Compatibilism

First let us examine Harry Frankfurt’s thought experiment. (Pro’s round 2 under “the second argument.) Pro states that “This is one of the so called “Frankfurt-cases”, cases in which someone’s choice is free but the outcome is deterministic.” It seems reasonable to recall that a person is only acting freely if they could have acted in some other way. In this given example we see that the type of “freedom” that my opponent is suggesting does not entail this ability. This type of freedom is clearly an allusion. Would you consider yourself free to choose so long as you always choose what an external force allows? Certainly not. Fkkize agreed with the definition provided of free will. The thought experiment above includes no moral responsibility. Reconsider, the experiment where Allison is the Dog. The Dog is either going to "choose" to do what its master Lloyd desires, or will be forced to. Not much of a choice. No one would argue the Dog to have moral free will. The only difference between my opponents example and mine is that he assumes the human somehow has moral free will when the dog does not. This assumption being bare leaves this example hollow. As Sam Harris has stated “Compatibilism amounts to nothing more than an assertion of the following creed: A puppet is free as long as he loves his strings.” (1) In this particular thought experiment I would say that my opponent is arguing A puppet is free so long as it is unaware of its strings. Thus, it seems to me that this argument it to suggest that an illusion of free will is compatible with determinism. But an illusion of free will is not free will. To Do Otherwise: Pro interprets “to do otherwise” as “in any given situation, where there are multiple choices open to an agent, it is not the case that the beginning of the causal chain leading up to her choice lies anywhere outside herself.” Not to deepen this discussion to far, but such a claim would have to clearly define the “self.” Certainly any sensible definition would include consciousness. This causes a problem as modern understanding of the brain demonstrates that our consciousness is more or less just a spectator and thought our thoughts and desires are not of our own creation but rather the result of something outside of consciousness. To suggest that people could do otherwise than they have is as pointless a statement as if things were different they would be different. Remember, “determinism entails that what we do is the only thing we can do, and that because of this we never really have a choice about anything.”(2) Pro provides an illustration as to why he thinks people could act otherwise. This contention misses the mark as it is an argument against determinism itself and not an argument for compatibilism. He concludes that “If I make choices, I want them to depend or rather be determined by what I want to do” This is a clever statement that plays on the semantics of “determined.” Determined in this sense is something you choose to determine, determinism is accepting that “every event (except the first, if there is one) is causally necessitated by antecedent events…… that the facts of the past, in conjunction with the laws of nature, entail every truth about the future.” Pro next presents what he calls a compatibilist account. This entire segment hinges on “desires.” The issue is that under determinism, our desires themselves are caused. “determinism entails that what we do is the only thing we can do, and that because of this we never really have a choice about anything.” Likewise we could conclude from determinism that it entails that we desire what we desire because it is the only thing we could desire due to previous causes. Conclusion: Remember this debate is not about whether determinism and/or free will are true principles, but rather if they are compatible. I confess at this point I am unconvinced that they are not compatible. Sources: (1) “Free Will” by Sam Harris (2) http://plato.stanford.edu...