It is probable that God exists

Con misunderstands both the TCAs and nature of quantum vacuums. Zero-point energy states still refer to a physical state of affairs where something is present. In such a state, the energy may be evenly balanced, but this is not equivalent to literal nothingness. This pre-existing state of affairs serves to causally condition the fluctuations, even if they do not causally determine it. [1] Again Con still conflates causal determination and causal conditioning. What we see in quantum fluctuations is not the literal emergence of something ex nihilo, but the emergence of something under an already existing physical framework. Moreover, Schrodinger's cat does not show that quantum indeterminancy is ontic. Con simply begs the question, as there exists many deterministic interpretations of what happens (for instance, De Broglie-Bohm). To pick an indeterminsitic interpretation over a deterministic one is to simply assume what he is trying to prove. We need an interpretation neutral argument that quantum indeterminancy is ontic, otherwise one can never be doing anything more than reasoning in a circle.Con again asserts that the TCAs do not prove that the first mover is God. This is false. I have noticed twice that the TCAs entail the existence of a being of pure actuality who must have all perfections. Con has not responded to this at all. Finally, Con drops his comparison of the TCAs to the OA.Teleological ArgumentCon's response to the TA is weak. He states that I have not shown why ends imply intentionality -- except that I did! In my opening argument, I noted that "to speak of causes as being directed toward certain purposes or functions is to admit to a type of intentionality. Intentionality is of course the mark of the mental, and there thus must be a mind who imparts teleology to the natural order." Why does goal-directedness imply intentionality? Because that's just what intentionality is! For something to be intentional is for it to be aimed toward a certain goal as its end. If there is genuine teleology in nature, then, there must be a mind in which this is grounded.He states that I have not shown why a descriptive account of teleology is inadequate. Again this is just plainly false. I gave three arguments in my OP which he has not responded to. Briefly, I argued against descriptive accounts of teleology by noting (1) natural regularities, (2) law-like behavior, and (3) our attribution of proper functions to natural entities. His second criticism completely begs the question. It is true that goal-directed behavior would continue without human persons, but this is not my argument, and it is unwarranted to extrapolate this to divine persons, especially given that my argument is precisely that a divine sustainier and orderer is needed for teleology. This applies whether or not human persons exist. His argument is thus misleading.ScienceNote first that Con drops Richard Dawkins's Boeing 747 Gambit. Now, Con argues that because naturalistic explanations have a better track record than theistic explanations, that therefore naturalism is more probable. But this doesn't follow. Con seems to equivocate on "naturalism" here, since this is only strong enough to justify methodological naturalism, not metaphysical naturalism. But since methodological naturalism is perfectly consistent with theism, it does not show that theism is any less probable. Indeed, the advances of science -- no matter how successful they are -- cannot in principle make theism improbable, for theism is not an empirical hypothesis regarding the operating mechanisms through which the world works. Instead, it posits the existence of an agent who explains why everything exists, not how it works. So while some have in the past erroneously asserted theistic explanations for natural phenomena, their failure does not mean that theism is any less probable. PhysicalismCon's reply evidences a gross misunderstanding of the relevant issues in the philosophy of mind. To say that physicalism is probable is to make a modal claim about the nature of existence: that all persons are essentially material. Since identity is cashed out (at least according to the standard Plantinga/Kripke analysis) in terms of obtaining in all possible worlds, all one needs to do to defeat this is show that disembodied existence is merely possible. Why? Because if it's possible that we exist disembodied, then being embodied is not an essential property of us. If being embodied is not an essential property, then it is not the case that physicalism is true (Indeed, it would be necessarily false). This has become known as the modal argument for dualism.One might say in response "But material embodiment is also possible" Sure, but this is too weak a claim. Since identity is cashed out in terms of metaphysical necessity, to show that some x is essentially material, one must show that x is material in all possible worlds in which x exists. This is quite a tall claim to prove. IncoherenceAccording to Con, because there are an infinite number of mathematical facts, God cannot know all of them. He writes:"If God knew that He knew every mathematical fact, it would still be possible to discover another mathematical fact that He did not know He knew."But this makes absolutely no sense! It doesn't follow by any means. If God knows that he knows all x, how does it follow that there is an x that he did not know he knew? There is no logical connection.Now as I pointed out, God's knowledge is both non-propositional and non-perceptualist. God does not literally know an infinite number of propositions which he somehow perceives. Rather, God knowledge is simple. He knows everything by means of a single universal intuition of all facts, similar to a mind's knowledge of innate ideas. Con thinks that this is incoherent, but what's incoherent about it? It is simply intuitive knowledge writ large. Note my initial clarification between the scope of God's knowledge and his mode, as Con's second reply conflates the two. God does indeed know all facts, but he knows them by a non-propositional and non-perceptualist means. This is not the same as saying that there is something in the scope of facts that God does not know. Argument from EvilCon argues that the epistemic inscrutability objection to EPOEs "works too well," since it leads to moral paralysis and theological skepticism. Not so. It does not follow that just because God might have reasons not to intervene, that we also have reasons not to intervene. Suppose that a parent notices that if the dishes aren't done, then nobody is going to have plates to eat from. But he refuses to intervene and wash the dishes, because he wants to see how his children handle such a circumstance. Simply because the parent refuses to intervene, it does not follow that the children have reason not to intervene as well. Whatever the parent's reasons may be, they don't transfer to the children.But the question arises: "How do we know theism is analogous, given epistemic inscrutability?" Simple. Given that the context of this discussion is the Judeo-Christian conception of God, and given that the Judeo-Christian scriptures/tradition calls one to a life of good works and promoting justice, it becomes likely that our actions work alongside God's reasons. The moral paralysis objection may work against other versions of theism, but not Judeo-Christian theism.ConclusionUnfortunately I have little space left, but let me just say that Con's claims about my argument not proving the attributes of God are simply unwarranted. Numerous times throughout this debate, I showed how the arguments I marshalled entail a conception of God in line with the Judeo-Christian theism. Con's points have been found wanting, as evidenced by the fact that he dropped his defense of the Boeing 747 Gambit and the comparision of the TCAs to the OA.Thank you for the excellent debate, FourTrouble. _____Sources1. John Jefferson Davis, Frontiers of Faith and Science (IVP: 2002) pgs. 55-56.