The Problem of Evil fails

To begin, I would like to redefine evil, for I believe that my opponent's definition is severely lacking and incomplete. I therefore wish to define evil as the following:"The infliction of gratuitous harm by an individual or group of individuals with either malevolent intent or disproportionate recklessness in regarding foreseeable, subsequent suffering.The Problem of EvilI would be remiss if I did not at least briefly outline how this more complete definition interacts with the aforementioned problem of evil. Here, we have one of two possibilities:1. God is inflicting gratuitous harm with malevolent intent2. God is inflicting gratuitous harm with disproportionate recklessness in regarding foreseeable, subsequent suffering.If the first assumption was true, the problem of evil already nullifies your position, so let us instead operate on the assumption that the second assumption is true. Given premise (1) of the Problem of Evil, we can assert that God is all knowing, and therefore, is able to foresee the subsequent suffering that will occur. Our task then, is to determine whether the recklessness adopted is proportionate to the outcome God seeks to achieve: free will. If it is proportionate, then we can assert that the Problem of Evil does not disprove the existence of God. If it is not proportionate, we can assert that the Problem of Evil does disprove God.Seeking ProportionalityMy opponent's argument is that a world with free will and possible suffering is preferable to a world with no free will and no possible suffering. While this argument is in itself, subjective, I will allow it to stand and operate on this assumption. Therefore let's assume:The privilege of free will perfectly balances the gratuitous harm that will befall others. If both are equated equally, then we can immediately see a glaring problem here: gratuitous harm often results in the loss of free will for another human being. I challenge you to find an example of evil which does not result in this. In fact, the very definition of evil (no matter what way you spin it) requires an exercise in free will to rob another entity of their free will. To rape or physically harm a person is to take away the free will in bodily autonomy. To enslave a person is to take away their free will in the choices they make at every level of consciousness. To kill a person takes away all free will they may have ever possessed in the future. When we look at evil acts as robbing a person of their free will, we can see that the proportional balance shifts drastically to one side. If a woman is forcefully kidnapped, chained to a bedpost, force-fed narcotics regularly, and is the victim of rape on an hourly basis; it is not reasonable to assert that this woman has, at any level (physical, emotional, physiological, practical, legal) free will. it has been taken from her. Yet, this is an example of evil that routinely takes place. If God seeks to maintain proportionality in the balance between free will and gratuitous harm, he must intervene in circumstances like these to afford the harmed party a reasonable exercise in free will.RebuttalThe above has been an argument as to why the problem of evil persists, but I will to rebut a few points that my opponent has made because I believe there are some glaring holes in the case that he himself has presented. For this portion, I will speak directly to him as it is his line of argumentation rather than a philosophical stance to be argued.1. You cannot include natural disasters in your version of evil because the word itself is defined as one that describes a state of 'intent'. Without intent, you cannot have evil. The only way in which natural disasters can have intent behind them is if they are created by God, in which case, you've negated your own argument in it's entirety as he is throwing gratuitous harm at human beings for absolutely no reason (they can exercise free will more easily without a natural disaster).2. You stated that, "Thus, when humans cure a disease (i.e., polio), we use free will to rid the world of suffering". Well, this isn't true. We don't. We use free will to make discoveries and try to achieve a cure. If, however, it is our free will to discover cures and we exert said free will to pursue these cures and discoveries, why does God not present us with the evidence we need sooner, before hundreds or thousands of other humans have lost all free will to death from these diseases? Why is a person with polio's rights to free will less important than a person researching it? By what arbitrary standard does god allot privilege levels?3. You stated, " Once humans have created a utopia (100 years from now), there will be no more evil". Can we not agree that this claim is a little absurd? You haven't any real evidence to support this and if we look back 100 years ago, while we have advanced in certain standards of liberal benchmarks, we are solving problems and creating new ones. Based on the many, many thousands of years we humans have been on Earth, can we not agree that it is perhaps a little asinine to state that in 100 years, we will have an utopia that is free from any and all suffering and evil?ConclusionBased on the proportionality issues raised by inevitable loss of free will on part of the victims of evil, I believe the conclusion that God is complicit in evil by not levelling the proportionality of free will among both the purveyor of evil and the victim to be correct. If God is complicit in evil for this reason, then the aforementioned Problem of Evil still stands.