Individuals have a moral obligation to assist those in need

What Aff does this round is very interesting. He brushes off the specific arguments which I use to attack his resolution & challenges the methodology behind them. This sort of strategy will prove fatal for his resolution, as his casual dismissal of the majority of my arguments reveals unsalvageable flaws. So let's talk about the resolution a bit and how Aff perceives the meaning of it. He claims that all that he has to do is prove that the obligation exists. However, this is incomplete, much like the resolution overall. Aff must prove that the resolution is worthy of enacting. Here is the difference between what I am arguing regarding the obligation to assist the needy and what the resolution actually asserts: I argue that the obligation, when it exists, can only be justified by circumstance and can be invalidated by circumstance. The resolution provides no such caveats. The resolution states that the obligation exists, sure. But it is the duty of the resolution to delineate under which circumstances it is applicable. "Individuals" is the key term, insofar as the only premise that the resolution identifies as necessary for the existence of an obligation is for the actor to be an individual (as opposed to a state or organization of some sort). This will be addressed more later.1. KantThis resolution takes the form of a categorical imperative. It states that the obligation exists, and no more. So you could attack the resolution for being absurdly nebulous and defining literally nothing, stating that all definitions will "be up for debate". But the resolution is unclear as to when this obligation applies, how this obligation acts in relation to other obligations, how much we should give to the needy, etc. Overall, it's a markedly terrible resolution with a fatal dearth of clarity. I provide all of these situations in which the obligation would not apply and which it would be outweighed by competing obligations, and Aff just brushes this off as inconsequential for his argument. The key problem with Aff's resolution, as we shall see, is that it is actually too specific to be an uncaveated imperative. Not in terms of clarity, but in terms of what it commands. The impact of this point is essentially the notion that, if it can be shown that the resolution does not function categorically as an imperative and yet lacks circumstantial contingency, we show that the resolution is incomplete. 2. Admittedly, the information was irrelevant to an extent. The point is that Aff's argument is neither type. 3. This is where Aff fails once more to address my underlying framework. He is right in his interpretation of CI, however he does not warrant his conclusion whatsoever. "With no harmful reprocussions" - I have shown you many situations in which there ARE harmful repercussions, in which you act directly AGAINST Aff's naturalist framework, and which utterly prove that this maxim should not be a universal law. 4. I don't warrant why assisting people violates their rights because that is not my point, interestingly enough. My point is that, if the action does happen to violate the rights of the needy or anyone else, then you ought not assist the needy, meaning that Aff's obligation is not universal nor does it qualify as a categorical imperative.So what does this mean for Aff's resolution? The purpose of this fourth contention is to show that most ostensible categorical imperatives are not categorical imperatives whatsoever. They are contingent upon circumstance, and to TRULY define what our absolute obligation ought to be, we must broaden our scope of interest and create a maxim which can be universal. This maxim, such as "never treat others as merely a means to an end" or "We ought respect human beings as inviolable autonomous ends in and of themselves" can dictate different actions. In many circumstances, they may dictate that we assist those in need. However, they may also dictate that we refrain from doing so. This demonstrates that Aff's absolute obligation is actually only a likely yet circumstantial extension of a larger obligation, say the obligation to respect others as ends in and of themselves. If the broader obligation is, as Aff believes, to act in accordance with naturalism, then my contentions in point 2 provide evidence that the duty to assist the needy is also a mere likely extension of a larger obligation, that is to act in accordance with naturalism. 2. Nature of HumansAff misinterprets my argument here as well. I in fact did address his Olson and Gintis articles by essentially reducing them to calls for reciprocal behavior. In fact, I show using Aff's own source that his naturalistic framework which he strives to act in accordance with often calls for what would be punishment of the needy. The resolution argues for altruism, while these sources argue for reciprocity within a society. Also, my contention was essentially that these sources argue for reciprocity and certain behaviors within a given society, but I have provided evidence that the existence of reciprocity and treatment of others is altered when we move to relations between different groups or societies. This challenges Aff to warrant the extension of his arguments, which, as stated by Olson, is evidence for "organizing societies". If this is how reciprocity works within a society, then why are we obligated to behave similarly when acting upon or refraining from acting upon members of foreign societies? Aff may offer the notion of a global community, as stated in Olson, however, as I've shown, humans from differing societies certainly do not naturally see it this way. His contradiction is not satisfactorily addressed. Rather than an obligation to assist the needy, I point out that Olson and Gintis would assert an obligation to behave reciprocally. Gintis specifically states in his article that there exists a propensity to "...punish those who violate cooperative norms". If this is true, then we see that Aff's specious extension to altruism is refuted by the innate propensity to behave reciprocally, not altruistically. Now, of course, pure reciprocity may dictate something along the lines of "an eye for an eye", but even if the harm inflicted upon the criminal is mitigated to an extent, harm is still inflicted upon the criminal. If the criminal is needy, which criminals often are, statistically speaking, we have a naturalistic obligation to inflict harms of some sort upon him. Aff's only refutation is "jail is shelter" but no where in his article is a jailhouse mandated reciprocally. Reciprocity means inflicting some sort of harm on the criminal, which societies tend to do. If the benefits outweigh the harms, then he is not truly punished. If the harms outweigh the benefits, then he is not truly assisted overall. Merriam-Webster: to punish is "to make (someone) suffer for a crime or for bad behavior"The majority of Aff's argument is spent warranting naturalism, and he makes a last-ditch effort to extend this to unfettered altruism. However, the notion that humans are innately altruistic is challenged by the notion that we are only altruistic in a reciprocal manner. Our altruism is limited by reciprocity and the desire to punish those who break laws or norms. This displays that Aff's resolution is incomplete in yet another fashion. We ought to assist the needy, save for the needy who commit crimes or act against social norms and the needy whose assistance would require violating universal maxims which we ought to abide by, such as never treating anyone as merely a means to an end. Aff tries to assert that the resolution and framework do not at all contradict by stating that we should still enact justice, but that's exactly my point. If there is an overarching obligation to consistently apply justice, for example, then the "obligation" to assist the needy is circumstantial and a mere extension of a universal maxim. 3. My opponent merely attacks my example here. I could just as easily have stated that the fire department was already there, in which case he once again is left with the burden of warranting the necessity & significance of the individual assisting. 4. Who is obligated? Who is needy? To what extent?This resolution is hopelessly vague. While it states that individuals are obligated, it never states what the definition of "needy" is. Is "needy" merely relative? Does a man making $11k per year have an obligation to monetarily assist a man making $10k? Does a man who hasn't eaten in 2 days have an obligation to give his food to a man who hasn't eaten in 4? And to fulfill this obligation, would we have to markedly assist the needy? Or would tossing a penny to a beggar be sufficient? Technically, a penny will help this beggar, though only marginally. If this fulfills the resolution, then we would take issue with the infinitesimally small significance of what the resolution insinuates. But the point is, the resolution is so vague, so nebulous, and so circumstantial that no one in their right mind should vote for it. It would be like me stating that individuals have an obligation to hunt in groups because humans hunt in groups naturally and hunting is good for group solidarity. Aff's defense of the res. is quite comical actually. He states that he only has to warrant the existence, not acting upon the duty. But if I show that acting upon the obligation could be impermissible, and the obligation relies on the imperative to help the needy, then how could it be both impermissible to help the needy and one's moral duty to help the needy? In my examples, the obligation doesn't exist. If it did, we ought act upon it, b/c that's how obligations function."break-down"1. Extend previous paragraph2. I concur3. Standard BOP applies. Aff needs evidence that res. acts according to his value. If I prove it doesn't, res. is defeated4/5 Covered aboveIf situations exist where the obligation does not exist, the resolution is incomplete & worthy of defeat.