Evil proves God does not exist (4)

Although this is my first debate on here, I hope to provide some intellectual stimulation and make a decent case for why we must affirm the resolution: Evil proves God does not exist. Clarification: Although I am arguing Pro, I would like to clarify that I am arguing with Con on the existence of God ex hypothesi. In order to make for a coherent debate, I will be using the context Con set forth in his opening argument. I presuppose the existence of God purely as a linguistic constraint, meant to further the debate, and nothing more. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- DEFINITIONS i. Objections: In the 'Definition of God' it is stated that "morally good" is one of the attributes of God. Rather than reject this definition, I instead ask for clarification. Proposed definitional change: To say that God is morally good is to say that God is essentially, perfectly good. To use possible world semantics, this would mean that God is perfectly good in all possible worlds. ii. Addendums: a) God is omnipotent if God is able to bring about any logically possible state of affairs. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- OBSERVATIONS and SUMMARY i. Con proposes the question, "is there an explicit contradiction between God existing and evil existing? " Naturally, it is Pro's burden (which is my burden) to affirm this interrogative. The argument is then put out formally, as: 1) If evil exists then God does not exist. 2) evil does exist. 3) Therefore God does not exist. It is important to note (as Con did implicitly) that this is a valid argument, modus ponens. The validity is not in question; rather, Con asks whether or not this argument is sound. Indeed, Con denies the first premise as being a true conditional - "there is no explicit contradiction between evil existing and God existing. " ii. Additionally, given the definition of God, it is assumed that EACH of the listed attributes are essential (otherwise they would not be given in a definition). In other words, it is NOT my burden to show how the existence of evil contradicts the entirety of God's attributes; rather, I merely need to show how the existence of evil contradicts any number of the attributes. Even if it can be shown that the existence of evil is contradictory to even a single attribute of God as defined, my burden has been upheld and we must affirm the resolution. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- I have three main arguments that I would like to put forth. Each argument has the aim of helping show that we are more reasonable to accept that premise 1) is true than we are to accept it as false. (1) Illuminate the famous trilemma from Epicurus, in order to form a conditional proof for Con's initial argument. (2) Argue from the notion of "natural evil. " (3) Discuss how 'evil' may contain irreconcilable conceptual issues. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- (1) The "problem of evil" first arose with Greek philosopher Epicurus (341 BC – 270 BC). He questioned the logical possibility of the God we are debating here. British Philosophy David Hume broke the trilemma down for us: 1. if God is unable to prevent evil, he is not omnipotent 2. if God is not willing to prevent evil, he is not good 3. if God is willing and able to prevent evil, then why is there evil? The purpose of illuminating the trilemma is to highlight what Con would call the "implicit" contradiction between evil and the existence of God. I hope to make it more explicit. I would like to use these highlights in order to make a conditional proof (CP) for the proposition in question: "If Evil exists, then God does not exist. " 1) if an agent is all-powerful, that agent can bring about any logically possible state of affairs. 2) it is a logically possible state of affairs for evil to be prevented. 3) Therefore, if an agent is all-powerful, that agent could prevent evil. [1, 2, Leibniz's Law] 4) if an agent is morally good, then that agent would desire to prevent evil, all things being equal. 5) if an agent both desires and is able to carry out some act, all things being equal, then that agent will carry out that act. 6) If God exists, he is both all-powerful and morally good. 7) If God exists, he both desires and is able to prevent evil. 8) If God exists, he will prevent evil. Begin CP: 9) Evil exists. (i. e. , evil is not prevented) 10) God does not exist. [Modus Tollens, 8 and 9] Close CP / 11) If evil exists, the God does not exist. My second point briefly addresses one of the main concerns with this proof. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2) Argument from "natural evil. " Here I draw heavily upon Peter Singer's argument on the problem of evil - the idea of natural evils such as suffering. Peter Singer points out that there are instances of "evil" in world - namely, the suffering of non-moral entities such as animals and severely handicapped humans. The argument is very basic - to willingly permit unnecessary suffering is evil. When applied to nature, wherein no human agents can interfere, this can be referred to as "natural evil. " I bring this up in anticipation to a possible objection to my second premise: 2) it is a logically possible state of affairs for evil to be prevented. The objector may state that perhaps not ALL evil could be prevented - there may be circumstances under which evil is necessary. One possible response would be to take 2) and imply, via existential generalization: 2e) it is a logically possible state of affairs for at least one instance of evil to be prevented. Natural evil provides us with the instantiation of 2e). Indeed, we are more reasonable to believe that outside of the conduct of a moral agent, the suffering of non-moral agents such as animals ought to be avoided. In other words, natural evil is an instance of a type of preventable evil. Albeit being a more modest claim, the proof will stand in light of this objection. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3) The final argument takes a different route, involving the definition of God as "personal. " I will argue that God's other attributes (particularly morally good and all-powerful) cannot coincide with God being a personal being, if evil exists. A personal being is a being which is able to choose to act. So it follows that if a personal being is all-powerful, they could choose to act in any way that is consistent with all logically possible affairs. Here is where we get into this new contradiction: Many evil acts, say, maliciously telling a lie, are not only logically possible - such acts have actually happened, and frequently (i. e. , evil exists). However, if God is morally good, then engaging in malicious behavior would contradict himself. There are two outcomes: a) God is not omnipotent,by definition, since there are logically possible states of affairs which God could not bring out, and/or b) claim God is ABLE to maliciously lie, but is determined not to. If he did, God would cease to be God (by definition). This creates a paradox for God as being a personal being; "choosing" to maintain an inability to choose. If this is so, then humans are able to "choose" their actions to an extend that God cannot - thus making humans greater moral agents than God. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Thus we see that there is a contradiction between the existence of evil and the existence of God. Evil proves God does not exist.