Intragovernmental debt should not be include in the National Debt of the United States

My opponent shifted the argument from not listing the debt at all, to instead arguing we should create a new category called "allowances" to list this special type of (non-)debt. Thus I am forced to rebut in the last round. First lets consider again 3 entities like I started this debate with: A is a non profit with $1000 in expenditures and an endowment in treasuries. A receives $900 in government subsidy and nothing in donations.A uses $100 from the endowment to cover the shortfall. B is a government agency with $1000 in expenditures and no endowment. B receives $900 in budget.It doesn't make good on the other $100 because it doesn't have the money. C is a government agency with $1000 in expenditures and a trust fund in treasuries.C receives $900 in budgetC uses $100 from the trust fund to cover the shortfall. I'm not sure how one can argue the case of C is more like the case of B than the case of A. And this is the key to this debate. It is the point I've been making every step that "allowances" still act exactly like debt. And this can be clearly shown by noting that most of the arguments made against counting the SS trust fund as debt would count equally for any private borrower investing in treasuries. For example, VFITX Vanguard Intermediate Term Treasury Fund, takes all its money and plows it back into treasures. The government could think of this as allowance and that it only has to come up with money for VFITX expenses when outflows are greater than inflows. The situation with the Social Security trust fund is exactly the same as the situation with this private debtor. That is what we mean by "paying off" VFITX is exactly what we mean by paying off the Social Security trust fund. Both represent a claim against general revenues payable in the future. Most importantly, is the problem with balance of power. Under the current definition a government agency selling off its treasury bonds does not create a new general obligation, because the bonds are already considered debt. Under the revised proposal any government agency selling its treasury bonds would be creating a new general obligation. That means the executive branch now has authority to create debt by itself the most important power held by the congress. Which severely damages the balance of power. Under this accounting a president could order a government agency to borrow money from a bank to buy treasuries and the treasuries to sell additional treasuries. a) The general ledger would show no additional debt but it would show the proceeds of the sale of the treasuriesb) The government agency would show bank debt and an asset (the allowance) canceling each other out. At which point the president could engage in additional off book spending. Also we haven't addressed the issue of quasi governmental institutions. For example Fannie Mae held huge quantities of treasuries was subject to congressional management but had private ownership. Does their bonds count as allowance or debt? What about treasuries held by state governments particular as part of futures, allowance or debt? What he has failed to do is show one benefit of distinguishing allowance debt from other forms of debt nor even provide a consistent definition for it. In short: a) He hasn't presented any disadvantages of the current system.b) He hasn't proven a single advantage of the proposal.c) He hasn't addressed the inherency issues of definition. The argument boils down to: intra-government debt shouldn't be counted as debt even though it exactly like debt because Pro doesn't like calling it debt. We need better reasons to change government accounting standards than that.