Logic suggest that some sort of creative, conscious God may exist . . .

Definition of GodPro did not define God. However, it seems as if he is going to argue that conceptual laws of logic exist in every possible world. If he is going to argue for a God that grounds the laws of logic, then the definition of God he is indirectly endorsing is a necessary being. A necessary being is one that exists in all possible worlds. God is also commonly defined as a supernatural creator, regardless of religion. So, we will define God as:"a necessary being, who grounds the necessary laws of logic, and created everthing else, but him."I do not see why Pro would object to this definition. Modal Ontological Argument(s) for Atheism The essential structure of this particular subset of modal arguments that I am going to be putting forward will be a regurgitation of Ryan Stinger's framework: A. It is possible that p. B. Necessarily, if it is possible that God exists, then it is necessary that God exists. C. Necessarily, if God exists, then it is not the case that p. D. Therefore, it is not possible that God exists. (from A, B, & C)[1] God is a necessary being, which entails that God, if possible, necessarily exists (which entails existence in every possible world). This inference is founded on the modal axiom S5[2], which is a basic axiom in modal logic. Now, in order for a Modal Argument for Atheism to work, the variable p has to be filled with that which will logically entail C is true. I am going to provide a quick list of such things which are prima facie metaphysically possible. It is possible that: (i) All sentience is physically realized (ii) The universe was created by a mindless, supernatural mechanism(iii) Naturalism is true(iv) The laws of logic are contingent, and not necessary*This possibility needs defending. Even if the laws of logic were contingent to humans minds, the nature of existence itself (which the contingent laws describe) could still be necessary. However, there is no reason to think the nature of existence is conceptual, like the laws of logic. Therefore, TAG loses its weight as it assumes a necessary mind has to exist to ground necessary conceptual laws. However, if we look at the laws as that which is contingent but describes that which is necessary; there does not seem to be problem. I could go on...We will call the set of all potential plugs for p, Set E. Each possibility mentioned is just as intuitively warranted as the premise that God is possible, and we can easily think of others then the ones mentioned. To defeat the argument above, the theist would have to show that God is indeed possible, and thus necessarily exists in every possible world independent of TAG. However, the warrant for the possibility of God is just as justified as any one one of the variable plugs. So, why is the modal argument for Atheism more plausible? There are more plugs for the Atheistic argument than there is for the Theistic argument, and each plug for the Atheistic argument seems just as plausible as the one for the Theistic argument. Take this premise: It is possible that f We will plug f with "God exists". Since Set E has more members than f, which has just one member, and each member of Set E is just as probable as f, then by sheer numbers alone, at least one member of Set E is likely to be true over f. Possible Objection to Above Argument One might try and claim that these apparent possibilities can be plugged in for f, making a set just a rich as Set E. For example: (i) God created the universe. (ii) Jesus was the son of God. (iii) God spoke to Abraham. (iv) The Ten Commandments were given by God. However, it is the same part of each proposition doing the work; "God". The mentioning of "God" just equates to "God Exists" which means that all 5 apparent possibilities are just the same proposition! The "created the universe" aspect in (i) is completely superfluous; as with the unnecessary additions pertaining to the rest of them. (iii) for example, says "God spoke to Abraham", but it essentially states "God exists" "and spoke to Abraham". However, it is the "God exists" doing all the work, the "and spoke to Abraham" is trivial. Thus, (i), (ii), (iii), and (iv) with regards to f are really just the same premise pertaining to which part of each premise is doing the work. It seems as if we can conclude that Atheism is more plausible than Theism based on my argument above. Set E is inherently going to be more rich than f by default due to the nature of the propositions. It is much more likely that a member of Set E holds, than it is that proposition f holds. "[I]t is more plausible that at least one of the modal arguments for atheism is sound and that the modal ontological argument is unsound than that all of the modal arguments for atheism are unsound and that the modal ontological argument is sound." - Ryan StringerBoth TAG, and the MOA for God are less plausible than myargument. Sources [1] http://www.infidels.org...[2] http://en.wikipedia.org...