Resolved; quantum mechanics do not refute the first premise of Kalam

Now, I do not feel the need to dwell too much on my opponent's opening round. I am going to focus on rebutting my opponent's last round due to lack of space. Everything That Begins To Exist Must Have A CauseI never once claimed that the first principle of the Kalam Cosmological Argument is known as a logically necessary truth, it is still necessary regardless according to the Kalam Cosmological Argument. The problem for my opponent, is that the first premise of the argument is "everything that begins to exist has a cause", not "everything that begins to exist most likely has a cause". Dr. Craig himself even advocates the notion that "everything that begins must have a cause" [1]. If something must happen, then it is necessary even if it is not logically necessary. Either way, one could rightfully claim that "everything that begins must have a cause" only if one was either be omniscient, or had some a priori knowledge [2] to back up the claim. Nobody is omniscient so we can rule out that option, all that is left is an a priori assertion. Now my opponent seems to reject that the causal principle is logically necessary, and adheres to the notion that it is based on a posteriori knowledge (judging by his H20 example). However, the only causal principle we can verify a posteriori is one that involves causality above the subatomic level and within space-time. The only physical causal principle we can actually give truth to, would be:"Everything that begins to exist above the sub-atomic level, and within space-time, has a cause which is also within space-time"Deterministic InterpretationsThere are huge problems with deterministic interpretations of Quantum Mechanics. They are a violation of the law of parsimony and also they would require physicists to abandon locality in this context. Basically, we know due to Occam's Razor that if x can be explained without any unnecessary additions, then the unnecessary additions should not come into the picture. Quantum Fluctuations can be explained in an indeterminate manner without having to appeal to additional non-local events, thus indeterministic models are clearly superior. Now Bell's inequality could be violated by non-local events if they interact with each other faster than the speed of light [3], however we have good reason to believe nothing can move faster than the speed of light at this time (we all know the neutrinos thing turned out to be a dud). Deterministic interpretations are simply not generally accepted, and for good reason. Grounds For Quantum Fluctuations Being UncausedMy argument is simple. If everything that begins to exist must have a cause, then we should have no grounds to claim that any certain events are uncaused regardless of whether or not we know if they are uncaused. However, we have grounds to claim these particle and anti-particle pairs pop into existence out of a vacuum uncaused, therefore it cannot be true that everything that begins to exist must have a cause. If it was true, we would have no grounds for claiming certain events are uncaused, but we do (and this is what most physicists believe). There are 3 reasons to adhere to the notion of quantum events being uncaused. 1) Quantum fluctuations appear to be events without causesThese events appear to be events without causes, that happen without any particular reason for why a certain event happens at any particular time. However, this alone is not sufficient to abandon reasons for why we should still expect some hidden cause. I believe the other 2 reasons do the trick. 2) Quantum Mechanics is extremely counter-intuitiveIntuition above the sub-atomic level has us believing that if an event occurs, then something must have given rise to that event and caused it to happen. However, If we enter an extremely counter-intuitive domain then there is no reason to stick to intuitive ideas gained above the sub-atomic level (it actually, would make very little sense indeed). Since these events appear to be events without causes, and we know for a fact that quantum mechanics are counter-intuitive, then claiming that intuitive causal principles must hold at this level is absurd.3) RelativityWe know that certain principles seem break down at the sub-atomic level (like Relativity), so what makes any common causal principles any different? It seems to me that if a principle as huge as relativity holds only on average at the sub-atomic level, what rules out any other commonly accepted principles? Due to the reasons above, and the argument I gave regarding why one should not adhere to deterministic interpretations of quantum mechanics, I believe one can conclude that any causal principle which implies necessity (or a "must") is false when dealing with all of reality. Necessary Causation/ Sufficient Causation Pro is basically saying that quantum events have a necessary cause, but not necessarily sufficient causes. Basically, without the vacuum no event could occur thus the vacuum is at least "some type" of cause of the fluctuations according to Dr. Craig and my opponent. This would mean, that the first premise isn't phased because these events still have "a" cause (the quantum vacuum itself being a necessary "cause"). There seems to be problems with this line of thinking for the theist. If the theist accepts that an event could occur without a sufficient cause (like William Lane Craig has conceded in the past), the first premise of the Kalam Cosmological Argument can be more accurately re-worded: P1: "Whatever begins to exist must have a necessary cause of its existence but not necessarily a sufficient cause of its existence. " The problem is thinking necessary, but not sufficient conditions can actually cause ("give rise to") something to come into existence, this is because causation requires both as philosopher Wes Morriston has pointed out [4] . If there are necessary conditions for an event to occur but no sufficient cause, then it makes no sense to call the necessary conditions a necessary "cause", there is no causal chain here and it's just semantics. Imagine a ball that just flies up in the air for no reason at all hypothetically, and someone asks “what caused that? ”. If I said “The Earth’s existence”, that would not answer the question being asked. The Earth’s existence is necessary for the event to occur without a cause, but it isn't a necessary cause unless there is a sufficient cause of the ball flying up in the air for this casual chain to exist. The Earth’s existence would simply allow for the ball to fly up in the air uncaused. It cannot be called a necessary "cause" unless there is a sufficient cause as well. ConclusionIf it was true that "everything that begins to exist must have a cause", then we would have no grounds for claiming any beginnings occur without causation. We do have grounds though, so the principle has to be false. Also, something cannot be a necessary cause unless there is a sufficient cause. Causation requires both necessary and sufficient reasons for an event because it's part of a chain. Thus, if there are necessary conditions which allow for an event to occur without a cause, then calling this an event with a cause simply because there are conditions which need to be in place for this to happen is outrageous. Therefore, contrary to my opponent's assertions, something wouldn't have to come from absolutely nothing in order for the it to be considered an uncaused beginning of existence (as pointed out by Wes Morriston). We have good reasons to believe this actually happens, and even if we don't know for sure, it still falsifies the first premise of the Kalam Cosmological Argument because the premise deals with the word "must", which infers some type of necessity. Sources[1] . http://www.reasonablefaith.org...[2] . http://en.wikipedia.org...[3] . http://en.wikipedia.org...[4] . http://commonsenseatheism.com...