Belief in god is justifiable

Thanks Skeptical.I've stayed withion the bounds of the definitions provided. I understand Skeptical was taking the term "right" to be of value to a person's life. And I argued for it to be "right" as in correct. Which I still think is the intended meaning. The next term in the definition is "reasonable" and we most certainly agree more on that term.To summarize that is what one of my arguments was. That a beleif in God is not justifiable in that the arguments are not reasonable. If the argument one uses to "justify" their beleif in God is irrational, it then follows by the definition that the beleif is "unjustifiable". That applies to the subject of the beleif. But as Skeptical pointed out this debate is not on the existence of God, but on the "Beleif". Again as I stated earlier "beleif" is a feeling. It is unjustifiable not becuase it is subjective, but becuase feelings are their own emergent knowledge. Indiscernable.My opponent is using Deontological Justification.Deontological Justification (DJ) S is justified in believing that p if and only if S believes that p while it is not the case that S is obliged to refrain from believing that p(One) is justified in beleiving that (God exists) if and only if (One) beleives that (God exists) while is is NOT the case that (One) is obliged to refrain from beleiving (God exists)This colloquial usage of the word sounds intuitive and correct. But logically it is reminescent of shifing the burden of proof. A person can beleif what ever they want to beleif as long as information contrary to that beleif does not make person obligated to disbeleive. This means a person can beleive an invisible pink unicorn is eating their garden cabage, is justified in their beleive until someone can point out the real cuase.Which is what I illustrated with the man stealing example. "justification" expecially as defined "reasonable" must entail more than just the un-proven or possible.A better description would be the Non-Deontological Justification:Non-Deontological Justification (NDJ) S is justified in believing that p if and only if S believes that p on a basis that properly probabilifies S's belief that p.(One) is justified in beleiving that (God exists) if and ONLY if (One) beleives that (God exists) on the basis that properly probabilifies (One)'s belief that (God exists).Which I think is certainly a better explaination for reasonable justifications. And certainly at the root of most logical debates. That a person presents justifications for their beleif. And Skepticalone has presented some of those arguments here. Becuase we are not debating the exsistence of God, I'll merely point out a few small errors in the arguments that make them erroneous and unusable to add probability to the existence of God.Round 1 C.S. Lewis Argument.As stated previously the argument is incomplete in that it distiguishes between Socially instilled desires and Natural desires for existent and needful things. But it does not make a good argument to why "God" should be identified as Natural Desire. Plus These natural desires for food, water, shelter, ect.. All have demonstrable concerns when not met. For instance a person desires water and when they do not get water they dehydrate and die. Negative impact on health can be seen with other Natural desires. As opposed to the desire to get a new car. But "God" doesn't appear to demonstrate this pattern. When someone goes through life rejecting a desire for "God" no apperent health concerns or impairment express themselves.Round 2 The Kalam Cosmological Argument.This is more a case of the Beleif for God dictating how the evidence is seen. the evidence of the Universes existence is then conformed to support the presuppositional beleif.P4 Doesn't demonstrate that the only cuase to the universe has to be a being of emmense power, will, and mind.Round 4 Copleston’s Argument from Contingency.Certainly the beginnign to a chain of contingent events or objects must be something that is non-contingent. Something that is necassary to exist. Why this "Something" is positied to be "God" is a leap without grounds. Energy is known not to be created or destroyed. The way Energy reacts in an expanding continuum of space is determined by "Laws of Nature". Even if these laws are incomplete at the time, or rather we have not completely been able to describe them perfectly.So far this all speaks to "justification" for a beleif in God being, as defined in round 1, reasonable or defensible.Skepticalone and I differ on the use of "right", which is where we see his arguments boil down to his round 2 Clarification: “My goal is to show a feeling that god is ‘valuable’ or ‘right’ is completely within reason.” In other words, a valuable or right feeling of god is reasonable.However this sounds a lot like an appeal to consequenses[1]. In an appeal to consequences a claim is argued to be accepted as true becuase of the beneift that such a beleif would bring. If we return back to Round 2, my opponent posts: --Is it reasonable to have a feeling that god adds ‘value’ to some lives? --Is it reasonable to have a ‘right’ feeling about god? My goal is to show a feeling that god is ‘valuable’ or ‘right’ is completely within reason. If the only thing making the beleif "reasonable" is the "value" that it adds ot a person's life, then that would be a fallacious appeal to consequences and therefore I would have to answer: No. [1]http://en.wikipedia.org...