Marx's Labour Theory of Value is Superior to Subjective Value Theory

Homestretch! As a side note: since this both the last Con argument, and final round of the debate, all citations I bring up will only be from sources I’ve introduced in previous rounds. Exchange Value I’m starting outside of the normal flow of the arguments for a moment, but this defense of my use of exchange value is necessary to proceed. The Pro argues that I’ve misinterpreted Marx’s definition of exchange value, and have conflated this term with value-proper. He basis this argument on my definition used in my car example: an intrinsic value based off of the labor that was put into making it. Once again, Pro may confuse “intrinsic” with “absolute”. Now I will grant to the Pro that my definition is certainly simplistic, but not inaccurate. Exchange values are intrinsic, and are determined by labor (labor time), and as my example demonstrates, express the “proper value” of an objective as a value form3. Furthermore, it is exchange value (and not the proper value) that forms one half of Marx’s dialectical relationship with use-value that my car example was demonstrating. Both sellers and buyers are concerned with the exchange of value: getting the same amount of value that you give. Prices Pt. 2 The Pro argues that for Marx, natural prices are values and therefore satisfy the mandate of being the only valid theory of value. First, it is unclear to me where Marx specifically makes this line of argument given two points. First, Marx still recognizes the existence of a subjective value based off of physical properties. As we both agree, this use-value doesn’t play a role in the natural price. Marx gives no claim that use-value isn’t a value, however, which means that he does recognize a value outside of natural price. As a result, we can’t conclude that Marx only meant natural price as value without a more specific analysis of the text. Second, this argument ignores the dialectical relationship between exchange value and use-value as both Keen in “Use-Value, Exchange Value, and the Demise of Marx’s Labor Theory of Value”1 and Cohen in his article, “Marx’s Dialectic of Labor”2 explain. The Pro disputes this, which I will address here as well. Once we accept this as an accurate interpretation we will see how the Pro’s claim on natural prices fails once more. As we both agree, commodities require a use-value to be salable. For Pro, this is the only major influence a use-value has. Both Keen and Cohen, however, argue that Marx saw the role of use-value as much. To a seller, the exchange value of a commodity is the only real concern: getting equal intrinsic value based on labor time. For the buyer, however, this concern for “equal intrinsic value” exists in addition to a concern with the utility of the commodity. As I demonstrate in my previous round, this extra addition helps to influence market price, which highlights how the full value of a commodity (exchange + use) is realized. This, therefore, contradicts the Pro’s notion that natural prices alone encompass all value. Note: in the Pro’s analysis of the car example, he claims that both parties get an equal amount of utility (seller gets utility of money). This utility doesn’t come from the commodity of the car. If we look at money as a commodity in this case, the seller becomes the buyer and vice versa (the owner of the car is “buying” this commodity through the worth of the car). Da Beers Revisited… Revisited Once again, differing interpretations of Marx’s theory seem to lead to different conclusions about my Da Beers example. So far, we’ve discussed our different interpretations on what constitutes value (natural prices vs. commodity value), and the influence of use-value (making a commodity salable vs. influencing the ultimate market price). The Pro argues that I’ve somehow conflated use-value and values without any sort of direct reference to where I conflate them, and I hope that I’ve shown via my explanation of Marx’s dialectical relationship, that this isn’t the case. He also claims, “It is absolutely not the case that Marx's view entails that the ad campaign increased the value of diamonds…” Let’s be clear: I make the argument that the value of diamonds as a commodity increases, not the diamonds themselves (this latter point is actually a crucial aspect of the Da Beers example). The value of the commodity did increase, because a commodity is the sum of exchange and use-value. This example shows that when N.Y. Ayers increased the utility of the diamond, the overall value of the commodity increased. To suggest otherwise ignores the historical market performance of diamonds. Finally, to address the issue of use-value in this example: my point is that Marx’s concept of use-value is unable to accommodate certain phenomena that don’t fit the criterion of “subjective value linked to physical properties”. The Pro challenges this by pointing out that the ad campaign was still linked to the physical properties of diamonds and wouldn’t work for something like carrots. This misses the extended point I made here: the use-value isn’t able to accommodate all of the extra subjective values created from a campaign, and as I said in round three, for the brand of De Beers. For example, “a diamond is forever” becomes a statement of worth: a legal trademark without physical property that can be exchanged. Intellectual property would be another example. Exploitation Pro argues for a concept of exploitation that derives from profit, or surplus-value. As Sheen1 points out, and I discuss in round three, surplus-value is not simply profit, but the net result of this dialectic between exchange value and use-value (refer to my previous sections for the logic on this dialectic). An employer gets a surplus of value from the utility of the employee’s labor power, while the employee only gets a fair exchange of intrinsic value from wages. The Pro argues for a Marxian interpretation of profits, but in the absence of specific logic cited from the text, and in the face of these contradictions in interpreting Marx’s theory, I don’t have enough to make a satisfactory critique. Final Outliers The Pro critiques my statement about the “current state of academic literature”. I make no argument that “economics are against LTV”. Whether this is true or not, my point is that the literature I’ve brought up contradicts A. some of Pro’s interpretations derived solely from Marx’s book, and B. the usefulness of LTV on market value analysis. He argues that I will “need to express” the ideas of economic thinkers, which fails to recognize the thinkers I cite, including Wolff. To be clear: I’m not an economist. My interpretations and arguments regarding Marx’s values, theoretical scope, and the dialectical relationships mainly come from the thinkers I’ve cited. Finally, the Pro summarized his concluding round with an array of critiques against STV, many of which constitute new arguments presented in the concluding round. Since I would have to dedicate an entire round to the defense on these critiques (which puts me at an unfair disadvantage), I will save this act for another debate and ask voters to consider typical debate decorum that often includes “no new arguments in a final rebuttal”. The Pro had the time to bring these critiques well before the end of the debate. Final Summary For the sake of simplicity, I’m going to summarize the winning points of the Con into three distinct arguments: 1. The Dialectical Relationship - Weigh my interpretation of Marx’s theory, particularly in regards to use-value, more heavily than the Pro’s, especially in regards to the evidential weight that supports my interpretation. The Pro consistently argues that use-value is only a requirement for a commodity to be salable, which completely ignores the dialectical relationship I’ve drawn from existing academic literature between use-value and exchange-value. This interpretation reflects what other economists find in Marx’s work, and is paramount to demonstrating that A. Marx saw value beyond natural prices (despite what the Pro argues), and B. the bigger picture we’re accounting for (extending to market prices) requires taking into account the subjective value of a commodity on the buyer’s account. 2. The Limits of Marx’s Use-value – even when we accept #1, we have to see the limitations that Marx’s strict connection of subjective utility and physical properties creates. Things such as trademarks, copyrights, intellectual rights, and the wealth of brands beyond their capital are all commodities that are bought and sold without having physical properties. In short, the campaign and brand that N.Y. Ayers created for Da Beers are drastically more than the mere physical properties of the diamonds they sell, as is people’s subjective attitudes about the campaign/brand. 3. The Pro’s Burden – as I’ve pointed out continuously, the Pro created a massive burden by arguing for LTV as the “only valid theory of value”. He’s argued that this burden has been satisfied by demonstrating how the phenomenon we call value only extends to the point of natural prices, but apply my critiques of the Pro’s interpretations on the role of use-value to this claim. Value extends beyond the natural prices of commodities, which LTV struggles to account for given my critique in #2. I demonstrate in my constructive how STV does account for this, and since I don’t have the burden to prove STV is the “only valid” theory, I successfully introduce a counter theory to account for this bigger picture. Therefore, the Pro fails to satisfy his burden. Done and done! Once again, thanks for a great debate! 1. “Use-Value, Exchange Value, and the Demise of Marx’s Labor Theory of Value” by S. Keen 2. “Marx’s Dialectic of Labor” by G.A. Cohen 3. “Das Kapital” by C. Marx