The United States should use private military firms abroad to pursue its military objectives.

Thanks, Con! I. CostsA. Financial BurdenCon must not only prove that PMFs cost more, but that the harms of spending outweigh the benefits.1. Con's argument is not one that the US should not use PMFs, it is one that the US should not use PMFs as extensively as it currently does. Pro can supporting trimming down PMF usage to save money while still affirming that the US should use PMFs.2. Con is in a double-bind: 2a. If Con is right, and PMFs cost so much, then the expense of them will disincentivize entangling ourselves in military action abroad. The economy and the federal budget deficit are the two issues that worry Americans the most. [15] More than just voter sentiment, policymakers realize the dangers of ballooning spending, thereby putting pressure on them not to engage in costly wars.2b. If Con is wrong, then PMFs don't cost more than conventional forces, and are actually cheaper military solutions for the US to utilize. Con's focus on salaries oversimplifies the true costs of conventional soldiers, who collect benefits, including health, educational, and economic assistance. Consider that "[f]or every one of the 866,181 soldiers officially counted injured casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan, the government is expected to spend some $2 million in long-term medical costs. " [16] That equates to more than $1.73 trillion in taxpayer money just for injured troops, not including all those uninjured troops who cash in other benefits. Add to these costs three others: the advertising and recruiting costs we detailed in our case, and training costs resulting from the need to train new recruits rather than caching in on experienced PMF personnel. Turn Con's own argument here: Con wants to expand these benefits further, which could be financially devastating. If PMFs save money, we can reinvest those savings into Vet benefits without breaking the bank. 3. If Con is right, and the costs are high, increasing the competitiveness of the bidding process could solve the issue. Con says as much himself. B. Ease of War1. We can solve the problem of "hidden costs" without stopping use of PMFs. Simply passing legislation that forces more transparency about the loss of contractor lives, and perhaps including those lives in official casualty tallies, would address Con's concern without forfeiting the benefits of employing PMFs.2. There is no guarantee that curtailing the use of PMFs will result in the withdrawal from conflict that Con envisages. In fact, there are real risks that the US may spread its forces too thinly in order to compensate for the reduce manpower as it attempts not to leave its allies in the lurch. As I discussed regarding the Andean counternarcotics mission, deploying troops from our limited reservoir of soldiers can leave key areas of sectors under-staffed or under-protected.3. It's in the US best interests to support our allies, to combat terrorism abroad, and to project power to counterbalance the activities of rivals like Russia and China. Mistakes of the past notwithstanding, we cannot withdraw from the world or reduce our capacity to respond to sudden, unanticipated threats. Reducing the tools in our toolbox limits our flexibility to adapt to an ever-changing world. 4. Con cannot know whether Iraq or Afghanistan would have ended sooner without PMFs. That is pure speculation. However, given the data, those wars may have cost more and been less well-supported without PMFs. PMF's local knowledge may have also been a boon to our forces.5. PMFs have a profit-motive, which makes them less likely to accept missions that are going to fail or drag on without end. Botched or prolonged escapades reflect poorly on the firm's record and apparent capability, which jeopardizes its ability to secure future contracts. This reality acts as a break on US military adventurism and willingness to go to war. This effect could be augmented further if payment, in part or whole, were contingent on a PMF's results. II. RiskCon is supporting an alternative whereby the US employs conventional soldiers instead of PMFs. If Con cannot show that (i) PMFs commit more abuses than conventional soldiers and (ii) PMFs are significantly less accountable, his impacts vanish. A. Treatment1. Con is trying to smear all PMFs on the basis of a few, cherry-picked examples. Consider that "even at the height of the surge, Blackwater employees comprised only 1 or 2 percent of all contractors in Iraq. " [17] Con isn't even skimming the surface of the PMF industry with his examples.2. Con's failed to provide any evidence of systematic or inherent problems in PMFs which would them more inclined to violence. In fact, "[D]emographic factors also tend to indicate that PMCs. .. are no more likely to engage in unlawful violence. .. [A]ge, education, marital status, and the presence of children correlate with a lower likelihood to engage in crime. .. and. .. violence. " [24] PMFs serving abroad are, on average, (i) older, (ii) more educated, (iii) more likely to be married, and (iv) more likely to have kids. PMFs are thus less likely to be violent than conventional soldiers. [24]3. Many contractors are unarmed and unable to commit the kinds of abuses Con describes. "If you visit any base or post within the United States or abroad, it is likely that contractors are running the family assistance centers, sexual assault prevention programs, physical therapy rehabilitation clinics, and schools for service members' children. " [17] Con would have us cease using PMFs in these helpful, but safe, applications.4. Abusive behavior is not unique to PMFs. US soldiers at Abu Ghraib engaged in actions against prisoners which entailed "physical and sexual abuse, torture, rape, sodomy, and murder. " [18] "The US commander in charge of military jails in Iraq. .. confirmed that a battery of 50-odd special 'coercive techniques' can be used against enemy detainees. " [18] In some cases, female inmates were raped by US soldiers while their children were made to watch. [18] Of the abuses at Abu Ghraib, PMFs were involved in only 36%. [19] Additionally, in the Haditha Massacre, 24 unarmed Iraqi civilians were massacred by the US Marines. [20]B. Accountability1. Soldiers in the US army are not significantly more accountable than PMFs. In the Haditha incident, of the eight people charged, 7 had all or most charges against them dropped (with one receiving a dereliction of duty conviction), and one was acquitted. [20] US military doctors accused of forging death certificates at US prisons in Iraq were never even investigated. [28] By contrast, in the Nisour massacre four Blackwater employees were convicted on very serious charges, one of murder and three of manslaughter. [25] 2. "The 2007 Defense Bill. .. places contractors. .. under UCMJ (the Uniform Code of Military Justice), by defining UCMJ to cover civilians not just in times of declared war but also contingency operations. To put it another way, basically 100,000 contractors woke up. .. under the same set of military laws that govern the armed forces. " [21] Thus, contractors are also regulated in a similar fashion to conventional soldiers.3. Even US troops are not beholden to international legal norms. "[T]he US applies 'broad doctrines of legal privilege and immunity' to prevent torture victims from seeking compensation against their torturers. .. [T]he US government invoked the principle of 'extraterritoriality' to exempt itself from compliance with the ICCPR on foreign soil. " [26]4. PMFs' profit motive can help make them accountable. If they reflect poorly on the US, they can be fired or not rehired. Loss of money through suits can be another reason to stay clean. "Since the 1990s, victims have increasingly used the [Alien Tort Claims Act] against corporations. .. Victims of PMC abuses abroad could well piggyback on this trend, and file a tort claim with a US federal court. Such claims against PMCs are considered to be viable, and have indeed been filed, notably in the District Court for the District of Columbia. Victims of alleged PMC abuses have also filed common law tort claims for wrongful death and fraud. .. in US courts. " [22] For example, a PMF was successfully sued for $5.8 million by ex-detainees in US prisons in Iraq. [27]III. Side-Effects1. Con is cherry-picking examples and hasn't shown that his harms will likely materialize. 2. Con's complaints could be addressed via (i) more careful screening/hiring of PMFs and (ii) reforms/legislation to boost PMF accountability and protect state authority. In fact, the US does regulate the export of PMF services, which can set an example for other states. [23]3. Many PMFs aren't armed or capable of producing these side-effects.4. Because Western states have successfully regulated PMFs domestically, PMF use is primarily a concern in "areas of limited statehood" like Iraq. [23] These places already are in a "state of disruption;" so there's hardly a net-negative. In fact, PMFs have the potential to help these places by protecting NGOs, providing security, providing employment, etc. 5. States have so far retained control of the PMFs in their employ, and it is highly unlikely that the community of nations would tolerate significant harm to state monopolies on violence. PMFs are also nowhere near challenging the power of many of the world's nations.6. The US cannot risk allowing other countries to gain the benefits of PMFs while denying itself those benefits. IV. Sources15 - . http://tinyurl.com...16 - . http://tinyurl.com...17 - . http://tinyurl.com...18 - . http://tinyurl.com...19 - . http://tinyurl.com...20 - . http://tinyurl.com...21 - . http://tinyurl.com...22 - . http://tinyurl.com...23 - . http://tinyurl.com...24 - . http://tinyurl.com...25 - . http://tinyurl.com...26 - . http://tinyurl.com...27 - . http://tinyurl.com...28 - . http://tinyurl.com...Thanks!