Warfare: Land Power (Pro) vs. Air Power (Con)

Definition of Sustaining Operation (also found in ADP 3-0): "Sustaining operations enable the decisive operation or shaping operation by generating and maintaining combat power." A sustaining operation cannot be decisive, but it is an acceptable alternative. Under the agreed definitions, my position is that most of the time, land power plays a larger role in directly winning wars. Air power more often acts as a shaping operation that creates favorable conditions for ground forces to exploit. My opening argument will consist of historical examples. == Historical Examples == There is no doubt that air power can cause heavy casualties and great destruction. However, that's not the same as being decisive. There is not a single major war since the invention of the airplane where the use of air power directly led to victory (Hiroshima and Nagasaki excluded). WWI - aircraft in WWI mostly filled a reconnaissance or harassment role. Far from being decisive. WWII - This was the first war where air power was tested as a tool to win war. This was done, by the Axis and Allies alike, according to interwar theorists such as Giulio Dahout, who wrote in 1921, "to have command of the air is to have victory." [1]. Throughout WWII, Dahout's theories were put to the test in three major campaigns: The London Blitz, American/British strategic bombing, and the Eastern Front. In all three campaigns, air power failed to produce victory. The London Blitz - In 1940, Nazi Germany began a systematic bombing campaign against England with the intent of destroying British industry and morale to force England into peace talks. Unfortunately, the opposite effect occurred. British morale and resolve greatly increased, and any chance of bringing Churchill to the negotiating table was destroyed. In the end, the Blitz obviously did not achieve victory over England. American/British strategic bombing - Allied bombers constantly attacked German industrial and population centers during the war. While this certainly caused great destruction and loss of life, it can in no way be seen as decisively leading to victory. If the combined American/British air campaign against Germany was so effective, it would have been impossible for Germany to continue fighting on three major fronts for 4-5 years. This was because allied bombing was not as effective as is often thought. In one estimate, the Allied Air Command calculated that it took 8 bombing missions to cut 1 German rail line.... but then admitted that it only took the Germans 5 hours to repair that rail line. [2] Germany would have been forced to surrender rather quickly after losing air superiority if the bombing was truly decisive. Despite continuous industrial bombing for 5 years, the German army only surrendered after the Red Army captured Berlin. This is significant evidence that the air campaign was a Shaping Operation - it hindered enemy supply and industry centers in order to create favorable conditions that the Armies on the ground could decisively exploit. Eastern Front - Like in the English Blitz, air power failed to achieve German victory on the Eastern front. During the Battle of Stalingrad and the Siege of Leningrad, brutal German aerial bombing became so intense that both cities were essentially reduced to rubble. Yet the cities did not surrender. On the contrary, Soviet ground forces, without any significant bomber support, were able to counterattack and ultimately win both of these major battles. If air power is decisive, then such events should be inexplicable. Korean War - If air power is decisive, then its effects should have been obvious and swift during the Korean War, since the the UN forces enjoyed almost complete air superiority to bomb at will, and the Chinese and Koreans had almost no ability to bomb. The destruction of North Korea was so complete as a result of strategic bombing that UN forces eventually stopped bombing the North Korean capital of Pyongyang because there were literally no more buildings left standing to target [3]. And yet the North Koreans continued to fight. Despite free and frequent UN bombing, the Korean and Chinese forces demonstrated an uncanny ability to sustain military operations so stubbornly that it forced the war to end in stalemate rather than victory. Vietnam War - A similar situation to Korea - one side (USA) had an almost limitless freedom to bomb the enemy, while the other side (North Vietnam) had almost no air force to speak of. The Vietnam War saw the same WWII formula of trying to bomb the enemy into submission. Significant bombing campaigns such as Rolling Thunder, Linebacker, and Linebacker II caused great damage and inflicted many enemy casualties..... and yet, the NVA continued fighting. Similar to the Blitz against London, the American strategic bombing produced the opposite of the desired effect - it was used for propaganda purposes to further strengthen to North Vietnamese resolve to fight, and further dissolved American political support for the war. Obviously, North Vietnam won the war without using a single bombing campaign, which casts significant doubt on the decisiveness of air power. Gulf War (1991) - The Gulf War is often toted as a total massacre of Saddaam's forces by American air power, but it's simply not true. In the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War, the US Air Force triumphantly declared it had destroyed over 100 Iraqi SCUD launchers using the high-tech LANTIM optics of the F-15E. However, when the Air Force conducted its official investigation to evaluate the effectiveness of its air campaign, it discovered that exactly zero SCUD launchers had been destroyed. This was because, according to reports, "The postwar analysis indicated that a number of the targets the pilots had hit were actually decoys, constructed by the Iraqis from old trucks and spare missile parts." [4] It should also be noted that, as is typical of a Shaping Operation, the air campaign in Desert Storm was principally used to target Iraqi air force, command, and communication centers.... in order to "set the conditions" for a successful and decisive ground attack. [5] Iraq/Afghanistan - Not much to talk about here. All the bombs in Tora Bora, and all the "Shock and Awe" over Baghdad did nothing to quell the Al Qadea and Taliban insurgencies. If anything, the air supremacy enjoyed by NATO in these wars actually damaged efforts at decisive victory by inflicting indiscriminate civilian casualties. In conclusion, air power helps, but it is rarely if ever decisive. Air power alone cannot bring a determined enemy to his knees - only overwhelming and equally determined ground forces can achieve that result. [1] https://books.google.com... [2] https://books.google.com... [3] https://books.google.com... [4] http://gladwell.com... [5] http://en.wikipedia.org...