A defense of moral skepticism

"Undeniably, my challenger has borrowed and fashioned an argument created by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong—an argument which diminishes ethical knowledge to nothing more than unjustified skepticism derived from non-inferential epistemology."Just in case my opponent is trying to say that I plagurized an argument, I will point out that I did cite Walter Sinnott-Armstrong as the main source of my main argument. Here is what I said in R2."For my argument I will use a somewhat revised edition of Walter Sinnott-Armstrong's adaptation of the regress argument for general skepticism as applied to morality."P2: No person T is ever noninferentially justified in believing any moral claim.My opponent argues that most people are able to noninferentially know that torturing babies is wrong. He writes specifically that:"I don’t perceive any reason to accept as true that a coherent human being with appropriately operational cognitive aptitudes wouldn’t be vindicatedbelieving in the claim it is unconditionally immoral to torture and murder small children or babies merely for one's enjoyment."It is true that most people would not say that it is moral to do this, however I will bring two points against this. A.--- I said that no in is justified in noninferentially believing a moral claim. As in the case of torturing babies, one may fallaciously believe that they are right and that it is immoral, one is not justified in believing it without reason. Refer to the agreed definition of 'justified'.Justified:todefendorupholdaswarrantedorwell-grounded. So even though the act of torturing babies for fun might seem wrong to anyone without the ability to reason, one is not justfied in believing it without some sort of reason.My opponent then makes an argument that one can be justified in believing something noninferentially based solely on sensory experience. He makes the analogy that we know we are drinking a cup of water even if we don't know it's chemical composition. But this makes the fallacy of assuming that moral properties are the same as natural proerties. The way someone would be justified in believing that they are drinking water is completely different form the way that one would be justified in believing that lynching one based on skin color is wrong. The reason sensory experiences are prima facie justified is because of the nature of sensory experience. It is the basis of empirical knowledge. However humans do not possess any sort of "moral sense" that taps into natural moral properties in the world and tells us what is right and wrong. My opponent then goes on to make a small argument of his own.a fortioriargument by defending the rationality of inferring warranted beliefs from our noninferential moral experience.In this argument, my opponent makes a category error by equating moral facts with sense experience. Again, sense experience alarms us of the outside world. We can feel real properties such as softness, hardness or bumpiness. While I may be referring the the ontological existence of moral facts here, I have a legitimate reason. You see we can actually be noninferentially justified in believing that our sensory experiences give us mostly warranted information as to natural properties of the world. However, with the case of moral properties, my opponent makes a presuppositional problem in assuming their existence. If he is to equate moral intuition with sensory experience then he must bring justification.The last thing my opponent writes was actually very interesting. He writes: "To suppose otherwise, as my opponent has done, is to participate in committing a category error, whereby, one conflates and misappropriates ontology with epistemology." This is clearly false in regards to my argument. At no point did I say that there were no moral facts. This is strictly an argument dealing with justification of believing that we can know moral facts if they exist.