The evidential argument from evil is valid.

I would like to open this round by thanking my interlocutor for his philosophical tenacity. Believe me, it is appreciated. As this debate draws to a close, it's a good time to reflect on the important issues being raised so far. In this round, I'm going to defend each of my accusations that my opponent's five arguments lack merit. It seems clear that none of them are successful in showing that theism predicts natural evils well. From here, I will continue to argue that naturalism is a simpler hypothesis than theism. With that out of the way, let's get right to the basis of the arguments. C1: Naturalism is far more plausible than theism. 1: God is "morally perfect," but is also the definition of "moral perfection." In his last round, my opponent appears to remain unfazed by his knowledge that his conception of moral perfection is circular. I find this to be very surprising for at least one reason. Valid arguments must have true premises that are also made sensible by coherent definitions. Consider the following argument. Barack Obama is morally perfect. What does it mean to be "morally perfect?" To be morally perfect is to have the moral characteristics of Barack Obama. These definitions could apply to anyone and anything because they are circular. Consequently, my opponent's argument is illogical because the definition of moral perfection he is using is literally meaningless. 2: There exists an equal and opposite force of evil that prevents God from alleviating all suffering. Once again, it is not possible for there to be two opposing forces that are both omnipotent. I've tried to demonstrate this earlier, but allow me to make this point once more. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy puts it this way, "[C]ould there be two coexistent omnipotent agents, Dick and Jane? If this were even possible, then possibly, at some time, t, Dick, while retaining his omnipotence, attempts to move a feather, and at t, Jane, while retaining her omnipotence, attempts to keep that feather motionless. Intuitively, in this case, neither Dick nor Jane would affect the feather as to its motion or rest. Thus, in this case, at t, Dick would be powerless to move the feather, and at t, Jane would be powerless to keep the feather motionless! But it is absurd to suppose that an omnipotent agent could lack the power to move a feather or the power to keep it motionless. Therefore, neither Dick nor Jane is omnipotent." [1] In short, the notion that there can be two opposing omnipotent beings is logically impossible. 3: God is morally perfect and cannot deal with physical things without becoming impure. The central claims that I've made in my previous round on this issue are not a matter of my opinion, they are a matter of logic. The "God" my opponent has described in his first round that cannot touch physical things without becoming impure could not be omnipotent. An omnipotent God could interact with anything without becoming impure. To assert otherwise is to assert the illogical proposition that God's own creation has power over him and his nature. God cannot be all powerful and yet be at the mercy of the very things he creates. Accordingly, a corruptable "God" that can be made impure by interacting with material things cannot be maximally powerful. 4: God has a morally sufficient reason to allow natural evils. It would appear as though my opponent has missed the point of my original argument. At best, he has merely reiterated what I have already conceded in my opening round: namely, that E does not logically make the existence of God impossible. But we aren't debating a version of the logical argument from evil, are we? God could have sufficient reasons for allowing smallpox to kill 500,000,000 people in the 20th century. The issue here is whether or not it is likely that God has sufficient reasons to allow these sorts of evils. If my opponent wants to show why God would likely allow E, he must give some sort of reason to justify this. Moreover, my opponent's claim that God has morally sufficient reasons for allowing natural evils has still not been supported. He has neither shown that this view is true or that it is likely to be true. He does, however, make the following claim, "[F]rom God's viewpoint, though, we are fairly safe in assuming that this is the best of all possible worlds." Honestly, what does my opponent mean by this? By itself, this appears to be a complete non sequitur. The claim that God could have incomprehensible reasons for allowing evil is irrelevant. Inductive arguments are based on known information. This is why Draper's argument is framed with the clause "other evidence held equal". Naturalism, on one hand, explains the occurrence of E superbly. A theistic hypothesis, however, raises numerous questions and difficulties in explaining E, which are not present under naturalism. For these reasons, naturalism is still far more plausible than theism when all moral considerations are held equal. 5: Suffering exists, but it's our fault. If my opponent thinks that I am going to uncritically accept his unsupported claims about young Earth creationism, then he is deeply mistaken. Claiming that humans are responsible for suffering and natural evils is like claiming that Britney Spears conspired to assassinate Abraham Lincoln. We know that this couldn't have happened because she wasn't even alive at any point during the life of President Lincoln. Likewise, no human beings were around when suffering and natural evils entered into the world. In order for my opponent's argument to even get off the ground, he has to smuggle in completely unscientific premises about human history. And since his premises about human history are demonstrably false, his argument collapses alongside his claims. 6: (P3) Naturalism is more probable than theism independent of all evidence. While attempting to show that theism is not more complex than naturalism, my opponent claims that, "The natural realm is ... a subset of the supernatural." This claim is specious. Under theism, two fundamentally distinct and separate types of things exist. There are natural objects made of atoms, and there are also supernatural objects (e.g., God) that are not made of atoms. Naturalism is therefore more unified in its ontology than theism because it states that only nature exists, thereby making it a simpler hypothesis. On a side note, my opponent claims that naturalism cannot explain the origins of the universe. However, this view is both premature and unsupported. The world renowned physicist Stephen Hawking has postulated that under "M-theory" the existence of gravity assures that "the universe can and will create itself from nothing." [2] Of course, these views are not yet proven; they are still being worked out. My point is that a natural hypothesis cannot be ruled out as an explanation for the origin of the universe. ::Conclusion:: In the end, my opponent's case crumbles on several very weak points. All five of the arguments he has clamed invalidate the second premise of my argument have been shown to be completely unjustified. As such, naturalism is still far better at predicting E than theism. Moreover, the notion that theism is a simpler hypothesis than naturalism is equally unmeritorious. Naturalism, unlike theism, has a unified ontology that posits only one domain of existence, the natural domain. For these reasons, naturalism is far more plausible than theism. Therefore, other things held equal, theism is very likely to be false. Sources: 1. Hoffman, Joshua, and Gary Rosenkrantz. "Omnipotence (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford University, 2006. Web. 19 Nov. 2010. http://tinyurl.com... 2. Greene, Richard A. "Stephen Hawking: God Didn't Create Universe" Featured Articles From CNN. CNN, 02 Sept. 2010. Web. 19 Nov. 2010. http://tinyurl.com...