It Is Possible That A Maximally Great Being Exists

I thank Con, again, for his rebuttal. As per the rules of the debate, this will be my last round.It seems to be a tactic of Con to accuse someone who doesn't agree with him of not understanding. I under the OA just fine, but there were several times when reading Con's last argument that I had to wonder if he's even been reading the same debate I've been engaging in for the past few days.Con's Case from Non-Sentient WorldsI'm not sure what Con means that God doesn't automatically have necessary existence like the Law of Identity. That it has to be shown that God is possible, then God is necessary. This statement doesn't even really make sense. If God exists, he exists necessarily (like the Law of Identity). The Law of Identity isn't just automatically necessary; the Law of Identity is necessary because there are no possible worlds in which two entities that are identical would not be the same entity. Just like God is necessary because there are no possible worlds in wihch he fails to exist. This is why a non-sentient world is not a possible world, if God exists. Since the question is whether or not God exists, the possibility of a non-sentient world can't be used against the possibility of God. This is true especially since, as I have shown, the existence of God is more metaphysically probable than the existence of a non-sentient world (since whether or not a non-sentient world is even possible is predicated on whether or not there are sentient necessary entities).It seems to me that Con is the one who lacks understanding of the OA. God is not necessary just because he is possible. The reason that God is necessary is because he exists in all possible worlds. If it is possible that God exists, then he exists in some possible worlds. This is true of even things that don't exist in the actual world. Unicorns and leprechauns exist in some possible worlds. But necessary entities exist in all possible worlds, including the actual world. Which means that if a necessary entity exists in some possible worlds, it exists in all possible worlds (which is by its very nature as a necessary entity). So one cannot say if it is possible that God exists, then God is impossible. One must show why the concept of God is incoherent. We know that a square circle is impossible because squares by their nature have four sides and four corners, and circles by their nature have none. A square circle is an incoherent concept. In order to defeat the first premise of the OA, Con must show why God is impossible. He has failed to do this, so the first premise of the OA is affirmed.Con even admits that if God is possible, then a non-sentient world is impossible. Since I have shown that God's existence is possible, this refutes Con's case of a non-sentient world. But as I have already shown, the existence of a non-sentient world is predicated on whether or not God exists, so the question of whether God is possible must be answered first, not the other way around, as Con asserts.Con's assertion that I gave no argument that God is more probable than a non-sentient world is simply wrong (and led to me questioning what argument he's actually been reading). I'll briefly recap: If God exists, he is necessary so a non-sentient world is impossible (if God exists). That's one strike against a non-sentient possible world. No one has ever proven God's existence is impossible. That's two strikes against a non-sentient possible world. We have warrant in the form of many arguments for God's existence that gives us warrant for accepting this premise. That's three strikes against it. The evidence that we have for God's existence places God's existence as much more probable than the existence of a non-sentient world.Con continues to come back to why the world couldn't have consisted of no sentient beings. This world, Earth, could have consisted of no sentient beings, if God would have chosen not to create humanity. But to say there is a non-sentient possible world is a much different claim, and that would be impossible if a necessary sentient entity exists. A possible world is simply a possible state of affairs that could have obtained. If there is a necessary entity (which is one that exists in all possible worlds), then a non-sentient possible world, if God exists, would be impossible.When I mentioned Christian philosophers who believe this argument proves God, I was using them to support my claim (that we have reasons to reject the claim that God is impossible, and that at least one Atheist has accepted the reality of God because of this particular argument, so it is persuasive to some). The fact that Christian philosophers like Swinburne don't accept the OA as sound is irrelevant. That's the nature of philosophy. Not everyone is convinced by every argument. What matters are the arguments presented here. Con has simply misunderstood my reason for including mention of Christian philosophers.Finally, Con simply misunderstands Plantinga's statement. He's not saying that the OA is unsound. It is internally consistent, and succeeds as an argument. I explained in the last round that this argument shouldn't be used on its own as proof of God's existence, but used in a cumulative case (with each argument like links in a coat of chain mail, not links in a chain). So Con's statement adds nothing to his own argument and takes nothing away from mine.He can't argue that God is impossible in the next round, since I will not have a chance to respond to it. The first premise of the OA stands affirmed.1 -- No One Has Shown God's Existence to be Logically ImpossibleI trust the reader will have an easier time understanding my argument here. Con has simply refused to engage with this argument, but it is a positive argument to show that God's existence is impossible. Again, we know that square circles and married bachelors are impossible entities. In order for God to be impossible, one must show that God is an incoherent concept. The fact that all attempts have failed shows that God is not incoherent at all. This argument is a positive argument to support the contention that God is not impossible, to say nothing of the fact that my next argument, apart from being a positive argument, also provides positive evidence supporting the claim. My argument is not fallacious, as I have repeatedly demonstrated, but Con insists on asserting that it is. He has failed to refute this argument, so it stands as evidence in favor of the first premise of the OA, that God's existence is possible.2 -- We Have Warrant for Accepting God's ExistenceWhether or not the other arguments for Theism succeed is beside the point. As Atheist Kai Nielsen has pointed out, all arguments for God could fail and God could still exist. It was not my intention here to support the other arguments for God's existence; that would have led to multiple red herrings, debates within a debate, and there certainly aren't enough characters for that. My argument was that those other arguments raise the metaphysical probability of God's existence. We have warrant for accepting the first premise of the OA because of the other evidences in favor of God's existence (such as that nothing comes from nothing uncased (KCA), the Fine-Tuning of the universe (TA), that the universe needs a Prime Mover (TCA), the moral law points to a moral law giver (MA), etc.). Whether or not these actually point to a Creator is not really the point for this debate. I was using it to show warrant that God's existence is at least possible. Con's assertion that I was making a non-sequitur was just silly to begin with. I don't know how much clearer I can make this.ConclusionCon has not successfully refuted my case. He has simply resorted to dismissing it away, which is just a dishonest tactic (especially since I have clearly shown how my arguments are not fallacious). The first premise of the OA stands affirmed.