Metaphysical Solipsism is Most Likely True

Thanks to my real, existing, sentient opponent Envisage. I would like to remind everyone there is no matrix and to obey their government. Epistemologically Preferred Position Here Pro is arguing because we cannot know there is an external world outside our perception that via Occam’s Razor we should reject such a thing. We may prima facie be able to see only our private mental events, but does this really make less assumptions than thinking there exists an external reality? It seems it doesn’t. It seems reasonable to think we are beings inside a world instead of the authors of it. When our apparent eyes are damaged, so is our qualia. When our ears are damaged, so too is the qualia and so on. Solipsism would hold this is an illusion, but now we see solipsism is making the bigger assumptions here. Solipsism would hold fundamentally what happens to the eyes has nothing to do with sight which flies in the face of our reasonable assumption. So too does solipsism have no reason for the apparent existence of the brain. There isn’t anything about the brain that has any relevance to the mind, even though it appears to be some type of CPU of the mind. Solipsism has to assume our everyday views of cause and effect in respect to our bodies are all wrong along with the radical change of how we think about our brains. Argument From Idealism Pro presents an argument for idealism then an argument for solipsism based on idealism. I will focus on attacking his argument for idealism. His defense of it stems from the modal argument. Basically he says if mind=physical then solipsism should be impossible, but solipsism is possible therefore mind isn’t fundamentally physical (or non mind). A huge problem is that this argument only works within the realm of Kripkeian modal metaphysics. There are alternatives that seem much better, such as David Lewis' counterpart theory. This theory denies transworld identity. Which is the idea that when we're speaking about possibilities we're speaking about the object's identity preserved into the realm of possibility. In other words, its identity is the same throughout possible worlds [1]. However, Lewis' theory “identifies possibly being F with having a counterpart—an appropriately similar object in another possible world” [2]. This model hurts the modal argument because it means a counterpart of the mind can exist alone, not because it's not fundamentally non-mind, but because there exists different counterparts in different contexts. As Dr. Derek Ball puts it “ ...she succeeds in generating a context in which “possibly, pain =/= c-fiber firing” is true. But this does not entail that pain =/= c-fiber firing; it only entails that pain/c-fiber firing has different counterparts according to different counterpart relations. The worlds that make an utterance of “possibly, pain =/= c-fiber firing” true are not worlds in which pain=/= c-fiber firing, since there are no such worlds; instead they are worlds according to which pain =/= c-fiber firing. So the physicalist can rest easy; the argument is invalid.” [3] We have good reason to accept this theory, one being from the problem of accidental intrinsics. I have dark hair and it is possible that I have blonde hair. If transworld identity is sound then in a possible world I am the same object, but I have blonde hair. However, since black hair is a part of me, then in order for me to be the same object I would have to also have black hair. This is a contradiction, as I cannot have both black hair and blonde hair. We have to say in this possible world, there exists my counterpart with blonde hair. Furthermore, this argument would only show the mind doesn’t reduce to non-mind. There are plenty of theories that aren’t substance dualism but still accept the irreducibility of the mind [4][5] We have good reason for adopting a counterpart theory of modal metaphysics which allows me to resist the argument for idealism. Furthermore, the argument from idealism doesn’t take into account other theories of the mind. I will now turn my attention to two arguments against the resolution Testing solipsism It seems to me that we can actually test solipsism. How? Well, if my mind creates reality then I should be able to control reality? There would exist nothing but my mind, yet there must be a restriction in place that prevents me from being omnipotent. This restriction obviously isn't conscious, nor would it seem to be mental at all. Any meaningful restriction wouldn’t seem to be mental as it must be something that governs the mental. Solipsism is incoherent Here I will be arguing that to think the thoughts “Solipsism is true” or to even read this debate you must assume solipsism is false. Without language, you wouldn’t be able to read this and wouldn’t be able think thoughts about solipsism like the ones above. If solipsism is true, then language would come about in a purely private manner. However, as Ludwig Wittgenstein pointed out, a private language is impossible [6]. Someone who has no language stranded on an island makes a mark “s” whenever he has a certain sensation. This however has no criteria of correctness. It has no rules governing when it’s used correctly, it can be used however one wants in an arbitrary way. Language then is used in a social context. A group of people come up with rules and correct the said behavior so others may learn the language. So in order for Pro to write an argument for solipsism, believe the statements in solipsism, and understand this debate, he must first assume solipsism is false. Now to Pro [1] Chisholm, Roderick. "Identity Through Possible Worlds: Some Questions," [2] Sider, Ted. 2006. “Beyond the Humphrey Objection” [3] Ball, Derek. 2011. “Property Identities and Modal Arguments.” [4] http://plato.stanford.edu... [5] http://socrates.berkeley.edu... [6] Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1974. Philosophical Investigations.