Compatabilism is a flawed philosophical doctrine.

I accept Danielle's definition of Determinism, however, although I agree with the sentiment behind Danielle's definition of Free Will regarding personal choice and our choices not being merely the result of forces outside our control, and will use it as a steer over the course of the debate, I cannot simply agree to define Free Will as 'not determined by physical forces' because then this debate would immediately end. I would be being asked to defend a violation of the logical law of non-contradiction. Danielle contends that compatabilism is an illegitimate attempt to redefine free will from what it actually is in order to reconcile two irreconcilable terms. This, however, puts the cart before the horse - it is only after a thorough analysis of what we ought to mean by free will that we should conclude either that determinism is compatible or incompatible with free will. Obviously one can simply define free will one way or the other - but that will remain unsatisfactory for either side because both will maintain that free will is relevant to our belief in ourselves as free persons only on their definition. Having said that, I actually do think I can provide an adequate definition of free will that is compatible with Danielle's definitions - for choices are not simply determined by physical laws on the account I shall present. Only particular kinds of causal processes are compatible with the exercise of free will and I shall argue for a particular account of which causal process these are, consider various objections that could be raised, and end up with a sufficient account of free will. Preliminary Definition : A subject acts freely if she could have done otherwise in the right sense. The subject could have done otherwise in this sense provided she would have chosen otherwise if she had chosen differently. The primary intuition that lies behind the incompatibalist's case is that determinism entails that our actions are all inevitable - that is, given a particular state S1 of the universe at T = 0, everything that occurs is the result of a causal chain resulting from S1. Every human action is caused by the laws of physics and antecedent events prior to that action. Thus, humans can never have chose otherwise than the actions they actually undertake and freedom is removed from the equation. The solution to this is the introduction of counterfactuals - that is, a subject is free if she could have done otherwise if she had chosen differently. Thus, causal routes in which higher mental processes are removed from the equation are ruled out. The causal route which leads from my being trapped irreversibly underwater to my drowning is one of them. Let us construct a primitive model of how the brain's decision making software functions. Imagine that the brain is composed of different 'modules'. One is a 'scanner' that takes in information about a situation. Another is a 'tree producer' that generates options in light of the information that the scanner says. Another is the 'evaluator' which ranks options in light of concerns programmed into it. Finally, a 'producer' selects the best option from the preceding processes. The process at work here is as follows: Scanner -> Tree Producer -> Evaluator -> Producer.Now, if a choice is the upshot of this process within my brain, the choice can be said to be mine. The end choice that results from this process is not the result of causal process outside of my control - rather, it is the various faculties that reside within my own self that determine the outcome. Now, the incompatibalist will raise the following objection - it seem to be a choice made under your own volition if you consider the point at which the brain processes start to the point at which they end - but the fact is that whatever 'modules' there might be that determine our actions are themselves fixed by the physical laws that determine the universe. This will require that I revise my preliminary definition. I offer a distinction similar to the one between decision-taking and drowning. Imagine that I have a little martian inside my head that controls the modules in my brain. I become a puppet in this martian's hands, such that no-one could reasonably say that I have free will. The incompatibalist might well say, well, what is the difference between the martian scenario and our actual situation? Whatever modules control my decision making, after all, are fixed by chemical processes in my brain which are determined by the laws of physics.The difference is the degree of flexibility that I have in responding to particular situations. In the martian situation I will not respond to new information and considerations in the same way that I will under ordinary circumstances. Ordinarily the way I respond will be considerate of arguments and additions or changes in the decision making process. This leads to the second revised definition of Free Will. Revised Definition: A subject acts freely if she could have done otherwise in the right sense. This means that she would have done otherwise if she had chosen differently and, under the impact of other thoughts and considerations, she would have chosen differently. This requires one more revision. What are the kinds of thoughts and considerations we are talking about? Many philosophers have associated freedom of the will to increased knowledge and understanding - this is the final piece of the puzzle. The 'thoughts and considerations' we are talking about, first, are accurate representations of the agent's situations and options, and second, are available to the agent. Suppose that, out of fear of losing humiliatingly to Danielle, I set out to poison her and cunningly slip arsenic into her morning coffee. Suppose that she drinks it. There would be no use me defending myself with the notion that Danielle, after all, was free not to do so. For although she could have done otherwise had she chosen not to, absence of contextual information makes her a victim rather than a free agent. Our final definition, therefore, is as follows:Final Definition: A subject acts freely if she could have done otherwise in the right sense. This means that she would have done otherwise if she had chosen differently and, under the impact of other true and available thoughts or considerations, she would have chosen differently. True and available thoughts and considerations are those that represent her situation accurately, and are ones that she could reasonably have expected to take into account. I hope that I have done enough groundwork in support of my chosen definition that Danielle does not respond with a cursory dismissal of 'You've just defined away the problem of Hard Determinism'. Identifying what free will is a process of identifying in what situations we consider ourselves to be free and how various considerations impact upon them. The definition comes after the hard work, not before.There we go, this is my chosen account of how to reconcile free will and determinism. It is adapted from the chapter on Free Will from Simon Blackburn's book Think: http://www.amazon.com...