xXCryptoXx's 100th Debate: The Conjugal View of Marriage is Philosophically Valid

Thanks once again to Crypto for this debate! In this round, I shall make some framework notes, address Pro's case, and present my own.FRAMEWORKGeneric: Since Pro raises no objections to my 5 points in round one, we can extend these through the round.Observation One: My only obligation in this round is to stop Pro from successfully affirming. In other words, I merely need to prevent Pro from showing that the Conjugal View of Marriage (CVM) is valid. I do NOT need to show that the CVM is invalid, nor do I need to present an alternative to the CVM. While I attempt to do the latter, I do not need to do so to win.Observation Two: This is fundamentally a debate about what the definition of marriage should be. Therefore, to use definitions of marriage as support for one's argument is NOT valid or appropriate, simply because to use those definitions presupposes their legitimacy. For example, to debate "X should be defined as Y" and then to cite examples of how X is defined is the status quo is irrelevant, because the resolution is asking a "should" rather than an "is" question. PRO's CASECommon GoodPro is setting up a telos claim here; i.e. he is explaining what a common good is in order to argue that marriage has an intrinsic common good affixed to it. There are several problems here: 1. Pro fails to explain why a common good is sufficient justification for something. He defines it, yet fails to say why it matters. I could say, "object X has common good Y" but yet I could say X is invalid for some other reason. Let's use an analogy: ice cream has the common good of making people happy. It is inherent to what ice cream is, yet it also has the byproduct of being unhealthy. So, while ice cream has a common good, it can be invalidated for a wholly separate reason: physical wellness.2. There is an issue with how Pro understands "good." Let's use the example of friendship, which has the objective core goods of "selflessness and love." Pro argues that a common good is evaluated in a societal context--essentially, that the common good is what benefits humanity. Yet, what if two people were friends, but isolated themselves from the whole community. Their friendship produces no direct benefit to humanity, because there is no interaction with humanity; however, we can still say that between these two people exists a selfless, loving relationship. The good is for them as individuals, enriching their individual lives. Why then, must the "good" be "common?" Why can't it be individual? Pro provides no warrant here to justify his interpretation.3. Pro seems to view the common good as a utilitarian function. Let's use the example of friendship again. There are two friends (G and H). G is in trouble--he is in legal trouble and needs to hide from the police. H offers G a room at his house. H does this because it is selfless and because he loves G and feels he's a good person. In this case, friendship has stayed true to its core goods, but has served a wrong end. Even if we reject this specific example, we can acknowledge that love and selflessness sometime lead to detrimental consequences. So, what Pro is really saying is that friendship is good--in general--because without it, things would be worse off (that love and selflessness produce net benefit). I will impact this next round. Next, Pro employs the "begging the question fallacy." When he says "revisionists are universally wrong when they try to distort marriage from its objective nature, from what marriage is," Pro is assuming the conclusion of the argument: that the CVM is correct, when he has yet to show this. Additionally, the definition and conception of marriage has changed over time, so it makes no sense to talk about what marriage "is" in any absolute sense. [1]The Square AnalogyThis is simply inaccurate. Let's refer back to round one, where Pro defines revisionist marriage as "Any marital definition different from the conjugal view." Therefore, the CVM does NOT fit under the umbrella idea of revisionist marriage, because they are separate ideas. But really, there is no impact to Pro's argument, so we can ignore this analogy entirely.CVMPro makes the following claim: "I am arguing that the conjugal view of marriage is distinct from any other relationship in that only conjugal relationships have an inherent link to procreation." This is essentially his thesis. Basically what Pro is arguing is that because the root of marriage is to procreate, that it is distinct from all other unions. There are several clear responses here: 1. It is hard to determine the root of marriage. There is certainly heated debate about the root of marriage--some argue that love is sufficient, other argue that it's primary goal is to secure inheritance and alliances, etc. As long as other potential justifications exists, we cannot be sure of the core root of what marriage is.2. Purpose =/= should. For example, let's suppose that a gun's purpose is to murder. Simply because a gun's purpose is to murder does not mean that is how it should be used. Similarly, even if we buy marriage is about procreation, that does not mean couples that are unable to procreate should not be included under its auspices.3. Purpose is not exclusive. Simply because a gun's purpose is to murder does not mean it cannot morally be used for other things (hunting, deterrence, self-defense, sport, etc.) The same is true of marriage. But, aside from these three criticisms, let us assume (briefly) that examining what marriage is about is an appropriate course of action. I would suggest that marriage is more about romantic love than anything else. As Pro says: "marriage is where the individuals within the relationship are joined together by the very aspect of their humanity." Why does this necessarily involve kids? Pro suggests that frats and institutions could adopt kids. Therefore, unless the relationship is ordered toward procreation, the symbolic importance of marriage could be conferred upon any number of groups underserving of that title. Yet these groups are not going to engage in romantic love--perhaps they may have friendship, but that isn't the same. In the diagram below, we can clearly see that consummate love involves much more than friendships or infatuation entail: http://www.debate.org...Pro then says: "romantic feelings are still essentially private." Perhaps, but why must the good of marriage necessarily be public? I've already pointed out that Pro's analysis is lacking here. Moreover, we can point to several common goods that arise from romantic love-based marriage (RLM). RLM promotes societal order and connection in just the same way friendship does, but at a deeper level. Everyone needs love in their lives to be happy, and having this sort of unique connection fulfills that need. Preempt: Infertile CouplesLet's say X is fertile, whereas Y is not. Under the CVM, as articulated by Pro, the justification for marriage is that it enables procreation. But, if X marries Y, their union cannot procreate. In this instance, the common good is not furthered. So, if we wanted to maximize the common good, we would naturally force X to marry someone fertile rather than Y.Pro then essentially builds a rule utilitarian case whereby a general rule should be applied in one case even if there are exceptions to that case, because the rule itself is net beneficial. Yet, if the common good is our goal, then it makes sense to make exceptions to that rule in order to maximize the common good. One such example would be excluding infertile couples. This leads us to the following dilemma: "collapse occurs because for any given rule, in the case where breaking the rule produces more utility, the rule can be sophisticated by the addition of a sub-rule that handles cases like the exception. This process holds for all cases of exceptions, and so the 'rules' will have as many 'sub-rules' as there are exceptional cases, which, in the end, makes an agent seek out whatever outcome produces the maximum utility." [2]Final point: consider that non-CVMs can still adopt or use outside help to engage in childrearing or procreation.CON's CASELet's start with the basic premise that moral worth arises from dignity. For example, the difference between a person and a chair is that a person can make choices and act for themselves. This confers upon them a certain dignity arising from their autonomy. “To be a person is to have a status and worth that is unlike that of any other kind of being: it is to be an end in itself with dignity. And the only response that is appropriate to such a being is respect. Respect is the acknowledgment in attitude and conduct of the dignity of persons as ends in themselves." [3]We undermine human dignity any number of way. Some of these ways include: (1) treating people as means to an end, (2) otherizing people, and (3) treating them unfairly. The CVM does all three of these things. (1) The CVM treats people as a means to an end. Consider the whole thrust of Pro's argument: marriage is a union ordered to the good of procreation. CVM uses people as tools of procreation, valuing them and their union more so because it produces some desired end than because they or it have value in and of themselves.(2) Sexual Orientation is not a choice; it is therefore an intrinsic component of who people are. If we grant this, then it is otherizing to deny LGBTQ people access to marriage, because it would be using an arbitrary trait to justifying treating people differently (treating them as "other." (3) It is also unfair, in that since such people can't choose to be different, they never are given the chance to participate in a marriage. I will develop these further point further later.SOURCES1 - http://en.wikipedia.org...2 - http://www.ask.com...3 - http://plato.stanford.edu...