The Moral Argument is Not Sound

I. What's the Problem? To support P1 of the Moral Argument is to say that God is necessary for OM. Scotty reaffirms this, but then proceeds to deliver a muddled treatise on his personal moral views. But he agreed to defend the Moral Argument as laid out in Round 1. P1 of the Moral Argument has specific entailments regardless of what the defender's personal views of morality are. The two implicit contentions in P1 are: (1) Theism can provide a foundation for morality. (Theistic morality is possible) (2) AFM cannot provide a foundation for morality. (Non-theistic morality is impossible.) I explained in previous rounds why these contentions are implicit in P1 of the moral argument, and I have yet to see Scotty face them head on. Scotty seems reluctant to shoulder this burden of proof P1 commits him to, and instead accuses me of doing "nothing to valid the his claim that the moral argument is not sound." Not true! I've provided both (A) an argument for thinking moral realism on atheism is true, which invalidates P1 of the moral argument, and (B) a non-theistic ethical theory, which invalidates P1 of the moral argument. He has done very little to address either. He says I've just defined AFM to mean a reduction of suffering. I suspect he is referring to my defense of NREN, but I've not defined "good" to mean anything. In fact, in my exposition of NREN, I was careful to point out that "good" cannot be defined in non-moral terms. I simply provided a possible account of its ontology. I've yet to see Scotty address the theory head on without attacking a straw man. II. Epistemological Argument for Ontological Grounding I argued that in the absence of a good argument against the possibility of AFM, we can be confident that P1 of the Moral Argument is false (see Epistemological Argument in my opening case.) 1. Atheist Friendly Morality Scotty again confuses the definition of AFM with the idea that atheists should be friendly people. AFM is clearly defined in Round 1 as "a class or moral theories which don't depend on God." Scotty is confusing the name of the term with the definition of the term, and ascribing his own separate meaning to the term based on his (mis)understanding of its name. He still argues against a blatant straw man. 2. God can be seen at the roots of moral reflection Originally, Scotty said that when we are done working out the details of morality, we can see morality is "based by the fingerprints of God not without." He didn't support this with argumentation in his opening round, and he didn't provide any further support in his most recent round. In fact, he seemed to have dropped the claim entirely, instead asserting that I am doing "nothing to valid the his claim that the moral argument is not sound," and asserting that morality is subjective. 3. Objective moral values require a standard Scotty repeats his assertion that OM requires a standard. He tries to shift the burden of proof by saying I must prove OM doesn't require a standard, despite the fact that I've already shown objective facts can be grounded without appeals to standards or platonic forms. Because Scotty is making the claim that we do require a standard for morality, the burden of proof is on him. He has yet to give us an argument. 4. Moral law requires a lawgiver Originally, Scotty claimed that moral law requires a law giver without any argumentation. I asked for an argument for this point, and even gave a moral theory which derives obligation without a law giver. Instead of providing support for his claim, Scotty rambles about primates and how we are superior to other animals because we have objective morality. I fail to see any connection to this and his claim that moral duties require a lawgiver. He seemed to have dropped the point completely and ignored my arguments against such a notion. 5. Requirements for an adequate theory of moral duty Initially, Scotty stated requirements for an adequate theory of moral duty. I agreed to most requirements, and asked for clarification and information on the last requirement. I also argued that unless Scotty could show that AFM cannot possibly account for these requirements, then he still has not met his burden of proof. No clarification on Scotty's part was given. In fact, Scotty seemed to drop discussion of his requirements altogether, not even attempting to prove AFM cannot account for his listed requirements. Scotty instead stated that morality is about how people should act, not how they do or will act. I agree. In fact, I've said as much in my opening case. Then Scotty wildly jumps, without any further argumentation, to the claim that unless there is a God, morality is subjective. This is a non-sequitur. It simply doesn't follow. Unless he can provide a good argument for this, there is no reason for us to accept it, especially considering the fact that I've shown how morality can be objective without God. 6. Moral Disagreement. Scotty seems to suggest disagreement is a problem for moral realism. He thinks if morality is objective, then we shouldn't be viewing it differently. Yet, he argues, there are plenty of murderers, rapists, and thieves in the world, so we must be viewing morality differently, we must all have our own subjective definitions of good, right? I don't think moral disagreement is very widespread. Most people hold the same core values. It's their non-moral beliefs that lead them to different moral conclusions.[1] For example, if a tribe believed that cutting a newborn's genitals gave the newborn a healthy life and a strong spirit and granted them access to the afterlife, then the tribe will believe genital mutilation is good, because they hold the core belief that helping people is good. Most of us believe helping people is good. But we disagree on the non-moral claim that genital mutilation really helps them, so we arrive at different conclusions even though we recognize the same moral values. Moral realism also doesn't commit us to the idea that bad people (like murderers and rapists) don't exist. Just because someone doesn't obey their moral duty doesn't mean moral duty doesn't exist! If that were true, it would be just as much a problem for theism as it would be for atheism. In the case of the sociopath who doesn't see that rape or murder is wrong, they are simply morally blind. They don't disprove objective morality than a visually blind man would disprove colors! Further, moral disagreement shouldn't cast doubt on moral realism, because different cultures disagree on many things we would all agree have objective answers, like cosmology. Scotty never contradicts the premises of my Epistemological Argument, and never gets around to showing that OM given atheism is necessarily false (impossible.) Therefore, my argument still stands, undefeated. Extend Argument. III. Non-Reductive Ethical Naturalism Scotty hasn't shown that my account of ontology was necessarily false. He hasn't shown that my account of duty necessarily failed to instill obligation. Because NREN still stands, we have good grounds for rejecting P1. Extend Argument. Conclusion Again, I'd like to remind readers: implicit in P1 of the moral argument is the contention that AFM is impossible. I've argued that AFM is possible by giving (A) an epistemological argument, and (B) an objective non-theistic moral theory. Scotty must argue that AFM is impossible. So far, he hasn't been able to do this. Because AFM is possible, as I've argued, we can reject P1. P1 is negated and the resolution is affirmed. [1] Michael Huemer, Ethical Intuitionism