Existence of objective morality

Hello and thank you for starting this debate since you're using a version ofmackies argument I suppose that means youre taking the position of an error theorist. For practicality I will be taking the kantian side which I believe is the proper response to an error theorist. One thinks stealing is ok, one does not. Subjectivity allows for both to be correct. Not so. Truth value is mutually exclusive--wrong or right. Both of them can't be correct. This would violate the law of non-contradiction. They can't be both wrong for the same sort of reason. One is right, one is wrong. Which means that there is an objective moral fact. Before I go on I must put forth an objection to the definition of the word existence or to have actual being if this means an existence or body is required then it's abusive if it means for example that facts like 2 2=4 exist then I take back my objection. Continuing, it will be convenient for me to use "morality" in a very broad sense. I shall call "morality" (in the objective sense) all facts, if there are any such facts, about what is wrong, good, bad, evil, ill-advised, just, beautiful, or preferable, or any other evaluative property. Anything that is a value judgement will count as part of a morality in the subjective sense. For instance, the fact that Aristotle is a great thinker is a moral fact in the broad sense, because it requires a value judgement to appreciate; so is the fact that it's best to eat when one is hungry, because stating it gives a prescription for action; so is the fact that the world would be better off without tyrants, because it requires a value judgement to observe (calling something "better" as well as calling someone "a tyrant" are value judgements). In particular, I stress that I do not wish to presuppose any particular theory about how people should behave nor any particular reasons why they should so behave. Most people appear to restrict the application of the term "morality" to prohibitions on actions satisfying desires. I disregard this convention. If desires must be held in check, then that will be a moral fact; and equally, if desires need not be checked but provide appropriate and rational reasons for acting (I don't mean merely that they make one want to act, which is a purely descriptive fact and not an evaluation, but that acting in accord with them is a good thing) then that will be a moral fact. In other words, my defense of objectivism, while it says that there is at least sometimes a way one should behave, does not actually recommend anything in particular. To make this more interesting I say we only use examples/metaphors with the color red Suppose I offer the opinion, "Colors are objective." What then is it that I am saying about colors? What I am saying, I think, is that colors are 'in the object.' In what object? In colored objects. What does "in" mean here? It means that a color - redness, say - is a property of the objects that are said to be red, that is, that the nature of those objects themselves and not anything else determines whether they are red or not. Hence, to say that morality is objective is to say that whether an action is right depends on the nature of that action; whether a person is good depends on the nature of that person. My oppoenets only charge is his second premise as he concedes that the first one is not an argument. This does not mean that i concede to this merely putting it aside for awhile. His second premise is there are no objectively prescriptive facts If we look closely at his defense of his second premise we note that he gives an explanation Of what it would mean to be objective then he sets up a straw man with the hypothetical imperative. I will respond to his arguments in full when it's my turn again.