KthulhuHimself's Argument is valid

First I would like to address what the instigator had said about well-ordered and well-defined. To put it short; yes, they are different things, well-ordered regards the integrity of a definition whilst well-defined regards to a concept with such a definition; at least that is their meaning in context of my proof. I would also like to mention that it is a bit distasteful to state "otherwise my opponent loses this debate automatically.", because whether I lose or win is up for the voters to decide. As for the actual refutations: "De Problemis Praeliminaribus": In this refutation, the instigator asks "I would ask my opponent why they need to be well-defined and not simply coherent definitions. That is, coherent definitions are necessarily non-paradoxical and non-contradictory hence we need a reason to suppose that well-defined definitions are necessary.", showing that he clearly does not understand what I mean by "definition" within this proof. To explain, I would like to clarify that there are two types of definition: One is the type used in order to describe concepts, and is the type that we humans give to already existing objects in order to understand them better; whilst the other is an atemporal, objective means of predication, which we humans have no effect on. Because my proof regards predicatory definitions, the only way for them to be objective is for them to be completely and utterly independent on human perspective, which is why they can't just be "coherent definitions"; coherent definitions are only relevant when regarding explanatory definitions. Because of the rest of his rebuttal is not even relevant to my proof (for the reason listed in the previous paragraphs), I doubt that I will need to address it any further. "De Proposito Tertio": In his rebuttal, the instigator says "In order for my opponent to prove this must show mathematics are objective features of reality rather than constructs in our head for understanding the world. Otherwise, there is no reason to think mathematics ought to be the language one uses to express the definition in. One can simply express it any language which one sees fit.", further demonstrating that he is using the wrong definition of definition; yet still, he presents a good point. To answer this, all that is needed is to show one case in which an objective (perceptionless) system uses a language in order to work. The standards for a system being perceptionless is that it never receives any external input that would otherwise change its operation. Of course, the laws of physics never change their functionality and operation according to any input whatsoever, showing that they are indeed perceptionless, and hence objective. Now, what language do the laws of physics operate by? Mathematics. This should be sufficient evidence supporting the differentiation of formal languages and natural languages, so I will move on to the next point. "De Proposito Quarto": In this section, all the instigator says is that God, by definition, doesn't necessarily have to be omnipotent, omnipresent, etc.; to which I answer, yes; it is entirely possible (for all we know) for a limited God-like creator to exist; but this proof payed no regard to that type of being. My proof's conclusion, in a more precise manner, is that if there is a God, it cannot be unlimited. "Conclusio": Given, the instigator had barely refuted what he had tried to refute, I would find it somewhat unsavory to vote for him.