Abortion Is Morally Permissible

I want to begin by thanking KeytarHero for giving me the opportunity to have a debate with him on this very important moral issue. I'm going to defend two basic contentions as I proceed to make my case. First, there are no good reasons to think that abortion is morally wrong. And secondly, there are good reasons to think that abortion is morally permissible. In defense of that first contention, I'll begin by offering a brief critique of a common pro-life argument. C1: The sanctity of life doctrine is morally untenable. Many arguments against abortion are based on some variety of the sanctity of life doctrine. In short, the sanctity of life doctrine contends that humans possess certain fundamental rights such as the right to life by virtue of their humanity. Here is an example of this type of argument that is as plausible as I can make it: P1: It is prima facie morally wrong to kill any innocent human being. P2: A human fetus is an innocent human being. C: Therefore, it is prima facie morally wrong to kill a human fetus. (from 1 and 2) As the world-renowned Princeton philosopher Peter Singer argues, there are good reasons to think that the first premise of the anti-abortion argument is false. First, the sanctity of life doctrine is vulnerable to clear counterexamples.[1] If all human beings are intrinsically valuable as subjects of rights, then this would imply that brain-dead individuals, anencephalic fetuses (i.e., fetuses that lack the neurological capacity for consciousness) and those in persistent vegetative states would all have a right to life. But surely such humans don't possess a right to life. For starters, almost no one believes that they do. Indeed, these implications are so implausible that even people who are passionately opposed to abortion are often unwilling to accept them! Josh Brahm, the Education Director for Fresno Right to Life, writes, "I will grant that abortion is permissible for the anencephalic fetus."[2] Don Marquis, one of the most influential pro-life philosophers of our time, pulls no punches when he deems the sanctity of life doctrine "clearly false."[3] Moreover, there is a good basis for the conclusion that Marquis and Brahm draw. As philosopher Dean Stretton points out, killing individuals that lack any mental life does not harm them because it does not frustrate their desires (they have none), and it does not deprive them of a valuable future.[4] Consequently, the first premise of the anti-abortion argument is false because it has absurd moral implications. Second, the sanctity of life doctrine is based on a morally irrelevant biological property.[5] The reason we deem racism and sexism morally wrong is based on the fact that biological properties have, all by themselves, no moral significance whatsoever. From this it follows that the biological property of being a member of the human species has no moral significance whatsoever. The sanctity of life doctrine must therefore be rejected because it is based on a biological, but not obviously morally relevant, property. Third, it is plausible that humans cannot be intrinsically valuable.[6] To be intrinsically valuable is to be necessarily valuable (i.e., valuable in all possible worlds).[7] But if there are possible worlds where humans had mental lives like insects, then it is doubtful that these humans would possess any moral value, intrinsic or otherwise. Given this possibility, it follows necessarily that humans aren't intrinsically valuable in any possible world including the actual world. Finally, it is plausible that the right to life is an accidental property.[8] It is theoretically possible to transplant a human cerebrum into a non-rational being. The resulting organism from the transplant would develop self-awareness and thus come to possess a right to life. This demonstrates the same organism can at one point lack a right to life and then later come to possess it, and so the right to life is an accidental property. But this conclusion spells doom for the sanctity of life doctrine - for the sanctity of life doctrine holds that the right to life is an essential property that isn't accidently acquired. And thus the destruction of the sanctity of life doctrine is well-established. So then let us turn to my second contention that there are good reasons to think that abortion is morally permissible. C2: A fetus is not a person and thus cannot have a serious right to life. A fetus may be a human in the biological sense, but it is not a person. According to philosopher Marry Anne Warren, the most plausible characteristics for personhood are mental in nature.[9] Since a fetus does not possess any significant mental qualities, it can rightfully not be considered a person with a serious right to life. My argument can thus be summed up as follows: P1: Only a person has a right to life. P2: An entity is a person if it has (1) consciousness, (2) the capacity to reason, (3) self-motivated activity, (4) the capacity to communicate messages, and (5) the presence of self-concepts. P3: A human fetus does not have properties (1-5). P4: Therefore, a human fetus is not a person. (from 2 and 3) C: Therefore, a human fetus does not have a right to life. (from 1 and 4) You might be surprised to learn that the only controversial aspect of the argument is the second premise which outlines criteria for personhood. Allow me to briefly sketch some of the reasons why the psychological criteria I have set forth should be accepted. First, these criteria should be accepted because only entities that have had conscious desires at some time can be harmed in the morally significant sense of the term. As the philosopher Michael Tooley argues, granting rights to any entity presupposes that the entity can be harmed.[10] So, for example, living organisms such as plants and insects that lack conscious desires cannot have rights because they cannot be harmed. Second, these criteria explain the intuitions most people have that brain-dead individuals, anencephalic fetuses and those in persistent vegetative states all lack a right to life.[11] Merely being human and alive is morally inconsequential. It is, rather, the ability to have a conscious experience of the world that is important. This is why most sensible people do not regard brain-dead individuals as having a right to life. Third, these criteria offer a non-arbitrary and species free account of personhood for various beings, both real and imaginary.[12] For example, advanced extra-terrestrials and self-aware robots would obviously be persons and have a right to life even though they are not human. Fourth, the psychological approach is able to explain numerous issues in personal identity.[13] In particular, the psychological approach explains why a human person would plausibly continue to exist over time if their cerebrum were swapped into another body and they possessed the same memories and personality as before. It would also explain why we would regard conjoined twins as two separate persons even though they are part of the same biological organism. Finally, it is plausible that rights function to protect interests.[14] This understanding of rights bolsters the psychological criteria for personhood because the only sorts of beings that are capable of holding a desire to continue living are those beings who possess self-consciousness. Attributing a right to life to individuals who qualify as persons is therefore justified because doing so helps to safeguard their desire for continued existence. | Conclusion | In conclusion, a fetus is a human being, but it does not possess the mental properties that would qualify it as a person. In light of this, then, abortion cannot be seriously wrong because the entity being destroyed in the process does not have sufficiently strong interests that could be violated. For these reasons, abortion is morally permissible. Sources: http://tinyurl.com...