Human Personhood Begins at and by Human Conception (fertilization)

Thanks to Con for taking the time to read and to follow the links I provided in R2 and for restating our Primary Points of Contention along with the specific areas for Burden of Proof. Con posted: Primary Points of Contention: Based upon Pro's R1 & R2, there are the following points of contention: 1. Our laws should recognize the fact that human 'personhood' begins at conception. 2. Our laws, to some extent, already do recognize the fact that human 'personhood' begins at conception. And the following explicit Burdens: 1. Pro will argue that the laws should and to some extent already do recognize the fact that human 'personhood' begins at conception. 2. Con will argue that personhood does not and/or should not begin at conception. "Additionally, the definition of 'natural person' and the 'equal protections' clause of the 14th Amendment provides the context for interpreting #1 and #2." Well stated. Con's point on the need to avoid equivocations (R2) when making these arguments is well taken. I can assure Con that I have not been and will not be engaging in such word play as he presented in his example. When I use the word "person" in this debate it will be for "a human being" (as the legal definitions define them) [2]. Con added: " ... it is undeniable and inarguable that at least some states have codified laws that include unborn humans as "persons"[2], this does not mean they are persons as was meant by Pro in his opening statement or within the context of the 14th amendment or as a 'natural person.' I must remind Con of his own words R2-1. "Pro will argue that the laws should and to some extent already do recognize the fact that human 'personhood' begins at conception." As you can see, Pro is not burdened with the task of proving that prenatal human being's ARE 'natural persons' in this debate. Though I do contend that they are and will attempt to prove just that. As, it would certainly help to support my other claims. Pro is burdened (as Con said) with showing "... that the laws should and to some extent already do recognize the fact that human 'personhood' begins at conception." I would like to continue my arguments from the basis that I outlined in R2. However, I would like to respond to some of Con's other observations and comments before I do. Con commented: "... it is conceded that many laws, at a federal or state level will include unborn individuals in their definition of a person (R2)." Con also added; "However, as mentioned in the section on equivocation, this does not automatically confer the status of being a natural person, with any other protections, even within the context of those laws (R2)." Con. If personhood were to be “automatically conferred” in all other areas of law by the establishment of personhood in one specific area of law, this debate would not be necessary. I would like to remind Con (again) that I am only challenged with showing that our "laws should and to some extent already do recognize the fact that human 'personhood' begins at conception." I am not burdened with having to prove anything beyond that which Con correctly stated himself in R2-1 and quoted above. Con has at least partially “ conceded that many laws, at a Federal or State level ” do recognize the fact that human personhood begins at conception. The law (such as Laci and Conner’s law) does this by defining a child in the womb as “… a member of the species homo sapiens, at ANY stage of development, who is carried in the womb” and by making it the crime of Murder [13] if someone unjustly kills an unborn child (person) under that law. So, because Con at least partially concedes that many of our laws already recognize the personhood of prenatal children (R2), I will focus my arguments on the remaining aspect of my BOP. Argument: 1. Because (as conceded by Con) many of our “laws at the Federal and State level include unborn individuals in their definition of a person (R2)…" It is my contention that our laws should recognize them as natural ‘persons’ in all other aspects as well. (Again, Cons caveat is understood. Con does not agree that children in the womb are ‘persons’ just because some of our laws recognize them as such. ) Con commented in R2: “ … While it is undeniable and inarguable that at least some states have codified laws that include unborn humans as "persons"[2], this does not mean they are persons as was meant by Pro in his opening statement or within the context of the 14th amendment or as a 'natural person'.” I submit to Con the fact that a person is charged with murder [13] under those laws for unjustly killing a child in the womb. Of course they are being recognized as ‘natural persons’ in the same context as the persons mentioned in the 14th Amendment [14]. By definition, a person cannot be charged with murder for killing anything other than another ‘natural person’ under the law. Con talked about the need to avoid equivocating and it is a point well taken. As Con noted, here in the U.S., our laws treat corporations as ‘persons.’ However, we cannot be charged with ‘murder’ for destroying a corporation. Can we? No. The charge of murder [13] means that another human being/ natural “person” was killed unjustly. So, Con is incorrect when he claims that our laws which make it the crime of murder to unjustly kill a child in the womb are not treating those children as ‘natural persons’ and in keeping with the context of the 14th amendment. [14] Con concluded: “ We cannot simply look in one area and see the word "person", look in another area and see the word "person", and then conclude that they are equal and connected and that the logical implications of one can be transferred to the other. “ I disagree. Doesn’t, the “equal protections” clause of the 14th amendment and the even greater cause of “equal rights” come with the expectation that we cannot define “persons” one way under one law to establish their rights and then to define them another way under another law so as to deny them? Con continued: “We must dig into the meanings in each case. Thus pro has an implicit burden that entails more than simply noting that some laws identify an unborn human as a "person," but must also demonstrate that such a classification falls within the general intent of the legal definitions of a person that he originally provided.” I have begun to demonstrate exactly that in my arguments, Con. I hope that you will consider my comments about the fact that it is the charge of murder that ties the personhood of a child under Laci and Conner’s law (and the many laws like it) to the context of ‘personhood’ under the 14th Amendment. [13] http://dictionary.findlaw.com... [14] http://www.law.cornell.edu...