The moral argument for the existence of God is sound

A I understand Con's attempt to show the argument as a non sequitur. Problem is, his claim of a non sequitur is itself based on a fallacy; a straw man, namely that I should be arguing for a specific deity, or a contingent being. But I'm arguing for just theism in general; and for a non-contingent maximally great being as the standard of moral truth himself. (So in essence, the fallacy of which I'm accused is based upon a fallacy of it's own... it's a shame that fallacies don't cancel each other out, because Con would maybe have a case!) So arguing for a specific deity isn't my aim, just because I showed a Christian model for conceptualizing 'how' all love can be grounded in the Triune God, it wasn't my aim to use my Rev's material for arguing specifically for the Christian God. (or to plagiarize it in an academic sense, but now I know the site's not loosey-goosey about the issue, my faut pas). Now being that the moral argument attempts to prove theism in general, I'm not concerned with other religions but instead I'm arguing for the objectivity of morals and their ontological basis in a maximally great reality, God. Such a being is greater if he is the standard of morals rather than just exemplifying morals. This doesn't have to be Allah, the Christian God, etc. B My rebuttal was in fact this, "asking what makes God good would be like asking what makes the number 5 possess it's five-ness? The question is just as meaningless as asking why can't God make a round circle, or create a stone which he himself cannot lift?" I think Con has confused God, a non-contingent being, with a contingent being; or something reflecting a moral character like every other contingent being, rather than Something being the moral standard, in itself subsisting. Martin's Euthyphro's dilemmaMartin's revised Euthyphro's dilemma, therefore, is simply a play on words and doesn't confront us with any obvious dilemma. Martin's argument doesn't apply to a non-contingent entity. This is why no philosopher takes the dilemma seriously, for it's simply viewed as a verbal game. The alleged dilemma applies to a contingent god who can have a good character, but it doesn't apply to a non-contingent God who exists within the necessity of his own nature.Thus we're presented with a semantic game at best, NOT a knock down argument for premise one. At best what Con does is arbitrarily place the standard which defines God and moves it to platonism, but as I've said, Atheistic moral platonism is more arbitrary than a metaphysically necessary being as the grounds for morals himself! So not only does Con move the definition of God to a story lower, as a contingent being, without any reason or justification, but he moves the moral ontology to a more arbitrary and less plausible level than if it were placed, ontologically, in a non-contingent God! Folks, this simply does nothing at all to refute premise 1! It's just an old out-of-context-argument boxed into the corner of a verbal game. Whenever a substantive argument moves from a logic-based contest to a semantically based contest, then it seems to me the argument is won on the side still using logic. Remember I'm arguing for a necessarily existing metaphysical and ontological ground for moral value; that is God. God as the necessary foundation for moral value is the most plausible and least arbitrary basis for morals. That's what I'm arguing for, " for God to not be the standard of Good, is to cease having his very identity; and identity is a necessary relation. There is no possible world in which some entity A is not identical to A"Atheistic Support for P1We've all heard the overused cliché, "God is Love," well that's implicit in P1. Indeed hailed Atheists themselves are committed to the premise. As 'G. Eliot' praised her new found “Religion of Humanity”vis a vis with the death of God, Nietzsche complained at this saying, “They are rid of the Christian God and now believe all the more firmly that they must cling to Christian morality.” (1968, p. 69) Nietzsche argued that such a superficial understanding is very much inconsistent exclaiming, “Moral judgments agree with religious ones in believing in realities which are no realities.” Nietzsche rightfully claimed nihilism at God’s grave, asserting, “There are altogether no moral facts,” because he believed that neither were there theological facts. Fellow atheists hadn’t yet grasped Nietzsche’s lament however. And it seems to me that advocates of new atheism hasn't grasped the situation either, http://www.amazon.com... Premise 1 Therefore, we've reached something of a trilemma for the Atheist which is thusly, 1) either choose a less plausible and more arbitrary ontological basis for moral value than; 2) a maximally great being who necessarily exists as the basis; or, 3) choose nihilism. Con's already a committed non-nihilist, all I can do is offer a more plausible and less arbitrary ontological basis for the moral value he so desperately wants to affirm. But to merely show the moral argument to be sound, I just need to argue in favor of the plausibility of morals grounded in God over the plausinility of morals grounded in Atheistic Moral Platonism (AMP). Which I have already done. There are other non-theistic moral ontologies I'l like to refute at less plausible, but alas they have as yet to be offered.Red-HerringNow here we come to a major misunderstanding of the argument: Pay careful attention: I said that what the argument does not have anything to do with is, 〻 Must we believe in God to have moral lives? (my answer; belief in God isn't required, no)〻 Can we formulate an ethics system without reference to God? (My answer; of course we can formulate an ethics system)〻 Can we recognize the existence of objective morals without reference to God? (My answer; Con certainly does, so yes) But Con thinks I'm asking these irrelevant questions, which is evident when he says, "My partner hasn't really argued anything here. He has simply asked us questions" ^no, I made a line of distinction between such misplaced questions. The line was between,how we can discover morals versus the proper metaphysical basis for morals. In other words our moral epistemology versus moral ontology. The former involves those questions, the latter does not, and it's the latter of which concerns the argument. Here's a diagram to help, http://www.debate.org... So Con's attempt to actually answer these questions are just stalling his rebuttal by drawing out conclusions about what I've already shown to be useless to our debate.But then Con goes into an even bigger red-herring. He asks a question regarding the doctrine of biblical inerrancy! Such a doctrine is wholly irrelevant to the issue of our moral basis. Now I'd be happy to answer this question but it's answer, whether adequate or inadequate still remains a separate issue, and goes nowhere to confirm or disconfirm the moral argument itself. For suppose I'm a theist but not on the basis of the Bible?Nevertheless I'll open a forum regarding these question and post it's link in my final rebuttal for those interested, since I agree they are good questions regarding biblical inerrancy. Conclusion Now I was promised in the comments section a more plausible and less arbitrary moral ontology from Con. But he hasn't given one except the implicit ontology in the Euthyphro's dilemma (Atheistic Moral Platonism AMP). But I've already shown this ontology to be lacking as compared to Theism's ontology for moral truths, specifically, in terms of plausibility and arbitrariness. Thus P1 remains more plausible than its denials, and Con affirms P2; so therefore it follows the conclusion that God exists. The moral argument is hence indeed sound.