Abortion is always Morally Permissible

Thanks, Envisage! I will address a rules dispute, rebut Pro's case, and crystallize.ON THE RULESBefore I launch into defending my own case, I merely want to point out that I haven't violated the rules. I think this is important for me to point out, because this is my only opportunity to defend myself against this accusation. Pro writes: "Con is breaking the rules attacking my case in R4." I have two responses: (A) pointing out how arguments interplay is not the same thing as rebutting Pro's case. Pro is expected to maintain logical consistency throughout the debate, and if there is something logically inconsistent, I should be able to point it out. (B) Pro violates the exact same rule, so things cancel out. In the last round, Pro states that, when he was rebutting my case, that he "implicitly addressed" arguments I made against Pro's case. That commits the same rule breach I am accused of.MORAL EGOISMAltruismBefore I get into the other issues here, I wanted to address my altruism argument. I pointed out that genetic evidence showed that people had biological factors that made it "possible for humans to feel motivation--to want--to act contrary to what they believe to be their self-interest." Remember, Pro specifically defines egoism as "maximising...conscious self-interest with intent." Pro does not challenge the genetic basis of altruism, but instead he says that altruism and egoism are not incompatible because people can choose for forgo their myopic self-interest in favor of a long-term self interest. Yet, this doesn't address my claim that the genetic basis of altruism means we could feel compelled to act altruistically EVEN IF we consciously believe it to be against our long-term or short-term interests. So, Pro's point does not address my argument. This is going to become very important as the debate progresses--it shows that it is not incoherent to not value one's own self-interest.Strawmans GalorePro then accuses me of strawmanning his position. But, by failing to clarify in the comments what his position actually was, I felt that I need to address possible interpretation of his argument, including one of absolute psychological egoism, which is the belief that humans can only act in what they believe to be their own self-interest. Saying that Pro failed to lay the groundwork for such a claim is also not the same as saying Pro was advancing that claim. As for the issue of ethical egoism, I merely meant to point out that his arguments were most similar to that theory of egoism. I have throughout this debate talked about Pro's standard for egoism, vice "necessary and sufficient," so my arguments are not aimed at a strawman. Also, Pro drops the following: if "the possibility of immoral action exists, it is still possible that someone will choose to abort their fetus in circumstances where that goes against their believed self-interest. That's all we really need to negate the resolution right now." Because he doesn't defend a hard psychological egoism, he concedes that people can act against their self-interests, and can thus act immorally. If the possibility is there, it is highly unlikely that all abortions will always be moral, and that is sufficient to negate the resolution.Is/OughtPro argues that we should prefer egoism because self-interest is linked to morality by definition; yet, nowhere in the definition of "moral" decided on in R1 does it mention self-interest. In addition, our genetic capacity to be altruistic means that we can value things other than our self-interest.Regarding the is/ought dilemma, Pro writes: "all the problems of deriving 'ought' statements are from moral realism philosophies...which attempt to posit objective 'oughts'." But, as I noted earlier, Pro is defending a form of moral realism. He is making the claim that what is in our self-interest is what we ought to do. That asserts that objectively true moral decisions can be reached via this axiom. Hence, it is a form of moral realism, and is open to is/ought critiques. Moral egoism assumes that there is a moral fact (that obeying our self-interest is moral), and that from this fact we can then make objective decisions about morality. He even says as much when he writes: "Moral egoism holds a tremendous advantage over every other moral system because what "ought" to be the case is synonymous with what "is" the case." So, not only is his system morally realist, but this quote shows I am not strawmanning Pro's position. In R3, Pro had claimed that I was strawmanning, because he had not argued that "what 'is' the case is synonymous with what 'ought' to be the case." Finally, the conditionals argument is not convincing, because a question such as "you ought to murder, if you enjoy murder" still makes the basic, core assumption that what is the case informs what ought to be the case--clearly, this still commits and is/ought fallacy, and moral reasoning, rather than factual reasoning, must be used to back up the claim. The altruism argument also serves to rebut these conditionals, because it confuses the link between what we desire and what we ought to do. Our genetic predisposition to altruism means that we may desire things we believe to be against our self-interest. So, I may believe X to be against my self-interest, but I value it nonetheless. Ought I to do X, according to Pro? No, despite what Pro's conditional might suggest.Therefore, Pro's framework is not only open to is/ought critiques because it seeks to make objective is/ought claims, but my attacks were also not founded on a faulty premise. Because no moral reasoning is forthcoming from Pro as to why self-interest is necessarily a moral criterion (except a faulty appeal to definitions), he commits an is/ought fallacy is his framework that takes it out.ABORTION AND SELF-INTERESTThe MotherPro claims that it is implausible that someone could rationally act against there self-interests. But, he gives no justification for this except to say it is assumed in courts of law. Firstly, this is an appeal to authority. Secondly, Pro has made arguments about how it is moral to act egoistically, but he never constructed arguments as to how egoistic action was the sole rational option to participate in. The two are not the same. Pro's argument lacks a foundation. Thirdly, our genetic predisposition to altruism provides an explanation of how a rational person could come to act in an un-egoistic fashion, therefore negating Pro's argument. The FetusPro's argument essentially boils down to the idea that only conscious entities can have a self-interest. Consciousness has to do with awareness. But, as I said before, "we can reasonably discuss a...comatose person's self-interest." Someone who is comatose is not necessarily aware. Pro remained silent on that example, so I can only assume he doesn't disagree. We can discuss the self-interest of a comatose person because we know that this person could wake up, we realize that they have an interest in being cared for and having their affairs run well in their absence. In other words, we realize that this person has an interest in their potential future should they emerge from the state of unconsciousness in which they reside.Firstly, "them" implies a self or individual just like "you" or "I" has that connotation, and that self has interests, and so it does not appear that consciousness is a prerequisite for self-interests. Secondly, in the instance of the comatose person, there will be an "I" if that person does awaken, and, there is definitely a "them" while they are unconscious. This future "I" allows us to rationally talk about the present entity's self-interests. For example, it is not incoherent to say, "it is in the comatose patient's interests that, in case he wakes up and regains consciousness, that he bank accounts are not robbed." Because a fetus is an individual entity and can be referred to as "them" and/or because it has a potential future, i.e. a FLO, it has self-interests. This is going to take out most of Pro's rebuttals here.As for pain, a desire to avoid pain does not imply some kind of advanced conative ability. A stink bug recoils from pain, as does any living creature capable of feeling pain. They all have a self-interest in avoiding pain because pain is--in a word--unpleasant. If this is the case, then it would be wrong to abort a fetus that could feel pain. Insofar as any abortion anywhere has/will cause pain to a fetus, it was/would be immoral. Please note: "some countries, like Canada, China...and Vietnam have no legal limit on when an abortion can be performed." [1]Pro says the law isn't topical, but they give fetus's protections, and thus interests in those protections. Pro fails to rebut this logic.SocietyI did not argue for dictatorship, but rather collectivism. Collectivism does work for the purpose of serving our interests, in that by making a better community to live in, we're better off. There are certainly societal harms to making abortion totally permissible (underpopulation, as with the USSR [2], lack of adoptable kids, harms to the mother, etc.) so such a society might reasonable make abortion illegal and "directly 'influence whether or not one will have the self-interest to abort.'"VOTING ISSUESRemember, Pro bears the sole BOP. My voting issues 1 and 3 take out moral egoism, the bedrock of his case. Without moral egoism, Pro cannot affirm. Issues 2 and 4 shows how even under egoism, Pro cannot meet the "always" standard. Thus, I negate.1. TURN: Moral Egoism is a form of Moral Realism. Pro defeats his own framework.2. The possibility of immoral action exists, which is sufficient to negate.3. Moral Egoism rests on an is/ought fallacy.4. The Fetus has Interests the Violation of which would be a WrongPlease VOTE CON! Thank you.SOURCES1 - http://en.wikipedia.org...2 - http://en.wikipedia.org...