It is probable that God exists

TCAsContrary to what my opponent has claimed, science has not vindicated Hume. First, quantum fluctuations are not true examples of events occuring without a cause. These fluctuations themselves occur in the context of a quantum vacuum, such that if one removes the vacuum, such fluctuations will no longer occur. Con thus confuses causal determination with causal conditioning. [1] Both of the cosmological arguments that I offered only make the modest claim that motion requires prior causal conditions. Second, there are more than a dozen interpretations of quantum mechanics, many of which are deterministic (Such as De Broglie–Bohm). For Con's appeal to QM to work, we must assume that an indeterministic interpretation (Such as Copenhagen) is correct, but there is no reason to suppose that this is so. Third, even if we do assume Copenhagen, there is no reason to suppose that quantum indeterminancy is ontic as opposed to epistemic.Con's criticism of TCA1 attacks a strawman. Nowhere did I state the argument to prove a being which is "outside of existence." Rather, TCA1 demonstrates the existence of an unmoved mover. This is simply to say that there exists a first originator of all motion -- a being whose nature includes motion -- not a being that is "outside" of motion.Does the TCA1/2 presuppose the ontological argument? Absolutely not. Unlike the ontological argument, cosmological arguments from contingency do not "define" God into existence, but show that God must exist because of some empirical fact(s), namely, that there exists causation/contingent beings. The arguments I offered are a posteriori, whereas the OA is a priori. Moreover, this objection confuses the type of necessity at play. Whereas ontological arguments purport to demonstrate the existence of a logically necessary being, the TCAs I have offered demonstrate the existence of a factually necessary being (One who must exist given some fact about the world). [2] To compare the two is to compare apples and oranges. Con's final criticism is simply false. While he may disagree with what my TCAs entail, I certainly offered warrant (cf. my last paragraph) to show that this first cause must have the attributes of God. Until this is responded to, extend my arguments. Additionally, note that my arguments are presented together as a cumulative case to demonstrate the probability of God. Hence even if my TCAs do not prove all the divine attributes, it still makes the existence of God more likely than not.Teleological ArgumentCon's criticism of my argument as question-begging is bizzare. By that standard of question-begging, every deductive argument begs the question. Deductive arguments are such that the conclusion is implicitly contained in the premises, waiting only to be unpacked. My argument is only substantively question-begging if I assume what I am trying to prove, which I did not. Indeed, I gave arguments for the notion that ends and purposes require persons behind them. If anything, it is Con who begs the question. He simply asserts that facts about goal-directedness are merely descriptive and that a person is not required for their explanation. But this is exactly what I disputed in my opening argument! My arguments against a descriptive account of nature were not responded to. Inherent ends are not merely descriptive, but also prescriptive. Why? Because positing normativity in the biological realm is necessary to explain (1) natural regularities, (2) law-like behavior, and (3) our attribution of proper functions to natural entities. Con writes: "Ends given to entities by persons are normative. While Pro's example of a heart pumping blood is descriptive (it is explained by science), medicine is normative. "But this begs the question! My argument is precisely that biological ends must be explained in terms of a person and that mere descriptive accounts of function are inadequate. To assert without argument that they are merely descriptive is to assume what you are trying to prove. Is God Improbable? Not so.Con's opening argument attacks a litany of strawmen and red herrings. It is true that theism is not empirically testable, but to say that this makes God improbable is like saying that because you can't taste music, that therefore music doesn't exist. His statement that theism requires an a priori commitment to God's existence is simply false. Many theists do not have such a commitment. His invokation of the Uncertainty Principle against omniscience is also mistaken. According to the UP, we cannot know with certainty a given particle's location because our measuring devices will affect it. But this is not to say by means that an immaterial being who does not use empirical measuring devices cannot also know. Dawkins's Gambit is logically invalid. Even if one were to grant all the premises in his argument, the conclusion does not logically follow. Moreover, the notion that God is complex is simply false, for God is an immaterial being admitting of no material parts. By all accounts, God is actually incredibly simple.Con's argument from the explanatory power of naturalism is simply a red herring. This debate is over the probability of theism, not the explanatory power of theistic/naturalistic explanations. One can hold that theism is probable but affirm that theistic explanations are generallly bad.Physicalism?Physicalism is itself wrought with problems, so it is not clear that appealing to one contenious hypothesis to support another contentious hypothesis is a good strategy. Indeed, even granting physicalism, the conclusion that disembodied existence is impossible simply does not follow. To conclude otherwise is to engage in an accidental generalization, similar to saying that because all evidence suggests that humans live in the Solar System, that it is impossible for a humans to live outside of it. For the argument to work, one must show that disembodied existence is metaphysically impossible -- for if disembodied existence is even possible, then this argument falls apart.Incoherence?This argument seems simply to confuse the mode of God's knowledge with its scope. Moreover, what's so problematic about having knowledge of unrestricted negative existential statements? I see no problem whatsoever. Indeed, given the classical conception of God's knowledge as being non-propositional and non-perceptualist, there is no such problem. [3] This argument is terribly unconvincing.Evil?Aside from the lack of argumentation given for the PoE, P1 is epistemically inscrutable. Probabilities are always relative to some background evidence. What such evidence is Con refering to? The only way he could justify (1) is if he were to show that it is unlikely that God would have morally sufficient reasons for permitting such evil. But it is unclear how he can do this. If I asked you to assess the probability of an elephant being on a football field, you could give an accurate assessment. However, if I asked you to assess the probability of there being a flea in the same field, you could not give an accurate probability assessment because of your epistemic limitations. The same is true with claiming that gratuitious evil makes God improbable. Improbable relative to what? To make this claim, we need to have access to the "big picture." But given our epistemic limitations, we lack this and thus also any justification for affirming (1). It may very well be the case that God has morally sufficient reasons for permitting evil. It also may very well not be the case, but we are not in a position such that we can assess the probability of either. Hence, the evidential weight of the PoE is inscrutable. The resolution is affirmed.____Sources1. cf. G. E. M. Anscombe, "Causality and Determination" in Zimmerman and Van Inwagen (eds), Metaphysics (Blackwell: 2008)2. Douglas Groothuis, Christian Apologetics (IVP: 2011) pg. 210 3. W. L. Craig and J. P. Moreland, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview (IVP: 2003) pg. 521