Dualism is true.

I am very pleased to see that he is well aware of the philosophical material behind it, and I can't wait for how this discussion will unfold. Let's begin. Before I dive into the topic, I want to make something clear: my opponent has the burden of proving substance is dualism is true, via this argument. I will propose that my burden is to simply disprove his argument and show there are no arguments in favor of dualism, thus negating the idea that it is true. Of course, I could go the extra mile and provide arguments against dualism as well but this isn't necessary. Furthermore, I find that given such a debate topic as this, to reach out into multiple angles concerning this subject will be biting off more than we can chew - it is often the case during philosophical debates on this website that space constraints prevent a debate from being much better than it could have been. In fact, following along with this fact in mind my criticism of the modal argument for dualism will only be ONE or TWO arguments - for I want to develop them as much as I can without sacrificing detail. Bringing other forms of contention will bog this debate down. Anyway, as the name suggests, the modal argument for dualism is based on the relation between conceivability and possibility. Indeed, it is this focal point where most contentions will occur as well, given that the other premises of the argument (which is logically valid) are relatively uncontroversial - as my opponent points out. So yes, I will agree that Leibniz's Law is sound for the sake of this debate since I want to focus my criticisms at the relation between conceivability and possibility. My case will be two-fold: I will challenge the possibility of disembodied perception and further argue that even if such a thing was logically possible, the rest of the argument would not follow. My quotations will be taken from Nicholas Everitt's paper on Substance Dualism[1] - I browse infidels frequently (as it is one of my favorite websites) and I've read several of his papers before. This paper caught my attention awhile ago, and now it's in use. ==================== Rejecting the idea that it is logically possible for me to continue to exist without my body or any part of it such as my brain ==================== The idea that it is possible one's mind might exist without one's body or any part of it is a consequence of the transition from imagining it to conceiving it. While my opponent finds the first premise to be relatively uncontroversial, Everitt makes a convincing case that it is quite the opposite -- the idea of disembodied perception (sensing other objects in the environment when you are separated from a physical body) is rejected given it's problems. The problem arises in how we can perceive things without a body - not in the physical mechanics of how it is to be done (which is another issue altogether), but how we can even come to imagine such a process. Take the following: "The idea that I am seeing my environment presupposes that I have a location from which I do my seeing. If I am in the kitchen, for example, the sink but not the television in the living room would be within my visual range, whereas if I am in the living room, the television but not the sink would be within my visual range. So if I am in the kitchen, and I have visual experiences as of seeing the sink, then maybe I really am seeing the sink. But if I am in the kitchen, and I have visual experiences as of seeing the television, then I am not really seeing the television: I am hallucinating it, or misperceiving as the television some other object in the kitchen. Similarly, if I am in the living room and I have visual experiences as of seeing the television, then maybe I am really seeing the television. But if I then have visual experiences as of seeing the kitchen sink, then I am hallucinating or misperceiving. " Everitt argues that at the least, the observer can resort to physical relationships. If he is sensing an object that shouldn't be in reach of his senses due to his current physical location or constitution, then he would have good reason to suspect he is hallucinating as opposed to real seeing. However, without a physical body how can the disembodied perceive tell the difference? Indeed, the bigger problem is how can we IMAGINE what this would be like? To make a distinction between real seeing and hallucinations, "I must have a determinate position in space. " This relates to the modal argument for dualism in that "if the supposedly disembodied perceiver's experiences might all be hallucinations, there is no reason to think that the perceiver is located outside her erstwhile body. " We have no reason to entertain the first premise of this argument. ===================== Rejecting the argument even if premise 1 was true ===================== This is the basic formulation of the modal argument for dualism: P1. It is logically possible for me to continue to exist without my body or any part of it such as my brain P2. So I must (now, here) already have some nonbodily component, whose persistence is the persistence of me. . : I must have a nonbodily mind, a mental substance. According to Swineburne (whose argument format I am relying on, and of whom my opponent is, whether he knows it or not, supporting) logical possibility means no logical contradictions, obviously. Now, take the following counter example with a parallel format: P1. It is logically possible for my chess set to survive even in a world in which there is no plastic. P2. 'My chess set survives although there is no plastic in the world' is not self-contradictory. . : My chess set now has some nonplastic part which continues to exist when all the plastic in the world is destroyed, and whose continued existence is the continued existence of my chess set. There is an obvious absurdity here, and Everitt sums it up in the following passage: "If you know that I am in fact a human body, you can deduce that I will be destroyed in a world in which all human bodies are destroyed. And similarly, if you know that I am a nonbodily 'soul,' you can deduce that I can survive in a world in which all the human bodies have been destroyed. But that means that you have to know what I am (what I am made of) before you can decide whether I can exist in a world in which all human bodies have been destroyed. " He is arguing that the movement from premise 2 DOES NOT LEAD to the conclusion, for the very reason listed. I will be prepared to defend this argument (as I can suspect some counterarguments already), but my character limits prevent me from doing so right now. ===================== Conclusion ===================== I have mounted two arguments - the first is meant to refute the argument by arguing it is inconceivable to imagine such a thing, but even if this were to fail I can fall back to the second argument that demonstrates the modal argument for dualism is either invalid or question-begging. Depending on how my opponent responds, I will decide to focus on certain arguments, or parts thereof, in comparison to the rest. ---References--- 1. . http://www.infidels.org...