People should be allowed to wear what they want.

As far as the approach of the International Human Rights Law standards is concerned, the debates on the wearing of headscarf by Muslim women in Europe could be analysed from the following three-fold dimension of rights, namely; freedom of thought, conscience and religion, freedom from discrimination and the right to education and work. Despite persistent controversies, the core of freedom of religion is not disputed. It is largely explicit from the text of the major international human rights instruments. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 spoke of the "advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and beliefR23;. Indeed, freedom of thought, conscience and religion is considered a fundamental human right. As noted by the UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religious Belief 1981 religion or belief, for anyone who professes either, is one of the fundamental elements of his life. Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 1966 is probably the most widely accepted text, with 155 states parties as of 1 April 2006. It provides; "1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching. 2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice. 3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. 4. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions." In addition, under the Article 9(1) of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), it was mentioned that; "Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes...freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice and observance."24 The European Court of Human Rights has consistently stated that this right of freedom of religion is at the core of a democratic society, claiming that, in its religious dimension, one of the most vital elements that go to make up the identity of believers and their conception of life, but it is also a precious asset for atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the unconcerned. The pluralism indissociable from a democratic society, which has been won over the centuries, depends on itR23;. The second part of Article 9 protects the freedom to "manifestR23; ones religion or belief "in public or in private, alone or with othersR23;. The manifestation may include "worship, teaching, practice or observanceR23;. Indeed, having mentioned previously that the wearing of headscarf constitutes an observance of Muslim women to the duty that is mandatory for them, wearing of headscarf should therefore be deemed as a form of manifestation of religion. Any act that could hinder the right to manifest the religion as prescribed in Article 9(1) of the ECHR could amount to the violation of peopleR23;s right to freedom of religion. The fact that there are some Muslim women who failed to properly observe such obligation cannot form a basis to conclude that the wearing of headscarf is not compulsory in Islam. It was the people to be blamed for not complying with the rule and not the rule itself. The justification whether the wearing of headscarf in Islam is a form of religious manifestation should therefore be made on the Islamic perspectives but not on the Muslim practices. In Vereniging v Netherlands, the European Commission of Human Rights stated "Article 9 primarily protects the sphere of personal beliefs and religious creeds....[i]n addition it protects acts which are intimately linked to these attitudes such as acts of worship or devotion which are aspects of the practice of the religion or belief in a recognised formR23;. Indeed, in Mannousakis v Greece, the Court held that the right of manifestation of belief excludes the discretion of states to determine "whether religious beliefs or the means used to express them are legitimateR23;. On the other hand, the subsequent article i.e. Article 9(2) of the ECHR has drawn up some limitations to the right to manifest religion. The Article states; "[f]reedom to manifest oneR23;s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals or for the protection of rights and freedoms of othersR23;. Indeed, the right enshrined in Article 9 is so fundamental that the limitations in Article 9(2) are even narrower than those relating to the freedom of expression, association and assembly contained in the ECHR. The European Court has consistently stated that there must be a narrow construction of these limitations together with a broad interpretation of the freedoms guaranteed. Any restrictions on freedoms must be "construed strictlyR23; and can be justified only by "convincing and compelling reasonsR23;. Hence, if a state were to ban the headscarf, it should firstly determine whether such ban is "prescribed by lawR23; or "necessaryR23; insofar as to protect "the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals or for the protection of rights and freedoms of othersR23;. Despite being an individual right, not a group one, the Article 9(1) makes it clear that the freedom of religion has a community dimension, viz, "either alone or in community with othersR23;. It was the state that will have the margin of appreciation and power to make national assessment on deciding whether to limit the extent of a religious manifestation. Additionally, there have issues of the religious manifestation could also fall under the protection of freedom of expression provided in Article 10 of the ECHR. Consider the case of Leyla Saihin v. Turkey where Ms. Sahin argued that the ban on the Islamic headscarf by Turkish government in higher education was an "unjustified interference with her right to freedom of religionR23; and "her right to manifest her religionR23;, under Article 9 of the ECHR. The Court, however, perceived the wearing of hijab or headscarf for Muslim women as "not a direct expression of the religion concernedR23;, but rather as a mere-religiously motivated act which could not be protected under Article 9. The wearing of the headscarf was thus seen to be a form of "manifestation of conscience or thoughtR23;, rather than a "manifestation of religionR23;. Although the judgment was also been challenged as a violation of Article 10R23;s freedom of expression, the Court maintained its judgment, stating that the impugned measures were justifiable for their legitimate aims; to protect the rights and freedom of others and public order, "to uphold the principle of secularism and to ensure the neutrality nature of Turkish universities. Hence, a conclusion could be drawn from this issue is the rights to religious manifestation provided in Article 9 are divided into two clusters, namely; the "manifestation of religion or beliefR23; and the "manifestation of thought and conscienceR23;. This has much to do with the distinction between "religion or beliefR23; and "thought or conscienceR23;, in that manifestation of thought or conscience may fall within the freedom of expression under Article 10. This is the manifestation of thought or conscience is always treated as "merely an idea dictated from religious beliefR23;, rather than an "obligation or direct devotion of the religion concernedR23; which should be protected unconditionally. Nevertheless, it is fundamental to remember that, to a Muslim woman, the wearing of the headscarf is not merely a personal display of faith - it is an obligation imposed by her religion. Proponents of the ban claim that the headscarf cannot be tolerated in a secular state educational system because the mere fact of wearing it amounts to proselytism. Yet for those who wear it, it is simply a matter of personal obedience to God. It is also imperative to remember that even if evidence is adduced to show that the headscarf amounts to proselytism - this is not a legitimate reason under international human rights law to ban it from being worn. In fact, such a manifestation of oneR23;s religion would be protected under ECHR provisions relating to freedom of expression. Article 10 of the ECHR provides that this right includes, "freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interferenceR23;. This right is often considered the cornerstone of personal freedom and is vigorously upheld. Indeed, the Court has stated that it "constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society, one of the basic conditions for its progress and for the development of every manR23; and applies to the freedom to express an opinion, even when it might "offend, shock or disturbR23;. In reality, this is the same freedom of expression advocated by European countries which criticise states such as Saudi Arabia or Afghanistan for their human rights standards. Human rights law is not specific to culture or country - it exists precisely to contradict every form of state oppression - whether it is in the name of religion or secularism. A further argument being made to support the ban is that childrenR23;sR23; autonomy is being overridden by parents and communities who are coercing them into wearing the headscarf. However, once again, there is little evidence to support this and even if this is the case - it is impossible to justify replacing parental control over a childR23;s actions with state control over the dress of individuals of an entire section of the community. Indeed, the idea of human rights is based on the notion that for each individual there is an area of personal liberty immune from state invasion. In recognition of this principle, Article 2 of the First Protocol to the ECHR (1952) (to which France, Germany and Belgium are signatories) states, no person shall be denied the right to education...the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictionsR23;. This is one example of the intention of international legislation to endorse the right of parents to protect children against the use of educational institutions by the state for ideological indoctrination of its own ideas. It seems that while the apparently proselytising nature of the headscarf is being criticised by state authorities, the same authorities are also engaging in their own form of proselytism by banning religious symbols - that of furthering their own secular agenda. This has particularly serious consequences if we remember that it is precisely in the human mind that attitudes and prejudices take form. By imposing the fictional absence of religion in schools that exist within a multi-faith society, it is arguable that the Government is simply promoting the development of uniform intolerant attitudes within young minds. Under the ECHR, the limitations on freedom under Article 9(2) are subject to Article 14 which, among other things, provides that the Convention rights "shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.R23; The European Court has stated that discrimination on the basis of certain grounds, such as race and sex, is particularly serious and has stated that "very weighty reasonsR23; would have to be advanced before such treatment could be regarded as compatible with the Convention. A ban on the headscarf, turban and kippa is unfairly discriminatory towards particular ethnic groups - namely Jews, Sikhs and generally Muslims from a particular racial group. Furthermore, in Germany, the ban is only applicable to the headscarf and specifically excludes Jewish and other religious symbols - a clear instance of religious discrimination. Although Germany has purported to justify this on the grounds of the Christian nature of the country, it is unlikely that the European Court will consider GermanyR23;s margin of appreciation in interpreting the ECHR wide enough to allow such flagrant discrimination. Furthermore, a ban on the headscarf would clearly affect women for whom this religious dress is considered mandatory under Islam. The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) 1979, to which France, Germany and Belgium are signatories, provides that the term "discrimination against womenR23; shall mean any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women...on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms...R23;. Article 2, on the other hand, places an obligation on states to "condemn discrimination against women in all its formsR23; and "to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating discrimination against women...R23;. The fundamental issue behind the headscarf debates in Europe lies in the failure of majority of European people and governments to properly understand the obligatory nature of wearing headscarf from the Islamic perspectives. Some have made justification that headscarf is not a religious manifestation based on the diverse type of practices relating to wearing of headscarf by Muslim in Europe which are inherent in various cultural backgrounds from different Muslim communities. Such practices, however, might not necessarily conform to the rightful Islamic principles. Islam has made it clear about the requirements on covering the aurah for Muslim women, and thus the dress being worn by them should aim to meet such requirements and not to reduce or add something which is beyond what is required for them. Apart from the prescribed requirements, other additional "thingR23;, for example niqab cannot be considered as something compulsory under Islamic rules or syariah as discussed before, i.e. due to the conflicting views among the Muslim scholars. Hence the ban on niqab could be justifiable based on its non-compulsory nature under syariah and the states may have the role and margin of appreciation to decide on whether such dress consistence with its democratic identity. Nevertheless, the ban cannot be extended to the wearing of headscarf as the headscarf is part of the dresses that will meet the requirements on dress code of Muslim women. As such, the compulsory nature of headscarf should be made clear in the first place to avoid any possible violation of the right to religious manifestation protected in the virtue of the freedom of religion. Additionally, the States must implement measures under CEDAW to abolish all discriminatory laws and ensure the effective protection of women against discrimination. Freedom of religion constitutes the core principle of a democratic society. As such, a democratic country that denies this right from being enjoyed by its people could be deemed as undemocratic. Islamic headscarf, being a manifestation of the freedom of religion, has indeed ignited a recurring dilemma among various European countries on whether to accept it as part of their multicultural diversities or a mark of separation which is not compatible with their democratic societies. Even though the discussion about headscarf was seen by some, including Muslims, as something trivial and less important, it should be viewed as a paramount element of a religious manifestation. Despite the fact that there are a significant number of Muslim women out there who chose not to comply with the headscarf obligation, this does not mean the wearing of headscarf has no basis in Islam. The acts and behaviour of Muslim cannot be a basis in justifying the Islamic principles. Having analysed the headscarf from the perspectives of Islam and the International Human Rights standards, this article believes that the wearing of headscarf should not be banned as it is an observance to the religion, simply like worship, and the claim that wearing headscarf could contribute public disorder or social dissention is totally unjustifiable and unacceptable.