Targeted Kiling is a morally permissible foreign policy tool

>> Overview: <<The entire thesis that the affirmative case relies on is having some objective moral theory or principle that justifies using targeted killing. Without this, there is no way we can call something morally permissible, thus negating the resolution. The problem with this is that morality is never objective because morality is constantly changing. While we used to call enslaving the African American population moral, we would hardly call that moral today. Thus, what we call moral or morally permissible one day is either a) viewed as immoral by others and thus not objective or b) changes over time and thus is not objective. If I prove that morality is subjective, then the ballot is an easy vote for the negative because if morality is subjective, we cannot call something morally permissible. Joyce[1] writes:“If moral [skepticism] is true, then nothing is moral obligatory, nothing is morally prohibited, and nothing is morally permissible either. one who claims that moral [skepticism] implies that everything is permissible must intend to denote some kind of permissibility other than moralcall it X-permissibility. But then an argument will be needed to show that the failure of moral discourse implies that everything is X-permissible, and [there is no] such argument.”Thus, taking a skeptical position on the resolution is enough to negate under the resolution. Before I go further, I would like to be crystal clear on what I am saying. I am not saying that we do not have enough information to make a decision as to what is moral. What I am saying is that because there is no commonly held moral theory, i.e. there is no objective moral theory, and that what we consider to be moral changes over time, it makes morality subjective and thus negating the resolution.>> Case: <<To negate is to deny the truth of, so the sufficient affirmative burden is to prove that it is morally permissible to use targeted killing. While there are different ways to reach that conclusion, such as by using impact turns or defense, the end result is an affirmation of the resolutional statement. If the aff can’t prove that using targeted killing is morally permissible, you negate. My thesis is that it is never morally permissible to use targeted killing. If I show it’s never morally permissible then you negate the resolution before you even look to the value criterion debate. As such the negative case comes before the rest of the AC because it functions as a gateway to affirming.Morality is subjective and everyone has their own specific morality that they adhere to. With so many different forms of morality, it is impossible to come to an agreement on which version of morality is the best to use in the given situation. Furthermore, morality can change over time, therefore making the choice of which morality is best even more impossible to come to. Koons[2] writes“if moral truth were determined by the generation of some affective response, then this would lead to objectionable sorts of moral relativism. our psychology is not shared by all rational creatures, or even by all humans. Imagine, the possible worlds in which we experience moral emotions or desires under different conditions than in the actual world. Are there possible worlds in which, say, kicking dogs is morally required? Or imagine an alien race whose psychology differed from our own. This race might have an affective nature very different from ours. wouldn’t their morality by true-for-them, and ours true-for-us? Or perhaps we would decide that since this alien race’s morality were so different from ours, that they weren’t practicing morality in the first place, but instead schmorality. Not all people have the same psychological responses; is morality different for these different people? does this mean that moral truth is itself relative and changeable?”Therefore, if morality is relative and changeable, it is impossible to come to a morality that works so that we can even call something morally permissible. This makes the resolution false because without morality, we cannot call something morally permissible. Furthermore, even the definitions of good and bad are subjective and subject to change. One person might see something as good, while another person might see that same thing as horribly bad. Without these two basic definitions, it is impossible to be able to form any type of morality. Nietzsche[3] writes“my curiosity and my suspicion felt themselves at the question, of what in point of actual fact was the origin of our “Good” and of our “Evil.” at the boyish age of thirteen I gave quite properly the honour to God, and made him the father of Evil. Under what conditions did Man invent for himself those judgments of values, “Good” and “Evil”? And what intrinsic value do they possess in themselves? Have they up to the present hindered or advanced human well-being? Are they a symptom of the distress, impoverishment, and degeneration of Human Life? Or, conversely, is it in them that is manifested the fullness, the strength, and the will of Life, its courage, its self-confidence, its future? “Thus, the definitions of good and bad are themselves indefinite and changeable based upon an individual’s perspective. This links into the debate because without these two definitions, forming a concept of morality becomes impossible. Moreover, even if we know what morality is there is no way we could know if those moral principles are something we would accept. Nietzsche 2 writes“the real homestead of the concept “good” did not originate among those to whom goodness was shown. Much rather has it been the good themselves, that is, the aristocratic, the powerful, the high-stationed, the high-minded, who have felt that they themselves were good, and that their actions were good, that is to say of the first order, in contradistinction of all the low, the low-minded, the vulgar, and the plebeian. a higher dominant race coming into association with a meaner race, an “under race,” is the origin of good and bad.”Thus, even if the definitions of good and bad are finite and definite, they themselves are not true and cannot work in any moral theory. Because we lack a working form of morality, thus making the resolution false, I negate.