This House Asserts Ontology Necessitates God's Existence!

This debate has (quicker than is normal) been reduced to a series of misunderstandings. Rather than any form of engaging argumentation, this has become a mess. I shall, in my round try to show why, whilst I will also justify my argument against the Hon. Con's attacks and semantics.To explain my order, in each category, a summary of Con's points are denoted by "Rubric (Rb)" followed by a number, and in that order they are answered. Each sub-answers of a Rb will be denoted by "Epicheirima (Ep)". Each rebuttal is denoted as "S" for ease. For the sake of consistency I ask that: a. all propositions not attakced by my opponent be taken as correct; b. my opponent cannot make new attacks in the next round (as it is the last), and he must only keep to these. I shall in my last round mention all the principles not attacked by my opponent. S1. Dogs can fly, ergo the moon is made of cheese: Definitions & Modal LogicRb 1. Necessity is to be defined as by modal logic, specifically understood through S5 Lewisian Modal Logic. Ep 1. My opponent cannot furnish his own definition of "necessity" (choosing that of the formal-logic modal sense). He accepted this debate, with its rules as outlined in Round 1, where necessity was defined as "Makes necessary, when I talk about necessitating God I make it clear that the argument must prove that God exists." This means that the debate only focuses on "God existing" while not making a distinction of "this or that possible world". Ep 2. It is clear that Con does not have any sense of Modal Logic. Not to be rude, but it is slightly comical that Con mentions S5 since the S5 system (through Axiom K, T) actually proves that if something is "necessary in one possible world, hence it is necessary in all possible worlds"(1) In fact the quote Con provides is actually the argument justifying this axiom. The reasoning he quotes is the informal reasoning speaking against the contradictory of the S5 system. The system actually says that if I prove the existence of God in any one "possible" world then I prove the existence of God (or any other universal proposition) in every possible world.(2) This is also shown in Con's own citation in the 6th part: "Possible World Semantics".S2. Where's Waldo: CitationsRb 1. Pro does not give any references to the citations given denoted in "[]". Ep 1. A careful reading of my argument will show that all citations as "[]" are in-argument citations and refer to the 7 principles I give in the pre-requisites. In the previous round, the last line before the explanations of the lemma reads: "The brackets refer to the principles above." I apologize if this was not clear. Citations of "()" have been referenced to outside sources. In fact unlike Con who has simply linked entire articles (and as S1 would suggest without reading them) all my citations include the exact place where I want readers to look.S3. Wer ist Gott? Rb 1. The definition provided of God is vague, with a follow up explanation of the definition according to Con. Ep 1. I feel I should mention that this definition was given to Con before the debate started and he should have objected to it before accepting the debate. In fact, Con insisted on having the definition the way it is present right now. Ep 2. It is depressing that my "principles" were not engaged with at all, and Con seems to want to run a parallel case; I ask the voters to take this into consideration. By transcendence I have already specified [7] that God is transcendent of the "physical" not of "all reality" as Con asserts. This is the definition of transcendence used in all of philosophy.(3)Ep 3. Con must justify his controversial statement that "sentience refers to the ability to perceive subjectively". Sentience simply entails intelligence which is defined as being able to perceive, and manipulate those perceptions. God, by His definition, would possess universal sentience. He would perceive the entire universe, as it actually is and not in a subjective manner. Ep 4. As I have mentioned in [7], humans are limited to think of qualities in terms of comparison, as humans think of math using symbols. These are weaknesses of the human minds, but qualities in their "essence" have a distinct definition: it is not necessary for humans to be able to understand it. These essences, like all definitions and essences are by their nature concrete. My opponent seems to be a solipisist and deny any mind-independent reality, something he will have to prove. This is agreed upon, near unanimously, by all philosophers.(4)S4. Straw and Hay: Relevance Rb 1. Pro's argument is not relevant, and goes from existence in "actuality" to existence in "possibility" Ep 1. This argument is a convulated one, and does not make much sense to me. In any case the problem of "actuality" and "possibility" was answered in S1. This argument is a red herring and in fact "it" has no relevance in this debate. S5. Why is a raven like a writing desk?: Cognitivism of God Rb 1. Pro is unclear by what "conception of God" means and fails to prove "that the term "God" is actually coherent". Rb 2. A reduction of what seems to be Pro's argument is presented; Pro's argument is not valid (as in the premises do not justify the conclusion) for there is a "sizeable gap" in the argument. Rb 3. The conception of a "flying spaghetti monster" is similar. Ep 1. It seems to me that Con has completely over looked the entirety of my principles. He has not engaged my argument by directly quoting even once. In fact his entire round is full of strawman's and this is no exception. The conception of God as pointed out by [1][2][7] is the "representation of the object" here being God. The coherent of the term is shown by it meaning meaningful, for incoherent terms (such as 3jwepfkn) are not meaningful, as also Wittgenstein's 4th thesis proves.(5)Ep 2. The reduction of mya argument is a straw-man. Again my argument has been presented as a deductive argument in my round as per the rules of formal logic(2b.). The explanation of connection has also been strenghtened by my analysis and epecially by my connecting principles[1][2][3][4][5][6][7]. Con fails to show why this is a valid reduction...Ep 3. I already mentioned why a spaghetti monster (or my example of a unicorn) is not a valid analogy.[1][3][4][5] I also showed this in Lem 4. Again as per our understanding of Imagination [2][3], a unicorn or a monster has a visual image, a taste, a smell which can be communicated. These representations are bound by sense experience while God by definition is not. You cannot compare apples with oranges...or in this case celery. S6. To Infinity & Beyond: Ad InfinitumRb 1. Pro's argument would prove the existence of an infinity of such beings, which is impossible. Ep 1. I ask the readers not to be fooled by Con's style. His argument depends on the assertion that my argument proves multiple beings, not the way he has phrased it. It is true, indeed I admit it, that my argument can prove a number of beings (possibly infinite) who fulfill the criteria listed in my argument as presented in the previous round. Mainly that a. their idea exists in cognition, b. said idea cannot be imagined. And why oh why should it not? After all a deductive argument is meant to be universal. If a conception exists in cognition and could not be imagined then, by God, it is true! Ep 2. This still doesn't prove Con's argument. My argument simply allows any idea which fills the requirement to prove itself as true, there is no evidence to suggest that an infinite number of such ideas exist. In fact. my opponent wants to suggest that no such ideas exist...It is a funny time indeed. In fact I dare Con to name 4 such transcendental ideas or dieties which do not contradict each other. He won't be able to. Just because something is possible does not mean it necessarily happens. Con's argument is invalid. Ep 3. By now the honest reader would have noted that Con has given a lot of assertions, but has not actually engaged with me, nor has he actually proven anything. Even this argument he leaves to be proven by a citation. This is not how debates work, he cannot simply citate "[4]" but must write down the argument in support of his rebuttal. SR. The Argument Itself: the Ontological Argument Rb 1. Pro is unclear in defining "fantasy". Rb 2. Pro defends the proposition: "if A is false, then A is imagined" Rb 3. Pro claims: "all simple ideas are true" Rb 4. "A being I deem "40 lbs" can't be imagined, but doesn't exist" - Pro claims it should Rb 5. Con provides a definition of "Imagination" and then states that "5+7=11" is actually imagined. Ep 1. I feel like my round went unread. In my principles [3][4] I explicitly defined imagination and fantasy. Ep 2. Con makes another strawman, I only talk about "ideas" not the entirety of possible As. The example given is not of an idea, but of a proposition. Ep 3. I don't recall using the term "simple idea" at all. Con will have to define his terms for me to be able to respond. Ep 4. Con makes a logical mistake. I stated that "all imaginative ideas are false or unprovable" not that "all false or unprovable ideas are imaginative". The both are not equivalent. Ep 5. I gave the logic of my definition of imagination in my principles [3], Con gives no reason why we should accept his instead, and appeals to authority. In fact his definition supports my case because it states: "S requires some sort of quasi-sensory or positive representation of S". So Con admits that imagination requires some form of sensory perception...? That would concede the debate...(1)https://en.wikipedia.org...(modal_logic) [Please look at the "Applications" section for the quote from Platinga] (2)Introduction to Logic by Harry J. Gensler; Modal Logic Chapter; b.Propositional Logic (3)http://tinyurl.com...;(4)https://en.wikipedia.org...;(5)Tractus-Logico by Ludwig Wittgenstein; Main Thesis 4 (also found in wikipedia here: https://en.wikipedia.org...)