God probably exists

I will show that my opponents arguments can be used to prove that God does not exist. Let us start with the ontological argument:PRO: 1) If it is subjunctively possible that a Maximally Great Being exists, then, necessarily, a Maximally Great Being exists. 2) It is Subjunctively possible that a Maximally Great Being exists.3) Necessarily, a Maximally Great Being exists.I agree that 3) follows from the premises 1) and 2). I disagree with 2). Since the definitions of "subjunctively possible" and "Maximally Great Being" are problematic, I won't endorse 1) either.PRO: 2) It is Subjunctively possible that a Maximally Great Being exists.I will give several reasons why I disagree with this.A. Pro's notion of "Maximally Great Being" is really strong. He writes:PRO: A being which can interact in all possible worlds is greater than a being which can only interact in some possible worlds. So if a maximally great being is contingent due to its subjunctive possibility, and exists in "some possible world", then due to how it is greater to be necessary, the being exists in every possible world.I think this is the real fishy part of the argument for 1). A being cannot be defined within one possible world in such a way that the definition transcends to all other possible worlds. Think in terms of the following analogy. A possible world could be a fiction novel. However, it is impossible to write a novel that has a character that is so powerful, that it transcends the novel and enters every novel known to man. I challenge you to write such a novel with such a character. It is impossible!B. My opponent defines a maximally great being as a being that possesses all great making properties. There are at least two problems with this:(i) two great making properties might contradict each other. For example, one "great making property" for a shape is that it has infinitely many rotation symmetries. For example, a circle has this property (you can rotate it over an arbitrary angle), but a square has only 4 rotation symmetries. Another "great making property" for a shape is the property that it can be divided up in to smaller copies of itself. For example, a square has this property because it can divided in 4 smaller squares. But a circle does not have this property. There is no shape that has both "great making properties". So there is no "Maximally Great Shape".PRO: There will be no contradictions between each great making property - if there were, then the being would be "0 and 1 at the same time - and thus is subjunctively possible.I did not understand this argument (not just because of the spelling and grammar mistakes). It is not clear at all that there are no contradictions between different "great making properties".(ii) The notion of "great making property" is subjective. Who decides what a great making property is? In my opinion, omnipotence is a great making property. However, an omnipotent God (in the strong sense) cannot exist because of the omnipotence paradox [1]:If God is omnipotent, then God can create a stone that is so have that no-one -- even God -- cannot lift it. But if God cannot lift the stone then this contradicts his omnipotence. We have to conclude that:God does not exist.C. If we assume that it is possible that God exists, then we should, in fairness, also assume that is possible that God does not exist.If we would assume that God has to exist right from the start, then the whole debate is pointless. Also, the title of this debate is "God probably exists". This means, that PRO claims that it is likely that God exists, but that it is possible that God does not exist.Since God does not necessarily exist, God does not exist in some possible world. Pro writes:PRO: So if a maximally great being is contingent due to its subjunctive possibility, and exists in "some possible world", then due to how it is greater to be necessary, the being exists in every possible world.So, if a maximally great being exists in some possible world, it has to exist in every possible world. But since a maximally great being does not exist in some possible world, we have to conclude that:A Maximally Great Being cannot exist in ANY possible world.The introspection argument: My opponent writesPRO:1. The mind exists2. The properties of the mind are not those which matter can haveC1. Mind is not reducible to matter4. Substance dualism is impossibleC2. Monistic idealism is trueWe can have a discussion about materialism vs. idealism vs. dualism. "C1" rejects materialism and 4. rejects dualism. PRO: C1. Mind is not reducible to matterThe relationship between "consciousness" and "matter" is complex and not well understood. There is no indication that consciousness can exist without matter. Since nature is very complex, it is possible that consciousness can be reduced to matter:“Some years ago, there was a lovely philosopher of science and journalist in Italy named Giulio Giorello, and he did an interview with me. And I don’t know if he wrote it or not, but the headline in Corriere della Sera when it was published was "Sì, abbiamo un'anima. Ma è fatta di tanti piccoli robot – "Yes, we have a soul, but it’s made of lots of tiny robots." And I thought, exactly. That’s the view. Yes, we have a soul, but in what sense? In the sense that our brains, unlike the brains even of dogs and cats and chimpanzees and dolphins, our brains have functional structures that give our brains powers that no other brains have - powers of look-ahead, primarily. We can understand our position in the world, we can see the future, we can understand where we came from. We know that we’re here. No buffalo knows it’s a buffalo, but we jolly well know that we’re members of Homo sapiens, and it’s the knowledge that we have and the can-do, our capacity to think ahead and to reflect and to evaluate and to evaluate our evaluations, and evaluate the grounds for our evaluations.It’s this expandable capacity to represent reasons that we have that gives us a soul. But what’s it made of? It’s made of neurons. It’s made of lots of tiny robots. And we can actually explain the structure and operation of that kind of soul, whereas an eternal, immortal, immaterial soul is just a metaphysical rug under which you sweep your embarrassment for not having any explanation.” -- Daniel C. DennettIn his book [2], Dennett explains the complex relationship between matter and consciousness. See also his Ted talk [6].PRO: We can divide our senses into 2 categories - physical properties and mental properties. And to give an example - the mental property would be the feeling of pain, and the physical property would be the sending of electrical signals to the brain. The sending of electrical signal to the brain causes pain. However, these are not the same thing - an electrical signal to the brain can occur without the feeling of pain. All we experience is a correlation.This is not true. Whenever you put an electrical charge on a certain nerve, it will hurt.[7] Every time you hit your thumb with a hammer, an electrical signal will go from your thumb to your brain and it will hurt. In fact, I bet if you repeat this experiment 100 times, that it will hurt A LOT. Consciousness, pain, is all part of matter. However, these are the aspects of matter that we do not understand very well because of its complexity. In any case, I do not agree that we can reject materialism.PRO: Moreover, to support this 2nd premise, we can say that even if you knew every physical fact about the brain, you could not use it to deduce anything about mental states. This is illustrated by the analogy of Leplace' demon. Say there was as demon who knew every single thing about every last atom in the universe. Even though he knew everything, he could still not figure anything out concerning consciousness, the feeling of pain, or the taste of sugar, etc. So what does this tell us?We are limited and we cannot know every physical fact about the brain. But if we did, perhaps we would be able to deduce everything about our mental states. I do not believe in demons, but if Laplace's demon existed, perhaps he would know everything about consciousness. It seems that you have rejected the idea that Laplace's demon would be able to know everything about consciousness with out any argument for it.C2. Monistic idealism is truePRO: This leads us to our final conclusion: all is mind (otherwise known as Monistic Idealism). If mind is fundamental, and mind cannot be reduced to matter and substance dualism is false, then the only option left is that all is mind. There are no other possibilities.What does "all is mind" mean? "All" is, by definition, the universe - everything that exists. Whether one calls the universe "mind"or "matter" does not really matter all that much. PRO: But why does Monistic Idealism mean that God exists? Essentially, it means that there is a fundamental mind. If mind in the universe is fundamental, then there must be a fundamental mind.This so-called "fundamental mind" is just the Universe. I do not disagree with the fact that the Universe exists. But we should not label it as "God". This is certainly not compatible with the definition of God that was given by PRO in the beginning of the debate:PRO: "the creator and ruler of the universe and source of all moral authority; the supreme being." According to this definition, God is not the Universe, but the creator and ruler of it. It is a stretch to call the Universe a "being", and it does not have any moral authority. The Universe is pretty much amoral.[1]http://en.wikipedia.org...[2]Daniel C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained.[3] http://en.wikipedia.org...[4] http://en.wikipedia.org...[5] http://en.wikipedia.org...[6] http://www.ted.com...[7] http://www.mydr.com.au...