BeIR/webis-touche2020 huggingface dataset:
International labour and business standards go hand in hand with development standards and will de facto increase implementation levels

What are international labour and business standards? They are globally acceptable methods of doing business and employing labour. These include Conventions Against Forced Labour[1], Discrimination[2] and Child Labour[3].  These also form guideline structures for social policy such as labour dispute resolution bodies, employment services and good industrial relations. Therefore, this goes hand in hand with reducing poverty and increasing the standard of living of the employees, and hence the standard is a facet of development in itself. This helps in achieving the goals of a stable long term plan for economic growth as well paid workers are necessary for consumer spending. Employing higher standards would be a way to tackle the problems with distribution of aid at the grassroots and increase efficiency within the system organically.[4] The poorest countries invariably have the lowest standards of labour and business. It is essential to raise these standards to an international level, implementing standards against practices like child labour. If this is done then the purpose of development aid, which is to increase the day to day standard of living of the people, will improve. In an absence of such a pre-requisite, a developing country will be free to employ standards that do not reflect the same principles of the donor nation. Thus, to avoid a hypocritical scenario, this pre-requisite is necessary. [1] C029 - Forced Labour Convention,  Adoption: Geneva, 14th ILC session, 28 June 1930, http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO:12100:P12100_ILO_CODE:C029 [2] International Labour Office, ‘Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention’, International Labour Organisation, 1958 No.111, http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---declaration/documents/publication/wcms_decl_fs_85_en.pdf [3] ‘ILO Conventions and Recommendations on child labour’, International Labour Organisation, http://www.ilo.org/ipec/facts/ILOconventionsonchildlabour/lang--en/index.htm [4] ‘How International Labour Standards are used’, International Labour Organisation, http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/introduction-to-international-labour-standards/international-labour-standards-use/lang--en/index.htm
Historically the donor of Foreign Aid has always set down pre-requisites

When a donor nation parts with foreign aid for development to a nation, it must always choose who it prefers to give it to as there is a limited pot of money to donate there needs to be a way of allocating it. It is not surprising therefore that countries with shared colonial histories tend to dominate aid flows, thus Britain has historically given most aid to countries that were its colonies; in 1960 Malta and Cyprus received most, while India was the biggest recipient for much of the rest of the 20th Century.[1] Further, often countries offering aid, such as the US, the UK, and the EU, require the pre-requisite of democracy or the start of a democratisation process. Therefore, it is justified to add a pre-requisite for better standards of business and labour as it helps implementation, and principally meets the goals of the developmental aid itself.[2] [1] Provost, Claire, ‘UK aid: where does it o and how has it changed since 1960?’, Datablog guardian.co.uk, 14 April 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2011/apr/14/uk-aid-spending-history [2] Dollar, David and Alesina, Alberto. “Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?” Journal of Economic Growth, Volume 5, No. 1(Mar., 2000). http://www.jstor.org/stable/40216022
Universal standards of labour and business are not suited to the race for development

Developing countries are in a race to develop their economies. The prioritisation of countries that are not currently developed is different to the priorities of developed countries as a result of their circumstances and they must be allowed to temporarily push back standards of labour and business until they achieve a level playing field with the rest of the world. This is because economic development is a necessary precondition for many of the kinds of labour standards enjoyed in the west. For there to be high labour standards there clearly needs to be employment to have those standards. Undeveloped countries are reliant upon cheap, flexible, labour to work in factories to create economic growth as happened in China. In such cases the comparative advantage is through their cheap labour. If there had been high levels of government imposed labour standards and working conditions then multinational firms would never have located their factories in the country as the cost of running them would have been too high.[1] Malaysia for example has struggled to contain activity from the Malaysian Trades Union Congress to prevent their jobs moving to China[2] as the competition does not have labour standards so helping keep employment cheap.[3] [1] Fang, Cai, and Wang, Dewen, ‘Employment growth, labour scarcity and the nature of China’s trade expansion’, http://epress.anu.edu.au/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/ch09.pdf, p.145, 154 [2] Rasiah, Rajah, ‘The Competitive Impact of China on Southeast Asia’s Labor Markets’, Development Research Series, Research Center on Development and International Relations, Working Paper No.114, 2002, http://vbn.aau.dk/files/33796055/DIR_wp_114.pdf P.32 [3] Bildner, Eli, ‘China’s Uneven Labor Revolution’, The Atlantic, 11 January 2013, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/01/chinas-uneven-labor-revolution/267041/
Development has many facets of which pure economic growth is a priority, especially in the context of a developing nation

It is a nation’s own sovereign decision to decide its own standards and pace itself.   It is a sovereign right of self-determination of a nation to freely comply or refuse to comply with international standards. It is unfair to back a developing nation up against a wall and force them to ratify higher standards in return for aid. It is notable that the countries that have developed fastest have often been those that have ignored the whims of the aid donors. The Asian tigers (Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan, later followed by South East Asia and China) did not receive aid, but preserved authority over their developmental policies. Their success story does not involve the international labour standards and goes against many of the policy prescriptions, such as free trade, of international institutions, such as the World Bank and the ILO[1]. This shows that nations that follow their national interest rather than bending to the whims of donors are the ones that ultimately do best economically. These states only implement labour standards when they become beneficial; when it is necessary to build and maintain an educated labour force. [1] Chang, Ha-Joon, “Infant Industry Promotion in Historical Perspective – A Rope to Hang Oneself or a Ladder to Climb With?”, a paper for the conference “Development Theory at the Threshold of the Twenty-first Century”, 2001, http://www.eclac.cl/prensa/noticias/comunicados/8/7598/chang.pdf
Labour standards are necessary to protect basic human rights

Not all standards benefit human rights and some could even undermine individual’s most basic human rights such as that to sustenance and shelter. Standards combating child labour, for example, could be misguided.  In many developing countries, child labour is an important source of income for children’s food and education.  Holding to the ILO’s convention on child labour would therefore affect families’ and children’s income and development opportunities.  Since child labour is dependent on level of economic development, developing countries should work on combating poverty before reducing child labour.  India implemented most international standards, including the convention for child labour. However, research has found that children working full time have better chances of making it to adulthood than those who work less, because they’re better fed[1]. Children’s physical wellbeing will often therefore benefit from being allowed to work. Rather than imposing labour standards the way to end such practices is to provide incentives that pay for parents to send their children to school as with the Bolsa Familia in Brazil.[2] [1] Cigno, Alessandro, and Rosati, Furio C., ‘Why do Indian Children Work, and is it Bad for Them?’, IZA Discussion paper series, No.115, 2000, http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/bitstream/10419/20956/1/dp115.pdf, p.21 [2] Bunting, Madeleine, ‘Brazil’s cash transfer scheme is improving the lives of the poorest’, Poverty Matters Blog guardian.co.uk, 19 November 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/poverty-matters/2010/nov/19/brazil-cash-transfer-scheme
Increasing a standard, even if not as high as the donor would want, increases the standard of the present situation

This is a common logical fallacy. With limited resources, there is a limited bandwidth within which one can stretch the standard above the capable standard. It is not favourable to increase this gap too much for then it is not realistic. Many countries have ratified ILO Conventions but not implemented any of it.[1] For example India has ratified both ILO core conventions on discrimination but domestic laws have not managed to curtail the widespread discrimination on the basis of caste, particularly for being a Dalit, gender, and ethnicity.[2] It is important that the standards not only need to be raised, but rather the current standards need to be implemented better – which means a stricter hand to the current regulations. [1] Salem, Samira and Rozental, Faina. “Labour Standards and Trade: A Review of Recent Empirical Evidence” Journaln of International Commerce and Economics. Web Version August 2012.  http://www.usitc.gov/journals/LaborStandardsandTrade_final%209_12.pdf [2] ‘India Hidden Apartheid’, Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, Human Rights Watch, February 2007, http://www.chrgj.org/docs/IndiaCERDShadowReport.pdf  P.80
Quick-fix policies: a failing model of implementation

Tax evasion remains a key concern across Tanzania. There remains a low tax base and high evasion. Imposing a quick-fix solution by taxing mobile phones fails to solve underlying issues. The model is widening the base of taxation, whilst neglecting the issue of tax evasion. Therefore, to what extent will the model provide future benefits? Domestic resource policies need to ensure the taxation enables state-building and future capacities to impose tax more effectively and equally. The model relied on MOAT to collect taxes monthly, reducing the need for the TRA to construct a functioning tax-collection system or resolve social resistance to taxation. This then is effectively privatising a vital state function.
The importance of mobilising domestic resources

Taxation remains a vital component of domestic resource mobilisation however focus needs to be placed on improving Tanzania’s top revenue sources before innovative new models. Although the performance of tax collection has improved - with tax revenues rising by a rate of 15.7% between 1996/97 and 2007/08 (AfDB, 2011) taxation does not reach many areas that could be taxed; despite increasing exports of minerals and natural resources,
Building productive capacity through increasing revenue

We need to be critical of the cumulative potential of the tax model proposed. Firstly, the theory of the state’s capacity and how it functions in practice differ substantially. The idea of taxation acting to enhance the productive capacity of a nation is based on assumptions that the institutions, human resources, and state-capacity, are already present. This is not always the case in Africa. Corruption and bad governance are prevalent. Reforms in 1996 to curb corruption in the TRA were reversed due to misunderstanding the nature of corruption amongst tax officials and administration (Fjelstad, 2003). Tax-revenue performance remains comparatively low[1], there is little reason to simply altering what taxes there are will change this. Finally, alternative methods can be used to assist rural infrastructure projects, and enable national savings. For example, revising the role of agricultural marketing boards[2]. [1] See further readings: Gray and Kahn, 2010. [2] See further readings: Baffes, 2005.
A fair tax

The SIM card taxation is an inequitable model for Tanzania’s poor. The tax fee proposed will have detrimental effects to low-income users, whereby the cost exceeds the amount of money they spend on their mobile. For example considering the cost of tax, living, and mobile phone usage, the poor may be placed in a vulnerable position. Evidence suggests 8 million out of 22 million SIM card owners will be affected - with the rural poor feeling the greatest economic burden[1]. The burden of taxation may simply mean the poor can’t afford a phone. Taxation cannot be promoted without recognising the constraints on household savings and income. Universal benefits are debatable when the initial disposable income is polarised to start - the price tag is not-so-small for some. [1] See further readings: BBC, 2013; Luhwago, 2013.
Quick-fix policies: a failing model of implementation

The SIM card tax is actually under-ambitious for potential change to be maximised. Nevertheless, the tax initiates a step in the right direction. Firstly, it will ensure reductions are made in tax avoidance. Secondly, the model shows the potential role the private-sector can play in tax collection. Decentralisation, and shifting responsibility, to independent providers means valuable resources can be collected outside of the criticised TRA structure. For example, the Association of Tanzania Employers may be granted greater involvement in enhancing corporate tax collection. Estimations suggest corporate tax exemptions resulted in annual revenue losses of 4% between 2011-2012 (Gaddis, 2013). The SIM card tax indicates domestic resources can be mobilised by engaging in public-private partnerships. For progressive tax systems, Tanzania needs to utilise private actors.
The importance of mobilising domestic resources

In order to sustain development and growth nations need to build domestic resource mobilisation capacities - through collecting tax and savings. Domestic resource mobilisation enables the transition into a capitalist mode of production - poverty can be targeted and sufficient economies built. Social and economic facilities can be provided. To meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and enhance performance capacity African nation-states need to improve the amount of funding they raise through taxes[1]. In order for development to be assisted, international donors and intervention needs to focus on encouraging innovative models of taxation such as taxing mobile phones. Such taxes don’t have the track record of failure other taxes have providing a new opportunity to redesign the taxation system. Initiatives such as the mobile phone tax provide a trial for such a new model helping to gain support for future changes. [1] See: UNCTAD, 2007.
Building productive capacity through increasing revenue

Between 2003-2009 the annual growth rate of mobile cellular subscriptions in Tanzania was 44.21%, higher than the average in Africa (Ondiege, 2010). Estimations suggest around 18bn Tsh[1] will be collected a month through the SIM card tax model (Rweyemamu, 2013). In 2012, Tanzania’s total GDP was calculated at ~45tr Tsh[2] - the tax could therefore provide almost 0.5% of GDP in taxes. Such a boost in government taxation will enable projects such as improving rural infrastructure (including potentially mobile phone coverage!) or help reduce the deficit. That one tax can raise so much shows the potential of this kind of taxation. [1] Equates to ~11.2mn USD (January 2013). [2] Calculated based on World Bank Data (2013) and exchange rate as per January 2013.
A fair tax

The model is for rolling out a tax for all, on a commodity used by all. The cost is small and fair, only applying to individuals who are able to afford to buy and use a working mobile phone. Those who can afford multiple phones will be hit harder so this is a progressive tax. Arguments suggesting the tax cost is unreasonable fails to look at the politics constructing such a discourse and manipulating what collected tax can do. Motivations for opposition are not necessarily emerging out of concern for individuals’ well-being, but rather have alternative motives. The MOAT (Mobile Operators Association of Tanzania) oppose the tax fearing profit margins may decline; and politicians may use fear over the new tax policy to gain political support for oppositional parties. The opposition of the operators however merely reaffirms that it is a fair tax and those who would support opposition to the measure can be won round through explaining this.
Halting the technological revolution

The tax creates disincentives when we consider the potential losses that will result in the technology sector. The technological revolution in Tanzania will be jeopardised. The growth of mobile phones across Tanzania indicates the emergence of a ‘network society[1]’ but if the population stops buying mobile phones this will end. Taxing SIM cards may deter individuals from buying mobile devices, due to the additional cost. Further, alternatively if the manufacturers and providers attempt to take the burden of the tax to keep the price of a mobile down then supply will be affected. Currently individuals use multiple service providers to get cheaper phone call rates; however, this would no longer be a sensible option. Taxing SIM cards will introduce costs to the entrepreneurship and service provision operating through mobiles. Technology holds great benefits within the twenty-first century; imposing taxation acts to exclude access and limit potential job opportunities. Mobiles have taken services to the people[2] - a vital resource for health services and information, aid distribution, banking, and commerce. [1] See further readings: Castells, 2011. [2] See Ondiege, 2010 on mobile banking. In Tanzania, where for every 100,000 people there is one bank, mobiles have enabled banking to penetrate across society.
Taxes cannot be justified while the network is poor

Can taxation be justified when the network remains poor, limited, and temperamental in numerous locations? Network coverage in Tanzania is 2G and geographically concentrated (see MDI, 2013). It must be improved before the government begins to use it as a tax resource. Tanzania’s Right to Information Act recognises that government transparency and public information is a right. Therefore increasing costs on how people access information, and failing to provide good service, neglects individual rights. A right to information is not just a right to information for those who can afford the tax.
The one child policy is ignored by Chinas elite

The one child policy is a policy that can be ignored fairly easily by richer people within China. Through their ability to bribe officials as well as their ability to hide extra children using foster parents and the like, it is easily possible for richer people to flout the one child policy. This has shown itself in the form of many wealthy Chinese officials, entrepreneurs and celebrities who have been caught ignoring the one child policy. For example between 2000 and 2005 1968 government officials in Hunan violated the one child policy.1 Given that this is true, the one child policy serves to create social division in China. It is perceived by the poorest Chinese communities as an obstacle to prosperity. By imposing harsh penalties (both moral and fiscal) on parents who attempt to maximise not only their future welfare, but also their family’s economic prosperity by trying for a son, the one child policy undermines social development within China’s rural and working classes. Moreover, it serves to entrench negative perceptions of Chinese officials and business owners as corrupt tyrants. How else will marginalised communities relate to a law that undermines the cohesion of their families and that the wealthy can exempt themselves from? 2 1   Liu, Melinda, ‘China’s One Child Left Behind’, Newsweek, 19 January 2008, http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2008/01/19/china-s-one-child-left-behind.html 2   ibid
The one child policy results in sweeping human rights violations

The One Child policy is often strictly enforced in China and many parents are given information about contraception to prevent any chance of an unplanned pregnancy. However a large number of pregnancies- within any population- are inevitable, despite the precautions that parents may take. Whether as a result of defective medication, irresponsible behaviour, or simple bad luck, sufficiently frequent sexual activity will always lead to pregnancy. Reports from human rights workers indicate that the Chinese states deals with such eventualities by forcing women to have abortions against their will. By some accounts, the state directly detains and punishes women who resist family planning policies.1 The psychological trauma caused by this is almost indescribable. Not only does a forced abortion represent a significant attack on a woman’s bodily autonomy, procedures of this type are officially contextualised as correcting the results of wrongdoing. The woman is not counselled or assured that she is not morally culpable for her actions; she is placed in a position where the destruction of her foetus is portrayed as the inevitable result of her own lack of responsibility. Chinese women are made to feel directly responsible for the loss of their unborn children or for the circumstances that gave rise to their pregnancy. Further the Chinese authorities often force people to be sterilised against their will. This has happened in some cases almost immediately after birth, which is incredibly traumatic for the people involved. Further, should these people ever leave China it prevents them from raising a family in the future with more than a single child. Again, forced sterilisation in this way causes large psychological harms due to the manner in which the person’s body is violated.2 1  Life Site News.  "Forced Abortion Still a Reality in China Says New Amnesty Report." Life Site News. 27-05-2005. http://www.lifesitenews.com/news/archive/ldn/2005/may/05052706 2  Elegant, Simon. “Why Forced Abortions Persist in China.” Time. 30-04-2007. http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1615936,00.html