Three Philosophical Topics - 1B

I'd also like to remind him to not worry too much about the forfeit - I'm not insulted or anything, though this may have negative effects for his arguments. Whatever it may be, it ultimately is in the hands of the voter. But since this is the last round, and my opponent has presented a common but interesting argument, I will do my best to attack it in my last argument. ==================== A precursor ==================== My opponent hasn't responded to my arguments about physicalism, so I will assume that he has accepted them while pressing this phenomena as evidence otherwise - I'm fine with that. Furthermore, I think a general definition of consciousness should be reached, so I propose that we loosely define it as "the quality or state of being aware especially of something within oneself[1]. " Before I begin, one major problem with my opponent's three points (which really, can be boiled down to the same claim) is that he provides NO REASONING FOR IT. He merely expatiates the issue behind consciousness, and what would possibly motivate one to consider dualism (not idealism, since my opponent implicitly admits that physical bodies exist). However, he gives no philosophic or scientific reasoning to motivate us to accept dualism - as such, I can't even begin to refute his arguments since he has yet to present them. His basic counterexample to physicalism is the phenomena commonly known as consciousness. I'm not surprised, because this is a common avenue used in philosophy. That said, I will show that there is no reason to believe consciousness is physically irreducible - instead, it can shown to be a product of our mechanical brains. ==================== My opponent's three points arguing for the non-physical nature of consciousness ==================== 1. Besides the fact you give no account about consciousness that would vindicate dualism (and invalidate physicalism), I will give the physicalist explanation of consciousness. I will be arguing in favor for functionalism, the "doctrine that what makes something a mental state of a particular type does not depend on its internal constitution, but rather on the way it functions, or the role it plays, in the system of which it is a part[2]. " Thus, the explanation of what consciousness is refers simply to causal relations to mental states, sensory stimulations, etc. 2. My opponent brings up the important point about qualia, which are subjective qualities of consciousness (feelings of what something is like). This is a cardinal issue in philosophy of mind, and I will answer his inquiries in the following section. 3. This point has nothing substantially different in it. You cite an excerpt from the article, but if you read it all it states is that physicalism is false. .. again, no reason why. If you had taken the REASONS WHY THIS IS SO from the article then this would be relevant, but you haven't. Simply put, you've given me a rehashed version of what you already stated, so there's no point for me to respond to this. ==================== Defense of functionalism from some common objections ==================== There are several very common objections that are raised against functionalism, of one which my opponent has mentioned. Here I will be addressing two popular ones - the thought experiment Mary's room by Frank Jackson and David Chalmer's Zombie argument. Mary's room[3] proposes that qualia is distinct from physical knowledge. If we are to agree that in the situation Mary learns something new about colors once experiencing them, then it would seem physicalism and definitely functionalism fails (refer to the link for what Mary's room if needed). Intuitively, this would seem to be the case but in the face of it all there really is no problem. Simply put, if Mary knew EVERYTHING there is to know about color, then she would know why and how human neurology is affected by rays of light. It's just the fact that such an incredible knowledge database is unheard of, which would seemingly lend credence for Mary's room. Chalmer's zombie argument[4] proposes that if philosophical zombies are conceivable (again, refer to the link for explanation if needed), then physicalism and definitely functionalism is false. Again, this is intuitively appealing but as Dennett would say - these are merely intuition pumps. I would argue a p-zombie is INCONCEIVABLE because it over complicates the issue. You can't have an entity perform everything identical to a conscious being and yet have no consciousness, because they go hand in hand. It would be absurd to say you can somehow remove consciousness but keep everything intact. It's akin to saying I could remove your health but keep your bodily conditions the same - this is absurd, and thus the example fails via simple analogies. ==================== Problems with dualism ==================== In at least one occasion my opponent has stated that there is a relationship between the mind and matter, but it somehow works only one way. He states that "if matter only produced consciousness, without being dependent on it in any way, then physicalism would be more valid, but that is not the case. " Even if he didn't explicitly or implicitly state this, nevertheless it is a consequence of dualism. This brings up the age old problem of philosophy of mind: the mind-body problem. Here is an excerpt explaning it: "If the mind is nonphysical, it has no position in physical space. How, then, can a mental cause give rise to a behavioral effect that has a position in space? To put it another way, how can the nonphysical give rise to the physical without violating the laws of the conservation of mass, of energy and of momentum[5]? " My opponent needs to demonstrate this bizarre relationship. How can the mind influence the body but have no influence upon itself? How can there be such a disconnect? There has never been a case of a nonphysical causation demonstrated in science, nor shown to be plausible in philosophy. ==================== Conclusion ==================== My opponent's only argument physicalism is to give a dualistic account of consciousness. However, as he can see not only is it prima facie absurd, but upon further inspection there are several hurdles it has never defeated. Since my opponent's only purported instance of dis-confirmation has been defeated, physicalism stands due to the heavy scientific and philosophic support. ---References--- 1. . http://www.merriam-webster.com... 2. . http://plato.stanford.edu... 3. . http://plato.stanford.edu... 4. . http://plato.stanford.edu... 5. . http://philosophy.ucsd.edu...