It is more likely that we live in a simulated reality than a real reality (2)

I think that my opponent has a few conceptual confusions, and also misunderstands my arguments in numerous locations. In this round, I will show where my opponent's argument failed to obtain out of the first round, and then present two horns to my opponents argument about possibility, and consolidate my views. Finally, there will be a defense of reason to the best explanation.1. My opponent's syllogism:My opponent cold drops the arguments I make on his conclusions, but most damning is that he drops C2 by omission and C3 totally. Recall that in C2 I said that my opponent needs to clarify what it is for something to exist in a simulated reality, otherwise it is unhelpful to understanding the situation. But where you should really be ready to already stop thinking about Pro's position as viable is when you see that he dropped C3, which is the entire point of his argument. I argued that just because there is "something" that is more likely to exist in a simulated reality than a real reality, doesn't mean that it's more likely that WE live in a simulated reality: there is a massive epistemic gap, one that goes completely unaddressed. Remember, that something is more likely in one world doesn't mean it supervenes on this world.2. Argument from substitutionWhile I will only cover this briefly, this argument still stands. My opponent misunderstands the goal, and drops the relevant part of the argument. The argument is solely intended to show that his syllogism only gains uniqueness due to ad hoc reasons for believing premise (2). He drops the point I make that in a nearby world where we believe we are in a simulated reality, his argument could just as easily be made for an argument that we are more likely to be in a real reality.3. Argument on possibilityLet's set up some groundwork first. My opponent argues that if it isn't logically impossible, it's logically (let's say metaphysically) possible. My argument was thus: My opponent needs to give us a reason that the physical reality we live in could be simulated, but I think he misunderstood what I meant by physical. Physical possibility is just the possibility relating to what the world is actually like, I don't stipulate that it has to be made out of physical matter. None the less, because BoP is on both sides, he should be forced to defend what this sort of reality would be like if it weren't physical in the non-philosophical sense. Another confusion I think my opponent has is regarding to what metaphysical possibility is. Because something is metaphysically possible, that does not mean that it is possible in this world or in this given reality', where reality' signifies both this reality and some hypothetical simulated reality. In other words, there is no interaction between a metaphysically close world and this world, because the possible worlds theory only stipulates their existence, not any interaction. (Ex Hypothesi, it might insist that all possible worlds are closed systems). Hence, to say that it is metaphysically possible, or probable, says nothing about the probability of our reality'. My opponent needs to either explain why it is physically, or nomonologically possible, or what the link between a metaphysically possible world and our reality'. A: Horn 1, Physical possibility This argument is mostly held up by my argument against (1), where by there is no reason to believe that we are in a simulated reality, and by my third argument about a simulation being reality. Here again my opponent completely misses the thrust of the argument. My opponent makes an ad hoc argument about you not needing a calculator the size of a car, to calculate the speed of the car. This misses the point in two ways:1. The speed of a car is only a contingent and temporal property of the car, it is not a calculation for the car. In other words, you aren't calculating the car, just something about the car. 2. I never claimed you need something scalar to calculate facts about something.The argument was that were we to be in a physical reality, the only thing that is epistemically possible is that we are simulated by the matter itself, and we are being manipulated by something vastly larger. The reason is because the only thing that can represent a proton is a proton, nothing smaller can represent said proton because it lacks the completeness, and anything bigger contains "other information." In order to simulate a reality, it would have to be chunked out of mass. This shows that even if we are a "simulated" reality, our reality is still the way we perceive it.B: Horn 2, metaphysical possibility First argument: To say that because it is metaphysically possible, that it is more probable is a non-starter to take, because realities are closed systems, since otherwise we'd observe quantum crosstalk.Second argument: Let [ brackets indicate some set.Assumption: All possible worlds where there is the possibility for there to be a simulated reality have a real reality, because otherwise there would be nowhere to ground the simulation.1. [All possible worlds] contain [worlds with simulations]2. [All possible worlds] > [worlds with simulations], since for each world with a simulation, there could be an identical without.C: There are more possible worlds than worlds with simulations. Using my opponent's syllogism, it is more probable we live in a real world4: Inference to the best explanation.Here, I'll quote my opponent:Con argues that their real world hypothesis has better "explanatory" power. Even if this is true, so what ? How does this refute any of the premises in the argument ? It doesn'tExplanatory power matters because according to any kind of naturalist, reductive, or even intuitive account, what provides the most explanation with the most parsimony is also the most likely. Hence, since my opponent completely drops all of the pseudo-location arguments, you can easily see why we're more likely to exist in a real reality, rather than a simulated reality; it's far more parsimonious, as it requires far less stuff, while providing the same amount of explanation as any skeptical hypothesis can give. As for it not refuting any premises in the argument; it doesn't. My opponent apparently forgot that I also have BoP, Inference to the Best Explanation is my method of fulfilling that burden. The sun circling the earth was the "best explanation" for why we perceive the sun rising up, and the sun going down too, how did that work out ? Obviously what we "seem" to "perceive" has be proven false time and time again. My argument is based on reason, not what is "perceived", so once again, how does any of this refute any of the premises in the argument ? This argument doesn't hold relevance to IBE, had my opponent read up on the theory itself. The sun circling the earth is in no way a better explanation for anything, because it doesn't match up with our findings. We have lots of experience with math showing how the sun rising and setting works out, that also gives explanatory value to the other cosmic movements. Something is only the best explanation if it can account for all of the relevant information, something which "the sun revolves around the earth" fails to do. The perception claim was loose talk, the lines of reasoning were more along that of, it has to explain why the world functions as it does, given our body of evidence.Regardless, my opponent completely conceded the pseudo-location / time / quality argument, as well as conceding that this gives them explanatory power. With explanatory power, we have the most reason and most probability to accept the RWH, because it doesn't require anything extra. Don't let him make ad hoc responses in his next speech, he had plenty of characters left to argue against IBE in terms of pseudo-propositions, which he completely fails to do. Thus far, my opponent is failing to fulfill his BoP, while I cleanly extend the warrants for mine without any real opposition.I look forward to Pro's response.