The Ontological Argument For God's Existence Is Sound

Introduction I thank KRFournier for his response. My opponent seems to acknowledge his error with regards to insinuating that logical coherence is sufficient for metaphysical coherence. Thus, I see no reason to really harp on that issue. The question that then remains pertains to whether or not Pro has proven God to be possible. It is Possible That God Exists In this section, I will dissect all of my opponents claims in search of errors: "The proof that this first premise constitutes a metaphysical possibility is found in the notion of a maximally great being. If such a being exists, it exists necessarily in a metaphysical sense. This is what it means to be maximally great." - Pro The above basically states that if God is possible, then he is metaphysically possible, and he exists necessarily in a metaphysical sense. Of course, I agree. However, it doesn't follow from this that God actually is metaphysically possible, just that if he is possible then the type of possibility that deals with God is metaphysical possibility, and he would exist necessarily in a metaphysical sense if that was the case. Pro still must prove that God is actually metaphysically possible in the first place. "If I say God is an epistemic possibility, i.e., it is possible God exists or possible he doesn't exist, then I have just described a contingent being that would clearly be less than maximally great. To say it another way, metaphysical possibility is a greater quality than epistemic possibility." - Pro The above seems to show a contradictory position in Pro's argumentation. In his first round, Pro tries to support the possibility of God prima facie. However, prima facie cases leave room for epistemological error regarding the premise that God is possible (he even left the door open for me to "contend it", as if it was contendable!), which means he is calling God metaphysically possible, but supports that notion as if God was epistemologically possible with a bare-assertion of prima facie warrant in the first round; which seems self-refuting. "We are left with the concept of a being that is either possible or impossible." - Pro Yes, God is either not impossible, or impossible... This is self-evidently a true dichotomy. "The only way to determine possibility at this point is to rule out impossibility, but falsifying this premise is not the job of Pro.I did not come to argue against myself." - Pro Pro has the burden of proof to establish the premise that God is not impossible; ruling out the impossibility of God is certainly part of this. I mean, if nobody has even ruled out that which makes God impossible, then it hasn't actually been established that God is indeed not impossible, as these two statements are essentially equivalent: i) God is not impossible ii) Nothing is the case which makes God impossible Pro has not shown that nothing is the case that makes God impossible so far in this debate. Thus, Pro has not met his burden of proof yet. Either way, I hope Pro is not suggesting that I must show that God is impossible. Asking me to show that God is impossible would be to ask me to falsify the Modal Ontological Argument. If one reviews the rules of this debate however, they will see that I only have to show that Pro hasn't established the argument at hand; I do not have to falsify the argument at hand. There is a difference between undermining an argument, and falsifying an argument. If this is not what Pro is implying, then we can move on. "That's why I initially opened the door for refutation in my opening round. I know of many objections against the coherence of a maximally great being, but I do not see why I must anticipate all of them." - Pro The reason that Pro must anticipate them all and rule them out is because if this is not done, then God is only possible "for all we know". The very fact that Pro concedes there is something to anticipate (potential defeaters of the first premise) shows that Pro is only supporting the notion that God is epistemologically possible, not metaphysically impossible. However, according to Pro himself, this goes against the very notion of a maximally great being! Therefore, Pro seems to be confused about his possibility, and is contradicting himself in the process. "As it stands, the coherence of a maximally great being is not disputed and therefore a maximally great being is not impossible.Thus, it is metaphysically possible and the first premise stands." - Pro The error with the above argument is that it has been disputed. Not in the sense that I hold the first premise to be false, but in the sense that I am showing how my opponent hasn't met his burden of proof pertaining to demonstrating the first premise is true. Not only that, but my opponent's stance here entails a fallacious Argumentum ad Ignorantiam. The logical fallacy is as follows[1]: Statement not-p is unproved p is true Pro is arguing that since I haven't shown the incoherency in God, then it is true that God is possible. However, even if I haven't argued for the incoherency of God, it wouldn't follow that God is metaphysically possible. This is an elementary logical fallacy that Pro is engaged in. Pro has to prove the first premise is true. Just putting the premise out there and expecting me to prove it false (which seems to be what Pro is actually doing) is not sufficient to prove the premise true. Since Pro's argument is based on a logical fallacy; his position here is invalid and does not hold. Conclusion Pro argued that if God is possible, then he is metaphysically possible and not merely epistemically possible. The problem is that God actually being metaphysically possible and existing in some possible world doesn't follow from the conditional statement provided. Not only that, his argument is entirely contradictory. He assumes God is epistemologically possible on one hand, but metaphysically possible on the other. How? Well, he thinks he can defend God is possible prima facie, but that means that God is possible "for all we know" (as prima facie cases leave room for epistemological error). If God is really subjunctively possible, then it actually has to be true that God is indeed not impossible, and that it is a fact that there is nothing that makes God impossible which is the case. Has Pro demonstrated that there is nothing that makes God impossible which is the case? Not even close. The closest thing to an argument that we saw from Pro in the last round in favor of the first premise being true was based on a logical fallacy known as appealing to ignorance. Not having a defeater for p, does not make p true. Thus, even if I have not shown any logical inconsistency in the idea of God; God's possibility has still not been proven true based on that fact alone. Since all I have to do to win the debate is show that Pro has not established the conclusion of the argument (I do not have to show the conclusion false), and I showed that Pro has not even proven the first premise of the argument; the resolution has not been established. Source(s) [1] http://philosophy.lander.edu... http://www.youtube.com...PS. The video attached is for educational purposes, as it parallels my positions in this debate very well.