The cosmological argument from contingency is sound

Defense of Premise 2Contingent sets and circular loopsMy opponent in trying to defend circular loops as explaining a contingent set asks why some fact A which explains B could not also be explained by B. The mere fact that B is explained by A makes B contingent upon A. And if A were to be explained by B than A would be contingent upon B. But A cannot explain and be explained by B since if that were so than A would be contingent and non-contingent upon B. Either some fact is contingent upon another or it is not, it cannot be both. My opponent is incorrect in assuming that no necessary fact is necessary to explain the set of contingent facts. As has been shown though circular loops are insufficient means of explaining contingent sets and thus a necessary fact is still necessary. The possible existence of infinite setsI have no problem with my opponent's concept of contingent facts being able to explain other contingent facts of a set. For instance, A may explain B which may explain C which may. .. .. and so on. However this still calls into question the explanation of A. A is still a contingent fact and thus from Premise 1 begets an explanation. My opponent's explanation here does not provide any sort of explanation for this initial contingent fact and thus has insufficient explanatory power. Defense of Premise 4A necessary fact and a theory of everythingMy opponent seems to believe that a theory explaining all contingent facts must in itself be a scientific explanation. However, as I argued already, physical laws are themselves contingent. As being an inherent part of the universe (which being the summation of contingent facts must also itself be contingent) scientific laws cannot function as a necessary explanation for the set of contingent facts. And so by my opponent's definition of a theory of everything (one which explains all contingent facts), the theory of everything must be "meta-scientific" or outside the realm of the physical sciences. The difference between scientific and agential explanationsMy opponent here argues that I am being "presumptive" by arguing that the necessary fact which I am defending could not be a scientific or casual fact. But how is this? I am basing this view off of the contingencies of scientific laws. Scientific laws are not necessary, and as such cannot logically be a necessary explanation. Scientific laws and explanations must be contingent. This is not to downplay their explanatory power, but in dealing with the ultimate explanation of facts, owing to their contingent nature they prove insufficient. Defense of Premise 5My opponent attempts to argue that the definition of the universe may very well change depending on future scientific discoveries and thus my definition is unwarranted. It is not unwarranted on my part however to offer this definition of the universe. The universe is made up of only contingent entities i. e. physical laws, etc. Nothing within the universe has been shown to be non-contingent and thus it is certainly warranted to define the universe in terms as the summation of those facts. My opponent has shown no evidence to the contrary. If it could be shown that any entity or phenomenon in the universe could not possibly have not been (that it is necessary as opposed to contingent) then my definition would not hold weight. However, no such entity or phenomenon has been to exist and my opponent has certainly not provided warrant.