History suggests the war in Afghanistan cannot be won

History suggests the war in Afghanistan cannot be won: Mohammad Omar, leader of the Taliban, has issued a taunting statement reminding Western leaders that for more than a millennium, would-be conquerors have tried and failed to subdue the mountain fastness known as the 'graveyard of empires' (Alexander the Great in the 4th century B.C., the British in the 1800s, the Soviets from 1979 to 1989): 'The invaders should study the history of Afghanistan. The more the enemy resorts to increasing forces, the more they will face an unequivocal defeat.'[1] As galling as it is to accept tutelage from one of Osama bin Laden's key enablers, this does seem to be what history teaches. Pouring forces into Afghanistan has always proved counterproductive. The presence of large numbers of foreign troops is the one thing that reliably unites Afghans, if only for long enough to drive the foreigners out. Tom Andrews, National Director of Win Without War, argued in February of 2009: "The first principle for someone who finds himself in a hole is to stop digging, The US policy 'hole' in Afghanistan is not of the new Administration's making. But it is important for the President to consider if adding new US combat forces in Afghanistan, without a new and comprehensive plan, for US policy there, might be digging an even bigger hole."[2] This argument similarly applies to keeping NATO forces in Afghanistan past the timetabled withdrawal date: it is just digging a deeper hole. Ann Jones added in 2009 to the argument that the war cannot be won by noting the lack of potential for Afghan forces to ever handle their own security or build a meaningful state: "I went out to the training fields near Kabul where Afghan army recruits are put through their paces, and it was quickly evident just what's getting lost in translation. Our trainers, soldiers from the Illinois National Guard, were masterful... The Afghans were puny by comparison: hundreds of little Davids to the overstuffed American Goliaths training them. Keep in mind: Afghan recruits come from a world of desperate poverty. They are almost uniformly malnourished and underweight. Many are no bigger than I am (1.6 meters and thin) - and some probably not much stronger. Like me, many sag under the weight of a standard-issue flack jacket. [...] American military planners and policymakers already proceed as if, with sufficient training, Afghans can be transformed into scale-model, wind-up American Marines. That is not going to happen. Not now. Not ever. No matter how many of our leaders concur that it must happen - and ever faster.”[3] Both history and NATO's own experiences in Afghanistan lead to the same conclusion: Afghanistan cannot be conquered, and so the timetable for withdrawal should be kept to. [1] Robinson, Eugene. "In Afghanistan, Downsize." Real Clear Politics. 22 September 22 2009. http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2009/09/22/in_afghanistan_do wnsize_98403 [2] Heuvel, Katrina vanden, ‘Don’t Bleed Resources in Afghanistan’, The Nation, 17 February 2009, http://www.thenation.com/blog/dont-bleed-resources-afghanistan     [3] Jones, Ann. "US wins mind, Afghan hearts are lost". Asia Times. 22 September 2009. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KI22Df03.html