It is probable that objective moral facts exist

In Shakespeare's Hamlet, the character Polonius noted that "brevity is the soul of wit." By this he meant that arguments should be as concise as possible and not use any unnecessary and obfuscatory terminology. While I appreciate my opponent's reply, I must say that much of the wordage was unnecessarily complex and hard to follow. I implore of him to use terse language in his future responses. PrefaceNow recall that I argued for the position that the existence of OMFs are probable. By an OMF, I mean either a value-laden fact about a certain state of affairs (ie: murder is bad) or a duty about how we ought to behave (we should not murder). Does Con reply undermine my arguments, and does he effectively argue against the resolution? Clearly he does not even attempt the latter (His strategy was merely reactionary). It is very important to note that the resolution of this debate is that it is probable that objective moral facts exist. In order to negate this resolution, Con must not merely refute my arguments, but also advance his own arguments to show that the existence of OMFs are not probable. If he does not do so, then he fails to uphold his burden of proof.Given that Con has failed to uphold his side of the debate, we now turn to his replies to my opening argument.Defense of Epistemic NormativityMuch of Con's argument against objective epistemic normativity is a non-sequitur. Indeed, it's hard just to piece together an actual argument from what he has said. What he seems to be arguing, however, is that epistemic normativity does not constitute evidence for OMFs because "an objective rational norm is, and will never be, an objective fact that is closed to interpretation in any way." This is due to the fact that we as humans have varying cognitive perspectives and also because one conceptions of moral issues are vague and subjective.This argument is faces a myriad of problems. First, even granting the premise that we have a wide range of different perspectives from which we approach epistemic issues, it simply does not follow that there are no objective rational norms. How does the mere fact that rational agents may have different conceptions prove that there are no objective rational norms? Con seems to be assuming the following difference principle:DP: If agents differ in regard to their beliefs on X, then X cannot be an objective fact.But this is clearly false, if not self-refuting. Suppose that one disagrees with DP (as in fact I do), then by DP it must follow that DP is false by virtue of the fact that I disagree with it. Moreover, how does one's disagreement have any bearing on whether or not something is an objective fact? This confuses moral epistemology with moral ontology -- the order of knowing with the order of being. One's beliefs on an issue are irrelevant in regards to the actual state of that issue. Hence with regards with epistemic normativity, that there may exist agents who disagree with certain epistemic norms does not, by any process of logic, imply that there are no objective epistemic norms.Our interpretation of certain rational norms may very will differ -- that I do not dispute, but this is a relatively trivial fact. Does that fact that we have differing interpretations mean that the principles in question are not objective? No. The interpretation of a principle is an epistemic question, not an ontological one. To reiterate: differing interpretations are irrelevant to the existence of OMFs.Indeed, the definition of objective employed in this debate simply means "the state of being independent of human minds." By that one means that an objective fact does not depend on there being human minds. A certaininterpretation of what an objectie fact is may depend on a human mind, but that once again confuses the order of knowing with the order of being. Contrary to what Con has implicitly assumed, "objective" does not mean "believed/affirmed by all" -- a lie is still a lie, even if everyone believes it.Defense of Moral PerceptionRecall that I compared moral knowledge to sensory knowledge, arguing that OMFs probably exist because they are known through the same way we know sensory facts. Now, as much as I want to be charitable to my opponent, his reply was barely intelligible to me. At any rate, he seems to be attacking a strawman. He writes: "The whole of the argument centers itself upon the assumption of the truthfulness of the trustworthiness of sensory beliefs. Trustworthiness in of itself does not in any way, implicitly or explicitly imply a normative."But so what? My argument doesn't assume or rely on such a notion. Of course trustworthiness doesn't "imply a normative" (whatever that means), but what has that got to do with my argument? Rather, the thrust of my argument is that the existence of OMFs are probable because our moral beliefs are trustworthy. Trustworthiness does entail that the belief in question probably corresponds to reality (aka: that it's true). So, if a moral belief such as "murder is wrong" is trustworthy, then it is probably true, and hence it follows from this that we are warranted in believing that OMFs really do obtain because moral beliefs are probably true. He then writes that even if my argument proves that moral beliefs are trustworthy, this doesn't prove OMFs exist because moral beliefs are subjective. However, this is a textbook case of begging the question! If one assumes in advance that moral beliefs are subjective, then of course my argument doesn't work -- but that's circular reasoning. Au contraire, if my parallel argument is a good one, then it does render the existence of OMF probable. Why? Because if our moral beliefs are trustworthy, then it follows that they are probably true. And if they are probably true, then the entities referred to by our moral beliefs probably exist, hence vindicating OMF.Refutation of Con's "Ideology-Fact Relation"Con makes the rather bold claim that the statement that "moral facts can be objective, is contradictory even in its statement." This is because "Moral objectivism denies the fact that the ideology of moral facts can be subjective in composition." This is wraught with plethora of problems. As I have already pointed out above, moral objectivism only claims that moral facts themselves are objective and leaves open the question of how they are interpreted. Con is again confusing moral epistemology with moral ontology. Indeed, he attacks a strawman of the objectivist position. Rational agents can differ in regards to their moral beliefs, but this is irrelevant to the truth of objectivism. Moral objectivism makes claims about morallity itself, not our moral beliefs. Indeed, most objectivists will be happy to admit that moral beliefs are subjective. But it does not follow from the fact that our beliefs are subjective that morality itself is subjective."Definition Naturalism"? Con's argument here is that moral facts must be defined such that they can be grasped by the social sciences. Unfortunately, this is a bold-faced assertion. Why should we think that definition naturalism is true? Indeed, Con begs the question against all forms of ethical non-naturalism without providing a single line of justification. But here's the catch: even if this "definition naturalism" is true, Con's conclusion that "Thus we see that moral relevance only exists when it can be subjective" is demonstrably false. Objectivist theories of ethical naturalism such as utilitarianism and natural law theory define morality in terms relevant to the social sciences in a way which perserves their objectivity. Con's rebuttal is thus an abject failure. It is safe to say that my case for OMF has remained unphazed.