Naturalism provides a more plausible explanation for objective morality than God.

What my morality entails (according to my opponent)With much of what my opponent claims my views of morality entails, I find absolutely no dispute with and am confused why anyone should. Most of the things he lists are really just rewordings of “Do something that would cause more benefit than harm” in as many repugnant ways he can think if. Apparently, doing something that would cause more benefit than harm is to be shunned by my opponent’s views of morality.For instance, he highlights the idea that, according to my views, it would be morally acceptable to kill a child if that child was later going to kill two innocents (Adolph Hitler being the prime example my opponent used). In what universe is this not morally acceptable?Who more deserves to live (that is, if you could save only one, who would you save?): Hitler or the millions of Jewish people killed in the Holocaust? Let’s make it even simpler. Who should you save: one person or two? What if that one person was a murderer and the two were innocents?Clearly, my opponent’s views of morality would prioritize the murderer over the two innocents, but I don’t understand why. I’ll leave it to you to decide whose morality should be favored.As for my opponent’s confusion of my stance on suicide: I never said suicide was a morally wrong thing to do. The most I said was that people with a dysfunction in their brain are not ideal candidates for judging the value of well-being. A life of suffering is worse than a life of nonexistence, so if a person wishes to commit suicide as a means to avoid a life of nothing but suffering, then that’s okay (so long as his/her problems cannot be otherwise remedied).Now for something that our intuitions disagree with: exterminating those who are un-beneficial to society. Our moral intuitions disagree with this very much, because natural selection wants every single individual to succeed, even though they can’t. My opponent clearly disagrees with it as well.I won’t say I agree or disagree with it; what I will say, though, is that my opponent has provided absolutely no warrant for why it’s wrong. Sure, our intuitions disagree with it, but my opponent has already conceded that our intuitions are crude for understanding morality (which, by the way, was literally suicide for his entire case). Therefore, my opponent must explain why eugenics is wrong without appealing to intuition, but if he does, then he will still be proving that morality is grounded in logic.Is/oughtMy opponent spends a lot of time discussing something that is not relevant to this particular debate: moral duties. I am arguing that naturalism is the most plausible explanation for objective moral values, not duties. I believe that objective moral duties cannot exist, whether we assume naturalism or God or anything else (they are just logically impossible) because of the is/ought problem.Originally articulated by David Hume, the is/ought problem states that one cannot derive an “ought” (a moral duty) without both an “is” and an “if”.For example: it “is” true that it hurts people to be punched in the face, so we “ought” not punch people in the face, “if” we don’t want to hurt anyone. Without adding that conditional statement (“if”), you’re basically saying we shouldn’t punch people in the face because it would mean we’d be punching people in the face, and the question that would immediately follow such a statement lacking the “if” would be “why?”Everything about the is/ought problem suggests moral duties are subjective (dependent on the relevancy of the conditional statement of the individual). To say moral duties are objective is to say the conditional statements are somehow unimportant and, indeed, irrelevant. “You ought to do X, even if you don’t want to do X or find X’s effects desirable.”God cannot account for objective moral duties either. Many theologians (William Lane Craig included) adopt Divine Command theory; that we get our objective moral duties from God’s commands, but this does not jump the hurdle of the is/ought problem either. God commands X (“is”); therefore, we ought to do X (“ought”), if we trust God’s judgment (“if”).Again, I’m not arguing for objective moral duties (and neither should my opponent be); I’m arguing for objective moral values.My Opponent's ArgumentPhantom has figuratively taken a tanto and committed seppuku in his last round. He conceded the answer to his third question is "No".1) Could God cause objective morality?Yes.2) What kind of morality would exist if God was the cause?Moral intuitions that would allow us to answer questions of morality intuitively (instead of logically).3) Does this type of morality exist?No. My opponent has conceded that our moral intuitions are crude for understanding morality, and therefore has shown how his own argument holds no actual weight.