Naturalistic evolutionism cannot be rationally affirmed

Hey ConArgument#1To my understanding, Con makes the following points:- Instinctual beliefs do not equal all beliefs- True beliefs are more likely to be naturally selected-Supernaturalism falls under the same trapAnd so I'll respond to these claims next.Only instinctual beliefs?Con's central claim is that instinctual beliefs are the only content beliefs that are affected. However, I see this to be patently false. An integral part of my argument is the notion that our neurology as a whole, under naturalistic evolution, cannot be trusted in itself nor in any of its operations. This is because it too is adaptive: the whole system of our neurology - not simply its content, but the way it observes, senses and understands the world is adaptive for survival and reproduction: if this is the case, it will see the whole external environment to be simply whatever is necessary or required for survival. To give a subjunctive example, it may be that observing the world as millions of little squares as opposed to concrete entities is more advantageous for survival. However, in such a case, It is true that all our beliefs stem from our perception of our environment - perception originating from neurology that sees such an environment to be whatever is best for survival.It is vital to note that our neurology isn't simply a blank canvas by which beliefs are produced in their own adaptive means - under naturalistic evolution, all aspects of human life is adaptive to the most basic structures, meaning that all traits being produced by such morphologies - id est, beliefs from neurology - are products of adaptive, and therefore untrustworthy, structures.Naturalistic Evolution as an instinctual beliefRegardless of Con's objection, I still maintain that it achieves no ground in discrediting my argument. This is because naturalistic evolution in itself can be argued to be an instinctual belief. Naturalistic Evolution fundamentally is opposed to religion and religious belief. Indeed, it explicitly rejects the involvement of the supernatural or divine in evolutionary development, ergo rejecting the integral premise of theism. This can tell us two things:1} Naturalistic Evolution is an instinctual response response to prima facie religious oppression and restriction of personal freedom2) Naturalistic Evolution is an instinctual response for the furthering of rational and intellectual thought that thereby gives a survival benefit for a species[1] Both aspects should produce a survival benefit to a species. Escaping an oppressive force encourages the flourishing of a species; and the advancement of rational and scientific thought is equally as beneficial to survival. Indeed, studies have even been shown that naturalism will be beneficial to survival [2], supporting the claim that such a belief like naturalistic evolution is an instinct belief.And so it is likely that Naturalistic Evolution, as a belief, is indeed a content belief that is subconsciously rooted in survival and reproduction and not therefore truth. It is no different to any other instinct belief. AssumptionsAn important side-note should be made, and that is that anything that Con asserts is based upon the assumption that his cognitive faculties are reliable. However, this has not been established; the establishment of reliability can only occur once my argument concerning whole neurology is refuted in itself.So an independent reason needs to be given as to why my argument fails, otherwise any objection that is made, like when Con argues that truth is advantageous to survival, is begging the question of reliable cognitive faculties. An unsound analogy Next, Con presents an analogy with a math equation in an attempt to show that truth correlates with survival. However, not only is this presupposing reliable cognitive faculties (see above) in even asserting the analogy; the external environment is not a math equation. It is far more complex with vastly more variables. And so while I agree that humans do not live in a 'vacuum', rather than being detrimental to my argument, it actually supports it, and makes the issue more complex for Con to defend, bringing greater capacity for false beliefs to surface. Moreover, there are equally as vast amount of ways to survive in an ecological environment. To extend the analogy, say that the true belief in accordance to the environment is equivalent to, say, 3+5=8 and whatever arrives at '8' survives. A species could survive with 7+1, 6+2, 4+4 etc. All are false beliefs, yet survive. Indeed, the number of false beliefs greatly outnumber the number of true beliefs. It doesn't seem that Con's analogy succeeds.Is truth always beneficial to survival?This is the underlying premise of Con's rebuttal; however, I see this to be mendacious. Firstly, there is no means of proving such a notion - it is innately unprovableSecondly, the truth value of the assertion at hand depends upon the backdrop of the reliability of our neurology and our sense of our environment and is not an independent objection in itself - as a contention, it simply presupposes reliable neurology.Aside from a faulty thought experiment, Con offers little in support of the notion. Indeed, there appears to be little to say in support of the notion - any support given will inevitably assume an accurate assessment of the environment and an accurate assessment of logic, which hasn't of yet been established. Any 'evidence' will merely show a correlation between presupposed truth and survival - but not only is this to be expected (any belief 'X' will always be supposed to be true by the instigator of such a belief), correlation never implies causation. Here, the lack of knowledge by the Naturalistic Evolutionist surfaces - they lack the required knowledge to back up their claims. Supernaturalism and truthAs a sub-point, Con argues that belief in supernaturalism is also self-defeating. However I simply do not see this to be true. If supernaturalism is correct, then truth, knowledge and all understanding is grounded in that supernatural entity. There is nothing about supernaturalism that implies, either explicitly or implicitly, that belief in supernaturalism leads towards a defeater for supernaturalism itself - and if there is, then Con needs to identify such a defeater. If one subscribes to supernaturalism, you do not in turn adhere to any particular process that puts in question the truth value of supernaturalism itself. Rather, you adhere to the opposite - that a supernatural being is the foundation of truth. It is in no sense self-refuting.Argument #2So Con makes numerous points in response to my argument, which I understand to be:-Clarification of terms-Defense of the first premise-Evolution as a solution-Objectiveness of TeleologyAnd so I'll respond to each. ClarificationThere appears to be some confusion concerning what Telos is concerned with in the argument. While I think that all definitions given are sound, in a strictly Thomistic sense, 'Telos' is a function which an entity exhibits, with regularity, that achieves a final cause of which, is integral to that entity's ontology. And so if an event performed by an entity falls under these criteria, then whatever event is performed, is the specified end - of which, I argue that a guiding intelligence must guide. Justification of P1Con, despite my original justification for P1, appears to be unsatisfied with my argument. Though I have already explained, I'll give further backing for the premise. If one admits that direction towards a purpose exists, you also admit a form of intentionality. An entity cannot be directed towards a purpose without some form of director of any sort. A useful way of seeing this is through Aristotelian possibility and actuality. An unintelligent entity that has the capacity to exhibit a function 'X' is said to be 'possibly X'. In order to move to possible function X, that same entity must be moved from possibly X to actually X. However, if it is in motion like that, then it must be moved by another, actual entity - an unintelligent and unconscious entity cannot move itself with regularity towards a purpose. As such, a final cause (telos) implies a guider towards the final cause.It is the specification that implies the intelligence. The mover, in order to constantly and with regularity move from state Y to state X must possess knowledge of X - how else can X be achieved with such regularity? P1 therefore stands.An unsound analogyCon gives an analogy to supports his argument. However, I think that it is counter-intuitive. Note that the agents in the analogy are in themselves intelligent and so far from being detrimental to my argument, it actually supports the notion that telos requires intelligence. Secondly, it hints at evolution as an explanation of telos - see below.Evolution There is a brief mention of evolutionary theory in Con's response, with the implication that it can explain teleology. However, it is simply an irrelevance. Firstly, evolutionary processes are in themselves teleological, being inorganic processes with teleological tendencies (e.g. survival of the fittest). Secondly, the truth value of evolution without a guiding intelligence needs to be considered on the backdrop of argument #1 in this debate. Objective StandardThe question of determining an objective standard of teleology is to be found in the 'Clarification' section of this round. Any entity that exhibits these criteria has objective telos in a Thomistic sense.ConclusionIn a general sense, the objections presented by Con fail on one count or another. In argument #1, my points concerning the general neurological reliability need to be responded to; in argument #2, Con still needs to form a substantive response to several of my points. The resolution is maintained.Sources[1] http://www.leaderu.com...[2] http://www.psychologytoday.com...