The United States government commits acts of terrorism

Thank you, governments_kill, for taking up the pro position for this argument. I'd like to note that we are not in disagreement on my second clause of the definition of terrorism. When I said "nor do the goals of the assailant matter," I was referring to the ultimate ideological goals (independence, class struggle, Manifest Destiny, etc.), not the strategic reasons for an attack. By our agreed definition, all terrorists employ their strategy in the belief it will "influence a third party in a specific direction." Not just any action to influence a party is equal to an act of terrorism: a union strike, a prominent deployment of an aircraft carrier, and a recall of an ambassador are all meant to influence a government's actions, but because they are not coherent, overt acts of violence intentionally carried out against civilians, they are not acts of terrorism. For the benefit of our debate's voters, you have added the caveat that the United States is in a role where it is "forced" to take a posture that "what we say, goes." This simplification of what drives American foreign policy is misleading. Each presidential administration makes decisions based on criteria and for goals that vary over time. Even if we were to constrain the U.S. government to the hegemonic model, its adherence to such a doctrine does not require the use of terrorism. If the U.S. is a hegemon, then it has many tools at its disposal: allies, diplomacy, cultural influence, economic sanctions, lots of conventional military force. Such a state has no need for terrorism, which is a (mistaken) tool of convenience for those with relatively little power to affect an outcome. In theory the U.S. has no need for terrorism, and in practice it has not espoused it as policy. The U.S. did not employ terror against the Sandinista regime as you have insisted. It is true that prominent elements of the Contras perpetrated terrorist acts against civilians under Sandinista rule. Although the CIA initially funded the Contras to serve as military resistance to the revolutionary Sandinista junta, the U.S. Congress moved to cut military funding once terrorist activities were discovered. Terrorist activities went against policies that President Reagan instated himself, such as the 1981 executive order banning political assassinations. The U.S. did aim to support conventional military actions against the regime, but did not seek to support terrorist activity. From the above example, it is clear that intent of the actor is important to this discussion. Simple actors such as individuals are prone to make mistakes. Larger, more complex actors such as sates are even more vulnerable to error, because there are more elements that they cannot readily control. Since the definition of terrorism hinges on intent, a state is not a perpetrator or a sponsor if an individual or even an isolated group commits an act of terror against the state's will. In the face of these lapses, a state such as the U.S. demonstrates its intent by disavowing terrorism and punishing those who carry it out. One might counter that a truly concerned state wouldn't take the risk of being associated with terror in the first place, but this is an impractical demand. Given this reality, we must look to the state's intentions. Before moving on, I'd like to refute the point about El Salvador. As I've stated before, atrocities are unfortunate, regrettable, and deplorable. I don't mean to defend any such acts. The U.S. didn't intend to slaughter people wholesale; it intended to shore up defenses for its ally government. Once again the question of risk-taking is raised, but the criminal intent was simply not there. Most importantly, you have not presented El Salvador as a scenario of violence to influence a third party; rather this is a citation of the use of violence itself, which is not in question. As for the use of smallpox against Native Americans, I know of a remote British outpost that aimed to use the tactic to alleviate a siege from a particular tribe. The weapon was imprecise, but the intent was to win a battle, not blackmail the tribe's leaders. The act was asymmetric, but not terrorism. Looking to the other cited instance against Native Americans, the massacre at Wounded Knee was not terrorism, because it was not premeditated, nor was it primarily a message to an authority responsible for those killed. It was an overreaction and negligence, but nobody handed down commands saying "Make a statement in blood today." You have stated that U.S. acts against Native Americans were committed as "part of a policy," but your evidence is nonexistent. Rather than being a result of a concrete, overarching government policy, the persecution of Native Americans stemmed from a series of individual decisions linked by a systemic cultural bias. Once again, this comes down to intention. You cannot equate cultural bias with intentions of government officials. For the final example, the Battle of Fallujah was definitely not terrorism. The primary consideration was to drive out and confront insurgents, not influence the civilians. Nonetheless, in police actions, authority can legitimately send nonviolent messages to those they govern. When you see a police walking around with a gun in his holster, he is not committing an act of terrorism. His main aim is to enforce the law, but he also has the side effect of deterrence, which is basically sending a message. He affirms the message to criminals that "what we say, goes." Don't confuse this with terrorism. The main aim in Fallujah was to fight the insurgents, not expend a lot of shells to make civilians cower in fear. Remember that terrorism has a very specific meaning. Violence in itself is not terrorism. Any innocent civilian can be hurt accidentally, so intention is required. Finally, the primary goal of the act must be to influence behavior. All of these must converge, or else what you have in a given case may be many other things, but not terrorism.