God exists

Rebuttals For example, no reasoning is offered to justify the assertions that “only possibilities with an intrinsic capacity to define and maintain their own existences can be actualized” In order for a potential to actualize, it must be real, for if it weren’t, there would be nothing to actualize. This implies that only potentials which can define themselves can actualize (by define, I mean distinguish that which they are from that which they are not i.e. define what is “real”). In other words, the only real potential is reality's own potential (and this potential is synonymous with reality itself). All potentials not relevant to reality are not real. “In order for there to be a real difference between two things, both must be embedded in a common medium providing the metric of separation” In order for two real things to be different, the difference must be real for both things, and this means that both things must “recognize” the “realness” of this difference, and are therefore part of the same reality. In any case, this point was to establish that there is only one reality, which can be done by simply defining reality as all and only that which is real. “Without two-valued logic, distinctions are impossible.” This is self-evident. A distinction cannot be distinguished if true and untrue, real and unreal, are not kept apart. “His "complexity" is not a hinderance [sic] to self-actualization, but a sin qua non of existence itself.“ Refer to round one. “An infinite, unbound ontological potential is not real in the sense which requires a cause.” An infinite, unbound potential cannot be called real, since it is the total lack of information i.e. constraint. In order for something to be real, you must distinguish it from its negation (else the term is meaningless), and that’s not possible where there’s no constraint i.e. where there’s nothing about something which is as opposed to isn’t. Dylan leaves us wondering what terms like “UBT” A total lack of information i.e. real constraint. “self-actualized” When a potential distinguishes itself from that which it is not. “unbounded” Same as UBT. “protomedium” The logical complement of real constraint i.e. that which real constraint is defined on, and which reality as a whole defines and is defined on. “meta-paradoxical” When something has no means by which to distinguish real from unreal, and as a logical consequence, has no mean by which to avoid it. “self-determinative” When something is internally determined and externally unconstrained/undefined. This argument is not about whether or not existence has meaning, but what the difference between entity and non-entity is. We are inquiring about the difference between entity and non-entity, or “Being” in Heidegger’s work. We are not asking about the meaning of existence. The meaning of existence is a question about the meaning of entities, while the meaning of being is not. The difference between entity and non-entity directly mirrors the difference between existence and nonexistence. If there is no difference between entity and non-entity, then how can Sargon identify them as things which need definition in the first place? How can you identify something when it is no different from its negation? This argument is self-defeating. Dylan is adamant that only two-valued logic can make distinctions possible. First, this assertion goes without any justification at all. Secondly, two-valued logic is outdated given quantum mechanics. Does two-valued logic need answer to quantum mechanics, or does quantum mechanics need answer to two-valued logic? There is nothing about our observations which makes two-valued logic obsolete save the erroneous interpretations we make of them. Quantum logic, however, is a many-valued logical system. Contrary to the principle of bivalence, propositions in quantum logic have more than two truth values [5]. Considering this, quantum mechanics shows that Dylan’s preferred logical system is outdated and inconsistent with empirical findings. Langan: ... many-valued logic, including infinite-valued logic, is a 2-valued theory - it must be for its formal ingredients and their referents to be distinguished from their complements and from each other - and thus boils down to 2VL. So 2VL is a necessary and sufficient element of logical syntax for systems with distributed internal structure. I provided an example of how this premise is false by pointing out that denying the existence of god could entail that god is a logically inconsistent concept. Dylan does not refute this alternative, so the first premise is false. Therefore, the argument is unsound. I fully acknowledge the soundness of Sargon’s insights. However, he has not attempted to show why the concept of God is inconsistent with the concept of God. My main argument establishes the consistency - in fact, the necessity - of God’s existence. The first premise states that an infinite, unbound ontological potential exists. I believe that this premise is obvious based on Dylan’s own statements. Then you have obviously failed to understand them. For example, in his last round, Dylan ascribes numerous properties to what he calls the “UBT” (I assuming this is intended to be synonymous with the infinite, unbound ontological potential). UBT does not express these properties intrinsically. Once again, they are defined only with respect to existence. He gives it the properties of “lacking structure”, “not real in the sense that it requires a cause”, and existing “qua existence”. Dylan himself states that “we were never really dealing with nothingness to begin with, but UBT”. That’s because UBT is in fact contradictory, as it lacks real constraint. Hence, “meta-paradoxical”. The second premise states that god could not have caused this “UBT”. My argument for this premise was that it is absurd to suggest that something can cause its own necessary conditions. It’s like saying that you can cause your parents to come into being, when you depend on their existence to come into being in the first place! This argument was not addressed by Dylan, so we can affirm the second premise as true based on this alone. Neither God nor anything caused UBT, as was clearly stated. However, from what I can interpret in Dylan’s last round, he has supported this second premise himself! He states things like “An infinite, unbound ontological potential is not real in the sense which requires a cause” and “UBT does not need a cause”. These statements only serve to help the notion that god cannot have caused the UBT, not to refute it! God did not cause UBT, for there is nothing to cause.