The US Constitution Should Be a Living Document

On Framework Note, here, that my opponent claims to have accepted my list of rights. Afterwards, he argues against the primacy of autonomy (saying that it must be compromised in the advance of something “greater”). He must have been very confused; there is no other explanation for this massive lapse in understanding. I specifically noted that the Right to Autonomy was the “primary right”, and other rights were corollaries. Given that my opponent has still presented no justification for his framework except for saying, descriptively, that certain things are “just” or “respectful of dignity” (which my opponent seems to believe counts as proving it so), there is absolutely no reason to accept the “appended” rights he tries to tack onto my own framework. Indeed, the very fact that he ACCEPTS my framework and then argues against its fundamental nature should be enough to discredit his attempts at consistency. The question one must first ask in this debate is "By what standard am I to pass moral judgement?” I pose one simple challenge to both my opponent and the reader: find any answer which does not, at least implicitly, require autonomy of the Will. You will find that you cannot. This being so, it is clear that, unless my opponent decides to finally offer a positive argument, my a priori true position must be accepted prima facie. Defence1. Consent of the Governed Quoting Ayn Rand: “A right is the sanction of independent action. A right is that which can be exercised without anyone’s permission. If you exist only because society permits you to exist—you have no right to your own life. A permission can be revoked at any time. If, before undertaking some action, you must obtain the permission of society—you are not free, whether such permission is granted to you or not. Only a slave acts on permission. A permission is not a right.” It should be clear that I am not arguing that justice is “up to a vote”, or whatever other ridiculous position my opponent wishes to paint me as holding; justice is the protection of consensual relations and the destruction of all others. This is much different – justice is not “majority rules” or arbitrary under my theory, but, rather, justice itself is the principle of free association with the world and others. This is why my opponent’s rant about how “What grants the Constitution legitimacy is not consent; it is its protection of the rights of the people“ falls flat; that which professes to protect rights cannot itself be a slavemaster. Thus, my opponent’s strawman is burnt to a crisp. The point made by my opponent about “practicality” is also worthless; is the unjust, then, to become just because it is expedient? I see no reason why one cannot consent to everything done to them; my opponent has a totally unjustified pessimism towards freedom. Also, I do fully believe that starving is oftentimes consensual. I have no problem biting the bullet; it’s your job to show why I’m wrong even if I do get around your silly reductios. Moving to another of my opponent’s scattered chains of twisted logic, he takes for granted that doing “beneficial” things is never unjust. This, while literally true, attempts to smuggle something past the reader: it assumes that non-beneficial actions actually are, in order to prove their moral acceptability. This is a ruse. He says himself that the reason the theft of the apple is a crime is the absence of consent. There are no two ways about this: Pro has unequivacly conceded that a possible distinguishing factor of a criminal act, as opposed to any other act, is a lack of consent. This, in itself, torpedoes the argument that consensual action is not an end in itself (and also the idea that “kind things” are always just). If that done without consent is criminal (and therefore unjust), and benevolent actions are always just, nonconsensual actions must always be unbeneficial. Q.E.D. I leave you with this unjustified, out-of-context segment of Robert Nozick (Anarchy, State, and Utopia is very relevant here) that should, in itself, be just as weighty as my opponent’s unjustified, out of context segments of Dworkin, and far weightier when taking into account my positive arguments for my framework: “Political philosophy is concerned only with certain ways that persons may not use others; primarily, physically aggressing against them, A specific side constraint upon action toward others expresses the fact that others may not be used in the specific ways the side constraint excludes, Side constraints express the inviolability of others, in the ways they specify, These modes of inviolability are expressed by the following injunction: 'Don't use people in specified ways,' An end-state view, on the other hand. would express the view that people are ends and not merely means (if it chooses to express this view at all), by a different injunction: 'Minimize the use in specified ways of persons as means.' Following this precept itself may involve using someone as a means in one of the ways specified, Had Kant held this view, he would have given the second formula of the categorical imperative as, 'So act as to minimize the use of humanity simply as a means,' rather than the one he actually used: 'Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end. Side constraints express the inviolability of other persons, But why may not one violate persons for the greater social good? Individually, we each sometimes choose to undergo some pain or sacrifice for a greater benefit or to avoid a greater harm: we go to the dentist to avoid worse suffering later; we do some unpleasant work for its results; some persons diet to improve their health or looks; some save money to support themselves when they are older. In each case, some cost is borne for the sake of the greater overall good, Why not, similarly, hold that some persons have to bear some costs that benefit other persons more, for the sake of the overall social good? But there is no social entity with a good that undergoes some sacrifice for its own good. There are only individual people, different individual people, with their own individual lives. Using one of these people for the benefit of others, uses him and benefits the others. Nothing more. What happens is that something is done to him for the sake of others. Talk of an overall social good covers this up. (Intentionally?) To use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has. He does not get some overbalancing good from his sacrifice, and no one is entitled to force this upon him-least of all a state or government that claims his allegiance (as other individuals do not) and that therefore scrupulously must be neutral between its citizens."2. Rome (An Exercise in Inconsequentialism) My opponent makes the rather unconvincing argument that, had the Romans made a new Constitution, it would likely itself have been in opposition to liberty, and thus the proper thing to do is not to make a new Constitution. The problem is obvious: I did not advocate for the creation of any Constitution, only a Constitution of a certain… constitution. Unless my opponent is fully committed to the idea that it is physically and logically impossible that such a Constitution be created, he must admit that it is possible, and thus relevant to the moral discourse. If this is done, it is clear that, of the choices, a new and truly just Constitution would be the obvious best. In conclusion, I wish the reader to keep in mind that my opponent constantly appeals to dignity. I ask: What is more dignified? Self-determination or subjugation? To quote, again, Senpai Nozick: “The minimal state treats us as inviolate individuals, who may not be used in certain ways by others as means or tools or instruments or resources; it treats us as persons having individual right with the dignity this constitutes. Treating us with respect by respecting our rights, it allows us, individually or with whom we please, to choose our life and to realize our ends and our conception of ourselves, insofar as we can, aided by the voluntary cooperation of other individuals possessing the same dignity. How dare any state or group of individuals do more. Or less.”