Resolved: Jury Nullification is a just check on government (LD style)

Because just is the adjective form of justice, the resolution is based in normative ideals of justice. Ideals of justice and morality have no privileged normative content; the only thing inherent to the form of justice is the conceptual exclusion of the unjust. This is true for four reasons. First, universal normative concepts are empty concepts that are hegenomized by particular identities that transform their struggle into the symbol of justice. Zizek writes, The universal is empty, yet precisely as such always-already filled in that it, hegenomized by some contingent, particular content that acts as its stand-in — in short, each Universal is the battleground on which the multitude of particular contents fight for hegemony. no content of the Universal [could] be effectively neutral and, as such, common to all its species: all positive content of the Universal is the contingent result of hegemonic struggle in itself, the Universal is absolutely empty. The implication is that normative concepts have no privileged content; anything could hegenomize justice or morality. All we know is that when something hegemonizes the universal it excludes other competing influences, meaning that justice is conceptual exclusion Second, defining universals implies that we place antagonistic limits on them. Laclau 1 writes, "true limits presuppose an exclusion a signifying totality is a system of differences. This means that [the two sides] are part of the same system and that the limits between the two cannot be the limits of the system. In the case of an exclusion we have, instead authentic limits because the actualization of what is beyond the limit of exclusion would involve the impossibility of what is this side of the limit. True limits are always antagonistic." This means that we define justice by setting a limit in a field of differences that establishes the line between justice and injustice. There is no naturally occurring place for line to be; we construct it ourselves. Thus no limit is privileged in its definition of justice's content and all that we know is that justice is conceptual exclusion. Third, justice is not derived from some transcendental being, it is conceptualized by humans. As such, these conceptions bear the marks of their creators, their current problems, needs, and desires. As these change so does the conception of justice. For example, the early feminist movement perceived their problems as resulting from legal inequality, and so conceptualized justice in terms of formal equality and legal rights like voting. Later, they achieved these goals and their needs and situation changed. They then perceived injustice as stemming from the effective exclusion of women from roles outside the household. This illustrates how normative concepts are never stable, they reflect the circumstances of their creators. The only thing we do know is that justice excludes something as unjust. Fourth, justice represents a negation of all particulars differences and is consequently empty of concrete meaning. Laclau 2 writes, "different particular struggles are so many bodies which can indifferently incarnate the opposition of all of them to the repressive power. the equivalent relation shows that these differential identities are simply indifferent bodies incarnating something equally present in all of them, [and] the longer the chain of equivalences is, the less concrete this 'something equally present' will be The community created by this equivalential expansion will be, thus, the pure idea of a communitarian fullness which is absent - as a result of the presence of the repressive power This absent fullness which shows itself through the collapse of all differential identities is something which cannot have a signifier of its own - for in that case, the 'beyond all differences' would be one more difference and not the result of the equivalential collapse of all differential identities. the community is not a purely differential space of an objective identity but an absent fullness Laclau explains that any particular can incarnate the struggle against injustice. This means that justice is just something that negates the differences of all particulars. It can't have its own meaning in the abstract because then it would just be one more difference in relation to other differences instead of the collapse of all differences. Instead all we know is that it is a fullness which is absent as a result of something that is excluded as unjust. Thus normative concepts are empty of content in the abstract. The only thing unique to the form of normative standards is conceptual exclusion. Therefore, the affirmative burden is to provejury nullification is conceptual exclusion. This is sufficient to affirm before anything else in the round because the only thing we know about justice is conceptual exclusion of the unjust. If jnull does this, then that's sufficient to affirm. I meet burden in two ways. First, every legal order depends on the determination of what are normal situations in which the law applies, and the exclusion from normality of abnormal situations in which the state is excepted from the law. Agamben writes, "Since "there is no rule that is applicable to chaos," chaos must first be included in the juridical order through the creation of a zone of indistinction between, chaos and the normal situation— the state of exception. To refer to something a rule must both presuppose and yet still establish a relation with what is outside relation, the sovereign decision on the exception is the originary juridico-policical structure on the basis of which what is included in the juridical order and what is excluded from it acquire their meaning. The state of exception is therefore the principle of every juridical localization, since only the state of exception opens the space in which the determination of a certain juridical order becomes possible. Second, Jnull involves the exclusion of things from the realm of justice. It accepts that a person is legally guilty under the united states system of justice and then excludes their legal punishment. under views: Consequentialism is flawed: a) Consequentialist morality is paradoxical because a single act can oscillate between moral and immoral as time passes. For example, after 1 year an act may be net beneficial, after 2 years net harmful, and continue to oscillate over time. The inability to characterize acts as definitively moral or immoral precludes its validity as a moral system. b) Values can't come from senses. Ends-based standards set empirical goals and ascribe to them value. But there's no rational way to tell which empirical states are valuable. It's completely arbitrary and not justified. "Something makes me happy" is not a rational justification. c) Utilitarianism paralyzes decisions because infinite future generations mean even a minor harm to the future by using resources now has an infinite impact due to accumulation of harms to each person in the future. Under ends based morality, no action could be taken because doing anything would use resources future generations could not use. 2) Presume Aff: Negate means to prove false, so the negative must do so. Simply disproving the affirmatives case does not negate 3)Fairness is not a voter a. No bright line for what is strategic and what is abusive because both exclude arguments, but there is no clear distinction. b. The only objectively fair standard is speech time, which is already equal, so theoretical correction is unnecessary. c. Ex post facto rule are unjust because I don't know what im being held to e.TURN: fairness as a voter is unfair because it asks for judge intervention and every judge has different conceptions of what is fair. There is no threshold for fairness The ballot says to vote for the better debater, which theory undermines because it asks the judge to vote for personal preference