Robots sent to destroy human life on Earth would be more moral than humans are capable of being.

Pro has not given much to respond to, but I will answer as best I can. The two sections seem to have merged somewhat, so I won't be splitting them up. On AP2 & Overcoming the is - ought gapLet me note that Pro has not responded to the point that crossing the is - ought gap is irrelevant - what matters is whether the humans can conform to a standard of right conduct, which Pro has tacitly conceded by not responding to. This point simply wins me the debate, because it shows humans are *capable* of being more moral than robots, even if I cannot show that they *ought* to. Which that in mind, let's look at what Pro did respond to. My point has been that Pro has inconsistently applied Hume's is - ought gap to humans and not the robots. If Pro cannot show that there is a disparity between the two cases that results in robots crossing the gap but humans not, then Pro has succeeded. Has he? Not even slightly; in fact, Pro's attempt to overcome it is laughable, boiling down to bare assertion. He argues that whereas the hypothetical imperative crosses the is - ought gap in the case of robots, it does not in the case of humans. Why does it succeed in the case of robots? He says the creators 'gave' the robots a hypothetical imperative. This is the misunderstand the nature of a hypothetical imperative: but let's first note the issue of whether the people who 'gave' the robots their hypothetical imperative were themselves beings with subjective preferences; I can't think of how they could be anything else, so again Pro falls into his own trap - by his own argument, the standards the robots conform to are subjective. But does crossing the is - ought gap using a hypothetical imperative render the actual standards of right conduct subjective? No, because the question of why you ought to conform to a standard has no bearing on what the standard actually is. Claiming that the way you come to conform to a standard changes the standard itself is as fallacious as claiming that the path you take to the local grocery store changes the local grocery store. It's a complete non - sequitur. Finally, the printer and the robots. Pro claims out of the blue that the robots are sentient - well firstly, whether or not robots even can be sentient is a contentious issue - see The Chinese Room [1] thought experiment. Secondly, Pro has just invented this now - nothing previously entailed that his robots were sentient, and it's usually against the rules of conduct to bring up new arguments in the final round. Besides, he still doesn't address the broader point, that it's absurd to claim that programming endows the thing being programmed with an objective moral standard. To sum:1. Pro did not show that crossing the is - ought gap is necessary. Even if I can't show that people ought to conform to rules of right standards, this does not entail that they are not capable of doing so. Pro dropped this point. 2. Pro has not shown that robots are capable of crossing the is - ought gap, or that humans can't while robots can. 3. Pro has not addressed the point that programming clearly does not entail objective moral obligations. Vote CON. [1] . http://en.wikipedia.org...