The US Supreme Court misinterpreted the equality clause when he legalized gay marriage nationwide

FRAMEWORKIn perhaps the most famous dissent in the history of the Supreme Court, Justice Benjamin Curtis, dissenting in the pro-racist case Dredd v. Scott, proudly (and correctly) states that "[when] the fixed rules which govern the interpretation of laws, [are] abandoned, and the theoretical opinions of individuals are allowed to control its meaning, we have no longer a Constitution." [1] The question here is not whether gay marriage should be legal, but whether the US Supreme Court misinterpreted the Equality Clause. Pro has ignored this, and in effect, what Pro has done is to use his own theoretical test, which has no precedent in any SC cases whatsoever, to incorrectly and incoherently interpret the Equality Clause. Also note that Pro has not presented any coherent rebuttal to the points made in the last argument. Hence, the fact that the Equality Clause refers to individuals and not institutions (in this case) must still be upheld. REBUTTALSa.) Pro's AnalogyAn analogy often does not deserve a mention within the rebuttal, but since the whole argument of Pro bases itself on one (faulty) analogy, one must inspect it. Pro's analogy states that legal recognition of gay marriage are similar "eco-friendly benefits [being] extended to non-eco-friendly businesses," as "[the] right to this privileges exist only as the result of policy that recognizes the importance of the preservation of the environment." This is a flawed analogy, as it incorrectly interprets the gay marriage case and moreover, it ignores the mere fundamentals of natural-law based jurisprudence.Now, let us interpret the analogy. This analogy assumes one thing about marriage: that it is essentially unchanging throughout the years. "Eco-friendly" is exclusive and binary as a definition. As a definition, it means one thing, and shall mean the same thing over time. Marriage, as a definition, is, however, inclusive. Marriage and the nature of marriage has always changed during the years. The SC (Supreme Court) has recognized this, especially in its decisions in Loving v. Virginia. Hence, this analogy's assumption that marriage has an essential character (a Platonic form) is flawed, as marriage and its nature has always been in flux.Moreover, this analogy fails to uphold the fact that marriage is a "fundamental" right, whilst business privileges are not, as seen in Maynard v. Hill. Marriage is "essential" for the continuation of the pursuit of happiness, which was one of the founding essentials of all liberal countries. Can the opposition then raise an acceptable analogy where a fundamental right of one whole people is to be violated for the sake of a decaying political doctrine? Ultimately, Pro's faulty analogy can prove nothing in favor of his thesis, as it does nothing to disprove the notion that gay marriage extends the privileges of marriage towards other undeserving groups of people.DEFENSESa.) Social ProductivityPro here again ignores and misinterprets the mere fact that marriages are not recognized by society because of social productivity, but because of individuality. Let us first analyse the case that Pro presents. Pro claims that "if [marriages are recognized, then all other types of relationship that provide happiness] must publicly be recognized and benefit every relationship in which someone finds most personal fulfillment." That is a red herring-we are not talking of other types of marriages and unions, but rather, of one type of union and solely that. Pro also claims here that "From the public perspective, pursuit of liberty and happiness of men has nothing to do with it." However, this again ignores the precedent doctrine of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has ruled on many occassions, as quoted in the Second Round, that the individual is the one gaining from the practice of marriage. Marriage is not for society, but for the individual, and this should be perfectly clear.Apart from this, even if the social productivity test is to be valid, this does not in anyway exclude homosexual unions. Homosexual unions, although cannot directly produce babies, can produce "test-tube" babies or surrogacy pregnancies, which, in the "social productivity" test that Pro uses, would make some homosexual unions much more "socially valuable" than non-natal (or sterile) hetereosexual married couples. b.) Case of ContraceptionPro calls this case a non-sequitur because these laws "exist because practical legislation must issue in demarcations that are clear and easily recognized." However, the opposition in no way refutes the case at hand, which is that the Supreme Court has on many occassions ruled that contraceptive usage among married couples must be protected under the US Constitution. Pro uses ad hoc reasoning and does not provide and reference any Supreme Court law to support his case. Again, as Griswald v. Connecticut bravely shows, contraception use is protected by the government not because "the state can't come by your house every Thursday night to make sure you're having sexual relations," but rather because the Constitution protects the rights to use it whenever one desires.c.) DefinitionPro's provided definition of marriage, "the state of being united to a person of the opposite sex as husband or wife in a consensual and contractual relationship recognized by law," is actually inconsistent with United States v. Windsor's definition, which struck-down this exclusive definition for a more inclusive definition of marriage as a union between two persons. Moreover, Pro also asks "why is it that every society in human history, across cultures and ages, have recognized man/woman relationship? It's because there's something inherent in the nature of men and women." However, this also ignores the mere fact that, throughout history, same-sex relationships have been recognized too. In Greece, homosexuality was as open as hetereosexuality. In Rome, it was said that Roman Empire Nero married at least two males before marrying his first wife. [2] This, in some ways, prove that social productivity, albeit may have been the evolutionary origins and justifications for marriage, in no way is a justification for marriage in times of civilization and liberty. CONCLUSIONTo conclude, Pro's case is filled with many flaws. But the most important, the largest and perhaps the only charge that could be levied against it is the following: that Pro's case does not in anyway answer the question. The question is Constitutional interpretation: whether the SC interpreted something correctly, or not. In this case, it is gay marriage in relationship to the equality clause. Pro's answer is "gay marriage should be illegal because it fails to be socially productive and it fails to meet conservative definition of marriage." Of course, it might be. But that in no way answers the question, which is, "does the Equality Clause protect homosexuals from unions?" Pro consistently fails to uphold Constitutional standards in the treatment of marriage, as Pro always applies his own "theoretical" opinions to interpreting it. Pro also ignores previous SC cases, and in producing a merely theoretical and collectivist interpretation of the Constitution, Pro has incoherently created an interpretation so inconsistent that even if one were to use deviant logicians would have rose up and screamed: "contradiction!"this case is pretty bad so yehCITATIONS:[1] https://en.wikisource.org...[2] https://en.wikipedia.org...