Morality is Objectively and Analytically the Same regardless of Culture and Era.

In spirit of the debate, I will also only refute Con"s arguments and not create new ones. Con suggests that my proof of a single intrinsic moral is "incredably vague" and that it is flawed insofar as individuals will develop their own views on morality around it. I don"t deny this, and I suspect that people will come to varying moral conclusions especially on complex moral dilemmas. But this is not to say that morality is subjective; for peoples' moral conclusions are merely interpretations of the objective whole. Returning to my example of mathematics, people often interpret complex mathematics in different ways, but it would be odd to then conclude that mathematics is subjective. Furthermore, I am not the one testifying for the veracity of "do not kill", I am merely saying that many people use this imperative to justify their more complex moral opinions (note that I am not saying that these are correct) such as "abortion is wrong". I agree that considering simple categorical imperatives such as "do not kill" is an oversimplification that requires fine-tuning. However, this does not mean that fine-tuned imperatives are not objective. To summarise, Con has raised some practical problems with my proof of an objective morality, but has not actually refuted the logic I use to prove that it exists. Thus my point stands. Next, Con takes issue with the definition of subjectivism that I postulated. (1) However, I do not see Con's definition as saying anything intrinsically different to 'I want X'. Perhaps because this seems quite an infantile portrayal of subjectivism, but the "emotional reaction of the individual" is merely a sophisticated way of saying that morality is what the individual feels they want to do. For example, if I have an emotional reaction that extramarital sex is wrong then this is just another way of saying that I want to have the moral right to have extramarital sex. Even in your changed definition, subjectivism still fails because it would mean that whatever I have a positive emotional reaction to is necessarily good. This is false. For example, I may strongly and emotionally believe that the segregation of black people is good; but this does not make it so by virtue of my emotional reaction. Consequently, even if Con does insist on modifying my definition, it does not escape the fact that subjectivism leads to absurdities. Con then goes on to make the point that morality is not either relativism or subjectivism, but a mixture of both. Yet I struggle to see why this point is any more than idle musing, my opponent has not bothered to actually ethically explain why we should mix the two. Even if we do combine them, why should the combination of two flawed ethical theories make a good theory? Put analogously, an ugly blazer and an ugly shirt do not combine to make an attractive suit. Finally, he states: "the exact combination of which is for personal determination (Again, proof of Subjectivity)." Yet again, my opponent succumbs to little more than speculation about what people ought to do, without actually explaining why this should be so. Stating a premise without an argument or evidence to support it does not provide valid proof of the conclusion (that subjectivity is correct). Just because people may choose to determine the combination between relativism and subjectivism does not make them right to do so. My opponent then responds to my counter-arguments, starting with my contention of the premise that objectivity requires a source. In regards to science, its source is not the objectivity of physical existence, although even if it was I would then postulate that the objectivity of physical existence has no source. The reason why physical existence is not the source of science's objectivity is that the scientific method itself is not sourced upon physical objects, it merely utilises them to seek understanding. The actual scientific method (which is the essence of what science is) is objective but not sourced on physical existence; it is an epistemological framework that establishes the veracity of empirical evidence. Therefore empirical evidence cannot be used as the source of the scientific method if it has not yet been proved veridical BY the scientific method. Con then disputes my assertion that he begged the question in his argument. To recap, my opponent"s argument was roughly this (I may be wrong in my interpretation, but this is the best attempt at putting it in logical format): A: Morality has changed over the course of history because we have historical evidence that what was culturally acceptable in the past is not culturally acceptable now (and vice-versa). B: If something changes over time then it is subjective C: Morality is subjective (contingent on cultural acceptability). The reason that this is begging the question is that the C (the conclusion that morality is effectively what is culturally acceptable) is subtly assumed in A. I am not saying that A+B = C because that would be a valid argument, but I am saying that A=C (using an assumption of the conclusion as a single premise) is begging the question. Therefore my assertion that Con's argument is fallacious stands. Con claims that I have completely refused to answer his arguments, but if an argument is proved fallacious then it is rendered null and void, I have no need to respond to its actual content. His argument would only hold water if it was agreed the morality = what is culturally acceptable, but my opponent has failed to prove this equation to be correct. Semantics are forbidden in this debate, although when Con highlights this he is guilty of using semantics. "Pro has just told us Morality is not "what is considered acceptable", but that is exactly what morality is". I actually use reasoned argument in round 2 to back up my claim that morality is not "what is considered acceptable" and so it is not semantics. However, Con"s claim that "that is exactly what morality is" is semantic. In his penultimate attempt at rebuttal, Con resorts to the appeal to dictionary fallacy. In short, Con has used this logic: - This dictionary definition says X=Y - Therefore, X=Y But this takes the dictionary to be an unquestionable authority that it is not. Finally, my opponent argues that an unlocated objectivity is effectively subjective. However, this is a dubious point, as ignorance of something does not change its fundamental nature. Con has failed to provide adequate logic to say otherwise. He then accuses me of using the "teapot in space" fallacy, which takes the logical form: - One cannot prove that X does not exist - Therefore X exists However, I do not use this logic because I am not saying that Con cannot argue against objective morality because it cannot be found. In the context of this debate, Con is arguing that subjective morality exists (and therefore cannot be objective) and I am arguing that subjective morality does not exist (and therefore must be objective). I would be guilty of the teapot in space fallacy if I was refuting Con's arguments that objective morality does not exist, but instead I was refuting Con's arguments that subjective morality does exist. To conclude the debate, I think my opponent has made a remarkable defence of subjective morality, although he has ultimately failed at actually proving that subjective morality exists. This allows my arguments for the existence of objective morality to remain standing. (1) http://www.harryhiker.com...