The Modal Ontological Argument for God is Logically Sound

I thank Con for his responses. So my opponent says that he has debunked the whole argument. Perhaps it would be, if I had decided to forfeit and not offer up a refutation of his arguments. But I have no intention of doing something like that. In this argument, I propose to show that he hasn’t debunked the argument just yet. Now, I remember saying that the BoP was shared, and that I would state my premises and defend them later, but I will comply with his request, refuting his rebuttals along the way to preserve precious character space for my argument. Defense of Premise 1 I will call upon the first proposition of Modal logic, which emphasizes the logical possibility of things; not the physical possibility. If the vegan he’s talking about possibly exists logically in some possible world, then such a person would exist logically in this world as well, but not physically. So with these revisions, my opponent would at least be conceding and saying that there could be such a person that exists in our world; and logically following from that, that a maximally great being is logically possible. This is where my opponent’s analogy breaks down; the idea of a person like that as outlined in his rebuttal does not entail his existence, but in my argument, the idea of God does. I ask my opponent to please explain further. Defense of Premise 2 I’ll start with refuting the reverse MOA. I’ll be calling upon proposition three of Modal logic, which tells about necessary propositions. This defense flows logically from the defense of the first premise. I already mentioned it was about the logical possibility of a God existing. Now, my opponent states that his argument is based upon the logical possibility of a god not existing. Exactly how is that a valid point or a rebuttal to my premise? The idea was to point point anything logically inconsistent or absurd in the premise or in the truth behind it, and it appears that he has failed to do just that. This would also be a contingent proposition, since naturally, my premise also stated that it was possible that a greatest possible being didn’t exist. Now, to put it into simpler terms, I’ll turn his argument into a syllogism: (If this is a strawman, please let me know.) P1: Pro accepts that it’s possible God doesn’t exist in a possible world with his line of reasoning. P2: By this line of reasoning, it is possible God doesn’t exist and possible he does exist. C: Therefore, the premise is invalidated because you can’t choose both in the MOA. So basically, P1 and P2 are irrelevant because the rebuttal has done nothing to point out anything logically absurd or inconsistent with the premise. My opponent’s argument also states that it’s still possible that a greatest possible being exists; therefore it stands. This argument would also break down in that it’s essentially making a metaphysical and logical contradiction in itself. The main problem with this argument lies in P2 and P3; how would God, assuming that he is a maximally great being, not exist in a possible world? At least as long as his existence would be in the question. The reverse MOA is not exactly well-explained by my opponent; and as I stated before, BoP is shared. I invite him to please explain further if he wishes. But what really invalidates the rebuttal is that he used the reverse MOA solely as a point of contention against the premise instead of trying to point out anything logically absurd or inconsistent. That is what the first two premises are built on; the idea of a greatest possible existing in some possible worlds brings no logical absurdities with it. Therefore, the first two premises stand. I humbly invite my opponent to help me understand the points of these rebuttals, as the first two premises in the MOA only deal with what is logically possible in possible worlds, and not with what physically exists or is physically possible. Defense of Premise 3 Now to defend my third premise… All that I am really saying in this premise is that going by the previous premises, if you can imagine a God existing in some possible world, then it’s at least logically possible he exists. Note how I place emphasis on the logical possibility of things, not whether or not it’s physically possible. An invisible unicorn or the Balrog are logically possible, (As far as I can tell, at least.) but a four sided triangle or a circular square would not be; or in other words, the idea of them existing brings about no logical absurdities. That is all I am saying here. However, my opponent hasn’t done anything to attack this premise yet. (I’m sure he will, though.) So until then, it stands. Defense of Premise 4 Now here, I will offer a refutation of Con’s “Other Problems” argument. My opponent claims at the end of this section of the argument that “It is possible God exists” must be false. Now, I must ask, in this argument, what kinds of beings are my opponent talking about? To better illustrate my argument, I’ll use this: C1: Beings that are logically possible and physically exist C2:Beings that are logically possible but do not physically exist C3:Beings that are logically possible and metaphysically exist C4:Beings that are logically possible and do not metaphysically exist. And then we have the next four which are logically impossible beings but share all the same secondary traits as the beings above, but we shall ignore that for now. As I said before, Modal logic deals with what is possible. I now ask my opponent to clarify which kind of being he’s talking about in his argument here. As I’m sure we all obviously know, there’s no lumping them all together in one category, as my opponent’s argument seems to do. (Other than that they’re all logically possible.) They are most sharply divided by whether or not they’re physical or metaphysical. And we also must remember we are talking about a maximally great being that would, by definition, exist somewhat separately from its creation. Defense of Premises 5 and 6 What I am saying her is that if a greatest possible being exists in some possible worlds; assuming that he’s maximally great, would exist in our world or reality as well. What more is there to say about it after defending the last 4 premises? The argument flows logically, therefore God exists and that provides the strongest premise for the MOA possible. Rebuttal to Modal argument from evil. Remember, we’re talking about a maximally great being such as stated in the Aquinas quote Con has provided. If a greatest possible being existed, there would be no gratuitous suffering. I imagine Con will call upon the possibility of God not existing in order to support his argument, but I believe I have already rebutted that argument. Therefore, it appears the MAE has been refuted. My refutations of Con’s arguments will stand until he posts his argument. Either that or I have completely misunderstood his arguments. Conclusion My opponent’s arguments do not appear to hold much water. I have provided evidence that the MOA is sound and the premises hold true. My opponent has yet to show otherwise.