Dualism is probably not correct about the relationship between mind and matter.

"Fortunately, Skeptic is concerned with "mind and matter" and not something silly like "mind and soul. "" ---->I'm concerned with the relationship between mind and matter; obviously dualism proposes they are ontologically separate categories while I propose they are not. I'm not sure what the phrase "mind and soul" is supposed to refer to, unless it's when someone believes the soul is equivalent to the mind. If this is so, then obviously this means they are completely different phrases depending on how you use it. I agree with my opponent's first two paragraphs. We will both assume that we aren't dreaming, being deceived, or aren't disillusioned brains in vats. Talking about radical skepticism or solipsism does nothing but to sidetrack the resolution. I also agree that what you perceive (psychedelic drugs, mental illness, fallibility of sense) is not necessarily reality, and that we can't control stimulus' with our mind. So really, it is the third paragraph that is the crux of my opponent's paragraph: ==================== "Processes of perception in the mind are fundamentally different (a reaction) to the stimuli that create them. " ==================== I ask of my opponent - why would the process of perception be fundamentally different from stimuli? Or in other words, why would the process of perception be ontologically different from stimuli? I argue that the process of perception is still a "physical process", meaning it is not categorically different from the stimuli (which is obviously physical). The processes that allow for perception, whatever that may be, is composed of physical parts that allow for such an ability - namely parts of the brain. My opponent's only reasoning for this claim is that "we have independent perceptions of identical situations and cannot control these perceptions". To be honest, I'm not entirely sure what my opponent is trying to argue. It's hard to tell from his example of the pink elephant/refrigerator and his final paragraph as to what his argument boils down to. I can only see two alternative as to what he is arguing: On one hand, he states that because "multiple people who do not previously know what is in the room describe the same gruesome scene (pink elephant/refrigerator), it shows that the event is not a creation of their minds. " Yes, I would agree that such a scene is not a product of their mind. However, to conclude that somehow the stimuli is categorically different has no merit. Of course when I see a red apple I don't have an actual red apple in my head - but the process of perceiving that red apple (or a pink elephant copulating with a refrigerator) is still physical. However, if it's the case that he is saying that since people have different perceptions of an identical situation, thus perception is different from stimuli, then it's obviously a different issue. I would argue that if two people where to have identical physical makeups, then they would have the same experience/perception. ==================== Conclusion ==================== I haven't put too much into my counterargument simply because I"m not entirely confident as to what my opponent's argument is. To prevent unnecessary strawmen, I have pulled back needless content until my opponent can be more clear with his arguments.