The Ontological Argument For God's Existence Is Sound

He seems to concentrate his objections on the first premise. He mentions three alternative possibilities - of which, if possible, would disprove the existence of a maximally great being. I will divide my response into two sections. I will start with attempting to prove that the possibility that God exists is much more probable than the possibility that he doesn't. The first premise states: 'it is possible that a maximally great being exists' If I am successful, then the weight of the argument will fall on the theist side, as it will be more probable that a maximally great being exists than not, making the Atheist's argument redundant. I will then show why his objections are not successful in disproving the first premise. So why is a maximally great being's existence more probable than not? Well to attempt to prove this, I will divide my response into two separate arguments: a Cosmological argument and an argument from Fine-Tuning. In order for my opponent to show that the Atheist's position on the Ontological Argument is more probable than the Theist's, he will have to refute both these arguments. #1: Cosmological Argument This has three premises. 1) Whatever begins to exist has a cause to it's existence. How do we know this? Well, by scientific method and immediate experience. For example, Human life begins at fertilisation in the womb. But how do we know that this applies to the universe? Well if it applies to universes, why not random objects? Why don't we see tables and houses come into existence uncaused? I don't think that any reasonable person can deny that whatever begins to exist has a cause - to deny it would be unscientific and illogical. 2) The Universe began to exist. This is fairly obvious. The consensus among any serious scientist is that the beginning of the universe was at the big bang, where the Universe began to expand at a finite point in the past and is continuing to expand to this day. Again, this point is fairly explanatory that I don't think anyone thinking scientifically can deny. 3) Therefore the Universe, which began to exist, has a cause. This follows from premises 1 and 2 But why was this cause likely to be a Maximally Great Being? Because the cause will have had to have had a number of qualities. These include: timelessness, changelessness and immateriality - because as the creator of space and time, it has to also transcend space and time; and it has to be a personal being by the mere fact that it brought the universe into existence. The only 2 possibilities that possess these qualities are either abstract objects - i. e numbers, or sets, or an unembodied mind - i. e a Maximally Great Being. #2: Argument from Fine-Tuning This argument states that the universe would had to have been so fine tuned at it's original conditions in order to be permit intelligent life that even if it expanded 1/10 of a millimetre too quickly of too slowly, It would have collapsed back onto itself and cease to exist. (source: 'A Brief History Of Time by Stephen Hawking') There are only two possible explanations for this miraculous event - it happened either by chance; or a Maximally Great Being brought the universe into existence. And through the laws of probablity, the most probable explanation for the remarkable fine-tuning of the universe is through a Maximally Great Being. Obviously these two arguments are separate to the ontological argument, but I think that they are certainly inter-related, and help show the soundness of the ontological argument if argued together. Now in my opponent's response, the main criticism he had was that there are other values that you can put in for 'God'. He mentions three, and I shall address them. 1) Omnipotence not being actualized in the actual world. My opponent seems to think that this is a possibility - and therefore it follows that God does not exist. However, I think that it is obvious that this is an impossibility; as the definition of omnipotence means that it is necessary for it to be actualised in ANY world - a maximally great being BY DEFINITION has omnipotence actualized in any world as for it NOT to be actualised would mean that the being is NOT maximally great. Therefore, were a maximally great being to exist, it is not possible for omnipotence to not be actualized in the actual world. 2) That all sentience is physically realized Similarly, if a maximally great being existed, then it would transcend space and time - not be independent of it. Therefore, were a maximally great being to exist, it is not possible for it to not experience physical sentience. 3) If there is gratuitous suffering Equally, if a maximally great being existed, it would be morally perfect and any 'gratuitous suffering' would therefore be the most moral eventuality possible. Therefore were a maximally great being to exist, it would be impossible for gratuitous suffering to also exist. I think that con's biggest downfall is the fact that the adjectives 'Maximally Great' go seemingly unnoticed in his argument - he still asserts that there are alternative eventualities that are possible we're a maximally great being to exist. Any 'plug' that implies that it is possible that a maximally great being cannot do something (as my opponent has suggested) is self-contradictory and therefore invalid as an argument. What my opponent needs to do is prove that it is not possible that a Maximally Great being exists in order to show the version of the ontological argument that I provided is false.