Abortion is Prima Facie Morally Wrong

I don't think Con has quite grasped my a fortiori argument. I stated that if these criteria were indeed indicative of what a being must have to be considered a person, then the unborn are persons by virtue of having the capacities for these criteria, even if these capacities are not fully realized. Con, in responding to this argument, argues that the capacities for these criteria are the same thing as potentials. In doing so, Con seems to presuppose that the immediate actualization of these characteristics are needed. But that is not what Con seemed to indicate in his OP, which was -- "I propose that if an entity does not have ANY of the 5 following psychological characteristics, then it can't be a person" I responded by stating that the unborn DO have these characteristics, but that they are not immediately actualizable. =My criteria of personhood= Con is correct in supposing that I base personhood off a biological basis (That is, human beings are persons because that is intrinsic to their very nature, a human being is essentially a person). Con additionally argues that I have provided no reason to accept this. This is not true, I argued for its being the best explanation by way of showing that Warren's view entails several absurdities. Even if Con does not buy the argument, I did provide arguments in favor of my view. But let me present another. Con argues that Warren's view of personhood is more intuitively appealing. On the contrary, my view (Which I shall refer to as Thomistic hylomorphism) is even more intuitively appealing than Con's, which turns out to commit us to an absurdity. Consider the proposition "I was once a fetus." After all, was it not you that was developing in your mother's womb? You are identical to that same fetus. Most of us would, upon reflection, immediately agree with this statement. But if Warren's view on personhood is correct, then we must deny that we were once a fetus, for they did not actualize the criteria required for personhood. Does it really make any sense to say that "I came to exist after my body?" Contrary to my opponent, this is not intuitively plausible. But if personhood is constituted by our human nature instead of our mental abilities, then it makes perfect sense as to why that proposition is true. Thus, Warren's view is not intuitively plausible. Intrinsic rights vs. Extrinsic rights The difference, I think, is pretty clear. Some rights are bestowed upon us only at certain times and places, they are extrinsic. For example, a Florida resident may have the right to vote in Florida, but not in South Carolina. These are legal rights, not moral rights. Moral rights, like the right to life and the right to be treated fairly, are intrinsic to all entities regardless of their time, place, or situation. =The issue of capacity= My opponent argues that an infant can feel pain, and hence must be counted as a person. However, medical research has demonstrated that the unborn, towards the end of the second month of pregnancy, can feel pain. [1] Thus, by this criteria the unborn must be considered persons. Con then states that "Even if does validate infanticide, so what?" I take this to be an incredible admission, for if it does, then is it not morally counterintuitive, contrary to what Con argues? If Warren's criteria validates infanticide, then I take that as a sign that it should be rejected. Con seems to simply shrug it off as it if were no problem. Moreover, what exactly is the difference between an newborn and a baby who is close to being delivered. There seems to be none, a journey of a few inches does not turn one into a valuable human person. Thus, if newborns qualify as being persons, then there is no reason to not extend this same treatment to late-term fetuses, thus making at the very least late-term/partial birth abortion immoral. Thanks for the debate! :-)