Foundationalism is a sound theory of epistemic justification

Again, I deeply apologize for my round three forfeiture and encourage any judges to dock conduct points. "My opponent's point however fails to realize that even if empirical observations are not sufficient to yield justified belief, this does not prove that either (A) no justified belief is possible or (B) that foundationalism fails to justify the type of knowledge possible. " (A) Justified belief is possible, I never contended this, however the use of foundationalism to achieve it is impossible as there is no way to achieve an absolute truth except through inference. Pascal, in his Pensees, speaks of imagination as the tool man uses to create what he believes to be true, yet challenges its absolute truth. He says: “Imagination: It is the dominant faculty in man… Imagination depends on images. Images come from sense experience. Thus we find ourselves upside down: the highest thing in us—reason, the prophet of truth—is at the mercy of sensory imagination. ” My opponent may question this logic by arguing that some principles such as “the whole is greater than the part” or “effects have causes” are universally known. They are like software in our human computers (brains). Pascal asks how we can be sure we can trust this software to be true. The obvious answer is that we just see it, we “intuit” it. Pascal goes on to question even this intuition by asking “where did it come from? ” But this alley is unimportant in our debate today, for regardless, it has been shown that even what we believe to be absolute truths, (e. g. “effects have causes” and “the whole is greater than the part”) are a product of our own human intuition, in other words, our ability to infer. (B) I would like to remind my opponent that as Neg, I am simply obligated to “show why these arguments or reasons are either flawed or insufficient to justify foundationalism” which is the criteria that he imposed on round one. I have merely to show that the theory is flawed or adequately insufficient. "Foundationalism is based off of the idea that all justified belief necessarily comes back to a single (or set of) non-inferentially justified beliefs. " My question to pro is this: where do these non-inferentially justified beliefs come from? Throughout this debate he has given us no reason to suppose that these non-inferred beliefs exist, what they are, or where they are from, or who gave them to us. "Consider Descartes famous dictum, 'Cogito ergo sum' (I think therefore I am). Surely one is justified in believing that one's self exists out of necessity (meaning we know this non-inferentially) since the very action of calling one's existence into questions implies existence. " My opponent attempts to give an example of where foundationalism is proven to be true, however, Descartes’ “Cogito ergo sum” is an inference. Because he could think, he could logically infer that he existed. For Descartes to gain this knowledge non-inferentially, a higher being, or deity, perhaps would have to have told him so. For this occurrence to have happened, however, was not necessary. As human beings, we can create absolute truths through our inferences, but these truths are not simply givens conferred upon us from above; they must be deduced and construed. "Kant begins with the observation that we are in a state of 'temporal irreversibility', meaning that time goes 'forward' and not backward. The sequence of events has a certain temporal order. " Of this argument I fail to comprehend the relevancy. "I would ask my opponent why non-inferential knowledge must necessarily be an extension of perception. " My opponent in reference to his query brings up mathematics as his example. We know two plus two equals four to be an absolute truth, right? This would be correct, however this absolute truth was not achieved through non-inferential means. I was man’s imagination that created the “definition that entailed the sum. ” This truth is an extension of perception because it is the direct product of imagination, which, as Pascal observed, is the software of the human brain. Pascal asks how we can be sure we can trust this software to be true. The answer is: we “intuit” it. Thus, even the mathematical theorems we create are the products of our intuition.