The 'Problem of Evil' never succeeds (Attempt 1), Pt. 2

I thank Ryft for challenging me to the same topic again, albeit with more rounds and another debate as a background to work upon. I appreciate his philosophical tenacity so I hope this debate becomes quite fruitful. He has accurately outlined the purpose of having a "Part 2" concerning our conversation about the problem of evil - subsequently, all definitions and agreements should be transferred to here as well. As should be obvious, the conclusion of our first debate has prioritized a discussion of gratuitous evil. My opponent presents two criticisms of my argument: he criticizes my argument to actually be a logical version and he also believes my support of gratuitous evil existing being logically fallacious by how I argue for it's existence. Let's examine each attack and expose the flaws in such a case. ==================== Criticism #1: My AE is actually a logical version, not evidential ==================== My opponent's defense of such a claim manifests in one simple fact: is gratuitous evils exist then they are logically incompatible with God, since by definition his nature would prevent such evils existing. And I absolutely agree. The problem is that he isn't accurately representing my thesis. It doesn't rely on the logical possibility of gratuitous evil existing, for I can also admit that evil can be compatible with God's existence as well. Instead, to borrow from the source[1] I used in our last debate, the evidential version of AE makes an INDUCTIVE INFERENCE. Let me paste a passage from the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy on this subject: "In evidential arguments, however, the evidence only probabilifies its conclusion, rather than conclusively verifying it. The probabilistic nature of such arguments manifests itself in the form of a premise to the effect that "It is probably the case that some instance (or type, or amount, or pattern) of evil E is gratuitous." This probability judgment usually rests on the claim that, even after careful reflection, we can see no good reason for God's permission of E. The inference from this claim to the judgment that there exists gratuitous evil is inductive in nature, and it is this inductive step that sets the evidential argument apart from the logical argument." There is no reliance on GE being logically possible, even if it's mere existence is incompatible with God's existence. You seem to take great concern with such a fact so let me direct you to another analogy to demonstrate the flaw in your reasoning: P1. In hypothesis H1, the existence of pyramids are attributed to concealed alien effort. P2. The case of humans being the actual creators of the pyramids is probably true. .: H1 is probably not true. As you can clearly see, if humans who are the actual creators of the pyramids exist then this is LOGICALLY INCOMPATIBLE with aliens who are purported to have actually created the pyramids. Either it was by human effort or alien effort (obviously the formulation of this argument rejects a combined effort by the definitions supplied). However, do we see a problem here as we do in my argument? Of course not, since we realize this is simply another probabilistic argument and not a logical one. And given this enlightenment, your proposal that my argument is begging the question crumbles under the fact that I do not rely on the reasoning you have portrayed. ==================== Criticism #2: I have not shown GE to likely to exist ==================== First and foremost, my AE is a direct inductive version of the evidential version most famously penned and supported by William Rowe (one of the philosophers credited with reviving philosophy of theology in analytical philosophy). And since we are focusing on the existence of GE, we must look at this as a factual premise. The purpose of such an argument is to revert the question of God's existence as a 50-50 probability, absent of any other arguments (since those are treated in different debates). Given this isolation, the presence of GE would be treated as evidence against God's existence and thus lowering the likeliness of his existence. My opponent, however, proposes that I am committing the argument from ignorance by claiming that I can't think of any good reason as to why he would do it. Indeed, in some ways this would be committing the fallacy but my opponent has done what many others have unfortunately done -- abuse a fallacy. Most fallacies have instances in which they do NOT apply, and this is one of them. To restate my opponent again, he claims that the inference from P (we know of no good reason to excuse proposed instance of GE) to Q (therefore, there is no good moral reason for these evils to exist alongside with God) is fallacious. He is attacking this supposed noseeum inference, where one "claims in P that, so far as we can see, no goods justify God's permission of E1 and E2, and from this [one] infers that no goods whatever justify God's permission of these evils[1]." Many theists such as Plantinga, Wykstra, Alston, and many other theologians have attacked the AE as such. They take the distinction between God's infinite wisdom and the limited human epistemology to explain away such an inference. For example, simply because a 1-month year old baby can't see why a parent punishes it doesn't meant he parent has no good reason to (for it's likely to reprimand bad behavior). This is seemingly a strong critique pointing out the fault of such an inference. The problem is that there is a distinct disanalogy that Rowe himself points out: "Being finite beings we can't expect to know all the goods God would know, any more than an amateur at chess should expect to know all the reasons for a particular move that Kasparov makes in a game. But, unlike Kasparov who in a chess match has a good reason not to tell us how a particular move fits into his plan to win the game, God, if he exists, isn't playing chess with our lives. In fact, since understanding the goods for the sake of which he permits terrible evils to befall us would itself enable us to better bear our suffering, God has a strong reason to help us understand those goods and how they require his permission of the terrible evils that befall us." In fact, even if the mother does punish the baby would she not have a moral obligation to attempt to comfort the baby? It's hardly productive for a loving relationship, one we are supposed to have with God, if the reasons for evils existing are kept hidden from us. Not only is this so, but a similar critique can be leveled against the skeptical thesis that by this standard of reasoning "we are [also] justified in supposing that there are probably no morally justifying reasons beyond our ken for God to make the world appear much older than it is[2]", among other things. ==================== Conclusion ==================== My opponent's entire argument is defused under the realization that my argument truly isn't an evidential version of the AE. I take inspiration from William Rowe's very influential paper to support the thesis that there is no legitimate explanation of such evils in conjunction with God's existence. It can be summarized from the following inference from P to Q. The instances prescribed by "E1" and "E2" can be read at the Internet of Encyclopedia link I gave since they are much too long to paste here. The idea is the same though - these are proposed as instances of GE. (P) No good state of affairs we know of is such that an omnipotent, omniscient being's obtaining it would morally justify that being's permitting E1 or E2. Therefore, (Q) It is likely that no good state of affairs is such that an omnipotent, omniscient being's obtaining it would morally justify that being in permitting E1 or E2. ---References--- 1. http://www.iep.utm.edu... 2. http://www.infidels.org...