God's Existence

Thank you for your courteous and thought through opening. The concept of god fails right from the get-go. We are offered a formulation of god that states it is: "supreme creator/sustainer of the universe". This is merely a relational attribute (in this case the relationship a god has with Existence), it says nothing of what a god actually is and thus descends into meaningless god-talk. For example we could state that a man is: "the builder of cities". That says nothing to the primary attribute (of its being) or secondary attributes (of its features) of what a man is and on its own is meaningless. What we can go on to do is to state the primary attributes positively from any number of perspectives (biologically, sociologically, geographically, geologically, culturally etc etc etc). Can we do this for a god? No Theist has yet. In Pros main argument, he has offered us an admittedly informal formulation of the argument from contingency. Traditionally this argument has failed to impress because it either leaves open the possibility that god is contingent (and thus has no explanatory power) or instead attempts to close that loophole by exempting a god from being contingent (by importing a claim that god is a necessary being). No arguments nor justification for such a claim is made, we are just left to accept this by theistic proclamation (an argument from fiat). The Theist however claims that this is reasonable. They argue that if a god exists, by definition it must be a necessary being. Even if one were to accept this (and I do not), the Theists merely begs the question from the outset, by incorporating into their definition and premises the conclusions they ultimately want to reach. Thus in this formulation we see the exact same problem in Premise 1 "until the ground of existence is reached which is not contingent upon anything". Why is this self evidently or axiomatically true? what evidence is there for this? Other than of course the Theist desire to set up a flawed conclusion. Nothing in the formulation prevents us from equally asserting that there were many "grounds of existences", or that one or all were infact part of a time series of "grounds of existences". In other words we could equally assume that Existence itself is the result of an infinite series of events, unless (as in my opponents case) the real aim is to terminate this potential infinite regress. And how does the Theist do this? By themselves invoking an infinite, only this time it is the concept of an infinite being. Thus the Theist uses an infinite to terminate an infinite regress. Premise 2 appears is a bare assertion fallacy. Why are we to assume that a "ground of existence", must be perfect? If it were perfect, wouldn"t that entail that it could only produce perfection (in that it is imperfect if it produces any imperfections)? If so the every concomitant contingent entity would also necessarily be perfect. Premise 3 is a non-sequitur. There are no reasons to conclude (even if we accept the first 2 Premises), that a so called "ground of existence" is spaceless, timeless and intelligent. No reasoning is given, we are just left to assume it. The conclusion is therefore unsound. I look forward to the next round.