The Argument from Meaning

My opponent's argument hinges on one particular metaphysical principle, namely, that meaning cannot arise from meaninglessness. Despite the fact I can list numerous problems with such a view, I will focus on only one, which I think it bears refining. Denying the principle is only an "absurd" opinion to the theist; the atheist (I am assuming the atheist is also a naturalist) has no problem with this denial since there is some evidential basis for thinking so; the brain creates meaning and it is fundamentally a meaningless structure carrying out meaningless processes. The theist must attack this belief on its own grounds, i.e. show how the biodiversity, including the structure of the human brain, observed on this planet could not have come about from only natural mechanisms, and show life does indeed have some kind of purpose, that is, it's engineered, to say the least. At the very least, the atheist has some independent reason for thinking meaninglessness can give rise to meaning, namely the brain and its activities. The mind-body problem, and its solution is particularly relevant to the AfM. To demonstrate why this is the case: "Meaning exists." Both sides agree to this proposition. "Meaning cannot arise from anything meaningless, so the mechanism by which meaning exists must be a mind, which means it's capable of generating meaning on its own." Here the atheist and theist will diverge, and the atheist actually has a very powerful piece of evidence of meaning arising from a meaningless system, namely the brain. When the brain is analyzed from the outside, there will be no meaning observed. All that exists, as far as can be measured and quantified, are the particles that make up the system known as the brain, which, from a third-person view, is completely devoid of meaning (aside from its arrangement and organization of its atoms, it's made up of the same stuff, fundamentally speaking, as a rock and carries just about as much significance from an objective point of view). There is no purpose; there are only neurons and synapses, which are ultimately atoms and so forth. From a first-person view, however, there are a myriad of experiences that seem correlated, and, arguably, caused by the physical goings on in the brain. In other words, the brain is, prima facie, meaningless, but it can produce something meaningful, and the correlation between physical states in the brain and experiences perceived by the subject, seem to lend some very strong weight to some kind of causal, even reductionist, mechanism between the brain and mental states, including meaning. These are very interesting questions, but the relation between the mind and brain, and what they reduce to, must be concluded before you can settle the metaphysical notion of whether meaning can or cannot arise from something meaningless. If reality is only composed of the physical, including mental states, then there is difficulty or even "absurdity" in meaning arising from something meaningless, and the atheist has, she thinks, a very good reason for positing this, namely the brain. But the brain, or, rather, consciousness is can be a powerful evidence for the theist, too, since it can be argued that the existence of consciousness actually implies some dualistic account of reality. But this question must be settled before you can even get into the argument from meaning, since so much depends on the ontology of meaning, whether it's reducible to or caused by something physical, and thus meaningless at the root, at least. The atheist has some independent reason for questioning the truthfulness of the principle "meaning cannot arise from meaninglessness", and this gets the parties, one way or another, into the ontology of meaning, and from that, the ontology of the mind, which must be settled first, and then meaning's ontology. The AfM soundness relies on a myriad of superordinate discussions which are very hospitable in the theistic worldview, but are highly suspect (to say the absolute least) in an atheistic worldview. Since this is the case, every single premise in the AfM must be analyzed meticulously, nigh exhaustively, in light of these very interesting subjects, making the AfM derivative, completely. The mind-body problem and intelligent design are just two examples of the sorts of issues contained within the AfM. Scholarly arguments, ranging from the cosmological and teleological and ontological, all have something in common in that they use some plausible premises that a sophisticated atheist has already thought about or even accepts due to the cost of denying them, in order to reason that some transcendent mind exists. In other words, the theist and atheist share certain principles in common, and the principles which the atheist deny in anticipation of the theistic implications of holding them may place her in a very awkward philosophical position. Disagreeing with a of the premise of the kalam, for instance, may place the atheist at odds with the overwhelming consensus of the relevant scientific community. Even worse, she may deny some fundamental principle of causality that places her in an even more precarious position that any reasonable person may regard her as irrational for denying. Fine-tuning relies on premises that will place her, once again, at odds with some fundamental, 'obvious' philosophical principles and rigidly tested facts of the universe. In any good argument, there should be some cost to disagreeing with any of its premises that places the disagreeing party in a philosophically weaker position, something that will cause some inconsistency or incoherency, hopefully, in her worldview if some premise that should be affirmed is all of a sudden denied because of some theistic implication. This is why the AfM is a bad one, despite the fact it is, in my estimation, sound. There is no cost for the atheist in denying the fundamental belief that meaning cannot arise from meaningless. She has some independent reason for thinking so, and argues from this reason that the principle cannot hold. It does not matter how meaninglessness causes meaning, but the brute fact the brain apparently does it gives her more than enough warrant for affirming its denial. This affirmation or denial cannot be argued from the subject of meaning alone, since meaning's ontology will be interpreted by more basic, foundational beliefs that must be attacked from another, fundamental angle, as any knowledgeable, rigorous theist ought to be capable of doing. However, meaning cannot be the platform of attack, a polemic; the AfM can only be affirmed as sound when multiple facets of the theistic worldview are working in tandem. In this way, it's a derivative of the theistic worldview and its persuasive force relies solely on decided, superordinate issues. For the atheist, it relies on premises too suspect to be agreed to, and they have some independent reasons for this suspicion, weakening the argument's ability to place her in a disconcerting position. These reasons show why this sound argument for the existence of God is simply a very poor one to anyone with a 'sophisticated' worldview. So, I conclude with this little summation: the AfM is hospitable only in a theistic framework, is only derivative, and even then only redundantly, and is completely unpersuasive and not even the least bit damaging for denying any of its premises for the atheist. ****** I would like to thank my opponent for this debate, and I hope that he has been edified by my comments, as well as the audience. I certainly know it has been an edifying experience for me.