In Defense Of Practical Moral Skepticism

My opponent has responded with a well thought response, and brings up some points about PMS that show I should have been more clear and detailed. However, this doesn't escape the pitfalls MBE has. ==================== Practical Moral Skepticism ==================== First, let me address my opponent's concern that I haven't given an argument for PMS, and instead stated a working definition of PMS twice in different forms. Embarrassingly enough, it seems I forgot to include my argument or merely didn't make it obvious enough - nonetheless, my opponent is correct when he surmises that one way I can do this is "provide at least one case in which there is overriding reason not to act morally." I agree with this assessment, and at face value it seems quite simple as well. As for a situation in which there is a reason overriding moral reasons, there's quite a lot. Criminals every day present clear examples of people who had reasons to not act in a moral way in favor of another reason (most likely desires relating to self-satisfaction such as monetary gain, passion, etc.). Of course, it is contentious whether these criminals are acting in contrast to moral reasons (since this would assume a moral framework already), but the point is that for virtually all moral systems there are external reasons that can be chosen. It'd be hard to refute the idea that if action/rule/etc. X is moral, then there is no reason to ever act in violation of this commitment. Take the example of gratuitous murder, for which most would regard as immoral: a possible reason for choosing to murder (thus not choosing the morally virtuous act) would be a reason of passion, or of monetary gain, of revenge, etc. The argument is literally as simple as that. ==================== Opponent's "Mutual Benefit" Ethical Theory -- Inherent Problems ==================== 1. I used the word conflate as a linguistic tool, so I apologize for that slight misunderstanding. Nonetheless, you show nothing to demonstrate why anthropological facts lead to an understanding of normative ethics. You claim that I haven't shown there is "an absolute boundary between descriptive and normative ethics"...so you surmise that you are thus correct? You state it's possible to do with MBE, but you demonstrate nothing as to how this is so. The burden is on you, you're making the claim. I'm not concerned with other discrepancies involving descriptive analysis of ethics until you can demonstrate the 'bridge'. As for the boundary, as an elementary understanding descriptive ethics refers to what "is", in the sense of what people believe to be moral, why they believe so, how this has evolved, etc. Normative ethics refers to what "ought to be", in the sense of figuring out what people should believe to be moral irrespective of what they do (a clear analogy would be an examination of whether people believe in evolution, and whether people should believe in evolution). 2. Your theory is quite similar to a utilitarian theory in the sense of prioritizing psychological results (benefits, happiness, etc.), and of purportedly arguing for an egalitarian ethics. And instead of asking you the same criticisms utilitarianism receives (e.g. utility monsters), I suppose a central question I can ask would be the following: what is the meta-ethical foundation for this theory? At this point, if it isn't obvious enough, this section will likely collapse with the following section concerning the cogency of MBE in the face of PMS. I won't even bother with any other criticism, since I want this debate to focus on PME. ==================== Opponent's "Mutual Benefit" Ethical Theory -- Unsatisfactory Response to PMS ==================== It seems evident to me that my opponent has made a crucial error in forgetting that PMS makes a slightly more specified claim than he appears to be reflecting: PMS states that there is no NECESSARY reason to ALWAYS act morally. Take note what this is saying and is not saying. It states that while there may always exist a moral reason in every possible scenario, it rejects that in every possible scenario such moral reasons will NECESSARILY motivate us. In other words, PMS can be fulfilled if there is one situation in which a non-moral reason is preferred over the moral reason. There is a distinct difference between there being always being a moral reason, and there always being a moral reason that motivates you (after all, when you are contemplating doing action A, there is usually a set of mutually exclusive motivations taken into consideration). Highlighting this important element is what undermines the majority of my opponent's responses. As for the issue of psychological egoism, I really want to sidestep it since it's another debate altogether, but I'll briefly respond to my opponent's misunderstanding. I don't reject psychological egoism because it's an empirical doctrine (that would be silly), but because AS an empirical doctrine it's inconclusive. Consider the following: 1. It's an empirical doctrine given that it makes claims regarding descriptive accounts of human behavior. 2. To make an absolute claim that "all actions are in self-interest" is quite the burden, especially given that it's an empirical doctrine. 3. There has yet to be any strong empirical evidence to claim that the human brain works in such a way - it's conceivable that another strategy for you to even support this theory would be to define "self-interest" in such a foreign way that it's akin to acting in accordance with your desires, which ultimately trivializes your position (and in this case, doesn't further your ethical theory).