Solipsism is entailed by logical extension of Idealism

1.1) There is no reality beyond the solipsistic reality for logical absolutes to apply to Remember, the argument entails that the laws of logic themselves ARE objective reality, which is why they are considered additional entities because they are not contingent upon anything. More importantly, they can apply to other abstract entities. For example, wave functions are mathematicals objects that represent a “possible” configuration of matter or a universe, which are not physical as well. 1.2) External Logical absolutes are as incompatible with Solipsism as with Idealism I was only trying to be consistent with Pro’s definition of idealism at the start of the debate: Idealism: The only reality that exists is a mental reality, ie. no physical reality. As you can see, his definition of idealism only excludes physical reality or entities, but it does not exclude abstract entities, which are not physical. More importantly, you could have a dualist framework minus physical entities where one human mind co-exists eternally with these abstract objects. For instance, I could just be a floating mind that actualizes each possible configuration of a world from the universal wave-function (i.e. the Platonic realm). Thus, we would still have idealism (one mind + abstract objects) minus solipsism (one mind). Again, there are other types of idealism and the one I described above is called Platonic Idealism. I also was trying to stay consistent with Pro's required format so Pro cannot claim I was inconsistent with the resolution he established. With that said, I plan on making an accumulate case for my position.1.3) Further Analysis of Con's argument “Con presents a faulty syllogism that doesn't follow.” Sadly, I have to concede here. I am not good at constructing my own syllogisms. The only reason I tried within this debate is because during my discussions with Pro beforehand, he insisted that I construct them. Luckily, the debate is not about who crafts the best syllogism so I will scrap this one but I will still keep the argument. 2) On Epistemic Mechanisms Pro did not really respond to the other aspect of my refutation, which involved more than just similar properties but also distinct choices. Or maybe Pro just missed the other side of my argument. To prevent this from happening again, I will use Dharmakīrti syllogism I found online, which is not my own because I am terrible at constructing my own: P1: I experience actions of a certain type. P2: Actions of this certain type have their cause in consciousness. P3: These actions do not have their cause in my consciousness. C1: Therefore, these actions have their cause in another consciousness. C1: Therefore, consciousnesses other than mine exist. The God example I gave before was a perfect illustration of this argument. It’s a shame Pro missed it because if he replaced God with the self-existing human mind, he would have seen the argument for what it was. Here is the illustration again, but this time lets assume God is a human mind. In Genesis, God told Adam and Eve that they can eat from any tree within the Garden of Eden except the tree of knowledge. When Adam and Eve ate from the tree of knowledge instead of the many others, they made a distinct choice that was contrary to God’s nature. Alright, so here is my point. When Adam and Eve ate from every tree except the tree of knowledge, God knows that the entities he percieves have similar properties that a mind would display because they made choices that were not contrary to his nature. However, when Adam and Eve ate from the tree of knowledge, they also made a distinct choice that was contrary to his nature. Thus, its a combination between the choices that other minds make AND the nature of those choices, which give me a reason to believe the existence of other minds. In other words, I can make predictions about what other minds will do or not do based upon my own nature within me without relying on an external mechanism to discover their existence. This objection does not necessarily refute Pro's argument, but it does provide a reason for why I reject the first premise. 3) On Identity Violation I did not reject premise 3 simply because I did not agree with it. I rejected it because I identified a category fallacy, which naturally undermines his entire argument as a result. Since Pro did not address this fallacy, there is no reason to discuss it further. My Comprehensive Case for Idealism Only Even though my ideas of memory and imagination that I experience are wholly subject to my will, my sense-experiences are not similarly compliant. For instance, my power to choose whether I react to a hot stove that I put my hands on or the flicker of my eyes when objects appear suddenly in close view did not originate from my will. I am going to have to use Berkeley’s syllogism as well for this argument to flow right: P1: All contingent ideas are caused by some mind. P2: I experience ideas that are independent of my will. P3: Ideas that are independent of my will must be caused by a mind other than my own. C1: Therefore, a mind other than my own exists. As stated in round 2, the laws of logic and mathematical objects form the basis of all mental thought. I can envision a world where there are no minds except my own, which would force me to question whether other minds exist beside my own. However, I can’t think of a possible world where the laws of logic and mathematical objects do not exist. Thus, I know that the laws of logic exist independent of minds existing. Now, I am going to combined these two arguments into one. P1: Every existing thing has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause. P2: If I have an explanation of my existence, that explanation is an objective mind. P3: I am an existing entity. C1: Therefore, the explanation of my existence is objective mind. So far, we have established the existence of objective ideas and an objective mind. Now, I am going to combine these arguments to make God who would be an omnibenelovent, omniscient, and omnipotent that exist in all possible worlds:P1: It is possible that a maximally great mind exists in my world.P2: If it is possible that a maximally great mind exists in my world, then a maximally great mind exists in other possible worlds.P3: If a maximally great mind exists in other possible worlds, then it exists in every possible world.P4: If a maximally great mind exists in every possible world, then it exists in my world.P5: If a maximally great mind exists in my world, then a maximally great mind exists.C1: Therefore, a maximally great mind exists. Since we would expect a maximally great mind to be all-good all-powerful all-knowing and exist in all possible worlds, we can assume that God would not allow me to deceive myself and wants the best for us. This would involve optimizing my sense experiences through the interaction of other minds and ,as a result, maximize my uniform experience because without this we could not know how to act upon anything that might procure us the least pleasure, or remove the least pain of sense. In other words, I know that other minds exist because God has revealed it to me through his perfect will and nature. Thus, we have no reason to assume that our knowledge of other minds is a result of deception according to our trust in God.