Speciesism is unjustified given a preference utilitarian framework

Thanks to Pinko for arguing a persuading and substantive case!! :DC1: HierarchyMarginal CasesPinko makes the mistake of not directly addressing my argument as it was, but rather he simply restated the problem surrounding specisism. He argues that I am applying an unnecessary meta-preference analysis within the PU framework. However it is not unnecessary because following a PU framework will functionally necessitate a hierarchy of interests. In other words, unless we can successfully breakdown a way to determine what preferences outweigh other preferences then we will be caught in ethical paralysis. He never addresses the substance of this argument which was that any utilitarian framework must deal with the realistic and common-place. This is the Singer evidence – he drops the particular argument. Insofar as utilitarianism only accounts for cases that are common and dealing in real-world moral dilemmas, cases of marginal human beings are excluded from the overall preference calculus. What is the impact of this dropped evidence? It essentially means that the dolphin/brain-dead human scenario is moot. HierarchyMy argument was never to generalize the trolley example as an end-all-be-all argument. Rather it was simply highlighting a differential in preferences between species. He tries to make the argument that 5 healthy dolphins is more preferable than a brain-dead loner with no family, friends, jobs, etc. However this ad absurdum argument falls in the face of the PU framework – utilitarian analysis doesn’t give credence to these types of moral dilemmas, since they are in and of themselves un-utilitarian (utilitarian here meaning useful). This is why the analysis of marginal cases is uber-important for this contention. Pinko attempts to make the distinction between generalizations and specifics of examples. He claims that I can only prove generally that humans have more preferences. This is exactly what the hierarchy does – it ensures that ethical paralysis does not occur due to minute, irrelevant and rare circumstances. Meaning, generalizations are they key to utilitarian decision making. For example, lets grant that it is possible that there is a situation where a human is in conflict with a dolphin, and a bystandard must determine whom he will side with and ultimately save. This bystandard cannot go through every detail of the person’s life and the dolphin’s life (clearly he doesn’t know – the dolphin could have some emotional defect or the person might have no job). The bystandard must make a decision in the moment – the generalization works. All competing preferences cannot functionally or realistically be taken into account. Which leads to positive and negative preferences. SEP writes: What is desired or preferred is usually not a sensation but is, rather, a state of affairs, such as having a friend or accomplishing a goal. (a positive preference) Remember, the resolution makes PU the framework – specisism is only the object of the framework.Thus, when establishing the essential and needed hierarchy of interests in any utilitarian framework there must be certain criteria to follow. Normal functioning humans have both negative and positive preferences – animals have mostly negative preferences. Pinko shows that chimpanzees have positive preferences such as appetite and such, however this makes no difference in the overall analysis. At the top of the hierarchy will be humans regardless of how close other species can get. Thus, since marginal cases are excluded from the PU framework, a hierarchy of the general, normal functioning human being compared to the normal dolphin is essential. Point? The PU framework is inherently specisist itself because its hierarchy is divided into levels of species. C2: Preference ViolationPinko: …my opponent and I are not arguing about whether or not HOLDING a specific view goes against preference utilitarianism, but whether or not that view IN ITSELF is in line with preference utilitarianism.I believe Pinko is misunderstanding the function of a framework. A framework is a way by which we can evaluate actions or beliefs – it is an umbrella/macro analysis which encompasses micro behavior. Preference utilitarianism is a utilitarian framework, just a specific type. Why does this matter? Because, utilitarian frameworks don’t give credence to the inner-workings of the thought process or intent of an action. All it cares about is the action itself. In terms of the resolution, in order for specisism to categorically violate a PU framework it inherently must be an act which violates the fundamental principles of PU. As mentioned above, specisism (by definition) does not violate preferences nor lead to animal abuse, cruelty or violence. The position of Pinko is based primarily in the belief that specisism leads to preference violation but this is not in and of itself what specisism is. Remember the resolution says unjustifiable, meaning categorically unallowed. As long as specisism in and of itself does not violate preferences then it cannot fit into this definition. Pinko tries to relate this to a mental negation of the first formulation (universality maxim) and claims that even though this doesn’t violate the maxim itself, it is still in violation of Kantian principles. I will disagree on two levels: first, my opponent gives zero warrants for this to be the case. He says, however one would certainly be justified in saying, though he never goes on to say why its justified. By secondly, I would argue this example isn’t analogous because mentally rejecting Kant would access the first formulation, i.e. it would universalize not accepting universalization, which would probably upset Kant. However, accepting specisism (using the definition given) does not access preference violation. Remember, the first formulation is a thought-experiment – a PU framework is not; it is actual. In other words, believing you can treat animals differently does not access direct preference violation. Impact? Pinko cannot access the word unjustifiable in the resolution. C3: Lack of PainPinko argues that my contention falls because I am holding the preferences, or lack thereof, of certain species in determining how they are treated. I.e. I am using PU instead of specisism. However, Pinko makes the fatal mistake in not recognizing the fact that this contention functionally molds the two systems together. Essentially, it is A PART of the species of sponges, for example, that they do not feel pain. Their species determines the build, or lack thereof, of the nervous system. Since this particular species lacks a nervous system, then by logical extension they lack the essential negative preferences (e.g. feeling pain) needed to warrant analysis under a PU framework. Insofar as that is true, specisism is permissible for these certain groups of species because it is inherent in their species to have no preferences. Pinko’s second argument is that there needs to be a rational rule or else there will be more preference violations than not. When applied to real-world scenarios dictated by utilitarianism, I think it fails in two ways. First, the common folk who might not know the difference in species will rarely if ever be interacting with animals of higher preferences where there will be a conflict of preferences. Second, if for instance there is a research facility in Africa and a preference conflict arises the experts there will know the difference between an ape and a sponge. However, regardless of this, this argument does not address the fundamental objection brought by my contention. As long as there are indeed species which cannot experience negative preferences, such as the sponge, then Pinko cannot again access the word unjustified in the resolution.