Terrorism can be justified

Regarding Just War Theory and the framework for this debate, I obviously understand that orthodox JWT condemns terrorism which is why I added the condition that it will be used as a general standard "unless a compelling reason is provided supporting why some aspect of it may be bypassed. " So Con's point regarding the definitional issues with my case is moot. On his conditions allegedly necessary to override orthodox JWT, his conditions are not actually all necessary. All I have to show is that the combatant/ non-combatant distinction in regards to civilians does not always have a legitimate moral basis in JWT. If I can show this then terrorism can be shown to be sometimes justified (at least not definitionally unjustified). Just War Theory. The distinction which Con has made between combatants and non-combatants is insufficient in relation to JWT. While it can't be denied that these differences do exist, Con hasn't shown why they are morally relevant according to JWT. In fact, JWT shows that they are not relevant. The rules of jun ad bellum and just in bello never argue for the combatant- non combatant distinction on the basis which my opponent has. The distinction is made because it is conceived of that civilians do not contribute to war or had no role in starting it. However, as I have shown, civilians are capable of (and often do) contribute to war via taxation and at some points may have a role in starting it through either voting in candidates on war platforms or through having their general will represented by the State in doing so. Contention. Civilians and Responsibility. (A) TaxesNote that Con has conceded the partial responsibility of citizens who fit my two conditions, yet he denies this as a forfeiture of the right to life. He writes: "True, a citizen who finances a hit man is held partially responsible for acts committed by the hit man, but partial responsibility does not justify killing the citizen. " On the contrary, moral responsibility has been properly shown. This along with the concept of necessity in facing an existential threat (wherein military means are untenable) makes terrorism justified. While not being justified in every conceivable case, terrorism may be justified in some cases. On a situation being conceived where terrorism could be necessary to achieve some political goal, Con has argues that there is no possible scenario which could ever possibly occur. When I denied this, Con asked for an examples. I did not realize an example was needed though, seeing as there is no conceptual impossibility in the aforementioned scenario, thus it is clearly possible. However, since approaching the issue from this level has apparently been rejected by Con in favor of a simple made up scenario, I will oblige. Consider a situation where a large nation is attacking a smaller one. The large nation is so well equipped and the smaller one so ill-equipped that conventional warfare is almost impossible. This war is financed by taxation by the citizenry, the citizenry is wholly supportive of the war, and the State only acts to represent its citizens general will. Therefore attempting to lower the level of support for the war, and thus possibly end the current military campaign would be a necessary course of action in the face of an existential threat. Obviously everything in this scenario is possible, thus the situation itself is possible. (Note that this is not a new argument but a line of support requested by my opponent)(B) Civic RepresentationCon's rebuttal to my argument (like his previous rebuttal) only serves to argue that citizens do not necessarily support war through taxation or civic representation. He argues that "not all citizens who pay taxes support war". Well obviously and I never argues against this. The point though is that there are some citizens who do do so and thus those citizens are not morally innocent in regards to JWT. The Con is charged with defending the definitional innocence of all citizens. Simply arguing that not ALL of them conform to my definition of moral culpability does not serve to defend the definitional innocence as there clearly are some members of the citizenry who do conform to my definition. Furthermore, I never defended basing moral culpability on only taxes. Both support for war and financial support are necessary, not just one or the other and I never argued just one was sufficient. The next contention by Con is that my reason for moral culpability is instead some assault on freedom of speech of expression. He argues that "if we are allowed to kill non-combatants because they voice their opinions publicly, then we have effectively negated the freedom of speech as a democratic ideal". This is far from the actual argument I am making and is a gross misrepresentation of it. Moral responsibility does not stem from the mere voicing of opinions, it stems from the fact that in many cases in a liberal democracy, the will of the people is represented in the actions of the State. My opponent has not refuted this. It's not that these citizens express their opinion. Taking an example, by my standard someone who just says that the State should exterminate the Jews is not morally responsible for anything since the State has not actually carried out their ideal. However, if the State were to begin an extermination plan based off of the will of that person and other anti-Semites, then him and those who supported such a policy would be partially responsible. Note that this condition only applies when one's will is actually being represented and has a causal link e. g. the State is basing its actions off of citizen opinion. If a citizens opinion just randomly conforms to the will of a State who doesn't take citizen opinion into account, then that citizen would have no moral responsibility in the matter. It is only when this support has a causal relation to State actions that the citizen becomes partially responsible and my opponent has not actually responded to this argument. ===Conclusion===Throughout this debate, Con placed a lot of emphasis on JWTs definition, claiming that the existence of the combatant/ non combatant distinction negated the resolutoin in itself, irrespective of the condition I provided in my R1 regarding the standard of value for this debate. Furthermore, since Con is defending the impossibility of terrorism being justified, the possible case which I provided serves to refute his position in itself. On top of that, Con never tried to refute my point regarding the will of the people and moral culpability (merely misrepresenting it as attack on freedom of speech). I also showed necessity as holding relevance in the case of military means being out of the question. This combined with the fact that non-military targets may hold moral responsibility also justifies the use of terrorism. Terrorism has been shown to be justified in some cases, with citizens not being definitionally innocent.