It is probable that God does not exist

Modal Argument Against Against A Maximally Great Being "A modal is an expression (like ‘necessarily’ or ‘possibly’) that is used to qualify the truth of a judgement. Modal logic is, strictly speaking, the study of the deductive behavior of the expressions ‘it is necessary that’ and ‘it is possible that’. " [1] Now if one uses modal logic, one could conclude that if a maximally great being exists in one possible world, he exists in all possible worlds (and thus, exists in the actual world). However, one could also conclude that a maximally great being exists in no possible world, and thus does not exist in the actual world, which is what I will be doing. P1: If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, the maximally great being is both necessarily maximally free and necessarily maximally good in every possible world. P2: If a maximally free being exists in some possible world, necessarily, the maximally free being is free to choose to want to commit an act of evil, and free to choose to commit that act of evil in every possible world. P3: If a maximally free being exists in some possible world, necessarily, there is some possible world where a maximally free being commits an act of evil. P4: If a maximally good being exists in some possible world, necessarily, the maximally good being commits no acts of evil in every possible world P5: There is no possible world where a maximally free and maximally good being exist. P6: There is no possible world where a maximally great being exists. P7: A maximally great being does not exist in the actual word. Defense of P1 I do not think any Theist will deny P1. If a being is not maximally free, it is not a maximally great because freedom is a quality interwoven with common doctrines of divine greatness (William Lane Craig describes God as a personal being who freely chose to create the universe, and a maximally great being). A maximally great being is also morally good, because evil cannot be logically equated with greatness. Thus, because a maximally great being must be free and good, necessarily, a maximally great being must be maximally free and maximally good. Defense of P2 If a being is maximally free, there are two options: (a) Being A is free to do x (b) Being A is not free to do x (a) Is compatible with a maximally free being (b) Is not compatible with a maximally free being If objective morality exists, then raping and torturing a 9 year old girl for fun who has done absolutely nothing wrong herself, is objectively wrong. Theists would agree, this act would be objectively evil. However, a maximally free being could commit this evil act if he wished. Theists may claim that it would go against his nature, however if it’s possible for a maximally free being to exist then he can freely chose the attributes of his nature, thus in all possible worlds a maximally free being would necessarily would have the ability to freely choose to want to commit an act of evil, and commit and evil act if he wanted. Defense of Premise 3 The conclusion logically follows from the first two premises. There exists at least one possible world, where a maximally free being commits an act of evil if it is possible for a being who has the ability to freely choose to commit an act of evil, to exist. This is because if it is possible this maximally free being exists then he necessarily exists in all possible worlds, so there would have to be at least one possible world where he would freely chose to commit and evil act, and commit an evil act. Defense of Premise 4 A being can only be maximally good, if there is no evil associated with him, his essence, his wants, his choices or his actions. If there is any evil associated with this being, then the being is not maximally good, because if the evil associated with the being didn’t exist, the being’s greatness could have been maximized further. Thus, in all possible worlds, a maximally good being commits no evil acts if this being exists in some possible world. Defense of Premise 5 It is logically necessary that an entity that contains incompatible properties exists in no possible world. A being who is both maximally free and maximally good exist in no possible world, because there cannot be both a possible world where this being commits an act of evil, if in every possible world the being commits no acts of evil. Defense of Premise 6 A maximally free and maximally good being exist in no possible world, however a maximally great being necessarily is maximally free and maximally good. Thus, a maximally great being exists in no possible world. Premise 7 (conclusion) If something exists in no possible world, then it does not exist in the actual world. Since it’s not possible for a maximally great being to exist, a maximally great being cannot exist, and therefore does not exist. Argument Against A Cause Of The Universe P1: x has a cause, if x is a consequence of that which occurs earlier to x P2: There was no earlier to The Big Bang, the Planck Epoch (0 to 10−43 seconds) was the earliest period [2]P3: The universe could not have been a consequence of that which occurred earlier to the universeC: The universe is not something which had a causeWilliam Lane Craig tries to address arguments like mine, by appealing to simultaneous causation: "For example, a heavy chandelier hanging on a chain from the ceiling. The ceiling and chain hold up the chandelier; the chandelier and chain don't support the ceiling. .. They[Atheists] might say that even simultaneous causation presupposes time. Yes, the cause and effect occur at the same time. But then why couldn't such a causal dependency exist timelessly? " - William Lane Craig [3] The problem is that for simultaneous causation to have occurred, the causal dependency must have involved the beginning of the existence of the chandelier, chain, and ceiling which occurred temporally prior to the effect in question. Also, other conditions which existed earlier to this simultaneous causation must have existed before the effect as well, thus, even simultaneous causation can only occur if it is the result of that which occurred earlier. So it seems, that even the idea of a timeless causal dependency doesn't make much sense because even causal dependency presupposes time. It also seems, that Premise 1 of my argument is not phased in light of simultaneous causation. What does this mean? If God exists he is the cause of the universe, but there are good reasons to believe that causation does not past the limits of space-time. Theists are simply just using spatio-temporal experiences and trying to apply them to the universe itself fallaciously. Thus, God probably did not create, or cause the universe to begin to exist, because there is no earlier to The Big Bang for this cause to exist. God Could Not Be Is Not The Source Of Objective MoralityIf God's nature is the way it is because it is good, then this means there is an independent standard of good. Thus, God could not be the source of good. If God's nature is good simply because whatever God's nature is, is necessarily good, then if God's nature was that of a murderer or rapist these attributes would be necessarily good, because whatever was God's nature would be necessarily good. The theist could claim that God's nature could not be that of a murderer of rapist, because since by necessity, God's nature must be good. However, without an independent standard of good, any attributes possible could be applied to God's nature, and they would be good necessarily when we know some acts if objective, are evil. Therefore, there must be some independent source of good besides God and his nature ontologically. Conclusion God ("a maximally great being; the creator of the universe and source of objective morality") probably does not exist. Sources[1] . http://plato.stanford.edu...[2] . http://en.wikipedia.org... [3] . http://www.reasonablefaith.org...