The argument from evil (AE) is sound

IntroductionCon’s second round consists largely of 2 general arguments against AE. The massive of problem for Con however is that I already anticipated many of his points in my second round. As such, much of his case has been pre-empted, while other criticisms (particularly of P1) are irrelevant. Also, Con fails to engage with my justification for the premises directly, meaning that the support I laid out for my argument in R2 is unscathed.Defending P1Con completely ignores my defence of P1. Extend argument.Remember, all P1 states is that if God exists, gratuitous evil does not.Con offers 2 similar criticisms of P1.First, Con argues that we should reject P1 because, following Koons, he is "doubtful that pain, suffering and death are bad simpliciter, as opposed to bad for or to those who suffer them ... [since] God has no special reason to aim at minimizing pain as such”.The problem for Con is that P1 has nothing to do with God minimising evil, nor holding that all evil is bad simpliciter. Instead, P1 states that God would have to eliminate a particular kind of evil (gratuitous evil), because such evil would be wholly bad by definition, locally or globally. Next, Con attacks P1 by supposing that a gratuitous evil “be the fortunate fall” (felix culpa) for some good. All I would say is that if an evil is allowed by God as a necessary by-product of an adequately compensatory good (character building/free-will), then it isn’t gratuitous (again, by definition). I never said that evil (or even lots of it) is problematic for God per se. I emphasised pointless, unnecessary evil as the problem, and it‘s this (if it exists) that can’t be reconciled with God.Given that Con’s points are irrelevant to P1, and my defence of it has been ignored, P1 is affirmed.Defending P2Con doesn’t dispute this (nor could he). P2 is also affirmed.Defending P3Attentive readers will remember I gave 4 justificatory points to affirm there were gratuitous evils:1. Prima facie case2. Rowe’s noconceiveum3. The nature of evil4. Epistemic consistencyUnfortunately, Con didn’t directly engage with any of these points at all. Extend arguments.As such, much of his case has been undermined already. Con gives 2 broad criticisms of P3 - sceptical theism and a theodicy.Before I deal with them individually, I think it worth noting that it seems contradictory to assert both. Either God’s actions are beyond our ken OR we are knowledgeable enough to know that each instance of evil can be plausible reconciled with God. Con can’t have it both ways.Sceptical Theism (ST)Con accuses me of arguing from ignorance by accusing me of reasoning “if we don’t discern God’s morally sufficient reason, then it’s probable there is none”. I already anticipated this response in R2. Firstly, I actually gave 4 extensive points to support P3, so to characterise my argument as merely “negative” is just dreadful straw-manning. Second, as even the principle architect of ST, Stephen Wykstra highlights, the AE uses “a proper, indeed primary and indispensable, principle of justification (the principle of credulity)”, as such, he says"if an instance of suffering appears not to have a point, that is a reason for thinking it has no point." (1)As such, even the prima facie case I offered doesn’t argue from ignorance, much less the 3 additional arguments for P3. Second, Con makes the much more serious criticism of epistemic limitation - basically that gratuity, like certain knowledge in physics, is too “complex (for us) to ascertain”, and as such, P3 fails.Again, I’ve addressed this point in my last post, particularly epistemic consistency (as well as my general case for gratuity). I’ll just add a few points.The first is that it just doesn’t follow that because we are epistemically limited, we can make NO judgement whatsoever. I have severe limitations in predicting the future, but I’m fairly certain Bill Clinton won’t win the 2012 election. Similarly, beliefs I have about evil can certainly be formed probabilistically, despite these limitations. In fact, I’ve given 4 justifications, and Con should at least engage with these before declaring such pessimism. Second, ST leads to devastating consequences, such as moral paralysis. Any moral choices we make rely on inductive judgement with epistemic limitations, no less than AE. As Scott Sehon notes,"the result is that, if I were to take sceptical theism seriously, I should be morally paralysed." (2)Thus, we lead ourselves into sceptical mire of indecision and absurdity that we can't escape. Ironically, if Con really believed God’s actions were completely beyond our ken, he would be similarly sceptical about the resurrection. Yet he is not sceptical in either count, strongly suggesting his scepticism is cynically contrived. But we need not speculate. Con actually defends a whole argument based on nothing more than perception. Even if my only argument was that perceived gratuity = actual gratuity, as Con says,“our perception . . . stands within the absence of any apparent defeater.” (3)So when we perceive gratuity, it stands until we have a defeater.Lastly, ST dissolves God as unfalsifiable, which is another reason to reject ST. Indeed, Con even admits this, saying that both evil and good “offer little in the way of a positive proof” regarding cosmic benevolence or indifference.Con‘s failure to engage with my argument directly has him offering these erroneous criticisms. If he’d tailored his criticisms to my argument specifically, this could have been easily avoided. TheodicyCon seems to construct a character building type theodicy mixed with a free-will response, where our choices “entails our capacity of one or many falls (evils)“, in order to receive the greatest good (divine love), and that evil is “outbalanced” with eternal, “complete-perfect happiness“.There are a couple of problems with this response. First, it’s abstract. At no point does Con try to apply this to any of my examples. As such, it’s a nice just-so story, but no more than that at this stage. Second, it’s woefully limited in scope. Indeed, I hardly focused on moral evils at all in my argument. Free-will may be necessary for certain goods, but it doesn't apply to natural evils. Third, evil seems to beget evil, fostering character destructive qualities (hate and vengeance). Lastly, even if gratuitous evil was massively outbalanced by eternal bliss, this doesn’t make said evils any less gratuitous. There are a few more problems with Con’s theodicy, but I’ll let him resolve these first, closing with the words of Alvin Plantinga:“…most attempts to explain why God permits evil — theodicies, as we may call them — strike me as tepid, shallow and ultimately frivolous.” (4)ConclusionCon’s last move is to target WSA personally, when he says that “we have to use our own standards” when judging God’s goodness. I confess to being perplexed. This is a point even Christians routinely make:“if we shroud God in total mystery, the claim the God is good becomes compatible with any motives or behaviors or commandments we might possibly attribute to God. But if that is right, what are we saying when we say God is good?” (5)The fact is we have no alternative if we are to speak about God at all, and if there is an objective good (as Con believes), then there is only one standard anyway.Sources1. Wykstra, 1984.2. http://www.bowdoin.edu...3. http://www.debate.org...4. http://plato.stanford.edu...5. http://thepietythatliesbetween.blogspot.co.uk...;taken from http://www.debate.org...