God Can Gain Knowledge While Being Omniscient

Thanks to RT for this debate. It's been fun. :) Prima facieMy opponent admits that our prima facie view of the resolution is unfavorable, but he says that it is based on a misunderstanding, or an incorrect assumption. He states, "we only think that assuming that the set of "everything that there is to know" doesn't change." But here's the problem... when most people say "everything that there is to know" they mean the totality of all past, present and future moments in a tenseless sense. An omniscient being knows that at 2:30 on Tuesday, RT will watch TV and at 8:30 on Saturday, Mike will be at the Easter Vigil (ok maybe I'll stay home and watch TB too). This set of all knowledge is unchanging. So while God might be in time, his knowledge is eternal. Then, in addition to this set of knowledge, there's the relational properties which change. More on this below. The reason that the resolution is prima facie implausible is precisely because most people view an omniscient being as one which cannot change in his knowledge.Straw-manYes, my opponent did say what type of fallacy I supposedly made. No, he didn't show that I actually made that fallacy. That's all I'm saying. I can shout "strawman!" until I'm blue in the face, but if I don't show why it is a strawman, I can be dismissed. "That which can be asserted without evidence can be dismissed without evidence." [1]If you'll look over what my opponent says, you'll see that my summary is extremely accurate. He just says it isn't, but gives no reasons to think it isn't. Furthermore, I am perplexed why he will not clarify or provide another syllogism. I am trying to make this debate as reader-friendly as possible, and syllogisms are an excellent way to do so, since they clearly show the reasoning process.Omniscient-being in timeMy opponent quotes me. However, the whole idea of an omniscient being gaining knowledge and losing knowledge could be a reason to think that a temporal omniscient being is impossible. RT's omniscient being really isn't omniscient, precisely because it doesn't know "everything", as he implicitly admits (though not explicitly). It's always gaining and losing knowledge. Thus, an omniscient being cannot be in time for the very arguments outlined by my opponent. This apparent contradiction is a good reason to think that an omniscient being cannot be temporal. Another argument. If God knows the future, then the future must already exist in some sense. We cannot know something which does not exist. But God knows the future, so it must exist somehow. But if the future exists, then the passage of time is an illusion. And if the passage of time is an illusion, then God cannot be in time.Intrinsic vs. extrinsic propertiesNow my opponent tries to rebut my arguments by simply repeating his own arguments. But this is circular reasoning. Let me explain.My opponent makes argument AI refute with BMy opponent refutes B with argument A.If B refutes A, we can't use the A to refute B. My opponent has used his original argument to refute my rebuttals.My opponent dismisses my analogies by simply stating that they don't hold. Why? Well we're not given many reasons other than..."Even if my opponent has examples where relational properties don't change a thing, wouldn't mean that applies to knowledge, or that this applies to everything. Therefore, these examples don't support Con's premise, and those examples were his only justification."Why wouldn't it apply to knowledge though? We've not been given any good reasons. This is a fallacy of special pleading on my opponent's part (2). He's saying, yes, time is a relational property, BUT this is a relational property we can change which DOES change the thing (knowledge). But why can't I say that about anything?That peanut butter sandwich I left in the freezer.. compare it to the one in the future. They both exist in different "nows". So they're different things, right? Well no, not really.All of my opponent's reasoning can be applied to my examples. My examples hold because they are similar structurally, and aren't significantly different than my opponent's main argument."Time clearly changes things (it changes an animate object, like a human organism, to an inanimate object, like a corpse), especially in the in the case of knowledge specifically."This is a very bad argument here. I'm not saying that something can change over time, I'm just saying that the passage of time doesn't directly change something. It's an extrinsic/relational change, and doesn't pertain to the essence of the thing. The reason things decay is because they are no longer functioning organisms, and forces like gravity and mice destroy them. Yes, this takes time to happen, but time isn't doing the changing. Time is a measurement.Affecting the time at which something is, doesn't necessarily affect what that thing is. If this were the case, when I time-travel, would I be a completely different person?Look at it this way. There's three options.i. Affecting extrinsic/relational properties always changes the thing essentiallyii. Affecting extrinsic/relational properties never changes the thing essentiallyiii. Affecting extrinsic/relational properties sometimes changes the thing essentiallyMy arguments in favor of ii remain. My opponent has opted for iii. However, he can't just do this, and leave it at that. He needs to show what type of relational/extrinsic properties affect the essential nature of a thing, and he needs to show why. He has not done so.It's like if I say: Some men have beards. I am a man. Therefore, I have a beard. Well, only men of a certain kind have beards.Even if my opponent argues that affecting "some" relational properties affects the essential nature of the thing, he needs to show which ones this is, and why. I can insist two things are different until kingdom come, but if I don't show why, nobody ought to believe me.Once again, all my opponent's reasoning can be applied to my examples.The peanut butter and jelly sandwich is affected by time. Therefore, the pbj sandwich is a different thing every new second.I am affected by time. Therefore, every new second, I am a new person.Why can time affect knowledge but not other things? Is it because of the "now"? Well is the pbj sandich "now" a different pbj sandwich than it was five minutes ago?Essential vs accidental changeNow, for the sake of argument, let's just assume that God's knowledge does change.Now what? Something can change and yet remain the same thing. If I move my phone across the room, it's still the same phone. At best, my opponent has shown accidental change in God's knowledge. At worst, he hasn't even done that.But why assume that knowledge undergoing a very slight change is "gaining" new knowledge? It's the same knowledge, just in a slightly different form.My argumentsMy arguments have been conceded, except for the parts which rest upon the above. I've defended the relational/intrinsic properties. So my arguments are sound.To recapMy opponent's argument is:P1 The totality of all possible knowledge is something which is always changingP2 God knows the totality of all knowledgeC God knows something which is always changing.I've shown that P1 is false, since changing a relational property doesn't change the thing itself. I've also shown that even if this argument succeeds, "changing knowledge" =/= "gaining knowledge".I've also given two arguments to think that an omniscient being cannot gain knowledge.P1 EITHER God is inside of time, OR he is not.P2 If God is inside of time, he cannot gain knowledge.P3 If God is outside of time, he cannot gain knowledge.C Therefore, in either case, God cannot "gain" knowledge.P1 IF God can gain knowledge, then he can lose knowledge.P2 God cannot lose knowledgeC God cannot gain knowledgeThus, the resolution remains completely debunked. As such, I strongly urge you to vote Con.(1) Christopher Hitchens, "Mommie Dearest" - slate.com. October 20, 2003.(2) http://www.nizkor.org...