The Argument from Evil Makes the Existence of the God of Christianity Unlikely

As this debate draws to a close, I think it's important that we briefly try to reflect on the current state of the arguments. Even if I were to grant my opponent's claims about the enigmatic nature of God's mind, this proposition wouldn't falsify the argument I have presented. At best, it simply leaves us with the claim that God might have morally sufficient reasons that we don't know about for allowing evils; however, as the philosopher Paul Draper has pointed out, it is also possible (and no less plausible) that God has morally sufficient reasons unknown to us for needing to prevent much of the evil that exists in the world.[1] If anything, these two propositions cancel each other out and allow us to make reasonable inferences about evil based on the current state of the evidence. In any case, it's still reasonable to believe that we should expect to know about many of God's reasons for allowing certain instances of evil. C1: The evidential argument from evil is valid. Once again, the structural validity of the argument is not being called into question. C2: Gratuitous suffering and pointless premature deaths probably occur. For a second time, my opponent has used an analogy with extraterrestrials in order to show why God's mind would be mysterious to us. This analogy completely misses the point of the argument I have outlined. Extraterrestrials, if they existed, don't have the properties that God is alleged to have (e.g., omniscience, omnipotence and omnibenevolence). Extraterrestrials, if they existed, aren't trying to form an eternal love relationship with humans. To say that my opponent is comparing apples to oranges doesn't quite encapsulate the prodigious gulf between the two entities he is asking us to compare. Later on, InquireTruth has argued for the following premise: "P1: We have good reasons for believing that God's mind and reasons are completely unknown to us." In order for P1 to be falsified, I do not have to prove that all of God's mind and reasons for acting in a particular way would be known to humans. Rather, I only have to demonstrate that at least some of God's reasons for acting in a particular way should be evident to us. If you will recall, I have previously argued that we should expect to know about God's morally sufficient reasons for allowing evil because this would help us better bear our suffering. I think it is quite telling that my opponent doesn't directly challenge this claim or the analogy I use to help affirm its truth. He merely reiterates the same key points that he has already brought up in his first round. InquireTruth goes on to quote a passage from the book of Isaiah in order to argue that we should expect God's mind to be mysterious to us. Of course, he is free to add any theological assumptions to this debate that he wants by quoting scripture; however, quoting scripture cannot settle this issue. Remember, the argument from evil seeks to point out an inconsistency within the Christian worldview. As such, we cannot simply take every Christian teaching to be perfectly valid without first examining if it is logically compatible with the rest of Christian theology. The claim that God's mind is unknown to us, as was alluded to in Isaiah, isn't really compatible with his supposed omnibenevolence. The knowledge of God's morally sufficient reasons for allowing evil would have helped the victims of the Holocaust better bear their suffering before they died. Moreover, those that survived the Holocaust often abandoned their faith in God altogether as a result of their experience. Because God has a compelling reason to help us better bear our suffering, we should expect to know about his morally sufficient reasons for allowing evil, since knowing those reasons will often help people better cope with their troubles. C3: The objections to the argument from evil are without merit. God, if he exists, is more powerful than Satan. My opponent's previous assertions about Satan doesn't resolve the issue or show that (P2) is false, it only pushes the problem further back. If actions like the Holocaust and tsunamis can be partially (or fully) attributed to the workings of Satan, then what are God's morally sufficient reasons for allowing Satan to exist and to cause so much evil in the world? Evils that Satan commits in this context are not "gratuitous;" rather, if Christianity is true, they are justified to the extent that God has morally sufficient reasons for allowing Satan to exist and to have free will. In essence, my opponent has presupposed the validity of the "free will defense" to the problem of evil on behalf of Satan without even arguing for it. This defense, even if it were valid, does not negate (P2), and it doesn't address why we should expect to be ignorant of God's morally sufficient reasons for allowing evil in any case. My opponent has raised a rather interesting argument by claiming that there may be no limit to the amount of suffering that God would allow in order to produce certain goods. I think this assumption leads to an absurd conclusion. If there is no minimum amount of suffering necessary for God to produce certain unspecified goods, then it logically follows that allowing the worst possible suffering for all conscious creatures is compatible with achieving these unspecified goods. Furthermore, it seems reasonable to believe that there is a limit to the amount of suffering that God can allow in the world. It is quite clear that the analogy Peter van Inwagen presents is completely bogus. If God needed to send "an impressively tall prophet" to Earth, then God would not be at liberty to send a midget. If everyone on Earth was 6 feet tall, then God couldn't send someone 3 feet tall. The prophet would have to be, at a minimum, taller than 6 feet, since "tall" is a relative concept. Likewise, a one cent fine for illegal parking wouldn't be a sufficient deterrent to prevent illegal parking. Clearly, a minimum fine exists, even if the exact amount (or range of amounts) that fine might be is ambiguous. The fact that these cases are ambiguous doesn't prove that they don't have answers (or a range of answers). C4: Skeptical theism violates good theories in epistemology. My opponent is defending skeptical theism, so there is no need for us to argue over this point. He just wasn't completely aware of what the term meant in the context I was using it. The principle of credulity, as articulated by Swinburne, is often applied to evaluate religious experience; however, it can be applied in other areas. Moreover, my opponent has confused the issue. The principle of credulity, when used in this context, does not entail that we can know some evils are gratuitous by "experiencing" this in some inward personal way. Rather, it maintains that, given all available evidence, the world is the way it appears.[2] So, if all evidence makes some evils appear to be gratuitous, then it is reasonable to infer that they are gratuitous. | Conclusion | In the end, the main point of my opponent's case is that God's mind is completely unknown to us. By itself, this doesn't show why the argument I presented is invalid. Moreover, I think we have seen good reasons for supposing that some instances of suffering are gratuitous. God's desire to care for humans gives him a strong reason to inform us of his reasons for allowing certain evils, because this would help people better bear their suffering. The fact that we don't know of any morally sufficient reasons why God would allow many evils, then, gives us good grounds to suppose that they aren't justified. On balance, it is therefore likely that God does not exist. Sources: 1. http://tinyurl.com... 2. http://tinyurl.com...