Morals and Ethics are a subjective matter

Without further wait, I shall start. The problem with my opponent's case is founded within a few errors and fallacies:Firstly, My opponent makes no distinction between this risk aversion and subjective morality. He's claiming that this "internal morality" we have is simply a risk aversion device we hold to choose actions that benefit us over actions that harm us, but he gives no warrant as to why that isn't subjective morality. So even if I were to concede this point as true, it does nothing to refute my case. Secondly, he gives no warrant as to why morality must be internalized to be subjective. He also gives no warrant as to why external morality is prima facie objective. I certainly don't want to believe that if I were to travel to my opponent's residence and told him what was right and what was wrong, my views would suddenly become objective for him. Thirdly, my opponent makes the argument from authority fallacy when claiming that because Plato couldn't come up with a way to internalize societal norms, that it's impossible to internalize societal norms. In fact, I would say that the way that people conform to things like peer pressure in our modern day society would be a perfect example of how we CAN internalize societal norms. So since my opponent is advocating that morality must be internal to be subjective, this argument actually functions against his case and helps mine. He gives two responses to this if it were conceded in my favor, which are both also flawed. Of course, both are without anything in the way of a warrant, but let's go specifically to each point. Point 1 only begs the question of why we value certain principles and why it comes before our reevaluation of morals, a question which he gives no answer for. This only links back further into subjectivism. Point 2 only turns my opponent's case around onto his head by essentially conceding that this societal morality my opponent is advocating for is entirely subjective. If it were objective, there would be no "re-training" required, as it would all be instilled in us from the very start, meaning no actual modification or teaching required. Fourthly, my opponent gives no actual warrant for why societal morality is objective, but rather just asserts that this is true. If anything I can simply say that because all societies are different (it would be quite the logical stretch to say that Hong Kong and New York have the same societies, or something like London and Beijing or the like), and these socieities impose their own societal moralities, that this actually proves a subjective morality rather than an objective morality. If it's just these elites who have "evovled" to higher socioeconomic status, then them just setting and editing the "societal morality" would be in a constant flux, and would be thus subjective. And fifthly, even if you don't believe a single syllable I have spoken so far, a state or society cannot divulge some sort of moral code onto us because it's not even a moral actor capable of being held morally accountable. Lloyd Gerson[1] explains that in order to be a moral agent, the agent-in-question must be able to be held morally accountable for their actions. A child can be held morally accountable for hitting someone, and thus would be a moral agent, while compared to something like a hurricane or a tornado, that cannot be held accountable for their action. Why can't a society or state be held morally accountable for their actions? Gerson continues to explain[1] that because states and societies do not hold second order desires. A first order desire would be, for example, to want to excersize, whereas a second-order desire would be to want to have that desire performed or to not want that desire to happen at all. Why can't societies hold second-order desires? Because only an individiual person can hold a second-order desire. [1] A state or society can have the first-order desire to do an action, but it cannot hold the second-order desire to hold or not hold that desire. So if society is really where we draw our moral principles from, then we would descend into a nihilistic world where morality could not possibly be objective, thus leaving only subjective. With my opponent's case dismantled, I would like to address his responses to my case, which will be below. .. .. .. With my opponent's non-existent arguments against my case refuted, let's look to what he conceded or dropped. My opponent conceded that knowledge is subjective. He also dropped that knowledge is where we derrive right and wrong from, since I can only know that punching an elderly woman is wrong if I have the knowledge to inform me of such. This means he has conceded my first premise, and dropped the second one. This automatically validates my conclusion, that morality is subjective. This is true because in order for morality to be objective, we would all have to possess the same knowledge of what is right and wrong. Since this is evidently not-true from any simple glance out a window into the outside world, we can easily declare morality to be subjective right here. As such, I must urge a pro vote in the resolution today to declare morality to be subjective. I now pass the floor to my opponent. Sources:[1] Lloyd Gerson. “The Morality of Nations: An Aristotelian Approach. ” Published in Aristotle’s Politics Today, compiled by Lenn E. Goodman and Robert B. Talisse. Albany: SUNY Press, 2007.