The Problem of Evil is Reasonable

1. Opposition In All Things Con argues that he fulfilled his burden by showing how (any amount) evil can coexist with God. This would be true if "God" was a loose term, unfortunately for him, it is not. God: An omnipotent (allpowerfull), omniscient (allknowing), benevolent (allgood/loving) transcendental creatorIt is his burden not only to assert a random amount of suffering as necessary, but rather to explain why a loving God would allow for this incomprehensible amount of suffering and no less.In his latest rebuttal he argues that it is not the instantiating of properties like "goodness" or "badness" that is valuable, it is to be able to make a comparison between the two. But this is exactly what I addressed in How much Evil?.1) We could without a doubt still distinguish good from bad and recognize a good God as such, if there were no natural disasters.2) If natural disasters are not necessary for this distinction then God (as defined for this debate) would either not allow for them or does not exist. 3) But natural disaster happen all the time. 4) It is therefore either the case that no such God exists or that natural disasters are in fact necessary for us to be able to make this distinction.My opponent has to explain why the latter is the case for his opposition in all things-defence to be successful.Moreover, to get around my Linguistics and Ontology response he has to demonstrate why the ability to differentiate good and evil is somehow valuable or rather more valuable than the plain existence of "goodness".Until any of this is done, his objection falls flat on its face.2. Unexplained SufferingThis sub-response was merely intended to demonstrate why LFW alone is not a sufficient condition to account for all the unwilled suffering in this world. My opponent does not contest this, as such How much Evil? and Linguistics and Ontology gain even more force.3. Libertarian Free WillIn his main contention kasmic presents a demonstrably false dichotomy.He claims that we either have LFW or no FW at all (hard determinism) and thus nobody could not be held accountable for her actions. In my response to the FW defence I already listed another option: compatibilism; freedom of will is the freedom to do what I desire (this is just one possible formulation).Two things come to mind. First, I would argue that LFW does get rid people's responsibility just as much as hard determinism and propose compatibilism as the only sensible form of FW (1) (2). But this would be off topic and I won't engage further into defending compatibilism, but rather stick to arguments against LFW. This form of FW is his proposal and as such it is his burden to demonstrate it.Secondly, he is making an argumentum ad consequentiam, an appeal to consequences. Even if it was the case that rejecting LFW would rid us of any responsibility, it does not follow that it is therefore true. Perhaps society would break down as a result of accepting the problem of evil and denying free will entirely (which I am not doing). However this is not proof of the veracity of LFW.Hence the FW defence still does not get off the ground.ConclusionMy opponent dismisses some of my responses to hasty and I contend, I fulfilled my burden.Sources(1) J.L. Mackie, Ethics. Inventing Right and Wrong, Chap. 9(2) Richard Carrier, Sense and Goodness without God