Free Will is Real and Compatible with Determinism

=RESPONSE TO OPPONENT My opponent claims that it is philosophy, not science, that should answer the question before us. Perhaps true a millenium ago, but not true in a world where we have abundant evidence that all macro-world processes are deterministic. Not in a world where we've studied the human decision-making process scientifically, and we have only confirmed the fact that things work deterministically therein. The quantum world is the only thing for which there is a significant amount of scientific uncertainty regarding whether or not it is deterministic, and that is a thing that has nothing to do with our decision making process. My opponent brings up issues with some of the things I said last round. I'll address those now. =FIRST SET OF 3 #1. I claimed that my opponent was implying that the ability to calculate things (assuming a omniscient calculator) in a deterministic world was somehow evidence against it. My opponent says I am wrong. My bad, I was reading with the assumption that my opponent would be trying to affirm the resolution, so I must have read that into it. Now that my opponent has recognized it has no bearing on the truth or falsehood of the resolution: #2. Again, I was assuming that my opponent was making a point for his resolution, rather than pointing out an irrelevant bit of data. Now that I know we agree that the possibility of randomness in the quantum world has no effect on how likely free will is to exist: #3. My opponent claims this was an appeal to reason. Here's the "appeal to reason" in question quoted directly from his R1: "With absolute determinism, we don't have the slightest chance of exerting any influence on our own lives. We are at the mercy of destiny. Not as appealing as creating your own destiny . . . but better than no destiny at all." That's not an appeal to reason." That's not as appealing as creating your own destiny" is about the most blatant appeal to wishful thinking I've ever seen. I'll get to the "evidence of experience" in the next point. =SECOND SET OF THREE #1. My opponent says that the "animate mode of response" (the nondeterministic mode of response) is obvious, but he "humors" me with an example he thinks proves him right. It doesn't. His example is that two identical twins but beside each other in a field will not act the same. This is true, because the identical twins are not completely identical (they have different memories, different positions in space, etc.). My opponent's example fails. #2. My opponent briefly insults me for not recognizing his argument: "animate mode of response." Too bad that's not an argument, it's a baseless assertion. My opponent has not shown that living beings determine their actions in nondeterministic ways. He has merely asserted it. #3. Now my opponent decides to give us what he calls evidence for free will, for his "animate mode of response." At least he admits that before this point, he simply assumed we all agreed with him already rather than expecting an actual argument. My opponent claims that the processes of learning and planning can't be deterministic. False. And my opponent does only that - he merely claims that it is non-deterministic rather than proving it in any meaningful way. Here's an example of the deterministic nature of learning: Let's say Bob is a novice driver. It's snowy and icy, but he decides to drive to his friend's house anyway. In his parking lot, he loses control of his car and nearly hits a nearby car. He then adapts his plan accordingly - he decides not to go out at the moment. He reads a web page on how to drive well in icy conditions without losing control of the car. Later, Bob decides that he can manage to get to his friend's house, even though the weather isn't any better. He gets in his car, and he makes a different decision on how to drive than he did originally. He manages to get to his friend's house without losing control. Now, we have examples of planning and of learning in the example above. I will explain how they fit into a deterministic worldview. Bob originally decides to go to his friend's house, but once he loses control, he changes his mind. His senses feed his mind the information that he has lost control of the vehicle, and with this new information, he comes to a different conclusion. Determinism only says that an identical brain (identical in what information it has within it, all other aspects of its state etc) will make an identical decision in an identical situation. With new information, the brain is in a different state, and thus decides to make a different decision. Anyway, he then decides to read up on how to drive in this weather. With this new insight, he later decides to go back out to his friend's house. He once again changes his plan because he has new information, not because he's some unpredictable free-willed agent. Again, he gets in the car, but makes a different decision on how to drive than he did before - this is once again due to having new information. The outcome ends up different than the last time because of this. Lastly, my opponent says that the fact that we act as if we have free will is evidence for free will. I will be generous and say that the way in which we act is how we'd expect whether free will is right or determinism is right. Thus, it lends no additional credibility to either of these opposed ideas (by my opponent's definitions, they are opposed). =LONE ONE #1. My opponent misunderstands me. I was saying that the Copenhagen interpretation is unproven, and that some other interpretations, such as a hidden variable theory, are just as likely. My opponent responds by assuming that I'm ignorant of all sorts of quantum ideas. I can only conclude that he has misunderstood me. The fact is that it matters not. Copenhagen interpretation may very well be true, and it would lend no additional credibility to my opponent's argument. So for the purposes of this debate, we'll say the Copenhagen interpretation is true and that quantum mechanics is nondeterministic. It really has absolutely nothing to do with whether free will or deterministic laws govern the decision-making process. =MY CONTENTIONS My opponent hardly addresses these, claiming that I've "made" him waste so much time with other things. My first contention goes unanswered - my opponent simply claims again that the "animate mode of response" rebuts my argument. My opponent is wholly unable to show how it is even possible that certain atoms, based on simply having a certain arrangement, become immune from the laws of physics. Such a thing would shatter physics as we know it. My opponent also refers to "his example of the single-celled organism" - an unsourced claim for which my opponent has given absolutely no evidence. If single-celled organisms have been shown to have "free will" in the sense we are using the term, I challenge my opponent to provide a reliable source that shows this. My second contention, neuroscience, shows that the decision-making process happens in the chemically-driven brain. My opponent has no response for this, so he simply asserts that consciousness and free will are not a product of the brain. My third contention, the universe, and how deterministic events and objects that follow deterministic laws can assemble in a way that somehow becomes non-deterministic. My opponent gives no answer, he merely says I am ignoring the difference between rocks and people. Rocks and computers also react in very different ways to events, but that does not mean only one of them reacts based on deterministic science. Lastly, the incompatibility of determinism as my opponent has defined it and free will as he has defined it. My opponent affirms that he was actually defining terms. Since he defined the terms, those definitions conflict, and the resolution says they don't, the resolution is negated. I look forward to my opponent's final round.