Physics is not able to determine whether or not A or B theory is true.

The topic we are discussing is fundamentally philosophical, not scientific. The resolution relates to determining whether or not a particular philosophy of time can be supported by physical evidence. The study of the implications of scientific evidence on what was traditionally philosophical questions is referred to as the philosophy of physics. Because this is fundamentally a philosophical issue, we must utilize the vocabulary of philosophy, and only employ the vocabulary of other fields, such as science, when the invokation of such vocabulary is necessary for our discussion. For this reason, it is clear that we do not have to use the vocabulary of science when it relates to the meaning of the word "theory".Con's position contradicts itself. Con informs the audience that neither the A-theory of time nor the B-theory of time offer testable predictions. However, he late claims that empirical evidence has falsified both interpretations. However, if this is the case, then it must also be the case that both theories offer testable predictions. Con states that both theories of time assume a "universal present". Con fails to precisely define this term, so it impossible to address the truth of this assertion. However, if we are to assume that Con is right in suggesting that both theories of time assume a universal present, then his position contradicts itself. If experiments showing that there is no universal present falsify both theories of time, then one testable prediction of the A and B theory must be that "two observers moving differently will not disagree on how much time has passed". Otherwise, the fact that experiments show that two observers will not always agree on simultaneity would do nothing to falsify either idea.I will now proceed to explain why the current state of physics is not able to determine whether or not A or B theory is true. The only theories in physics which have obtained consensus are theories like Newtonian mechanics, quantum mechanics, special and general relativity, and the other physics such as fluid and solid-state mechanics. However, these physical theories only have applications under certain physical conditions and scales. For example, Newtonian mechanics is true as an approximation, but Newton's physics fails to hold at speeds closer to c (the speed of light). At this scale, Einstein's special relativity must be used. However, Einstein's special relativity is only true for inertial reference frames, and the physicist mut invoke general relativity in order to speak about non-inertial reference frames as well. However, this theory is inconsistent with the empirical results of quantum mechanics, such as Alain Aspect's and other Aspect-type experiments using Bell's inqualities. These experiments indicate that at the quantum scale, there are insantaneous, non-local causal correlations between distant particles. If one measures the spin-state of a particle X, then the spin state of a spatially distant particle Y will instantaneously become anti-correlated, or take the opposite spin. This is contradictory with general relativity's principle of locality, which states that if two objects are to causally influence each other, then they must do so through successive space-time points. Indeed, the fact that Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen utilized relativity's assumption of locality as an argument against quantum mechanics in the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paper's EPR paradox shows how deeply embedded the assumption of locality is in relativity.As this shows, when one looks at the only physical theories with an established consensus, none of them are true for every scale, and instead have their own applications in certain physical conditions and scales. Because of this, one can never make the argument that "General relativity is true, therefore X is also true", because general relativity, in a sense, is only an approximation. One can only employ conditional logical statements like "If general relativity is true, then X is also true". Now, let us imagine that we let X represent the A-theory of time. If this is the case, then no established physical theory can be used to prove that the A-theory of time is false. The same reasoning is true if we let X represent the B-theory of time. (General relativity is merely a generic placeholder for any of the physical theories mentioned.)One may ask how this contention deals with the unified theories in physics which are said to apply to all physical scales and conditions. While some purport to do this, we must remember that none of these theories have any well-confirmed evidence, and await confirmation in the distant future. Therefore, they do not in any sense "determine" either of the two theories to be false, as they are on such weak empirical grounding that they cannot accomplish it.To conclude, Con approaches the resolution with a misconception; The misconception is that he has failed to utilize the correct vocabulary for this issue. Furthermore, his arguments against the resolution only serve to contradict each other, thus supporting the Pro position. Finally, all established physical theories only work at certain scales, and are therefore not "strictiy true". For this reason, one can only make conditional statements about the consistency of either theory of time with physics, and one can never make the assertion that it disproves either theory of time.I thank Con for a stimulating debate, and turn this over to him.