Homosexual Acts are Immoral

Pro's Sources and Conduct In his final statement, Pro used his sources page for arguments. Specifically, his footnotes 3, 4, 5 and 8 all contain argument and/or commentary. Pro may wish to claim that these statements are incidental, but in at least one case - number 8, where he states that one of my cited sources (namely himself) did not mean what I argued he meant - he states something which would potentially affect the outcome of this debate if accepted. He makes an argument.This is a clear attempt to circumvent the character count restrictions. It's the ethical equivalent of an oral debater making arguments during his "prep time." This behavior meets the spirit, if not the letter, of Pro's own rule that one side violating any term of the debate should result in all seven points going to his opponent. I therefore submit that I should be awarded all seven points.Failing that, I should be awarded sources, conduct and, as I will now show in my final statement, arguments. (I will use few sources here myself, as Pro’s argument consists mostly of logical fallacies.)One: Is/Ought Pro’s objection to Hare is self-defeating. Shortly after the quote Pro cites, McInerny goes on to explain that that very objection to Hare cannot be maintained except under Thomistic natural law (NL), which is inherently theistic.[24] But Pro has already committed to a non-theistic view of NL. Also, this response merely calls for further qualification that “good,” in asking whether a function-aligned use of an organ is good, is used in a moral, not literary, sense. It does not defeat Hare. Pro argues that “good” has an action-guiding aspect by virtue of the attributing noun only. But this implies that “good action” and “bad action” mean the same thing. Pro has refused to explain what he means by moral normativity being “grounded” in biological normativity. For the above reasons, Pro has failed to show that his NL bridges the is/ought gap. Two: Teleology. Pro argues that I need to present an argument that teleology in nature does not exist. This is false; it is burden-shifting. Pro has the burden to show that teleology does exist. Pro argues that descriptive accounts of biological processes fail to account for regularities in biology. However, this argument assumes that a description of a biological process that does not include include an Aristotelian final cause is inadequate, which in turn assumes teleology, which is what is at issue in this objection. So this argument begs the question. Pro’s use of the term EAAN (Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism) proves that he is indeed arguing from a theistic concept of NL. Thus, having failed to rebut 3A and 3B above, Pro’s case fails. Regarding EAAN itself, we have no reason to think that an information-processing algorithm whereby consistent false beliefs are conducive to survival, nor has Pro shown that the EAAN disproves a pragmatic philosophy of mind, other than to say that it is a minority position; a clear argumentum ad populum. Pro now denies having endorsed external teleology, and states that he had meant internal teleology all along. That being the case, it was incumbent upon him to address my first round argument that internal teleology would be formed by happenstance, such as plate tectonics and meteors, and that objective morality cannot be based on happenstance. Nowhere in the entire debate did he do this. Pro denies assuming without argument that teleology exists in several of his statements. He did offer two arguments but, as I have shown, has been unable to defend either of them without assuming teleology. Thus, the question-begging problem remains. The Teleology objection stands. Three: Foundation/Four: DCT Since Pro now states that he meant internal teleology all along, I admit that this would weaken these two objections -- if not for the fact that the theistic nature of his own NL theory is established by his own arguments elsewhere (see above). Pro accuses me of committing tu quoque, or arguing that Pro is hypocritical, in my having quoted him as rejecting all naturalistic morality. On the contrary, I was simply using Pro as a source. In his Sources page, Pro argued that he himself did not mean what he said; this is, as I've established, an attempt to circumvent the character limit, and Pro should forfeit for this alone. Pro has failed to establish that NL requires neither God nor a coherent DCT; thus, both these objections stand. Five: Handstands Pro denies having conceded that sex for pleasure is proper, at least under certain circumstances. Two sentences later, however, he makes that very same concession a second time: “One may act for the pure motivation of pleasure-seeking.” He qualifies this by saying that this act must conform to the proper function of the genitalia, namely procreation, but whether that is the (sole) proper function of the genitalia is, again, what is at issue in this objection. The question-begging fallacy therefore remains.Pro states that senior citizens can have sex because that act is oriented toward procreation, even if the end of procreation cannot be achieved. To be oriented, however, means to be pointed or directed towards an end or goal. I can think of no way in which sex between an infertile couple is directed toward the end of procreation. So Pro has not explained why, given NL, senior citizens may have sex. In any case, Pro did not deny that handstands for pleasure are immoral. Therefore, given the above arguments, Pro has failed to establish that morality can be derived from proper function. Six: Pleasure Pro thinks, perhaps because I did not use the word “eating,” that I did not address his analogical argument that, just as pleasure via taste buds are motivational for eating nutritious food, so sexual pleasure is motivational for procreating. I did address that, by saying that pleasure can be both motivational and a proper function. Pro has given no reason to believe, in light of this objection, that this is not the case. 6A: Pro does not respond to this at all. He therefore concedes that the female orgasm and procreation are biologically unrelated except by happenstance of timing. 6B: My response to Pro’s parts/whole argument assumed an understanding of moral terms which Pro later denied. So let us consider his statement that “parts themselves are subservient to the whole and derive their function by virtue of the role they play in the whole.” The clitoris is subservient to the body. The role it plays in the body is pleasure, and only pleasure. Thus, this is a function. In any case, Pro does not deny that FOD is a medical malfunction, the treatment of which is proper. 6C: Pro concedes that FGM is significantly worse than toenail mutilation, and this is by virtue of the clitoris giving pleasure. Construing NL as a science[25], and using Gould’s definition of a scientific fact[26], I argue that the evidence in 6A-C establish pleasure as a proper function to such a degree that to deny it would be perverse. Pro’s argument thus fails. Summary Pro has failed to meet each one of my objections. He has failed to: Define his moral terms in a non-circular manner, Establish the existence of a morally relevant teleology, Establish the metaphysical foundation of NL (or refute its necessity) Overcome the DCT, Show despite the morality of handstands for pleasure alone that morality can be derived from proper function, or Refute the fact of pleasure as a proper function. All of my objections stand. Pro has failed to meet his burden of proof. The resolution has not been established. Indeed, it has been negated. Also, as stated above, I believe that the spirit of Pro's rule in his opening statement mandates that I should be awarded all seven points, as Pro has improperly used his sources page to make arguments. But at the very least, I should be awarded points for arguments, sources and conduct. I thank Contradiction for an engaging debate. I thank the readers for their attention, and ask them to VOTE CON.Sources: http://bit.ly...;