Dualism is true.

==================== Is disembodied existence and perception incoherent and/or inconceivable? ==================== I'd rather not get drawn into defending idealism as it is not my intention to defend a position I do not hold to. I agree, however, at the very least, a basic sketch of how idealism is not incoherent and/or inconceivable is appropriate. Here is the basic test to see if idealism is inconceivable - can I spy any logical contradictions in asserting that's it's possible that some type of disembodied mind perceiving of the material world? To be honest, I simply cannot find any logical contradictions. This, of course, does not necessarily mean there aren't logical contradictions in reference to a disembodied mind perceiving (I simply may not be thinking hard enough), but, I, and most philosophers, cannot spot even one. This is good reason for supposing that there are no logical contradictions therein. Furthermore, I read the section about G. E. Moore's attack on idealism that TheSkeptic linked to and I admit to being slightly perplexed as to the point being made. He certainly did (supposedly) spy at least some logical fallacies in idealism, but those certain fallacies have nothing to do with whether or not it's inconceivable that the mind can perceive without the body. As far as I can tell he argues against idealism based on the idea that "blue" is separate from the "sensation of blue" but with idealism "blue" and the sensation of "blue" would have to be the same thing, which is false because "blue" has an existence independent of experience. He also makes an argument against the idea that all relations are internal (in the mind) but he argues that that makes no sense and that there are some external relations. Notice, however, nothing here picks out any logical contradictions with a mind perceiving without a body - the objections deal with other issues in idealism which are only contingently false (as reality could have been that "blue" and the sensation of "blue" are the same thing). So, therefore, it still seems that the particular part of idealism I am concerned with, perceiving without a body, is not necessarily false. And, that part of idealism at least, still seems logically valid which is all I need to give myself stable footing in regards to the first premise of the modal argument. "I would then be in confusion as to how you can support substance dualism. .. " To be a substance dualist all one would have to believe is that there is at least ONE property of the mind that is not reducible or supervienient on the body. As for myself, I am agnostic on whether minds can be in space or not, but there are several properties that the mind has that NO material thing can have such as intentionality (among other things)[1]. I never said that minds are non-spatial and neither does substance dualism broadly speaking. Cartesian dualism does, however. "Now hold on, don't you yourself move from the step of conceivability to possibility? Therefore, is it not perfectly acceptable on my part to deem it to be inconceivable and thus impossible? " I do, you are correct. What I am saying here is that a mind existing without a body is conceivable and therefore not impossible. I say this for the specific reason that there aren't any logical contradictions in conceiving of such a situation. It's up to you to show that I am not thinking hard enough about it and there are logical contradictions in how I'm thinking about this situation. Like, for example, in my first round I made the argument that it is inconceivable that water can't not equal H20, even despite preliminary considerations that suppose that it is conceivable that water not equal H20. And finally, the argument from the impossibility (implausibility? ) of disembodied perception is not strictly a refutation of the modal argument. Why? First and foremost it's basically a restatement (albeit a clever one) of the interaction problem objection against dualism [2]. While this problem can be difficult to answer - at it's heart it is an *epistemological* objection to a *metaphysical* position. Even granting that if this objection renders it a complete mystery as to how a mind can perceive (see) without a body (which I do not think so) this does absolutely nothing to refute the modal argument; it does not attack conceivability in the slightest. So, if there are good metaphysical arguments for dualism, which there are, it is simply absurd to assert that an epistemological argument defeats dualism. Simply because it may be hard to explain as to how a mind mind can perceive without a body does not refute dualism. For you to make a case against the modal argument's first premise you'd have show that having a body is a necessary condition of perception. ===================== Begging the question? ===================== "Reports of out of body experiences do not constitute valid instances in which a person has a clear conception of a disembodied experience given that out of body experiences are not really out-of-body (which lends evidence to the idea that they are simply hallucinating such an experience, thus grounding it's seemingly realistic experience). " Now that's begging the question. You're simply assuming that out-of-body experiences are not really out-of-body. I think it still supports my point that one need not be already convinced of dualism in order to think that it's possible to conceive of a disembodied mind. An undecided person could be given a simple inclination towards thinking the first premise is possible by hearing reports of out-of-body experiences. "And lastly, your argument is once again simply relying on authority. Simple look at how you introduce it: "Second, this argument does not beg the question as there are physicalist philosophers who grant. .. "" I think you miss my point - begging the question against a position is assuming, as truth, some premise that some particular position would not grant. In other words the objection is that to grant that is conceivable that a mind can exist without a body one would already have to a dualist, but, as I showed before, this is plainly not true! For example, "We know God exists because we can see the perfect order of His Creation, an order which demonstrates supernatural intelligence in its design. .. [3]", would be an example of begging the question against an atheist because they would not grant the premise that God exists. It would not be begging the question if opponents of dualism grant premise 1 of the modal argument! If physicalists and/or materialists grant that it is conceivable that a mind exist without a body then there is no position I am begging the question against. It simply doesn't matter if you think physicalists are, just like dualists, performing bogus feats of imagination - they still grant premise 1. I can't really respond much to Dennett due to character limits but I will say that further argument is required to relate consciousness to cognitive systems as health is to bodily functions. In fact, that's whole question here, isn't it? Furthermore, I am still awaiting an argument that shows that it is inconceivable that a mind exist disembodied as I've shown above, the argument from the impossibility of disembodied perception is an epistemological objection - not metaphysical. It does nothing to refute the modal argument. ===================== Conclusion ===================== "As you can see, while my opponent's argument rests on the idea of conceiving disembodied perceivers, Everitt and Dennett points out that such a task is absurd. " I think not. ;) I still think I have showed the modal argument to be sound and urge the audience to read carefully and come to their own conclusions about who won this debate. Cheers!