The Anselmian Ontological "Proof" of god's existence is flawed.

Anselm of Canterbury was an 11th century Benedictine monk who held the esteemed position of the Bishop of Canterbury. He is considered the founder of scholasticism and is the originator of the ontological argument as well as the satisfaction theory of atonement. I will deal with the former in this debate. Anselm held in high esteem the law of non-contradiction, though his application of the law is debatable (thus, this debate!). He famously noted that theology was "faith seeking understanding," already displaying the level of internal bias that I note throughout. The ontological argument for god's existence is as follows: 1. God is the greatest thing of which we can conceive. 2. Everyone can understand or comprehend of god in this way. 3. Therefore, god exists in the understanding, even for "the fool." 4. It is greater to exist in reality than solely in the understanding. 5. Therefore, god (that which nothing greater than can be conceived) exists in reality. I shall take my objection in parts consecutively with the above five-fold argument. 1. It is important to make a note of the difference between an atheist and an anti-theist in this matter. An atheist is someone who simply denies the validity of religious and metaphysical claims. An anti-theist holds this position, but also posits that the religious claims that have been used throughout the years have been not only inaccurate, but harmful either to the progress of our species as a whole or to individuals who have been convinced by these arguments. In this instance, I shall take on the part of an anti-theist and note that I must vehemently disagree with the premise. Whether or not this is agreed upon is not entirely relevant as the argument itself claims a universal conceptualization of god in a benevolent fashion. Anselm has set up a dialectic that assumes what an atheist, or "the fool," would claim to believe. For the following reasons (though, as pointed out, this need not be agreed upon to deem the argument wrong): the idea of an eternal supervisor is not one that I would label "great" in the normative sense. It is the essence of big brother, and closely resembles the political nature of North Korea. The theistic god is in a sense a divine North Korea, but at least one can die and leave North Korea. A being claimed to be the superlative in all characteristics is not only contradictory when applied to malevolent characteristics, but indeed something that I not only believe were not true, but that I am glad there is no evidence of. In this sense, the premise has been negated. 2. I will concede that it is at least possible for an atheist, or "a fool," to at least recognize an individual's claim to such a belief. However, once again, this is an argument that is meant to be thought of universally. To think otherwise would be to necessitate the labeling of the ontological argument as a proof of god's existence to only those who already believe in said deity. In this sense, an individualistic reading of this argument is an affirmation rather than an argument. To make this a debate of universal nature, as Anselm meant, one must recognize the inaccuracy of the first two assumptions. 3. I concede this point fully to Anselm. God does exist in the understanding. The brighter among us will easily see this as an irrelevant claim being that unicorns, tolls, ogres, and even the Flying Spaghetti Monster exist in our understanding. Within the context of religious pluralism, this point, and indeed the entirety of the ontological argument, can be used to justify existence of any deity (or any superlative). In that sense, Anselm could be said to be making an argument for Allah or Yahweh, which admittedly is the same as the Christian deity. The question at hand, however, is whether this argument can be said to be convincing to the unbeliever, or even to an individual who has never even heard of a claim of divinity. In short, I think most would agree that individual and subjective imagination has no bearing on objective reality. 4. This is the point at which the argument crumbles before our eyes. There are two ways to approach this: 1) one approach begs the question of why existence is "greater" than nonexistence; 2) another approach takes issue with existence being a characteristic in itself. The first seems to me vague and unanswerable at best. It is intrinsically tied with his premise instead of independently stemming from it in the sense that the existence of this being will be deemed greater by the individual who wishes the deity exist, but the nonexistence will be deemed greater by the individual who is glad that there is no evidence for his/her existence. This raises a question that I raised in my first debate, which is the appropriate level of simplicity and complexity. I argue that while simplicity is easy and convenient for our insufficient brains (marked by adrenal glands too large and pre-frontal lobes too small), complexity is ultimately the more accurate, or at least more reliable, approach. I take this into more detail by outlining what I see as the relationship between two concepts that are of great importance to this debate: wish thinking and argumentation. The relationship between the two can be categorized as follows: an individual may argue A) Against something that he or she 1) wishes were true or 2) wishes weren't true; said individual may also argue B) For something that he or she 1) wishes were true or 2) wishes weren't true. Which approach (A1, A2, B1, B2) an individual partakes in does not necessarily point to validity or invalidity of the argument, but I think credibility and objectivity can be inferred. A1 & B2 should be thought of as at least slightly more objectively reliable, but also can be viewed as more complex for it is quite practical and easy (if you allow me to make a parallel between these two traits and simplicity overall). Admittedly, I am arguing with an A2 approach, but once again this question should be taken universally rather than individualistically, as it has been set forth as a "proof" (whether abstractly taken as empirical or theoretical) of a universal being from which all of us derive existence. The second response dealing with the categorization of existence as a trait in and of itself stems from much of the same argument of simplicity and complexity. I argue that not everything can or should be categorized neatly into ontological or cosmological characteristics. As a more practical example, I assert that courage is not a virtue, but is instead a rightfully unclassified human characteristic (emotion, or ambition) that allows us to exercise the virtues. In the same way, I argue here that existence is not a characteristic in and of itself, but rather that which allows an object or conceptualization to hold real and observable (though not necessarily physical) characteristics. This applies indirectly to the argument from simplicity in that it is comfortable for us to categorize any descriptive adjective or other qualifying descriptor into proper categories, but I argue here that this is a premise which has no place in objective reality. 5. I have clearly expressed my opinion to the contrary of this facet. The agreement with (5) by any individual will ultimately be dependent on recognition of subjective imagination having no bearing on objective reality, or to the contrary. The internal bias of this argument (thus negating the "proof" status of an argument for a deity from which we all collectively derive existence) can be seen in a famous quote of Anselm from Proslogion: "I do not seek to understand in order to believe; rather, I believe in order to understand. For I also believe this: that unless I believed, I would not understand." I propose in closing that he has done he opposite of rational argumentation by allowing the wish to become the father of the thought.