Mind Over Matter? (2)

Hopefully we can start suitable continuations of this debate, perhaps to the point of focusing on many sharply specific issues. ==================== Hempel's Dilemma ==================== "Now what principled reason could one give to deny that it is highly likely that this will happen again and again and again in the future while holding on to the definition of physicalism as only things that can be described by physics existing? " I'll go off this quote to begin: my reply specifically noted that there is a distinct fuzziness in physicalism. At my current knowledge concerning physicalism, I am inclined to agree that there is no fundamental principle in believing that only the physical exists (unless one creates an overtly adaptive definition of physical, which I am not keen towards doing). Is this a problem? Perhaps, if I was an ardent physicalist who denies dualism based on such convictions. .. but I'm not. I affirm that I know the physical exists due to scientific principles (indeed, whatever science discovers IS considered to be physical). However, I also agree that this does not deny the existence of souls and what not - as I stated in my previous round, we simply put them on a neutral epistemological shelf. Of course, if you introduce philosophical argument in their favor then this would be a compelling reason (but I have yet to see any convincing arguments :P). I can't stress again that while there is no evidence against dualism, there has yet to be solid evidence in favor of it as well. I don't need to debunk every possible threat against physicalism or current scientific knowledge (fairies, souls, ghosts, etc. ), the burden of proof isn't on me. Continuing in the same vein, take into consideration the understated historical fact that most trends of thoughts change drastically. It could be that in a few centuries functionalism has either been largely abandoned or vastly improved on, whereas dualism is an ancient philosophical tradition learned for scholarly/historical purposes. If one were to trace the trend in history, MANY philosophical beliefs and systems have been abandoned or improved significantly. This is a parallel to the problem my opponent presents towards physicalism, and I would assume he is reserved about my example. The reason would be that whereas we realize there is a distinct probability that our beliefs can turned out wrong (or not 100% correct), this is to the best of our knowledge anyway. Apply that analogy to physicalism. ==================== Non-reductive Physicalism ==================== Refer to the article I cited in my previous round: . http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk... We can regiment this line of thought as follows: (1) Mental properties are real (Mental realism) (2) So, mental properties have causal powers (Alexander's Dictum) (3) But mental properties are irreducible properties (Property Dualism) (4) So, mental properties have irreducible causal powers (Alexander's Dictum) The problem is that (Alexander's Dictum) does not license the step from (3) to (4); only (Causal Individuation) would validate this move. All the dictum says is that to be a real property is to have causal power, regardless of whether that property or its causal power is reducible or not. It is one thing to say that to be a real property is to confer causal power on its instances, another thing to say that to be a real property is to confer irreducible causal power on its instances. The nonreductive physicalist will accept the former, but need not agree to the latter. ^That entire group of text was cited from said article, pg. 13. I did so since it succinctly bolstered my point about a distinction to be made between Alexander's Dictum and Causal Individuation. Note that it is one thing to say real property -> causal power, and another to say irreducible property -> irreducible causal power. "The problem is that causal powers are inherently irreducible. What this means is that causal powers aren't capable of being reduced to anything else or analyzed in non-causal terms nor can they be reduced to something that is more basic. " I think your characterization is misguided; an irreducible causal power would be a causal power that is not reducible to lower levels. If A supervenes upon B (B being the distinct base property), and A has a causal power that B can't instantiate, then A has irreducible causal power. In other words, if A can cause something that B can't (thus can't be reduced to), A has irreducible causal power. This would be a case of emergence. However, as noted before the functionalist is not bound to this.