Morality is an Idea

Thanks again to jason_hendirx for taking time to deliberate this issue. I hope the readers have been edified the interaction. According to my opponent, I have "shown [him] no physical evidence, nor have [I] put forth anything resembling a formal logical proof." This is simply untrue. Dismissing my arguments does not make them nonexistent. I have argued quite plainly why morality cannot be just an idea. Let me outline it: 1. Any theory of morality ought to rationally account for both moral distinctions and moral obligations. Anyone can simply observe the existence of moral distinctions and moral obligations. As I argued in my first round, morality is meaningless without both, so any theory of morality ought to justify both. 2. The resolution is a relative moral system. If morality is just an idea then it must be a relative morality, i.e., a morality consisting of subjective opinion rather absolute moral laws. In this theory, morality is a convention and not a reality. 3. Relative moral systems cannot rationally account for moral obligations. While a relative moral system can account for moral distinctions, it cannot account for moral obligations. This does not mean people are unable to hold others accountable to their morality, it simply means that in so doing, they unintentionally and temporarily adopt an objective morality. I am not appealing to popular opinion. I am using a transcendental argument. Objective morality is the necessary precondition for the act of moral obligation. Take for example the post modern moral theory which essentially dictates that so long as one's actions do not harm other people, those actions are permissible. Adherents to this philosophy are happy until someone passes judgment (moral obligation). If judging others does not create harm, one should be permitted to do so. But judgment is deemed as objectively evil in the post modern worldview. In other words, they adhere to a relative morality on the surface, but fall back on an objective morality in practice. Thus, the moral theory is irrational. Now take for example the naturalist moral theory which claims morality to be a necessary evolutionary advancement, meant to advance the human species. Morality, as a result, is a product of advanced human thought which is in turn a product of natural selection. Yet adherents reject the notion of one "Fit" committing genocide against an Unfit" culture, as though human life is more sacred than other animals. When injustice hits too close to home, the naturalist no longer considers survival of the fit to be adequate in justifying any atrocity. Naturalists speak of evil even though evolution is impersonal; again, an irrational position. These examples are meant to show how a relative moral system fails to justify moral obligation. Adherents to relative moral theories are indeed capable of moral obligation, but it does not mean the theory is rational. In fact, it is the inability to remain wholly within the theory that disproves it. 4. Therefore, morality cannot be just an idea. My conclusion is that morality must be more than just an idea. It might be an idea based on something of greater authority, but it is certainly not just an idea. This is my formal logical argument which I have repeated each round. The resolution is in the form of a falsifiable statement, and my argument falsifies it. My opponent cannot simply expect to get away without a formal logical argument of his own. He cannot insist, by default, that his position is true until proven false. Indeed, those arguing for the existence of God are not granted such privileges. My opponent asks, "If you are basing your proof primarily on human experience and actions, then how does your belief in the existence of morality as more than an idea have any more validity than a belief in ghosts?" My response is that my proof lies in the transcendental argument. Ghosts are not a necessary precondition for objective morality, but absolute moral entities are. To show that morality is objective, I have to show relative morality to be irrational. Any theory on morality must justify its use in practice. If I say morality is based on the color of my pants, but I do not follow my theory in practice, then it must be rejected. Since relative morality fails this test, it too should be rejected in favor of an absolute morality. What I call human experience, my opponent calls human action. He insists that moral obligation is simply one person acting on an idea. He says, "Humans do not act solely on rational laws of reality. They act also on thoughts, emotions, and shared beliefs in ghosts." I would argue that humans act on only on belief, whether the belief is in a truth or lie. This is how reason works. When one acts on a thought, it is a thought based on a belief. If I think crackers are in the pantry, my acting on it shows my belief that the thought is in fact true. When one acts on emotions, they are acting on what they believe to be true, though emotion may distort that truth. When I choose to get revenge in anger, I do so in the belief that I deserve justice. Belief drives all action. Ergo, action reveals one's belief. Thus, when someone takes the action of moral obligation, they reveal a belief that their morality is undeniably true. Therefore, a relative moralist abandons the belief in morality as mere opinion when obligating another party to his/her moral standard, taking on instead a belief--albeit temporarily--that morality is objectively true. Adherents to an objective moral theory do not commit this fallacy. The rest of my opponent's objections all reflect the general nature of this conflict. This is a battle of worldviews. Everyone makes assumptions about reality, specifically in the area of epistemology. My opponent asks for physical evidence or formal logic. He equates the possibility of abstract moral entities to ghosts, as though such things are not possible simply because they cannot be evaluated by scientific means. In other words, my opponent presupposes that only empirical evidence brings knowledge--an axiom which cannot itself be empirically proven. I have presuppositions about reality and knowledge as well. So do the readers. So which worldview wins? The one that can be lived out without contradiction. Since metaphysical entities are impossible in my opponent's worldview and morals are not physical objects, he has no choice but to believe they are mere thoughts. In my worldview, a third option is possible: an objective morality based on a transcendent and immutable God. By showing the irrationality of subjective morality, I have made the possibility of absolute moral laws more likely. Even if I cannot convince the reader that my worldview is correct, I can still win on the basis of proving the resolution impossible. I have laid out my case as plainly as possible. I used transcendental argumentation to make my case. Morality cannot be just an idea. There must be a fixed truth behind them in order that they may be reliable. If it is just an idea then this debate and others like it are rendered entirely meaningless and we should all do what our hearts desire. Relative morality's ultimate end is no morality. Therefore, by necessity, morality must be objective and can therefore not be just an idea. I extend my thanks to my opponent for donating time to writing this debate and to the readers for taking the time read and evaluate it.