Plea Bargaining Ought to be Abolished in the United States Criminal Justice System

CON's CASEI. FrameworkA. Weighing MechanismThe round should be evaluated on a consequentialist paradigm, where consequentialism is understood to mean that "[a]n action is morally right if and only if it has the best reasonably expected consequences," from among the available courses of action. [1] By talking implicitly about the harmful results she imagines will occur in my world, Pro has implicitly conceded to this standard already. Moreover, because my opponent offered no competing standard, mine must be preferred by default. B. ObservationInasmuch as Pro must argue for the abolition of plea-bargaining, implying plea-bargaining's total removal from the US criminal justice system (USCJS), any retention of plea-bargaining whatsoever sufficiently negates. II. Court ClogA world without plea-bargaining is a world full of unpalatable options for the state. If cases are not disposed by the plea-bargaining process, they must be disposed of in some other way. The state may choose to allow more cases to go to trial, but with a finite number of human and other resources, the added burden of these cases my simply overwhelm the courts, leading to backlogs and delays. In fact, we've seen this kind of outcome before. For example, "an eight-month moratorium on plea bargaining in criminal cases in. .. New Haven [Connecticut] has produced the largest backlog of cases a year or more old in any judicial district in the state. .. The number of such cases in the New Haven district rose from 181 to 310. " [2] Alternatively, the state could choose to simply not charge suspected criminals or to dismiss cases prior to trial in order to save time and resources. This second option is problematic insofar as criminals are more likely to go un-prosecuted, which seems to not only be unjust on its face, but which may also reduce the deterrent effect of the law. Finally, the state could choose to relax its judicial standards to process cases more quickly but in a less rigorous manner. This would make convicting innocents at trial more likely. In other words, Pro's world is a world in which the state has no good choices--create court clog, lower judicial standards, or dismiss potentially legitimate cases because of a lack of resources to prosecute them all? III. Solving Other CrimesPlea-bargains allow the state to offer reduced sentences or similar enticements to incentivizing criminals to "flip" on their confederates. For example, in exchange for a reduced sentence plea bargain, mobster Salvatore Gravano turned informant. "Mr. Gravano's testimony or information helped win nearly 40 convictions or guilty pleas. .. The biggest case in which Mr. Gravano testified was the prosecution of Mr. Gotti, the. .. boss of the Gambino crime family, who is now serving life in prison for murder and racketeering. " [3] We can look to more recent examples as well, e. g. George Papadopoulos pleading guilty as part of an arrangement with Robert Mueller. [4] The point is, whether plea deals secure testimony, wire taps, or lead to the acquisition of physical evidence, they are incredibly useful tools in ensuring effective law enforcement and in bringing criminals to justice. IV. Helping VictimsOur Constitution provides that accused criminals have a right to confront their accusers at trial. This creates a perverse scenario in which a rapist, for example, could, just by exercising his right to a trial, force his victims to take the stand and testify against him. Plea-bargains, by providing an incentivize for criminals to not go to trial, reduces the likelihood that victims will be re-victimized by having to relive their experiences in the court room. Researchers examined "the effects of criminal court testimony on child sexual assault victims. .. [T]estifiers evinced greater behavioral disturbance than non-testifiers, especially if the testifiers took the stand multiple times. .. and lacked corroboration of their claims. .. In courthouse interviews before and after testifying, the main fear expressed by children concerned having to face the defendant. " [5] Similarly, "[o]ften a crime victim is. .. infirm and does not want to be subjected to the rigors of trial, to have to relive in the presence of the accused the detailed horrors of victimization. In rape and abuse cases particularly, an accuser…must have great fortitude to endure cross-examination. " [6]PRO's CASEI. Prosecutorial PowerA. S1 and S2It seems that most of Pro's objections here have to do with mandatory minimums and a lack of proper checks on a prosecutor's discretion. It is important to note that I can support keeping the latter even as I advocate ending the former; one does not entail the other. It is my position that mandatory minimums ought to be abolished. Even so, it seems odd that Pro would want to do away with plea-bargaining when she spends so much time informing us of the dangers of mandatory minimums, because plea-bargains are a way around minimum sentences. If I reach a deal with a prosecutor to be charged with mere possession of LSD and not possession with an intent to sell, I might never trigger the mandatory minimum and thus escape an unjust punishment. Plea-bargains are a huge source of flexibility that can ameliorate injustices of the kind Pro discusses. As for checks on a prosecutor's power, judges are empowered to reject a plea-deal if they find it problematic, so final review power does rest in the judge's hands. [7] Furthermore, reforms could address Pro's concerns. "In Connecticut, for example, judges often actively mediate plea negotiations, sometimes leaning in with personal opinion on an offer's merit. In Texas and North Carolina, along with a few other states, both sides share evidence prior to a plea. " [8] Abolishing plea-bargaining outright is an overreaction to a fixable problem. Next, if the prosecutors threats are not extralegal and I am indeed guilty of a more severe offense, is it then wrong to pursue me to the full extent of the law in a trial setting? It doesn't seem so, since I am, indeed, guilty of that offense. Finally, Pro gives no concrete data of how often prosecutorial discretion is abused. It is therefore extremely difficult to quantify and weigh this problem. B. S3 and S4These points repeat what Pro later states in her other contention, i. e. that plea-bargaining leads to innocent people being convicted. I will address this issue on her other contention, but will make two quick notes here. First, if 95% of cases are settled by plea-bargaining, and 99.5% of cases result in accurate verdicts (these are Pro's numbers), what precisely is the objection to plea-bargaining? It seems like it's overwhelmingly accurate. Second, Pro says that plea-bargaining conceals the truth. Turn this argument: my second contention proves plea-bargaining is a useful tool in uncovering the truth. II. Wrongful ConvictionsA. Risk to InnocentsTurn: abolishing plea-bargaining would actually lead to more innocent people being falsely convicted. "'[C]onvicting innocents would likely be easier in a no-bargaining world'…To compensate for the additional requests for trials. .. the trial process…will become more 'casual. ' The relaxation of the trial process will result in higher error rates and in a greater number of innocent defendants being convicted. " [9]Pro has not established, using data, that the plea-bargaining process is more inaccurate than the trial process. If both are equally inaccurate, then there is no benefit to scrapping plea-bargaining. It is, in fact, not the case that plea-bargaining is less accurate than trials. "Recent empirical evidence hints that. .. far fewer innocent persons plead guilty than proceed to trial. A study. .. found that less than six percent of the persons exonerated…had pled guilty. " [10] That means that 94% of those exonerated had been convicted at trial. B. S2This contention supports my case that plea-bargaining is a useful tool in collecting evidence. Even so, it's wrong to suggest that plea-bargaining always comes down to horsetrading. To think that prosecutors will be lenient only if you have information to sell seems wrong; they will likely consider a variety of factors, including your past criminal history and the circumstances surrounding the crime. Finally, plea-bargaining clearly does still benefit even innocent defendants. These are defendants who may, despite their lack of guilt, be convicted at trial. It is, in fact, beneficial to them offer them a risk-minimizing alternative like plea-bargaining. C. S3Turn: public defenders actually get better results because of plea-bargaining than supposedly "better" attorneys who are incentivized to proceed to trial. "A study. .. revealed disturbing disparities in the outcomes of murder cases. .. Public defenders achieved significantly better outcomes with fewer trials than their private court-appointed counterparts, who were paid more if the case went to trial. "Turn: Going to trial would actually harm defendants with substandard lawyers more than plea-bargaining. "Trials require greater levels of attorney skill, preparation, and time than plea negotiations," meaning that substandard lawyers are more likely to make mistakes at trial than in plea-bargaining. [11]Note that Pro describes trials as "time-consuming and costly," which bolster's my case that ending plea-bargaining would result in court-clog. Also, if Pro is going to cite data, she needs to provide in-round citations. SOURCES1 - . https://www.iep.utm.edu...2 - . https://tinyurl.com...3 - . https://tinyurl.com...4 - . https://tinyurl.com...5 - . https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov...6 - . https://tinyurl.com...7 - . https://tinyurl.com...8 - . https://tinyurl.com...9 - . https://tinyurl.com...10 - . https://tinyurl.com...11 - Scott, R. & W. Stuntz. "Plea bargaining as contract. " Yale Law Journal 101 (1992): 1909-1968. Thank you!