Which Significant Power was the most ill-prepared for conflict at the start of WWII

This is my first time on this site, but I hope to get some experience arguing this. (And I wouldn't mind any suggestions about format, style, or anything else). I will list all my sources for convenience, because I think a technical topic like this would be more informative with defined facts. I tried to avoid using Wikipedia, as there is some risk of inaccuracy. The con will defend that the French military was the most unprepared force at the beginning of World War II. The con would like to clearly designate that since at the late years of the 1930's Germany was the clear growing rival to France, France's unpreparedness is exemplified through inadequate defensive organization and weak offensive strategy in the face of this enemy. The con will clarify 3 points. 1. A large amount of military and industrial resources had been invested in the Maginot Line, an investment which would turn out to have extremely low returns. . http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk... "What exactly was the Maginot Line? It was not a continuous line of forts as some believe. [. .. ] The Line comprised of over 500 separate buildings but was dominated by large forts (known as ‘ouvrages') which were built about nine miles from each other. Each ouvrage housed 1000 soldiers with artillery. Between each ouvrage were smaller forts which housed between 200 to 500 men depending on their size [. .. ] There were 50 ouvrages in total along the German border. [. .. ] German Army Group B attacked through the Ardennes – such an attack was believed to be impossible by the French. One million men and 1,500 tanks crossed the seemingly impenetrable forests in the Ardennes. The Germans wanted to drive the Allies to the sea. Once the Maginot Line had been isolated it had little military importance and the Germans only turned their attention to it in early June 1940. Many of the ouvrages surrendered after the government signed its surrender with Germany – few had to be captured in battle, though some forts did fight the Germans. One in seven French divisions was a fortress division - so the Maginot Line took out 15% of the French Army. " -Using a little bit of math (1000 soldiers * 50 ouvrages + an average of 350 soldiers * 49 forts in between the ouvrages), we find that the French force dedicated to defense was about 67,150 troops, give or take some. Since the main German task force completely bypassed the Maginot Line, all these troops were essentially left as sitting ducks and as space-filler. If the German war machine was pouring a million men into France, the French military didn't have a lot of spare troops to be playing around with. Splitting their force with this useless operation instead of defending cities shows poor planning on the French side, and poor preparedness. 2. The Panzer would become the awesome armored vehicle that would crush any enemy of the Germans. But, instead of preparing against this huge German advantage, the French tank had largely been unchanged since World War I. . http://en.wikipedia.org... "[. .. ]Around 35% of French tanks were only equipped with machine guns (again designed for trench warfare), ensuring that when French and German tanks met in battle, a third of the French vehicles could only fire machine-gun bullets, which simply bounced harmlessly off German armour. Only a handful of French tanks had radio sets, and these often broke as the tank lurched over uneven ground. German tanks were all equipped with radios, allowing them to communicate with one another throughout battles, whilst French tank commanders could rarely contact other vehicles. The French Army suffered from serious technical deficiencies with its tanks. In 1918, the Renault FT-17 tanks of France had been the most advanced in the world, although small, capable of far outperforming their slow and clumsy British, German, or American counterparts. However, this superiority resulted in tank development stagnating after World War I. By 1939, French tanks were virtually unchanged from 1918. French and British Generals believed that a future war with Germany would be fought under very similar conditions as those of 1914–1918. Both invested in thickly-armoured, heavily-armed vehicles designed to cross shell damaged ground and trenches under fire. .. ." -With warning signs such as Hitler's invasions of the Rhineland and of Austria, France should have taken measures against the German tank advantage. Failure to do so left them wide open. 3. Finally, slow development of an independent Air Force, low numbers of airmen, and unstrategic airfield locations left the French vulnerable to the German Luftwaffe. . http://en.wikipedia.org... "Most French airfields were located in north-east France, and were quickly overrun in the early stages of the campaign. " . http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil... "The question of aviation policy was not so easy to control. The army and the navy had fought the creation of the air ministry and the independent air force with sufficient vigor to retain operational control of 118 of the 134 combat squadrons. The air force officers were responsible for training, administering, and commanding the air force in time of peace; but in wartime, only sixteen squadrons of bombers would remain under the air force chain of command. Many aviators saw the primary role of the air force as close support of the ground forces--observation, liaison, and attack of targets on the battlefield. The French had developed close support techniques during the First World War (1914-18) and had refined them during the war against the Rif rebellion in Morocco in 1925. [. .. ] Aviators who were impatient with the close support mission [. .. ] gained ascendancy on the air force general staff. [. .. ] The strategic bombing enthusiasts found their advocate in Pierre Cot, air minister from June 1936 until January 1938. Cot tripled the bomber force by organizing five new bomber escadres, converting seven of the twelve observation and reconnaissance escadres to bomber escadres, and equipping four of the five remaining reconnaissance escadres with aircraft capable of long-range bombing. [. .. ] The struggle for independence occupied the energies and attention of the air staff so completely that they neglected to develop fully the ground observer corps; command, control, and communications systems; and airfield facilities.19 Because they were preparing to wage a defensive aerial battle over their own territory, the French aviators could have prepared these elements in peacetime, but they were still in a rudimentary state in 1940. During the battle, the French had difficulty tracking and intercepting intruders, were unable to mass units and consequently suffered unduly heavy losses, and achieved an operational availability rate only one-fourth that of Luftwaffe units. [. .. ] In 1940, the general said the air force required only 40 to 60 [aircraft per month]. There were not enough aircrews or ground crews for a larger number, and to expand the training program would require the efforts of the entire strength of the air force. " -The Luftwaffe was another deciding factor in Germany's quick onslaught, yet the French Air Force infrastructure was lacking. To end, the con would like to reinforce that the French military was actually pretty strong against most other countries that might be a threat. However, the biggest threat and the most likely source for future conflict was Germany; and since the French had not made a strong plan against THIS group in particular, they were the most ill-prepared power at the start of WWII. Now, I'd like to hear what the pro has to say about Canada. The con will make comparative arguments at the end of round 2.