Abortion is Generally Immoral

My argument certainly is strictly valid. Prima facie means at first sight. The pro-lifecase is that it is immoral to kill a human without moral justification. As such, Con’s counter-example fails. Just war is not immoral. The innocent people who die during war time are tragic, and soldiers have a moral obligation to protect the innocent. The point of war is not to kill innocent people, though innocent people do die from it. The point of abortion is to stop a woman from being pregnant by killing the innocent human within. But there is no moral justification for killing the innocent human. (For example, a woman who can’t afford it is not moral justification. If you would not allow a woman to kill her two-year-old child because he becomes too expensive, then neither is it justifiable to kill an unborn child for that reason.) Natural embryo loss Con’s view that spending resources on NEL is absurd commits the fallacy of begging the question. The only reason one would find it absurd is if one didn’t think the unborn were human beings, or that they have moral value. He has already admitted he accepts the premise of the substance view, which is that the preborn are biological members of humanity. But this is exactly what the substance view entails! It entails that since we are the same biological entity (i.e. “substance”) as we were in utero, then if a morally justifiable reason is required to kill us now, one is also required to kill the being in utero. The example of the scourge does not undermine this, for just because embryos die naturally (even a great number of them), this does not entail that we have the right to kill them intentionally. Con has essentially ignored my main defense against his argument. I did not say that reductio ad absurdum is a logical fallacy. I said that his argument was fallacious thinking. The “scourge” does not entail the substance view is false; it merely entails that if the substance view is correct, then we should take a greater interest in NEL. This is a conclusion that I support. Now, we do actually take an interest in miscarriage. We tell pregnant mothers not to smoke or drink while pregnant, because that increases the chances of miscarriage. Doctors will operate on an unborn child in the womb. We do take an interest in preservation of the unborn. It’s not something that we just completely ignore. However, it still does not follow that we would have to spend most or all of our resources on it. First, we have organizations that try and find cures for all kinds of illnesses. If we stop looking for cures for cancer, etc., then those people will continue to die while we search for a cure for NEL. Say it takes us ten years to find a cure for NEL. That’s ten additional years it will take us to find a cure for other ailments. It would not be wise to set cancer research back ten years while we try to find a cure for NEL. Second, NEL is not threatening the human race with extinction. It would be far more pressing to find a cure for a “scourge” that was killing born people because we need these people to keep society running. This is because people who are born (e.g. police officers, the president, etc.) have more instrumental value than someone who is barely in the beginning of their lives. So while NEL is a tragedy, it is not one that threatens the very survival of our race. So while we should find a way to prevent it, it is not so pressing that we would have to put off finding a cure for all the other ailments of our race. It is also worth noting that my example of the racist disease was not an “appeal to ramifications” like Con was making. It was merely a counter-example to show that it is not absurd to suppose that if the unborn are human beings with moral value, that we should put resources into preventing their deaths. Con has essentially side-stepped my counter example. Violinist It is worth point out that, especially in the United States, the risk of death through pregnancy is incredibly rare – a woman has less than a 1% chance of dying in pregnancy or childbirth. [1] Also, Con illustrates another difference between the violinist and pregnancy – the unborn is not a stranger. The unborn is the child of the woman. What parent would deny their child a blood transfusion, or an organ that their child needs, if their child is in danger of dying? However, I didn’t bring this objection up last round because one could simply tweak the violinist analogy to where the violinist is a long-lost relative. Even though it’s a child, the parent is still not morally obligated to “stay connected,” even though one would certainly look down on a parent for denying their child something she needed to survive. Pregnancy remains a morally obligatory act, not supererogatory. None of Con’s objections to my rebuttal are successful. Regarding killing the fetus, this objection certainly is powerful against surgical abortions, in which you must kill the unborn in order to “unplug” from the fetus. There have been abortion survivers. But regarding Thomson’s objection, abortion is not “slitting the throat” if the baby survives through a miracle. Abortion is “slitting the throat” of the child in order to unplug the child. Abortion works through dismemberment, suction, or chemicals. So at least in the case of surgical abortion, we can see that the violinist analogy fails. Now, if there is someone who risks your life and the only way to get rid of them is to kill them, then it is morally permissible to do so. However, this was a concession I made in round one. I believe that lifesaving abortions are morally justifiable if the unborn is not yet viable. However, if you find a stowaway on your boat, despite the fact that he will continue to use your resources, you are not morally justified in throwing him overboard and leave him to drown or be eaten by sharks. You are morally obligated to leave him aboard until you reach shore. Abortion is not morally justified in the off chance it may become life threatening, especially since a woman has less than a 1% chance of dying in full-term pregnancy and delivery. Schwartz’ analogy stands. There is no third option for the woman, so killing a needy child she had a hand in creating is not justified. You may not remove someone if the only way to remove them is to kill them (as I have shown). There is a critical difference in Con’s modified analogy – you may now be responsible for the condition the violinist finds himself in, but that is only because you saved his life and elongated it. Without the treatment, he would have died – you simply gave him longer to live. This is not analogous to pregnancy, in which you cause a being to begin life in a naturally needy state. You did not elongate its life. So what about medical abortion? As I have shown, remaining pregnant is still a morally obligatory action. So while medical abortion may be more analogous to simply “unplugging” from the fetus, it is still morally impermissible due to the reasons already mentioned – if you create a naturally needy child, you are morally obligated to care for that child. I can show this in an analogy. Say you see a button on a wall that will give you a very pleasurable experience, but has a 1/100 chance of a baby popping out. You press the button and receive the experience, but a baby, indeed, pops out. Are you now obligated to care for that child, or are you justified in walking away and leaving that child to die? Conclusion In short, my argument stands. Con’s objections do not work against the pro-life case. Thank you for reading, and thank you to Con for debating this with me. [1] http://health.usnews.com...Note: This article shows that early-term abortion is safer than childbirth.This is irrelevant to the case at hand; besides, even though early-term abortionis safer, full-term pregnancy and delivery is still not a danger to the woman.