It is probable that God exists

Pro ends: "Con's points have been found wanting, as evidenced by the fact that he dropped his defense of the Boeing 747 Gambit and the comparison of the TCAs to the OA."Neither point was dropped. Pro's criticism of the Gambit depends on God's immateriality, which I addressed in the sections entitled "Science" and "Physicalism" from R3. Pro's counter-argument to the OA-comparison rested on facts about contingent beings, but I showed these facts were themselves incompatible with the TCAs, putting Pro in a double bind and implicitly defending the OA-comparison.What is more, why would Pro conclude that my overarching argument is "found wanting" from the supposition that I dropped two relatively minor points? Does Pro really think dropping the Gambit and OA-comparison seriously weakens the force and impact of my case? Is it not more reasonable to assume secondary points are dropped because of space limitations? It seems to me that Pro's focus on alleged-drops of secondary points indicates Pro's own lack of confidence: why else would someone use their concluding statement to direct the reader's attention away from the actual arguments?TCAsPro concedes a first mover operates from nothingness, which is itself a causal condition. It follows that, if quantum fluctuations are not causally determined by vacuums and vacuums are the equivalent of nothingness, the force of the TCAs is fully negated.The TCAs thus turn on Pro's claim that vacuums are not a state of "literal nothingness." But notice Pro provides no source to prove "something is present" in a vacuum. This is because a true vacuum is devoid of matter, a state in which nothing exists except random quantum fluctuations. [1][6][9] As such, vacuums can in fact refer to literal nothingness. I hope readers prefer my claim to Pro's, as I provide sources and evidence for this important point whereas Pro does not.Again, Pro provides no source for his claims regarding Schrodinger's cat, whereas I provided a source which cites Shrodinger himself and clearly establishes ontic quantum indeterminacy. [7]Teleological ArgumentFirst: according to Pro, ends imply intentions because that is what intentions are. But this is bad logic. If p entails q, it does not follow that q entails p. Just because all intentions are ends (by definition) does not mean all ends imply intentions. Pro's argument commits a logical fallacy, as well as offering no reason other than defining intentions as ends to believe all natural ends require intentionality.Second: contrary to Pro's claim, I did respond to the "three arguments." Recall Pro conceded that physical ends continue whether human persons exist or not. Hence, in R3 I argued that (1) and (2) occur regardless of whether intentions are given to physical ends, and (3) is irrelevant because it explicitly refers to a normative teleology created by humans, not the necessary being of Pro's teleological argument. (1) and (2) are question-begging, falsely assuming all ends are intentional, and (3) is irrelevant, a red herring at best.SciencePro drops the "explanatory power" point, conceding predictive power does matter. Unlike my alleged-drops, Pro's drop has impact, as it admits naturalistic explanations are preferable to theistic explanations. Now, Pro claims methodological naturalism is compatible with theism. So what? The issue at stake in this debate is whether theism is probable, not whether theism is possible. Given the superior track record of science, methodological naturalism strongly suggests metaphysical naturalism (incompatible with theism) is probable.Pro insists theism is probable because there must be "an agent who explains why everything exists, not how it works." First: does an agent who explains why entail theism? Pro's necessary agent is just as well understood as a natural occurence, not God. Recall we have reason to prefer natural explanation over theistic explanation. Second: must there be an agent to explain why? It is just as likely (i.e. probable) that there is no answer to the question of why everything exists, everything just is. That said, since naturalism can account for both possibilities -- the existence or non-existence of such an agent -- naturalism is clearly more probable.PhysicalismIs God's existence possible? Yes. Is God's non-existence possible? Yes. Is dualism possible? Yes. Is physicalism possible? Yes. Do any of these answers make a "modal claim about the nature of existence"? Only insofar as we can say anything is possible.According to Pro's logic, dualism is as contingent as physicalism. If both dualism and physicalism are possible, the question becomes which is more probable? If there is no evidence of disembodied existence, it seems more likely physicalism is true. Pro did not contest the fact that there is no evidence of disembodied existence. Therefore, physicalism is probable.IncoherenceIf God does not have propositional knowledge, how can God know propositions? Pro seems to think God can know propositions in non-propositional modes. But this still poses a problem: can God have propositional knowledge? Pro seems to deny it, implicitly negating possibility of God's omniscience and omnipotence.Furthermore, Pro's reply does not answer the crux of my argument, which is that God would have to know there were no facts He did not know. Even with non-propositional/non-perceptualist knowledge, how could God be absolutely certain He knew every mathematical fact? Pro's response does not answer that question.Argument from EvilThere are two fundamental differences between God-human relations and parent-child relations. First, a child knows a parent exists whereas humans do not know God exists. Second, a child has the capacity to eventually understand why a parent does what a parent does, but humans will never have the capacity to understand why God does what God does. Hence, Pro's parent-child analogy is a non-starter.Pro states the moral paralysis objection does not work because "the Judeo-Christian scriptures/tradition calls one to a life of good works." There are a number of problems here. First: Judeo-Christian scriptures only apply to people who know Judeo-Christian scriptures. Is Pro willing to say non-theists lacking knowledge of Judeo-Christian theism have reason to allow rape and genocide to occur?Second: Pro confuses what is reasonable to do with what is morally right to do. According to Pro's logic, belief in Judeo-Christian theism provides us with a reason to act, but it does not provide us epistemic access to the morally right thing to do. Think about it this way: Hitler did the wrong thing regardless of what reason he had for doing it.Third: if we are not in a position to know what God's reasoning is for allowing seemingly gratuitous evil, then we have little to no reason for thinking that God's moral commands as we know them are accurate.Fourth: using Judeo-Christian traditions/scriptures to prove the existence of God is question-begging because it assumes Judeo-Christian theism is true.Moreover, recall my argument: "Pro’s skepticism cuts both ways. If it undercuts arguments against God’s existence, it likewise undercuts arguments for God’s existence." I argued Pro's skepticism implicitly negates the resolution, because without knowledge of God's existence, the probability of God cannot exceed 50/50. Pro's response does not address this.ConclusionI refuted the TCAs through QM and the teleological argument by unpacking Pro's question-begging and fallacious logic. My burden did not entail proving God's existence was impossible. Yet the majority of Pro's criticisms attempt to prove God is possible, a point I barely contest. Each of my arguments -- that naturalism/physicalism is probable, that QM makes omniscience improbable, that omniscience/omnipotence are incoherent, and that a perfecly benevolent God is not probable -- clearly calls the existence of God into question.In sum, God's existence is not probable. The resolution is negated.[9] http://muse.jhu.edu...