Animal rights is an unjustified ethical doctrine.

I would note in this final round that my opponent, who has proposed the resolution that "animal rights is an unjustified ethical doctrine" has never provided any argument in support of his resolution. I believe that in and of itself calls for a Con vote. However, in the interests of providing a fair and full debate, I will answer my opponent once more: 1. Argument: Fulfilling the urge towards universal compassion and understanding 1. "What you are implying is that everyone has, at the bare minimum, adequate knowledge about ethics, which is demonstrably false …" and "why would you resort to an argument from authority? " Actually, I was arguing that ethics is the province of every moral agent, which means that everyone is an ethicist in some manner. I made this point to disprove my opponent's assertion that Einstein's musings were not relevant because Einstein was not an ethicist. As for an argument from authority, I was merely citing Einstein originally for the proposition that universal compassion was the objective of morality; the argument became a discussion of Einstein's authority only because my opponent questioned it, not because I relied upon it. Rather, I explained my reasoning for why universal compassion should be the objective of morality in the second part of this argument. If I explained it imperfectly, that is of little relevance. As my opponent has conceded "humans should more or less lean towards compassion. " If compassion is the end towards which we should "lean" then certainly there is no good cause for us not to be wholly compassionate where we are able. Furthermore, an explanation of why someone should value compassion is well outside the scope of this debate, and a rather impossible burden given character limits. I think it is enough for me to show that there is an objective that even my opponent concedes is likely justified and which the animal rights movement seeks to promote. This I have done. If I am unable to explain the whole of ethics in the process, that is of no concern in this debate. 2. Why should we care? As I mentioned above, this is not really my place to say – yet, I think I have provided an answer already, as to what would happen without compassion. I might also add that choosing not to pursue compassion in some degree, which is the only logical alternative to choosing to pursue universal compassion, must necessarily be the worse choice if being compassionate is a valid moral objective, as one would have to assume that meeting the objective in the fullest possible way (universal compassion) is better than meeting it only partially. 3. "We can very well survive and prosper even with every animal species put into extinction" and "don't tell me you are actually referring to Murphy's law" and why we shouldn't create sentient beings just to kill them. We may very well survive, but to what end? If we are the only living thing in existence, what a dull and miserable place have we made for ourselves? Biodiversity is an end in itself; additionally, the myriad ways life solves the problems of survival have inspired inventors and engineers through the centuries. To eliminate all such sources of inspiration would be a terrible loss to us. As for Murphy's law, yes I went there, as I've found that it does tend to apply to increasingly complex projects with some frequency … however, I see my opponent's point and will concede that perhaps we could survive someday without other animal species. That being said, the reason why we should not induce suffering in other sentient beings needlessly is that it is not the compassionate thing to do. Compassion being a virtue, and one which many would find justifies an action or inaction, it is clearly better not harm sentient beings needlessly. 3. Argument: Meta-ethics - Allowing the shooting of the box 1. Not an issue. 2. "Whenever there is a possibility that harm could arise needlessly from one's actions, one should restrain oneself. " The key to this sentence is the word "needlessly. " Needlessly is not the same as "at all. " Rather, I am saying that where there is no good cause to act, one shouldn't if it could cause harm. "By driving to the drugstore to get my prescriptions, I may accidentally hit a stray rock that coincidentally hits a dog that yelps and runs into a car, making that driver swerve and hit traffic killing several. So by trying to buy Tylenol, I could be deemed a killer … Everything imaginable is possible, but this doesn't mean we grant them all the same degree of consideration" … which is why you should weigh the probabilities. If you do not get your prescriptions, you will likely remain or become ill, and suffering will result. There is nothing wrong about being ethically considerate of your self. The accident scenario is significantly less likely than the likelihood that you will suffer. So much so that, even given the greater levels of suffering possible, it is better to act than not to. Additionally, this argument is somewhat absurd in that such an "accident" could never be foreseeable. It is much more likely that a sentient being deserves rights than it is that you would take several lives through a series of unfortunate events. If it will help, I will alter my claim to "Whenever there is a foreseeable possibility that harm could arise needlessly …" which is somewhat redundant in that you wouldn't be making an ethical choice if you couldn't foresee the potential consequences of that choice. 3. Prove how diminishing suffering of sentient beings amount to some good. After all, isn't this the ENTIRE PURPOSE of this debate? " "[P]lants and inanimate objects" do not possess nervous systems nor the clearly demonstrated ability to suffer pain nor the ability to think or any of the other qualities that humans share with animals and for which reasons and by which facilities humans argue for the protection of rights. There may be an argument that plants deserve some protections, as living beings, but otherwise I must disagree. In the analogy, you are told (given warning) that there is a box with a probability of there being a child inside. With animals, the warning of the probability clearly is the similarity of the animal to a human being, with greater similarities leading to greater consideration of the extension of rights. Likewise, I have already explained that rights don't contemplate being self-destructive; humans need at least plant matter to survive, and until the time comes when humans can live off of rocks, humans can not extend rights to all forms of sustenance because the chance that harm will be done to something that ought not be harmed (plants/rocks) is outweighed by the reality that harm *certainly* will be done to beings that ought not be harmed (humans). 4. "We like it, so we do it. " This is not a dis-analogy. Humans have rights in property and their lives, and so actions against those things are wrong. Likewise, if animals have rights to their lives, then actions against them are wrong and claiming that you enjoy it is no excuse. 5. Conclusion In conclusion my opponent has made no argument to support his resolution. Conversely, I have shown how the animal rights movement is justified, as a means of extending the reach of our compassion and as a pragmatic approach to handling a murky ethical issue. My opponent sought to turn this debate into one justifying compassion; that was never a requirement of the debate, nor should it matter. Therefore, I strongly urge a Con vote, for the resolution has been negated.