Experts' Debate Competition R2: Just Societies and War

This is turning out to be an exciting debate. Again, I extend my thanks to Phantom. In this round, I will present a review of key points regarding the definitions, and the I shall defend my arguments. DEFINITIONSCon says, "Definitions accepted. " This means that we both agree on the definitions I presented in round two, and that these definitions will provide a foundation through which we can view the round. Simply, these are the definitions for this debate. At this time, I'd like to go through and highlight definitions that may prove especially pertinent to this debate. Just means "morally right. " Therefore, a J. S. is one that acts in a morally right fashion. If it is determined that war is not "morally right" then a J. S. would never initiate war. War requires three components: (1) actual, widespread conflict of arms, (2) significant mobilization on the parts of belligerents, and (3) intent. Each of these elements was clearly articulated in my definition. This interpretation of war is important, because it would exclude limited military actions from being considered war. For example, sending a small strike team into a foreign country for a 1 night operation would not be "war" insofar as it fails to meet the "widespread" criterion, as well as the "significant mobilization" criterion. Never means "as a rule. " I provided this specific example to illustrate this term: "I never drink soda, but maybe this one time. " When we talk about doing things "as a rule," we accept that there may be rare exceptions to the rule in which case it is permissible to act outside of the rule; however, in the vast majority of cases, conformity to the rule is ideal. This can be evidenced by such statements as "I don't lie, as a rule, but if it will spare her feelings, maybe I should. " Hence, I must show that J. S. should not, as a rule, deliberately initiate war. FRAMEWORK + CASESCon says that the statement "if murder is wrong, it is always wrong" is tautological. However, this is not quite what I said. I wrote, "if murder is wrong, it is almost always wrong. " For the purpose of this example, let us say that murder is simply understood as killing a human being--homicide. I am sure that Con can agree that if killing is wrong, it is almost always wrong. The first clause, "killing is wrong" is a generalization--a rule of thumb. From this generalization, we can extrapolate that killing is usually wrong. Refined and clarified as it is, we can see that the statement makes sense, and is not an a-priori truth, but rather a 2-step analysis. Moreover, I fail to see what offense Con gains from arguing this. Con concedes that moral absolutes exist, which was the foundation of my point here. I then asserted that we should presume in favor of moral absolutes--this makes sense in the absolutes are ABSOLUTE. If X is always or nearly always wrong, then in any given situation it is more likely that X is wrong than right. Therefore, we should presume in favor of absolutes and rules of thumb. Con says that the standard for the round is that "the scenario which best serves the interest of the values of morality is the best possible scenario. "This seems like an act-utilitarian point of view. This is problematic inasmuch as it leads to too much subjectivity. I would argue, for example, that human rights can be justified by rule utilitarianism as being net beneficial to humanity. Under an act consequentialist paradigm, however, human rights are meaningless because they can be abridged at any moment to achieve some greater good. This seems like an awful lot of leeway to give agents. C1: DeontologyCon says that I provided a case where it was fine to kill innocent people. Firstly, in the hypothetical example, I explicitly state that both options were immoral, and bad. Killing innocents is almost always wrong. However, if you had no other choice but to (1) kill an innocent to save 5 people, or (2) kill and innocent for no gain, you should choose (1). This is not because (1) is moral, but because it is the lesser of two evils. Sometimes, you are faced with two wrong choices, and so it is logical to choose the lesser one. It is not a matter of making "just" choices, but rather of making the least unjust one. So, no, it's not fine to kill innocent people. Secondly, the example I offered was simply meant to show that utility is not irrelevant. I then clarified that I was specifically defending rule utilitarianism. Con says that war can be in the greater good. I submit that he has no shown evidence that this is the case in a majority of instances of deliberately initiated war, which he needs to do in order for this point to become any sort of viable offense against the Pro's position. Finally, Con never challenges the idea that killing innocents is usually wrong. This is key, as I will illustrate in subsequent rounds. Suffice it to say, that if the action of killing innocents is always inherently wrong, then a J. S. could not undertake it. C2: UtilityCon states: "There is no reason at all to apply a standard of morals that provides broad general rules to live by when plausible exceptions can be found to them. " By this same logic we could obliterate human rights. Some people argue that H. R. have exceptions, so should we just obliterate them, despite all the good they have done and could do? This logic is insufficient to sustain that argument that rule utility adds nothing of substance to moral dialogue. This rationale also fails to show that rule utility doesn't maximize benefits. Additionally, rule utility links back to the definition of "never" I provided, and obviates the issues I raised regarding act-utilitarianism earlier. Finally, I would argue that "keeping promises" is an example of a rule that could be undertaken, but not that it should be. However, I have offered evidence that the rule of non-initiate of war by J. S. not only could be undertaken, but should be undertaken. SA: Devastating forms of WarfareEven if nations would seek weapons regardless, those weapons would likely be more defensive than offensive in nature. For example, creating an anti-IBM system or creating anti-aircraft defenses. These types of military installations, and anti-IBM rockets, are not provocative in that they have a primarily defensive purpose. If we look at Japan, which has yet to acquire, en masse, offensive weapons, we can see empirical evidence of my assertion. [1] This is key to keep in mind. We should also keep in mind that, as Con seems to assert with his source No. 6, if weapons have deterrent value (and thus prevent war), then we can turn this argument on Con. The acquisition of deterrence capabilities would, in fact, reduce instances of warfare. Therefore, whether you buy my argument re: defensive weapons, or Con's argument re: deterrence, war is still prevented and J. S. remain secure. As for Hitler, GERMANY INITIATED THE WAR. I am not arguing against self-defense, because by then war is unavoidable. I am only arguing that a J. S. should not deliberately INITIATE war. Therefore, even under the Pro's world, Hitler would've been stopped. SB: More ViolenceCon offers no response here. My source stated: how far are experts "willing to stray from a strict rule of self-defense, which requires actual enemy attack. .. ? Some lawyers worry that a lower threshold for self-defense. .. will impinge on nations' sovereignty and increase cycles of violence. " Con's only remarks against this are that the UN will halt wars of aggression. This resolution is highly philosophical in nature. Discussing UN sanctions is irrelevant, because I am debating this hypothetically. But, even so, the laws on wars of aggression are very loosely enforced, and, because of that, are not effective. In fact, some aren't legally binding. [2]C1: PreemptionSC: Limited InfoI apologize about the confusion re: the PDF. The first quote in SC fits with source 6. The addendum at the end was given in another article about his research. Moreover, 1 example is not enough to show that intelligence is usually good. I think it's safe the assume that intel is poor, so that unneeded risks aren't incurred. History is also replete with cases where preemption failed, like Iraq or Germany's invasion of France in WWI. Finally, Con has put emphasis on obeying UN doctrine, yet preemption is illegal according the UN. [3] This seems a bit contradictory. Had we known about Pearl Harbor in advance, we should have attacked Japanese forces when they entered U. S. airspace, before the reached Hawai'i. Finally, as my SC shows, evidence and intel are rarely "incontrovertible. " Con is setting up a standard that he simply cannot meet. Incontrovertible means "not able to be doubted or questioned. " [4] In this way, Con is saying that preemption can only be undertaken when the evidence of attack is incontrovertible--but how often does this occur. If it does, than it's negligible, and I outweigh. SD: JustificationCon drops this point entirely. Extend it as clean Pro offense. I will impact it next round. SE: CooperationCon drops this point entirely. Extend it as clean Pro offense. I will impact it next round. C2: RightsCon's utilitarian arguments contradict this rights-based approach, as I noted earlier. Con says here that under Pro's world, societies could not engage in self-defense. This is patently false. I am against initiation of war, not against self-defense. Finally, if a war is on-going, then it has already been initiated, so a J. S. could join in. SOURCES1 - . http://en.wikipedia.org...2 - . http://en.wikipedia.org...3 - . http://en.wikipedia.org...4 - . http://www.merriam-webster.com...Thanks!