Moral Naturalism is more compelling than Moral Relativism

"If this young man expresses himself in terms too deep for me, why, what a very singularly deep young man this deep young man must be!" The Aesthete I apologize for my poor argument last round as I had a limited amount of time (reason beinghttp://www.9news.com...-)Before I start my rebuttal and development of my case:Moral Realism and Moral Objectivism are not the same thing:http://www.ncsu.edu...What is the difference between areligious philosopher and Priest?A priest might support a theoryphilosophically but not be able defend it in a secular matter; a religiousphilosopher most likely can support his argument in a secular way. I considermyself the latter I do not believe an appeal to Supernaturalism needs to bemade to bridge the is-ought gap. Aristotle certainly never appealed toSupernaturalism in Nicomachean Ethics. Rebuttal to Refutation of FunctionsNow onto my opponents supposed refutations. My opponent claims that knifes arefor cutting because that was the intention of knife makers. He seems to claim thatthere exists no function outside of intention of the maker. I fundamentallydisagree if there is no such thing as functions then we cannot make sense ofbasic biology certainly my opponent agrees with the normative nature ofmedicine, if my opponent is correct there is nothing objectively better about afunctioning heart versus a non-functioning heart. Certainly the nucleus had thefunction of producing DNA prior to anyone noticing. According to my opponentMedicine commits is-ought fallacy. But let’s go even further let’s suppose thatmy opponent is correct again if we suppose the mind doesn't have the functionof thinking rationally then his and my argument are rationally equivalent.Certainly my opponent’s pragmatic assertion is false that functions are subjective;if such is true there is no reason to trust our sensibilities in that they areonly true in that they are useful. Objective purpose is inherent rather thansubjective intention. I don't intend that my eyes see they simply do. AsContradiction explains "If we think of teleology as inherent to naturerather than legislated by God, then this does not requires us to commit totheism -- indeed, many neo-Aristoteleans are atheists!"If not B than A is probable.Not B Therefore A is probable.If Moral Relativism is false some form ofmoral realism is true. Certainly we can conclude if moral realism is true,Moral Naturalism is probable than Moral Relativism.Argument from ReformersGandhi and Martin Luther King Jr. were very important reformers in theirrespective countries and helped improve quality of life for many individuals,many of the people who were being discriminated against or unfairly taxed wereput into a greater moral state. Can Moral Relativism ground this? MoralRelativism can say that they changed the views of the people within thesociety, but there is nothing objectively better about the situation at leastnot in a moral sense. All the Moral Relativist can say is the views inside asociety changed and because morals are ultimately subjective it was only moralfor the people that benefited from it. This is the real question: can moralitybe based in persons? I think not just based on the definition of moralityversus mores. But let’s see if Moral Naturalism can ground this. Well we canconstitute that if more individuals have equality more individuals willflourish. Moral Naturalism can ground morals in natural facts, teleologyexplains this quite effectively.Further Rebuttals:[1]Is-ought fallacyMy opponent seems to concede if naturalteleology exists than there is no is-ought fallacy. He doesn't seem to objectto the existence of natural teleology per se but seems to assume the atheisticposition automatically. Two comments:One my inherent teleology doesn't rely on God;two even if it did there is no reason to presuppose atheism over theism.Furthermore there are other reasons to think that morality should be naturalrather than nonexistent. It seems that the value exists independent of thesubjective perceptions. Most people if asked whether right or wrong exists willsay yes. But why should morality be understood as anything different thanmathematics. Some people will say this is just a bunch of bare assertionsmasquerading as a logical inference(thank you Dr. Tom Morris) but nonsense ifwe suppose that something may or may not exist we don't automatically assume itbehaves differently than other things simply because people have mixed reportson it. Now this is part of my argument: we needn’t suppose neither separateontological status nor non-existence if right or wrong is grounded in naturalteleology. It is not only the most simple answer (Okeams razor) but the mostcommonsense (not to say what is true is always commonsense).Emotivism is most definitely a form of Moral Relativism.It doesn't ground objective moral values in ontology or natural facts. Itgrounds them in persons. I think my opponent is making the fallacy ofcomposition here. Something can be a part of something without being something.Rebuttal to Moral Relativism on thebasis of jurisprudence:A implies BNot BTherefore not A.If Moral Relativism is true, it logicallyfollows that laws cannot be based on morality only on social mores hence allmost all forms of jurisprudence of philosophy of law. The main problem withthis thesis is that if it were true there would be literally no such thing asunjust laws. All laws are equally just simply because they are laws. Massacreof citizens is not unjust if provided by in the law and there is nothing unjustabout discrimination laws against African-Americans. If the laws supportsomething it cannot be unjust. Before my conclusion I would like to quote myopponent "My opponent faults Moral Relativism for not being moralobjectivism"My opponent faults me for basically explainingthe theory of Moral Relativism and claims I cannot refute Moral Relativismsimply by explaining it. He is simply incorrect. The “unpersuasiveness” ofMoral Relativism as a theory can be shown through plainly explaining it. Theimplications of Moral Relativism seem rather counter-intuitive. It may be notthe case maybe it is logically coherent but it really seems incompatible witheverything we know about laws and logic.The majority of people agree there wassomething objectively wrong with Hitler killing millions of Jews but on Moral Relativismthere is nothing objectively wrong with this. Conclusion:Moral Relativism is a incoherent position, ifone accepts this position and rejects teleology you have to reject therationality of the mind. Truly morality is based in natural teleology which isthe only attainable position. It is the most commonsense position to hold andit relies on the least amount of assumptions possible. If morality doesn'texist it is impossible to make sense of moral intuition and unjust laws.WorksCited"TheAesthete." W. S. Gilbert's Poem:. N.p., n.d. Web. 12 Nov. 2012. .Aristotle,and Martin Ostwald. Nicomachean Ethics. Indianapolis [Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill,1962. Print."HomosexualActs Are Immoral." Debate:. N.p., n.d. Web. 12 Nov. 2012. Morris,Thomas V. Philosophy for Dummies. Foster City, CA: IDG Worldwide, 1999. Print.