God exists

Rebuttals What does it mean to say that an entity is, if we do not know what 'is' means, or what the difference between entity and non-entity is? Because these issues in pre-ontology have not been worked out, we are necessarily on a weak foundation when we jump from pre-ontology to ontology. Truth and existence are tautologically related. If statement X is true, then it is a description of existence, and if X exists, then any statement which reflects this fact is true. If existence has no meaning, then truth has no meaning. But if truth has no meaning, then consistent and inconsistent theories are of equal validity (a contradiction). Indeed, Sargon's statement - that existence isn't necessarily understood - is wholly based on the truth concept. Since this is necessarily true, no such argument can be considered valid. Quite simply, acknowledging that something exists is to rule out its nonexistence. Existence means inclusion in the most general sense (that is, in every included sense) and non-existence means exclusion. Dylan argues that nothingness is actually an unbounded, infinite ontological potential. Given this definition, anything and everything that is logically possible could actualize itself from this unbounded, infinite ontological potential. Like I said, only possibilities with an intrinsic capacity to define and maintain their own existences can be actualized. My argument, as described in the previous round, is that only God satisfies this requirement. In order for there to be a real difference between two things, both must be embedded in a common medium providing the metric of separation. Therefore, a single reality exists, and therefore only one God exists. If only a certain type of entity could actualize itself from this unbounded, infinite ontological potential, then "nothingness" would be constrained, which Dylan seeks to refute in his opening statement.That which exists must conform to the rules of existence i.e. logic, in order to distinguish itself from nonexistence. Without two-valued logic, distinctions are impossible. Entities which are logically incapable of defining and maintaining their own existences cannot self-actualize; they defeat themselves in the very attempt to, as they have no means by which to self-actualize. Furthermore, if only a certain type of entity could actualize itself from this unbounded, infinite ontological potential, then it is not really "unbounded" or "infinite" in any usual sense of the terms.UBT is unbounded, but reality is a self-restriction of this protomedium and must conform to a logical structure in order to be recognizable as something which "exists" as opposed to something which doesn't exist. In keeping with this requirement, reality must actively distinguish that which it is from that which it is not - that is, maintain its identity. Ultimately, this is possible only through structural closure implying that reality is self-referential. Therefore, we must conclude that anything and everything that is logically possible can actualize itself from this unbounded, infinite ontological potential.Anything that is "logically possible" is predicated on self-consistency (that is, identity), and identity requires God for reasons I explained last round. It's not enough that something be logically possible given a pre-existing framework - it must also define and maintain such a framework. Reality must enforce its own consistency, which requires a self-distributed and coherent identity (God). However, this entails that Dylan's position is rather than absurd. For if an entity like god can actualize himself from this infinite, unbound potential, why can"t all kinds of beings actualize themselves as well? In fact, Sargon, an entity "like God" is the only thing which can self-actualize. His "complexity" is not a hinderance to self-actualization, but a sin qua non of existence itself. It's absurd to think that god would have any reason to stop entities like leprechauns and unicorns from actualizing themselves. What difference would it make to god? This means that we can do with away the possibility that they are excluded by god. You assume that something would exist unless God prevents it, when really, something exists only when God permits it. This is because God is the guiding principle of existence, and the cause of all things. Now, the only option left is that these "lesser possibilities" are contained within god. Since god is synonymous with reality in Dylan's ontology, then it would follow that these lesser possibilities still exist, so the problem of unicorns and leprechauns also still exists.The lesser possibilities do not insist on their actualization at the expense of displacing others. Only God can do that since it requires self-referentiability. However, this argument fails because of the first premise...Denying the existence of god does not necessarily entail that there is something external to god which prevents god from existing.Yes, the concept of God must be consistent with the concept of God for the argument to work (however, this is a trivial observation insofar as consistency is a requirement for anything to be real). That's why I would like to resolve any paradoxes associated with God's attributes. This argument also suffers from the fact that none of our R1 definitions define god as "unrestrained" or "without constraint", so Dylan's statements that this property belongs to the definition of god are entirely unfounded in the context of this debate.Omnipotence implies an arbitrary ability to define and remove constraint. God could not be described as all-powerful if he were unable to do something because of something external to himself, and not simply because the action was incoherent and therefore not "something" which he could do/not do. The Euthyphro DilemmaDylan argues that god is the basis of objective morality. This contention is subject to the famous Euthyphro dilemma: "Is it good because god chooses it, or does god choose it because it is good?". This assumes an either-or situation when that need not be the case. I contend that it is both - that neither "leads" to the other, but that the two necessarily coincide in order for reality to have a closed structure. That is, objective morality = God's morality (since God is reality). Now the question changes...instead of asking "why is God's morality good" we must ask "why is God's morality God's morality". The answer, of course, is that since God is self-justifying, God's morality is God's morality because it is God's morality. This may seem arbitrary, but that's merely because God's morality is self-justifying and cannot be externally justified. The case is no different for logical tautologies...X = X because it does (it is self-proving), but that doesn't mean the statement is non-objective. Indeed, it is based on logic itself! If the second horn is true, then objective morality exists whether or not god exists, and the existence of god is irrelevant to the existence of good. If the first horn is true, then the theist is left in an absurd situation...I can't make that decision based on what's just or unjust, fair or unfair, good or bad. There is no good or bad until I decide! But that means god's decision would have to be arbitrary!" [5] The theist is stuck between god's decisions being arbitrary, and god's existence being irrelevant to the existence of good. This argument makes the assumption that in order for a moral standard to be objective, it must be based on something external. In other words, it assumes that since God doesn't base his moral reasoning on any pre-existing ethical framework, it must be random in origin, and based on nothing. But that merely rules out the possibility of self-justification. There is nothing more oxymoronic than a self-justifying, self-determinative entity which chooses its moral standard for what it considers to be an arbitrary reason. P1: An infinite, unbound ontological potential existsP2: God cannot be the cause of this infinite, unbound ontological potential.P3: The definition of god is that god is the cause of everything that is realP4: By P1 and P2, there is a real entity that god did not causeC: By P3 and P4, god does not existAn infinite, unbound ontological potential is not real in the sense which requires a cause. Reality is by definition all and only that which is real, and unbound potential is incompatible with such a distinction (or definition of any kind). In this sense UBT is meta-paradoxical, and is why reality can be described as a self-resolving paradox (that is, since UBT lacks definition, it also has definition i.e. reality). It should be noted that UBT does not cause reality, it just doesn't stop reality from causing itself. Unreality is defined with respect to reality by reality in order for reality to be defined. That is, UBT's existence can only be extrapolated, and only exists qua existence. In regards to P2, god cannot be the cause of this infinite, unbound ontological potential. Why? Because it is absurd for an entity to be the cause of its necessary conditions. This infinite, unbound ontological potential is a necessary condition of god"s existence because god requires this "sea of potential" to bring himself into being. UBT does not need a cause, as it lacks structure and therefore has no definition. Langan: … UBT "contains" other positive properties in the sense that it represents the suspension of their definitive constraints, and the superposition of the things thereby distinguished. To put it as simply as possible, unbound potential is simply the logical complement of constraint with respect to syntax-state relationships, and is a requisite of any attempt to meaningfully define or quantify constraints...Jacob asks "from whence arose the UBT?" Since UBT is nil constraint, it doesn't need to have "arisen"; causes are necessary only in the presence of informational content (that's really the point).(Out of characters...)