The Kalam Cosmological Argument is Invalid

Misrepresenting CraigMy Opponent says:"[Pro] attempts to show how William Lane Craig believes that it is impossible for something to come from nothing, and that consequently William Lane Craig does not believe in creatio ex nihilo."I was expecting this, and it is false. I did not attempt to show how Craig believes that it is impossible for something to come from nothing, nor did I attempt to show that Craig does not believe in creatio ex nihilo, nor did I even say that I reject creatio ex nihilo (in this debate).What I showed was Craig's rationale behind P1, and that P1 is based only on our experiences and intuitions, which are necessarily limited to creation ex materia events. Again, to repeat Craig's own words:"The causal premiss is rooted in the metaphysical intuition that something cannot come into being from nothing"At no point did I extend this to say that this actually means something cannot come into being from nothing, nor did I ever attribute such a conclusion to Craig (since I never made any such conclusion). All this shows is that such events (from nothing) are out of the scope of the causal premiss, according to Craig's own words.Craigs subsequent statement, "but this principle does not in any way contradict the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo" is irrelevant. I'm not saying that P1 contradicts creatio ex nihilo, simply that creatio ex nihilo is out of scope of P1.This is further supported by Craig's statement, "For only in the case of creation is there a cause which brings the relevant object into being" (Emmphasis mine)If creatio ex nihilo is only possible in the case of creation, of which there has only been one case (god's creation of the universe), of which we are not privvy to, then it necessarily falls outside the scope of our experiences and intuitions.This response also applies to Con's false accusations of a Straw Man.On BeginningCon has provided a definition of "beginning" in, "x begins to exist if and only if x exists at time t and there is no time t* prior to t at which x exists'." Which I don't refute. And Con is correct in saying that this definition does not, in itself, discriminate between ex materia and ex nihilo creation. And, indeed, the premise, as stated, either by myself or Con, does not explicitly discimrinate between ex materia and exnihilo creation.That's hardly the point, nor does it mean equivocation has not occurred. Indeed, the entire point of equivocation is the use of terms which are identical in appearance, but are used in context in a manner that ignores important distinctions and discriminations.If I were to take the argument at face value, then, yes, based upon reading only what is written, without performing any critical thinking, the arugment would be valid because "begins to exist" appears verbatim in P1 and P2. But I'm not taking the argument at face value. I am looking deeper into the argument and factoring in context and the rationale behind the premises.There are implicit (that is, unstated) modifiers to "begins to exist" in P1 and P2 whose ommission results in the fallacy of equivocation. The terms are being treated identically merely because they are stated identically. It is this identical treatment which is false. Hidden and unstated are the restrictions to ex materia events in P1.If this restriction was made explicit, then the invalidity of the argument would be apparant and indisputable. By ommitting it, however, the argument gives the appearance of identical meaning, comitting the fallacy of equivocation. Indeed, it is the existence of this unstated restriction that I have been arguing the entire time. I believe I have been doing this well, as that restriction is supported by Craig and Con's own words to that effect.Con, here, is basically suggesting that the implicit restrictions don't exist or one simply doesn't exist in this case. However, all Con has done is shown that the restriction isn't explicit, which is hardly a refutation to my argument to it being implicit. Of course it isn't explicit! That's the point! It is, however, there - merely unstated.On CausesI don't exactly "concede" the point on causes as much as I noted that it wasn't a point that was ever in contention. He then goes back to restating his rebuttal in the previous section and states:"[T]here is no language in P1 that excludes creatio ex nihilo..." and illustrates that Con has missed the entire point of the equivocation accusation.If the language was there (was explicit) then there would be no debate. My assertion is not that the language is there, but that the meaning is there, merely unstated and implicit. This is what an equivocation fallacy is and what I have been arguing. As yet, Con has not refuted this. He restates, repeatedly, that it is not explicit, and I will concede this point everyday of the week and twice on Sundays. That's not the point. The point is that the restriction is implicit. It is there, but invisible. I have supported this claim based upon my rationale provided in Round 1, supported by Craig's and Con's own words in Rounds 2 and 3 (this round).More Strawman AccusationsCon correctly points out that Craig does talk about uncaused events being against our metaphysical intuition. However, he conveniently ignores Craig's final statement on the matter:"Finally, the first premiss is constantly confirmed in our experience, which provides atheists who are scientific naturalists with the strongest of motivations to accept it."Our experiences are limited to beginnings ex materia. Our experiences can't confirm beginnings ex nihilo because we don't experience them. Thus, if this generalization were to include such events, it would be false to say that our experiences confirm it!SummaryAfter two rounds of debate, the summary of my position is as follows:1. Based on my reasoning provided in Round 1, supported by Craig's and Con's own words in Rounds 2 and 3, P1 is implicitly limited only to things which begin to exist ex materia.2. The failure to make this restriction explicit gives the false appearance that the terms in P1 and P2 refer to the same class of beginnings and falls into the trap of equivocation.3. Since the terms in P1 and P2 don't refer to the same class of beginnings (when you factor in implicit restrictions), the properties of beginnings identified in P1 don't necessarily apply to the types of beginnings identified in P2 and the conclusion does not follow; the argument is invalid.The summary of my opponent's position is as follows:1. No restriction is made explicitly, ergo no restriction exists at all.Unless Con wishes to assert (and demonstrate) that implicit meanings don't exist at all, then he will need to do more than to just note that the implicit meaning that I refer to isn't explicit, if he wishes to provide a valid objection to my points.