Resolved: United Nations peacekeepers should have the power to engage in offensive operations.

Pro I affirm the resolution which states resolved: UN peacekeepers should have the power to engage in offensive operations. Observation: The power bestowed upon peacekeepers to use offensive operations is not a power that is necessarily used in all cases; it is a tool in the toolbox. Peacekeepers would obviously not use offensive operations in every situation, only when needed. Thus, pro’s burden is simply to show why having offensive operations is legitimate in certain situations. Definitions Peacekeepers - provide security and political and peacebuilding support to help countries make the difficult, early transition from conflict to peace. They are guided via three basic principles: impartiality, consent of parties, and only use of defensive operations (what the debate is over)-un.orgPower - legal or official authority, capacity, or right -merriam websterOffensive - more robust mandates that go beyond self defense or defense of the mandate given to peacekeepers -un.org C1: Military peacekeeping requires offense. The ultimate goal of peacekeeping operations is to help both parties in a conflict obtain stability through the transition from conflict to peace. Under the status quo, peacekeepers usually use force in self defense or in defense of their current mandate. Mandates involve the protection of "safe zones" in which peacekeepers do what they can to protect civilians within said zones. The problem is, rebel groups go unpunished for violence committed outside of safe zones. This is exactly what happened in the Rwandan Genocide of 1994. Gerard Prunier, an African scholar and journalist, describes the peacekeepers as "the powerless UN military force" who watched the genocide without being able to lift a finger (1). Peacekeepers should be striving to convince armed groups that instigating conflict is futile by attaching a cost to violence. If peacekeepers are limited to acting in self defense and defending safe zones, the rebel groups will likely continue the conflict because little cost will be attached to their violent actions. Matt explains, "Being able to stop and combat the groups that led to the need for a UN mission will make for a more lasting peace than when the groups are ignored or government forces are relied on to stop them. This will go a long way in ensuring that a tragedy like the Rwandan genocide does not happen simply because the peacekeeping forces hands are tied by red tape (2)." Thus, offensive operations are necessary to ensure peace in many situations. The success of the most recent offensive operation by the UN in Congo helps justify their future use. Beehner records that a brigade of 3,000 people was sent to neutralize armed groups in DRC. The peacekeeping mission was considered successful as the M23 rebels laid down their arms within two weeks and later signed a peace treaty (3). An account from various UN generals notes that the most advantageous action for the peacekeepers to take “all feasible steps” to make sure the protection of affected civilians is met. Using the situation in congo as a template for future conflicts, the UN should have the power to engage in offensive operations when necessary to truly deal with rebel groups. C2: The authorization of offensive operations leads to peace. Point A: EfficacyThe efficacy of offensive operations can be measured by how well peace enforcement is achieved (one of the four basic tenets of UN peacekeeping).Green explains in a meta-analysis of offensive operations that, “peace enforcement operations are most successful when they… maintain impartiality and legitimacy through close cooperation with UN peacekeepers (5).” Green notes that other groups tend to be more partial and biased, making the UN most fit to engage in offensive operations, and documents that peace enforcement has a “318% to 369% hazard ratio of civil war termination controlling for force capability (6),” meaning that the risk of a country being able to prevent a civil war is 3 times more likely. Thus, it is safe to conclude that offensive operations can coerce a rebel group into resuming peace talks and terminate current conflicts. Point B: Deterrence Paul Collier explains in his book Wars, Guns, and Votes that France issued a security guarantee to its former colonies in Africa which provided protection against armed groups. The guarantee was called an "over the horizon guarantee" which can be defined as providing reliable commitment to dispatch peacekeepers to disarm armed groups in a particular area. The French only had to assist its colonies a few times in disarming rebels before rebel groups realized that continued efforts to prolong conflict were futile. Collier documents a huge deterrent effect: a 75% decrease in armed conflict in former French colonies. Giving the UN peacekeepers the power to engage in offensive operations will have a similar effect because the UN will be able to provide an over the horizon guarantee like France did to its colonies, only the UN can do this to all countries. Armed groups will understand the greater cost attached to violence by looking to successful offensive operations in the past such as Congo, thus making them understand that instigating conflict is futile (7). Point C: Rebel Access to Weapons When rebel groups acquire tanks and chemical weapons, the use of offensive operations is needed to destroy them. When evaluating this problem, look to the situation in Syria. Hummel explains that rebel groups in Syria currently have access to chemical weapons, posing a higher risk for Syria to lapse back into a state of conflict. Hummel also documents the risk of non state actors smuggling the weapons outside of Syria (8). A similar situation existed with the M23 rebels. Upon the rebel groups defeat of the Congolese army prior to the UN brigade, a member of the rebel group boasted, “In the port of Goma alone, 500 tons of military equipment are now in our hands, Now we have missiles, lots of ammunition, even a tank (9).” Unless weapons belonging to a rebel group are hidden in a safe zone, peacekeepers have absolutely no means of destroying them without having the power to engage in offensive operations, causing the rebel group’s power to consistently grow. 1. http://www.debate.org...... 2. http://www.debate.org......3, http://www.debate.org......4. http://www.debate.org......5. http://www.debate.org......6. http://www.debate.org......7, http://www.debate.org......