The Cosmological Argument

It's particularly interesting because it involves arguments, like the principle of sufficient reason, that I've never dealt with before. Thanks also for your calm and articulate delivery. :(1) Every contingent fact has an explanation. :(2) There is a contingent fact that includes all other contingent facts. :(3) Therefore, there is an explanation of this fact. :(4) This explanation must involve a necessary being. :(5) This necessary being is God. : :The argument itself is plainly logically valid in that the conclusion logically follows from the premises. On its face, it is a series of wild leaps, not a valid argument. Perhaps there are unstated assumptions that would turn it into a valid argument. I almost regret that we're in a debate format, rather than an informal discussion without rules, so that we could work together to hammer out a valid version of whatever you're trying to say here. In fact, if you want to work together in the comments area to refine your argument before your next post, I'd be pleased to help. I'd rather refute an argument that I understand, and point out its precise defects, than just say, "That wasn't persuasive because it wasn't clear. " Of course, if the argument turns out to be persuasive, I will happily concede. :(1) Every contingent fact has an explanation. I know of no reason to believe this. Quantum mechanics posits many uncaused events. Are those events not facts? I'm assuming here, perhaps wrongly, that explanations are causes. It seems an obvious attempt at special pleading. Why doesn't (1) say that everything has an explanation? Why make an exception for gods. Wouldn't your argument be exactly as strong if the exception was for cheeseburgers? (1') Everything without melted cheese on it has an explanation. Yes, exactly as strong. You say that you would be unsatisfied if I said that a Mac truck occurred for no reason. Why, then, are you satisfied if a god occurs for no reason? That's special pleading. Likewise your argument that my cheeseburger must have an explanation if there is a possible world in which there is an explanation for its not having an explanation. Well, obviously, the same trick would prove that god has an explanation: all we need is a possible world in which there is an explanation for god lacking an explanation. So, again, this looks like special pleading. [off topic]I'm new here. Can you explain, or give me a link to an explanation, of how to italicize and do block quotes? [/off topic] Meanings Unclear I need explanation of what is intended by "explanation" and "contingent. " I can't come up with definitions that make your arguments work. For instance, what are you trying to convey when you say that god explains contingent facts in all possible worlds? He's not causing them, obviously. In fact, he caused them not to exist by not instantiating those worlds. I'm at a loss for meaning here, and you have the burden of communicating your argument rather than making me guess at what I'm trying to refute. As for contingency and necessity, I've run across some confused people, not in agreement with each other, making arguments related to yours. (Though yours is definitely a new version to me, and thank you for that! ) Something contingent ought to depend on something else, it seems to me. But I'm told it's actually something that exists at one time but not another. Necessary things, then would always exist, from the beginning of time to the end. Is this what you mean by these words? But you're also using modal language, possible worlds language. In that case, contingent things exist in more possible worlds than none, and possible fewer worlds than all. Necessary things would exist in all possible worlds, though not necessarily constantly thru all of time in those worlds. You can see why I'm confused. ;Skepticism Ironically, you argue that, "it follows that if the PSR is not true then we could not ever know objective probabilities. " But you favor belief in a magic-throwing god, whose magical powers upset all rules, including the rules of probability. So, while there is no reason to accept your "skepticism" argument, you would gain nothing thereby. ;"(2) The Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact (hereafter the BCCF) ;(3) Explanation for the BCCF ;Given premises (1) and (2) it follows, by metaphysical necessity, there has to be an explanation for the BCCF. " The same logic proves there is an explanation for god too. The BCC is (big clump of (all) facts (including necessary facts, including, therefore, gods)) is obviously also a contingent fact. The whole could be different if any of the parts could be different, and you posit that the parts could be different. Therefore, the BCC could be different. Therefore there is an explanation for the whole ball of wax, including your god. ;"(4) A Necessary Being ; ;If we plausibly suppose that a contingent fact cannot explain itself (if contingent facts could explain themselves them ;it would seem that they aren't contingent) then we are forced to conclude that a necessary being must explain the ;BCCF. I don't understand this at all. Are all facts now sentient people? Forgive my unfamiliarity with your argument. Are you saying that any uncaused thing is a god? Why should anyone accept such a hypothesis? ;"(5) Necessary Being = God ; ;Given that we have good reasons for accepting the premises the argument we see we have good reasons to accept ;that there is a necessary being who is the explanation or causes of all contingent facts. " I don't see the connection. If I say that everything without melted cheese has a cause, that doesn't prove that cheeseburgers created the rest of the world. It doesn't even suggest it. So (4) and (5) seem like a wild non-sequiturs. I wish we had more rounds, more time for you to communicate the missing parts of your argument. Presumably you think they are implicit, but to me they are just mysterious. I apologize for not knowing how to format posts on this website.