In regards to possibilities for the creation of the universe, Deism logically precedes Theism.

------------------------------------------------------------------------ R1 – Use of the word supernatural. I would like to begin by clarifying my opponent’s misconception on the use of the word ‘supernatural’ in this debate. I would remind him that we are operating under the premise that the big bang was the method for the creation of the universe, and as such, we are operating under the premise that the laws of nature that enable the big bang are also true. To use the word supernatural in this context is to say that the supernatural entity exists outside the laws of time, space, gravity etc. R2 – Criticism of my first and second points. For clarity, my first point was a logical progression, and was as follows; 1. We have established the need for a cause, namely for the big bang theory. 2. Any proposed cause shall come under one of the two aforementioned categories. For the purposes of the resolution, we are moving forward with the assumption that the cause is supernatural by nature. 3. As, for arguments sake, we have proceeded with the assumption that a supernatural force/entity is subsequently responsible for the creation of the universe, we have now arrived at deism. 4. We shall now ascribe the supernatural force responsible for the creation of the universe with the traits associated with a ‘personal’ god. These may include, but are of course not limited to; an entity which cares about our sex lives, an entity that cares about what we eat, an entity that cares about what we say and believe, and in general an entity that concerns himself with the affairs of human life. This is the overlying concept of theism, and is what differentiates it from deism. I would draw your attention to the resolution at hand, which states that “deism logically precedes theism”. It is clear that, following the logical progression that gives us grounds to present possibilities for the creation of the universe, deism presents itself at step three. Another step, one that derives from deism, is required in order to reach theism. This takes the form of step four. It therefore resoundingly obvious that 'deism logically precedes theism'. My opponent agrees with the first and second premise, yet raises concerns in regards to the third. These concerns essentially amount to denial of my assertion that deism is the default position, the assertion that theism and deism are equally basic possibilities, and the misconception that an absence of a characteristic is in itself a characteristic. These criticisms are repeated in his response to me second point. As these points are all intrinsically linked, I will address them in the following response. Response The absence of a trait is not in itself a trait, therefore deism is the default position for a supernatural creator, and, as such, the concepts of deism and theism are not equally basic, with deism logically preceding theism. My opponent has repeatedly asserted that, by observing the absence of previous characteristics, I am ascribing the creator with new ones. This is false. In step three of my initial point, all we had got to was a supernatural creator. That is it. We don’t know what this creator looks like, what colour he is, or if he intervenes in human affairs; all we arrived at was that there is a supernatural creator. This is accurately described as deism. The absence of any such traits is the most basic form of a supernatural creator, in that there is just a supernatural creator. We have not asserted that he is purple, or that he has long hair, or that he intervenes in human affairs. All we have done is assert that a supernatural creator exists, this is deism. Now, if we attempt to ascribe our supernatural creator with additional traits, we make the leap to theism. Say, for example, that I give the creator the trait of being blue. I have given him this trait seemingly randomly, for no reason that can be gleaned from the original premise. To point out the previous premise that the creator was colourless (had a complete absence of colour) is not ascribing the entity with a new trait, it is making the observation that the original concept did not contain any concept of colour in the first place. It is the same thing for an interventionist deity, which would result in theism. If I point out that our previous idea of a supernatural creator (deism) originally had no concept of interventionism, it is not ascribing him with a new trait to therefore say he is non-interventionist, as that was the original concept. For the premises we are working by, to which my opponent agreed with by agreeing with premise one and two of my initial argument, a supernatural creator with a complete absence of other traits is the most basic supernatural creator, and as such is the default position. It just so happens that this is called deism. Any additional traits that are imposed upon this base in order to create theism are expanding upon the basic understanding of a supernatural creator, are ascribing said creator with new traits. As such, it is clear that deism, as the most basic possibility for a supernatural creator, logically precedes theism.