Should immigrants in the United States illegally who are parents of us minors be deported

Border Terror DA Links Border Border surveillance is necessary to prevent terrorism Wilson 2/26 (Reid Wilson, covers national politics and Congress for The Washington Post and author of Read In, The Post"s morning tip sheet on politics. He's a former editor in chief of The Hotline, the premier tip sheet on campaigns and elections and a graduate of The George Washington University, "Texas officials warn of immigrants with terrorist ties crossing southern border", February 26 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com...) A top Texas law enforcement agency says border security organizations have apprehended several members of known Islamist terrorist organizations crossing the southern border in recent years, and while a surge of officers to the border has slowed the flow of drugs and undocumented immigrants, it"s costing the state tens of millions of dollars. In a report to Texas elected officials, the state Department of Public Safety says border security agencies have arrested several Somali immigrants crossing the southern border who are known members of al-Shabab, the terrorist group that launched a deadly attack on the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi, Kenya, and Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya, another Somalia-based group once funded by Osama bin Laden. Another undocumented immigrant arrested crossing the border was on multiple U.S. terrorism watch lists, the report says. According to the report, one member of al-Shabab, apprehended in June 2014, told authorities he had been trained for an April 2014 suicide attack in Mogadishu. He said he escaped and reported the planned attack to African Union troops, who were able to stop the attack. The FBI believed another undocumented immigrant was an al-Shabab member who helped smuggle several potentially dangerous terrorists into the U.S. [Drone strike kills senior al-Shabab official in Somalia] Authorities also apprehended immigrants who said they were members of terrorist organizations in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. The Department of Public Safety said the report, first published by the Houston Chronicle, was not meant for public distribution. "[T]hat report was inappropriately obtained and [the Chronicle was] not authorized to possess or post the law enforcement sensitive document," department press secretary Tom Vinger said in an e-mail. U.S. Customs and Border Protection did not respond to requests for comment. The department said it had come into contact in recent years with "special interest aliens," who come from countries with known ties to terrorists or where terrorist groups thrive. Those arrested include Afghans, Iranians, Iraqis, Syrians, Libyans and Pakistanis. In all, immigrants from 35 countries in Asia and the Middle East have been arrested over the past few years in the Rio Grande Valley. The department says there is no known intelligence that specifically links undocumented immigrants to terrorism plots, but the authors warn it"s almost certain that foreign terrorist organizations know of the porous border between the U.S. and Mexico. "It is important to note that an unsecure border is a vulnerability that can be exploited by criminals of all kinds," Vinger said. "And it would be naive to rule out the possibility that any criminal organizations around the world, including terrorists, would not look for opportunities to take advantage of security gaps along our country"s international border." Border surveillance is k2 preventing terrorism Smarick et al. 12 (Kathleen Smarick and Gary D. LaFree of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism at the University of Maryland. 11/12 "Border Crossings and Terrorist Attacks in the United States: Lessons for Protecting against Dangerous Entrants" START, http://www.start.umd.edu... CCC) An essential step in this project was determining the frequency and dynamics of border crossings by individuals who conducted or who wanted to conduct terrorism-related activities in the United States. Towards that goal, the project built upon the existing holdings of the American Terrorism Study (ATS) in this effort. The ATS, housed at the University of Arkansas, catalogs and systematically codes information on more than 300 Federal court cases involving Federal terrorist charges since 1980 and, following a review of other possible resources, proved to be the most useful starting point for compiling open-source, quantitative data on terrorist border crossings. Since 1989, the American Terrorism Study (ATS) has received lists of court cases and associated indictees that resulted from an official FBI terrorism investigation spanning 1980 through 2004. Housed at the University of Arkansas" Terrorism Research Center in Fulbright College (TRC), the ATS now includes almost 400 cases from the FBI lists. Of these, approximately 75% of cases have complete court documentation, and almost all of those collected have been coded into the ATS database, while the ATS team continues to track new cases by collecting, reviewing, and coding new and additional court documentation. The ATS includes terrorism incidents and attacks, thwarted or planned terrorism incidents sometimes referred to as preventions, material support cases for terrorism, general terrorism conspiracies, and in some cases, immigration fraud; the common denominator among all ATS events is that the FBI investigated these events as terrorism-related incidents. During preliminary research for this project, court records from 378 terrorism cases found in the ATS dataset were reviewed for information on potential border crossing events related to terrorism cases. The documents for each court case were manually reviewed by researchers to determine whether the collected records reported that one of the defendants or accomplices in a case crossed a U.S. border at some point. Thirty-eight percent of the reviewed cases"145 cases"from 1980 through 2004 were found to either have: " direct mention of a border crossing in the court documents, or " a link to a terrorism incident that involved a known border crossing, either before or after an incident. After compiling this list of court cases for inclusion, each identified court case was then linked to a criminal incident involving terrorism charges. Initial reviews revealed a connection to a border-crossing event in a total of 58 successful terrorist attacks, 51 prevented or thwarted attacks, 26 material support cases, 33 immigration fraud incidents, and 4 general terrorism conspiracies. Additional reviews of relevant information on indictees and their activities resulted in a reduction in the number of successful terrorist attacks associated with these individuals to a total of 43. Appendix 2 provides more details on the data collection process and how a reliable collection methodology was established to create the U.S. Terrorist Border Crossing Dataset (USTBC), using the ATS as a starting point. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence Border Crossings and Terrorist Attacks in the United States 12 Systematic evaluation by the research team revealed that the American Terrorism Study is a reliable and useful resource for identifying individuals associated with terrorist attacks or terrorist criminal cases (such as conspiracies) and for determining which of these individuals crossed U.S. borders in advance of or in the wake of their terrorism-related behavior. This is largely because the ATS is based on court documents, which among sources of data on terrorism are the most likely to reference relevant border crossing activity. The Global Terrorism Database, which is based primarily on media sources, can serve a supporting role in this research, but the ATS is the primary source allowing for construction of a new, relational database on U.S. Terrorist Border Crossings (USTBCs). That being said, it is important to recognize that the ATS is not a perfect data source. As noted above, its contents are limited to individuals and information related to court cases in which one or more defendant was charged with Federal terrorism charges. As such, the contents of ATS clearly represent a subset of all terrorists or attempted terrorists in the United States, as it systematically omits those who: " were never arrested or faced any charges, " were charged with offenses not directly related to terrorism, " were charged at the non-Federal level, or " were engaged in dangerous activity that does not meet the FBI"s definition of a terrorism case. Throughout this project, the research team was careful to respect the limitations of this data collection and to draw conclusions that recognize that the border crossing events included in this project likely represent a non-representative subset of all border crossing attempts by terrorists or intended terrorists. Despite these limitations, though, the data that was built upon the baseline of ATS provides important insights into the nexus between border crossings and terrorism. The U.S. Terrorism Border Crossing Dataset The final versions of the codebooks used to develop the U.S. Terrorist Border Crossing (USTBC) data collection are presented in Appendix 3. Based upon knowledge gained from pilot efforts (as discussed above and in Appendix 2), the project resulted in two codebooks"one focused on dynamics of a bordercrossing event involving someone associated with a Federal terrorism court case, and another focused on the characteristics of the individuals associated with Federal charges who were involved in the bordercrossing event. Data collection for the USTBC lasted for approximately one year and was primarily conducted by research assistants at the Terrorism Research Center at the University of Arkansas.3 The resultant data that comprise the USTBC are available in Appendix 4. Table 4 provides a snapshot summary of these data, which include detailed information on the location of an attempted crossing, the timing of a crossing relative to attempted or actual terrorist activity, the origin or destination of an attempted crossing, and more. The data also include specific information on border crossers, including their citizenship status, their criminal history, and key demographics (including level of education, marital status, etc.) Appendix 5 provides descriptive statistics from the border-crossing and border-crosser data. 3 Special thanks to Kim Murray and Summer Jackson of the Terrorism Research Center for their efforts in combing through the courtcase material and assembling these data for the USTBC. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence Border Crossings and Terrorist Attacks in the United States 13 Border Crossings Identified in USTBC Attempts to Enter the United States Of the 221 border crossings identified in this project as involving individuals who were indicted by the U.S. government in terrorism-related cases, the majority (129 crossings) involved an individual attempting to enter the United States, while the remainder (92 crossings) involved an individual attempting to exit the United States. Eighty-seven percent of the attempted border crossings were successful, rather than being thwarted by law enforcement or foiled by some other events or developments. Additional discussion on the nature of successful crossings versus those who were apprehended at the border is presented below. Among those attempts to enter the United States, the most frequent origin for these crossing efforts was Canada.4 But, as Figure 2 illustrates, such attempted entries originated from all corners of the world. US Border Patrol proves that surveillance is key to anti-terror efforts Stamey 14 (Barcley; DOMESTIC AERIAL SURVEILLANCE AND HOMELAND SECURITY: SHOULD AMERICANS FEAR THE EYE IN THE SKY; March 2014) The leading national agency currently using drones to combat a wide range of domestic threats is U.S. Customs and Border Protection. With its fleet of seven MQ-1 Predators and three MQ-1 Guardians"Predators modified for marine surveillance"CBP 26 is at the forefront of large-scale drone operations. With an annual budget exceeding $11 billion, CBP is well equipped for protecting our national security while combating potential terrorist threats.55 But how efficiently are those funds being used, and what is meant by effectiveness? According to Merriam-Webster, effectiveness is "producing a decided, decisive, or desired effect or result."56 Ultimately, that desired result is safe international borders. Accomplishing this result involves the apprehension of illegal immigrants, interdiction of illicit drugs, and prevention of terrorist infiltration, which CBP does quite well, but with respect to UAS, effectiveness must be viewed on a much broader scale. This section takes into account the size of CBP, its operational budget, and couples it with published results. According to CBP, the primary mission of drone use is "anti-terrorism by helping to identify and intercept potential terrorists and illegal cross-border activity."57 CBP uses its Predators and Reapers to accomplish this goal through human detection and tracking, surface asset coordination, and threat detection through IR sensors in multiple scenarios. Previously mentioned sensor suites allow the Predator to detect movement along the border, identify actual personnel numbers, and track the location of threats all while being unobserved to the individuals on the ground. With their long loiter times, Predators allow officials to monitor gaps along the border while maximizing the efforts of ground personnel in actual interdiction missions. After witnessing the functionality of actual Predator operations in Afghanistan, this author realizes the value in having high definition video sensors overhead during dangerous operations. This type of technology certainly has a place in homeland security missions, and future capabilities will provide a clear advantage to U.S. personnel in combating border security. This force multiplier mindset is one CBP has adopted and publicizes regularly to justify the success of its drone program. Long loiter times, remote area access, and flexibility during National Special Security Events are common claims. Border security stops terrorism Zuckerman, Bucci, Carafano, no date (Jessica Zuckerman, Steven P. Bucci, Ph.D. Director, Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign and National Security Policyj and James Jay Carafano, Ph.D. Vice President for the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, and the E. W. Richardson Fellow, 13, 7-22-2013, "60 Terrorist Plots Since 9/11: Continued Lessons in Domestic Counterterrorism," Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org... CCC) Chiheb Esseghaier and Raed Jaser"April 2013. Chiheb Esseghaier and Raed Jaser were arrested in April 2013 for attempting to carry out an attack on a Via Railway train travelling from Canada to the U.S. The attack, authorities claimed, was supported by an al-Qaeda element in Iran, although there is currently no evidence that it was state-sponsored.[205] The exact route of the targeted train has not been identified, and Iranian authorities vehemently deny that al-Qaeda is operating within Iranian borders. Esseghaier and Jaser have been charged in Canada with conspiracy to commit murder for the benefit of a terrorist group, participating in a terrorist group, and conspiring to interfere with transportation facilities for the benefit of a terrorist group. Esseghaier has also been charged with participating in a terrorist group, and both men face up to life in prison.[206] The two men are awaiting trial. Chiheb Esseghaier wants to represent himself, basing his defense on the Quran instead of on the Canadian criminal code, which has caused delays in the proceedings.[207] Continued use of border surveillance technology is crucial to the detection of and response to threats on the border Haddal 10, Specialist in Immigration Policy, 8/11/10 (Chad C. Haddal, Congressional Research Service report, August 11, 2010, "Border Security: The Role of the U.S. Border Patrol" https://www.fas.org..., accessed 7/15/15 JH @ DDI) Perhaps the most important technology used by the Border Patrol are the surveillance assets currently in place at the border. The program has gone through several iterations and name changes. Originally known as the Integrated Surveillance Information System (ISIS), the program"s name was changed to the America"s Shield Initiative (ASI) in FY2005. DHS subsequently folded ASI into the Secure Border Initative (SBI) and renamed the program SBInet Technology (SBInet). Once it is beyond the pilot phase, SBInet will, according to DHS, develop and install "new integrated technology solutions to provide enhanced detection, tracking, response, and situational awareness capabilities."19 The other program under SBI is the SBI Tactical Infrastructure program, which, according to DHS, "develops and installs physical components designed to consistently slow, delay, and be an obstacle to illegal cross-border activity."20 In the late 1990s, the Border Patrol began deploying a network of Remote Video Surveillance (RVS) systems (i.e., camera systems), underground sensors, and the Integrated Computer Assisted Detection (ICAD) database into a multi-faceted network designed to detect illegal entries in a wide range of climate conditions. This Integrated Surveillance Intelligence System (ISIS) attempted to ensure seamless coverage of the border by combining the feeds from multiple color, thermal, and infrared cameras mounted on different structures into one remote-controlled system with information generated by sensors (including seismic, magnetic, and thermal detectors). When a sensor is tripped, an alarm is sent to a central communications control room at a USBP station or sector headquarters. USBP personnel monitoring the control room screens use the ICAD system to re-position RVS cameras towards the location where the sensor alarm was tripped (although some camera positions are fixed and cannot be panned). Control room personnel then alert field agents to the intrusion and coordinate the response. Information gathered from surveillance activities is key to any effective response to terrorist threats along the border Fisher 12, U.S. Customs and Border Protection Office of Border Patrol Chief, 5/8/12 (Michael, Department of Homeland Security, "Written testimony of U.S. Customs and Border Protection Office of Border Patrol Chief Michael Fisher for a House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security hearing titled "Measuring Border Security: U.S. Border Patrol"s New Strategic Plan and the Path Forward."" http://www.dhs.gov...; accessed 7/15/15 JH@ DDI) Information gathered from reconnaissance, community engagement, sign-cutting and technology together provide situational awareness and intelligence and helps us to best understand and assess the threats we face along our borders. Information and intelligence will empower Border Patrol leadership and front line agents to get ahead of the threat, be predictive and proactive. Integration denotes CBP corporate planning and execution of border security operations, while leveraging partnerships with other federal, state, local, tribal, and international organizations. Integration of effort with these organizations will ensure we bring all available capabilities and tools to bear in addressing threats. Lastly, through rapid response, we will deploy capabilities efficiently and effectively to meet and mitigate the risks we confront. Put simply, rapid response means the Border Patrol and its partners can quickly and appropriately respond to changing threats. Goal 1: Secure America"s Borders The 2012 Strategic Plan has two interrelated and interdependent goals. In the first goal, the Border Patrol will work with its federal, state, local, tribal, and international partners to secure America"s borders using information, integration and rapid response in a risk-based manner. There are five objectives within this goal: Prevent Terrorists and Terrorist Weapons from Entering the United States Manage Risk Disrupt and Degrade Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) Whole-of-Government Approach Increase Community Engagement I. Prevent Terrorists and Terrorist Weapons from Entering the United States The current risk environment is characterized by constantly evolving threats that are both complex and varying, and the Border Patrol must strategically apply intelligence to ensure that operations are focused and targeted against the greatest threats. The Border Patrol"s ability to prevent and disrupt such threats is enhanced through increased information sharing and operational integration, planning, and execution with our domestic and foreign law enforcement partners. Integration with our federal, state, local, tribal, and international partners" intelligence and enforcement capabilities into the planning and execution of CBP operations is critical to our ability to secure our nation"s borders. The use of necessary surveillance technology is key to the identification and prevention of terrorist threats on the border Office of Border Patrol 4, September 2004 (THE OFFICE OF BORDER PATROL AND THE OFFICE OF POLICY AND PLANNING, US CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, "National Border Patrol Strategy" http://www.au.af.mil..., accessed 7/15/15 JH @ DDI) The Border Patrol currently uses a mix of agents, information, and technology to control the border. The Border Patrol"s ability to establish situational awareness, monitor, detect, respond to, and identify potential terrorists, instruments of terrorism, and criminals relies heavily on interdiction and deterrence-based technology. Having the necessary technology to support the Border Patrol priority and traditional missions cannot be overstated. In the future, there must be continued assessment, development, and deployment of the appropriate mix of personnel, technology, and information to gain, maintain, and expand coverage of the border and ensure that resources are deployed in a cost-effective, efficient fashion. Technology which enhances operational awareness and effectiveness includes camera systems for day/ night/infrared work, biometric systems such as IDENT/IAFIS, processing systems like ENFORCE, sensoring platforms, large-scale gamma X-rays, and aerial platforms, and other systems. Technologies requiring modernization include wireless and tactical communications and computer processing capabilities. Coordination between Border Patrol and inspectional personnel at the ports of entry ensures the most efficient use of trained personnel and technology. In the future, the Border Patrol will take advantage of the targeting and selectivity tools made available in the Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) and the National Targeting Center. The continued testing, evaluation, acquisition, and deployment of appropriate border enforcement technologies will be pursued vigorously so that the maximum force-multiplier effect is achieved in support of both the priority and traditional missions. Any gap in security on the border allows international terror groups to come into the United States Wilson 15 [Reid Wilson, 2/26/15, covers national politics for the Washington Post, "Texas officials warn of immigrants with terrorist ties crossing southern border," Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com... jf] A top Texas law enforcement agency says border security organizations have apprehended several members of known Islamist terrorist organizations crossing the southern border in recent years, and while a surge of officers to the border has slowed the flow of drugs and undocumented immigrants, it"s costing the state tens of millions of dollars. In a report to Texas elected officials, the state Department of Public Safety says border security agencies have arrested several Somali immigrants crossing the southern border who are known members of al-Shabab, the terrorist group that launched a deadly attack on the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi, Kenya, and Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya, another Somalia-based group once funded by Osama bin Laden. Another undocumented immigrant arrested crossing the border was on multiple U.S. terrorism watch lists, the report says. According to the report, one member of al-Shabab, apprehended in June 2014, told authorities he had been trained for an April 2014 suicide attack in Mogadishu. He said he escaped and reported the planned attack to African Union troops, who were able to stop the attack. The FBI believed another undocumented immigrant was an al-Shabab member who helped smuggle several potentially dangerous terrorists into the U.S. Authorities also apprehended immigrants who said they were members of terrorist organizations in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. The Department of Public Safety said the report, first published by the Houston Chronicle, was not meant for public distribution. "[T]hat report was inappropriately obtained and [the Chronicle was] not authorized to possess or post the law enforcement sensitive document," department press secretary Tom Vinger said in an e-mail. U.S. Customs and Border Protection did not respond to requests for comment. The department said it had come into contact in recent years with "special interest aliens," who come from countries with known ties to terrorists or where terrorist groups thrive. Those arrested include Afghans, Iranians, Iraqis, Syrians, Libyans and Pakistanis. In all, immigrants from 35 countries in Asia and the Middle East have been arrested over the past few years in the Rio Grande Valley. The department says there is no known intelligence that specifically links undocumented immigrants to terrorism plots, but the authors warn it"s almost certain that foreign terrorist organizations know of the porous border between the U.S. and Mexico. "It is important to note that an unsecure border is a vulnerability that can be exploited by criminals of all kinds," Vinger said. "And it would be naive to rule out the possibility that any criminal organizations around the world, including terrorists, would not look for opportunities to take advantage of security gaps along our country"s international border." Maximized surveillance on the border is key to stopping terrorism Willis et al 10 [Henry H. Willis, 2010, director of the RAND Homeland Security and Defense Center, with Joel B. Predd, Paul K. Davis and Wayne P. Brown, RAND.org, "Measuring the Effectiveness of Border Security Between Ports-of-Entry", http://www.rand.org..., jf] One of the unexpected results of our study was recognition of the importance of networked intelligence in elaborating objectives for and measuring effectiveness of border security.11 This came about for many reasons. First, all of the focus missions are best understood in national terms: Border security contributes significantly to several high-level national objectives, but results depend sensitively on interactions with and the performance of other federal and local agencies, as well as economic and demographic conditions outside of DHS"s control. Second, national-level effectiveness depends not just on individual component or agency effectiveness but also on components" ability to share information and work collaboratively, i.e., to network. This is perhaps most obvious with respect to preventing terrorism, in that individuals might enter the country who are vaguely suspicious but who cannot reasonably be arrested at the border. Responsibility for follow-up then transfers to, e.g., the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). However, the FBI"s ability to follow up"either immediately or when further information emerges"might depend critically on information collected and effectively transferred by border agencies to the FBI. The word "effectively" is key because all agencies are deluged with data. The 9/11 Commission"s report dramatized the consequences of ineffectiveness: It is not that information for apprehending the perpetrators did not exist, but rather that the dots were not connected and the relevant agencies did not cooperate well (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004). Third, national-level law enforcement also depends on the effectiveness of the justice system, including the ability to convict and punish. That, in turn, often depends on authorities being able to construct an extensive, fact-based story of criminal behavior from which, cumulatively, guilt can reasonably be inferred by a jury. Fourth, the nature and quality of information collected by border-security components, the consistency with which it is collected, and the effectiveness with which the data are both transferred to national databases and"where appropriate"highlighted in cross-agency actions, are leverage points for improved national-level effectiveness, especially in relation to terrorism- or drug-related functions. Border-security eff orts sometimes will query detected travelers against data sets of known or suspected terrorists or criminals. This is especially relevant at ports of entry, ports of egress in some modes, and in cases in which border enforcement detains an illegal crosser. In other settings, border-enforcement agencies collect as much information as possible on individuals, their conveyances, license plates, accounts, and other records of persons detained for crossing illegally but for whom no prior records exist. The same is true in the maritime regions when individuals are arrested for illegal drug smuggling or illegal migrant smuggling. The collected information can become future tactical intelligence (and used in prosecutions) if the detained person becomes involved in criminal or terrorist functions at a later date. Discussions with component agencies indicate that this is an important capability to measure. Technologically, it is even possible to tag individuals so that subsequent surveillance within the United States (or another country) is possible.12 Border surveillance prevents terrorist groups from attempting attacks Willis et al 10 [Henry H. Willis, 2010, director of the RAND Homeland Security and Defense Center, with Joel B. Predd, Paul K. Davis and Wayne P. Brown, RAND.org, "Measuring the Effectiveness of Border Security Between Ports-of-Entry", http://www.rand.org..., pg 19, jf] The principal contributions that border security makes to counterterrorism relate to preventing certain kinds of terrorist attacks dependent on flows into the country of people or materials. These contributions can be illustrated by considering what opportunities exist to disrupt terrorist attacks while they are being planned and orchestrated. Through a number of planning efforts, DHS and its components have developed detailed planning scenarios of terrorist events (DHS, 2006). Each of these scenarios has been deconstructed into attack trees that are useful for considering how DHS border-security programs contribute to terrorism security efforts. In their most generic form, these attack trees specify dimensions of attack scenarios with respect to building the terrorist team, identifying a target, and acquiring a weapon (see Figure 4.1). This decomposition of attack planning provides a structure around which to consider how interdiction, deterrence, and networked intelligence contribute to preventing terrorist attacks and, thus, why it is relevant to measure these functions. DHS border-security eff orts focus on interdiction of terrorist team members and weapons or weapon components when they cross U.S. borders. Examples of initiatives that are intended to enhance these capabilities include the Secure Border Initiative, the acquisition of Advanced Spectroscopic Portals for nuclear detection, the Secure Communities Initiative, and US-VISIT. In addition, it is often pointed out that, when border-security measures are perceived to be effective, terrorists groups may be deterred from attacking in particular ways, or possibly from attacking at all. This could result from awareness of what type of surveillance is occurring or the capability of interdiction systems. In either case, deterrence refers to the judgment of terrorists that they will not be successful, leading them to choose another course of action. Finally, many border-security initiatives also contribute information to the national networked-intelligence picture. For example, the Secure Communities Initiative has implemented new capabilities to allow a single submission of fingerprints as part of the normal criminal arrest and booking process to be queried against both the FBI and DHS immigration and terrorism databases. This effort makes it easier for federal and local law enforcement to share actionable intelligence and makes it more difficult for terrorists to evade border-security efforts. Drones Drones are critical to combat bio- and chemical-terror Koerner 2015 (Matthew R, Duke University School of Law, J.D. expected 2015, "DRONES AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: REDEFINING EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY", 64 Duke L.J. 1129) Senator Dianne Feinstein, a staunch advocate of governmental surveillance n1 and Chairman of the 113th Congress's Senate Intelligence Committee, n2 recently found herself, rather ironically, as the target of surveillance. n3 One day at her home, Senator Feinstein walked to the window to check on a protest that was taking place outside. n4 Much to her surprise, a small drone n5 hovered on the other side of the window, only inches away, spying on her. n6 The drone immediately flew away. n7 Senator Feinstein's experience is just one example of drones being used for surveillance within the United States. But her story and others like it n8 have sparked significant controversy over the use of drones for domestic surveillance, which falls within a broader debate [*1131] on privacy and governmental surveillance programs. n9 Advocates of robust federal surveillance policies champion governmental surveillance as the only way to prevent terrorist and cyber attacks against the United States. n10 President Barack Obama defended these surveillance programs as ""modest encroachments on privacy'" that "strike the "right balance' between national security and civil liberties." n11 In comparison, privacy advocates envision these surveillance programs leading to a dystopian, totalitarian government watching over its citizenry - undetected but omnipresent. n12 References to George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four n13 abound. n14 [*1132] Apart from the surrounding privacy-concerns debate, drones currently provide many practical benefits and their projected applications seem limitless. n15 Based on their obvious advantage of being unmanned, drones have the capability to conduct missions previously considered too risky, dangerous, or impracticable. These applications are also provided at continuously decreasing costs and with the latest technological sophistication, such as the capability to see through physical obstructions, to detect various chemical and biological agents in the air, to recognize human faces and license plates, and to fly in strategic, coordinated formations. n16 Drones provide effective surveillance of the borders Spagat 2014 (Elliot, "Drones replacing officers in Mexican border surveillance", Nov 13; www.dailynews.com/social-affairs/20141113/drones-replacing-officers-in-mexican-border-surveillance) The U.S. government now patrols nearly half the Mexican border by drones alone in a largely unheralded shift to control desolate stretches where there are no agents, camera towers, ground sensors or fences, and it plans to expand the strategy to the Canadian border. It represents a significant departure from a decades-old approach that emphasizes boots on the ground and fences. Since 2000, the number of Border Patrol agents on the 1,954-mile border more than doubled " to surpass 18,000 " and fencing multiplied nine times to 700 miles. Under the new approach, Predator B aerial drones, used in the fight against insurgents in Afghanistan, sweep remote mountains, canyons and rivers with a high-resolution video camera and return within three days for another video in the same spot, two officials with direct knowledge of the effort said on condition of anonymity because details have not been made public. The two videos are then overlaid for analysts, who use sophisticated software to identify tiny changes " perhaps the tracks of a farmer or cows, perhaps those of immigrants who entered the country illegally or perhaps a drug-laden Hummer, they said. About 92 percent of drone missions have shown no change in terrain, while the others raised enough questions to dispatch agents to determine if someone got away, sometimes by helicopter because the area is so remote. The agents look for any sign of human activity " footprints, broken twigs, trash. About 4 percent of missions have been false alarms, like tracks of livestock or farmers, and about 2 percent are inconclusive. The remaining 2 percent offer evidence of illegal crossings from Mexico, which typically results in ground sensors being planted for closer monitoring. The government has operated about 10,000 drone flights under the strategy, known internally as "change detection," since it began in March 2013. The flights currently cover about 900 miles, much of it in Texas, and are expected to expand to the Canadian border by the end of 2015. The purpose is to assign agents where illegal activity is highest, said R. Gil Kerlikowske, commissioner of Customs and Border Protection, the Border Patrol"s parent agency, which operates nine unmanned aircraft across the country. "You have finite resources," he said in an interview. "If you can look at some very rugged terrain (and) you can see there"s not traffic, whether it"s tire tracks or clothing being abandoned or anything else, you want to deploy your resources to where you have a greater risk, a greater threat." If the video shows the terrain unchanged, Border Patrol Chief Michael Fisher calls it "proving the negative" " showing there isn"t anything illegal happening there and therefore no need for agents and fences. The strategy was launched without fanfare and is being expanded as President Barack Obama prepares to issue an executive order by the end of this year to reduce deportations and enhance border security. Rep. Michael McCaul, a Texas Republican who chairs the House Homeland Security Committee, applauded the approach while noting surveillance gaps still remain. "We can no longer focus only on static defenses such as fences and fixed (camera) towers," he said. Sen. Bob Corker, a Tennessee Republican who coauthored legislation last year to add 20,000 Border Patrol agents and 350 miles of fencing to the southwest border, said, "If there are better ways of ensuring the border is secure, I am certainly open to considering those options." Border missions fly out of Sierra Vista, home of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center at Fort Huachuca, or Corpus Christi, Texas. They patrol at altitudes between 19,000 at 28,000 feet and from between 25 and 60 miles of the border. The first step is for Border Patrol sector chiefs to identify areas least likely to attract smugglers, typically those far from towns and roads. Analysts scour the drone videos at operations centers in Riverside; Grand Forks, North Dakota; and Sierra Vista. After an initial survey, the drones return within a week for another sweep. Privacy advocates have raised concerns about drones since Customs and Border Protection introduced them in 2006, saying there is potential to monitor innocent people under no suspicion. Lothar Eckardt, the agency"s executive director of national air security operations, said law-abiding people shouldn"t worry and that cameras are unable to capture details like license plate numbers and faces on the ground. He looked on one September morning as a drone taxied down a runway in Sierra Vista, lifted off with a muffled buzz and disappeared over a rocky mountain range into a blue Arizona sky. About a dozen computer screens line the wall of their trailer, showing the weather, maps and real-time images of the ground below. Eckardt said there is "no silver bullet" for addressing border security but that using drones in highly remote areas is part of the overall effort. If there"s nothing there, he said, "let"s not waste the manpower here. Let"s focus our efforts someplace else, where they"re needed." Drones are necessary to protect the border Ingram 2013 (David, How drones are used for domestic surveillance, Jun 19, www.csmonitor.com/USA/Latest-News-Wires/2013/0619/How-drones-are-used-for-domestic-surveillance) The U.S. government has made no secret of its use of drones to monitor the United States border with Mexico. The Obama administration has been defending its surveillance tactics since former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden released secret documents revealing a massive database of daily telephone records, as well as coordination between the NSA and social media companies. The programs are designed to target militants outside the United States who are suspected of planning attacks, but they inevitably gather some data on Americans, U.S. officials said. In a May speech, Obama defended the use of armed drones abroad but said the United States should never deploy armed drones over U.S. soil. The Justice Department had disclosed that two domestic law enforcement agencies use unmanned aircraft systems, according to a department statement sent to the Judiciary Committee and released on Wednesday by Grassley's office. The two are the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives. Grassley sent a letter to Attorney General Eric Holder on Wednesday asking why the Justice Department did not earlier mention the FBI's use of drones. At Wednesday's hearing, Democratic Senator Dianne Feinstein of California said she was concerned about the privacy implications of drone surveillance. "The greatest threat to the privacy of Americans is the drone and the use of the drone, and the very few regulations that are on it today," Feinstein said. Mueller reiterated that drone use is rare. "It is very narrowly focused on particularized cases and particularized needs," he said. Mueller is due to retire when his term expires in September. Border drones effectively and efficiently monitor the border RussiaTimes "14 (November 13, 2014, http://rt.com..., 7-3-15) Predator drones are silently patrolling almost half of the United States" border with Mexico, looking for illegal immigrants, human traffickers and drug cartels in desolated areas the government agents can"t realistically patrol. The unmanned aircraft fly over about 900 miles of rural areas where there are no US Customs and Border Patrol (CPB) agents, camera towers, ground sensors or fences along the 1,954-mile border, according to a new report by the Associated Press. The Predator Bs use a high-resolution video camera and then return within three days for another video in the same spot, two officials told the wire service. The two videos are then overlaid for analysts who use sophisticated software to identify tiny changes. There are changes in terrain in only eight percent of the drone missions under the current strategy R10; known internally as "change detection" R10; since it began in March 2013. Of those flagged missions, about four percent were false alarms, like tracks from livestock or farmers, and about two percent are inconclusive to the agents dispatched to the area to investigate. The remaining 2 percent offer evidence R10; like footprints, broken twigs, trash R10; of illegal crossings from Mexico, which typically results in ground sensors being planted for closer monitoring. In the last year and a half, CPB has operated about 10,000 drone flights, with much of their missions over Texas. Border missions fly out of Sierra Vista, home of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center at Fort Huachuca, or Corpus Christi, Texas. They patrol at altitudes between 19,000 at 28,000 feet and between 25 and 60 miles of the border. The program is expected to expand the the Canadian border by the end of 2015. The purpose is to assign agents where illegal activity is highest, R. Gil Kerlikowske, commissioner of Customs and Border Protection, the Border Patrol's parent agency, which operates nine unmanned aircraft across the country, told AP. "You have finite resources," he said in an interview. "If you can look at some very rugged terrain (and) you can see there's not traffic, whether it's tire tracks or clothing being abandoned or anything else, you want to deploy your resources to where you have a greater risk, a greater threat." Gregory McNeal, a law professor and drone expert at Pepperdine University, told NBC News in July that the money spent on drones is worth it. "This is a better way to patrol the border than helicopters," he said. "It"s not a comprehensive immigration solution or border security solution, but more surveillance time in the air will help plug gaps in the border." A typical Predator drone can fly for 12 hours before landing, compared to three for a standard helicopter. But the cost is much higher: Predator drones require a crew of between five to eight people R10; plus maintenance staff R10; to operate, coming out to about $3,000 an hour to fly. And each one has an $18 million price tag, NBC News reported. CPB began rolling out Predators in 2005, but rapidly expanded the unmanned aerial reconnaissance operation along the US-Mexico border at the beginning of this decade, the Washington Post reported in 2011. Michael Kostelnik, a retired Air Force general and former test pilot who is the assistant commissioner of CPB"s Office of Air and Marine, told the Post then that he had yet to be challenged in Congress about the appropriate use of domestic drones. "Instead, the question is: Why can"t we have more of them in my district?" Kostelnik said. In July, President Barack Obama requested $39.4 million for aerial surveillance, including troops, along the US-Mexican border. The emergency funding was for 16,526 additional drone and manned aircraft flight hours for border surveillance, and 16 additional drone crews to better detect and stop illegal activity, according to administration officials. The request was in response to the humanitarian crisis after tens of thousands of unaccompanied children and families illegally entered the country in the first half of the year. "Border Patrol wants the money and it wants the drones," McNeal said. "This is the kind of crisis where, if you are Border Patrol, you seize the opportunity to get more funding from Congress." The agency"s "unmanned and manned aircraft can continue to support ongoing border security operations, specifically regarding the tracking of illegal cross-border smuggling operations," a CBP official told Nextgov. The president"s request was part of a larger funding appeal of $3.7 billion to deal with the illegal immigrants and border security problems. In January, CPB was forced to ground its entire fleet of drones after a mechanical function forced a crew to crash an unmanned aircraft valued at $12 million. The mishap lowered the number of agency drones to only nine. Domestic drones k2 solve for terrorism Bauer 13 (Max Bauer, of ACLU of Massachusetts 9-11-2013, "Domestic Drone Surveillance Usage: Threats and Opportunities for Regulation," https://privacysos.org... CCC) Unmanned aerial vehicles, commonly known as drones, are an emerging and rapidly-expanding development in domestic surveillance technology. [4] On Valentine"s Day 2012, President Barack Obama signed the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, legislation authorizing the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to develop regulations to facilitate the growing usage of drones in domestic airspace. [5] Drones are best known for their use in military operations [6] including the use of weaponized drones for targeted killing. But drones have been used for domestic surveillance purposes for years [7] and their usage is expected to grow exponentially. [8] The FAA has issued 1,428 drone operator permits since 2007 (as of mid-February) and predicts there will be 10,000 drones deployed within the next five years. [9] A public information request by the Electronic Frontier Foundation showed that numerous universities and law enforcement agencies have been approved to use drones by the FAA. [10] Of course, the widespread use of drones for domestic surveillance raises serious privacy concerns. [11] Drones can be outfitted with high definition [12] and infrared cameras, [13] and even license plate readers. [14] Drones "present unique threats to privacy," in the words of one privacy advocate. [15] Why? They are smaller " potentially insect-sized, [16] can fly longer " perhaps soon in perpetuity, [17] and are not bound by the historical, practical check on law enforcement excesses we've had as a result of limited police resources. [18] In a seminal 1890 law review article aptly-titled The Right to Privacy, future Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis recognized that "instantaneous photographs" have invaded the secret precincts of private and domestic life"Of the desirability " indeed of the necessity " of some such protection there can, it is believed, be no doubt." [19] Brandeis and his co-author Samuel Warren were ahead of their time when they wrote that article but even they couldn"t foresee anything like the domestic surveillance schemes that have arisen over a century later. Drones Used in Massachusetts and Response to Boston Marathon Bombings. Late in 2012, the Boston Globe reported that a SWAT team in Massachusetts had filed an application with the FAA for a drone. [20] As of April 2013, there were no police drones yet in Massachusetts but Waltham-based defense contractor Raytheon was flying many of them in testing capacities. [21] Surveillance and war contracting companies hope to expand their market from military to domestic law enforcement. [22] Following the explosion of two bombs at the 2013 Boston Marathon, parts of the city shut down as the search for a suspect continued, prompting Ron Paul to write: "This unprecedented move should frighten us as much or more than the attack itself." [23] Boston Police Commissioner Ed Davis told the public shortly afterward that he seeks more surveillance cameras (there are already hundreds) in downtown Boston. [24] And further, he said, he wants to have drone surveillance for next year"s marathon. [25] Drones K2 stop terrorism Byman, 13 (Daniel L. Byman, Director of research at Center for Middle East Policy, 8/2013, http://www.brookings.edu... CCC) The Obama administration relies on drones for one simple reason: they work. According to data compiled by the New America Foundation, since Obama has been in the White House, U.S. drones have killed an estimated 3,300 al Qaeda, Taliban, and other jihadist operatives in Pakistan and Yemen. That number includes over 50 senior leaders of al Qaeda and the Taliban"top figures who are not easily replaced. In 2010, Osama bin Laden warned his chief aide, Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, who was later killed by a drone strike in the Waziristan region of Pakistan in 2011, that when experienced leaders are eliminated, the result is "the rise of lower leaders who are not as experienced as the former leaders" and who are prone to errors and miscalculations. And drones also hurt terrorist organizations when they eliminate operatives who are lower down on the food chain but who boast special skills: passport forgers, bomb makers, recruiters, and fundraisers. Drones have also undercut terrorists" ability to communicate and to train new recruits. In order to avoid attracting drones, al Qaeda and Taliban operatives try to avoid using electronic devices or gathering in large numbers. A tip sheet found among jihadists in Mali advised militants to "maintain complete silence of all wireless contacts" and "avoid gathering in open areas." Leaders, however, cannot give orders when they are incommunicado, and training on a large scale is nearly impossible when a drone strike could wipe out an entire group of new recruits. Drones have turned al Qaeda"s command and training structures into a liability, forcing the group to choose between having no leaders and risking dead leaders Drones take out terrorist leaders Al-Haj, 15 (Ahmed Al-Haj, writer for the Stars & Stripes and AP the big story, 7/10/2015, http://www.stripes.com... CCC) Yemeni security and military officials say a suspected U.S. drone strike killed four al-Qaida members travelling by car in the coastal city of Mukalla. The officials say the airstrike took place on Friday night in Mukalla, the capital of Yemen's sprawling eastern Hadramawt province. The explosion was heard in some parts of the city. Al-Qaida's Yemen branch, considered to be the most dangerous offshoot of the terror network, has made gains in the province and captured Mukalla earlier this year. The officials say at least five other militants were wounded in the airstrike. The officials spoke on condition of anonymity because they are not authorized to talk to reporters. Al-Qaida has profited from the turmoil that has engulfed Yemen, and U.S. drones have continued to target top al-Qaida leaders there. AT Retaliation AT: Retaliation Ayson flips neg- terrorism is not an existential risk Ayson 10 (Robert, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, "After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 33.7, Francis & Taylor) A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the @257;rst place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in signi@257;cant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-@257;rst century might bring would fade into insigni@257;cance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. No US nuclear retaliation Neely 13 (Meggaen Neely, The George Washington University Master of Arts (M.A.), Security Policy Studies 2012"2014 (expected) Baylor University Master of Arts (M.A.), Public Policy and Administration 2010"2012, Richard D. Huff Distinguished Masters Student in Political Science (2012) Baylor University Bachelor of Arts (B.A.), Political Science and Government, Research Assistant, Elliott School at George Washington University, Research Intern, Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) at Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Communications Intern at Federation of American Scientists Graduate Assistant at Department of Political Science, Baylor University, "Doubting Deterrence of Nuclear Terrorism", March 21, 2013, http://csis.org...) Because of the difficulty of deterring transnational actors, many deterrence advocates shift the focus to deterring state sponsors of nuclear terrorism. The argument applies whether or not the state intended to assist nuclear terrorists. If terrorists obtain a nuclear weapon or fissile materials from a state, the theory goes, then the United States will track the weapon"s country of origin using nuclear forensics, and retaliate against that country. If this is U.S. policy, advocates predict that states will be deterred from assisting terrorists with their nuclear ambitions. Yet, let"s think about the series of events that would play out if a terrorist organization detonated a weapon in the United States. Let"s assume forensics confirmed the weapon"s origin, and let"s assume, for argument"s sake, that country was Pakistan. Would the United States then retaliate with a nuclear strike? If a nuclear attack occurs within the next four years (a reasonable length of time for such predictions concerning current international and domestic politics), it seems unlikely. Why? First, there"s the problem of time. Though nuclear forensics is useful, it takes time to analyze the data and determine the country of origin. Any justified response upon a state sponsor would not be swift. Second, even if the United States proved the country of origin, it would then be difficult to determine that Pakistan willingly and intentionally sponsored nuclear terrorism. If Pakistan did, then nuclear retaliation might be justified. However, if Pakistan did not, nuclear retaliation over unsecured nuclear materials would be a disproportionate response and potentially further detrimental. Should the United States launch a nuclear strike at Pakistan, Islamabad could see this as an initial hostility by the United States, and respond adversely. An obvious choice, given current tensions in South Asia, is for Pakistan to retaliate against a U.S. nuclear launch on its territory by initiating conflict with India, which could turn nuclear and increase the exchanges of nuclear weapons. Hence, it seems more likely that, after the international outrage at a terrorist group"s nuclear detonation, the United States would attempt to stop the bleeding without a nuclear strike. Instead, some choices might include deploying forces to track down those that supported the suicide terrorists that detonated the weapon, pressuring Pakistan to exert its sovereignty over fringe regions such as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and increasing the number of drone strikes in Waziristan. Given the initial attack, such measures might understandably seem more of a concession than the retaliation called for by deterrence models, even more so by the American public. This is not an argument against those technologies associated with nuclear forensics. The United States and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should continue their development and distribution. Instead, I question the presumed American response that is promulgated by deterrence advocates. By looking at possibilities for a U.S. response to nuclear terrorism, a situation in which we assume that deterrence has failed, we cast doubt on the likelihood of a U.S. retaliatory nuclear strike and hence cast doubt on the credibility of a U.S. retaliatory nuclear strike as a deterrent. Would the United States launch a nuclear weapon now unless it was sure of another state"s intentional sponsorship of nuclear terrorism? Any reasonable doubt of sponsorship might stay the United States" nuclear hand. Given the opaqueness of countries" intentions, reasonable doubt over sponsorship is inevitable to some degree. Other countries are probably aware of U.S. hesitance in response to terrorists" use of nuclear weapons. If this thought experiment is true, then the communication required for credible retaliatory strikes under deterrence of nuclear terrorism is missing. The threat of a nuclear retaliation is exaggerated " even stolen material can be easily traced Lieber and Press 13 (*Keir A. Lieber and **Daryl G. Press, *Received his M.A. and Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago, Associate Professor in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and the Department of Government, **Associate Professor in the Department of Government, Dartmouth College. He received a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, "Why States Won"t Give Nuclear Weapons to Terrorists", Summer 2013, International Security, Vol. 38, No. 1, Pages 80-104) This gloomy picture overstates the difficulty of determining the source of stolen material after a nuclear terrorist attack. In the wake of a detonation, the possibility of stolen fissile material complicates the task of attribution"but only marginally. At the end of the Cold War, several countries"particularly in the former Soviet Union"confronted major nuclear security problems, but great progress has been made since then.40 Although no country has perfect nuclear security, today the greatest concerns surround just five countries: Belarus, Japan, Pakistan, Russia, and South Africa.41 In addition, not all of those states are equally worrisome as potential sources of nuclear theft. Substantial concerns exist about the security of fissile materials in Pakistan and Russia (the latter if simply because of the large size of its stockpile), but Belarus, Japan, and South Africa would likely be quickly and easily ruled out as the source of stolen fissile material. Belarus has a relatively small stockpile of fissile material"approximately 100 kilograms of HEU42"so in the wake of a nuclear terrorist attack, it would be easy for Belarus to show that its stockpile remained intact.43 Similarly, Japan (one of the United States" closest allies) and South Africa would be keen to allow the United States to verify the integrity of their full stocks of materials. (In the wake of a nuclear terror attack, a lack of full cooperation in showing all materials accounted for would be highly revealing.) Iran is not believed to have any weapons-usable nuclear material to steal,44 although that could change. In short, a nuclear handoff strategy disguised as a loose nukes problem would be very precarious.45 No retaliation " international cooperation and limited suspects solve Lieber and Press 13 (*Keir A. Lieber and **Daryl G. Press, *Received his M.A. and Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago, Associate Professor in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and the Department of Government, **Associate Professor in the Department of Government, Dartmouth College. He received a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, "Why States Won"t Give Nuclear Weapons to Terrorists", Summer 2013, International Security, Vol. 38, No. 1, Pages 80-104) There are at least five reasons, however, to expect that attributing a nuclear terrorist attack would be easier than attributing a conventional terrorist attack. First, no terrorism investigation in history has had the resources that would be deployed to investigating the source of a nuclear terror attack"particularly one against the United States or a U.S. ally. Rapidly attributing the attack would be critical, not merely as a first step toward satisfying the rage of the victims but, more importantly, to determine whether additional nuclear attacks were imminent. The victim would use every resource at its disposal" money, threats, and force"to rapidly identify the source of the attack.47 If necessary, any investigation would go on for a long time; it would never "blow over" from the victim"s standpoint. The second reason why attributing a nuclear terror attack would be easier than attributing a conventional terrorist attack is the level of international assistance the victim would likely receive from allies, neutrals, and even adversaries. An attack on the United States, for example, would likely trigger unprecedented intelligence cooperation from its allies, if for no other reason than the fear that subsequent attacks might target them. Perhaps more important, even adversaries of the United States"particularly those with access to fissile materials"would have enormous incentives to quickly demonstrate their innocence. To avoid being accused of sponsoring or supporting the attack, and thus to avoid the wrath of the United States, these countries would likely go to great lengths to demonstrate that their weapons were accounted for, that their fissile materials had different isotopic properties than the type used in the attack, and that they were sharing any information they had on the attack. The cooperation that the United States received from Iran and Pakistan in the wake of the September 11 attacks illustrates how potential adversaries may be motivated to help in the aftermath of an attack and stay off the target list for retaliation.48 The pressure to cooperate after an anonymous nuclear detonation on U.S. soil would be many times greater.49 Third, the strong positive relationship between the number of fatalities stemming from an attack and the rate of attribution (as depicted in figures 1 to 3 above) suggests that the probability of attribution after a nuclear attack" with its enormous casualties"should be even higher. The 97 percent attribution rate for attacks that killed ten or more people on U.S. soil or that of its allies is based on a set of attacks that were pinpricks compared to nuclear terrorism. The data in those figures suggest that our conclusions understate the actual likelihood of nuclear attribution. Fourth, the challenge of attribution after a terrorist nuclear attack should be easier than after a conventional terrorist attack, because the investigation would begin with a highly restricted suspect list. In the case of a conventional terror attack against the United States or an ally, one might begin the investigation at the broadest level with the U.S. Department of State"s list of fifty-one foreign terrorist organizations. In the case of a nuclear terror attack, only fifteen of these FTOs have state sponsors"and only one sponsor (Pakistan) has either nuclear weapons or fissile materials. (If Iran acquires nuclear weapons, that number will grow to two, but there is no overlap between the terror groups that Pakistan supports and those that Iran assists.) Finally, any operation to detonate a nuclear weapon would involve complex planning and coordination"securing the weapon, learning to use it, planning the time and location of detonation, moving the weapon to the target, and conducting the attack. Even if only a small cadre of operatives knew the nuclear nature of the attack, the planning of a spectacular operation would be hard to keep secret.50 For example, six months prior to the September 11 attacks, Western intelligence detected numerous indications that al-Qaida was planning a major attack. The intelligence was not speci fic enough"or the agencies were not nimble enough"to prevent the operation, but the indicators were "blinking red" for months, directing U.S. attention to al-Qaida as soon as the attacks began.51 Turns Case Terrorism is used as a justification for increased surveillance " empirics prove and turns case Haggerty and Gazso 2005 (Kevin, Professor of Criminology and Sociology at the University of Alberta; Amber, Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology at York University, The Canadian Journal of Sociology / Cahiers canadiens de sociologie, Vol. 30, No. 2 ( Spring, 2005), pp. 169-187 "Seeing beyond the Ruins: Surveillance as a Response to Terrorist Threats" JSTOR; accessed 7/17/15 JH @ DDI) A climate of fear and anxiety helped ease the passage of such laws (Davis, 2001). However, a great deal of organizational opportunism was also at work. Many of the surveillance proposals adopted in the days after the attack were recycled from earlier legislative efforts. In previous incarnations these proposals had often been legitimated as essential for the international "war on drugs" or to address other crimes, such as money laundering. The September 11 th attacks gave the authorities a new and apparently unassailable legitimation for long-standing legislative ambitions. Before the dust had settled on Manhattan, the security establishment had mobilized to expand and intensify their surveillance capabilities, justifying existing proposals as necessary tools to fight the new war against terrorism. Ultimately, the police, military and security establishment reaped an unanticipated windfall of increased funding, new technology and loosened legislative constraints by strategically invoking fears of future attacks. There are several examples of such opportunism. Since at least 1999, when Congress initially turned down their request, the U.S. Justice Department has lobbied for the development of new "secret search" provisions. Likewise, prior to the attacks, the FBI and the National Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Committee had a lengthy shopping list of desired surveillance-related measures including legal enhancements to their wiretapping capabilities, legal constraints on the public use of cryptography, and provisions for governmental agents to compel Internet service providers to provide information on their customers (Burnham, 1997). All of these proposals were recycled and implemented after the September 11th attacks now justified as integral tools in the "war on terrorism." New provisions requiring banks to exercise "due diligence" in relation to their large depositors were originally justified by the authorities as a means to counter the "war on drugs." The opportunism of many of these efforts was inadvertently revealed by an RCMP Sergeant when, during a discussion about new official antiterrorism powers to monitor financial transactions, he noted that: "We've been asking for something like this for four years. It's really our best weapon against biker gangs" [emphasis added] (Corcan, 2001). In Canada, the Federal Privacy Commissioner was particularly alarmed by the development of what he referred to as a "Big Brother database." This amounts to a detailed computerized record of information about Canadian travelers. Although justified as a means to counter terrorism, the data will be made available to other government departments for any purpose they deem appropriate. Such provisions raise the specter of informational "fishing expeditions." Indeed, the Canadian government has already indicated that this ostensible anti-terrorist database will be used to help monitor tax evaders and catch domestic criminals. It will also be used to scrutinize an individual's travel history and destinations, in an effort to try and determine whether they might be a pedophile or money launderer (Radwanski, 2002). While these are laudable goals, they also reveal how a host of other surveillance agendas have been furthered by capitalizing on the new anti-terrorism discourse. Lone wolf terror attacks are used to justify disproportionate increases in surveillance and military operations abroad Lennard, Senior News Analyst for Vice News, 10/27/14 (Natasha Lennard, Brooklyn-based Senior News Analyst for Vice News, VICE News, October 27, 2014, "'Lone Wolf' Terrorist Acts Will Be Used to Justify the Surveillance State" https://news.vice.com..., accessed 7/17/15 JH @ DDI) The phenomenon of individuals committing violent and murderous acts in the name of an ideology is nothing new in the US. The FBI's Operation Lone Wolf investigated white supremacists encouraging autonomous violent acts in the 1990s. Why, then, are we seeing pundits and politicians newly focus on the "lone wolf" category? There's no simple answer, but we can at the very least see that the old binary, distinguishing terror as the act of networked groups versus lone madman mass killings " a distinction that has tacitly undergirded post-9/11 conceptions of terrorism " doesn't serve the latest iteration of the war on terror. California Senator Dianne Feinstein, speaking on CNN's State of the Union on Sunday, suggested that "the Internet, as well as certain specific Muslim extremists, are really firing up this lone-wolf phenomenon." Whether intentionally or not, the Senate Intelligence Committee chair performed a lot of political work with that one comment. Crystallizing "lone wolves" as a key threat domestically helps legitimize the US's current military operation against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. With or without established connections, the Islamic State's far-reaching tentacles of online influence encouraging individuals worldwide cement the group as a threat to the homeland " which is always useful for politicians struggling to legally justify another protracted war. In this way, attributing attacks to homegrown "lone wolves" is more useful for current US political interests than attributing them to madness alone. The assumption that terror acts were always borne of connected networks problematically buoyed domestic counter-terror efforts that saw entire communities profiled as potential threats. Which is not to say that "lone wolf terrorist" is a flawed designation for attacks by ideologically motivated individuals. In many ways it seems apt, and any challenge is welcome to the all too basic distinction that imbues group terror with motive while dismissing individual acts as madness. The "lone wolf" straddles the ill-conceived gap between madman and terrorist node. It's an intersection all too complicated for the inexpert punditry of Fox News: "They are terrorist acts, to be sure," Megyn Kelly said about Canadian gunman Michael Zehaf-Bibeau, adding "but this guy was also a nutcase." Furthermore, the assumption that terror acts were always borne of connected networks problematically buoyed domestic counter-terror efforts that saw entire communities profiled as potential threats. Under the premise that terror networks ran like arteries through US Muslim communities enabled an era of profile-driven preemptive policing that has been nothing short of racist. Entire mosques in New York were designated terrorist organizations to enable police surveillance. The NSA's meta-data collections claim justifiability on the premise that terror was locatable by tracing networks of communication. The "lone wolf" phenomenon should at least prompt the questioning of the sort of profile-based counter-terror efforts that assumed terror lurked in any network of Muslims, and that the mass hoarding of communications data was vital to national security. However, the rhetoric surrounding this type of domestic threat already bodes ill for civil liberties. If the hunt for terrorist networks has been plagued by ethnic profiling and overreaching spycraft, an established threat of "lone wolf" attacks gives a defensive imprimatur for unbounded NSA-style surveillance " anyone can wield a hatchet with ideological ire. As Chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee Michael McCaul said on This Week, finding such lone actors in advance of attacks is like "finding a needle in a haystack." And as Feinstein said the same day, "You have to be able to watch it, and you have to be able to disrupt them." As such, the era of the "lone wolf" terrorist does not only spell the end of the bunk distinction between motivated group and deranged individual. It ushers in the dawn of a new era of justification for our totalized state of surveillance and national security paranoia. Surveillance would increase after a terrorist attack Feaver 1/13/15 (Peter D., 1/13/15, Foreign Policy, "10 Lessons to Remember After a Terrorist Attack," Peter is a professor of political science and public policy and Bass Fellow @ Duke University, and director of the Triangle Institute for Security Studies and the Duke Program in American Grand Strategy, http://foreignpolicy.com..., 7/16/15, SM) In particular, it is striking how some of the things that were "obvious" in the days and weeks after 9/11, but then were gradually forgotten, have become obvious again:W06; Terrorists succeed when they are abetted by intelligence failures. Or, put another way, terrorists only need to get lucky once to "succeed," whereas counterterrorism has to be lucky all the time to "succeed."W06; Even robust intelligence and law enforcement may not guarantee 100 percent safety and security. By global standards " certainly by the standards of Western democracies " France has a particularly formidable counterterrorist structure. But it failed in this instance.W06; When terrorists succeed in an attack, citizens demand that the government do more to protect them " even if they have already been doing a lot. And steps that would have seemed heavy handed before the attack, say aggressive surveillance of suspected terrorists or visible demonstrations of presence by the security forces, are deemed not just tolerable but necessary. Moreover, savvy political leaders will understand that one of the benefits of a stronger official response is that it is a hedge both against dangerously stronger vigilantism and also against additional pressure from some segments of the public to do more than is wise. Terrorism leads to crackdowns History.com, Reaction to 9/11, http://www.history.com..., 2010 "Today," the French newspaper Le Monde announced on September 12, 2001, "we are all Americans." People around the world agreed: The terrorist attacks of the previous day had felt like attacks on everyone, everywhere. They provoked an unprecedented expression of shock, horror, solidarity and sympathy for the victims and their families. Citizens of 78 countries died in New York, Washington, D.C., and Pennsylvania on September 11, and people around the world mourned lost friends and neighbors. They held candlelight vigils. They donated money and goods to the Red Cross and other rescue and relief organizations. Flowers piled up in front of American embassies. Cities and countries commemorated the attacks in a variety of ways: The Queen Mother sang the American national anthem at Buckingham Palace"s Changing of the Guard, while in Brazil, Rio de Janeiro put up huge billboards that showed the city"s famous Christ the Redeemer statue embracing the New York City skyline. Meanwhile, statesmen and women rushed to condemn the attacks and to offer whatever aid they could to the United States. Russian president Vladimir Putin called the strikes "a blatant challenge to humanity," while German chancellor Gerhard Schroeder declared that the events were "not only attacks on the people in the United States, our friends in America, but also against the entire civilized world, against our own freedom, against our own values, values which we share with the American people." He added, "We will not let these values be destroyed." Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien denounced the "cowardly and depraved assault." He tightened security along the border and arranged for hundreds of grounded airplanes to land at Canadian airports. Even leaders of countries that did not tend to get along terribly well with the American government expressed their sorrow and dismay. The Cuban foreign minister offered airspace and airports to American planes. Chinese and Iranian officials sent their condolences. And the Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, visibly dismayed, told reporters in Gaza that the attacks were "unbelievable, unbelievable, unbelievable." "We completely condemn this very dangerous attack," he said, "and I convey my condolences to the American people, to the American president and to the American administration." But public reaction was mixed. The leader of the Islamic militant group Hamas announced that "no doubt this is a result of the injustice the U.S. practices against the weak in the world." Likewise, people in many different countries believed that the attacks were a consequence of America"s cultural hegemony, political meddling in the Middle East and interventionism in world affairs. The Rio billboards hadn"t been up for long before someone defaced them with the slogan "The U.S. is the enemy of peace." Some, especially in Arab countries, openly celebrated the attacks. But most people, even those who believed that the United States was partially or entirely responsible for its own misfortune, still expressed sorrow and anger at the deaths of innocent people. On September 12, the 19 ambassadors of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) declared that the attack on the United States was an attack on all of the member nations. This statement of solidarity was mostly symbolic"NATO did not authorize any specific military action"but it was still unprecedented. It was the first time that the organization had ever invoked the mutual defense section of its charter (intended to protect vulnerable European nations from Soviet invasion during the Cold War). NATO eventually sent five airplanes to help keep an eye on American airspace. Likewise, on September 12 the United Nations Security Council called on all nations to "redouble their efforts" to thwart and prosecute terrorists. Two weeks later, it passed another resolution that urged states to "suppress the financing of terrorism" and to aid in any anti-terrorism campaigns. But these declarations of support and solidarity didn"t mean that other countries gave the United States a free hand to retaliate however, and against whomever, it pleased. Allies and adversaries alike urged caution, warning that an indiscriminate or disproportionate reaction could alienate Muslims around the world. In the end, almost 30 nations pledged military support to the United States, and many more offered other kinds of cooperation. Most agreed with George Bush that, after September 11, the fight against terrorism was "the world"s fight." Terrorists Hate US Al Qaeda Al Qaeda is expanding and plotting attacks against the West Hubbard 6/9/2015 (Ben, Al Qaeda Tries a New Tactic to Keep Power: Sharing It, www.nytimes.com/2015/06/10/world/middleeast/qaeda-yemen-syria-houthis.html) BEIRUT, Lebanon " After they routed the army in southern Yemen, fighters from Al Qaeda stormed into the city of Al Mukalla, seizing government buildings, releasing jihadists from prison and stealing millions of dollars from the central bank. Then they surprised everyone. Instead of raising their flags and imposing Islamic law, they passed control to a civilian council and gave it a budget to pay salaries, import fuel and hire teams to clean up garbage. The fighters receded into the background, maintaining only a single police station to arbitrate disputes. Al Qaeda"s takeover of Yemen"s fifth-largest city in April was the most direct indication yet that the group"s most potent regional affiliates are evolving after years of American drone strikes killing their leaders and changing to meet the challenge posed by the Islamic State"s competing and land-grabbing model of jihad. While the image of Al Qaeda has long been one of shadowy operatives plotting international attacks from remote hide-outs, its branches in Yemen and Syria are now increasingly making common cause with local groups on the battlefield. In doing so, they are distancing themselves from one of Osama bin Laden"s central precepts: That fighters should focus on the "far enemy" in the West and not get bogged down in local insurgencies. In recent weeks, the Qaeda affiliate in Yemen has allied with armed tribes to fight Iranian-backed Houthi rebels, putting that alliance on the same side of the country"s civil war as the United States and Saudi Arabia. In Syria, Qaeda-allied fighters are important members of a rebel coalition against President Bashar al-Assad that includes groups supported by the West. This strategy has clear benefits for a group that has long been near the top of the United States"s list of enemies by allowing it to build local support while providing some cover against the threat of foreign military action. But despite Al Qaeda"s increased involvement in local battles, American officials say the group remains committed to attacking the West, a goal that could be easier to plot from sanctuaries where it enjoys local support. Cooperating with others could also give Al Qaeda a long-term advantage in its competition with the extremists of the Islamic State, analysts said. Since its public break with Al Qaeda last year, the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL, has stolen the jihadist limelight by seizing cities in Syria and Iraq and declaring a caliphate in the territory it controls. This has won it the allegiances of other militant cells from Libya to Afghanistan. The Islamic State has insisted that other groups join it or be considered enemies, a tactic that has alienated many in areas it controls. And its public celebration of violence, including the beheading of Western hostages, helped spur the formation of a United States-led military coalition that is bombing the group. Al Qaeda"s branches in Syria and Yemen have taken a different route, building ties with local groups and refraining from the strict application of Shariah, the legal code of Islam, when faced with local resistance, according to residents of areas where Al Qaeda holds sway. When Al Qaeda took over Al Mukalla in April, it seized government buildings and used trucks to cart off more than $120 million from the central bank, according to the bank"s director, Abdul-Qader Foulihan. That sum could not be independently verified. But it soon passed control to a civilian council, giving it a budget of more than $4 million to provide services, an arrangement that made sense to local officials seeking to serve their people during wartime. "We are not Qaeda stooges," said Abdul-Hakeem bin Mahfood, the council"s secretary general, in a telephone interview. "We formed the council to avoid the destruction of the city." While the council pays salaries and distributes fuel, Al Qaeda maintains a police station to settle disputes, residents said. It has so far made no effort to ban smoking or regulate how women dress. Nor has it called itself Al Qaeda, instead using the name the Sons of Hadhramaut to emphasize its ties to the surrounding province. One self-described Qaeda member said that the choice of name was deliberate, recalling that after the group seized territory in southern Yemen in 2011, the country"s military had mobilized to push it out with support from the United States. "We were in control for a year and six months, we applied God"s law, we created a small state and the whole world saw it, but they did not leave us alone," the man said in an interview with a Yemeni television station. "So we came here with the name the Sons of Hadhramaut, but the people here know who we are." American officials have long considered the terrorist group"s Yemeni branch, known as Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the most dangerous to the West. It has sought to carry out attacks against the United States, and it retains sophisticated bomb-making expertise. Now, Yemen"s civil war has given the group an opportunity to expand, analysts said. Can"t deter Al-Qaeda Ignatieff "4 (Michael Ignatieff, Canadian author, academic and former politician. has held senior academic posts at the universities of Cambridge, Oxford, Harvard and Toronto, 2004, Princeton University Press, "the lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror") The third type of terrorist who might prove undeterrable were they to acquire these weapons is Al Qaeda itself. Unlike terrorists who serve the liberation claims of a particular group of people, Al Qaeda does not depend for its support on a particular population who could be subjected to revenge or retribution following an attack. Thus the attackers on Afghan soil. Once Afghanistan had served its function as a base, it was dispensable as far as Al Qaeda was concerned. Since their goal is not the acquisition of power itself but the punishment of the United States and its strategic allies, they cannot be stopped by political negotiation, concession, or appeasement. Nor are they susceptible to the incentives that make some armed groups conform to the laws of war in order to achieve international recognition or legitimacy. This indifference to incentives and sanctions applies not merely to Al Qaeda but to any cult with charismatic psychopaths at its head. It is hard to see what political action a state could have taken to deter the Japanese cult group Aum Shinrikyo before it released toxic agents in the Tokyo subway system. 9 Unlike political groups seeking liberation or national territory, these cults cannot be engaged politically, and since they are closed and conspiratorial, they are difficult to infiltrate and neutralize. The logic of deterrence that once kept state violence in some kind of check has no traction with loners and the cult leaders of global terrorism. Since they promise their followers eternal life, they create a cadre of undeterrables. Standard rationality doesn"t apply to Al-Qaeda " they cannot be deterred Ignatieff "4 (Michael Ignatieff, Canadian author, academic and former politician. has held senior academic posts at the universities of Cambridge, Oxford, Harvard and Toronto, 2004, Princeton University Press, "the lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror") In the examples considered so far, it has become clear that where armed groups have a real prospect of obtaining recognition and statehood, they may be persuaded to abstain from terrorism. Where their success in this struggle depends on retaining the support of local populations, they may also conclude that restraint pays better than atrocity. But these incentives and restraining factors do not apply to all terrorist groups. No such factors discipline the conduct of Al Qaeda. They have no aspirations to statehood and therefore no incentive to play by any known rules. They do not serve a determinate population and are therefore unconstrained either by their supporters" moral code or by their vulnerability to reprisal. They even appear indifferent to casualties inflicted on Muslim populations who live or work in proximity to their targets. This is what makes them so dangerous. This is also why they cannot be engaged politically and must instead be defeated militarily. Al Qaeda is therefore a distinctive kind of terrorism, no longer in the service of a people"s freedom or in the name of the overthrow of a given state. The apocalyptic nihilists who attacked the United States on September 11 did not leave behind justifications, noble or otherwise, for their actions. They directed their propaganda and their justifications not at a specific state denying a claim to self-determination, but at the United States as the hated imperial capital of a materialistic, secular, and alien civilization. The so-called martyrs defended their actions in the language of Islamic eschatology, not in the language of rights. 33 Moreover, their intentions were apocalyptic, not political: to humiliate the archenemy of Islam and secure martyrdom in the process. It is difficult to see, in principle, how acts unaccompanied by demands can be accommodated politically. If the goal of terrorism is neither territory nor freedom, if its purpose is to strike a blow that asserts the dignity of Muslim believers while inflicting horror and death upon their enemies, then it is difficult to envisage a political response of any kind. Such an attack cannot be met by politics but only by war. Generic Biological realism explains terrorism " means it"s impossible to stop it Thayer and Hudson "11 (Brad and Valerie, Thayer is a Professor of Political Science at Baylor, Hudson is the Professor of Political Science at Brigham Young. "Sex and the Shaheed: Insights from the Life Sciences on Islamic Suicide Terrorism" International Security, Vol 34 No 4. 2011) Yet, even if al-Qaida is diminished, Islamic fundamentalist suicide attacks will continue to be executed by al-Qaida-inspired groups, Palestinian terrorist groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah, and the Taliban because they are an effective asymmetric tactic against some of the world"s most hardened security forces. Islamic fundamentalist suicide terrorists have penetrated British, French, Israeli, and U.S. defenses, among others. Moreover, only suicide terrorists could have executed the September 11 attacks or penetrated the Israeli security corridor bordering the Palestinian Authority, because they alone could navigate the countless security obstacles and be capable of self-destructing at a precise location and time while causing the greatest damage. As Mustafa Alani puts it, "It"s what we call a thinking, walking bomb. He watches the whole scene [and] chooses the best time and best location."4 Suicide terrorism is the ultimate smart bomb, demonstrating unparalleled political commitment and personal resoluteness. Scholars have examined Islamic fundamentalist suicide terrorism primarily through the lens of international politics, economics, and cultural studies, and each offers important insights into the motivation and recruitment policies of groups that practice it. There is, however, another discipline that can make a useful contribution"the life sciences. We argue that the application of concepts and approaches from the life sciences yields new insights into (1) the causal context of Islamic fundamentalist suicide terrorism, (2) the motivation of suicide terrorists, and (3) policy approaches to subvert this form of terrorism. A consilient approach, incorporating ideas from the life sciences and the social sciences, can aid social scientists and policy analysts in addressing the problem of Islamic suicide terrorism.5 The life sciences can be a source of new analogies and examples that might help scholars and analysts to approach the problem in fresh ways and derive effective policies.6 Our argument is important for three reasons. First, understanding the motivations of Islamic fundamentalist terrorists is critical for creating policies to stop them, ideally before they become terrorists. Second, our approach helps to illuminate why few Islamic fundamentalist terrorists defect and how policies may be crafted to promote defections. Finally, it advances the goal of consilience"that is, using insights from human evolution and ecology, as well as from the social sciences, to create a more comprehensive and detailed understanding of human behavior. In essence, consilient approaches bridge the gap between the life sciences and the social sciences. For the advancement of knowledge concerning human behavior, there may be no more important task than removing the barriers between the life sciences and the social sciences, which we believe will revolutionize both fields of study.7 The evolutionary structure of terrorist organizations makes them impossible to deter Thayer and Hudson "11 (Brad and Valerie, Thayer is a Professor of Political Science at Baylor, Hudson is the Professor of Political Science at Brigham Young. "Sex and the Shaheed: Insights from the Life Sciences on Islamic Suicide Terrorism" International Security, Vol 34 No 4. 2011) Alpha males try to resolve this inevitable tension through male bonding. By persuading non-alpha males that they are all "family," alpha males may be able to dampen intragroup tensions. Evolutionary psychology also helps to explain why this strategy will be effective. Humans evolved in small-group dominance hierarchies"principally the family and extended family hunter groups. Accordingly, the human mind is well suited for comprehending and bonding with small groups of dozens or, at most, 100 or 150 people.24 To be sure, humans may bond with larger units (e.g., a country), but that requires an extensive effort by the state (e.g., years of nationalistic education). In mimicking the family bond, male-bonded groups often assume the task of educating young males, providing another family-like service. Young people often embrace indoctrination into a belief system through a religion or an educational system, or the combination of the two, such as in madrassas.25 Emulating the family also makes the male-bonded group more resilient"harder to penetrate and to destroy"similar to the family or the mafia and suggests they must be targeted in unique ways. The dynamics described above are found among all societies, not only those of the Islamic world. Alpha males will seek to co-opt non-alpha males into male-bonded societies in which violence is controlled by alphas and guided toward out-groups, not in-groups (and especially not targeted toward the alphas). In this study, however, we limit ourselves to examining factors that we argue contribute to Islamic fundamentalist suicide terrorism. Of course, even within the Islamic world, individuals will possess other motivations to conduct suicide attacks. For example, there is evidence that at least some Iraqi male teenagers have been forced to train as suicide bombers under fear of reprisals against their families. Terrorism"s engrained in Islamic societies " it"s the only way for non-Alpha males to achieve status Thayer and Hudson "11 (Brad and Valerie, Thayer is a Professor of Political Science at Baylor, Hudson is the Professor of Political Science at Brigham Young. "Sex and the Shaheed: Insights from the Life Sciences on Islamic Suicide Terrorism" International Security, Vol 34 No 4. 2011) Baldly put, polygyny means mates for some men and none for others. And who will not obtain mates? It will not be those with advantages, but rather those who lack them. Non-alpha males will be the reproductive losers, and this gives them great motivation to use force, the sole area in which they possibly hold a reproductively relevant advantage over alpha males. Alpha males and non-alpha males understand the ramifications of polygyny for their relations: polygyny will heighten in-group violence against alpha males by non-alpha males absent a mechanism that directs this violence to an out-group. From the perspective of alpha males, suicide terrorism offers some interesting possibilities. A non-alpha male in a polygynous society with high levels of gender differentiation wants to find a way to project power, preferably through violence. In this way, he hopes to obtain greater social status and thus greater reproductive success. An alpha male in the same society wants to find a way to channel that violence to out-groups without allowing the nonalpha male to achieve social status through violence, which ultimately could threaten the interests of the alpha males. Suicide terrorism, sanctioned and applauded by religious belief, represents an attractive strategy in this context. If alpha males can persuade non-alpha males that (1) their violence should be directed to out-groups, (2) that thereby these non-alpha males will greatly increase their social status and make their families proud, but (3) they will have to die and experience their reproductive success vicariously through their kin, or in the afterlife, then the threat of in-group violence can be decreased. For some non-alpha males, becoming a shaheed is the most effective response to the human evolutionary conundrum produced by male dominance hierarchies, high levels of gender differentiation, and the scarcity of females resulting from polygyny.40 In 2003 Robert Pape found that among Islamic suicide terrorists, 97 percent were single and 84 percent were male. If one excludes the Kurdistan Workers" Party, which promotes gender equality, the gender ratio rises to 91 percent.41 These young men come predominantly from lower socio-economic strata of society than those involved in nonsuicide terrorism, despite the somewhat anomalous case of the September 11 attacks. Evolutionary psychology would predict that this subpopulation would be most susceptible to the lure of suicide terrorism. Islamic religious texts promise the shaheed seventy-two virgins in the afterlife. 42 Miller and Kanazawa note, "It is the combination of polygyny and the promise of a large harem of virgins in heaven that motivate many young Muslim men to commit suicide bombings. Consistent with this explanation, all studies of suicide bombers indicate that they are significantly younger than not only the Muslim population in general but other (nonsuicidal) members of their own extreme political organizations like Hamas and Hezbollah. And nearly all suicide bombers are single."43 Failed suicide bombers may not admit to this temptation as motivation for their action, perhaps considering it too vulgar or impious. Nevertheless, it can be a key draw for a male contemplating poor reproductive prospects in this life. In March 2004, Husam Abdu (also Abdo), a sixteen-year-old failed suicide bomber captured at an Israeli checkpoint in Gaza, explained to Israeli intelligence officials that his dwarfism made him the object of ridicule at school, and he had been tempted by the promise of sexual relations with virgins in paradise. 44 Another captured would-be suicide terrorist, a Moroccan man, aged twenty-six, suffered from facial disfigurement.45 A study of suicide bombers in Iraq conducted by the U.S. military found that they were almost always single males from eighteen to thirty, with a mean age of twenty-two and no children. 46 The study concluded that most are "alienated young men from large families who are desperate to stand out from the crowd and make their mark."47 Immigration DA (WIP) tag Levy 6-3 (Gabrielle, Capitol Hill analyst at US News, "Signs of Life For Immigration Reform," June 3 2015, http://www.usnews.com...) With comprehensive immigration reform essentially dead on Capitol Hill for the foreseeable future, Republicans appear poised to advance a series of incremental measures to address the hot-button issue amid political pressure to tackle the broken system. W06; GOP lawmakers in recent weeks have proposed potential areas of compromise they hope can help the party handle the delicate balance between appeasing the demands of the base in beefing up border security while addressing the practical economic need for foreign labor.W06; The moves come amid almost no progress on immigration legislation since the then-Democratically controlled Senate passed a comprehensive reform bill in 2013 that never came up for a vote in the GOP-led House. The impasse led President Barack Obama to issue executive orders protecting some groups of immigrants living illegally in the U.S. from deportation " infuriating Republicans in the process.W06; With the unilateral moves halted by a federal judge, congressional leadership has been content to sidestep the thorny issue after losing a faceoff in March in which they unsuccessfully tried to tie funding for the Department of Homeland Security to a rollback of the Obama actions. But the looming presidential race has increased the sense of urgency among some of the rank and file eager to see the party raise its standing among Hispanic voters.W06; "If you"re a Republican [running for president], you at minimum want the immigration issue neutralized, and maybe gain votes where Mitt Romney was unable to get them" in 2012, says Stuart Anderson, executive director of the nonpartisan, nonprofit National Foundation for American Policy.W06; While any of the the piecemeal proposals faces long odds to passage and even less chance of cooperation with the White House, one area of focus appears to be on guest worker programs that would increase the number and accessibility of visas for both high- and low-skilled workers. The reform already has bipartisan support.W06; "When it comes to illegal immigration, what"s the No. 1 reason people come to this country illegally? The same reason our ancestors came here: to work," Sen. Ron Johnson, R-Wis., said Tuesday at a bipartisan event exploring pragmatic methods of reigniting the debate on reform. "From my standpoint, if you really want to secure our border, let"s eliminate or drastically reduce the incentives for illegal immigration, starting with a guest worker program."W06; Some studies have suggested that, instead of taking away jobs from Americans, those workers help spur economic growth. It"s a position immigration advocates hope to use to sell the issue to a broader constituency.W06; "If you don"t have a restaurant worker working in the kitchen " you"re not going to have good jobs, waiter jobs, management jobs in restaurants for Americans," says Alfonso Aguilar, director of the Latino Partnership program at the conservative American Principles in Action group and the former chief of the U.S. Office of Citizenship under President George W. Bush. "So we need to connect with the middle class and show that immigration is good for the middle class."W06; NOGALES, AZ - JANUARY 21: The U.S.-Mexico border fence on January 21, 2014 in Nogales, Arizona. (Photograph by Charles Ommanney/Reportage by Getty Images)W06; RELATEDW06; Tracing the 2016 Fault LinesW06; Aguilar"s organization has suggested setting up guest worker programs for low-skilled workers that would allow the number of visas to fluctuate based on the needs of businesses. The system, particularly suited to the needs of the agricultural industry, would allow workers to come into the U.S. for a few months of the year, then return to their home countries.W06; A more narrowly tailored bill from Sen. Orrin Hatch, R-Utah, has also gained some interest from advocates on both sides of the aisle. The measure, which has yet to move in committee, would increase the number of visas for high-skilled workers, particularly those in science, technology, engineering and mathematics, or STEM, fields, and make it easier for those workers to stay in the U.S.W06; "Just like in business, I don't want the smart people working in my competitor's business, I want them working in mine," Johnson said. "The same thing should be true for a national economy: If we use American resources to educate the brightest people from around the world ... we should provide every incentive for the brightest minds to be working here to grow our economy."