Resolved: The USFG should eliminate its nuclear armed ICBM force

____________ Both sides are advocating for a restructuring of the nuclear triad- this debate is about which leg to cut: the ICBM or bomber leg. The CP reduces the bomber leg to an aging skeleton force torn between a conventional and nuclear mission with no plan for replacement. There are effectively five topics on which the Rez and CP are competitive, and they can roughly be prioritized as follows: Solvency Con’s case hinges on arguments that ICBM are critical to nuclear readiness. But a budget crisis will collapse US nuclear deterrence; Con must win that the CP solves the budget for any of his pro-ICBM arguments to be relevant. It doesn’t matter how great ICBM are if the US is forced to scrap the program due to a budget crisis. Con concedes most of my first contention- that a budget crisis will collapse US nuclear deterrent and grants that cutting the ICBM program will solve this crisis. The Pro case is guaranteed to solve the budget; Con’s suffers from a major solvency deficit. My [1] notes that managerial complexity is a key feature of the crisis; the CP still requires modernization of all 3 legs of the triad and so can’t solve this. Only Pro leverages the cost savings of cutting an entire leg. Conventional Military Power Global economy and peace depends much more heavily on US conventional power than nuclear. The US uses its military all around the globe EACH DAY; nuclear weapons function mostly as a worst-case trump card. My R1 arguments about US security guarantees apply equally to conventional force; I have also provided evidence specific to the bomber program are essential to deterring Chinese aggression against Japan. I have multiple sources for specific ways bombers are crucial to US power; Con can’t just dismiss these with his own assessment of the airforce and a 25 year old paper. Loss of conventional military power outweighs concerns about nuclear deterrence because a) timeframe is immediate- the CP eliminates weapons we currently use to keep China and Russia in check, and b) probability of impact is much higher- China and Russia are already showing signs of military build up and aggressive action, loss of conventional deterrence will destabilize the globe. Terrorism The disarray and chronic mismanagement of ICBM both exposes us to a risk of nuclear terrorism and undermines the reliability of ICBM for nuclear defense. Despite promises that systematic failures of the program will be fixed, nothing has been fixed over the past decade. Budget issues means problems will only get worse. If we have to cut a leg off the triad, we should cut off the leg that’s a magnet for terrorism. Deterrence Subs are the most survivable leg of the triad; as long as we have subs we have second strike capability and credible deterrence. The bomber force ensures redundancy. The CP cripples the bomber force which are crucial to signaling intent- bombers can be deployed and recalled to signal a stand down. This makes miscalculation more likely and increases the odds of accidental nuclear war. Con’s ASW arguments are based on speculation about technology that doesn’t exist and convoluted plots for terrorists to destroy subs. Even if you buy Con’s arguments, loss of ICBM is only a marginal loss of deterrence. Nuclear war will still be improbable due to high costs to all parties. The immediate cost of losing conventional military power and risking total collapse of US nuclear deterrence in a budget crisis are more important. I am winning the survivability issue- retaining ICBMs forces nuclear carpet bombing in the event of war, leading to environmental catastrophe that will disrupt agriculture and kill tens of millions- the impact is both death and societal collapse. But a credible deterrent means the odds of nuclear war are minimal. Survivability is a worst-case scenario that should not govern defense spending. Politics The Politics issue should be seen as a tiebreaker. Con concedes that CP directly links and jeopardizes arms control agreements.