A Fetus is Not Morally Equivalent to a Mature Human

It's a pleasure to be debating Roy on this topic. Given his past record, I'm looking forward to a very fruitful debate. Pro advances several arguments as to why the fetus is not morally equivalent to a mature human being. [1] In responding, I will both advance a positive case for my position and respond to the arguments offered.1. Mental CriteriaA. Self-awareness?Why isn't a rock morally equivalent to a fully developed human (Hereafter FDH)? According to Pro, it is because a rock is not self-aware. Unfortunately, this is not analogous to the fetus. Additionally, this analogy can be seen to backfire.While the fetus cannot immediately exercise self-awareness, it has the inherent capacity as part of its nature to develop self-awareness. A rock, by contrast, does not have this inherent capacity. The analogy therefore breaks down. Moreover, suppose I am asleep, under general anesthesia, or in a reversable coma, such that I cannot immediately exercise my ability to be self-aware. Am I no longer morally equivalent to a fellow FDH? Of course not, it would be immoral to kill me under any of these circumstances. But can the functionalist criteria appealed to be Pro justify this? It seems not, for as soon as I can no longer execise self-awareness, I am no longer morally equivalent to a FDH. What Pro's rock analogy really proves is not that self-awareness is essential to moral equivalent, but that an inherent capacity for self-awareness is essential to moral equivalence. And it is precisely this capacity for self-awareness which the developing fetus has, even if it's not immediately exercisable. The latter is irrelevant to personhood. Indeed, this is affirmed by the very source Pro as support of his position!"In fact, philosophers often use the terms self and person interchangeably: a capacity [Emphasis mine] for self-awareness is necessary for full personhood." [2]Even worse is that self-awareness is a degreed property. If moral equivalence is determined by an aquired property, then "moral equivalence" and human rights comes in varying degrees. This means that those who are more able to exercise their self-awareness are more valuable than those who are less able. It's more plausible to argue that "Humans have value simply because they are human, not because of some acquired property they may gain or lose in their lifetime." [3]Finally, if by "self-awareness" pro means an immediately exercisely capacity for self-awareness, then the fetus might as well be morally equivalent to some FDH humans who are in a vegetative state or permanent coma. B. Perception and Memory?Here, both Pro's sci-fi and tree analogy fails for the same reason. The reason we would save a fully functioning human over one who is not properly functioning is because the former has more utility and is more familiar to us -- not because he is less valuable. As an counter-analogy, the fact that a mother may choose to save her own children from a burning building as opposed to a group of orphans does not mean that the latter group are less valuable. She does this only because her own children are more familiar and attached to her -- not because they are more valuable.The analogy is more of an exercise in our personal preferences than it is an accurate guide to moral equivalence. That being said, it's unclear as to how perception and memory count towards moral equivalence. Both are degreed properties and are thus vulnerable to some of the arguments offered in (A). Consider a blind, deaf, and mute adult with CIPA (Congenital Insensivity to Pain with Anhydrosis) who cannot perceive anything but who still has the capacity and is immediately exercising the capacity for self-awareness. Would this adult be morally equivalent to another FDH? Of course, perception has nothing to do with moral equivalence. Would those who have amnesia not be considered morally equivalent to another FDH? No. Memory is therefore irrelevant to moral equivalence. 2. Extrinsic ConsiderationsA. Life of the Mother?The reason that the life of the mother takes primacy over the life of the fetus is because for the most part, the mother has a much higher chance of survival than does the fetus, and not because the fetus is not morally equivalent to a FDH. All things being equal, it is better to save one than let two die. With that in mind, it is better to save the one who has the higher chance of survival. Thus, the life of the mother takes primacy for prudential reasons, and not because the fetus is morally inferior. B. Spontaneous Abortions?It is unclear how this is relevant to moral equivalence. There is a high infant mortality rate in the third world, yet virtually nobody (Including those who aren't proactive about stopping it) would think that they are not morally equivalent to FDHs. This seems to be more of an attack on the intellectual consistency of those in the pro-life camp than an argument against the unborn being persons. Moreover, this "confuses our obvious prima facie moral obligation not to commit homicide with the questionable moral obligation to itnerfere with natural death of a human person every instance. Clearly the former does not entail the latter." [4] As Norman Geisler points out, "Protecting life is a moral obligation, but resisting natural death is not necessarily a moral duty... There is no inconsistency between preserving natural life, opposing artificial abortion, and allowing natural death by spontaneous abortion." [5]3. The Case for Moral EquivalenceLet's say we had a photo album which chronicled my life development. The person depicted in those photos is the same person that I am now. Of course, some things have changed over time (I'm taller, for example), but I am still fundamentally the same entity in those photos -- just at different stages of development. Now, say we turn the pages back to my Kindergarten year. Is that me in those photos? Yes, it is me at a different stage of development. Now, suppose we turn all the way back to the first page. There, we see a sonogram image. Is that image of me? Yes. Like the other photos, it is simply me at a different stage of development. I remain the same individual throughout my development. Even the blastocyst which preceded the fetal stage was still me.After all, my mother gave birth to me, not a body that later became me when it was able to immediately exercise the capacity for self-awareness. She is my mother, not the mother of the body that would later become me. Similarly, my father is the father of me, not the father of the body that would later become me. It would be absurd to deny that I once was a fetus.However, if we assume a functionalist definition of personhood (Which, as we have seen, fails), then I came to be after my body came to be, since my body was not yet a person. But this is absurd. My mother was pregnant with me, not the body that would later become me. I was once a fetus and thus, if it is was wrong to kill me now, it was wrong to kill me then. [6] A fetus is therefore morally equivalent to a mature human._______Notes1. Actually, "fetus" is not the proper term here, since the fetal stage does not begin until the 8th week of development [Neil Campbell and Jane Reece, Biology 7th ed (Pearson: 2005) 979]. But since Pro is referring to the zygote/blastocyst stage, I will use fetus interchangeably with these terms.2. Handbook of self and identity (pp. 68-90). New York: Guilford Press, 2002. http://socrates.berkeley.edu... cited by Pro.3. Scott Klusendorf, "Advanced Pro-Life Apologetics" Biola University lecture notes4. Francis Beckwith, Defending Life: A Moral and Legal Case Against Abortion Choice (Cambridge University Press: 2007) 76 5. Norman Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues (Baker: 1989) 1536. Alexander Pruss, "I Was Once A Fetus: An Identity-Based Argument Against Abortion," http://www9.georgetown.edu...;