i dont know means, i know its false

IntroductionIn this debate I will to argue against the resolution or to be more concise I will argue it is not the case that 'I don't know' means 'I know it's false'. Further I want to examine Pro's opening statement which is rather disconnected from the resolution.KnowledgeKnowledge and the nature thereof has been one of the main concerns of philosophy ever since. As such I am going to use the established analysis of 'justified true belief' (1). In what follows I want to present a quick explanation for this analysis as well as demonstrate how the belief and the justification condition are relevant to this debate.Belief:To believe a proposition to be true is the basis of all (potential) knowledge. That is to say I can't know that "the sky is blue" is true if I don't even believe that the sky is blue.Justification:I might believe all sorts of things. I might belief my neighbors dog to be called Rex and many other things. Those beliefs might all be correct, maybe it is called Rex. If however my response to the question "why do you believe that?" turns out to be "Dunno" or "Believing it makes me feel go on the inside", then my belief is not justified and does therefore not constitute knowledge.Truth:I might believe that the moon is made of cheese and I might be justified in believing so.Perhaps I went there and took some rocks with me. Back home, before I examined them, someone exchanged them for pieces of cheese. I have direct perceptual experience of picking up the rocks, I have memorial experience of said event, I have direct perceptual experience of the rocks tasting like cheese and therefore may be justified in believing that the moon is made of cheese. The fact that this belief is not true should be obvious.Of course my examples are very simplistic but the spirit is clear.'I don't know' means 'I know it's false'Now we come to the heart of this debate. There are many reasons for me to think not to know something without affirming Pro's case. To negate the resolution, I am going to present two examples, all relating to the above listed knowledge conditions.Belief: Imagine I lived my life far away from any civilization. Say you approach me and ask "Do you know whether New Year's Eve is next week?". As an isolated desertman I probably have no concept of New Year's celebrations, therefore I cannot believe New Year's Eve to be next week or not. It does not at all follow that I know it's wrong, I might just think you are crazy or ask what a New Year's Eve is supposed to be. I have no doxastic attitude towards the propostion and I am not in a position to form a proper one.Justification:Perhaps I do understand your question, because I only lived the recent years in isolation. I might not remember at all what day it is or I might have some gutfeeling as to whether it is summer or winter, but I won't be able to tell you with certainty. The reason why I don't know the answer is because I lack any justification, I do not believe it to be false.Therefore there are at least two possible ways to say "I don't know" without asserting to have knowledge contrary to the initial claim."i dont know is a position on an imaginary claim"Simply put, no, I can answer with "I don't know" to all kinds of very real claims. To say I only imagine my daily conversations is to commit oneself to some kind of solipsism, for which my opponent has not yet argued in any way."only know is true"As stated above, the truth of a belief is a necessary precondition for knowledge, not the other way around.There is nothing that is knowledge which is also not true, but there are some things that are true without being knowledge."i dont know god"That may or may not be true regardless of the existence of God, but it is also irrelevant to both the resolution and the rest of my opponent's opening statement.Sources(1) http://plato.stanford.edu...