Resolved: Elective abortion is prima facie morally permissible

This resolution allows wiggle room for exceptional situations such as one where the life of the fetus or child puts the mother's life at risk. However, on the face of it, elective abortion is not morally permissible, and only in an exceptional circumstance, such as the one noted above, is it permissible if the mother's life is at risk. My opponent notes that in a circumstance such as rape, "it is Prima facia morally permissible to the woman to have an abortion. " First, what makes it prima facie morally permissible for a raped woman to have an abortion? If I have a 2 year old child that reminds me a painful past event, do I have the right to murder that 2 year old? I would say no because the child is a human person (as well as being a human being). This is precisely what's in question. If the fetus is a human being, being raped is not a justification to terminate the child just because it will remind the parent of a painful event, assuming the fetus is a person. I don't intend to minimize the psychological and emotional trauma that women face when going through such a tragic event, however, that doesn't give anyone the ok to take the life of another human being just because they remind the victim of a tragic event. So one wrong doesn't justify another wrong. Secondly, my opponent brings up the idea that a woman has a "right" to abortion. Where does this "right" to abortion come from? My opponent is simply begging the question. If the right comes as a result of it being granted by the government, then women cannot complain if the government makes abortion illegal, and this right is only arbitrarily available depending on whether or not the government makes it legal. If it's universal right stemming from human nature (based on the substance view of persons), then the fetus is entitled to rights as well since these rights stem from what it is, namely, human with a human nature. I'd like to reiterate the terms I'm using and the metaphysical explanation I gave last round. According to the substance view of a persons, a human being has a particular nature or essence. This is why human beings are intrinsically valuable because of the very thing it is[1] Francis J Beckwith elucidates this point saying, "The human being is a particular type of substance - a rational moral agent - that remains identical to itself as long as it exists, even if it is not presently exhibiting the functions, behaving in ways, or currently able to immediately exercise these activities that we typically attribute to active and mature moral rational agents. "[2] For example, a dog is still, by nature of what it is, a dog even if its vocal cords are damaged and it no longer has the ability to bark. The loss of this property doesn't take away from the dog's dogness or nature. Please keep this metaphysical description in mind. 2) A Fetus does not qualify as a personI'd like to extend the personhood argument by Alexander Pruss from last round as my opponent has not made any reference or refutation of it Given that criteria, infanticide would also be morally permissible since the baby doesn't exhibit number 2, 3, 4, 5. Moreover, people in a coma or vegetative state, under this criteria, are not considered human persons and killing them is ok. The metaphysic I've proposed, along with the argument, shows why this criteria is flawed. My opponent asks me how can a person in a vegetative state have a serious right to life. I reply that he is still a human with rights because of the nature he has. He doesn't lose this nature when he loses certain properties or attributes, just as a dog doesn't lose its nature or essence of dogness just because it loses certain capabilities or properties. In this case, however, the person in the state doesn't lose the property of rationality entirely. Rationality and consciousness is still a part of his nature, it's just not actualized anymore. Likewise, a fetus contains the potentiality for rationality, consciousness, self-awareness, etc. as a result of being human. These capabilities or attributes become actualized once it develops them by reaching its developmental stage. It's not these properties that grants the rights, but rather the human nature. It's in virtue of having this nature or essence that the fetus is entitled to its rights and everything else that comes with it. Furthermore, Klusendorf rightly points out that we all "exercise those capabilities better than others can. In what sense then are we equal? " [3] If value is derived from having these capabilities actualized, and if these actualized capabilities are exercised in varying degrees among different people, then if follows that human value varies among different people. So in what sense are we equal? Another issue is if we are only valuable or have rights in virtue of acquiring some property, then we do not have unalienable rights. Only the substance view of persons can account for having unalienable rights and for equal value among all human beings. 3) A fetus is not physically independentHow does it follow that since the fetus is not independent, that therefore it's not a person entitled to rights such as the right to life? If the fetus is a person with rights, then it would be prima facie (immoral) to kill that person. Next, the violinist parallel fails and is not comparable to the relationship between a fetus and its mother. First, the fact is this violinist is a stranger and is unnaturally hooked up to the woman, while the fetus is mother's offspring and the fetus is naturally where it's supposed to be during development. The fetus is not a stranger or a parasite to the mother. Scott Klusendorf notes, the mother's child [or fetus] was conceived with her own flesh and blood and is where he naturally belongs at that stage in development … the child's [or fetus] relation to the mother is indeed a proper one"[4] The syllogism my opponent presented is invalid. Given its premises, the conclusion does not follow necessarily from its premises, thus making the argument invalid and automatically unsound. As it is, the Alexander Pruss argument still stands in defense of premise 1 of my original argument, as well as the argument proposed by Madeleine Flannagan, and I've shown that it is prima facie morally wrong to terminate a fetus based on the metaphysical claims I've proposed. The metaphysical principle of the substance view of personhood adequately provides a framework for the morality of killing human persons and granting rights to human beings including the fetus. Furthermore, I've shown why my opponents arguments and rebuttals do not successfully demonstrate that a fetus is not a person since the arguments contain multiple flaws.