The Problem of Evil (LPoe will be addressed, not the EPoe)

INTRODUCTION My opponent first says that his missing premise is not relevant to his argument. He is mistaken. Without it, the argument is invalid. Summary of the Logical Problem of Evil God is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent. Evil exists, therefore God does not exist. Cleary, the conclusion does not follow. We have to have a premise that states that God, considering his attributes, would actually act to get rid of evil. That premise is absolutely necessary. But this is a minor point, as my opponent has now presented it. There is no questioning the relevance of it. The only question is this: Is the premise true? ARGUMENTS I am not questioning everything about my opponent’s argument, just the premises stating that God’s omnibenevolence would entail that there would be no evil in the world (1a, 1c, 2, 2b, 3, 3b, 3f, 3g, 3h). My opponent has given no argument for why those premises are true, but I will give an argument for why they are not true: We can easily imagine scenarios in which having the ability and desire to do something does not entail that we should do it. A mother might not want her toddler to experience the pain of having a needle go into his arm, and she might be able to prevent it too, but this does not mean that she should or would prevent the needle from going into his arm. The reason why she might not do it is because the needle is a vaccination for a disease, and the child’s receiving of the vaccination would prevent him from contracting the disease. Hence, the mother’s desire (benevolence) to prevent the suffering of child, her ability (potency) to prevent the suffering of her child, and her knowledge (science) of the child’s suffering do not entail that she should actually prevent the suffering. We can think of a million scenarios just like this. They demonstrate that the belief that one ought to perform some action does not follow from one’s desire and ability to perform the action. Here is another important criticism of the argument: My opponent words his false premise more strongly when he says (in 1a) that God “doesn’t have the ability to give anything less than relief from suffering…” Doesn’t have the ability? So, in other words, God’s loving nature would force him to be good? That doesn’t sound very loving to me. If fact, it makes no sense. Part of being loving is having that love from a choice. In order for God to be truly loving (and especially all-loving), he must have the ability to allow evil, even perform evil. His loving acts must not be a compulsion. A loving God is a God who has the ability to do evil but does not always chooses not to, not a God who simply lacks the ability to do evil, as that makes no sense considering how love is understood and turns God into some kind of robot. It also contradicts God’s omnipotence. CONCLUSION My opponent has included all the relevant premises for his argument this time but has not explained why it is the case that God’s attributes would entail that he should or would prevent or eliminate evil. The argument is valid (the conclusion follows) but it is unsound (not all the premises are true) hence the conclusion has not been proved.