God does NOT Exist!

Modal Ontological Argument This argument defines God as a "necessary being," which entails all properties required by a standard definition of God. This is because the universe is contingent, thus a necessary being has to be transcendent. Outside the universe, there is no constraint, and infinite ontological potential, meaning the being has to be omnipotent, omniscient, et cetera. As the singular necessary entity, the universe has to be contingent on it, thus it is the cause of the universe. Since all existence is contingent (BCCF), it is contingent on a singular entity, and to avoid infinite regression, it has to be singular. If the argument entails, then there is a singular, necessary, omnipotent, and omniscient entity that is the efficient cause of the contingent universe. The argument: P1. If God exists in one possible world, G(God) exists in all possible worlds (including the actual world) P2. G is logically possible C. Therefore, God exists P1 I am using possible world semantics to justify this premise. Since God ('G') is defined as "necessary," it means []G, and [][]G. This means that if <>G, then <>[]G, since God is necessary and God is possible, thus God is necessarily possible and possibly necessary. Now, if you are "possible," by possible world semantics, one exists in at least one possible world. Since God is defined as necessary, the logical possibility of God would entail to mean <>[]G by definition. P2 The existence of God entails no logical contradiction. Since God is transcendent, God lacks any constraint and has infinite ontological potential, meaning God is not bounded by the Law of Non-Contradiction -- therefore, God has to be logically possible. Conclusion Since God exists in all possible worlds, God exists in the actual world, since the actual world itself is a possible world, else quantum states cannot exist. The argument in logical format: 1) <>[]X --> X 2) <>X --> <>[]X 3) X --> []X 4) <>X 5) <>[]X (2,4 Modus Ponens) 6) X (1,5 Modus Ponens) 7) []X (3,6 Modus Ponens) Godelian Ontological Argument I will be defending the ontological argument of Kurt von Godel. D1) A "positive property," hereby +P, is a property that does not lessen the excellence of an entity, but whose negation lessens the excellence of an entity D2) Something has necessary existence of it is not contingent on anything else D3) A property is strongly positive if []+P P1) If 'A' is any strongly positive property, then, necessarily, there exists a being that both exists necessarily and essentially possesses 'A'. This is because necessity itself is strongly positive. If []A, then A is separate from the universe, thus has to possess omnipotence, omniscience, and moral perfection, which are strongly positive. Thus, if []+P, then []A has []+P. P2) The properties of omnipotence, omniscience and moral perfection are strongly positive properties. Godelian ontological positivity refers to being "positive" in fields of omnipotence, omniscience, and moral perfection. Thus, these properties are +P. They are also []+P because otherwise they are bound by logic, which *is* all ontological constraint. P3) To possess a conjunct of strongly positive properties is a strongly positive property. This doesn't commit fallacy of composition since positivity is transferable by Godelian definition of positivity. C) There exists a being which exists necessarily and essentially possesses omnipotence, omniscience and moral perfection. Over to Pro!