The Kalam Cosmological Argument is sound

A & B-Series of TimePro has still not shown A-Theory is true, and concedes that the entire argument we are debating rests upon it. In a last attempt to try and meet his burden of proof he presents one single, irrelevant argument. This is apparently supposed to show that A-Theory is most plausibly true, but my opponent miserably fails in his task.Zeno's ParadoxConceptual Scenario A: Even if Zeno's Paradox succeeds at showing that an actual infinite number of things is incoherent, this still would not support the notion that A-Theory is most plausibly true. This is because B-Theory does not necessarily posit an infinite number of things, just tenseless time [1]. This makes the Zeno's Paradox section from Pro trivial, as its content does not have any obvious bearing on whether A-Theory is actually true or not. Since this entire section from Pro is just one strange red herring [2], it can be disregarded.Also the resolution to the paradox is incredibly simple. With regards to the thought analysis involved, the intervals pertaining to scenario get progressively tinier, by halves. Zeno's Paradox for some reason just assumes that because the number of steps is infinite, then so is the total amount of time with regards to this situation. However, 1/2+1/4+1/8...=1. The total time is finite, not infinite. Therefore, Zeno's Paradox does not necessarily show that an actual infinite is impossible. A-Theory and RelativityThe Theory of Relativity is one of the most well tested theories we have in science [3]. This alone puts A-Theory in a different light, as Relativity questions it. Without a preferred reference frame for identifying a simultaneous point in time at which would be dubbed "now", one has to come to the conclusion that presentism is false. Relativity infers we do not have this preferred reference frame. Therefore, A-Theory is most plausibly false.Pennington is also incorrect in claiming that he does not have to deny B-Theory. If B-Theory is true then the Kalam is trivial. He must deny it to meet his burden. "What Pro still does is deny he exist or anyone or thing for that matter." - PenningtonForgetting the fact that I'm Con, the above drivel is just ridiculous. B-Theory implies that things objectively exist tenselessly, not that things do not exist. Pro just does not understand B-Theory, and is building straw men instead of tackling the issues I am actually bringing forward."If he tries to say that the universe has always existed then what he is saying is we all have always existed. This means I was not born in 1979 but existed since the Big-Bang blew and formed matter into things." - PenningtonTo say "I was not born in 1979 but existed since the Big-Bang" assumes that there is an arrow of time leading back to The Big Bang. However, this is supposed to be an analogy describing B-Theory. Ergo, the above is a false analogy. "Begins to Exist"With regards to other aspects of Premise 2, Pro claims that The Big Bang Theory is evidence that the universe began to exist. Therefore, he has met his burden of proof. This is odd, as I already showed that The Big Bang Theory only lets us know the universe has a finite past (assuming A-Theory), not that the singularity came into being from non-being. There is simply no scientific evidence to support that, as all evidence we have is within space-time. Without a reason as to why we should necessitate the conclusion that the singularity came into being from non-being, simply due to inference of a finite past of the universe; we have no grounds to claim the universe began to exist. Basically, Pennington has not shown Model 2 below to be true using The Big Bang Theory, as The Big Bang Theory supports Model 1 just as much. This is important, as the singularity does not come into being in Model 1: In Model 1 the universe does not come into being, but in Model 2 the universe does come into being. Has Pro shown Model 2 to be correct? Not in the slightest. In Model 1 the universe does not "come from" at all, while the universe "comes from" "nothing" in Model 2. Since both fit all the cosmological evidence we have, then what basis are we left with to claim Model 2 is the correct one?The Problem with William Lane Craig's Definition "x Begins to exist if and only if x exists at some time t and there is no time t* prior to t at which x exists and no state of affairs in the actual world in which x exists timelessly."Pro comes out of the ball park without another red herring here. He claims that Premise 1 of the Kalam Cosmological Argument has some severe relevance to Premise 2 in the context described. However, Premise 1 deals with causal aspects of hypothetical beginnings, while Premise 2 does not speak on causality. Thus, denying this definition above from Dr. Craig in no way undermines Premise 1 of the Kalam Cosmological Argument. All of these random objections coming from Pro are strange indeed. The point is that without a reason to accept Dr. Craig's definition as absolute, we cannot say the universe began to exist based on it. Now, we actually have very good reason to reject Dr. Craig's definition. Keep in mind the distinction I mentioned in my first round between:i) "x has a finite past"ii) "x came into beingIf we take a look at Dr. Craig's definition, i) alone meets the criteria. This suggests that all we need to say something began to exist, is the inference that that i) is true pertaining to "x". Why is this problematic? Well this indicates that something can begin to exist even it did not necessarily come into being (as only a finite past is required according to the definition). Since Dr. Craig's definition leaves the door open for something to begin to exist even if it did not come into being, this makes it logically invalid because the two are rather synonymous. The definition introduced by Pro can be discarded for this reason.The Advantages of Richard Swinburne and Adolf Grunbaum's Definition"x begins to exist if and only if x exists at sometime t and there is time t* prior to t at which x does not exist."Pennington claims that because the above does not mention any metaphysical aspects, it is unreasonable. However, this is what makes it advantageous as it does not need to! It should already be assumed that metaphysical existence does not begin to exist. For example, we do not need a definition for "begins to exist" which excludes The Law of Identity. The only reason metaphysical aspects are mentioned in Dr. Craig's definition, is because without them we would have to conclude that God began to exist based on the remaining definition. Swinburne and Adolf Grunbaum's definition necessitate that both i) and ii) be true pertaining to "x", when dealing with the claim that "x" began to exist. This makes the definition in question prima facie valid, while Dr. Craig's definition suffers from the issue of being illogical nonsense. Since Pro left us without good reason to accept Dr. Craig's definition of "begins to exist", Premise 2 cannot even get off of the ground.Analogy"This is true. This still does not change that those descriptions also describe a TV" - PenningtonThis is true. This still does not change the fact that those descriptions alone cannot tell us whether "x" is a TV or not. This was the whole point of the analogy in the first place. Direct CausationThis has no real bearing on the resolution. ConclusionIt seems evident that Pennington's responses to my arguments were extremely underwhelming. He is drawing conclusions without logical and metaphysical bridges, and is misrepresenting my position in an slightly embarrassing fashion. In this this last round I demonstrated why Premise 2 of the Kalam Cosmological Argument has not been established. The resolution has been negated according to the debate outline.Sources[1] http://www.academia.edu...[2] http://www.nizkor.org...[3] http://www.space.com...