God`s omniscience contradicts the notion that we have free will.

[Burden of proof, what is important what is not] Lets be clear here, Pro can ask as many questions as they want, they can dispute time travel, aliens and what ever. They can make all the demands they want but that counts for nothing, at the end of the day the burden is all on Pro, they are the ones claiming that an all knowing God can't co-exist with free will because there is something about the all knowing part that negates the possibility of free will. As long as there remains the mere possibility, how ever unlikely, how ever implausible, how ever many unanswered questions remain, Pro will not have met their burden. [Knowledge of A vs Free will choice (or not) of A] First recall how I argued. .. ""Pro can't get past that the impossibility of God being wrong about Pro making choice A (before Pro makes it from Pros temporal point of view) does not logically entail therefore Pro will have no choice when it comes to Pro choosing A (again from Pros temporal point of view). "" Pro replies. .. " How can I have a choice If there is no possibility of me picking anything except A because God foreknows that I will pick A. " And that is what this debate really comes down too. I think I am just going to repeat myself again. .. "That was the purpose of my thought experiments to try and show more clearly these are two very different things, knowledge of choice A (even before it happens from the choosers point of view) vs the free will choice made in the present (from the choosers point of view). " "They are two different things and thus impossibility of one (God having false knowledge about your choice) does not entail the other (therefore you have no choice). " [Gods knowledge of Choice A dependent on determinism ? ] Pro asks. .. "Ironically, this is argument for deterministic universe. How can God observe future if it has not already happened/been determined ? " & "Observed events need to happen/be determined before they are possible to be observed. "" Because an observation of A does not mean A was predetermined. Maybe A is not predetermined and observed. Let's be clear what we mean when we say something is predetermined. .. . "the doctrine that all events, including human action, are ultimately determined by causes external to the will. Some philosophers have taken determinism to imply that individual human beings have no free will and cannot be held morally responsible for their actions. " Recall how I said. .. ""But even if this isn't true, why must Gods knowledge of choice A be dependent on determinism ? because that is the only way that humans could know and thus that must mean the only way that God or anything else could know too ? well that's an unjustified leap there. "" Pro in reply says. .. " Here we are trying to use rational arguments to see if Gods omniscience is compatible with free will under laws of nature/our physical laws. If you are gonna appeal to special pleading with God being able to do even the logically impossible then anything is possible, even the absurd. To claim exemption from the laws of nature is to refute the validity of every canon of rational argument. " Where exactly did I argue that God has to do the logical impossible for it's existence to be compatible with free will ? Where exactly did I argue for special pleading for God ? How humans possess knowledge may not be the one and only way that knowledge can be possessed, hardly a logical impossibility, hardly a violation of natural law. And even if a violation of natural law so what ? natural law only applies to natural things. Note this isn't special pleading for God because I am not saying that only God may not be constricted to natural law I am saying any proposed thing outside of nature may not be constricted to natural law. I maintain these assertions by Pro are without basis. Coin analogy Pros analogy breaks down because the the coins outcome is not (at least in part) determined by a free will decision by the coin as opposed to an (alleged) human free will act. Closing remarks Assuming that an all knowing God exists, is it even possible that an act by Pro or anyone else be a free will act ? well according to Pro no, that is an impossibility, due to Gods knowledge of said act before it happens. What I have tried to do is make a clear difference between an alleged free will act and the knowledge of that act, how certain knowledge of that act (even before it happens from the choosers POV) does not mean it is impossible for that act to be an act of free will. But if God knows I will choose A before I choose A that means I won't have the option to choose B ! !! wrong.