This Argument for the Existence of God Doesn't Work

(7) "Something can constrain something else, yet not be the cause of its existence." Well, we aren't applying it to just anything, but specifically the First Cause. So, is this possible with the First Cause? Well, except for the principle of non-contradiction, anything that would constrain the First Cause would have to be created by the first cause. However, if there is a constraint that is created, then it can be added or removed. But you are talking about constraints that prevent something from being infinite. Now, if there are constraints that make something finite, those constraints must exist. However, those constraints must have a cause. Therefore, all constraints must originate from the First Cause (with the exception of the principle of non-contradiction). Perfection- that which nothing more cannot be added onto in order to make better. This idea you gave is good to look at. (Approx. quote) "Perfection doesn't mean immutable. Something could be perfect, yet could change. For example, a perfect circle can be moved from place A to B or have its size and radius changed." That sounds like you know what the definition of perfect is (so why don't you just help me out and you give a definition of perfect before I do?). Now, when you say a perfect thing can change and still be perfect, you failed to take note that you were changing things that had nothing to do with the perfection of that thing. However, with the First Cause, if it is perfect in every way, then you can't change it at all without it losing its perfection. The First Cause is perfect in every way because it is the source of everything that exists (and so nothing more that exists (and there is nothing that doesn't exist) can be added onto it). Also, I don't know how you can make the First Cause imperfect, as the only way to limit it is through things which don't exist, but the problem is that those things which don't exist, don't exist! We can only use things that exist to limit other things that exist! (10) Ax -- (changes to) --> 0! Problem Solved! Nothing = 0! Man, you want me to define things that people are familiar with. That's not bad, but you do it before I do. Good, you did do that. I agree that change implies going from one state to another. Oh wait! That sounds like the informal definition of change that I gave previously, which states that "you go from something you don't have to something you do have!" I should include that vice versa applies as well. Oh you. "Something doesn't have to formally have something else in order to give it." For example, what about heat from friction? My response? E = mc^2. That's right. Energy = Mass times a constant, squared. Therefore, mass formally is energy (a multiple of mass). Friction deals with mass and molecules, and results in energy in the form of heat (One can look at https://www.quora.com... for a possible explanation on friction). As a side note, make sure to take potential energy into account. Also, your argument once again presupposes that something can come from nothing, but you haven't talked about my Round 2 proof. Also, I would argue that I do have to formally have something else in order to give it. I can't give a library book that I borrowed if I don't have it with me. If I were to give something of a different form, like a rock, they wouldn't say, "Well thank you! I can't wait to read it!" You can play the name game, and call a watch a pizza all you want, but that doesn't make the watch edible. The form needs to be there. Premise 2a: The " is meant to be . . ., but " means that the symbol wasn't recognized. I meant for A to be {c1, c2, c3, . . .} Then, define C to be what is ~A. Then, C = { {c1}, {c1, c2}, {c1, c2, c3}, . . . }. Actually, I just realized that C isn't ~A, but a proper subset of ~A. For example, C doesn't have c2 (= c[2]), or c[a] or c[b], or a whole bunch of other chains. It just has one particular chain. So, I would refine one of the previous sentences to be: "Then, define C to contain elements which are only in ~A." P1: A exists. P2: C is an orderly chain consisting of elements that is in ~A, constructed by the following: a subsequence of length n that is in C has n subelements which correspond to the n most recent causes timewise in terms of A. P3: A is an element of C (by construction of C). P4: Therefore, A both can't exist (by P2 and P3) and does exist (by P1). Your problem in your P1 is that it fails to connect the P1 you gave me, A and C, with brain and Socrates. You would have to say P1 (based off of the P2 you gave me of "C is not A (by definition)) is this: A brain is an element in ~Socrates (or a brain is not an element in Socrates). But you probably meant to say that a brain is an element in Socrates. Therefore, your P1 would be obviously false if it were to line up with the P1 you gave me: "A is an element of C". However, you have yet to show me how the P1 (with the P2 definition you gave me) you gave me is false. So, your logic is confusing when you link it to my logic here, because Socrates is ~something, and ~Socrates is something, the way your argument is set up. Your P2: In the P2 of "C is ~A (by definition), I realized that the way I said this isn't accurate. So, let's change it to, "C only has certain, specific elements of ~A." Now, given that, your P2 is obviously not true (with my use of logical not), but you haven't shown me why the P2 you gave me isn't true. (Keep in mind that I could define C to be ~A, and then just have some proper subset D of C as part of my proof, so I would have two steps, but you can't define C to be ~A in your argument without committing a fallacy, meaning you can't copy the first step I did here). I think you once again commit an equivocation fallacy. Socrates isn't everything that isn't a brain. Socrates isn't a spleen. Now, just because I'm not trying to prove yet that this makes your argument not work doesn't mean you don't have to resolve this problem. That being said, fallacies prevent proofs. You failed to learn about my logical ~. You can't say you are a ~head, because you aren't a pancreas. Premise 4: That's fine if you want me to show that acausality can't be real (except for the First Cause). You still haven't commented on my proof from Round 2 against the idea that a thing can pop into existence without a cause, which does rule out this possibility if the proof is true. Now, it is good to ask how the First Cause wasn't caused by anything. Well, other than by logical necessity from premises 2, 2a, and 2b (since the causal-chain and time are both finite, which can be shown by these premises), and by definition of First Cause as Existence, the question needs a reason for it to be asked, such as something coming to existence in time. However, the First Cause has no beginning, from the proof I gave in Round 2, else nothing caused something to exist, which caused everything else to exist. Note that this is different from saying that Existence was shared or given to something that previously didn't exist. You fail to see that nothing is a contraction of not-anything. For the fact that there is no explanation for why some things happen, see my proof from Round 2, but also the fact that just because we don't know of a cause doesn't mean there isn't one. Why does the universe have to be explainable? See my Round 2 argument. The universe doesn't just pop into existence on its own because that would be like saying it caused itself to exist, which you and I argued was absurd. It isn't from nothing by my Round 2 argument. For your dilemma, you fail to include the situation that one thing doesn't have a cause. If there were more uncaused things, they would identical to the First Cause, because they are infinite, and boundless, and therefore indistinguishable, because if one has something the other doesn't, then they are bounded. What happened to Occam's Razor? If you're wrong, admit it. Be polite.