Moral subjectivism is false.

Circularity and IncoherencePro starts off the round with a shifting of the burden of proof. He must show why the subjectivist is committed to whatever he believes the subjectivist is committed to. Regardless, it may be true that "x is good" may entail "x believes x is good", but it doesn't follow from this that one specifically defines the other. That is a non-sequitur. I can say that what is "good" is what I "approve of", and what I "approve of" is "what increases positive emotion". Now, it seems is if Pro is special pleading pertaining to circularity to try to wiggle his way out of a dilemma, and delving into the dark world of double standards[1]:1. Person A accepts standard(s) S and applies them to others in circumstance(s) C.2. Person A is in circumstance(s) C.3.Therefore A is exempt from S. Circularity is circularity, yet he tries to say that only vicious circularity entails incoherency. This is false. Even though the two are indeed different, the fact still remains that the English language ultimately entails begging the question linguistically just like the definition Pro is claiming is "viciously" circular. Pro either has to say that it is fine to semantically beg the question in this way (therefore destroying his argument here in the process), or say that it is not, and claim that both of our arguments fail due to the incoherency of language. While this may seem like an uncomfortable and counter-intuitive dichotomy for my opponent to deal with, it is a necessary one due to the arguments he is making. As far as the infinite regress is concerned, in his first round he insinuated that it was the "ad infinitum" which was causing the logical problems for Moral Subjectivism. In any event, if he accepts that infinite regresses can be logical then I apologize for misunderstanding. Conclusion of Circularity and Incoherence. "X is good" doesn't have to be defined as "it is believed that x is good" even though it does entail it. I presented a definition of "good" which avoids direct circularity (even though that it wasn't necessary to undermine his argument). This objection takes care of Pro's argument alone. . It is begging the question semantically that Pro is opposed to, yet he presupposes a language that begs the question semantically. This is a self-refuting argument. Circularity is circularity, whether direct ("vicious") or not. This may be unsettling, but necessary to point out. I think it is clear that this argument from Pro does not establish the resolution. No Moral DisagreementPro completely ignores the important points in my last round pertaining to this section. He claims that because it seems as if we are actually contradicting each other when we argue about something like abortion, then this gives us prima facie belief in it. However, I mentioned how there are plenty of situations where it seems as if we are contradicting people even though it isn't true in the same fashion. Some prima facie cases are stronger than others with regards to the context. Now, when I say that Biggie is better than 2 Pac, I honestly feel like it is true and I am contradicting the claim that 2 Pac better. However, as I'm sure my opponent agrees, it all boils down to subjective preference. When I argue with my girlfriend about what colour to paint the room, the very fact that we are debating presupposes there is an objectively correct answer; when there is not. Essentially, my rebuttal to Pro's prima facie case is that there are too many instances where conversations take place as if there is an objectively correct answer when there is not. Thus, even though it does seem as if there is a correct answer in a debate, that doesn't even mean it is probably true; even with prima facie warrant. Here is an example. Lets say that in a city a whole bunch of water gets contaminated in a town but nobody knows which areas specifically. Nobody would take a glass of water and say: "It looks and smells just like the water I have always had, so I have prima facie warrant for thinking it is normal uncontaminated water."The reason that is insane is because even though at first glance the water seems fine, there is a good chance it is not due to the contamination. Thus, it is a weak prima facie case. Similarly, conversations are "contaminated" by debates which may have no objective resolution (I gave countless examples in this exchange). Just because a debate seems like it has an objective answer, that is a not a good reason to think its true unless you have external reasons. Not all prima facie cases are strong and actually raise the probability of a desired conclusion. In a certain area where things are commonly not what they seem at first glance, it would be absurd to say that something probably is the way it seems, because it appears that way at first glance. Conclusion of No Moral Disagreement. Pro made a prima facie case. However, there are strong and weak prima facie cases; Pro didn't show his was a strong prima facie case.. I rebutted Pro's case by showing it a weak prima facie case, due to countless times in our lives when we debate as if there is a objective resolution to the discussion when there is not. Pro's argument in this regard does not establish the resolution. Moral InfallibilityHe brings up the prima facie case again. However, it is strange because a prima facie case is easily seen for Moral Subjectivism. Morals are based on values (we wouldn't deem rape wrong if we didn't value victim's will), but what we assign value to or "care about" seems to be completely subjective. Therefore, morality seems to have a subjective basis prima facie. To rebut Con's argument, all I need to do is show that a prima facie case can be made against the resolution. They essentially cancel out, and leave Pro not showing the resolution of this debate to be true with the argument. I am not alone in thinking that Moral Subjectivity seems to be the case on the surface:"To say that music is good is simply to express an opinion. In fact, we could even consider that the vast majority of people may agree that there are certain basic acoustic features of music which makes it distinguishable from noise. Nevertheless, music is a human invention--the distinction between an annoying sound and a pleasant one does not exist in nature but only in our minds. I think it would be relatively uncontroversial to argue that the same holds for the distinction between a moral and an immoral action were it not for people's distaste with the perceived consequences of such a view." - Keith AugustinePeople simply "don't like" the idea of morality not being objective. However, if this was removed, people would realize that morality certainly seems subjective. Pro re-iterates a point:"If subjectivism is true rational considerations and reasons don't play any role is the deliberative process because it reduces those considerations and reasons down to mere whims and tastes." - ProI see no reason to accept that the moral subjectivist cannot take reasons into play in the deliberative process. To take it back to the father example, until a reason was brought up, I may not have realized that I value the elderly people's feelings. Basically, certain reasons can awake certain subjective feelings deep down that have had little attention. At the end of the day, it is still subjective whether I assign value to the elderly (someone else might not value the elderly). Therefore, the Moral Subjectivist can still take reasons into account with regards to ethics. Maybe the person down the street doesn't value the elderly and their well being, so my father's reason would have no similar effect on him as it had on me. There doesn't seem to be anything that makes him right over I. The fact that a reason made me realize my subjective feelings more than previously doesn't entail any problems with moral subjectivism. Conclusion of Moral Infallibility. Another reason the prima facie case fails for Moral Obectivism, is that one can be made for Moral Subjectivism. ArbitrarinessPro claims:" If Con disapproves of raping girls because of the reasons he mentioned that must mean that there is some prior and independent moral fact (besides just his disapproval) by which he judges those reasons sufficient to render his disapproval." - ProThe reason for the approval only means there is a fact which falls in line with my subjective views. For example, I disapprove of rape because I because "it enduces negative emotions in me and I feel sympathy for the girl in question and the people who care about her". However, that reason is not an independently objective moral fact. It could be the case that someone doesn't have sympathy, and doesn't value what I value and would deem that reason insufficient to not rape. That reason could only be an independently existing objective moral fact if it applies to everyone. Since that is exactly what Moral Subjectivism denies, I think Pro is confused."That would refute subjectivism because subjectivism categorically denies that there moral facts independent of Con's attitude of disapproval." - ProHow is "it enduces negative emotions in me and I feel sympathy for the girl in question and the people who care about her" an objective moral fact? That literally makes no sense. That fact has absolutely nothing to do with morality under Moral Subjectivism until I disapprove of rape for that reason.Additionally, Pro hasn't shown any real problems with arbitrariness in the first place. Conclusion of Arbitrariness. It is the disapproval of rape that makes it bad to someone, not an objective reason for the disapproval if Moral Subjectivism is true. That reason might not effect the next person; they might rape. Thus, it wouldn't be an objective reason not to rape. Self-evidently, this is completely consistent with Moral Subjectivism.Sources[1] http://www.nizkor.org...[2] http://www.infidels.org...