The "I was just following orders" defense should not shield soldiers from criminal culpability.

Thanks for a thought-provoking argument CiRrK. I will begin by addressing my opponent's two contentions, followed by a brief defense of my own arguments from the previous round.Con CaseC1: Victor's JusticeThe Victor's Justice objection suggests atrocities committed in times of war should not be punished because the moralistic-legal decisions will always favor the winning side. This would not only excuse individual soldiers responsible for committing war crimes, it would also excuse the superiors who issued abusive orders in the first place. The consequence of CiRrK's argument is to shield all war criminals on the losing side from criminal culpability. If the Victor's Justice objection has any weight, then it would mean Nazi war criminals were unfairly punished after World War 2. This result is unacceptable because it goes against our deepest moral intuitions to excuse the actions of Nazi war criminals just because they were on the losing side.There are two problems with the Victor's Justice objection. The first problem is that the Victor's Justice objection does not apply when the function of punishment is expressive or communicative. Recall my argument in R2 - the purpose of punishing individual soldiers is to send a message to other soldiers, the nation, and the world (CiRrK offered no response). The underlying idea here is from Joel Feinberg's seminal essay "The Expressive Function of Punishment," in which Feinberg argues that punishment is justified because it provides a way for society to express disapproval of particular behaviors. Robert Nozick takes this one step further, arguing that punishment is primarily communicative: it sends a message to the wrongdoer that what he or she did was wrong. The purpose and function of holding individual soldiers responsible for committing military atrocities is thus twofold - to convey a message to war criminals that what they have done was wrong, and to express disapproval of abusive conduct on a societal level. The Victor's Justice objection does not apply because it has no relevance to the purpose and function of the punishment, which is explicitly political and partial.The second problem with the Victor's Justice objection is that it is not relevant to the evaluation of the superior orders defense. The only thing the Victor's Justice objection establishes (if it is the case that it establishes anything) is that soldiers on the losing side of a war cannot be punished for their war crimes. But what about the war criminals from the winning side? The point is, regardless of whether soldiers on the losing side are not subject to trial and punishment, soldiers on the winning side still are. Therefore, even if the Victor's Justice objection holds, it still admits that the superior orders defense should not excuse soldiers who commit military atrocities. In fact, CiRrK's Victor's Justice analysis says absolutely nothing about the superior orders defense precisely because there is no connection between the Victor's Justice objection and the superior orders defense. The evaluation of either one is completely independent of the other.C2: Self-Defense JustificationCiRrK claims the superior orders defense is an extension of the "inherent right of self-defense." The problem with CiRrK's argument is that falsely conflates the two because it assumes committing a military atrocity to save one's life or family is the moral equivalent of committing a military atrocity solely because a commanding officer orders one to do so. The two may be similar, but morally, the two are completely different. Think about it this way: in the case of self-defense, the issue at stake is the life of oneself or one's family, but in the case of superior orders, the issue at stake is obedience or disobedience. The two issues at stake in each defense are not morally equivalent. The moral value a person should place on their life and family far outweighs the moral value a person should place on obeying their superior. Hence, the individual soldier can invoke self-defense as a legally viable explanation for his actions, but a soldier cannot invoke the superior orders defense.The problem with CiRrK's second argument - the superior orders defense should be viable in asymmetric warfare - is that it redefines military atrocities to include situations that are not included. If a soldier kills a single non-combatant because of asymmetrical warfare, the action can be justified in a court of law, not because the soldier was following orders, but because the soldier feared for his life. This has nothing to do with the superior orders defense, which is a defense invoked to justify military atrocities, massacres, genocide. The moral evaluation of an individual soldier who commits genocide has nothing to do with asymmetrical warfare. As such, CiRrK's asymmetric warfare objection is irrelevant.Pro CaseC1: Moral JudgmentCiRrK argues soldiers should not be held responsible for their actions because they have desensitized moral reasoning. I disagree. The first problem with CiRrK's argument is that it conflates desensitization to violence with desensitization to moral reasoning. The Williams' analysis CiRrK himself provides indicates that some soldiers "experienced an increase in moral character while others declined." The truth is, military training teaches moral thinking because combat requires moral decision-making. The fact that moral training is even given in the first place furthers my point: the capacity of each individual soldier to make a "moral choice" is not compromised by either military training or combat (as the purpose of training is to desensitize soldiers to combat precisely so that they can make moral decisions without being compromised).Another point to consider is whether desensitized moral reasoning makes soldiers less culpable. For example, if a drug addict commits armed robbery to finance his addiction, he or she would still be tried and punished for their crime, even though it will be apparent to anyone that the addict's moral reasoning was compromised by their drug addiction. Or if a man kills you because he mistakenly thinks you killed his mother, he will still be tried and punished, even though it will be apparent to anyone that his moral (and cognitive) reasoning was compromised by his mother's death. This brings me back to a point I argued in R2: ignorance of the law does not justify breaking the law. Just because a soldier does not recognize their conduct was abusive does not mean they should not be held responsible. If we take CiRrK's argument to its logical conclusion, it would not only excuse soldiers who commit military atrocities because they were following orders, it would also excuse soldiers who commit military atrocities because they thought they were doing the right thing. A belief that one thinks they are doing the right thing does not mean one is actually doing the right thing. This second point is important because it demonstrates that CiRrK's argument is is irrelevant: the fact that each soldier has a "capacity" for a "moral choice" is enough to hold them individually responsible for their actions.C2: The Expressive Function of Punishment and its ConsequencesIn R2, I argued that punishment serves an expressive and communicative function: it conveys a message of disapproval to soldiers, the nation, and the world. This is the primary function of punishment. The consequence of not conveying this message, logically-speaking, would be an increase in the number of military atrocities that soldiers commit. It is important to express democratic ideals like individual responsibility and political freedom in our laws by holding soldiers responsible for abusive conduct. The public expression of these ideals is important because it helps people develop into virtuous citizens, which in turn helps prevent military atrocities because soldiers are more likely to make moral decisions.