Using taxes to build football stadiums is not justified.

The aff. case must prove that using taxes for the building of football stadiums is not justified. Justified is defined as being done or marked for a legitimate reason. The affirmative case must prove that the resolution is not done for a good or legitimate reason. I will be attempting to negate the resolution by using a K based on moral nihilism where I will show you that we cannot determine what is good and what is bad. Pro has the burden to prove the resolution to be true [1]. This means that Pro must also prove that intrinsic moral values exist in order to affirm. Friedrich Nietzsche, one of the most notable moral nihilists: “"I seek God! ... We have killed him … How shall we comfort ourselves … What was holiest and mightiest of all that the world has yet owned has bled to death under our knives: who will wipe this blood off us? … Must we ourselves not become gods simply to appear worthy of it? There has never been a greater deed; and whoever is born after us---for the sake of this deed he will belong to a higher history than all history hitherto." … "I have come too early," … "my time is not yet. This tremendous event is still on its way, still wandering; it has not yet reached the ears of men. … deeds, though done, still require time to be seen and heard. This deed is still more distant from them than most distant stars---and yet they have done it themselves.” [2] Pro may attempt to claim that God is irrelevant. The argument isn’t contingent on God’s existence. The message of the argument is that without a source of moral authority we cannot have objective moral values which is what is required from the affirmative case in order for them to prove that something can be considered intrinsically good or legitimate [1]. Wendy Brown critiques morality: “the loss of … epistemological ground for … morality … does not quash the moral impulse itself. … what form does this impulse take when it has lost its lodging in an abstract principle and vision of the good .. . … ? It is when the telos of the good vanishes but the yearning for it remains that morality appears to devolve into moralism … at this point that one finds moralizers standing against much but for very little, adopting a voice of moral judgment in the absence of a full-fledged moral … vision. … the moralizer refuses the loss of the teleological and becomes reactionary: clinging without logical ground to the last comforting frame in the unraveling narrative … Despite its righteous insistence on knowing what is True, Valuable, or Important, moralism … marks both analytic impotence and … aimlessness … the moralizing injunction to act, … might be read as a symptom of … paralysis in the face of radical … disorientation and as a …hysterical mask for the despair that attends such paralysis. … a life force flattened into a passive or paralyzed stance toward the world turns against life as it turns against itself; … it paradoxically evinces precisely the nihilism, the antilife bearing that it moralizes against in its nemesis …” [3] Brown explains that without a definitive aim of what good really is then we cannot know what is good. This brings us back to the definitions. Justified is defined as being done for a good or for a legitimate reason. How can we define what a good reason really is? The term good has no exact meaning and without a clear definition of what good really is then voters have no choice but to negate. Brown continues, “moralistic repreoaches … Rather than offering … substantive accounts of the forces of injustice … they condemn the manifestation of these forces in particular remarks or events. There is, … a politics … that … symptomizes despair over effecting change at more significant levels. As vast quantities of … attention go to determining what socially marked individuals say, … the sources that generate … violence … and other elements of social injustice remain … unarticulated and unaddressed. We are lost as how to address those sources; but rather than examine this loss … rather than bear the humiliation of our impotence, we posture as if we were still fighting the big and good fight in our clamor over words and names. Don't mourn, moralize.” [4] Moralism means that solvency not possible as it symptomized despair over effecting change at notable and important levels, ensuring the sources of violence remain unarticulated and further more, unaddressed. “the insistence on the importance of transcendent ideals … paradoxically affirms rather than challenges a figuring of the political domain as relentlessly amoral. It places the idealist actor at a distance … thus inevitably disappointed by it and … even prepared to renounce politics because of its failures and compromises … genealogy formulated by Nietzsche…might function as … a ground that, … embraces the contingent elements of political life and also faces … the relative arbitrariness of … values. … genealogical knowledge as … released from conviction. … As Nietzsche describes this questioning, he also describes its productivity: "Out of my answers there grew new questions, … until at length I had a country of my own, … an entire discrete, thriving, flourishing world, … This secret garden is what genealogy intends to produce: this other way of conceiving the familiar, this radical displacement of the lay of the land through which we think and perceive ourselves, … Genealogy promises a worldview that is differently populated and oriented than the one in which we are steeped. "The project is to traverse with quite novel questions, … the enormous, distant, and so well hidden land of morality … to discover this land for the first time" … This problem of … morality … . seems … to be … something detached, an isolated question mark; but whoever … learns how to ask questions here will experience what I experienced—a tremendous new prospect opens up for him, … a new demand becomes audible. … genealogy is a form of artful questioning, a way of asking "what really happened there" … we need a critique of moral values, the value of these values themselves must first be called in question—and for that there is needed a knowledge of the conditions and circumstances in which they grew, … questioning produces an experience of vertigo, and the vertigo gives way to a demand. The demand is not of a conventional … sort but rather seeks new knowledge …” [5] And so Brown concludes that morality is not defined. And this is what is leading to violence and chaos. Our moral values need to be “called into question”. We need to reject morality until we can assess and confirm what we classify as intrinsic morals. Disagreed upon moral values means that key terminology cannot be defined and if this terminology is not intrinsically defined then this ultimately means that affirming is not possible. The K is effective since Pro's case rests upon the assumption that economic crisis for certain teams and for the country is bad. There are people that dislike other teams and want them to be in economic crisis (basic psychology tells us that people that are supportive of their own team are usually against other teams) [6]. There are people that hate other states [7] and want them to be in debt. There are people that hate the US [8] and want them to be in (more) debt. How can we determine who has the right perception of what is good and what is morally bad. In order to affirm we need a clear definition on what is good. No clear definition means that it can't be justified. I'll hand it over to Pro and look forward to their rebuttals. Pro's arguments have no weight because good has no intrinsic definition. The resolution is negated. Vote con. [1] http://tinyurl.com... [2] Freidrich Nietzsche, Parable of the Madman. [3] Wendy Brown, Political Theory @ UC Berkeley, 2k1, Politics Out of History, P 28-29 [4] See above - P 35-36 [5] See above P 95-98 [6] http://tinyurl.com... [7] http://tinyurl.com...; [8] http://tinyurl.com...