Policy Debate - Transportation Infrastructure

ON CASE (Attacking the Aff"s Round 1) Contention 1: Inherency a. My opponent said that ports are lacking security now. My answer is that Risks are decreasing, alternative transportation methods solve, catastrophic impacts are empirically denied Edward E. Leamer and Christopher Thornberg, professor of statistics at UCLA and senior economist with the UCLA Anderson Forecast, 2006 (UCLA Anderson Forecast, Protecting the Nation"s Seaports: Balancing Security and Costs, www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/r_606jhr.pdf) Although the United States is considerably more trade-dependent today than in earlier periods, this potential vulnerability is offset by a number of factors.One is the shift from ship to aircraft for delivery of many high-value, time-sensitive goods, particularly on the export side. Second, countermeasures to a terrorist strike, such as increased inspections of containers, may be more onerous for imports coming from uncertain ports than for exports packaged in the United States. And although a widespread labor action would stop most maritime trade completely, a terrorist strike would only slow trade rather than stop it. When added together, these factors mean that the disruption to the flow of goods as a result of a current terrorist attack could be roughly similar in size to the effect of a major port strike in the 1960s. Therefore, we feel that these historic labor actions correspond closely enough to the kind of port disruption that a terrorist attack might bring to tell us a lot about the probable effect on the national economy of a terrorist attack on the ports. We will show how these labor actions are visible in the import data and export data of the period. In all cases, there was a small increase in import volume before these actions, a drop in volume during the action, and a large surge in import volume after the dispute was settled. Because of the size of that postdisruption volume surge, the overall loss of trade during a labor action was very small and in some cases nonexistent b.My opponent claims that ships can be used for smuggling; my answer is that his plan, which calls for RFID tech, doesn"t actually solve for the given harm. Jon D. Haveman and Howard J. Shatz, Public Policy Institute of California, 2006 (Protecting the Nation"s Seaports: Balancing Security and Costs, www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/r_606jhr.pdf) There is no way to completely inspect all of the millions of containers entering the United States. They are about as large as a full- size moving van and are often tightly packed. Inspecting each thoroughly would bring commerce to a halt, exactly the kind of reaction that terrorists hope to generate. Contention II: Solvency a.Explosives can be divided, making detection impossible Lt. Morgan James et al, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007 (Port Security Strategy 2012, edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/TR/2007/NPS-97-07-003.pdf) The first scenario considers an individual or group with the purpose to cause maximum destruction to the port facility and the in-port ship. One way to achieve this goal is to break up the explosive weapons into various parts carried by different shipments into the port. The insider would coordinate the different shipment of weapons by selecting a shipment that is less likely to be marked for inspection. It is difficult to detect any possible existence of weapons since most components can be mixed with other legitimate items such as electronics, machinery and raw manufacturing materials. Alternatively, the random check conducted can also be exploited. Assembly of the weapons would be done by the insider(s) disguised as workers of the port (e.g. machinery operators, dock workers etc). Detonation of explosives would be coordinated in conjunction with the docking of a ship. The explosives could be installed near the bay and cargo landing areas (near to the fuel tanks of the ship). The attack potentially could generate enough fuel explosives to cause substantial destruction to the port b. Detection doesn"t solve for direct attacks with ships Lt. Morgan James et al, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007 (Port Security Strategy 2012, edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/TR/2007/NPS-97-07-003.pdf) The first scenario considered small boat attacks on ports. Small boats loaded with explosives can penetrate the waterside of the port and detonate in the port vicinity. This action would cause damage to the ports" systems and equipment and disrupt the normal operations of the port. From the military point of view, a small boat attack would elevate the force protection level of the ship. It would also create psychological effects within the U.S. populace and generate retaliatory outcries. The USS COLE (DDG 67) attack in Yemen in October 2000 and French tanker Limburg"s attack in October 2002 demonstrated the potential major threat from the explosive-laden boats. Advantage 1 : Terrorism Al Qaeda no longer capable of large scale attacks Brian Michael Jenkins, senior adviser to the president of the RAND Corporation, 2011 (The Long Shadow of 9/11: America"s Response to Terrorism, Ed. Bruce Michael Jenkins and Paul Hodges, p. 4) There is consensus in this volume that the United States has accomplished a great deal in the past ten years. Al Qaeda"s capacity for centrally directed, large-scale terrorist operations has been greatly reduced, if not eliminated entirely. The risk of nuclear terrorism is low " it is too expensive for terrorist organizationsJohn Mueller, department of political science at Ohio State University, 2008 (1/1/2008, The Atomic Terrorist, p. http://polisci.osu.edu...) Assessing the financial costs. The discussion so far has neglected to consider the financial costs of the extended operation in all its culminating, or cascading, entirely, but these could easily become monumental. There would be expensive equipment to buy, smuggle, and set up, and people to pay--or pay off. Some operatives might work for free out of utter dedication to The Cause, but the vast conspiracy requires in addition the subversion of a considerable array of criminals and opportunists, each of whom has every incentive to push the price for cooperation as high as possible. Alarmists Zimmerman and Lewis (2006) suggest the entire caper could be pulled off for $10 million. The conspirators would be lucky to buy off three people with such a paltry sum. Moreover, the terrorists would be required to expose their ultimate goals to at least some of the corrupted, and at that point (if not earlier) they would become potential extortion victims. They could not afford to abandon unreliable people who know their goals (though they could attempt to kill them), and such people would now enjoy essentially monopoly powers ever to escalate their price. The cost of the operation in bribes alone could easily become ten times the sum suggested by Zimmerman and Lewis. And even at that, there would be, of course, a considerable riskthat those so purchased would, at an exquisitely opportune moment of their choosing, decide to take the money and run--perhaps to the authorities representing desperate governments with essentially bottomless bankrolls and an overwhelming incentive. No nuclear terror " terrorists cant acquire, build, or deliver a bomb Steve Chapman, reporter and editorial writer for Chicago Tribune, 2012 (RealClearPolitics, "The Implausibility of Nuclear Terrorism", http://reason.com...) But remember: After Sept. 11, 2001, we all thought more attacks were a certainty. Yet al-Qaida and its ideological kin have proved unable to mount a second strike. Given their inability to do something simple -- say, shoot up a shopping mall or set off a truck bomb -- it's reasonable to ask if they have a chance at something much more ambitious. Far from being plausible, argued Ohio State University professor John Mueller in a recent presentation at the University of Chicago, "the likelihood that a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems to be vanishingly small." The events required to make that happen comprise a multitude of Herculean tasks. First, a terrorist group has to get a bomb or fissile material, perhaps from Russia's inventory of decommissioned warheads. If that were easy, one would have already gone missing. Besides, those devices are probably no longer a danger, since weapons that are not scrupulously maintained (as those have not been) quickly become what one expert calls "radioactive scrap metal." If terrorists were able to steal a Pakistani bomb, they would still have to defeat the arming codes and other safeguards designed to prevent unauthorized use. As for Iran, no nuclear state has ever given a bomb to an ally -- for reasons even the Iranians can grasp. Stealing some 100 pounds of bomb fuel would require help from rogue individuals inside some government who are prepared to jeopardize their own lives. The terrorists, notes Mueller, would then have to spirit it "hundreds of miles out of the country over unfamiliar terrain, and probably while being pursued by security forces." Then comes the task of building a bomb. It's not something you can gin up with spare parts and power tools in your garage. It requires millions of dollars, a safe haven and advanced equipment -- plus people with specialized skills, lots of time and a willingness to die for the cause. And if al-Qaida could make a prototype, another obstacle would emerge: There is no guarantee it would work, and there is no way to test it. Assuming the jihadists vault over those Himalayas, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil. Sure, drug smugglers bring in contraband all the time -- but seeking their help would confront the plotters with possible exposure or extortion. This, like every other step in the entire process, means expanding the circle of people who know what's going on, multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up. OFF CASE (My own case) T - Topicality A. The Interpretation a. Investment - the investing of money or capital in order to gain profitable returns, as interest, income, or appreciation in value. The word implies the expectation of profit or return. b. Infrastructure - the basic, underlying framework or features of a system or organization. c. Transportation Infrastructure is the underlying structure that allows for the movement of goods and people. Trimbath 9 (Dr. Susanne, Senior Research Economist in Capital Market Studies at Milken Institute, Senior Advisor " United States Chamber of Commerce, and Professor of Economics and Accounting " Bellvue University, "Transportation Infrastructure: Paving the Way", http://www.uschamber.com... e/files/2009TPI_Update_Economics_White_Paper_110712.pdf) The strategy applied by the US Chamber of Commerce for the infrastructure performance index project presents a model for developing the way forward. A stakeholder-centric approach allows you to measure the right things, communicate to the people in a language they understand and get to ACTION faster. The process, detailed in the Technical Report last summer (US Chamber 2010), is basically this: 1. Clearly define "transportation infrastructure" as the underlying structures that support the delivery of inputs to places of production, goods and services to customers, and customers to marketplaces. The structures are: - Transit - Highways - Airports - Railways - Waterways (Ports) - Intermodal Links B. Violation a. Port Security isn"t actually transportation infrastructure Jon D. Haveman and Howard J. Shatz, Public Policy Institute of California, 2006 (Protecting the Nation"s Seaports: Balancing Security and Costs, www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/r_606jhr.pdf) There is no way to completely inspect all of the millions of containers entering the United States. They are about as large as a full- size moving van and are often tightly packed. Inspecting each thoroughly would bring commerce to a halt, exactly the kind of reaction that terrorists hope to generate. Given the difficulties of complete inspection, defense needs to be layered, with checks at multiple stages on a container"s journey. Even if a check at one stage has a low probability of uncovering a problem, multiple checks throughout the supply chain raise that probability a great deal. Such a layered defense can be divided into five areas: (1) intelligence"gaining information about which containers might be risky, (2) information about contents"having shippers notify authorities about the goods they are shipping, (3) procedural uniformity"creating standard procedures regarding packing and moving goods so that anomalies will be seen more easily, (4) limiting access"enforcing greater control over who may come near containers and ports, and (5) technology"the development of new inspection and tracking technologies. b. Not all sorts of spending equates to investment, only capital expenditure is topical and requires new projects Becker "8 (Werner, Deutsche Bank Research, et al., "Improving the Quality of Public Finances " The Road Ahead", 2-5, http://www.dbresearch.com...) With regard to the effects of public spending on growth, a distinction is traditionally made between current government consumption expenditure (on, say, the compensation of government employees) and capital expenditure geared to the future (on infrastructural projects such as transport, utility supply and communications systems). Government consumption spending is frequently generalised as unproductive, whereas public capital expenditure is regularly labelled as growth-enhancing investment in the future. When assessing the growth effects of public spending, however, this simplistic approach needs reexamining. There are some kinds of public spending that, while reported as capital expenditure, do not count as productive investment in the economic sense. Empirical surveys show that substantial growth effects can normally be expected only from infrastructure investment. But over the past 25 years this has accounted for a mere quarter to a third of total government investment.13 Ultimately, the simple equation "more public investment equals more growth" has been undermined in Germany by the very broad interpretation of the debt rule in Article 115 of the Basic Law.14 Although the rule stipulates that net new borrowing by the Federal government must not exceed public investment expenditure, in many years the government has departed from this principle " most recently in each of the years from 2002 to 2006 ", taking as its justification the disturbance in macroeconomic equilibrium. Public spending and public debt rose, but in most cases growth remained anaemic. A problem here is the relatively broad definition of public investment. c.Plan is monitoring transportation infrastructure, not infrastructure itself. USDOT RITA 2012 (US Department of Transportation Research and Innovative Technology Administration, March 28 EM05-Transportation Infrastructure Protection http://www.iteris.com...) Thisservice package includes the monitoring of transportation infrastructure (e.g., bridges, tunnels and management centers) for potential threats using sensors and surveillance equipment and barrier and safeguard systems to control access, preclude an incident, and mitigate the impact of an incident if it occurs. Threats can result from acts of nature (e.g., hurricanes, earthquakes), terrorist attacks or other incidents causing damage to the infrastructure (e.g., stray barge hitting a bridge support). Infrastructure may be monitored with acoustic, environmental threat (such as nuclear, biological, chemical, and explosives), infrastructure condition and integrity, motion and object sensors and video and audio surveillance equipment. Data from such sensors and surveillance equipment may be processed in the field or sent to a center for processing. The data enables operators at the center to detect and verify threats. When a threat is detected, agencies are notified. Detected threats or advisories received from other agencies result in an increased level of system preparedness. In response to threats, barrier and safeguard systems may be activated by Traffic Management Subsystems to deter an incident, control access to an area or mitigate the impact of an incident. Barrier systems include gates, barriers and other automated and remotely controlled systems that manage entry to transportation infrastructure. Safeguard systems include blast shields, exhaust systems and other automated and remotely controlled systems that mitigate impact of an incident. C. Standards a. My definitions were given in the first round, and the rules demand that they be in place for this debate. The aff, by accepting the debate, has acknowledged the definitions and their place in this debate. b. Fairness - Allowing the aff to run any plan including security measures would create an unbearable burden on the neg, because the topic would no longer be limited. Such a debate would eliminate clash and take away from the educational value it has. My definitions limit such a scenario. D. Voters a. Fairness - It isn"t fair for the aff to be able to run any case they wish or debate a non-topical case. b. Education - The educational factor of this debate is lowered if the case is allowed through. By voting against them, you warn them of future consequences. c. Jurisdiction - Judge isn"t allowed to vote on cases that are outside the parameters of the debate. They can only vote for aff cases that actually affirm the resolution.