Theism v Atheism

Why Theism is More Probable I. Ultramundanity & Necessity Ultramundane means “outside the sphere of physical existence.” [11] So the first cause without the cosmos, is spaceless and timeless, beginningless, changeless, necessary, uncaused, and enormously powerful; since the first cause of all causes is by definition transcendent from its effect. I gave 3 reasons for the causes necessity but Con only deals with the third, that since God’s property of “maximal greatness” is asymmetric, then such a being would be necessary if he’s possible. Singularity The initial singularity shouldn’t be construed in realist terms since there is no physical state in which 0 is the distance between any two spatio-temporal points. And this is independent of thermodynamic laws or any early description of the cosmos. Also the Borde-Guth-Vilanken theorem says that any space-time reality which is in a state of inflation must have came to be. [12] A physical object existing for no time and having no extension or spatial volume is not a physical object at all, but rather a mathematical conceptualization. But Con thinks the singularity existed abstractly or necessarily; but how? It isn't eternal in the past: it has a beginning, it's ephemeral and impermanent (vanishingly so) it ceases to exist as soon as it comes into being. Plus the conservation principle of matter only applies to an isolated system, it doesn’t speak to transcendent causes. And Con conveniently forgot to finish the Hawking quote, “... having changed my mind, I am now trying to convince other physicists that there was in fact no singularity at the beginning of the universe...” (p. 50) But even if it were true that the singularity is an actual event, fine! God’s creating the universe was then coincident with the singularity at the boundary of spacetime, and by creating the contingent singularity God created the cosmos. Con just pushes the problem back one. [13] Why The Cause is Personal First, Con fails to address how the nature of personal v scientific explanations regarding the cosmic origin implies that the cause is personal. Extend Argument. Second, if the cosmic cause is timeless and so exists permanently, agent causation is the only explanation for why the effect isn’t also timeless and permanent. Just because God was in a timeless state without creation doesn’t imply that at the instance that he created time that both the universe and God are eternal in the same sense. The contingent cosmos didn’t exist in a transcendent timeless state like God; whose free act of creation would be simultaneous with the cosmic origin. Thus God enters into time at the moment of undertaking in his creation; making him causally prior to the big bang, not temporally prior as Con mistakes. Third, in addressing how cosmic inclusion of embodied moral agents implies that the cause is not impersonal, Con claims that this is arguing from ignorance. But it’s arguing from what we do know! That given a non-sentient cause, the cosmos could have existed in many different ways, all of which don’t include the possibility of embodied moral agents. Yet what do we get but a cosmos with fine-tuning parameters resulting in the regularity and reliability of that regularity that science demands for intentional action. We get a cosmos in which our cognitive faculties are adequated to this particular reality, this disconfirms non-sentient creation over what theists have always affirmed, that God is mindful of man. PCW Davies therefore concludes that, "the existence of mind in some organism on some planet in the universe is surely a fact of fundamental significance. Through conscious beings the universe has generated self-awareness. This can be no trivial detail, no minor byproduct of mindless, purposeless forces. We are truly meant to be here.” [14] Fourth, the nature of the first cause as ultramundane and necessary implies a personal cause since abstract concepts can’t cause anything. Concepts like 2+2=4 are necessary because it’s impossible for it to be 5. But since such necessary concepts are causally impotent, if they exist, then the cause isn’t a concept, but a necessary mind with those concepts. This isn’t at all question begging, the argument takes the form of a disjunctive syllogism from which a reason is given against one of the disjuncts that’s distinct from its conclusion, that necessary abstracta can’t cause anything, so we’re left with a necessary mind. II. Con repeats that existence is a contingent thing while appealing to instances of existing contingent things, while forgetting necessary existence, which is a non-contradictory property. Just because 2+2 can never be 5, doesn’t imply it’s incoherent. Con’s maximally great island is indeed logically incoherent though, since there could always be a better island, plus better islands are a subjective matter. Anselm anticipated such objections long before Hume and Kant in his proslogion. The concept of God however differs crucially from such parodies; for the properties comprising maximal excellence possess intrinsic maximum values. Whereas things like islands don’t possess such values. Failed parody. Now how is a handicap a great making property? How is inexistence itself a great anything? Gasking’s word-play is meaningless here. Inexistence is no more a property than contingent existence. Also, the burden is on Con to show that there could even be a “better universe.” (Fallacy of false precision) All he does is ask about metal skin and perfect memory, this is just a ridiculous reply. Humans have great potential in self-creation which necessarily involves certain vulnerabilities that are worth the price, all things considered (sex with metal skin?). We even make for ourselves armor, and computers with memory. Con begs the question on behalf of atheistic moral Platonism when he asserts that a prescriptive moral system is non-cognitive but then begs the question of nihilism when he asserts morals are not objective. On theism, moral values like kindness are objectively good and the moral duty to be kind issues forth from a competent authority; which are reflections from a maximally kind being for example. Anyhow, such morals were claims by Con to be dependent upon physical humans, but that doesn’t at all seem to be the case, there are possible worlds in which humans don’t exist and yet kindness is still objectively good. Nor has Con dealt adequately with the prescriptive-descriptive distinction. Why Theism is Less Probable? III. Con never responds to the argument from reason which undercuts his whole case. Extend Argument A. Kierkegaardian Fideism Con drops the point about certitude as a requirement for knowledge yet brings up more irrelevancies: Allah, Vishnu, Ahura Mazda, trinitarianism, God’s intervention, and gender are not relevant to whether a maximally great being exists. Recall that Kierkegaardian Fideism is too hasty, self-defeating and a strawman anyhow. Too hasty: Con says it’s ludicrously false that Kierkegaard argued for Fideism. Yet the term is most commonly associated with Kierkegaard, who argued that “If I am able to apprehend God objectively, I do not have faith; but because I cannot do this, I must have faith. If I want to keep myself in faith, I must continually see to it that I hold fast the objective uncertainty, see to it that in the objective uncertainty I am ‘out on 70,000 fathoms of water’ and still have faith” (1846, 204). [15] Self-defeat: Con says that our ‘complete ignorance’ of God doesn’t imply he’s a false concept, but a meaningless one. But how could God be meaningless if we know we’re ignorant of him? And how could theism be false if it has no content? But then Con says that, theism is surely false on the meaninglessness ground. So theism is not false, but it is, and it’s meaningless to talk about it? This is confused. Theism clearly has content since we’re debating it, and so arguments leveled at it like from evil are meaningful to speak of. Anyhow, I’ve clearly defined God, what in that definition is meaningless? Strawman: Con drops this point. Kierkegaard’s case is in response to evidentialism, not foundationalism, which is compatible. Extend Argument B. Falsificationism Con failed to reply to why Falsifiability isn’t essential to knowing or showing theism’s truth. Extend arguments. I know that Con wants to reference falsifiability in light of his problem of evil, but since the world is morally ambiguous in its moral happenings, no theologian argues that God exists from the moral good in the world. Likewise Con can’t argue that God doesn’t exist from the moral evil, for it’s an argument from ignorance to state that God has no morally sufficient reason for permitting some instance of suffering given that we’re limited in time and space. But despite this fact, there’s still a justified theism (see above) even if it’s not falsifiable, which it is anyway, at least in principle. C. 1000 Qualifications? - Extend arguments D. Evil Con never attempts to show that God would have no morally sufficient reason for those evils. Nor does he attempt to show that partial knowers can know about them in principle or that a partial knower’s moral purview is identical to an all knower’s. This isn’t an appeal to mystery, this is a charge of Con arguing from ignorance! He hasn’t dealt with this charge. Rather he continues to presuppose what he ought to first prove. But yet the bulk of my case doesn’t even rest on this skeptical theism! Rather I gave two arguments for the compatibility of pointless evil and theism. The resolution argument and moral baseline argument. So Con never responded to show that God and evils are logically incompatible in the first place, how then can evil count as evidence? Sources 11. dictionary.reference.com/browse/ultramundane 12. http://arxiv.org... 13. http://www.reasonablefaith.org... 14. Davies, The Mind of God, p 306 15. http://plato.stanford.edu...