Resolved: That homosexual acts are immoral

In this debate, I will be arguing for the proposition that homosexual acts are immoral by appealing to classical natural law ethics. In doing so, I will defend my arguments against objections, including the infamous is-ought "problem" of David Hume and the naturalistic fallacy of G. E. Moore. My argument, if sound, will also constitute an argument against oral sex, anal sex, contraception, masturbation, and pretty much everything else contained in a liberal sexual morality. The Argument The argument I will defend is relatively simple, and consists of three premises: 1. If we act, we ought to act in accordance with our nature. 2. Homosexual acts are contrary to our nature. 3. Therefore, homosexual acts are immoral. This is a logically valid argument. If the premises are true, then the conclusion necessarily follows. Premise 1 Special attention must be paid to the meaning of "nature" in the first premise. By nature, I do not refer merely to phenomena which occur in the physical world. Rather, I refer to notions of proper function or teleology. For example, we call a heart "good" if it is functioning properly, whereas we call it "bad" if it is not functioning properly. Similarly, a good car is one that fulfills its purpose properly, whereas a bad car is one that does not fulfill its purpose properly. Our proper function is therefore what determines our good. This becomes moral goodness insofar as it is applied to rational moral agents capable of moral deliberation. It is therefore a red herring to appeal to the fact that homosexuality is, say, practiced in the animal world. This does not, mind you, fall victim to either the is-ought problem or naturalistic fallacy. Both Hume and Moore simply begged the question by assuming a mechanistic conception of nature that is devoid of any teleology. They assumed ethical naturalism to be false. Edward Feser writes: One example of such confusion is the assumption that any natural law theory must commit the “naturalistic fallacy” by failing to take note of the "fact/value distinction.” For there can only be a “fact/value distinction,” and thus a “fallacy” in deriving normative conclusions from factual premises, given something like a modern mechanistic-cum-nominalistic conception of nature. No such distinction, and thus no such fallacy, exists given a classical essentialist and teleological conception of the world. [1] If one really can't derive an "ought" from an "is," then the entire discipline of medicine falls apart. Medicine is inherently normative and is concerned with restoring the proper function of our organs. Granted, the "ought" in this situation is non-moral, but this is sufficient to demonstrate that normative premises (be them functional or moral) can be derived from descriptive facts. [2] Moreover, to deny that we can infer normative premises from descriptive premises is ultimately self-defeating. Consider the mind, which has the proper function (ie: purpose) of producing true beliefs. Even though our cognitive processes might sometimes lead us into error, it is oriented toward the production of true belief. Now if the Humean is true and teleology as such does not exist, then the mind does not have the purpose of producing true belief. This, however undercuts the epistemic warrant for the Humean claim itself! Thus, teleology is an irreducible fact of this world and cannot be denied without self-refutation. Any such fact-value problem therefore collapses. As David Oderberg aptly puts it, "it is value 'all the way down'." [3] Premise 2 Thus when we engage in sexual acts, we must act in accordance with the proper function of our sexual organs. The purpose of our sexual organs, upon reflection, is procreation. This is an inference from the way our sexual organs are structured. Just as it is the proper function of the eyes to see or the heart to pump blood, the proper function of our sexual organs is to procreate. Homosexual acts are intrinsically non-procreative in type and are therefore contrary to the natural end of our sexual organs. It might be objected that pleasure, and not procreation, is the function of our sexual organs. This is untrue. As Feser points out: "[G]iving pleasure is not the final cause or natural end of sex; rather, sexual pleasure has as its own final cause the getting of people to engage in sexual relations, so that they will procreate." [2] Indeed, he draws a parallel with eating: "Even though eating is pleasurable, the biological point of eating is not to give pleasure, but rather to provide an organism with the nutrients it needs to survive... to emphasize pleasure is to put the cart before the horse." [3] Pleasure, moreover, must always be practiced in accordance with something's proper function. While it might be pleasurable to eat junk food, it is certainly not good in that it frustrates the purpose of nutrition. Pleasure is thus subordinate to the proper function of sex. Special attention must also be drawn to the meaning of "contrary," for sometimes it is objected that given natural law theory, it would be immoral to wear glasses, walk on your hands, etc... These are not immoral, for they are not contrary to any natural function, but simply the use of something other than its function. "Contrary to" is not logically equivalent to "other than." Wearing glasses, moreover, actually aids in fulfilling the proper function of our eyes. This objection therefore fails. From this, premise three follows logically. Homosexual acts are therefore immoral. _______ Sources 1. Edward Feser, "Classical Natural Law, Property Rights, and Taxation" Social Philosophy and Policy, vol. 27, no. 1 (2010) 2. J. Budziszewski, The Line Through the Heart: Natural Law as Fact, Theory, and Sign of Contradiction (ISI: 2009) 13 3. David S. Oderberg, Moral Theory: A Non-Consequentialist Approach (Blackwell: 2000) 15. 4. Edward Feser, The Last Superstition (St. Augustine's Press: 2008) 142 5. Ibid .