God probably exists. (Version 2).

My opponent's argument can be boiled down to his step by step "walk through" per se, to prove the omnipotence of God. I will refute it accordingly. "(1) A maximally great being is possible. (2) A maximally great being exists in some possible world. (3) A maximally great being exists in every possible world (Refer to the definition of maximally great) (4) A maximally great being exists in the actual world. " I will work down. "(1) A maximally great being is possible. " The argument falls here - my opponent has not demonstrated how this is possible. He attempts to dodge the question by shifting the burden of proof onto myself, backing it up by stating that: "in modal logic, all things are possible until proven impossible. " While this could be true, my opponent has provided no source to back up this assertion, so it is an assertion without evidence. And, what can be asserted without evidence can be dismissed without evidence. Until my opponent provides evidence that "in modal logic, all things are possible until proven impossible", I will be forced to dismiss my opponent's claim. But, let's assume that a maximally great being is possible, and continue. (One can essentially dismiss point two, as, by definition, a maximally great being exists in all possible worlds from the start). "(3) A maximally great being exists in every possible world". This is not true. Take, for example, a world of non-sentience . In a non-sentient world, there can be no sentient beings, such as a maximally great one. So, if this maximally great being exists, then, logically, no non-sentient worlds exist. This would be logical. However, for this maximally great being (MGB) to exist, Pro must prove that a non-sentient world is impossible. He has not done this. His argument, as it stands, is refuted. Now some arguments to show that the God of the Bible is not probable. (Though this is not a burden, as agreed upon by my opponent by his acceptance of this debate). Contention 1: Epicurus' Argument. (This argument was probably not Epicurus', but for the sake of argument, we'll assume it is his, as it really makes little difference). "Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent [not omnibenevolent]. Is he both able and willing? Then whence cometh evil? Is he neither able nor willing? Then why call him God? [not omnipotent nor omnibenevolent]". This is an argument that, while not relating to the God of the Bible in its original context, I will apply now. This argument, when applied to the God of the Bible, demonstrates how the God of the Bible does not have the qualities that the Bible asserts. Thus, the God of the Bible does not exist. Contention 2: Argument from Perfection. The argument is simple: (P1) God is a perfect thing (a perfect being). (P2) Perfect things are usually nonexistent idealizations of real things. (P3) Perfect things are unlikely to exist. (from P2) (C) Therefore, it is unlikely [not probable] that God exists. (from P3 and P1). The God of the Bible is perfect[1]. So P1 is true. P2 is also true, because most things that are considered to be perfect are real things that are imagined to be better. For example, a perfect day is (on the day of imagining of this day) the current day that could have or can go better. This is not always true, but it is usually true, as P2 states. P3 follows logically from P2. The conclusion follows logically from P3 and P1. Conclusion. Pro failed to meet his burden of proof in round one - as shifting the burden of proof is not recognised as logical at this point in time of the debate, Pro's premise one is a claim that he has thus far not verified, and Pro's premise three is not logical, either, unless Pro first demonstrates how non-sentient worlds are impossible. I thank my opponent, the voters, the audience; I await my opponent's response(s)! Source(s): [1]. http://biblehub.com...