The modal ontological argument is not sound

Ave!Counter-Argument RebuttalPremise three states that ‘’There is a possible world in which God does not exist.’’ In other words, ‘’There is a possible where world where a maximally great being does not exist’’. The logical conclusion is that a maximally great being doesn’t exist, because it would have to exist in all possible worlds in order to exist.But look at the conclusion of the argument! ‘’God does not exist in every possible world.’’ The conclusion of Pro’s argument is contained in the premises of the argument. Premise 3 and the conclusion are the same exact statements. Therefore, Pro’s argument only begs the question, because it assumes the very same thing it is trying to prove. [1]The same problem exists with premise two as well. It states ‘’P(2): A world without God (a maximally great being) is a world without logical contradictions.’’ This is the same thing as saying ‘’There is a possible world where god does not exist’’. So, it has the same problem that I mentioned above.Pro uses this fallacious reasoning to justify the premises of his argument as well. In order to show that there is a possible world where a MGB does not exist, he says ‘’We can imagine a world where a maximally great being does not exist.’’ So, Pro’s argument is that a MGB does not exist in some possible world because a MGB does not exist in some possible world ?!Thankfully, Pro starts to give us reasons for thinking that there is a possible world where a MGB doesn’t exist, instead of circular arguments. Pro says:‘’There could be a possible world where 1 being is omnipotent, while another is perfectly moral. So in that possible world, no maximally great being could exist, because 2 of the properties required, are in 2 different beings. ‘’The problem with this argument is that there is no reason to think that a being can’t posses omnipotence and maximal moral good at the same the time. You could have a being that is omnipotent, and a being that is perfectly moral, and they would both be two separate entities. However, it doesn’t logically follow that there does not exist a third entity which has all of those traits in the same being.Metal Toothpick ParodyPro admits at the end of his round that this was a failed parody, and dropped the argument.Lillian Lane Craig ParodyI can easily use this parody to show the existence of a maximally great being. If Lillian Lane Craig’s existence in some possible world requires him to exist in all possible worlds (P3), then Lillian Lane Craig is the maximally great being! It would mean that Lillian Lane Craig is an objective feature of all reality, which is exactly the type of being that the MOA aims to prove.Think about the traits that Lillian Lane Craig would have. Lillian Lane Craig would exist as an objective feature of all reality, per premise three. This means that Lillian Lane Craig is a necessary being that exists because of its own nature, and was not caused.Lillian Lane Craig isn’t a physical being either. Physical beings are contingent, and LLC is a necessary being. Pro called LLC a ghost, which I interpret as saying that the being isn’t physical.In conclusion, LLC is an objective feature of all reality, immaterial, causeless, and exists because of its own nature.What does the MOA try to prove? A being that is an objective feature of all reality, immaterial, causeless, and exists because of its own nature.I think the audience can piece this together.Maximally Great DemonPro claims that the demon doesn’t have to be maximally great. I think that this is overtly false. In order to exist in all possible worlds, the demon would have to be maximally great. [2] By definition, there is no way for the demon to exist in all possible worlds without being maximally great.I think the same logic I used on the Lillian Lane Craig parody can be exercised here as well.Leibniz’s ArgumentPro continues to misunderstand the purpose of Leibniz’s argument. Leibniz didn’t argue that because you can’t show the impossibility of a MGB, then it must be possible for a MGB to exist. Leibniz argued that, for this reason, it is more plausible for a MGB to be possible than not possible. This means that we should consider it more likely for a MGB to be possible than impossible, because the latter of the two can never be justified. It’s a good reason to accept the positive MOA (it is possible that a MGB exists) over the negative MOA (it is not possible that a MGB exists).Pro asks why we can’t analyze perfection. I think that this should be clear. We are imperfect human beings. Epistemologically, we have no way of saying that we understand what perfection would be.Pro also gives reasons for why we can analyze perfection. Let’s look at his reasoning.‘’We can look at a chess position and find and analyze the perfect move. So when something has certain rules, like a chess game, it is possible to find and analyze the perfect move.’’Pro makes the fallacy of equivocation. The fallacy of equivocation is ‘’the misleading use of a term with more than one meaning or sense (by glossing over which meaning is intended at a particular time’’. The meaning of the word ‘perfection’ in Leibniz’s argument is having all great-making properties to their maximal extent. The meaning of the word ‘perfection’ in Pro’s example is a chess move that is most conducive to victory. These are two different uses of the word perfection that have very different meanings. Equivocating the two is fallacious.I could imagine Pro and I have the following conversation.Pro: Women shouldn’t worry about man-eating sharks.Con: Why?Pro: Because they only eat men. [3]Vale!Sources[1] http://www.nizkor.org...[2] http://www9.georgetown.edu...[3] http://en.wikipedia.org...