It is probable that objective moral facts exist

In assessing whether or not it's probable that objective moral facts exist (OMFs), I want focus specifically on a certain type of moral fact: epistemic virtue and normativity. As such, if my opponent denies that there are objective moral facts, then he does so on pain of irrationality. The very possibility of rational discourse relies on there being such facts. As Tim Mawson has put it, objectivity about morality is "rationally inescapable." [1]Epistemic NormativityFor there to be rational discourse, there must be certain norms about how we should think. Indeed, as agents with advanced cognitive faculties, we ought to believe what is true and we shouldn't believe what is false. We all ought to be rational regardless of whether we want to or not. One might ask "But why should I be rational?" Whoever asks this question, however, is already reasoning from within a rational framework, since his question presupposes that he should only believe something only if he is given a good reason for believing it. Our very thinking, then, presupposes the existence of objective rational norms. Indeed, the very act of disputing this point ends up affirming it. Suppose you think that so far I have offered a bad argument. Presumably, you will also hold that one shouldn't be convinced by this argument. But to say that one shouldn't be convinced by bad arguments presupposes that there exists objective rational norms which govern how we ought to think -- namely, that we have a duty not to willingly embrace falsehoods. Now suppose you also attempt an argument against the existence of objective moral facts. If there are no objective rational norms, then I am under no requirement to accept yours -- or any argument, no matter how good it is. Obviously, this undermines the very idea of rational thought. The very point of argumentation is to convince another that a certain claim is true. We present premises with supporting evidence in the hope that our opponent will recognize the soundness of our argument and thus embrace it. But if there is no duty to embrace the truth, then it becomes trivial. Imagine the following conversation:Joe: What do you think of my argument for heliocentrism?Henry: I think it's a sound argument -- your conclusion was well-argued, and I see no problems with it.Joe: So does that mean you'll become a heliocentrist now?Henry: NoJoe: Why not?Henry: Because I have no duty to embrace the truth. Such an exchange is truly bizzare, and highlights the absurdity of denying epistemic norms.One might fall back and say "Well... it's not that this argument shouldn't convince anyone, it's just that it doesn't." Fine, but given such a reply one cannot fault anyone for being convinced by bad arguments or for holding on to irrational positions. So one cannot fault the flat-earther who refuses to countenance the evidence against his position for anything -- he has no intellectual duty to believe the truth or to refrain from embracing irrational positions. Nor can one praise an individual for embracing the truth, for there is nothing praiseworthy about coming to adopt true beliefs. The person who believes that the sun orbits around the earth is just as "rational" as the person who believes that the earth orbits around the sun. But surely this is absurd. A final implication of this is that nobody is under any obligation to accept that very reply! Consider the following principles and values which are foundational to the very possibility of rational discourse, all of which the skeptic of OMFs must deny:1. It is good to believe the truth and avoid falsehood.2. We ought to think rationally.3. We ought not be convinced by bad arguments.If relativism or nihilism about value entails such conclusions, then it can be rightly rejected as absurd. Given the ubiquity and centrality of rational discourse in everyday life, we have every reason to suppose that there are such things as objective moral facts. One last reply is avaliable to the skeptic. Instead of saying that there are epistemic duties which are binding for everyone, one could adopt a sort of noetic subjectivism. On this view, one should be rational because it is good for him to do so. One thus avoids the more general claim that everyone should be rational. But then as Mawson points out: "But he or she would now be left without any way of explaining why it is good for him or her and no-one else to believe truth and avoid falsehood. He or she wouldn’t be able to explain why it is good for him or her to believe truth and avoid falsehood in terms of the more general fact that its good per se to believe truth and avoid falsehood and he or she wouldn’t be able to consider himself or herself reasonable in thinking of himself or herself as a special case, the only person to whom such objective principles apply." [2] The relativist/nihilist position is thus absurd. The denial of rational thought is too high a price to pay for the denial of objective value. By reflecting on the very nature of rationality, it becomes rather obvious that there must be objective moral facts.Moral Perception and Sense PerceptionAnother way in which we might come to knowledge of objective moral facts is through intuition. Of course, many are skeptical of "intuition's" ability to provide us with accurate knowledge of how the world really is. But such a skepticism is unjustified. Indeed, we can construct a parallel argument by comparing moral intuition with sensory intuition. If beliefs inferred from sense intuition are prima facie justified, then so are moral beliefs. Unless one can find a relevant disanalogy, then it is it probable that objective moral facts exist. Consider then the following argument:1. If our sensory beliefs are trustworthy, then our moral beliefs are trustworthy.2. Our sensory beliefs are trustworthy.3. Therefore, our moral beliefs are trustworthy. (2) seems obviously true to everyone but the most radical epistemological skeptics. It thus stands in no need of justification. There is no good reason to think that our sensory beliefs are untrustworthy. It is true that from time-to-time we might be provided with false experiences, but this only proves that our sensory beliefs are not infallible. As so long as our sensory faculties are functioning properly, we may infer that our sensory beliefs are prima facie reliable, meaning that in the absence of a defeater we are justified in trusting them. This is how we treat sensory beliefs in our daily lives. Turning to (1), there doesn’t seem to be any relevant difference between our sensory beliefs and our moral beliefs. Perhaps someone might argue that (1) is a category mistake, since our sensory beliefs can be verified empirically whereas our moral beliefs cannot. This is deeply problematic. First, such an argument proves too much. It would not only apply to moral beliefs, but other rational beliefs which are non-empirically based. Our knowledge of mathematics and logic would thus be compromised. Second, it shows an unjustified bias toward empiricism. Why should we treat something as suspect just because it cannot be empirically verified? If pressed hard enough, it turns out to be self-defeating. Finally, such an argument is circular, for in order to verify our sense experiences through empirical means, one must already assume our sense experiences to be reliable! Another response might be to say that sensory beliefs are relatively uncontroversial, whereas moral beliefs are not. However, by focusing only on non-paradigmatic cases, one begs the question. After all, there are controversial examples of sensory beliefs as well: there is bound to be a lot more disagreement as to the identity of a dark silhouetted moving figure in a far off distance during a stormy night. But we would not infer from these examples that our sensory experiences aren’t reliable. __________Sources1. T. J. Mawson, "The Rational Inescapability of Value Objectivism" Think: A Journal of Philosophy 17/18 (2008) 2. Ibid, p.21