Speciesism is an unjustifiable form of discrimination.

In this final round, I hope to tie together some loose threads that have been brought up throughout the debate. As I've already said in my first round, speciesism is prejudice on the basis of species membership, in the exact same way racism is prejudice on the basis of race. Moreover, it seems clear to me that the vast majority of my opponent's case is directed at straw men. Nonetheless, he does raise a few good points about moral reciprocity and the 'intrinsic' value of humans. I will respond accordingly. Contention 1: We are carnivores Once again, I decline to play word games with my opponent, and I flat out reject his cynical and biased definitions. For the purposes of this debate, the word 'justify' means the following: "To demonstrate or prove to be just, right, or valid." And the word discriminate means to 'treat differently.' These are perfectly reasonable definitions and should thus be accepted. So, the resolution could be loosely understood as follows: It's wrong to treat animals differently/worse than humans simply because they are a different species. Later on, my challenger clearly implies that eating meat cannot be wrong because doing so is natural. Firstly, I've never claimed that eating meat was immoral. Secondly, this argument commits the naturalistic fallacy in any case.[1] Proving that phenomenon (x) is natural does not prove that phenomenon (x) is moral. This would be like saying that rape must be moral because it is natural. Contention 2: A two-tiered morality The argument that my opponent ascribes to me is not a "demon of my own design;" it's a straw man of his own choosing. It is not my position that we treat all humans and animals exactly the same or that all animals have the same moral value as all humans. Rather, it is my position that we give all animals "basic moral considerations" by giving equal consideration to their interests regardless of what species they are. Different animals will have different capacities to hold interests, in the same way children have different interests/rights than adults. The ability to have interests and preferences increases with cognitive abilities, psychological development and higher levels of consciousness; however, these qualities have nothing in principle to do with species membership. To put it simply, insofar as any animal (human or not) can hold certain interests, those interests should be respected. Moreover, it is not my position that it is wrong to eat meat. Most animals have such rudimentary and basic interests that it wouldn't really be all that objectionable to give them a good life and then painlessly euthanize them. This is also Peter Singer's position, who is the ultimate champion against speciesism. Of course, some animals can suffer more than others, and we should take this into consideration. Con has clarified his two proposed moral systems by saying that both of them maintain "animals' lives [are] less intrinsically valuable than human lives." And I will admit that his clarification here does make both systems guilty of speciesism. In response to my opponent's two proposed systems, I feel obliged to ask my opponent by what form of logic does he postulate that a brain dead human being on life support is "intrinsically" more valuable than an adult gorilla? By what form of logic does my opponent conclude that a human being that has even less mental prowess than a dog is "intrinsically" more valuable than a dog? By what form of logic does my opponent conclude that a human is "intrinsically" more valuable than a non-human animal (e.g., an extra terrestrial) with an even higher level of cognitive development than most humans? If he is right, we should conclude the human in all of these settings has more intrinsic worth than all of the animals in question just because they are members of the human species. This conclusion seems to be completely untenable, and thus both of his systems should be rejected. Contention 3: More absurdities My opponent, yet again, creates another straw man. I didn't refer to the "mentally handicapped" in my second round. I referred to the "severely mentally retarded." Whether my opponent likes it or not, some humans have cognitive abilities lower than most animals. Given this example, he has no basis to say that moral reciprocity or understanding property rights are essential to ethics. Whether or not these humans have a right to self ownership is irrelevant. Their basic preferences and interests are still respected. I won't bother to quibble about babies, since this example is enough. Moreover, these humans also lack even the potential to become persons. Either way, the argument swings in my favor. C1: Animals can suffer and thus should be given basic moral considerations. Despite what my opponent may believe, I've only used the words "equal moral consideration" once in my second round, and that was to paraphrase him. At any rate, what I've argued for is that animals should revive 'equal moral consideration' of interests. 'Basic moral considerations' are referring to essentially the same thing. An animal's moral value should scale with its ability to have interests. Like I've explained before by quoting Singer, this doesn't mean that all animals have the same moral value. C2: Membership in a species is an arbitrary characteristic with respect to moral considerations. My opponent fabricated the quote of Peter Singer he presented in his last round. Peter Singer never said the following: "Biological properties have no moral significance." My opponent invented this quote in order to distort Singer's views so that he could tear down a straw man. The actual argument Peter Singer presents is that biological properties alone don't have any moral significance, as I've pointed out before. Things like species membership, race and gender simply aren't directly related to the capacity to hold interests and suffer.[2] Obviously, if the biological property in question, along with other factors, allowed an entity to suffer, it would be morally significant. Later on, my opponent says that I engage in speciesism by saying that the capacity to suffer is morally important. This is nonsense. It's literally impossible for things like bacteria to have any moral considerations exactly because they can't suffer. He also says that under my position I would free domesticated cows that couldn't survive in the wild. Why he feels the need to create so many straw men is beyond me. C3: Different levels of intellectual acuity between animals and humans cannot justify speciesism. Along with my opponent's question begging assertion that 'Habermasian ethics' are valid, his claims about intellectual acuity are completely irrelevant. The capacity to suffer or have emotions isn't directly related to one's intelligence; it's related to other neurological and psychological factors. For example, Albert Einstein and Isaac Newton were probably two of the most intelligent humans to ever live. It does not follow from this fact that Einstein and Newton could suffer and hold more interests than all other humans. Clearly, my opponent is deeply mistaken. Correlation doesn't prove causation. | Conclusion | After my opponent's failed attempt at semantics, fallacious assertions and blatant straw men are put aside, his case is paper thin. He asserts that humans are intrinsically more valuable than animals, but this is nonsense. How is a brain dead human on life support "intrinsically" more valuable than a fully conscious gorilla? There is just no way of rationally getting around this issue. It's not intellectually defensible to discriminate against animals at the same time we give equal consideration of interests to humans that, due to mental defects, are even less rational and intelligent than most animals. Sources: 1. http://tinyurl.com... 2. http://tinyurl.com...