It is wrong to teach children that Santa Claus exists

Nature of the Debate.Pro has apparently waited until the very last round of this debate to attack the utilitarian framework out of which we've been operating. Not only that, but many of Pro's own contentions rely on utilitarianism to work. For instance his betrayal point implies that the consequences of lying are what makes it bad in this case i.e., leading to a feeling of betrayal, etc. No matter though. Even if we throw out consequentialist methodology, Pro still has still failed to provide a compelling case for deontological immorality of lying (given his numerous counter examples). And if deontology and consequentialism are out, I fail to see from what moral perspective Pro argues from.Betrayal.Pro has completely failed to show reasoned causation or empirical evidence for any long-lasting negative effects on children as a result of their parents lying to them about Santa Claus. (Of course this would still be inadmissable if we hold to Pro's point that this debate isn't utilitarian/consequentialist in nature) His only points of evidence argue that (a) children trust their parents (not arguing with it, Pro hasn't shown why all instances of lying are detrimental to a child's mental health though), (2) random unsupported hypotheticals about strangers dressed as Santa, and (3) that parents lying about Santa could teach children that lying is good/acceptable. On this last one, it contradicts Pro's own points thusfar in which he argued that there were instances in which lying was indeed acceptable. If lying always teaches kids that lying is good then we should stick to a strict deontological rule against lying. But since Pro endorses lying in some instances, he must give up on this point.Christianity and Santa.Pro argues here that lying to children about Santa *could* cause them to question Christianity. Therefore, if the parents had the intention of raising their children Christian, this could err against that effect. Now even though Pro brought this new contention in the last round and therefore it's inapplicable, I'll throw out just a few refutations for good measure.(1) The hypothetical imperative outlined is completely dependent on whether a parent wants to raise their child Christian. This is contrasted with a categorical imperative (a la Kant) which would constitute actual morality and would thus actually be applicable to the resolution (the resolution says it's "wrong" for parents to teach children about Santa, indicating a moral imperative). If one can get away from Pro's "imperative" by simply changing one's intentions, it's doubtful it constitutes an objectively binding prescription of action. (2) This imperative isn't binding at all to non-Christians or those who don't care how their children are raised religion-wise.===Conclusion===Pro's points almost universally lacked warrant. Besides not providing "moral" evidence (given the nature of the resolution), Pro flipped inconsistently between consequentialism and soft-deontology, from being against lying for reasons of its consequences to arguing for the immorality of lying except for in some pre-established cases. Neither standard was really defended but it doesn't change the fact that Pro kept switching moral standards. Besides that, all of Pro's sources in favor of his case were simply drawn from blogs, hardly reliable evidence for anything in itself. Of course evidence for the ill effects on children from lying about Santa was never shown in the first place. Pro seemed to simply be trying to reason it out a priori without empirical verification. Overall, Pro failed to provide a case against lying about the existence of Santa Claus. Therefore, I endorse a Con vote.Thanks to Pro for the opportunity to debate this topic. As usual, it was a pleasure!