Moral Naturalism is more compelling than Moral Relativism

When I read in the Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP) that moral naturalism is "usually reserved for naturalistic forms of moral realism," I assumed that's the way my opponent was using the phrase. If so it would mean he is a naturalist who thinks morals are part of the furniture of the physical universe. I am familiar with natural law theory. It was not only advocated by Aristotle, but also Thomas Aquinas, and it has a strong tradition in the Catholic church. It is defended by modern theistic philosophers such as J. Budziszewski.[1] In their case, it is certainly not a naturalistic theory of ethics. When I read my opponent's post, I questioned whether moral naturalism and natural law were really the same thing. There are separate entries for each in the SEP.[2] Neither article made reference to the other moral theory. I did, however, find one internet source by an anonymous author who said that "Both New Natural Law and Science of Morality ('SOM') are forms of (in practice) moral naturalism.[3] If so, then I have nothing to complain about except that I'm not really clear on what my opponent's position is. He says that his point of view is not inconsistent with supernaturalism, but he doesn't say whether supernaturalism is part of his point of view or what roll supernaturalism plays in it if any. That would make a huge difference in how I response, which I will explain presently.My opponent attempts to do away with the fact/value distinction by grounding natural law in teleology, i.e. purpose or design. For example, knives are for cutting, minds are for reasoning, and eyes are for seeing. That is their purpose. But as I argued in the previous round, there can be no purpose unless somebody means for things to be a particular way. The reason knives are for cutting is because that was the intention of knife makers. If we are the accidental by-product of purely natural causes, and nobody meant for us to be here, then we don't have any purpose in any objective sense. Eyes may be useful to us insofar as they allow us to pursue our own ends, but unless somebody meant for us to have them so that we could see, they don't have any objective purpose. So it makes all the difference in the world whether my opponent grounds his moral theory in a being such as God or not. If God created eyes for the purpose of seeing, then that is their proper function, and it is good when they are successful at accomplishing that end. But if there is no God, then no moral quality can be attached to an eye's ability to see. If there is no God, then my opponent's theory commits the is/ought fallacy and is ungrounded.So far, my opponoent hasn't defended his point of view. He has only explained it. To defend it, he's got to explain to us why we should think there is any purpose or teology in the universe. He's got to explain to us why we should think there's any objective morality at all. And since it seems to me he can only do that by appealing to a supernatural being, he's got to explain to us why we should think a supernatural being exists. In my opening, I said that although I didn't subscribe to moral naturalism or moral relativism, I could still take this debate without having to play devil's advocate. My original intention was to show that assuming naturalism, moral relativism is the better theory. But if my opponent appeals to supernaturalism to defend his argument, then I will have to play devil's advocate in order to refute his arguments. After all, I do believe in God.My opponent faults moral relativism for not being moral objectivism. He says that moral relativism cannot tell us what is actually true about morality. Well, of course not! That's because in moral relativism, there are no objective moral truths. You can't refute moral relativism just by telling us what it is.He says that moral relativism is problematic because moral laws do exist, but he doesn't defend that claim. He just asserts it.In some of the things my opponent said, it's not clear whether he's got some misunderstanding about moral relativism or if he's just not being careful with how he words his sentences. For example, he says, "By dogmatically asserting that there is no truth, people have become close-minded to the possibility of knowing truth, if in fact it does exist." But moral relativism is not the view that there is no true at all. He's confusing moral relativism with epistemological relativism. Moral relativism is perfectly consistent with there being objective truths that can be known. There just aren't any objective truths about morality.He also confuses moral relativism with emotivism. Although closely related, they are not exactly the same thing. For a moral relativist, moral statements like, "Rape is wrong," don't necessarily reduce to, "I don't like rape" or "Rape makes me feel bad." Rather, they mean "I value happiness, and rape diminishes happiness," or "I disapprove of rape." Although emotions are usually associated with what people value, they are not the same thing. People can value things and not get emotional about it, and people's emotions can be inconsistent with what they value. So moral relativism is not the same thing as emotivism.He also says that moral relativism is an attempt to resolve moral differences. It's not clear what argument he's trying to make here. If he's saying that moral relativists appeal to differences in morality in order to prove moral relativism, then so what? What follows from that? if he means to critique this argument, then he's committing the straw man fallacy since I haven't made that argument in this debate. But if he means to say that a desire to explain moral differences is what motivates people to be moral relativists, then he's committing the genetic fallacy. What causes or motivates people to adopt a point of view doesn't tell us anything about whether that point of view is true or false.He makes the odd claim that Occam's razor destroys, not only moral relativism, but objectivism as well. That's an odd claim since moral objectivism is part of his theory! He also says, "The axiom problem is solved and doesn't necessitate an infinite regress." i have no idea what he is talking about. What infinite regress does he think he has avoided? How does Occam's razor shave away moral relativism or objectivism? And if it does, then how has he salvaged his own theory, which is a form of moral objectivism?In my opening, I claimed that moral relativism is a better theory than moral naturalism because moral naturalism commits the is/ought fallacy, and it leaves morality ungrounded. My opponent has attempted to solve both problems by grounding morality in natural teleology. But he has left natural teleology ungrounded, which means his theory still suffers from the two criticisms I made of it. Moral relativism doesn't suffer from either malady. And if naturalism is true, moral relativism must also be true since morality must be grounded in persons, and we are the only persons around.[1] J. Budziszewski, Written on the Heart: The Case for Natural Law http://www.amazon.com...[2] "Moral Naturalism" http://plato.stanford.edu..."Natural Law Theories" http://plato.stanford.edu...[3] "Moral Naturalism and the Naturalistic Fallacy" http://sophistintraining.wordpress.com...