The United States should use private military firms abroad to pursue its military objectives.

Thanks for the debate, Con!I. ObservationsA. Role of PMFsFirstly, PMFs need not be in actual combat to count as PMFs. If they're proving support to regular service personnel they are "enhancing" and "facilitating" the ability to "exercise force in a systematic way." Secondly, there are a diverse array of military objectives for which PMFs are used. Military objectives may include things like capturing towns, protecting leaders, and espionage, but may also include such mundane things as operating bases that are used to counterbalance the rise of regional competitors, e.g. China, and to keep allies safe.B. The TopicPro must affirm that the US "should" use PMFs to achieve its military objectives. Con must therefore argue that the US "should not" do so, in order to effectively negate the topic. In essence then, Con's position is one in which PMFs are not tools in America's military toolbox, one in which it completely abnegates the use of PMFs.II. PMFs Fill a VoidA. Hard to Replace PMF ManpowerIn '08, '09, and'10, the height of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan, there were about 232,000-255,000 contractors in the Middle East alone. [1] Consider that there are likely thousands more in NATO countries, Australia, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Africa.There are only about 1.39 million servicemen in the Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force. There are an additional 800,000 or so reservists. [2] If you assume at least 500,000 contractors during that timeframe, which I think is a low estimate, that would represent almost 36% of our regular military personnel, and 23% if you include reservists, though, the need for reservists to stay at home to assist in emergency and security crises at home places an upward cap on their deployability.The armed forces already go to great lengths to recruit new troops. Recruiters have admitted to feeling pressure to "bend the rules" to meet quotas and they have a record of using aggressive techniques to bring in new men. [3, 4] In '05, the Pentagon relaxed acceptance standards, and in '06, "The Army paid more than $1 billion...in bonuses to attract and keep soldiers in the service...[a] job is made more difficult by the service's plans to grow by 7,000 soldiers a year through 2012." [5] Despite these efforts, the Army missed its '05 recruitment target, and would have missed it's '06 target, had it not specially allowed 653 recruits over the age of 35 to join. [5] For the $1 billion in bonuses the Army spent in '06, the army recruited 81,000 soldiers. [5] To make up completely for the 800,000 contractors lost, the Army would've needed to spend about $10 billion in bonuses alone, not including base salaries and other benefits, on top of what they already spent for regular recruitment. Media spending, distinct from bonuses, also adds up, projected to hit around 700 billion in 2011. [6] In 2015, only %12 of recruiter appointments resulted in people signing up to serve. [7] If we assume that we spend $210 million (Army spending) for a 12% success rate (about 50,000 new recruits), we would need to spend $3.36 billion to reach 800,000 recruits. The military likely spent more than that at the peak of the war to try to recruit people and still missed annual targets.B. PMFs Best OptionPerhaps the only viable alternative to PMFs, particularly in times when large numbers of recruits need to be mustered quickly, is a draft. Notice that in '05 and '06 the Army failed to meet even its own recruiting targets, and if it had to recoup the loss of contractor manpower, would have completely missed those targets by several thousand people. Drafts are unappealing not only for the coercive nature of them and the damage to personal liberty they entail but because they produce inferior fighting forces: "conscripts are less motivated, less educated, less creative, and less reliable than those in an all-volunteer army. Their use is inefficient and potentially makes armed conflicts longer and more likely. Further, data indicate that a draft leads those forced into service to civilian harms, including lower wages, less education, and pervasive opportunity." [8]PMFs are unique in that they can be mobilized quickly. They "can provide 'surge' capacity to quickly field additional forces. Without the political and bureaucratic lead time required for mobilizing military forces, PSCs can move forces in to accomplish a wide variety of tasks. As quickly as these forces can appear, they can disappear. Once dangers pass or local forces are trained and deployed, contracts can lapse and these personnel can be quickly demobilized." [9] Moreover, PMFs lack the kind of lead-time the military needs to train personnel for deployment: "PSCs can also more easily field the kind of forces most needed. These companies recruit from databases of mostly retired military and police personnel. This makes it easier for them to hire people with particular experience...It is much harder for national military organizations to find those kinds of specific skills and experience, and deploy them to a particular arena." [9] In this way, the US can save on training new troops. Consider a specific example: "Outsourcing permitted the United States to allocate military resources more efficiently, thereby enhancing the military’s overall agility. To cite just one example, Washington could have implemented its Andean counternarcotics policy without [PMFs] simply by deploying U.S. special forces, colonels, pilots, and uniformed aircraft mechanics to train Bolivians, Colombians, and Peruvians in counternarcotics tactics and aircraft maintenance. Doing so, however, would have left vacant key posts in the U.S. Southern Command, military training institutions, and combat divisions--a pattern of resource allocation adverse to overall military preparedness. By contrast, employing PMCs enabled Washington to implement its Andean policy without undermining America’s own military readiness by placing a larger reservoir of talent at Washington’s disposal without straining its all-volunteer force." [10]PMFs fill a void we simply cannot fill without them. They provide the rapid deployment (of well-trained personnel) capabilities the US needs in times of crises. It would be absurd to suggest that the US will never need this kind of capacity, and so it would be absurd to rule PMFs out.III. PMFs Promote ResponsivenessPMFs, because they are not regular servicemen, are more easily--not just rapidly--deployed where to respond to various threats. This can allow them to go where other forces cannot, to resolve otherwise unresolvable conflicts. "[PMCs] make it possible to break vicious cycles of violence. They could do this by...providing troops for outside interventions. The importance of providing troops is often argued with reference to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda...: a situation marked by widespread agreement around the necessity of outside intervention, but an equally widespread unwillingness to provide troops. In such a situation, those suggesting that PMCs could be used to enhance security argue that they could make up for the lack of willing and qualified troops." [11]Public support for long-term military operations abroad has hemorrhaged since Iraq. But that doesn't make these missions somehow less vital, nor does it address the reality that we are there and that we have an obligation to stabilize the countries we occupied. This obligation is both one of basic decency--i.e. we pushed Humpty Dumpty over, at least we could put him back together again--and one of practical need. If these countries are not calmed then they will become breeding grounds for terrorism and violence, each of which having the potential to spillover and generate a dangerous knock-on effect like in Libya. Because of the popular sentiment against continued presence in these places makes it politically difficult to keep in place the experts and forces needed to strengthen post-invasion governments. [12]PMFs, however, can fill in when these kinds of necessary missions are hindered by the political demands of withdrawing regular troops. The US has around 5,000 servicemen in Iraq, compared to some 7,000 contractors, about 1,500 of whom are in support functions. [1, 13] "[F]or those who believe that a long-term commitment is crucial to successful nation building in Iraq and worried that the US cannot sustain such a long term commitment, the use of PSCs may be a tool to substitute for troops and encourage staying power." [9]IV. PMFs & Local BenefitsPMFs can (1) give locals a stake in the outcome of missions, (2) train them to succeed post-conflict, and (3) provide them paychecks, building stronger local communities. "Of the estimated 180,000 contractors in Iraq...close to 120,000 are Iraqis, the people who should be doing the reconstruction and security in their own country. As a rule of thumb companies will employ as many locals as contractually allowed since they have better knowledge of the situational complexities, are less expensive, do not require logistic support, and operate under clear legal frameworks. This utilization of local talent makes contractors the most effective counterinsurgency tool conceivable, providing training, capacity building, and income for impacted populations and giving them a significant stake in developing a stable society." [14] Inclusion of locals may also de-mystify US military operations in local communities and, thus, promote accountability.V. Sources1 - http://tinyurl.com...2 - http://tinyurl.com...3 - http://tinyurl.com...4 - http://tinyurl.com...5 - http://tinyurl.com...6 - http://tinyurl.com...7 - http://tinyurl.com...8 - http://tinyurl.com...9 - http://tinyurl.com...10 - http://tinyurl.com...11 - http://tinyurl.com...12 - http://tinyurl.com...13 - http://tinyurl.com...14 - http://tinyurl.com...Thanks! Please Vote Pro! Over to Con...