Embryonic stem cell research and the Constitution are in conflict with Roe versus Wade

== Overview == As I said before, Pro has the BoP in this debate. Because the resolution is an "and" statement not an "or" statement, Pro had to prove that *both* embryonic stem cell research *and) the Constitution are in conflict with Roe v. Wade. If he fails to prove either, he loses. Pro has failed on both counts. (1) Embryonic stem cell research Let's look at the literal wording of the resolution here. Pro has to prove that "[e]mbryonic stem cell research . . . is in conflict with Roe v. Wade. " So he already loses. Roe v. Wade permits abortion. Nothing in Roe v. Wade prohibits embryonic stem cell research. Vote Con due to this poor resolution drafting. I think Con meant that stem cell research is in conflict with *the Constitution,* not Roe v. Wade. But that's not what the resolution says. Vote Con right there. Nothing in Roe v. Wade conflicts with embryonic stem cell research. In addition, Pro fails to prove that embryonic stem cell research is unconstitutional. Pro's case against stem cell research in Round 2 can be broken down into two arguments: (a) human cloning is impermissible and (b) a fetus is a potential life and is therefore a "person," deserving of protection under the Constitution. We can dispense with (a) really easily: the resolution does not deal with human cloning. Just because a clone could be made from the DNA in stem cells (or from the DNA in any human cell) does not mean that it is topical. Cloning is not the same as stem cell research. As to (b), Pro also loses because he bases personhood on *potentiality,* but he drops my analysis from Round 1 that the eggs donated for stem cell research *never* had the *potential* to be a human life. If stem cell research were outlawed, those embryos would just sit in a freezer somewhere -- unused. Unlike a natural pregnancy, when those eggs are fertilized in the laboratory, there is no mother to carry them to term. The eggs and resultant fetus never have the potential to be a human life. And if they aren't used for research, they won't be used at all. They're not going to become people. We can draw a clear line in the sand here between a natural pregnancy, which maybe has potentiality, and a fetus created in the lab for research, which clearly does not. By dropping this argument, Pro concedes that fetuses created for stem cell research lack potentiality and are therefore not "persons" under the Constitution, *even under Pro's definition of personhood. * Lastly, Pro in essence concedes my argument that utilitarian analysis is part of constitutional interpretation as applied in Mathews v. Eldridge and Lawrence v. Texas. Pro's only attempt at a response falls flat. Pro first cites the dissent in Carhart, which you'll notice is composed of the *liberals* on the Court. The dissenting justices in Carhart thought that late-term (post-viability) abortions should be protected by the Constitution. This position hardly supports Pro. Pro also cites the majority's reasoning in Carhart, which is that women -- by failing to terminate their pregnancy pre-viability -- consent to the state's intervention post-viability. Pro then takes that logic *too far* by arguing that women who have *sex* consent to the state's intervention into their private lives to ban abortion *entirely* because (as Pro puts it) "women [must] take responsibility for their intimacy. " This reasoning was expressly rejected in Lawrence v. Texas in which the Court held that sex is an intimate relationship in which the state has *no business* meddling. I don't think anyone truly believes that by having sex with someone they are ceding their autonomy to the state, so that the state can turn them into a forced incubator for nine months. Under Pro's reasoning, if a stem cell researcher who was a woman violated Pro's proposed law and fertilized an egg in the laboratory, she is responsible for creating a life and the state should be able to forcibly implant the fetus into her and force her to carry it to term. The only difference between this and natural sex is whether the egg starts out inside or outside the woman. But ultimately, the violation of bodily autonomy is similar. The only difference is our reaction to the latter would be more visceral. Lastly, and *most importantly,* what does any of this talk about consent have to do with *utilitarianism. * Remember what Pro is supposed to be answering here: that constitutional analysis includes utilitarian analysis and that banning stem cell research has no benefits (no additional fetuses become people) but has serious harms (we cannot cure Parkinson's, diabetes, and paraplegia). Pro doesn't actually respond to this argument. He merely raises an off-topic argument about consent to state intervention. Utilitarianism is about the *efficacy* of government action, and if government action cannot achieve any benefit and can only be harmful, it is said to be irrational and unconstitutional (see Lawrence). For this reason, Pro has dropped my util argument and loses on the stem cell issue alone. (2) The Constitution is in conflict with Roe v. Wade Pro cites a lot of different passages. Let's dispense quickly with some of them. First, the Declaration of Independence is not part of the Constitution. Second, the Preamble is an "introduction" to the Constitution and is not a binding part of it. Third, the Ninth Amendment has been interpreted by the Supreme Court as having no binding legal effect, and more importantly, it does contain the word *person,* despite Pro's claims to the contrary. The Amendment says, "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people. " Pro misses the fact that "people" is the plural form of "person. " But Pro misses the point by citing to all these other amendments and the Preamble. Roe v. Wade concerned the Fourteenth Amendment, which states (in relevant part), "nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. " Ultimately, Pro concedes the key reasoning in Roe v. Wade that in terms of the *legal* definition of "person" in the Fourteenth Amendment, personhood starts when you are born. How do we know this? Because the Fourteenth Amendment specifically says it in a different provision -- in the provision about birthright citizenship. Personhood and citizenship both start at birth. So the definition of "any person" in the Fourteenth Amendment means people who have been *born. * Pro may have a different *non-legal* definition of personhood that hinges on potentiality, but in the field of law, words are often used in a technical legal sense and have to be interpreted in context. The Fourteenth Amendment is quite clear that its protections extend only to people that have been born. Think for a second how absurd it would be if a fetus were considered a "person" in the *legal* sense. It would mean that a father could sue for custody of the fetus and insist that it be ripped from its mother and implanted in a woman of his choosing. If instead we conceive of the fetus -- for legal purposes -- as being part of the mother's body, such a ridiculous custody dispute could not arise. Pro makes a lot of *lay* appeals about what personhood *ought* to mean, but fails to prove that personhood actually means "potential to become a person" in the legal sense it is used in the Fourteenth Amendment. By failing this BoP, Pro fails to show that the Supreme Court interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment incorrectly in Roe v. Wade. Furthermore, Pro drops my analysis from last round that potentiality is not enough to inhere a "right to life. " As I stated before, ending a life is cruel if the life is self-aware or can feel pain. Pre-viability fetuses are neither self-aware nor feel pain. Their potentiality to be a human under the right conditions is also not met (e. g. they don't have a willing and consenting mother to carry them to term). In addition, potentiality is absurd. Pro is arguing that even a laboratory stem cell fetus is a potential human life, but the conditions needed for it to become a human life are so ridiculous. You need to find a woman who is willing to have the fetus implanted and carry it to term, and if the lab happened to create 10,000 fetuses for research, it would be hard to find willing women for all of them. If you consider that to be "potentiality" then you should also consider an unfertilized egg or a sperm to have the same potential. The conditions needed to produce life are also unlikely, but perhaps the Constitution should allow the state to *force* us to procreate because wasted sperm and eggs are wasted human "potential. " Conclusion: "potentiality" is an absurd definition of personhood, particularly when you're using it as a legal definition, rather than a lay one. In addition, Pro in essence concedes my argument that Roe cannot be in conflict with the Constitution by definition because the Supreme Court gets to decide what the Constitution says. Pro's only response is to the Justice Jackson quote. He misunderstands the quote as saying the Court is infallible and then points out the Court has reversed itself. However, the quote actually says that the Supreme Court is *not* infallible; it's decisions are just *treated* as such because it's word is *final. * Notice that Pro is saying that the Supreme Court reversed itself. Not the President. Not Congress. Not the People. The Court reversed itself. Because the Court has the final say on the Constitution. It can change its mind. But that doesn't mean that Pro's separate interpretation of the Constitution has any constitutional validity. And the Court has never reversed itself on whether fetuses are "persons. " So Pro loses by default because the Constitution says what the Supreme Court says it does. Lastly, Pro drops my util analysis here too. Banning abortion would not reduce the abortion rate, so it would be wholly irrational to do so. The Constitution does not permit wholly irrational government action (see Lawrence). So the Constitution cannot be in conflict with Roe v. Wade.