Quickfire Debate: Justice, Retribution, and Forgiveness

Thanks once again to Blade for this debate. I hope I can be a bit more prompt in responding this time. I will now address his case.==================================C1. Crimes GenerallyFirstly, Blade’s statistics apply just to federal prisons, not to prisoners in general or criminals in general. Additionally, there are competing studies which reach different conclusions: "Roughly 34% of all prisoners in the U.S. are incarcerated for victimless crimes." [1]Secondly, one could argue that all or (at least) most crimes have some kind of victim. For instance, crimes against public order victimize the public, by harming their right to live in an orderly society. The same can be said of drugs; perhaps the claim could be also made that drug crimes support a broader industry that is harmful (illegal drug industry), and so everyone who is a victim of that industry is also a victim of those who act to support that industry. Finally, drug users can even be their own victim, destroying their own bodies with their decisions, in which case they are eligible to engage in self-forgiveness.Thirdly, the resolution assumes that crimes have victims. To argue otherwise treads into the realm of critiques. The resolution implies that the criminal acts in questions have victims; if it didn't, it would be incoherent. It would be like saying: "regarding victimless acts, justice cannot be obtained without the victim’s forgiveness..." Thus, it’s clear that the resolution is making the basic assumption that this debate is about those crimes that have victims. Even Pro appears to recognize this when he writes: "I don't want to play a semantics game here, I'm not trying to win on a 'most crimes don't have a victim' argument. The point I'm trying to make is that in order for it to generally be the case that forgiveness is necessary to obtain justice, we'd have to say that crimes with a victim require forgiveness in order to obtain justice, and we'd have to have some basis for that assertion."C2. Forgiveness =/= JusticeFirstly, it's not my job to argue that forgiveness is obligatory. I can argue that it is just a moral good. All I need to assert is that justice cannot usually be obtained without some forgiveness.Secondly, this contention only argues that the forgiveness is not necessary to give the criminal their due. It says nothing about giving the victim their due. So, it only applies to a small portion of justice and the actors involved. Thirdly, cross-apply my case's contention two here. It really addresses this fairly well. Ultimately, a criminal is due the punishment meted out by the state; they are not due a life haunted by their act, particularly if this act was a relatively minor harm, a crime committed as a youth, a mistake, or a first time offense. It is unfair to punish the criminal for years in prison, and then to still condemn them to be punished afterword. The motto here is to forgive them, but not allow them to forget the lessons they have learned.C3. Forgiveness is EmotionalFirst, why are emotions not justified grounds for moral impulses? Surely, emotions are useful moral guides. The human feeling of empathy for instance, is useful in ensuring we aren't okay with genocide or torture or other such abominations. Why is forgiveness not a similar case?Secondly, emotions are not necessarily the root of moral impulses such as forgiveness. "We conclude that current evidence is insufficient to support the hypothesis that emotional processes mediate our intuitive moral judgments, or that our moral concepts are emotionally constituted. We suggest instead...that our moral judgments are mediated by a fast, unconscious process that operates over causal-intentional representations. The most important role that emotions might have is in motivating action." [2]Thirdly, forgiveness may relate to emotions, but it also often goes against our emotional desires. It is often very hard for victims to forgive. Blade's objection to forgiveness is that acting on our emotions is necessarily morally risky, then forgiveness is not subject to this objection, because it requires one to act against our emotional intuitions. Forgiveness is defined at the opening of the round as the letting go of emotions.Fourthly, you can unjustly inflict emotional pain on another person. That's why we view psychological bullying or torture as wrong. If that's the case, then actions (like forgiveness) which alleviate such unjust emotions, do promote justice.C4. MercyRight, basically, all Blade is saying here is that "justice and forgiveness are different." That's begging the question, because it's exactly what Blade needs to prove. Blade is just going in circles here. He's not actually proving his point. So, to illustrate this: P1. Justice and forgiveness are differentP2. Justice and forgiveness are differentC1. Justice and forgiveness are different Additionally, this Christian theology, which even Blade rejects, is based on a retributive form of justice. That justice is inflicting penalties, or "death and eternal separation." But clearly, the idea of justice is more than just inflicting penalties, it is about "giving each their due." I may be due a penalty just as much as I may be due a reward. The reward can be achieved through forgiveness. That is what this debate is about. And, justice cannot truly be blind if it seeks to give each their due. The determination of who is due what is equally in the eye of the beholder. That justice is blind is a nice saying, but the determination of who is due something relies as well on the interpretation of those meting it out. Moreover, if forgiveness is a tool of justice, and justice is blind, that doesn't mean that forgiveness isn't usually required to attain justice. Sources1 - http://mic.com...2 - http://faculty.georgetown.edu...