The principle of empirical verifiability by David Hume is flawed.

I'll begin my final argument by first complimenting my colleague on the professionalism he has show throughout this debate. Friend, you are an inspiration for all of Debate.org. This debate has taken on several tangents as it has progressed, which is generally a sign of an active and inventive mind. There is danger however when the focus of the argument gets sidetracked, and the end does not match to propositions of the beginning. So far we have covered existentialist claims, mathematical proofs, many rabbits in many holes, and finally we arrive at Kant's Copernican Revolution. Yet for all this, have we remained true to the goal of proving that Hume's theory of Empirical Verifiability is flawed? I say to you we have not. The point here was to find evidence of failure in Hume's theory, not to debate the relative merits of competing theories. But I would be remiss if I did not address the Kantian claims regarding the limits of empirical verifiability. After all, the two are closely related. Kant famously states that it was Hume who "awoke me from my dogmatic slumber." (1) As my opponent has so eloquently explained above, Kant is in total agreement with Hume about everything, except our ability to gain knowledge (mostly mathematical) through the use of synthetic a priori statements. For Hume's purposes, and therefore my own in this particular debate, it is important for us to examine whether Kant's mathematical claims negate Hume's own theory. My opponent states that I was mistaken in asserting that mathematical concepts are learned, and thus posteriori in our reasoning. Not so, even in Kant's own reasoning. Kant claims that "objective reality is known only insofar as it conforms to the essential structure of the knowing mind." (2) Our concepts of spatial relationships (which gives rise to geometry) and sequentially (the basis of arithmetic) are hardwired into our brains as a way to organize the vast amount of sensory data we gather every second. Kant therefore claims these concepts, the basis for mathematics, are a priori. At the same time however, these claims are dependant on our ability to gain sensory information and empirical knowledge. Kant's weak point is that he is never actually able to prove his claims on synthetic a priori knowledge, at least not to the liking of future philosophers. Additionally, Kant backs up Hume's claim that we can only have true knowledge about those things that we can verify with our senses, saying "Only objects of experience, phenomena, may be known, whereas things lying beyond experience, noumena, are unknowable, even though in some cases we assume a priori knowledge of them" (3) This sticky wicket brings us to the heart of that matter of what constitutes as true knowledge. We can use your example of Gabriel's Horn. You claim "Gabriel's Horn clearly cannot exist in the physical universe as we know, nor can we put together any pieces of our experiences to produce Gabriel's horn, and once we determine the result of the deduction, we know that the processes will produce the same results into the future." Within the confines of any rational presuppositions you can continually prove the same result repeatedly. This does not make it true knowledge, but rather an interesting mind puzzle. Where you to show you an example of Gabriel's Horn in the real world, it would merit your claim. Until you do, we are arguing about something that for practical purposes does not exist. The basis of Hume's theory is exactly this; something cannot be considered truth if it does not actually exist. Instead, it contains "abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number... [and] experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence... [therefore] it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion." (4) **************************** As for A.J. Ayer, I fail to see how his theories make a significant impact on this discussion. His argument is certainly not "clearly superior," nor have you given any real evidence that his argument shows a flaw in Hume's. All that you have demonstrated is that Ayer assigns more meaning to certain sentences than does Hume. His idea of "meaning" is entirely subjective, and has nothing to do with the verifiability of truth. Therefore I say that Ayer is no evidence whatsoever against Hume's theory, and thus discard that argument. **************************** If you have made it this far dear reader, then I applaud your tenacity! I'm sure few enough will have both the interest and ability to read and understand the minutia of our debate. However if you have made it this far, please keep in mind the original point of this debate. My opponent had the burden of proving that Hume's theory of Empirical Verifiability was flawed. In doing so, he never once even cited any works of Hume, and instead offered only vaguely related theories. Since each of these competing theories was rebutted, and no actual flaws were conclusively proved, I strongly urge you to vote Con. Thank you. 1: http://www.trincoll.edu... 2: """" 3: """" 4: David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Section XII (last sentence in the book, actually)