Sex with animals is ethically permissible

Given the form and structure of this debate from the presented rules, this will largely be a response primarily to Pangloss's initial argument, and additional argument of my own; I will make an attempt to answer Pangloss's questions so that he can be more clear on my argument.First, there is the matter of unsubstantiated claims made by my opponent. Principally of these is why he believes that sex with non-persons requires informed consent. Certainly the mentally disabled are unable to give consent to the same consent as fully functioning adults, yet they are still allowed to engage in sexual behavior with fully functioning adults so long as their legal guardians allow it (if they even HAVE such a guardian).Indeed, I have not accepted the preposition that all sex with "doomed children or the mentally disabled" is ethically unacceptable. In the same manner as my opponent, I will call such not-quite-people or maybe-people as people*. Such people* are difficult to differentiate between people, to the point where it is difficult to conclusively know if any given person* is a person or not. For instance a child may be be mentally advanced enough to be capable of actual informed consent while their twin, identical in all physical ways, is not. In this hypothetical situation twin A is capable of informed consent, and thus sex involving informed consent with this individual should be acceptable. Unfortunately, there's no way to clearly tell that this is the case. If someone sees twin A and his lover being affectionate, they might object, either confusing twin A with twin B, or assuming that twin A because of his apparent youth is a child incapable of consent and his lover might be arrested and punished wrongly. Another might see twin B, make passes and then get MAPC, and then find that they have just committed an unacceptable act with either the wrong twin or with someone who is a child. We have resolved this with the PRAGMATIC requirement that all people must reach some legal age before they are afforded person status, to resolve the ambiguity and to further make the assumption that even if thy aren't actually capable yet of informed consent, whatever they provide at that point is "good enough".Further, I cannot claim to think that no act of pedophilia is ethically unacceptable. For the reasons I outlined in my initial argument, in fact, I do NOT think that they are all ethically unacceptable, however, there is still the issue that the vast majority are unacceptable. First, there is the possibility that "doomed" children may be saved and become adults; then any future-person argument against pedophilia applies to them. Second, there is the concern that those pedophiles who will seek out such broken people* for sex will be likely, for various reasons, to engage in such unacceptable sex with actual persons; such people* are also very unlikely to be of the sort that is sufficient to satisfy the majority of actual pedophiles. For this reason, even though it cannot be said that those acts are ethically unacceptable, there are pragmatic concerns which cannot be mitigated.Questions and AnswersWhat does it mean that people have value to other people? It is readily apparent that any person who has joined the collective is bound to the clear responsibility to defend other people such as themselves from natural evil. As they are the ethical equals of the agent in question, it is the value of the agent to themselves which means that he other must also have value. Further there is actual instrumental value in that person's ability to contribute to and evaluate the contributions of the original agent. Finally they have value in their execution of their own responsibility to the original agent to defend their freedom from harm.Why game theory? Game theory provides a preferable model of the extent of applicability of normative ethics, because as normative ethics is concerned with ideal states: game theory seeks to investigate the qualities that would bring about an ideal state based on a set of rules (an environment) and a goal, and which qualities and activities would degrade the ability to reach that ideal state.Intrinsic value of animals? No. In short, animals do not have intrinsic value to people, but merely to individual persons, though the value that some other person gives them need not be accepted by me. Let us take for example my cat. I love my cat. He is kind and friendly, enjoying pets and hugs and he makes my life more livable for being in it. If he died I would be sad, and if someone abused him, I'd make them quite sad. My cat has the pragmatic value of being an emotional boon in my life. But this is MY cat, and he has this value because I have decided he does. I have no more right to define the teleology of cat for all people, nor do they have the right to force their teleology upon me. For something to be unethical, it must be impermissible for all agents in all situations. On evolution It is apparent that the intrinsic value of people to people is in their ability to increase the survivability of people. My argument on that front is that normative social memeticism (rather than social Darwinism) converge with ethics from first principles. This massive convergence speaks to its correctness.On the doomed and the incapable First, it becomes apparent that just because they are currently doomed, it is not known or knowable if they are actually going to die. On the subject of mentally disabled infants, the question of whether we wish to allow those who are capable of using sexually using something that is visually indistinguishable from an infant that has value to remain free in society. As such, it becomes apparent that we should treat them as if it is unacceptable, unless those pragmatic concerns can be mitigated in such a way to prevent ethically unacceptable activities. While such activities may be pragmatically problematic, they are not ethically problematic.In short, I am not arguing that infants* are ethically different from animals, however they are pragmatically different from animals.As per rebuttal I am, according to the rules of this debate, not going to actively rebut the current round until the next round. I look forward to CON's defense of his moral rule as requested in the previous round.