The moral argument for the existence of God is sound

Introduction I am grateful for my opponent for presenting his opening argument in such a singular and well-organized manner. Though I have objections to all three premises, my objections will focus on the seeming falsehood of Premise 1: “Objective moral facts exist.” This is a belief that is too often taken as a given, but the belief seems to me impossible to incorporate into a cogent theoretical model of existence. In other words, Premise 1 is incoherent. If this premise fails, then the argument fails, though not necessarily the conclusion (there may still be a God, but the probability of that conclusion would not follow from this argument). Definition: whenever I say, “objects,” I mean items or attributes with objective existence. Prima facie absurdity of Premise 1 To begin, the premise requires that moral facts are objects. An item or attribute can be considered to have objective existence if and only if it “is something that presumably exists independent of the subject’s perception of it” (The Internet Dictionary of Philosophy via http://www.iep.utm.edu...). This means Premise 1 requires that “moral facts,” being objective, would belong in the same category of existence as other objects. The following list typically identifies objects with objective existence: They can be independently observed (given the physical proximity of the subject and object), meaning that the information about the objects can be transmitted to the subject via light waves, sound waves, odors, or pressure sensors. “Independently” means the results of observations are not dependent on the shared beliefs of the subjects of observation. They have measurable physical characteristics, meaning that they can be described in terms of such qualities as mass, volume, temperature, molecular components, or informational configuration. Such objects include animals and asteroids. They can be independently observed, and they have measurable physical characteristics. If “moral facts” exist objectively, then “moral facts” likewise are expected to be capable of being independently observed and have measurable physical characteristics. On the face, such qualities do not apply to “moral facts.” Therefore, Premise 1 is implausible. Rebuttal 1 to “P1: Objective moral facts exist” The above reasoning is a rebuttal to “P1: Objective moral facts exist.” Socialpinko claimed in his sub-argument that “There is no categorical difference between moral and sense perception.” However, my two listed points refute that assertion. Sense perception entails the capability of independent observation and measurable physical characteristics, and moral perceptions do not. Therefore, there is a significant categorical difference between moral and sense perception, and the sub-argument P1 fails from a false premise. Alternative model: subjective morality I propose, instead, that morality is subjective, meaning that morality is dependent on the beliefs of subjects. This follows from the prima facie nature of morality being a system of values. The moral system of values follows from human nature, culture and ideology, like all other subjective values of human society. The marketplace assigns monetary values to items at garage sales, and human society likewise assigns values to human actions. “Moral facts” are the subjective values of human actions. This model of morality is both coherent and probable on the face. Analogy to value of money A helpful analogy to this model of morality is the commonly-accepted model of the value of money. Everyone in society agrees that greenbacks (American paper currency) have a set of values. However, everyone accepts that this set of values is purely subjective. If almost everyone in society decided that greenbacks are worth only as much as any other rectangular paper sheets, then money would lose its value. The value of money is dependent on the beliefs of subjects, and that is what makes the value of money subjective. I will end my turn here. Good luck to Socialpinko.