Human suffering is bad

So as not to get caught up in semantics, as my opponent anticipated, I will try to clarify my interpretation of the definitions. Bad means "of low or poor quality", which is to say that there is nothing intrinsic to humans in the concept of bad we will be using. Quality is commonly used as an objective idea. If we were to observe an alien species with intelligence and emotions, we would have many ideas as to the quality of their behavior. Many people also see quality as something that stems from a god. Such a morality could easily transcend humankind, and the only logical conclusion is that morality does not need to follow the framework of people's pain to be coherent. That aside, my opponent states that the resolution rests on the basis of the concepts "human suffering" and "badness" being coherent. The term "human suffering" has a very clear and objective meaning, while my opponent has done nothing to prove the claim that "badness" has any such thing. Pro claims that we all know what is meant by the term, but I am puzzled. There are several metaethical propositions that suggest that badness doesn't have meaning, and there are certainly some who accept them. That plainly negates the claim. The position that human interests don't matter is a much more rational one than the position that they do. My opponent suggests that if human interests were unimportant, then we would simply cease functioning. This is a baseless claim. People don't do what they do because it matters, they do what they do because they are pushed, biologically, into avoiding pain, and attaining pleasure. Going back to the alien jellyfish comparison, their reproduction isn't important simply because it manages to continue. Suffering, happiness, and whatnot are simply tools we have adopted because of evolution. We are putting in an effort to avoid suffering to live. Our will to live isn't there because living is better, but simply because the things that do live often manage to do so by willing it. The suggestion that when planets spin it matters, because otherwise they wouldn't, is laughable. Pro makes the deductive argument that one cannot say that human suffering is unimportant, independent of humans. Frog baseball, similarly, cannot be coherently labeled as unimportant when there is no such thing. So yes, without humans (and therefore human suffering) we can simply not rationally discuss human affairs. What we can do, however, is discuss the importance of human affairs objectively; from the perspective of truth and facts, as opposed to the emotional viewpoint of people. We can discuss the objective notion of human importance in the terms of size, volume, energy, and all kinds of things. Why can't we discuss their value? And what does it mean to be bad to human beings anyway? My opponent has done nothing to suggest that our survival strategies are a basis for value on an objective or subjective scale. My last point concerns subjective badness. If my resolution had been "The moon is up", the fact that it is above an individual is irrelevant to the claim. Ultimately, given that there is no objective basis for which one can assume that anything is up, the resolution fails. Likewise, though any given point in space can subjectively be the center of the universe, the resolution "I am at the center of the universe" would be false. The resolution "Human suffering is bad" could not stand simply due to that we (hypothetically) feel so, subjectively.