This House Asserts Ontology Necessitates God's Existence!

I thank Tej for his round. Let "Pv" denote positive notes. SP. Memoirs and Notes Pv 1. I ask that the readers read the debate as an organic work, and connect the rounds to the previous ones. In this let us remember that Teja admits to using "semantics" (against rule 6) and quoted references (Modal S5 logic) without understanding the concept or even reading his own source which agrees with me. He also did this with his definition of "imagination" as I will elaborate again. He is clearly hiding behind sources. Pv 2. Similarly there are many arguments with Con drops such as: the majority of my principles other than the definition of "imagination" (though he no longer claims it is vague or questions "fantasy") and parts of my 7th principle. As such my other principles ought to be taken as de facto true. Another concession is the deductive nature of the argument. Pv 3. An important aspect is the debate of "simple ideas". Con has defined, on my request, simple ideas as "ideas that cannot be imagined" while he states in his original round that my argument should be (to avoid contradiction): "Otherwise, the premise would basically be:" " All simple ideas are true (considering the fourth premise, which states simple ideas can’t be imagined)." This means Con wants my argument to read: "Ideas that cannot be imagined are true" and admits that this avoids any contradiction regarding his imagination rebuttals. A careful reading of my argument shows that this is exactly what I said. Con has, himself shown, that his rebuttal was based on a straw-man, for what he says my argument should read as to avoid contradiction is exactly what my argument reads as. This effectively concedes the majority of most of Con's arguments as I shall point out below. Pv 4. Con has, in his round, given references, not to support his argument as they should be used but rather as external parts of his argument. This is not the way references are given, and arguments should be self-sufficient with references only used to elucidate. He mentions "Hilbert's Hotel" without explaining it or how it applies in his argument just as he gave definitions without showing their relevance. Pv 5. Con concedes the definition of "transcendence" as I gave it. Also Lem 4. has not been attacked which means Con agrees to it, and the explanation and connections made therein ought to be taken as true (for they were not objected to). Pv 6. A principle of logic states that if A then B cannot be written as not A, then not B. In example: if good grades, then a psp does not logically entail that bad grades = no psp. Parents could take pity on the child, after all. Similarly "false ideas are from imagination" and "imagination leads to false and subjective ideas" does in no way entail that all false ideas are imagined, it states that all false ideas in cognition are imagined. If something is not in cognition i.e.. that it is not meaningful, then it is not a subject of the mind and has no relation to it. All ideas that are in cognition are meaningful (they make sense) even if they are false as I showed in my round, and by giving further reference to Wittgenstein's 4th thesis which was not attacked by Con. Pv 7. Let's understand a definition. Let the definition be: "S requires some sort of quasi-sensory or positive representation of S". Surely if someone explains this as (as Con does in the last round): "A positive representation merely means some way of conceiving S as a body, e.g. imagining the color green, or imagining an atom." then this means that S is understood or represented through (I quote) "a body". Is this not congruent to saying that all ideas of Imagination clearly require other ideas and (as I say in [3] my original definition): 'we cannot fantasize concepts which are universal or completely devoid of sensations." By the earlier Pv 3. & this Con *has* conceded the definition of imagination, which was essential to his entire case. This only proves that Con's case is, as I have said, self-contradictory and muddled. Pv 8. Con completely drops the argument entitled "Relevance" which seems logical since it based itself on the misinterpretation of logic as detailed above. [Pv 1.][S1] I have re-stated these principles for the ease of the readers and myself. We ought to see the debate as a whole, for only then can progress be made. By using these principles in my (what would seem to be short) refutations below I hope to address Con's arguments as they have been presented in both rounds and engage successfully. I do not wish to misrepresent Con's arguments and for this reason I have spent space to do this. The refutations may seem short because I will quote the principles above as the fundamental theses and only connect them below. Lastly since a debate (even if Pro has the BoP) is based on appraising arguments of both sides, I hope the Hon. Readers will take the concessions and paradoxes of Con's case above into consideration. I hope in this I have not upset Con, I have the utmost respect for his as a debater, I hope only to evolve this debate to better elucidate both positions. The above principle are also positive attacks Con must answer independently. S3.1 Wer ist Gott? Rb 1. Con accepts the definition of transcendence, and states he only disagrees with [7]. Rb 2. Con re-asserts that "sentience" implies "subjective perception" while stating Pro agrees. Rb 3. Principle 7 is invalid, goes against rule 6, and deconstructs all of logic. Ep 1. With "transcendence" now understood, [7] will be discussed below. Ep 2. I do not agree with that in the least! As I show [S3;Ep3] God's perception would be objective, by definition. Con provides no evidence to the contrary, but this contention doesn't matter alot-here I agree with Con. Ep 3. I don't see how rule 6 applies, I'm not throwing rotten tomatoes (their being thrown at me...ouch Wylted). Actually Con is trying to deconstruct all logic and state that the "laws of logic are limited to human cognition". As I show in [7][S3;Ep4](4) "humans may understand essence through comparison" but essence itself is objective. Con is trying to deny mind-independent reality. There is no engagement with my analysis, Con only makes assertions. After all "goodness-in-itself" is different from doing a good act, and essence by nature of any quality is objective (this is analytic and self evident).(4) S5.1 Why is a raven like a writing desk?: Cognitivism of God Rb 1. Con re-asserts his reduction and states now there is a "gap" in "we have a conception of God". Rb 2. Following the above Rb, Con states that humans do not have a conception of FSM and that it is an "intrinsic conception". Con gives a "proposition" which does not fit into Pro's model. Rb 3. Con states that Pro drops this argument (and also again in the Conclusion) Ep 1. Earlier [S5;Ep1][1][2][7] I already explain how "a conception of God" is coherent because the idea is meaningful. I especially explain this again, in depth, in Pv 6. above to which I would refer my readers. (The Wittgenstein part especially as well as [S5;Ep1][5]). Ep 2. Con has not defined "intrinsic conception" now or before and so I really do not understand this point. A reading of Con's analysis will show each sentence contradicts the one earlier (especially in the preceding rounds). Ep 3. I have answered all of Con's points (in the most efficient way possible...literally). His non-cognitivism bases itself on the "gap" in Rb1 which he never proved, but I have still enunciated on. [Pv 3.][Pv 7.] As for God being an "empty definition" I already show in Lem 4. (which was never analysed) that I discuss God's Being and Essence differently. This fulfills the onus of the definition of God agreed upon, of course I don't have to show we can think of God as we do of a rabbit, that would negate my whole case. S6.1 To Infinity & Beyond: Ad Infinitum Rb 1. Con clarifies his burden by stating it is his duty to show: "(1) Pro's argument entails infinite entities, (2) infinite entities cannot exist, (3) therefore Pro's argument is false." Rb 2. A basic explanation of Hilbert's Hotel (where a. and b. are contradictory) and assertion that "Pro's argument *necessitates* infinite such beings". Ep 1.It's good that Con has clarified his burden for us, it is a heavy one. As anyone who reads this and then Con's argument can tell, he fails at both (1) and (3). Ep 2. As I have already stated [S6;Ep1-3] Con doesn't elucidate his claims. The refutation I gave remains unchallenged and so works. I have again explain this above, and I refer to [Pv 4,6]. My argument "allows" as many beings who fulfill the criteria to exist, as all deductive arguments work. I asked Con to name a few such beings, he has not, for they would be self-contradictory. Con failed to address any of this. SR.1 The Argument Itself: the Ontological Argument Rb 1. Con concedes his argument was originally a straw-man and amends "A" to only ideas. States that "xghsx" is not a proposition, it is an idea. Rb 2. Defines "simple idea" and speaks more about imagination and its definition by quoting Pro. Rb 3. Questions again why God cannot be imagined. Ep 1. This functions on a logical inconsistency that I have detailed before in [SR] as well as now [Pv 6]. "xghsx" is not meaningful, and so not in our model. Ep 2. As clearly shown in Pv 3. here Con concedes his entire case. There is detail in Pv 7. Ep 3. It is not just definition, it is being. Con has conceded this by Rb 2. I have given detail in Pv 3. and Pv 7. as well as in [Lem 3,4] which was never answered. In fact the original, unchallenged principles [Pv 2.] still work [2][3][4][5]. The thesis stands. P.S. I apologize for making all of you refer back again and again, but this proves to be efficient (for it makes the debate organic). I thank Con for a rigorous debate. I thank the voters and readers for their patience, I hope we have not bored you.