The Kalaam Cosmological Argument is Unsound

Premise 1 - Refutation The KCA is a deductive argument which imports inductive reasoning. The conclusion follows that God exists, not that God probably exists. This debate is about soundness. [1] Inductive arguments are arguments which do not attempt to establish a thesis conclusively. [2] However, the KCA tries to do exactly that. Therefore, its veracity is dependent on its deductive logic to establish its soundness. "". if the Problem of Induction cites a lack of justification for beliefs about the past that are out of the range of experience and observation.... Since the premise lacks justification, there"s no way to establish its soundness. It follows that we cannot establish the soundness of the argument as a whole." [3] My opponent has confirmed how apparent this is, in premise 1. [4] Con's explains why virtual particles pop in and out of existence. Now simply stating the conditions it arises in does nothing to prove that it's dependency nor does Con cite any evidence for this claim. This is a false cause [5] Just because there is a correlation between two variables does not necessarily imply that one causes the other [6]. It's the equivalent of saying whatever happens within the universe is caused by the universe. To make the assertion that without it virtual particles cannot come into being is illusory. Now my opponent defends this statement by alluding to the PSR. The PSR is a principle that everything must have a reason for coming into existence. PSR has prima facie plausibility, however, this would lead to an infinite regress. Not every fact can have an explanation, for there cannot be an explanation of the Big Contingent Conjunctive Fact which is itself the conjunction of all the contingent facts. If a possible world is conceivable in which the PSR is false, then the PSR is not true necessarily, and cannot be accepted a priori. Since our experience does not give us sufficient knowledge of causality that would bring the Universe into existence, we cannot confirm the PSR 1.Assuming the PSR is true, suppose all contingent things make up one big contingent proposition, i.e. C 2.Since C is contingent, if the PSR is true, C"s explanation must be necessary (if the explanation were contingent, it would be a part of C and could not be C"s explanation.) 3.Something with a necessary explanation must be necessary. 4.If C was the result of a necessary explanation, then it follows that C must be necessary. 5.Yet, C, by definition, cannot be necessary. 6.Therefore, the PSR is false. If infinite regression is illogical then the KCA is unsound, as it is based on the PSR which cannot be shown to be true. [7] It cannot be logically proven that there must be a sufficient reason for everything, without assumptions or committing the fallacy of composition. Now it is equally plausible that if God does not require an explanation then a multiverse theory is equally plausible. Since this argument does not pertain to the probability of God but the actuality of God, any categorical generalization of efficient causes are grounded on the fallacy of composition. Premise 2 " A theory of Time. Con uses the argument from incredulity by saying "It seems absurd to suggest that the present is an arbitrary illusion created by the consciousness" thus making an appeal to ridicule. Now addressing Con"s argument against the B theory of time, there is an easy rebuttal of this which can be seen in the following syllogism (1)There is an event/instant, t, such that it is (objectively) present (2)Some t is past, present and future (3)Necessarily, nothing is past, present and future (4)(1) Entails a falsehood (i.e. (2)), and is therefore false Now Con supports his argument with two trends of thought. (1)It goes against our intuitions (2)No evidence has been provided to support this view Answer to (1) - Both theories predict the same intuitions. Consider the following, Person A exists at a certain point in time T. At time T person A remembers the moment T* that lies in the past and anticipates the moment T**, that lies in the future. The only intuition that person A can have is the memory of having experienced T*, experiencing T right now and anticipating T** in the future. At any point of time this is the only knowledge about time that person A can have. But this tells A nothing about the nature of time. At time T person A will have a memory of the moment T* and an anticipation of T** whether presentism or eternalism is true. Even if eternalism is true, this doesn't change the fact that at moment T, the moment T* is merely a memory and T** has not yet been experienced. The only intuitions A can have is his memory, his present awareness and his anticipation, none of which are excluded on an eternalist point of view. Therefor dynamic theories of time do not have an explanatory advantage and nor are tenseless theories of time falsified or rendered implausible by intuition. See link [10] Answer to (2) - Evidence in favour of the B theory of time [8], [9] and [13]. "Velocity time dilation tests, Gravitational time dilation tests and Velocity and gravitational time dilation combined-effect tests [11] which supports Einstein's Theory of Relativity. Time is relative, as Einstein showed us. When objects move, their clocks tick slower. So if a traveling alien billions of light years away starts moving away from us and their "now" becomes our past, the straight line of time between us that represented our "now", becomes angled for the alien backwards towards our past. But ahead of the alien, in the direction he's (or it's) travelling, that diagonal angle points toward someone or something else's future "An experiment has been done which proves time is static [12] "Philosophical Arguments. See [8], [9] and [13] Also, it should be noted that Con has presented no evidence for the A theory of time rather than appealing to our intuitions, familiarity and utility of this intuition. However, it is clear that scientific discovery clearly supports a B theory of time over the A theory. [14 and [15] Objection to Premise 3 - Problem of Personal Being Con states gives us only two options "a number or a logical device" or "a mind". There are many problems with this line of reasoning. Firstly, it presents the false dilemma I was stating in Round 2, why immaterial essence must be due to familiarity. Secondly, substance dualism has not been proven to be true. It has been shown to more likely false than true. [16] and [17]. Ergo, Con has to show how a mind can be independent of the material brain. Since, it cannot be known alluding to intuition or the PSR, the mind is dependent on a material basis. Therefore, a mind requires a material basis. Also, trying to get around the problem of an eternal cause having a temporal effect has the problem of simultaneous causality which I mentioned above. Con also has the burden of showing the coherency of atemporal personhood, since the only properties that could be ascribed to the mind is consciousness (knowledge which is attained by considering or analysing possibilities), thinking and reasoning (sequence of events) and intention (free will). If PSR is true, then free will is not possible. Illustrated by the following syllogism: P1. If free will exists, then there exists a world 1 and a world 2 where a conscious entity took two different choices (t=0). P2. If w1 exists, then there exists a SR for it's existence P3. If w2 exists, then there exists a SR for it's existence P4. SR for w1 =/= w2 from w0 C. P4 entails a contradiction Now the problem with free will leads us to the problem of agent causation of freely choosing to make the effect temporal and not eternal which shall be explained for defence of premise 3. Omnisicience vs Free Will [18] - If a being knows all things, then by necessity the being must do what he knows what he will do and cannot change his mind on any matter. He knows not what he wants to do, but what he must do and cannot do otherwise. Therefore, if A (God) is a necessary object that must exist, then B (The Universe) must necessarily exist too since it is impossible that B cannot exist. The Defense for the compatibility of omniscience vs free will "A Contingent Effect from the ECU must be a personal agent (This runs into the problem stated above) "The only candidates for metaphysical necessary beings are minds or abstract objects. (False Dilemma, addressed in Round 2) Con must: 1.Rectify the omniscience vs free will problem 2.Explain how minds can exist independent of a physical brain 3.Show coherency of a timeless mind Knowledge must also be shown not to have any foundation in sense experience (material) itself [1] http://www.iep.utm.edu... [2] http://www.jimpryor.net... [3] http://academicatheism.tumblr.com... [4] http://atheism.about.com... [5] http://en.wikipedia.org... [6] http://en.wikipedia.org... [7] http://comp.uark.edu... [8] http://www.academia.edu... [9] http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk... [10] http://debunkingchristianity.blogspot.com... [11] http://en.wikipedia.org... [12] https://medium.com... [13] http://www.atheismandthecity.com... [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] http://www.skepticink.com...