Individuals have a moral obligation to assist people in need.

Let's give you a hypothetical situation: one day you are walking down by a shallow pond. You see a small child in the lake drowning. If you could have and did not help this child most people would consider you a monster and you consider yourself a monster. How is saving this small child from drowning any different from donating money to save people from starving? The simple answer, it is not, and this is where I shall begin my case. Value: Morality. First, since the resolution is a question of moral permissibility, this is the most logical and applicable value. Second, moral systems are designed to reflect and promote our ideals, so morality encompasses any other value. Third, the ability to develop and abide by moral principles is a defining characteristic of humanity and the source of much of our inherent worth. Criterion: fairness, defined as a lack of bias or preference on arbitrary or irrelevant factors. All morale systems must be fair, even if the world is unfair. First, a logical moral system will be internally consistent and free of any contradictions created by bias. Second, our morals represent the rules and duties we would ideally abide by, and there is no justifiable reason for treating people differently, since there is no morally relevant difference between them. Third, any unfair moral system will be disregarded by the groups it disadvantages, which will weaken its effectiveness and likely lead to conflict. Therefore, the sufficient affirmative burden is to show that failing to assist people in need shows a form of bias, since individuals are morally obligated to act fairly. Contention 1. Self-interest is a form of bias "we ought to be preventing as much suffering as we can without sacrificing something else of comparable moral importance. This conclusion is one which we may be reluctant to face. I cannot see, though, why it should be regarded as a criticism of the position for which I have argued, rather than a criticism of our ordinary standards of behavior. Since most people are self-interested to some degree, very few of us are likely to do everything that we ought to do. It would, however, hardly be honest to take this as evidence that it is not the case that we ought to do it. " (1) People should do what they can to solve suffering in the world. Simply stating that people have their own interests in mind and therefore, will not do everything they should does not change the fact that they should do it. I refer back to the hypothetical situation I presented above. Simply stating people have failed to "fulfill the requirements of a moral principle" does not mean this moral principle is null and void. (2) A truly moral person will commit an action out simply to follow morale law, not out of fear of God. If a person does act out of fear, then, that does not render their action bad but, rather a person's actions lack moral worth, but, it does not render a person's actions to be immoral. Contention 2. Individuals are morally obligated to help those in need, unless the cost to themselves is significant "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it. By "without sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance" I mean without causing anything else comparably bad to happen, or doing something that is wrong in itself, or failing to promote some moral good, comparable in significance to the bad thing that we can prevent. This principle seems almost as uncontroversial as the last one. It requires us only to prevent what is bad, and to promote what is good, and it requires this of us only when we can do it without sacrificing anything that is, from the moral point of view, comparably important. I could even, as far as the application of my argument to the Bengal emergency is concerned, qualify the point so as to make it: if it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything morally significant, we ought, morally, to do it. An application of this principle would be as follows: if I am walking past a shallow pond and see a child drowning in it, I ought to wade in and pull the child out. This will mean getting my clothes muddy, but this is insignificant, while the death of the child would presumably be a very bad thing. " (1) Once again I ask the question, how is saving this child any different from giving money to a charity to help those who are starving eat? There is no difference. If a person does not prevent an extremely bad outcome from occurring, death, by helping a person in need, and the cost to themselves is insignificant, getting clothes dirty, then their actions are biased by self-interest and thus, are immoral. Sources: 1. . http://www.utilitarian.net... 2. . http://www.jstor.org...