Substance Dualism is true

Con argues that it’s not fair to bring up epiphenomenalism in the debate. I see no such reason why. Con defined substance dualism such that I’m not bound to any specific philosophy. I clearly said in my first round that “I will simply defend the thesis that the mind and the body are two different, distinct metaphysical entities.”. Con showed no objection to this. If Con wished me to only stick to interactionism the fault is his for not setting up the debate like so. You cannot change the parameters mid debate to suit your case. He also states that I’m giving him an impossible to fulfill BOP. Although it’s an increased burden it’s far from impossible. I know because I’ve made an argument that required me to present arguments against interactionist, epiphenomenal, and property dualism. Which I did in only three paragraphs [1]. Maybe these two versions are contradictory, but that misunderstands the point. They both fit with the thesis that the mind and body are separate and that’s what matters. Mind/Body Correlations Con has agreed that his argument doesn’t necessarily show dualism is false (as he was advocating for in the last round). He is now saying it shows dualism unnecessary. I’m not sure why Con thought I agreed that the brain can account for the mind because I said no such thing. Nonetheless Con is far from showing the violin is self playing. He is committing a category mistake, as correlation doesn’t entail identity. All Con has showed that the brain is correlated with the mind, this is very very far from showing the brain is mind. Gravity and mass are correlated with each other, but this doesn’t entail that gravity is mass, nor does it refute a dualism between the two. A conductor and his symphony are correlated with each other, but this doesn’t mean the conductor is his symphony. Just as mind/body correlations don’t show an identity relationship. That idea is nonsensical. If a burglar left footprints we say the footprints correlates with the burgerlear (two separate objects) we don’t say the burglar is correlated with the burglar. Dualism isn’t unnecessary. Furthermore, the principle of parsimony is only used when we have two equal theories [2] , but we’re arguing one has superior evidence than the other thus Con’s argument only amounts to showing materialism is the default hypothesis if my arguments fail. That’s only a case if all else fails, not a case in and of itself. The argument is refuted. Problem of Interaction 1: The problem with Con’s argument is he’s taking the analogies too far. Every analogy breaks down somewhere, the point was to help us understand this mode of interaction via reaction, not to take the analogies as literal gospel. Con’s only objection is that this model introduces a third substance, but this is a strawman as I’ve said no such thing. Con really has no argument attacking the core idea of the premise. 2: Con entirely misunderstood this argument. The purpose wasn’t to propose some in depth model, but to attack a fundamental basis of the problem of interaction. If it’s possible for two things to interact without a causal link the initial basis of the problem of interaction has failed. My argument isn’t the strawman that Con has attacked. I’m not claiming that since quantum entanglement can interact with each other this proves the mind and body do the same, I’m claiming it erodes the foundation of the problem which opens up the possibility of the mind body interaction. 3: Con states I must elucidate more on this. However since Con is arguing for the problem of interaction it’s his job to show how counterfactual theories don’t allow dualism to flourish. His only argument for that is that it seems like there still needs to be a direct link. This is a misunderstanding since Con (and most materialists) are assuming anti-Humean causal theories [3]. Counterfactual theories don’t care about substances in question. All that needs to be true is that if the Cartesian mental event of willing a hand to raise exists, then a raised hand would occur. That’s all, where’s the relevance of different substances? My argument remains. The Zombie Argument Con has dropped his previous argument against my appeal to authority, so I’m guessing he concedes on that point. Con’s argument here is an extension of his first argument. However in modal terms his argument is even worse here. Con is now attempting to argue neuroscience shows the mind is the brain therefore zombies are incoherent. However, no matter what neuroscience comes up with one can always imagine the event happening without the second correlate. As I said before neuroscience only shows there exists correlations, this is even farther from showing dualism is incoherent. For example a conductor’s movements are correlated with playing musical instruments, but this doesn’t entail that a possible world without a conductor and with playing instruments is somehow contradictory. Or if clapping of the hands is correlated with a crying child doesn’t mean there’s something contradictory with the idea that the child might not cry when the hands clap or he might cry when the hands don’t clap. Just like something like say C fiber firing is correlated with the feeling of pain doesn’t entail there’s something wrong with saying C fiber firing might cause no feeling at all. Con’s rebuttal here fails. The Knowledge Argument It’s very very difficult to understand what Con is saying here, as he’s misusing terms left and right. The third person/first person distinction in philosophy of mind has to do with science (third person) and qualia (first person) [4]. However Con is using it in terms of people translating information into things like language and imagery. Furthermore fundamentally is about the core or base of something [5] saying two things are fundamentally different but both physical is a contradiction since physical refers to something fundamental. What I get from Con's argument is that people translating first person information for Mary doesn’t give her complete information. However no where did I say people translated all of Mary’s information for her. She would’ve learned her information not from other people’s mouths but from the brain states of people. This makes Con’s argument a strawman The resolution is affirmed. Now to Con for his final. Sources [1] http://www.debate.org... [2] http://math.ucr.edu... [3] Lycan, William (2009). Giving dualism its due. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):551-563. [4] http://consc.net... [5] http://www.oxforddictionaries.com...