This House would Rather be in than Out.

(In the following I will refer to my position as either "the negative"—or, sometimes, as is fitting for parliamentary debate, "the opposition.") My opponent's presupposing a causal basis for any intended effects is the problem inherent to the resolution (and on a note about effects, this is something that necessarily has to be answered for by my opponent since, as Rawls' definition of justice put forth by my opponent—in a criminally simplistic manner—requires that agents are given their due); the first contention laying the groundwork for the second and third clearly exhibits the problem of causality undermining any claim to impact: the affirmative has not established how joining this court will deter terrorist recruitment—that is, how does A give rise to B?— Or, simply put, how does a court prevent crimes to humanity? I only know of courts that convict crimes against humanity post facto. Moreover, the question of why terrorists would find the United States' joining this court to be appealing, such that their motivations for carrying out violent acts is quelled, has yet to be addressed--Why would accountability make it difficult to recruit terrorists?—Has the affirmative considered that the motivations for joining a terrorist organization are much more complex than keeping a country in check?—On second thought, perhaps the affirmative has a point, maybe it's simply desirable to make recruitment efforts "more [difficult]"—but wouldn't their strategies for "manipulating the populace" merely adapt, should the United States join this hypothetical court? Their selling point would just differ in content, but not in motivation or content.—Thus, Justice doesn't seem like it would be "achieved" in this superficial act of accountability, for even the most corrupt organizations modify their justifications so as to continue their efforts (which, on this last point, is implicitly my argument against the alleged policing through pressure, from a membership nonetheless,--if, for supposition's sake, tyrannical regimes justify themselves through American hypocrisy, why wouldn't they just modify their justification for tyranny, my opponent assumes these individuals to be more stupid than they are). Should the clearly fallacious causal basis of my opponent's plan not have been convincing, or the absurdly simplistic assumption of motivations and justifications not have been convincing, perhaps the complexity of raising the issue of uniqueness ought to suffice. If the state's primary obligation is to ensure the right to and protection of life, liberty, and property, I'd like to ask my opponent if the United States is, in fact, already doing so (what's the status quo?). Are there protections of life in the United States such that there are no monetarily poor individuals who, because they are human and have a right to live, receive the care they require in order to maintain that right?—That is, what's meant by "right to life"?—For one may argue that a fetus has a right to life, and yet one may argue that the poor man on the corner who is starving to death does not have a "right to life,"—furthermore, though this is not an argument advocated by the opposition, has the affirmative considered the famous sentient being argument made by Peter Singer where Dr. Singer claims that what's really due in the instance of, say, a child whose born with cognitive impairment, is to terminate newborns, who lack personhood. Why, you may ask? Because, according to Dr. Singer's claim, lacking personhood—rationality, autonomy, and self-consciousness, aspects that will not be developed in the case of said newborn—means having no life whatsoever, cattle has more sentience than said case. And don't mistake here that this argument about right to life here cited is not the argument of the opposition, but it highlights the great defect in my opponent's argument: what do you mean by "life"?—What do you mean by "right to"? Because many would argue that the United States' policy on euthanasia is inhumane since it is a natural life, something anyone is due, to end their life—because it is their own!--This is a crucial issue, my opponent claims that there will be something righteous about joining the hypothetical court (the one with the magical powers of preventing crime), since the United States will be able to clean up the world of bad-guys by putting pressure on allegedly totalitarian regimes—but, this is completely mislead, in fact, it serves to be quite imperial (thus perpetuating the problem my opponent claims to solve), because it will impart occidental-centric values upon the rest of the world—I mean this in all seriousness, why is it that my opponent assumes we must condemn these other nations? Has my opponent considered that in, say, a nation like Saudi Arabia, where, according to we narrow-minded Americans, a woman' rights to liberty are violated, but do not assume that the rights to familial life are in fact protected by Saudi law? The family, simply put, is an integral part of that nation's culture, and those dictates about, say, dress, are family's right in Islamic life, the appearance of the mother of the child, the appearance of the wife of the husband, is private. Given that it's evident my opponent operates under a pipe-dream (or, simply put, unfounded) causal basis, my opponent has negated the plight of those who resort to inflicting terror, and my opponent doesn't even understand the problem of Justice, I will now propose the better plan. The opposition's plan is quite simple, in fact it treats all of the faulty presuppositions of the opponent's by not assuming a value system that the United States can export; the United States ought to be the first nation to start a debate league of politicians, from any nation or political organization, to debate issues for the purposes of producing dialogue about values and justice, under the stipulation that none of the views expressed are to be assumed to be an official policy of those nation's participating. This plan would give what's truly due: a moment to discuss why one's values, policies, legal system, foreign policy, is the way it is or ought to be the way it is—had anyone, prior to the invasion of Iraq, bothered to ask Sadaam Hussein he thought would happen if he reformed his country?—did anyone bother to ask whether such a state wouldn't split due to a power struggle between those who have long ties of bad blood and quite different outlooks on what is the good life?—Perhaps the United States may show some humility for a moment, if it decided to engage in transparent debates with others, perhaps this might show that the United States has something to learn, especially since my opponent clearly exhibits its lack of valuing the field of inquiry known as Comparative Justice. This problem is exhibited quite clearly in my opponent's speech and will be in this subsequent debate: what is justice?--What is right?—What is equitable?—Whose vision of the good life is best?—How can one assess differing value systems?—And so forth.