The Argument from Meaning

Special thanks to my opponent, who has graciously provided a superior formulation. I was concerned more with how I will defend the premises than I was with whether it was logically valid. A costly error on my part, but I don't think it should effect the argumentation that was presented in my OP. There's much more that can be improved, as my opponent has shown, but as long as the essential concept of the argument is not shown to be completely ineffective at refuting naturalism, then I think I'll continue to hope that this has potential. That of course has nothing to do with whether I have won this debate unless I have successfully justified theism. My opponent has recommended replacing premise 4 with a "supernatural object" instead of God so as to strengthen the argument. While I can certainly see the use of this suggestion, I do not think it necessarily does good to the intention I had for giving an explanation of meaning. It seems to me that a supernatural object is too obscure to answer this need and only tells us that there is something beyond the natural realm. This is indeed sufficient to refute naturalism, but not enough to answer the question that I had in mind. In addition, a mere supernatural "object" would appear about as unintentional as matter. Other than it being non-natural, what would be the difference? For this to strengthen my argument, I'd have to know what sets it apart from naturalism (or God for that matter) in explanatory power. As I had elaborated in the OP, there are ultimately only two kinds of explanations of meaning - either it is created by some non-intentional object or it is created by something intentional like a rational mind. An object of the supernatural kind can only fall into either category and if the latter, I would not really call it an "object". I do anticipate a naturalist to deny either p3 or p4, but I don't see this as a problem unless my defense of the premises have been discredited. Simply because the naturalistic paradigm requires meaning to exist in matter does not warrant the claim that it is because that's begging the question. I don't think the fact that atheists are not committed to some of the premises is of any surprise. Most arguments in philosophy suffer from the same situation so this is nothing unique to the argument from meaning. The question is whether I can successfully surmount their criticisms enough to convince them that their worldview is not a satisfactory account of reality. My opponent objects that I cannot accomplish this since the premises are only acceptable to a theist. This is certainly true of an advocator of any argument. If the premises are validly sound and accepted by the opponent, then they must concede to the truth of the conclusion and therefore become an advocator of the argument as well. To rephrase the problem, I have been accused of begging the question in favor of theism by "preaching to the choir". This can be viewed as such by someone with prior commitments to naturalism but merely because I present premises that contradict the worldview that one is reasonably committed to does not entail that I am begging the question. It is quite possible that my premises "ought" to be accepted as more reasonable than their beliefs. Furthermore, I do not think that this makes physicalism have primacy over the question of meaning. Because I may have confused my opponent, I need to clarify that premise 2 is not equivalent to saying that meaning exists in a "non-physical mind". Perhaps it is physical but that is irrelevant to the fundamental problem of why there exists meaning instead of meaninglessness. Failure to address this from a naturalistic frameworks warrants the belief that this is a contradiction that demonstrably proves naturalism as false. This is not to be confused as just an argument for the falsity of naturalism, however, as that is not the point. I am merely seeking a satisfactory explicans of the explanandum. Whether I have proved the falsity of naturalism or the truth of God as an explanation for meaning is indeed a matter of debate which is what we're here for. **As for studying dualism and physicalism thoroughly, I will gladly take the suggestion! I would make the point that if I'm trying to prove dualism, why could they not simply assume that the brain is physical because that's entailed by their paradigm? There seems to be no particular difference between that and the problem of meaning. The argument from meaning seems to be a good aid to accompany my study of dualism and physicalism. If anything, I see the argument as a sound tool in the theistic toolbox for refuting physicalism. Even though it might not be the best of the tools, I still think it is an interesting one.