Atheism is Morally Bankrupt

(i) The Debate Understood A number of problems arise just looking at the presentation of Pro's case. The first and perhaps most notable is his mistake of not defining the terms at hand. The question to be asked when we are faced with a proposition such as "Atheism is morally bankrupt" would be to properly wonder as to what exactly is meant by atheism - including other given terms such as theism and conventional morality, along with in what sense those terms are somewhat related. The reason for this I think can be best stated in C. Stephen Evans' discussion in his book God and Moral Obligation: Of course the claim that morality depends on God is ambiguous and can be interpreted in a number of different ways. One way it might be understood is as a claim that a person must be believe in God to act morally or have a moral character. Religious belief is necessary to be a moral person. . . This seems implausible. . . and I have no reason to argue otherwise. [1] In other words, the claim "morality is dependent" is too ambiguous (general) so as to have a particular meaning. Along with the interpretation of religious belief as a necessity for there to be moral persons, there are two other interpretations that Evans examines: (1) an epistemological claim (God is the basis of our knowledge of morality) and an (2) ontological claim (morality exists because of God). It is unclear as to which interpretation Pro holds (since he has not stated it clearly), although he argues that "Atheism is unable to provide a foundation for moral action[s]," and quotes several perspectives supporting that view. It seems evident, I think, to suppose that pro holds a view similar to the (3)rd view - that God is the foundation for morality in an ontological sense. I suppose that this is the case, given claims such as "atheism is unable to provide a foundation for moral actions," along with, "[I]f God is dead, then morality that derives from God, which is all morality, is without foundation and must be rejected. " However, if Pro wishes to correct me on this observation, he is more than welcome to do so. (ii) Defining TermsBy atheism, I simply mean the view that "it is not the case that there is a unique, necessary, eternal, immaterial, personal being who created the universe and who possesses all perfections - specifically omniscience, omnipotence, and benevolence" [2]. We can take nihilism to be the view that "no moral property is instantiated" [3]. Morality (although better definitions are available) can be understood as the opposite of nihilism. Moral atheism thence is the conjunction of atheism and morality. (iii) Criticism of Pro's Case Pro offered the following argument (MA1 hereafter): If one is an atheist (A), then one objects to transcendent foundation of morality i. e. , God (B). If one objects to transcendent foundation of morality i. e. , God (B), one lacks the ability to justify conventional morality. (C) If one is an atheist (A), one lacks the ability to justify conventional morality. (C) Although I find premise (1) to be uncontroversial, I do take a problem with premise (2). Since I take Pro's argument to contain an ontological claim, it seems to be the case that he is arguing that if one does not accept (B) as the foundation of morality, one cannot justify (C) - conventional morality. The problem with this form of argument is that it commits the genetic fallacy - in other words, Pro is more so concerned with truth and not so much with the justification of morality. Stated simply, we are not capable of holding to (C) because we have not granted the truth of (B) - hence, no other account outside of (C) can adequately explain/account for the existence of (C). If Pro's argument was concerned with justification, he might be concerned with the following statements: (a) An atheist, by definition, denies the claim that God is the ontological foundation of morality. (b) An atheist believes that our ethical beliefs are true. However, (b) seems to be problematic. To be fair to my definition of atheism, it would perhaps be best to restate (b) as the following: (b') An atheist, holding to (x), believes that our ethical beliefs are true. Pro is claiming in his argument that (1) is the case, while also maintaining that whatever represents (x) is nonetheless inadequate to account for conventional morality since the atheist has denied (1). This is problematic for the reason that Pro has not presented us with any barriers to suggest that the justification for the existence of morality cannot be done (or it is highly unlikely that it can be done) given the atheist worldview. Pro's argument (or at least his presentation) is inadequate to suggest that (3) is the case: (3) If one is an atheist, one lacks the ability to justify conventional morality. Furthermore, Pro in supporting this conclusion merely quotes several atheistic perspectives as evidence that (3) holds. This is a classic example of the Argument from Authority; namely, that if (x) says (y) is the case, then (y) is the case. I could quote philosophers who hold to the view that an external reality doesn't exist - that doesn't mean that an external reality in fact does not exist. Pro quoting those figures do not add to the substance of his argument. (iv) Counter Arguments Moral arguments as we might often hear them are of the sort that suggest our human moral experience points to the existence of God. One form of this line of reasoning is a sort of cosmological argument: the cause of objective moral facts must be God. We can formulate the argument as follows: (1) If morality is objective and absolute, then God exists. (2) Morality is objective and absolute. (3) Therefore, God exists. Premise (1) is not often adequately addressed by theists. One would need to show (just as Pro would) that no other alternative explanation - especially alternative views that hold morality as absolute and objective - is adequate or justified in holding morality as objective and absolute. If that alternative is naturalistic and fails, then the adherent of the argument must also argue that supernatural explanations are not the case. Although Hastings Rashdall has argued that the "[moral law] cannot be defended or fully justified without the presupposition of Theism", [4] this doesn't seem to be a view that can be substantiated given the consideration of the possible alternatives available [5]. For instance, consider a discussion by Louise Antony where he suggests that "there is a way that human beliefs could have been shaped by ethically significant factors" [6]: The phenomenon that "emerge" when we abstract from the microphysical details fall into regularities of their own - these regularities form the domains of chemistry, biology, geology, and the other "special sciences. " The first point, then, is that there is nothing in the naturalist picture that precludes there being lawlike regularities at higher levels than physics. [7] He goes on to argue that we as human beings have evolved in such a way so as to develop brains and nervous systems that support a psychology. To have this psychology, argues Antony, is to have the ability to form mental representations and use those representations to have guiding interactions with the subject's environment. For instance, creatures with a psychology (such as human beings) have the ability to integrate representations of the way the world is (beliefs) as well as form representations of the way they'd like to see the world (desires). To finish on Antony's point: Ethical properties. . . are theoretical properties involving crucially, the capacity to see other creatures as psychological beings. It can be seen that one creature is colliding with another, but it takes psychological inference to classify the event as a case of one creature's attacking another, and a further inference to conclude that the attack is an act of aggression. . . Human beings can and do perform such inferences. [8] (v) SummaryIn his Ethics Without God (1973), philosopher Kai Nielsen calls our attention to three fundamental questions crucial to this conversation: (1) Is being willed by God the, or even a, fundamental criterion for that which is so willed being morally good or its being something that ought to be done? (2) Is being willed by God the only criterion for that which is so willed being morally good or its being something that ought to be done? (3) Is being willed by God the only adequate criterion for that which is so willed being morally good or for its being something that ought to be done? For the following rounds to come, I do hope that Pro will carefully examine these questions and address the points I have raised here in my rebuttal. However, Pro has not adequately presented a case that would establish the above proposition: "Atheism is morally bankrupt. " Therefore, I urge a vote in the negation of this proposition. ______________________Notes: [1] C. Stephen Evans, God and Moral Obligation (Oxford University Press: 2013) p. 1 [2] Louise Antony, "The Failure of Moral Arguments" in Debating Christian Theism, ed. J. P. Moreland, Chad Meister, Khaldoun A. Sweis (Oxford University Press: 2013) p. 101 [3] Ibid. [4] Hastings Rashdall, "God and the Moral Consciousness," Religious Belief and Philosophical Thought, ed. William Alston (Brace and World: 1963) p. 92 [5] See Roderick Firth, "Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 12, 1952, pp. 317-345 for an example. [6] Louis Antony, "The Failure of Moral Arguments," Debating Christian Theism (2013) p. 105 [7] Ibid. , p. 106 [8] Ibid. [9] Quoted from Peter Angeles, Critiques of God (Promotheus Books: 1997) p. 242