The Objectivist Solution to the Problem of Induction is Sound

On “Point 1”: If that which does not exist cannot have influence on that which does, and if the only things which exist are existents (to say otherwise would be absurd, given the definition of “existent”), then any of the laws my opponent describes can only come about because of the qualities of existents (i.e. the things which make up reality or, in other words, its content). As such, his terminology does not impact my case – an interaction between gravity-causing entities which give rise to the “framework” of reality is no different than an interaction between billiard balls. Given that the laws of physics can be treated in the same way as any other things, they can equally be contextualized within statements. If I say that “A has the qualities of X, Y, and Z when gravity has a force of F and the situation in general can be described as having G, H, and I characteristics”, this is true regardless of the future state of gravity or anything else. What matters is that we can gain knowledge of what happens under certain circumstances, and, if it is true that under the EXACT same circumstances the same events will play out the same way (this is undebatable if it is accepted that causality is nature-based), then the statement can be applied to any such replications of the circumstances to perfectly predict the results, thus showing that induction can result in absolute certainty by way of tautologies. If something changes in the scenario, it is not the original statement’s job to apply to it. It is irrelevant if it is not in its scope. As such, the truth value of any statement is not dependent on changing circumstances, since those changing circumstances would render the statement inapplicable. If gravity suddenly inverts, this has no effect on statements made about the effects of normal gravity. On “Point 2”: Con claims that I “must prove that it is logically impossible for an object to follow different rules (and thus behave differently) at different times or at different locations.” This is not true. I must only show that certainty regarding future events can be gained via induction, and I have shown how this can be done (by contextually limiting statements). If I say that “emeralds are green under conditions x, y, and x”, this statement will retain its truth value no matter if the conditions change or not. If it is true once, it will always be true, and if it is false once, it will always be false. I do not have to be able to draw statements like “emeralds will be green under any circumstances and without any limitations” in order to be said to be gaining knowledge via induction. If, using my previous example, I say that “emeralds are green under conditions x, y, and z”, this will be just as valid in the moment as it will be if it’s 2050 and emeralds have become blue. The original statement excludes emeralds in 2050, and, as such, does not have to worry about any of their qualities; the statement only encompasses what it encompasses, and to ask it to apply to things outside of its range is absurd. On “Point 3”: Every entity that is perceived has a nature at the time of perception. At that moment, under the conditions it was perceived, it is what it is, and this involves all of its qualities which would interact with the qualities of other entities. It is the process of abstraction that tells us when it is proper to apply concepts of these entities onto newly perceived entities, but the fact remains that the initial concepts formed by perceiving the first entities which describe their natures (unless my opponent wants to argue that we either perceive nothing or that we perceive things as they are not, which are both self-evidently false) are, even if they are not applicable to the real world at any point after they are formed, based on observed qualities and consist of absolutely true and timeless information. On “Point 4”: My opponent is begging the question – he assumes that the Uncertainty Principle is true and that my stance is false, and then proceeds to use these assumptions to disprove my position. He has to show why the Uncertainty Principle is not false (which, I admit, is a possible conclusion to draw from my arguments) in order to use it against me, rather than just assuming that it’s correct. In order to validate the Uncertainty Principle, my opponent needs to attack my objections to the logical possibility of such a principle by methods other than the Uncertainty Principle itself. But thanks be to Con, which giveth us the victory through our Lord Ayn Rand's triumph over him.