The Moral Argument is Sound

While I think it’s clear he ran out of steam by the end of R3, I think we both share a willingness to defend our beliefs, and for that, Pro has my respect. Unfortunately though, Pro has only addressed 2 of my 8 arguments in his final round. This means that even prior to my final post, 6 of my criticisms stand, and the resolution is already multiply and unequivocally negated. As such, one is simply compelled to vote Con. In this last round, I’ll engage with the criticisms Pro actually bothered to address and catalogue the criticisms Pro fatally ignored. Remember, even if Pro were to win these points, the fact is that Pro has neglected the vast majority of my case and thus his argument fails anyway. I’ll follow the familiar format, and try to provide closure on each point in the debate systematically. Justification for P1Readers will remember Pro offered 3 justificatory points to affirm P1The first point Pro made was that “Objective moral values are most plausibly based in a maximally great being”. I offered 3 responses:Begging the question - Pro’s first statement here is:“Were it not for his perceived circularity Con would affirm a weak P1”This is totally false. I’ve offered 7 criticisms of P1, without even mentioning the epistemological problems or the Euthyphro dilemma. I can’t emphasise enough how absurd I find P1, and was bewildered to read Pro’s statement here. So why does Pro think I would accept a weak P1? Pro uses my words from R3 to arrive at this puzzling conclusion:“If God existed, it may well be His nature that grounded some sort of morality. ”There are 2 problems here. First, I’m conceding this merely for the sake of argument (note the tentative “may”). Second, my statement simply isn’t P1. Here’s what P1 states:“If God does not exist, then objective moral values & duties do not exist. ”While P1 is about the state of affairs would be if God DID NOT exist, my point above (which Pro quotes) is to do with what the case may be if God DID exist. These are 2 completely separate claims. To conflate them as Pro does commits the fallacy of equivocation (15). In fact, if my statement above was identical to P1, the argument would actually commit the fallacy of affirming the consequent (16)! So Pro’s point here is, well, pointless. Secondly, Pro tries a different tact, repeating what he said in the last round, that God based morality is more intuitive. But I responded to this, saying it was nothing but pure assertion, and that it neglects all the problems I’ve already spelled out with such a moral system. He doesn’t rebut any of this, he just repeats his refuted prejudices ad nauseaum, without even a hint of justification. Extend argument. Subjective moral values - Readers will remember my complaint here was that any morality dependent on a subject is, by definition, subjective. Therefore, God-based morality is doomed to produce subjective moral values. Pro’s most recent response is to complain that God is a subject unlike any other:“For although God is described as personal, a necessarily existing maximal moral agent isn’t influenced by culture, trend, parental upbringing, etc; like we are . . . “Notice this is wholly irrelevant. If morality is based on a subject, it is subjective. Pro admits God is a subject, so it’s game over. Sure, if God existed, He would be a special kind of subject, but so what? As I already pointed out, ideal observer theory (17) grounds morality in a likewise strange source - a fictitious, perfectly rational being, but it too is still subjective. Case closed. Pro also dropped my point about his adoption of Platonism. Extend argument. As I said previously, any moral standard which is dependent upon a person is subjective. As long as God’s essence grounds morality, God-based morality is subjective, and P1 is thus necessarily false. Irrelevance - Here, I argued that the first justification was irrelevant, as it is qualitatively different from what P1 states. All Pro does is to assert to the contrary, not bothering to engage with any of the points I made in R4. Also:If God is a conditional, one cannot ground P1 in a maximally great being. If God is assumed, Pro begs the question. Either way, Pro’s first justification fails. None of this was addressed by Pro. Extend argument. As we have seen, the only 2 criticisms Pro did address in his final round were 2 of the 3 above, with even one of these a basic admission of my point. It is clear that Pro’s first justification fails dismally and my counterarguments stand. The resolution is thus negated. Pro’s second justification was that there were problems with AF morality. I responded:Atheist moral duties:- account of atheist moral duties- convergence of rational and moral oughts- finitude of life- response to Pro’s EAN- reason to doubt cognitive faculties on theismPro failed to respond to each of these points again. Extend argument. Pro then asserted that atheists were ideologically dedicated to P1. All he offered here was a quote from Nietzsche, which I refuted in R3. No response. Extend argument. I also offered a further counterargument:What’s the problem? - Here I offered 3 reasons to think P1 was absurd:A Factually absurdB Historically inaccurateC Logically unwarrantedI also noted that even Pro accepts that atheists affirm moral values. Pro didn’t respond to any of these points. Extend argument. As we can see, Pro’s second justification was pretty much jettisoned as early as R3. Given this, we can say with complete confidence that the resolution is negated for a second time. Pro’s third justificatory point was that “it's just not obvious that atheism provides as sound a foundation for objective morals”. Arguing from Ignorance - This again was ignored. All Pro did here was repeat the fallacy throughout his last post. Extend argument. Climbing Mount Impossible - Here, I pointed out that unless Pro could show all AF morality to be somehow impossible, he simply can’t affirm P1. Pro again failed to engage with my refutation of his latest points in R4, and such, this criticism also survives scrutiny. Extend argument. Lastly, Pro made some incomplete remarks in R3 about AMP, but never got round to extending them. I’ll take this opportunity to address them. He says:“For what does it mean to say 'justice' just exists (without persons)? ”There are 2 points I should like to make. First, I hold AMP merely as a possibility, rather than the approach I actually take. I don‘t hold this view myself, but Pro still must rule it out. Second, justice would exist the same way Pro adopts his essentialism - in some Platonic realm. There’s nothing incoherent or contradictory here. P1 is thus undoubtedly false. Justification for P2Moral Mirror - My first point here was actually that one could mirror Pro’s approach to justify objective morality. I responded to Pro’s comments to this in my last round. My second point was that any non question-begging affirmation of P2 will be Atheist-Friendly by definition, as P2 will have to be justified by a non God-based morality. P2 will therefore necessarily refute P1! Both of these were completely unaddressed. Extend arguments. ConclusionAs we can see, Pro justifications are easily disposed of, and 6 of my criticisms here were completely ignored by Pro. I think I showed that all 8 criticisms succeed, but regardless, honesty compels all of us to reject P1 and vote Con, given the contents of the debate. Pro’s refusal to engage with almost my entire case, and his superficial objections to my criticisms necessitate that the resolution is handily negated. Given the comparative sources, organisation, S/G, as well as the fact that I engaged with every point Pro made, I also think the other points, if carefully considered, must flow my way. Thanks to the readers in advance. Vote Con! Sources15. . http://en.wikipedia.org...16. . http://en.wikipedia.org...17. . http://en.wikipedia.org...