God most likely does not exist

First off, I copied and pasted the formulas along with what the variables were being filled with, however I tried to refrain from using exact phrases and modified much the text greatly. Also, I added commentary of my own extensively. Argument From Incoherence: Omnipotence/ OmnibenevolenceCon claims that my statement “This means that it is possible for God to freely chose to commit an act of evil if he wishes, thus, he commits an evil act in some possible world.” assumes (ii) is false right off the bat. I do not see how Con reached this conclusion, God could still hypothetically be the author and source of morality and be malevolent (thus I am not assuming ii false off the bat). This argument attacks either God's omnipotence or omnibenevolence specifically. Regardless, my opponent claims:"committing an act of evil implies that God is bound by a moral metric for which he is presumably not the author, which is a limitation"We can see that this is false immediately. God committing an act of evil implies he is not bound by any moral standard. If a being is truly omnipotent and free, then he commits an act of evil in some possible world. I will give an example to show how outrageous my opponents argument is here. Imagine an omnipotent being who is both benevolent snd malevolent. This being could hypothetically do almost twice what God can, however, if that being could do more then God then that being would be omnipotent. A being who is limited to only acts of good, cannot be omnipotent, because a benevolent and malevolent being could do twice as much. Therefore, my opponent's argument here is severely moot. Now, Con claims:"It would be intellectually insane to assume that a programmer ought to be bound by his own programming"It would be intellectually insane to think that moral truths do not apply to one sentient being, while they apply to all others. This would negate the claim that moral truths, are actually moral truths. For example, if raping a child for no reason but purely for pleasure is wrong, then it would be objectively wrong even if God commits this act. An omnipotent being could commit this act, but not an omnibenevolent being. This is because, a being who commits an evil act in no possible world would be more benevolent than a being who commits this act in some possible world. Basically, Pro did a horrible job refuting this. Therefore, it still stands. Either God is not omnipotent, or not omnibenevolent. Paul Draper's Argument From Evil (Gratuitous Suffering)All of my opponents objections here, seem to fall flat on their face. First off, (ii) is how God is defined and would be an attribute of his essence if he exists. I am not assuming God's existence in anyway shape of form with (ii). Also, Con suggests that the very existence of evil implies God's existence. However, this simply begs the question against objective Atheistic morality. Most moral philosophers simply do not believe that God is necessary for objective morality, and moral philosophy has been done without appealing to God for centuries. Even prominent theistic philosophers for example, believe that if objective moral truths exist, they must exist independently of God. Take Richard Swinburne for example:“Some moral truths are clearly moral truths, whether there is a God or not: it is surely wrong to torture children for fun whether or not there is a God.” [1] Objective morals would exist independently of God if they exist. If objective morality exists, it cannot even be grounded in God's nature/ authority ontologically.If God's nature is the way it is because it is good, then this means there is an independent standard of good. Thus, God could not be the source of good. If God's nature is good simply because whatever God's nature is, is necessarily good, then if God's nature was that of a murderer or rapist these attributes would be necessarily good, because whatever was God's nature would be necessarily good (this seems to be what my opponent adheres to). However, this should strike us as intuitively wrong. Surely, raping a child for fun without any compensating good, is wrong even if God commits this act. The theist could claim that God's nature could not be that of a murderer of rapist, because since by necessity, God's nature must be good. However, without an independent standard of good, any attributes possible could be applied to God's nature, and they would be good necessarily when we know some acts if objective, are evil.Therefore, there must be some independent source of good besides God and his nature ontologically. If rape is bad, then it would be bad if even God did it as well. If God could rape and it would be good, then obviously moral truths would not be necessary truths regarding all sentient beings. Thus, this would completely destroy the idea of objective morality as a whole. God simply could not be the source/ author of objective morality. Thus, the resolution is still affirmed. There is no way to ground objective morality in God. I would also add, that if God exists he is a non-physical mind (William Lane Craig has said this on several occasions). If morals are dependent on God, then they would be dependent on a mind, and thus subjective by definition.Now, Con states:"So logical calculations like the following: Pr(O1 & O2 & O3|T) < Pr(O1 & O2 & O3|HI), are really quite meaningless, as they depend upon information for which we have no access."However, I already addressed the claim regarding lack of information. I stated:"For while it might be true that God has a reason for O, we have no antecedent reason to expect O to obtain. Regardless, (HI) already accounts for O, making it more likely anyway."There is no reason to believe we are lacking certain divine information. This is assuming God actually exists, and has information we are lacking in the first place. Needed ClarityMy opponent's argument is one that is intuitively ridiculous, and I already addressed this line of reasoning in the last section, but I will drive it home even further. My opponent is basically saying that Draper's argument fails, because gratuitous suffering would be a good thing if God wanted it or allowed it to happen. Basically, anything God does is good no matter what it is, thus I am presenting a false problem. The problem with this line of thinking, is that if Earth was one big torture chamber, this would be good because God allowed it. Why is this a problem for the theist? Well, in defense of the moral argument the theist appeals to intuition. Basically, we all know deep that certain things are objectively wrong. However, Con completely stomps on this intuition by claiming that these things would actually be good, if that's what God wanted. However, it is more intuitively obvious that certain acts are objectively morally evil regardless of which being commits the act. Until my opponent adequately responds to this, his attempts at refuting my argument remain futile thus far. Now, Con also has not justified Pr(O1 & O2 & O3|T) > Pr(O1 & O2 & O3|HI). This is because, even if he undermined my argument (which he did not), all this would mean is that we are now on the same playing field. This wouldn't mean, gratuitous suffering is now more likely under T than Hi.Also, since I showed the outrageousness with my opponents stance regarding God and morality, there is no foundation for claiming that Hi and T can co-exist. They simply cannot, if God exists, he is not morally indifferent with regards to us. ConclusionCon didn't even scratch the surface of my argument from incoherence, and I adequately refuted the objections he did have. Thus, the resolution has been affirmed with this argument alone. Also, Con's refutation of Draper's argument was based on a radical morality with regards to God, which I easily dismantled. This took care of (ii) simultaneously, therefore, furthermore affirming the resolution. Source(s)[1] Richard Swinburne, Is there a God?, P14