The Problem of Evil (PoE)

In virtue of the fact that Con has left so little to engage with, I’m going to bolster the case for believing that gratuitous evils (as I define them) exist, and then will respond to Con’s case against P3. Defending and reinforcing P3At present, I have given 4 reasons to think P3 is true:1. The prima facie case for the existence of gratuitous evils2. Rowe’s Non-conceiveium case for the existence of gratuitous evils3. Divine silence4. That there is no reason to think that these evils can be explained. Con hasn’t really engaged with any of these points at all. Rather, he hopes that by giving his short response to P3, he can undercut it without having to reply to these 4 justifications. Another reason I want to add could perhaps best be termed epistemic consistency. In essence, this simply means applying the same or similar standards to the PoE as we do to normal beliefs, and only to take seriously beliefs which are at least plausible. Sinnott-Armstrong explains the absurdity of abandoning this standard,“Would it benefit my family in the long-run if I were to burn down our house tonight? Possibly. Does that possibility make it reasonable to believe that we would benefit? No. Why not? Because we do know one thing: Burning down my house would cause serious problems in my family in the short term. Those known costs set up a presumption or burden of proof that needs to be overcome before contrary beliefs can be reasonable. ” (1)The same is true of evil. Given the massive short-term cost it causes, and (as well as we can judge), it’s seeming ability to lead to long-term costs, the standard we follow must be consistent with our daily lives. Otherwise, as Sinnott-Armstrong quips, theists would be agnostic towards burning down their houses! The point is this: unless we genuinely adopt such scepticism with regard to decisions we make in our lives and beliefs, then we (if we are to be consistent) have to act on the information we have in respect to gratuitous evils. The only information we have in the debate thus far compels us to believe that they exist, and thus affirm P3. Con's Sceptical theist (ST) response to P3Given my last point, I think it’s pretty clear that already Con’s objection is shaky. His first point is basically just a sceptical theist response, holding that we need something like omniscience to judge whether gratuitous evils exist. Firstly, notice that all we have here is a retreat to the possible, which gives us no grounds whatsoever to doubt for a moment the evidential case for P3, save the mystery card. Of course I agree that all evil may have a morally sufficient reason, but given that we have now 4 relevant lines of evidence to counter this, it is no help to hold epistemic scepticism, and the absurdities this would entail. Secondly, I anticipated this response in my justification of P3. At least 4 of my justificatory remarks for P3 attempt to bridge the gap between the appearance of gratuitous evils, and the fact of gratuitous evils, and Con just ignores this. Thirdly, what this view amounts to is that NO amount of evil could make it even slightly less probable that God exists, regardless of if everyone in the world suffered horrendously from birth to death. Surely, if our beliefs are to reflect the world, then this seemingly open-ended commitment to evil on any scale with a belief in God diminishes the concept of God, and makes him as unfalsifiable as Flew’s invisible gardener. Fourthly, if one is consistent, ST leads to unpalatable and absurd conclusions. As my 5 point intimates, epistemic scepticism would either be totally selective or all consuming. As Stephen Law points out:“if this implausible degree of skepticism were adopted, then we would not be in a position reasonably to conclude on the basis of observation that mice are not the thing that God values most. True, this may not seem like the kind of world a mice-valuing God would create (it’s not sufficiently mice-friendly or mice-centered). But, for all we know, God’s apparent utter disregard for the well-being of mice, and, indeed, apparent sadism towards them (cats etc. ), is really no evidence at all that he doesn’t value mice above everything else. This degree of skepticism would be a wholly implausible, ad hoc way of salvaging belief in a mice-centered God from empirical refutation. It’s no less an implausible, ad hoc way of salvaging your belief in a human-centered or good-centered God. ” (2)ST also leads to devastating consequences, such as moral paralysis, because any moral choices we make rely on inductive judgement. Perhaps saving the fawn in my example from this dreadful suffering, or the children from dying painfully would create a ripple effect which would lead to far greater suffering. Indeed, they must do. According to Con, we just don’t know, and in fact, we would be best to do nothing if we come across such a circumstance. As Scott Sehon notes,"the result is that, if I were to take sceptical theism seriously, I should be morally paralysed. " (3)Thus, we lead ourselves into sceptical mire of indecision and absurdity that we can't escape. This contrived scepticism would also make belief in God on the basis of arguments like the first cause or design equally problematic. How could we really tell that that God would fine-tune a universe, given our lack of omniscience? To summarise, Con's position not only spectacularly fails on its own merit, but the consequences one is lead to seems like a huge price to pay. Denying logicHis second response is to say that God doesn’t abide by rules of logic. I suppose I could term this the illogical response. Of course, this is self-refuting. Denying the law of non-contradiction, for example, requires that the law holds in the first place. Notice that even Con in his short reply makes use of the law of identity and non-contradiction when describing God. He is omniscient, for example. Can God be all-knowing and not all-knowing? Of course not. Can He simultaneously exist, and not exist? No. Even most theists recognise that God must be logically coherent. Bill Craig remarks,“God can make all things, but in one sense to make a squared circle, or a married bachelor is not a thing. There is no such thing. Those are just logically contradictory combinations of words. ” (4)But it’s not even relevant to the PoE. Indeed, if God were able to transcend reality boundaries, then there should be no evil in the world. It is God’s coherence that enables the theist to hold that evils may be morally justified in the first place! ConclusionThere are a load of points which I could introduce or develop, but I think I'll stop here. It's clear that Con is either unwilling or unable to rigorously engage with the debate at hand. In order to try and refute P3, he simultaneously denies logic and employs extreme scepticism. Quite obviously, this won't do. Sources1. God? Debate between a Christian and an Atheist, William lane Craig and Walter Sinnott Armstrong, 2004, Oxford University Press, P1422. . http://stephenlaw.blogspot.com...3. . http://www.bowdoin.edu... P124. . http://www.youtube.com...(Video)