Theism v Atheism

The Improbability of Theism The Singularity and the Cosmological Argument My opponent’s case against the singularity has been reduced to the BGV theorem, which he claims “says that any space-time reality which is in a state of inflation must have came to be”. This is just false. The BGV theorem claims in fact: “Thus inflationary models require physics other than inflation to describe the past boundary of the inflating region of spacetime.”[1]. In other words, it shows simply that the Big Bang Theory, without an explanation of the ‘past boundary’ (the beginning of time), “is not sufficient to provide a complete description of the Universe”1. The singularity is the explanation of the past boundary. Moreover, I ignored the Hawking quote because it was redundant to my case: but of course, my opponent can also argue against Hawking’s belief that there was no beginning to the universe, if he so wishes. It does not change the fact that singularities are not mathematical abstracts but actual physical things. What my opponent cannot do, however, is concede a simultaneous creation, without debate. Are we really going to assume that, contrary to reason and intuition, a cause does not have to precede the effect? Craig states the causation principle is “philosophically unobjectionable”, yet my opponent must deny it in order to make his case work. I’d urge him to pick up this point he dropped regarding simultaneous causation, instead of brushing it under the carpet. Causation requires the cause to be temporally prior to the event, yet my opponent circumvents this basic law to justify his hypothesis. Now, whether the cause is personal or not my opponent has to prove, not I. To simply assume it is personal is nonsensical. As I’ve already stated, the universe’s existence has been easily explained in scientific causes: the Big Bang Theory being one among many (The Many Worlds hypothesis, for example, or Oscillating Universe). Secondly, agent causation gives no justification for a timeless cause: this just begs the question of “why so?” What is it the agent can do, that an object cannot? Moreover, why is it that a non-sentient cause can do things in any other way? In my experience, sentient beings like animals act in many more differing ways than gravity. Similar to the moral agent case, and despite my opponent’s platitudes to dissuade the rebuttal, there is no reason to suppose a sentient creator of the universe. Moreover, my opponent’s fourth point brings up an interesting point: name a non-physical cause. None come to mind. Just like numbers, they are useful tools for analysis, but are not real like, say, your computer, or your eyes. Yet God is not physical – he does not take up space nor is in time. Therefore, we’re left with something in the same category as numbers: an abstract. By contrast, the singularity, being an object which takes up space and acts within time (being the first cause at t=0), is neither a mind nor an abstract, yet still the most viable explanation for the universe. The Ontological Argument My opponent fails to give any examples of necessary existent beings (apart from his God-exception), revealing Hume is correct that existence is not a property. 2 for example does not exist like my eyes exist, yet again God is closer to the abstract than anything physical. Moreover, any mathematician will tell you that “2+2=5” isby definition not just logically incoherent but inconsistent[2]. Second, my opponent claims God’s greatness has maximum values, yet islands do not. I say: says who? Anselm’s objection was discarded quickest by Aquinas, another Christian, by pointing out that God is too great to be conceived, and has no limits. Maimonides before him said the same thing. This again begs the question why the excellence of the island is distinct from the excellence of a deity. Finally, the idea that there could be a better universe is intuitively obvious. My opponent is in essence claiming the universe is perfect: no improvement can be made. For if a single child did not have to suffer so badly from malaria, the universe would be a worse place. This is absurd, if not just abhorrent. The Moral Argument Firstly, my opponent has not shown morality exists. Secondly, he has not shown that the commands from an authority count as morality, and not simply despotism in practice. Thirdly and finally, I never stated morality is not objective, I stated his prescriptivism from an authority is de dicto not objective. My opponent needed to show atheism leading to moral nihilism, and not simply assert it without foundation. The Case Against God Falsification First, I never stated Kierkegaard was not fideist: I stated my case is a Kierkegaardian one – it comes from an argument made by Kierkegaard that God cannot be proved. The contingency argument is Thomist, yet I’d be wrong to assume my opponent is Catholic as a result. The “Too Hasty” case seems to just quote how Kierkegaard believed arguments cannot prove God, and his strawman response repeats the fact. While it is interesting to note this due to how my opponent is using evidentialist apologetics, the only real criticism is the self-defeating claim: that God is meaningless means God cannot be inexistent. Yet, what else can we conclude? My opponent even claimed “Inexistence is no more a property than contingent existence”, implying inexistence is not a property. A meaningless statement certainly cannot be true, so how can this argument leave room for God’s existence? I want to move my opponent’s rebuttal of falsification mostly into evil, where it is more appropriate, but I want to refer to two key things first. Firstly, my opponent stated God’s love is “It’s an “in house” reminder to folks who are already theists that God cares for us even in the hard times.” I’ll quote Flew’s response: “We are reassured. But then we see a child dying of inoperable cancer of the throat. His earthly father is driven frantic in his efforts to help, but his Heavenly Father reveals no obvious sign of concern. Some qualification is made — God's love is "not merely human love" or it is "an inscrutable love," perhaps — and we realize that such suffering are quite compatible with the truth of the assertion that "God loves us as a father (but of course…)." We are reassured again. But then perhaps we ask: what is this assurance of God's (appropriately qualified) love worth, what is this apparent guarantee really a guarantee against? Just what would have to happen not merely (morally and wrongly) to tempt but also (logically and rightly) to entitle us to say "God does not love us" or even "God does not exist"? I therefore put to the succeeding symposiasts the simple central questions, "What would have to occur or to have occurred to constitute for you a disproof of the love of, or the existence of, God?"”[3] Evil My opponent seems to complicate my case by adding in segments he has surely heard from others who propose it. My case is simple. Consider the Boxing Day Tsunami: hundreds of thousands of people died suffering painful horrible deaths. Is it more reasonable that an infinitely powerful being existed who could stop the act, and "There's an excellent reason for why [he] did not intervene, but it's just way too complicated for you to understand”[4], or that there is not an omnibenevolent, omnipotent deity. The moral maxim of “prevent evil” is universally binding, and so we must conclude that if evil occurred under the watch of a being which could stop the evil, that person is certainly not good. Just as we’d condemn an armed man watching a rape and not attempt to stop it, we can condemn any omnipotent deity for doing the same thing a million fold. Therefore, the question only is: has an evil act taken place? If my opponent wishes to argue so, then I shall be very interested in the gymnastics. A “threshold” of evil of course is nonsense: if an act is morally better to have occurred than not, then it is a morally good act. Evil, necessarily, requires the lack of good, so all evil is an infringement on benevolence, so any evil is incompatible with omnibenevolence. The idea that God has a plan goes along the same lines: what is more likely? God has a plan too complex for us to understand, or that the rape of children and painful death of hundreds of thousands of innocent people is wrong? And my opponent’s final theodicy was “it’s impossible to know this [moral] baseline”. Again, is it more likely that God has a baseline too complex for us to understand to justify evil, or that arbitrary luck depends on whether someone is brought up in a rich family in Sweden or a child soldier in Sudan? I want to also revisit my argument from technology. Think: the greatest luxuries of the aristocracy in the 19th century pales in comparison to the luxuries of the working class today. The kings in the 10th century would be jealous even of the lives of the average person in Bosnia or Botswana. When God created the world, surely life would be better if it started, say, last Wednesday, instead of so many thousands of years ago, with so many tormented, suffering lives? This is not, to be clear, a case from ignorance: I put it that the average life today, by any meaningful standard, is objectively better than hundreds of years ago. Any right-minded creator would not force humanity through such suffering for some indeterminate end. Unless the creator, simply put, does not exist. I pass over to my opponent for his final input, which ought to be a short summary of the debate. Thank you. [1] http://arxiv.org... [2] http://logic.philosophy.ox.ac.uk... [3] http://www.stephenjaygould.org... [4] Vuletic, The Tale of Twelve Officers