In the USCJS, truth-seeking ought to take precedence over attorney-client privilege.

As this round is reserved for Constructive Only, I shall refrain from rebutting Pro at this time. Instead, I shall present my case in this round. I will, however, contest one of Aff's definitions--I believe this is permissible since such arguments are normally made at the onset of the NC. From this point forward, Attorney-Client Privilege may be referred to as ACP.DEFINITIONSAff (Pro) defines ACP as "law requires that the attorney does not reveal any communications or letters between him/her to his/her client or any third party." Unfortunately, this is not strictly correct; there are a number of exceptions to the privilege which are already codified into law. In other words, the wording of Aff's definition makes it seem as if ACP is an absolute, but it isn't. Among the exceptions are [1]:1.the communication was made in the presence of individuals who were neither attorney nor client, or was disclosed to such individuals,2.the communication was made for the purpose of committing a crime or tort,3.the client has waived the privilege (for example by publicly disclosing the communication).4. Lawyers may disclose confidential information relating to the retainer where they are reasonably seeking to collect payment for services rendered.I therefore defined ACP as "the client's right, within the boundaries of existing law and jurisprudence, to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications between the client and the attorney." NEGATIVE CONSTRUCTIVE (NC)Prof. R.A. Hill once wrote, “Government, as an institution formed and controlled by human beings, is subject to the moral injunction to treat human beings as entities accorded certain rights, and included among these rights is the right to just treatment.” Because I agree, I must negate.Observation One: Renowned jurist, Prof. Ronald Dworkin, states that there are two types of rights: strong rights and weak rights. A strong right is one “that it would be wrong to interfere with…or at least that some special grounds are needed for justifying any interference.” An example of a strong right is free speech. It is something that we cannot be prevented from doing by any agent except for very rare, limited cases. A weak right might be my right to a drive down a street as a shortcut to work. Dworkin 1 argues, “Of course a responsible government must be ready to justify everything it does [from a general utility standpoint]...So, the New York City government needs a justification for forbidding motorists to drive up Lexington Avenue, it is sufficient justification if the proper officials believe...the gain will outweigh the inconvenience.” Yet, in the case of strong rights, “this sort of justification is not enough. Otherwise the claim would not argue that individuals have special protections against the law when their rights are in play, and that is just the point of the claim.”I Value Governmental Legitimacy. A government is legitimate if it respects the rights of its people. Dworkin 2 states, government employees and law enforcement officials “must understand what rights are, and they must not cheat on the full implications of the doctrine. The government will not reestablish respect for the law without giving the law some claim to respect. It cannot do that if it neglects the one failure that distinguishes law from ordered brutality:” respect for rights.As Prof. Jack Donnelly states, “To violate someone's right is not merely to fail to do what is right but also to commit an…important personal offense against the right-holder by failing to give him his due...To violate a right goes well beyond merely falling short of some high moral standard…Rights are not just one type of social or moral goal co-equal with others; rather, in ordinary circumstances, rights have prima facie priority over utilitarian calculations or considerations of social policy. In fact, one of the basic purposes of rights would seem to be to insulate right-holders from claims based on such principles.”Therefore, the Criterion must be Distinguishing Between Strong and Weak Rights. Contention One: Fundamental constitutional rights are strong rights. Dworkin 3 observes, “United States citizens are supposed to have certain fundamental rights against their government, certain moral rights made into legal rights by the Constitution. If this idea is significant, and worth bragging about, then these rights must be rights in the strong sense…the claim that citizens have a right to free speech must imply that it would be wrong for the government to stop them from speaking, even when the government believes that what they say will cause more harm than good. The claim cannot mean…only that citizens do no wrong in speaking their minds, though the government reserves the right to prevent them from doing so…those constitutional rights that we call fundamental, like the right of free speech, are supposed to represent rights against the government in the strong sense...if citizens have a moral right of free speech, then governments would do wrong to repeal the first amendment…even if the majority would be better off without it.” Contention Two: Attorney-client privilege is a fundamental constitutional right.Sub-point A: Attorney-client privilege is protected by the Fifth Amendment.According to the California Law Review [2], “denial of the attorney-client privilege is compulsion [to self-incriminate] because it penalizes the client's right of effective counsel if he wishes to avoid self-incrimination. Without the attorney-client privilege, an attorney could routinely be subpoenaed to produce his communications with his client. The only way the client could prevent self-incriminating statements from reaching the prosecution would be for him to limit his communications with his attorney. If this occurs, the attorney may not receive all the facts necessary for an adequate defense.” Prof. Harry Subin [3] furthers, arguing, a client “may reveal incriminating information to the attorney. In such a situation, the feasibility of seeking legal representation is based on an implicit promise that the information revealed to the attorney by the client will not be disclosed to a tribunal. Without such assurances the potential client would find himself in a ‘catch-22’ situation.”Sub-point B: Attorney-client privilege is protected by the Sixth Amendment.California Law Review 2: “If a state denied a criminal defendant the attorney-client privilege, the client's sixth amendment rights would be violated because he would be deprived of an active, partisan advocate...Active, partisan advocacy, however, is impossible when a defense attorney is expected to give evidence to the prosecution while he is supposed to defend his client...Thus, active, partisan advocacy can only be achieved if the attorney cannot be required to divulge his client's confidences to the prosecution. The denial of the attorney-client privilege would also violate the client's sixth amendment rights because it would damage the attorney's ability to investigate his client's case. To provide effective legal assistance, an attorney must investigate the facts...A proper investigation can only be made if an attorney is able to communicate [effectively] with his client...When an action of the state prevents a defense attorney from discharging functions vital to effective representation of his client, a sixth amendment violation will be found.” A strong right is a right that can only be violated in rare, highly exceptional cases. Because attorney-client privilege is a strong right, it must be respected in the vast majority of instances, and would therefore naturally take precedence over truth-seeking. In other words, because of what a strong right is, and because attorney-client privilege is such a right, we must negate.SOURCES1 - http://en.wikipedia.org...2 - California Law Review, 1982, Dashjian, Michael B., "The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Criminal Defendant's Constitutional Rights," July, 70 Calif. L. Rev. 1048, p. 1064-53 - Subin, Harry I., Law Professor-NYU, 1985, "The Lawyer as a Superego: Disclosure of Client Confidences to Prevent Harm," 70 Iowa L. Rev. 1091, p. 1132Thanks! I apologize for any formatting errors caused when I C/P'ed from Word. Over to Aff...