Moral subjectivism is false.

Again, thank to Rational_Thinker. My goal is to argue to argue that moral subjectivism is false and there is good reason to reject it. There a multiple, I think, fatal problems with moral subjectivism but I will only be canvassing a few of the most salient. They mainly take the form of reductio ad absurdum. [1] I take a lot of the inspiration for my criticisms from Michael Huemer. [2] Circularity and IncoherenceSuppose, as subjectivists will say, that saying that "x is good" (where anything can be plugged in for 'x') consists of the speakers approval of x. If we consider the idea that approval of x is a moral belief about the goodness of x then subjectivism really entails that "x is good" just means that the speaker "believes that x is good". If we are trying to figure out what exactly it means to say that some speaker thinks x is good we have to know what "good" is first. This leads to an infinite regression. If x is good = the speakers believes x is good then, naturally, the speaker believes x is good = [the speaker believes (the speaker believes x is good)]. Then [the speaker believes (the speaker believes x is good)] = [the speaker believes (the speaker believes (the speaker believes x is good))]. And on and on and on, ad infiintum. That is a very clear problem threatening the very coherency of moral subjectivism.No Moral DisagreementLet's say that the above objection doesn't go through and approval cannot be construed in terms of moral belief. Even then, moral subjectivism appears to have multiple absurd consequences that we have no reason to accept unless strong argument is given in it's favor. It's implies that there is no such thing as moral disagreement. In every day, normal moral discourse and dialogue we presume that we are actually contradicting each other when one person says that "abortion is wrong/bad" and the other says that it isn't (one can check the debates on abortion this very site as further evidence of this phenomena. People take themselves to be disagreeing on the issue of abortion). We take it as obvious that it simply can't be the case that both abortion is wrong and that it isn't wrong (controlling for context and the like). But moral subjectivism entails that this isn't the case because, remember, "x is good" merely means the speaker who thinks "x is good" approves of x. And it would be true that "x is good"; that is a psychological fact about that speaker. But another person can come along and say about the same x that the original speaker was talking about and truthfully say that "x is bad" - because that would merely be reporting the psychological fact that the second speaker disapproves of x. Note that both speakers aren't actually disagreeing on anything. They are both truthfully reporting their approval and disapproval with is all goodness and badness consists of on moral subjectivism. To make matters clearer: if person A says "I'm sad" and person B says "I'm not sad" they aren't really disagreeing on anything; they are just reporting their own feelings, and assuming they both reported their feelings accurately, it is the case that person A can be sad and person be could be not sad at the same time. I know when I say that "slavery is evil" I intend to contradict the person who says that slavery is not evil. I suggest most people do intend their moral pronouncements in the same way. But, again, if subjectivism were the case there would be no moral disagreement. There seems to be moral disagreement - or, at least, it's more reasonable to believe there is moral disagreement then there isn't - therefore subjectivism is false and we have reason to reject it.It also implies the following absurdity: Imagine a rapist says:1) I approve of raping children.2) Raping children is good.On subjectivism they both mean the same thing, even though they appear to be logically distinct. We would normally say that while they may approve of raping children it is not the case that raping children is good, but this distinction cannot be made on subjectivism.Moral InfallibilitySubjectivism has the absurd implication that everybody is morally infallible. I can say "if I approve of x (ANY x) then it is automatically good" and be truthfully saying it. Goodness of x = my approval of x on subjectivism. I can never actually be wrong about any of my moral beliefs which, again, seems to go against the view that many people take that when they talk about morality and make moral claims there is the possibility that they are wrong about them. It makes nonsense of claims like "I may approve of shooting random people, but is shooting random people actually right/good?" I can know that I can believe something but have doubts about it's truth status; the same seems to be true about moral matters. I can know that I approve of something, but have doubts about whether it is really good or not. But all of that goes out the window on subjectivism. Another reason to reject it.Arbitrariness Yet another problem rears it's head when we consider the simple question of why some approves of the things they do. It leads to an interesting dilemma. On one hand, if someone approves of x for some reason then it shows that that particular reason, and not that persons mere approval, explains why x is good. This would refute subjectivism because that means that someone's approval of x IS NOT equal to the goodness of x. That reason would be a moral fact that is independent of that persons' approval. That reason would have to be in some way desired. But, the other horn of the dilemma is this: if there actually is no reason why some approves of x then that approval is arbitrary and there is no principled way to evaluate that approval. This raises the difficult question of why someone approving of something for no reason at all (or arbitrary reasons) make something good. There seems to have to be a reason why approval makes something good. There appears to be no good answer to that question.Given that there are all these absurd implications of moral subjectivism and it's attendant incoherencies I think that renders it more than sufficient to show that moral subjectivism is false and ought to be rejected.Sources[1] http://www.iep.utm.edu...[2] Huemer, Michael. "Subjectivism." Ethical Intuitionism. 49-51. Print.