The Argument from Meaning

The fact that a supernatural object is neither rational or irrational seems to strengthen the point that it is too obscure. For it to include any existent thing as long as it is "supernatural" would prevent it from answering the problem of meaning. On whom or what is meaning ultimately grounded in? It certainly cannot be a temporal being or else there was a time when meaninglessness was and a time when meaning came to be, which is an absurd proposition. Furthermore, I'd eliminate any plurality of rational beings through Ockham's Razor as well as take issue with the claim that there is some transcendentally irrational force(s) because this serves no better as an explanation than a natural force like matter. There needs to be a point of differentiation between alternative explanations and ultimately, that can only be done through the categorical distinctions that I had originally given (either it's intentional or non-intentional). I realize this is not an important aspect of my opponent's criticism but I do wish to reveal with more clarity how I can reason to a God-like being through the falsity of naturalism as a starting point. Since clarifications need to be made, I'll rephrase the fundamental aspects of this argument. Meaning is information that is conceptualized by minds and is gathered by means of perception and/or analytical thought. It's an intrinsic feature of a mind to express or perceive information "about" something which matter itself lacks as an inherent feature. Sure, it is possible to posit a mechanical explanation but this does not mean that the "stuff" which the mechanism can be reduced to is in itself what creates minds. That can be disputed by non-reductionistic physicalists but I will not address it until I need to. You'll observe that I do take elements from substance dualism or more generally, critiques of naturalistic accounts of the mind but it should not be confused as being subordinate to that discussion. I simply borrow ideas from that issue in the philosophy of mind to define "meaning" and I leave off from there to argue for an explicans of the explanandum. Thus I must emphasize that this is not an attempt to assess whether the mind is physical at all but is fundamentally concerned with the question of what the ontology of meaning is. In other words, what cause or substance is meaning dependent or arrived from? If meaning does not exist then this question would be irrelevant. However, premise 2 is made to affirm that it does exist somewhere in order to justify the question. It appears my opponent misunderstood this premise since he suggests it can be undermined by an appeal to a mechanical explanation which cannot be done unless one wants to deny that meaning (as subjective it may be) exists which no naturalist would accept. As I understand it, a naturalist would assert that meaninglessness exists at the micro level and is made to exist at the macro level through a specific composition of matter. I dispute this claim by showing that this involves a contradiction. To posit meaninglessness as the ontological ground for meaning is completely absurd. Why did meaning have to exist at all? It seems to me that there is no good reason to suppose that meaninglessness can produce anything meaningful. My opponent suggests that a naturalist will respond that meaning exists because naturalistic forces are capable of generating it mechanically but that in itself is a meaningful mechanism! Matter in itself does not have an inherent capability of creating such systems without the aid of a rational mind because the micro level is by a naturalist's own admission meaningless. Hence I am unconvinced that this argument does not contain within itself a sufficient refutation of naturalism. I'd agree that this does have similarities to other theistic arguments like the Argument from Contingency, Argument from Reason and the Fine-Tuning argument but I don't believe they're superordinate to the argument from meaning (AfM). They're just different proofs a theist could use incase another one fails to be convincing. I'll grant that it would be pointless to provide the AfM as a means to prove God's existence once they have been convinced that theism is the best worldview. However, I do not see how this is relevant since anyone who agrees with theism would accept just about every sound argument for its truth. Thus it seems uncharitable to criticize them all as being redundant since they prove the same conclusion. Rather, I think a more appropriate perspective would be to recognize the points of difference. So a theist could find more elements of nature that theism best explains than one realized through something like the AfM which I think would further strengthen their belief in God. I had a discussion with my opponent on AIM and he raised another criticism which he gave me permission to mention here. He thinks that an appeal to the universe's organization is superordinate to a discussion of the fine-tuning argument because the naturalist will deny that there is ultimately any meaning and assert that the organization in the universe is a mere coincidence. If the universe has been organized by an intelligent being, then I can only provide evidence from the fine-tuning of the universe. To counter this criticism, I'd point out that the naturalist is begging the question by assuming meaning just "is". Obviously it can have no ontological grounds in something meaningless so their objection is rather insignificant (refer to my above defense). Moreover, this argument has nothing to do with whether the universe is life-permitting so it seems that the fine-tuning argument is at least not needed, and at worst totally irrelevant. Even if the universe just is a "determining mechanism" it would still not explain why meaning exists rather than not. For example, just because there exists a computer that is physical does not mean that meaningless matter is responsible for it while completely ignoring the designer. A computer-like mechanism is possible precisely because a mind was there to create it! In conclusion, I am convinced that non-intentional matter cannot create meaning and that a God is the most plausible explanation. This presentation of the AfM had certainly included an invalid formulation and could've been a much more forceful argument by being more lucid in certain areas. There was also a lack of sufficient attention to God being the explanation but I hope to improve on all these areas as I go on. Having said that, this has been an extremely pleasant debate and I must thank TheNoblePolemic for having taken the time to discuss this. When he expressed agreement with this argument's soundness, I was rather delighted because it gave me assurance that I have improved the AfM in comparison to the original which was more of an idea at the time than a full-blown argument. As anyone can see, he is a proficient writer and honorable debater who I am quite pleased to know. I'll allow the readers to assess our performance but I hope everyone here was able to enjoy it!