The 'Problem of Evil' never succeeds (Attempt 1), Pt. 2

INTRODUCTION As we are reaching the half-way mark in this debate it might be helpful to remind ourselves of what the central issue is and what has been uncovered so far regarding it. The resolution I am arguing for is that no versions of the PoE argument succeed at proving the non-existence of God as believed under biblical Christian theism. My opponent, TheSkeptic, accepted the challenge of providing a PoE argument that does precisely that, having chosen to argue that the probability of gratuitous evil proves the improbability of God. We have agreed on the nature and character of the God at issue, what gratuitous evil means, and that the two are mutually exclusive. Having presented his argument in a clear and understandable way, its success or failure turns on the issue of probability. Because Skeptic has not given me any indication that he accepts the important relationship between probability and possibility that I'm arguing from—especially since he charges me with "glossing over" the probability of gratuitous evil—I shall assume that there might be some people following this debate who do not see the relationship. Given that my criticism draws heavily from that relationship, it is vitally important for me to make it clear, relevant, and thereby acceptable. To say that X is probable is to say that X is more likely to be the case than not (derived from the Latin 'probabilis', "likely"). [1] However, the probability of X is grounded upon its being possible. To say that X is possible is to say that X is capable of being the case (from the Latin 'potent', "to be able"). [2] So let me flesh out what this looks like for us. If X is POSSIBLE, then the chances of it being the case are greater than 0 percent (able to be). If X is PROBABLE, then the chances of it being the case are greater than 50 percent (likely to be). This is why probability is grounded upon possibility. If X is impossible, then its probability is zero—that is, not probable at all. [3] This is the basis supporting what (4) asserts: "If GE has a probability greater than zero, then GE is logically possible." My opponent's argument involves a far stronger premise, by positing that GE has a probability greater than 50 percent; i.e., more likely than not, and so inclines the mind to belief. [4] But in order for its probability to be greater than 50 percent, its probability must be greater than 0 percent. This is self-evident. To put the matter in the language I've been using all along, in order for GE to be probable it must first be possible. Since the success or failure of his argument turns on the issue of probability, a critical analysis of its possibility is not only relevant but fundamental. Hence, I am confronting his argument by attacking the very legs upon which it stands. THE ANALYSIS As I have argued—and Skeptic has now agreed in the preceding round—the matter of whether or not his argument begs the question centers on what (5) is asserting ("GE has a probability greater than zero"). If the assertion in this premise implies the non-existence of God, then his argument is question-begging since the non-existence of God is supposed to be proved (i.e., it is invalid to assume, directly or indirectly, the very thing supposed to be proved). Skeptic finds it "surprising" that I center my focus on applying the rules of inference to his argument, but it shouldn't be surprising; to demonstrate that his argument is invalid is to uphold the debate resolution: there are literally no versions of the PoE argument that succeed at proving the non-existence of God. Despite his subtle attack on my cognitive abilities ("If you have trouble conceiving of this type of objection"), my responses throughout this debate have shown that I understand very well what it means to describe some evils as 'probably' gratuitous, which I've now made especially clear above. But as I have shown consistently, asserting that gratuitous evil is probable assumes that gratuitous evil is possible! I've now described in very clear terms how this is so, as indicated also in (4) of my Round 1 and Round 2. It follows self-evidently, and Skeptic has rightly never contested it. And it is perfectly acceptable to assume that GE is possible. In countless cases it would be totally appropriate—but NOT in an argument whose target is BG! Why does an exception arise at that point? Because, and let the reader understand this clearly, GE and BG are logically contradictory, such that affirming one intrinsically denies the other (by definition of the very terms). A person can raise an argument that seeks to prove the non-existence of BG, but in such arguments he cannot include a premise that intrinsically denies the existence of BG. Doing so inappropriately begs the question. My opponent claims that his argument attempts "to move from the step that there can be gratuitous evil" to the claim that it probably exists. However, it is absolutely imperative for readers to recognize that such a step does not exist anywhere in his argument. That claim is false. At no point in my opponent's argument do we find a step that shows "there can be gratuitous evil." His argument simply assumes that point, which is how it commits the fallacy. He cannot simply presuppose that GE is possible and skip ahead to its degree of probability. He must back up and actually move through the step he neglected to move through, showing how gratuitous evil is even possible vis-ï¿½-vis the biblical God; i.e., he must confront (7) in my analysis. Then, and only then, could he move on to address its degree of probability. (Note: I have been ignoring his "pyramid" argument because (i) that is not our argument in this debate and (ii) he was only using it to demonstrate how probability arguments work, which I clearly understand already.) REFERENCES 1. "probable." Random House Dictionary, 2010. [http://dictionary.reference.com...] 2. "possible." Random House Dictionary, 2010. [http://dictionary.reference.com...] 3. "probability." Garth Kemerling, Dictionary of Philosophical Terms and Names [http://www.philosophypages.com...] 4. See definition (2) of "probable" at Random House Dictionary. [http://dictionary.reference.com...]