DA Tournament: The Most Accurate Meta-Ethical Theory. Moral Realism (Pro) vs Moral Relativism (Con)

Moral NihilismNon-CognitivimCon attempts to square the circle here. Moral Nihilism is explicitly different to moral relativism, as it is the complete rejection of all moral judgements, thus no moral judgement can be true (moral scepticism) or true or false (moral non-cognitivism). This is explicit from moral relativism that states that moral judgements CAN have truth values, only those values are subjective. Thus Con’s attempts to affirm moral relativism via. moral nihilism effectively kills his own case.Con seems to confuse the philosophies here, since moral non-cognitivism is a branch of moral nihilism if anything, and cannot in principle be a branch of moral relativism. If anything, it is only a branch of moral-anti realism. It only serves as a mitigating argument.Existential nihilismExistential nihilism is also rather irrelevant to this debate, as it is not inclusive of all forms of moral realism and moral relativism. While all dogs are mammals, not all mammals are dogs. Thus while some moral realist and relativist philosophies take into account inherent values (such as that of a human life), it simply isn’t the case that they are contingent upon them. Thus this does not help Con affirm any philosophy, not even moral nihilism.Furthermore, Con entirely begs the question when he affirms existential nihilism. He gives this no support whatsoever for this presupposition. Why should we reject inherent purpose and value by fiat> Con simply states it is more parsimonious, but doesn’t go to any length to explain how. This is in fact, false, since it is virtually undeniable that we all have a moral sense. We are oriented to behave certain ways, to conform to certain expectations, and we have an innate sense of right and wrong. It is almost certainly a properly basic truth that is known subjectively, as are other truths such as cogito ergo sum (I doubt therefore I think, I think therefore I am) or incorrigible mental states (such as your mental state visualising the words on the screen in front of you). It is easily arguable that the moral sense is an incorrigable mental state, thus cannot be argued to not exist.Given this, it would be the one denying this basic truth that would be making the less parsimonious claim, since we are starting from basic truths and working from there, rather than starting from *no* truths and working from there. Thus it is Con’s burden to show that our sense of meaning, purpose, and moral sense is false, as we have direct access to it, much like we have direct access to visual stimuli (colour qualia), hearing, etc. It is undeniable that our other incorrigible mental states reflect something happening in reality (colour qualia for example), thus our moral sense is simply an extension of that.Argument from EvolutionCon’s argument appears to be the following:1. If morality is emergent then moral relativism is true2. If evolution is true, then morality is emergent3. Evolution is trueC. Moral Relativism is trueThe problem for Con is that he is overgeneralising what evolution does. Natural selection doesn’t lead to calculus, or art, or to literature. Evolution only explains the formation of the machinery that allows that to happen, evolution does not, and can not in principle say anything about morality except how we experience and bias certain stimuli.To give a counter-argument:1. If evolution is true, then mathematics is emergent & relative2. Mathematics is not emergent & relativeC. Evolution is falseMy first premise is affirmed using exactly the same logic that Con has used to affirm P2 of my depiction of his argument (If evolution is true then morality is emergent). Since mathematics is objective, formal and most certainly not emergent, but an objective system of truth that simply is, then it follows that evolution must be false.Thus, Either Con has to concede that evolution is false, or that his reasoning for P2 in my depiction of his argument (“If evolution is true, then mathematics is emergent & relative”) is false. In either case his evolution argument fails (since his argument uses both as premises).Furthermore, evolution simply cannot affirm moral relativism even in principle, and can only hope to support moral realism since evolution is objective, and it deals with what “is”, thus evolution is insufficient to get to an “ought” (c.f. is/ought problem), thus Con cannot affirm morality via, evolution since they are like cereal and water. They simply do not mix, and cannot ever hope to mix. Also because evolution is objective, something that is inherently subjective (such as Con’s moral system) cannot be derived from it.EgoismCon completely dodges the hurdle when it comes to actually affirming egoism as the most accurate meta-ethical theory. At best Con has only presented an alternative system that may or may not have ontological relevance. We can dream up physical theories all day, but they are only ever going to be relevant and say anything about it when we test it against reality and look for it’s logical implications.Con has not provided that with descriptive egoism. Furthermore egoism deals entirely with self-interest and desires, yet we have abundant evidence that people act outside of their major self-interests, even as far as sacrificing their own lives for others (altruism).[http://en.wikipedia.org...] We simply would not expect this IF descriptive egoism is correct.Descriptive relativismCon ignores the fact that there is significant agreement on the most important moral issues between societies, which would not be expected of moral relativism. While different cultures may have different marriage and child-raising customs we can plainly see that the moral statements that garner most agreement also garner the heaviest judicial punishments. Such as unjustified murder, child rape, etc. We would expect this not to be the case if descriptive relativism is true. Moreover it may well be the case that the facts are objective, but dependant on the situation and environment. For example, it is generally seen as “less wrong” to kill somebody in self-defence than it is to kill someone on one’s own volition. Further we do not attach heavy moral responsibility on lions eating zebra as opposed to a human poaching them, since the context is different.This is perfectly consistent with moral realism, thus Con has a long way to affirming descriptive relativism.Non-cogntivismAlready addressed this in moral non-cognitivism. Con commits a categorical error here.Con simply asserts by fiat that descriptive egoism entails non-cognitivist. Again I addressed this in non-cognitivist, since it essentially kills Con’s own case. Nothing would be right or wrong by moral relativism either, thus relativism would fail. A lack of understanding on the true nature of something doesn’t preclude it’s coherence. Again, we could coherently talk about gravity long before we understood it in physical terms. We could make superficial true/false claims about it even though we weren’t certain they actually said anything about gravity.Similarly, we at worse have the same thing with realism.EthnocentrismJust how is this an argument for moral relativism> We may have disagreements about objective phenomenon and what best describes them, but that doesn’t’;t mean those phenomenoa are not objective. Take theories in science for example, nobody generally questions that reality is objective, and there really is a “right” answer in the solution of how gravity really behaves, how electrons behave, etc. Large disagreements broke out in the advent of quantum mechanics, with scientists left rightr and centre arguing for their own theories with “central importance”, yet this in no way affirmed that the facts were themselves subjective.Con’s argument follows exactly the same line of logic. Thus ethnocentrism is not an argument for moral relativism, but merely for disagreement amongst which moral philosophies are most accurate, just as this debate is!