Redistributive Justice

Thanks, Endark! I will rebut Con's case.C1: Right to PropertyCon engages in an appeal to authority fallacy throughout this contention, saying that because X said something, it must be true. To effectively argue that (a) people have a right to property, and that (b) this right is unalienable, Con must do more that simply name-drop; he must provide reasoning, and, as yet, no such reasoning has been forthcoming.But let us momentarily assume that property is a right, and that the reason it is important is, as Con suggests, because property is a prerequisite for freedom. This logic creates some nasty byproducts that we must consider. Suppose that freedom is the absence of coercion, or, as Kant frames it, being independent of another's will. "If we take this definition of freedom then the amount of freedom a person has is the extent to which they can act without being coerced to do (or not to do) something against their will. In a libertarian society you cannot (legitimately) do anything with another's property if they don't want you to, so your only guaranteed freedom is determined by the amount of property you have. This has the consequence that someone with no property has no guaranteed freedom, and that the more property you have, the greater your guaranteed freedom. In other words, a distribution of property is a distribution of freedom, as the libertarians themselves define it. Thus...the libertarians are saying that the best way of promoting freedom is to allow some people to have more of it than others, even when this leads to some having very little or even none." [1]This creates an interesting paradox. Property is meant to be the right that ensures the right to freedom (you cannot be free without it), yet when we enforce unalienable, ultra-strict property rights, we consequently deny some people freedom. Property is both the supposed guarantor of freedom, and the force depriving some people of freedom.I would suggest that property is something to which we are all entitled, but that it is not unalienable in the sense that it can be take away provided a good reason exists to do so. Humanity has created many such good reasons, including protection of the environment, historical preservation, taxation, eminent domain, national defense, etc. If I can present a good reason to restrict property rights in this case, then I believe I can still affirm the resolution. "Taking property from someone restricts their freedom, but ALL societies restrict people's freedom in some way, and libertarians themselves accept some restrictions on freedom--such as the restriction of not violating other people's property rights. The issue is then what are acceptable incursions on people's freedom and what are not." [1]C2: Absolute EqualityFirstly, it is important to note now that I am not necessarily arguing for equality of outcome, merely equality of opportunity. Everyone deserves at equal chance at success, but that does not mean that people are due equal success. This portion of the contention does not negate my case, my advocacy, or my rebuttals. Merely, it restricts my ground.SA: Equal Opportunity is Not a RightCon posits that it is an injustice to redress or equalize for the arbitrariness of nature. Why? Con, in his opening, agrees that fairness and justice are linked, so why is it fair that one person born into poverty should have naturally less of a chance to advance himself than someone born into a wealthier society. Children cannot choose their parents nor can they choose the community into which they are born. This is not fair, because it is not, as Nozick incorrectly suggests, "a series of individual exchanges." Life--and success--are just as much influenced by things you cannot control as it is by things you can.Con states: "It cannot be called unjust for a man to use his natural wit to raise a fortune while another man, born with less faculty, works for a modest salary and more than it can be called unjust for a woman born naturally fast to defeat a man born crippled." But, unfortunately, Con fails to explain WHY this is not unjust.As Peter Singer wrote, "the claim to equality does not depend on intelligence, moral capacity, physical strength, or similar matters of fact. Equality is a moral ideal, not a simple assertion of fact. There is no logically compelling reason for assuming that a factual difference in ability between two people justifies any difference in the amount of consideration we give to satisfying their needs and interests. The principle of the equality of human beings is not a description of an alleged actual equality among humans: it is a prescription of how we should treat humans." [2] Certainly, all humans are MORALLY equal, regardless of their levels of talent.If we buy this premise, which I think is intuitively obvious, then Con's point is negated. Consider, Endark and I are moral equals. Endark is a better singer than I am, and I am a born with low IQ and EQ. Endark succeeds because of his talent, while I fail because of my lack of talent and skill. What has essentially happened is that two morally equal agents were treated unequally from the get-go. I am treated less well, despite moral equality requiring that I be treated equally to Endark.This argument, at most, justified equality of outcome. And, at least, it affirms the need for equality of opportunity. If moral equals should be treated equally--deserving equal treatment re: their rights to life, liberty, property, and freedom--then it is wrong to give one moral equal a leg up over another at the start of life, since this gives one a greater chance to make use of and maximize their rights than the other. By equalizing them at the start, we pay homage to the idea that moral equals should be given a fair and equal playing field.I would also contend that Equality of Opportunity, and indeed redistribution of resources, is essential for other rights, such as the right to life. Even Nozick asserts that life's value can be found in our ability to self-actualize. [3] It is hard--if not impossible--to self-actualize under conditions where one lacks basic access to food, water, shelter, and other fundamentals. Surely, redistribution of resources to people in such privation is justified as a means of saving their lives (upholding a right to life), as a means of increasing their liberty, and as a means of respecting their human dignity as described by Nozick. SB: The Necessary EndCertainly, an absolutely fair playing field might be impossible to attain, but that in no way negates the idea that we should have the most fair playing field possible. 90% justice is better than 50% justice, for example.C3: Right To Property 2.0Con discusses theft, a form of coercion, where coercion implies the use of force or the imposition of one's choice on another. I would argue that unless Con can show that his society uses less coercion on net than one in which redistribution is enshrined, he cannot outweigh me here. "Libertarians are unanimous in viewing coercion as a violation of liberty, thus if you are forced to give money to the government to provide welfare, then you are being coerced and your liberty violated. The only legitimate use of coercion, according to libertarians is in enforcing people's rights. Libertarians legitimise coercion in these circumstances, and the amount of coercion required to enforce these rights depends on how willing people are to respect them. Hence it cannot be the case that a free market is free from coercion, unless everyone voluntarily respects these rights and abides by the law. For a libertarian to claim that a libertarian society is totally free in this sense, and justify it by saying that they expect everyone to respect property rights in this way, is on a par with a socialist claiming that a socialist society is free from coercion, because they expect everyone to be willing to accept the socialist's laws. Arguing that the free market they depict is an ideal that is free of coercion, but the practice requires some coercion to prevent people from violating rights, doesn't help either--the socialist can argue the equivalent point in defence of their position! A libertarian may concede that coercion is required to protect rights, but that other than that, the free market is free of coercion, and will be freer of coercion than a non-libertarian society. However, as I said before, the amount of coercion required depends on how willing the citizens are to accept a free market order. If the citizens of a society do not want a libertarian order, it may require a lot of coercion to impose it, likewise if the citizens want socialism it won't require as much coercion to get it. In other words, what determines the amount of coercion required in a society, is the extent to which people are willing to accept the rules imposed on them, and this is as true of a libertarian, society as it is of any other. Thus, it is debatable that a libertarian society would have less coercion in it than a non-libertarian one." [1]C4: Reactionary SolutionsI would simply cross-apply much of what I've already said here. I would note that Con is indeed required to present an alternative solution or show that affirming creates more issues than it solves. If redistribution is the ONLY solution to the problem, then it is required. Insofar as Con acknowledges a problem exists, unless he can offer a better solution, we must default to the one I have presented to address it.Concluding RemarksUltimately, the ideal of libertarianism is freedom and the ability to use that freedom to pursue happiness. Indeed, one might even define the former as the latter; yet, oddly enough, without redistribution, the pursuit of happiness may be beyond many.SOURCES1 - http://web.archive.org...2 - Source 3, R23 - http://www.iep.utm.edu...