Moral absolutism does not explain moral judgments

First, a definition so our debate doesn't run rampant with relativistic definitions... Moral Absolutism: "Moral absolutism is the meta-ethical view that certain actions are absolutely right or wrong, devoid of the context of the act." (http://en.wikipedia.org...) Absolutism: "any theory holding that values, principles, etc., are absolute and not relative, dependent, or changeable." (Dictionary.com). **************************************** My opponent must be of the opinion that absolute moral positions are *possible*, else there would be no point for this debate. His contention is that whatever these absolute moral position are, they do not adequately explain moral judgments. I take this to presumably mean that when one makes the statement "Eating chocolate ice cream is morally reprehensible," he indicates that an absolutist position on this topic (eating chocolate ice cream) does not adequately explain the moral import of the action. Second, Pro's burden of proof is not merely to show the position of moral absolutism to be in error - he must also disconnect the position from moral judgment. Else it would be possible to have the following conversation: A: Eating ice cream is always morally reprehensible. B: That statement is false, I'm going to eat some anyway. A: That is an immoral action. B: What? No it's not! A: Sure it is - you just don't accept moral absolutism. ********************************** Some responses: >> "if universe x contained all natural properties y and has moral standing z, then a universe x* that contained all natural properties y would be hard to explain as having a different moral standing, and, therefore, would typically be thought to have moral standing z." Correct... >> "The lack of explanation for how moral properties could be independent of natural properties and yet there be an apparent correlation between natural properties and moral claims demands explanation (21-2)." This statement presupposes that moral theory is dependent on natural properties in a morally absolutist system. If one can show an absolutist moral position that does not require natural properties, then the statement is moot. >> "that it is not self-contradictory for a man to claim that an action is right, but decreases the net happiness of the world (105)." Grammar aside, this statement concerns utilitarianism, which is inherently subjective (to whomever "assesses" the situation) and really doesn't apply to moral absolutism at all... *********************************** To negate the resolution, I shall provide an absolutist moral position that explains moral judgment. It is usually held that man has certain basic rights that are held by virtue of being a human - i.e. that these rights are not "earned" but simply exist. For example, the right to life is held as one that exists (but can sometimes be lost by virtue of one's actions). I put forth the position that the basic right of self-determination in mind and body introduces a moral obligation to respect that right in others. It is impossible to hold the right AND violate that same right in others - as soon as you violate it, you would lose your own right, just as with one's right to life. The absolute position that "There is a always morally right to have a right to self-determination" explains moral judgments. Now, it is possible for an individual to not have a right to self-determination, but for that to be the case, he would have necessarily already had the right and simply lost it by virtue of his actions. Furthermore, the right to self-determination carries with it the right to a normative moral theory, as this normative theory is a necessary part of making a moral judgment. The right to a relative moral theory vis ï¿½ vis the moral right to self-determination explains all moral judgments, as we are not concerned with the particulars of one's normative moral theory. I look forward to my esteemed opponent's rebuttal.