There are no compelling arguments against same-sex marriage

In this closing response, I want to begin by refocusing the goal of this debate. It was my intention to demonstrate that there in fact compelling arguments against SSM while my opponent sought to prove the opposite. To defend my position, I looked at the intrinsic nature of marriage through sex kinds to determine whether it had any special value over other relationships in order to warrant a legal establishment of it. It was my contention that heterosexuals causally ground human existence and thus have a distinct purpose that cannot be achieved by homosexuals in principle. This approach is inherently philosophical and has been met with the best objections that I think can be surmounted. However, from the start we have had some theoretical differences as to how this debate should be framed. Was the burden of proof just on me? Did I need to assume a liberal framework? To answer these specific questions, I will provide an outlined review of the previous arguments that were made and my summarized responses (R). This is a structure that I will be following in the next sections as well. Review: (1) The burden of proof is on those who are against liberty. (R) To claim a liberty has been violated, marriage must be defined. Therefore, the burden of proof is mutual. (2) Arguments against SSM must be uncontroversial. (R) This is self-refuting because it is itself a controversial conception of good. (3) Liberal states should allow SSM even if it is immoral or inferior to EHM. (R) You need a reason to do so, first of all, and legalizing SSM is not the same as allowing it. l. Philosophical Issues In essentialism, any kind of being must posses properties that define what it essentially is. A being with no essence cannot be anything at all. Normative conclusions are simply drawn from the descriptive essential properties of something, not from mere descriptive properties that are incidental to that being. What something "ought" to be is based on a kind's essence, not an expectation. This is not fallacious and is an essential metaphysic of this debate. Without it we could not claim that marriage "ought" to be anything, let alone claim that it is a universal human right. Given essentialism, one can derive an "ought" from the essential nature of something. However, because my opponent has denied essentialism, he has defeated his own position. Intrinsic value follows from this as the value exists within the nature of something, not just in its external application. Human individuals with intrinsic value collectively form a society and as such, have "intrinsic" social value because they ground society as intrinsically valuable individuals. How well they contribute is an issue of extrinsic value. Since heterosexual sex kinds have intrinsic value and also ground society, I think my opponent's argument is defeated. ll. Marriage and Sex Kinds To determine the nature of marriage, we looked at the nature of sex kinds and discovered that these ultimately exist FOR procreation with the opposite sex. We all participate in a sex kind but it is only until there is a relationship between the opposite sex that this purpose is relationally apt (or conducive) for procreation. For example, an outlet and a power cord are kinds made for an electrical connection but they're not enabled for conducting electricity until that connection arises. In other words, a sex kind on its own cannot accomplish its purpose until it meets the relational requirements. Their value is not merely derived from behavior but from the type of relationship that meet the conditions for procreation. This is true even if the effect does not obtain because their relationship is still FOR procreation and is still a valuable comprehensive union that covers the biological, emotional, and spiritual aspects of their being. PVI does result in a one-flesh union because two people come to preform a singular biological action as if they are one biological organ. Also, spiritual can just refer to personal here. Marriage is an institution that is between a committed heterosexual couple who have entered into a contractual agreement to ensure the the good of the other and the good of any potential child that may arise from that relationship. This is why non-marital heterosexual relationships that are done for sexual pleasure or the like are not called marriage. Incestuous relationships, while participating in the HSK, cause genetic problems for future citizens of society and would be contrary to the state's interest in procreation. Even if they were infertile, the state would want to set an example by not promoting incest in principle. On the other hand, non-incestuous infertile couples set an example of the purpose of marriage since their relationship still has procreation as its conducive purpose. However, this problem does exist for my opponent because if marriage is not about procreation then incestuous relationships should be accepted. With regard to SSM and children, I'd like to point out that even if his statistics were true, it would still be the case that HSKs have special social value for the creation of children. Homosexuals could not exist or raise a child without heterosexual unions. His view would allow for relationships like polygamy, incest, or pedophile couples to count as marriage as long as they can raise children well. My conception depends on procreation and then child-rearing, not the other way around. Furthermore, Child Trends does mention that biological parents are more ideal than just two parents, which naturally includes homosexuals by definition. Vitro fertilization is just the same as a single biological parent with a non-biological parent. Furthermore, the credentials of David Blankenhorn is a red herring and does not dispute the merits of the study itself. For those interested, I will provide some more sources in the comments. Review: (1) Heterosexual union is not indispensable to procreation (e.g, vitro fertilization) (R) False. Vitro fertilization still depends on a heterosexual union. (2) Heterosexuals are only valuable as long as their procreative effects obtain (R) The kinds produce the effects, not the other way around. Sex kinds have intrinisic value because they enable the good of procreation. (3) Non-procreative kinds disprove EHM (infertile, children not desired, post-menopausal, etc). (R) False. Defects do not change the purpose of a kind and couples that do not procreate can still set an example for what marriage is for through their relationship. Conclusion In summary, I think the formidable objections raised by Pangloss have been answered. Even if my defense against infertile couples was unconvincing, it seems that this argument would still succeed as long as the government does not allow for infertile relationships. On the other hand, if the entire principle of my approach is false then this would entail that we have no reason to legalize marriage at all. For if you recall the conditions of this debate, the burden of proof was mutual but unfortunately my opponent only got around to attacking my conception. Indirectly SSM was defended but no clear affirmative definition of marriage (or legal reason) was provided in this discussion. If there's no reason to legalize opposite-sex marriage at all then we have no reason to legalize SSM either. Without a foundation, we can allow all kinds of relationships as marriage. Unfortunately, he also denied essentialism which I believe is the crucial foundation of this discussion. Nevertheless, he has made the best case against EHM that I have seen on DDO and I hope he will be remembered as a great debater here. [Sources in comments]