Pick your own debate - 1F

In accordance with the rules set in place, I will be arguing against the third topic - that the universe probably had a definite starting point in time (I'm CON). I'm a little disheartened at the two other topics; does my opponent really find them to be controversial or worth debating about? Nontheless, I find the third topic interesting so here goes: I negate the topic by arguing that there is no reason to believe that time could infinitely extend to the future and the past. My argument will basically comprise of philosophical arguments, even though my opponent has labelled it science. Indeed, most debates about the nature and topology of time is philosophical (see philosophy of time). A reading from my opponent's other debate about time is comprised of philosophical arguments as well, so I'm comfortable in asserting that we probably will be utilizing a philosophical perspective. Finally, I want to note that I am playing devil's advocate here - I personally have yet to make a strong opinion about the debate over time's nature, topology, existence, etc. ==================== Argument for Eternalism ==================== I will argue in favor of Eternalism, the thesis that "temporal location matters not at all when it comes to ontology[1]. " To elaborate, the usage of terms such as present, past, and future are nonsensical. Instead, I'd argue that another model we should advocate is what has come to be known as the B-Theory (the A-Theory is what I described). According to the B-Theory,"positions in time can also be ordered by two-place relations like two days earlier than, one day earlier than, simultaneous with, etc. (These relations are now often called "B relations. ")[2]. " So why do I reject the A-series but not the B-series? Simply because A-series are inherently contradictory due to the fact that the different A properties are incompatible with one another - an example is that no time can be both future and past. Another criticism takes inspiration from Einstein's theory of relativity (which I assume my opponent takes to be correct) which brings up the concept of simultaneity[3]. Because different observers are able to perceive the same instance of time as both a future and the other a past, there is no standard or universal moment of time we can label as present. This problem arises because time is a dimension, and thus it can only be sensibly defined in relation to something else. For example, one would have trouble locating let alone understanding north, but north TO is coherent. Because the A-series fails, and there doesn't seem to be any other alternative, B-series wins by default. ==================== A result of Eternalism that negates the resolution ==================== So what if Eternalism is true? The consequence is that an infinite past is completely valid. This is because any moment of time becomes ontologically equal in footing to any other moment of time -- the term "now" is a privileged usage for a certain instance of time but ultimately it's no more real than other moments of time, just like how the term "here" is equal in footing with any directional language. Some would argue, especially my opponent stemming from his previous debate, that an infinite past is incohereble because it would take an infinite amount of time to reach NOW. If he were to argue via this path, then he'd be seriously misunderstanding Eternalism. It is precisely point that there is no flow of time - this is merely an illusion caused by our consciousness. Therefore, any talk of "reaching the present" betrays a lack of understanding on the speaker's part. ==================== Conclusion ==================== To summarize: t1 is ontologically equal to t2. .. t3. .. tn. Time exists independently and atemporally from other instances of time; it is connected only when we use terms such as "before" or "after". The term present is simply an indexical term used for human conveniences, otherwise it holds no ontological significance. This is why an infinite past is completely sensible, and thus why the proposition that there must have been a definite starting point in time is not only likely false but INCOHERENT. If Eternalism is true, which I defend to be so, then a "starting point in time" is self-contradictory. ---References--- 1. . http://plato.stanford.edu... 2. . http://plato.stanford.edu... 3. . http://en.wikipedia.org...