Animal rights is an unjustified ethical doctrine.

To begin, I think it is important to understand that I have a small, though fundamental, disagreement with my opponent regarding the burden of proof in this debate. My opponent has claimed that if he "can successfully [refute] all [his] opponent's arguments then" he "will have upheld the resolution. " I disagree. While the rules of this debate clearly require me to posit an argument for granting animals rights, I believe that my opponent's position as Pro requires him to provide an equal and opposite argument as to why the "moral background of animal rights [are] empty and unfulfilled. " While it is true that, if I am unable to make an argument justifying animal rights, I would not have provided a successful *counter*argument, this does not prove my opponent's resolution true unless he can provide a meaningful argument in support thereof. With that being said, I will address my opponent's attacks in turn: 1. Fulfilling the urge towards universal compassion and understanding My opponent makes two arguments against this justification: (1) Einstein is irrelevant and (2) not everyone is universally compassionate. As to point (1), I would argue that (a) a discussion of rights necessarily implicates a discussion of ethics, (b) ethics is of concern to any moral agent, (c) humans are moral agents, (d) Einstein was a human, (e) Einstein was a very bright human, and (f) in so far as anyone may be cited as a relevant authority on the matter of ethics, Einstein, a very bright moral agent, certainly may be. If I can't cite Einstein for the proposition that the pursuit of morality concerns as its ends harmony of a part of creation with the greater whole, then I really can't cite anyone in support. As to point (2), I would say that one doesn't need to be universally compassionate for universal compassion to be the end of morality – indeed, Einstein's quote suggests that it is a process being developed, not one that has been perfected. Falling short of one's goals for a time, however, is no excuse for not continuing to pursue them. 2. Acquiring Symbiotic Benefits Technology is not a panacea, nor will it ever fully insulate us from the rest of nature; nor would many people prefer a dead and sterile landscape, devoid of all life save our own. Unless we intend to eliminate all other species on earth, we'll have to deal with them in some context, and the preferable relationship is one without conflict. I am not arguing that animals would aid us out of compassion; rather, I am arguing that animals could come to aid us or at least be convinced to not be aggressive towards us with repeated non-violent beneficial contact. With some animals direct communication could be established. . http://acp.eugraph.com... Over time, the benefits of interacting positively with humans would outweigh the benefits of being aggressive towards them, and animals would adapt to live in harmony therewith. Of course, this argument is limited – for example, insects couldn't even comprehend that they were being treated well. Some animals, clearly, could never enter into a symbiotic state with human society. As for whether or not such benefits are considerable, I would argue that, for so small a price as non-aggression, saving a single drowning victim is probably already significant. Of course, there are more direct benefits possible. For example, the Navy deploys marine mammals on various missions. . http://www.spawar.navy.mil... While it might be argued that such a ‘use' would constitute an animal rights violation under the PETA definition, the methodology used in training is similar to what a continuous rights-based form of interaction could be expected to reproduce. After all, there's nothing saying you can't ‘play' with the animals, and play itself can be a form of conditioning. 3. Meta-ethical argument: Allowing the shooting of the box Let me see if I can answer my opponent's concerns with this argument point by point: 1. "At the very least it will force some sort of change upon humans that will likely be UNWANTED. This is detrimental enough itself. " Actually, it's not. If merely enduring an obligation in and of itself was a reason not to enforce a right, then no one would have *any* rights. After all, one person's rights are another person's obligations. You could hardly argue that a world where people who would like to murder can't without consequences is worse than a world where people who would like to murder can without consequences. Certainly, the murderers are burdened, but the burden is the cost paid for safeguarding others' rights. If animals deserve to have rights, you can not argue that the inconvenience of enforcing those rights would be cause enough not to grant them. 2. "The issue here is whether or not animals are persons, which you have yet to satisfy. " Actually, the argument here is whether or not the animals possess elements of personhood which should be safeguarded by concomitant rights. Note that the analogy does not ever contemplate directly shooting a child; I explicitly presented the *possibility* that a child was within the box. The analogy notes that an animal (the box) could have elements of personhood (the child) such that rights would attach. The animal may not have any such elements; the box could be empty. It is possibility, not actuality, which makes preserving the box against gunfire the preferred moral stance, as opposed to allowing it to be shot. "Prove how diminishing suffering of sentient beings amount to some good. After all, isn't this the ENTIRE PURPOSE of this debate? " As per the first part of the argument, if we accept that morality is a movement towards universal compassion, and that compassion contemplates alleviating suffering as one of its aims, and that a sentient being is a component of the universe that can contemplate suffering, then clearly diminishing suffering in sentient beings is some good. Likewise, if we assume that humans have some intrinsic worth due to the composition of their elements such that rights would attach thereto, then at least to the extent such elements are reflected in non-human entities some rights should attach thereto. "So any human who eats steaks and wears leather jackets is more cruel and callous to others in comparison to vegetarians and the like? Preposterous. " A human who limits the harm caused by his activities should ordinarily possess a concern for the welfare of other beings that extends to his fellow humans. The reasoning is what's important. If people are taught not to eat meat out of custom, then it is as meaningful in their ethical development as the requirement to attend church out of custom is- i. e. , not very. On the other hand, if people do not eat meat because they understand that they have a responsibility to cause as little suffering as possible to all living things, that rationale should result in positive social benefits. I cite the considerations of other ethicists to show a trend of agreement amongst them indicative of some truth to this point. Although their considerations would not *prove* the anti-resolution by themselves, in conjunction with argument such as that which I have provided, I believe that the animal rights movement can at least be safely said to be justified. Of course, a *justified* movement does not mean a *correct* movement. 5. Conclusion In conclusion, I would like to note that my sources provide those reviewing this debate with external materials upon which to determine the veracity and accuracy of my claims, which thus far is more than my opponent has provided. I fail to see how an argument can be made that disqualifies them from consideration, and I'm somewhat perturbed that my opponent would bother to make this appeal when he could easily just cite his own sources in support of a more substantive argument to win this point.