Abortion is Generally Immoral

Below I’ve mapped PRO’s original argument. Note it isn’t strictly valid: it does not follow from “Abortion kills an innocent human being” and “Killing an innocent human being is prima facie immoral” that “Abortion is generally immoral” (my emphasis). Counter example: “Killing a human being is prima facie immoral”/ “Just war kills an innocent human being”// Just war is generally immoral. Most of PRO’s R2 was spent supporting premises I accept (e.g. “From fertilization, the preborn are biological members of humanity”).[1] My own R2 implies two attacks on PRO’s argument. If either of these attacks succeeds, PRO’s case against abortion fails. Scourge If we take the substance view seriously we must consider natural embryo loss a much higher priority than HIV, Malaria, or any other disease, as more than half of all (substance view) people die due to natural embryo loss. We should spend far more on treating natural embryo loss than (for example) HIV. Yet this is absurd, so the substance view is wrong. One ‘out’ PRO tries is that aren’t obliged to spend all our money on natural embryo loss, and that we can spend some effort on lesser killers like HIV and Malaria. I agree, but we only need (and I only used) very weak resource allocation claims to make the conclusion preposterous: for natural embryo loss kills orders of magnitude more than HIV, and so surely deserves more funding than HIV. Yet this is absurd. PRO asserts that “[J]ust because we do lose embryos through miscarriage and natural process, does not give us the right to kill them intentionally”. True, but irrelevant: I never used the embryo loss data to argue ‘we may kill embryos intentionally’, but that the substance view is false. The centrepiece of PROs objection is an accusation this sort of argument is ‘fallacious’, that ‘something is not true or false despite its ramifications’. Yet reductios aren’t fallacious: and are standard practice in moral philosophy (see Rescher 2005): if we find some belief Y implausible, then it follows (by modus tollens, no less) that any belief that entails Y is implausible too. If PRO really thinks this sort of reasoning is fallacious, I defy him to provide a citation from anyone who agrees.[2] We can charitably construe PRO as offering a better objection. “It is absurd to prioritize natural embryo loss over HIV” is an intuition. Yet moral intuitions can be wrong, and PRO invites us to consider how, if there was a black-only serious disease, how racists could use a scourge like argument to vindicate racism.[3]. But so what? That we our moral faculties sometimes get it wrong is no reason to disregard all their deliverances, no more so than the fact my eyes occasionally deceive me means I’d better wear a blindfold. PRO needs an argument either that all moral intuitions are not to be trusted, or that the particular intuition supporting my reductio is wrong, and PROs thought experiment supplies neither. Here’s a map of where we are so far. Violinist Even if the foetus is a person from conception, pregnancy remains a supererogatory act from woman to foetus. So refusing this relationship, much like unhooking yourself from a dependent violinist, is not immoral. PRO makes a number of objections. None are successful. PRO notes the analogy does not permit direct killing of the foetus. Thomson herself agrees: “[B]ut to say this [unplugging yourself is permissible] is by no means to say that if, when you unplug yourself, there is a miracle and he survives, you then have a right to turn around and slit his throat.“ Thomson 1971, pp.66). This at best is an argument for methods that evacuate instead of kill. Medical abortion remains acceptable, as it works by halting maternal blood flow to the placenta and stimulating uterine contractions to expel the foetus (see Fiala and Danielsson 2006 accord Physicians for Life 2012). As medical abortions are common, are growing in proportion (see eg. Department of Health 2012 pp. 10) and could replace surgical methods in most cases, this concession is innocuous. Next, cursory inspection shows Schwatz’s analogy to be a disanalogy. In our day-to-day lives there are other options besides letting an intruder stay in your house or chucking him into the sea. No such ‘middle ground’ exists for pregnancy due to foetal dependence. If you find some intruder on your lifeboat whilst the ship is sinking, and letting him remain entails risks to your life and welfare – and those of your family, then we arrive at a similar intuition that one is ‘within one’s rights’ to get rid of this intruder, even if he will drown.[4] Finally, PRO notes that in pregnancy one is responsible for creating the foetus in a ‘naturally needy state’, and this entails an obligation. Yet there is no ‘third option’ for the woman to have the foetus not be in this naturally needy state: either the foetus exists needily or not at all. So if the woman actualizes this foetus in this state for a month and then opts to no longer support it, the foetus has no grounds for complaint: it had a month of life it would never have had otherwise, and one which the woman was never obligated to provide it. So any pregnancy for any time and regardless of dependency remains a supererogatory action. To return to our violinist analogy, the ‘naturally needy state’ can be modelled by having there need to be a ‘life saving’ procedure prior to ‘hooking-up’, and without the life-saving the violinist dies immediately, but with it he still needs the nine months of hooking up to provide, so, by consenting to the life saving procedure, you are responsible for the violinist being in the needy state. If the woman (supererogatorily) accepts to participate in the life saving procedure she does not assume an obligation to stay hooked-up for any length of time. Another map My arguments stand, and each independently show abortion is generally permissible, and each independently show PRO’s argument to be unsound. Enjoy life, Thrasymachus References Department of Health. (2012). Abortion Statistics, England and Wales: 2011. Retrieved from https://www.wp.dh.gov.uk... Fiala, C., & Danielsson, K.-G. (2006). Review of medical abortion using mifepristone in combination with a prostaglandin analogue. Contraception, 74(1), 66–86. doi:10.1016/j.contraception.2006.03.018 Physicians For Life - Abstinence, Abortion, Birth Control - RU 486 -- Mechanism of Action (How it Works). (n.d.). Retrieved July 1, 2012, from http://www.physiciansforlife.org... Rescher, N. (2005). Reductio ad Absurdum. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved from http://www.iep.utm.edu... Thomson, J. J. (1971). A Defense of Abortion. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 1(1), 47–66. [1] Although I’ll note that calling non substance views ‘arbitrary’ is - at best – question begging, and that although Tooley and Singer consider infanticide permissible this isn’t a necessary consequence of a non-substance view. If (like me) you take personhood to obtain in a degree way throughout development, then you broadly preserve early abortion is permissible whilst infanticide is not (ditto killing those who’ve reversibly lost consciousness). [2] As further support. None of the dozen or so articles published in response to Ord’s argument ever made the fallacy accusation. [3] Note this is exactly the sort of ‘appeal to ramifications’ PRO told us was a fallacy! [4] PRO notes that pregnancy “not a prison bed”. Yet, in general it remains burdensome: there are increased risks of mortality and morbidity, and it may in particular circumstances engender pain, social isolation, stigma, etc. Accepting such burdens for the benefit of a stranger can only ever be supererogatory.