It should be considered morally wrong to kill sentient animals, without consent, for their meat

Contention 1: Anthropomorphism. My claim is not that non-human, sentient animals should be held to human standards, rather that non-human, sentient animals should be held to a moral standard of some kind. Clearly, as I argued, non-human animals should not have ‘rights’ because they are not human (e.gs. non-human animals don’t have the mental capacity to vote, they don’t have the capacity to understand public indecency etc.). Therefore, non-human, sentient animals should not be treated as humans. However, non-human, sentient animals have a capacity, of perhaps a lesser level than humans, to feel empathy. Dr. Michael W. Fox writes, “If animals were incapable of empathy, of understanding another’s emotional state and having feeling for another’s distress, then we would find no evidence of altruistic behavior in the animal kingdom. But indeed we do.”[1] Here is a brief example wherein a dog tries and succeeds to help another dog in danger (video on right). [2] This, at the very least, gives us a slight insight as to the capacity that non-human, sentient animals have for understanding other animal’s emotions/ state of being. A journal article by Karine Silva and Liliana de Sousa titled: ‘Canis empathicus’? A proposal on dogs' capacity to empathize with humans [3], explores exactly what is suggested in the title. The article, which collaborates numerous other works, concludes that dogs do have a capacity for empathy, which has origins in their wolf ancestors (hunting in packs). Empathy is a social phenomenon that is, as you can see, not limited to humans (but, arguably, non-human, sentient animals have a lesser capacity for empathy). Another report by White, in 2007, suggests that dolphins (and related species) have the capacity for empathy, and this was demonstrated by identifying spindle cells (nerve cells that convey empathy). [4] I argue that because it is clear that non-human, sentient animals have a capacity for empathy, they should be morally bound, but not by the heights of human moral standards, rather standards of their own, relative to their capacity (so, a higher standard for those social creatures, and a much lower standard for those ‘loner’ creatures). In light of this, in no way have I anthropomorphised non-human, sentient animals. Contention 2: Anthropomorphism Part 2: Carnivores. Regardless of whether eating is required for sustenance, it is immoral to kill for the purpose of eating sentient, feeling meat. Perhaps you could be empathetic for the lions, as that is their evolutionary assigned method of consumption, but the act is still immoral. My moral framework, as I outlined in round 1, explains why it is immoral to kill conscious animals for their meat (because it is known that is causes suffering). The lion has a capacity to understand the suffering that it is inflicting (another social creature), and so it should be morally bound to an extent. In this case, it would become a decision of which of two options is less immoral (letting the lion starve or letting the lion eat now). I argue that letting the lion eat will not only cause the suffering of the animal eaten (although, the suffering resulting from the lion’s starving would subside), but that the lion will be obliged to eat many other sentient, feeling creatures in the future, hence creating an enormous amount of suffering by perpetuating its existence. Since I doubt the lion would be able to understand this future extension, I feel it unfair to hold it to this kind of human standard of morality. However, it is more than capable of understanding the suffering that it is imposing on its victim in the current situation, and thus the morality standard should extend from there. The latter of kbub’s arguments suggests that allowing the extinction of lions would be, morally, the wrong thing to do. I argue the complete opposite; we should, as humans that can understand the predicament that a sentient, feeling state dictates, we are morally obliged to prevent unnecessary suffering. As I somewhat hinted to earlier, allowing the further procreation of lions would not only ensure monumental suffering of its prey, but an amount of suffering for the predator itself. The lion has to eat, it has to consume the meat of these creatures; why would you want to condone the existence of such a morally revolting creature? Contention 3: Animal Ignorance: Again, I am not “professing” ‘animal rights’, as I explicitly stated in my opening round, under the title: Non-human animals do not have rights. I understand the need for animals to eat, and that’s precisely why carnivores should be disallowed from breeding. It’s the fact that these animals have to eat other animals to exist, and the fact that it is immoral to kill sentient, feeling creatures for their meat, that you can now see the two are incompatible. But I put it to you, again, as another human, which is the least morally problematic?-: allowing these terrible creatures to eat now and continue to cause suffering in the future, or to starve them to death and end the cycle of suffering? You, as a human, have the capacity to understand the question and the suffering involved, and hence you have the moral obligation to answer this question. Conclusion I’ll say it again so that it is clear: I am NOT arguing for animal rights in the sense that my opponent speaks of. I AM arguing for a lesser (than human’s), moral obligation for non-human, sentient animals to be held accountable to. This extends from their capacity to be empathetic towards other sentient, feeling creatures. I have also argued that humans have a moral obligation not to kill other sentient, feeling creatures for their meat, which my opponent seems to agree on. Over to you, kbub. References and sources [1] http://drfoxvet.com... [2] http://www(dot)youtube(dot)com/watch?v=qjOJmc2aCkI http://www.youtube.com... [3]http://rsbl.royalsocietypublishing.org... [4] White, T. I. (2007). In defense of dolphins: the new moral frontier. Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub