Speciesism is an unjustifiable form of discrimination.

Thanks for the topic Freeman. Definitions Justifiable means "capable of being justified."ï¿½ [1] Justify means "to show a satisfactory reason . . . for something."ï¿½ [2] Discrimination is "the cognitive process whereby two or more stimuli are distinguished."ï¿½ [3] Un is a pre-fix meaning "not" Burden of proof My opponent, as instigator/pro, has the burden to show that there exists no reasonable explanation for the cognitive process of differentiating animals from humans. Showing that the distinction does not comport with certain conventions of morality is irrelevant; my opponent must show that the explanation for why we draw the human/animal distinction is not a satisfactory explanation for the behavior. ==My case== Contention 1: We are carnivores Although technically, we are omnivores, the human body is clearly optimized to eat meat (based on bowel length and canine shape, for example). [4] For the aboriginal Bushmen, whose lifestyle mimics that of ancient humans, meat is an integral part of their diet. Predators who empathize with their prey would tend to die out because this empathy would either prevent them from killing and eating or, in the less extreme case, it would interfere with the split-second decision-making necessary while hunting, but would not completely overwhelm the survival instinct. Either way, evolution naturally selects against empathy for prey animals. This is a sufficient explanation for why humans draw a human/animal distinction, and thus Pro fails the BOP. Our evolutionary default - to not empathize with prey animals - can however be overcome, by pets for example. Serpell (1996) explains that the meme for humanizing dogs has led to the belief in the West that pig meat is tasty but dog meat is disgusting. [5] This demonstrates the effect of Pro's advocacy of humanizing all animals: that we would no longer be able to bring ourselves to eat meat. Whether this outcome is desirable or not is irrelevant, however, since the topic only asks whether there is a sufficient explanation for the human behavior of drawing a distinction between ourselves and animals. The explanation is clear: the evolutionary advantages of being able to eat meat. Contention 2: A two-tiered morality My opponent seems to argue that either we give animals the exact same moral status as humans or we give them no moral consideration whatsoever, allowing them to be tortured and killed indiscriminately. However, the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy explains that non-humans can be considered "morally considerable" - meaning worthy of moral considerations - but, at the same time, not "morally equivalent"ï¿½ in status to humans. "That non-human animals can make moral claims on us does not in itself indicate how such claims are to be assessed and conflicting claims adjudicated. Being morally considerable is like showing up on a moral radar screen - how strong the signal is or where it is located on the screen are separate questions." [6] It is possible to create a system of morality that offers some moral consideration to animals but does not view them as morally equivalent in status to human beings. I will offer some such systems of morality as examples, but I advocate a two-tiered system of morality in general, not one particular moral system. Let's take a second, first, to evaluate the absurdity of treating humans and animals as morally equivalent beings. Imagine, for a second, that you are on a hiking trip with your spouse and your dog. You get lost in the woods for days, and when you finally get your bearings, you only have enough food left for two beings to survive the trek back to civilization. If you consider all three beings of equal moral status - having an equal claim on the "right to life" - then you would need to draw straws to decide who lives and who dies because random selection is the only fair method of adjudicating these competing rights claims. However, most people would consider feeding your dog and letting your wife or husband starve to death to be morally bankrupt. So let's consider how a two-tiered system of morality might protect animal rights without elevating animals to absolutely equal moral status with human beings. System 1: deontology A two-tiered deontological position might say that animals have an inviolable right to life, unless a human life is at stake. Under this two-tiered system, animals could be slaughtered if there are no other food options, and experimental drugs can be tested on animals if the only alternative is to test the drugs on humans, potentially endangering those human lives. Note that this deontological approach is a pretty extreme moral position, requiring that most humans become vegetarians and that most animal testing cease. Thus, this two-tiered morality avoids the cultural chauvinism of the absolutist animal rights groups, who would deny animal meat to people in arctic regions or living nomadic lifestyles, whose choice is: eat animal meat, perish, or give up their traditional lifestyle. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy chalks this up as a benefit to two-tiered systems of morality: "In many parts of the world where economic, cultural, or climate conditions make it virtually impossible for people to sustain themselves on plant based diets, killing and eating animals that previously led relatively unconstrained lives and are painlessly killed, would not be morally objectionable." [7] System 2: multi-factor utilitarianism Peter Singer (who my opponent cites) was one of the original proponents of a multi-factor utilitarianism as a solution to the animal rights question. [8] Under multi-factor utilitarianism, when there are competing rights claims, we are instructed to take into account the content, context, and relative weight of the interests of all morally considerable beings. [9] Since human interests are given more weight than animal interests, if saving human lives requires harming an animal, then this harm would be morally acceptable. However, "if there are two courses of action, one which causes extreme amounts of suffering and ultimate death, and one which causes much less suffering and painless death, then the latter would be morally preferable to the former" under multi-factor utilitarianism. [10] Multi-factor utilitarianism thus allows humans to eat meat in many situations, but requires that animals used for meat be treated well and humanely slaughtered. Contention 3: More absurdities I evaluated one absurdity of treating animals as morally equivalent to humans in contention 2, but continuing from there: Another absurdity is that animals do not adopt our systems of morality or consider us to be worthy of moral consideration. A hungry grizzly bear does not consider a human's right to life before attacking - it just attacks. Moral equality requires reciprocity, which cannot exist in animals. In addition, animals cannot be considered perfect moral equivalents to humans because they lack certain abilities, such as the ability to own property. Many systems of morality, such as libertarianism and communism, focus on property ownership as their core organizing principle for rights. However, animals clearly cannot hold property, so my opponent's approach to morality would invalidate both moral systems, as well as many others. I will refute my opponent's case in depth the next round, but briefly: C1 has been answered already and C2 leads to the absurd conclusion that plants also have equal moral rights to humans. In answering C3, I'll show how cognitive development is a necessary moral consideration. Citations: [1] http://tinyurl.com... [2] http://tinyurl.com... [3] http://tinyurl.com... [4] http://tinyurl.com... [5] http://tinyurl.com... [6] http://tinyurl.com... [7] Ibid, supra note 6 [8] Ibid [9] Ibid [10] Ibid