Individuals Ought to Help Those in Need

I would like to sincerely thank Romanii for this great debate! In this round, I will address Con's third round remarks only.C1: Duty to RescueCon's only argument against this contention is that there is no difference between acts of commission and acts of omission. Therefore, if I can successfully rebut this argument, this contention can be extended.Let's take a look at Con's own example:"Person A goes up to some poor victim and breaks his arm (an act of commission). Soon after, Person B walks by, sees the victim writhing in pain, and keeps walking without stopping to help (an act of omission)."Before I address Con's analysis of his own example, let me point out some initial problems with this analogy: Person A and Person B have not committed equivalent acts. In my example, one mother killed her child, another let her child starve by refusing to feed him. Both instances had the same result: the death of the child. The problem with Con's example is that the results of the acts are not the same, so it makes no sense to draw the comparison. Person A's action resulted in a broken arm and suffering. Person B's action simply resulted in suffering, as the arm was already broken when he arrived, he cannot be blamed for it. Perhaps a better way to write Pro's example, then, if to say the following: Person A broke Person C's legs with a baseball bat. Person B failed to warn Person C of an obstacle on the ground, causing Person C to fall and break his legs. In both cases, we have the exact same result: a broken leg and suffering. Con then creates a hypothetical world in which Person A never existed. Yet, this example creates several problems. Firstly, Person A and Person B both do exist, and wondering about abstract concerns such as "what if Person A never existed" are useless. My assertion is that there is no meaningful distinction between commission and omission. By meaningful I am talking in terms of real outcomes. Since both Person A and Person B exist in the real world, and both have identical outcomes, they have no meaningful difference (no difference in real-world outcomes.)But, if you buy Con's point, then let's examine this under his hypothetical. When Person A beats the victim, Person A is the cause of the victim's suffering because Person A could've chosen to not let the victim suffer. When Person B fails to warn the victim, Person B becomes a cause of the victim's suffering, because Person B could've chosen to not let the victim suffer. In this way, both are causes of the suffering for the exact same reason. When Person A and Person B are removed (made nonexistent) then the cause of the victim's suffering is just the obstacle, nothing else. This doesn't mean that Person A is more guilty than Person B because Person B, when he exists, becomes the cause of the victim's suffering. Con makes the following conclusion from his analysis: "It is clear that Person A's act of commission is far more harmful to the well-being of the victim then Person B's act of omission." Yet, this seems faulty as well. Person A's act of commission resulted in a broken leg and suffering. Person B's act of omission resulted in a broken leg and suffering. In both instances, the, the wellbeing of the victim is impacted in the exact same way. Next, let's discuss the issue of intent. There are three point to raise here: 1. Con provides absolutely no warrant for why intent matters in moral decision-making. If we are basing moral decision-making off of a cost-benefit analysis, which Con implied when he talked about the impact to the wellbeing of the victim, then we need not evaluate intent at all. 2. Acts of omission can have malicious intent. Returning to the previous example, Person B could omit to warn Person C about the obstacle because Person B dislikes Person C and wanted to see them suffer. This is malicious.3. Acts of commission can be motivated by non-malicious motives. Let's say I tie my friend's shoelaces together as a joke (an act of commission). We he starts to walk, he falls, injuring himself. My act of commission was not malevolent, but it was harmful. Let's pause here for a moment. Con's asserts that because acts of commission require malevolent intent, whereas omission does not, commission is worse than omission. But, as we can see, commission does NOT require malevolent intent, and omission can involve malice. Therefore, Con's conclusion that one is worse than the other is unsubstantiated. C2: LevinasCon boils his argument down very succinctly for us: “Levinasian ethics…is all far too hypothetical and untested to be taken seriously. Psychological egoism is just as likely to be correct about human nature as Levinasian ethics is.” I will endeavor to show that Levinas’s philosophy is indeed logical, and well-supported.First, I shall endeavor to clarify what “sympathy” is. When we think of sympathy, we think of two things: (1) the act or capacity of entering into or sharing the feelings or interests of another; and (2) the feeling that you care about and are sorry about someone else's trouble, grief, misfortune, etc. [1] If we meld these two understandings together, we can comprehend sympathy to mean a capacity for sharing the feelings of another which also generates empathy for that other. For example, if I see you lying in pain, I may feel pain as well, and that, in turn, makes me feel sorry for and care about your plight.I will attempt to distill Levinas’s ideas down; I will expand on the points afterward.Human relation and Sympathy: P1: Human relation is the birthplace of moralityP2: Human relation leads to uniquely affective momentsP3: Sympathy is an affective moment Moral Dialogue gives Rise to “Ought” claims: P1: Sympathy involves a non-discursive appeal, initiating the dialogueP2: Sympathy leads us to feel as if we should respond to the appealP3: Sympathy leads to “ought” claims First set of points:In a void, there is no need for morality. I cannot wrong you—I cannot choose to ignore anyone’s rights or otherwise harm a morally relevant agent. Moreover, without other humans with which to communicate, there is no way to formulate any principles of right or wrong. I am unable to engage in moral dialogue and therefore I am unable to create moral rules. Now, Con seems to support this idea, by suggesting that humans would simply act on instinct if isolated. So, what happens with this isolation is shattered? "If precognitive experience, that is, human sensibility, can be characterized conceptually, then it must be described in what is most characteristic to it: a continuum of sensibility and affectivity, in other words, sentience and emotion in their interconnection." [2] For instance, a human who had lived all of his life in total isolation would not be able to experience romantic love. His introduction to other humans therefore transforms him by providing him access to a new and powerful emotion. This is an affective moment caused by sensitivity to other human beings. One such affective moment is sympathy, in that, now I can share in a far more complex variety of emotions such as the aforesaid romantic love that I could not before.Insofar as morality required other agents with which to communicate and who could be wronged, human relation provides the initial conditions for morality. Affective moments, because they are what make human relation significant, are involved in morality. Our sensitivity to others emotions influences our idea of what we should and should not do. Every time you feel guilt, you are evidencing this assumption. "Sympathy [is] the glue that affectively binds others to oneself and, by implication, binds a community of ethical individuals together." [3]Second set of points:My pain, reflected in you, generates a feeling that you should help me. This pull is the appeal; it is the initiation of the moral dialogue. This relationship is moral in that it generates an idea of what is right or wrong. Our conscious calls on us to respond to such feelings. That is what sympathy is: a call to action; you feel that to neglect them would be wrong. Consequently, you ought to reply to the appeal with assistance. Thus, we can affirm the topic.Moreover, if you buy egoism, then you should buy that sympathy, as a survival-oriented goal, is a good thing, and we should act on our sympathetic motives. "You would think that survival would be a very selfish process, but it’s not. It’s much more about how embedded in a family or a community we are. People who are more socially connected have a better chance of surviving. We live when we have something to live for." [4] C3: UtilityCon DROPS that maximizing pleasure is moral. Con also never rebuts that helping people at no cost to oneself maximizes pleasure. Merely, he asserts that these conditions are rarely met, so even though my points are true, I can't meet my BOP. Thus, all I need to show is that these conditions (where one can help others at no greater personal cost) occur sufficiently often, and I win."Need" has been defined as "something required to achieve some goal." To be in need is be in a condition where I need something. Just as to "I'm in distress" indicates I am in a condition where I am distressed about something. So, my mom is making cookies and is too short to reach the shelf with the tray she needs. She is in need because she cannot reach her goal of making cookies without help. I am not busy, and it would not unduly incommode me to help, and so I do. Cases like this, where small, simple acts can help some one, are far more common than acts that "require a substantial amount of time and energy on the part of the helper."SOURCES1 - http://www.merriam-webster.com...2 - Source No. 3 from my R23 - Source No. 4 from my R24 - http://adventureblog.nationalgeographic.com...I apologize if I seemed rushed! I am trying to post this quickly for Romanii.