Qualified Immunity

Thanks again to Hayd. I will now address Con's case. I. FrameworkA. Morality v. JusticeI didn't know we would be actually offering specific value-frameworks in this debate (in traditional LD style), but it is fairly clear that "morality" is a more central question to the resolution than "justice. " This topic is not "purely legal" because it is asking a clearly moral question. Ought has been defined as indicating moral desirability; given that ought is the evaluative term in the resolution, the topic is asking us what we should do per morality, not per justice. Ultimately, then, only arguments which link to morality can be used to indicate what the US "ought" to do. Furthermore, I think it is important to recognize that morality and justice are inherently distinct concepts. Con says that justice can be described as fairness, while I offer a theory of role morality. In my world, it would be moral for the government to do something unfair so long as that unfair thing was in the best interests of the citizens. This illustrates an important conceptual difference between justice and morality, and illustrates therefore that Con cannot affirm an ought statement with justice. I also want to say that morality and legality are not the same. Slavery was--at one time--legal. That did not mean that slavery was ever moral. By framing this debate as one of legality and justice, Hayd has fundamentally miscast the task the resolution is giving us. We are here to answer a question of morality, albeit within the legal system; but the question remains a moral one. B. QI IssuesI will also say briefly that the official definition of QI for this debate is the one presented in R1 (per the rules), not the one Hayd offered. While I don't expect definitions to be a point of contention, I want this to be clear from the get-go. And, just to quickly touch on my advocacy again, I must defend limiting QI, i. e. reducing the scope of QI protections for police officers. So, there may be police in Hayd's world which would've qualified for QI which do not qualify for QI in mine. I do not do away with QI. Hayd needs to show that keeping absolute QI is better than even reducing QI protections to the slightest degree. II. IndemnificationA. Immunizing the GovernmentHayd claims that it is unfair to tax citizens for the wrongs of police officers. Using this logic, it would always be unfair to sue government agents who misbehave, because they might be indemnified. We could carry this even further: what if a police department--a government agency--does something wrong. Would it be unfair to sue the department, because the taxpayers, who are not themselves directly at fault, would be paying? If that is unfair, could we ever sue the government? If we can't ever sue the government, citizens lose a powerful means of protecting their civil rights, which may actually increase the net unfairness going on. If citizens cannot sue, then injustices perpetrated by the government can never be rectified or halted, which is also unfair and unjust. Hayd's argument basically makes the government immune from any civil lawsuits, because the taxpayers will be paying the government's legal fees and any damages won by the plaintiff. B. Inflated Impacts1. Limiting IndemnificationIf QI is limited and more police go to trials, it is logical to assume that police departments may respond by limiting the scope of the indemnification they provide to officers in order to avoid having to foot the bills for those suits. Perhaps departments may cap the expenses they will cover, or only offer indemnification in certain kinds of suits, or indemnify on a case-by-case basis. But it is highly unlikely that indemnification will exist to the extent Hayd describes, and so it is probable that the taxpayers will not be charged as much as Hayd imagines they will be.2. Not AbolishingSince I am not abolishing QI, many lawsuits, particularly those without merit, will never make it to trial anyway. So, again, the cost of affirming is likely not to be as high as Hayd might envisage it being.3. DeterrenceThe deterrent impact of limiting QI on police misconduct may reduce the number of lawsuits by reducing the amount of abusive police behavior, thereby reducing the costs of limiting QI. C. Keeping Departments HonestDepartments, to avoid paying indemnification-related fees, will have an incentive to better train and monitor their officers in order to curb police misconduct and reduce the number of suits. This way, limiting QI may still result in reduced police brutality. III. CharitiesA. ImpunityHaving charities pay the damages may only strengthen the feeling of impunity felt by both the departments and the officers. If both know that they will never face monetary consequences for their actions, the psychological and financial barriers against misconduct will erode further. What incentive do agencies have to waste money on community policing programs or excessive force training when they will never have to pay for any court rulings as a result of officer misconduct? Why should officers feel constrained against using excessive force when they know they won't be paying legal damages for it? B. Taxation vs. CharityCharitable giving cannot replacing tax money. Charitable donations are significantly less than governments can raise through taxation, because one is voluntary and one is not. Charitable giving is also more susceptible to economic situations--people may stop giving altogether in a bad recession, but they still have to pay taxes. Moreover, plaintiffs who win their cases can force either the police or their departments to pay out; but plaintiffs cannot compel third-parties like charities to pay out, so there is little in the way of an ironclad guarantee that victims will even get their compensation in Hayd's world. C. Feasibility and FramingHayd gives us literally no reason to suppose that people would actually donate to these charities in large enough numbers for his plan to work. His gives us no reason at all to believe that there would be sufficient gifting to these charities to allow them to operate to fill the void of government. Making up $1.4 billion is not an easy task. People give to causes that garner their sympathy, which may not always be the most important or pressing causes. The Make-A-Wish foundation pulls at my heartstrings. Seeing a sick little kid get the time of his life as he walks in a batman costume through "Gotham" saving innocent civilians. But, the Make-A-Wish doesn't feed the hungry or cure the sick; it helps a few kids smile throughout the year, and that's great, but it doesn't begin to solve the big problems. Police officers who are convicted of abuse and face civil damages are hardly going to generate as much sympathy as the kid in the batman suit. You will also notice, of course, that nearly every charity and charitable service that Hayd lists (bar the NCPC) is benefiting the victims of police abuse or crime, and not benefiting the police officers themselves. Claiming that charities like these could be co-opted to help pay the legal damages owed by abusive police officers, or that these charities serve as a model for new charities which could help pay for those officers, is absurd and disingenuous. Because, ultimately, what Hayd is proposing is that these charities act as a legal screen for police officers--it is hard to imagine the ACLU, for instance, agreeing to be complicit in shielding police officers and departments from having to pay damages to victims of police brutality. Hayd is not really talking about helping the victims. Both he and I are trying to compensate victims, but only I hold the police and their departments accountable. Hayd is just talking about letting police off the hook for their abuse. How is that fair, how is that just? D. Charity Discussion PrematureIf Hayd is keeping QI as it is, he is keeping a system in place that already shields officers from having to answer for dubious actions. It is likely very few cases would ever make it to trial, including cases which obviously have merit. Since those cases never go to trial, they will never have a chance at receiving compensation. So, all this talk of charities is a bit premature, since we first need to make it easier for meritorious cases to advance to trial in order to ensure that those cases and those victims have a chance of being heard and being compensated. Only my plan is maximizing the opportunity for people with legitimate grievances to not only get their day in court, but to get compensation of any kind, irrespective of who pays it. E. Even If: PermCharity is non-unique. There is nothing in the resolution which prevents me implementing Hayd's charity plan. Even if Hayd defeats my arguments against charity, then he's still not gaining any offense, because there is no reason I can't just perm his plan. Either way, Hayd is losing this offense. IV. Concluding ThoughtsIt's not fair to encourage police abuse by increasing police impunity. It's not fair to deny meritorious cases their day in court. It's not fair to protect a system which creates legal catch-22s. It's not fair to make the government immune from any lawsuits. It's not fair to let police officers and departments off the hook for their wrongdoings. I truly don't see how Hayd is really achieving justice. Only my plan gives victims a meaningful opportunity to seek justice, regardless of who provides the compensation. What good does it do for charities to provide compensation if people aren't given a sufficient chance to win that compensation in the first place? Hayd still prevents discovery, hindering the search for truth. He still allows for legal catch-22s. And his advocacy may actually make police misconduct more likely than it already is. That's not moral or just. Thus, I affirm. Thanks again to Hayd and to the readers!