BeIR/webis-touche2020 huggingface dataset:
One working language understood by all Member States is a more practical way of communicating often untranslatable yet vital EU-specific vocabulary.

The EU does use technical jargon for which there is often not a direct translation. Therefore, it makes more sense to only have one name for each concept, by which that concept shall be known, in order to economize effort and to not waste time creating translations for EU-specific jargon. It is not chauvinistic, or even a matter of preference, to use English as a working language over other languages; it just so happens to be a language that is understood throughout the EU Member States. It is better and more effective to spend the time addressing the issues rather than deciding by which names to call these entities that give rise to issues within the EU.
Translation is an intercultural activity that the EU must embrace if it continues to hold “United in diversity” as its motto.

Ernst-August Gutt observes the use of translation “across boundaries”.[1] As a body dedicated to being “United in diversity”, the EU should practice translation in order to affect this intercultural activity.  The linguist Laurence Venuti observes this: “Translation is the ‘trial of the foreign’. But in a double sense. In the first place, it establishes a relationship between the Self-Same (propre) and the foreign by aiming to open up the foreign work to us in its utter foreignness …And this trial, often an exile, can also exhibit the most singular power of the translating act: to reveal the foreign work’s most original kernel, its most deeply-buried, most self-same…most distant”.[2] Governmental bodies such as the EU have to mediate and compromise when discussing issues and debating. Translation is simply another type of mediation. The linguist Laurence Venuti describes it as “a bilingual mediated process of communication”.[3] Translation in a political setting is therefore simply an extension of this political mediation strongly present in the European Union.  [1] Venuti, L. (ed) The Translation Studies Reader, 2000, p.378 [2] Ibid p.284 [3] Ibid p.161
The EU ought to make English its working language in order to be a more transparent democracy for the rest of the world.

So many of the world’s problems stem from a lack of communication. War is often a result of two sides unable to mediate, and one side often refers to resorting violence as ‘the only language the opponent understands’. This is what prompted Sir Winston Churchill to say ‘To jaw-jaw is always better than to war-war’.[1] He meant that communication and compromise are always better than resorting to conflict, not least of all because it brings with it new problems of poverty, mentally scarred people and famine. However, communication works both ways: what is said and how well it is heard. The EU cannot simply assume its activities will be well listened to. Its own issues and actions have little in common with the governments in the developing world who truly need help and improved strategies. For example, the EU deals with those problems facing a developed world; health, education, governmental services. By contrast, those governments in the developing world are faced with a whole array of problems that bear no resemblance to these, and far more serious ones; child soldiers, the setting up of schools, as opposed to making improvements therein. Therefore, listening to the EU will not inspire, advise or help the governments of those countries who really need it, regardless of how easily accessible and understandable the information is. [1] Platt, Suzy ed., Respectfully Quoted: A Dictionary of Quotations, 1989.
If the EU ‘elects’ a single working language, it will be deliberately contributing to the narrow-minded, anglicising of the entire world, despite being a union of diverse cultures with the power to fight it.

A “single working language” implies English, a global language, and already one of the two key EU languages, the other being the lesser understood French. That English could be the default language worries the French where they fear the rise of what the French call anglosnoberrie ; the anglicising of the world at the expense of other languages including French. The EU would become one more example of English dominating the world at the expense of the many cultures and languages of Europe. This is indeed an extremely hypocritical stance to take, when the EU is a body that seeks to strengthen intercultural activity and give all the cultures within it a voice. This cannot be done when the overwhelming majority- twenty-six- of the languages, ‘voices’, of the Member States are  silenced and only one is given a platform on which to speak.
It is more practical to work through one language that all Member States understand in order to ensure the effectiveness of communication.

There are often no direct translations for indispensible EU-specific vocabulary, so Member States should refer to it in their native language. The European Union uses in its debates and practices lots of technical jargon. For such vocabulary, there is often not a direct translation. The Member States must be able to speak about such important issues effectively and, while there exists no direct translations for much EU jargon, the best way to do this is through their native languages.
There already exists a pan-European identity across all EU Member States, and a single working language would help to strengthen that identity.

Europe is only an umbrella identity; the diverse elements that form it must not be ignored. European identity is comprised of many elements, these being the many different countries within the continent. These different countries assert their individual identities through culture, people, traditions and languages. These must be acknowledged so that the EU is aware of the identities of the very Member States that comprise it. Keeping languages alive in the face of language death is a very emotive issue. Such response to one’s own language is what makes us human. To deny people affection for their own language is to dehumanise them.  In the whole, if the EU tried to strengthen its identity by choosing one language, it would harm its true identity, as a group of diverse states, joined together.
Britain is the country of Euroscepticism, and its official language is English. For English to be the medium, the mouthpiece for the EU communications is wholly wrong.

Press freedom is a separate issue from EU language politics. The press must have reasonable freedoms, and so they are perfectly within their rights to express anti-Europe opinions; provoking debate and discussion on political issues is essential to a well-informed readership. The anti-EU arguments get more coverage than pro-EU ones, but there are many arguments in favor of the EU within the British press. Freedom of the British press to express anti-EU opinion is their right and should not affect the use of English as the single working language within the EU at all. It should not impinge upon improving the strength and effectiveness of communication within the EU at all.
There is no need to translate absolutely everything, but prioritising translation is favourable.

Prioritising translation may well have negative results. A mistranslation can lead to severe confusion and when such sensitive information is being handled, this is not at all desirable. Further, confusion can result if one entity becomes known by two different names. The practice of translation may only create tensions and divisions between bodies within the EU. Some may be angered that their literature is not being translated, when another organisation’s literature is, and is thusly getting a higher profile and receiving more attention. Therefore, one single WORKING language makes sense.
The EU ought to make English its working language in order to be a more transparent democracy for the rest of the world.

If the EU uses the global language of English as its working language, other governments, parliaments and Unions will be able to understand its activities and methods of operation. 27% of the world’s population speak English. In the EU Member States alone, there are 61, 850,000 native English speakers and 168,000,000 non- native speakers of English.[1] It is a medium that could reach so many people and through which the EU can influence other governments to take similar positive action.  So many of the world’s large problems stem from a lack of communication. War is often the result of two sides being unable to communicate and mediate, and so violence is resorted to. It is often described as ‘the only language the enemy understands’ because of a failure to work out differences in a non-violent way. When fighting breaks out, it brings with it all manner of other issues such as famine and trauma. English is a global language and the EU should use this to its advantage. The EU brings democracy and should serve as a great example thereof for the rest of the world. Populations of all other countries need to be able to understand the EU’s activity and the way to operate a democracy as demonstrated by the EU, and the way to achieve this is for the EU to use the global language of English so as to render transparent the running of a democracy, so that it can spread.  If the EU can communicate its good ideas successfully, it can influence other organisations, providing them with the antidotes to their own problems. [1] Wikipedia, List of countries by English-speaking population, en.wikipedia.org
It is more practical to work through one language that all Member States understand in order to ensure the effectiveness of communication.

Multilingualism could lead to several breakdowns in communication, which only give rise to further problems. This is especially likely between French and English where there are many ‘false friends’. For example ‘actuellement’ in French translates into English as ‘currently’, not ‘actually’. Using only one working language will eradicate confusion and reduce the number of errors. This is especially important in the realm of international politics, where small errors can breed long-term consequences.
There already exists a pan-European identity across all EU Member States, and a single working language would help to strengthen that identity.

There is no need for any prefixed or specified Europeans anymore. Given that the continent of Europe is merging into one single identity, there is no need to have more than one working EU language in operation; this could create divisions and even tensions within the overall identity of ‘European’. The Euro coins are no longer specific to each nation, goods are bought and sold between EU nations without restrictions. The seams between the European nations are fast disappearing as they merge ever closer together. Therefore, one singe language for managing all the EU Member States’ communal affairs makes perfect sense.
South Ossetia has a right to self-determination

The 1993 Vienna Declaration, which reaffirmed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the UN Charter (and so sets the standard in current international law), unequivocally gives all peoples the right to self-determination: "All people have the right to self-determination. Owing to this right they freely establish their political status and freely provide their economic, social and cultural development...World Conference on Human Rights considers refusal of the right to self-determination as a violation of human rights and emphasizes the necessity of effective realization of this right".[1] By this measure, South Ossetia has the right to self-determination (by democratic processes), and any suppression of that right should be seen as a human rights violation. In 2006, South Ossetia held a referendum that found over 99% of its population of over 100,000 desire independence from Georgia. 95% of the population turned out to vote. The referendum was monitored by a team of 34 international observers.[2]  These facts are the core of the case for South Ossetian independence. It demonstrates that South Ossetians are entirely unified and enthusiastic in their desire for independence. The strength and unity of these calls for independence are almost unprecedented and cannot be ignored by the international community. And, certainly, the percentage of a population that desires independence is of relevance to assessing the legitimacy of the call and a country's right to self-determination. By this standard, South Ossetia's right to self-determination is highly legitimate. [1] United Nations World Conference on Human Rights. “VIENNA DECLARATION AND PROGRAMME OF ACTION”. United Nations. 14-25 June 1993. http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/%28symbol%29/a.conf.157.23.en    [2] BBC News. “S Ossetia votes for independence”. BBC News. 13 November 2006. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/6140448.stm
South Ossetian independence will help prevent future conflict

The status quo in the region is one of militarized clashes and tensions. It is important to recognize that South Ossetia has been de facto independent for some time. If it does not achieve independence, the proposed alternative is that it re-integrate into Georgia. Yet, of South Ossetians have made it clear that they will not accept this.  The only possible course of action, therefore, would be to force over 100,000 South Ossetians to live under the tyranny of the majority of the Georgian state. This would not only be a clear violation of self-determination and basic democratic principles, but it would also risk a protracted war or insurgency in S. Ossetia against any re-assertion of Georgian authority. S. Ossetia and Georgia have been battling each other for over a century. Georgia has been accused of ethnic cleansing there, and of launching a 'war of aggression' which killed a large number of S. Ossetian civilians in 2008.[1] This war, as the culmination of Georgian aggression against S. Osstia, has made finally made any sort of reconciliation between the two impossible, and hardened S. Ossetian desires for independence. Keeping S. Ossetia within Georgia will simply prolong this ethic struggle, which has demonstrated itself to be irreconcilable in the foreseeable future. This conflict could easily draw in other powers (such as Russia) and cause a wider war once again. Granting S. Ossetian independence, therefore, would help avoid future conflicts and their awful humanitarian consequences. [1] Walker, Shaun. “South Ossetia: Russian, Georgian...independent?”. Open Democracy. 15 November 2006. http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-caucasus/south_ossetia_4100.jsp
Illegitimacy of the 2006 referendum

South Ossetia was wrong to hold elections under conflict conditions. In 2006, South Ossetia can be said to have been in 8 conflicts with Georgia when it held its 2006 referendum on independence. Holding referendums under such conflict conditions is generally illegitimate because the results of the elections are skewed by the conflict, threats, and the various risks for the voters involved. This caused David Bakradze, the chairman of a Georgian parliamentary European Integration Committee, to comment, “Under conflict conditions, you cannot speak about legitimate elections.”[1] This mirrors European human rights watchdog, the Council of Europe’s, denunciation of the referendum as "unnecessary, unhelpful and unfair".[2] Furthermore Russia's involvement in the 2006 referendum arguably corrupted its validity, as many of the authorities in S. Ossetia were installed there by the Russian government.[3] [1] Radio Free Europe. “Overwhelming Support For South Ossetia Independence”. Radio Free Europe. The Journal of the Turkish Weekly. 13 November 2006. http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/40956/overwhelming-support-for-south-ossetia-independence.html    [2] Walker, Shaun. “South Ossetia: Russian, Georgian...independent?”. Open Democracy. 15 November 2006. http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-caucasus/south_ossetia_4100.jsp    [3] Socor, Vladimir. “MOSCOW’S FINGERPRINTS ALL OVER SOUTH OSSETIA’S REFERENDUM”. Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 3 Issue: 212. The Jamestown Foundation. 15 November 2006. http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=32238
A South Ossetian state is unviable

There are many factors that make South Ossetia unviable as a state. South Ossetia is very small with a very small population. It is also a landlocked state and very poor. These facts make it unlikely that South Ossetia could act effectively as an independent state. The result is that it would become dependent on other states.[1] This can already be seen from the fact that S. Ossetia has only been able to secure its current de facto independence with substantial military and foreign aid from Russia.[2] S. Ossetia is economically unviable as an independent state. It is landlocked and only has meaningful road access to the sea through Georgia. S. Ossetian GDP was estimated at US$ 15 million (US$ 250 per capita) in a work published in 2002. S. Ossetia is arguably lacking in the basic economic necessities for autonomy. Indeed, a $15 million GDP would make South Ossetia one of the poorest nations in the world. Particularly following a war with Georgia in the 1990s, South Ossetia has struggled economically. Employment and supplies are scarce. The majority of the population survives on subsistence farming. Virtually the only significant economic asset that South Ossetia possesses is control of the Roki Tunnel that links Russia and Georgia, from which the South Ossetian government reportedly obtains as much as a third of its budget by levying customs duties on freight traffic. The separatist officials admitted that Tskhinvali received more than 60 percent of its 2006 budget revenue directly from the Russian government.[3][4] Finally, S. Ossetia has a population of roughly 70,000.[5] This would make it one of the smallest states in the world. This fact, combined with its high level of poverty, makes it a poor candidate for independence, and shows that its “independence” would compel it to become even more dependent on Russia, or else risk disintegrating as an unviable state. [1] BBC News. “S Ossetia votes for independence”. BBC News. 13 November 2006. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/6140448.stm    [2] Socor, Vladimir. “MOSCOW’S FINGERPRINTS ALL OVER SOUTH OSSETIA’S REFERENDUM”. Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 3 Issue: 212. The Jamestown Foundation. 15 November 2006. http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=32238    [3] Walker, Shaun. “South Ossetia: Russian, Georgian...independent?”. Open Democracy. 15 November 2006. http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-caucasus/south_ossetia_4100.jsp    [4] Vaisman, Daria. “No recognition for breakaway South Ossetia's vote”. The Christian Science Monitor. 10 November 2006. http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/1110/p07s01-woeu.html    [5] BBC News. “S Ossetia votes for independence”. BBC News. 13 November 2006. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/6140448.stm
Georgia has a right to territorial integrity

Georgia has a legitimate sovereign right to maintain its territorial integrity as well as the social contract accompanying it. Georgia has the right to take action to secure the integrity of these things, unless blocked by a higher international authority. Internationally, S. Ossetia's independence is recognised by only five nations (including Russia), demonstrating that the international community is not convinced that S. Ossetia's claim to self-determination trumps Georgia's claim to territorial integrity.[1] In order to obtain independence, it is important that a country be recognized diplomatically by a significant number of the members of the United Nations. This is important in large part because it ensures that a state will have viable diplomatic relations internationally if it becomes independent. It also demonstrates that the international system supports a certain action being taken internationally. Thus Georgia's claim should continue to stand until the international community changes its mind, and at the moment the international community has legitimate concerns regarding the regional instability and conflict that an independent S. Ossetia might foster. Moreover, as shown above the S. Ossetian state is entirely dependent on Russian support, and so it can be accurately stated that the issue of S. Ossetian independence, and its threat to Georgian territorial integrity, has arisen only because of Russian interference within Georgia. Even those who argue that any region has the right to self-determination would probably reject the idea that nations have the right to foster and encourage parts of other nations to secede from their current state and join another. The S. Ossetian independence movement can thus be correctly seen simply as Russian aggression against Georgia for its own advantage, not an issue of self-determination. [1] RIA Novosti. “Nicaragua recognizes South Ossetia and Abkhazia”. RIA Novosti. 4 September 2008. http://en.rian.ru/world/20080904/116538071.html
South Ossetia has a right to self-determination

Self-determination is not an absolute right. Not every territory and region in the world that seeks independence has the right to it. This is due in no small part to the fact that such a system would be unworkable. Certain criteria must be met for a territory and people to obtain a legitimate right to self-determination (for example, viability as an independent state and an authentic internal drive for independence), and S. Ossetia arguably does not meet many of these criteria. Therefore S. Ossetia possesses no absolute right to self-determination, and its calls for independence must be evaluated in the context of what the consequences of independence would be. Furthermore, no countries recognized South Ossetia's 2006 referendum and vote for independence at the time it was carried out, and few do now. Without such approval, the referendum should be considered illegitimate. The European human rights watchdog, the Council of Europe, denounced the referendum as "unnecessary, unhelpful and unfair".[1] [1] Walker, Shaun. “South Ossetia: Russian, Georgian...independent?”. Open Democracy. 15 November 2006. http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-caucasus/south_ossetia_4100.jsp
Georgian rule in South Ossetia is historically illegitimate and oppressive

Georgia's government is democratic and modern in its institutions. It is fully capable and intent on governing S. Ossetia democratically and honestly. Moreover, if the aim of the S. Osseitans' is to join with Russia, upon seceding from Georgia (as seems likely), then the many arguments it is putting forward in support of its national identity and right to self-determination do not apply in the same way, as they would be simply exchanging minority status in one state for minority status in another, and not truly seeking their own homeland where Ossets would be a majority, as they claim. This means that arguments about Ossetian being its own language and the Ossets having a long history of self-rule are not in fact arguments for secession, as secession would simply result in a transfer to Russia and not a truly Ossetian state. Therefore, the real question is: does Georgia or Russia have a greater claim to S. Ossetia as part of its territory? The historical arguments made by proposition clearly should Georgia to have a greater claim here.
South Ossetian independence will help prevent future conflict

If S. Ossetians renounce violence, no future conflicts will occur. S. Ossetian militant separatists argue that, if S. Ossetia is not given independence, that future violence and chaos will result. Yet, this is only the case if S. Ossetian separatists continue to resist Georgia's sovereignty violently. If S. Ossetians renounce the use of force and their separatism, there will be no future conflicts. This is an equally valid solution as independence. Furthermore, the US State Department rejected the 2006 independence referendum and warned that it would “only serve to exacerbate tensions and divert attention from the need to peacefully resolve the conflict.”[1] [1] The Georgian Times Online. “US slams separatists' decision”. The Georgian Times. 9 November 2006. http://www.geotimes.ge/index.php/css/?m=home&newsid=2248