The Kalam Cosmological Argument Is Sound

Premise 1: Everything That Begins To Exist Has A Cause This premise is not self-evident, and it is not as uncontroversial as my opponent believes. At best we can say that the premise seems reasonable on its face, but it is inherently problematic once you start unpacking the implications of its details. -- A Priori Support The synthetic a priori support for the first premise of the Kalam Cosmological Argument is the metaphysical principle that something cannot come from nothing, or that out of nothing, nothing comes (ex nihilo nihil fit). However, it seems strange as to how this is really solid support for the first premise. Something can begin to exist from something and still be uncaused. Thus, even if ex nihilo nihil fit is true, the first premise could still be false. Causation as a whole is split up into two parts, or categories philosophically: (i) Necessary Causation (ii) Sufficient Causation As Wes Morriston notes, if something came into being that stood in relation to necessary conditions, but with no sufficient conditions in the equation, then that would be something coming into being without a cause [1]. "How could it be that necessary, but not sufficient, conditions can cause something to come into existence? Causation requires both."[1]We would not refer to the necessary condition as a necessary cause without the accompanied sufficient cause. You cannot have half a causal process, anymore than you can half a pregnancy. Thus, if something came into being that stood in relation to a necessary condition, or came from not "nothing", but there was nothing sufficient to bring said object into existence, this would clearly being a situation lacking a real causal process. Thus, even if ex nihilo nihil fit is true, that is no real support for the first premise of the Kalam Cosmological Argument. Take a flat sheet a paper. Now, envision a dent appears in the paper for no reason. Nothing changed pertaining to the paper to cause the dent, and nothing happened externally to cause the dent. Simply because the dent came from pre-existing paper (not "nothing") which served as a necessary condition for the dent, it would be a misnomer to claim that paper actually caused the dent without a sufficient cause for the dent. Without the required sufficient condition, or conditions, we lack full, and proper causal conditioning. Therefore, ex nihilo nihil fit could be true even if the first premise of the Kalam Cosmological Argument is false. This suggests that ex nihilo nihil fit is rather bizarre support for the first premise of the Kalam Cosmological Argument indeed. This is because it could be true, while the first premise itself is false simultaneously. -- A Posteriori Support We have empirical and prima facie support for the notion that everything that begins to exist at the macroscopic level within space-time has a cause. The notion that everything that begins to exist has a cause enjoys no such support. Any examples provided by my opponent in support of the first premise can only support the former premise that I assert is warranted; not the latter. While the first premise of the Kalam Cosmological Argument seems intuitively reasonable, its strength starts to break down once critically examined.Premise 2: The Universe Began To Exist -- If The B-Theory Of Time Is True... Lets take a look at the two main schools of thought with regards to the metaphysics of time: (i) A-Theory (left) (ii) B-Theory (right) I have seen my opponent argue before that the B-Theory of time being true would not refute this premise of the Kalam. That is just embarrassing I am afraid. Temporal becoming is a necessary condition for something to come into being, or begin to exist. This is because you could hypothetically time how long that thing has existed since its inception if it came into being, and this would necessitate that time is tensed, thus temporal becoming would have to be actually real. However, if the B-Theory of time is true, then temporal becoming is an illusion of consciousness with things only seeming to come into being due to the past, present, and future all sharing the same ontological status as real. Therefore, under this theory of time, nothing ontologically comes into being in reality. What we would call "The Big Bang" for instance would just exist on a tenselessly eternal 4d or n +1d space-time block. Therefore, it follows that the universe could not have objectively began to exist if the B-Theory of time is true, because this would require objectively real temporal becoming; which demands the A-Theory of time (Also, something eternal self-evidently cannot come into being). This point, which is necessarily true based on a simple unpacking of the metaphysics of time, is even conceded by the champion of the Kalam Cosmological Argument himself: "From start to finish, the Kalam Cosmological Argument is predicated upon the A-Theory of time. On a B-Theory of time, the universe does not in fact come into being or become actual at the Big Bang; it just exists tenselessly as a four-dimensional space-time block that is finitely extended in the earlier than direction. If time is tenseless, then the universe never really comes into being, and, therefore, the quest for a cause of its coming into being is misconceived." - William Lane Craig [2] The problem for William Lane Craig is that the B-Theory of time is probably true, and the A-Theory of time is probably false. A-Theorists themselves (like Dean Zimmerman) even admit that the A-Theory of time does not have as much backing as B-Theory of time in philosophy amongst metaphysicians of time: "The A-theory is almost certainly a minority view among contemporary philosophers with an opinion about the metaphysics of time.” - Dean Zimmerman [3] There are many logical problems with A-Theory. These errors were pointed out by McTaggart and his famous paradox against A-properties, and by other philosophers such as Simon Prosser who brought forward another devastating problem. However, my argument for B-Theory and against A-Theory will not be based on the a priori problems with A-Theory, but with scientific problems with it. My support for B-Theory rests on Einstein's Theory of Special Relativity. Einstein's theory has been tested time and time again, and has passed flying colors[4]. The most scientifically feasible interpretation of this theory is the Minkowski space-time view[5]. This is due to its success with making testable predictions that have been verified (time dilation and length contraction[6]). This interpretation spells death for A-Theory, because A-Theory entails a universal "now" moment. However, the Minkowski space-time view entails that there is no universal "now" moment, and is the most scientifically sound interpretation. This above suggests that the B-Theory of time is probably true. Thus, the second premise of the Kalam Cosmological Argument is probably false. The B-Theory of time and the second premise are incompatible. -- If The A-Theory Of Time Is True...My opponent argues for the finitude of the past by appealing to the Second Law of Thermodynamics, and philosophical arguments in favor of the notion in question. However a finite past only gets one, at best, "a starting point of the universe". Not a "starting point point of the universe that came into being from no starting point (i.e. nothing)". The latter does not follow from the former, and is not synonymous with the former. Thus, my opponent's arguments do not actually support the second premise. Conclusion Unfortunately, Pro has not met his burden of proof; the resolution has been negated. Sources[1] http://commonsenseatheism.com...[2] The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, pp. 183-184 [3] http://fas-philosophy.rutgers.edu...[4] http://en.wikipedia.org...[5] http://en.wikipedia.org...[6] http://hyperphysics.phy-astr.gsu.edu...