In Defense Of Practical Moral Skepticism

TheSkeptic raises some interesting points. I will try to address them all here as best and clearly as I can. This is Pro's argument for PMS: that it is "sometimes rational to choose some choice over a moral one." As evidence, Pro simply states that there is no "necessary reason to always act morally." As his argument, then, Pro merely states a working definition of PMS twice using different words. This is not really an argument; it is merely a repetition of a claim. Because it is Pro's burden to prove PMS, I really think he should offer a more substantive argument than just stating the claims of PMS. I propose this: if there is no reason to always act morally, provide at least one case in which there is overriding reason not to act morally. If Pro can provide one such case that cannot be negated on closer scrutiny, then Pro would have an argument for PMS. On the other hand, if Pro cannot provide even one case in which there is reason not to act morally, then we can conclude, until proven otherwise, that there is ALWAYS reason to act morally. Now, before getting to the 2 "inherent" problems Pro locates in MBE, let me address Pro's argument that MBE is an "unsatisfactory response to PMS." First, Pro rejects "psychological egoism" as a "clear empirical doctrine." This is also not much of an argument. It is the equivalent of saying, I reject "gravity" as a "clear empirical doctrine." This can be generalized to any statement derived scientifically (as science is empirical), and is really an empty way of attempting to reject something. To reject something because it is empirical, Pro would have to show why an "empirical doctrine" should be rejected. Second, Pro states that "self-interested" actions that produce benefits do not provide reason that "we should ALWAYS act morally." That is fine. I grant Pro that not all reasons (in general) must be self-interested. This point is irrelevant, however, when we consider MBE. Why? Because the only other kind of reason besides self-interested reasons are reasons that concern others. Per the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on PMS, there are two possible interpretations of "reason" in the question "Why be moral?": (1) that "all reasons are self-interested"; or (2) that "some reasons concern effects on others (rather than oneself) or do not concern any effects on anyone" [1]. Reasons that do not concern effects on anyone are irrelevant because they cannot be classified as immoral/moral. Therefore, when we talk about morality, there are only reasons that are self-interested or reasons that concern others. MBE derives its strength because it provides both kinds of reasons. The concept of "mutual benefit" is that there is benefit to yourself and to at least one other person. As such, MBE permits reasons that concern effects on others (rather than oneself) and self-interested reasons. In either case, there is ALWAYS a reason to act morally. Third, Pro states that it is "one hell of a claim for you to make that all acts of mutual benefits will result in self-interest. In other words, is it not conceivable for there to be an act which solely (or mainly) benefits me and yet satisfies my self-interest? For example, raping a woman would likely highly benefit me while being highly damaging to the woman." Just because there is a possible action that solely (or mainly) benefits you and satisfies your self-interest does not mean that all acts of mutual benefit will not ALSO result in your self-interest. The connection Pro makes between the two cases is faulty. Now, with respect to the case of raping a woman, there are two possible cases. First, while it may be in your benefit and self-interest to rape the woman, there could still exist (in this hypothetical situation) an OVERRIDING reason not to rape the woman. For example, it is conceivable that not raping the woman would produce a magnified benefit (more benefit than raping the woman) to all concerned (including you, the woman and any others). Hence, between rape and not rape, there would be more reason to not rape because it provides more of a benefit to you as well as to the woman. Second, in the rare case that raping the woman does provide more benefit than not, we would have to conclude that raping is a moral action. This redefinition of rape as moral is possible because MBE allows for any and all variation in moral schemes. Why? Because it allows for any and all variation in coordination schemes to mutual benefit. Rape may produce benefits to yourself and to those that you are concerned with (mutual benefit). The magnified benefits to all concerned would outweigh the benefits of not raping. I can imagine one such case being a society in which all woman desire to be raped. Such extreme cases of rape becoming a moral action, however, are usually only possible in some science-fiction scenario (like the one I describe). It is unlikely this happen in our world. Either way, the point is that rape would in this highly contrived case still be considered moral according to MBE. Now, the "inherent" problems Pro locates in MBE: the first is result of Pro's wrong (or at least unsupported) assumptions, the second a lack of clarity on my part. Neither of these things are actually problems with MBE itself. 1. See Pro's "1" above for the relevant points I address below. First, there is nothing wrong with relating anthropological fact to normative ethics (also note, I do not "conflate" the two as Pro argues; I use one to derive consequences relevant to the latter). Second, if there is an absolute boundary between descriptive and normative ethics, what is it? I see no reason not to account for both under a complete ethical theory if it is possible to do so. I claim it is possible to do so with MBE. To negate this, Pro must show otherwise. Pro has not done this. Third, Pro's claim that "it's evident in most societies that ethics doesn't form in mutual benefits but arcane, abstract laws" completely loses sight of the fact that these "laws" themselves must have come from somewhere. MBE provides the framework to explain how and where these "laws" come from. So if Pro wants to argue this point, I put the question to him: if not from coordinating actions to mutual benefit, where did these "laws" come from? According to MBE, before it had these "laws," each society used a combination of our evolutionary biology (maximizing survival) and game-theoretic-style reasoning to derive ethical beliefs that would coordinate our actions to mutual benefit for all concerned. These beliefs became "laws" so that we would not have to go through the process of reasoning each time we chose an action. We could simply use the law to help facilitate the coordination of our actions to mutual benefit (without having to reason each situation on its own terms). 2. Pro argues that another problem with MBE is that the "concept of ‘mutual benefits' is incredibly vague." As a result, Pro states, "You're going to need to explain what benefit means, how people are connected in your moral evaluation, and in what sense these two concepts are interlinked." The concept of "benefit" is quite simple. It can include anything that gives an advantage or desired effect. Some benefit B1 could carry more weight than benefit B2. This means that through (game-theoretic) reasoning we'd choose the action that led to B1, not B2, even though both are benefits. A "mutual benefit" is a benefit that benefits more than one person, usually persons whose actions are mutually connected. I defined "mutually connected" actions in Round 1. That is how "people are connected" in my "moral evaluation." As I stated in R1, it would require an elaborate science-fiction scenario to imagine a world without mutually connected actions, and as a result, without the possibility to coordinate action to mutual benefit. [1]http://plato.stanford.edu...