International Intervention and Human Rights Abuse by State Actors

Thanks once again to YYW for a tremendous round of debate! I will use this round to address the main point of clash (framework and contentions), and then recap with some reasons to cast a Con vote today. FRAMEWORK Pro assumed that I knew that his definition was from Joseph Nye. Pro's assumption was erroneous, and I should notbe penalized for it. Pro cited Seybolt, not Nye, for his definition, and this is the first time he's mentioned Nye. Pro says that I failed to address Nye's concept--obviously, since Nye was never once mentioned. Pro is asking me to rebut something never even brought up in this debate, and that is abusive. So, let's look at the rest of Pro's remarks here. Pro says that hard power is achieved through the threat of use of force. But he can't take out my objections against this just by repeating his initial definition. He must actually address my attacks, which were as follows: (1) to exercise something is not merely to "threaten" to use something, but to actually use it, and (2) that delivering aid is not, in and of itself, invervention. Firstly, if intervention is, as Pro clarified in R3, the "exercise of hard power" then hard power must actually be used, not just threatened. If you buy into Pro's R4 explanation of hard power, then there is a semantic conflict: you cannot exercise hard power via suggestion, but yet Pro says you can. Which is it? This is one reason to prefer my definition. Secondly, R4 is literally the first time Pro addresses my second objection. His only remark here is that it "doesn't make much sense." Pro never explains WHY it doesn't make sense, so I don't really understand his reasoning here. My logic is that simply dropping a bundle of food from a airplane, for example, is not International Military Humanitarian Intervention when you consider that, to use Pro's own R2 phrasing, humanitarian intervention means "force...aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals...due to violence." Where is the force here? There isn't even a threat of force. Also, aid is needed in places where nonviolent crises arise; it is not specific to violent conflicts. This is a second reason to prefer my definition--Pro dropped this point most of the debate, and makes a warrantless attack against it in the final round, which is easily disected. Pro, in R3, objected to my counter-definition, saying that it failed to address the resolution. I defended my definition in that same round. Since he hasn't responded to my remarks or reiterated his own objection, I must assume that he concedes that my definition does meet the resolution. So, while there are problems with Pro's definitions, there are no such observed problems with mine. Prefer my definition. REBUTTALS C1: Humanitarian Intervention SA: Intervention fails Pro again attacks my Kenya example as a form of cherry-picking. However, as I said, Kenya is the only nation where R2P has been applied. It is, frankly, the only cherry available to pick--the only example of R2P to examine. Pro also never rebuts that the following problems did occur in Kenya: (1) lack of security for returning refugees, (2) insufficient planning, (3) failure to rebuild, (4) long-term failure to respect human rights. This has become a pattern among instances of humanitarian interventions, with similar results in Bosnia, Somalia, the Congo, Libya, and Kosovo. Therefore, if we look from the R2P microanalysis to a macro-view of humanitarian action overall, we can see a trend of failures emerging. I can name even more if Pro would like, including Mali and Hati. I am well aware of what statecraft means, and a bit taken aback that Pro would demean my arguments by refering to them as "naive and obtuse." Pro should address my arguments, not insult them. Moreover, Pro's own points show how much he has misconstured my points. Pro says: "military power might be a 'clumsy' measure for a state to nation build, that is beyond the scope of this resolution because the resolution is not about the extent to which military force might be used to stop human rights abuses by state actors." Part of the reason humanitarian interventions fail to stop human rights abuses is that the fail to rebuild. This was point 3 in my Kenya example, and was also evidenced in Kosovo. Rebuilding, helping to build up infrastructure (governmental and physical) is key to bringing stability back into a region. I doubt that a crises-stricken region can rebuild on its own. What Pro is basically saying here is that humanitarian military intervention, which is what this debate is about, cannot effectively rebuild. Ergo, it cannot effectively create long-term peace. Ultimately, this line of reasoning is within the scope of the topic because we need to examine the long-term impacts of intervention as part of any rationale justifying its use. This brings us back to Foust's points: "(1) most interventions require long-term commitments, and (2) states have a terrible record at predicting outcomes of intervention." Pro also totally drops my analysis that: "humanitarian intervention can either be risky and fast, or well-planned but too late to do anything. An inability to balance the competing time concerns inheres in the very notion [of intervention.]" In this way, intervention is caught in a Catch-22, whereby no matter when it is initiated, it is highly likely to fail. SB: Futility Pro basically concedes that intervention is futile when he says that "even granting [Conry's] premise..." Again, he never challenges Conry's logic, so it stands. His only argument is that we're not talking about regional conflicts, but rather human rights abuses by a state. The flaw here is that many human rights abuses are regional conflicts. The on-going crises in Sudan, for instance, pits the Dinka and Murle against the Nuer peoples. [1] Outside interveners have been unable to resolve the differences between the people, just as Conry predicted. Another example is Bosnia, where Christian-Muslim animus is still evident. Regional tension exists everywhere, and is present in a multiplicity of crises, including also the Congo, Mali, Libya, and Somalia. Therefore, in the many cases where such regional tensions abound, intervention is going to fail. SC: Deterrence This is totally dropped by Pro. Extend it--the impact is clear: intervention does not deter future rights abuses from being perpetrated. SD and SE: Just for the record, reticence does mean reluctance. Pro drops that nations don't want to put troops on the ground and so go to extreme measures to avoid it. Pro, in fact, says that the means by which intervention occurs is irrelevant to deciding whether or not intervention is justified. This is a very bold and callous claim to make. Consider, if nation X doesn't want to put troops on the ground, but is justified in intervening in nation Y, it decides to firebomb those regions of Y where most rebels reside. After a month, 100,000 rebels die. In that same time 500,000 innocent civilians die. Is this justified? This is clearly wrong. It's a bull in the China shop appraoch, that ends up killing people who don't deserve to die. The ultimate goal of intervention is to stop human rights abuses, but by taking this "at all costs; by any means" appraoch, you commit human rights abuses yourself when you murder civilians. Pro also drops that nations will use humanitarianism as an excuse to intervene for other reasons. This could lead to exploitation. Pro never reasserts his claim that my points conflict, so he concedes this argument to me. C2: Self-Interest SA and SB: True--some stability may be in a nations interest to promote, but that misses the crux of her assertions. Most nations in a position to intervene, namely the Western powers and their allies, don't have an interest in, say, the stability of Malawi or the stability of the Congo, but yet we waste resources doing so. Instability is not inherently bad, and the effort to combat it wherever it occurs is misguided, and ultimately disasterous. SC: Harms Interest Pro literally never addresses this: "If a nation intervenes and fails, it's credibility will be hurt and skepticism will rise domestically. If a nations intervenes and makes the situation worse, as I've shown can happen, it engenders enmity, which can create problems down the line." He never attacks this logic, so it can be extended cleanly. SD: War For the second time, Pro utterly fails to touch on this. Intervention spurs on war. That is a massive impact that goes against Pro. VOTING ISSUES So why, after all of this back-and-forth, should you vote Con today? First, let's return to the resolution, which states: "If international military intervention is a likely viable means to ameliorate human rights abuses by state actors, and intervention as such is in the intervening state's best interest, international military intervention is justifiable." As Pro stipulated to earlier, he must uphold both criteria for him to win. Upholding one is not sufficient--he must achieve both. I have shown: 1. Intervention causes war 2. Intervention is not in a nation's self interest 3. Pretextual interventions will be legitimized 4. Nations will go to extreme measure to avoid putting boots on the ground 5. Intervention is futile 6. Intervention does not deter 7. Intervention is caught in a catch-22 that renders it useless 8. Intervention (esp. R2P) has a pattern of failure 9. Intervention fails to rebuild 10. States can't predict outcomes. So, when we ask ourselves, is intervention likely viable, we have to say "no." And, when the risks are so high (explotation, war, death), and our ability to predict the outcomes is so low, intervention in any case is too much of a risk, and should not be undertaken. Moreover, Pro has dropped almost half of my arguments, giving me more offense technically in this round. Thus, I ask that you VOTE CON. Thank you. 1 - http://en.wikipedia.org...(2011%E2%80%93present)