The categorical imperative vs. the principle of utility

I'll begin my taking to defend some of the counters to possible criticisms of Con's take on the grounding of morality.1) Con has no way of critiquing or judging the validity of any rival moral system (or his own for that matter) Assuming non-cognitivism, as my opponent has done, ethical statements cannot be truth-apt. But if this is the case then from whence does the rational basis on which to critique and compare ethical systems come from? Con is left with either presupposing his own system as a standard or (as I'll get to next) judging a standard based off of the reactions and merely subjective valuations of others.2) Con's system of judgement is more or less incoherent. First, it's not obvious that people will reject a "bad" system of morality. For instance, racial genocide is taken by many to be a "bad" ethic but it's clear that people still accepted it. So an acceptance/rejection criterion is not only normatively blind (in that it fails to show the theoretical or moral failings with a system) but it's descriptively unreliable. Furthermore, Con defends this conception by simply showing an example of someone rejecting something they didn't like. But equating morality with mere preference or value equates to giving up any claim to argumentative validity and this brings me to my next point3) Con's system of judgement fails as an inter-subjective metric of judgement since it takes individual valuations as its measuring stick. Imagine trying to convince someone of your system of ethics when it relies entirely on a value which they do not hold. It would be impossible. Con tries to bring discourse ethics down with it as well by positing that it does the same thing, only with reason and argument as its values. Let me clear up this confusion quickly. Con's interpretation is completely false. Discourse ethics doesn't rely on whether one accepting the value of discourse or reason, that's specifically what separates it from the more traditional Kantian framework of relying solely on contradictions in the will. Discourse ethics instead looks at the NECESSARY presupposed norms inherent in discourse and argument to base normative judgements. Con, in even arguing against discourse ethics, is forced to accept its prescriptions. So even if Con (or any objector) consciously claims to deny reason or argument as values or preferences, they contradict themselves in arguing in the first place. Con can of course claim that this only applies if we accept reason, but this isn't a very good criticism. Doing so (making an argument) in the first place invalidates any such claim.4) Con's next problem comes from a redefinition of what utility and utilitarianism actually are. Con claims that the base motivation for action is that we want something (i.e., by recourse to preference). So far so good. Next he argues that since this is the case, the moral good resides in the satisfaction of some aggregate preference level. This is where it doesn't follow though. I'm perfectly justified in presuming that my preferences (assuming the term isn't loaded here to denote relativism) are objectively valid and others' that contradict mine aren't. Con's only refutation is that others could think the same thing. Well of course they could, that doesn't make them correct though. Con's presuming his own system in preferring an open mind towards preferences out of want for social stability (presuming a utilitarian framework).5) A short criticism of deontological ethics is made by Con. He claims that "these ethical principles are not founded in anything, and are too rigid in many systems." Firstly, Con simply waives past my own justification for discourse ethics in claiming that deontological ethics aren't founded in anything. I can claim that utilitarianism claims no arguments as well but doing so would ignore the entire case I'm tasked with refuting in this debate. The same is true of my opponent. The second problem comes from the fact that Con, unwarranted, calls deontological systems "too rigid" without argument. What makes it worse is that Con actually has to presume his own ontic standard in order to argue this. But doing so would simply be circularity. Furthermore the inclusion of "intuitively horrid events" as criticism isn't unique to deontology. Consider the utility monster thought experiment[1] showing the "intuitive" moral failings of consequentialists lines of moral reasoning.Con's case revolves around an idea of the "good" centered around flexibility. However, support for this type of system is generally only made up of intuitive moral feelings or presupposing the moral system undertaken to be proved. Discourse ethics on the other hand shows that ethical truths are objective and absolute since their grounding lies in the norms we presupposed in even having a debate. For these reasons and others I implore a Pro Vote.===Sources===[1] http://en.wikipedia.org...