The United States Should Intensify Economic Sanctions On North Korea

With that, I will do as he has and launch right into my case. Before I start in, however, I'd just like to both clarify what we're arguing, and ask my opponent to clarify his case in the next round based off of some vague aspects. The topic at hand is "The United States Should Intensify Economic Sanctions On North Korea" and as such, I assume that Pro's position is in support of further sanctions rather than maintaining sanctions at their current level. This is made somewhat more confusing by his statement that he will negate the resolution "The United States Should Lift Economic Sanctions On North Korea," a substantially different topic. As such, it is not my burden in this debate to argue that economic sanctions on North Korea should be lifted, though if I prove that that is net beneficial, it would be sufficient to win this debate. I may simply prove that it is net beneficial to support current sanctions, as this would not intensify them. But here's the concern. Much as Pro has stated the definition of intensify, he needs to state what he means to accomplish specifically here. What trade does Pro intend to reduce specifically? This is essential, because the total volume of trade between the two countries is currently $1.2 million, 95% of which is humanitarian assistance from private agencies. [1] Does he mean to cut off humanitarian assistance to the nation? This would mean directly asserting controls over private agencies within the U. S. to prevent it, and so Pro would have to explain how that policy would work. Maybe he means to address the other $70,000 that goes to the country, but then he would have to prove that that amount of export is sufficient to make a difference in our interactions. Speaking on effects. .. Contention 1: The failure of economic sanctions to influence action At its most basic level, this debate is about whether economic sanctions work. Pro spends the entirety of his R1 arguments assuming this to be true, but realistically, it is not. Multiple reasons. Let's start off with why sanctions are ineffective in general. 1) They simply don't work "Sanctions have failed ot dissuade Iran from continuing to enrich uranium. They haven't dislodged NK's repressive and erratic leaders or forced a rollback of their nuclear and missile programs. For all the international pressure on Syria's Assad, the regime is getting more ruthless, not less, and the policy debate in Washington has moved on to how much military support to provide the rebels. " This is the reality " it doesn't affect policy. As Daniel Drezner, a professor at Tufts University's Fletcher School says, sanctions "tend to work when the demand is incredibly well-defined," but essentially requires that "some sort of decent relationship" exists with the target state. It's because those governments know each other well enough to not worry that the country imposing the sanctions will keep demanding more of them. Let's look to Cuba. We've had an embargo with them for 50 years, and yet that entire time, the Castro brothers have been in charge. This shows that no amount of sanctions over no length of time can truly be effective, especially with a state we are already at odds with. [2] 2) What it actually does It increases defiance. I'll get into this more on the specific case of NK, but from a generalist standpoint, this makes logical sense. A country is getting income, whether necessary or not, from trade. That country loses trade. That country's leadership gets upset that they're losing said trade, and that another country is trying to supplant their sovereignty. Leaders who are losing their economic pedestal and their grip on leadership tend to be upset, making them more prickly to negotiate with. 3) Masking the problem Countries have a general policy of engaging in sanctions rather than negotiating with the country directly. As veteran U. S. diplomat Thomas Pickering has said of Iran, the U. S. has "Spent a huge amount of time and attention developing a sanctions regime and far less on trying to work out a negotiating approach to take advantage" of that pressure. Negotiations should be first on our list, but they're not, because this is viewed as a more powerful approach, in spite of its ineffectiveness. [2] This leads to two problems. One, lawmakers focus on this in meetings, meaning that just based on time constraints, there will be less efforts made towards the ends of negotiation. Pickering reminds us that sanctions are a tool, not a strategy. Two, it masks the problem, effectively making lawmakers believe that just by addressing it, even ineffectively, that they are done, or at least sufficiently far along that they need not immediately push for other actions. It slows our progress and builds more enmity, making negotiations all the more difficult. Now, let's focus on NK as a specific case. 1) China Bilateral trade between China and NK has sharply risen since 2007. As of 2013, that trade had gone up to $3 billion in exports to China and $3.6 billion in imports to NK. [3] Even if Pro wishes to end all trade between the U. S. and NK, the trade with China is over 3 magnitudes higher. They simply won't care. Essentially, China's going to keep on enabling them, and any economic action we take against NK will mean nothing next to them. 2) Passing off the costs We already have cut off any the sending of any military materials to NK. The problem is that many of these sanctions simply don't affect the leadership at all. Remember that the vast majority of what the U. S. sends to NK is humanitarian aid. That means that the leadership is getting scant little of it, and they care little for it. It's not a major benefit for them to abscond with the humanitarian aid, though sometimes they do. However, the harm of erasing humanitarian aid is higher. Kim Jong-un is the supreme leader, and holds his leadership by releasing vast amounts of propaganda that spreads lies regarding the U. S. and western powers. This guarantees his hold on leadership by providing actual proof that the U. S. is willing to cut off aid to a starving people. 3) Circumventing "NK is using sophisticated techniques to circumvent UN sanctions, including the suspected use of its embassies in Cuba and Singapore to facilitate and illegal weapons trade, according to a UN report. The report, compiled by a panel of 8 UN experts, said NK was also making use of complicated financial countermeasures that make the country's purchase of prohibited goods more difficult to track. "[4] Contention 2: International side effects This is quite a bit simpler. We can look to China and Russia as two examples of major countries concerned with U. S. involvement in NK. China already has strong economic ties, so strong that it's shown a willingness to break international sanctions,[5] and Putin is making moves to create those ties. [6] Why are China and Russia concerned with NK? The main concern is that our placing our influence in the region is harming their influence. "North Korea is China"s sole ally in East Asia and a buffer state facing hostile powers as the US, Japan or South Korea. It is worth recalling that the Chinese army intervened in the Korean War in 1950 to prevent the occupation of North Korea by US and South Korean forces. Thus, it prevented the creation of a pro-US state directly on China"s border and a future US invasion of China itself. .. China understands that it cannot abandon North Korea from a strategic perspective especially at a time when it has become the target of a policy of containment and strangulation by the US and its allies. "[7] In other words, any excess power we push on them, soft or hard, is going to make China dig in further, and I would argue, make Russia all the more likely to entrench itself as well. This will strain our relationships with those nations, putting us in a similar staring match to the one we faced in Syria, with war a very dangerous possibility. Moreover, this will ensure that NK has continuous access to large trade partners, enough so that the loss from the U. S. is even less significant. With that, I turn the debate back to Pro. 1. . http://www.globalpost.com... 2. . http://www.businessweek.com... 3. www. ft. com/cms/s/0/f8fca490-9a23-11e3-a407-00144feab7de. html 4. . http://www.foxnews.com... 5. . http://www.washingtontimes.com... 6. . http://www.ibtimes.co.uk... 7. . http://www.presstv.com...