God Probably Doesn't Exist

Pro's statements in bold throughout My ArgumentNow, remember my argument proceeds from the existence of contingent things (those things with an essence distinct from their existence) to a necessary being (essence= existence). For the rest of this argument it is important to consider what a necessary being is. I am not just positing "logically necessary" although it does follow that this being is logically necessary. The reason this being is necessary is because its essence, that is, WHAT this being is, its very nature, is existence itself and this is why it is necessary[1]. This is also why we can deduce various traits from here like simplicity (if it were composed of parts it would exist insofar as these parts exist not by its own nature) infinity (limits imply non-being or potentiality in some sense and also limits imply an external nature) etc. as I explained in my first post. You say that I didn't respond to this:That a contingent something may be necessary I didn't know what to say as it is incoherent based on my definitions. A contingent thing is one that has a nature distinct from its principle of existence (essence different than act of existence). Hence a contingent thing cannot be necessary (law of non-contradiction). A contingent thing may be necessary in order to produce an effect or prevent an effect however this means it is necessary for something (as my computer is necesssary to type this response). However, this is irrelevant for the sense of necessary that I was using (essence=existence). To argue otherwise is to equivocate on the word "necessary." [2] The necessary being has intellect:1. What exists in the effect must in some sense pre-exist in the cause- Pro concedes this point. However, he argues that information doesn't necessarily have to exist in the form of ideas. The problem with pro's statement is twofold:A) Information, where it does not exist in the form of ideas, is usually only derivitive. This means it does not contain information in itself but only insofar as it is interpreted to contain information. For instance a book contains only derivative information. This means it truly does contain information however this information only exists insofar as the words are given meaning by minds. Words themselves do not have what is called "intentionality" of their own (i.e. there is nothing about the ink splotches that have inherent meaning to them..e.g. cat doesn't have to mean cats, it does so by convention not by inherent meaning in the arrangement of letters). Same could be said about the way in which computers have information. The point is that true information exists insofar as it is interpreted ultimately by a mind. Therefore, we cannot say God lacks a mind but has information because this information would have to have derived meaning, but since God is necessary and all else is contingent, this would be impossible. B) Even if there could be intentionality in non-sentient entities, how could it exist in an immaterial and simple entity? There is no way to say that an immaterial entity contains information except if it contains it as ideas. A computer might be able to because it has electric circuits, but an immaterial being must posess it in the form of ideas. [3]2. The necessary being is unlimited. If it lacked intellect it would be limited. This would imply with respect to intellect it had either "potency" or "non-being" and thus some form of external nature other than existence itself. This is a contradiction, therefore, it must contain intellect. All other forms of being can exist as ideas and therefore it is not limited because it lacks these traits. Much like how a computer can map the brain of a worm. It has all information of the worm’s brain, but does not have the worm’s consciousnessHowever this implies that the computer is limited with respect to conscioussness as it lacks this power. Hence it does not show arguement 2 is false. Argument from evil [4] if God is omnipotent, he can bring about this good without the use of evil This is not entirely accurate. God can do all things as there is no effect which He cannot produce, this is what omnipotence is. However, not all things can be properly called "effects" as a logical contradiction is not itself an effect. Therefore, God cannot contradict logic. Now suppose there are two logically possible scenarios 1 and 2. For 1, evil effect E exists and there is a way to produce good G. Situation 2 involves no evil but a lesser good g. Now, God has the power to produce a world with either situation. If E is logically necessary for the production of G, God cannot produce G without allowing (NOT CAUSING) E. So God can either chose 1 or 2 but he cannot chose G without situation 1. Since G is a great good and God's perfection means that He only actively wills the good, there is no contradiction in God willing situation 1 for the sake of G and God being morally perfect. Hence your argument fails. It is true that we may not KNOW what good effect follows from a particular evil. However this should be expected given that God is infinite, we are finite and that there are many considerations which we cannot even begin to know (e.g. the future, life after death, the gravity of sin, etc.). I would also add that it is at least plausible that a world with suffering allows for greater love and compassion, which is what God ultimately wants. Further, various religions have different further explanations of suffering (e.g. redemptive suffering in Catholicism) that at least make it very plausible that God has good reasons for allowing evil. Certainly the problem of evil has rhetorical power (as in the examples you gave) and it can be an emotional burden. But logically, it is not a problem as omnipotence and goodness can coexist in God even with an evil world as I demonstrated above and as philosophers have argued over the ages. Argument from atemporal mindsNo where did I state God’s freedom was based on him pondering a choiceIt was implied by the fact that you said "without a chance to chose." In any case, that's not the central point. First, you use an argument to show that time is needed for a mind. However a static mind is a perfect solution. You say that this doesn't fit some "definition." However that doesn't matter. If it doesn't fit a definition it means we are not using mind in the same sense. Which is okay. What the theist means by mind is roughly "the ability to grasp ideas or concepts." Humans do this through time and reasoning and in conjunction with sense experience. These are not logically necessary. God can do so immediately and intuitively without time and sense. It is possible to grasp concepts in one instant (theoretically) therefore a mind can be static. You shift the argument to one about God's will. However you deny the claim that it has anything to do with eternity. This is therefore an entirely new argument. Your basic argument is: God's nature is necesssary, God's will flows from His nature, therefore, God's will is necessary. I will concede that God's will necessarily exists and is necessarily good. However, the specific objects of the will are not necessary.For a full discussion on this, see the link I provided earlier and this one: http://dhspriory.org... especially the discussion on the divine will. However, a simple summary to refute your objection is that God's nature is to will the good, which is the manifestation of His own goodness (the ultimate good and the only thing essentially good). This is absolutely necessary as it proceeds directly from God's own nature. However, the means to this end, as they can vary, so can God willing them. God is free to choose among them because there is no external compulsion to will one or the other (as God is the cause of all things therefore God's will presupposes the external) and there is no internal necessity. There is internal necessity that God loves Himself (as this is the essence of will, namely, to desire goodness). This act of will proceeds from God's nature. However, the specific objects which God wills to manifest His goodness does not necessarily proceed from His nature because God's will (which exists on account of His nature) is essentially "to desire goodness." Since however goodness can be varied and many objects can be used to manifest the good, it follows then that God's essential will can coexist with a number of different objects. Since God's nature does not determine these objects and God is unlimited, it follows God is free to chose between these. This universe is one example. God necessarily wills that this universe manifest His goodness on account of His nature, however, that He make this universe rather than that one are both in accord with His nature and His will therefore there is no internal necessity that God chose one or the other. Also, fy own info, see the link I provided in last post for necessity "absolutely" and by supposition. Non-Physical minds I know its probabilistic, I was arguing that it is less certain than you would think But you can’t have the genes yourself. This is a false analogy. Genes are DNA sequences, I can see the gene in its entirety. Thoughts are not the same as the neural activity as thoughts involve the subjective as well as the mental. Hence there is more too them than the mere physical It is still more likely and the best explanation that this immaterial mind is dependent on the brain However this shows human minds must depend on the brain. IF, as you and Tooley claim is possible, the mind is immaterial, then it is theoretically POSSIBLE that a mind exist apart from the brain, even if not our minds. Therefore, minds as such can be independent. Since your argument is merely probabilistic, if I can provide a counter-example, then your argument is shown to be false. I argue that I demonstrated that God has intellect in my first few paragraphs and that God is immaterial. Therefore, I provided a counter-example In conclusion my central argument stands, and pro's points are refuted. extra links in comments for space