Rematch Debate: God Exists

Teleological ArgumentFine-tuningMy opponent compares the conclusion that the universe was finely-tuned for life to the conclusion that the universe was finely-tuned for rocks. Of course, the implication of the universe being finely-tuned for life would entail that the universe is indirectly finely-tuned for rocks, since many of the conditions for life existing are shared by the conditions for rocks existing (such as the existence of heavy elements). But we must ask ourselves which one of these existing objects (be it rocks, humans, trees etc...), is the reason why the universe was finely-tuned. Did the creator fine-tune the universe for rocks? Or for humans?In round 1, I concluded that the creator of the universe is likely to be intelligent, and therefore a person. Persons essentially seek reciprocated, personal relationships with other persons. As Martin Buber wrote, there are two types of relationships a person can have; an 'I-It' relationship which is objective, reasonable and empirical, and an 'I-You' relationship which is subjective, inter-personal and reciprocated. (1)The very essence of a person seeks to develop 'I-You' relationships, since 'I-it' relationships are cold and impersonal. Since 'I-You' relationships are personal and reciprocated, they can only be relationships between persons, not between a person and an object. Therefore God, as a person, would seek to develop 'I-You' relationships and this can only be done if He were to create persons with which to have these relationships with. This implies that the universe is fine-tuned to allow persons to exist, and it just so happens that complex life is necessary in order to embody these persons.To summarise, God as a personal being (inferred by his intelligence) would decide to fine-tune the universe to allow humans, not particularly rocks, to exist; even if fine-tuning the universe to allow humans to exist would also allow rocks to exist.NecessityCon argues that the universe being LPU is metaphysically necessary, and hence it is not prudent for a theists to conclude that fine-tuning is the most likely explanation.Michael Hurben is cited as stating that the values for the relevant physical constants 'aren't really tunable'. But why is this? No evidence is given that the constants are non-contingent. This would imply that, for example, the ratio of proton mass to electron mass had to be 1836.15267245 (2), and that there is no possible world in which it has a slightly different value. Yet one can clearly conceive of many. It is a bare assertion that the relevant physical constants are non-contingent.Victor Stenger is also cited as claiming that 'some form of life' could have arisen from a far larger variance of the physical constants. However, this is the reason why I wrote in my initial argument that I am referring to complex life, by which I mean multicelluar, intelligent organisms. Complex life entails the existence of heavy elements because these elements (namely carbon or silicon) are the only elements that can form the large variety of compounds necessary to form complex life. Life could have still formed if heavy elements never actually came to exist, for example in hydrogen based life (3). But this is not complex life and hence they are not persons, so there would be no reason why God (a person) would create a universe to allow them to exist. Therefore it is complex life that my argument pertains to, even if I acknowledge that light elements such as hydrogen could create simple lifeforms.Next, Con talks about inflation theory, but he does not actually explain why the rapid expansion of the universe entails that complex life could have arisen from a much larger variation of the physical constants. His science is complex and no doubt impressive to the casual reader, but this does not hide the fact that it does not clearly pertain to a rebuttal of the fine-tuning argument.Even if, as Stephen Hawking speculated, the early universe was a 'superposition of possible values', it does not explain why the exact possible values needed for complex life became the exact actual values. It would be far more likely that another possible value, one that did not allow for complex life, became the actual value.Therefore, Con has failed to give an explanation for how the universe is necessarily a LPU, and hence my argument stands. RebuttalsCausalityCon misreads the example of simultaneous causation. The depression of the cushion is irrelevant. The fact remains that the casual relationship is as follows:Cause: sitting downEffect: Having a lapOne does not sit down and then, after a finite time, begin to have a lap. Instead, the instant that one sits down, one immediately (with no time delay) has a lap. This is simultaneous causation because the cause and the effect are not temporally separated (they happen at the same time).Furthermore, simultaneous causation is compatible with eternalism. All eternalism entails is that time is a dimension in roughly the same way as space is a dimension (well, three dimensions). But just as there are distinct, objective points in space, there are distinct, objective points in time. If both the cause and effect exist in that distinct point in time, then they are simultaneous.Therefore, eternalism does not refute simultaneous causation.In terms of physical laws, Con has qualified his argument to state that metaphysical causation requires physical laws; but why should metaphysical causation require physical laws? Surely only physical causation (i.e a physical cause and a physical effect) requires physical laws? Metaphysical causation should therefore be subject to metaphysical laws, but Con has not given evidence that metaphysical laws were created by the Big Bang, and so metaphysical causation could happen outside the universe.Finally, eternalism does not refute causality - Con's argument does not even imply this. Even if I accept four-dimensionalism this does not refute causality - why would it?With all due respect, Con has also shot himself in the foot here. For if causation does not exist then Con cannot cause the effect of him winning this debate, and hence voters would be wrong to award him the victory. If causation does not exist, then Con cannot cause himself to win the debate!Atemporal mindsHere I would like to apologise for my carelessness, I accept that 'eternal' implies that something is inside time, yet what I meant by 'eternal idea' is an idea that is not constrained by time in any way, because God is defined as transcendent and therefore outside of time. Nevertheless, this is a semantic technicality that is easily rectified.Con commits the appeal to definition fallacy (4) by claiming that intelligence necessitates processes by definition, yet it is clear from this definition that the definer is referring to worldly, evolutionarily-developed organisms not metaphysical, disembodied minds. This is a fallacy because it is taking a definition out of context, as well as treating a limited definition as an infallible authority on the true nature of things. It's like saying 'gay marriage is impossible because marriage is defined as between a man and a woman'. The truth is that definitions are not absolute authorities, especially not when taken out of context.Moreover, by insisting that minds require processes, Con contradicts himself. This is because processes require change and yet, according to Con, change is not coherent within an eternalist theory of time.Law of ParsimonyAs Con has agreed with my interpretation of the law, I extend the argument and let the above arguments/rebuttals speak for themselves. Over to you Tejretics! (1) http://www.iep.utm.edu...(2) CODATA Value: proton-electron mass ratio". The NIST Reference on Constants, Units, and Uncertainty. US National Institute of Standards and Technology. June 2011. Retrieved 2011-06-23.(3) http://hos.ufl.edu...(4) http://www.logicallyfallacious.com...