The cosmological argument from contingency is sound

1: Every contingent fact has an explanation.There are a number of reasons to accept this as true. The first of which being that we implicitly accept this (formally called the Principle of Sufficient Reason, hereon referred to as the PSR) in most investigative situations. When a dead body is found on the street it is reasonable to presume that there was a caue for that person to die. When a hurricane forms it is reasonable to presume that there is some sort of scientific explanation for that formation. The problem that the denier of the PSR runs into then is the seemingly arbitrary lime at which they decide which events and phenomena have an explanation and which do not. If my opponent was hit in the head with a football he would surely think there was an explanation. At what point then does my opponent decide which events do not beget an explanation? I contend that in dealing with contingent facts (not necessary facts), they must by their very nature have an explanation since there could have been a scenario or possible world in which they could have not been. This reasonable calls for an explanation for why they DID happen.2: There is a contingent fact that includes all other contingent facts.Obviously, if we are to accept that there is an explanation for every contingent fact, than this leads us logically to an explanation for all of those facts. A set of only contingent facts begets an explanation since the set itself (being the summation of contingent facts) must be contingent. 3: Therefore, there is an explanation for this fact.As a contingent fact, it follows from 1 that this fact must also have an explanation for itself. While the explanation for a set of facts, it still exists contingently and hence 1 applies in this case.4: This explanation must involve a necessary being.In dealing with explanations, we can run into only two metaphysical options. Either some fact is explained contingenty and begets another explanation ad infinitum or that fact is explained necessarily. Since a contingent fact cannot explain itself (owing to the nature of contingency), we are left with only the option of necessity as an explanation for 3.5: This explanation is God.Obviously, the agreed upon definition of God is a necessary being. Since it has been established that the explanation for 3 must involve a necessary explanation, it fits in well with our conception of God. However, there is still the problem of whether or not this explanation has being, whether it can rightly be called an agent as opposed to some sort of casual or scientific explanation for phenomenon.When dealing with the likely nature of our established necsesary explanation, we must look at the nature of explanations. In explaining something, there can either be a casual (scientific) explanation or a personal (agential) explanation. For instance, the reason for a fork falling to the ground can be divided into casual and personal explanations. The casual explanation might be that the Earth's mass was large enough that its attraction was to the point strong enough to pull the fork down. The personal explanation though would only include the fact that I chose to drop the fork in the first place.It's unlikely though that this explanation could correctly be categorized as a casual explanation since scientific explanations rely on the contingencies of laws at their base. A scientific explanation cannot be divorced from the contingent nature of scientific laws. Since we are dealing with the explanation of the universe as a whole (which would include natural laws within itself), scientific explanations would rightly be called contingent and so not fitting in with the established nature of the necessary explanation. It therefore seems plausible that this necessary explanation is some sort of personal agent, thus in line with the agreed upon definition of God.