Free will is an illusion

Thanks a lot for your well-thought out and reasoned argument, it is much appreciated. I am happy to agree with that definition of free will, with emphasis on the notion that a being is free so long as they could have done otherwise at a given juncture in life. Let's go through your points one-by-one:Argument 1: Common Sense IntuitionI would say that asserting the truth of a concept based solely, primarily, or partially on the notion that it is common sense is a very inadequate way to look at the world. The following are just a few examples of notions once considered to be held in the "common sense" arena that are clearly no longer valid: The world is flat Geocentrism Washing hands doesn't prevent disease Continents are unmovable "Unfortunately, it seems that our common sense notion of free will is flawed regardless of one’s opinion on determinism: free will is impossible in a world that is determined, undetermined, or anywhere in between" - Brandy Jo Newell, Indiana Undergraduate Journal of Cognitive ScienceMy counterargument here is not at all to say that common sense is never accurate. Rather, I am trying to illustrate that over the course of human history, it has been proven that "common sense" is not always true. As such, I feel it should be removed from the list of arguments. Argument 2: An ought implies a can, and a cannot implies an ought not. There are two pieces to this argument. First, you appeal to Kant's infamous OIC argument (A). Second, you state that it follows that, since free will fails, moral responsibility fails, etc.A) OICAs I said, this argument of yours appears to be a formulation of Kant's. Though he is undoubtedly one of the most respected philosophers of all time, there are an ample number of philosophers that disagree with ought-implies-can (OIC). There seem to be a plethora of counterexamples to the OIC tenet, so we will first start with some definitions (provided with the aid of Moti Mizrahi, The City University of New York): 'Ought' is typically used to connote some sort of moral obligation or duty. An example would be the statement, "A husband ought not commit infidelity". In most literature, especially that of philosophical variety, 'ought to' and 'is obligated to' are typically used interchangeably. As for 'can', I most agree with the definition of "what an agent is capable of doing within the limits of her physical and mental abilities in the circumstances." Your contention translates as - If A ought to do X, A can do X.Consider the case of a soldier, a medic, and their commander. Suppose the soldier has been wounded. Further suppose that the commander instructs the medic to treat the soldier's wound. Then, imagine a conversation such as the following:Commander: “Medic, tend to that wound!” Medic: “I cannot, commander.” Commander: “What do you mean you can’t do it? You’re the medic of this platoon and I just gave you an order!” Medic: “Commander, I know I should but I can't."In this hypothetical, the medic is paralyzed by fear because of the heavy surrounding fire. With that, he is unable to provide aid. Both the commander and the medic know that the latter ought to treat the wounded soldier. So, it’s true that the medic ought to treat the wounded soldier, by virtue of his capacity, even though it’s false that he can actually do so. If this is correct, we seem to have a case where the fact that the medic can treat the soldier does not follow from the statement that the medic ought to treat the soldier.It seems we have established at least one case in which OIC fails. B) Failure of free will -> failure of moral responsibilityIf I understand at least the start of this deduction, I absolutely agree here. Without free will, the notion of moral responsibility certainly does fail. This is why the final line of my initial argument was, "There are, of course, many deep implications of this - for the justice system, religion, morality, etc. However, that is not what I wish to debate here. I simply wish to contend that free will is a mere illusion in our current reality." With that said, just because a lack of free will would imply the evacuation of moral responsibility and that a world without moral responsibility may seem askew, incomprehensible, or downright silly, that doesn't mean in any way, shape, or form that free will need not exist.Argument 3: In general, evolutionary processes select for traits with adaptive benefit to the organism. As a staunch supporter of evolutionary theory, I could not agree more with this statement. However, I don't at all agree with what follows. Whether or not free will truly exists, I would agree with you that an overwhelming majority of humans think and act as if they do. However, who are we to say whether evolution has selected for this notion of free will to be objectively true, subjectively true, or completely false? What if the illusion of free will is the precursor to a neurophysiological chain of events that results in increased resources devoted to mating which, in turn, leads to an increase in the proliferation of the genes that give rise to the illusion in the first place? I don't think there are many people who would argue that human agents in any way act according to free will in their dreams. Thus, by your logic, dreams have no causal efficacy and, further, no adaptive benefit. I also don't think there are many people who would argue that dreams exist. You are entitled to your own opinions regarding the purpose of dreams (though many scientists don't think they serve a purpose (Scientific American)), put you cannot deny that in some way, evolutionary processes have selected for organisms using resources to further non-causally efficacious epiphenomenal experiences.Argument 4: beliefs are considered knowledge when reasons cause those beliefsI'm not sure this is a stance that can be unilaterally held, depending on your definitions of 'reason' and 'knowledge'. If I believe that God created the universe based on the reason that a priest told me, does that make it knowledge? If I believe that it only rains on Tuesdays based on the reason that I've only observed rain on Tuesdays, does that make it knowledge? Surely there must be some sort of evidence or truth requirement in transforming a belief into knowledge. You state that beliefs are not knowledge "when blind processes cause those beliefs." You might argue (and I might agree) that the priest/God example reflects a sort of blind faith and, thus, should not be considered knowledge. However, the rain example is by no stretch of the imagination representative of a blind process. It is a belief, backed up by observation and unwavering empirical evidence, used to create "knowledge". As I run out of characters here, I'll make one last comment regarding to your answer as to you having the will to want to have this debate. We can happily discuss the remaining in future rounds.If you take the stance that the "want" was created over the course of many years of thinking what you value, I would ask you to more closely examine what it is that you value and why it is that you value it. The further you drill down into notions like this, the closer you get to realizing that these values were the result of processes, whether on the molecular level or the nature/nurture level, over which you have no control. Suppose you want to have this debate because you value defending your viewpoints. I would ask - why do you have this viewpoint and why do you value defending it? You might say you value defending it because you've spent intellectual energy refining your opinion in the pursuit of enlightenment and enjoy logical discourse. To that I would ask why it is that you enjoy logical discourse. You seem more than capable of tracing a thought process like this to its roots and I'd be very interested to see you trace something all the way back to its genesis without arriving at an unconscious factor.