Resolved: On balance, philosophical naturalism is true.

Thanks Con for your response.I reject that I have assumed anything, and Con has not, in any way, refuted the basis of naturalism, which is that things that exist are either physical themselves or contingent on the physical.Con's dodging a lot here.*Final Rebuttal*Con makes one last attempt at burdens:"notice how in the Debate rules which I provided, that my opponent must show Naturalism is plausible."My response:Notice how in the debate rules, which Con provided, that the definition of true is "being in accordance with the actual state of affairs" and that the resolution is that naturalism is true.Well all states of affairs that have been discussed in this debate have either contained particles/radiation/energy or have been contingent on such, and Con hasn't given any reason to doubt this.Con claims:"My opponent never seeked to prove [naturalism is true]... hence, I do not believe he can win this debate today."My response:Since naturalism is the position that all things are physical or contingent on the physical, in this debate, I've *only* sought to prove naturalism is true because everything, from the brain I'm using to generate words to the signal my computer sends via internet to DDO's server, has been physical or contingent on such...is there something about my brain, my computer, the signals sent, or DDO's server that isn't made of/contingent on particles/radiation/energy?Nope.Con gets contradictory:"I am arguing that the qualities about the world are *fundamentally* non-physical...being contingent on the existence of the physical is irrelevant..."My response:Being contingent on the physical means that something cannot *fundamentally* exist without the physical.So being contingent on the physical isn't irrelevant as Con would have you believe; by something being contingent on the physical, the physical is fundamental to that something's existence.Con continues:"The problem with my opponent’s case here, is that simply just because mental states and physical are associated does not mean that one’s existence is of the same nature..."My response:It's not that the mental states are associated with the physical, it's that there are no mental states *without* the physical; the physical is fundamental to the mental as is one's existence.Con argues:"One could easily contest that it is simply the mental substance expressing itself through the physical substratum."My response:This sounds like word salad, but come on Con.You've not explained what a mental substance is and sans this explanation, how can we follow the prospect that this concept is expressing itself through the *basis* of the physical?Con demands:"You have to be able to actually argue that the thing is physical through rational argument or evidence not merely assert it."My response:My evidence is that particles/radiation/energy exist, and they make up our physical world.The thing is that physics, chemistry, and cosmology all indicate that existence is in fact physical, and Con's given us no reason to doubt that fact.*The Challenge*Con doubles down on his baffling logic:"The idea is that even if naturalism were to be true, you cannot support it rationally."My response:Where to start here...If naturalism were to be true, then the debate is over, because that's precisely the resolution, vote Pro.But this other idea from Con, that if naturalism is true, then one cannot support it rationally is buffoonish and contradictory.That something is true might be the number one reason to support it rationally, so if we agree that naturalism is true, then it would be most reasonable to endorse...I'm still baffled that Con doubled down on that.Con complains:"My opponent claims because verification works repeatedly, it simply must be true!...well let us see this syllogism form to see why my opponent is incorrect...Event 1 happens from Thing 2Event 1 happens from Thing 2Ad InfinitumTherefore, Event 1 is caused by Cause 2."My response:Let's be clear, I said that because we can *exclusively* produce thing 2 from *exclusively* event 1 repeatedly, then our verification by way of accurate predictions about this interplay isn't mere chance...predictions are being confirmed, therefore our verification.Con's mock syllogism of my points is silly too.Con adds:"It is like saying just because every swan I have ever seen is white, that all swans therefore must be white."My response:No it's like saying that the lack of oxidation of the amino acid tyrosine, in swan feathers, produces white feathers, therefore all swans that lack this oxidation will have white feathers.If we can confirm this prediction over and over again, then our verification is not "mere chance," which was Con's original contention with my verification logic.*Mental Causation*Con repeats:"My opponent again assumes here that because something is dependent on physical that therefore, it is(in-of-itself) physical."My response:See, contingent isn't *exactly* synonymous with dependent, the difference being that contingent means "cannot exist without" and dependent means "relies on for something."I've said that something contingent on the physical cannot be without the physical so it is fundamentally physical.Con repeats again:"I again repeat, if all causation is physical causation how does the content of some mental state cause another."My response:Mental states are fundamentally physical, so if all causation is physical, then this makes perfect sense, no?*Consciousness*Con mentions:"I contend I can easily conceive of a zombie with psychological consciousness but no phenomenal consciousness hence he must show exactly why this idea is incoherent."My response:You neglect what you originally said Con, and that included a world *physically identical* to our world.So, if we are conceiving a zombie with psychological consciousness AND a physically identical world, then all of the phenomena that exist in our physical world would have to exist there, and this would provide the zombie with a phenomenal consciousness.Con points out:"In fact, my opponent’s own article is not about whether consciousness is indeed physical. The substrates certainly have some relation to consciousness or perhaps are preconditions for the ability to express consciousness but this has zero to do with whether consciousness in of itself is physical."My response:The substrates are producing the consciousness, so consciousness is fundamentally physical, because sans these substrates, we have no reason to believe that consciousness can exist...at least Con's given no reason to think so.*Conclusion*This has been pretty clear.Con has not been able to falsify the idea that things are either physical or contingent on the physical, in fact, in many cases, Con has conceded that the examples discussed in this debate are physical or contingent on the physical.Since Con could not poke any holes in the position that things are physical/contingent, one must affirm that naturalism is true; Con's given no reason to doubt this veracity.