Kalam Cosmological Argument for God is Invalid

Thank you, mecap, for not throwing a fit and running away, as I'm sure many people would do. I'll start by fixing a typo I made in the first round. P1 of Cliffton's argument should read "P → ~Q" rather than "P → Q." Pro is trying to have his cake and eat it too. In his attempt to salvage his case, he equivocates wildly over the meaning of "valid," alternating when convenient between his "colloquial" definition and my technical definition. This makes his rebuttals, especially Rebuttal 4, extremely difficult to follow. Rebuttal 1: Pro did not offer a definition of "valid" in the first round. This is not a trivial issue. According to the National Forensics League, important definitions should be given in the 1AC.[1] Because no binding definition was set out in the framework, this leaves the debate open to interpretation. Moreover, "an expert definition from an economics or legal dictionary or encyclopedia would be preferable to a standard dictionary."[2] This is a philosophical debate centered on formal logic. It's not at all unreasonable to demand that a proper technical definition of the word be used. Note that this IS a voting issue. Anyone who sides with Con is engaged in judicial activism. If you must, deduct a conduct point from me, but there should be no ambiguity over which side wins arguments. Rebuttal 2: Pro points out that the IEP article I cited includes a disclaimer at the bottom. But this is a genetic fallacy and totally irrelevant unless he intends to actually dispute the content of the quote I cited. The meaning of "valid" and "sound" are not at all controversial. Strangely enough, Pro seems to concede this himself. He goes on to cite a second source that basically re-iterates what I already said. His source states: "to show that an argument is invalid, we must give an example of a possibility in which the premises could be true and the conclusion false at the same time." He claims that Cliffton's argument demonstrates that this is the case with the KCA, which is patently false. He even goes so far as to insinuate that I've conceded this point, which is again false. I have conceded that Cliffton's argument is logically valid. However, as I've pointed out, the two arguments begin with different causal premises, and thus both can be valid though only one can be sound. Rebuttal 3: Pro is just repeating Rebuttal 2, claiming that Cliffton's argument demonstrates that even if the premises of the KCA are true, the conclusion is false. To support his claim, Pro asserts that I've conceded Cliffton's argument is valid. But again, I've only conceded that the argument is logically valid, I haven't conceded that it is "valid" with respect to Pro's colloquial usage of the term. Pro is guilty of equivocation. The premises of the two arguments are mutually exclusive. If Cliffton's premises are correct, then the KCA is indeed unsound, but it is not logically invalid as Pro is attempting to prove here. This is not debatable. The KCA is simple modus ponens argument. I'll re-state it here for emphasis: (1) P → Q (2) Q (3) P Anyone who disputes the logical validity of this argument is mentally deficient and has no business either debating or judging debates. Rebuttal 4: First of all, Pro doesn't even understand his own argument. If P1 of his argument is correct, then P1 and P2 of the KCA are false. End of story. I'll say it again, because Pro apparently still doesn't get it. Just because an argument rests on false premises does not mean that it is logically invalid. Second, Pro incorrectly claims that my summary of the KCA doesn't included the entire argument. The KCA consists of two premises and and one conclusion. Graham Oppy has actually criticized the argument for being overly simplistic. Craig responds that a successful argument need not have "dozens of complex premises. The supporting arguments and responses to defeaters of the argument's two basic premises can proliferate in an almost fractal-like fashion."[3] But let's play along with Pro just for fun and pretend steps 4 and 5 are part of the argument itself. We'll start by formalizing it: (1) P → Q (2) P (3) Q (4) Q → G (5) G So there you have it. The argument is still logically valid. Pro's superfluous addition of a supporting argument doesn't change anything. Conclusion: Not only is Pro a moron who doesn't know what words mean, he apparently can't even be consistent in the application of his own incorrect definitions, and thus contradicts himself repeatedly. In Rebuttals 2 and 3, Pro tries to show that the KCA logically invalid by demonstrating that it's unsound. In Rebuttal 4, he tries the converse. He fails hard on both fronts. Resolution negated. Vote Con. 1. http://www.nflonline.org... 2. Ibid. 3. Craig, William Lane, and James D. Sinclair. "The Kalam Cosmological Argument." The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology. Ed. William Lane Craig, J.P. Moreland. John Wiley and Sons, 2009. pg 102. OFF CASE: Everything below this point is irrelevant to the judging of the debate. The following is for informative purposes only. Objection 1 to the KCA's causal premise: I do indeed disagree with Pro's ontological reductionism. Reductive materialism is a total joke; it's self referentially incoherent and virtually all secular philosophers have moved on to non-reductive forms of materialism, namely functionalism and property dualism. I endorse the latter. However, this isn't particularly relevant to the debate. The statement "Dr. Craig began to exist" only implies a formal or an efficient cause. The KCA attempts to establish that God is the material cause of the universe. Objection 2: Pro claims that that the universe can't begin to exist because of the First Law of Thermodynamics. But as Victor Reppert points out, the laws of thermodynamics are just inductive, empirical constructs describing the behavior of closed physical systems.[1] It's not logically impossible for matter to be created or destroyed. The proposition "X is logically impossible" is true if and only if there are no possible worlds wherein X obtains.[2] For example, the existence of square circles or married bachelors is logically impossible. Pro is making a nomological claim that the creation of matter and energy is impossible, which begs the question with regards to physicalism. Objection 3: Pro claims that causes can't be applied to things that don't exist. But things that begin exist are not formerly non-existent things that become existent. By definition, non-existent things don't exist. The idea behind creatio ex nihilo is not that X undergoes some change and subsequently becomes A or B, it's the idea of X simply becoming. As I previously pointed out, there is no reason to think this is logically impossible. Moreover, according to physicist Paul Davies, the consensus view among cosmologists is that matter and energy really did begin to exist at the singularity.[3] 1. Reppert, Victor. "The Argument From Reason." The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology. Ed. William Lane Craig, J.P. Moreland. John Wiley and Sons, 2009. pg 382. 2. http://en.wikipedia.org... 3. Craig, William Lane, and James D. Sinclair. "The Kalam Cosmological Argument." The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology. Ed. William Lane Craig, J.P. Moreland. John Wiley and Sons, 2009. pg 130.