The argument from evil is successful

The argument before us has been presented above in the following manner: 1) If God exists, gratuitous evil does not exist. 2) Gratuitous evil exists 3) Therefore, God does not exist My opponent (OP) accepts (1) and for the time being, though I have reservations, I will as well. The argument is valid which leaves us with premise (2) as the focal point. OP has already noted as much and, therefore, supports (2) with an argument along the following lines: 4) If X appears to exist then it is more reasonable to believe that X exists than not. 5) Gratuitous evils appear to exist. 6) Therefore, it is more reasonable to believe that gratuitous evils exist than not. Now, what is correctly noted by OP is that this argument works only “in the absence of defeaters.” What will a defeater look like? A defeater will show that one is reasonably justified in believing gratuitous evils do not exist despite the presence of inscrutable evils. Again, what is required is not to prove that gratuitous evils do not exist, but merely that it is reasonable to believe that they do not. (I also wish to point out that I do not need to prove that God exists.) In regard to my opponents opening definition of a successful argument this would mean that one is under no epistemic obligation to raise one’s credence. Whether the defeaters I offer will “do the job” will be our point of contention. In this first reply I offer one. Building A Case: The most prominent defense against this type of evidential argument has typically been the idea that an omni-God could have a justifiable reason for allowing evils despite our lacking the epistemic capabilities to know what that justification actually is. In other words, even though the evil is inscrutable to us and it is, according to OP’s argument, reasonable for us to believe it is gratuitous, it is, at least, equally probable that an omni-God has a justifiable reason for allowing that evil which is not presently accessible to us. In pre-empting this response OP offers a criticism: “But I will say now (as the literature neglects it) that for us not to trust our appearances, it needs to be shown that our moral faculties are too poor to have access to whether an evil is gratuitous: it is not enough to show that our faculties are far inferior to someone else's (e.g. God's).” Most likely, the reason the literature has neglected this criticism is that in considering the cognitive abilities of humans we make certain assumptions. For example, we have limited resources in terms of our ability to know the past and future, we are limited in our ability to compute certain amounts of information, we are limited in our perceptual capabilities (i.e. their range and precision), etc. It seems plain that this is representative of the epistemic capabilities of humans, or lack thereof. Furthermore, in considering an omni-God we are also assuming a being whose epistemic situation is vastly superior and more capable to that of a human. The point, therefore, is not to simply say that God is superior, but that due to these implications it follows, quite reasonably, that an omni-God has access to, at the very least, information that we do not. Let’s piggy-back the chess analogy and bring to light a few of our epistemic limitations in regard to moral situations. I offer two 1) Consider the “end-game” to be the “closing” of a given event. In other words, the point of time in which, after an inscrutable evil, a moral good could no longer be instantiated that would justify said event. If one assumes it is after the completion of a given inscrutable evil then he begs the question, for instance, against any type of eschatological theodicies. The point being that our epistemic limitations do not put is in position to determine whether or not an inscrutable evil is still “open” for justification. Since we cannot show ourselves to be at “the end game” it is unreasonable to assume we have the necessary information required to judge whether or not a given evil is gratuitous and, therefore, opens the possibility that justification can be provided. Considering our epistemic limitations the assertion that we have an adequate moral capacity to recognize gratuitous evils seems to have failed. Let’s refer to this limitation as (VEG) for “vague end game.” 2) Furthermore, even given an inscrutable evil and a moral good it is highly questionable that a group of even the most intelligent of humans would have the cognitive faculties to understand the connection, if any, and its implications. For example, consider an inscrutable evil, of which we are aware, that occurred last Tuesday. Let’s assume that, in light of the defeater in question, this inscrutable evil led to a moral good which, unbeknownst to us, justified the inscrutable evil the following day. Furthermore, consider our proverbial “chessboard” which is the world and all the events that have occurred between Tuesday and Wednesday. Now, since we know an inscrutable evil and a moral good both occurred, what is the possibility that, given our epistemic limits, we understand the connection between the two without a full understanding of the “mid-game?” (Of course, there are specific reasons for which we could narrow the parameters. This does happen in certain instances and I’ll discuss them shortly.) Furthermore, what are the limitations on discovering a connection when these events are a week apart, a year, a hundred years, etc.? The mere recognition of “the end game” will not provide us with the information needed to understand the causal chain between the inscrutable evil and the moral good. For instance, in the “Bambi” scenario it could be that a moral good occurred sometime later as a result of Bambi’s death for which we lack the cognitive abilities to see a connection. Again, in considering our epistemic limitations this strategy seems to have failed. Let’s call this epistemic limitation (NPC) for “no perceivable connection.” These examples accurately show two difficulties surrounding our epistemic capabilities and, specifically, our capabilities in assessing various moral situations. Were one to reject either would require assessing human cognitive abilities to be above and beyond what is presently understood and accepted. The Defeater: It is clear that we lack the epistemic capabilities of an omni-God which will seriously limit our ability to identify connections between inscrutable evils and moral goods. Although, this defeater is strong enough to counter my OP’s argument one more addition will put it fully to rest. It is quite obvious that we often encounter “evil” we know is justifiable due to its positive results. OP, being in the medical profession, will be quite familiar with the immense number of situations in which present suffering will lead to someone’s healthy recovery. In fact, there is an unquantifiable number of instances that have occurred in which the justification of a given evil event can be identified. Considering this, in conjunction with our epistemic limitations, the defeater for my opponent’s argument is this: (1) We know of “lots” of instances where evil is justified. (2) Given such epistemic limitations as (VEG) and (NPC) it is unlikely that we will find justification for each and every evil that has occurred. (3) Given (1) and (2) it is at least as likely that a given evil has justification as that it does not. (4) Therefore, we are under no epistemic obligation to raise our credence concerning the non-existence of God. In short, the evidence we have from seeing various ‘evils’ justified and the lack of our epistemic capabilities (e.g. VEG and NPC) shows we have a powerful defeater for each instance of inscrutable evil and, at the very least, an equal amount of evidence for believing it is non-gratuitous than that it is. Thus, “lots” of inscrutable evils do nothing to raise our credence of gratuitous evils because we have “lots” of reasons to think they do not exist.