Which Significant Power was the most ill-prepared for conflict at the start of WWII

Unfortunately, Ninja_Tru must have become otherwise occupied. I've exerted various points regarding the dismal state of Canada's military and also how much they achieved, nevertheless. However, I had better not leave these with a mere 'good luck' in the voting, in case Ninja returns and somehow compensates with a miraculous post. As such, I'm going to briefly describe several follies, anecdotes and 'mis-preparations' of the Canadian Government and how they were unprepared for war. Firstly, the Canadian Government, in its naivety (along with all other Allied nations), did not believe that Hitler would wage an all out war. Unlike its fellow Allied Governments, Canada did not even engage in a brief arms race until 1939, whereas some nations (such as England) began rebuilding considerably sooner. Why was Canada so unprepared in the first place? It largely disarmed during the Depression, due to financial difficulties. It only had a handful of regular (active) Regiments, which still possessed aged weapons. Budget cuts nearly crippled the RCAF, which possessed a smattering of obsolescent biplanes and even less of the Hurricane Mk. 1, Fairey Battles or Bristol Blenheim bombers. As aforementioned, the Canadian Navy was limited to six River Class destroyers (two arrived in 1939 and 1940), a handful of top heavy Flower Class Corvettes (The Flower Class Corvette was an inadequate ship for the Atlantic. It rolled and pitched so often that everything got wet. Crew morale was often extremely low, as even rations were 'salty and soggy'. Furthermore, there were so few of these Corvettes that only one or two could be in port for relief at any one time - the rest had to be perpetually active in ever-harrowing convoys.) It was so desperate that it employed Armed Yachts - what purpose does an Armed Yacht serve, may I ask? And while the Navy was scrambling during the war, the German U-boaters were jubilant with two 'Happy Times' in the Atlantic, in which hundreds of thousands of tonnes were lost each time. The U-boats preyed right up to the Coast of the US and Canada, and even into the Gulf of Mexico, St. Lawrence and the Bay of Fundy. It was the Royal Canadian Navy that was responsible for much of the convoy duty in the Eastern Atlantic, as the USA, when it joined the war, sent most of its fleet to the Pacific. So that's a second reflection on the state of Canadian Armed Forces. Next, let me share a couple of Anecdotes and a few other follies. The Canadian Government wished for the Canadian Army to stay together - all five divisions. It refused to let them be implemented into any fighting until Italy, when it finally conceded upon pressures from Crerar and restless soldiers that had been training in England for two whole years. Well this was, indeed, a mistake, as proven later on. When the Canadian Armies hit Sicily, Italy and Normandy, their communications and tank/artillery/infantry cooperation were extremely poor. The training they received meant very little in the face of real fire; so why didn't the Canadian government allow a division at a time to gain experience in Africa? It became evident that the English 8th was far better than Rommel's Afrikaan Korps and was driving it backwards while the US and English landed armies in Tripoli and Tunisia. Why didn't the Canadian Government allow some of its divisions to gain valuable battle experience in an already determined victory? Rather, they shocked them by plunging them straight into battle - facing fire - at drops on Sicily and into Italy, and for the rest of it, at Juno Beach. this was terrible for Canadian morale and poorly thought of by the command structure. It became evident that NCO's, regimental and even Divisional commanders were mostly inadequate. Wholescale sackings had to take place, but Canadian officers did not distinguish themselves, except for Guy Simonds and Crerar (who also narrowly escaped being sacked on one occasion). In fact, the Canadian Army was trained largely at Battalion and Regimental level. The loyalties were fierce, but when other companies were tacked on, or they had to fight as a Division, they often floundered as they weren't so fiercely loyal to their Division, and may even have dissented other Regiments of the Division, in some cases. Another point is that throughout the war, Canada was always a step or two behind its Allies in innovation. Its planes were always inferior, its ships were always lacking the latest asdic or radar, its military the latest wireless sets or mortars. For example, the HAndley Page Halifax was kept in the RCAF as a heavy bomber until 1945! The Halifax was described as a 'metallic tinderbox' due to the placement of its engines. It was slow and it could not pull a looping dive or it would spin out of control and all hands would be lost. Of course, Canada was given the lowest priority for the greater planes (such as Liberators, Flying Fortresses, or greater Lancasters) and technologies, though it was one of the 'Big Four'. It never received the Gloster Meteor, the P51 Mustang or other great planes (it did acquire a substantial amount of Spitfires, but few of them were Mk VI's). In fact, even though the Royal Canadian Navy was responsible for most Atlantic Convoys in '41, '42, '43 and '44, the United States exercised some command over it from a Naval base on Canadian territory! Outrageous!!! the USA hadn't a consistent ship in the area, yet it's exercising convoy command. A tremendous folly of the Canadian government. Another Folly of the Atlantic was the mid-Ocean gap. Throughout 1941, '42 and '43, much of the mid-Atlantic wasn't covered by planes or dive bombers, which would keep U-boats submerged and incapable of grouping into 'wolf packs'. It (and England) did not utilize planes and Carriers to close this gap from their respective shores until late 1943 and 1944. A last folly that I shall discuss was the Canadian Government's sheer stupidity in the following anecdote. Leading into the Battle of Ortona, the English soldiers had been fighting at the base of Italy for sometime and were worn out. Mackenzie agreed that the 1st Canadian Division could substitute for the English, so the English gradually began to withdraw. However, for 'easier shipping purposes', it was agreed by BOTH parties that the Canadians would leave their equipment in England and the English would leave theirs in Italy. It apparently did not occur that the Canadians would then be utilizing worn out, sometimes broken and often grungy equipment that had seen much battle in lieu of its (Canadian) brand new equipment that had been left behind in England!!! eventually the First Canadian Division received some of its equipment, but it took three weeks to make the Division operational in Italy. And, as I've mentioned, the Canadians had an excellent medium tank - the Ram Tank. The Ram Tank was better in quality than the Sherman (larger gun, thicker armour, stronger engine, wouldn't 'brew up' with a shot from a Tiger at 1,000 yards), yet the Army abandoned its Rams because England insisted that all forced standardize with the Sherman. Is that not stupidity in the entire essence? The Sherman 'brewed up' as easily one could imagine; yet because the USA could produce them faster than they were lost, they were the 'ideal tank'. Bah Also, the Ram could actually penetrate the Panzer's Armour at 200 yards, whereas the Sherman could be 150 yards away and there was no guarantee that the shell wouldn't just bounce off and into the sky. And thus, I shall end my rant. Thanks for debating (and reading). Cheers