My 150th Debate: Animal Rights

Thanks for a steller debate, FT! BURDENSCon argues the purpose of BOP is resolving disputes. (a) Con gives us zero reason to believe a shared BOP would prevent us from resolving this dispute. (b) The purpose of BOP is also to ensure fairness in argumentation; it's unfair to require a debater to prove a negative in fact resolutions. However, this fairness justification vanishes in normative topics; Con dropped my reasons for this. Hence, there is no reason why a shared BOP is inappropriate here. Re: uncertainty--(a) Con drops that many countries recognize AR, so having AR is not a (major) change to the status quo. (b) the uncertainty claim is one against taking risks, but, theoretically, the risk is the same either way. When given the option between G (status quo) and H, and three outcomes (better, worse, same), G and H each have a 33% chance of being worse, better, or the same as each other. That is why we, as debaters, should have an equal BOP: we have an equal starting point. It is our job from there to show why our world is then better. The status-quo isn't self-justifying. (c) Con dropped my R3 argument that the status quo recognizes rights for all humans. Con's frameworks' thresholds deny rights to all humans. If you must be able to consent or justify to have rights, justice requires that you deny some humans rights. Either that, or all Con's "you must be responsible to have rights" assertions go out the window. Also, if you must be in faith X for faith X to give you rights, faith X requires you deny rights to outsiders. Ergo, Con's frameworks absolutely prohibit rights for people who don't pass their criteria. Con is making an affirmative argument to change the status quo = shared BOP. RIGHTSOverviewSuppose I say: "the sky isn't blue, it's red," "the sky isn't blue, it's pink," and "the sky isn't blue, it's white. " Even if they're independent, they can be turned on each other: "the sky can't be pink, as you say it's red, and it can't be red, as you say it's white," etc. If the theories contradict: (a) Con's theories turn against each other (Rawls refutes religion, religion refutes Forst, etc. ). (b) It's utterly unclear what Con's is actually advocating. Con drops my specific analysis why his theories contradict. Rawls and Forst argue that actors must be capable of consent/justification to have rights; religion disagrees, since God can/does grant rights to those unable to consent/justify. Rawls and Forst conflict because one requires active volition, the other mere capacity, and because one sets a lower bar than the other. These 3 frameworks reach different conclusions on who gets rights and why, and so they cannot coexist. Turn: Con admits rationality alone cannot justify universal rights, defeating Rawls and Forst, who use rationality thresholds. Also, as Con has part of the BOP, he needed to justify his positions; his failure to do so necessarily dooms his case.1. Faith(a) Con wrote: "whether justice requires extending rights to animals depends on why humans have rights in the first place. " Con's logic, then, was that if his theory required rights for X, justice required rights for X. The theories themselves require rights for agents based on their consent/justificational capacity/God-given status. Therefore, if religion requires AR, so does justice. Ahimsa requires animal rights [19], and Con hasn't argued that justice prohibits Hinduism, et al. So, either (a) religion has internal conflict in determining what rights are required, making it a faulty standard, or (b) it requires AR. (b) Faiths disagree re: what universal rights are required (if any). If faith is going to be the threshold for rights, it should be free of internal contradictions so it can be fairly/evenly applied, and so we can successfully use it to test potential rights. As different religions give conflicting verdicts, it fails as a standard.2. Rawls(a) The card I cite notes that Rawls actually requires that there not be laws against animal cruelty, because such laws conflict with Rawls's belief that people should be able to pursue their reasonable conceptions of the good. Rawls prohibits prohibitions on animal cruelty. Insofar as Con repeatedly calls for laws against animal cruelty, he contradicts his own framework and denies a fundamental tenet of Rawlsian philosophy, calling into question the whole validity of Rawls's philosophic model. (b) "They know only characteristics and interests they have in their capacity as moral persons. .their need for the primary social goods, and so on. " [21] This is hardly enough information to make rational choices in constructing an ethical system, and necessarily excludes information about the complexities of human life, which can pose a challenge to any ethical system. (c/d/e) People in the original position won't necessarily reach one conclusion. Rawls assumes people will act rationally, but people don't do that; some will gamble, some will have different thought-processes, some will act on intuition not rationality, etc. And, even if there is a consensus, that consensus is only impartial, not non-arbitrary, since it can still lack fair reasoning. 3. Forst(a) There are universal values; Forst says justifications must be "valid and binding with reasons that aren't based on. .. conceptions of the good that can reasonably be questioned," like faith. So, there are still values that we use to justify things, they just must be beyond reproach. The presence of these values means that my 3 objections still apply, since values/reasons must (a) be justified by something else if they are to be valid (infinitely regressive), and (b) can still be contorted to serve any purpose. Re: (c), justice arises from justification, but justice must also justify justification, since justice is likely one of these conceptions of the good that cannot reasonably be rejected. (c) Con says animals lack knowledge of morality, yet moral sentiments (e. g. guilt, empathy) are clearly present in animals, e. g. elephants, chimps, dogs, and expressed via body language. [27, 28, 29] I see no reason why an animal cannot justify itself or demand justification through its body language (Levinas argues that displays of distress trigger our empathy and demand of us action). It is also possible that animals can understand the justifications of others via body language. UTILITYOverviewC3 or C1 don't give animals equal rights. C3 would give them rights on par with the rights of humans at the animal's level. We don't give infants voting rights, but we give them a variety of other protections, which animals at an infant's level should also get. Same re: C1; animals should get rights comparable to people who can suffer like them, since not all people suffer alike. Con drops point 2. Since he only considers human's preferences, his utility calculations are flawed. Utility(1/3) I didn't drop the justification for rights. I said utility actually grants a basic and inalienable (not case-by-case) right to have preferences weighed equally. Con says animal's aren't due equal consideration, but his reasoning for that isn't utilitarian, and so cannot apply under a utilitarian model. Pro's dog example is merely an appeal to emotion. Turn: If you buy this attack, then we shouldn't be considering Con's utility args at all as they could justify wrongs to for a greater good. I also never said utility factored into justice. (4) Con sites 1 cherry-picked example of testing on animals. I cite, among other studies, an analysis of 4,000 studies that concluded animal testing isn't efficacious. Prefer my evidence; it's more comprehensive. On balance, it doesn't work + alternatives exist. Plus, if we use utility, animals could still be tested if the benefits for all (humans + animals) outweighed. (5) Con's given little evidence to support a slippery slope, but I've given you some to disprove it: "Humans have already learned the dangers of treating themselves as property. .. giving oppressed blacks more rights didn't cause whites to treat themselves more like oppressed blacks. "(6) Con never considers whether the money earned may be an economic positive. Thus, we cannot be sure that the situation will be as dire as Con says. And what if we grant animals moral, vice legal, rights? (7) Con drops 4, 5, 6 to instead ask rhetorical questions. VOTING ISSUES1. Kettle Logic Con's frameworks are self-refuting and vague. You cannot know what his threshold actually is. Prefer my case, because you actually can know what threshold you're voting. 2. The Frameworks Religion is too contradictory to be a successful standard. Con contradicts Rawls, voiding one of Rawls's essential premises. And, Forst fails for 3 reasons, plus it's possible animals can justify. 3. BOP Con shares the BOP. Since he fails to justify and explain why we should adopt any of his frameworks, he's failed to meet his BOP. 4. Turns Con says rationality alone can't justify rights (yet Rawls + Forst rely on rationality); his dog arg precludes utility discussions; + Aristotle backs fairness. 5. Fairness I've show this is the best way to decide who is due what. 6. The Law The law makes promises to animals which are their dues. It would be unjust to deny them. 7. Needless Suffering Con misunderstood my arg + his rebuttals were under-warranted. I showed that agents are due freedom from NS, and that animals can undergo NS. 8. Marginal Cases Whether or not you buy all humans suffer, if you extend rights to all humans as Con does, justice/fairness requires that you also extend rights to all animals. Con's line is arbitrary--if rationality is what matters, why not give rights just to rational humans? Why not be more/less inclusive? Con gives no good reason to draw the line where he does. SOURCES27 - . http://tinyurl.com...28 - . http://tinyurl.com...29 - . http://tinyurl.com...Thank you for reading! Long Live the Elephants!