God Exists.

Con seems to have no problem with my argument except for the possibility of there existing a God (as he did not raise any objections with it). So I will get to refuting Con's objections against my definition of God. Con brings us back to a familiar problem with the concept of omnipotence - can God create a rock too heavy for him to lift? Normally this argument is considered enough by itself but Con supplements it with a sort of additional argument about greater conceivable beings. It runs roughly as: since God cannot create a rock too heavy for him to lift (which would outright disprove the concept of an omnipotent being if right in any case) Con can conceive of a being greater than God that can do the task. This would make it so that God is *not* the greatest conceivable being. I admit I've never heard of this supplement to the stone paradox but I am confused at what it's supposed to do. Which part of argument is supposed to disprove God? The classical stone paradox or the argument from greater conceivable beings? If it's the first part then that would render Con's second argument from greater conceivable beings superfluous. Unfortunately, there are several problems with both of Con's arguments. First, I will tackle the second part of Con's disproof. Con ignores the definition of supreme: "the property that a thing has if and only if it is impossible for something to be greater and impossible for there to be something else than which it is not greater. " What this means is that it is *impossible* by definition that anything be conceived of that is greater in some way than God. If Con can conceive of a more powerful force than God then Con wasn't conceiving of God in the first place. The most "powerful force" is by definition God. There can no forces more powerful than God. What Con is essentially saying is that he can conceive of force that is more powerful than an *OMNIPOTENT* being. That makes no sense. An omnipotent being, by definition, is all-powerful. Assuming I have misunderstood his argument and the classical stone paradox is meant to disprove God I will refute that objection as well. Typically, omnipotence is defined in two ways: 1) The ability to do absolutely anything (including logical impossibilities). 2) The ability to do anything logically possible. From my understanding of omnipotence it really means (roughly) what number 2 is stating. I will answer the paradox from both definitions of omnipotence for posterity, however. Take the first definition of omnipotence - God can do absolutely *anything*. Notice what this does, though. This makes it that God can make logical contradictions true. So, let's say that Con presents an airtight sound logical argument showing that no such omnipotent being as God can exist. I mean an argument that absolutely disproves God and no rational person could think otherwise. Well, if God can do absolutely anything he can make it that he exists even though Con's sound logical argument shows that he doesn't! I don't think Con wants to take this option. Take the second definition of omnipotence - God can do anything logically possible. This is the position I actually hold. Creating a stone that is too heavy for an omnipotent being to lift must be nonsense then. A logical contradiction isn't a task. It isn't any"thing" in fact. Is a square circle a thing? No, of course not. It's not even a possibility. It's an incoherent "concept" if I may even call it that. Saying that God doesn't have omnipotence (and therefore can't exist) because he can't create a logical contradiction like creating a stone too heavy for him to lift is absurd. In essence Con is asking a meaningless question akin to this: "Green remaining Japanese sky cat? Ha! Can God do that? No? ! Well, then God doesn't exist; furthermore, I can conceive of a more powerful force that can do that! " Even if Con were to take the more traditional route with the stone paradox Con's argument would still fail. Now, much of what I have said above applies to his second abstract example. I quote Con: "Assume for a moment that he does exist. Is it not conceivable that there could be another entity capable of destroying 'God', and would it not then be conceivable that an even more powerful entity could destroy that one and so on. " The short answer: no. The longer answer: no, it is not conceivable that another entity destroy God or even be capable of such an act. That would make that other entity more powerful than an *OMNIPOTENT* being (God). Absurdity. Again, you can't have a being be more powerful than an omnipotent being - that is logically impossible. I'm a bit confused by Con's last part. What does Con mean when Con says that a being existing beyond our three-dimensional space doesn't meet my definition of God? What does "not meet [your] definition of God" even mean? Ignoring that; assuming that the universe had a beginning - and all of physical reality with it - would necessarily make God "beyond" our three-dimensional space. Assuming that the universe is eternal and arguing that God is not part of the universe, because otherwise God would be contingent (making him not supreme), that would necessarily make God "beyond" our three-dimensional space. What part of that doesn't meet the definition of God?