The "I was just following orders" defense should not shield soldiers from criminal culpability.

Thanks for a great debate CiRrK. I have definitely learned a thing or three from it. In closing, I want to clear up a few of CiRrK's misunderstandings and briefly respond to new arguments from R3. I ask that readers carefully weigh the arguments from each side, and pay particular attention to C1, as that section contains the most crucial yet difficult and complex philosophical argumentation in the debate.Con CaseC1: Victor's Justice and the Expressive Function of PunishmentCiRrK provides no objective reason to believe the Victor's Justice argument "only shield[s] soldiers." The categorical distinction CiRrK establishes between individual soldiers and their superiors is thus unsubstantiated, arbitrary and completely subjective. The irony here is that CiRrK's advocacy is inconsistent with the very point of the Victor's Justice objection itself (which is itself a critique of subjective bias in trials held to punish war criminals). Indeed, CiRrK's advocacy of the Victor's Justice objection is as subjective and biased as the systemic bias the objection critiques in the first place. CiRrK's version of the Victor's Justice objection is therefore incoherent (it does the very thing it critiques), as well as circular and question-begging (it assumes its conclusion - that individual soldiers are not culpable for war crimes - as an underlying premise).This brings me back to my original point in R3: if the Victor's Justice objection is applied as an impartial calculus, it would shield all war criminals on the losing side from criminal culpability. CiRrK admits this would be an unacceptable result, as it would even excuse the worst of the Nazi officers. Therefore, I maintain that the Victor's Justice objection has no weight.This brings me to a third point: the Victor's Justice objection does not apply to the expressive function of punishment because an expressive function is inherently biased. The punishment of individual soldiers for committing military atrocities helps establish a public moral/legal order by expressing societal disapproval of military atrocities. CiRrK concedes (I assume concession since CiRrK has not addressed this point yet) that symbolic legal acts express (keyword) societal disapproval (or approval) of certain forms of behavior. CiRrK also concedes that holding individual soldiers responsible for committing military atrocities expresses democratic ideals - individual responsibility, individual autonomy, political participation, and freedom of speech (CiRrK never addressed any of these points). In R2 and R3, I explicitly stated that sending such messages to our soldiers, the nation, and the world, is important because it helps establish a common ground for moral conduct, which helps people develop into virtuous citizens. CiRrK does not challenge any of this, yet this is one of my primary arguments in support of holding individual soldiers accountable for committing war crimes.So: the superior orders defense should not shield soldiers because it is important for society to express approval of democratic ideals like individual responsibility and disapproval of following orders to commit war crimes (which itself supports the ideal of individual autonomy). This is a major point on which to vote Pro, as CiRrK has not challenged the expressive function of punishment or its value for society.C2: Self-DefenseCiRrK claims my counter-argument is irrelevant. Of course, I disagree. I pointed out a categorical difference between acting in self-defense and following orders: in the case of self-defense, there is no "moral choice" because the preservation of one's own life and family takes precedence over all other choices; in the case of following orders, there is a "moral choice," specifically that of obeying or disobeying orders. The choice to obey or disobey is ethically neutral because it does not establish in and of itself whether one's choice is moral or not. On the other hand, in the case of self-defense, there is no moral choice because the defending one's right to life is in and of itself ethically charged. I clearly articulated this categorical difference between the two defenses in R3, but my opponent did not address it, so I will assume my opponent concedes this point.CiRrK claims self-defense must be extended to include the superior orders defense when it comes to asymmetric warfare. The argument says that, because there is an existential threat towards one's life, disobeying orders is an existential threat towards one's life. The problem with this argument is that CiRrK attempts to tie the superior orders defense into self-defense, even though the superior orders defense remains irrelevant to asymmetric warfare. The so-called "existential threat towards one's life" has nothing to do with following orders or not - it has to do with the particular environment in which the soldier lives. The choice to obey or disobey orders is morally irrelevant because sometimes the soldier's best chance of surviving is obeying orders and sometimes the soldier's best chance of surviving is disobeying orders. The choice to obey or disobey remains ethically neutral, whereas the choice to save one's life does not. This is the key categorical difference between self-defense and the superior orders defense, and it applies in asymmetric warfare as much as it applies anywhere else. Pro CaseC1: Moral JudgmentIf a moral choice was possible, then each individual soldier is responsible for their actions, regardless of whether they are "desensitized." As CiRrK explains: "desensitization is much different from a clouded judgment" (these are CiRrK's words, not mine). A soldier may be desensitized, but this does not mean the solder is incapable of making moral judgments (a moral choice is still possible). CiRrK defines desensitization as a decrease in compassion. But desensitization to violence and a decrease in compassion does not mean a soldier is unable to make a moral choice. The issue here is straight-forward: individual soldiers have a moral choice - they are capable of obeying or disobeying orders regardless of their so-called desensitization - and the possibility of making a moral choice is enough to hold them responsible for making the wrong choice.What's more, CiRrK's response to the case of the druggie assumes the druggie has broken the law, but there are addictions to substances that are legal, so the argument holds. A drug addict is not excused for commiting crimes, even though his/her capacity to make moral judgments is compromised. So even if a soldier's capacity to make moral judgments is compromised, it does not change the fact that they are responsible for their actions. CiRrK compares soldiers to children as a counter-example, but this does not work because soldiers are categorically different than children: a child does not have the capacity to be responsible (according to the law), but an adult soldier does have that capacity. That is why children are not allowed to join the military; and this fact alone should alert readers of the obvious difference between children and soldiers. The truth is, there are countless examples of soldiers who disobeyed orders because they recognized that those orders were impermissible. World War 2 often presents the best example, as there were many Nazi soldiers who did their best to save as many people as they could (disobeying their orders). I maintain that the possibility of a moral choice is sufficient reason to hold individual soldiers responsible for committing military atrocities. C2: ConsequencesCiRrK claims my argument was "unwarranted" and "unsubstantiated." I'm not sure what CiRrK means though. I argued that expressing disapproval of certain forms of behavior helps prevent those forms of behavior from manifesting. This seems fairly straight-forward: people are less likey to act a certain way if that act is criminalized. CiRrK does not give any reason to believe otherwise.