Kantian metaphysics and epistemology is superior to Objectivist epistemology and metaphysics

The difference between the stick appearing bent and the illusions I mentioned, is that it"s much easier to account any mistaken judgement from the former as a conceptual mistake. Of course we shouldn"t believe that the stick is actually bent. We know that it"s merely an appearance. However, when the sense of sight overrides our sense of sound, there is simply no way to perceptually know what is really being stated in the given example. Peikoff himself states that if the mind reported the stick as straight so as to "correct" the perceptual image, then the senses would be misreporting. He says that it is in virtue of the fact that the senses report the stick as bent that they are reporting objectively. So, how is it that the mind filling in the blind spot in sight any different to the mind depicting the stick as straight? There is absolutely none. If we actually saw the blind spot when we closed the eye, then Objectivists would praise this as a perfect example of the senses" objectivity. They would say that if the mind filled in the missing portion, then it would be putting into perception what"s not really there. Given that the mind does do this, we can see that Objectivism fails on the same groundings with which it sets up. The criteria with which Peikoff judges the validity of perception in the case of the stick in the water sways the opposite way in the case of the eye"s blind spot being filled in by the mind. Con calls the picture nothing more than the interaction between objects, the senses, and the mind. He says that any false judgement on the perception is solely conceptual, in other words, solely of the mind, not the senses. But Con has just thrust the mind into perception! The whole Randian argument for direct realism is based on perceptions being objective and unquestionable while the mind"s judgements are prone to error. However, if the mind, not just the senses, is shaping perception, as I have shown, and Con concedes this, then the mind, fallible as it is (according to Rand), introduces a fallible element to perception. Con"s defense is entirely self-defeating. He goes along with Objectivist principles that perception is objective and conceptual judgements are fallible, and then, in endeavouring to defend Objectivism against illusions, situates fallibility into perception. If the mind is fallible and the mind shapes perception itself, then Rand"s picture is demolished. Perception cannot serve as an objective epistemic foundationalism because the very epistemic tool with which Objectivism claims to be fallible, i. e. the mind"s concepts, can be shown to shape perception on its own, which Con concedes. Perhaps Con"s picture of Kant is distorted. Reading Rand and Peikoff is liable to do that. Nothing in Kant indicates that phenomenal knowledge is illusory. In fact, only a priori knowledge provides any notion of objectivity because it"s the only means at arriving at necessity and universality. All perceptual knowledge is contingent. There"s no way at arriving at universality merely by observing what is. Con, by the way, has not responded to this argument. Kantian objectivity rests on inter-subjective universality of percipients of a certain kind. Both Kant and Rand would concede that other types of agents would perceive reality in a different way than we do. Despite there being no "one way of perceiving reality" Kant and Rand also both maintain that objective knowledge exists. For Kant, it is because of inter-subjective universality. Our concepts and sense organs allow us to perceive reality only in a specific way. The universality that the categories give provides a framework of objectivity. It doesn"t matter that other creatures could hold different sorts of conceptual schemas. It is, in a sense, an inter-subjective objectivity because it is universal and necessary for humans. Science and math provide objective laws. This is only possible via some framework that provides notions of necessity, identity, and universality. As I"ve explained, only a priori concepts achieve this. Con asks, "If you are not perceiving reality as it really is, then what are you perceiving? " Appearance. The logical structure that is brought to experience through the forms of experience and categories gives us a picture of reality distinctly human. Though Con"s using the term "reality" in a different sense. Phenomenal knowledge is part of reality in the sense it tells us objectively what experience is for humans. But, in saying that we don"t perceive reality in itself, Kant"s just saying the features of experience are provided by us. Saying appearances are not separate from reality is mere semantics and not something Kant would deny. Con"s answers have become entirely self-refuting. He says that the law of identity cannot be derived from anything. This is absurd given that he also holds to tabula rasa. If we do not come about it by any means, it must be innate, which is entirely self-contradictory. Under Objectivism, our knowledge of identity has to come from perception. To say it isn't derived from anything is nonsensical. The only way it would make sense is if the law was present a priori. This is sounding even more rationalistic than before. Moreover, given Rand"s perceptual foundationalism, the only unquestionable laws are those found directly in perception. However, I"ve already explained why the law of identity cannot be found anywhere in experience alone. Moreover, experience cannot tell us that objects retain their core essence even after undergoing alteration, as is constantly happening. A may equal A unquestionably, but why does A remain A over the course of time and even after undergoing change? Again, skepticism sets in inevitably once you set up perception as the sole basis of knowledge. Con has not addressed this argument beyond the ungrounded claim that it"s an invalid question, so it remains undefeated in its entirety. Again, I am not trying to examine our basis for believing A=A. I am trying to explicate the means by which we come by that knowledge. Since perception only provides contingent truths and identity is not directly present in any stimulus, as I"ve explained, it must be a priori--before experience. Con says that one entity combined with another will always produce a specific result. Again, this is just an explanation of causality and is not what I"m looking for. I"m asking how an agent operating under the faculties and conditions that Rand claims it must, ever arrive at the notion of causality, not on what causality is. Con misunderstands Kant. The extent to which reason can be applied independent of experience is very limited. Any claim that cannot be presented to us in intuition is not an element of knowledge. Intuition is the passive form of representation by which our faculty of sensibility--affiliated with the passive reception of objects--enables sensations as given in space and time. Going beyond this is delving into the realm of the transcendent, which is purely imagination, faith, hope, metaphysical dogma, or whatever you"d like to call it. Con says "You cannot think of "time" or "space" without thinking of objects in time or objects in space". Space can be represented independent of objects with Euclidian geometry. Moreover, mathematics presupposes temporality. All beings can easily both perceive and conceive of a 4 sided object with 90-degree angles (a square). However, while all beings can easily conceive of a chiliogon (a figure composed of a thousand sides) it is impossible to perceive of one. This represents the fact that we can easily employ spatial concepts that could not be found perceptually. The main argument, however, is not merely that we have a priori knowledge of the two, but that experience of external objects is only possible through a foundation of time and space. For example, we could not possibly have knowledge of succession, simultaneity, and pre-existence, which govern all of experience, without time. This is represented in our notion of causality. Causality could never give us knowledge of time, for causality itself relies on temporality. Space and time are not represented as entities in experience. They have to be concepts derived by some means or pre-possessed prior to experience. While it requires objects to apply space and time or Euclidian geometry to, it does not follow that space and time come from the senses. That is the whole problem. Since space and time are conditions to all empirical knowledge, and since neither can be found directly in experience, but only as some relationship or property with objects, it follows logically that knowledge would not be possible without space and time first existing in us prior to experience. Transcendental refers to the necessary preconditions to any possible experience. It"s important that we focus on "preconditions", which is distinct from traditional a priori knowledge. My thesis against tabula rasa is that children have an innate knowledge of linguistic grammar. As far as I can see, Con has still not done anything to debunk this claim. I did not in any way equate tendencies towards concept formation with innate knowledge. That's why, of course, children don't innately know languages. However, what I've clearly argued is that they innately know the grammar of language, as is evidenced by the ease by which they learn a language despite their infancy and lack of direct instruction. Con may look further into Chomsky's argument if he desires more clarification. Just because children's knowledge of grammar is not articulated initially, does not mean it's not innate. In fact, no innate knowledge could possibly be articulated until the acquisition of some kind of language. This is no argument against innate concepts. Their learning of language merely provides the manifold by which this innate structure may be employed. Thanks again to con, and the voters.