Resolved: On balance, philosophical naturalism is true.

Unfortunately my opponent has failed to meet his burden in this debate and thus failed to give me a case which I can refute, choosing merely to assume Naturalism and work from that assumption. However notice how in the Debate rules which I provided, that my opponent must show Naturalism is plausible. Now to do this, one must show either that: Naturalism is True. Naturalism is the assumed truth and has no relevant objections. My opponent never seeked to prove condition 1 and has only addressed the latter part of condition 2 hence, I do not believe he can win this debate today. First things first, my opponent makes a rather silly remark about me using the word nature not supernature. However, he is ignoring the other definition of nature, i. d. fundamental properties. This is part of his general argumentation style, snipping at the toes which are explanatory(but not argumentative for) to the main argument(nearly his whole round 2 on The Transcendental Challenge). The next issue I would like to address is my opponent’s clear misunderstanding of the implications of my position. My opponent repeated many times that such a feature is contingent on the brain, or on some physical processes by which it arose. This is simply not what we are arguing about, I am arguing that the qualities about the world are fundamentally non-physical. Being contingent on the existence of the physical is irrelevant to whether the thing itself is actually physical. The problem with my opponent’s case here, is that simply just because mental states and physical are associated does not mean that one’s existence is of the same nature. One could easily contest that it is simply the mental substance expressing itself through the physical substratum. Non-reductive physicalism and Substance Dualism are empirically equivalent, hence the case must be made based on the reasons to think the substance is physical or not. This is why appealing to physical examples does nothing to show the thing is itself physical. You have to be able to actually argue that the thing is physical through rational argument or evidence not merely assert it. The Transcendental Challenge In my argument here, I point out the inconsistency between endorsing a belief in science, mathematics, and metaphysics and ontological naturalism. My opponent acutely notes(appearing slighted) that this argument seeks to prove my opponent’s inability to meet the burden, he is correct. This is clearly the point of the argument. The idea is that even if naturalism were to be true, you cannot support it rationally. Hence I am defeating my opponent by showing he cannot possibly justify his own position with regards to rational thought if one wants to have science, mathematics, or metaphysics. The essential question is whether naturalism is a rational position to hold. Now it seems that my opponent only has one objection with my reasoning here, and it really does nothing to the challenge. My opponent claims because verification works repeatedly, it simply must be true! Well let us see this syllogism form to see why my opponent is incorrect. Event 1 happens from Thing 2 Event 1 happens from Thing 2 Ad Infinitum Therefore, Event 1 is caused by Cause 2. There is simply no logical connection between the premises and the conclusion. Hence my opponent has to assume that verification really is a principle by which reality works. Necessity is obviously not found in this argument because there is no logical connection between events from different times. It is like saying just because every swan I have ever seen is white, that all swans therefore must be white. Now my opponent tells me to explain how we explain accurate predictions by Science? Well we use a priori synthetic judgments but that only is a valid inference if you assume Leibnizian Dogmatism or Transcendental Idealism both of which negate Naturalism, hence the objection. Rather than refute my objection, my opponent appears to not even have understood it! The Argument from Mental Causation My opponent again assumes here that because something is dependent on physical that therefore, it is(in-of-itself) physical. Essentially, his repeated assertion that physical things are needed for reference does nothing to refute that Naturalism is incorrect. I agree physical things exist, I am not arguing this point, I am saying there are things which are not physical(thus it does not matter whether they are dependent on physical things). Notice how my opponent does not explicitly attack any of my premises but simply says “Well it’s still contingent on the physical”, but my opponent works the opposite way I do. If mental events necessitates a mind, we still can ask whether the mental is physical in nature. It makes no difference whether it acts via the physical or not. The problem with my opponent’s misunderstanding of the argument is that inference he makes with Mark Henry about his intentions is not justified by naturalism. There is nothing about the physical effects of Mark Henry permits us knowledge of the intentions of Mark Henry. Furthermore, my opponent has not answered my justification for premise one hence my opponent has lost this argument. I again repeat, if all causation is physical causation how does the content of some mental state cause another. For this argument, my opponent cannot simply muse over what he thinks about contingency since it is made in syllogism form. He must attack the premises or structure or accept the conclusion of the argument. The huge neglect he is making is simply attacking that we infer regarding physical things which has nothing to do with how propositional content relates inside the mind. How can purely physical events relate to propositional content within the mind via mental causation? If my opponent cannot answer this(and he has failed to do so), then this argument stands unchallenged. Consciousness is Irreducible My opponent has again grossly misunderstood my argument here, especially with regards to the primacy of the transcendental self. As I clarified in the last round, the first part of the argument was clarifying ontological primacy of the existence of the self separate from the body. To borrow a phrase from David Chalmers, “There is nothing we know about more directly than consciousness”. And our natural intuitions about it and the subjectiveness by which we experience it give it primacy over everything else. Hence epistemologically, we have a natural tendency toward this view and it seems the correct starting point. Notice my opponent never disputes this at all. Going into the main argument my opponent does even worse! Instead of actually addressing the argument, he simply assumes naturalism and moves on. When he contends regarding my twin that if both psychological consciousness and the same physical properties, then it would have phenomenal consciousness. But this isn’t an objection! It is simply assuming what he has to prove. I contend I can easily conceive of a zombie with psychological consciousness but no phenomenal consciousness hence he must show exactly why this idea is incoherent. Simply speaking, there is nothing that it is like to be the zombie. Hence this premise holds. He even uses a red herring regarding whether animals are conscious or not. It simply doesn’t matter. In fact, the assumption of physicalism is so strong that he doesn’t actually have anything but an appeal to authority to prove his case. In fact, my opponent’s own article is not about whether consciousness is indeed physical. The substrates certainly have some relation to consciousness or perhaps are preconditions for the ability to express consciousness but this has zero to do with whether consciousness in of itself is physical. Conclusion The burden of the affirmative in this case was to prove naturalism was the more plausible view, my opponent has not even attempted to fulfill that position and instead relying on simply attempting to refute my own view. Sadly my opponent appears to have failed to understand the majority of my case, and thus has failed to meet his own burden while offering very few substantive objections to my arguments. If we boil it down, my opponent’s arguments are simply cases of begging the question. However I have offered three arguments, two in syllogistic form, for the improbability of naturalism and the existence of non-physical things. If even one of these arguments are true, at least Naturalism is improbable if not outright incorrect. Along with this, I offered an epistemological appeal to the primacy of Supernaturalism via the subjective self. I have therefore fulfilled my burden. Hence, I must urge a vote in the negative today.