Sense Data

Beginner's arguments in defense of an emprical interpretation of physical properties has a fatal flaw, it is limited to the viewer's perspective. How do [em]you[/em] know that an object possesses certain qualities if [em]you[/em] have not been presented the relevant sense-data. I contend that physical properties exist independent of our senses. If I were to look at a table and utilize the sense data to create an image of the table in my head, that pre-requisites the existence of a collection of sense data that can be interpreted. Remember, Beginner is not providing support for his most extreme claim, that "nothing exists independent of the self." He admits in his own round that, "We only know a thing exists when it is pushed through our senses." If everything that exists is dependent on the self, and we are talking about the ontological nature of these objects, then these objects exist internally to the self. If that is true, then sense data is irrelevant because we create it internally within our own consciousness, but Beginner admits that sense data is pushed through out senses. He argues that sense data exists externally to the self, that our state of being is independent of the sense data's state of being. Because Beginner argues against the claim nothing exists independent of the self in his opening argument, do not allow him to change his stance later. His official stance is that objects exist externally, but we cannot understand them until they are internally processed. My opponent makes the claim that "If [I] [reject] solipsism, [I] [refute] the existence of the linguistic definition of an object's very existence and its properties." This statement makes little sense and is unsubstantiated. At most he can link back to his opening round claim that, "EVerything [sic] we know, from our knowledge of language, the things we see, touch and hear determine what we know." This is inaccurate in that we understand language internally. We are perfectly capable of having discussions within our own minds and then come to a conclusion after that introspective thought process that we did not possess prior. Furthermore, it is hard to say that a blind, deaf, mute would lack an internal monologue. What they would talk about with their conscious is up for debate, but the capacity for an internal monologue is a fundamental faculty of the mind. Moreover, my opponent's claim that everything exists internally is a tacit acceptance that language is understandable internally. Even more damningly, during no part of my argument do I require that language be external in order to determine the physical properties of an object, simply that there is a linguistic assertion that combines judgment with understanding. Yes, these words interacting with other human beings will allow for a better understanding, but the fundamental idea is that through assertion we formulate a more precise description of a physical object's properties. In addition, in a world in which all is internal to the self, the people we talk to daily are also internal, but it doesn't reduce the validity of my argument. When a red-green colorblind person speaks with non colorblind people, even if those people are internal to his conscious, he is gaining a more precise understanding of the colors red and green. So in summation my opponent's argument fails because: 1. He argues against it. 2. Language is internal. 3. Language does have to be externalized to define physical properties more accurately than sense date. 4. Even if it does, our conception of externalization is internal. Onto his refutation, sure we have to be introduced to a door empirically, but out understanding is lacking until the assertion phase. Again, if the door doesn't open, we have a period of awakening, interpretation, in which we reconsider the properties of the door? Is it locked? Assertion mends reality with this realization to truly describe the state of the door and its physical properties.