Resolved: The Ontological Argument is Sound

Thank you for the debate. Right from the start I can make the clear extension of the Ontological Argument I offered. The reason is that even if everything you said is correct, the argument is still true, which means its conclusion is also true. Notice how the definition I offered of a MGB is not part of the argument in terms of the deductive syllogism. This is because the syllogism, if the premises are true, prove the definition of a MGB to which I appealed. That is, if the argument is true then the definition of a MGB I offered is exemplified in a being that actually exists. If you accept that "it is possible that a MGB exists" as in MGB that I defined, then everything follows. So you have not shown how my definition is incoherent. But, naturally, your arguments are vacuous. Your use of definitions for specific words are fallacious. My a MGB, supporters of the Ontological Argument do not mean Great to be "powerful" and greatness to be "measure of ability to accomplish." As I said, taken together, a MGB is a being "than which no greater being can be conceived." If you can think of a greater being, then that would be the MGB. Thus, if the properties of this being to which I have appealed are properties that a MGB should have as a being than which none greater can be conceived, then it follows that my definition is superior. Omniscience: Your argument is demonstrably fallacious. You say: "A maximally great being which can accomplish the same tasks without a consciousness would be just as great as a maximally great being with a consciousness would be." This is false. You already concede that a MGB would have omnipotence. But if a MGB has omnipotence, then it would have to have consciousness. For if it could not experience the ability to perceive and reason and think, then it not only is not a MGB but it is also not omnipotent because there is something that is logically possible that it cannot do; namely, the property of having consciousness. Moreover, if it does not have the ability to be all-knowing then it is not truly a MGB since we can plausibly conceive of a being that is greater; one who does have the property of maximal intelligence and knowledge. So your claim that a MGB is fallacious because by definition, the most perfect conceivable being would have the properties of knowing and reason and consciousness. These things are better to have than not to have, otherwise it is blind about without purpose. An omnibenevolent being is also a property of maximal greatness because to not be the greatest possible authority on morality would be inferior to what it means to be maximally great, that is, the greatest conceivable being. By the very nature of maximal greatness, the nature of such a being would entail the property of being all-good, for to be all good is greater than to be partially good or all-evil. Then you claim that existence itself is omnipotent. You have committed the fallacy of equivocation in terms of the word omnipotent. Omnipotent means a things ability to do all logically possible things. But an abstract concept of a thing that is, on your equivocated definition of omnipotence, void of any ability to perceive or reason or invoke purpose or experience love or experience person hood etc. is by definition not omnipotence. Your view renders this abstraction as a thing that cannot do a multiplicity of things that we would consider a MGB to be able to do. Thus, you completely undermine the definition of omnipotence because your view means there are plausibly things that cannot be done by this being. It is important to note, however, that I win even if everything above is false. You have simply pointed out that a MGB does not have to have certain properties. But you did not show that having those properties is logically incoherent. Since you did not prove that it is logically incoherent, then that means the argument's conclusion follows and therefore a MGB under my definition exists. Since the argument is based on the definition I gave, and the definition I gave is logically possible, then the conclusion is inescapable based on the laws of deduction. Since it is possible that a MGB as defined by me in post 1 is possibly exemplified in a world, then it follows that such a being does exist, even if you are correct and a MGB does not have to have those properties. My argument shows that it does. By the way, references include Alvin Plantinga who developed this modal form.