The non-aggression principle is a justified ethical position

By way of response, I will argue for ethical pragmatism. In doing so, I will offer a counterargument to Pro’s foundationalism (through a pragmatist epistemology) and thus an argument that directly counters the NAP. Before doing so, I will once again address Pro's flawed syllogistic argument for the NAP.Pro's argumentPro offers two foundations: 1) our mind's experience of "existence" and 2) the “three classic rules of logic.” But what reason do we have for believing either of these is foundational? Pro provides none. In fact, because foundational beliefs must be self-evident and non-arguable, if Pro's foundational beliefs are true, they must be true for no reason at all.Hence, Pro's Premise 1 is incompatible with foundationalism. According to Pro, P1 "argues that in order to justify a proposition one must prove it using argumentative discourse." Foundationalism argues that there exist propositions that are justified and proven without using argumentative discourse. Pro states he "fail[s] to see wherein the contradiction lies." I cannot think of a way to make it clearer. Pro's P1 states nothing is justified without argumentation, foundationalism states some things are justified without argumentation. Pro attempts to avoid the contradiction by creating a false distinction between epistemology and ontology. Whether absolute truths exist or not (ontology) is irrelevant. The question is whether those truths can be justified. To justify those truths implies knowledge of those truths. Justification is a characteristic of epistemic access to truth, and as such, justification is a purely epistemological question.Pro falsely claims 2+2=4 is "inherently justified." As mathematician Charles Steinmetz states: "Mathematics is the most exact science, and its conclusions are capable of absolute proof. But this is so only because mathematics does not attempt to draw absolute conclusions. All mathematical truths are relative, conditional." [3] The way "2" and "4" are defined is conditional and open to interpretation, as are the operators "+" and "="Law of non-contradictionIn R2, I argue that a contradiction depends on distinctions between things that are themselves defined by an interpretive act. This means that any contradiction is only a contradiction as the result of beliefs, not truths. I also gave Nozick's example, true contradictions occurring because of time's continuity or infinite denseness. Pro does not contest these. Instead, Pro ignores my arguments and claims that the laws of logic are a "presupposition necessary for communicative argumentation." The laws of logic are a "presupposition" for the kind of "communicative argumentation" that Pro engages in. Communicative argumentation is itself contingent, and there are many different kinds of communicative argumentation that use different laws of logic. In R2, I gave examples. I also cited Nozick, who clearly states that logic and reason would not crumble without the law of non-contradiction.PragmatismKant famously argued the "things-in-themselves" are inaccessible. According to Kant, "intuitions without concepts are blind," which is to say, all experience is always interpreted through the frame of a pre-existing vocabulary or set of "categories."Pragmatists push Kant one step further, arguing these "categories" are the creations of human subjects who cannot "step outside" their interpretive framework. In other words, epistemic access to reality is necessarily mediated by concepts and descriptions that precede that reality. Of course, this means different interpretive frames produce different beliefs and conceptions of reality. Because there is no independent or neutral mechanism for adjudicating between these different interpretive frames, pragmatists maintain that there are no absolute and certain foundations for knowledge.In response, Pro argues that the "justification of propositions may not go on ad infinitum," but why not? Pro states: "any initial proposition would never truly be justified as the source would never be able to be drawn on." Yes, exactly. Pragmatists argue that, because we have no access to a foundation or "ultimate grounding," any attempt to justify a proposition absolutely is misguided. Pragmatists are not saying such a foundation does not exist; they are saying that, if a foundation does exist, we do not have epistemic access to that truth. Therefore, pragmatists argue that the justification of any truth is conditional (as in mathematics).Ethical pragmatismAt first, it might seem that any pragmatist position is ethically relativistic. On the contrary, however, every pragmatist position carries an "ethical justification" in the maxim: do what works. The pragmatist recognizes that, for every principle, there will be an exception. As Rorty states: "our sense of community as having no foundation except shared hope and the trust created by such sharing -- is put forward on practical grounds." [4] In the absence of any metaphysical or epistemological foundation, ethical obligations are a matter of what works practically. "Community" and "shared hope" are things that, according to Rorty, work. Nozick makes the exact same argument using game-theoretic reasoning in a chapter titled "The Genealogy of Ethics." [2]The NAP is a principle that may work most of the time, but the pragmatist recognizes that there will be exceptions. There will be circumstances in which the NAP does not work, and therefore, is not justified. Non-aggression as an ethical stance can be justified in particular circumstances, but not as a principle that works for all circumstances.Ethical Critique of the NAPAs I argued in R2, even if readers accept Pro's argument for foundationalism and Pro's "argumentation" argument for the NAP, Pro nevertheless has not proven the NAP is an "ethical position." If readers accept Pro's arguments, readers accept that the NAP is a justified formal or metaphysical or epistemological position. But Pro himself admits "the NAP does not rely on value judgement and is therefore value-neutral." Value-neutral positions are not ethical positions.Consider Pro's example, 2+2=4. Does that statement say anything about ethics? Is the law of non-contradiction an ethical position? No, sometimes ethical actions require contradictions. Again, a value-neutral position is not an ethics. The whole point of an ethical position is to provide values on which we can determine whether our actions are ethical or not.Hence, as a value-neutral position, Pro's NAP says nothing about ethics. For example, it does not tell us how to interpret non-aggression. If a stranger interprets the greeting "hello" as aggression, does that justify a violent response to the greeting "hello"? NAP has no way of answering this question because it is value-neutral. It has no content. It is a purely formal determination that depends only on the rules of logic, not on "governing right or wrong methods of interpersonal actions."Utilitarianism and other forms of consequentialist ethics also critique the NAP as unethical. Utilitarianism is an ethical position in which ethical actions are actions that lead to good consequences. Actions that produce the best results are ethical. The NAP is thus unethical because sometimes the "initiation" of aggression produces better results than non-aggression. Suppose that you could save a million lives by killing one innocent man. The NAP holds that you should not kill that man. But this leads to a million deaths. The famous trolley problem works just as well against the NAP.Furthermore, recent scholarship has argued that moderate aggression is a positive adaptation. [5] These scholars argue that aggression exists along a continuum, with moderate levels of aggression being most adaptive for the individual, as well as for society as a whole. This clearly makes the NAP unethical, as some aggression is evolutionarily good. [3] E. T. Bell, Men of Mathematics[4] http://tinyurl.com...[5] http://tinyurl.com...