The Ontological Argument

In Conclusion I presented the OA to CON, who provided two major contentions; that the MGB simply exists because the argument says so, and that the wording in P2 and P3 or P3 and P4 were inconsistent. I agreed with the first premise with the example of Schrödinger' s cat, which demonstrated that P2 is simply reiterating possibility. His next contention is where this debate was at.CON argued that "possible worlds" could only refer to actual worlds for the argument to make sense. To accept this, however, one would also require to demonstrate how P2 made sense if it isn't simply reiterating possibility, in which case it wouldn't make sense at all. At this point I introduced the concept of necessity to counter his rebuttal.The axiom of S5 Modal Logic states this:If possibly P, the necessarily possibly P.If possibly necessarily P, the necessarily P.My argument, I must admit, was poorly worded and didn't get my point across very well. All I was trying to say that if the MGB is possibly necessary, he must be necessary. However, to people with little knowledge in philosophy this would just cause them to dismiss the Axiom S5 and continue on with their days. So I will express the argument in more casual terms.Let it be noted that if a MGB exists, he will also be necessary for existance of our world, since necessary > possible.Our world must be one of two possible worlds, one where the MGB exists and one where he does not exist. But if it is possible that a MGB exists, in the world it would be necessary for him to exist. In a world where a MGB does not exist, this necessity of existence is not fulfilled, so that world is absurd and paridoxial, making the only possible world one where the MGB exists.This follows straight from initial premise to conclusion, as we can see in the following:1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists.Accepted claim. No arguments presented to counter.2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.This is simply reiterating possibility. Not saying the MGB actually exists.3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.Because the MGB is possibly necessary, he is necessary.4. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.If the MGB is necessary in every possible world, and our world is one of these possible worlds, he must exist in the actual world5. If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.No brainer6. Therefore, a maximally great being exists.Conclusion.I believe I have shown enough evidence and thwarted my opponents argument sufficiently to have won this debate. I would like to thank Double_R for a wonderful debate, and hope to debate him some time in the future.Final Note about the "Santa Clause" Double_R concludes round 4 with a bit about S5 and Santa Clause, going like this:If possibly Santa Claus exists, then necessarily possibly Santa Claus exists.If possibly necessarily Santa Claus exists, then necessarily Santa Clause exists. This is simply a confusion of terms. Possibly necessarily and necessarily possibly are not the same thing. Necessarily possibly means that it is necessary that it is possible, meaning unfalsifiably possible. I suppose it is a complicated way of saying anything is necessarily possible. Possibly necessarily means something completely different. Possibly necessarily means that if it is possible that something is required, then it is required. S5 doesn't directly state it, but it (somehow, I'm not really sure) is derived from the first premise, that if something is possible it is necessary that it is possible. For more info, heres a wikipedia link or two;Axiom S5: http://en.wikipedia.org...;S5 (modal logic): http://en.wikipedia.org...(modal_logic)