All Religious Bloodshed is Righteous if God Exists

Re: ‘Argument on the Condonement of Righteousness’ (Con): I agree with all premises presented, but hold contention with the validity of the conclusions. The conclusions of my opponent’s argument rely on the assumption that if religious beliefs are in line with God has intended them to be, that those religious beliefs reflect God’s will. This is certainly not the case, because (a) God could want those beliefs to exist as they are to achieve a particular end and (b) as my argument expresses, any omnipotent/omniscient who did not wish something to be so, would certainly change it.Additionally, in C2, Con uses the word “wrong” which is somewhat ambiguous. If this is intended to mean “contrary to what God wants”, then this is exactly what my argument is expressing, as mentioned above in (b). These points that Con’s argument alludes to are covered more in-depth by my defense, below. To conclude, this argument is founded on assumptions which render the conclusion a mere assumption, thus, invalid. Re: ‘Argument of Righteous Bloodshed’ (Pro): Defense of MP1:I am willing to revise the tense of this statement to be past-tense: “God has previously been willing to intervene with influential knowledge.” I am only seeking to show that God has previously intervened by influencing people (as referenced by MP6). This primarily matters towards countering the common response that God does not wish to infringe on free will (as referenced by MP9), because if this constitutes a violation of free will, then God has shown that He has been willing to do so in the base. The contentions regarding motive are addressed in the Defense of MP8 & MP9, below. With this rephrasing, I ask my opponent if we are in agreement, now. Defense of MP3:My opponent misunderstands the intent of this premise, which has led to a misrepresentational analogy. The intent is to consider an individual belief and to ascribe the property of righteousness to bloodshed in accordance with that particular belief. As an example, if God had originally made it known that He wanted everyone to do the Hokey Pokey and Bob held that belief, then performing the Hokey Pokey is righteous; NOT killing everyone who doesn’t perform the Hokey Pokey. That belief would be considered separately - only if God had made it known that He wanted that killing, would it be righteous. This premise is essentially tautological (which is why there was no real justification provided). Additionally, Con’s statement about non-violent religious doctrines does not pertain to this premise. P3: “if a [non-violent] religious belief is righteous, then all bloodshed in accordance with that belief is also righteous”. But since that belief entails no bloodshed, this statement is rendered null. I feel this should clarification should elicit agreement. Defense of MP6:Since this premise only makes claim that it is merely possible for God to correct mistaken beliefs (in a manner previously employed) and doesn’t pertain to motive, I do not perceive any contention to it in my opponent’s argument. Defense of MP7:My opponent has provided statements regarding Satan possibly preventing God from correcting mistaken beliefs, so I felt this was better treated as a contention to this premise because it essentially argues that God is unable to make this corrections. Satan is a scapegoat; an antagonist that’s crucial to the narrative. Let us address this by asking one question: “Is Satan an equal rival to God: omniscient and omnipotent?” If the answer is “no”, then Satan only came into existence and continues to exist as a result of God’s will. Since any infinite force (God) will absolutely overcome any finite force (Satan), God could effortlessly pacify, nullify, or otherwise deal with Satan. If the answer is “yes”, then two pertinent conclusions can be drawn. One, if this is the case, then Satan is a god, in of and himself, which renders this proposition a polytheistic scenario, which is outside the scope of this debate. Two, if two beings of the exactly equal power (infinite) and identical knowledge (everything), are in contest, then a stalemate is guaranteed, because two equal forces will cancel each other out, meaning that they don’t have power over anything, which is paradoxical. Say, for instance, God and Satan wished to move a rock in opposite directions. Whose action takes precedence? If either one is, then they are more powerful than the other. If neither does, then neither has the power to move the rock, so neither is omnipotent. This applies to any proposed adversarial force. In regard to this, I will ask my opponent if this premise is acceptable given this debate’s restriction to a monotheistic notion of God (as defined in Round 1: Assumptions). Defense of MP8 & MP9:Firstly, the explanations regarding Satan and theistic Satanism is addressed in Defense of MP7. My opponent states that there could be other reasons (other than free will) that God would be unwilling to correct mistaken beliefs, and I agree. However, God is able to correct them and, therefore, is necessarily unwilling to do so because of these reasons. We cannot claim to know the intentions that the true God has for this world (or such details as Heaven and Hell), especially since we cannot identify which religion (if any) accurately depicts Him (taken from P2 of Con’s argument). Whatever His reasons may be, they’re part of His plan, especially since He is omniscient. God knows full well, for example, that Person X will mistakenly believe that God wants him to kill Person Y, and follow through with this action which He believe is wholly righteous. God, being capable of modifying/configuring his plan in any way, could have easily arranged it so that Person X would not have been misled or deceived by incorrect knowledge that led to the killing of Person Y. Since God then necessarily chose this arrangement (nothing would have existed, otherwise), the occurrence is in accordance with His will. If, say, Person X’s belief is mistaken in actuality, then the very existence of that mistaken belief and the consequences of it are what God wanted. Regarding the specific explanation provided by my opponent accompanied by the image, I will present an analogy. Say that you set up a test in which a thin tightrope rope is tied between two platforms, and there is a mouse on one platform. Beneath the rope is a fire; certain death for the mouse. The mouse is pressured to cross the rope as the platform beneath it continues to increase in slope. If it makes it across, it is saved. If not, it falls into the fires, below. Let us compare your scenario and God’s scenario: (a) You are each the one who constructed the parameters and conditions of the test; it wouldn’t have existed otherwise.(b) You are each responsible for the subject’s position in the test.(c) You are each capable of altering the experiment to ensure the subject’s safety, should you desire it.(d) Unlike God, you do not know beforehand whether the mouse will fail or succeed. We’ll assume you can.(e) Unlike God, you cannot instantly, effortlessly, and subtly alter the conditions of the test to achieve the desired result. We’ll assume you can.(f) Unlike God, you are subject to unknown variables and interferences. We’ll assume you aren’t. Given the above, if the mouse falls into the fire, it will be only because you wanted it to fall into the fire, since you are in full control. Correction to logical representations: Corrected logic for MP9: (Ax)((Fgx&((Bxg&Mx)>Rx)) (MP9) Justification+P2) Bag&Ma [Assumed CP]+P3) (Bag&Ma)>(Lga&~Wga) [MP7,UI]+P4) Lga&~Wga [P2,P3,MP]+P5) ~Wga>(Rav~Fga) [MP8,UI]+P6) Rav~Fga [P4,P5,MP]+P7) ~Fga>~Ig [P1,UI]+P8) Fga [MP1,P7,MT]+P9) Ra [P6,P8,DS]P10) (Bag&Ma)>Ra [P2-P9,CP] P11) ~Fga>~Ig [P1,UI]P12) Fga [MP1,P11,MT]C) (Ax)((Fgx&((Bxg&Mx)>Rx)) [P10,P12,CJ,UG] (C) Justification+P2) Fga&((Bag&Ma)>Ra) [MP9,UI]+P2.5) Ra [P1,P2,MP]