Logical Positivism is Sound

On Ayer The ideas are what are being debated, and their rejection, no matter by who, holds no bearing on their truth. On Wittgenstein I find my opponent’s interpretation of Wittgenstein to be odd: Wittgenstein does not argue for the mystical being real. In fact, he proposes that “It is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists” (6.44), which, according to his picture-theory of meaning, means that the proposition “The mystical exists” is strictly outside of the world, and therefore senseless. He ignores 6.53: “The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing except what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science—i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy—and then, whenever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions. Although it would not be satisfying to the other person—he would not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy—this method would be the only strictly correct one.” Re: dividing philosophy and natural science: I don’t see the point here. Positivism’s main tenet requires such a division; philosophy deals with linguistic clarification, not matters-of-fact. The Verification Principle’s “self-destruction” My opponent mistakes the claims of LP: the VP is meant to be a criterion of meaning, not a normal proposition. AJ Ayer: "Thus, while I wish the principle of verification itself be regarded, not as an empirical hypothesis, but as a definition, it is not supposed to be entirely arbitrary. It is indeed open to anyone to adopt a different criterion of meaning and so to produce an alternative definition which may very well correspond to one of the ways in which the word 'meaning' is commonly used. And if a statement satisfied such a criterion, there is, no doubt, some proper use of the word 'understanding' in which it would be capable of being understood. Nevertheless, I think that, unless it satisfied the principle of verification, it would not be capable of being understood in the sense which either scientific hypotheses or common-sense statements are habitually understood.” (Language, Truth, and Logic) On Sense-Data Here, my opponent claims that verification is impossible because sense experience is fallible, and prone to “perceptual errors.” However, if Positivism is true, it is nonsense to speak of fallible sense experience; on what basis can you say that a sensation comes, not from the world, but from outside it? If fallibility does not require sense-data to be based in the non-real, and in fact can hold even when sense-data corresponds to the real, the question of its usefulness as a concept is raised. Since the Principle of Verification is epistemically primary, notions of fallibility must be based in it, making the idea of fallibility refuting its own basis absurd. On Induction Science is predominantly a matter of inductive reasoning, it fundamentally attempts to infer universal principles or scientific "laws" from specific instances, and yet, LP denies that universal principles are cognitively meaningful, which undermines the entire enterprise of science. Two hundred years before LP was even a thing, Hume showed that induction can never achieve certainty. Nevertheless, LP bypasses the "Problem of Induction" by simply elevating empiricism to the standard of truth and certainty without any logical justification. Historical Refutations My opponent lists a number of historical arguments against LP (Godel’s, Quine’s, Popper’s, etc.), but does not choose any to defend in the debate, instead opting to merely list names and vague descriptions of their theories. The closest thing to an argument is this: “The individual statement is almost irrelevant, single statements are not verifiable or falsifiable, only theories as a whole are,” which, by itself, is merely asserted – there is no reason to accept that individual statements are not verifiable except for the fact that my opponent says they are not, which is not compelling. For me to be obligated to respond to any one of these theories, and for me to be able to (for I must know the exact arguments my opponent is depending on), he must present substantial formulations of their arguments, lest he make the mistake of substituting namedropping for debate. On LP’s “narrowness” A consistent thread of attack in this debate is that LP ignores certain aspects of reality, and, thus, should not be accepted. However, this seems to be a very flimsy reason to reject LP, for, if LP is true, its rejection of metaphysics, ethics, and all forms of pseudopropositions is also true. To say that they should be accepted anyway – for comfort, perhaps – precludes good philosophy; one cannot assume that certain fields have value when determining which arguments regarding their value to side with. Conclusion If LP follows, it must be accepted, no matter how that makes one feel. Sentimentality is not grounds for philosophical agreement or rejection.