I am not the stongest man in the word

My opponent has failed to make an argument and really hasn't challenged my inerpretation of the resolution. For those of you who have seen the Modal ontological argument, you can skip this next section and go ahead and vote for me. My argument is this and the support for it lays below. I merely type this to give people an option to skip the lengthy text. P1- God (I am) is omnipotent P2- Jesus (a man) is God (I am). C1- God (I am) is the most powerful man in the word (bible). DEFENSE OF P1 Skip to MOA at the end of this which will show God (I am) is the most powerful man in the world and thus the bible. This is actually an extremely strong version of the MOA because we are assuming God (I am) is real for the purposes of this debate. DEFENSE OF P2 John 1:1 "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God." That's the bible flat out stating Jesus (a man) is God (I am). Premise 2 is affirmed. C1 Jesus is God, God is the most powerful man in the word. I am (God is) the most powerful man in the word (bible). MOA Since my argument relies on modal logic, it is important that voters have at the least a very basic understanding of what modal logic is. Modal logic consists of 4 propositions. Possible Possibility deals with what is logically possible, not physically possible. If something isn't logically impossible, than it is logically possible. For example the Flying Spaghetti Monster is logically possible (as far as I can tell). So, it is possibly true. Impossible Something is impossible, if it can't logically exist. A triangle with 4 sides would be logically impossible and therefore couldn't exist. Necessary Necessary propositions are ones that must be true and can't be false. For example 2 2=4 and can't be false. Contingent Contingent possibilities are ones that could be true but could also be false. For example Obama is president of the United State is true, but it could have been false. So it is contingently true. Al Gore was not president of the United States is false, but it could have been true so it is contingently false. Possible Worlds Possible worlds is just another way of representing what is possible. If I say the Flying Spaghetti Monster exists in some possible worlds and not in others, than all I'm saying is that the Flying Spaghetti Monster is possible. Ontological Argument for the Existence of God. (Borrowed from Alvin Plantiga and various other people) Premise 1 It is possible a greatest possible being exists. There are no logical absurdities here or contradictions. If my opponent can prove this premise wrong then the whole argument falls apart. So far in the history of mankind this has yet to be done so good luck. Premise 2 Necessarily, if a greatest possible being exists he must be omnipotent and omniscient. If it wasn't omnipotent and omniscient then a greater possible being could exist in some possible worlds. Premise 3 If the concept of the greatest possible being is coherent it exists in some possible worlds. Premise 4 If a greatest possible being exists in some possible worlds it exists in all possible worlds. It exists in all possible worlds because it is a necessary truth and not a contingent truth. Premise 5 If the greatest possible being exists in all possible worlds, he exists in the actual world. Premise 6 The greatest possible being exists and by definition is God. It is omniscient and omnipotent. Logically Valid The argument is logically valid. Here is the mathematical proof here: http://jwwartick.com...... "Ax=df x is maximally great Bx=df x is maximally excellent W (Y) =df Y is a universal property Ox = df x is omniscient, omnipotent, and morally perfect 1) `74; (W07;x)Ax pr 2) `33;(x)(Ax iff `33;Bx) pr 3) `33;(x)(BxX35;Ox) pr 4) (Y)[W(Y) iff (`33;(W07;x)Yx W44; (`33;~(W07;x)Yx)] pr 5) (Y)[(W07;Z)`33;(x)(Yx iff `33;Zx)X35; W(Y)] pr 6) (W07;Z)`33;(x)(Ax iff `33;Zx) 2, Existential Generalization 7) [(W07;Z)`33;(x)(Ax iff `33;Zx)X35;W(A)] 5, Universal Instantiation 8 ) W(A) iff (`33;(W07;x)Ax W44; (`33;~(W07;x)Ax) 4, Universal Instantiation 9) W (A) 6, 7 Modus Ponens 10) W(A)X35; (`33;(W07;x)Ax W44; (`33;~(W07;x)Ax) 8, Equivalence, Simplification 11) `33;(W07;x)Ax (`33;~(W07;x)Ax) 9, 10 Modus Ponens 12) ~`74;~~(W07;x)Ax W44; (`33;(W07;x)Ax) 11, Communication, Modal Equivalence 13) `74;(W07;x)Ax X35; `33;(W07;x)Ax Double Negation, Impl 14) `33;(W07;x)Ax 1, 13 Modus Ponens 15) `33;(x)(Ax iff `33;Bx) X35; (`33;(W07;x)Ax X35; `33;(W07;x)`33;Bx) theorem 16) `33;(W07;x)`33;Bx 14, 15 Modus Ponens (twice) 17) `33;(x)(Bx X35; Ox) X35; (`33;(W07;x)`33;Bx X35; `33;(W07;x)`33;Ox theorem 18) `33;(W07;x)`33;Bx 16, 17 Modus Ponens (twice) 19) (W07;x)`33;Bx 18, Necessity Elimination"