It is probable that objective moral facts exist

I appreciate arguments in this debate so far, as well as a few concerns and issues that my opponent has addressed concerning wordage in this debate. I would like to likewise point out that the wording that I have used in my responses only serves as a way for me to convey specific messages and meanings to my opponent, and I have not made an attempt to use overly complex or obfuscatory terminology. However, if it would help the cause of this debate, I will definitely strive to limit my word usage in order to help my opponent understand. Premises of this debate/Preface I find it fascinating that my opponent so points out the specific fact that I have not made a reply adequate enough to undermine his arguments, or effectively argue against the resolution; as we look back throughout the course of this debate, we can all see that I agree to the same definitions imposed for terms such as OMFs throughout this debate with my opponent. Yet a question that I would like to likewise point out for PRO would be: does he make any attempt to adequately justify the context for which objective values can be applied for morality? His only structural points fail to address the fundamental concept of objectivity. Looking to thus, I beg to differ from what my opponent so fallaciously points out for my misinterpretation and upholding of my side for the context of the debate. The overall framework of my case caters directly to the specifications of the resolution, and not only have I upheld my burden of proof in advancing my arguments to show existence of OMFs are not probable, but have also shown specifically in concise terms how PRO does not achieve the specific criteria for which jurisdiction on any moral premise can be judged for this round. His false accusation, I feel, is no doubt unnecessary, but also impacting upon the personal reflection of my opponent himself. 'Defense of Epistemic Normativity' Pro, through his response, seems to cater to the sole refutation that concerns the misconceptions of belief and objective fact. Yet throughout his response, he reinstates the contradictory as well as fallacious point that our intrinsic and inherent belief system is not influential upon objective facts whatsoever in his stated difference principle. We can obviously see some fundamental problems with this argument, starting from the justification in of itself. Moral ontology and epistemology are clearly concepts that my opponent fails to comprehend to the context for which they are applied; the foundational concept of all epistemic normatives, or even ideologies for that matter, exists in the subjective context. We as individuals are the ones who assign meaning specifically to moral judgmental values, as exemplified in epistemology, and yet all the moral principles that are ontologically sound are all conceptualized by their inherent existence by a subjective mind. Morality in of itself is a conceptual value that we vindicate in our actions to provide for our social contract; yet the question my opponent fails to address if not flagrantly contradicting is that: Are there truly moral values or principles outside of a subjective context? And yet my opponent seems to uphold his interestingly constructed yet utterly fallacious argument when he imposes his ideologies that advocate for an objective moral principle or value. PRO fails to justify how our belief system, differing as it may be in scope of context in our society, does not correlate with the presence of morality itself. Not only is this logically unsound, but also questions the plausibility of his arguments themselves. Misconstruing the concept of moral ontology itself, as PRO is doing, falls sadly short of the justification necessary for his refutation. Now, we look to a statement that sums up his framework in of itself: "The interpretation of a principle is an epistemic question, not an ontological one." Yet when we merely glance at this statement, a plethora of contradictions come to mind. To say that a moral principle or value is objective or as PRO states, ontologically sound is to question the very basis for moral semantics as well as the concept of morality. It undermines what the concept of morality is based upon, rather than achieving what he feels is an adequate refutation. Indeed, it would be rather absurd to ascertain that a moral value may be objective or factual in nature, for the inherent existence of such a value only exists in the minds for which we feel it holds certain value or importance. Having a such 'normative' would rather be distorting the definition of a normative as well, for we see in clear distinction such that moral values may share common aspects for which individuals share, yet the underlying issue is that there is no norm for which objective moral statements can be made. Furthermore, we find that PRO fails to provide any justification for why a moral normative is plausible in the context of our social framework as an objective and factual concept without violating fundamental concepts of 'morality' or 'normative'. His only statement that considers such a notion merely briefly asserts that belief does not constitute the truth of an issue. To misconstrue such a concept would be likewise saying that there is no plausible correlation between morality and a subjective context. We find this extremely logically contradicting and fallacious in validity as well. Morality in of itself is completely subjective, because of a basic principle: It only exists in the subjective context, and we choose to apply it to our actions. Not only have I provided a justification for which there is truly tangible issues for which we can relate back to the context of this debate, but also numerous problems for which PRO fails to justify or address in his refutation, starting with the basic concepts of morality and subjective values, which are the foundational points of consideration according even to the resolution. Thus we can easily see that my opponent's refutations and defense of his 'epistemic normativity' falls sadly short in its validity and plausibility by any standard. 'Moral Perception'? Now recall the fact that I have been reinstating throughout the whole of my framework for this debate, that PRO fails to address the basic concept of the basis of morality on subjective values. He again implements an interesting yet boldly false claim that OMFs are probable because our moral beliefs are trustworthy. Fascinatingly, this is once again fallacious in its intrinsic construction and logically contradictory to even his own case. By asserting that we can justify an objective value because our beliefs are trustworthy would be reverting to my case in of itself. Indeed, such a claim caters directly to my points that suggest that moral values can and should be dependent upon subjective values. The principles he introduces are, if I may kindly suggest, irrational themselves. We see an example of such: "So, if a moral belief such as 'murder is wrong' is trustworthy, then it is PROBABLY TRUE,..." Rational discourse itself depends on validity of an argument, for which my opponent himself fails to justify as PRO. By implementing his values, once again, he instead supplements all of my principles and points, for which he has provided no adequate refutation. 'Ideology-Fact Relation' Interestingly enough, PRO once again ascertains that morality cannot be justified to be subjective merely because beliefs are. As I have pointed out in numerous instances, morality depends upon and bases itself upon the basic truth that we are agents that conceptualize moral values for our lives. My opponent's refutation of 'DN' is furthermore inadequate, and provides no justification for how such an subjective context which I have proved for moral values is false in construction. Thus we see that my case remains unfazed in its plausibility, and PRO has failed to defend his overall framework as well as his points.