A Fetus is Not Morally Equivalent to a Mature Human

Thanks for the response. Readers are encouraged to check the footnotes for a deeper explanation of some points that I touch on.Natural (Negative) Rights vs. Positive RightsIt is true as Pro argues, that depending on our age, the rights and privileges we have will vary (As evidenced by laws on motor vehicle operation, marriage, military service, etc...). However, to use this in a context which entails certain moral conclusions is sorely mistaken, as Pro engages in an equivocation between positive rights and natural rights. Positive rights are those which are imposed upon society by the will of a soverign or state, whereas natural rights are those which we have innately. The former are non-moral and thus cannot be used in matters of determining moral equivalence, whereas the latter are distinctively moral. [1] Since the debate is over moral equivalence, it would be a mistake to use the former. Legal value is not identical to moral value. Pro's argument is therefore irrelevant in regards to moral equivalence.Pro seems to be assuming legal positivism, a controversial jurisprudential view under which law and morality are the same thing. Instead of being presupposed, this must be defended in an argument. Under legal positivism, there would be no such thing as an unjust law, which strikes many as plainly absurd. We can name many examples of unjust laws, but if the law is the same thing as morality, then those who protest against so-called unjust laws would actually be acting immorally. 1. Mental CriteriaA. Self-awareness?As pointed out in the preceding paragraph, Pro's argument here equivocates between natural rights and positive rights. Pro argues that our "privileges decrease dramatically" when asleep. This is an ambigious statement. Our legal rights (Those arbitrarily imposed on us by a state or soveriegn) may decrease, but our natural rights remain the same. Picture two people lying on a bed, one asleep and the other awake. Even though they may be of different legal value, they have the same moral value. A "capacity" is commonly understood by philosophers to be "another term for a thing's potentiality." [2] Whether or not this potential is actual is completely irrelevant. As it thus standards, Pro's own source ends up backfiring and hurting his own position. Moreover, the term ability does not refer to the immediate exemplification of some trait, but to the inherent potential for a trait to be exercised. Nowhere is the term "ability" to be understood as the immediate exemplification of some property. [3] What is relevant to personhood is thus not the actual expression of self-awareness, but a potential for it. This is precisely why Pro's rock analogy breaks down, for rocks do not have such a capacity inherent in their natureAs it stands, Pro has not shown why self-awareness is equivalent to moral equivalence. He has simply reasserted it. Are we to believe that sleeping persons are morally inferior to awake persons? Pro's appeal to legal value fails, as it ends up equivocating between legal value and moral value. At any rate, this seems like a rather hard position to embrace, such that we should reject Pro's argument if it entails such counterintuitive conclusions. B. Perception and MemoryFirstly, Pro has done nothing to object to the two counterexamples I raised. Let me therefore extend and repeat it here: 1. Consider a blind, deaf, and mute adult with CIPA (Congenital Insensivity to Pain with Anhydrosis) who cannot perceive anything but who still has the capacity and is immediately exercising the capacity for self-awareness. Would this adult be morally equivalent to another FDH? Of course. Perception has nothing to do with moral equivalence. 2. Would those who have amnesia not be considered morally equivalent to another FDH? No. Memory is therefore irrelevant to moral equivalence. From this we see that perception and memory is neither a necessary or sufficient condition for personhood.Pro's response seems to have misunderstood me. By "utility," I refer not to moral value, but to pragmatic value. All things being equal, a fully functioning human is just as valuable as one who is not as functioning. So morally speaking everything is equal, but since it is better to save one life than to let two die, we factor in other non-moral criteria into our decision. This is not to say that one life is more morally valuable than another. Utility does not take precedence over moral equivalence. We only consider non-moral reasons in decision-making when all the moral criteria are equally weighed.2. Extrinsic CriteriaA. Life of the motherMorally speaking, the fetus is equal in value to the mother. However, if faced in a situation such that we have to choose one or the other, we incorporate external non-moral factors into the decision-making process. This is not to say that non-moral factors take precedent over the moral factors, but that if we have to make a decision in which the two sides are equally weighed, we can incorporate other criteria. Consider the paradox of Burridan's donkey, in which a donkey is presented with two equally large bales of hay. If he deliberates forever, then he will die. The same principle applies in this instance. In the context of a medical decision though, it is better to save one than to let two die. A decision therefore has to be made. To tip the scales, we therefore introduce non-moral criteria to influence our decision-making. This has nothing to do with the moral value of the two subjects involved -- rather it has to do with the necessity of making a decision. Pro's argument here therefore fails.B. Spontaneous abortionsPro's argument here is rather dubious. Consider a parody argument: If poor African babies are "morally equivalent" to adults, then their deaths should be mourned like the loss of adults. They are not (The majority of people in the developed world would just shrug their shoulders). Very few hold funerals for African babies who die in poverty. Does it follow that they are morally nil? Of course not! As I argued earlier, "There is a high infant mortality rate in the third world, yet virtually nobody (Including those who aren't proactive about stopping it) would think that they are not morally equivalent to FDHs." Or suppose a mother decides to rescue her own children over those of another parent. Would those children be less valuable? Hardly. Pro has not responded to this argument.Regarding natural death, by "natural" I referred to death by natural causes -- not what corners refer to as "unnatural deaths" (Which may be by homicide, natural disaster, etc...). While it would be a good thing to prevent it, it is arguably not a duty. So there is no inconsistency when pro-lifers ignore the number of sponatneous abortions.Pro simply chooses to bite the bullet in regards to those with vegetative states. This seems completely counterintuitive and strikes me as a sufficient reason in itself to reject Pro's argument. Could we also not extend his argument to its logical conclusions, such that the elderly (and especially those with Alzheimer's) are included?The Case for Moral EquivalenceThere isn't much to say here, as much of Pro's response to my argument has been dealt with in the above responses. Refer especially to my argument (Since I'm out of character space) that Pro equivocates between natural rights and positive rights. I look forward to Pro's response.________Notes1. Positive rights have to do with legal issues, which is distinct from moral issues. 2. Simon Blackburn, The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy (OUP: 2005) 52. Note that Pro's source for his definition of capacity is the Wikipedia article on "self-awareness." However, the actual disambiguation page on "capacity" all understand the term (In its many uses) to refer to an ability to do X. See: http://en.wikipedia.org...;3. See Pro's own source, none of the meanings of "ability" refers to the immediate exercisability of some trait. http://www.thefreedictionary.com...