Abortion is always Morally Permissible

Moral EgoismPrefer EgoismCon argues that I gave no justification as to why self-interest is necessarily a moral criterion/linked to morality, but Con completely ignores that self-interest is linked to morality by definition. It makes no sense to ask why a definition is a definition. I gave reasons to prefer moral egoism’s definition over any other definition which include: 1. Purely subjective system, with directly relevant values 2. Only moral anti-realist systems are coherent 3. Any “ought” is necessarily subjective anyway While other moral systems such as Util can give frameworks around certain elements, such as maximising well-being, altruism, etc. it still remains necessarily subjective “why” we should act morally (hence the “ought”).Con seems to be predicating his assumption that morality = moral realism. That morals are ‘tangable’, but this is incoherent, as I argued last round. There cannot be an objective “ought”, nor a “correct” definition of “moral”, only concepts of “moral” that are preferable to others.My Egoism StanceCon strawmans my position by asserting I have failed to lay “the groundwork for an absolutist psychologically egoistic stance”, but I never tried to argue for an absolutist stance. My stance is an entirely relative one, and is necessarily entirely subjective. I explicitly affirmed this in my opening:“..all moral facts of moral egoism being entirely subjective depending on the people involved”Con also strawmans my position by attacking a different definition of ‘morally right’ to what I presented in my framework.Con: ”[e]thical egoism claims that it is necessary and sufficient for an action to be morally right that it maximize one's self-interest”Pro: “A morally ‘right’ action is an action which maximises self-interest with intent, and a morally ‘wrong’ action is an action which minimises self-interest with intent.”There are two crucial differences in these definitions: 1. Con’s argues for absolutism 2. Mine includes intentionality #1 I have just discussed. #2 is also a critically important distinction, and is an aspect of most moral philosophies (that are non-imperative). For example, natural disasters are not ‘morally wrong’ since they completely lack intentionality, even if their effects go against self interest/well-being/etc. and lesser intelligent beings such as lion kills are seen as ‘less immoral’, since they do not possess the same level of intentionality of the consequences (murder). This applies to many other moral philosophies we well (such as some util). With these two points, most of Con’s rebuttals collapse. Is/OughtCon’s objection that my arguments are an is/ought fallacy might apply IF I was arguing for an absolutist philosophy, but I am not, as such “ought” statements can and are easily coherently and logically made by presenting them as conditionals. Virtually all the problems of deriving “ought” statements are from moral realism philosophies (such as the type Con is affirming himself) which attempt to posit “objective oughts”. By including the subject and their desires within the statement, the is/ought problem disappears:“You ought to drink water, if you desire quenching thirst”“You ought to walk the dog, if you value your dog’s fitness” Also, Con’s entire is/ought objection is based on a predicate that I argued that what ‘is’ the case is synonymous with what ‘ought’ to be the case, which is another strawman. I made a very clear distinction between moral facts (what IS moral) and moral oughts (why one ‘ought’ moral), but Con misunderstood this. The fact that moral facts = values does not equal moral facts = “oughts”.Arguments against egoismCon’s argument against ‘resolving conflicts’ is only an argument against pragmatics. It is unlikely that two things would ever be valued uniformly, one thing will almost always be a more core/important self-interest to the other (e.g. avoiding torture might be a more core interest to having breakfast). My overall value would be in favour of the more significant value.Also, Con’s moral altruism argument is in no way an argument against moral egoism, because then it simply becomes one’s self-interest TO act altruistically (to forgo myoptic self-interest for the larger altruistic self-interest). Ergo, altruism is perfectly compatible with egoism.Abortion & Self-InterestThe MotherCon’s only rebuttal here is that a women may be coerced. But I already addressed this:“while an abortion may not be within the woman’s immediate self-interest, it will be within the woman’s long-term self-interest.”IF a woman is having an abortion while not herself immediately wanting it it is clear that: 1. She has considered external factors to the abortion 2. Has come to the decision that it would be in her overall interest to continue anyway Her self-interest in her family’s interests will exceed her unenlightened self-interest. It’s for these reasons why somebody would not rob a shop even if it was within their immediate self-interest to make material gain, since it’s against their greater/enlightened self-interest not to be arrested, imprisoned, etc.Con argues one can chose to act against their self-interest. This is implausible since it assumes we do not have full autonomy over our own actions when we have a sound mind… which is universally assumed to be false in the court of law.[2[The FetusIntelligence & AwarenessCon misunderstands what I mean by ‘intelligent’, to which I was only stipulating the intelligence required for consciousness. A dog would have a degree of intelligence, as would a baby (albeit very low). It’s for these reasons why self-interest is predicated on consciousness, since there is no *you* or *I* if there was no consciousness, and self-interest is predicated on *me* or “my self-interest”.Ergo it is logically absurd to talk about self-interest outside the context of consciousness, of which intelligence and awareness are required.FLOCon commits an absurd equivocation: 1. Normal people have an interest in our future 2. Therefore a foetus has an interest in its future Quite bluntly, a foetus is not a “normal person”! When we are talking about people we are talking about “they” or “I”, but a foetus doesn’t possess that (since it’s not a conscious entity), a crucial distinction. If we hack away a person’s limbs, it does not change the fact that *they* exist, even a quadreplectic has interests. But as soon as their brain dies (and therefore their consciousness), *they* do not have values, moreover legally we don’t even treat them as such (organ donation, autopsies, etc). There simply is no *they* to talk about.Con can argue that death is against *our* self-interest, but in doing so he is no longer arguing relevant to a foetus, because there is no *they* in this sense. There is a reason why killing embryos, even if it is considered as “wrong” for the sake of argument, is clearly not considered as “wrong” as murdering a healthy human. [1]Con concedes 2 things in his argument from pain: 1. There is clearly period in which foetus’ do not feel pain 2. “Much of our self-interest is rooted in our *desire* not to feel pain” Both seriously damage Con’s case. If we were to accept that ability to feel pain predicates self-interest, then clearly we have a period in which abortions do not cause that. Given that most societies’ statutes do depend on the stage of pregnancy before allowing an abortion, this affirms my case. Since a society would not make abortions available for later term pregnanciesSecond, Con’s entire objection is based on a double equivocation: 1. Ability to feel pail =/= having self-interest 2. Having self-interest =/= having a self-interest for not dying Self-interest for ‘not dying’ is the only relevant concept here, yet while it’s highly dubious a foetus has any self-interests, for a foetus to have a self-interest in self-preservation is absurd. It is simply unable to comprehend that concept, and this fact extends beyond birth towards infanthood.Con makes an argument from legal rights, etc. But this is beyond the scope of this debate, as this debate regards morals. Our legal rights usually follow from our understanding of ethics and morality, not the other way around.Con argues that abortion may violate the father’s self-interest, but I hardly see this as relevant, as a moral egoism judgment would only argue it is “wrong for him”. Given that the father is not an immediately related party, then this can only be argued from a society perspective. The same argument can be made for anything you “don’t like”, for example my neighbours choosing wear skirts instead of trowsers may annoy me, but it wouldn’t be remotely relevant in a moral judgement (for them).SocietyNote when I talk about society, I am talking about the social construct that serves humans (such as a governments). I gave the context of abortions I was referring to in my opening, assuming a consenting procedure performed within society. Therefore it’s implausible that an abortion *could* occur in a society which has illegalised it.Assuming this though, I made the moral argument as for why society is important (access to food, shelter, security, etc.), but also outlined where societies self-interests should be, which is to be in its continued function to serve our core self-interests.Abortion is rather irrelevant to societies’ function to cater to our core self-interests. Abortion doesn’t affect how society functions, does not affect the price of food that’s on our plates, nor our sense of security in any meaningful way. Because abortion is irrelevant to society’s function to cater to our core self-interests, then it is morally neutral towards society.A core self-interest shared by virtually everyone in society is a right to autonomy. Con’s only objection is an argument for theocracy or dictatorship, but neither systems are constructed nor operated for the purpose of serving our self-interests, and hence irrelevant.References 1. http://tinyurl.com... 2. http://tinyurl.com...