There are no compelling objections to anarchism

Note: My introductory case is the same as for this debate which I'm currently doing: http://debate.org... wrote it myself so it isn't plagurism. Furthermore I'm almost positive that this is a trolled debate and I don't wish to put in the effort in righting out another exhaustive case for nothing. Readers should also note that this is merely an introduction, I still plan on writing out unique responses to whatever objections Con brings against my arguments. Contention I. Polycentric vs. Monocentric Organization.One of the main differences between statist and anarchist social and legal theory is that states operate under a monocentric legal and political system. This simply means that within a given geographical region, a single institution (called a government or state) manages and controls how the legal, police, and court systems are organized and operated. This doesn't mean citizen input isn't used (as in the case of democracy), just that the institution charged with carrying out of these duties and with providing these services is singular. This may be contrasted with polycentric law, the legal system posited by anarchism. Under polycentric law, multiple institutions exist without monopolistic jurisdictions, similar to how other commodities are provided. There are a few reasons why this form of social organization would be viable, and possibly even superior, to monocentric law. Gustave de Molinari wrote: "That in all cases, for all commodities that serve to provide for the tangible or intangible needs of the consumer, it is in the consumer"s best interest that labor and trade remain free, because the freedom of labor and of trade have as their necessary and permanent result the maximum reduction of price." and that "That the production of security should, in the interests of the consumers of this intangible commodity, remain subject to the law of free competition."[1]One could counter that technically states are open to competition. This might be accepted in a sense, though not in the sense advocated by laissez-faire. Under monocentric law, the provision of services is subject to a geographical monopoly, even if not a universal one. For instance, in a city A, if there was only one gas station B, this would surely be considered a monopoly. This is even given the fact that gas station B technically has competition with some gas station C over in another town or gas station D,E,F,G.... in further cities or states. The competition is in name only or at least inferior to a situation in which gas stations (or states) were more geographically competitive.Contention II. Exceptions and Public Goods.One possible counter to the above argument (that competition generally fairs well) is that certain services and commodities are special, that they are public goods. This means that it is not possible (or highly impractical) to exclude others from using a service. For instance, a common service thought to be a common good is national defense. That is, when seeking the funds to produce such a service, my contribution to the funds will not by itself guarantee that it is produced. Many other people also have to chip in. But since national defense is just that, national, I will benefit from its production even if I don't chip in at all. Therefore I have more to gain if I don't chip in but everyone else does. The problem is everyone else thinks this as well which turns individual rationality into collective irrationality. Everyone does what's in their best interest and the good is never produced. Therefore, it is argued, there must be some centralized coercive organization to force every citizen to pay (via taxation).(A)The first problem with this argument is that it fails to take into account the possibility of non-necessitated incentives. The game-theory analysis shows that it's rational for one not to pay, but irrational if everyone chooses the same. However, switching these incentives leads to the opposite conclusion. This is the method employed by the concept of dominant assurance contracts[2]. What happens is, one agrees to pay for a service (through contract) if and only if enough others also agree to pay for it whereby it would be sufficient to produce. One only gets access to the service by paying for it, therefore it becomes individually as well as collectively rational to chip in.(B)The second problem with this argument is that (a) it proves too much and (b) it is inconsistently applied. If we accept the logic behind this conclusion, monocentric government cannot itself be the solution since this logic has been shown (through public choice theory) to apply just as well to liberal government (both republican and democratic). The only difference is the public good. We move from national defense to "good policies" or policies which serve the overall interest of the community. The point comes about by an analysis of the various roles in a politic, citizens, politicians, and special interests. Via the large number of voters (and subsequently the relative uselessness of an individual vote) combined with the fact that not everyone can be expected to really understand such out of reach issues as the geopolitical situation in the Middle East, voters are taken to be what is called rationally ignorant[3]. Even if you take all the time to learn everything there is about the Middle East in order to make a rational decision, this is the exception not the rule. And since this wouldn't bring positive utility benefits, it becomes individually irrational to do so, even if it is collectively rational.Analysis towards politicians and special interests yields equally distressing results. Since in a democracy, politicians are in most cases elected to office (barring how so whether direct or through republican means), a large amount of time must be devoted to re-election. Even if you have all the right ideas, you can't do much if you're not ever elected. In doing so the interests of the politician align with those of the special interest. In devoting money to politician A's campaign, special interest B curries favor while politician A ups their chance of election. We can even see this in the most recent Presidential election. Conclusion.No system is perfect, but the criticisms levied against anarchism are generally either self defeating or not rigorously applied. Anarchism is supposed by the critic to be a system without rules or order, whereas the state is supposed to a system of rules and order, applied by politicians and kept in check by the citizenry. But this is rarely the case in practice. Furthermore, the legal system proposed by anarchismitself the outgrowth of the logical implications of the classical liberal move toward laissez-faire and free enterprise. Ifiscompetition is a favorable condition, it must apply to any other service, even law. The public goods counter applies just as well to the state, the exact thing prescribed in anarchisms stead.===sources=== [1] "The Production of Security" by Gustave de Molinari. Available online: http://praxeology.net...[2] "The Private Provision of Public Goods via Dominant Assurance Contracts" by Alexander Tabarrok. Available online: http://mason.gmu.edu...[3] "The Myth of The Rational Voter" by Bryan Caplan. Available online: http://www.cato-unbound.org...