The Social Contract and Moral Obligations

Thanks again to Kasmic! At this time, the rules require me to address Pro's case, which is what I will be doing.OVERVIEWPro must demonstrate that the social contract creates moral obligations for governments. The social contract is defined (in part) thusly: "[it] is the view that persons' moral and/or political obligations are dependent upon a contract or agreement among them to form the society in which they live...[T]he social contract theory argues that a government is formed pursuant to a mutual agreement or contract among the people of a given jurisdiction, and that the scope and duties of the government are determined by the agreement or contract." In other words, the social contract binds government through an agreement, and the social contract gains its moral force in virtue of the fact it is an agreement.I submit that Pro's entire argument is non-topical. Pro argues that moral obligations are a function of the closeness of relationships. That is not the same as saying that moral obligations are a function of a contractual agreement. To illustrate Pro's reasoning, Pro writes: "[S]ay there are two starving children. One is your sibling...Your relationship to them as family creates an additional obligation." In other words, just by being related to someone implies obligations towards them. But, I cannot choose who is or is not my sibling. That is something that is totally arbitrary and outside the scope of my control; yet Pro suggests I have obligations to them regardless. The point here is clear: Pro is grounding moral obligations in a theory that legitimizes the existence non-voluntary, non-agreed obligations. That is NOT the social contract. Pro's case is not-topical and can be dismissed on that basis alone.PRO's CASEClarificationIt is just important to note that the question being asked by the resolution is not merely "does a contract create a moral obligation," as Pro suggests, but "does a contract create a moral obligation for governments." It is important to understand specifically what is at issue in the debate in order to correctly interpret what may or may not be a kritik. Therefore, any argument that questions whether social contracts can produce moral obligations, whether governments can have moral obligations, and whether those moral obligations justify differential treatment is fair game.ObligationsPro writes: "A contract by its very nature creates an increased obligation." This is a bare assertion fallacy, and lacks any kind of warrant whatsoever. But even if I concede the point, I can argue that a contract, when legitimately constituted, creates legal obligations. That would leave us with several questions. Why do legal obligations necessarily translate to moral obligations? Why is the social contract legitimately constituted? None of these questions are really answered by Pro. In my case, I've endeavored to show why the social contract was not legitimately constituted (invalid consent) and that it's not actually attributing moral obligations (because the government is not a moral agent).Obligations are WeightedThere are several arguments to make here:1. Cross-apply my overview to Pro's case here. Pro is trying to derive obligations from relationships, but he needs to be deriving them from agreements. It almost seems as if Pro is trying to reason backwards. He has identified a conclusion that he wants (that relationships breed obligations) and is attempting to find a way to justify that stance after the fact. He wants to use the social contract to do that.2. Pro's case lacks warrants. Pro writes: "Your relationship to them as family creates an additional obligation. Likewise, imagine you signed a contract that you would feed your sibling. Your obligation is now influenced by an agreement in addition to the already existing obligations." Pro just assumes that agreements equate to moral obligations. Supposed I was a hitman and I signed a contract to kill someone. Am I morally bound to follow that contract? No I am not; in fact, it would be immoral to carry out that contract. So, clearly, we cannot just assume that contracts entail universal moral obligations as Pro does. He needs to actually provide reasoning as to why the social contract is a contract that conveys moral obligations.Essentially, Pro only has two arguments to ground the existence of obligations in this debate: (1) contracts convey obligations because they're contracts and (2) relationships convey obligations. The latter is just not topical. The former is un-warranted (ipse dixit), question-begging, and incomplete (in the sense it blindly assumes the validity of the social "contract" and assumes that contractual obligations are moral without ever making the case for that).3. Pro's contradicted himself. First, it's important to note that a contract doesn't imply a close relationship. For instance, I could be a U.S. citizen (thus a member of the contract), who uses legal loopholes to avoid paying taxes (or who makes too little to pay taxes), who lives outside the U.S., and who works for a foreign firm that does not really have connections to the U.S. Compare this hypothetical person to someone who lives inside the U.S., who pays taxes, and who contributes to his society through his work. The second person obviously has closer ties to the U.S. than the first. Using the idea that the weight of obligations changes based on closeness, surely the government has more obligations towards the second person rather than the former. Yet, most social contract theorists contend that governments have equal obligations towards all people (my rights to equality, liberty, property, justice, etc. are just as good and valid under the social contract as those of other citizens, and just as entitled to government protection). So, Pro would both have systems where a government's obligation is both weighted and unweighted regarding its citizens.4. Arbitrariness presents a huge problem for Pro. Pro writes: "[a]s there is no feasible way to 'choose' where you are born." Pro is basically saying that relationships are arbitrary. If so, why is that just moral grounds for deriving moral obligations. Surely, Pro has a reason for why relationships are a good way to justify moral obligations, but an arbitrary reason is not a good reason. In that case, Pro needs to furnish that good reason, lest he leave himself no foundation for his claims.5. Pro's contradicted himself. The social contract is built on the belief that coercive government is illegitimate (therefore consent must be obtained). Yet, Pro also suggest that I have obligations to which I did not consent (e.g. obligations to family). Consequently, Pro is both saying that obligations must only be grounded in consent (to reject coercion) but may also be grounded in non-consensual ways. That's just nonsensical. Pro must either affirm volition-based obligations, or involuntary obligations. Not both.ScarcityJust cross-apply everything I said above here. It rebuts the claim that: "This clearly shows that your moral obligation is stronger due to both the relationship and the contract." Really, Pro's argument here is to make a case through anecdotes and assumptions. He never explains the underlying moral logic behind the situation; he never actually explains WHY it is the case that one should prioritize one's sibling. He just presents his example and assumes that it proves his point. Examples should be used to supplement reasoned argumentation, not to replace it.In a sense, one could even say that his example is a non-sequitur, which "is an argument in which its conclusion does not follow from its premises." [1] Pro's argument is as follows: P1. I have a contract with my siblingP2. I do not have a contract with the other personC1. I am morally bound to help my sibling over the other person What is missing from this logic is any explanation of how or why having "a contract with my sibling" (P1) gets him to the point of me being "morally bound to help my sibling" (C1). This is a gap in the reasoning that is never really explained in Pro's entire case. Pro's one meager attempt to fill this gap is to say, "A contract by its very nature creates an increased obligation." But the nature of the contract is never actually explained, and the link to morality is never drawn. Why are my obligations to my family "moral?" Perhaps they are legal, filial, pragmatic, etc.SUMMARYPro's case is characterized by three things. Firstly, he fails to sufficiently explain anything. He leaves way too many question answered, which means his whole case is built on a series of as-yet unfounded assumptions. And, his assumptions themselves have gaps in logic that make it hard for them to stand up to critical analysis. Secondly, his whole line of argumentation regarding relationships just is not topical, and cannot be evaluated. Thirdly, he contradicts himself, which seriously undermines the credibility of his case. Pro's case is just not sufficient to validate the social contract, let alone that it conveys moral obligations. Thus, I negate.SOURCEhttps://en.wikipedia.org...(logic)