Proposed Redistricting Procedure

I would like to begin by thanking my opponent for his quick response. I also notice that he is relatively new DDO. Welcome to the community, mattrodstrom. I hope you enjoy your time here. ======== ======= Affirmative Case ======= Contention 1: 1. Packing districts with like-minded voters maximizes voter happiness. *Note: I apologize for not being entirely clear in my introduction to this contention. By happiness I mean to say happiness toward the system and their representative.* It should come as no surprise that voters' whose candidate wins election are happier with their representative and look more favorably on the system as a whole than voters' whose candidate lost the election. This has been established by several recent studies.[1] Competitive districts, then, result in more unhappy constituents than uncompetitive ones. The closer to a 50/50 ratio that a district gets, the greater the number of unhappy constituents. Conversely,the more like-minded voters packed into one district the more happy the constituency.[2] -------------- Contention 2: 2. Packing districts with like-minded voters maximizes representation. Another recent study shows that uncompetitive districts outperform competitive districts in representativeness.[3] Wi a little thought on the matter, it is easy to understand why this is so. For the same reason that uncompetitive districts result in a happier constituency, uncompetitive districts also result in more representativeness. Firstly, more voters are likely to hold similar views to that of their legislator. Secondly, there are significantly fewer voters who disagree with the ideology of their legislator. As such, the activity of the legislator is more likely to mirror the activity desired by constituents. -------------- Contention 3: 3. 3. Non-competitive districts produce legislators that are more attentive to their constituency than competitive districts. The opposite view, that legislators are more attentive in competitive districts, is based on the idea that inter-party competition forces legislators to pay more attention to the the needs of their constituents. However, uncompetitive districts are not uncompetitive, strictly speaking. Competition shifts from the general to the primary election; from inter-party to intra-party. As we have seen with the sources in contention 2, uncompetitive districts outperform competitive ones in representativeness. ======== My Opponent's concerns: 1. Packing leads to polarization. 2. Packing leads to a dominance of the two-party system. Rebuttals: 1. Recent studies have shown that gerrymandering actually little to no link with polarization.[4] The claim that gerrymandering is significantly responsible for polarization fails to explain two major facts. First, it does not explain the rise in polarization that has occurred in the U.S. Senate that is not subject to redistricting. Second, it fails to explain past polarized eras when gerrymandering was not common. 2. My opponent has expressed concerns over the dominance of the two-party system. He believes that a system of packing will perpetuate this dominance. However, the procedure being advocated does not preclude consciously redrawing districts to allow for some non-mainstream ideologies to obtain representation. Additionally, the so-called 'big tent' philosophy of the two major parties allows for representation of most ideologies. 1. Anderson, Christopher J. and Andrew J. LoTempio, "Winning, Losing and Political Trust in America" British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 32 (2002): 335-351; Clarke, Harold D., and Allan Kornberg, "Do National Elections Affect Perceptions of MP Responsiveness? A Note on the Canadian Case." Legislative Studies Quarterly , Vol. 17 No. 2 (1992): 183-204. 2. Burnell, Thomas L., "Rethinking Redistricting: How Drawing Uncompetitive Districts Eliminates Gerrymanders, Enhances Representation, and Improves Attitudes Toward Congress," PS: Political Science and Politics (January 2006): 77 – 85. 3. Buchler, Justin, "Competition, Representation and Redistricting: The Case against Competitive Congressional Districts" Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 17, No. 4, (2005): 431-463 . 4. McCarty, Nolan, et al. "Does Gerrymandering Cause Polarization?" (February 2006). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com....