The Kalaam Cosmological Argument is Unsound

Causation Whilst it is true that, if one attempts to ascribe that every event or entity has a sufficient cause, they will commit the cum hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy but ONLY if they attempt to do so deductively. This is because there is no apparent deductive link between correlation and causation. Yet as I have maintained, there is an inductive link if it is observed that X always correlates to Y. If it is not usual that X correlates with Y then we have no inductive grounds to assert a causal link, yet if X is observed to exclusively and consistently correlate with Y, then it is reasonable to use inductive reasoning to conclude a causal link.As a sufficient reason exclusively and consistently correlates with that which it is the reason for, then we can inductively conclude that the PSR is correct.Just as a side, whilst Hume does cite the problem of induction and the non-deductive essence of causality, he nevertheless maintains that:"I never asserted so absurd a proposition as that something could arise without a cause."(1)Although Quentin Smith calls the emergence of virtual particles "uncaused", all this is saying is that there is not a particular event that causes virtual particles to arise. Moreover, this is an appeal to authority. Recall the definition of cause:"good or sufficient reason" (2)So to determine whether virtual particles have a cause, we must ask ourselves whether they have a sufficient reason as to why they emerge.This sufficient reason is that virtual particles exclusively and consistently only arise within a magnetic field; so we can inductively conclude that a magnetic field is the sufficient reason as to why virtual particles emerge.Pro goes on to state:"If the ECU is omnipresent then there cant be "nothing" since something always existed. It must follow that the first cause created the universe out of itself therefore P1 would be affirming the consequent"But this commits the fallacy of division. Even if the ECU created the universe out of its (necessary) self, then it does not follow that the universe is necessary. The ECU as a whole is necessary (to suggest otherwise would entail further causes for the ECU, which is needless multiplication and violates Occam's Razor), yet it is not a sound conclusion that any individual part of the ECU must also be necessary.Furthermore, the KCA does not commit the fallacy of composition. To reiterate; this is its logic in a simplified form:P1: Everything which comes into being has an efficient causeP2: The Universe came into beingC: The Universe has an efficient causeAlthough the premises may be inductive, the actual reasoning (the logical step from premises to conclusion) in the above syllogism is categorically, necessarily deductive and correct. It is absurd to suggest that it could be logically invalid. Therefore it cannot have committed the fallacy of composition because such a fallacy concerns itself with the logical connection between the premises and the conclusion - yet the logical connection is inarguably valid.If the syllogism is to be refuted, its premises must be attacked since no fault or induction lies in the actual reasoning. However the fallacy of composition cannot be applied to individual premises.In regards to the connection between necessary essence and necessary explanation, I maintain that such a link is unsound.If all the contingent entities are lumped together (let us call this C), then I agree that its explanation cannot be contingent (as this would be retro-causation; an absurdity) so it must be a necessary explanation. Yet C is not therefore necessary by virtue of it having a necessary cause.To put it in logical form, if entity Q has property P and causes entity Y, it does not follow that Y has property P.Therefore, it is perfectly possible for a contingent proposition to have a necessary cause, as properties are not necessarily transferred by causal link, which is what Pro's argument entails.Finally, simultaneous causation is not contradictory at all; it is a common phenomenon. Simultaneous causation is when the effect occurs simultaneously to its cause. An example of this is the act of sitting down; when I sit down I create a lap (as my knees are bent). Sitting down is the cause of the effect of having a lap. The effect (sitting down) is simultaneous to the effect (having a lap), yet there is no contradiction in this.Therefore, simultaneous causation is not contradictory, which therefore means that God could have caused the universe simultaneously at time t=0.Pro cites Alexander Vilenkin, who supposes that quantum tunnelling could have caused a finite universe to spontaneously come into existence, yet there is no apparent reason why quantum tunnelling could ever achieve this effect. As such, Pro is just making an appeal to authority as all he has done is post a quote from a scientist, and not actually explained the scientist's reasoning.Therefore, this point is unsupported and thus invalid.TimePro attempts to force me to accept that acceptance of the A theory necessarily encompasses an acceptance of a universally objective present. He says that the growing-block and the presentist A theories are the only varieties, yet his source says different. The cited article states that these are the two principle A theories, they are not an exhaustive categorisation. The basic distinction between A and B theories is that the latter is tenseless and the former ‘takes tense seriously’ (3). So irrespective of whether the present is objective or relative, A theory simply asserts that tense is a meaningful and actual attribute of events.McTaggart’s argument fails upon the premise that a time, t, has three A properties (being past, present and future). The A series would only be contradictory if all these properties were held simultaneously, yet we know that contradictory properties can be held by the same event or entity but at different times. For example when I was in junior school I was not depressed but when I was in senior school I was depressed. These properties are contradictory but only if they are held simultaneously. If they are not then it is not contradictory. Hence a time, t, does not simultaneously have three A properties, so McTaggart’s premise is false.Furthermore, quantum entanglement is a nuclear phenomenon and so cannot create the psychological illusion of a flow of time. Pro’s source that supposedly suggests otherwise, does not mention anything of the sort. Therefore the assertion that the flow of time is illusory is unwarranted.Pro goes on to refute presentism; which is a straw man because I never asserted the veracity of presentism.Finally, A theory is not incompatible with the scientific concept of time as a fourth dimension. Tenses can still be taken seriously (and therefore the A theory as well) as one can consider tenses to be properties of events relative to one’s position in the fourth dimension. Just like a footprint has the property of being behind a person in the spacial dimensions, an event has the property of being in the past relative to a person’s position in the temporal dimension. Time dilations in the temporal dimension are analogous to fluctuating velocity in the spacial dimensions. For example, a car can speed up or slow down, but positions still have the properties of either being behind or in front of it. Hence the present can speed up or slow down, but events still have the properties of either being past or future.Therefore, scientific conceptions of time do not refute the A theory.Characteristics of the ECUPro asserts that a timeless, unchanging mind cannot exist because it is not conceivable. Yet this is non sequitor. It is perfectly possible that a timeless mind can exist but we do not have the intellect to conceive of how this could occur.Next, Pro accuses me of appealing to ignorance in my argument for dualism. However, such a fallacy is only fallacious in non-dichotomous arguments. Yet the options of immaterial and material are dichotomous. Hence if there is no evidence (despite extensive neurological investigation) that all mental aspects are material, then we have inductive implications that some mental aspects are immaterial, as there is no other option to assign for them. '...do not fit with the emerging picture of the physical world.'Disaccordance with current paradigms does not constitute falsity; for example evolution was true despite it not according with the established biblical paradigm.'Evolution.'Evolution is only posited to account for the development of our biological bodies, it cannot be expected to account for the development of human minds.'Atemporal Agent causation is incoherent.'This is not an argument against substance dualism.'brain damage'Brain damage is simply damaging the tool with which the mind works. As we can only see the outward projections of the body, we do not know whether it is both the mind and brain or just the brain that is damaged. For example, a good carpenter will appear to be a poor carpenter if he has a broken saw.'Occam"s razor'Occam's Razor is only used in absence of rational argument either way regarding a resolution, yet this is not the case in the monist/dualist debate.IdentityI do not engage in special pleading. My argument was that, if the self was material, we would probably be able to confidently answer questions of what would happen to it in partial brain transplants. As we cannot do this, there is inductive inference that the self is immaterial.Free willPremise 5 assumes that the causal determined nature of an event is external to the agent. It is possible that the agent is what causally determined the event. Therefore the agent had a free choice as to what to causally determine, which is essentially what free will is. Hence I negate the resolution. Thanks for the debate, CorieMike! (1) http://en.wikipedia.org...(2) http://dictionary.reference.com...(3) http://fas-philosophy.rutgers.edu...