Global Nuclear War is good

No it is not good. Introduction The original purpose of this paper was to assess the systemic effects of a limited nuclear war and offer some thoughts regarding the potential health care complications that might result. As work progressed, It became increasingly apparent that research into the direct and immediate impact of war has been, And continues to be, The subject of considerable effort. However, A review of the literature on the consequences of nuclear war revealed few references to social science research. The citations that were uncovered appeared to be confined almost entirely to the application of economic theory to problems of reconstruction. Much of the work was performed in the mid-1960s to mid-1970s and is therefore dated. To our knowledge, Little has been done on such subjects as social response to a warning of nuclear attack; willingness of health care organizations to administer aid under postattack conditions; ability of a moneyless economy to rebuild without the aid of other nations and without a heavy reliance on fuel oils. There is, On the other hand, No shortage of assumptions regarding the nation's institutions, Individual behavior, And the likelihood of social change, None of which have been seriously questioned. As a result, Published projections that implicitly adopt current economic and social arrangements should be questioned as well. In such a short paper, We cannot pretend to cover the subject of socioeconomic consequences in any depth. However, We do not apologize for raising a wide variety of issues that may frustrate even the most patient reader. We view this as an opportunity to question, Speculate, And entertain possibilities that may not have been previously considered. Go to: Warnings Of War Mutual assured destruction (MAD) is founded on the condition that each side's offensive weaponry surpasses the defensive capability of the other. Deterrence is thought by some to be stable so long as populations and industry remain vulnerable to the destructive capacity of the other side. If one subscribes to MAD, Then it must follow that any movement to reduce vulnerability or enhance offensive capacity heightens the risk of war. Accordingly civil defense could play a dual role. Under ideal circumstances it might reduce casualties, But if thought to be too effective it could also destabilize the arms race, And under certain conditions heighten the potential for misinterpreting intentions. It is well known that the Soviet Union has invested considerable effort to develop an effective civil defense system. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) notes that there is sufficient blast-resistant shelter space for the Soviet leadership at all levels (Weinstein, 1981). The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) assumes that the Soviet Union would not launch a preemptive strike without first protecting its own citizens (or at least reducing the number of anticipated casualties to tolerable levels), By evacuating the larger cities and population centers proximate to major industrial plants. It is estimated that it would take from 3 to 5 days to complete the process. Such large-scale population movements would be readily detected by U. S. Intelligence sources interpreted as a warning of an impending nuclear strike. One response to this message, Albeit an unlikely one, Would be for the U. S. To launch a first strike directed at the highly vulnerable evacuees. A second, Which was favored for some time by FEMA, Would take advantage of the lead time afforded by the observed movements to relocate 145 million of our own citizens. This so-called crisis relocation strategy has been roundly criticized for its lack of realism and the fact that only meager resources were devoted to its preplanning. Despite the apparent lack of support at the federal level for crisis relocation, Unplanned evacuations may still be an important factor in determining the number and types of casualties that might be sustained as a direct result of war or indirectly as a product of the evacuation itself. It is interesting to note that the debate over crisis relocation presumes that evacuations are orchestrated primarily by FEMA. However, A spontaneous flight from areas thought to be targeted cannot be precluded, In the event of a sudden escalation in tension between the world's superpowers. It is highly unlikely, For example, That Soviet population movements, Of the scale indicated above, Would escape the attention of the news media. The question which then must be answered is how will U. S. Citizens react? This is an area where lessons learned as a result of studying societal response to natural hazards and warnings, Particularly earthquake prediction, May provide insights. How people in general and people with disaster response roles respond to information about impending catastrophe has been the target of research for three decades. The findings have been summarized (cf. Mileti, 1975; Williams, 1964) and suggest several principles that would affect the vulnerability of medical and health care systems to nuclear war. People respond to situations of impending danger on the basis of their situationally defined perceptions of risk, And what they then believe to be appropriate response to those perceptions. Even without official government evacuation plans or sanctioned warnings of an impending nuclear exchange, News regarding related events could lead some people to perceive risk and evacuate to areas thought to be safe. Persons who are responsible for providing postimpact aid, Such as health care professionals, Might be motivated to evacuate personnel and supporting materiel in order to preserve their ability to provide assistance after the attack (cf. Mileti et al. , 1981). Given Abrams' (1984) estimates of medical requirements, It is doubtful whether such behavior would alter the outcome. Go to: The Direct And Immediate Impact Of War The immediate effects of nuclear war, The completeness of the devastation it brings, And the detailed accounting of the expected human suffering have all been the subject of numerous studies. We begin with a war scenario which provides the basis for estimating the demands placed on the medical system, And sets the parameters for determining the direct and indirect economic impacts. The results are then reexamined in the context of what is known about organizational behavior and transformation. Damage To Cities Other papers in this volume have touched on many of the direct effects of a limited nuclear war. In order to avoid repetition we will briefly describe the scenario which is used as a point of departure for the issues raised in this paper. The following calculations are based on the Federal Emergency Management Agency's CRP-2B scenario which assumes that the United States is exposed to 6, 559 megatons (Mt) of nuclear explosives targeted primarily at military installations and 250 centers of population exceeding 50, 000. In the absence of warning and any subsequent evacuation, About 125 million people would be caught within the 2-psi circles (geographic areas which sustain a blast overpressure of 2 pounds per square inch); nearly 58 million would be inside the 15-psi region (Haaland et al. , 1976; p. 20). In preparing the scenario, Defense planners anticipated the delivery of 843 1-Mt warheads. It is estimated that each ground burst would leave a crater 1, 000 feet (about 305 m) in diameter and 200 feet (about 61 m) deep. All structures from the point of detonation to a distance of 0. 6 miles (about 1 km) would be leveled. Within the band between 1. 7 and 2. 7 miles (about 2. 7 and 4. 3 km) (5 psi) only skeletal remains of commercial and residential multistory structures would be observed. The 2-psi circle, Characterized by moderately damaged structures (cracked load-bearing walls, Windowless, Contents blown into the streets), Would reach 4. 7 miles (about 7. 6 km) (Office of Technology Assessment, 1979; pp. 27-31). Damage to Electronic Systems: Effects of Electromagnetic Pulse In contrast to the effects of blast and fire, The electromagnetic pulses (EMP), Generated as a result of airbursts, Leave no visible signs. Nonetheless, In theory such pulses could be highly damaging to microcircuitry. Because of the partial test ban treaty (1963) and the highly sensitive nature of EMP to national security, There is little hard evidence to conclude just how much damage might be incurred. However, Recent military interest in new communications technology, Such as the $10 billion MILSTAR project, To protect against the effects of EMP suggests how serious the problem may prove to be. Although much of what is known about EMP either is classified as secret information or is highly speculative, The danger the phenomenon poses is very real. Telecommunications networks, Information processing equipment, And highly sophisticated medical technology would be vulnerable and could be irreparably harmed by such a blast. 1 The problems this pulse poses for electronic equipment are twofold. Electrical power grids would pick up the EMP and transmit a transient spike in voltage to equipment drawing power at the time of the detonation. The rapid rise in voltage would damage microprocessors in a way similar to that resulting from lightning strikes. However, The rise in voltage would be typically 100 times faster, Thereby rendering common surge protectors ineffective. Second, The electronic component itself could pick up the pulse and generate internally induced currents. The result could produce physical damage to the equipment.