The fine-tuning argument for God's existence is a failure

Am I confused about k’? My opponent insists that I am fundamentally confused about k’ because I said it entails all that we know. Now, of course, this background knowledge would have to exclude the fact of our universe existing or, as my opponent points out, the probability will always = 1. I took this as assumed, as all probabilities about prior events must subtract the outcome from their background knowledge or probability is impossible. So what should have been said was this: K’ equals everything that we know, save the knowledge of the existence of our universe. At this point, all that is necessary for my opponent’s argument to fail is for there to be a good reason to include EIR (our epistemically illuminated region) in k’ when dealing with P(LPU|T & K). Where an argument proves too much. My opponent attempts to avoid the problem of the effectiveness of his argument by using our “background knowledge normally.” Does this avoid my criticism? I do not think it does. If we omit the knowledge of our existing in a world external to ourselves (EW), then P(EW|k’) is inscrutable. This means that extreme skepticism is our only reasonable outlet. But we can avoid this all together by not omitting the knowledge of EW from k’, giving us k (normal background knowledge). But how is this not special pleading? What are the prevailing, relatively different features that make the possibility space in the aforesaid scenario substantially different then the possibility space regarding our universe? Why is it that we can treat the possibility space regarding EW as remote possibilities and not equiprobable? There are no known differences between the epistemically unilluminated possibility space of EW and LPU, making my opponent’s distinction special pleading. So if my opponent can take k when dealing with EW, then he must be committed to taking k in all scenarios that have no relative differences (or at least none that are known). So in order for my opponent to avoid his own criticism, he must not permit the use of k’ all together. Let’s look at some similar circumstances that require both indifference and subtraction and are similarly defeated by my opponent’s argument. Say I roll a 20-sided die and land on 12. I could say that the probability of my rolling 12 is 1/20, but that would be wrong unless I subtract my rolling 12 from my background knowledge (or else the probably = 1). Moreover, the only way I can say it was 1/20 is if I apply the principle of indifference, insofar as all other possibilities are equiprobable. But now we’re in a tight spot, because the only way to get 1/20 is to also limit our epistemic considerations only to that which we know, namely all known possible rolls. Or else we would be committed to giving equiprobable weight to all of the possibility space, mostly all of which we have no epistemic access to. This renders the simple equation matter of 1/20 impossible to achieve per my opponent’s criticism. For all we know, there could be something like a Cartesian evil genius that makes all rolls hit 12 more often than any other number. Or it could be that the roll may have fell within a crevice and stopped between two numbers. The only way to avoid this problem of inscrutable prior probabilities is to include EIR in k’. In fact, there are no instances that employ both subtraction and the principle of indifference that avoid my opponent’s criticism. All efforts to calculate prior probability in such scenarios are impossible unless we include our epistemically illuminated range within our background knowledge. Good Reason for EIR restriction The above is actually powerful reason for why it is necessary to consider only our EIR when dealing with prior probability that includes subtraction and indifference. Let me briefly address Pro’s examples of where limiting our EIR is dangerous: Statistical Significance: This is a false comparison. A sample group that is too small has failed to consider that which was possible to consider, namely a much larger group. A more relevant comparison would be where a statistical study examines everything that falls within their EIR but is determined to be insufficient for not considering all that was impossible for them to consider per it existing outside of their EIR. Statistical comparisons MUST consider only that which is within their EIR or else they could never do statistics. Skeptical Theism: This is relevantly different inasmuch as it relies upon propositions that are definitionally inaccessible. Meaning that the whole discussion takes place outside of our EIR. Argument from skeptical hypothesis: This hypothesis itself shows why we have good reasons for restricting our EIR. If we do not, then everything is necessarily inscrutable given this latter point. The reality of this debate is inscrutable given the fact that we are unable to consider whether or not we are a brain in a vat. But if we include, however, our EIR in k, then we need not believe that literally everything, save a single proposition, is inscrutable. This point fails because it insists upon a strict Cartesian epistemology. So the only way for my opponent to be right is to admit that his being right is inscrutable, inasmuch as every single proposition, save one, hinges upon things one is unable to consider. This sort of skepticism is rife with self-defeating clauses. So the proposition that our EIR is much smaller than the entire probability range is itself inscrutable. It is possible that our EIR is the entire range. It becomes incoherent when we expand our range to propositions that exist outside of our EIR. It seems clear that we need to include EIR in k’. Dart Boards and Red Selection You’ll remember that my dart board analogy illustrated how we use the EIR and the irrelevancy of the unilluminated region, insofar as the bulls eye is very small in comparison to our illuminated range. But what of PROS use of the analogy of “red selection”? How does this red selection analogy differ? The red selection analogy is dependent upon the commonness of red within the probability space – which we do not know (if ignore our EIR). But what we do know, to some chagrin, is that within our EIR only one red selection is available, giving evidence that non-red selection is more common than red – inasmuch as one would expect to have more red selections that fell within our EIR if such selections were at all common. Even worse, however, is the fact the analogy of red selection ALWAYS fails when applied to prior probabilities, meaning my opponent has simply poisoned the well. If 10 red selections are put in a hat with 10 other blue selections, and I pull a red one, I could not correctly insist that my selection had a probability of ½ without subtracting my knowledge of selecting red and assuming indifference. If I do not limit my EIR, as my opponent suggests, then the probability of my pulling red is not ½, but inscrutable – given that the unknown possibility space is larger than the known. So we should only assume that my opponent’s analogy is greater or more applicable if assume from the onset that we should not limit our EIR (to beg the question). EIR and probabilistic tension If we insert the fact that all probabilities that require subtraction and indifference also require inserting EIR into our background knowledge, then there is no good reason to exclude EIR from k’ when dealing with P(LPU|T & k’). This makes probabilistic tension unsuccessful because EIR is knowledge not excluded by our subtraction of the knowledge of the universe existing, making it a necessary property of k’ and not a conjoined, ad-hoc belief.