This House Asserts That Ontology Necessitates God!

Pro's Premise 3 is wrong, because ideas may be nonsensePro says that if I had completed his ten page reading assignment, I would have understood his definition of “idea.” Giving a long reading assignment as part of a debate is an inadmissible extension of the character limits. Pro could point directly to succinct definition, but he did not. In any case, the reading assignment doesn't help resolve the conflict within Pro's case whereby ideas are treated both as subjects of proposition and as propositions themselves. My problem with understanding Pro's use of “idea” is that the subject of proposition is not the type of thing that is able to be true or false. Pro claimed that an “If an idea of cognition which exists independent of experience exists, it is either false or necessarily true. “ Pro clarifies that an idea is not a proposition but rather a concept that might be the subject of a proposition. He uses the example of “pain.” So according to Pro “pain” is either “true or necessarily false.” But “pain” is not a proposition, and asking if it true or false is as meaningless as asking if a rock is true or false. Pro says that if the idea exists then it is true. That is making a propositions from an idea, like “pain exists in the real world” or “the tri-omni God exists.” Once the propositon is formed, it can be nonsense. If Pro absolutely insists that there is no proposition either explicitly or implicitly formed from his use of “idea” then Pro's third assumption is nonsense and his whole argument fails for that reason. All of my arguments show that an idea exists, which may be true, false, or nonsense. The three examples I gave of nonsense propositions work equally well as examples of nonsense ideas. A jabbywocky, understood as a creature capable of being twill and brillig in the slithy toves, is as nonsensical as an assertion of what the jabberwocky does. The pure idea of “colorless green dreams sleeping furiously” is nonsense. The concept of an omnipotent God that can (or cannot) make a rock too big to lift is nonsense. Pro's third premise is wrong because he did not cover the cases of nonsense ideas. I am arguing that the particular God he is claiming to prove is either nonsensical or nonexistent. Consider two cases. The first case is if the God has no interaction with the real world. That's nonsensical because “benevolence” is only defined relative to interaction with humans. A benevolent god that does not interact is a nonsensical concept. The other case is that the tri-omni God interacts, in which case benevolence could be demonstrated and the idea of God thereby gains meaning. But the Argument from Evil and the Argument from Non-belief disprove the God. Either Pro's idea of God is nonsense or the God does not exist, depending upon whether the god concept excludes or includes interaction with humans. If the God is to be derived from ontology alone, then the idea is nonsense.I did not argue logical positivism, I argued directly that Pro's god concept is nonsense I did not mention logical positivism in my argument. Doing so would have given Pro a reading assignment to understand logical positivism, and arguments made as reading assignments are not allowed. I am aware that logical positivists have abandoned their early claim that all non-empirical questions are meaningless. However, logical positivists and others, nonetheless maintain that some ideas and questions that sound meaningful are in fact shown to be meaningless when carefully examined. All I am calling upon for this debate is the philosophical concept of “nonsense” and the application of that to Pro's particular idea of God. Other ideas of God may escape the objection.An idea is meaningful if it has a sensible application I spelled out how an idea may escape the criticism of being meaningless. I said that ideas could be understood either directly in terms of human sensation or, alternatively, in terms of rules that ultimately affect sensation. There is no contradiction is supposing it may be done either way, because the ultimate reference is to senation. Pro said quantum physics cannot be imagined directly, and I agree. However, quantum physics is understood as a mathematical description which is verified by observation. For some theories, at some point it might be possible in principle to verify the theory, but the technology might not exist to carry out the verification. The potential for verification still makes the idea sensible. String theory is an example. Some scientists argue that string theory is not a scientific theory because it cannot be tested. String theorists respond that there are potential tests of the theory, but experimental verification requires energy levels above what is currently available. I don't know who is correct in the argument, but the point is that observation, actual or potential, takes the theory out of the realm of meaningless construction and into being a realistic possibility. Those who support string theory as valid do not claim that the universe is really made of tiny vibrating strings. They acknowledge that the “strings” as merely useful analogies, and that whatever is really happening is not subject to direct human comprehension.Pro explicitly referenced the tri-omni god Pro said, “Roy may say we are arguing for a tri-omni God but then I would direct him to the definition. God is only a metaphysical Being who transcends Time, Space and Number.” Pro established the connection to the tri-omni god in the second round under the heading “Defense of premise one,” where he said “This I state this way, the God we are talking about is tri-omni, ...” Pro further agreed that the debate would be bound by standard philosophical definitions. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy says, “Most theists agree that God is (in Ramanuja's words) the “supreme self” or person—omniscient, omnipotent, and all good. But classical Christian theists have also ascribed four “metaphysical attributes” to God—simplicity, timelessness, immutability, and impassibility.” [1. http://plato.stanford.edu...] No one thought we were talking about rain gods or the like, but rather what most theists have as their concept. If we use nothing but the definition of “a metaphysical Being who transcends Time, Space and Number.” We can have ideas of an infinite variety of such gods: gods who make it rain and make it not rain, gods who control the stock market on Thursdays and others who work on other days, and so forth. But the definitions and powers of the infinity of gods allegedly proved to exist by ontology cannot all be true because their powers conflict. A logical conflict cannot be resolved, so the claim is nonsense. As shown by the standard definition of the Stanford Encyclopedia, and by Pro's assertion that we are talking about the tri-god, the concept of perfection is inherent. But if there is anything not perfect about the tri-god, then my arguments against simplicity stand. There is, for example, no simple definition of what is “benevolent,” because what is benevolent for one person is not necessarily benevolent for another, and in fact attempts to be benevolent to all results in conflicts to be resolved.Inability to be sensed does not imply simplicity Pro argues that because God can not be detected by the senses, He must be simple. Consider the DNA molecule. It is too small to be seen or touched or tasted. Yet it is ultimately revealed by it's functions to be extremely complex, with millions of components. A god that is omniscient must be extremely complex in order to access all the data of the universe. The extreme complexity is necessary whether god is perfect or not.