The Kalam Cosmological Argument is Sound

In my closing remarks, I’d like to review not only the arguments for premise (1) in light of my opponent’s criticisms, but also the arguments I gave for premises (2) and (4). To premise (1) we turn first. (1) Whatever Begins to Exist has a Cause I offered three reasons for thinking that (1) whatever begins to exist has a cause: i. The metaphysical principle being cannot come from non-being. ii. If something could come into being without a cause, then it becomes inexplicable why anything and everything doesn’t come into being without a cause. iii. Common experience confirms and never falsifies premise (1). Concerning (i), my opponent charges that the principle “something cannot come from nothing” is synonymous with premise (1), so it’s not a warrant for (1) but a mere restatement of it. But I think this is mistaken. (i) is more ontologically basic than premise (1); it grounds the truth of and explains why premise (1) is true. In other words, whatever begins to exist has a cause because being cannot come from non-being. (i) provides a deeper explanation of (1) and is more obviously true than (1). Someone might think that things can begin to exist without a cause, but then reflect that that would entail being coming from non-being, and so change their minds. William Lane Craig responds to this charge: “Well I don’t that’s true. I think that the one can provide a deeper explanation for the other and can be more evidently true than the other. Sometimes rewording a claim in a certain way can make it more perspicuous. And I think that the vast majority of people, certainly the vast majority of philosophers, have believed that being doesn’t come from non-being, that being only comes from being and that therefore it is a certain first principle of metaphysics that something doesn’t come from nothing…” [1] And I think that when we reflect on this metaphysical first principle, we can see that it is true. How could the potentiality for something’s existence be actualized without a cause? There’s nothing to turn that potentiality into actuality, and so it should not happen, right? Indeed, in the case of the universe, there wasn’t even the potentiality for its existence, because there was literally nothing before it began to exist. With regard to (ii), my opponent says that only things which being to exist at T=0 can do so without causes. If we ask why this no longer happens, as (ii) does, he says that it’s logically impossible for things now to begin to exist as T=0, so there’s no problem. I have three responses to this. First, there’s still no explanation as to why the universe began at T=0 and not root beer, an alien civilization, or even an omnipotent, unembodied Mind (!). Second, there’s no explanation why everything didn’t come into being at T=0. Because it’s possible that every logically possible thing begin at T=0, we are left with no explanation as to why this did not happen. Unless my opponent is willing to accept the absurd proposition that everything that can exist does exist, he shouldn’t allow even one thing to begin without a cause at T=0. Third, there can’t be anything which causes things to come into being without a cause at T=0 and not at later points in time. For if something really comes into being without a cause, then there can’t be anything which constrains nothingness so that things can only begin without causes at T=0 and at no later time. If things can come into being without causes at T=0, then there’s no reason why they do not do so at T=1, T=2, and so on. Again, William Lane Craig responds to this objection: “Sometimes critics will say that while it is impossible for things to come into being uncaused in time, things can come into being uncaused with time, that is, at a first moment of time. But until the premise’s detractors are able to explain the relevant difference between embedded moments of time and a first moment of time, there seems to be no reason to think it more plausible that things can come into being uncaused at a first moment than at a later moment of time. If something cannot come into existence at t, where t is preceded by earlier moments of time, why think that if we were to annihilate all moments earlier than t, then that thing could come into existence uncaused at t? How could the existence of moments earlier than an uncaused event be of any possible relevance to the occurrence of that event?” [2] Finally, let's turn to (iii). Notice, my opponent does not disagree that common experience confirms and never falsifies premise (1). He does point out that we only experience things which are temporally preceed beginning to exist with causes. I’ve already pointed out that temporal priority just doesn’t seem to have any releveance to causality, but I’d also say that there’s no reason why the inductive generalization from “things which are temporally preceded begin to exist with causes” cannot go to establish the broader causal principle “whatever begins to exist has a cause.” In light of the fact that there’s no reason to think that if something has no temporal precursor it cannot have a cause, the inductive generalization goes through. To use my opponent’s terminology, stopping the inductive generalization at (a) is wholly arbitrary. There’s just no reason not to carry it out all the way. Consider the set of all things which begin to exist (c), and consider (a) a sampling of those things. We draw the inference that because everything in the subset (a) has a cause, therefore everything in (c) has a cause. This just is inductive reasoning, and I don’t think my opponent has raised any significant objections to it. (2) The Universe Began to Exist We’ve seen no reason to think the universe did not begin to exist, and two reasons to think that it did: (i) the impossibility of an actually infinite number of things, and (ii) the Big Bang theory. My opponent has raised no significant objections to these two lines of evidence, so I think we can all agree that the universe began to exist. (3) Therefore, the Universe has a Cause This follows deductively and necessarily from the two premises. Because premise (1) and (2) are more plausibly true than false, we can conclude that the universe has a cause. (4) If the Universe has a Cause, that Cause is a Spaceless, Timeless, Changeless, Immaterial, Beginningless, Uncaused, Enormously Powerful Mind We’ve seen no objections to premise (4), and I refer the reader back to my opening speech for the reasons to accept this premise, which I believe demonstrate that it's more plausibly true than false. Accordingly, we can conclude that if the universe has a cause, then that cause is a spaceless, timeless, changeless, immaterial, beginningless, uncaused, enormously powerful Mind. (5) Therefore the Cause of the Universe is a Spaceless, Timeless, Changeless, Immaterial, Beginningless, Uncaused, Enormously Powerful Mind This, too, follows deductively and necessarily from premises (3) and (4). Because (3) and (4) are more plausibly true than false, we can conclude that it is more plausibly true than false that the cause of the universe is a spaceless, timeless, changeless, immaterial, beginningless, uncaused, enormously powerful Mind. Conclusion It seems to me that I’ve demonstrated that the premises of the KCA are more plausibly true than false, and because it's deductively valid, I’ve in turn demonstrated that the kalam cosmological argument is sound. I ask that my opponent not raise any new arguments in his closing speech, for the simple reason that I cannot respond to them. I thank him for this mind-expanding exchange. Notes [1] Craig, W. L. (Speaker). (10 May 2010) Reasonable Faith [Audio Podcast]. Retrieved from www.reasonablefaith.org. [2] William Lane Craig, and James Sinclair, “The Kalam Cosmological Argument,” http://commonsenseatheism.com...;(18 July 2013), 94.