Resolved: The Ontological Argument is Sound

(See explanation in comments before reading.) Your argument in all of its forms is a proof by contradiction. First, I will address the original. I will only present the relevant lines in order to make it more readable: A - It is possible that a maximally great being exists, so it exists in some possible world. B - If it existed in only some possible worlds, it would not be maximally great, as it would be even greater to exist in ALL possible worlds. C - Therefore, it must exist in all possible worlds. What definition of great must we use to allow us to assert that it would be "greater" to exist in all possible worlds? Throughout the debate, I have proposed two: 1 - "Powerful; posessing the ability to accomplish." 2 - “Of major significance or importance." You presented a third: 3 - "having unusual merit, very admirable." As you can see, the definition we use is crucial in determining the conclusion of your argument, or whether it even flows. If we use the first definition, your maximally great being is not a god, which was the conclusion of your argument, as indicated at the end of the first round. You did not object to this; you merely stated that my definition was inadequate. It is also quite obvious that if we use the second or third definition, statement B is false, as existing in all possible worlds does not make a being greater under those terms. In rounds 2 and 3, you avoid this by stating that you have provided properties that a maximally great being would have. This is entirely meaningless unless we define how we measure greatness. For example, under definition 3, a maximally great being need not have these qualities; it can be admirable AND useless. In round 5, you indicate that great can simulateously mean all of its definitions. For example, it can mean a combination of the above 3. This simply cannot be, for those definitions can interfere. Again, I propose that under definition 2, I am the greatest being. Under definition 1, obviously an omnipotent being would be maximally great. If I were omnipotent, this would be even greater than either of the other two, and thus an omnipotent me would be the maximally great being. If we prove the existence of a maximally great being using those 2 joint definitions, we have just proved the existence of an omnipotent me! This is why we must stick to one definition of the word per argument and/or prioritize them. You attempt to face my request for a definition of "great" for the first time in rounds 3 and 4 by posting a different version of the argument in which you avoid using that word: A - It is possible that a being which is omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent, and necissarily-existing exists, so it exists in some possible world. B - If it exists in some possible worlds, it exists in ALL possible worlds. C - Therefore, it must exist in all possible worlds. I will restate this point: "Any form of argument in which the conclusion may be false given true premises is invalid." Here are your objections to the gods I presented, which you list in round 5: "...Maximal Horribleness does not, in itself, warrant the application of omnipotence and omniscience." If we define "Horrible" as, "Causing fear or dread or terror," a being which is omnipotent would certainly cause more fear than a limited being. You suggest that it would not need to be able to create a universe, but how horrible could it be if it were not able to create things which it could terrify and maim? Omniscience would also enhance the horribleness of the being. Thus, both of these qualities are musts for a maximally horrible being. You do make the claim that maximal horribleness contradicts omnipotence, but you do not back this up. Anticipating spectators' feelings toward this claim, note that this is only true in the case that maximal horribleness implies that some things are not logically possible, such as saving a kitten from a tree. The fact that the maximally horrible being is unwilling to help a kitten from a tree does not mean that it, in principle could not help a kitten from a tree. Furthermore, I am of the opinion that a being which could help the kitten and instead chooses not to is more horrible than a being which simply could not. "There cannot be a MG irritating or competitive being because such a being would necessarily have to rely on things to irritate and things to compete with (as you demonstrate)." I can easily conceive of necessarily-existent beings possessing these qualities. There need not exist things which the maximally irritating being can annoy. There also need not exist a being with which the maximally competitive being can compete. It would be within the power of each of these beings under their omnipotence to create things to irritate with which to compete. Similarly, as per your definition of a maximally great being, such a being would be omnibenevolent. There need not exist a field in which this being can do good works; it can create a field within which it can do good works Unless you want to concede that your argument structure is invalid, you must accept the existence of these beings. Fortunately, no one need accept their existence as the argument structure is demonstrably invalid via the use of another god. I conceived of this god in a rather absurd dream last night: the maximally detectable being. The maximally detectable being would have to be omnipotent to ensure circumstances under which it would be detected. The maximally detectable being would have to be omniscient to ensure it has knowledge of all states of the universe with which it manipulates circumstances via its omnipotence to maximize its detectability. The maximally detectable being is necessarily existing. And finally, the maximally detectable being ensures that the minds it creates would be aware of the presence of the maximally detectable being with 100% certainty. Assume your argument structure is valid. It is possible that a maximally detectable being exists. If your argument structure is valid, the maximally detectable being can be proven to exist using that structure. Therefore, the maximally detectable being must exist. If the maximally detectable being exists, you and I would detect it with 100% certainty. Neither you nor I have detected this being, therefore it does not exist. This proves either that one of your premises is false or that your argument structure is invalid. Some minor points from round 5: [1]: I need not give an argument for a claim I did not make. If you read what I wrote, I said nothing of brains. If an entity does not have a mind, it is not logically possible for it to do things which require a mind. You have not shown it to be the case that mindlessness contradicts omnipotence, because all of the things you claim are logically possible without a brain, which I do not deny, DO require a MIND. Again... the non-conscious entity's omnipotence remains intact. [2]: Note that my statement was in response to another claim you made in round 4: "Sure, an omnipotent thing need not do anything if IT CHOOSES NOT TO. But that entails its ability to choose." The rock is not thinking "I'm not going to do anything today." The rock is simply not choosing to do anything as it cannot choose. The non-conscious entity is not thinking "I'm not going to exercise my limitless power." It is simply not exercising its limitless power because it does not have the ability to do so. If it had that ability, it would contradict its mindlessness, which you never successfully proved to be impossible. [3]: I did concede the existence of a "maximally great being." However, the existence of an utterly useless thing was not your conclusion. Although I conceded the existence of something with the same name as what you arguing for the existence of, it is not the same thing; I have not conceded the debate.