(MiG Tournament) Physical laws must conform to preconceptions of what is logical

I presented two distinct arguments in my opening round, and I apologize to my opponent and the readers if I did not clearly communicate that these arguments are separate. The second one does not build upon the first. I had hoped that since both arguments reached the same conclusion, that their individuality would be self-evident. From here on out, I will give them names so as to mitigate further confusion.I concede that my first argument as it was stated is invalid, so I am going to change it. Since this is not the last round, this "new argument" should satisfy the rules of this debate:Argument from ContingencyP1. Mathematics is contingent upon logic.P2. The plausibility of physical theories relies upon mathematics. (Formerly: Physical laws are contingent upon mathematics.)C1. Therefore, the plausibility of physical theories is contingent upon logic. (Formerly: Therefore, Physical laws are contingent upon logic.)Argument from RealityP3. Reality must conform to what is logical.P4. Physical laws describe reality.C2. Therefore, physical laws must conform to what is logical.Argument from ContingencyP1. Mathematics is contingent upon logic.It is true that mathematics has non-logical axioms, but it also has logical ones. Moreover, mathematics would be incomplete without those logical axioms. Therefore, mathematics is incomplete with logic. Ergo, mathematics is contingent upon logic.Con's focus on non-logical axioms is a red herring unless he intends to convince us that mathematics could be complete without logical axioms. In the meantime, if mathematics needs even one logical axiom, then P1 stands.P2. The plausibility of physical theories relies upon mathematics.I did not consider the implication of the original wording of P2, and Con was right that it was false. Physical laws themselves are not contingent upon mathematics. However, we rely heavily upon mathematics to formulate these laws and then test them. Indeed, mathematics is usually the initial testing condition. While mathematics never guaranteed that a theory will become a law, it always eliminates theories as being possible in the first place.C1. Therefore, the plausibility of physical theories is contingent upon logic.Given the change in P2, C1 is not as strong an argument in favor of the resolution. I can admit that much. However, it is still evidence. Seeing as my opponent has not offered any positive arguments in negation of the resolution (offering only rebuttals so far), I am content that this argument still makes a positive case albeit weaker than I had originally envisioned.Argument from RealityP3. Reality must conform to what is logical.My opponent's rebuttal is straw man, as it refutes an entirely different premise. He even uses the heading, "'What is logical' about physical laws in unknown a priori." P3 is not concerned whatsoever about physical laws or mathematical representations. This premise is about reality. I'm making a blanket philosophical claim that reality—whatever it is—must conform to what is logical.That is to say, reality will not exhibit something logically impossible. For example, it will never be reality that I am sitting in my chair typing this while simultaneously not sitting in this chair typing this. If we were ever to observe such a phenomenon, then we would rightly assume it has a logical explanation. This is exactly what led to the development of wave–particle duality. [1] While something cannot simultaneously be wave and particle (as we had defined them), it is logical to have something entirely new that is something like a hybrid of the two. We developed a new mental category to describe something that brought pre-exsiting mental categories into logical contradiction thus reinforcing the notion that reality is always logical though our understanding of it might end up otherwise.In fact, the whole reason wave–particle duality was pursued in the first place is precisely because we expect reality to be logically coherent. If one denies P3, then why wasn't the issue just dropped and the antinomy accepted as is? If we presume that reality itself can contradict logic, then there is no value to scientific pursuit. If reality can be illogical, then even the statement, "The earth is in orbit around the sun" cannot be known because we'd always have to consider that it is also not in orbit around the sun. Science becomes a vain endeavor in such circumstances.P4. Physical laws describe reality.As far as I can tell, Con doesn't really dispute this. He says that this "is the goal, and that conforming to reality is the test." In other words, a physical theory becomes a physical law when it has been thoroughly tested to conform to reality. I agree.Con brings up the multiverse theory, which is an interested case study of how theories live or die by their predictive qualities. I don't have a problem with the multiverse being a useful model, but the multiverse is not a physical law. In fact, there are many theoretical models regarding the state of our universe prior to the singularity. None of these, however, are physical laws, so it doesn't matter which ones do or do not describe reality. They will all be tested until one or none are discovered to conform to reality. So, the existence of the multiverse theory doesn't really dispute this premise either.C2. Therefore, physical laws must conform to what is logical.This conclusion follows from the premises, so Con's comment that mathematics can describe anything even though it is not guaranteed to be logical is superfluous. C2 logically follows from P3 and P4. Since my opponent did not seem to succeed (in my estimation) in refuting P3 or P4, C2 stands in affirmation of the resolution. The fact that logic is deductive rather than inductive seems to be red herring. I'm not sure how it affects any portion of this argument.ConclusionWhen Con approached me with this topic, he implied that we would share the burden in this debate. In fact, I mentioned in my opening round that he would "argue the contrary, that logic itself is better embodied in mathematical equations, so if the equations work, then the physics is at least possible." This sentence came directly from our private communication, and he didn't dispute it when accepting this debate. I am disappointed not to see that argument manifest directly, though perhaps Con feels that the argument is natively present in his rebuttals. If so, I will give him the benefit of the doubt and respectfully ask that he present that case in a way that I can rebut more directly.In the meantime, I have two arguments in favor of the resolution. The first one, revised from my previous round, is evidential. It's not logical proof, I admit, but it still supports the resolution. The second argument is very powerful as it directly affirms the resolution so long as its premises stand.Sources http://en.wikipedia.org...