Animal rights is an unjustified ethical doctrine.

He also interestingly takes a different perspective of arguing that animals need not deserve such rights but rather the animal rights movement itself can be justified by having humans hold them anyway (a sort of pseud-animal rights movement). I'll expose this belief to be preposterous and pointless. ==================== Argument: Fulfilling the urge towards universal compassion and understanding ==================== In this section, my opponent's responses commit the same error that many of my opponent's have done in the past; he has forgotten his own use of a certain claim, and in defending it from my criticisms misplaces it's purpose and thus fulfills nothing on his part. This is something I often come across and though I would love to prevent it by explaining everything in excruciating detail, character limits demand otherwise. 1. Flawed syllogism: ethics is not the concern of EVERY moral agent and Einstein's intelligence is irrelevant. It seems that you forgot what you meant when you said ethics is the concern of every moral agent - what you are implying is that everyone has, at the bare minimum, adequate knowledge about ethics, which is demonstrably false. There are multitudes of people who have barely any adequate understanding of it. The further flaw in your syllogism is to apply Einstein's intelligence to his knowledge pertaining ethics - you have not demonstrated in any way a particular knack he has for ethics. Yes, he has provided material for philosophy of science but that is distinct from ethics; all your source cites is quotes from Einstein, no material to work with. I mean seriously, why would you resort to an argument from authority? While we're at it, should I just go cite Immanuel Kant as one who doesn't support animal rights? Whether or not you agree with him, he is undoubtedly one of the greatest moral philosophers that ever lived. I can reference people like Kurt Godel[1], who were immensely influential and brilliant in certain fields of philosophy (logic) but hold other philosophical views that we both would look down upon - namely his religious views. 2. Why should we care? Again, your response misses the entire point of my claim. By asking "why should we care", I am asking of you to supply me any meta-ethical background you can for the objective moral value of universal compassion. I agree that humans should more or less lean towards compassion, but it would foolish to then make the claim that we would have a value of being universally compassionate - to deny such a value does not lead one to "serve the self at the expense of all else". Humans, as you should know, can very well work between the extremes. The reason why I am claiming animal rights is an unjustified ethical doctrine is betrayed by your responses - you claim that there is an ethical obligation to be universally compassionate and yet show me nothing. ==================== Argument: Acquiring Symbiotic Benefits ==================== My point about technology protecting us from nature is that we can very well survive and prosper even with every animal species put into extinction - with adequate technology (that obviously has yet to be created) we can grow our own synthetic food and sustain the environment if we wanted to (safari trips :D? ). Again, you forgot what my claim was responding to - you claimed that our environment would not survive without animals existing, and to which I claimed that even in the most extreme circumstances humans could still survive provided we have ample technology. And please, PLEASE, don't tell me you are actually referring to Murphy's law. Further, your reference to growing meat in laboratory (a great development for my claim that eventually we have technology to sustain us in a situation in which animals are all extinct) misses the point - even if there is an alternative to eating animal meat this in no way reflects the ethical question of whether or not eating animal meat is right or wrong. "It serves no purpose other than to cause suffering. Please show me the moral excuse for that. " ----> If you would first show me the meta-ethical obligation to preventing the suffering of sentient beings in virtue of their sentience. Again, you have yet to defend such a claim. ==================== Argument: Meta-ethics - Allowing the shooting of the box ==================== 1. Since I don't need this argument, I have dropped it. 2. "The possibility of animals having rights, unless shown otherwise, is much less than 50% … just because there is a possibility does NOT MEAN we should have a reasonable concern for it. " As I read your argument, I am more surprised at how you are conflating possibility and probability - even by embracing the difference you still muddle the importance of such a distinction. You claim that even if the chance of a child being in the box is ONE IN TWENTY FOUR MILLION, you wouldn't do it. You justify by making the following ludicrous claim: "Whenever there is a possibility that harm could arise needlessly from one's actions, one should restrain oneself. " This would entail an absurd amount of situations such as that. If we simply look at POSSIBILITIES, then even simply day-to-day actions would deem us to be morally vicious. By driving to the drugstore to get my prescriptions, I may accidentally hit a stray rock that coincidentally hits a dog that yelps and runs into a car, making that driver swerve and hit traffic killing several. So by trying to buy Tyenol, I could be deemed a killer. A definite possibility? Absolutely. A reason to take into consideration? Hell no. Point is that possibility is a poor reason to take into consideration in virtue of itself - a mistake common among those who conflate the importance of probability and possibility. Everything imaginable is possible, but this doesn't mean we grant them all the same degree of consideration. 3. Prove how diminishing suffering of sentient beings amount to some good. After all, isn't this the ENTIRE PURPOSE of this debate? " Interestingly enough, your defense of animal rights rely on the POSSIBILITY THAT ANIMALS COULD HAVE RIGHTS. Not only do I demonstrate that this ridiculous in the previous criticism, but I want to add on more here: would we be confronted with the same possibility in relation to plants and inanimate objects? By your same argument, there could be a possibility that plants, rocks, and tin cans are persons -- so what do we now? Nothing apparently, we would starve from the possibility that veggies are persons and dehydrate from the possibility that water is a person. .. by your reasoning of course. 4. "We like it, so we do it. " I'm claimed this would be alright given that animals have no rights - obviously your examples of thievery and murder is a dis-analogy given that they do clash with those who rights (namely the victims of thievery and murder). You said that shooting the box, like eating meat, generates no good in face of the possibilities - which I claimed is wrong even if your reasoning about possibilities were to be correct. ==================== Conclusion ==================== While my opponent introduces novel ideas, they are heavily underdeveloped. To add on to this, his responses often misconstrue my criticisms that would seemingly expose a lack of understanding on his part. Along this entire debate he has yet to provide any ample meta-ethical considerations to supply rights to sentient beings, and it would be inexcusable to provide him a vote in face of such a failure. ---References--- 1. . http://en.wikipedia.org...