BeIR/webis-touche2020 huggingface dataset:
Libyan rebels can succeed without no-fly zone.

Daniel Larison. "Why a no-fly zone for Libya is a bad idea." The Week. March 1st, 2011: "The excessive violence against protesters by Muammar Gaddafi's forces, including the use of air power against civilians, has triggered the rebellion of much of the country and the defection of many military officers to the side of the rebels. Libyan rebels now control the majority of the country, Gaddafi has limited control outside of the capital and his tribal stronghold of Sirt, and most of the military has not committed itself to Gaddafi's defense. Given time, the rebels seem poised to overthrow Gaddafi without outside help."
Libyan no-fly zone would evolve into larger military engagement

Edward Rees. "The Case Against a No-Fly Zone in Libya." The Atlantic. February 28th, 2010: "Any NFZ carries two serious risks: downing the wrong aircraft, such as an aid flight or transport; and getting drawn into the conflict on the ground. Even if Qaddafi doesn't provoke ground strikes by shooting at occupying planes, it's not hard to see how the NFZ could escalate into a bombing campaign. It could quickly devolve into a "no drive zone" operation, in which Libyan ground forces such as tanks, artillery, and convoys become targets. As the NFZ escalates, so does the risk of losing planes and pilots, as does the possibility of mistakenly bombing protesters, some of whom already occupy military bases and could try to use the hardware themselves."
Doing nothing is to be complicit with Gaddafi regime.

' Paddy Ashdown. "It is time for Europe to back a no-fly zone in Libya." Financial Times. March 13th, 2011: "The indiscriminate use of overwhelming force against his people by Muammer Gaddafi – in flagrant contravention of his international obligation to protect them – is now having an effect. To do nothing is to acquiesce to the crushing of a people, which will almost certainly be accompanied – if it has not been already – by horrors that amount to crimes against humanity."
No-fly zone is an act of war; goes too far

John Carney. "Just Say No to a ‘No Fly Zone’ Over Libya." CNBC. March 7th, 2011: "The very first step in establishing a no-fly zone would be a bombing attack on Libya. Our bombers would have to seek out and destroy Libya’s air defenses. Bombing another country is called war. We’d be converting a nascent civil war in Libya into an international war lead by the United States."
No fly zones have a history of limited effectiveness.

Edward Rees. "The Case Against a No-Fly Zone in Libya." The Atlantic. February 28th, 2010: "NFZs are not a frequently used tool in the international community's array of potential response mechanisms to internal violence. This is because they only address a symptom of conflict rather than the cause, are complicated to implement, have historically had middling results, and can draw states further into conflict rather than resolving them. NFZs have been implemented in only a few cases in the last twenty years. During the Bosnian war, Operation Deny Flight (March 1993 to December 1995) and Operation Deliberate Force (August to September 1995) were imposed over the war zone. Designed to deny the Serbian air force the ability to deploy airpower, these NFZs did little to stop the worst abuses of that conflict, including the infamous Srebrenica massacre among other atrocities. Intra-state conflicts, as in Libya today, are ultimately conducted on the ground. The Serbs only came to the negotiating table once the land power balance shifted against them. Certainly NFZs contributed to this, but were not the determining factor. Armies cannot be defeated by air forces alone."
No-fly zone requires a backup-plan in case it fails

Ross Douthat. "Iraq Then, Libya Now." New York Times. March 13th, 2011: "Advocates of a Libyan intervention ... have rallied around a no-flight zone as their Plan A for toppling Qaddafi, but most military analysts seem to think that it will fail to do the job, and there’s no consensus on Plan B. Would we escalate to air strikes? Arm the rebels? Sit back and let Qaddafi claim to have outlasted us? If we did supply the rebels, who exactly would be receiving our money and munitions? Libya’s internal politics are opaque, to put it mildly. But here’s one disquieting data point, courtesy of the Center for a New American Security’s : Eastern Libya, the locus of the rebellion, sent more foreign fighters per capita to join the Iraqi insurgency than any other region in the Arab world."
Air transport is dynamically important; no-fly zone effective.

"The military balance." The Economist. March 3rd, 2011: "Tribal militiamen, ferried by air from the Sahara, were deployed on the streets of Tripoli on February 21st and bloodily put down resistance there. A few days later, air transport was crucial again to Colonel Qaddafi’s plan to recapture coastal towns close to Tripoli from rebel hands."
No-fly zone could increase support for Gaddafi

Sami Hermez. "Libya and the folly of intervention." Al Jazeera. March 7th, 2011: "Indeed, while many have called for a no-fly zone, this would effectively equal military intervention, since its enforcement would entail patrolling the Libyan skies, shooting down planes and otherwise disabling the Libyan air force, a scenario that would surely win Gaddafi many more supporters."
Iraq and Kosovo no-fly zones weren't really successes.

Daniel Larison. "Why a no-fly zone for Libya is a bad idea." The Week. March 1st, 2011: "We should remember that the no-fly zones in Iraq devolved into a decade-long air war that paved the way for the later invasion of Iraq, and the Kosovo intervention brought an end to Serbian control of the province only to deliver it into the hands of a criminal gang in the Kosovo Liberation Army."
No evidence that rebels would govern any better than Gaddafi

Leslie Gelb. "Don't use U.S. force in Libya!" The Daily Beast. March 8th, 2011: "The real question is this: If the rebels gained power, would they be any better than Col. Gaddafi? I haven't found many Americans, or anyone else, for that matter, who know much about them. Doubtless, some are noble freedom fighters who seek democracy for their nation. Still, I wouldn't bet on many of them falling into that category; they've had little opportunity to learn about democracy under the tutelage of Col. Gaddafi. Many of them could turn out to be thugs, thieves, and would-be new dictators. Surely, some will be Islamic extremists. One or more might turn into another Col. Gaddafi after gaining power. Indeed, when the good colonel led the Libyan coup in 1969, many right-thinking Westerners thought him to be a modernizing democrat. "I guess we were kind of euphoric about him at first," William D. Rogers, who was President Nixon's secretary of state at the time of Gaddafi's ascension to power, has said. Many caring and anti-colonial Westerners felt the same good vibes coming from the likes of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and Hafez al-Assad in Syria, and on and on."
Imposing a no-fly zone on Libya is easily achievable.

General McPeak said to New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof in March of 2011: "I can’t imagine an easier military problem. If we can’t impose a no-fly zone over a not even third-rate military power like Libya, then we ought to take a hell of a lot of our military budget and spend it on something usable. Just flying a few jets across the top of the friendlies would probably be enough to ground the Libyan Air Force, which is the objective."[1]
No-fly zone that fails to dislodge Gaddafi will look bad.

Ross Douthat. "The Perils of a No-Fly Zone." New York times. March 10th, 2011: "what will happen to American credibility if we effectively declare war on Libya [with a "no fly zone") and then fail to dislodge Qaddafi, because he’s well-entrenched and we aren’t willing to escalate beyond air cover? It seems all-too-plausible that rather than vindicating American power, a no-fly zone will ultimately just make the United States look like more of a paper tiger: We’ll demonstrate that we’re capable of going halfway to war, but no further, and Libya’s tyrant will be able to claim that he fought America and won."
Helping rebels in Libya is of great strategic value.

Paddy Ashdown. "It is time for Europe to back a no-fly zone in Libya." Financial Times. March 13th, 2011: "Libya is not our backyard. But what happens there and in the other countries of the Maghreb matters to us Europeans very much. If those who have overturned dictatorships in Tunisia and Egypt (and hopefully Libya) in this “Arab spring” can create effective, broadly secular democratic republics on the model of Turkey, Europe’s crucial relationship with its southern (and oil-providing) neighbours will be fundamentally altered to the advantage of both. If they fail, then dictatorships will inevitably follow – and very likely extremist Islamist ones. The nature of our neighbourhood is being decided on the dusty streets of Libya’s towns and that matters to us very much indeed."
No-fly zone would taint Libyan revolution with Western influence.

"A no-fly zone over Libya? The case for and against." The Guardian. March 15th, 2011: "A no-fly zone would taint not just the Libyan rebels, but the whole Arab pro-democracy movement, as western stooges, sapping the uprising of its home-grown vitality. The Arab League vote in favour represented the region's elites. The "Arab street" would be far more hostile to western intervention, especially if civilians were harmed. Al-Qaida could exploit the consequent turmoil to present itself as the defender of Arab sovereignty and pride."
US has support from Muslim world for no fly zone.

John Kerry. "A no fly zone for Libya." Washington Post. March 11th, 2011: "So our diplomatic efforts must extend beyond the United Nations. The support of NATO and the African Union are important. To avoid the perception of NATO or the United States attacking another Muslim country, we need the backing of the Arab world. On that front, there are promising signs. The six Arab countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council have called for a U.N.-imposed no-fly zone. The Arab League may consider a similar proposal on Saturday. Muslim nations in particular should support preparations for intervention if the violence spirals out of control."
No fly zone in Libya prevents a massacre

John Kerry. "A no fly zone for Libya." Washington Post. March 11th, 2011: "the stakes in Libya today are more appropriately underscored by the tragedy that took place in southeren Iraq in the waning days of the Persian Gulf War. As coalition forces were routing the Iraqi army in February 1991, President George H.W. Bush encouraged the Iraqi people to "take matters into their hands to force Saddam Hussein the dictator to step aside." When Iraqi Shiites, Kurds and Marsh Arabs rebelled against their brutal dictator, they believed American forces would protect them against Hussein's superior firepower. When Iraqi attack helicopters and elite troops began butchering their own people, coalition forces were ordered to stand down. The world watched as thousands of Iraqis were slaughtered."
No-fly zone does not require bombing Libyan air bases.

Nicholas Kristof. "The case for a no-fly zone." The New York Times. March 9th, 2011: "The secretary of defense, Robert Gates, has said that a no-fly zone would be “a big operation in a big country” and would begin with an attack on Libyan air defense systems. But General McPeak said that the no-fly zone would be imposed over those parts of the country that Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi doesn’t control. That may remove the need to take out air defense systems pre-emptively, he said. And, in any case, he noted that the United States operated a no-fly zone over Iraq for more than a decade without systematically eradicating all Iraqi air defense systems in that time."
Hard to implement no fly zone over large territory like Libya.

Edward Rees. "The Case Against a No-Fly Zone in Libya." The Atlantic. February 28th, 2010: "Libya is a large country and violence has been reported over a vast area, but the greater an area of enforcement, the more difficult an NFZ becomes and the less likely to be effective. The Bosnian NFZ was conducted over a small airspace just 51,000 square miles, and even the Iraq cases were larger at approximately 100,000 square miles. A proposed NFZ over Darfur was mooted in part because the region, at 550,000 square miles, is simply too big."
Nuclear abolition could not prevent covert nuclear programs

While it may be possible to, at one point, achieve the abolition of all nuclear weapons, it is not possible to ensure that some states would not attempt to engage covert nuclear weapons programs. It's not possible to implement sufficient enforcement mechanisms to prevent a rogue state, for example, for covertly developing nuclear weapons. And, without nuclear arsenals, "well-behaved" states would be less capable of compelling rogue states to comply with the ban.
Nuclear weapons encourage further nuclear proliferation

To be a part of the so-called 'nuclear club' is seen as a matter of great prestige; when India and Pakistan recently declared their nuclear capability, it was seen in both countries as increasing their international status. Also, nations opposed to a nuclear power feel that they need to develop their own capability in order to protect themselves. The declared nuclear powers must therefore take the lead in disarmament, as an example for the rest of the world.
Nuclear weapons could fall into terrorists' hands.

This is particularly true in Russia, which now had control of all of the nuclear weapons which were distributed around the former Soviet Union. The military is disastrously underfunded; technicians and officers who were used to a high standard of living are now finding themselves without pay, sometimes for years. At the same time, other states and extremist groups are willing to pay substantial sums for their services, and to gain access to nuclear weapons. The danger of a weapon being stolen, or - in consideration of the current political instability in Russia - a nuclear base being taken over by disgruntled members of the military or other extremists, can only be ended by destroying the weapons.
The deterrent principle still stands.

During the Gulf War, for example, one of the factors which prevented Iraq from launching missiles tipped with chemical weapon warheads against Israel was the threat the USA would retaliate with a nuclear strike. Although there is no longer as formal a threat of retaliation as there was during the Cold War, the very possibility that the use of nuclear weapons by a rogue state could be met a retaliatory strike is too great a threat to ignore. Moreover, although the citizens of the current nuclear powers may be against the use of force against civilians, their opinions would rapidly change if they found weapons of mass destruction being used against them.
Nuclear deterrence helps prevent conflict

Of course not. Keeping nukes make the world more secure. Nukes make great leverage. That's why Saddam Hussein, Kim-Jong-Il, Ahmademijad and countless others couldn't press the red button themselves. Nukes make war virtually impossible since war means firing of nukes which means a big bang! (All dead including the aggressor.) Nukes make great leverage, and also act (in a way) like an international forcible police.
Nuclear weapons immorally threaten mass murder.

Over the past fifty years, we have seen a general tendency towards limited warfare and precision weapons, allowing military objectives to be achieved with minimal loss of civilian life. The entire point of nuclear weapons, however, is their massive, indiscriminate destructive power. Their use could kill tens of thousands of civilians directly, and their catastrophic environmental after-effects would harm many more all around the world. These effects could never be morally acceptable.
It's not possible to abolish nuclear weapons now that the are at large.

Nuclear technology exists, and there is no way to un-invent it. Much as the ideal of global disarmament is fine, the reality is that it is impossible: it takes only one rogue state to maintain a secret nuclear capability to make the abolition of the major powers' deterrents unworkable. Without the threat of a retaliatory strike, this state could attack others at will.
The idea of a so-called 'nuclear deterrent' no longer applies.

Peace during the Cold War was maintained only by a balance of power - neither superpower had an advantage large enough to be confident of victory. This eventually became the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction: both sides had sufficient weaponry to totally annihilate one another, and potentially the whole world. However, there is no longer a balance of power. With the proliferation of nuclear weapons, some rogue states may develop the ability to strike at enemies who have no nuclear weapons of their own. It is not clear that the major nuclear powers would then strike back at the aggressor. This is further complicated by the fact that most of the emerging nuclear threats would not be from legitimate governments but from dictators and terrorist groups. Would it ever be acceptable to kill thousands of civilians for the actions of extremists?
Nuclear weapons can not just be simply destroyed or dismantled,

the radioactive element within the warhead cannot just be turned off or put into storage. The only thing that can be done that is beneficial and not harmful is to put them to use in a nuclear power plant but to build all those costs to much and there fore is unfeasible and there fore unthinkable. As fore destroying them that would require detonation and if you wish to rid the world of these then you wouldn't want that so there fore there is nothing that can be done.
The plutonium in nuclear warheads cannot simply be destroyed.

Instead, they must be stored in special facilities; in Russia, there are some thousand sites were military nuclear material is stored. It is producing this plutonium which is in fact the most difficult stage in building a weapon - by dismantling missiles, you are therefore not destroying their most dangerous part, and hence the risk of theft does not decrease. In fact, it may increase: missile silos in Russia are still the most heavily funded part of the military, whereas in recent years it has become clear that security at storage facilities is often inadequate. Moreover, it is far easier to steal a relatively small quantity of plutonium than an entire Intercontinental Ballistic Missile. Ironically, the safest place for plutonium in present-day Russia may be on top of such a missile.
Nukes help deter conflict, which is morally legitimate.

For those who didn't study the military doctrine of MAD (mutually assured destruction), the doctrine proves that nobody would be mad enough to start launching nukes. Look at Saddam Hussein, look at Ahmademijad, look at Kim-Jong-Il. Why don't they start launching nukes? That's because if they lauch nukes, other countries would launch nukes at them too. They all know that pressing one button can destroy the world (and thus destroy them too). They all know that even sending one division to a country to wreck havoc means siging a death warrant. Look at the last 50 years or so. Has there been any big wars involving or not involoving nukes? Come on, it's paranoia.
No one who has them complains about it.

Realy only the contries that don't have them actuly try to abolish them because then they would be equals. However the countries that posses them are in no hurry to spend millions upon millions of dollars to get rid of their best deturent. The world powers may talk about how they want to get rid of them but none of them actuly want to, they are realy just trying to seem considerint and kind.
It is irrelevant whether Malvinas are part of South America

Hugh McManners. Forgotten Voices of the Falklands - "International law regards various offshore distances as being of significance to territorial disputes: three miles, seven miles and twenty-one miles, with two hundred miles as an absolute limit. Territorial contiguity (via an undersea continental shelf) does not seem to have much force in international law; otherwise presumably the Canaries would belong to Morocco."
UK planned to give the Falkland Islands to Argentina

"1968 Secret History- The Falklands War of 1982 might never have been necessary"The UK Government prepared a secret deal in 1968 to give Argentina ownership of the Falkland Islands, it has been revealed. An Argentine draft Memorandum of Understanding, largely accepted by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, is one of the documents released after 30 years of being locked in government vaults. Dated 5 July 1968, it reads: "The government of the United Kingdom will recognise Argentine sovereignty over the islands with effect from a date to be agreed."
A few notable dates :

1690 – the waterway between the two islands is named ‘Falkland Sound’ by Captain John Strong from the ship Welfare. 1712 – the name ‘Falkland Islands’ is used in a publication describing the Welfare’s journey. 1716 – a French map refers to the islands as ‘Les Isles Nouvelles’. 1722 – a new French map refers to the islands as ‘Les Iles Malouines’. 1764 – France founds a settlement on the Falkland Islands at Port Loius but makes no formal claim. 1765 – Captain John Byron explores the islands and claims them for King George III as the Falkland Islands. 1766 – Captain John MacBride founds the settlement of Port Egmont , named after the sponsor of the Byron expedition. Cattle, goats, sheep and pigs taken to the islands. 1767 – France cedes Port Louis to Spain in exchange for compensation. Port Louis is renamed Puerto Soledad. Captain John McBride of HMS Jason is Military Commander of Port Egmont. Spain only seems to have noticed the islands in 1767.
The terms 'prepared' 'will' and 'draft'are not binding just speculation

. Since the implementation of resolution 1514 the British government has always maintained it would only transfer sovereignty if the population requested it. Spain recognised Britains rights to the islands in 1771 allowing the British to physically leave the islands. This agreement can only be cancelled mutually. Physical abandonment does not mean politcal abandonment. Argentina claims the islands are theirs despite the fact nobody with BsAs authority orders to do so, set one foot on the islands until 1823 (7 years after independence and 13 after taking control of BsAs)
Spanish explorer Megellan was first to discover Malvinas

Embassy of Argentina in Australia - "For most of the 16th century only navigators in the service of Spain traveled the maritime routes along the South American coast, advancing southwards in their search for an inter-oceanic passage. In this process the Malvinas Islands were discovered by members of Magellan’s expedition of 1520. From that moment on they were recorded on European maps under a variety of names and remained under effective control of the Spanish authorities."
Argentina-UK relations will be strained until the Falklands are returned.

Former Argentinian president Nestor Kirchner declared on 2 April 2006, that Argentina's claim to the Falklands is "permanent and cannot be renounced."[5] In 2008, pressure by the Argentinian government was ramped up even more on the issue. Until the Malvinas are returned, it would appear that the issue will continue to be a major source of strain between the UK and Argentina.
Britain never secretly agreed to give Falklands to Argentina

"The Argentine Seizure Of The Malvinas (Falkland) Islands", History and Diplomacy. Global Security. 1987 - "The British disavow knowledge of the "secret understanding" which Spain alleged was made prior to the signing of the exchange of peace declarations in 1771. The British declaration made no comment on the issue of sovereignty. The British claim both sides accepted a return to the status quo."