BeIR/webis-touche2020 huggingface dataset:
The leave campaign may have broken the rules meaning it was not a fair election

The leave campaign bent, or possibly even broke, electoral rules in terms of finances, and use of personal data. Different leave campaigns Vote Leave and BeLeave shared offices, with Vote Leave providing up to £625,000 to be used in BeLeave advertising which got around election finance limits. Some remain campaigners, such as Gina Miller, have seized on this to demand a second referendum.[1] It goes further; Helen Mountfield QC and Clare Montgomery QC of Matrix Chambers have concluded there is a “prima facie case” that electoral offences were committed that require investigation and decision on whether to refer to the Crown Prosecution Service.[2] Such violations are therefore serious. As the vote was comparatively close it is open to question whether these practices may have swung the vote. As such there must be a second vote to confirm, or change, the outcome of the first. [1] Miller, Gina, ‘BeLeave revelations taint the Brexit result. There must be another vote’, The Guardian, 27 March 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/mar/27/beleave-revelations-taint-brexit-result-shahmir-sanni-disclosure-funds [2] Townsend, Mark, and Cadwalladr, Carole, ‘Vote Leave members ‘may have committed criminal offences’’, The Guardian, 26 March 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/mar/26/vote-leave-members-may-have-committed-criminal-offences
Parliamentary sovereignty

There is no need for a second referendum as it is Parliament that is sovereign. Major changes in British Law require the consent of parliament, acting as representatives of the people (through having been elected) in order to be enacted. The government has already promised “there will be a meaningful vote on the Brexit deal where parliament can choose to either accept that deal or we can leave without a deal”.[1] Once parliament has given its backing the people themselves have as a result of each MP representing the electorate in their constituency. There would be no need for a second referendum. [1] Reuters Staff, ‘Parliament will have a meaningful vote on Brexit deal- PM’s spokesman’, Reuters, 26 March 2018, https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-eu-vote/parliament-will-have-a-meaningful-vote-on-brexit-deal-pms-spokesman-idUKKBN1H2194
Britain should honour the 2016 vote

The result of the vote on the 23rd June 2016 was clear. It was a vote to leave the European Union and that is what Britain must do. David Cameron, the Prime Minister who called the referendum said at the time “I am absolutely clear a referendum is a referendum, it’s a once in a generation, once in a lifetime opportunity and the result determines the outcome ... You can’t have neverendums, you have referendums.”[1] We should not be going back to the public only a few years after offering them ‘a once in a generation vote’ which it was promised would decide the issue.[2] [1] Reuters Staff, ‘Cameron says no second EU referendum if result is close’, Reuters, 17 May 2016, https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-eu-cameron/cameron-says-no-second-eu-referendum-if-result-is-close-idUKKCN0Y81VK [2] Note: This has only been added because it is the most commonly made argument against a second vote. If debating it however it is not a good standalone argument.
A second referendum does not just affect the UK but will impact on the negotiations

It is not just the UK’s decision whether a second referendum will have any significance. It affects all the other members of the EU. With the triggering of article 50 it may already be too late for a referendum to have any meaning. The UK if it wanted to vote, and decided remain, it would at the very least find that it does not have all the privileged opt outs it had before – such as the rebate which reimburses 66% of the imbalance in the UK’s payments and receipts, around €6.1 billion.[1] But it may even find that it simply can’t get back in and needs to go through he accession process. This would likely be expedited but has in some cases taken years – Turkey has been an applicant since 1987 and is still years away from joining.[2] Even worse if there were to be a second referendum on staying in the EU, or even the suggestion of one, it would impact on negotiations. The European Union would be encouraged to play hardball to try and ensure that a second vote is more likely to vote to remain. [1] ‘The UK 'rebate' on the EU budget: An explanation of the abatement and other correction mechanisms’, European Parliament, 18 February 2016, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI%282016%29577973 [2] ‘Turkey’, European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, European Commission, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/turkey_en
Circumstances may change

Circumstances are constantly changing but that is not a reason to be constantly having new votes. Should there be a vote to remain in next time and the EU only allows this with concessions from the UK should the public have to vote a third time? The public voted on the general broad-brush principle, not the details of an agreement. That principled vote will remain valid regardless of what the final agreement is. The options, in or out, will remain the same. We will simply know with more clarity what each means.
A referendum could not provide the nuanced policy the UK needs

An ambiguous result will be far less of a problem in a second referendum. It would be clear that the vote is a yes or a no on the particular deal that has been agreed between the UK and the European Union. This would mean that there would not be contradictory campaigning being made as in the first campaign where some groups in favour of leaving were arguing against too many immigrants arriving, while others, like BeLeave wished to end discrimination in migration policy.[1] The debate would be about a specific set of policy positions laid out in the agreement to leave. [1] Cadwalladr, Carole, and Graham-Harrison, Emma, ‘Why young, inexperienced BeLeavers were perfect for the Brexit campaign’, The Guardian, 24 May 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/mar/24/beleave-cambridge-analytica-brexit-boris-gove
There is no time to hold a second referendum

The ideal time would be in the first couple of months of 2019, once the deal is pretty much known, but before the UK. It would be best if the deal on how we will leave, and what our continuing relationship with the EU will be were fully agreed before a referendum takes place. However both sides have at each stage been making commitments and the overall shape of the final agreement gets clearer and clearer. There was no agreement on what leave would mean in the first referendum so there need not be a set in stone final agreement for a second referendum either. Negotiations could even continue at the same time.
Public sovereignty

The government is here to serve the people. The concept behind a referendum is public sovereignty, the people themselves are the ones who get to decide. Having had one referendum it has already been agreed that this is an issue where it should not be up to our representatives in Parliament to decide, rather it is an issue for direct democracy. Having started the issue, the people have a right to determine the result. In Parliament there is not just a single vote on an issue. Rather there are three readings of a bill in each house. Then there is consideration of amendments from the house that did not initiate the bill often with parliamentary ping pong. Throughout this MPs get multiple opportunities to vote, both on the whole bill and on individual amendments.[1] So why should one general vote be considered final and definitive when it comes from the people? [1] ‘Passage of a Bill’, parliament.uk, https://www.parliament.uk/about/how/laws/passage-bill/
Circumstances may change

‘When events change, I change my mind. What do you do?’ paraphrasing economist Keynes the public must be allowed to change its mind as circumstances change. This is also the position of the British Parliament; David Cameron introduced the fixed-term parliament act in 2011 which created a five year period between general elections, but this did not bind parliament from having an early general election in 2017.[1] In exactly the same manner a referendum would not bind the public from having a second referendum. If the facts change they are entitled to vote again due to the different circumstances. There have clearly already been large changes in circumstances. Many promises or threats, on both sides of the campaign, have not been born out. To take two of the most prominent the returning £350million a week has been discredited, while there was no immediate Brexit crash. As the final outcome of a leaving deal becomes clear so circumstances change. All sides will have a much better idea of what leaving means, and some may well consider it to not be the event they voted for. This being the case they should have the chance to change their minds.      [1] ‘Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011’, House of Commons Library, 27 April 2017, http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN06111
Other countries have had second referendums

The idea behind referendums is to give a decision to the people to decide on an issue that has an impact on them. This remains the case. There is no doubt that Brexit will have an immense impact, and for a second referendum that impact will be better known as the terms will have been laid out. As such referendums are not one time only possibilities. The UK has had very few referendums, yet two of the three have been on EU membership, it should be clear that there can be a third. Other countries have held considerably more referendums, and it is certainly not unknown for countries to revote on the same issue. Three countries’ voters have rejected EU treaties only change their vote in a second referendum. Denmark voted against the Maastricht treaty only a year later to vote in favour. The same happened in Ireland, with both the Nice and Lisbon treaties. In each case there was reassurance about the fears expressed that lead to a no vote leading to a yes vote. This shows that even without substantial changes there can be a shift in perceptions leading to a shift in position, as such a second vote would be legitimate.[1] [1] Atikcan, Ece Özlem, ‘Asking the public twice: why do voters change their minds in second referendums on EU treaties?’, LSE European Politics and Policy, 19 October 2015, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2015/10/19/asking-the-public-twice-why-do-voters-change-their-minds-in-second-referendums-on-eu-treaties/
A referendum could not provide the nuanced policy the UK needs

It is clear that part of the problem with Brexit is how broad brush the vote to leave was; apart from leaving it did not say anything about our continuing relationship. Was the vote for more sovereignty? To be able to reduce migration? To get out of the single market and customs union? No one knows because the motivation was different for each voter. This has shown the difficulty with relying on a referendum for guidance. A new referendum would have similar problems. Unless it were to be multiple choice we would be left with the question; does the electorate want leave but not on these conditions? Does it want a harder or a softer Brexit? It is far better to leave this to parliament which can have votes on each issue that comes up rather than one big public vote.
There is no time to hold a second referendum

The timetable for Brexit is already tight so it is very difficult to see where a referendum could fit in. It would need to be done after negotiations have been completed, which given a history of EU negotiations going to past their initial deadlines means this likely won’t be settled until March 2019. Even if the agreement is done in line with the timetable – by October 2018 – there is little time. If there were to then be a debate and vote in Parliament that would not be complete until the end of the year or even January.[1] There would then at best be two and a half months to have a campaign and referendum. If the referendum were to happen later, into the transition period, there is no guarantee the UK could get back in. [1]  Walker, Nigel, ‘Brexit timeline: events leading to the UK’s exit from the European Union’, House of Commons Library, Briefing paper No.07960, 12 March 2018, p.28, http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-7960/CBP-7960.pdf
The referendum was only advisory

It is wrong to state that the vote was advisory. Yes, it required Parliament to put it into effect but no one would ever consider simply not implementing the ‘advice’ from the people. It would be logically incoherent to call a referendum to give the people the choice only to deprive them of it by considering their vote to simply be advice that can be ignored as and when the government desires. If someone makes a protest vote then that is their legitimate choice. But that does not invalidate the result. They simply need to accept that the made a mistake in assuming the vote was meaningless. It was a meaningful vote and has to be made into one.
An independent Tibet would serve as a buffer state between India and China, reducing the chances of a regional clash

On the contrary, this situation almost ensures that the Tibetans will become a puppet of one or another foreign power. Weak states almost invariably need allies to maintain their independence. An independent Tibet, especially one that has inherited the history of the last sixty years would likely be dominated by politicians who are militantly anti-Chinese, but would be too weak to defend itself against China. It would almost certainly become an Indian proxy, as its only hope of survival would be to attempt to gain the support of the United States and India against China. In effect the creation of an independent Tibet, rather than avoiding conflict, would make it more pressing by moving the effective frontline hundreds of miles northward. Right now China and India may not like each other, but the Tibetan-Indian border is sufficiently mountainous as to make military action difficult if not impossible. By contrast, its northern border is much more easily crossed as the Chinese themselves showed in 1950. An independent Tibet would be a security threat to China and the region.
Tibet presents an explosive domestic political issue for China which the latter would benefit from eliminating

Everything is comparative. The major reason why China does not face more serious domestic unrest is that its international and economic progress have allowed it to appeal to Chinese nationalism. Withdrawing from Tibet would be viewed as an act of weakness, one which would do far more to undermine the Communist party’s legitimacy and support base than remaining there. Secondly, attacks on China’s Human Rights record matter less and less each year as trade with the PRC becomes more and more valuable to the West. It barely affected the Olympics and increasingly it is viewed as an effort by the West to divide China. Thirdly, the cost of the province has to be compared against the potential security risks an independent Tibet, especially one under anti-Chinese leadership, would pose to Chinese security.
Tibet has made enormous strides under Chinese rule

Such progress has been self-serving, with many of the economic gains made by Han Settlers. Secondly it has come at the cost of Tibetan culture and the very national identity that Tibetans hold dear. It is also absurd to suggest that these gains would disappear upon independence. Tibet would likely seek to continue to trade with China, and if that is not possible, there would be opportunities to gain investment from India or the West. The benefits of such trade could then be used to help the Tibetans themselves rather than Han settlers. As Ten Zin Samphel, a leader of the Tibetan community in Britain remarks "At the moment, the economic development is for the benefit of the Chinese… If Tibet were free, we could develop it ourselves."[1] [1] McGivering, Jill, ‘China’s quandary over Tibet’s future’, BBC News, 20 March 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/7305558.stm
Tibet is almost 50% Han Chinese and they dominate the economy. Expelling them would be catastrophic

First of all it is worth noting that the Chinese settlers are themselves the product of deliberate campaign of cultural genocide on the part of the Chinese government. While individually they may be innocent, by their participation they have become targets. In this sense there is little difference between them and Israeli settlers in the West Bank or the former French settlers in Algeria. But even granting that, there is no reason to assume this violence would continue if Tibet became independent and the major cause of conflict, namely the Chinese occupation, was removed as a major issue of contention. It could be expected that a new Tibetan government would have an incentive to avoid all of the harms outlined by the opposition. Symbolic of this is the Dalai Llama’s remarks that Tibet’s future is linked to China’s and that an independent Tibet would benefit from a close relationship with China.
China has viewed the last century and a half as non-stop efforts by Westerners to divide China. This looks like another.

While of obvious interest, it is hard to see how Chinese opinion is of vital relevance to whether or not Tibet should enjoy independence. Serbian opinion was almost certainly overwhelmingly against Kosovar claims in 1998, and it can be assumed that Southern Sudanese Secession may have been less than popular on the streets of Khartoum than Juba. Furthermore, a large part of the reason for the reaction of the Chinese Public is that the Communist Party has consistently encouraged nationalist sentiment in an effort to deflect its own population from their lack of human and political rights. An independent Tibet would serve as a beacon of freedom in the region and might well inspire Chinese citizens to begin to make demands of their own for political and social freedoms.
Tibet could never be a viable independent state and would either become a Chinese puppet or a launching pad for American and Indian power against China.

Simple geography makes a general conflict over Tibet unlikely. Located on some of the most mountainous terrain in the world, moving large armies would be next to impossible in the region, with the consequence that conflicts like the Sino-Indian war of 1962 were contained by the simple inability of the combatants to bring supplies and reinforcements to the front. Making Tibet a neutral buffer state would simply exacerbate these challenges by denying the likely combatants a common border behind which to build up military infrastructure. It may well be that China and India would become rivals for influence in Lhasa, but this would be a diplomatic war of shadows rather than a physical one, just like the current competition for influence in Myanmar which is in a similar position,[1] and it would be a conflict which would provide Tibet with the opportunity to play the rivals off against each other in a way that would safeguard its independence as well as peace in the region. [1] Kuppuswamy, C.S., ‘MYANMAR: Sandwiched between China & India and gaining from both’, South Asia Analysis Group, 31 January 2008, Paper no. 2574, http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers26%5Cpaper2574.html
Tibet is a distinct nation with a distinct history that China illegally invaded

Tibet has a long history of independence going back more than 1500 years. Even in times of Chinese “domination”, Tibetans largely governed themselves independently of the small number of Chinese officials in Lhasa.[1] Tibet at most was a tributary of China, and was no more part of it than Thailand, Myanmar or Korea. And from 1911 until 1950 it was entirely independent and conducted its foreign relations as such, for example remaining neutral in World War II despite both its neighbours the Republic of China and the British Empire being on the side of the Allies. Tibet’s annexation by China occurred under the guns of 40,000 Chinese soldiers, and the precedent begun by the invasion stands as one of the few post-1945 cases in which the national principle was abandoned and the only one in which a fully independent state vanished from the map. When one notes that Tibetans have their own language, and a history that includes far more wars with the Chinese than examples of kinship, Chinese arguments of sovereignty have little bearing on the reality.[2] [1] van Walt, Michael C., ‘The legal status of Tibet’, Cultural Survival Quarterly (Vol. 12, 1988), http://www.freetibet.org/about/legal-status [2] Tsering, Lhasang, ‘India’s Tibet: A Case for Policy Review’, 17 March 2000, http://www.friendsoftibet.org/articles/india.html
Tibetans are rapidly becoming a minority in their own country

Due to systematic campaign of Sinocization, millions of Han Chinese have been encouraged to settle in Tibet, and with the support of the government they now dominate the economy and upper echelons of the administration. Demographically Tibetans are rapidly becoming a minority within their own country, and administratively this has already taken place. While short of open genocide, the intent of the Chinese government is quite clearly the elimination of the Tibetan people as a distinct national, cultural and linguistic group. Not only are they attempting to drown them through settlement, but Tibetan students are forced to learn Mandarin in the schools and are being taught that they are Chinese. While there may well have been past periods of Chinese sovereignty, the policies of the current Beijing government seem designed to produce an outcome far more permanent than those past efforts which respected Tibetan identity and culture.
An independent Tibet would serve as a buffer state between India and China, reducing the chances of a regional clash

An independent Tibet would serve a useful purpose as a neutral and demilitarized buffer state between India and China. Given the rising economic and military clout of both powers, a future conflict is becoming ever more likely, and they already fought one war against one another in 1962. An independent Tibet would mean that the two nations would no longer have a common border, making their rivalry less practical and far less pressing. This would reduce military obligations for both, and prevent the Tibetans from being caught in the middle of a future conflict.
Tibet presents an explosive domestic political issue for China which the latter would benefit from eliminating

Tibet, and the resistance Tibetans continue to show to Chinese rule presents a toxic domestic and international political problem that costs far more than it worth. Domestically, violence in Tibet is the most serious domestic disturbance facing the Chinese government, and the fact that there is nearly constant violence between Han Settlers and Tibetans forces the Chinese to alienate everyone in order to contain it. Furthermore, the economic and political disenfranchisement of the Tibetan people is an enormous domestic problem, as it has led to large numbers becoming unemployed and moving to other parts of China where they form an underclass. Internationally, the Tibetan issue keeps China’s Human Rights record in the news and almost torpedoed the 2008 Olympic games. Given that China is already losing money on the province, it may well be worth it for China to jettison it in order to gain much greater international benefits.