The Kalam Cosmological Argument is Sound

OVERVIEW: My case rests on successfully demonstrating that the premises "everything that begins to exist has a cause" and "the universe began to exist" are more likely truly than false. The general approach I have taken is to outline a priori metaphysical arguments in favor of each claim. I began my defense of Premise 1 by noting that Con really has the burden of demonstrating the falsity of this claim, given the overwhelming support experience provides us. I then provided an independent argument beginning with the metaphysical truth that "from nothing comes nothing" and concluding that "everything that begins has a cause." My defense of Premise 2 rests on two independent a priori arguments; the first shows the impossibility of the present if the universe were eternal and the second demonstrates the impossibility of actual infinites. It is important to note that my principle arguments depend only on principles of metaphysics, while my opponent quite often relies on empirically derived claims for his argument. My approach thus has two advantages: 1) Metaphysics concerns the underlying reality of things as things while empirical claims are derived to explain particulars. Metaphysics is therefore a priori and comes before the evaluation of empirical claims. 2) Metaphysical arguments, in not relying on particular observations, are much more certain than empirical arguments. This is especially true in this debate, where my opponent frequently relies on speculative and contentious empirical theories such as quantum mechanics and pre-big bang physics. The take away from this is that when in conflict, my approach better meets the Burden of Proof by offering a method that is more reliable and certain. PREMISE 1: b.i) I am unclear as to exactly what my opponent's argument involving QM is. He admits that QM does not disprove "from nothing comes nothing" but still claims it disproves that all existing things have causes. Refer to my R1 argument to see that the claim "from nothing comes nothing" entails that all existing things have causes; if I am granted this claim, the conclusion of necessary causality follows. However, to remove all doubt, let me quote Fritz Rohrlich, Syracuse Univ. Physics Prof. (Book: From Paradox to Reality) "Lest there be a complete misunderstanding…one must emphasize the existence of causality in quantum mechanics…The fact that the exact time of an event cannot be predicted in no way detracts from this cause-effect relationship." b.ii) Note my R2 argument that my metaphysical arguments should be evaluated before arguments involving QM goes unanswered. c.i&ii) My opponent argues that the only "beginnings" we observe are actually "transitions" from one state of matter to another. I will restate my point that you can call the construction of Rome a "transition" but it still represents a thing coming into existence and requires causality. c.iii) My opponent seems to think that because we have never witnessed the creation of matter, and that I have not demonstrated that matter could be created "ex nihilo" I have failed to prove my case. Again, my case for premise 1 rests on the very fact that a creation "ex nihilo" is impossible; to say it is impossible demonstrates the need for something to cause the creation of matter. If "only nothing comes from nothing" is true, then it follows that "something can not come from nothing" and therefore that "something must come from something." If this something at one point did not exist, then the existence of that something must have another something as a cause. As I stated in R2, it isn't necessary to observe matter being created in order to know that it is impossible for such a thing to happen without a cause. My arguments rest on a priori arguments- note, in the case of "from nothing comes nothing," these arguments have even been affirmed by Con- and a priori arguments do not depend on observation. d) My opponent never addressed my point that my arguments apply to all things insofar as they are real metaphysical objects, thus the informal fallacy does not apply. His human cell/body example fails because the conclusion he makes (invisibility) depends on the size of the object in relation to optical capability of the human eye- a trait not shared between part and whole. My argument depends on the metaphysical reality of a thing- a trait shared by the parts of the universe and the whole. PREMISE 2: a)This argument has gone unrefuted, as I noted in R2. On this argument alone I win that the universe has a finite past and therefore had a beginning. If the judge is feeling lazy, I would not find a fault in deciding "Pro" on premise 2 without reading the remainder of my arguments; the failure of con to address my argument a) is justification to do so. b.i) Con concedes mathematics are not real objects but claims they have a "relationship" to the real world. Note in R2 I do not deny a "relationship" to the real world- I state that math can describe the real world without being a real object. I can claim that "-1" is useful in describing reality without insisting that there is such a thing as "-1 apples," just as I can claim "grammar" describes reality while denying that "grammar" exists as a real entity. In the same way I contend "infinity" may have the ability to describe reality without the possibility of there being "infinity apples." b.ii&iii) A simple proof: 1+inf=inf, 1+inf-inf=inf-inf, 1=0. This is a contradiction, not a misplaced intuition. Con is simply wrong that you are allowed to subtract from infinity; this is taught in any high school or college calculus class. However, in the real world you cannot "disallow" subtracting from infinity; a real infinite would mean that in the real world 1=0. b.iv) Con did not dispute this point. I maintain that real infinites cannot exist, and so a Universe with an infinite past is not possible. c)Con's cosmology is at this point incoherent. He says the Big Bang does not represent "the beginning of time" but also advocates Vilenkin in R2 with the following words:"In short, they posit a "time" (term used loosely here) in which energy existed without time." So according to Con the Big Bang does not represent the beginning of time, and he also advocates that there was a "time without time" before it? This is not a coherent position, and I would appreciate a lucid account of exactly what cosmology Con is advocating for during his next round. c.iii) Gott and Li explain that both Vilenking and Hartle-Hawking imply that the pre-universe behaved as an oscillator and "this universe could not have existed forever: after a finite half life it is likely to decay." Con can claim this is a "time before time" but the mathematics behind Vilenkin suggest a pre-universe that undergoes oscillations, has duration, and is not eternal. Whether you choose to call it "time" or not, such a universe is not eternal and could not have existed forever, and so must have had a beginning. c.iv) I maintain the Friedmann model in which, per my R2 evidence from physicists Gott and Li, "the universe…began at a finite time in the past." My model maintains that the universe began. Con has given no reason why this model is less likely than any competing model, and so has failed to meet the B.O.P to demonstrate the universe did not begin. Con offers no explanation or warrant as to how Friedmann suggests the universe did not have a cause. All I am committed to in advocating for Friedmann is: there is a universe with no boundary conditions, that begins with a singularity at a finite point in time in the past, and that this means the universe had a beginning. c.v) I again remind the judges that my Metaphysical arguments in a) and b) come first in the evaluation of this debate. Speculation on the origins of the universe is a murky subject with no consensus around any single theory. In contrast, my a) and b) arguments proceed from sound and clear metaphysical truths.