The conclusions of "The Veil of Ignorance" are a just standard by which public policy must be made

My entire case in this round is sourced from Justice for Hedgehogs, by Ronald Dworkin. All parenthetical citations refer to page numbers. A note on the resolution: Pro clarifies in his intro that the resolution is "that the conclusions drawn from [the Veil of Ignorance experiment] are a just standard [by] which public policy should be made," after having stated in the title that it's a just standard by which the policy must be made. I'm fine with the first clarification. However, I'm not fine with his change in R2 to "The conclusions drawn from the Veil of Ignorance thought experiment created by John Rawls are, by the definitions provided, a fair standard by which to judge and structure future public policy of the United States of America." I cannot accept this change because it changes what Pro said he would be arguing when we initially started this debate. There is a difference between calling it a fair standard to judge public policy, and calling it the fair standard to judge public policy that we should use. This unfairly restricts my options from the original resolution--according to the original, I need only show that another standard is more fair and thus the standard we should use. Pro notes that I will argue that the conclusions are unfair, but he misses a critical point--I don't need to argue that they are on balance unfair, as I only need to show that another standard is more fair. He attempts to add in a rule in Round 2 against that, but adding rules after the debate has started is unfair. Holes in the VeilMy opponent wants to defend these conclusions: "-Each person will be given the most extensive basic liberties without intruding on the liberties of others -There will be equal opportunity for everyone to climb the economic and/or social ladder and that any social or economic inequalities that are allowed must be arranged so that they might improve the access to Primary Goods for the Least Advantaged." These sound great, but there are issues with these conclusions as they stand. My opponent has not defined many of the terms. What are the "basic liberties"? How do we define "equal opportunity"? How can "social or economic inequalities that are allowed . . . be arranged so that they might improve the access to Primary Goods?" Until Pro defines these terms, they are quite meaningless. This is important because of several flaws in the VoI experiment. The VoI does not reach all the conclusions my opponent claims it does. For a tl;dr, the VoI experiment is this: Imagine you are a human who is going to spend life on earth. You do not know where you will be born, who you will be born to, or any of the details of your family's wealth or stature. Assuming you're a rational actor, what do you do? According to my opponent, two of the things you do are A) advocate for maximal liberties for everyone, and B) advocate for an equal chance of success. This is not necessarily the case, though. The model assumes that people are going to value liberty as an end. However, liberty is not an end; it is a means to an end, and different people have different ends. This by itself makes the thought experiment fall apart, as people have to know their values for the veil to work, and yet the veil explicitly excludes value calculations, but we're interested in the effects this has on the conclusions of the experiment. Let us presume we have a religious extremist. This religious extremist values martyrdom for their cause. No matter what their situation, they wish to spread their religion by any means necessary. Under the VoI, this extremist does not care about "basic liberties" like freedom of speech. They care about how best to fulfill their own ends--liberty is incompatible with the extremist's desires. Now, under the experiment, those few people can be ignored. But what if there is a world of extremists? If there is a world where all are interested in spreading their religion by any means necessary, liberty will not be valued. Liberty is only valued if the people themselves value it, and thus it cannot be derived from the thought experiment itself. Because the thought experiment bends to the will of the people, its conclusions are only to give the majority what they want, no matter how bad the consequences might be. The conclusions aren't bad if people who think like Rawls constitute the people under the veil, but if people think differently, disaster ensues. The Alternative This flaw leads us to a better, more just theory. Famed legal scholar Ronald Dworkin argues, "No government is legitimate unless it subscribes to two . . . principles. First, it must show equal concern for the fate of every person over whom it claims dominion. Second, it must respect fully the responsibility and right of each person to decide for himself how to make something valuable of his life" (Dworkin 2). In other words, the government must value everyone's life the same, no matter their status, and it must respect their autonomy and Will to Power--their actions must still have consequences to grant them a meaningful life. The consequences of such are illustrated as follows: "Imagine an initial auction of all available resources in which everyone starts with the same number of bidding chips. The auction lasts a very long time, and will be repeated as long as anyone wishes. It must end in a situation in which nobody envies anybody else's bundle of resources; for that reason the distribution of resources . . . treats everyone with equal concern. Then imagine a further auction in which these people design and choose comprehensive insurance policies, paying the premium the market establishes for the coverage each chooses. That auction does not eliminate the consequences of good or bad luck, but it makes people responsible for their own risk management (3) This is more just because, rather than abstract "liberty" and "equal opportunity", the framework I present has actual impacts. Dworkin does not "endorse any general right to freedom," but argues for individual liberties that must be protected because they stem from the right of equal concern and the respect of personal responsibility (4). Specifically, it protects the rights that people want for themselves, but do not necessarily want for others (369). Unlike the VoI, which concludes that people should have all the rights that the majority wants for itself, this framework argues that people should have additionally all the rights that they want for themselves, but that the majority does not want them to have, provided that said rights do not infringe upon the rights of others. In the VoI, "liberty" is a buzzword that masks a majoritarian stance in which the only ends valued are the desired ends of the majority. In Dworkin's framework, "liberty" means freedom to pursue your own ends, to fulfill the Will to Power. This respect for individualism and minority rights makes it the just framework. Furthermore, Dworkin's framework is superior in that it answers how those primary goods should actually be distributed. He criticizes "[supposing] that our own communities could be improved only by an actual completely fresh start: by a voluntary return to a state of nature or an isolated island with convenient veils or bidding chips at hand. A useful theory of distributive justice must show which of the minimal steps we can actually take now are steps in the right direction" (352). For instance, the responsibility of government to treat people with equal concern requires that it implement regulations on businesses to prevent "distortions of monopoly or externality" (357). Conclusion The VoI is majoritarian and does not truly lead to protection of individual liberties. The liberties it protects are so vague under Pro's conception as to be effectively meaningless. Better are Dworkin's equal concern and personal responsibility. Both of these result in a truly just society in which all people are ends in themselves, and are free to pursue and achieve their own goals in life.