Homosexual Acts are Immoral

I am grateful to Con for his reply. Unfortunately, it contains multiple problems.The Open Question Argument FailsIn my initial argument, I showed how both Hume's fork and Moore's naturalistic fallacy fail. As William Frankena has pointed out, both beg the question against their opponents. [1] Value is not so much derived from fact as it is built into fact from the beginning. Con, in response, marshalls another one of Moore's arguments: the open question argument.This argument too fails. As I pointed out in my initial post, the term "good" is an attributive adjective. It varies depending on what it is predicated of. There are good cars, good professors, and good computers. All of these are good in the sense that they are fulfilling of their respective functions. Moore's "elementary mistake," as Ralph McInerny puts it, was to treat "good" as a predicative adjective -- that is, as a univocal term whose meaning does not vary. [2] But, as Peter Geach showed, "good" is attributive (equivocal). [3] Accordingly, the good for humans is defined in terms of how we ought to be by nature. This is not circular, as Con argues, since I am grounding moral normativity in biological normativity (which are two different types of normativity). The open question argument simply does not apply to natural law. Evolution and Teleology? No Problem!First, Con does not respond to one of my two arguments for teleology. Teleology is indispensible if we want to (1) make sense of medicine, for medicine is concerned with restoring our bodily processes to the way they should be. This is impossible if there are no such things as functions. His response to my second argument misses the point. Natural selection only selects for beliefs that are pragmatic toward survival, not true beliefs. [4] And even if I grant that natural selection did select for a majority of true beliefs, we would not be rationally justified in holding them. Why? For a belief to be justified it must be produced by a reliable cognitive process. But "reliable" smacks of teleology, which Con does not want to commit to. Hence either way, teleology must be invoked to make sense of rationality.Second -- and even if all of the above fails -- Con's response is simply a false dilemma. Teleology is not incompatible with evolution, assuming it is true. [5] Indeed, if we think of teleology as built in to the fabric of nature, then we can have teleology with evolution. Simply invoking evolution does not disprove teleology. [6] Evolution doesn't have to have an "end in mind" in the sense of looking ahead and planning; all that's required is that there be ends in nature to begin with. Con simply begs the question when he asserts that nature is not inherently teleological. Specifically, he assumes a post-enlightenment mechanistic view of the world as opposed to a Aristotelean teleological view of the world. Indeed, he begs the question against just about every neo-Aristotelean, who thinks that evolution and teleology are compatible! If we think of teleology as inherent to nature rather than legislated by God, then this does not requires us to commit to theism -- indeed, many neo-Aristoteleans are atheists! To disprove teleology, he must offer an actual argument against it.Does Natural Law Require God or Divine Command Theory?No. A natural law theorist need not be commited to theism. Indeed, Larry Arnhart and a slew of other natural law theorists have argued that we can have natural law without theism, so Con's points here are simply unfounded. [7] There are natural law theorists who view it in light of certain tenets of theism, but that says nothing about natural law itself. Moreover, given the points advanced in the last section, teleology does not in itself commit one to theism. Hence I will not respond to his arguments against theism, since natural law does not in itself commit one to belief in God. Additionally, Con's has incorrectly cited Moreland. Moreland is referring not to teleology as I have construed it, but as it refers to complexity in the context of the teleological argument, which I am not defending. [8]Multiple Functions? Sure, why not!Con's reasoning here is simply invalid. It does not follow that simply because some bodily faculties (such as hands) have multiple functions that therefore one cannot ground morality in biological function. That a bodily faculty may have multiple functions only shows that there are multiple ways to realize its good. Nothing in natural law theory says that we must be committed to the presence of only one function [9]. Indeed, our sexual organs have another purpose other than procreation: expelling waste. But that in itself proves nothing.Pleasure is not to be sought as an end in itself, but that doesn't mean that there isn't anything wrong with properly using a faculty with the intention of seeking pleasure. One may intend pleasure as long as he respects the proper function of a given bodily faculty. As I stated before, not all sex must be had with the intention of procreation in mind, only that actions involving our sexual faculties must be consistent with this purpose by being a procreative-type act. One may have sex for pleasure as long as he does it properly (that is, by respecting the proper function of our sexual organs). Similarly, one may eat for the sake of pleasure as long as he eats food that is nutritious. Pleasure is not a Purpose of Sex6A is unfounded. There is no strict connection between orgasm and procreation does not in itself prove that pleasure is a purpose of sex. Strictly speaking, there is no connection between good taste and nutrition: we can eat nutritious food without it being good tasting, but nothing of significance follows from this. As I stated before, pleasure exists as a motivation for us to engage in certain activities. This doesn't mean that pleasure is a means through which an end is accomplished, as Con falsely assumes. Eating is pleasurable because it motivates us to ingest nutritive substances. Sex is pleasurable because it gets us to procreate. Pleasure can be had independent of nutrition, but that does not prove that the purpose of eating is pleasure.6B simply doesn't follow. Sex ought to be pleasurable because pleasure serves as a motivation toward getting us to procreate. When this motivation is lacking, it is acceptable to restore it, but it does not follow that therefore pleasure itself is a purpose of sex. Con is confusing parts with wholes. A whole may not be able to function as efficiently when lacking a part, but restoring that part does not mean that both part and whole share the same function. Indeed, parts themselves are subservient to the whole and derive their function by virtue of the role they play in the whole. The purpose of eating is nutrition, but eating is also pleasurable because it gets us to consume food. If our taste buds stop working and eating is no longer pleasurable, it is acceptable to restore the pleasure-giving aspect of the taste buds. However, it doesn't follow from this that pleasure is a purpose of eating. Pleasure is always subordinated a more basic end. If we restore pleasure-giving, we do so only insofar as it is subordinated to a more primary end. [10]I'm not even sure how the reasoning in 6C makes any sense. I can (and do) oppose female genital mutiliation while simultaneously holding that procreation is the function of sex. Mutilation of any sort is inherently damaging and should be opposed, regardless of whether or not that mutiliation affects the proper function of a faculty or one of its related parts. So this is just a non-sequitur.What's more, even granting 6A, B, and C, it does not follow that pleasure is a function of sex. All that it shows is that there is no strict connection between pleasure and procreation, but that does not in itself yield Con's desired conclusion.The resolution is affirmed. Homosexual acts are immoral.Sources: http://tinyurl.com...;