United Nations peacekeepers should have the power to engage in offensive operations

This debate is not that simple. Don’t let Thett obscure the complexity here.I’m not saying armed men should stand by as civilians are hacked to pieces. Nor am I saying that I support how the United Nations handled the Rwandan genocide. Both those positions are untenable. Again, I'm surprised Thett ascribes those positions to me. To be clear: I never said anything about peacekeepers letting civilians suffer. And I explicitly criticized how the UN approached Rwanda.What I’m arguing is that peacekeepers should have the authority to use self-defensive force but not offensive force. Self-defense includes defense of the mandate. So if the mandate requires the protection of civilians within the mission’s area of operation, the peacekeepers have authority to protect these civilians as a matter of self-defense. Using force in that context is defensive, not offensive. And all this requires is intelligent drafting of mission mandates.Of course, Thett misses this key nuance. No wonder he thinks this debate is “simple.” The only mention Thett makes of self-defense is in passing, suggesting that peacekeepers can’t do anything unless they’re personally attacked. But that’s not how self-defense works. Thett simply ignores the extensive literature defining self-defense to include defense of the mandate, where the mandate may (and should) involve the protection of civilians.Self-defense also includes what’s called preemptive force to prevent an imminent threat. Under my plan, then, peacekeepers not only have the authority to protect civilians, they might even have the authority to strike preemptively, all without needing any authority to conduct offensive operations. So the self-defense principle is all that's needed to keep the peace, protect civilians, and defend the mandate.Thett’s only substantive response is the notion that coalitions are less effective than peacekeepers. But that argument makes a number of false assumptions. First, Thett assumes peacekeepers can’t use force defensively to protect civilians. Of course, that strawmans my plan. As I explained above, if civilians are under attack, peacekeepers should have the authority to defend them.Second, Thett’s response focuses on any coalition whatsoever, whereas I’m talking about enforcement coalitions authorized by the United Nations Security Council under Chapter VII, Article 42, of the UN Charter. The coalitions led by the US and Russia in Syria aren’t authorized under Chapter VII – so they’re not United Nations enforcement operations. In fact, the UN has totally botched the situation in Syria. It pulled out its peacekeeping operation in 2012 – and since then, it hasn’t authorized a Chapter VII enforcement operation. But I don’t feel like turning this debate into a discussion about how ineffective the UN Security Council is – because that’s applicable to both our plans.Third, Thett assumes that peacekeeping forces aren’t supplied by member nations. The reality is that the United Nations doesn’t have its own army. Its forces are provided by member nations. So to the extent Thett wants a force that is independent of any national interests, his plan has the same faults as mine – the UN by definition borrows its forces from member nations. And to the extent Thett wants independent forces, I’m in agreement. But there’s no reason those forces must be peacekeepers; they could also include enforcers and peacemakers. So again, it’s a non-unique issue.Now, let’s talk about the advantages of my plan:(1) Civilian statusThe divide between combatants and civilians is at the heart of international humanitarian law. In short, civilians have special legal protections from violence; combatants don’t. This distinction is important for two reasons: (a) it incentivizes armies to take into account the combatant/civilian distinction in planning their attacks (i.e. to use proportionality measures), and (b) it determine issues of accountability in criminal court after-the-fact. This distinction thus shapes the way armies conduct wars.Traditionally, peacekeepers are classified as civilians, so targeting them has severe criminal penalties. Civilians may use force in self-defense. But using force offensively turns you into a combatant. So if peacekeepers are given authority to use offensive force, they’ll lose their protected status as civilians – they’ll become combatants. And that means it’ll become legal to directly target peacekeepers. So if the US or Russia or China wants to attack the peacekeepers directly, they could legally do so without facing any liability.The impact is huge. Attackers won’t be held accountable for targeting peacekeepers, so armies won’t need to use proportionality measures (i.e. they won’t need to distinguish peacekeepers from their targets). That will inevitably lead to more peacekeeper casualties. It’ll lead to worse (and potentially escalating) conflicts. There won’t be any accountability. And there’s a danger that otherwise non-combatant peacekeeping personnel will become legitimate targets as well, due to their collaboration with combatant peacekeepers.Thett drops this analysis entirely, admitting he knows nothing about international law. (2) ImpartialityThett concedes that enforcement is "way, WAY less impartial." Of course, enforcement is explicitly about creating peace where a nation has emphatically broken the law, so impartiality isn't needed. But Thett advocates blurring the line between enforcement and peacekeeping.Thett says there's no impact. But that's untrue. As I explained, impartiality is crucial to the legitimacy of UN peacekeeping. It ensures that peacekeepers are viewed as independent third-parties to a conflict. This is especially important when permanent members of the UN Security Council are involved in a conflict (e.g. during the Cold War).Impartialtiy also reflects an important UN value, that no matter what side of a conflict you belong to, you're entitled to the same rights. This is what not only legitmizes peacekeeping missions but also the UN itself. This also allows peacekeepers to ask parties to comply with certain measures to create peace without either side feeling prejudiced.Finally, a lack of impartiality creates confusion on the ground, as forces can't be certain whether they've been attacked by peacekeepers or a party to the conflict.(3) ExpectationsThett's "turn" rests on a strawman of my position. The point is that greater power means greater expectations, which means the harm to the legitimacy/credibility of the UN is greater in cases where the peacekeepers fail.(4) Less enforcementAgain, Thett's response rests on a strawman. The point is that there's a risk nations won't contribute to enforcement operations if they've already contributed to a peacekeeping force authorized to use offensive force. Nothing Thett argued shows otherwise.--Finally, Thett argues that these advantages/disadvantages only apply to certain situations. But the problem is that we don't know what those situations are. Thett's plan entails serious risks and substantial uncertainty about when those risks will become actual harms. So it doesn't matter if the risks won't always manifest. What matters is that these risks are real, they could happen in any mission. It's not like these risks are sometimes risks and sometimes not-risks. They're always risks, in every single operation, mission, sitaution.To vote Con, you just need to acknowledge that Thett's plan has unique disadvantages with no unique benefits. I've shown that throughout this debate. Self-defense is sufficient to protect civilians, defend the mandate, and keep peace. There's simply no reason to take risks if there's no unique benefits. And Thett just hasn't proven any unique benefits to blurring the line between peacekeepers and peacemakers.