Genetic enhancement that enriches emotional well-being is ethical

Thank you, Anayansi, for this debate. QuotesCon states: "Aristotle and Kant portray happiness as a goal, not as a permanent state." I am not talking about a permanent state. I've stressed repeatedly that we are talking about degrees of happiness: some things make you happier than others. As for Bentham, why limit the production of happiness to social conditions? Bentham surely urges genetic programming as an end of utilitarian ethics. The "absence of negative feelings" would not "result in the deterioration of morals" precisely because moral action is action that generates greater happiness. Hence, genetically enhancing well-being is a moral action.Responsible ParentingThe debate is about enhancing "emotional well-being." The enhancements will result in the treatment of depression by default, and that is a GOOD thing. Not sure why Con insists depression is the topic of a different debate, if the topic of this debate is "emotional well-being." Almost every psychiatric disorder is a component of emotional life, and all are subjects of this debate.Last Round, I wrote: "parents are ethically obligated to choose the best possible life they can for their children." Con disregards my argument. We can assume, then, that Con grants us that parents must choose the best life for their children. Here's the problem. If ending suffering is a bad thing, parents should make sure their children suffer. If parents make sure their children suffer, parents run the risk of depressed, emotionally ill, even suicidal children. Their children may even be unemployable because of emotional problems. We can conclude, then, that parents who do this are not choosing the best possible life for their children if they have the option of preventing their children from having emotional problems. Con's in a no-win situation here: if Con insists that parents should let their children suffer, parents will act unethically. But if Con agrees that it is unethical, and that parents should do something, Con concedes my argument, and with it, the debate.Ethical systemsCon completely drops my arguments for Utilitarianism and Kant's categorical imperative. As for Judeo-Christian ethics, "hell as punishment for sins" does not imply that God would not allow genetic enhancements. Con's conclusions do not flow from her premises. Buddhist ethics is about ending suffering. Con thinks "lack of attachments" means emotional well-being is unethical, but that makes no sense: for Buddhists, lack of attachment implies emotional well-being, as the end of suffering. Hence, nothing Con argues discredits my argument that genetically enhancing emotional well-being is supported by the Buddhist imperative to end suffering.On the connection between human biology and ethical systems: Con tries to blur the line between biology and ethical systems, which is basically blurring the line between descriptive ethics (nature, the way things are) and normative ethics (how things ought to be). The two are philosophically distinct, yet Con continues to blur the two.Con states: "By removing negative emotions you have removed half of the emotional link in the ethics chain." In Round 2, I explained that genetic enhancements would preserve degrees of well-being and preserve our preference architecture. I then explained that this would also preserve functional analogues of negative emotions. This means that there will be positive emotions that function the same way as pain, guilt, and other negative emotions. Con accepted this in Round 2, never even contesting it. So why, then, does Con insist that removing negative emotions removes the "emotional link in the ethics chain," if functional analogues of negative emotions are preserved?Is Genetically Enhanced Happiness Harmful?Con claims that "lack of negative emotions will remove adaptive traits needed for life in society." But Con provides no argument to support this claim. Con does not even show that, without negative emotions, we would not survive.What Con does show is that negative emotions currently have a function in society. But what I argued did not contest that fact. What I argued in Round 2 was that genetic enhancements that enrich emotional well-being would preserve functional analogues of these negative emotions. Con granted me this point. So: what Con had to do was show that these functional analogues would not be sufficient. But Con never even tried to argue this point. Some other pointsCon agreed with the "theoretical premise" that "human evolution will select against negative emotions when they are no longer necessary." Problem is, by agreeing to this premise, Con effectively checkmates herself. This is how:Con is forced to argue that, because natural mechanisms can increase happiness, we should not use artificial mechanisms to increase happiness. Of course, the obvious response is, why not? What exactly is it about artificial mechanisms that make them immoral? Con provides no answer to this, does not even try to. In fact, Con later states: "I believe that we can make changes that could be considered man-made evolution." Well, which is it? Con dismisses artificial mechanisms in one breath, and in the next, embraces them. And therein lies the incoherence of Con's position.If Con accepts artificial selection mechanisms, then Con concedes the debate because Con has accepted that human evolution will do away with negative emotions, and artificial selection provides the selection pressure to remove negative emotions. Hence, contrary to Con's own statements otherwise, Con cannot accept artificial selection. But if Con does not accept artificial selection, Con has to provide a reason against it. Con was unable to do so, which is why Con was forced, later in Round 3, to accept artificial selection. Con's argument thus not only accepts artificial selection, but implies an inability to deny it on ethical (or any other) grounds. Con effectively concedes the debate on this crucial point. Functional AnaloguesI've already emphasized repeatedly throughout the debate that genetic enhancements preserve functional analogues to fear, guilt, anger, pain, and other negative emotions. Con accepted this in Round 2, yet implicitly disregards the fact throughout the rest of the debate by continuing to argue that without negative emotions, we'd have no emotions to play the same role that they once did.On the contrary: with genetically enhanced well-being, people will feel positive emotions that FUNCTION the same as negative emotions, but without the nasty feeling attached to negative emotions.Instead, Con keeps insisting (by ignoring my arguments) that ending suffering would deprive individuals of an adaptive mechanism. But as I've argued, what genetically enhanced well-being would do is replace an outdated adaptive mechanism with a superior adaptive mechanism. That is how human evolution works. To argue against this point will always and necessarily traffic in circular reasoning. Why? Because the argument says, we should not choose a new adaptive mechanism because we have an old adaptive mechanism that does the same thing. This is saying the same thing, which I pointed out in Round 3, as this: we should not allow human evolution to continue because human evolution is over. The circular fallacy is self-evident. Con disregards my point in Round 3, and continues to push it by rhetorically presenting it as different.ConclusionCon only made one argument. That denying humans negative emotions would cause harm. Yet as I have shown, the argument relies on circular reasoning, and also completely disregards the form of genetic enhancements that Con and I have been talking about: a recalibration of the hedonic treadmill. The idea is to preserve degrees of happiness, a preference architecture, and functional analogues of negative emotions. The resolution is affirmed. I'd like to remind Con that the last Round is for summation, and not for making new arguments, because I'd be unable to respond. Thanks.