BeIR/webis-touche2020 huggingface dataset:
The bombing was immoral and illegal

Before Hiroshima and Nagasaki the use of the Atomic Bomb did not raise profound moral questions with allied policymakers. Civilians had been intentionally targeted from the air since the start of the war and both Japanese and German cities had been already subjected to relentless bombardment. There was no compelling reason for politicians to view the Atomic bomb any differently from the London blitz or the Dresden raid.[1] The Hague conventions had been systemically honoured only in the breach for the previous six years and so would not have given Truman or his advisors any particular heartache. The radiation effects were as yet unknown and so there was no reason to treat atomic bombs as anything more sinister than a mighty conventional bomb would be. Had the radiation been known about then it might have moved them into a category akin to chemical or biological weapons, which were already frowned upon. Chemical weapons were banned by the Hague convention in 1899.[2] This did not of course prevent their widespread use in WWI but the horrified reaction to the use of mustard gas and other agents lead to the Geneva Protocol[3] which came into force in 1928 although the US was not a signatory. In practice Atomic weapons have not been since treated as equivalent to poison gas or other ‘analogous devices’ and thus the International Court of Justice has said that they do not breach the Hague conventions or the Geneva Protocol.[4] Therefore as these were the only international laws in force at the time of the action the dropping the bombs were not illegal acts. [1] Barton J. Bernstein, ‘The Atomic Bombings Reconsidered’, Foreign Affairs, vol.74, no.1, Jan.- Feb., 1995. p.135. [2] Declaration on the Use of Projectiles the Object of Which is the Diffusion of Asphyxiating or Deleterious Gases; July 29, 1899; http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/dec99-02.asp [3] Geneva Protocol to Hague Convention http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Geneva_Protocol_to_Hague_Convention [4] International Court of Justice advisory opinion of 8 July 1996 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, paragraphs 54-6. http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/95/7495.pdf?PHPSESSID=61c346606e8c49...
The use of atomic bombs was the only was to persuade Japan's rulers to surrender

From late 1944 Japan’s defeat was certain. The Japanese leadership knew this, but this knowledge did not equate acceptance nor did it translate into action. The Americans felt that some sort of game changer was needed to push the Japanese into surrender.  According to Henry L. Stimson “We, [the administration] felt that to extract a genuine surrender from the Emperor and his military advisors, they must be administered a tremendous shock which would carry convincing proof of our power to destroy the Empire.”[1] The United States Strategic Bombing Survey reckoned that to cause equivalent damage done by the Atomic Bombs using conventional weapons would require 345 B29’s.[2] However it is not the fact that the Atomic bombs saved hundreds of B29 missions that is the crucial element. That is the sheer terror that the destructive power of the atomic bombs. This made the Atomic bombs of a different order to any number of conventional B29 missions and was a crucial factor in bringing about the Japanese surrender. If the fact that a city could be levelled in a single night could make the Japanese surrender they would have done so many months previously, and many times over. Important members of the Japanese government agreed with Stimson’s assessment of the importance of shock. Prime Minister Suzuki said “The atomic bomb provided an additional reason for surrender as well as an extremely favorable opportunity to commence peace talks. I believed such an opportunity could not be afforded by B-29 bombings alone.”[3] [1] Secretary of War, Henry Stimson quoted by Rudolph A. Winnacker, ‘The Debate About Hiroshima’, Military Affairs, vol.11, no.1, Spring 1947, p.27. [2] United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Summary Report (Pacific War), http://www.anesi.com/ussbs01.htm p.24. [3] Suzuki Kantaro quoted by Sadao Asada, ‘The Shock of the Atomic Bomb and Japan’s Decision to Surrender - A Reconsideration’ in Hiroshima in History: The Myths of Revisionism, (Columbia, 2007) p. 35
The continuation of a conventional war would have been much costlier than an atomic attack

The US was planning for a massive invasion of the Japanese Home Islands (Operation Olympic). Nine divisions were to land on the southern Japanese island of Kyushu. However the Japanese had ten divisions in southern Kyushu by August, and 600,000 troops on the whole island.[1] The US army widely disseminated a figure of half a million casualties for the conquest of Japan. This was however only the figure for public consumption and some calculations went much higher.[2] On top of the US losses the same amount and probably considerably more Japanese deaths would have to be added. The estimates of US losses were so bad that atomic bombs were actually considered for use in clearing the landing beaches. Chief of Staff George C. Marshall argued “We had to visualize very heavy casualties unless we had enough atomic bombs at the time to supplement the troop action.”[3] Invasion was therefore not really an alternative to the A-bomb use at all. Although the use of the bomb in a battlefield situation might be more justifiable that it was considered shows the ignorance of the radiation effects that might well have been a disaster for US forces as well as Japanese. [1] Edward J. Drea, ‘Intelligence Forecasting for the Invasion of Japan: previews of Hell, Hiroshima in History: The Myths of Revisionism, (Columbia, 2007) p.59,71 [2] D. M. Giangreco, "A score of bloody Okinawas and Iwo Jimas": President Truman and casualty estimates for the invasion of Japan’, Hiroshima in History: The Myths of Revisionism, (Columbia, 2007), p.88 [3] Edward J. Drea, ‘Intelligence Forecasting for the Invasion of Japan: previews of Hell’, pp.74-5.
The United States need to maximise the effectiveness of its atomic weaponry program before it could be compromised

There was no possibility of keeping nuclear weapons under wraps; scientists from several countries had been working on them. They were ripe for discovery. Robert Oppenheimer pointed out “it is a profound and necessary truth, that deep things in science are not found because they are useful; they are found because it was possible to find them”[1] If Atomic bombs were going to be developed anyway there was a compelling reason to be the first to own these weapons, even to be the first to use them. Deterrence, would not work if suspected to be a bluff or a dud, having used the bomb twice it could not be doubted that the US was willing to use it again in extremis. The cost of building the bomb was enormous. At 2.2 billion dollars the Manhattan project cost about the same as the drive to get to the moon in the sixties, but the comparison is not adjusted for inflation.[2] The vast majority of the cost, and of the 130,000 employed in the project, was not in the development but in the building of the factories to produce the fissile material. The opportunity cost of that 2.2 billion is surely huge, how many more bombers and tanks or how many more medicines and bandages could it have bought? Not using the bomb and squandering that investment would bring that opportunity cost to life; the question is not just how many would die in months more war but how many might not have to build something unused. [1Robert Oppenheimer quoted by Richard Rhodes, ‘The Atomic Bomb in the Second World War’ in C. C. Kelley (ed.), Remembering the Manhattan Project : Perspectives on the Making of the Atomic Bomb and Its Legacy, (River Edge NJ, 2005), p.18 [2] ibid p.22
It was not necessary to use atomic weapons on a population centre

The first bomb, on Hiroshima was sufficient to achieve the objective of surrender without the use of the second bomb after only a very short period of time. There was only three days between the two bombings, an unpardonably short period. Communications between Hiroshima and Tokyo had unsurprisingly been severed, so the full effect had yet to sink in on some policy makers by the time ‘Fat Man’ was dropped. It had however already convinced Foreign Minister Togo, Prime Minister Suzuki and crucially the Emperor himself. He said upon hearing the news of Hiroshima:  “Now that things have come to this impasse, we must bow to the inevitable. ... We should lose no time in ending the war so as not to have another tragedy like this.”[1] The rest of the cabinet was as yet unmoved, but even if they had been it is unlikely they would have been able to actually surrender before the second bomb was dropped. There were significant other factors in play as well. Before the second bomb was dropped the Japanese had learnt of the Soviet attack which dashed their last hopes of mediation for a favourable settlement and they were not optimistic of their chances in that conflict, even the army’s planners expected Manchukuo’s capital Changchun would fall in two weeks.[2] Although the Cabinet was deadlocked 3 to 3 this was the case both before and after the news of Nagasaki came in, the point of fact that the US had more than one bomb although a shock to those opposed to surrender did not alter their position. Ultimately the Emperor was forced to intervene on the side of the proponents of peace, his mind had been made up even before the first bomb. It is arguable that Hiroshima was necessary to push him into acting, which was unprecedented but the Nagasaki bombing was entirely superfluous. Historian Sadao Asada’s opinion is that the second bomb was unnecessary.[3] [1] Emperor Hirohito quoted by Sadao Asada, ‘The Shock of the Atomic Bomb and Japan’s Decision to Surrender - A Reconsideration’ in Hiroshima in History: The Myths of Revisionism p.33. [2] Sadao Asada, ‘The Shock of the Atomic Bomb and Japan’s Decision to Surrender - A Reconsideration’ in Hiroshima in History: The Myths of Revisionism, p.36. [3] Sadao Asada, ‘The Shock of the Atomic Bomb and Japan’s Decision to Surrender - A Reconsideration’ in Hiroshima in History: The Myths of Revisionism, pp.38, 41-2.
A negotiated peace would have been preferable to the dropping of the atomic bombs

It is conventional to argue that Japan was defeated already and so the bombings were unnecessary as Sadao Asada points out this confuses defeat with surrender. However such a position seems equally to confuse surrender with peace. That there had to be an unconditional surrender seems almost unquestioned. Most wars do not end in an unconditional surrender of one side or the other, Japanese defeat was plain so a negotiated peace would normally have been set in motion when the US saw the terrible casualties it might be forced to take in its push for total victory. The Americans learnt of Japanese willingness to negotiate in July, on the 13th Secretary of the Navy Forrestal wrote in his diary “The first real evidence of a Japanese desire to get out of the war came today... Togo said further that the unconditional surrender term of the Allies was about the only thing in the way of termination of the war”[1] Stimson, Grew and Forrestal aimed at persuading president Truman to offer the Japanese promise of the preservation of the monarchy as an alternative to unconditional surrender.[2] Ultimately the Potsdam declaration set the unconditional surrender policy in stone.[3] Offering such a condition would certainly have strengthened the peace party within the Japanese cabinet and allowed them to present further resistance by the generals and admirals as endangering the monarchy.[4] However, on its own this would probably not have lead to peace, the cabinet would still have been split 3-3 with the Army and Navy ministers both opposed and with vetoes on policy. Even the most belligerent of the Japanese Cabinet, Army Minister Anami’s conditions were preservation of the Imperial institution, no military occupation of the home islands, Japanese forces were to demobilize and disarm themselves and war criminals were to be prosecuted by the Japanese themselves.[5] While these conditions are obviously ripe for exploitation, would they really disarm and try war criminals? they are not unreasonable. Just because there was no hope that the US would accept these conditions, they fly in the face of the Potsdam Declaration from which the allies would not deviate, does not mean that another alternative to unconditional surrender should not be considered as an alternative to the dropping of the Nuclear bombs. [1] Secretary Forrestal quoted by Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Racing the enemy: Stalin, Truman and the surrender of Japan, (Cambridge MA, 2005) p134. [2] Campbell Craig and Sergay Radchenko, The Atomic Bomb and the Origins of the Cold War, (New Haven, 2008) p.69 [3] Potsdam Declaration, http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c06.html [4] Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Racing the enemy: Stalin, Truman and the surrender of Japan, (Cambridge, 2005) pp.290-1. [5] Sadao Asada, ‘The Shock of the Atomic Bomb and Japan’s Decision to Surrender - A Reconsideration’ in Hiroshima in History: The Myths of Revisionism, p. 39.
The bombing was immoral and illegal

The use of the Atomic bomb raised immediate moral questions as to its use. Albert Einstein argued “The American decision [to use the bomb] may have been a fatal error, for men accustom themselves to thinking a weapon which has been used once can be used again... [on the other hand] Our renunciation of this weapon as too terrible to use would have carried great weight”[1] So far Einstein has been proved wrong and the precedent thus set has not been followed. That the bombs are ‘to terrible to use’ does seem to have sunk in. The use of the bombs was also illegal as it would have breached the Hague conventions of 1899 and 1907, signed by the US. Of Hague IV The Laws and Customs of War on Land it probably breached   articles 23, forbidding the use of weapons that cause ‘unnecessary suffering’, and article 25 forbidding the attack of undefended towns. It would certainly by its indiscriminate nature have breached article 27 “In sieges and bombardments all necessary steps must be taken to spare, as far as possible, buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not being used at the time for military purposes”[2] as well as the attendant declaration forbidding attack from aircraft! Clearly such sections forbidding attack from aircraft, or balloons in the 1899 version make the Hague convention seem antiquated but the laws of war in general remain even now as they were codified in 1907.[3] The International Court of Justice has referred back to these precedents “In the view of the vast majority of states as well as the writers there can be no doubt as to the applicability of humanitarian law to nuclear weapons. The Court shares that view.”[4] That humanitarian law included the Hague conventions.  The court reconfirmed the view that “States must never make civilians the object of attack and must consequently never use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets”[5] It is noteworthy that dissensions from a position of banning the use of nuclear weapons entirely focus on the possible use with minimal civilian casualties.[6] Since the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings did not attempt to minimize civilian casualties the implication is that their use was illegal based upon the Hague conventions that were already in force. [1] Albert Einstein, quoted by Rudolph A. Winnacker, ‘The Debate About Hiroshima’, Military Affairs, vol.11, no.1, Spring 1947, p.25. [2] Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV); October 18, 1907 http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hague04.asp [3] Malcom H. Shaw, International Law (Cambridge, 1997), p.807. [4] International Court of Justice advisory opinion of 8 July 1996 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, paragraphs 85-6. http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/95/7495.pdf?PHPSESSID=61c346606e8c49... [5] ibid. para. 78. [6] ibid. para. 91.
The continuation of a conventional war would have been much costlier than an atomic attack

The alternatives to either invasion or atomic bombing are covered in the previous counterpoint. It can only be said that none of them are without a high human cost, though invasion spearheaded by an atomic barrage is surely the worst. The principle of advantage of the conventional bombing option being that it would be easily justifiable as only quantitively different to what the Japanese had already meted out themselves. The blockade similarly has easy justification in not being a deviation from any accepted standards as well as only indirectly attacking the home islands while putting the onus on the Japanese government to avoid starvation. Really in order to find a less costly alternative then diplomacy has to be raised for which refer to the second response argument.
PMCs have an equally strong incentive to perform.

This image of responsible professionals may not be entirely justified. Some employees of PMCs may have no military experience, those who do may have been dishonourably discharged from duty and some may be implicated in criminal activity or atrocities, such as Eeben Barlow (former officer in South African 32nd Battalion- Assassination squad during Apartheid, now a chief of PMC Executive Outcomes which predominantly employs ex-secret policemen). These people may know how to do the job but they may also not be the kind of people we want working with the military.
PMCs provide a service that may be otherwise unavailable.

The use of mercenaries is counterproductive for unstable states. By relying on hired mercenaries weak states encourage private competition rather than reinforcing their own nascent armies. The emergence of powerful local, as well as international, mercenary organisations frustrates the ultimate goal of securing a state monopoly over the use of force. There are many cases where mercenaries have remained in a region long after their official contract ended in an attempt to exploit regional instability in order to further a particular ideological cause or reap financial reward. Colonel Bob Denard fought vaguely “against Communism” in Africa and attempted to overthrow the government of the Comoros Islands off Madagascar on four separate occasions. Similarly, Colonel “Mad” Mike Hoare tried to topple the government of the Seychelles in 1981, arriving with 43 mercenaries disguised as rugby playing members of a beer-tasting club named The Ancient Order of Froth Blowers. Furthermore, PMCs may be helpful in resolving conflicts in the short-term, they are not viable solutions because they do nothing to actually solve the problem in the long-term.
PMCs have an interest in conflict.

ncreased reliance on mercenaries is destabilising in the long term. It allows invaders and local governments to feel that they can get away with not providing sufficiently trained or numerous security forces because there are men on the ground. It also means that the most influential actors, large multi-national companies, no longer have to pressure governments so hard to provide security guarantees for everyone because they can buy their own. That leaves those without influence or money high and dry. This then leads to a proliferation of armed forces in the country, some working for the central government, others for local governments and some for private individuals and firms. These PMCs are hired provide security and to help create stability yet that is not where their interests lie. If the country returns to stability they are out of a job so it is in their interest to keep an unstable situation unstable to result in more work. (Wennmann, 2008)
PMCs violate human rights and International agreements in pursuit of profit or power.

Some PMCs may abuse the power they wield. Simon Mann, founder of PMCs EO and Sandline International, in a recent plot to oust President Obiang in Equatorial Guinea (BBC News, 2008) shows that even mercenary organisations considered legitimate by the British Government remain staffed by corrupt opportunists.  It is highly morally questionable whether organisations with such a profound disrespect for the sovereignty of other nation states should be involved with the training of our armed forces, let alone fighting alongside them.
PMCs are a valuable resource

PMCs are a flexible and efficient tool with which to fight 21st Century wars making them a necessity. Private contractors can be hired at short notice and used only when necessary. They can be used to carry out specific missions, to reinforce traditional troops where greater numbers are required or to protect other contractors whilst traditional troops carry out more lucrative missions. Additionally, most PMCs are non-combative but rather defensive, providing security for officials, supply trains etc. As a result they are viewed less as invaders or “the enemy” and more as peace-keepers.
PMCs have an equally strong incentive to perform.

PMCs must perform carefully and effectively to secure future contracts. It is therefore in their interests to ensure their employees are well- trained and well-equipped and perform to the highest standard. Most PMCs recruit ex-service personnel as a way to ensure the quality of their force.  In 2004 more SAS soldiers worked privately in Iraq than served in the army. Additionally, governments increasingly recognise the quality of mercenaries. PMCs and regular militaries cross over on occasion: An American PMC -Military Professional Resources Inc - trains the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) on behalf of the US Government (Lock, 2011). The British Ministry of Defence now allows soldiers yearlong sabbaticals to work as mercenaries in the hope they will return having earned more in the private sector. This official recognition suggests that mercenaries have shed their “dogs of war” image. They are no longer disreputable maverick figures operating in failed states but highly trained professionals endorsed by national governments
PMCs provide a service that may be otherwise unavailable.

Many nation states have achieved sufficient unity to rely on their own armies but for those which cant, mercenary forces provide an invaluable and possibly only mode of protection and security. British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw believes that in an era of “small wars and weak states” mercenaries have a “legitimate role” (The Economist, 2002). Mercenaries may be the only way of providing short term security guarantees to allow a government to establish itself without relying on warlords or one side of an ethnic conflict. This could be the only way out of a pattern of coup and counter-coup. Recruiting local mercenaries also has the benefits of reducing transportation costs, instant readiness as well as any knowledge of the local politics, geography and customs which may be highly valuable to a security force. These local recruits may be less inclined to share this information with a government force.
The role of PMCs has had a negative effect on traditional militaries and their operations.

This does not necessarily mean that there is anything inherently wrong with using PMCs. While it might be true that the United States has sometimes misjudged which private forces to hire, this does not mean that we cannot use PMCs altogether. In fact, there can be solutions to ensure the quality of PMCs, such as legal regulation. The risk of inadvertently funding the enemy temporarily is perhaps worth taking, considering the alternative may be to have them constantly preventing anything being done to help. Short-term compromise could be the best option to long-term victory.