Morality is Necessarily Subjective, but Non-Arbitrary

Con seems to believe that I’m intentionally engineering anunclear argument to “win”. He charges me with semantic trickery. He assumes badfaith of me in doing so. I have no pretense to “win” by wordy exhaustion. His attempt to stylistically contrast his argument with mineby brute repetition of language does nothing to deal with my arguments. I addressed his counter that rocks are morally eligiblebeings because they comply with “ought implies can”. I addressed this counter in saying, “So far as the external world itself is concerned, smashinga rock is no different from smashing a face”, meaning that in order todistinguish between these two cases, subjectivity must be invoked. One of those two actions result in suffering and harm:smashing a rock does not lead to suffering or harm for the rock; smashing aperson’s face does lead to harm andsuffering for that that person. Therefore, the first case is not a moralscenario; the second case is a moral scenario. Con points out that rocks are in compliance with “oughtimplies can”, but my point is that rocks don’t qualify to be treated as morally eligible thingsbecause they can’t suffer or be harmed. If morality were objective, then it would be independent ofexperience. But morality requires experience, described in subjective terms, inorder to make any sense. It requires that suffering and harm be invoked inorder to account for what it does. If we eliminate subjectivity from our account, then thedistinction between rocks and people is eliminated also, and morality musteither apply to both rocks and people, or to neither of them. None of this is new material. I presented this in theprevious round. I’m simply revisiting it because Con flatly denies that Iaddressed it in the first place. Con says that since I “did not define ‘subjective’ when setting up the debate”, I can’t “resort to[a] private idiosyncratic and inexplicable usage” of that word. This is justfalse. In the very first round, I said: “To be clear, I use [subjective] to mean concerning properties accessible only tofirst-person modalities of observation.” This was the second line I typed. Con accepted this debate after reading this definition. He therefore accepted thedefinition, and decided to oppose my claim that morality was subjective by thatdefinition. He now denies that I defined "subjectivity" from the outset. This calls into question how closely Conis really paying attention. Perhaps the reader should take care, then, inheeding Con’s charge that I am peddling sheer obscurantism. I defined “subjective” from the outset. Con has also extended his claim that my use of subjectivity/objectivityis illegitimate because it’s eccentric or “non-standard.” I’ve provided an example in which a leading philosopher(Chalmers) uses objectivity/subjectivity as I do. Namely, when Chalmers says that a “rich inner life” producedby physical processes seems “objectively unreasonable”, it does not make senseto interpret this to mean “consciousness seems like it should be able to not beso, if one prefers it to not be so”, which how Con has used “subjective”. Rather, it makes more sense if taken to mean: “Given thatthe brain is a bodily organ, all of its data seems like it should be availableto an external analysis by other parties. That it yet produces data whichdefies this expectation (i.e. consciousness) seems unreasonable.” This is the way in which I use “subjective” and it, in fact,makes sense of everything else Chalmers says. Applying Con’s use to Chalmers makes his work read like aMad Lib. So my use of “subjectivity” is not an abnormal, shadowything. That Con requires me to use a non-philosophical and colloquial usage ofa word in a philosophical argument is unreasonable. Con also flatly denies that I showed morality to be non-arbitrary.This is also untrue. I demonstrated deductivelythat harming others is irrational. What is irrational and rational isnon-arbitrary. Since morality concerns itself with harm done unto others, moralityhas the same non-arbitrary nature. This is perhaps the strongest argument thatI’ve given. Here it is again, verbatim: -An agent is a discrete identity. This identity contains the ability to act asthat agent.-When an agent intentionally performs an action to harm itself, it denies itsidentity by affirming its destruction.-But when an agent intentionally acts, it affirms its capacities to act as anagent, and therefore its identity.-Therefore, self-harm is a performative contradiction.-To assert a contradiction is irrational, and to assert a performativecontradiction is to perform the action it concerns.-The action concerned is self-harm. Therefore self-harm is irrational.Now consider a collection of discrete agents:-Each such agent is a self, and to each of them, every other agent is an other.-Therefore, each agent occupies a category of "self" and"other" when all relations between them are considered.-For one agent to intentionally harm an "other" is for it to harmanother "self". It is therefore harming an element of the category towhich it also belongs.-But if it so grants that elements of this category may be harmed, then it isvolunteering itself for the same treatment, because it belongs to the samecategory.-This constitutes the endorsement of self-harm, which is irrational.-Therefore, for one agent to intentionally harm another is irrational. End proof. This is not incomprehensible obscurantism; it is deductivereasoning. This was given in the very beginning, yet Con simply denies its existence. I have cleanly proven this part of the case. Con’s charge that I have disingenuously cloaked my argument with evasive rhetoric is false. However, I did have to weaken my position on the point thatmorality is necessarily subjective. I conceded to Con that I couldn’t prove morality to be subjective in all possible worlds. So out of the three things contained in the resolution: 1. Moralityis non-arbitrary, 2. Morality is subjective, and 3. The subjectiveness of morality is necessary, as opposed to just possible. I’ve successfully defended the first two of these, and conceded the third. This is not a globalfailure to uphold the resolution; I've successfully defended it in fargreater proportion than I've had to weaken it. I can still say with good consciencethat readers should vote Pro. Importantly, I didn't concede the third point to Con because of any counter-argument Con hadmade. Con simply noted that my resolution was “a tall order”. I, in fact, argued myself into the concession by noting that the hard problem of consciousnessforced me to do so. I have met the burden of proof, and satisfied my role in this debate. Con has claimed that Ihave failed to communicate, but I am simply saying what people like Erwin Schrödingernoted 70 years ago: "While the stuff from which our world picture is builtis yielded exclusively from the sense organs as organs [that is, agents] of themind, …the conscious mind itself remains a stranger within that construct, ithas no living space in it, you can spot it nowhere in space...To learn that it[the personality of a human being] cannot really be found there [in theinterior of a human body] is so amazing that it meets with doubts andhesitation, we are very loath to admit it.” [1] He is noting, as I have repeatedly, that consciousness and its contents behave according to this private causalitythat does not act in the world as it appears to its audience (us). Because our objective accounts of the world only deal with “public”causality, our subjectivity remains “a stranger” to that account. It is not tobe found within it, for its content cannot be analyzed by external parties; itconsists of this “private causality”. My points are not bizarre and arcane; this quote of Schrödingercame from a popular science lecture in 40’s. If I have failed to communicate,then so has one of the greatest scientists of all time. I have substantially defended the resolution and can saywith good conscience that readers should vote Pro. --- [1] Mind and Matter, Schrödinger