The Kalam Cosmological Argument is Sound

Let’s review each premise in light of his objections. (1) Everything that begins to exist has a cause Let’s look at my opponent’s objection: Quantum vacuum fluctuations under the mainstream interpretation of QM begin to exist with no cause – I have no desire to disagree. But what exactly is a fluctuation? Well, a fluctuation is a change in the quantum vacuum, and a change is an event, not a thing. Premise (1) is not “every event requires a cause“, but “everything that begins to exist has a cause. ” Things are substances; events are changes in those substances, and it is no part of my case that every event requires a cause. But actually there are ten different interpretations of quantum mechanics, and they’re all empirically equivalent. Many of these interpretations are fully deterministic. My opponent muses that Bell’s Theorem invalidates certain deterministic interpretations of quantum mechanics, but this is false. Consider the following: “Recently, however, physicists more commonly cite. .. Bell's inequality in support of the contention that a deterministic completion of quantum theory is impossible…Wigner to the contrary notwithstanding, Bell did not establish the impossibility of a deterministic reformulation of quantum theory, nor did he ever claim to have done so. On the contrary, until his untimely death in 1990, Bell was the prime proponent, and for much of this period almost the sole proponent, of the very theory, Bohmian mechanics, that he supposedly demolished. ” [1] So with no reason to reject (1), and three reasons to accept it, I conclude that premise (1) is more plausibly true than false. (2) The universe began to exist Let’s turn now to my opponent’s objections: We don’t know if time, space, and matter existed before the Big Bang – I simply beg to differ. On the standard Big Bang model, as you trace the expansion of the universe back in time, the universe gets denser and denser until it’s squeezed down to a singular point. This point, or singularity, constitutes an edge to space and time themselves. P. C. W. Davies comments: “If we extrapolate this prediction to its extreme, we reach a point when all distances in the universe have shrunk to zero. An initial cosmological singularity therefore forms a past temporal extremity to the universe. We cannot continue physical reasoning, or even the concept of spacetime, through such an extremity…On this view the big bang represents the creation event; the creation not only of all matter and energy in the universe, but also of spacetime itself. ” [2] Cosmologist Alexander Vilenkin writes: “It is said that an argument is what convinces reasonable men, and a proof is what it takes to convince even an unreasonable man. With the proof now in place [the BGV theorem], cosmologists can no longer hide behind the possibility of a past-eternal universe. There is no escape: they have to face the problem of a cosmic beginning. ” [3] Even though the standard model will need correction, this needn't avert its prediction of an absolute beginning of the universe, for reasons outlined in my opening speech. 4. If the universe has a cause, there exists an uncaused, personal Creator of the universe who sans the universe is beginningless, immaterial, timeless, spaceless, changeless, and enormously powerful. Let's turn finally to my opponent's objections to premise (4): We cannot know what exists beyond the universe – Really? Why? Why can’t we make reasonable judgments about the cause of the universe? Indeed, the person who says that we cannot make claims about what exists beyond the universe is himself making a claim about things beyond the universe, namely their unknowability. My opponent does try to justify this claim by saying that all of our knowledge comes from within the universe, and so could never tell us about things beyond the universe. The only way I can understand this claim is as an endorsement of epistemological naturalism, the view that human knowledge can only be derived from science. [4] I have two responses to this. First, we know many things that cannot be proved through science. We know mathematical truths (which are simply assumed by science), we know metaphysical truths (an external world exists, other minds exist, etc. ), and we know moral truths (torturing a child for fun is really wrong). None of these things can be proved by science, and yet we know they're true. Second, epistemological naturalism cannot be proven by science, and so by its own standards we cannot know whether it’s true. Why must God be the cause of the universe? – The reasoning for this conclusion goes as follows: (4.1) The cause of the universe is either an abstract object or an unembodied Mind. (4.2) It is not an abstract object. (4.3) Therefore, the cause of the universe is an unembodied Mind. If the two premises are true, then the conclusion follows logically and necessarily by disjunctive syllogism. Does my opponent seriously think, “This is the argument from ignorance and a bare assertion fallacy”? Does he think disjunctive syllogism is an invalid form of logical inference? Why can't the cause an immaterial, causeless, eternal, powerful, spaceless, timeless, uncaused, non-sentient force? – Well, what entity would you ascribe these properties to? What entity is immaterial, causeless, eternal, powerful, spaceless, timeless, uncaused, and a non-sentient force? The fact is, we just can’t conceive of something which possesses all these attributes. I can think of two entities which are timeless and spaceless, namely abstract objects and unembodied Minds. If he can think of a third substance which fits this description, I’ll add it to the list. Until then, premise (4.1) must be considered exhaustive. In the absense of any reason to think our modal intuitions are false (our intuitions about what is possible), we should accept them. Why should we accept God created the universe over retro-causality? – Retro-causality presupposes a B-Theory of time, and the entire KCA is predicated on an A-Theory of time. On the A-Theory, past events do not exist and so cannot be caused by present events. Our experience of tense and temporal becoming should be considered veridical in the absence of powerful arguments for the B-Theory, and therefore retro-causality just won’t cut it. Why accept God over simultaneous causation? – What my opponent needs is not simultaneous causation, but circular simultaneous causation. The problems with circular causation are the same as those with self-causation. In order for atoms A, B, and C to cause eachother, A, B, and C would have to exist logically or explanatorily prior to their existence, which is a self-contradiction. Therefore, circular simultaneous causation won’t cut it either. The EPR correlations show simultaneous causation, not circular causation. A timeless Mind is incoherent – I don’t have the space to address this objection here, so I’ll pon it off to William Lane Craig. [5] Suffice is to say that a timeless Mind can have an unchanging state of conciousness and awareness. There need be no succesive states of conciousness. Perhaps in a later round I’ll be able to expand on my response. Notes [1] Goldstein, Sheldon, "Bohmian Mechanics", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed. ), <. http://plato.stanford.edu...; [2] P. C. W. Davis, “Spacetime Singularities in Cosmology,” in The Study of Time III. Print. 78-79. [3] Vilenkin, Alexander. Many Worlds in One: The Search for Other Universes. New York: Hill and Wang, 2006. Print. 176. [4] See, for example, “We can reason because we observe the Universe around us and come up with things like causality. ” Actually, the main basis for causality is not observation, but our metaphysical intuition that something cannot come from nothing. [5] See “Divine Timelessness and Personhood,” Reasonable Faith < . http://www.reasonablefaith.org...;