The Problem of Evil (PoE) is sound

Con admits equivocating evil with pain, but claims mere convention. This is still fallacious, as well as being needlessly confusing.As for Con’s gish gallop, Con has dropped large swathes of his case. His points on animal pain, noetic sin and Christian doctrine just 3 examples, and should be punished for doing so.ContradictariesHere I pointed out that Con resorted to 3 contradictory positions in response to the PoE.Con’s latest response is merely to repeat his same distinction in the last round, which I already rebutted. This distinction also says nothing, even if true between ST and Theodicy. Extend argument.Con then implies his position may be contradictory, but excuses this as “either/or”. Let me quote Con from the forums,“embracing a contradiction is embracing incoherency ... as if it were popular to do so- you can't embrace what is impossible, otherwise you're just telling a nice fictional story... wouldn't you agree?” http://debate.org...Con’s resorting to “fiction” to deal with the PoE means it’s game over. Resolution affirmed. God of LawHere I used Law’s thought experiment, in the hope of showing how ad hoc responses to the PoE are. He admits this, showing incredulity at an “infinite Mind”, not realising this response works equally well with Anti-God.Con’s next response is to admit his previous attack was a straw-man. Yet he still insists that I deal with his claim that the PoE’s conclusion is not inflated, as if dismissing a straw-man weren’t enough.Con then erects another straw-man, inserting words into my quote, changing what I said.My point was an indifferent world doesn’t allow to infer to God, but it doesn’t follow we can’t rule God out. Indeed, this was the PoE does, if successful, as would be the case with Anti-God and the problem of good. By analogy, I don’t need to know who was president in 1920 was to rule out Paris Hilton. Con then allows that God is compatible with any state of affairs, and that Flew’s death of qualifications leads only to agnosticism.But an unfalsifiable God not only betrays both Christianity and the debate definition from R1, but is also clearly contrived. Con has simply shifted the goal posts because he can’t defend his position from the PoELastly, Con still has no answer for inferring God rather than Anti-God. Extend argument.Defending P1P1 states that if God exists, gratuitous evils do not.I offered both a conceptual and plausibility defence of P1.Con offered 2 criticisms:RA: All Con asserts here is a “possibility” that God’s motives may involve divine non-intervention.Despite this flimsy alternative and Con still not answering how he knows God’s motive given ST, or justifying essentialism, this point is moot. As Con says,“God seemed to have morally sufficient reasons to enter into [*R], for if mankind were created without [*R], then there’s no way of knowing whether mankind would be something different altogether in such a world.”If God has moral justification to allow *R, then divine non-interference itself makes the resulting evils necessary for greater goods, thus non gratuitous. Con simply refutes himself here, by affirming P1 to justify RA.BA: Here Con claimed that a lack of a minimum level of evil eroded P1.Con’s latest response to my points is to state my examples are “extreme”. Despite this, it still shows we don't need precision in all cases to judge better/less than worlds, so Con's point is rebutted.I also pointed out that there was an ideal amount of evil. Con’s reply was to ask how we would know such a thing.Easy - a world absent gratuitous evil! Clearly it’s removal would improve the world, and thus we would have a sub-optimal level of evil. The whole debate rests on whether gratuitous evil does in fact exist - the remit of P3.As such, Con’s criticisms here fail, and P1 is easily affirmed. Defending P3P3 states that gratuitous evils exist.Con offered arguments from animal pain, noetic sin and origins essentialism. While the first 2 have been completely dropped, all Con offered in defence of the third beyond describing it was that it was “quite plausible” . Unjustified. It’s also predicated on making evil impossible rather than morally permissible - which straw-man’s my version of the PoE. Extend argument.In defending the PoE, I offered 4 justificatory points:Prima facie: Here I argued that apparent gratuity supports the fact of gratuity.Con’s latest response is to repeat for a third time a claim I’ve rebutted twice - that my case is “negative“. I’ve already shown that this is a straw-man, that negative evidence is relevant anyway, and that everything we reason from what we know evidences gratuity. Unless and until we are given reason to doubt our primary experiences, the fact that gratuitous evils appear to exist is at least very good tentative evidence that gratuity exists.Epistemic consistency: Here, I pointed out that if we treat the PoE no different that other beliefs, we will conclude gratuity.Con has not once disputed this. He merely assumes evil is a special case, without justification, trying to shift the burden to me to prove being epistemically consistent!Indeed, his special pleading goes so far as to adopt a “fictional” position, retreat to the possible or envelop himself in crippling scepticism. Unless we rig the game and assume theism, treating the PoE different from other inductive beliefs must be justified. It hasn’t been. Extend argument.Nature of evils: Here I pointed to the abundance, dispersal, necessity and sheer horror of evil, as well as divine silence, all evidencing gratuity.Throughout the debate, Con disputed none of this. All he did was assert that the good outweighs the bad, which was rebutted in R3.Extend argument.Noconceive’um: Here I argued that our failure to even determine a conceive of moral permissibility for some evils support gratuity.Con admitted this in R2, but says this is what we would expect, given theism. In other words, the fact that theism is inconceivable, given some evils, is evidence for theism. This is clearly ridiculous, which I showed in R3. Extend argument.Lastly, he says this point conflicts with epistemic consistency. First, both point towards gratuity. Second, it just doesn’t. Epistemic consistency sets a standard for belief, while this catalogues the huge difficulty conceptually with squaring apparent gratuity with theism in a plausible way. No conflict.Even Con, in an unguarded moment, affirms P3,“I see the world, Christian or non, and there's a lot of pointless suffering.” http://debate.org...Resolution affirmed.STI pointed out that ST begs the question and is contrived (theological scepticism). Con never responded. Extend arguments.As for it being arbitrary, all Con’s response was a blanket denial this would apply to an illusory past, without justification.But surely, due our “epistemic limitations”, an Infinite Mind may have reasons to plant such memories which are completely beyond our ken?The point is Con can’t rule this out, unless he repudiates ST. As I’ve shown ST is unjustified, contrived and wholly arbitrary.TheodicyCon here offered a virtue response.I pointed out that it doesn’t cover it is too narrow to deal with P3 and that it isn’t plausible that the best means to build virtue is to allow such horrendous evil, nor doe it seem morally permissible. No response. Extend argument.All Con says is that it is possible all this leads to greater goods. But Con has to show that this is more plausible than P3, and hasn’t done so. Also, if evils begets evil, then it will tend to destroy character, rather than build it. Sources and conductCon’s failure to reference sources from Aulen, Alston and Williams disabled me from engaging with these points, even after repeated requests to properly source them. When compared with my case, this failure is even more apparent.Con also accuses me of dishonesty and uses repeated straw-men, all which demonstrate extremely poor conduct.