This House would limit the amount of food aid that developed nations can freely provide.

On Practicality and Failure My opponent makes the claim that, because my plan may and most likely will fail, I'm unable to affirm the resolution. This can be shown to be absurd through analogy. Imagine that a debate on the resolution “We should colonize Mars” occurred – it would be impossible to negate the resolution by saying that it's implausible to do such a thing in itself. Any such argument depends on the alternative being better – even if the odds of successfully colonizing Mars were astronomically low but still possible, it should be tried if not doing so would be impossibly worse. In this hypothetical debate, Con could argue that the money spent on the endeavor would be better used elsewhere as a result of the fact that it's overwhelmingly likely that the plan would fail, but this only has impact because the plan failing would be worse than having never tried to follow through with it in the first place. It is the combination of the chance of failure and the effects of the failure which would carry any weight, not the chance of failure alone. For this reason, my opponent must show that even the worst-case scenario of my plan (i.e. the strong dying) would be worse than the status quo to win, and, if I can show the opposite (that even if my plan fails the world would be no worse for it), the chance of success (and the resulting benefits) would outbalance his objections and I would win. The only way to escape this is to show that the success of the plan is logically impossible (in the strictest sense of the word), which my opponent has not done. If it's true that there is no “right” apart from that which the strong call “right”, then, if the strong cannot achieve this state of rightness, everything else is equally a-right – because of this, my opponent cannot claim that the death of the strong is any worse than sharing the world with the weak, since the only possibly positive scenario is the one in which the strong have complete control. With this in mind, the following cost-benefit analysis shows the correct course of action: Choice One: Do nothing – allow the weak to co-inhabit the earth with the men who would otherwise be truly strong. Choice Two: Attempt to exterminate the weak Result of Choice One: The strong are alive, but this is completely a-right, since “rightness” is only defined if the strong are allowed control and have overcome the morality of altruism. Result of Choice Two, Outcome A: The strong die, this is a-right since the strong cannot define “right”. Result of Choice Two, Outcome B: The strong exterminate the weak and gain complete control, and therefore the world is right. Since the worst-case scenario of choice two, a choice which has a possible outcome which would be desirable, is equivalent to the status quo, choice two should be chosen in order for the possible good outcome – after all, if choice two fails, nothing at all is lost. On the Rightness of the Rule of the Strong and the Lack of Value of the Weak My opponent asks: “Why is domination of the weak the rightful order of things? Pro offers no answer.” I did, however, answer this in my first round – quote: “All these illusions [of morality] vanish as soon as the fists of the corporeal Gods strike down upon them and turn them into nothing more than dust – remnants of a misguided and ill culture.” The point here is obvious, though maybe not explicit enough for Con's taste – no moral system has value if it can be freely ignored. As such, the only concept of “rightness” that can exist is that of those who cannot be bound by any other – the Ubermensch. These people, the strong, transcend the ideas of traditional good and evil, and, in doing so, set a new standard: the standard they set. Nothing outside of themselves can bound them, and, as such, there is no code for them to follow but that which they choose to follow – the code of the strong that the strong set by virtue of their strength is the only logical thing to honour. The extermination of the weak follows – for the weak to be worth keeping alive they must give some value to the strong, which is impossible, so they must be a burden, and burdens degrade the status of the strong, so they must be removed. This extends to any country helping the weak, for they themselves are weak and must therefore be a burden to be eliminated. As explained before, helping the weak, for whatever reason, lowers you to their level. If, as Con says, many benefits would potentially come from the weak if they are saved, this reveals something else: the idea that the strong can find any such benefits in the first place. What can benefit a being who is already at the peak of their potential? If a great, albeit weak, scientist were to help a supposedly strong man, this shows that the strong man was incomplete and needed to rely on the weak – because the truly strong man, by virtue of the fact that the strong set their own values unrestrained by others (for the strong are those that overcome), is an island unto himself, being “helped” by the weak shows that he himself isn't strong and therefore has no worth, negating Con's point – no strong man could ever possibly benefit from the weak. On the Paradoxical “Altruistic Strong” and the Idea That I Would Limit the Strong I was accused of dropping this point, but I addressed it completely – here's a recap. My opponent contradicts himself quite clearly here: he first writes “even if being both strong and altruistic is impossible”, accepting, for the sake of argument, that the strong cannot be altruistic (a point of mine that he does nothing to refute), and then says that I can't affirm the resolution because one “cannot prohibit the strong from doing anything.” The disconnect here is obvious, shown in the following set of syllogisms: p.1 Being simultaneously strong and altruistic is impossible (unchallenged) p.2 Certain countries are altruistic c.1 Those countries cannot be strong p.3 Only strong countries must not be governed (unchallenged, given in my case) p.4 Countries that are altruistic are not strong (above) c.2 Countries that are altruistic can be governed q.e.d. My creed is not relativism – this completely relies on the strong and no one else. If one is not strong, they cannot be arbiters of right and wrong, and therefore can be limited without contradiction. On the Folly of Justifying Herd Morality by Appeal to the Acts of the Herd My opponent makes a very odd argument – he argues that he doesn't draw his justifications for his moral system through its widespread acceptance but rather through the fact that many people follow it. This redefinition does nothing to affect my arguments – they all still apply. Even if it's overwhelmingly common for people to view murder as immoral, that doesn't do anything to prove the immorality of murder, just as the widespread acceptance of genocide by the Germans in WWII didn't make such genocide justifiable (for those reasons – it was justified for other and more substantial reasons). The fact of the matter is that my opponent grounds his framework in what most humans believe without realizing that most humans could be flat-out wrong (as they have been in the past, as my opponent must admit). A mass-delusion is a delusion all the same, and it is for this reason that common behaviors do not justify those behaviours – leaving Con's appraisal of morality with no solid supports. The BOP The burden of proof is on Pro insofar as I have to show that restricting food aid is good and prove that my framework that leads to that position is solid; I fully recognize that I have to do everything that Con lists. However, this doesn't mean that Con can be completely passive - Con has the burden of disproving my arguments and showing that either my premises or conclusions are false,which he hasn't accomplished - all he's done is misrepresent what strength is and appeal to a magical "moral intuition" (which amounts to nothing more than saying "You're wrong because I know I'm right”).