The Problem of Evil (PoE)

IntroductionIn my response, I will show not only that Con’s approach leaves the PoE unmoved, but that, taken to its logical conclusion, his response destroys the basis for his own worldview. As we seem to agree that evils exist, I will take it that Con accepts P2, and will only defend premises 1 and 3.As regards to the definition of evil, I will use it in the broad sense it is typically used in the PoE. Unless Con believes that gratuitous suffering (if it exists) would not present a problem for God, then this isn’t really an issue.Defending P1Con laid out 3 criticisms of P1, but none of these criticisms hold much water. One of these criticisms is that Con asserts that P1 has to assume that humans have epistemic access into the reasons God has for permitting evil. But this is false. All P1 states is that if God exists as defined, gratuitous evils do not exist. Whether these evils are inscrutable or not is simply irrelevant for P1, and this only come to bear in the argument in reference to P3. As for Con’s reformulation, I insist that we stick to the initial presentation of P1. This because the original P1 explains the necessary conditions for evil to be morally permissible - that it must be logically necessary for an adequately compensating good, just like in the analogy, the only way to relieve pain was to drill one’s teeth. Now, on the analogy, Con criticises it as being “man-centred” because he claims that the analogy shows that the compensatory good must be immediate and benefit in a “physical, materialistic, tangible way”. All the analogy aimed to show was merely a sketch of an example of P1, but Con took this in the most uncharitable light possible. The goods could be spiritual (e.g. salvation), mechanical (free-will) or physical (reducing greater pain). All I ask is that Con plausibly show the evil to be logically necessary and the good adequately compensatory, but as I said before, this disagreement seems to be primarily directed at P3. All P1 does is to say that the evils in world have a morally sufficient reason (in the way that I specified with), and unless Con disagrees either that the evils a) have to have adequate compensation somehow, and b) the evils permitted be necessary to obtain this good, we both seem to accept P1.In short, most of the criticisms of P1 conflate it with P3, and from a few misunderstanding of what P1 entails.Defending P3Con’s primary attack of P3 is that of Sceptical Theism (ST), a position which claims that due to one’s ”limited perspective, knowledge and time”, we simply cannot bridge the gap between the appearance of gratuitous evils, and the fact of gratuitous evils. In order to reject this criticism of Con, I will begin by addressing a few minor criticisms of P3 that he gives to supplement ST. Firstly, the PoE does not necessitate that one know (in the strict epistemic sense) that gratuitous evils exist. Rather, as Rowe stresses, the contention is whether it is reasonable to believe that they do (1). Thus, Con cannot be content merely to address my argument as one would the logical PoE. Second, Con charges that the PoE is an argument from ignorance, but even principal advocate of ST Wykstra dismisses this as a bad criticism for two reasons. Firstly, because P3 doesn’t conclude gratuity merely on no apparent morally sufficient reason for these evils. Rather, it says from all that we know of these horrendous circumstances, we are unable to even to conceive (much less identify) why these evils are logically necessary for any good at all. This inability to even conceive of these evils being morally justified is a hugely persuasive reason to affirm P3. Secondly, because as Wykstra puts it:“For if an instance of suffering appears not to have a point, that is a reason for thinking it has no point.”(2)Further, he calls such a principle a “primary and indispensable principle of justification”, and providing at least prima facie evidence for P3, which Con must address (3). Con’s last minor criticism is that God must have morally sufficient reasons to permit evils, given His existence. But this is precisely the problem, God’s existence is at stake! It simply does no good to simply assume evils are justified because God exists, when His existence is questioned on the basis of gratuitous evils. As for ST, there are several reasons to reject it as plausible in dealing with the PoE, some of which have been touched on already. A few more reasons to disregard ST is that it seems to imply that even if all sentience in the universe experienced the most horrendous suffering imaginable until death, this would not render God’s existence any more unlikely (4). But this is absurd. If postulating God has any implications, then surely the nature of the world is of primary concern. This blind dismissal of evil, however prevalent, simply leaves us with a conceptual black hole. Second, surely a wholly good being would comfort us in times of suffering, ensuring us of the necessity of these evils, even if their purpose was somehow unknowable, much like a parent comforts a child (5). But this is not apparent either. Additionally, even the appearance of gratuitous evils leads to perhaps the greatest evil - nonbelief. Thirdly, the postulation of unknowns to explain greater goods begs the question. Who’s to say that these unknowns won’t create even more difficulty for the theist, much less that the compensation is logically necessary for an adequately compensatory good? Assuming that the problem solves itself somehow is not an answer we can take seriously. From these 3 reasons and the 2 above (the solution being inconceivable and the prima facie case for justifiably believing P3 because of the appearance of gratuitous evils), we can already dismiss ST, in reference to the PoE. But what of its further implications?ST and theismST creates huge problems for the theist:Moral paralysis - Given ST’s insistence on our cognitive limitations on suffering, our ability to make moral choices is eroded by the same scepticism that the believer applies (unsuccessfully) to the PoE. So decisions like saving our hypothetical baby for its horrendous pain are simply off limits for the advocate of ST, for how can we know that relieving the suffering of this child is the right thing to do, given these limitations? "the result is that, if I were to take sceptical theism seriously, I should be morally paralysed." (6)Moral depravity - Likewise, ST’s agnosticism about moral justification can lead to us not only failing to condemn moral abominations, but to believe that such actions are morally permissible:“If one accepts that God could have reasons beyond our ken for permitting the rape and murder of children, then how can one reasonably deny that God could have reasons for commanding us to do that which we have outweighing reasons not to do?” (7)Lastly, sceptical theism not only undercuts Reformed Epistemology (which Con holds to) by emphasising the limitations of our cognitive faculties and undercutting our trust in them, while also denying us us any mechanism for a host of beliefs Con holds, such as believer salvation, because of our scepticism in God's actions:"for all we know, everything turning out for the best includes all those who believe in Christ being annihilated at the moment of death." (8).ConclusionNot only does ST fail to deal with the PoE, but it presents a huge challenge to theism on its own terms. Sources1 Rowe, 1979, p3382,3 http://www.calvin.edu...(P149-150)4,5 http://www.springerlink.com... (P79-92)6 http://www.bowdoin.edu... (P12)7 http://www.tandfonline.com... (P86-87)8 Wielenberg, E. ‘Skeptical Theism and Divine Lies.’ Presentation at the Paciﬁc Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Vancouver, British Columbia, 2009