God does not exist

Thanks, Pro.My line of attack was simply this: due to an insufficiently clear understanding of "ultimate benefit" and ambiguity in Pro's argument does his argument get it's legs. There is a version of theism that is compatible with premise (2)'s negation that is more plausible than (2). Once it is fleshed out what "ultimate benefit" is and what it would involve - some goods that are ACI connections - this would show that there is more reason not to believe (2) than there is to believe it.Pro is right that I did say "Now, what does all this have to do with premise 2? The answer would be that the CBT can provide a partial explanation as to why preventing child suffering is good even when the child will ultimately benefit." (Emphasis on the "good"). That was a mental faux pas on my part. It should have been cast in terms of obligation - i.e. right and wrong.Pro objects that (2)'s negation is impossible. Because obviously a child can't ultimately benefit from the suffering it was prevented from going through in the first place. But this itself is a bit unclear and ambiguous. For instance, one could prevent a child from experiencing any ongoing or more thoroughgoing suffering. John could prevent a child being beating within inches of his life from being beat further until he is dead. In that case, the child has experienced suffering, yet the person has prevented more suffering had he not intervened. Does Pro mean "prevent suffering" in both the proactive sense (such as working to prevent children from being sold into prostitution rings in the first place) and the reactive sense (such as working on getting children trapped in prostitution rings out of their predicament)? Obviously in the second sense a child could still ultimately benefit from their suffering even if they are prevented from experiencing more suffering. But even in the first sense the CBT helps because it provides no overarching reasons for skepticism about moral obligation. On the CBT preventing suffering in that first sense would still build positive ACI connections that are part of the ultimate benefit of the child. In essence, the moral obligation - and connections that spring from it - to prevent child suffering figures in the ultimate benefit of the child. The CBT also could work as a complement to the soul-making theodicy whereby preventing evil would help form one's morally virtuous character. [1]Finally, Pro questions my assumption of a certain sort of after life that is essential to the the CBT. His charge seems to be that this assumption is either a) unmotivated or b) question-begging. I can't see the force of either of these objections. Regarding both those objections when considering Pro's argument it's surely fair play to consider propositions that are likely given the existence of God. If we assume that God is a morally perfect person - and we are for this debate - and is the supreme good (in Platonic terms The Good), it would seem likely that the greatest good/ultimate benefit for any child would be to participate in communion with God. If full participation in this life doesn't happen it'd be reason to think it happens in the next life. If full participation with God partly involves the sort of goods I invoked (ACI connections). Necessarily, that would rule out afterlives that don't have ACI connections (i.e. ones with an annihilation of some people or an eternal hell). So the "other afterlives" objections doesn't really work. One point I didn't perhaps make clear is that the CBT isn't limited to ACI connections between humans. There could also be ACI connections between human persons and non-human persons (like God or angels).In conclusion, I think I need not offer arguments for God's existence in the context of this debate. Not only would it take us too far a field - and given space and character limits that's a real concern - it is enough to just show that it is not reasonable to believe Pro's argument is sound. Thus the resolution is not affirmed.Sources[1] http://plato.stanford.edu...