The Moral Argument is Not Sound

I did not get a chance to do so in my opening case, due to character restrictions. I. What's the Problem? To support P1 of the Moral Argument is to say that God is necessary for OM. Scotty affirms this in his statement of the argument. But oddly enough, he seems to deny that the two contentions I listed are implicit in such a premise. The contentions are: (1) Theism can provide a foundation for morality. (Theistic morality is possible) (2) AFM cannot provide a foundation for morality. (Non-theistic morality is impossible. ) The contentions are implicit in P1 because if AFM is possible, or if DCT is impossible, then it would not be the case that God is necessary for objective morality. If the contentions are supported and defended by Scotty, then that would constitute a necessary relation between God and morality, and P1 is justified and the Moral Argument works. If even one of the contentions is false, then P1 is false and the Moral Argument fails. Therefore, Scotty must support and defend these two contentions, if he wants his argument to stand. II. Epistemological Argument for Ontological Grounding I argued that in the absence of a good argument against the possibility of AFM, we can be confident that P1 of the Moral Argument is false (see Epistemological Argument in my opening case. ) Did Scotty provide any such argument? 1. Atheist Friendly Morality Scotty confuses the definition of AFM with the idea that atheists should be friendly people, including to theists, who are, in Scotty's words, atheist's "enemies. " This blunder on Scotty's part made me chuckle. AFM just refers to the class of ethical theories which don't depend on God (as I noted in the definitions section of round one. ) Thus, it is a Straw Man Fallacy. [1] (It is, perhaps, one of the strangest straw men I've seen. ) 2. God can be seen at the roots of moral reflection Scotty says once we are done working out moral details, we see the fingerprints of God. I see no fingerprints of God. And neither do many other moral philosophers. Unless Scotty can provide a good argument for this, it should be discarded as bare assertion. 3. Objective moral values require a standard Scotty asserts OMV require a standard, but he never actually argues for this point. We don't require abstract platonic forms or standards for colors or other objective facts. Why should we do so for moral facts? [2] I've also provided a theory which grounds objective moral values independent of a standard, proving this contention false. 4. Moral law requires a lawgiver Scotty sketched a version of DCT. However, Scotty never gave us any arguments to support the idea that duty requires a lawgiver. It seems he just assumed it. Unless Scotty presents an argument proving duty without a lawgiver is impossible, then we have no reason to believe a lawgiver is necessary for duty to arise. Also, I've given an account of duty which makes no appeals to a lawgiver. In practice, a recognition of goodness and badness seems to provide reasons for action even in the absence of commands[2], as I explained in my opening case. 5. Requirements for an adequate theory of moral duty Scotty lists requirements of an adequate theory of moral duty: Objectivity, Normativity, Catagoricity, Authority, Epistemic Access, and Unity. I agree to all except for the last. I've never heard of "unity" in moral discussions. I ask Scotty to (a) elaborate on what he means by "unity", (b) describe why he thinks it's a requirement, and [c] cite a source where I can read more about it. Also, readers should note that unless Scotty provides us with an argument proving AFM cannot possibly account for these facets of morality, then he still hasn't met his burden of proof. Simply listing them is not enough. My Epistemological Argument shows why we are justified in believing AFM can account for these things, even if we don't yet know a specific theory which can. Scotty never contradicts the premises of my Epistemological Argument, and never gets around to showing that OM given atheism is necessarily false (impossible. ) Scotty mentions something called "ATF" in his conclusion, but I didn't see this defined and am unsure of what it refers to. Therefore, my argument still stands, undefeated. Extend Argument. III. Non-Reductive Ethical Naturalism I sketched a possible view in which both moral values and duties have ontological grounding in the world. I won't repeat the theory here, but I will note that NREN meets the criteria for an adequate moral theory. Moral Values and Duties Objectivity: On NREN, goodness and badness objectively exist when certain good-and-bad-making properties exist, like suffering and happiness (much like colors exist when certain color-making properties exist, like reflected light particles. ) These properties exist independently of people's opinions. Moral reasons for action exist objectively. I developed this idea more robustly in my opening case. Epistemic Access: We come to know of goodness and badness (and thus rightness and wrongness) through moral intuition. Normativity: On NREN, duty arises upon recognition of goodness or badness. I describe this in more detail in my opening case. Authority: In practice, these moral reasons for action take precedent over practical reasons. They are "weighty. " Categoricity: These reasons are accessible by and applicable to all moral agents, even if they have contrary desires (I differentiated between practical reasons and moral reasons in my opening case. ) If NREN is possible, then the contention implicit in P1 of the moral argument is wrong. Scotty hasn't yet provided any real substantive challenges to the possibility of NREN, so we have good grounds for rejecting P1. Extend Argument. Conclusion Implicit in P1 of the moral argument is the contention that AFM is impossible. Scotty must meet this burden of proof by supporting and defending a positive argument against the possibility of AFM. So far, he hasn't been able to do this. Further, I've gone the extra mile and sketched a possible ethical theory that grounds objective moral values and duties. Because AFM is possible, as I've argued, we can reject P1. P1 is negated and the resolution is affirmed. (PS: I'd like to call attention to the frequent grammatical mistakes in Scotty's opening case. In some places, these mistakes clouded his intended meaning, rendering it nearly incomprehensible. Also, the quality of many of his sources is suspect. Among them are two creationist websites, one of which brings us to a 404 error. Another is an irrelevant blog post about atheism and religion as they relate to politics and secularism. ) References: [1] . http://www.iep.utm.edu... [2] Wes Morriston, God and the Ontological Foundation of Morality