Metaphysical Solipsism is Most Likely True

Alas let me begin. PrefaceI will be taking two approaches to this resolution within this debate. The first is to directly affirm solipsism via. epistemological grounds. I. e. We should prefer belief in solipsism to be true outright. Secondly I will argue for solipsism via. idealism. Thus I will establish that physical reality doesn’t exist, and thus only mind exists. Then, via further arguments I will establish that solipsism is the only compatible philosophy assuming idealism. A1. Epistemologically Preferred PositionWe cannot doubt our own mind. Cogito ergo sum (I think therefore I am) establishes that any act of doubting one’s own mind automatically presupposes there is a doubter (you), thus we can have certainty of our own minds existence. The same however cannot be said for ‘external reality’, external reality is but a conjunct of experiences in the form of various qualia (sensations of colour, sounds, touch, etc. ), however there is nothing inherent that ties them to the fact that external reality exists. We can be certain that the qualia exists within our minds, but we cannot justifiably make any claims that these qualia represent anything external to our minds. Thus we should reject this notion purely on Occam’s Razor grounds. Solipsism simply makes fewer assumptions than any other ontology. A2. Argument From IdealismMind does not reduce to non-mindI will establish idealism is true in two parts. First by establishing that non-mind is not fundamental, and second by establishing a multiplicity of substances is a false ontology, which leaves the conclusion that monistic idealism entails. Leibniz Law of Identity of Indecernables This law dictates that for two things to be the same that they must have the same properties. For whatever is true for one must be true for the other. What is metaphysically possible for one must also be metaphysically possible for the other, and so on and so forth. If everything is true for one is also true for another, and vice versa, then both things are the same. Thus:P1) If mind is non-mind, then what is true for mind is true for non-mindP2) It is true that it is possible for mind to exist in a solipsistic worldP3) It is not true that it’s possible for non-mind to exist in a solipsistic worldC) Thus, mind is not non-mindDefence of P1This is true by Leibniz Law of Identity of Indecernables. Defence of Premise 2Solipsism is a logically self-contained universe, for it to not be metaphysically possible then it must entail a logical or metaphysical incoherence, yet solipsism remains a stubburn (albeit annoying) philosophy to this day. For virtually any inductive argument given in favour of another ontology such as physicalism is also compatible with solipsism, since the world exists as a perception. Virtually anything said of the physical can be reduced coherently to the mental. Defence of Premise 3Premise 3 is true by definition, only a world of idealism is compatible with solipsism, thus it is impossible for a non-mental substance to exist in it. ConclusionShould follow deductively if the premises are true. The only premise that can be realistically contested is premise 2, which can only be false if it is metaphysically impossible. A tough burden for Con to overcome! !Substance Pluralism is falseSo far the immaterial nature of mind is established, thus now to address pluralism, the notion there is more than one substance. Interaction ProblemThe most trivial reason to reject poluralism is because, assuming pluralism is true, then the mental must interact with the non-mental. I. e. your mind tells your arm to move, and your arm moves. If pluralism is true, then your mind (which doesn’t reduce to non-mind, or material, etc. ) must somehow interact with non-mind. But how is this even possible if they are fundamentally different substances. It would be akin to a ghost with no physical properties pushing a block across the table, it needs to interact somehow! Another problem is inductive. IF it was true that the mental interacts with the non-mental, then we would expect evidence of this ‘interaction barrier’, or this ‘third substance’ with the shared properties, such as a substance with both qualia and electric charge which we can detect with both ‘physical’ methods, or ‘mental’methods. Yet evidence for this is absent. Furthermore, our laws of physics are essentially closed, thus if there existed both non-mind (which is detectable physically) and mind (which is not in pluralism) then we would expect our laws of physics to be causally open. We would not expect the law of thermodynamics to hold, nor any other uniformity laws (such as energy conservation), since there would be the ‘void’ where the open non-mental world would be spilling interaction, energy, etc over to. This is obviously, false. Thus, monistic idealism entails. Metaphysical Solipsism is NecessaryThis argument is adapted from knownnomore’s refutation of idealism, ironically this refuation only world if solipsism is false, I intend to adapt it to show solipsism is necessary. P1) Mind is fundamentalP1) If mind is fundamental, then either my mind is fundamental, or another mind is fundementalP2) Another mind cannot be fundamentalC) My mind is fundamentalP1 I have already justified so far. P2 follows de facto, mind is fundamental, thus some mind must be fundamental, either mine or someone elses. Something must ground reality in some form. Thus I only really need to justify P2. This rather trivial. IF another mind is fundamental, while all other minds are contingent, then there needs to be a reason for why one mind si fundamental, but my mind is not. This reason cannot be encapsulated within “it’s mind”, because that would entail another substance, thus we cannot have a reason for this difference that is within the ontology of idealism, thus the reason cannot exist and the notion of another mind being fundamental is also incoherent. Otherwise there would be something external to idealism that is fundamental, which I have already proven so far is false. Thus solipsism entails. Back to Con!