Zaradi's Prized Tournament: Animal Rights

Thanks again, 16K! I will now defend my case.HOUSEKEEPINGWhile I don't think the definitions were such that Pro had to accept the observations, he nevertheless does accept them. The impacts coming from 1-3 are that I only need to show (at least) 1 right that 1 animal can access in order to prove animal rights exist. The impact of 4 is that if I show that animals have any rights, as defined, then I have also show that justice requires them.Pro also DROPS my underview, so presume Con. Finally, all of my contentions function independently, so I only need one to win. Pro's contentions don't function independently, because Pro contends that only members of the moral community can be factored into utilitarianism; so he needs to win his C2 for his C1 to even be possible.ARGUMENTSC1: Needless SufferingOverview: Pro agrees that animals can suffer; so if preventing needless suffering is a right, it can be meaningfully given to animals.JustificationIn SC1, I gave 3 discrete justifications for why preventing needless suffering was a fundamental due: 1. The whole raison d'etre for rights is to prevent needless suffering2. Preventing needless suffering is an objective of the MC3. Needless suffering is an affront to justice JUS1. Pro says I'm making the argument that because "the majority of people agree with [the] statement" that it proves that is "how justice should be applied." But, Pro's not correct--I'm not attempting to apply justice broadly, just rights specifically, and I am not attempting to assess majority opinion, just to observe how rights work.I am actually making the claim that if you examine all rights (pick any right at random, e.g. life, liberty, food, bodily integrity, due process, etc.), it appears to be the goal of all of them to prevent needless suffering. Liberty is good because it prevents us from being miserably locked up in confinement or from being terrorized by an authoritarian regime. Food is good because it prevents us from suffering from hunger. Bodily integrity is good because it prevents us from being beaten up or tortured. So, the claim I am asserting is one of the nature and purpose of rights. Pro NEVER REBUTS the idea that the purpose of rights is to insulate something against needless suffering.The impact of this is fairly straightforward: if the fundamental purpose of rights is to prevent needless suffering, then any kind of being that can experience needless suffering would qualify for rights--just as the purpose of unemployment benefits is to help the unemployed, if you are unemployed you would qualify for them. Since animals can needlessly suffer, they have a right against needless suffering.JUS2. Pro's rebuttal doesn't do anything to counter the idea of morality as a set of ideals; he merely repeats his stance on rationality. Last round I noted morality is defined as a set of principles. If one of the principles the MC has agreed on is that needless suffering is bad (Pro NEVER DISPUTES that this is a goal of the MC), then it would seem immoral to cause needless suffering to animals even though they're animals. The principle is still just as applicable to treatment of animals as it is to treatment of humans. Some societies, such as Hindu society, even explicitly include animals in this principle. The impact therefore is that animals have a moral right (a due given to them by moral principles) against needless suffering.JUS3. Pro's main counters are that pain to animals is not a moral harm, that we don't abuse animals for our sakes vice the animals' sakes, and that emotions don't connect beings to morality--only rationality does. I have 5 responses:a) Suffering is obviously a moral harm. I only need to point to Pro's own argument of utility to make that link. Furthermore, as I said earlier, pick any good, like liberty, and we can see that it is valued for the pain it avoids and the pleasure it brings. But even if you don't buy that, I still did give 3 reasons why needless suffering was key for rights.b) Pro says that harming animals is not bad due what it does to the animal, but how it impacts us. Why does animal abuse harm us? The essay Pro cites notes: "the duty...in question is the duty to cultivate feelings that are conducive to morality." So, if humans have a duty not to cause needless suffering (since inflicting that suffering is not conducive to morality), then my claim that animals have a right not to needlessly suffer is affirmed. Rights are the other side of duties, after all. Plus, this supports my claim that preventing needless suffering is vital for morality.c) Agents often establish rights not out of interests for others, but for themselves. In the state of nature, we realize that it is in everyone's interests to bring some order, and so we set up rights to provide us protections from others. So, why do we have to not abuse animals for their own sakes in order for them to have rights? It seems that rights can be granted even in spite of selfish motives.d) If we agree that preventing needless suffering is of moral importance (which follows from my 3 justifications, and from points (a) and (b) above), then why should we distinguish between animal and human suffering. Suffering is suffering is suffering. Pro might respond with more of his MC/rationality claims, but these fail because we've already established that suffering itself (irrespective of other considerations) carries moral weight.e) Morality is not only a rational enterprise. Emotions play a significant role too. Human's sense of conscience, or our natural moral compass, is not something we rationally came to a decision on; it is an emotional experience. Sympathy, empathy, love, etc. all inform our moral system. Pro only talks about rationality, but in doing so he misses an important part of the picture. Pro writes: "An animal can do something moral but it is unable to know why it is moral." Maybe that is true on a rational level, but I would submit that on an emotive level its not true. At least some animals can emotionally experience why certain things are wrong, just as we do. So, it seems that animals can still "pursue goodness," which was Pro's criterion for rights, on an emotive level.C2: Give and Takea) Saying that animals are inherently better off as property without rights is like saying that slavery was a good thing. Slavemasters "do not like their property being misused. Making [slaves] property, then, actually increases [a slave's] welfare." Hopefully this illustrates the absurdity of Pro's point. Rights are necessary to establish boundaries of conduct.b) The rationality argument he applies here has nothing to do with whether a one-sided relationship is fair (or, at least he never makes that impact). If animals give, people shouldn't just take. Justice is a scale, and when it tips to far in one direction, it's no longer fair or just.c) TURN: Pro kills his own C1. He cites Kant, who claims that people can never be used as a means; this defeats utility, which requires people be used as means in pursuit of the greater good.C3: Emotions and RightsPro's only reply is that, just because it is we feel sympathy, doesn't mean that the animal has rights; it only has to do with us. My point is that when a person feels sympathy, they care about the Other. So, to that particular person, the animal is morally significant from their individual point of view. As I said: "the Other [has] moral value in the beholder's eyes." Because those who sympathize with the animal feel morally compelled to act, the animal is entitled to those actions, just as if I were legally obligated to pay taxes, the state is entitled to those taxes. As I said: "Sympathy is an internal compulsion to act...That we feel sympathy...gives the Other a claim on our actions." Obligations give way to entitlements, i.e. rights. Pro pretty much DROPS most of this.C4: Animals have Legal RightsSC1. Inheritancea) The presence of one right doesn't negate the existence of another. That my relative had a right to give me my inheritance doesn't logically imply that I cannot have a right to that inheritance, esp. since my inheritance is "something that [I] may properly claim as [my] due." It is owed to me. Both rights seem equally valid.b) Pro says that as the animals wouldn't have gotten anything if it had not explicitly been bequeathed to them, they have no claim to inheritance. But this misunderstands the issue. The animals may not have had a claim to the inheritance before it was left to them, but once it was left to them, they did have a claim, and thus a legal right. This is how it works with human inheritors and wills too.Pro DROPS that proxies can claim the rights of animals on their behalf.SC2. That Law as a DuePro asks where the laws promise anything. Laws, for example, against animal abuses (which I specifically mentioned) promise animals that they won't be treated certain ways. Next Pro says animals need to be able to rationalize the promise. But, he never explains why. Promises are not contracts; they don't require both parties to understand and act. If the law promises something, an animal (via proxy) can legally assert the animals claim to the promise, thereby giving the animal a legal right.C5: No Relevant Differencesa) Pro claims that just being of humankind makes you the capacity to be rational, and all such beings are part of the MC. Yet, elsewhere he says right-holders must understand their rights and be able to pursue morality. He even writes: "in order to be part of a [MC], you must promote (or accept) things which are loosely defined as 'good'." Clearly, not all humans can do those things. b) Pro's whole notion of capacity is vague: how does someone who is severely impaired have rational capacity? Esp. if you were born with the impairment, you'd never have the potential to be rational.---------Pro can't rebut dropped points as they'd be new arguments. Over to Pro...