God exists

Unfortunately, they either simply fell flat on their face, or were based off of simple misunderstandings. Necessary Cause/ Sufficient Cause My opponent says that a necessary cause is not the same type of cause proposed by the KCA. However, the KCA states that everything that begins to exist has a cause, thus, any type of cause would fall under this description (a necessary cause, is still "a" cause). Now, Con claims: "Necessary causes are the same things as necessary conditions. Necessary conditions are completely different to actual causes. "My opponent is talking about "actual" causes, like only certain subsets of causality (sufficient causes/ efficient causes ect. ) can be considered "actual" causes. However, there are many different forms of causation, and there is no good reason for why they all aren't "actual" causes as well. Therefore, my argument regarding a necessary cause still falling in line with "a" cause, stands. Absolute Nothingness Absolute nothingness = Non-beingWhen a physicist talks about nothing, they may be talking about empty space or simply the absence of energy and matter. When a philosopher speaks about nothing, they mean absolute nothingness, non-being [1]. Absolute nothingness has no qualities, if it even contains within it the potential for something, then that potential existence negates the conclusion that what we are discussing is actually non-being. Now, my opponent is claiming that my argument here actually contradicts creatio ex-nihilo. This is false, because the potential wouldn't exist within absolute nothingness if creatio ex nihilo was true, it would exist within God himself. This wouldn't equate to ex-deo either, since God would not be creating from himself (this is just where the potential rests). Now, if there is no God, the potential for something must have existed within absolute nothingness, which as I already explained, is contradictory to what philosophers mean when they refer to absolute nothingness. If the universe didn't come from absolute nothingness, then whatever it came from would be a necessary cause because the universe wouldn't exist without this cause (this would include, the quantum vacuum). Thus, there is no way the first premise of the KCA could be false. Fallacy Of CompositionThe fallacy of composition arises when one tries to say that because something is true for the parts of a whole (or even every part), then it is true for the whole itself [2]. This is a strange accusation on Con's behalf, since the fallacy of composition was never once used in my argument. If the KCA was:P1: Every part of the universe that begins to exist has a causeP2: The universe as a whole began to existC: The universe had a cause. .. Then I would be committing the fallacy of composition, and would deserve being called out on this fallacy. However, my argument is regarding everything (which includes the universe as a whole), not just everything within the universe, or all parts of the universe. Thus, I have not committed the fallacy of composition at all, and this is a baseless accusation. Quantum Events This entire argument from Con only holds weight if necessary causes are not causes (which would be a self-contradictory claim), and if absolute nothingness can still include the existence of the quantum vacuum (which would also be a self-contradictory claim). Since I already explained how these two assumptions are incoherent already, then we can dismiss this argument from Quantum Mechanics (as I already conceded that we have good reason to believe there is no sufficient cause for these fluctuations). Argument From Mental CausationSince my opponent did not adequately tear down the KCA, and this argument went completely untouched by Con, God's existence has been established (this would also imply a sufficient cause, as well as a necessary cause). Argument From Personal CausationSince my opponent did not adequately tear down the KCA, and this argument went completely untouched by Con, God's existence has been established (this would also imply a sufficient cause, as well as a necessary cause). Modal Ontological ArgumentWhat is a maximal being? My opponent, unfortunately, presents an unsophisticated objection to the Modal Ontological Argument here. These "parody" type rebuttals are extremely easy to respond to. All the items these parodies are discussing, involve contingent objects being called necessary, this renders the parodies useless and incoherent. For example, songs are contingent to song writers, so the idea of a necessarily existing song is just nonsense. Also, God is by definition not contingent to anything, thus there is no contradiction in claiming that it is possible for a maximally great being to exist, and that being is God. Paradoic arguments "P.1 It is better to work in perfection than non-perfection. P.2 A maximally great being would work in perfection. P.3 The universe is not perfect. P.4 Therefore, a maximally great being does not exist. " I would rebut this, with another syllogism: P1: It is greater to be free than not to be freeP2: If a maximally great being exists, he could freely chose to create something less than himself P3: If a maximally great being exists, this being is perfectP4: If a maximally great being created something less than himself, then he necessarily created something imperfect. My syllogism above, shows that a being could be maximally great and still create something imperfect. Thus, my opponent's conclusion that a maximally great being does not exist, fails. Con didn't show any incoherence in the idea of a maximally great being with his argument, and I showed that it is possible for a maximally great being to create something imperfect. Basically, my opponent is right that it is greater to work in perfection than not, however it is even greater to chose whether or not you want to work in perfection. His argument simply does not apply to a maximally great being, because only a being lesser in greatness has to work in perfection instead of being able to chose whether or not he works in perfection. "P.1 It is better to be good than evil. P.2 A maximally great being would be good. P.3 A maximally great being would want good rather than evil. P.4 Evil is very prevalant. P.5 Therefore, maximally great being dos not exist. "A non-sequitur is when a conclusion does not follow from it's preceding premises [3]. My opponent's argument above, is a non-sequitur. A maximally great could want good rather than evil, with evil existing, and this wouldn't negate the existence of a maximally great being. One may adopt the attitude of "whatever God wants, God gets" attitude, but this is not so, this would come into direct conflict with our free will with regards to evil (God wills us to have free will ourselves). Therefore, this argument from Con fails to show the incoherence of a maximally great being as well as his last syllogism. Conclusion Con only attacked P1 of the KCA, and didn't even touch P2, or my arguments for a personal mind causing the universe to exist. Now, since every last one of Con's refutations of P1 failed, and my arguments for why the cause must be God still stood, untouched, then God's existence has still been established with the KCA. As far as the MOA is concerned, my opponent's parodies did not succeed, he is trying to make the idea of contingent items necessarily existing coherent, and it is just not. Also, his arguments regarding a maximally great being working in perfection and not allowing evil were utter failures as well, he didn't include in some critical factors in his reasoning. Due to the reasons above, I think it's safe to say the resolution has been affirmed, and my arguments for the existence of God remain unscathed. Sources[1] . http://en.wikipedia.org...[2] . http://www.nizkor.org...[3] . http://en.wikipedia.org...(logic)