The Kalam Cosmological Argument is sound

A & B-Series of timeIt is true that A-Theory is intuitively widespread throughout the common folk, but philosophers are extensively divided on this issue. When dealing with philosophers of physics (and physicists themselves), it seems to be that they are leaning more in the direction of B-Theory due to relativity. Many even adhere to the notion that quantum mechanics itself proves B-Theory, like Willard Van Orman Quine and Hilary Putnam [1][2]. I am not trying to make the case that B-Theory correct, but it seems Pro is just assuming A-Theory true without warrant. My opponent claims:"It [B-theory] says things like future marriage, our deaths, vacations we take, and what we will eat next week, are all as real as right now. The problem here is that though these things could become real, they are not yet" - PenningtonPro is committing a fallacy of presumption [3]. He has to presume A-Theory true in order to make the claim that these future events are not real. All my opponent is doing is restating the conclusion of A-Theory. He then goes on to say:"By conceding the first premise my opponent therefore concedes the A-series." - PenningtonThe above is clearly false. It could be true that everything that begins to exist has a cause, even if nothing actually begins to exist. This is because something could be true for 'x' even if 'x' is not ever the case. Take for instance a perfectly cubed sphere; it is logically incoherent, and will never be case but we can still infer a truth about it (the fact that it involves two distinct geometries for instance). In contrast, there is no reason to think Premise 1 does not hold simply because things do not actually begin to exist. This is an elementary mistake. Pro also states: "My opponent assumes I must show the B-theory false to make the A-theory true and ultimately the KCA valid. This is not the case. By the logic Modus Ponens, we have a conclusion that follows necessarily." - PenningtonI already conceded the logical validity of the argument. The problem is that Premise 2 has not been established. This is because Premise 2 rests upon the A-Theory of time and Pro left us with no good reasons to believe it is true. This holds, even if the Kalam Cosmological Argument follows consistently. "Begins to Exist"My opponent fails to adequately respond to my objections here, and most of what he is saying is straw manning [4]. Keep in mind that my arguments hold, even if A-Theory is true. Also, still keep in mind the distinction between:i) "x" has a finite pastii) "x" came into beingHe says says:"My opponent gives us the argument on the meaning of 'coming into being.' The argument equivocates on the "begins to exist. 1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause means 'from a material state." - PenningtonI never argued that everything that begins to exist has a causal means from a material state. This is misrepresenting my argument. I conceded that a coming into being from a non-material state was prima facie [5] conceivable. My argument was that we cannot infer ii) strictly off of the truth of i), not that every cause must have its origin in material. This whole contrived syllogism from Pro misrepresents my argument entirely and can be disregarded. In reality, he is equivocating by interchanging between i) and ii) without warrant. Lets take into account the description of "begins to exist" provided by Pro (which is actually a regurgitated definition from the mind of William Lane Craig himself): "x Begins to exist if and only if x exists at some time t and there is no time t* prior to t at which x exists and no state of affairs in the actual world in which x exists timelessly."This comes at the price of coming off extremely forced. It also still suffers from the problem of not necessitating ii), and only inferring something began to exist based off of the inference of i). Pro still has not built this bridge between the two, meaning the above description of "begins to exist" fails miserably. It basically states that something can begin to exist even if it did not come into being. This is absurd. Another dilemma with the way my opponent is using the description, is evident in the fact that this definition has not been shown to be absolute. There are other philosophical definitions which are completely different which would have to be ruled out as less superior. Richard Swinburne and Adolf Grunbaum have their own description for "begins to exist" [6]. It can be formulated in this fashion: "x begins to exist if and only if x exists at sometime t and there is time prior to t* at which x does not exist." The advantages of this description are clear, as it necessitates i) and ii). It would exclude the concept of God and the universe as that which began to exist as well, containing less baggage. There is no need for "timeless" aspects being mentioned, as the description itself inherently takes care of that. One can accuse it of forcing an exclusion of the universe. However, one can accuse Pro's definition of forcing an inclusion of the universe. The acusation against Pro would be especially true, since ii) has not been established by him in context. Until My opponent shows why Dr. Craig's definitions are superior and knocks my arguments down, he hasn't even scratched the surface. Pennington then goes on to assert that claiming "nothing begins to exist" under B-Theory opens up the possibility of us not existing. This is false. It just means that we would objectively exist in time tenselessly. Note the illustration on the right: Analogy"....Like knobs for channels, volume, antennas, and a speaker box." - PenningtonFalse analogy [7]. Knobs, channels, volume, antennas, and a speaker box could be describing an antique radio for all we know. Unless we know that the function of "x" is projecting moving images, we cannot begin to say "x" is a TV for sure (or at the very least, a working TV). "Furthermore even if those were the only two options for knowing a TV is a TV, then it still does not follow that the TV is not a TV just because one of the premises can not be known." - PenningtonI did not say that they were the only options, just that they were necessary qualities. I also did not say that this would mean "x" wasn't a TV. It would just mean "x" hasn't been shown to be a TV. Thought ExperimentThis is just a conceptual analysis of possibility. It is not actually an argument for logical or metaphysical necessity. Direct CausationThis is a rehashing of Dr. Craig's "Origin of a Temporal Effect from a Timeless Cause" dilemma. This is trivial, as it presumes a cause of the universe. I am arguing that a cause has not even been shown in the first place due to lack of support for Premise 2 of the Kalam. Conclusion Pro concedes that the resolution rests on the the A-Theory of time. None of his arguments for A-Theory stood up to critical examination and contained strings of fallacious spaghetti. He also mistakenly inferred that conceding Premise 1, entails conceding A-Theory. I disproved this by showing that we can say something is true for "x" even if "x" is never the case, without contradiction. My opponent also misrepresented my critique of the support for Premise 2 of the Kalam, and provided a problematic definition of "begins to exist". There is no doubt that Pennington did not meet his burden of proof. As it stands, the resolution is negated according to the debate outline.Sources [1] A philosopher Looks At Quantum Mechanics again, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 56, pp 615 - 634.[2] Word and Object, Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press.[3] http://www.philosophypages.com... [4] https://yourlogicalfallacyis.com... [5] http://www.collinsdictionary.com... [6] http://commonsenseatheism.com... [7] http://www.skepdic.com...[*Image*] http://www.atheismandthecity.com...