Should eminent domain be allowed for private use? (private use includes economic development)

I don't know anyone disputing the right of government to take land. The courts have made an error in upholding it for private use. As was ruled in Marbury v. Madison 1 Cranch (5 U.S.) 137 (1803): It cannot be presumed that any clause in the Constitution is intended to be without effect, and therefore such construction is inadmissible unless the words require it. The Public Use Clause was meant to be a limitation on government's ability to take property, just as the just compensation clause was. With that in mind, the only other interpretation would be that it distinguishes takings that require compensation with those that don't. But that would be going against a founding principle: all takings require compensation. And again, I refer you to the other places that "use" is applied in the constitution. Can you seriously tell me that the same interpretation of the word "use" can be applied in those two places? The word "use" in those places means "the act of employing." If that's the case, then the word should have the same meaning in Public Use, and it's hard for the public to "employ" the property when the property is given to a private individual and the public has no right to it. And again I'll emphasize, if the founders meant for it to be broad, why didn't they just say "public purpose" or "general welfare?" And to say that "public use" means "public purpose" would make it redundant with the Necessary-and-proper Clause: To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof. With the Necessary-and-proper clause, the Public Use Clause would be irrelevant if it meant "public purpose." The explicit mention of one thing excludes all others. So even if it said, "nor shall private property be taken without just compensation," they wouldn't be able to take it for whatever reason. Necessary-and-proper clause would ensure they only do it to exercise an enumerated power. The Public Use Clause was meant to be a greater limitation on the ability to take property. But now let's shift to the rulings that inspired the decision you talk about: Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112, 161-162 (1896): To irrigate, and thus to bring into possible cultivation, these large masses of otherwise worthless lands, would seem to be a public purpose, and a matter of public interest, not confined to the landowners, or even to any one section of the state. The fact that the use of the water is limited to the landowner is not, therefore, a fatal objection to this legislation. It is not essential that the entire community, or even any considerable portion thereof, should directly enjoy or participate in an improvement in order to constitute a public use. That broad statement constitutes as dictum (An opinion voiced by a judge that has only incidental bearing on the case in question and is therefore not binding), because the law in question made clear: All landowners in the district have the right to a proportionate share of the water, and no one landowner is favored above his fellow in his right to the use of the water The SCOTUS cited no authority for this dictum, and that was the first line of deviation from the Public Use Clause Then to United States v. Gettysburg Electric R. Co., 160 U. S. 668 (1896), the second line of deviation, where the government was using eminent domain to build battlefield memorials at Gettysburg. That constitutes as a public use by anyone's standards. But, the SCOTUS again engaged in dictum: In these acts of congress, and in the joint resolution, the intended use of this land is plainly set forth. It is stated in the second volume of Judge Dillon's work on Municipal Corporations (4th Ed. 600) that, when the legislature has declared the use or purpose to be a public one, its judgment will be respected by the courts, unless the use be palpably without reasonable foundation. Many authorities are cited in the note, and, indeed, the rule commends itself as a rational and proper one. That was unnecessary and unjustifiable. To defer the definition of "public use" to the legislature is like deferring to the accused the decision of whether he/she's guilty. Or to keep it in context with the Bill of Rights: Do we defer to the legislature's interpretation of when a search or seizure is "reasonable?" Of course not, because it was meant to be a limitation on their power to search and seize. So given that "public use" was meant to be a limitation on their power to take property, why would we defer to the legislature what a "public use" is? Berman v. Parker and Midkiff v. Hawaii Housing Authority also cited the dicta, and Kelo was a logical extension of that. So there you have it. The Public Use Clause was meant to be more restrictive than "public purpose," and the SCOTUS has made an error. Our founders understood that the power of taking an innocent person's property should not be a regular means of exercising their enumerated powers, but should be more restrictive. The words "Public Use" mean the government may take property only if it actually uses or gives the public a right to use the property, not if the public receives some secondary benefit. Furthermore, if "public use" meant that, given that all uses of property can be said to have some secondary benefit, any taking would be justified and the words "public use" have no meaning