Substance Dualism is true

Con has allowed me to take the last round. Mind/Body Correlations Con states he didn’t merely show there existed correlations, but there existed causation too. I see no importance. Even if this is important, my arguments still stand, more so than ever since causation clearly doesn’t entail identity. Mass may cause gravity, but this still doesn’t entail that mass is gravity. By definition you cannot have a cause without a correlation, since a correlation is “A mutual relationship or connection between two or more things”. My arguments are stating that a relationship between the mind and body don’t entail identity. If that relationship is causal, nothing changes, as causation still exists with correlation. Con’s argument is simply a red herring. This is much like arguing that someone stating that metal will conduct electricity doesn’t apply to your position because you have steel. His objections here are in error since they’re not relevant and don’t address the my argument. Problem of Interaction 1: Con still contends that a third substance is needed. Con still hasn’t shown why it’s not possible for the brain to be able to sense the mind. Taking the snake analogy, although sensory input is there the sensory input doesn’t cause the person to flitch. Since sensory input is neutral, there must exist an interaction by reaction that’s not connected with any other substance. 2: Con states there’s other interpretations of quantum mechanics, then asserts without citation that many scientists are accepting them. First, the most comprehensive survey of accepted interpretations shows that the Copenhagen interpretation is the most accepted [2]. Second, I gave a positive reason for not accepting interpretations that claim there is a connection, since any connection would violate relativity. Con defends himself from my argument by arguing “"Possible" does not translate to "probable", and Pro needs to demonstrate that this form of interaction is *probable* in order for his rebuttal to hold up” However, Con has unknowingly conceded his argument is unsound. All that needs to be true is that this type of interaction is possible, since Con’s argument hinges on the claim that dualism is self refuting and thus impossible. Con states at the beginning of the second round “substance dualism requires something which is impossible according its own claims” but now Con is claiming interaction is possible, just not probable. Which is an new version of his original argument. Nonetheless, even his probable argument is irrelevant. As I stated before, the argument is attempting to destroy the problem’s foundation, not propose an in depth model of interaction. Therefore my argument still stands. 3: Con’s problem here is just like Lycan said, he cannot separate causal realism from semi-Humean causal theories like counterfactual theories. Con wants to know what Cartesian events and physical events have to do with each other, but that itself is question begging against the counterfactual theory [3]. Physical events counterfactually depend on mental events, asking what those two things have to do with each other is irrelevant and question begging. Con’s entire argument here akin to “Under my theory, your theory is wrong, therefore your theory is wrong.” My argument remains and Con himself unknowingly conceded that his own argument fails. The Zombie Argument Again, arguing for causation is irrelevant, as I’ve pointed out. Causation still doesn’t entail identity. Con then argues that my argument is circular. He states I have to assume dualism in order to argue that zombies are possible. However, Chalmers points out “ ….I don't think this is quite right: the point here (roughly that if A=B, imagining A entails imagining B) applies to 2-conceivability but not to 1-conceivability, so no relevant question is begged in asserting the 1-conceivability of zombies” [4]. 1-conceivability has to do with conceivability that is accessible a priori whereas 2-conceivability has to do with necessity [5]. Showing zombies aren’t necessary doesn’t have any relevance on their a priori conceivability. Con tries to show there is something wrong with the idea of dualism by arguing that "If X then Y" is true then there’s something wrong with the negation. This only deals with possibility in worlds themselves, not across possible worlds. Showing “If X then Y” is true doesn’t mean it couldn’t have been the case that the negation is true. It only shows that in one possible world “X then Y” is true, not in all possible worlds “X then Y”. Making that argument irrelevant. The Knowledge Argument Here, Con still doesn’t respond to my questions I proposed. Such as why can’t the first person be reduced to the third person? He also straw manned my argument, as Mary doesn’t have merely descriptive knowledge. Not all knowledge she gained was by other people describing color to her, she got it from studying the brain states of those who are experiencing color. He also straw mans my argument against causal overdeterminism. Nowhere did I say overdeterminism was impossible. I clearly said it was absurd and it still is. Con is advocating for the idea that every event in the mind just happens to agree with every event that’s happening in the body. Maybe it’s likely for one event to have two causes, but constant events all having two independent causes all the time is extremely absurd. Finally, I’m not arguing that first person and third person knowledge is dissimilar as that would clearly contradict dualism. I’m arguing it’s absurd to hold this view and hold physicalism. Conclusion Con’s first argument is only true if my two arguments fail. Con makes an irrelevant distinction between causation and correlation. He contradicts himself with the problem of interaction and begged the question when it came to counterfactual theories. He misunderstands modal logic in the zombie argument. Making a category mistake between two different possibilities and fails to distinguish possibility in worlds with possibility across worlds. He never makes a coherent argument against the knowledge argument. He argues third person knowledge is different from first person knowledge. I argued that physicalism is very difficult to defend when you take this position. He straw manned my argument by claiming I’m arguing the two are dissimilar. He also takes the absurd view that causal overdeterminism is sound which heavily hinders his position The resolution is affirmed. The end. Sources [1] http://www.oxforddictionaries.com... [2] Schlosshauer, Maximilian, Johannes Kofler, and Anton Zeilinger. "ArXiv.org Quant-ph ArXiv:1301.1069." [1301.1069] A Snapshot of Foundational Attitudes Toward Quantum Mechanics. Eprint ArXiv:1301.1069, Jan. 2013. [3] Lycan, William (2009). Giving dualism its due. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):551-563. [4] http://consc.net... [5] Chalmers, David John. "Foundations." The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. New York: Oxford UP, 1996. Print.