Resolved, the US should shift the focus in Afghanistan toward peace-keeping rather than combat.

Hello everyone, the topic is Resolved, the United States should shift the focus in Afghanistan from combat to peace-keeping, for which I will be arguing con, or against; incidentally, for anyone who is curious, this is my first debate, as I'm interested both in this topic and in testing my own skills. To begin with, I'd like to preface my arguments with a history of the War in Afghanistan. Prior to the 9/11 attacks, the Taliban regime was issued an ultimatum, to surrender bin Laden or face the consequences. A month after the aforementioned attacks, bombing runs began, and US Special Forces were inserted into Afghanistan. Fast-forward to 2002, after the capture of Kandahar and Kabul, and the Taliban seemed to have been destroyed; Coalition forces occupied the nation, and the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance had been greatly strengthened by US munitions and funds. It was at this point that US forces shifted more towards peace-keeping and state-building. Democratic elections were set up, and the UN authorised a security force (ISAF) and a political mission (the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). (1) However, since then the situation has deteriorated. According to Paul Rogers, professor in the department of peace studies at Bradford University: "Even during a period when the number of foreign troops has increased, Taliban and other paramilitaries have actually gained control of more of Afghanistan. This has been further accompanied by political regression in the country, reflected in the many accounts of widespread voting irregularities in the presidential elections of 20 August 2009; the collapse in women's participation in the polling across many parts of the country is especially notable. The flawed election reinforces the negative effects of endemic corruption and maladministration under the Hamid Karzai government in eroding the Afghan people's confidence in and support for the military and political strategy of their domestic rulers and foreign military backers." (2) This leads me into my argument. It didn't work the first time around, why try it a second time? As I previously finished outlining, our original plan for Afghanistan was a "shock and awe" campaign followed by an occupation that turned towards state-building and peacekeeping. However, this was based on a flawed assumption that the Taliban had been eradicated, when in fact they had simply melted back into the shadows from whence they came. By 2005, they'd returned, unleashing extreme violence in the summer months directly after the opium-poppy harvest, with al-Qaeda also entrenched in the border districts between Afghanistan and Pakistan. (2) Between 2007 and 2009, they've shown themselves extremely capable and deadly, blending into civilian populations and relying on small engagements rather than large-scale battles (2) In fact, this crucial flaw in the United States' approach to the War in Afghanistan is merely a repeat of past history, specifically the French War in Algiers. In November of 1954, the FLN, a militant group seeking Algerian independence, launched nationwide terrorist attacks and then retreated to the nation's mountains, awaiting the counter-attack. Instead, the French armies, focused in this case on peacekeeping, executed police actions in the major cities, arresting militants. By staying in the urban areas and policing the cities, the French forces gave up a crucial chance to sweep the mountains and eradicate the bulk of the insurgency, which was at that time weakened by a lack of support among the public. (3) In fact, throughout this War in Algiers, every effort to keep the peace in the cities via arrests, etc., met with utter failure and disgrace, while the only truly successful operations against the FLN involved large numbers of troops deployed in combat operations to cut off their supply lines. (3) Again, a clear parallel to the Afghanistan scenario. After driving the Taliban out of the cities, we were content to keep the peace there, allowing the Taliban, like the FLN, to build their strength and entrench themselves. Even now, in 2010, the war is not winding down but instead intensifying, and the situation calls not for more peacekeeping, but rather for a military crackdown, for a refusal to let our guard down. US casualties this year as a result of terrorist actions are at a record high, 326 this year as of September 30. (4) The attacks are only increasing, because the Taliban are becoming more capable, and to shift focus from combating them to state-building and peace-keeping would be a serious mistake. According to a senior US counter-terrorism official in Washington: "Most of the stupid Taliban are dead... Even in the south, the adversaries are becoming more tactically capable." (5) The article cited went on to state that many of the "Afghan mujahideen" are at their strongest ever. Having had years to examine American tactics and technology, they are fighting better than ever despite heavy losses. US Special Forces, having also examined this situation, make it clear in this article that the Taliban, having been counted out many times before, are far too deadly for Green Berets to underestimate them or let their guard down; a constant stream of new recruits flows out of Pakistani madrassahs to partially recoup their losses, but despite being slowly worn down, the Taliban are still lethal. (5) In conclusion, to shift the focus in Afghanistan toward peace-keeping rather than combat would represent not only a fundamental flaw in our understanding of the situation but a crucial mistake that could cost us the opportunity to prevent Afghanistan's joining the ranks of other "failed states." George Santayana once wrote, "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it." (6) If we shift the focus in Afghanistan towards peace-keeping without first fully eradicating the Taliban, we will be repeating the mistakes of the past, both the mistakes of our earlier operations in Afghanistan and the mistakes the French made in Algiers. Such a serious mistake would not only give the insurgency a chance to regroup, but would almost inevitably plunge the nation of Afghanistan into the darkness of oppression once again. For this reason, I urge you to vote Con. 1) "Afghanistan: Peacekeeping without Peace." opendemocracy.com. Accessed 08 Nov 2010. http://www.opendemocracy.net... 2) "The Afghan Dilemna." opendemocracy.net. Accessed 08 Nov 2010. http://www.opendemocracy.net... 3) "French Counterinsurgency in Algeria: Forgotten Lessons From A Misunderstood Conflict." smallwarsjournal.com. Accessed 08 Nov 2010. http://smallwarsjournal.com... 4) "Afghanistan Casualties: Military Forces and Civilians." fas.org. Accessed 08 Nov 2010. http://www.fas.org... 5) "Taliban in Afghanistan may be rallying despite General Petraeus' insistence they are worn out." nydailynews.com. Accessed 08 Nov 2010. http://www.nydailynews.com... 6) "Answers.com- Those who ignore history are bound to repeat it." answers. com. Accessed 08 Nov 2010. http://wiki.answers.com...