Developing Countries should prioritize environmental protection over resource extraction

Overview: The entire thesis that the affirmative case relies on is having some objective moral theory or principle that justifies prioritizing environmental protection over resource extraction. Without this, there is no way we can call something morally permissible or obligatory, thus negating the resolution. The problem with this is that morality is never objective because morality is constantly changing. If I prove that morality is subjective, then the ballot is an easy vote for the negative because we cannot call something morally permissible or obligatory. Joyce[1]: “If moral [skepticism] … is true, then nothing is moral obligatory, nothing is morally prohibited, and nothing is morally permissible either. … one who claims that moral nihilism implies that everything is permissible must intend to denote some kind of permissibility other than moral—let’s just call it X-permissibility. But then an argument will be needed to show that the failure of moral discourse implies that everything is X-permissible, and … [there is no] such argument.” To negate is to deny the truth of, so the sufficient affirmative burden is to prove that we are morally obligated to prioritize environmental protection over resource extraction. While there are different ways to reach that conclusion, such as by using impact turns or defense, the end result is an affirmation of the resolutional statement. If the aff can’t prove that we ought to prioritize environmental protection, you negate. My thesis is that we are never morally obligated. If I show we’re never morally obligated then you negate the resolution before you even look to the value criterion debate. As such the negative case comes before the rest of the AC because it functions as a gateway to affirming. Morality is subjective and everyone has their own specific morality that they adhere to. With so many different forms of morality, it is impossible to come to an agreement on which version of morality is the best to use in the given situation. Furthermore, morality can change over time, therefore making the choice of which morality is best even more impossible to come to. Koons[2]: “if moral truth were determined by the generation of some affective response, then this would lead to objectionable sorts of moral relativism. … our psychology is … not … shared by all rational creatures, or even by all humans. … Imagine, … the possible worlds in which we experience moral emotions or desires under different conditions than in the actual world. Are there possible worlds in which, say, kicking dogs is morally required? … Or imagine an alien race whose psychology differed from our own. This race might have an affective nature very different from ours. … wouldn’t their morality by true-for-them, and ours true-for-us? Or perhaps we would decide that since this alien race’s morality … were so different from ours, that they weren’t practicing morality in the first place, but instead schmorality. … Not all people have the same psychological responses; is morality different for these different people? … does this mean that moral truth is itself relative and changeable?” Therefore, if morality is relative and changeable, it is impossible to come to a morality that works so that we can even call something morally obligatory. This makes the resolution false because without morality, we cannot call something morally obligatory. Furthermore, even the definitions of good and bad are subjective and subject to change. One person might see something as good, while another person might see that same thing as horribly bad. Without these two basic definitions, it is impossible to be able to form any type of morality. Nietzsche[3]: “my curiosity and my suspicion felt themselves … bound … at the question, of what in point of actual fact was the origin of our “Good” and of our “Evil.” … at the boyish age of thirteen … I gave quite properly the honour to God, and made him the father of Evil. … Under what conditions did Man invent for himself those judgments of values, “Good” and “Evil”? And what intrinsic value do they possess in themselves? Have they up to the present hindered or advanced human well-being? Are they a symptom of the distress, impoverishment, and degeneration of Human Life? Or, conversely, is it in them that is manifested the fullness, the strength, and the will of Life, its courage, its self-confidence, its future?” Thus, the definitions of good and bad are themselves indefinite and changeable based upon an individual’s perspective. This links into the debate because without these two definitions, forming a concept of morality becomes impossible. Moreover, even if we know what morality is there is no way we could know if those moral principles are something we would accept. Nietzsche 2: “the real homestead of the concept “good” did not originate among those to whom goodness was shown. Much rather has it been the good themselves, that is, the aristocratic, the powerful, the high-stationed, the high-minded, who have felt that they themselves were good, and that their actions were good, that is to say of the first order, in contradistinction of all the low, the low-minded, the vulgar, and the plebeian. … a higher dominant race coming into association with a meaner race, an “under race,” … is the origin of … good and bad.” Thus, even if the definitions of good and bad are finite and definite, they themselves are not true and cannot work in any moral theory. Now, go to the AC. Start off of their resolutional analysis:First: by my opponent's own definiton of prioritize it means that we just do one thing first. The problem here is that it doesn't preclude us from doing the other one later after we finish doing the first one. This means that even if we negate, we can come back later and do all of the affirmative things, making his impacts non-unique. Also, don't let him extend off the analysis he makes in his framework saying that we can't have the two co-existing. I'm not saying that they would co-exist, rather that we can just do one and then come back and do the other one later, meaning that I can still get the same pro-environment impacts as Pro would in the long run. Second: My opponent claims that LD is about morals but has no moral framework to evaluate morality. Thus, by his own argument, he is failing to figure out what's moral for the environment, making it impossible to affirm by his own framework. This means you instantly default to voting negative.Third: Even if my opponent advocates for a moral theory in later rounds, he still has to sufficiently refute the NC before he gains access to the offense coming off of the AC. If morality is subjective, then it becomes impossible for him to fulfill his framework fo finding out what's moral for us and for the environment. This means that so long as I'm winning off of the NC, I'm winning the debate. Next, go to his contentions. You can group all of them together since they're all essentially just talking about how good environmental protection is and how bad resource extraction is:First: All of this is non-unique. I can get the same results in the long run negating. This means that neither of us are getting any kind of unique offense off of his contentional level, but since that's his only offense there isn't anything that he can extend off that I can't get access to either, meaning there isn't a place you can vote pro.Second: There's no actual warrant behind any of the impacts coming off of his contentions. Literally all of the impact analysis he makes in his contentions are just emotional appeals, but there's no actual warrant for why resource extraction is killing us or causing any of the harms he's listing out in his contentions, as well as how environmental protection is leading to the benefits he's listing or solving any of the supposed problems. This means that even if he had unique access to his contentions, that you wouldn't vote off of them anyway because the warrants are so bad. So the round breaks down really easily. The NC comes first because it precludes the AC from fulfilling their framework. If he doesn't sufficiently refute the NC, you instantly negate there. But even if he's sufficiently refuting the NC, he doesn't have any kind of unique offense coming off of the AC, meaning you default neg anyway. Moreover, he isn't advocating for any kind of moral theory, which by his own resolutional analysis precludes him from fulfilling his framework. [1] Richard. “Nihilism,” International Encyclopedia of Ethics, forthcoming. Accessed online. [2]Koons, Jeremy R. "Why Response Dependance Theories Are Morally False." Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6.3 (2003). JSTOR. Web. [3]Nietzsche, Friedrich. "Beyond Good and Evil." Web.