The Problem of Evil Disproves an All-Loving, All-Powerful God

Con begins by claiming that natural evil, specifically natural disasters, are not a problem for God because, "Natural Disasters can create new life, take an earthquake for example; Plate tetonics move wihin the earth on fault lines causing the earth to shift forming new natural features such as mountains & new habbitats for life." The problem with this is it assumes a limit on God, specifically one where God is unable to create a world with the good effects of plate tectonics, but not the bad ones. For example, an omnipotent God could merely have created a larger Earth which included any habitats for life already made, without needing plate tectonics. Or, more fundamentally, he could have simply created a non-physical world, like heaven, where these natural phenomena would not even be an issue. He goes on to remark "A wise saying is beauty is in the eye of the beholder, Humans may consider it a destruction of life, but tiny organisms may thrive. Which in return may cause life to flourish." The problem with this is that it implies a limit to God's power. An omnipotent God would be entirely capable of causing life to flourish without the necessity of tiny organisms or plate tectonics. Con responds my argument against free will by saying that he takes a compatibilist view. This also is my view; however, compatibilism is not sufficient to grant free will defense validity. The reason is that if, as Schopenhauer stated, man cannot will what he wills, then it would be in no way contradictory to free will for God to change what we will himself, such that we do not choose evil. Con then says: "An agent my value integrity, and honesty, but may be forced to steal food for his family." I agree, but this does not refute my first premise, as his reason for stealing food is in order to achieve something he values more than integrity and honesty. It is entirely possible for two values to be in opposition to each other and I do not deny this. He next says, "Point 2 then says that agents do not freely choose their own values & preferences. Let us take a child that is abused, He then declares that he will never be like his father. In turn he chose his own values based of his own life expirence." This is entirely accurate; however, I would contend that the value of not being like his father was not freely chosen, as the child's reason for choosing that value was not freely chosen. He would have to choose his life experience for this to hold any weight, which he clearly didn't. Con disputes premise three by saying, "Point 3 states that an agent's choices are ultimately determined by factors outside it's control, those choices are not free. I agree with the fact that choices are a result of what has happened, as known as life expirences. But to say that your choices are not free based on that is to my understanding in accurate." I would argue that they are free in the compatibilist sense, but such a definition of free will is not sufficient for the free will defense to hold any weight. In this argument, the term 'free will' effectively means "the ability to choose otherwise," which compatabilists obviously deny, as they accept determinism. Con then tries to give a counterexample to prove free will, which goes as follows, "A child walks into an icecream store one day by accident. He has never tried icecream or even heard of it. He then chooses chocolate for no reason at all." I would argue that this action was not actually chosen based on values, but rather on whim, this would beg the question "Did the child choose to have that whim?" The answer, or course, is no, making the example insufficient to prove metaphysical libertarianism. Con responds to my question about non-belief by saying that God has proved his existence through Jesus. This is flawed first because it assumes the Bible's validity, which is heavily disputed, and second, because even if the Bible is accurate, its accuracy is questionable enough to deter some people away from Christianity who would not be deterred had God given direct proof of his existence. He then again appeals to man's free will. If my opponent continues to hold a compatibilist view though, this response leads us to ask why God doesn't make us value blind faith more. Con responds to my remark that people are more or less likely to fail God's test based on where they were born my claiming that many people have converted. I do not dispute this; however, it still remains the case that people born in Iraq are less likely to pass than someone born the United States. In the same way, a few 9th graders may ail the test on basic arithmetic, and a few may pass the one on advanced calculus, but that does not make the test any more fair. Con also says that babies are automatically allowed into heaven. If this is the case, then why don't we all die as babies so we can be guaranteed to reach heaven? Con claims that there are higher values which are contingent upon suffering, claiming that God has allowed and even caused it. However, he seems to be missing the point, as I am claiming that if this is the case, then we would still be getting bombarded by plagues and we would still be suffering from the Black Death. It is clear that there is less suffering now than there used to be, and consequently, less of the values produced by suffering. If those values are greater, then there would be far more suffering, and if they are less valuable than freedom from suffering, we would expect no suffering. Either way, we should expect uniformity throughout the world and through out time, which is not the case. Con points out that some Biblical claims have been proven by extra-biblical sources. There are a few problems with this. First, evidence of King Solomon would only provide credibility to the books of Bible that mention Solomon, as the Bible is a collection of separate works. In the same way, if I published a science textbook in which the last 150 pages were from "Alice in Wonderland," the credibility of the scientific claims would not carry over to the fictional ones. Second, I am far more inclined to believe the Bible's claims of the existence of certain figures than I am to believe any supernatural or otherwise extraordinary claims. In the same way, you are probably more likely to believe me if I say I just ate a cheeseburger than you are if I say I just ate a fire-breathing unicorn, which I killed using a lightsaber. The former claim takes little more than assertion, while the latter claim takes direct proof. Regarding Tacitus's account Jesus, its authenticity has been questioned by some histiorians. To quote Gordon Stein: "Perhaps most damning to the authenticity of this passage is the fact that it is present almost word-for-word in the Chronicle of Sulpicius Severus (died in 403 A.D.), where it is mixed in with obviously false tales. At the same time, it is highly unlikely that Sulpicius could have copied this passage from Tacitus, as none of his contemporaries mention the passage. This means that it was probably not in the Tacitus manuscripts at that date. It is much more likely, then, that copyists working in the Dark Ages from the only existing manuscript of the Chronicle, simply copied the passage from Sulpicius into the manuscript of Tacitus which they were reproducing."[1] References: 1. http://www.infidels.org...