If God is omnipotent and omniscient, then God cannot be omnibenevolent at the same time.

I: I do believe I am arguing perfectly within the scope of this debate. When my opponent uses a word that itself requires definition to define omnipotent, then it is subject to my understanding. Since his argument is based on the well aged epicurean pericope (he even mimicked Epicurus' language in his first round), then my presumption is that he is actually arguing against a being that people ACTUALLY believe exist – not a straw man. It is a little late in the debate for my opponent to tell me what almighty means. He will find that almighty has a similar etymology as omnipotence. Almighty, in terms of a deity, is power over all things. Not included in this definition is the power to defy logic or to violate ones own nature. I am using my opponent's terms as he has defined and I have understood, if he was actually arguing against a deity that no one espouses as true, then the most he could do is succeed with a handful of straw. Since he has defined omnipotent as almighty, and the ability to do that which is not logically possible to do is NOT included its definition, then we should not assume that any such deity that possesses omnipotence can do that which is not possible to do (this line of thinking goes back to as early as Thomas Aquinas' "summa Theologica"). 1 My opponent's argument is casuistry with words. He is dipping and dodging and hiding behind different definitions. The objection that I put forth against good, insofar as it is possible that what we perceive to be not good is in fact good, can be put forth against kind. (P1) It is possible that "kind" is defined objectively (given that an omnipotent and omniscient God exists). (P2) Our perceptions of "kind" are subjective not objective. Therefore, (C) What we view as unkind may, in fact, be kind. As long as (P1) is possible, then our subjective understandings of kind are irrelevant as they do not reflect reality. As long as (P1) remains possible, then my opponent's assertion that it is unkind to allow ANY suffering is an ipse-dixitism. God need only be kind or good in the OBJECTIVE sense in order for him to be omnibenevolent. It is ridiculous to conclude that God must be good and kind in EVERY sense, given that it is logically impossible. For a sadist might think it is good to rape and kill people, while a philanthropist thinks to the contrary – both cannot be right as they are diametrically opposing. If it is possible that morally significant freedom is more valuable than non-autonomous, robotic beings, then it is possible for an omni-excellent God to produce free creatures that then choose to make decisions that lead to suffering. This suffering is possibly kind and good given the abovementioned syllogism. "My opponent once again limits God. Omnipotence means that God may have any world he wants." Of course I am limiting God; even omnipotence has its limitations. For instance, if God could create a being more powerful than himself, then he would not be omnipotent given that it is possible to be even more powerful. Omnipotence does not include the ability to defy logic. God cannot do that which is logically impossible to do (e.g. create a circled square). In order to have logical freedom, there must be a possible world for every action or event, in that every action or event could be possibly different. God knows each and every possible world, but, because he has created beings with logical freedom, the world that is actualized is not contingent on the action of God, but on the choices of His creation. Since my opponent has a ridiculously distorted view of omnipotence, in that it is philosophically confused, he is continuously grasping at straws. His very understanding of omnipotence is self-defeating. Since, in his argument, God can defy logic, then there is absolutely no LOGICAL contradiction with God being omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent at the same time, given that God, with unfettered and absolute power, can do whatever in the world he wants to do. As long as my opponent maintains that omnipotence includes the possibility of defying logic, then his very use of logic is a red herring, because, as we know, that does not apply to God. So as long as God is omnipotent, then it does not matter if there seems to be a logical contradiction with him being omnibenevolent at the same time, because, as my opponent contends, God is far beyond logic. My opponent says that it is not good for God to not intervene. I am asking him to prove it. I am asking him to show, that even if good and kind were objective definitions, that it is not POSSIBLE for an omni-excellent God who has created LOGICALLY free beings to not intervene. Assertions without out evidence are never all that convincing. "What keeps God from actualizing both at once, then instantly dissolving the worse of the two worlds." My opponent is unfamiliar with modal logic. Possible world jargon is used to understand the realm of possibilities. If God has created beings with logical freedom then he cannot actualize a choice that never happened – insofar as if Fred did not actually choose to give money to the poor, God cannot actualize the world in which Fred did (this would defy logical freedom). "My opponent assumes that there are only good and bad choices to be made." My opponent assumes it is possible to know good without bad. Moreover, he assumes that there can be absolutely no kind reason for God to allow suffering. This, like I have said before, is a claim to absolute knowledge and is therefore self-refuting. The most my opponent can say is that it is POSSIBLE that there is no morally sufficient reason, or "kind" reason for God to allow suffering – quite a distance away form his burden. "Allowing that which will occur when YOU HAVE MADE IT SO means that God INTENDS for us to suffer." God did not make it so. He made it POSSIBLE and WE made it so. "Only if God allows the contradiction to exist." This is beyond humorous to me. Since my opponent says God is not bound by logic, why in the world is he using a logical argument against Him? "Any morally sufficient reason he would have must exist separate and apart from this debate's definition of good. The reason can not be kind, therefore it must be to some extent not good, therefore God is not omnibenevolent." My opponent must prove this. Prove that it is not possible for the reason to be kind. As long as it is possible for kind to be objectively measured, then it is possible for God to have a morally sufficient reason that IS kind. 2 "I do not care about God's purpose. God can end suffering with no adverse consequences. God does not. Ending suffering is good. God chooses not to be good. Therefore, God is not omnibenevolent." What evidence is there that ending suffering in this world is good other than saying, "because it is kind?" Since good can possibly be measured objectively (the traditional Christian notion), then it is possible that ending suffering is indeed NOT good. "My conception of good stems from a plain reading of the definition of ‘kind'" It does not matter where your definition comes from, but how you measure what KIND is. As long as it is possible that the allowance of suffering is helpful (www.m-w.com), then it is possible that God's action is good. Moreover, I need only shift the argument over a bit; his conception of kind stems from a subjective base and is therefore not indicative of ACTUAL reality. If an objective standard for kind exists, then it is possible that what my opponent feels or conceives as kind, is indeed wholly or partially inaccurate – insofar as kind would no longer be a property of subjective measurement, but a property of an objective one. 3 Missing the point. The point is that our perceptions can be wrong. What we perceive as unkind or not good may be wrong. 4 False. Moreover, human conceptions cannot be wrong?