Consequentialism is the most justifiable ethical theory.

But secondly, just to make this clear - while it may seem that you have a tautologically true position "that morality is best which produces good" and thereby any argument I make as to why some other morality is better, so long as it is rooted in producing good, will be buying that utility structure, I think I actually have the significantly more definitional side of this discussion, a fact I don't think you are going to be able to get out from under. Look at it this way: You say that you can't imagine a more clear vision of morality than that morality which produces utility. You say in essence that the only thing that is intrinsically (definitionally) true is that good actions are good. But that sounds like a universal truth. Like an -ontological-truth. Actions that are utile, are inherently good. That's ontology. Gotcha. The fact is that we can't escape our intuitions, and our intuititions all line up like this, so calling it Utilitarianism simply because the -only- ontological maxim the theory holds "it is good to produce good" doenst make it any different than a very singular application of Ontological Morality. But adressing the specific arguments: - Utility Monster - Your 4 responses 1) Low probability of finding one 2) Couldnt enjoy eating people that much 3) Maybe we should feed them, but they dont exist so so what? 4) Possibly societies can ignore monsters. 1) Not enough of a defense here. The moral realm is the realm of the theoretical, and as such has to be capable of robust responses even to out-there claims. It is possible to envision a world in which this kind of monster is more common, would morality cease to function there? If so thats a pretty thin morality. 2) I just don't buy this, but it also seems to highlight the relativism of utility's defintion. 60 years of utility is what? 60. .. utiles? Quantitatively measuring these things seems ridiculous. Anyway, for the sake of argument, I promise, PROMISE, that this utility monster freaking loves eating people. Moreover, he loves it more when they are in a position to lose utility, so much so that his utility gain every time is X + a billion utiles, where X is the amount they stand to lose. Moral? 3) This is part where you go: "yeah, maybe moral, but we don't have to deal with it because this is intuitive analysis in a made up world. " Which is a good responce, but I'm not sure a sufficient one. The problem is that morality is bound to our intuitions, and if I can construct what amount to false sentences using your moral terms, then the moral system seems incorrect, contraindicated by our understanding of the universe. 4) Why would socities want to? If the society is utilitarian, and these monsters are -hugely- satisfyed, then logically (though not intuitively) we just feed the monsters. - Repugnant Conclusion - Also called the Mere Addition paradox, and the issue here is again one of incoherence in utilitarianism. It's. It's totally boring though. Like, I think the paradox is a valid one, and I'll present it here in total if it becomes really important, but I kind of hate talking about it and I'm not resting on it very heavily. Anyway your last claim under this argument is telling, in which you indicate that it doesn't matter because we shouldn't adopt a policy based on this paradox given the impossibility of knowing if it wil work. This is A) a concession of the impossibility of using a utilitarian calculus properly in anything except the very small scale, and B) pragmatic analysis that you will later say is unimportant. "Remember, arguments against the difficulties of deciding what utility is in a practical sense is not necessarily an argument against the philosophy's truth, but rather it's practicality. " So. Ethics! I'm sorry this isn't what you imagined the debate to be about, its one of the things I find most interesting about philosophy, the divide between ethics and morals. It is what I believe is the constructive debate to be had, so thanks for engaging in it. Ethics are a practical subject, so yes, the problems that I illustrated in reaching a group consensus about what is utile in any given situation still apply. When you say "These rules would not be arbitrary or based of the fallible intuition of the select few, but rather off of the assumption that the set of rules that maximizes utility would be the best system. " It seems like you are just asserting that the assumptition based rules set that is trying to maximize that really vague goal wouldnt be arbitrary, intuitive, of exclusive to a few. But! To advance what I think is a clever argument. Ethics is something that must be taught, and must be easily understood if it is to be particularly effective at creating moral ends. Bearing in this in mind I think that your "Rule-based-ethics" is basically just another way of saying ontological. In teaching we wouldnt sit kids down and go "Ok now if you take your sisters toys it reduces net utility" we say "stealing is wrong" - the ethics is most enduring, most easily accessible, and most in concert with out other notions and intuitions about the order present in the universe, is that kind of ontological presentation. Ontology, while it may be a bit dodgy, is really -effective- as an ethical system of behavior to adavance, on that ground I find it emminently easy to justify. The problem with discussions about morality like this one is that if -you- get to say: "any system that has good results is utilitarian" then conversely -I- get to say: "any system that proposes an absolute is ontological. " In the end, we are talking about the same thing. The serious question then is which of us gets there better. I think it's me. I think it's easier to understand and obey propositions of moral truth that it is to weigh utility constantly, be wrong frequently, and never escape the relativism you purport to defeat.