Solipsism is entailed by logical extension of Idealism

Imagine it like a person with delusions of persecution. They don't want to be persecuted, but their mind shows them the persecution independently of their will. I am really not following Pro’s example here. If my mind shows me delusions of persecution without an external mind , then its my mind that is creating those delusions on purpose. I have already said and agreed with this before that my ideas of memory and imagination that I experience are wholly subject to my will. As a result, this objection does not successfully refute anything about the argument because it is not dealing with sense ideas, which are different. Another example is taking a hallucinogenic drug. This induces your mind to show you things that you didn't ask for, and are beyond your control. Now, this argument is actually referring to sense ideas, but Pro is appealing to an epistemic or external mechanism that I thought we agreed does not exist according to this debate. More importantly, the choice to introduce outside drugs inside my mind would be subject to my will and I would be aware of it even though the ideas created within me would be beyond my control once the drug is taken. Thus, the objection falls short as well. The next argument he brings up is an ontological argument for God, but this is too far beyond what I made this debate for. We are arguing over whether or not Idealism infers solipsism, not whether or not there is a god. I'm not going to respond to this argument, as it's a new debate in itself, one which I've done many times and don't intend to do here. All my arguments were relevant to the debate and necessary to make a comprehensive case for Idealism minus Solipsism. For instance, I made two arguments beforehand that established the existence of objective ideas and one external mind that my mind is subject to. The contingency argument was presented to show that this mind exists by necessity and thus is an objective mind. Then, I presented the Ontological argument to combine the previous arguments and show that God exists who is a maximally great being. This allow me to establish the existence of other minds as a result. Con claims it's because they can do things which are against your will, but this is absurd because a tree can fall on me against my will and that doesn't mean a tree is a mind separate to me. There are no identifyable properties that allow us to identify other minds. Again, it is more than just against my will but it’s against my nature as well. Pro keeps isolating the two, but it is not an either/or proposition I am arguing but a both/and. Moreover, the will and nature of a mind are two different things. The nature of that mind encompasses ideas within the mind. there needs to be something that can link minds together, and such a thing would therefore be both an entity of itself and a property of the mind. Con both agreed and disagreed with this point. He took issue with it, but later argued that a god-mind is indeed necessitated. I don’t understand why Pro continues to commit this category fallacy without a response back from him that would explain to everyone why it’s not a fallacy. Again, although conceptual applications of the mind are contingent upon my mind and God is conceptual, the concept itself is pointing to something that is supposed to be objective and mental, which would be God. This means Pro’s argument does not apply to God anymore than it would apply to the laws of logic. To suggest that it does would be a fallacy of composition. I will just encourage voters to watch a discussion between Matt Slick vs Matt Dillahunty on the Atheist Experience show. Pro is essentially making the same argument that Matt Slick used and Dillahunty refuted except God is replaced with the laws of logic. My Case for Objective Ideas Again, there are several different interpretations of idealism, and Pro’s definition of idealism in this debate did not rule out any of them including platonic idealism. Pro responded and suggested that I needed to provide a coherent concept of “beyond reality” in regards to these objective ideas for the argument to follow. I proceeded to explain how my argument could work using a dualist framework ,which excludes physical reality, where objective ideas can apply to other objective ideas including my mind while all exist externally. Thus, despite a poorly constructed syllogism, the argument for platonic idealism alone proves idealism minus solipsism. Pro himself even acknowledged the existence of objective ideas and admitted it disproves Solipsism. Moreover, Pro’s no response to my dualist model being coherent within idealism is a concession on his part that it does NOT disprove idealism as well. My Case for an Objective Mind I constructed three deductive arguments that established the existence of God (i.e. another mind) without appealing to epistemic mechanisms. There was two premises that Pro was against between the three syllogisms. The first premise he was against is how “Ideas that are independent of my will must be caused by a mind other than my own”. I explained already that this premise was referring to sense ideas that are not a part of my nature and will. For example, if I am sleep depraved, I have a tendency to fall asleep against my will. Pro suggested I can just take a drug, but this is appealing to physical mechanisms and ,thus, the objection falls short. Thus, since all contingent ideas come from some mind, then at least one other mind exists. The second premise he was against is how “Every existing thing has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or an external cause”. Pro suggested that I assumed everything had an external cause except God and then he proceeded to restructure my argument to include a different proposition to make it seem like he refuted it. This is not the case at all. I made two previous arguments that established the existence of Objective ideas and one other mind without assuming them. More importantly, I never suggested that these other entities created or sustained the existence of my mind. For example, I still can assume that my mind existed forever but possesses limitations that are imposed by an objective mind that may or may not have those same limitations. Thus, Pro’s objections here are essentially attacking a straw-man version of my argument, which is a violation of the rules Pro established within the debate. My Case for Other Minds I generally used God as an explanation for why we can infer the existence of other minds beside my mind and God’s mind. This is because God is a maximally great being who we would expect to maximize our well-being and reveal the truth that all other minds exist through his perfect will and nature. However, I also presented a syllogism that established the existence of other minds without invoking God, but it was mainly used as an objection to Pro’s argument. The nature AND the will that other entities display in comparison to my own nature and will can allow us to establish the existence of other minds. I made an illustration of the Adam and Eve story to convey this. Plus, I have already explained how Pro did not fully address my counterargument to his argument. Thus, I am assuming he is conceding here. ConclusionMy case that proves Idealism does NOT infer solsispim comes in three arguments: Objective ideas, God, or other minds. Anyone of these arguments can prevent the logical extentsion of solispism, but all three arguments combined make a compelling case that leaves no doubt as to whether I met my BOP. As far Pro's case, the fundamental reason why his arguments could not ever establish that God-mind Idealism inescaply leads to solispsism is because it will always lead you to make a category fallacy called the Fallacy of composition. Since God can establish the existence of other minds through his perfect will and nature, God-mind idealism also undermines Pro's other argument and ,thus, he does not meet his BOP.