Kantian metaphysics and epistemology is superior to Objectivist epistemology and metaphysics

Re: Sense Perception To the best of my knowledge, when Peikoff said that “reporting the stick as straight” would be an error in itself, this was in the context that the scenario did not give any reason for it to be reported as straight. Given the nature of man’s senses and the nature of the things being sensed, in the situation of the stick, there would have to be some drastic change to make it perceivable as straight without error. However, in the case of blind spots being “filled in” and other similar things, the situation is perfectly capable of explaining why, via the interaction of its parts, this phenomena occurs. There is no discrepancy here, considering that the “filled in” portions are the direct results of existents interacting on each other. “[If] the mind, not just the senses, is shaping perception […] then the mind, fallible as it is (according to Rand, introduces a fallible element into perception.” Here my opponent misunderstands my argument – Rand never claimed that the mind, in the sense of “the brain and all of its functions”, is always fallible. She claimed that volitional consciousness (i.e. the mind operating on a conceptual level) was fallible. Quoting Peikoff: “It is only in regard to the “what” – only on the conceptual level of consciousness – that the possibility of error arises” [1]. I was not using the term “mind” to refer to this volitional aspect of the mind; I was referring to the mind in the sense relevant to the discussion at hand, including those parts that operate automatically and mechanistically without room for error. As such, I haven’t injected fallibility into sense perception, since the mind, in the context of my argument, was being used to mean “the mind’s automatic functions which give rise to the phenomena my opponent outlined, and, as such, the functions of the mind which are on the same level of the eyes or ears.” My opponent’s argument rested on the idea that things such as the McGurk Effect are the result of non-conceptual factors, and, given that I had not rejected this, I had assumed that it was clear that I did not mean to introduce conceptualization (and, by extension, fallibility) into the debate on the point. Given that point of clarification, my opponent’s rebuttals do not stand. Re: Causality, Certainty without A Priori Concepts I have shown that objective and universal knowledge can be gained without the need for a priori concepts: “If X + Y = Z is observed once, then, assuming that no variables change, it is absolute knowledge that X + Y = Z.” Just by observing the nature of existents it is possible to draw undeniable tautological conclusions, and my opponent has done nothing to refute this point (so his arguments about a priori knowledge being necessary for truth and there being no others means to it fail). Although my opponent claims that “[p]henomenal knowledge is part of reality in the sense it tells us objectively what experience is for humans”, he’s avoiding the question – what distinction is there to be drawn between the “experience of humans” and “things in themselves” if things in themselves are the only things that are possibly perceived? If humans cannot experience things in themselves, then, by definition, they cannot gain absolute knowledge of reality. If they can, then the Kantian claim that things in themselves cannot be grasped is false. The former supports the interpretation that Kantianism holds that knowledge is illusory, and the latter contradicts Kantianism at the outset. When I say that the law of identity cannot be derived from anything, I mean that it cannot be derived from any previous conceptual knowledge. An axiom, by definition, cannot be proved – it is a self-evidency because it is a precondition for proof. Axioms are the starting points of knowledge. This is not to say, however, that axioms aren’t grasped. I never claimed that knowledge of axioms do not come to man via any methods – I claimed that they do not rely on anything other than themselves for validation. This is in no way to imply that axioms are a priori, just that they are grasped and validated at the moment of perception of anything because they are implicit in everything and every act of recognizing anything. My opponent asks why A cannot change to be Non-A – I have explained this previously. Quoting myself, “The only way for X + Y to equal non-Z would be if something changed, but, if something does change, then the initial claim (that X + Y = Z) would not be applicable.” In other words, if you are still identifying A as A, then A is, by definition, A. If A changes, it is no longer A, and identifying it as such would be an error. This is trivial – if a seed grows into a tree, you cannot say that the seed was not a seed. It might not be a seed any longer, but that does not invalidate what it once was and the fact that it currently has the identity of a tree. My purpose in explaining what causality is was to show that knowledge of it is inherent in grasping the axiomatic concept that A = A. It directly follows from the idea that things have identities that things with identities will always have those identities unless they cease to be those things, and this provides proper grounding for knowledge of causality. It seems quite absurd to make the argument that, since experience cannot be interpreted without time or space as inherent concepts, those concepts are necessarily a priori, considering the same argument may be turned against itself by rearranging its ordering. “Time is required to make sense of experience” is just as accurate as “experience is required to make sense of time” (as explained in my last round). If anything, this implies that they are at least grasped together, with sense experience being a necessary component of any concept, and so my opponent has failed to defend the existence of a priori knowledge. My thesis against tabula rasa is that children have an innate knowledge of linguistic grammar. As far as I can see, Con has still not done anything to debunk this claim. I did not in any way equate tendencies towards concept formation with innate knowledge. That's why, of course, children don't innately know languages. However, what I've clearly argued is that they innately know the grammar of language, as is evidenced by the ease by which they learn a language despite their infancy and lack of direct instruction. Con may look further into Chomsky's argument if he desires more clarification. Just because children's knowledge of grammar is not articulated initially, does not mean it's not innate. In fact, no innate knowledge could possibly be articulated until the acquisition of some kind of language. This is no argument against innate concepts. Their learning of language merely provides the manifold by which this innate structure may be employed. Re: Tabula Rasa There is a distinction to be made between the ability to learn new things and inherent knowledge. It is not in conflict with Objectivism to assume that children are predisposed to certain things, including a grasp of new languages via a framework of grammar. However, if they have not conceptualized this framework or any languages, they do not have inherent conceptions, that which Objectivism argues against. I see no reason to count tendencies as conceptions, and, as such, this poses no problem. I’d like to thank Pro as well – that was a fun debate. [1.] Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand