It is reasonable to believe that Santa Claus exists.

=== Intro === Because Con agrees with my other points, the only contention I have to defend is that modal realism is a reasonable belief to hold. Con has brought up arguments that (if they work) may run counter to mine, but none of them actually refute modal realism itself or show in any way that it is implausible. Additionally, I think Con's counterpoints fall short and I'll attempt to show why. === Pro Case === 1. Fine Tuning Con's objection appears muddled, however, I'll take a guess at what he was aiming for and do my best to respond to it. It's true that when you roll a die 30 times, every possible outcome is equally probable. However, should you roll 30 straight sixes, it's reasonable to conclude that you're playing with a loaded die. The same is true of the universe: every possible way the universe could be organized is equally likely, however, the specific arrangement we observe (an arrangement where sentient life is possible) is extremely unlikely. There are for more ways to design a universe that is not life-permitting than there are to design life permitting universes. To blithely assert "well, the arrangement we observe is unlikely, but every other possible arrangement is equally unlikely" sidesteps the problem rather than actually addressing it. On modal realism, the probability that there is at least one life permitting universe is 1 (since all possible worlds are real worlds). By inputting the likelihood of given universe being life permitting (assuming that there is only one real universe), we can create a Bayesian inference showing the final probability of modal realism. Assuming that modal realism has a fairly high initial probability (which I established in C2), the final probability would be quite high. 2. Modal realism is parsimonious Con misunderstands the law of parsimony. He writes "what you're actually suggesting is that we should just believe in whatever it is that can be explained the quickest." This is incorrect. What the law of parsimony actually states is that *all other factors being equal,* simpler hypotheses are more likely to be true.[1] This can be verified both empirically by inductive inference and a priori by appealing to epistemic pragmatism. Modal realism *qualitatively* reduces the kinds of possibilia while only *quantitatively* increasing the number of real entities that actually exist. Because Con has not provided an alternative hypothesis to modal realism (besides briefly mentioning God, though he hasn't followed up on it), I've compared it to the view that our universe arose by naturalistic causes and is the only such universe that really exists. Of the two hypotheses, I think I've clearly demonstrated that modal realism is more parsimonious. At this point, it is too late for Con to introduce a different theory. Since he also hasn't raised any salient objections to the law of parsimony, this contention, and thus the entire debate, should go to Pro by default. 3. Pragmatism Con claims "mathematical sets are just things we make up, not real objects, and we know this because we make them up and they're just not even things." This is false. The things that mathematical sets represent (numbers, functions, lines, planes, etc.) don't exist in the sense that they take up space in the physical world, however, "impure" sets can be actualized whenever its constituent parts are represented -- for example, 4 apples, econometric modeling, and a chess board, respectively.[2] Con claims that by appealing to epistemic pragmatism, we open the door to believing in things like the boogie man, which is false. There are good reasons to doubt the existence of the boogieman; there is no good reason to doubt the existence of other worlds. If the boogie man existed, we would expect to see some evidence of this, yet no evidence is forthcoming. Where did the boogie man come from? What is his evolutionary history? What taxonomical group does he belong to? Note that unless positing the existence of he boogieman is somehow *logically* incoherent, this only rules out the existence of the boogie man in *our* world, not in some other possible world. Con's last objection is that believing in modal realism necessitates the explanation of certain concepts, thus violating the law of parsimony. This is a misconception; such concepts as those outlined in R2 require an explanation anyway, modal realism just makes it easier for us. This works in the same way that set theory allows us to understand mathematical abstracta. === Con Case === "Where're (sic) are the good reasons [for the existence of Santa Claus]?" See above "Are you trying to tell me that my argument is so good and obviously true that it doesn't even need to be stated?" No, I'm telling you that your argument is fallacious. --- Conclusion --- Con agrees that if modal realism is true, then my argument is sound. He has not given any reason to think that modal realism is false, let alone show that it is an unreasonable view. His attempts to refute my arguments ultimately fall short. The resolution is affirmed. Thanks, badger for being a good sport. Merry Christmas and have a Happy New Year! References: 1. http://plato.stanford.edu... 2.http://plato.stanford.edu...