Civil Disobedience and Voluntary Punishment

Thanks, Lupricona, for the debate, and to the readers and voters!I. DropsIn order to avoid making new arguments, Lupricona may not talk about any points he dropped or make arguments he never previously made. A dropped point is one he failed to respond to when he had the chance to do so earlier.II. FrameworkCon's points re: Objective Morality or The Simple Life have simply become irrelevant because we have already agreed that (a) there is an objective morality and (b) attaining human flourishing (HUFL) is a/the central aim of said morality. Con drops a & b and drops that protecting and promoting HUFL is a standard by which we can weigh the arguments in this debate and the morality of accepting punishment. Con drops the definition of HUFL: "[h]uman flourishing is about individual self-actualization; basic conditions of wellbeing are essential preconditions to having a meaningful opportunity and ability to self-actualize. People who are starving, who are living in a war zone, or who are suffering from illnesses face substantial hurdles to self-actualization."Given that Con's own theory makes HUFL central, it's hard to see how he could've possibly objected to this standard; regardless, it is now too late for him to raise objections to it. Moreover, I have already conceded to the view of objective morality which places HUFL at its core, agreeing with Con's claim that "[g]iven that the most basic moral principle is existence, it follows that the principle for human societies to follow is to flourish." I do not need to offer my own theory of objective morality when I agree with my opponent's theory up until this point. The question now becomes: how best to achieve HUFL? Whoever best achieves HUFL will thus best link into morality. Con says that NAP is the best way to achieve HUFL. I disagree, and point to an ends-based model which seeks to produce concrete outcomes which cohere with HUFL as I defined it. Since HUFL is our moral objective, all I need to do to justify my model is to show that it best achieves that objective as it was defined; I have already shown this with my examples (e.g. taxation, parenting). Moreover, Con's theory has consequentialist (CONSEQ) undertones which undermines his R4 deontological talk.III. NAPA. Consequentialist Undertones Con wrote: "Given that the most basic moral principle is existence...the principle for human societies...is to flourish. A way...to achieve this is to limit the amount of violence that occurs." The key word here is "limit." This word implies that we are looking to avoid producing certain outcomes, in this case, violence. He treats NAP as a means to limit violence. This is a kind of CONSEQ reasoning.Even using the term "human flourishing" implies consequence-oriented morality, because HUFL as defined is an end-state that will have to be achieved through actions designed to produce that end-state. Finally, Con says, "Human suffering is an evil, and a morally righteous person would attempt to prevent it...the person ought to prevent the cop from killing a victim." This is entirely consequence-oriented; Con wants to prevent the consequence of suffering.Con seems to abnegate consequentilaist logic, yet appears to make both CONSEQ and deontological claims. He can't backtrack from his own words. Also, if Con can use CONSEQ reasoning, he cannot to object to me using it.B. NAP is Inconsistent with HUFLStealing and taxation are not analogous, because one (not the other) comes from an authority checked by legal restraints and democratic processes. A society without taxation would prove catastrophic--how could the state run food programs for the starving, secure the borders against violent groups, or fund healthcare initiatives to aid the sick without tax money? There is no good reason to suspect that voluntary donations would be sufficient for the government to do all or even some of these things. It's not hard to imagine people--selfish as we can be--not coughing up money for those programs without some coercive force. In this same vein, Con drops that "requiring parents to care for their children violates NAP." Con also admits that we cannot punish people for committing fraud. How can I flourish if I have no money to feed myself because I was defrauded of all that I owned? These examples illustrate that in order to achieve HUFL and existence, force is sometimes necessary. That which is necessary to achieve a moral aim cannot itself be immoral in all situations, as the necessity of it serves as its own justification. Con says it's immoral to negate existence, but suggests it is okay to allow people to starve to death or to neglect infants until they pass away. Force is necessary to prevent this suffering. Non-initiation of force would fundamentally harm HUFL and existence in certain situations, and therefore force cannot always be immoral.C. Risk1. We Can Never ActWe ought not to act immorally. This is tautological; furthermore, Con repeatedly advances this position throughout the debate. He argues that initiation of force is immoral, so we ought not initiate force. If every action we do has the possibility of initiating force against someone else, then we ought never to take any action. When a hunter accidentally harms his friend, mistaking his friend for game (Dick Cheney *cough*), he has acted immorally under NAP because NAP's prohibition is a blanket one against any initiation of force. Con concedes as much when he notes that the hunter ought to be punished for initiating force. As Con writes, "People should not initiate force on others. Causing harm on others goes against existence, so causing force is wrong." Thus, we ought never to take any action, because every action is potentially immoral. Every action could initiate force against something else, and that is something we should not do. They only way to avoid acting immorally then, is to never act.It does not seem that merely being prepared to accept punishment for a violation of NAP makes an action that risks violating NAP morally permissible to do. If we ought never to act immorally, then we ought never to put ourselves in a position where we would be punished, because the fact that we need to be punished indicates that we have acted immorally. So merely being willing to accept a penalty for doing something immoral does not mean that we should or are permitted to do that immoral thing. Since all actions are potentially immoral, and we never want to act immorally, we should never act under NAP.2. We can Always + Double-BindActions only carry the "risk" of harm. No action in and of itself is guaranteed to initiate force. If the trigger jams as I try to fire a loaded gun, I haven't initiated force, I have only attempted (and failed) to do so. Thus, Con is in a double-bind. If he wants us to be able to act, he must acknowledge that all actions are permissible. If he rejects that position, than no actions are permissible. As my card noted, "either all risks are permissible (because they are not really aggression until they actually result in a harm), or none are (because they are)." Con drops my card's argument that violence/aggression/force requires physical harm to occur (mere intent to harm is not considered violence, therefore).3. SidenoteCon says that punishment is only justifiable if and only if NAP is violated. Consider my card's earlier example about the revolver. Suppose there are two people who each have a 6-bullet revolver filled with only one bullet. Both take aim at a target and and pull the trigger. For the first one, the chamber is empty and so nothing happens. For the second one, the chamber is full and the target dies. Con can only punish the second one, yet it seems obvious that what the second one did was not any worse than what the first one did, since both people had an equal chance of killing the target. This has several impacts: 1. Con is punishing people based on random chance (not a moral basis for punishment) 2. If Con is okay with only punishing the second one, he seems to lend further credence to CONSEQ logic 3. If second one was willing to submit to punishment if they hit the target, does that mean that the second one acted in a morally permissible way? If not, then Con's plane example is bunk. IV. Voting Issues1. Flourishing As I said in R4, "promoting human flourishing" is the standard Con dropped the definition of HUFL, which (a) implies looking at consequences and (b) is best promoted & protected by looking at the ends (this was shown through examples, e.g. fraud, parenting). This interpretation promotes HUFL better than NAP. If morality requires us to protect human flourishing and/or existence, we must examine the consequences of our actions and we must occasionally use force. 2. NAP Three things: (a) NAP fails because of the double-bind--either all actions are wrong or all are right--and Con's reply about "submitting to punishment" fails; (b) NAP fails because it obviously fails to protect and promote HUFL and/or existence; and (c) accepting punishment voluntarily does not violate NAP. 3. Intent Given that Con would punish the hunter who accidentally shoots his friend, Con acknowledges that intent alone is not grounds to avoid punishment. Plus, if you buy the HUFL standard, we cannot excuse well-meant actions which harm HUFL. 4. Nature and Law & Order Disobedients will sometimes violate moral laws. Violating any laws undermines stability. If the penalty is justified, then not accepting is wrong and it hurts society--that is doubly bad. Even if the penalty weren't justified, it would still undermine HUFL. So, it's not worth avoiding potentially justified punishment when doing so harms HUFL and existence. 5. Disobedience By making disobedience more effective, I access Con's benefits while also securing my own. Ultimately, Con gives us no reason to negate. I however, give several reasons to affirm. Please VOTE PRO! Thank you!