The Modal Ontological Argument for God is Logically Sound

Premise 1, and predicating existenceMy opponent now admits that a steak-hating vegan logically exists in this world. So does an immaterial transcendent steak-hating vegan, who exists in all possible worlds exist in this world? Well we can make an easy test by eating a steak and seeing what happens.Furthermore, if a steak-hating vegan exists in this world, but only in a "logical" sense, what is this supposed to mean? Then does God exist "logically" in this world as well?Pitbull still insists that we can predicate existence of the greatest possible being; in other words, "existence" is just part of the greatest possible being. But this is a special pleading. Why can't I say "the greatest possible vegetable" (which would include existence in it's definition)? Why can we predicate existence of God, but not other things? But I've shown that we cannot predicate existence of other things. Unless my opponent can show that God is "different" and that the rule applies to him differently, this is just a special pleading. Why assume God is any different than the vegetable which is necessary by definition?The reverse MOAI made some super cheesey diagrams to try and make this argument clear... Don't laugh. ;-)Now, assuming that existence can be predicated of God (which it can't, as I showed above) we have two options. Either God exists in all possible worlds, or he exists in none. And... Essentially what both my opponent and I are both doing is looking at just one square, or one possible world, and then saying, "Since we found God in one possible world, then he exists in all the rest, including this one." Or... "Since we didn't find God in one possible world, he doesn't exist in any of them, including this one."It's as if you knew: Ok, either every square is blue, or every square is red. Then you took a magnifiying glass, and just looked at one square, and saw "red". You could then conclude that all the other squares are red. Or blue, depending on what you saw under the microscope.Remember, possible worlds are hypothetical (metaphysical) situations. In this world, I am typing out my reply. In a different possible world, I went and ate a big breakfast instead. In other possible worlds, pigs fly, etc. etc.However, I've argued that there are possible worlds in which there are absolutely no omniscient beings, and no omnipotent beings, etc. That means in each of these possible worlds, God does not exist. This would make fig 2. true. I'm not talking about physical beings; rather, I'm talking about any sort of metaphysical being. This means, God, angels, men, Thor, etc.Now I've defended that there is a possible world in which God does not exist.The MAEMy opponent essentially states that gratuious suffering is incoherent, due to the fact of a maximally great being which exists in all possible world, and who wouldn't allow such a thing to go on. But is gratuious suffering more plausibly metaphysically possible? Let's see. Is there a possible world in which a young boy breaks his leg, with absolutely no good outcomes? Perhaps we imagined that the possible world ends shortly after he breaks his leg, so that there is ultimately no possible good outcomes at all.So we can see that it's quite possible for there to be suffering for no reason whatsoever. We can easily conceive of such a thing.Finally, I'd like to say that I don't think I've shown that to comprehend God is completely impossible, rather that it just seems dubious. Since to conceive of God seems dubious, as many Christians, (Aquinas and Augustine) have held, this puts more strength to the reverse modal ontological arguments, and the MAE. It just seems difficult to grasp the concept of a maximally great being. I'm not saying it's impossible to conceive of such a thing, just that it's doubtful.Many thanks to my opponent for the challenge! Happy voting! :)