BeIR/webis-touche2020 huggingface dataset:
Legislation against mercenaries

Nation states and the United Nations have passed laws making mercenary activity illegal. Legislation against mercenaries prevent either seeking employment as a mercenary or hiring one.  Western states such as Austria and Germany have made it illegal for citizens to become mercenaries, revoking their citizenship if they choose to do so anyway6. South Africa, a major source of hired guns, passed the ‘foreign military assistance act’ in 1998 which prohibited citizens from joining foreign wars with the exception of humanitarian intervention. In international law, the United Nations has outlawed mercenaries through the UN Mercenary Convention of 1989 which bans the use of foreign soldiers from fighting for profit. Finally, many African states have passed further legislation which restricts mercenaries operating in their countries. The trial of thirteen mercenaries in Angola  and the arrests of Simon Mann’s unit Zimbabwe in 2004 were both due to their mercenary status. The increased legal pressure is a symptom of changing attitudes towards the use of mercenaries in Africa. 6) Mian,Q. ‘Legal status of mercenaries’
Decreased Conflict and the end of the mercenary age

The decline of conflicts and mercenary freedom on the African continent has meant less work for mercenaries. The Congo conflict of the 1960s, is seen as the first mercenary age8. Hired guns fought on all sides of the conflict and enjoyed the freedom to act at their discretion. The 1976 execution of mercenaries in Angola was seen as a symbolic ending of this age. That said, mercenaries were still prevalent into the 1990s and early 2000s. Since the peak of the 1990s, however, there has been a noticeable decrease in the number of conflicts in Africa from 27 civil wars and 9 interstate wars to 5 major civil wars and no interstate wars9,10 .  As wars and civil unrest are an obvious source of employment for mercenaries; this decrease in conflict leaves them with fewer opportunities.  The African Union’s promise to end war on the continent by 2020 also puts the future prospects of mercenaries in to question. 8) Keane,F. ‘There will be work for mercenaries in Africa until democracy replaces dictatorships’ 2004 9) The World Bank ‘World Development Report 2011’ pg.52 10) Wikipedia ‘List of ongoing armed conflicts’
The expansion of democracy

The increased presence of democracies on the African continent has led to greater security. Mercenary activity is usually associated with the presence of bad governance, which is most commonly featured in dictatorships. Dictatorships generally lead to corruption, unrest and economic collapse. The dispossessed in society then begin to resist, with the ensuing conflict providing employment opportunities for mercenaries. A prime example of this being Equatorial Guinea, where mercenary Simon Mann planned to use popular support to remove the infamous Teodoro Nguema13. Since the first mercenary age, however, the number of democracies has increased from 3 to 25 which has reduced instability on the continent in some regions, reducing opportunities for mercenaries. 13) Keane,F. ‘There will be work for mercenaries in Africa until democracy replaces dictatorships’ 2004
Humanitarian mercenaries

Mercenaries are finding a more ethical role in the form of humanitarian missions. The idea of humanitarian mercenaries is a concept of hired guns employed by governments and the United Nations to prevent genocide in the place of nation state militaries. The major benefit of using mercenaries would be the absence of a political cost should there be mercenary causalities as seen in Iraq15. There will not be waning political support from the military’s home country. Early examples include the use of mercenaries in Sierra Leone. When the Revolutionary Unified Front (RUF) was advancing on the capital Executive Outcomes and other mercenaries held back the RUF, preventing a massacre. They would later seek out and destroy elements of the rebel group. The lack of political cost makes them ideal for operations where other countries have no domestic political will to intervene. 15) Raffin,R. ‘Humanitarian Mercenaries’ 2008
Mercenaries still have a presence in coups

African Mercenaries have been crucial to the success of many coups in the 21st Century, and are a ‘ubiquitous factor in the continent’s conflicts over the years, often determining the duration or outcomes of such conflicts’20. The 2013 coup in the Central African Republic saw President Francois Bozizi ousted from power and was accomplished with support of mercenaries from Chad and the Sudan21. An attempted coup by Simon Mann against Equatorial Guinea failed in 2004 and Bob Dernard’s five coups against the Comoros22 demonstrate that mercenaries still have a role in the changing of political leaders within Africa. 20) Mwagiru,C. ‘Mercenaries: Are the ‘dogs of war’ still prevalent in Africa?’ 2012 21) Melly,P. ‘Central African Republic: France and the CAR- Now Comes the Hard Part’ 2013 22) Mwagiru,C. ‘They Kill Africans, paid by Africans’ 2012
Mercenaries are still hired by NGOs

Non-Governmental organisations struggle to operate in conflict zones, and still hire mercenaries to protect them. Extractive industries also require security for their installations and operations in unstable regions25. The massacre of 74 civilians at a Chinese oil field in Ethiopia in 2007 and the 2013 Amenas siege demonstrate the continued need for security, which mercenaries can provide. Charities have employed mercenaries in the past to ensure better security. In 2002, mercenaries were hired by the African Rainforest and Rivers Conservation Organisation to seek out elephant poachers who they could not pursue themselves26.  25) Avant,D. ‘Mercenaries’2004, pg.26 26) Astill,J. ‘Charities hire gunmen to stop elephant poachers’ 2002
Cyber Mercenaries

There is a new form of mercenary appearing on the continent which is hired to use technology, rather than a gun, to fight. Cyber mercenaries are a relatively recent phenomenon. In 2013, British intelligence service GCHQ stated that nations were beginning to employ hackers to ‘attack their enemies’28.  Kenya experienced attacks by cyber mercenaries in 2013, with 91% of its organisations coming under attack from these hired hackers29. There is potential for this to become a substantial form of mercenary work in the future. 28) The Age ‘Hackers turn into cyber-mercenaries as nations battle a virtual war’ 2013 29) Murule,R. ‘Kenya: Firms Battle Cyber Crime’ 2013
Private corporations have replaced mercenaries

PMCs are just mercenaries under a different name, demonstrating a continued prevalence of the dogs of war in Africa. To escape the name, and the illegal status, of mercenary a PMC must only avoid one of the several clauses laid out by the United Nations Mercenary Convention4 While they are rarely hired for fighting roles, companies such as Military Professional Resources Inc. have demonstrated a willingness to engage in military operations;  making them guns for hire5. Executive Outcomes’ operations in Sierra Leone equated to mercenary work, as they undertook offensive military operations with a force of foreign soldiers for profitable gain. In this sense, mercenaries still maintain their position on the continent. 4) Sheimer,M. ‘Separating Private Military Companies From Illegal Mercenaries in International Law’, 2009 Pg. 624 5) Milliard,S. ‘Overcoming Post-Colonial Myopia: A Call to Recognise and Regulate Private Military Companies’, 2003  Pg.16
Legislation against mercenaries

The majority of these laws have done little to prevent citizens from seeking a career as a mercenary. While they are commendable on principle, mercenary specific legislation has not translated in to a high number of prosecutions for mercenarism in Africa7. Examples such as Angola and Zimbabwe are rare exceptions.  Mercenaries generally operate in conflict zones, where government control is weak. This makes it difficult for the state to enforce such laws, especially as the mercenaries may be working for opposition factions. 7) Fallah,K. ‘Corporate actors: the legal status of mercenaries in armed conflict’, 2006 pg. 610
Decreased Conflict and the end of the mercenary age

There are still enough wars and rebel movements to provide opportunity for employment. By 2013 there were 23 conflicts in Africa, with many other small militia groups actively fighting low-intensity wars. This stream of conflicts has ensured revenue for mercenaries. Reports have surfaced that ex-commander for the anti-terror unit in Liberia, Benjamin Yeaten, raised a mercenary force to fight against the army of the Ivory Coast between 2012 and 201311 With the prediction of ‘forever wars’ by Gettlemen12, where rebels have no object except banditry, mercenaries could maintain their prevalence in Africa for a long time. 11) Heritage ‘Liberia: UN reports- Yeaten remains a threat to peace and security in Liberia’ 2013  12) Gettlement,J. ‘Africa’s Forever Wars’ Foreign Policy 2012
The expansion of democracy

More than half of African countries are ruled by dictatorships. Authoritarian regimes remain numerous enough, and the opposition still prominent enough, for there to be adequate instability for mercenaries to gain employment. During the Libyan revolution, caused by the poor governance of Gaddafi’s regime, South African mercenaries attempted to extract Gaddafi from Libya with supposed Tuaregs joining his force as guns for hire14. 14) Hicks,C. ‘Tuareg rebels make troubled return from Libya to Mali’ 2012
Humanitarian mercenaries

Firstly, the emergence of the African Union (AU) as a peacekeeping force on the continent negates the need for mercenaries. The AU’s has become increasingly involved in peacekeeping since 200316. They are more willing to involve themselves in African affairs than the West, and have deployed the lion’s share of soldiers in peacekeeping operations as in the Central African Republic17. Secondly, the UN has condemned mercenary use in general and it would seem hypocritical to begin hiring them. The UN’s weaker states have been reluctant to agree to UN mercenaries for fear they could be used against them18. The UN has actively criticised humanitarian mercenaries in the past for their lack of appreciation of conflict dynamics19, making them unlikely to employ dogs of war. 16) Pan,E. ‘African Peacekeeping Operations’ December 2005  17) Felix,B. ‘Militia attack Muslim neighbourhoods in Central African Republic’s Capital’ 2013 18) Avant,D. ‘Mercenaries’ pg.26 19) Chrisafis,A. ‘UN and aid groups criticise “Humanitarian Mercenaries’ 2007
Mercenaries still have a presence in coups

Coups are becoming less frequent and less successful. The number of coups, which some mercenaries headed personally, has decreased from an average twenty per decade between 1960 and 1990 to ten a decade23. Success has also been less forthcoming; Simon Mann’s attempted coup in Equatorial Guinea was met with failure when he was arrested in Zimbabwe, and Bob Denard was eventually arrested by French forces for disgracing France’s reputation abroad with his frequent coups24.  23) August,O. ‘Africa Rising: A Hopeful Continent’ 2013 24) Mwagiru,C. ‘They Kill Africans, paid by Africans’ 2012
Mercenaries are still hired by NGOs

NGOs are actively discouraged from hiring mercenaries. In 2003, UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw strongly advised against the use of mercenaries by British companies on the Ivory Coast. In addition to government deterrence, many charities are more likely to depend on the United Nations to secure conflict zones before they operate. In Darfur, aid agencies relied upon the United Nations to set up refugee camps in the region rather than seek protection from mercenaries27. 27) Pham,J. ‘Send in the Mercenaries’ 2006
Cyber Mercenaries

Hired hackers don’t count as real mercenaries. While it is true that they are not a citizen of either state’s military structure and that they seek to gain profit from their venture, they do not qualify under the UN mercenary convention. To be a mercenary, one must qualify under all the conditions listed in the convention. Cyber mercenaries are not directly involved in acts of violence, which disqualifies them under Article 1, sub-section 2.A of the UN mercenary convention30. Definitions will have to be updated in the future if cyber-mercenaries are going to be considered anything other than criminals.  30) United Nations ‘United Nations Mercenary Convention’ 1989
Private corporations have replaced mercenaries

Private Military Companies (PMCs) are independent, registered, corporate actors who have risen in prominence and replaced mercenaries in their security function. PMCs are different to mercenaries in the sense that mercenaries will fight for the highest bidder. PMCs on the other hand will only work for legitimate governments and intergovernmental organisations such as the UN1.  Their main roles include; support services, logical support, humanitarian support and the upholding of law and order and defensive military action2. PMC activity has seen corporations operating on behalf of the Somalian government training coast guards to deal with the threat of piracy which peaked in 20093. The legal status of PMCs, compared with mercenaries, makes them a preferable choice for the aforementioned tasks reducing the prominence of illegal hired guns. 1) Jefferies,I. ‘Private Military Companies- A Positive Role to Play in Today’s International System’, 2002 Pg.106  2) Jefferies,I. ‘Private Military Companies- A Positive Role to Play in Today’s International System’, 2002 Pg.107 3) Stupart,J. ‘Somalia’s PMCs: What’s the Big Deal?’, 2012
When you know terrorists are likely to be members of particular national and ethnic groups, it is simply more practical to focus searches on those groups.

The reality is that all of the major terrorist attacks against Western targets in recent years have been perpetrated by young, Muslim men. It doesn’t require any prejudice at all to realise that they are the most sensible group to check and recheck. Although it is important to respect people’s rights and liberties regardless of ethnicity or religious belief, a sensible security policy must force police officers and security officials to make decisions based on factual information. Everybody- including most members of the groups identified by profiling- has an interest in not being blown up on an aeroplane. They will, therefore, accept that this is a regrettable necessity. Airport staff can only stop so many people and it makes sense to target groups that terrorists are likely to be part of.
Profiling would have caught many of the perpetrators of terrorism in recent years.

Profiling takes account of many more characteristics than an individual’s ethnicity. Targeted checks would have caught, for example, the so called Christmas Day Bomber. Individuals who pay in cash for a one way flight while carrying no luggage, as Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab[i] did, are a fairly small group and it makes sense to target them. Profiling is a great deal more subtle than a decision to target a single ethnic group. It is entirely possible to identify patterns in the behaviour of terrorists, drug mules and smugglers, and to respond to that accordingly. Obviously, the more refined the profile can be, the better. It is incredibly unlikely that an affluent, Caucasian businessman with a return ticket for the following day is either a suicide bomber or a drug smuggler. Both common sense and statistics show this to be the case. [i] “Obama vows to repair intelligence gaps behind Detroit airplane incident”. The Washington post, 30 December 2009. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/12/29/AR2009122901433.html
The experience of Israel proves that profiling works

Israel has been using profiling for decades to identify those individuals at airports that should be stopped, questioned and have their luggage thoroughly checked[i]. Despite the massive threats that Israel faces, the Israeli state does not feel the need to invade the privacy of most passengers because they simply know what and who they are looking for. This approach has meant that, despite high odds, hijackings and bombings are not the routine affairs on El Al flights that one might expect it to be. As the focus for terrorist atrocities has now become the US and the UK, it simply makes sense to follow the example of a nation that has been such a target since its creation. [i] “Exposing hostile intent”. SecuritySolutions.com. http://securitysolutions.com/news/security_exposing_hostile_intent/
Profiling is simply institutionalizing racism an reduces minorities to the status of second class citizens

Profiling is, in the end, simply wrong. Britain suffered for decades from the ‘innocent until proven Irish’ attitude of their security forces, which did nothing but engender resentment among Irish individuals who were trying to live and work in the United Kingdom. For western nations to make the same mistake in their approach to Muslims would be the gravest folly. Aviation authorities are, ultimately, under the control of the state, and if a government announces that they consider all members of a group to be potential criminals, it sends out a very provocative message.
Randomly checking passengers’ identities is much safer than allowing terrorists to know in advance who the authorities are seeking.

Making statements in advance as to who is likely to be stopped at airports is the most dangerous action any government could take. There are innumerable ways in which it would be possible to perform a terrorist act, and random checks mean that all possible routes are equally likely to be apprehended. By contrast, actively and visibly subjecting members of particular ethnic groups to stricter security checks will enable terrorists to determine where surveillance in airports is at its most lax. The most dangerous terrorist groups operate on an international level, recruiting attackers from a wide range of backgrounds and ethnic groups. It would therefore be comparatively easy for an organisation such as al Qaeda to mount an attack using only individuals who do not conform to the authorities’ profile of a potential terrorist. More importantly random checks mean that all people, regardless of the background, age or appearance are equally deterred from considering criminal or terrorist acts. On the basis that it would be impossible to search everyone at a major international airport, the deterrence factor offered by random stops is far more effective than searching a tiny proportion of a designated group.
Profiling exacerbates terrorism as it reinforces the perception that Muslims and marginalised ethnic groups face prejudice.

The reality is that if a plane can be held up with a box-cutter, a broken glass bottle from duty free or flammable alcohol from the same source could be just as threatening. However, increased use of air marshals- armed plainclothes police officers who travel secretly on certain flights- means that even these desperate tactics are likely to be ineffectual. Institutionalising prejudice and assumption will add legitimacy and grativas to terrorist propaganda that seeks to radicalise curious or confused young people. Not only is profiling ineffectual, it is likely to exacerbate the situation.
When you know terrorists are likely to be members of particular national and ethnic groups, it is simply more practical to focus searches on those groups.

The presumption of innocence is a principle worth defending and an important part of this is rejecting policing strategies that assume certain groups are more likely to be engage in criminal activity than others. In the last ten years, a few dozen people, at most, have been involved in terrorist acts at airports. Meanwhile, millions upon millions of young, Muslim men have flown across continents and oceans without the slightest disruption. It is both unfair and foolish to target a single group as being more likely to contain terrorists. It builds resentment among the group concerned and is unlikely to reveal any practical results because of the numbers concerned.
Profiling would have caught many of the perpetrators of terrorism in recent years.

It is incredibly unlikely that any randomly selected member of a particular group would be attempting to commit a crime. Racial, ethnic and identity groups are extremely large. Terrorist organisations, even al Qaeda, rarely contain more than a few hundred members. The relative proportion of individuals belonging to any particular identity group who also belongs to a terrorist organisation is likely to be impossibly small. The impact of the perceptions of the communities involved, however, would be significant, allowing for accusations of racism and persecution. Statistically, profiling would have very little impact: in 2005, US Airlines carried 745.7 million passengers.[i] Faced with figures like that random stoppages make far more sense. Although exact figures are not available even if just two or three million fell within the profile group, it would be impossible to search all of them. The use of profiling, however, as a result of the PATRIOT Act, led to, among others, the late Sen. Ted Kennedy being stopped; it does not and cannot work.[ii] [i] ‘2005 Total Airline System Passenger Traffic Up 4.6 Percent From 2004’, Research and Innovative Transport Administration, 2006, http://www.bts.gov/press_releases/2006/bts020_06/html/bts020_06.html [ii] ‘Senetor? Terrorist? A Watch List Stops Kennedy at Airport’, Swarns, Rachel L., The New York Times, 20 August 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/20/national/20flight.html
The experience of Israel proves that profiling works

The scale of flights in Israel- both domestic and international- is tiny. Compared with the North American and European aviation markets, screening passengers entering and leaving Israeli territory requires an entirely different approach. Equally the racial diversity of Tel Aviv is quite different to New York and London. The Pew Research Centre estimates that there are 2.6 million Muslims living in the US[i], a number equal to twice the population of Jerusalem and Tel Aviv combined. The pressures on airports between a small state in the Middle East and the transportation hubs of the US and Europe are totally different. The very account cited by Proposition talks about some passengers being interviewed for up to half an hour, that is a rather different prospect when dealing with JFK or Heathrow. It is just not a practical solution. [i] “The future of the global muslim population”. Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, January 2011. http://features.pewforum.org/muslim-population-graphic/#/United%20States
Profiling is simply institutionalizing racism an reduces minorities to the status of second class citizens

The use of the term “racism” suggests that assumptions made by screeners are based on prejudice, not fact. Profiling, which takes far more than race into account, has a solid basis in fact. It is entirely sensible to attempt to prevent criminal acts by being particularly cautious in the investigation of those groups and individuals that are most likely to pose a risk to other passengers. Risking the lives of innocent passengers in the name of political correctness is simply absurd. These are measures that protect the security of thousands of passengers at the cost of minor inconvenience to a few. Any reasonable traveller- Arab or not- would accept that there is a reason for these actions in the same way that passengers realise that delays caused by security controls and passport checks are an unavoidable nuisance in an era of routine international travel.