A Monotheistic God Probably Does Not Exist

Pro, it seems as though based on the title of this debate you are assuming the burden of proof to show that the monothestic God does not in fact exist. I understand that in general, the BOP is on the theist to show that God does exist however it seems as though your contention is stronger and in fact a positive argument against God hence you are assuming a BOP. Anyway, because you have attempted to show God does not exist, I will first address these and focus on your arguments for this debate. I will only briefly offer my own arguments in favor of God's existence at the end. You can take it from there in the 2nd round.I. Argument from Evil1) Concede2) Concede3) Concede4) Deny5) Concede6) I don't like the word "unnecessary" in there. I think that this begs the question 7) Deny I am denying premise 4. First of all, you phrase it poorly. So I will rephrase what I think you mean to say is "If God is monibenevolent and if he also knew that evil+unecessary suffering was about to occur he would have prevented it if he could have" or something like that. Anyway, I have two problems. The first is just semantics. By calling suffering unecessary, you seem to imply that it has no purpose and you give it a strong connotation that God shouldve gotten rid of it. This begs the question and therefore should go. Anyway, your point stands, the gist of this premise is that if God is all good, he would want to get rid of all evil.The problem is that you give no support in favor of this premise. You simply state it is true. Now, you may think that it is obvious however I deny this. It is entirely reasonable to suppose that an all-good God allows evil for the sake of some greater good. Notice I said allows not causes. It is important to realize that all I am saying we may suppose is that God lets evil exist in order that He may bring some other and possibly greater good out of it. In other words, the ultimate greater good happens when God allows the evil. This is an entirely reasonable thing to believe. Because of that, in order for your argument to actually disprove God exists as described, you have to show how this assumption of mine (God allows evil for greater good) is in fact false necessarily and the opposite is true. You have to show that a good God simply cannot allow evil and a moral God has no good reason to allow evil ever in any situation. If you can do this, your argument succeeds. As for your examples, they are very emotionally powerful however logically you do not prove anything. You do not know what good and if there is some greater good God can bring about by allowing such evils to exist either in particular or the possibility of such evil in general. They are certainly very emotionally powerful instances but do not show that God cannot exist. As for your comment about heaven, it is true that God could make a world without suffering. Maybe some other world doesn't have suffering. This doesn't prove anything. All I am claiming is that a good God is not bound to create a world without suffering because a good God might allow suffering for some greater purposeNow, your paradox problems. These are old little conundrums but do not have much force among those who actually understand philosophy of religion. If it was this simple, God wouldve been disproven long ago. These are really just evidence of lack of understanding more than anything else. First:"...if a being can perform any action, then it should be able to create a task which this being is unable to perform; hence, this being cannot perform all actions. Yet, on the other hand, if this being cannot create a task that it is unable to perform, then there exists something it cannot do." The problem with this argument is that it has a false view of omnipotence. Omnipotence traditionally means that God can do anything logically possible. Not that the laws of logic bind Him so much as anything illogical is not really a thing at all but a string of meaningless words. You might as well say "can God create a dkaslfj;dsakl ?" Because a fjladkfj;dlsf or whatever is the same as any logical contradiciton, in other words, it is meaningless. Now, the quote says "it should be able to create a task which it cannot perform" however this is a contradiction in terms--- it is a "task which the being that can do all tasks cannot perform" its an absurdity. A self-contradiction like a married bachelor. So such a thing cannot exist because it is only a string of words, not a meaningful concept. Philosophers like Thomas Aquinas have thoroughly refuted this objection. Now on to my argument for God's existence. It is based on a few premises. 1. If a substance is both (a) contingent and (b) exists, it requires an external cause2. The sum of all contingent substances that exist is contingent and it exists (a and b) 3. Therefore, the sum of all contingent substances requires an external cause Defense of this argument:DefinitionsA substance is really anything that can be definedA contingent substance is one that in itself has possible existence because it might or might not exist. It does not have to but could. Most things we see are contingent. To be contingent simply means the nature of the thing and its existence are two separate principles. An external cause is something that makes the possible existence of the substance a reality. Defense of the premises:1. We must accept this premise. First of all, if we deny it, we deny that there is any real explanation for the existence of things. If we ask why does this contingent thing exist, we cannot appeal to the thing itself. The reason is that this would make it its own cause, in other words, it is more fundamental than itself, whcih is absurd. Also, it would mean that something that possibly exists caused its real existence but a possibility cannot do anything so thats also absurd. Since the contingent thing cannot explain itself, its explanation must be in something else. If we deny it is in something else we have to conclude that there is no explanation. There are two main problems with this. (1) This is an affront to reaosn which tells us that things have explanations. If we deny this, we are saying that there is in principlle no reason WHY this contingent substance exists. (2) It is metaphysically unsound becasue we should realize that possible things only recieve existence from real things. This is a metaphysical principle. BIG DISCLAIMER: WE CANNOT GET INTO ALL OF THE METAPHYSICS HERE it is impossible to have a real good thought out argument for God's existence on this kind of forum. However this is a brief sketch. 2. This premise holds because contingent things are things which might not or might exist. If two things exist but do not have to exist, the sum of them together does not have to exist. For something to HAVE TO EXIST, it means that its nature includes existence. However, if two things have natures that do not include existence, it follows that the sum of them together does not have a nature that includes existence because the nature of the sum of the two things is simply that of the two things. Since this holds true with two contingent things, it holds true no matter how many there are. In other words, the sum of all contingent things is itself contingent. This sum does in fact exist because there is at least one contingent thing in the world (this computer is contingent because in itself it does not have to exist...one contingent thing is sufficient to fulfill requirement a and thus prove the argument)Conclusion: the sum of contingent things has a cause. THis cause cannot be contingent because otherwise it would be included in the sum of contingent things. It must be outside of this sum and therefore not contingent. Because it is not contingent, it must be what we call necessary. A contingent thing might or might not exist. A necessary thing must exist by its own nature. Therefore, there exists at least one being such that its nature is to exist. We may proceed from here to understand what this being is. (AGAIN, THESE ARGUMENTS HAVE BEEN ARTICULATED IN 10000s of pages of philosophy...this is just a brief sketch)The necessary being must be (and again BRIEF reasons) pure reality and not anything else. If it were anything else, this extra part would be contingent and thus not truly the fundamental reality. Only something necessary and that is existence itself or pure reality does not need a cause and thus can be truly fundamental. 1. Infinite---Something is limited by its nature. But if the nature of something is subsistant being (pure reality, i.e. a necessary being) it follows that it is not limited 2. Immaterial- Material things do not necessarily exist. It is possible to logically concieve of a world without matter, energy, or physical laws. Further, if the necessary thing were material, its nature would be more than its existence which as we have said is false. 3. Unique- There is no way in principle to distinguish between two necessary beings. One would have to lack something the other had. To say a necessary being lacks something is to say that it is limited in some respect which we said is false. 4. All Powerful- Obviously as the cause of contingent things it is powerful. However since it is infinite, it must be all powerful. 5. All Good- Something is good insofar as it is in being. The necessary being is pure reality and thus pure goodness. 6. Intelligent- Something is intelligent if it can contain in itself the ideas of other things. Material things can only contain one idea in themselves. HOwever, to be removed from matter is to be able to contain multiple ideas (or forms as it is called in ancient philosophy) in itslef. Thus since the necessary being is immaterial it must have the capacity to contain in itslef many ideas or forms. However since it is unlimited, it must be able to contain all forms or be all knowing.