Individuals Ought to Help Those in Need

Thanks to Pro for his excellent rebuttals! Now it's my turn...As agreed in the comments section, this round is only for rebutting the other side's opening arguments; counter-rebuttals will be saved for next round.Like my opening contentions, my rebuttals function independently of each other.R1) Duty to RescuePro argues the following:P1: There is no substantive difference between Commission and OmissionP2: Immoral Acts of Commission should be PreventedP3: Immoral Acts of Omission should be PreventedThe flaw in this argument is in the first premise. Pro's only defense of the premise was through example, claiming that a mother poisoning her child (commission) is just as bad as a mother allowing her child to starve (omission). However, that example is a rather unfair one, as our pre-conception is that a mother has a duty to take care of her child, which makes both situations seem equally disturbing and immoral.Let's look at a different example to more accurately portray the difference between commission (causing suffering) and omission (allowing suffering):Let's say that Person A goes up to some poor victim and breaks his arm (an act of commission). Soon after, Person B walks by, sees the victim writhing in pain, and keeps walking without stopping to help (an act of omission).If Person A had never existed, then the victim would be perfectly fine. If Person B had never existed but Person A had, then the victim would still have a broken arm and would be enduring terrible suffering. It is clear that Person A's act of commission is far more harmful to the well-being of the victim then Person B's act of omission. The fundamental difference between acts of commission and omission is that an act of omission merely requires an attitude of indifference, whereas an act of commission requires malicious intent. Malicious intent causes harm; it involves actually DOING something and inflicting suffering on someone. Indifference does not cause harm; it is simply a choice to ignore suffering. Ignoring suffering after it has been (or while it is being) inflicted is substantially different from inflicting that suffering in the first place. It is clear that there IS a substantive difference between acts of commission and acts of omission, thus bringing down Pro's entire "duty to rescue" argument. R2) Levinasian EthicsFirst of all, I must give my sincere thanks to Pro. My inexperience in debates of this type caused me to have to ask him for several clarifications of the quotations used in his argument, and it was very gracious of him to oblige in providing me with those clarifications. Now I shall use my new-found knowledge to refute his argument ;)Pro's argument is basically that humans have an intrinsic feeling of sympathy/empathy towards other humans, which has become the basis of morality in society. However, this system of morality has the same problem as its opposite extreme, psychological egoism (i.e. humans are intrinsically selfish and self-interest motivates all their actions): there is barely any empirical evidence proving either "theory".Pro cites examples in nature of more intelligent mammals exhibiting sympathy, but just because they have been observed exhibiting sympathy does not mean that sympathy is their default nature. It is more than likely that their default nature is like that of all lower-intelligence animals, only caring for their own survival (and their off-spring if they have any, but even that is primarily based on instinct). Humans aren't necessarily any different. There have been thousands of instances recorded throughout history of battle field brutality and things of the like which could go to disprove the notion that humans have any sort of intrinsic sense of sympathy for other humans. Humans could be just as as bestial as any other animal, with a much higher frequency of sympathy/empathy displays due to social norms and more developed mirror neurons.Pro's B and C quotations speak of a human meeting another human for the first time, making the assumption that the humans would immediately empathize with each other and form some sort of positive social bond. However, there is no evidence that the scenario would play out as such. It is purely hypothetical. What makes us so sure that they wouldn't try to kill each other competing for resources? Basically, my rebuttal to Pro's argument from Levinasian ethics is that it is all far too hypothetical and untested to be taken seriously. Psychological egoism is just as likely to be correct about human nature as Levinasian ethics is.R3) UtilitarianismPro argues the following:P1. Maximizing Pleasure is Morally DesirableP2: Helping people at no cost to oneself maximizes pleasureP3: Helping people at no cost to oneself is morally desirableThe main problem with this argument is with the second premise and its inclusion of the phrase "at no cost to oneself". Very rarely does helping people come at no cost to oneself; helping some one in need almost always requires a substantial amount of time and energy on the part of the helper. Yet the resolution (people ought to help those in need), is meant to apply to all situations in which someone is in need.This argument is irrelevant to resolution at hand, as one of its essential premises does not apply to the majority of situations in which people help those in need. CONCLUSIONS1. The first premise of the "duty to rescue" argument is false, thus debunking the whole argument.2. Levinasian ethical theory is based on an unproven proposition.3. The argument from Utilitarianism is inapplicable to the resolution being debatedWith that I hand the debate back over to Pro.I look forward to seeing his counter-rebuttals!