The 'Problem of Evil' never succeeds (Attempt 1)

INTRODUCTION: I have read a number of debates on this site since joining about a month ago, and I have to confess that Skeptic has quickly proven himself to be one of my favourite debaters here. His familiarity with significant philosophical issues, his stoic civility, and the intellectual honesty with which he treats his opponents is the exception to what is otherwise a disappointing rule. I have been engaging in online debates for longer than Skeptic has been alive, so I can say this with some confidence. I appreciate him as an opponent. SECOND ANALYSIS: As I had carefully explained in Round 2 and my opponent concured, the crux of his Problem of Evil (PoE) argument centers on his first premise, that "gratuitous evils probably exist." And as I further explained, the nature of his first premise turns his PoE argument into a logical version; that is, given the very definitions of the terms involved, it follows (necessarily) that if a God with the aforementioned attributes exists, then it is logically impossible for any evils to be gratuitous (unjustified, purposeless). And because they are mutually exclusive, notice that the inverse also follows (necessarily): if gratuitous evils exist, then it is logically impossible for a God with the aforementioned attributes to exist. (The only way gratuitous evils could exist is if God lacked one or more of the given attributes.) Consequently, if my opponent were to presuppose the truth of gratuitous evils, then he would illegitimately beg the question and consequently render his own argument invalid by reason of logical fallacy. [1] If gratuitous evil exists, then it follows (by force of logical necessity) that the Christian God does not exist—indeed, cannot exist. This argument, by virtue of its being a logical form, is an extraordinarily strong one. If my opponent could prove the truth of his first premise, then he would easily defeat my resolution. But one thing must be kept in mind: the truth of the first premise is at issue. He cannot assume its truth (and thereby beg the question). He must prove its truth, which he has chosen to do on the probable score—i.e., that its being true has greater probability than does its being false. And because the crux of his PoE centers on this first premise, he has chosen to focus all his efforts on proving the probability of its truth. So how did he go about doing so? By reasoning via an argument from ignorance, whereby he said that with "no good reason to believe" that some evil X does have a justification or purpose, then it can be considered as having no justification or purpose (gratuitous). In other words, we must accept as probable the truth of his first premise unless or until it is proven false; i.e., "a person regards the lack of evidence for one view" (there is justification) "as constituting proof that another view is true" (there is no justification). [2] Because this sort of reasoning is invalid, it can be dismissed. Consequently, my opponent's PoE argument is still waiting for him to prove, validly, that we must accept his first premise. ADDENDUM: Skeptic challenged me to provide "an adequate explanation" for some evil X, saying that a theodicy should be able to account for it. Curiously, my opponent seems to have forgotten what this debate is about. It is not my burden to reconcile God's goodness or justice with some given evil or suffering (theodicy); it is Skeptic's burden to prove that a PoE argument succeeds at proving the non-existence of God. From the debate resolution to the opening round, the burden of proof was established clearly. Some PoE arguments "expose powerful demands for a coherent and consistent theodicy," I admitted candidly, but "that is not the same thing as proving that God ... does not exist." Moreover, he also said that theodicies commonly argue that some evils are meant "to lead to some greater good," but that some evil X makes it "seem highly improbable for such a theodicy to work." I should like to point out that an inability to conceive of a greater good coming out of some evil X does not count against a theodicy; the argument from personal incredulity is a form of the argument from ignorance. Being unable to imagine or conceieve of something does not constitute as evidence for (or against) anything. It is strictly biographical information. And finally, it is indeed true that a "logical possibility remains for the compatibility between evil and God." However, there is zero logical possibility for compatibility between gratuitous evil and God, as I have argued clearly above and in the previous round. That is why proving that any evils are gratuitous will inescapably win this debate for my opponent. ==== REFERENCES ==== 1. Douglas N. Walton, Ph.D. "The Essential Ingredients of the Fallacy of Begging the Question," in Fallacies: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Hans V. Hanson. and Robert C. Pinto, eds. Penn State Press, 1995. Print. pp. 229-239; "Begging the question." Wikipedia. Web. (http://en.wikipedia.org...); Robert Carroll. "Begging the question." The Skeptic's Dictionary. Web. (http://www.skepdic.com...). 2. Gary N. Curtis, Ph.D. "Appeal to Ignorance." FallacyFiles.org. Web. (http://www.fallacyfiles.org...); "Argument from ignorance." Wikipedia. Web. (http://en.wikipedia.org...).