Moral absolutism does not explain moral judgments

Tarzan: Second, Pro's burden of proof is not merely to show the position of moral absolutism to be in error - he must also disconnect the position from moral judgment. Else it would be possible to have the following conversation: A: Eating ice cream is always morally reprehensible. B: That statement is false, I'm going to eat some anyway. A: That is an immoral action. B: What? No it's not! A: Sure it is - you just don't accept moral absolutism. dtclark: The issue is not whether someone could intelligently have the above conversation and be sensible, the question is whether or not the assertion that "eating ice cream is wrong" has a an absolute truth value. If it cannot be shown that there is any kind of moral fact that comes about from natural properties (utilitarianism) or supersedes natural properties (intuitionism), that also is binding for all beings in situation x, then moral absolutism is incorrect. Therefore, my opponent has incorrectly categorized the debate. *********************** >> dtclark: "The lack of explanation for how moral properties could be independent of natural properties and yet there be an apparent correlation between natural properties and moral claims demands explanation (21-2)." Tarzan: This statement presupposes that moral theory is dependent on natural properties in a morally absolutist system. If one can show an absolutist moral position that does not require natural properties, then the statement is moot. dtclark: I certainly was not presupposing that moral theories are dependent on natural facts. I was merely trying to indicate that, after examining the implications of having a moral theory that is devoid of natural facts, the moral theorist must account for his/her knowledge of that moral theory. If I were to say something as spurious as, "tiny dragons cause electrical fires" I would be asked to provide an explanation as to how I came upon such knowledge. Similarly, if someone were to purport to have knowledge of a moral fact, then one should reasonably expect him/her to be able to provide an explanation as to how they have come upon said knowledge. If we do not expect anyone to explain where their knowledge has come from, then it is just as reasonable to claim A as it is B, and there would be no way to determine the truth or falsehood of either. ****************************** >> "that it is not self-contradictory for a man to claim that an action is right, but decreases the net happiness of the world (105)." Grammar aside, this statement concerns utilitarianism, which is inherently subjective (to whomever "assesses" the situation) and really doesn't apply to moral absolutism at all... Actually, utilitarianism is a naturalistic attempt at moral absolutism, and I personally reject my opponents definition provided by wikipedia, preferring the definitions offered up by such illustrious analytical philosophers such as David O. Brink, Micheal Smith, A. J. Ayer, etc. However, since my opponent wants to give up one of the strongest versions of moral absolutism, i.e. definitional naturalism, which contains utilitarianism, I am more than willing to do so myself for the purposes of this debate. ******************************* The problem with my opponent's substantive position is obvious. My opponent first asserts that a "man has certain basic rights that are held by virtue of being a human - i.e. that these rights are not "earned" but simply exist." By claiming this, my opponent has begged the question. If it is indeed true that a man has basic rights, then by what method did he come upon this knowledge? Did my opponent merely feel like this is true, or did he appeal to a larger audience's social upbringing? Either way, the question on point, as he himself has framed it, is to provide an explanation as to how one could have knowledge of a morally absolute fact, and to presuppose that there already exists a morally absolute fact, however minimal, simply begs the question. Since my opponent's position is obviously inadequate for the purposes of this debate, I will not address it further because to do so would only entertain the idea that my opponent has said something on point. Rather, to keep the focus of the debate sharp, I will provide alternative hypotheses that explain moral judgments without presupposing any moral facts that ask for epistemological leaps of faith. First, it could be possible that a moral judgment is correct, iff (if and only if) there is a societal norm that dictates it's correctness. In this system, the truth or falsehood of a moral judgment are completely determined by the speaker's society. Therefore, if a society disapproves of killing a member of the society, then the statement, "it is morally correct to kill a member of our society" is a false statement. In this system, I can both explain how I came upon the truth or falsehood of the moral statement, and I can explain how moral statements in general receive their truth or falsehood. If this system seems inadequate or repugnant, I will offer up my preferred interpretation of moral judgments, which is non-cognitivism. A non-cognitive statement is one that has no truth value. For example, if I were to say, "ugh" in disgust to some action, it would not make sense to ask whether or not my statement was true or false. Similarly, when I make a moral judgment such as "it was wrong for Kenny to rape that little boy," what I am really saying is that I disapprove of Kenny's actions in a non-cognitive way. Therefore, a non-cognitive interpretation of this statement would be that I really meant "KENNY!!!" in a disgusted tone because I disapprove of Kenny's action, but there is no truth or falsehood inherent in my meaning. There are many other complicated arguments about why someone should accept non-cognitivism, but I will not bore the readers of this debate with such arguments unless my opponent has legitimate complaints about the position. I look forward to an argument from my opponent that is actually on point.