God most likely does not exist

As was sorely anticipated, my opponent believes all of his arguments survived unscathed. A careful reader may wonder if my opponent would be able to legitimately discern between a scathed argument and an unscathed one, all things considered, of course. Let’s see where the debate now rests.RE: Argument From Incoherence: Omnipotence/ OmnibenevolenceAs you’ll notice, my opponent believes that God, as author of moral authority, can be both malevolent and benevolent. You’ve also noticed, I expect, that I agreed in my last round that this is possible ONLY if we take God’s moral authority as his having authored morality as precepts for which he is also free to break. Such that we can take the precepts authored by God and also conclude that he’s free to break them. However, if we take omnibenevolence as an ESSENTIAL part of God than omnibenevolence can be easily defined as inherent in God's nature and/or wholly defined by whatever God chooses to do. Thus, Evil would only be defined by what God's nature is not. You may also understand that this doesn’t need to be true, it need only be possible. So long as it is possible, my opponent’s criticism of incoherence fails.But there is something we REALLY need to touch on here, and that is this ridiculous appeal that my opponent is making to some sort of fluffy, undefined, atheistic understanding of objective morality. Going so far as it say that this is a NECESSARY truth. Those familiar with modal logic may well know that a necessary truth is one that is true in ALL POSSIBLE WORLDS. That means that “it is wrong to rape” is also wrong in worlds where no sentient life exists at all! Or even in worlds where green monsters rape 2 million schoolgirls on Sunday unless one person is raped on Saturday. Or in a world where all things must rape to survive. Or in a world where rape is rewarded with eternal life. Having a whole range of epistemic possibilities, this weird appeal to moral objectivity can be reduced to absurdity in literally countless ways.God is either the moral authority, inasmuch as morality is contingent upon Him and Him alone, or he is not. My opponent CANNOT in any reasonable fashion think he can seriously assume that God is not the author of moral authority in order to prove that he is not. This is what his argument can be reduced to:“God cannot be the author of moral authority because some things are wrong no matter what.”THIS IS BEGGING THE QUESTION. Things being wrong no matter what assumes that God is not the author of moral authority and thus assumes false from the start the thing it is trying to prove false!!! It’s really that simple.Now we move to my opponent’s failure to properly use modal logic. First he claims, “Regardless, I never said God was omnibenevolent in every possible world.” To which I respond with a quote from his 2nd round, “an omnibenevolent being commits an act of evil in no possible world.” And “a being who committed an act of evil innopossible world, would be perfectly moral”The only way for this criticism to work would be to make omnibenovelence a necessary truth, inasmuch as omnibenevolence must obtain in every possible world in order to qualify as omnibenevolence. If this is true, than my opponent must maintain that either omnibenevolence itself, without the addition of omnipotence, is incoherent, or that omnibenevolence necessarily exists in the actual world. This is defeating to his case. Omnibenevolence is ONLY defined as being absent of evil and this need only obtain a possible proposition (wherein it obtains in some possible world). In fact, saying that a being is made more morally righteous by not committing wrongs in all possible worlds is ridiculous, as the moral weight of nonfactual moral goods or crimes is precisely 0.His (A), (B) distinction can be reduced to the following:(A) A being who commits no acts of evil in all possible worlds except 1.(B) A being who commits no acts of evil in all possible worlds.The difference is (A) distinguishes a being who is omnibenevolent – 0 and (B) distinguishes an omnibenevolent God + 0. Thus, the sum of their differences by way of basic math is 0 – 0 = 0. Or, in less modal terms, the question is (1) whether or not a being is made more good if it must do good necessarily, or (2) a being who always does good despite not having to. I think the difference here is immeasurable. And intuition tends to favor (1), though (2) is necessary for my opponent’s argument work.In sum, my opponent either must maintain that omnibenevolence is a necessary truth, meaning it MUST exist in reality. Or he must maintain that omnibenevolence is a possible proposition that obtains in at least one possible world. The former works against him, and the latter makes his argument fail.RE: Paul Draper's Argument From Evil (Gratuitous Suffering)“I supported the idea that morality cannot be grounded in God several times throughout this debate.”Let us refresh on what my opponent sees as his great defense of this non grounded nature:“However, without an independent standard of good, any attributes possible could be applied to God's nature, and they would be good necessarily when we know some acts if objective, are evil.”This is a super important lesson that my opponent should learn. It is called the fallacy of consequences, begging the question and also circular reasoning. He seems to be committing a form of all them. He is attempting to prove that Morality cannot be grounded in God by showing that it could allow for something that we feel as wrong, like rape, to be right. This (1) appeals to our emotional reaction to the idea of rape in an attempt to weigh truth value (fallacy of consequences. It also (2) assumes that some things are objectively wrong, like rape, independent of God as moral authority, in order to work as an argument to begin with. This is a begging the question, inasmuch as his defense of independent moral objectively depends upon the truth of independent moral objectivity. Lastly, (3) in order to prove objective morals he assumes objective morals and in order to prove God’s moral authority false he assumes it false. All of these are forms of circular reasoning. And he really ought to know better.“If God could rape and it would be good, then obviously moral truths would not be necessary truths regarding all sentient beings. Thus, this would completely destroy the idea of objective morality as a whole.“This is another fallacy of consequences. WHO CARES! My opponent has simply assumed objective morality and wants the whole DDO crew to buy into the idea that he has somehow proved its extensive obviousness.Conclusion:My opponent was unable to surmount my criticism of the inscrutable nature of God, wherein if He is the author of moral authority we have no good reasons for thinking we would be privy to the content of his moral nature. Having full and unilateral control over what morality is, we have no justificatory grounds for calling this or that evil. Thus, making a probabilistic claim between something we do know and something we do not know is meaningless and inscrutable. Lastly, my opponent failed to show that omnipotence and omnibenevolence were incompatible because he did not surmount the objection that omnibenevolence can be defined as inherent in God's nature and/or wholly defined by whatever God chooses to do. Also, he made indefensible modal claims regarding omnibenevolence, inasmuch as omnibenevolence must be defined as a possible proposition or his conclusion is false, or it must be defined as a necessary proposition and his conclusion is necessarily false. Lastly, his modal claims rest upon an immeasurable moral claim that it is better not to be able to do good than to be able to do evil but to not.The likelihood of the God as stated in round 1 is made no less likely by the arguments given by my opponent in all transpired rounds.InquireTruth