Naturalism provides a more plausible explanation for objective morality than God.

The ought problem As I think this ultimately destroys pros case and that his addressal of this contention only throws the debate to my side, I will address it first. Pro’s entire basis of negation for this contention rests on his assertion that he is talking about values rather than actions. Thus he has directed zero effort into proving that we ought to act in accordance to morality. Therefore all I have to prove is that pro’s morality does entail moral actions rather than just values. Now I'm afraid for pro, but this is a very easy task, for pro asserts it himself, as well as the definition presented by him and mutually agreed upon. The definition: Morality: the field concerned with the distinctions between good and bad behavior. We see pro has absolutely no grounds in claiming that we are only talking about values. Morally good behavior is behavior in which we ought to act by. Otherwise why mention behavior at all when talking about objectivity? We can further see that pro himself sets down a distinction early on in the debate between good/bad actions and good/bad state of beings. Unfortunately for him he outright asserts that we can determine objectively good behavior. "How can we determine, objectively, which actions are good and bad" to "How can we determine, objectively, which states of well-being are good and bad". " So yes, it is obvious that pros morality does entail categorical imperatives contrary to what pro wishes us to believe. //… you’re basically saying we shouldn’t punch people in the face because it would mean we’d be punching people in the face…// I can't but find cons analogy in support of the is/ought problem, rather lacking. The reason for which is that he does not make a directly applicable and fair analogy. The more fitting example would be "we shouldn't punch people in the face because it would mean we are initiating a harm on their well-being. This clearly and completely coincides with everything pro has been saying up till this round. Furthermore pro outright states earlier that it is morally apprehensible to pound your fists into a child’s face! Thus there’s really no reason to even consider this analogy, as pro has already taken the position early on that we shouldn’t commit certain actions. There is really no way out of it. Con has essentially conceded the debate by naming my contention irrelevant rather than negating it, for it has been found to be very relevant and in fact pivotal. As I have already stated, and as pro has entirely refrained from addressing, at best, pro's morality could be thought of only as advice. And as I explained in the last round, saying something is good because it's beneficial is entirely different to saying something is good because it is moral. I would also like to restate the question, not that pro has a chance to answer it, but because he completely ignores it, why is well-being the most important factor of our lives? Why would happiness, for instance, not be more important? Pro commits a few lines to focusing his is/if problem in refuting God causing objective morality. He tries to argues along the lines that we ought to follow Gods commands if we trust his judgment. However I see absolutely no relevance between judgment and morality. God, the maximally powerful authority and ruler of all creation could easily impose moral duties on us and trusting his judgment has nothing to do with it. Moral facts according to cons morality Note that con has not directed effort into refuting these facts. Now I will concede that in part I did commit to fallacious appeal in my initial contention. My opponent starts out using my actually least worthy example, which was used primarily to show that pros analogy of hitting a child in the face could be considered a morally good thing. I will focus on other facts. Pro declines to affirm whether he agrees that it is objectively moral to exterminate those who are un-beneficial to society. I think an act of refraining should be considered as an assent to this fact, and thus we should still absolutely consider that pros morality entails exterminating un-beneficial persons as a morally good thing to do. I'm also confused as to why appealing to our intuition would be to affirm moralities logical basis. I'd think it would be much more the opposite. Our moral intuitions very strongly dictate that exterminating those that are un-beneficial is a morally wrong act, whereas the naturalistic morality pro presents clearly dictates that it is morally right. Pro makes the claim that our moral intuition has been formed by evolution into perceiving certain moral facts, but his claims that natural selection would cause us to want "every one to succeed", are both unsupported and false. Exterminating those that are unbeneficial to society in order that that the superior may prosper is directly in line with survival of the fitness. [1] Thus pro can't explain this puzzle. And then we again come to further problems with my opponents case, for if you want to cause harm to yourself why is it objectively better not too? Why is the so called moral state of your well-being not dependent on how you want that state to be? Instead pro would claim that it is based on how beneficiary that state is. Thus according to my opponent, if you want to cause harm to yourself, that would be a morally wrong state, independent of the fact that it is your decision and your inclination to cause that harm and be in that state of well-being. Moving on, suppose we take the statement, "It is better to have a balanced amount of iron in your body than not. " Can we insert the two words objectively moral into this statement? That it is an objectively moral state of being? I say absolutely not. I see little sense in assuming so. It doesnt seem logical. I have never had the experience of being called immoral for the fact that I was depriving myself of sleep, and thus causing harm to myself. What would your reaction be if someone came up to you and accused you of being immoral for the fact that you were overweight or underweight? I think most people would give that person a queer or offended look and walk away. So again, it makes no sense to say states of well-being are morally better than others, because that does not even coincide with the general meaning of the word morality. Cons response to my arguments for God and morality is simply completely unwarranted and over-expressed. I don't know what to attribute it too, but I deem it nothing but a little semantical twist that does not correlate whatsoever with relevance. Basically he uses my concession of our "crude" moral intuition as "suicide for my entire case". I see little to no facts supporting this addressal and I think it safe for the viewers to drop it. The reasons being as follows; moral intuitions that give us certain moral facts can still very easily be a crude intuition. It's as simple as that. It would be absurd to claim that our intuition is entirely objective, or that God being the cause of objective morality would necessitate an inherent moral sense. Thus it would be absurd to deny the fact that our moral intuition is a crude one. I do not know why con took this approach to my argument. Maybe it is partially due to the fact that there really is nothing to refute the fact that God is a plausible explanation for morality. As agreed upon from the beginning, proving God/naturalism is not necessary but rather the task of proving which one would be more plausible if it were reality. I think the question of whether God offers a plausible explanation for morality has always been an easy one. The idea of God causing objective morality is very plausible where-as naturalism causing objective morality only brings up countless unanswered questions. [1] . http://www.bartleby.com...