This House Asserts Ontology Necessitates God's Existence!

I'm dropping the semantics on "necessary."Consistency (1) "[A]ll propositions not attacked by my opponent . . . [are] taken as correct" - I agree with this, assuming I don't address those propositions in this round either, since this is Round 3 - therefore I can argue in this round (this isn't the final round). (2) "[M]y opponent cannot make new [arguments] in the next round . . . as it is the last . . . he must only keep to these" - Round 4 is the last round, not this one, therefore I am free to make new arguments in this round. I don't need to "only keep to these," as this is *not* the last round, as Pro asserts. What is God?"I feel I should mention that this definition was given to Con before the debate started and he should have objected to it before accepting the debate. In fact, Con insisted on having the definition the way it is present right now."> I'm not objecting to the definition. The definition is vague - I am *expanding* on the vague definition, since it's quite unclear what some of the terms mean. "It is depressing that my principles were not engaged with at all, and Con seems to want to run a parallel case; I ask the voters to take this into consideration."> I can still implicitly engage the principles in this round -- it is not the last round, allowing me to do so. Further, the only principle that I find to be a bare assertion is Principle 7, since it isn't clearly justified. > I concede the definition of "transcendence," as God being transcendent from the physical. "Con must justify his controversial statement that 'sentience refers to the ability to perceive subjectively'. Sentience simply entails intelligence which is defined as being able to perceive, and manipulate those perceptions. God, by His definition, would possess universal sentience. He would perceive the entire universe, as it actually is and not in a subjective manner."> The definition of sentience is "the ability to feel, perceive, or experience subjectively." [1] I have already justified this. But Pro's definition seems to match mine anyway -- perceiving the objective universe is a subjective form of perception. This isn't really that relevant. "[H]umans are limited to think of qualities in terms of comparison, as humans think of math using symbols. These are weaknesses of the human minds, but qualities in their "essence" have a distinct definition: it is not necessary for humans to be able to understand it. These essences, like all definitions and essences are by their nature concrete. My opponent seems to be a solipisist and deny any mind-independent reality, something he will have to prove. This is agreed upon, near unanimously, by all philosophers."> All of this -- and point 7 -- is a bare assertion. Pro gives us no reason to actually believe that "excellence" and "greatness" have objective definitions. Further, if we buy this, we can also buy claims such as "the laws of logic are limited to human cognition, but there are things beyond cognition," et cetera and negate all logic. Such a kritik is explicitly prohibited by Rule 6, since this basically deconstructs all of logic, thus is "deconstructional" in nature. Cognitivism of GodPro's subdivisions that try to make a tl;dr of my argument are straw-men. Let me address this individually. "A reduction of what seems to be Pro's argument is presented; Pro's argument is not valid (as in the premises do not justify the conclusion) for there is a "sizeable gap" in the argument."> This is not a reduction of *Pro's entire argument,* this is what justifications have been given for the claim "we . . . have a conception of God." There is a sizable gap in the justification of *that,* not the entire argument. "The conception of a "flying spaghetti monster" is similar."> Straw-man. I did not claim the conception of FSM is similar to God -- I said it is *not similar.* I said, it's obvious that conception is beyond merely thinking of that being, it is intrinsic conception: humans don't have such a conception of an FSM. I used the FSM as an example of something we "conceive of" without intrinsically conceiving of it. Furthermore:> Pro *drops* non-cognitivism. All he says is "incoherent terms . . . are not meaningful." But the proposition "colorless green ideas sleep furiously" has meaning, but is still incoherent. Similarly, I argue that God has as much meaning as a rabbit defined as "4 lbs." Pro *drops* this. Ad infinitumThis isn't a rebuttal -- this is an *offensive argument* against the structure of Pro's argumentation. This is addressed as though it is circular, but this argument is meant to attack the conclusion; it is an offense, not a defense. With this, I'm trying to prove (1) Pro's argument entails infinite entities, (2) infinite entities cannot exist, (3) therefore Pro's argument is false. "My argument simply allows any idea which fills the requirement to prove itself as true, there is no evidence to suggest that an infinite number of such ideas exist."> Error. Pro's argument would *necessitate* infinite such entities. Consider the following:1) The idea of God #1 is true, as it cannot be imagined, thus is not false2) Apply reductio once more: the idea of God #2 is trueInfinity) Et cetera"[W]rite down the argument in support of . . . [the] rebuttal." > Pro fails to warrant why I must do so. > I will do so, nonetheless. Hilbert's Hotel basically states that successive addition to an infinite is impossible. Take, for example, a hotel. There are infinite rooms in the hotel. Infinite people come to the hotel to stay. This entails two propositions:a. All rooms in the hotel are filled [infinite rooms, equal number of people]b. There are infinite empty rooms in the hotel(A) and (B) entail a contraction, therefore infinity is contradictory. --Now, onto the actual argument. “Con makes another strawman, I only talk about "ideas" not the entirety of possible As. The example given is not of an idea, but of a proposition.”> This doesn’t significantly impact my argument. Let ‘A’ represent an idea, in that case. Thus, it isn’t a straw man. > The example of “xghsx” is not a proposition -- it is an idea. This idea is incoherent, therefore is false, but can’t be imagined. “I don't recall using the term "simple idea" at all. Con will have to define his terms for me to be able to respond.”> I apologize for not defining “simple idea.” A “simple idea” is an idea that can’t be imagined. “Con makes a logical mistake. I stated that "all imaginative ideas are false or unprovable" not that "all false or unprovable ideas are imaginative". The both are not equivalent.”> Error: Pro does make the claim that “all false or unprovable ideas are imaginative.” Let me quote Pro from Round 2: “[F]alse ideas or unprovable ideas are solely from the Imagination faculty.” Another quote: “All of these ideas though clearly require other ideas and are built by various connections, for how else do we arrive at these fantasies? All of our fantasies have limits of senses (we may experience various tastes, sounds) which may in turn arouse feelings but nothing more. This means we cannot fantasize concepts which are universal or completely devoid of sensations.” Pro also claims that “[imagination] is the only faculty which gives false or unprovable ideas.” “I gave the logic of my definition of imagination in my principles, Con gives no reason why we should accept his instead, and appeals to authority. In fact his definition supports my case because it states: "S requires some sort of quasi-sensory or positive representation of S". So Con admits that imagination requires some form of sensory perception...? That would concede the debate.”> A “positive representation” does not equal a sensory perception. A positive representation merely means some way of conceiving S as a body, e.g. imagining the color green, or imagining an atom. When we “imagine an atom,” we don’t require sensory perception. > Pro doesn’t give any reason to think God can’t be imagined outside of their definition. Pro just defines imagination in principle 3, without justifying it. Conclusion: Pro *drops* the actual “40lbs” and non-cognitivism argument, which is key to the essential premise of Pro’s that concludes “God is an idea in cognition.” I have shown that the idea of God is meaningless, but Pro merely picks parts of this argument of his choosing (e.g. the irrelevant bit about the FSM) and tries to refute it. Therefore, vote Con.1. https://en.wikipedia.org...