Roe v. Wade is a very messed-up decision

As Con, it is merely my duty to refute pro’s claim. I shall address the moral and social concerns first, then address legal claims. 1t=1st trimester, which is what the decision of the case discusses. Pro is guilty of heavy equivocation. Moral Case Pro’s moral case is contingent on the validity of divine command theory,i.e”God’s law”, however pro has done nothing to substantiate this position. Pro is merely taking it as an axiom. This is an utterly baseless assertion, as we have largely dismissed “God’s law” in civil nations throughout human history. We no longer stone children, nor put homosexuals to death, and we are much better off. Look at the following passage:”Do not wear clothing woven of two kinds of material” (Leviticus 19:19). Pro’s argument is that God’s law is categorical, however no rational person would state that the aforementioned passage is either moral, or immoral, so it would appear that God’s law is not categorical, and may be violated, if one would be better off violating it. And, of course, this is granting the existence of God a priori. On a more foundational level, divine command theory encounters major problems: Constructive Dilemma I. Is something good because God commands it so or does God command it so because it is good? II. If something is good because the God commands that it is so, then what is morally reprehensible to us can be good. III. If God commands that it is good because it is good, then the good is greater than God. IV. So, either the good is arbitrary or good is greater than God. So it is either the case that morality(good) is arbitrary, and can’t be meaningfully investigated, or transcends God, and as such, God cannot be invoked to as a tool for moral justification. Reproduction vs Pleasure? This is a false dichotomy, as I see no reason why sex cannot encompass both. Pro goes on to assert the most slippery slope ever, hinting at extinction, or at least some sort of bottleneck effect, by saying that procreation is the only way to ensure the population. While this is true, every fetus does not get aborted. Quite the contrary, observe the following CDC data: “ The abortion rate for 2012 was 13.2 abortions per 1,000 women aged 15–44 years, and the abortion ratio was 210 abortions per 1,000 live births.” While this was in 2012, and does not encompass the entire population, I believe it does establish that abortion will not produce extinction. Sentience as the Standard for Moral Inquiry and Legal Protection: Pro’s moral case is also contingent on the assertion that fetuses have personhood, and as such, are protected. However, (A)I shall argue that fetuses do not have the requisite properties for moral protection, and as such, cannot be taken into account in moral discussion. I will also argue (B) Fetuses do not have the requisite properties for legal protection. A.1- Sentience may be defined as “the capacity to feel, perceive, or experience subjectively.” Or, in other words, possessing the property of consciousness, and explicit to morality, the capacity to suffer. Why is this property necessary for morality? While I’m not a deontologist, so I can’t assert things to be categorically wrong, let’s examine a proposition that is about as close as it gets-- child rape. Why is this act wrong? I would assert, and I believe I am well justified in asserting, that it is because children are sentient, and rape imposes suffering upon them. Rape imposes suffering, however, because children are powerless(comparatively), and do not have strong coping mechanisms, the suffering child suffers from rape is exacerbated. A.2- Does morality make sense external to the context of sentience? Is it immoral squish an insect?Ants are biotic organisms, however, they are not sentient, and this is why no one makes a fuss when one squishes them. However, if one deliberately harms a puppy, this can appropriately be labeled as monstrous, because puppies possess sentience, and can suffer. Is it immoral to pick a flower? Flowers are biotic, however they do not possess sentience, and thus, cannot suffer, therefore they are not of moral concern. From A.1 and A.2, we can establish the sentience is not only sufficient for moral discussion, but necessary? Thusly, the question then becomes, (A.3)“Are fetuses, within the 1t, as per the context of the decision -- sentient”? A.3- No. Meller and Dietsche state: “The neural apparatus of embryos and fetuses of farm animals is inadequate to support sentience for at least the first half of pregnancy, but the required structures and mechanisms to develop by the time of birth.” The 1t concludes before the median point of gestation is reached, so it would follow that fetuses are not sentient, and thusly cannot be considered in moral discussion. However, let’s not just take their word for it. Nociceptors are responsible for the sensation of pain, which as I established, only exists within in the context of sentience. The presence of nociceptors are contingent upon sensory receptors, which don’t fully develop until after the 1t. Myers states:”“The first essential requirement for nociception is the presence of sensory receptors, which first develop in the perioral area at approximately 7 weeks gestation and are diffusely located throughout the body by 14 weeks.” However, per the prior source, we can derive that these minor developments are insufficient to establish sentience, and thereby, are insufficient for the conscious experience of pain, which as established, is necessary for moral discussion. So by A.1-3,it has been established that fetuses are not sentient, and thereby are not eligible for moral consideration, and this is substantiated by the neurophysiological literature. Legal Protection Pro brings up personhood within some unclear context. I’m not sure how this would fit into a moral discussion, seeing that I just established sentience as the standard for morality, however, personhood, as a standard for legal protection, could be a substantive argument. So let’s analyze if fetuses, during the 1t, are indeed persons, and as such have legal protection, per the the 14th amendment, and as such have a right to life. Well, as a prerequisite, it seems necessary to figure out what a person is, or what constitutes personhood. The eminent Mary Ann Warren posited 5 properties that are sufficient for personhood, which seem to coincide with what we mean by person: I) Consciousness II) Reason III) Autonomy IV) Communication V) Self awareness I)As priorly established, fetuses do not have sentience, which for all intents and purposes, entails the property of consciousness. II) Things that are not conscious cannot reason III) Things that are not conscious cannot act autonomously, because that necessitates choice. IV) Things that are not conscious cannot be mentally aware, which is what it means to be conscious, and thereby, cannot be self-aware Due to character limitations I shall not expound further, however I do find these statements to be rather self-evident, and pro can contest them if it is wished. Subsequently fetuses, within the 1t, do not meet the criteria for personhood, and as such, are not protected by the 14th amendment. Also, as it may arise, one’s personhood is not contingent on aptitude in any of the aforementioned areas. Newborns are undoubtedly persons. They communicate by crying, which communicates that something is wrong,which entails self-awareness, because it is the case that they themselves are experience this wrong, which invariably requires consciousness. If you impede a baby’s crawling by placing a small object in front of them, they will pick it up, which displays inquiry, of which, reason is a constituent. It can be said that a baby chose to do this, which displays autonomy. So there is no slippery slope indicating infantacide here, babies are persons, however 1t fetuses are not. Social concerns Per the prior discussions, these points are non-substantive. Children, brothers, and sister-- the constituents of the family, are invariably persons. If pro wishes to argue that children, brothers, and sisters exist external to personhood, then that is up to pro, however this appears quite absurd. On guilt, really? I may feel guilty after eating too much junk food, however should it be the case that there should be a legal prohibition on eating too much junk food? Guilt is not an argument. This does not at all entail the slippery slope of the wide permissibility of murdering persons, because 1t fetuses, once again, are not persons. Also, I don’t know how pro is using the term “baby”, but in the context of child development, babies are not fetuses, and fetuses are not babies. This argument is a non-sequitur, a red herring, and equivocates baby and fetus. Also a fetus could grow up to be Hitler, this argument goes both ways. Legality Literary Really? The legal discourse is like this. Also, the conveying of the decision is not the same as the decision. Also, I defined the decision in my 1st round, and pro showed no objection to it, and it appears to not be ambiguous. Const. The right of privacy has evolved to protect autonomy, which is impeded by gestation, so they have the right to negate gestation, if it does not impede the rights of anybody else, and as fetuses are not persons, it doesn’t. Court error. The external conditions involved in the acceptance of a case, do not negate the validity of the litigation and adjudication of the case. Precedence Precedences are not permanent, and merely act as guidelines, so long as they are valid, and can be overturned, by the decisions of new cases. The legal system is not stagnant. Once upon a time, the precedent was that blacks were not persons, but that was overturned. I’ll have to elaborate on legality next round, however that’s what happens when pro puts forth a gazillion minimally developed arguments. The defense rests* (sources in comments)