Justice requires the recognition of animal rights

Burden of Proof The resolution clearly indicates this debate is about something more than mere "consideration" of animals. It is about animal rights. My opponent, as Pro, has the burden to show a just society must grant animals access to legal rights. Pro states the "animal rights"-burden cannot be fulfilled. Not sure why, both Peter Singer and Martha Nussbaum argue for animal rights and not only for moral consideration. This suggests the burden can be fulfilled. That said, by arguing the burden cannot be fulfilled, Pro implies that animals cannot be holders of legal rights. Pro in effect concedes the debate when Pro asks readers to "prefer" his "equal consideration"-burden because it is "actually able to be fulfilled." Nussbaum 2 According to Pro, Nussbaum 2 claims that capabilities in different species are "equal and trade off with one another." Pro claims this does not mean capabilities deserve "equal consideration." I agree. It turns out I was granting Pro a stronger argument than Pro was actually making. Pro admits equal capabilities does not lead to equal consideration. So what is Pro saying here? That the capability of a human to swim is equivalent to another animal's capability to swim. The capabilities can "trade off with one another." I agree. What does this fact tell us about moral consideration of animals? According to Pro's own argument, absolutely nothing. Pro claims I have no support for my claim that human life is more valuable than the life of a dog. I supported the claim in two ways: 1) because Pro admits humans can use and kill animals, implying human life is more valuable than animal life; and 2) by referring to deeply held moral intuitions (which are the basis of all ethical thinking). Contention 1 Pro claims a "life is not the same thing as a capability." I agree. But depriving anything of life necessarily deprives it of the capacity to exercise all its capabilities. Pro claims the capabilities animals possess should be allowed to flourish. What are the consequences of allowing animals to exercise their capabilities freely? If I am not mistaken, it means a grizzly bear with the natural capability to kill and eat humans should be allowed to exercise that capability. I disagree. Granting a grizzly bear the right to kill humans conflicts with our deepest moral intuitions. Pro claims killing animals is allowed as long as it "gives consideration to the animal's capabilities." Killing, by definition, deprives animals of their capabilities. How can Pro justify the killing and exploitation of animals by humans while arguing for animal rights? Pro's position is logically incoherent. Pro "extends" evidence that "ownership of animals isn't prohibited by justice." Human ownership of animals is incompatible with animal rights. When an animal becomes the property of a human, it becomes the equivalent of a slave. We are allowed to do whatever we want to our property. If an animal has rights, it cannot be property. Pro admits that justice allows animals to be property. Hence, Pro admits that justice does not require animal rights. Pro claims I commit plagiarism. I explicitly cited Posner, and I follow that with a direct quote. As for the paraphrasing with similar wording, I wanted to explain Posner's thought-experiment using as little character space as possible. Regardless of what Pro may think, I referenced Posner. But so what if I had not cited Posner? The argument still holds. Pro can try to draw attention away from Posner's argument by calling it plagiarism, but that does not change validity of the argument. Pro claims Posner's argument rests on a "fallacious appeal to emotions." But Pro does not explain why or how it is "fallacious." The argument is a thought-experiment intended to bring out our moral intuitions. Moral intuitions are the heart of moral philosophy, and they are usually brought out by thought-experiments. Even the results of Kant's moral constructivism (categorical imperative) is largely determined by our moral intuitions. Let me clarify what Posner's argument says. Posner argues that equality in civil rights occurred because "facts mounted that there were no morally significant differences between humans based on race, sex, or sexual orientation that would support inequality. If and when similar facts emerge about the difference, or lack thereof, between humans and animals, the differences in rights will erode too." The point is that equality is supported through facts, or as Posner states, "facts will drive equality." [1] Claiming that a dog's pain is morally equivalent to an infant's pain is not supported by the facts. Animals are far less judgmental than humans. As long as we feed them, dogs return affection regardless of what we do to them. Animals thus do not deserve equal moral consideration as humans. Pro claims computers are not granted rights "because they are not alive and living, and thus cannot be sentient and conscious." If sentience or consciousness is the quality of things that gives them moral consideration, then whether something is alive or not is irrelevant. Furthermore, there are many examples of things that are "alive and living" that are not the moral equivalent of humans. Mosquitoes and rats, for example. Many scientists and philosophers have argued that computers will achieve consciousness soon. Nonliving things can conceivably have consciousness and feel pain/pleasure. Should we then give moral consideration to nonliving things that are conscious and feel pain/pleasure? Our deepest moral intuitions tell us that computers should be categorically excluded from moral consideration. As such, sentience and consciousness are not sufficient reasons for granting moral consideration. Pro argues that the "killing and exploitation" of animals is a "permissible action." I agree. How does Pro reconcile the killing and exploitation of animals with animal rights? I'm not sure. Pro seems to think that, as long as animals are respected and treated "humanely," that animals have been granted legal rights. But reality is anything but. Pro explicitly admits that human ownership of animals is permissible. If something is property, justice does not require it have rights. Animals can be property, and therefore, do not hold rights. The resolution is negated.