If God is omnipotent and omniscient, then God cannot be omnibenevolent at the same time.

My opponent continues to argue outside the scope of this debate: Contention 1: Omnipotence already has a concrete definition in this debate, and "the traditional notion of the Christian deity" has nothing to do with it. The word's definition, not its etymology, matters. Omnipotence means "almighty", meaning "having power over all." My opponent argues another definition, as though I claimed "the traditional notion of the Christian God can not be omni-excellent." I have not claimed this. I have claimed that God can not be omni-excellent, according to pre-defined terms. My opponent must use those terms. My opponent restates his syllogism: "(P1) It is possible for an [omni-excellent] being to create a being that has morally significant freedom." Accepted. "(P2) It is possible for an [omni-excellent] being to create [beings] who … freely choose to bring about evil (… undeserved pain and suffering)." Once again, we are not debating evil, or "undeserved" suffering. A being capable of eliminating ANY suffering, which chooses not to do so, can not be "kind." An unkind being is in a sense not good. A being that is even in a sense not good is not "omnibenevolent." "(C) It is possible for an [omni-excellent] being to create a being who then freely chooses to bring about evil." No. Being omniscient, God would know that "evil" leads to suffering. Being omnipotent, he needn't create evil. Being omnibenevolent, he wouldn't. You have successfully argued that we should not exist. You have not successfully argued that an omni-excellent God could bring himself to allow or produce suffering. "My opponent … assumes that God, being omnipotent, can bring about [a world] where people freely … do good." Yes, I do. An omnipotent God has "power over all," including natural laws and causality. "There are many worlds that even an omnipotent God cannot bring about." My opponent once again limits God. Omnipotence means that God may have any world he wants. "The problem lies in … free choice. … God cannot determine which choice will be made." Yes, God can. He is omniscient. Even assuming he had a moral imperative to make us free, that doesn't prevent him from keeping us from the consequences of that imperative. Moreover, for our freedom to not limit God's power, God would have to choose to not interfere (as nothing could stop him from doing so). As such, God still has the ability to intervene, and chooses not to. This is not good. "One of those two worlds even an omnipotent God cannot actualize because it resides solely on the free choice of the person – not God." Then God is not omnipotent. What keeps God from actualizing both at once, then instantly dissolving the worse of the two worlds, unifying the experiences of the inhabitants therein so that there is no suffering and no loss of life? I assume God has at least as much creativity as myself, being omniscient. My opponent cannot … expect us to believe that he has seriously considered Plantinga's … work and found it wanting." Sure I can. Even the theory of relativity has its detractors. [1] Persuasive codswallop is STILL codswallop. "Since an omnipotent God can create, insofar as [morally free creatures'] decisions are made without … force, it is possible for an omni-excellent God to exist while human suffering exists..." No, it is not. My opponent assumes that there are only good and bad choices to be made. God could alter the dichotomy, and change the choices to great and good, or good and best, or good and ineffectual. People would still have a choice of alternatives; the choice just would not lead to suffering. "There is no reason to believe that omniscience equaling determination is true, let alone necessarily true …" Omniscience alone does not equal determination, but omniscience with omnipotence does. Allowing that which will occur when YOU HAVE MADE IT SO means that God INTENDS for us to suffer. "… God [forcing] genuine love … is a logical contradiction." Only if God allows the contradiction to exist. "Therefore, an omni-excellent God that desires genuine love and virtue must ... allow the opposite to be possible." If God MUST do anything, he is not omnipotent. Additionally, an omni-excellent God should HIMSELF be genuinely loving and virtuous. If his desire for our genuine love and virtue stands in the way of this, he should set aside his desires. "To say that there is no possible world in which an omni-excellent God would permit suffering is to say that you … have considered every proposition … and found … no possibility of … a "morally sufficient reason" to permit suffering." Any morally sufficient reason he would have must exist separate and apart from this debate's definition of good. The reason can not be kind, therefore it must be to some extent not good, therefore God is not omnibenevolent. "My opponent mentions ridding consequences. To what end? What is the goal?" The elimination of suffering, because God is kind, and would eliminate it if he could. Being omnipotent, he can. "What if God's purpose is to "bring his sons and daughters to glory?"" Then that purpose must not be good, based upon his observed actions relative to our current state. "…why does God not … create humans in this perfected state[?] The answer is … they would not be morally or logically free creatures." If God can not immediately perfect morally and logically free creatures, then he is not omnipotent. "Moreover, it is POSSIBLE that finite perfection can only logically be achieved through process." If God can not change the process of perfection, or alter logic according to his needs, then he is not omnipotent. "If God's desire is soul-making …" Then nothing is stopping him from making the souls he wants, right now. Contention 2: "My opponent … clearly [cares about] what God's purpose [is as] he assumes it must include a desire to stop human suffering." I do not care about God's purpose. God can end suffering with no adverse consequences. God does not. Ending suffering is good. God chooses not to be good. Therefore, God is not omnibenevolent. "My point is that his conception of good stems from a subjective base ..." My conception of good stems from a plain reading of the definition of ‘kind', part of the definition of good. Unlike my opponent, I do not wax philosophical about definitions, because I read the ones accepted at the beginning of this debate. Additionally, I do not argue that "good and suffering are mutually exclusive." I argue that a good God that is omnipotent and omniscient would know to prevent or end suffering where it would or does occur. Allowing suffering when one has created the process whereby it is generated, and doing nothing to end or prevent it when one could, is not good. Contention 3: "The man thought that his suffering was not good, but indeed, his suffering was for good." My opponent was mentioning "evil" before. Now that he mentions suffering, he must concede that a doctor has no other way to heal. God, being omnipotent, has any way he pleases. An analogy that compares God to a doctor would have to allow that doctor whatever procedure the doctor could imagine. The doctor should then choose the least painful procedure. God has a better option: he can choose a procedure with no pain. Is the doctor kinder than God? "… my opponent … cannot … say … there is no purpose because he does not have absolute knowledge …" I don't need absolute knowledge to understand that a God who meets the definition for omni-excellence in this debate wouldn't act on any purpose if such purpose conflicted with his nature. Contention 4: "[H]uman conceptions of good and bad" are all that matter in this debate. [1] http://www.sciencecentric.com...