Kantian metaphysics and epistemology is superior to Objectivist epistemology and metaphysics

My opponent claims that his argument sidestepped the objections raised by Peikoff – he says that the fact that the mind extrapolates from incomplete data is proof that the senses are not inviolable, and that this is somehow distinct from viewing a straight stick as bent when it is placed in water. This distinction is made arbitrarily; the same arguments given by Peikoff against the stick’s illusion disproving direct perception apply even in cases like those described by Pro. If one sense “drowns out” another, that is because the sense organ responsible for perception was acted on in such a way as to cause this to happen. If the mind “fills in” things that are not there, this is only the result of the mechanistic interaction between the mind and the senses, and, as such, is not an error. It is merely the result of objectively observable phenomena, and the only way that sense data which is “clouded” in the ways Pro describes can be used to reach incorrect conclusions about reality is via a conceptual mistake. If the mind and the eye interact in such a way as to produce an image of something that is “not really there”, this does not mean that the image was created out of thin air. It was created because of the nature of the eye and the nature of the mind, and, since neither cannot be said to be outside reality (that would be patently absurd), the result of their interaction is in no way divorced with the real world. There is no reason to claim that the result of such an interaction is “indirect”, and the idea that anything that is real is perceived indirectly is to suppose that you can perceive the unreal. If you are not perceiving reality as it really is, then what are you perceiving? How are Kantian illusions any less real than noumena? In Defense of Entity-Based Causality and Certainty without the Need for A-Priori Concepts and Against Kantian Skepticism The law of identity cannot be “derived” from anything – it is an axiom and is not reliant on anything outside of itself for validation. To try to evaluate it in any way, such as how Pro is trying to, is impossible, since it underlies every statement and every piece of analysis that can be given. It is grasped self-evidently when the first entity is perceived, and to say that “entities don’t have to stay the same today and tomorrow” is self-defeating (how do you make sense of the argument if none of its terms mean anything absolute?). If an entity is the same entity that it was yesterday (else why would you call it the same entity?), then it must be that same entity. There is no internal debate to be had over whether A = A, considering that, if A is defined as A, then there is no way for it to be any other way. Hume’s claims are equivalent to saying that “it is possible that things aren’t what they are”, which is inherently absurd. In any causal interaction, there are entities with specific identities that are the agents which interact. Take this scenario as an example: X + Y = Z. Assuming that all of the relevant variables are included (for this purpose, they are), then there is nothing outside of X and Y that can possibly produce Z. If X + Y = Z is observed once, then, assuming that no variables change, it is absolute knowledge that X + Y = Z. The only way for X + Y to equal non-Z would be if something changed, but, if something does change, then the initial claim (that X + Y = Z) would not be applicable. Even if the environment one finds oneself in changes to one of X + A = B, this does not invalidate the fact that X + Y, by definition, are equal to Z. As such, as long as the terms of the equation are accurately identified, there is no room for error or uncertainty in areas of knowledge. There is no need for Kantian explanations of causality when causality flows directly from self-evident axioms. And how can one gain knowledge about any entities without experiencing them? The idea of a priori knowledge being necessary to conceptualize anything further is shown to be false simply because a priori knowledge itself is nonsensical unless viewed in the context of sense-experience. You cannot think of “time” or “space” without thinking of objects in time or objects in space. You cannot make sense of causality without first having knowledge of the existence of entities which can act, and you cannot have knowledge of mathematical units without first having the knowledge of subdivided existence. These concepts cannot reasonably come before that which they’re based on and that which is necessary to understand them. Even the concept of “concepts” would not be able to come about without first having the prerequisite grounding in reality via sense experience. It is not, as Kant argues, that perceptions cannot stand alone - it is conceptions that are dependent on perceptions. This is the crux of most of my opponent’s round: my opponent claims that Objectivist portrayals of Kant are wrong since he believed that knowledge could be gained from the senses. What he is ignoring is that this knowledge is not of reality “as it really is” – it is knowledge of the phenomenal realm. It is knowledge of appearances, as opposed to knowledge of things in themselves. This distinction is exactly what Objectivism attacks, and this distinction is what Objectivism uses to justify the claim that Kant believed that no true knowledge could be had by man. To Kant, it is because humans must make things perceivable to them that humans cannot perceive anything in themselves – they can only know reality as filtered by his consciousness. Rand argues that there is no divide between appearances and things in themselves, which is the cause of her claim that Kant was against all knowledge. If there is a distinction between appearances and noumena, and if noumena are “pure reality”, then to say that we can only know appearances is an attack on knowledge. Even if Kant does hold that we can know appearances, he most certainly does not believe that noumena are reachable to humans, so my opponent has no basis on which to claim that Kant didn’t believe that sense-perception was limited.On Tabula Rasa My opponent’s misunderstanding of the Objectivist view of tabula rasa is based in the fact that he equates tendencies towards the formation of concepts with the possession of the concepts themselves. He himself says that “children don’t innately know any languages” – children are not in possession of any conceptual information at birth. My opponent says that “something innate must be in place that enables children to learn language.” This is decidedly not in conflict with Objectivism – Rand did not deny that those with long legs make better runners on the basis of tabula rasa, nor did she deny that those with minds of a certain kind are able to do things like learn languages faster than minds of different kinds. What she did deny is that there is conceptual knowledge inherent in every mind. The extent of her tabula rasa view was that concepts had to be formed; Rand never denied that some may form concepts more easily than another. As such, my opponent’s arguments on this front hold no weight.