The argument from evil (AE) is sound

Theodicy: In principle, any apparent gratuitous evil wouldn't disconfirm ChristianityWSA says “theists cannot simply point to some small compensation … it must be not only important enough but also fair.” My Theodicy fits this! Consider if we know (in part) God’s justification for permitting any apparent gratuitous evil, which involves knowledge of God’s purpose for Man; a Good great enough to justify any evil in the world, thus providing no evidence against Christianity. I propose that God’s teleos for man is to share in Divine Love, from which perfect-complete happiness follows. Say Wholeness is a prerequisite for God’s purpose since if we’re ‘broken’ then our purpose can’t logically be met. Any appearance of gratuitous evil would therefore be compatible with theism given our limited, broken epistemology. There seems to be two ways to pursue happiness: True Love is the way of Divine Love, & false love is a counterfeit of the just way to pursue happiness. Complete happiness must be sought with the former. Such Love is oriented to God & others, is commitment-based where happiness follows welcomed as a by-product, where God’s standard of justice doesn’t lower but Grace enables us to meet meet it. This God of true Love is worthy of worship which itself upgrades our capacity for intimacy & freedom. This then is the paradigm of genuine Love, for such Love involves the Law of Accelerating Returns.But if our pursuit of happiness is of a false love, an unjust path, then such a path to happiness is a counterfeit: A self-oriented, satisfaction-based life where commitment follows un-welcomed as a by-product. A choice of false love almost always involves a movement towards sexual immorality & rejects Grace thereby disabling us to meet God’s standard of justice. False love yields for us a worship disorder which degrades our capacity for intimacy. This then is the corruption of genuine Love, for such a counterfeit involves the Law of Diminishing Returns. Theodicy: Out of a demonstration of true Love, suppose God created free creatures (as Whole) to share in & enjoy God & his creation in Divine Love forever. But man’s freely willed moral evil (brokenness through a choice of false love) estranges us from God’s Divine true Love. However if such evil can be not only defeated by justice, but also out-balanced with complete-perfect happiness that follows from participating in Divine Love, then any evil experienced for a finite time poses no threat to the existence of God. Yet broken selves must first become Whole. If happiness is sought in an unjust way in this life, & the last possible return is obtained with no further prospect of happiness. Then perhaps God ‘gives us over to our sins’ for the obscure effect of hitting absolute bottom so that, paradoxically, we would experience the worst so that we may not only desire & actually know the best but also so that God’s Love justly gives us our provision through Grace making us Whole in the process; in order to experience complete-perfect happiness. (An important & fair compensation for the evil experienced.)So if the necessary condition for a breakthrough from the self-formed choice of estrangement from God is precluded with a problem (see prodigal son), it follows then that the evil we freely chose has a fail safe for good at some point, even if at the expense of the temporary happiness of others (Mat.18:12-13). O Felix Culpa: Were God to create free creatures capable of giving / receiving Divine Love, which entails their capacity of one or many falls, it would be most logical to permit necessary evils to prevent future falls, i.e. more evils than a “first-fall only.” In this way, God’s creation is not only made Whole & shares in Divine Love with God with the quale of complete-perfect happiness as a by-product, but also that quale is realized with the eternal prospect of unlikely future falls. Therefore, a first fall, which may well involve gratuitous evils, would be the fortunate fall, given an eternal frame. S+DL: Koons questions "whether it makes any sense to suppose that God is aiming at maximizing anything on a global, as opposed to local, scale." Meaning he’s "doubtful that pain, suffering and death are bad simpliciter, as opposed to bad for or to those who suffer them ... [since] God has no special reason to aim at minimizing pain as such, or at maximizing the overall balance of pleasure over pain. [This is] consistent with God’s being perfectly loving and compassionate."Koons argument is supported by the Existential Presupposition of Love (EPL) which states that “If x’s action A is a logically necessary condition of y’s existence, then x’s doing A cannot count decisively against the claim that x loves y.” Skepticism: In fact, there's no reason to believe in apparent gratuitous evilsJust as fundamental physics are often complex to ascertain, so also is the iceberg of moral ontology. Why think in a broken world that such truths would magically rise through the waters on theism? So Pro’s challenge remains to accurately infer from the appearance of no Divine justification, its reality. All he can do is assume an epistemic principle that if we don’t discern God’s morally sufficient reason, then it’s probable there is none: which is a fallacy of Argumentum ad Ignorantiam-- "if it does not appear to you that p, & you have no grounds for doubting the accuracy of your perceptual state, then it is reasonable for you to believe not-p.” Kvanvig submits that it doesn’t appear to him that there are extraterrestrials, but that doesn’t make it more reasonable to think there actually aren’t any aliens! Likewise, why think that if every evil had a point we would know it... & would we even need to in order for God’s purposes to be fulfilled? Craig submits that “our failure to discern the morally justifying reason for the occurrence of various evils gives very little ground for thinking that God—especially a God equipped with middle knowledge—could not have morally sufficient reasons for permitting evils.” I submit that if God’s purpose for us is happiness sought on our own terms, & yet the quiddity of complete perfect happiness is necessarily rooted in God’s just Divine Love (if he created us to experience that love)-- & not the unjust pseudo-love spoken of earlier: if this is the case, then there’s no contradiction in supposing certain amounts of evils as well as goods present a necessary distinction for not only a non-neutral existence, but also one in which a fortunate fall is greater than many unfortunate falls. Also, are we justified in inferring the non-existence of an All-Evil Deity from the copious amounts of good in the world? I see no reason to think we can, for the events in the world seem to offer little in the way of a positive proof against any external events. Rather it appears we ought to place events in the world such as the evil and good in the proper context of existentialism. PoE’s Rightful Place WSA’s argument breaks down to, “why should we love or worship a God who does such things?” He pragmatically affirms our ignorance regarding moral standards with respect to God’s middle knowledge, “we need to use our own standards, because we cannot understand any others.” The WSA EPoE, then, lands in the arena of a negative defense for atheism, in the sense that we ought to prefer atheism solely on the basis of apparently better worlds. But this is not to be thought of as a positive offense against theism- so suggesting would inflate the conclusion.If I had more room I’d argue, existentially, that Christianity is still to be preferred (given objective virtues of meaning, purpose, value, etc) if we’re to remain reasonable; despite evil’s constant presence in this life. ConclusionI've presented a simple sketch of my contentions against any problem of evil in this round. Next round I'll unbox my contentions as Pro objects while offering critiques of his defense of the WSA EPoE.