It is most probable that a god exists.

Ave!Epistemological Argument for the PSRIf some contingent facts are inexplicable, then your perceptual states may be occurring for no reason at all, with no prior causes (Koons (1997).Objective probabilities are tied to laws of nature / objective tendencies, and so if an objective probability attaches to some contingent fact, then that situation can be given an explanation in terms of laws of nature or objective tendencies. Hence, if the PSR is false of some contingent fact, no objective probability attaches to the fact. Thus we can't say that violations of the PSR are improbable if the PSR is false. But someone who doesn't affirm the PSR can't say that the sceptical scenario is objectively improbable either. So if the PSR were false or maybe even not known a priori, we wouldn't know any empirical truths. But we do know empirical truths. Hence, the PSR is true, and maybe even known a priori.Evolution: If one rejects the PSR, then our knowledge of evolution may be undercut. For if one weren't confident of something very much like the PSR, it would be hard to be justifiably confident that no biological features of the human species arose for no reason at all...Inference to best explanation: The PSR is essential to the practice of science, even outside of evolutionary biology, for were it not for the PSR, bricks can just pop into being and there would be no reason to consider why it did so.Why aren't there widespread violations of the PSR all around?: For each way that things could go in accordance with the laws of nature, there is an uncountable infinity of ways that things could, for no reason at all, go contrary to the laws of nature. Our empirical observations suggest that the probability of such events is very low.The logical possibility of miracles shows that it should be possible for a supernatural being to cause photon clouds to show up ex nihilo, and if the PSR is false, such supernatural beings could be coming into existence all the time, and causing the weird effects. But the best explanation for why this is not happening is that there is nothing in existence that would be likely to cause such supernatural beings to come into existence, and by the PSR they can't come into existence uncaused.Con's appeals to quantum indeterminacy are irrelevant. The PSR that I'm defending concerns explanation, which is the giving of reasons sufficient to explain the explanandum, not the giving of reasons logically sufficient for entailing the explanandum. Quantum mechanical events do, however, have explanations. The experimental set-up in which they happen has the property of giving rise to emissions with certain probabilities (John Haldane makes this suggestion in Smart and Haldane 2003, p. 126). Argument against the PSR RefutedCon's argument against the PSR can actually be used to prove the existence of god! Here's how: 1. If p1 is the Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact of a world w1 and p2 is the Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact of a world w2, and if p1 and p2 are identical, then w1=w2. true by definition 2. p is the actual world’s Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact. 3. (W-PSR) For any proposition, p, and any world, w, if p is in w’s Big Conjunctive Fact, then there is some possible world, w1, and proposition, q, such that w1’s Big Conjunctive Fact contains p and q and the proposition that q explains p. 4. If p is in the actual world’s Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact, then there is some possible world, w1, such that w1’s Big Conjunctive Fact contains p and q and the proposition that q explains p. 5. There is a possible world w1 and a proposition q, such that w1’s Big Conjunctive Fact contains p and q and the proposition that q explains p. from 2 and 4 by modus ponens6. w1=the actual world.7. There is in the actual world a proposition q, such that the actual world’s Big Conjunctive Fact contains p and q and the proposition that q explains p8. q is either a personal explanation or q is a scientific explanation. Some sort of a conceptual truth9. q is not a scientific explanation. 10. q is a personal explanation. 11. q reports the intentional action of a contingent being or q reports the intentional action of a necessary being. Premise 12. It is not the case that q reports the intentional action of a contingent being. Premise 13. q reports the intentional action of a necessary being.A full explanation of the argument can be found here: http://www9.georgetown.edu...Ontological ArgumentThe ontological argument against god is logically valid. So, the question before us is whether the premises are sound and demonstrated. P1 has has not been demonstrated to be true. How is there a logical state of affairs where a maximally great being does not exist? Unless Con demonstrates that such a logical state of affair can exist, his parody can not go through.Con asks us why existence is greater than non-existence. But the MOA as Plantinga formulated it doesn't depend on existence being greater. Existence isn't even a property, but necessary existence IS a property. But anyhow, it's clearly greater to exist than not since if you didn't exist, there would be ~you and so nothing great could arise in which you're the only existing entity whatever. In fact, it may even be nonsense to say that non-existence is greater... how would that work out? If nothing is not anything, and since only things have the capacity for greatness, however big or small, then how in the logical world can ~thing be somehow "great"? It's incoherent to think of a non-existant being as having any amount of greatness.Moral ArgumentCon actually ends up supporting my criticism of descriptive relativism. There is no reason to think that an objective answer does not exist just because there is conflict over what that answer is. Con writes, 'The example regarding descriptive relativism doesn’t necessarily mean that that are not any truths to be known about physics.' Trying to rebutt my argument, he just ends up helping it.Moral content simply means that an action can be thought of in terms of right and wrong. This premise should be obvious, as people think of actions in terms of right and wrong all the time! Why would we think that our actions have no moral content? Abortion, murder, slavery, infacticide. All of these can be thought of in terms of right and wrong, so they have moral content. On what grounds does Con consider P1 to be dubious?Objective Morality on AtheismCon argues that we can have objective morality on atheism if we base it on the suffering of conscious creatures. But on atheism, why think that the suffering of conscious creatures is actually immoral? It's an arbitrary assumption that Con does not justify at all.Sure, conscious creatures don't like to suffer. That's just an is statement, however. It doesn't tell us that therefore, conscious creatures ought not to suffer! Con's pain based morality is destroyed by Hume's is-ought gap.Conclusion1: There are good epistemological reasons to accept the PSR.2: The counter-argument offered actually proves a necessary being.3: There is no reason to think that there is a logical state of affairs where a maximally great being does not exist.4: There are good reasons to believe that existence is greater than non-existence.5: There are no good reasons to think that actions don't have moral content.6: All objective morality without god depends on arbitrary assumptions.Vale!