My argument for a god will be more convincing than my opponents.

Thank's to Unstobbaple for instigating and to the judges for voting. I will open with my first argument for the existence of God. Modal Ontological Argument P1) It is possible that a maximally great being exists. P2) If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world. P3) If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world. P4) If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world. P5) If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists. C1) Therefore, a maximally great being exists. This argument uses the laws of modal logic and is similar to a mathematical proof. So if at first this argument made no sense, bear with me. I will attempt to simplify it and make it easier to understand. When philosophers speak of “possible worlds,” they mean a hypothetical situation (a possible description of reality) Premise 1. The 5 previous arguments support this premise. Premise 2. This is just a restatement of P1 in a “possible worlds” format. Premise 3. There are 3 types of entities that can be spoken of when talking about possibilities: An impossible being (that which can't exist in any possible world, such as a three-sided square), a contingent being (that which could exist in some possible world, but not every world, such as a unicorn. It could exist, as there are no logical incoherencies, it just doesn't in reality), and a necessary being (a being which has to exist in all possible worlds). A maximally great being would be necessary, as being necessary is greater than being contingent or impossible. So a being that necessarily exists is greater than one that exists in some possible worlds, or one that doesn't exist at all. Premise 4. This premise is obviously true as the actual world, what we would call “reality,” is possible. Premise 5. This premise is also obviously true. To suggest the opposite, that if something exists in reality, then it doesn't exist, is illogical. Conclusion 1. Thus a Maximally Great Being exists. There is a modified version of this argument that is easier to understand: 1) God is that which nothing greater is possible, i. e. the greatest possible being. 2) It is at least possible for God to exist in reality. That is, whether or not God actually exists in the real world, He at least exists in some possible set of circumstances. So, God might have existed in the real world. 3) If something exists only in the mind but is possible, then that something might have been greater than it is. For example, a majestic mountain that exists only in the mind might have been greater: the mountain existing in reality.4) Suppose God exists only in the mind and not in reality. 5) Then there is a possible being that is greater, namely God existing in reality. 6) So it is possible for something to have been greater than God. 7) Since God is that which nothing greater is possible, then it is possible for something to be greater than that which nothing greater is possible. C: Premise 7 is not possible and therefore its negation is true, God exists. Argument in logical symbolism: Gaunillo's Island A monk named Gaunillo objected to Anselm's modal ontological argument not long after its formulation. He created the Gaunilo's island response, which claims that the term God was interchangeable with any 'greatest possible thing,' therefore rendering the argument invalid. There are several flaws in this objection, the biggest being that it is wrong, but also that it does nothing to invalidate the argument. Technically, the Modal Ontological Argument is still sound, and thus the conclusion necessarily follows. So what is wrong with Gaunilo's island? The modal ontological argument is invalid with anything other than a greatest possible being. To refute the objection: P1) There exists an island greater than the perfect island. P2) Such an island has no physical boundaries or forms. P3) Such an island is capable of thought and being. P4) Such a being is tri-omni P5) This tri-omni being is God. The island parody simply proves God. A “greatest possible island” is impossible; there will always be something greater until the “island” exhibits God-like qualities. It is similar to claiming there exists the greatest possible integer, no such thing. There is another objection that is as follows: Presumably, a perfect island is one with an abundance of lush palm trees and pristine beaches. The more of these an island has, the better it is. There is, however, no intrinsic maximum number of trees or beaches that an island could have; for any island that can be imagined, there is another, greater island, with one more palm tree and one more beach. There is, then, no island than which no greater island can be conceived. The concept of the perfect island is incoherent; there can be no such thing. " Kant's Objection In Critique of Pure Reason, Kant claims that existence is not a predicate, so the modal ontological argument fails. This objection is undermined by Godel's Proof, a formal proof that concludes with God's existence. It only uses mathematical functions to create following premises. The principles that many of the axioms pre-suppose to be true don't need to be debated if we are to assume that both parties agree on things like positiveness is relative to our moral aesthetic sense. The following is Godel’s mathematical proof: The following is a worded version: D1) X is God-like if and only if X has as essential properties those and only those properties which are positive. D2) A is an essence of X if and only if for every property B, X has B necessarily if and only if A entails B. D3) X necessarily exists if and only if every essence of X is necessarily exemplified. A1) Any property entailed by—i. e. , strictly implied by—a positive property is positive. A2) If a property is positive, then its negation is not positive. A3) The property of being God-like is positive. A4) If a property is positive, then it is necessarily positive. A5) Necessary existence is positive. A6) For any property P, if P is positive, then being necessarily P is positive. T1) If a property is positive, then it is consistent, i. e. , possibly exemplified. C1) The property of being God-like is consistent. T2) If something is God-like, then the property of being God-like is an essence of that thing. T3): Necessarily, the property of being God-like is exemplified. Conclusion: Inferring X as God is justified as God-like properties are exhibited. This formal proof is also a justification for premise 3 in the Modal Ontological Argument (see arg. above). This proof is also supported by Godel's Temporal Modal Logical Proof: MN = Modal Negation FR = ◊R HR = `33;R (H ψ → (ψ • G ψ)) (T1) ~ (H ψ → (ψ • G ψ)) (n) NTF (T2) H ψ (n) 1, PC (T3) ~ (ψ • G ψ) (n) 1, PC (T4) ~ψ (n) 3, PC (T4) ~G ψ (n) 3, PC (T5) F~ ψ (n) 3, MN (T6) nBk 5, FR (T7) ~ψ (k) 5,6, FR (T8) kBn 2, HR (T9) ψ (k) 2,7, HR Verbal Equivalent: (T1) = It is not true that if it always has been the case that a God-like being exists then a God-like being exists and it is always going to be the case that a God-like being exists in (n). (T2) = It always has been the case that a God-like being existed in (n). (T3) = It is not true that a God-like being exists and it is always going to exist in (n). (T4) = A God-like being does not exist in (n) (T4) = It is not the case that a God-like being will always exist in (n). (T5) = In sometime in the future it will be the case that a God-like being will not exist in (n). (T6) = (n) occurred before (k). (T7) = A God-like being does not exist in (k). (T8) = (k) occurred before (n). (Reflexive Rule) (T9) = A God-like being exists in (k). The negation of the formula creates a contradiction.