A duplicate of you is not you.

It seems my opponent does not wish to clarify/further explain his position. There are many cases where, rather than demonstrate WHY his claims are correct and mine are faulty, he rather just ‘states'. The assumption is that we should agree without further elaboration. I think not. My opponent claims that separateness and alternate location are irrelevant to whether the clone is me. He claims nothing prohibits two instances of self, via the technology which I specifically stated are not up for debate. He is correct – the technology is not up for debate; it is assumed to be possible and exists. Duplication is possible. I've never denied this. He addresses my relative list of properties yet takes them out of context. Two separate though identical persons will experience a distinctly different and separate set of experiences because of those separate properties, both externally and internally. To elaborate: If I place person x on the right side of person y, he will breath different air, see different light, and, if person x turns to look at person y, he will have to turn his head left, but person y will then have to turn his head right... which is not possible if each is the "same person" acting "the same way". They may appear identical externally to anyone watching, yet upon deeper examination, they are actually quite distinct and must of necessity be considered different people. My opponent attempts to illustrate why he are not a different person by comparing himself relative, in two separate locations, to a chair, claiming he is thus not a separate person, as if walking physically from A to B beside a chair were comparable to an original and duplicate person opposite one another. He then remarks that mental status is irrelevant; the clone containing all prior thought instances prior to cloning. He states each would act EXACTLY the same. He is wrong of course, because as I've described above each person would experience uniquely their respective set of variables externally and internally, differently. Also, that a duplicate set of neurons were created doesn't change the fact that they were just created at that instant and were never involved in the history of actually forming via biological growth and phenotypic experience – indeed, every atom, the entire set making up the duplicate, did not participate in the development and growth of the original body, in the way the authentic person's atoms and molecules did. I will address this point again later. Regardless, I have sufficiently refuted my opponents claim that each entity would act the same, simply because if placed side by side they demonstrably must act and behave differently – it would be physically impossible not to. On a side note, it is interesting to observe how people generally do not refer to photocopies, carbon copies, photographs from source negatives, painted reproductions, even manufactured, mass-produced products as being "the same" items as their originals or other copies (only in lazy ways as matters of convenience) – yet in this example of original and duplicate people, the two persons in question must somehow be "the same" person. He claims I am begging the question by claiming my clone is not me because it is a clone. However, I would ask him to point out where I have stated that claim alone without a contextual background example and follow-up explanation. He ignores or misunderstands my example of how Leibniz's Law does not take the two distinct notions of sameness into account. It is even described in wikipedia below under ‘qualitative versus numerical identity'; http://en.wikipedia.org...(philosophy) The equation is either inadequate itself, or has been inadequately and insufficiently applied by him to this problem. Simply throwing out an equation without a follow-up explanation of how and why it relates to the problems in question is insufficient in debate. He takes something else I said out of context when accusing me of holding up a strawman just for explaining how the word "same" is overused and mistakenly assumed to mean "absolutely the same" as opposed to "quite similar". He further claims there is only one relevant usage of the word same – his. I beg to differ. I have shown how "same" can imply X and Y is actually one letter representing two; that X = Y can be understood as meaning X is equal to Y in quantity, OR, that X IS Y; thus X is not a separate thing from Y. If my opponent can't grasp this distinction then I fail to understand how I can proceed with this debate, as this is a critical and crucial point to understand. Identical twins are not the same person. Next, my opponent argues that my original's presence is arbitrary as to whether the clone is me. Yet he has avoided the question I want him to answer; "How is it that because duplicates are made of me that I should have to go anywhere?" "Sameness" is either absolute, or it is not. If it is not, then my duplicate need not be me no matter how perfect the number, type, and arrangement of atoms... he remains a copy. My opponent claims that location is not an inherent property, yet I disagree once again – only one person can be in one specific location at one time. A location is a specific signature; evidence of an object's existence in time and space – the parameters of its mass cannot be occupied simultaneously by another object. Later, my opponent claims I confuse identity with causality, when I demonstrate absolute sameness by suggesting that the alien stabbing my duplicate must also stab me. I believe the confusion my opponent perceives is his own. If both I and my duplicate are "the same", causality must logically carry between both persons though they APPEAR separate. My opponent next advances I have agreed with him that the nature of the clone is exact – I have not used those words at all that I recall, but please do point them out to me if I have. You go on to claim that the totality of all instances prior are exact, yet I have already pointed out that precision of duplication isn't the issue – all atoms could be duplicated in quantity, type, and arrangement, yet this will not necessitate my changing my point of view, location, body, etc. If the atoms used to make the copy have not got the same history as the atoms making up the original, and the copy's atoms are all brought together artificially in an instant to appear like they have a history like the original's atoms, then they are imposters – as is the duplicate if he believes he has had the same history as the original. I cannot understand my opponent's analogue with the child and t~ or t, or whatever, and how it relates to the problems I've provided. Unless he explains I will have to leave that to our audience to decipher. My opponent says he never stated the photo was a perfect copy – neither did I. I wish he wouldn't take my points out of context. Lastly, my opponent implies I have ignored his arguments. I simply do not understand some of his analogues and how they apply to what was established early on. I invited my opponent to explain – he chose not to. In summation my position thus far: 1) The inadequacy of Leibniz's law 2) The two distinct senses of sameness 3) The impossibility of two persons being "the same" person 4) That one need not go anywhere if duplicated elsewhere 5) That location is inseparable from identity/uniqueness when speaking of existence 6) That one person can die leaving the other not dead 7) That both persons have independent, unique behaviour just as much because of location as separateness 8) That perfect duplication of quantity, type, and arrangement of atoms does not make sameness 9) That the history of duplicate atoms does not equate to the ‘original's' history of atoms I have demonstrated reasonable doubt that my copy is not me. Please vote PRO. I wish to express my thanks to my opponent for a challenging debate.