This House Believes That The Law of Non-Contradiction Is Sound!

On my “not having any arguments”. This is far from the truth – I have shown that there is no way for one to refute (or even not accept) the LNC, as the very concept of doing so already assumes that the LNC is valid. If this debate were on the resolution “Language is real” and I argued that language must be real, given how both I and my opponent are using language to debate or to even hold opinions on the topic, I doubt the same accusation would be thrown at me. I have shown, without doubt, that the LNC is sound and must be sound, meaning that I have successfully fulfilled my BOP. The issue of proof. My opponent criticizes me for not providing proof of the LNC, even when I had specifically went over this point in my first round. Quoting myself, I said “These are axiomatic concepts [identity, etc] – they are the point from which all proof comes.“ I never intended to give proof from former premises, and my opponent seems to see this as a fault. He does not see, however, that I have set about validating the LNC as the axiomatic concept that it is – he has completely ignored this part of my argument. Note that nowhere in the opening round of the debate is it stated that I must use proofs to support my position – in order to fulfill my BOP, I must only show that the LNC is <em> sound </em>, and this can be done by showing that it is a self-evidency. This should be taken into account by any voters. On the accusation that intuition isn’t “good enough”. When my opponent says that intuition should not be considered to be a valid basis for reasoning, he fails to realize that reasoning itself is wholly reliant on intuition (intuition being the near-automatic grasp of self-evident truths). I’ve explained already in my first round why axioms are necessary in logic – if they are not assumed, logic as a whole breaks down, and, as a result, any “logical” argument against axioms gained by intuition is an argument against itself. If the LNC is not accepted, the reasons for its non-acceptance are, by definition, illogical, since the framework the reasons are justified in rely on the LNC in the first place. If things can both be and not be so, then no truth can be distinguished from untruth, making the exercise itself pointless. Con’s use of gravity as an example is irrelevant, considering how the Law of Gravity is not a self-evident truth. It is a more-abstracted concept that relies on the self-evident axioms, meaning that it itself is not an axiom. I, in no way, need to defend every case of faulty reasoning (not that I believe the classical formulation of the LoG to be one), considering how most of them deal with non-axiomatic matters (which is beside the point of the debate). If it can be shown that a true self-evidency (true in the sense of the thing actually being a self-evidency) is false, then I will lose the debate. However, no such thing has been shown. I just want to say this once more – every one of these arguments was already contained in my opening round, so if it sounds as if I’m repeating myself, that’s because I am. I am doing so out of necessity, because my opponent has completely overlooked my round and I must force him to not do so again. On the Double-Slit Experiment. I do not intend to refute certain interpretations of quantum physics by pointing out any specific flaws – I just need to show that those interpretations cannot be true in any case. If I can do this, Con’s argument can be disregarded. If it is true that something both did happen and didn’t happen, then nothing can be said about it – it cannot exist, because it is, by definition, in conflict with the law of identity. I am not well-versed in QM, but one does not have to be to see why this interpretation completely disregards proper scientific methods. Firstly, science is wholly reliant on its base – the metaphysical principles that govern what it means to be at all. If the base is false, science cannot be said to be true. Likewise, if science does not cohere to its base, it cannot be said to be true. The relationship between the two seems fairly evident to anyone who things about the hierarchy of the branches of philosophy, and I doubt Ajab would object to me saying that metaphysics precedes physics. If certain things in metaphysics can be shown to be true, then certain conclusions drawn from science will, by the nature of the relationship between the two, be false. Given the previous arguments I have given in support of the irrefutability of the LNC, it comes to reason that there must be some issue with the science being done. Science done that does not take into account the first principles of existence cannot be truly said to be useful in giving any conclusions about the things which actually exist. If they could, then there would be a conflict between the undeniable LNC and other axioms (which have been validated earlier) and science – and, since the LNC had already been validated, this situation could never occur. I do not know exactly where science has went wrong regarding QM, but it is logically impossible for it to be right. Any arguments for it via experiment must have some hidden variable or other such unknown aspect to them that acts in such a way as to make the conclusions reached seem different to the actuality of the matter. Regardless of what it is, I have shown that Con’s arguments do not stand, given the primacy of the LNC. On prepositions. Quoting my opponent’s round, he says: “"I can, and cannot step in the same river twice". This seems ridicolous but is a sound enough statement. After all if you step into a river, the river water has flowed, and even you have changed. Similarly when does a grain become a heap? If one has a heap, and one removes one grain, one still has a heap. By that extension a grain would be a heap.” This is an entirely ridiculous example of equivocation – the meaning of the phrase is used in two different ways when it is evaluated. There are two meanings: I can step in what is commonly said to be the same river twice, regardless of whatever minute changes have taken place, since the general river shares enough similarities so that those differences are irrelevant in my use of language. I cannot step in the same combination of molecules twice, as doing so once would have changed the molecules. As can be seen, neither one of these <em> individually </em> can be said to be both true and false, and it is only through language tricks that it can be said to be so. Likewise, the problem of the heap of grain is a problem with language being used in different manners and in a flippant manner, not a problem with any particular definition that is clearly laid out. Thanks for reading, and this is a really fun debate. Can’t wait to read the next round!