On Balance, Naturalism Is More Plausible Than Theism

Thanks to my opponent for his reply. I will go straight into my counterarguments. I am going to take the liberty of organizing my responses under a few of his general points. I will try to do this is fairly as possible. CA1: The Origin of the Natural World Con suggests that the natural world must originate from something, and it is implied (though never stated directly) that this must be God. It seems that everything must have a cause, and so God must be the original cause. This argument is full of problems. I will assert that the following problems render this argument invalid: 1) Con has no evidence that the universe cannot spontaneously come into existence. While this is counterintuitive to human thought, so is much of modern physics. Physics may one day almost fully explain the physical universe. However, in order to solve Con's problem we need to be able to explain not just all physical objects but all existent objects. There is no justifiable reason why this problem should apply only to physical objects and not all objects. Explaining the fact that existence exists, that there is something rather than nothing, is a deep question of metaphysics that may never yield to human reasoning. Even if naturalism fails to go above the physical world and answer metaphysical questions, that does not hurt the theory unless another approach can. The supernatural is no more capable of explaining this problem. 2) As stated above, there is no reason why Con's problem of explaining the existence of existence should not apply to supernatural things. The metaphysical problem of explaining why objects exist applies to all existent objects, not just physical objects. We are just as justified in wondering why God exists, if he does, just as we are in wondering why the universe exists. Why should supernatural objects get special permission to ignore problems that in principle apply to all objects? They still suffer from the same problems. 3) Even if supernatural objects could explain the origin of not just the universe but existence itself, which I have demonstrated they are unable to do, there is no reason to assume that the supernatural entity that performs this function is the God of theism. A supernatural First Mover need not have complete power over the present universe or indeed possess any of the traits normally attributed to God. CA2: God as a Regulator of Existence Con suggests that there must be some reason why the laws of logic and natural are as they are. While some of these questions yield to physics and mathematics, there will in principle always be questions that cannot be answered. Every single question of "Why?" can never be answered because it can be asked infinitely, but we cannot have infinite knowledge. This problem creates a gap in naturalism, but it is a fundamental problem of philosophy and indeed of human thought. It does not yield to a simple answer through the supernatural. If we explain mathematical and physical constants through God, God still demands an explanation. Why does God exist? Why is His nature such that he has set the physical constants the way they are? The problems my opponent is suggesting are metaphysical problems, not simply physical problems, and so they apply to all objects and not just physical ones. God, and indeed the whole idea of the supernatural, is equally subject to these problems. There is no reason to grant them a pass because they are outside the physical world; metaphysical problems apply to all existent entities and my opponent has contended that God is an existent entity. Final Comments on Con Arguments: These are the only discernible arguments in Con's case. This is the only round in which he is allowed to offer new arguments, and both of these arguments fail to affirm the existence of God. As I suggested in my C3, all Con does is make additional assumptions (God exists, the supernatural exists, etc.) without gaining any explanatory power. Theism has failed to explain anything that cannot be explained by naturalism. Every problem that naturalism cannot answer, theism cannot answer either. Theism, unlike naturalism, makes random and unnecessary assumptions that render it less plausible. God is far from a necessary being; He is perfectly unnecessary. I do not feel the need to offer many new arguments against God in addition to refuting my opponent's. There is nothing logically inconsistent about my opponent's God and my opponent proposes no traits for God that lend themselves to evidential arguments. Based on my Round 1, I am offering a version of the Argument from Parsimony. My opponent's God offers no explanatory power and is an unnecessary assumption. It is not rational to believe in Him when everything that He is supposedly necessary to explain is either unexplainable or explained without him.