Zaradi's Prized Tournament: Animal Rights

Thanks, 16k, for a great debate. I will now rebut and crystallize. PRO's CASEC1. PragmatismOverviewsOV1. I am not saying Pro must defend all rights insofar as he defends ANY rights. If we acknowledge that my rights exist in spite of utilitarian considerations--and it seems like all rights will sometimes run into conflict with utilitarian goals--then utilitarianism isn't a good justification for rights, because they defeat their own purpose. OV2. Justice is about fairness, not survival. Even if an action weren't utilitarian, if it were fair, it would be just. This is true merely by the R1 definitions. We can imagine scenarios, whatever they may be, where fairness and utility would conflict, where I was due something, but yet deprived of it to further the greater good. Thus, utilitarianism's a poor framework for the round. OV3. We don't necessarily support rights for utilitarian reasons. We may ground them because in the dignity of life, even if respecting that dignity can produce bad ends. Pro cannot assert as fact that the root of rights is utilitarianism. Moreover, Pro DROPS that rights are often at odds with utilitarian goals, which implies that the utilitarian would not recognize any rights, so as not to constrain the pursuit of the greatest good. Pro's point is an implicit K and does contradict his own case. OV4. The example that I gave may be legal, but Pro doesn't explain why the notion that rights should be balanced cannot apply to moral rights too. Pro says, "legal rights are not always indicative of rights," but the agreed on definition of rights includes legal rights. Finally, recognition does not mean enforcement in all cases. We recognize that I have a right to free movement, but we must balance that against someone else's right to property. That doesn't mean we only recognize one right; we can recognize both, but only enforce one in a given situation. Recognition is merely agreeing that a right exists and should be weighed when balancing the scales of justice. So, saying that animal rights inherently preclude all testing or hunting is wrong. OV5. Pro agrees that his C1 is predicated on his C2. TRN. Utilitarianism argues that, occasionally, even humans must be used as a means to an end (the greater good). Kant argues that this is ALWAYS immoral. SCA. Animal Testinga) Pro notes that %86 of drugs in early human trials fail later. This data applies to humans testing in Phase 1 of clinical trials. Phase 1 tests on only a very small group of people, so, arguably, if that initial pool were expanded, it's accuracy would increase. Moreover, studies only advance to phase 1 after animal testing, which speaks even more authoritatively on the inefficacy of animal studies. Besides, there are good reasons to believe that testing on humans would be accurate: "the FDA and. .. (EMA) introduced guidelines for testing very small 'microdoses' of drugs in humans. .. These early tests. .. would show, for instance, how the drug is distributed and broken down in the body, and whether it hits the right molecular target. .. [A]. .. study of the new AKT drug formulations. .. allowed the team to pick the one absorbed best by the body for use in future trials. " [. http://tinyurl.com...] Pro also never contests the accuracy of the numbers I gave earlier, he only says I "misapplied" them. b1) Some animals will invariably die or be injured in testing, but if a right to humane treatment is recognized, it wouldn't curtail all testing, and regulation does minimize animal suffering. At the very least, this mitigates Pro's impacts. b2) Testing on synthetic organs is happening now, in the status quo. The research Pro cites is referring to all animal research, not just inhumane research. Therefore, it seems possible to use animals for humane experiments, and to reserve inhumane tests to alternatives. This would respect animal rights. SCB. Sustenancea) Pro agrees supplements provide protein. It also seems possible to either find other sources of fats or to synthesizing them,eliminating dietary reasons for carnivory. b) The question is whether there are species like the wild boar in the Sahara region (or even in Alaska), and Pro has not given any evidence to show that there are. Moreover, what is to stop people overhunting or stockpiling meat? Thus, my argument about ecological collapse stands. If the environment collapses, it will be even harder for people to find food (even plant food), and that isn't utilitarian--more people in the long run. C2. Moral CommunityOverviewsOV1. Pro says that this argument is question-begging because it relies "upon the opinion of the author as to what makes harming animals evil. " In fact, the argument merely articulates what I said last round: that such a narrow-focus on rationality ignores the important emotional facets of morality. That rationality alone is sufficient to construct an accurate picture of morality. This is DROPPED. OV2. Pro argues that if animals aren't within the MC, their rights cannot be infringed on because they have no rights. This FAILS TO DENY that things outside of the MC can still be treated in unfair or unreasonable ways. Thus, while the MC discusses justice, it does so insufficiently and incompletely, making it a bad way to weigh the round. My framework is more complete, because if something cannot suffer, then there is no way to be unfair or unreasonable towards it--it has no good of its own and so can't be wronged. OV3. Pro cannot have it both ways. First he says that legal rights are not indicative of moral rights, but now he says that legal rights are based on morality. Regardless, legal rights and moral rights are not the same; legal rights are things we voluntarily create and confer. Moral rights exist just in virtue of what morality is, irrespective of whether we choose to confer it. Even if we use morality as a justification for many legal rights, we don't HAVE to do that. We could choose to give animals legal rights (and, in fact, we have made that choice as point (d) of this contention shows), whether or not animals have moral rights. So, Pro cannot say that legal rights are necessarily predicated on morality. Pro does say that because animals don't have moral rights, there is no reason to give them legal rights. But, Pro has consistently repeated that it is morally good for humans to treat animals well. So, maybe animals should be given legal rights to ensure human moral wellbeing. That would still give animals a legal right which, per my case's OB4, justice would have to recognize. Argumentsa) Pro says: "Animals. .. cannot rationalize why [things are] moral. " I have argued, and Pro has even agreed, that emotions are important to morality too. Even if animals cannot rationalize why an action is moral, they can understand why an action is moral on an emotional level. Pro never gives us a good reason as to why rational understanding should be preferred to emotional understanding. Animals can even pursue good on such an emotive level. Pro also DROPS that if the mentally impaired cannot rationalize why something is moral, then rationality is bad standard for assigning rights. Pro also DROPS that morality is about respecting the good of others and that animals have a "good" in their welfare. Even if animals cannot respect our good, morality would suggest that we should still respect theirs. This gives animals a claim to a due (their good. ) Finally, Pro DROPS my definition of morality, but gives no explanation as to why the principles of morality can or should only apply to the MC. b) I never said that animals are rational. Pro misunderstands. I argued that "their emotions can direct them to pursue basic morality. " Pro states: "Emotions are irrelevant. You must be able to rationalize moral behavior. " But this is just an ipse dixit (bare assertion) fallacy. There is literally no warrant here from Pro. c) Firstly Pro writes: "You can have standing in a community without acknowledging you are part of it. " This only makes it easier for animals to join the MC. But, still, this clearly contradicts his claim that: "You MUST identify with the Catholic Church in order to be part of a Catholic community. " Secondly, Pro then argues: "People who are unable to be rational have the capacity to be rational. " Pro's argument is absurd. He says that individual bearers of rights must have the capacity to understand those rights. This means that a rights-bearer must have the ability to now (or in the future) understand her rights. This cannot apply to the mentally impaired. How does being human suddenly confer upon them a capacity to do that? Capacity requires the potential for manifestation, and for some people, that is never going to apply. Importantly, Pro agreed that all people had rights except when they gave up those rights by choosing to do wrong, so the mentally handicapped still have rights in Pro's world, resulting in a major contradiction. d) Pro DROPS this. It impacts back to OV3. Animals have legal rights. VOTING ISSUESPer my case's OBs, showing any right negates. Also, Pro dropped the presumption; so, if it's close, presume Con.1. UTILITY I've taken this out with the Kant turn and by demonstrating its conflict with Justice. 2. THE MC Emotive action is sufficient to "pursue good," animals have a good to be respected, and the mentally ill would be excluded from the MC due to a lack of rationality (and/or capacity), which is a contradiction in Pro's case. 3. LEGAL RIGHTS Animals can have legal rights, promises are still dues, and inheritance is a due. 4. NEEDLESS SUFFERING The goal of rights is to stop NS, NS is contrary to the principles of the MC, and NS is an affront to justice. I only need to win 1 justification to win this point. Ultimately, suffering is suffering--it doesn't need to be rationalized to be valid; suffering is an emotional experience. Animals can suffer, so have rights. Thanks!