Objective Morality is not God's Work

Pro's response, while grandiose, is short on substance. As we will see, he doesn't actually respond to any of the arguments I offered. Rather, he dodges most of my criticisms and engages in unnecessary nit-picking. Some Preliminary Comments About the DebateMy opponent begins with two nit-picks. First, he seems irked with my pre-emptive rebuttal to his position (Which grounds ethics in evolutionary considerations). Yet what exactly is problematic with this? He outlined his position in R1 when he defined morality, and as such I responded in kind. Moreover, given that this is a debate setting in which one is supposed to respond to the claims of the other side, Pro's claim is simply unwarranted.Second, he takes issue of my use of the term "atheism" to describe his position. But this is entirely warranted. Given that my opponent's position is that God is not required to ground objective moral facts, my describing his position as being an atheistic one is perfectly warranted. "Atheistic" in this context is synonymous to "Naturalistic." But, since my opponent has complained, I will go ahead and use the term "naturalistic" to describe his ethic.God Best Explains Moral ValuesPro never responds to my argument here. He begins by asserting that man is the highest of values. Yet this glances over the main problem. First, why think that values exist to begin with? What grounds these values? Saying that man is the highest of values doesn't account for why values themselves exist. My criticism of evolutionary ethics is likewise completely ignored. Recall earlier that in response to evolutionary ethics, I stated that could simply ask: "Why is survival value good, and what grounds that?" Simply explaining moral values in terms of evolutionary concepts does not remove the need for an ultimate explanation of the good. Evolution can only give us a proximate grounding of morality -- not an ultimate grounding. We can see that Pro's position -- even if true -- does not in any way remove the need for a theistic explanation of morality." Moreover, Pro misconstrues my position. My mention of Plato's forms was only done in the context of an argument against moral platonism. I do not myself hold that view, but was merely giving a pre-emptive response. Even worse, Pro appeals to a self-defeating standard in response to my argument. He writes "I believe that all knowledge is derived empirically." How does Pro know this? That very claim to knowledge itself cannot be an empirical statement about empirical reality, but a philosophical claim about reality. Pro's claim therefore undermines itself. This is a patently self-defeating argument.God Best Explains Human Dignity and RightsOnce again, Pro completely fails to engage the argument here. He writes: "Intrinsic value can indeed come from a random, non-guided process." But this is absurd! How can value come from valueless processes? Unless value is already present from the get-go, then to say that intrinsic value and diginity can arise from such a process is to say that one can get something from nothing. To claim this is worse than magic. When a magician pulls a rabbit out of a hat, at least there is the hat. Pro's claim, however, reduces to the idea that intrinsic moral value can come out of thin air. Just as something cannot come from nothing, value cannot come from non-value. Thus, if humans have equal value and dignity, there must be a further wellspring of value from which our value is derived from. God Best Explains Moral DutiesPro's response to this argument boils down to two points: Duty can arise out of responsibilities we have toward ourselves, and God cannot be the ground of duties because God is undefinable (See R1 for how he defines God). The second argument is simply self-refuting. To define God as undefinable is to engage in an act of definition, and hence God cannot be defined as undefinable. His second argument can be easily dismissed. His first argument also faces grave problems. He asks "Do we not have a duty to ourselves, that duty being the need to survive?" This is inadequate as a ground of objective moral duties. This may be an acceptable ground for duties toward oneself, but it utterly fails as a ground for duties toward others. Moreover, this fails to satisfy the criteria for an objective ethic, for if the ground of moral duties are self-issued commands, then this reduces to nothing more to moral relativism. My opponent acknowledges Koukl and Beckwith's criticism as "indeed a strong objection against naturalism" -- yet he doesn't respond to it at all. Why should someone care about the survival fo the species? Pro answers "Because the individual fares better if the cooperates with the rest of his species." But why should one care about his own survival? What makes survival good? As Koukl and Beckwith write: "The responses intended to explain morality ultimately depend on some prior moral notion to hold them together. [Emphasis mine]" [1] Whatever response Pro gives, we could simply respond with a Moorerean open-question argument. Hence, all Pro can ever do is give a proximate grounding of morality as opposed to an ultimate grounding.God is the Best Explanation of Moral ResponsibilityPro goes off on a tangent here and completely ignores my argument. Recall that I argued that metaphysical naturalism could not provide the adequate pre-conditions for a meaningful framework of objective morality. Pro's response simply nit-picks the term I used. Atheism or naturalism aside, my argument applies to both. The only thing that closely resembles a response to my argument is when my opponent said that "free will came along with the realization that we are our own end." This is obviously incoherent. If we are determined beings, then free will does not "emerge" at a certain level of intelligence. Recall earlier that I argued that on naturalism, " we are no different from rocks -- our actions are governed not by an immaterial self which is genuinely free, but by prior natural conditions governed by natural laws." If we are purely physical beings goverened by natural laws, then how can we be free in any meaningful sense? But since moral responsibility requires freedom, we are unable to act in any morally significant way given naturalism.In order to account for libertarian free agency, Pro must introduce something akin to a soul which is able to perform undetermined actions. Yet this is anathema to naturalism, and thus it remains elusive as to how naturalism could account for moral responsibility. ConclusionPro has utterly failed to show that naturalism can account for objective moral facts. An evolutionary-based ethic is fraught with problems, as it rests on prior moral notions which are not themselves grounded in natural facts. Moreover (and this is another argument against evolutionary ethics), it confuses an is with an ought. Mere facts of biology are descriptive -- one cannot derive moral conclusions from purely descriptive facts. The philosopher G. E. Moore referred to the these two criticisms as the open-question argument and the naturalistic fallacy. Evolutionary ethics falls victim to both. His responses to my arguments have been found lacking. Most of his criticisms ignore or misunderstand my arguments completely. Additionally, several of his responses are patently self-defeating (ie: empiricism and defining God as "undefinable"). As such, Pro's case has been found wanting. I urge a vote for Con.Sources1. Gregory Koukl and Francis J. Beckwith, Relativism: Feet Planted Firmly in Mid-Air (Baker: 1998) 163