The Tri-Omni God chooses life

Thanks to GCL for her thought-provoking arguments. I'm now going to respond to her arguments and rebuild my case.Framework I'd like to begin by noting, first and foremost, our criterion of preponderance of evidence, meaning that we each equally share the burdens. Moreover, we are not making any presumptions as to God's existence nor are there any stipulations suggesting that we must operate under such an assumption. From that, and Pro does not contest this, providing a coherent case against the Tri-Omni God, or a case that he cannot in fact make such a choice or any choice at all, does in fact negate the resolution. Pro has not contested it, so I will extend my analysis through stating that, if I could prove, on balance, points I and II, I have negated the resolution. RebuttalsTo comment on this further, Pro suggests that the opposite of life is hell. This cannot be the case because it is possible to die and either [1] go to, in Pro's eyes, her vision of heaven or [2] simply disappear. "Hell" and "death" are not, in this sense, equivalent, so we are merely examining whether the Tri-Omni God has or would choose life or death, or whether he is able to make such a choice. Second, my opponent has not presented a logically coherent syllogism. Her P1 makes sense; if God is able to save -- the Tri-Omni God, per our definition, would be "able" to save per his omnipotence -- then he certainly should, as it would be morally right for him to do so, and this flows from omnibenevolence; that is, if God were omnibenevolent and omnipotent, then he should save. However, my opponent's P2 is that God saves, which implies that he is able to save, and from this she concludes that God saves. However, this is a begging-the-question fallacy: "Any form of argument in which the conclusion occurs as one of the premiseses. More generally, a chain of arguments in which the final conclusion is a premiss of one of the earlier arguments in the chain. Still more generally, an argument begs the question when it assumes any controversial point not conceded by the other side" (5). Pro's P2 is nearly identical to her premise, but he has not provided any justification for this. To prove this, not only must she show that it is at least likely that God exists, but that he in fact saves. Moreoever, she must justify, based on the Scriptures she has cited, why God "chooses" selectively whom to save. Why, for instance, do roughly 6 million babies die per year (6)? There are other instances where, if we were to use the Scriptures as our guide, God has carried out actions that we could hardly consider omnibenevolent, or "choosing life" (7): -He killed off virtually every living thing via the flood (8)-God helps men in Judah kill 500,000 Israelities (9)-God killed all the first-born sons of the Egyptians (10)-God killed 14,700 Israelites after they complained that he had killed so many of them (11)-God was involved in numerous other genocides, even more than I'm now citing (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) My opponent may try to attempt to issue a post-hoc rationalization as "part of God's will," but the problem is that we really need to question his motives. For instance, in many cases the reason for God's genocide was jealousy at people worshiping other gods. How is this justified? There are about 4,200 other religions (21). We would never justify the killing of people for believing differently as we do. We would rightly condemn these actions as immoral. Not only has he "chosen" death for these people insofar as he could "choose," but he has committed an act that is evil. If he commits an evil act, we cannot call him omnibenevolent. Now, even if my opponent were to point out any instance where God has saved someone, let me pose this: why some and not others? Why couldn't he save person (x) without slaughtering person (y)? Why did he allow person (a) to perish without allowing the same fate for person (b)? RegenerationPro argues that people are saved by grace and have no control over regeneraton save for free will, and this culminates in an argument for God choosing life. However, there is no logical connection to this. First of and foremost, omniscience cirvumvents free will. If God is Tri-Omni, meaning that he is omniscient, people do not have free will. Of course, we know that we have at least some from will by virtue of Heinseberg's Uncertainty Principle (22). This point alone is enough to negate the resolution because it negates the existence of the Tri-Omni God. Moreover, Pro contradicts herself in saying that we have free will, but at the same time "play no active role." Another point she makes is that God "works things for His Good and His Good alone." Whose good is he working toward, though, when he participates mass genocide, or allows gratuitous suffering to occur? Can we really say that a omnibenevolent, omnnipotent God would create a world in which there exists evil, and then refuse to intervene to save innocent lives? SalvationThere are several problems with Pro's remarks. She argues, first, that the Tri-Omni God "chooses" to give salvation to a certain amount of people when I have demonstrated that, per the very definition of omniscience, this isn't possible. Moreover, her narrative of predestiation suggests to us that God in some way has a list of people who will be saved and a list of people who won't, and people who believe in him are doing so because he has chosen them. Let's look beyond, of course, the lack of evidence for this claim and note the ramifications of it. If God has limited his atonement, which of course is a key tenet of Calvinism (23), this means that whilst some people are predestined to heaven, others -- everyone else -- is predestined for Hell. Why would an omnibenevolent God predestine people to eternal damnation? Moreover, why would he devise a system whereby he would create people in his image and then predestine them for Hell? Not to mention, how would these members of the elect know of their status? Do they have access to evidence the rest of us don't? My adversary has not contested that the question of God's existence doesn't possess truth value. Citing the Bible as evidence of God is, of course, circular logic. In light of the fact that the Bible was written over the course of 1500 years by 40 authors (24), we have no reason to trust it as prima facie evidence of God. Point 1Pro provides another syllogism which begs the question: P2 is the same as her conclusion. She does not explain why the Tri-Omni God is logically coherent, but merely asserts it. I've pointed out a number of logical inconsistences with her premises. Even her P1 is flawed because, if God is omniscient, he doesn't have free will because he possesses perfect knowledge of the future, which means that he cannot "choose" life. Insofar as God can "choose" anything, I have demonstrated several cases where he has in fact "chosen" death. Pro effectively concedes that it isn't possible to prove or disprove the Tri-Omni God. Indeed the question of God has no truth value, but we are inclined to reject concepts and ideas for which there is no evidence, which are unecessary, which require a plethora of assumptions, and are logically incoherent. This is effectively an appeal to Occam's Razor, which Pro drops. Not to mention, the criterion for our debate is preponderance of evidence, so in the same way that I cannot disprove God, Pro cannot prove God. However, I have provided reasons as to why he probably doesn't exist, or why the concept is logically incoherent, which have not been rebuted by Pro. EvidencePro admits that it requires faith to believe in a Tri-Omni God. Because faith doesn't require evidence, she concedes the point that there isn't any evidence. Her only response to Dr. Michio Kaku's account that something could come from nothing is an appeal to authority from an evangelist preacher (24). He does nothing more than assert that this account is unscientific. However, he isnt a scientist, nor has he refuted Dr. Kaku's remarks. He then remarks that God is provable. If so, why haven't you proved him? These remarks are utterly baseless. Pro goes on to provide several verses to asserts that we can make assumptions about God. Of course, I've pointed out why the Scriptures are not evidence, and in dropping Occam's Razor, Pro cannot win on this point because my position is not only logically coherent, but empirically falsifiable, whereas hers is not. She also misunderstands "theory." A scientific theory is one that is falsifiable and that has been strenously tested. Indeed, a theory could be tested and scientists could change their minds. But theologians cannot. The Bible is not subject to change. I'm not "assuming" God is not caused because I cannot "assume" a negative. I'm not assuming that he exists because the weight of evidence doesn't support his existence. Pro concedes that the question of God has truth value, but she misconstrues subjective ideas with objective, scientific evidence. Science is not based on ideas, but on experiments. Free WillBy conceding that omniscience is inclusive of knowing the future, she concedes that God cannot possibly have free will and thus make a choice. She then goes on to contradict herself by saying that "it is not God who is omniscient." This doesn't make any sense. If God isn't omniscient, he isn't Tri-Omni. ConclusionOut of characters, but far too many of my arguments have not been adequately addressed, so this debate is largely over.Sources(5) http://tinyurl.com...;(6) http://tinyurl.com...;(7) http://tinyurl.com...(8) Genesis 7:21-23 (9) 2 Chronicles 13:15-18 (10) Exodus 12:29 (11) Numbers 16:41-49 (12) Joshua 6:20-21(13) 1 Samuel 6:19 (14) Deuteronomy 2:32-35(15) Deuteronomy 3:3-7(16) Numbers 31:7-18(17) Genesis 19:24(18) 2 Kings 2:23-24(19) 2 Kings:9-10(20) Judges 14:11-19(21) http://tinyurl.com...;(22) Round 1, Source 4(23) http://tinyurl.com...;(24) http://tinyurl.com...