Malthusian Theories.

India was, and still is quite susepitble to famines and droughts. Before the british came along they were met with varying success in an ad hoc fashon. Britain had a policy, and that was exactly in line with prevailing thought of the day, Adam Smith and the free market was king. [[S. Ambirjan, 'Malthusian Population theory and Indian Famine Policy in the Nineteenth Century' Population Studies, Vol.30, No.1 (Mar., 1976) p.5]] Thomas Mathus's population theory that there was an uper limit for population at which famine occured was widely accepted in Europe, Frenchman abbe Dubois said "I am persuaded that as the population increases, so in proportion do want and misery" India hit something of a Malthusian limit in the 1860's. British officials argued that Famine War and Disease had held the population in check, british riule did away with the second and softened the third. The result they perceved was that famine was now an inevitable and necessary check on population growth. Sir James Caird, a member of the Indian Famine Commission of 1880 said "The produce of the country on an avarage of years is barely sufficient to maintain the present population" [[Ambirjan p.6-8]] The result was the view that if not actually desirable Famine was not a terrible thing. If the government was to intervene in a famine and save people, then that in itself would cause the next famine. famine releif needed taxes, these would fall upon the self supporting and likely drive them to penury to support those who were not self supporting, simultaniously escalating the problem and undermining the tax base. [[Ambirjan p.9]] The bengal famine of 1943 has been mentioned, by this time the wheels were comming off the British laissez-faire waggon. Systematic famine releif existed. A Famine Manual had been published in 1941 just for this very situation. They were however still free market based, sell off stocks bring down prices, and import more for the same effect. The Famine was also no worse in total shortages than another the British had handled in 1936, very successfully with little loss of life. In funding the War with Germany by use of pretty wellevery availible method, taxes and the printing of money the British government inflicted the indian labourer with a considerably smaller take home pay. [[Lance Brennan, 'Government Famine Releif in Bengal 1943' The Journal for Asian Studies Vol.47, No.3, (Aug., 1988) p.542]] A combination of factors then came into play. A cyclone devastated Midnapore in Oct. 1942 resulting in government efforts there to the exclusion of already apparent warning signs. More damning was the british were purchacing grain and rice along the probable Japanese line of advance in order to deny the Japanese. [[Brennan p.543]] Nonetheless as early as March the government began selling its stocks to bring prices down. But in attempting only to manipulate prices the poor were relieved but at the expense of not giving hand outs for the really destitute [[Brennan p.545-6]] Belated shifts in emphasis (august) to gurel kitchens only made matters worse as to provide for the destitue the government requisitioned from the better off [[Brennan p.547]] There was not a terrible lack of food there was a distribution problem. The government destroyed boats in case the Japanese could use them, but of course in sprawling river systems the locals needed them more than the distant Japanese. The result was very few died in Calcutta where government effort was based and centered. [[Amartya Sen, Ingredients of Famine Analysis: Availibility and Entitlements. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 96, No.3 (Aug., 1981) p.445-6]] The government made systematic errors in not providing enough food cheaply through existant cheap grain (ie subsidised) shops and concentrated principly on flooding the market, principly because they were essentially already subsidising imports, selling it below market rates would be second subsidies. The result being that the cheap grain shops for the destitute ran out very fast. The government basically erred by failing to channel resources to those in most risk, rather than supporting those with a modicum of purchasing power by cheapening the general supplies. [[Brennan p560-1]] In total there was probably no great shortage, but when the free market is left in these situations those with money, the middle class Indians automatically horde to tide themselves over, the result is a crisis that is to some extent artificial.