DA Tournament: The Most Accurate Meta-Ethical Theory. Moral Realism (Pro) vs Moral Relativism (Con)

I thank Benshapiro for this debate.OverviewI will just be using this round for positive material; I will proceed with my critique of moral relativism next round. I am going to take several routes in affirming the resolution. Inference to the best explanation (via. moral sense theory and doxastic beliefs), logical necessity and pragmatics.Moral Sense TheoryMoral realism is an excellent explanation for our moral sense. If moral realism is true, then we would expect strongly general moral statements across sentient beings. Thus is because the statements of moral facts will not be subjective and thus will be uniform in their truth value from person to person. Hence we would expect strong consensus on several moral statements from our moral sense.We find this is indeed the case when it comes to several statements, such as involving murder, rape, sickness and health. We almost unanimously prefer to be in a state of health, and prefer to be alive than dead. We almost ubiquitously prefer our cognitive and physical freedom and have an innate sense of affection for close parties, such as family, children and partners. If moral realism is true then we would expect a strong consensus on these moral senses, and that is exactly what we observe in reality.Furthermore, it is virtually impossible to deny the fact we have a moral sense as it is an incorrigible experience.[1] I.e. it is something we directly perceive as the subject, similarly to how we perceive colour, sound, taste and our own thoughts. That is not to say it is a statement about what our moral sense refers to (for example, it is possible that our colour qualia don’t actually correlate to wavelengths of light, but something else), but the statement that we have a “moral sense” is one that cannot be false. Similarly, the fact you perceive black and white as colour qualia cannot be false, as it is an incorrigible experience, although you can dispute the nature of what the qualia represents.Thusly, we have a moral sense, and that moral sense is inductively observed in a way which is supportive of moral realism. When we refer to our moral sense when we make statements about when we see someone murdered, or raped, we refer to our “sense qualia”, which are in some manner linked to moral realism.Grounding Moral TruthsThere is no lack of abundance of ways in which moral truths can be grounded. The more traditional ways of grounding moral truths are in an objective moral agent, such as God. Accordingly what is moral will be that which concords with God’s nature. Note that God doesn’t actually have to exist for morals to be grounded, only for there to be an agreed upon concept of God to which moral truths are reported from. For example, even assuming the Christian God is completely fictional still leaves God’s moral code as an objective standard by which actions can be reported to be right or wrong (such as those listed in the ten commandments). This allows for imperative statements such as “You must not murder” to be cogent and thus moral realism follows.Other efforts ground moral truths in naturalistic features of the world. For example utilitarianism grounds moral truths in the well-being of the population when considering the global effect of one’s actions and so on (such as in scientific realism).[2] The moral facts are easily definable and cogent in non-moral terms, and they are true or false independently of personal bias or subjective opinion. While the quantities of the measure of each grounding may be subjective, the facts (X is wrong) are themselves true or false for each situation. Thus we have good reason to accept that in principle, it is very easily possible to objectively ground moral truths, and thus entailing moral realism.Categorical ArgumentIn moral realism, at least one indicative proposition is true. An indicative moral proposition such as “raping babies for fun is wrong” is either true of false in moral realism, however it is incoherent in moral relativism. If at least one indicative moral proposition is indeed true then the resolution is immediately affirmed.[3]Thus, we can make a tautological proposition:“Either raping babies for fun is either right or wrong or raping babies for fun is not right and not wrong”To put this into notational form:X is either [A or B] or [Not A and Not B]IF we accept the former proposition “either A or B”, or “not right and not wrong”, then moral realism holds. Thus the only way moral realism can be false is if the latter proposition “not right and not wrong” is true for each and every possible “moral proposition”.Thus we end up with assigning potential moral acts into two categories, moral categories “either right or wrong” or amoral categories “neither right, nor wrong”.This is problematic, since the category of “amorality” is defined according to what “morality” is defined. Similarly, categories such as “asexual” and “non-English” etc. are defined according to the absence of the non-qualifying category. In set theory this would be the universal set without the set containing the qualifying category.Thus, the term “amoral” is defined directly according to what is “moral”, however this is only possible if what is “moral” is a cogent concept, otherwise the term “amoral” would be completely meaningless since there would be no distinction between moral and amoral acts. Thus, it must follow that there are truth conditions by which something can be “moral” or not. IF there are truth conditions, then moral realism must follow, since inevitably something will fall into the former category, even hypothetically.Functional RealismWe operate on the assumption that realism holds, since we almost ubiquitously agree that moral disputes are resolvable. This is essentially impossible to do cogently in moral relativism, or flat out moral anti-realism, since moral statements can never be universally true in either meta-ethical framework.When we make political decisions to resolve humanitarian crimes in other countries, sanction other bodies due to violations of weapons treaties on their own people, or even draw up a constitution for all members of society (as well as when we grant human rights) we consequently operate under the assumption that there are global moral truths ubiquitous across the human species. We operate under the assumption that is really is wrong that North Korea starves its own people for example, and that we need to do something about it. Recent action taken in Libya provoked by the use of live ammunition on unarmed civilians protesting are made on the assumption that we are within our right to impose certain values upon the Libyan populace.IF it really was the case that morality was relative, then we would not have grounds upon which we can indeed condemn such actions, since it is just the subjective opinion of the totalitarian regime in power at the time.Because we operate under “functional realism”, it follows that it is doxastic, and thus is by default, the most accurate and preferred position. This applies to several other fields, for example methodological naturalism is the principle underpinning of science, which has led to the well-respected position of metaphysical naturalism, thus we should have good confidence that moral realism is the most accurate and best supported meta-ethical theory.References1. http://en.wikipedia.org...2. http://en.wikipedia.org...3. https://philosophynow.org...