Mind Over Matter? (2)

I applaud my opponent for his intricate round - I'm itching to refute his arguments, but I realize that the 2nd round is designated for arguments in favor of our favored theory of mind. As stated before, I will be defending a physicalist functionalist theory of the mind (I prefer physicalism over materialism as it means ultimately the ontology of any being is described under physics). ==================== Argument for physicalism ==================== Before I can even begin to argue for functionalism, and either of it's major variations, I will first solidify my metaphysical foundation. The argument from methodological naturalism is simple, and I will use this instead of the more commonly referred argument for physicalism, the argument from causal closure. The argument from methodological naturalism is as follows: P1. It is rational to inform one's metaphysical beliefs based on the methods and results of natural science. P2. The methods and results of natural science infer that physicalism is the probable metaphysical world view. .: It is likely that physicalism is true. A simple argument, and yet already at face value one would be hesitant to object to either of the two premises. I'll leave it to my opponent to either accept this argument and use his mentioned Argument from Indeterminacy of the Physical as his ticket out, or refute my argument in whatever way. ==================== Argument for functionalism ==================== Defense of functionalism usually take the form of criticizing other competing monist theories (behaviorism and identity theory), or replying to common criticisms that functionalism entails too many systems to be labelled as having mental states (Chinese room argument, philosophical zombies, etc.). Obviously, my opponent does neither of these. So my plan is to first reject the other two popular monist theories of the mind, then have functionalism in the placeholder of the most likely theory given our understanding regarding the mind and of related concepts such as multiple realizability, supervenience, etc. Of course, a glaring objection is my opponent's dualism -- I will address this next round. So first, the crushing objection supplied by Putnam against behaviorism[2]: P1. If behaviorism is true, it is not possible for there to be a perfect actor or doppelgï¿½nger who behaves just like me but has different mental states or none at all. P2. But it is possible for there to be a perfect actor or doppelgï¿½nger who behaves just like me but has different mental states or none at all. .: Therefore, behaviorism is not true. (by modus tollens) On the other hand, a serious logical objection to identity theory follows: "...the physical-chemical state in question must be a possible state of a mammalian brain, a reptilian brain, a mollusc's brain (octopuses are mollusca, and certainly feel pain), etc. At the same time, it must not be a possible (physically possible) state of the brain of any physically possible creature that cannot feel pain. Even if such a state can be found, it must be nomologically certain that it will also be a state of the brain of any extraterrestrial life that may be found that will be capable of feeling pain before we can even entertain the supposition that it may be pain[2]." This is inextricably linked to the concept of multiple realizability - whereas identity theory can't account for several species of animals (who happen to have distinctly different mental processes) who feel the same type of mental states such as pain, functionalist theories can. Identity theory demands an explicit one-to-one relation, whereas functionalism is much more liberal. ---References--- 1. http://plato.stanford.edu... 2. http://www.iep.utm.edu... 3. http://w3.uniroma1.it...