United Nations peacekeepers should have the power to engage in offensive operations

The resolution is about whether to blur the line between peacekeeping missions and enforcement missions. I'm not required to argue that the UN should never engage in offensive operations. Nor am I required to argue that offensive operations are ineffective. The issue at stake is whether to have mixed peacekeeping/offensive missions. And I have proven throughout this debate that mixing peacekeeping/offensive missions entails serious risks with no unique benefits. That alone wins me this debate. Thett's argument assumes that self-defense is insufficient. But Thett concedes that self-defense includes defense of the mandate. And Thett concedes that mandates should include the protection of civilians. And Thett concedes that nothing precludes the UN from protecting civilians defensively through peacekeeping mandates. So why is self-defense insufficient? Thett offers no answer. In fact, Thett concedes my point about preemptive self-defense allowing peacekeepers to strike preemptively when under an imminent threat. And that ends the debate, as peacekeepers even have the ability to initiate force defensively, all without any need to give them the power to conduct offensive operations. Self-defense is a robust principle that affords the peacekeepers all the authority they need. Throughout the debate, Thett harps on the Rwanda case. But Rwanda is irrelevant. I admit the UN fvcked up. Sh! t happens. But why did the UN fvck up? Because the mandate was poorly drafted. And because the Security Council stupidly decided to withdraw the troops instead of pursuing other options (e. g. telling the troops to defend civilians). Thett also says some stuff about coalitions. But again, it's irrelevant. This debate isn't about independent coalitions. We're talking about what the UN should do. And the UN should authorize enforcement missions when offensive force is necessary. In other situations, the UN should use peacekeeping missions, where force should only be used in self-defense. Don't let Thett distract you with irrelevant points about Rwanda, independent coalitions, and Syria. Focus on the actual issue: peacekeeping. Thett's point about "taking too long to build" is also irrelevant. If a peacekeeping force is already deployed, they're able to justify the use of force in self-defense. So my plan has the same benefits as Thett's plan. In short, I win this debate because Thett's plan simply doesn't have any unique advantages; my plan does. In particular, Thett concedes the negative legal effects. Thett seems to think those effects are irrelevant. But the law changes how armies conduct war. And it effects how we assign liability after-the-fact. Both these points have massive impacts that Thett simply ignores. Finally, Thett's point about the UN being scared to authorize offensive force actually works against him, because it suggests the UN will authorize less peacekeeping missions than they already do. If the UN is truly a bunch of cowards, as Thett argues, they're going to be scared to use peacekeepers, lest the peacekeepers use offensive force where the UN doesn't want that. This ties into my point about expectations, as well as my point about how we'll actually end up with less enforcement under Thett's plan. This debate isn't close. Thett hasn't proven a single unique benefit to his plan, while I've proven multiple advantages to my plan. As long as you don't get distracted by Thett's totally irrelevant observations, this should be an easy decision.