The U.S. should negotiate with the Taliban

Thank you. I will be defending the position that the benefits of negotiating with the Taliban outweigh the costs. I am aware that this idea might seem frightening or foreign to some (no pun intended) because people are still affected by the fear mongering of neo-cons and/or immense negativity after the abhorrent attacks on the U.S. that occurred on 9/11. However, I am prepared to argue that negotiations are preferable based on both a cost/benefit analysis as well as a pragmatic and moral one. I would also like to clarify that in no way am I suggesting that we start negotiating with the Taliban NOW; however, I feel that negotiations sometime in the future would be the best and most effective way at dealing with our current foreign policy issues in the Middle East as well as ensure (or make the best case for) the safety of Americans in the future. I'd also like to take this opportunity to wish my opponent luck even though he will probably be plagiarizing my arguments and using them for school, his debate team, etc. Nevertheless - let's begin! 1. Despite the U.S. making claims about our war strategy being successful (a lie similar to the ones they told the public back when we were involved in Vietnam), the fact remains that the Taliban is actually gaining ground despite the U.S. stepping up military drone attacks. For instance, the Taliban effectively subdued the Pakistani military in the Swat Valley allowing them to impose Sharia law and institute measures that included closing girls' schools, banning music, and installing "complaint boxes for reports of anti-Islamic behavior" [1]. I'm assuming that we all agree that this is bad both for the U.S. and our goals of "freeing" the people in the Middle East under the fanatical terrorist regime. However, the Taliban insists that they will refuse to negotiate until all foreign forces are withdrawn from Afghanistan [2]. This means that we are actually making the problems worse for the people over there instead of better. Additionally, the U.S. military is failing at achieving many of their objectives, and subsequently hurting Afghans in the process. For instance, many innocent Afghans die as a result of the continuing conflict and many find conditions in their country being worsened as a result of the war. As such, many are even willingly being converted and joining forces with the Taliban simply because they see it as a means to an end; they would rather be fundamentalists then dead. So, my first argument is that our method of guerilla warfare hasn't really been successful, and thus just wasted American tax payer dollars. This is especially true because the Taliban has increased it's control out of Afghanistan and into places like Somalia, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Algeria, Yemen, etc [3]. This problem is too big and we need to find alternative ways aside from a destructive, costly and seemingly never-ending war. 2. This brings me to my next point. Opponents of negotiating with the Taliban suggest increasing the Afghan army and police forces to deal with the Taliban themselves. However, 80% of Afghanistan's economy relies on foreign aid and opium cultivation. Since we are specifically trying to rid of the opium market there, this means that Afghanistan does not have the money to sustain a larger army thereby meaning that the U.S. will be the ones wind up funding the army, and quite frankly we just can't afford it [4]. It's expensive and the greatest cost of all are human lives. Instead, we should work toward diplomacy and empowering the people, even if it means 'buying out our enemies,' so to speak. "The central problem in Afghanistan is that the Pashtuns - who make up 45 percent of the country and almost 100 percent of the Taliban - do not feel empowered. We need to start talking to them, whether they are nominally Taliban or not. Buying, renting, or bribing Pashtun tribes should become the centerpiece of America's stabilization strategy, as it was Britain's when it ruled Afghanistan... if we make the right deals, it will be ruled by leaders who keep the country inhospitable to Al Qaeda and terrorist groups like it." [5] As you can see, negotiating or even bribing in this way becomes more effective then not. 3. As a final note (for now) I'll just add that in no way should the U.S. attempt to negotiate with The Taliban without implementing other means, such as getting NATO to send more troops to Afghanistan, encouraging Pakistan to fight harder against the Taliban, and help the Afghan government build resources and a stronger army to fight against oppression instigated by The Taliban as well as improve conditions in that country so that people are not compelled to join forces with the terrorist group. However, it is in the U.S.'s best interest to not rule out negotiations all-together due to the overwhelming cost of the war and the cost that it will present both currently and in the future due to immense danger or threat imposed by the Taliban. Right now, the U.S. feels insecure and thus has to spend a substantial amount of money on both defense and homeland security. The U.S. has even gone so far as to enact shakey legislation that infringes upon the rights of Americans, and draws up controversy such as debates about Gitmo, etc. If we could come up with some sort of agreement, many American rights might be restored and perhaps Americans can feel safer knowing we have some sort of "contract" with the terrorists however flakey it might be. Additionally, it would improve U.S. international relations and views about America from all over the world. Conclusion -- In addition to the many contentions I have provided in R1, I also have additional reasoning as to why I support the resolution; however, was unsure if Con wanted to limit this debate to just 3 arguments a piece. In that case, I'll end here. If I deem necessary and/or if Con agrees, I will post more reasons in R2 though of course I would not introduce any new arguments in R3 as that would be considered abusive. That said, I'll end this round with a quote as I'm running out of characters anyway. Thanks again... "Barring total victory for the U.S. over a pervasive, locally-based force, the question is not whether we will negotiate with the Taliban, but when, under what circumstances, and with which members? It may indeed be too soon to push for direct talks with the Taliban because the conditions are not yet ripe to negotiate an acceptable outcome for the U.S., and serious costs may result. But it is probably never too soon for indirect talks, in order to feel out the Taliban's interests and seek a path to a ZOPA [zone of potential agreement] -- all while striving to increase bargaining power by improving the U.S.'s BATNA [best alternative to no agreement] and decreasing the attractiveness of the Taliban's BATNA" [3]. [1] Jane Perlez and Pir Zubair Shah, "Truce in Pakistan May Mean Leeway for Taliban", N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 2009 [2] http://www.hnlr.org... [3] http://www.ocregister.com... [4] http://walt.foreignpolicy.com... [5] http://www.newsweek.com...