On balance, it is benificial to place political conditions on humanitarian aid.

A big thank you to Luke for doing this debate with me; I really enjoyed it. I'll do a brief rebuttal pertaining to my case as well as pro's. Hopefully, there will be room for a conclusion. Pro's CaseEnsuring disaster will not be repeated:Pro explains that my argument pertaining to political conditionality not being followed long term is too simplistic; political conditions enact real change. Simply look at my Gordon Crawford evidence in my constructive. In over 50% of all country cases, political conditions are not followed during the time period that humanitarian aid is given. Given this evidence, it is very logical to predict that such conditions will stop being followed after the humanitarian aid goes away. Even if humanitarian aid is followed by conditional developmental aid, causing the country to ultimately achieve good governance as pro claims often happens, look to the fact that the conditions actually making a difference would be the conditions attached to the developmental aid, not the humanitarian aid. Pro provides a couple country examples where corrupt countries have apparently benefited from political conditionality. The problem with the examples is that they are unsourced, meaning that the voters and myself have no way of knowing what specific political conditions were placed on the aid and what crisis the aid was given for. The strongest reason to ignore these examples is that Philippines, Niger, and Yemen are all highly corrupt. Looking at the corruption perceptions index, it is apparent that all these countries score below a 36 on a scale of 1 to 100 (1 being the most corrupt), Yemen being the most corrupt in the world (1). Therefore, it is fair to conclude that political conditionality certainly hasn't resulted in good governance in any of those countries. Theft:I should note that I accept pro's idea of food aid theft being a legitimate problem; the reason his argument doesn't hold up is that he hasn't shown political conditions are a viable solution to the problem. Pro even concedes that such countries that suffer from a problem like that are unlikely to accept political conditions. Pro ends by making a claim that perhaps *not* sending aid to a country battling food aid theft could be considered a political condition. This is certainly not the case given that political conditions are policy changes the recipient is asked to make. What the resolution is asking is whether or not political conditions should be attached when humanitarian aid is given. If a donor were to decide to give food aid to a country with large levels of corruption (which certainly isn't something they would always have to do in the affirmative world), it would be better to leave the political conditions off of the aid due to the multiple reasons I have provided pertaining to the donor and aid quality. Donor must benefit:Pro's idea that I have not shown benefit to aid without political conditionality, but only attempted to disprove his claims is not true. The benefits to taking away such conditions are less conflict, better diplomatic relations, more donor credibility, and stronger NGO's. If a donor was making a condition with the intention to benefit itself, there is a high chance it wouldn't be accepted so the idea of a humanitarian aid being compared to a global market is a bit ridiculous. Really, the only type of political conditionality that could be assumed to help the donor is trade concessions. However, even this type of political conditions will not benefit anyone because trade concessions can severely harm the recipient and the retaliation of the recipient will harm the donor. Lastly, I will note that it is almost impossible to expect a country to form a "new fair government" in attempt to receive aid. If countries currently cannot follow small forms of political conditions, there is no way they would ever agree to institute something the donor considers to be "good governance. "My CaseIneffective Conditions:Conditions not accepted: To elaborate on my North Korea example a little bit: the political conditions were asking North Korea to abandon their nuclear weapons program. My suggestion would not necessarily be to send unconditional aid, nor does taking the affirmative require me to take that position. I am simply saying that every donor faces three choices: political conditions, no political conditions, and no aid. I am arguing that the first option is not beneficial. My opponent's suggestion of simply not sending aid can actually be turned over to my side because the affirmative position does not advocate for the sending of humanitarian aid in every situation. Looking back on the North Korea situation, obviously not sending aid is a viable option. Remember that sending no aid whatsoever is not a political condition. However, if aid were to be sent, is must be sent without political conditions if it is to cause more benefit than harm. Conditions not followed: What causes pro's impacts pertaining to the promotion of good governance in countries to fall is his concession that political conditions are often not followed. If such conditions are not followed, how can a recipient achieve good governance long-term? Looking at my source on Haiti, remember that the section I quoted in R3 was about both developmental and humanitarian aid. Pro criticizes my West Africa example saying that this is not a problem with political conditions, but a problem with upholding them. Recognize that even if pro is correct in saying that the only occurring problem is political conditions, this is enough to negate his case because without such conditions being accepted, pro cannot solve for anything. Pro continually harps on the idea that conditionality is going to fix problems like the one in Afghanistan, yet again, sending conditions that wont be accepted or followed to a country is legitimately worse than sending unconditional aid. I'd also like to cross apply what I said in response to pro's theft contention where I talked about exactly what it means to affirm/negate this resolution. Well being of the Donor:Pro explains that while abusive political conditionality is still conditionality, my examples must reflect legitimately good political conditions causing harm. Look to the fact that a lot of my examples are of good political conditions. The political conditions on aid to Afghanistan were good, but they were not followed, raising tensions. The political conditions placed on the aid to North Korea were good, but they were not even accepted, again raising tensions. Remember that my Smith card is referring to all types of political conditions, not just ones that could be considered abusive. Again pro brings up this idea of no aid being preferable to aid without political conditions. This is not what the resolution is about. Quality of AidPro basically drops this point by talking about how this doesn't matter since he has shown that political conditions lessen theft and conflict. First, look to my point above about well being of the donor and remember my North Korea example. Conflict is significantly worsened by political conditions because donors give up their neutrality the moment the propose conditions of a political nature. Also, pro hasn't yet shown that political conditions are a viable solution for theft because he has provided no empirical evidence that shows political conditions lessening this form of corruption. Even if you as a voter don't buy this, recognize that pro has basically dropped the idea of lower quality aid. Conditionality like trade concessions lowers aid value by huge amounts, ultimately taking away from the benefit of the recipient. ConclusionWhen voting, take these points into consideration.1. My opponent may be able to show that political conditions are made with the intention of benefiting the donor and recipient, but if they are not accepted and followed, none of that matter. Less than 50% of all political conditions are followed (and this doesn't even begin to talk about the amount that aren't accepted).2. Political conditions, whether effective or not, can be perceived as an invasion of sovereignty. This causes my opponent's point on conflict to fall because it is decreased when the resolution is negated since the donors become neutral.3. The perceived invasion of sovereignty ultimately causes loss of credibility. This extends further when looking at the impact on diplomatic relations.4. NGO's have less leverage, making political conditionality more dangerous for them.5. Specifically looking at the benefit of the recipient, untying aid is going to make the aid worth more, since conditions such as trade concessions severely decrease aid value. The resolution has been negated.