God doesn't exist

I will post my argument in this round, and rebut Pro’s argument in the next. Key: I will be using multiple logic symbols in this debate which will be useful for me to demonstrate modal expressions. This acts as a key for all the logic symbols I use. <> ‘possibly; is logically possible that’ [] ‘necessarily; is not logically possible that not that’ p-->q ‘if p, then q’ ~ ‘not’ G the proposition ‘God exists’ C1) Modal ontological argument I shall be using the modal ontological argument, an ontological argument predicated on the nature of modality, for God’s existence. The definition of God here is one with all properties mentioned, along with the property of necessary existence, i.e. where G → []G. 1) If p can be perceived, then p is logically possible 2) God can be perceived P1: It is logically possible that God exists 3) If God exists, God is a necessary being 4) If God does not have necessary existence, then God necessarily does not exist 5) God’s non-existence, if true, is solely contingent P2: If God is true in one possible world, then God is necessarily true in all possible worlds 6) The actual world is a possible world 7) If God has necessary existence, then God exists C: Therefore, God exists The argument phrased in modus ponens form: a) If God exists in one possible world, God exists in all possible worlds b) God exists in one possible world C: Therefore, God exists in all possible worlds a) God is Necessary The premise: “If God exists in one possible world, then God exists.” We must first understand what a ‘possible world’ is. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy explains, “[T]hings, as a whole, needn't have been just as they are. Rather, things might have been different in countless ways, both trivial and profound. In any case, no matter how things had gone they would still have been part of a single, maximally inclusive, all-encompassing situation, a single world. … Intuitively, then, the actual world … is just one among many possible worlds.” [1] From this, we can conclude that there are multiple situations that described how the world could have been, and each situation depicts one among infinite possible worlds. There are also situations that the world can’t have ‘been’ as such, since they would entail contradictions. But if <>p, then we can conclude that p exists in at least one possible world [2]. Now, if p existed in all possible worlds, then []p, meaning ~<>~p. Now, take the proposition G, i.e. the proposition ‘God exists’. With the law of the excluded middle, one can reasonably assert that either []G or ~[]G [3]. Becker’s postulate also concludes that ~[]G → []~G [4]. Since God is defined as “necessary being”, if God does not have necessary existence, he necessarily does not exist. If something is “necessary”, then it is true in all possible worlds. But since God’s existence remains possible, it is true in some possible world, which means God doesn’t necessarily not exist, which, from Becker’s postulate and modus tollens, allows us to conclude that if God exists in at least one possible world, God is necessary. b) Possibility of God Premise two is defended from Sankara’s dictum [5], which states that if p can be perceived, then <>p. If p is considered ‘possible’, then it does not entail a logical contradiction, i.e. is logically possible. When p does entail a logical contradiction, when the contradiction is realized, p cannot be perceived, due to Russell and Whitehead 1910’s proposition that known as the Law of Non-Contradiction [6], which entails that if []q and p is an unproved proposition that contradicts q, then ~p. The link here is that God can be perceived, and entails no contradiction. Therefore, God is logically possible. The conclusion entails from the premises from modus ponens. C2) Argument from idealism I shall be defending the position that there is a consciousness that grounds reality--therefore, there is a being that grounds reality and rules it, thus acting as its creator. Since reality defines ‘power’, and the being exercises control over reality, that being is ‘all powerful’. Therefore, it fits the definition of God. If reality is mental, then a mind controls it by definition, thus I shall affirm that reality itself is a mental product. a) The mind is not physical, and is mental b) If X is mental, it cannot interact with something which is not mental C1: Minds cannot interact with anything non-mental c) The mind interacts with reality C2: Therefore, reality is mental, and requires a mind to ground it a) Minds are Mental First, it is known that the ‘mind’ is something that exists. As Descartes put it, “Cogito ergo sum” [7], or “I think; therefore, I exist.” To doubt the existence of the mind itself requires a mind. With this, I shall affirm that a mind is not physical. If a mind is physical, then metaphysical solipsism is logically impossible, i.e. exists in no possible world, thus is necessarily untrue. Metaphysical solipsism is the position that the mind is all that exists [8]. If the mind is made of matter or energy, then it is impossible for the mind to exist apart from it, which it would under solipsism. Is solipsism metaphysically possible? A proposition p is metaphysically possible iff it entails no logical contradiction. From Sankara’s dictum, something is metaphysically possible if: (1) it is not prima facie impossible, and (2) it is conceivable and can be perceived [9]. Consider this diagram I borrowed from Zmikecuber: Therefore, minds are neither matter nor energy, meaning they are ‘mental’, and physicalism or materialism is false. b) Interaction With the Physical If q is mental, then q cannot interact with y if y is ‘physical’. Interaction between q and y assumes that dualism is true, therefore I shall refute dualism to affirm this premise. Under substance dualism, the mental and the physical are different, and the mind does not interact with reality. But consider the ability to make a choice--this refutes substance dualism. Now, move on to property dualism, which holds that while mind and reality are separate, they can interact with each other, because the mind is a property of a physical. The problem is, this runs into non-cognitivism. If the mind is a property of the physical, it only acts as a relational attribute, therefore cannot exist independently--the mind as property of the physical means the mind is to the physical as ‘40lbs’ is to a rabbit that weighs that much. But solipsism is possible, so the mind is not a relational attribute. c) Interaction With Reality The mind does interact with reality. When I make a choice to touch something that is actually real, the mind tells me to touch it, thus the mind interacts with reality. Additionally, I can feel pain due to physical effects. The conclusion entails. There is a mind that grounds reality--an all-powerful spirit that is the creator and ruler of the universe. 1. http://plato.stanford.edu... 2. http://plato.stanford.edu... 3. http://web.stanford.edu... 4. http://legacy.earlham.edu... 5. http://en.wikipedia.org... 6. Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead. Principia Mathematica, 116-117. Cambridge: 1910. 7. https://en.wikipedia.org... 8. http://www.iep.utm.edu... 9. http://alexanderpruss.com...