Originalism is the correct principle for interpreting the Constitution.

Many thanks to my opponent for the debate. In this first round of debate I’m going to do three things:(1) Evaluate the resolution.(2) Clarify what originalism is.(3) Explain why, while originalism is a valid paradigm of constitutional interpretation, that it is not necessarily the only valid paradigm of constitutional interpretation because of its inherent limitations.(1) Evaluation of The Resolution:The resolution states: “Originalism is the correct principle for interpreting the Constitution.”The resolution asserts that “Originalism is the correct principle for interpreting the Constitution.” Based on my opponent’s first round, it is necessary to limit evaluation examination to only the Constitution of the United States. Because the resolution casts originalism as ‘the’ correct principle for interpreting the constitution, the use of the word “the” indicates contextually that Originalism is the ONLY correct principle of constitutional interpretation. If Originalism is the ONLY correct principle of constitutional interpretation, then all other principles/paradigms (and I will use those words interchangeably) are incorrect, which is to say that they are not valid principles of constitutional interpretation. Because the resolution asserts this, in order to sufficiently affirm his case, my opponent must rule out all other paradigms of constitutional interpretation as having possible validity to sustain the claim that originalism is the only correct paradigm of constitutional interpretation. It is permissible, therefore, that in negating this resolution, I as CON may accept the validity of originalism so long as that validity is not held as exclusive -meaning that there are than more than one valid paradigms of constitutional interpretation OR that no one paradigm is more valid than another.(2) Originalism:Originalism is defined by a legal doctrine which holds that “the meaning of the Constitution should be settled by reference to the original understanding of those who ratified it.” (Barnett) Or, as described by Antonin Scalia “Originalists believe that the Constitution should be interpreted to mean exactly what it meant when it was adopted by the American people.” (Smith, p. 162) There are, however, three different kinds of originalism: (1) Original Intent- the intent of those who wrote the constitution at the time it was written, (2) Public Understanding- ordinary meaning of literal words of the constitution and (3) Textualism- distinguishes between the intent of the person who wrote the actual constitution, and the actual words used in the constitution. Scalia, a visceral critic of Original Intent, is a widely published champion of Textualism. (Smith, 163) Scalia is an ardent critic of Original Intent because (a) people can say things they do not mean, (b) deciphering what law makers ‘intended’ risks involving a casuistic alchemy of legal principles which effectuates the same kind of judicial activism that originalists ardently seek to avoid and (c) because he asserts that the literal text of the constitution itself, the words written, as what was ratified -rather than the unspoken thoughts of the framers- is and can be the only viable source of legal authority. The text and only the text, then, Scalia posits, is sufficient and is only sufficient to serve as a source of Constitutional Law. This has the salutary purpose of elevating the law over men -legislatures and judges- which thereby legitimizes the practice of judicial review where the ratified words of the Constitution are the sufficient metric by which measures of government are evaluated.(3) Evaluating Originalism:(A) Meaning and CircumstanceAs described by Smith (167), “under the conventions of our language, almost any sequence of words can communicate more than one meaning, depending on the circumstances.” That is to say, to interpret on text alone ignores the unspoken meaning which is found in intent, because while it may be the case that it all and only those words which are ratified into law can be a source of legal authority as proscribed by the constitution, the words of the constitution alone are not sufficient to encompass the whole meaning of the text itself, because it fails to take into account the context in which the words themselves were written. In this way, intent is a means by which meaning may be determined. (Smith, 169) Context matters because the meaning of a words which describe a concept may be subject to change over time, such that while the use of words to describe a concept vary according to the time and place in which they were recorded, the values and principles of which they are descriptive do not. It is to evaluate laws on the basis of these values and principles which originalism aspires to achieve, so, the text alone (Scalia’s textual originalism) cannot suffice.(B) Less than Objective Objectivity and Equally Valid Competing ParadigmsThe appeal of originalism is broad as a paradigm because of its claim to posit legal objectivity. Indeed, this is the primary appeal of originalism -but it is a claim which ignores the reality of the Judge’s function. Fundamentally, the judge is the interpretive instrument of the legal system, such that his or her role is theoretically to apply standing precedent to existing cases which may produce a verdict that will stand as precedent for future cases. This judicial method (of applying past cases to present cases) is the judicial method known as “stare decisis” -which translates roughly from Latin into “let the decision stand,” and means that past cases serve as sources of legal authority for future cases -but all cases are at least in theory guided by the constitutional principles. So arises the interpretive problem of the American law.The problem of interpretation stems from the application of past precedent and constitutional principles to legal questions invoked by given cases at hand which are novel. In the presence of novel challenges, which is to say that certain legal questions that involve circumstances that invoke legal questions which have not yet been asked before, new law is functionally written where in the authorship of judicial opinions which render holdings that serve as precedent for future cases. New legal challenges arise from new circumstances that emanate from social, economic, political or societal change over time -thereby necessitating legal casuistry that hinges on a subjective application of legal principles (from the constitution or case law) whether those cases are objective or not. That being the case, the claims of objectivity on which the paradigm of originalism is predicated turns out to be less than objective.That is not to say, however, that Originalism is more or less valid than competing paradigms of constitutional interpretation. If originalism in practice turns out to be less than objective, objectivity in the law becomes, rather, a target towards which legal theorists and judges aspire in interpreting legal questions -which is more or less possible in either the Originalist or Living Constitutionalist school of thought. The fundamental difference, rather, comes from the question of what constitutes valid legal authority -that of all an only those words ratified by the people, or other influences to be discussed in Rd. 3.In Rd. 3, I will discuss the kinds of sources of legal authority and evaluate their significance to Originalism's being the only valid paradigm of constitutional interpretation.SOURCES:Barnett, Randy. “Restoring the Lost Constitution.” at pp, 89Smith, Tara. “Why Originalism Won’t Die- Common Mistakes in Competing Theories of Judicial Interpretation. Duke Journal of Constitoutional Law & Public Policy. Vol. 2., (2007)