Aquinas' First Way succeeds

Also, I would like to point out to any readers that Pro and I both understand the BOP and agree. Smooth sailing so far, but rough waters are ahead for Pro and his case. Pro's response to my "non-being to being as a change" objectionPro responds to my objection that non-being to being is not a change of a particular thing, by saying, "I agree that a non-existent thing itself does not have 'potentiality', but the non-existent thing is still 'potential', in that it can potentially exist. "I'd like to thank Pro for this claffification. I'll agree that if we're not using strictly Aristotelian senses of the term "potential" then the existence of something is a "potential" that is, it is possible to be (or exists in some possible worlds), even if it is not a potential of something. But due to Pro's restatment of the argument, it is now clear that Pro is not explicitly arguing that the existence of the universe is actualized, but rather that the general change of the universe is actualized by another. This could be any sort of change which we view in our day to day lives, or it could even be changes such as the expansion of space. The argument restated. .. Pro has graciously restated his argument in a very clear and concise manner:1. The universe actualizes.2. Something cannot actualize itself. C: Therefore the universe must ultimately be actualized by something outside of it, that does not need to be actualized, which can only be God. He further clarifies "actualization means to go from one state to another. "Premise 1Due to misunderstanding earlier, I thought that Pro meant that the universe was constantly being actualized from non-being to being. While I don't doubt Pro would argue that the existence of the universe is also a cause of God (which is irrellevant to this debate), this is not what the premise reads. I will concede this first premise; the universe actualizes. Premise 2Premise 2 is where I shall devote most of my attention to arguing. Pro's argument in favor of Premise 2 seems to be mostly this:"It seems intuitively certain that something does not move itself to a new state (again it is absurd to think that an ice cube melts itself"While I shall agree that it does, on face value, seem intuitive that something cannot move itself to a new state, this is not necessarily the case. First of all, intuitions are often wrong. While we may cling to them at first due to our human nature, when evidence to the contrary is presented, it is absurd to hold to our intuitions. I shall proceed to cast doubt upon Premise 2 of the argument, which states "Something cannot actualize itself. "The conception argumentTo begin with, I'd like to say something about possibilites and conception. Everything which we can conceive of is at least metaphysically possible. This can be shown by viewing the impossibility of conceiving metaphysical impossibilities. We cannot even conceive of a metaphysical impossibility such as a square triangle. The reason behind this is that a square triangle is inherently and metaphysically impossible. I don't think Pro will argue this at all. With that idea in mind, I shall procceed to my argument. P1: IF self-actualization is metaphysically impossible, THEN self-actualization is inconceivable. P2: Self-actualization is not inconceivable. C: . '. , Self-actualization is metaphysically impossible. This argument is logically valid; it is a modus tollens. [1] Thus, my opponent must show that either premise is false. Premise 1 has already been demonstrated as true. I shall argue briefly in favor of premise 2. We can close our eyes, and imagine something moving without any external cause. I would use my 4x4 Rubik's cube as an example. Try to really conceive and imagine the Rubik's cube solving itself without any external cause. Can you do it? If the answer is yes, then you've conceived of self-actualization. This suffices to show Premise 2. InertiaAnother substantial response to Premise 2 is Inertia. P1: IF Inertia is true, THEN an external actualizer is not needed. P2: Inertia is true. C: . '. , An external actualizer is not needed. This is a logically valid modus ponens argument. [2]Sir Issaac Newton writes, "Law I: Every body persists in its state of being at rest or of moving uniformly straight forward, except insofar as it is compelled to change its state by force impressed. " [3]Premise 2 is clearly true, since it is accepted as true by literally every physicist, and is considered one of the laws of physics. Premise 1 also seems to be true. If something can simply persist in its actualization with regards to spatial position without any external cause, Pro's 2nd Premise is dubious. Free will argumentThe free will argument also carries a good deal of force, and it runs thus. .. P1: IF self-actualization is impossible, THEN there is no free-will. P2: There is free-will. C: . '. , self-actualization is possible. What is free will? Right now I am tired, yet I'm determined to finish this reply before I go to bed. Why doesn't my tiredness simply cause me to go to bed (or to fall asleep, which it may yet)? The answer is obvious: Because I do not choose to go to bed yet. Let's use the analogy of a compass. I am able to somehow direct myself towards what I want to do. However, if this actualization is caused entirely by something external, I do not have any free will at all. Now Pro could simply say, "Very well. You don't have free will" and that would be that, but then he would have to account for my illusion of free will. If I have no free will, why do I think I do? False dichotomyMy last argument shall be that Pro presents a false dichotomy of sorts. Namely that either something is actualized by another, or is actualized by itself, or is actualized by nothing. Pro thinks that the only one of these which is possible is the first. But they seem to ignore a very simple possibility. Perhaps something is not actualized by anything. It seems very odd to jump to the conclusion that "caused by nothing" and "having no cause" are the same thing. One assumes there is a cause (which is nothing) the other says that there is no cause in the first place. So why can't something just have no cause at all? Not that it is caused by nothing, but that is has no cause. Infinite regressI agree with Pro that an infinite regress is impossible. This topic will not be brought into question in this debate. ClosingIn closing, I would like to point out that I don't think Pro has not successfully demonstrated why the unmoved mover is purely actual. For, suppose that the unmoved mover were not purely actual and had some admixture of potential. In this condition, the unmoved mover would not require another actualizer, but still would not be purely actual. Pro has argued that actualized potentials require a cause, but not that something with potentials requires an external cause. [1] . http://en.wikipedia.org...;[2] . http://en.wikipedia.org...[3] . http://en.wikipedia.org...