Logic should not be trusted.

I'm going to chop his argument up into bite-sized chunks for my snarking pleasure. "What he has described, as the cautious reader has probably already observed, is an axiom. "That's right. However, your point about this invalidating my argument was refuted in the last round and it seems you decided to ignore it. "So far as I can see, (6), from my former round, that “logic could be false,” is precisely what results from both (1) and (1’) respectively. "The point is the same, it's how we get there. "I will not be addressing his reformulated syllogism with Occam’s razor because it is observably invalid and unsound, inasmuch as Occam’s razor is not a law of logic, does not depend upon itself, and the conclusion clearly does not follow from any of the premises. "This is where you are wrong. Occam's Razor is a principle based on statics. The more assumptions you make, the more likely you are to get more wrong, as every assumption provides an opportunity to be wrong. It is clearly grounded in logic, and if it were wrong, it would invalidate all of our assumptions about logic, specifically our concept of probability. If probability was meaningless there would be no Occam's Razor, since it relies on probability to be true. Hence, Occam's Razor is circular logic. In a sense it is like what you said, only using more explicitly detailed examples (which you failed to directly address in the first round). "If intuition can be trusted however, then we can clearly point to the observable fact that virtually all logical laws are intuitive. "Nowhere did I concede that intuition could be trusted, only that you have the burden to validate all axioms as reliable and that I was simply rejecting them as invalid. The law of noncontradiction can be trusted, but only to a degree which is unknown to us and can therefore not be relied upon. "To be more clear, he must trust logic in order to attempt to refute its trustworthiness. "Not necessarily. Recall that in my previous argument I hypothesized about a certain phrase, "All logic could probably be false," and offered two distinct possibilities if such an assertion were proven to be true. The phrase may have been confusing to some, but it is simply the same conclusion that I am attempting to argue here- that no logic should be trusted. If we assume my argument to be true, then that does indeed leave us two possibilities: 1. Not all logic is valid, but some of it is, specifically the types I am using to refute logic. This is suggested by the fact that logic disproves it's own validity. Note that this does not concede the definition since we would still be unaware of the extent of it's validity.2. Logic is totally wrong, which would invalidate my argument, but also his argument and would mean that he concedes that logic can be trusted. Of course, the second option is impossible or above our understanding (seeing as it would invalidate the law of noncontradiction). But what if we say that the phrase has not been proven? Well, guess what: the bulk of his argument seems to be focused on this point about my argument being self-collapsing, which I have just refuted. "The relevant point is whether or not I should trust logic. On this point, my opponent did not respond. I can easily trust things that are possibly wrong. "Actually, my point was that we had no way of measuring how likely these things were. Please read this:Everybody who wants to vote, I am going to have to ask you not to do so based on bias (which will inevitably be a problem here), but on who made the more convincing arguments, seeing as I myself am devil's advocating.