The Objectivist Account of Free Will is Nonsense

My opponent is correct – to Rand, everything has a cause. The problem he is having is that he is assuming that causality is caused by actions rather than by entities. It is not the reaction of two detached “motions” that causes billiard balls to move after colliding – it is the result of the two billiard balls colliding. Causality is a direct implication of the Law of Identity, and it is this law that allows causality to exist. In other words, it is the identities of things which cause things to happen. Identities are primary and causality does not make sense apart from them.With this being so, there is no contradiction in supposing that, say, a rock being thrown through a window will always break it while a consciousness can be tasked with deciding between two alternatives – the window is broken because of the interaction of the identities of the rock and the window, and the consciousness is able to choose because the nature of consciousness is volitional. If consciousness is volitional, it can still be causal ­­- it is merely causal in the way that its nature requires, and the nature of the soul is to be able to choose what it will do and what its exact identity is. In this way, the soul can choose its cause, keeping intact causality because nothing is uncaused while supporting free will by means of the choice. The choice itself isn’t uncaused, either – it is caused by the nature of the soul. Everything does operate according to a fixed law – the law of identity – and this law demands that consciousness follows its identity and is volitional. There is no contradiction here.Quoting Peikoff from Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand: The principle of causality does not apply to consciousness, however, in the same way that it applies to matter. In regard to matter, there is no issue of choice; to be caused is to be necessitated. In regard to the (higher-level)actions of a volitional consciousness, however, “to be caused” does not mean “to be necessitated”If the soul exists in the way Rand describes, it is what it is. Nothing you can describe about neural connections or anything else can dispute the fact that the sum of them creates an entity with volition.My opponent asks, foolishly, the following question: “If volition cannot in any way contradict the structure of the brain from which it arises, and if the brain must behave according to its intrinsic causal nature as determined by its material configuration (which must be fixed, since A is A) then where’s the freedom?” The correct response is that it doesn’t matter that the parts of the mind are of a certain kind if, when combined, they produce an entity with an identity that has the characteristic of being volitional in nature. My opponent might as well ask “If a tapestry cannot in any way be different from the threads from which it arises, and if the individual threads must be of single colors according to their intrinsic colorful nature as determined by their material configuration (which must be fixed, since A is A) then where’s the rainbow pattern coming from?” It’s absurd to say that, since the individual parts of something don’t have quality x, the whole won’t either, and my opponent goes a step further by saying that even if the whole had quality x it would be somehow “contradicting” the parts! The only reason why epistemology is applicable to humans at all is that we have the ability to choose between alternative means of attempting to gain knowledge. The most basic of these choices is whether to evade reality or to face it head-on. Without this choice, there is no basis for the field – if you are determined to follow certain methods or to think certain things, there is no grounds for the study of superlative methods. This is the force behind Rand’s argument – if epistemology is not applicable, then there is no way of pursuing truth, and, if this is so, there would be no way of validating any conclusions. If we cannot choose between evasion and the recognition of reality, then we have no way of knowing if we are right or wrong in our conclusions – we have no way of forming and proving accurate conceptions about anything, including determinism. Men are fallible if they choose to be and infallible if they choose to be. Determinism, however, destroys this choice and replaces it with solely a string of perceptual information and concepts formed from these percepts – there is nothing that guarantees infallibility over fallibility without the ability to choose between the two. In this way, free will is an axiom and any attempt to deny it refutes itself by means of undercutting any means to verify itself.Dylan: “For every thought we have, we can be certain we were not forced to think otherwise. So when we follow a valid chain of reasoned thought, we can be sure we were not destined to be irrational. Valid thinking is self-evidently valid; we needn’t be infallible to argue that X=X, since it is true by definition. Thus, there’s no way we could have been forced to think incorrectly, or have incorrect views about what is incorrect, when faced with self-evident truth.”The problem is that there is no way to validate that a truth is self-evident if you cannot choose to do so. If you hold that determinism is true, then you hold that you can hold that things are true, and to do so you have to either choose to validate statements or infallibly reach the conclusion via things outside of your control. If you do not have control of your mind, though, and your mind is fallible, then all attempts at thinking and justification are, by definition, fallible. If your justifications are fallible, then the justification for determinism is also fallible, and, if this is so, determinism is self-defeating since it provides no solid ground for its own validity. Even the self-evident truths you speak of will be subject to this fallibility since you have no choice over whether or not to recognize that they’re self-evident or not. No matter if it’s true by definition or not, you have no way of knowing that for certain unless you’re able to justify your beliefs, and you cannot do that if you are forced into a fallible framework like determinism.Dylan: “Secondly, claiming that deterministic minds cannot be certain of their own rationality is itself contradictory if we are, in fact, deterministic minds. In order for that argument to work, it must take for granted that which it attempts to prove: that we aren’t deterministic minds“My opponent claims that, in this respect, Objectivism begs the question. I suppose that Dylan thought this argument was very clever. However, it doesn’t work. It refutes itself because it does not hold the Law of Identity as a primary axiom. If arguments from the Law of Identity work, they work no matter what – by definition, there are no possible circumstances under which A is not A. Therefore, any argument from axioms cannot be refuted by potentials, since there are no potentials which make sense without first accepting that reasoning from axioms is correct. As such, if Rand’s arguments from axioms holds true, there is no possibility that we are deterministic minds. The supremacy of the Law of Identity trumps that possibility and rules it out at the very start, so that any attempt to use that possibility to refute the Law of Identity are cut short long before they can do any damage.My opponent’s argument can be summed up as follows: “1 + 1 = 2, you say – but this assumes that 1 + 1 = 2! What if 1 + 1 = 3?!?­ Anyone who says that 1 + 1 = 2 is begging the question because it takes for granted that 1 + 1 isn’t 3, and, if 1 + 1 does = 3, then their positions fall apart.”As you can see, the argument is useless, since it assumes that impossible things are possible and that they can have any bearing on what is logical.Dylan: “Thirdly, this argument - in light of my earlier criticisms - at best establishes a paradox. I.e., we would be forced to conclude that we both do and do not possess free will. In order to resolve the paradox my opponent must defeat my earlier criticisms without appealing to the notion that denying the existence of free will is contradictory.”I must do no such thing and my opponent offers no reason for me to believe that I do. Reason, considering my opponent is trying to use rationally-based arguments, is axiomatic – you cannot deny the Law of Identity. If this is so, paradoxes cannot exist, and, since it is the acceptance of determinism and not the acceptance of free will that causes the so-called paradox, determinism must be abandoned. Free will alone does not create a paradox – determinism does, since determinism, by its nature, conflicts with rationality via conflicting with epistemology via conflicting with free will. Reason, as already stated, is primary, so it cannot be discarded before or simultaneously with determinism, and, if determinism is thrown out first, no problems remain.