BeIR/webis-touche2020 huggingface dataset:
The invasion of Iraq was illegal, making a withdrawal necessary

"Iraq war illegal, says Annan". BBC. September 16th, 2007 - "When pressed on whether he viewed the invasion of Iraq as illegal, he said: 'Yes, if you wish. I have indicated it was not in conformity with the UN charter from our point of view, from the charter point of view, it was illegal.'" There are two basic justifications for this claim. First, the UN charter only allows for self-defensive wars in cases where the threat is imminent. The threat was not imminent in Iraq's case. Second, exceptions to self-defensive wars require UN approval through Security Council resolutions. No explicit authorization was provided by the UN to the US and coalition forces to wage war. UN resolutions only mentioned "serious consequences" in the event of Iraqi non-compliance with inspectors. "Serious consequences" is certainly not the terminology used by the UN to authorize war; "all necessary means" are the keywords that authorize war, and they were not provided in any UN resolution. Thus, the war was illegal and coalition forces have no legal basis for continued operations in Iraq.
A US withdrawal might embolden Jihadists, but they are insignificant in Iraq

The proportion of the fighters in Iraq that are driven by a Jihadist/terrorists cause is very small. Most are fighting to expel the United States, to fight other religious sects, or simply to earn money. Therefore, while a withdrawal might embolden Jihadists, they are so insignificant in Iraq that the effect would be negligible on Iraq and US and coalition security interests.
The US tried and failed to secure a UN Security Council authorization for war.

The US actively attempted to pass a UN SC resolution authorizing the invasion of Iraq. When it discovered that it could not secure enough votes, it withdrew its resolution from the floor. It proceeded with the invasion despite not receiving this authorization, and justified the invasion on the grounds of previous resolutions. But, of course, it knew that this was far less legitimate under international law than receiving an authorization that was relevant to the circumstances. That the Bush administration proceeded despite not receiving a fresh authorization speaks to its disregard for international law and legitimacy.
Prolonging the Iraq War will permanently damaged the US military

"A responsible plan to the end the war in Iraq." 2008, Democratic plan - "Our capacity to respond with overwhelming force has been a powerful deterrent. Our military capabilities and readiness, however, have been deeply damaged by this war. Both our troops and our military equipment have been seriously depleted. Our forces are stretched so thin that we are unprepared to defend our country.6 Many of our best and brightest officers are choosing to leave military service.7 Under the grinding strain of constant wartime use, a dangerously high percentage of our military equipment is damaged, gone, or unavailable to units who might need it.8 Our dependence on private military contractors9 and the politicization of some of the upper echelons of the military compromise the professionalism which had been a hallmark of our forces10. And the nationalization of the state National Guards presents a further threat by hampering our ability to respond to emergencies at home."
Coalition forces are neutral and so more capable than Iraqi troops of preventing civil war

The obvious reason why coalition troops are effective in holding Iraqi factions apart is that they are not Iraqi Shiites, Iraqi Sunnis, nor Iraqi Kurds. This means that coalition troops can act effectively ad unbiased arbiters, security forces, policemen, and check point officers. And, Iraqis can trust coalition troops as unbiased in these roles, which is absolutely essential. If coalition forces were not trusted as arbiters in a sectarian conflicts, they would would not be approaches by Iraqis with important information on crime or sectarian violence.
Sputtering Iraqi economy requires indefinite US presence

"A responsible plan to the end the war in Iraq." 2008, Democratic plan - "Economic crisis in Iraq The state of the Iraqi economy gives Iraqis little incentive to work to preserve it. Unemployment is estimated at 60 percent,24 and most educated Iraqis, or those with money, have already fled. Foreign direct investment is under 1 percent. Most Iraqis have electricity for less than 3 hours per day. This economic paralysis is a direct impetus for the ongoing violence. Young, unemployed men end up joining militias that vie for control of neighborhood turf, rather than putting their energies toward rebuilding a shattered nation."
US justifications for war in Iraq were faulty, making a continued occupation baseless.

America and its allies should never have invaded Iraq in the first place. Claims that Saddam Hussein was linked to Al-Qaeda, and that he possessed weapons of mass destruction have both turned out to be incorrect, at best, and lies at worse. The war was an illegal act of aggression, without United Nations sanction, and the occupation is therefore also illegal. For this reason alone the coalition should remove its forces from Iraq as soon as possible.
War in Iraq is a cause of US economic recession

"A responsible plan to the end the war in Iraq." 2007, Democratic plan - "Economic costs. The Iraq War has cost U.S. taxpayers a staggering $526 billion so far15 in direct costs, and roughly $1.3 trillion to the economy so far. That’s $16,500 for each U.S. family of four, or roughly $3 billion for each Congressional district in the country. The full economic cost of the war is estimated to be $3 trillion. As the U.S. economy spirals into recession, the economic impact of the war is both a clear contributor and a factor crippling our ability to respond."
Many armed sectarian factions have a direct interest in fomenting civil war.

Many of the leaders of sectarian groups have a direct interest in fomenting civil war. These groups and their leaders are frequently disenfranchised from the Iraqi government and are incapable of achieving power through political means. Therefore, they are only capable of attaining power through their means of power, violence. A civil war, to the extent that it creates opportunities to use the power of force and violence, is subsequently within the interests of many of these disenfranchised armed groups. This is why so many armed groups seem to be attempting to foment violence. If the US withdraws, the opportunity to seize power through force will appear greater, as decisive repercussions from the US military will be gone. The nodes of a civil war, therefore, would increase.
Iraq contains oil reserves critical to global economy

"While its proven oil reserves of 112 billion barrels ranks Iraq second in the work behind Saudi Arabia, EIA estimates that up to 90-percent of the county remains unexplored due to years of wars and sanctions" [10]. The current stagflation the U.S. is experiencing is rooted in the oil shortages and energy shortcomings - continued troop presence is paramount to obtaining and using these resources effectively and preventing U.S. stagflation.
Limited "success" of surge only feeds false hopes in Iraq

Peter Dale Scott. "Why the U.S. must withdraw from Iraq". Salon.com. Oct. 28, 2004 - "In retrospect we can see that it was precisely the early U.S. successes in Thailand that misled America into an unwinnable hot war [in Vietnam]." This point can be extended as a warning against attaching too much meaning to the "success" of the surge; it may serve only to protract the war without any actual prospects for success.
The "domino theory" in a post-Iraq-withdrawal Middle East is as illegitimate as it was with Vietnam

Many argue that if coalition forces withdraw prematurely from Iraq that Iraq will fall subject to Islamism and tyranny and that, in a domino effect, so too will other Middle Eastern countries fall. This was predicted by proponents of the Vietnam War; that communism would infiltrate Vietnam if the US withdrew and subsequently infiltrate the entire region in a domino-like way. Yet, this did not happen after the US withdrawal from Vietnam. None of the region's nations subsequently became communist (except for Cambodia), and most of them enjoy democratic systems today with booming economies. With this as an example, it would appear false to claim that a US withdrawal from Iraq would result in a domino-like effect in the Middle East. Rather, it is likely that these countries' political systems will remain largely insulated from any political occurrences in Iraq.
Congress authorized the war for objectives that no longer exist

The Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) in 2002 was for the removal of Saddam Hussein from office and the elimination of the supposed WMD threat. Both objectives have been "accomplished", which means that the war no longer enjoys congressional authorization and approval. Without such authorization, the war, in its current form, lacks the added legitimacy provided by Congressional consultation and approval. While this alone may not be enough to end the war, the lack of Congressional approval is a major strike against it.
Deficit spending in Iraq is not what is causing the economy to recede in the status quo

- rather, basic economic principles dictate that in a time of recession, deficit spending (like Iraq) actually helps the economy. Furthermore, securing oil resources in the region is key to easing the stagflation in the United States. Because the current inflation occuring in the United States is supply-push or cost-push, the economy is experiencing both a recession and inflation. This supply-push inflation is rooted in transportation costs and the fact that oil is key to producing and manufacturing just about everything the U.S. GDP is composed of. Securing oil is the only way we can save the economy. Prefer specific analysis above unwarranted claims and polls by the public.
Foreign troops are doing more harm than good in Iraq

Many argue that the presence of US troops is largely exacerbating problems in Iraq, in particularly because the insurgency and terrorists are fighting US troop on an anti-occupation premise. If coalition forces leave, insurgents and terrorists will stop waging an anti-occupation war. This means that an entire component of the War in Iraq will end. While violence between Iraqis may persist on various levels, withdrawing the occupation-insurgency-terrorist front would markedly improve security.
Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) is not coordinated with Al Qaeda at large

AQI emerged in Iraq as a fairly independent organization from Al Qaeda. They adopted the name Al Qaeda in Iraq because they are terrorists and because they desired to achieve a kind of "brand recognition". But, because they are not coordinated directly with Al Qaeda at large, it would be unfair to say that any strength they accumulate from a US withdrawal from Iraq would correlate to strength accumulated by Al Qaeda at large.
The 2001 Congressional "war on terror" resolution does not authorize the Iraq War

The Bush administration has cited the "war on terror" legislation passed by the United States Congress weeks after the September 11th attacks as having warranted war in Iraq. But this legislation cannot be viewed as a blank check. While it offered the executive branch the authority to use "all necessary means" to protect the United States from terrorism, this cannot be interpreted to have included an authorization to invade Iraq, which posed no clear terrorism threat.
You cannot put a price on freedom and security.

We should be proud that our nations, and their armed forces have risen to the challenge of rebuilding Iraq, and confident that their brave efforts will make the world both safer and freer. It is a shame that other countries have not been willing to share their part of the burden. Apart from our moral commitment to the Iraqi people and the desirability of spreading freedom, it is also in our interest to secure a stable Middle East. Our free society and open economy depends for its prosperity on international peace and stability, so all our futures are threatened if we give in to terrorism in Iraq or elsewhere.
Regional powers in Iraq not equipped for war

Barry R. Posen. "The risks of staying vs. leaving Iraq". Boston Globe. April 19, 2007 - "The worst case. The civil war escalates; outsiders back their friends; their friends begin to lose, so the war escalates to become a regional conflagration. Could happen, but one should not exaggerate the military capabilities of any of the local players. They are all heavily armed, but conventional warfare is not the strong suit of any of the regional actors, with perhaps the exception of Turkey. The Saudi forces, though equipped with modern weapons, are almost surely helpless without help from western contractors. Iran's air forces are obsolete and highly vulnerable to American air attack. Moreover, Saudi Arabia and Iran are one-crop countries; each depends on oil facilities that are vulnerable to attack by the other. A kind of Mutual Assured Destruction should deter both from risking general war."
That coalition troops are not the cause of violence is shown by the fact that most attacks are not against them

. These attacks are largely against ordinary Iraqis, including innocent shoppers and worshippers in mosques, as well as policemen, soldiers and potential recruits, and construction workers. This is why the civilian death toll is so large in Iraq. Such a death toll, while unleashed by the invasion of Iraq, is not a direct cause of the presence of US troops. It is, rather, a result of many internal tensions between Iraqis that the US troops can help mollify.
Withdrawing from Vietnam did not undercut US credibility and it won't in Iraq either

Opponents of withdrawing from Vietnam in the late 60s and early 70s almost all argued that it would damage US credibility in the international arena. And yet, this is not what happened after the withdrawal. Instead, the United States continued to rise in power and influence around the world, with an economy and military that was no longer encumbered by the Vietnam war. It geopolitical strength increased, and thus so too did its geopolitical credibility and leverage increase. These lessons should be applied to Iraq.
The 2002 Congressional war-authorization does not cover the current scope of the Iraq War.

The Congressional Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) does not provide authorization for the current War in Iraq. This authorization was, first, based on conducting a war to rid Iraq of Saddam Hussein and of WMD, both of which have been accomplished. It did not provide approval for the war as it is currently being conducted, simply because the current course of the war was never a consideration on the minds of any members of the United States Congress; a war whose main effort is now to fight an insurgency, Al Qaeda in Iraq, and to prevent sectarian violence from erupting into Civil War. None of these current roles for the US military were under consideration for the AUMF, which invalidates the use of this bill as stamp of Congressional approval for the continuation of the war. If the President wants the legitimacy of Congressional approval, he should seek a new authorization from Congress to wage the war as it is currently prosecuted.
Case against Iraq withdrawal relies on fear mongering

Former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote in a March 30th, 2008 Washington Post article, "The contrast between the Democratic argument for ending the war and the Republican argument for continuing is sharp and dramatic. The case for terminating the war is based on its prohibitive and tangible costs, while the case for ’staying the course’ draws heavily on shadowy fears of the unknown and relies on worst-case scenarios. President Bush’s and Sen. John McCain’s forecasts of regional catastrophe are quite reminiscent of the predictions of ‘falling dominoes’ that were used to justify continued U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Neither has provided any real evidence that ending the war would mean disaster, but their fear-mongering makes prolonging it easier."
Success in the Middle East will be achieved like in South East Asia; despite withdrawing

US analysts feared withdrawing from Vietnam on the basis that it would undermine the future of US policies in South East Asia. Nevertheless, withdrawing did not lead to the failure of US policies in South East Asia, and some even believe it was necessary to its great successes. Similarly, many analysts fear that withdrawing from Iraq will lead to chaos in the Middle East. Yet, following the history of withdrawing from Vietnam, withdrawing would not appear to jeopardize US Middle East policies, and it may actually help them.
Iraq never disarmed after Kuwait, inviting the use of force

Following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the UN-mandated, US-led expulsion of Iraqi troops from Kuwait, the UN passed resolution 687, which called for Iraq to disarm its WMD stockpiles, or face enforcement by "all necessary means". At the time of the decision to go to war in 2002, Iraq was believed to have not disarmed its WMD stockpiles. The 2003 invasion, therefore, could be justified on the basis of Iraq's non-compliance with resolution 687 and that resolution's mandate for enforcement via "all necessary means".
Claims that disaster would follow withdrawal are made by discredited advocates of invasion

Ron Paul. "The Price of Delaying the Inevitable in Iraq". June 4, 2007 - "The growing demand by the American people for us to leave Iraq prompts the naysayers to predict disaster in the Middle East if we do. Of course, these merchants of fear are the same ones who predicted that invading and occupying Iraq would be a slam dunk operation; that we would be welcomed as liberators, and oil revenues would pay for the operation with minimal loss of American lives."
Withdrawing from Vietnam was a mistake and so should be avoided in Iraq

John E. Carey. "Consequences of Speedy Withdrawal From Iraq?". Peace and Freedom. March 31, 2008 - "Ironically, many of the same liberals who demand an immediate withdrawal of American troops from Iraq are the same ones who believe they are great protectors of human rights and also suffer from the dream that America’s withdrawal from Vietnam was justified and made Southeast Asia a better place.
The majority of Americans want troops to withdraw from Iraq on a timetable.

According to a Rasmussen Report in April of 2008, between 57 percent and 64 percent of Americans want all U.S. troops out of Iraq within a year. This includes all non-combat troops.[19] It is important to note that a majority of the American public has favored an timetable withdrawal from Iraq (within one year) as early a 2005, according to a CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll.[20] Sustained public opposition to the war increases the importance of heeding it.
Regional powers would help stabilize Iraq following US withdrawal

Lt. Gen. William E. Odom. "Cut and Run? You Bet. Why America must get out of Iraq now." Foreign Policy. May/June 2006 - "Following a withdrawal, all the countries bordering Iraq would likely respond favorably to an offer to help stabilize the situation. The most important of these would be Iran. It dislikes al Qaeda as much as we do. It wants regional stability as much as we do. It wants to produce more oil and gas and sell it. If its leaders really want nuclear weapons, we cannot stop them. But we can engage them."
It is not credible anymore to claim that success is possible "this time"

At every stage of the War in Iraq, from 2003 through 2008, "changes of strategy" have been held out as the kernel of hope toward achieving "success" "just around the corner". Each time, however, "changing" the strategy has failed to bring coalition forces noticeably closer to "success" in Iraq. Things have, rather, steadily worsened. New claims that "strategic changes" will, "this time", make the difference no longer have any credibility, and need to be shut out on this basis. The main problem is that no strategic changes can alter the fundamentals of the conflict (below).
The UN continually concluded that Iraq was breaching its disarmament obligations

The UN repeatedly noted Iraq's non-compliance with its disarmament obligations through the 90s, and authorized the use of force on a number of occasions. Prior to the 2003 invasion, UN chief weapons inspector Hans Blix concluded that Iraq continued to shirk compliance, and that it continued to have stores of WMD. The invasion could be justified on these grounds; continued non-compliance and past authorizations for the use of force.
Americans would not have supported the Iraq War if they'd known what it would become

Zbigniew Brzezinski. "Plan to End Iraq War". Washington Post. March 30, 2008 - "if the American people had been asked more than five years ago whether Bush’s obsession with the removal of Saddam Hussein was worth 4,000 American lives, almost 30,000 wounded Americans and several trillion dollars — not to mention the less precisely measurable damage to the United States’ world-wide credibility, legitimacy and moral standing — the answer almost certainly would have been an unequivocal 'no.'"
A civil war in Iraq would draw in regional powers

In a January 2007 report, "Things Fall Apart: Containing the Spillover From an Iraq Civil War," Pollack and co-author Daniel Byman studied 11 civil wars, from Lebanon in the 1980s and Afghanistan and the Balkans in the 1990s, to Somalia and the Congo today. They uncovered that, in nearly every case, civil wars and collapsed states attracted the military intervention of neighbors who saw their interests threatened. If civil war occurs in Iraq, it is likely to result in a similar fate, drawing surrounding states into a broader regional war.[13]
An early US withdrawal from Iraq would be generally disastrous

Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr. "How to Win in Iraq". Foreign Affairs. September/October, 2005 - "The administration's critics, meanwhile, have offered as their alternative 'strategy' an accelerated timetable for withdrawal. They see Iraq as another Vietnam and advocate a similar solution: pulling out U.S. troops and hoping for the best. The costs of such premature disengagement would likely be calamitous. The insurgency could morph into a bloody civil war, with the significant involvement of both Syria and Iran. Radical Islamists would see the U.S. departure as a victory, and the ensuing chaos would drive up oil prices."
No strategic changes in Iraq can alter the fundamental impossibilities of the conflict.

The fundamentals of the Iraq conflict cannot be resolved by strategic adjustments. These fundamentals are: a counter-insurgency war, anti-American Iraqis that support insurgents, sectarian hatreds, an endless flood of Jihadi terrorists into Iraq, the difficulties of urban warfare, the lack of sufficient numbers of US troops, and a host of other factors. No strategic changes can affect these fundamental problems. We should not be fooled, therefore, by claims of "strategic changes" holding the key to success "this time". And, with no prospect for "strategic modifications" making success possible, the United States and coalition forces should leave.
Post-invasion UN resolutions authorized the presence of coalition forces in Iraq.

While there may be some questions regarding the legal justifications for the invasion of Iraq, there is no question that the UN has provided resolutions authorizing the post-invasion presence of coalition forces in Iraq. On January 1, 2009, the last UN resolution providing this authorization will expire. The United State will likely seek an additional resolution to extend into 2009 and beyond. The point here is that a continuum of UN resolutions have provided continual legitimacy to the presence of coalition forces in Iraq. They also override any argument that the Iraq War is illegal based on the lack of a UN resolution; subsequent UN authorization has been provided. There is, therefore, no justification for withdrawing on the basis of a lack of UN resolutions.