There is most likely an intelligent creator of the universe

I’d like to begin with a note on burdens. The resolution is a fact claim, since it presents a hypothesis of what is true, rather than what should be. As such, it’s up to Pro to prove it true. It isn’t a burden of persuasion, it’s a burden of proof. And the greater burden rests with Pro. If I refute Pro’s arguments, vote Con by default.Pro’s argument defends what is known as the "simulation hypothesis," which is the idea that the universe is a simulation, and different theories have different views as to what the simulation is. It seems that Pro defends that the universe is a computer simulation. How does that entail an intelligent creator? Pro will probably argue that for a computational system to exist, there has to be an intelligent cause. But there’s no reason to suppose that, except that our own worlds seem like that. There’s no way of knowing the details of the world where the computer exists, and the laws of science as we know it don’t necessarily apply in that other world. Pro doesn’t give an indicator of how a law of causality applies in such a world, or if that world experiences linear time. The computer could be self-sustaining, which means nothing caused the computer. Pro doesn’t give a reason for the computer being caused by a creator with intelligence similar to a human’s. Pro does say that the limits of computation can only be escaped by intelligence, but why should that apply outside the universe? It’s impossible for humans to even process what’s outside the universe, and it’s a nonsensical conclusion that since ancestor simulations would require an intelligent creator in our world, it would in the great computer’s world. Vote Con right there, since Pro doesn’t link his argument to the resolution.Pro doesn’t even give a reason to think a post-human civilization exists. Just because *we* can become post-human doesn’t mean someone else already has. Merely possibility doesn’t entail the existence of such a civilization. There’s no real reason to conclude that there is some post-human civilization out there. The posthuman motivations argument is nonsense. Human nature doesn’t need to apply to posthuman civilizations. Additionally, it’s possible that the *idea* never arose to the posthuman civilization in question. It’s equally probable that nobody has the motivation to do it, because there’s no indicator to suggest that posthuman motivations should be measured like human motivations.Furthermore, Bostrom’s trilemma doesn’t show that if the third condition is true, we live in a simulation. Let me quote the third condition: "The fraction of all people with our kind of experiences that are living in a simulation is very close to one." So what if this is true? How does that entail we’re likely living in a simulation? Merely because there are many people in a simulation, it doesn’t entail we’re in a simulation. Additionally, Pro confuses possibility with probability -- a possible world is not the actual world, so the possibility that there are many with "our kind of experiences" living in a simulation. Pro presumes the principle of indifference, which states that when there’s no independent reason to believe one proposition over another, the probability that the proposition is true is equal to the number of ways it could turn out to be true divided by the total number of possible outcomes. [1]Bostrom’s assertion that the fraction of people with our kind of experiences living in a simulation is close to one is false. Multiple critics argue that the assertion is based on a miscalculation. Pro doesn’t show that Bostrom’s calculation is likely true. In fact, Pro’s entire case relies on appealing to Bostrom’s authority. Pro doesn’t even defend the paper except for the listing of indicators. Bostrom’s calculation is based on “the number of simulations that are run (assuming that they are run) times the number of people in each simulation (again, assuming that these simulations are run) times the probability that these simulations are run.” [2] The paper argues that Bostrom counts our own world while calculating the probability, his logic being we will be able to run simulations as well. But the principle of indifference here only would hold to calculations not including the simulations we create in an attempt to prove point 3. So the fraction is significantly reduced, and isn’t close to one. [2] Pro says, "When you consider the fact that stacked civilizations could exist, and that a society could create several simulated universes, each simulated universe having stacked simulated universes, we have to assume we're most likely simulations." Why is this true? This seems like a bare assertion. Merely that stacked civilizations could exist doesn’t mean they do.Bostrom’s equation relies on an unmentioned assumption. It assumes that the population of a simulated universe would be the same as the population of a posthuman one. There’s no reason to believe that. There’s no evidence of that. Most critics agree that it was likely a mistake on Bostrom’s part to assume that during the calculation.Another criticism says that Bostrom exaggerated the abilities of computation. The level of computation required would have to create multiple AI’s with variant personalities, various non-intelligent simulations that still respond to stimuli, and varying degrees of "intelligence," including a level of intelligence to become posthuman. Computation is the motion of syntax (symbols). Syntax isn’t sufficient for a level of semantics high enough to form new posthumans, humans, and such variant degrees of intelligence. For instance, let’s say a man is in a room. He only knows English. He is instructed by a book that if he comes in contact with Chinese symbols, he must respond in a certain way. For instance, if he comes in contact with a certain Chinese symbol A, he must respond with B, so whenever a message that says A comes, he responds with B. That is fundamentally computation. He doesn’t have actual understanding of the language. [3]Bostrom makes multiple assumptions when he says computation can produce a simulated reality similar to our own. He assumes that (a) we only need to simulate down to the level of atoms and photons, (b) time-wise, we need to simulate only down to the level of basic chemical reactions, which would only take one femtosecond to process, and (c) gravity does not need to be simulated. All these assumptions are false. The first assumption is false because scientists can observe quark-level interactions. The second is false because the current lower-bound for chemical interactions is as small as Planck-time. The third isn’t even justified, and is nonsensical. [4]Finally, let me address the indicators of a simulated reality.(1) First, string theory is nonsense. There's no actual reason to believe that string theory is even true. In fact, most current evidence we have suggests that string theory is false. The purpose of bringing a new theory of physics is to explain something which hasn't been explained by the previous model. But the Lambda-CDM model explains everything, and even explains it better than string theory. So super-symmetrical equations shouldn't be taken into consideration as representative of the actual structure of the universe. Second, it merely resembles computer code, because it resembles "Adinkra symbols." This led Professor Gates to make references to computer code, which was probably exaggerated by the media.(2) Merely because the universe looks like a hologram doesn't entail it is one. Furthermore, that research was only based on possibility, not on probability. It merely suggested the possibility of a two-dimensional universe.(3) There's no actual evidence that the universe is made of pixels. It is merely a suggestion by the NASA scientist in question. It's a fallacy of appeal to authority. The idea hasn't hit peer-reviewed journals, and, as such, there's no actual study to prove this point. Pro doesn't actually justify the claim except appealing to Terrile's authority.(4) I really don't see how this relates to the resolution, outside of a post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy. Pro has a very vague link between the double-slit experiment and the simulation argument. He says a computer could save memory by simulating something while actually having something else. And the universe seems to have particles that behave in a certain way when observed. This doesn't justify probability, and commits a post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy.I've given multiple reasons to vote Con. None of the arguments are relevant, since there's no reason to think a computer would even need to be "created" sans the universe by someone intelligent. All the supposed "indicators" fail. Bostrom’s equation has multiple assumptions, all of which are easily challenged. Pro’s entire argument relies on the authority of Bostrom, and the study in question fails for multiple reasons. For all those reasons, vote Con.Sources1. http://www.medicine.ox.ac.uk...2. http://web.stanford.edu...3. John Searle, "Minds, Brains, and Science"4. http://users.digitalkingdom.org...