Evidence for God

Thanks, Con.Rebuttal"Simply, I am asserting, correctly, that there is no certainty regarding whether the universe had a cause."If we're going to understand "certainty" in that way, then there isn't really any certainty about virtually anything. This is, however, irrelevant, as all that is necessary in order for the conclusion of the argument to remain sound is that the argument's premises are more likely true than their negations. In order words, one doesn't need to be certain that the universe had a cause (I think there is ample evidence for one to be certain, I am only saying that this certainty is not a necessity). All that's required is that it is more likely that the universe had a cause than it is that the universe is uncaused. "I find it slightly disappointing that Pro would stoop to the low level of criticizing a reliable source"I can't think of any source that could be more unreliable than a biased blog. I see no reason at all to think the blogger my opponent quotes ought to be given any sort of credibility. I suppose this is an issue which reader's must decide for themselves, though it's worth noting that my references to Vilenkin come from academic papers whilst my opponent's come from a biased blogging site. "the second premise of the Kalam Cosmological Argument (the universe began to exist) is simply not known to be true."Once again, even if my opponent is correct, the argument remains sound. All that is required for an argument's soundness is that it's premises are more likely true than their negations. Here again, it may very well be true that the premise is not "known to be true", but this does nothing to refute the argument, which hinges only on whether or not the premise (and other premises) are more likely true than not."The morality of an action is determined on whether it causes a positive or negative net change in well-being. This is not related to the amount of people with changing well-being"My opponent continues to alter his strange attempt at an explanation for morality. Upon recognition that his system fails as soon as the quantity of individuals having a positive change in well-being as a result of an evil action outweighs the negative change in well-being of only one individual, my opponent tries to argue that his quantity is not what matters in his system. He doesn't give any sort of reason as to why an action which maximizes well-being for 5, or 50, or 500 individuals but minimizes well-being for only one individual is still not a "good" action, he merely makes the assertion that this is not the case. Even if my opponent's unwarranted assertion were correct, his system would remain trivially flawed. All that's necessary to show that this idea of morality is inconsistent is that it's possible for a rapist to have a more positive change in well-being than his victim has a negative change as a result of rape. So, if we put "well-being" onto a scale from -10 to +10 (0 being neutral), it's entirely possible that a psychopathic rapist gets a +8 well-being as a result from raping someone. The victim of this rape, however, gets a -7 well-being, resulting in a net change in well-being of +1. If this is even possible, then it follows that my opponent's propose system of morality is utterly flawed and thus ought to be rejected, as actions like rape are sometimes "good" actions and actions like self-sacrifice are sometimes "evil" actions on this system. "As philosopher Chris Hitchens once said"He was a journalist, not anything close to a philosopher."Pro must provide evidence that existence is good."My opponent has been very stubborn on this subject; I think it could be plausibly argued that this is a properly basic belief, in the same way that believing the external world is real is properly basic. Nonetheless, I think it can easily demonstrated with evidence that existence is preferable to non-existence. Going back to my opponent's flawed system of morality, recall his insistence that actions that maximize well-being are "good". Well-being (or "good") cannot be obtained without existence. Thus, "good" is only possible if existence applies to the being concerned. My opponent would be shooting himself in the foot if he denied this, as this conception of "goodness" if what his moral system hinges on. "For what seems like the billionth time, using axiom S5, any possibility is real in at least one possible world."For what seems like the billionth time, I agree that any possibility is real in at least one possible world. I haven't been given any reason by my opponent to think that God's nonexistence is a possibility. My opponent is the one making the assertion in this case (claiming that there is a possible world where God does not exist). He fails to provide a shred of justification for this assertion. Why should we think that it's even possible for there to be a world in which God does not exist? If my third argument is true (which I think we can safely say it is as my opponent hasn't come anywhere close to showing at least one of it's premises to be false), then it follows that it is impossible that there be a world in which God does not exist. Thus, we have reason both in my own argument and in my opponent's lack of justification for thinking that his assertion is false."My opponent is absolutely using circular reasoning if he argues that it's impossible that God doesn't exist due to the ontological argument itself."This is a blatant demonstration of my opponent's misunderstanding of the argument. I am in no way arguing that the "ontological argument is true because the non-existence of God is impossible". Can my opponent (or any readers for that matter) find this statement in any of the argument's premises? I think not. These are my opponent's own words and have absolutely nothing to do with the argument I've presented. The argument is true if each of it's premises are more likely true than their negations. As my opponent's statement that the "ontological argument is true because the non-existence of God is impossible) is nowhere to be found in these premises, his accusation of circular reasoning is clearly false. ConclusionsIt seems to me that each of the three arguments I presented remain unrefuted:i. God is the best explanation for the origin of the universe.P1: Everything that begins to exist has a cause.P2: The universe began to exist.C1: Therefore, the universe has a cause.ii. God is the best explanation for objective moral values and duties.P1: If God does not exist, objective moral values and duties do not exist.P2: Objective moral values and duties do exist.C1: Therefore, God exists.iii. The very possibility of God implies His actuality. P1: It is possible that a maximally great being exists.P2: If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.P3: If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.P4: If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.P5: If a maximally great being exists, in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.C1: Therefore, a maximally great being exists. As such, I think we can reasonably conclude that there is at least one piece of evidence for God.I'd like to thank my opponent for creating and participating in this debate. I'd also like to thank any readers for taking the time to read the debate through. Sources http://arxiv.org...http://now.tufts.edu...http://www.reasonablefaith.org...http://scienceblogs.com...http://www.reasonablefaith.org...http://www.merriam-webster.com...http://plato.stanford.edu...http://mind.ucsd.edu...