The argument from evil is successful

A Failed Reductio Having removed the equivocation Thras offers a modified reductio for my defeater. Thras wants us to believe that our sense perception has something to do with our moral perception. His argument is that if something seems to be gratuitous then it probably is—in the same way that if a swan seems to be black it probably is. Even given our various perceptual short comings we shouldn’t turn our back on our perceptions. Thus, for his analogy-dependent reductio to work we have to believe that there is a strong enough comparison between our sense perceptions and moral perceptions. However, this is something we simply should not do as the “metaphysical baggage” surrounding the justification of a given evil bares little, if any, resemblance to a swan, or any other physical object. Quite obviously there is an immense difference between the metaphysical nature of “evil justification” and spacio-temporal nature of swans. (That is, they exist in space and time.) Furthermore, our sense perceptions have direct access to that spacio-temporal existence—assuming we are within “perceptual range.” Being out of range is no matter because we fully accept that if one was in range with normally functioning sense perceptions (i.e. they are not blind) then the person would be fully capable of experiencing the swan. Now consider moral justification. Does it have a spacio-temporal existence? No, of course it doesn’t. Although, an event may be spacio-temporal that in no way implies that the moral justification of that event is spacio-temporal. Furthermore, consider an inscrutable evil which has occurred—can we consider that to be within our moral range? Not unless we assume that our faculties are capable of accessing the “metaphysical arena” in such a way as to reasonably assess the justification of moral events. Of course, we reasonably believe ourselves to have access to the color of a swan, but it is far from certain as to whether we have sufficient access to something so metaphysically weighty as moral justification, especially in consideration of a omni-God. The point, once again, is that God would have full access to the metaphysical arena including the full knowledge of how an evil is justified. In fact, it seems plain that only a omni-God would have this access. Thus, even were we to have access to 99% of what God does it still leaves open the possibility that God knows of a reason we do not. (Of course, we don’t have anywhere near 99% of the abilities that a God would have.) In short, for Thras’ argument to hold he has to show that swans and moral justification are analogous in regard to our access of them via our sensory or moral faculties. He simply has failed to do so and that is why the analogy doesn’t work. Bayes In addressing a few issues I will begin by saying that (J) and (I) were definitely not meant to be compliments (they do not refer to the same evil). Admittedly, I should have been clearer on this point and used a different letter for (I). Recall that (J) is the totality of justified evils. In the quotation in question (I) was intended to represent the totality of seemingly unjustified evils—not a single instance, but this confuses us with the previous use of (I). Let’s consider the totally of inscrutable evils to then be (U). Having made this adjustment the simple point here is that for all occurrences of evil .5 are justified and .5 are inscrutable. I make no bold assertions concerning the amount of justified evil (medical procedures, child discipline, etc.) over inscrutable evils or vice versa. It seems clear that were we to weigh one over the other would be question-begging and a bold claim on our abilities to access all the needed evidence, assess it, and quantify its implications. Furthermore, Thras’ criticism of my credence function continues to rely on his failed reductio which was already discussed above. In short, he claims that we have adequate moral access to conclude whether or not an evil is justified. I have provided evidence to think we do not. (Also, see his fn. 2. Why should we think that our “sensor” is 90% effective? Again, compared to an omni-God this would be plainly false.) Five more points: 1) He continues to claim that in order for my argument to work most evils need to appear to be justified. This is simply false and I dealt with it more in depth in the previous round. Also, he writes; "...pointing to instances where humans perform evils justifiably does not help this case, no more so than pointing to instances where humans perform evils unjustifiably helps mine." This claim is false. If we know of instances of human justification in addition to the plausibility of an omni-God then it is further plausible that God has justification for evils we do not know. 2) there is no reason to remove (O) from the argument. It is simply a statement concerning the possibility of God existing and nothing more. Thras argues in a footnote that if (G) then (~O). Notice, however, that I did not use (O) in the side of the function with (G). (O) may be false with (G), but it is perfectly plausible with (~G). There is no reason that both sides of the function need to incorporate the same evidence. 3) in regard to his section on “lots of evils” Thras still misses the point of my claim. To repeat myself, again, it is that we experience justified evils (call them “human justified”), but we also know that we have serious epistemic limitations especially in regard to the metaphysical. Considering an omni-God, and God’s epistemic superiority, it is likely that he knows/has justification for evils we are not aware. Consider the epistemic difference between an infant and a grown-up. Are we to conclude that an infant has the needed epistemic access to assess and quantify the implications of various “evils”? (Specifically, for example, punishment from a parent) Of course not and neither should we assume that if a God exists we have the needed access to what justifies his actions either. 4) Thras does ask for a plausible explanation of why God might be causally limited. Although, I didn’t give a full explanation I did offer the well-known free-will defense. If God desires that we have free-will which includes making either destructive or constructive decisions then this would plausibly prevent God from coercing the world in such a way as to limit our freedom and thus contradict his desire that we have free-will. (This is also an example of a God-justifying reason.) Considering that Thras wants me to show why FW and cancer are preferable to ~FW and no cancer. I might ask why Thras doesn’t think that FW is good enough, but I doubt this will get us anywhere. Exactly how we would go about assessing the value of FW and decide if it is worth the existence of cancer is beyond me. However, full-on comparison isn’t needed. All that is required is a plausible reason why God would allow evil and FW looks to be it. 5) As for moral paralysis Thras’ misunderstood my argument. (I’m actually confused as to what my argument had to do with any of his criticisms.) As simply as possible this is the point: (1) God desires that we have FW and act morally within that context, (2) G gives us guidelines to live by, (3) In order to maintain that we have FW G must allow some evils to occur; thus, we know what is right and wrong and we have the FW to choose either. Thus, in a given moral situation we don’t have to guess if the evil results in a better outcome because it is our free choice of “the good” that God desires. Conclusion So my original defeater still works despite Thras’ claims. His claim against (J) is false via the dis-analogy and, consequently, his whole reductio fails. FW is a plausible reason why God allows evil, and FW also shows why moral paralysis is avoided. In short, through the course of our debate, I have reasonably shown that we have no reason to raise our credence of the non-existence of God due to the existence of evil and that is all that is needed.