A Maximally Great Being is Possible

Con's First Glance"I'm dubious ... 'Most philosophers?' Hardly." What an odd doubt; nearly every philosopher agrees that necessary existence is either possible or impossible. Whereas contingent existence is either probable or improbable. This is one of the principles governing all of metaphysics. Although I must say Con's rhetorical skills are quite persuasive on a superficial level, such skill of persuasion ought to give the voter pause for how carefully to weigh the logic of his arguments themselves. Con continues, "All of those steps are controversial" I'd like to know what credible philosopher considers the the premises controversial? It seems as if Con misunderstands the argument itself. How we know of greatness is subjective, but maximal greatness in every possible world is an objective property: Con has confused ontological greatness with epistemological greatness. The latter is irrelevant to the "Ontological argument." Con then asserts that non-existence is somehow greater than existence. How is this claim even remotely coherent? For non-existence isn't even a property! How could "not anything" be great? It's clearly greater to exist than not. Imagine if I told you that the burrito I never had today was great.. Clarifying Maximal Greatness God is maximally Great Being, if you can conceive of something greater, then THAT would be God. This need not be ambiguous or even epistemically known. I'm arguing for Ontological Greatness; not just a "hedge word." Con's Alleged Refutation Con assumes to know errors in the reasoning but hasn't offered yet any proof of such errors. But the logic is air tight then by the cannons of logic Con must show which of the premises are false; but instead what does Con do? He begins with the conclusion. This ought to raise suspicion for anyone who has ever taken a class in logic. Remember this. For now let's look at his argument leading to a different conclusion in which he claims isn't "tricky" ... despite its premise 2, "There is no inherent contradiction in godless worlds" Con revises his concept of possible worlds for the sole reason of the conclusion! This is a text book example petitio principii, or "begging the question" ... Con uses his P2 as a proposition which requires proof yet assumed without proof. What I think Con really wants to say is that a Maximally Great Being is IMpossible, that is, he wants to deny premise 1 of the Ontological Argument. But he hasn't yet. Hence Plantinga's argument isn't at all refuted. Further, he's saying here that something contingent is not necessary; which is true, but Con has yet to show just how a maximally great being's existence is contingent, or even IMpossible. But if a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world; since by definition it is greater to exist than not to exist. Remember, necessary existence is a property. Maximal Greatness = IMpossible? "Any "logic" that proves both that god exists and that god doesn't exist is patently worthless." Misunderstood again. The argument affirms God's existence as possible, not IMpossible. Regardless of that, Modal logic has been highly advanced and developed since Ockham & Scotus; far from worthless. See,http://homepages.mcs.vuw.ac.nz...; Con's Second Alleged Refutation But notice now what I'm arguing for, A Maximally Great Being, is a far cry from Xal-xe, who cannot be maximally great in all possible worlds since that would, well, be God by a different name. Switching the names doesn't render a God's existence impossible. Maybe Con's argument would work if Xal-ze has quasi-greatness, but that's incompatible with maximal greatness. For there are possible worlds in which God must have the power to refrain from creating Xal-ze; hence Xal-ze lacks necessary existence, which doesn't adequately parody Plantinga's argument.I'm afraid Con has failed to point out alleged errors in Plantinga's logic. We've only seen fallacies, failed parody's and misunderstanding's of actual vs. knowable, not refutations so far. Con's Alleged Refutation of a posteriori Warrants Insofar as theists arguments are even possibly true, it follows God's existence is necessarily true. Yet since the a priori warrant is unfounded within Con’s intuition, whether by design or accident, one can nevertheless offer the following conceptualist argument for a posteriori warrant: consider the Conceptualist Argument, 1. Abstract objects, such as numbers & propositions, are either independently existing realities or else concepts in some mind 2. Abstract objects are not independently existing realities. 3. If abstract objects are concepts in some mind, then an omniscient, metaphysically necessary being exists. 4. Therefore, an omniscient metaphysically necessary being exists. Premise 1 would simply require a refutation of Nominalism (view of non-existing abstract objects), which has already been accomplished and can be found, http://philmat.oxfordjournals.org... Premise 2 simply requires a Platonism Refutation, which has already been accomplished in the literature by showing not only how abstract objects are causally isolated, but are also irrelevant to what transpires in the world. Premise 3 excludes abstract objects as grounded in a human mind, for there are just too many abstract objects to be grounded in anything less than an infinite mind; and since many of these objects exist necessarily, they can’t be grounded in any contingent mind. Thus this leads us to a conclusion which supports premise 1 of the ontological argument. Surely, though, it just seems obvious that a metaphysically necessary being is the ground for abstract objects which are themselves metaphysically necessary; at least more obvious than any negation offered thus far. Hence we’re within our rational right to affirm the possibility of God, from which it follows God must exist. Con has clearly not understood this concept. This is even more evident from how he talks about 'Possible World' semantics, "So long as there are possible worlds which didn't begin, which don't have god-given morality, and which don't have abstract objects grounded by Plantinga's contradictory and impossible god, then these three arguments fail to support that god" A possible world, it will be remembered, isn't a universe, it's just a set of conjuncts which maximally describe the way a reality might be. For example, there is a possible world in which I ate breakfast today. Now when you read his claim^ again, you'll see how Con has miserably confused possible world semantics. For there could BE a possible world in which the universe didn't begin, but that would indeed BE a possible world, still with necessary abstractions. Con has obviously confused material worlds with possible worlds when he attempts to refute a posteriori support for premise 1 of the Ontological Argument. Con's Conclusion "Plantinga's argument is refuted because its conclusion is false." In order to refute a logically airtight argument, in which the conclusion necessarily and logically follows from the premises, you don't start by refuting the conclusion. You must show which of the premises are false. This is a rule of logic. Con is therefore going contrary to the cannons of logic in order to negate the argument. This ought to show the voter just what lengths this Con is willing to go in order to deny the existence of a metaphysically necessary being. You don't have to agree with the conclusion, or even like it, but if the premesis are true and valid then the conclusion necessarily follows. Conclusion The Ontological argument stands irrefuted. If Con is to actually refute the argument, he must obey the rules of logic and attack the premises first and not just assume there are "errors" in them. He talks about being a tricky argument, yet there seems to me nothing more trickier than giving the voters an impression that you can show the premises to be false by attacking the conclusion first; this goes against all we know of logic.