There is no rational reason for which an American civilian should want to own an assault weapon.

I will hope that the wait has been worth it. First, I would like to point out that my opponent’s definitions of what may be considered a rational desire is an argument from authority. To examine whether there is such a thing as a “rational desire” and to evaluate what such a thing is to be described as, I pose that such an argument stands to be defended when it is presented. So let us examine if CON’s argument from authority stands up to scrutiny. First, so far in the debate, in the resolution and elsewhere I have left the idea of what may be a rational desire to good faith, trusting that my opponent would use the same “rational desire” as I have been using, and have forgone spelling it out. I see, however, that this is not the case. The definition of “rational desire” I have been operating under has been based upon knowledge rather than belief. It is not simply enough to say that some action or activity is rational because someone believes it to be effective or consistent with, but rather that they have knowledge that it is to be effective. There is because people can clearly hold irrational beliefs, and so belief cannot be the basis of rationality. Further, I have been operating on objective rationality, rather than subjective rationality. Something must be consistent with reality rather than simply internally consistent to be rational; if someone believed that Draino was a delicious and refreshing drink which causes no ill effects upon the imbiber based upon observing people drinking fluid from a Draino bottle this belief is not inconsistent with itself nor with their knowledge, however it is inconsistent with reality and thus irrational. This brings me to the crux of CON’s argument: that "Our reason cannot tell us what to desire". While it is certainly true that our reason cannot currently tell us what to desire at this point in time, it is not guaranteed to be thus forever in the future (it is a noble and plausible goal to seek to alter our desires such that they are consistent with our reason). More importantly, however, is that even so, our reason can tell us which of our desires are consistent with truths of reality and with our knowledge. Those goals which are consistent with our reason we can understand are rightful desires, and those which are not are thus irrational desires. So this leads me to my rightful rejection of CON’s counter-example of Simon. To do this, I will present the example of Tom, a close dear friend of Simon. Tom is a collector of historical heavy machinery, and has a stressful job. Tom owns a farm, and decides that one of the historical heavy machines which he wishes to own is a replica of The Killdozer(see youtube video . http://www.youtube.com...). Being the industrious individual he is, he actually builds one of the deadly monstrosities. This weapon of mass property destruction is completely legal in many localities to own, and as such is like Simon’s unnecessarily destructive weapon in every relevant way. While Tom is a fairly reasonable person, when the bank repossesses his farm he snaps. During this period of mental break, he hops in his Killdozer and levels the bank and kills a few people in the bank as well. It is clear that his desire to own such an unnecessary weapon is not rational, given the extant truth of reality that people can snap. While CON may have a case that such a weapon as Simon’s Baretta or Tom’s Killdozer may be a rational desire if such destructive weapons are rendered inoperable it remains the case given extant truths of reality that owning such a weapon is irrational. Whether it is Simon or Tom, the knowledge that they may snap and USE their weapon to the fullness of its function is cause enough to preclude ownership of such tools unless they have an actual rational need besides simple temptation to own the weapon. CON’s argument stands refuted, and the resolution stands affirmed.