The Ontological Argument is a Failure

IntroductionI must admit, I'm somewhat perplexed by Pro’s argument, as it completely disregards my Prussian Godelian argument. Pro simply does not respond to the argument I made. Instead, Pro attempst to refute Godel's original argument, whereas I was using a revised argument that is not susceptible to the same kinds of refutations. Regardless, Pro concludes that “God has both negative and positive properties,” “The argument commits circular reasoning by defining God into existence,” and therefore, “God does not necessarily exist by definition.” Each of Pro's conclusions is false. God has both negative and positive properties?If by negative and positive propertes, Pro means that God is both "infinite" and "not finite," then yes, I agree with Pro. Thing is, Pro has completely misunderstood Godel's notion of a "positive property," and as a result, commits the fallacy of equivocation, the same fallacy Pro accuses me of commiting.The "positive property" is a technical term. I defined it in Round 2, as a property that does not take away from the greatness of its possessor, but whose negation does take away from the greatness of its possessor.Necessary existence is a positive property: it does not take away from the greatness of its possessor, but its negation does take away from the greatness of its possessor. Pro conflates "positive property" with the definitions of "positive" and "negative" as they are usually used. The property, "not finite," is arguably a "positive property," even though it is a "negative." Furthermore, "finite" is not a "positive property" even though it is a "positive."We can thus see how Pro equivocates between two senses of the word "positive" to derive his predetermined conclusion that my argument is flawed. Of course, Pro ends up committing the same fallacy that Pro accuses me of in Round 2. Another important point: the negation of a "positive property" is not a “negative property.” A Godelian “negative property” is not defined. If you use the usual meaning of "negative," as Pro does, I can assure Pro and readers that it has nothing to do with the "negation of a positive property." Point is, a positive property can be expressed in a negative form, and the negation of a positive property can be expressed in a positive form. The two senses of the word "positive" are distinct.As for the concept of “negative theology,” that is a concept that probably comes from Hegel’s conception of God as the “negation of negation,” or in other words, in an endless dialectical process of reasoning (which takes contradictions and negations in systems of thought and synthesizes them to form new systems of thought).Pro’s understanding of negative theology is fundamentally tied to the post-structuralist concept of differance, as it was developed by Derrida. According to Derrida, we can never arrive at an origin (defined as God) in a process of signification because meaning is always negatively different and deferred from itself. The process of deferred negation through time is what we call deconstruction, and negative theology thus locates God not in an impossible "origin," but in this endless movement of negative differences working (or deconstructing) themselves out.There are a few important points here: one, that negative theology does not foreclose the possibility of ontological arguments proving God's existence. Two, because negative theology is predicated on a post-structuralist understanding of being and language as intimately intertwined, it forces us to seriously consider the possibility that things can be defined into existence, not because it is a possibility, but because things only exist through their definitions (this is the implication of no origin).Most importantly, that negative theology has nothing to do with Godelian arguments, the "positive property," or the equivocation Pro commits between "negative property" and "negation of the positive property." It is entirely irrelevant to this debate, except as a way to explain how being is defined into existence.Defining a being into existencePro claims we cannot define a being into existence because it employs circular reasoning. I dunno about that. What I can say with 100% certainty is that the ontological argument does NOT commit a logical fallacy.In the ontological argument, we use modal logic to deduce God’s existence. It might use circular reasoning, I don't know, but its besides the point: if the premises are sound, then the conclusion is sound. To get clearer on how Pro goes wrong, take a look at Pro's example:1. If X exists by definition, X exists.2. X exists by definition.3. Therefore, X exists.According to Pro, this argument commits a logical fallacy. Consider though, that Pro's example has absolutely nothing to do with my Godelian argument. Pro attempts to refute the classic ontological argument of Hartshorne or Plantinga. And furthermore, Pro's refutation does not work. We can see this if we look at the formal proof. We take the modal axiom, “if possibly x, then necessarily possibly x,” as given. We also take: > to be "strict implication"v to be "or"n(x) to be "necessarily true" X to be “God exists”1. X > n(X) -- we define God as necessarily existing; God cannot exist contingently2. ~n(~X) -- God is possible, not impossible3. n(X) > X -- the modal axiom4. n(X) v ~n(X) -- principle of excluded middle5. ~n(X) > n(~n(X)) -- apply Becker's postulate, which holds that modal status is always necessary, to ~n(X)6. n(X) v n(~n(X)) -- 4,5, substitution7. n(~n(X)) > n(~X) -- 1, modal modus tollens, which holds that if the consequent of a conditional is necessarily false, then its antecedent is necessarily false.8. n(X) v n(~X) -- 6,7, substitution9. n(X) -- 8,2, disjunctive syllogism10. X -- 9,3, modus ponens, which is a basic syllogism: if 3, and given 9, 10.This is basically Hartshorne's and Plantinga's version of the ontological argument, and it uses the conditional existence of God to prove that God's existence is necessary, not conditional. The argument commits no logical fallacies. Thus, if its premise, God possibly exists, is sound, so is its conclusion.Pro states that this argument can be used to justify the existence of anything. Again, Pro's claim is false. The first premise, "that God cannot exist contingently," is the key here. We cannot say of anything else that it "cannot exist contingently," and therefore, only God can be proved using this version of the ontological argument. What this shows, then, is that the argument does not “define a being into existence.” What it does is show that the conditional existence of a necessarily existing being, in formal logic, proves the necessary existence of that being. This is different from what Pro calls, “defining a being into existence.” Godelian ArgumentThe argument I gave last round was a Godelian one. Unlike Hartshorne's or Plantinga’s argument, it does not begin with the conditional existence of God. Rather, it begins with the notion of "positive property." The notion itself generates, through higher-order logic, some object that has a set of all positive properties. Because necessary existence is a positive property, any object that has all the positive properties necessarily exists. We say that object is God, as it includes all the positive properties, perfect goodness, omniscience, etc. I worked the argument out last Round in a very simplified form, so that Pro and readers would understand it. Unfortunately, Pro did not address my version of the argument. Instead, Pro responds to Godel’s original argument, which differs in its axioms and definitions. Furthermore, Pro completely misunderstands the argument, and therefore, Pro's objections do not work. Pro equivocates, conflating the formal meaning of “positive” with the primitive notion of “positive property.” As a result, Pro's refutations and conclusions are flawed and false. The resolution remains negated.