Cosmological Origins: Conscious Multiverse vs. Personal Creator

=Parsimony= The definitions that Con has employed in this argument strikes me as puzzling and hard to follow. In his OP, under definitions, he defines he multiverse as "Everything that exists, including other dimensions" to which I objected was doctored. In his round 2 OP, he responds by saying that the proposed definition was really a clarification. This strikes me as odd, since it was included under the definitions subsection of his OP. Now, I'm not trying to argue semantics here, but I'm simply trying to establish what is meant by multiverse and universe. I will thus go by the definitions that Con has offered in his most recent post. He responds to my parsimony argument by stating that there are multiple universes (what he calls singularity points) that exist within the multiverse. But this does not even come close to solving the problem. Wouldn't it still be more parsimonious to eliminate everything but one universe (singularity point)? Indeed, to multiply the number of universes and then to posit a sort of "cosmic soup" in which all these universes exist in (the multiverse) seems flatly unparsimonious, so it is not evident how Con's response even comes close to solving the problem. Instead of picturing the multiverse as a cosmic soup which contains smaller universes, it would be more parsimonious to eliminate the soup and other universes entirely in favor of just one universe. Con seems to miss the target of my criticism. Indeed, it is still one Universe (capital-U), but that is not where the addition of entities is supposed to lie. Instead, it lies in the positing of additional universes which exist within the Universe. Whereas Con posits multitudes of universes which exist in a Universe, I simply posit one universe and one deity. Secondly, Con misunderstands Ockham's razor. According to the razor: all things being equal, entities should not be multiplied beyond _*necessity*_. In the case of beaches and oceans, all things are _not equal_ and it is thus _necessary_ that entities be multiplied. Con begs the question by presupposing things to be unequal, which is not how Ockham's razor is correctly formulated. Additionally, Con states my it is my proposition which is the parsimonious one. But how exactly is that the case? Whereas Con posits a multiplicity of universes that exist in a Multiverse, I am merely affirming one deity and one universe. It seems evidence thus that my position is the more parsimonious one. =Edge of Another Universe= If the void of space that was discovered was actually in our own universe as Con admits, then it does not give us any reason to think that a multiverse exists, since it does not tell us whether or not it is probable that there are other universes. It is consistent with multiverse theory, but it cannot be said to lend credibility toward it (Since it is equally consistent with there just being one universe). =MW Interpretation= Con still has not given a good reason to accept the MQ interpretation of QM over others. He only states that an MW interpretation would be correct if quantum physics applies to reality. He has yet to demonstrate that conditional. Moreover, it does not seem clear how this would solve anything, since another empirically equivalent interpretation would just reinterpret the evidence along other lines. =Infinity/KCA/Time= Con argues that the KCA does not demonstrate a personal creator over a conscious universe, only that it demonstrates a deistic god. In my OP, however, I specifically outlined several traits of this cause which demonstrate that it must be a personal creator. To quote: It must be noted that since there is nothing prior to the cause of the universe (This relies on the assumption that a multiverse does not exist, a task which I relegate to my previous arguments), it cannot be explained scientifically, as this would imply the existence of antecedent determining conditions. Hence, because there are no prior determining conditions, the cause of the universe must be personal and uncaused. It seems that the only way this could be possible is if the cause was a free agent who has the ability to effect a change; for if the cause of the universe was impersonal, then it would not have created. Con responds to my argument against actual infinites by stating that on the A-theory of time, the series of past events is merely potentially infinite (By virtue of only the present existing). Moreover, he also states that time, unlike numbers, cannot be divided unarbitrarily. However, the problem here is only epistemic. Firstly, the nonexistence of past events "is no hindrance to their being enumerated." [1] Simply because on an A-theory of time only the present exists does not mean that we cannot form a set of past events. Second, regarding the issue of what constitutes an event and how things can be unarbitrarily divided, I see no problem here at all. There would be a problem in the framework of a B-theory in time, in which all events tenselessly exist. But in an A-theory of time (Which the argument assumes), there is a real difference between events such that they can be numbered and placed into a set. Hence, though we cannot specify an exact division, we simply specify an arbitrary division point for the sake of clarity. Additionally, there are several problem with the B-theory which space constraints do not allow me to elaborate on. But very briefly, these include the problem of intrinsic change (A B-theory of time cannot adequately account for continuity through time), the charge of "spatializing" time, and the experience of temporal becoming (To which some thinkers have argued that the B-theory is self-refuting). Sidenote: Con's response seems a bit confused. The KCA does not assume the B-theory of time to be valid, it assumes the exact opposite. Con also claims that my argument backfires, since it must also apply to God, who has existed for an eternity. This is not the case. The argument against the eternal existence of the universe works by demonstrating that one cannot have an infinite sequential number of past events (Something cannot exist for an infinite amount of time). In the case of God, he simply exists without time. So there is no problem for God. Con charges that the idea of a creator violates the first law of thermodynamics, and any attempt to make a creator exempt to this principle is to propose a doctored definition, one that would define myself into winning. I do not see how this is doctored at all, I am defending the traditional concept of God as a necessary being. Laws of nature are by definition contingent, and contingent laws cannot be expected to bind a necessarily existent being. To argue that the laws of nature must adhere to God is to assume that they are valid on all possible worlds (a possible world is simply a logically consistent state of affairs), which is clearly false. (For clarity: Contingency and necessity are being used in the modal sense). Moreover, laws of nature are descriptive, not prescriptive. They are empirical generalizations that do not dictate that something must happen. Hence, the first law of thermodynamics does not dictate that the universe must have existed forever. SOURCES: See comments