All morality is subjective

Against Moral Subjectivism The fundamental question is, “Do morals themselves change because they are ontologically based on the changing cultures? Or do our subjective ideas about an objectively existing morality change due to our limited cognitive powers in discovering reality?” Con’s “yes” to the first question lacks any sound reason because the entirety of his case is summed up by these fallacies: Post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy [3] Con uses the change of moral views as evidence against moral realism. But such change regarding moral value and duty is actually compatible with -- and better explained by -- the realist! Con mistakes the correlations of the changes of the subject(s) with the causation of morals; just because the subject changes, whether within and across cultures or personal, that doesn’t imply that therefore morality itself change because of the subjective shifting. For example, the interpretation of celestial bodies such as the moon and Venus changed throughout cultures, that change of interpretation however, doesn’t imply that the moon and Venus only exist in the human mind! Further, these moral view changes can’t count as evidence against the transcendent reality of morality because the realist expects us to shift our views as we learn more about reality and so likewise the moral realist expects disagreement between and across cultures mainly because we gradually and fallibly apprehend the moral reality. Fallacy of petitio principii [4] Con only points to features of subjectivism for support for moral subjectivism; this is text-book question begging. He is also guilty of this circular reasoning elsewhere, such as when he argues that God doesn’t exist and so within the absence of an objective moral prescriber, we’re without objective prescriptions: yet he hasn’t falsified theism, which is what he must do in order to say that there exists no objective morality. Genetic fallacy [5] Note the difference between moral epistemology (which studies how we come to know or justify moral judgements) and moral ontology ( which concerns the proper foundation for morals, how they exist, their nature, etc) … moral ontology is only relevant to our debate since it deals with meta-ethical questions, not ethical questions. Con’s case is entirely built from ethical questions dealing with moral epistemology, but such questions are irrelevant to questions of moral ontology, or meta-ethical concerns. Con therefore commits the genetic fallacy by using how we come to know about morals (through culture, etc) in order to try and disprove the existence of morality itself. Self refuting [6] Con argues that “all conceptual schemes are incommensurable” .. however that statement itself is built upon Con’s conceptual scheme and so if his scheme here isn’t able to be measured against logic, then his argument is ultimately nothing more than an artistic expression which is free to reject. Indeed this notion of the incommensurability of concepts is argued for using reason (albeit shoddy reasoning); a conceptual scheme by its own right. Notice also that Con affirms “all societies possess equal merit” while affirming relativism! He therefore affirms what he denies, that there’s at minimum one moral principle that holds across societies, namely that each should hold equal merit. Fallacy of the inverse [7] Con argues that without God then moral realism is false, and I agree, however God is just a necessary condition for moral realism, he isn’t the sufficient condition. Con is guilty then of denying the antecedent in attempting to deny the consequent. There can be many other necessary conditions for moral realism such as moral Platonism, etc. Con is guilty of backwards logic here. Straw-man fallacy [8] Upon realizing that Con’s vulgarized or relativized form of moral ontology is clearly wanting, he subtly changes position and redefines his ontology as “not absolute or universal.” Well I agree that morals are not always absolute, but the resolution is about whether morals exist in a subjective or objective way, not whether they exist in an absolute or universal way; e.g., acting justly can be objectively good without being absolutely good. Con admits to this altering, “I apologize for altering the terms of my debate,” ... he spends his entire opening round attacking a straw-man, he attacks absolutism rather than objectivism: this should count as a violation of conduct if continued. Con also commits this genetic fallacy in asking, “If there is an absolute, universal moral code, then why do multiple views concerning what one should do in an ethical dilemma exist?” But this is an ethical dilemma, not meta-ethical, and we’re talking meta-ethics in this debate! Also, happiness is an experience that is an intrinsic good, but it’s not a moral good, it’s an existential good, so that’s also irrelevant to our debate. Explaining the explanation fallacy The moral realist is by no means “tasked with explaining what a universal moral code would be.” Such a demand would equally force the scientist to explain all of physical reality prior to affirming that it exists! Clearly the physical world existed long before we explained anything about it. So likewise Con can’t argue that moral value can’t exist until humans can explain it. Con’s charge here would lead us into an infinite regress of explanation such that knowledge would be impossible - we would have to explain the explanation of the explanation, ad infinitum! False analogy fallacy [9] It’s completely naive to say that a global acceptance of methodology, data, theories, and conclusions exists within the scientific community. Which methodology is Con even referring to? The hypothetico-deductive model, inductivism, Lauden’s hard core vs protective belt, etc? There is no one scientific method, no flow chart for discovery, the best we have is subjective observation with experimentation that relies on theory coupled with Bayesian inference with prior probabilities which are themselve most plausibly subjective! [10] It’s all based upon perception, something which Con would have us deny in an ad hoc way whence perceiving morality. And in fact when it comes to meta-ethics, there is great convergence among moral philosophers! Just a quick internet search reveals that, "..few philosophers would claim to be nihilists.." [11]. I would actually argue that more investigators of meta-ethics are moral realists than investigators of science agree on proper method (just think of the difference between historical science like geology and history vs empirical science like chemistry and physics)! Con’s point here is a major blunder. In summary, difference of judgements simply don’t imply that there is not an objectively right and wrong judgement. If anything, it reinforces the fact that someone is truly wrong, given the staunchness of disagreement! Hitler was wrong and he would have been wrong even if the right side didn’t stand in victory today. For Moral Objectivism It seems that our moral experience is on a par with our sensory experience. We perceive external truths just as we perceive the internal truth of morals. In moral experience we apprehend a realm of objective morals, just as in sensory experience we apprehend a realm of the physical world. There is therefore no more reason to deny moral objectivity than there is to deny the physical world. Literally, if you are skeptical of the objectivity of morals, then you ought to also doubt that you have a head! So in the absence of any type of defeater for both perceptions, we're rational to trust both types of perceptions given that Con hasn’t offered any defeater for us. No doubt we can be wrong in our interpretations of what we perceive, or our moral perceptual faculties can be damaged, but so can our sense faculties; but does a blind man have any say on whether there’s a tree in front of a man with 20x20 vision? Moreover, concerning the apprehension of objective moral truths, philosopher Michael Ruse affirms that "the man who says it's acceptable to rape a child is just as mistaken as saying 2+2=5!" Surely actions like rape aren't just socially unacceptable, they are moral abominations! People who fail to see this are simply morally handicapped and there's no reason to allow their impaired vision to call into question what we clearly see in our moral perception. Thus any arguments for moral nihilism will always include premises which are less obvious. Here are further examples of Con’s less obvious premises. Con asks, “would mankind not already have discovered the correct path to take[?]” Who’s to say mankind hasn’t? Why does the near global court system exist if our perception of morality was a known illusion like that of a bent straw in water? Likewise why does the near global scientific lab system exist if our perception of the external world was a known illusion? Honor is a moral good, just like justice, equality (as Con affirmed), and forbearance, etc. Con as a subjectivist would have us believe that there is a possible state of circumstances in which injustice, dishonor, malevolence, etc are all morally good. How does he support this? He simply cites personal inclination… well so what? It was Hitler’s personal inclination to torture and murder innocent Jewish babies, does Hitler’s insane inclination therefore undercut our sane inclination? How is the mistaken view of one person at all relevent to what another person clearly sees? Sources 3. http://en.wikipedia.org... 4. http://philosophy.lander.edu... 5. http://en.wikipedia.org... 6. http://en.wikipedia.org... 7. http://en.wikipedia.org... 8. http://en.wikipedia.org... 9. http://en.wikipedia.org... 10. Theory & Reality, Godfrey-Smith, p.161 footnote 11. http://www.iep.utm.edu...