My 100th Debate: God Exists

In the television series House, M.D., the internist and nephrologist Dr. Gregory House -- famous for his skills in diagnosing rare diseases, especially infectious diseases -- uses “differential diagnosis,” a form of diagnosis used by multiple doctors in diagnosing patients. In differential diagnosis, the diseases that explain a patient’s symptoms are listed, and, based on a set of criteria, the possible diseases are narrowed down, and tested for. House always uses criteria such as Occam’s razor, using explanations with least assumptions; background knowledge, using explanations that are less rare; testability, since diseases with often-false tests have no point in testing for them; and so forth. This form of reasoning is called “abductive reasoning,” and is a critical part of the scientific method. It follows from a set of criteria to determine, among a set of competing hypotheses, which hypothesis is the most probable:1) Principle of simplicity2) Invokes fewer ad hoc explanations3) Explains phenomena better (has greater explanatory power)What am I arguing for? God is defined as the mind which grounds reality -- I argue that intelligence is a part of reality, therefore there is no mind to ground it; a position called physicalism. Let me analyze physicalism from each of the mentioned criteria. (1) The “principle of simplicity,” or Occam’s razor, posits that, among a set of competing hypotheses, the hypothesis with least assumptions is most likely a priori. [1] The assumption of physicalism is simple -- everything is physical; a mind doesn’t exist. Physicalism -- and other forms of monism -- fulfill this criterion (as does idealism). So, physicalism and idealism are equally simple. (2) I will defend the point that God’s existence invokes more ad hoc explanations by presenting two arguments in favor of atheism. With these two arguments, I shall:(a) Make God’s existence less likely(b) Force theism into invoking more ad hoc explanations to explain the phenomenaMinds are temporal: God is, by definition, an “intelligence behind all of reality.” This means, reality is contingent upon a mind that grounds it, and is external from reality. Therefore, God’s existence would hold that there is a mind outside of reality, an intelligent being sans the universe. We don’t have a quantitative understanding of intelligence, but we do know that intelligence requires a process of generating/gaining information. Any process, which involves a progression of events, is contingent on time. Without the universe -- and reality -- time doesn’t even exist, therefore there is no intelligence behind reality. This argument can be escaped, but it only adds to the number of ad hoc explanations invoked by theism. Eternalism and an experience of time: The flow of time is an illusion, and there is no coherent distinction between the past, present, and future. This view represents a position called eternalism, the idea that we exist in a four-dimensional space-time block; our perception of time is an illusion. Past, present, and future all simultaneously exist, and time dilation (time travel) is metaphysically possible. This is affirmed by the fact that time dilation has been observed. [2] Further, the only explanation for the phenomena known as Andromeda’s paradox -- where there is a significant shift in time due to lack of absolute simultaneity -- is eternalism. [3] What does this entail for God? It is a known fact that humans experience temporal becoming, a form of progression of events; distinction between the past, present, and future. If eternalism is true, only non-conscious minds, contingent on brains, can explain it. [4] (3) God is not required to explain any phenomena. All phenomena within the universe, and all observations, can be explained by what is “material,” without need for entities such as God, or minds that ground reality. Take the mind. Everything about the mind can be explained by what is natural. According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Detailed psychological research . . . gave no indication of any physical effects that cannot be explained in terms of basic physical forces that also occur outside living bodies . . . since the only laws governing behavior are those connecting behavior with physical antecedents, mental events can only be causes of behavior if they are identical with those physical antecedents.” [5] --Now, onto the rebuttals. First, the teleological argument. I argue that both premises of the teleological argument are false. The first premise is a hasty generalization. Pro’s example, e.g. a car has a builder, fail to prove that everything with telos is generated by intelligence. Take, for example, evolution via natural selection, which -- by means of a combination of random mutations and natural selection -- manages to produce telos. The second premise fails to provide an objective standard for telos. Telos is subjective. There is a distinction between telos that is prescribed and telos that is attributed. Pro merely attributes telos to things, but that is subjective. Pro must demonstrate the objective existence of telos for the argument to work. Next, the cosmological argument. My objections lie with premise 1 and premise 4. Let me address each of them individually.(1) The Conservation of Mass is a physical law, that applies within the universe. The Earth doesn’t explode suddenly because it is bound by the laws of physics. *Outside* the universe, there are no laws of physics, as there is no physical constraint. Thus, this justification fails. (2) This premise isn’t even justified. First, Pro argues that the cause has to be beyond cognition, therefore is God. I still don’t see how this is an “intelligence,” or a “mind.” A cause beyond comprehension does not necessarily entail God. Further, the idealism justification fails, for the following reasons:(A) I don’t see how idealism even links to the fourth premise. Pro doesn’t even *mention* the relevance of idealism throughout the whole idealism argument. This is irrelevant to justifying the KCA.(B) The argument from solipsism only works if physicalism is true in all possible worlds. P1 is false, because the mind being matter in the actual world doesn’t mean the same is true in all possible worlds. The statement “mind is matter” is not logically equivalent to “mind is necessarily matter.” As such, there would still be a possible world where mind isn’t matter. Further, this argument is explicitly circular. This is because, if solipsism were metaphysically possible, necessary physicalism would be false. If physicalism is true in all possible worlds, then solipsism is not metaphysically possible. So the argument’s justification for solipsism being metaphysically possible has to presume that physicalism is false. Finally, Pro conflates logical possibility with metaphysical possibility, which has been contested. [6] Until Pro establishes this distinction to be false, the argument fails. For these reasons, vote Con. --[1] http://plato.stanford.edu...[2] http://tinyurl.com...[3] https://en.wikipedia.org...[4] http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu...[5] http://plato.stanford.edu...[6] https://en.wikipedia.org...