The Ontological Argument is Sound

Recall the Ontological Argument (OA),1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists.2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.4. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world5. If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.6. Therefore a maximally great being exists.a priori Warrant for P1Con has dropped all of his arguments from the last round, as well as the round prior. This failure to manage a sustained attack is itself evidence of Cons inability to refute the OA. First, his new objection seems to be against 3, but is really parasitic against 1 since it rests upon the assumption that 1 is false. For his alternate reality world is assuming the impossibility of a maximally great being. But if God’s existence is possible then such a world isn’t possible! And Con has not demonstrated any incoherence of maximal excellence, nor has he rebutted my a priori and a posterior warrant for the possibility of maximal excellence. Therefore, the resolution is won.Secondly, Con forgets that I anticipated objections from imagination, and his alternate reality world is just a product of human imagination. Just because we can imagine things, it doesn’t follow that they’re possible. For example, I could imagine a world in which things pop into being un-caused, but that's metaphysically impossible! Nothing comes from nothing. So, sure, we can imagine possible worlds which are incompatible with maximal excellence, but are those really possible worlds or are they products of the imagination? To think that Con's alternate reality is possible is to assume the impossibility of maximal greatness: This assumes a denial of 1, it doesn't successfully negate 1. Third, our intuition of God’s possibility has priority over intuition of the possibility of some alternate reality, for this possibility depends upon God's possibility! And this means that the prima facie warrant remains for 1. Fourth, Con uses contingent beings who are just assumed to have existed as necessary beings (albeit a confused set of such beings), and since there is a possible world in which these un-created confused contingent beings don't exist then they would lack necessary existence, unlike God. Therefore, they would require God, a prime-mover, to actualize their being! Con's argument actually presupposes God in order to undercut the existence of God. This makes his argument self-refuting. In sum, even Descartes, when he came up with the axiom, "I think therefore I am," built the rest of his epistemology on the basis that God would not deceive him about what he perceives in the external world. Also, the Russellian quote Con referred to, "the essence of a person can be described and their existence still remain in question," was intended to be in the proper context of contingent beings, not necessary beings. For necessary beings- their essence just is their existence, whereas contingent being's essence is separate from their existence. Compatibility of Omniscience & OmnipotenceCon then objects that, "omniscience and omnipotence may be incompatible." He justifies this by asserting that mere middle knowledge of how a person would freely choose something, actually determines them to choose that thing. But how does my knowing how my girl-friend will freely choose in an option between ice-cream and spinach, actually determine her free choice? Surely there's still a possible world in which she could have chosen otherwise, I just knew that world wouldn't be actualized! ... In what way does this fate her to choose ice-cream? What mysterious force is used between my knowing? God's knowing? ... Con is making a jump of causal logic here. In order for Con to sustain this attack he would have the burden of proof of showing that the possible world in which my girl-friend chooses something else is literally impossible, somehow due to God's knowledge. But knowledge, as such, isn't a force, much less a determining factor. How then can he reasonably meet this burden? Also, if one looks at the definitions given for God's attributes, one can easily cash out that none of these are incompatible as a whole. For I said that omnipotence doesn't include determining free choices, that would be a meaningless property to not have. ConlusionThanks Con for debating this with me! I hope you've learned as much as I have :-)