Compatibilism

Due to issues on this website, Fkkize was unable to post his argument last round even though it was completed on time. Here is the link to Fkkize’s 3rd round. . http://www.debate.org...I am going to respond directly to a few of the statements made by Pro. A: “I spent roughly a third of my opening statement rejecting the idea of moral responsibility requiring the ability to do otherwise”This statement by pro illustrates well the topic being debated. I do not find the argument presented convincing, nor does it seem reasonable to assign moral responsibility to an “agent” who did not have the ability to do otherwise. What sense does it make to assign moral value, or determine an action right or wrong if it is the only action that could have taken place? There is none, and furthermore pro has not provided any solid reason to think there is. B: “If Allison was NOT forced, everyone would most certainly attribute moral responsibility to her, but if the dog was not forced, we would still not attribute moral responsibility to dogs, that would be ridiculous. ”I agree with the last sentiment, and even stated “No one would argue the Dog to have moral free will. ” Going on to conclude “The only difference between my opponent’s example and mine is that he assumes the human somehow has moral free will when the dog does not. This assumption being bare leaves this example hollow. ”C: “As such I do not at all see why we should be afraid of "our strings", if we are morally responsible agents anyway. ”I never suggested we should be afraid of our strings, rather that determinism suggests there are strings and that being accepted would be incompatible with freewill. Surely my opponent is not suggesting that a puppet is free . Again this highlights the real point of this debate. Can a puppet be morally responsible? Determinism implies human action being guided much like a puppet by strings. This is clearly incompatible with free will. D: “I did not state I want to determine my choices or desires, I said I want my choices be determined by my desires (which I do not freely choose). ”This is about as close to conceding without saying it I think my opponent could get. Not determining your desires which cause your so called “choices” makes it unreasonable to hold one morally accountable. Choice begins to lose all meaning when used this way. If determinism is accepted then your choices are determined by something you have no control over and thus could not be moral responsible. E: “Ghandi"s fasting was caused by his desire to free India, hunger is caused by a variety of physiological reasons”You could argue Gandhi exercised free will here. But you could not do say and say that determinism is true. If Gandhi’s actions where determined by things outside his control than he is not their causer and cannot be held responsible for their repercussions. Conclusion: I want to thank Fkkize for doing this debate with me. I value his insight and enjoyed the back in forth. That stated, I find myself currently unconvinced that compatibilism is plausible. I think all should as it is clear that accepting Determinism would make it impossible for us to “cause and control our actions in the right kind of way” to be held morally accountable. Likewise, “Determinism deprives us of the power or ability to do or choose otherwise. ” Which, as I stated above, What sense does it make to assign moral value, or determine an action right or wrong if it is the only action that could have taken place? There is none, and furthermore pro has not provided any solid reason to think there is. I conclude as I did in round 2 It seems clear to me that these two principles being; free will and determinism, are incompatible. One may subscribe to free will, or determinism, to accept both would be to accept opposing thoughts. This is fickle, and would be inconsistent.