JOKE LD - Moral Obligation and the "Tickle Cream of Death"

I must commend my opponent for submitting her arguments before the superlaser's kiss of death. Unfortunately, I must demonstrate why I find her lack of faith (in the CI) disturbing. I will begin this attack run with the overall V/C clash, then proceed to A. defend my case and B. attack hers. For full effect, I've included a Youtube link to John William's "Duel of the Fates" for you. http://www.youtube.com...V/C ClashTo review, my opponent has offered a value of "knowledge" (specifically "knowing-how" knowledge) with a criterion of "socialization of proper behavior". I have countered her V/C framework with a value of "moral consistency" and a criterion of "Kant's Categorical Imperative". Like Emperor Palpatine and bad fashion, my opponent is adhering to a "cultural relativist" critique/defense in our clash. Four points must be addressed: Knowledge as a teacher - Responding to my attack involving the limited moral capacity of the Aff's version of "knowledge", the Aff claims that I'm ignoring the value of having a teacher (i.e. society). She offers the parable of "Captain Jack and Mr. Turner's Fun Times" to demonstrate this value, but I fear the dark allure of Orlando Bloom's "obvi gorgeous" eyes has clouded my opponent's conclusion. My attack doesn't ignore the value of having a teacher, but is concerned with the subject matter the teacher is teaching. The knowledge a teacher passes isn't limited to societal rules. If this were the case, then the philosophical theories of Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Yoda, R2D2, and Han Solo that have been passed down from generation to generation wouldn't exist. The point is, moral philosophies are taught just like anything else. The impossibility of moral consistency - My opponent seems to be taking a page from Luke Skywalker's biography, "Whine When You Can't Lift A X-Wing Out Of A Swamp" (working title). She assumes that I'm addressing some sort of "global moral consistency", and argues that people must act in the same way to be morally consistent/a consistent source isn't obtainable. Kant's CI is a normative framework regarding individual morality. While it attempts to address certain metaphysical properties, it's mainly concerned with how individuals should establish their moral judgments. Second, CI's principle is concerned with consistent reasoning for motivation over action. Moral consistency in this form allows for a variety of actions as long as the motivation to do good remains consistent. Finally, the Aff provides no warrant for why individuals can't live morally consistent lives, even when the bulk of society differs. If people achieve moral consistency, then we ought to reject any ideal of religious, philosophical, or societal consistency and "party like it's 4 ABY". Escaping social subjectivity - My opponent's claim that morality can't escape social subjectivity is the kind of tractor beam Obiwan Kenobi simply laughs at. Apply my defense as to why moral consistency is an individual value and recognize that people have choice over social subjectivity. People can certainly reject the allure of the cultural relativism my opponent adopts. Countless philosophies are shared among a variety of cultures, and it's up to individual choice and effort to adopt such philosophies. Moral obligations and consequences - Ultimately, what my opponent is resting this moral obligation for TCD on is a consequentialist version of cultural relativism. Basically, if society obligates the action based on positive effects, we have a moral obligation. This is problematic. A moral obligation is a call to "do right", which is difficult if you rest this "right" on a positive outcome. It's impossible to insure a positive outcome, and thus you risk doing the exact opposite of what the obligation mandates because of an uncertain future. This form of moral obligation demands action, even when negative consequences could do more harm than good. To my case.Criterion: My opponent critiques the CI when it doesn't account for context. Nothing about the CI naturally rejects context. My opponent once again confuses consistency with action vs. consistency with motivation. Billy would be morally correct in knocking the gun away provided his motivation was to save others. No one is being used a means to an end in this example. But, if Billy knocks the gun away because he wants to kill the ten lives, we can see whether justification through action/consequence alone isn't enough. O1: My opponent doesn't necessarily disagree with my distinction between moral justification vs. moral obligation, but instead attempts to demonstrate why Tricia has an obligation to socialize to society's norms. First, note that the Aff never specifies that Tricia's obligation is a moral one. Feeling obligated to "fit in" is psychological, not necessarily moral. Furthermore, this doesn't provide any sort of moral grounding for Tricia's "moral obligation" to commit TCD. Recall my fourth critique regarding cultural relativism in the V/C clash and see that we can't use "because the empire says to" as reason alone for a moral obligation. O2: My opponent's critique on the impossibility of moral consistency doesn't dismiss this observation. Our moral obligations, if we are to follow them, require some sort of rhyme and reason, whether they are consistent or not. While I reject cultural relativism, this still acts as a source for moral obligations. My O3 demonstrates why categorical imperatives are more preferable.O3: Since my opponent attacks this in the V/C framework clash, cross apply my defense regarding the normative aspects of Kant's CI to here. C1: My opponent does nothing to reject the immorality of using another being as a means to an end, but instead argues that Tricia is restoring her own free will after a violation. We must see that it is this very sort of logic that creates the negative spiral I describe in my attack of her C1. If we rest this moral obligation to commit TCD on Tricia's need to restore her own free will, then this obligation must be satisfied whenever free will is violated. Hence, her friends must restore their free will after the TCD by committing TCD. She must then restore her free will by committing TCD. So on and so on. Eventually, too many hands will have been creamed, too many noses will have been tickled, and yet the Force will still be out of whack.C2: The Aff only attacks the emotion component of this contention, and ignores the "victims shouldn't dictate retributive justice" component. First, apply my critiques in the V/C clash. Second, she argues that any reaction to a cause will have an emotional component, which would explain why a rock gets mad when it gets wet, or the number 4 goes on a murderous rampage whenever a 2 and a 2 cozy up to each other. Lightsabers probably get a little too frisky whenever they're turned on. Heck, I'm rather annoyed that the floor beneath my feet has the audacity to resist my relationship with gravity. The point is, the presence of a cause & effect sort of relationship doesn't require an emotional bias. Kant explains the necessity of having retributive justice without "extraneous considerations", which is a principle many societal and legal systems strive for. C3: The Aff critiques this contention by stating I ignore any positive benefits of TCD. Keep in mind that with my C1 & C2 rebuilt, we have to see how regardless of positive or negative effects, TCD is an immoral act worthy of any budding Sith warrior. Resting any moral obligation on an immoral act is problematic, regardless of positive or negative effects. This obligation requires one individual to restore their autonomy by subverting another's autonomy. As I show in my critique of the Aff's C2, any positive effect requires the victim to see the act in a positive light. Otherwise, the victim is to blame when this moral obligation goes wrong. Moving onto my opponent's case.C1: My opponent dances around my critique of her use of scientific theory to explain moral obligation with the grace of a drunken Rancor. She suggests A. denying Newton's Third Law denies cause & effect, and B. ignoring potential positive effects of TCD regarding the Conservation of Energy. First, let's stay on target with what my critique is actually attacking. The use of scientific theory to explain moral obligation fails as a direct explanation of what makes things moral, and is an inadequate analogy due to a vicious circle of immoral acts. This doesn't ignore the existence of cause & effect. In fact, Kant's CI is heavily concerned with cause and effect. Knowing that our causes can produce undesirable consequences is one of the primary reasons to live by any moral code. Regarding the positive effects of TCD, recognize that the benefit of my criterion is that we don't hedge our moral obligations on "possible benefits" of an action. A moral obligation comes before the knowledge of actual effects. Just because an action "may end up good or bad" doesn't provide any consistent foundation to lay these obligations on. C2: My opponent is saddened by the fact that I reject the philosophy of My Little Pony, which I believe I can live with. Since her defense of Sub A relies on her rejection of my O1, cross apply my defense here. More importantly, she claims I simply counter her Sub B. with the example of Vader chopping off Luke's hand. Once again, this misses the actual target of my argument. The point is, any "friendship strengthening benefits" in the story only comes if Gilda compromises autonomy with an attitude adjustment. This offers no source for a moral obligation, and hedges the positive or negative consequences on Gilda's attitude. Whether it's My Little Pony, Luke and his father's weird relationship, or any other example, we must recognize that we can't morally justify actions by demanding that those who are affected should simply adjust their attitudes. For these reasons, I urge for a vote of "no confidence" regarding the Aff's position.