The Problem of Evil falsifies the Christian God's Omnibenevolence

Thanks Con. Preface I have both the utmost respect for Wylted as both a person and a debater, but I am really rather disappointed he has dropped so many arguments with his hand waving that they are allegedly not relevant to the resolution. I hold they very much are relevant to the resolution, as they all deal with evil and suffering present in the world, or could be present, which contradicts the Christian God's attributes. That after all, is exactly what the problem of evil is. In either case, I greatly appreciate Wylted for his stiff defence this debate and for following through on his arguments. Without further ado, let's tie this all up. II. Original Problem of Evil Please note the problem of evil I had clarified to be a horned dilemma in the third round: P1. Either the suffering argued is gratuitous suffering or is with a possible justifiable purpose P2. If suffering is gratuitous suffering, THEN God is falsified (as per original PoE) P3. If there is a possible justifiable purpose, THEN God cannot be omnipotent, falsifying God C. In either case, God is falsified Both horns essentially share similar reasoning, gratuitous suffering would quite obviously falsify God as per the original argument, but the latter does not fare much better. I have already given good reasons why we should accept that P2 is correct which will lead to the inescapable conclusion that the Christian God cannot exist, however (which Con agrees with). I agree there is better opportunity for defence of the Christian God if P3 were possibly true, but even this fails as I have already argued. So let's recap my arguments: We have many examples of sentient beings which will not receive heavenly redemption (particularly non-humans) according to the Christian doctrine which will undergo unnecessary (gratuitous) suffering, specifically naturalistic suffering. This single line of argument has gone completely unaddressed by Con, yet it seems to be the cleanest, and most obvious example of gratuitous suffering I have provided in this debate, as such it seems that it should have been the first one that Con should have addressed. It is well accepted within Christian circles, and biblically that man is the creature that God wants to have a personal relationship with, with complete disregard for our animal kind. However, they are demonstrably just as capable of suffering as we humans are, and on far greater scale, with zero redemption opportunities. Con's silence on this is rather deafening, and has not given me the opportunity to respond to any rebuttal he may have if he does so in the next round. It is quite conceivable that the same objectives in which a certain amount of allegedly gratuitous suffering was induced (that we could possible give evidence of) could be accomplished with a lower amount of suffering. This 'suffering difference' is pretty convincingly, an example of a quantity of gratuitous suffering. Which effectively rebuts any free-will defence, or other purpose defence Con has put forward. Children born with chronic, lethal diseases such as HIV and cancer seem quite apparently unnecessary for the purposes which Con has put forth. There is no good reason to accept many of these people will receive redemption, now is there any reasonable purpose for this appalling scale of suffering is justified by. Most certainly none of Con's suggestions even come close to qualifying. Now, concentrating on P3, Con's best argument is probably 'for the appreciation of God's glory'. Now I have already provided rebuttals to this, one of the most important ones were that it's perfectly conceivable that this could have been accomplished with precisely zero suffering endured. Indeed there doesn't seem to be anything logically inconsistent or contradictory about the concept. By making his glory inherently positive, or pleasurably, or euphoric, it would negate the need to purposefully induce suffering to achieve this end. If God is omnipotent, then this is quite clearly an example of malevolence, and vice-versa (as argued in P3). Please note that this rebuttal also rules out free will as a defence, as changing one's appreciation of certain stimuli does not take away from one's free will, as I have already argued in round 2, with the oxytocin example. Con simply has not addressed this point whatsoever. Returning to Con's objection regarding God not wanting to force his love onto others. He writes: "A benevolent God, won't force you to love him. He won't force you to know him, glorify him, or even believe in him. God wants all these things, but he knows it's wrong to force them on you." Let's replace 'God' with something else, like 'Bob', let's cut away from the presuppositions that cloud the issue here: "A benevolent Bob, won't force you to love him. He won't force you to know him, glorify him, or even believe in him. Bob wants all these things, but he knows it's wrong to force them on you." This sounds all well and good, but this ignores the fact that appalling suffering, pain and evil, on indescribably large scales are occurring as a result of Bob not wanting to force us to love him, to glorify him, to believe or know him. All because Bob wants it, but doesn't want to force the issue. Sounds ridiculous, right? What is worse, having mind control (which I have argued already is unnecessary for this purpose), or being tortured to accept the goodness of your torturer. Outing aside these astonishing assertions, it is also a narcissistic desire, that the desire of God suddenly makes his mandatory suffering that he has induced still within the definition of omnibenevolence. This quite clearly is a demonstration of selfishness, rather than anything else. III. Evil God Hypothesis: Con's "so what" retort to this argument isn't going to suffice, as I have supplied it as a deductive argument. Furthermore, I have given reasons to believe that the AntiGod hypothesis is actually a better explanation than the Christian God hypothesis, as it does not run into anywhere near the number of problems with gratuitous evil and suffering. Furthermore it is much easier to explain the alleged instances of 'good' in the context of an evil God hypothesis, as they are very conceivably just mechanisms for achieving the greatest possible evil and suffering in the world. Con has not argued against any of this, however. If the AntiGod hypothesis is more plausible than the Christian God hypothesis, then I have already satisfied my burden of proof for this debate. IV. Modal Argument from Evil: The argument is logically valid, as it have asserted, and Con has done nothing to attack either 1. the structure of the argument or 2. the premises. Therefore it's pretty trivial that the conclusion has passed by without so much of a sniff of a fight from Con. Con makes some complain that I am apparently shifting the burden of proof in the debate onto him. This is clearly false, as the burden of proof is on me to justify the premises in the argument, the key premise being that gratuitous suffering is metaphysically possible. And I believe I have fulfilled that burden in my second and third rounds, which Con has completely ignored. Con does not need to prove gratuitous suffering is impossible at all, he only needs to demonstrate that I have not proven that it is possible. THAT was Con's job in this debate. The only real retaliate Con has made here is that the Modal Ontological Argument (MOA), which uses a similar form, just as effectively demonstrates the existence of an omnibenevolent God. However there is a massive difference between these two arguments. The MOA asserts that the maximally great being who necessarily exists is metaphysically possible. The Modal Argument from Evil asserts that gratuitous suffering is possible. Both of these assertions carry a burden of proof, and both generally use the fact that these entities are conceivable, and are logically consistent. But it is very easy to argue that an omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, omnibenevolent necessary being (MGB) is way beyond our ability to comprehend, and as such this argument simply cannot be used to satisfy the premise that such a being is metaphysically possible. It is simply absurd that such a being is conceivable, and each of it's attributes may well be logically inconsistent, as is argued elsewhere. The same problem in no way whatsoever applies to gratuitous suffering. Which is a very easy concept to conceive of. Nor is it a necessary quality, and is very difficult to see how it is logically inconsistent. This argument is far more effective for gratuitous suffering than the MGB. By analogy, if you imagine a gaming grid, with an infinite number if boxes in it, which are to be filled in by the numbers rolled by your dice. Now, rolling the number 6 is metaphysically possible, so after enough rolls at least some of these boxes will contain the number six. But for God to necessarily exist in these boxes, then NONE of these boxes can contain the number six, by definition. Given that this is a contradiction, then God simply cannot exist in any of these boxes. V. Conclusion: I can say with great confidence that I have satisfied my burden of proof on all three sub-sects of the Problem of Evil this debate encompasses. The Problem of Evil is regarded by theists and atheists alike as one of the most potent weapons against traditional theism, and indeed various examples of it have cause many to abandon their religious beliefs altogether. From this debate, I can see why, for the seemingly best theodicys used to justify the Problem of Evil have fallen flat, and lack adequate explanatory power. As such I strongly urge voters to vote Pro, and I gratefully look forward to any feedback voters can give. VI. Final Remarks: I am once again most grateful to Wylted for taking this debate and his dogged and stern defence of his position.