The Cosmological Argument

Thanks to wiploc for agreeing to debate me on this fascinating topic.I will be advancing and defending a version of the cosmological argument for the existence of God. [1] The argument is simply formulated as follows: [2] (1) Every contingent fact has an explanation.(2) There is a contingent fact that includes all other contingent facts.(3) Therefore, there is an explanation of this fact.(4) This explanation must involve a necessary being.(5) This necessary being is God.The argument itself is plainly logically valid in that the conclusion logically follows from the premises. Now I will give some preliminary considerations for thinking each premise is true and hence for thinking the argument is sound.(1) The Principle of Sufficient Reason (hereafter the PSR) [3]Premise (1) is merely just a particular formulation of the metaphysical PSR. There are several considerations for thinking the PSR is true.(1a) A modal argument [4]This argument starts from a weaker PSR (hereafter w-PSR) than the PSR that everyone should accept and goes on to show that the w-PSR entails the stronger principle - i.e. the PSR. So if one accepts the weaker principle one should accept the PSR. The w-PSR is this (slight modification by me): "every contingent fact possibly has a complete explanation." [5] There seems to be good reason to accept this is true and no reason to say it is false.Given the following terms and assumptions:p = a contingent fact that has no explanation.p* = that p and there is no explanation for p.z* = a possible world in which p* has a complete explanation.a* = completely explains p*.One can argue from the w-PSR as follows: in z* p* obtains (i.e. there is a complete explanation for p* in z*). Now say a* obtains as well. P* is really analogous to the BCCF is that it is a conjunction of contingent facts and so if something explains the conjunction than something has explained each conjunct. So a* explains p in z*. So in z* p has an explanation. A* also explains p* in z* and thus it follows that p has no explanation. It now comes out to a patent absurdity; it shows that in z* p both has an explanation and does not have an explanation. This shows that the very same fact does and does not have an explanation. This is an obvious and clear absurdity. To avoid this absurdity we have to avoid the posit that p has no explanation. But if we avoid that then we have to posit something like the PSR. The PSR comes out to be entailed by the very plausible w-PSR.(1b) Mundane Explanations [6]In our everyday, mundane dealings with reasons and explanations we seem to assume the PSR. If wiploc and I both hear a sound and I ask, "what was that?" and wiploc nonchalantly shrugs and answers, "nothing." I'm not the least bit inclined to accept that as an answer. Maybe he doesn't know or maybe he doesn't want to tell me or maybe...anything. I ,nor anybody, can credibly accept that literally nothing caused that sound. No one thinks that a mack truck is going to materialize in their living room for no reason or explanation at all. The best explanation for this would seem to be that the PSR is true as a matter of metaphysical necessity (meaning it is true in all possible worlds). And it surely seems that way for all contingent matters of fact. To say that the PSR only applies in mundane, everyday matters but doesn't apply to, say, the BCCF would seem wholly arbitrary because then one would have to explain why it only applies to certain situations but not to others. If the PSR isn't true that would mean that in some possible world a mack truck does materialize in your living room for no reason. This would also have devastating effects on scientific hypothesizing in matters of choosing amongst competing explanations. [7](1c) Scepticism [8]If the PSR is false this seems to admit the possibility that your perceptions can happen for no reason at all. Given that objective/physical probabilities are given from observations of the laws of nature and the like, and since scientific matters are plausibly taken as contingent facts, it follows that if the PSR is not true then we could not ever know objective probabilities. [9] The kicker is that one couldn't even this scenario is implausible or improbable because one would be appealing to objective probabilities to say so. (2) The Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact (hereafter the BCCF)Premise (2) is simply just stating the conjunction of all contingent facts as the name suggests. Naturally, a fact that is the conjunct of all and only contingent facts can't itself be anything other than contingent. (3) Explanation for the BCCFGiven premises (1) and (2) it follows, by metaphysical necessity, there has to be an explanation for the BCCF.(4) A Necessary BeingIf we plausibly suppose that a contingent fact cannot explain itself (if contingent facts could explain themselves them it would seem that they aren't contingent) then we are forced to conclude that a necessary being must explain the BCCF.(5) Necessary Being = GodGiven that we have good reasons for accepting the premises the argument we see we have good reasons to accept that there is a necessary being who is the explanation or causes of all contingent facts. What reasons are there to call this being God? Many of attributes of the first cause fall right in line with the traditional concept of God. [10]For one, a necessary being that itself depends on nothing else for it's existence.For two, there seems to be two types of explanation. Scientific and personal or agential. A scientific explanation to question "why is the PlayStation on?" would be something like "well, when I press the power button this activates the circuitry...etc". A personal explanation would be "because I wanted to play on it". Since a scientific explanation seems to be in principle impossible because scientific explanation to deal solely with contingent matters (in terms of laws and the like) we need to look elsewhere. If the only other explanatory cause is personal or agential we can say the first cause is an agent or personal. And given some data, like fine-tuning of the universe, it would seem to be plausible say that the necessary being is also immensely intelligent. For three, given that there is a metaphysically necessary being that explains every contingent fact in every possible world that would seem to offer a consideration that this being immensely powerful, omnipotent even. If omnipotent, then it would not make sense to say there is more than one cause as there can't be two omnipotent beings. Or, making use of Occam's razor, that provides some support that there is only one cause.The Leibnizian cosmological argument doesn't purport to prove all of the properties typically attributed to God but it certainly helps in the case. It is now seen that we have good reasons to think the argument sound.--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------[1] http://plato.stanford.edu...[2] Alexander Pruss, "The Leibnizian Cosmological Argument", The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, pgs. 38-39[3] http://plato.stanford.edu...[4] Alexander Pruss, "Modal Arguments", The Principle of Sufficient Reason: A Reassessment, pg. 234[5] ibid[6] ibid, pg. 254 [7] ibid, pg. 280[8] Same source as [2], pg. 41[9] http://en.wikipedia.org...[10] Same as [2], pg. 103