The Problem of Evil (PoE)

IntroductionGiven the nature of Con’s response, I will try to affirm 2 key contentions in this debate:1. Con’s objections to the PoE do not survive serious scrutiny and2. Even if they did, Con’s objections are, in large part, irrelevant to the argument at hand.Ironically, and such is the seriousness of the charge of 2, that even if Con’s objections are literally unrefutable, they still fail miserably, and as such I will mainly focus on substantiating that these objections are irrelevant.The first thing to do is to remind ourselves quickly what the PoE seeks to establish:“In the philosophy of religion, the problem of evil is the question of how to explain evil if there exists a deity that is omnibenevolent, omnipotent, and omniscient”. (1)Irrelevance of Con’s objectionsSelf-Refuting CritiqueImportantly, the PoE requires not only the assumption of God’s existence, but of a very particular type of God (one who is, among other things, omnibenevolent), as specified by my definition of God in R1. Now let’s take Con’s second argument for a second, which is intimately related with the first to show how inept of a response this is, as he makes it crystal clear for us with the following:1) Evil can only exist if Good exists2) Good does not exist3) Therefore Evil does not exist.Immediately noticeable here is that given the definition of God, Con objections to the PoE while assuming that God does not exist! Consider this, using Con’s own reasoning:1) If God exists, he is omnibenevolent (i.e. He is all good)2) Good does not exist 3) God does not existNow given that 1 above is a necessary precondition for the PoE in any context one wants to talk about it, it has to apply, so this premise is simply cast-iron. 2 is Con’s own premise, so this can hardly be doubted, and the conclusion which follows necessarily is that God himself does not exist! Now, in trying to refute an argument, it is always possible to take a position which avoids the clutches of the argument. The relevant way to judge an argument is in the context it is applied. If Con wants to deny that God exists to deny the problem of evil, he is quite at liberty to do so, but the argument necessarily starts with the assumption that God exists. If one wants to beg the question, and assume God non-existent, then the PoE, rather than being undercut or refuted is simply irrelevant, given the starting point of Con. Likewise, if God is defined as being anything other than the traditional omni-being, then there is no problem of evil. As Sinnott-Armstrong points out,“That is the only kind of God we are arguing about here. So my argument shows that there are no Gods of the disputed kind.” (2)Indeed, my definition of God and P1 of the argument painstakingly state that this is the only framework one can talk of a problem of evil. If Con wants to argue that the PoE does not work in another environment, with different preconceived notions of God, I would agree, but this objection is simply irrelevant, given the context the PoE is discussed in, as mentioned frequently above and in my last post.A continually existing problemThe second argument again concedes wholeheartedly the points raised by Con, and is similar in nature to the first, except that it strengthens his position a little. Let’s say that there is absolutely no reason to suppose moral realism is true, and that “evils” do not exist. The PoE, ironically, would still be a problem. This is because it would be a conceptual problem for God, in the same way that the supposed contradictions of God’s nature (an example of which would be perfect being vs. Creator being) would still be. No atheist who uses a character-conflict against the existence of God believes omnipotence is a reality, otherwise their position would be self-refuting. Likewise, whether evils exist or not, as long as theists assume they do (which they have to), then there will always be a problem of evil. To emphatically demonstrate this point, one only need point out that Hume himself repudiates this:“In respect of the first view, that there is no real evil, Hume takes the view that it is plainly contrary to human experience . . . insist(ing) on the reality of evil and the doubts that this casts on any claim that the beauty, harmony and order of this world provides us with clear evidence that an infinitely powerful and good being created and governs it.” (3)In conclusion, there is no conflict with the atheist denying moral values actually exist and simultaneously using the PoE. As it happens, I don't deny moral values exist, but even if I did, it would certainly still be feasible to use the PoE, even if this means conceding significant ground in the direction of the argument (which may very well be the case). Moral marginalityLastly, the scope of the PoE is to be as receptive as possible to varying moral views. As such, the contentious issues of morality are left as much as possible. By using cases where these contentions are largely bypassed, the scope of ethics becomes even more marginal, as it is almost universally accepted that irrespective of why it so, babies suffering horribly for days on end and dying for no reason is, ceteris paribus, wholly undesirable to all parties, and one would assume, God. Furthermore, the placeholder “evil” can be designated as umbrella term for all the things God would stop prima facie, and thus even if (gratuitous) suffering, for example, did not have a moral dimension to it, one could affirm that God would prevent it if He exists, (gratuitous) suffering exists, thus God does not. The argument again emerges, albeit slightly differently, but substantively identical to the PoE.The problems with Is-OughtAs for the Is-Ought problem itself, I have 2 quick objections (none of which really matter if the above is affirmed). Firstly, an "ought" can explicitly demand an "is", when a goal is specified. So with respect to God, given omnibenevolence, God ought to minimise evils in the world, if suffering is something which all reasonable people want to avoid, all things being equal. Also, a related point to this is while it is true that morality may indeed assume a goal in mind, justifications for almost everything does as well:“No system of thought can be derived out of thin air. They all have to be based on axioms that can, in principle, be rejected. But if that's a strike against objective morality, it's also a strike against philosophy, science, mathematics, and every other branch of human inquiry as well. Just as the hypothetical evildoer can say, "Why should I care about human happiness or well-being?", the hypothetical creationist or homeopath or astrologer can say, "Why should I care about falsifiability, repeatability or empirical evidence?" (4)To be sure, there is always a condition on certain actions, in order to achieve a given result. But it just seems like special pleading here to mark morality out as particularly dogged by this problem. ConclusionGiven that Con’s objections have been shown to be irrelevant, as well as destructive to his entire case, coupled with doubts about even the veracity of these objections themselves, I contend that evil is a problem for theism, which is, after all, what the PoE is all about. Given that Con's response is so inadequate that it undermines the use of the PoE by disqualifying the target of the PoE from the beginning (God), the consequence for the theist is perhaps even more damaging. Imagine for a second a theist using a response to the PoE which eliminates God! This response cures a headache for traditional theism by use of the guillotine, and thus cannot be considered a viable solution to the PoE, which is the measurement by which any case against the PoE must be analysed.Sources1. http://en.wikipedia.org...2. God? (ibid, P98)3. http://plato.stanford.edu...4. http://www.daylightatheism.org...