Moral subjectivism is false.

Circularity and IncoherencePro argues that "X is good to person Y" is defined under Moral Subjectivism as "Person Y believes X is good to person Y" and vice versa, and the circularity of the definitions apparently implies incoherency. However, it is not clear at all why Moral Subjectivism is committed to that particular definition (it certainly doesn't follow from the definition of Moral Subjectivism I accepted in this debate). This is just a fallacy of presumption on Pro's behalf, and Pro may just be trying to tear down a straw-man. Most importantly, all definitions are inherently circular if you look at how languages work:"The charge of circularity can be applied to all definitions if we extend the circle far enough. After all, to define a term, we need words other than the term being defined. And if these new terms require definitions, we cannot resort to any term already used. To define a term (term 1), we require a new set of terms (term 2). These new terms have definitions, and to avoid the charge of circularity, none of the definitions can invoke term 1. So we require a third set (term 3) to define term 2. The process continues. To avoid the charge of circularity, none of the new sets can be defined in terms of the preceding sets. But since the number of words in any given language is finite, at some point this condition must fail." - Robert Malcolm Murray, and Nebojsa Kujundzic[1]The entire language entails circularity. Since Pro is using this language, which presupposes circularity of definitions, and he is arguing against circularity of definitions; his position is contradictory. His argument here falls into the abyss of incoherency. Pro then commits the red herring fallacy by arguing that the infinite regress implied by "truth" doesn't suffer from his line of reasoning. This, even if true, is utterly irrelevant. Pro implied in his first round that something that entails an infinite regress cannot be the case. I showed that the idea of "truth" does entail an infinite regress. Remember the formula:[I]f something is true, then it must be true that it is true, and it must be true that it is true that it is true (and so on).Even if the infinite regress is established through a different line of reasoning, the fact still remains that "truth" implies an infinite regress, and that it must be true that something is true, and true that it is true that the thing is true... ad infinitum. Since he is saying his position is "true" (which entails an infinite regress), but he argues against an infinite regress; he is destroying his own argument extensively in the process.No Moral DisagreementPro starts off this part of his overall case by shifting the burden of proof. He claims that it may be the the case that our assumption is wrong, but I have given no reason to suppose so. However, he has the burden of proof to establish the resolution true. It not being the case that our assumption is wrong is necessary to prove his conclusion true. I also have a problem with saying "our" assumption, as we as individuals all have different assumptions. Now, my opponent claims that the best reason for why we assume we are disagreeing about facts of the matter beyond our psychological states is because it is true, and morality is indeed objective. This sets off red flags right away, as I am not sure how this follows at all. Also, as I said, we all assume different things. For example, I for one do not assume we are disagreeing about actual facts of the matter beyond our psychological states. Since we all have different assumptions, and lack thereof, I think that I would ask Pro to speak for himself and refrain from using words like "we" and "our" in the context that he is. Pro accuses of me of straw-manning his position when I claimed that Pro's stance is that "we cannot debate things unless we have an objective answer". If this is the case, then I apologize as that was not my intention. Pro further clarifies his argument that if Moral Subjectivism is true, then nobody is actually disagreeing:"What I'm saying is that on moral subjectivism you aren't actually disagreeing." - Pro The above is false. We could disagree about whether something is objectively wrong or not even if nothing is objectively wrong. For example, we can debate about whether hip-hop is better than rock even though neither one is actually better; it boils down to what you like more. Even if nobody is disagreeing about a real fact, we could still disagree based on would it would be like if it was real. We would still be exchanging words which describe our views; which accounts for the apparent observation of moral disagreement with regards to objective morality under Moral Subjectivism, without having to presuppose we are disagreeing about a fact that is the case, and which entails objective morality. I can argue that the Godfather is a better movie than Gigli all I want as if it is true, but if you don't believe that, you are no more right than me as this is a subjective issue. Pro completely ignores Keith Augustine's quote which explains that it is not necessary to assume that there is no moral dispute under Moral Subjectivism as well.Why do we feel we are right if there is no right answer? I am secluded from your subjective experience, which creates an extreme bias. This produces intuitions that the other person is wrong when this is not the case. This is not some ad hoc explanation as similar examples can be found in reality with regards to our lives in many areas. I gave a movie and music example but there are others. My view is that red is a better color than blue for the living room of my my new house, and my girlfriend disagrees as her view is that blue is better. We argued, but the fact of the matter is that there is no objectively right answer to the question: Q: "Which color is better for this wall?"Thus, even if people disagree under Moral Subjectivism, assuming that Moral Subjectivism can account for this apparent observation of disagreement in the fashion I described is not ad hoc work, as other similar examples exist in large quantities pertaining to what I am proposing. Moral InfallibilityPro continues to argue that if Moral Subjectivism is true there would be nothing to deliberate on. This is false. We could debate about whether it is objectively right or wrong to abort a baby; even if there is no objectively right answer to the question. If one goes back to my example in this round, me and my girlfriend argued about what color to paint the room as if there was an objectively correct answer, even though there wasn't. Thus, even if Moral Subjectivism is true, it is not far-fetched to assume that we could argue about moral issues as if there is a correct answer, even though there is not. There would only be a contradiction in this context under Moral Subjectivism if it was actually true that there is an objectively correct answer to certain moral questions. That assumption doesn't follow from the notion that we debate as if it is true. Just like how there is no right answer as to what color we should have painted the room (she just likes blue, and I like red), even though we argued as if there was an objectively correct answer. My opponent then claims that with my father analogy, my father's reasons figure into my new disapproval of punching old people in the face. So what? How does that contradict Moral Subjectivity? Pro claims that those reasons don't figure into determining what is good or not to me; only my approval or disapproval does if morality is subjective. Why assume this is true? As I said in my first round, reasons for approval might only be a necessary condition for Moral Subjectivity, while approval is the sufficient condition. Additionally, if I disprove of X for reason Z, that doesn't necessarily mean I think Z is an objectively "good" reason, just that it falls in lines with my current feelings. Feelings change all the time, so if I take my father's view, that in no way implies that his view is the "correct" view. This way of arguing against Moral Subjectivity falls short. ArbitrarinessThis section is rather absurd. The reason for approval/ disapproval itself cannot account for, or explain by itself why something is good to me or bad to me. Lets say that I disapprove of raping girls because it enduces negative emotions in me and I feel sympathy for the girl in question and the people who care about her. There is nothing about that reason which makes it required that I disapprove of it. Thus, it isn't sufficient for subjective morality by Pro's own definitions of it. It just so happens, due to my preference, that I do not approve of it for that reason; and only when we have that disapproval do we have a sufficient condition. The argument from my opponent is bizarre, as Moral Subjectivity presupposes that the existence of beings would be a necessary condition for subjective morality, as no type of morality would have any meaning without conscious beings. This is self-evidently a necessary condition for any approval or disapproval. Implying that I would endorse a theory where approval by itself gets us subjective morality is ludicrous, as approval/ disapproval cannot occur without certain necessary conditions (such as beings existing). If that is not what Pro is implying, then I see no reason why we cannot view the reason for approval/ disapproval as just another necessary condition, but not a sufficient condition for Moral Subjectivity. The reason for approval/ disapproval is not enough to establish that "x is good or bad to me", it is only a necessary condition; approval/ disapproval is the sufficient condition, and they have necessary conditions; this view doesn't seem to have any logical problemsConclusionPro's argument fails to stand up to critical scrutiny; the resolution has not been established. Sources[1] Critical Reflection: A Textbook for Critical Thinking by Robert Malcolm Murray and Nebojsa Kujundzic (P. 134)