The cosmological argument from contingency is sound

1: Every contingent fact has an explanation.In the words of Spock, "I would accept that as an axiom."2: There is a contingent fact that includes all other contingent facts.For any series, there are basically three options:1. The series terminates (at one end or the other).2. The series repeats.3. The series continues ad infinitum without repeating.If a series of contingent facts terminates at some point in the past, then it has a beginning and, thus, the first contingent fact explains all those that come after it.Now, con states that "contingent fact cannot explain itself (owing to the nature of contingency)" but what of a series of contingent facts which loops back on itself? Certainly an individual fact cannot explain itself (otherwise it wouldn't be contingent). But why can't a series of individually contingent facts be a loop instead of a line?Lastly, we have an infinitely long series of contingent facts; a series with no beginning. Again, I see no objection to this.3: Therefore, there is an explanation for this fact.3 follows from 2 and 1, but if 2 does not hold, then neither does 3.4: This explanation must involve a necessary being.Here we start to get into a non-sequitor. Even if 1-3 held, the only thing we could deduce from that would be "This explanation cannot be contingent." If we interpret the negation of contingency to be necessity, then we could say "This explanation must by necessary." The inclusion of the qualifier "being" however is unwarranted and not supported by anything previously stated in the argument. As such, it is an additional premise. By why include it? What is a "being" in the sense used here?Con addresses this later, but since the concept is being introduced at this point in the argument, I will address it here. Con commits two errors.1. He contends that scientific laws themselves are contingent. It would be more correct to say that the scientific laws, as we know them, are contingent. The Holy Grail of science is to find the Theory of Everything, a model that explains all contingent facts. If this model did not provide an explanation for itself, then it would not be complete. Now, it is arguable as to whether or not we will ever find such a theory but to simply and categorically dismiss necessary facts as out of the realm of science is baseless.2. He distinguishes between scientific and agential explanations. The only agents known to exist are those in this universe, on this planet. Yet we, too, are bound by scientific laws. Biology, Psychology, Sociology; these sciences seek to explain and predict our behavior. They do so with varying degrees of accuracy, but to take some as yet unpredictable, unexplained aspect of human behavior and set that outside the realm of science is also baseless. While it may be outside the realm now, in that we cannot yet explain it with existing models, it is presumptuous to say that it is necessarily outside the realm of science.Since Con has not established that neither agential explanations nor necessary explanations are necessarily outside the realm of science, then to describe the necessary explanation for all contingent facts as non-scientific and agential is begging the question.5: This explanation is God.Having dealt with the scientific vs. agential portions in the previous point, the only thing that remains is to evaluate whether or not such an explanation, even if non-scientific and agential, is rightfully called God.Con defines God as "a necessary being or agent, one that depends on nothing but itself for its existence."Now, without getting dangerously close to violating restrictions on semantic arguments, I will simply note that, as stated, any necessary being or agent would be called "God" by this definition.However, it is important to note that God, as a being or agent, is also normally assigned many other attributes, such as omniscience or omnipotence. Con has asserted neither but should God have any other attributes other than being a necessary agent, then the mere proof of a necessary agent is insufficient to prove God, as it leaves unanswered the question of those other attributes.Furthermore, it implies a necessary distinction between other possible causal agents for which we already have terms. For example, what if the universe itself is a necessary agent? Some might suggest that this makes universe God, a la pantheism. But we already have the term "universe" so what is gained by also calling it god? If the universe and "god" are one in the same, then we needn't have the second term. If "god" indicates something more than just the universe, then we run into the problem discussed in the previous paragraph. It would seem bizarre to have two people, identical in all beliefs save that one calls the universe "universe" and the other calls the universe "god" and the former is an atheist but the latter a theist. It would seem that any form of theism or deism would entail more than simply slapping the label "God" onto something.Summary:Contention 1: Con assumes only one way contingent facts can be organized: with a definite beginning. Infinite series and repeating series (looping back on themselves) are dismissed without adequate argument.Contention 2: The qualifier "being" on whatever the necessary explanation for all contingent facts may be is an unsupported premise; The reasoning for discounting non-"being" explanations is fallacious.Contention 3: While technically correct, given the proposed definition, there are issues with calling any proven necessary being God when compared with the use of the term in practice.