Homosexual Acts are Immoral

In my final round, I'll provide my responses to Con's rebuttals. I would like to thank him for debating with me. The Open Question Argument Still FailsFollowing R. M. Hare, Con argues that not all instances of the term "good" are attributive. Since it is a moral term that is action-guiding, "good" is not always a descriptive term. This response is mistaken. As Ralph McInerny notes, Hare confuses "the elocutionary force of sentences in which 'good' occurs with the meaning of the term and even perhaps the meaning of those sentences. Thus, 'The Winds of War is a good book' may in given circumstances be used to commend the novel, but that is not what the sentence means." [1] Moreover, whenever "good" has an action-guiding aspect, it is precisely because of thing it is attributed to, not the term itself. This is why some instances of "good" carry action-guiding content and why others do not. Con's second argument has already been dealt with. I am grounding moral normativity in biological normativity, so I am not circularly defining moral oughts in terms of moral oughts. Con may think that this grounding is inadequate, but as adefinition of morality it is obviously non-circular and hence defeats Con's second objection.Some Confusions About Teleology I gave two arguments for teleology based on the normativity of medicine and rationality. Con's response to (1) was to attempt to use it against my application of teleology (Which will be dealt with later). This does not, however, show thatteleology itself is non-existent. Con needs an actual argument for that. To his credit, he offers an etiological reduction of teleology, viz. it can be explained in purely descriptive terms. This is inadequate, for it fails to account for theregularities of bodily processes. If they are not inherently disposed to act in a certain way, then it becomes inexplicable why they consistently do so. [2] It is more plausible to be a realist about teleology than to be a constructivist of sorts.Con's response to the EAAN is lacking. He argues that there is no reason to think that such a scenario is likely, or even possible. But why? He simply asserts it without argument. It is perfectly coherent to suppose a creature with false, butpragmatic beliefs would tend to survive. All that is required for a belief to be selected for is that it contribute to an organism's survival. It doesn't matter whether it is true or false, only that it's pragmatic. He then notes that my argument has no sway on someone who adopts a pragmatic philosophy of mind. That in itself is uninteresting, for he needs to demonstrate why we should countenance such a perspective, especially when it is quite a minority view.Con charges me with being confused about the very teleology I am appealing to. This is just false. I was very explicit in the previous round that I was appealing to Aristotelian as opposed to Platonic teleology -- hence my use of terms like "inherently teleological", "inherent to nature," "built in to the fabric of nature," and "inherent purpose." [3] This should make it very clear that I see teleology as originating from within a substance rather than being externally imposed. I even stated as such when I wrote that "If we think of teleology as inherent to nature rather than legislated by God, then this does not requires us to commit to theism." Nowhere did I even hint toward endorsing external teleology. The phrase Con quotes gives no indication of that.Aside from this charge, he does not respond to the notion that we can have teleology without God. I do believe that God is required for external teleology; but not for the type of inherent teleology I am appealing to in this debate. [4] Specifically, I am appealing to an inherent and emergent teleology, as I indicated in last round's footnote [6].Finally, he charges me with assuming that teleology exists without argument. This is just false. I gave two arguments for teleology. Con may think they fail, but he can't dispute the fact that I offered arguments. This charge is baseless.Teleology Without GodGiven what was said in the last section, it should be clear why my argument does not in any way presuppose the truth of theism. Since my argument operates on inherent rather than external teleology, God is not required to ground natural law. [5] I noted Larry Arnhart's version of a non-theistic Aristotelean natural law in support of this. [6] Con simply responds to this by saying that it has been "thoroughly debunked" by "one of my own sources" (As if my citing a book means that I agree with everything in it -- and if he's going to pull this move, then I should note that of Con's own sources rejects the open question argument [7]). This is false if we take into account that I am appealing to inherent teleology. Unlike external teleology, which much be imposed by above, inherent teleology is a metaphysically basic fact that does not require God as an explanation. While there are theistic versions of natural law theory, it does not have to be theistic.Other than charging me with inconsistency (Which is a tu quoque fallacy), Con never really replied to the arguments in my last round. Most of his charges assume that I take an external view of teleology, which is false (This is also why the Moreland miscite is in fact a miscite). [8]Natural law does not require God, and hence does not require DCT.Multiple Functions and Pleasure?There are no concessions here, for Con misunderstands my argument. I argued that while organs can have multiple functions, pleasure is not one of them. One may act for the pure motivation of pleasure-seeking, but the act must still conform to the function of a given organ. It is an instrumental rather an intrinsic good. Con charges this with question begging, but this charge is off-base as that was not my argument against pleasure as a function. My argument for that thesis was in my eating analogy, to which I will later turn. As for his other point, sex acts between heterosexual senior citizens are still procreative-type because they are still oriented toward it as an end, even if the effect cannot be acheived. Function is based on a thing's directedness (internal or external) toward a certain end and is independent of whether or not that end is brought about. [9] A clock will eventually stop running, but it is still oriented toward telling-time as its function. In responding to 6A/B, I drew the analogy between pleasure in sex and pleasure in eating. To briefly reiterate: There are things which we eat that are pleasurable but which obviously are bad for us. If pleasure were a purpose of eating, then a glutton who consumes nothing but candy could be said to be eating well. But this is absurd, so pleasure must always subordinated to the good of a faculty -- pleasure itself cannot be a function. Hence sexual pleasure must conform to the function of procreation. [10]In his responses to all three points, Con did not even attempt to deal with this analogy, yet he charges me with failing to explain why pleasure is not a function of sex? He simply says that since organs may have multiple functions and that pleasure can be one. But this is exactly what I was arguing against, hence he begs the question. Additionally, Con does not respond to my criticism of 6B -- that it confuses parts with wholes. The bulk of my argument is unresponded to. 6C is a non-sequitur. I can affirm that procreation is the function of sex while simultaneously affirming FGM as a grave offense. It is worse than a toenail removal because it impairs one's ability to experience pleasure. But it doesn't follow that pleasure is a function of sex. A tastebud removal procedure which removes one's ability to receive pleasure from eating is also worse than a toenail removal, but it isn't because pleasure is a function of eating. In both cases, the deprivation of pleasure is bad because the pleasure ought to be there as a means to a further end that it is subordinated to. [11]The resolution remains affirmed. Sources: http://tinyurl.com...;