In Defense Of Practical Moral Skepticism

Introductory Remarks: First, let me note once again that psychological egoism (and Pro's argument against it) is irrelevant to MBE. According to MBE, all moral actions benefit two people, yourself and another person whose actions are mutually connected with yours. This means that there are always two potential reasons for an action: (1) self-interest, or (2) concern for another. Second, according to Pro, "PMS states that there is no NECESSARY reason to ALWAYS act morally." I have no disagreement with this, but to make my argument easier to follow, I want to reword this as follows: PMS states that not all immoral actions are irrational [1]. The two claims are equivalent, so I hope Pro has no problem with this. As such, I must only show that all immoral actions are irrational. Third, let me clarify and summarize a few key points in this debate. I must either show that PMS is unsound or provide an alternative ethical system. So far, I have provided an alternative ethical system. But now that Pro has provided his argument for PMS (through examples of cases in which a non-moral act is rationally preferred over a moral one), I will also attack PMS directly (specifically, the arguments Pro has made). In other words, while it will seem I am only taking one approach here, I ask Pro and the reader to note that I am actually making two distinct arguments: one against PMS generally, the other for MBE. As long as one of my arguments are sound, PMS is negated. On Pro's Section "Practical Moral Skepticism": First, Pro gives the example of criminals. I am not exactly sure what Pro hopes to achieve with this example, however, as Pro himself notes that it is disputable whether "criminals are acting in contrast to moral reasons (since this would assume a moral framework already)." Indeed, by definition, being a criminal means you are breaking a law, but breaking the law is not necessarily an immoral act. Pro claims that the point of the "criminal" example is to show that "for virtually all moral systems there are external reasons that can be chosen." Of course, there are always any number of reasons to motivate us, but it does not matter if these reasons are irrational. To show that not all immoral actions are irrational, Pro must show that acting immorally is rational in at least one case. This does not mean showing that there may exist a reason behind an immoral act; it means showing that an immoral act is rationally preferred over a moral one. Finally, Pro provides the example of a "gratuitous murder." This is a faulty example by definition: "gratuitous" means "being without apparent reason, cause, or justification" [2]. As such, a "gratuitous murder" is irrational, without reason, and therefore, a faulty example. I assume, then, that what Pro intends is simply an immoral "murder." Well, what exactly is an immoral murder? We must first realize that murder, as it is usually understood, is a legal term. In and of itself it has nothing to do with being immoral; rather, it has to do with breaking the law (and the law is not the moral code, especially if we accept MBE as our ethical system). Let's continue exploring this example, as I think it will yield some interesting insights. There are two kinds of actions: irrational and rational. Likewise, there exists murder motivated by irrational reason (or no reason at all) and murder motivated by rational reason. To make his case, Pro would have to show that murder motivated by "rational reason" is immoral. Before concluding this section, I remind Pro that MBE is an emergent ethics. This means that MBE adapts to every situation; what it means to be moral is redefined according to the circumstances at hand. Pro states that "it'd be hard to refute the idea that if action/rule/etc. X is moral, then there is no reason to ever act in violation of this commitment." Thing is, in MBE, this action/rule/etc. X is constantly redefined such that there is no "commitment." Rather, there is only game-theoretic reasoning for specific to each situation. In some sense, we can even say that through the notion of mutual benefits, we gain ethical objectivity in the sense that moral actions become equivalent to any rational action specific to any situation. On the Supposed "Inherent Problems" of MBE: 1. Pro claims I have overstepped some boundary between descriptive and normative, but I think this is evidence of Pro's misunderstanding of MBE. MBE states that moral actions are those that coordinate action to mutual benefit. This is what "ought" to be. What actually "is" is irrelevant to my argument. People all the time are motivated by "irrational" reasons. People all the time believe "irrational" things. I do not care what people actually believe. What I stated in R1 was that ethics clearly had an extremely important function because we find it everywhere. That was the only claim I derived from anthropological fact. I think it is reasonable. Pro has not address the actual claim I made. Rather, Pro merely makes some abstract claims about descriptive/normative ethics without actually locating any place where I do overstep boundaries. Again, Pro has not really made much of an argument here. 2. MBE is not quite a utilitarian theory. What MBE does is provide a reason why every action either benefits me or benefits the person that this action is mutually connected with. This means that for people that my actions are not mutually connected with, no benefit is necessary. For example, suppose my action A1 is mutually connected with another's action A2. Another person whose actions are not mutually connected can easily be harmed by actions A1 and A2, but this does not make actions A1 and A2 immoral. As long as these actions A1 and A2 are mutually beneficial for the doer of A1 and A2, then it is moral. Furthermore, it does not matter how mutually beneficial the action is. It is not about maximizing mutual benefits, but about having them in the first place. As such, getting into arguments about utilitarianism would be quite fruitless. Pro asks, "what is the meta-ethical foundation for this theory," and states MBE would collapse while attempting to answer this question. Pro, however, has not shown how it would collapse. Again, Pro has made a lot of claims but rarely supports them with any evidence. I would answer the question if it were more specific and Pro explained where he believed MBE to be faulty. Otherwise, the answer to that kind of question would take far more space than what Pro could reasonably expect me to elaborate on here. This is an unreasonable request if done without specificity. On the Section "Unsatisfactory Response to PMS" Pro argues that "while there may always exist a moral reason in every possible scenario, it rejects that in every possible scenario such moral reasons will NECESSARILY motivate us. In other words, PMS can be fulfilled if there is one situation in which a non-moral reason is preferred over the moral reason." That is precisely my point: PMS can ONLY be fulfilled if it can be shown that there is a situation in which a non-moral reason is PREFERRED over a moral reason. Pro has not actually shown a case in which it would be rational to be immoral. The reason Pro has not been able to do so is because Pro would have to show that this immoral act is actually preferred over the moral one RATIONALLY. This is a lot to ask, and would require far more extensive arguments than the ones Pro has given so far. Since I have nothing else to refute, I wait for Pro to attempt to find such a case in the following round. [1] http://plato.stanford.edu... [2] http://dictionary.reference.com...