Individuals have a moral obligation to assist those in need

Hello, and thank you for all who are following and to my opponent for the debate. He may be disappointed, and I am too to an extent. However, that does not mean you should judge the round any differently, nor does it mean that I didn't have fun with some quasi-meta debate, which is always a good time. But I digress.I think it's important to address Aff's crystallization before we dive into my own.Aff breaks this down interestingly. Do we have to enact the resolution to affirm it? A better question would be "must we extend the resolution to the real world to see if it is true." And the answer is unequivocally yes. But onto Aff's 3 points.1. I never attacked the notion that the resolution is a truth statement? REALLY? Did my opponent write this before reading my last round? A plurality of round 4 is me talking about how the res. is a claim of value and not fact and why that matters! I said that a claim of value should be extended to see if it actually functions in real world situations. His only contention to this was that it wouldn't work for other claims, which I identified as claims of policy and fact and addressed satisfactorily. So don't buy this point. Consider my Round 4 value claim rant dropped by Aff.2. Did I drop the meaning of obligation? Refer to my syllogistic proof that by Aff's own definition of moral obligation, the obligation, in many circumstances, does not exist whatsoever. My opponent totally drops this proof from R4 and thus drops my point that there exist situations where the resolution is markedly false.3. Once again, he ignores what a claim of value is and how it functions. He states he merely must prove existence. I prove syllogistically that it often doesn't exist, and discuss why value claims ought to be tested. Aff's argument that the resolution need not be extended through the most absurd yet possible of examples is ridiculous. He later tells us that I have not warranted that helping people causes harm, and that I need this warrant. I think this displays a lack of debater awareness on Aff's part...a misunderstanding of my point at the very least. I very clearly state throughout the debate, including in R4, that I use situation in which helping does cause harm as hypotheticals. I don't have to warrant that helping always leads to harming, only that we can imagine a situation in which helping does violate others' rights. I have already warranted this notion. Aff has already conceded this notion and attacked the validity of hypothetical altogether rather than the notion that we can imagine a situation which displays these qualities. Does helping necessarily lead to harm? No, of course not. But can an obligation to help hypothetically lead to infringing upon the rights of others and harming them? Of course! My opponent fatuously challenges the very notion of a thought experiment! Look up thought experiment! The trolley problem! The envelope! The ticking time bomb! What are these examples? THEY'RE TOOLS USED BY PHILOSOPHERS TO TEST THEIR ETHICAL THEORIES BY EXTENSION TO REAL WORLD APPLICATION! The ticking time bomb scenario challenges Kantian ethicists defending staunchly deontology. The envelope is a thought experiment to test obligation to assist the poor in other countries, used famously by Peter Unger. I challenge any voter to find a modern philosophy book in which the philosopher does not use thought experiment to test if their theory is applicable. But what do they do if the answer to the thought experiment contradicts their moral calculus? Do they brush it off as irrelevant? OF COURSE NOT! They reassess their theory in the context of this new information and consider how to fix it to account for this! Unless you buy Aff's argument that moral obligations should never be subjected to thought experiments and other extensions, you can't buy his entire argument, as he says that this one point is what the debate boils down to. My opponent, on this point, argues as if he didn't read the last round. Of course examples apply & of course they're necessary to value claims! Shouting "irrelevant" predictably failed.Now onto why you should vote for Neg.Admittedly, I did probably miss some elements of the CP. Why? Because I've never made a CP. I've never done LD. But of course that's no excuse. Aff's LD spec does render my CP incomplete, as is his resolution (though for different reasons). But still consider the implications of the CP. Take into consideration the notion that there is an opp cost to enacting Aff's universal obligation. But does this really matter for the debate? What is consequential for the debate is the notion that the resolution "individuals have a moral obligation to assist those in need" is incomplete. In fact, as I suggest throughout the debate, it's markedly false. My syllogism proving that, in cases that are possible in the real world, the obligation to assist the needy does not exist. But the resolution says the obligation does exist! How does Aff reconcile this contradiction? How does Aff address the notion that the res. states that the obligation exists yet in various circumstances it does not exist? He doesn't. He merely states that these extensions are irrelevant. That, even though I use them to PROVE that the obligation does not, in those situations, exist and that, in those situations, the resolution is false, it is irrelevant. Not only do I state why examples and thought experiments are relevant in round 4 and above, but I also show you that they can be used as evidence against the resolution. Evidence that Aff ignores. Now, what conclusions do I draw from this proof? I suggest two possibilities. The first one concerns incompleteness of the resolution. The notion that it offers an opp. cost. But I address that in the CP. Let's examine my contention, DROPPED by Aff, suggesting that a larger obligation is at work here. Aff argues that we should act in accordance with naturalism. Ok. I then suggest that our obligation is actually this accordance with naturalism, and that any "obligation" to assist the needy is, as I've proven, circumstantial, but more importantly, a mere extension of this larger obligation. Just as it would be more accurate for a politician to state that he has a duty to represent the people than to state that he has a duty to subsidize farms, it is more accurate to state that an individual has an obligation to act in accordance with naturalism than to assert an obligation to assist the needy. He may sometimes be obliged to do so, but this is an extension of the true obligation, which may just as easily oblige him to punish/harm someone who is needy. How does my opponent address the notion that naturalism often calls for harming the needy when they've misbehaved? He doesn't. He first states that justice should still be done in those situations, which is exactly my point, and then he fails to address this later on. He drops the point on occasional obligation to act directly against the resolution. He then drops THIS ENTIRE POINT! He NEVER ADDRESSES THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE OBLIGATION LIES ABOVE ASSISTING THE NEEDY AND THAT ASSISTING THE NEEDY CANNOT TRULY BE AN OBLIGATION. My opponent wanted proof that the obligation doesn't exist at all, and this argument served as proof. But insofar as my opponent dropped this point, I win on this alone. To address his last couple of paragraphs:-Aff states this only occurs when rights are violated. This ignores cases in which punishment is mandated by naturalism.-I'm not "promoting not assisting people". This is a straw man. I merely argue that the obligation doesn't exist. If, as I argue, the res. should be caveated or the obligation is to naturalism, I do not, by Aff's own arguments, forgo helping people. I do not oppose helping people, and the emotional argument that Aff is helping people bears no consequence for a resolution that asserts an obligation. This point is absurd, but you don't have to default to this argument, luckily, as I've given you other reasons to vote Neg.-Aff states he's the only one trying to link his framework. If he addressed point made repeatedly that the framework itself, that is naturalism, is the obligation, then he would realize that in fact I do precisely what he says I do not. I use the framework against him. Luckily for voters, to make this easier for you, you'll find this point dropped. This flows to my side automatically.-Aff's argument from utility, that is he saves the most people, has no bearing on the round. Even if you don't buy my arguments, a default as such is not proper for a debate about the existence of a moral obligation. As I've stated, Aff must prove this obligation to be true. So if you don't buy any of the arguments, default Neg because Aff hasn't proven his resolution. This is a no-brainer. Gather round voters for a compendious summary of the debate:1. Aff asserts that this all boils down to whether or not my real-world extensions are valid. He then ignores my warrant as to why real-world extensions are valid under a VALUE CLAIM and demands a warrant be shown. Take this warrant as dropped and I win according to AFF's own standard, as I've proven extensions to be valid.2. I prove using a syllogism that Aff ignores that, in my hypotheticals, the resolution is markedly false. No response from Aff on this, except more calls for warrants. Not sure if a warrant can get much better than a syllogism.3. Aff DROPS my point about naturalism itself being the true obligation and assisting the needy being an extension that may not apply in situations where rights are violated or punishment is called for by reciprocity. This was introduced a couple of rounds ago, Aff had ample time to address it, and it remains unchallenged. Thus, take it as conceded that the true obligation acting here is not the resolution. I win on this alone. 4. If you buy these, don't default to anything. Vote Neg. If you don't, Aff still must prove res.5. Contrary to Aff's rebuttal, Round 4 happened.