Laws against voluntary polygamous marriages are just

As far as I can tell, the only mention of polygamy in debates here so far have been in passing, so I hope everyone can enjoy looking at it a little bit closer. With debates concerning same-sex marriage currently taking over cable news channels, quite a bit has been said about "the sanctity of marriage. " People have questioned whether marriage should only be between one man and one woman or if it can also extend to one man and another man or one woman and another woman. While a great amount can be said about this subject, I turn my attention instead to a single word used in the rhetoric; that word is "one. " It seems that whether groups are advocating same-sex marriage or rejecting it, they believe that marriage is a commitment between one person and one other person only. On some level, this reflects the anti-polygamy sentiment of modern society. In fact, Edward Stein states "that polygamy has never been legal in any [U. S. ] state. " He adds that the U. S. Supreme Court "effectively denied that there is a right to marry more than one person at the same time" in Reynolds v. United States. [1] In this debate, I will argue that is no just basis for laws against voluntary polygamous marriage. Before progressing any further, it would be beneficial to actually define polygamy. Generally, polygamy can be defined as marriage between more than two partners. Alan S. Miller and Satoshi Kanazawa note that polygamy is often confused with polygyny. They add that "polygyny is the marriage of one man to more than one woman. " On the other hand, polygamy can also include polyandry, "the marriage of one woman to more than one man. "[2] It should be mentioned that both polygyny and polyandry require that the relationship be heterosexual; I will not give much consideration to homosexual polyamory in this debate because doing so would require even more complex distinctions than those already made and does not even meet the technical definition of polygamy. Additionally, I would no like to define an important term in my arguments, which is legal paternalism. In "Weak and Strong Legal Paternalism," William Talbott explains that "[a] law is paternalistic if it is enacted to promote the good of the target audience by overruling their own judgment about what is good for them. " He adds that "[l]egal paternalism is the enactment and enforcement or paternalistic laws," which can be either weak (also called soft) or strong (also called hard). [3] C1-I would like to first explore why some kinds of paternalism (strong/hard) can be considered unjust. In On Liberty, John Stuart Mill makes a convincing argument against legal paternalism being just. Mill claims that "neither one person, nor any number of persons, is warranted in saying to another human creature of ripe years, that he shall not do with his life for his own benefit what he chooses to do with it. " He explains that this is because "[h]e is the person most interested in his own well-being, the interest which any other person… can have in it, is trifling, compared with that which he himself has" and "with respect to his own feelings and circumstances, the most ordinary man or woman has means of knowledge immeasurably surpassing those that can be possessed by anyone else. "[4] So, Mill suggests that a fully-capable adult is the most reliable judges on what is good for her because no other person is as interested in that person's good as she is. Of course, this means that other people as well as governments are less reliable judges. Thus, legal paternalism is generally not justified. Mill does provide some exceptions to this; such exceptions are weak/soft paternalism. C2-Laws against voluntary polygamous marriage do not meet the standards of either major theory of weak/soft paternalism. A-They do not meet Mill's standards. In fact, Mill directly addresses polygamy. He explains that the particular Mormon belief "which is the chief provocative to the antipathy which thus breaks through the ordinary restraints of religious tolerance, is its sanction of polygamy. "[5]. Mill admits that he strongly disapproves of the practice, but he concludes that polygamy should not be prohibited. He notes "that this relation is as much voluntary on the part of the women concerned in it, and who may be deemed the sufferers by it, as is the case with any other form of the marriage institution; and however surprising this fact may appear, it has its explanation in the common ideas and customs of the world, which teaching women to think marriage the one thing needful, make it intelligible that many a woman should prefer being one of several wives, to not being a wife at all. "[6] Whether or not the latter claim here represents an outdated worldview, the prior is certainly still relevant today. B-They do not meet Joel Feinberg's standards. In "Legal Paternalism," Feinberg describes a weak form of paternalism. According to Feinberg, "the state has the right to prevent self-regarding harmful conduct when but only when it is substantially nonvoluntary or when temporary intervention is necessary to establish whether it is voluntary or not. "[7] Such an intervention is certainly paternalistic, but it is a weak form of paternalism and, as such, is justifiable. Feinberg describes a voluntary act as one that "represent[s] the agent faithfully in some important way… [and] express[es] his or her settled values and preferences. "[8] If the agent is somehow ignorant, uninformed, or misinformed about the particular circumstances of his or action, that action would not be considered voluntary. So, another person would be justified in preventing the agent from acting if that person believed the agent is somehow ignorant, uninformed, or misinformed. However, such an intervener would be justified in intervening long enough to establish whether the agent's action is voluntary or not. Of course, the resolution deals with voluntary polygamous marriage, so laws against it certainly are not weak/soft. In Harm to Self, Feinberg addresses polygamy more directly. He asserts that "there are no convincing liberal reasons for the" prohibition of polygamy. Feinberg then makes the slightly stronger claim "that there should be no such crime [against polygamy] at all". [9] This seems consistent with his account from "Legal Paternalism. " If an act is clearly voluntary, then paternalistic intervention is not justified. C3-Laws against voluntary polygamous marriage are not just. To prove this, I offer the following syllogism based on my arguments so far. 1-Paternalism is either strong/hard or weak/soft (by definition) 2-Strong (or hard) legal paternalism is not just (by C1) 3-Laws against voluntary polygamous marriages are not weak/soft paternalism (by C2) 4-Therefore, laws against voluntary polygamous marriage are strong/hard paternalism (by disjunctive syllogism 1, 3) 5-Therefore, laws against voluntary polygamous marriage are not just (by identity 2, 4) Sources: [1] Stein, Edward. "Past and Present Proposed Amendments to the United States Constitution Regarding Marriage. " Washington University Law Quarterly 82.3 (2004): 611-685. PDF. (Pg. 633) [2] Miller, Alan S. and Satoshi Kanazawa. Why Beautiful People Have More Daughters. New York: Perigee, 2007. Print. (Pg. 81) [3] Talbott, William. "Weak and Strong Legal Paternalism. " Which Rights Should Be Universal? Oxford: Oxford UP, 2005. Print. (Pg. 53) [4] Mill, John Stuart. On Liberty. New York: Prometheus, 1986. Print. (Pg. 86-7) [5] Ibid. (Pg 103) [6] Ibid. (Pg 104) [7] Feinberg, Joel. "Legal Paternalism. " Seattle: U of Washington. Print. (Pg 9) [8] Ibid. (Pg 7) [9] Feinberg, Joel. The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. Vol. 3, Harm to Self. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1986. Print. (Pg. 265)