Resolved: High school dress code restrictions should include prohibitions on Satanic clothing.

Evaluating the Resolution:This is a debate which hinges on the First Amendment rights of students while they attend public schools, and the duties of schools to facilitate environments conducive to the educational process. Only if this were a specific trial involving a specific school restriction to a specific student under a specific circumstance would it be necessary to demonstrate that such a material interference had transpired. This debate, rather than applying to a specified case as described above, involves the application of a general limitation on state behavior which may have the potential to interfere with the school’s duty to promote an environment conducive to the educational process.Because this is resolution which involves the application of a general rule which may limit the power of schools to facilitate environments conducive to the educational process, it is therefore only appropriate to theoretically entertain the notion that the wearing of clothing of any controversial variety (satanic or otherwise) may have the potential to interfere with the educational process, rather than demonstrate that such an interference has, in fact, occurred. Contention 1) Public schools may prohibit behavior that materially or substantially interferes with the educational process.There are two competing issues at stake in this resolution. Just as in the case of Tinker v. Des Moines 393 U.S. 503 (1969), “our problem lies in the area where students in the exercise of First Amendment rights collide with the rules of the school authorities” Upholding an earlier precedent from Burnside v. Byars, 336 F. 2d. 744, at 749 (1966) in Tinker, the Supreme Court of the United States held that where student apparel "materially and substantially interfere[s] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school," the school’s interest in facilitating a necessarily stable environment conducive to the educational process overwhelms the first amendment rights of students. This is in keeping with the general principle with the earlier precedent established in Meyer v. Nebraska (later upheld and later reflected in Epperson v. Arkansas) which emphasized that the first amendment allows for, pursuant to certain safeguards, school authorities enjoy a broad latitude to establish parameters for student conduct in pursuit of that objective, 262 U.S. 390, at 402 (1923). Therefore, when in conflict, where student behavior has the potential to demonstrably interfere with the educational process, the Supreme Court has consistently held the constitutionally permissible authority of school officials to restrict student first amendment rights. This is the case because, although “students do not shed their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate” (Tinker, supra), the First Amendment does not provide students with a carte blanche liberty to materially or substantially interfere with the educational process. Contention 2) Where the state can show that the wearing of Satanic clothing materially and substantially interferes with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school, restrictions on such behavior may be constitutionally imposed.In Tinker by Justice Potter Stewart mirrored the principle extended in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, which delineated the rights of children (or students) in questions of first amendment rights, stating that a “state may permissibly determine that... a child... is not possessed of that full capacity for... First Amendment guarantees." to the same extent as an adult citizen may be constitutionally entitled, at 649-650.As such, it is necessary to evaluate questions of student 1st amend. rights with considerable skepticism because, pursuant to the rule established in Burnside, “In order for the State... to justify prohibition of a particular expression... it must be able to show that its action was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint” by demonstrating that the conduct in question which is forbidden "materially and substantially interfere[s] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school." Burnside at 749 (1966)That students’ wearing of satanic clothing may have the potential to materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline necessary to facilitate an environment conducive to the educational process is beyond contention, because such a possibility cannot be extinguished beyond all reasonable consideration.Contention 3) The state’s interest in promoting an environment conducive to the educational process does not violate the free exercize clause. While the wearing of specified clothing may be associated with certain religions (such as the Hijab is associated with Islam) or cultural norms, while on schoolhouse grounds students do not enjoy the carte blanche liberty to wear clothing which may materially or substantially interferes with the educational process, pursuant to the authorities cited above including Tinker, Burnside, and Epperson.While if an adult’s first amendment rights were in question it would be appropriate to examine certain limitations on said rights with higher scrutiny, because children are not necessarily entitled to the same degree of first amendment protections as adults, it is hardly appropriate to entertain the notion that children enjoy untenable first amendment guarantees. see Prince, 321 U.S. 158.The schoolhouse, pursuant to the rule established in Prince, ranks among the locations where student first amendment rights may be constitutionally restricted in the event of a material or substantial disturbance to the educational process.However, it is necessary to recognize that under no circumstances would a student’s right to practice any religion of their choosing (beyond the halls of the school house) would be in any way limited by any theoretical prohibition on specified apparel choices. To evaluate wether a particular rule presents a religious discrimination, the Supreme Court established a three prong test in Lemon v. Kurtzman 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The test is as follows1) The government's action must have a secular legislative purpose2) The government's action must not have the primary effect of either advancing or inhibiting religion3) The government's action must not result in an "excessive government entanglement" with religionWhere a general rule prohibited the wearing of clothing which, pursuant to the rule again established in Tinker, substantially or materially infringed on the educational process, if satanic clothing were observed to infringe on the educational process, then the first prong of the lemon test would be satisfied because the school’s interesting in facilitating said environment is necessarily secular. If satanic clothing were to be inadvertently restricted by such a general rule, the students’ right to practice their chosen religion would neither be advanced or inhibited, because the rule itself was not specifically engineered with the purpose of limiting the free exercise of religion, but rather with promoting the (secular) interest of the school outlined above. Because government is neither sponsoring or prohibiting any specified religion, no excessive entanglement can be said to exist. Cases Tinker http://supreme.justia.com...Burnsidehttp://scholar.google.com...Meyer http://www.law.cornell.edu... Epperson http://www.law.cornell.edu... Prince http://www.law.cornell.edu...Lemonhttp://www.law.cornell.edu...