Palmer should not receive the inheritance from the will.

1) The respondent, a lad of sixteen years of age, being aware of the provisions in his grandfather's will, which constituted him the residuary legatee of the testator's estate, caused his death by poison in 1882. (6.2.1) 2) For this crime he was tried and was convicted of murder in the second degree, and at the time of the commencement of this action he was serving out his sentence in the state reformatory. (6.2.2) 3) The appellants' argument for a reversal of the judgment, which dismissed their complaint, is that the respondent unlawfully prevented a revocation of the existing will, or a new will from being made, by his crime, and that he terminated the enjoyment by the testator of his property and affected his own succession to it by the same crime. (6.3.4) 4) But the matter does not lie within the domain of conscience. (6.4.2) 5) We are bound by the rigid rules of law, which have been established by the legislature, and within the limits of which the determination of this question is confined. (6.4.3) 6) The question we are dealing with is, whether a testamentary disposition can be altered, or a will revoked, after the testator's death, through an appeal to the courts, when the legislature has, by its enactments, prescribed exactly when and how wills may be made, altered and revoked, and, apparently, as it seems to me, when they have been fully complied with, has left no room for the exercise of an equitable jurisdiction by courts over such matters. (6.4.4) 7) The appellants' argument is not helped by reference to those rules of the civil law, or to those laws of other governments, by which the heir or legatee is excluded from benefit under the testament, if he has been convicted of killing, or attempting to kill, the testator. (7.2.1) 8) In the absence of such legislation here, the courts are not empowered to institute such a system of remedial justice. (7.2.2) 9) I think that a valid will must continue as a will always, unless revoked in the manner provided by the statutes. (8.1.4) 10) We may concede it to the fullest extent; but still the cardinal objection is undisposed of, that the making and the revocation of a will are purely matters of statutory regulation, by which the court is bound in the determination of questions relating to these acts. (8.2.2) 11) The whole of this subject is now regulated by statute, and a mere intention to revoke, however well authenticated, or however defeated, is not sufficient." (9.1.5) 12) I cannot find any support for the argument that the respondent's succession to the property should be avoided because of his criminal act, when the laws are silent. (9.2.1) 13) To allow their argument to prevail would involve the diversion by the court of the testator's estate into the hands of persons, whom, possibly enough, for all we know, the testator might not have chosen or desired as its recipients. (9.3.6) 14) The laws do not warrant this judicial action, and mere presumption would not be strong enough to sustain it. (9.3.8) 15) We may not, in the language of the court in People v. Thornton (25 Hun, 456), 'enhance the pains, penalties and forfeitures provided by law for the punishment of crime.' (9.4.4) 16) Therefore, the judgment should be reversed and the provisions left in the will must be awarded to defendant Elmer Palmer. Non- Cntroversial 1,2,3,5,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15 Controversial 6) The question we are dealing with is, whether a testamentary disposition can be altered, or a will revoked, after the testator's death, through an appeal to the courts, when the legislature has, by its enactments, prescribed exactly when and how wills may be made, altered and revoked, and, apparently, as it seems to me, when they have been fully complied with, has left no room for the exercise of an equitable jurisdiction by courts over such matters. (6.4.4) 4) But the matter does not lie within the domain of conscience. (6.4.2) 1) The matter at hand is weather the courts are able to edit or modify wills against a defendant. The courts do not have the jurisdiction to make decisions on wills, and or alter contracts. The grandson should recieve his money because he is already paying for the crime of murder, the common wealth has been vindicated, therefore to further punish the defendant for this crime is a violation of his rights. The corts also cannot grant the money to the daughters as the courts have no right to decide weather Palmers grandfather intended for them to have it either. 2) Weather or not the courts feel it is morally correct to recive the will is not sufficient to make a decision as they have to opperate within the provisions of the statue which deals with wills and contracts.