Warfare: Land Power (Pro) vs. Air Power (Con)

Thanks for the opening argument. On to rebuttals! 1. Strategic Bombing: Con emphasizes how much destruction Allied bombers caused during WWII. I completely agree that Hitler's oil and Japan's industry were hit hard by Allied strategic bombing. I freely admitted in Round 2 that air power can cause heavy casualties and great destruction. But the question here is - was that decisive? Did industrial bombing DIRECTLY lead to ultimate victory, or did it simply shape favorable conditions for ground forces to exploit? I believe the latter is true for the following reasons: First and foremost, a quick examination of Con's source yields an interesting discovery. According to Con's own figures (see Table 7), German oil production actually INCREASED throughout the war from 1,465,000 metric tons in 1940 to 1,963,000 metric tons in 1944. So much for the "destruction of Germany's oil industry"...... But in any case, why were the Allies targeting German oil and Japanese manufacturing in the first place? Because Panzers need fuel and island garrisons need supplies. In short, the bombing was aimed at stifling enemy GROUND FORCES, allowing them to be more easily overwhelmed and destroyed by friendly ground forces. This is the very definition of a Shaping Operation, and it's a strong indication that ground forces remained the primary focus. If the bombing of oil/industry was decisive by itself, then we must ask if victory would have been won by these efforts alone? If the Allies had kept their armies at home and instead simply sent waves of bombers against Hitler's oil, would he have said "I quit" and given France and Poland back? We know the answer to that question, because in spite of the years and years of industrial bombing, the German Army did not surrender until Allied ground forces had captured every last bit of Nazi territory, including Berlin itself. Dealing with an industrial bombing campaign would have been mere pinpricks to Hitler without also having to face the Soviet, American, and British armies. Conversely, we know from the North Koreans, North Vietnamese, and Taliban that victory can be achieved (albeit at a much higher price) without significant air power. As such, I maintain that air power is helpful, but ground power is still decisive. Finally, it's curious that Japanese manufacturing did not significantly drop until 1944-45, because Japan had been at war since 1937. Did nothing decisive occur between 1937-1943? The only reason the bombing increased between 1944-45 is because Allied ground forces attacked and captured the islands of Saipan and Tinian, which allowed the construction of airfields that were in range of the Japanese home islands. The ground forces had to capture and occupy this terrain before the bombing was possible. 2. AirLand Battle: I applaud Con's inclusion of AirLand Battle, as it was an important evolution in military doctrine. However, Con does not give a completely accurate summary of what it actually was. AirLand Battle was devised as a solution to the problem of vastly superior numbers of Soviet Bloc ground forces in Europe and Asia. At the height of the Cold War, the USSR possessed 157 armor/infantry divisions. [1] The USA had less than 16 divisions. [2] The self-proclaimed goal of AirLand Battle was to allow the US to "Fight Outnumbered and Win." [3] It was precisely because ground forces are so decisive that AirLand Battle was invented - the US needed a strategy that would allow 16 divisions to defeat 157 divisions. And..... Ironically, that strategy was NOT to rely more on air power. AirLand Battle centered around the creation of "The Big 5" technological advancements. The Big 5 were: The M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle, the M1 Abrams tank, the Patriot missile, the UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter, and the AH-64 Apache helicopter. The first three are ground based systems, and the last two are airframes, but the blackhawk is only a transport aircraft and the AH-64 is only a ground support/reconnaisance aircraft. So, interestingly, AirLand Battle actually introduced more land-based systems (Bradley, Abrams, Patrior) than air systems, which is very suggestive of where the decisive focus was. 5 Rings Concept: This is similar to the Industrial Web Theory that was exercised in Vietnam - the thought that attacking certain nodes, or "rings" of an enemy's war effort can cause collapse. I have two very simple rebuttals to this thought. First, it's just a theory. There's no empirical evidence to indicate it is correct. Second, its general application has failed to produce victory in at least 3 wars. The strategic bombing over Vietnam, which at various times targeted each of the 5 rings, obviously failed to defeat the North Vietnamese. Air strikes in Iraq, most notably the airstrike that killed Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, did not cause the Iraqi insurgency to die down. Years worth of drone strikes in Afghanistan/Pakistan targeting Taliban leadership have not quelled that insurgency either. In fact, interestingly, it was the surge of GROUND TROOPS in each conflict that is credited with the fragile victories enjoyed by the US. Finally, Con says that Warden's theory has led to overwhelming Air Power victory in every war since Desert Storm, most notably Operation Allied Force. Interestingly, there is much doubt about the air force's effectiveness in Operation Allied Force. For example, the Air Force reported that it had destroyed 110 tanks, 210 armored vehicles, and 449 artillery pieces during the operation. However, later reports concluded that only 26 tanks, 12 armored vehicles, and 8 artillery pieces were actually hit. [4] Furthermore, a post-conflict analysis conducted by the US Army War College concluded, "Air power neither decimated nor defeated the Yugoslav army in the field. In fact, the air strikes did very little to damage Serb forces in Kosovo." [5] It was actually the eventual threat of a NATO ground invasion that caused Slobodan Milosevic to yeild. In conclusion, there's no real evidence that air power has decisively caused victory in ANY war. Conversely, there are numerous examples of armies winning victory (or, at least, avoiding defeat) with either inferior or no air power at all. These examples include the Red Army on the eastern front, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Soviet-Afghan War, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan). If air power was decisive over land forces, it would follow that the side with the best air force should always win. Yet this does not happen. To the contrary, recent history has shown that the side with the best air force often loses. Conversely, the side with the most overwhelming and most dedicated ground forces usually acheives victory. [1] http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk... [2] http://www.history.army.mil... [3] http://www.benning.army.mil... [4] http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil... [5] Ibid.