The modal ontological argument is not sound

I agree with him that modal ontological argument is most interesting indeed! In this debate, I will present 3 objections to the modal ontological argument. Each of these objections, show that the modal ontological argument is not sound. 1. Counter-argumentFirst, I will give a counter-argument which shows that either premise 1 or premise 3 of the modal ontological argument is not true. The argument goes as follows:P(1): A possible world is a world without any logical contradictions. P(2): A world without God (a maximally great being) is a world without logical contradictions. P(3): There is a possible world in which God does not exist. P(4): If there is a possible world in which God does not exist, then God does not exist in every possible world. C(1): God does not exist in every possible world. C(2): The modal ontological argument is not sound. Justifications:Premise 1: Definition of a possible world. Premise 2: We can imagine a world where a maximally great being does not exist. This is similar to premise 1 of the modal ontological argument: “It is possible that God exists”. In this premise we simply say the opposite: “It is possible that God does not exist”. Both premises are equally likely to be true, since they are both assumptions. Or in other words: We have no reason to accept one over the other. Premise 3: Follows from premise 2. Premise 4: Follows from premise 3. Conclusion 1: Follows from premise 4. Conclusion 2: The ontological argument states that God exists in every possible world. If this counter-argument is sound however, then I have shown that there is at least one possible world in which God does not exist. Therefore, either this argument is not sound, or the ontological argument is not sound. I have provided sufficient justification that this argument is sound and therefore it follows that the ontological argument is not sound.2. Parody argumentsIf the logic of the modal ontological argument is valid, then this logic can be used to show that an infinite amount of things exist. A few examples: A maximally great demon [1]:A maximally great demon is a being which contains all evil making properties to maximum value. P(1): It is possible that a maximally great demon exists. P(2): If it is possible that a maximally great demon exists, then a maximally great demon exists in some possible worlds. P(3): If a maximally great demon exists in some possible worlds, then a maximally great demon exists in all possible worlds. P(4): If a maximally great demon exists in all possible worlds, then a maximally great demon exists in the actual world. P(5): If a maximally great demon exists is the actual world, then a maximally great demon exists. C(1): A maximally great demon exists. Justification:Premise 1: We are equally justified to accept this premise as we are to accept premise 1 from the modal ontological argument. Premise 2: Follows from P1. Premise 3: Surely, a being which is evil in all worlds, is more evil than a being which is evil in only a couple possible worlds. Therefore, it follows from the definition of the maximally great demon, that it exists in all possible worlds. Premise 4: Follows from P3. Premise 5: Follows from P4. Conclusion 1: Follows from P5. Any abnormal toothpick: I chose toothpicks as an example, but you can choose pretty much anything. You can give the toothpick any properties you want it to have, as long as the definition is logically valid, and contains the following part: “if this toothpick exists in at least one possible world, then it exists in every possible world”. For example, the metal toothpick: A toothpick with 5 blue dots, 1 red dot, which is made out of metal and if this toothpick exists in at least one possible world, then it exists in every possible world. P(1): It is possible that the metal toothpick exists. P(2): If it is possible that the metal toothpick exists, then it exists in some possible worlds. P(3): If the metal toothpick exists in some possible worlds, then it exists in every possible world. P(4): If the metal toothpick exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world. P(5): If the metal toothpick exists in the actual world, then it exists. C(1): The metal toothpick exists! Justification:Premise 1: The metal toothpick doesn't have anything contradictory. Premise 2: Follows from P1Premise 3: DefinitionPremise 4: Follows from P3Premise 5: Follows from P4Conclusion 1: Follows from P5Because of the infinite amount of available parodies, we can conclude that the logic used in the modal ontological argument, is not sound. 3. Premise 1 The modal ontological argument uses axiom S5 of modal logic. There is nothing wrong with S5, if you use it properly and stick with it once you are using it. The problem with the modal ontological argument however, is that it starts with an assumption. If you grant the premise that any necessary being is possibly true, then that is the same as saying that it is actually true. So, using an assumption under S5 and going with it, is absurd (take a look at the parody examples). [1][2][3] This may be a bit confusing, so I will elaborate. “It is possible that God exists”. This premise seems completely reasonable. .. , and it is! We have to make a distinction though, between being reasonable and being true. In everyday conversations we can say: “Sure, as far as I know, God might possibly exist”. But actually using premise 1, as something which is true, in a deductive argument using S5 modal logic, is completely absurd! If you can’t prove the first premise to be true, then you can’t prove the conclusion to be true! It’s as simple as that. This is also clearly shown in the parody arguments, which all start from a reasonably true premise. This is the same reason why the Kalām cosmological argument doesn't convince me. It starts with a premise which is reasonably true, but not proven to be true. Therefore, the conclusion can’t be proven to be true either. Let us look at a quote from the creator of the modal ontological argument himself: “Our verdict on these reformulated versions of St. Anselm's argument must be as follows. They cannot, perhaps, be said to prove or establish their conclusion. But since it is rational to accept their central premise, they do show that it is rational to accept that conclusion” [4]My opponent says the following: "The German philosopher Gottfried Leibniz argued that since we cannot analyze perfection, there is no way to prove that all perfections cannot exist in one being to their maximal extent. Because of this, it is logically possible that a maximally great being exists. "I'm afraid however that this is an argument from ignorance. I don't have to prove that it cannot exist, you have to prove that it can exist. The German philosopher concludes that since we can't prove that it doesn't exist, it follows that it is logically possible that it does exist. This logic is completely absurd and is, like I said above, a complete argument from ignorance. [5]Now, lets look at the definition of a sound argument again: An argument in which all premises are true and the conclusion follows from the premises. As I have shown above, premise 1 is only reasonably true and not proven to be completely true. Therefore, by the definition of a sound argument, the modal ontological argument is not sound. Conclusion:Each of these objections clearly show that the modal ontological argument is not sound. Sources[1] . http://counterapologist.blogspot.be...[2] . http://www.patheos.com...[3] . http://en.wikipedia.org...(modal_logic)[4] . http://plato.stanford.edu...[5] . http://en.wikipedia.org...[6] . https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com...