Moral Relativism (Pro) vs. Divine Command Theory (Con)

This is a great debate, it's rare to get such complex and sophisticated discussion :) Parts-Whole Fallacy In hindsight, I admit that the distinction between qualitative and quantitative does not avoid the fallacy, but it is still not the case that the contingency of the universe commits the fallacy. The reason I say this is that, whilst some properties may not be transferable from part to whole (as in your example of the car), not all properties fail the transfer. For example, if a house is entirely made out of yellow bricks then the house will be yellow. Inferring the contingency of the universe is more similar to inferring the colour of the house from its component bricks than the false-inference that one will not be able to drive a car because its components are not drivable. This is because contingency is a property that is essentially unchanged by multiplication; adding five contingent objects together will not change the contingency of the whole by a single bit, just like stacking five yellow bricks does not make the stack any other colour. However, adding five components of a car together does increase its drivability slightly, it does not suddenly become drivable when the last bolt is hammered in. Contingency Pro makes a valid point that the universe could be a serendipity, however, this circumstance is so unlikely considering the hugely precise fine-tuning of the universe that it can realistically rejected as infinitesimally improbable. The maximum deviation of cosmological constants a life-supporting universe could have is 1 in 10120 (1). Then my opponent claims that I do not demonstrate how God's omnipotence is entailed from transcendency. However, I do exactly that in line 13 of round 3. To reiterate, a lack of omnipotence can only be caused by a physical limitation. A transcendent being is not subject to physical limitation so a transcendent being must be omnipotent. Perhaps I was at fault for not explaining why his omniscience is necessary in round 3, admittedly the character limit was restricting. Either way, I will explain now. If God created the universe, then he will know everything there is to know about his creation. To illustrate, a painter knows everything about his painting by virtue of the fact that he painted it. In regards to omnibenevolence, my argument does not prove that God is omnibenevolent but it infers it. For why else would God create a universe so fine-tuned to human life if he did not love us? But then again, if we prove that an omnipotent, omniscient being exists then it is rational to ascribe the title 'God' to such a being, even if we cannot prove its omnibenevolence. The explanation of the theory of infinitely-oscillating universes could potentially be correct, and I therefore accept that the possibility (however small) means that God is not deductively proven. However, my argument only inductively proves God, which is to say that it presents God as the most feasible explanation for the existence of the universe. The postulation of 'plurality beyond necessity' contravenes Occam's Razor (2), as an infinite chain of universes is a much more complex explanation than the existence of God (which is actually quite a simple concept [3]). MR vs MN My opponent states that his definition of morality is a set of rules relative to all societies and is 'an objective standard'. However, his definition of morality is out of context as we are considering morality in a descriptive, not normative sense (as we are discussing what morality is). Therefore, the proper definition of morality is: 'Some codes of conduct put forward by a society, some other group such as a religion, or accepted by an individual for his/her own behaviour' (4) This correct definition of morality does not render subjective morality incoherent, and so moral relativism can cogently argue for an existing subjective morality. Besides, my opponent commits the 'appeal to dictionary' fallacy by using a single (in this case uncontextual) definition of morality to base his whole argument that subjective morality is incoherent. Moral nihilism is a separate metaethical theory altogether and so Pro does not help his argument by advocating moral nihilism. God's objective morality Perhaps I should have stated it clearer, but I assert that necessary moral truths are objectively true due to their essence, and so God did not make them so. However, he did make contingent moral truths by virtue of the fact that he created the universe. So when I say that God created an objective morality, I refer to contingent, not necessary moral truths. These 'objective moral rules for us to live by' are founded upon God's omniscience of the structure of the universe; he knows how the universe functions so he therefore knows what is contingently wrong or right. A benevolent God would inform humanity of these contingent moral truths (and necessary moral truths, for that matter) and thus dictate objective morality. Is/ought gap refuted Pro opines that I do not justify why Hume's Law is self-refuting. However, I did justify my reasoning in round 3 so my opponent must have misunderstood. Let me reiterate: The is/ought gap concludes that 'ought' statements should be rejected because they are rationally unjustifiable. But the reason why Hume thinks we should reject ought statements is based on the statement that we ought to value rational elucidation. But this is an ought statement in itself, and according to Hume is therefore meaningless. As the is/ought gap is based on an 'ought' statement, it is refuted by its own logic. Evolution I maintain that evolutionary basis for morality is still a hypothesis, as there is no proof beyond correlative observations. Correlation does not mean causation. However, I do not deny that evolution could have lead us to accumulate moral faculties, that is, our ability to rationally consider morality. However, there is no consequent conclusion that morality does not exist. I argue that morality is external to humanity, although evolution may well have played a key part in actually developing our cognitive ability to recognise and comprehend morality. To conclude, to say that our moral faculties were developed evolutionarily is not to say that morality does not exist (as the moral nihilist maintains). Necessary Moral Truths My opponent states that necessary moral truths form tautologies because they are defined in terms of themselves. However, even if they form tautologies this does not remove the veracity of the statement. A tautology is that which is using unnecessary words to say the same thing; it is not necessarily a false statement. An example of a tautology would be 'In my opinion, I think he is wrong.' (5) This is not made false by its tautological nature. Therefore even if my opponent does prove that necessary moral truths are tautological does not mean that they they are false or non-existent. Whilst I do concede that necessary moral truths are not ascribed their moral worth by God, DCT can still be maintained if I assert that the vast majority of moral truths (contingent ones) come from God. The theory remains intact even if not every single moral truth comes from God; so long as morality in general does so. (1)http://www.godandscience.org... (2)http://math.ucr.edu... (3)http://plato.stanford.edu... (4)http://plato.stanford.edu... (5)http://examples.yourdictionary.com...