The 'Problem of Evil' never succeeds (Attempt 1), Pt. 2

As noted countless times before, this entire debate centers on one point: whether the possibility of both GE (gratuitous evil) and BG (Biblical god) are logically incompatible in the relevant sense. I've accused my opponent of misunderstanding my argument while he has professed to have accurately understood it by demonstrating a logical fallacy in my argument. My process won't be any different - I am adamant in my proposal that such an argument is not fallacious for a very simple reason. ==================== Response to opponent's two reasons ==================== "In this debate, my opponent resolved to argue that the probability of gratuitous evil proves the improbability of God—but his argument fails if the probability of gratuitous evil is zero, which it must be if God is actual. In order for gratuitous evil to have any probability greater than zero in the actual world, God cannot have occupancy in the actual world. But that cannot be assumed if it's the very thing to be proved." ----> If GE is merely possible, then there it has no probability greater or less than zero. There is no problem in assuming GE is possible, which you profusely contend, given that it is to be on an even 50/50 scale (thus being merely possible). My burden, then, is to move from this possibility to a probability. Further, an absurd consequence of your argument is that a wide variety of other arguments are seemingly discarded as well. If I am attempting to show Q doesn't exist in virtue of P's existence, then you would claim that my proposal of P being possible is begging the question. AGAIN, refer to my pyramid analogy which you have yet to respond to. Even if you believe it to evade the problem at hand, at the very least you should address it to demonstrate why this is so. Begging the question as a criticism only works if what I assume is my conclusion - assuming GE is possible (premise) does not negate BG's existence (conclusion), and yet we can see it to be false. You're actually claiming that I can't even assume something possible can deny God's existence. "The other and perhaps more important reason why his counter-argument fails is because it's constructed out of straw; he compounds his fallacies rather than relieving himself of any, by describing a God different from that of biblical Christianity." ----> You completely misunderstand me when I claim that God and GE's existence are contingent. In other words, they aren't necessary propositions found in every possible world. It's obvious that GE won't exist in every possible world, and it's also obvious that God need not exist in every world...unless you want to argue he is an ultimately necessary being, which would be quite a novel attempt. ==================== Conclusion ==================== Your sole criticism this entire debate contends that positing GE as a possibility denies God's existence - preposterous. If we were to follow your reasoning then many, if not all, forms of arguments fail by the same reasoning. You would damn us to not being able to assume the possibility of a negating proposition in response to any claim. Is it wrong to argue for the nonexistence of fairies without assuming there is a possible world in which fairies don't exist? Is it wrong to argue for the nonexistence of Zeus without assuming there is a possibility that lightening is a natural event? If not, then why is it wrong to argue for the nonexistence of the Biblical God by first assuming the possibility that gratuitous evil exists?