Ideological Diversity is not a Virtue

My case relies on two premisses: 1.) Where multiple ideologies exist, only one may be correct. 2.) An ideology which is incorrect cannot have moral worth and should not be valued. _____________________________________________________________________________________ 1.) Where multiple ideologies exist, only one may be correct. _____________________________________________________________________________________ Proposition One: Either: A.) Ideology, in general, is able to be analysed morally. Or: B.) Ideology, in general, is non-moral. Proposition Two: A.) must be assumed. Demonstration: If B.), one could not make the claim that ideological diversity is a virtue, thus defeating any possible arguments against the resolution. A.), then, must be assumed. Impact: If A.), the moral analysis I will give is both applicable and warranted, and, if all follows, my case will have been proven. Proposition Three: Ideology must be analysed logically. Demonstration: In assuming A.), a further assumption is made: that ideology has a cognitive meaning (else analysis would be impossible). Ideology must then be reducible to logical propositions to have cognitive meaning, for, as Wittgenstein reminds us, “The logical picture of the facts is the thought” [1]. This means that it must be assumed that any analysis of ideology must be done on propositions of ideology. “Ideology X is correct” is such an analysable proposition. Proposition Four: If multiple ideologies are to exist, they must have points of disagreement. Demonstration: “To suppose two things indiscernible, is to suppose the same thing under two names” [2]) Proposition Five: Two contradictory propositions cannot both be correct. Demonstration: (P) and (~P) is axiomatically invalid; (P) or (~P) is axiomatically valid. Proposition Six: Where multiple ideologies exist, only one may be correct. Demonstration: Ideologies must be reducible to propositional form for our purposes, and this consists in constructing propositions of the form “Ideology X is correct”, “Ideology Y is correct”, etc. [Prop. 3]. If “Ideology X is correct” and “Ideology Y is correct” must contradict each other at some point [Prop. 4], then only one can be correct [Prop. 5]. This can be applied to all pairings of ideologies within a given system to show that only one, at most, may be correct (even if none are due to an incomplete set of ideologies). Q. E. D. __________________________________________________________________________________ 2.) An ideology which is incorrect cannot have moral worth and should not be valued. __________________________________________________________________________________ To have moral worth, a thing must be conducive to goodness. Since morality is applicable only to moral agents, and moral agency implies action as an extension of the moral agents, moral worth is tied to actions and their causes. For an ideology to be incorrect, it must not fulfill its function qua ideology. Since ideologies are worldviews, an incorrect ideology is a faulty worldview. If a moral agent seeks to hold an ideology, they are expressing that that ideology is a value to them, and, thus, that they perceive it as furthering the good. Moral agents do not seek to hold faulty worldviews, for any act, including seeking worldviews, relies on the presupposition that one’s worldview is not faulty, and thus such an undercutting of fundamentals is impossible. If an ideology is established as faulty, it fails as an ideology; it would then not be pursued or valued. When multiple ideologies exist, only one may be correct. If ideological diversity is virtuous (conducive to value), it follows that faulty ideologies are virtuous, which is absurd, as established. Therefore, ideological diversity is not a virtue. _____________________________________________________________________________________ [1] Wittgenstein, “Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus” [2] Leibniz, Letter to Clarke