Atheistic Objective Morality

Thanks Con for that response.After reading Con's remarks, I still affirm that morality can be objective.*Con's Problems With Pro*Con mentions:"My opponent begins by making a misconception...I meant that many people would disagree that homeostasis is a valid way of measuring morality objectively."My response:So what?Many people disagree that evolution is a valid way of explaining biodiversity, but that doesn't make evolution invalid or subjective.*Con's Assessment*Con assesses:"My opponent fails to justify why suffering is the valid unit of measurement for morality."My response:Con, we're at philosophical bedrock here...you're asking why should human well being/suffering be considered in morality, when morality is the way we act toward each other.Really?I invite readers to look at the definition of morality in this debate - "right and wrong behavior."What is behavior other than how we act with each other?behaviour - the way in which one acts or conducts oneself, especially towards others:http://www.oxforddictionaries.com...Notice, I used the British spelling for my opponent.What Con wants me to do then is show that human well being should be considered when determining the way that humans act toward each other.Without considering human well being/suffering, there is no behavior *towards others*, there's just nonreactive, isolated actions.Can con defend that position, that acting *towards others* doesn't exist?If we can both agree that acting *towards others* exists, then we can both agree that there are positive actions towards others and negative actions towards others.Fortunately, we have a wonderful objective unit of measurement.The absence of suffering, which can be reduced to homeostasis.We must consider human well being when behaving towards others...that's what good and bad behavior is. *Metaethics, Blah, Blah, Blah*Con repeats:"Which brings me back to the point of metaethics and normative ethics. [Pro's case] is normative ethical and therefore, by definition, subjective (when it isn"t justified with a metaethical framework)...there is no way of determining which one is correct without a metaethical framework...proving it to be preferable to other metaethical systems of morality."My response:Since homeostasis isn't a social norm or social standard, I'm not normative ethically defining anything, instead, I'm using a standard that is neither a behavior nor normative; homeostasis removes norms and embraces an objective standard that *can be* used to determine if actions lead toward this goal or away from it.*Perspectives On Morality*Con points out:"My opponent believes that we should be considering human well being."My response:Call me crazy I guess.Con continues:"A believer in intellectualism would believe that the action that produces the most knowledge is the most moral action."My response:Ok, though beliefs are irrelevant here, even in this case, the intellectualist is valuing human well being, because having knowledge is a means to better the human, i.e. increase well being.The intellectualist isn't valuing knowledge because it typically causes detriments to homeostasis, rather the intellectualist still agrees that the fruits of knowledge increase well being.Con adds:"A utilitarian would value happiness."My response:A utilitarian therefore values homeostasis, no?Con had mentioned:"A believe in welfarism would argue that a moral action is an action that economic well being or welfare."My response:The welfarist values welfare, and without homeostasis, there is no welfare, so the welfarist's attempt to have economic well being is rooted in the welfarist's attempt to achieve human well being, quite in contrast to suffering, no?So Con asks:"What makes your system (ie. well being) any better than any of the other possible option I put in that sentence that you used."My response:I don't have to prove *better*, I have to prove *objective*, and, so far, you've given a bunch of perspectives that ALL consider human well being in one form or another...what does that tell you Con?Philosophical bedrock.Con agrees:"Yes, homeostasis can factually measure SUFFERING."But then, when I mentioned that true well being involves homeostasis,Con claims:"You are asserting this as if it is a fact that homeostasis is the correct way of measuring well being..."My response:Well, which is it Con?Well-being exists in opposition to suffering, and you've already conceded that homeostasis factually measures suffering.So, we both agree that homeostasis factually measures the lack of well-being...sounds objective to me.Con continues:"You are asserting...that homeostasis is the correct way of...ultimately determining what is right and wrong"My response:Yeah, determining right and wrong "actions towards others" must consider "others" when determining right and wrong; since homeostasis is our objective standard, there are clear actions that lead to/away from the well being of those "others" we are acting towards.Con asserts:"[Homeostasis is] NOT an objective unit of measurement for right and wrong actions."My response:Con, with respects to the phrase "towards others," how can one not consider the well being of those others when determining right and wrong behavior towards them?All of your perspectives on morality seem to indicate a standard of well being too.Con furthers:"You have subjectively decided that one (of many) objective conditions should be used to measure morality. This is not objective morality. This is subjective morality using a subjectively decided objective condition."My response:Since morality necessarily includes actions *towards others*, it isn't subjective to consider *others'* well-being when acting *towards others*.Therefore, the objective condition, homeostasis, isn't subjectively decided as a standard for others' well being; it's the indicator of it; it serves as our standard of actions *towards others*.*Conclusion*The resolution is very clear that morality *can be* objective.I must remind readers of this.If we use well being-->homeostasis as the standard for morality, and Con agrees that homeostasis is an objective condition, then, by using this objective standard, morality *can be* objective.That's all I have to affirm here...that little *can be*.Since morality can be objective, given my framework, one must affirm.Con?