Mind Over Matter? (2)

Just a quick note: I use the terms physicalism and materialism interchangeably like many philosophers do. I'm going to stick with one argument as I want the space to explain it. This argument has it's roots in Plato, Aristotle, and Aquinas who gave a version of it to try to prove the existence of a soul/immaterial intellect but has been given a modern twist by the philosopher James Ross. [1] I will present the argument in syllogistic form and then go on to defend each premise. ========== Argument from Indeterminacy of the Physical ========== (1) Some thoughts have determinate content. In particular thoughts that involve formal reasoning (i.e. mathematical and logical reasoning). (2) Physical process or function among physical processes are indeterminate with respect to intentional content. Any physical state is logically compatible with the existence of a multiplicity of propostionally defined intentional states, or even with the absence of propositionally defined intentional states entirely. (3) Therefore, some thoughts are not physical processes or functions among physical processes. [2, adapted from Victor Reppert's formalization of Ross's argument] ========= (1) ========= This premise is, or should be, uncontroversial. Indeed, denying that at least some of our thoughts are determinate is self-refuting (I'll explain if necessary). However, I will show clear examples of the determinate content of some thoughts. The type of thought I am focused on is that of formal reasoning, that through their form, preserve truth. In logic there are certain argument forms that determine validity. Let's take modus ponens: if p then q; p; therefore q. Example: If Ash is a Pokï¿½mon trainer then he can catch Pokï¿½mon; Ash is a Pokï¿½mon trainer; therefore he can catch Pokï¿½mon. That argument couldn't fail to be valid because I reasoned by the form of modus ponens. Now it must be the case that modus ponens be logically incompatible with any other form of reasoning or it would fail to retained it's validity in all cases - and that would be disastrous! Imagine if modus ponens only was valid *some* of the time. What would that do to all of our arguments? There'd be no way to differentiate between a valid modus ponens and an invalid "modus ponens"! That means we would have never given a logically valid argument in our entire lives. Surely, the argument form of modus ponens is determinate then. In math, like logic, their are certain forms that will always have to work in every single case. Let's take addition: x + y = z. Example: 1 + 2 = 3. Obviously, for it to be adding it has to work for every single case you add correctly. It can't be adding if I get the right answer only some of the times. Would it really be addition if 3 {+} 12 = 15 but 45 {+} 3,000 = 5? No, of course not. Addition must determinate enough to exclude anything that is logically incompatible with it. And certainly the last problem I presented is logically incompatible with addition (more on that below). ========== (2) ========== I expect this premise may be less obvious then the first but if you think about it I think you will see my point. There is nothing inherent in matter that will give it one meaning (or particular determinate content) instead of another. And even if we can somehow eke meaning out of manner, the meaning would still be indeterminate. There is nothing inherent in matter that will "constrain" it to be compatible with some particular determinate. I propose two arguments to definitely show that this is the case. If these two arguments are sound their results can be generalized to all cases of meaning and determinate content. First, W.V.O. Quine's indeterminacy of language thesis. [3] Quine asks us to imagine an anthropologist who is trying to translate an unknown language into, say, English. She comes across native speaker of that language who she notices says the word "gavagi" every time when looking at a rabbit. Naturally, she would think gavagi means rabbit and goes on to translate as such. But, equally compatible with the natives behavior alone are other translations such as gavagi meaning an undetached part of the rabbit. Perhaps those people like a particular body part of rabbit (like the foot) but only while it is still attached to the rabbit. It is highly implausible but it is possible. The point is that there is nothing about the behavior/material facts of these people that determines whether they mean rabbit or undetached rabbit part by gavagi. It is indeterminate what they mean by it just going on how they act. Quine took this to mean that there is no interpretation of gavagi that is objectively better than any other and that choosing the "correct" translation is a only a matter of mere pragmatics. Generalizing this it leads us to the conclusion there is no fact of the matter about people's behavior that would determine what we mean by anything we ever say. Or to put it alternately there is nothing about people's physical facts that we could derive determinate content from. That's an issue to say the least. Second, Saul Kripke's interpretation of Wittengenstein's rule-following paradox which is really just a sceptical paradox of meaning. [4] Basically, Kripke makes this point by contrasting addition and "quaddition". Addition is defined as it normally is - but what is "quaddition"? Quaddition is similar to addition except past some certain point where you have never added the numbers it diverges from addition. For the sake of simplicity imagine that you have never added any to any sum larger than 57. The form of quaddition is this: x {+} y = x + y if x, y < 57 x {+} y = 5 otherwise With addition the answer to 57 +1 would be 58. But if you quadded 57 {+} 1 what would be the answer? 5, of course. Now imagine I asked: "What fact about you determines whether or not you are adding or quadding?" You can't appeal to when you have added in the past because I can easily just say when you thought you were adding you were really quadding. This seems to show that there is no fact of the matter about what you meant when you said you were adding as you might well have been quadding the whole time and not known it. But if that is a problem for adding then it can be generalized to be made a problem for all meaning as there is nothing about the physical facts that determine meaning at all. Surely, one can see the problem with accepting this conclusion? It leads to radical meaning skepticism. If we accept both of these arguments it it would seem that all of our thoughts are indeterminate. ========== (3) ========== But, wait! If it has been established that some thoughts have determinate content and that matter literally *can't* have determinate content - i.e. it's indeterminate - then matter, in principle, cannot even be capable of thought. It's impossible for thoughts to be thought without a thinker so we need to look elsewhere for what is responsible for thought. The only answer seems to be that there is an immaterial thinker, a substance, that thinks these thoughts. I think this argument supports my advocacy of substance dualism while simultaneously attacking physicalist functionalism. I turn it over to TheSkeptic. ========== Sources ========== [1] http://www.nd.edu... [2] Victor Reppert, "The Argument from Reason", in William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland, The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology (Oxford: Blackwell, 2009) pg 379 [3] "Translation and Meaning", W.V.O. Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge,MA:The MIT Press, 1960) pgs 29 -34 [4] "The Wittgensteinian Paradox", in Saul Kripke, Wittegenstein on Rules and Private Language: An Elementary Exposition (Harvard University Press; Reprint, 1984) pgs 7 - 55