Targeted Killing is a morally permissible foreign policy tool

As stated in the rules, my case is posted in the following google document link:https://docs.google.com...#Please read through that before continuing on reading here.Assuming you just read through my case, let's go to refuting his.Let's start with his criterion of Rule-Util. This is flawed for a number of reasons: First: Utilitarianism fails because the definition of what our results are, good or bad, is all relative. I could say that the result of punching a baby in the face meant that I received a piece of candy, which could be defined as a good outcome or that if I were to tackle my friend in order to save him from being hit by a car and break his ribs in the process, even though I possibly saved him, I injured him in possibly a worse way which could be seen as a negative outcome. Second: Utilitarianism doesn’t make sense because we can never really be sure what an end is and what is just a link into a different impact. We can never know that if nuclear war were to happen, it would cause aliens to come and give us some amazing technology that betters humanity as a race. Moreover, it stops us from acting because we can never finish calculating the infinite possible things that make an end good, making it self-effacing because it doesn’t actually bring about good ends. Third: Under util, we can never be sure that a proposition is 100% true. As long as someone promises that an action will bring about an end with a massive profit for all, society then has to take that route, even if they don’t believe it to be true. As long as someone promises a large enough impact, society then has to follow what he says, making util self-effacing. Fourth: Conceptions of morality that are based off of desirability are circular. Parfit[1] writes: According to desire-based theoriesreasons have to be provided by facts about what would fulfill our present desires. If we want future happiness as an end, this could give us instrumental reasons to have other desires, since it would give us reasons to want whatever would make us happy. But the fact that we had this desire could not give us a reason to have it. Desires cannot be self-supporting. Our wanting happiness as an end could not give us a reason to want happiness as an end. This applies to util because the desire to maximize good bites straight into what this is saying. Our desire to maximize good cannot give us reason to actually maximize good. Our desires cannot be self-supporting, and since util is self-supporting, it’s logically circular, and thus flawed. Fifth: Aggregation is nonsensical since combining disparate experiences is impossible. Ten headaches don’t become one migraine as there is no actor capable of experiencing the collective pain of ten people. Rather, moral theories must recognize individuals’ subjective claims, which doesn’t require that we minimize suffering since my happiness is only valuable for my sake - we can’t weigh between 2 individuals’ interests.But if you don't buy any of the five reasons I've already talked about, you can refer to my case, which proves that morality is subjective. If morality is subjective, as per the Joyce evidence, then nothing can be morally permissible. So this functions before any of the rest of the arguments. If I'm winning off of my case, it's impossible for my opponent to win. Now let's talk about his observation one. There's two things that I'd like to point out as slightly contradictory. He says that in order to get into the UN, you have to be "peace-loving". Last I checked, killing someone wasn't exactly a really peaceful thing to do. Regardless of who you're killing, it's still a bit violent, which, last I checked, was the opposite of peaceful. The second thing I'd like to point out is in his Article 51 fo the UN charter, he says that any member of the UN should prevent things like self-defense. But he then defines targeted killing as preemptive, which means it happens BEFORE any sort of attack that would warrant self-defense. So under the UN, targeted killing wouldn't be justified, as per his definition of targeted killing. With his observation one self-refuted, let's turn to observation two, which is the Doctrine of Double Effect. There's a few fatal errors here that I would like to point out. The first is the Doctrine of Double effect is a deontic argument, which is directly contradictory with his framework of utilitarianism. This means that even if you're buying this argument, it is impossible for it to justify anything under his framework. The second thing is that it's impossible to accurately judge the intentions of a person without devolving into a form of "he said she said" bickering. I could say that I intended to save people, but there's no way to actually verify if that is what I intended, which makes the Doctrine of Double Effect unverifiable.Before we get to his contention level arguments, I'd like to point out one little detail: without a framework to link into, his contention level arguments have no impact in the round. His contention level arguments, even if they are true, have to link into some sort of framework to prove anything in round. Since I'm refuting his framework of utilitarianism, they have nothing to link into. Thus, even if you don't buy my refutations on his contentions, they don't really matter in the round anyway. Let's start with contention one. This is the easiest one to refute, as it is hingent upon his observations one and two being true. Since I've already refuted both of those observations, there's literally no warrant to this argument. No warrant means we can't be sure if it's true or not, and thus we can put it aside and ignore it. His contention two talks about how targeted killing is a last resort to terrorism, but I'm trying to find an impact to this argument, and it's all in vain. There isn't an impact to this argument. He lists a bunch of things that terrorists try to do to prevent being killed, but he never justifies why this actually matters.With contention two impact-less, let's look to contention three, which utilizies, in my opinion, one of the most ridiculous arguments in existence. My opponent seems to assume that because something is effective, it makes it morally permissible. I do not deny that targeted killing IS effective, but this doesn't make it morally permissible. While throwing all the people who appose you into shower stalls and spraying poisonous gas all Nazi-style is quite the effective way to establish dominance, it hardly makes it morally permissible. Unless my opponent wishes to argue events like the Holocaust being morally permissible, this argument is refuted.With his entire case gone through, the round breaks down pretty simply. There's three levels to this debate:1. The negative case. If I'm proving skepticism true, then you negate a priori to the rest of the debate.2. The affirmative framework. If I'm disproving this, there's nothing for his contention level arguments to link to to prove targeted killing is morally permissible, thus making you negate.3. The contention level arguments for my opponent's case. He must be winning sufficient offence and refuting my arguments against his to get sufficient offense to affirm. If he's not doing this, then you still negate, as he isn't proving anything.If I'm winning off of any of these layers, then you negate. My opponent must be winning on all three in order to win the debate.Thusly, I urge a con vote. [1]Parfit, Derek (Philosophy Professor, Oxford University). Climbing the Mountain (Unpublished).