Resolved: It is moral to kill one innocent person to save the lives of more innocent people.

ashwathc, we once debated this LD topic before – it was fun, but we never got to finish. This should be a good opportunity. I'd like to clarify that the correct resolution is: it is morally PERMISSIBLE to kill one innocent person to save the lives of more innocent people. My opponent deleted this correction from his original post, but still defines "morally permissible." I accept the resolution, but only because it contains the word "permissible" in it. Random House Dictionary (2010) defines "permissible" as an adjective, meaning: "can be permitted." [1] This cited definition should be preferred to the one my opponent makes up himself. The Pro need only prove that it "can be" morally permitted to kill one innocent person to save more innocent people, not that it "must be" morally permitted. This takes out all my opponent's arguments about how the pro must prove every killing of an innocent person (when more innocent people are saved) to be moral. His fruits resolution is a perfect example, since the correct analogy to this topic is: "fruits can be sweet." Proving that lemons are not sweet does not disprove that "fruits can be sweet." My value is societal welfare. I'll prove that my opponent's value of "always protecting human life" leads to some absurd conclusions. My opponent essentially advocates the Kantian categorical imperative: that people cannot be used as means to an end. I advocate a utilitarian morality: achieving the greatest good for the greatest number. My opponent then twice worries, in two different paragraphs, that an endorsement of the resolution will lead to moral confusion among the listeners/debaters when/if they are confronted with the decision of killing one innocent to save many. However, if they truly endorse utilitarian thinking, they will make the right decision. If they endorse my opponent's Kantian logic, they may very well make the wrong one. This brings us to contention 1 of my opponent's case: My responses: 1. I accept my opponent's definition of infinitives as "hypothetical future events." Apply this definition to "to kill." The killing is not guaranteed either. If I shoot at someone, I may miss. However, since I only need to prove the resolution true in some cases (that it "can be" permitted), I can choose to support only cases where if the killing is successful, the saving of lives is also guaranteed. Also, by nature of him agreeing that we are debating only in hypotheticals, I can also simply assert that in my hypothetical, the killing is guaranteed to result in the saving of lives. 2. This actually turns my opponent's case. He argues here for the philosophy of consequentialism: that actions can be judged only by their results, and not by their intentions. If this is true, then this turns his whole case. If your "intention" is to abstain from killing an innocent, because it is "morally wrong," but the direct result of your action is the unnecessary death of more innocents, then my opponent's consequentialism would judge that act immoral because the result is that innocent people died. It doesn't matter that the intention was to "protect the right to life." His entire case rested upon the supposition that intentions matter more than results. By saying "infringing upon another's right to life is inherently immoral," he opposes killing one person on "moral grounds" (Kantian morality), even if it results in the death of everyone in the entire world. It is easy to imagine such an example, such as killing a terrorist who is about to disrupt the Earth's gravitational field, sending us all spiraling into the sun. My opponent must pick: should an action be judged "moral" based on intentions or results? If he picks consequentialism, I'll show how utilitarianism is just a short hop-skip-and-a-jump away. If he picks the categorical imperative (no killing no matter what), then he must drop the argument that intentions don't matter, only consequences do. Contention 2: the classic "murdering doctor" First response: remember that I don't even need to defend this example, since I don't need to prove that killing an innocent to save more innocents is ALWAYS moral, just that it "can be" moral. Second response: hypothetical, he'll die anyway What if the patient is on life support, is brain dead, and cannot survive independently of the machines. Is taking him off life support before he dies a "natural death" really immoral, if it saves 5 lives? Utilitarianism says yes, categorical imperative (no killing no matter what) says no. Third response: can be deemed immoral under utilitarianism Since the murdering doctor is usually used as an objection to utilitarianism, I may as well answer this objection now. Remember, to win, I only need to prove that killing an innocent "can be" justified if it saves more innocents. I seek to win this round by proving that utilitarianism best matches with what Habermas would call our "moral feelings." By this statement, I mean that I will prove: utilitarianism leads to killing one innocent to save many in cases where we (as listeners) "feel" it is right to do so, but not in cases where we "feel" it is wrong to do so. The murdering doctor example is only compelling because we (as listeners) "feel" it is an example of something that is "wrong." The murdering doctor should not kill one patient to save 5 under utilitarianism because if society knew that doctors are willing to do such a thing, they would cease visiting doctors. The harms caused by all members of society refusing to visit doctors would outweigh the benefit of saving 5 lives. Thus, killing one innocent to save many can only be done under utilitarianism if society will be able to view the killing as an exception, rather than the rule. The harms of making murder "the norm" would clearly outweigh the benefits of saving a few lives in one case. Mitigating circumstances, or "exceptions," could include "he would die anyway," "he asked me to," and "the exceptional magnitude made it necessary." I covered some of these above. I offer more examples below. "He would die anyway" Joseph Nye of Harvard University cites the following hypothetical to disprove the categorical imperative: you pass through a conflict area and a rebel captain has captured two innocent villagers. The captain is going to execute the innocent villagers. You pass by and the captain, for his amusement, hands you a gun and says: shoot one villager and I will let the other go free. If you refuse, the captain will order his men to shoot both villagers. Nye asks, "Will you shoot one person with the consequences of saving one, or will you allow both to die but preserve your moral integrity by refusing to play his dirty game?" [2] Refusing to get your hands dirty is morally bankrupt, since one villager will die no matter what, especially when you expand the example to: save one doomed person to save the entire world. Arguing that "negative duties" should trump "positive duties," at this point, is an attempt to hide behind your morality (categorical imperative) and allow unspeakable and preventable atrocities simply because you refuse to get your hands dirty. "Please kill me" (given permission) After a car crash, on a bridge, a mother is trapped inside a car and her 4 children are trapped under the car (outside the car). If you don't act, the children will suffocate, but help will arrive in time to save the mother. The mother asks you to push the car off the bridge (and thus kill her) to save her children. Should you refuse her wishes and let her 4 children die? Lastly, my opponent's definitions/case lead to the perverse conclusion that you cannot fight back during war, since enemy soldiers are often conscripted and forced to fight and are thus "innocent." [1] http://dictionary.reference.com... [2] "Nuclear Ethics" p. 18-9