God (Probably) Exists

Thanks, Con, for your excellent reply. Kalām Cosmological Argument There are two contentions central to Con’s critique of the first premise of the KCA. (a) We cannot witness anything “begin to exist”. First, due to the Law of Conservation of Mass and Conservation of Energy, all that we see are changes. Second, due to advancements in physics, the notion of “nothingness” does not apply within our universe, due to the fact that there still is, even in a vacuum “a positive energy density, known as the Cosmological Constant.” (b) Metaphysical intuitions about nothingness are void, when applied to the origin of the universe, because “conditions prior to the Big Bang were *radically* different to our current conditions.” (a) Con begins by arguing that the Law of Conservation of Energy and the Law of Conservation of Mass shows that it is “basically impossible” for anything to begin to exist. This is, he argues, due to the fact that what we see are merely changes, rather than them “beginning to exist.” The problem with such an argument, is that it makes an assumption. Namely, that things “beginning to exist” must result in an increase in energy or mass, as opposed to when they did not exist. Unfortunately, this assumption has not been justified by Con. I could leave it here and wait for him to provide a rationale for such an assumption, but I shall go further. It is simply untrue that something “beginning to exist” must result in an increase in energy or mass, when compared to when they did not exist. This can be shown by looking at the definition of “begin to exist”, in the context of the KCA. Craig states, that the term “begin to exist” when applied to the Kalām means the following (where time is denoted by t and the entity coming into existence is e): “e comes into being at t if and only if (i) e exists at t, (ii) t is the first time at which e exists, (iii) there is no state of affairs in the actual world in which e exists timelessly, and (iv) e’s existing at t is a tensed fact.” [1] Thus, Con’s argument is void. However, Con provides another argument for such a contention: that particle physics demonstrates the existence of the “cosmological constant”. Furthermore, due to the fact that two things cannot exist in the same space, we cannot observe things coming into existence; they only can when there is nothing there. Thus, “nothingness” in our universe is impossible, and we have no reason to believe that something cannot come out of it. While I would agree that the physics used to justify the existence of the cosmological constant is sound, I don’t agree with Con’s other statements. I’m not quite sure what Con means by “two things cannot exist in the same space”, particularly what “space” is meant in this context. I would ask him to clarify what he means. Con tries to refute the following usage of the following logical absurdity as justification of P1 of the Kalām: “If it was possible for the universe to suddenly ‘pop’ into existence, then why don’t we see let’s say, horses, or Eskimo villages pop into existence?” He argues that this is impossible, because “the entirety of the space in our universe is already occupied.” It would occur to me that such an argument is based off misrepresentations of what is meant to “begin to exist”. I have already criticised the notion that we can’t see anything begin to exist because the Laws of Conservation of Energy and Mass entail that all we see is physical, chemical, or sub-atomic change. If that is false, which I believe is the case, then there are plenty of instances where things “come into existence”, even when the Cosmological Constant exists. Con also states that “things can only come into existence where there is nothing there”. I’ll deal with this while I deal with his second point. (b) Another criticism Con makes against P1 of the KCA is that the “conditions prior to the Big Bang were *radically* different from our current conditions.” Because of the fact that our metaphysical intuitions were supposedly formed on the basis of space-time, which was not in existence prior to the Big Bang, we cannot apply such metaphysical intuitions to the origin of the universe. The problem is, however, that such metaphysical principles were not discerned wholly on the basis of observations within space-time. There are other reasons, independent of such observations that confirm P1: “Everything that begins to exist has a cause of its existence”. Something cannot come from nothing, because there is no properties of nothing that enables something come from out from it eg. no potentiality. In fact, it has no properties at all. Thus, the fact that our observations come from within space-time make little difference to the soundness of P1, due to the fact that the premise is not reliant on it being true; instead, it is more of a supporting beam. Teleological Argument Unfortunately, Con has delayed any criticism of the fine-tuning argument until the next round. There is little that I could say, except for the fact that I was looking forward to discussing the fine-tuning argument more so than the KCA :( Conclusion In conclusion, none of Con’s criticisms against Premise 1 of the KCA are sound. On the other hand, all of my arguments in favour of the premise: ex nihilo nihil fit is a fundamental metaphysical principle; experience always confirm, rather than weaken ex nihilo nihil fit logical absurdities are a consequence of denying ex nihilo nihil fit. Thus, the KCA is sound. Combined with the fact that Con has not as of yet argued against the fine-tuning argument, the resolution has been affirmed. [1] http://www.reasonablefaith.org...