Violence is Wrong

In this debate, I should set out to convince you of the proposition that violence is wrong according to a moral standard. While I hope my arguments apply generally, I shall also hope to rebut and circumvent my opponent's previously elaborated tactic regarding violence, characterised by the famous line, "life is violence."What is violence?First of all, I agree to leaving the definitions somewhat open; there is no 'absolute definition' for any word, however, it is important to understand at least the common threads among most or all definitions of the word 'violence', if I am to tie the concept to morality in a solid, meaningful way.Let's start with the definitons provided by Wrichcirw in his debate on pacifism:"1. exertion of physical force so as to injure or abuse2. injury by or as if by distortion, infringement, or profanation3. intense, turbulent, or furious and often destructive action or force4. undue alteration (as of wording or sense in editing a text)"http://www.merriam-webster.com...I would summarise a basic definition, for this context, as; a being causing harm to a being (either another or itself). I will propose a few common threads among these definitions:- It is always undesirable for the victim. - It, in itself, applies only to the negative effects caused to a victim, not to anything surrounding that. - It describes a facet of an action. An act is not 'only, entirely violent'.Are all acts (equally) violent?This third point is in a sense responding to Con's common strategy of proving that violence is amoral, which generally runs as follows;- If an act causes harm to a being, it is a violent act.- All acts, followed far enough along the deterministic chain of events, cause harm to another being.- Therefore, all acts are violent acts.- Therefore, no distinction regarding violence can be made, and moral principles based on violence are meaningless.This seems, as I have admitted in the past, quite a convincing tactic. It seems to follow that no actual distinction in violence can be made, we cannot avoid or reduce violence, and the only difference lies in how direct or indirect an act is in causing harm.However, on further consideration, it also seems counter-intuitive. Is it true that no distinction can be drawn between, say, if right now I stay in my room and read a book, or go outside an stab someone? Perhaps the paper used in the book, the electricity used in the light, the sunlight I do not get by not going outside, the new experiences I miss out on by doing something new; all these things might contribute to their own harms against beings. Indeed, Con has often commented that the only way to avoid violence is to commit suicide, but even this doesn't do it, because it in itself is a very violent act. Despite this, we almost all feel that, not only is there a definite distinction between the two acts (reading a book or stabbing someone,) but that one is intrinsically more favorable as a choice. Not Con though, as while perhaps he does accept that there are factors which must come into play in making a decision, he certainly cannot hold whether harm will come to others as a result of it, as one of those factors.Singling out violenceNow, how do we avoid the painting of all acts unilaterally with the label 'violent act'? To do so, I will begin with an example:Let's say I am eating a piece of food, and that for some reason - it doesn't matter why - I find this act (eating the food) funny. And let's say that at that same time, I have a small, almost unnoticable, irritation, say an itch. What kind of act am I engaging in? Is it a 'nourishing' act, a 'humorous' act, or an 'irritated' act? The answer seems obvious; it is all of those. But not only that, it is more humorous than it is irritating. Now, let's say we want to comment on the positivity (to myself) taking place in that act. We should not say, "This is a completely negative event, because there was a small itch, and itches are negative". Because the overall emotion of the event is positive, we regard the 'net emotion' to be a positive one.Applying principlesNow, what if we want to judge the pleasurable-ness of itches as a principle? Is the itch positive simply because the net outcome of all emotions experienced was positive? No, we can say that, insofar as a feeling is itchy, it is not pleasurable.Similarly, insofar as violence exists, it is not desirable for living beings.This is because while any act has many facets, and can be labelled in multiple ways, each still can be applied to principles, according to the corresponding implications.All other variables being the same, in a choice between the more or less violent action, it is always preferable for the totality of people involved that the less violent choice takes place. It might be objected; "What if violence is a means to an overall more desirable end?" This does not affect the principle of the issue, because it is not a desirable means; it's in that case a 'necessary evil', and if the same end could be achieved without violence, or with less, we should always prefer the least violent option.According to whose morality? I don't believe it is necessary in this context to justify any elaborate moral theory to substantiate the 'wrong' element of my claim. Any moral theory must differentiate between 'right' and 'wrong', 'desirable' and 'undesirable', and be so for living beings; so if a type of action is defined as 'undesirable', it is by definition morally wrong on principle. It doesn't matter which particular moral standard is applied, as long as it's applied to all players involved, and is not so completely contradictory as to be senseless. This concludes my Round 1, thanks for reading.