The USFG should eliminate its nuclear-armed ICBM force

== Definitions == http://www.youtube.com...Eliminate = "completely remove or get rid of (something)." (Google's dictionary)== Plan ==The debate requires me to hold an advocacy position, i.e. a plan. So here is the plan text. The plan says that the United States federal government (i.e. the legislature and the executive) should pass legislation that requires the elimination of the nuclear-armed ICBM force of the U.S. The US currently has an arsenal of 4,760 nuclear warheads. [1] Currently, it operates Minuteman ICBMs from underground silos, Trident SLBMs carried by Ohio-class submarines, and multiple nuclear aircraft bombers. [2] I propose the elimination of those Minuteman ICBMs. Contention 1: The ICBM force runs on outdated technology and has experienced severe security lapsesSubpoint A: HarmsThe first argument in this debate is the severe lack of security. There have been *multiple* close calls that have almost lead to disaster. Security lapses are increasingly common. There has also been a lot of misbehavior among officials responsible for the nuclear ICBM force. In one case, two crew members who possessed nuclear launch keys left silo blast doors- meant to prevent terrorists from entering- open while an officer was asleep. [3] Major Air Force nuclear units have failed security inspections. [4] Nine Air Force commanders lost their jobs because of systemic cheating on security tests. [5] Nuclear ICBMs are stored in silos in the states of Wyoming, Montana, and North Dakota. The security in all these places is poor. Take the example of Wyoming, where -- in the underground control center -- there is an enormous outer door designed to protect the corridor leading to the ICBM capsule. The door has a broken part so it can't close, and is propped open with a crowbar and marked with a "Danger" tag. [6] The technology used in Wyoming for launching the nuclear weapons is outdated as well. Journalist Lesley Stahl explains, "[T]he equipment is ancient. One of the computers that would receive a launch order from the President . . . uses floppy disks; the really old, big ones." [6] North Dakota isn't any better -- many times, the officers aren't well-trained, and 17 of them were relieved of duty on failing security inspections. [4]There has been severe misbehavior and criminal activity within the force. A certain launch officer was involved with a *drug ring.* Jeffrey Lewis lists out some examples of such misdemeanors: "A partial list of embarrassing stories includes: the so-called 'munitions transfer incident' in which six nuclear weapons were mistakenly flown across the country; an accidental shipment of Minuteman III nosecones to Taiwan; the removal of the commander of the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force for an epic bender involving a Beatles cover band at a Mexican restaurant in Moscow; the reprimand of the number two official at U.S. Strategic Command who is the subject of a criminal probe involving gambling with fake casino chips; the court-marshal of a launch officer involved with a drug ring -- as well as a plethora of other embarrassments ranging from widespread cheating on examinations, poor marks in unit assessments, and violations of security procedures including launch officers sleeping with the door to the command capsule propped." [7] John Oliver concludes, in his brilliant Last Week Tonight piece on nuclear weapons: "Within the last 12 months we were in a situation where in the event of us launching a nuclear strike, the president's command would theoretically have gone through a man gambling with fake poker chips, who would've then tried to call a drunk guy wrestling with a Russian George Harrison, who would've then needed to send someone with a bag full of burritos to wake up an officer and tell him to go grab an LP-sized floppy disk and begin the solemn process of ending the world as we know it." [8] The impact is nuclear terrorism. Out of the three wheels of the US nuclear triad, ICBMs are land based, so they can be targeted easily by terrorists. The security lapses outlined above -- e.g. leaving doors designed to protect from terrorists open -- allow easy nuclear terrorism. Criminal infiltration of the ICBM program has *already* happened (see the officials who ran drug gangs). Terrorists have the means, motives and opportunity to orchestrate a nuclear terrorist attack. And this isn't some extremely hypothetical scenario; there's *probability* to it as well -- it doesn't rely on a magnitude-based impact analysis. Information reported to the International Atomic Energy Agency shows "a persistent problem with the illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials, thefts, losses and other unauthorized activities." [9] Subpoint B: InherencyThe problem is inherent to the status quo -- the plan is the best, and possibly the only, way to solve it. Due to the past actions of the Air Force, it's clear that it doesn't care much about the ICBM force, if at all. It views the program as unnecessary to national security. [7] So it isn't going to become "more responsible" fast -- and nor are the officials. The plan is the best solution to nuclear terrorism.Contention 2: Maintaining the nuclear triad is incredibly expensive and may cause budget crisisThe nuclear triad as a whole needs modernization. It is incredibly outdated. Almost everyone agrees -- from Senator Marco Rubio to President Obama -- that the nuclear triad needs to be modernized, and there are multiple variant plans to accomplish the same. [10] The problem is the *immense* cost that modernization plans carry with them. Experts agree that the government is severely underestimating these costs, and the costs of modernization could go up to $1 trillion. [11] Attempts to modernize the nuclear program will trigger fast, emergency budget cuts and virtually push the country into "budget crisis." The budget crisis will cause the *sudden* need to, chaotically, eliminate the nuclear ICBM wheel anyway (which is the one that should, and will, be the first to go, as shall be outlined in the third contention). There are a few impacts to this contention. First, the ICBMs will go *anyway,* so there's no actual reason to keep them, once the level of budget crisis is realized. Second, if ICBMs are eliminated hastily, there will be a severe loss in nuclear deterrence rather than slow replacement and focus on conventional warfare. The budget crisis might well persuade complete disarmament, which might actually persuade hostile nations to go all the way to a nuclear war. On fact, Pifer, et al. argue that the loss of a guarantee in nuclear security might result in Turkey becoming a nuclear state, alongside fears from Russia. [12] Contention 3: The ICBM wheel of the triad is the best one to eliminateMy second contention has already established that the triad will cause a nuclear budget crisis. So we have to agree that *something* has to be eliminated. I argue that the best one to eliminate is the ICBM wheel. ICBMs bring with them risk of miscalculation, failure to act as a suitable deterrent, and they are easily detectable by satellite. They're pretty ineffective as a part of the nuclear triad. [13] The only suitable purpose for nuclear weapons is deterrence of nuclear attacks, because the US isn't going to launch first strikes, and has not even *threatened* to do so. ICBMs don't act as a significant deterrent. SLBMs -- submarine-launched ballistic missiles -- provide sufficient second strike capability to deter. [14] The Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation explains, "Nuclear-armed submarines remain the most survivable leg of the nuclear triad. While further reductions might entail reductions to all three legs of the triad or discussions about eliminating one leg, a safe and secure SLBM force seems destined to remain the centerpiece of deterrence -- especially in the United States -- for years to come." [14] As established above, ICBM launching can lead to severe miscalculations. [13] These can prevent de-escalation significantly. Launching an ICBM requires a decision of whether to launch or not to launch, because they cannot be recalled at all, so in a war-scenario, using ICBMs more than the others increases the risk of de-escalation. The CBO explains, "Bombers provide the most flexibility, because the tempo of their operations can be ramped up or down, signaling intent to an adversary." [15] The impact is nuclear war: less de-escalation means greater chance of nuclear war, which is a *huge* impact and can lead to millions of deaths. To summarize, I've proven: (1) the ICBM force has poor security and has faced severe security lapses that could lead to nuclear terrorism, (2) the budget crisis means some leg of the triad has to be cut, and (3) cutting anything except ICBMs significantly would reduce chances of de-escalation, increase security threats and reduce overall deterrent capability. For these reasons, Vote Pro in today's debate. [1] http://tinyurl.com...[2] http://tinyurl.com...[3] http://tinyurl.com...[4] http://tinyurl.com...[5] http://tinyurl.com...[6] http://tinyurl.com...[7] http://tinyurl.com...[8] See Last Week Tonight clip, starting at 7:56[9] http://tinyurl.com...[10] http://tinyurl.com...[11] http://tinyurl.com...[12] http://tinyurl.com...[13] http://tinyurl.com...[14] http://tinyurl.com...[15] http://tinyurl.com...