The Morality of Abortion

I would like to begin by appreciating the uniqueness of the pro's argument. It is most definitely an argument I have not encountered before. Definitions ----------- Human personhood: A human being who is alive and separate from any other human person Law of biogenesis: The scientific law that states that living things reproduce after their own kind (see R1) Embryo: A zygote consisting of 32 cells (normally 4 days after fertilization) Allow me to first explain the difference between a zygote and an adult human heart. It is true that a human heart is part of a human. It is true that it is alive, but it itself is not a living human organism (which is what I think the pro means by person). When I say that a zygote is a human being with rights I mean to say that it is a completely separate creature from the mother. In other words, it is a completely new living organism. A human heart is not a separate creature from the mother, it is a part of the mother. Now, don't confuse this to mean that if something is attached to the mother it is apart of the mother. Something can be attached to another human being and not be apart of that human being. I believe that when the pro says at the moment of conception a unique entity comes into existence, he means that an entity which is separate from its mother (i.e. an entity unique from it its mother) comes into existence. With that said, let me add a premise to Argument A (see R1) argument. Here is the new logical syllogism. Argument A (argument by the law of biogenesis; revised): P1: Living human persons have the right to life P2: Requirements for being a human person are a) being human, b) being alive, c) being separate from another human person (some may argue that having a soul is a requirement but this it is impossible to point to a place where a spiritual thing is developed so I will leave it out of my argument) P3: A zygote fills the biological requirements for life P4: By the law of biogenesis a zygote (see R1) is a human being P5: A zygote is a separate entity from the mother C: A zygote fills all of the requirements for personhood and therefore has a right to life. I believe this new syllogism better defines my argument. Now I would like to address the dilemma presented by the pro. I find that is easiest to address these problems by addressing them on a larger scale. Assuming we have no problems with the above syllogism (i.e. we are assuming that at the moment of conception a zygote is a human person), let me present a hypothetical situation that I think should answer the scenario presented. Imagine that we have a singular adult person. Say at a random moment the man (M1) splits in two into two separate entities (M2 and M3). Logically, M2 and M3 are M1's biological offspring. By the law of biogenesis they are human beings. Because they are living human beings who are separate from any other human person, they meet the requirements for personhood. This is merely asexual reproduction. Now say that both M2 and M3 were to spontaneously fuse together to form a new man (M4). M4 would be the offspring of both M2 and M3. Because both M2 and M3 are human beings, M4 is a human being as well. M4 is obviously alive (although he may be a bit confused) and is obviously separate from any other human person. M4 meets the requirements for human personhood and therefore has the right to life. Here is my argument in a logical syllogism Argument C (a refutation of the twinning and fusion argument): P1: An embryo (which is just a more mature zygote) is a human person at the moment of conception (see argument A) P2: The law of biogenesis states that living things reproduce after their own kind. This means that a human parent can only have human babies. P3: Requirements for being a human person are a) being human, b) being alive, c) being separate from another human person P3: If an embryo reproduces asexually into two separate embryos, then those two embryos are its biological offspring P4: An embryo splits into two separate embryos, E2 and E3. P5: E2 and E3 are alive C: E2 and E3 are offspring of the original embryo which is a human being and therefore fulfill the requirements for human personhood by the law of biogenesis. My argument would be the same if we were talking about M2 and M3 fusing into M4. Let me now address the difference between personal identity and human personhood. I would stipulate that it does not matter whether M1 dies or merely is M2. All that matters is that they meet the requirements for personhood. If I separate into two beings exactly like me (but neither one is me) is it wrong to kill the two new beings that spawned? Well if they are my offspring, I would argue that they inherit my personhood and it would be wrong. They have different personal identities (i.e. they are different people) but they have the same personhood (i.e. they are still people) and it would be wrong to kill them. I believe it would be just as wrong to kill the two beings if I were one of those beings. In other words, if I split into two beings (where I am one of them) I would argue that we are both people and it would be wrong to kill us. I believe this logic extends to the embryo. It does not matter if P1 is P2 or if P1 is dead (i.e. the personal identity of the separate embryos does not matter). In summation, just because you do not know who you are killing does not mean you are not killing a person. Thank you for your time.