Qualified Immunity

Thanks Hayd! I. FrameworkA. PlanHayd misconstrues what I'm arguing. M plan text changes only those things I specified--all else remains constant between our worlds. Police can be sued for the same kinds of abuses in both of our worlds, though whether QI is granted is a separate matter. I explain that QI should not be granted where cases are in "rough equipoise" or where the victim clearly shows that the police officer should not receive QI. These thresholds are fairly clear-cut. B. DefinitionsI am required "to limit qualified immunity for police officers. " This is reasonably interpreted as limiting the scope of QI protections for police officers. Let's substitute the definition of limit and part of the definition for QI for those words in the resolution. If we do that, this is what we get: "The United States ought to reduce in quantity or extent the legal doctrine which protects government officials from lawsuits. " In this case, the government officials are police officers. But what this shows is that we are reducing the extent of the legal doctrine which protects police officers, implying that it should be easier to deny them QI and that some changes to how QI works are required to affirm. I cannot abolish QI, but there is no reason I cannot tweak it as long as I leave the basic structure in place. Hayd says this is not what the resolution means. But he offers no clear, non-ambiguous alternative interpretation rooted in the definitions given in round 1. If we don't limit the scope of QI protections, then what is being limited? How can I ever be topical? Moreover, he drops my topicality arguments under my plan; extend these arguments; they show that I'm topical. C. Morality v. JusticeCon concedes that the resolution is asking a moral question. Con gives us literally no analysis to support his assertion that morality is commonly understood as something that allows us to decide what is just. I would argue that morality is a system by which we understand what is right, whereas justice is a system that allows us to understand what is fair. These two concepts are distinct. A utilitarian moral system might argue that taxation is morally right because it funds useful programs, but Hayd argues that taxation is unfair. This example shows that there is a conceptual distinction between morality and justice. That is all I need to do to delink Hayd's framework from the resolution. Hayd cannot affirm by showing his position to be just. He can only affirm by showing his position to be moral. Hayd also drops that legality =/= morality. D. Role MoralityThe judiciary has a responsibility to the common welfare as a branch of the government. Arguably, the reason it incapacitate of criminals, enforces laws, etc. , is that if it did not perform these socially vital functions, social welfare would be severely imperiled. While I think dispensing justice is a goal of the courts, because I think that this goal does often promote the general welfare, I would not argue that it is the goal of the courts. Consider the following example: a court is aware that if it makes ruling Y, there will be massive riots potentially killing thousands of people. If it makes ruling Z, it does an injustice to a single person, but saves the lives of thousands. I would contend that the court ought to make ruling Z. Moreover, none of Hayd's arguments challenge a key aspect of my logic: "governments have special duties of care to their own citizens, both because citizens contribute to their societies in unique ways (they pay taxes, they vote, they serve on juries, etc), which entail reciprocal obligations from the state to pay citizens back for these contributions, but also because of the more ephemeral sociocultural and moral connections that people share with their countries. " These bonds do not just apply to "utilitarian entit[ies] such as a legislature;" courts could not function without taxes and jurors. Courts are part of this social contract, and thus carry the same obligations as the legislature. Hayd drops my logic here. E. MiscellaneousHayd offers no particular theory of justice or fairness. His own advocacy is therefore extremely vague. Justice is not some monolithic concept; there are myriad interpretations thereof. At least I am offering you a clear interpretation of morality. Also, there are ways I can link into the justice framework, as you'll see. II. My CaseA. Points B-DHayd drops my entire case except for the catch-22 argument. Extend transparency, abuse, and legitimacy. These arguments clearly link to both frameworks, as allowing abuse to go unpunished, unacknowledged by the courts through findings of guilt, and undeterred is unfair. Moreover, a prerequisite to administering justice is truth-seeking. Without things like discovery taking place, the court cannot reach meaningful findings to properly administer justice. Finally, if courts are not seen as legitimate, communities become more likely to use the judicial system rather than to resort to unfair vigilantism or to refuse to cooperate with police to solve crimes. B. Catch-22Con does not dispute that the catch-22 exists or that the catch-22 is unfair. Thus, if I can prove my solvency is topical, I am winning offense weighable under both standards. I am not allowing courts to dismiss suits based on the fact that constitutional rights in certain cases had not been clearly established. What I am doing is requiring courts to make constitutional rulings in QI proceedings so that future cases can be clearly established. Allow me to explain by example. Suppose Officer Bob is sued for violating right C and faces a QI hearing. Suppose the Court decides that right C was not clearly established, but never rules that right C existed. Bob gets QI and goes on his merry way. Then, a few months later, Officer Sally violates right C, and also gets QI, because the first court never clearly established whether right C existed. The cycle repeats. What I'm calling for is this: Officer Bob gets sued for violating right C and faces a QI hearing. The Court finds that right C was not clearly established, but does rule that right C exists. Bob gets QI (because it wasn't clearly established when he violated it). But, when Officer Sally violates right C, she is denied QI because the right was previously clearly established by the court during Bob's hearing. Suddenly, we go from endless loop of impunity (the catch-22) to a fair judicial system. III. Con's CaseA. Indemnification1. Immunizing the GovernmentHayd seems to concede that his logic would preclude all lawsuits against the government. Do not allow him to back track on this--otherwise he can unfairly shift the goalposts. He then says that criminal trials are a sufficient alternative to check the government. If I can show that they're not a sufficient alternative, I win this point. There are three reasons why criminal trials aren't sufficient checks on the government:i. The government decides whether to initiate criminal trials. If you suspect a police department (PD) of abuse, but the district attorney refuses to prosecute them for abuse. How can we expose the injustice, if citizens cannot initiate lawsuits on their own and force discovery to take place? Hayd is basically saying that government should police itself; that's almost as laughable as saying oil companies can self-regulate. ii. Civil trials have lower burdens of proof, so it is easier to get convictions and thus they function as a greater deterrent to misbehavior. iii. Not all forms of government misconduct are (clearly) criminal. Lawsuits are therefore still necessary to check illegal or improper activity. Hayd also never responds to the idea that suing even for non-monetary compensation (or even filing a criminal case) might be unfair to taxpayers, since their money would be going to pay for the government's legal fees. He says, "The fact that [the taxpayers] are paying any money at all violates justice. "2. Inflated ImpactsHayd concedes my arguments here. These at least function as mitigation. If I can show that my impacts outweigh his mitigated arguments under whatever standard we use, then you vote Pro. 3. Charitiesi. Impunity Taxpayers pay for government budgets, but that doesn't mean that civil damages don't punish PDs. Legislatures are less likely to allocate funds to departments who lose lawsuits. Also, PDs have to pay for those damages out of their allocated budgets. Government agencies have a clear interest in increase their budgets to boost their clout and capacity. Also, worker bees want more money for (and higher-ups want to avoid scandals so that they get) bonuses and promotions. ii. Taxation v. CharityDo I choose not to donate to Medecins sans Frontieres or Make-A-Wish because they do not help every single needy person? No. Con concedes that courts cannot compel charities to pay compensation to everyone who deserves it, and so there is a real risk that victims will go without their just rectification. Con drops that charity is more susceptible to economic ups and downs. iii. Feasibility + FramingPlease disregard all of Con's sourced info since the citations were not in the text of the debate, as required by the rules. Con drops that "these charities act as a legal screen for police officers--it is hard to imagine the ACLU, for instance, agreeing to be complicit in shielding police officers and departments from having to pay damages to victims of police brutality. " His charities aren't going to garner the sympathy he says they will because this isn't about compensating victims (that happens in my world too). It's about shielding abusive officers. iV. OtherCon drops that talk of charities is premature and that charities are non-unique. Extend these. I'll impact them later in the debate. Thus, I affirm. Thanks to Con and the readers.