Epistemic Justification is possible

I must say I have a new found appreciation for this topic, thanks to Pro! It has been a very daunting task. Unfortunately, due to unforeseen circumstances, I was unable to fully commit to a proper refutation of Pro’s arguments and have entered youtube videos to further defend my position. I ask that Voters take this into consideration before voting. That being said, here goes!Pro claims that it ~A or ~(~A) (tautologous and non-contradictory by above arguments) which is equivalent to saying ~A is possible (either true or false) which is equivalent to saying A is possible (either true or false) and this is enough to uphold the resolution. However, if we cannot know if something is impossible, it does not follow that, therefore, it is possible and vice versa. This requires an assumption that has no justification. For Pro to do this he would be asserting the truth of A before it has been proven possible. The apropriate position would be to withhold assent to either proposition.Pro states “It could very well be the case that there exist things which are simply true; brute facts which have no “reason”. That is,there can be no meaningful way of understanding how or why these facts are truebut this does not entail that we do not know them nor do they have to be arbitrary”. Pro seems to be assuming truth before justification. Without justification one cannot know if something is actually true and therefore, if one cannot understand how and if something is true, then there is no way to know what is a fact to begin with.The Liar & The Liar’s Revenge ParadoxPro argues that “statements can be meaningless because we can arbitrarily dismiss those who assert it. Therefore any assertion made need not be a proposition but may also be a statement which is meaningless.” However, any arbitrary justification to dismiss P3 premise will be assuming Foundationalism before proven to be possible. Pro asserts that I haven’t shown that it is a proposition since the onus is on the one asserting it. However, I have done this from P3a and P3b in my previous round. For clarification, a statement is the words that are used to express a proposition, whereas, a proposition is the meaning of a statement. Pro suggests it is a meaningless statement but clearly we can find meaning in it. Declaring the liar’s revenge sentence as semantically defective cannot be expressed in the very language itself, but only in a comprehensive meta-language. If these statements were expressable in the object language we would land up in another revenge paradox.Now the statement “this statement is false or meaningless” is still asserting that the statement is meaningless and hence truth bearing, and therefore, not void of meaning since we can accurately understand what is being stated. Strictly speaking, this is not a valid objection to the revenge argument. It is instructive to see why this sort of approach fails. The most obvious problem with this objection is that there is no independent reason to think that paradoxical sentences are meaningless or ungrammatical. In fact, if one were to adopt such an account, one would have to reject our most popular theories of meaningfulness and theories of grammar. Another reason to reject this objection is that paradoxicality is not determined by meaning and grammar. That is, one can specify two sentence tokens of the same type that have the same sentential meanings, the same subsentential meanings for their subsentential parts, and the same referents for their singular terms, but one is paradoxical and the other is not. Paradoxicality can depend on virtually any fact one can imagine, while meaningfulness and grammaticality do not. Thus, if one accepts that paradoxical sentences are meaningless or ungrammatical, then one has to accept that whether a sentence is meaningful or grammatical can depend on virtually any fact that one can imagine, which is radically implausible. There are many other defences for possible refutations of it. [1] Thus, I have defended my premise. AmbiguityPro also objects saying that “this statement” is ambiguous. Just because half of a disjunction may be meaningless, does not imply that the other half of it is not truth bearing [2] This objection incorporates the Use/Mention Distinction, Rule of Replacement and Rule of Truth (which are all assumptions without justification).DefintionsUse – When a term (article of language) is being used, then it refers to its reference. Eg. Earth is a planet. In this statement Venus is used since it is referring to the reference of the term (the planet), not the sense (the word Earth). Mention – When a term (article of language) is mentioned then it refers to its sense. Earth has five letters. In this statement Earth is mentioned since it is referring to the sense of the term not the reference. Pure Term - a term that does not refer to anythingIf pure terms are lumped together neither will bear truth. However, Pro may claim that it is not the terms themselves that bear truth such as “statement” but rather THE statement. This can easily be rectified by changing the definitions to “statements that refer to pure terms fail to bear truth”. Therefore, statements with pure terms fail to bear truth. In other words, it cannot be known to be true or false or rather, possible or impossible. Another problem that arises from this is, if statements that do not bear truth are neither true or false, then what are they? [3] Also, avoidance of revenge paradoxes leads to a problem called the “unable to say” problem. [4]Munchhuassen’s Trilemma (MT) Pro seems to be regurgitating what was previously asserted. He alludes that if justification can be true, it can be possible. However, Pro is equivocating between truth and justification, yet again. It may be the case that justification is possible or not, but we are unable to know that, hence, the resolution “Epistemic” justification is possible. Now since Pro has already conceded ~C or ~I, these can simply be ignored. Also, Pro claims that we can say that justification is both impossible and possible, but this is evidently contradictory and since, the law of contradiction is assumed for the resolution to be upheld, Con cannot argue that is both possible and impossible. Now Pro challenges these the Principle of Sufficient Reason. Reason is defined as “a consideration which justifies or explains” https://en.wikipedia.org...(argument). Therefore Pro will be indirectly conceding foundationalism which assumes this very principle. Pro implicitly implores this principle for all his arguments, as even logic imports it and poses a problem against his case. NB. This is all that is needed to show that Pro has not upheld the resolution. Truth, Doubt, and Certainty Pro seems to be making an appeal to incredulity and ignore my argument. It does not follow that n order to doubt one presupposes certainty. Pro seems to being an ad hominem against scepticism. The pyrrhonian skeptic lacks beliefs. Therefore, they do not believe that in order to doubt one must understand doubt, that doubt challenges certainty, that where there is doubt there is no certainty. Belief is a propositional attitude. However, belief is not the only propositional attitude that is available. One can desire, hope, wonder and even suspect that a proposition is true or doubt that it is. A skeptic can have a proclivity [5] For example, if a car is approaching a skeptic they may lack the belief that they or the car exists, but have a proclivity to act as if they do. [6] All furthers arguments against skepticism can be combated here. [7] Further argument against Foundationalism1. For all axioms either there is a reason (PSR) for choosing those axioms over others or there is not. (LEM)2. If there is no reason to choose one set of axioms over another, then the system is irrational (there is no reason to prefer one conclusion over another). (Definition of irrationality).3. If there is a reason for choosing the axioms over others, then those reasons are the support for those axioms, and all beliefs are simply justified by other beliefs and therefore we have accepted coherentism. (Definition of coherentism)4. Therefore foundationalism is either irrational or simply coherentism in disguise.Closing RemarksI thank Tarkovsky for a great debate! Please remember to waive Round 4 in which you must ONLY enter Concede as per debate rules or likewise. The resolution has not been upheld. Vote Con!:)Sources[1] http://kevinscharp.com... pg 14-16[2] [3] @6:53. [4] https://books.google.tt... PG 12-13. [5] https://www.google.tt...[6] @ 6:22.[7]