There are no compelling objections to anarchism

Multiplicity in LawCon's first counter contains two essential points. First, Con argues that ideological structure wouldn't be singular in a state of polycentric law. The second point is similar to the first, but instead argues that a neutral mechanism or arbiter wouldn't be possible under polycentric law. The main point of both contentions though is that, Con claims, under anarchism, law enforcement and defense would be both higher in cost and that it would result in wealth influencing legal outcomes and lack of fairness in the justice system. (A) The first problem with Con's counter has to do with his point regarding ideological, moral, or theological heterogeneity. He argues that without some homogeneous set of rules and guidelines, legal arbitration would be reduced to wealth and power.There are two reasons for the falsity of this contention. The first reason is that it is false- the cause and effect which Con has laid out. The second reason stems from the fact that Con's point actually works against the state, not anarchism.(i)-The reason the effect of ideological and legal heterogeneity is not as Con claims is because social convention isn't causally posterior to the given legal system, it's prior. Con has his whole conception backwards. Taking the U.S. legal system as an example, we can see that it's based originally in English common law. The U.S. and other nation states do not operate respectively under singular legal systems because some government has decreed so (though I don't deny that these governments have decreed so obviously, I only deny the causal relationship). It is because societies generally favor singular underlying social conventions that a nation state is erectable in the first place. So Con's claim that government is all that keeps wildly differing social conventions and legal systems at bay is fallacious. (ii)-As stated in my R2 case, the public goods problem works against statism in the same sense that some say it works against markets or anarchism. I won't waste space reiterating it here, readers may feel free to check R2 where I expanded on it in full. My point in relation to Con's counter though is the end result, that is the wealthy and politically influential ultimately having unfair control over policy, resulting in an overall detrimental state of political affairs. Polycentric law is actually the only form of governance which doesn't fall into this problem.(B) Neutrality of arbitration is another problem regarding conceptual problems under polycentric law which Con argues for. I really don't see where this claim comes from. Polycentric law actually insures neutrality by allowing for truly third party arbitration in disputes. This is of course contrasted with the non-neutrality of monocentric law which allows for governments to be the judges in their own case. When a singular institution controls the institution of law, obviously all legal disputes will be arbitrated by that institution (even if it be a different part of that institution). Polycentrism allows for arbitration to be left to an agreed upon third party. This is what insures neutrality.Favorability of TradeCon has argued that exceptions to general principles are somehow always necessary. Besides this rule itself being internally incoherent (i.e., is there an exception to that principle), Con fails to make an adequate case for why this rightfully applies to the case of law. For instance, Con claims that a non-competitive institution is necessary to make sure that monopolies don't form in the market. But Con doesn't apply this to that non-competitive institution itself. If we take it as a premise that monopolies are bad, then introducing a monopoly to solve the problem of monopolies is itself incoherent.Furthermore, Con is guilty of conceptually misrepresenting a free market. The problem of monopolies is state-born. Ludwig von Mises writes:"With the progress of specialization, the area served by an individual supplier must continue to widen. The market supplied by a textile mill that produces only a few kinds of fabrics must be larger than that served by a weaver who weaves every kind of cloth. Undoubtedly this progressive specialization of production tends toward the development in every field of enterprises that have the whole world for their market. If this development is not opposed by protectionist and other anticapitalist measures, the result will be that in every branch of production there will be a relatively small number of concerns, or even only a single concern, intent on producing with the highest degree of specialization and on supplying the whole world."[1]If Con wishes to claim that markets tend to create monopolies, I invite him to provide some sort of reasoning or evidence for this. If Con wishes to bring posterior evidence in support of his claim, a free market would obviously need to be the model on which to find it. If the evidence be a priori, I invite Con to provide his reasoning.===Conclusion===Con is again guilty of arguing from a fantastical view of government, while ignoring the harsh realities which we actually see. He asks how a polycentric legal system would prevent things like murder, rule of the wealthy, the subjugation of minority rights, the violation of religious freedom, etc. But how well does the state fare in these fields? Tens of millions of civilians killed by their governments in the 20th century alone, public choice problems allowing for the rule of the politically well connected and wealthy, and numerous instances of human rights violations. We have clear empirical evidence of the evils and horrors of states, those of anarchism are merely unsupported hypotheticals. Con's reasoning in favor of why they might come about are themselves just as applicable to states and in fact fail to take into account the mechanisms under anarchism which would fare much better against these problems than statism.===Sources===[1] "Liberalism" by Ludwig von Mises. Ch.2, sec. 7. Available online: http://mises.org...