The fine-tuning argument for God's existence is a failure

Much thanks goes out to Thrasymachus, for an always interesting topic choice and a very fun and critical analysis of it. In wrapping up, I give the story of this debate as I see it. This is what I hear him saying: Example 1 1. k' is background knowledge minus our knowledge of the existence of our universe. 2. Once we subtract the knowledge of our universe, we need the principle of indifference in order to assign prior probabilities to our range of possible outcomes. 3. The principle of indifference ascribes equal probability to all possible outcomes. 4. The amount of unknown, possible outcomes is far greater than known, possible outcomes, therefore the probability of LPU is inscrutable. Then I illustrated, since there are no inherent attributes in the former logic that limit its application to universes, that such a criticism renders many things unnecessarily inscrutable. Example 2 1. K* is our background knowledge minus our knowledge that 12 was rolled using a 20-sided die. 2. Once we subtract the knowledge of the rolls outcome, we need the principle of indifference in order to assign prior probabilities to our range of possible outcomes. 3. The principle of indifference ascribes equal probability to all possible outcomes. 4. The amount of unknown, possible outcomes is far greater than known, possible outcomes, therefore the probability of my having rolled 12 is inscrutable. Examples digested: Both examples above employ the same exact reasoning and the only way for the conclusion of example 2 to equal the obvious (1/20) is to consider only our epistemically illuminated range (EIR). In fact, this is exactly what PRO does: "So long as we have good reason to reject external world scepticism, we can use most of our background to 'winnow down' the space of possible worlds we need to consider when doing probability. So the possible worlds where the 20 sided dice comes up 1-20 dominate the possible world space, because wacky alternatives (landing 24, say) are unlikely given what we know about being in this universe and so on - these are remote possible worlds." The arguments in the literature against general skepticism (to which we are referred to a large body of uncited literature) are simply ones that require lowering the bar of what it takes to achieve knowledge, where certainty is not a factor, merely a firm enough justification is necessary (with no set and measurable standard). This weaker form of knowledge (against traditional Cartesian strands), actually operates entirely within our EIR and, quite decidedly, not outside it. This weaker form of knowledge is helpful, because it allows us to have knowledge of more than just the single proposition of our existing. This means that his wacky alternative worlds where our physics are different and/or the requirements of life are changed have as much warrant as the alternative, epistemically possible worlds where dice fall between two numbers or are controlled by spiritual forces. This can mean only one thing. He is subtracting more from our background knowledge when dealing with P(LPU|T&k') then he would from any other formula that requires the same steps. Subtracting Too Much From K' As you'll remember, k' stands for our background knowledge, that is, everything that we know, minus our knowledge of the universe existing. This is a rather big issue in that it involves the fundamental question that my opponent and I have been butting heads over: should k' include our EIR? You'll also remember that EIR stands for our epistemically illuminated region which is, in essence, the region that we have intellectual access to and can achieve knowledge within. There are some things that may well exist, but, by virtue of falling outside of our EIR, we will never know for sure. There are many reasons I believe that EIR should be included in k', not least of which is because it is always required of all prior probabilities that utilize subtraction and the principle of indifference. I think I have finally put my finger on why PRO and I have been talking at somewhat of an impasse. It has become clear that he is subtracting too much from K'. When we consider the probability of a life permitting universe it is often helpful to consider possible worlds. For instance, if conditions for life were x,y and z, we can consider the general likelihood of a universe within this possible world arriving by chance by looking at other possible outcomes. PRO completely eliminates the conditions for life and our understanding of physics from k' and then entreats us to consider all other epistemically possible scenarios created by this omission with equaprobable weight. This is bizarre, as we are equally as ignorant as to whether or not our minds yield true or verisimilitudinous perceptions of reality, rendering our Example 2 inscrutable -- why is it that we do not treat this epistemic possibility as equaprobable? If we only consider what is within our EIR then alien physics and alternative life permissions are as much irrelevent to our probablity calculations as brain-in-a-vat type hypotheses are to everything else. So this makes probability very possible. Since there are only a finite amount of possible and epistemically known universes that support life, we can make very easy probability calculations. This is because the requirements of life and of physics are not things subtracted from k' as they are not conjoined to our knowledge of our life-permitting universe. What are we left with? If we treat k' then, as it ought to be treated, we can know certainly that in order for a life-permitting universe to exist, it must not, for instance, collapse upon itself immediately after forming (strength of gravity). So any one of our universes' parameters is fine-tuned for life relative to a set of possible worlds iff the life-permitting values for those parameters are rare in relation to all of the values they could have taken in the those possible worlds. While all possible worlds are not known, the finite life-permitting values are, allowing us to "winnow out" all possible worlds, whether unknown or known, that are incompatible with our known life-permitting values. So it does not much matter that we cannot epistemically fathom what a universe would look like with a nuclear strong force a thousand times different than ours, as we know it does not fall within our finite set of life-permitting values. The only way to avoid this is to subtract our knowledge of the requirements of life and/or physics, which is disingenuous (especially since I explicitly stated that fine-tuning was included in k' and in fact, needs to be for the probability to even make sense in round 2). This clarity makes his analogies irrelevent because they would only be comparable if the requirements of life was oustide of our EIR, and a required subtraction from k, which it is not.Conclusion: Again, I would like to thank my opponent for this debate and would look forward to discussing this issue further with him, as I feel like we have only just begun understanding one another. InquireTruth