xXCryptoXx's 100th Debate: The Conjugal View of Marriage is Philosophically Valid

I thank Crypto for a fantastic debate! I hope he’s enjoyed it :) In this round, I will address the line-by-line arguments and present voting issues. FRAMEWORKCon drops my observations. OVERVIEWThe purpose of this overview was to assert that Pro was claiming that "conjugal relationships are good because they uniquely benefit the community. " Therefore, Pro's response that "it is irrelevant whether other relationships also possess a common good" is non-responsive to the primary claim my overview was making. Pro never rebuts that his justification of CVM is inherently utilitarian. Extend my overview. PRO's CASEPro then makes a variety of observations about his burden in the round. He states that "since marriage has universally been about relationships that are distinct, or set apart a special, and that conjugal relationships are distinct in regards to the common good, then conjugal relationships should be set apart as marriage. "As I pointed out last round, Pro needs to offer two things to actually show that CVM should be called marriage: (1) he needs to justify that the link to procreation is unique to CVM, and (2) he needs to offer a brightline. The first point is straightforward enough, but the last one is also important. If I say that X is P but not Q, I need to be able to distinguish between P and Q to make that claim. So, if I say that marriage is CVM, but not RLM, I need to be able to make a non-arbitrary distinction between CVM and RLM. CVM may have an inherent link to procreation (which id dubious), but why does that matter? RLM is distinct from most other relationships, including friendships and flings. Why is it that RLM is NOT distinct enough to be considered marriage? Pro offers us no brightline, no non-arbitrary way to say that one specially distinct relationship (CVM) matters more than another specially distinct relationship (RLM). At this point, why can't both RLM and CVM be considered marriage? Pro responds writing, "If marriage is about distinguishing relationships from each other, then it would be logical that conjugal relationships…would be called marriage. It is logical to move further than romantic relationships because there is still a relationship that exists which has an inherent link to the common good unlike any other relationship. " Firstly, just because a more exclusive layer exists does not mean we SHOULD go farther. As long as we can set RLM aside as "distinct from other relationships," which we can, then it seems as if we have a basis for marriage. Pro gives us no reason to further narrow the definition. Secondly, as I shall show, the inclusion of infertile couples as part of CVM actually means that CVM lacks an inherent link to the common good. And thirdly, we could theoretically narrow the definition beyond CVM to say that only couples capable of reproduction should marry. Pro says that this interpretation goes too far, but yet the goal—as Pro implies—is to achieve the most limited, distinct notion of marriage possible. Surely an institution that only allows for couples who are biologically capable of procreation to marry would have the strongest inherent link to the common good, more so even than CVM. In which case, CVM can still be rejected. Remember though, as Pro conceded in R1, he must show that "the conjugal view is the ONLY valid view to take. " By failing to invalidate RLM, Pro has already failed to meet his BOP. The Common Good and InfertilityPro states, "Conjugal relationships possess the same common good romantic relationships do through nature of being a romantic relationship, but then also have a special link to a different, distinct common good: reproduction. " There are two issues here: (1) Pro never justifies why we need to get so specific. Why do we need to narrow down relationships beyond romance in order to find out what marriage is? Why can we stop at the RLM level? Really, Pro provides zero analysis here, as I have stated numerous times throughout this debate. (2) Reproduction is non-unique. Pro claims that only CVM has an inherent link procreation "through its biological nature. " But, as I pointed out last round, infertile couples "lack any biological ability to reproduce. " If Y is naturally, biologically unable to reproduce, then a union between X and Y has NO inherent link to procreation through its biological nature, regardless of whether the union is heterosexual or not. This is a MASSIVE internal contradiction in Pro's case, and it causes his entire analysis to collapse. But, secondly, the way Pro has argued his case has been less about the link to procreation, but rather about achieving the common good, as I've pointed out. Insofar as reproduction is a common good, I have provided evidence as to how non-CVMs can meet this common good as well. This evidence was never contested. Pro says that "it is the link that is relevant, not on who could do what. " Unfortunately, Pro never explains why that is so; he's repeated it every round with nauseating regularity, but he has yet to justify or warrant why it is the link that matters, and why that common good of procreation matters more than the common good of love and self-actualization. RLMPro concedes that RLM marriages have a link to a common good. CON's CASETopicalityI am not making a claim about legal recognition, but rather moral equality. If we deny that non-CVMs are marriage, then we otherize non-heterosexuals. It's that simple. It's not a legal claim, but an ethical one that is inherent to Pro's advocacy. Points1. CVM is justified because it has a link to procreation. Why would this link matter if we weren't concerned about the end result? Pro cannot simply say that he's only concerned about the link itself, and not about procreation--particularly when he talks about the common good and maximizing benefits for humanity. If he cares about linking to the common good, then he acknowledges the common good is something worth linking to and worth advancing. So, insofar as CVM uses people as a means to promote the common good, it violates human dignity.2. Pro denies outright that CVM otherizes people. Yet, simply because he denies it does not make it false. Consider, when ONLY heterosexual unions are permitted, we exclude non-heterosexuals. We treat them as "other. " This exclusion, whether intentionally or not, correctly or not, may lead society to the belief that non-heterosexuals are unworthy of participating in the institution of marriage, thus degrading them. CVM, by excluding some groups of people based on characteristics over which they have no control, otherizes those groups. VOTING ISSUESFirst, let’s take a minute to review what Pro had to do in order to win this round. Based on my 5-point analysis in R1, Pro needed to do three things. Keep in mind, Pro has to check the box off on every single one of them; missing just one means Pro has failed to meet his BOP. 1. Pro must show that there is a special distinction that justifiably sets CVM aside from other POVs2. Pro must show that CVM is valid, not just specially distinct3. Pro must show that conjugal view is the ONLY valid view to take If Pro fails to do any one of these things, you default Con. So, now, let’s review what arguments I am winning and their impact re: Pro’s 3 burdens in this round. 1. Pro fails to explain why an inherent link to procreation is sufficient justification for a “special distinction. ”Pro writes that connection to the common good reflects “humanity’s goal to reduce suffering and maximize happiness” and is therefore an adequate criterion for determining special distinctiveness. If that isn’t a utilitarian argument, I don’t know what is. At this point, if we’re focusing on maximizing happiness, why exclude gay couples who can raise children effectively, procreate (albeit with assistance), and who would have their lives enriched by the experience. Gay couples also link to the common good, so CVM isn’t as “distinct” as Pro would have us believe. This makes it hard for him to meet his 1st burden in this round.2. Infertile couples have no, inherent biological link to procreation. Pro justifies his stance on the strength of this link, but the presence of infertile couples (who biologically cannot reproduce) exposes a contradiction in Pro’s own advocacy. This prevent Pro from achieving his 2nd burden in this round—CVM is not valid if it is not internally consistent.3. RLM is affirmed. Pro basically concedes that RLM has a link to the common good, and can be distinguished from many other relationships. Pro defines marriage as a “relationship(s) set apart as special, or a relationship(s) set apart as distinct from other relationships. ” Pro has agreed that RLM is distinct from many other relationships. This is important: observe the the definition of marriage Pro provides does not say the “most distinct relationship,” just that the relationship must be distinct in some sense. Next, Pro defines valid as “reasonable or cogent. ” Pro has failed to point out any internal inconsistencies in my RLM arguments, preferring instead to co-opt my evidence. Therefore, RLM is cogent. So, because RLM meets the criteria for marriage, and for validity, so we can say with confidence that the RLM view of marriage is philosophically valid. At this point, Pro cannot meet his 3rd burden in this round.4. The risk of otherization merits the rejection of CVM. Even if you buy none of the last 3 arguments, you can still vote Con on this claim. Pro was non-responsive to it last round, and it is fairly straightforward. CVM, by excluding some groups of people based on characteristics over which they have no control, otherizes those groups and thus devalues them as people. This renders CVM philosophically invalid, as it relates to the philosophy of deontological human dignity. Thanks to Crypto on a great debate! Thanks also to anyone who took the time to read this debate!