I will PROVE that a finite past of the universe doesn't equate to it coming into being

IntroductionThere is no consensus in philosophy on the Kalam Cosmological Argument. Many philosophers believe it has been shipped off the grave yard already (Wes Morriston, Quentin Smith ect.), others believe that its success has already been established (Like William Lane Craig). In order to prove my opponent's assertion that the Kalam Cosmological Argument is unresolved, he would have to show that all of the philosophers who believe it is resolved; are wrong. Con has not done this, so his argument that it is has been unresolved remains a bare-assertion. Just because the argument still gets debated to this day, doesn't mean it is unresolved; it could only mean that one side hasn't realized the resolution. Either way, as Pro stated, the Kalam Cosmological Argument is not really what this particular debate is about, so I will get into my opponent's objections.B-TheoryPro claims that there cannot be a finite past under B-Theory, because B-Theory is a tenseless theory of time, and the word "past" implies tensed time. Thus, the B-Theory section of my last round is void by default. However, tensed language can be used when dealing with tenseless theories, so this objection simply does not work. B-Theory is a type of eternalist theory anyway, which entails that the that the past, present, and future all exist ontologically. If my opponent was correct, then B-Theory would entail that neither the past, present, or future exist; which is the exact opposite of what B-Theory claims. B-Theory is an eternalist theory, and eternalism means that the past, present, and future exist. Now, if my opponent is correct, and there can be no "past" on an eternalist theory of time, then it should also be true that there can be no "future" either. However, once, more, this goes against what eternalism actually is:"Eternalism is a philosophical approach to the ontological nature of time. It builds on the standard method of modeling time as a dimension in physics, to give time a similar ontology to that of space. This would mean that time is just another dimension, that future events are "already there", and that there is no objective flow of time."[1]How can future events be already be there if the future doesn't exist? They self-evidently cannot. "The ontology of time is currently dominated by two theories: Presentism, according to which 'only currently existing objects are real,' and Eternalism, according to which 'past and future objects and times are just as real as currently existing ones.'"[2]My opponent simply hasn't proved that the past, present, or future cannot exist under B-Theory. This seems rather embarrassing for a philosophy student, because simple research begs to differ. Additionally, physicists who adhere to B-Theory describe it as such:"The past, present, and future are all equally real; they all exist." - Brian Greene[3]"If you believe the laws of physics, there is just as much reality to the future and the past, as there is to the present moment." - Sean Carrol[3]"The past is not gone, and the future isn't non-existent. The past, present, and future are all existing in exactly the same way." - Max Tegmark[3]The above can be put into a logical syllogism:P1: B-Theory is an eternalist theoryP2: If eternalism is true, then the past, present, and future are all realC: If B-Theory is true, then the past, present, and future are all realTherefore, it follows logically that that my opponent's claim below is false:"[T]here can be no past, finite or otherwise, in the B-Series." What Con means to say is that there is no past with respect to an objective present in a tenseless theory, but with respect to any given point selected on the 4d or n + 1d block, there is a finite extension in the earlier than direction, which can be called a the past even on a tenseless theory as long as we are not discussing a past with regards to an objective present.A-Theory (Prelude)My opponent states that I have not provided any evidence for my assertions. However, my argument is an a priori argument, which doesn't really require any external evidence to support it[4]. He then commits the appeal to ridicule fallacy twice by saying my argument isn't "even an argument" and it is just an "extraordinary claim". Well, it certainly seems as if my opponent isn't convinced of my argument. The question that remains pertains to whether his reasons are sufficient or not.He starts of by implying that even if a coming into being without a "prior" is a harsh misnomer, that wouldn't effect the resolution. However, a misnomer entails incorrect terminology:"A misnomer is a word or term that suggests a meaning that is known to be wrong"[5]The specific terminolgy being incorrect was part of the support for my argument in favor of the resolution. Now, Con makes the following statement:"There would be no difference between finite and infinite in the case my opponent is arguing because the past is not bounded or limited within the temporal dimension being addressed." - ProThere would be a clear difference because if the universe has an infinite past, then any state of the universe you could hypothetically point to necessarily has another state of the universe preceding it (there would be no first state of the universe). However, if the universe is finite, then it seems as if there would be a first state of the universe, which of course necessitates a lack of a preceding state of the universe. Thus, the claim that my argument is just an argument in semantics is false. A-TheoryMy opponent starts off this section with a straw-man. He claims that my argument is:"If A = there was no "prior" to the first state of the universe And B = we cannot say it came into being"I never once made that argument, so I am not sure where Con is deriving this misinterpretation from. My argument was that nothing about a finite past tells us whether there was a "prior" to the universe or not. Since a "prior" to the universe is necessary for a true coming into being, then even if we know the universe has a finite past, that doesn't mean we can say it came into being; more info is needed (such as, whether there was a "prior" to the universe or not). Since a finite past by itself doesn't tell us whether or not the universe came into being, then the two clearly cannot be properly equivalent.Therefore, it wasn't me that committed a logical fallacy with any non-sequitur argument, it was Con who committed the straw-man fallacy my not representing my argument properly.Additionally, there being no "prior" to the first state of the universe is not an extraordinary claim, but actually an extremely modest one! As far as my "self-evident" claim, my opponent simply completely disregards Modal intuition. Something is possible if it doesn't contradict any of the laws of logic or metaphysics. There being no "prior" to the first state of the universe violates no laws of logic or metaphysics, thus is it possible by definition. Essentially, it is self-evident that no "prior" to the first state of the universe doesn't violate these laws upon simple reflection. If we follow my opponent's logic, then we cannot say anything is possible based of Modal intuition. I am sure that Con's philosophy teacher would have something to say about that, as simple reflection upon this claim can tell us whether or not it necessarily cannot be the case, or is possible. It is self-evident that there being no "prior" to the universe doesn't violate any logical or metaphysical rules (like a perfectly spherical cube would for example), thus it is possible. ConclusionAll of Con's objections were either based on logical fallacies, or just plain false. My arguments still remain unscathed.Sources[1] http://www.princeton.edu...(philosophy_of_time).html[2] http://people.umass.edu...[3] Video Source[4] http://plato.stanford.edu...[5] http://en.wikipedia.org...http://www.youtube.com...