Three Philosophical Topics - 1F

Further, since he has supplied several arguments, several which I don't want to dwell too long upon (given the character limits), I'll try my best to have the length and detail of my counterarguments reflect the importance of the arguments being attacked. Before I begin, I want to reply to two comments my opponent has made, one which he never really expanded upon. In his introduction to hard determinism, he claims that "free will cannot be denied with denying our ability to reason", which is preposterous. Would he care to defend it? Reason is simply a mental faculty that helps us generate sound conclusions, while free will is some metaphysical property we are purported (falsely) to have - there is no necessary connection between the two. And on an irrelevant notion, he claims that my adherence to time travel and the consequence argument is contradictory - untrue. Determinism states that there is only on future IN CORRESPONDENCE to one past; if the past becomes different then so does the future. ===================== The Consequence Argument ===================== His first objection, that a main problem with this argument is that it takes a post hoc view of events, claims that it shows us nothing about the moment of decision. He misses the point of this argument by failing to see the stronger claim, let me explain by responding to his example: So given the case of Jack, we are enlightened by the fact that he has chosen to take R2. My opponent states that the incompatibilist tells us nothing new when we say he only could have taken R2 - for if the future was so, then in this instance it must be (in virtue of the simple fact that if A leads to B, and A happens then B must). The thing he misses is that I am also claiming that if we were to somehow constantly reverse time to when he is presented with the option of taking either road, he will ALWAYS TAKE R2 given the same set of causal chains in the past. Besides this obvious fact, I can't see how this argument is effective at all. You assume Jack has free will for the sake of argument, and then you conclude that we can't disprove the possibility of it? Unless you clarify on how this argument is both sound and relevant, it's not much of a threat to the power of the consequence argument -- that, as you admit in your first round, things will play out a certain way in the future in correspondence with the past. The reason why this argument is so strong is that you have to show free will exists without resorting to the idea of proving one can have alternative possibilities or choices - which you believe you can do. Now show me HOW you conceive of this. As well for the first objection, I fail to see the tenacity of his second objection. At this point I would have him clarify the point of his conclusion. If it's my failure to understand your argument, then I apologize but I'm struggling to see how it's an effective counterargument; for I am giving you the benefit of the doubt that you have an adequate grasp on this subject. ==================== The Source Model ==================== You misunderstand the source model - it does not imply that to have free will it must manifest in randomness - for how can one have control via randomness? I can imagine that something like a soul would be an adequate fulfillment for one who believes in free will and the source model - where his actions originate within himself but have no preceding conditions. Remember, the source model is one that describes CONTROL. So your ad absurdum fails to make a correct example - quantum particles have no control over their actions (they aren't conscious in even the most remote sense). Indeed, I think your responses to the source model need to be much more intricate than this. In your first round you claim that you can argue for free will even in the face of determinism and the idea that you can't resort to alternative possibilities as did the classical compatibilists - this is exactly what the consequence argument forces you to do. Therefore, you have to find a way to reformulate what you mean by free will, and I have yet to see one. ==================== The Godelian Argument ==================== To be honest, I don't know much about the philosophy of artificial intelligence, so this subject is relatively foreign to me. And while I can't comment on the validity of his argument, I do spy a premise that leads me to to doubt it - premise 5. Why would the ability of L(m) to predict one's actions in all circumstances, which fails, lead one to believe in the existence of free will? Simply because it can't predict all of m's actions doesn't mean all of m's actions are free. If you would expand on this idea, we probably will get more done. ==================== Argument from consciousness and experience ==================== I would ask of my opponent, why would a freedom-less consciousness become an illusion? Indeed, it seems obvious to me that there can be a conscious being without free will and my opponent has yet to demonstrate otherwise. The same with your argument from experience. Yes, we can internally recognize our decision making in a vague but definite manner, but when does incompatibilism deny decision making? It denies a certain TYPE of decision making, namely one with the free will smear, but it in no way would make such an absurd psychological claim as that. ==================== Conclusion ==================== My opponent's argument, for the most part, need to be expanded for me to see where he even is going. And indeed, several instances he has stated he will expand on this later - well I hope he does so sufficiently given that we only have one round left. I would recommend that he drop some argument unless he can fit them all with the character limits. ---References--- 1. . http://users.ox.ac.uk...