A god exists

So, here's the deal. I'm going to show you that a god exists (the affirmation of which I'll call 'theism'). In reading our arguments, please bear in mind that every claim has a negation. It's important to discern the plausibility of a claim in light of the plausibility of its negation because while a position may appear plausible in its own right, its negation can still be even more plausible. Consequently, I’ll begin my opening essay with a brief analysis of my position’s negation: the position that no gods exist, which I’ll stipulatively call ‘atheism’. What would a god be like if it existed? If we don’t even know what the term ‘god’ means, how can we reasonably disagree over whether any gods exist? Well, herein lays a significant problem for ‘atheism’. Our paradigmatic examples of deities—such as Zeus, Ra, YHWH or Allah—are so utterly diverse in their descriptions, that it seems neigh on impossible to argue against allof them. Some gods are described as immaterial, others as material, some as all-knowing, others as drunken idiots, still some as magnificently benevolent, and others as down-right nasty. What sort of reason could one have to doubt the existence of all gods? In all my studies, I’ve never come across any such argument from any philosopher. Gods are described as being so different that whatever argument you make on behalf of ‘atheism’, it’s simply bound to apply only to a sub-set of deities, being thereby incapable of justifying ‘atheism’ per se. E. g. problems of evil are only relevant to a sub-set of deities having a certain amount of goodness and power. I hope it’s therefore clear that ‘atheism’ itself is not really plausible at all: at most, we’re able to rule out single or select deities. However, recall that I’m arguing that a god exists, and the negation of this position is not that single or select deities fail to exist, but rather that no gods whatsoever exist. I’m not saying my opponent adheres to this position, or needs to. But, as I explained, it’s important to discern the plausibility of a position in light of its negation, regardless of whether my opponent endorses that negation. Having therefore examined ‘atheism’, and finding it to be fairly implausible—at least at this stage in our knowledge—let’s move on to seeing if ‘theism’ fairs any better. Given how difficult it is to define godhood, how can we reasonably argue for gods? Well, here the theist has it pretty easy. While the atheist needs to identify a necessary condition of godhood—and, please don’t hold your breath for that—all the theist needs to do is identify sufficient conditions of godhood. For example, if we can show that an omnipotent, omniscient and morally perfect individual exists, we’ve shown that a god exists. We don’t need to know the necessary conditions of godhood to know that this thing counts as a god. I suggest then that we just stick close to our paradigmatic examples of deities: if something is more like them than not, than it seems perfectly reasonable to call it a god. Allow me now to advance an argument on behalf of theism. The Argument:1. If it's possible that the maximally purely contingent state of affairs has a cause of its existence, then a god exists.2. It's possible that the maximally purely contingent state of affairs has a cause of its existence.3. Therefore, a god exists. Now, this argument is deductively valid meaning if its premises [(1)-(2)] are true, then its conclusion has to be true. The only thing that matters, therefore, in figuring out whether a god exists here is whether the premises are true. Explanation and Defense:Premise (1): If it's possible that the maximally purely contingent state of affairs has a cause of its existence, then a god exists. A state of affairs is just a situation. Some situations involve nothing but contingent things (like the state of affairs wherein I type at my desk), and others only necessary things (like the state of affairs wherein 2 +2 = 4). [1] A state of affairs is purely contingent if it only features contingent things. So, what if we looked at the group of all purely contingent states of affairs at once (call it M for 'maximal')? Clearly, that group didn't have to exist, lest it fail to be purely contingent. Because all contingent things are included in M, it can't be caused by anything contingent. Otherwise, the cause would have to cause itself to exist. But, you can't perform an action or participate in an event unless you exist. Thus, you'd need to already exist to perform the action or participate in the event of causing yourself to exist, which is absurd. The idea is then that if M has a cause of its existence, this cause must be metaphysically necessary. As such, it'd have to be non-physical since space is contingent. The only sense we can make of a non-physical cause is to regard it as a mind (for better or worse). Thus, the cause of M would be a metaphysically necessary non-physical mind with unimaginable power. Clearly such an entity would be a god. So, all premise (1) is saying is that if it's possible that M has a cause, then it's possible that an unimaginably powerful, non-physical mind exists out of necessity. But, if something is possibly necessary, it follows by S5 that it is necessary. [2] Obviously, if something necessarily exists, it actually exists. I don't think many will take issue with this premise. Premise (2): It's possible that the maximally purely contingent state of affairs has a cause of its existence. All premise (2) requires is that there's nothing absurd or contradictory about M having a cause. And for the life of me, I can't imagine why M's having a cause would be ridiculous. Conclusion:Given that both premises are plausibly true--even if they're not certainly true--it follows by strict and necessary rules of logic that a god exists. I'll leave it toyou to decide whether this case is even marginally more plausible than theism's hopeless negation. Thanks for reading. Footnotes:[1]: “They [states of affairs] are situations, the sorts of things that have essentially or necessarily the property ofobtainingorfailing to obtain. Some states of affairs (like that consisting in two plus two’s equaling four)obtain necessarily; others (like that consisting in nine’s being a prime number) arenecessarily such that they fail to obtain; still others (like Clinton’s being a slow runner)obtain, but do so only contingently; and, finally some states of affairs (like, alas, that consisting of QPR’s winning the Cup) are such that theycontingently fail to obtain. ”- Loux, Michael J. Metaphysics a Contemporary Introduction. III ed. New York: Routledge, 2006. p. 145. [2]: S5 refers to amodelof our modal beliefs and reasoning (i. e. our reasoning about what is possibly true, necessarily true or impossible, etc. ). In S5, every possible world is accessible from another: they can all see each other. Thus, what goes for one possible world goes for them all. I. e. if X exists necessarily in one possible world, it does so in all of them.