Civil Disobedience and Voluntary Punishment

Thanks, Con. I will now respond to Con's R3. I. FrameworkAll of Con's points have become immaterial, insofar as we both agree than promoting human flourishing can be used as a means of weighing the arguments in this round. I noted that we could use human flourishing as a prism to assess the round earlier in this debate (see round 3). In other words, I concede partially to Con's framework and intend to show how I win within that framework. This is a commonplace debating strategy both IRL and on DDO. I agree that (a) there is an objective morality and (b) attaining human flourishing is a/the central aim of said morality. I do not agree that NAP is an effective means of achieving or furthering human flourishing as defined. And, as a brief aside, how does accepting punishment for disobedience truly violate NAP, when the disobedients are voluntarily submitting to the punishment? It does not seem that affirming the topic necessarily incurs any harms under a NAP framework. Even so, I think there are plenty of reasons to reject NAP as the framework for this round. Also, even if you don't buy that my Kritik argument excludes things like cultural relativism, it does seem to reject nihilism insofar as nihilism would shift the debate from "ought we to do X" to "does morality even exist. " The resolution is asking the former, not the latter, so there is some built-in assumption that we've moved past the latter. On reflection, I was hoping for a debate that wouldn't get bogged down in all this moral theory and could--at the very least--have debaters who accepted that Hitler and the holocaust were obviously immoral. Clearly, a different debate has emerged. II. Means of JustificationMy opponent concedes that a disobedient has two areas to derive their justification for avoiding action. A. Moral IntentI presented two arguments on this topic. I will address each in turn:1. Flat EarthI pointed out that: "belief and reality are not the same thing. Moral intent cannot, in and of itself, render immoral actions moral. People who engage in immoral activity ought to be punished for that activity (more on this later). " My opponent and I agree that morality is objective and that human flourishing is a central aim thereof. Moral intent cannot change whether an action does or does not further or comport with human flourishing, so it cannot absolve individuals guilty of acting contrary to human flourishing. This defeats Con's "well, maybe Hitler shouldn't have been punished" retort. No one in their right mind would argue that the holocaust served the interests of human flourishing. So, even if Hitler meant well, by the standard of human flourishing, Hitler acted immorally. Moreover, at the point Con said: "I agree with my opponent that someone believing something does not make it so," Con basically conceded the point. If intending well doesn't change the nature of the action, and if immoral actions should be punished (we established this at the end of R3), then immoral but well-intended acts ought to still be punished. Finally, I offered an argument as to why intent and the moral nature of the action are different. Belief (like the flat earth theory) is not the same as fact. If Con wants to undermine that connection, he needs to do more than just say that "some moral theories rely on intent. " Con would need to actually make an argument that belief and fact are one in the same, morally-speaking. He was made no such argument.2. Ballooning EffectsThis argument really wasn't addressed directly, but what it shows is that allowing people who intend well to escape punishment for their actions would justify letting people like Hitler go free. Clearly, this is against the interests of a peaceful, violence-free society and against the interests of human flourishing. So, a human flourishing standard is incompatible with intent-based punishment avoidance. B. The Nature of ActionFirstly, we are not taking about any law just "possibly" being immoral. A law is morally dubious if "a reasonable person, operating within established cultural conventions (i. e. not fringe), could question" it as moral. Laws against sadistically torturing infants, for example, are laws in which no reasonable person, operating within the establish cultural conventions of a functioning democracy, could question. Sure, it is "possible" that such statutes are moral, but that does not mean that they are morally dubious per the definition in the resolution. The definition was clearly constructed in such a way as to suggest that a "morally dubious" law was one which was debatable within the mainstream of society (not the fringe). So, only a small subset of our legal system can be classified as "morally dubious" for the purposes of this debate. Therefore, this does not imply that humans could never act, because action would only be restricted in a select number of cases. Secondly, Con simply does not respond to other elements of my argument. Obviously, people ought to follow morally desirable or morally obligatory laws. This is tautological and self-evident. Morally permissible laws ought to be followed to promote human flourishing and to prevent social decay (as I outlined in Law, Order, and Democracy). If disobedients ought to avoid punishment for violating morally dubious laws, then they also ought to avoid punishment for violating some moral laws. Con cannot just affirm for those who violate "objectively immoral" dubious laws; Con's position conveys a blanket right on all disobedients to avoid punishment for all morally dubious laws, including laws that might be objectively moral ones. Is it Con's position that people who violate objectively moral laws should go free? Given that only a small number of laws are implicated by the phrase "morally dubious" and given that a significant portion of those laws may actually be moral, it seems obvious that we ought to err on the side of abiding by the laws, particularly when the risk of not doing so is a social breakdown that would be detrimental to human flourishing. The balancing act here clearly favors the Pro side. III. Law, Order, and DemocracyAll Con's comments about the consequences of actions not impacting the morality of actions strike me as rather absurd, at least insofar as he seems to contradict himself. In R2, Con wrote: "Given that the most basic moral principle is existence. .. the principle for human societies to follow is to flourish. A way for a society to achieve this is to limit the amount of violence that occurs. " Clearly, this comment is all about consequences and outcomes. When the consequence of an action is limiting violence, such an action is good because it protects the outcomes of flourishing and existence. It is wrong to kill people because of the consequence of killing, i. e. terminating someone's existence. Con cannot simultaneously argue that consequences don't matter and that consequences do matter. Next, Con suggests, "If more people resist morally dubious laws, it could lead to a more minimal state. " There are several responses to this point. Firstly, there is literally no argument here. Con is saying, "well. .. it miiiiggghhhttt happen," with absolutely no evidence or logical argumentation to warrant the assumption. Secondly, history has shown us that after years of protests and resistance in functional democracies that none are minimal states. The weight of historic analysis is against Con. Thirdly, a minimal state is not conducive to human flourishing and to protecting human existence--I elucidated this point in my previous round. Therefore, it is not a "satisfactory" result. Fourthly, Con dropped my observation from last round that "disobedients do not aim to protest the whole system, or to topple over the existing government. " Disobedience would likely not lead to a minimalist state, because that is not its aim. Con is talking about something far more revolutionary than is pertinent to this debate. Finally, Con mistakenly believes that disobedience is always going to be oriented against more government authority. That is not necessarily the case--environmentalists who illegally squat on federal land to protest the lack of federal regulations protecting the environment want more, not less, government interference. Moreover, when we analyze this question through the prism of protecting human flourishing--even through the prism of saving lives--we can understand why it is important to prevent the erosion of law and order. Con does absolutely nothing to rebut any of my arguments in this section besides saying that "consequences don't matter" and making a rather feeble point about the minimal state. IV. Civil Disobedience ItselfCon concedes that accepting punishment may help the disobedient's cause. In Con's R2, he talks about the benefits of civil disobedience, particularly under his "suffering" section. Obviously, Con believes civil disobedience is an important tool in redressing moral wrongs. If Con didn't believe that civil disobedience had moral utility (esp. in terms of promoting flourishing), he would not be negating. By making disobedience more effective, I can not only co-opt Con's advantages in terms of objecting to immoral laws, while still securing the moral benefits outlined in my case. It is a win-win to vote Pro. V. ConclusionCon and I have agreed on a framework: human flourishing. Human flourishing entails basic conditions of wellbeing which are essential preconditions to having a meaningful capacity to self-actualize. Using moral intent as grounds to negate is incompatible with this standard. And, given the risks to social stability, it is not worth evading punishments which may, in many cases, be deserved. Plus, I can link better than Con can to the moral benefits Con sees in civil disobedience. This is a clear Pro ballot. Thus, I affirm. Thanks again to Con and to the readers.