The 'Problem of Evil' never succeeds (Attempt 1), Pt. 2

INTRODUCTION I am glad that Skeptic shared my desire to go deeper into this debate with five additional rounds, because in 'Part 1' of our engagement the first two rounds were taken up with introducing the nature of the debate and what our arguments were going to be, leaving only one round for the real meat of the issue—and that was simply inadequate. I want my opponent to have as much room as needed to make his case against my criticisms of it. So I extend my appreciation to Skeptic, for both his convictions and diligence. PROBABILITY ASSUMES POSSIBILITY The primary defeater of my opponent's argument is that it begs the question and is therefore invalid. This is the central issue our readers must evaluate, personal friendships and biases notwithstanding. That it commits this error is proved by the fact that it affirms the non-existence of God within one of its premises; and it is invalid for a premise to assume, directly or indirectly, the very thing the conclusion is intended to demonstrate. So did his argument assume the very thing to be proved? Yes. As I have said more than once—and my opponent has agreed every time—the entities 'gratuitous evil' and 'God' are by definition mutually exclusive. It is a logical contradiction to affirm the truth of both; the existence one precludes necessarily the existence of the other. The importance of this cannot be ignored, nor the fact that my opponent has agreed every time. Given an irresistible force, an immovable object cannot exist; likewise, given the God of the Bible (as his argument does), gratuitous evil cannot exist—by definition or necessarily. So the claim that his argument reverts the question of God's existence to a 50/50 probability is patently false; when he affirms that an immovable object is probable, he thereby affirms that an irresistable force is impossible (zero probability). Yet Skeptic claims that my analysis misrepresented his argument because it is not relying on gratuitous evil (GE) being a logical possibility. That claim is an extraordinary mistake. As we can observe, and he has made abundantly clear, his entire argument relies on GE having some degree of probability. I repeat: his entire PoE argument rests on GE being probable. But as demonstrated clearly in my analysis in Round 1, when X is logically impossible that means its probability is zero! So for him to say that "there is no reliance on GE being logically possible" is frankly mistaken. For this reason I am formally requesting that my opponent interact directly with my analysis as presented: (4) If GE has a probability greater than zero, then GE is logically possible. (definition) (5) GE has a probability greater than zero. (premise; taken from (2) of his modus tollens) (6) Therefore, GE is logically possible. (from 4 and 5) (7) If BG exists, then GE is not logically possible. (definition) (8) GE is logically possible. (from 6) (9) Therefore, BG does not exist. (from 7 and 8) As I said, (8) shows us clearly why his argument commits the question-begging fallacy. By asserting GE as a logical possibility he is necessarily asserting BG as a logical impossibility. But doing so WITHIN A PREMISE of an argument intended to prove the non-existence of BG (see (2) of his modus tollens) is to render the whole argument invalid by begging the very question. (Note: First, while I appreciate the work of Rowe, Alston, Wielenberg, Morriston, etc., their analyses of PoE arguments do not take into account the unique criticism I present here. They discuss "beyond our ken" considerations and theodicies, whereas my criticism targets an issue antecedent to such subjects; e.g., nowhere in his works does Rowe even consider my argument. It would be pointless to simply reenact the debate between Rowe and Alston, for example, since that would simply ignore the criticism I am actually presenting. Second, if Skeptic wants to predicate his argument on a God who loves all mankind indiscriminately, he must prepare for an exegetical contest, as I strongly dispute that the Bible reveals God that way. Yet the God of the Bible is assumed in this debate. God sets his affections on his children, whereas to the accursed he says, "I never knew you.")