God Probably Doesn't Exist

I have a number of qualms with this argument. It's central premise is that " In order for something to have the property of being known, it must exist,". However, I see this to be in breach of several axioms and truths in modal epistemic logic. i) Axiom 5 of modal epistemic logic (The Negative Introsepction Axiom) [1] This states that: In other words, if someone does not know x, then they know that they do not know x. What does this means for Pro's central premise? Well, it seems that x can be known, but does not necessarily exist. For, knowledge is transitive from the knowledge of knowing that one does not know x; for in order for someone to know that one does not know x, the essence of x must be known (otherwise x could not be identified as not being known). So, the premise is false: the content of x is known, without it necessarily existing (in the sense that if the premise is true, then it is a conceptual truth such that if x is known, then x necessarily exists. But, this axiom shows that there is no entailment between knowing x, and the existence of x as Pro claims). Perhaps underlying this argument is what is meant by 'known'. If it means to know the content or nature of something, then the argument fails on a basic level. If it means to have a true belief about something, then it fails for someone can have a true belief about an non-real abstract object. If it is meant by the tripartite analysis of knowledge (p is true; S believes that p; S is justified in believing that p), then it fails due to temporal considerations, as I will now show. ii) Abstracta If one takes any sort of non-realist view of abstracta, then the premise is simply wrong; for few would deny that we know abstract objects (we obviously know 2+2=4, or the colour red) but on a non-realist view, they do not exist. Thus, something can be known, but it does not exist, contrary to Pro's premise. iii)Temporal Epistemic Modal Logic This is concerned with our knowledge of events that are temporal. First, take presentism - the view that only the present actually exists [2]. If Pro is to contest this, then eternalism will be assumed before eternalism is concluded, which would be begging the question (eternalism will be a premise in the argument, where the conclusion states that the past, present and future exist, id est, eternalism) On presentism, past events do not exist. But it is obvious that we know things that occurred in the past. For instance, I know that 5 minutes ago, I was writing this debate round. This is something I know. However, it does not exist on presentism! So what are we to make of the notion that "In order for something to have the property of being known, it must exist"? Well, we must reject it. For our memories do not exist, but we certainly know them. So what the premise is equivalent to is "in order for God to know something that exists, it must exist". But this doesn't prove much, and certainly doesn't establish what Pro hopes for it to establish. So presentism, which is true for all we know (it is at the very least prima facie coherent), refutes Pro's argument. Of course, one could defend presentism, giving arguments from a sense of flow or against determinism. But that is beyond the scope of this debate and unnecessary for my onus in giving a defence. How does all this apply to God and his omniscience? Well, it means that contrary to Pro's premise, God can know something without it existing; as such, God can be omniscient before the actual existence of the past, present and future and consequently, the argument fails. Evil Now, onto the evidential argument from evil. What is a defence? In order to refute Pro's argument, I must give defence. That is, I must give a story about the relationship between God and evil that shows that it is not logically inconsistent for God and evil to coexist, and that we should expect evils given theism. This story must be true for all anyone knows (have no logical inconsistencies): it does not need to be a theodicy. This is vital in a defence; the aim is to disprove any logical issues (as is the claim). As such, premise 2 of the argument will be refuted. Massive Irregularity Definitions Sentient creatures: those creatures who have the capacity to suffer Massive irregularity: where nomological conditions and laws of nature fail in some massive way. Morally equivalent: Where there is no morally decisive reason to prefer one option for another. Defect in a world: a property of a world which it is intrinsically better for not having E: the amount of evil recorded in the actual world The defence is composed of three propositions: 1) Any possible world that contains sentient creatures contains, ceteris paribus, a level of evil at least as great as that recorded in E. 2) Any world which is massively irregular is a defect; one which is at least as bad (or morally equivalent) as E. 3) the existence of sentient creatures is a good which is morally equivalent or outweighs E. [3] Defence of 1 It seems that in order for life, and a fortiori intelligent life, to come about by whatever means non-irregularly, a certain amount of evil is essential in the process. Take biological evolution - which for all we know, is the only possible means for sentient creatures to come about. Sans Divine intervention, This is likely to be a process filled with sufferings and evils - organisms necessarily need to be selected, killed off, and suffer. It seems absurd that a sentient creature like a great ape could come about, non-irregularly, without millions of years of suffering. And this is exactly what we see - suffering and evils related to sentiment creatures all the way from fawns to humans. So we have a prima facie case for admitting P1. Defence of 2 It seems that if a world is massively irregular, then it is also massively deceptive. For, take an example: every time a sentient creature is about to experience pain, God makes it such that the being's pain receptors cut out, and it doesn't experience any pain. This would be deceptive for an actual thing - pain - is illusory. This deception is inconsistent with the actions of a morally perfect being. So, a morally perfect being could not actualise it - and to do so would be of moral abomination (to go against a perfect being's nature is the greatest moral abomination of them all, if he exists) that would outweighs E as a moral disvalue. Moreover, a massively deceptive world leaves no room for great goods such as eternal atonement, free love between God and man, and bring about great evils such as a spoiling of the human race, and no appreciation of the creator of the universe (this would be to assume God exists, but we can do that in a defence - remember, the goal is to establish logical compatibility). Defence of 3 It seems obvious that world containing sentient creatures, where acts of love, compassion, kindness etc. are possible, is of greater moral worth than a world populated purely by worms. Given God's existence (which we can do given this is a defence), the existence of sentient creatures enables the possibility of eternal love (which is true for all we know) which outweighs E. So we must conclude that on theism, we should expect the world to be filled with evil in the way we see it. For sans God, it is around the amount we should expect. But including God, it is around the amount we should expect, for God would not, on moral grounds, create a massively irregular world - it is a defect at least as great as E, and creating sentient creatures is of sufficient moral value to create. This succeeds in both prelapsarian and postlapsarian conditions. The defence is complete. We should see evil as favouring neither theism nor atheism. Epistemic limitation Now, I want to poke at some of the modal moral judgements that Pro is using. Essentially, I see no means for the advocate of the Problem of evil to support to the notion that: " There (probably) exists instances of intense suffering which [God] could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. " Relative to what is this probabilistic claim referring to? It seems that it is in relation to everything that has existed, ever; a scale which may span not only universe-wide, but over billions of years of history in which God could bring about a greater good. But how could we possibly make such a judgement? How could we, with our limited modal capacities, state any such claim? In order to make any probabilistic claim of the sort, one would literally need to be omniscient. But of course, that is not the case (otherwise this debate would be redundant). So we must be modal moral sceptics in this case. Let us think of it in terms of an analogy. Say I am standing on top of the grand canyon - I don't see a fly down there. Would it then be reasonable for me to conclude that therefore there isn't a fly down there? Or even that there probably isn't a fly down there? Of course not. I lack the epistemic conditions necessary to make a judgement, despite all my senses telling me there is not a fly down there. In such a case, it seems that we simply should not make a judgement. The same is with evil: we lack the cognition to state with any sort of certainty that there is no justifier for any certain evil. so, premise 1 is very suspect (even more so considering Pro's light treatment of the evidence of the matter). The argument, therefore, fails. I have given a defence that shows that it is logically possible - if not probable - that on theism, evil and God should exist. Moreover, I see the modal moral judgements to be lacking in specificity. So, we should reject the argument from evil that Pro presented. Conclusion I have shown that Pro's arguments fail: the incoherency argument doesn't add up, and I have given a defence which renders the Problem of Evil unsuccessful. Sources in Comments