It is probable that objective moral facts exist

The probability of the existence of objective moral facts (OMFs), is, as my opponent states, mainly dependent upon the rational framework from which we reap the benefits of the presupposition of the existence of objective rational norms. Specifically, he makes the concept of epistemic normativity a central and fundamental base point of his framework, and provides a theory for which jurisdiction of the existence of OMFs depends on rational thought and the rational framework. My few inquiries cater to such a premise which I feel is a 'gray area' in the context of this resolution. My (2) question asks specifically whether by 'moral fact' you refer to values and principles of human ideologies concerning a moral factor, or specific objective facts which can be supposed to be 'moral' in their intrinsic make-up. The basic question is whether realism represents our best understanding of moral discourse and the ways in which moral judgements relate to the domain of human interaction and the natural world. In order to understand the motivation for endorsing realism and the plausibility of doing so a series of related questions must beconsidered. 'Rational Framework' Indeed, as my opponent states that rational discourse is dependent upon the epistemic normative, thus there are crucial factors that provide severe obstacles to the logical framework of his argument. As he specifies that, we as advanced agents with cognitive faculties, rationality and the trustworthy belief system is fundamental to our very existence; an objective rational norm obviously has weight in the epistemic normative, yet the central concept remains that an objective rational norm is, and will never be, an objective fact that is closed to interpretation in any way. I can, for example, say that I have the burden, by rationality, to make certain decisions that I am obligated to do so in certain ways after rational thought, yet it does not ascertain that I am obligated to follow a objective moral normative, as it does not exist. Rationality as providing for what we judge is right or wrong shows that we base rationality as a fundamental concept that we do presuppose and go forth to implement in our daily lives and actions; yet such a normative concedes the very point of argumentation that I am trying to achieve, and that my opponent fails to recognize: That rationality does justify, or at least provide partial premises for which we give judgment to an action, yet it does not provide the grounds for which an objective moral fact can be formed. We can see, as in an example of Deontological Justification: -S is justified in believing that p if and only if S believes that p while it is not the case that S is obliged to refrain from believing that p. [11] Thus providing that rationality is obviously a factor for which we look to in any form of justification, believing in a normative in epistomology as well as our belief systems does not ensure that we can not endorse the non-existence of OMFs. Indeed, objective moral facts, as my opponent and I agree to some extent are defined as any normative states of affairs, whether they be about moral values or duties, and are ultimately true, no matter what interpretation allows. Thus we can clearly see that OMFs as well as metaphysics in of itself mandate that morality, represented in any medium or way, exemplified in values or duties, must be subjective and differing from individual to individual. An objective moral fact is not only obsurd in its supposition, but also impossible to achieve a normative of moral values as based on rationality. Rational discourse or thought affects our judgment on certain issues and actions, but a true 'normative' is impossible to achieve by means of rationality, not only because of our differing and different cognitive capacities, but also due to the inherently vague conception of moral issues and duties that vary in importance from person to person. "Moral Perception and Sense Perception" Not only does my opponent not provide the fundamental basis or criterion that is tangible for us to support existence of OMFs when he states that intuition and sense perception is absolutely adequate to determing the jurisdiction of the existence of OMFs, but also questions his whole framework of rationality as well. Indeed, if we are to rely on sense intuition as well as moral perception, as my opponent has reinstated in his case multiple times, we resort to differentiating values and duties as well as to embrace a differing belief system that discards his supposed concept of the 'normative'. Rationality is not only ignored in his observations and points, but also excluded in the basic and fundamental path of analogy that he constructs. His three statements that he states is empirical for me to refute as an opponent of the existence of OMFs is in its intrinsic construction, logically fallacious. The whole of the argument centers itself upon the assumption of the truthfulness of the trustworthiness of sensory beliefs. Trustworthiness in of itself does not in any way, implicitly or explicitly imply a normative, and thus sensory beliefs, which also discourages equality in composition, is impossible to achieve a rational normative for, thus making it impossible to justify existence of OMFs. Even if you would discard this argument, there is the basic issue that the whole argument does not cater to proving the existence of OMFs, only that "moral beliefs are trustworthy". In NO way does this prove an objective view of moral facts, instead actually going to support my argument that since trustworthiness is subjective in of itself, moral facts are subjective. _____________________________________ Ideology-Fact Relation Now, as this debate now concerns itself mainly with basic and fundamental principles of meta-ethics, we will take the assumption that it will also be an important factor in judging validity of arguments here as well. My opponent's view, that moral facts can be objective, is contradictory even in its statement. To prove that such is true, I will present the following example: An idea, whether it concern itself with morality, justice, or any field of knowledge, must be composed of subjective as well as objective components, which allow it to have both a vague concept experienced on an individual scale, but also having tangible relations to fact. Moral objectivism denies the fact that the ideology of moral facts can be subjective in composition; yet that would deny and provide a fallacy for the very definition of an idea or conceptual entity. The latter view, as put forward by Protagoras, holds that there are as many distinct scales of good and evil as there are subjects in the world. [2] The subjective aspect and factor of an idea is what makes it possible for us as individuals to accept and form it, and without subjectivity, there would be no concept of idea in an individual context. The soundness of this argument resounds through its appeal to not just rational normatives, but also the very concept of ideology in individuals. Moral Realism/ Definition Naturalism A moral fact in of itself not only mandates that we consider the factors and aspects of meta-ethics concerning pertinence of moral fact, but we also must look towards the modal operator itself as the underlying issue affecting moral existence. The concepts of right/wrong in our present society does not have a moral impact, nor does it actually form a tangible benchmark, as demonstrated by the fundamental principles of definition naturalism: Definitional naturalism is basically that the view that we can define moral terms exclusively in terms apt for describing the subject matter of the natural and social sciences. The catch cry of definitional naturalism is not just analysis, but reductive analysis. Thus we see that moral relevance only exists when it can be subjective.