International Intervention and Human Rights Abuse by State Actors

I thank YYW for for a stellar, cordial debate. In this round, I shall confute Pro's original case, and then proceed to reconstruct my own case. First, however, I shall discuss the framework for the round.FRAMEWORKPro posits that " intervention in this sense is the intentional exercise of hard power to coerce a given end." Frankly, to exercise something is to use it, and a threat does not use hard power, it only suggests that it will be used. It seems then, that Pro's own explanations lack coherency. Pro fails to respond to my second objection to Pro's definition, which is that delivering aid is, in and of itself, not intervention. Extend this point.Pro then errs by hazarding that my definition fails to address the resolution. Pro asserts that intervention is not solely military force, but consider that Pro's own definition states "use of force" and "use of military personnel" and that Pro refers explicitly to "international military intervention" and "international humanitarian military intervention." It is very clear that Pro is referring to military action, and so here too Pro's objection to my definition lacks coherency.Based off of this analysis, I urge judges to prefer my counterdefinition.REBUTTALSC1: Humanitarian InterventionSA: Intervention failsPro oppugns the link between my example and my tag line. Regardless of the linkage to the tag line, the source is denotative of how intervention and R2P fails. We must also remember, that Kenya is the only nation in which R2P was explicitly invoked, and so, arguably, it is the best case study for R2P. Finally, consider the problems with the Kenya disaster: (1) lack of security for returning refugees, (2) insufficient planning, (3) failure to rebuild, (4) long-term failure to respect human rights. These issues are mirrored and encapsulated by other instances of intervention, including Iraq, Bosnia, Somalia, the Congo, and Libya. Kenya is simply an exemplar of why intervention fails, and its lessons have clearly yet to be learned. Pro then contests the verisimilitude of my interpretation of Foust. The article does place great stress on the fallbacks of intervention, summarizing it with the following quip: "military power is, at best, a clumsy instrument of statecraft." At worst, I would say, it only worsens the crises it attempts to ameliorate. Let us examine what Pro does not address: (1) most interventions require long-term commitments, (2) states have a terrible record at predicting outcomes of intervention, and (3) the example of Kosovo.The example of Kosovo, specifically, shows how intervention can backfire and actually create or magnify humanitarian crises. Consider that the exact same problems in Kenya, i.e. lack of security for returning denizens and long-term human rights abuses, abound also in Kosovo. Pro then insists that the reason Kenya failed was that there was a lack of planning and that there was insufficient international support. As regards planning, that is precisely my argument--that intervening powers don't plan sufficiently and are unable to predict outcomes well. Suppose that a civil war breaks out in a remote area--let's say southern Cameroon. For every day the outside powers delay intervention, 5,000 people die and another 20,000 are displaced. In a week, 35,000 people will have perished, and 140,000 people will have been displaced. It is going to take more than a week to adequately plan for, mobilize for, and deploy force to combat the crisis. In other words, if humanitarian intervention is designed to halt conflicts before the spiral out of control, those missions need to occur with alacrity. But, if humanitarian intervention is to avoid causing the crisis to degenerate, it must be meticulously planned, which takes time. Simply, humanitarian intervention can either be risky and fast, or well-planned but too late to do anything. An inability to balance the competing time concerns inheres in the very notion.As for the international support, the global community is a divisive and fractious one, and we cannot expect it to mobilize behind goals in a timely or coordinated manner. Look at how hard it was to garner global acquiesce for the intervention in Libya, especially with Russia and China displaying their proclivities for obstructionism.SB: Intervention's futilePro attempts to dismiss my Conry evidence by pointing out it focuses specifically on the U.S. That is largely the case, but it does not give Pro the free pass he is attempting to garner. Pro needs to address the logical substance of each of my cards.Conry exposits on the futility of intervention, saying: "“[We] must also recognize that many regional conflicts are so deeply rooted that no outside party, from within or outside the region, will succeed in ending the fighting.” This is true, and Pro never disagrees. Look at Iraq--this was an initiate that was international in nature, but has failed regardless because the underlying sectarian tensions have not be remediated. In fact, regional partners like Saudi Arabia and Qatar have only exacerbated conflict in Iraq. Another instance of this might be Libya, where international cooperation has miserably failed to end the violence as long-term conflicts that had bubbled under the surface during Gadhafi's reign exploded to the surface.Pro, by arguing for international intervention, in essence, takes a pro-multilateralism stance. This is faulty for several reasons. Multilateralism carries with it significant costs of its own; it requires sacrifice of power and control over intervention. Further, it may seriously compromise the military effectiveness of those operations, as recent debates over command and control in UN military operations suggest. [1] Moreover, the UN is a highly gridlocked organization. If this statement weren't obvious on its own, I have a source that emphasizes this: “Once paralyzed by cold war rivalries, the [UN] is nowadays asked to do too much: enforce peace in Sarajevo, face down a truculent Saddam Hussein and clean up messes in Cambodia, Central America, Afghanistan and South America.’” [2] While the crises may have changed, the principle hasn't.SC: DeterrencePro, fails to ignore the logic, and just lays down the blanket argument that the Conry cards are invalid. We can see that Conry's logic does hold up when placed under scrutiny, despite Pro's error-laden claims. Conry observes that intervention has failed to deter those who would abuse human rights. We can look to an example as recent as Koni to substantiate this. Despite African Union efforts to halt his reign of terror, he has continued to engage in his militant activities. Gadhafi also fought to the bitter end, exacting a huge toll on his populace. A third instance would be Milosevic in Bosnia, which Conry expounded upon.SD and SE:Pro mistakenly claims these sub-points conflict. In SD, I argue that due to a reticence to put boots on the ground for solely humanitarian reasons, nations tend to drop bombs and take other, more extreme measures that do more harm than good.In SE I assert that nations may use humanitarianism as a pretext for other motives. This does not conflict with SD for two reasons. (1) nations operating under ulterior motives are willing to set boots on the ground because they are not intervening just for humanitarian reasons. If nation A intervenes for humanitarian purposes, it sees little profit in the war, and so minimizes risk, but if nation B intervenes under the pretext of humanitarianism (but for the real purpose of gaining access to mineral extraction facilities, for example) it is willing to put troops on the ground, to avoid indiscriminately damaging the infrastructure it will need to utilize those facilities. (2) My SD never said that nations are reluctant to intervene and my SE never said nations would place boots on the ground. Pro totally misread these point. SD is saying that nations don't want boots on the ground, and SE is saying that nations will abuse the humanitarian justification for intervention to legalize otherwise illicit interventions. Nations could drop bombs and avoid placing boots on the ground even while operating under a false pretext. There is literally no conflict here.Since Pro never actually contests the points (he only says they conflict), we can extend them.C2: Self-InterestSA: InstabilityPro's attack again centers around a critique of the Conry evidence.Let's review Conry's logic: the world is inherently unstable. It is a waste of funds to try to change that. Therefore, the search for stability is a waste of funds. This train of though is never attacked, Pro drops it, and I'm extending it. SB: No InterestAgain, Conry's logic holds up. Most international crises do not effect those states in a position to intervene. Rwanda did not affect Europe or America, Haiti did not affect Europe or America, and so on. Therefore, there's no reason to intervene. Pro drops this, please extend it.SC: Harms InterestsAgain, Conry's logic is not faulty. If a nation intervenes and fails, it's credibility will be hurt and skepticism will rise domestically. If a nations intervenes and makes the situation worse, as I've shown can happen, it engenders enmity, which can create problems down the line.SD: WarThis is totally dropped. Extend it. Pro's only attack on it is that it's specific to the U.S, but it is not specific to any country. Pro is just incorrect here. Ultimately, if intervention has a such a great potential to proliferate animus, generate war, and waste resources, it's not in a nations interest to undertake.We can cross-apply all of my arguments to Pro's case as well.SOURCES1 - http://www.thepresidency.org...2 - Benjamin, Barry M. [previously cited - R2]Thanks to YYW. While I'd not describe the round as "titillating" it is kinetic, engrossing, galvanic, and bracing.