The Modal Ontological Argument

IntroductionThis stalemate I have demonstrated between the Modal Argument for Atheism and the Modal Ontological Argument shows that God's existence has not been logically demonstrated. Thus, Pro loses the debate as he has the burden of proof. God's ImpossibilityI apologize, but Pro doesn't seem to understand Modal Logic at all. He claims that if there are no internal contradictions in the idea of God, then he exists in some possible world. This is dead false. If there is an external fact about the world which is incompatible with God's existence then God is still impossible. If the plugs for p are possible, then God is incoherent. Pro also commits the appeal to ignorance fallacy by saying that until I show God is incoherent; God is coherent. Additionally, Pro also has a self-refuting case! He claims that something is possible if there are no internal contradictions with it. Well, his only real argument against my plugs for p was that there was an external fact (God existing in every possible) world which makes them impossible. If only the lack of internal contradictions are sufficient, then my plugs for p are possible based on Pro's same reasoning. He then says that all possibly necessary facts are true. This is true, and I do not contest that premise. The problem is that Pro hasn't shown God is possible in the first place.Pro's Misunderstanding ExpandedPro claims that I admit God exists if I grant that he is necessary if he is possible. This is embarrassing, as it is clearly a non-sequitur. Even if I grant that God's existence is necessary if possible, I don't grant that God's existence is possible.Remember the Modal Ontological Argument:"P1: It is possible that a maximally great being existsP2: If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible worldP3: If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then a maximally great being exists in every possible worldP4: If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual worldP5: Therefore a maximally great being exists in the actual worldP6: Therefore a maximally great being existsC: Therefore God exists"Pro claims that because I accept P2, that means I accept C. This is clearly nonsense because I don't accept P1. The conclusion is only established if all the premises are true. Plugs for PPro engages in the red-herring fallacy. He claims that he has shown that the plugs for p aren't necessary. This is irrelevant. The plugs for p need only be possible, not necessary and God's impossibility is established. Also, I already showed why his arguments against p are invalid. He is saying that God exists in every possible world, which entails that my plugs for p are false. Remember though, this is only true if God is possible (Pro has not proven that God is possible). I can just presuppose my plugs for p are possible just like Pro presupposes God is possible, and derive the conclusion that God is not possible. Thus, P1 of the Modal Ontological Argument is false based on that logic. Pro gives us no reason to accept the possibility of God over the possibility of any of the plugs for p.More evidence arises that Pro doesn't comprehend Modal Logic when he claims: "What he has to do is demonstrate how these p are not only possible, but necessarily true." - ProThe above is self-evidently ridiculous. If any of the plugs for p are the case in even one possible world, then God's impossibility follows via Stringer's argument. Remember the plugs for p:. All sentience is physically dependent. Gratuitous suffering exists. Omnipotence is not actualized. The total sum of information there is, is unknown Any of the above only need be merely possible, not necessary for God to impossible. Take for example "the total sum of information there is, is unknown". If God exists, he is omniscient and knows the total sum of information there is, and this would be true in every possible world. Thus, if there is even one possible world in which it is true that "the total sum of information there is, is unknown" then God isn't in every possible world. Therefore, God wouldn't be possible. Since there is no internal contradiction with any selected plug for p, then it is possible according to Pro's own standard. But if so, then God is not possible! If the plugs for p are false in some possible world; Ryan Stringer's argument still holds as long as one of plugs holds in one possible world. Pro has not given us even a hint of a reason to accept God's possibility, over the possibility of any of the plugs for p. He presumes God is possible because of no internal contradiction is entailed by his possibility, and then derives the impossibility of the plugs for p off of that. But I can just presume the possibility of any one plug for p because there is no internal contradiction with any of them, and derive the impossibility of God off of that. Pro is special pleading by arguing that we can accept God's possibility, over the possibility of any plug for p even though they are both internally consistent, and that is the only reason he gives for God being possible in the first place.Omnipotence Being ActualizedPro's argument against this plug making God impossible fails. He asks "what if God does not create anything, or act on his omnipotence?" Even in that case, God would still have omnipotence. Thus, omnipotence would be actualized in any world in which God exists. Pro confuses:(i) Omnipotencewith(ii) Acting based on what omnipotence allows one to doIf (ii) is not actual, or actualized, (i) still would be if God exists. Therefore, Pro's rebuttal here is a non-starter.Pro's AssumptionPro argues that even if he is just assuming that God is possible to derive the conclusion that the plugs for p are impossible, that doesn't mean his assumption is a bad one because God's existence is logically valid. Once more, this is logically fallacious. I can just say the same thing in reverse for my position. I can just assume that the plugs for p are possible. Thus, making God impossible via Stringer's Argument. If he asks why can I assume the plugs for p, I can just say because they are all internally consistent. Any argument Pro gives, I can just reverse in favor of the Modal Argument for Atheism (but they both cannot be true). Even if God is internally consistent, he may be externally inconsistent (and exists in no possible world). In order to defend P1 of the Modal Ontological Argument, Pro has to argue that the plugs for p are false without presuming God is possible already. Once more, that would be begging the question and circular reasoning.Switching The Burden Of ProofPro says that if I cannot show God is impossible, then I haven't defeated the possibility of God. This is false. I only need to undermine the first premise to defeat it in context, and show that Pro hasn't met his burden of proof. I do not need to falsify it. Since I showed a stalemate between the Modal Argument for Atheism and the Modal Ontological Argument; the resolution has not been established. Unless Pro pulls out a miracle in the last round, he has clearly lost this debate. More ReversalI can say that I have shown God is incoherent. Because those plugs for p are internally logically consistent, and lead to the impossibility of God. Thus, God is impossible. This is the same logic, but in reverse that Pro uses to say the plugs for p are impossible!He claims:"But just by admitting that a MGB is POSSIBLY necessarily true, Con admits that a MGB is necessarily true." - ProI don't admit that God is possibly necessary, just that if he is possibly necessary, he is necessary. It is simply fallacious to say that "x" follows from "if x". Even though I accept P2 of the Modal Ontological Argument, I do not accept P1.ConclusionAll of Pro's arguments for P1 of the Modal Ontological Argument are logically fallacious. He must show that the plugs for p are not possible, without assuming God is possible.