This House Believes That Sense Experience Is The Ultimate Source of Knowledge!

I thank Marc for both his argument and his graciousness. I should clarify that I do not know which source of David Hume he is referring to as he has not named the book. I thought it would be the Treatise but it was published in 1740, and its Section IV of Book 1 talks about Causality, not Truth. This baffles me so. I should also mention a priori and intuition are the same. I should also note that some of my counter-rebuttals will only in Round 4 as while Marc only gave the rebuttals to my case; I had to rebut his case, abswer his general issues, and counter-refute. Of Marc's Case:4. Of Definitions:(4.1) I am happy with accepting the definitions insofar as you define my position as: "he still must argue for rationalism playing a substantive role in the generation of knowledge.(4.2) I am however strongly opposed to the statement: "in which the criterion of the truth is not sensory but intellectual and deductive." I believe this misunderstands my position because this debate is less about criterion that it is about how knowledge is formed. If Marc wishes to use this definition he must prove why it is absolutely necessary. 5. Of the Acquirement of Knowledge:(5.1) This argument shall require the support of the clarification of: What is Truth? I have argued this in my counter-rebuttals and if one wishes to connect this argument I suggest a quick read of it. (5.2) I should like to make clear the fact that my opponent has not fulfilled his yardstick. After all we must ask ourselves, after reading his argument are we convinced that there is no other way that one may gain knowledge? My opponent made it very clear that I should do more than simply poke holes in his logic, why is he then simply arguing to try and poke holes in mine? His positive argument does not satisfy his onus. (5.3) Marc argues for sense experience accounts for knowledge, and it does but fails to provide an argument as to why no other knowledge can be entertained. Now let us examine the weakness of knowledge of sense experience. Marc is correct that we see the color green, or touch something hot and therefore get the knowledge of an object being hot. He does not, though, take into consideration the fact that this knowledge is purely subjective. While hot is determined by sense experience, how hot is not. I may find boiling water hot, another might find luke warm water hot. One might find Sherbet color more green than blue, another may find it more blue than green. Sense experience then lacks the conceptualization of necessity: by knowing hot I cannot apply it to an infinite possibilities as I can with a priori knowledge. (5.4) Marc actually concedes to this subjectivism when he states that one may perceive this as a C, and another as a crescent symbol. He then actually admits that all that knowledge which has necessity is a priori, as we know 2+2 will equal 4, no matter whose cognition. Ergo we conclude that Mathematics is a priori. (5.5) He argues that theoretical knowledge does not have any verifiability. I will tackle this point later on but the crux of the rebuttal is that reasoning is correct because: a. it follows the concept of necessity, and b. follows the laws of logic. (5.6) It is then here that I raise this contention: if I were to touch a hot pan I would feel heat and receive the knowledge that touching a hot pan gives heat, can I then assume that if I were to touch the pan again, in mostly the same conditions I shall once more feel heat? Until my opponent can show why this example fails the second time his argument is moot. Of the Original Case:6. On Truth:(6.1) It is noteworthy that Marc is the one to first bring such a drama to this debate that Truth is naught but the empirical, that is of course what he is arguing for, it is hurtful that he would try to make this the very definition of truth. Simply quoting Hume does not establish this, and while he tries to shift the onus so that I may have to fulfil the meaning we know it is his assertion and he must demonstrate this meaning. He must show why geometry is not part of the Truth and is pure speculation. As he does not do this we must not consider this point of his however I will still establish the meaning of Truth, from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (as per the rules).(6.2) Truth then, as Pierce put it, is the end of an inquiry. From a pragmatic point of view we may take truth that which may be demonstrated to show its validity, however is true nonetheless because it possess the essence of being true. Here we shall use Tarski's theorem as modal proof of the validity of this definition: an adequate theory of truth for L must imply, for each sentence φ of L, this then means that ⌈ φ ∨ ψ ⌉ is true if and only if ⌈ φ ⌉ is true or ⌈ ψ ⌉ is true. We then reach the conclusion that something is true, if its convention is of truth. (6.3) We should know that Marc is trying to insinuate Logical Positivism here: he is trying to state that only if something is empirically demonstrable is it true. This theory is self-refuting for the statement that everything is only true when it can be empirically tested can itself not be empirically tests. The theory fails here and so does Marc's counter-argument. For us to believe that only that is true which can be empirically tested we must see this theory empirically tested. As this is impossible we should disregard it immediately. Is it then clear? Since there exists to empirical test to prove that all proof need be empirical this theory destroys itself. 7. Of Intuition:(7.1) I believe the first thing to explain is that intuition is synonymous with a priori. All a priori knowledge is knowledge either garnished by intuition (such as the pan example above) or from reason (such as if I know that if I throw my glass onto the floor with enough speed and energy it will break). (7.2) I need not mention the word intuition or a priori at all so long as I am arguing for it. Marc states that I have "to show specifically how intuition provides the necessary warrants to support a concept's being true." I am doing so with Mathematics. I am also showing that at the belly of all empirical knowledge is a criterion of purely a priori knowledge which basically means that I will show that empirical knowledge is impossible without a priori knowledge. (7.3) Your definition is flawed, primarily because it is more lexical than philosophical. I believe we had agreed to look towards the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy for such matters. If you believe this definition is absolutely necessary you must provide an argument as to why it is so. 8. Of Mathematica: (8.1) I find, with all due respect Marc, the first part of your contention rather funny. You have just spent the above portion of you argument citing Hume and arguing for Logical Positivism where Hume specifically mentions Pure Mathematics such as Algebra, Geometry and Arithmetic, only for you to argue here that Mathematics is empirical. This goes against the quote and your own argument above. Now that we have that problem cleared I should mention that Marc takes analytical to mean a posteriori, when analytical is by definition a priori. This is also slightly comical because while no one denies that synthetic a posteriori exists, I am to defend synthetic a priori. For Marc to have brought in analytic a posteriori he has given himself a burden nor Kant nor Hume dared to take. For anything that is empirical is not self-refuting, for if it were it would possess the concept of necessity which goes against the argument given by Marc where he says one may take C as a C and another as a crescent. (8.2) The above points aside Mathematics is analytic for as I said 10+4=14 but nor in 10, and nor in 4 does one find 14. Only by using your intuition so that you connect the concept of 4 to the concept of 10 (perhaps count theoretically on your fingers) do you reach 14. Secondly this is not possible as Godel's Theorem shows that a set of axioms cannot be both complete and provable. This means that Mathematics at its highest point is purely theoretical where no proof exists. There is no proof of 1+1=2, yes you may take an object and another to show that they equal 2, but they only do so because you have already in your mind pictured the number 1, and the number 2. For you would count the objects to prove this, but to count you would need numbers, which then must exist as a foundation impure a priori. As for Frege's system, it is debunked by Russell's Paradox, where: It is then clear that Frege's system does not work properly. Lets not forget that Marc has given no proof as to why Frege's system should be considered in the first place! He has also given no evidence of Mathematics being analytic. For the formal disproof see: (8.3) None of the contentions of Marc actually debunk my arguments, he only gives counter-arguments no refutations. Here he says that they need to empirically tested: this goes against his above statement that Mathematics is analytic a posteriori. Also I have already shown that Marc has not justified Logical Positivism but I have already shown that it is self-refuting. Particularly since a statement like x^2+3x-4 cannot be tested, does Marc mean to argue that all Mathematics is flawed. In any case he makes many principle contradictions. As I had more to do than Marc did, my counter-arguments about Time, and Space will be entertained in the fourth rounds. This in no way breaks the rules of the debate and I am allowed to do this. I ask Marc to use his space to justify the above contentions and of course enunciate his own case more clearly. As I have shown the contentions I have, how Marc has not justified his arguments; how his case works of Logical Positivism which is inherently floawed; and how he refutes himself multiple times, the resolution collapses. Of course if it doesn't I have the booking to the rehab. Ajab