The Problem of Evil (PoE)

IntroductionBefore I address Con’s specific points, I feel I have to say something about the PoE more generally. The PoE is a problem for theists who hold a particular conception of God. It is this (and only this) the problem can or does address, as like anything else, it is only applicable within a certain context. The main points here are these: firstly, in order to faithfully engage with the argument, Con must do so within the context it is applied. Holding that God for example, is completely “unfalsifiable” and “untestable” betrays the essence of the problem, for such a God is not (nor could be) the target of the PoE, and neither could a limited being, or an evil being be amenable to the PoE, so much of Con’s post is strictly irrelevant to the debate, when he diverts from the theistic conception of God. Secondly, the PoE challenges the theist to cohere one’s thoughts, with respect to God. Denying, for example, that we can conceive of God in any way whatsoever clearly robs us of the target of the PoE, but it does so at the cost of leaving us with no idea of the being of worship, for example. Any solution to the PoE must surely rescue, rather than annihilate God, for all intents and purposes. Despite this, I will try to deal with all the relevant points Con makes with respect to the problem.Note on evil - Here, Con accuses me of fixing P1 into the definition of evil. Not so. I simply suggested that suffering, for example, would provide just as big a problem to the theist who thinks that God would wish to prevent it, all else being equal, whether or not it is evil (in a moral sense).Defending P1Here I gave 2 reasons to think P1 was true: initial plausibility and conceptual analysis. Indeed, I pointed out that it seems necessarily true. Con objects, but does so by reference to ST. This is simply irrelevant. Even if we cannot affirm the existence of gratuitous evils, it is still possible to reason that God would prevent such things, and Con tacitly acknowledges this by trying to account for gratuitous evils. Secondly, Con notes that my admission that evils may have a morally sufficient reason is inconsistent with my conclusion. This is because P3 establishes (or hopes to) that gratuitous evils exist, while the theological premise (P1) does indeed seem to be true regardless of P3, and my “admission” is merely to clarify that both premises are somewhat independent. Lastly, this controversy is wholly contrived, as Con conveniently ends my quote before it qualifies that we do indeed have “4 relevant lines of evidence to counter” the position that evils are morally permissible.Defending P3Before I return to defending my 4 positive reasons for affirming P3, we should note that this is a cumulative, mutually reinforcing case for P3. Secondly, that it is enough for the purposes of the argument to show rational justification for P3, as is necessarily the case with an evidential argument.Prima facie case - Here, I defended the view that we are rational to believe that evils are gratuitous, at least initially, purely on the basis of everything we know of a particular case of evil, just as I can trust that my perception of events and circumstances provide me with rational justification generally. Con responds that my lack of omniscience prevents me from ascertaining that gratuitous evils exist, but such a response seems question-begging, as well as being slightly irrelevant. It just doesn’t follow that limited knowledge necessitates complete scepticism here, rather than cautious affirmation of P3. Again, all the problems of ST erode this point, but even notwithstanding, is it really feasible to conclude that I’m not rational to believe that e is gratuitous from everything I know? Absent some very good reason to doubt my assessment of the seeming gratuity of these evils, one is certainly justified to affirm P3, particularly if all the evidence points in the same direction. Let’s see if it does.Non-conceiveium - Here, I argued that in conjunction with the appearance of gratuitous evils, we are also seemingly unable to reconcile, even conceptually, certain evils with any necessity, or fail to see how any compensation could even plausibly occur (much less hold that these evils be logically necessary for an adequately compensatory good). Con responds that this is an argument from ignorance, but this is clearly not the case for several reasons. Firstly, the reasons are from everything we know about the evils in the 2 examples given, rather than appealing to unknown unknowns (which, ironically, is exactly what ST does). Secondly, I noted that the horrendous short-term costs of these evils gives a massive presumption of gratuity in practical terms, while the long-term effects are also plausibly predictable in perpetuating suffering, as evil really does seem to beget evil (violence escalation, nonbelief), particularly when this evil appears gratuitous.Divine Silence - Again, all things being equal, it is certainly surprising on theism that we often don't even have a hint of the necessity of dreadful evils in the world, even in the most general terms, and this supports the view that these evils really are gratuitous.Epistemic consistency - This is the view that we cannot contrive a standard of reasonable belief which is selectively sceptical to the PoE. Here, Con seems to hold 2 contradictory views. First, he says that we should be extremely sceptical of affirming P3, in accordance with ST. Secondly, he slips,“In no way is it necessary for me to be absolutely certain at any moment about anything.” And“I do not have to be certain of anything in order to act.”Clearly, his position is purely selective, and as I argued, given innumerable contingencies in acting morally, for example, he would (if he were consistent) be agnostic about all moral choices, but dismisses this absurdity by realising omniscience to be irrelevant. I agree. But why not be consistent and apply this to P3?Lastly, even if it were true that ST somewhat contained P3, it still is easy to salvage it from such a response, using Draper’s hypothesis of indifference. Put simply, given the scale, nature and seeming gratuity of evils in the world, a world indifferent to the suffering of sentient beings is certainly more probable, given what we know, and this would again affirm P3.STCon denies holding to ST, but we can see from the definition provided, he clearly does hold this position. http://www.iep.utm.edu...Here, I noted the dreadful implications of ST. Firstly, I noted that holding such a position makes God vacuous, with respect to the scale and pervasive nature of evils in the world. Con accepts this, concluding that God is thus unfalsifiable, but this is clearly far removed from a theistic conception of God, and thus irrelevant. Secondly, ST begs the question. While long-term unknowns may somehow compensate for evil in some magical way, the belief that this is so is purely speculative, and probably wrong as evil facilitates more evil. Thirdly, the absurdities ST causes are evident, and as I showed above, the scepticism Con shows is wholly selective and contrived. In our lives, we have to make important moral decisions on things without complete information, but this doesn't remotely imply that the we cannot assess at all, for example, the work of missionaries as being more conducive to alleviating suffering than dropping nuclear bombs would be, and it certainly doesn't make it irrational to hold to this without omniscience, despite the fact that we (strictly speaking) cannot rule out the absurd belief that a nuclear holocaust might produce less suffering in the long-run. LogicHere Con maintains that limiting God to logical constraints betrays the true nature of God. Con himself notes that his own position is “self-refuting”, but claims that such is the nature of God. If denying logic is self-refuting, then it holds in all possible worlds, and one can't even be agnostic without identifying God as God.