its more likely than not that no one can know anything

Thanks, Pro, for this interesting challenge. Thanks to DDO for hosting these debates. And thanks to any readers, especially those who take the time to vote or give feedback. Resolution: Pro has undertaken to prove this resolution: Resolved: It is more likely than not that no one can know anything. The Obvious Problem: The resolution is self-refuting: If we don't know anything, then we certainly don't know that we don't know anything. But Pro hedged. He said we probably can't know anything. But, if we don't know anything, then we don't know anything about probabilities. But perhaps Pro is not done hedging. He may say we don't 100% know that we probably don't know anything. Rather, we only probably don't know that we probably don't know. But, if that were true, then we probably wouldn't know it. In which case, Con would have to win this debate. The better Pro is able to defend the resolution---or any other claim---the less likely it is that the resolution is true. We Do Have Knowledge: We know that two plus two equals four. We know some poems rhyme. We know the 2nd law of thermodynamics is either true or not. We know George Washington was the first president of the United States. We know Wednesday comes between Tuesday and Thursday. We know there are three feet in a yard. We know people buy stocks on Wall Street. We know Americans tend to drive on the right side of the road. Amazingly, we even know that Pulp Fiction is better than I Spit on your Grave. Many of us know where we went to grade school. We know that if nobody knows anything, then Pro doesn't even know whether the above statements are suspect. Pro's First Argument: Pro wrote: "no one can know for certain whether or not an alleged "proof" of theirs is valid because there is a potential for their own human error. " That's not relevant if knowledge is justified true belief. If your belief is justified, and if your belief happens to be true, then it doesn't matter whether there was a potential for human error. If you have a well-founded belief that happens to be true in the actual world, then that is knowledge---regardless of whether it might be false in other possible worlds. Pro's Second Argument: Pro wrote: "an alleged proof must pass certain criteria to be confirmed as a valid and 100% conclusive proof. but how can we know that these criteria are infallible and cant potentially yield a falsehood? "I'm not sure, here in round one, but this looks to me like special pleading. It's like he wants me to have to prove things 100% conclusively, and infallibly, and in way that can't even potentially be false. But all he wants to prove is that it is likely that it is likely that the resolution is true. That's a double standard, special pleading. Or it's like he wants us to use, in this debate, a special language of skepticism that we wouldn't use elsewhere: Officer: "What's your name? "Pro: "I'm not sure. "Officer: "Do you have ID? "Pro: "I sort of have a thing like a belief that I maybe probably have what could be an ID. " Officer: "You on drugs? "Pro: "I may not be in a position to say. " Officer: "Quit screwing around! Do you understand me? "Pro: "Possibly not. "Officer: "Step out of the car. "Pro: "I'm really really sorry. Maybe. At least I think so. Or I think I think so. " But this debate isn't about special phrasing. In real life, and in regular language, we do know things. Conclusion: - The resolution is self refuting: Pro has undertaken to prove that it is a fact that the resolution is more likely true than false. But, if the resolution were true, then he could never do that. - We have knowledge. (Examples provided above. ) Therefore, the resolution is false. - Pro's first argument is false because some of our justified beliefs are true. Therefore, some of our justified beliefs are knowledge. - Pro's second argument requires special pleading or equivocation, both of which are logical fallacies. Therefore, the resolution is both false and unproven.