The Argument from Contingency is sound.

Thanks to Immortal again. I will respond only to his relevant criticisms so I will be skipping some premises. Premise 1: Every temporally contingent being possibly fails to exist at some time. The premise isn't just probably true - it is analytically true. Con's rebuttal fails - God's nature is defined as a necessary being (see source 13 in my 1st round) and according to classical theism, which is the concept of God that I am defending, omnipotence means that can God can do all things according to his nature. He can do all things that are logically possible in other words. It would be logically impossible for God to change his own nature and make himself a contingent being - temporally or otherwise. Con says omnipotence is defined as unlimited power but his *own* source 2 betrays him - from under the "meanings of omnipotence" header: "A deity is able to do anything that is logically possible for it to do". And to further add to this for clarification: "In the scholastic understanding, omnipotence is generally understood to be compatible with certain limitations upon a deity's power, as opposed to implying infinite abilities. There are certain things that even an omnipotent deity cannot do...In response to questions of a deity performing impossibilities (such as making square circles) Aquinas says that "Nothing which implies contradiction falls under the omnipotence of God." [1] This is the definition of omnipotence I hold to. I urge Con and the readers to remember this. Premise 2: If all things possibly fail to exist at some time then it is possible that all things fail to exist at some past time. No, I am not agreeing with Con that God is temporally contingent. (See my above rebuttal.) Remember, I said "thing" and "being" are interchangeable but for clarification a thing is "an entity, an idea, or a quality perceived, known, or thought to have its own existence." [2] Premise 3: It is necessarily the case that possible truths are explicable. A possible truth is something that is, well, possibly true. Something like saying in some other possible universe there is a bed made of jello. It is possibly true. It may not a very good bed, but it's possible. :p I never said that God didn't have an explanation in the actual world or any possible world. I said that God's explanation is only possible in reference's to God's own self which is what the later steps of the argument prove. Con concedes that it's possible that virtual particles have a cause and that is all I need, but Con confuses a few things. First, yes all possible truths are explicable *in principle*. However, the laws of logic and mathematics aren't possible truths - they are necessary truths meaning they exist in every possible world. In fact, we couldn't judge what is possible without using them. The "laws of reality", whatever those are (I'm assuming laws of nature?), are possibly true in that they could be different. God would also be a necessary truth in that he could not possibly be different and still be called "God". Premise 4: It is necessarily the case that something is explicable only if there was not a time when nothing existed. Con, unfortunately, makes little to no sense here. He dismisses complete explanation *in principle* as unnecessary because...well, I'm not exactly sure. Because of the threat of infinite regress? That's exactly what complete explanations are there for! They would stop the infinite regress of explanations in principle. And his second point is a complete logical non-sequitur. It does not follow that since something is already existent that it is not possible that that something cannot begin or go out of existence. For an easy example of this: say I explain the fact that my homework mysteriously disappeared with the explanation that my dog ate it (and suppose that is true) it doesn't follow that my dog can't begin to exist or go out of existence. Even better, suppose that a black hole's existence is explained/caused by the death of star, it obviously does not follow that the star can't begin or go out of existence. It only has to exist only up until the point until it collapses. Considering that his point about the laws of nature possibly being temporally necessary falls flat. And, again, I *granted* that virtual particles might pop into existence uncaused out of "nothing". But Con already conceded that they may possibly have a cause, which does nothing to refute my argument about complete explanations. Premise 5: Whatever is temporally necessary might be unlimited. My opponent confuses several things here. First, it's possible for there to be dependent temporally necessary things. Only unlimited temporally necessary things are not limited. I'd contend all those things are dependent temporally necessary beings except the consciousness of God. Second, Con makes several mistakes about what he is attacking. Classical theism doesn't hold that God created the laws of logic making them contingent; it holds that logic is grounded in God's nature, and the laws of logic would be something like divine thoughts. So, God couldn't make the law of non-contradiction false, as even God cannot change his own nature - that would be a logically impossibility. God is not dependent on logic; it doesn't even make sense to say God is dependent on his own nature. Premise 6: Whatever might explain itself is unlimited. More non-sequiturs. Let's say that I couldn't explain those axioms; it doesn't follow from that they are unlimited. I never said that we have to have complete explanations actually...just that they be possible. Going back to classical theism I would just say that the laws of logic are just part of God's nature. By the way, 1+1=2 isn't self-explanatory in the sense I mean it. Con is equivocating. 1+1=2 is a set of mathematical inferences and can be broken down, and he's using self-explanatory as synonym for obvious. I am using self-explanatory as capable of being explained only in terms of itself. None of those axioms are unlimited. Premise 8: Everything *that* is unlimited is supreme. Yes, the laws of logic and mathematics (what are the laws of reality?) are not supreme. That's because they are not unlimited. I am not talking about infinity as a mathematical concept. I'm not even sure where I mentioned infinity. God is not dependent on the laws of logic, as it's part of his nature, so Con's point about the laws logic "stopping" perfections is moot. Let's take these in order. Omniscience - doesn't mean that God can "know" things that are logically impossible. That's incoherence. Can you "know" that 1+1=12? Neither can God because it doesn't make any sense. Omnibenevolence - no God is not capable of doing evil. That would contradict his nature to even be capable of it as he is thought to be perfectly good. And all Con is doing is agreeing with my definition (and about all other classical theists as well) that God can only do what is logically possible to do. That is no knock against his omnipotence. Omnipotence - No, God cannot create a logical contradiction. Con has repeatedly asserted that logic "restricts" God, but surely this makes no sense upon further inspection. "Restriction" only makes sense if there is something more to which God does not have access to which would be better for him to have access to. Essentially Con is saying that God is "restricted" because he can't create logical contradictions. But logical impossibilities aren't things God doesn't have access to. But logical impossibilities aren't things at all. Is a square circle a thing? No. So saying God is "restricted" from having these perfections by logic makes no sense. It's impossible to go beyond logic. In conclusion: Con has done nothing in the slightest to put a dent in the argument and it still stands. [1] http://en.wikipedia.org... [2] http://www.answers.com...