God Probably Doesn't Exist

Contention 1: The Problem of Evil Con argues that God allows evil to let some greater good come about. The problem with this is, if God is omnipotent, he can bring about this good without the use of evil. If God is morally perfect he would want that. If for example, a women being raped and murdered brings some greater good for someone else doesn’t make the women being raped ok, if the greater good could have been done without the rape. Furthermore, it is more likely that gratuitous evils exists. Since humans have experienced many apparent acts of it. Consider William Rowe’s famous analogy “In some distant forest lightning strikes a dead tree, resulting in a forest fire. In the fire a fawn is trapped, horribly burned, and lies in terrible agony for several days before death relieves its suffering." [1] The possibility of some unknown greater good exists, but the evil being unnecessary is the more probable one. My argument still stands Contention 2: Argument from Temporal minds/Atemporal Will Con misunderstands much of this argument. No where did I state God’s freedom was based on him pondering a choice. Nor did I say anything to contradict the idea that his freedom was from nothing but himself. The point is, if God’s will is from himself, and he is necessary, thus his will is necessary. Con then goes on to present a fallacious false analogy about his will to live. This is entirely different, Con is a contingent temporal being with a contingent will. He could possibly be different. Furthermore, being eternal doesn’t mean being necessary. Con commits a straw man fallacy, because I never negated that idea. Con makes an argument that was already preemptively rebutted in my opening statement. He states God’s choice to create the universe is not necessary. I gave this as a possible out. However, if God’s will is from himself and if his will is not necessary, then he is not necessary. If God’s mind is static anything that is different makes himself different. Con’s argument was already responded to. Con agreed that God’s mind is a static one. However, looking at what a mind is, no definition fits the idea. 1. the element of a person that enables them to be aware of the world and their experiences, to think, and to feel; the faculty of consciousness and thought: 2. a person’s ability to think and reason; the intellect: [2] Simple static information would be things such as computers and books. We don’t call computers or books minds. Claiming a mind is one that does not function is much like saying we can listen to music while it’s muted or take a car ride without movement. This argument still stands. Contention 3: The Argument from Physically Dependant Minds Every single bit of Con’s response here is misunderstood strawmen. The argument doesn’t say an immaterial mind is impossible. I said from the very start “This argument is purely probabilistic” Along with every single premise except the first one is speaking in a probabilistic fashion. This makes his response from plants moot. I was arguing probabilistically from the minds we observe. It is an inductive probabilistic argument. Con goes further to straw man the argument. Trying to prove consciousness is in some sense immaterial because you can’t have a subjective experience. This is much like saying genetics is in some sense immaterial. You can see what kind of genes I have and even predict what kind of genes children have. But you can’t have the genes yourself. Anyway, this again is entirely irrelevant. The mind can be immaterial. If it was proven 100% that the mind is in some sense immaterial, this doesn’t change the argument at all. It is still more likely and the best explanation that this immaterial mind is dependent on the brain. The man I quoted Dr. Michael Tooley has this to say about Dr. Craig’s similar rebuttal. “Dr. Craig distorted my argument. I did not claim, as he said, that there could not be a non-embodied mind, for I believe that non-embodied minds are possible. My argument did not, as he suggested, involve the assumption that dualism is false. For I myself am an interactionist dualist, and I was certainly not making assumptions that are contrary to ones I myself believe! My argument here was a probabilistic argument. The claim was that all the minds we are acquainted with have a certain property---namely, that they are all at least dependent upon physical entities---brains. But if this is so, then it's reasonable to project that property onto any other minds that may happen to exist. And if you do project that property, you arrive at a certain conclusion-not that the existence of God is impossible, but, rather, that the existence of God is unlikely.” [3] This argument is still standing. Con’s case Determining Contingency After analysis, the argument I was planning to make here would not be relevant. This is why I asked for clarification. Good thing I didn’t make it. Why God? Con essentally repeats himself. He says the information must be contained in the form of ideas or thoughts. There is no reason why some non-sentient force can't contian just the information of these thoughts and ideas. He says the being does not have parts, can't move, and has no location. Of course, we could say we know where information like ideas, thoughts, and memories are stored in the brain. The theist could just say God's mind is a special disembodied mind. The same can be said about this information. He then goes onto talk about how the effect must exist within the cause. I never negated this, so it’s irrelevant to my response. His other argument is that an unlimited being must have consciousness because it would be limited if it didn’t. An immaterial force could have the information of consciousness without having consciousness itself. Much like how a computer can map the brain of a worm. It has all information of the worm’s brain, but does not have the worm’s consciousness. Con has ignored my second argument. That a contingent something may be necessary. So, even if my first rebuttal is refuted, my second one is untouched and thus succeeds. Ultimately, Con failed to take down my alternatives that are just as good as God. His argument remains refuted. Sources [1] Rowe, William L. (1979). "The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism". American Philosophical Quarterly 16: 337. [2] http://www.oxforddictionaries.com... [3] http://www.leaderu.com...