Pascal's Wager should not be followed, it is flawed.

I know this is suicide, but bear with me on this. Pascal's wager, since my opponenet did not clearly define it, is as follows: If one is uncertain about a religion that promises eternal bliss if followed, one should follow that religion, rather than simply ignoring it until sufficient evidence is provided. Some people can willfully believe in something like a religion, and most certainly people can follow a religion's teachings willfully, even if there is uncertainty. Here's my line of reasoning. I. We [should] make decisions to maximize benefit for ourselves. II. The benefit of a thing can sometimes not be determined before the thing occurs. Religion is an example of this. In this case, one should predict the outcomes and their likelihoods, and place the average gain value as the gain value of doing the thing. Here's an example: Decision: Do I eat a watermelon, or don't I? Good things about eating a watermelon: 1. It might satisfy my hunger. [50% chance, +5 motivation if true] 2. It might taste good. [95% chance, +10 motivation if true] 3. People will think I'm cool because I'm eating watermelon. [1% chance, +5 motivation if true] Bad things about eating a watermelon: 1. I will not be able to spend this time doing X, Y, or Z. [-4 motivation] 2. I might get sick. [10% chance, -30 motivation if true] 3. People might think I'm less cool because I'm eating watermelon. [1% chance, -5 motivation if true] Now there might be a few other variables I'm not considering, but I'm sure you get the point. Anyway, I will now explain the most reasonable way to approach this situation. By multiplying the chance of each thing by the motivation if true, we get the predicted value of motivation [benefit]. We then get the following: +2.5 because it might satisfy hunger +9.5 because it might taste good +.05 because it might make me seem cooler. -4 because I could potentially gain 4 motivation doing X, Y, or Z instead. -3 because it might make me sick -.05 because it might make me seem less cool =+5 We see from this that it is indeed the most rational decision for me to eat a watermelon at this time. Notice that the motivation numbers I assigned are fairly arbitrary. They would vary based on what you value as a person. However, it is clear that this is the most rational way to make decisions when uncertainty is involved [by multiplying the benefit/loss by the chance of it happening]. Also, rather than couinting the opportunity cost in the equation, we can omit it, and rather than choosing to do anything that's positive, we will simply choose the highest-valued combination of choices. This way it would look like this: +2.5 because it might satisfy hunger +9.5 because it might taste good +.05 because it might make me seem cooler. -3 because it might make me sick -.05 because it might make me seem less cool =+9 The best thing I could do with the time I'd be eating the watermelon would be +4 benefit [this is the X, Y, or Z, whatever other choices I have]. Since 9 is higher than 4, I choose to eat the watermelon. III. Deciding to follow a religion you are uncertain about is a rational choice [Given that eternal rewards are promised]. I'll do the same thing I did with the watermelon decision, but this time, it'll be about following a religion. Decision: Do I follow religion X? Good things about following religion X: 1. People from religion X will like me better/I'll be part of a new community [+10 motivation] 2. I might have eternal bliss. [1% chance, +Infinite motivation if true] Bad things about following religion X: 1. People from other religions will like me less/I'll be alientated from some communities. [-10 motivation] 2. I won't be able to spend as much time and/or money doing other things [-1,000,000,000,000,000,000 motivation*] So here we get: +10 because of new communities +infinite because it might lead to eternal bliss -10 because of damaged communities -1,000,000,000,000,000,000 because I could potentially gain that much benefit doing other things. =+infinite Therefore, we should do it. You'll notice I made an asterisk next to the opportunity cost line. That is because it is quite possible that there will be an infinite opportunity cost [not being able to follow another religion, for example]. In this case, the religion whose probability times benefit is larger will win. For example: Religion X and Religion Y each offer eternal bliss if followed, but cannot both be followed simultaneously. Religion X promises an eternal bliss half as good as Religion Y, but it seems about 3 times as likely as Religion Y to be true. Thus, Religion X would win, since its infinite component is 1.5 times as great as Religion Y's. [The infinite compononet ends up being the only meaningful one]. It may not seem as intuitive doing math with infinite numbers, but it can conceptually be done if a person is capable of placing relative levels of probability and benefit to each religion and its promised eternal bliss. These things are up to each individual to place relative benefit levels on, but it is a very premise of Pascal's wager that we're talking about a religion that does promise infinite reward if we follow it. Thus, based on I, II, and III, Pascal's Wager is not flawed. I await my opponent's rebuttal.