Resolved: The USFG should eliminate its nuclear armed ICBM force

R1: Trillion Dollar Nuclear TriadPro implies that we will see a one-third reduction of a trillion dollar cost over thirty years if we eliminate ICBM. The real savings estimate is much lower. According to Fig 1 in Pro's source [1, pg13], it is actually a one fourth reduction of just the current costs of the nuclear triad which amounts to around $80-90 billion over thirty years. Pro's source also adds in the cost of a "Minuteman follow-on" which is a replacement to the current Minuteman III missiles. There is no need for the USFG to do that as the Minuteman III can be refurbished to extend its life till 2030. According to the CBO, over the next 10 years, $10 billion can fund modernization [2, pg14] of ICBMs. Counterplan: The USFG should substantially reduce its Strategic Bomber force and forgo LRS-BThe USAF currently has 94 heavy bombers that can be equipped with nuclear weapons of which they intend to maintain 60 under new START and they can be maintained through at least 2040-2050. Bombers share many of the same strengths and weaknesses as SLBM. They are global and mobile while also being high value targets. They are vulnerable to being destroyed in accidents while on a mission whereas a nuclear attack on ICBM is a direct act of nuclear war. According to Pro’s source, the Bombers are the most expensive leg of the triad. They are also not routinely equipped with nuclear weapons. I propose that a) The number of Bombers be substantially reduced, and b) The USFG not invest in the Long Range Strike Bomber (LRS-B). The current fleet will last approximately 30 years.If my counterplan is solvent, it takes all of Pro’s fiscal impacts in C1 which is the entirety of his C1.R2: Nuclear TerrorismA) Isolated security lapses and misbehavior are non-unique to ICBMs. A study by retired military officers found problems with all three legs of the triad including staffing at submarine bases being so scarce that nucelar armed submarines were kept away from patrols far longer than intended undermining their deterrent capabilities [3]. There will be bad apples in every sector of the military. The solution is to root them out as opposed to eliminating a leg of the nuclear triad.B) There is no evidence to show that Air Force believes that the ICBM program is not essential. Pro's source is an opinion from a new article which actually claimed that "the Air Force will sabotage ICBM replacement and keep finding excuses to save money on the LRS-B by delaying nuclear certification for the aircraft." This is non-unique. If Pro's source actually holds, it supports my counterplan as well. Pro's source also argues that people don't take their job seriously because they think nukes are unimportant. If this stands, it applies to all nuclear weapons and isn't unique to ICBM. C) Security concerns of nuclear terrorism are grossly exaggerated. We’ve had nukes and securely guarded them for over 70 years. Terrorists don't normally hijack missiles. The primary risk from terrorism is that terrorists could steal fissile material used to create nuclear weapons which apply to all the triad legs. It is near impossible for a terrorist to break into a silo, steal an ICBM and walk out just because it is on land or hold the launch site at gunpoint as they have multilayered security [4].R3: Eliminate the Third WheelA) Deterrence is not the only reason to have nuclear weapons. The US must be prepared to fight and win a nuclear war should one occur. While the potential for nuclear weapons to wipe out humankind in a very large scale nuclear war exists, nuclear war does not always involve extinction of mankind. Brian Martin, a professor of Social Sciences outlines several scenarios:Limited nuclear war in the periphery: Nuclear war breaks out in the Middle East. US and Russia place their nuclear forces on the highest alert. A state of emergency is declared and the dissidents are rounded up. The crisis may contribute to an increased arms race.Limited nuclear war between superpowers: A limited exchange of nuclear weapons occurs destroying a sizeable number of military and civilian targets. Further political mobilization and arms race occur.Global nuclear war: A massive nuclear war occurs killing hundreds of millions of people in the US, Russia and elsewhere but need not lead to human extinction. Most of the radioactivity will have died away by the time it reaches areas away from major nuclear conflict. [5]B-E) ICBMs while stationary are also in hardened individual silos making them low value targets. Each ICBM silo is also orders of magnitude cheaper than a submarine. The best survivability comes from keeping both. Pro’s impact of crossing private airspace is warrantless. A phone call is all it takes to alert third parties after a missile launch and can be done in minutes. With a well-staffed DOD and White House, this is trivial. It also makes the inflexibility of missile paths irrelevant.Pro’s source doesn’t say anything about quick launching due to longer trajectories and I don’t see what difference it makes to strike our opponents a few minutes later anyways. What the source discusses is whether ICBM need to be launched quickly in order to avoid being destroyed pre-launch and also mentions that “Land-based missiles are vulnerable to attack, but they don't need to be launched quickly because there are hundreds of them dispersed across the country [6]." Bombers have the same weakness of pre-launch vulnerability but do not have the advantage of being in silos which makes destroying all ICBM a herculean task. Cost trade-off to SLBMs occurs with my counterplan as well and isn't unique.==== My case: Why we should keep ICBMs ====C1: ICBM survivability characteristics diversifies riskThe Minuteman III missiles which comprise the ICBM force are secured in geographically separated silos equipped to handle nuclear environments like overpressure and EMP. Due to accuracy limitations, the adversary would be forced to use at least a two-on-one scheme to ensure destruction of each missile requiring them to use over 900 warheads which makes Russia the only credible threat. Each silo is a low value target as it only has one warhead [7]. This causes waste and exhaustion of opposing forces which significantly weakens their nuclear capabilities and exposes them to easy attack serving as a massive deterrent.All nuclear bombers are stationed at a mere three US bases and are vulnerable to pre-launch attacks [8]. The bases contain multiple bombers and therefore are high value targets. ICBMs offer a cheaper alternative to manufacturing substantially more bombers.Of the fourteen SLBM-carrying submarines in service, each carry about 96 warheads and 4-5 of them are at port at any given time. The submarines at port are vulnerable, high value targets with a single warhead potentially destroying 96 warheads. Submarines at sea are high value targets if detected [7]. ICBMs offer a hedge against advances in submarine detection technology by the Russians. Without ICBMs, we leave the nuclear capability of the US hanging solely on Russian inability to make advances in anti-submarine warfare. The survivability of the nuclear triad complement each other. The impact is safeguarding our nuclear arsenal and nuclear deterrence. C2: ICBMs as bufferICBMs offer a target away from civilians and the other components of the triad. To avoid retaliation from ICBMs, opposing forces must target the ICBM silos first or in conjunction with the other triad components.Targeting ICBMs first alerts the US to a hostile nuclear power and enables second strike from SLBMs and strategic bombers. Targeting the triad simultaneously makes the attack more complicated and exhausts resources. The large quantity of resources that need to be spent attacking ICBMs in hardened silos weakens the attack elsewhere allowing the US to gain the advantage.It is easier to pin down an attack on ICBM silos as hostile since it is an attack on US sovereignty than it is to pin down an attack on SLBMs or Strategic Bombers which could easily be results of accidents. The impact is high moral ground which results in international allies, and political capital in negotiating favorable treaties. C3: ICBMs as post-nuclear war reservesThe USFG should store a substantial number of ICBMs in reserve in the event of a nuclear war. What happens in a nuclear war? Despite popular perceptions nuclear war doesn’t typically end in total elimination of a nation’s population or human extinction [5]. ICBMs can be stored underground to provide a reserve of strategic nuclear weapons for a long time in a post-nuclear war world. They have two advantages over SLBMs. First, they are cheaper to store securely in underground bases than SLBMs constantly at sea. Second, they will last substantially longer than the operational life of SLBMs without land-based logistic support [9]. In a post-nuclear war world with a highly reduced population and economic and industrial breakdown, cheap and durable access to a substantial stockpile of nuclear weapons can shift the balance of power back to the United States against an occupying power. The impact is liberty of the American people against a hostile, occupying power which will have the leverage to enforce unfair treaties and force reparations if the US surrenders.Sources [1] http://cns.miis.edu... [2] http://www.cbo.gov...[3] http://www.nytimes.com...[4] http://www.popularmechanics.com...[5] http://www.bmartin.cc...[6] http://www.npr.org... [7] http://csis.org... [8] http://tinyurl.com... [9] http://www2.gwu.edu...