The God of Abraham probably does not exist

Salaam.I must also admit a certain sense of sadness. I expected Khalif to take one argument and run through it properly with explanation, instead he has listen different premises, which he has not defended, and thought that that suffices. It does not. Secondly I should remind everyone that the resolution reads: 'The God of Abraham Probably Does Not Exist' which is `71;¬p and he must show that. According to the rule: Onus probandi incumbet ei qui deciet, non ei qui negat, he has the burden of the proof, for the burden is determined simply by the resolution. On the other hand I do not have to show that the Abrahamic God necessarily exists (`33;p) but only that the Abrahamic God probably does not probably not exist, or `71;¬(`71;¬p). This cannot just as well be said by (`71;p). I need not give an argument for God's existence for the resolution does not read: On Balance God Probably Exists" but: 'The Abrahamic God Probably Does Not Exist'. So we phrase the entire debate so: ((`71;¬p)⊕(`71;¬(`71;¬p). The negation of the resolution is not to argue opposite, so says the resolution. I will still though, out of courtesy give an argument. I need only remind the voters that I am not compelled to do so, even if there is a shared burden of proof. My shared burden is to show that this resolution is more likely negated logically, and that is not to prove God's existence. I also give an argument because Khalif has in the rules made the second round for arguments not contentions. Though the judges must vote on how well Khalif now tackled my arguments, and defends his own, while I if I do either, prove my arguments or tackle his, I win. This is then the structure of onus. With that let us begin, I understand that the opening argument is for positive material only, which puts a bad taste in my mouth since I would never have argued a single argument from Khalif's pre-emptive arguments. He could have used this space to elaborate his premises more. Also I have an issue with his sources, instead of using them on certain points he simply adds a list at the end. I could list a hundred sources like that, no sources are supposed to help at certain points. There is one more point, please remember that when Khalif talks about omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence they seem to take on the forms of absolute constructs. I remind the readers that where I can show from Abrahamic sources how these qualities are at times subjective I am not conceding, in fact am making a viable argument because the title of the resolution reads: 'The God of Abraham Probably Does Not Exist'. The argument that I will be arguing for was not mentioned by Khalif in this preemptive arguments. It is my own conception of the Ontological Argument. It bases itself on the belief that since the Idea of God exists in cognition, and could not have been made up it is necessarily true. The argument will need however a precursor explanation. The first thing I need to explain, which will help me in the refutations as well is the importance of a priori/a posteriori and how it is applied. There are three a priori which I refer to viz. Time, Space and Number. I mean two things when I state a priori: the first is the condition upon the mind such that the mind, to understand any phenomenon needs to apply causality, quality, and quantity. We cannot comprehend Quantum Mechanics because it goes against causality, we cannot understand infinity because it digresses from both quantity and quality. The mind is bound by this a priori. The second I need to assert is that this a priori exists solely in the mind, so that nor Time, nor Space, and nor Number are physical entities.[1] Since it is clear that Space-Time is effected by mass, and mass is physical while God is metaphysical it should be clear that when we talk about God we talk about a Being who transcends Space, Time, and Number. For the proof of Einstein I cannot but cite the Equivalence Principle and how it is proved by the Cosmic Microwave Background Radiation of the nucleo-synthesis.[2]Let us them move onto my argument. I present to you the Ontological Argument which I shall first state in premise-conclusion and then in logical terms so as to show that it does indeed make sense. Or at least I wanted to show it in Modal Logic but for some reason it is not working here. It converts the letters into something weird. I just hope the ones above are safe from all this.1. The idea of God exists in cognition independent of experience.2. If an idea of cognition which exists independent of experience exists it is either false or necessarily true. 3. If an idea of cognition which exists independent of experience is false then it is imaginative. 4, The idea of God cannot be imagined. 5. Ergo the idea of God is necessarily true. 1. The idea of God exists in cognition, and is independent of experience:(1.1) The first of that which we must prove is that the idea of God exists. For this we must first understand what we have come to know as an idea. An idea is then a faint reflection, either of an impression which includes the passions, or a faint recollection of something. (1.2) When I talk about the idea of God I talk about the idea of the tri-omni a priori Being which we all possess. This idea need not refer to the properties of God, but only to the faint recollection of God that we possess, the very predicate God himself. (1.3) If my opponent argues that idea of God is garnered from direct experience he has conceded for he accepts that we can physically feel God, thus making God a reality. If he states that by experience he means hearing from others the belief in God then I counter by asking, where did the first person gain the idea of God from? I say independnt of cognition because Ontology can only apply to those phenomenon which are a priori, for other phenomenon could be imagined by taking the recollection of impressions but since no impression precedes the idea of God it cannot be imagined. 2. An idea can either be false, or would be necessarily true:(2.1) This I believe is sufficiently shown from logic, though I believe a good amount of sense can also prove it. While there may be a wonderful debate about morality being right or wrong where grey areas could be introduced, when we discuss the idea of an object, that being God, in cognition we can say that either that idea corresponds to God or it does not. There is no grey here, either this idea of God is true or it is false, while I do not like semantics if Khalif will feel the need to debate this I will happily engage him. 3. A false idea, independent of cognition, must necessarily be the result of imagination:(3.1) I fear that I will once more be called esoteric; I have, I swear, tried to keep this simple. Let us examine the different faculties of the mind, other than those of sensations*. The first faculty that man possess is reason. This we may rule out here for if the idea of God has come to us from reason, then it must necessarily be valid. To insinuate otherwise would lead to all sciences being incorrect, and we know that Mathematics and other sciences can be reasoned, where the observations are coherent with reason, so reason is a sound faculty. (3.2) The only other faculty of the mnd which we may not explain is that off Imagination. It is clear that our conceptions of monsters, and sea lions show the power of imagination. Though one thing need to made clear, that imgaination does not come up with new ideas. It conjoins old ideas into newer, more complex ways to form the appearence of new ideas. Imagination takes the decaying thought of reality and alters its form, that is it. I have no further proof for this other than to challenge my opinion to present me an imagination completely unconnected to reality. This is where the contentions of 'the perfect island' to Ontology are debunked, by showing that Ontology will only apply to metaphysical constructs we have clarified this misconception. Our point then is to show that the idea of God did not originate from any alteration of form, it was not imagined. It is important to know that Imagination cannot yield a simple idea, a simple idea is one which cannot be distinguished into parts. So while an apple is a compex idea for it can be broken into color, taste, et cetera, concepts such as pain are simple. I give this argument ab absurdo that my opponent show me a simple idea which is imagined. For if one conceptualizes sweetness one must identify an object. Imagination cannot yield a simple idea, if our opponent insinuates otherwise let him show us such an idea.*We have already ruled out sensations with respect to the idea of God.4. That the idea of God cannot be Imagined:(4.1) The first and foremost thing we need to realize is that the idea of God is a simple idea. We cannot divide our idea of God into color, or taste we have but a simple idea of His Being. Seeing how we understand that imagination cannot yield a simple idea we but conclude that the idea of God is not imagined and we can end our argument here. (4.3) We shall not however end here, we shall provide another proof. That we understand that God is a priori is clear by His very defintion. We know that God transcends Space, Time and Number, for God is not of physical mass, and that God is tri-omni. My argument is simple, that the human mind is bound by a priori and therefore could not have come up with an idea of God which is a priori. The human mind can only imagine and combine ideas which it has gained a posteriori, since all its ideas are a posteriori and bound by Time, Space and Number, it is not possible that two physical ideas can combine to create a metaphysical idea. Take the idea of Quantum Mechanics we could not have imagined what is decayed for it is above that. I am lost for examples for this only applies to a priori ideas which are scarce, I am however confident of the logic we used. It is not possible that an a posteriori mind come up with an a priori idea. We shall explan more later.