The modal ontological argument is not sound

I thank socialpinko for his analysis of my last round, but I'm afraid his latest rebuttal doesn't actually make his Round 2 argument any less of a logical contradiction.All I did was take Pro's own definition of a maximally great being (one that exists necessarily) and show how it directly renders his P2 as logically incoherent thereby rendering his entire Round 2 argument as void since the conclusions were not soundly proven.Let me be clear on this: Pro provided a logically unsound syllogism in support for his position.Pro does say that his P2 "does seem contradictory," but the fact of the matter is that it is absolutely contradictory given his own terms. It clearly violates the law of non-contradiction. It's meaningless. It's a non-starter. It's null and void. He keeps calling it a thought experiment, but how is such an experiment even plausible in the first place? It's like asking me to experiment with the idea of a married bachelor or square triangle. Such things are intrinsically unthinkable.It appears to me that my opponent does not understand how modal logic operates. He insists that I'm not allowed to assume the truth of God's existence even though I never did assume such a thing. Neither does the Modal Ontological Argument. Instead, it makes a powerful proposition:P1. It is possible that a maximally great being (God) exists.In modal logic, "possible" simply means that the entity is logically coherent whereas "impossible" means it's logically incoherent. A square circle is impossible and therefore exists in no possible world, but a unicorn is logically coherent and can therefore exist in some possible world, even though it doesn't exist in the actual world. P1 of the Modal Ontological Argument claims that the notion of a maximally great being is logically coherent and therefore possible.That's it. P1 is does not assume anything, beg the question, or reason in circles. It simply proposes that God is—as defined in this debate—conceivable in our minds. From there, the Modal Ontological Argument rationally concludes that such a conception must exist in the actual world. Here is Platinga's version of the argument:1. It is possible that a maximally great being (God) exists.2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.4. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.5. If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.6. Therefore, a maximally great being exists.Pro's asks, "Is there a clear contradiction between a God not existing and anything else BUT the simple definition of God needing to exist in all worlds?" If God is a defined as a maximally great being, then the answer is yes, there is indeed a clear contradiction. Consider two possible beings: one that exists in some possible worlds and one that exists in all possible worlds. The first one cannot possible be the maximally great being because clearly such a being is lesser than the one that exists in all possible worlds.Now, the criteria for what makes a being greater than another is certainly up for debate, but that ball is my opponent's court. In the meantime, he cannot escape his Round 2 blunder. He has not shown the Modal Ontological Argument to be unsound because his only argument against it is logically invalid. The resolution remains negated.