Animal Rights

Con’s ArgumentCon defends his argument by changing it. I did misinterpret the argument. I’m glad Con clarified. I thought that Con meant: if human X infringes upon human Y’s human rights, then human X forfeits his own human rights. But the clarified argument runs: if human X infringes upon human Y’s human rights, then human Y’s human rights are infringed. P4) Existence of human rights necessitates abstention from infringing upon the rights of other humans.Why is this? The only justification for human rights is being human, as Con defined. Thus, the only way for human rights to stop existing would be for human beings to stop existing. Infringement does not do this.P7) If living is what entitles an entity to rights, then both plants and animals have the same rights as humansThe problem with this argument is that it does not adequately justify “living” to be a moral status grounding property over any other property P. Con says that P must be grantable on a “broad-classification basis”. It does not have to be grantable on a broad spectrum, it merely has to ground moral status. That is its only qualification. I directly challenged Con to justify the property of living over any other moral status grounding property such as sentience or rationality. Con uses circular reasoning to justify it; “any entity is entitled to such rights by belonging to the group in question that has rights; in other words living.” By “group” Con is referring to beings that are alive. Sentience is also a property that belongs to the group that in question has rights. So is rationality. This does not justify “living” over any other property and thus the premise does not stand; it's a bare assertion. Argument from Marginal CasesCon’s rebuttal is that not all humans have equal moral status. Saying that criminals lose their moral status somewhat by not obeying society’s laws. Does this make criminal’s suffering less morally undesirable? Is it no longer morally wrong to needlessly torture a criminal? Is it any less morally wrong to torture a criminal than a non-criminal? By Con’s argument all these statements are true. But the criminal still feels pain. Disobeying society’s laws does not hinder the criminal’s ability to suffer. Thus, criminals’ moral worth is equal to any other human, and humans do all have equal moral status. Con also suggests that a moral worth grounding property that only humans exclusively possess is a “conscious willingness to obey the laws of society”. I find this strange, since many species of animals. For example; wolves. Wolves have an orderly social structure in which there are specified roles; the omega through alpha. Roles entail special privileges; who is first to eat, breeding rights, etc. These societal rules are expected to be followed, if not, the “criminal” is driven from the pack. Complex social structure is displayed in many other species such a gorillas, dolphins, orcas, whales. But simplistic ones are displayed in every species that interacts with other organisms; ants, bees, penguins, bats, etc. Even plants are showing social structure to some extent [3].This is not a property that animals lack by any means. Argument from Suffering2) Con argues that there is no moral obligation to prevent suffering. Suffering is an inherently undesirable state. It is undesirable for the person experiencing the negative mental state. Morality is recognizing what is desirable and undesirable. Any moral obligation is to do a morally desirable action, or prevent a morally undesirable action. Preventing a morally undesirable state such as suffering is a moral obligation. 3) Con questions the term “moral worth”, suggesting that it is meaningless. “Moral worth” is the right to not be killed, to not suffer; a moral requirement to be treated in a certain way. If animals and humans have equal “moral worth,” then it would be equally morally wrong to kill a human as it would to kill an animal, as well as any other moral principle. Con argues that if animals were granted rights, human suffering would ensue. But Con also says that the amount is irrelevant. I agree that some suffering will ensue on humans as a result of veganism. Such as loss of pleasures such as enjoying steak, bacon, etc. But this is only relevant if it outweighs the amount of suffering that would be reduced by granting animals rights. Suffering can be weighed. Cutting off two of my fingers is more painful than cutting off one finger. The drastic reduction in animal suffering greatly outweighs the suffering that not being able to eat meat brings on. When I am referring to animal suffering, I am literally referring to animals suffocating to death over the course of three to four days after experiencing muscle paralysis and severe nausea [1]. Putting animals through a cage washing machine while still trapped in the inside, getting scalded to death in a 180 degree machine [2]. The amount of suffering that animals experience is enormous. It is truism to say that the suffering that animals experience outweighs the suffering that not eating meat produces. Thus the argument stands. [1] http://www.humanesociety.org...[2] http://www.humanesociety.org...[3] http://www.wired.com...