Moral Relativism (Pro) vs. Divine Command Theory (Con)

I agree with my opponent, this debate is a refreshing change of pace.Parts-Whole FallacyWhile my opponent is correct that some properties do transfer from part to whole, having this property is something that must be demonstrated, and is not fiat. My opponent has not demonstrated why contingency makes this transferral.Additionally, my opponent's example of color as a transferrable property is flawed. Adding white sodium powder to white-colored water does not produce a white fire. It produces a red fire.The fallacy's undermining of the transition between contingency of parts of the universe and contingency of the universe still stands.ContingencyWhile it is true that the odds of serendipity producing a universe as we know it are remote, there is no reason to believe that alternate conditions would not produce alternate universes. While these universes would be different from our own, they would still be universes.My opponent states that "a lack of omnipotence can only be caused by a physical limitation". This is incorrecct. It could also be caused by a nonphysical limitation, such as a logical one (see arguments on omnipotence). Therefore transcendency does not entail omnipotence. But even if it did, that would not entail omniscience either. This being would not necessarily know everything about his creation, as there are elements of chance in the universe. If I make a set of dice, that does not mean I know what every roll will be. But even if this being did know everything about the universe, that wouldn't entail omniscience either, because the universe wouldn't be the only thing to exist, demonstrated by the fact that this entity is transcendent. Therefore, there exists the possibility of things beyond the universe. Therefore, omniscience is not entailed.My opponent then invokes Divine Simplicity. The problem with this is that complexity is a subjective concept. We cannot really define what "complexity" means except in intuitive terms.MR vs MNMy opponent misinterprets my reiteration of my definition. I was merely summarizing the part I was trying to emphasize. The definition I actually gave was:"a code of conduct that, given specified conditions, would be put forward by all rational persons" I then concluded that as any code put forward by all rational persons would have to objective, subjective morality was incoherent. If we accept my opponent's definition, then my opponent faces a problem, however. As any code of conduct put forward by any person fits their definition of morality, the various codes of conduct can have wildly different tenets. Therefore, if we accept my opponent's definition, MR is proven to be correct by definition alone. If, however, we accept my definition, then MN follows from MR, and my arguments in favor of MN allow me to win. I will allow my opponent to choose among the two definitions.God's Objective MoralityMy opponent themself admits that there are some moral truths that exist such that "God did not make them so". I have already pointed out that this does not avoid the prongs of the Euthyphro dilemma, but embraces one of them. Again, Russel points this out himself."you will then have to say that it is not only through God that right and wrong came into being, but that they are in their essence logically anterior to God."The problem with accepting this concept, however, is that the definition of DCT is that all morals are created by God, and therefore no moral truths can exist such that God did not make them so. Again, this undermines the basic premise of DCT.Is/Ought Gap UpheldI did not say that my opponent did not justify his refutation of Hume's Law, I merely pointed out that it was based on the unfounded assumption that Hume is advocating that we ought to value rationality. But Hume never states this. Hume may simply be acting arbitrarily, or he may find happiness in seeking knowledge that is correct and therefore desire to do this.But to assume that he is making an ought statement himself when he never does such a thing is completely unfounded.Hume's Is/Ought Gap remains standing.EvolutionI concede that this a moot point.Necessary Moral TruthsWhen I point out that so-called "necessary moral truths" are tautological, it is not because I believe that being tautological means being false (because that is not true), but rather because tautological statements are not actually statements. When you say "If X, then X", this does not actually perscribe any special meaning to X, or mean that X has some magic property of morality. It just means that X is X. Likewise, defining immoral actions in terms of unnecessary cruelty is defining a thing in terms of itself. It does not make a statement. It does not have any special properties. It is a tautology.Divine Command Theory does not stipulate that some moral truths do not come from God, it stipulates that ALL moral truths come from God. Therefore some not coming from God violates the premise of the concept.Arguments on OmnipotenceThe problem with defining things with two definitions for two different things is that it completely ignores the purpose of a definition. When we define a concept, all we are doing is linking a word with an idea. We are saying "When I say this word, I am referring to this idea." So two create two different definitions defeats the purpose entirely. We want ONE definition of omnipotence that applies to all instances.When you define God's omnipotence as the ability to do whatever is in his nature, you are just making a tautology. God's nature mean whatever it is that God does. Therefore, when you define God's omnipotence as the ability to do whatever is in His nature, you are saying "God can do whatever God does." This is not an actual statement about God's abilities.One other definition commonly used to subvert the Paradox of the Stone is that omnipotence means "the capability to do whatever is logically possible." The problem with this definition is that it doesn't actually avoid the paradox. A logically possible action is an action that can be undertaken without any internal contradictions. It is logically possible to create a rock from smaller rocks. It is logically possible to lift a rock. Therefore, these are things that God can do. So, can God create a rock that He cannot lift? The paradox is still there.In SummationMR is correct because:1) It is correct by the definition of morality.2) Hume's Is/Ought Gap proves we cannot have moral knowledge.DCT is incorrect because:1) It is incorrect by the definition of morality. 2) The Euthyphro Dilemma undermines at least one of its tenets.With that, I will hand it over to my opponent to make the final argument.This has been an enjoyable debate, and I hope to have more like it in the future.