is a very obscure and complicated example and should not be compared to the obvious example of the mind.So my opponent’s analogy does not hold. In the case of solipsism, we can easily examine mind and easily examine the properties of physical matter. This is not the case with Goldberg’s Conjecture. To compare the mind, which is what we know most immediately (in fact, all we ever know) to an infinite amount of numbers which the greatest mathematicians cannot find an answer to is not a valid analogy at all.He also asks how I know this is conceivable? Well how do we know it is conceivable that the rabbit might exist while the chew doesn’t? Because they’re completely different things.My opponent also argues that my argument is invalid. However, this is a modus tollens argument which is perfectly valid.P1 IF mind is matter, THEN there is no possible world in which solipsism is the case.P2 There is a possible world in which solipsism is the case.C Mind is not matter.As I have defended P2, which my opponent has attacked, the argument remains.Thus, we have seen good reasons to believe that the mind is immaterial. Unless, of course, my opponent can give us arguments to think otherwise.The resolution remains affirmed.