The Existence of God is unlikely

Pro responds by stating that the parts in question are immaterial. Yet once this is clear, it is not evident why we should accept the premise. What exactly is an immaterial part, and how is complexity to be understood when applied to immaterial parts? Moreover, even if we grant that the notion of an immaterial part is coherent, it is not evident that God is a complex being. There is only one part, that of the experiencer -- the "I" who perceives several different things at once. "I am currently simultaneously aware of the hum of the air conditioner, the sound of my hands typing and the letters on my computer screen. I cannot explain this experience by supposing that my self has three parts and that one part is experiencing the hum, the other my typing, and the other is seeing letters on the computer screen, for then there would be three separate experiences, one corresponding to each part." [1] It is reasonable to think of the mind as being composed of one part: that of the self who engages in all these experiences. God, as a disembodied mind, is a simple being no matter how a "part" is defined. That God is defined as a necessary being is the overwhelming consensus within the philosophy of religion, simply because there may be some disagreements here and there does not mean that necessity is not part of the definition of God (Incidently, Swineburne does hold God to be necessary, albeit factually necessary). Pro states that to call God a necessary being is ad hoc and arbitrary. He asks for an argument as to why we should consider God to be a necessary being. This is rather simple: necessary existence is a more perfect mode of being than contingent existence. God, being the greatest possible being, would thus have this mode of existence. In order to show that God is not a necessary being, Pro would have to show that necessary existence is logically impossible, a tall task indeed. Pro responds the skeptical theist's response to the evidential problem of evil in two ways. First, he accuses it of violating Ockham's razor, and secondly he delivers a parody argument. It is not evident how it is unparsimonious. As outlined before, given what we _do_ know about God, it is very likely that there is indeed an explanation, and hence I am warranted in postulating one. Given this background information, Pro's paraody argument seems unconvincing. Pro argues that theism is a priori less likely than naturalism because it postulates an additional entity (God). I would happen to agree with him provided that the evidence for both sides were equal and that the theistic hypothesis is not necessary. But since our background information is *not* equal, Pro cannot rule out theism on the basis that it adds another entity. To rule out theism a priori by using Ockham's razor is to beg the question, because it presupposes that theism is not necessary to explain our background information. The real debate is thus not over Ockham's razor, but the relative merits of both positions. We cannot use the razor to make an accurate assessment without first considering our background information. Now, I see no reason why I must prove that these phenomena exist, nor does my argument presuppose that. Remember, I stated that "Though both theism and naturalism can account for these phenomena, theism's explanation is superior in that it tends to affirm the reality of phenomena that we find basic to life." This is an abductive argument -- one that seeks to produce the best explanation for the widest range of phenomena, regardless of whether or not these phenomena actually correspond to reality. Thus, theism's explanation is prima facie more plausible in that it tends to affirm the reality of the phenomena we tend to observe (Naturalism's explanation is less plausible since it denies the reality of these phenomena). Regarding Pro's response to the KCA, I firstly do not see how P2 implies that the origin of the universe _within_ time. It is perfectly plausible to suppose that the origin of the universe was simultaneous with the first moment of time, such that the first moment of time marked the beginning of the universe. Indeed, standard big bang cosmology states that time itself began in the big bang, since the singularity served as a space-time boundary to which there was no prior moment. Pro endorses an ekpyrotic model of the universe as championed by Steinhardt and Turok in which two branes collide and retreat from each other. I find their position to be rather speculative. It is based on string theory -- a concept still in its infancy and whose "equations have not been stated, much less solved." Additionally, the Horava-Witten version of string theory which the argument is based on conflicts with it, since it requires that the brane on which we live have a positive tension while the theory requires that the tension be negative. Moreover, the theory requires a remarkable amount of fine-tuning that the naturalist will find unappealing. It also faces the same problem as the oscillating universe, "there is no means for the physical information in one cycle to be carried through to the next cycle." Finally, in 2001, cosmologists produced a theorem (the Borde-Guth-Vilenkin theorem) which requires such a universe to have a beginning. [2] Pro also cites Quentin Smith's big bang argument against God. I find his argument to be problematic: 1. God is not required to create a universe that contains life. "He may, in fact, freely choose to create a world because of the good He may want to bring about. But just because God possesses a reason for creating a universe, this does not impose a necessity on Him... Apart from creation, God is neither lonely nor in need of objects for his benevolence. " [3] 2. God can miraculously intervene to create life. Pro has anticipated this objection, but I find his response to be lacking. Why must we suppose that God must have created the universe pre-programmed with life-permitting properties? It is consistent with most religions which view God as active in his creation. Smith argues that this would be "incomplete planning," but hardly seems to hold any weight. Why must we suppose that God must adhere to our criteria of efficiency? Efficiency is only an issue when there is a limited amount of resources, but God has infinite resources. "Furthermore, there are many reasons why God might choose to be causally engaged in the activity of creation. Craig points out two: (i) God could delight in the work of creation and (ii) God might want to leave a general revelation of Himself in nature." [4] Against the LCA, Pro argues that God doesn't appear to be necessary because he can imagine the non-existence of God. Firstly, I must question this claim. Is it really possible to imagine the non-existence of God, an immaterial being? I do not believe that conceivably implies possibility (there are many things that we cannot conceive of but which are obviously not necessary). Conceivably, though a good guide to what is possible, is defeasible. God's non-existence, though epistemically possible, is metaphysically impossible. There is no good reason to suppose that the universe is necessary -- nothing about it seems to indicate that, and thus it is ad hoc to postulate it as necessary. Pro argues against the AfR by providing a scenario where humans selected the development of the computer, thus resulting in a rational computer. But this seems to be a false analogy. Whereas intelligent humans assisted in the evolution of the computer, nature is inherently non-rational. It does not have the property of rationality to begin with, and it is hard to see how reason can arise out of non-reason. Pro's analogy begs the question by assuming the prior existence of reason. In reality, however, nature does not have the property of being rational. Thus, Pro has not given a good reason to suppose that reason can arise out of non-reason.