The teleological argument for God's existence is unsound

I'd like to first extend thanks to Marauder for agreeing to do this debate with me. It should be nice to debate someone as well versed as he is in theology and apologetics. Now on to my argument, I will be forwarding and defending only one contention. This contention will take the form of the Humean objection to the analogical subset of the teleological argument, drawing on Hume's account of induction, his skeptical epistemology, and his division between logical necessity and mere matters of fact.First I'd like to explain the nature of the teleological argument. It is inductive, meaning that the conclusion is said to be highly probable given the truth of the premises (ex. given that all men I've met have brown hair, it's highly likely all men have brown hair). This is contrasted with deductive arguments which claim absolute certainty in their conclusions given the soundness of the premises (ex. given that all men are mortal and that Socrates is a man, Socrates must be mortal). The argument is also a posteriori as opposed to a priori, meaning that we must look to experience to validate the soundness of the premises as opposed to just sound logic and reasoning. This distinction possesses important consequences for the soundness of the argument.Now since the argument is inductive and a posteriori, it runs into the problem that any argument does in attempting to ascribe a universal *cause* to a generalized, observable *effect*. Basically, the argument takes a generalization of the universe as a whole (that what we see implies design) and goes past that. Even if one admits that the universe as we have observed exhibits symptoms of design, this wouldn't go far enough to establish the conclusion. This is because we're attempting to establish a cause of the entire universe, not just the observable part. The rule of proportionality states that we should proportion our conclusion to our evidence and if we only have evidence in what we have observed, this doesn't go far enough to justify the conclusion that the universe as a whole (including parts which we have never observed) must have a designer. We can observe this rule in action by example. Imagine an alien observing the Earth (ignore the fantastical nature of the analogy, it's meant to prove a principle, not a matter of fact). This alien only points it's observation equipment at the Gansu province in China. Given that China is a mostly ethnically homogeneous country, we can expect that most of the people observed will be Chinese or of some Asian descent. Judging from such a small sample of the entire Earth's population, we can see clearly that the extrapolation from "This region is mostly made up of Chinese people" to "The entire Earth must be inhabited by Chinese people" is fallacious and unsound. And so the same principle shows that extrapolating from the tiny fraction of the observable universe which we inhabit and observe to the whole is equally unsound.Also, an important distinction in Humean epistemology must be made between logical necessity and matters of fact. Facts may be called logically necessary when their denial entails a contradiction. An example of this would be the statement that "Some bachelors are married." This is a strict contradiction in terms. A matter of fact though is a statement which could be true or false, but neither option entails contradiction. An example would be that "Man X is a bachelor." Nothing in the concept man necessarily entails being married or not married, therefore the statement is a matter of fact. The fact that some phenomenon we see entail design (i.e., watches) is only a matter of fact. It's wholly within the realm of logical possibility that matter could give way to phenomenon that appear designed or orderly. Therefore, any argument which claims that the appearance of design/order necessitate a designer is unsound.===Conclusion===The Humean objection creates two major problems for the analogical-teleological argument. First, the argument fails to meet the epistemological burden of establishing a cause for the universe as a whole, since the part of the universe we inhabit and have observed is seemingly minuscule in relation to the whole. Therefore, we have no epistemic grounds for ascribing a cause to the entire universe. This can be shown by the fact that the teleological argument is inductive and a posteriori, meaning it only draws upon empirical observation, so it automatically must have nothing to say of things which we have not observed. The second major problem with the argument is that given the parts of the universe we see which seem to imply design, a designer still fails to be necessitated since even when we see objects which are orderly and imply design, it's only a matter of fact that they were (i.e., houses, watches). There's no logical contradiction in the premise that undirected matter could give way to products which are orderly and give the appearance of design. Seeing as I don't want to get too repetitive, I'll pass the debate over to Con now.