The Omnipotence Paradox is Self-Refuting

Answers to questions:1. Yes.2. Because in doing so he loses his maximal omnipotence, as he cannot lift a stone he cannot lift.3. No, rather the semantic truism that a "lifted" rock is "liftable"4. Because the phrase "God can't" makes no sense if maximal omnipotence is assumed.5. That God cannot be maximally omnipotent. Whether it is enough has nothing to do with your argument.6. Yes in this case, because the paradox sets up a binary test. It only gives God the option of either being able or unable to lift the stone. My Counter-ArgumentThere are only two alternatives upon creating a stone - either God is able to lift the stone, or God is not able to lift the stone. It is still my opponent's belief that God is unable to lift the stone. Despite being unable to lift the stone, he still lifts it because he can do the logically impossible. I contended that God should have created a stone unable to be lifted by beings which defy logical possibility. By being able to defy logic, he is able to lift objects that my opponent classifies as "unliftable," and therefore to God they are liftable. It should be possible to create a stone, however, that cannot be lifted, even by defying logic. My opponent offered absolutely no response to this argument, other than to reaffirm that God can do the impossible. I've already gone over this, but if this is the case, then obviously it is impossible for God to be unable to lift the stone. However, the presumption of maximum omnipotence is that nothing is impossible for God. God can try all he wants, but the stone will be liftable so long as he can lift it, and he can lift it so long as he is maximally omnipotentWhat my opponent is in fact asserting is that since the presumption is incompatible with the premise (that God creates an unliftable stone), the presumption must be correct and the premise can't be wrong, therefore both are right. This is exactly the point. Both logical steps cannot be correct and therefore there is a paradox. The only way pro can weasel his way out of this is by his self-contradictory logic that logic isn't relevant (which I deal with later). From a logical perspective, pro has simply restated the paradox and considered the "no" alternative. At the very end, my opponent breifly states that there is nothing wrong with being able to lift an unliftable stone if one can defy logic. It is, of course, possible for God to do things that defy logic. Therefore the observation that the stone is unliftable is false - it must be "unliftable except by defying logic. " That wasn't the challenge though, and that's why last round I said my opponent added an extra qualifier of logic. The stone had to be unliftable even (not except) by defying logic. Inputting this observation gives us: there is nothing wrong with being able to lift an unliftable-except-by-defying-logic stone if one can defy logic. This is completely true and correct, but not what the paradox asked for. The reason why my opponent only spent four sentances defending his actual argument was because I have already proven all of the above. The rest of my opponent's case did not defend his particular argument, but rather defended his claim that logic is irrelevant. Let's look at that one more closely. Logical IrrelevanceP2. Arguments that seek to disprove God via principles of logic fail (see P1). Just because God can defy logic doesn't mean that one cannot apply logic to God. The omnipotence paradox (unlike, say, the free will paradox) does not say an attribute of God is wrong or inconsistant, but rather it sets a test for God. It isn't the fact that God is maximally omnipotent that is the problem - it is the observed outcome of this. Let me give you an example. No seriously, read this example. I'm pretty proud of it. Suppose I had an object that could not be moved, and a force that could not be stopped. When they collide, one of two things will be observed: the object may move, or it may not. If it does the object was not immovable, if it does not then the force did not act on the object and thus was stopped, thus I claim nothing has such power. My opponent's argument is like saying that the object will move due to the force, but not have moved because it's immovable. If it moved it has moved. To say that it would not have moved because it's immovable is pointing out the paradox - it is inconsistant with what you said earlier. To now state I'm wrong because I'm applying principles of motion to something immovable or unstoppable is silly. I'm not applying principles of motion, I'm observing the result and making a conclusion based on this observation. In the same way to say I'm wrong because I'm trying to constrain God by logic is silly. I'm using logic to defeat your argument, not God. The onmipotence paradox, also, leaves God alone and rather makes a comment based upon what God is able to do, not tell God what he must be. If this argument sounds strangely familiar, it's because I've made it before. This time I'm only giving it more attention because my opponent gave this point more attention. ConclusionMy opponent's argument is still not an argument. Look back to our agreed-upon summary. Such a God is covered under the omnipotence paradox as one unable to create a such a stone that the next premise reads "God cannot lift this stone no matter what he does. "Next look at his new formulation at the end of last round. I have shown that this is a non-sequiter, and that it doesn't actually relate to the omnipotence paradox at all, for the omnipotence paradox does not seek to disprove God via principles of logic. It does not relate to God, but to observations of God's omnipotence. It proves that the observations are impossible to reconcile with omnipotence and that therefore God is not maximally omnipotent. That's what it proves. My opponent hasn't disproved it.