Resolved: The Leibnizian Cosmological Argument is Sound - 4

TopicalityMust the PRO defend the God of Christian Theology to win the debate? Indeed, this is a strikingly important issue within the debate. To answer the aforementioned question, I remind the readers of the resolution: The Leibnizian Cosmological Argument is Sound. For me to win this debate I must only prove that the Leibnizian Cosmological Argument is sound and nothing more. It is implicit in the LCA that God is defined as the personal, necessary creator of the universe. If my opponent had any questions about this he could have asked prior to the debate starting. He was in no way obligated to accept when he did not understand the terms of the debate. Furthermore, this is the fourth time I have run this debate, and the fifth time presenting the LCA. It should be quite clear from a quick look at my debate history that I am defending God as the personal, necessary creator of the universe. My opponent has no excuse for not realizing this. He claims that my A. W. Pink quote draws confusion, however its purpose was simply to avoid semantics. I even made it clear in my original presentation of the argument that the second premise - and therefore the conclusion - referred to God as the personal, necessary creator of the universe. Instead of addressing my second premise, he cops-out and tries to think that the LCA must prove something that it does not claim to be able to. My opponent cannot from that the LCA is not sound by adding planks that are not in the actual argument. Finally, in my last round I claimed that I did not have to defend the God of Christian Theology, but decided to add clarification in stating that many of the attributes commonly attributed to God by Judeo-Christian belief are necessary truths that follow from the validity of the LCA. Even if they were not, I would not lose the debate as it is not my burden to prove them to be. I must simply prove the existence of God as the personal, necessary creator of the universe. Premise 1My opponent concedes the validity of P1 but denies the truth of modal logic and the PSR. His refutation is, and I quote, "I have not conceded that my opponent's formulation of modal logic or the PSR are necessarily valid - for the simple reason that I don't need to. " My opponent has to provide reasons why my conception of the PSR and Modal logic are wrong before he can dismiss them. As I cannot respond to refutations my opponent makes in the next round, they have been - for all practical purposes - conceded. Premise 2Telanian tries to tackle my second premise by denying that the cause asserted by P2 has a mind. I would note that first of all, his solar system analogy is false. Sure, the gravitational pull of the sun keeps the solar system intact, but the sun by no stretch of the imagination created the solar system. Now for more philosophical and scientific proof that the first cause must have a mind. My opponent does not respond to my example of N1 and P1, or a natural first cause and a personal first cause. I believe that my explanation was clear enough the first time around that my opponent should have understood it, so I will just quote it here as a conceded extension:"Now, the argument is not that God must exist because we do not currently have evidence of natural, non-contingent causes but rather that the idea of natural non-contingent causes is irrational. Consider this: a completely material cause is the first cause. This cause, known as N1, or the first natural cause, sparked the creation of the entire universe. N1 is a necessary being because as previously explained, an infinite number of contingent beings cannot explain their own existence. N1 is the reason the spacio-temporal world as we know it was created. It is the reason matter came into existence. But how is this possible? How can N1 create space and time? By definition, natural beings require space to exist within and are temporal. Also by definition, natural beings are composed of matter. How can that which is composed of matter also account for the creation of matter? On the other hand, suppose P1 is a necessary, personal being and serves as the first cause. Now we can logically explain the creation of space, time, and matter because a personal being may posses the qualities of being eternal, and may transcend the physical. It's will allows for the creation of that which it is not, the physical world. As demonstrated a necessary, natural being that is also the first cause is logically contradictory. Due to the inability for it to be anything but God, God himself must serve as the explanation of the universe's existence. "Now, my opponent might ask, "How do we know that a personal first cause has a mind? " Well, I would say that there are two kinds of necessary beings that can logically exist. The first is that of abstract symbols, like the laws of mathematics. The second is a personal mind. Because abstract symbols cannot cause anything, the cause must be a personal mind. Next he claims that I have not proved the existence of any necessary beings. This statement makes me wonder whether he has read my case and I have presented both a God and the laws of mathematics as existing necessary beings. He cannot deny the existence of God because I prove that a necessary cause must be the first cause, and that a necessary natural cause is incoherent. Therefore the only explanation available is a necessary personal cause. This refutation necessarily concedes that he believes the universe is a contingent being as all existing things are either contingent or necessary and he dismisses the possibility of a necessary being. He also concedes my P3 that the universe is an existing thing. Even if you reject this, I have shown that the universe is contingent by composition, and it is contingent for it could have failed to exist. I don't see what my opponent is getting at by rejecting the conception of a necessary being possessing the qualities of being eternal and unchanging. If the laws of mathematics could change, they would not be laws. If the first cause were not eternal, it could not have created time. These assumptions are properly basic. My opponents final attempt to win this debate is claiming that if God created A and A created this universe, then God did not create this universe. Even if he did not directly create this universe, the LCA still stands. The LCA states, "If the universe has an explanation of its existence, that explanation is God. " Indeed, it appears that even if the universe was not created by God, it must still be explained by God, and that would be sufficient to affirm. This is proved in a rather simple manner. My opponent has not refuted that a set of solely contingent beings could not explain their own existence. Therefore, a necessary being must explain the existence of all contingent beings. As I have already proved that I necessary natural being is incoherent, it must be a necessary personal being. Furthermore, as abstract symbols cannot cause anything, that personal being must be a mind. Thus we conclude that the necessary, personal creator of the universe is God. Premise 3Premise 3 have been conceded. ConclusionMy opponent decides to argue a red herring in this debate and leaves the LCA practically untouched throughout the debate. Do not let my opponent make new rebuttals in the final round. As it stands, the LCA is perfectly sound.