The argument from evil (AE) is sound

In this round, I want to try and defend the argument I laid out in R1. Defending P1Put simply, P1 states that if God exists, then gratuitous evils do not. Given the definition in R1, God knows about all the evil in the world (omniscience), has the power to wipe out the evil in the world (omnipotence), and has the motivation to do so (wholly good). It follows inescapably, therefore, that any evil in the world must have a morally sufficient reason, if God exists.The problem in denying P1 is that gratuitous evil has no morally sufficient reason to be permitted, because, well, it's gratuitous! We see that once we even begin to unpack God conceptually, P1 seem to follow inescapably from God’s nature.At the very least, we can suppose that P1 is more plausible than its denial. As Christian philosopher Daniel Howard-Snyder remarks,"on the face of it, the idea that God may well permit gratuitous evil is absurd. After all, if God can get what He wants without permitting some particular horror (or anything comparably bad), why on earth would He permit it?" (1)If Con really wants to argue that God would permit gratuitous genocide, for example, then all I'll say for now is that it's an argument I would want to see.Defending P2If P1 is virtually undeniable, P2 is even more so. It is clear that there is lots of suffering, pain, disability and death in the world. I doubt Con will dispute this, so I’ll say no more about it here. Defending P3This premise states that there is at least one instance of gratuitous evil. Remember, that given what I’ve argued, if P3 is more likely than not (>50%), the conclusion follows, and the resolution is affirmed.Before I defend P3, I want lay out 2 examples (of which there are many more), which are fairly typical of the evils I’m talking about:E1 - "Many babies each year are born with Down's syndrome . . (and) have intestinal obstructions that will kill them . . . dehydration and infection will cause these babies to wither and die over a period of hours and days.” (2)Another example given by Rowe is that of animal suffering:E2 - "Suppose in some distant forest lightning strikes a dead tree, resulting in a forest fire. In the fire a fawn is trapped, horribly burned and lies in terrible agony for several days before death relieves its suffering. So far as we can see, the fawn's intense suffering is pointless." (3)What reasons do we have to believe these evils are actually gratuitous? The first is what we might call the prima facie case, and this is not a belief we should give up lightly. From absolutely everything we know, the evils seem gratuitous. A baby destined to die suffered days of seemingly unnecessary, excruciating pain, with relatives helplessly looking on in many cases. Given the fact that no hint of any reason at all seems evident to allow these babies to suffer, let alone the conditions of P1, it is reasonable to conclude on this basis from the appearance of gratuitous evils, to the fact of gratuitous evils. As critic Stephen Wykstra reasons,"For if an instance of suffering appears not to have a point, that is a reason for thinking it has no point." (4)Secondly, it is difficult even to conceive of some examples of evil being morally permissible. In the case of the Rowe's fawn, there seems to be no conceivable reason to allow the extent of the suffering, nor any benefit which could even come from it. As Rowe points out,"In light of our experience and knowledge, of the variety and scale of human and animal suffering in our world, the idea that none of this suffering could have been prevented by an omnipotent being without thereby losing some greater good or permitting an evil at least as bad seems an extraordinary, absurd idea, quite beyond our belief." (5)The difficulty even to conceive of a plausible, morally sufficient reason to permit some evils also supports P3.Third, the nature of the evils themselves point strongly towards gratuity. Evil is abundant in the world. Sentient beings have suffered for millions of years, and the sheer volume of evil is just staggering. The way this evil is dispersed is also horrific. As E1 illustrates, there have been many children whose sole experience in life is that of seemingly pointless, excruciating pain before their inevitable death. Also, many evils are necessary, as long as there are sentient beings. The evolutionary process is just a litany of predation and extinction, where animals have to tear each other apart just to survive. Indeed, the vast majority of species which have inhabited the Earth have perished. For many of them, life is as Hobbes described - solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short. Lastly, many people suffer without God‘s comfort to sustain them. Divine silence in the face of horrendous evils is something even Mother Theresa expressed upon witnessing evil (6), and is again something rather pervasive in the world.None of these points are controversial, yet they strongly and unequivocally point to a universe callously indifferent to the suffering of its inhabitants. Given that theists posit a benevolent deity, this seems overwhelming evidence to the contrary. The fact that evil has these features, often simultaneously, is massive evidence in favour of gratuity, and thus P3.Another reason I want to add could perhaps best be termed epistemic consistency. In essence, this simply means applying the same or similar standards to the PoE as we do to normal beliefs, and only to take seriously beliefs which are at least plausible. Sinnott-Armstrong explains the absurdity of abandoning this standard,"Would it benefit my family in the long-run if I were to burn down our house tonight? Possibly. Does that possibility make it reasonable to believe that we would benefit? No. Why not? Because we do know one thing: Burning down my house would cause serious problems in my family in the short term. Those known costs set up a presumption or burden of proof that needs to be overcome before contrary beliefs can be reasonable." (7)The same is true of evil. Given the massive short-term cost it causes, and (as well as we can judge), it's seeming ability to lead to long-term costs, we have a massive burden to believe that evil is primarily destructive, and this is a burden that Con must overcome, before we even consider an alternative explanation.The futility of contrived scepticism, retreats to the possible or fanciful ad hoc storytelling constructed cynically to deal with P3 given this point is pretty apparent. Only an epistemically consistent standard is feasible for the theist here.In order for Con to defeat P3, he must first tear down the 4 justificatory points I have offered, as well as provide a plausible theistic account of the data. I wish him the best of luck in doing so.ConclusionIn order to refute the argument, Con must present both a plausible and coherent account of why the argument is unsuccessful. I invite him to make his case, closing with the words of the prominent Christian scholar N.T.Wright:"If you think you have solved the problem of evil, lie down. It will pass." (8)Sources1. Howard-Snyder, Daniel, and Frances Howard-Snyder. 1999. "Is Theism Compatible with Gratuitous Evil?" American Philosophical Quarterly 36: 115-29.2. God? P843,5 Rowe, William, The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism, American Philosophical Quarterly 16: 335-41.4. Wykstra, Stephen J. 1984. “The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments from Suffering: On Avoiding the Evils of ‘Appearance’,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 16: 73-93.6. http://www.time.com...7. God? P1848. http://commonsenseatheism.com............... (debate with Ehrman can be found here).