Substance Dualism is true

Thanks, n7. I'd like to start out by addressing Pro's technique of bringing up "epiphenomenalism" in response to both of my arguments against substance dualism. I contend that it is only fair for Pro to be limited to a single advocacy, just as I have limited myself to one (physicalism). It is unfair to allow him to defend more than one because that means that every time I refute one version of dualism, he can just say "oh but Con hasn't refuted THIS version yet", thus making it impossible for me to ever fulfill my burden of proof within the space of this debate. Moreover, by defending two mutually exclusive views of dualism, Pro automatically loses because the two views refute each other simply by virtue of being true. Since Pro has spent the bulk of his round defending interactionist substance dualism, I will assume that to be the advocacy he is sticking to. ------------------------------- Case for Physicalism ------------------------------- Pro puts forth a very interesting analogy comparing the mind to a violinist and the brain to a violin. However, the analogy doesn't really accurately reflect the situation. To put this into the terms of Pro's analogy, my case demonstrates that the violin is *fully mechanized* and is capable of playing itself without any external help; therefore we have no reason to assume that a violinist exists at all. All Pro has done is provided a rationale for why the existence of the mind is still compatible with modern neuroscience; he seems to have conceded that the brain is, indeed, fully capable of accounting for human mind-functions on its own. Yes, I agree that even if the violin is fully automated, there still could technically be a violinist holding onto it and pretending to be the one playing the music. However, that view of substance dualism renders the mind to essentially be unnecessary baggage to the independently functioning brain. Via the Principle of Parsimony, an explanation which includes such unnecessary baggage should be rejected in favor of an explanation without it. In other words, we have positive reason to reject Pro's minimalist interpretation of substance dualism and instead favor the physicalist view that the brain alone is responsible for all mind-functions. --------------------------------- Problem of Interaction --------------------------------- 1) Pro argues that the mind and the brain could interact via indirect reaction to each other. The only way in which he has tried to show *how* this would actually occur is through example. However, in all of his examples, the only reason the objects in question are able to "react" to each other is through the transmission and reception of electromagnetic waves (e.g. the person perceiving light waves reflected off the snake, the Xbox motion censor catching infrared waves reflected off the players). To translate this into the context of mind-brain interaction, Pro is essentially introducing some *third* substance into the equation! But this is just begging the question. What is this third substance? How can it interact with mind? How can it interact with matter? Pro's "solution" to interaction creates far more problems than it solves. 2) Pro claims that objects need not directly connect in order to interact, citing the phenomenon of quantum entanglement to back up his assertion. However, he never actually explains why we should assume that such a property, which has only been observed to occur between virtually identical particles of matter, can also occur between different metaphysical substances; that is an enormous leap in logic. It is akin to claiming that because a tiger and a lion can mate to produce a viable offspring, we should accept that an elephant and an ant can do so as well -- except that Pro's assertion is even more radical because ontological differences are so fundamental that they trivialize reproductive barriers. 3) Unfortunately, I must once again request that Pro elaborates on how exactly his alternative "counterfactual" theory of causation solves the problem of interaction; it is not enough to simply propose some random philosophical concept and then state that it serves as a valid rebuttal -- Pro must elucidate on *why* it serves as a valid rebuttal. Based on his example, it would seem that counterfactual causation still requires some sort of direct contact or link, so it doesn't really escape the problem of interaction. --------------------------------- Philosophical Zombies --------------------------------- Thanks to Pro for elaborating on this argument. With this new understanding of his argument, I shift the focus of my rebuttal to the second premise of the argument -- attacking the notion that it is possible for "the brain to function like it has a mind, but not really be conscious". Pro is correct in stating that it is my burden of proof to provide a defeater for the possibility of philosophical zombies existing, so i shall provide one: neuroscience dictates that if a human brain has all of its components and is fully functioning, then it *will* invariably produce cognition, emotion, consciousness, and all the other functions associated with the mind. Consider the following thought experiment: "... imagine that engineers have invented a tiny computer that simulates the action of an individual neuron. What would happen if we replaced one neuron at a time? Replacing one would clearly do nothing to change conscious awareness. Replacing all of them would create a digital computer that simulates a brain" [1]. Point being, that a human brain, by definition, contains faculties which produce the functions of the mind, thus making philosophical zombies (i.e. beings that have brains but no real mind-function) impossible. -------------------------------- Knowledge Argument -------------------------------- Pro is mistaken in believing that first-person sensory information is "fundamentally the same thing" as third-person descriptive information. Both are physical, yet they are fundamentally *different* in that the former can only be attained through direct perception of an object, whereas the latter is ultimately derived through people translating the former (sensory information) into symbols (i.e. language, imagery, etc). In other words, third-person information cannot be reduced to first-person information because it is in essence just a second-hand representation of first-person information. Unfortunately, I have only a couple more minutes left to post my argument, so I'll have to leave it at that. . Over to Pro :) [1] http://en.wikipedia.org...