The Term 'Miracle' is a Misnomer--No Such Thing Exists

Thank you for the kind welcome. My opponent said that he is "not required to prove that miracles exist" and I would like to remind the audience that it is the semantic nature of the word itself that I am confronting and not whether miracles exist [based on what most people understand them as being]. Though it is only a small mediation, it is an important distinction to make. I will admit that my opponent has justly shown that I have improperly built the first stage of my argument by straying away from the definitions that I provided. The definitions came straight from a dictionary and not the ones from which I later developed my argument. I understand the hit to my legitimacy and humbly accept it with open arms—I have learned from it and will not repeat it again. Though I have undermined my own efforts in this argument, I would like to refurbish the argument into a stronger one. My opponent would be in the right if he objected to this but I am here to expand my knowledge and I believe that both my opponent and I would benefit the most if I were allowed the following. "What are miracles?" is a crucial question to our purposes. I would like to refine the definition as being an event that is inexplicable by natural law conventions and that contradicts the current knowledge of causation. You might recall this as being the first part of the definition provided in the first argument, but this time without the divinity clause. I do not think that my opponent was fair in initially denying this. He claimed that he could do so because I myself had dismissed the importance of God(s) in our argument. I should have explained that I meant that I did not want to bog down the argument with such meddlesome inquiries, such as whether God(s) could indeed interfere with our universe, or whether they have already, or whether we would even notice. I was merely trying to steer the argument away from the multitude of questions that, though worthwhile on their accord, have no place in this particular argument. I believe (and am well aware that I myself included it in the first place) that an improbably event is an inaccurate portrayal of a miracle. I am well aware that I myself listed it as so in the first place. The definition that I was working under was defined in P1, but please note that I improperly reintroduced the improbability clause in the conclusion. Remove the clause and my argument stands strong. My opponent said that P3 of my argument is weak, and that apparently I myself have noted "that there are exceptions". I would kindly ask that our audience look at my argument, and specifically at my choice of words. Did I indeed admit that there are multiple exceptions to my premise? No--my opponent has tried to weaken my premise by means of changing my intended meaning. Let me clarify: I mean to say that there is only one exception to P3, one that is irrelevant to our discussion. In clever anticipation, however, my opponent proceeds to provide another example of an exception. He claims that "many of [quantum] theories are derived entirely from mathematical formulae and have nothing to do with sense data." I would like to argue that this statement is false. Every single mathematical formula that has ever existed has depended on sense data. How would you propose to conduct arithmetic without understanding that A is A, or rather, that 2 equals 2? Would you have ever learned that 100 is greater than 99 without sense data? Mathematical concepts arise entirely from sense data. The Pythagorean Theorem, for example, could have never been derived if it hasn't been for sense date—how else would you know what a triangle is? As a concluding remark to his argument my opponent adds that there are other systems of epistemology that disagree with empiricism, but this is equivalent to saying that people disagree with one another. No argument has been contributed in that last part and should be ignored by the audience.