Free will does not exist

Contextual DefinitionsCausal Determinism"Causal determinism is, roughly speaking, the idea that every event is necessitated by antecedent events and conditions together with the laws of nature" (3)."For centuries following Newton, causality was understood in terms of a "colliding billiard ball" model of particles, based on the idea of "energy transfer" among particles that obey the laws of classical mechanics, including the fundamental laws of conservation of energy and momentum. Fundamental particles were assumed not to transform into different physical particles. Partical trajectories were thought to be entirely determined by physical properties such as mass and momentum. This energy transfer conception of causality was deterministic. If a demon could know with absolute precision the locations, masses, momenta, and all other physical properties of all elementary particles everywhere, the whole future and past of the universe could in principle be known to it" (4).Underview: Determinism is the foundation in which a case against free will is built. If all actions are determined, then we cannot have free will as we cannot actually make decisions. If not all actions are determined, then there must be some conscious activity that causes our action, i.e. free will. Even if this is not true in every action, I will prove that in at least one action we exhibit free will. If a single drop of water falls from the sky it has rained. In the same vein, if a single account of free will can be proven, free will must exist. If it rained, water must have fallen from the sky and water must exist. If free will is utilized, free will must too exist. The antecedent is proven through the soundness of the argument's conclusion.Physicalism"Physicalism is the thesis that everything is physical, or as contemporary philosophers sometimes put it, that everything supervenes on, or is necessitated by, the physical" (1)."Physicalism maintains that there is only one fundamental substance or substrate, namely energy, changing within space-time in a manner that is best described by the laws of physics" (2).Underview: The validity of physicalism is a necessary criterion for even considering determinism. I will not dispute physicalism and will operate under the assumption that it is true.OntologyOntology is the study of being, of what is. It is, "The study of the most general features of what there is, and how the things there are relate to each other in the metaphysically most general ways" (5).Ontological pluralism is, "The doctrine that some things exist in a different way that other things. For the ontological pluralist there is more t olearn about an object's existential status than merely whether it is or is not: there is still the question of how that entity exists" (6).Ontological monism then is the doctring that all things exist in the same way as other things.Underview: Ontological monism is necessary for determinism. The assumption that all particles exist in the same way, and that all atoms exist in the same way, is necessary to make definitive and monistic statements about the nature of causation. This is true because determinism assumes the soundness of counterfactual definiteness. "Counterfactual definiteness refers to the idea that certain properties, such as momentum or position, have a definitive state, even when they are not measured or not known" (7). Ontological pluralism allows for there to be multiple states of existence, in which case the state of unknown properties may be ontologically indeterminate. Therefore my case is that ontological indeterminism proves causal determinism false. Quantum PhysicsEinstein's theory of physics, that which concludes in determinism, rejects the probabilistic nature of quantum physics. He argues that at its most basic level, causation is deterministic because nature does not simply "play dice." Therefore, to explain causal determinism Newtonian physicists adopted hidden variables determinism (8). Peter Ulric Tse explains that, "According to advocates of such 'hidden variables determinism," the probability density functions whose dynamics are given by the equations of quantum physics describe uncertainty in our knowledge of partical locations and movements, not any kind of actual nonspecificity of partical locations, momenta, energies, or durations" (9). However, Bell's research which has been confirmed later through other studies has ruled out hidden local variables, i.e. hidden causes that are locally relevant in proximity to the event that occured. This means that rational conceptions of quantum mechanics, "Must either allow for nonlocal coordination or correlation of the states of distant physical events, or the must violate 'counterfactual definiteness'" (10). Determinism is then faced with an ultimatum: "Either determinists must accept that there are causal chains involving nonlocal correlations that are instantaneous (leaving them with the problem of explaining how coordination of partical attributes ... can occur at faster than the speed of light with other 'entangled' particles over arbitrarily large distances), or they must accept that unmeasured properties do not have a definite ontological state at times when they are not measured" (11). If my opponent chooses to advocate the former, he must present a case for its soundness. The latter concludes that, "To accept that particle properties are ontologically unspecified when not measured would be tantamount to accepting ontological indeterminism, since nonspecific properties are by definition indeterminate" (12).Underview: Determinism is clearly false as evidence points towards the soundness of ontological indeterminism. This is important as we address the aspect in which determinism attempts to exclude mental activity from physical causation. The argument from determinism is that the physical operates under a sense of closure, or that there can be no input to a causal chain once it has begun. In other words:A => B => C => ad infinitum.If the physical operates under an open system then we have the possibility of:A => B => C ^ || CIn basic terms, in a closed system there is only one possible set of events that could occur after the first cause is set into motion. In a closed system, however, other sources of input may alter the chain. In other words, the chain has multiple possible outcomes. If this is true, free will is rationally true. The idea that our actions cannot be influenced by mental activity collapses when alternative sources of input may change our actions other than neural transmitters themselves.Occurences of InputThe prior claim is evidenced by a study in which acts of self-control are shown to reduce the level of glucose in our blood and that people with a drained reserve of glucose are unable to effectively display self-control. Drinking lemonade and increasing our glucose made self-control easier, yet drinking lemonade with a glucose-free substitute did not yield the same benefit. Therefore glucose serves as an energy source, similar to out metaphorical conception of willpower, that allows us to make conscious decisions of restraint. If conscious restraint is possible, then free will must exist as we have the option not to restrain outselves.Sources1. Stoljar, Daniel. Physicalism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. February 13th, 2001; Rev. September 9th, 2009. http://plato.stanford.edu...2. Tse, Peter Ulric. Neural Basis of Free Will. February 22nd, 2013. Page 241. Print.3. Hoefer, Carl. Causal Determinism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. January 23rd, 2003; Rev. Jan 21st, 2010. http://plato.stanford.edu...;4. Tse, Peter Ulric. Neural Basis of Free Will. February 22nd, 2013. Page 241. Print.5. Hofweber, Thomas. Logic and Ontology. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. October 4th, 2004; Rev. August 30th, 2011. http://plato.stanford.edu...