It is probable that God exists

Revisiting the TCAsPro misunderstands the relevance of QM to my argument. A vacuum state is a zero-point energy quantum state. [6] Because a vacuum can be defined to have zero energy, it is a physical state in which no motion occurs. If Pro "removes the vacuum" and the relevant quantum fluctuations, Pro implicitly undermines the TCAs because the TCAs presuppose a vacuum. But if Pro accepts the existence of a vacuum, Pro admits the existence of quantum fluctuations. Either way, the TCAs crumble.Can the TCAs work without presupposing a vacuum? Only if we postulate something outside of existence. But in R2, I argued this position was incoherent. If something is outside of existence, it does not exist by definition. Pro conceded the argument, claiming it was a mere strawman. Clearly, the point was relevant and not a strawman.In response to Pro's "second" and "third" points: Schrödinger's cat demonstrates quantum indeterminacy is both epistemic and ontic. [7] As such, QM poses a serious challenge to the TCAs as well as the possibility of omniscience.But again, even if the TCAs were correct (they aren't), it does not follow that the necessary being and first mover is God. It is just as probable that the TCAs refer to a non-Judeo-Christian god or to any number of undiscovered natural phenomena.Teleological ArgumentPro's claim,"that biological ends must be explained in terms of a person and that mere descriptive accounts of function are inadequate," is completely unsubstantiated. Pro assumes ends imply intentionality, without explaining why that must be the case.If all persons died, would the physical world continue functioning as usual? Probably. There is no evidence that suggests otherwise. Mathematical truths and scientific laws hold regardless of whether persons think them or not. Plants continue photosynthesizing and Venus will continue orbiting the Sun regardless of whether persons will it so. The burden is on Pro to prove independent physical ends require persons to continue functioning.ScienceScientific facts are verified by empirically observable data, whereas God is empirically unknowable. Pro concedes this point.To counter its impact, Pro says "explanatory power" does not make something more "probable." I disagree. People believe gravity exists because gravity explains, and makes accurate predictions about, observable phenomena. People no longer accept the 18th century medical practice of bleeding because it has been replaced by medical practices that more accurately explain and predict how healthy bodies function.Last round, I argued science has a track record of replacing supernaturalistic explanations in favor of naturalistic ones. Pro offered no response. The track record shows it is probable that science will replace theism in favor of naturalistic explanations. There is no evidence of God's existence, and without evidence, we have no reason to believe God's existence is probable.PhysicalismPro claims disembodied existence is possible. So what? I never argued disembodied existence was impossible. I argued physicalism is probable. Pro offers no response, there is none. There is no evidence of disembodied existence. It therefore makes sense to conclude that physicalism is more probable than dualism.IncoherenceAs Pro concedes, my argument is about the scope of God's knowledge, not its mode. The question is whether God knows that He knows everything. There are an infinite number of mathematical facts. Hence, God cannot know that He knows every mathematical fact. If God knew that He knew every mathematical fact, it would still be possible to discover another mathematical fact that He did not know He knew.Pro claims, absent support, that this argument is "terribly unconvincing" because God's knowledge is "non-propositional and non-perceptualist." Even if this were true (it's not, Pro offers no evidence of what "non-propositional" and "non-perceptualist" knowledge could even look like), so what? My argment is about knowledge of a specific proposition, which is propositional knowledge. If Pro admits God can only have non-propositional/non-perceptualist knowledge, Pro implicitly denies God's omniscience.Argument from Evil (AE)At least some of the evils in our world appear gratuitous. Tsunamis, earthquakes, volcanoes, viral outbreaks, wild fires, famines, and fatal diseases kill millions of people each year. Consider the case of Charles Rothenberg, who kidnapped his six-year-old son, David, from his ex-wife and doused him all over with kerosene and set him on fire. David suffered third-degree burns covering 90% of his body. [8] Can there truly be any reason for David's horrific suffering?Pro agrees many of the evils in our world are so terrible we cannot grasp how they could possibly be justified. But given our “epistemic limitations,” Pro argues the existence of gratuitous evil is “epistemically inscrutable.” In other words, Pro argues it is impossible to know whether our failure to see God-justifying reasons for evil leads to the conclusion that no such reasons exist in actuality. If Pro's argument works, it threatens to undercut any inference one might draw from the existence of any amount of evil about the lack of morally sufficient reasons for God's permitting that evil.But the problem with Pro's argument is that Pro’s skepticism works too well. If we are never in a position to tell whether God has a reason for allowing a particular evil or not, then we are never in a position to tell whether we should allow a particular evil or not. According to Pro’s logic, anytime we are faced with the opportunity to intervene in what looks like a terrible tragedy (e.g. rape, genocide, etc.), Pro would have us do nothing because we have no way of knowing whether that particular evil is necessary for the existence of some compensating good.Pro's skepticism induces a form of moral paralysis inconsistent with theism. Pro’s position is also inconsistent with theological knowledge as such, and therefore, the resolution of this debate. According to Pro's argument, we cannot know anything about God, and as such, Pro’s skepticism cuts both ways. If it undercuts arguments against God’s existence, it likewise undercuts arguments for God’s existence. Without epistemic access to God's existence, Pro cannot prove God's existence is more probable than God's non-existence.ConclusionIf, after the substantial evidence provided against God's existence, readers remain convinced by Pro's TCAs and teleological argument, I ask readers then consider the impact of my opponent's arguments. Do the TCAs and teleological argument fulfill Pro's burden to show God probably exists? Consider the following: Pro has offered no evidence that the first mover or necessary being is omniscient, omnipotent, benevolent, or even personal. Likewise, Pro has offered no evidence that the intentional person posited by the teleological argument is omniscient, omnipotent, benevolent, or even necessary or a first mover.Pro has offered no reasonable way to connect the person of the teleological argument and the first mover/necessary being of the TCAs. And Pro has offered absolutely no evidence that either of these arguments is connected to omniscience, omnipotence, benevolence, etc. The point is, the TCAs and teleological argument are compatible with finite and evil gods, even polytheism. Pro has not provided any evidence specific to the Judeo-Christian God.I argued the Judeo-Christian God is not probable, supporting my argument with QM, the track record of science, the probability of physicalism, the incoherence of omniscience, and the evidential AE. In closing, I think it is quite clear that Pro has not sufficiently fulfilled the burden of proof, and I ask readers seriously consider these points when deciding whether Pro has met his burden or not.[6] http://en.wikipedia.org...;[7] http://www.mtnmath.com...;[8] http://articles.latimes.com...;