If God is omnipotent and omniscient, then God cannot be omnibenevolent at the same time.

However, I must contend that he has failed to meet his burden of providing even a possibility of an omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent God that allows suffering. My opponent and I differ in approach not because one is necessarily ‘better' or ‘worse,' as my opponent contends, but because I argue empirically, as required for this debate, and my opponent argues ideologically, ignoring the terms of this debate. This does not amount to ‘casuistry'[1] (though I suppose he means sophistry[2], as casuistry requires precedence and God has none, assuming he exists. ) If anything, my opponent has resorted to casuistry in attempting to apply former arguments about the nature of God's qualities to this current argument. I argue for a definition of God that is free from the limitations of theological apologetics for two reasons: 1. More than one omni-excellent God has been posited. [3] If I had focused solely on the Christian God, I couldn't argue against others. We do not have the time to debate every past consideration of every god's attributes. 2. This argument is one from observation, not merely one from assumption. Otherwise it would be mere sophistry and semantics. Let us examine what my opponent's argument is actually about: we have terms. These terms have semantic meaning we understand. To the extent that they describe anything, they describe a set of traits we consider valid of the description. A tree is not equal to the word ‘tree. ' The word tree merely describes all of the physical properties of a subjectively considered tree. My opponent has repeatedly argued that, assuming some objective aspect of reality known as God, "our subjective understandings of ‘kind' are irrelevant as they do not reflect reality. " My opponent is wrong. We create terms. If an aspect of reality, however objective, does not meet our subjective definition, then we are using the wrong term for it. [4] If God does exist, even assuming that his choice to let us suffer amounts to a more beneficial one than to do otherwise, it does not amount to an absolutely good choice, because we have assigned a trait to kindness, a subset quality of good, that includes the alleviation of suffering. If I claim that something is hot, and put my hand on it, I do not expect my hand to freeze. If I claim that something is all good, I do not expect it to be in any way not good. If my hand freezes, that which I believed was hot, was not. If I discover that something I considered all good is in some way not good, I now know that I have used the wrong terms. I have two choices: I can revise the terms, or I can develop a new one. My opponent claims I should revise the terms, particularly ‘good. ' I can not because the debate presupposes that the terms are fixed. Therefore, we should use different terms. If we use a different term, we have abandoned the idea of affixing the original term to God. In which case, God does not possess the qualities necessary to apply the term. It would also be absurd for us to replace the value of the particular term ‘good,' because it is applicable when describing the qualities of things other than God. When an observed quality otherwise applies to all but one thing to which we would assign it, it is far more efficient, and rational, to assign a different quality to this exception than to redefine the term for all qualified objects/actions. We can not observe God. I assume my opponent has not personally observed God directly. Therefore, we should not assume his purpose based on a hypothetical assumption of the observation of God. [5] We must infer it from what we CAN observe. In this case, the concern is how a God, assumed for the purposes of debate to have two qualities that do not contradict themselves, can have a third quality that, considering the truth of the first two qualities, would appear paradoxical to our observation. My opponent is right that God is assumed to have unfettered, absolute power (no limits). My opponent then engages in a bit of his own sophistry by arguing that this must mean that God could be omni-excellent and allow suffering to exist, as he has the ability to rearrange logic. God does have the ability to alter logic for the purposes of this debate, but clearly, he has not or we would not be using it as we are. [6] Therefore, a consideration of what God could do is irrelevant to what he IS or IS NOT doing. God also has the ability to eliminate suffering for the purposes of this debate, but clearly, he IS NOT. That observation IS relevant to the debate because for God to be omnibenevolent, suffering SHOULD NOT exist. My opponent has attempted to win this debate by hypothetically positing a purpose beyond our ability to understand. He claims that our inability to define it means that it could possibly be omnibenevolent in nature. He is wrong. Our inability to define it makes it indefinable. [7] The definition for ‘indefinable' does not equal the definition for ‘omnibenevolent. ' It is high sophistry to debate that an unknown could have a different value. [8] It already has a value. That value is ‘unknown. ' If my opponent wishes to prove that the value of unknown is something greater than unknown, he must predicate that proof upon an observation of the undefined quality that is correlative to the conceived possibility. In order to do that, he must be able to show how observed suffering IS NOT INCAPABLE of existing assuming an all-powerful God predisposed to end suffering. [9] Even a "mere possibility" must be rationally related to actuality. My opponent has failed to meet even the relatively low threshold burden of possibility, as each of his attempts to do so was either qualitative of a limited God, or one who is not Omnibenevolent. For this reason, my opponent has not refuted my claim, and functionally has conceded the debate. Vote Pro. [1] . http://en.wikipedia.org... [2] . http://en.wikipedia.org... [3] . http://www.pantheon.org... . http://books.google.com... [4] . http://www.scribd.com... - one of several readily found works linking pragmatism and semantics – even agency semantics requires a rational relation to the thing observed, however [5] . http://www.nizkor.org... [6] . http://en.wikipedia.org... . http://en.wikipedia.org... [7] . http://www.merriam-webster.com... [8] . http://student.britannica.com... [9] . http://en.wikipedia.org... Debate Flow Chart: Pro argument {Oe = Op+Os+Ob}, {Ob = [g(a…z)]}, {g(k) = -S}, {Ob=[g(a…z) -(g(k) + S)]}: Identity {Op /= -Os, -Ob}, {Os /= -Op, -Ob}, {Ob /= -Op, -Os}: Argument against paradox {Oe =1}: Assumption; {S=1}: Observation {Oe =S}; {Oe-S=0}; {Op+Os+Ob-S = Op+Os+[g(a…z)] –S = Op+Os+[g(a. .z) –(g(k)+S)-S=0}; {Op+Os+[g(a…z)-g(k)] -2S = 0}; {Op+Os+[g(a. .z)-g(k)] = 2S}; Arguments from substitution/redistribution {1-g(k) =2} Argument from substitution {1=2+g(k)} Redistribution 1>2 : Assumption is invalid. Con Argument {g(k) is not an element of g(a …z)} Pro Argument g(k) is defined as an element of g(a …z). Con Argument Then g(k) /= -S Pro Argument g(k) is defined as = -S Con Argument Defining is impossible. If you can not define, you can not make a claim. Pro Argument Then nothing is true, and omnibenevolence is invalid/false. If omnibenevolence is not true of anything, it is not true of God as well.