The 'Problem of Evil' never succeeds (Attempt 1), Pt. 2

INTRODUCTION This is "Part 2" of a debate I am having with TheSkeptic regarding the Problem of Evil (PoE) as an argument for the non-existence of God. If you have not already done so, please see "Part 1" of this debate first before following and voting on "Part 2" (for it contains the agreed-upon definitions and parameters of the debate). [1] This debate in both parts is considered the first attempt at defeating my resolution because my opponent is still TheSkeptic. The next attempt will not be engaged until this chapter is concluded to the satisfaction of its participants. Toward that end, "Part 2" is going to allow the maximum number of rounds because, as discovered in "Part 1," three rounds is insufficient for our needs. Again, my resolution is, "There are literally no versions of the Problem of Evil argument that succeed at proving the non-existence of God." THE ARGUMENT In the first of these debates, my opponent chose to use "gratuitous evil" to defeat my resolution, defending that such an argument indeed does succeed at proving that God doesn't exist, but probabilistically—in other words, his non-existence is more probable than the alternative. And in this debate my opponent proposed an internal critique, which simply means that he intended to make his case using Christianity's own terms, so terms such as 'God' and 'evil', etc., are as defined biblically. Stated as a modus tollens, his argument amounted to: (1) If an omnipotent, omniscient, and all-good God exists, then gratuitous evil probably does not exist. (2) Gratuitous evil probably exists. (3) Therefore, an omnipotent, omniscient, and all-good God probably does not exist. With respect to the first premise, he described gratuitous evil as being "incompatible" with the biblical God. Regarding the second premise, he described gratuitous evil as any evil that is "unwarranted or unjustified" or "pointless." THE ANALYSIS There are two problems with his argument, regarding each of the premises. First, it is incorrect to characterize gratuitous evil as being "incompatible" with God, insofar as that understates the matter tremendously. Given that the God at issue in this debate is defined as omnipotent, omniscient, and all-good, the existence of gratuitous evil is not a matter of probability—because its probability is zero! In other words, 'gratuitous evil' and 'God' are mutually exclusive entities, in the same way that an Immovable Object and an Irresistible Force are. Either gratuitous evil exists or God exists; it is logically impossible—by the very definition of the terms involved—for both to exist. In order for any evils to be gratuitous, God must lack one of the given attributes; he has insufficient power, or he is unaware, or he is inattentive, or he is indifferent, etc. But to assert such a God is to build a straw man, which is invalid so he cannot do this. Ergo, his first premise fails because it defies the agreed-upon definitions of the debate. Second, it is therefore question-begging for him to assert that gratuitous evils probably exist, never mind how he intended to support that particular premise (which cannot be done validly at any rate). Consider the following exposition: (GE = gratuitous evil; BG = biblical God) (4) If GE has a probability greater than zero, then GE is logically possible. (5) GE has a probability greater than zero. (6) Therefore, GE is logically possible. Here (4) is uncontroversial, since it follows necessarily or by definition, but (5) and (6) prove the question-begging fallacy being committed by his argument: (7) If BG exists, then GE is not logically possible. (8) GE is logically possible. (9) Therefore, BG does not exist. Here (7) follows by definition of the terms, and (8) is a restatement from (6). However, (8) shows us clearly why his argument commits the question-begging fallacy. For him to assert gratuitous evil as logically possible (cf. (5) above and (2) earlier) is for him to assert the existence of God as logically impossible. But doing so WITHIN A PREMISE of an argument intended to prove the non-existence of God is to render the whole argument invalid by having implicitly begged the very question! As a result, his argument has rendered itself invalid by reason of a logical fallacy. There is also the matter of any evils being gratuitous in the first place. If we construct the argument for it as a modus ponens, it might look like this: (E = some evil) (10) If E is without warrant or purpose, then E is gratuitous. (11) E is without warrant or purpose. (12) Therefore, E is gratuitous. Of course (10) is true by definition, so the issue centers on (11). How did he support the truth of (11)? By pointing to the lack of evidence for its alternative. But it commits the argument from ignorance for him to assert that (11) is "true until proven otherwise" so he cannot do that. Yes, there are cases when the presumption of truth (or falsehood) is a valid move; but it is an INVALID move if doing so would end up begging the question, as it does with respect to his argument (such that the existence of gratuitous evil is said to count against the existence of God). It is for this reason that (11) is disqualified from the presumption of truth. So then he must PROVE that (11) is true, rather than presume its truth until proven otherwise. And good luck doing that validly. I should also point out another slight problem in his argument. Toward supporting (11) and its probability, he said that "even after careful inspection of an example in which evil has occurred, there would be no good reason to believe that God would have an adequate reason to allow [it]." The problem is that his being unable to believe that God has a justification or purpose for some evil is not the issue, but whether or not God does in fact have one—or for his case, that God does not have one. But rationally speaking, being unable to imagine or conceive of something does not constitute as evidence for or against anything. Such is an argument from personal incredulity, which is a fallacy. CONCLUSION As a PoE argument proving the non-existence of God, it seems that the ‘gratuitous evil' version cannot avoid rendering itself invalid by reason of logical fallacy. And when we consider the definitions of the terms involved, we discover that this argument turns out to be a logical version of PoE arguments, which not only infuses it with tremendous potential strength but also tightly controls the rules for defending it—or, on the other hand, makes it very easy to defeat. With a mental toolbox equipped to understand and recognize errors in reasoning (fallacies), we discover that no arguments attempting to prove the non-existence of God are valid, including the Problem of Evil versions. REFERENCES 1. The 'Problem of Evil' never succeeds: Attempt 1 (http://www.debate.org...)