Humans Can Have A Soul

The characters was mentioned for the voters, it was not a contention of debate. The first premise still begs the question, you have to assume that a soul exists in order to be able to evaluate it on the concept of freewill. Certainly, we cannot conclude based on the evidence that the soul gives us any freewill, because even if the soul exists, one could take a Epiphenomenalist view upon the nature of the soul and therefore no causal relation exists from the soul to the physical properties. Mental events could be caused by physical events, and physical events may have no effect whatsoever, therefore the definition of souls is unclear and false in the context of the argument. Ignosticism should lead us to take a noncognitivist view upon the soul. But nevertheless, we have been given no reason to accept this position anyway. The quote is truly an appeal to authority(unlike my Einstein example). Why should we think this is the true definition? There are many views that would clearly contradict this view. For example, a determinist may be a dualist. On Quantum Mechanics, my opponent fails to realize(as stated in my opening paragraph) all experimental results would still obtained by a hidden variable theory. However, my opponent completely misunderstands Bell's theorem. Locality is the issue not variables. You see Bell's Theorem shows that no hidden variables can exist in a local system however Bohemian Mechanics, one of the primary deterministic views, is non-local. Further, the many-worlds interpretation is a non-local deterministic theory. Anyone who remotely understands Bell's Theorem knows this. The appeal to authority is a simple mistake in definition and in use of the fallacy. The appeal to authority fallacy is defined as "that because an authority thinks something, it must therefore be true." I never claimed this, I introduced the objection Einstein himself made. If I hadn't introduced the actual objection, the yes it would be. BUT, I didn't therefore no fallacy. My opponent simply asserts that spontaneous generation isn't similar to Quantum Mechanics in anyway. For one, creationism has to do with the creation of universe by a being not the biological view held for thousands of years, religiously by many scientists. This theory was tested by scientists back then, and they were convinced it was absolutely true. This definitely has parallels to Quantum Mechanics as my opponent seems to concede by not really objecting but by saying "Noooo, its not even close to the same thing". Renunciation is dropped therefore it flows to my side of the debate. Further there are reasons to think deterministic view is likely, for example as David Albert once summarized "The dynamics and the postulate of collapse are flatly in contradiction with one another ... the postulate of collapse seems to be right about what happens when we make measurements, and the dynamics seems to be bizarrely wrong about what happens when we make measurements, and yet the dynamics seems to be right about what happens whenever we aren't making measurements." (Albert 79) However, Bohmian Mechanics doesn"t fall for the problem that traditional quantum mechanics does because it sees the initial description of the Wave function as incomplete(that is why it is called a hidden variable theory in that there are more variables that we can measure epistemologically speaking). For the evolution of the Wave function is formulated based on Schrodinger"s equation alone, and therefore the textbook collapse is simply the result of Bohmian dynamics. You see because observation implies a certain level of interaction, some system that maybe under observation cannot be truly consider a closed system (which is required by the laws of classical physics and thermodynamics). So because we have fundamentally two systems. Copenhagen interpretation simply lacks the resources and epistemological reliability in order to form a conditional wave function unlike the Bohmian interpretation. Due to this conditional wave function the interpretation (Bohmian) is able to solve the problem of the Double-Slit.