God Probably Exists

SimplicityIn this round my opponent argues that to use a tool (Occam's Razor) that is only meant to provide a useful assumption and not a deductive proof to establish the main fact at issue seems misplaced. The ironic aspect of this form of argumentation is that it is itself is misplaced, as the resolution clearly states that God probably exists, not that God definitely exists. Therefore, a "deductive proof" is not actually required in this scenario [1]. Regardless, if simplicity cannot be a valid tool in determining what is true then there would be no reason not to believe that a invisible fairy that you can't see or feel lives on your shoulder. We don't include these things when determining the most probable model for reality because it is unnecessary and is outside the scope of what we can infer. This doesn't mean that there definitely is not such invisible fairy on my shoulder, but just that there probably is not as it is just added fat to a model without any reason for belief in its existence in the first place. The same concept applies to more than one God. Now, my opponent says that these competing theories have independent explanatory value but has not defended this notion in the slightest; I would say the exact opposite is true. Lets suppose that we need a certain amount of mental content applied in a certain way in order to explain a specific event in terms of Monistic Idealism, we have just as much reason to assume that one being can do this as many, so positing more than one mind is unnecessary and useless. We might as well say there is another gravity in another universe as well as gravity in this universe that causes my bottom to be planted on this seat. Nobody believes that, as one gravity within the universe suffices; it is the most probable conclusion (which is all this debate pertains too) regardless of any other possible situations. Also, Occam's Razor is about sticking with what we know unless an external factor calls for the alternative; which we have no reason to be the case. If you hear a door open and close, what is the most probable conclusion, that something opened the door and closed it, or that it did it by itself? We know that people can open and close doors, but we have no reason to believe a door can open and close by itself. So, the door was probably opened by someone. In the case of the mental and the non-mental, we know the mind exists (knowledge requires a mind, and so does doubt so you cannot doubt it). However, we have no reason to believe anything non-mental exists, it is just plugged in to try to explain empirical reality when explaining the empirical reality as mentally constructed works just as well, but better as it sticks with a category we cannot doubt; mentality. Mental and Non-Mental PhenomenonMy opponent claims:"However, when it comes to belief in objects independent of what is mental, there is room for doubt, but this doubt does not lead to the definite conclusion that non-mental object do not exist."I never said it did. I only claimed that if we are going to conclude what probably exists, then sticking with what we know always works better. We don't know that a non-mental reality is even possible, and there is no reason to posit it as it doesn't explain anything better than a purely mental reality. The point is that we know mentality exists without a doubt, so modeling reality in terms of mentality is a safer bet.My opponent then quotes Bertrand Russell to try to show that it is a common sense view that objects exist independent of "us". However, "us" is used to describe our finite human/ animal minds. Even if one was to grant that objects exists outside of "our" minds that wouldn't mean they existed outside of God's mind. So this intuition about objects existing outside of "us" does nothing to entail an intuition about the existence of non-mental objects.My Opponent's Straw-Man Argument ---A straw-man is a misrepresentation of an argument [2]. Con claims that I am arguing that because there isn't an existing explanation that we know of as to how the mental and the non-mental can interact, that this means that they most likely cannot react. This is not what I am arguing, I am arguing something much stronger; that such an interaction cannot occur because the preconditions for interaction are not met. I am not simply asking a question that there is no answer to yet and viewing that as a probabilistic argument against such a notion. The argument is simple, that coherence between properties is necessary for interaction. If their properties don't cohere, then interaction would be impossible as the properties wouldn't recognize each other. The mental has thoughts, feelings, emotions, mental imagery, perceptions, and the hypothetical non-mental world has none of these properties. Thus, their properties wouldn't cohere, and thus interaction would not occur. ---Now, my opponent states the following:"Also, I would like to note that my opponent's argument provides an analogy that is not entirely consistent with the manner in which the mental and non-mental must interact." This is trivially true as no analogy is perfectly aligned. An analogy is only supposed to paint a basic picture; not be the same in every respect. Con also states:"It is reasonable to believe that we interact with a non-mental world but that we do so only through our own perceptive mechanisms. In this way, it is possible that we do not actually know the non-mental world itself but only our perception of it." This is problematic for two reasons. For one, if we do not know the non-mental world itself then how can we infer that it is a non-mental world we are perceiving in the first place? The "non-mental" would just reduce to a theory that doesn't need to even be there. Secondly, in order us to perceive the non-mental, the non-mental would have to interact with the mental (self-evidently). However, the non-mental doesn't have any mental properties so the mental wouldn't even recognize the non-mental. Therefore, there is literally no reason to believe in a non-mental reality.This was also mentioned:"Accordingly, the better analogy could be that of an English speaker listening to a Chinese speaker through an electronic translator: the English speaker does not know the actual Chinese spoken, but only the interpretation brought to him by the translator."But this analogy begs the question, because we know that "Chinese" corresponds to concepts that can also be expressed in terms of "English". However, the mental does not correspond to that which is non-mental as there is no bridge that connects them. The mind contains thoughts, feelings, perceptions, emotions, mental images. The non-mental world is claimed to be one of independently existing gravity, particles, atoms, and space. Trying to use the mental to recognize the non-mental would be like trying to use the ear to recognize the color red. Non-Idealists are using one reality which is distinct in its nature from anything non-mental, and trying to claim that its properties can cohere with the non-mental and interact with it. It makes no sense. More/Less Supernatural MindsIt should be clear that without external reasons, assuming one God is the most reasonable conclusion. Now, Con gives a quote from Gary Gutting...The problem is that this only addresses the issue of the number of creators of the universe, not the number of Gods. There could have been many creators of the universe but there would still be one God which serves as the foundation for all the creators of the universe. One could claim that there could be many God's which serve as a foundation. However, I already showed why this it not rational as we could just say that many different types of gravity keep me planted to my seat. Only one type of gravity is needed. Again, my opponent repeats:"However, the competing theories of multiple gods have independent explanatory value so that the multiplication of entities is not unnecessary." So, I will repeat that there is no more explanatory value in positing more God's as the amount of mentality required for a certain effect can easily be explained by one God (similar to how one form of gravity suffices to explain why objects attract). There is no need for a group of different gravities.Digital PhysicsCon says:"If digital physics can be defined as the idea that the entire universe is integrated and functions as a single program, it does not simplify matters to state that there is the existence of a supreme being that thinks, has a will, and experience consciousness in the manner in which we do." It is a necessary assumption, as Integrated Information is identical to consciousness (we can know this by simple introspection, or through Totoni's Integrated Information Theory of consciousness if preferred). Therefore, if the universe is an integrated informational complex, it is a conscious state. Either way, information is conceptual, not physical. Information requires the informed. Therefore, even if integrated information didn't equate to consciousness the fundamentality of the mind is still intact.Con then claims:"However, even if it is assumed true that consciousness is an example of integration, this is no reason to make the leap to the premise if something is integrated, then it entails consciousness." This is a straw-man. The argument isn't that if something is integrated it entails consciousness, the argument is that if information is integrated, it is consciousness. Either way, as I said, information is conceptual [3], so if reality boils down to the information then reality is still mental.ConclusionNone of my opponent's rebuttals hold any water. Ergo, my arguments stand.Sources[1] https://www.msu.edu...[2] http://www.nizkor.org...[3] http://dictionary.reference.com...