(Phantom's 99th Percent) Intervention in Iran

Pro Case C1: Iran, existential threat Stephen makes the argument that the assassination attempt was not the work of the Qud forces; citing numerous articles and sources, e.g. RAND, that validate this argument. However, reviewing the articles show a lack of strategic international analysis. STRATFOR counters this argument: Now, while the Iranian government has shown the ability to conduct sophisticated operations in countries within its sphere of influence the use of suboptimal agents to orchestrate an assassination plot in the United States is not entirely without precedent. For example, there appear to be some very interesting parallels between the Arbabsiar case and two other alleged Iranian plots to assassinate dissidents in Los Angeles and London... Sadeghnia's profile as an unemployed housepainter from Iran who lived in the United States for many years is similar to that of Arbabsiar, a failed used car salesman. Like the alleged Arbabsiar plot, the Sadeghnia case displayed a lack of sophisticated assassination methodology in an Iranian-linked plot inside the United States. There also have been numerous assassinations and failed assassination attempts that were conducted in a rudimentary fashion by operatives easily linked to Iran.ï¿½ [1] Stephen makes the point further that Iran has so many other issues to deal with it doesn't make sense for them to act irrationally. On Syria, Iran isn't very concerned because the West seems to be doing nothing to force the Assad Regime to step down and also Russia is aiding the Assad Regime. On Turkey, Iran has nothing to fear. Even in my opponents own source the author tells us that to conclude a breakdown of Iranian-Turkish relationships is to sensationalize the issue. But more importantly, political instability, financial collapse and internal instability has led to Turkey moving away from pro-Western stances to pro-Islamic policy, even Iran in energy matters, i.e. their nuclear program. Battiato writes, "...it can be deduced that the intention of Erdogans party is to abandon Turkey's traditionally pro-western foreign policy in favor of one decisively more Islamic."ï¿½ The problem with my opponent's source is that the author is seeing only a recent decline in favorability between the two states, well after Iran started its nuclear proliferation. [2] [3] But, TURN: if we assume Stephen's argument about regional rivalry is correct then it should apply to international relations theory. According to the theory of counter-balancing, if a rivalry exists between two countries each country will try and best the other, especially in terms of arms proliferation. This is demonstrably true as proven during the Cold War where both the U.S. and Soviets attempted to counter-balance each other. Iran, by proliferating first, will get the hegemonic edge over Turkey and will essentially create a nuclear umbrella over the Middle East. Stephen's final argument under C1 is that that an attack on Iran's nuclear facilities would spark patriotism and a rally-around-the-flag mentality. This argument has zero impacts because the pro-democracy/anti-regime movements have all but collapsed, and even if we assumed a movement could succeed the timeframe is too long to wait. According to Herrington, Though the movement lives on, the two years that have passed since that fateful day have been unkind. Analysts the world over have asked why the Green Movement did not succeed. Some believe it was simply not possible in the face of government suppression. The truth is, however, that a number of social, political, and economic barriers to regime change exist in Iran, and each has contributed to the perceived failures of the Green Movement.â€ï¿½ The Green Movement being the pro-democratic movement in Iran, not to be confused with the environmental movements. [4] Note: Stephen never directly addresses the AEI and Silber evidence which indicates that Iran has been doing reconnaissance within New York City, Washington and other vital US cities. As such, both pieces of evidence are dropped and conceded. C2: Terrorism Stephen's argument against Hezbollah is that they are Lebanese and not Iranian, and it would be stupid to attack Iran to stop Hezbollah. Even ignoring the fact that Stephen drops and concedes all the evidence which indicates the link between Hezbollah and Iran, Stephen misunderstands the impact of this argument. My argument is not that attacking Iran stops Hezbollah attacks, but rather attacking Iran will prevent Hezbollah from obtaining nuclear material which they could use in an attack against the U.S. or Israel. Stephen tries to link into an all out conventional invasion of Iran, but unfortunately thats not my advocacy and it isn't resolutional. But even if he tries to argue escalation, his own prior arguments kick this argument because it is not in the interest of Iran to escalate against the United States if it lacks its greatest chip on the table, its nuclear program. Note: Stephen completely drops link evidence from Hezbollah and the Al Qaeda argument. He thus concedes it. C3/4: The Nuclear Threat His argument presupposes the use of a nuclear warhead that can function with a compatible ballistic missile, refer to his sources. This argument is irrelevant since my advocacy is not of nuclear war, but nuclear terrorism. My timeframe argument refers to a nuclear capability of a nuclear device that can be portable a used in a city. His treaties argument is irrelevant since treaties do not paralyze action. The Iranian government can do whatever it wants. Moreover, his Source #7 links back to the tinyurl cite, not the evidence. He can post it in the next round. His third argument assumes nuclear warfare, not nuclear terrorism. Moreover, he gains no ground from the argument that the West will take action because (1) our sanctions aren't working and Iran is still gaining percentage on enrichment and (2) negating the resolution takes the last option off the table which leaves Iran unopposed. Stephen tries to argue that Iran knows that its neighbors won't want them to obtain a nuclear weapon. If this were true Iran would have stopped already. Just the risk of proliferation accesses the risk of a development of a nuclear weapon. As mentioned above, nations will not stand idly by while its rivals perceptually are on their way towards a nuclear weapon. Essentially all of the Gulf States are compelling the West to take action, but negating the resolution accesses the impact of an arms race. Even if you grant the possibility that Iran doesn't desire nuclear weapons, that fact doesn't kick the impact of perceptual arms proliferation. This source indicates that the Gulf States are nervous now, and an argument saying well Iran knows this doesn't even suffice as an argument. [6] Note: He dropped the specific AEI evidence which indicates that Iran is close to having capability of a functioning device or bomb. Con Case C1: Economics First, this argument is non-unique: as long as an arms race is inevitable with a negative ballot than oil spikes are going to occur. Second, my advocacy is direct action, not conventional invasion. Thus, my advocacy doesn't link into high costs of life and capital. Third, my opponent is in a double bind: if the regime is rationally it won't take action even if we destroy their nuclear facilities because a war would threaten regime survival. If they are not rational then a nuclear weapon will be developed which will spark regional instability. Refer to arms race. C2: Politics His politics disadvantage has no impact argued whatsoever. He simply tells us that Obama would probably lose the election. And? There is no impact to this. He makes the claims that the government will shut down.This is not true. Obama will just be kicked out of office and a Republican will take over. [1] http://tinyurl.com...... [2] http://tinyurl.com...... [3] http://tinyurl.com...... [4] http://tinyurl.com...... [5] http://tinyurl.com...... [6] http://tinyurl.com......