The Argument from Desire is a sound argument.

This debate is, in fact, the first time I have ever seen this argument. However, I do feel it falls short of being a sound argument. Premise 1: Every natural, innate desire in us corresponds to some real object that can satisfy that desire. I have a few problems with this statement. The first being the wording of it. For all of the desires this is implying, the real object(s) that can satisfy them exist on earth. As such, to say something exists somewhere other than earth to satisfy the desire of the second premise doesn't logically follow as the argument suggests it does. Therefore, the premises together do not actually imply the conclusion. Secondly is the distinction of two types of desire, natural and artificial. I do not see such a distinction as truly existing. Logically speaking, all desires are natural, even the desire to have a sports car, or for whatever football team a person calls their own to win the Superbowl. Yes the specifics of them may be derived from society, but the reasoning for them will always correspond with a more basic desire. Why does someone desire a sports car? Some people would have different reasons than others. Possibly that it's a beautiful machine, aesthetically pleasing to look at. We all desire beauty for both ourselves, and the people/things around us. Perhaps its the significance of status it implies, as we all desire to be important in some way. I'm sure there are other possibilities, but I'm confident they all relate to some basic desire. Why does someone want "their" team to win the Superbowl? Because they consider themselves a part of that team through support of them, and should they be declared the best, that person will feel pride, which is a perfectly "natural" desire. Perhaps I'm mistaken and there are other examples that better illustrate the distinction, but it's a minor point anyways, bearing no real effect on my arguments. (Also, I didn't know what you meant by Risa, so I searched for it. Are you referring to the planet in the Star Trek Universe, or something else? The desire for the planet still follows, being born from the desire for exciting and new experiences, assuming that is what you were referring to. )The third problem I see, which actually involves both premises, is that no desire can ever truly be satisfied by what's available to us. We get hungry, and so we eat. We thirst, and so we drink. We get horny, and so we have sex. But we will get hungry, thirsty, and horny again. It is only a temporary relief. As I understand it, this argument is implying a desire for true happiness, and that desire is no different from the aforementioned. I can't speak for anyone but myself in this regard, but I have most certainly had moments where I am truly happy. Enjoying the company of friends, joking and laughing. Even just sitting down with my cat, petting him as he purrs. In these moments, I am truly happy, not longing for anything else. I ask anyone reading this to look at there own lives, and experiences. Have you ever felt such a happiness? I would guess that many who read this, if not all, have at some point. Is it a fleeting feeling? Very much so. Am I in that state as I type this? Not even close. But to my knowledge, there is no permanent end to any desire, short of death. And if there's an afterlife, depending on what that consists of, death may not even suffice. So to say the desire for perfect happiness is substantially different from any other desire is simply not true. As such, the conclusion cannot be deemed a truth. Premise 2: But there exists in us a desire which nothing in time, nothing on earth, no creature can satisfy. For the same reasons as above, I agree with this statement, except that I would apply it to all desires, and only because no desire can ever be truly satisfied. The satisfaction is always temporary. However, it's inclusion in the argument makes it an exception to the initial premise. It has to be, otherwise they would be in direct contradiction, leaving only one of the premises the possibility of truth. But because it's an exception, the rules of the first no longer apply to it, and so it cannot be said for certain that something exists to satisfy such a desire. Even if the first premise is deemed true, this renders the argument invalid. In ClosingAs there is no desire that cannot be fulfilled, no matter how temporary that fulfillment may be, the argument cannot be considered sound. Even if I'm mistaken in my understanding of the desire being described, the arguments logic does not follow as it suggests, and still cannot be considered sound. With that, I turn it back over to Pro.