The mind is probably not entirely physical

IntroductionI'm very glad that my opponent has provided a response to my arguments! Unfortunately, many of her rebuttals simply misunderstand the arguments presented. Thus, they provide no refutation of the arguments. Furthermore, the rebuttals which do actually refer to the five arguments I have presented are very weak, and easily dealt with.First things first... definitionsTo begin with, Con presents a definition of the brain, stating:"the brain: "an organ of soft nervous tissue contained in the skull of vertebrates, functioning as the coordinating centre of sensation and intellectual and nervous activity; a person's mind""The first half of the definition, I can agree fully with. The brain does play a key role in the functioning of sensation, intellectual, and nervous activity. However, it's not clear that "mind" in this particular definition means the agreed upon definition of this debate. If by "mind" is meant the agreed upon definition of mind, then I would argue that "the brain", defined as such, is not entirely physical.Leibniz's lawMy opponent seems to concede the second premise of my argument, saying:" My opponent uses the argument to prove that because certain things are not true of the mind and the brain then they cannot be the same thing"However, she seems to think that Leibniz's law cannot be applied to particular situation (the first premise), and that my argument is invalid, arguing thus:"P1: If all brains are identical then there is nothing true of one, not true of the other. (Leibniz's law)P2: All brains are not identical- they vary in volume, genetics etc.P3: As all brains are not identical pro's argument is not logically valid."First of all, my opponent does not demonstrate how her conclusion, (which she unwisely names "premise 3"; an incorrect logical terminology, but may be overlooked) actually follows from her premises. In fact, her first two premises seem to deny the antecedant-a logical fallacy. (1)Furthermore, my opponent simply does not understand Leibniz's law. When Leibniz says "identical" he means the exact same thing. So that if the mind and brain really are the exact same thing, just different names, then there is nothing true of the mind, not true of the brain.Finally, I can happily admit that not all brains are identical. I've never said this anywhere, and why my opponent brings this up is beyond me. This objection completely misses the mark.I shall rephrase the argument slightly:P1: IF the mind and the physical matter of the brain are the exact same thing, THEN there is nothing true of one, not true of the other. (Leibniz's law)P2: There are some things true of the mind, which are not true of the physical matter of the brain. (Conceded by Con)C: .'. The mind and the physical matter of the brain are not the exact same thing.Once, again, this is logically valid by modus tollens. (2)Thus, the argument from Leibniz's law remains.The conception argumentCon once again misunderstands the argument, and tries to pick apart the examples I have given (which fail, but I won't get into that).The point is that, if two things, really aren't "two different things" and are actually one thing (the exact same thing), then the one cannot exist without the other.It's like saying: "X" can exist, while "X" does not exist.Since Con does not dispute any of the other premises, I shall assume that she concedes them. Thus, the argument remains:P1: IF the mind and the physical matter of the brain are the exact same thing, THEN it is metaphysically impossible for one to exist without the other. (misunderstood by Con-self evident)P2: IF it is metaphysically impossible for one to exist without the other, THEN it is impossible to conceive of one existing without the other. (Undisputed by Con)P3: We can conceive of the mind existing apart from the physical matter of the brain. (Undisputed by Con)C: .'., The mind and the physical matter of the brain are not the exact same thing.Thus, the conception argument remains.The zombie argumentCon also objects to the zombie argument. However, this is by far Con's most embarassing rebuttal.Once again, Con presents a counter-argument:"P1: If I have awareness other people must also have awareness that is the same as mineP2: My neighbour John killed his dog, something I can never conceiveP3: Therefore my neighbour John does not have awareness."And once again, it's not clear how Con's conclusion follows from her premises.However, Premise 2 is clearly false. Anyone can conceive of killing a dog. Close your eyes and imagine yourself killing a dog. Finally, even if you cannot conceive of something, this doesn't demonstrate that it is metaphysically impossible. I've never argued that (I would dispute that argument), and Con should not imply that I have. This reasoning affirms the consequent of the true statement "IF something is metaphysically impossible, THEN it is inconceivable", and is fallacious. (3) While it does follow that if something is metaphysically impossible, then it is inconceivable, it doesn't follow that if something is inconceivable, then it is metaphysically impossible. Our lack of imagination does not dictate metaphysical possibility; however, our ability to imagine something does show it is metaphysically possible.Con also argues:"There is no scientific evidence that the clone does not have consciousness and it is perfectly possible to conceive that it does."I happily concede this. But it is still irellevant, and does not affect the argument. The point is that it's also conceivable for something to be physically the same as me, but not have consciousness. Since this is metaphysically possible, it demonstrates that the consciousness cannot be the same as the physical matter of my brain, since if they were, we could not even conceive of one without the other. The mind and physical matter of the brain have different modanic properties.Thus, the zombie argument remains.The experience argumentCon equivotates on the meaning of "smell." When I say the "smell" of lasagna is in my mind, I do not mean the physical odor of lasagna is in my mind. Rather, there is a particular sensation in my mind. Namely, "what lasagna smells like." But nothing physical is like this. Con also argues:"There are plenty of studies out there on the way people experience things, be it smell, touch, sight etc and all of these register in the brain: it is the brain that produces images and controls our sense of smell. The reasons those differs from person to person is because no two brains are the same- it has nothing to do with the mind."But this is simply a non-sequitur. Just because the brain may cause our mental states, it doesn't follow that my mental states are my brain states. While certain neuron patterns in my brain may cause certain experiences in my mind, it doesn't follow from this that the neuron patterns in my brain are the exact same thing as the mental states I experience.And once again, Con's arguments that no two brains are the same are irellevant, and have nothing to do with the argument at hand.P1: IF my experiences are purely physical, THEN they would be able to be viewed by a third person.P2: My experiences are not able to be viewed by a third person.C: .'., My experiences are not purely physical.Once again, the argument stands. The free will argumentCon argues that I have not justified the first premise of my argument. However, if the mind is purely physical, then free will seems very dubious. Any actions I make can be explained as being caused by something physical, since that's all they are.Finally, free will seems more plausibly true than false.The free will argument remains.SummaryUnfortunately, Con's responses all miss the point entirely. One cannot possibly hope to respond to an argument if one does not understand the arguments in the first place, but this is precisely what Con has done. She particularly does not understand Leibniz's law of the Indiscernibility of Identicals, and does not see how since the mind and brain have different actual properties, as well different modanic properties, then they cannot be the exact same particular thing.Finally, Con's remarks about "schools of philosophy" and "the soul" are irrelevant. I am not arguing for a "soul" or a particular philosophical view. Rather, I am arguing that the mind is probably not entirely physical. These arguments could support substance dualists, property dualists, or even idealists. The resolution remains affirmed (and then some): Please vote Pro!REMEMBER: No completely new arguments please!(1) http://en.wikipedia.org...(2) http://en.wikipedia.org...(3) http://en.wikipedia.org...