Three Philosophical Topics - 1A

I unfortunately had to let the clock run out into a forfeit. Hopefully my final attempt to even out the playing field fulfills needed backing of my argument: _______________________________ My opponent continues his trust in foundationalism without looking at the main root of its problems: the Justified True Belief (JTB) theory in question (I will demonstrate more on this as soon as I clarify where BonJour goes wrong in his objection). BonJour's critique of his former observation doesn't hold water as it falls through the same holes as he suspected foundationalists would fall through. :An Objection: BonJour states: "such a built in awareness of sensory content is thus also apparently available to justify genuinely foundational beliefs […]. Thus if I have the belief that, e. g. , my present visual experience includes a red, square patch in the approximate middle of my visual field, and if my constitutive or built-in awareness of the content of my actual conscious visual experience includes an awareness of such an element, then this latter awareness seems to provide a clear and compelling reason for thinking that the belief is true. [1]" Whatever BonJour sees will be processed into his visual cortex, and to finally form a "belief" in his head, BonJour's brain will turn it into a belief statement in the perietal cortex. BonJour's visual perception can be clearly stated as this such belief: "It is. " The thing is, BonJour's statement is a syllogistic inference. It requires the premise (using P as a trait) "Whatever has the property of P exists. " Which leads to other premises needing to contribute, namely to answer questions like how we know things exist, etc. Therefore, leading BonJour's failed answer right back to where he came from: the skeptic's inferred regression trap of JTB theory. My opponent then goes on to state, ". .. .then we come across the problem of it being too strong for it's own good. " The idea here follows (as JTB theories progressions like Foundationalism fail to see) that skepticism can not be overthrown in the argument for justification. Yes, it is too strong, but not for it's own good. It proves what it needs to prove - that JTB theory needs to be replaced with a new theory of knowledge that isn't subject to the regress problem. BonJour himself states his belief in foundationalism is of convenience for him because there is no theory of epistemology that helps ease cognitive distress for him if he submits to JTB being false. Bonjour and many other philosopher's actually suggest something else: While discussing Externalism, BonJour states that we might abandon the traditional concept of epistemic justification and knowledge. You can rid the epistemic regress problem that skeptics pose on JTB theory: If the regress problem is a direct result of our traditional definition of knowledge as justified true belief, then the most efficient solution would be to alter this definition to avoid the problem entirely. Justification's definition in True Belief should be altered for any defeat of the skeptic's weapon of the infinite regress problem. So, my opponent's statement of, ------"In summary, if we are to accept this objection then we have to accept the abandonment of all epistemological attempts at a theory of justification, given in virtue of how the objection is used. " ----- is false. We just go back to working on what justification means is all. Submitting to skepticism in regards to foundationalism being a valid theory of justification doesn't lead to a bleak black hole of nothingness. My opponent also states the following, ----- "This means that if we are to accept this objection, then we have to submit to the fact that NO THEORY OF JUSTIFICATION can be held accountable. The problem with this conclusion is that it's self-defeating; such a admittance would result in abandoning oneself from any possible rational discourse. " --- This is a complete Straw Man. My opponent assumes that only the JTB theory of knowledge is an acceptable theory of Justification. He then throws in a bit of scare tactics without showing the readers that all you'd have to do is attempt a new definition for Justification in order to produce another theory of knowledge for rational discourse. Thus, Foundationalism fails as a valid theory of Justification. Sources: . http://www.niu.edu... (my class! )