Kalam argument is sound

RebuttalsAttacking conclusionsCon notes that you can disprove this argument by attacking its conclusions. But that's not possible. Under deductive reasoning, you can only attack either the premises or validity (form). The conclusion logically follows.Whatever begins to exist has a cause only within this universe and composition fallacyThere are multipe problems with con's first rebuttal. It's utter red herring. I gave two deductive proofs of the first premise based on a priori definition of nothing and based on principles of philosophy like the PSR. My third argument was based on inductive reasoning. NONE of my arguments are reasoning by composition. So again this rebuttal is not apt and is beyond irrelevant since in none of my arguments did I use reasoning by composition rather I used deductive reasoning twice and inductive reasoning once. Composition fallacy are applicable to specific situations (Take for example, if every brick of the wall is yellow then the wall will be yellow.) However, inductive reasoning is the basis behind science [1], so if Con objects to inductive reasoning, he is really just objecting to the foundations of science. Inductive reasoning (like let's say the second law of thermodynamics) can make judgements about the parts (closed systems within this universe will run out of entropy [2]) and the whole (The universe itself will run out of entropy [3a]). Reasoning by composition can not but that is irrelevant since that is simply not what I did. The law of causlaity in science which is based on inductive reasoning also supports the first premise. [3b]On the metaphysics of causationCon notes that I have no grounds to conclude that the first premise is metaphysical but I advise him to go re-read the opening arguments in the second round and I do have grounds to conclude that causation is metpahysical. [4] On the properties of the first cause"Material things are only caused by other material things (therefore, a cause cannot be immaterial)"This begins with a rejection of the supernatural. You are arguing against the supernatural by a priori dismissing the supernatural (in which immaterial things can cause material things) and thus you have assumed what you are trying to argue. This is a classic example of the circular reasoning fallacy. You ultimately can not say that material things can ONLY be caused by other material things since you do not know whether or not the supernatural exists so you simply can not assume that the supernatural does not exist and that immaterial entities can not cause the material since making that assumption then declaring that material can only be caused by the material is to be assuming your conclusion and would result in a fallacy of circular reasoning. Nothing is ever caused by an entity that is not, itself, within timeThat's patently false. For example, suppose that there was one frame of reality without any passage of time. Now suppose in this singular frame, there are no preceeding nor following frames of reality. In this frame of reality, there are two elements namely a human standing in the sand. The human in this example would be timelessly causing the footprints in the sand. Or suppose the same scenario with a lit candle. The candle would be timelessly causing a flame. Time is not a property of causality. Or imagine the same scenario but with a chandlier and a roof. The roof would be timelessly holding up the chandlier. I can go on and on."All minds are physically embodied (therefore, a mind cannot be non-physical)" How do you know?"Any one of these examples, arrived at through the very same method Pro uses to derive P1"You did not use any deductive or inductive proof though.Semantics on time"The word "begin" is temporal by nature. Something can only begin to exist if there was a TIME where it didn't exist."I would like to remind Con that this is my argument and I get to define what I am arguing for. Recall that I explicitly defined "began to exist" as having a finite past. Con is not allowed to go in and change the definitions of the terms of my argument then claim that it is unwarranted premise. Imagine this scenario, suppose Con is a christian and I am a Muslim. I claim that the bible has evolved overtime where evolved means "the text has changed overtime". To which Con responds : "There is no way the bible could have evolved overtime since the bible is not a natural orgnaism capable of changing its genome over successive generations". You see the problem? He went into my argument and re-defined what I mean by "began to exist" even though I was clear as day when I said that began to exist means has a finite past and then Con claimed that the premise was unwarranted. B-theoryEven with Con's incorrect charactericization between A and B theory, he has not demonstrated why B theory is incompatible with Kalam.Relativity and B theoryCon claims that light is constant everywhere but right off the gate, this is false. [5] and He claims that Relativity proves eternalism but this has been disputed. [6] It has even been argued that special relativity refutes eternalism. [7]"If true, and Relativity seems to confirm it is, then that absolutely confirms time is subjective thus confirming B Theory." Actually this is the view of presentism as well that time is subjective and is relative and specific to a certain observer or human conciousness and relative to their "past, present or future" since to people living 2000 years ago, Nov. 11 2017 would be future relative to them and to us, Nov. 11 2017 is relative to us. Actually still according to Con's example, passage of time is still true and time still does ellapse and therefore the arguments given for the finitude of the past still succeed.What B theory actually saysAs a B-theorist myself, I believe that which "ontology" of time you adopt is irrelvant to the Kalam. If time is as Con describes it then just think about this. Imagine how many scientific principles would absolutely crumble such as Newton's third law of action and reaction, law of causality in science, etc. If Eternalism is as Con describes it then When some unpleasant experience is behind us, we feel glad that it is over. But if Eternalism is correct, there is no such property as being over or no longer happening now or if there is no present where you have a toothache and future where you go to a dentist and get your tooth fixed then under eternalism, your teeth already fixed even before you go to the doctor since there is no "future" where you are at the doctor. Suppose another example with Con's misconceived view of B theory. If there is no passage of time and the present, future and past are just illusions since there is no passage of time, that means that there will not come a time in the future where I am dead (since the future/ the "yet to come" is an illusion) or that time will not pass to a certain moment when I am dead (since there is no passage of time) and that would mean that since there is no future with potency for certain events and all events have happened right now since there is no future or passage of time where things will change (recall that passage of time is an illusion). That would mean two things: I am currently dead since there is no future moment where I can die (since all time is equally real and there is no such thing as passage of time and there is no such thing as a moment prior where I am alive and no future moment where I die) or that I am immortal since there is no future moment where I can die. However, that is ridicolous and is not what B-theory claims. Let's take Con's meat loaf analogy. In Con's meat loaf analogy, suppose you exist on the third meatloaf and you have 3 meatloafs ahead of you. You would describe the 2 meatloafs behind you as past and the three infront of you as future and the "seat of reality" as the present. Now that's A theory where events are ordered "Past, present and future" relative to a specific observer. Now according to B-theory, the sequence of events is not described relative to any observer, the meatloafs are all equally real. There is no "seat of reality". The events are merely described as events that ellapse before or after relative, not to any observer, but relative to other meat loafs or other events in the same sequence. In B-theory, there is an ellapse of time where the only major difference with A theory is that events are described in position relative to other events rather than the past, present or future of anyone. That's what we mean by saying that B-theory is tenseless. It is has no "tense" meaning there is no past, present or future. Under B theory, events are not described through the temporal prespective of any one observer. With that in mind, B-theory is absolutely compatible with Kalam and I would even argue that it meakes Kalam easier to explain. [8]