Moral subjectivism is false.

Circularity and IncoherencePro argues that "X is good to person Y" is defined under Moral Subjectivism as "Person Y believes X is good to person Y" and vice versa, and the circularity of the definitions apparently implies incoherenceCon contends that subjectivism doesn't commit him to that the particular definition but gave no reason to think that this is not the case. If "X is good" just is "person Y approves of X" and if approval just is a moral belief as I contended in my first round then that does translate into "X is good = person Y believes X is good". Con hasn't contended this point so it can be fairly assumed Con agreed with that point so it's hard to see how I committed a "fallacy of presumption". As to Con's second point - it seems to prove too much. One can agree that at some point all definitions will be circular (if you extend the circle far enough) while not agreeing that the charge of circularity and incoherence doesn't stick in at least some situations. It'd be wholly absurd to be debating someone about the usefulness of cordless phones and when person B asks what a cordless phone is or means person A replied: "A phone without a cord." When person B complains that person A hasn't actually said anything useful, the proper reply shouldn't be for person A to "go nuclear" and say "Well, all definitions are circular on some level, so your complaint isn't valid". [1] I'm talking about viscous circularity where the circularity is undeniably objectionable. The following definition "an object has property P IFF it is not next to anything that has property P" is undeniably objectionable, and if approval is a moral belief and my argument is right then on subjectivism where "x is good" means "person y approves of x" then it reduces to an undeniably objection vicious circularity.Con argues that I was implying that if something entails an infinite regress it cannot be the case. This is not true. Some infinite regresses are virtuous, and I have no problem with infinite regresses per se. "In the objectionable kind of infinite regress, two or more propositions join to constitute the meaning of some proposition; of these constituents, there is one at least one whose meaning is similarly compounded; and so on ad infinitum. This form of regress commonly results from circular definitions(pm348) If A be a proposition whose meaning is perfectly definite, and A implies B, B implies C, and so on, we have an infinite regress of a quite unobjectionable kind. Thus there is no logical necessity to complete the infinite regress before A acquires a meaning(pm349)" [2] I am arguing that subjectivism is leads to the objectionable kind of infinite regress. Notice on the unobjectionable kind of infinite regresses it is said that there is no logical necessity to "complete" the infinite regress before x acquires a meaning. But on my argument this isn't the case. It is argued that "x is good doesn't acquire a meaning from "person Y approves of x" because "person Y approves of x" just means "person Y believes X is good". Obviously you can't define "good" by having "good" in the definition.No Moral DisagreementThere is no shifting of the burden of proof. I am assuming that moral disagreement is a prima facie real phenomena because it seems as if it is (because there can't be disagreement without contradiction). Or it appears that it is the case for the vast majority of people. In philosophy, the existence of moral disagreement has been a hotly debated topic and it is presumed that they are disagreeing (i.e contradicting each other) about actual facts of matter. I don't think it's a stretch of the imagination to say the vast majority of people who argue about ethics have presumed themselves to be contradicting each other. This presumption may be wrong, but given some plausible epistemological principle like that of phenomenal conservatism the initial presumption is justified absent defeaters. [3] Con has provided no defeaters. In accordance with with that epistemological principle the best explanation would be that since we assume that we are disagreeing about facts of the matter in ethical debates, we actually are disagreeing about facts of the matter in ethical debates. This would be similarly compared to the assumption that there is an external world - we are prima facie justified in believing in it's existence because it appears that way and we assume and live our lives as if it does. That there exists solipsists and idealists and the like who don't initially assume that the external world is real as most people do does nothing itself to defeat the rationality of believing so. If they brought some defeater (arguments) then we would have to consider them and see if they defeat our presumptions. Much is the same, I contend, in the debate about moral disagreement. Most of us presume that moral disagreement is a real phenomena and going by the principle we are justified in doing so absent defeaters.Con says: Even if nobody is disagreeing about a real fact, we could still disagree based on would it would be like if it was real.That is the crucial point. I'm saying moral disagreement here is a matter of contradiction. If does not involve contradiction, in certain domains of moral dispute then it isn't disagreement. The definition of contradict is:deny the truth of (a statement), esp. by asserting the oppositeOn non-subjectivism you are contradicting someone by saying "raping children is wrong" when they are saying "raping children is right". On subjectivism, you aren't as I have detailed in the rounds before. You can entirely agree with your interlocutor that raping children is right (since that statement just reports their approval of child rape) even when you think raping children is wrong without falling into contradiction. No contradiction, no disagreement.Moral InfallibilityCon, if I'm not mistaken here, seems to be advocating some sort of fictionalism (correct me if I'm wrong). That is, he's arguing that we don't have to take statements such as "it's right to abort this baby (in circumstance x)" as aiming toward a literal, objective truth but we merely talking as if it was true. That might be the case if subjectivism were the true, but that's the exact issue at hand. And, this goes back to the presumption that the a good reason to assume that moral disagreement is a real phenomena is because the vast majorityy of us take it be so, and absent defeaters (like reasons given for the truth of subjectivism), we are justified in taking it to be so. This takes us back to the contention that Con and his girlfriend wouldn't be having an actual, genuine, disagreement if there is no contradicting taking place. My point about moral deliberation is just this: if subjectivism is true rational considerations and reasons don't play any role is the deliberative process because it reduces those considerations and reasons down to mere whims and tastes. "When engaging in this deliberation,when asking yourself these questions, you assume, so it seems to me, that they have answers. You try to @257;nd out what the (better) answers to these questions are, and how they interact so as to answer the arch-question, the one about what it makes most sense for you to do. You are not trying to create these answers....Thus, deliberation should be distinguished from the making of an arbitrary choice....It is worth noting how similar the phenomenology of deliberation is to that of trying to find an answer to a straightforwardly factual question: When trying to answer a straightforwardly factual question (like what the difference is between the average income of a lawyer and a philosopher) you try to get things right, to come up with the answer that is - independently of your settling on it — the right one. When deliberating, you also try to get things right, to decide as— independently of how you end up deciding— it makes most sense for you to decide..." [4]If this is a correct account of deliberation, and it seems to be so, then, yes, Con deliberating on his father's reasons supports my case against non-subjectivism. Because, on non-subjectivism, you are creating these answers, not discovering them. And if we have good reason to believe that moral deliberation is real, then we have good reason to reject subjectivism.ArbitrarinessCon seems to miss the point. If Con disapproves of raping girls because of the reasons he mentioned that must mean that there is some prior and independent moral fact (besides just his disapproval) by which he judges those reasons sufficient to render his disapproval. That would refute subjectivism because subjectivism categorically denies that there moral facts independent of Con's attitude of disapproval. On the other hand, if Con does not disapprove of rape for those or similar reasons that would mean that his approval/disapproval has no or arbitrary reasons for his approval/disapproval. That would put subjectivism in a difficult spot as well.Sources[1] http://stephenlaw.blogspot.com...[2] http://philosophy.wikia.com...[3] http://en.wikipedia.org...In epistemology, phenomenal conservatism (PC) holds that it is reasonable to assume that things are as they appear, except when there are positive grounds for doubting this. A later formulation, designed to allow the principle to encompass inferential as well as foundational justification, reads as follows.-If it seems to S that p, then, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has at least some degree of justification for believing that p. http://en.wikipedia.org...[4] http://www.academia.edu...