Objective Morality Necessitates a Higher Being

This has been a short debate, but I have gotten to where I like short debates. They're not as tiring, and they get more votes.When Pro initiated this debate, he said, "Respond with an introductory argument in your first response, respond to specific points in mine with your second. I will do the same." So them's are the rules. I'm guessing he meant that I'm not supposed to respond to his response, but only to his opening. I'm just pointing that out so none of the voters will say, "Hey, philochristos ignored everything Pro said in the second round, dropping all his arguments!"Pro made two arguments for why objective morality necessitates a higher being.I. Because humans cannot conceive of an objective moralityPro argues that because humans cannot reach any agreement on morality that they therefore cannot conceive of an objective morality. And since they can't conceive of an objective morality, it follows that objective morality must be grounded in a higher being.I don't think it follows that because humans can't agree on every moral issue that they therefore can't conceive of an objective morality. After all, "objective morality" does not mean "universally agreed upon morality." Most humans, in fact, do conceive of morality as being objective. A moral claim does not have to be true to be objective. A person can hold some moral point of view to be objective and yet be wrong about it.Supposing universal agreement is necessary for objective morals, Pro does not solve the problem by appealing to a higher being. Since that being differs with everybody else on morality, it would still follow that there are no objective morals. The same argument pro uses for why morality cannot be grounded in humans applies to the higher being as well since it would exist right along with everybody else.II. Because an individual's sense of morality does not extend to othersPro begins with the premise that morality cannot be conceived without a mind, which I agree with. Then he goes on to argue that unless one person's concept of morality is shared by everybody else, it can't be objective.First of all, that is a misunderstanding of what it means for morality to be objective. If morality is objective, it doesn't depend on any individuals beliefs about it. So universal agreement would not make morality objective, and disagreement doesn't make it subjective.Second, postulating a higher being doesn't solve the problem. If universal agreement is necessary for one mind's concept of morality to extend to everybody else, and if the higher being's concept of morality does not extend to everybody else, then by Pro's reasoning, the higher being's concept of morality is not objective. The only way it could be objective, by Pro's reasoning, is if everybody else shared the higher being's concept of morality.ConclusionI think Pro's biggest problem is in not understanding the subjective/objective distinction, which I clearly explained in the first round. The very meaning of a subjective truth is that it depends on subjects. The very meaning of objective truth is that it does not depend on subjects. Yet Pro thinks that whether a moral claim is objectively true or not depends on whether everybody agrees with it or not.If everybody agreed on some point of morality, that would not make it objective. At best, you could arrive at cultural relativism, in which the entire culture agrees on morality. But it wouldn't be objectively true.And if some moral claim was objectively true, it wouldn't become less so just because not everybody agreed with it.After all, the earth was round even when people thought it was flat. And when people disagreed about the shape of the earth, it was not for that reason shapeless. Human belief, whether universally agreed upon or not, has no affect whatsoever on the shape of the earth because whatever the shape of the earth is, it is objectively so.Thank you for coming to tonight's debate. And thanks to Pro for initiating the debate.