Inaction in the face of injustice makes an individual morally culpable.

Arguments/Rebuttal 1. Con's argument is that if people disagree on whether or not an injustice is taking place, then there is no consensus that an injustice is even occurring -- and therefore, people are not responsible for having a reaction. However, the resolution mandates that we reconcile inaction with an injustice. Not a perceived injustice, but an injustice. Thus we must be arguing from the position that an objective injustice is taking place, OR, that the agent (individual) in question perceives an injustice to be occurring. I would note that we are debating the latter. We are debating whether or not an agent is culpable for reaction in the face of their perceived injustice. My opponent actually confirmed this standard in the last round, which I will demonstrate in the Analysis. 2. My argument stands affirmed regardless of Con's rebuttal on objective vs. subjective morality. I've illustrated that one is responsible for their actions, and therefore, it logically follows that they are responsible for their inaction. This would be true regardless of any assigned moral factors. For example, let's say I was faced with a choice of drone striking a terrorist leader. Whether my doing so is objectively moral or not, anyone would agree that I am responsible for the consequences of my behavior. If I choose to strike in that situation (for whatever reason) I would be responsible for the outcome, and if I choose not to strike, I would still be responsible for the outcome. Thus whether or not my behavior is moral or immoral is completely irrelevant to the fact that my behavior has consequences, and I am directly responsible for the consequences, including the perceived moral value. Analysis So let's work backwards to explain my point further. Point #2 confirms that we are responsible for our actions and inactions, whether those [in]actions are moral or immoral. Con did not argue this point that we are responsible for our action and inaction; he only argued that morality was subjective. Of course that is irrelevant. Whether an observing individual perceives my reaction to be moral or immoral, I would still be morally culpable regardless of their perspective/preference of my choice. Con provided an example of the students protesting in Tiananmen Square. He explained that since both sides (students vs. government) see their actions as right, "the resolution should be applied to how each individual views what is moral and what is unjust." A-ha! Con just confirmed what I explained in point #1. The resolution should be applied to how each individual views what is moral and what is unjust. Therefore, Con's first point is negated. His own words confirm that we are debating whether a person who perceives an inaction to be unjust is responsible for reacting in that situation. In Con's second argument, my opponent states that some people might fear for their lives in the face of reacting against injustice - and therefore, they are alleviated from any moral culpability. But this logic does not follow. The agent is still responsible for their inaction; they have simply justified their inaction through utilitarian standards. That said, I will #1 explain the problem with using utilitarian standards, and #2 explain that culpability exists even if utilitarian standards were justified. - - - - #1 Utilitarian Concerns In many cases, it is not explicitly obvious as to which action has preferable utility. For instance, Con noted that the government might execute Tiananmen Square protesters for acting against injustice. Well those issues certainly need to be resolved, but who is to say that the government's execution of said protesters wouldn't ultimately have had positive utility in the long run? Said act may have wound up drawing attention to the issue, and thus much needed resources to resolve the situation at hand. The fact is that we have neither the insight nor objectivity to utilize this consequentialist framework. Some philosophers argue that it is impossible to do the calculation that this standard requires, because consequences are inherently unknowable, and our own judgment is skewed by inherent bias. Thus we can always use the excuse "what if" our action led to worse consequences, but ultimately it does not withstand scrutiny. We cannot know what the future holds or what the truly best course of action will be, and thus, acting against injustice in the face of it holds significant value. #2 Culpability Despite Justification I completely acknowledge that if you value your safety over righteousness, that it makes logical sense to prioritize your safety over righteousness. However, that in no way alleviates your passivity in the face of injustice, and therefore makes you partially responsible for the outcome. If I chose to not fight an oppressor because I feared for my life, nobody would "blame" me, but I would still be responsible for my inaction. I will have expressed a priority for X over Y. But valuing X over Y doesn't make me any less responsible for Y. It simply means my inaction may be justified. Let's use Con's own example."Consider a bank robbery where the bank robber has an AK-47 in a bank full of people, with one person carrying a pistol. That person can use the pistol to stop the injustice of robbery, but using the pistol also risks the lives of everyone in the bank. According to the resolution, the person would be morally culpable for not acting against the injustice, even if acting against it would most likely result in a worse injustice."Indeed. The person would be morally culpable for not acting against the injustice, even if acting against it would most likely result in a worse injustice. Why? Because the only thing my opponent has proven here is that one who operates under a utilitarian framework (one who believes the best course of action is the one that maximizes utility) may prioritize X over Y. He did NOT explain why the individual is not culpable for Y. He only explained that the individual may have valued people's lives over theft. That is fine and certainly reasonable, but it doesn't change the fact that the agent is responsible for letting the bank robbery occur. It simply means they have exemplified a greater value for people's lives. Nobody would "blame" them for that, but that doesn't change that they were complicit in the bank robbery. Conclusion If one's action [in the face of injustice] might result in greater harm or their own danger, it would make sense that the agent is afraid or chooses not to react. That is understandable and may even be justified. However, just because we can understand one's decision doesn't mean they are not blameworthy. In a situation where one knows that their inaction is likely to permit/contribute/exacerbate a harm, and where one knows that their action would mitigate or prevent the harm, they are necessarily a cause of the harm and therefore still morally culpable. Further, the fact that we cannot truly know whether our reaction would worsen the harm in the long run, provides logical reason to react and try to rectify the injustice head-on. I have no doubt that in most cases Con described (where inaction might result in harmful blowback) people would give the agent a pass for their inaction. The observer would understand the agent's reasoning. But that doesn't make the agent any less morally culpable for their passivity. If someone does not react to ABC in order to prevent XYZ [further harm], and XYZ does not occur, the agent is still responsible for ABC happening whether or not their decision to prevent XYZ was justified.