Free will

My opponent stated the resolution for the debate as "free will does not exist and that all events, past present and future, were determined at the [Big Bang]." My opponent called himself "Con" but actually affirmed the resolution he offered. To affirm the resolution, Con must show both that "free will does not exist" and that "all events, past present and future, were determined at the big bang." In R1, Con conceded that the second part of the resolution has been negated. The two parts were connected by "and." Therefore, he has conceded the debate. We are now no longer debating, we are chatting. Five rounds of 8000 characters is a rather long chat, but I'm rarely accused of being brief. We are considering the question: Do humans have free will? There are at least three responses: 1. Yes, 2. No, 3. There is something wrong with the question that makes it meaningless. (Of course, there is also: 4. I dunno. But what fun would that be?) The third response is akin to the logical positivist response to the question, "What is the meaning of life? They say, "Life does not have a property of "meaning," so the question is not really a question. It just has the form of a question. I'm not sure whether or not "Do humans have free will?" is a legitimate question. At the outset, Con defined the question implicitly in his resolution. He offered two alternatives. Either everything is predetermined, in which case there is no free will, or everything is not predetermined, in which case there is free will. Free will was defined as lack of predetermine outcome. I think that is the classical definition used in philosophizing about free will over centuries. The theory that everything is predetermined is put to rest by modern science. Not only is the universe not predetermined, it could not function without inherent probability distributions. We have to have the inherent randomness to support wave-particle duality and other properties of nature I presented in R1. Pro recognized that his implicit definition of "free will" was fatally wounded. Pro offers a reconstructed implicit definition according to: "Consider a universe where there are not these random variables to deal with. If humans exist in this theoretical universe, which I am not claiming could actually exist, than all events would be pre-determined in the way I described. If we were to create those same arrangement of particles in our own universe would he then have free will?" To answer his question, IF a predetermined universe could exist AND it were possible to make a predetermined human to function in it, then by Con's definition of free will, the predetermined human in the predetermined universe would not have free will. (Well, probably not, buts let's suppose not.) The problem is that while it seems like it ought to be possible to construct a predetermined universe, we do not know how to do that. The laws of nature we know do not allow it. In any case, analogy with an imaginary universe does not resurrect the definition of "free will." So I challenge Con to define "free will" within the constraints of what is known of our existing universe. We know that events are not predetermined. Because the human mind is made of the same stuff of the universe, even the process of choice is not predetermined. A computer program is predetermined in the sense that if you give it the same inputs, and everything is working normally, we will always get the same outputs. So one might imagine a probabilistic universe that is generating random inputs, but with the program operating in a predetermined way. That analogy for the brain fails because (a) the brain is a living organism that is constantly repairing itself, (b) the inherent probabilistic nature of the universe occurs within the brain, and (c) the brain modifies its "program" based upon past experience, including the experience considered the problem before. So what is the definition of "free will" that fits within what we know of modern science? Separately, Con claimed, "However, the unpredictable variables are not influenced at all by the human mind, so even if future events are not predictable, humans have no influence over them." We certainly have influence over whether we go to the store or not. We don't have influence over when and where particles appear by quantum fluctuation. I think Pro is making an analogy to fixed computer program given random inputs. That analogy fails for the reasons given. My suspicion is that resolving the definition of free will depend upon solution of the problem of subjective consciousness, and perhaps much beyond that. If we understood how we made decisions and why we perceive we are making them, maybe we could then approach the question of whether or not there is a definition of free will that makes sense. Right now, Con has the burden of defining "free will" in a sensible way, and then proving we don't have it.