Targeted Killing is a morally permissible foreign policy tool

Con Case Definition: Targeted Killing Targeted killing does not necessarily include drone strikes. Anderson writes, “Weaponized drone aircraft might or might not be used in an instance of targeted killing. But still more important is that drones have roles to play in an ever-increasing range of military operations that frequently have no connection to “targeted killing.”.” My opponent’s value is justice and claims that justice is the end of all moral systems since it determines how we ought to treat each other. There are a few problems with this: First, this analysis is lacks a warrant or justification for this statement. She simply asserts the premise that moral systems should achieve justice. At this point, unless she provides a sufficient warrant then my opponent can gain no link to the resolution. Second, justice is a bad value to pick because we don’t know what justice is. In Plato’s Republic Book 2 Socrates asks his company to define what justice is. The only adequate definition presented is knowing your friends, and knowing your enemies – i.e. giving each their due. However the issue with this is that we really don’t know what people are due. But moreover, only an affirmative ballot wields the result of the extension of knowing your friends and knowing your enemies. Socrates tells us that giving each their requires that we protect the city at all costs – i.e. using targeted killing to take out our enemies. My opponent provides the criterion of Due Process which is derived from Rawl’s A Theory of Justice – there needs to be an objective standard to measure what is just. The problem with this is that we don’t know if it’s an objective standard. Rawl’s applies a thought experiment where he imagines a scenario where there is no bias (the original position + veil of ignorance). At that point since due process and legal system is itself prone to bias, manipulations, perceptions there is no clear link to unbiased justice as presented through Rawls. Moreover, my opponent’s Bassouni evidence is problematic for a few reasons: First, social contracts do not exist in the international realm. As Hans-Morganthau, one of the fathers of realism, tells us is that the international realm is anarchy – moral standards do not exist and countries do not submit explicitly or implicitly to another nation’s control. Thus, insofar as moral codes do not exist in the international realm all states are obligated to their own citizenry which makes targeted killing permissible. Second, this evidence is teleological in that it has an end goal of greater social stability and protection. The issue with this is that these moral codes are the very codes which prevent good men from acting against evil. In trying to achieve stability, the requirements of legality and due process strangle “the good” from preventing greater evil. C1: Due Process The McKelvey evidence is completely warped in its worldview of warfare. First, this evidence lacks any type of brightline for determining when an imminence standard is met. This author simple asserts since it takes months, it obviously must not meet this standard. Second, months in warfare is imminent - terror attacks aren’t just done in minutes or days. Remember 9/11 took about 5ish years to plan. Third, long planning is key to preventing wrongful hits. With more planning, more preparation and more investigation the potential for mess-ups is decreased by a large percentage. The Alston evidence can be ignored because it isn’t up to date in current law and doesn’t apply universally, only to the U.S.. Radson writes: “The Court recognized that this generous interpretation increased the risk of improper targeting of peaceful civilians. It therefore crafted a set of legal limits to curb errors and abuses, citing customary international law, human rights case law,and a raft of secondary authorities. The checks include: (a) thorough verification ―regarding the identity and activity of the civilian who is allegedly taking part in the hostilitiesǁ; (b) forbidding deadly attacks if other means, such as arrest, can be used without imposing too great a risk on security forces or others; and (c) following up an attack on a civilian by an independent, intra-executive investigation ―regarding the precision of the identification of the target and the circumstances of the attack. For good measure, the Court said the internal investigation should be subject to judicial review.” C2: Rights My opponent argues that due process must be upheld for U.S. citizens. First, my opponent doesn’t provide why there is a moral distinction between two clear enemy combatants or terrorists but one happens to be a U.S. citizens. She must provide this for her argument to hold any moral weight. Second, U.S. citizens who are enemy combatants lose most due process rights. Benjamin writes, “…it raises the question of what precisely due process requires in these admittedly unusual circumstances. The chatter on the political left notwithstanding, it clearly does not require prospective judicial review of targeting decisions or military operations. The Due Process Clause does not even require thatin domestic settings involving police actions–like a hostage situation, for example. What it requires in the hostage situation, rather, is that force only be used as a last resort when other options are not available. And it seems to me that it requires something similar here too. That is to say that I think it requires a strong preference for the capture, instead of the kill–and it requires the exhaustion or non-availability of reasonable options either for a conventional trial or for military detention... This evidence makes the clear point that the question is not whether targeted killing is morally impermissible or not – it is – but under what circumstances does it becomes morally permissible. As long as the doctrine of last resort is followed, targeted killing is permissible. And since the resolution makes no distinctions, under these conditions targeted killing is permissible. C3: Consequences First, backlash argument is non-unique. The War on Terror is already going on, and simply stopping targeted killings would invoke conventional style warfare. My opponents world is worse in terms of bloodshed and revenge. Daniel writes, “The moral legitimacy of targeted killing becomes even clearer when compared to the alternative means of fighting terror—that is, the massive invasion of the community that shelters and supports the terrorists in an attempt to catch or kill the terrorists and destroy their infrastructure. This mode of operation was adopted, for example, bythe U.S. and Britain in Afghanistan and by Israel in its “Operation Defensive Shield” carried out after the terrorist Passover massacre in March 2002….First, invading a civilian area inevitably leads to the deaths and injury of far more people, mostly innocent people, than careful use of targeted killing. Second, such actions bring death, misery, and destruction to people who are only minimally involved (if at all) in, or responsible for, terror or military attacks, whereas with targeted killing, collateral damage is significantly reduced.” Second, my opponent’s stats on Pakistan are skewed – it distinguishes terrorism and militancy, and doesn’t note the use of human shields. Paust writes, In contrast to reports of high numbers of apparently excessive deaths, others report that some 600 people have been killed “in northwestern Pakistan since August 2008, including around 400 militants” 102 (which would be a ratio of some two targetable persons to one), and Senator John Kerry has stated that drones had been successful in combating al Qaeda and have resulted in minimal collateral damage…only ten percent of the persons killed are “civilians.”… al Qaeda and Taliban fighters purposely intermix with civilians who take no active part in hostilities inan effort to shield themselves...