The Great Commission negates Calvinism/predestination teaching

I accept, and may the odds be ever in your favor!ClarificationsPro says that the Calvinist/predestination teaching is "that there is no free will." To be more precise, the position is that there is no libertarian free will with respect to the decision to accept or reject the gospel. Calvinists typically subscribe to compatibilist free will. The difference is that under compatibilism, our choices are determined by our strongest preference, motive, or desire, but under libertarianism, there are no antecedent conditions whatsoever that are sufficient to determine our choice, including our own desires and motives."Freedom" has a different meaning under compatibilism and libertarianism. J.P. Moreland and William Lane Craig explain that under compatibilism, "We are free to will whatever we desire even though our desires are themselves determined. Freedom is willing to act on your strongest preference."[1] Under libertarianism, "a free act is one in which the agent is ultimately the originating source of the act itself…This means that if Smith freely does (or wills to do) A, he could have refrained from doing (or willing to do) A or he could have done (or willed to have done) B without any conditions whatever being different. No description of Smith's desires, beliefs, character or other things in his make-up and no description of the universe prior to and at the moment of his choice to do A is sufficient to entail that he did A."[2]My own view is that all of our choices are determined by the net effect of all of our psychological states (including our desires, motives, biases, inclinations, preferences, etc.) prior to and up to the moment of choice. The greater hand our own desires have in bringing about our actions, the more free we are. As Jonathan Edwards put it, "He that, in acting, proceeds with the fullest inclination, does what he does with the greatest freedom, according to common sense."[3]I take it that when Pro says, "free will," he means libertarian free will.Pro also says that under Calvinism/predestionation, "God controls the actions of all." According to the Westminister Confession, "God from all eternity, did, by the most wise and holy counsel of His own will, freely, and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass; yet so, as thereby neither is God the author of sin, nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures; nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established."[4] So while it's true that God is in control of everything that happens, including our choices, he doesn't necessarily control everything directly. Rather, he uses secondary causes. This is important because it's relevant to some of Pro's arguments.The meaning of the resolutionPro's point of view in this debate can be worded a few different ways:1. There is a contradiction between the great commission, and the Calvinists' denial of libertarian free will.2. The great commission presupposes libertarian free will.3. If there is no free will, then there is no point in witnessing or evangelism, and the great commission makes no sense.4. The great commission is evidence against predestination.These are all basically saying the same thing.Pro's "arguments"But Pro doesn't so much argue for his point of view as he simply asserts it with various paraphrases. The closest he comes to an argument is this sentence:"If there is no free will and the souls that will one day be in hell were made for since before they were born and the souls in heaven were elected for it before they were born then Jesus flat out would not tell his disciples to go preach the gospel to every creature on earth, for the gospel is not for every creature but only the elect."But this is just another paraphrase of his main contention. If we add to this statement the premise that "Jesus did tell his disciples to preach the gospel to every creature on earth," then we'd have a modus tollens argument with the conclusion being "Therefore, there is [libertarian] free will." But the resolution of this debate is not that "We have libertarian free will." Rather, the resolution is the first premise of the modus tollens--that if there is no free will, then there would not be a great commission. So Pro hasn't offered us an argument for his resolution. He's just paraphrased it in a number of ways.My argumentsHere's a couple of reasons why I think his contention is false.First, as I explained earlier, God can use secondary means rather than causing each choice directly. Preaching is a means by which God calls the elect. It is only superfluous if it has no hand in bringing about conversion. However, even if there is a deterministic causal chain from God's will to your conversion, as long as preaching is part of that causal chain, it is not superfluous. Since, under Calvinism, God ordains everything that comes to pass, that includes not only the ends (i.e. the conversion of the elect), but also the means (i.e. preaching). So it is not true that preaching makes no difference given predestination.Second, if predestination is true, there is no reason to expect God to tell us who the elect are so we can decide who to witness to and who to ignore. It is perfectly consistent for him to tell us to preach to all people and leave it to him to decide who will be receptive and who won't.Pro's Ezekiel argumentEzekiel wasn't involved in the great commission, which makes him irrelevant to the resolution, but I think Pro was trying to make an argument from analogy. Ezekiel preaching is analogous to the great commission, and if Ezekiel's warnings presuppose libertarian freedom, then so does the great commission.But my first point above fully addresses the Ezekiel argument. Pro's objection is that under Calvinism, Ezekiel shouldn't be held accountable for the city's blood since his choice to warn or not should have no bearing on their choice to repent or not. If God predestined the city's choice, then Ezekiel is not responsible. But Pro is neglecting the fact that if God controls everything, that includes Ezekiel's choice of whether to warn the city or not. If there is a deterministic causal chain from God's decree to the city's choice, and Ezekiel is a link in that chain, then Ezekiel's choice has everything to do with what happens to the city.A 3rd argument against the resolutionCalvinists do not deny that people make choices. Rather, we deny that people make choices spontenously apart from cause or reason. Our choices are determined by antecedent conditions, especially our own psychological states. It would be pointless to preach if preaching had no effect on people's choices. It only makes sense to preach if it's possible that by doing so, you can influence their choice.Libertarians do not deny that antecedent conditions influence our choices. They just deny that antecedent conditions are sufficient to determine our choices. But influence comes in degrees. The stronger the influence, the closer it is to determining the act. If it is contrary to free will for an act to be determined by an antecedent condition, then free will must come in degrees. The more influence an antecedent condition has over our choice, the less free we are, which means we have the most freedom when we act out of total indifference with no influence at all.How is it, then, that the great commission can be contrary to freedom? If freedom is increased when influence is decreased, then preaching and witnessing, if they are to have any effect at all, must diminish freedom. If it doesn't diminish freedom, then it's superfluous.So if anything, the great commission is more likely to be inconsistent with libertarian free will than it is with Calvinistic compatibilism. [1] J.P. Moreland & William Lane Craig, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview, p. 271.[2] Ibid.[3] Jonathan Edwards, The Freedom of the Will, Part IV, Sec IV. http://www.ccel.org...[4] http://www.reformed.org...