Social Contract Theory

From my original two contentions, I think this debate has come down to three key areas of clash. The first two are the issues I identified last round - the reciprocity and consent of social contracts. The third is whether individuals have recourse. What has NOT been an issue of clash in this debate is the meta-narrative of social contractism - whether it has existed. This is irrelevant. As my opponent said in round one, all I need to prove is that it "could exist in theory. " I have cited theories under which social contracts could exist, for instance, the theory of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. My opponent did not engage with this analysis, so despite repeating himself over and over, he has in fact dropped the point. 1. Reciprocity First my opponent brought up slaves, and I showed how that does not affect social contracts between the state and it's citizens. While social contract theory may not hold for slaves, frankly they do not matter. Social contract theory explains citizen's interactions with the state. If you are a citizen, social contract theory applies to you. Therefore slaves are not an exception, for they are not citizens. Slaves are, as I explained in round one, outside of the jurisdiction of the social contract. Secondly my opponent has brought up the Hobbes and Locke conceptions of how the contract would be ideal. I thought both theories would be irrelevant to the debate, because they both presuppose the social contract rather than argue for it. Nonetheless, relinquishing rights, be it to the self or a judge, is a central part of the social contract. Does that mean there is an imbalance of power? Not if everyone else relinquishes their rights too! Remember that states are non-human institutions. The humans who operate their constructs have relinquished their rights. Therefore by both formulations there is no power imbalance. Further still, even if both of these formulations of the social contract have a power imbalance, that does not mean that every formulation of the social contract has a power imbalance. Then there is the whole issue of whether the "love it or leave it" ideology of social contracts is reciprocal. I have used naturalism to show that it is. There is the whole NAZI issue, which I would love to discuss in another debate but I feel it is becoming increasingly irrelevant. The point is that "love it or leave it" is how all contracts work. You can either accept them or decline them. You can accept to live in the USA, or you can decline and come join us in New Zealand. My New Zealand example, incidentally, my opponent missed the point of. The law is practically unenforcable. You cannot stop parents giving their kids corrective smacks. Parents need have no fear. What has changed is not the terror of police, but the culture of parenting. Ultimately you have the burden of proof to exclude this alternative possibility, and you have not done so. Finally, that the state creates exceptions for itself in customary law. On a more basic level, my opponent is arguing against the whole body of law contained private acts. First, such laws can decrease social inequality as much as they can increase it. It is not the role of social contract theory to dictate an ideal level of inequality. Finally, even where states do not bind themselves by their own rules (which is rare - as I have stated in most countries you can sue the government) they still bind themselves to society, without which they are nothing. People can choose to reject the change if they do not think it is warranted. If they do, then the condition can hardly be called unfair. After all, the contract is still providing them significant benefit . .. so much benefit, in fact, that even you argue that people are reluctant to give it up. This point falls to me because I have shown a social contract, where it exists, functions in a reciprocal way. 2. Consent First, a minor issue. You can't kill someone extra-legally. If every country in the world repealed the charge for murder, there would be no social contract implications from murder. However, for moral reasons, I doubt that hypothetical scenario is worth dealing with. Second, a very minor issue, that states need a power monopoly to create consent is not true, but states do need a power monopoly, as I have shown with my pretty-much-uncontested point about public goods. I, too, would love to have a debate about that issue some day. Third, on infants. Infants are not presumed to have consented to social contracts by virtue of birth. Laws will be imposed when understood, because if they are not consented to when understood, it is rational for an individual to escape the jurisdiction of the law. To accept the contract by taking advantage of the benefits of the law, as Socrates did, is consenting to the body of law in that jurisdiction. This point falls to me because I have provided a mechanism for consent, despite my opponent's assertions that such a mechanism does not exist. 3. Recourse What is at stake is whether individuals exclusion from the social contract is in fact a recourse. My opponent snatches the moral high ground with his assertion that earning something forgone in the contract - such as the right to lead a popular revolt - is not a recourse because members party to the contract will, naturally, follow their own contracts to shut you down. First, this proves my sides's theory of social contract, because otherwise the state would be powerless to stop you, as they have no contractual relationship with their citizens. Second, my opponent accepts that the state has a recourse. Therefore it is illogical to say that the individual has no recourse when I have already stated that their recourses are identical. You will find that once a state breaches a critical mass of contracts they are almost always over-thrown, which again supports the theory that recourse is possible. My opponent also has two minor points - dependence and conditioning. Neither is usually recognised in contractual law. Just because I depend on buying a house, or am conditioned to signing house contracts, doesn't exempt me from the terms of house-buying-contracts I sign. His argument here is as ridiculous as it sounds. This point falls to me because I have actually shown a clear mechanism for how individuals can have recourse. Conclusion Ultimately to prove a social contract, or the possibility thereof, I had to prove my two opening contentions, for reasons that I explained in round one. I did so, and in round two I handled the key objections to these statements my opponent brought up. In this third round, I have summarized why my opponent has failed in each of these objections. I think, therefore, that the social contract theory stands.