Can this work be considered existentialist

--Note On Conduct--By claiming that I’m “full of crap” and that my actions in the Previous Round “perhaps indicate[d] a malicious intent for this debate ie. to derail it” Pro is not only incorrect , but has - by openly attempting to insult me - grievously violated common debate protocol. These actions alone justify a vote in the Conduct section in my favour. --Pro’s Case--In the Previous Round of the debate, I argued that because Pro has not provided a framework in order to judge whether a work can be discerned to be an “existentialist” work. Pro responds in several ways. However, none of them succeed, for they misunderstand my position. In this debate, as shown in my previous Round, I am tasked with showing that it can be reasonably doubted that the work provided by Pro can be considered “existentialist”. Therefore, contrary to Pro, who believes that I have to show the work definitely “is not existential”, I need not to provide any positive argument in order to satisfy my burden-of-proof.In my previous round, I have argued that in order for Pro to show that the work provided by him is “existentialist”, he must provide a framework which can be used in order to discern whether a particular work can be existentialist. It is important to do so because there is no clear definition for what is existentialist. He claims that he has indeed provided a framework, pertaining to angst. There are several problems.Firstly, even if that is a satisfactory framework, Pro offers no response to my brief comment that he has not even established that the work provided is relevant to angst. In my previous round, I defined angst as “a negative feeling arising from the experience of human freedom and responsibility”. Such a definition has not been contested, and at this point, it is presumed that Pro is willing to accept it. Yet, Pro has not justified his claim that the work is about existential angst at all; he has only been making bare assertions. He has not been able to link the portion of his work towards “human freedom and responsibility”, and as a result of this, he has been unable to show that his work pertains to the concept of “existential angst”, let alone “existentialism”. Secondly, he has not justified the assumption that because a work has themes that pertain to the concept of “existential angst”, it by default can be considered “existentialist”. It should be remembered that existentialism is a fairly broad and multi-faceted philosophy, without any clear, uncontroversial definition. Thus, if Pro wants to show that in the work provided, by discussing the concept of “existential angst” - which he has not shown is the case as of yet - ought to be considered an “existential” work as a result, he must provide reasonable justifications, rather than making bare assertions. --Con’s Case-- Here, I will build on my previous points, in order to make a positive argument that the work provided by Pro can reasonably be doubted as being “existentialist”. Existentialism, as noted above, is a very multifaceted philosophy. However, generally, what is the most distinguishing feature of existentialism? According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, the answer to this reached through Sartre’s principle that existence precedes essence, ie. that “no general, non-formal account of what it means to be human can be given, since that meaning is decided in and through existing itself”. (1) Thus, we see, that by failing to address the Sartrean principle that existence precedes essence, Pro has failed to link his work to what the SEP considers the most distinctive principle within existentialism. That is not to say that the work Pro has provided by default is not “existentialist”. It is perfectly plausible for a work to be “existentialist”, without considering that existence precedes essence. However, if Pro would like to argue that this is the case, then he clearly has quite a lot of explaining to do. --Conclusion--In this round, I have shown that :(a) It is dubious that Pro’s work addresses “existential angst”.(b) Pro has not been able to justify his framework for discerning what is considered an “existential work”.(c) Pro’s work neglects the most distinguishing principle within existentialism, Sartre’s concept that existence precedes essence. For these reasons, it can be reasonably doubted that Pro’s work can be considered “existentialist”, fulfilling my burden of proof. Therefore, the resolution is negated. --Source--(1) http://plato.stanford.edu...;