The Death penalty is a just form of punishment for convicted murderers/killers.

As mentioned previously, this is allowing them to define the rules. "giving which they have set up", "the criminals have set the standard of death" and "We are essentially giving them what they want." This last one is particularly unusual thing to say, as they (generally) clearly have no desire to die. And again, as I mentioned previously, they aren't expecting to get caught. As previously, I submit that this point my opponent has put forward is an attempt to pass the responsibility of OUR actions to the criminal. The simple fact is, they only die if we kill them, that makes US responsible however you contort the logic. My Response: He says they have no clear desire to die. This is irrelevant. By killing, they themselves have killed themselves. They have universalized the action of killing. If I steal from someone, I have stolen from myself. My opponent seems to not get Kant's theory. I will explain. My opponents arguments are irrelevant, and thus are dropped against my contention. Universality: Kant's first formulation of the CI states that you are to "act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law." (G 4:421) O'Neill (1975, 1989) and Rawls (1989, 1999), among others, take this formulation in effect to summarize a decision procedure for moral reasoning, and I will follow them: First, formulate a maxim that enshrines your reason for acting as you propose. Second, recast that maxim as a universal law of nature governing all rational agents, and so as holding that all must, by natural law, act as you yourself propose to act in these circumstances. Third, consider whether your maxim is even conceivable in a world governed by this law of nature. If it is, then, fourth, ask yourself whether you would, or could, rationally will to act on your maxim in such a world. If you could, then your action is morally permissible. If your maxim fails the third step, you have a ‘perfect' duty admitting "of no exception in favor of inclination" to refrain from acting on it. (G 4:421) If your maxim fails the fourth step, you have an ‘imperfect' duty requiring you to pursue a policy that can admit of such exceptions. If your maxim passes all four steps, only then is acting on it morally permissible. Following Hill (1992), we can understand the difference in duties as formal: Perfect duties come in the form ‘One must never (or always) φ to the fullest extent possible in C', while imperfect duties, since they enjoin the pursuit of an end, come in the form ‘One must sometimes and to some extent φ in C'. So, for instance, Kant held that the maxim of committing suicide to avoid future unhappiness did not pass the third step, the contradiction in conception test. Hence, one is forbidden to act on the maxim of committing suicide to avoid unhappiness. By contrast, the maxim of refusing to assist others in pursuit of their projects passes the contradiction in conception test, but fails the contradiction in the will test. Hence, we have a duty to sometimes and to some extent aid and assist others. Kant held that ordinary moral thought recognized moral duties toward ourselves as well as toward others. Hence, together with the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties, we recognize four categories of duties: perfect duties toward ourselves, perfect duties toward others, imperfect duties toward ourselves and imperfect duties toward others. Kant uses four examples, one of each kind of duty, to demonstrate that every kind of duty can be derived from the CI, and hence to bolster his case that the CI is indeed the fundamental principle of morality. To refrain from suicide is a perfect duty toward oneself; to refrain from making promises you have no intention of keeping is a perfect duty toward others; to develop one's talents is an imperfect duty toward oneself; and to contribute to the happiness of others an imperfect duty toward others. Again, Kant's interpreters differ over exactly how to reconstruct the derivation of these duties. I will briefly sketch one way of doing so for the perfect duty to others to refrain from lying promises and the imperfect duty to ourselves to develop talents. Kant's example of a perfect duty to others concerns a promise you might consider making but have no intention of keeping in order to get needed money. Naturally, being rational requires not contradicting oneself, but there is no self-contradiction in the maxim "I will make lying promises when it achieves something I want". An immoral action clearly does not involve a self-contradiction in this sense (as would the maxim of finding a married bachelor). Kant's position is that it is irrational to perform an action if that action's maxim contradicts itself once made into a universal law of nature. The maxim of lying whenever it gets what you want generates a contradiction once you try to combine it with the universalized version that all rational agents must, by a law of nature, lie when it gets what they want. Here is one way of seeing how this might work: If I conceive of a world in which everyone by nature must try to deceive people any time it will get what they want, I am conceiving of a world in which no practice of giving one's word could ever arise. So I am conceiving of a world in which no practice of giving one's word exists. My maxim, however, is to make a deceptive promise in order to get needed money. And it is a necessary means of doing this that a practice of taking the word of others exists, so that someone might take my word and I take advantage of their doing so. Thus, in trying to conceive of my maxim in a world in which no one ever takes anyone's word in such circumstances, I am trying to conceive of this: a world in which no practice of giving one's word exists, but also, at the very same time, a world in which just such a practice does exist, for me to make use of in my maxim. It is a world containing my promise and a world in which there can be no promises. Hence, it is inconceivable that my maxim exists together with itself as a universal law. Since it is inconceivable that these two things should exist together, I am forbidden ever to act on the maxim of lying to get money. "Contradict each other. Killing is killing. To protect yourself from an imminent threat, because there is NO OTHER OPTION, is the only time that killing is justifiable." My Response: Killing is wrong, yes. But killing can be warranted, when it is deserved. Also, the death penalty can be sued as a mechanism for incapacitation, which is a safety mechanism. Thus according to you, killing is justified in defense. I do not have room to copy phrases so I will continue without them My opponent then says that it doesn't warrant the same action. It does because all rights have been violated. Thus to keep criminal/victim equality then the criminal must receive the death penalty to forfeit all rights. He then attempts to undermine the social contract by saying should we deport anyone who is against the death penalty. Not at all. They have a choice to live where they feel the government is promoting what they like. If they do not like the contract at hand leave. Also, this is irrelevant. The contract is made. My opponent clearly doesn't understand the SC. Someones belief in the death penalty is irrelevant once again. It's the obligation of the government to uphold justice. and the death penalty is necessary for this. You can drop all my opponents arguments because they are subjective based and unwarranted. He then goes on to attack my attacks by saying that there are revenge. Thge Death penalty is not revenge. Revenge is a person want to hurt. The government cant have this because it is a mechanism not a human. It is a mechanism to achieve justice, impartial justice. Hate is not a factor, thus it isn't revenge. I'm running out of room, I will end here. Thank you ladies and gentlemen.