The Balanced Budget Amendment is a bad policy response to the 2011 debt issue.

Pro has brought us an important and timely topic, which I appreciate. We need more such topics on DDO. Thanks to Pro for a vigorous debate.(Con 1) The heart of the debt issue is the fundamental flaw in democracy identified by Burke in the eighteenth century:A democracy cannot exist as a permanent form of government. It can only exist until the voters discover that they can vote themselves largess from the public treasury. From that moment on, the majority always votes for the candidates promising the most benefits from the public treasury with the result that a democracy always collapses over loose fiscal policy, ... [5]The remedy is a republic in which powers are limited by a Constitution. Whatever the checks at present, they are clearly inadequate. Pro argues that in the time of Hamilton and Jefferson, when there ere no entitlements, that we got by without a balanced budget amendment. I challenged Pro to make the case with respect to present-day politicians entitlements, and he did not respond to the challenge. Because the Constitution lacks sufficient checks, discussion of a BBA is always appropriate in the context of the debt issue.(Con 2) The August 2nd deadline on raising the debt ceiling was met by a compromise that did not require a BBA. The US credit rating was downgraded anyway, because the long term deficit problem was not solved. A BBA would have solved the long term problem and prevented the downgrade. That mans it was appropriate to raise the BBA as part of the debt issue.Pro 1: No way to stop near-term downgrading.Pro claimed in R1, "the only way to increase the deficit is for both houses to pass an amendment which is sent to the states." This is false because the Senate version of the BBA, which Pro agreed to an acceptable basis for the debate, only requires a 60% vote both houses to increase the debt, and the requirement does not take effect at all for seven years.Pro then argued that even in seven years Congress would not be ready for the imposition. I replied that Congress would meet the hard deadline because they are sworn to uphold the Constitution. If they were not ready, then that would show that the process was in desperate need of Constitutional limitations on out-of-control spending.Later, (I had trouble figuring out what Pro's argument was until the end) Pro argued that House Republicans should not have proposed a BBA because they should have known it would not pass the Senate. The starting point in virtually any negotiation is a position unacceptable to the other side, and it's always appropriate to present a position that represents the viewpoint of constituents.Pro 2: BBA UnenforceablePro argued, "What this system of enforcement says is that unelected judges will be the ones combing through our budgets finding what spending to nix." I responded by quoting a National Journal article which correctly states, "If the constitutional amendment had been violated, a federal court would issue an injunction ordering Congress and the president to stop breaching it. The legislative and executive branches would then have to decide what to do about that." The Courts throw the problem back to the legislature and executive with an order to cut a certain amount, and they, not the courts, get to decide exactly what to cut.Pro did not reply, but repeated that judges would make policy decisions. In truth, judges would force the legislature and executive to make the budget-cutting policy decisions.I further argued that if the other branches refused to obey the Court, the likely remedy was policy-neutral across-the-board cuts. Pro did not respond to that argument.Pro 3: Unrealistic near term cutsPro concedes that unrealistic near term cuts are not required by the Senate BBA, because it would not take effect for about seven years.Pro 4: Vulnerability to recessionPro argued that a BBA would defeat "automatic stabilizers" that help minimize recessions. I argued that "rainy day funds" --which are savings accumulated in good times to be spent in bad times could be used to perform stabilization functions. I also argued that the Federal Reserve functions of controlling the money were unimpeded by a BBA. In addition, I pointed out that the BBA was likely to dampen recessions by preventing over stimulation by borrowing, as happened in the present recession. I challenged Pro identify the stabilizers and say which could not be supported as I described.Pro pointed to unemployment insurance and the insuring of bank accounts, and did not identify any other stabilizers. Unemployment insurance is a state benefit paid by employers contributing to a fund. Similarly, bank accounts are insured by payments made by banks to the FDIC. Neither depends upon deficit financing. Pro argued that payments out of a fund are deficit spending. Obviously they are not, but if that's an issue BBA wording could make it clear. In a protracted financial crisis the Federal Government could provide debt-financed bailouts upon a 60% vote of Congress. It's appropriate that bailouts only be provided in circumstances that really require it; that's the purpose of a BBA.In this final round, Pro cites an IMF paper on the effectiveness of automatic stabilizers, but he never says what the stabilizers are. The paper refers to fiscal policy decisions that are not automatic in the United States. Congress must authorize spending each year. The prime stabilizer is that government employees never are fired and never take a pay cut. That's not a good policy to adopt automatically. It's extremely inefficient to have an entitled class immune from economic conditions. Nonetheless, it only takes a 60% vote of Congress to authorize deficit financing if the case can be made.Pro 5: Alternative mechanismsPro says he never advocated a line-item veto authority, but that's what the Cato Institute study he referenced proposes. Impoundment means the President refuses to spend money appropriated by Congress. Impoundment was ruled unconstitutional when Nixon tried it. In any case, the mechanism requires a president willing to use it, and I claimed that no recent president has shown any such inclination. Pro did respond to my claim.Pro claims "the BBA as a solution has never been brought up on a national level. the BBA as a solution has never been brought up on a national level." That is factually incorrect. There have been many attempts since 1936. http://www.heritage.org... In 1995 a balanced budget amendment was approved by the House and fell only one vote short in the Senate. Keep in mind that there was no income tax until after 1900, so the opportunity for politicians to drain the Treasury for benefits given to voters was limited before the 20th century.=======================This was a difficult debate because it involved many issues. Pro had the burden to prove that the Balanced Budget Amendment is a bad policy response to the 2011 debt issue. Pro did not meet the burden of proof because the debt issues flow from a defect in the Constitution that permits politicians to drain the Treasury to buy votes. The problem is long-term, not just a side issue of the debt ceiling debate. We know that because the US bond rating was downgraded despite the debt ceiling deadline having been met.Perhaps some fine tuning of the BBA is required. Pro accepted that possibility when he offered to debate either the House or Senate versions. The issue we debated is whether a Constitutional limitation on debt is bad policy. It is not bad policy.In the debate, my opponent had few references and in some cases, as with "automatic stabilizers" and the CATO proposal for impoundment, relied too much on my reading the references to discover what the argument was. He should have made the arguments directly. The resolution is negated.