Compatabilism is a flawed philosophical doctrine.

Thanks, Con. Compatibilists accept the following argument for Determinism: 1. We have no control over circumstances that existed in the past, nor do we have any control over the laws of nature.2. If A causes B, we have no control over A, and A is sufficient for B, then we have no control over B.3. All of our actions and thoughts are consequences of past events and the laws of nature.4. Assuming responsibility requires control, we are not responsible for what we do or think (2, 3).Therefore, assuming freedom entails responsibility, then we are not free which is to say that every form of Compatibilism is false.As such, this comes down to a semantics debate about whether or not Compatibilists have any business in referring to the act of volition (the cognitive process by which an individual decides on and commits to a particular course of action) as "free" will. Con says that in this debate he will prove that our choices are free because they are not simply determined by physical laws. I wish him the best of luck in this endeavor. First, let's consider the fact that Compatibilists already accept the argument for Determinism. The argument for Determinism that I just outlined specifically explains how/why our choices are determined by physical laws. So how are these choices not determined "simply" by physical laws?Con's preliminary definition of free will posits that a subject acts freely if she could have done otherwise. He notes, "The solution... is the introduction of counterfactuals - that is, a subject is free if she could have done otherwise if she had chosen differently." Of course, Hard Determinists believe that free will refers to absolute, ultimate alternate possibilities for choices rather than merely counterfactual ones. As such, this is irrelevant.(I will explain more if need be, though I doubt it will be an area of misunderstanding so I'll move on...)Con's argument can be outlined almost verbatim here [1]. Throughout the previous round Con argues against each revised definition so that I don't have to do it, until he reaches a final definition he considers correct. Therefore negating his final definition is all I'm really responsible for.Final Definition: A subject acts freely if she could have done otherwise... if she had chosen differently and, under the impact of other true and available thoughts or considerations, she would have chosen differently. True and available thoughts and considerations are those that represent her situation accurately, and are ones that she could reasonably have expected to take into account. Con explains the rationale that brings us to this final definition. He provides an example suggesting that suppose he intended to poison me by slipping arsenic into my coffee. He says he cannot justify this action by saying that after all, I was free not to do so. Although I could have chosen not to drink the poisoned coffee, the absence of contextual information makes me a victim rather than a free agent. This seemingly supports my position rather than Con's. Here Con admits that I am not a free agent. Considering the absence of contextual information (I didn't know that he poisoned my coffee), my decision was not "free." What Con is suggesting is that had I been exposed to other variables - i.e. had I known he poisoned my coffee - my choice probably would have been different and therefore should be considered "free" because a potential different choice would have yielded a different outcome. Unfortunately for Con, this reality in no way establishes free will. I agree that I would probably have made a different choice had I been exposed to more variables (information). That doesn't make my choice "free" - it just makes my choice ignorant to potential alternatives. Hard Determinists do not deny the fact that a choice exists, nor do they deny the fact that different choices yield different outcomes. Instead, what they argue is that we can never know all variables, and particularly for that reason our choices are not free: they are determined based on what we do know.Let's consider The Bohm Interpretation of quantum mechanics, which attempts to validate indeterminism at the quantum level. This theory posits that every atomic particle has a definite position and momentum at all times, but we do not usually know what they are, though we do have limited information about them [2]. Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle says that certain pairs of physical properties, like position and momentum, cannot both be known to arbitrary precision. It does not state that the position and momentum do not exist - simply that they can not be measured [3]. Likewise, we can never know every variable pertinent to our choices. That does not mean that variables affecting our choices don't exist; they certainly do. But just because we cannot possibly as human beings have knowledge about every single variable, does not change the fact that our choices are bound (not free) by the variables that we DO know. Based on what we DO know due to antecedent events and the laws of nature, our choices are inevitable. If we somehow could possess the knowledge to know every single factor about every single variable that could affect our choices, our choices would STILL be inevitable - just a lot more informed. My opponent doesn't deny that our choices are determined (inevitable and therefore not "free") based on what we know. Instead his argument is that because we don't know every variable, our choice is somehow free. Of course this doesn't make sense and I have negated the premises around his proposed final definition of free will. As such, the description I provided at the beginning of the debate stands uncontested, and by Con's own admission would directly contradict determinism therefore making Compatibilism (acceptance of both determinism and free will, simultaneously) a flawed theory. The resolution has been affirmed. We have no reason to accept that a decision is "free" just because exposure to different variables would yield different choices and subsequently different results. Now admittedly, most discussions of free will revolve around an agent's capacity for moral responsibility. The philosophical question is whether or not we as human beings have the sort of free will required for moral responsibility. In other words, if we are determined creatures (which Compatibilists accept), then there's a good chance we cannot be held morally responsible considering we technically have no control over our thoughts and actions. I was fully prepared to argue a case that while we indeed do lack the sort of free will that would make us morally responsible for our actions, indeterministic theories do not significantly improve the prospects for this sort of free will. I would essentially be arguing for what Derk Pereboom calls Hard Incompatibilism, which posits that even without this sort of free will, it does not exclude morality or our sense of meaning in life. In some respects, it could even be seen as beneficial. I believe this view is far superior to Compatibilism which tries hopelessly to reconcile two opposing ideals. Con nor any brilliant philosopher I've read thus far has remotely convinced me that a determined being can make "free" choices. However Con's approach in this debate was not to question moral responsibility. Instead, he attempted to argue that "free will" refers to one's ability to make different choices, which is simply naive. Hard Determinists do not deny that one has the ability to make different choices with different results based on particular variables. Therefore Con's dissention does not stand; his position does not contradict Hard Determinism making free will obsolete and Compatibilism a flawed philosophical doctrine. [1] http://aix1.uottawa.ca...[2] http://plato.stanford.edu...[3] http://hyperphysics.phy-astr.gsu.edu...