Warfare: Land Power (Pro) vs. Air Power (Con)

Okay, bringing out the arclight bombers for this one. WWII & Strategic BombingIn Round 1, I argued that Airpower played a decisive role in ending World War II along with Land power, but with Airpower being vastly more decisive. There is no way one should simply dismiss the merits of Strategic Bombing on a war that we know was factually decided primarily through industrial attrition and the destruction of the Axis's physical means to wage a war (aka total war). To say that industry, production, economic strangulation, lend-lease, and the mass mobilization of wartime resources (like those in the US economy) that were churning out hundreds of thousands of new tanks, fighters, bombers, and sea-faring ships at rates of "one every four hours or less" was not among the most historically important factors towards winning World War II - is one of the most intellectually bankrupt positions I myself would ever hope to defend (IMHO).So when Pro writes "how do we know that industrial bombing leads directly to ultimate victory?" it is therefore imperative that we remember and look hard at the total war concepts that were used to decisively end WWII - and not just those strategies belonging to limited wars. The word "total" in a total war sense -as I've hopefully eluded to- refers more directly to the extent of warfare's participation and a country's mobilization, and not just the extent of warfare's destruction (1). This is because in a Total War (according to academic definition) its nature implies the complete mobilization of a society, its citizens, and its industries to provide the military means to wage war (2). This is hugely significant because in total war scenarios like World War I and World War II, the official political-military objective rulebook gets thrown out the window extremely fast in favor of "all in" poker rules as society itself (along with civilian populations and infrastructure) becomes a military participant and a legit military objective. In other words, you are now basically attempting to physically kill the enemy and all the means he has that could possibly go into resisting your will - again, the objective here is not to simply beat the enemy on the battlefield by scoring a few points against his football team (the military), but actually f**** kill him! We're going to win this game and we're going to kill the players and coaches too! And I cannot stress that last point enough. When the Allies decided to nuke Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as well as fire-bomb Dresden and rape Berlin, it was in fact to win by obliterating the enemy. And so I therefore bring Pro back to Gilohut's original theory of Stragtgic Bombing, which claimed that airpower would one day be able to bomb entire cities and industrial complexes into the dust and win wars completely either through morale or industrial attrition. How do we know that bombing leads directly to ultimate victory? = morale and industrial attrition.1)Layman's Terms: Total War http://en.wikipedia.org...2)Academia: Total War http://history-world.org... Air Power vs. German Oil Industry I maintain that Air Power vs German Oil was where allied bombing was shown to be most effective in the complete total war sense. Though Pro mentions that Germany had managed to marginally increase total energy production from 1941 up until the beginning of 1944 (as my R1 source indicates http://www.sturmvogel.orbat.com...), he fails to mention that most of the allied bombing campaign over Germany was still dedicated to the destruction of the German Luftwaffe - which had remained the dominant focus of the Allied Air Force until the decisive land invasion of DDay (also 1944). This conclusion is also shared by a post war DoD survey of allied bombing which indicated that the first targeted bombing of German synthetic oil plants "did not occur" effectively until May 1944, but by July 1944, every major German oil producing plant "had been hit." (1) The survey also indicated that within one month of bombing, 316,000 tons of German synthetic fuel produced per month by factory had fallen to 107,000 tons, and then a meager 17,000 tons by September 1944 on through the end of the war (1). But by May 1944 onwards, consumption of German oil had effectively "exceeded production," and German tank divisions on both fronts were decisively "immobilized for lack of gasoline," which did subquently lead to victory at such key battles like the one featured at the Battle of the Bludge.1)http://www.usaaf.net...Air Campaign vs JapanAnd I do not understand at all why Pro writes that "did nothing decisive (from airpower) occur between 1937-1943?," when a DoD survey I already cited in R1 mentioned that control of the air was also found to have been "essential to the success of every major pacific operation." (1) Does Pro not remember what happened at Pearl Harbor when Air Power obsoleted the Battleship? How bout Midway when Airforces decisively destroyed the Japanese Carriers without even coming within radar contact of another American ship. Surely Pro remembers what happened at Layette Gulf and Coral Sea because of airplanes. I must therefore ask Pro, where was the ground invasion of Japan then? Excluding even the nuclear factor, my whole point of being is that in the final analysis of WWII, air power was just as decisive (if not more so because of naval and industrial total war factors) as ground power, and both could also be said to have played shaping roles.1 DoD survey: http://www.anesi.com...Quick rebuttals - will not revisit these in R3.The London Blitz (Battle of Britain) - This is rather curious example from Pro. He correctly states that the German Luftwaffe had failed to destroy British industry and morale, but clearly never mentions the fact that the Battle of Britain was primarily won by the Royal Air Force. Korea War - AP couldn't cross the Chinese border to attack NK airbases. Soviet supplied MIGs were better than US counter parts.Vietnam War - I maintain the opinion that the massive strategic bombing campaigns of Linebacker I and II directly led to the US-Vietnamese negotiations that formally ended the Vietnam War. And that CAS at Khe Sanh, Ia Drang, and ArcLight were more effective than land power.Gulf War - This was the first war to effectively feature Warden's Five Rings concept in what was called Operation Instant Thunder (USAF learned their lesson from Rolling Thunder) - and it was pretty devastating. Look no further than Highway 88, the complete destruction of Iraqi C2 infrastructure, power plants, water-treatment facilities (huge deal), oil refineries, transportation grid, airports, and the fleeing of Iraqi Air Force to Iran to know what the combine results of Air Power was in that war. In contrast, the ground campaign lasted only 100 hours and only engaged Iraq ground forces. The fact that a ground operation was even included at all was because old school Amy commanders (like Norman Schwarzkopf and Colin Powell) had insisted on it.Allied Force - Five Rings Concept for Strategic Bombing used again, destruction of Serbian centers of gravity complete - No ground troops used at all. The threat of ground invasion stands as a hypothetical *what if* and we'll never no for sure how accurate that was.Afghanistan 2002 - Massive Air Power was used in conjunction with special forces and Northern Alliance members providing laser designated targets for coalition aircraft (shaping operation on land's part), No large deployments of US ground troops were used in the initial overthrow of the Taliban.Iraq War - "Shock and Awe" was used against the Iraqi Armed Forces and not Al-Qeada in Iraq (as Pro had mistakenly mentioned) where it achieved near indentical results to the First Gulf War. In my view, ground forces were more of a sustaining operation than anything else.