God is existant

Coherency of GodMy opponent begins by attacking the idea that we can intuitively know the intrinsic greatness (and hence objective greatness) of certain properties. He does so by arguing that intuition is 'necessarily subjective'.Whilst our actual faculty of intuition may be subjective inasmuch as it can recognise different intuitive truisms than someone else's intuition, but this is not to say that the intuitive truisms themselves are subjective.We know, intuitively, many things that are objectively true (even if we do not know them for certain) despite there being a lack of empirical or rational, deductive, evidence. For example, the Brain in a Vat hypothesis postulates that whole world could be an illusion stimulated by a supercomputer, and that in reality we are merely 'brains in a vat' connected to the computer by a series of cables and probes. There is also the concept of philosophical zombies, in which it is suggested that we are the only real people and that everyone else we see behaves like us, but is actually a "zombie" that is, mentally, nothing like us.There are many hypotheses like these, in which we have no empirical or rational evidence to verify them. So why do we take them to be false? Because of intuition.In other words, intuition is epistemologically valid in the absence of empirical data or rational deduction. Hence, since we have no empirical/rational evidence for or against the proposition of the objective greatness of certain concepts, our intuition can tell us that some concepts are actually objectively "great".If Con believes intuition cannot be used as evidence, then I would ask him why he accepts the validity of empiricism or rationalism. There is no empirical or rational evidence for or against the proposition "rationalism and empiricism is epistemologically valid" (as this would be self-justification); but I would hazard that Con intuitively knows that they are valid.Con's next point is essentially this:Premise: People have different perceptions of greatnessConclusion: Greatness is not objectiveThis isn't a sound argument. Just because people perceive greatness differently, it does not follow that there is no objective definition of greatness. People often perceive science differently, but it is absurd to conclude that science is therefore not objective.Anyhow, there are certain concepts such as power, moral integrity and knowledge that are perceived to be great by all people of sound cognition. It is absurd for one to perceive these as being not great. So it would seem that seem that it is not greatness itself that is perceived differently, but the application of the concepts that are intrinsically great.Ontological ArgumentCon begins by asserting that logical possibility is not always referred to when people consider whether something is "possible" per se, such as with unproven mathematical relationships.I agree with this; in different situations people refer to different considerations of possibility. With unproven mathematical relationships, when people say "it's possible", they are essentially saying "it's epistemically possible". With physical feats such as walking on water, considerations of possibility are considerations of nomological possibility.But with ontology, in which the question is "could X possibly exist?", people take "possibly" to mean logical possibility. For example, if asked "could Superman possibly exist?", people would generally say yes (as there is no incoherency in Superman existing), despite it being nomologically impossible for a man to fly unaided.As possible world semantics is ontological, it therefore considers logical possibility.Modal CollapseCon's argument here essentially states that, if God exists, modal collapse entails and hence one cannot use modality to prove that God exists in the first place.The problem with this argument, as conceded by Con, is that is assumes some form of strong PSR (principle of sufficient reason). There is no reason to suggest that modal collapse would happen if God, as a sentinent being with free will, simply chose to create the world with slightly different laws. Secondly, a necessary being can choose to create a contingent system (such as evolution), that would go on to contingently produce contingent entities (that could have not existed).For example, God could have created a system of evolution that would produce certain biological entities through a system of random mutations. These products would not exist necessarily because they are products of random events (i.e mutations).In this way, there are other possible worlds and they are compatible with a necessary creator, inasmuch as this creator could create circumstances that could go on to create something else contingently (for example, a scientist could create a random number generator, but the numbers generated are not determined by him).PossibilitiesCon yet again fails to give an accepted definition of metaphysical possibility, so it is meaningless for him to claim that modal logic mandates considerations of metaphysical, not logical, possibility. He yet again asserts that use of logical possibility is unsound because I have not presented an "a priori understanding of being", yet it has not been logically demonstrated that this is actually required in order to discuss logical possibility.The distinction presented by Con to give an example of metaphysical impossibility is all well and good, but metaphysical possibility is still not defined conclusively and nor is it cogently argued why we should use metaphysical possibility instead of logical possibility. The 'a priori understanding of being' argument doesn't cut it - why do we need an 'a priori understanding of being' in order to talk about logical possibilities? It's non-sequitur.Con's presentation of metaphysical possibility appears simply to be another way of expressing nomological possibility (physical possibility). Since nomological possibility considers how propositions accord with actual reality, the water = H2O analogy seems to do exactly that. In other words, metaphysical possibility only seems to say 'water = H2O, so it is impossible that water is not H2O'. But this is not a discussion of possibilities or possible worlds, but simply a description of the world as it is, not what it could be.Therefore, Con's attempt to bulldoze metaphysical possibility into the argument is irrelevant and just distracts from the argument itself.Logical Possibility of GodI have not ignored Con's arguments, I have soundly argued that we can, and we do, assume logical possibility. I will reiterate the rational argument:P1: X is only logically impossible if it contains an essential absurdityP2: X does not contain an essential absurdityC1: X is not logically impossibleC2: X is logically possibleThis argument is absolutely sound. The only point of contention when asserting something's impossibility comes in at P2. But God has no essential absurdity, so he is not logically impossible.Con's next two reductio ad absurdum arguments are strawmans. I never asserted that:'Logical Possibility is more likely than Logical Impossibility'All I argued was that if something does not have an essential absurdity, it is not logically impossible. This is analytically true. I never made any claims regarding the likelihood/probability of modal states, just that logical possibility is the default state from an epistemological perspective, not a probabilistic one.Logical impossibilityI am surprised that Con is contesting P1, as this premise is proved by the very definition of 'logically impossible'. If he disputes it then I recommend he takes it up with the dictionary.For P2, if it cannot be demonstrated that there is an essential absurdity in the existence of a being, then we can safely assume that none exists, as ontological absurdities are self-evident (such as a married bachelor, or a square circle), their absurdity is obvious so if we see no absurdity in being's existence, then there probably is none.Reverse ArgumentContrary to what Con thinks, a 'maximally great being' is essentially synonymous with 'greatest possible being'.This is because a 'maximally great being' is that which is great to the maximally possible extent. This is because if something is greatest, then it is not possible that anything is greater than it. Therefore semantically, a being that is 'great to the maximally possible extent' is just a 'greatest possible being' with different wording.The problem with Con's next argument is that we can predicate things with logical possibility, but of course that is not to say that we can predicate things with existence. Logical possibility is a common predicate, for example the 'smallest possible particle' or 'the fastest possible train' has the implicit property of logical possibility.Therefore, Con's analogy of defining 'a million pounds in his bank that exists' as 'Fod' is a straw man, as I never attempted to use existence as a predicate. Instead, I used logical possibility as a predicate, which is perfectly sound (unlike using existence).Finally, Con states:'If we define Goldbach’s Conjecture as a “Logically possible solution to the divisibility of even numbers” then we have literally defined the conjecture as true. Clearly we cannot do this soundly.'If we define Goldbach's Conjecture as logically possible, then the result would be logically possible, but it would also no longer necessarily be Goldbach's Conjecture. The definition is simply referring to 'a logically possible solution of the divisibility of even numbers'. This may actually be Goldbach's Conjecture, or it may not, dependent on whether Goldbach's Conjecture is actually logically possible.I think the problem here is that Con is insistent in applying ontological possibilities to mathematical problems, which just muddys the waters. If we stick to ontology, in which we discuss the logically possible existence of beings or events, then it all becomes quite clear.