Abortion is Prima Facie Morally Wrong

The reason I took his use of prima facie to refer to inutiton is that it's often used in ethical intuitionism (prima facie obligations and such). He instead states that it means that in general abortion is wrong - I'm fine with this, because I will argue that abortion is morally permissible even in situations in which rape or the mother's life is not involved. However, given the latter exceptions on my opponent's part, I will drop my argument about Jane English since it would not apply (though it's no fault of mine). ==================== Response to my opponent's case - Potentiality ==================== His criticism of my criteria at the onset makes a small but important mistake - I nor Warren never states that an entity must have all 5 characteristics to be a person (though this is a distinct possibility), instead we stated that if an entity has NONE of these properties then it is surely not a person. There is a faint but critical difference. In summary, my opponent's response is to resort to a common defense by abortion opponent's; that a fetus has the potential for certain psychological characteristics. And indeed, I would agree that on average a fetus will develop into a human person given the natural course of human development. However, to predicate your argument on potentiality is utterly absurd - there is no moral virtue in having the potential to acquire certain characteristics. To say that a fetus has the potential to be a person is another way of saying a fetus is NOT A PERSON (it only has yet to become one). Indeed, I find such a defense to be awkward and unfounded - do we prescribe children the same rights as adults because they have the potential to become one? Of course not, we know that in the present they possess certain psychological characteristics that limits their rights. For example, take the thought experiment in which a scientist finally creates an A. I. machine. Effectively, this computer has the same cognitive abilities as a human, maybe even better. This means that the moment the scientists flips the switch, the computer will possess all the needed psychological characteristics to be a person. .. so is it immoral for the scientist to not flip the switch? Of course not - potentiality does not prescribe rights. On a final note, he makes another criticism that if we are to accept this criteria, then we would then put people on a moral standard based on their psychological disposition (notably intelligence). This is a strawman; what matters is not to what degree you have actualized certain psychological traits, it's that YOU HAVE THE CAPACITY to utilize them. The mere fact that you possess them warrants you rights, as well as everyone else. ==================== Response to my opponent's case - His criteria of personhood ==================== Interestingly enough, my opponent states that "personhood is not determined by what properties you have, but by what you are. " What is entertaining about this is that it's self-defeating, the essence of an entity is described BY THE SET OF PROPERTIES IT POSSESSES. What you "are" is prescribed by what characteristics/properties you have. As an essentialist, my opponent is aware of this and advocates it as well - since I am one as well, I will argue in favor of this position in this context (though I don't expect our debate to delve into that topic). If we both agree on essentialism, then it would seem obvious that such a statement is useless. ==================== Conclusion ==================== Potentiality is a weak basis to determine the personhood of an entity, it's a complete red herring that has no basis in rational argument or intuition. Likewise, to say that "personhood is not determined by what properties you have, but by what you are" is completely self-defeating.