Free will

Pro offers the definition: "Free will is the ability to make different choices to an identical situation at the same time. " This definition fails because it is not possible, not even in theory, to recreate a situation identically. The impossibility follows from the properties of the natural world, as I recited in R1. Considering Pro's three points individually: 1. Pro says, "You might argue that under identical circumstances one would inevitably make the same choice, which is precisely what i am arguing," No, what I am arguing is that having identical circumstances is theoretically impossible. 2. Pro clarifies, "When i say identical situation i mean identical to the sub atomic level, all particles have the same velocity each time . .. " I think the idea is analogous to putting a bunch of pool balls on the table with identical positions and velocities. The problem is that we now know that particles do not have exact positions and velocities; they only have probability distributions. It is not the case that they have exact positions and velocities but we cannot know them. The problem is that they only exist as probability distributions. Consequently any attempt to reproduce an identical situation necessarily fails. The best that can be done is to reproduce the situation within some bounds of the probabilities, but that fails to guarantee the outcome. It is also theoretically impossible for the quantum fluctuations to be reproduced. So the concept fails not just because it is impossible to test, but it is theoretically impossible to have been reproduced in the first place. 3. Pro continues, "i am saying is that the identical situation is playing out in two separate locations, possibly different universes, possibly an identically earth in our own universe. and is mentioned only for arguments sake, the inability for this to exist only makes it impossible two test, and like point two, does not diminish the value of the argument. " No, objects that only exist as probability distributions cannot be reproduced in any way other than as probability distributions, and once the probabilities are reproduced, the outcome is in doubt. In the pool table analogy, not only don't we know where the balls are, the balls themselves don't know. They are not in specific locations, they only exist as probability distributions. If a ball is put in a box, there is a theoretical probability it will spontaneously appear outside the box. But an identical ball in an identical box, and one may escape while the other does not. The probability is very small, but it is possible. Any attempt at recreating a situation identically necessarily fails because our universe can only be made to work with probability distributions. It cannot be made to work deterministically. I challenged Pro to come up with a definition of "free will" that works without a concept of determinism. Pro's attempt fails because the best one can do, even in theory, is to duplicate the probability distributions. Doing so does not guarantee the outcome, only the probability distribution of outcomes. My second challenge was for Pro to prove that humans have no power to shape the probabilities of seemingly unpredictable events. Pro supposed that quantum fluctuations occurred strictly apart from human influence. I cannot imagine how they could be influenced by humans, but I also cannot imagine how it can be that particles do not have a specific location or velocity and exist only as probability distributions. The evidence says that is the way particles must be, and mathematics describes how that works. It nonetheless remains unimaginable, at least to me. Consequently, we cannot demand that what we cannot imagine does not exist. In may be that thought processes interact with quantum events. The classic definition pf "free will" was that either everything is deterministic or there is free will. My claim remains that in an inherently probabilistic universe the classic definition of free will fails. Without a definition of free will, nothing can be asserted about it. Let's examine a possible escape. Suppose the world is in two parts: deterministic stuff + random stuff. The deterministic stuff is deterministic, so we may suppose there is no free will there. The random stuff is uncontrolled by humans, so we may make different choices when the deterministic stuff is identical, but the difference is not a product of our own volition, it is just random. Behaving randomly is not free will. So have we disposed of free will? The error in this possible escape is that there is no guarantee that "deterministic stuff" and "random stuff" can be separated. It may seem that one cannot affect the other, but we know that intuition based upon day-to-day experience is an unreliable guide. There may be something in the process of subjective consciousness that plays off of the inherent randomness in a way we cannot imagine to define and explain free will. It may also be that no meaningful definition of free will is possible. Resolving that is above my pay grade. For this debate, I am only claiming that Pro has not provided a definition of "free will" that works with the known laws of nature, and therefore the resolution cannot be affirmed.