Germany (along with its allies) had the military capacity to win the second world war

RebuttalsD1: Technological FailuresD1.1. The LuftwaffeDespite the fact that one may argue of British air superiority, the destruction of the British air defences was within days of destruction. The loss of the Battle of Britain was due to strategic blunders of Goering.Counter-Argument: Failure to Attack British Strategic Targets rather than Air Inferiority"We realized [Adolf Galland, the famous German fighter ace, later testified] that the R.A.F. fighter squadrons must be controlled from the ground by some new procedure because we heard commands skilfully and accurately directing Spitfires and Hurricanes on to German formations... For us this radar and fighter control was a surprise and a very bitter one."[1]It was recognized by the Germans that the British were shrewdly using radar to govern their defence, and for this reason British radar stations were attacked. Even though this seemed apparent, the attack on British radar stations which on August 12 had been so damaging had not been continued and on August 15, the day of his first major setback, Goering called them off entirely, declaring: "It is doubtful whether there is any point in continuing the attacks on radar stations, since not one of those attacked has so far been put out of action." The other key to British air defense was also nearly destroyed but called off by the tactical error of Goering, and that was the sector station. The sector station was the underground nerve center from which Hurricanes and Spitfires were guided by radiotelephone into battle on the basis of the latest intelligence from radar, from ground observation posts and pilots in the air. The Germans, as Galland noted, could hear the constant chatter over the air waves between sector stations and the pilots in the air and finally began to understand the importance of these underground control centers. On August 24 they switched their tactics to the destruction of the sector stations, seven of which on the airfields around London were crucial to the protection of the south of England and the capital itself. This was a hit against the very center of Britain's air defenses.Until that day the battle was going against the Luftwaffe. "We have reached the decisive period of the air war against England" Goering declared. "The vital task is the defeat of the enemy air force. Our aim must be to destroy the enemy's fighters."[2] From August 24 to September 6 the Germans sent over an average of a thousand planes a day to achieve this end. For once Goering was right. The battle of Britain had reached its decisive stage. Though the R.A.F. pilots, already strained from a month of flying several sorties a day, put up a valiant fight, the German preponderance in numbers began to show. Five forward fighter fields in the south of England were extensively damaged and, what was worse, six of the seven key sector stations were so severely bombed out that the whole communication system seemed to be on the verge of being knocked out. This threatened disaster to Britain.In the crucial fortnight between August 23 and September 6 the British lost 466 fighters destroyed or badly damaged, and though they did not know it at the time the Luftwaffe losses were less: 385 aircraft, of which 124 were fighters and 138 bombers. Moreover, the R.A.F. had lost 103 pilots killed and 128 seriously wounded, a quarter of all available."The scales had tilted against fighter command... There was much anxiety" wrote Churchill. A few more weeks of this and Britain would have had no organized defense of the skies. Operation Sea Lion would almost certainly succeed without British resistance in fighters.And then Goering made his second tactical error. It saved the battered reeling R.A.F. With the British fighter defense suffering losses in the air and on the ground which is could not long sustain, the Luftwaffe switched its attack on September 7 to massive night bombing in London in order to gain revenge for the British night bombing of August 24. This reprieve would allow the British to repair their battered air defenses so that by the time the Germans returned to day bombing they were repelled by the R.A.F.D1.2. PanzerIt is openly acknowledged by myself that the German tanks by the end of the war were inferior to British and Russian models, but this made little difference in the Beginning of Operation Barbarossa and the victory in the west, where superior tactics were utilized by the Germans in order to maintain victory. Even with slight armored inferiority they were extremely tactically sound in all but a few battles which could have been won if it were not for the tactical ignorance of Hitler.D3. Failure of AlliesThough the allies of Nazi Germany were not sound they were in full control of their own destiny. It was their own decision to declare war on the United States. They had the military capacity to gain the goals they seeked, only a few tactical errors prevented them from obtaining their goals.[1]Adolf Galland, The First and the Last, p.26.[2]Luftwaffe General Staff record of directives given by Goering