The Objectivist Solution to the Problem of Induction is Sound

Point 1: The way in which an entity behaves is determined by the syntax of the system in which it resides (by syntax, I mean rules of organization and structure). Objects are merely “pawns” which obey laws that are subject to change. Thus, we cannot be absolutely sure that entity X will always behave in such-and-such way in such-and-such context, because the rules according to which events unfold may change or have unknown irregularities. We can know this to be true for at least two reasons. First, interaction between objects is not reducible to the objects themselves. Interaction requires the participation of not only the causal entity, but of the all the affected entities as well. It is a prearranged relationship which requires both objects to ‘recognize’ how they are supposed to act in light of the physical laws they obey i.e., to recognize how they are implicated within the overall explanatory framework of reality. Second, since we can imagine an object behaving in different ways even under the same material conditions (for instance, we can imagine a universe in which gravity were temporarily suspended during the time a ball is thrown), the causal nature of an object is not inherent within the object itself. For if it were inherent within the object, such a scenario would be inconceivable. Since it is conceivable it is possible, and thus does not violate the law of identity. To sum up, transformation of state depends on syntactic rules which determine how objects interact and behave. Point 2:Even if an entity’s causal nature were inherent within the entity itself, this would not be enough to overcome the problem of induction. This is because an entity’s causal nature does not follow logically, and must be derived from experience. Since our observations are necessarily local, we can never actually observe that an object will continue to behave the way it has in the past. We can merely say that is it in an object’s nature to behave as it has within the contexts it has thus far existed in, and extrapolate how it might behave in those contexts in the future. It may be in the object’s nature to behave differently at different points in time. Take the example of Goodman’s Riddle:Suppose you have two hypothesis, namely “emeralds are green”, and “emeralds are green and will remain so until New Year’s Day 2050, at which point they will all turn blue.” Statistically, both of these hypotheses are equally confirmed by current observations.My opponent must prove that it is logically impossible for an object to follow different rules (and thus behave differently) at different times or at different locations. Point 3: If my opponent attempts to get around these problems by simply defining objects to include their observed causal natures, such that object X behaves with object Y in Z way by definition, then I would simply point out that such an entity could not be said to exist through observation. That is, such a definition would be inapplicable to the real universe. We cannot empirically detect such a property and therefore would not be justified in ascribing it to any observed entity. Point 4:According to the Uncertainty Principle, there is a fundamental limit to the precision with which certain pairs of physical properties of a particle known as complementary variables, such as position x and momentum p, can be known simultaneously. In other words, the position and momentum of every single particle in the universe is not fixed ahead of time. This means that two identical particles under the same conditions can behave differently. If what my opponent is saying were true, then the uncertainty principle - one of the most well-established principles in physics- must be false.