If God is sovereign in the Calvinist sense, then universalism should be true.

Thanks again to philochristos. I will be drawing a lot of inspiration from Oliver Crisp's article "Augustinian Universalism". [1]I'll set the stage a little bit. Calvinism is an essentially deterministic theology. As explicated in round 1 nothing happens that is ultimately outside of God's will or control - this includes the salvation of the elect (which are those humans who are rejuvenated through God and thus go to heaven) and the damnation of the reprobate (who are the non-elect). Humans have free will but only in the compatiblistic sense. Humans can not ultimately frustrate Gods' will. If one is elect they can not become non-elect because God ordained them to be elect. And vice versa for the reprobate. This ties in closely with the notion of predestination where God temporally and logically prior to humans' existence determines who will be elect and non-elect. The mechanism of this selection process typically proffered by Calvinists is that those chosen to be elect are not chosen because of meritorious virtues or actions on their behalf - the selection has nothing to do with human efforts or wills at all. God's grace and mercy are shown by his ordaining of the elect and his wrath and justice are shown by his ordaining (or "passing over") of the reprobate. One unfamiliar with the theology might ask an obvious question: why doesn't God just show grace and mercy to ALL humans and make them ALL elect? The typical defense will be that God is not JUST mercy, grace, love, and kindness he is ALSO a holy God righteously angered by sin who must punish it wherever he sees fit. This depends on the plausible assumption (within the Christian context) that all God's essential attributes must be manifested within his creation to (in part) display His own glory as an intrinsically good thing. So the argument is that just as his mercy and grace must manifest in him choosing the elect his justice and wrath manifest in choosing the reprobate. Where my argument comes into the picture is according to internal logic of the theology briefly sketched above it is perfectly compatible with universalism. And that God DIDN'T elect all humans vitiates against the claim that God is essentially good.1) The Problem of Arbitrariness [2]The problem is basically that say that we have any number of elect in this world (call that that number of elect E). There would be a possible world where the number of elect is E + 1. That is he could have created one less person as reprobate and one more as elect. The question comes into focus: doesn't it seem arbitrary that the number of people saved in the actual world is E instead of E + 1? In fact, it would seem better of God if he inducted as many people as possible into the set of E (since the alternative is an eternity of punishment and suffering) and as little possible remaining amongst the set of reprobates. We can ask the question potentially indefinitely; we can always ask why isn't there one more person that is elect than there actually is. There is nothing within Calvinist theology that says that the number of reprobate must be more than one. Even if we remember the Calvinist supposition that both mercy/grace and wrath/justice must be manifested it's unclear how not just have 1 reprobate wouldn't satisfy God's need to manifest his wrath and justice.The kicker is that this reprobate need not actually be a human person in order to satisfy God's manifestation of wrath and justice. It merely needs to be something like a demon (or the baddest of the bad) Satan. So, God could have arranged affairs in such a way that only Satan is a reprobate and all of humanity is elect. This would mean that universalism obtains. That this doesn't obtain would make it seem that God is arbitrarily capricious and evil in not choosing all humans to be elect. This would obviously mean God is not essentially good and thus this generates a problem of evil.2) Calvinistic universalismAnother way universalism should be true given Calvinistic considerations is that given:(a) the need for an infinite retributive punishment to be meted out for the sin of those human agents who are fallen.(b) the need for sin to be atoned for (in Christ's death on the cross) for sinful human agents to be counted among the elect.18(c) the need for the display of both God's grace and mercy and his wrath and justice in his created order. [3]These are the reasons given by most Calvinists to defend the claim that that are both elect and reprobate humans.Universalism is entirely compatible with (a) - (c). The following syllogism shows how:(1) God decrees to create and elect all human agents.(2) God decrees that the mechanism by which the sin of all human agents is atoned for is the death of Christ. (3) The sin and guilt accruing to all sinful human agents is transferred to Christ, who is punished on their account on the cross. Thus, (4) all human agents are saved; none are lost, and none are in hell. [4]Given the background assumption of penal substitution theory (which is the traditional Calvinistic theory of atonement) wherein Jesus the Son takes on the wrath and justice of the Father in order to atone for humans' sin and make effective the elects' salvation. [5] It should be clear here that there is nothing within point (a) that contradictions the previous syllogism. God metes out punishment for the sin of human agents who are fallen. The syllogism is also not inconsistent with (b). Sin is atoned for by the universalism advocated for in in the syllogism by Jesus' death. Jesus takes on the wrath and justice meant for all humans so that God can elect some humans. But in this case, he takes on the wrath and justice of the Father so that ALL humans can be elect. (c) is easily met. God shows his grace and mercy by electing all humans through Jesus and he shows his wrath and justice in the death of Jesus.All this shows is that given the sense of sovereignty in the Calvinist sense and other Calvinistic theological considerations then universalism should be true. If a Calvinist wants to deny the conclusion of this argument it would seem that they have to do so at the expense of a of an intractable problem of evil. It would seem that God damns some human beings to hell even though it is not required in any sense by Calvinistic theological considerations. Meaning God could have saved all human beings from an eternity of punishment and suffering and misery (at no cost to God's personage)but he didn't for some inexplicable, arbitrary reason. This would strip God's goodness of any sensible understanding.Sources[1] http://www.jstor.org...[2] ibid, pgs 131 - 132 [3] ibid, pg 134 [4] ibid, pg 135[5] http://www.theopedia.com...