A duplicate of you is not you.

Welcome and thanks to my new opponent for meeting the challenge of this debate. Simply choosing to take a side on this problem, one way or the other, is a difficult task, yet I believe not an insurmountable one. May the most persuasive and convincing argument win. The equation my opponent provided (Leibniz Law) I believe has been improperly applied to this particular philosophical problem. LL may prove logically sound in the world of abstract numbers, but it falls flat in the real world of three dimensional complex entities. I shall demonstrate why... "For every property F, subject x has F if and only if subject y has F, then x is identical to y." Then after the equation... " If x and y differentiate then there is at least one property that x has and y does not, or vice versa." A problem arises though when discussing two distinctly separate yet seemingly identical individual persons in geographical space. Person x has a completely different set of environment variables; photons, air molecules, point of view, sensory inputs, mental activity, etc., and is, as a whole, an completely independent compositional set and instance unto himself, than person y, by virtue of there being two distinct and separate bodies in two separate locations. Mathematically, I'm sure Leibniz does not mean 1 and 1 = 1 when his law claims x = y. This does not mean x IS y. Given ‘1 and 1' Leibniz must actually mean, 1 and 1 = 11, or put another way, A and A = 2A, when discussing his perfectly identical x and y. This is an important distinction that must be taken into account when discussing ‘sameness' beyond the simplicity of numerical quantity. My opponent uses the word "same" in a parallel context as the word ‘identical' is used in the equation above. ‘Same' is often mistakenly used in place of what is actually meant – ‘similar'. There are two possible senses of what can be meant by ‘sameness'... 1) Two identical persons, x and y, APPEAR to be separate individuals, yet truly are not. They are exactly the ‘same' person, LITERALLY. Thus, if I were to stab person x, person y would experience a stab wound in exactly the same spot and way in which I stabbed x. If x died, y would also die at exactly the same time, same blood flow, screams, etc. [It would be as if you were cross-eyed and visually saw 2 identical people when in fact there was really only one person in front of you, who happened to appear in two separate locations.] 2) Two identical persons, x and y, ARE separate individuals. Thus if I were to stab x, y would not be stabbed. Thus, x might very well die, and y would remain alive, unaffected. I will call these ‘sameness 1' (the absolute sense) and ‘sameness 2' (the similar sense), as I will use them to illustrate later the inherent problem of my opponent's argument and position. My opponent claims that, "...the methods of copying are unimportant, as all give rise to a perfect copy...". He is correct – the methods of copying are not the intended focus of my point in using the three mischievous alien scenarios. The results of each scenario and what DOES NOT happen consistently in each case is what is worth noting; In scenario A and B I do not go anywhere. I am unaffected, oblivious to what the alien is doing on his planet. After the alien's having created a duplicate copy of me on his planet, I am still on Earth, in bed, asleep. In scenario C however, I am killed, and then a duplicate of me is created on his planet. So a question is begged... How is it that because duplicates are made of me that I should have to go anywhere? Regardless of the method used to copy? I clearly die in scenario C. I don't die in scenario's A and B. Yet in NONE of them do I actually go anywhere (except in C where I am disintegrated/killed). Now, if I truly were the same person (sameness 1) as my duplicate, and the alien decided to stab the duplicate to death, technically I should die also, here on Earth (see my explanations on sameness earlier on). Yet this clearly cannot be the case since we couldn't experience two separate locations simultaneously as if we were both the same body. I can only be here, OR there - not in both places at once. So ‘sameness 2' must apply here; we are two separate and distinct individuals each with our own independent lives and processes, though very similar. Thus, if I am not the same (sameness 1) as my duplicate, I can die, and he will survive without me, and vice versa – ergo, I am not him. My opponent continues on using 3 different analogues, ranging from confusing and dubious, to irrelevant, in order to refute my over all argument. I'm unclear what my opponent means by "...person A's life as being a film...". Do you mean a motion picture film? Regardless, this analogy does not address the problem of a copy being a separate and distinct entity from its original, yet not having ever been the original. An original can never experience being the copy as I have illustrated, even though he may, for all intents and purposes, SEEM like he's "the same" person, he cannot ever be. Which in turn infers that I can never BECOME him, or experience life from his point of view - or that I can magically bounce from being the original to suddenly being the duplicate. As for the photo analogue, an image on the photo can be described as ‘representing' the actual living person, in 2 dimensions, who posed for it. The image is identifiable as person A. Yet that image was not something like a voodoo picture that you could stick a pin into resulting in person A bleeding. If it were, the photo could be described as perhaps, ‘having his sameness (1)' but in 2 dimensions on a piece of photo paper. None of my opponent's points written after each of my alien scenarios makes any actual reference to the relevant point intended in those scenarios, nor explains clearly my opponent's rationale overall. In summation, for the purposes of clarity and concision, I shall itemize each point of MY rationale for MY argument. 1) Leibniz's Law fails to address properly the nature of two separate seemingly identical objects as having innate difference due to their separateness in geographical space. Sameness being physically impossible, it stands to reason that both objects though appearing identical, are not in fact the same singular thing. 2) Given each alien scenario as example, duplication never results in the original person actually travelling anywhere (except with destruction of the original body, ie; death) or experiencing the point of view of the duplicate. The original of necessity always stays the original, likewise the duplicate stays the duplicate. 3) Thus original can never experience the point of view of the duplicate, or vice versa. The duplicate is essentially a perfect clone with uploaded memories yet no actual experiential past. My position still stands. A duplicate of me is not me. If I die, my duplicate will take my place, and I will be dead. I am looking forward to my opponent's rebuttal in the hopes that he can clarify his position. I believe his challenge is two fold; he must show how a duplicate of me is the original me without being "the same" in the sense I have pointed out to him (which is clearly impossible physically), and he must demonstrate how I have experienced a 'transference' of position and point of view, from the original to becoming the duplicate. It would be satisfying also if my opponent can show me the errors in my reasoning also.