People Shoudn't Smoke Cigarettes

1. Pro’s reply to the contingency problem produces what I regard as a fatal antinomy between two claims: on the one hand, Pro must always maintain that there exists a universal, absolute moral obligation to refrain from smoking; otherwise, Pro must concede that the proposition “People should not smoke cigarettes” is false. On the other hand, much of Pro’s language seems to concede to the normative contingency thesis. Says Pro: “[I]t can be said that humans are alive to live. To purposely indulge in habits that would refrain one from being able to do so would go against what could be the intention of our existence. Though we are not required to live, while we are alive it’s important, though not required to take part in actions that will allow us to do just that. Smoking cigarettes prevents smokers from being able to partake in what one may call a human duty. Though no duty is required, it is certainly present.” I do agree that smoking is detrimental to one’s health, and that some individuals might regard it as important—even as a duty—that one do whatever is in one’s power to maximize longevity; however, the central argument of the normative contingency thesis is that normative claims only find meaning if they are deduced from a mutually-agreeable axiom. Given that a) I do not agree to the longevity axiom, and b) Pro agrees that many others are likely to disagree, one must conclude that statements such as “it is important [to maximize longevity”, “one may call [maximizing longevity/not smoking] a human duty”, etc. are contingent on an axiom of which non-acceptance invalidates derivative conclusions. Pro’s assertion that “If a person has the intention of staying alive, and while doing so staying healthy, it certainly is irrational for them to partake in smoking” captures perfectly the kind of conditionality that characterizes normative contingency. A similar story plays out for statements like “It is true that not all smokers suffer the same fate”, “However, one can fall in and not regret their decision to smoke”, “Whether a smoker regrets their decision to smoke… and whether or not they decide to quit is, indeed, a matter of personal framework”. In particular, the problem of universality is applicable here. 2. Pro cannot presuppose that the categorical imperative is a legitimate moral principle. To the extent that universality is a useful criterion, however, our agreement that the disadvantages and interpersonal hazards of smoking are extremely conditional precludes Pro from affirming as a general principle that people ought not to smoke (given that the premises on which he predicates his affirmation cannot be extended to all smokers). In short: 1. Pro has not addressed the fundamental contention, in this context, of the normative contingency thesis, which is that the longevity axiom on which his deductions are predicated cannot be presupposed in a discourse where the other party/parties do not agree. Further, that Pro is willing to concede that his axiom is not morally necessary suggests that he must implicitly concede to normative contingency. 2. Pro is unable to presuppose Kantian Ethics; however, insofar as any variety of universality criterion is applicable, the premises on which his argument is advanced do not extend to all smokers, which relegates his conclusion to the same fate.