The Problem of Evil (PoE) is sound

IntroductionIn this round, I’ll be defending the argument I laid out in R1. Defending P1Put simply, P1 states that if God exists, gratuitous evils do not.This seems necessarily true. God, as defined, would have both the means and the motive to prevent this kind of evil, if He exists. Similarly, by definition, gratuitous evils have no morally sufficient reason to be permitted. As such, it seems truly self-evident that a morally perfect being able to remove pointless, unnecessary suffering would do so. Asking if an omni perfect God would remove gratuitous evil would seem as silly as asking if a perfect mathematician would be able to do long division. At the very least, we can certainly say P1 is more plausible than not. As Christian philosopher Daniel Howard-Snyder remarks,"on the face of it, the idea that God may well permit gratuitous evil is absurd. After all, if God can get what He wants without permitting some particular horror (or anything comparably bad), why on earth would He permit it?" (1) Defending P3Put simply, P3 states that gratuitous evil exists.I will offer 4 justificatory points to substantiate this claim. Before this, I want to offer an example of the kind of thing I’m talking about.E1 - “Ebola patients suffer from soaring temperature and excruciating joint and muscle pain. The throat is so sore, that swallowing anything, including one’s own saliva is intolerable. The skin becomes like soft bread, it can be spread apart with one’s fingers, and blood oozes out. Victims choke as the slopped off surfaces of their tongues and throats slide into their windpipes. Every body orifice bleeds. Even the eyeballs fill with blood that leaks down the cheeks. In the final stages, victims become convulsive, splashing blood all around as they twitch, shake and thrash to their deaths.” (2)Leukaemia, droughts and torture are yet more examples of the kind of horror which permeate our world. But what reasons do we have for thinking these are gratuitous?Prima facie case: This point is simple. It reasons that we can justify P3 (at least tentatively) on the basis of what appears to be rather obvious - that some evil in the world, even after very close scrutiny, appears to be utterly gratuitous. The examples above are just some cases of apparently gratuitous evils. There are many more. Indeed, many theists concur on this point. Bill Craig, for example, says,“Everybody admits that the world is filled with apparently gratuitous suffering.” (3) (Original emphasis).The question becomes, does the appearance of gratuity lend support to the fact of gratuity?Ironically, support from this inference comes from another theist. Swinburne’s principle of credulity states that, all things being equal, “it is reasonable to believe that the world is probably as we experience it to be” (4)I want to suggest that not only that we ought to accept this principle (and thus affirm P3 from the apparent gratuity we see), but that it is necessary in everyday life.For example, let’s take the belief we all share - the occurrence of WWII. Documents, footage, eyewitnesses and so on all attest to this event. It would take something extraordinary to doubt that this war had taken place. Of course, it is possible that this belief is false. Maybe the evidence is illusory or doctored, for example. But, clearly, doubt in this case wouldn't be reasonable without huge justification. It’s not just a principle, but a presumption of credulity at work here, and this is what Con has to overturn before his case can even get started. Anything other than this seems contrived, desperate, absurd. It’s the same with evil, as even critic Stephen Wykstra acknowledges,"For if an instance of suffering appears not to have a point, that is a reason for thinking it has no point." (5)Unless and until Con can justify a more plausible alternative than the case our primary experience strongly supports, as in the cases mentioned, we must affirm P3.Epistemic consistency: In essence, this simply means applying the same or similar standards to the PoE as we do to normal beliefs, and only to take seriously beliefs which are at least plausible. In the case of evil, and its prevention, this becomes even more imperative.Given the massive short-term cost evil causes, and it's seeming ability to lead to long-term harm, we have a massive burden to believe that evil is primarily destructive, and this is a burden that Con must overcome. Otherwise, permitting, even partaking in, any and all evil for some mysterious eventual "greater good" would be our normal reaction to evil in the world. The futility of contrived scepticism, retreats to the possible or fanciful ad hoc storytelling constructed cynically to deal with P3 given this point is pretty apparent. Only an epistemically consistent standard is feasible for the theist here. Nature of evils: Third, the nature of evils themselves point strongly towards gratuity. Evil is abundant in the world. Sentient beings have suffered for millions of years, and the sheer volume of evil is just staggering. The way this evil is dispersed is also horrific, with innocents, babes, the weak and vulnerable suffering most. Also, many evils are necessary, as long as there are sentient beings. The evolutionary process is just a litany of predation and extinction, where animals have to tear each other apart just to survive. Indeed, the vast majority of species which have inhabited the Earth have perished. Moreover, as my example shows, some of the suffering in the world is beyond horrific. What possible reason could God have for allowing each stage of Ebola? The sheer brutality of natural evil in particular seems simply totally inexplicable. Lastly, many people suffer without God‘s comfort to sustain them. Divine silence in the face of horrendous evils is again something rather pervasive in the world. People suffering not just from the loss, but also from a cruel, uncaring world which offers no comfort to many in the face of tragedy.None of these points are controversial, yet they strongly and unequivocally point to a universe callously indifferent to the suffering of its inhabitants. The fact that evil has these features, often simultaneously, is massive evidence in favour of gratuity, and thus P3.No conceive’um: Lastly, it is difficult even to conceive of some examples of evil being morally permissible. In the case of the Ebola, there seems to be no conceivable reason to allow the extent of the suffering, nor any benefit which could even come from it. As Rowe points out,"In light of our experience and knowledge, of the variety and scale of human and animal suffering in our world, the idea that none of this suffering could have been prevented by an omnipotent being without thereby losing some greater good or permitting an evil at least as bad seems an extraordinary, absurd idea, quite beyond our belief." (6)The difficulty even to conceive of a plausible, morally sufficient reason to permit some evils also supports P3.ConclusionAs we can see, the PoE is amply justified. In order to better the argument, Con must first show that these justifications fail. I invite him to make his case.Sources1. Howard-Snyder, Daniel, and Frances Howard-Snyder. 1999. "Is Theism Compatible with Gratuitous Evil?" American Philosophical Quarterly 36: 115-29.2. http://www.youtube.com...3. God?, P1144. http://www.philosophyofreligion.info...5. Wykstra, Stephen J. 1984. “The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments from Suffering: On Avoiding the Evils of ‘Appearance’,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 16: 73-93.6. Rowe, William, The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism, American Philosophical Quarterly 16: 335-41.