Utilitarianism is an unsound ethical system

Overview: This is a debate of competing ethical systems. I have offered a number of ways to evaluate ethical systems: Ea) Evaluate the fundamental philosophical assumptions and premises on which the theory is based. Eb) Evaluate whether the system can reliably generate answers to ethical questions Ec) Evaluate whether the system can adequately account for “common sense” moral conclusions. These standards have been advocated by both sides of the debate – for example Pro appeals to b) in his original C3) and Pro says in R3: “How can one prove these assumptions? The only way is to appeal to our ethical intuitions and "common sense". ” We can use these standards to compare Util to the NAP and see that Util is consistently the better system NAP P1) Pro has never refuted my claim that utilitarianism can generate rights. My entire argument describing how utility justifies rights to free speech and property were NEVER disputed. Pro’s only response is that NAP generates “firmer” rights- a point I do not argue. I argue that these absolutist rights are a drawback. This means I capture a large amount of the benefits of NAP by providing some form of rights, while Pro must show that absolutist rights are required for an ethical system. P1 shows the comparative superiority of Util. In evaluating which system better accounts for common sense moral judgments,Util yields the appropriate valuation of rights while avoiding the pitfalls of absolutist rights. P2) The case of the drowning child shows how NAP fails to account for a very important common sense moral judgment- this is a standard Pro advocates in R3. P2 alone shows utilitarian is preferable since it better accounts for moral judgments. Pro tries to shoehorn in language about “moral desirability” that is totally absent from the NAP. Prior to the final round Pro never argued it was “morally desirable” to protect rights. Pro’s language is incommensurate with the NAP conception of rights- if the right to life is only the right not to be killed by aggression, how does saving a child from drowning relate? If something is “morally desirable” why isnt not doing that thing “morally undesirable,” and why do we not have obligations to refrain from what is morally undesirable? Pro only raises a crop of NAP inconsistencies in his final round. Pro is clear that ONLY acts that violate rights are wrong. The NAP is blind to the myriad of moral situations that do not involve a violation of rights. P3) Pro concedes the examples I list. These are cases where common sense acknowledges that some rights infringement are necessary- an absolute prohibition on pollution would shut down the global economy but NAP prohibits absolutely any infringement of rights. This contention shows the failure of the NAP to meet Ec. Strict adherence to the NAP would be restrictive of human interaction to the point of paralysis, also showing that the NAP fails to meet Eb. Trying to use the NAP to make security decisions would be catastrophic- wars always result in some innocent casualties so the NAP would bar even defensive military action. Utilitarianism is capable of navigating these situations with ease. P4) Pro misses my point- utilitarianism provides the tools to deal with uncertainty by evaluating probable cost/benefit. NAP absolutely prohibits rights violation which means it lacks the conceptual framework to evaluate uncertainty. This isn’t a case of “sometimes we don’t have all the facts,” this is a case where at an abstract level the NAP is incapable of yielding satisfactory conclusions in cases where action risks violation of rights. My defensive arguments don’t apply. Pro’s C1 argument was that imperfect knowledge means we can’t know what is right; my argument is that uncertainty is unavoidable and an ethical system must be able to account for it. My C1b said that uncertainty doesn’t invalidate a system, but I’m arguing that it is NAP’s inability to yield conclusions about how to handle uncertainty that invalidates the system. To clarify, I am NOT making the argument that sometimes we don’t know if rights will be violated and this means the NAP is invalid. What I am arguing is that the NAP is fundamentally unable to make satisfactory moral evaluations of cases with any risk of rights violation, which is almost every human action. Either risking the violation of rights is ok, or it isn’t. The fundamental question of the NAP is “does this act violate a right? ” and if the answer is “possibly,” strict adherence to the NAP bars that act. The NAP contains no justification for risking the violation of rights because of its absolutist nature. Thus even mundane activities like driving a car become immoral under the NAP. My C1c outlined exactly how utilitarianism IS able to yield decision making procedures in the face of uncertainty by generating rules that are likely to yield utility maximizing outcomes. We can justify a risk of harm by appealing to an overall maximization of utility. Pro has offered no explanation of how the NAP can deal with risk of rights violation. On this point alone I have shown that the NAP fails, it is a broken system that cannot reliably generate answers to ethical questions. P5) Pro ignores my criticism, saying I haven’t provided a good justification either. But even if that is the case, my argument has another level- the sheer size of the philosophical baggage the NAP carries makes it unreliable. A failure to justify the existence of rights, the specific rights NAP defends, a theory of property, etc. causes the whole project to collapse. Util is preferable just by virtue of simplicity alone. But I DID provide an explanation of the premises of util while Pro has NEVER justified the claim that rights exist despite my explicit demand in R2 that he do so. Pro vaguely talks about personhood and autonomy, but gives no explanation of how those yield an absolute right to property. I’m feeling generous, so here’s the justification for rights: they fall out of utilitarian principles of general welfare. At least one of our theories can explain why rights exist! On this point I provide two reasons why Utilitarianism better satisfies criteria Ec. Util C1) This argument is crazy. Experience is subjective- but we make all sorts of reliable conclusions based on experience. Any 5 year old can tell you which experiences people tend to enjoy more or less. My example of the satiated man is not pleasure neutral: a satiated man nibbling at a delicious meal will still have SOME pleasure, but it won’t be near as much pleasure as someone who is starving. Would anyone in the real world respond to this dilemma with the claim “well it’s just impossible to tell who will enjoy this meal more? ” Pro’s strategy here is just moving the goal posts- every example I provide manages to fit into Pro’s special categories where comparisons are possible. But the bottom line is even if only these special cases are possible for comparison, it still means utilitarian calculations are possible! I have outlined again and again how utilitarianism justifies practical decision-making factors, demonstrating that interpersonal comparisons ARE possible. Pro provides no explanation why subjective factors are inherently problematic- I have explained why they are morally relevant and how they don’t make decisions impossible. Pro clearly states he is not contending that all ethical systems are unsound- this means he MUST win that NAP is superior to win this debate. C2) Pro never refuted my account of motivation through its relation to consequences- thus utilitarianism successfully accounts for the moral relevance of motivation. Pro’s argument about people choosing to act wrong just plays into my C2b and C2c. People who choose to cause harm will cause more harm than those who don’t. C5) Again, Pro has completely conceded the Utility Monster as he doesn’t refute that happiness isn’t infinite so such a monster is impossible even as a hypothetical. This argument is really about whether individuals ever have an obligation to sacrifice for others. Again, Pro’s position doesn’t mesh with common sense- if I can save 1000 lives by donating one dollar to charity it is unequivocally wrong for me to keep the dollar. We would certainly condemn this in the real world. Pro explicitly says the ONLY way an act is wrong is if it is a knowing violation of rights. Pro’s justification for this extreme position is fluff- he just appeals to our “personhood” without explaining why or how this generates absolute rights. My justification for utilitarianism draws a clear line from what humans care about, what parameters are fundamental to all human decisions, to the ethical criteria of utilitarianism. I have clearly explained how utilitarianism treats all as equal. Pro would have you believe that pain and suffering are “just emotions,” but I would ask Pro to look the drowning child and his parents in the eye and say “Your suffering is just an emotion, and to say that I had an obligation to save this child would not value my rights fairly. ” Moreover, I have explained how rights are generated by utilitarianism- utilitarianism provides a much clearer justification for why we should value property rights than Pro’s vague reference to human autonomy. The well-being of all people is of fundamental ethical value- only by valuing the suffering of other as equal to my own suffering do I respect the equal value of all humans. Pro never refutes my argument that if we value our own well being we must value others as well. This is an independent argument for obligations to others that Pro simply ignores. Such an obligation disproves the NAP. C6) Pro concedes this contention but fails to acknowledge that my C6a shows that the NAP fails to account even for Pro’s own claims! Pro also concedes that the obligations of sacrifice are moderate- utilitarianism is best able to generate protection of property rights while acknowledging that we cannot simply ignore the suffering of others. C7) Addressed in C5.