United Nations peacekeepers should have the power to engage in offensive operations.

I'll start by attacking my opponent's case. I'll then move on to rebuild my own. Also sorry for being dumb and not realizing that CX goes in the comments.The Pro CaseOffensive operations are more effective:Pro's point relies on the success of one example: Congo. There are several reasons why the use of an offensive operation in Congo doesn't justify the long term authorization of offensive operations. Firstly, the situation in Congo isn't any better. Reuters states, "Tens of thousands of civilians are likely to be forced to flee their homes during a planned offensive by Congolese and UN forces against the Rwandan Hutu rebels." Now that M23 has been disarmed, another rebel group has emerged. The problem is, there are a multitude of other rebel groups in the Congo besides FDLR and the fact that FDLR has stepped up after the elimination of M23 shows that actually fixing the situation in Congo will take multiple successful offensive operations. Every offensive operation sufficiently weakens the UN, as I have demonstrated in my second and third contentions. If an operation fails, donors will withdraw their troops, exacerbating troop shortages. Even just having an offensive operation drains the UN of funds and troops due to the mission creep that is created. So, since there is no way for the UN peacekeepers to actually improve the situation in Congo without multiple operations, and since the UN in it's current state is unfit to perform multiple offensive operations, Congo does not justify the continued authorization of more robust mandates.Beyond this, Congo is only *one* success. Under mandate VII, peacekeepers have actually been using offensive operations for around 60 years, and most of them have been unsuccessful. Firstly, reference the Somali crisis, documented in my second contention. The UN-ordered attack caused the US to withdraw many troops from the peacekeeping forces, thus worsening the Rwandan genocide. Sloan documents ONUC (a mission in Congo, 1960), one of the first offensive operations by the UN, as a failure. Dorn elaborates, “The Congo mission highlighted many organizational difficulties for the United Nations. As a mission of unprecedented complexity, cobbled together in a rush, it experienced difficulties with command and control, intelligence (at least initially), and the application of force.” Another example would be UNPROFOR: a failed peace enforcement operation charged with protecting civilians in ‘safe areas’ in the former Yugoslavia (including, tragically, the ‘safe area’ of Srebrenica where some 8,000 thousand men and boys were murdered while peacekeepers were pushed to one side).Offensive operations increase credibility:A more truthful way to phrase this would be *successful* offensive operations increase credibility. Cross apply all my examples of failed offensive operations: they all decreased UN credibility. Since I am winning that offensive operations are unlikely to be successful, pro must lose on the point. Moreover, the UN currently isn't a credible force. The UN deals with a multitude of corruption issues within peacekeeping leadership, and doesn't have enough well-trained troops or weapons. Thus, in the UN's current state, they must increase their credibility before engaging in offensive operations to preserve diplomatic ties.Pro specifically talks about the Rwandan genocide. Reference my second contention in my constructive. The reason the UN was so uninvolved was a result of not their inability to engage in offensive operations, but rather the UN's reluctance to create broader mandates due to the fact that Somalia syndrome weakened the UN. Also, just because the UN peacekeeping forces were successful on a small scale mission in Congo doesn't mean that the UN peacekeeping forces are likely to be successful on a large scale mission during the time of a mass genocide.The Con CaseC1: Offensive operations will fail.First pro references Congo as an example. Cross apply my attacks on his case where I explain why the success in Congo doesn't mean the UN is fit to have the authority to engage in offensive operations.Ignore pro's arguments about the likelihood of the UN gaining the needed resources to engage in offensive operations. (specifically his responses 2, 3, and 5) The resolution implies that this debate is over the current state of the UN. Whether or not the UN is able to engage in offensive operations in the future is entirely irrelevant. Right now the UN is unfit to engage in such operations, thus such operations should not be authorized. If you, as a voter, do not buy this, look to the fact that pro hasn't shown that the UN *will* overcome the current problems. Pro has only shown that the UN *can.* This argument is uncompelling. I could easily argue that it is possible for the US to overcome the deficit, but the likelihood that the US actually will is overwhelmingly low.Pro's claim that the more troops will want to join the peacekeeping forces due to the success in Congo is absurd. My Seet meta-analysis has shown that death through hostile acts for UN peacekeeping has increased by 50% due to increased use of force. Few countries will want to bring more troops into an unnecessarily dangerous environment. Also, I'll extend my Mincielli evidence that shows donors are deterred from allowing their troops to engage in operations that increase the chance of a mission creep.C2: Failed offensive operations are bad.Pro's claim that this argument is non unique is trumped by my Seet evidence which demonstrates the increased danger that offensive operations cause for the troops involved. Military intervention can happen without the use of offensive operations, invalidating the claim that the UN is "sitting by and doing nothing." Victories in offensives do not minimize the impact. Extend my third contention. Regardless of how successful a mission is, the UN will still have to undo the damage they have caused in the form of nation building. 13 billion was spent in the small country of Kosovo alone. Moreover, the UN has to make a huge commitment if they want to better the area dealing with rebel groups. Cross apply my attack on pro's first contention where I showed that such a commitment will drain the UN of resources even if the first few attacks were mildly successful. One unsuccessful offensive outweighs a successful one because donors withdrawing their troops is something the UN cannot easily overcome.The event in Somalia was UN ordered but US lead. However, the leadership behind this attack doesn't actually matter because I'm not using it to gauge the UN's chance of success (although keep in mind that the UN was highly involved). I'm using this example to show the aftermath of a bad offensive operation.C3: The aftermath of all offensive operations are bad.The UN will have an equal amount of reparations in a successful mission as they will in an unsuccessful mission. Regardless of how well a mission goes, the use of force is still increased. When the peacekeepers use air strikes and tanks and other effective weapons in an offensive operation, they are given the task of fixing the damage done. Humanitarian aid is an entirely different area that the UN deals with that is unrelated to the topic at hand so don't buy pro's claims that defensive operations create mission creeps due to humanitarian aid. The example I cited in Congo happened right before the offensive in Congo happened. Donors withdraw their troops because they didn't want to deal with the inevitable mission creep that would be created, as well as it's consequences.The resolution has been negated.