The ends justify the means

I'm afraid my opponent seems to entirely miss the point, which makes his objections rather ineffective. We should try to clear up the confusion. To do so I will address the points he brings up and point out the key issue he has neglected to address.RebuttalsRebuttals to Assertions1. Pro characterizes my position incorrectly as that "morality is only defined by its intrinsic nature" or that "actions cannot be judged for the (...) intentions behind them". I mentioned in my argument that both the object and the intention must be morally acceptable in order for the action as a whole to be deemed good. This is not an "either or", but a "both and" proposition.2. Pro also says that given my view certain goods would only be achievable if a society "[changes] its morals (...) to make the action moral" thereby changing an intrinsic evil to an intrinsic good. This is patent nonsense. If something is intrinsically good or intrinsically evil it depends on nothing outside of itself (much less public opinion) for this to be true. If a society ignores morality and cries out "evil be thou my good" it does not make it so, it simply makes that society an immoral one.3. Pro then goes on to make a rather odd remark about the cutting down of trees. This seems to reaffirm my conclusion that the differentiation between intrinsically evil and morally neutral or positive means was simply not registered. Cutting down a tree is not an intrinsic evil. We recognize the beauty of nature, and have a certain degree of responsibility to be good stewards of nature, but a tree is not a moral agent, and cutting down a tree is not intrinsically evil whereas cutting down a tree for the pure pleasure of destruction or out of envy for a neighbor's orchard would be. This is because while the object is neutral the intention is negative. This falls completely in line with the framework I set forward and I thank my opponent for the example.4. Pro makes the rather bizarre claim that under the framework I propose we would not be able to send criminals to prison, as he decides to call imprisonment an intrinsic moral evil. Unjust imprisonment (taking freedom away from the innocent) certainly is, however imprisonment itself is not. Imprisonment of criminals is comparable to holding back the fist of an aggressor so he may not strike his victim or sending a child to his room to "think about what he has done". For it to be just it must seek 1. the safety of society and 2. the rehabilitation of the delinquent. The fact that a situation causes discomfort does not make it an intrinsic evil.Rebuttals to Rebuttals1. Cheating. Pro claims that, as society deems cheating an intrinsically immoral act, this means that the ends are immoral. This once again confuses the ends (whether considered as the intention or, more erroneously, as the result) and means (the object, the act itself). The act is cheating, the intention is to get the degree. Getting a degree (the ends) is a good thing. The means, however, are problematic. The fact that they are problematic do not automatically make them ends, there is simply no justification for this misuse of the terms.2. Result-based morality. The dog example shows precisely what I am getting at. You cannot know the man is going to commit suicide due to the loss of his dog (result). You can only know your intention (to save the child) and the means used to seek that end (killing the dog). To say the result is what gives an action moral character is, therefore, a patent falsehood.3. Killing the obese. There are certain moral goods the value of which are qualitative and not quantitative. Food is good because it feeds people, so more food is better, because it serves its purpose better. People, however, are not means but ends in themselves, and have infinite human dignity. We cannot quantify the value of people. If the choice were between saving one and saving 15, saving 15 would be the greater good. The choice however is between murdering one and saving 15 and the tragic death of 15 people. The murder itself would be an affront to the dignity of the 15 who were saved and would undermine the very foundations of any moral philosophy worth the name.4. (I believe the issues here have already been addressed)Rebuttal to Conclusion"Mmorality must be defined as what is the most moral -- morals being defined as what individuals rationally consider to be moral" This definition is utterly meaningless. I could just as easily say "pickle must be defined as what is the most pickle, pickle being defined as what individuals rationally consider to be pickle". The core argument, however, is that morality must not limit reasonable people. In fact, Pro's main complaint about the moral framework set forth in my first intervention is the fact that it is limiting; but that is the roll of morality. Chesterton famously said that morality, like art, consists of drawing a line somewhere. This line may go against conventional wisdom, it may go against what is desirable at a certain moment. The problem is, though, that if we redefine principle to whatever is convenient in a certain situation, we really have little use for principle in the first place. If Pro considers my morality objectively immoral, I must say the one defended here is no morality at all.Dropped ArgumentThere is a key issue which has been omitted in this round of debate: the problem of definitions. It is vitally important, as we must be speaking in the same language in order to communicate effectively. Pro has been using equivocal definitions of both "ends" and "means". He alternatively claims certain means are ends (when these are immoral) and certain ends are results (when it is more useful in building a utilitarian defense). This is not the commonly accepted use of these terms as found in the phrase "the ends justify the means" (the actual adage is the ends don't justify the means, of course, but in defying conventional moral wisdom he is making reference to it). If he is not able to differentiate between the intention and the act or omission by which this intention is to be achieved, it will be difficult for him to make a strong case in favor of this resolution. As per his rules, he is not allowed to play semantics on this one, as he already defined the phrase as "a good outcome excusing wrongs committed to attain it". He cannot now claim that wrongs committed to attain the outcome are actually ends. Nor can he change the definitions now as per his own debate rule 3.I hope that, in the following and final intervention Pro will be able to offer an explanation to clarify this equivocal use of the key terms of the debate. Otherwise we will be forced to consider his position to be based on either sophistry or a lack of comprehension of the issues at play.