God Exists

Russell's Teapot By the very nature of the Teapot analogy, we have good prima facie reasons to believe that it is unlikely that a microscopic teapot is orbiting the sun between the Earth and Mars. Mainly, that a teapot is inherently unlikely to be in space. The only way that a microscopic teapot could occur in space are: 1st, someone would have to make a microscopic teapot. 2nd, someone would then have to put it there. Or some freakish natural event would have to launch it into orbit. Now as far as we know, neither conditions 1 or 2 have been met. It begins with an object whose existence in outer space is intrinsically unbelievable ,and ends in the conclusion that belief in the object's probable existence is irrational.My second objection is specifically to your statement, "the person making the [positive] claim has to back it up." Suppose in the resolution, "God Exists," we exchanged "God" for "Donald Trump." It seems ridiculous to suggest that the person who is making the positive claim has the burden to prove that Donald Trump exists.Even if I am misconstruing what you said, and you do really mean that anyone making a claim has to back it up; I would contend that you are in fact making the claim that God does not exist. As Alvin Plantinga said, "[L]ack of evidence, if indeed evidence is lacking, is no grounds for atheism. No one thinks there is good evidence for the proposition that there are an even number of stars; but also, no one thinks the right conclusion to draw is that there are an uneven number of stars. The right conclusion would instead be agnosticism. [1]" Thus, the burden of proof is not solely on me, rather we share it. OmnipotenceThere are 2 types of omnipotence. Common and Maximal omnipotence. Common omnipotence means that one can do anything that is logically possible. If then, we ascribe common omnipotence to God, the paradox does not apply. On this view of omnipotence, it's not that God lacks the power to create the rock, or to lift it. It's that the task itself is nonsense. So the supposed problem only applies to maximal omnipotence. Maximal omnipotence is the ability to do anything. Even the logically impossible. Even if God does not have common omnipotence and rather has maximal omnipotence, the paradox still fails. I could not have found a better way to say this than DDO user InquireTruth, who puts it this way: "[T]he only reason such a God could not lift a rock too heavy for himself to carry would be because it is logically impossible. But that is irrelevant, because inherent in the definition of maximal omnipotence is the ability to do the logically impossible. So the statement, "God can lift a rock too heavy for himself to carry" may very well be logically impossible, but it would, per the definition of maximal omnipotence, be perfectly within God's power to do so. So the paradox fails because its own inference of maximal omnipotence makes its application of logic irrelevant! The paradox assumes that God ought to be able to bring about logically impossible states of affairs. So it is an application of consistency to believe that a God who can realize the logically impossible state of a stone too heavy to carry can also realize the logically impossible state of his carrying that same heavy stone [2]." Basically if God possesses maximal omnipotence, which the argument assumes; any attempt that uses logic to show that God can't exist is pointless as He can defy logic. Thus, Paradox of the stone is self refuting as it assumes that God possesses an attribute that makes Him irrefutable by definition, and then tries to refute it. OmniscienceBefore I rebut this point, I would like to make an observation. God, as defined in round 1, is not said to be Omniscient. So this point doesn't really count as evidence against the God that I'm arguing for. So whether I refute this argument or not has no bearing on the outcome of the debate. However, I will take the time to rebut it. The notion that knowledge of an proposition before it happens undermines the idea of free will rests on a modal fallacy. As Norman Swartz points out, the argument is basically this: If x knows that P then P must be true. But if P must be true, then P cannot be false. Any proposition which cannot be false is not only true, but necessarily true. Thus if x knows that P, then P is necessarily true. By the transposition (or contraposition) theorem, we can restate this last conclusion in this manner: if P is not necessarily true (i.e. is contingent or necessarily false), then it is false that x knows that P. In short, the only knowable propositions are necessary truths, e.g. the truths of logic and mathematics. All other truths, though possibly highly confirmable, are ultimately not knowable and must remain a matter of opinion only[3]. The fallacy arises in the ambiguity of the first premise. The correct interpretation of the first premise is: [](Kxp --> p) However, the way it is interpreted here is: Kxp --> []p In essence, if P1 was interpreted in the 2nd way, we could not know contingent propositions to be true, only necessary propositions. However, we can know contingent propositions to be true, so the 2nd interpretation is false. However, suppose it doesn't succumb to a modal fallacy. There are other reasons to believe that this argument has no merit. I believe that C.S. Lewis has a good response to this. "God is outside and above the Time-line. In that case, what we call 'tomorrow' is visible to Him in just the same way as what we call 'today.' All the days are 'Now' for Him. He does not remember you doing things yesterday; He simply sees you doing them, because, though you have lost yesterday. He has not. He does not 'foresee' you doing things tomorrow; He simply sees you doing them: because, though tomorrow is not yet there for you, it is for Him. You never supposed that your actions at this moment were any less free because God knows what you are doing. Well, He knows your tomorrow's actions in just the same way—because He is already in tomorrow and can simply watch you. In a sense, He does not know your action till you have done it: but then the moment at which you have done it is already 'Now' for Him [4]." Problem of EvilThe statements, "an omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent God exists," and, "Evil exists," are not logically inconsistent. I.e. there isn't any explicit contradiction between the 2. There must be some assumptions made to posit that they are contradictory. There are 2 assumptions made. First, that if God is omnipotent, then He can create any world he wants. Second, that if God is all-loving, he prefers a world without suffering. As stated before, there are 2 kinds of omnipotence. I personally believe that God has common omnipotence. He can do anything that is logically possible. I contend that it is logically impossible to create a world in which we have free will, but are also forced to do good. For if we are forced to do good, we are not freely choosing to do good. Thus the first assumption is false. The second point is also false. There are cases where we allow suffering in order to bring about a greater good. For instance, having wisdom teeth extracted. After the operation is complete, your mouth can hurt for days, but pulling wisdom teeth can prevent damage to other teeth and having crooked teeth. The burden is on the atheist to prove that there are absolutely no circumstances in which God would allow suffering. I would contend that we are not in a position to say whether God lacks reasons to permit suffering. For we have limited space, time, intelligence and insight. So suffering may seem pointless in our limited scope of understanding, but the truth is we just can't tell.Sources and Symbolism Key will be in comments.