A human Soul exists

Thanks Con! Onto the rebuttals. Fungibility ArgumentPhysicalism And Non-FungibilityCon's central objection lies in the accusation that Physicalism can account for non-fungibility, as "what is non-fungible is the fact that there is a continuation of atoms"However, this doesn't seem to be a correct or even a coherent view. What exactly about a 'continuation of atoms' is non-fungible?As Alexander Pruss states:"Start with the thought that: 'Something wholly composed of fungible parts is fungible'. If this is right, and material objects are composed of elementary particles, then all material objects are fungible since elementary particles are fungible. And that's all we need for [the] argument." [1]So, it makes no difference whether an entity is a continuation of atoms. Assuming the notion that elementary particles are fungible, then it entails that something wholly constituted of fungible parts is still fungible - each part can be replaced with no intrinsic loss or gain, to result in a wholly fungible being. It should also be noted that there is a distinction to be made between 'identical' and 'fungible'. While two identical entities are fungible for each other, two fungible entities need not be identical. They may be identical in form, but that is not to entail that they are intrinsically identical. Fungibility does not necessarily rest on that. And so we should view Con's objections with caution when he places the focus on identical persons, as it is not necessary for the argument. Time-Worms"A TV show like a person needs no soul. A person can be a non-fungible time worm" That's going on my profile.While I agree in principle to this view, I also see it to be largely irrelevant to the argument, which rests on the non-derivability of the entities at hand. This is because such a theory could only ever be non-fungible in the sense of dynamic non-fungibility. However, this is a derived change - deriving non-fungibility from dynamical processes and thus, cannot be considered to be a sound objection to the argument.It also seems to rest on a tenseless theory of time, which in itself is controversial and huge assumption to make. [2] Is the Argument a Non-Sequitur? Finally, Con states that the premises can be accepted while still accepting a physicalist conclusion. However, it seems that Physicalism as a concept is contested in P2 assuming P1 - if all persons don't possess a property that all material entities possess, then we have no choice but to conclude that Physicalism, that states that all humans are purely material objects, is false.It appears that what Con is really objecting to is P1 rather than the conclusion, by stating that humans, though purely material objects, can still be non-derivatively non-fungible. Of course though, this is a minor point. Modal Argument A Priori, A Posteriori Necessity and Conceivability Con objects by stating that the 'a priori possibility of something doesn’t entail the metaphysical or a posteriori possibility of something'. And while I see no reason to object to this principle in general, Richard Swinburne (1997) proposed that we do have reasons to think that it differs in the mind-body case. [3] Essentially, a posteriori necessities are always based on observable, superficial stereotypes that originate from the observation of essences. For example, we know a posteriori that water is H2O, from our observation of its essence. However, when we make metaphysical claims about the mind, we know of its essence - after all, we experience it. If so, then it appears that there is no difference between a priori and a posteriori metaphysical claims about the mind; all metaphysical claims are based on our a posteriori experience of the mind. In such a case, it is indeed true that a priori possibility does entail a posteriori possibility. ConceivabilityCon states that when we make an ideal conceivability claim, this leads to an infinite regress. However, it seems that this issue is avoided when we arrive at conceivable metaphysical possibilities which are possible in accordance with the actual world: in such scenarios, there is no need to ideally conceive of possible world p, as the possible world is known. Now an obvious response would be to note that metaphysical possibility is entirely different to epistemic possibility, which is posited in P1. However, if we take P3 to be true, then it is easy to see deduction between general logical possibility and logical possibility in the actual world (id est, metaphysical possibility) - at which point, we avoid an infinite regress as we need no modal epistemic justification for modalities in the actual world.In other words, it only seems that we only need to posit a single possible world in which we need no epistemic justification in which it is conceivable that I might exist without my body to avoid this regress. It seems perfectly rational that this possible world might be something like the big conjunctive contingent fact, which needs little to no justification for its possibility (as it is, in essence, the actual world). Is The Argument Compatible With Physicalism?Simply, no. It seems that a non-reductionist physicalist approach would still constitute 'physical embodiment', for nowhere in the argument is it necessary to equate 'body' with the immediate physical reality of a person; what's required is to posit the entire physical reality of a person - of which, would be inclusive of any such non-reductive structure. That's to even ignore the issues of positing non-reductive physicalism to begin with. As such, it doesn't appear that the argument is compatible with physicalism even in the slightest. Issues With The soul The Soul And IdentityCon claims that identity is an issue when advocating a soul, and presents a dilemma. However, A Lockean view of the soul seems to solve this issue. That is to say, that the soul preserves identity in the sense that it preserves consciousness (viz. memories, experiences, thoughts etc.) rather than the actual substance of the soul or body. This is clearly distinct from the Cartesian description that Con provides - consequently, two beings with the same consciousnesses are to be considered the same person - contrary to the dilemma that is provided. All the while, the soul exists, preserves consciousness, and as such, preserves identity, albeit indirectly. [4]Moreover, I see no reason as to how Physicalism provides any further enlightenment on the issue, as it holds that identity is the brain state. But as Chalmers (1996) points out in his criticism of identity theory, if this is true, then it becomes inexplicable as to why we might experience non-physical qualia. [5]So it seems that in order to be an advocate of a Physicalist theory of identity, you must in turn advocate that non-physical qualia could be experienced through physical means. This seems to be a case of the fallacy of proving too much. [6] While one could then resort to a non-reductive Physicalism, this appears to be ad hoc, and also rests on the truth value of the conceivability argument which, as I stated, still includes non-reductive physical structures.So, far from being an issue exclusively for the proponent of a soul, it is a universal issue for all ontologies. The Soul And Interaction Finally, Con states that interaction is an issue for the substance dualist (which, my arguments imply). However, this presupposes that for two substances to interact, they must be of the same kind of substance, or at least, possess a shared property. But there doesn't seem any reason to assume that - what do we even have to base it on? Sure, we have moderate inductive reasons to think that, but this only provides a general, not necessary property of interaction. I see no reason to think that the shared property couldn't be 'existing in space-time', which would be sufficient enough for interaction, all the while remaining distinct separate substances within that. This doesn't seem like a strong objection either.Indeed, for sake of subjunctive conditional (not ad hoc), there are several solutions for the dualist in response to this; namely, that an immaterial substance could emit some form of ethereal substance, that interaction can be achieved via a simple conjunction, or even some kind of occasionalism can't be ruled out. This shows, albeit not an adequate response by itself, that it at least isn't nonsensical upon dualism for interactionism to have merit Conclusion I have shown that despite apparent issues concerning the soul that Con has brought to the surface, there are adequate responses to these issues for the proponent for the soul. Back to Con! Sources: [1] http://alexanderpruss.blogspot.co.uk... [2] Craig (2000), 'The Tenseless Theory of Time: A Critical Examination (Synthese Library) [3] Swinburne (1997), 'New Appendix C' (Clarendon Press) [4] http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov... [5] http://plato.stanford.edu...[6] http://en.wikipedia.org...