God is not real.

Kalām Cosmological Argument Surprisingly, my opponent states that he “will not argue with [my] first syllogism. ” My opponent states that the mandate for a cause is logical, and he declares that theoretical physics, such as M-theory, supports such a proposition. However, he then states that such a cause is “explained by logic and science, rather than the supernatural. ” This rebuttal fails for multiple reasons. First, when I say Universe, and perhaps I should have clarified this, I am referring to all of spacetime reality, meaning I’m also referring to any sort of oscillating multiverse that some theories posit. P2 would apply to any sort of theoretical multiverse model; and because P1 is a metaphysical truth, P3 follows for all of spacetime reality. The soundness of the KCA mandates a nonspatiotemporal cause. Any cause within spacetime merely misses the point and only moves the question to the cause of that cause. Thus, if my opponent is referring to a spatiotemporal entity that caused the Universe, he simply begs the question as to what caused that. Second, given that my opponent agrees my syllogism to be true, it seems logical to assume my analysis of the conclusion to be true. I’ve already explained that I’m referring to all of spacetime reality (“nature”) when I discuss the Universe, so the cause of nature must necessarily be supernatural. I’ll repeat that my analysis revealed the cause of the Universe to be an uncaused, nonspatiotemporal, unimaginably powerful mind with free-will. Modal Ontological Argument As stated in the comments, my wording here was also confusing, and I sincerely apologize – my opponent states he “think[s] it would do well if [I] could explain it in terms and progressions slightly less confusing. ” Consequently, I’ll clarify the premises behind the modal ontological argument. First, let’s examine what modality is. In modal logic, some proposition can be either impossible or possible. Then, if that proposition is possible, it can be either contingent or necessary. Let’s examine contingency and necessity. For this explanation, I’ll use what’s called “possible world semantics,” which is a way of talking about modal logic that facilitates its comprehension. Here, a possible world doesn’t refer to a concrete physical entity, just a hypothetical situtation. In possible world semantics, a proposition is contingent if it is true in some possible worlds. For example, I am contingent as I could have possibily never existed, just as my microwave oven could have possibly never existed. Moreover, my microwave oven could be not as obnoxious in some possible world. A proposition is necessary if it is true in all possible worlds. For example, mathematics and logic necessarily exist. 1 + 1 = 2 is true in all possible worlds. Thus we must make the distinction between contingency and necessity for any given propostion. Let’s now discuss this within the context of the modal ontological argument. Within this argument, God is defined as a “maximally great being,” meaning He embodies all great-making properties to their maximal extent (i. e. omnipotence, omniscience), etc. This means that God, in His maximal excellence, embodies necessity over contingency, because being true in all possible worlds is greater than being true in some possible worlds. Thus God is necessary. If God is necessary, then he exists in all possible worlds. If God exists in all possible worlds, he exists in the actual world. This last bit follows logically from axiom S5 of modal logic: if possibly necessarily God exists, then necessarily God exists. Now within the context of my larger argument, I used the MOA to apply to God the usual Judeo-Christian attributes because such a being must exist. I also used this argument to apply the Principle of Sufficient Reason to God, in that he is necessary in his own nature. Logical Absence Although not necessary, my opponent has made a case of his own. His argument roughly states that science rationally explains the beginning of the Universe without supernatural phenomena, and thus should be accepted over a supernatural explanation. This argument fails for multiple reasons: (1) it is not logically valid, (2) premise 1 and premise 2 are false, and (3) premise 3 is false. Basically, all of the premises are false; and, even if they were true, it would not follow logically to its conclusion. Logical validity First, my opponent’s argument is not logically valid. He derives that science is “probably more accurate” than a divine explanation. However, he pulls this probability out of thin air, as he does not mention probability anywhere in his premises or his explanation. Thus, the premises do not follow to their conclusion even if we assume his argument is inductive rather than deductive. Second, my opponent’s argument commits the false dichotomy fallacy, as he basically supposes that a divine explanation and a scientific explanation are mutually exclusive without substantiating this point. The truth of the matter is that science is constrained to spatiotemporal reality, and religious explanations are not. I’ll discuss this further in 2 and 3. Premise 1 and 2 My opponent’s first premise is “science has a rational explanation for the source of the universe,” and his second is “science can explain, with supporting evidence, this rational explanation, without the necessity of magic. ” First, science has no explanation for the source of the Universe – if we’re discussing the Big Bang model for the beginning of our Universe, then it merely describes the inflation of an infinitely dense singularity into the cosmos. Science does not provide a sufficient reason for the existence of this singularity; indeed, the Universe could not possibly exist necessarily – it had a beginning, the fundamental particles are not necessary, no composite entity is necessary, and we can imagine the fundamental particles in a different arrangement with no apparent logical contradiction. [1] Thus, the Universe is not necessary, and requires an external cause which is beyond empirical constraints. If we’re discussing the multiverse, then as it too would require a beginning due to the absurdity of an actual infinity, then you can just move my entire explanation to this same realm. Science has no rational explanation for the source of the Universe, no matter if we’re discussing our Universe, the multiverse, or all of spacetime reality. Second, if science did have an explanation that didn’t lead to an absurd infinite regress of causes, it would mandate an uncaused first cause. Since science can only empirically test nature, it would literally require whatever this is to appear out of nothing – which is literally “worse than magic,” as Dr. Craig is so fond of saying. Once again, science can only test nature, and because nature requires an explanation, science cannot explain the source of the Universe. Premise 3 My opponent’s third premise states, “The concept of the divine cannot explain the source of the universe without magic and illogical, non-supported claims. ” I’ve already given very good reasons to believe in the divine. All of my premises have been supported, and each of my syllogisms follow to their conclusions. Thus, I have given good reasons to believe in a supernatural cause of the Universe. Similarly, science cannot explain the source of the Universe as it is by definition beyond the empirical limits of science. Unless my opponent can define “magic,” this is just a loaded word. I’ve proven that a divine Creator fashioned the Universe ex nihilo, and if my opponent wants to call this magic, fine. My opponent ends his round 2 response with “it seems to me that the very good structure of my opponent's argument calls for a tie at the least, if not a win on his part,” and because of his humility I must ask voters to give my opponent conduct. Notes 1. I’d like to thank my friend philochristos for helping me here: . http://debate.org...