When Nothing hears a tree fall it makes no Sound - When Nothing sees an Orange it is not Orange!

I will kindly ask anyone voting not to base their vote on any information gained through the comments section. This debate is between Brittwaller and myself. Please vote for who has the better argument. The debate has broken down to a few simply points. (note: from here on any usage of "sound' and ‘color' will refer to both sound and color/vision.) Brittwaller and I seem to agree that the sensation of sound is not identical to the physical phenomena of sound. When the debate began I defined sound solely as the sensation. So really my point has been proven. In the last round Brittwaller argued that the physical phenomena of sound does not require an observer. This is a notion I agree with and am not arguing against. Our disagreement seems to arise on what the word "sound" should really refer to. The dictionary traditionally defines "sound" as both the sensation and the physical phenomena. This poses a problem b/c these things are not identical. Brittwaller claims that the word "hearing" refers to the sensation and that the word "sound" refers to the physical phenomena. In the last round I posed an argument that the word "hearing" does not suffice in describing the sensation because of the transitivity of the act. Brittwaller still needs to address this argument. I will now present an argument for why the word "sound" should refer to the sensation and not the physical phenomena. 1.The act of hearing does not suffice in describing the sensation of sound because of its transitivity. 2.Currently the word "sound" refers to both the sensation and physical phenomena. 3.The sensation and the physical phenomena are not identical so the word "sound" needs revision. 4.Therefore a new word is needed to describe either the sensation or the physical phenomena. 5."Sound" is a common word used by everyday people to describe their experience. Such people do not normally discuss the physical phenomena as being distinct from their experience. 6.It would be tremendously difficult to popularize a new word that refers to the sensation of sound while holding that "sound" refers only to the physical phenomena. (b/c of #5) 7.If we are to create a new word to refer either to the sensation or the physical phenomena it would be best if the new word referred to the physical phenomena. 8.We need to create a new word. (premises 2-4) 9.Ergo the new word should refer to the physical phenomena and not the sensation. Now I will provide an analogy to clarify my position. I want the readers to imagine a digital camera with an LCD screen. Suppose that you are focusing the camera on an apple. As you do this you will see two things. You will see the actual apple and you will see the image of the apple on the LCD screen. What I am trying to show in this debate is that your experiences (all of them) are like the image of the apple on the LCD screen. The apple on the LCD screen is not identical to the actual apple. Yet the image on the screen is still an object itself. It is an image. It is an impression. It could even be referred to as a sensation/experience. It is what Kant would have called a phenomenological object. So now you can see there are two objects the actual apple and the image of an apple on the LCD screen. As humans created language they began to give "objects" names. What they didn't realize was that there actually were two objects. The phenomenological-one and the actual-physical-one. What I am trying to say is that since we use these "names" in everyday speech about our sensations/experiences we should use different names to talk about the actual-physical-objects. (They require different names bc they are not actually the same thing.) Thank you brittwaller for this excellent debate, probably the best I've had so far. I turn it over to you and remind you that you still need to address >>>My argument on the transitivity of hearing posed in R2.