If The Universe Has A Cause, That Cause Is A Personal Mind

-Introduction- Philochristos is correct that I am an Idealist. However, with regards to this debate, I think it goes without saying that we will assume the universe is material for the sake of argument as to not complicate things. I would like to thank Philochristos for engaging in this debate with me. In this round, I am going to refute his arguments for the cause of the beginning of the universe, if there is one, being a personal mind. -Refutation Of My Opponent's Argument Against A Spaceless, Timeless, Immaterial, Impersonal Force Or Object- My opponent says that such a thing is foreign to our experience and even fiction. However, such a comment can also be said about a mind that does not engage in a thought process or in the act of experiencing (as Pro concedes would be impossible for a timeless mind). Either way, the cause of the universe being foreign to our experience and seeming like fiction is very plausibly the case. After all, we are talking about the cause of the only realm we have ever empirically experienced. Pro presents a rather interesting argument against the existence of a spaceless, timeless, immaterial, impersonal force or object as the cause of the universe. If the necessary and sufficient conditions for the universe existed eternally, then the universe should be eternal as well. However, since the universe began a finite time ago then this option can be ruled out. I mean think about it, if the sufficient conditions were eternal, and the universe isn't, this would imply the sufficient conditions weren't actually sufficient conditions (which is clearly contradictory). So what is the problem with this line of reasoning? The problem is that it erroneously assumes that there must be sufficient conditions in the first place instead of just merely an impersonal set of necessary conditions. If there is only a set of impersonal necessary conditions in place, then there is still a way the universe could begin to exist along side time without sufficient conditions for it to occur; it would happen spontaneously. Since this has not been ruled out by Pro, then his argument against a spaceless, timeless, immaterial, impersonal force or object fails. It simply is not clear why this impersonal object would have to entail both necessary and sufficient conditions, when necessary causation is enough as long as the universe begins spontaneously due to the nature of the necessary conditions which allow such a thing. So instead of Pro's scenario which involves: (i) An eternally existing set of impersonal necessary and sufficient conditions for the universe to exist Another possibility is: (ii) An eternally existing set of impersonal necessary conditions for the universe to exist; with the universe beginning spontaneously Pro might argue that even if this is possible, we still have no examples of something beginning to exist spontaneously due to an impersonal set of necessary conditions. Thus, a personal explanation would still be preferred. I would simply point out that this is false; we do have examples of such causal processes. Quantum fluctuations occur spontaneously without sufficient causation, even though there are still necessary conditions that must be in place for them to occur (the quantum vacuum and the laws of physics that allow for the virtual particles to come into being). As Physicist Ted Edis notes: "Quantum fluctuations have a way of just happening, without any cause, as when a radio active atom decays at a random time." - Ted Edis [1] Of course, by "cause" he means a sufficient cause as there are self-evidently necessary conditions in place in order for these fluctuations to occur. Now, in order for this not to be the case then a deterministic interpretation of Quantum Mechanics must be true. The problem is that the most plausible deterministic interpretations either require the existence of multiple worlds, or hidden variables (Many-Worlds, Bohm's interpretation etc.). Since neither can be verified, and, to my mind, seem ad hoc (created to avoid certain "quantum weirdness"), they are not desirable interpretations. Also, the Copenhagen interpretation enjoys more experimental support than its rivals despite previous assumptions that all interpretations of Quantum Mechanics are experimentally equivalent. In 2008, Physicist Alexander Klyachko and his team were able to show that: "... If you repeatedly measured five different pairs of properties of a quantum particle that was in a superposition of three states, the results would differ for the quantum system compared with a classical system with hidden variables." [2] Leading Physicist Anton Zeilinger concluded: "This experiment lends more support to the Copenhagen interpretation." - Anton Zeilinger Since Pro's argument fails to not only rule out the possibility of an impersonal force or object as the culprit of universal causation, but also leaves us with no reason to deem it implausible based on what we know about reality; the argument without a doubt fails to establish the resolution. -Refuting Pro's Additional Argument For The Resolution- This argument, if I'm not mistaken, is that the only immaterial entity we know of which can cause changes in a material world is a personal agent as it creates energy out of nothing via its volition. This not only solves the interaction problem plaguing Dualism according to Pro, but also provides us with a good reason to establish the resolution. I would simply like to point out that this line of reasoning fails because it merely pushes the question back. If an immaterial being creates X energy in order to interact with physical object Y, then we are still left with the problem of how the immaterial being interacts with X energy it created in order to cause a change in Y in the first place (or how it could even create X energy from nothing in the first place). It would seem impossible since the immaterial being is, well, immaterial, and the X energy is material which means they don't share common properties which allow for this bridge of interaction as they are metaphysically distinct substances. If they tried to interact their properties would not cohere. However, this debate was not meant to argue over Dualism, and since something immaterial clearly has to interact with the material for this debate to get off the ground in context I will concede that this is possible for the sake of argument. I am going to respond to this argument by simply appealing once more to the possibility of the spontaneous coming into being of the universe. We have evidence of energy being spontaneously created from a vacuum, and there is no reason to assume there couldn't be a timeless and spaceless vacuum which allowed for the universe to spontaneously begin to exist. So even if Pro has come up with a way for our immaterial human minds to interact with the material, it still would not follow that a mind is the best explanation for the universe. Pro may argue that it is still the best explanation because whatever this alternative immaterial necessary cause is, is merely conjured up, while we know minds are immaterial. While it is true we know minds are immaterial, we don't know that minds can be timeless in the actual world even if it is logically possible. Whatever the cause of the universe is (which contains everything we have ever empirically verified), would almost certainly be very counter-intuitive and foreign. So appealing to what we know for explanations (like we do for things within the universe) may not even be valid with regards to whatever is outside the universe. -In Conclusion- My opponent has presented two arguments in favor of the resolution which have both been sufficiently undermined. -Sources- [1] http://www.azquotes.com... [2] https://www.google.ca...