Adolescents ought to have the right to make autonomous medical choices

I disagree with OV2 in that I don't have to "prove moral nihilism to be true. " The default position is moral nihilism, as outlined in Rd. 2. Extend the default position argument. Pro's only point of contention to my kritik is the definition of "right" and "wrong. " Pro says I haven't adequately addressed it, but it seems like Pro has skipped a large block of text. Let me C/P the same argument from Rd. 3. "Right" is defined as "morally good, justified, or acceptable. " [3] Pro is seeking to prove the "justified" and "acceptable" aspects, but the definition is clear in making a *distinction* between "morally good" and the other two. The definition implies that "morally good" is different from "justified" and "acceptable. " Pro is merely using semantics to prove that it's "acceptable" and "justified" to have such an obligation. But that isn't Pro's burden -- Pro must show there's a *moral* obligation, which is beyond merely acceptance of society. Social acceptance deciding morality is a concession of the lack of an objective standard of morality. The dictionary distinguishes "morally good" from being justified or acceptable, which implies that they aren't the same thing. I understand that normative ethics is relevant. Pro misunderstands my argument. Normative ethics, though, isn't coherent without establishing a coherent metaethic first. If morality doesn't exist, normative frameworks cannot hold despite their justifications. There is no normative "ought" without objective morality. If morality is subjective, it doesn't exist as fact, so much as opinion. Pro concedes that God doesn't exist, which means Pro believes in naturalistic morality. I'm not saying the mentally ill *should* have an understanding of morality -- I'm saying the fact that they don't implies that morality isn't intrinsic or naturalistic. If there's nominalistic morality, uniform morality should be seen across species and individuals. The mere fact that people hold different opinions on what is "moral" implies that there's no morality intrinsic to our genes. Pro drops this point. Pro also drops that nature doesn't provide an authority for what is moral and what isn't. Pro defends a Buddhist framework, but does not justify it. There's no reason to think the Buddhist framework is true. Under the Buddhist framework, there's no *proof that morality is objective. * The Buddhist framework says suffering is wrong. But Pro does not prove that this is the case. There's no proof that causing suffering is immoral. Pro tries to justify this with Kantian deontology without showing why Kantian deontology is true. Pro misunderstands the debate: I'm arguing that morality doesn't exist, all normative ethical positions are false, there's no justification for moral realism. Pro doesn't show moral realism is true. Everything Pro says is an appeal to authority -- so what if Buddhist ethics holds that moral realism is true? Pro doesn't prove that Buddhist ethics or Kantian ethics is *correct. * Let me quote my Rd. 3 once more: Pro doesn't show that "our understanding of morals" are objective. Why should we judge this debate under subjective human standards? The debate doesn't regard whether humans *consider* a moral obligation as described above to exist -- this debate is about whether such a moral obligation *actually exists. * Pro drops that the "libertarian framework" is a normative framework, not a metaethical one, and my argument regards metaethics, which is an assumption within all normative ethics. Pro also drops that the libertarian framework is justified by utilitarian standards that actually contradict it, and that there's no justification for utilitarian standards. Pro then appeals to a third framework of morality, a Buddhist framework which regards suffering as immoral. Once more, this is a normative framework. My argument doesn't concern normative ethics, it concerns metaethics -- whether normative frameworks are actually *objective. * Pro merely says "causing suffering comes under the definition of wrong. " This is a bare assertion and is false -- "wrong" is defined as "immoral," and it's up to Pro to prove that causing suffering is immoral. Pro's normative frameworks may show this, but the normative frameworks lack coherence under moral nihilism. Mental illnesses, suffering, etc aren't morally wrong because objective morality doesn't exist. So what if Buddhist ethics and Kantian ethics says something? How are we to know what they say is true? Pro doesn't justify the metaethical claims of the Buddhist ethical framework. Pro has frameworks without justify them. The libertarian framework is defended under the assertion "suffering is immoral. " But Pro doesn't prove that suffering is immoral. Pro's sole evidence are two cards: Buddhist ethics and Kantian deontology. But why should we believe what they say? Pro doesn't give a reason. I've shown that God doesn't exist, and that if ethics were natural, there would be uniform ethics among all species and individuals since ethics would be ingrained into us. Pro keeps talking about normative frameworks and metaethical claims, without actually proving any of them as true.