Euthyphro's Dilemma

Thanks for accepting Pro. However let’s stick to the previous definition of objectivity, since I didn’t intend such a meaning to be restricted to “thing like.” Rather objective in the prefered sense just means it’s not merely based on human opinion and culture, etc. That it's discoverable rather than invented. First I’ll argue that Atheistic Moral Platonism is implausible itself, then I’ll show how the dilemma doesn’t transfer to Judeo-Christian monotheism well at all. I’ll do this by showing how it’s a false dilemma when classical theism is in scope. Arguments Atheistic Moral Platonism (AMP) The Euthyphro dilemma, even in its proper context the dilemma isn’t enough to support its implication of AMP. For the non-nihilist, AMP attempts to anchor morals in a non-theistic transcendent ground by essentially saying they “just exist.” But what does it mean to say 'justice' just exists? A person can be just, but with the absence of people, how can justice “just exist?” Since an abstract 'justice' itself isn’t just, then without people justice can’t exist! But that idea seems to contradict the AMP hypothesis. At best, AMP leaves moral truths floating in an unintelligible way, lacking any adequate foundation. Furthermore, moral obligation is incompatible with AMP: for suppose duty indeed "just exists" Platonically, how then does that result in obligation? An obligation towards wrong may exist too; why not commit wrong actions? Theism, however, provides a more plausible basis for the moral realist under Divine Command Theory, which is the third option that the Euthyphro dilemma ignores. But not only is AMP a highly arbitrary basis for morals, it’s implausible as well. For it seems absurd to think that creatures would blindly evolve to correspond to abstract moral realms! (It’s almost as though the moral realm knew we were coming). It's more plausible that the moral and natural realm would coincide under a Creator Law-giver hegemony then to think these two realms "just meshed.” But now if the Euthyphro dilemma implies AMP, then the negation of AMP would conclude with a denial of the Euthyphro dilemma per Modus Tollens. We’ve just seen how AMP is unreasonable, and so the rational person must deny the Euthyphro dilemma. Euthyphro’s Uneasy Transfer to Monotheism The Euthyphro dilemma out of its context doesn't even touch Judeo-Christianity. Jewish philosophers Avi Sagi and Daniel Statman say the dilemma is "misleading" because "it is not exhaustive": it leaves out a third option, namely that God "acts only out of His nature" [1] Katherine Rogers says, "Anselm, like Augustine before him and Aquinas later, rejects both horns of the Euthyphro dilemma. God neither conforms to nor invents the moral order. Rather His very nature is the standard for value." [2] Now in order to transfer the argument from against polytheism to monotheism, the Euthyphro dilemma should be formulated as, 1. Is something is good because God wills it or; 2. does God will it because it’s good? If we choose 1, then what is good is arbitrary and if we choose 2, then what is good is independent of God. All we must do then is posit a coherent third option. Under Divine Command Theory, an action A is required of a moral- agentS if a just and loving God commands S to do A. A is forbidden to S if and only if a just and loving God commands S not to do A. A is permitted for S if and only if a just and loving God doesn’t command S not to do A. [3] Thus objective moral duties are grounded in Divine Commands which are themselves proper reflections of an all good God. So morals aren’t independent, nor are God’s commands arbitrary since they are necessary reflections of his nature. God’s nature is definitive of the Good since God, by definition, is the greatest conceivable being, and a being who is the paradigm of goodness is greater than one who just exemplifies it. Now the proper context of the dilemma: Plato's Republic, deals with a mythology of gods, which is something very different from the dilemma presented by the modern atheist. A plurality of gods with different moral opinions is no doubt a hard problem for Euthyphro, but would Socrates have posed the same kind of questions about a maximally great moral being? Modern Christians do not believe in a multiplicity of gods with differing opinions; they're simply so utterly unlike the Christian God. Moral duties, then are grounded in Divine Commands to beings created in God’s image with intrinsic dignity, and moral values are grounded in a maximally great God, who if he is good, then he is maximally good, a standard of moral value in himself. So neither are God’s commands arbitrary or independent, for they are necessary reflections of himself, the only competent authority in issuing moral commands. So although the Euthyphro dilemma may apply to a pantheon of contingent gods who can may desire to have good characters, nevertheless it doesn't apply to a non-contingent God who exists within the necessity of his own nature as the greatest good.Sources1. Sagi, Avi and Statman, Daniel (1995). Religion and Morality. Amsterdam: Rodopi, pp. 62–6]2. http://www.thedivineconspiracy.org...3. http://www.iep.utm.edu...