It is reasonable to Believe in A Personal God

I appreciate pro’s kindness and would also like to express gratitude to pro for engaging in this debate. Contention 1: Pro states:”I assert that what he calls non-natural is in fact natural, in that people have been hearing voices who they transcribe to being voices from the divine, since history has been recorded, therefore it is not non-natural.” This is to miss the point. My use of the word “natural” is not in the sense that a phenomena may be common, or even a natural entailment of the human condition, as sociologist Karen Armstrong notes in Homo Religiosus. As aforementioned, my use of the word natural is in the epistemological sense. My contention is that we can only investigate claims within the natural, or material realm, and by definition a God is transcendent to this realm, and as such we can not meaningfully investigate the validity of such a claim. So pro’s objection is predicated on a failure to make the distinction between “natural” in common discourse, and “natural” in epistemological discourse. Pro goes on to make the following note:”Until evidence exists that there without a doubt is no divine being that is able to contact humans through them hearing voices, such a belief is not at all unreasonable.” This is to blatantly advance an argument from ignorance. Pro is essentially stating that because X has not been demonstrated to be false, then X is reasonable, and that it is furthermore reasonable to believe X. As demonstrated through my elephant analogy, this is not how claims are assessed. Even within in the natural realm, I cannot reasonably make unwarranted claims of knowledge. As an extension of Russell’s Teapot,I cannot reasonably assert that a pink elephant exists in a neighboring galaxy, however since I do not have evidence to make such a claim, it is unreasonable. Pro’s objection is predicated on an argument from ignorance, and a fallacious shifting of the BoP. Contention 2: I apologize for my generalized note on schizophrenia. I should have specifically stated paracusia, which is invariably a symptom of schizophrenia seems to miss the entire point remember, my argument was that how could one reasonably distinguish between an actual case of divine communication and an auditory hallucination. Pro goes on to give a cultural analysis of Schizophrenia. This is not relevant to my point. What does it actually mean to hear voices? “A paracusia, or auditory hallucination, is a form of hallucination that involves perceiving sounds without auditory stimulus.” So the question is, in light of pro’s failure to provide a methodological framework for addressing supernatural claims, how can one distinguish between an auditory hallucination, and divine communication? If paracusia occurs in the absence of stimuli, and divine communication entails unverifiable stimuli, what framework should one employ to distinguish between these? By virtue of my prior epistemological framework, one could not, and as such it would be unreasonable for one to believe they were the recipient of divine communication. Pro has not addressed my framework, which I substantiated, and as such the conflict is unresolved. My argument isn’t that everyone who hears voices is a schizophrenic. This is an ad absurdum. I actually have no problem with pro’s discussion of the cultural considerations of schizophrenia, however this is not the point. My argument is more foundational than this. As you recall, once again, my argument is that one could not distinguish between a schizophrenic episode, which I was using in the context of auditory hallucinations, and actual divine communication. I’m actually quite fine with everything pro says until this point. Pro states ”Could it be that schizophrenia was a label slapped on to individuals who had a deeper connection to their inner workings and/or the unseen aspects of the world and that the way that those who experience hearing voices were labeled as ill caused them to experience more negative self reflections? “ I have no problem with the notion that schizophrenia could potentially be a misappropriated label. However, pro makes a completely unwarranted leap of logic to the inner working of the world. I would like pro to provide evidence for the claim that an auditory hallucination can translate to some mystical knowledge. If you recall my epistemological discussion, how could this even be verified? “The fact that not all voices of those who are labeled with schizophrenia seem to derive from God disproves cons contention that those who claim that God communicates with them are having schizophrenic episodes.” This was definitely not my argument. My claim was not at all that an invariable symptom of schizophrenia was a claim of divine communication. It was that how could one distinguish between a schizophrenic episode and divine communication Pro’s statement is an utter non-sequitur. Conclusions: Pro has failed to address my epistemological framework. I was careful to employ this argument first such that it constituted a prerequisite. All else is of secondary concern. Pro gives a brilliant discussion of schizophrenia as it relates to sociocultural considerations, however this does not address my point. Let me rephrase my contentions more concisely, and I apologize for any confusion that ensued from my failure to be concise; [1] I have argued that claims are addressed on their adherence to evidence and logic. I have further demonstrated what constitutes a reasonable belief. As far as I can tell, pro has not actually addressed this contention in any substantive way besides shifting the BoP and advancing an argument from ignorance. [2] If an invariable trait of a personal God is that the God communicates with humans, how could one reasonably verify this communication. My argument was that one could not verify communication from a God, and as such how could one further distinguish between an auditory hallucination and divine communication? I would like to refocus the discussion along these line because it would appear that we are not on the same page. The crux of my argument is epistemological, and I used the example of schizophrenia,and hallucinations to show this. With this being said, I pass it back over to pro, and would like to again apologize for my inadvertent and misleading equivocation of schizophrenia and paracusia/ auditory hallucinations.