If God doesn't exist, we should not show the evidence to the world.

A1. Conceded. A2. Pro's arguments on this contention support my case rather than his. Pro points out that other prosperous democracies often have lower crime rates. Those are generally the other prosperous countries that have lower levels of religion. I reference Pro's own source for this. In fact, Pro's source goes beyond the arguments I've made previously and says that life expectancy also correlates with religion: the more religious a country, the lower the life expectancy. You can add that to the impacts. Pro continues arguments relative to A2 in B3, and confuses the world of the status quo with the world of the hypothetical. Leaving that aside, Pro takes the fact that 84% of the world's population is religious and makes a distinction between religious and non-religious countries, saying that if so few people are non-religious, few countries must be non-religious, thus we cannot draw inferences from studies about the effect of religion in different countries. This is a non-sequitor. Different countries have different numbers of religious people in them. No country is 100% religious or 100% non-religious. Nothing about that prevents us from looking at differences in societies that have different levels of religiousness. I also find Pro's 50-50 standard unsupported and dismiss it. I also dismiss Pro's final tautology in B3, as murderers and rapists commit murder and rape by definition. Pro repeated my quote by Provonsha, but he did not counter it. Provonsha recognized that correlation does not equal causation, so he pointed out that it is the case that either "religion leads directly to dysfunctionality, or religions merely flourish in dysfunctional societies. " Pro did not directly address this interpretation, instead using the arguments countered above. Therefore I ask the reader to accept it, even if you do not personally agree. B1. Pro misremembers his previous argument. He stated in Round 2 B1 that in the world of our hypothetical, "any moral obligation that they [religious people] stated to tell the truth would be gone. " Having accepted that, please extend my previous B1 arguments that follow the loss of morals to the collapse of society to nuclear war. Pro's further objections here are a confusion of the status quo with the hypothetical world in which we possess a disproof of gods. No one has asserted that in the status quo religious people lack a moral obligation to tell the truth, thus it would not be expected to see impacts of that currently. We should only expect these impacts to happen in the hypothetical world of the resolution where I have accepted Pro's assertion that the religious would become immoral once we possess this information. As a member of society, we have a moral obligation to prevent to prevent it from falling into chaos. Sharing the information is the only way to do so, given Pro's argumentation in Round 2. Thus we should share the information using the obligation definition of should. B2. I first remind Pro that while he has reinterpreted his previous argument to address my arguments in this section in round three, he failed to do so in round two, addressing instead an alternate version of my argument that I did not make. Thus it was entirely appropriate for me to point that out and request my earlier arguments on the topic be extended. This section is arguing that we should share the information based on the meaning of should as "proper," that it is proper to share the information. American values declare it proper to tell unpleasant truths[1][2][3]. Thus we should share it, based on the meaning of should as "proper. " The harm debate will be briefly addressed in the conclusion. B3. Much of Pro's B3 response was a better fit to the A2 debate and is discussed there. As noted before, the value of decreasing religion is most important in B1, as it creates the obligation that meaning of should requires. In this contention, we are concerned with should as expediency, whether revealing the information moves us towards a defined goal. Therefore the effects of that goal are gravy in this argument. As first stated in round 1, the goal is to reduce religion in society. With A1 conceded, there is mutual agreement that revealing this information will further that goal. Therefore we should reveal the information, where should is defined in terms of expediency. Conclusion. There are two ways to vote on this debate. First, you could vote on harms. Pro's harms from revealing the evidence such as loss of hope remain unsupported, unevidenced, and unquantified. My harms from not revealing the evidence rely on the studies cited by both pro and myself and include higher crime, shorter life, and assorted other antisocial maladies which are quantified in the various studies and links. At this point, Con is winning the harm debate. Once we add in the harms from B1, where the religious lose their sense of morality and send society spinning into a tailspin of destruction and doom, the harm debate swings even further in con's favor. The second way to vote is on whether Con met the standards that something "should" be done: obligation, propriety, or expediency. You only have to agree with one to award a vote to con, a metric pro did not dispute. I believe that all three are valid reasons to vote con. Between the harms debate and any of the three "should" debates, a vote for con is the best choice. [1]. http://olimu.com... [2]. http://www.tnr.com... [3]. http://www.nytimes.com...