Hume's Argument Against Miracles Fails

Thanks for accepting and enjoy. A few initial thoughts and then on to the main points; Look again at your 2nd citation. You claim that by “dictionary definition” a miracle is a violation of nature’s laws. However, your citation says nothing close to this. (You seem to claim that it does in the comment section, but you will have to support this by more than just the outright claim that human affairs are subject to physical/natural laws. In doing so you have just ruled out a good majority of discussions within philosophy of mind among other topics.) I think what you mean to say is that this is Hume’s definition of a miracle. I’ll discuss this claim below. (Also, just a quick suggestion to be wary of “dictionary definitions.” Especially in philosophical discussions.) You define miracle in two different ways: 1st as a suspension of laws and 2nd as a violation. These are not the same. Again, I assume you mean Hume’s definition which is the latter. (If you don’t wish to accept Hume’s definition then we can retire and begin a new debate on the definition of miracle. This debate concerns Hume’s view so we will keep it at that.) The distinction between “suspension” and “violation” is an important one in that according to the former a miracle will only “put a law on hold” whereas, for the latter, a miracle, if possible, would show the law to have failed. In other words, it would act as a defeater for the experience we have concerning a given law. This is, quite obviously, much worse than a mere suspension of the law. Furthermore, the use of “violation” becomes problematic for Hume which I will discuss below. You claim that I have to prove that a miracle is “not a violation of nature’s laws.” However, this is to assume that you have a correct definition of miracle—which, as I will, show is not the case. That said, (and ignoring tiresome and useless “burden of proof” discussions) my only “burden” is to show that this definition is false. I will do so in the following. Moving on: You have provided a dilemma for me: either prove a miracle is not, according to the “dictionary definition”, a violation of the laws of nature or I must prove that a miracle has happened. However, given (1) you have failed to show that it is by “dictionary definition” a violation and even were Merriam-Webster to have defined it as such this is contestable. (Likely, that is the reason why MW did not define it as such.) Yet, let’s be charitable, ignore the mysterious definition, and attempt to restate your position. What I think you mean to argue is that I must show that Hume’s definition of miracle as “a violation of laws” is, at the very least, contestable and, at most, unlikely. I will attempt to do this, but before I do a few remarks about proving a miracle. One claim made above is that “no miracle has been empirically proven.” For the sake of argument let’s assume Hume’s definition of miracle. Now if a miracle is the violation of a law how would we go about empirically proving it to have happened? Of course, we would have to reproduce it, but that would require an agent capable of violating laws to do so. Thus, if I’ve witnessed a block of iron floating in mid-air, decide to tell someone else about it and they require a demonstration I will be unable to do so. My only recourse becomes testimonial evidence even though the event has been “empirically proven” as I have witnessed, assessed it, etc. (Assuming all the necessary steps I should have taken, favorable conditions, etc.) In short, what is being required is not simply empirical proof in the sense that it has been experienced, but repeatable and immediate empirical proof. (FYI - Hume’s own definition of proof concerns “possibilities” for which all doubt has been removed.) This is an interesting problem because now we have determined that a miracle, which is apparently a violation of natural laws, ought to be repeatable in order that we may have adequate proof it did, in fact, happen. Yet, recall that, for Hume, a law is a regularity drawn from our experience. What becomes of the miracle if it is repeatable and immediate to our experience? From this it follows that now the miracle becomes a regularity and either introduces a new law or modifies an existing law. (I use exist only in the common sense usage and not implying any metaphysical realism in regard to laws.) The implication is that either Hume has ruled out miracle claims because they are violations of laws or, if the supposed miracle is reproducible, then it is simply a regularity that becomes a law itself and, presumably, a part of the natural order. There are various issues with this, but to begin notice that all of this rests on the assumption that his definition of miracles will hold. So the first question we should ask is what reasons does Hume offer in support of this definition? Unfortunately, we are left disappointed as Hume simply assumes that it is the correct definition and, thus, we are free to reject it because there is no a priori justification. However, despite our disappointment a closer examination will still prove to be fruitful. There are two difficulties with Hume’s definition. The first is “what exactly does it mean for a law to be violated” and the second “what is a natural law?” I’ve already mentioned some difficulties with a regularity account above. If we consider laws to be regularities and a violation happens then: “…an apparent “violation” would most naturally be an indication, not that a supernatural intervention in the course of nature had occurred, but rather that what we had thought was a natural law was, in fact, not one.”[1] If violations merely show that our previous understanding of the natural order was misguided then whatever event caused the disruption will influence a new natural law. As a result Hume has begged the question by ruling out miracles via the way in which he has defined them. The second problem is that, as of yet, we simply do not have an account of laws that is robust enough to do the leg-work Hume desires. For example, it is certainly possible that we could have a set of laws which includes various “putative laws” that allow for certain counter-instances of other more common laws.[2] In this sense of laws miracles no longer become a violation because their occurrence does not rule out the previous law. (Other theories of laws of nature abound, but are unnecessary for our present discussion.) “Surely,” one might say, “what we mean by laws is only what happens in the physical universe and doesn’t that rule out the possibility of miracles?” One could, of course, go this route and dogmatically assume some type of materialism. Personally, I would rather pursue the issue and attempt to rationally discover what is true rather than drawing a conclusion from my own bias. Clearly, Hume's definition of miracles is inadequate, but I won't be too hasty in saying that he has not ruled out the possibility of a miracle. Recall that for us to accept the possibility of a miracle (let's just assume we have an adequate definition) most of us will have to accept it on the testimony of others given that very few have experienced one or, at least, claimed to have experienced one. However, the idea of a miracle is so contrary to our experience that the testimony required will need to be exceptional. In fact, as Hume argues, miracle testimony must be so exceptional that its denial will be considered more of a miracle than the miracle the testimonial proposes to have occurred. Thus, Hume's argument becomes focused on the epistemology surrounding testimony rather than a metaphysical argument against miracles. But, unfortunately, space is limited so I will resume discussion of this in my next post. [1] McGrew, Timothy. Miracles. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 1.2 [2] McGrew, 1.2.