If God is omnipotent and omniscient, then God cannot be omnibenevolent at the same time.

Introduction: I agree that my opponent "will succeed if, at a bare minimum, he can show that it is possible for there to be no explicit contradiction" in God being omnibenevolent, omnipotent and omniscient. However, for there to be no contradiction, God must still REMAIN omnibenevolent, omnipotent and omniscient in any possibility provided by my opponent. Therefore, any point my opponent makes that is representative of a God who does NOT meet these qualifications, must be discarded as an invalid argument against my resolution. Contention 1: There is nothing an omnipotent God cannot do My opponent contends that "[a] world that contains free creatures is more valuable than a world that contains no freedom at all." There is no rational support for this contention. It may be well argued that a peaceful world of happy robots is a better one for those experiencing it, than a world of strife gifted to those granted autonomy. However, even if one accepts freedom as a virtue, one must recognize that there is no such state in a universe formed by an omnipotent God. God sets all the rules. He is all powerful. If he deemed it desirable we would exist as septadimensional kumquats that reproduced by licking each other. He knows every act that we will take in any given state given any number of possibilities (being omniscient), and sets the stage upon which we will conduct our play. He knows all of our lines in advance, and does not act to change the script. Where then is the improvisation that my opponent would imagine impossible without God's policy of non-interference? My opponent fails to recognize that a being that is all powerful and all knowing necessarily affects reality by merely existing. In acting, God allows what would be to not come to pass. In not acting, God allows what he knows will be to come to pass. The agents who believe they are free-willed have no ability to choose outside of God's caprice. My opponent argues that God " must create creatures capable of moral evil" in order to "create creatures of moral good" and "He can't give these creatures the freedom to perform evil and at the same time prevent them from doing so." This is false. God, being all powerful, may eliminate evil as a possibility within reality, allowing every choice to be good, although by varying degrees. He may redesign our understanding of morality, or morality itself, if you assume it is objective, to improve our situation. He can even alter the laws of action and consequence. I can quite easily imagine a universe where the rules were developed to make us fully autonomous and yet devoid of suffering. How difficult could it be then for a God, whose omniscience makes him infinitely more creative than I, to conceive of such an alternative? As my opponent is fond of syllogisms, I present my own: P1: It is possible for an omni-excellent God to create a being with moral freedom. P2: If it is possible for said God to create morally free beings, then it is possible for Him to create beings that freely choose to act deleteriously. P3: It is then possible for said God to create a being who then freely chooses to act deleteriously. P4: The consequences of these actions, not the actions themselves, lead to suffering. P5: God, being omnipotent, can remove consequences from these actions, or alter the consequences of these actions. C: Therefore, it is possible for God to create morally free beings without needing human suffering to result. As my opponent noted, his syllogism accounts for "evil acts." It does nothing against consequences, which God may allow or disallow at his leisure. I should also point out that this is not a debate about good and "evil." This is a debate about why an omnibenevolent God that has the capability does not alleviate human suffering. I did not define "evil" because the why of people doing bad things is irrelevant when it is the consequences of those bad things, not the rationales behind them, which lead to suffering. In short, God does not need to "force a free action" if he sets the world up so that no action can lead to suffering. My opponent's argument fails because he argues the case for a limited God, not an omnipotent one. Contention 2: Hedonism? Unlike my opponent, I do not care what God's purpose is, nor do I need him to create a "hedonistic paradise." My assumption is valid because I have a concept of good that includes the desire to alleviate the suffering of others and must wonder why God, who is all good, does not do so when given the opportunity. Additionally, because we are discussing God's goodness, and not mankind's, it is important to note that it is no less hedonistic of God to allow human suffering for the pleasure he will receive in fulfilling his plan by such suffering than it would be for a human to request of God that he eliminate suffering from the world. Assuming omnipotence, God could choose to make us all perfect, in an instant. What benevolent objective could God have for making us wait? An alternative understanding is only relevant to this debate if God could still be all good and all powerful with the understanding. Clearly, he could not be in this case. As for my opponent's argument regarding parents and children, the difference is that parents are not omnipotent. They affect their children to a certain extent, but after a time they are on equal terms with adults who may or may not accept or reject their desires. Humans, being finite beings, as my opponent notes, will never be in such a relationship with God. God can make sure that people do what is right instantly. If it's a matter of God wanting free willed beings to act with an understanding of good, then he can make them instantly good. There is no need to wait. My opponent's understanding of God in this sense must be either less than omnipotent or less than omnibenevolent for him to allow experience at the expense of suffering when He could provide the experience without the expense. Therefore, my opponent's argument is invalid. Contention 3: Our limited perspective Evil is meaningless to this debate. See above. Within the context of this debate, humans need only suffer and understand the concept of good. Arguing that we don't understand good because we have an insufficient understanding of evil is an attempt to redefine good and is invalid. Worse, it is illogical, as good only matters in this debate as it relates to justification for seeking the reduction of suffering, not in opposition to ‘evil.' It is like saying we can not understand why we use water to douse a fire because we do not know why someone would light the fire. God has a bucket of water and the disposition to use it. Nothing opposes him. The house is on fire, and people are screaming. Yet not a drop falls. No one can argue that he benevolently stays his hand because he has not yet considered the arsonist's mindset. Contention 4: Good and Bad? This argument is irrelevant, as we are not debating whether or not God exists. In fact, for the purposes of this argument, we should assume he DOES. However, we ARE debating whether or not God is an omni-excellent being. My opponent has already argued that for a good God to be all-powerful, he must be capable of creating beings that can do evil. I contend that it is just as likely that an evil God could create the same or the inverse. The existence of God is not limited by his being omnibenevolent. His nature is merely redefined. This argument is therefore invalid, because it argues that God exists with no regard to his qualities. Conclusion: My thanks to my opponent for his earnest response. I will be happy to explain my assumptions and how it is not at all possible for God to be all powerful, good and knowing at the same time, when my opponent makes an argument that actually shows how such a God could even possibly be all powerful, good and all knowing at the same time.