The Kalam Cosmological Argument is Invalid

However, he has completely misrepresented William Lane Craig, drawn an incomplete and false conclusion from one of William Lane Craig's quotes, contradicted himself in regards to "begins to exist", and confused the defense of a premise with the premise itself. In essence, my opponent is profoundly confused about what the Kalam Cosmological Argument actually is and has consequently straw-manned the argument in entirety. Misrepresenting William Lane CraigHere my opponent offers a quotation from the answer to the 9th question of William Lane Craig's series of Q&A's on his website. He attempts to show how William Lane Craig believes that it is impossible for something to come from nothing, and that consequently William Lane Craig does not believe in creatio ex nihilo. Pro errs when he derives an incomplete conclusion from the quote. Pro concludes that "the causal premiss is rooted in the metaphysical intuition that something cannot come into being from nothing". However, this conclusion is incomplete! Pro has completely forgotten to include the extra language "from nothing" in his conclusion. Indeed, William Lane Craig is defending the causal premise of the KCA by arguing that nothing can come into being uncauses. However, it does not follow that William Lane Craig denies creatio ex nihilo! As William Lane Craig himself argues in the very same Q&A question:"I think that the principle ex nihilo nihil fit (out of nothing nothing comes) is as certain as anything in philosophy and that no rational person sincerely doubts it. But this principle does not in any way contradict the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo (creation out of nothing), as the medieval thinkers who espoused both realized. For only in the case of creation is there a cause which brings the relevant object into being"-[1]Therefore Pro's claim that William Lane Craig denies creatio ex nihilo is false. On "Begins to exist"There are two problems with Pro's argument. First, he attempts to show that the first premise discriminates against "creatio ex nihilo", but then accepts my [and WLC's] definition of "begins to exist" as being "x begins to exist if and only if x exists at time t and there is no time t* prior to t at which x exists'". But in doing so, he inadvertently concedes that "begins to exist" is non-discriminatory in regards to creatio ex materia and creatio ex nihilo! Indeed, this definition of "begins to exist" is applicable to both creatio ex materia and creatio ex nihilo. If something begins to exist from nothing, there is a time in which that something exists and a lack of any time at all prior to that time in which that something exists. So it goes with something coming into existence from pre-existing materials. Indeed, when I was conceived in my mother's womb, that was when I began to exist for there was no time prior to the moment of my conception in which I existed. Therefore, by accepting my definition of "begins to exist", Pro contradicts his position that the first premise of the KCA only refers to creatio ex materia. The second problem with Pro's argument is in how he attempts to show that "begins to exist" refers only to creatio ex materia. He points out that we only see evidence of creatio ex materia, but we see no evidence of creatio ex nihilo. But this does not at all play into the the meaning of the first premise! After all, the meaning of a literal statement does not automatically change to accommodate the truthfulness of reality. If I say "I am pregnant", my statement does not suddenly change in meaning to become "I am not pregnant", simply because the latter is a true statement. It may in fact be so that creatio ex nihilo is impossible, but this point would only be valid in arguing against the soundness of the first premise, not the validity of the argument itself. On "Causes"Pro concedes my point on causes. Thus we can both agree that in this case, cause is defined as an "efficient cause". So far so good. However, he then goes on to reiterate his previous point that there is a difference in "beginnings" between P1 and P2. Unfortunately, such a difference is imagined. Keep in mind that Pro has previously agreed that "begins to exist" means "x begins to exist if and only if x exists at time t and there is no time t* prior to t at which x exists". But what difference is there in the beginning of creatio ex materia and creatio ex nihilo? Both fit the previous definition of beginning to exist. Pro argues that creatio ex materia and creatio ex nihilo are different, but this is largely irrelevant. The first premise contains no language that discriminates against either. In conclusion, there is no language in P1 that excludes creatio ex nihilo, therefore the argument remains logically valid. The only way to invalidate the argument would be to add language to the first premise, which is precisely what Pro does in the next point. The Straw Man Is There, I say! He is! First of all, Pro maintains his misrepresentation of William Lane Craig's position on creatio ex nihilo, therefore all arguments relying on this misrepresentation are automatically invalid. But even more so, he reveals the added language of premise one, offering an argument for why he chooses "Generalization: Everything that begins to exist ex materia has a cause" over "Everything that begins to exist has a cause for its existence". But this is precisely where the Straw-Man comes into play! The first premise reads as the latter, not the former! Pro argues that P1 is rooted in induction, so far so good. He then argues that his #2 "Generalization: Everything that begins to exist ex materia has a cause" is preferable over #3 "Generalization: Everything that begins to exist has a cause" But in context of this debate, how is this even relevant? Let's assume, for the sake of argument, that #3 is false, whereas #2 is supported by the evidence. This would only be a valid argument against the soundness of P1, not against the logical validity of the entire argument! As I have previously stated, it is illogical to argue that the meaning of a statement changes to accommodate the truthfulness of reality. The Straw Man Begins To Transform Into A Real Man But Then Goes Back To StrawFinally, Pro comes close, ever so close to correctly representing William Lane Craig's position by finally correctly quoting his position:"The causal premiss is rooted in the metaphysical intuition that something cannot come into being from nothing"Ah yes, I love the smell of correct representation in the morning. However, Pro then draws a peculiar conclusion! Pro then argues that:"You can't say that the first premise (the "causal premiss") is rooted in the notion that something cannot come into being from nothing, and then say it applies to things which come into being from nothing"This statement is confused. First of all, the first premise is rooted in the notion that something can not come into being from nothing uncaused. It does not logically follow then that the KCA has nothing to do with things coming into existence from nothing! Finally, there is no logical contradiction between ex nihilo nihil fit (or, something can not come from nothing uncaused) and creatio ex nihilo. For while it is true that nothing can not come from something uncaused, it certainly does not logically follow that it is impossible for something to come from nothing caused. SummaryPro is very confused about the Kalam Cosmological Argument. He misrepresents William Lane Craig, contradicts himself, and confuses the defense of an argument with the argument itself. I have shown that P1 of the Kalam does not discriminate against creatio ex nihilo or creatio ex materia. Therefore the accusation of equivocation dissolves. [1] . http://www.reasonablefaith.org...