God more than likely does not exist

I thank CommonDebator for their opening arguments.With Cons first round obviously they seek to establish a case for the existence of God and did not argue against my previous arguments, as such extend those arguments.St Anselm Ontological argumentConsider where Con states..."3. A being that exists as an idea in the mind and in reality is, other things being equal, greater than a being that exists only as an idea in the mind." & "Thus, by definition, if God exists as an idea in the mind but does not necessarily exist in reality,"Existence is not a predicateMy first argument is the objection raised by Kant that existence is not a predicate, this is explained as such..."existence is not a property that objects possess or lack, but a correspondence between a concept and the world, then this is comparison is illicit. For in that case, God existing is a matter of the concept of God being exemplified, and God not existing is a matter of the concept of God not being exemplified. In both cases, though, the concept of God that either is or is not exemplified is exactly the same.The comparison on which the ontological argument rests is therefore a comparison between two identical concepts of God, one exemplified, and the other not. As these two concepts of God are identical, they cannot be contrasted, and so no conclusion can be drawn from any such contrast. The ontological argument therefore fails, because its assumption that an existent God is greater than a non-existent God is false; the two are equal in greatness, because they are identical. [1]Conceptions/what is imagined does not necessarily correspond to realityRecall how Con claims..."6.Thus, if God exists in the mind as an idea, then God necessarily exists in reality."Consider the following 2 claims....X is imaginedX is imagined to be the greatest conceivable XJust because something can be imagined does that mean it ACTUALLY exists ? of course not. But what if we take anything and everything and claim that it is the "greatest conceivable", does this addition now justify that that thing exists ? No.To put it more directly the conception of the greatest conceivable being that exists in both mind and reality is it's self a conception and thus like all conceptions does not necessarily correspond to reality.Greatest conceivable being & the mindConsider where Con states..."1. By definition, God is a being than which none greater can be imagined."But can the greatest conceivable being exist in the mind ? Thomas Aquinas didn't think so..."He (Aquinas) suggested that people cannot know the nature of God and, therefore, cannot conceive of God in the way Anselm proposed. The ontological argument would be meaningful only to someone who understands the essence of God completely. Aquinas reasoned that, as only God can completely know His essence, only He could use the argument. His rejection of the ontological argument caused other Catholic theologians to also reject the argument" [2]William Craig's Ontological argumentIt is possible a maximally great being does not exist Consider Cons first premise here..."1.It is possible that a maximally great being exists."But this argument also works starting with a different premise, that being 1) It is possible that a maximally great being does not exist1.It is possible that a maximally great being does NOT exist2.If it is possible that a maximally great being does not exist, then a maximally great being does not exist in some possible world.3.If a maximally great being does not exist in some possible world, then it does not exist in every possible world.4.If a maximally great being does not exist in every possible world, then it does not exist in the actual world.5.If a maximally great being does not exist in the actual world, then a maximally great being does not exist.6.Therefore, a maximally great being does not exist.Exists in all posible worlds vs Does not exist in all possible worldsTo say that it is possible for X to exist also entails that it is possible for X not exist. Eg It is possible a unicorn exists entails it is possible that a unicorn does not exist.X exists in every possible world = there is no possible world where X does not exist.Now consider the following premises...1.It is possible that a maximally great being exists. (Therefore there is a possible world where a maximally great being does not exist)&4.If a maximally great being exists in every possible world,(therefore there is no possible world where it does not exist) then it exists in the actual world.Either something exists in all possible worlds or it doesn't, it can't be both, thus 1 & 4 contradict each other thus the argument has an internal contradiction to it.Necessarily true or necessary existence can be used to justify anythingIt might be claimed that a maximally great being is a necessarily true proposition or that a maximally great being exists necessarily. But this kind of reasoning can be used on other things too, like a maximal unicorn. A maximal unicorn exists is a necessarily true proposition and/or a maximal unicorn exists necessarily.A common retort that that such a maximal unicorn is physical, but presumably the maximal great being is not physical thus why can't we have a maximal unicorn or something other maximal thing and justify it using the same kind of reasoning.Also recall the objection raised by Kant that existence is not a predicate, this likewise applies to necessary existence.Modal realism has not being justifiedConsider the premise that states..."4.If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world."Now consider an explanation of modal realism..."Modal realism is the view propounded by David Kellogg Lewis that all possible worlds are as real as the actual world. It is based on the following tenets: possible worlds exist; possible worlds are not different in kind from the actual world; possible worlds are irreducible entities; the term actual in actual world is indexical, i.e. any subject can declare their world to be the actual one, much as they label the place they are "here" and the time they are "now"" [3] A possible world is just as real as an ACTUAL WORLD ? This is extremely contentious, until modal realism is justified even if we grant that something exists in all "possible worlds" does not necessarily mean that it exists means in "the actual world". The argument can be formulated as follows.......1) The actual world is real 2) A possible world is not necessarily real 3) (Assume) X exists in all possible worldsC) Therefore X does not necessarily exist in the actual worldOntological argument-Mulla Sadra"s logicI am not as familiar with this ontological argument as I am with the others, so rather than present a counter argument I seek some definitions and clarification."1.There is existence"Does existence here mean the sum total of all things that exist ?"2.Existence is a perfection above which no perfection may be conceived"Define and elaboration on perfection"3.God is perfection and perfection in existence"What does it mean to say perfection in existence ? All things in existence are perfect ?"4.Existence is a singular and simple reality; there is no metaphysical pluralism"Is this because existence here is understood to be the sum total of all things that exist ?I look forward to Cons reply.Sources [1] http://www.philosophyofreligion.info...[2] http://en.wikipedia.org...[3] http://en.wikipedia.org...