Rehabilitation ought to valued over Retribution in the US criminal justice system

I negate the resolution. Smith defines rehabilitation: "Although rehabilitation is often considered a type of punishment for criminal offenders, its objectives are therapeutic rather than punitive. While some theories of punishment claim that criminals deserve to suffer for their crimes, the rehabilitative ideal views criminal behavior more like a disease that should be treated with scientific methods available to cure[d] the offender." Retribution is "The idea that offenders should be punished for committing crimes when they freely violate existing social rules."(Gabremichael) Ought is defined as a moral obligation (Merriam Webster) so I value morality. To value is to regard or esteem highly (Dictionary.com). Valuing is not synonymous with acting for instance I may value a clean kitchen, but that doesn"t mean I"ll do the dishes. The resolution questions what we ought to value, so the aff must prove that the principle of rehabilitation is better than the principle of retribution. Because the resolutional actor is the criminal justice system, any moral theory must account for unique obligations of government rather than individuals. And because, the US criminal justice system encompasses individuals who sacrifice certain liberties in exchange for protection, the US is obligated towards a system of equal benefits and burdens, Richard Dagger explains: Richard Dagger, "Playing Fair With Punishment," Ethics, Vol. 103, No. 3 (Apr., 1993), pp. 473-488 "As it applies to punishment, the principle of fair play begins with a conception of society as a cooperative endeavor secured by coercion. To think of society in this way is to recognize that the individuals who compose a society enjoy a number of benefits available only because of the cooperation of their fellows. The social order enables us to work together for common purposes and to pursue in peace our private interests. But we can do these things only when others, through their cooperation, help to maintain this order. This has two important implications. The first is that [Thus,] rules or conventions of some sort become necessary, for we need to know what the required acts of cooperation are. The second is that those who enjoy the benefits of society owe their own cooperation to the other members of society. Because the cooperation of others makes these benefits available to me, fairness demands that I help provide these benefits for them by cooperating in turn. When other things are equal, then, I owe it to the others to obey the rules; if I fail to do so, I take unfair advantage of them." In order to do this, we cannot arbitrarily take the fruits of certain people"s labor and redistribute them to others, Edward Feser notes: Edward Feser, "Robert Nozick," IEP, Pasadena City College, May 2003 "If individuals are inviolable ends-in-themselves (as Kant describes them) and self-owners, it follows, Nozick says, that they have certain rights, in particular (and here again following Locke) rights to their lives, liberty, and the fruits of their labor. To own something, after all, just is to have a right to it, or, more accurately, to possess the bundle of rights " rights to possess something, to dispose of it, to determine what may be done with it, etc. " that constitute ownership; and thus to own oneself is to have such rights to the various elements that make up one"s self. These rights function, Nozick says, as side-constraints on the actions of others; they set limits on how others may, morally speaking, treat a person. So, for example, since you own yourself, and thus have a right to yourself, others are constrained morally not to kill or maim you (since this would involve destroying or damaging your property), or to kidnap you or forcibly remove one of your bodily organs for transplantation in someone else (since this would involve stealing your property). They are also constrained not to force you against your will to work for another"s purposes, even if those purposes are good ones. For if you own yourself, it follows that you have a right to determine whether and how you will use your self-owned body and its powers, e.g. either to work or to refrain from working." Thus my value criterion is consistency with equal benefits and burdens of society without infringing on people"s self- ownership. Note that this value criterion is a side constraint - whatever value criterion my opponent advocates, I don't necessarily disagree, I simply place my criterion as a side constraint that still must be upheld. Contention1: Only retribution, punitively dealing with criminals, can restore equilibrium. This is because when I commit a crime, I place myself at an advantage. For instance, if I steal your car, I"m advantaged and you"re disadvantaged because I stole and will enjoy the fruits of your labor whereas you will not. The way to counter an advantage is a disadvantage, i.e. jail, which punishes the offender and restores balance for the original unfair inequality. Dagger 2 explains the concept: Richard Dagger, "Playing Fair With Punishment," Ethics, Vol. 103, No. 3 (Apr., 1993), pp. 473-488 "Punishment is justified, ceteris paribus, because the persons who disobey the law fail to meet their obligations to the other members of society. In this sense every crime is a crime of unfairness, whatever else it may be. Criminals act unfairly when they take advantage of the opportunities the legal order affords them without contributing to the preservation of that order. In doing so, they upset[ing] the balance between benefits and burdens at the heart of the notion of justice. Justice requires that this balance be restored, and this can only be achieved through punishment or pardon. As Herbert Morris has argued, "A person who violates the rules has something others have-the benefits of the system-but by renouncing what others have assumed, the burdens of self-restraint, he has acquired an unfair advantage. [because] Matters are not even until this advantage is in some way erased.... [H]e owes something to others, for he has something that does not rightfully belong to him. Justice-that is, punishing such individuals-restores the equilibrium of benefits and burden by tak[es] from the individual what he owes, that is, exacting the debt." Rehabilitation can never restore balance because as my definition from Smith notes, its therapeutic, it tries to help people by fixing their disorder. But you don"t rectify a criminal advantage by helping the criminal, you need to disadvantage them in some way. Only retributive measures like jail, disadvantage them. Contention 2: Rehabilitation arbitrarily advantages the few over the majority. Any legitimate government function serves all citizens, like Fire Departments or Police departments, rather than prioritizing a few, but according to the US department of justice, only 6.6% of all people get incarcerated at some point during their life time " a clear and obvious minority (http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov...). Rehab immorally prioritizes this minority. Even if there is some sort of greater good coming out or Rehabilitation, the government can"t distribute resources to benefit a few. It"s immoral to burden society with the education, drugs, and therapy of a small minority of people. Thus, you negate.