There is an objective morality

Just in case there’s any confusion, here’s what I’m arguing: Morality is dependent upon the existence of subjective experience Morality is a manger of subjective experience Subjective experiences have objectively ideal subjective experiences To objectively violate an objectively ideal subjective experience is to be objectively wrong in a moral sense. Contentions: 1. Can’t be lying about your ideal subjective experience 2. Can’t be too naive to know what your ideal subjective experience is 3. Can’t be deluded –so cut off from reality, and un-open to other possible subjective experiences- that you're unable to judge what your ideal subjective experience is(To be in contradiction with one or more of these contentions is to be less than objective in reference to your subjective experience) “However the problem is that for there to be objective morality there does need to simply be a code of morality void of opinion or even that there are objective facts, what is required is that moral propositions are objective truth statements.” To objectively violate an objectively ideal subjective experience is to be objectively wrong in a moral sense. –I maintain that this is void of opinion and objectively true- Break down: “To objectively violate an” Explaining the presence of a legitimate obstruction (No subjectivity creeping in here) “objectively ideal subjective experience” Representing the fact that subjective experiences legitimately have things that they want to have happen to them and things they don’t want to have happen to them.( Con now seems to be in agreement with this as he stated: “Bob thinks killing is wrong, may be an objective statement. In that his brain physically contains the thought that killing is wrong.” “is to be objectively wrong in a moral sense.” This is to signify the connection between morality and subjective experience. Since morality is dependent upon the existence of subjective experience, morality must then be a manger of subjective experience. So therefore, to objectively violate an objectively ideal subjective experience is to objectively violate or worsen what morality manages. Now con might ask well who says morality shouldn’t mange subjective experience so that’s its worse or so that it is violated? To my ears this is like asking well who’s to say worse is worse? I want to remind you that my argument has yet to stray from objectivity, what is worse is worse than what is better. I haven’t decided what is better, what is better is objectively so because of how ideal subjective experiences are and because of how objective-subjective distinctions work. So to objectively violate or worsen what morality manages is to objectively violate or worsen what morality could be sustaining. Violate: “to break, infringe, or transgress” Worse: “bad or ill in a greater or higher degree; inferior in excellence, quality, or character.” “However the point remains as to how this is a moral equation, my opponent equates ideal experiences, or desirability with morality. If morality is founded on ideal subjective experiences then actively choosing a less desirable course of action must be immoral,” This is confusion; it isn’t entirely true to say that my argument “equates ideal experiences… with morality”. Rather my argument points out that morality is a manger of subjective experience. (Not that they are one and the same) When judging the morality of an act I’m arguing that you must ask this question: “Does it objectively violate an objectively ideal subjective experience?” If so, then it is worse in a moral sense then if you were to sustain from such an act. Plus what is less desirable isn’t as straight forward as con seems to think. For instance you may very well have more fun going to a movie with your friends than going to your son’s baseball game, but even so it maybe that you in fact desire making your son happy more so than gaining fun for yourself. “Bob and Jill I do not understand my opponents argument here. Bob's ideal experience is to rape Jill. Jill's ideal experience is not to rape Jill.” Bob and Jill’s desires in this situation: B (Bob) desires C (To rape) J (Jill) desires D (To not be raped) What they need to do to get what they want: B needs to violate J to get C J needs to not be violated to get D Bob would be the only one objectively violating an objectively ideal subjective experience. “My objections are, 1: Why is morality equated with ideal experience? What is the objective basis for this. 2: How if there ideal experiences and therefore their moralities differ, can there be a single true objective morality? Are they not both moral relativists, does not the situation illustrate moral relativism?” Dealt with. “To objectively violate an objectively ideal subjective experience is to be objectively wrong in a moral sense.” This is the core premise of my argument and it itself isn’t relative. There maybe relativity in what subjective experiences have for an objectively ideal subjective experience, but the statement “to objectively violate an objectively ideal subjective experience is to be objectively wrong in moral sense.” will always be true, therefore not relative. What con seems to maybe be arguing is really the equivalent of saying that because the levels of gravitational pull vary in the universe, then therefore the fact that gravity objectively exists and works the way it works is not an objective fact. From an application stand point there is much more I could discuss, but really that isn’t so much what this debate is about. First and foremost we must realize that moral questions have objective answers. I thank both Cerebral_Narcissist and the readers for spending their valuable time on this debate. Sources: http://dictionary.reference.com... http://dictionary.reference.com...