Increasing the troops in afghanistan can end the war.

I negate the resolution that "Increasing the troops in Afghanistan is the best chance of ending the war." While definitions are not necessary I would start by making the observation that the phrase "best chance" indicates a statement of probability. So the affirmative burden is to prove that there is no other strategy than troop increase which is more likely to end the war in Afghanistan while my burden is to prove that there are indeed alternative strategies. Since the resolution specifically mentions ending the war as the ultimate goal all impacts must be linked to ending the war. My thesis is that increasing troop levels in Afghanistan does not address the heart of the problem. First I contend that merely increasing troops is not enough. The common misconception is that Gen. Potreaous won the war in Iraq due to a troop increase. Indeed the so called 'surge' did increase troop levels in the country of Iraq however it also represented a significant change in strategy. According to the Washington Examiner the same must be done in Afghanistan, "Change the strategy. Both in Iraq before the surge and in Afghanistan today, U.S. strategy emphasized transitioning security responsibilities to indigenous forces that were not yet capable of fulfilling them. Violence rose, the strength of the insurgency grew, popular discontent with the security forces themselves grew, and the security forces lost confidence in their ability ever to face the enemy. The surge in Iraq allowed Army Gens. David Petraeus and Ray Odierno to defeat the insurgents in their key strongholds -- tasks the Iraqi Security Forces could not have performed -- while also partnering in combat operations with the Iraqis. The aim of all of these operations was to protect the Iraqi population in order to reverse the momentum behind the incipient civil war and create space for political progress. McChrystal is proposing to do the same thing, suitably tailored, in Afghanistan." While this approach does call for a troop increase, the increase itself is not what would cause the war to come to a successful conclusion. The fact is that we need to significantly alter our approach to the problem in Afghanistan. Merely offering more troops would just be sacrificing those young men at the same altar as their predecessors. Second, I contend that retreat is the fastest most guaranteed way to end the war. The resolution doesn't pose the question of winning or losing the war. In fact what it means to win a war of counter insurgency is an entire debate within itself. Given that success is so ambiguous, and comes at the price of so much innocent blood, the seemingly safest and definitely quickest way to end the war is simply to retreat. Remember that I do not have to prove that this option is right or moral, only expedient. Since it would be immediate and 100% effective, withdraw will always be the easiest solution, even if it's not the right one. That means that my opponent has already lost this debate since no other solution could be as sure as retreat. Third, holy wars can only be won through complete annihilation of one part or the other. No one has ever won a holy war except through extermination. Period. The war in Afghanistan is not against a sworn enemy who wears a uniform and follows the rules of combat. Rather, the enemy is an ideology and a group of radicals who spread that ideology. This ideology being that the existence of a free America is a threat to the peoples of Islam. As long as this ideology exists in Afghanistan there will still be those trying to do us harm. This means one of two things for the affirmative: 1) He must prove that a troop increase will result in the elimination of this ideology or 2) the war is literally unwinable and we ought to retreat anyway. Remember the debate at this point is not about if the war is or was a good idea, only about how to end it. Fourth, we cannot win in Afghanistan without increased commitment from Pakistan. The situation in Afghanistan in regards to Pakistan is largely well known. Those seeking refuge from US forces can quite easily and freely cross the border from one country to another where the US can neither identify nor harm them. To date, Pakistan has been largely symbolic in its efforts to cooperate with the US. Without increased effort from Pakistan an increase in US forces will simply cause a massive shift into Pakistan effectively creating a stalemate and prolonging the war because we cannot invade Pakistan which is in possession of effective nuclear weapons. The impacts of this argument are many. 1) Increasing troop levels without dealing with the problem of Pakistani cooperation actually prolongs the war. 2) Shifting a large number of enemy combatants into Pakistan could create volatility in a region where nuclear weapons are available creating the potential for absolute catastrophe. 3) Increasing troop levels is not only insufficient to end the war in Afghanistan it will create a climate where success is impossible. In conclusion, an increase in troops in Afghanistan does not address the root of the problem. It is not only not a successful way to win the war, it could lose us the war and still prolong the conflict. The affirmative must meet all of the burdens outlined in my preceding arguments, for if even one solution is better than a troop increase or if a troop increase fails to address some critical problem, then it is impossible for this deadly conflict to come to a successful conclusion. ( I would like to say thanks for doing this debate. This is by far one of my weakest arguments however I haven't done this in a long time, and never before in this format. Good luck!)