Cosmological Origins: Conscious Multiverse vs. Personal Creator

=Parsimony= Let me begin my response by setting forth a clear definition of Ockham's razor as given by the Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy: "Entities are not to be multiplied beyond necessity" [1] Pro hasn't quite grasped my argument. As such, here is a visual aid of the positions defended by both sides: http://philapologia.org... From this diagram, it is very evident that Pro's proposal multiplies entities beyond necessity, and hence should be ruled out on the basis of Ockham's razor. His response is simply that the multiverse is "the ONE explanation for our universe, not the multiple neighboring universes," yet that is exactly what I am attacking. What I am proposing is that the multiverse itself and the pluralities of universes that are contained within it should both be discarded in favor for a single universe that does not exist in a multiverse, as illustrated by the visual aid. It is evident that a single universe which exists by itself is more parsimonious as opposed to a plurality of universes that exist within one multiverse. Pro responds by stating that the postulation of a deity is unparsimonious. Suppose I grant this, it would still follow that Pro's position is ultimately still the more umparsimonious view. For whereas I only posit two entities (A deity and a universe), Pro posits a multiverse which is populated by countless unobservable and unproven entities. Pro also charges the postulation of a deity as incoherent, asking "what and where is this realm outside of space-time, void of scientific laws that he apparently exists in." This is an incoherent question, it is a category mistake. Such a deity would be immaterial, having no physical parts. It would thus make no sense to ask "where" this realm is, since there is no spatial dimensions to this real. Just exactly how is it absurd? =Edge of Another Universe= Pro argues that the discovered of a void of space is impossible to explain using standard physics. This is not evidently the case. Mersini-Houghton's conclusion is actually rather controversial, as it depends on string theory, a relatively new area of physics which has secured no experimental proof. In fact, its equations haven't been fully formulated yet! And by interpreting it along the lines of string theory (which presupposes the existence of other universes), to use this as proof is to beg the question. Many different competing explanations exist, and it is not evident why Pro's (controversial) explanation should be preferred. =MW Interpretation= Pro still has not demonstrated that QM applies to all of reality. He has only stated that if QM applies to all of reality, then a MW interpretation would be correct. Up to this point, he has failed to demonstrate that conditional (that QM applies to all of reality). As such, Pro's assertion remains unproven. Additionally, it is not evident that of QM applies to all of reality, then MWI must be true. Since the other competing interpretations are empirically equivalent, then QM could simply be interpreted along those lines. MWI would thus simply be one of many. =Kalam Cosmological Argument= Pro's responds to my first argument by simply asserting that the conclusion that the cause is personal does not follow. Yet what is his basis for doing so? I have provided good reasons for why this should be the case. Let me rehash. Prior to the creation of the universe, there were no antecedent determining conditions that would necessitate the creation of the universe. As such, the act of creating the universe must have been a free act that was initiated free of any determining conditions. That is, a being freely willed to create the universe. This is an obvious sign that the creator must have been personal. Pro argues that by personal, I must demonstrate the existence of a God who intervenes within creation. But that is clearly not what the debate is over, it was over _cosmological origins_. It is thus sufficient for me to show that the cause of the universe must have been personal (in that it freely chose in the lack of determining conditions) without showing that it still intervenes in creation. =Infinity and Time= Pro's counter-argument is analogous to ancient Sorites paradoxes. However, pro has forgotten that even though the division of events are arbitrary, divisions still exist. Previously, I stated that "But in an A-theory of time (Which the argument assumes), ___there is a real difference between events such that they can be numbered and placed into a set. Hence, though we cannot specify an exact division, we simply specify an arbitrary division point for the sake of clarity."____ He states that if we cannot empirically define with precision what an event is, then the problem is null. But that is an assertion that I find no warrant in at all. Simply because we cannot define what constitutes an event with absolute precision does not mean that divisions do not exist. Pro is committing the fallacy of the beard: simply because I cannot specify with exact precision when a stubble ends and a beard begins does not mean that any difference between them is non-existent. Though we cannot give an exact cut-off, we specify an arbitrary division for the sake of clarify. This does not at all imply that a distinctions do not exist. Hence, in the case with the kalam argument, there _are_ real divisions between events (since it presupposes the A-theory of time in which there are real distinctions between past, present, and future). However, these divisions, though they exist, cannot be specified with precision. As such, we simply specify an arbitrary cut-off for the sake of clarify. This does not at all imply that divisions do not exist. Pro also charges the KCA with assuming the B-theory of time over the A-theory of time. This is rather bizarre, as all proponents and opponents of the argument have acknowledged that it presupposes the A-theory of time. On a B-theory, there is no beginning of the universe, since all events have ontological parity, which is why it is referred to as the static theory of time (all events exist at once, and are not ordered by relations of tense -- the universe has a "beginning" in the sense that a yardstick has a beginning, but all points on the yardstick are coeternal). Pro also misrepresents the A-theory when he states that the present exists infinitely. That is simply untrue. On an A-theory, temporal becoming exists (time is flowing -- which is why the A-theory is also called a dynamic theory of time). At t1, E1 is present and at t2, E1 is past and E2 is now present. [3] =God and Thermodynamics= Pro charges my definition is being self-defeating, but how? He simply states it without stating why. Indeed, the definition of God I proposed makes him beyond scientific inquiry -- but surely this is a virtue and not a vice. Scientific constraints only apply to contingent beings, whereas God is traditionally thought of a necessary being who exists in all possible worlds. To define God as a limited being who is bound by the laws of nature is to redefine the parameters of the word "God." By God we mean the greatest possible being, and this would entail that he cannot be bound by mere contingent scientific laws. Pro insists that the laws of nature are prescriptive, that they prescribe what must happen. But is it not clear as to how they are prescriptive. What we call the laws of nature are really empirical generalizations which describe how the patterns in which the universe functions, but they do not prescribe how it functions. Suppose we observe the sunrise everyday and conclude that the sun rises in a particular time. Can we conclude on the basis that the sun _must_ rise at that particular time? No. Simply because nature _is_ a certain way does not mean that it _must_ be a certain way. This is a non-sequitur. Is does not imply must anymore than it implies ought (David Hume's famous is-ought problem of ethics).