The ontological arguments justify a belief in God

Thank you to Con for making an effort to participate in this debate.Going straight to defending the argumetns, I would first like to note that Con gave 1 argument against ontological arguments and it didn't refute Godels proof. Before I address that, we must first see why Con's argument is wrong.Deconstructing Con's argument from subjective standard:The fallacy of Con's case becomes evident when one considers what the word 'great' actually means. There is actually no such thing as a universal objective definition for an adjective. Does greatness exist? can one hold it? At this point, it seems like I am arguing against my own case, however, my point will become clear in a moment.A big problem facing us here in this debate is the problem of words, the english language is quite frankly, horrible for most sorts of logical and philosophical arguments. So instead of saying that there is such thing as 'greatness,' we must instead conceptualise it. A good definition for great is 'markedly superior in character or quality'[1]. This is where our first problem arises, we use words to define words. To find out what the greatest possible being is, we simply compare it with other things. It has no standard on its own whatsoever. Notice in the definition I just gave, the word 'superior,' but for something to be superior, it must be compared to something. This is where we make our standard. The standard is the comparison between two things. So to find out if God is superior to a mountain, we simply draw conclusions as to which of the two has:a) more qualitative traitsb) more quantitative traitsGod has more of both, this is how we know He is greater than a mountain. Con's argument seeks to use semantics with words to form a contradiction, however, when one starts to define the word 'greatest' it becomes evident that it has no standard individually.In summary of this point, we can ignore the word 'greatest' all we have to do is compare God with everything, thats how we know He is the greatest possible being. There exists nothing with more positive qualitative traits, and quantitative traits.Moving on, Godels formal proof does not define God as the greatest possible being, it simply concludes with x as exhibiting God-like qualities, and is therefore God. Since I have plenty of characters to spare, I will now employ another ontological argument that is likewise not affected by Con's current address, a temporal modal logical proof also authored by Godel.Godel's Temporal modal logical proof: (H ψ → (ψ • G ψ)) (T1) ~ (H ψ → (ψ • G ψ)) (n) NTF (T2) H ψ (n) 1, PC (T3) ~ (ψ • G ψ) (n) 1, PC (T4) ~ψ (n) 3, PC (T4)' ~G ψ (n) 3, PC (T5) F~ ψ (n) 3, MN (T6) nBk 5, FR (T7) ~ψ (k) 5,6, FR (T8) kBn 2, HR (T9) ψ (k) 2,7, HR MN = Modal Negation FR = ◊R HR = □R (T1) = It is not true that if it always has been the case that a God-like being exists then a God-like being exists and it is always going to be the case that a God-like being exists in (n). (T2) = It always has been the case that a God-like being existed in (n). (T3) = It is not true that a God-like being exists and it is always going to exist in (n). (T4) = A God-like being does not exist in (n) (T4)' = It is not the case that a God-like being will always exist in (n). (T5) = In sometime in the future it will be the case that a God-like being will not exist in (n). (T6) = (n) occurred before (k). (T7) = A God-like being does not exist in (k). (T8) = (k) occurred before (n). (Reflexive Rule) (T9) = A God-like being exists in (k). The negation of the formula creates a contradiction. [2] I would like to see what Con has to say for his own argument and the 2 argumetns currently unaddressed. [1] http://www.merriam-webster.com...;[2] http://www.ifzg.hr...;