does god exist

1. Theological Non-CognitivismPrefaceThis is an epistemological argument against God’s existence. In other words, I shall neither use ontology or metaphysics to affirm the position I take here – it shall be that the term “God” doesn’t refer to a coherent concept, thus attributing existence to it is incoherent. First, I must clarify what “theological non-cognitivism” is. Theological non-cognitivism posits that “words such as ‘God’ ... are not cognitively meaningful.” [1] So I’ll be defending the meaninglessness of the term “God”, and, in the process, affirm that the existence of such an incoherent concept is impossible. The argument is formalised: P1. If God lacks a positively defined attribute, then secondary & relational attributes cannot be justifiedP2. God lacks a positively defined attributeC. Secondary & relational attributes of God are meaningless, thus God, by definition, is meaningless Defense of Premise 1For meaningfulness of a term of an entity, then its relational attributes must be defined as contingent on a positive attribute. For instance, let us consider an entity x. A relational attribute of x is that it weighs one pound. If a person asks “what is x?”, an answer of “x is 1 lb” only describes a relational attribute of x, thus can’t affirm what x actually is, since a positive attribute isn’t shown. If y is a concept without any such positive attribute, then the concept y is meaningless. We can only reasonably talk of the existence of an entity if the entity has positive attributes in addition to relational attributes or secondary attributes, since if an entity’s sole attribute is “1 lb”, then the entity can’t exist since “1 lb” is a secondary attribute that is used to describe the being, rather than define it. Defense of Premise 2Let us consider the attributes of the term “God” as defined in this debate – intelligence, supernatural power, transcendence, intelligence, creating & ruling the universe. Let’s analyse the attributes individually, and I shall show you that the attributes are all secondary or relational attributes. “Intelligence” is defined as “the ability to acquire knowledge and skills”. Now, let’s try applying a property of intelligence to an entity x, which someone is asking to define. “X is defined as intelligent” is incoherent if intelligence is the sole attribute the entity has (in addition to, perhaps, other secondary & relational attributes). The same can be applied to any entity, thus intelligence isn’t enough. Similarly, “greatness”, “power”, “creation & rule of the universe”, and “transcendence” all fail, even together, to define x as a coherent entity. “Intelligence” and “power” are also relational attributes, i.e. require a standard to be coherent. For example, something can’t be considered “powerful” unless we have a standard or objective criterion to coherently define “powerful”, or “intelligent”. Since God is transcendent, he is outside the universe – thus a standard external to God is lacked. A standard internal to God is question begging. ConclusionThus, the two premises entail that the concept of God is intrinsically meaningless as it has only relational & secondary attributes, and no primary or positive attributes. 2. Ontological Parsimony“Ontological parsimony” is basically an ontological form of simplicity. According to the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, (1) P is ontologically simpler than Q if and only if proposition P posits less assumptions than proposition Q, and (2) if P is ontologically simpler than Q, then P is a priori more likely to be true.[2] Definition – A is proposition of theism, B is proposition of weak atheismP1. If A simpler than B, A is more likely, and if B is simpler than A, then B is more likelyP2. B is simpler than A, and negation that A is simpler is falseC. Weak atheism is a priori more likely than theism P1 is true via. ontological parsimony, leaving P2 to be justified. Theism posits three assumptions – God, the universe, and natural laws; atheism posits two – the universe and natural laws. As such, atheism is ontologically simpler than theism. The conclusion entails. == Rebuttals == R1. Ontological ArgumentModal Ontological ArgumentPro first presents W.L. Craig’s formulation of Alvin Plantinga’s “victorious” ontological argument, that uses modal logic.[3] Basically, the argument is that if it’s possible that God exists, then God exists. Reductio – A. <>P --> []P (assumption)P1. It is possible that God does not existP2. If it is possible that God does not exist, then God does not existC1. God does not existP3. It is possible that God existsP4. If it is possible for God to exist, then God existsC2. God existsP5. C1 and C2 contradict, and rest on AP6. Premises are sound from AC3. A is false The same justification given by Pro to the MOA works on the reverse MOA equally well. Anselm Ontological ArgumentPro then presents Saint Anselm’s ontological argument, as formalised: P1. God is the maximally great beingP2. It would be greater if God exist then not existC. God exists, since he should be as great as conceivable P2 is falsified by Kant’s famous objection that existence is not a predicate.[4] Additionally, Pro provides no justification for P2. The property of “greatness” is subjective, as such cannot be exemplified by the objective term “existence”. R2. Cosmological ArgumentKalam Cosmological ArgumentPro first presents Craig’s kalam cosmological argument.[5] Pro justifies P1 via. the Conservation of Mass. That is a physical objection. But any physical assertion assumes the principle of the “uniformity of nature”, i.e. that the laws of physics apply. The Conservation of Mass doesn’t apply to the universe, since the uniformity of nature only applies within the bounds of space-time, so sans time directionality & physical constraint, such a principle doesn’t apply, so P1 isn’t necessary. This, thus, commits a sweeping generalisation fallacy.[6] The second premise has to assume a presentism ontology of time, and the B-theory of time, as Craig himself admits.[5] But presentism has been falsified by special relativity via. relativity of simultaneity, which posits that each observer has a separate plane of simultaneity – this entails four-dimensionalism and eternalism.[7] Second Cosmological ArgumentPro then continues a cosmological argument after presenting his teleological argument, that I shall address here. For the universe to coherently have a “beginning in time”, a presentism ontology of time is assumed. Under eternalism, time has no beginning – past, present, and future are all equally real – so a past-finite universe only “begins” as much as a ruler begins with its first inch. R3. Teleological ArgumentFirst, this argument doesn’t argue for God as defined. It only, at most, would affirm an “ordering intellect”, not necessarily one that rules the universe, and has all attributes as held. Secondly, Pro equates between prescriptive and descriptive telos – Pro needs to prove the former, since telos as Pro posits is subjective & relative. References1. http://goo.gl...2. http://goo.gl...3. http://goo.gl...4. http://goo.gl...5. http://goo.gl...6. http://goo.gl...7. Roger Penrose. The Emperor’s New Mind, pp. 392-393.