The Kalām Cosmolgical Argument attempts to prove very little.

What makes this debate more interesting than the myriad other KCA debates on this website is that we are looking at the implications of the argument rather than its soundness. It is my assertion that if the KCA is indeed sound, then the implications are quite remarkable. In fact, if I've done my job rightly, then atheists will have even more to strike the KCA down.1. The KCA points to a personal creator.A common criticism of the KCA is that it only points to a first cause, and that the cause might be anything. This couldn't be farther from the truth. It is possible to determine several characteristics of the first cause through transcendental necessity, all of which point to something that looks more like God than my opponent would have us believe. The necessary qualities of the first cause are as follows:Timeless. Our universe is temporal, and any first cause would by necessity have to transcend time. Time is finite due to the impossibility of the contrary. An actual infinite number of past events is logically absurd. While infinity as a concept is useful in mathematical abstractions, an infinite number of things is entirely unintelligible. It cannot even be accurately thought in the mind. Since time is finite, anything that caused our temporality must be outside of it. It would be absurd to say that our time begat our time.Let it not be said that our time was caused by another time and consider the matter closed. When we talk about the first cause, we are talking about the ultimate first cause, not merely the cause of our present cosmos. All temporal entities require a beginning for the reason I stated above. Thus, at some point, we come to a being that must transcend temporality altogether.Spaceless. Just as our time cannot beget our time, our space cannot beget our space. Thus, the first cause is ultimately spaceless, at least insofar as we experience it. It would certainly be absurd to think that the first cause was merely two-dimensional, for such a being would have no way to think of a third-dimension, just as we can't accurately think of what a fourth dimension of space would be like. Minimally, the first cause is extra-dimensional, but it could also be spaceless altogether. Either way, it must transcend our spatiality.Changeless. By transcendental necessity, anything that is timeless must also be changeless. Change itself is an event, and events are temporal.Immaterial. By transcendental necessity, anything that is changeless must be immaterial. Anything with material existence is modally contingent. Material-ness is defined by its temporality. Something is never truly believed to have come from nothing. Only abstract entities, like the number 2, are truly changeless. The number 2 does not need time and space to be the number 2, and it will never not be the number 2.Unimaginably Powerful. Our cosmos is massive in scope. While the laws that govern it are simple, the sheer amount of energy contained within it is beyond our ability to fully comprehend. The sheer amount of matter is astonishingly great. Therefore, whatever caused our universe is incredibly powerful. Its resources and energy must exceed that of this cosmos. And if the cause of this cosmos was another temporal cosmos, then the first cause is even more powerful still.Personal. There are only two kinds of things that are both timeless and immaterial: minds and abstract objects (like the number 2). Since abstract numbers cannot stand in causal relations to the universe, by process of elimination, we can rightly conclude that the first cause is a mind. Moreover, the first cause is a free agent. An impersonal mechanically operating cause is not a possibility since such a cause cannot exist without its effect. If such a machine contains within it the sufficient condition for a temporal effect then it must also have temporal effects built into it as well, which defeats the aforementioned timelessness.Only an immaterial mind that freely chooses to create time can do so without defeating the necessary precondition of timelessness and changelessness, since such a thing does not require any antecedent determining conditions in order to produce a temporal effect.What we find is that, if the KCA is sound, then it points to a timeless, spaceless, changeless, immaterial, powerful, personal cause. Of course, the existence of such a being has its own implications as well.2. The KCA undermines naturalistic presuppositions.There are many that might grant me the above conclusions and say, "so what?" Just because the cause was a mind doesn't necessarily mean the cause is involved in this universe. Cynics would say that, at best, I've only argued for deism. Such skepticism, however, fails to account for the impact that even deism has for naturalism.The fundamental presupposition of naturalism is that the cosmos is all there is, ever was, and ever will be. If the KCA is true, then naturalism is patently false. As naturalism falls, so does all purely naturalistic explanations of human experience. Naturalistic views on morality and science cannot be taken for granted. If the KCA is sound, then it is utterly irrational not to consider the possibility that morality comes from outside our cosmos, even if the first cause is inaccessible to us. If the KCA is sound, then it is utterly irrational to entirely discount the possibility of miracles. If the KCA is sound, then science cannot possibly be the final authority on what is true.3. The KCA makes the resurrection plausible.Theists are often asked to provide extraordinary evidence for their extraordinary claims. Christians, in particular, hold to the actuality of Jesus Christ's resurrection from the dead. Since the KCA points to a personal creator and renders naturalism false, there is no rational basis upon which the resurrection can be dismissed as too extraordinary to have occurred. The existence of a personal being with immeasurable power makes it completely plausible, no matter how unlikely.ConclusionThe KCA does not prove the truth of Christianity or any other specific religion, but that hardly means it proves very little. On the contrary, the implications of the KCA's conclusion are far reaching and worldview shattering. It points to a powerful personal creator, which in turn defeats naturalism. As a result, miracles cannot be dismissed as impossible and opens up resurrection as a plausible event. To think that these three things are "little" is dubious to say the least.As a courtesy to my opponent I am withholding my rebuttal until the next round so that he may use all his allotted characters in rebuttal rather than having to spread himself thin in both rebuttal and defense. This should keep the debate focused for the readers and each other.