Rematch Debate: God Exists

R1) Teleological Argument Hurben argues that there is no other possible ‘tuning’ to change the proton mass. Pro’s response to this is that, if there is no possible tuning apart from what it is, it is impossible to conceive of something such as this. Conceivability is *irrelevant* to metaphysical possibility. For example, the existence of stars is physically necessary, but we can conceive of a universe without stars. Secondly, Pro is shifting BoP without justification, but via. Hitchens’ razor, Pro is making the claim that the universe cannot have been an LPU except for intelligent design, thus Pro has the burden of proof to affirm the fine-tuning argument. I need only show that the physical necessity option is not *absurd* to refute this argument, since this argument rests on the assumption that the universe being an LPU by physical necessity is absurd. All I need to show is that ID and physical necessity have equal probability. The fine-tuning could very well be necessary, as Hurben argued, and Pro has not adequately justified it because of conceivability being only relevant to subjective possibility, and not possibility in the metaphysical sense. “[I]t does not explain why the exact possible values needed for complex life became the exact actual values.” As Hurben argued, it is necessary for them to be the exact actual values since entropy showed them to be such, and since that argument still stands, that is the contention I shall extend here. C1) A caused universe is incoherent a) Requirements for causation Simultaneous causation of the universe entails an immediate contradiction, wherein one cannot coherently conceive of what is the ‘cause’ and the ‘effect’. The universe cannot have been simultaneously caused by God, as that would beg the question, as God would, for an atemporal moment, be simultaneously timeless and temporal. God has absolute transcendence as observed, thus exists timelessly sans creation, and cannot exist temporally by definition. The transcendence observation is primary here, since that guarantees that it is impossible to conceive of God as temporal, thus this entire objection begs the question and is logically contradictory. Additionally, there would be absolutely no way to determine what caused what. If God exists, the statement ‘X caused Y to be’ is seen as coherent, especially in the case of God causing the universe. But if God caused the universe simultaneously, then it cannot be demonstrated temporally if God existed forever or was caused by what God himself caused, thus being momentarily temporal and, thus, employing circular reasoning. Pro argues that there are likely no metaphysical laws, and I agree. But for something to coherently happen, there must be restrictions, else a causal relationship would be incoherent, since otherwise the effect would run into problems such as doing something logically impossible. Without restrictions, the coherency of ‘being caused’ is non-existent. A causal inference such as the creation of the universe requires logic which bases its foundation on physical laws. b) Eternalism “Finally, eternalism does not refute causality - Con's argument does not even imply this. Even if I accept four-dimensionalism this does not refute causality - why would it?” Pro has entirely dropped my argument that if the B-theory and eternalism are true, there is no coherent capacity for temporal ‘change’, which is implied if the universe was caused [1][2]. I extend it to this round. c) Conclusion of argument “With all due respect, Con has also shot himself in the foot here. For if causation does not exist then Con cannot cause the effect of him winning this debate, and hence voters would be wrong to award him the victory. If causation does not exist, then Con cannot cause himself to win the debate!” I’m not arguing that causation does not exist, I’m saying causation does not exist without the passage of time or physical laws. Since physical laws and time surely exist where Philocat is and where I am, I can most certainly cause myself to win the debate. Thus, Pro is presenting a straw-man [3]. C2) Atemporal minds are impossible God is ‘intelligent’, and if defined as such, is ‘intelligent’ by the standard interpretation of such a property. “[I]t is clear from this definition that the definer is referring to worldly, evolutionarily-developed organisms, not metaphysical, disembodied minds.” How so? The definer is merely standardly defining intelligence. The definition is: “the resultant of the process of acquiring, storing in memory, retrieving, combining, comparing, and using in new contexts information and conceptual skills.” [4] Here, there is no implication that it is a worldly organism, thus Pro commits a bare assertion fallacy, an assumption via. ipse dixit [5]. The definition is not taken out of context, so I have shown that intelligence itself is a process and requires time. “Moreover, by insisting that minds require processes, Con contradicts himself. This is because processes require change and yet, according to Con, change is not coherent within an eternalist theory of time.” That processes require change is a bare assertion. Processes only require a directionality of change, not temporal ‘change’ in itself, and eternalism and the B-series accept a directionality of change, according to John McTaggart [6][7]. C3) Occam’s razor Pro and I agree on this interpretation, and since the teleological argument has been refuted, I extend this contention. Note to Voters To fulfill my burden of proof, I need only uphold a single of these contentions as they are individual, and refute my opponent’s contention. Thus, if you find any of the three contentions convincing, vote Con. For example, since my opponent concedes Occam’s razor, if I have adequately refuted the teleological argument, Occam’s razor would apply and I have fulfilled my onus. I thank Philocat for an engaging debate. Please remember to waive Round 4. The resolution is resoundingly negated. Vote Con. 1. Michael Tooley (1999). Time and Causation. p. 158. 2. http://www.ditext.com... 3. http://www.fallacyfiles.org... 4. http://www.sciencedirect.com... 5. http://en.wikipedia.org... 6. http://en.wikipedia.org... 7. Source 2.