The Moral Argument is Sound

Rebuttal OverviewCon's rhetorical skills are seemingly impressive. But are his numerous 'objections' as effective as the rhetoric portrays? I'll show that no real objections were offered, but for now note that once a heap of logic terminology is thrown in & supported with nothing more than parlance, the debate moves from substance to emotive expression dressed as rationality. Let me explain. Warrant for P1 "Begging the Question" Objection Misunderstood: Begging the question is the informal fallacy, "petitio principii," it's whenever the conclusion of the argument is taken as one of the premises; not when the premise is defended with an ontology. Con only says that "grounding moral values in God fairly obviously begs the question." He then later admits, "Pro’s first premise is NOT that God is the best grounding for objective morals, but that without God, no such values would exist. These are 2 very different claims..."Well which is it? Am I begging questions or not? ... Is showing the claim, "God is necessary for objective morality," to be more plausible than not circular? The argument itself doesn't even explicitly ground morals in God, rather that's implicit in it's defense. By showing that God's nature is the highest moral value, which makes him qualified in issuing commands, I've shown God as the basis and most plausibly necessary for objective morality, hence making P1 more plausible. Which is all I have to show. So how is the argument circular if it doesn't explain moral grounding in God? It only asserts P1 & 2, which merely imply God’s existence but don't propose an ontology. It wouldn't be circular to employ other moral ontologies as a defense for P1 in order to make P1 more plausible, how is the employment of DCT any different? WL Craig also denotes that moral duty arises in response to an imperative from a competent authority. Who or what else is as qualified to issue moral commands which are valid and binding apart from any subjective opinion? It would appear nothing else is, hence P1. Without God, we're simply left in moral anti-realism; a claim which can be defended by a moral ontology which views God as the moral standard. Con must show how either how this is incoherent, or provide a more plausible ontology. Con's objection is thus confused."Subjective Moral Values" ObjectionThis would be a devastating objection had I been defending God as a subject. But I'm defending God as a maximally great being. If God exists, he would exist in all possible worlds, which makes him not merely a subject of certain possible worlds, but rather an objective feature of all reality by virtue of his maximal greatness. Con's objection is thus a non-sequitur. "Irrelevance" Objection How is my defense of P1 irrelevant? All I have to show is that it's more plausible that God is necessary for moral truths. I even quoted WL Craig on why God's existence is necessary for objective morals, Con has yet to respond to both this along with the Taylor saying that to speak of moral obligation is meaningless without reference to God. Con hasn't obliged these arguments, all he's given is an assertion of friendlines towards objective morals. Con's objection just blindly accuses irrelevancym ignoring the scholars. Will he ignore Leff? A Divine standard is further articulated,"... if we are looking for an evaluation, we must actually be looking for an evaluator ... If the evaluation is to be beyond question, then the evaluator & its evaluative processes must be similarly insulated. If it is to fulfill its role, the evaluator must be the unjudged judge ... Now, what would you call such a thing if it existed? You would call it Him." (Arthur Leff, 1975) Con's objection is thus blind."Atheist Moral Duties" ObjectionCon argues that our cognitive abilities include objective moral intuition. From a theistic perspective I can coherently agree. But in a non-supernatural world, why think our cognitive abilities are aimed at moral truth value & not merely survival value? Here he says because rationality dictates duty. But rationality only tells us what is the case, it doesn't tell us what ought to be the case. What's irrational about euthanizing the elderly in order to better preserve healthier people? Mere rational responses to the question reveal hidden presuppositions which are left unjustified. Now naturalistic evolution seems bereft of objective oughts, insofar as X behaves properly for its survival in its environment, X's traits are passed on. But survival value isn't moral belief value. Indeed altruism, the virtue most expressed by Christ, is wholly absurd on atheism. What's worse, given Darwinianism, we have grounds to very much doubt our moral perception. Hence Con's arguing from a self-defeating perspective. But he goes on to say morality is special by virtue of short duration, and no do-overs. How? Isn't this subjective in its own right? Plus how is life less valuable if it were 'done-over' anyway? And especially if it were objectively meaningless to 'do' in the first place? Con's objection thus not only undercuts itself but asserts subjectivism."What's the Problem" Objection II've already given an evolutionary argument against the atheistic appeal to objective morals arising naturally. Indeed the argument proves that the atheist should radically & viciously doubt any moral intuition by virtue of unreliable cognitive faculties. But given theism, man is made in God's image so that our mental faculties are indeed reliable guides to moral truth among rational truth. How does this not at least 'approach' justification for a theistic moral ontology? Indeed does this even remotely sound "out-right wrong"? At worst the playing field is even, with a preference towards theism; since on atheism we should heavily doubt our moral intuitions."What's the Problem" Objection IICon quotes scholars who are all referring to belief in God as uneccesary for moral truth. I warned Con of making this mistake when I listed what the moral argument does not involve. So in answer to the question, the problem is that with the ontological non-existent God, we're faced with the ontological non-existence of moral truths. Nietzsche argued, “Moral judgments agree with religious ones in believing in realities which are no realities,” exclaiming nihilism at God’s grave, Nietzsche affirms, “There are altogether no moral facts.”Nietzsche understood; no God = no moral standard = no objective basis for identifying true moral obligation. So I don't argue: no belief in God = no moral standard.., etc. Another non-sequitur. "Argument from Ignorance" ObjectionI offered three unanswered arguments for P1. Con's objection is thus another blind one."Climbing Mt. Impossible" ObjectionNext round I'll negate Atheistic Moral Platonism (AMP), for now let me say AMP leaves morals floating in an unintelligible way, lacking any adequate foundation. For what does it mean to say 'justice' just exists? A person can be just, but with the absence of people, how can justice itself “exist?” Plus if an abstract 'justice' itself isn’t just, then without people justice can’t exist. But that contradicts the AMP hypothesis!Furthermore, moral obligation is incompatible with AMP, for suppose duty platonically 'just exists,' how then does that result in obligation? Obligation towards wrong may exist too; why not commit wrong actions? Con's objection is thus unfounded & overly-restrictive; simply see above.ConclusionI've run out of room to respond to P2 since Con cluster-bombed the debate with nothing more than nerf-darts; a confused fallacy, 2 non-sequiturs, 2 blind, a self-defeating & subjective objection, & an unfounded refutation of P1. Moreover, I've further shown P1 to be more plausibly true than AMP. Remember, one needen't show P1 to be neccissarily true just becuase it contains verbage denoting necessary conditions within the premise. For sake of our epistemic position all I need to show is that P1 is more plausibly true.