Thomson's Violinist Analogy for Abortion

The Stranger versus Offspring ObjectionThis objection to Thomson's argument tries to draw a dissimilarity between the violinist case and a pregnancy. To recap, the objection runs as follows. In Thomson's story the violinist is a stranger, whereas in the case of a pregnancy the woman is pregnant with her own biological child. Surely, the objection goes, we have special responsibilities to our children that we don't have to strangers. However, I think we need to ask ourselves what we mean by "my child." There seem to be two different meanings of it. One thing it might mean is my child in the biological sense. That is, one is genetically related to that person. The other thing it might mean is my child in the custodial sense. Adoption is an example of this. So, given this distinction, the question is which of these two options actually grounds responsibility towards a child? Suppose we go with my opponent’s view, that being biologically related to the child is what grounds this responsibility. What are the implications of accepting this? There are two responses I have to this. The first is that I could simply change the violinist thought experiment around to fit this objection. Let’s say you're about to unhook yourself, and a DNA test revels that the violinist is a biological offspring of yours that you never knew existed. Suppose that many years ago you had contributed to a study in which people donated sperm and egg samples for fertility research, and without your knowledge and against your expressed wishes someone had stolen some of what you donated and created a zygote in vitro, which was then implanted into a woman, the result of which now lies in bed next to you. [1] In this particular example, it seems like the opponent of abortion would have to hold that to unplug from the violinist would be morally impermissible. But this is counterintuitive. The fact that you share some DNA with this person, doesn't seem to make a huge moral difference. The second thing is that there are some cases where a woman is NOT biologically related to the fetus. For example, a woman at a fertility clinic in Japan found out that an egg inserted into her uterus was not her own, nor was it fertilized by her husband's sperm. In this accidental case, it seems like Con would have no objections to this woman getting an abortion, since the fetus is not biologically her offspring. However, it looks inconsistent to claim that abortion is impermissible when there is a biological relationship, but permissible when there is no biological relationship. Given these two considerations, it doesn't look like mere biological relatedness is what grounds responsibility towards a child. Now I will respond to a couple of examples that Con provided in support of the claim that being biologically related is what grounds parental responsibility. To quote Con: "If the neighbor kids raids your fridge, it’s stealing. If your own kid does it, it’s not." Yes, you're right about that. But the reason it's not theft for your kid to take food from your fridge is because you have assumed guardianship over that child; whereas you did not do that for your neighbor’s child. That makes a morally relevant difference. My opponent then quotes the Pro-choice philosopher Michael Tooley on one of the reasons he rejects this argument: "Additionally, pro-choice philosopher Michael Tooley rejects Thomson’s violinist argument specifically because you can conceive of a pregnant woman on a deserted island who isn’t able to abort, but gives birth to her child. What grounds her responsibility? Since she couldn’t abort before birth, what reason is there that she couldn’t now kill the child because she can’t care for him?" Once the child is born it's no longer in the situation that Thomson's argument appealed to. A fetus after viability or an infant at birth cannot be justly killed on her argument, because those would be like cases where the violinist has been healed. As such, I don't think this is a good objection to the violinist analogy. The Weirdness ObjectionJohn T. Wilcox claims that the violinist analogy is rare and basically impossible, whereas pregnancy is natural and normal. But the fact that the violinist analogy would be a rare situation is irrelevant. As long as the thought experiment or analogy is logically possible, it can serve as a good example to test whether an idea makes sense of not. The fact that something is natural and normal is also irrelevant. I get the feeling that Wilcox is implicitly making the appeal to nature fallacy here. Just because something is unnatural doesn't make it bad. Many of the things we do nowadays could be considered unnatural. Some examples of this would be driving a car, talking on the phone, debating people online ect. The Responsibility ObjectionThis objection to Thomson's argument tries to draw a dissimilarity between the violinist case and a pregnancy. To recap, this objection runs as follows. In the violinist analogy you did no voluntary act that caused him to be in his needy state, but in a pregnancy that is the result of consensual sex, the woman did a voluntary act that caused the fetus to be needy. To help put this objection into a better perspective, Con gave a reverse version of Thomson's argument where the violinist causes the destruction of your kidneys.Here I think we need to distinguish between being responsible for someone's neediness, and being responsible for the fact that they exist and as a result are needy. To help clarify these two different concepts of responsibility, I will give a thought experiment for each of them. Let's consider the first concept of responsibility. That is, being responsible for someone's neediness. Suppose that in Thomson's story the reason why the violinist developed the kidney ailment is because you poisoned his food. If you poisoned his food, you're responsible for his neediness because if you had not done that act, he wouldn't be in this current situation of need. Now let's consider the second concept of responsibility. That is, being responsible for the fact that they exist and as a result are needy. Here I will borrow a thought experiment originally used by the philosopher Harry Silverstein. Imperfect Drug. You are the violinist‘s doctor. Seven years ago, you discovered that the violinist had contracted a rare disease which was on the verge of killing him. The only way to save his life that was available to you was to give him a drug which cures the disease but has one unfortunate side effect: five to ten years after ingestion, it causes the kidney ailment Thomson has described. Knowing that you alone would have the appropriate blood type to save the violinist were his kidneys to fail, you prescribed the drug and cured the disease. The violinist has now been struck by the kidney ailment. If you do not allow him the use of your kidneys for nine months, he will die. [3] In this case you are responsible for the violinist's existence because, in giving him the drug, you voluntarily acted in a way which forseeably caused him to exist at this time. [4] But because you caused him to now exist, he is needy as a result. Why? Because if you had not given him the imperfect drug, he wouldn't exist at this time and therefore not be needy. Now that I have explained these two concepts of responsibility, I can use a modified version of Thomson's analogy set up by the philosopher David Boonin that more accurately reflects a pregnancy that is the result of consensual sex. Hedonist: You are a hedonist, who wishes to engage in a very pleasurable activity. The activity is such that if you engage in it, there will be gas released that will add some unconscious life to some already comatose violinist. As things now stand, the violinist has no more unconscious life ahead of him. But if the gas is released, and he does have a few extra months added as a result, it will then become possible for you to bring him out of his coma by giving him the use of your body for 9 months. There are certain devices that you can use during the pleasurable activity that lower the risk of gas emissions, but not entirely. However, you do not like the way such devices "makes you feel" when you do the pleasurable activity. So you do the pleasurable activity without the devices. As (a foreseeable but not intended) result, some gas escapes, causing some extra unconscious life to be added to the violinist, and now making it possible for you to bring him out of his coma if you remain plugged into him for 9 months. [5] But in this Hedonist version of the violinist analogy, does the violinist have the right to use your body? No, he does not. You are responsible for the violinist’s existence, but you are not responsible for his neediness, given that he exist. You’re not responsible for his neediness because there was no way you could have engaged in the pleasurable activity without causing the violinist to exist at this time. But if that’s right, then this same line of reasoning applies to a pregnancy that is the result of voluntary sex. She is responsible for the existence of the fetus, but is not responsible for the neediness of the fetus, given that it exists. Once this is realized we can see that the Hedonist example is more analogous to a pregnancy that is the result of voluntary sex than my opponent's reverse violinist with the pranksters. In the prankster version the violinist is responsible for your neediness because he destroyed your kidneys. In the Hedonist example you are responsible for the violinist's existence, but not for his neediness. The former generates an obligation because he harmed you. The latter does not generate an obligation because there was no harmed caused.However, let's suppose my response to the responsibility objection is mistaken. What would the implications of this be? It would mean that Thomson's analogy shows that abortion, at least in the case of rape, can be justified. Sources in comments