TT2 Expert Final: U.S. militia groups pose a greater threat to our national security than do FTOs

Alright, thanks to bsh1 for an awesome round of rebuttals. Onto case defense - I'll stick to the running organization.1. History of harm1a. By the numbers - The trend study(1/2) Pro states that my data is out of date. A few problems here. First off, the study doesn't just extend from 2001 to 2009, though those are the figures I focused on. It extends back 40 years, establishing a long-term trend, which Pro doesn't address. I would say that such a long term historical trend presumes a continuation, and it's up to Pro to explain why that trend has vanished in the last 5 years.Pro later points to a CNN link that contradicts mine. Unlike my link, however, his source isn't primary and doesn't allow you to peruse the individual instances of terror, and thus lacks verifiability. It also overlimits the data, ignoring every attack on U.S. troops abroad, which encompass the majority of al Qaeda terror attacks in that timespan and still affect our nation's security.[1](3) I've shown both a higher gravity and frequency through this evidence. I've also established a substantial likelihood for these acts to be perpetrated. The combination continues to outweigh Pro's case.(4) Much of Pro's evidence focuses on the presence of this potential threat without any historical trends to support its occurrence. I laid out last round why an increase in membership doesn't equate to an increase in likelihood to commit to such devastating attacks, and how monitoring programs ameliorate any existing capacity. - Fear(1) The majority of Pro's examples have involved individuals who engaged in violence on or near their property. Attacking government buildings actually appears to be uncommon.(2) Pro is trying to have it both ways. Here, he argues that USMGs fly under the radar, making them more dangerous. Later, he says that USMGs are willing to engage in high-profile attacks, which garner media attention. Either they're going to continue trying to remain anonymous, or they'll move on to bigger hits, not both. If it's the former, as Pro asserts here, an explosion of violence ruins their advantage. If it's the latter, then, just as with FTOs, the country rallies against them. Since he's arguing the former here, I will mention that most operations by USMGs are disrupted by the combined efforts of the reporting agencies and law enforcement, as evidenced by nearly all the examples we've cited. They're not anonymous.(3) Interesting that Pro questions my evidence from 2009 on the basis that it's too old and then tries to utilize the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 as evidence that USMGs are willing to commit mega-attacks today. Recall that much of my analysis from R2 showcased a much higher death toll from FTOs without including 9/11 in the data. A single attack does not a trend make.(4) Threats on diplomatic targets are still all too common, and they still play on those fears.[17](5) The harms are clear: people are mentally and physically harmed when suffering from PTSD.[18] This showcases a large harm that goes well beyond the physical vicinity of a terrorist attack. Pro drops it. He also drops that FTOs present a unique threat by engendering xenophobia and the associated acts of violence that also threaten our internal security. He says later that this is non-unique, but this presents an excess harm resulting from FTOs that aren't committed by them or their adherents, which makes it unique.Pro says that I'm defeating my own point, but he either misunderstands or misrepresents my source. The primary evidence I provided shows that organized international terrorism doesn't incite organized domestic terrorism, whereas organized domestic acts of terror are linked to increased organized international acts. In other words, his impacts supercharge mine, but not the other way around. - Media(1) Again, I think Pro has to pick a stance on what's likely to happen and stick with it. However, he provides no evidence of a trend of high-profile attacks to support any evaluation of likelihood.(2) The latter point here is really just an extension of radical ideology point, so cross-apply my response from there. Pro states that USMGs are engendering some level of fear of government in the general populous, but his link doesn't support this, nor does he explain on any level how this fear is damaging to national security.1b. Gravity of attacksTimely as Pro's evidence is, I've already shown mine to be more valid.The only other point made here is that they can stockpile dangerous weapons. First off, in doing so, they put themselves in the cross-hairs of the FBI. His own source says these are illegal weapons, and that they're often caught and “charged with weapons, explosives, and/or conspiracy violations.” This shows that they actively create reasons to both track and arrest them before they ever commit a violent act. Second, all these weapons are similarly available to FTOs, often in larger amounts due to their associations with sovereign nations. Whether 200 randomly picked members that have been arrested possessed as many firearms at the time of arrest doesn't prove that they lack for weaponry. Third, there are substantially more damaging sources of weaponry available to FTOs, such as rockets, many CB weapons, and even nuclear weapons.2. Going forwardPro makes the argument that distance serves as protection. However, threats have to be recognized at the point of entry, and sufficient coverage of all points of entry is virtually impossible, as security measures can only cover “about two-thirds down the list in covering the routes and modes of concern to a nominal level,” which can all be avoided.[19] He says that privacy rights prevent monitoring, though that certainly hasn't stopped the NSA from wiretapping U.S. citizens.[20] Beyond that, the capacity to monitor everyone abroad encounters physical limitations in its scope, which Pro concedes is much larger.Pro discusses how USMGs influence government. However, he's equating levels of influence that are starkly different. No part of the U.S. government is actively supporting USMGs financially or arming them, nor is the U.S. encouraging their violent activity. The fact that they've had meetings with government officials only proves that the government views them as a sufficient threat to meet with them. The same cannot be said of FTOs – Syria, Iran, and Sudan all have been designated as nations that “have repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism,” providing arms, financial aid, and sheltering them.[21]Pro then states that we have more options with FTOs. However, he gives two more, both of which have been incredibly ineffective. Public diplomacy, a necessity for dealing with non-state actors, has “not yet been realized” due to numerous U.S. deficiencies.[22] Sanctions haven't stopped Syria and Iran from contributing to these groups, nor has closing off other sources done much to stem their efforts.[23] Pro doesn't address any of my analysis on why other means present a huge concern, and how they create new threats to our national security and bolster the ranks of FTOs. The disparate nature of FTOs and the resulting difficulties with selecting targets is also dropped. Bundy's response to federal agents certainly presented a dangerous possibility, but it only resulted in a single armed confrontation that has mostly resolved with no casualties. Scary as it was, it doesn't compare to actual terrorist attacks, nor the potential of a random nuclear or missile strike. That's not to mention that the Bundy case actually shows the very clashes between USMGs I mentioned in the previous round.[24] - NBCsPro never addresses the “N” here. Nuclear weapons are infinitely more accessible by FTOs than USMGs, as are missiles,[25] both of which are more effective than CBs for the purpose of killing people.[5] The Tokyo example just furthers this point.(1) The key part of Pro's quote here is “only nation states have succeeded in doing so.” Remember, many of these terrorist groups are state-sponsored. To assume that access to the large quantities of CB weapons manufactured and weaponized by countries like Iran and Syria couldn't possibly fall into the hands of FTOs ignores a likely route of acquisition.[26] Whether they're given those weapons or they take them by force,[27] acquisition is a problem. The “erosion of state control over chemical and biological weapons (or their ingredients)” also allows them access that USMGs lack.[5](2) Again, those 200 individuals don't represent the capabilities of all FTOs. The article actually doesn't cite those 13 cases, but they likely had to manufacture their own, which presents with the exact same concerns of acquiring large amounts and weaponizing that Pro cited in the previous point.(3) This is just an assertion of likelihood without warrants or evidence to support it.Pro ends with an appeal to authority that, once again, focuses on opinion and fails to prove his point.I do also join my opponent in mourning those lost on 9/11. I leave it to him to continue the debate.17. http://www.isvg.org...18. http://ptsd.about.com...19. http://www.rand.org...20. http://www.usatoday.com...21. http://www.state.gov...22. http://www.cfr.org...23. nyujilp.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/42.2-OLeary.pdf24. http://web.archive.org...25. http://www.gloria-center.org...26. http://cns.miis.edu...27. http://www.intifada-palestine.com...