The Non-Aggression Principle Is a Flawed Moral Position

Let me begin by pointing out that Pro has dropped both of my constructive arguments - the justification for the NAP and the problems with relying on ethical intuition. This should mean an auto-win for me. To summarize Pro's case, he expects us to just agree with utilitarianism without giving any argument for it while dismissing my objections with a wave of the hand. === Pro Case === 1. Utilitarian critique A) Pro doesn't answer my point that his argument is circular. "Utilitarianism is utilitarian" is not an argument. He says he doesn't believe in meta-ethics. I'm not sure how to respond to this other than to point out that this is not an argument either. This whole debate is centered on meta-ethics; imagine two biologists debating the phylogeny of some newly discovered organism when one side suddenly announces that he's not sure he believes in the scientific method. This is a huge concession by Pro. Pro states "if you want humanity you thrive, in my view, your idea should account for consequences. " This is problematic for several reasons. First of all, he is again blurring the line between individual preferences and ethics. What I really want is a society where I'm King and I get to do whatever I want; I'm defending libertarianism as the only consistent and ethically sound political philosophy. Second, this makes ethics a wholly contingent matter. If everyone prefers something other than the betterment of mankind, then the betterment of mankind is no longer of moral value. Third, the idea behind "ethics by consent" is that morality is a social contract with universal affirmation. But if everyone voluntarily agrees to act a certain way, there is no essential conflict with the non-aggression principle. B) Using the rape example, I've tried to drive a wedge between "human thriving" and the property of moral goodness. Pro responds that good actions must not only produce a net benefit, but the greatest possible net benefit. First of all, this doesn't really answer the objection. It's still logically possible that gang rape could be the best course of action in a given situation. Pro has no response to this. Second, I think this approach creates more problems than it solves. Cross-apply the knowledge problem; it's virtually impossible to know what the best possible course of action is in any given situation. If I'm a fireman and a car crashes right in front of a burning building, I have to make a decision about who to help first. I might not know how many people I can save through either course of action. If I run in to the building and save three kids and a box of kittens instead of four kids and a puppy who die in the car crash, I've behaved immorally according to Pro. C) I didn't have time defend the utility monster argument in the previous round, so it would be poor conduct to revive it at this point. TURN - Pro tries to attack the uniqueness here by arguing that if we take the knowledge problem seriously, then ethics is meaningless. I disagree. Even if it is a problem for all ethical theories, it is much more damaging to utilitarianism, as Pro's argument seems to implicitly admit. Pro thinks certain outcomes are good while others are bad. But if outcomes can be intrinsically good or bad, why can't actions? Under a system of deontological ethics, certain actions are categorically wrong. By contrast, on utilitarianism, it's literally impossible to know how your actions will affect the grand scheme of things. Utilitarianism fails to provide any sort of guide to how one ought to lead a moral life. 2. Appeal to basic necessities A) Dropped by Pro. B) I'm not sure what Pro is getting at here. I don't see what universal preferability has to do with anything. C) My argument here doesn't rely on any particular conception of rights, I'm just pointing out the logical implications of Pro's position. You can't have two equally valid yet conflicting rights claims; that's just how the law of non-contradiction works. So in order to maintain that person A has a right to aggress against some random stranger, B, for the "greater good," one would also have to affirm that B has no right to try to defend himself, which is counter-intuitive to say the least. Again, the NAP is theory of rights based on property. It doesn't say whether I ought or ought not break into someone's apartment to save myself if I'm hanging from their balcony; it merely explains that I forfeit my own rights to the same exent that I violate the rights of others. This is not relevant to the debate. 3. The unjust society The history of the estate is very relevant. Assuming the initial distribution of property is just, any subsequent changes made through voluntary transaction "preserve" the justice of the original distribution. Thus, by definition, any theory of redistributive justice is incompatible with the right of individuals to make free choices. As I've already pointed out, the institutions of entail and primogeniture were largely responsible for feudalism. These legal constructs are totally illegitimate under libertarian law, so the property owners have essentially forfeited any right they may have had to the land. Conclusion: All of Pro's arguments are all essentially the same: what if the NAP leads to bad things? But absent a metaethical case, this is just circular reasoning. I could try to defend libertarianism by pointing out how each scenario is unlikely to arise, but this pointless since one can always think of new possibilities. Moreover, this approach ignores the bigger picture: Pro has given us absolutely no reason to accept utilitarianism, nor has he given any metaethical reason to reject libertarianism.