United Nations peacekeepers should have the power to engage in offensive operations.

I'll use my final round to defend my case and present some voting issues. I was expecting con to not only attack my case, but also rebut my attacks on his case. Con did not do this; he may rebut these claims during the final round, but I would like to remind voters that con may not use new evidence. With that, I would like to extend these attacks because some very important points I made during my last round have gone unanswered.Before I begin with my rebuttal, I would like to address what has probably become the most important issue in the round.The status quo:Under the status quo, offensive operations have been allowed for the past 60 years or so under mandate VII. Con's continual defense of the status quo should be turned to my side. As I pointed out during the previous round, con's evidence actually supports the use of mandate VII. His source explains: "...but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII." It is worth noting that the UN hasn't utilized the mandate as much as they should have, but there have been offensive operations used in the past.Moving on to rebut con's attacks:C1: Military peacekeeping requires offense.Con explains that the goal of the UN is *not* to punish violence, and he would be absolutely correct. However, the goal of the UN peacekeepers is to assist in the transition from conflict to peace and attaching a cost to violence is necessary to accomplish this goal in many situations. Specifically, Rwanda and Congo.Con then moves on to put my example of the successful offensive operation in Congo up against the lack of success with ISIS. There are a few reasons why this comparison doesn't work. Firstly, con never talks about *un peacekeeper* involvement with ISIS. Secondly, con never talks about *offensive operations* being used to deter ISIS. This is a red herring because con is basically saying, "Successful un peacekeeping operations don't necessitate their authorization because ISIS is a problem." Yet these two things are entirely unrelated.So, (a) attaching a cost to violence *does* lead to the achievement of UN peacekeeping goals in some cases and (b) offensive operations have been successful in the present (and the past, which I will elaborate more on later). Obviously offensive operations don't guarantee peace. Absolutely no operation can guarantee success. However, after looking at past "robust" mandates, it isn't hard to come to the conclusion that offensive operations can increase the likelihood of success.C2: The authorization of offensive operations lead to peace.POINT A: EfficacyCon has entirely dropped one of my most important pieces of evidence. I'll go ahead and extend it: Green explains in a meta-analysis of offensive operations that, “peace enforcement operations are most successful when they utilize the appropriate spoiler management strategy and maintain impartiality and legitimacy through close cooperation with UN peacekeepers(5).” He documents that peace enforcement has a “318% to 369% hazard ratio of civil war termination controlling for force capability (6),” meaning that the risk of a country being able to prevent a civil war is 3 times more likely.This meta analysis encompasses all of the offensive operations used in the past and shows that they have decreased conflict significantly. Con is strawmanning my argument when he sums up my terminology as "offensive operations can rather than offensive operations do." My argument explains that offensive operations *have done* well in the past and *can* do well in the future. Congo was a success, as were less recent operations encompassed in Green's analysis. Whether or not defensive operations are effective is almost entirely irrelevant because all I have to show it that offensive operations can be more effective, which I have done. Remember, the UN didn't use force in Congo for a year and a half, and the situation only got worse.POINT B: DeterrenceCon explains that such operations undermine the sovereignty of nation states, which contradicts the principles of the UN. Firstly, observe that peace enforcement can act as an exception to the general need for consent of the parties (and this is stated by the UN). Even then, offensive operations are usually preformed with the consent of the government in the particular area. For example, the Congolese government supported the UN's brigade that disarmed the M23 rebels. Con says that this only worked because France had the authority to act in such a manner (and by extension, it won't work for the UN because they don't have such power). I'll make three points:(a) Con essentially concedes that a deterrence effect *would* kick in if the UN had the power the France has.(b) If the UN continues to be given the power to engage in offensive operations, they *can* extend an over the horizon guarantee to other countries, thus the deterrence effect will kick in.(c) Even if the UN doesn't issue a formal agreement like France did, deterrence will still be seen. Look again to Congo. Since the M23 rebels have laid down their arms and signed a peace treaty, this spreads a message of how futile continued conflict is to other rebel groups.I'd also like to extend a point I made during the previous round.UN Goals and Principles:In my rebuttal, I explained that con has no empirical evidence supporting the idea that the UN's goals and principles are violated by offensive action. He explains all these negative impacts, but never shows how offensive operations have caused such problems or why they could cause such problems. Thus, as a reader, you should not buy his arguments pertaining to the dangers of offensive operations.C3: UN is the best organization to be able to perform such operations.I'd like to start by touching on the status quo yet again. Since offensive operations *are* being utilized currently, and *have* been utilized in the past, con cannot legitimately argue that their use causes the UN to lose credibility. In fact, the only actual evidence that talks about the UN losing credibility that has been brought up in the round is the Rwandan genocide, where offensive action was needed, yet the UN did nothing. Con has not substantiated the claim that UN operations are preferred due to absence of aggression, most likely because this isn't true.As I cannot bring up new evidence, I will not be able to further my point about non-UN operations being *worse.* It will be up to the voters to decide whether or not they buy the UN's current level of credibility, when compared with other organizations like NATO and the EU. However, I have clearly shown that the UN peacekeepers are an effective organization, furthering the idea that they have been capable and still are capable of using offensive operations.This contention doesn't contradict my third contention because my observation explains that such operations are a tool in the toolbox. They won't be used in every circumstance because they won't be needed in other circumstance. However, the fact that peacekeepers are an effective force furthers the idea that they can handle offensive operations when needed. Just because the UN peacekeepers have done well with defensive operations doesn't mean they don't need to use offensive operations occasionally.Now, I'll present some voters. They will be short because I'm tired afHere's why you should vote pro:1. Offensive operations are needed: Rwandan Genocide, 1.5 years in Congo of continually worsening conflict2. Offensive operations are good: 3 times more likely to reduce the risk of civil war (as shown by past operations VIA THE UN)3. Offensive operations lead to less conflict long term: deterrence effect of 75% by French peacekeepers utilizing offensive operations4: The UN can do this shiznit well: shown by my green meta analysis, peacekeepers are an effective force, thus making them more capable to engage in offensive operations