Objectivism is a valid ethical system.

Firstly, I am not a nihilist. I am not attempting to argue that nothing is true and everything is permitted, nor is that the implication of my critique. While rejecting that there is a standard given to us to enable us to evaluate existence, I fully realise that “the only way to evaluate that existence is via a standard”. As I explained in my previous round, that standard can only be that contained within our unique personality – it is our personal system of values. My opponent’s argument is that we should evaluate existence according to the axiom ‘Life is good’, and, referring again to my previous round, I attempted to show simply that evaluation assumes life but that life cannot be viewed as an ‘end in itself’ or as a standard for evaluation.My opponent’s response is threefold. He argues that death is not valuable, and hence life is valuable, that you cannot logically be pursuing what you value by acting “in spite of life”, and that life is the only possible standard for evaluation, which I can only assume is the assertion that I have not adequately proven what I attempted to in my first round. The idea that “death cannot logically said to be a value” is something I agree with, but my conclusion appears to widely diverge from my opponent’s. Death cannot be said to be good or bad, in itself, because you cannot evaluate unconsciousness – thus I say it cannot be valued, not that it is ‘unvaluable’. You may logically assert that ‘to die now would be bad, because I am currently very happy’, but the latter part of that statement constitutes a sufficient qualification for the assertion that ‘death is bad’ as it contains content (being happy is an actual experience, it is experiential content). Death is bad in relation to the lack of a certain valued content. This returns to the point I was trying to make in my first round – without content there is nothing to value, and ‘life in itself’ is not content, but the domain for the experiential content I am discussing. There is nothing good or bad about being dead or alive unless there is some reason to think that, and the only reason you would have is real experiential content. If you are dead, no evaluation will occur, but similarly, life itself is not something which can be evaluated since life without any content is unconsciousness, as I did point out in my previous round. ‘Life is good’ when what I experience by virtue of being alive pleases me – ‘death is good’ when what I experience by virtue of being alive is incredibly displeasing and hopeless. My opponent is mistaken in denying this.The remaining strand of argument is summarised by his simile: “It's almost like burning a forest in order to increase the number of trees in a given area”. I interpret this to mean that if I desire certain experiences, it is illogical to act in a way which will bring about death, and thus the preclusion of those experiences, sooner. This is a fair statement, but it only serves to prompt someone to reconsider their plans for the future. Perhaps, on second thought, fifteen years of heavy drinking followed by death is not quite as good as it seems and I might prefer to live a longer life with a little more restraint regarding alcohol, but this seems to be my decision based on my values. If I truly wish to spend my life living dangerously, then I see no reason why, provided no one is unfairly damaged by my behaviour, that I should not do this. To conclude, then, there does not seem to be any reason to live if there is nothing to live for. This captures both my response to the idea that life itself can function as a standard for evaluation, and to the idea that we must above all else strive to lengthen our lives. Should anyone find themselves regarding my sentiment here as childish, I would like to remind them that they in all likelihood do not live in a way which will ensure them the longest possible life. If by some miracle that is false, then I can only say that our tastes differ.