This House Asserts Ontology Necessitates God's Existence!

IntroductionPro has the full BoP to uphold that "ontology necessitates God's existence." Let's first analyze his burden. Pro's burden is to prove that ontology makes the existence of God "necessary." Necessary existence -- in the modal sense -- refers to existence in all possible worlds. What is a "possible world?" The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy explains, “Most of us also believe that things, as a whole, needn't have been just as they are. Rather, things might have been different in countless ways, both trivial and profound. History, from the very beginning, could have unfolded quite other than it did in fact: The matter constituting a distant star might never have organized well enough to give light; species that survived might just as well have died off; battles won might have been lost; children born might never have been conceived and children never conceived might otherwise have been born. In any case, no matter how things had gone they would still have been part of a single, maximally inclusive, all-encompassing situation, a single world. Intuitively, then, the actual world . . . is . . . one among many possible worlds.” [1]According to S5 modal logic, if (and only if) A exists in any possible world B, it is metaphysically possible for A to exist. If A exists in one or more (but not all) possible worlds, then we can say -- A and ~A are both metaphysically possible. The world that we exist in -- in which “objective existence” is possible -- is referred to as the “actual world,” represented as ‘M’. If A exists in the actual world, but not in all possible worlds (one or more), then A is “contingently existent.” Only if A exists in all possible worlds -- including the actual world -- is A “necessarily existent,” where it is impossible for A to be false. That is necessary existence. [2]Thus, it is insufficient if Pro demonstrates the existence of God in the actual world. Pro must be able to demonstrate the existence of God as necessary, as result of ontology. CitationsPro doesn’t have any sources. All 7 of Pro’s references are not cited. There is no accessible reference given by Pro. As such, I have to treat every argument of Pro’s -- every statement -- a bare assertion. What is God?The “God” as defined in Round 1 is very unclear. It is a vague definition. Let me analyze each of God’s attributes, and attempt to make a coherent formation as to what “God” is. Transcendent - This definition is stressed upon. To be “transcendent” entails the question: transcendent to what? I can only presume Pro means transcendent to reality, which means God is separate from all of reality, therefore is not physical. Sentient - “Sentience” refers to the ability to feel or perceive subjectively. The God that Pro talks of, thus, should be able to feel/perceive in a subjective sense. Once more, a question entails: feels/perceives what? There must be something besides God transcendent to the universe for the idea of God as described to be coherent. Excellence/Greatness - Both of these terms seem subjective. But all subjective terms require a standard: God cannot be “great,” unless God is compared with something else that is seen as being “less great,” or “less excellent.” But God is transcendent, therefore cannot have a standard within the universe. Once more, Pro has to demonstrate a being apart from this singular deity sans the universe. RelevanceWhen it comes to actually proving that ontology necessitates God’s existence, I found Pro’s argument to be lacking of relevance, and being quite weak. The argument that leads to the conclusion can be formalized:P1. ???P2. Ontology proves the existence of God in the actual worldC. Therefore, ontology necessitates God’s existenceThere is no plausible way in which P2 entails the conclusion, and only P2 is defended. The reductio ad absurdum, therefore, fails to affirm the resolution in any way. Cognitivism of GodWhat does “having a conception of God” mean? Pro is very unclear -- of course we can conceive of “God,” just as we can conceive of a Flying Spaghetti Monster. But it seems Pro is meaning a deeper form of “conception,” which involves something beyond people telling others tales. No human would have conceived of a Flying Spaghetti Monster had other humans not spread the idea. Pro seems to claim that the same is true with God. Pro’s warrant -- if humans do not intrinsically conceive of God, then the idea of God would be meaningless. The argument is basically:P1) If humans do not intrinsically conceive of God, the idea of God would be meaninglessP2) ???C. Humans intrinsically conceive of GodPro fails to fill the sizable gap between the first premise and the conclusion. Pro fails to justify that the term “God” is actually coherent, and fails to account for theological non-cognitivism as a position. As long as non-cognitivism is logically possible, this premise fails. I will now defend theological non-cognitivism, thus significantly weakening Pro’s argument. All attributes of God are secondary and relational attributes. God is defined as being a “transcendent, sentient deity who goes beyond the limits of empirical cognition, possessing excellence and greatness.” All of these attributes are secondary attributes or relational attributes. Take, for example, the idea of a rabbit. A person doesn’t know what a rabbit is. So, he asks the other person, “What is a rabbit?” The other person replies, “40 lbs.” A rabbit being without any attributes except the relational attribute “40lbs” is an incoherent entity. A rabbit which has only that definition is incoherent, therefore attributing existence to it is impossible. For a rabbit to have any coherence, it would have to be clearly defined, with the structure of it from fur, muscles, tissue, organs, its characteristic epiglottis, etc. The same can’t be done with God -- since then God can be imagined. All God is defined as is equivalent to a rabbit being “40 lbs.” It lacks any cognitivism. [3] Ad infinitumPro’s reductio ad absurdum would prove the existence of not one, but an infinite regression of transcendent entities. This is demonstrated in my counter reductio ad absurdum:A: The idea of any entity that cannot be imagined is true (assumption)1) The idea of transcendent entity ‘B’, which cannot be imagined, is true2) The idea of transcendent entity ‘C’, which cannot be imagined, is trueInfinity) The idea of entity “...” which cannot be imagined is trueP1) There is an infinite regression of entities which cannot be imaginedP2) An infinite regression of entities is incoherentC. A entails a contradiction, therefore A is false1, 2, ∞, and P1 all follow from A. Most philosophers agree that P1 is true. An “actual infinite” is metaphysically incoherent, as demonstrated by Hilbert’s Hotel and similar paradoxes. [4] Thus, the argument is false (since A is false). R: Ontological ArgumentNow, onto the actual ontological argument. I have objections to some of the lemmas, that I shall outline below. “Lem. 1: The idea of God . . . is a fantasy.”Pro is very unclear as to what they mean by “fantasy.” There’s no coherent definition given to me, by either Pro or by any encyclopedias/dictionaries of philosophy. Until Pro brings some coherence to this lemma, it remains meaningless, as far as the debate is concerned. “Lem. 2: The idea of God has been imagined.” The lemma basically attempts to defend the proposition: If A is false, then A is imagined. This is false. Consider the idea that “colorless green ideas sleep furiously.” It is false (incoherent), but it isn’t necessarily imaginative. We can’t imagine the idea, but we know it is (1) an idea, and (2) false. There are multiple other ideas that are false, but not necessarily imaginative. Otherwise, the premise would basically be: All simple ideas are true (considering the fourth premise, which states simple ideas can’t be imagined). Incoherent ideas escape that proposition. A being that I deem to be “40 lbs” can’t be imagined, but doesn’t exist. Similarly, an entity “zxc,” defined as “abc,” does not exist, but cannot be imagined. “Lem. 4: Lemma 3 is false.” Imagination can yield ideas independent of senses. What is “imagination?” “To imagine something is to form a particular sort of mental representation of that thing. Imagining is typically distinguished from mental states such as perceiving, remembering and believing in that imagining S does not require (that the subject consider) S to be or have been the case, whereas the contrasting states do. It is distinguished from mental states such as desiring or anticipating in that imagining S does not require that the subject wish or expect S to be the case, whereas the contrasting states do. It is also sometimes distinguished from mental states such as conceiving and supposing, on the grounds that imagining S requires some sort of quasi-sensory or positive representation of S, whereas the contrasting states do not.” [5] Thus, the idea of 5+7=12 or i is actually imagined, since there is some positive representation of 5+7=11. Similarly, atoms are imagined, despite the fact that our sensory experience does not intervene within it. The argument fails for the above reasons. Vote Con. --Sources:1. http://goo.gl...2. http://goo.gl...3. http://goo.gl...4. https://goo.gl...5. http://plato.stanford.edu...