The 'Problem of Evil' never succeeds (Attempt 1), Pt. 2

It seems that we are stuck on one crucial impasse. I am willing to wager that a large part of this disagreement is founded in my opponent's misunderstanding of several things I have said. This, coupled with his constant refusal to address any supposed dis-analogies in my example, serves to demonstrate his criticism to be incredibly weak. Let it be made clear that I do agree with the obvious premise that for X to probably exist it must be possible to exist - what I meant by the claim that the idea of possibility is not an issue is that I would argue the claim "GE is possible" to be almost trivially true, or at least to the point of no controversy. Of course, my opponent contends this but as my example (and later explanation in this round) demonstrates, he commits quite the simple error in believing the two are logically incompatible in any relevant sense. In fact, this simple stalemate won't necessitate too long of a round on my part if I can successfully defeat it -- therefore, my efforts will be dedicated to doing exactly that. ==================== Disagreement about the relevance of possibility ==================== "And it is perfectly acceptable to assume that GE is possible. In countless cases it would be totally appropriate—but NOT in an argument whose target is BG! Why does an exception arise at that point? Because, and let the reader understand this clearly, GE and BG are logically contradictory, such that affirming one intrinsically denies the other (by definition of the very terms)." ----> Such a criticism would only be valid if I was positing both GE and BG to exist in the same world; however, given the common semantical command of modal[1][2] concepts, we can easily circumvent this (the references are light and simply for introduction - I don't need any heavy literature to prove my point here). A possible world refers to "a semantic device formalizing the notion of what the world might have been like. A statement is necessarily true if and only if it is true in every possible world[3]." What's the relevance you say? Well in my argument, when I posit GE and BG I posit them as contingent propositions which are propositions that are in some possible worlds and false in others. This is simple to understand; GE can be true in some and false in others, alongside with BG. To posit both these as possible is in no way a contradiction UNLESS they were to both exist in the actual world; such a statement is indeed contradictory. Of course, this is what my arguments works on! I begin with the step that either GE or BG contingently exist, then attempt to show that GE probably exists in the actual world THUS RULING OUT BG. "(Note: I have been ignoring his "pyramid" argument because (i) that is not our argument in this debate and (ii) he was only using it to demonstrate how probability arguments work, which I clearly understand already.)" ----> My pyramid analogy wasn't simply to show how probability arguments (in fact to fully demonstrate a probability argument I would need to explain inferences, and touch upon the problem of induction) but rather demonstrate that you can have two logically incompatible statements and YET consider them as premises in an argument. This is seen to be justified if we simply view them beforehand in different modal worlds, and then come to the conclusion as to which one contingently exists in our world. If you find this to be irrelevant then do please go into detail where the dis-analogy is, as I have inspected your argument in detail alongside with your wishes. ---References--- 1. http://en.wikipedia.org... 2. http://plato.stanford.edu... 3. http://www.thefreedictionary.com...