Moral Relativism (Pro) vs. Divine Command Theory (Con)

I will begin by rebutting my opponent's arguments, then defend and build upon my own.I begin by attacking my opponent's basic argument for DCT.Rebuttal of Premise One:I would like to note that although my fourth contention already addresses this, I will be defending that later on, so I shall only attack my opponent's argument for this premise at the moment. The first premise is that everything and every event in the universe is contingent, or dependent upon something else for its existence. The term dependent is vague, so the definition I will use for A being dependent on B is that "If B did not exist, it would entail that A did not exist." One might draw the conclusion that ultimately everything in the universe is dependent on the Big Bang. However, my opponent then commits a Parts-Whole fallacy, drawing the conclusion that because the parts of an entity have certain properties, that the whole must as well. For example, the Bank of New Zealand. All of it's call centers were built in the last 100 years, all of its employess are less than 100 years old, it's main building is composed of parts put together in the last 100 years, etc. But we cannot then conclude that the Bank of New Zealand is less than 100 years old, because it was actually founded in 1862.Likewise, the next premise states that the universe, being contingent, must necessarily rely on something else as its cause, something outside of the universe. My opponent then makes an unfounded leap that this entity must be God. However, my opponent did not justify their leap from "outside the universe and non-contingent" to "an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent entity". Indeed, many other causes are much more justifiable, including an infinite chain of eternally oscillating universes that loops back into itself [1], which conveniently solves the problem of infinite recursion as well.Rebuttal of Premise Two:The problem with my opponent's justification for the existence of morality here is that it is unfounded. Intuition is hardly accepted as a source for reliable information about reality, for example. Additionally, my opponent states that reason leads to the acceptance of morality but does not justify this. They then demonstrate a fundamental misunderstanding about what Moral Relativism states. MR does not state that any standard for morality exists. I have provided definitions with credible sources for morality and for MR. One can see from these two definitions that if a truly objective standard existed for morality, then it couldn't be relative to groups of people.The statements "Morality exists" and "MR is true" are irreconcilable.Counter-Refutation:My opponent provides a definition of MR that is fundamentally wrong. I have previously shown that MR entails morality not existing, therefore by definition MR does not stipulate that moral goodness follows from being socially acceptable. MR truly only states that morality is relative to groups of persons, and therefore does not follow an objective standard.Thus, it can be shown that MR does not in fact violate Hume's Is/Ought Gap, because MR is the position that one cannot make perscriptive statements. This is the reason that I employ the gap in my first contention.My opponent's following arguments in their refutation of MR only apply if one accepts their flawed definition. MR does not stipulate that socially accepted ideas are good. MR stipulates that there is no such thing as goodness.Defense of First Contention:My opponent claims that Hume's Is/Ought Gap does not apply to DCT because God uses heaven to entice men into behaving by moral tenets. However, the problem with this is that enticement is not morality. This also applies again to Hume's gap because the statement "If you behave this way, you will get into heaven" does not translate into "You ought to behave this way." That only works if you redefine morality to mean "The set of actions God wishes you to do." However, this is not the definition of morality.Additionally, this does not explain why atheists, or even members of religious faiths that do not believe in heaven, such as Judaism, would ever behave in ways that appear to be considered moral. If heaven does not exist in their worldview, what is enticing them to be moral?Defense of Second Contention:My opponent's main argument against my second contention involves once again misinterpreting MR. I do not claim here that morality is based on evolution. I claim that our perceptions of morality are derived from evolution. Evolutionary ethics, which claims that morality is evolution-based, is merely a subset of objective morality, which as I stated before is not what I am arguing for. Rather, I am attempting to head off arguments about intuition by demonstrating that our feelings about morality are derived from our natural origins and nothing more.And although at first glance homosexual marriage may seem to not be beneficial to the survival of the species, this marriage actually allows couples to raise adopted children more easily, allowing those children to have a greater chance of surviving and passing on their genes. But even though there may be some examples that do not derive from evolution, that doesn't mean our moral perceptions don't originate there. Evolution can't produce perfect results.Defense of Third Contention:The problem with the idea of "necessary moral truths" is that it leads to the formation of tautologies, which serves not to prove the existence of moral standards but simply identify logical loops. A truth is necessarily moral why? Because it meets the criteria for being a necessarily moral truth. What is the criteria? Avoiding being unnecessarily cruel. What does "unnecessary cruelty" mean? The opposite of necessary morality. Therefore, a truth is necessarily moral because it is necessarily moral. It is a tautology. It does not actually make a division between any two types of actions.As for "contingent moral truths", these are in reality the only true tenets of morality that aren't tautological.In addition, how does the differentiation of these two pass the Euthyphro dilemma? Are necessary moral truths necessary because God says so, or are they necessary because they conform to a standard outside of God? Either way, the dilemma still stands.Defense of Fourth Contention:The problem with defining omnipotence as the ability of an entity to what is in that entity's nature is that by that definition, literally everything is omnipotent. For example, I can do anything that it is in my nature as a mortal human to do. Does that make me omnipotent? Of course not. What omnipotence does is establishes the realm of actions it is possible for God to undertake. The paradox of the stone proves that this realm of capability is not logically coherent. Changing this realm to "whatever it is in his nature to do" is saying "God can do whatever God can do". It is tautological.My opponent then claims that a stone could only not be moved up if there were no space to move it up into. This is not true. If one is unable to supply the necessary force to list the stone, then one would be unable to lift it. The paradox of the stone merely asks if God can create a stone with such a mass that he would be unable to supply the necessary force to lift the stone. If he can supply the force, then he cannot create the rock. If he cannot supply the force, then he cannot lift the rock. Either way, he is no longer omnipotent.Over to you. [1] Pre-big-bang in string cosmology, Astroparticle Physics, Volume 1, Issue 3, Pages 317-339, M. Gasperini, G. Veneziano