U.S. Primacy is globally desirable.

C1: U.S. Primacy maximizes the spread of Democracy [1] Mark argues that I have not provided an analytic as to why it’s true that U.S. Primacy has been vital in the spread of democracy. Ignoring the fact that Mark and drops and concedes the empirics, which I will get to later I will expound on the international systematic reasons as to why this is correct. As implied by the Kagan quote I offered in the first round, “History shows that the distribution of world power at the top affects the course of smaller and weaker nations across the globe,” the analytic is pretty simple compared to all the empirics I’ve provided. The analytic is that when hegemons arise on the international stage, by demand or by choice, the hegemon directly and indirectly influences the actions of smaller nations throughout the globe. The United States, being the hegemon, has the economic and military prowess that no other nation can even compare to and as such the U.S. can wield this to alter global events. A recent example would be the intervention in Libya where the National Liberation Army (NLA) was at an retroacting unbalanced standstill with Qaddafi forces. It was only after U.S. and European intervention which gave the rebels the edge necessary to topple the Qaddafi regime.. Through the use of both hard power and soft power the U.S. has been able to push the scale in favor of democracy. In terms of soft power, just the fact that the U.S. can aid if necessary and use its diplomatic strength gives democracy an edge. Since the U.S. is the sole universal hegemon in the globe authoritarian regimes are kept mostly isolated diplomatically, sanctioned economically and even toppled militarily. Now onto the empirics, Mark made the fatal error of dropping the historical empirics I provided last round. Due to U.S. influence or intervention: “…the U.S. compelled the international order to protect human rights in the Eastern bloc and other Soviet satellite states; Carter promoted democracy in the Dominican Republic and Reagan in Granada; the U.S. prevented military coups in Honduras, Bolivia, El Salvador, Peru and South Korea; the U.S. influence on governments such as Poland, Chile, Portugal and Taiwan gave the edge necessary for democratic victory.” In total as explained by Kagan when Soviet power declined and U.S. was projected as the sole hegemon democratic movements sprung up motivated by the U.S. power projection, leading to more than half the world’s nations turning to democracy. This is the result of direct U.S. intervention, an optimistic internal democratic movement gaining momentum from a strengthened U.S. or the fear of communist and authoritarian regimes losing favor of the hegemon. Mark argues further that my common denominator argument is unwarranted, though the response I gave should suffice for warrants and the dropped empirics. But to respond further, as noted by Kagan, as evidenced by historical analysis the division of the world’s governance always resembles that of the division of power. Mark argues thirdly that my counter-argument is a strawman or red herring. It’s not. The argument was not meant to explain my opponent’s position or set up an argument for him, but rather to preempt potential arguments. But that being said, in light of the analytic and empirics I’ve provided Mark really should offer a counter-interpretation because as will be seen soon Mark entirely concedes the impacts. Since he concedes the impacts as long as I win the fact that U.S. influence has spread democracy (which at this point is unavoidable due to the conceded empirics) then I win the link to the impacts. Mark tells us that my claim that the U.S. reversed its policy on authoritarian regimes is false. Well, his argument is false. If you refer to my argument I indicated at after the 1970s the U.S., on balance, supported democracies and not authoritarian regimes. Kagan did an analysis and explains that after 1970, with the deteriorating power of the U.S.S.R., the United States gave support 2:1 in support of democracies in the early 70s, then to 4:1, then to 5:1. As time moves away from the 1970s starting point, the ratio increases in favor of democracies. Also, most of his sources give examples starting from the 1930s and most in the 1960s and early 70s. Impact 1: DPT Mark concedes that democracy is more desirable than autocracy, and never once addresses the Rummel analysis that no democracy has gone to war in the last 100 years. Impact 2: Democide He concedes impact 2 C2: U.S. Primacy maximizes the spread of free trade Marks only response is that I appeal to authority. Unfortunately for him this isn’t an appeal to authority because I provide the analytics and empirics that Kagan uses to arrive as his conclusions, both of which you drop and concede. An appeal to authority would be if I said “Kagan says it, so believe it.” The first dropped analytic is that free trade is maximized by naval powers because it opens trade routes for these countries to ship their goods. The dropped empiric is that the two periods of greatest free trade is that of the Pax Americana and Pax Britannica, which in light of the analytic makes sense. Moreover, he drops the warrants provided by Olson which indicate that free trade increases the overall base of commerce which leads to increased productivity and an expansion of goods. He drops the empiric that on average an analysis of free trade nations, e.g. Asian Tigers, against protectionist nations demonstrates that nations have longer recessions. Since empirically the U.S. has expanded free trade since the 1970s (dropped empirics) U.S. primacy is overall desirable. C3: What's the Alternative? Mark misunderstands my argument, and he argues that China is nowhere near the U.S.. This is true but very irrelevant. The argument is that if my opponent’s advocacy is correct, and U.S. primacy is undesirable a U.S. voluntary withdrawal from the international stage would create a power vacuum. Even though China isn’t near the U.S. power in the status quo, China as evidenced by its belligerent actions in its own sphere of influence would be the most likely agent in filling the vacuum. Again Mark says I appeal to authority but refer to my response above. As such, extend the arguments that China is acting protectionist and belligerent and has promoted autocracies throughout the world, especially in its sphere of influence. Con Case C1/2: Intervention and Democracy This argument has no impact. As explained aptly by Mark himself there is no link to what people want and the desirability of that act. His undemocratic argument is irrelevant because regardless of the U.S. acting democratic or not, it is still promoting democracy globally. Unless these arguments can delink the empirics and analytics I provided in my own case, they don’t matter. C3: Blowback [2] Mark makes the cliché argument of blowback, which is essentially that the U.S. causes problems to itself through intervention. On terrorism this is false. An analysis by Rubin demonstrates that there is a huge disconnect between the state goals of terrorist groups and their actions. For example, Osama told us after 9/11 that terrorism is necessary to rid the Middle East of U.S. intervention, but Rubin explains that Osama knows terrorism would not rid the Middle East of the U.S. but actually increase U.S. presence, as evidenced by invasion of Afghanistan. Rubin goes on further to explain that from all the terror attacks prior to 9/11 the U.S. never shows signs of withdrawal. However, on the converse, it is only when there is stability that the U.S. withdraws, which then leads to more terror attacks. Thus, Rubin concludes that the blow back argument doesn’t make logical sense when compared to historical facts. But moreover, my opponent needs to weigh this argument. [2] [1] Kagan. The World America Made. [2] Rubin. The Real Roots of Arab Anti-Americanism