Sex with animals is ethically permissible

Let me first propose a case of bestiality for us to keep in mind in this discussion. I think it is essential for us to remove any obvious wrong-making properties that could occur in any sexual act so that we can have a debate solely concerned with whether or not the property of being an act of bestiality is a wrong-making property. Thus, let us imagine a case in which a woman and her (male) dog have a really close relationship. If they were to have sex it would be pleasurable for both of them. That is, the person would not in any way mistreat the dog by causing it physical or emotional pain. For the sake of argument let us imagine that this dog, Spot, is a full-grown dog as well. Let us begin the case against bestiality with the following argument: 1. In order for an act of sex involving at least one person and one semi-rational and/or sentient being to be morally permissible, there must be voluntary, informed consent from both participants. 2. An act of bestiality, by definition, cannot involve voluntary, informed consent from both participants. 3. Therefore, bestiality is not morally permissible. The first premise is clearly the most controversial; so let me elaborate on it. By "voluntary," I mean that neither participant is being coerced or threatened in anyway. By "informed," I mean that both participant understand what they are consenting to, what it means to each one of them and what it means to the other, and perhaps as well as its broader social meaning. This kind of consent is normally the minimal criteria for an act of sex to be morally permissible. For the sake of argument let us imagine that one participant is a person. By person, I do not necessarily mean a human being. The latter is a biological category and the former is a moral category. I shall not offer a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for a being to be a person, but let us consider the following to be some necessary conditions: consciousness, sentience, and autonomy (self-determination). Thus, the average adult human is also a person. But an alien might also have these properties without also being biologically human, so they are clearly distinct categories. I have specified that the second participate is semi-rational and/or sentient. By this, I mean to include animals and certain kinds of humans, e.g. infants and the mentally disabled. I have included these two properties (1) because animals have them and (2) to eliminate the objection that without them, premise 1 would make sex with inanimate objects (e.g. blow-up dolls) morally impermissible. I do not think that sex with inanimate is morally impermissible in the slightest and so I thought it was essential to include it. Now, I think the best objection to premise 1 is that while animals cannot offer"in fact, are not capable of offering"voluntary, informed consent, they can offer a kind of tacit consent. Following Neil Levy [1], let us refer to this latter kind of consent as consent*. Consider the following scenario. You're at a friend's house for a Christmas party and your friend's dog comes up to you and starts humping your leg with a full erection. Surely this dog knows what it is doing"as much as is possible. In fact, let us call the kind of consent that is displayed in the act of an animal initiating a sexual act "active consent*." That is, the animal actively consents* to a certain act. In addition to being able to offer active consent*, an animal can offer what we might call passive consent*, i.e. once a sexual act has been initiated, the animal has the ability to show signs that it no longer consents. For example, the animal might try to get away from the person with whom it is having sex. Or it might make sounds indicating that it is not enjoying itself, e.g. sounds indicating pain or discomfort. If an animal offers none of these indications, then it ostensibly offers passive consent* as well. It seems to me that if an animal offers both active and passive consent*, then that instance of bestially is morally permissible. However, we will soon see that this might necessarily be so. For the purposes of this discussion let us refer to a case in which a person has sex with an animal who offers active and passive consent* and who enjoys the sex and who suffers no physical or psychological harm form the sex as bestiality*. With all this in mind, let us formulate the argument against the moral permissibility of bestiality in two ways. Argument One: Rejection of Voluntary, Informed Consent 1.Either voluntary, informed consent (VIC) is a necessary condition for a sex act to be morally permissible or it is not. 2.If (a) VIC is a necessary condition for morally permissible sex, then bestiality* is morally impermissible, however, if (b) VIC is not a necessary condition, then bestiality* is morally permissible. 3.If 2b is true, then certain instances of pedophilia are also morally permissible, i.e. those in which a child offers both active and passive consent*. 4.However, no instances of pedophilia are morally impermissible. 5.Therefore, bestiality* is not morally permissible. [from 3 and 4, modus tollens] Argument Two: Acceptance of Active and Passive Consent* 1.Mutual active and passive consent* (MAPC*) is a sufficient condition for morally permissible sex in which one of the participants in not a person. 2.Bestiality* involves MAPC*. 3.Therefore, bestiality* is morally permissible. 4.However, if (1), then certain instances of pedophilia are morally permissible"i.e. ones including MAPC*. 5.No instances of pedophilia are morally permissible. 6.Therefore, MAPC* is not a sufficient condition for morally permissible sex. 7.Therefore, bestiality* is not morally permissible"if the only justification of its moral permissibility is the fact that it involves MAPC*. These arguments are quite similar; I offer them both in case either of us finds one more accurate or useful than the other. Before I end, let me just anticipate a possible objection to premise 3 of the first argument and premise 4 of the second"i.e. the reductio ad absurdum. It may be claimed that pedophilia is different than bestiality because children will grow up into persons and will be traumatized by having had sex with an adult. That is, while children cannot offer voluntary, informed consent now, they will be able to in the future whereas animals will never be able to offer such consent. In fact, one might argue that being a child is similar to being drunk with regard to voluntary, informed consent. While a person is drunk, she cannot possibly offer such consent, but eventually she will be able to. However, we can avoid this objection by arguing that, in this case, pedophilia only refers to certain instances of pedophilia, i.e. sex with children who will never be able to offer voluntary, informed consent. For example, perhaps we know that a child will die before she reaches the age in which she could offer such consent, or perhaps the child is permanently mentally disabled. Let us refer to these instances of pedophilia as pedophilia*. We might even extend this argument to include mentally disabled adults, however, I think that sex with them is less morally objectionable than sex with children"of any kind. If either of my arguments is sound, then the moral permissibility of bestiality* would entail that pedophilia* is morally permissible, e.g. sex with an infant that will die before the age of five or a 3-year-old that will always be mentally disabled. However, it seems to me that this implication is absurd and we must thus question the moral permissibility of bestiality*. I look forward to Jarhyn's response and to a lively conversation in general. """""""" Notes [1] Neil Levy, "What (if Anything) Is Wrong with Bestiality?," Journal of Social Philosophy 34, no. 3 (Fall 2003): 446.