The possibility of a Christian God existing is highly improbable

The Likely Possibility of a Revelation by Resurrection Pro’s case is either too weak or irrelevent. Weak because there is a difference in defending that there is no need for a God and defending that the possiblity of God is unlikely. In principle, even if it were true that the universe is explainable without reference to a transcendent God doesn't mean that therefore Christianity is likely incoherent, which is what Pro must defend. I also don't need to show that we have a need for God as the explanation of the universe, I just need to show that such an explanation is likely possible! (Again note the funny wording of the resolution). I also don't need to answer all of the "questions a God brings" since in order for a hypothesis to be a good explanation, we don't need to have an explanation of the explanation, so requiring would hault science in its tracks, because then we’d need an explanation of the explanation ad infinitum! So this is an overly restrictive and even ad hoc requirement. But God just is a more simple explanation for the universe than an infinite causal chain of past events! Irrelevent because the existence of other religions doesn't play into the resurrection hypothesis R especially given the evidence for it. I. The Revelator i.Nature of Reasoning Recall what Pro must answer the question, if some of the fundemental causes of reality is not more like a mind, then why is it more probable that reasoning should emerge?” But explaining reason in terms of unreason explains reason away, and undercuts the very reason on which the explanation is supposed to be based. There are cosmic norms of physics, rationality and morality; and it makes no sense to reduce rationality and morality to physics or regard physics as a sufficient explanation of rationality and morality. Physics is descriptive whereas rationality and morality are prescriptive, why then reduce prescriptions to a descriptive discipline? Pro seeks to do this with morality, yet it’s notoriously difficult to get an ought from an is, and physics and rationality are norms for what ‘is.’ Morality The concept of God is a supreme being with great making properties, and since it’s greater to be morally perfect than not, then God is the Good, so his commands are just proper reflections of who he is. So asking “if God would command rape to be moral?” is just like asking, “would the Sun emit spagetti instead of Sun rays?” … it’s just a meangingless question! The false dilemma is therefore a bifurcation. Thus morals aren’t independent, nor are God’s commands arbitrary since they are necessary reflections of his nature. The proper context for the dilemma anyhow deals with a mythology of gods. Yet Christians don’t believe in a multiplicity of gods in the cosmos but rather a trancendent Good beyond it. Pro must offer a more plausible and less arbitrary moral foundation. And he can’t just equivocate morality with human flourishing, since we can always ask “why think it’s morally good for humans to flourish?” On theism God created humans in his image as beings with intrinsic dignity and self-worth. On atheism we at best have arbitrary and bias flourishing of one species over another. ii.Concept of God Occam’s Razor First, how simplicity is weighted against other criteria like explanatory power, scope, etc isn’t clear. Nor is it essential for science, as Godfrey Smith explains, "...I do not think we have made much progress on understanding the operation of, or justification for, this preference." [6] Yes, the razor is used to adjudicate between theories that have already passed theoretical scrutiny tests, and which are equally well-supported by the evidence. But a simpler but less correct theory should not be always preferred over a more complex but more correct one. A theory can even become more complex in terms of its structure, while its ontology becomes simpler, and here it’s not clear which to choose. Simplicity is but one of many epistemic virtues a theory can have but it’s not the most essential. There are times that the razor is too sharp and reduces reality to too little. Kant says, that "the variety of beings should not rashly be diminished." [7] Likewise Karl Menger affirms, that "entities must not be reduced to the point of inadequacy" and "it is vain to do with fewer what requires more." The contingency of the universe and morals certainly requires more than, “it just exists.” So "there are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy." [8] But leave that aside, an unembodied mind is a remarkably simple entity. As a non-physical entity, God is not composed of parts in contrast to the contingent and variegated universe a divine mind is startlingly simple. Such a mind may have complex ideas but the mind itself is a remarkably simple entity. So postulating a divine mind behind the universe most definitely does represent an advance in simplicity, for whatever that’s worth. Initial Singularity Given my argument is compatible with an eternal though contingent universe, Pro’s argument here is irrelevent. However the Borde-Guth-Vilenken theorem shows that every universe which is on average in a state of cosmic expansion must have came to be at a finite point ago. [9] And this includes Krauss’ universe unfortunately. Moreover Krauss is embarrassingly notorious for equivocating the word nothing, a universal negation of all things whatever including empty space, with something. Simply put the false vacuum from which quantum fluctuations arise is not nothing, it’s a false vacuum with many physical laws and characteristics. So Krauss’ model fails as an objection to the causal principle. Problem of Evil First, omnipotence doesn’t imply God can do the impossible, he can’t force free choice, that’s a contradiction. However if the purpose of life is to justly experience perfect happiness then how we choose to obtain that happiness must be free. And a world containing creatures who are significantly free is more valuable than a world containing no free creatures at all. But in order to justly experience such happiness one must be saved from their unjust ways, and so God’s justification for allowing created persons to experience evil is that the great goods of incarnation and atonement be instantiated. But if there were no moral evil and the pain and suffering that come with it, there could and would be no atonement. So the free choice of sin and consequent suffering make possible a level or kind of happiness that cannot be experienced without them, a unity with with a supreme being through mutual suffering like that of a friend in the fox hole of existence. Insofar as this is even possible the problem is solved, for Pro has incurred a huge burden to show that a world in which God’s creatures always choose justly is feasible for God. Plus even though God is all loving he may have morally sufficient reasons for permitting pain. Pro must bear that this is imposisble. Nevertheless there is on balance a great deal more good than evil in the world, otherwise everyone would be commiting suicide. And it’s Pro’s enourmous burden to show that any world containing less evil wouldn’t also contain less good. II. The Revelation by Ressurection Irrelevency of Other Religions to the Ressurection Hypothesis Pro misunderstands how probability induction works, you don’t just take the sheer number of competing hypotheses and divide your hypothesis by that number. Note the scientific version Bayes’ theorm, Where probability P, hypothesis h, evidence e, and background knowledge b that’s relevent to h; in our case the ressurection hypothesis R. What Pro is assuming then, is that the existence of other religions should be part of our background knowledge relevent to R. Even more so he is arguing is that P(R|b) is low at <.5 (0.00024 actually, by his estimate of 1/4200) simlpy because there is a large number of other religions. But the Christian actually expects other religions to be invented given the fallibility of man to discover God! Thus other religions can’t be used as evidence against R since their invention is compatible. Moreover they are not even relevent because we’re asking what P(R|e) is! We’re asking what the likelihood of the resurrection is given Christ’s empty tomb, post mortem appearences and the origin of the near global Christian church. A very specific question, and Pro convelutes it with more vague and generalized considerations which seem secondary at best. So this is a miserable argument, why not cite the number of physical theories from Anaxamander to Newton in order to disconfirm Einstein’s reletivity? More importantly how likely is the evidence given the ressurection hypothesis? Since we’re not surprised by an empty tomb, post mortem appearences and the origin of the Christian church, the value is well above .5, from which if one does the math, R is >.5. So it's fine that Pro can fill in any deity in place of morals, and necessary cosmic explanations, all the better for the intrinsic probability of R! All that’s needed there is that least one diety be possible for the P(R|b) expression. Sources 6. Theory & Reality, p.2157. Kant, 19298. Hamlet9. http://arxiv.org...