The United States ought to extend to noncitizens accused of terrorism the same constitutional due pr

I negate: I value morality as ought implies a moral obligation. Before we form a society we are in a state of anarchy called the state of nature. Celeste Friend[1] explains: “In the State of Nature,men are exclusively self-interested, they areequal to one another, there are limited resources, andthere is no powerto force men to cooperate. Given these conditionsthe State of Nature would be unbearably brutal.every person is always in fear of losing his life.They have no capacity to ensurelong-term satisfaction of their needs.No long-term cooperation is possible because the State of Nature [is]a state of utter distrust.Most people wantto avoid their own deaths,, the State of Nature is the worst possible situation in which men can find themselves. It is the state of perpetual and unavoidable war.” And, The Leviathan is a Hobbesian theory of the social contract that accounts for the only working possibility of preventing the state of nature with any certainty. As Cristine Travis[2] explains: “Hobbes proposes that the best solutionisthe Leviathan.The Leviathan is therepresentative of the people, andhas a monopoly on violence, taking of property, and other actions that hadoccurred in the state of nature. The Leviathan isauthorized to do whatever is necessary to maintain the commonwealth. This can includecurtailing liberties when they place [society]at risk.” Thus, we form a contractual government where people consent to state authority in order to get rights in return. This means the best criterion for the round is promoting the leviathian, which is contextualize and preserving the state and not returning to the state of nature. Thus my burden is to show that the leviathan doesn’t owe rights to non-citizens accused of terrorism. Contention 1: Rights can only be guaranteed by consenting to the state which terrorists do not, meaning no due process rights. Arthur Ripstein writes: ARTHUR RIPSTEIN [professor of law and of philosophy at the University of Toronto, doctorate in philosophy from the University of Pittsburgh, a degree in law from Yale]. Authority and Coercion. Philosophy & Public Affairs , no.1 2004. “Contract enables rights, If you and I make a contract, each of us agrees to confer a benefit upon the other, and each of us transfers the right to expect that benefit to the other. We act interdependently and consensually.;contract is distinctive because it creates an entitlement: you can complain if I fail to perform, because I have failed to give you something to which you have a right. Without a contract, you cannot complain if your expectations are frustrated. In the case of a contract, I do not possess you: I only have the use of your powers in the manner specified by the contract” This means no due process rights for non-citizens accused of terrorism because: A) The nature of terrorism is distinct from domestic crimes because they happen on an international scene of one small group attacking a larger nation. There’s no international contract or board that promises due process rights or terrorists consent to. Even if there was, that would be insufficient because the resolution specifies the same rights as the U.S. which obviously a non-citizen doesn’t consent to B) The resolution specifies non-citizens as opposed to US citizens granting that they fall out of line of traditional contractual agreement between states and it’s citizens. They may argue that the state can still give them rights but that would only make it permissible not obligatory which is the aff burden. In forming the Leviathan, we give it our consent to do whatever is necessary to prevent the return of the State of Nature. Travis 2 continues: “The will isthe last thought a person has before making a decision,a person consentingout of fear of the state of nature is still giving consent. \a person consenting to the Leviathanas a way out of the state of nature is also givingconsent to the actions of the Leviathanthis person has authorized the Leviathan to do whatever is necessary to keepsociety from returning to the state of nature.” Thus, when we choose to form the Leviathan, we give it right to do whatever is necessary to prevent the return of the state of nature. And this means it’s necessary to restrict the rights of suspected non-citizen terrorists because the risk of their activities causing a disturbance and inciting chaos and the return of the state of nature is too large to allow them to possess rights that might allow them to go back out to what they were doing before, especially if the suspicions are true. Taking away these rights will mean, more often than not, that the prevention of terrorism is continued, which thus keeps the state of nature from returning.Now, let's look at the AC quickly. As an overview to the AC:1. My opponent is failing to actually uphold the resolution in two ways because a) he's not actually proving that we OUGHT to do something but rather that we SHOULD do something. The difference there being that he doesn't prove why we are morally obligated. His only arguments are that because the constitution says we can give them and that certain prisons treat them poorly that we possess a moral obligation to do it, but this is unwarranted and there's no link between the two. The critical problem is that he poses no ethical system to back up his claims. This means that not only is he not actually proving the resolution true, but rather a differently worded version of it, but that you also have to prefer the negative's framework as I'm the only one providing any way to evaluate what is moral and what isn't moral. This means we look to the Leviathan when evaluating the debate. 2. Even if my opponent is proving that it is morally good, that's literally all he is proving. Refer back to the fact that my opponent and I agree that the word "ought" in the resolution implies a moral obligation, and he does nothing to prove that we have a moral obligation to extend out these rights. AT BEST, he's coming close to proving why it's a morally permissible action, but the link is missing as for why a morally permissible action is morally obligatory to take. You can also cross-apply the second reason why I said the Ripstein evidence negates that states this. This means that even if you don't look to the negative's framework, the AC isn't doing enough work to affirm the resolution and you presume neg off of a risk of offense and a risk of a link.Now, let's look at his contentions. You can group them all.1. You can cross apply the Ripstein evidence I read in my case that says that because terrorists do not consent to the US, they are not guarenteed the rights to due process. This is going to completely wipe out all of his contention level arguments since they revolve around the fact that the constitution can extend them these rights, however since the terrorists do not consent to the constitution, they aren't guarenteed the rights.2. There's no link back to the resolution. Even if he's winning 100% offense off of his contentions, this doesn't prove an obligation in any way, only rather that it's permissible. He's missing the link there, don't let him try to come back and create one off the top of his head since it's not in his case.So the debate breaks down really simply. My opponent isn't proving why he's being moral in the first place, meaning you presume that the negative framework is true, or why we are morally obligated instead of it just being morally permissible. And since I'm negating any offense coming from his contentions, there isn't any other way to vote except for con. [1] Friend, Celeste. "Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy." Social Contract TheoryÂ []. N.p., n.d. Web. 31 Aug. 2012. <http://www.iep.utm.edu...;. [2] Traivs, Cristine. "Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan - Philosophy, Explanation, Summary." Yahoo! Contributor Network. N.p., n.d. Web. 31 Aug. 2012. <http://voices.yahoo.com...;.