Zaradi's Prized Tournament: Animal Rights

Housekeeping Dropping the underview doesn’t really mean presume Con, how is dropping a summary a dropped argument? C1) Suffering Justification JUS1: Bsh says he is arguing specific applications of rights are all made in order to prevent suffering. This is correct. He goes on to list many rights, and then says I never responded to them. This is false. I spent the majority of the round explaining how it was true for humans but not animals. I noted how pain itself is not sufficient for rights. It is moral pain, not physical pain, which causes rights to be enacted. Animals may experience physical pain, but they lack the capacity to rationalize the pain. TO reiterate the rebuttal, “[T]he harm dealt to animals is a necessary — but not sufficient — feature of what grounds the wrongness of animal cruelty. ” [1. . http://www.academia.edu...] This is something that bsh actually drops. Unless my C2 is totally undone I win this point. Bsh merely lists multiple human, not animal, rights. The goal is to prevent suffering in humans. The comparison cannot be made because humans can rationalize their suffering which is essential for moral status. It is the rationality which makes physical pain a moral issue. Animals cannot do this. Whether or not animals should be given a right to not be inflicted needless harm all relies upon rationality. If animals are not proven rational, pain in and of itself is not sufficient to garner a response. JUS2: I never dispute that the MC’s goal is to promote needless suffering because it is true. But as you ignore, I explain in detail why this doesn’t necessarily apply to animals. The MC wants to promote goodness, but there is no reason to give goodness to outside members. The MC only promotes ‘good’ for those who are rational because autonomy (not to be confused with practical autonomy) are essential for rights. Just like the religious benefits of the Catholic church aren’t given to atheists, the moral benefits of the MC are not given to animals. Humanity is identified by “[it’s] rational nature, a capacity he thinks of as distinctive of human beings, and he identifies our practically rational nature with our capacity to govern ourselves by autonomous rational choice. ” [2. . http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu...] In order to respect that autonomy through rational choice we should not inflict unjust pain upon other humans--something I have been saying since round one. Animals lack such capacity. Even assuming unjust pain is immoral, those rights cannot be transferred to animals. JUS3: a) Human suffering is a moral harm because it is wrong to infringe upon someone’s rational choices. A human rationalizes why harm is bad and avoids it. Animals simply avoid it due to instinct (which we do too, but have expanded upon such adaptations). Suffering in humans is wrong--animals suffering isn’t inherently wrong. b) As I argued, it is wrong because it is “demeaning to ourselves. ” [2] A rational actor abusing a non-rational actor is a sign of cowardice. The animal itself is physically harmed, but this does not mean it obtains rights. Scraping bark of a tree causes physical harm, but this does not mean trees should have rights. Whether or not something is rational is really what this entire debate hinges on. “Kant thinks that we can have duties only to someone who is in a position to morally constrain or obligate us by his will, and that only someone with a legislative will can do that. The non-human animals cannot obligate us because they do not have legislative wills. ” [2] Whether or not needless suffering is immoral is irrelevant--it does not apply to animals. c) Bsh suggests we can give them rights even though it harms us. But this is for the other arguments--the question under this contention is whether or not animals have a right to not suffer needless pain. They would not suffer needless pain not because they have a right to not suffer pain, but rather a human has a right to not to be morally harmed. We have no obligation to animals. d) Suffering *only* carries moral weight under the specific conditions outlined. We are only obligated to not do something if the other thing is worthy of obligation. I have explained under (b) and in other parts of the debate as to why we only have an obligation towards other humans. Physical suffering is equal in both humans and animals, but moral suffering is very different between the two kinds. e) Emotions do play a role, but the question is whether or not emotions can be rationalized. A dog may feel sad because his owner left to get food, but the feelings are not rationalized. Emotions are necessary but not sufficient. Rationality must be coupled with every factor bsh brings up. I am not saying other things are not necessary, but that they are not sufficient for moral or legal rights. C2) Give and take a) This is a utilitarian argument. There is actually evidence that slaves were actually harmed more often during reconstruction, but this is a perfect argument against C1. Physical harm increases, but the moral harms of slavery counterbalance this. Suffering is necessary but not sufficient. When it comes to animal rights, they are materially protected by property rights--and, of course, the moral harms of keeping animals as property is zero (because they are not of rational kind). b) The question of whether or not a one sided relationship is bad is totally reliant on rationality. Bsh has to prove we have a direct obligation to animals--something I have been arguing against. I have proven we only have rational obligations to people because humans are “is in a position to morally constrain or obligate us by his will” [2]. Animals cannot do this. As we have no direct obligation, there is no reason a one sided relationship is immoral. We have no obligation to make it ‘fair’. c) This doesn’t defeat utility. The reasons provided in this debate which say you can't use humans as a means is because it harms people both physically AND morally. This is a direct application of utility. C3) Emotions It doesn’t follow that caring for someone gives them rights. We accepted that humans, except those who commit things like murder, have rights. This means some humans do not have rights, but the eyes of a murderer dying in a botched execution garner sympathy, this has nothing to do with his rights. All it has to do is with ourselves. Emotion has nothing to do with moral worth or justice. C4) Legal rights a) This is true, but one right may be recognized over the other. If this is true, animal rights may not actually recognized meaning the resolution is not affirmed. b) Human inheritors really don’t get claim, either. They only have claim because the deceased transferred the goods. It is the right of the deceased, not the right of the living, to choose which items get given to who. Animals and humans being given inheritance don’t have claim beyond what the deceased gives them, meaning it is the former person’s rights and not theirs. Proxies suffers the same issue as above, which is why it is seemingly dropped when it wasn’t. c) When a tree falls in the woods, it makes a sound but no one hears it. It has no relevance. If both parties do not understand the promise, it has no relevance and can be broken--the animal cannot morally obligate the human to keep the promise (see JUS3 b). Animal rights would not be recognized in this scenario. A proxy giving rights does not mean the animal has a right as the proxy is doing all of the work. The animals have no rights beyond what the human proxy is saying. Just because the law gives them something is a weak argument as we have no direct obligation to uphold our promises. C5) Differences a) I have used the language of rationality interchangeably, this is just arguing with my wording. They have the capacity to promote good which is what the entire argument is based upon. In R1 I argued, “Bearers of rights must have the capacity to understand and exercise the rights they have been given. ” Animals have no such capacity, infants and old humans do. To rephrase in the words of Kant, they have the capacity morally force us to keep our obligations, animals cannot. b) A human always has full potential for rationality, even if they cannot practically utilize it due to an impairment or due to the fact they are not yet developed. We have differing levels of practical autonomy, just as animals do, but animals will “never possess the consciousness of a human. ” [3. . http://www.regent.edu...] I have argued humans have worth by being of humankind--bsh has made no such arguments in favor of animals. Crystallization C1: Utilitarianism a) Utilitarianism does explain justice and human rights. b) Recognizing animal rights infringes upon human rights because it harms humans C: Recognition of animal rights is not required by justice as it harms humans I should note bsh’s rebuttal--that now allowing babies in the MC--is not compelling. We accepted in R1 that some conditions can release you from the MC, so an exception does not harm my case. I mentioned this last round. C2: Moral Community a) Rationality is both necessary and sufficient for moral status. All of the things bsh brings up are necessary but not sufficient. b) As noted exceptions does *not* harm my case. Regardless, I rebutted the objection as the capacity to rationalize, not necessarily the ability to rationalize, are important. We have a direct obligation to humans, but no such obligation to animals c) I have argued humans have rights simply because they are humans. Bsh has made no such claim, meaning animals have no claim to morality. Justice cannot require animal rights because animals have no worth in and of themselves. d) This is not to say animal abuse is immoral, but it is immoral because it harms the human. It has nothing to do with animal rights Thanks for the great debate!