The Kalam Cosmological Argument is Sound

1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause. Metaphysical Support for Premise (1) I think clarification is in order. The argument looks like this: 1.1. Something cannot come from nothing. 1.2. If something came into being without a cause, it would come from nothing. 1.3. Therefore, something cannot come into being without a cause. On behalf of (1.1), I gave the boat thought-experiment. When a carpenter makes a boat, he must act on the potentiality already existing within a pile of wood. But for a boat to come into being from nothing (without a carpenter and without an original pile of wood), that boat would come into being without even the potentiality for its existence. Given the impossibility of this feat, it follows that a boat cannot come from nothing. I’m pleased that Con isn’t a merriological nihilist. He admits that boats, as such, exist. Nevertheless, he points out that “the boat was made from pre-existing elements.” Well, boats in general are. But the boat in our thought experiment is not. It pops into being out of nothing. I’m not sure what the objection is. Given that boats exist, the boat thought-experiment cannot be called nonsensical, which was Con’s original objection. Aside from this, I can’t see any further objections to (1.1). Nevertheless, Con doubts the truth of (1.2), and he gives the example of a block of ice spontaneously turning into an ice sculpture. The sculpture is uncaused, and yet it doesn’t come into being out of nothing. In the previous round, I tried to anticipate this objection by explaining what I mean by cause. Remember, by “cause” I mean either an efficient cause (the producer) or a material cause (the original material). So premise (2’) may be more formally stated as: 1.2’. If something came into being without either an efficient cause or a material cause, it would come from nothing. As such, Con’s example of an uncaused sculpture isn’t a counterexample to (1.2’) because the sculpture does in fact have a material cause: the original block of ice. This is true even if it lacks an efficient cause. Premise (1), then, is really saying: 1’. Everything that begins to exist has either a material cause or an efficient cause. I hope this clarifies why something’s coming into being without a cause entails that it comes from nothing. Having established this, the force of the metaphysical support for premise (1) may be seen. Inductive Argument Here, I argued that from our observations of things beginning to exist with causes, we can infer inductively that everything (whether observed or not) that begins to exist has a cause. Con’s current objection, as I understand him, is that everything we observe to begin to exist has a material cause (i.e., is made from preexisting materials), but the universe can’t have a material cause. Therefore, the argument goes, we can’t infer anything about its beginning. In short, the beginning of the universe was a creation event. But we’ve never observed a creation event. Therefore, we can’t know whether such a creation event was caused. When inferring through induction, we take an observed subset of the whole set, and infer properties about the unobserved subset. You can’t defeat this inference by merely pointing out a difference between the observed subset and the unobserved subset. You’ve got to give some reason as to why that difference is relevant. In the case at hand, even if the universe doesn’t have a material cause (while everything observed does), Con must show why this observation is relevant to something’s being uncaused. In its absence, the inductive inference goes though. Now, this inference doesn’t give us certainty, but it does give us probability. And that’s all were after.So at the end of the day, we still have a strong inductive argument for (1). 2. The universe began to exist. Philosophical Support - Actual Infinity Con admits he can’t refute the argument from the actual infinite. He admits it shows time and space began to exist, but he still thinks it doesn’t prove that matter and energy began to exist. He gives the laws of thermodynamics as support for this claim. I’ll respond to that argument below. Nevertheless, he didn’t respond to my argument as to why matter and energy must’ve begun to exist (i.e., “matter is necessarily in constant flux…”). So I simply extend arguments. Accordingly, the philosophical argument stands. Scientific Support - Big Bang Cosmology Here I drew upon modern Big Bang cosmology to support the proposition that the universe began to exist. Con objected that the singularity caused space and time, and the singularity itself is timeless. Therefore, the universe never really began to exist. But I contended this was based on a misunderstanding: the singularity is part of the temporal history of the universe. It didn’t exist before time began; it just is the very first instant of time. It begins to exist because it doesn’t exist timelessly and doesn’t extend infinitely into the past. There is no other option. This no more mysterious than understanding how the first instant of my life began to exist. Barrow and Tipler, two famous cosmologists, point out that “[a]t this singularity, space and time came into existence; literally nothing existed before the singularity, so, if the Universe originated at such a singularity, we would truly have a creation ex nihilo.” [1] Further, Davis writes, “the big bang represents the creation event; the creation of..all the matter and energy” [2], directly contradicting Con’s scenario. On Con's misinterpreted scenario, you don’t have creation ex nihilio (out of nothing), as you do in the Standard Model. As such, his understanding is incorrect. Concerning thermodynamics, let me simply rephrase my response to avoid talking past one another. The laws of thermodynamics are physical laws; they are not metaphysical laws (like the law that 2+2=4). They only apply within the universe. But the origin of the universe is a metaphysical phenomena (it doesn't happen within the universe, afterall); you can’t use laws that only apply within the universe to describe what must be the case outside the universe (I use “outside” metaphorically). Alternatively, think of it like this: the laws of nature come into being when the universe comes into being, and so they don't yet apply when the universe comes into existence. I take this to circumvent Con’s current objections.Big Bang cosmology, then, supports premise (2). 3. The universe has a cause. 4. If the universe has a cause, then there exists a transcendent, personal Creator. I argued the cause must be transcendent, that is to say, beyond space and time. I then argued that such a cause must be personal. The logic of the argument here is inference to the best explanation. One examines the pool of live options for explaining the beginning of the universe, and then shows why an unembodied Mind is the best explanation. And that’s what we’re arguing; not that a Mind is the only explanation, but that it is the best explanation. Originally, I only presented abstract objects as an alternative explanation. Why? Because it’s the only viable alternative. All three scenarios proposed by Con were, as I demonstrated, logically incoherent or clearly defective. The problem with his three parodies of my argument is this: they all leave out clear alternatives. Fully stated, this subargument looks like this: 4.1. The cause of the universe is either A, B, C, D, or E. 4.2. It can’t be A, B, C, or D. 4.3 Therefore, the cause of the universe is E. A, B, and C are Con’s three scenarios. I gave specific reasons why they couldn’t be the cause of the universe. Con never gave a response to those arguments. D is the hypothesis of abstract objects. We saw why abstract objects won’t work. Therefore, the only thing we’re left with is the hypothesis of an unembodied Mind, or E. Unless you can show that (1) the “unembodied Mind” hypothesis is worse than the alternatives, or (2) suggest another alternative, the inference of (4.3) is unavoidable. This subargument presents all the known alternatives; Con’s parodies do not, and that's why they're defective. Con does, in fact, suggest some objections to the hypothesis of Mind. First, Con writes, “The only thing an unembodied mind can do is think.” But this is simply an assertion that rests on air. I see no reason to think it’s true, and Con presents no such reason. As such, it’s not an objection. Second, Con charges that I “must...present a logically irrefutable line of reasoning as to why God is the only logical answer.” This misunderstands the argument. I’m giving an inductive argument, not a deductive argument. Accordingly, the demand for logically irrefutable lines of reasoning is inappropriate. As I said above, we’re looking for probability, not certainty. Third, Con demands that I give a model to describe “the unembodied Mind” hypothesis. Two responses. (1) I don’t have to propose a model that describes God’s existence because I’m not proposing God as a scientific hypothesis; He is, rather, a metaphysical hypothesis. (2) There is no interveaning mechanism between God and the universe through which God creates the universe. It is, rather, a simple or basic action on God's part. As such, asking how is innappropriate. Fourth, what caused God? This is based on a misunderstanding. The proponent of the kalam cosmological argument isn’t saying that whatever exists has a cause, but that whatever begins to exist has a cause. The being arrived at in the argument’s conclusion must be timeless, and therefore without a beginning. As such, it doesn’t need a cause. This isn’t special pleading with regard to God. The atheist has traditionally said that the universe is eternal, and therefore uncaused. But the universe has been shown to have a beginning. It therefore requires a cause. Asking this question is like scratching your head wondering, “What caused the eternal universe?” Well, nothing![1] The Anthropic Cosmological Principle 442.[2] See previous round.