Tim Spin's Debate Tournament R1: Vegetarianism

P1: "Plant Sentience" Plants are not sentient beings. They lack a central nervous system or the pain receptors that would be processed in a central functioning area (i.e. brain). Con is making the argument that plants have feelings. The burden of proof is entirely on Con on this one, and if his argument rings true (and we are indeed causing immense suffering to plants) then we are horrible people for picking flowers or trimming bushes. The hypothalamus, for example - in the limbic system - regulates responses for pleasure, pain, sexual satisfaction, anger, and aggression [1]. No such structure exists in plants. Anyone can observe certain chemical processes in plants and label them "suffering" or "pleasure" but such a judgment is far removed from any resembling structure in animals. Plants can, however, react to stimuli through nastic movements [2]. Like other organic substances, plants clearly have environments where they thrive and fail to thrive. Often, individuals will label certain environmental conditions as causing plants to “suffer” but this is more an emotional phrase than sound physiological statement. When examined critically, this statement becomes even less tenable. Consciousness arises out of suffering in that for a being to suffer, it must be acutely aware of its own existence. The notion that plants are conscious beings that can experience a wide range of emotional states falls well outside the range of science and into the realm of the paranormal. Additionally, there would be one more reason against the notion of plant pain making sense: Evolution. Ironically, pain actually benefits humans and other animals as a survival mechanism, as one thinker explains “Pain is a response to a negative environment, a way of telling us that something is wrong, and of forcing us to go do something about it. It is a survival trait”. Plants, however, have a different line of evolutionary needs and pain serves no useful function “If they are harmed, they cannot do anything about it. So, again evolutionarily-speaking, there is no reason for them to have developed the ability to feel pain [3].” TURN: Even if it is true that plants can feel “pain” in some sense highly detached from how animals would feel it and based on their own physiology (such a profession of pain on our part would be subjective given the physiological discrepancies) does it follow that causing unnecessary suffering is morally acceptable because we essentially can’t avoid it? I would argue no, and there is certainly a difference between picking fruit from a tree and slaughtering animals in terms of suffering elicited. Does wheat now have emotions under Con’s argument? Physiology, evolution, and common sense can all point in one direction, but as long as we insist to interpret innate responses to stimuli as “pain” or “suffering” from non-conscious plants Con will still have an argument. P2: Value of life/Pain insensitivity Con’s question is a little tricky here due to our tendency to evaluate humans as individuals rather than members of a species. I certainly do not agree that humans have the same moral worth as plants, as he does. I also disagree with the contention that there are no grounds for differentiating in terms of “intrinsic” moral worth, which is itself a very complex issue which is a side argument from the issue of vegetarianism. Vegetarianism simply holds that the suffering of other conscious beings has value. It never explicitly states or leads to the conclusion that humans are morally equivalent to rabbits, nor does my first premise. While very few humans may not be able to feel pain, it does not follow from my first premise that those who cannot feel pain are without value. Con Criticisms 1. I have already addressed this point. I maintain that plant suffering in any way that resembles the suffering of animals does not exist. Another point here is that while it is absolutely necessary to kill the animal before eating it, it is not necessary to kill the trees that drop fruit or plants that grow vegetables to reap their nutrients. 2. Lying, in general, tends to be morally wrong – but that is not to say that it is always wrong. Instead of advancing a rule-based morality, I advance a contextually based one where lying in such a case would be morally demanded. I think that Con needs to re-evaluate his moral views on this one. 3. I am going to skip to Con’s perceived distinction between suffering and killing because it is a common one, and I have already answered the first criticism. While it is true that shot to the back of the head as a means for execution is not suffering in the traditional sense, what can be argued is that the population suffers from a broader angle. The innocuous “Do not cause unnecessary suffering to conscious beings” does not excuse every act that does not cause direct physical suffering to conscious beings. We have no moral obligations to rocks and other non-conscious beings, but this basic rule does not excuse actions that prima facie do not cause immediate physical suffering. Even still, it is only prima facie – can we ever really be sure if a human feels absolutely zero suffering when shot through the back of the head? Again, I contend that this proposition does not immediately excuse actions that fall outside of the direct scope of it. It would be like someone claiming that “Do not murder” entails the moral acceptability of burglary. Conclusion: Con’s argument seems to boil down to “Omnivores might be doing wrong, but vegetarians are just as guilty!” Even if plants do feel some form of “pain,” it does not resemble the sort that animals feel due to vast physiological differences. One study echoes this statement In theory, plants could possess a mental state like pain, but IF, AND ONLY IF there is a requisite complexity of organized plant tissue which could serve to INSTANTIATE the kinds of complex information processing that is prerequisite to such higher order mental states as that of consciousness and felt pain. A mammalian brain is not necessary but an immensely complex hierarchically organized central processor of some form would be [4]. Where is such a structure located in biological make up of plants? The same study concludes “A lot is required and plants just don't have it. This is not to say that they cannot exhibit complex reactions, but we are simply OVER- INTERPRETING such reactions when they are designated as "felt pain" [4]. Con has presented no more justification for eating meat than his two-wrongs approach and the occasional dispute of my propositions. We are still yet to see a strong justification for meat eating outside of “Well, I am not the only one sinning!” [1]http://webspace.ship.edu... [2]http://www.tiem.utk.edu... [3]http://www.vegan3counties.org.uk... [4]http://tabish.freeshell.org...