The non-aggression principle is a justified ethical position

Introductury remark: I do not drop and concede a single point in Pro's argument.Justification?Before it can be asked whether the non-aggression principle is a justified ethical position, it must be asked if any position at all can be justified. If it turns out some position can be justified, we must follow up with the question of whether an "ethical" position can be justified. Only then can we ask if the NAP is justified as an ethical position. The various theories of justification are usually split into the foundational and anti-foundational (or pragmatic). Foundationalism posits the existence of foundational beliefs through which other beliefs can be justified; according to this view, foundational beliefs are justified positions that require no argumentative support. Some examples include the cogito of Descartes, the sense data of the empiricists, or the necessary metaphysical truths of the rationalists. One by one, these purportedly certain, indubitable, and unassailable points have been shaken. That is where anti-foundationalism enters the picture, in which pragmatism, logical positivism, and postmodernism unite in a critique of holding foundational beliefs.Pro's argument clearly rests on foundational beliefs, specifically on the "law of non-contradiction." Before asking whether the NAP can be justified as "ethical," I make two preliminary arguments that dispel the possibility that the NAP can be justified at all: 1) anti-foundationalism/pragmatism, and not foundationalism, is correct; and 2) even if foundationalism is correct, given Pro's foundation, "Premise 1" as well as everything that follows from it is flawed.1) The pragmatist Charles Peirce held that nothing was indubitable. Each thing was open to doubt, although not all things at once. Each thing could be doubted on the basis of other propositions that were, at that particular moment, not actually in doubt. Their turn could come later. The idea is that any proposition is only justified locally, in a specific time and place or historical and social context. Otto Neurath, followed by W.V. Quine, likened this situation to that of sailors who have to rebuild a ship at sea: while standing on somewhat rotten planks, they must repair and replace the others. Every plank sooner or later gets repaired. Everything is open to transformation. Nothing stays fixed.Richard Rorty expands on this train of thought, arguing that the "individual, the community, the human body as a whole have a 'means by which they know the world' (this entails language, culture, semiotic systems, mathematics, science etc.). Rorty claims in addition to this that the philosopher, in order to verify a particular means, or a particular statement belonging to a certain means (eg. the propositions of the natural sciences) would have to 'step outside' the means they are judging and critique it neutrally -however, this is quite literally impossible, the only way in which one can know the world is through the means by which they know the world." [1]In other words, there is no independent epistemological mechanism for determining the validity of a statement. If anti-foundationalism is correct, then it would be the case that the opposition between reason and belief is a false one, and that every situation of contest should be recharacterized as a debate between two sets of belief with no possibility of recourse to a mode of deliberation that was not itself an extension of belief. In other words, any principle will always be a matter of faith, of the assumptions that are bedrock within a discursive or communicative system which because it rests upon them cannot (without self-destructing) call them into question.The conclusion cannot be avoided by invoking abstract (that is, contentless) logical operations like the “law of non-contradiction.” What is and is not a contradiction will vary depending on the distinctions already in place. A contradiction must be a contradiction between something and something else and the shape of those somethings will always be the product of an interpretive rather than a formal determination.Pro’s P1, in an attempt to find some belief or view that is unchangeable and foundational, assumes the weakest principle of non-contradiction. Robert Nozick offers a compelling response. He argues that, "the fact that a particular theory has a fixed point does not show that this very same point must or will be held fixed by every plausible theory. And it does not show the theory under consideration is unable successively to transform itself by using its own then accepted standards, so that this point and even these very standards get modified." [2] Nozick continues by giving many examples of the way the principle of non-contradiction can be challenged. I rehearse one of these below:Suppose an object changes from red to black. If time is continuous (or even if it dense), then between any two instants there are an infinite number of other instants. So with a changing object in continuous time, either there will not be a last instant when it is in one state or there will not be a first instant when it is in the other. If time is continuous, and if there are no instants when the entity is in neither state, no instant when it is neither red nor nonred, then the last instant of the first state and the first instant of the second state would be the very same instant. The object would be both red and nonred. As Nozick explains, "Of course, because these contradictions hold for only an instant, it is no wonder we do not notice them." [2]Furthermore, Nozick emphasizes that "it is important to realize that logic and reason would not crumble if the law of non-contradiction is given up." Indeed, there are many examples of logics without non-contradiction, e.g., paraconsistent logic or dialetheism. Therefore, no principle can be justified absolutely. As Quine, Rorty, and Nozick argue, no foundational beliefs exist, and without these, the justification of any principle is impossible.2) Suppose we are generous, and for the sake of argument, grant Pro the use of foundational beliefs to justify NAP. What then? That fact itself demonstrates the inconsistency of Pro's argument. Pro's first premise is predicated on the fact that things can only be justified by "argumentation." The problem is, if there are foundational beliefs, they require no argumentation to be justified. Hence, Pro's claim that "argumentation is necessary to justify any proposition" is simply false: no "argumentation" is required to justify the principle of non-contradiction, and it is that very principle that Pro invokes to justify the "axiom of argumentation." Pro's first premise is unjustified, given the fact that this premise is justified on the basis of foundational beliefs. As we can see, Pro's entire position is inconsistent. It requires foundational beliefs to have any validity, but if Pro accepts foundational beliefs, Pro admits that argumentation is not necessary to justify every proposition. Hence, P1 is false. If P1 is false, the rest of Pro's premises and conclusions are also false. Ethical Justification?Once more let's be generous to Pro. Hypothetically, suppose Pro's argument that the NAP is a justified position is sound. Does it follow that the NAP is an ethical position? It does not. Pro must show that the NAP is not only justified, but that it is itself an ethical position. This means Pro must show how the NAP produces results that are "right" and "just." So far, Pro has simply made a completely formal argument, using the operations of logic, but Pro has not shown how the NAP is itself an ethical position, and therefore, there is still a lot left for Pro to demonstrate if Pro wants to fulfill the BoP. That said, I will save my arguments for why the NAP is not an ethical position for the next Round, where I imagine Pro will have provided some reasons for supporting the NAP as an ethical position. [1] http://tinyurl.com...[2] Nozick, Robert. Invariances