I will PROVE that a finite past of the universe doesn't equate to it coming into being

IntroductionCon Restates that claiming to have resolved the unresolved Kalam Cosmological Argument after 2,500 years is an exceptional claim. However, my opponent is committing the fallacy of presumption by assuming the Kalam Cosmological Argument is unresolved in the first place (many philosophers believe it is resolved, and that the argument has been in the graveyard). Until Sidewalker proves that the Kalam Cosmological Argument is unresolved, then his claim that I have made an exceptional claim cannot even get off the ground. I have seen random bloggers tear down the Kalam Cosmological Argument, so to act like its exceptional to claim to have defeated it is just ridiculous. It's an easy argument to tear town, and plenty of philosophers have torn it down already. B-TheoryCon essentially drops all my points from the last round, and thus concedes this section (and the debate in the process). I proved in the last rounds that B-Theory entails that the past, present, and future are all real. On a theory that the past, present, and future are all real, then we can obviously talk about the past, present, and future. On a tenseless theory, there only cannot be a past, and future with respect to an objective present on the 4d or n+1d block. However, there is a still a past, present, and future with respect to any hypothetically selected point on the block (also referred to as the earlier than, or later than direction). So yes, there would be a finite past as the universe would have an edge (at The Big Bang), however it simply wouldn't be a past with respect to an objective present. Even on a tenseless theory we can used tensed language, as long as it is not with respect to an objective present. Remember, in my last round I stated:"He claimed that we cannot speak about a past on a tenseless theory, but I refuted that argument by stating that we can talk about a past, present, and future on a tenseless theory for two reasons:i) B-Theory entails that the past, present, and future are all real (which Con's own source supported, and my sources in my last round supported)ii) There can be a past on the B-Theory of time, as long as it is a past with respect to a hypothetically selected point on the 4d or n+1d block, and not to an objective presentCon did not touch on i) or ii). Thus, as it stands I have established the resolution with my B-Theory argument."Con still did not touch on my points, and conceded that nothing comes into being on B-Theory. As it stands, the resolution has been affirmed with this B-Theory section from me. A-Theory (Prelude) This section from Con was just hand-waved away, thus Con concedes my points.A-TheoryI didn't recant anything. Even after Con quoted me, I still proved in my last round that he was misrepresenting my argument. He then says that saying something is self-evident is not an argument, I agree. However, something that is self-evident requires no external argumentation[1]:"self-ev·i·dent adj. Requiring no proof or explanation." For example, I don't need an argument from anybody to prove that I am typing right now, it is self-evident. Similarly, based on Modal intuition, it is self-evident that nothing makes a "prior" to the universe at which it did not exist metaphysically or logically impossible (like a perfectly round square is logically impossible). If nothing makes it metaphysically or logically possible, it is possible by definition. Also, my arguments are logically valid, so the claim from Pro that my argument doesn't follow valid logic is absurd. Lets form another syllogism:P1: If it is possible that there is no "prior" to the universe at which it was out of being, then we cannot say the universe came into being strictly off of the basis of a finite past of the universeP2: It is possible that there is no "prior" to the universe at which it was out of beingC: We cannot say the universe came into being strictly on the basis of a finite past of the universeP1: If we cannot say the universe came into being strictly on the basis of a finite past of the universe, then a finite past of the universe and a coming into being of the universe cannot be equivalent. P2: We cannot say the universe came into being strictly on the basis of a finite past of the universeC: A finite past of the universe and a coming into being of the universe cannot be equivalentThe above arguments follow Modus Ponens perfectly[2], so Con's claims of invalid argumentation are false.Con then proceeds to give reasons for the assertion that there must have been a "prior" to the universe, at which it was out of being. First, as a prelude, he discusses the PSR:"While the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) is certainly controversial, it is a necessary presupposition of both logic and science in the pursuit of intelligibility, and it states that everything must have a reason or cause." - ProMany scientists actually reject the notion that causality is a presupposition of science:"Quantum events have a way of just happening, without any cause, as when a radioactive atom decays at a random time." - Taner Edis. Department of Physics Truman State University Kirksville[3]"Uncaused, random quantum fluctuations in a flat, empty, featureless spacetime can produce local regions with positive or negative curvature" - Victor Stenger. American Particle Physics[4]He then claims that given a finite past, we have a right to ask what cause brought it into being. However, this begs the question. This assumes the first state did come into being, which necessitates a "prior" to it in the first place! This means Con is assuming his position to demonstrate his position; which is illogical. Even if I accept that the first state has a reason, that reason could be that it had to be that way. If that's the reason, then a cause of such a state is impossible (if it was caused, then it didn't have to be that way). It is at least possible that the reason the first state existed was because it had to; this satisfies the PSR. Thus, this takes care of Con's argument pretty easily. He then makes the claim that I am equivocating with regards to the word "time" but this is a fallacious red-herring. It doesn't matter how we view time, because if we view it as something having ontological existence, then if time had a beginning 13.7 billion years ago; there is no such thing as 13.8 billion years ago. If time is epistemologically viewed, this doesn't mean that we can speak of a 13.8 billion years ago; that is a non-sequitur (also, a non-finite past is illogical and leads to infinite regress). Also, the Standard Big Bang model has nothing to say about the universe coming into existence, it only speaks about a first state of the universe 13.7 billion years ago that expanded. Con still leaves us with no reasons to think that a "prior" to the universe at which it does not exist was the case. "Lastly, the General Theory is explicitly ontological, it tells us what space, time, matter, and energy are, and what it says they are is relationships, as such, they are contingent substances, and their postulated coming into being at a specific point in time by the Lambda-CDM model does in fact logically necessitate a prior realm or framework upon which they can be contingent." - ProThe above is a bare-assertion. Con has not argued in favor of his position above that the standard Big Bang model necessitates a prior realm. Thus, the above can be dismissed.ConclusionMy B-Theory argument proves that a finite past of the universe doesn't equate it to a coming into being, and Con essentially concedes this by dropping all points. My A-Theory argument was misrepresented, and Con's objections are all logically fallacious. My arguments remain unscathed, and the resolution has been established.Sources[1] http://www.thefreedictionary.com...[2] http://en.wikipedia.org...[3] http://atheism.about.com...[4] http://www.infidels.org...