The Leibnizian Cosmological Argument is Sound - 2

Premise 1An Overview of Modal LogicThis is a response to Roy's third rebuttal.God is defined as the necessary, personal, first cause of the universe. The discussion of perfections is a conclusion that could plausibly be derived from the validity of the LCA, but is irrelevant to this debate. My apologies for using the term perfections when speaking of God. That is a topic that ought to be discussed in another debate. Let's just talk about necessary existence. Roy's third rebuttal, at this point, is a straw man. I do not argue that God must exist because I attribute to him, by definition, the quality of necessary existence. My argument is that the first cause of the universe must exist necessarily, not contingently. I then proceed to show that no other necessary cause can explain the universe's existence. As a result of the process of elimination, I conclude that a cause which is both necessary and personal must have been the first cause of the universe. This necessary, personal, first cause is what the LCA defends as "God." Note that this "God" is not attributed any qualities of Christian Theology or common divinity.The Principle of Sufficient ReasonI have two arguments in support of the PSR.1. The Argument from CoherenceThis is a response to Roy's second rebuttal.This argument claims that the PSR acts in coherence with all available evidence collected and experiences we have had about the world.Roy's example paints the image of somebody making the claim that by adding velocity we may go faster. This claim is not referential to possible alternative, i.e. there existing some upper barrier of speed. Because the reasoning in Roy's example is not referential to all possible alternatives, Roy's rebuttal holds true. However, the PSR does look to all possible alternatives, as utilized in the LCA. It defines every type of cause and then uses the process of elimination to reject impossible explanations. At best Roy has succeeded in proving the PSR is fallacious solely based on its own merits, but the LCA provides a more rigorous environment in which we can utilize the PSR. Because the PSR is only used in the LCA when every possible type of cause is known, i.e. every alternative is addressed, we can still hold it as sound for the purpose of this debate.Roy also tries to claim that quantum fields are responsible for things "popping into existence." This is a classic equivocation fallacy. My argument that things do not "pop into existence" is the principle of ex nihilo nihil fit, from nothing comes nothing. This is not a new formulation of my argument, I clearly concluded that the reason that things do not "pop into existence" is because, "For every existing thing there must also be an explanation of its existence." Ex nihilo nihil fit. In the quantum theory proposed by Roy, the particles are not uncaused, but instead originate as a fluctuation of the vacuum energy that has many physical laws and structure in space, which isn't what is meant by the word 'nothing.' Even in principle we cannot affirm uncaused quantum events, for their experimental setup yield probabilistic emissions. Sure these events don't yet have a best known cause, nevertheless they still have a cause enough - regardless of the interpretation, and this is all that is required for the PSR. Moreover, and since we do not know the true nature of matter, if anything, quantum fluctuations in empty space where photons pop into existence could serve as a "tongue-and-cheek" conceptual example of a caused ex nihilo creation. Insofar as this phenomena occurs, it is evident that a personal cause is to be held responsible.2. The Explanation of Negative States of AffairsRoy did not refute this defense of the PSR, therefore even if my first argument in favor of the PSR does not hold, we still ought to accept the PSR as sound due to my second, and as previously stated, stronger argument in it's favor. If a stronger formulation of the same claim is proved true, then the weaker formulation cannot be false for the stronger formulation defends more claims, the weaker formulation included. Premise 2This is a response to Roy's first rebuttal.Roy is misinterpreting the way the LCA addresses causal chains and where in that chain the universe's origin must be placed. I agree that a completely natural cause could have provided reason for the universe, but that cause's existence would either be contingent on a necessary cause, or it would exist contingently on another contingent cause. As I explained, all causal chains must have a necessary cause as it's first cause. Ergo in a causal chain of C1, C2, C3, C4, ..., Cn, we can conclude that Cause 1 (C1) must exist necessarily. Every following cause must exist contingently, as it only exists as a result of the prior cause. The reason that every causal chain must begin with a necessary cause is that contingent existences cannot be explained solely by alternative contingent existences, because those causes will demand further explanation ad infinitum. Because a chain of contingent causes cannot explain itself, there must be a necessary first cause that provides explanation for its own existence.Roy is arguing that the LCA claims C1 is God and C2 is the universe. This is false. The universe can be any cause, or existence, after C1. Therefore, if we determine that C1 is God, C2 are quantum fields, and C3 is the universe, the LCA still holds true. The LCA does not argue that the universe miraculously popped into existence, but rather derives arguments from the contingent nature of the universe. You could replace the universe in the LCA with any contingent being and achieve the same results. The LCA speaks to a typology of existence, not the directly prior cause of that being. This also addresses his second rebuttal. Even if a natural explanation of the universe is possible, that explanation must be necessary to be the first cause within the causal chain. However, I have explained how necessary, natural, first causes are incoherent. My original argument was that matter could not create matter. The idea is that all physical entities require causal explanation from other physical entities. No physical entity could explain itself. Because no physical entity can explain itself, all physical entities must be contingent. Because a chain of solely contingent causes is impossible, there must be a non-physical first cause at the beginning of every causal chain containing physical properties. Roy offers negative energy as the reason we have matter, but negative energy cannot explain why we have negative energy. Therefore, either a personal being created negative energy, or they created another physical entity that created negative energy.Premise 3Premise 3 was not refuted.ConclusionTo make things simple:Every causal chain, C1, ..., CN must begin with a necessary first cause. Roy's rebuttals are compatible with the LCA because he simply argues that for any given CN at which the universe exists, C(N-1) is a natural cause. This is perfectly fine given the LCA's validity because the universe may be C3, the quantum fields may be C2, and God may be C1. There may be a larger gap because God and the quantum fields and the LCA would still remain sound. Insofar as natural, or physical, causes of the universe result in an infinite causal chain, we know that the beginning of this chain must have been personal. Insofar as solely contingent causal explanations carry on ad infinitum, we also know that the beginning of this chain is necessary. Ergo, the first cause of the universe must have been necessary and personal. Because God is defined as the necessary, personal, first cause of the universe, the LCA is sound. Essentially, none of Roy's rebuttals are incompatible with the LCA, and even if they were, they are ill-founded.