God doesn't exist.

Thanks Pro! I'm going to present a single argument which will prove the existence of God as defined. Modal Ontological Argument Definitions Metaphysically Possible: Could have been true in the actual world [1] Maximally Great Being: A being that possesses all great-making properties The Argument P1) It is metaphysically possible that a maximally great being exists P2) If it is metaphysically possible that a maximally great being exists then it exists in some possible world P3) If a maximally great being exists in some possible world then it exists in all possible worlds P4) Therefore a maximally great being exists in the actual world Defence of P1 Here, I use support from Robert Maydole. It can be characterised (albeit simplified) as such: 1) If a property is a great-making property, then its negation is a lesser-making property 2) Great-making properties do not entail lesser-making properties 3) Maximal greatness is the greatest great-making property 4) Maximal greatness cannot entail non-maximal greatness All premises can hardly be denied. Let's have a premise-by-premise walk through. P1) is obvious - the lesser-making property of, say, weakness, is the negation of a great-making property such as strength. P2) Is also self-evident. After all, great-making properties cannot be great-making properties and at the same time entail flaws from lesser-making properties; that in itself is a logical absurdity, for we would arrive at a scenario where an entity has both great and lesser-making properties, despite them being antonymous. It would be analogous to a square circle. P3) Also must be true; it is obvious that maximal greatness is the greatest of all great-making properties. Nothing could be greater: it is inclusive of every great-making property, and to lack that would be less than maximally great. P4) Must follow. If it is true that great-making properties do not entail lesser-making properties, and also that maximal greatness is a great-making property, then it must follow that maximal greatness is a metaphysically possible property, for there exists no metaphysical contradictions within the notion. Maximal greatness does not entail non-maximal greatness. It seems that P1 must therefore be admitted. [2] Defence of P2 P2 doesn't need much support: it simply uses possible world semantics [3] which are pretty much uncontested by philosophers. If something is metaphysically possible then it is said to exist in 'some possible world' - some logically consistent state of affairs. This is standard. And as we established in Premse 1, the concept of God is metaphysically possible and thus, exists in some possible world. Defence of P3 The reasoning behind this lies in axiom S5 of modal logic [4], which states the if it is possible that 'A', then it is necessarily possible that 'A': <>A-->[]<>A That is to say, if 'A' exists in whatever ontological form - possibility or necessity - in one possible world, then it exists in all possible worlds with the same ontology (either possible or necessary). The consequences of this means that when we admit the possibility of a maximally great being (which I have argued for in Premise 1), which is by definition a necessary being (as, to necessarily exist is greater than to contingently exist) in some metaphysically possible world, we must also admit the existence of a necessary being in all metaphysically possible worlds Defence of P4 P4 must follow from the previous three premises. If a maximally great being exists in all possible worlds, then it must also exist in the actual world, as the actual world is a subset of 'all possible worlds'. Attributes of the being If we admit the existence of a maximally great being, it seems that we also have to admit the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent being, for all are qualities that are greater to have than to not have. This can hardly be denied: perfect power is greater than impotence, perfect knowledge greater than ignorance, and so on. Considering the existence of this being, it only makes sense for it to be the creator and sustainer of the universe, not least because they are qualities that are greater to have than to not have, but also because it only makes sense that an omnipotent being would exercise its omnipotence and have the motive to both create and sustain a contingent conjunct of entities. Summary I have shown that there exists a being which satisfies the definition of 'God' as per the original definition given by Pro. Sources: [1] http://en.m.wikipedia.org... [2] http://philpapers.org... [3] http://plato.stanford.edu... [4] http://plato.stanford.edu...