Resolved: On balance, violence is a just response to political oppression

I appreciate that he thinks I'm such a good debater, and I've been impressed with the debates of his I've read thusfar. With that, I'll get into it. The justice definition is a bit of a problem. First off, we're not talking about justice. We're talking about what is just. And yes, there is a difference. [5] So while justice is itself not so simple as "giving each their due" (a much more extensive and accurate definition is seen in the link, though it does include the basic idea as well), we're not discussing what supports justice, since that isn't the word that appears in the resolution. Second, I provided a much more extensive definition of just from a legal dictionary in R1 (and you'll find it agrees with [5]) that goes untouched. My definition should be preferred based on its specificity, applicability, and quality. Third, I meet his definition better. No one is "due" oppression, and yet Con would relegate many to extensively continued oppression. Criminals are "due" punishment, and yet Con would afford them none at all, as any punishment would be violent. Con attempts to define political oppression. I mostly agree to this, but we must realize that since a government has many means of oppression, this is a broad issue with a lot of pieces to think about. However, governments will always have militaries and usually have police forces, providing them with the capacity to impose force on their populace. Whether they use that force or not, its very presence can be used to oppress, enforcing the will of an oppressive regime. Their capacity to engage in violence on this large scale should be considered when we consider what political oppression means. Onto Con's case. Con makes a delineation between the terms "permissible" and "justified. " He says that it is permissible to protect oneself from someone inflicting violence using violence, but that it is not justified. However, he never warrants this statement at all, and there is nothing mutually exclusive about these terms. Something can be both just and permissible " in fact, an action being just can be what makes it permissible, as is the case here. The main claim here is that the violence is inherently unjustified in any context. This is a massive unwarranted statement. It assumes that all violence = killing, but since we're talking about revolutions, we can certainly assume some killing is likely. However, the most important implicit assumption here is that killing is the MOST unjust action, and therefore can never be justified. I'd argue that context matters. Should violence prevent the loss of more life, even by Con's own standards, this would be just, as it would reduce the amount of killing that occurs. This includes reducing the propensity for future violence. Should violence result in higher quality of life for a much larger number of people, thus producing increased freedoms, improved equality, better health and less hunger (just to name a few examples), it is just, as their suffering from a lack of any of these is unjust and their restoration, thus, just. This is where Con's analogy to a mugger turns on him. If said mugger is allowed to proceed, they could kill or further injure the person they're stealing from. That mugger won't be stopped due to a lack of violence (this can involve subduing him, not just killing him), and thus will go on to kill or injure others, or at the very least reduce their quality of life by breeding fear and stealing valuables. It is unjust to allow that mugger to continue in their actions. It is therefore just to ensure that said mugger is stopped. Con then states that, even if voters are buying my arguments, I wouldn't be meeting my BoP. On the contrary, it is Con who needs to see to his burdens, as he needs to show a clear delineation between permissible and justified, and demonstrate why killing, in any instance and for any reason, is unjust. Onto his point regarding the view that "violent revolutions never provide equality, liberty, and political freedoms to all of their citizens immediately after the revolution," 1. He's wrong. The American Revolution is a great example. Yes, it didn't usher in an age of unprecedented freedoms and equality, but that shouldn't be the standard here. Oppression of these groups existed prior to it as well. The aftermath of the American Revolution improved basic freedoms and equalities for some, that's what matters. We cannot proceed to evaluate all past revolutions based on our current views of oppression, and we certainly cannot treat the violence as the cause for those deficiencies. 2. Even if Con was right here, that doesn't change whether the revolution itself was just. The fact that a given government that comes to power isn't benevolent doesn't change the fact that the original government was oppressive. The revolution itself was effective in producing change, it is not to blame for the outcome that follows it. 3. All the end of this position shows (and note that this is solely an unwarranted, sourceless claim on Con's part) is that some political oppression can be solved with non-violence. This doesn't mean that violence would have been ineffective, nor does it prove that violence is unjust. The existence of a non-violent alternative, which Con has not specified, doesn't make violence unjust. Both can be just. Now, back to my case. Start by extending my analysis on frameworks and burdens. Con has failed to produce a framework with any meaningful analysis, and he has not yet met his burden to show that there is an inherent moral wrongness to engaging in violence as a way to end unjust oppression. 1. Retributive justice Con states that my source is biased, but doesn't provide any reason to believe that to be the case. Even if it is true, that's an appeal to motive fallacy. He's ignoring what was actually said and instead insinuating that no one should pay attention to the link on the basis that it might be biased. Unless he actually shows a fault in the definition provided, it stands. Similarly, he proceeds to call out Wikipedia as an untrustworthy source. He could have looked down at the citations given and addressed them specifically, but he decides not to do that (it is interesting that he trusts some of the people who post on the website who say the links might not be enough and not the others who posted those links). Both of the sources provided in the Wikipedia link are sufficient, as one comes from a Stanford encyclopedia, and the other from a book of philosophy written by Robert Nozick, a Harvard professor. [6, 7] If Con wants to challenge these, challenge them directly. These sources are actually better than his, as Con's source is focused on retribution against an external force by governments. My sources address retributive justice as a whole. Con proceeds to say that two wrongs don't make a right, asserting that violence in response to violence is inherently wrong, but this goes back to his fundamental, and still unwarranted, assertions about violence. He's just restating it differently. My definition shows that vengeance and retribution are separate. His link doesn't conflate the two either. The fact that some people move from retribution to vengeance doesn't mean that the original act of violence, aimed at securing retributive justice, is immoral or unjust. The fact that some violence is taken too far doesn't mean that all violence is inherently unjust. Con doesn't respond to my analysis that he's effectively limiting resistance groups in their response to oppressive regimes. He hasn't stated what non-violent options are more useful, nor has he supported any specific methods as alternatives, just assuming that violence is never morally necessary or just. His only response to this is pulled out in a "self-defense" point, which is a rehash of his mugger argument. He ignores the reality that he is telling people who are defending themselves physically that they are all acting unjustly, and that their only just action is to accept that they are being treated violently and respond only in a broadly acceptable manner, no matter what the situation might be. Under many oppressive regimes, non-violent methods are commonly made illegal, and thus those who use them are effectively silenced, resigning them to their continued oppression. If Con feels that it is unjust to engage in violence for the sake of bucking oppressive leadership, then he has to provide some specific just methods that will work for people under tyrannical governments. We agree that it is unjust to be under a tyrannical government, so as long he gives them no just recourse, making violence the only method available to them, making it just. 2. Intervention Con's responses on intervention are just questions, neither of which get at the point. If Con's case is that violence and killing is morally bad and unjust, then ending them sooner is morally good and just. In oppressive regimes, violence and killing are common, independent of the response of the oppressed. Violence on the part of the oppressed brings in external intervention, which ends the violence sooner, thus resulting in fewer deaths overall. Thus, violence can be an effective mechanism for reducing loss of life in the long term, and it can therefore be justified. I've provided two examples, neither of which were attacked by Con, that show how violence is the sole effective mechanism among those available for attracting foreign intervention. So this point stands strongly - it provides a powerful justification for pursuing violence with the goal of ending both violence and oppression and bringing about long-lasting stability. 5. . http://www.lectlaw.com... 6. . http://plato.stanford.edu... 7. . http://books.google.com...