Idealism is true

Rebuttals1. Notice that this debate is about ontology. We're asking whether or not reality itself is mentally constructed. Dylan's argument, however, does not seem to be a matter of ontology. Rather, it seems to be an argument relating to discourse. Discourse, in this context, refers to the fact that when we debate such topics as realism and idealism, we do so within a conceptual, linguistic, historical, social, and temporal paradigm that determines the way we think about the issue. Dylan's argument attempts to prove that if the non-mental exists, it cannot be conceived. It also attempts to prove that if the non-mental exists, it cannot be expressed. Given these terms, it is very clearly an argument based on the conceptual and linguistic foundations of the paradigm that our thinking is taking place in. It amounts to the argument that the discourse we are participating in gives no conceptual or linguistic coherency to the existence of mind-independent entities and the non-mental. Ergo, it is not an argument relating to ontology, and therefore has no implications on the true nature of reality.This amounts to an a priori rejection of the premise that ontology and the medium of discourse (mind) can be properly conflated. But that just amounts to the assertion that my position is false. My argument is that when considering reality, the map is the terrain. Why do I think this? Because there's no conceivable alternative to mind. In other words, when Sargon talks about the "non-mental" as if there were an alternative, he's talking about the "non-mental" as something mental and simply ignoring the fact that what he's talking about is in fact mental! In order to consider whether or not the non-mental is even a coherent concept, we must define it, such that it perfectly conforms to our mental structures. But in that case it is in expression of cognition and therefore cognitive. There's no reason to even consider that which is by definition inconsiderable. Even arguments which do not directly address the “non-mental” and “back into it” as an implication cannot be considered valid, since their conclusion would presuppose the existence of something which is meaningless. Since "reality" is a theory (definition, description), and since theories are mental, reality is mental. 2. My opponent claims that idealism is unable to account for the persistent order of the universe around us. In other words, he claims that the order we perceive could only be kept in place by something non-mental. In order to refute this argument, I simply have to put forth a model of the universe that assumes reality is mental and accommodates the fact that the universe is structured. The universe is a mind. The entire structure of the universe is distributed over all of its contents, such that all of its contents “participate” in its definition and organizational structure. In other words, our minds “simulate” the structure of the universe. Since the entire structure of reality is distributed over all of its contents, us defining reality amounts to reality defining itself, which means that the map and the terrain are not actually separate. Note that I’m not using this as evidence for idealism, but rather using it to “accommodate” for my main argument: that there is no meaningful alternative to “mental” when it comes to answering the question “what reality is”.