Objectivism fails to describe an adequate meta-ethical answer for the is-ought problem.

However, in her speed it seems she has misunderstood much of my arguments, so I will do good to clarify and elaborate in this round to demonstrate why the criticisms are currently insurmountable. ==================== Touching upon auxiliary issues ==================== "Believing in moral objectivism does not necessarily mean that one particular action is always right or always wrong, so Pro's introductory argument about meta-ethics is wrong. " ----> I stated that objective moral systems have in place an objective moral STANDARD - whether it be evaluating the consequences of actions or the actions themselves. For utilitarianism, the standard is the greater good while for Kantian ethics the standard is the categorical imperative. However, besides this impasse it seems that both of us agree that Objectivism is not the only objective moral system, so there is no further discussion needed on this point. ==================== Criticism of Objectivist meta-ethics : Existence as the ultimate value of all living beings ==================== There is a distinct misunderstanding in my opponent's counterargument. I never stated that praying mantis' don't value their lives - they obviously do to some extent given the fact that they attempt various measures to avoid becoming meals. However, the key is that Rand talks of existence as an ULTIMATE value that animals and plants supposedly adhere to. If this was an empirical fact then mantis' wouldn't give a damn about their species propagation but rather fend for themselves (after all, what happens to their species in the future has no bearing on their life now). Furthermore, even if mantis' are inadequate examples there is a plethora in the animal kingdom. Take tigers for example; the male leaves the female after copulation[1], meaning the female is burdened with having to take care of cubs (resulting in more work and danger). If Rand is attempting to ground part of her philosophy in empirical facts, then what she must realize is that because of evolution, it can be the case that one's survival is NOT the ultimate value - the end of all ends. Propagating your future generations mostly, if not always, has negative effects on your own survival. Just refer to my example of animals who mate and get pregnant, with knowledge that their partner will likely leave them. Obviously, we know that survival is not always an animal's ultimate value because of how evolution works. "Life makes values possible. Regardless of what values or ethics Pro would present as a basis for morality, the reality is that unless a living being existed to implement these values or benefit from them, then they would be completely useless. Thus sustaining life is the ultimate value to implement other ethics, and choosing good over evil as a means to live that life is obviously preferred. " ----> My opponent actually brings up an important point about Objectivism that leads to it's downfall. Objectivists state that since one would need life to have values, then life must be the foundation for value - the ultimate value one could say. Even if we are to accept this reasoning (which is ludicrous in itself), we are presented with a problem of choosing what to hold as an ultimate value. Is rationality not necessary for values, and the obtainment of them, to exist? You see, Objectivism reveres rationality as the primary virtue since it's what helps one sustain life but NOT as the ultimate value. Why should values be based on the achievement of one's own well-being but rather something to do with rationality? Even if life is necessary for rationality, there seems to be no reason why one should simply choose life as the ultimate value instead of rationality. ==================== Criticism of Objectivist meta-ethics : Life or death as the fundamental value choice ==================== "My opponent proposes that if one chooses an action that promotes death over life, such as a utilitarian accepting death for the purpose of a greater good (or rather not having their own life as a motive for their goal), then this disproves Rand's overall theory. " ----> NO. I clearly stated in my argument that this was not meant as a direct attack on Rand, but rather to demonstrate that Rand's reasoning, the idea of choosing either life or death as a suitable justification for Objectivism, is flawed. Let me elaborate: As discussed before, Rand states that life is the ultimate value and subsequently the foundation for her meta-ethics. One of her ways to prove this is so is to point out that one either lives or doesn't. She then proposes that if one doesn't act with life as the ultimate value, then it's death. And since most people who are living desire to continue living, life then serves as the ultimate value for others. Here is where my criticisms come in: I will take a charitable interpretation and assume she means that if we don't choose life as an intrinsic value (Objectivism believes in value monism, after all) then this means we put ourself in a higher probability of death -- after all, just because I do something that does not see life as my ultimate value does not mean I will automatically die or commit suicide when I can (otherwise the only people living right now would be consistent Objectivists). However, right away we can see this is a futile attempt to ground Objectivism; so what if one doesn't act on the standard of life? This doesn't lend any credence to the Objectivist philosophy - as my opponent aptly points out. If a utilitarian came up to you and said you were acting contrary to the standard of Utilitarianism, and then used this as evidence for utilitarianism, you'd rightly call him out on a ludicrous argument. But once you submit to this, then you should also realize that Objectivism is guilty of the same crime. ==================== Criticism of Objectivist meta-ethics : Life or death as the fundamental value choice ==================== "Instead, an Objectivist would argue that a harmony of interests exists among rational individuals, so that no one's benefit need come at the price of another's suffering. Because one person's happiness does not come at the expense of another's, a life of mutual respect and benevolent independence is possible for all. " ----> This explanation of the Objectivist view of stealing irrevocably boils back down to my point; you don't steal because of the negative consequences that happen to you (being sent to jail, societal backlash, etc. ). You state one's happiness does not come at the expense of others, but what lends credence to this claim? For rapists and sadists, their happiness very well depends on the expense of others. In fact, this glaring problem is commonly addressed by ethical egoists - which Objectivism is - by following some sort of idea influenced by the social contract theory. If this is so, then the problem of getting an absolute from a shady generalization becomes VERY clear. "Additionally, Pro claims that Objectivists on this website wonder why one would avoid doing things like drugs. He then says that he doesn't believe that there is a right/wrong code of morality, and instead, that morality is subject to preference. " ----> I mentioned the Objectivists on this website for the sake of rhetoric; I had no substantial meaning behind it (I did assume that the Objectivists here had a fairly accurate representation of Objectivism, so if you want to dispute that sure). Furthermore, I stated that the decision to live or not is a matter of preference, NOT MORALITY. ==================== Conclusion ==================== I'm not arguing that Rand believes one must value existence in all circumstances - but her support of this general rule (that life is the intrinsic value) is incredibly flawed and unsupported. ---References--- 1. . http://en.wikipedia.org...