Resolved: Economic sanctions ought not be used to achieve foreign policy objectives

Intro: I affirm the resolution. Economic sanctions have repeatedly been shown as an inefficient and worse inhumane method of accomplishing diplomatic goals. For the purposes of this debate, my value is the efficiency and benevolence of any purported action in the area of foreign policy. The criterion for determining the best possible action will be both the ability of any specific course of action to accomplish stated objectives in addition to the total happiness and prosperity produced in the outcome. Through this case, I will show how economic sanctions are a thoroughly unfavorable method and how there are many better possibilities. Definitions: To begin my case, I must define certain terms. First off, ‘economic sanctions' are define as "government mandated limitations and domestic penalties applied by one or more countries on customary trade or financial relations among nations." Secondly, ‘achieve' is defined as "to bring to a successful end". Because the successful achievement of an objective is only possible through an efficient strategy and economic sanctions are not as such, the resolution must be affirmed. C1. Although the purpose of any purported diplomatic action is to achieve certain objectives, economic sanctions fail miserably at this criterion. S1. Because of the callousness of sanctions, millions of those affected have suffered greatly. Joy Gordon says: "As Walzer notes, siege is the oldest form of war waged against both soldiers and civilians. In siege, noncombatants are not only exposed, but in fact are more likely to be killed than combatants, given that the goal of siege "is surrender, not by defeat of the enemy army, but by the fearful spectacle of the civilian dead." Thus, siege warfare has the quality of actually inverting the principle of discrimination. Siege operates by restricting the economy of the entire community, creating shortages of food, water, and fuel. Those who are least able to survive the ensuing hunger, illness, and cold are the very young, the elderly, and those who are sick or injured. Thus the direct consequence of siege is that harm is done to those who are least able to defend themselves, who present the least military threat, who have the least input into policy or military decisions, and who are most vulnerable to hunger, cold, and illness." These sanctions, which support the suffering of the young and the elderly, are indefensible and thus obviously to be thrown out. S2. As history has shown multitudes of times, inhabitants of a country have an innate tendency to group closer in a nationalistic sense when threatened. Joy Gordon says: "The most extensive study of sanctions episodes in this century estimates that sanctions are "a factor" in achieving the target state's compliance about one-third of the time. But even this figure has been challenged as far too optimistic. The typical response of a people in the face of sanctions is in fact to "rally 'round the flag," and support the leadership in the face of foreign coercion. That response has characterized sanctions situations from Italian support for Mussolini in the face of the League of Nations' boycott and Serbian support of Slobodan Milosevic, to the U.S. response to the Arab oil boycott of the 1970s." As you can see, the only effect of applying sanctions will have the opposite effect than intended: the people, rather than taking down the opposing regime or leader, will only more forcefully support them, thus making our efforts worse than useless. C2. Because of the utter inefficiency of and harm done by economic sanctions, they ought not be used for the accomplishment of most if not all foreign policy objectives, thus affirming the resolution. S1. In terms of the resolution, it is asked if economic sanctions "ought" to be used to accomplish a certain action. The word "ought," in addition to the oft-used meaning relating to morality, can also be put forward the concept that if an object or ideal is unable to or less efficient at accomplishing a particular objectives For example, one would not use a handsaw in order to cut down a tree; one would use a chainsaw. In addition, one would use a flashlight to light up a dark room, and not a fish. Similarly, the term "ought" is based on the efficiency of any particular action; if one purported action is more cost-effective than another, it "ought" to be used, thus fulfilling the resolution. In addition, the negative must show how economic sanctions are better and thus must be used as opposed to any possible alternate course of action. As the negative cannot possibly supply every possible scenario's cons, it is limited only to the defending of the one indefensible position of sanctions. C3. As the resolution is specifically searching for a viable method of achieving diplomatic objectives, any action that is in itself more efficient than economic sanctions should be used, thus negating the resolution. S1. The primary issue with the use of sanctions is their indiscriminate nature in the area of unintentional suffering directed at those least able to afford it. However, as a better alternative to the general, malevolent sanctions mentioned in the resolution, better "smart sanctions" exist which, although they may seem similar to the topic being debated, in reality have very little relation to the former. William H. Kaempfer says: "In the same way, if sufficient intelligence existed on the sources of wealth of specific politically important individuals in a target nation, measures could be carefully aimed to reduce that wealth. Such sanctions are commonly referred to as "smart sanctions." The individuals singled out by smart sanctions could be either major political operatives behind the objectionable policy or their key supporters. In either event, the role of smart sanctions is to identify those responsible and to increase the cost to them of engaging in that behavior found to be objectionable in the sanctioning countries. An example would be the freezing of assets owned abroad by members of the target elite, of which more below. S2. Secondly, there is always the chance that diplomatic talks will produce fruit. This is especially the case if there are independent warring factions in the sanctioned country; in this situation, the US could offer aid to a faction which holds shared goals in order to jointly take down the present administration. In addition, direct talks with the leaders of the opposing government could have a good chance of being fruitful. For example, talks with North Korea in 2004, at least until the advent of its failed satellite attempt in 2009, offered a great opportunity to achieve normal relations and so freeze its nuclear weapons production. S3. A final possible route to take, in the extremely unlikely event of all others mentioned failing, would be, although somewhat more objectionable than mentioned before, a militaristic act of diplomacy. In essence, the threat of military invasion is used as a bargaining chip against a regime that would otherwise ignore any efforts to bring it down. Even if primary threats did not always work, the follow through would always be likely; however, the primary target of any such venture would be the elite ruler who the army is being mobilized against. Any obstructionist civilians could be dealt with infinitely more gently than they would otherwise in an economic sanction scenario. The effort would, in effect, a humanitarian war. The only objective would be to remove the opposition quickly and lethally, thus making a quick and successful strike against the heart of the opposition as well as minimizing collateral damage and so winning the minds of the oppressed citizens, as well as other prominent nations. Due to the evidence presented, there is no possible rational choice but to affirm the resolution.