The Universe's Existence is Explicable

My opponent begins with a "clarification" that I fully accept, except where he states that language deals purely with how we express things. This is one function/definition of language, but certainly not the only thing language deals with. Language- "Another definition sees language as a formal system of symbols governed by grammatical rules combining particular signs with particular meanings. .. The structuralist viewpoint is commonly used in formal logic, semiotics, and… the most commonly used… In the philosophy of language. .. " (1) The important thing to note in this definition is its prevalence in philosophy and so its relevance to this debate. "It's important to note that I did not claim that "everything has an explanation" (nor was it implicit). Instead, the argument simply demonstrated that explanations are in general superior to brute facts (inexplicable propositions) in order to support a certain claim, namely that the universe is explicable. " If one assumes that explanations are generally better (i. e. more plausible) than brute facts, one would have to assume that this is also true in the cases where there are no explanations for something. Of course it is ridiculous to say an explanation is more plausible when something has no explanation and so an explanation is not possible. Since this is ridiculous, the argument must either be faulty or assume that there must always be an explanation. "This is the only way in which a brute fact can be posited. Plausibility is thus inherently determined by one's explanatory power, which is what a brute fact would lack by definition. " This is faulty because my argument is not an explanation of how any one brute fact is a brute fact it merely suggests that there are brute facts. Suppose X=X is a brute fact. The argument above supports the existence of brute facts, not that X=X IS a brute fact. Again, if my opponent thinks that explaining how something could be a brute fact removes its brute fact status than Con's side is impossible. "The only real assumption that matters here is what I stated in premise one. " This premise is not an argument for my opponent's side, but the assertion of it. It is clear how it leads to illogical propositions. To state that in order for something to be plausible it must be explicable is to state that only explanations offer plausibility. It does not prove this only asserts this. "The argument that my opponent has presented seems to equivocate between expressibility and explicability" This is not true. "what is explainable must first be expressable". Expressability is merely a criteria of explicability. "Ontology is logically prior to epistemology, for without being you cannot know or be anything. And epistemology is logically prior to language, for without knowledge you cannot express anything. " This is patently false. Ontology is the study of being, not being itself, and so the criteria for knowledge logically comes before the study of any other thing as it is necessary in all studies. The statement that knowledge is necessary for expression totally ignores belief. I can express things that I believe, but do not know. I can believe that I am expressing myself properly when in fact my listener gets a very different message, this however does not mean I am not expressing myself. What's more, epistemology is a practice done entirely with language. "this does not mean that a being needs our ability to know and express it in order to be what it is or to have an explanation for why it exists as it does. " The resolution being debated goes beyond simply "having an explanation" it is "explicable" which means: "capable of being explained. " (2) Since expressability is a prerequisite of explaining, it is not enough to say that there is an explanation out there we just can't know it. My opponent may believe that I am splitting hairs her, but as the audience sees, this debate becomes categorically different because of the difference in these two words. My opponent then goes on to state different definitions of explanatory, all of which I offered in the beginning of my prior argument. My opponent also ties them to their various philosophical sections, I have no problem with this. "we can clearly see that an explanation is not first a function of language but instead is first a function of ontology. " This mistake stems from the prior mistake that ontology is somehow prior to the other two studies. Explanation as a process, even as my opponent writes this and for the purpose of not just this debate, but any debate, is a function of language. "Furthermore, I am only concerned with ontological explanations here. Whether we're capable of explaining our perceptions of beauty to another or to ourselves is irrelevant to this debate as those are strictly an epistemological and linguistic concern. " My opponent arbitrarily limits this debate to ontology after failing to provide any definition of explanation before this argument. I have included all three studies in my multiple definition of explanation--my opponent even offers comparable definitions-- which should be accepted on the grounds that they are clear, common, and not abusive. If my opponent wants to limit this debate to ontological matters, I believe it is incumbent on him to show why this should be the case. "We can explain beauty by arguing that it exists objectively within a being or to appeal to some kind of mechanism in the brain that brought this about. " Even if we consider some objective definition of beauty the proposition is still "X is beautiful because X has all the qualities necessary for beauty". This is the equivalent statement to "X is beautiful because X is beautiful". If a tautology has no explanatory power than neither does any more specific definition as they are all in their purest forms tautologies. Therefore, a proposition with explanatory power the way my opponent explains it is impossible. "Similarly, the fact that some things may be inexpressible does not make it inexplicable. That's a non sequitur. " This is clearly not true as an explanation is an expression with specific qualities. Again my opponent unfairly dismisses the language element of this debate and gives no particular reason for its dismissal. "It is certainly explanatory to say that I cannot express how evolution works but that does not entail that evolution works inexplicably without any ontological reason. " "I cannot express x "and "x" are two different statements. It should also be noted that I am not saying "I cannot express the reasons for the universe" I am saying "the reasons for the universe are inexpressible". These are also two different statements. The latter makes any explanation (v) impossible. "I have seen no persuasive argument for this other than to suggest that "some things are inexplicable" without showing how it includes the universe. Since we know the universe exists, I see no reason why the proposition that it has an explanation cannot be meaningfully expressed. " My opponent seems to miss the fact that "the universe has an explanation" is a different explanation from "X is the explanation for the universe. At no point did I call the first statement meaningless, the second one must be meaningless because there is no frame of reference possible to give it meaning (this argument is totally ignored by my opponent). I only agree to premise 1 to show its contradictory implications, which have not been properly refuted. Premise 1 remains merely an unsupported assertion. A=Cause of B is the same a Cause of B=Cause of B. In conclusion, the problems with my opponent's arguments are due entirely to the arbitrary assertion that this is purely an ontological debate. If it is not, than an explanation is not only less plausible but impossible. (1) . http://en.wikipedia.org... (2) . http://dictionary.reference.com...