Civil Disobedience and Voluntary Punishment

A Brief Note:My opponent, bsh1, seems to be highly intelligent and wonderfully methodological. His arguments are very well written and structured. I apologize for not being able to match that level of sophistication, and I hope to improve my arguments and structure so that I can offer a formidable.Also, I want to apologize for making a couple of errors:Kritic:Pro claims I effectively used a kritic with my moral argument. I don't quite think that's the case, so I want to address this now. So, while the resolution does make an “ought” claim, I don't see how this makes the assumption of objective morality. There are methods of morality that can use an ought claim that isn't objective, like cultural relativity or pragmatics. However, this is my opponent's debate, and if he claims to have assumed objective morality in the first round, I do not want to go against that.The issue still remains, though, that my opponent does need to present his objective moral system, so that we can measure his claim. Imagine we were debating “We ought to obey God.” Because there are so many different religions with contrary positions on how to obey God, the pro arguments would need to supply which mode of understanding God is correct. Or, imagine we wanted to know what day of the week it is- we would need to refer to some objective calendar system, and depending on the calendar system, the day of the week would be different. I hope this explains why this isn't a kritic, and why my opponent needs to present an objective moral standard.Secondly, I want to apologize for linking out arguments for the existence of God without arguing for them within text. The arguments are both the original and current representation of Aquinas' causal argument for God. Even though this argument is well known, my opponent is right, I should present it in my textThe argument for the existence of God:There is an efficient cause for everything; nothing can be the efficient cause of itself.It is not possible to regress infinity in efficient causes.To take away the cause is to take away the effect.If there be no first cause then there will be no others.I exist as a contingent being, therefore, a first cause exists.This first cause is necessarily eternal, which is why I put forth that the most basic principle is existence itself, which is what morality is based off of. I apologize for not having added this in the previous round, and I will address the rebuttal to this in the next round.Okay, with those clarifications finished, I'll move on to Pro's opening case:Means of Justification:I agree with my opponent that the two possible forms of justification rest with either the intent of the agent, or the nature of the law they broke justifies non-acceptance of punishment.Moral Intent:I agree with my opponent that someone believing something does not make it so, but believing the earth is flat is not the same as intending to do good yet causing harm in the process. My opponent stated that moral intentions should not absolve punishment, but gave no arguments to prove this. There are some moral theories that rely only on the intention of the agent. The consequences might not be what matters in the moral realm.My opponent argued that moral intention isn't enough to absolve punishment, because that would mean Hitler shouldn't have been punished. This isn't an argument- it commits the fallacy of begging the question. Why should Hitler have been punished? Also, by the logic of your next argument, you state that there is always a possibility that a morally dubious action is morally righteous. Your own argument concludes that it is possible Hitler was moral. And remember, Hitler was elected, and his actions were entirely legal.There is no justification here; my opponent argues only in circles.The Nature of the Action:The crux of the argument seems to be that any dubious moral principle has the possibility of being true, no matter how slightly, so we ought to commit to that principle on the off chance that it is true. If we follow this system to its logical conclusions, then this leads to moral decay. Any action in the world has the possibility, however small, that it is moral. Humans perceive killing people to be wrong, but there is a chance, ever so slightly, that it could be morally correct. Humans do not have perfect knowledge. We all disagree on correct moral actions- some may see a law as morally dubious, and others may not see it as dubious at all.By this logic, the opposite is true as well. There's always a possibility that the action itself is wrong, so we ought not to do it because of that chance. But, this leads to us never making any action, for the possibility that it is wrong. Therefore, this argument is logically contradictory and impossible to follow.What matters is whether the action itself is objectively right or wrong. So, if there is a morally dubious law, that is actually objectively immoral, then the person has the moral right to oppose that law. This argument is logically contradictory; there is no justification.Respect for Democratic Institutions and Promoting Social StabilityThe argument here seems to be simply summarized as: If people start resisting punishment, this could result in a deconstruction of the rule of law and a stable society.This argument is irrelevant to the resolution. Let me give an analogy to help explain why: Imagine you are in a situation with your friends, and you know if you tell all of them the truth about something, it could dissolve the entire group. However, just because the moral thing to do- telling the truth- could lead to results that are unsatisfactory, it does not make it act of telling the truth in that situation immoral.So, even if people are justified in to resisting punishment, and that leads to issues in society, it does not make the act of resisting punishment immoral. Now, to make this argument relevant, my opponent could argue that while it may not prove the objective morality, it could prove it pragmatically, in that we should focus on the results.So, as a counter for the pragmatic argument, resisting punishment might even lead to satisfactory results. If more people resist morally dubious laws, it could lead to a more minimal state that increases the rights of the citizens. According to some moral theories, a minimal state is the result we should strive for.This argument fails in both relevancy to moral objectiveiy and in practicality.Civil Disobedience ItselfAgain, this argument is irrelevant in regards to objective morality, but my opponent could argue that pragmatically, if a dissident wants their voice to be heard, they are more likely to achieve this by accepting punishment.I concede this point to an extent. It does seem that the dissidents who do so peacefully and in the terms of the government do create an environment where others are more likely to want to create change for their platform. So, if a revolutionary wants to use this method, it may be practical for them. However, this does not prove that they OUGHT to use this method, it only implies that it is an option.Given that this argument doesn't prove that revolutionaries OUGHT to submit to punishment, my opponent is effectively left with zero arguments for his position.I look forward to new responses; good luck!