Resolved: God Exists

Thank you, Tejretics :)Cosmological argumentContingencyCon misunderstands my argument, I do not say that:'in a group of variables x, y, and z, wherein x, y, and z are individually contingent, then there must have been a non-contingent origin for x, y and z'Obviously this is not necessarily true. Instead, what I do say is that if we identify all contingent entities and put them in a set (S), then S is contingent (as contingency is a transferable property from part to whole).But what is S contingent on?S cannot be contingent on another contingent entity, as then S wouldn't be the set of all contingent entities (there would be an external contingent entity). Therefore S must be contingent on a necessary entity. Con then cites the Hume-Edwards Principle. Yet this doesn't solve the problem. If there is a causal chain X > Y > Z > ... , then all the Hume-Edwards Principle does is explain the existence of a given entity within that chain (for example, X's explanation would by Y). What the Principle does not do, at least soundly, is explain the existence of the chain as a whole. Relating to the cosmological argument, even if some event within the universe is explained by another event, if we group all the events into a set, then we still haven't explained the set as a whole.Con states that I 'must first prove that everything is contingent'.But I have already given inductive proof; namely that we know all the fundamental particles within the universe (i.e the standard model) and we know these particles to be contingent. And as everything is made up of these particles then we have reasonable grounds to conclude that everything is contingent.SentienceNext, the question is asked of why the necessary cause of the universe is a sentient, intelligent ruler.But this does not matter! The aim of the cosmological argument is only to prove that a transcendent creator of the universe exists, it falls upon the ontological argument and the religious experience argument to assert that this creator is intelligent and sentient. Nonetheless, the fact that we observe the grand complexity and scale of the universe should suggest that its creator is intelligent. Just as if we observe a huge supercomputer we can conclude that its creator must be intelligent.OmniscienceCon presents a syllogism that presumably aims to render the concept of contingency as at odds with an omniscient being.The premise I dispute is P4:'Definite certainty implies lack of contingency.'But this premise is based upon the human faculty of certainty. Namely that we, as human beings, are uncertain of contingent entities or events, but this is only because we have limited intellect or epistemic ability.Yet if a being is omniscient, then there is no contradiction in an omniscient being knowing with certainty about contingent entities. As human persons, we can know about contingent entities, although our certainty about such entities is limited because our finite intellect cannot infallibly foresee and recollect future and past contingencies.But if the intellect is not finite, then we can be certain of contingent entities, because our intellect is sufficient to foresee and/or recollect the future and the past. Hence God could be omniscient and be consequently certain of everything despite contingency.Ontological ArgumentMy opponent starts off by attacking the uncontroversial premise that God's existence in reality is possible, he claims it is a 'bare assertion'.This is odd, because Con seems to believe that everything is impossible unless proven possible. Yet this is absurd. Being possible is the 'default' state, it can only be claimed that something is necessary or impossible if proven so, otherwise it is possible. Hence something is possible unless it is proven impossible.More to the point, a metaphysical impossibility would contain a logical incoherency, yet none is present in God so we can negate the claim that God is metaphysically impossible.Therefore, God is metaphysically possible.Is existence a predicate? Firstly, I think that I should highlight that existence is a positive property and this is demonstrated epistemologically, which in turn suggests that there are metaphysical grounds for supposing that existence is, metaphysically, a positive property. This is because our epistemology reflects metaphysical truths if we accept the veracity of our epistemic faculties. Hence we can give analogies of how we perceive existence, and then use this basis to inductively assert the positivity (or lack thereof) of existence in a metaphysical sense.I did give an analogy, that an existent cure to cancer is greater than a non-existent cure to cancer, but Con made the valid argument that existence can be not great. For example; existent evil is less great than non-existent evil.But this rebuttal does not refute the ontological argument, it merely prompts us to reclarify that existence is a positive property if it is possessed by an good thing.This assertion is supported inductively by the fact that we epistemologically perceive existence to be a positive property, and hence there is inductive proof that existence is a metaphysically positive property. Con seems to maintain that there is no connection whatsoever between epistemology and metaphysical truths, yet epistemology is intrinsically geared towards reflecting metaphysical truths - so if something is demonstrated epistemologically then this implies that there is a corresponding metaphysical reality.Ontological non-existenceIn this apparent reversal of the ontological argument, Con attempts to prove that God actually does not exist.But the problem with this argument is P3. This premise is unwarranted - the premise that God is non-existent in all possible worlds does not follow from the previous premise that God is conceivable as non-existent. I could also take issue with P1, as if my ontological argument is sound, then P1 is false. This is because my argument demonstrates the incoherency of the idea of God not existing.Subjective existenceAs Con insists that I stick by his definition of existence, I will do so.But anyhow, something can still exist objectively in the mind. For example, if I imagine a house, then the idea of that house exists objectively in my mind. Either I am imagining it or I am not - the veracity of the statement 'I am imagining a house' is an objective, not a subjective statement. This is because subjective statements can have differing veracity dependent on individual judgement, but whether I am imagining a house or not is not dependent on individuals' judgements.So, the first conclusion (C1) of the ontological argument is affirmed. God can exist objectively in the mind as an idea. The dichotomy remains of whether God only exists in the mind as an idea, or whether he exists both in the mind as an idea as well as existing in actual reality.GreatnessCon disputes whether omnipotence and omniscience are necessarily great. The word 'great' entails a certain concept of magnanimity, which is to say that a 'great' being possesses good qualities in abundance. Hence a maximally great being would possess all good qualities in infinite abundance. Power, knowledge and love are intuitively good qualities (even if we cannot exactly pinpoint *why* they are), so we can cogently suppose that a maximally great being would be all-powerful, all-knowing and all-loving.Religious ExperienceI extend this argument.Naturalistic origin of the universeMy opponent's entire case here rests on the premise that gravity was preexistent to the Big Bang. He cites a respectable source, but his source does not say this.Furthermore, the proposition that gravity was preexistent to the Big Bang demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of what gravity actually is.'In modern physics, gravity is most accurately described by the general theory of relativity (proposed by Einstein) which describes gravity as a consequence of the curvature of spacetime.' (1)This seems to entail that gravity is contingent on spacetime, as if spacetime does not exist, then curvature of spacetime cannot exist and hence gravity cannot exist.Therefore, it does not make sense to propose that gravity existed before spacetime.Con does go on to assert that some sort of 'gravitational space' existed before the Big Bang, but he does not give a source for this so it remains an unwarranted assertion. Furthermore, this 'gravitational space' would analytically have to exist within the universe, as the universe is defined as:'all existing matter and space considered as a whole' (2)So if the 'gravitational space' exists, then it would have to be within the universe by definition (as it is 'space'). And so we still haven't reached a naturalistic explanation for the origin of the universe.Mass-energy equivalenceThis argument does not work, as the question is regarding the source of all physical matter, so it does not matter that mass can become energy and vice-versa, because it does not explain why mass and energy exist at all.CCR1For so long as the universe exists, it violates the conservation of energy because more energy exists now than did before the universe. So this would imply that the conservation of energy has been violated for nearly 14 billion years. Quantum fluctuations cannot be responsible for this.CCR2I have already raised the problems with a 'gravitational space'.ParsimonyI accept that naturalism is simpler than theism, but this does not refute theism at all.For example, creationism is simpler than evolution, but this does not refute the latter. This because the evidence supports evolution, and evidence rightly supersedes simplicity._______(1) http://en.wikipedia.org...(2) http://www.oxforddictionaries.com...