Omnipotence is impossible

The resolution of this debate is as follows:Resolution: Be it resolved that omnipotence is impossible. I (Con) will be arguing against the resolution. My opponent (Pro) will be arguing for the resolution. In this section of this round I will present my case against the resolution. My opponent will then make his or her case for it. What is omnipotence? There are several definitions of the term “omnipotence. ”1. having unlimited power [1]2. having great power and influence [1]3. having unlimited or very great power [2][5]4. often capitalized: almighty [3]5. having virtually unlimited authority or influence [3][4]One dictionary of theology defines omnipotence as follows: Omnipotence is an attribute of God alone. It is the quality of having all power (Psalm 115:3). He can do all things that do not conflict with his holy nature. God has the power to do anything he wants to do. However, God cannot do that which is contrary to his nature. For example, God cannot lie (Titus 1:2). [6] The Catholic Encyclopedia defines omnipotence as follows: Omnipotence is the power of God to effect whatever is not intrinsically impossible. [7] Despite these definitions, there are many people who define the term “omnipotence” as a being who is capable of doing absolutely anything. However, as the entries above have shown, this is not a proper definition of omnipotence. Modern dictionaries define “omnipotence” to mean anything from “very great power” to “having unlimited power. ” There are doubtless reasons why some people insist on this definition as being absolute and authoritative (despite the presence of several other definitions). The most famous one, of course, is the stone paradox: Can an omnipotent being create an object so massive that the omnipotent being cannot lift it. In essence, the alleged “paradox” comes down to the following question: Can an omnipotent being do what an omnipotent being cannot do? These questions certainly raise a problem for the person who wishes to defend this particular definition of omnipotence. But is this the definition most Christian thinkers have used over the past two millennium? The answer, hardly surprising, is no. This is important because some contend that, at this point, the Christian is changing their definition of omnipotence. However, that is not the case at all. It is usually this person who is trying to force the Christian to use the word in a way that is at odds with traditional Christian doctrine. Classical theists like St. Augustine, St. Anselm, and St. Thomas Aquinas said that even though God is omnipotent, God cannot do absolutely all things, especially those things that contradict his own nature. St. Augustine clearly denies that God can do absolutely everything and he grounds his denial in Scriptural asseveration that God cannot die or deceive. St. Augustine notes that the claim that God can do all things lacks Scriptural support. Similarly, St. Anselm says that there are many things God cannot do. For example, “God cannot be corrupted, or tell lies, or transform what is true into what is false (that is, undo what has been done). ” [8]The Catholic Encyclopedia emphasizes that the inability of an omnipotent being to carry out intrinsically impossible actions is not a limitation to its omnipotence, since a power that extends to every possibility must be perfect. [7] The intrinsically impossible is the self-contradictory, and the mutually exclusive elements it poses could result only in a string of words describing an unintelligible nothingness. “Hence,” says Thomas (Summa I, Q. xxv, a. 3), “it is more exact to say that the intrinsically impossible is incapable of production, than to say that God cannot produce it. ” As intrinsically impossible must be classed: 1. Any action on the part of God which would be out of harmony with His nature and attributes. 2. Any action that would simultaneously connote mutually repellent elements, e. g. a square circle, a married bachelor, etc. The stone paradox has been dealt with in many different contexts. Richard Swinburne, a prominent contemporary Christian philosopher, writes, “By God's being omnipotent I understand that he is able to do whatever it is logically possible that he can do. ” [9] With this definition in mind, let us return to the problem of the stone and see if it is still a problem. The question we must ask is whether the stone is a logical possibility, and the obvious answer is that it is not. It makes no more sense to speak of stones which are too massive for omnipotent beings to lift than it does to speak of making square circles, or an Irresistible Force colliding with an Immovable Object. Both elements are mutually contradictory and the situation is intrinsically impossible. If we have defined an Irresistible Force as “a force that cannot be stopped,” and an Immovable object as “an object that can stop all forces,” there is a logical contradiction due to their intrinsic attributes. This excludes God from being able to realize an incoherent state of affairs that involves an intrinsic logical contradiction. The best charge the atheist can make now (and a rather lame one at that) is that God cannot do the illogical. But, is that really a charge against God at all? Swinburne addresses this absurd charge by pointing out that “a logically impossible action is not an action. It is what is described by a form of words which purport to describe an action, but do not describe anything which it is coherent to suppose can be done. ” [10] Indeed, most philosophers recognize the distinction between a sentence, which is a string of words that obey the rules of grammar, and a meaningful proposition that expresses an intelligible and coherent description. In other words, a sequence of words describing an action that is incoherent, such as “moving while not moving,” cannot describe any conceivable state of affairs. “Moving while not moving” is a sequence of words that is not realized in any possible world. Swinburne points out that the first response to the paradox is to say a stone that cannot be made to rise by an omnipotent being is a contradiction, since an all-powerful being could lift anything. [10] He could not make such a stone because he can only do all things that are conceivably doable. His not being able to make such a stone is not a limitation to his omnipotence since it involves a contradiction. Therefore, the paradox of the stone, and its derivatives, have failed to show the doctrine of omnipotence to be incoherent, unintelligible, or absurd, and there is no reason whatsoever to regard omnipotence as impossible. References[1] omnipotent. Oxford Dictionaries. April 2010. Oxford University Press. 14 August 2011. <. http://oxforddictionaries.com...;.[2] omnipotence. Oxford Dictionaries. April 2010. Oxford University Press. 14 August 2011. <. http://oxforddictionaries.com...;.[3] omnipotent. Merriam-Webster Dictionary. Merriam-Webster. 14 August 2011. <. http://www.merriam-webster.com...;[4] omnipotence. Merriam-Webster Dictionary. Merriam-Webster. 14 August 2011. <. http://www.merriam-webster.com...;[5] omnipotent. Collins Language. Harper Collins Publishers. 14 August 2011. <. http://www.collinslanguage.com...;[6] omnipotence. Dictionary of Theology. Christian Apologetics & Research Ministry. 14 August 2011. <. http://carm.org...;[7] omnipotence. The Catholic Encyclopedia. New Advent. Robert Appleton Company. 14 August 2011. <. http://www.newadvent.org...;[8] St. Anselm. Discourse on the Existence of God. University of Notre Dame Press, 1979. Print. [9] Swinburne, Richard. The Existence of God. Oxford University Press, 2004. Print. [10] Swinburne, Richard. The Coherence of Theism. University of Oxford, 2003. Print.