Death Penalty

Crystallization is only crystallization of your own contentions--*not* of mine. Thus, even in the crystallization, you must just sum up your defenses, and perhaps an impact calculus comparing the impacts. C1) Deterrence I presented 9 sources for this argument--Lexus *drops* all sources except the source I presented regarding the New York homicide rate. All impacts still stand--I have shown studies and analyses by John R. Lott [1-2], both of which document direct correlational evidence for rational choice theory (including the DP reducing crime by 12-14% in the 1990s), a study by Joanna Shepard [3], two studies by FCC economist Paul Zimmerman [4-5], both of which document a direct correlation between the DP and dropping homicide rates, and I showed that there are, in all, 17 studies that favor the DP deterring crime as opposed to 5 opposing [6]. Additionally, a dissenting study by Donohue & Wolfers has been rebutted and thoroughly refuted by studies by Zimmerman [7], Cloninger and Marchesini [8], and Dezhbakhsh and Rubin [9]. Another study is flawed since it finds a direct correlation between DP and homicide rate reduction, but not crime rates [10]. Obviously, the DP won’t affect other crimes directly since it doesn’t apply to other crimes. So, that’s 18 studies against 3 (one is refuted, other is actually pro-DP despite claim). As seen above, even if I entirely conceded the New York graph, it wouldn’t affect my impacts at all, and the argument still would stand in all its strength, having been dropped by Con. I shall, nonetheless, defend the New York crime rate as well. First, I’m sorry for poor sourcing. The actual source of the graph is by economists Tella, Edwards, and Schargrodsky, documenting the graph below [11]. The second graph Lexus presents in support of her case is a graph documenting homicide rates in New York City [12], which is irrelevant, since my graph documents New York State [11]. Additionally, I would like to note that the graph is from an opinion blog, versus my graph documented by economists. So my source here is superior. C2) The DP prevents recidivism I disagree with Con’s point of order. Each life has some worth according to the criminal justice system--saving even one life has a huge impact. Since two lives outweigh one, that one life does add value, and life can’t be considered ‘negligible’, if it has such significant impact. Note that this isn’t a turn--the DP is just because two lives outweigh one, and so on, by this logic. Saving one life is greater than saving none, which means the value is not, by any means, ‘negligible’. If saving lives is to be valued, the DP saves one more person. Let’s also look at this from a viewpoint of costs. The cost of *one* murder to society is $17 million [13], so if the DP prevents in-prison recidivism to even save one life, it saves a huge $17 million. This means the DP has a huge impact on costs if it prevents even one murder via. recidivism. C3) Justice Lexus first claims the argument seems defensive. First, I must clarify--what is a defensive argument? A defense is an argument that has no offensive impact, and only “mitigat[es] an argument made by the opposing team” [14]. But this stands as a contention of its own, affirming that the DP is just and upholds justice. Her objection is that while choices elicit consequences, the DP is too harsh a consequence for any crime. But since homicides are the worst crime, they deserve a corresponding punishment. For example, stealing results in fine, a punishment that corresponds to the crime. While I’m not saying we must ‘rape the rapists’, I’m saying a punishment that, somehow, corresponds to, or is equal to, the crime committed, must be the punishment. Fining deters thievery, and the DP deters crime. To counter this is to counter any form of punishment, and would result in abolition of punishment for crime, which would be a Kritik, thus wouldn’t be permitted. Basically, the criminals took a choice in committing murder, and *knows* the consequence it elicits, but nonetheless commits the crime. This means, the criminal expects the consequence, thus if the criminal were a rational being with dignity and autonomy, they would be entitled to punishment relatively equal to, or corresponding to, their crime. “Punishment acknowledges the autonomy and responsibility of offenders and the significance of the norms violated by holding offenders accountable. Failure to punish can be seen as an unacceptable form of paternalism where individuals are viewed as morally deficient and lacking an understanding of what they did.” [15] Edward Feser writes, “[T]he aims of punishment are threefold: retribution, or inflicting on a wrongdoer a harm he has come to deserve because of his offense; correction, or chastising the wrongdoer for the sake of getting him to change his ways; and deterrence, discouraging others from committing the same offense.” [16] He notes, “We can’t correct someone who doesn’t deserve correction.” So, retribution and deterrence are the only options. Feser also preempts the objection Lexus raises: “Now, what a wrongdoer deserves as punishment is a harm proportionate to his offense. If we allow that someone guilty of stealing $100 deserves to be punished, we must also acknowledge that he ought not to be punished by having $100,000 taken from him, or by having merely ten cents taken from him; he has not done anything to deserve the harsher punishment, but he does deserve more than the lesser punishment. In short, the punishment should fit the crime.” [16] As such, the DP is just. Crystallization C1: Deterrence The DP deters crime. Lexus drops the majority of the argument, only addressing the direct correlation between DP and the New York homicide rate. But the graph she presents is: (1) from an opinion blog, and (2) only documents NY State homicide rate, which is a red herring of my graph that relates to New York State. Deterrence also outweighs Lexus’ costs and innocent death contentions, and significantly rebuts Lexus’ personal harms contention. C2: Recidivism The DP prevents recidivism. Lexus downplays the value of one life, but the monetary value, at least, is huge. This also outweighs costs. C3: Justice Outweighs personal harms, and Lexus’ refutation fails proportionality. Thanks to Lexus for what has been the most interesting debate I’ve had on DDO, and to bsh1 and 16kadams for inspiring my contentions. The next round is only for defense. Thus, I affirm. Vote Pro. 1. John R. Lott. More Guns, Less Crime, p 20. 2. John R. Lott. Freedomnomics, p 135. 3. http://tinyurl.com... 4. http://ageconsearch.umn.edu... 5. http://papers.ssrn.com... 6. http://www.cjlf.org... 7. http://aler.oxfordjournals.org... 8. http://www.tandfonline.com... 9. http://www.tandfonline.com... 10. http://aler.oxfordjournals.org... 11. Rafael Di Tella, Sebastian Edwards, and Ernesto Schargrodsky. The Economics of Crime, p 396. 12. http://qzprod.files.wordpress.com... 13. http://www.soc.iastate.edu... 14. http://en.wikipedia.org... 15. http://www.sciencedirect.com... 16. http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com...