Ethical naturalism is the only authentic metaethical philosophy.

THE PRIMACY OF WANT I believe the first question that anyone should ask themselves when doing anything is to ask themselves — "Why bother?"ï¿½ There is a clear distinction between having a "reason to" do something, and understanding the "reason why" something is done. The latter is a naturalistic question, subject to study by psychologists. The former, however, deals with how we justify and make choices about which actions we perform — the former is the special niche of ethicists. What, however, constitutes a good reason to do something? This question is wholly unapproachable without reference to psychological concepts like interests, desires and needs that comprise the basic units of human motivation. Without these units, not only is the sole impetus of human behavior lost, but so is all purpose behind it. Without a motivational system like ours, an organism is little more than a chemical reaction capable of thought, as capable of goal-oriented action as a rock. So by reduction I posit as a premise that the basic units of motivation, by default, are also the basic units used by agents to select and justify actions.ï¿½ In essence, I'm saying that the ONLY good reason to do something is because you want to. Even God, himself, without compromising your free will cannot negate this fact. He can promise you hell for doing one thing and heaven for doing another, but in the end, you weigh the options and decide which course of action you want most — and that's that. Of course, this might not be enough to call "want" a good reason, in itself. Epistemically, there might always be a better reason to do something that we simply don't know about — or even might not be able to comprehend. But I posit that the 'almighty want' is the best available justification possible for human action, and is ultimately the only one ever used.ï¿½ *** THE EVALUATIVE CALCULUS It's obvious that the fact that something is desired does not, by itself, make for a good reason to do something. Wanting to kill someone who has called you Pinkie ONE TOO MANY TIMES, for example, is not an intuitively good reason to actually do it. Obviously, there's something more in the mix. But if the framework of our entire ethical science depends on want, then how do we judge wants? In this case, it's because we also work under a moral framework, where agape love, social needs, and practical requirements, among other things, motivate us to take the interests of others into consideration. It's common sense that some wishes can 'outweigh' others; this evinces the existence of an inner practical calculus that, by factoring in relevant desires, can be used to compare possible courses of action.ï¿½ — From this we can infer that we not only aim, but that we aim for the best possible. — SOME FAMILIAR TERMS The fact that we seek the best possible provides coherence to our pragmatically-oriented ethical framework.ï¿½ We now understand what it means, in at least one sense, to say that one "ought" to do something in normative discourse. "Ought" is now a clean signifier that our "something" is the most effective (best) course of action in a situation with respect to the motivational schema of the agent.ï¿½ It's not some divine imperative that entreats you to do something. It's simply a really good idea to do it. The Ten Commandments [2] teach us that one ought not kill, ï¿½but this only makes sense with reference to our obeisance to God and willful conformity with his aims. "Ought" only makes sense as practical instructions with some implied aim in mind (here, to avoid sin, estrangement from God!).ï¿½ But note that I have talked much specifically about morality, here, which I'm holding as a mere subset of what goes into our ethical calculus. Morality is only one part of good decision-making.ï¿½ A PRACTICAL IMPERATIVE We humans are astutely aware of what our ultimate wish is when we're performing actions. Our final goal is to achieve a wonderful state of affairs called happiness. I'm not talking about happiness in the enjoyment sense of the word, but in the Aristotelian sense that one is living well, flourishing — eudemonia. As Aristotle points out in his Nichomachean Ethics [1], our own flourishing (which is a state of being-in-action) is the highest good we can aim for, the one thing we would still choose even if nothing resulted from it. Having determined the object of our action, we now have a clear standard from which to evaluate and justify our choices. As Aristotle puts it, "Shall we not, like archers who have a mark to aim at, be more likely to hit upon what is right?" [1] AND NOW ONTO MORALITY With in mind the ultimate aim of our own actions, we are now made aware that either morality has to make sense with respect to this, or else it is senseless (we lack a good 'reason to') to actually act by it.ï¿½ Descriptively, morality consists of the norms set by society (or a smaller group, or even an individual) to differentiate condemnable actions from commendable ones. The norms imposed develop naturally through both sociobiological and cultural evolution (i.e., incest condemnation stems at least in part from the evolutionary adaptiveness of not inbreeding [4], and homosexuality condemnation stems at least in part from condemnation of the practice in the Bible [2], and especially by the Roman Catholic Church during the Middle Ages [3] ). These norms are often imposed with arbitrary aspects that are senseless with respect to any ethical calculus, and are made relevant to the calculus only by the social demands that constitute them and the cultural identity bestowed by them. The senselessness of social norms, however, can be not only inefficient, but harmful. Entire social groups, including women and Black Americans, have been subjugated by arbitrary norms [3], creating both economic and social problems that persisted longer than the norms ever did. Without an intelligent ethical compass guiding the production of moral rules, the law-giving archers missed their marks. These episodes were no more ethically sound than New Guinean natives' moral belief in corpse cannibalism as respect for the dead (which led to several nasty epidemics among them) [5]. These are key examples of moral fallibility and the significance of ethical naturalism as a superior guiding principle. THE POINT OF MORALITY In order to give sense to morality and naturalize it such that dumb norms can be contrasted from the rational ones (and so the concept of moral progress can be vindicated), the point of morality with respect to our ethical aims needs to be specified.ï¿½ The point of morality is the achievement of social harmony (the combination and orchestration of social agents to achieve some effect) among human social groups. That's why it evolved, that's why we can rationally be glad that it did, and that's why it's so significant to our pursuits. As social animals navigating in a social world, we can be thankful that the other relatively hyperintelligent creatures among us have a conscience.ï¿½ Harmony, itself, of course, is not enough. Adolf Hitler organized Germany pretty harmoniously to orchestrate the genocide of over 6 million Jews [3]. But this is where things get tricky. Heretofore, morality has been organized harmoniously in the name of plenty of — dare I say it? — crappy things.ï¿½ The most subtle of these has been "biological fitness". We've evolved to prefer some norms over others (fairness being our crowning achievement, with evolution embedding into our species an informal system of reciprocal altruism) that improve how efficiently we reproduce and pass on genes [6]. Gene replication, though our biological 'aim', is not the aim by which we select actions. We have psychological wishes to actualize, and if we want to be nerdy, dateless scientists instead of Ghengis Khan imitators, there's nothing wrong with that. Biology explains why things happen, but as agents, we choose actions for distinct reasons. A SPECIAL CASE — SUPERNATURALISM The more infamous of these guiding forces of moral law-giving is transcendental, and it is a guiding precept of ethical naturalism that such guides are inane. The idea is that someone has somehow been approached by God with a set of (arbitrary) moral rules to guide humanity. And, of course, these rules come attached with a series of threats and promises. The problem with supernaturalism as an ethical basis is epistemic. Not only are supernaturalistic claims unreliable and usually rationally inconsistent/specious, but evidence to support supernaturalistic claims is inexistent. Beyond that, there's also no evidence that the supernatural messengers aren't liars or being misinterpreted.ï¿½ DIRECTING HARMONY No, the point of human morality is simply a large-scale version of the point of human action — to foster social harmony so that each involved agent can individually flourish in an optimal social environment. Norms are imposed according to how well they suit this goal, along with how practicable they are and so forth. Condemnable actions are those which go against these ideal norms, and moral progress is the transformation of a society/group/etc such that its norms conform better to this. A wrong action is a legitimately condemnable one with respect to true morality, and a right action is a legitimately commendable one. *** The opening post dealt with the term "ethical" in its moral sense, which I will emphasize here. A summary of my position: Moral claims express propositions about which behaviors would be condemned/commended in a society whose norms aren't organized senselessly (i.e., they are organized with respect to the general aim of human action). Some are true. Those propositions are made true by objective features of the world, independent of human opinion. Specifically, they are made true by 1) human nature, especially with regards to human motivational nature and 2) optimal (most effective) action given said motivational nature. ï¿½These moral features are reducible first to optimally selected moral norms, which are, themselves, reducible to practical guidelines — instructions — about the most effective way to achieve human aims. And supernatural/metaphysical claims are unacceptable bases for ethical claims. Sources: 1 - The Basic Works of Aristotle (edited by Richard McKeon) 2 - The Bible 3 - Western Civilization by Spielvogel 4 - The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology edited by David M. Bus 5 - Guns, Germs and Steel by Jared Diamond 6 - Sociobiology: The New Synthesis, Abridged Edition by E. O. Wilson