Three Philosophical Topics - 1F

I will be arguing against the Source model (the negation of which is all that is necessary for a CON victory) and advocating the Cogito Model, which requires four things: - Adequate Determinism Is True -Chance Must Not Be The Direct Cause of Action -Our Will is Adequately Determined -Our Actions are Causally Determined by Our Will ===> Introduction <=== Hard determinism is not science, but rather scientism. PRO has given the following definition of Free Will: the ability that rational agents have when they exercise control over their actions. It is an undeniable fact that man experiences the act of reasoning, while a rock, or a low-level organism does not. Thus free will cannot be denied without denying our ability to reason and negating our ability to affirm or negate the resolution ===> The Consequence Argument <=== It's ironic that one who believes in time travel would advocate such an argument, but I digress My first objection is that, in my view, the main problem with hard determinism is that it takes a post hoc view of events that tell us nothing about the moment of decision. Suppose we had external knowledge that Jack has Free Will,which for the sake of argument, we will take to mean that he has alternate choices open to him. Jack wants to get from point A to point B, and has roads R1 and R2 available to him. Jack, who we know is empowered with libertarian free will, can choose either road to reach his destination, thus the argument does not disprove the possibility of Free Will. When the incompatibilist says that Jack couldï¿½ have only taken R2, it only has meaning after the fact. When we look at it from the future, of course he couldï¿½ only choose R2, that is, if he took R2, he could not have taken R1 as well. This tells us nothing about the existence of choices. G.E. Moore writes "The question of Free Will has thus been represented as merely the question whether we ever could have chosen, what we did not choose, or ever can choose, what, in fact, we shall not choose. And since there is some plausibility in this contention, it is, I think, worth while to point out that here again it is absolutely certain that, in two different senses, at least, we often could have chosen, what, in fact, we did not choose; and that in neither sense does this fact contradict the principle of causality."ï¿½ [1] My second objection is that the incompatibilist conflates causedï¿½and causally determinedï¿½[3] as well as willï¿½ and ï¿½€œpower.ï¿½€ï¿½[4] Obviously, it is empirically impossible (and theoretically impossible as well, which I will come to later) to take into account every factor involved in a personï¿½€™s decision making. We must necessarily simplify it to this: Jack wants to get from point A to point B, and has roads R1 and R2 available to him. But this is not incompatible with causality: as we stated, he was caused to make either decision by the fact that he wished to get from A to B. The fact that he only has the options R1 and R2 available to him are a matter of power not will, and his decision was caused, but not causally determined. In the same sense, Jack could not fly from A to B, as man does not have the power to fly, or at least not without mechanical assistance. ===> The Source Model <=== ï¿½€œThe source model conceives of control if one is the ï¿½€˜ultimate originï¿½€™ of it - it conceives of control as emanating from one's self. Thus, if an agent is not the ultimate source or origin of her actions, then she can't be rightly in control - and thus rightly have no free will.ï¿½€ï¿½ In this case, the Source model would seem to imply that in order to be free, an action must be uncaused. However, this would not be freedom, but randomness. As I stated in my thesis, adequate determinism is necessary to maintain the Cogito model, adequate meaning caused, though taking into consideration the randomness that exists at a quantum level.[2] From this, we can reduce the Source argument ad absurdum: the quantum particles in the universe are the ultimate source of their actions. They obey no specific law or pattern; the predictions we make are only accurate one a larger scale when we factor in the probability that, say, an alpha particle is emitted from a radioactive isotope, which allows us to use various forms of radiometric dating. Thus quantum particles possess Free Will, while humans do not.[3] ===> Hard Determinism is Self Refuting <=== This requires four premises: 1) with respect to the free will issue, we should believe what is true 2) ï¿½€œoughtï¿½€ï¿½ implies ï¿½€œcan,ï¿½€ï¿½ ie. we ought not do something that is impossible, for example, jump off of a building and attempt to fly 3) If determinism is true, than what ï¿½€œcanï¿½€ï¿½ be done is done. This follows from the definition of determinism. 4) I personally believe in Free Will. This comes from introspection. It is not necessary that Free Will be true, as that would be begging the question, only that I believe it. THE ARGUMENT 1. With respect to the free-will issue, we should refrain from believing falsehoods. (premise) 2. Whatever should be done can be done. (premise) 3. If determinism is true, then whatever can be done, is done. (premise) 4. I believe in minimal free will. (premise) 5. With respect to the free will issue, we can refrain from believing falsehoods. (from 1,2) 6. If determinism is true, then with respect to the free will issue, we refrain from believing falsehoods. (from 3,5) 7. If determinism is true, then minimal free will is true. (from 6,4) 8. Minimal free will is true. (from 7) [6] As you can see, step 7 shows a contradiction, which leads us to step 8, hard determinism is false. I will clarify this later. ===> The Gï¿½ï¿½delian Argument <=== This is a complex logical derivation of Gï¿½ï¿½delï¿½€™s theoretical incompleteness theorem. This is highly advanced, and I ask the voters to refrain from considering it unless they feel they can understand it. This was first postulated by J.R. Lucas in his 1959 paper ï¿½€œMinds, Machines, and Gï¿½ï¿½del.ï¿½€ï¿½ Due to space constraints, I am forced to clarify it in later rounds. 1. Determinism ï¿½†" For any human h there exists at least one (deterministic) logical system L(h) which reliably predicts h's actions in all circumstances. 2. For any logical system L a sufficiently skilled mathematical logician (equipped with a sufficiently powerful computer if necessary) can construct some statements T(L) which are true but unprovable in L. (This follows from Gï¿½ï¿½del's first theorem.) 3. If a human m is a sufficiently skillful mathematical logician (equipped with a sufficiently powerful computer if necessary) then if m is given L(m), he or she can construct T(L(m)) and 4. Determine that they are true--which L(m) cannot do. 5. Hence L(m) does not reliably predict m's actions in all circumstances. 6. Hence m has free will. 7. It is implausible that the qualitative difference between mathematical logicians and the rest of the population is such that the former have free will and the latter do not. ===> Argument From Consciousness <=== Jean-Paul Sartre states that ï¿½€œa consciousness externally motivated-becomes pure exteriority and ceases to be consciousnessï¿½€ï¿½[5] It is undeniable that we experience consciousness. How then is it possible for man not to have some degree of freedom? What evolutionary purpose could there possibly be in developing the ILLUSION of consciousness, but not consciousness itself? ===> Argument from experience <=== We experience decision making. I realize I have derided several debaters for use of experiential arguments, however, I contend that this is fundamentally different: one can logically deny that he has experienced God with the proper understanding of human cognition; one cannot deny that we experience Free Will without denying our ability to perceive anything. I will expand on this later. SOURCE(S) http://www.debate.org...