The Modal Ontological Argument

In my last round I responded to my opponent"s objection to my argument. Let"s see his response. First, he mischaracterized my statement by saying "Pro states that any possibilities I that I can think of that make God impossible, are God himself." But what I said was "It doesn't matter what you postulate the being to be, that being will be God". Now as he pointed out below, none of the possibilities he mentioned were "beings". But I assumed that "beings" were included, because after all, he did say "So, what can we plug for p? Lots of things! For instance, we could plug p with omnipotence is not actualized in the actual world". The list can go on and on and on, but all these seem at least possible." So if "beings" were not included with this "lots of things", and also not included in the "list" that can go "on and on and on", then I apologize. Second, notice that I directly responded to the specifics that he did give, such as gratuitous suffering and his "omnipotence" argument. Con: "If it is the case that there is a possibility which makes God impossible, then clearly it cannot be God because that would mean God is possible." My response: The only way the existence of God can be impossible would be for there to be a logical contradiction based on the concept of God. That is what Con has to demonstrate. If there are no internal contradictions based on the concept of a MGB, then a MGB must exist in some possible world. So until Con can demonstrate this absurdity, it makes absolutely no sense to speak of God"s existence as being impossible, given the fact that all possible necessary truths must be in fact, TRUE. Con said " Since this is a logical abomination, this argument can be dismissed. Pertaining to the plugs for p, I can say that it is possible that: . All sentience is physically dependent . Gratuitous suffering exists . Omnipotence is not actualized . The total sum of information there is, is unknown None of those are "beings". Thus, Pro's objection here fails." My response: I agree, none of those are "beings", but notice that I"ve already responded to his p"s, so my responses remain untouched. Now here are the meat and potatoes of the whole discussion. My opponent stated that I misunderstood Ryan Stringer"s Argument. Con: "Pro re-iterates that if we grant that God is even possible, then he has to exist. I never contested that so this is a fallacious red-herring." My response: If by "never contested" it means that Con grants the premise, then he has subconsciously admitted that God exists, and here is why: For God to exist, he would exist necessarily, which means that if God DOES exist, it is impossible for him to NOT exist. It means that there are no circumstances at which God doesn"t exist. So if it is possible for God to exist, he must actually exist. There is just no logical way that Con can maintain that it is possible for a MGB to exist, but that such a being doesn"t exist. If it is possible for God to exist, but God doesn"t exist, then how can that possibility be actualized? Necessity is not something that you can acquire; you must have it as the essence of your very being, and if Con does admit that the existence of God is possible, he is saying that it is possible that a necessary being exists, and since a necessary being cannot "NOT" exist, then such a being must actually exist. He then said, "He (Pro) says God is either impossible, or necessary. The argument from Ryan Stringer claims that if any of those plugs for p is possible, then God is not possible." My response: But I"ve already responded to that and gave reasons WHY those plugs were not necessary (at the very least). Con: "In order for Pro to meet his burden of proof and show P1 of his argument true, he has to show that all the plugs for p are impossible without begging the question by assuming God exists in every possible world already (that would assume God is possible, which is the premise Pro has to prove in the first place). " My response: Notice that he keeps mentioning the "p"s". What he has to do is demonstrate how these p"s are not only possible, but necessarily true. Remember, P1 makes the case for the existence of a necessary being. If Con is not making the case for any "p" to be necessarily true, then we are comparing apples and oranges, and thus far his p plugs have not been shown to be necessarily true and neither one can serve as a defeater of the argument. My opponent quoted me as saying: "Not so fast. God, by definition (that you also granted), is a necessary being, whose attributes are also necessary. If such a being exists, then its omnipotence MUST be actualized in the real world." " Pro" In response to this, he said "I agree 100% with the above. This is what Pro doesn't understand. If God exists, then it would be impossible for omnipotence not be actualized. Since it is possible for omnipotence not to be actualized, then God is not possible and P1 of the Modal Ontological Argument is false. " My response: I think this is a rather weak response by Con. First of all, omnipotence not being actualized does not mean that God is not possible. Suppose God, if such a being existed, decided not to create anything? Is it safe to say that omnipotence is not being actualized? Suppose God existed for all eternity and NEVER ONCE used his power for anything? Does that mean that omnipotence is not actualized? Suppose the very fact that such a being exists is in fact a demonstration of its omnipotence? Is not the concept of a self-contained omnipotent being in itself a demonstration of omnipotence? Con has not given me/us any reasons to believe that just because omnipotence is not actualized, then God is not possible. In fact, quite the contrary, as I just pointed out, God"s existed may not be actualized, and he could still exist, or the very essence of God"s existence could be said to be part of his omnipotence, so either way, Con has not presented a defeater. Con: "This follows Modens Tollens. Pro has to assume that God is possible already, to assume that he exists in every possible world making my plugs for p impossible." My response: But is my assumption a good assumption, or bad assumption? I maintain it is a good assumption, due to the fact that the mere concept of a MGB is logically valid. I have good logically grounds to believe that the concept of a MGB is at least possible. The concept doesn"t violate any laws of logic. If it does, I would like for my opponent to enlighten me on the irrationality of such a concept. If it doesn"t violate laws of logic, then it is at least possible in some world. Not only that; but the good thing about the argument is the fact that it starts off neutral. The argument basically says we don"t know whether God exists, but if it is possible for God to exist, God must exist. The only way to refute the argument is to show a logical absurdity based on the concept, and I just don"t think Con can demonstrate such. Con: "However, it is Premise 1 Pro has to prove and defend in the first place! Since this is circular reasoning and begging the question, Pro's argument fails." My response: Does P1 defy logic? In order for my opponent to refute P1, he has to find some kind of logical absurdity with the concept/definition of God, but remember, he has already granted the definition! He accepts the definition/concept of God, and I will assume that he doesn"t accept the definition as absurd. So if the definition is logical, the only question is whether or not such a being actually exists. But just by admitting that a MGB is POSSIBLY necessarily true, Con admits that a MGB is necessarily true. To admit that it is possible for something to be necessarily true, but actually false, is a categorical error on the part of Con. His response: I agree 100% with the above. This is why if gratuitous suffering is even merely possible, then God is impossible.