The Kalam cosmological argument is sound

This debate originated from a thread I made some days ago (. http://www.debate.org...) where Jedi4 and I decided to debate God and presentism. I suggested doing both in the context of the Kalam argument, which is why I am going to focus on presentism in my rebuttal. Without further ado, let's get started. DefinitionsPresentism - Presentism is the view that only present objects exist. (1)Eternalism - Eternalism is the view that objects from both the past and the future exist just as much as present objects. (1)Premise 1P1) Whatever begins to exist has a cause. First of all we have to be clear on what is meant by "begins to exist". William L. Craig defines it as follows:e comes into being at t if and only if (i) e exists at t, (ii) t is the first time at which e exists, (iii) there is no state of affairs in the actual world in which e exists timelessly, and (iv) e’s existing at t is a tensed fact. (2)(iv) predicates the Kalam on the A-theory of time and with it presentism. Hence I am going to present two objections to it. Special RelativityThis is probably the most well known objection to presentism and it is pretty straight forward. Presentism asserts that there is one single plane of simultaneity, a single privileged frame of reference. Einstein's special theory of relativity treats time like just another dimension together with the three spatial dimensions. Accordingly the notion of a present time is meaningless in Minkowski spacetime as there is no observer independent plane of simultaneity. The only ontology of time this is compatible with is eternalism. RelationsBoth of the following objections are derived from Theodore Sider's book Four-Dimensionalism. Minor Objection: Cross-Time RelationsPresentism has a very intuitive side and a very counterintuitive one. For example it intuitively makes sense to say "dinosaurs don't exist". This is compatible with presentism as only present objects exist. However what is rather difficult for a presentist is to make sense of propositions like 'Once dinosaurs roamed the earth'. Typically a presentist wants to allow some talk about past and future events and therefore introduces tense operators like 'WAS(Φ)' and 'WILL(Φ)', which can be informally expressed as "At some past time t, Φ was is true at t" and "At some future time t, Φ is true at t" respectively. For example 'Once dinosaurs roamed the earth' could be translated into 'WAS (Dinosaurs roam the earth)'. These operators are not ontologically committing. At first glance it might seem like the presentist is able to talk about other times, however, in the following I am going to present a example from Sider's book utilizing cross-time relations (2):Consider the claim that some American philosophers admire some Greek philosophers, how would a presentist capture this? ExEy(x is an American philosopher, and y is an ancient Greek philosopher, and x admires y)This would obviously be false since presently no ancient Greeks exist. WAS: ExEy(x is an American philosopher, and y is an ancient Greek philosopher, and x admires y)Is just as erroneous, because at no time when an American philosopher existed, an ancient Greek philosopher existed, too. Ex(x is an American philosopher, and WAS: Ey(y is an ancient Greek philosopher, and x admires y))Here 'x admires y' is in the scope of the 'WAS' operator, and existence is no longer at issue. However there is yet another problem since this claim is about two separate times at once and we cannot treat both as real. Another example by David Lewis goes like this: "There have been two kings of England named George". Since the 'WAS' operator can only be true at an instant, not time spans. It seems hard to capture. Major Objection: Cross-Time Spatial RelationsWe have seen that presentists struggle with these kinds of statements, however the actual defeater is yet to come. Science requires us to compare objects' locations at different times to understand velocity and acceleration. According to the Russellian theory of motion an object's instantaneous velocity is not just defined by how an object is at one particular time, but instead to have instantaneous v at t is to be located appropriately at infinitesimally immediate future and past times. The presentist cannot capture this in his tensed language. Premise 2As established under Premise one, eternalism is the superior ontology of time. Therefore, as William L. Craig himself puts it, "[t]he universe began to exist only in the sense that the tenselessly existing block universe has a front edge. It has a beginning only in the sense that a yardstick has a beginning" (3), not a beginning in the sense required for the KCA. My opponent brings up the Borde-Guth-Vilenkin Theorem in support of his position. However the BGV theorem does not conclude a universe had to begin, it concludes that it is past indeterminate (we have yet to figure out what is happening). Furthermore it relies on classical physics and as such does not take into account quantum mechanics. "Premise" 3Unfortunately I wrote "P3" instead of "C)" last round. This was a mistake since "Therefore, the universe has a cause. " is of course the conclusion, not a premise. ConclusionI have presented several serious objections to the KCA and negated the resolution. Sources(1) . http://plato.stanford.edu...(2) Theodore Sider, Four-Dimensionalism, p.26(3) . http://www.reasonablefaith.org...