On balance, theism is more plausible than naturalism.

Implicit in all of Con's arguments, and specifically in his stubborn refusal to address the case I've built for reformed epistemology, is the assumption that theism is a priori less plausible than naturalism. However, this is an instance of begging the question. Con has essentially dropped his response to the Leibnizian cosmological argument. Nonetheless, I'll go over it again to see if I can make my meaning more clear. His answer to the teleological argument assumes that it takes the logical form, so I'll attempt to clarify this as well. ============ Reformed epistemology ============ I think Con has misunderstood this argument. The point of reformed epistemology is not merely to establish theism as equally plausible in comparison to naturalism, but as more plausible. Not only is God a basic belief, but He acts an external guarantor for the veracity of our cognitive faculties. As I explained in the first round: "reformed epistemology is an externalist form of reliabilism that holds beliefs have warrant just in case they are produced by properly functioning cognitive faculties. We know that on naturalism, unguided evolution shaped our brains *not* for the purpose of producing true beliefs, but as a mere tool to aid survival and reproduction. By contrast, on theism there is good reason to think that our minds *were* designed to produce sound understanding." This is a hard epistemic defeater for naturalism. As I've stated several times, in order to win this contention, Con would have to either argue for a different epistemological viewpoint (empiricism, positivism, etc.), or posit a hard defeater for theism. This late in the debate, it would be bad conduct to introduce new arguments. As such, the ballot should go to Pro by default. ============ Cosmological argument ============ Although Con stated his objection is to "Premise" 4, I already explained that is one of three separate conclusions contained within the argument. This leads me to believe that he doesn't understand why it logically follows from 1-3. The "Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact" (BCCF) alluded to in step 2 is the conjunction of all true contingent propositions, with logical redundancies removed. Now, the explanation for the BCCF must involve some necessary fact. Let's say the BCCF is explained by q. What is q like? There are two possibilities: either q is necessary or q is contingent. If q is contingent, then it is contained in the BCCF, and since q explains the BCCF, it follows that q is self-explanatory. Thus, q must be necessary or else contingent and self-explanatory. Of course, q can't be both contingent and self-explanatory as this constitutes a contradiction in terms.[1] I expected Con to attack either the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) or the notion that the necessary fact posited in Step 4 must be a volitional agent. Since he hasn't done so, I think this will suffice for now. ============ Teleological Argument ============ Again, I think the core of matter boils down to a misunderstanding: Con has given counterexamples that show how fine tuning *might* be accounted for on naturalism. By his own admission, his explanations are not supported by logic or evidence; they are purely conjectural. Not even Dawkins himself accepts the hypothesis that the physical constants of the universe are somehow physically necessary. His basic counterargument runs something like this: (1) We know of no irrefutable objections to the possibility that fine tuning might occur on naturalism. (2) Therefore, the fine tuning of the universe was likely caused by natural processes. Well Holy water, Batman! If that's all it takes to establish the plausibility of a hypothesis, then I'm the Queen of England! Imagine a murder trial. The defendant has no alibi, the bullet has been matched to a gun registered in his name, they have his fingerprints and DNA at the crime scene and several witnesses claiming to have seen him in the area on the night it occurred. The jury, after deliberation, prepares to deliver a guilty verdict. The judge lifts his gavel in anticipation, when the defendant's lawyer shouts "WAIT! You've proven nothing! The murder could have been committed by an evil clone! After all, we know of no irrefutable objections to the possibility of such a thing happening." While showing how fine tuning might be accounted for on naturalism would be sufficient to refute a logical teleological argument, what I have presented is a Bayesian evidential teleological argument. If I were to state it in formal terms, where "F" represents the fine tuning of the universe, it would run something like this: (1) We know that F is true. (2) Theism has much more predictive power with respect to F than naturalism does (ie., F's truth is antecedently many times more probable given theism than it is given naturalism). (3) Theism is more plausible than naturalism (ie., theism is more probable than naturalism independent of all other evidence). (4) Therefore, other evidence held equal, naturalism is very likely false. Regarding divine simplicity, Con claims that God might be "indivisible," yet "internally complex." But this objection is literally incoherent. What does it mean to be "internally" complex? These are terms used to describe physical objects. God is a spiritual being possessed of maximal power, knowledge, and goodness, so there is no conflict between competing desires. God is a timeless being, so there can be no conflict between will and action. Finally, God is a necessary being, so there is no conflict between essence and existence.[2] ============ The historical Jesus ============ Con has not in any way, shape, or form refuted my arguments regarding the historicity of the Gospels. Rather, he blithely, arrogantly, and most importantly incorrectly dismisses the evidence I have presented without providing any of his own. It's frankly insulting to the readers' intelligence to suggest that Jesus never existed. He is mentioned multiple times by several secular sources, including Josephus, Tacitus, Pliny the Younger, and Suetonius.[3] Moreover, as I already explained the Gospels are very early accounts written while the eyewitnesses to the events were still living.[4] The swoon hypothesis hasn't been taken seriously in nearly 100 years. Today, it's generally regarded as medically impossible that Jesus could have survived his torture and execution.[5] Even in the unlikely event that he did, he would be in desperate need of medical attention and would have died shortly after being placed in the tomb. Additionally, the appearance of a haggard, half-dead Jesus would be unlikely the inspire in the apostles the faith that he had risen and conquered death. Finally, this would reduce Jesus to a charlatan and liar, since he would know that he hadn't actually been raised from the dead. This would wholly inconsistent with his character and moral teachings. Again, Con's claim that it is "infinitely more likely" Jesus never existed, the story was made up, or that he survived the crucifixion is, in addition to begging the question, essentially an argument from personal incredulity. || CONCLUSION || Con has not made a sound objection to a single one of my arguments; any of them on their own would be sufficient to make my case. Moreover, even if none of them succeed individually, due to their inductive nature, each lends evidential support to the theory as a whole. In this way, I've built a cumulative case for the existence of God. Indeed, even Con conceded that reformed epistemology places theism and naturalism on equal footing. In light of this, his objections to my other arguments -- especially the argument from the resurrection of Jesus -- lack any real heft. The resolution is affirmed. References: http://tinyurl.com...