God is existant

Thanks Con!Incoherency of God?My opponent's entire argument here consists only of an attempt to attack the credibility of intuition. He claims that intuitive epistemology has no place in a philosophical discussion. The argument he uses is that intuitions can sometimes be misleading such as when considering behaviour of physical objects around the speed of light.I accept that intuitions can be misleading, but so can rational and empirical data, yet this does not mean that rational thought and empirical data don't constitute evidence.Granted, reason and empiricism are generally more reliable than intuition, but in the absence of reason and empiricism then intuition can still count as evidence. So if a proposition has no rational or empirical evidence that can determine its veracity, then intuition can assist us. In Con's example, he posits an example of our unreliable intuitions regarding pushing an object that is moving at the speed of light - our intuition suggests that it will go faster despite this not actually being correct.Yet all this shows is that rational/empirical evidence outweighs intuitional evidence - it does not invalidate the latter entirely.The proposition in this example is:'If I push an object traveliing at the speed of light, it will go faster'.There is intuitional evidence for this proposition, and empirical evidence agaisnt it. As empirical evidence is generally more reliable, then it outweighs the intuitional evidence and we can hence conclude that the proposition is false.Yet if there was no empirical or rational evidence for or against this proposition, and there was intuitional evidence for the proposition, then we can conclude that the proposition is most likely true.In other words, intuitional evidence may not be as reliable as rational/empiricial evidence, but in the absence of the latter it can still constitute valid evidence.Applying this to my proposition:'Power, love and knowledge are objectively great'We do not have any empirical or rational evidence that pertains to this proposition, yet we do have intuitional evidence in favour of it. Therefore we can conclude that it is most likely that power, love and knowledge are actually objectively great.Hence the content and definition of greatness is not subjective - and so it is a cogent property that is not dependent on an external source.Therefore, 'a maximally great being' is a coherent proposition, since 'great' is objectively defined by virtue of intuition and the fact that it is 'maximally' great entails that it is not relational to any external being, so the coherency of God is not dependent on the existence of other beings that share His properties to differing degrees.Possibility of God's ExistenceThe round 1 argument was not misleading, just not as detailed as I could have put it. From my perspective, my opponent was a relatively new member of this sight who could have either been an expert in philosophy or just one of the wannabe militant atheists that reside all over the internet but are philosophically ignorant. I had no idea that my opponent actually knows a fair bit about modality.Besides, generally when people say 'X is possible', they are saying 'X is logically possible', as this is the form of possibility most people refer to.Logical vs Metaphysical possibilityCon states that the system of possible worlds mandates the consideration of metaphysical, not logical possibility. He argues that this is the case because we don't have 'an entirely a priori understanding of what being is'.But the link between our lack of a priori understanding of being and our inability to consider possible worlds from a logical possibility standpoint is tenuous and not made clear. Agreed, logic is purely a priori, but it does not follow that we cannot make meaningful and verifiable statements regarding logical possibility.My argument stands that when one considers 'possible worlds', what one means by 'possible' is logical possibility (1). There is nothing invalid, fallacious or incoherent about talking about possible worlds being representative of logical possibilities.Furthermore, Con has failed to provide an agreed definition of what metaphysical possibility actually is - so his claim that possible world semantics is based upon metaphysical possibility is meaningless.Logical Possibility of GodCon's argument here is bizarre; he is attempting to shift the burden of proof onto myself that I prove that God is logically possible. This ignores the fact that logical possibility is the default modal state - for if there is a proposition that we have no knowledge of pertaining to its possibility, then we assume it is logically possible until persuaded otherwise.For example, if my brother came up to me and claimed he saw a pink swan, the logical possibility of a pink swan is assumed by default. It is absurd that I would be justified in concluding that a pink swan is logically impossible without any evidence for this conclusion.This is because an entity is only logically impossible if that entity has an essential contradiction or absurdity - viz. something inherent to the being that causes a logical contradiction. An example would be a married bachelor.If there is no essential contradiction then we have no grounds to assert it is logically impossible, so we are left with the conclusion that we can validly assert that it is logically possible.We do assume things to be logically possible all the time, and it does not entails absurd conclusions. I'm not sure where Con is coming from with this argument.My argument then, to justify God's logical possibility is:P1: Something is only logical impossible if it contains an essential absurdity or contradiction (2)P2: God does not contain an essential absurdity or contradictionC1: God is not logically impossibleC2: God is logically possibleI cannot prove P2 because it is impossible to prove a negative. The burden of proof therefore is on Con to demonstrate an essential contradiction contained within God. If he fails to do so, then God is logically possible.Reverse ArgumentI agree with Con that the reverse argument's and the ontological argument's first premises are equally plausible (if we use the conclusion of the latter to refute the premise of the former or vice versa, we are begging the question). But if we look further along both arguments, an absurdity arises in the reverse argument yet none arises in the ontological argument.The absurdity is in P3:'God does not exist in all possible worlds'Given that:'God' = greatest possible being (by definition)and'does not exists in all possible worlds' = impossibleThis premise is essentially saying:'The greatest possible being is impossible'.Yet this is a contradiction, an absurdity. Therefore we can conclude that this argument is absurd since it reaches a point of absurdity (so we are prudent to doubt the validity of its logic).To summarise, although both of the arguments have apparently equally innocent first premises, it is the reverse argument that leads to an absurdity, so we are prompted to accept that it is the ontological argument that is valid.Therefore, the reverse argument is absurd and hence my ontological argument is not refuted.Religious ExperienceCon claims that often our epistemological claims have no valid link to actual reality, such as in cases of people feeling weightless or the world spinning around them.However, remember the three possibilities that exist in regards to an experience claim:1. The experiencer is lying2. The experiencer is deluded (mistaken)3. The experiencer is correctIf there is no sufficient reason for possibilities 1 or 2, then we are rational to accept the likelihood of possibility 3. This is the case with religious experiences; most mystics have no sufficient reason to lie and there is no reason why they are mistaken (most are in sound mental health). Of course if there was a good reason why mystics would lie or be mistaken then the argument would be a poor one; yet the fact remains that this is not the case.In the cases of experiences of weightlessness, we have a good reason why we are justified in concluding possibility 2 (the experiencer is mistaken). Namely that being weightless is a nomological impossibility.When an experience claim is made, we should deduce the best explanation. In the case of ghosts the best explanation is not that ghosts exist, simply because there are valid arguments that ghosts do not exist.In other words, if X is experienced, then X's existence is the best explanation unless we have prior reason for asserting that X does not exist.We do not have a prior reason for asserting that God does not exist, so God's existence is the best explanation for experiences of God.It is not valid that we posit naturalistic explanations for religious experiences because we have no reason to propose that these explanations are actually the case. Whilst it might be true that an experience has a naturalistic explanation, it does not follow that this is the actual explanation. Furthermore, it is a hugely unwarranted assertion that every single religious experience is veridically explained naturalistically.Con then goes on to claim that the example of alien abductions only serves to demonstrate absurdities. But the problem with this claim is that parody arguments only work at demonstrating absurdities if their parody is sufficiently similar to the initial argument. Alien abductions and the existence of God are not sufficiently similar because there are valid arguments against the former but not against the latter. So this does not succeed at parodying the argument.In response to Con's final paragraph, I accept that not all false beliefs have good arguments against them. But this raises the question of what grounds we have to call them false beliefs if we have no good arguments against them. (1) http://en.wikipedia.org...(2) http://www.thefreedictionary.com...