We Cannot Create Artificial Intelligence via Computation Alone

Thanks. Con’s Arguments Argument for Functionalism Con misunderstands my argument here. The fact that they both have minds is irrelevant and misunderstands what Con’s own argument implies. My argument was in a modus tollens format. 1.If Con’s argument is correct, Functionalism is true. 2. Functionalism is false C.Con’s argument is false If we know others have a mind based on how they function then functionalism would be true [1]. Since others can function the same yet not have the same experience, functionalism is false. Con is trying to ignore the implications of his argument. The two people may have a mind, but we cannot say they have a mind by their functions which is the very soul of the my opponent's argument. Con then attacks Searle's biological naturalism by appealing to P-zombies. My goal in this debate is not to defend biological naturalism, but to defend my initial argument and refute Con’s arguments. I can therefore disregard biological naturalism and agree Chalmer’s zombie argument is sound. This creates a bigger problem for Con. The P-zombie argument refutes his very argument. If it is possible for there to be a zombie n7 that functions exactly like me, but is not conscious, then we cannot say people have a mind based on their function and Con’s whole argument has been refuted by a point he has brought up. In order for Con to defend his argument he must argue against Chalmer’s argument which then opens up the spot for biological naturalism. The argument is definitely refuted. The Morality of AI Con concedes here. Defense of the Chinese Room Argument The Systems Reply Con ignores my argument that he must concede an inanimate room understand Chinese. He then claims the man is a part of the environment's system. So does the Earth itself understand Chinese? How is the environment playing any part in the system? The man is not interacting with them at all. What if we send the man to space? Would spacetime itself understand Chinese? Would the universe? How far are strong AI advocates willing to go? If you’re really going this far, let’s remove the physical. We can imagine the man became disembodied. He is no longer in any system. He knows how to respond to Chinese, yet still doesn’t understand it. Con then appeals to Copeland’s idea of a hidden mind. Looking at this prima facie, the idea of a hidden second mind is absurd and ad hoc. Even if I assume there is a hidden second mind, we would have to note there must first be a primary mind. A hidden second mind isn’t conscious and isn’t like a mind that humans have. You would first need some defense for computers having a primary mind which is the very thing you’re trying to do. The systems reply fails. Its defense has become absurd. We would have to accept so many absurd conclusions like conscious inanimate objects and hidden secret minds within minds. Even ignoring the absurd, they are still false. A second mind isn’t sufficient or a primary mind and we can conceive of the man being disembodied. Connectionist reply It seems my opponent has stopped arguing for AI via computation alone and started arguing for using the material of computer chips to create an AI. If we were to simulate the neurons it would either by a model of neurons or it wouldn’t be computation anymore. If Con is still advocating for connectionist computation he has yet to respond to my reason why a simulation with computation must be a model and not a mind. Wait Till Next Year reply Con has seemingly dropped this argument. He seems to have reduced the rebuttal to his last one. Which still has the same problems which have went unaddressed. Conclusion I find both of my opponents arguments fail. The first argument fails because functionalism fails. Con himself defended the zombie argument which is a contradiction of his position. Con agrees his other argument fails. Con’s objections fall flat too. If we are to accept the systems reply we have to accept so many absurdities. Con never responded to my argument that a computational simulation would be a simple model we instead argues we have to emulate the causal power of the brain. Which is true, but then it’s not computation. His last argument falls back on his connectionist argument My arguments remain standing. Sources [1] http://plato.stanford.edu...