Resolved: It is immoral not to extend rights to living animals.

Definitions: I prefer my definition of immoral because it is a term which is negatively defined – which is different than being circularly defined. Anoxia means ‘without oxygen’. Asexual means ‘without sex’. Immaculate means ‘without blemishes’. Immaterial means ‘not material’. Imperfect means ‘not perfect’. Immoral means ‘not moral’. The Latin prefix ‘im’ makes this undeniable. I define morality in my arguments using a credible source. I prefer my definition of rights because my opponent provides scant defense of his claim, other than the bare assertion that it is the ‘mutually agreed upon definition’. I provide an extensive argument backing up my concept of rights. He also fails to explain how it is possible to have a right to be ‘free from suffering’ when such a state is an impossibility. Standard: My opponent makes an argument that I find interesting: that of abortion. I actually find this to be a perfect analogy for our debate over the standard: I am arguing that animals do not have rights. If my position is true then their hardships need not be taken into consideration, and certainly not when in conflict with those of humans, which do have rights. A pro-choice position would mirror mine quite nicely: they are arguing that a fetus does not have rights. If this is true then their hardships need not be taken into consideration, and certainly not when in conflict with those of the mother, who does have rights. As for Cuba, that depends. A strict isolationist would argue that the welfare of Cubans is not at all a legitimate concern of our government. I think that undertaking an argument on abortion under the condition that the welfare of the mother and the fetus must be given equal weight gives the pro-life side an enormous advantage, since the point of contention in the first place involves whether or not we ought to extend such considerations. The same applies to this debate. I think that sticking to the simple standard of morality allows for a broader, more varied debate with many possible angles of attack. Plan & Burdens: I would still argue that my opponent has failed to defend the first premise of his plan, the veracity of which is instrumental to the soundness of his overall argument. In order for his conclusion to follow, he must prove that ‘if the endangered species act is beneficial, then extending rights to animals is beneficial.’ If this is not proven to be true, then his entire argument falls. His angle seems to be only that the endangered species act extends rights to animals; this is not sufficient by itself. If under any circumstances P is true and Q is false then the material conditional is false, his first premise is false, his modus ponens is unsound and his entire plan is dismantled. In other words, he must prove that “the endangered species act is beneficial” in order for his second premise to be true. He must then either prove that “extending rights to animals is beneficial” independently or restate the first premise and prove it in some other way in order for the argument to hold. He also claims that I must prove that his premise is not true, but the onus is always on the one making a proposition. The first premise of his argument is a proposition, so any attempt to shift the onus onto me constitutes a fallacious argumentum ad ignorantiam. My First Contention: My opponent misunderstands a rather expansive definition; all four statements end in ‘or’, meaning that the normative definition which he takes offense to is only one of four options. My opponent then attacks several straw men. My first contention is not that it is impossible for animals to, among themselves, adhere to codes of morality or that it is impossible to extend morality to animals, so these arguments have no bearing on those that I present. His next straw man is to claim that my first premise consists of claiming that immorality and impossibility are mutually exclusive. He then proceeds to provide examples of deeds which ware both immoral and impossible. But my first statement does not claim that immorality and impossibility are mutually exclusive, only that no viable code of morality demands the impossible of its adherents. Surely my opponent would agree that a moral code which demanded that he steal every can in the grocery store or be deemed immoral would be useless for the purpose of governing human conduct? That is my point. My Second Contention: My opponent begins by misapplying Hobbe’s theory: social contract is a political theory; it is a foundational theory of government. The fact the animals do not have governments precludes them from engaging in a social contract. There is no social contract between humans and animals. If I startle a cornered horse, it will not hesitate to kill me. It did not agree to live in a civilized society; it does not understand the principle of non-aggression. It was rigorously trained to act in a certain manner in order to prevent such actions, but its instinct can and will overpower that training in certain scenarios. I did not trash Hobbes theory, any more than one trashes Charles Darwin when one brings up Gould’s theory of punctuated equilibrium. One theory builds upon the other, often tweaking it slightly. If my opponent holds that humans and animals need not bond politically in order to share rights then he must come up with an alternate philosophical base for rights and defend it. One cannot just tear the word out of its political and philosophical framework and expect it to hold the same weight; this constitutes a fallacy of equivocation. As for the claim regarding foreigners, our government represents us in foreign affairs and has an incalculable number of treaties with foreign powers around the globe to make such things illegal. This is a proper function of government. Opponent’s 1st Contention: I am satisfied with the source. I still claim that the benefits arise chiefly from biodiversity, which can be maintained without extending rights to animals. Opponent’s 2nd Contention: I can argue that the benefits were not a result of extending rights to animals but rather a result of decisions informed by sound science. Opponent’s 3rd Contention: Already addressed. Opponent’s 4th Contention: To say that I do not understand this contention is quite accurate, seeing as it is a non sequitur. There is no logical reasoning given to link our sharing a clade with non-human animals to the application of the altogether human political and philosophical concept of rights to them. Mutual respect has nothing to do with rights. Cubans and Americans are both human, thus able to share in the social contract. A human and a dog are not. And I did refute the last argument: it is a blatant argumentum ad novitatem. One cannot say that just because something is new and modern that it is better. Atom bombs, school shootings, flamethrowers and mustard gas are all unique to modern ‘civilized’ society. This does not automatically make them good. Conclusion: Here I will restate my argument: 1. All P are M 2. No S is M 3. Thus no S is P 1. All demands for the applications of rights to animals are impossible. 2. No viable moral demand is impossible. 3. Thus no viable moral demand is a demand for the application of rights to animals. 1. My opponent consistently failed to show how rights under social contract theory could be applied to animals while also failing to present an alternate workable definition. 2. My opponent has failed to provide an effective counter argument to this premise, attacking a straw man instead. I never claimed that the impossible could not be immoral, only that a viable moral code cannot demand the impossible. This follows the form modus camestres and is valid. My premises have been defended as true. Thus the conclusion follows and is true, and, following the law of non-contradiction, the resolution must be false. I thank you for your time and effort.