It is most probable that a god exists.

CONTINGENCY ARGUMENT Given that my opponent has not challenged that my assertions that this argument does not actually prove God as defined in R1 and that the sixth premise was not sufficiently proven, I could say nothing more on this argument at this point in the debate. So, it is rather unfortunate that my opponent has spent most of his round arguing something that I can simply drop with no repercussions whatsoever. I will, nevertheless, offer some comments regarding his oppositions. PSR I’ll go ahead and concede that the PSR is true within the Universe given its practical applications, but I see no reason to believe that it is true outside of the Universe, which would be the applicable state for use in an argument over the Universe’s origin. Regarding quantum mechanics, if physical laws can explain the change in state in these events, I don’t see why laws outside the Universe could not be responsible for the change in state that led to the Universe. This brings me right to. .. The Argument Against the PSR “Refuted” My opponent claims that he has turned Professor Senor’s argument in his favor, but his argument really doesn’t address my objection at all. He has not explained how the Universe can both be a contingent fact and the PSR can be true. The argument he presented also suffers from similar problems as the Argument from Contingency. First, it fails to prove a maximally great being, and second the eighth and ninth premises are unjustified and present a false dichotomy. ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT Here, I must both congratulate and thank my opponent for recognizing why my version of his ontological argument “cannot go through,” for in making this recognition, my opponent himself has pointed out why his (the normal version of the argument) fails to “go through. ” What is Pro’s objection to my argument? That the first premise has not been demonstrated to be true. Yet, if we look back at my opponent’s initial presentation of the argument what do we find is lacking? You guessed it: A sufficient demonstration of the truth of his P1. Beyond my opponent failing to prove his P1, I think there’s good reason to actually reject that notion that it is possible for a maximally great being to exist, as the idea of a maximally great being is rather paradoxical in nature. In the same vein that infinities of time provide problems, so do infinities of other natures. Put simply, a maximally great being cannot be greater than itself, meaning it is not actually maximally great. I’ll present another variation on the argument to help illustrate this point and why this sort of argument doesn’t help us explain the actual world. P1. It is possible that there exists an island that is infinitely better than every other island. P2. If it is possible there exists such an island, then such an island exists in some possible world. P3. If such an island exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world. P4. If such an island exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world. P5. If such an island exists in the actual world, then such an island exists. C. Therefore, such an island exists. But, we know that such an island does not exist, and, in fact, it would seem that such an island cannot exist given the practical impossibilities of infinities, which are explained by my opponent in R2 as he discusses why there cannot exist an infinite amount of time. My other challenge in R2 to this argument was to P3. I argued that there was not sufficient reason given to accept that a maximally great being’s existence in some possible world equated a such a being’s existence in every possible world. I expressed this challenge to the premise by asking what made existence greater than nonexistence. I apparently wasn’t clear enough in what I was trying to say, as my opponent addressed why existence is greater than nonexistence outside of the context of the discussion of the third premise. What I am really trying to ask is why it is greater to exist necessarily than to exist contingently, for no justification for this premise along these lines has been presented. MORAL ARGUMENT To criticize descriptive relativism, my opponent presented the argument that if two people disagree whether physics supports a moral position, this leads us to the conclusion that physics must not demonstrate any truths about the world, but since we know that physics does demonstrate truths about the world, descriptive relativism must be false. I challenged this by saying that this scenario should not lead us to the conclusion that physics has no truths to offer about the world, but rather that at least one of these two was mistaken about what physics says about the world. My opponent has failed to refute this, and misconstrues my argument. Additionally, my opponent has failed to take into account the possibility of moral nihilism and has given us no reason to believe that actions ultimately do have moral content. He has given several examples of things he claims are moral judgements, but does not back this up with logic. CONCLUSION My opponent has failed to truly address my objections to his arguments. Additionally, I have explained why a God as defined is not even a possibility.