The modal ontological argument is not sound

Ave!Pro’s Counter ArgumentI won’t contest P1 of the argument, because there’s nothing wrong with Pro’s definition of a possible world. I also won’t content P4, C1, and C2, because they follow logically from P2 and P3. So, I’m going to take apart those two premises to debunk the argument.P2 argues that there is a possible world where a MGB doesn’t exist. To justify this, Pro states that we can imagine a possible world where god does not exist. This argument confuses Anselm’s ontological argument with Plantinga’s ontological argument. It’s not enough to state that you can think of a PW where a MGB doesn’t exist. You have to show that there is some logical state of affairs that a MGB could not exist in. We aren’t given any reason to think there is a possible world where a MGB does not exist.Pro seems to agree that P2 is an unjustified assumption when he states ‘’Both premises are equally likely to be true, since they are both assumptions.’’However, it’s not just an assumption to say that a MGB exists in some possible world. There are very good reasons for thinking that is true, and I offered one reason in my last round. Gottfried Leibniz argued that because we can not analyze perfection, there is no way for us to argue that all perfections cannot exist in a being to their maximal extent. This allows a MGB to exist in at least one possible world.Pro argued that Leibniz is making an argument from ignorance. An argument from ignorance is when you claim that because there is no evidence to contradict a premise, the premise must be true. However, that’s not what Leibniz was arguing. Leibniz argued that we have no epistemological justification for saying that a MGB cannot exist. Because of that, it’s more plausible for a MGB to be a possible rather than an impossible being. This is an argument that works against anybody who brings up two traits that a MGB could not have at once. Leibniz simply asks ‘’What justification do you have to say that these two things cannot exist in one being at once?’’. The answer is that there is no justification, because we do not understand perfection.If Leibniz had argued ‘’It is impossible to show that a MGB cannot exist, therefore it does exist’’, then his argument would have been fallacious. Leibniz doesn’t make that argument. He makes the argument that because you can not demonstrate the impossibility of a MGB, it is at least possible that it exists. Please remember that important distinction. It’s not an argument for the existence of a MGB, it’s an argument for the possibility of a MGB.Pro’s case seems to be a lot weaker now. I have showed that it is possible for a MGB to exist. Pro has yet to show that there is a possible world where a MGB doesn’t exist. It’s more plausible, therefore, that a MGB exists in some possible world. P2 is negated.Maximally Great Physical BeingsPro gives two parody arguments, one with demons, the other with a metal toothpick. They both follow the same logic, so I won’t waste space addressing both of them in different sections.Remember, there are three categories of being. A contingent being that exists in some possible worlds, a necessary being that exists in all possible worlds, and an impossible being that exists in no possible worlds. A maximally great being has to be a necessary being in order to be maximally great. So, if it can be demonstrated that an angel and a demon must be contingent, it follows that they are not maximally great.A metal toothpick is contingent, so it cannot be maximally great. Pro’s definition of the metal toothpick was a toothpick made out of metal. Metal doesn’t in all possible worlds. There is a possible world where metal doesn’t exist. The metal toothpick cannot exist in that possible world, because it’s made of metal, and metal doesn’t exist. It would be logically impossible for a metal toothpick to exist in a possible world that contains no metal. Therefore, there is a possible world where the existence of a metal toothpick is not logically possible. As a metal toothpick cannot exist in all possible worlds, it is contingent, or existing in some possible worlds but not all. It then logically follows that a metal toothpick cannot be maximally great.A maximally great being must also have all great-making properties to their maximal extent. Great-making properties are things like goodness and perfection. A maximally evil demon would be the complete opposite. It would be maximally without good. It logically follows that the demon does not have all great making properties to their maximal extent. Therefore, it cannot be maximally great.The parody arguments that Pro gives are based on a misunderstanding of what it means to be maximally great. I’ve demonstrated that the ontological argument cannot be used to show that a metal toothpick and demons also exist. The parody is a failure.P1Pro criticizes P1 of the argument and then refers us to the parodies he gave earlier. I’ve already shown why these parodies don’t mirror the logic of the ontological argument, so I won’t waste words addressing them again.I agree with Pro that if you cannot demonstrate P1 to be true, you cannot demonstrate the conclusion to be true. That’s why I gave an argument for accepting P1 to be true. Pro responded to this by criticizing Leibinz, which I answered above.Vale!