The Kalam Cosmological Argument is unsound

===A priori defense===Con's arguments comes down to two points. First, foundational beliefs are necessary for the grounding of knowledge, and, second, the grounding of knowledge is necessary given that the alternative (global skepticism) is unjustifiable. Con makes some other minor points as well but they mostly relate to these two points so I'll handle them together most likely.Con's first point is that foundational beliefs are necessary to ground knowledge given the problems associated with infinite, ungrounded (hence unjustified) inference claims. This is actually where most of his a priori defense comes from, the supposed necessity of foundatonalism. However, he spends much less time defending the causal principle itself. Even if Con can show that some sort of foundational beliefs MUST be accepted upon pain of contradiction (for instance the cogito), he still hasn't shown why the causal principle is among these. I can freely accept this principle but go on denying that the causal principle is among these necessary foundational beliefs.Con next responds to the problem I raised last round of inter-subjective justification. The nature of truths which can only be known by "intuition" lends itself to a problem with argumentative justification. The very fact that these truths are non-inferential and are supposedly the basis of argument means that they can't be justified inferentially (with reasons or evidential support). Con's point that something being justified doesn't mean everyone will recognize it is irrelevant to the question. If we are having a debate and you argue for a position, you may not expect others to assume your premises by simply stating them and hoping the other rationally intuits them as well. Just pointing out the obvious (ontological truth =/= people accepting it) doesn't change that and Con hasn't offered up a sound response to this.There is actually a way around this fortunately. And that is by recourse to non-contradiction. Some principles can't be denied under pain of contradicting one's self, therefore, even though they can't be deductively or inductively proven, we're forced to accept them regardless. The mistake Con makes here is to equivocate propositions which we "intuitively" know and propositions which we are forced to accept if we expect to remain within the realm of rational thought. Doubtless these two sets might overlap, but they certainly don't necessitate one another. For instance, a proposition such as causality may be "intuited" by my opponent, however, he isn't forced to accept it without contradiction. I admit that certain propositions (Descarte's cogito among them) must be assumed on threat of contradiction. However, Con has failed to show why the causal principle finds itself in this set.The non-contradiction point also gets around Con's reductio to skepticism in light of his mis-statement of my position (that we need inferential justification for ALL beliefs). My point was simply that Con hasn't posed any inter-subjective reasoning to support the existence of an a priori causal principle. Non-inferential beliefs can still exist as the above shows, those which discarding results in contradiction.===A posteriori defense===Con's first line of defense is to assume that the failure of induction necessitates the failure of science or experiential reasoning. This is false considering Karl Popper's philosophy of science known today as "Critical Rationalism"[1]. I don't want to get too off topic but it's necessary to fully refute this point from my opponent. The problem of induction shows both our epistemological limits as well as the methodological flaws of early modern empiricism. The flaw stemmed from relying on a verificationist model of human knowledge as opposed to a falisiable one. On critical rationalism, knowledge is gained in a sense by repeatedly subjecting our knowledge claims to rational scrutiny. So long as we follow reliable scientific methods and the proposition fails to be refuted, we are justified in holding to that view. The problem of induction, on critical rationalism, clearly allows for both the progress of science and the existence of experience-based knowledge (though knowledge defined in a different paradigm).Con's next point isn't really an argument, more him pulling a bit of pseudo-"common sense" into this debate. However, (I don't understand why I even need mention it) in a debate of philosophic nature such as this one, it's unwarranted to appeal to the reader's subjective feelings without recourse to any arguments for the validity of those feelings. Just saying "You know you agree with me" isn't an argument and I implore Con to refrain from employing such means in future rounds. Just claiming that induction is part of our a priori knowledge and attempting to prove it by asking readers to "feel" it is not an argument.Con makes some more points about Hume specifically and his reaction to the problem. For instance, he claims that Hume relied on induction for his arguments concerning miracles. I'm not entirely sure of the relevance here. Hume introduced the problem into philosophy, just pointing out that he was either inconsistent or used it in a different way than I am here doesn't refute the validity of the points being raised. On whether we need accept Humean empiricism to accept the validity of the problems raised by induction, I simply refer my opponent to the last round where I explained the problem. Induction as a principle of inference cannot be known inductively (circularity) or deductively (categorically different types of truth claims). I implore Con to show where Hume's empiricism need be assumed and why it is wrong specifically if he is to make such claims.===Conclusion===Con here mistakenly claims that my points have not amounted to a refutation. However, my points have gone to show (if successful) that we have no valid reason to think that a metaphysical causal principle exists. My inductive argument does this implicitly by showing the problems with inference of universal laws (physical or metaphysical) on a verificationist-type epistemology. Furthermore my foundationalism point calls into question putting the causality principle into the realm of necessarily accepted/justified beliefs. That's why I didn't just refute Con's individual reasoning on each premise from his R1. P1 allowed for me to bring unique problems to the debate which the KCA cannot account for. Con claims I haven't attempted to show P1 false. However, I ask, can P1 be true if my application of the inductive problem along with the critique of foundational truths holds up? Obviously not. Con mistakenly presumes I don't have a case when my case is what we exclusively focused on in this round.===Sources===[1] http://www.iep.utm.edu...