Morality is an Idea

>1. Any theory of morality ought to rationally account for both moral distinctions and moral obligations. I would like to reiterate, your idea of "moral obligations" consists of people convincing others to follow their brand of morality. This is an action, and philosophies are under absolutely no obligation to rationally account for the actions of others. Not every action has a rational basis, and it is silly to assume that one must prescribe one to them. >2. The resolution is a relative moral system. >If morality is just an idea then it must be a relative morality, i.e., a morality consisting of subjective opinion rather absolute moral laws. In this theory, morality is a convention and not a reality. Yes, this is true. I have not found your arguments for why it is otherwise to be convincing. The major reason is what I stated above. >3. Relative moral systems cannot rationally account for moral obligations. Like I said, no human action is necessarily entitled to philosophical and logical rationalization. One must account for natural phenomena, but not for human actions. Human actions are products of free will, hormones, and often a small dose of insanity, nothing more. >Take for example the post modern moral theory which essentially dictates that so long as one's actions do not harm other people, those actions are permissible. Adherents to this philosophy are happy until someone passes judgment (moral obligation). If judging others does not create harm, one should be permitted to do so. But judgment is deemed as objectively evil in the post modern worldview. In other words, they adhere to a relative morality on the surface, but fall back on an objective morality in practice. Thus, the moral theory is irrational. Not all postmodernists believe judging is evil, they simply think it is superfluous and narrow-minded. If they think judgment is evil, it may simply be because so many of those judgments (homosexuality is bad, loud music is bad, sexuality outside the confines of marriage is bad) are backed up by actions that DO end up hurting people (firings, lynching, police intervention). If social judgment never entailed negative consequences, then postmodernists would most likely brush them off completely. Until then, people will protest Proposition 8 and the Rodney King beatings until the authorities give in or they die of exhaustion. >Now take for example the naturalist moral theory which claims morality to be a necessary evolutionary advancement, meant to advance the human species. Morality, as a result, is a product of advanced human thought which is in turn a product of natural selection. Yet adherents reject the notion of one "Fit" committing genocide against an Unfit" culture, as though human life is more sacred than other animals. When injustice hits too close to home, the naturalist no longer considers survival of the fit to be adequate in justifying any atrocity. Naturalists speak of evil even though evolution is impersonal; again, an irrational position. If you're referring to World War II as a grand act of human altruism, I would have to disagree that there was much more than simple self-interest at play in the decision to oppose them. Until 1941, the U.S. was content to isolate itself from the world at large. In fact, up until that point, the U.S. praised Hitler and Mussolini and invested heavily in their industries. It wasn't until the U.S. was a target of Axis military aggression (Pearl Harbor) that it decided to step in. As for feelings of attachment, it is far too coincidental that they are generally held for those who ensure people's Darwinian fitness (relatives, mates, friends, allies, etc). Any grand moral pronouncements regarding the necessity of human evil are artifacts of the human imagination or the perfectly rationally self-interested desire of university professors and affirmative action coordinators to keep their cushy, well-paid jobs. That's why today we allow millions of Africans to starve even though saving them would be a thousand times easier now than fighting both the Nazis and the Japanese was back in 1945. >Ghosts are not a necessary precondition for objective morality, but absolute moral entities are. Again, you fail to give me a reason to think that this is even an issue. People act based on ideas of "objective morality," and they also act based on tribal affiliation and schizophrenia. Actions speak louder than words, but not necessarily more convincingly. >Any theory on morality must justify its use in practice. Again, no action necessarily deserves justification. Why are acts forcing others to comply with one's morality any different? >What I call human experience, my opponent calls human action. He insists that moral obligation is simply one person acting on an idea. Yes, I do. This is because your definition of moral obligation >Moral obligation is the act of holding another person or group of people to a specific moral standard. is described by YOU YOURSELF as an action. Why must this necessarily prove that the motivations are just? I act, therefore I am right? That is silly. >I would argue that humans act on only on belief, whether the belief is in a truth or lie. Exactly. We agree that people aren't necessarily right when they act. >Thus, when someone takes the action of moral obligation, they reveal a belief that their morality is undeniably true. Therefore, a relative moralist abandons the belief in morality as mere opinion when obligating another party to his/her moral standard, taking on instead a belief--albeit temporarily--that morality is objectively true. Adherents to an objective moral theory do not commit this fallacy. Actually, believers in relative morality do no such thing. When they act on their own wishes by eating an apple, are they contradicting themselves? Why would acting on their wishes while performing a moral intervention be any different? They, their subjective self, are performing an action that will please their subjective self or at least allow their subjective self to gaze into the mirror without shame. Whim and desire are simple emotions, and shame is no different. >In other words, my opponent presupposes that only empirical evidence brings knowledge--an axiom which cannot itself be empirically proven. No, I am simply saying that if something does not exist literally, then it does not exist except as an abstraction. If you wish to prove the opposite, that an abstract, moral Plato-space exists beyond the walls of sleep, then that is an entirely different discussion. >By showing the irrationality of subjective morality, I have made the possibility of absolute moral laws more likely. Like I said, there is nothing novel or amiss about human action essentially being devoid of reason. >There must be a fixed truth behind them in order that they may be reliable. You have never defined reliable. If by reliable you mean logically consistent, then all one must do is conceive a logically consistent idea of morality. Ideas don't have to be real to be logically consistent. >If it is just an idea then this debate and others like it are rendered entirely meaningless and we should all do what our hearts desire. If one wishes, then one may do so. Unless you're poor or in prison, in which case it is physical, rather than metaphysical, reality that is preventing you. >Relative morality's ultimate end is no morality. And why is this necessarily untrue? Because it would be unpleasant if it were? >Therefore, by necessity, morality must be objective and can therefore not be just an idea. Whose necessity? Reason's, or yours? I thank my opponent for engaging in this debate. This was entertaining and (somewhat) fruitful.