Agnosticism is self-contradictory in at least one way.

The main problem with my opponent's argument is that they are all based upon an unspecified position called "agnosticism"—there is no one identified as holding these supposed tenets and my opponent bases his understanding of this allegedly inconsistent position upon a dictionary definition, and anyone knows that dictionary definitions do little, if anything, to help one understand a philosophical position for the purposes of its analysis (just look up "Idealism" and then go read all of the scholarship on German Idealism and notice how little that definition tells you about a whole movement from which many common understandings of "Idealism" are mistakenly derived—notice this also in the case of British Idealism, Platonic Idealism—Berkeleyan Idealism!—well, you get the point). I'm not clear on the inconsistency, let alone the position, as I said before. From my studies in Greek, gnosis means knowing, or knowledge, and the alpha privative "a" means without. There are many philosophical positions in eastern philosophy that, through dropping one's assumption that they know, one develops a different and more refined mode of knowing (and this is even seen in Socrates' dialectical humility where he stops assuming he knows and decides to work with hypotheses to conclusions so as to sort out a good position to find knowledge)—but my opponent has not considered such a thing and has committed a fallacy, and this is seen in contention A: my opponent has claimed that agnostics think "either A exists or A doesn't exist" therefore "A might exist." One notices that the mode of existence is faultily inferred, the original premise was a strict binary existence (A or ~A) and the supposed conclusion infers a third existential value in the argument that wasn't seen in the premises (A, ~A, ?A—exists, doesn't exist, might exist). Therefore, contention A is fallaciously loaded (and also, as was said in my previous paragraph, commits the straw-man fallacy). Again, my opponent's claims are quite specious since they stem from this vague position known as "agnosticism" so, as I've shown, the basis for all the contentions are problematic such that all the contentions fall apart stemming from their faulty basis in contention A, however, my last point will be to clarify why my opponent has mistakenly thought that revelation (as found in contention B) makes the agnostic's position inconsistent. If one reads William James' lecture on religious experience, it's clear that revelation is such that its claims to truth cannot make any claim upon another person—that is, if God reveals himself to someone, that person is not able to make that truth into something that another must subscribe to, and if one attempts to, there must be an attempt at a derivation from the revelation since when explaining what God revealed to oneself to another person requires producing the infrastructure of rational grounds for the claim in question so as to make it consistent with reality, since, in revelation, reality is not what it is for the person having the mystical experience, nor can it be for anyone else hearing the experience. Thus, contention B is quite consistent with any epistemological humility that an "agnostic" may have (whatever the tenets of their position may be), since, even if God reveals himself to someone, as James might say, one doesn't quite know what thing was revealing truth, since mystical experience is quite fleeting and often plagued by mystery. In conclusion, I'll leave aside the bold overstatement that, as my opponent states in the summary, that the agnostic supposes no one can know anything (does anyone know of anyone who has made this claim aside from some philosophy professor trying to play out Descartes' skepticism in an intro course's lecture?—hell, even Descartes gets past his skepticism),--that is, I'll simply end by stating that my opponent's great faulting is supposing he has understood "agnosticism" as a formalized doctrine, when, in fact, he has merely created his own demon to wrestle with.