The Modal Ontological Argument for God is Logically Sound

I will be borrowing from what I learned from Wylted about the MOA in our debate over God's existence. The Modal Ontological Argument is comprised of six premises. My argument rests heavily on modal logic, so I'll run over a brief explanation over what it is. Modal logic is comprised of four propositions: P1: Possibility Possibility deals with what is logically possible, not physically possible. If something isn't logically impossible, then obviously it would belogically possible. For example the Invisible Pink Unicorn is logically possible, so all I'm saying is that it's possible that it could be true. P2: Impossibility If something's impossible, than it would be logically impossible and could never exist, since it doesn't even fall under possibility. For example, 2+2 can't equal 5. It will always make 4 as that's the only possible outcome. P3: Necessary propositions Necessary propositions are ones that must be true and can't be false. For example 2 2=4 and can't be false. P4: Contingentency Now, contingent possiblities are propositions that may be true, but may also be the opposite. For example, there is a bear outside my house right now, but there also could've not been one, so it is contingently true. Now if I say that there's a bear outside my house, but in reality, there isn't one, then it would be contingently false. Simply put, contingent possibilities deal with what could be and could have not been, and what are and what could have been. My last proposition will be on the subject of possible worlds. That's just another term of saying what is logically possible. These four propositions are what make the MOA different because it deals with possibility. Now that I have all that cleared up for us and the voters, I'll move on to the actual argument. Premise one: God is a greatest possible being that would exist necessarily. Premise two: It is possible for a greatest possible being to exist in some possible world. These are the main premises of the argument. There is nothing logically absurd about these premises and thus I don’t believe they need to be contested. However, if these premises can be both knocked down, the entire argument would fall apart. Premise three: If it’s possible for a greatest possible being to exist in some possible world, then necessarily, it’s possible for a greatest possible being to exist in all possible worlds. This follows from the last premise in saying that if we can imagine that a greatest possible being exists in some possible world, then it’s at least possible it could exist. Premise four: If it’s possible for a greatest possible being to exist in all possible worlds, then it’s possible for a greatest possible being to exist in our world, or our reality and universe. A greatest possible cannot exist in some worlds and not others, otherwise it would not be a greatest being, and it would also be a logical contradiction. If a greatest possible being exists in a world that we know nothing about, then a greatest possible being must exist in all and any world that we know nothing about. And if a greatest possible being exists in all possible worlds, it must exist in our world as well since our reality would count as one of the possible worlds mentioned. Again, I see no logical absurdities with this premise and I welcome zmikecuber to point any out. Premise five: Based on the last four premises, a greatest possible being exists in all possible worlds including ours. Premise six: Therefore, a greatest possible being, or God, exists in all worlds including ours. Remember, it is only up to my opponent to prove how this argument would be logically inconsistent or absurd. I welcome any challlenge and rebuttal he presents. My opening argument isn’t long, considering that I would just need to lay out the argument and wait to see what Con has to say about it, and then I can defend it. This argument hasn’t been proven unsound to my knowledge thus far, so good luck and may this be an eye-opening debate for both of us.