The Problem of Evil (PoE)

DefinitionsGod - An omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent personal being who created the universe and is concerned with the well being of His creatures.Evil (minimalist account) - (At least) anything which causes suffering, pain, disability and death. Note on evil: The term "evil" is being used here as merely a placeholder for certain things which God would seek to prevent. As long as we agree that suffering, for example, exists and is something which God would wish to prevent ceteris paribus, then the argument is relevant even if moral nihilism were true, and evil (in the moral sense), doesn't exist.I ask that if Con challenge this definition, he shows how this would be relevant in defeating the problem.The WSA Evidential problem of evil (1) (P1) If there were an all-powerful and all-good God, then there would not be any evil in the world unless that evil is logically necessary for an adequately compensating good.(P2) There is evil in the world.(P3) Some of that evil is not logically necessary for any adequately compensating good.(C) Therefore, there is no God who is all powerful and all good. Defending P1Put simply, P1 states that in order for evil to be morally permissible, the evil in question cannot be avoided, and the reason for permitting it outweighs preventing the evil. Such an example would be in the case of tooth decay. If painful drilling were the only way to prevent lots of future suffering, then it would be sufficient to meet P1, as it minimises evil in the most efficient way possible. Given that God is a being who is aware of all evil, has the power to prevent it, and would want to limit it as much as possible, it follows that only evils which are described by P1 would exist. As Christian philosopher Daniel Howard Snyder remarks,"on the face of it, the idea that God may well permit gratuitous evil is absurd. After all, if God can get what He wants without permitting some particular horror (or anything comparably bad), why on earth would He permit it?"(2)Thus, P1 holds that if God exists, gratuitous evils (as defined by P1) do not. Defending P2If P1 is virtually undeniable, P2 is even more so. Remember, given the definition of evil, it is merely sufficient to provide examples of things which meet the criteria I provided above. This criteria does not have to define evil as such, but merely provide examples of circumstances which (all else being equal), God would prevent. I think we all can agree that pain, suffering, disability and death are good candidates for circumstances that need a morally sufficient reason to be permitted. All P2 is concerned with is do these things exist. The fact is that there are many things which cause suffering, pain, disability and death. There is torture, rape, murder, and a host of natural evil, from floods to droughts. All of these may provide some greater good (this is for P3 to determine later), but in and of themselves, clearly all of us would seek to avoid them, because of their very nature. P2, I suspect is relatively uncontroversial - these things exist, and do so in abundance. The conflict will be whether or not these evils are gratuitous, which is the remit of P3.Defending P3P3 states that it is reasonable to believe some evils in the world are not logically necessary for an adequately compensating good. In short, there exists gratuitous evil. An all powerful being is able to prevent the evils that occur, and an all good being is obviously willing, so the question becomes, is there always justification for the evils in the world? The answer, I think, is quite clearly, no. Before I begin to outline the justification for P3, I want to use 2 particularly horrendous examples of suffering on a massive scale: "Many babies each year are born with Down's syndrome. Most of these babies, with normal paediatric care, will grow up healthy. A significant number, however, have intestinal obstructions that will kill them if they do not receive an operation. Without the operation, dehydration and infection will cause these babies to wither and die over a period of hours and days. Today this operation is relatively simple, but not long ago these babies could not be saved . . . This baby (one born in the past with this) suffers for days, then dies." (3)Another example given by Rowe is that of animal suffering:"Suppose in some distant forest lightning strikes a dead tree, resulting in a forest fire. In the fire a fawn is trapped, horribly burned and lies in terrible agony for several days before death relieves its suffering. So far as we can see, the fawn's intense suffering is pointless." (4)What reasons do we have to believe these evils are actually gratuitous? The first is what we might call the prima facie case, and this is not a belief we should give up lightly. From absolutely everything we know of the first case, there was nothing to suggest that from the length, extent or even the very existence of the suffering of these babies that this was anything other than gratuitous. A baby destined to die suffered days of seemingly unnecessary, excruciating pain, with helpless relatives helplessly looking on in many cases. Given the fact that no hint of any reason at all seems evident to allow these babies to suffer, it is reasonable to conclude on this basis from the appearance of gratuitous evils, to the fact of gratuitous evils. As critic Stephen Wykstra reasons,“For if an instance of suffering appears not to have a point, that is a reason for thinking it has no point.” (5)Secondly, it is difficult even to conceive of some examples being morally permissible. In the case of the Rowe’s fawn, there seems to be no conceivable reason to allow the extent of the suffering, nor any benefit which could even come from it. As Rowe points out, “In light of our experience and knowledge, of the variety and scale of human and animal suffering in our world, the idea that none of this suffering could have been prevented by an omnipotent being without thereby losing some greater good or permitting an evil at least as bad seems an extraordinary, absurd idea, quite beyond our belief." (6)The difficulty even to conceive of a plausible, morally sufficient reason to permit some evils also supports P3. Thirdly, we have cases of divine silence. In many cases of suffering, often there seems to be no comfort given to those who experience horrendous evils. To use perhaps the most striking example:"the silence and the emptiness is so great, that I look and do not see, — Listen and do not hear — the tongue moves [in prayer] but does not speak ... I want you to pray for me — that I let Him have [a] free hand." (7)Thus, the divine silence in light of evils gives an additional reason to think these evils are really gratuitous. Lastly, the attempts to deny that there gratuitous evils run into a host of problems, which I will show in my defence of P3 in the next round.Given this, it seems all 3 premises are justified, and with this, the conclusion necessarily follows.ConclusionIn order to refute the argument, Con must present both a plausible and coherent account of why the argument is unsuccessful. I invite him to make his case, closing with the words of the prominent Christian scholar N.T.Wright:"If you think you have solved the problem of evil, lie down. It will pass." (8)Sources1,3. God? Debate between a Christian and an Atheist, William lane Craig and Walter Sinnott Armstrong, 2004, Oxford University Press, p84.2. Howard-Snyder, Daniel, and Frances Howard-Snyder. 1999. "Is Theism Compatible with Gratuitous Evil?" American Philosophical Quarterly 36: 115-29.4, 6. Rowe, William, The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism, American Philosophical Quarterly 16: 335-41.5.http://www.calvin.edu...7. http://www.time.com...8. http://commonsenseatheism.com......... (debate can be found here).