Animal Rights

I will offer three overviews, address Con"s case, and then proceed to defend my own. OV1: Extend my further clarification of a right as "a claim to something and against something else." Con drops this entirely. OV2: Con"s arguments about why the mentally ill and the brain dead do not have rights rests on them being incapable of rational thought. His argument on why infants have rights is also predicated on their being rational agents. In fact, his entire case relies on the idea that only actors that could be rational have rights. Thus, if I can show rationality is no needed for rights, Con has no case, at which point a Pro ballot is in order. OV3: This debate is about what a "just government" would do. A just government would not deny rights to the mentally ill or the brain dead, as it would be "tolerant" and respectful of everyone"s right to life regardless of other factors that may be discriminatory. Such a government would seek to minimize such things as undue pain and harm, because those things are not due to any agent, even animals. The actor in this resolution, then, would be more likely to err on the side of the Pro, and grant animals rights. REFUTING THE CON Con throws out the term "positive law" in his explanation of his core stance. I will take a moment to define this term: "guidelines, statutes, and codes which are imposed upon a country. It is dissimilar to natural law." [1] The reason for the divergence of natural and positive law, is that with natural law, the belief is that rights are inherent and conferred by nature, rather than by government legitimized by the social contract. There are three key understanding that we can arrive at based upon this definition: (1) a right granted via positive law does not require agents to be consenting, (2) the concept of positive law does not preclude rights for animals, and (3) Con contradicts his very own premise. I will now explain each one of these three points in turn. Firstly, the laws are "imposed" upon a country and its denizens. It is therefore not implausible that a government impose"or grant"a right to animals. The whole notion of imposition seems to rule out needing consent. For example, if the government of Nation X wishes to grant the mentally ill a constitutional right to life, then it can impose that right upon them, even without their consent. Secondly, if consent is not necessary, then animals can be extended rights. A government informed by the social contract could easily see the plight of abused animals as reason enough to extend, via positive law, animals rights. Thirdly, Con takes positions more in line with natural law than positive law. For instance, he denies that the mentally ill have rights, even though he admits that they "are protected from harm by law." But, if the mentally ill are protected by law, they have a claim to just treatment and a claim against maltreatment. This means that, based on the definition of a right, the mentally ill have rights, and that these rights were granted to them through the positive law assurance of protection. There are also some additional reasons to reject Con"s points. By accepting this debate, he agreed that rights were "immunities" and "entitlements." I would argue that neither require consent or rationality to have. A mentally ill person can be immune from harm without being able to understand what that means, just as an animal can be immune to maltreatment or entitled to human treatment even though it does not necessarily comprehend those very protections. This is because immunities and entitlements are ensured by a guarantor other than oneself, i.e. that rights of this kind are guaranteed by others, and therefore do not entail a need for consent of rational understanding. Furthermore, Con"s last line of his actual case is incorrect; not all my arguments are predicated on natural law. Additionally, he provides literally no evidence or analysis whatsoever which would invalidate natural law. So, even if my case were all natural law, Con gives no reason why this is problematic. DEFENSE OF THE PRO C1: The Con makes a massive contradiction here. He states that simply because our currently legal system treats things a certain way doesn"t mean its extending rights. But, his whole case is based on the notion of positive law, which says that rights arise from the current laws passed by the government. Con states that the current system isn"t enough to grant rights, but that, at the same time, the current system is the only "valid platform for defining rights." Thus, Con"s own attack on my point subverts his own position. But even if you don"t accept this, Con never addresses the substance of my point, that an animal has a claim to his inheritance, and thus has a right to his inheritance. Con never actually argues that the animal, in this case does not have a claim. Referring back to my OV1, if the animal has a claim, then it has a right, in which case a Pro ballot is in order. Finally, this whole debate revolves around the double standard. My advocacy, all of my arguments, is that animals should have rights to eliminate this issue. C2: Con utterly drops my Stanford evidence, which shows that animals have a moral claim to a right if they can be wronged. Wrong means to inflict undue pain. Thus, if animals can be wronged, they have claims to just treatment and against being wronged, and so they have rights. SPA: Con completely misconstrues my source"s argument here. My evidence is referring to "rudimentary" urges"things like "appetites" and "basic biological interests." Con challenges me to show that animals are not simply responding to stimuli. But frankly, I don"t have to. Animals have basic biological interests, like the need to eat, which when denied, causes harm and pain. Therefore, animals can be wronged, and therefore have a claim against being starved. Hence, they have a right. Con fundamentally misses the point of the argument"I"m not saying animals are intelligent, I"m saying that although they are unintelligent they can still be wronged and can still deserve rights. SPB: Con states that emotion is insufficient ground to grant a right. Con is yet again misunderstanding my point. Emotional harm is a wrong. Thus, I have a claim against emotional harm, and a right to be free from it. For example, I have a right against cyberbullying or harassment because it causes emotional distress. In fact, I can even sue to receive compensation for my right"s being violated. In response to the Con"s example, I would point out that Con"s girlfriend has a right to be with whom she wants, and the conflicting rights should moot one another out. But, if the case of purposeless harm, this is not true. For example, no one has a right to harass someone else. So, if harassment is a wrong, it would be against my rights to harass me. C3: Firstly, by accepting this debate, Con agreed to limit this debate to non-human vertebrate animals, not no-living objects. Furthermore, what the source was talking about being moral upright. An emotional response to maltreating animals indicates it is not virtuous to do so. Consequently, we ought to extend rights to animals because we recognize they have moral value that a virtuous person ought to respect. Our emotions simply provide insight into this. Plus, Con basically concedes animals have rights when he states animals should have "protection." Let"s go through this semantically. If an immunity is a protection, and an immunity is a right, then protections are rights, and animals should have a right. If a = b, a = c, then b = c. It really doesn"t matter for whose sake the animal has the immunity, because the resolution isn"t asking whether or not animals have rights inherent in them. It merely asks if animals should be granted rights. If animals should be granted rights to spare the owners, that doesn"t change the fact that animals should be extended rights. At this point, a Pro ballot is in order. But, even if you don"t believe that, I"ve made myriad other arguments explaining why rights should be granted to the animal for its own sake. C4: As to the utility argument, I would say that ensuring animals have checks against abuse and means of obtaining their interests (like food or an inheritance) then clearly the animals would be more well off. Either way, Con fails to address the notion that if we"re evaluating animals on par with humans, we are giving them equal consideration, and, in a sense, a right to be considered in decision-making. They have a claim against simply be discounted. Extend this argument. In regards to the speciesism argument, Con states that all people are speciesist, and uses that as a rebuttal. In fact, he never explains why speciesism isn"t bad. I would posit that speciesism is bad, and that it is a sad statement about humanity that most of us are speciesist. Frankly though, Con fails to actually rebut the argument. Finally, as sponges and plants are not actually vertebrate animals, they are not within the agreed upon scope of the debate, and so those example ought to be dismissed. Closing Point: Con has offered no sources thus far, whereas I have offered several in both this rebuttal and in my initial speech. I thank my opponent for a good round, and await his replies. Source: http://thelawdictionary.org...