God Exists

Thanks to Con.Non-Cognitivism My opponent’s response here is inadequate, as he does not seem to understand either of my points. Con’s lexical game concerning the term “God” is simply untenable. Con reasserts there must be an existence prior to an essence, but gives no example of a terminal existence which cannot be described in terms of its own essence. In other words, Con seems to believe that being “human” is a cessative point in our existence, and it is this “primary attribute” which must exist before his array of properties, “secondary attributes,” can exist. But he does not explain how being “human” is a primary attribute. As I described in round 2, “humanity” is not a terminal point in existence, as it can be described further in terms of its essence – that is, rational animality. And then both rationality and animality can be described in terms of their respective essences, and so forth. Unless my opponent can give an example of an existence, i.e. a “primary attribute,” that cannot be expressed in terms of its essence, i.e. “secondary attributes,” the argument fails in its own criteria. Subsequently, Con misses the argument from divine simplicity – he simply reasserts his round 2 argument and ignores my entire case. As I demonstrated in my initial argument, there must be a purely actual First Mover – consequently, the term does in fact refer to something which exists. Con questions what the term “purely actual” means, and for this, I’ll redirect him to my intial argument. To quickly summarize, a hierarchical series of motion mandates a mover with no potentials – pure act. Since actuality is existence, and since God’s essence is actuality, God’s essence is existence. Thus, God needs no existence prior to His essence. Remember, dear opponent, this structure of attributes assumes much that classical theism does not accept – and even if I were a theistic personalist, I’d still find this argument poor for the reasons outlined in my first point! So it seems Con misunderstood each of my rebuttals, and resultingly ignored them. First Way First, I’ll mention that Con has thankfully dropped his arguments from the supposedly uncaused nature of quantum events. The argument is cosmological, but does not argue from a linear series. Aquinas does not argue there is a first cause in the temporal sense, but rather in a simultaneous sense – the quote I employed does not assert that the “first cause is God,” but rather that “a first cause of change” is what theists understand to be God. I explicitly outlined this argument from hierarchical motion in my initial case. Alas, Con enters the substance of my argument and objects with an argument commonly advanced to Thomists – that Newton’s first law of inertia effectively refutes Aquinas and Aristotle. But indeed this conflict is nonexistent. The principle of inertia itself presupposes Aristotle’s principle of motion: for the compulsion of an entity to change translation in some manner first mandates there be something actual that realizes that potentiality. Spatial linear translation is itself an inherent potentiality; as such, to change directions, there must be something actual which realizes this potentiality. And this is exactly what Newton’s law prescribes. Note that Newton’s law really clashes with Aristotle’s physics, which required there exist a continuously operative force to actualize translation at any given moment – the impetus theory, obsolete, but not identifical in any way to the principle of motion. While Newton’s first law seems to intuitively pose a threat to Aristotle’s metaphysics, as it does in fact concern the nature of actuality and potentiality, my opponent’s next two arguments concerning the relativistic nature of spatial translation have nothing to do with motion in the Aristotelian sense. While Newton’s ideas anent the continuous nature of spatial translation seemingly conflict with the metaphysical principle of motion, the relativistic nature of spatial translation is irrelevent, as a potential is still actualized by an actual, and as such is no threat to Aristotle. Con claims I’ve erected a strawman in my response to his critique of atemporality and immateriality. He declares that there is no reason to assume these given the information provided. However, I’ve shown twice that the First Mover must be atemporal and immaterial necessarily – remember, temporality is the capacity to shift from t = 0 to t = 1, which represents the actualization of the potential Pure Act has not. Con next questions the inherent potentiality of material. It should be intuitively grasped by the reader that as a finite configuration in space, material particles have the intrinsic potentiality to translate to another point in space (among other potentials I’ve mentioned). Next, Con claims that the mind of God changed with respect to Creation, but it’s difficult to see where this change lies; the intent to Create can exist atemporally; as such, there is no contradiction here. Con turns to omnipotence. He simply confuses potentiality, an unactualized state of affairs, with passive potentiality, one of the two types of power in the Thomistic tradition. Passive potentiality is the power to be acted on; that is, the ability for an inherent potential to be actualized by another. God has no such power in this sense, as he has no potentials and thus no ability to be acted upon. Active power is the ability to actualize a potential. As Pure Act, God has all active power; thus, God has all ability to actualize a potential, as any less would represent a potential for more. It cannot be said that more represents a potential for less, as less is a privation in actuality rather than an actuality. Subsequently, Con presents the omnipotence paradox – supposedly, God’s potence or impotence to create an unliftable stone paradoxically refutes the idea of omnipotence. However, there is no such paradox, for active potentiality is the ability to actualize a state of affairs which exists as a potential within existence. As a metaphysical impossibility, lifting an unliftable stone is incompatible with existence and as such exists not as a potential. Hence, the paradox only misrepresents the classical theistic conception of omnipotence, which is perfectly justified given God’s essence. As mentioned earlier, God exists atemporally, and as such has unchanging knowledge of the state of affairs at all times. So to actualize a state of affairs that will not be actualized is just as nonsensical as lifting that which cannot be lifted. Each of these paradoxes entail a contradiction – that which is incompatible with existence – and hence has no outcome that negates God’s omnipotence. My opponent claims that each of these paradoxes entail potentials within God to possess greater power: as we’ve seen, however, there is no power which could actualize a self-contradictory potential, since such potentials do not exist. Again Con misinterprets the idea of goodness within hylomorphic dualism, declaring that his vaguely Platonic theory of forms is superior to the Aristotelian theory. The idea is not that goodness comes from the extent to which a specific instantiation of a cup resembles an ultimate cup, but rather that goodness comes the extent to which a cup actualizes its form of cup-ness. Con’s claim the hylomorphic theory of goodness is based in the cup itself merely confuses a specific instantiation of a form with the form itself. Finally, I’d like to add that my argument was never a cosmological argument from a linear series, as I explicitly rejected this in my round 1 case.