The Deistic God

Preamble I'll start by answering Con's question on why I think evolution can't account for consciousness. The answer is simple: consciousness is not a material attribute. Unfortunately, this is where presuppositions are a hindrance since Con insists that consciousness strictly reduces to the ongoings in the brain. I was hoping Con will target more important points I made starting from my explanation (in the first part of my argument) that consciousness (ie self-awareness) isn't physical. Or my talk of why the emergent property explanation of consciousness fails. Neither does his counter hold because he still repeats that consciousness is physical. It is interesting he says that consciousness is a property like sharpness and smoothness is. This is because he touches on the most difficult aspect of consciousness that religion extends: the ability to attribute properties to physical objects. For example, height isn't physical and yet it exists because as conscious beings we abstract what height is from seeing physical objects. We just do. Humans quickly infer or attach concepts to and from objects; this is at once the source of human creativity and depravity. On a general note, I think Con's arguments fell into the trap of not building the case against the more important first part of my argument, and 'over-bashing' the second part when its case actually rests on the first part. I hope to build on why neuroscience doesn't help his case and show why his case against the second part of my argument is without merit. It is also noteworthy that while I do have a burden of proof, in the course of debate it can shift to Con if he makes a claim that must be evidenced. Hence, I would want Con to state if consciousness (by which I mean self-awareness) is physical, and if so, bring evidence for it. Rebuttals For The First Part Of My Argument * On Matter: First of all I think your definition of matter is vague. Till date, particle physicists are still finding out what matter is. Physical objects are composed of smaller physical objects eg molecules, atoms, quarks, etc. So the 'substance' in your definition must be physical. By matter, I was referring to elements since all objects are certain to be either macromolecules of elements or compounds of elements. If you agree with this we can move on. * On the 'causal gap' argument: Your conclusion on my causal gap argument doesn't refute it at all. It refines it. Consciousness is certainly an additional attribute over matter. The key words being 'over matter'. Because being over matter suggests that consciousness is an extra baggage atop it. The physical properties you list, in an attempt to show how consciousness is naturally explained fail for a primary reason: they are attributes conscious minds attach to physical objects. For example, water doesn't know whether its liquid or solid. Neither does a broken glass know if it is sharp. Protons are oblivious to being bound by a strong force: humans observe protons behave in a manner and infer a strong force. The macroscopic objects as constituted by matter just are. Again, this aspect of our debate is crucial as it resonates with a defining ability that comes with our consciousness: the ability to attach or abstract concepts to or from objects respectively. For example, we look at a given natural scene and attach beauty to it, or we see a chair and abstract its volume, width, smoothness etc. Please distinguish the objects and the matter they are composed of from the concepts we make of them. As it applies to humans, consciousness isn't a physical property, it is an awareness of a property starting from knowing its existence. Other properties (eg location, color, temp) which we attach to objects are descriptive of the objects but consciousness goes farther than being a mere description of man; it is what does the describing. My argument is not solipsistic. Solipsism asserts that when one dies, the universe outside of such a person, ceases to exist. This is false. In contrast, my stance would be that the universe can't know its state of existence without being conscious. And this applies to humans and the properties you mention. Removing a single molecule may change the sharpness, but the object remains. You may break the Himalayas today, but the molecules and atoms it is composed stay similar. The mistake you make is confusing the concepts (ie properties) you attach to objects for objects themselves. This is a point worth repeating. * On consciousness: Neuroscience doesn't help your case. With or without it humans know they are conscious. I agree that consciousness is entirely based on the brain; that's not what I argue against. My argument is that it isn't fully explained by the brain. I already stated why. It isn't a material property. I grant that animals have varying degrees of consciousness, but theirs is diminished. Consciousness is more fully expressed in the average healthy human adult and though their consciousness is dependent on the brain; it isn't explained by it because the working brain itself (like a working processor) lacks consciousness. Consciousness (or self-awareness) is thought to be mediated between a portion of the brain stem and the prefrontal cortex of our brains.[1] From experience, damage to this two areas puts people into coma where subjective consciousness is lost[2] This knowledge (while important) doesn't address the problem. The reason is that even these portions of the brain are also unconscious within the context of the working brain. Hence, I find your appeals to emergence to be special pleading. As to consciousness being something one has (or doesn't have) I stand by it. Your analogy wasn't well explained. I can only presume you mean how temperature or speed are secondary attributes of objects, not objects themselves. This is true of consciousness is humans and it is precisely why I insist there is a causal gap. Begging the explanation_as you say_is precisely what the first part of my argument is. The reason is simple, I find that consciousness isn't physical thing, yet isn't nothing because it knows things. This lacks a precedent because most, if not all chemical reactions typically result in new materials as the emergent property. To see how absurd your argument is, consider our earlier talk on purpose. You maintained that the universe is purposeless but humans made their own purpose. I then asked how humans could make their purpose when the universe (which is physical like them) lacks purpose. How will the specific arrangement of matter that humans are, have what the universe (a collection of matter too) lacks ? You simply assumed humans somehow had it. I submit to you that, at that point, you simply ignored the causal gap of consciousness as it relates to purpose. Only conscious beings find purpose or deny purpose. Rebuttals On The Second Part Of My Argument * On the fallacy of composition: I don't make that fallacy. In fact, what I specifically mean by matter are the elements in the periodic table. All objects are elements or compounds of elements. I disagree with Con's use of puddleness which is conceptual. The word 'puddle' is okay. A drop of water isn't a puddle but lots of water are. If I am ask to bring evidence for a puddle, pictures or videos of them are easily gotten. But consciousness would bring a case whereby lots of puddles know they exist. That wouldn't be an object. How can I detect knowing ? That would be an attribute that begs for explanation. My point in P1 is so that Con would see that even in a conscious brain, the current of sodium ions caused by synapses are themselves unconscious. I have already explained that emergent properties are physical eg hydrogen and oxygen combust to arrange themselves to a new compound called water. The emergent property they result in is physical. How on earth do you then derive the immaterial attribute of consciousness from an assemblage of matter which don't have it ? * On Has/Has-not dichotomy: Until Con shows that consciousness is an object he is on shaky ground. I don't think he can. Any child knows that their consciousness isn't physical; and that it is somthing they have. As experienced, consciousness isn't physical and the reason why skeptics won't dismiss it is because they directly experience it. Even then, some like Dennet say it is illusory, which is absurd.[3] * On conscious beings causing conscious beings: I actually gave more context to that argument using mammals as an example. I don't think my opponent's thought experiment will work here. The reason is simple. In the experiment, he is the conscious being who made the brain-dead mum live, concieve, and give birth. A brain-dead person won't even know they should eat without help, they need life support to even breathe (which doesn't require consciousness and suggests its a more widespread damage to the brain) just like the brain dead woman in his reference. A more convincing case would be a scenario like that of 'Kyle XY' who was bred in an artificial womb: even then, so far a conscious being arranged all that, my point will still stand. Robots doing so won't even help, because a conscious human would be the final cause within that scenario. * On the argument from ignorance: I would argue that_on the contrary_the argument for God stems from what man knows. In this case, from the very source of knowledge. We know as an emergent property consciousness is not physical. We know that as an emergent property it results from the brain and depends on it. We know that knowledge of any kind stems from consciousness, and that all matter, compounds or elements (including the ones in the human brain) lack the ability to know. We know there is ignorance on how unconscious matter can result in conscious brains as in humans (and other apes). It is on the basis of explaining this gap we postulate a God. On the contrary, naturalists ignore the gap and assume matter somehow poofs up consciousness, or they say consciousness is an illusion, or they say consciousness is just the brain. If consciousness was just the brain at work you would think a neuroscientist would know my thoughts by looking at an fMRI scan of my brain. Even then, the 'knowing' wouldn't be physical. It also is important to note that being alive can't be indiscriminately used in my argument since being alive boils down strictly to biochemical processes in the body. As Con showed in his example and thought experiment, unconscious people can be kept alive. But if you mean alive in the truest sense, which is someone's consciousness (their persona), then my argument is applicable in that regard. Don't confuse the two uses of the term 'alive'. * More on the place of evolutionary mechanisms: I have already said the first reason why evolution fails is that consciousness isn't physical. While neuroscience certainly allows us explore consciousness as it relates to the human body, it doesn't explain consciousness itself (as experienced). The same applies to evolutionary mechanisms. At a base level, evolution is simply chemical processes and how they result in new protein compounds. Random mutations tweaks biochemicals and natural selection is the result of the better ones flourishing. In that sense, evolution concords with naturalism. But when we get to consciousness, there is a problem, we can't explain it in terms of matter. The ability of a group of atoms to know they exist, concieve of other arrangements of matter not seen in nature (eg planes, artificial compounds, short-lived artificial elements, gadgets of all kinds etc) and infer attributes like beauty, religion etc from other physical arrangements is unprecedented . . . . and is immaterial. The only way we do involves equivocating it to the what goes on in the brain. You may equivocate to pheromones all you like but I'll bet that their physiological effect on a person in coma would meaningless. The saying is true that one can't find love in a test-tube and this is what applies to consciousness. As an 'evolved ability', it is inexplicable from a purely physical standpoint. If it isn't, then we should be zombies. Possible Objections Again, I think Con's response to my objections here will revolve around his some key beliefs he holds: 1) that consciousness is entirely physical 2) that the arrangement of matter in the human body and in animals fully explain consciousness 3) that consciousness is an emergent property 4) that naturalism is a simpler explanation on the origin of consciousness. If my case must be made these suppositions must be shown to be flawed and I believe I am doing so. If Con can't tell what physical object(s) is consciousness as I asked, then his first assumption falls. If 1) fails 2) falls with it because an arrangement of matter cannot be non-physical. If 2) falls 3) falls, since emergent properties are always physical. This will make 4) untenable as an explanation. We know that attimes simpler solutions can be simply wrong. References [1] Brain Facts pp 6, 8. Download here: http://www.brainfacts.org... [2] http://www.ted.com... [3] http://www.ted.com...