The Problem Of Evil Is Sound

-If Gratuitous Suffering Exists, God Probably Does Not Exist- God is defined as omnibenevolent, which means all-good. No all-good being would allow utterly pointless suffering if this being could easily stop it or prevent it, as suffering without a point is something we all clearly acknowledge as bad; an all-good being would eliminate all states of affairs which are bad unless there was, of course, a morally sufficient reason to allow such a state of affairs. This premise is relatively uncontroversial and is held to by the majority of Atheists and Theists alike. As Theologian Howard Snyder notes: "[O]n the face of it, the idea that God may well permit gratuitous evil is absurd. After all, if God can get what he wants without permitting some particular horror (or anything comparatively bad), why on Earth would he permit it? " - Howard Snyder [1] As Theistic philosopher Stephen Wykstra notes: "[I]f God exists, there is some actual (outweighing) good related. .. to every instance of suffering he allows. " - Stephen Wykstra [1] Essentially, the allowance of utterly pointless suffering is incompatible with God's pure goodness. Therefore, gratuitous suffering's probable existence would lead to God's probable non-existence. -Gratuitous Suffering Probably Exists- This is the controversial premise. However, on the face of it it seems justified prima facie. There certainly appears to be utterly pointless suffering. Consider a lightning bolt that strikes a tree that traps a man in a forest. He is far from anybody who could help him and he bleeds to death in horrible pain and agony. Without a doubt, similar situations like this have happened that do not appear to have any grand purpose at all. Similarly to how the appearance of the computer screen in front of me gives me justification to say that my computer screen probably exists, so the appearance of gratuitous suffering gives us justification for thinking gratuitous suffering probably exists; absent a defeater of course. Now there could be a God who has a good reason for apparent gratuitous suffering that we don't know about, making gratuitous suffering only apparent. Sure, this is possible, and there could also be a mad scientist who has our brains in vats making the external world we experience only apparent. Of course, without good reason to believe in such beings or to take them seriously; we are justified in affirming what strongly appears to be so, actually is so. Philosopher Bruce Russell makes a similar point: "Suppose one grants that there is no reason to assume God exists. Assume, also, that, leaving the Problem of Evil aside, there is no reason to think he does not exist. Shouldn't we then suspend judgement about whether there is a God-justifying reason to his allowing all the suffering we see, not believe there isn't? No, because the hypothesis that there is no such good is a better explanation of why we fail to see one than the explanation that there is such a good which is hidden to us. Other things being equal, explanations which posit some hidden mechanism are never as good as those that do not. That is why we should believe that there is a real world outside us that is pretty much the way we think it is, not some evil demon causing the sensations that we think are caused by physical objects outside us. " - Bruce Russell [3] So without good reasons to take seriously the idea of beings making something seem "as if" something specific is true, the best explanation is that what seems to be true, is probably true. Therefore, the jump from "there appears to be gratuitous suffering" to "there probably is gratuitous suffering" is epistemologically justified. However, I think we can do even better. Suppose there is a God who has morally sufficient reasons for allowing intense suffering that appears gratuitous that is beyond our ken. A morally sufficient reason would have to be that the suffering in question being allowed by God is either necessary for some greater good, or necessary to prevent some greater evil. Since even one instance of gratuitous suffering would disconfirm God's existence it follows that every instance of suffering that we see is necessary for some greater good, or to prevent some greater evil under Theism. With this prediction in place for Theism, it seems that if we see a child being raped we ought not intervene. Think about it, if God exists then there is a net positive to be gained by every instance of suffering and evil; it's part of God's plan. To intervene would be to cause net loss of goodness in the world which surely is a bad thing. Therefore, not only would it seem like there would be no good reason for a Theist to intervene upon seeing a child being molested and raped; there would be good reason not to. However, it seems intuitively obvious that we ought to intervene in such a situation if Moral Realism is true (which it would be if Theism is true). Thus, Theism entails a contradiction; we ought to intervene if a child gets raped (moral intuitions tell us so), but we ought not to intervene if a child gets raped (as intervening would stop a greater good or cause an even greater evil). Thus, we should reject the notion that there exists a God who has morally sufficient reasons for allowing all suffering and evil that exists. Philosopher Dean Stretton makes a similar point: "God's existence is logically incompatible with the existence of evils that certain onlookers have a moral obligation to prevent. Since there clearly do exist evils that these onlookers have a moral obligation to prevent, it follows that God does not exist. " - Dean Stretton [4] It gets even worse than that, believe it or not. If God exists and has morally sufficient reasons for allowing the horror and suffering in the world, why don't us sufferers know what these reasons are? As Philosopher Austin Dacey notes: "[W]e would be the first to know. " - Austin Dacey A good parent who is loving would explain to their child why he/ she allowed the child to suffer the pain of needle given for vaccination purposes. One might argue that we don't have the cognitive abilities to understand God's reasons, but that is nonsense. If God exists he is Omnipotent, and could expand our cognitive abilities as much as it was needed in order for us to understand his reasons. Why did God not explain to the Holocaust survivors why he allowed their horrific experiences even when they cried out to him looking for an explanation? The best explanation is that there is no God with morally sufficient reasons for why he allowed said suffering, because if there was, it seems plausible that he would comfort the victims of said suffering with knowledge of the reasons for said suffering based on his purely good and loving attributes. Additionally, if E (an evil state of affairs) is necessary for G1 (a state of affairs entailing X amount of goodness, or entailing the lack of an even greater evil than E), then this puts into question God's Omnipotence and/ or Omnibenevolence. If God is Omnipotent then it seems plausible, prima facie, that he could increase the worlds goodness by X amount by use of G2 (a state of affairs lacking any E), as this appears logically possible, making the instantiation of E gratuitous as G1 is not needed for X amount of goodness, which would contradict God's Omnibenevolence. Now, what about the free-will defense? I don't think it's a good response to the PoE, but if my opponent mentions it I will refute it in the next round. ---Sources--- [1] . http://www.iep.utm.edu... [2] Wykstra, Stephen J. 1984 "The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments from Suffering: On Avoiding the Evils of Appearance'" [3] . https://infidels.org... [4] . https://infidels.org...