Justice Requires the Recognition of Animal Rights

I negate and value Justice, defined by Aristotle as giving each his due. Accept my definition of Justice over her definition because it is more clear and is clearly weighable; i.e. it is easy to determine whether or not someone is receiving his or her due, but it is not as easy to weigh reasonableness. Moreover, my definition is the basis of her definition; we can only say that an action is fair if it gives each what he is due. Thus, the burden of the affirmative is to prove that animals are due rights. Any discussions of rights or goods outside of these guidelines is clearly irresolutional and should not be considered. I will accept the rest of my opponents definitions. Any notion of Justice depends on fairly distributing goods in a proper context. When humans join a society, they do so to provide reciprocal protections of rights and distribute negative rights to all. However, extra rights are granted on the basis of responsibilities; for example, the President of the United States has more rights than ordinary citizens due because he has greater responsibilities. So, in human society, rights are distributed in accordance with responsibilities. Thus, my value criterion for this round is fairly distributing rights and responsibilities. My sole contention is that Justice does not require the consideration of animal rights because animals do not have the ability to rationally join society. Animals are not capable of joining the social contract. The social contract is an agreement between individuals and the state that is based on reciprocity. Individuals in society relinquish some liberties to the state, and consent to follow the state's laws, in exchange for the protection of their natural rights. Joining the social contract is contingent upon one's ability to consent to follow laws; if one does not follow rules, then one's rights are not protect. For example, we violate the right to liberty of felons because they openly flout the moral codes created to protect the rights of all. Animals are not capable of joining the social contract, thus indicating that their rights ought not be considered. John Rawls of Harvard University explains, "No account is given of the right conduct in regard to animals and the rest of nature. A conception of justice is but one part of a moral view. While I have not maintained that the capacity for a sense of justice is necessary in order to be owed the duties of justice, it does seem that we are not required to give strict justice anyway to creatures lacking this capacity. But it does not follow that there are no requirements at all in regard to them, nor in our relations with the natural world…They are outside the scope of the theory of justice, and it does not seem possible to extend the contract doctrine so as to include them in a natural way." (Rawls, John, Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University. A Theory of Justice (1971).) Moreover, animals are incapable of consenting to society because they lack rationality. Professor Joel Fineberg explains, "Well-trained dogs sometimes let their masters down; they anticipate punishment or other manifestations of displeasure; they grovel and whimper, and they even make crude efforts at redress and reconciliation. But do they feel remorse and bad conscience? They have been conditioned to associate manifestations of displeasure with departures from a norm, and this is a useful way of keeping them in line, but they haven't the slightest inkling of the reasons for the norm. They don't understand why departures from the norm are wrong, or why their masters become angry or disappointed. They have a concept perhaps of the mala prohibita—the act that is wrong because it is prohibited, but they have no notion of the mala in se—the act that is prohibited because it is wrong. Even in respect to the mala prohibita their understanding is grossly deficient, for they have no conception of rightful authority. For dogs, the only basis of their master's "right" to be obeyed is his de facto power over them. Even when one master steals a beast from another, or when an original owner deprives it of its natural freedom in the wild, the animal will feel no moralized emotion, such as outraged propriety or indignation." (Fienberg, Joel, Professor of Religion. "Human Duties and Animal Rights." On the Fifth Day. Eds. Morris and Fox (1986).) On to my opponent's case. In contention 1, she explains two important concepts. First, respecting animal rights does not mean that we cannot eat them or use them for research. This is key in the round because she contradicts this in her third contention. She next asserts that the United States protects animal rights. First, I would like to see a source for this; the one she provides is a link to trade statistics. Second, even if the United States does protect animal rights, that does not mean that it is required to do so. This resolution stipulates that we are debating about whether any nation (not just the United States), should protect animal rights, not whether it does. Finally, this is irresolutional insofar as we are discussing Justice, a universal concept, and not just the United States. Group contentions 2 and 3, in which she discusses the economy and health. Please remember that, as I mentioned earlier, these are irresolutional. They do not discuss whether or not animals are receiving their due; rather; they discuss what is good for humanity. They are thus outside the bounds of the resolution and cannot be considered in the round. Even if you disagree, there are still flaws with both of these contentions. In C2, she discusses the economy. First, just because something is economically beneficial does not mean that it is just. Slavery, for example, was extremely beneficial for the economy of the South, but it was clearly unjust. Moreover, she never even provides any statistics or evidence that animal rights would, in fact, promote the well-being of the economy. The quote that she gives says that we must meet governmental food safety standards. This is entirely irrelevant to her contention, meaning that C2 is just an unwaranted assertion. Finally, I would posit that respecting animal rights would harm trade because it would reduce the amount of meat that farmers sell and thus harm the U.S. economy. In C3, she notes that eating meat is bad for health. Note that this contradicts C1, in which she explicitly states that eating meat would not be banned in the affirmative world, so all of these problems still exist on her side of the resolution. Moreover, the problems that she discusses, including pollution and contamination of meat, can easily be solved through environmental regulations and legislation passing new safety standards. Respecting animal rights is not even necessary to achieve these ends, so this position is entirely nonunique. (Note that this does not require the respect of animal rights: she is arguing that if we improve conditions, we respect human rights. That means that I can still achieve these ends because then negative world would do these things in order to promote human, not animal, welfare.) Finally, in C4, notes that recognition of Animal Rights is key to preserving justice. However, her only evidence to promote this is an out of context Mill quote. John Stuart Mill was not an ardent supporter of animal rights; his utilitarian philosophy was written to benefit humans. Moreover, she never explains why animals deserve to have rights; she merely asserts that justice cannot be impartial. In fact, I would turn this sentiment because we require humans to join the social contract before we grant them rights. Thus, according to her own Mill analysis, we should not give animals rights because they cannot consent to our laws and to the social contract. In conclusion, the affirmative case cannot be voted for because she is not telling you why animals have rights. Her case is irresolutional, so you vote negative.