Definitions posted by the Instigator in Round 1 should be treated more like rules than contentions.

Thank you for your clarifying response, Skeptic. I don't believe that I have misunderstood anything; I am simply providing solutions. "A couple of responses" My opponent claims that there are "many" debates about finding the correct definition. However, that would contradict my own experience in debating. In all of my debates, I don't think a single one was intended to search for the proper definition of a word. If there was any, it would not be a general case, and would thus not be of any concern of this debate, by rule #2. My opponent contends that definitions are correct if "used in the context of figuring out the truth." However, there are many different truths out there, and the truth being concerned depends on the definitions. For example, let's take the example of a debate entitled, "Which came first, the chicken or the egg?" Now, the Instigator could define "egg" to only include chicken eggs, or they could define "egg" to encompass all things we consider eggs. In the first scenario, the chicken is usually said to come first (http://www.debate.org...), while in the second scenario, the egg is considered to come first (http://www.debate.org...). I would like to note that although the voters decided to vote-bomb the debate in favor of Panda because of the delayed definition, this would not be poor conduct at all if "egg" was defined beforehand. However, in no case would it make sense to allow the Contender to replace the Instigator's definition. The idea of focusing only on the chicken egg is a completely valid one, so if the Instigator declares that "egg" will refer only to chicken eggs for the debate through a definition, why can the Contender complain? It's just a different truth from the one that would be reached through the other definition, but to shift the truth being concerned is highly unfair for the Instigator, who chose a position based on the intended truth, as the Contender should do. My opponent attacks my gibberish as irrelevant. However, if I can assign any definition I want to "Xebo" (as my opponent has conceded), why can I not do the same thing with "personhood"? After all, perhaps I want to focus on a specific aspect of personhood, and using "personhood" in the resolution makes the resolution more simplistic to recall or type while the real intention of the debate would still be evident in the definition. My opponent also uses an example using Link, with the resolution, "There is no link between smoking cigarette[s] and lung cancer." First, I would like to note that Link would be capitalized in the resolution, so let's assume that every word in the resolution is capitalized. Secondly, it would be rather clear that the Instigator wants to debate about whether or not there is any sword-wielding video game character between smoking cigarettes and lung cancer. The Contender cannot assume that the intention was to use the connection definition of "link," as the video game definition was already declared. As the Instigator already declared "Link" to refer to a video game character, the debate is still focusing on a truth; the fact that it is a rather obvious truth is beside the point. To suddenly force the Instigator to debate about connections when he wanted to debate about video game characters would be unfair to the Instigator, as he already made the resolution as clear as can be. Equivocation relies on the idea that the definition of "Link" in the resolution is different from the Instigator's chosen definition. However, as the resolution was written and defined by the Instigator, this would quite simply be impossible. Just because when other people write out the resolution, they define "link" as a connection, doesn't mean that the Instigator must conform to this standard. He would already prove himself not to conform to this standard through defining "Link." Now, we're back to the personhood example. My opponent argues that the definition of personhood must be changed to obtain truth. However, he does not respond to my idea from Round 2: "Or, the Contender could point out that as the Instigator's definition of personhood is not the same as the definition of personhood typically used, the Instigator's definition of personhood has no legal or moral relevance, leaving the Instigator needing to defend the notion that his definition has legal or moral relevance." Now, this option makes more sense than attacking the Instigator's definition directly. First, let's say that "personhood" is in the resolution, and is defined as "having human genetics." In this case, "personhood" is still just a placeholder in the resolution for the definition "having human genetics," and should be read as "having human genetics." So, a fetus would have "personhood" by the definition introduced by the Instigator. The Instigator would obviously be looking to debate on the genetics of fetuses. Depriving the Instigator of such a debate after it has already been clarified would be unfair. Note that a truth is still reached in the debate (fetuses have human genetics). Now, if "personhood" is used to support a contention, then the Instigator can merely argue that such a definition of "personhood" has no moral relevance. In a debate about abortion, if the Instigator says, "Fetuses have personhood, and therefore, abortion is immoral," the response would be, "By my opponent's definition of personhood, having personhood doesn't actually grant a fetus the right to life." The Contender could even bring up a new definition of personhood to show why the Instigator's definition of personhood is not the same as the norm, but this definition would not replace the old one in any context, unlike what would occur in a dispute over the resolution. In either case, and especially in the resolution case, the definition should not be attacked. My opponent's example to talk about free will seems to be the resolution "Can the Source model provide free will's existence?" This would lead to two main arguments: 1. Is the Source model real, and therefore, able to provide existence? 2. Does the Source model provide free will's existence? However, I still don't see any discrepancy over definitions. In general cases, the definition for Source model would not specify that the Source model is indeed true. Free will has multiple different extremes, and therefore, the extreme chosen by the Instigator to be debated should be observed. The Contender should not be allowed to change the extreme of the free will being debated anywhere from free will being the illusion of choice to having the ability to do things independent of all factors whatsoever, as the Instigator will likely choose a definition between these two extremes. The Source model should be shown to be inadequate using the chosen definition for Source model, as disproving one conception of the Source model does not disprove all of them, and the relationship between Source model and free will depends on the definitions of each, but any connection between the two as defined by the Instigator could still be debated whole-heartedly. My opponent's example does not include any justification of attacking definitions. Conclusion: In all of my opponent's examples, I have shown why attacking definitions is either unfair or unnecessary. If the word is in the resolution, attacking the definition is unfair because it shifts the debate from the truth chosen by the Instigator to a completely different truth. There cannot be any equivocation, because there's nothing to equivocate from except the Instigator's definition itself. If the word is not in the resolution, but it is instead used in support of a contention, it can be pointed out that as the word's denotation changes, so does its connotations, so the word loses relevance previously associated with it. Skeptic, thank you for this debate. I hope I didn't misread your arguments.