God Probably Doesn't Exist

Yes, onto my final round. Ontological Argument Where does a positive property come from? Of course, I see positive properties to be objective in nature. But I see no issue with this: it to be entirely coherent for the objectiveness of positivity to come from either external to God or ex deo. i) External to God If positivity is external to God, then it seems that it is simply an abstract proposition that is a necessary fact about this world, like any other abstract object, such as redness or the letter a. Everything that exists is subject to these propositions. I see no issue with this. What does Pro say in response? He states that 'excellence is relational'. But it is unclear as to what it means: something can certainly be an excellence in relation to this abstract object - say that it grounds power (in some unknown way - all that's important in responding to the criticism is that it is external to God and an abstract object), such that maximal power is being able to do everything possible to do. If I can do everything it is possible to do, then I am omnipotent - relationally to the abstracta which defines it. So positivity being grounded in external abstracta leads to no issues so far. Pro continues: "If we had something other than God that the standard is dependent on, then that means there is something better than God". Well, not at all. Firstly, if this abstract object is non-real, then God isn't really subject to anything. Secondly, it is a huge jump from stating that 'there is a standard of excellence external to God', to 'there is something better than God'. An abstract object cannot be omnipotent, omniscient etc. , but merely grounds it. If excellence is grounded in whether an entity can do these things, then it seems obvious that God is of maximal excellence, and the abstracta that grounds it is minimally excellent, for God can do all of these things and abstracta none of them (they are causally impotent). So if anything, God is infinitely greater than abstracta, contrary to Pro's criticism. Moreover, perhaps more importantly, it is not a necessary feature of the argument that God must is the most positive being possible. In fact, it is irrelevant. So the only concerns here are doctrinal, mainly about Anselmian perfect being theology, but not ontological and thusly, not relevant to the context of this debate. ii) Objectiveness ex deo The objectiveness of positive properties can also come from God himself, as I'll now show. Take two concepts: divine simplicity, which states that God is identical to his attributes; and a quasi-leibnizian view of God and abstracta: that abstract objects are non-volitionally divine 'thoughts'. Taking these (which we can do as this is a defence), excellence is both from God, and are God. This is in the sense that abstracta grounds God's excellence, but as (due to divine simplicity) abstracta is God, God grounds His own excellence. Now it should be noted that this is circular. But, it is only circular in the sense of logical circularity, rather than causal circularity. As Logical dependence is non-viciously circular, it is validly circular (only vicious circularity is an issue). As Davidson (2005) elaborates: "although God's ability to cause abstracta to exist is logically dependent on his having certain properties, it is not causally dependent. The account would be problematically circular only if God's ability to cause abstracta to exist were causally dependent on his having certain properties, and his having these properties were in turn causally dependent on his having caused these properties to exist. There is a circle of logical dependence here (as there is between any two necessary truths), but there is no circle of causal dependence. " [1] So while, if I posit this in the argument, it is circular (God will be used to prove God), it is not an issue - the argument will still be valid. iii) Do we even need objective excellence? Perhaps the best thing about the argument is that it works even if we don't take an excellence view of properties. For, take the quasi-leibnizian view: that there are basic properties that count a property as positive provided that it is entailed by at least one of the basic properties. This will avoid Pro's criticisms, for there doesn't need to be a 'scale' of excellence that is objective: there only needs to be the notion of a property (which we certainly have) and then positivity is worked on the definition of a property. Is existence a property? Does the argument assume that existence is a property? No. If you look at the line of reasoning used in the proof of Lemma 2, I used existential instantiation( ) and then I used the various axioms and lemmas; this replaces the need for existence being a property being included in the proof. For in EI, a logical inference is made, and instead of x(Fx), existential instantiation gives us x(Gx) such that the same logical inference can be applied to G as it did F. Existence need not be a property of G if it is to be existentially instantiated and a fortiori, is not needed for the argument. So, Pro objects to a strawman; no such assumption is made anywhere in the argument. Cosmological Argument Lewis' Semantics Pro is partially right in saying I use Lewis' causal counterfactual semantics. What I do use is a weaker version. This doesn't exempt it entirely from Pro's criticism, but we should keep in mind that the argument rests on a weaker claim than the objections object to. Firstly, Pro objects by saying that there could be a series of causes such that even though x is dependent on y, if y did not exist, x still might, for there could be some z that causes x. But it seems that I accounted for this; it was a bracket in my argument which stated: 'if A is the explanation of B, and there is no C that causes B then if A were not to exist, then neither would B'. So, it accounted for Pro's objection. What about the next objection? Well as Elga (2000) proved, it seems that of this is right, then there is no counterfactual asymmetry, such that there is not a counterfactual where: "that later affairs depend counter- factually on earlier ones, and not the other way around" [2]. But this is not a stance that many would want to take (the example Bennett uses even depends upon such a counterfactual). So, Lewis' semantics pose no problems for the argument. Brute Facts Pro now appeals to Brute facts, giving various examples, like: "Why does one contingent thing exist and not another? ". Such things are 'brute facts' so why can't we posit them? Well, because they aren't really brute facts, they are kripkean a posteriori necessities. It would be a long shot to describe such thing as 'brute facts'. He continues: "why can’t someone say the existence of the BCCF is simply a brute fact? ". The answer is because it would be ad hoc to avoid the conclusion by positing a notion of 'brute facts' when we have no reason to think that they exist. It would go against the causal principle I gave and so, is not an independent objection; it's establishment depends upon the falsehood of the CP. So it isn't a very good objection. It is ad hoc, and isn't an independent contention. And that is even to assume brute facts are distinct from plain necessity: if not, then positing brute facts gets us nowhere. Indeed, I see little difference between brute facts and necessity: on several accounts of Alethic modality (namely the Aristotelian, narrowly logical and all Platonic accounts and their subsets) they are the same in all but name. If a necessary entity is defined (in a broad sense, but consistent with all accounts of Alethic modality) as something which cannot not be, then this is synonymous to a brute fact. So to posit a brute fact as an explanation gets us nowhere. What have I proven? Pro contests that at most, the argument proves a necessary existence of the BCCF and so is compatible with atheism. However, it seems that it just requires a few lines of reasoning to show that this is misguided. I won't go beyond personhood in this; I think that is sufficient to show that it is wrong. So why should we admit personhood? Well, there are three types of explanation: scientific (where the explanans are always in relation to contingent things), conceptual (where the explicandum is explained by the concept of something) and non-conceptual, non-scientific (like that shown by agents and personal entities, viz. humans). Scientific and conceptual explanations do not necessarily entail personhood, but non-conceptual non-scientific explicans do. And, it seems that the explanation of the universe cannot be either scientific nor conceptual, for a necessary entity cannot by definition be contingent, and a conceptual explanation cannot explain anything exterior. So, the explanation must be non-conceptual non-scientific, and thus, personal. Conclusion Pro's criticisms of the Ontological argument fail. We can posit a grounding of excellence that is external to God without any issues; we can do the same ex deo. But even if it succeeds, we only need to make a minor alternation to the notion of a positive property to avoid the objection. His second objection fails on a basic level: the argument doesn't even assume that existence is a property. As for the Cosmological argument, he objected to a stronger notion than I put forward; and even then I accounted for it. He posits the concept of a brute fact to avoid the conclusion, but this is ad hoc and it is questionable as to whether it is distinguishable from plain necessity. Lastly, I have put forward why we should take the cause to be personal, such that Pro cannot accept it. So, Pro's contentions have failed. We should therefore conclude that God exists. Finally, thanks n7. He really is a great debater (best atheist debater on DDO IMO) and it's been great discussing this with him. I wish him the best in the future. Sources in comments"Because you have so little faith, I tell you the truth" - Matthew 17:20