The Universe's Existence is Explicable

"To refocus the purpose of this debate, we need to note that the topic is "The Universe's Existence is Explicable" and is not "The Universe's Explanation is Expressible". " I have never stated these two are the same, but based on the provided definition of explain, explicible, and explanation, expressability is certainly a necessary component. The focus has been solely on expressability because if it can be shown that the reasons for x are inexpressable, then it necessarily follows that they are unexplainable. "In sum, I had a strict focus on the plausibility of an ontological explanation for the existence of the universe. " In reality, this has become a debate over what explanation actually entails. So while the main debate might be ontological in nature, there are metadebates here , which are necessarily language/epistemology-centred. I have attempted to resolve these issues, namely, what is necessary for an explanation. "Ontology was thus not an arbitrary ad hoc invention. .. " At no point, did I accuse ontology of being an "arbitrary ad hoc invention" on the part of my opponent, I have simply stated that, while it is intrinsic in this debate, so are many other issues and it is an arbitrary distinction to ignore the other issues. "To explain in this case is not to simply "make plain or clear" but in context clearly refers to offering "reasons for or a cause of". " The last sentence of this is perhaps the greatest statement of my case. Explain means: "offering reasons for or cause of". The word offering means that in order to have an explanation, one must not simply have reasons, but also the ability to offer those reasons, otherwise, X remains impossible to explain. This has been half of my case since the beginning, the other half has been showing that the reasons of the universe categorically, canont be offered (i. e. expressed). I agree that I misunderstood the meaning of logically prior, but it becomes entirely irrelevant, because as my opponent says, they are all inextricably tied up in each other. My opponent goes on to say that we can be dealing with epistemology and language without debating it. I agree that this resolution would not necessitate that side debate if a clear accurate definition of "explanation" was set forth and agreed upon. However one was not offered. I do not equate it with the main debate. "This is because something is determined to be plausible precisely because it possesses explanatory power or reasons for why something is the case. " P1. Plausibility comes from explainalibility C: An explanation is always more plausible The core argument of my opponent defines two key terms (plausability and explanatory power) as functionally the same without reason. Needless to say, this argument shouldn't be accepted. "my opponent responds by arguing that this is faulty because he only suggests that there are brute facts, not how any one brute fact is a brute fact. This makes no sense. " It does indeed make sense because if it can be shown that a brute fact exists than we know there is at least one case where an explanation is not more plausible (because it is impossible) than its negation. This disproves my opponent's core argument. "proposition is plausible if it has explanatory power". If I said that the premise was a brute fact, he should rightly have a problem with that. This is exactly what I pointed out in the second round and my opponent said "Yes, it is necessary to explain why a proposition is inexplicable". .. " "X is inexplicable" should be explained in order for a debate to be possible, however "X" itself does not need to be explained in order for a debate to be possible. Again, my opponent's statement entails that every plausible statement must have explanatory powers, whereas I state that a specific statement must have explanatory power to be plausible (i. e. X is inexplicable), but not all statements (e. g. X). "More confusion arises when he claims that it is not enough to "say that there is an explanation there we just can't know it". This is not at all what I had said as I think it is possible to know exactly what that explanation is but that is simply not the subject of this debate. " it is important that the reasons of the universe be knowable if you understand an explanation as being something that is understandable. Since it seems logically ridiculous to think an explanation doesn't need to be understandable to be explanatory, whether it is possible to know the reasons of the explanation is therefore part of the debate. ""X is beautiful because X has all the qualities necessary for objective beauty" with "X is beautiful because X is beautiful". Even if this is true, this just ignored the alternative explanation, namely a biological mechanism that I provided too. " This doesn't ignore any biological factors. If there are biological reasons behind beauty than what stimulates those are what is meant by "qualities necessary for objective beauty". X is beautiful because X is beautiful is the equivalent statement to: X=2+3+4 (i. e. the factors for beauty) X=9 (i. e. beauty) X=X These are all logically equivalent, so what changes that some of these statements have explanatory power and some do not? My opponent never shows this change. As my opponent astutely concludes: "I could turn anything into a tautology with that kind of logic. " If we accept that tautologies lack explanatory power as my opponent does than an explanation of the universe is indeed impossible. Note: ""the cause of A is B" into "Cause of B is B" which is nonsensical and two completely different statements. " I meant to write the Cause of A is the Cause of A" this was simply a typing error. "Lastly, he attempts to distinguish between "the universe has an explanation" from "X is the explanation for the universe". He says the former is meaningful but the second one must be meaningless. .. I am affirming the former and not the latter. .. whether it can be meaningfully expressed or not as "X" but about whether the universe can be plausibly thought to have an explanation at all. " Again, I am not debating what the explanation of the universe is. If the second statement is necessarily meaningless than the first statement cannot be true. Keep in mind a statement can be meaningful and false. In order to have explanatory power, a statement must be meaningful and so the question of meaning is very much related to the question of whether an explanation is possible or not. "In response to my evolutionary analogy, he attempts to appeal to what I can only perceive as an artificial distinction. To say "I cannot express the reasons for the universe" is the same as saying that "the reasons for the universe are inexpressible" precisely because inexpressibility is a person's inability to express something. " This is far from an artificial distinction. "Bob doesn't understand physics" is not the same as "physics is not understandable". The first statement deals with a quality of Bob whereas the second statement deals with a quality of physics. My argument is the latter. My opponent rebuts my frame of reference argument with an appeal to "all worlds" logic, however this relies on an assumption that "a world" indeed preceeded this one which hasn't been proven to be more likely than its opposite. The statement the universe has an ontological explanation might be meaningful as a statement, but if "the explanation is the explanation" is enough to provide explanatory power than my opponent must accept tautologies as having explanatory power, which he does not. In conclusion, my opponent's misunderstands the word explanation, bases his argument on an unsubstantiated equivocation, and fails to show 1)a meaningful frame of reference, 2) the difference between any explanation and a tautology. Con affirmed.