It is probable god exists

The responses that Con has given to my arguments are rather inadequate. Indeed, his responses against the Leibnizian cosmological argument isn't even applicable to that version of it. One gets the impression that Con didn't even read my opening argument but instead Googled the arguments' names along with the keyword "refutation" or "debunked" at the end. 1. The Ontological Argument According to Con, the biggest problem with the OA is that "there is no reason to go from possible to necessary." Had he read my opening argument however, the move from <>[]P -> []P is perfectly warranted and axiomatic given the S5 axiom of modal logic. As I previously indicated, P3 is simply a statement of axiom S5 of modal logic, which is that:S5: If possibly necessarily P, then necessarily P.If an MGB is possibly necessary, then it exists in at least one possible world. But it follows from this that it must also exist in all possible worlds qua maximally great, since maximal greatness entails necessary existence. As such, the shift from mere possibility to necessity is justified.Con's primary criticism is that Plantinga himself says that the OA may be rationally denied. But how is this a criticism Plantinga is simply making a statement about what may be within the epistemic rights of the person who considers this second. That an argument may be rationally denied does not mean that the argument is unsound. So the mere fact that an argument can be denied doesn't mean its wrong (Lest Con shoots himself in the foot).He then charges the OA with what J. L. Mackie calls the "no-maximality" objection. According to NM, it is possible that maximal greatness is not possibly exemplified. Therefore, it follows that the OA is unsound. But unfortunately this criticism is wholly off point. It confuses epistemic possibility with metaphysical (or what Plantinga called broadly logical) possibility. It may be epistemically possible that maximal greatness is not exemplified in some possible wold, but its metaphysical possibility does not follow. In order to show that maximal greatness is not possible, one has to appeal to more than just epistemic possibility. For all we know it is epistemically possible that, say, Goldbach's conjecture is true/false, but its metaphysical possibility does not follow.Finally, he advanced Ockham's razor against the OA. But the razor isn't even applicable to this situation. [1] Indeed, the quotation he gives from Mackie nowhere near endorses using Ockham's razor against the OA. One wonders if he actually has read his sources. 2. The Kalam Cosmological ArgumentThe first thing to note is that the fallacy of composition is an informal fallacy. Informal fallacies are only fallacious given certain situations. For example, it is not fallacious to assert that because every brick in a wall is red, that the wall itself must be red. Thus, it will not do for Con to simply say the KCA is guilty of the fallacy of composition without showing why it does, as part-whole reasoning is not always fallacious. Secondly, the KCA does not rely on part-whole reasoning. The KCA is not saying that because every part requires a cause, the whole too requires a cause. Rather, it is claiming that whatever begins to exist has a cause. The universe, regardless of whether it is a part or a whole, still requires a cause if it began to exist. Con's criticism is thus wholly inapplicable.Con's criticism of the second and third premises are completely off point too. He asserts that there is no evidence for the second premise, yet he does not even attempt to refute the two lines of evidence that I brought up in my opening argument (That P2 is supported by the big bang and the impossibility of an actual infinite). Moreover, his statement that we do not know "what happened before the big bang" is mistaken as well. There is no such thing as "before the big bang." As Quentin Smith (himself an atheist) notes, "It belongs analytically to the concept of the cosmological singularity that it is not the effect of prior physical events. The definition of a singularity... entails that it is impossible to extend the spacetime manifold beyond the singularity... This rules out the idea that the singularity is an effect of some prior natural process." [2]Con has also completely misunderstood the reasoning behind P3. It is not claiming that "everything has a personal cause," but that the cause of the universe must be personal because there cannot be antecedent conditions in which event causation can take place. Event causation is when an event A causes event B, and agent causation is when an agent A causes an event B. The mode of causation operative at the beginning of the universe could not have been event causation because there were no prior conditions under which natural causes could operate. As a matter of necessity then, the cause of the universe must have been a personal agent. 3. The Leibnizian Cosmological ArgumentDid Con even read the LCA I presented? If he did, he would recognize that it is completely immune from the fallacy of composition. Sure, older versions of the argument may be have been vulnerable to it, but Ramussen's version certainly isn't. Aside from the fact that the FoC is an informal fallacy (and thus not always fallacious), exactly which premise is guilty of this fallacy? The move from (1) to (3)? Certainly not, for there is no part-whole reasoning at all, nor is the term "universe" found anywhere in the six premises. From this I conclude that either Con has misunderstood the argument, has not read it, or both.He also accuses the first premise of being "unfounded" and that "we do not know if the universe was not a necessary outcome." This is completely irrelevant. First, Con merely asserted that P1 is unproblematic and did not provide a single argument for that thesis. By contrast, I provided several arguments as to why the PSR is more plausible than its denial. Secondly, this version of the LCA is not about the universe, but about contingent facts simpliciter. Con thus attacks a strawman.The LCA thus remains completely unresponded to, and hence I extend my argument. Plus, the link he provides doesn't even attack the right argument. A Lesson on Background EvidenceIn order to win this debate, Con has to show the negation of the resolution. He must thus show that the existence of God is improbable. Thus, it is simply not enough to respond to my arguments. He must also include his own arguments as to why we should consider the existence of God to be improbable.Con begs to differ. He thinks that improbability is the default position, as the existence of God is on par with other mythical deities and figures (Which are also presumably improbable). But this simply begs the question. Probabilities are always relative to some background evidence. What that background evidence is will determine which hypothesis is the more probable. Con simply assumes that the background evidence is against theism, and he uses this as an argument that theism is improbable. This is simply a circular argument, as he is assuming his conclusions. Why is theism improbable relative to the background evidence? Con has not shown us why; instead he assumed it. As such, he cannot say that God's existence is improbable. At best, he can only say that it is inscrutable (We don't know the probability either way). Now as it stands, I have given evidence that the background evidence is in favor of theism. It is thus more probable that God exists.This is not a "shifting the burden of proof fallacy," this is a simple lesson on probability. 1. For when Ockham's razor is justified, see my response to DetectableNinja's arguments here: http://tinyurl.com...2. W. L. Craig and Q. Smith, Theism, Atheism, and Big Bang Cosmology (OUP) p.120