Resolved: On Balance, Human Childbirth is Immoral

Thanks to my opponent for the debate. --- Con Case: --- 2CVD: Prefer Utilitarianism Utilitarianism is the best available ethical system; even if this is not true, it is a better ethical system than minimizing suffering. --- 2CVDA: Utilitarianism Best Handles Moral Uncertainty How do we know whether the Pro or Con side is more "moral"? To objectively know, we must determine which has more value. Value "denotes something's degree of importance, with the aim of determining what ... is best to do," [01]. Value is that which is ethically significant, and an ultimate value or values would be the most ethically significant value, to which all other values are subservient. To attempt to determine what the ultimate value is, living sentient entities attempt to construct ethical systems. However, because living sentient entities have limited knowledge, we cannot know which, if any, of the ethical systems available is/are perfect, and thus we don't know what, if anything, is actually valuable. In this dearth of knowledge, we must attempt to maximize the chance that we can determine what the ultimate value is. Thus, we must keep the maximum number of sentient entities alive and ensure their maximum ability to make reason, because only living sentient entities are likely to significantly increase the probability that we can determine what the ultimate value is. (Because non-living entities and non-sentient entities don't usually develop or test ethical or scientific theories, and both of those actions are vital for increasing available knowledge and the chance of ascertaining ultimate value.) Further, if an ultimate value is determined, then only living sentient entities would be able to act towards it. Thus, we must value: 1. Maximizing the number of living sentient entities, and 2. Maximizing the capability of living entities to reason Utilitarianism best achieves these goals, because it values both keeping the maximum number of living sentient entities alive (because life is a prerequisite for utility and determining ultimate value) and in maximizing potential utility by giving living sentient entities long, interconnected, educated, scientifically engaged, relatively comfortable, and relatively free lives (because a high quality of life, high level of knowledge, and high level of productivity increase utility both for the person and society in general, and thus increase the probability of determining ultimate value). As such, we should prefer whichever side of the debate maximizes utility, in order to maximize the probability of determining ultimate value. --- 2CVDB: Utilitarianism is A Better Ethical System than Minimizing Suffering Pro didn't explicitly state what is valuable in Round 2; however, much of Pro's case has minimizing suffering as good, which I interpret to be Pro's value. (If I'm wrong, correct me.) Pro didn't support suffering as a value in Round 2; however, I presume that, in response to this argument, they will do so in future rounds. Aside from the lack of support, minimizing suffering, instead of maximizing utility, has two problems: 1) It doesn't maximize the possibility of discovering value, as it would support policies like that of preventing the future existence of any sentient living entities. See the resolution as a justifiable premise under this value. 2) It doesn't recognize positive value may exist in the world, only negative. Increasing the chance of finding ultimate value is, while working within our stopgap Utilitarianism, a positive value. --- 2C1: Maximizing the Number of Sentient Living Entities Increases the Probability of Determining Ultimate Value Maximizing the number of sentient living entities maximizes the chance to find ultimate value. Affirming the resolution reduces the number of sentient living entities, while negating increases the number of sentient living entities. As such, negating is more valuable and thus more moral. Increasing the number of sentient living entities is thus moral in most circumstances. However, in circumstances where increasing the number of living entities would lead to (a) a net decrease of the number of living entities, as would be the case with global warming, overpopulation, or starvation scenarios, or (b) a decrease of the probability of determining ultimate value, such as causing an increase of the total number of sentient living entities but a decrease of per-capita industrial capacity, as would be the case with overpopulation or starvation scenarios, then increasing the number of living sentient entities would be immoral. (At least, until the average fertility rate is low enough that it would not cause these effects, at which point it would again be moral.) While the current world situation of overpopulation and global warming may require a decrease of human childbirth (which is happening), it does not require a complete removal of human childbirth, only a reduction. --- Rebuttals: --- 2P1: "Every human ... makes a substantial contribution to the damage on the biosphere ... and ... to the suffering of ... other sentient beings ... [A]dditional human life will amplify this, and hence be immoral." 1. While I believe that the biosphere should be maintained, because it maximizes the potential for determining the ultimate value, the fact that suffering exists is not a problem (and my opponent has not shown it to be signficant). 2. If sentient life on Earth exists, do tell. --- 2P2: "[L]ife is ... preferable not to have ever [been] attained[.]" 1. My opponent states that life is inherently worse than nonlife; I disagree, because life maximizes the chance that ultimate value can be found. See 2CVD. --- 2P2A: "[W]hat of ... the pleasurable things in life? ... [T]hese ... are merely just temporary reprieves from ... discomfort[.] .... Therefore, the maximal possible comfort state ... is ... zero[.] .... [D]eath is preferable to life, since death is a state of no discomfort." 1. My opponent would thus advocate for the permanent killing of all living entities. This clearly reduces the ability to determine ultimate value, and is thus immoral. 2. If we really wanted to prevent future suffering, why not wait until humans have enough scientific knowledge to destroy the universe and whatever (if anything) created the universe, to prevent future evolution of living sentient entities? --- 2P2B: "Bringing in new life ... without ... consent ... is selfish[.] .... '[A]ny selfish action is immoral'[.]” 1. Consent is unimportant to utility and to maximizing the chance of determining ultimate value. My opponent has yet to prove why is immoral. 2. Selfishness reduces utility. My opponent has yet to prove why is immoral. 3. See 2CVD and 2C1 on why maximizing life is more important than reducing suffering. --- 2P3C: "[I]f comfort was ... a positive state, we would expect that having more ... would ... lead to ... increasing ... 'happiness'[.] ... The scale 'tops out' at zero. .... This ... contradicts ... positive states of comfort. .... There ... isn't an ... upper limit of discomfort." 1. My opponent's logic is thus: A1: Assume that comfort is a positive state. P1: If comfort is a positive state (if A1 is true), then when a person has more stuff, they should be more happy. P2: A person is not more happy when they have more stuff. C1: P2 and P1 form a contradiction, A1 is rejected, comfort is not a positive state. P1 doesn't follow from A1. Because comfort might be a positive state does not imply that more wealth would unlimitedly increase comfort. Thus, this does not disprove comfort as a positive state, regardless of whether it is. 2. Pain and pleasure are neurologically linked [3], but pleasure is not merely the lack of pain. To quote, "[T]he motivation and hedonic subsystems seem to be mediated by different neurotransmitters. .... [D]opamine increases motivation for, but not the pleasure of, eating palatable foods, whereas the opioid system influences motivation indirectly by modulating subjective emotional feelings of pain and reward. ... [O]pioids are necessary for hedonic experience (‘liking’) but dopamine motivates you to get ready for it (‘wanting’)." A large problem with my opponent's case is that pleasure isn't just the removal of pain; it's a positive feeling. 3. Pain is limited. A limited number of pain transmitter neurons in the peripheral nervous system and pain receiver neurons in the central limit pain in extent, and limited lifespans limit pain in duration. --- 2P4: "That ... life is inherently ... good[.] ... [T]he default position for this ... is to disbelieve ... until provided evidence[.]" 1. See 2CVD and 2C1. --- Summary: Maximizing the probability of determining ultimate value is more important than reducing suffering, and voting Con does exactly that. --- Quotes: I leave you with the following two quotes from Portal 2: 1. Announcer on dealing with suffering: "This next test is very dangerous. To help you remain tranquil in the face of almost certain death, smooth jazz will be deployed in three. Two. One. [SMOOTH JAZZ], [SMOOTH JAZZ DISTORTED], [SMOOTH JAZZ SHUTDOWN]." 2. Cave Johnson on things more significant than suffering: "Now you might be asking yourself, "Cave, just how difficult are these tests?", "What was in that phonebook of a contract I signed?", "Am I in danger?" Let me answer those questions with a question: who wants to make $60? Cash." --- References: [1] http://en.wikipedia.org...(ethics) [2] http://www.aei-ideas.org... [3] http://www.physiology.gu.se...