The Kalam Cosmological Argument Successfully Demonstrates its Conclusion.

Well, Raistlin, this has, indeed, been a very fascinating topic to debate with all sorts of ramifications for other areas of study. Thanks again for broaching it! My opponent attempted to make a very theoretical case against the kalam cosmological argument by showing that a particular theory of time should be applied. We are told that the B theory is more adequate in terms of modern quantum physics. While that may be true and there may be some truth to the B theory of time, it probably does not apply to the origin of the universe in quite the way that he thinks it does, as I have demonstrated via Mackie and Eddington and other philosophers who recognize some validity to the B theory of time but who also recognize its limitations. As I showed, Mackie's argument on the nature of causation conclusively entails that temporality, i.e., a sense of not-being and being and a sense of becoming and not-becoming, is inherent in causation. We simply cannot have one thing or event bringing about (causing) another without it. Put otherwise, it is a sine qua non. Sans temporality, nothing about causation would work in our universe. Thus, the B theory of time can have validity but not in the sense that it would erase the ontic reality of becoming, passing into and out of being inherent in temporality. Therefore, the YouTube video that you shared on the B theory of time has more conceptual limitations than you are perhaps willing to acknowledge. Raistlin rebuts Mackie's argument by attempting to demonstrate that the B theory of time entails different, subjective senses of when an event began. That is all well and true but it does not touch Mackie's argument.[1] We are talking about a real, ontic beginning point. In fact, it is pre-conditional or necessary that one event or thing be distinguishable temporally from another (caused) event or thing in order for the notion of simultaneity of causality to be understandable or intelligible. And speaking of simultaneity and causation, in a strange turn of events, Raistlin renovates his emphasis that causality is so dependent on time that a cause must be temporally prior to its effect in order to be causally effective. Ironically, he argues against his own presentation of the B theory of time to make his point. Well, the obvious question emerges: "Doesn't that open up the possibility that the B theory of time may be misguided in ruling out a beginning of the universe?" In one sense, it doesn't matter because he is still mistaken about this. Simultaneity of causation is possible according to the Law of Causation and has been observed (even by various people with different perspectives). [2] There can be no language about beyond time or without time according to my opponent. That doesn't seem like a fair debate: to rule out a priori anything beyond time or without time simply because one does not like the language. Then, Raistlin proceeds to assume that non-time (~T) entails that the universe is eternal. Not at all! Something not subject to time is not part of the time-based universe. That is all. Thus, his argument about the EU (eternal universe) misfires on all cylinders. Raistlin complains that I only used inductive reasoning to arrive at the notion of origins or beginnings that I did to defend Kalam. Not at all! Please re-read my previous responses! I actually argued that the form of logic called "abductive"[3] where one reasons from various proposals to the best explanation or from various parts to a whole that makes sense. So, I certainly never concluded that inductive reasoning was the only form of reasoning to conclude that the universe had a beginning point in time. Quite the contrary! In fact, one doesn't have to use inductive reasoning at all. In sum, (1.) the B theory of time is limited in scope and does not overturn empirical evidence which supports the notion that the universe had a beginning. Oddly enough, my opponent seems to grant this in some measure without fully acknowledging its force; (2.) Mackie shows conclusively that causal priority does not entail temporal priority and, therefore, Raistlin cannot logically believe that both the universe and succession of time could not be brought about simultaneously; (3.) other forms of logic, besides induction, can easily be used to determine that the universe had a beginning and therefore a cause. Thanks again for setting up this debate and I wish you a great, non-boring rest of your summer. [1] J.L. Mackie, The Cement of the Universe: A Study of Causation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974, 1980). [2] http://www.apologeticspress.org... [3] https://en.wikipedia.org...