God more than likely does not exist

Thanks IllegalCombatant!Cosmological Argument Pro begins by attacking the veracity of P1. Supposedly it is too tenuous a step to move from:'Every physical entity we have experienced is contingent'to'Every physical entity is contingent'.Prima facie, this seems a dubious jump in logic. However, given our knowledge of particle physics, it is actually a perfectly reasonable conclusion.Basically, it has been scientifically proven that there are 18 fundamental particles (1), and that everything in the universe is composed of these particles. In other words, every single physical entity is a particular combination of quantities of these fundamental particles. The implications of this is that entities we observe here on earth are composed of the very same particles as everything else in the universe, so therefore it is not an unreasonable logical jump to extrapolate our conclusions about physical entities we have experienced, to make conclusions about all physical entities.To summarise, because everything in the universe is made of the same particles (evidence being spectroscopic readings of starlight), we can observe the particles here on earth in order to make scientific deductions regarding what happens throughout the universe.Pro goes on to assert that I commit the fallacy of composition. Yet this is false. My logic was as follows:P1) All physical entities are contingentP2) The universe is a physical entityC) The universe is contingentNowhere here do I commit the fallacy of composition. I do not prove that the universe is contingent by appealing to the contingency of its parts, I prove the universe is contingent by appealing to the fact that the universe is a physical entity, having already established that all physical entities are contingent.To conclude, Pro's rebuttals have not successfully refuted my argument.Ontological ArgumentPro voices the ages-old response to the ontological argument that it can be applied to any nonsensical object (unicorns, in this example). Like so:P1: Unicorn = A unicorn of which no greater unicorn can be conceivedP2: We can either conceive of a unicorn existing only in the mind (A), or conceive of a unicorn existing in both the mind and reality (B)P3: B > AC1: A is a contradictionC2: A & B are bivalent, so B is correct Yet this argument does not work. This is because P2 is false; we cannot conceive of 'a unicorn of which no greater unicorn can be conceived' and so it cannot exist in the mind. The reason we cannot conceive of this is because we can always conceive of a greater unicorn - a pointier horn or a shinier coat. As Anselm put it, objects apart from God have no 'intrinsic maximum'.Therefore, the argument does not work with physical objects such as unicorns, pizzas or chairs because no matter how great a unicorn we conceive of, we can always conceive of a better one because unicorns have no 'intrinsic maximum'. Therefore we cannot conceive of P1 in the mind and so P2 fails, so the conclusion fails.This does not apply to God because he does have an intrinsic maximum - namely the qualities that have already been defined. And therefore we can conceive of him.To conclude, the argument does not work with physical objects yet it does work with God, so it cannot be simply disregarded as sophistry by virtue of the fact that maximally great physical objects do not exist.GDE vs GDNE/Divine SilenceMyself and Pro are in agreement here - the veracity of these arguments is dependent on the veracity of the cosmological argument and the ontological argument. As I have showed them to be sound arguments, the applications of Occam's Razor continue to be un-sound. Best possible world?Again, Pro's argument rests on the presumption that the cosmological and ontological arguments are invalid. As I have shown them to be valid, my arguments that we do indeed live in the best possible world continue to be valid.Pro accuses me of shifting the burden of proof to 'ridiculous levels'. He says this in response to my option that Pro must '[Present] evidence that we definitely do not live in the best possible world'. Pro states that the burden of proof is on myself to prove that we do live in the best possible world, and not on him.I agree with this, but remember that I have already fulfilled my burden of proof by using a sound argument to prove that God exists, and therefore we do live in the best possible world. Pro cannot complain about having to disprove that we live in the best possible world when I have already proved that we do.The reason I shifted the burden of proof onto Pro is because one can only negate a valid argument if they provide actual proof of its negation, in this case this 'proof of its negation' would have to be proof that we do not live in the best possible world.Pro goes on to commit the 'appeal to emotion' fallacy (2) by providing statistics about children dying. I will remind voters that such statistics only serve to conjure up an emotional impulse - they do not provide valid backing to a rational and logical argument. Whilst such evidence may have some weight in the absence of logical arguments for or against the proposition that we live in the best possible world, I have provided a logical argument that we do indeed live in the best possible world. Therefore we should not let emotional bias stand in the way of logic.Moral ParalysisPro's arguments here are based on a semantic misunderstanding. Let us look at the definition of necessary suffering: 'Necessary suffering = suffering which is logically necessary for an adequately compensating good.'Pro assumes that this definition univocally entails that, in order for suffering to be necessary, it must be necessary in every manifestation. What I mean by this is that the suffering inflicted by a rapist would have to be adequately compensated by a greater good that is specific to that particular scenario. For example, in order for the suffering of a particular rape to be necessary, it would have to be logically necessary in that particular rape in order to allow a greater good.However, this need not be the case. Suffering can be necessary by virtue of it, as a concept, causing a greater good by its existence when compared to the lack of it.For example, child rape as a concept must exist if we are to have free will (which is the adequately compensating good). Considering that we have the physical capacity to rape a child, to conceptually prevent child rape from existing it would involve an infringement on our free will to choose how we act.Therefore, the moral paralysis argument does not stand up to scrutiny, since it is possible to acknowledge the conceptual necessity of certain ‘evils’ and yet seek to prevent them where we can, since prevention of an event’s manifestation does not remove the concept of that eventPro goes on to claim that my assertion that we have a God-given free-will is a ‘bare assertion’. It would be a bare assertion if I had not previously proven God’s existence, but as I have already done so, it is reasonable to assert that our free-will is God-given once we acknowledge that God exists.He then goes on and makes three attempted rebuttals of the free-will defence, yet they are all based on a flawed understanding of free will. It is not simply a matter of:1.‘Person wills X’2. ‘X occurs’For example, it would not be free will for a child to will not to be raped. Free will is a matter of potential – when making a decision, free will is the autonomy involved when deciding what one will do or not do.Finally, Pro states that we can have free will but no moral evil. Yet this is clearly misguided. If we could not physically commit moral evil then we wouldn’t have free will. Free will is the choice between A and B, it cannot therefore be the case that B cannot occur. (1) http://physics.info...(2) http://www.logicallyfallacious.com...