Abortion Is Prima Facie Morally Wrong

Freeman begins by pointing out that my statement, “the brain-dead adult is not comparable to a fetus, because the adult is dead, while the fetus is alive and developing at the natural pace for a human being," is incorrect because death is the permanent loss of “mutual interaction among all the parts.” Having researched more in the last few days about people in irreversible comas, I withdraw my statement that a “brain-dead adult is dead.” I now believe the concept of “brain death” to be a myth, because there is more to biological life than the ability of the brain to communicate to the rest of the body. I believe someone in an irreversible coma does have the right to life, and the current rules about organ transplantation affirm that. We can’t take someone’s organs unless they’ve already consented to the procedure, or in some cases, the family does instead. Irreversible Coma Guy is not remotely comparable to a fetus, except for an anencephalic one. While our brains help coordinate our bodily functions, the embryo does that without a brain during the first moths of life. What Irreversible Coma Guy doesn’t have anymore is precisely what the fetus does have: the ability to coordinate bodily functions without a brain. What Irreversible Coma Guy lost, the fetus has, and only loses when she is cut to pieces during an abortion. For the sake of this debate, I will grant that abortion is permissible for the anencephalic fetus. There’s still a lot of debate about what’s actually going on biologically with anencephalic fetuses, and you’re talking about 1 out of 10,000 births.[1] Let’s debate about the other 9,999 perfectly healthy defenseless human beings in utero that are not remotely comparable to a guy in an irreversible coma. I accidently miscommunicated Warren’s personhood criteria. Having now read Warren’s essay,[2] I understand she only believes you need to have 2-3 of the 5 qualities for personhood. However the point I was making, that under Warren’s criteria the killing of infants and disabled people is justified, still stands, as Freeman readily admits! He only counters that this is primarily an “emotional argument.” I agree that it’s a moral intuition, but Freeman is wrong to think we should discount moral intuitions. Philosophers often act like the best way for us to think about an issue is to lock ourselves in a proverbial ivory tower, and remove all moral intuitions from our reasoning. But if Warren’s criteria does legitimize infanticide and the killing of disabled adults, and if we know we’re definitely against the killing of infants and disabled adults, than there’s probably something wrong with the personhood criteria we started with. Granted, Peter Singer sticks to his argument no matter what the consequences are. In Singer’s case, his argument is coherent, but that doesn’t make it correct. Most people are rightfully repulsed by the idea of killing infants and disabled adults. Yes, part of that is moral intuition, but that doesn’t make us wrong. On the contrary, I think it’s what Leon Kass calls the “wisdom of repugnance.”[3] Freeman will need to either concede the moral permissibility of killing infants and disabled adults, OR he will have to adjust his criteria for personhood. There is just no way around that. Freeman creates a false dilemma when he states, “I think we've seen that membership in a certain species cannot solely establish a right to life.” The implication is that either: A: Species membership establishes a right to life; or B: Freeman is right, that consciousness establishes a right to life. But my view is C, the substance view of persons: the right to life is a categorical property of creatures that belong to a rational moral kind of being. Species membership is irrelevant, but if morality is a property of rational creatures, and if rational creatures maintain their identity through their entire existence, than those rational creatures maintain their right to life through their entire existence. For example, an alien like Spock has the right to life, because he is a rational kind of being. When Spock was a fetus, inside his human mother, he maintained that right to life because he maintained his identity through his entire existence. Freeman, I’m curious. What do you think of the concept of equal human rights? Should we do away with that “emotionally appealing” concept altogether? “The right to vote, after all, is something that you either have or you don't have. And it is clearly attained by being a certain age.” ~Freeman Yes, but the right to vote is connected to different factors: being a citizen; not being a felon and being at least 18 years old. The critical distinction is that the right to vote is a secondary right granted by government. In fact, the voting requirement used to be age 21, not 18. (That change occurred in the 26th amendment.[4]) Those rights can clearly be altered. But our common human nature is rightfully how we ground the way we should treat each other. So Freeman’s argument actually makes my point. You either are an 18-year old citizen, or you’re not. Similarly, you either are a member of a rational kind, or you’re not. “It is clearly possible to imagine a spectrum of species with gradually diminishing natural capacities for consciousness all the way from humans down to amoebae. At some point along this spectrum, people who agree with Josh will have to create an arbitrary cut off line where the natural capacity for consciousness is diminished to such a degree in an organism that it can no longer be adequate in granting the entity a right to life.” ~Freeman Freeman is wrong. Based on the substance view of persons that I’ve argued for in this debate, the only logical point to grant a human being the right to life is at the beginning of her life. That’s not arbitrary at all. In contrast, requiring an intrinsically rational entity to be presently conscious BEFORE granting a right to life is completely arbitrary, which Freeman seems to admit here. An amoeba is a single celled organism. It is not a member of the human community. It does not have the inherent natural capacity to function as a person. In contrast, a fetus has the intrinsic ability to develop into an adult human. Bodily cells like sperm and egg merely have the extrinsic potential to function as persons. (Some outside agent needs to act to make it happen.) All the fetus requires is a proper environment and adequate nutrition. (As does the rest of us.) The difference between intrinsic ability and extrinsic potential is why Singer’s abstinence argument is rooted in bad biology. Freeman quotes Warren’s space explorer analogy. In the case of the space explorer, you’re a person and it’s your right to life that is about to be violated. Your cells are not persons yet; they’re potential organisms. They’re not harmed by you escaping. As my colleague Trent Horn points out, “I don’t have the right to kill a man and woman to steal their sperm and egg to create 50 people.” | Conclusion | I have demonstrated that my opponents C1 conclusion does not represent my actual argument, and is actually a strawman. I’ve also shown that C2 and C3 are demonstrably false from a philosophical standpoint. Furthermore, my opponents C2 and C3 conclusions result in the justification of infanticide and eugenics, which runs contrary to the moral intuitions of virtually the entire human community. In contrast, my argument that it is prima facie morally wrong to kill any full-fledged member of the human community stands strong. Readers, you can either vote for my view that all humans are equally valuable because of what we have in common, our human nature, or you can pick Freeman’s view, that rights depend on how well you function. (Fair warning: you might not fare as well under Freeman’s view.) Sources: 1: http://bit.ly... 2: http://bit.ly... 3: http://bit.ly... 4: http://bit.ly...