A Fetus is Not Morally Equivalent to a Mature Human

Con makes an abstract argument about differences between legal rights (positive rights) and natural rights (rights denied from the nature of mankind) but he never applies the distinction to my arguments of the debate. I claimed that children have fewer rights than adults. Suppose Mom and Pop tell Junior it's time to go to bed. Junior then holds tightly to his teddy bear and, being precocious five year old, proclaims: "Maybe you can get away with your fascism under the law, but it is my natural right to do as I wish. I have the natural right to sleep when I please, have an evening glass of gin, get married, and tell you people where to get off." Con never asserted that children have all the natural rights of mature adults, just that they might have natural rights different from legal rights. Laws can be wrong, so indeed natural rights might differ, but Con did identify any instance where I had gotten the assignment of natural rights incorrect.The diminished natural rights of children follows from their dependence on adults, their diminished reasoning capacity, and their lack of remembered experience. Children have some rights, both natural and legal, but that they clearly do not have all the rights of adults. That's what our debate is about. Con agreed that moral equivalence meant equal rights and privileges. I did not equivocate on the different between natural rights and legal rights, because for each case I presented the natural rights are the same as he moral rights. There may be other cases where they are different, but that's irrelevant. Con did not challenge a single one of my specific claims of diminished rights, so the argument stands. Children are denied rights and privileges, but they retain other rights. In fact, I think they have rights to be cared for that independent mature adults do not have. Having both lesser and greater rights means they are not equivalent. (If the resolution is accepted, Con would be free to argue that zygotes have a greater right to life because of an added moral obligation to care for them.)1. Self-awareness is essential to moral equivalence. Con repeats his unsubstantiated claim that philosophers agree that "self" is defined by the future potential for awareness, not by actually being aware. He claimed my source asserts that, but it does not. My source clear speaks only about "capacity for self-awareness" as present self-awareness of humans, as opposed to inanimate objects and animals that lack the capacity for immediate self-awareness. The source states:"Although the self is a thorny metaphysical problem for philosophers, raising questions about mind and body, the homunculus, and whether teleporters can replicate subjective identity as well as material existence ..., cognitive psychology offers a simple answer to James' question: the self is a mental representation of oneself, including all that one knows about oneself." http://socrates.berkeley.edu...If Con's claim is true that "self" refers to future ability, then there must be some philosopher who says that. Descartes' "I think, therefore I am" is clearly a reference to present self-awareness, not potential future self-awareness. I did a Google search and could not find any reference that took "capacity for self-awareness" to mean anything other than a present ability. In the face of this challenge to find support, Con did not offer a single case of self-awareness meaning a future capability. He found alternate dictionary definitions that allow that, but those definitions are not used in the context of self-awareness. My point stands.2. The life of the mother is more important than that of the fetusVirtually everyone agrees that the life of the mother is more valuable than that of an unborn fetus. Con now says that if a medical decision must be made, "To tip the scales, we therefore introduce non-moral criteria to influence our decision-making." "Tipping scales" is only an appropriate analogy if there is balance, such that the risk to the mother's life is about the same as the risk to fetus. But even if it's clear that the risk to the life of the mother is greater than that to the life of the fetus, we always choose to try to save the mother. Everyone reasonable moral person knows that mother is more important than the fetus, and we would choose the mother if there was any reasonable chance of saving her. The correct moral choice is to value the life of the mother more highly. The mother has loving relationships with her family, is self-aware, independent, and a mature member of society. It makes perfect sense to place a higher moral value on the mothers life.3. Early spontaneous abortions are universally ignoredCon concedes that infants in poor countries with high infant mortality rates are not honored in funerals, and hence not considered morally equivalent. They are valued less. Pro then asks, "Does it follow that they are morally nil? Of course not!" Right, they are not morally nil. I never claimed they were. The debate is about whether they are morally equivalent, and the relevant population says they are not. They value mature adults more. Con tries "Could we also not extend his argument to its logical conclusions, such that the elderly (and especially those with Alzheimer's) are included?" Yes, in fact sometimes in a disaster situation, a rescuer must decide whether to save a very old person rather than a younger person. Those who instruct rescue workers have counselled that the younger person is to be preferred. Con continually implies that unless every person from zygote to maturity has exactly equal rights and privileges, then we must allow that some have no rights due at all. That's wrong. It means that moral decisions must be made carefully in each case. Con really does not escape the moral problem, he only pretends to. Should we sacrifice the mother if that guarantees the survival of the fetus, even if the mother is not guaranteed to be saved by sacrificing the fetus instead? The doctrine of moral equivalence demands that we must sacrifice the mother. That's clearly the wrong decision. But wait, there are practical considerations, and maybe it's not fair to appraise risks, and so forth. The moral decision is not really escaped, it is just danced around to find excuses that allow the correct moral decision to be made. 4. Perception and memory count in determining moral equivalenceCon asks if a person who has lost all capability for sensation but is self-aware is morally equivalent to a person who has full faculties. No, a person without sensory capability loses rights and privileges because the person is almost totally dependent on others. That person maintains many rights, but not all. For example, the hypothetical person retains the legal right to vote, but loses the moral right, because he is completely uniformed. Con asks about a person with amnesia, who has lost all memory with no hope for a cure. The premise is that they have no current ability to form new memories. "All memories" means all the acquired skills of language, education, and so forth. Under those circumstances, the person has no identity and cannot interact with other humans, so they have fewer rights and privileges than fully functional humans. This is not to say that such people would have no moral value, but, say, if we had to choose between saving the life of such a gravely impaired person or a fully functional one, the moral decision would be to save the life of the functional one. That would be the correct decision even if there was great risk in attempting to save the functional person. The resolution is affirmed.............Thanks to Con for a vigorous debate. I urge readers to judge the debate based upon what is presented directly and not accept Con's suggestion to complete a reading assignment to build his case. I urge readers to examine carefully the support of theoretical assertions by facts and examples throughout the debate.