The finitude of the past of the universe does not necessitate that the universe had a creator

Assuming The A-Theory Of TimeIf something comes into being, then this entails that prior to the first state of that thing existing, that thing was out of being. This seems like a self-evident truth. For example, we know I came into being because prior to the first state I existed, I was out of being. I existed in 1987, but not in 1986; there is a transition. Basically, what I am saying is that there must be a transition from "out of being", to "in being" for the term "came into being" to have any meaning in context. I will concede that most things that have a finite past do come into being, as there was a point prior to it's first state at which it was out of being. With the universe however, it is self-evidently possible that there is no "prior" to it's first state at all. According to our best science, the universe is around 13. 7 billion years old[1]. This entails that 13.7 billion years ago was the universe's first state (whether it be a singularity at t=0, or something else). What if there was no "prior" to the first state of the universe all that time ago? Then there could be no "prior" to the first state of the universe at which the universe did not exist, meaning that we cannot say it came into being if that was the case; that would be a harsh misnomer. It seems at least possible that there was no "prior" to the first state of the universe 13.7 billion years ago, at which there was no universe (whether a temporally prior, or an atemporally prior), simple Modal intuition tells us this. It is possible that "the buck stops" as they say, at the first state of the universe at t=0. It would then not make sense to ask whether there was nothing or something prior to the universe, as that question would assume there was a "prior" to the universe in the first place.In the diagram below, I will use "e" to describe the universe. (i) shows a universe with a finite past that comes into being (as there is a "prior" to it at which the universe is out of being), and (ii) shows a universe with a finite past that doesn't come into being (as there is no "prior" to it at which the universe is out of being). Since both are self-evidently metaphysically conceivable scenarios, then it cannot be true that (i) is necessary assuming a finite past of the universe. However, (i) has to be necessary assuming a finite past in order for Con's position to be true; there is nothing about a "prior" to the universe that makes it metaphysically necessary. The problem is, for the universe to have come into being, there must have been a "prior" to it in which it was out of being. We have no reason to think that a "prior" to the universe had to have been the case. Thus, it is more than reasonable to conclude that I established the resolution assuming the A-Theory of time.Assuming The B-Theory of TimeIf the ontology entailed by the B-Theory Of Time is true, then nothing at all comes into being (and this holds even if the universe as a finite past). This is because The Big Bang 13.7 billion years ago would just represent the edge of a 4d or n+1d space-time block that exists tenselessly eternally. If it exists eternally, then it self-evidently cannot come into being. As Christian Philosopher William Lane Craig states:"From start to finish, the Kalam Cosmological Argument is predicated upon the A-Theory of time. On a B-Theory of time, the universe does not in fact come into being or become actual at the Big Bang; it just exists tenselessly as a four-dimensional space-time block that is finitely extended in the earlier than direction. If time is tenseless, then the universe never really comes into being, and, therefore, the quest for a cause of its coming into being is misconceived." - William Lane Craig[2]This is not even controversial. If the B-Theory of time is true, then the universe did not come into being even if it has a finite past. To make this easier to conceptualize, William Lane Craig uses the analogy of a yard stick to show that a finite past of the universe (which extends back 13.7 billion years ago) doesn't necessitate that it came into being 13.7 billion years ago assuming B-Theory."On the B-Theory of time, nothing really comes into existence. The universe 'begins to exist' on the B-Theory only in the sense that a yard stick begins to exist at the first inch; it just has an edge... The yard stick doesn't come into existence at the first inch." - William Lane CraigConclusionI have proven that a finite past of the universe doesn't automatically mean that the universe came into being. Why? Well, it is possible that there was no "prior" to the first state of the universe 13.7 billion years ago (its possible because it entails no metaphysical or logical contradictions or problems).If there was no "prior" to the universe 13.7 billion years ago, then the universe did not come into being, even with a finite past, as there was no "prior" to the first state of the universe at which it did not exist. The universe could very well have a "prior" to it, I am not arguing that it does not. However, the very mere possibility of it not having a "prior" is enough to establish the resolution. Another reason that a finite past of the universe doesn't necessarily entail that the universe came into being is that the B-Theory of time could be true. If this theory is true, then time is tenseless; and nothing comes into being. This holds whether or not the universe has a finite past or not.Due to my two arguments, the resolution has clearly been established.Sources[1] http://en.wikipedia.org...[2] The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, pp. 183-184