Resolved: The United States ought to limit qualified immunity for police officers.

Counter-Plan Text: The United States will initialize civilian oversight to determine justice in cases of qualified immunity. Meltzer ‘14[1] "the current ... qualified immunity doctrine ... permits the use of nonjudicial statements of law in the qualified immunity analysis but impliedly demands it as a practical matter for continued constitutional … norm generation … qualified immunity … is rooted in considerations of notice, fairness, and culpability, the proposal rests on the premise that findings of external oversight bodies serve the same purpose and bear many of the same characteristics—as … sources of law cited by the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts in qualified immunity rulings … the findings of oversight bodies should be entitled to at least the same weight in the qualified immunity analysis as internal police regulations and advisory reports … where binding case law supports the existence of the right asserted by the plaintiff, an oversight finding can serve as additional evidence of notice or culpability, similar to the ATF directive in Groh and the ADOC regulation and DOJ report in Hope. … where binding case law is conflicting, an oversight finding can serve as a tiebreaker—occupying a space somewhere between an internal policy statement and a persuasive judicial opinion. … where no binding case law exists on point and persuasive case law is either supportive or conflicting, an oversight finding can serve as a tiebreaker with a thumb on the scale in favor of recognizing the right in question—situating the finding closer to a binding judicial opinion. … oversight bodies should formalize and publicize all of their merits findings." This solves for unjustified qualified immunity claims, which solves for the entirely of the harms from the Aff. The board takes things out of the hands of the courts and thoroughly review each case with unbiased standpoints. Meltzer ‘14[1] "Civilian oversight represents a critical component of the patchwork of police regulation in the [US]. Given the limited effect of constitutional criminal procedure,the problems inherent in internal police oversight mechanisms and the ... barriers to ... criminal … sanctions on individual police officers … external oversight bodies reach police conduct that might otherwise escape reproach. … civilian oversight agencies play a vital role in developing the law of the police by addressing legal claims silenced by settlement in the civil arena. ... civilian oversight ... involves participation by persons who are not sworn officers (citizens) in the review of citizen complaints against the police and/or other allegations of misconduct by police officers. ... Civilian external supervisory bodies ... examine the investigations conducted by internal police investigative units. ... investigatory agencies “embody a criminal trial model of citizen oversight.” Investigations are directed at determining guilt or innocence in a discrete case and are governed by “elaborate rules of procedure designed to protect the rights of accused officers.” ... investigations are highly fact intensive, requiring the collection of testimonial, physical, and documentary evidence akin to what might be seen in a criminal or civil trial. ... the investigative findings of oversight bodies resemble the sources of law that may support a ruling on qualified immunity. ... unlike civilian in-house oversight bodies, civilian external investigatory bodies are entirely independent from the departments they regulate. This separation confers a presumption of neutrality—and ... legitimacy—on their investigative findings. ... by virtue of the novel factual scenarios they routinely encounter in the course of their investigations, civilian external investigatory bodies are constantly engaged in constitutional-norm generation. ... for qualified immunity purposes. ... the Court has endorsed the use of various forms of nondecisional law to demonstrate the sort of fair notice and culpability required to justify imposing individual § 1983 liability on a government agent." Meltzer ‘14[1] continues, "the Supreme Court ... never set forth a categorical rule demarcating ... sources of law that may clearly establish the relevant law to a reasonable official for the purposes of qualified immunity. ... The Court ... indicated ... willingness to consider nondecisional law in the modern qualified immunity inquiry in Wilson v. Layne. ... As this weight of authority indicates, the federal courts have reserved space for nonjudicial statements of the law to contribute to the qualified immunity analysis. Such sources of law are increasingly important in the post-Saucier era, as courts are now accorded largely unfettered discretion to reach the merits of constitutional tort claims. It is in this context that the work of civilian external investigatory oversight bodies constitutes an essential—albeit untapped—resource for constitutional articulation. .... By engaging in fact-finding, legal research, objective evaluation of compliance with internal regulations, and, sometimes, policy review, civilian external investigatory oversight bodies mirror the work of courts and compliance agencies and serve a function similar to the internal policies and regulations cited by the federal courts. …" ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Now to respond to the Aff. As an overview to the AC: First, Jurisdictions just indemnify officers. They don’t have to pay anything - this kills any incentive to stop doing the harms in the aff. Schwartz ‘14[2] "indemnification of officers is virtually certain and universal. During the six-year period across the 81 jurisdictions, there were over 9,200 civil rights cases in which plaintiffs received payments. The total awarded was over $730 million, but there were just 37 to 39 cases in which officers contributed something. When they contributed, it was a rather small amount. The median payment was just over $2,000 by officers per case. ... No officer paid more than $25,000 in any case. ... Those findings amazed me, but what I found particularly amazing was jurisdictions indemnified officers for punitive damages. ... I found 20 cases ... in which a jury had awarded punitive damages ... In many instances those awards were reduced by the courts, often based on argument by defense counsel that the punitive damages awarded would be a financial hardship for the individual officer–but not one officer paid a nickel toward any of those punitive damages. They were either indemnified, paid by the cities and counties that employed them, or the cities and counties entered into some post-trial settlement that waived the punitive damages judgment, and essentially the city paid the entirety of the settlement ... There are cases in which officers planted evidence. ... Officers went to prison for between five and 10 years for their conduct, but they were indemnified in the civil case. …" Second, limiting QI is counterproductive - QI allows cops to do their jobs better. Coates ‘12[3] "Qualified immunity balances “the need to hold public officials accountable ... and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” ... qualified immunity assumes that “it is better to risk some error and possible injury . . . than not to . . . act at all. ... qualified immunity “gives ... breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments” …" Third, Courts have ruled that police have no specific obligation to the people - this means that a lack of QI will lead to police being bystanders to horrific crimes. This means that by limiting QI we make the harms listed by the Aff worse. Only negating solves. Eyre ‘13[4] "If you pay for a good or service, don’t you expect some benefit in return? ... Such deliverables – the supply of a good or service paid for, or even adequate customer service, are entirely void from policing as it’s currently structured. Not only are police “customers” told to pay “or else” ... courts ... have ruled that police employees have no obligation to provide you … any good or service. ... “When the news was brought to my attention that police had an opportunity to intervene and maybe prevent the whole incident, and it was explained to me they chose to stay in the motorman’s compartment instead of coming out, I was very upset.” Lozito sued for negligence, but city lawyers say his demand for unspecified money damages should be tossed because the police had no “special duty” to protect him or any individual ..." Sources: [1] - http://www.texaslrev.com... [2] - http://www.nyulawreview.org... [3] - http://www.americanbar.org... [4] - http://www.copblock.org...Uncut copies of evidence available upon request.