Resolved: It is immoral not to extend rights to living animals.

I affirm.For the definitional debate, my opponent defines "immoral" on a foundation of moral principles, but he/she does not actually DEFINE morality. Thus, prefer my definition that "immoral" means conforming to standards of bad behavior in ANY way, shape, or form.It looks like we agree on the definition of "rights". Realize that my opponent's definition also includes "free from VIOLENT FORCE which brings about death or pain". Thus, I could argue that killing an animal in its sleep is not depriving it of its rights because I would use a nonviolent method. Thus, I will agree to my opponent's slightly modified definition for the rest of this debate. I would like to agree with living animals as long as all "non-human animals possessing self-sustaining biological processes which function" can feel pain. If Animal C is beaten each day but has no nervous system, we are not depriving Animal C of its rights.My opponent's standard is sort of a repetition of the resolution. In debate, a standard (or framework) should be a way to WEIGH the debate. "Which side better upholds _______?" Prefer my framework of net benefits for humans and animals, because it makes sense that the side whose arguments are more beneficial to these living things should win the debate. My opponent does not specify which ways we can access the ballot.My opponent brings up a plan (technically called a "counter-plan"), but my plan is still also valid. If I can prove that the benefits of upholding the Endangered Species Act, a key piece of legislation for protecting basic animal rights, outweigh the costs, then I should win today's debate.I would like to argue that my opponent's burdens are very narrow and do not look to a fair debate. If we look to just philosophical arguments, then my opponent by definition has more access to the ballot starting at Round 1. I have a more simplistic burden for my opponent, which is to show that extending rights to living animals does more HARM than GOOD. The reason for this burden is that morality, as I defined, measures the principles of good and bad behavior. Thus, if my opponent proves that giving rights to living animals is a uniquely bad behavior, he/she should be eligible to win. But if I prove that the benefits of my plan (upholdings the ESA) outweigh the costs, then I should win.Refutation 1:My opponent defines codes of morality as "put forward by all rational persons". This means that every single rational (not mentally insane? not a child?) individual would have to AGREE on a standard of morality. Thus, in a population of 10 trillion people, if one of them disagrees to extend rights to living animals, then extending rights to living animals is an immoral behavior. This is an abusive definition that does not give me any ground to refute the contention. Thus, please refer to my opponent's FIRST definition of the code of morality.I would like to point out a couple of glaring holes in the evidence that my opponent uses. In his/her OWN links, my opponent defines "morality" from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. From that very same source, I quote that "comparative and evolutionary psychologists have taken morality, or a close anticipation of it, to be present among groups of non-human animals, primarily other primates but not limited to them." The same encyclopedia states one sentence later that "'Morality” has also been taken to refer to any code of conduct that a person or group takes as most important." With respect to the first quote, realize that morality can extend to non-human animals and that it is not impossible to achieve this ideal. With respect to the second quote, my opponent uses a source that says that morality can be used to mean something that is most IMPORTANT. Cross-apply my first and second contentions, where I show that extending rights to living animals is both economically beneficial and helps to improve human society. If these are in the best interests of society, then my opponent's definition falls on itself, and the argument is turned to the Pro side.My opponent continues to rely on a premise that extending rights to living animals is impossible. There is no warrant for this argument. Extending rights is PHYSICALLY possible: I can rid my household of all weapons that could attack or violently end the lives of my animals. Extending rights is ECONOMICALLY possible: cross-apply my first contention, where I talk about the national money saved as a result of upholding the ESA. Finally, extending rights is MORALLY possible because my opponent does not differentiate a human animal from a non-human animal. If it is immoral (or, as my opponent implies, disagreeable) to kill a fellow human being, what makes it 100% less immoral to killa fellow non-human animal? Again, prefer my definition of "immoral" as stated at the beginning of my Round 2 spech, because it gives Pro and Con fair access to the ballot and really defines immoral in an unbiased, sensible manner.Refutation 2:My opponent makes a very philosophical argument about Hobbes' and Locke's theories of government and rights, especially the latter of the two. He/she begins by definining Thomas Hobbes' system as the social contract theory, namly that "freedoms guaranteed by natural law must be surrendered to the state in order that the state secures other freedoms to secure their lives". I would point out that while animals do not have a definite government that presides over them, there is a special social contract between humans and animals. Regardless of whether animals are capable of hurting humans or not (some are), the fact of the matter is that they do not hurt or negatively impact our productivity. Thus, according to Hobbes' theory that my opponent presents, we therefore have no warrant to hurt or negatively impact the productivity (or, for presence of a better word, welfare) of animals.In the second paragraph of my opponent's second contention, he/she trashes Hobbes' theory and replaces it with an emphasis on Locke's approach, which essentially implies that a society with rights must be able to instill a common government that can deliver retribution to threatening aggressors. I would argue that humans do not have to bond together with animals politically to share a system of rights between one another. My opponent's argumentation once again falls on itself, because while there are no political social contracts between the United States and Germany, any citizen from the U.S. would deem it immoral to use violent force to kill or torture a German citizen. Sometimes, a social contract theory is implied by common intuitions. I would cross-apply my fourth contention, because my opponent has not drawn the line between a foreigner, who has no defined social contract with another country, and an animal, who lacks no more than the same defined contract with that other country. Response to Conclusion:I would like to finally argue that some behaviors can be both impossible and immoral. Thus, even if I agreed with my opponent that it is impossible to extend rights to animals, not doing so could still confirm to principles of bad behavior. For example, I, an American citizen (hypothetically), cannot physically assault the president of the United States because he has too much defense and too many guards. This does not strip the act of its immorality. Another example is shoplifting every single item from a supermarket. I would be caught and convicted long before being able to remove everything from the store, but once again there is still an act of immorality in doing so or even trying to do so. Impossibility and immorality are not mutually exclusive, as I have proven with common examples. Thus, it is impossible (and immoral) for my opponent to extend this premise through the rest of the debate.Thus, I affirm.Sources:[1] http://plato.stanford.edu...[2] http://www.merriam-webster.com...