If God is sovereign in the Calvinist sense, then universalism should be true.

I. The problem of arbitrariness1. We're not in a position to say why God didn't save one more person.First, I think Con is simply missing the point of my argument here. It's not an argument from ignorance. The line of logic in my argument gives good reason to thin that all should/will be saved or one runs into unpalatable theological arbitrariness. If Con wants to deny the reasons/implications of the argument it will not do to simply leave it at a charge of an argument from ignorance.Second, Con's charge of me basically changing my argument doesn't stick. Because a) benevolence is essentially being used as a synonym for goodness and b) nothing hangs on me using "goodness" and "benevolence" interchangeably. If they are not the same thing, then surely "benevolence" would be a good making property. When people say God is all good, benevolence (among many other properties like love, kindness, mercy, just, etc) is subsumed under that set of all those good-making properties. Benevolence would just be one specific aspect of God's goodness.2. Pitting God's goodness in saving people against his goodness in displaying his wrath. Of course, this seems to miss my point where I elucidated that wrath - properly understood in the rehabilitative sense - is good. No one would argue that that wrath simplicter is good. No one would argue that a husband's wrath who flies into a jealous rage and beats his wife in his wrath because of his insecurities is good. But ignoring that point, even understanding wrath in a retributivist sense, as I've argued, that is no stumbling block to him saving all humans (i.e demonstrating his wrath on demons/satan). It might be "good" to demonstrate wrath on humans, but it'd be better if it was demonstrated without the damnation of a single human (because, after all, humans hold a special, valued place within Christian theology). All of this argument works even on the assumption that humans do not deserve anything from God - it could simply be that demons/satans deserve salvation even less than humans.3. It ignores the fact that everybody who is damned deserves it, but nobody who is saved deserves it.Again, Con misses the point. He seems to to want to frame the entire debate in terms of God's moral obligations to his creatures. The thing is, my argument doesn't depend on that. God could have no moral obligations whatsoever (which is what certain versions of Divine Command Theory entail) and still be motivated by his good making properties (like loving, kindness, mercy, justice, etc) to save all human beings. For example, it may not have been required (in the morally obligatory sense) for Mother Theresa to devote so much of her time to helping the poor and sick, but her character or nature was such that she literally could not live without helping people in this sense. Not required but unavoidable, nonetheless. I'm talking about much the same situation would obtain with God. It's simply uncontroversial to say if God doesn't display some essential good making properties, then God isn't good. That's the whole thrust of my argument.Con's point about it only being evil to damn people if they don't deserve it seems patently false in any case. Imagine there is a father to three unruly and disobedient children. He constantly tells them over and over again not to disobey him and skate on the ice when it is thin because the ice might break and they might die. He even shows them what would happen as they freeze and drown to death. Perhaps they even curse him as a fool for even suggesting such a thing. Being the unruly and disobedient children they are, they don't listen to him and, just like father said, the children fall through the ice and start drowning and suffocating. Father jumps in the water and only saves one of the children even though he could've saved all three. He wanted to "make an example" of the other two. In one sense, they deserve exactly what they got; Father told them not to do it. But, when reflecting on the notion of Father being a good person (loving first and foremost) if Father did not save his children even when he could have that seems to vitiate against the claim that Father is a good person.My point here is simply that if God is love is discriminatory in the sense that Con claims and if God is sovereign in the sense Con claims than the PoE remains for those who want to deny universalism. Pointing to bible verses doesn't resolve the internal theological, philosophical, and moral problems. The charge of changing arguments, again, doesn't stick because notions of "infinite love" and "omnibenevolence" are intimately tied with the notion of "perfect goodness". And if we were to subscribe to perfect being theology (as is implicit in this debate) then it would be better that God's love extends to all humans rather than some. It might be that God could get by on lesser goods - I have no idea if that's true or not - but surely not at the expense of greater goods that could be actualized.II. Calvinistic universalism2. It could be that God's wrath poured out on the reprobate enhances our appreciation of Christ's sacrifice.My argument is not too modest because Con seems to take a overly restrictive view of "intractability" here. If the best and most plausible answer to the logical problem of evil is that ducks are awesome, therefore a good God could coexist with evil, then I'd certainly say we'd have an intractable problem of evil on our hands. If the most "plausible" answer is that implausible that is not a good thing. It might be possible that is why God allows evil, but it's not plausible. In any case, I see no reason why my argument must be cast in terms of logical impossibilities/possibilities like Con seems to think. It could be cast in an evidential problem of evil fashion, where plausibility judgements come into play more heavily. And I think my speculative scenarios are much more evidently plausible than Con's. If Con's scenario is the best on offer, it would seem the problem of evil in this context (with respect to sovereignty and universalism) remains intractable.III. The sovereignty of God in salvationOn the other hand, if the Bible allegedly teaches Con's (1) - (3), yet the theological system used to make sense of (1) - (3) entails - or gives good reason to deny - (3) if one does not want to sacrifice (2) (as no Christian should) then that would either imply that a) the theological system in question is inconsistent or b) God is not good. Which is exactly what I have been arguing. Mere logical or epistemic consistency can not do the heavy work of coming up with a plausible answer to the challenge. That'd be like arguing that the mere logical possibility of some esoteric theory of quantum gravity solves the intractable problem of how to reconcile general relativity and quantum mechanics given our current understandings of how they work.IV. God has a purpose in not saving all peopleAnd I'm arguing that given the line of logic internal to Calvinism generates a tension in the form of a PoE. It's not a matter of proving this or that doctrine from scripture (because otherwise my case would look a lot different); it's the matter of showing that given Calvinistic assumptions (and working within the Calvinistic theology) about God's sovereignty, universalism should obtain. If these theological points deriven from scriptures generate a PoE the intractable problem doesn't go away because of the fact they are deriven from scripture.ConclusionThanks for the debate, Con, and thank you every one for reading!