The Christian God is personal and not merely philosophical

Objection One: Socrates and MonotheismSocrates was a monotheist, and there is no doubt (except from those unfamiliar with the works of Aristophanes and Plato) that he was a monotheist. Take example a passage from the dialogue Euthyphro: "May not this be the reason, Euthyphro, why I am charged with impiety-that I cannot away with these stories about the Gods?" If Socrates was not a monotheist, then (if he accepted the conception of polytheism) how would it be possible that he introduced other, new Gods without a belief in the stories of an anthropecentric God? If perhaps that is not enough, then take this excerpt from Apology:What can the god mean? and what is the interpretation of this riddle? The normal Greek tradition would have been to appeal to one of the many Gods, such a Zeus etc. [1,2]Nevertheless, this makes no revelence to this debate. Objection Two: Jewish PhilosophyAbraham was indeed a philosopher; Abraham was a learned philosopher who justified his beliefs in God using an analogy of "a house with a light in it" in a primitive version of argumentation from design. Furthermore, it was Melchizedek who taught Abraham philosophy, or at least, philosophy of the Jews. [3]Objection Three: Falllllllllaciiiiies! Firstly, I claimed that the BoP lies entirely upon the opposition to prove that faith justifies belief in God. He has not done so at all, instead claiming that the Burden of Proof is shared, which is, in this case, equally absurd as saying 1+1=3. Secondly, the opposition's strawman of my argumentation from consistency is unforgiveable. The opposition has taken his own stance and assumes that whenever I raise any argumentation, it is about him, and not the resolution. He also cherry picks minor parts of my argumentation and ignores the key argumentation here, which puts him on the edge, since he has the BoP! Apart from this, he has strawman the relation between faith and philosophy; we are in a debate about the resolution, not the word faith. The opposition has ignoratio elenchi'ed his way through, and still thinks that the resolution is affirmed via circular logic (and if not circular logic, then mere appeals to the authority) like "I have faith in God" because "the Bible says to have faith" simply because "the Bible is the word of God" [4]Objection Four: InconsistencyNevertheless, albeit the opposition has strawman'ed my argumentation, let me build upon this consistency issue. Perhaps I shall make it clear if I restate my argumentation:1. (Æx)(PxG) 2. (Æx)(~PxG)3. (Æx)(~PxG) iff (O~PxG)4. (OPxG) according to 15. (Æx)(O~PxG)The opposition henceforth attacks the conception that the conclusion (proposition 5) is "unbiblical" (apparently). This mere and weak appeal to authority should be characterized by the fact that he wholly ignores the logic involved. If then we shall affirm the opposition's position, which is (FxG), then let us derive two axioms from this position:Ax. 1 (FxG) implies (~PxG)Ax. 2 (FxG) iff ((~PxG) then (~G))Here, I have created a framework of how the opposition believes that the notion of God can be affirmed. For if x does F to G, then in theory, if x does P to G then apparently ~G is the only final conclusion that shall be affirmed. On this basis, then of course there would be (Æx)(~PxG) but the fundamental question here is that (in positive relation, not in negative) if (FxG) were true, then how could some people believe in the notion (Æx)(PxG)? Let us apply our atomic proposition theorem here. If (Fv~F) is true, then F is an analytical atomic proposition! And since this debate exists, then (Fv~F) is an atomic proposition. Then if something is an atomic proposition, then it has to be able to be proven via philosophy; henceforth, via virtue of atomic proposition, philosophy justifies faith. Henceforth, neither way, faith has to be justified via philosophy or God has to be justified via philosophy, which seemingly negates the resolution's attempts at playing on words. Objection Five: On Biblical JustificationsWe have a entirely different section to deal with Biblical justifications, just AS A VIRTUE OF RESPECT for the sake of it. The absurdity of these argumentations shall be proven in the following:"Come now, and let us reason together, Says the Lord, Though your sins are like scarlet, They shall be as white as snow; Though they are red like crimson, They shall be as wool." Isaiah 1:18 This phrase shows that the Bible, and Christianity, needs you to use your logic to justify your faith. But we are told by other Biblical passages to live via faith in Romans 1:17. Let us call this "faith" Biblical faith for now. Biblical Faith has been misdefined. It is not "believe without reason" but it is "reason your faith, then believe!" This is forever present in Hebrews 1:11:"Now faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen." This faith is not apparently "I hope God makes my opponent die tomorrow" (which the opposition is prolly thinking); this faith is faith with reason, as notated in the Greek notion ελπιζω (elbiso) which apparently implies to be hopeful after fully reasoning the causality-effects of the event. Moreover, Apostle Paul always reasoned, as seen in Act 17:17:"Therefore he reasoned in the synagogue with the Jews and with the Gentile worshipers, and in the marketplace daily with those who happened to be there"The opposition's main notions about Christian faith and reasoning are flawed, and Biblical faith is faith in reasoning, or reasoned faith, not the blind fiedeistic faith that the opposition attempts to pursue and justifiy through this debate motion! With these presumptions, let us easily refute the opposition's case:Gen. 15:6 "And he believed in the LORD; and he counted it to him for righteousness." This verse attempts to justify belief in God, but as proven before, and as demonstrated here, faith is the reasoning of the cause-effect factor, not "blind faith" Nevertheless, all this proves is that faithfulness in "God" and "Christ" yields the effects of the following, yet it does not justify faith at all, it just justifies the need for faith. [5,6,7,8]Objection Six, Argumentation from Representations: CertaintyThe opposition claims that this term does not apply to him, but is it not him that said that "God was unknowable via reason and experience"? This is the whole thesis of the debate, that God is unknowable a priori or a posteriori, and that he must be knowable a faith-iori (or something of that matter). I did describe him as a Christian Agnostic, and at this I stop. But there is another issue that I must address here; that is, how can we come at certainty to something?If object x is not known a posteriori, then it is know a priori. Then henceforth, faith is an a priori object. But is it an intuitive representation or abstract representation; does it require reason to be cognitized, or does it not require reason to be cognitized. Let us first formalized the dilemma at hand here:1. (IgvAg)Then what is an intuitive representation; an intuitive representation is something that does not require reason to cognitized, that is, it exists without reason. The presumption denies the idealistic worldview, which states that everything, including time and space, assumes requires a mind to perceive. Nevertheless, we shall go on without anymore debating; the only intuitive representations that do not require reason to perceive is possibly time, space, and the existence of oneself. This is intuitive; whatever is abstract requires reason to cognitize. Things like the existence of other minds, 1+1=2, and such, are abstract representations. Then if God were an intuitive representation, the idea that God exists must either be: (1a) innate, or (2a) justifiable via common sense (there is worldwide consensus that God exists, just like time). With this said, let us say that (1a) God is not innate. Innate principles are not ideas that are given via hereditary, and lost throughout the development, but ideas that stick with man forever. Innate principles are false (albeit innatism may be true) for if they exist, then (1) all children will have to have them, and (2) all children will have the same beliefs. But children are fundamentally different, for these principles we consider innate are actually done via assention. If they weren't, then how would it be possible that some children say God "doesn't exist" whilst other affirm that? Also, if they exist, then how could some say that "blue is the best color" whilst other say that red is? Then let us take the second possibility; children do not have the same beliefs. Henceforth, we can say that God is not innate. Then (2a) God exists via common-sense. i.e there is a consensus of people that God exists. This is not true, as atheists exist. With both possibilities (which allow faith to follow, as intuitive representations requires simple faith in the senses) exhausted, henceforth:2. ~IgErgo AgThen with this said, if God were an abstract representation, then it requires reason to perceive him, not just pure faith. CONCLUSION:The opposition has still ignoratio elenchi'ed his premises, uses circular reasoning, cherry-picks my case, and attempts to "shift the goal post" via strawman-ing my premises and conclusions. He thinks that this debate is about him, not the resolution, which I find absurd. He has done nothing but say that Socrates was not a monotheist, which I have proven him wrong, and said that the Bible is enough justification, which is both (1) appeal to authority, and (2) absurd analytically! The resolution here is negated. Citations:[1] http://classics.mit.edu...[2] http://classics.mit.edu...[3] Bereishit Rabba (39,1) (retrieved from Wikipedia)[4] https://yourlogicalfallacyis.com...;[5] https://answersingenesis.org...[6] http://biblia.com...;(Biblical passages taken from here)[7] http://www.christnotes.org...[8] http://www.christnotes.org...