The Argument from reasonable Non-Belief (ANB)

IntroductionIn the last round of the debate, I will try to highlight some of the contentious issues regarding the ANB, and to answer the objections laid out by Con thus far.Personal relationship with GodTo make it as clear as possible, the point I’m making here can be summarised as follows:All else being equal, an optimal relationship with God (involving knowledge of Him, interaction, and so forth) requires de dicto belief in Him.Con admits this but argues that epistemic distance can sometimes be necessary for people to grow spiritually and morally. In other words, de dicto non-belief can be logically necessary for an adequately compensatory good. This is where the crux of the conflict arises. Now given that the cost of de dicto non-belief (even if temporary) is a sacrifice of an optimal relationship with God, I would argue that only by meeting conditions above (that the non-belief be logically necessary for this spiritual/moral development) can Con deny P1. To be honest, it’s not that Con has failed to meet this burden, it’s more like he has not even constructed a framework for this to work. Secondly, I deny that de dicto non-belief is necessarily beneficial, and certainly not always beneficial enough to warrant separation from God for a significant period. Are there examples where de dicto non-belief causes character defects - depression from non-belief, rejection of objective moral values or familial bonds between humans, and so on? Surely there are, and if this is the case, our ability to grow morally or spiritually is prohibited in such cases, may result in a loss of moral sense. Con even argues this in a previous debate:“Nonetheless, there is good examples of without religion some people would lose their moral sense. See: Stalin's murders.” “(Morality) would seem to require religion and God. God to judge; religion to let us know of these morals.” (1)Now, clearly Con is committed not just to the value of de dicto beliefs in religion, but monotheism and Christianity in particular, and obviously this is an expression of knowing the Christian God. Given the conflict caused by differences in de dicto beliefs (religious wars and so on), as well as the benefits gained from a Christian worldview, we need to be convinced that de dicto non-belief is compensated in all cases, lest we have a case of gratuitous non-belief. Impact of non-beliefNow Con’s response to this was that the benefits would be realised anyway (in the long run) and that the costs were not necessarily the reason for depravity and so forth. As I said before, I don’t agree that the benefits/costs will be accounted for (see heaven and hell), but even if they were, Con would still have to show that their loss in the meantime would be logically necessary for an adequately compensatory good. He hasn’t even gotten this far, and I don’t think he would be successful if he were to sketch out a theodicy type defence. On his point about the effects of non-belief, I agree with him. Crucially, however, if these beliefs had ANY part to play in moral depravity (which even Con has argued they do), then ceteris paribus, we should affirm P1. Con must construct and defend that epistemic distance is for the greater good in all cases, yet has not done either. As Bill Craig points out,“To them (people in the Bible), God was not an idea adopted by the mind, but an experiential reality which gave significance to their lives. Now if this is the case, then there’s a danger that proofs for God can actually distract your attention from God Himself. If you are sincerely seeking God, God will make his existence evident to you.” (2)This gives us reasons to doubt a greater good response from the off. Lastly, it seems to me that there is just no support for this view in the bible at all, and plenty to mark against it. As Matt 7:7 unequivocally says:“Ask, and it shall be given you; seek, and ye shall find; knock, and it shall be opened unto you”Here, we can be sure that on this basis alone we can affirm what, in any other context, would be actively argued for by Christians themselves: that an optimal relationship with God is most desirable (including de dicto belief in Him), and that unless we have a massive paradigm shift, I see no reason to doubt it, and this together with 1 Tim 2:4 to affirm P1. RationalityThis point is more an implication of Con’s view, rather than direct support for P1, and despite Con protesting, it seems relevant here. Only belief is relevant here, not whether God actually governs our cognitive faculties. If we believe he does, and if we also affirm that God utilises false de dicto beliefs for some greater good, it follows that any belief we have could be used for some greater good even if false. Like the EAAN, it strips for grounding beliefs, because the guarantor of the grounding for our beliefs (God in this case) is unreliable, with regard to de dicto beliefs. As Con intimates the EAAN to be a strong argument (3), I maintain that it works in reverse, and that an unreliable de dicto belief system from God is just as groundless as he thinks blind nature is to the warrant of the naturalist.More criticismsMy point here was that claiming that even some non-belief encompasses belief in the Good for example de re is (at least partly) an empirical statement which should be justified. I see no reason to think that the nihilist who rejects morality affirms the Good de re, and Con can’t just expect me to share his assumption here. Further, he says that he is not committed to de re belief in all cases. While this is true, I find it puzzling that he sees such a distinction to be favourable to him. Any circumstance which non-belief existed de re and de dicto not only would require explanation, but would destroy the distinction between de re and de dicto belief which his rebuttal has been solely based around. Con comes dangerously close here to undermining his own case, with one single sentence. I see no reason to conclude that non-belief de dicto is belief in God de re, and unless Con wants to justify this empirical claim, his whole distinction is of no use to defuse the ANB.Heaven and hellCon reacts here to cite a passage of his own and to accuse me of assuming de dicto non-belief with heaven or hell. First, I want to make clear that I fully acknowledge belief (of any kind) is not sufficient for salvation. This is all that Con's passage (Matt 25:34-40) shows, and my position is certainly compatible with this. The passages I provide however (John 3:18; Mark 16:16) strongly suggest that de dicto beliefs about Jesus specifically are necessary (if not sufficient) for salvation, as do these passages:Knowing that a man is not justified by the works of the law, but by the faith of Jesus Christ, even we have believed in Jesus Christ, that we might be justified by the faith of Christ, and not by the works of the law for by the works of the law shall no flesh be justified. (Galatians 2:16)If a man abide not in me, he is cast forth as a branch, and is withered ; and men gather them, and cast them into the fire, and they are burned . (John 15:6)Now, all these quotes explicitly say faith in Jesus is a NECESSARY condition for salvation, and this is not solved by de re belief in Platonic concepts like The Good. Further, such passages are rife in the bible, and are often from Jesus himself. Given that non-belief is most certainly antithetical to salvation, together with 1 Tim 2:4 that God wishes all to be saved, it certainly seems like we have good grounds for affirming P1 on this point alone. Conclusion Given the level of support and resilience of P1, and Con's acceptance of P2, it seems that we must affirm we have good grounds to believe God does not exist. Sources (1) http://www.debate.org...(2) Abovehttp://www.youtube.com...(3) http://www.debate.org...