Same-Sex Marriage Should Be Legal in the United States

I appreciate Freeman's careful reply. Recall that the main thrust of my opening agument was that Pro's argument begged the question. Before we can delve into issues of what marriage law should be, we first have first to establish the relevant facts concerning marriage. Once understood, these facts about marriage will in turn help guide us in the direction of what marriage law should be. Accordingly, I stated that Pro had two tasks:1. He must provide and justify a definition of marriage.2. He must show how this definition makes sense of the state's interest in marriage.In his latest response, Pro states that I have dropped numerous points relating to his argument. This is simply not the case. Rather, I pointed out that his central argument is circular in nature. I would be the first to grant his argument and admit that same-sex couples should have the full right to marry, but only if marriage is defined in a certain way (Such as being an emotional union of persons). That’s a big if, and one that my opponent seems to have glossed over. To assert that same-sex couples should be allowed to marry because they are unjustly being denied a right is to presuppose that such a right exists, thus begging the question. The opponent of SSM will simply deny that, so it is of no use to assume it.Consequently, arguments from Equal Protection, Due Process, and Suspect Class status are irrelevant until the relevant marriage facts are first established.The Definition of MarriageWith respect to (1), Pro has not done anything. His argument hinges on the fact that marriage is understood in terms of an emotional union, but he has failed to justify this. Citing legal evidence will not do, since this debate is fundamentally over what the law should be. It would therefore be circular to cite what's under dispute to prove it. Indeed, prior precedent can and has been overturned in the presence of relevant facts. Consequently, we have seen no reason as to why marrige should be genderless.The State's Interest in MarriageIn regards to (2), Pro lists three criteria for why the state has an interest in marriage. Aside from the fact that homosexual relationships are not conducive to child-rearing, these criteria are vague and could be used to justify any sort of emotional relationship as marriage. [1] Friendships, for example, are conducive to the public good, but clearly the government has no interest in extending legal recognition to friendships (Be it in the form of a marriage or some other civil recognition). Pet owners nationwide would benefit economically if their pet would be legally recognized as their children, but clearly the state doesn't do that. So the salient question here is, why should we take the criteria listed by Pro as being indicative of legal recognition? The fact that something may be good does not mean that it deserves legal recognition. Procreation, on the other hand, warrants legal recognition because it is required for society to exist -- it is a pre-political concept, a fundamental cornerstone to the very existence of society. The government therefore has a compelling reason to base marriage law on relationships which are procreative in type.Defending the Procreation ArgumentPro levies numerous arguments against the procreation argument, the first of these being the oft-repeated sterile couples argument. As I have argued in my past debates, this objection confuses between acts that are reproductive in type and acts that are reproductive in effect. Recall that in my opening argument, I stated that the case for conjugal marriage is based on acts that are reproductive in type. Whether these reproductive type acts are reproductive in effect is thus irrelevant. The sterility argument thus fails.The second argument Pro presents also fails for this reason. Indeed, the Supreme Court has never inquired into the procreative capacity of a man and woman. But since my reasoning is based on reproductive type acts as opposed to acts that are reproductive in effect, this argument simply attacks a strawman. Now what's interesting is that a fortiori, male-female complementarity (aka: reproductive type acts) has always been considered a necessary condition for marriage at common law. [2] It matters not whether a couple can actually procreate, only that the conditions for procreation are met.The third argument also fails for the same reason as the previous two. To say that the state may take away the right to marriage because it is no longer interested in having new citizens is to presuppose that conjugal marriage is based on acts that are reproductive in effect. As I have stated, however, conjugal marriage is based on reproductive type acts. In such a scenario, the state would still have a reason for recognizing conjugal marriage because it would still be getting "a good example for others and help to teach the next generation what marriage is and is not." [3] In other words, it would be affirming that conjugal marriage is the normative means through which procreation should occur, even if it is not required at the moment.The fourth argument is problematic as well, for assuming the state's only interest in recognizing marriage is because of its procreative and child-rearing elements, then this by definition excludes homosexual unions on account of the fact that such types of unions are not intrinsically ordered toward procreation as their final cause. Upon further reflection we see this to be true -- the state is not in the business of extending legal recognition fo relationships simply because those involved are emotionally commited to one another. Indeed, friendships can have the same level of love and fidelity as found in marriage, but obviously the state is not in the business of legally recognizing friendships. While love certainly matters in a marriage, the state could care less (As it had throughout history) as it has no interest in legally benefiting mere emotional relationships.The fifth argument simply begs the question. Whether or not conjugal marriage will pass rational basis/strict scrutiny will depend first on what marriage actually is. Indeed, to even say that we should use strict (As opposed to rational basis or heightened) scrutiny is to already beg the question, since the level of scrutiny will depend on the relevant facts. As Monte Neil Stewart points out, the responsible procreation argument can easily pass even strict scrutiny if one accepts the facts of conjugal marriage. "[A] judge applying strict scrutiny will nevertheless sustain man-woman marriage against all constitutional attacks -- if she accepts the factual accuracy of the.... [conjugal] description.... At the same time, a judge applying the rational basis test will declare man-woman marriage unconstitutional -- if he accepts the factual accuracy of the [revisionist] description." [4] Moreover, as of late 2008 (I say this because the numbers may have changed slightly), there have only been three instances out of more than twenty cases in which appelate judges have decided that strict strutiny should be applied to conjugal marriage. The rest have held that rational basis review was either appropiate or could be applied. [5]Once again, whether or not a certain conception of marriage will pass any level of scrutiny will first depend on what the relevant marriage facts are. This is not simply just a legal issue, but an philosophical and social issue which will necessarily involve extra-legal evidence and arguments beind presented. Anything less is mere question-begging. Pro has not attempted to justify his definition of marriage beyond mere assertion.ConclusionDespite Pro's arguments, nearly all of them are question begging and neglect the central issue of the debate. The heart of the issue is not over issues of rights or equality, but what the facts of marriage are. This must first be addressed before we launch into any considerations of rights.Sourceshttp://bit.ly...