Obama should appoint Cheney to negotiate with North Korea over hostages

Thank you once again, Roy, for your well-formed argument. I have thoroughly enjoyed this debate. I would also like to note that I did not take offense to the not-so-subtle subtle insults included in his posts - in fact, I found them rather funny. I would also like to take this opportunity to correct Pro on one point. I did not claim that sanctions have worked in n. Korea in the past, I claimed that sanctions have worked in other places on other issues. Something through us directly getting what we want, other times by getting other nations to join us in boycotting or sanctioning trade with another nation. I didn't realize I needed sources for this - I considered it to be common knowledge. I will include them now: - David Cortright and George A. Lopez. "The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990s." Boulder, Colo., 2000. - Richard N. Haass, ed. "Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy." New York, 1998. - Joseph Hanlon, ed. "South Africa: The Sanctions Report. Documents and Statistics." London, 1990. I would also like to note that Pro failed to respond to the alternatives I provided in the second round. ------- I will summarize Pro's argument: The Obama Administration should appoint VP Cheney as special envoy to negotiate the release of two U.S. citizens because: 1. Merely sending him sends a chilling subtle threat that the U.S. intends to take violent action should N. Korea choose not to comply. 2. Sending him also sends the message that Democrat and Republicans are united in their resolve. 3. Cheney would be taken more seriously by China and N. Korea than any other potential envoy. 4. Ultimately, sending Cheney with a follow up violent action (if necessary) is the best plan. --------- I will answer each of the points made by Pro to support his resolution in the order that they appear above. 1. I have repeatedly asserted that this issue, while unfortunate, is not a viable reason to go to war with N. Korea. There may be legitimate reasons for violence or war with N. Korea, but this is not one of them. Pro failed to respond to this point I made, suggesting that he believes this to indeed be a provocation to war. On this point we obviously differ, and it serves to outline my criticism of Pro's second point. 2. Of course there will be some bipartisan unity behind the Obama Administration's plan of action. However, as Pro nicely outlines, there will be differences on whether the U.S. should consider this a negotiation situation or a provocation for war. Democrats and Republicans will be far from united. If recent foreign policy history tells us anything its that the two parties have very different views of America's place in the world; and very different views on what a proper response would be. Even if we can make the jump to assume that Pro is correct and that a display of partisan unity is necessary in this instance, this does not automatically mean that Cheney is the best choice. Appointing a republican or two to accompany Al Gore, Bill Richardson, Wesley Clark, or any other Democrat that can be perceived as hard-line would produce similar results. Another option is to select a Republican to head the delegation who does not have a history of extreme policy differences 3. Pro offered no reason as to why VP Cheney would be taken more seriously by China or N. Korea than any other potential delegate. We can assume that he means the threat of violence that goes with sending Cheney. 4. This is the point where Pro's entire argument unravels. He has backed himself into a corner where he must admit that a follow up physical action would be the necessary step to show N. Korea and China that we are serious about this new policy that Pro has proposed. That undermines his original position that merely sending Cheney would be sufficient to impress China and N. Korea into working with us. Such a follow up would have precisely the same effect even following the weakest of emissaries. It seems anathema to common sense that either nation would look at a violent U.S. response and say "but they sent Al Gore, that means the violence is less important." Once the violent response occurs, it matters not who was the negotiator. At that point it is the bullet that is doing the negotiating. ======= CONCLUSION Pro failed to live up to many of his requirements to win this debate. He failed to show why threats of violence, or why violence itself, was warranted in this instance. I have countered every point made by Pro as to why Cheney is not the best option: - Hard-liners exist within the Democratic Party; and some exist within the Republican party with fewer extreme differences with the current Administration. - A delegation consisting of both parties would be sufficient to show partisan unity. - The violent follow up is the real action that would impress China and N. Korea, not VP Cheney. Because Pro failed to live up to his burden; because he ignored my alternatives; and because I have sufficiently countered all of his points: I urge you to vote CON. Thank you for reading.