The Great Gay Debate Regarding Marriage - Debunk

My thanks to Pro for his gracious response. In regards to my argument, he argues that heterosexual union is not a necessary component for procreation, since procreation may be accomplished in ways other than the uniting of a male and female in a reproductive-type act. The example he cites is artificial insemination. The conclusion to be drawn from this is that heterosexual union therefore does not have social value.Unfortunately, Pro fails to engage with my argument at all. Artificial insemination itself involves the intrinsically heterosexual union of a male sperm and a female egg. The term "union" involves more than just a male and a female uniting in marriage -- it also refers to a procreative act. Indeed, this is how Spiegel uses the term. He uses "heterosexual union" to refer to a general type of act, not just the uniting of a man and a woman in marriage. Pro writes,"What are indispensable are male sperm and the reproductive track of a female in order to create life."But what Pro seems to miss is that this act is intrinsically heterosexual in nature. Consequently, there is nothing to be found here to support the introduction of homosexual unions into the definition of marriage. Moreover, Pro doesn't seem to engage the rest of my argument, so let me reproduce it here:This argument, however, misses a glaring fact. Artificial insemination is only possible due to the prior fact that male-female complementarity is required for procreation. As David Orland writes, "[h]omosexual 'families' of whatever type are always and necessarily parasitic [Emphasis mine] on heterosexual ones." [1] Far from constituting an argument against my position, this actually hurts Pro's argument, for the act of procreation is always heterosexual in type. This notion is what Spiegel's argument is based on, as he writes:"As for your point about the 'many' ways of making a child, all of the examples you give (and all that can be given) are heterosexual in nature. [Emphasis mine] In-vitro fertilization, surrogate motherhood, etc. all involve a male sperm fertilizing a female egg. This is sexual reproduction, and it is essentially heterosexual. The phrase “homosexual reproduction,” in fact, is a contradiction in terms." [Emphasis mine] [2]The argument presented here is not based on considerations of the agents involved, or even the effects, but on the intrinsic nature of reproduction. Henceforth, Pro's attack on the first premise ends up strengthening the argument. Frank Beckwith agrees, writing: "[T]he argument against same-sex marriage is based on the nature of human persons as beings with a gender who have a purpose derived from that nature... This argument is not based on a human persons's function, ability, or desire,which could each be inconsistent with how human persons ought to be by nature." [3] Since procreation is possible only within a heterosexual framework, the state therefore has no compelling reason to allow homosexual couples the right to marry. As Spiegel has said, "homosexual reproduction" is a contradiction in terms. Pro dedicates a section of his response to no-default divorce law. This is more or less irrelevant to the point the debate, and I only mentioned it in my previous response as an aside. Additionally, in the wake of my previous responses, Pro seems to have completely dropped his statistical arguments, noting that this debate is about the nature of marriage, not marriage as it is practiced.Interestingly, Pro charges me with commiting the is-ought fallacy. Unfortunately, this is mistaken. I defended marriage as a normative concept. That is, it has a nature that is directed toward a certain proper function. Therefore, it is perfectly legitimate to infer an evaluative conclusion from descriptive premises. For example, if the proper function of my heart is to pump blood, then therefore my heart ought to pump blood. The difference between this and a fallacious instance of is-ought reasoning is that the former is based on normative premises.Now, notice that Pro never actually responds to the charge that he comited the is-ought fallacy. He simply brushed it off and accussed me of it. This is a prime example of an argument ad hominem tu quoque. In regards to the contractural nature of marriage, Pro argues that marriage is a contract because that is what the legal system has defined marriage to be. But this is a grossly naive legal analysis, and once again it misses the big picture. In order for the judiciary to have defined marriage as a contract, it must have had a compelling reason to do so. Pro, however, never actually attempts to elaborate on this reasoning, choosing to simply argue that "That's the way the judges have defined it." This is an incomplete analysis, for we have to know why judges have defined it in that way.Pro argues that the definition of marriage as provided by DOMA and other legal statutes is discriminatory. But to say that some statute is discriminatory is to presuppose a view of what marriage is supposed to be. So the debate then is primarily over the nature of marriage. How else could one say that a certain statute is discriminatory unless there is a certain way that marriage ought to be. Legal definitions, after all, have to be based on something. As Sherif Girgis, Robert P. George, and Ryan T. Anderson point out: Any legal system that distinguishes marriage from other, nonmarital forms of association, romantic or not, will justly exclude some kinds of union from recognition. So before we can conclude that some marriage policy violates the Equal Protection Clause, or any other moral or constitutional principle, we have to determine what marriage actually is and why it should be recognized legally in the first place. [Emphasis mine] That will establish which criteria (like kinship status) are relevant, and which (like race) are irrelevant to a policy that aims to recognize real marriages. So it will establish when, if ever, it is a marriage that is being denied legal recognition, and when it is something else that is being excluded. [4] As I noted in a previously it makes no sense to argue, for example, that fatherhood unjustly discriminates against women, for fatherhood is properly understood to be a role that is intrinsic to males. Since women cannot be fathers in principle, there is no discrimination taking place. Thus, when one argues that a specific institution discriminates against certain persons, they presuppose that said persons have a right to partake in said institution. But, unless we have settled the prior question as to what this institution actually is, then to use the discrimination argument as supporting evidence for a particular view that institution is to beg the question, since the argument presupposes what it sets out to prove. Pro cannot simply assume that a certain conception of marriage is right and then argue that this is only a legal debate and exclude all philosophical arguments, for this would end up excluding his own argument. This would be self-defeating.The state regulates the institution of the family because it recognizes that it has a special social value in that it leads to the flourishing of its future citizens. This is why the state regulates familial matters, but not matters between friends, roommates, etc... For the state has no compelling interest in either relationship. Of course, not all heterosexuals will marry, but the state is concerned with the common good, not the individual good.ConclusionPro's arguments fail to stand up to rational scrutiny. He drops several of his previous arguments, and has not defended himself against the charge that he commits the is-ought fallacy.I now turn it over to Pro.____Sources[1] - http://www.boundless.org...[2] - http://wisdomandfollyblog.com...[3] - Koukl and Beckwith, Relativism, p.123[4] - Girgis, George, and Anderson, “What is Marriage?” Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 34, no. 1 (Winter 2010): 251