Abortion Is Morally Permissible

I also appreciate Freeman's time in debating this important topic to me.Freeman is an intelligent and well-read debater. This makes it a travesty that he has decided to debate in the way that he has. Freeman's arguments largely rely on appeals to authority (citing other philosophers as opposed to arguing for his position), and trying to quote pro-life philsophers in an attempt to discredit my arguments. I don't have the books he is quoting from with me so I can't verify whether or not he is accurately representing their positions, but I can tell you that Pro, throughout this debate, has misrepresented the position of Josh Brahm so it can be assumed that he is not accurately representing the positions of those in the pro-life field. Even if he is, quoting a philosopher who disagrees with me is nothing more than an appeal to authority.C1 -- Sanctity of Life1. Freeman has consistently misrepresented the Substance View. This view states that since humans outside the womb are the same humans that exist in utero, then unborn humans enjoy the same basic human right to life (for there is no right more fundamental, as you cannot enjoy any other rights without the right to life) as we do. That being said, this does not mean the Substance View entails it is never right to take a life. What it entails is that there must be sufficient moral justification for taking any life, born or unborn. Freeman's claim that this view entails that we are never justified in taking a life is misrepresentation, and simply false.This means that a brain-dead person is not a non-person. This means the unfortunate brain-dead human is still a person, but it is morally justifiable to pull the plug. The person he was is gone. He is dead and not coming back. This is different from a human embryo, which does not require a brain to live until it develops one. It has a Future-Like-Ours, whereas the brain-dead human does not.Pro's assertion that I am appealing to authority with Trent Horn is blatantly false. He appealed to authority by quoting Trent (among quoting other philosophers), and I was showing that the two positions are not mutually exclusive. It is a pity that Pro would accuse me of appealing to authority, as appealing to authority makes up the bulk of his argumentation.2. I have not begged the question here. Sexism and racism is wrong because we are all humans. You are discriminating against groups of humans based on their race or sex. Race and sex are accidental properties. A human is a human regardless of whether they're male or female, black, white, or Asian (or others). Being human is an essential property. Remove what makes you human (the inherent capacity as moral, rational agents) and you stop being human. This is why Pro's "all possible worlds" analogy fails. If there is a possible world in which a humans are not inherently moral, rational creatures, then they would not actually be human in that possible world.3. One might wonder here if Pro is even reading the same debate you are. I engaged his argumentation and showed it to be false. Not liking my rebuttal does not equate to not engaging the argument. We can pull the plug on a brain-dead human because they have lost what makes them "you," and will never get it back (this is why it would be immoral to pull the plug on someone in a reversible coma but not an irreversible one). This is also why it's immoral to kill a human embryo, because it has those inherent qualities. It just hasn't developed them yet. As toddlers are less developed than humans and deserve the same right to life, so we are not morally justified in killing an unborn child simply because they are less developed.Pro simply misunderstands my argument. Humanity is an essential property. The right to life extends to humans only insofar as they have the qualities that make them valuable (the inherent ability to be moral, rational agents). If there exists any possible worlds in which humans would not have these qualities, they would not have the same right to life we do. 4. I understand the benefit of thought experiments. What I meant is that we can only speculate what would happen in the case of a cerebrum swap. We can't prove for sure what would happen. I can only say it is more reasonable to suppose that if my cerebrum was removed and put into another person, "I" would inhabit that person's body. The person that human was would be lost and I would now occupy the body. This means that if I were put in the body of an irrational animal, the animal would now be rational and deserve a right to life because "I", the person who inhabited the human body the cerebrum would be removed from, would still exist. Just in a different body (or animal, as the case may be).I think it patently obvious to anyone who reads the debate that Pro is taking his words grossly out of context. And he has done it again. There is a difference between kill and pulling the plug on a brain-dead human. Josh does not believe we can kill a brain-dead person, or someone in an irreversible coma. However, withholding treatment (or pulling the plug) is morally justified in this case. This is not killing. It is allowing a human that is essentially already dead to finally rest in peace.C2 -- PersonhoodI do not define "personhood" arbitrarily. In fact, I believe that all humans should be considered persons. This is the inclusive view. To claim that any humans should be excluded as persons would leave Pro with the burden of proof as to why we should define it in any other way. Pro's definition does not hold up.Pro speaks of a right to life, but what he fails to consider is that blacks in the south at one time did not have a right to life, so therefore were not persons. Pro would have to say this was morally acceptable because they didn't fit the definition of person. Only under the pro-life view, the Substance View, can we say that even though black didn't fit the definition of person, they still deserved a right to life and should have been considered persons. In fact, anti-slavery was the pro-life position back then.1. Pro doesn't have to agree with Warren's view of infanticide, but to be consistent with his views he would have to accept infanticide. He has not shown why we should accept infanticide, or reject infanticide if we accept Warren's criteria. In fact, Warren's view on infanticide was laughably ad-hoc. If we accept Warren's criteria for personhood (as Pro does), then we must also accept infanticide. To do otherwise is inconsistent. Pro is simply incorrect in labeling my views. My views charge that all humans are valuable, whereas Pro would argue that infants, like the unborn, are not valuable and do not have a right to life. Which is it, Pro?2. Pro tries to have it both ways, that a sleeping person has a right to life due to previous consciousness, but not the brain-dead human. Pro has failed to offer a reason for why we should even accept that consciousness should define personhood (for even in this case, infants would not qualify and therefore still would not have a right to life).3. Pro has granted my case here.4. Pro's criticisms do not hold up. Even if conjoined twins share organs, it does not follow that they are not separate individuals. Does Pro honestly believe that conjoined twins are the same organism, the same person? Would a conjoined twin, him- or herself, say that they are?5. The fetus may not be corrected for cognitive distortion, but it still does not follow that they would not have an ideal desire to live if they had actual desires. I'm running low on characters, but it does not follow we should be able to allow the killing of someone just because they haven't yet developed to the point where they can have, or even express, those desires.Again, Pro's entire case rests on misrepresentation and appeals to authority. The pro-life position has the most explanatory power, and therefore should be accepted. I look forward to our final round.