The argument from evil is successful

Thanks to Modi for the spirited exchange. I’ll finish with a (suitably partisan) summary. Modi’s Magnificent Maneouver – Massively Mistaken! Modi’s original defeater: (m1) We know of “lots” of instances where evil is justified. (m2) Given such epistemic limitations as (VEG) and (NPC) it is unlikely that we will find justification for each and every evil that has occurred. (m3) Given (1) and (2) it is at least as likely that a given evil has justification as that it does not. (m4) Therefore, we are under no epistemic obligation to raise our credence concerning the non-existence of God. My objection was a reductio – MMM-esque reasoning means we ignore evidence wrongly, like seeing swans: (r1) We know of "lots" of instances where a swan is black. (r2) Given such epistemic limitations as (visual defects) and (lack of omnipresence), it is unlikely we will observe black swans for each and every occurrence of a black swan. (r3) Given (1) and (2) it is at least as likely that a given swan is black as that it is not. (r4) Therefore, we are under no obligation to raise our credence concerning the existence of non-black swans [when faced with apparently non-black swans] Modi initially objected that this relies on a minority ‘lots’ case, and that isn’t the ‘lots’ he meant. So I showed that the reductio doesn’t hinge on a minority ‘lots’ case, by switching to white swans. Modi now says the reductio doesn’t work because visual faculties (that see stuff) aren’t the same as moral faculties (that do stuff like apprehend justification). That’s true, but the reductio does not hinge on that either. We could concoct yet another reductio about moral justification (e.g. you see me punching a child, but I point out the many instances you have seen me do good, and your limited moral faculties). There is a reason MMM is easy to reductio. The inference rule that makes (m3) follow from (m1) and (m2) is: Modi’s rule: When there are lots of observations of X, and we know it is unlikely our faculties will see X for each and every occurrence of X, we should believe an appearance of not-X is at least as likely to be X as it is not Modi’s rule is mad. All our faculties - moral, perceptual, whatever – are unlikely to see X for each and every occurrence of X (for pretty much any X). But that doesn’t mean apparently not-X is still likely X! When we see a white swan, there probably is a white swan, even though we’ve seen lots of non-white swans and we know our vision will not pick up swan non-whiteness in each and every case. When we see an unjustified evil, there probably is an unjustified evil even though (rather, even if) we’ve seen lots of justified evils, and we know our moral faculties will not pick up evil justification in each and every case. There are valid arguments that motivate scepticism in our moral faculties. I’ve even revised MMM myself to make it valid. Modi has rejected these alternatives in favour of the moribund MMM. The reductios show MMM to be fallacious. As he has not presented a valid (let alone sound) defeater, he has provided no reason to believe the argument from evil is unsuccessful. Bayes Modi’s new Bayesian claim is that about half observed evils are justified, and half are inscrutable (“[F]or all occurrences of evil .5 are justified and .5 are inscrutable”). He seems to think that unless we can provide some evidence that there are more than half inscrutable, the argument from evil is not successful. But look: P(U|E & O & J & ~G) is at least as likely as P(U|G)[1] Where does the proportion of unjustified evils come in? Nowhere! In principle, a single case of inscrutable evil can be evidence against God – that there are as many members of the set J as set U doesn’t prove the likelihood above. It is orthogonal to the argument. What would be on point is a demonstration of how E&J (and O, if you like) screen off this apparent confirmation. But Modi’s argument is a fallacy – so whatever evidence he thinks he has his premises doesn’t matter. Again, there are valid Bayesian defeaters (and, again, I have offered them), but, again, Modi has rejected these. Too bad for him. (Parenthetical remarks) 1) Modi has never argued why human-justified evils are evidence of God justified evils, asserting so instead: R3: Thras argues that we are not interested in simply justifying reasons for evils (J), but rather God-justifying reasons. However, by identifying evils for which we find justification we have a plausible reason why, in conjunction with our epistemic limitations and the vastly superior capabilities of an omni-God, the evils … have justification we are ignorant of. R4: If we know of instances of human justification in addition to the plausibility of an omni-God then it is further plausible that God has justification for evils we do not know. [W]e experience justified evils (call them “human justified”), but we also know that we have serious epistemic limitations especially in regard to the metaphysical. Considering an omni-God, and God’s epistemic superiority, it is likely that he knows/has justification for evils we are not aware. Besides calling the lack of argument, I also showed why it is wrong. R3: [evils we perform] are justified through casual limitation: there is no other way of getting the goods in question. God does not labour under these limits… R4: [J]ustification for evils we perform almost always relies on our limited casual powers, something God doesn’t have… Modi asserts this is false; again, no argument why. 2) Modi, in R4, notes an Alston-esque analogy to buttress his sceptical claims: Consider the epistemic difference between an infant and a grown-up. Are we to conclude that an infant has the needed epistemic access to assess and quantify the implications of various “evils”?... [N]either should we assume that if a God exists we have the needed access to what justifies his actions either. I pre-empted this all the way back in R2: [F]or us not to trust our appearances, it needs to be shown that our moral faculties are too poor to have access to whether an evil is gratuitous: it is not enough to show that our faculties are far inferior to someone else's (e.g. God's). That are moral faculties are far inferior to God, if he exists, doesn’t show we lack access to whether evils are justified or not, in the same way that our chess faculties are far inferior to God, if he exists, doesn’t show we lack access to whether White is in mate. 3) Modi asserts that Free will is a plausible reason for stuff like cancer. Firstly note that plausible accounts are not strong enough to show an evil is probably God-justified, so these accounts do not show there is lots of justified evil. Besides, cancer isn’t a necessary constituent of free will, so we can have both free will and no cancer. So free will isn’t even a plausible reason to permit cancer.[2] 4) None of Modi’s free will story answers the moral paralysis charge[3]: it might be ‘enough’ for God that we are freely willing to do the good, but good will is not enough. If want to know what actually does good, and we can’t know because we cannot trust appearances, then we’re still paralysed. (see Sehon 2011, pp. 76-79) Conclusion Modi has failed to provide a valid argument. He has also failed to support any of his premises. For these reasons his defeater is a failure. The argument from evil remains undefeated, and consequently unsuccessful. Vote pro. Enjoy life, Thrasymachus [1] Switched I to U. [2] Plantinga’s FWD (cited above by Modi) does not attempt to show free will is a plausible reason, but the weaker claim that it is epistemically possible there is no possible world with creaturely free will without evil. [3] Modi is right: moral paralysis does not interact with MMM, as MMM a) uses a weaker sceptical claim, and b) is fallacious. I offered moral paralysis to rebut valid sceptical defeaters which Modi never presented. (All these parenthetical remarks are unnecessary, as I do not need to rebut the premises of a fallacious argument).