The Modal Ontological Argument

IntroductionIn my last round, I presented a counter-argument to the Modal Ontological Argument which devastatingly undermines it. In this round, I am going to demonstrate why all of my opponent's objections to the counter-argument completely miss the mark, and fail to stand up to critical scrutiny.Are possibilities That Make God Impossible, God?Pro states that any possibilities I that I can think of that make God impossible, are God himself. This makes no sense for two reasons:(i) It violates the Law of Noncontradiction(ii) None of the possibilities I mentioned were "beings"If it is the case that there is a possibility which makes God impossible, then clearly it cannot be God because that would mean God is possible. Since this is a logical abomination, this argument can be dismissed. Pertaining to the plugs for p, I can say that it is possible that:. All sentience is physically dependent. Gratuitous suffering exists. Omnipotence is not actualized. The total sum of information there is, is unknownNone of those are "beings". Thus, Pro's objection here fails. Pro Misunderstands Ryan Stringer's ArgumentPro re-iterates that if we grant that God is even possible, then he has to exist. I never contested that so this is a fallacious red-herring. He says God is either impossible, or necessary. The argument from Ryan Stringer claims that if any of those plugs for p is possible, then God is not possible. Thus, Ryan Stringer's argument shows that P1 of the Ontological Argument ("it is possible for God to exist") is false, not P4. I completely accept P4 of the Modal Ontological Argument, it is P1 I do not accept. If any of those plugs for p is possible, then God is not possible and P1 of the Modal Ontological Argument is false. Thus, the rest of the argument does not follow. In order for Pro to meet his burden of proof and show P1 of his argument true, he has to show that all the plugs for p are impossible without begging the question by assuming God exists in every possible world already (that would assume God is possible, which is the premise Pro has to prove in the first place). Ryan Stringer's argument demonstrates that P1 of Pro's argument ("it is possible for God to exist") is false if we grant the initial possibility claim, not P4. Pro Begs The QuestionHe claims:"Not so fast. God, by definition (that you also granted), is a necessary being, whose attributes are also necessary. If such a being exists, then its omnipotence MUST be actualized in the real world." - ProI agree 100% with the above. This is what Pro doesn't understand. If God exists, then it would be impossible for omnipotence not be actualized. Since it is possible for omnipotence not to be actualized, then God is not possible and P1 of the Modal Ontological Argument is false. This follows Modens Tollens. Pro has to assume that God is possible already, to assume that he exists in every possible world making my plugs for p impossible. However, it is Premise 1 Pro has to prove and defend in the first place! Since this is circular reasoning and begging the question, Pro's argument fails. Pro then states:"Gratuitous suffering would contradict the character of an omnibenevolent being." - ProI agree 100% with the above. This is why if gratuitous suffering is even merely possible, then God is impossible. Basically, if God is possible then God exists and is omnibenevolent; every possible world would contain no gratuitous suffering. Thus, if there is a possible world with gratuitous suffering; God is impossible. This is what Pro doesn't understand. His objections only work if you presuppose God is possible. He assumes God is possible, thus my plugs all fail by default. However, I can just presuppose that those plugs for p are possible, thus God's possibility fails by default. He has given no reason to grant God's possibility over any of the plugs for p. If we grant God is possible, then all my plugs for p are impossible. I agree. However, if we grant that any of those plugs for p are possible, then God is not possible. Pro must give us a reason to accept the possibility of God, over any of the plugs for p without begging the question as he has the burden of proof in the debate. He has not done this.He then states:"'all sentience being physically realized" is not a necessary truth'" - ProI agree 100%. Ryan Stringer's argument only argues that "all sentience being physically realized" is merely possible, not necessary. Pro is all over the place here...Expanding On Ryan Stringer's ArgumentPro claims:"To say it is possible for omnipotence to not be actualized in the actual world is to state that it is impossible for a MGB to exist." - ProExactly. If it is not possible for a maximally great being to exist, then P1 of the Modal Ontological Argument is false, and God's existence does not follow. This is why the Modal Ontological Argument fails. Pro hasn't given us a reason to accept God's possibility over any of the plugs for p."If it is possible for such a being to exist, then my opponent is in error when he postulates possible worlds at which such a being DOESN'T exist." - ProYes, if it is possible for such a being to exist then Pro is correct. However, it is not possible for such a being to exist based on Stringer's Argument. Thus, it is completely fine to postulate worlds in which God does not exist, because he is not even possible in the first place. I thought Pro was catching on but he went further into the deep end. Pro is just assuming God is possible. If he does that then of course, he exists in every possible world, and all my plugs for p fail. But I can just assume that all those plugs for p are possible based on the same type of presupposition. This means that God not being possible is true necessarily, and P1 of the Modal Ontological Argument is false. Pro needs to give us a reason to accept the possibility of God, over any of the plugs for p. He is just assuming God is possible and begging the question.The Conclusion of Stringer's ArgumentMy opponent claims: "My opponent's premises were false, so there is no need to accept the conclusion as true. Why? Because he fails to give reasons why there isn't at least one possible world at which a MGB's existence is true." - ProPro has not shown my plugs for p are false. Pro can only assume they are false, if he assumes God is possible, and exists in every possible world making my plugs for p false by default. However, this is what he has to prove, not presuppose. I can just say that P1 of the Modal Ontological Argument is false because all those things I mentioned are possible, and they make God's existence impossible. He then says I failed to give reasons why God cannot exist in one possible world. However, I gave reasons. If God exists in some possible world, he exists in all of them. Since those plugs for p are possible, then God cannot exist in all possible worlds. If he was possible though, he would exist in all possible worlds. Thus, those plugs for p show God is not possible, and P1 of the Modal Ontological Argument is false. It was also said:"I've offered refutation of my opponents 'p's', and I will wait for his response." - ProHis refutation committed the exact fallacy I knew he was going to commit. In my first round I said:"Pro has to give us a reason to hive him the 'leg up' without begging the question and assuming God exists in every possible world already." - MePro's only refutation of the plugs for p, is that God exists in every possible world so they cannot be true in any possible world. However, I can say that those plugs for p are the case in some possible world. Therefore, God's existence cannot be true in any possible world.Overall Conclusion Pro claims that since every possible world has God in it, because he is possible, then those plugs for p are false. I can just say that because those plugs for p are possible, then God's possibility is false. Pro just begged the question and assumed the crucial premise without valid warrant.