Cogito Ergo Sum is Bunk

My B.O.P and the nature of Scepticism for this debate. My B.O.P is to show we cannot reasonably be doubtful of one's own existence, thereby giving oneself certain knowledge of one's own existence. I quote my opponent. " This is about epistemology". A concession that unfortunately undermines two of his objections outright. First Formulation My B.O.P is to demonstrate that 'I think, therefore I am' is validation of one's own existence to one's own self beyond reasonable doubt. Note Validation after the fact, not before, we assume existence, and are questioning the validity of the assumption, I am not required to prove1 I exist to you. 2 I exist a-priori of this debate or formulation. 3 I am anything specific. we are looking for, as Stroud critiques in everyday terms 'Hyper Knowledge' of certainty. So, what I will do is simply demonstrate the proof, but also note something here, I am assuming a certain mind-frame of doubt, this frame of mind is central to the arrival of 'Cogito ergo sum', my opponent must also be aware and apply exactly this formulation to his arguments, otherwise be out of context and thereby critiquing the argument mistakenly. It is plausibly conceivable that my senses could be wrong all the time. I see something far away, I am confused to what it is, it seems like X, but turns out to be Y. I am uncertain that my senses provide a stable platform for the certainty of my sensorial knowledge. Perhaps, but it is not impossible to be wrong on this.I then state what can I be certain of? Well, if I am confused or 'tricked' by some scientist or evil Demon, that has created this world in front of me. My senses, body, and life is purely a work of fiction, then is there anything I can hold sure of, under this almost complete doubt. Second formulation Well, I am being doubted. I doubt I exist, but that makes no sense, I exist and via doubt, I validate one's own existence to a certainty. Now, some say this is circular, I have been assuming I exist all along, but remember, this is NOT about do I exist, but how certain am I of my existence. It is epistemology, and not a theory of being, so any objection that is not epistemological or first person referential ducks the sledgehammer of the conclusion, that is my doubt is a sure validation beyond any reasonable doubt that I exist. 1 My senses can be doubted. 2 The real world can be doubted as a certainty of existence. 3 I can doubt. 4 I cannot doubt, I am The conclusion being, one's own doubt is a self-evidential demonstration of certainty in one's own existence. Note, I assume existence is, so far as to question my certainty in my knowledge. This debate is about knowledge and certainty, my opponent needs to remember that. There are thoughts, I am experiencing those thoughts, therefore I am. Quite straightforward. The context for 'Cogito Ergo Sum' arises, in that it is the certainty of being, not the formulation of being. He is stating the argument doesn't prove 'I exist', nor does it need to, I exist is self-referential, and the argument, simply gives absolute certainty to that proposition. My opponent has to do one thing. Prove that his doubting or thinking is not evidence of his existence beyond reasonable doubt. He cannot appeal to computers or modes of logic on this point. He needs a premised argument to win this. Rebuttals Circular Logic I need to qualify 'Cogito Ergo Sum', my opponents weakest objection, but at the very least, his most extensive, is the idea that is in some way begging the question or presuming a premise. This is contextually and logically false. Firstly, the argument should be as I wrote in the comments taken in reference to its context, you cannot rip a formulation out of context and apply pressure from areas it has not dealt with. A moral argument for not eating meat, should not be dismissed on 'moral' grounds due to some economic factor, that is out of context, and likewise, my opponent confuses epistemology with being/existence. The argument presumes the individual is asking 'what can I know of', not 'Do I even exist'. The first is an epistemological claim, while the second is a claim on the nature of being. We must assume the existence of X is in question in terms of certainty. Can we know of God's existence is not equal to 'Does God exist'. If evidence arises though that proves God's existence via certainty of knowledge then of course, we validate both without ever assuming certainty. 1 I am certain I exist. 2 I exist. This would be in some way question begging but truly, cogito ergo sum asks us 'Can I even be certain that I exist', note we are questioning the assumption of X, and so a-priori to the argument we are on a minimal axiom of existence. And so, my opponent is misunderstanding the actual aims of 'Cogito ergo sum'. 1 I can be doubtful of my senses. 2 I can doubt. 3 At the very least if I doubt or am tricked, I am. 4 I am. This follows logically from each premise. I feared Pro would misunderstand what is my B.O.P. So, I encourage Pro deal with the epistemological status of perceiver rather than attempt to drag the argument out of context. this objection is not relevant. I am not proving myself as existing, simply by virtue of assuming I am, but rather proving I can be certain via thoughts. A Framework of character properties and movement inferential I will detail specifically exactly what 'I think, therefore I am' shows on the basis of all it needs to show is the 'and/or' dilemma of inferential logic. Note my opponents argument boils down to 'begging the question. When studying logic, patterns emerge as a result of either language difficulties, note Wittgenstein. Inferential logic breaks down this, and upon reading Pro's mixed logic ( one non-spatio-referential and the other a sub-set of John Barwise's Modal application) The misunderstanding of the argument This is what a defence of movement premising is, in inferential logic, it is explicit. As argued by leading Logicians, Johan van Benthem and Manuel Rebuschi, no actual methodological theory of science or unity exists, especially in relation to Pro's singular truth value claims. So take 'I think, therefore I am'. I'll go through each point step by step. A(I) is a relative, Movement from relative flexives 'A of I, to the think' is seen below. Ref [‘re@258;exivity’]: A ⇒ A Cut [‘transitivity’]: if X ⇒ A and YAZ ⇒ B, then YXZ ⇒ B The next three lines are demonstrations of 'movement'. Con [‘contractibility’]: if XAYAZ ⇒ B, then XYAZ ⇒ B and XAYZ ⇒ B Ext [‘extendability’]: if XY ⇒ B, then XAY ⇒ B Note that Con and Ext together entail, this is irrelevant in so far as it is just tidying the possible worlds for my next point. Perm [‘permutability’]: if XABY ⇒ C , then XBAY ⇒ C I think, therefore, I am, is one of the most notable 'inferential and conjunction signed arguments in Philosophy, as argued by Jaroslav Peregrin, the movement or possible worlds role of the premises can follow from A+ = {X | X ⇒ A} A− = {<X 1,X 2,Y > | <X 1AX 2 ⇒ Y >}. note, {X | X ⇒ A} Is not Peano axiom, the axioms will be elucidated later on, for now, all we need is a bed mat for the language as Wittgenstein will argue that Cartesian doubt is not truly doubt but rather Language gone on holiday. As long as I route language in a very simple inferential mode like this one, my opponent needs to come up with some on point objections, in logical formulations. I think the main problem here is Pro has copied some logic but misplaced it into an attempt to refute the thought experiment, this is a very interesting move, but it would require hundreds of pages of argument, not simply a blanket statement about the nature of truth, undefined. I can't help but just move on from this since, I can't apply it anymore into his argument. Computers objection Pro's best argument is still wrong. Pro's counter example of computers fail for two reasons. Pro cannot enjoin his conscious experience to that of another being, and therefore cannot say with certainty, a thinking thing requires anymore material or conscious activates that himself, therefore negating his attempt to transcribe 'cogito ergo sum' on a machine, so theoretically he is without a sound basis for his move. Also, under radical scepticism, assuming the nature of consciousness, actually assuming the nature and origin of consciousness is both fraught with difficulties and not relevant to my debate. Notably Thomas Nagel's paper on this dismantles this approach. Thinking is also an act of conscious, and since computers do not think, to say they do not think, therefore 'I think', cannot follow, is trivially true, but irrelevant in almost all respects to what we are trying to prove. So, a computer is not relevant, because a non-conscious agent cannot think, so a computer you state is 'non-conscious', therefore won't be able to think. conclusion Note not one thing has been said about epistemology by Pro, even though he claims this debate is about that. I have shown 1 Two sound formulations of the argument in CONTEXT. 2 A solid logical basis for inferential movement. 3 A detailed rebuttal of all his arguments. I have satisfied by B.O.P by simply explain through Cartesian Doubt, we can achieve epistemological certainty in one's own existence. The relevance of my opponents replies seemed misinformed or mismanaged. As of far, I genuinely have not seen anything to make the statement that a thinking thing, can validate its own existence (that is certainty) via acknowledgement that its thoughts are self-referential evidence is false. Sources Barry Stroud, Philosophical Scepticism and Everyday Life. Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003 The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism byBarry Stroud Oxford Studies in Metaphysics( Volume 2) von Dean Zimmerman What Is It Like to Be A Bat? by Thomas Nagel (1974) The logic of complementaritymore by Décio Krause The Age of Alternative Logics: Assessing Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics http://www.earlymoderntexts.com...