Civil Disobedience and Voluntary Punishment

Thanks to Lupricona for taking this debate! I. Means of JustificationIt seems to me that there are two possible internal justifications that a disobedient could use to excuse themselves from accepting punishment. A disobedient could argue that (1) their moral intent justifies their non-acceptance of punishment and/or (2) the nature of the law they broke justifies their non-acceptance of punishment. The latter option could refer to the nature of the law as immoral or as simply morally ambiguous. Actions are, in a sense, bipartite, involving the mental state (part 1) that spurs one to commit the action itself (part 2). This analysis generally seems to fit with the way we normally examine issues of crime--the idea of mens rea paired with the action itself. A. Moral IntentSomeone can sincerely believe that the Earth is flat, but that belief does not make it so. Someone can seriously believe that their actions are moral, but that does not make it so. If good intentions absolve crime, then there are many monsters who would be morally justified in avoiding justice. Take Hitler--it could be said that he believed he was in the moral right all the time by eliminating the barriers to the Aryan utopia he idolized. Take Cecil Rhodes--he believed the colonialism was not only good for the colonizers, but good for the colonized, and that there was a kind of moral imperative to engage in the kinds of policies which would plague South Africa for decades. Even for non-violent acts, the idea that intentions alone could absolve a crime is troubling--embezzlement, segregation, and stalking are all non-violent offenses, so would it follow that good intentions can excuse them? Certainly, a sexists discriminatory hiring practices are nonviolent and may be morally well-intentioned, but that does not make them moral either. This argument then takes two forms. Firstly, belief and reality are not the same thing. Moral intent cannot, in and of itself, render immoral actions moral. People who engage in immoral activity ought to be punished for that activity (more on this later). Secondly, their is a "ballooning effects" argument to be made here. If moral intentions can excuse a disobedient from submitting to punishment, then why can't they also form the grounds for people like Hitler to be excused from submitting to punishment? The only way to answer this question in a way that responds in favor of the disobedient while not in the favor of Hitler is to appeal to the nature of the actions themselves, implying that intent is insufficient grounds to excuse failure to accept punishment. B. The Nature of the ActionLet's look at two basic claims: (1) people ought to be punished for immoral actions, and (2) people ought to follow moral laws. On the second claim, moral laws are those laws which are in concert with morality; i. e. they are either morally obligatory, morally desirable, or morally permissible. In terms of laws which express morally obligatory or morally desirable propositions, the second claim is obviously true. Of course it is morally desirable that we engage in morally desirable/morally obligatory activities. As for morally permissible laws, there is no moral reason not to follow them, and there is reason to follow them: respecting democratic institutions (more on that later). If we accept the premise that individuals ought accept punishment for violating moral laws, then moral dubiousness can justify evading punishment. Moral dubiousness indicates that a law's moral standing is unclear; it implies that there is a chance, perhaps a significant one, that a law is moral rather than immoral. In other words, a law can be both morally right and morally dubious at the same time. If disobedients ought to avoid punishment for violating morally dubious laws, then they also ought to avoid punishment for violating some moral laws. It cannot be simultaneously true that people both ought to accept punishment for violating moral laws and ought to avoid punishment for violating moral laws. These points are mutually contradictory, and so cannot be jointly advanced as action-guiding principles. Thus, the nature of the law cannot serves as grounds for the disobedient fleeing punishment. II. Law, Order, and DemocracyThere are several reasons that have to do with law and order and democratic institutions that explain why we ought to accept punishment when we violating the law. Those reasons include: (1) respecting the legal process and (2) promoting social stability. A. Respect for Democratic InstitutionsDisobedients are seeking to "draw attention via their disobedience to a law or practice which they believe needs to be reassessed, exposed, altered, or rejected," per the definition provided in round one. They are not seeking to overturn the democratic systems in their country which provide the very preconditions necessary for the kind of free and open socio-political debate that disobedients hope to spark. Disobedients can object, therefore, to a law or practice, but ought to submit to punishment as a demonstrating of their respect for the democratic institutions which produced the law. Submitting to punishment reaffirms the idea that no single person is above the democratic system in deciding what laws ought to exist or ought to be enforced. The act of protest may serve as a catalyst for democratic dialogue, but when a disobedient refuses to submit to punishment they are suggesting that they are above the law and above the democratic system. This would undermine the force of law. The general outline for this argument has been expressed before: "disobedients do not aim to protest the whole system, or to topple over the existing government: they want to denounce a violation of those principles of justice accepted as fundamental by the whole community. Therefore, while breaking a particular law to protest, they still want to show respect for the legal system as a whole. This is why. .. protesters must be willing to accept the legal consequences of the law-breaking action. " [1] We should not confuse the legitimacy of any particular law with the legitimacy of the entire system. B. Promoting Social StabilityThere is a risk that, were disobedients to avoid punishment, that the legal system could be harmed, resulting in reduced stability and safety for all. Erosion of the rule of law could create chaos or upheaval resulting in greater violence or crime. An over-proliferation of disobedient activity and avoidance of punishment, even were it not to produce anarchy, could undermine the ability of the government to do its job and reduce confidence in the ability of the system to do that job. This may be true for several reasons.1. Slippery Slope Effect: suppose disobedients are morally justified in eluding the authorities when they violate morally dubious laws. A would-be disobedient sees this, and then feels morally justified in eluding the authorities when he or she violates a moral law because they personally disagree with it. Then others see this and feel that merely disagreeing with a law is a justified basis for violating it in a nonviolent manner and avoiding punishment for doing so. Next come violent violations. A jilted wife might feel morally justified in killing her cheating husband, and believe that because she felt morally justified that it is okay to evade punishment for her actions, esp. if she sees other morally justified individuals escaping their penalties. Submitting to punishment heads off this kind of "well, they did it, so why can't I" logic; it communicates to others that laws have force.2. Symbolism: as discussed in Section A of this argument, when disobedients fail to submit to laws, they send a symbolic message that individual people are morally justified in putting themselves above democratic institutions. This begins to erode the credibility of the institutions and the laws they promulgate and enforce. Submitting to punishment affirms norms of law and order which are important to social stability and wellbeing. To quote MLK: "In no sense do I advocate evading or defying the law. .. This would lead to anarchy. One who breaks an unjust law must do it openly, lovingly, (…) and with a willingness to accept the punishment. I submit that an individual who breaks a law that conscience tells him is unjust, and willingly accepts the penalty by staying in jail to arouse the conscience of the community over its injustice, is in reality expressing the very highest respect for law. " [1]III. Civil Disobedience ItselfAccepting punishment may actually strengthen the disobedient's message. Individuals who are arrested or punished for their activities become--in effect--martyrs. Firstly, their willingness to accept punishment attests to the strength of their convictions, and demonstrates the sincerity of their demands. This sincerity separates them from criminals who try to break the laws for their own personal gain and makes it harder for society to dismiss them as mere criminals. In other words, it bolsters the credibility of the disobedient; he didn't just resist injustice, he sacrificed in his fight against it. Secondly, martyrdom often attracts greater publicity and attention to the disobedient and their cause. Thirdly, trials themselves can serve as platforms to address injustice. Mandela used one of his trials to " showcase 'the ANC's moral opposition to racism'. " [2] Fourthly and finally, submitting to punishment helps people stop thinking of the law in the abstract, but to put a face to the injustice, to see how and who it injures as embodied by the disobedient himself. It particularizes the narrative, which can bolster the narrative's sympathetic appeal. Thus, submitting to punishment actually makes the disobedience more effective. IV. Sources1 - . http://tinyurl.com...2 - . http://tinyurl.com...Thus, I affirm. Thanks again to Lupricona and to the readers.