There are no compelling arguments against same-sex marriage

The purpose of this argument is to (1) discover the intrinsic nature of marriage (2) to determine whether it has intrinsic (not extrinsic) social value in order to (3) motivate the government to institutionalize it with unique benefits. It appears that in appealing to the naturalistic fallacy, my opponent has attacked (1) in order to leave me no metaphysical ground to stand on. However, I am appealing to essentialism here, not natural law. The former deals with the Aristotelian notion that a particular formal essence (or characteristics) makes a thing what it is. The latter takes essentialism in order to come about at moral truths [1]. The "ought" that is being defended here is simply with regard to the nature of things, not with whether one morally "ought" to do or not do something. The naturalistic fallacy is not applicable as I am defending a normative concept of something that by nature is directed toward a certain proper function. In other words, an evaluative conclusion can be drawn from descriptive premises. For example, an eye has the proper function of sight and one that does not function for that purpose due to blindness is not how something 'ought" to be. If essentialism is denied, then it entails absurd conclusions for medical disciplines and leaves us with no reason to think marriage "ought" to be something. Not only that but it leaves us with no grounds for supposing that human life has intrinsic value. Which leads me to the definition of "social" value that my opponent has provided. He seems to put an emphasis on extrinsic value that an effect has on society rather than the intrinsic value that exists within the nature of what something is. I cannot accept this for reasons that I think are self-evident. It causes us to think that humans have no intrinsic rights unless they contribute something to society. While I think extrinsic value is important too, it is secondary to intrinsic value. I hope we both agree with this and that the definition provided was a simple mistake in detail. The Intrinsic Value Of Sex Kinds I think it is inaccurate to claim that no reasons were provided for the intrinsic value of sex kinds because I did provide some but perhaps he meant to say I had no "good" reasons. To summarize my opponent's objections, he claims that the SSV of sex kinds are found in the procreative effects and that non-procreative sex kinds have no effective value for society. Most of the objections seem to have already been addressed in my second response, which have been largely misunderstood. Like I noted earlier, heterosexual sex kinds have certain biological distinctions that are complimentary to each other. The purpose (or proper function) of these kinds is to fulfill their potential for procreation through an intimate bodily-union. This purpose is immutable as long as they remain in their respective sex kinds. Infertility is merely an incidental defect, as it does not change the fact that their biological components have an intrinsic procreative purpose. Thus, contrary to what my opponent suggests, there are no non-procreative heterosexual sex kinds, just non-procreative effects. This error prohibits my opponent from understanding the argument as he puts infertility into its own kind, as if the purpose of their biological organs is infertility. I have not failed to address where the value of infertile couples comes from because by virtue of participating in a sex kind at all, their biological organs have it as their purpose to procreate even if that is not fulfilled. My opponent has already conceded to this fact by saying that "the most important feature of sex kinds is the ability to procreate". The SSV is intrinsic to the purpose of these kinds, as the effects could not exist without them. If the purpose has intrinsic value, then the effects will fulfill that value. Because effects must rely on their kinds to actualize, it seems logical to conclude that all those who participate in a heterosexual union (as infertile couples do) have intrinsic value as all the formal requirements for procreation are met through their bodily and behavioral conditions. The conscious analogy is correct because it notes a lack of some "essential" conditions for humanity but with procreation, the essential characteristics are the sexual organs, which still exist despite the incidental (not essential) defect of infertility. The nature of marriage is between heterosexual sex kinds who have entered into a contractual agreement to establish and form a relationship that is intrinsically apt for procreation and child-rearing. Such a relationship is valuable in itself because two people that harmonize to preform one single action as "one flesh" is a comprehensive union that covers both the bodily, emotional, and spiritual aspects of their being. Their union is naturally fulfilled through the creation of a child as a fruit of their marital commitment. Even if this fruit is never actualized, their behavioral acts are still oriented toward procreation even if some non-behavioral aspect like infertility prevent the actualization of that potential. Infertile couples can thus live out this intrinsically valuable union and can contribute to a healthy marriage culture because they live out the behavioral conditions and participate in their respective kinds. In doing so, they represent what marriage "is" as infertile and fertile couples are still the same kind of bodily unions, which helps promote a message for those who may enter such an institution for a multi-leveled union that is fulfilled through child-rearing [2]. On a side note, what if I bit the bullet and agreed that only procreative couples should be allowed to marry? What could my opponent say in response? I think the only effective response is the one I have just given here. SSM and Children This objection is similar to the vitro infertilization that I refuted in the previous round. There is no question, at least in this debate, that same-sex couples can raise a child but the reason that such a child exists is due to some heterosexual union. The normative structure of child rearing is found with the biological parents and adoption only exists because these parents are unable or unwilling to raise the child. In which case, society has lost its natural optimal setting for child-rearing as a father and mother figure is now lacking . Besides, friends, family, and single people can all adopt a child as well but we would certainly not call that "marriage" in any meaningful sense. Child-rearing is a secondary condition of a certain relationship's fruit, not the primary condition. According to some recent studies by the Center for Law and Social Policy, Brookings Institution, and the Institute for American Values, they all claim that two biological parents are the ideal setting for children. As Child Trends (with liberal tendencies) has recently found, "Research clearly demonstrates that family structure matters for children, and the family structure that helps children the most is a family headed by two biological parents in a low‐conflict marriage. Children in single‐parent families, children born to unmarried mothers, and children in step‐ families or cohabiting relationships face higher risks of poor outcomes. . . . There is thus value for children in promoting strong, stable marriages between biological parents. . . .“It is not simply the presence of two parents, . . . but the presence of two biological parents that seems to support children’s development." [3]Sources________________1. Feser, Edward. Aquinas: a Beginner's Guide. Oxford: Oneworld, 2009. Print. 2. Lee, Patrick, Robert P. George, and Gerard V. Bradley. "Marriage and Procreation: The Intrinsic Connection « Public Discourse." Public Discourse. Web. 17 May 2011. <http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com...;3. Moore, Kristin Anderson et al. Marriage from a Child’s Perspective. Web. <http://www.childtrends.org...;