This house believes in Utilitarianism over its rivals.

Thank you. I'll start off by addressing my opponent's case, then reinforce my own.Epistemic BasisMy opponent argues for pragmatism through an appeal to a broken boat and anti-foundationalism. There is a major problem here: knowledge is not like a boat, where all the facts are on the same level bobbing along. It is more like a ladder: there are conclusions high up, built on premises, which are in turn built on more premises all the way to its base. And this isn't really an analogy, it is how logic works. We have a conclusion, supported by premises, which in turn are supported. We do not question this. Why? Because logic is indubitable. When we question the bases of logic, we reach contradictions or things we simply cannot comprehend. For example, when we question whether you can be pregnant without bearing child, we cannot imagine this working. We cannot imagine a green wall not having a speck of green. We have foundational truths which we cannot doubt - not because we'e not allowed to, but because we are incapable of doing so. This is a turn against anti-foundationalism: it simply follows that there are some indubitabe truths.Moreover, another thing about ladders is that they end. The Munchhausen trilemma takes an argument, and looks at it. Does the argument ever end? Assume conclusion X is supported by Y, which is in turn true due to Z. There are four possibilities: either Z is regressively true (foundationalism), the system loops (coherentism, which my opponent seems to espouse), or there is an infinite regress, or nothing is true[1]. Ignoring the third and fourth option, my opponent espouses that truths indirectly prove themselves, as "there is no independent or neutral mechanism" for determining what is true, as "human subjects who cannot "step outside" their interpretive framework". I ask my opponent: how can a belief (albeit indirectly) prove itself? Also, ladders have a single rung which is a brute fact. However, coherentism cannot. I ask my opponent: how do things that seem to be brute facts, like "I am cold" or "I am", rely on other facts? Facts are derived from them, we do not derive them from other facts. Again, this is a turn against coherentism.If these problems cannot be solved, my opponent's logical basis is inexistent, and thus his argument prima facie fails.Meta-ethical basisMeta-ethics is the study of what we mean when we say ethical statements. For example, what do we mean when I say "Murder is wrong"? I claim it is a prescriptive command: I am telling you to do something, that is, not murder. If prescriptivism is wrong, my argument fails. What is my opponent's basis? He tells us strengths of pragmatism is "Pragmatism does not conflict with our moral intuitions", and "pragmatic ethics is more in tune with our moral intuitions". This implies moral intuitionism. Moral intuitionism argues we cannot reduce our moral positions down to a sentence-formula for how to behave, as morality isn't a science we can perfect and tune, but instead a recognition of the morality we just know to be true. Similar to yellow, we cannot define yellow through description: we simply know what yellow is, just like ethics. There are a number of problems with this approach though.Firstly, the "beauty is in the eye of the beholder" argument. Our intuitions are completely different person-to-person. There is a completely radical difference between our ethics. Everyone's ethics are different. But we don't have these disputes about whether something is yellow! Everyone knows what yellow is, even if they call it by a different name. The intuitionist meta-ethical stance is just plain false.Seondly, not only do we disagree with each other on intuition, but we disagree with ourselves. I want to lose weight, which means not eating doughnuts, but God they taste soooo gooood...ahem. Our intuition disagrees so much that an ethical system based on it is self-contradictory.Finally, this contradicts with his original case against foundationalism! If foundationalism isn't true, then there aren't these self-obvious things which we just know to be true. Yet that is precisely what intuitionism claims! There are these self-obvious facts. I am sure I am accidentally misprepresenting my opponent's ethical position, because this is too glaring a contradiction to ignore.Again, if any of these problems cannot be resolved, then my opponent has no logical basis for his argument and his argument prima facie fails.However, an interesting problem arises as I agree with my opponent that meta-ethically we are non-cognitive. This agrees with my starting foundation of my argument. Unless he can provide either a cognitive approach to morality or disprove the validity of my case, my argument is prima facie rationally justified.The normative ethical systemsFirstly, utilitarianism claims exactly that "situation make[s] all the difference, and in different circumstances, entirely different actions [are] appropriate". I made clear "Utilitarian ethics goes past this". However, pragmatism goes beyond flexibility: it is unable to make ethical judgments at all. We have no ability, from the information my opponent provided, to judge any situation, and what makes an action moral or not, other that it being "pragmatic". That's not an explanation. Utilitarianism, however, gives situations with what to do, and I made clear what they are, such as when stealing is moral or immoral.Secondly, my opponent's claim utilitarianism doesn't promote discourse is simply comical: he cites a utilitarian to give credence to his idea! If we did not listen to people's ideas, people would be unhappy. However, there are some ideas that should not be publicly repeatedly heard, like "kill all the jews". Utilitarianism is compatible with quietening (thought not silencing) other voices to get jobs done. By contrast, my opponent, in his words, contends pragmatism "requires moral uniformity between people and across cultures" of promoting discourse. He contradicts himself with his values: firstly uniformity is wrong, now the lack of uniformity is wrong... certainly pragmatism allows us to say anything we want to criticise others, and if that includes contradiction, so be it!Thirdly, is pragmatism more pragmatic than utilitarianism? Imagine you worked in a nuclear power plant. You have no idea what to do. There are two men telling you how to operate the factory. The first man, a pragmatist, says "do what works". You have no idea how to proceed! I wouldn't! The second man, by contrast, is a utilitarian. He explains how the plant works (via explaining meta-ethics as I have done), and how to operate it (via the felicific calculus of evaluating things based on the net preference created). Who has been more practical and useful here? If the utilitarian, then clearly the fact that utilitarianism answers your questions gives it a massive boost in its favour.My opponent then commits to another absolutist value-statement: science is better than all else. In all fields? I'll happily claim ethics isn't a science, as it doesn't follow a scientific method, nor has my opponent shown it has. Utilitarianism is similar to science, though, in the sense that it has a method. Pragmatism has no evaluative method to weigh up actions, because it simply cannot. Utilitarianism asks how to live your life, not how do magnets work. It's not rocket science, pun intended.Points seven and eight are irrelevant, as I addressed them in the first round. Preference utilitarianism is value-plural, and my argument doesn't presume infallibility (or even correct knowledge) anywhere among those taking part. Though a valid criticism in other ethical systems, it is not a problem in my presentation.Finally, my opponent claims pragmatists can conclude killing the healthy patient is wrong. I say, conclude it. My opponent has made no moral claims, because pragmatism doesn't make them. He cannot even claim this is wrong. I await my opponent's next case.1 -http://tinyurl.com...