Resolved: The country of Scotland should legalize gay marriage.

[CON Case]Aristotle definition: It's evident that my opponent wishes to make justice the ultimate deciding factor in the debate for gay marriage, but the definition that she uses is arbitrary with consideration that there is no thershold within the definition as to what "unequals" would entail. This is important because too much flexibility in the characterization could ultimately result in unfair discrimination. Take for example if I were to think that African Americans were unequals, any unequal treatment done against them would be justified. I'm sure that my opponent would argue against this claim, but when there's no context or threshold as to what is an unequal within her definition, such an argument would be defenseless against my own. With this definition, my opponent would then have the burden to prove that gay couples (as a unit) are less deserving for the right to marriage than a heterosexual couple, implying that my opponent would need to prove that gay couples are unequals. The definition she provides is even further vague with consideration that she doesn't explain what being treated as an "unequal" would entail. John Rawls: Looking at the theory itself in juxtaposition with her definition of justice from Aristotle, we can clearly see a road bump in the reasoning of my opponent's framework: Rawls and Aristotle have different definitions of what entails justice--the difference being that Rawls's theory contends that every person is entitled to an extensive list of basic liberties and makes no distinction between "equals" and "unequals." [1] While it seems that my opponent's ideas logically flow, the foundational basis of Rawls's arguments conflicts with her earlier definition. At the risk of being claimed to make an accusation, it seems like my opponent selectively cut out a part of Rawl's theory and attached it with a customized definition; while my opponent uses the theory, she doesn't use the theory in its entirety. In fact, the theory of Aristotle, most notably Nicomachean Ethics, argues that the highest good for all human beings is happiness and well-being (utilitarianism). [2] The argument about legislations that are not just must be abolished from society hangs from an arbitrary definition of what "just" entails and begs the question of the definition of "just." I use the Merriam-Webster definition of it, and the said definition can encompass utilitarian arguments based on what it's defined as. For that reason, it isn't fair for my opponent to make that argument that utilitarian arguments don't count when it all depends on how "just" is defined, and considering the arbitrary nature of my opponent's standard for it, it is evident that mine should be considered over hers.Observation 1: My opponent argues that marriage is based around procreative type acts and anything that does not result in procreation does not qualify for the distinction of marriage, meaning that gay peple should be allowed to marry one another and infertile couples are irrelevant to the scope of the argument. This means one of two things: this argument is either a double-standard or just discriminatory depending on whether or not reproduction is the ultimate goal for my opponent's definition of marriage. If it is, the argument is a double-standard because the argument sanctifies infertile couples over gay ones despite the fact that both are equal in product, and if it is not, then gay couples are being excluded out of marriage for no relevant reason. Sylloligism: My opponent's argument has a lot of parts, so I will argue the logic according to the part number. (4) This is where the logic hits a speed bump. My opponent states that recognizing gay marriage is a rejection of the special value of heterosexual unions, yet doesn't explain why. One of the most important questions in this logic is what or who assigns special social value, and not only doesn't my opponent define that, but she also doesn't prove that this entity assigning special social value will recognize heterosexual unions with any less value with the establishment of gay marriage. (2) This argument implies that gay marriage cannot be a means in which reproduction can occur. Gay couples can themselves reproduce even though it's not through conventional standards. Nevertheless, it assigns the special value of reproduction regardless. (5) This is the most important part because my opponent has changed her standard as to what encompasses justice. Earlier, she mentioned that justice was treating equal people equally and unequals unequally even though in conflicts with the arguments of John Rawls, but now argues that denying special value to what possesses special value (assuming there is some entity that had assigned such a special value) is unjust. This connects in no way to her earlier statement of what justice is or why according to the definition she explicitly defined, denying special social value is inherently unjust. [PRO Case]1: Marriage is an institution formed and regulated by the government, so in reality, gays cannot "privately marry" if marriage is an institution of the very government that states that they cannot marry. Because of the very nature of marriage and its institution, by government's denial to recognize gay marriage, it in effect bans it, henceforth violating the rights in the way that my opponent described. Consider this as a response not only to this particular subset of my opponent's rebuttal, but also as a response to my opponent's Observation 2. 2: By actively rejecting gays equal status in the scope of their marriages to other gays and making laws explicitly restricting their abilities, the government actively discriminates against them and puts them closer toward being second-class citizens. In the most practical sense, the government creates a standard of marriage that can only really restrict their relationships because while heterosexuals also cannot marry people of the same sex, they wouldn't need to because they have no attractions toward people of the same sex. Technically, the restrictions are not discriminatory, but practically and structually, they are because the restrictions can apply only to them. As I've explained earlier in my case in a human rights sense, the right to marriage doesn't require it to only be with memebers of the opposite sex, and by Scotland's government actively putting more inhibitations in order to exercise this right through the provision of additional prerequisites, the government inherently violates human rights. Furthermore, my opponent's third response doesn't hold much water with consideration that she doesn't provide any mode of measurement as to how to evaluate one injustice is greater than another, let alone prove that denying gay marriage is a greater injustice than denying any special value to heterosexual marriage.3 and 4: This can be coupled into a single response because the response can be the same for both as far as its inclusion in the justification argument goes. Under Aristotle's standards, the justification would be that gay marriage helps to advance the happiness of the society--the standard from the person whom my opponent takes a definition from. The implications of my opponent's framework paint a grim standard: that utilitarian benefits to the gay community don't matter and the consideration that their community could face significant problems therein are not to be considered in the scope of justification. Gays can get "privately married," but there's no incentive to with consideration that in a legal and practical sense, it means nothing. Henceforth, there is no incentive to spend. Further, the study in question was looking at all amendments that restrict gay marriage and not just Prop 8. The justness of the decision really depends on the definition of "just," and for her Rawls argument to be valid, she needs to provide a warrant as to why it is the best perspective and wht her definition of "just" is better. Sources in comments