Utilitarianism is an unsound ethical system

.. however, I will specifically address his concerns regarding what he perceives to be "multiple contradictory positions" in A1, since that is a more appropriate place to do so in terms of organization. == NEG CASE == If I can successfully refute all of Con's objections to the Non-Aggression Principle, then I will have shown that the NAP is a sound ethical theory, and will be free to utilize it as a tool to evaluate utilitarianism's claims. 1. Con claims that "utilitarianism justifies all the benefits of NAP without the drawbacks. " This is patently false. As I explained before, the NAP provides a much firmer grounding for the existence of natural rights than utilitarianism does, since those rights are always protected as an extension of our existence as human beings, rather than only when it results in the prosperity of the majority. The NAP is quite obviously preferable to utilitarianism, in this respect. 2. Con lists the example of a drowning child, criticizing the NAP for not generating a moral obligation to save the child. But Con never explains: why should there be a moral obligation to save the child? Because utilitarianism indicates that there should be? Con is essentially claiming that utilitarianism is superior to the NAP because the NAP is not utilitarian. This is a blatant case of circular logic. Furthermore, Con claims that in this scenario, "watching a child drown to death and saving the child are morally equivalent. " Another patently false claim. The NAP, while it wouldn't create a moral obligation to save the child, would certainly make it *morally desirable* to save the child, since by doing so, the savior would be protecting the child's right to life. It is obvious that such an act would be favored by a system based completely in the protection of human rights. .. 3. Cross-apply circular logic point from #2. Con makes no arguments for why civilian casualties and pollution *are* justified which do not already assume the soundness of utilitarianism. 4. Con's argument here seems to be nothing more than a reiteration of my conceded third contention. .. in both cases, it is argued that our lack of foreknowledge regaring our actions' consequences interferes with our ability to apply the opposing side's respective ethical system in practice. Therefore, I can simply cross-apply Con's rebuttal to C3, which states that such a degree of uncertainty is present in all ethical systems when applied in practice. If Con wants to argue that this practical uncertainty can make an ethical system unsound, then he concedes that all ethical systems are unsound, including utilitarianism, thus automatically affirming the resolution. 5. Here, Con is basically criticizing me for never making an extensive positive case supporting the NAP's soundness. However, I would like to point out that Con is just as guilty of this as I am, having never made an elucidated case in favor of utilitarianism. We both only provided a short justification of our respective ethical systems towards the end of our Round 3 arguments (in response to C7, in both cases). And it makes sense that we have avoided going too in-depth on the philosophical justifications, as doing so has allowed for the debate to stay on topic. I have countered all of Con's objections to the NAP. Therefore, I can now use it as an objective basis by which we can evaluate the morality of utilitarianism's claims (at this point, it is only being used as such in C5. .. ) == AFF CASE == A1) Utility Comparisons Con starts off by claiming that my concession of C3 equates to a concession of this contention. This is completely false. .. by conceding C3, I did no more than admit that whether or not people have full knowledge of their action's consequences has no bearing on the soundness of utilitarianism. This nothing to do with interpersonal utility comparisons. "Life experience gives us plenty of knowledge to make interpersonal comparisons" 'Experience' is inherently subjective. For utilitarianism to provide objective ethical verdicts, it must be able to make *objective* interpersonal comparisons of utility, which don't exist (with one exception, addressed later). Pleasure and suffering cannot be objectively measured; the perceived amount of suffering or pleasure a person is experiencing changes radically depending on the perspective of the person who is judging that amount. "Pro offers no argument that uncertainty invalidates a system" Firstly, I would like to make a distinction, here. The "uncertainty" that was being referenced in both my C3 and Con's 4th objection to the NAP was of a different sort than what is being referenced here; that had to do with uncertainty relating to the practical application of ethical systems, whereas this "uncertainty" (a mis-nomer that was introduced by Con) refers to the inherent subjectivity involved in 'measuring' pleasure/suffering and the logical impossibility of comparing 'amounts' of an immeasurable, subjective concept. I doubt Con will contest the notion that logical impossibility invalidates a system "Pro continues to keep open the option that ALL ethical systems are unsound" [Regarding Con's concerns in the Framework section]. The proposition that all ethical systems could be unsound was nothing more than a secondary response to Con's claim that all ethical systems are centered around subjective, immeasurable factors, in case Con successfully refuted the primary response. In fact, Con never even addressed the primary response: that deontological ethical systems such as the NAP are not based in subjective factors at all, instead centered around objective principles such as the protection of human rights. Therefore, I am not at all advocating for all ethical systems being unsound, since it is unnecessary to resort to such a tactic. There is nothing remotely unfair about what I have done here. ". .. he needs to win that interpersonal comparisons are intrinsically IMPOSSIBLE, not just practically impossible in SOME cases. " I have, indeed, affirmed that. An exception is made for cases of clear-cut pleasure vs suffering, pleasure vs neutral utility, and suffering vs neutral utility because we are operating off the assumptions that pleasure is desirable and suffering is undesirable, which makes the 'desirable' choice in such scenarios obvious. Pro attempts to show that there are more exceptions to be made by providing the following example: "The choice of giving a starving man meal vs giving a satiated man a meal is simple. " However, this is example falls straight into the category of causing pleasure vs. causing neutral utility. .. Note that Pro cannot bring up any new examples in his last round argument, as I will not be able to respond to it. A2) Intent My account of intention's relevance to an action's morality is much more well-grounded than Con's. If we consider why we as humans tend to judge purposeful murder to be more immoral than accidental murder, we see that it is much more because of the difference in intent than the 'likelihood of actual harm' business that Con was speaking of. The only reason we are able to render negative moral judgments upon *anyone*, is because a person who has committed an immoral act was aware of the existence of moral standards yet still *chose* to violate those standards. In the case of accidental murder, there was little to no choice available to the actor, which is why we do not render nearly as negative moral judgments upon them, and why such actions cannot be considered immoral in the same sense that purposeful actions are. Since utilitarianism fails to properly take this into account (it still labels completely accidental actions as immoral), it cannot be considered a sound ethical system. A5) Utility Monster A couple reminders. .. the hypothetical itself is NOT the important part of this contention; the important part is the point it demonstrates-- that there is no rational reason given to us for us to sacrifice our own rights for the sake of others. Why are we obligated to suffer in order to give pleasure to an external entity whose happiness we get no benefit from? No answer. .. Also, Con turns back again to attack the NAP, saying that "Pro would claim that I have no obligation to donate one dollar to charity even if doing so could save thousands of lives at minimal expense to me. " Cross-apply my rebuttals to Con's second NAP objection. ". .. the well-being of all humans is equally valuable. .. if we find our own pleasure and pain to be of value, we must also value the pain and pleasure of others. " This is the only relevant part of Con's rebuttal. However, pleasure and suffering are just emotions experienced by us-- a byproduct of our consciousness; meanwhile, rights are an extension of our *personhood*-- a part of our existence as human beings, derived directly from our possession of distinctly human characteristics such as personal autonomy and self-awareness. The protection of these rights ought to take precedence over the preservation of ephemeral sensations such as pain and pleasure; and per Con's own 'all-men-bleed' reasoning, we should value all humans' rights equally-- we cannot violate a person's right to life and personal liberty for the sake of "maximizing happiness. " A6) Poverty Conceded due to a lack of space. A7) Rights All points addressed in A5. =========================== In conclusion, I have given 3 compelling reasons to reject utilitarianism: the impossibility of making interpersonal utility comparisons (with a few reasonable exceptions), utilitarianism's labelling of completely accidental actions as immoral, and its irrational rights violations for the sake of 'maximizing pleasure'. Any one of these three points show that utilitarianism is an unsound ethical system. The resolution is affirmed.