The Problem of Evil (PoE) is sound

Contra-P1 Resolution ArgumentMotivation: Just because an agent has Love for his creatures presently, doesn't imply that there wasn't an overriding motivation necessary to instantiate such creatures in the first place. This prior motivation would require a resolution of divine non-interference with *exceptions, [*R]. And since God can’t have compelling reasons for logically incompatible actions, then God’s love for P doesn’t provide a compelling reason to violate [*R]. So God’s failure to prevent every pointless evil is consistent with God’s perfect love.Baseline ArgumentMeans: Pro’s notion of divine knowledge is parasitic to the Theologians notion- God knows all true propositions. God can't logically know what's impossible to know. If it’s impossible to know the minimum amount of suffering that God is to allow if he is to fulfill both his plan for humanity and to not allow gratuitous pain, then such a baseline can’t be included in God's "means." It’s a fallacy of false precision to think otherwise. Hence theism is in principle compatible with gratuitous suffering. Contra-P3 Pro gives examples of suffered natural evils that are open to many theistic answers. Perhaps the first humans lost the cognitive ability to protect themselves from such evil when they sinned, so what don’t appear to be moral evils, are.Kripkean Origins Essentialism views such evils as merely the consequence of the necessary conditions for life. It's quite plausible that we could not have existed in a world in which tornados and ebola were impossible. For had the world been so structured to make such natural things as Pro describes impossible, then it would’ve been significantly different at the time of my conception. Hence, any person who would’ve been conceived in such a world couldn’t have been me. Thus, God showed no lack of love for me in failing to prevent these specific vulnerabilities. http://plato.stanford.edu...Skeptical TheismThe inference from the appearance of gratuitous suffering to its actuality remains tenuous. Pro can’t reason by analogy that an eternal God must conform to the vicissitudes of a human ethics system. For a God-Human relation isn’t analogous with a human-human relation. Nor can he argue from ignorance while claiming Prima Facie. For although such a principle of credulity is reasonable when we’re in a good epistemic position to make a probability judgment (say forecasting a mesoscale storm), nevertheless it’s an unreasonable principle when we find ourselves in a severely limited epistemic position (like forecasting a mesoscale storm 10yrs from now!). Pro's source says, "Swinburne carefully states his positive principle of credulity … does not apply to experiences of absences." And yet Pro seeks to apply, "I see x, therefore x" to, "I see ~x, therefore ~x." To see the difference, it doesn’t appear there are extraterrestrials, so would that make it more reasonable to think there aren’t any aliens? No, we’re not within a good epistemic position for this negative probability judgment. So much the worse for Pro’s case since it’s an infinite Mind that apparently lacks moral reasons, not just some town drunkard who we can easily discern lacks moral integrity.Hence before insisting on epistemic consistency, Pro must give reason to even think we’re in a good position to assess with confidence the probability that God lacks morally sufficient reasons for permitting the suffering in the world. But upon a survey of the 6 cognitive limitations impairing judgments, Alston writes that the “judgments required by the inductive argument from evil are of a very special and enormously ambitious type, and our cognitive capacities are not equal to this one. . . . it is in principle impossible for us to be justified in supposing that God does not have sufficient reasons for permitting evil that are unknown to us.” Pro's "nature of evils" is also said to require an “adequately compensating good.” But if we say “a good G is greater than an instance of evil E if and only if the conjunctive state of affairs G and E is a good state of affairs,” then we must deny P3. For the actual world contains on balance more good than evil, and so for any instance of evil that you please, there is some greater good that could not obtain unless that evil were permitted, namely the actual world. So merely saying that "evil is abundant in the world" isn't enough to warrant P3. Now most life up until developed humans can't reasonably be used as an example of suffering as we experience it. For not only does affirming a problem of intrinsic pain commit Pro to dualism, but dualism implies our ignorance one way or the other if such creatures experience pain as we do, as bodies with a higher order mental awareness. Regarding infants when you were one and pain came along, did you have the type of awareness of that pain like you have of pain now? Or was it just an innate reaction to stimulus? Do you have any clue either way? … Clearly an argument can’t be made from this.No conceive’um is actually MY argument! I claim that our difficulty to conceive of a morally sufficient reason to permit some evils, far from supporting P3, actually gives us reason to doubt our ability to fully know God-level assumptions, even if we can gradually and partially discover God in this life. Nevertheless we’re still limited, and must reasonably temper our inductions as such.TheodicyWhatever contributes to a virtuous response to existential events (whether painful or pleasurable) will result in justly experiencing perfect complete happiness, H. A virtuous response to existential events are therefore the logically necessary condition for an adequately compensating good, namely the justly achieved experience of H.Because God is just, he doesn’t allow a person to justly experience H if no self-forming choice for a virtuous response to existential events are given. Why? Because no justly-seeking-self-forming choice (SFC) is made. A moral choice that literally forms the self can either be just or unjust. If it is unjust than an unjust person can’t logically experience H; first because it would be imperfect happiness, and second because a just God won’t allow unjust selves to experience what only just selves should.Hence Andy must show how his examples of gratuitous suffering cannot logically contribute to a virtuous response of a just SFC (a choice not merely for the sufferer, but also for those who are somehow apart of an existential event that has eternal significance on theism).But then if God’s purpose for man is eternally H, then God is justified in permitting evil insofar as that evil provides a chance for a virtuous response (a just-SFC). This is how evil is defeated (by virtue), then out balanced (by H). And defeatable, out balanced evil isn't gratuitous.Thus it seems that any evil we experience in this life counts as raw material for forming the self in a just way in the pursuit of happiness. What we do and how we choose to respond to events in our epistemic distance from God, will have eternal significance given theism. Insofar as this is the case, there is no actually gratuitous evil found in reality. For any evil experienced can be justified by the potential virtuous response to the great goods of God’s general revelation in nature and conscious, and God’s special revelation of Christ’s incarnation & atonement. God acting justly itself requires that he submit himself to what he submits his creatures to (pain). “This God must become incarnate & atone our sins by vicariously suffering the punishment due to us, for the demands of justice must be satisfied.” (Aulen 1969) Christ’s atonement not only implies that created persons can be saved from the consequences of their choosing unjustly, but also that they know that they’re saved from their unjust-formed selves. Atonement then is not only salvation from our brokenness, but also salvation for our wholeness.