The Kalam Cosmological Argument is Sound

Thank you, Con, for your multilevel response! Let’s go through each premise, look at my arguments on behalf of them, Con’s objections, and my counter-responses. 1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause. Metaphysical Support for Premise (1) Here I argued that if something were to come into being without a cause, it could come from nothing. But such a feat is impossible, for it entails something coming to exist without there being the potentiality for it. I distilled basically two responses from Pro. In the first place, Pro charges me with using “shady, ambiguous language”. For example, something and nothing went undefined. By “something” I mean “a thing”, and by “nothing” I mean “no thing”. Further, coming into being was never clarified. By “coming into being”, I mean “beginning to exist” or “coming into existence.” We can go even further and offer an analysis of the notion: [1] x comes into being at t if and only if: (1) x exists at t, and the actual world includes no state of affairs in which x exists timelessly, (2) t is the first time at which x exists, and (3) x’s existing at t is a tensed fact. Notice, coming into being has nothing to do with the manner in which something comes into being. Whether something begins to exist ex materia (from preexistent material) or ex nihilo (out of nothing), it still begins to exist. Finally, let me go the extra mile and explicate what I mean by cause. Aristotle distinguished between two types of causes: a material cause, and an efficient cause. A material cause is the stuff out of which something is brought into being. An efficient cause is what we usually think of as a cause: the producer of something. In premise one, we’re talking about both. In the boat example, the original pile of wood is the boat’s material cause and the carpenter is the efficient cause. And were the boat to come into being without either an efficient cause or a material cause, it would come from nothing. And as we saw, this is impossible. Thus, everything that begins to exist must have either an efficient cause or a material cause.Having defined my terms, Pro's first object falls flat. In the second place, Pro objects, “[t]he wooden boat analogy makes no sense.” Pro gives two reasons for this conclusion. Firstly, the “title of boat is just given to the structure of the wooden materials.” This is an endorsement of merriological nihilism, the view that all that exists are different arrangements of elementary particles. On this view, there is no such thing as a boat, only a configuration of particles arranged boat-wise. Sadly, merriological nihilism is absurd. On this view, neither books, pizzas, planes, chairs, tables, nor even people exist. Indeed, you don’t even exist! But surely you do, as do the rest. At the very least, the burden of proof is on the one who denies that they do. Secondly, Pro asserts that “[t]he carpenter isn't ‘creating’ anything”. Now, in the boat example, the carpenter does not create the boat in the sense of bringing it into being out of nothing, but he does create it in Pro’s sense of causing it to come into existence. So then, my analogy makes good sense. In short, we’ve still got strong metaphysical warrant for premise (1). Inductive Argument Two responses were given by Pro. First, he asks, “what have we ever observed beginning to exist?” Well, I myself! The alternatives are: (1) I am eternal, or (2) I do not exist, both of which are absurd. I may not have begun to exist from nothing, but I still began to exist! Indeed, boats, pizza, planes, pianos, and anything else all begin to exist in the way I analyzed the notion above. Second, Pro writes that “we haven't observed everything that began to exist,” which he takes to invalidate my argument. In response, it needs to be pointed out that this argument just is an attempt to show that even though we haven’t observed everything that begins to exist, we can still infer that all of those things have causes. How? Via inductive reasoning! And Pro gives no response to that argument. As such, we have good physical warrant for the causal principle. 2. The universe began to exist. Impossibility of an Actual Infinity Here I argued that the series of past events in the history of the universe must be finite. Amazingly, Pro gave no response, and so it goes through unrefuted. If this argument is sound, you must reach a first change or event, before which is only changelessness. Now, material things are necessarily in constant flux (on the atomic level). As such, material things could not exist in such a changeless state. In other words, they must’ve begun to exist. Further, as Pro himself says, space and time are the biproducts of the interactions of matter. So if you don’t have matter, you don’t have space or time. Thus, this first argument shows that space, time, matter, and energy began to exist, the essence of “the universe.” So I think we have good philosophical grounds for premise (2). Modern Big Bang Cosmology Here I contended that modern Big Bang cosmology supports the conclusion that the universe is not eternal. Pro alleges that even though the universe as we know it began to exist, “[t]he things in it...‘predate’ the universe.” As I understand him, Pro is suggesting the singularity timelessly exists in a state causally prior to the universe. In this timeless singularity, matter is infinitely compressed. This assertion is nonsense. The singularity, by definition, just is the point at which the universe began to exist. It exists for an instant before expanding into the universe we observe today. It is not a timeless existent, nor is it what existed prior to the universe. It is the universe in its very first state. It began to exist, and so needs a cause. Additionally, Pro contends that the universe coming into being “would violate the laws of thermodynamics.” Now if this is correct, modern Big Bang cosmology would contradict thermodynamics. Fortunately, it's not. The laws of thermodynamics only apply to closed systems (e.g., no external influences). Only in closed systems is energy/matter neither created nor destroyed. God (the ultimate external influence) bringing the universe into being is not a closed system. Therefore, thermodynamics don't apply, and so can't be violated. So I think the scientific argument for (2) stands. 3. Therefore, the universe has a cause. Here Pro raises the interesting objection that the “universe has no cause because the only thing that can be caused are events.” Three responses. First, he gave no argument for this claim. Second, it's false that only events have causes. I am a thing and not an event. I know this through mere introspection of myself. Nevertheless, I have causes that brought me into being. Third, even if it were the case that only events have causes, the universe coming into being is still an event, and so requires a cause. 4. If the universe has a cause, there exists a transcendent, personal Creator. Here I argued, first of all, the cause must be beyond space and time because it created space and time. Pro counters, “the stuff of the universe” created spacetime. This won’t cut it. Remember the quote from P. C. W. Davis. On the Standard Model, all matter and energy began to exist at the Big Bang. As such, the “stuff of the universe" requires a cause. Second of all, I argued the cause must be personal. Only two candidates present themselves as possibly timeless and spaceless: abstract objects and unembodied minds. But abstract objects lack causal power. Therefore, the cause must be on the order of mind. In response, Pro writes, “numbers, sets, and properties are things that humans use to describe what they observe,” implying that they do not exist. Fine! Now we have two reasons to think abstract objects cannot create the universe: (1) if they exist, they are causally impotent, and (2) they don’t exist! But Pro thinks the “unembodied mind hypothesis” faces problems as well. In the first place, “the only casual abilities of a naked intelligence would exist within itself.” I have no idea what this means. I await clarification. In the second place, “[an] unembodied mind isn't the only remaining alternative.” We have at least three others: 1. Space and time could be illusory – Well, they could be. But do you have an argument for this? We experience space and time, and therefore are warranted in believing in them in the absence of any reasons not to. 2. Time and space could have been created as the result of a larger universe collapsing – If you’re going to argue this, you’ve got to suggest some model by which this happens. The Standard Model precludes such a scenario, so what model are you thinking of? It can’t be inflationary models, for the BGV theorem shows such models require a beginning. It can’t be cyclical models, for they violate thermodynamics. So, Pro, what model? 3. Time and space could be the body of an invisible pink space panda that exists within an infinite amount of larger space pandas – This scenario is logically incoherent, on two fronts: (1) space itself cannot be contained in a wider space; that’s a contradiction, and (2) invisible pandas can’t be pink, otherwise they wouldn’t be invisible! Further, my philosophical argument requires that even this wider, “invisible pink panda” world must’ve begun to exist, and so requires a cause. The point is, the hypothesis of an unembodied Mind faces none of the problems that afflict these alternative hypotheses, and so it is to be preferred. I’m confident it’s clear to anyone following the debate that I have done the exact opposite of saying, “I dunno, therefore [God].” My approach has been to offer careful, rigorous argumentation on behalf of the theistic hypothesis, something Pro has not likewise done in response. Hopefully in the remainder of the debate, he can shore up his end of the deal, take this debate seriously, and have a mature conversation on this most important of questions.[1] See http://www.reasonablefaith.org...;