The Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy is Not Rational

My opponent’s argument rests on the assumption that there is no difference between analytic and synthetic propositions. If I could come up with a way to systematically and objectively separate propositions into two categories, and if those categories perfectly matched the categories implicated in the analytic-synthetic dichotomy, it would prove that the analytic-synthetic dichotomy describes a real difference between propositions. My method for distinguishing propositions is as follows: A proposition is to be called synthetic if we can imagine a particular which would belong to the class of the subject were it to exist, and if said particular would falsify the predicate assigned to the subject were it to exist; a proposition is analytic if this cannot be done. This is somewhat confusing, so I’m going to illustrate what it means with an example. Consider the statement “All flowers are red.” Since we can imagine something that is blue (i.e., not red) which would qualify as a flower were it to exist, the statement is synthetic. Now consider the statement “All bachelors are unmarried”. Since we cannot even imagine an unmarried particular which would meet the definition of “bachelor” were it to exist, the statement is analytic. 1. It is not merely enough to say that “bachelor” and “unmarried man” are synonymous because they are synonymous, even assuming that they are.What’s stopping us from ascribing the same meaning to two different linguistic expressions, and what problems can we expect to run into by doing it? 2. Why are they able to be substituted for each other? What makes “bachelor” necessarily equivalent to “unmarried man”?The fact that “bachelor” is literally defined as “unmarried man”. It is simply is defined as such. There’s no discussion to be had beyond that. 3. If one must look at reality to form any concept, then it follows that concepts are fundamentally dependent on existents and can do nothing but describe them.That simply doesn’t follow. Particulars only provide us with the material for abstraction. Once we have abstracted a set of criteria and formed a concept, the particulars are no longer relevant because we have our definition. In this sense, a concept could have been formed without exposure to particulars, it would just be more difficult. A definition is basically a cognitive process. 4. Nothing exists but existents – that is axiomatic.If we define “existence” as “relevant to reality”, then I’d disagree. Time, space, causality and physical laws are all examples of abstract syntax which dictates how entities behave and interact with each other. Although they are defined with respect to entities, and although it is only through entities that we know of them, they are not reducible to the entities themselves. Such “rules” do in fact apply to reality and therefore exist. Is the concept of “infinity” physically embodied somewhere? No. But we still use the concept in mathematics. 5. The “essential characteristics” of an existent do not erase all the others – the “accidental/essential” split is only valid epistemologically, when talking about particular concepts. Accidental qualities are no less real than essential qualities and a concept which subsumes an entity with “accidental qualities” does not escape from those being a part of it. The arbitrary selection of essentials cannot wash out anything else about the existents in question.The analytic-synthetic dichotomy only pertains to epistemology, so I’m not sure what my opponent is talking about. “Are some statements true by virtue of their meaning, while some aren’t?” That’s a question that has to do with the nature of knowledge. And no one’s saying that the other characteristics are erased, they just don’t have any relevance to the meaning of the concept. A concept such as “circle” only refers to a portion or aspect of an existent circle. The rest of the existent gets to be part of “the circle” but that’s really only out of linguistic convenience... not every part of the circle partakes of circleness - it’s merely seen in conjunction with those aspects that do partake of circleness. The non-essential aspects of a circle do not affect the meaning of “circle”. Instead of saying “hand me the plate” we could just as easily say “hand me the existent which has “plate” aspects, but which also has other characteristics that do not pertain to what I mean by plate”. There’s no reason whatsoever that the reference of a concept cannot be larger than the meaning of a concept. In other words, it's possible to call something an apple without assuming that all of the characteristics of the object pertain to what you mean by apple. Quite simply, "hand me the apple" is shorthand for "hand me the object with apple qualities". 6. In this sense, the term “bachelor” is only reasonable because there exists existents which have the qualities that “bachelor” describes, or, in other words, only because bachelors exist. This would seem to imply that we can only talk about things which exist, which is ridiculous. 7. The thought experiment my opponent proposes to prove the independency of concepts from entities fails to recognize that, even if “bachelor” =/= “human” in terms of essentials, both groups do overlap and the existent man both lends the qualities of a “bachelor” to the concept of “human” and vis-versa. It can be said that a bachelor is human or that a human is a bachelor, which is the extent of what I am arguing. If no human nor bachelor existed, then both concepts would be entirely meaningless.My opponent missed the point of the thought experiment. “Overlapping” is intentionally made irrelevant, because in the thought experiment there’s only a single entity that the concepts describe and thus no “overlapping” (only concurrence). Since both the concepts describe the same single entity, they would mean the same thing if concepts were actually equivalent to whatever particulars they apply to. The thought experiment demonstrates that the meaning of “human” and “bachelor” do not equal the entire referent, only those aspects of the referent which qualifies it as human/bachelor. Thus, even though they have the same referent, they mean different things.