The conclusions of "The Veil of Ignorance" are a just standard by which public policy must be made

The title of this debate is, "The conclusions of 'The Veil of Ignorance' are a just standard by which public policy must be made". In R1, Pro goes on to state, "I will be arguing that the conclusions drawn from this thought experiment are a just standard of by which public policy should be made." He then states, "Essentially my argument is that for a society to be fair, as one who does not yet know the specifics of their birth would wish it to be, it must adhere to the conclusions of this thought experiment." When he states, "My opponent will argue that adhereance to these conclusions would make society unfair," given all the prior information, it is unreasonable for me to expect that I should somehow interpret that last statement as the resolution, when every other statement about the resolution speaks to the contrary. It looks like this was an unfortunate case of miscommunication, but regardless, Pro accepted my interpretation, so go with that.TermsPerhaps I poorly communicated this in my first round. When I said that the terms were not defined, I meant that their definitions were so vague as to be effectively meaningless, as I stated in my conclusion last round. What are the rights of which he speaks? What are the conditions for self respect? What does it mean to have the "most extensive basic liberties possible?" As I stated last round, "How do we define 'equal opportunity'? How can 'social or economic inequalities that are allowed . . . be arranged so that they might improve the access to Primary Goods?'" The link he provides doesn't do any better at explaining this. My framework protects specific liberties, while his protects only general "liberty", which, again, is vague. Telling me to read Rawls is not a rebuttal; this is a debate, not a summer reading list. The point of a debate is not to give books to read that support your point; it's to use the books yourself to support your points.Holes in the VeilPro's description of the veil fails when it comes to the problem I mentioned before. If you're a rational actor selecting conditions for living, and yet you are ignorant of your ends, then you have nothing to value. I never implied that Pro said that liberty was an end, but if you're going to accept the thought experiment, you have to accept that. Otherwise, it doesn't work. The rational actor under the veil, if liberty is not an end in itself, has no reason to value it if they do not know the ends they aspire to. If there is a chance they will become a religious extremist, and yet also a chance that they will become a relatively normal human, then the people selecting conditions under the veil have no reason to choose any particular circumstance whatsoever. Without values, none of the possible scenarios can possibly be preferable under the VoI. That is why the possible world of religious extremists is important--it demonstrates that any agent under the veil cannot possibly predict what their desires in life might potentially be, and thus there is no guarantee that they will select the things Pro claims they will. Who is to say that the conclusions of the veil, given complete ignorance, wouldn't be communism? After all, the probability of being born into the lower classes is much higher than the probability of being born into the upper classes. If all people seek to ensure security of their person, and at least most do, why would they not advocate for seizing the means of production to ensure their security? That's not to argue that communism is itself unjust; it's merely to state that the VoI doesn't have a definitive conclusion.The AlternativePro accepted my interpretation of the resolution, so I only need to show an alternative is better. He did not put "nor that these conclusions are in fact the best solution" in R1, but R2; do not accept that new rule, because it is unfair and because Pro already accepted my interpretation. Since my own description of Dworkin was unclear, I'll borrow a paraphrase from a secondary source. Dworkin believes that a right to liberty in general is too vague to be meaningful. However, certain specific liberties such as freedom of speech, freedom of worship, rights of association, and of personal and sexual relations, do require special protection against governmental interference. This is not because these preferred liberties have some special substantive or inherent value (as most rights philosophers hold), but because of a kind of procedural impediment that these preferred liberties might face. The impediment is that if those liberties were left to a utilitarian calculation, that is, an unrestricted calculation of the general interest, the balance would be tipped in favor of restrictions.. . . Dworkin says that if a vote were truly utilitarian, then all voters would desire the liberties for themselves, and the liberties would be protected under a utilitarian calculation. However, a vote on these liberties would not be truly utilitarian nor would it afford equal concern about and respect for liberties solely by reflecting personal wants or satisfactions of individuals and affording equal concerns to others . . . because [of] external preferences, such as prejudice and discrimination against other individuals deriving from the failure to generally treat other persons as equals . . . These external preferences would corrupt utilitarianism by causing the individual to vote against assigning liberties to others.Accordingly, the liberties that must be protected against such external preferences must be given a preferred status. By doing so, society can protect the fundamental right of citizens to equal concern and respect because it prohibits "decisions that seem, antecedently, likely to have been reached by virtue of the external components of the preferences democracy reveals."(The Philosophic Foundations of Human Rights, Jerome Shestack, Human Rights Quarterly 20.2: 201-234)This also provides further evidence that my framework is superior in treating human beings as ends--its prevention of "corrupted" utilitarianism means that the framework in itself doesn't just provide an opportunity for all humans to achieve their ends, but advances them by its very nature, increasing the utility all humans share in.ConclusionPro failed to address my major points. At this point, Pro has still not shown how the VoI advances justice. He has argued that his conclusions help "Jack and Jill", but this is fallacious. Let's put what he says into another form:P1: Jack and Jill should both have an equal chance to succeed in lifeP2: The VoI concludes that people should have an equal chance to succeed in lifeC1: The VoI's conclusion matches with what should be.P3: The VoI concludes that this equal chance to succeed can be achieved by improved access to the primary goodsC2: Adhering to the VoI improves access to the primary goods.C3: Adhering to the VoI helps Jack and JillThe problem is C2; it doesn't follow from P3. Pro has not shown how the VoI actually improves access to the primary goods. He just says that improved access to the primary goods is the way it should be. This is not unjust, but it is also not just. The reason is because it's simply a statement on reality rather than a way to fix it. It is akin to saying that "murder is wrong" is a just standard for government. Yes, murder is wrong, but simply stating conclusions is not actually working to achieve a solution to murder; it's a moral fact-claim, rather than an actual standard for government to follow. Similarly, the VoI as Pro describes it doesn't actually offer a way to improve access to the primary goods. My framework does. As I showed, one logical conclusion of it was the need to "implement regulations on businesses to prevent "'distortions of monopoly or externality'" (Dworkin 357).In summary:The VoI is vague and doesn't reach the conclusions Pro claims it doesDworkin's framework protects specific liberties to achieve justice.On to the conclusions!