God Exists

R1) Ontological Argument a) MOA P1’s S5 axiom is unsound As Pro mentioned, Plantinga’s modal ontological argument uses the S5 modal logic axiom, “If possibly necessarily P, then necessarily P.” [1] This completely fails the following analogue from de Morgan’s laws from Boolean algebra: “It is ‘not necessary that X’ is logically equivalent to ‘it is possible that not X’, and also ‘it is possible that X’.” [2] This axiom is a bare assertion. Furthermore, it makes no sense, thus is easily subject to reductio ad absurdum, viz. if something P is possible, then it’s necessary. Since Pro does not justify the assertion of P1, I shall assume Pro considers a state of possibility to be the ‘default’ state. Therefore, P is possible unless proven otherwise. Reductio ad absurdum: P1: The existence of a Chimera is possible, thus existing in some possible world. P2: If possibly necessary P, then necessarily P (S5). C: If P is the “Chimera’s existence”, then the Chimera’s existence is necessary, thus the Chimera exists. The primary fallacy with both these arguments is that P1 begs the question. Epistemic vs. Metaphysical Possibility P1 requires a highly specific definition of “possible” to be valid. This ontology would need to demonstrate metaphysical possibility. Instead, it merely affirms epistemic possibility, with great distinction. A statement of epistemic possibility implies a statement of “possible for all I know”, where a state of possibility is considered a ‘default’ state. [3-4] Thus, P1 is a bare assertion. Reverse MOA The reverse premise, “It is metaphysically possible that God does not exist”, entails the reverse conclusion: “God does not exist”, via. the same S5 modal axiom, wherein it is both epistemologically and metaphysically possible because of Occam’s Razor. If P implies God’s existence, it implies an additional assertion, and, thus, is merely epistemic unless proven to be metaphysical. But if P implies God’s non-existence, parsimony would allow for it to be metaphysically possible if and only if God is not necessary. [5] Both premises cancel each other out, and, thus, the same structural format implies that ontology cannot necessitate God’s existence via. modal logic. b) Godel OA Godel’s axioms and theorems are all bare assertions, and commit the same error in showing only epistemological and not metaphysical probability. Axiom 3 says “the property of being God-like is positive”, but this is not proven. ‘Positivity’ is a subjective property, and, as mentioned in the ‘greatness’ argument, requires a standard to be objective. Pro must expand on these bare assertions, especially the assumption that the property of being God-like is objectively positive. Theorems 2 and 3 assume that existence is a property. This must be appropriately justified, or will be considered bare assertions. R2) KCA a) Causality is not required The Law of Conservation of Mass is falsified by Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, which allows quantum uncertainty to create a particle and an antiparticle that annihilate and release two photons that ‘pop’ out of existence as a vacuum fluctuation. [6] But if the photons (or other energy) are/is ‘canceled out’ by the attractive negative energy of gravitational force, the net energy created would be zero, thus they wouldn’t have to cease existing. [7] If the universe is ‘flat’, its net energy would be zero via. the zero-energy universe hypothesis, and it is known to a chance of error of 1% that the universe is flat, thus the zero-energy universe hypothesis is likely true. [8] What caused those vacuum fluctuations? The quantum vacuum, which literally came out of ‘nothing’. “What produced the energy before inflation? This is perhaps the ultimate question. … [T]he energy could have come out of nothing. … The meaning of nothing here … could be nothing at all – that is, all concepts of space and time were created with the universe itself.” [9] As Pro notes, the Earth doesn’t explode because it’s bound by the physical laws of nature that govern the functions of the universe. But prior to, or outside of, the universe, there are no physical laws, nor is there time, thus there’s no need to believe there was a cause of the universe. Sans physical laws and time, causality is incoherent. I also challenge the premise “everything that had a beginning in time had a cause”, as the same rebuttals as above can refute the mentioned premise. Pro self-refutes quoting The Grand Design, that says, in Pro’s own quote, that “a whole universe can [appear out of nothing].” [10] That the laws of physics can be broken *strengthens* my point, as Pro cites the Conservation of Mass to support the first premise of the KCA. Furthermore, the black holes strengthen my point here as black holes have gravitational singularities that can breach physical laws. Thus, causation of the universe is not *required*, and Pro refutes their own premise. b) BGV theorem Introduction Now to the Borde-Guth-Vilenkin theorem. Pro’s interpretation of the BGV theorem assumes a presentism ontology of time, which is dubious in light of special relativity, which suggests divergence of the planes of simultaneity, entailing four-dimensionalism and, thus, eternalism and a block-universe model. [11] Pro also assumes without evidence the ‘A-series’ model of time, i.e. the A-theory of time, which is unlikely in light of general relativity. [12] Furthermore, the cosmological redshift merely shows that the universe is expanding, and shows that it must have begun expanding at some point. [13] This classical interpretation of spacetime is largely inaccurate, thus this usage of the BGV theorem is flawed. Defense of Eternalism Pro’s refutation of this assumes that the future is *non-contingently* real and necessary. But for something to be ‘real’, it need not be *necessary*. The block universe model can advocate for the past, present and future to be *contingently* real. This completely refutes all Pro’s points regarding this, as Pro assumes a non-contingent reality of the future, which is not a prediction of eternalism. Thus, I have refuted the KCA. R3) TA The supposed ‘design’ in the universe is entirely relative. Objective design is self-contradictory, since telos is a subjective property by definition. Since telos is relative, there is telos that is attributed and telos that is prescribed. Attributed telos is entirely subjective, thus irrelevant. Pro needs to effectively demonstrate the latter. The teleological argument hardly argues for God as defined so much as an ordering intellect. Why does such a being need to be objectively ‘great’ or ‘powerful’? P1 is hardly justified. An “ordering intellect” is not required to generate telos. Telos can be generated by anything, such as evolution via. natural selection. Intentionality is not required for design. Furthermore, Pro needs to specify what form of “telos” he refers to. P2 is a bare assertion; is the prescribed ‘design’ in life or the physical universe generally, and how? Design is entirely based on perspective. C1) Greatness a) God existed prior to the universe, when there was nothing. In this stage, it is impossible to compare greatness with anything, as God was the only existent entity. Therefore, this point still stands. b) The laws of physics are irrelevant to the non-cognitivism of greatness as an objective property. Pro is yet to justify God’s objective greatness. c) Pro concedes that greatness is based on perspective. God is defined as being “immensely great.” But if even one mind perceives God as not great, then via. Pro’s own logic, God is not great. Pro must then prove that every mind in the universe perceives God as ‘great’, or this argument still stands. C2) Incoherence of a Caused Universe a) Pro *drops* Sean Carroll’s observation that time and the laws of nature are necessary for causation to be coherent. This is completely and entirely ignored. I forward the contention to this round. b) The objections to eternalism and the B-theory of time have been addressed, as Pro assumes eternalism perceives the future as non-contingent. Eternalism implies lack of temporal change, which makes causation of the universe completely incoherent. C3) Argument from Atemporal Minds a) Pro confuses the Biblical God with the God defined here. In the debate, I provided the definition of God to be transcendent to the universe, which means he is not within spacetime at all. Therefore, God has no direct interaction with time itself. b) Even IF God interacts with spacetime, God has to be transcendent at some point by the debate’s definition, and the argument renders even that impossible and incoherent. Therefore, Pro’s objection does not properly address this argument and is absurd. C4) Occam’s Razor Pro drops Occam’s razor entirely. Since I have demonstrated how causation is not required in my objection to the KCA, God is not required and is a useless addition to the universe. Therefore, the existence of God is a priori improbable via. the Law of Parsimony. [14] On this, philosopher Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) wrote, “If I were to suggest that between the Earth and Mars there is a china teapot revolving about the sun in an elliptical orbit, nobody would be able to disprove my assertion provided I were careful to add that the teapot is too small to be revealed even by our most powerful telescopes. But if I were to go on to say that, since my assertion cannot be disproved, it is intolerable presumption on the part of human reason to doubt it, I should rightly be thought to be talking nonsense. If, however, the existence of such a teapot were affirmed in ancient books, taught as the sacred truth every Sunday, and instilled into the minds of children at school, hesitation to believe in its existence would become a mark of eccentricity and entitle the doubter to the attentions of the psychiatrist in an enlightened age or of the Inquisitor in an earlier time.” [15] Sources in comments.