God almost certainly exists

Hey Con Semantics My opponant doesn't seem to make sense of the semantics of the debate; however, it just doesn't matter. Either way, we are discussing the validity of the two arguments. If correct, then God exists. If Con sees the probablistic claim to be no different to the empirical claim then fine. It simply does not change what we are discussing in this debate nor does it change the burden of proof, and it would be futile to argue over it. Sources This seems like a cheap shot by Con. Regardless, his accusation that I used unreliable sources is a false one. Craig is a philosopher. I cite his website because the points I make are philosophical points concerning the problem of evil and agent causality and thusly, I cite a philosopher's viewpoint as a source from his website, just as my opponent cites a scientist's website concerning quantum mechanics. The source is fine and reliable. Evil "How can there possibly be binding morality if there is no binding evil that morality commands us to avoid" I never state there is no 'evil', I just state that we cannot know whether in a wide context, 'evil' really is morally abominable as opposed to morally justified. Is this an explanation why God permits evil? No. Rather, it is an appeal to not make a judgement concerning evil's comparability with God. Falling into the same trap Con just reiterates the same assertions, that God is responsible for everything that goes on in the universe and therefore also for evil, and that evil can't coexist with God. This simply ignores my response. The simple fact is that you cannot make any sort of judgement that because we lack the subjunctive knowledge. We are finite beings with limited mental scope. We have simply got to withhold any sort of judgement because we cannot make any sort of judgement. A self defeating argument It should also be noted that it cannot be argued both that evil exists in a genuine, binding sense, but also deny the existence of objective morals. This is because evil is an objective moral in itself. It seems therefore that Con's argument is counter-intuitive. [1] Argument #2 God of the gaps I'm entirely sure what God of the gaps means. And so I'm equally as sure that the argument is not appealing to such a notion. It appears that in asserting such an accusation, Con ignores all the justification I gave for the cause being necessary, transcendent, powerful, timeless and immaterial and thusly, is equivalent to God. Instead, Con just argues from ignorance, stating that there may, for all we know, be a scientific answer but we don't know what it is. This is hardly a rebuttal to my argument and so needs to give an independent reason as to why the cause cannot be so, which has so far been done. P1 Science vs philosophy Con still maintains that 'the universe could have brought itself into being'. However as I have already pointed out, this is philosophically impossible, and this seems to go ignored by my opponent. Gravitational quantum waves, even if they were the cause of the universe, are still within space-time and thusly still, philosphically, within the universe. Consequently, no alternate external explanation other than God being presented. Therefore, in the context of the philosophical argument I presented, these quantum events have no relevance. Interpretations Con states that the different accounts of quantum mechanics is not a relevence. However, the reallty is far from it - which interpretation is taken is vital, as only upon an indeterministic interpretation can the claim that the quantum vacuum can produce matter from 'nothing' have any credability. Is a quantum vacuum the 'absence of anything'? Simply, no. It is still within space-time; and for an entity to be genuinely the absence of anything, neither space nor time can be present. It appears that con equivocates on what 'nothing' means. It is not simply the absence of matter and energy - it is the absence of space and time as well; of which, the quantum vacuum does not fulfill the criteria of. [2] P2 Necessity, causality and circular reasoning Con claims that it is circular to argue that a necessary being has no cause. However, this is just mistaken - It is simply extracting a characteristic from a definition, like stating that because someone can run 100m in 9.2 seconds, they are the current world record holder. The fact that they can run in that time already implies the holding of a world record. Equally, The fact that God has no cause is already implicit within his nature. If you really want, we can formulate a syllogism to show the reasoning, if you prefer: 1) Whatever is necessary has no external cause 2) God is necessary 3) Therefore God has no external cause Does creation affect God's nature? No. Through creation, God gains no new attributes. A decision is not a new attribute; and as I have already stated, the change is external to God, as creation is ex nihilo as opposed to ex Deo. Argument #2 Genetic fallacy Con simply restates his case, and still appeals to the origins of morality as opposed to contesting the morality itself. As I have already stated, by explaining the means by which morality arises achieves absolutely nothing in establishing the ontology of morality. There is nothing about evolutionary theory that implies any particular theory of ethics; if this is rejected, then Con is begging the question, as there is already the presupposition that God did not guide evolution in such a way which could bring about objective morality. For all we know, it could have done. But it's truth value depends soley upon the existence of God, which Con already rejects in his contention. The simple fact is, the origins of morality are simply an irrelevance. P1 Can we prove objective morals? Of course we can. But Con is correct when making the assertion that science can't prove such a phenomena. However, that is because ethical truths are out of science's grasps. It is an a posteriori claim that relies on human experience to prove and not the controlling of external variables - that is the precise reason why I appeal to moral experience in support of the second premise. How can objective morality exist if there are varying opinions on morality? The simple answer is because even if objective morals exist, that does not imply that all humans agree on them. Indeed, objective morality makes the claim that there exists morals that are true irrespective of human opinion. The 'irrespective of human opinion' is the vital part - there may be some that have varying views on morals, but regardless, are objectively true. Indeed, varying viewpoints are expected under such an ethical theory. But as I have already explained, it has no impact on objectiveness and so is an irrelevance. P2 Experience vs instinct There is a distinct difference between moral experience and moral instinct. Moral experience is the internal sense, whereas moral instinct is the external reasoning. I argued for both experience and instinct in affirming objective morality and so Con must respond to both affirmations, not just moral instinct, when objecting to P2, as of yet has failed to do that. Burden of proof I don't argue that Con has the burden of proof at all. I argue the given that given the context that objective morality is a properly basic belief, and that we at least have a prime facie experience of objectiveness, it is a sufficient enough reason to assume objective morality. Conclusion For large parts of the debate, Con resorts to ridicule rather than constructive argument, failing to distinguish between a scientific notion and a philosophical notion and as a result, his objections have little to no force against my arguments. I presented two arguments and neither have been successfully contested - even Con's argument from evil supports my argument for objective morals. It seems therefore that the motion is passed. Thanks TruthHurts for this great debate and I wish the best of luck to you. God Bless Sources: [1] http://www.reasonablefaith.org... [2] http://abyss.uoregon.edu...