Moral Relativism (Pro) vs. Divine Command Theory (Con)

Parts-Whole Pro states that I have not demonstrated why contingency survives the fallacy, however, I state that discrete properties (such as colour) are not fallaciously transferred from part to whole whereas continuous properties are. By continuous I mean that addition of many objects with property X increases that property, and by discrete I mean that addition of the property does not change that property at all. As addition of contingent objects does not change their contingency as a whole, contingency is a discrete property and so is not guilty of the parts-whole fallacy. 'Adding white sodium powder to white-colored water does not produce a white fire. It produces a red fire.' But in this case, all the constituent parts are changed by addition (by chemical reaction) so they are no longer the same parts as they were before they were added. In contrast, when one adds multiple yellow bricks together their colour is not changed because the constituent parts (the individual bricks) are not changed by the act of addition. Relating this to contingency, the individual contingent parts are not changed in essence by virtue of addition. Contingency Whilst different conditions could produce alternate universes, the likelihood that the universe would support complex life is extremely tiny. As Professor Stephen Hawking put it: "The laws of science, as we know them at present, contain many fundamental numbers... the values of these numbers seem to have been very finely adjusted to make possible the development of life." (1) My opponent states that there could be a non-physical limitation such as a logical limitation, but I have already stated that omnipotence need not encompass logical limitations, so my point stands. I maintain that transcendency entails omniscience despite the existence of chance, because the only limit to knowledge of chance happenings is that they have not yet come to pass in a temporal sense, yet by definition God is outside time and so would not be subject to this barrier of knowledge. I agree that there is a possibility of other external beings outside the universe, but as they are lesser than God then God would have created them, so he would know everything about them in that way. I disagree that complexity is a subjective concept, it is a relative concept relative to things of other complexity. We have a wide ranged of objects with varying complexity, so we can assert a level of complexity to something relative to the complexity of other things. MR vs MN My opponent postulates that morality is a code that would be put forward by all rational persons, and thus morality can only be objective since reason is objective. However, there are rational people who passionately disagree on innately moral issues such as the death penalty or euthanasia, this would suggest that morality CAN still be subjective as well as objective (although I argue that the latter is preferable). Even if my opponent accepts his definition of morality, this definition is not the definition that is propagated by moral relativism. The moral relativist asserts that: 'Moral relativism is the view that ethical standards, morality, and positions of right or wrong are culturally based' (2) and 'Moral nihilism is distinct from moral relativism' (3) It is clear to see that moral relativism asserts the existence of subjective morality, so my opponent is shooting himself in the foot by stating that subjective morality is incoherent. God's objective morality Even if we accept that some moral truths are not created by God, and if this does indeed embrace one prong of the dilemma, it does not damage the innate connection between morality and religion. The only possible damage that this prong of the dilemma causes is that it insinuates some exterior moral authority, but if we assert that the moral worth of necessary moral truths is essential, then this consequence is avoided. The existence of necessary moral truths may undermine strong DCT (that all moral truths are created by God), but I personally advocate weak DCT (4), which is the view that moral obligation is derived from God's commands, irrespective of whether the moral worth of moral truths is created by God. In this way, God's omniscient nature would put him in a place of moral authority by virtue of the fact that he knows what is necessarily right and wrong. Therefore DCT (albeit in its weak form) survives. Hume's Law If Hume does not assert that we ought to value rationality, then he is not saying that we should disregard prescriptive statements (which is what people interpret Hume's Law to be saying). If this is the case, then Hume is not claiming that prescriptive statements are unfounded so we can continue to uphold moral realism. If the is/ought gap is arbitrary then its ability to pragmatically disregard ethical theories is a matter of semantics. The simple truth is that people derive moral truths from descriptive facts and have no problem doing so; whether the manner of this derivation is from intuition or from some as-of-yet undiscovered logical process is irrelevant so long as we currently do so effectively. Necessary Moral Truths Even if saying the likes of 'unnecessary cruelty is immoral' is tautological, the whole point is that necessary moral truths are fundamentally and intuitionally known to all rational humans, the reason that blankly stating the morality of a necessary moral truth is tautological is because it does not need saying. Just like we do not need to say that a triangle has three sides because the concept of three sides comes with the concept of a triangle. In this way, the concept of immorality comes with the concept of unnecessary cruelty. 'Divine Command Theory does not stipulate that some moral truths do not come from God, it stipulates that ALL moral truths come from God.' This is only the case for strong DCT, which I do not necessarily advocate. Personally I am an advocate of weak DCT. Omnipotence 'We want ONE definition of omnipotence that applies to all instances.' Alright then, I define omnipotence as: 'The ability to do anything that is logically possible to do' This does not infringe on the concept of a theistic God, and escapes the problems posed by omnipotence paradoxes. My opponent goes on to say that my above definition of omnipotence does not actually subvert the paradox of the stone. However, my opponent does not seem to understand that a stone that an omnipotent being could not lift would be logically impossible. As I stated in round 4, God could provide an infinite force in a particular direction (up, in this case), and so if this rock was to not accelerate up then the rock would have to have infinite mass. As the universe has finite mass, it is logically impossible to have a rock with infinite mass within the universe. Conclusion DCT is correct because 1) God exists 2) A creator God would create an objective, not relativist, morality. MR is incorrect because 1) It is refuted by G E Moore's Open-question argument 2) It is counter-intuitive as an ethical theory Ultimately, my opponent spends too much time concerned with attacking DCT, and has not actually made much of a valid case to assert the veracity of MR. Well, this has been a very interesting debate of high quality discussion, I thank my opponent for creating the debate and positing a spirited attack against the Divine Command Theory. (1)http://www.bethinking.org... (2)http://www.moral-relativism.com... (3)http://en.wikipedia.org... (4)http://www.iep.utm.edu...