The Problem of Evil (PoE) is sound

Alleged Contradictions Contra-P1 & Contra-P3 (C-P1 & C-P3) don’t need to be taken together as a whole even if both are incompatible. For the resolution can still be false if we deny C-P3 while affirming C-P1 (or vice versa). But C-P1 / C-P3 are in fact compatible (+ ST / Theodicy)! For we can partially know God’s ultimate means & motives (through the exceptions of *R) without knowing how his proximate means & motive in life work towards God's ultimate plans. On RA, for example, God is free to act with limited intervention that’s specific towards his plans- which are gradually discovered & revealed given the exceptions of *R (recall the example of the Israelites).Thus RA preserves our knowledge of God’s ultimate motivation while we can reasonably deny knowledge of his proximate motivations. But trust (a virtue) is cultivated while awaiting God’s proximate means & motive. We know God prefers such virtue since it accords with Christ’s claims- which were vindicated by God's resurrecting Christ. There is positive evidence for Christ’s claims & resurrection: there is negative evidence of God’s morally sufficient reason for allowing Ebola. The question is, are we justified in believing the former while remaining agnostic in the latter? The principle of credulity says yes! The atonement clearly isn't beyond our ken since we have primary source documentation of witnesses detailing the empty tomb, post mortem appearances of Jesus & the origin of Christianity. Thus we don't have a case of absence, as in Pro's case. Thus one can coherently deny the inference of gratuitous evil from it’s appearance given the lack of God’s proximate means & motive, while affirming God’s ultimate means & motive as revealed in Christ & in consciousness. (Through self reflection one knows that just responses build virtue, something a good God would clearly desire for his creation.) ST: Pro’s attempting to disconfirm an all-knower as a partial-knower using an absence of God’s proximate means & motives. This is a text book argument from ignorance, not just mere induction open to skepticism. Pro’s epistemic consistency fails since he's trying to disconfirm an all knower. Science doesn’t disconfirm God, but postulates of his creation, & we’re limited in a similar way in applying what we partially know of morally sufficient reasons of evil to what an all knower would know of such reasons. Theodicy: If evil is the opposite of what we desire, then it’s logical to deduce man’s purpose as happiness. And since God’s plan for humanity can be revealed given [*R], then it can be doubly known. And since his reasons for non-intervention in times of pain aren't deduced or revealed in the same way, then one can affirm both knowing God's purpose for man while also not fully comprehending His lack of intervention whence evils occur. In sum, Pro oversimplifies & misrepresents my case with his (i-iii). For instance, the RA & BA under C-P1 doesn't conclude that "God won’t prevent gratuitous evil." Here, Pro universally qualifies my C-P1 arguments; erecting a straw-man. The C-P1 (RA/BA) only concludes that in principle, some (not all) instances of suffering will be prevented by God given [*R] & the epistemic impossibility of knowing 'gratuity'. So (i) changes to, (i') In principle, God sometimes may not prevent what seems like gratuitous evil Then, since my Theodicy shows that God and man, in fact, have the ability to prevent gratuitous evil, then Pro's (ii) changes to, (ii') In fact, God and man can prevent gratuitous evil, (with a virtuous response & an outbalance of complete happiness) Pro then mischaracterizes ST: "(iii) God’s actions are completely beyond our ken." On the contrary, as I've stated numerous times, my argument here is, (iii') In fact, God’s actions are SOMETIMES beyond our ken. Take all my arguments from C-P1 / C-P3 together & we have a coherency, "In principle, God sometimes may not prevent what seems like gratuitous evil. But in fact, God & man can prevent it with a free, self-forming response- even if God’s actions are gradually discovered & not yet known in full." This is a more accurate representation of my modest case. On the other hand, Pro's mischaracterization is this, "God won’t prevent gratuitous evil, and does prevent gratuitous evil, while his actions are completely unknown." God of Law Pro asserts that the problem of incommensurable goods would rule out Anti-God just like the problem of (somehow) commensurable evil can rule out God. He backs this assertion up only by an analogy that's friendly to justificationism- not falsificationism, “I don’t need to know who was president in 1920 was to rule out Paris Hilton.” But ruling out Hilton as a president involves justification of her never being a president. It doesn’t involve falsifying that Hilton was president by surveying her absence in 1920 as a president! Likewise, even if God was unfalsifiable, what if one were a justificationist rather than a falsificationist? In that case it wouldn’t matter whether God was unfalsifiable by the PoE alone. Even so, just because Flew’s death of qualifications leads to agnosticism, doesn’t mean God remains unfalsifiable. For one could show God to be an incoherent idea- or the bones of Christ could be found for Christianity. Contra-P1 Throughout the debate, Pro’s only support of P1 is that [God would have both the motive & means to prevent pointless evils.] Against this, I showed that God’s motive of perfect love is compatible with his failure to prevent pointless evils, given *R, prior to creation. Then I showed on God’s means, P1 is less probable since it rests upon a fallacy of false precision. Therefore, P1 is less probable regardless of *R merely being possible. RA Pro fails to show how God’s moral justification for *R makes the resulting evils necessary for greater goods. He missed my point, “the RA views creaturely existence in light of prior divine teleology; not evil used for some greater good” BA Again, best/worst worlds are irrelevant! We want to know the epistemic threshold necessary for God to fulfill both his plan for humanity & to not allow his creatures to suffer gratuitously- not whether there can be best & worst worlds. Pro then says that an ideal amount of evil is a world absent gratuitous evil.. This is a trivial justification & fails to rebut the epistemic impossibility of God’s knowing the least amount of evil for the greatest available good. Contra-P3 ST Pro failed to demonstrate both how it’s unreasonable to tempter our inductions according to our epistemic position, and; that we can reasonably carry our inductions to God’s proximate means & motives from our current epistemic position. Again see R2 for my argument for Essentialism. Pro fails to deal with it by just claiming I only said “it’s quite plausible.” Pro’s last 3 justifications for P3 all rest on the first, Prima Facie, not being an argument from ignorance. He merely repeats that inferring no divine reason from the appearance of no divine reason for some evil; isn’t negative. But clearly it is negative since you're inferring from experience, an absence & thus the principle of credulity doesn’t apply. Theodicy Pro’s BoP to show what evils in the world aren’t defeatable by virtue & outbalance-able by the promise of perfect happiness as revealed in Christ; was not met. Recall that God is justified in permitting certain events if they present us with a chance for a virtuous SFC, because virtue is inherently good. And a good God would be just in considering who should & shouldn’t experience perfect happiness according to what response an agent gives upon experiencing existential events. Evil begetting more evil still allows for a virtuous response. The BoP was on Pro here & his ultra-weak case should be weighed in light of that.