United Nations peacekeepers should have the power to engage in offensive operations.

I'd hoped to have my crossfire questions answered before I posted this round, so Con please answer them despite the fact that I've already posted this round. Now to begin with my rebuttals. To my opponent's first contention I will have five major responses. 1. Offensive operations have succeeded in the past. Refer back to my case. I have proven that the UN's Force Intervention Brigade was able to successfully defeat the M23 rebels in the Congo [1], and the mission was so effective that the UN and Congo are already laying the groundwork for a mission to defeat another major rebel group, the FDLR. [2] Obviously offensive ops can be effective. 2. The UN can overcome a lack of resources. Modern offensive peacekeeping is often supported resources from international and regional coalitions which allocate their troops and supplies to the UN. [3] With the support of these other multinational organizations, the UN can overcome this problem. 3. UN resources are expanding. China has become an increasingly large supporter of the UN by donating larger and larger numbers of troops. China has the largest number of troops in the UN when compared to all of the other permanent members of the Security Council (1,900 at time of article) and is only going to continue to grow in their number of donations. [4] 4. The success in the DRC will convince more countries to join. Obviously, everyone wants in on success. That means that since the FIB worked so well, countries will be more likely to allocate troops. 5. Leadership will improve. The UN is always looking for ways to improve, including self-investigation. The most prominent example is the Brahimi Report, where the UN looked into nearly every problem within it's structure and offered solutions which it quickly began to implement. [5] This means that the UN is continuously going to put better people in better positions, and will eventually return to strong leadership nearly free of corruption. Additionally, this "failure" in the ranks has obviously not stopped the FIB from succeeding in the Congo, so this argument falls flat. For the second Con point I will have three major responses. 1. Military engagements all have consequences. This point is non-unique to UN offensives but rather applies to military involvement altogether. It is better that we attempt to get involved and stop the crimes against humanity carried out by the M23 rebels rather than sit by and do nothing.* 2. Victories in offensives minimize the impact. As I have proven, the FIB was successful in the Congo. Successful missions mean less damage.* 3. Con's Somalia example is inaccurate. The US military was in Somalia at the same time as the UN, but the two remained separate entities. [6] Now for my opponent's final point, I will have two responses. 1. Again, victories minimize the impact. When the mission is successful, the UN has minimal reparations.* 2. Mission creep is more prevalent in defensive mandates than offensive. Defensive missions suffer from mission creep because the original mission is defense... Then humanitarian aid... Then nation building... The mission shifts objectives. The example Con cited was the Congo, but this falls flat because the mission since 1999 has been purely defensive. The offensive mission was quick and got to the root. M23 is gone. FDLR was quickly made the new target. Once stabilization is achieved, the FIB will pull out, the mission is clear: Defeat the rebels.* *All starred responses are logic-based. [1] http://www.washingtonpost.com... (This one was already cited in my constructive, so if you wish to read into each source, this link will be repetitive) [2] http://www.csmonitor.com... [3] http://www.e-ir.info... [4] http://www.economist.com... [5] http://www.unrol.org... [6] There is no link for this one, it's from the novel "Seal Team Six" by Howard Wasdin. Autobiography of a Team Six sniper that was deployed in Somalia.