Legitimate reasons why gays should not be allowed to have equal marriage rights

I thank Con for her reply.Her counter-argument seems to rely on one major contention which she invokes in each of her responses to me. To summarize in here own words: "[t]here is no correlation between the qualifications of marriage and the ‘special social value' of being able to propagate children through sexual reproduction." Another focal point of her argument is that, "just because a fertile heterosexual couple gets married, doesn't mean that they will have children" or some variant thereof.We first need to note that the argument I am presenting against same-sex marriage is not based on notions of intent or desire. Rather, the argument is based on the nature of marriage, irrespective of what an individual's desire or intent to get married may be. For example, the purpose of a car is transportation, and it remains so even if everyone intends to use his car as a moving bomb or as a plow to mow down pedestrians. Moreover, it is still true even if transportation is logically distinguishable from cars. So, simply because people may get married for reasons other than procreation has no bearing on what marriage actually is for. Frank Beckwith writes: "[T]he argument against same-sex marriage is based on the nature of human persons as beings with a gender who have a purpose derived from that nature... This argument is not based on a human persons's function, ability, or desire, which could each be inconsistent with how human persons ought to be by nature." [Emphasis mine] [1]Consequently, Con's points about individuals getting married for reasons other than procreation are wholly irrelevant to this debate and are thus red herrings. Con also misunderstands the connection between heterosexual sex and marriage. The argument I am presenting is that the state should afford special protection to the traditional conception of marriage because it is based on the idea of heterosexual union. Since the only way new citizens can be produced is by heterosexual means (ie: Sperm and an egg), a relationship which incorporates this understanding into its core ought to be protected by the state.The difference between a marriage and say, a boyfriend/girlfriend having sex is that the former is a contractural agreement to the welfare of both partners and any children that may arise as a result of the relationship. The state does not regard the latter as a marriage because there are no contractural obligations involved. So the state bases its marriage law on more than just heterosexual union simpliciter. Since traditional marriage provides the environment necessary for both the production and raising of the state's future citizens, it should be afforded protection under the law. The fact that heterosexual sex is logically distinguishable from marriage by no means dampens this argument.So it's not clear what Con's distinction between heterosexual sex and marriage as two different concepts is supposed to prove. I readily accept it, but there are no substantive implications to be drawn from this. After all, simply because murder is logically distinguishable from an unjustified shooting spree does not mean that the state does not have warrant to legislate against the former. What's relevant here is that traditional marriage should be protected because it incorporates into its definition the sole means through which society can flourish. The fact that there exist procedures such a IVF are more of less irrelevant due to the fact that they too rely on heterosexual reproduction.Now, most of Con's response relies on that argument, so let I get repetititive, let me move on to some other points.Elsewhere, she argues:"Also, if homosexual couples biologically give birth to children (through surrogacy or IVF), would that not also give them a ‘special social recognition and sanction' as well?"This completely misses the point of the argument. Artificial insemination is only possible due to the prior fact that male-female complementarity is required for procreation. As David Orland writes, "[h]omosexual 'families' of whatever type are always and necessarily parasitic [Emphasis mine] on heterosexual ones." [2] Far from constituting an argument against my position, this actually hurts Con's argument, for the act of procreation is always heterosexual in type. This notion is what Spiegel's argument is based on, as he writes:"As for your point about the 'many' ways of making a child, all of the examples you give (and all that can be given) are heterosexual in nature. [Emphasis mine] In-vitro fertilization, surrogate motherhood, etc. all involve a male sperm fertilizing a female egg. This is sexual reproduction, and it is essentially heterosexual. The phrase “homosexual reproduction,” in fact, is a contradiction in terms." [Emphasis mine] [3] Homosexuals can never reproduce because it is impossible by nature. Remember, the argument is about the means through which new citizens can be produced. What matters therefore is that the act is reproductive in type, not whether it is reproductive in effect.Con writes,"So what you're saying is that allowing same sex couples to partake in civil marriage would be wrong, because then heterosexual couples would no longer be able to enjoy the sense of relationship superiority towards homosexual couples?"No, and that is a rather disegenious way of phrasing it. Rather, what I am saying is that it would be wrong to allow same-sex couples the same marriage rights as heterosexuals because it would be detracting from its special social value as being based on the sole means through which society brings into existence and rears its future citizens. There is no "haughty attitude" present here. Con just seems to be making pejorative attacks toward the traditionalist position. Con argues:"Think about it. When fertile heterosexual couples choose not to have children, the government doesn't annul their marriage. And the government most certainly does not make sure that heterosexual couples are able to conceive offspring before they are allowed to acquire a marriage license." This argument, and her subsequent response to an anticipated objection, are both off point. First, as I have already argued, marriage is based on acts that are reproductive in type, not acts that are reproductive in effect. The relevant principle, then, is based on the nature of the relationship, not the intent of those involved. As I noted in response to the sterility objection:It may be objected that such reasoning prevents sterile heterosexual couples from marrying due to the fact that they are unable to procreate. But this objection fails to understand the argument. Marriage is not based on the ability of the individual couple to procreate, but on a type of relationship in which procreation is inherently possible to begin with. Males are meant for coupling with females, even if it does not result in procreation all of the time. By contrast, homosexual relationships are such that procreation is impossible in principle. Thus, such relationships cannot qualify as marriages. What matters is thus that an act is procreative in type, not whether it is procreative in effect. ConclusionCon's argues that because marriage is distinguishable from heterosexual sex that therefore traditional marriage does not have special social status. She also argues that individuals get married for a myriad of reasons other than procreation. As my responses demonstrate, however, these arguments fail to stand up to rational scrutiny. The state is accordingly justified in passing legislation to protect traditional marriage.I now turn it over to my opponent.Sources1. Koukl and Beckwith, Relativism, p.1232. http://www.boundless.org...3. http://wisdomandfollyblog.com...;