Inaction in the face of Injustice makes an individual morally culpable

In this round, I shall endeavor to achieve two objective: (1) to better understand the resolution, and (2) to offer a constructive argument in negation of the topic. UNDERSTANDING THE RESOLUTIONThe resolution reads: "Inaction in the face of Injustice makes an individual morally culpable. " I will begin by defining terms from the resolution, excerpting those definitions from Merriam Webster. [1] Inaction - "lack of action or activity" Injustice - "unfair treatment: a situation in which the rights of a person or a group of people are ignored" Individual - "a particular person" Moral - "of or relating to principles of right and wrong in behavior" Culpable - "deserving blame: guilty of doing something wrong" From these definitions, we can see that the phrase "morally culpable" refers to a situation where a person was guilty of acting against the principles of right and wrong. But, what makes someone culpable? In law, "an accused is culpable when he or she is sufficiently responsible for criminal acts or negligence to be at fault and liable for the conduct. " [2] In much of the world, the threshold for responsibility is extremely high, and would only be triggered in limited instances, (a) where a person creates a hazardous situation that another person falls into, or (b) where a special relationship exists, e. g. a parent to a child. [3] So, what does this have to do with the resolution? The resolution is asking us whether inaction in the face of injustice makes an individual morally culpable, where culpability implies responsibility and liability. Thus, Pro must show that inaction makes an individual responsible for the injustice they are witnessing. Additionally, observe that the resolution is not making a on balance claim. Rather, it is presenting a moral maxim much in the way Kant does, where it should be either rejected as valid or invalid. I would draw your attention to the fact that the resolution is not asking us what is desirable or generally accepted, but instead it is putting forth a question of moral fact. If X condition is met, the result is Y. That is essentially what Pro is being forced to uphold. Consequently, I would posit that if I can show just one example in which the Condition X does not result in Y, the resolution is negated. After all, logically, something cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time; we cannot affirm that inaction makes an individual morally culpable while at the same time deny that this is true in any case. Finally, this is not a topic about whether people should or should not act in the face of injustice. I can say that bystanders should act without assigning moral culpability to them for choosing not to act. Let me put it like this, culpability is about blame, and so the resolution is implying that inaction is blameworthy. It is my job in this round to argue that inaction is not blameworthy, but that is not the same thing as saying that people should not act to help. Blameworthiness implies a breach of obligation or duty, it implies that you have done something wrong. I intend to argue that inaction is not always wrong, even if acting might be better or advisable. CONSTRUCTIVE ARGUMENTSI will make two types of arguments. One will be a generic analysis of why inaction would not lead to moral culpability. The other will be to provide some scenarios or conditions under which inaction would be justified. These two sets of arguments function independently of each other. General AnalysisMuch of the support for good samartian law or moral theory stems from the idea of universal human dignity. I will attempt to show how an understanding of human dignity leads to a contrasting, albeit counterintuitive, outlookAccording to G. W. F. Hegel, autonomy separates us from all other things. A table cannot be blamed for a moral failing because it cannot choose to do something wrong. A human, on the other hand, is morally relevant insofar as we have this autonomy. This moral worth grants every person an inherent dignity that should be respected. "The idea here is that a human being, as a rational agent endowed with self-awareness, free will, and the possibility of formulating a plan of life, has an inherent dignity and cannot properly be treated as a mere thing, or used against his will as an instrument or resource in the way an inanimate object might be. In line with this, Nozick also describes individual human beings as self-owners. The thesis of self-ownership, a notion that goes back in political philosophy at least to John Locke, is just the claim that individuals own themselves--their bodies, talents and abilities, labor, and by extension the fruits or products of their exercise of their talents, abilities and labor. " [4]This understanding of human dignity has very clear political implications, in the sense that, morally speaking, "a state cannot regulate what citizens eat, drink, or smoke (since this would interfere with their right to use their self-owned bodies as they see fit), cannot control what they publish or read (since this would interfere with their right to use the property they’ve acquired with their self-owned labor—e. g. printing presses and paper), cannot administer mandatory social insurance schemes…(since this would interfere with citizens’ rights to use the fruits of their labor as they desire, in that some citizens might decide that they would rather put their money into…private retirement plans), and cannot regulate economic life in general via wage laws and the like. ” [4] Now, this debate is about individual, not governments, but this excerpt underscores the power of the notion of self-ownership. Human dignity requires that we respect other's rights, and that it is wrong to violate those rights. However, just because we should respect the rights of others does not mean we are called up to intercede when we see rights violations. The libertarian paradigm evoked by these arguments is best stated by Mills, whose argument posits that "the only actions that can be prevented are ones that create harm. " As self-owners, with total control over our own actions, we are not required to intercede where we see injustice, because our actions do not create harm. Rather, we are free to exercise our control over ourselves and refuse to intervene. Moral culpability is obviated because the course of action--or, in this case, inaction--that was taken was completely morally licit. ExceptionsEx. 1 The idea here is simple. Let's say I live in a authoritarian state, and a person being persecuted for being a certain ethnicity. They ask me for shelter. I know that if I am caught, the person will die, as will myself and my entire family. It would actually cause more harm to take this person in if I am caught. Should I really endanger innocent lives to rectify this injustice? Utilitarianism would say no. Ex. 2 Let's say someone is drowning in a pool. I could choose to dive in and attempt to save them, or choose to do nothing. It would take too long to summon help. I cannot swim and am apt to die as well if I jump into the pool. In such a scenario, I shouldn't be called upon to risk my own life to remedy an injustice. SOURCES1 - . http://www.merriam-webster.com...2 - . http://definitions.uslegal.com...3 - . http://www.ask.com...4 - . http://www.iep.utm.edu...5 - . http://education-portal.com...I apologize for the brevity of my response; I've had an insanely hectic day. I will respond to Pro's arguments (ultimately this is more crucial than the constructive) in the next round.