General Relativity Implies that God does not Exist

I. Implications of the Argument The reader will recall I made two general remarks about Sargon’s argument for atheism. First, I said the argument, even if true, does not prove atheism. This point went completely undiscussed, even though this is perhaps the most important point I’ve made. Sargon gave no response, so I will simply extend arguments here. General relativity at most shows the concept of a temporal creation to be problematic; it does not imply that God does not exist, and as such Sargon has failed to establish the resolution. Second, I contended that Sargon’s argument was a philosophical argument, not a scientific one. But, Sargon replies, “Numerous scientific conclusions are made with the use of philosophical premises.” I agree; but how does this show Sargon’s argument is not philosophical in nature? To give an example, William Lane Craig has defended various philosophical arguments for the beginning of the universe [1], and clearly these arguments, if sound, have scientific implications (namely, that the universe began to exist!), but that does nothing to show that such arguments are not philosophical arguments. I hope the reader understands that nowhere did I characterize science “as nothing more than experimental results, and anything further beyond that as ‘philosophy’”. I make no pretensions on defining science and philosophy, but I do know that premise (1) is not a scientific principle. But this is all beside the point. The main point is really this: premise (1) is no part of the General Theory of Relativity, so whether or not it’s philosophical in nature, it’s still not relevant to the resolution of this debate, namely, that General Relativity implies that God does not exist. II. An Examination of Premise (1) I raised three objections were to premise (1). First, I remarked that it hasn’t been shown that God could not have caused the universe prior to its existence, for even if physical time begins with the universe, metaphysical time may still exist before it. Here, Sargon gives the curious response that “metaphysical time either has a beginning, or existed forever”. The second option is ruled out because, in his words, “Miles believes that an actual infinite cannot exist in reality”. To be sure, I do think that metric time had a beginning, but it seems to me that an amorphous time, where time literally has no intrinsic metric, is entirely possible. On this view, an amorphous time existed prior to metric time, so that metaphysical time can still be said to be without beginning. Regarding the first alternative, that metaphysical time had a beginning, Sargon argues this option cannot be taken because then the theist faces the question, “if god exists within a finite metaphysical time, then wouldn’t god require a beginning as well…?” Hardly. Just look at the definition of “begins to exist” that Sargon himself gave: “e comes into being at t if and only if (i) e exists at t, (ii) t is the first time at which e exists, (iii) there is no state of affairs in the actual world in which e exists timelessly, and (iv) e’s existing at t is a tensed fact” The key clause here is (iii). If there is a state of affairs in the actual world where “e” exists timelessly, then even if “e” has only existed for a finite time, it does not begin to exist. And the same applies to God. He has literally only existed for a finite amount of time (if time began to exist, that is). But causally or explanatorily prior to the beginning of time, He exists timelessly. And for that reason, He did not begin to exist. Does God's creation of time imply that God causes Himself? No, so long as we see God, not as directly creating time, but indirectly creating it. In other words, time springs into being simply in viture of the fact that God, for the first time, changes (whether it be through an excersize of power or thinking a new thought). God does something, and time comes into being as a result, so that time may be said to be indirectly created by Him. Second, I explained that from the fact that two things happen simultaneously, one cannot infer they happen instantaneously. Here Sargon agrees, but reformulates his point to mean “in a given cause-and-effect relationship, if the cause is simultaneous with the effect, then the causal relationship happens at an instantaneous moment.” But why think that’s true? Because, Sargon argues, either (1) “the cause and effect happen at an instant”, or (2) “there is a duration of moments…between them”. Clearly (2) is untenable, but does that imply we must accept (1)? No, because we can craft a third alternative, namely, (3) cause and effect overlap in an interval of time. That is to say, something causes something else over an interval of time. On this view, there’s no temporal gap between cause an effect, but there is a temporal overlap between them. With regard to the universe, the theist can coherently maintain that God created the universe over the interval of time at which the universe came into being (e.g., the first second, the first minute, etc.). Third, I proposed that God could timelessly create the universe. I gave the example of God timelessly sustaining an abstract object in existence to illustrate the coherence of timeless causality. As Sargon rightly points out, in the case of the universe, it began to exist and so is temporal, whereas an abstract object is not. What’s needed for the universe is not mere timeless sustenance, but efficient causality. But, Sargon writes, “efficient causality is temporal, because if something comes into being, then…it now exists when it did not exist before, which requires time.” But it seems to me all that proves is that, in efficient causality, the effect must be temporal; it does nothing to suggest that the cause must be temporal as well. With regards to God, we would simply say that He does not create the universe at any time; He does so timelessly, even though the universe is temporal. I’ve yet to see any incoherence with this suggestion. III. An Examination of Premise (2) Two objections were given to premise 2. First, General Relativity is only a partial theory of the world, and so no arguments should be constructed from it. Sargon appropriately points out that this objection is outside the confines of this debate, and so I’ve reformulated it. General Relativity either entails its own destruction, or predicts the existence of a first instant of time. Stephen Hawking explains, “All the Friedmann solutions [to the equations of General Relativity] have the feature that at some time in the past…the density of the universe and the curvature of space-time would have been infinite. Because mathematics cannot really handle infinite numbers, this means that the general theory of relativity…predicts that there is a point in the universe where the theory itself breaks down. Such a point is an example of what mathematicians call a singularity.” [2] Sargon, I believe, is caught in a dilemma. He must either affirm (1) that General Relativity is true, but that it can’t be applied to the beginning of the universe (because it breaks down), or (2) it can be applied to the beginning, and there really is an initial singularity. If he opts for (1), he’s given away his entire argument. If he opts for (2), he’s also given away his argument, because the singularity just is the first instant of time. This revised objection, I believe, is within the confines of the debate. Second, I alleged General Relativity can only show that physical time lacks a first instant, not that metaphysical time has no first instant. Sargon did not respond, presumably because his response to my first objection to premise (1) applies to this one as well. But I think his counter-response was shown to be clearly inadequate, so this second objection stands; time is not to be identified with the physical time discussed in physics. The implications? General Relativity, even if completely true, does not show that time had no first instant. As such, the warrant for premise (2) is removed. IV. Conclusion Sargon’s argument is multiply flawed. Premise (1) fails because: 1. God could create the universe prior to its existence. 2. He could simultaneously create the universe over the interval of time at which the universe comes into being. 3. He could create the universe timelessly. Premise (2) fairs no better: 1. If Sargon is to use General Relativity as justification for premise (2), he must either affirm that it breaks down at the beginning of the universe, or that there exists an initial spacetime singularity. 2. Even if physical time has no first instant, metaphysical time may still have a first instant. Finally, even if the argument were sound, it would not establish the resolution of this debate because, (1) it’s philosophical in nature (or at the very least, premise 1 is no part of the general theory of relativity), and (2) it doesn’t establish atheism. Notes [1] http://www.reasonablefaith.org...[2] A Brief History of Time, 49.