God is existant

Non-CognitivismPro’s entire defence of non cognitivism is plagued with the following words:“an extreme”“notable ““intuitive awareness”“our intuition”“our intuition” (again)“self-evident”These buzzwords constitute I estimate over half of Pro’s defence of non-cognitivism. Pro’s argument is a blatent appeal to intuition/subjective opinion – one I am not impressed in the least by. Self-evidence is evidence of nothing except possibly consciousness itself, something is only self-evident to the individual, thus relies on an individual’s intuition. Intuitions are notoriously unreliable in determining anything about reality beyond our medium day-to-day experiences. Fundamental questions of ontology, philosophy, physics, mathematics, etc. etc. require much more than intuition to be sound, as our intuitions blatantly fail virtually every time. If you push an object, our intuitions say it will go faster. If you push an object near the speed of light, it will go faster than the speed of light – our intuitions will say. Well done, you have just disproven one of the most well-established theories of science with your intuition!Intuition has no place in philosophical/scientific enquiry except as a starting point for enquiry.Pro is partially correct in that maximal is cogent in an empty universe, but the very notion of “greatness”, and what makes something “more great” is not cogent. Since to say something “is greater” than something else is to have a cogent definition of what entails ”more” greatness. Pro has yet to provide a coherent definition of what greatness is, and what entails more or less greatness. His provided definition ‘being such in an extreme or notable degree’ simply begs the question of the nature of greatness, what would be entailed by an ‘extreme’ or ‘notable’ degree. Degree of what?When one asks for what a rabbit is, and one answers "10 lbs", the obvious question is "10 lbs of what", the reply “well, just 5 lbs” is clearly insufficient to elucidate the nature of what a rabbit is. Pro is attempting to define the relational attribute of greatness, with more relational terms. It is blatently question-begging.Possibility of God’s ExistancePro concedes that he did not define his terms properly in round 1. I find this an admission that the original presentation of the argument was misleading.Logical vs Metaphysical PossibilityPro’s assertion that the modal ontological argument uses logical possibility is flat out false, it is false because he is using “possible world semantics”, which mandates the use of metaphysical possibility. It would be pure logical possibility if we had an entirely a priori understanding of what being is. But the notion of “being” is clearly not understood from first-principles. Pre-ontologies such as Heidegger’s dasein implicitly concede that we simply do not have an a priori understanding of being, and can only make if and then statements grounded on our subjective experience.If Pro has an a priori framework of “being”, or “existence”, then he is welcome to rewrite metaphysics, but until then he must argue for metaphysical possibility, since we do not have the gap bridged between pure logic to metaphysics. Logical Possibility of GodNote that I wasn’t arguing that the argument itself uses epistemic possibility, only that Pro was implicitly using epistemic possibility as a justification for metaphysical possibility. The jump here is deceivingly large. Even assuming logical possibility, Pro has still not even attempted to demonstrate this. He has not even attempted to show that God’s existence (as defined as a necessary being) is logically possible. He has flat out ignored my points that we cannot just assume things to be logically possible, such as mathematical propositions, since it entails absurd conclusions.For pro to show God is logically possible, then he needs to show via. some purely deductive process that God as a necessary being is a coherent proposition. Appeals to intuition are not sufficient to do this.Thus until Pro demonstrates that God is logically possible, then his entire argument is a bare assertion. Good luck to Pro in accomplishing that!Reverse Modal Ontological ArgumentThe reverse argument is intended to show that Pro’s premise “There exists at least one possible world where God exists” is itself unsound, and that the premise is no more likely than the conclusion is without this argument.. It is not intended to demonstrate God doesn’t exist, since I acknowledge that it is dubious to assert anything is metaphysically/logically possible without rigorous deductive justification. The reverse premise “There exists at least one possible world where God doesn’t exist” is just as deceivingly “innocent”, let it is diametrically opposed to Pro’s premise. Why should we prefer the original premise over the reverse premise> I see no reason to based on the context of this debate, and in fact every single argument Pro has made can be mirrored to support the reverse premise.For example:"‘God does not exist in at least one possible world'Yet this would only be the case if God was logically impossible, which has not been demonstrated.”This can be flipped:“‘God exists in at least one possible world'Yet this would only be the case if noGod was logically impossible, which has not been demonstrated."Clearly Pro isn’t going to get anywhere with this line of defence. The premises are diametric mirrors. Pro’s next statement can be mirrored:"Furthermore, the conclusion of my argument (that a necessary being exists) entails that there is no possible world in which this being does not exist. So there is no possible world where God doesn't exist.”Mirrors to..“Furthermore, the conclusion of my [reverse] argument (that a necessary being doesn’t exist) entails that there is no possible world in which this being exists. So there is no possible world where God exists.”Pro simply begs the question in every single one of his defences, he privileges the conclusion of his argument as a refutation of the reverse argument, ignoring that the same can be said from the perspective of the reverse argument. Clearly we have no method of discerning between the two possibility premises – both are not, and I argue cannot be demonstrated to be true due to modal scepticism. God’s existence or non-existence would first need to be provide in order to demonstrate the possibility premises. Similarly, Goldbach’s conjecture, or any other mathematical theorem would first need to be proven outright before one could say “it is logically possible”.Summary of MOAUntil Pro actually makes any progress in demonstrating the “possibility premise”, then his argument is not even an argument. I hold it is impossible to do so. I would actually be excited to see if Pro could demonstrate the possibility premise, since he would essentially also find a way to solve virtually every mathematical problem we have in doing so!!Religious ExperienceEpistemologyThe argument form religious experience essentially “embeds” the epistemological claim of “I saw God” (or something of the like) with the claim “I experienced something I label God”. I argue that doing so is an unjustified epistemological leap.Experiences of various things occur to us every day. Often we will have experiences of weightlessness, or the world spinning around, etc. However it would be foolish to conflate the experience of such with the event of such. Otherwise people would literally be flying in their dreams, or when they are disoriented. The world would literally be spinning like a top when one is dissy.Thus when it comes to religious experiences, the experience of “God” needs to be separated from the epistemic claim that they “experienced God himself”. Similarly superstitions such as aliens I posited last round, or people seeing dead relatives in their bedrooms need to be judged on their relevant inferences (such as inference to best explanation).It doesn’t follow that there is an epistemic chance of each being “correct”. This is absurd reasoning. By this line of reasoning all the millions of people who believed that the Earth was flat each carried a “small chance” of being correct, thus after millions of examples it is unlikely that all of them are incorrect, hence the Earth is flat! Pro would need to demonstrate that God is the best explanation for religious experiences, rather than just positing that “Whilst it is probably the case that many mystics are either lying or deluded, it is a huge assumption that this is the case with every single claim.”.I assert - IF there is a general explanation that gives rise to religious experiences, then it would be hardly surprising that all mystics were mistaken (Pro attempts to paint me with the requirement to argue that mystics were either lying or deluded, but this is a false dichotomy, I argue they are simply mistaken in their epistemological claim). Given we already know of (natural) mechanisms that do exist by which experiences can be induced, then arguing God is the cause is premature.[http://tinyurl.com...]Counter Rebuttal Pro’s rebuttal here completely misses my point, since my argument demonstrates a methodological problem with Pro’s line of reasoning. Aliens were deliberately picked as an example precisely because it is an absurd example. If Pro’s line of reasoning entails absurd propositions, such as aliens have visited and abducted people, then there must be a problem with Pro’s line of reasoning.Pro implicitly argues that all false beliefs would have good arguments against them, but has given no reason why we should believe this. Also, if the concept (such as God) is simply incoherent, then it is impossible to construct an argument against it (except one from non-cognitivism) since it isn’t a coherently discussable concept to begin with. Also Pro’s argument from distance of aliens is based on no evidence or argument whatsoever, aliens would be many centuries, millennia, etc. ahead of humans, thus travel would be easier.