God does not exist

RebuttalI thank popculture for his opening statement. Of my argument’s three premises, my opponent concedes the first and the third but opts to dispute the second. Let’s think very carefully about his objection.Premise (2) says that “If any child that suffers will ultimately benefit from it, then no one ought to prevent any child from suffering.”There are only two ways to defeat this premise. You could either show that it’s no more plausibly true than its negation (called undermining), or you could show that its negation is more plausibly true than it (called overriding).Premise (2)’s negation can be stated as that someone ought to prevent a child from suffering even if that child will ultimately benefit from it.So, in order to defeat premise (2), popculture must either undermine premise (2)—by showing that it’s no more plausible than this negation—or override (2)—by showing that its negation is more plausible than it.Which route does popculture undertake? Well…neither by the sounds of it.After clarifying the notion of ‘ultimate benefit’ by reference to Marilyn McCord Adams—which incidentally strengthens my first premise—and laying out Collins’ connection-building theodicy (CBT), he says “Now, what does all this have to do with premise 2? The answer would be that the CBT can provide a partial explanation as to why preventing child suffering is good even when the child will ultimately benefit.” (Emphasis mine)And how would the CBT provide a partial explanation for this? “On the CBT the means in which a child will ultimately benefit from their suffering will be through a person preventing their suffering.”But, we can concede that it’s good (in some cases) to prevent a child from suffering even if the child will ultimately benefit from it without having to say one ought to (in some cases) prevent a child from suffering even if the child will ultimately benefit from it. Thus, even if he was right, he will have only shown that (in some cases) preventing a child’s suffering is supererogatory, not that it is obligatory, which is what he’d need to do if he wanted to defeat (2). He therefore does not seem to be responding to premise (2), but rather objecting to the claim that it wouldn’t be good to prevent a child from suffering if it ultimately benefited from it.However, would his CBT response work if it was re-worded to show that one ought to (in some cases) prevent a child from suffering even if the child will ultimately benefit from it?No, because premise (2)’s negation is impossible. A child can’t ultimately benefit from its suffering unless it suffers in the first place, and it can’t do this if it was prevented from doing so. Thus, if a child will in fact ultimately benefit from its suffering (as (2) stipulates), then it will not be prevented from suffering. In fact, it’s impossible for a child to ultimately benefit from its suffering if it’s prevented from suffering, for then the child will and will not have something to ultimately benefit from!Since ought implies can, and one cannot prevent a child’s suffering if it will ultimately benefit from it, then no one ought to, just as premise (2) stipulates.Thus, premise (2) is rationally indubitable.All of this is aside from the fact that his CBT response requires an eternal after-life, which even if it is unclear why it should be ruled out given God’s existence, it’s also unclear why it should be included, as it needs to be. Furthermore, not all after-lives would do the work his CBT needs to be done. It needs an after-life wherein these relationships will grow deeper, but it’s hard to see how this would feasibly obtain on eternal after-life scenarios like reincarnation where the people in the relationship don’t need to reincarnate at the same time, in the same place, or even as the same species, or on scenarios where participants in the relationship end up in hell, where such relations cannot deepen. He needs there to be a very specific after-life which unfortunately presupposes God's existence. Since that's precisely what's in dispute, his response begs the question. But, even if it didn't, it requires a hefty amount of evidence he's not yet mustered. As my opponent has conceded two of my three premises, and I’ve shown the final premise to be rationally undeniable, there are only two options left for him. First, he could concede that the premises are true and de-convert. This needn't mean endorsing atheism, agnosticism or giving up any of his arguments for theism as he'd be free to believe in other deities, re-routing his arguments towards other gods. This seems perfectly reasonable since most arguments from natural theology are for generic things like an 'intelligent designer', which of course needn't be identified as 'God'. His second option is to reject at least one premise on the grounds that it leads to the unacceptable conclusion that God does not exist. If he opts for the second option, he will need to explain why God’s existence is more plausible than the premises of my argument. In other words, he’ll have to give us some arguments for God’s existence (as I recommended he do in my opening post). Being late in the debate, some might feel this would be cheating as I would have little room to do justice in a further rebuttal. However, I’m not bothered to be honest. I feel more than confident that I could adequately address any new arguments he wishes to marshal, and invite him to do so if he’s not yet prepared to concede that God does not exist.