BeIR/webis-touche2020 huggingface dataset:
PMCs give value for money

There is no guarantee of the quality of contracted soldiers often resulting in less being done per soldier. The competitive-business nature of private contractors includes cost reduction as well as profit maximisation, which leads to the recruitment of cheaper, less experienced and ill-prepared staff as well as the use of cheaper and poorer equipment. As no standardised training is in place, the quality of the hired men is never known and may be incompatible with the training of traditional forces and therefore unsustainable. The result of this is in the long run to push up the cost as work that PMCs should have done has not been done to the right standard.
PMCs attract less attention and suspicion and can carry out their role more effectively.

The amount of attention and suspicion depends on what the PMCs are doing not that they are PMCs. Whilst mercenaries appear to be less disliked than American troops in Iraq, in parts of Africa their activities have increased tension. The reputation of a national government is often stained by the activities of hired mercenary groups. The involvement in national military operations of white supremacist adventurers and discredited individuals like Simon Mann is used by men such as Mugabe to challenge the legitimacy of British policy in Africa. These kind of actions by some groups mean that all PMCs are considered with suspicion.
PMCs can be made much more legitimate by regulation

  Currently mercenary work as a profession is not regulated by law, which allows the corruption and lack of guaranteed quality, as well as the problems of accountability to remain problematic. Regulating PMCs encourage a safer, professionalised security sector which can be standardised and controlled. Governments would then legislate, regulate and moderate the use of such forces rather than provide them outright. PMCs today are legitimate businesses, much of their work has nothing to do with fighting and killing MPRI for example "shipped more than $900,000,000 worth of donated food and medical supplies to the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union over a five year period”. These companies are already placing greater emphasis on having a good reputation and are increasingly transparent so many companies would welcome regulation.(Vaknin, 2011)
PMCs are untrustworthy

The possibility of mercenaries pulling out will always remain a risk. PMCs are not fighting for their own country so they can never be threatened with a charge of desertion.  PMCs are motivated by money and do not have the interests of their employer at heart. Loyalty is given to the highest bidder and is therefore delicately balanced. “The fact is, they have no other attraction or reason for keeping the field than a trifle of stipend, which is not sufficient to make them willing to die for you. They are ready enough to be your soldiers whilst you do not make war, but if war comes they take themselves off or run from the foe.”(Machiavelli, 1515) Machiavelli considered that it was mercenaries that ruined Italy much as they are now doing in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The role of PMCs has had a negative effect on traditional militaries and their operations.

Soldiers trained at high expense by the state may leave for the greater income of private employment, reducing the power of the state’s military and bolstering the attraction of PMCs. PMCs also have a much more relaxed, business-like attitude to conflict. Being unregulated gives them a freedom to work outside of the law to an extent, using illicit practices such as torture and bribery which goes unnoticed. However, these practices strengthen the morale and line the purses of “the enemy”, such as warlords or the Taliban in Afghanistan, putting the militaries they are fighting alongside in danger.
PMCs give value for money

Mercenaries are a cost efficient way of fighting. Although expensive to hire, the government does not have to cover the cost of training, housing, pensions or healthcare. Mercenaries, unlike regular troops, are only paid for the days on which they are used. Outsourcing when necessary will reduce the cost of the force. For example, the US army is around a third smaller than it was in the 1991 Gulf War (PBS News Hour, 2004). This saves taxpayers’ money and avoids the build up of conventional troops, which, in the past, has contributed to the development of arms races which can be cripplingly expensive as shown by the collapse of the Soviet Union.
PMCs attract less attention and suspicion and can carry out their role more effectively.

Mercenaries often arouse less hostility amongst civilians than soldiers fighting for national armies. In ethnic conflict they are perceived as less partisan. The fact that civilians to some extent do not connect mercenaries with a particular ideological cause, invasion or civil war makes them ideal for protecting safe areas and policing reconstruction projects. For example, PMC Global Risk Strategies successfully guarded the Green Zone in Baghdad, the sealed off section inhabited by coalition staff. As they are mercenaries they can be fighting for the national or local government of where their mission even if they have a different paymaster.
PMCs are a valuable resource

PMCs are ineffective as they do not fit in with a disciplined army. PMCs are not bound by the same rules and standards of conduct and accountability as conventional troops. When problems arise it is often unclear whether army representatives or PMCs should be held responsible.  Moreover, the lack of regulation means that there is no means to ensure mercenaries breaking laws are disciplined. Currently most mercenaries can operate outside martial law with relative freedom. Some of the worst offences at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq were committed by “privatised interrogators” (Hersh, 2004) who are yet to be punished.
The intervention was necessary in order to protect US interests in the region

The intervention in Libya has run contrary to the interests of the US by giving the president stronger powers. When Bill Clinton intervened with NATO in Kosovo he had to gain the approval of congress following the 60th day, with the conflict ending on the 78th. In allowing Obama to do this, a fundamental part of the U.S. democratic system has been undermined and more powers have been given to the presidency. In the future this could lead to further bad decisions for the united states as presidents are required to prove less in order to take stronger action.1 Greenwald, Glenn. “The illegal war in Libya.” Salon. 19/05/2011
Congress was appropriately and openly consulted

Firstly, the Obama regime had plenty of time to get congressional approval. It would have been fairly easy for a bipartisan bill led by Senators John Kerry and John McCain to get through congress in time for the U.S. to successfully intervene in the area. The United States through a joint session of congress declared war on Japan within two days of the Japanese launching their attack on Pearl Harbor showing that declarations of war can be pushed through congress quickly when there is the need.1 Secondly, whilst some of congress, the leadership was consulted regarding the actions in Libya, all of congress was not. This harms the portrayal of congress as an important and representative body when more minor members are not consulted for very important decisions made by the state. As such, no discretion can be allowed in this area because to do so is to harm the institutions upon which the US is founded.2 ‘Joint Address to Congress Leading to a Declaration of War Against Japan (1941)’, ourdocuments.gov,  Ackerman, Bruce. “Obama’s Unconstitutional War.” ForeignPolicy.com 24/03/2011
Humanitarian reasons prompted swift intervention

Firstly, the Obama regime had plenty of time to get congressional approval. It would have been fairly easy for a bipartisan bill led by Senators John Kerry and John McCain to get through congress in time for the U.S. to successfully intervene in the area. The United States through a joint session of congress declared war on Japan within two days of the Japanese launching their attack on Pearl Harbor showing that declarations of war can be pushed through congress quickly when there is the need.1 Secondly, whilst some of congress, the leadership was consulted regarding the actions in Libya, all of congress was not. This harms the portrayal of congress as an important and representative body when more minor members are not consulted for very important decisions made by the state. As such, no discretion can be allowed in this area because to do so is to harm the institutions upon which the US is founded.2 ‘Joint Address to Congress Leading to a Declaration of War  Ackerman, Bruce. “Obama’s Unconstitutional War.” ForeignPolicy.com 24/03/2011
The United States engaged in "hostilities" under War Powers

There are multiple arguments indicating why the U.S. might be engaged in hostilities under the War Powers Act, enough so that this single argument could make an entire two person case. The U.S. has engaged in sustained hostilities in Libya which have resulted in regime change within the country. The President himself admits that causing regime change would be unjustifiable in his speech justifying the war by pledging that “broadening our military mission to include regime change would be a mistake.”2 However, regime change was the result of the mission and NATO and U.S. played a significant role in facilitating that change. Secondly, the War Powers act covers the U.S. fighting in a supportive role in wars. "For purposes of this chapter, the term 'introduction of United States Armed Forces' includes the assignment of members of such armed forces to command, coordinate, participate in the movement of, or accompany the regular or irregular military forces of any foreign country or government when such military forces are engaged, or there exists an imminent threat that such forces will become engaged, in hostilities.”3 Hence the U.S. is acting in violation of this condition. Further, troops do not need to be on the ground to call the Libyan engagement hostilities. U.S. men and women have firstly died in the conflict, but secondly if troops were needed on the ground for a war, a U.S. president could potentially fire a thousand missiles at a country without the engagement being considered a war. Further, even though the U.S. gave powers to NATO, it maintained a lead role in this coalition force. As such, the engagement should still be subject to U.S. laws and rules. Finally, the sheer cost of the engagement to the U.S. taxpayer implies that it should be considered a war. The cost of the war has been more than $1 million per day.1 Greenwald, Glenn. “The illegal war in Libya.” Salon. 19/05/2011 BBC News, ‘Libya: Obama says US intervention will be limited’, 29 March 2011, United States Congress, 50 USC CHAPTER 33 - WAR POWERS RESOLUTION, 7 January 2011,
US intervention is not consistent with other aspects of US law

Firstly, Libya did not attack US soldiers and did not harm US citizens. Given that this is true, then engagement with Libya to begin with goes against the spirit of US law. Given that the situation is not an emergency for the U.S. circumventing congress in order to prosecute the war is incredibly harmful as it undermines one of the core institutions in U.S. democracy. Further, the use of international organisations such as the UN and NATO to circumvent congress has bad ramifications for the future as in doing this the U.S. government has significantly lowered the burden required to go to war should it wish to do so in the future. This is problematic because the decision to go to war should never be one that is taken lightly. Should the U.S. wish to go to war again then it might end up in a situation such as Vietnam, the conflict that inspired the creation of the war powers act.1 Ackerman, Bruce. “Obama’s Unconstitutional War.” ForeignPolicy.com 24/03/2011
The Libya intervention lacks sufficient international authority

Firstly, the UN intervention in Libya wrongly rests on NATO authority. The use of NATO to circumvent congressional approval in this situation violates the initial agreement regarding the participation of the U.S. in NATO that was ratified by congress. As such, even if the U.S. is legitimate in going to war and the circumvention of war powers can be justified, the circumvention using NATO cannot. Secondly, the use of UN approval to circumvent congress means that the UN charter and the ideals of the UN have been placed by the government at a higher level of value than of the US constitution. If this is the case then the government has undermined the validity of the US constitution and through doing that has undermined all laws within the U.S. which is harmful should the U.S. wish to project power in a way that is contrary to the UN’s wishes.1 Editorial: “Obama’s illegal war” The Washington Times. 18/03/2011
The intervention was necessary in order to protect US interests in the region

If it can be proved that the intervention was incredibly important to the US for both its own interests as well as for its moral imperative then the US bending the War Power Act can be seen as a legitimate exception to constitutional rules that has to be borne despite the harms such a breach might cause. Violence and insecurity within the Libyan region would negatively affect US security. Firstly through the fact that poverty and conflict often breed religious radicalism and can often result in terrorism which directly harms the US as the most visible world power. Secondly, the US intervening is necessary to show members of the Middle East and North Africa that it is willing to support the region during a time of taxing transitions from old dictatorships to often weak democracies. Further, it shows that the US is compassionate in that it is unwilling to stand by and allow regions to descend into humanitarian crises. The intervention also prevented a flood of refugees into Egypt and Tunisia.1 Egypt itself is currently undergoing democratic change and such a crisis might have forced that process backward. Tunisia is undergoing a similar transition and America needs to show support for these countries so that the governments that are established in the future will view America in a positive light. Finally such an intervention is necessary owing to the role that the US and the people of the US feel that it should take in the world. Standing aside whilst a humanitarian crisis unfolds goes against the ideals that the US stands for. Further, given this revolution is likely seeking a democratic government it seems inconsistent that the US would not help countries aiming to become more like the US. 2,3 Wauquiez , Laurent, ‘Libya/no-fly zone/sanctions/refugees – NATO intervention/Arab reaction’, France in the United States, 8 March 2011,  Obama Administration letter to Congress justifying Libya engagement, 15/06/2011  Text of Obama’s Speech on Libya: “A Responsibility to Act.” NPR.org 28/03/2011
Congress was appropriately and openly consulted

Firstly, the Obama administration did not truly have time to gain congressional approval for their actions. Obama’s justification of the Libyan conflict claims: "As his troops continued pushing toward Benghazi, a city of nearly 700,000 people, Qadhafi again defied the international community, declaring, “We will have no mercy and no pity.” At that moment, as the President explained in his speech to the nation on March 28: “We knew that if we waited one more day, Benghazi could suffer a massacre that would have reverberated across the region and stained the conscience of the world.” Stopping a potential humanitarian disaster became a question of hours, not days. The costs of inaction would have been profound. Thousands of civilians would very likely have been slaughtered, a ruthless dictator would have been triumphant precisely at a time when people across the region are challenging decades of repression, and key U.S. allies, including Egypt and Tunisia, would have been threatened by instability on their borders during a critical point in their own transitions toward a more promising future.”1 Further, even if this is not true Obama did consistently consult congress regarding the mission, with Obama’s justification claiming: "The Administration has consulted extensively with Congress about U.S. engagement in Libya. Since March 1, the Administration has: testified at over 10 hearings that included a substantial discussion of Libya; participated in over 30 Member and/or staff briefings, including the March 18 Presidential meeting with Congressional Leadership, Committee Chairs and Ranking Members; all three requested 'All Members Briefings' (two requested by the Senate, one by the House); and all requested 'All Staff Briefings;' conducted dozens of calls with individual Members; and provided 32 status updates via e-mail to over 1,600 Congressional staff."  Finally, the Senate was also consulted and passed a resolution that condemned the gross and systematic violation of the rights of the Libyan people by Gadaffi. As such, a large portion of the U.S. governing body was consulted by Obama and as such, a small amount of discretion in this area can be tolerated. 2 United States Activities in Libya, p.7,  Obama Administration letter to Congress justifying Libya engagement, 15/06/2011
Humanitarian reasons prompted swift intervention

The US intervention in Libya was necessary because Gadaffi had shown and has shown before that he is willing to kill and abuse citizens en mass in order to preserve his power. The U.S. intervention was necessary in order to prevent the indiscriminate bombing of towns by Gadaffi’s air forces. Such bombing attacks led to significant civilian casualties.1 Following the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 the United States placed on itself a moral mandate that ‘never again’ would such massacres be allowed to continue without intervention. Had the uprising been put down, reprisals by Gadaffi would have been swift and likely resulted in many innocents being killed. 2 The United States had to step in. Obama Libya Speech Strongly Defends Intervention (FULL TESXT)’ AP/The Huffington Post, 28 March 2011,  Obama Administration letter to Congress justifying Libya engagement, 15/06/2011
The United States engaged in "hostilities" under War Powers

The president’s office released this statement, justifying the engagement in Libya: "The President is of the view that the current U.S. military operations in Libya are consistent with the War Powers Resolution and do not under that law require further congressional authorization, because U.S. military operations are distinct from the kind of “hostilities” contemplated by the Resolution’s 60 day termination provision. U.S. forces are playing a constrained and supporting role in a multinational coalition, whose operations are both legitimated by and limited to the terms of a United Nations Security Council Resolution that authorizes the use of force solely to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under attack or threat of attack and to enforce a no-fly zone and an arms embargo. U.S. operations do not involve sustained fighting or active exchanges of fire with hostile forces, nor do they involve the presence of U.S. ground troops, U.S. casualties or a serious threat thereof, or any significant chance of escalation into a conflict characterized by those factors." 1 As such it is justifiable to say that the conflict in Libya do not amount to legal hostilities. Secondly, the U.S. gave control of the operation in Libya to NATO on April 1st 2011. As such the U.S. government is not in violation of U.S. laws as it is not the U.S. prosecuting hostilities should they be considered to be happening. It is instead NATO doing it. Given that NATO is part of U.S. spending and that NATO commitments require contribution from all member states in some way, the U.S. does not have to justify the engagement in law as the U.S. is not culpable for its participation, NATO is. Further, whilst regime change was a consequence in Libya, it was not the military objective of the campaign in Libya, which was to simply limit Gadaffi’s ability to use aircraft to visit harm upon his citizens. Regime change was just a happy coincidence that benefitted the people in Libya. As such the conflict did not amount to “hostilities” as U.S. participation in said conflict was incredibly limited. 2 BBC News, ‘Libya: Obama says US intervention will be limited’, 29 March 2011, Obama Administration letter to Congress justifying Libya engagement, 15/06/2011
US intervention is not consistent with other aspects of US law

Through the processes of committing to Aid programmes and the UN, the US has incorporated a certain amount of internationalism into its legal system. The power given to Congress by the War Powers Act must be balanced against the fact that the executive retains control over US foreign policy. Secondly, a UN resolution that allowed the use of air power by countries to protect civilians.1 This means that fears of conflict escalation are unfounded and given that the UN resolution exists, the war powers act is not weakened significantly as it would still mandate a UN resolution to prevent conflict escalation. Even if the U.S. government sought regime change however, it has moral legitimacy in doing so because of the demand for such changes from a large number of members of the international community.2 Lynch, Colum, ‘Security Council passes resolution authorizing military intervention in Libya’, Turtle Bay Foreign Policy, 17 March 2011, “War Powers Act.” Cornell University Law School.
The Libya intervention lacks sufficient international authority

The US has the authorization of NATO, the UN and has acted in concordance with the mandates that these organisations have put up. The US does not harm the powers of the US constitution by helping the UN and NATO in this area because the US committed to these organisations with the knowledge that it might have to compromise sometimes in order to fulfil the responsibilities it has taken on within these organisations. Libya is simply an example of one of these compromises and this does not harm the constitution any further than the US initially did by entering into these agreements and institutions. 1, 2 Editorial: “Obama’s illegal war” The Washington Times. 18/03/2011  Stone, Daniel. “Is the Libya War Legal” The Daily Beast. 22/03/2011
Think tanks may become smoke screens for criminal groups

There is no necessity to disclose think tank funding publically in order to circumvent this issue. As long as there are public institutions that scrutinise think tanks and are also bound to secrecy unless there are anomalies, the risk of terrorism can be successfully regulated. Being a think tank does not prevent an organisation from having to be transparent to government about their finances. It is unnecessary to expose think tanks that do not act illicitly to the general public.
Overregulating think tanks sets a dangerous precedent

This is not an inherent flaw in the system. In the status quo, large investors can still publically advertise the fact that they are funding a project, and this too can have repercussions and bring negative associations for other investors. It is a risk anyone makes when investing in a given idea. The right to privacy of investors in political campaigns was discarded once evidence of potential abuses and political arrangements surfaced. Similarly, this right cannot apply to think tank funders.[1] [1] “The Political Activity of Think Tanks: The Case for Mandatory Contributor Disclosure”, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 115, No. 5, March 2002, pp. 1502-1524. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1342554
Think tanks should be assessed by the value of their ideas, not by who funds them

People are capable of assessing a biased idea after discovering its bias, while it is dangerous to present potentially biased ideas as genuine, for this limits discussion. This is especially so in the status quo, where the suspicions of who may be funding think tanks remain when they choose not to disclose their funders. A blanket obligation of all think tanks to reveal their funding allows for open discourse and thus more space to discuss the ideas themselves.