BeIR/webis-touche2020 huggingface dataset:
The ICC’s widely endorsed authority extends its deterrent effects.

The ICC’s investigative and prosecutorial powers are endorsed by 122 States Parties to the Rome Statute. This broad reach and agreement not only provides a strong disincentive for individuals and groups who would attempt to evade prosecution, but also has the effect of deterring states that might otherwise ignore the Court’s authority. Furthermore, even non-member states have recognised the importance of co-operating with the Court’s investigations. In 2013, one of the most wanted war criminals, Bosco Ntaganda was forced to surrender to the ICC while hiding in Rwanda. Though a non-member state, “Rwanda's aid-dependent economy was damaged by the allegations of links to Mr Ntaganda's rebels.”[1] [1] The Economist
The ICC lacks the power to ensure arrests

The fact that the Sudanese president has been able to travel freely to several countries without being arrested does not indicate that he or other would-be criminals are undeterred by the threat. Though the African Union has strongly advised its member states to ignore the arrest warrant and most have obliged, more recently Malawi and Kenya prevented Al-Bashir from attending summits. Even when Nigeria allowed his attendance at an AU summit last year, Al-Bashir fled within a day of arriving, after local human rights groups filed a court action. The Democratic Republic of Congo has surrendered several suspects to the ICC and this was enough to induce another suspect to surrender.[1] [1] Roth, "Africa Attacks the International Criminal Court."
In the decade since its formation, the ICC has only one successful conviction

The Lubanga case took 6 years to reach a verdict owing to problems with the reliability of testimony and the sheer number of witnesses and victims involved in the proceedings. [1] Although the Prosecutor sought a harsher sentence, these problems with the weight of evidence and difficulties ascertaining the number of child soldiers required the Trial Chamber to impose a more modest sentence.[2] Therefore, even if the Lubanga conviction might not have a strongly deterrent effect by itself, the ICC is pursuing many other cases and it is these constant and cumulative investigations that deter others from committing similar crimes. [1] Kammer, "Deconstructing Lubanga" [2] Human Rights Brief
As the ICC intentionally limits its prosecutions to group leaders, many of those who actually commit atrocities need have no fear of prosecution

Precisely because many rank and file perpetrators are easily controlled or manipulated by group leaders, their criminal responsibility is diminished. While Article 26 of the Rome Statute prevents prosecution of those under 18 years of age, this is designed to prevent injustices towards those who are often themselves victims of those in command.  Article 33 specifically rejects the ‘Nuremberg defence’ that following orders absolves a person from criminal responsibility. But in keeping with International Humanitarian Law (Rule 155 of Customary IHL), child soldiers should not be prosecuted for crimes committed under severe coercion by leaders. Prosecuting those responsible for that coercion is the most powerful deterrent.[1] [1] IRIN News, "Should child soldiers be prosecuted for their crimes?"
The ICC’s investigations have already deterred potential crimes.

The actions by Columbia and Sri Lanka do not alter the fact that, as noted earlier, the recruitment of child soldiers in Africa and elsewhere is still endemic in 2013. And while the Lord’s Resistance Army and its leader Joseph Kony have indeed been muted, that is largely due to the initiative of the U.S. government which has itself refused to ratify the ICC’s Statute.[1] [1] Schomerus, Allen and Vlassenroot
Potential prosecution by the ICC encourages local authorities to improve their own judicial systems.

Even if Kenya’s recent reforms were motivated by the ICC’s indictments, the 2013 elections were still marked by violence which “as of February 2013, had claimed more than 477 lives and displaced another 118,000 people.”[1] Despite many African governments’ initial enthusiasm for the ICC, the African Union has since openly challenged the Court’s investigations and Kenyan authorities have been doing their utmost to obstruct the ICC’s investigations.[2] [1] Human Rights Watch [2] Evenson
The ICC lacks the power to ensure arrests

While the ICC has the power to issue arrest warrants, it does not have the coercive powers to ensure that those warrants are followed.  Despite the fact that States that are parties to the Rome Statute are obliged to co-operate with the directions of the Court, there have been many instances where such States have failed to pursue those indicted.  Cases that have been referred to the ICC by the United Nations Security Council allows the Court to extend its jurisdiction to include UN member States that are not parties to the Rome Statute.  This enabled the ICC to issue an international warrant for the arrest of Sudan’s President Al-Bashir. Yet several of these countries obliged to arrest him have refused when the opportunities have arisen.[1] [1] Rothe & Collins, pp.198-9
In the decade since its formation, the ICC has only one successful conviction

Since becoming operational in March 2003 the ICC has only had one case resulting in a conviction and it is currently being appealed. Despite being found guilty of the war crime of recruiting and forcing child soldiers to fight and kill, Thomas Lubanga was sentenced to just 14 years imprisonment. Lubanga was arrested and sent to the Court in March 2006. This single ICC conviction and the light sentence imposed are hardly sufficient to deter other warlords from using child soldiers. Six years later, in the same country where Lubanga’s crimes occurred, thousands of child soldiers are being recruited by various armed groups.[1] [1] UN News, "Child recruitment remains endemic."
As the ICC intentionally limits its prosecutions to group leaders, many of those who actually commit atrocities need have no fear of prosecution

By prosecuting only those leaders deemed ‘most responsible’ for the crimes in question, the ICC is effectively allowing lower-ranked perpetrators to commit crimes with impunity.  These rank and file troops generally have little awareness or understanding of international criminal laws. Furthermore, just as local domestic laws fail to deter offenders who often commit crimes with little thought of being punished, distant ICC threats are even less likely to deter those whose actions are easily manipulated and controlled by militia leaders. Child soldiers, in particular, have often been drugged before going into combat.[1] [1] Mullins & Rothe, pp.782-4
The ICC’s investigations have already deterred potential crimes.

There is compelling evidence that the ICC’s past or current investigations have caused potential perpetrators as well as those already indicted, to abandon their plans. For example, as the ICC’s first Prosecutor noted, even before the Court had convicted Thomas Lubanga for the recruitment of child soldiers, its African investigations were enough to prompt responses in Columbia and Sri Lanka, resulting in children being released.[1] At the same time, there has been a notable decrease in crimes by those already under investigation, such as the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda.[2] [1] ICC Prosecutor's Address to Council on Foreign Relations, p.9 [2] Bosco, p.176
France was asked to intervene by Mali’s government

“France has answered… a request for assistance issued by the interim president of the Republic of Mali”. France is therefore not coming in uninvited. Mali’s President Traore directly appealed to French President Hollande to provide “French military assistance against these terrorist groups” that have “attacked our front lines of defense”.[1] As the former colonial power in much of West Africa, including Mali, France is the obvious country to turn to for help. As a result of this colonial past Mali is a member of the French led Organisation internationale de la Francophonie.[2] Mali is therefore fully within its sovereign rights to ask for assistance and Hollande is right to agree to provide it.   [1] Lynch, Colum, ‘France’s U.N. envoy: French military intervention in Mali is open ended’, Foreign Policy Turtle Bay, 11 January 2013, http://turtlebay.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/01/11/france_s_un_envoy_french_military_intervention_in_mali_is_open_ended [2] ‘Welcome to the International Organisation of La Francophonie’s official website’ http://www.francophonie.org/English.html
Fighting terrorism

While it was Tuareg separatists who first sparked the insurrection wanting to split Mali but now the North has been taken over by Islamists and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb presenting a terrorist threat that cannot be ignored. France’s Defence minister Jean-Yves Le Drian says "France's goal is to lead a relentless struggle against terrorist groups," and that "We have to eradicate this terrorism".[1] The United States was already clearly worried about Mali becoming a center of terrorism having on the 7th December designated the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa a terrorist organisation while other groups involved in Mali such as al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb were already designated as such. The State department highlights several terrorist attacks the group has conducted such as “a March 2012 suicide attack on a police base in Tamanrasset, Algeria, which wounded 23 people”.[2] [1] CNN Staff, ‘France determined to ‘eradicate’ terrorism in Mali, official says’, CNN, 13 January 2013, http://edition.cnn.com/2013/01/13/world/africa/mali-military-offensive/index.html [2] Office of the Spokesperson, ‘Terrorist Designations of the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, Hamad el Khairy, and Ahmed el Tilemsi’, U.S. Department of State, 7 December 2012, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/12/201660.htm
It is a humanitarian intervention

Fundamentally at its heart this is a humanitarian intervention by the French. The Islamists who took over Northern Mali have been imposing a severe, austere form of Islam demanding "No cigarettes, no CDs, no radios, no cameras, no jewelry" and beating those who disobey the rules. Men and women have to sit in separate areas in buses. With Sharia being more strictly enforced with increasing number of amputations despite opposition from the local population.[1] Much of the population of the North had already fled to the south with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees saying 200,000 have fled since January 2012.[2] Those who have, like Moussa from Timbuktu, clearly welcome the intervention, he told a French radio station “We have been suffocating and [France] has given us a breath of oxygen. We are ready to fly Malian and French flags alongside each other.”[3] [1] Mben, Paul Hyacinthe, ‘A Trip Through Hell Daily Life in Islamist Northern Mali’, Spiegel Online, 29 October 2012, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/a-trip-through-hell-daily-life-in-islamist-controlled-north-mali-a-864014.html [2] Caux, Helene, ‘IDPs struggle to survive after escaping fighting in northern Mali’, UNHCR, 12 December 2012, http://www.unhcr.org/50c8d4399.html [3] Bamat, Joseph, ‘Mali-based Islamists pledge attacks on French soil’, France 24, 14 January 2013, http://www.france24.com/en/20130114-mali-france-intervention-terrorist-attacks
French interests

This intervention is not all about terrorism and a humanitarian desire to end a civil war. France does have a stake in the conflict and a reason to deploy military forces. There are 6,000 French citizens living in Mali who are obviously at risk to a rebel advance; even without a full scale intervention France would almost certainly have had to deploy forces to protect an evacuation. Already there are seven French citizens being held hostage in Mali and rescuing them is one of the three main objectives for the French intervention.[1] [1] Welsh, Jennifer, ‘Sending soldiers to Mali may be the only solution’, The Globe and Mail, 14 January 2012, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/commentary/why-france-couldnt-wait-for-a-regional-solution-in-mali/article7318783/
Western countries should not be interfering in African internal affairs

Western nations should clearly not be interfering in African affairs. Not only is this conflict outside of NATO’s remit but it is internal to an individual African state rather than a war between states. By intervening France and other nations are taking part in a civil war in which they are aiding a government that was placed in office by a military coup in March 2012 so does not have a democratic mandate.[1] This intervention is an example of France once more playing the role of gendarme and considering that it has some kind of divine right to intervene in Africa.[2] This war is of course in large part France’s fault in the first place; it is trying to hold together a nation that should be split in two as a result of artificial colonial borders that fan conflict by dividing communities.[3] In this case France is intervening to deny a legitimate people’s, the Tuareg, their right to self-determination. The Tuaregs are divided between Algeria, Kibya, Mali, and Niger but without a majority in any.[4] The Turegs when they took control of Azawad made a declaration of independence.[5] While this has not been recognised this simply shows how existing states are worried about accepting the logic of self-determination when they themselves have groups that may want independence. [1] Felix, Bate, ‘Mali junta sees civilian government “in days”’, Reuters, 8 April 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/08/us-mali-idUSBRE8350MO20120408 [2] Diop, Boubacar Boris, ‘La Vie en %$!’, Foreign Policy, July/August 2010, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/21/la_vie_en [3] Zachary, G. Pascal, ‘African Needs a New Map’, Foreign Policy, 28 April 2010, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/04/28/africa_needs_a_new_map [4] 10% in Mali ‘Mali’ The World Factbook, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ml.html 9.3% in Niger ‘Niger’, The World Factbook, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ng.html [5] Fessy, Thomas, ‘Mali Tuareg rebels declare independence in the north’, BBC News, 6 April 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17635437
African organisations should have lead the way

The United Nations charter is quite clear that it should be African Nations leading the way in this conflict. It says “The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies”[1] and since there are several African Security Organisations there is little reason why these could not have taken the lead. The African Union in particular has undertaken interventions in similar situations before; notably in Somalia.[2] This has been recognised right up until the French intervened and the UN Security Council resolution in December mandated for “the deployment of an African-led mission to support efforts by national authorities to recover the north.”[3] [1] Article 52, http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter8.shtml [2] Jowell, Marco, ‘Kenya: Intervening in Somalia – Risky Business With No End in Sight’, All Africa, 17 January 2012, http://allafrica.com/stories/201201170950.html?page=2 [3] Security Council 6898th meeting, ‘Security Council authorizes deployment of African-led international support mission in Mali for initial year-long period’, United Nations, Resolution 2085, 20 December 2012, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sc10870.doc.htm
Quagmire

Western states seem to so often be willing to get involved in conflicts without thinking about how to get out of them. Interventions are difficult operations that need a lot of planning and the United Nations has previously said that in the case of Mali "Nothing could be done before September, October," and there should be diplomatic talks and a rebuilding of the Malian army first.[1] Unless there is a clear exit plan then there is the risk that the conflict in Mali will turn into a Quagmire from which French and other Western forces cannot easily extradite themselves. The conflict has not resulted in many French casualties although they did have a helicopter shot down.[2] However there is still a question of how long France will have to keep a military presence in the country.  The French initially said they would be pulling troops out in March;[3] the first troops did not leave until May. They said they would only have 1000 there by the end of the year[4] but in January 2014 still had 2500.[5] [1] Irish, John, ‘No military intervention in Mali before September: U.N. peacekeeping chief’, Reuters, 5 December 2012, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/12/05/us-mali-un-idUSBRE8B415120121205 [2] Chrisafis, Angelique, ‘Mali: high stakes in ‘Hollande’s war’’, The Guardian, 13 January 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jan/13/mali-high-stakes-francois-hollande?INTCMP=ILCNETTXT3487 [3] Schofield, Hugh, ‘France action in Mali is real war, says Le Drian’, BBC News, 6 February 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-21348335 [4] BBC News, ‘Mali crisis: French troops begin withdrawal’, 9 April 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-22079290 [5] Al Jazeera Staff, ‘Interactive: Mali Speaks’, Al Jazeera, 21 January 2013, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2013/01/201312113451635182.html
Fighting terrorism

If terrorism is the concern then the French intervening is one of the worst possible options. Having France fighting in Mali may well result in the internationalization of the conflict bringing in jihadists.[1] Already the islamists are saying the conflict is a holy war as “France has attacked Islam” and they will in response “strike at the heart of France”.[2] [1] Welsh, Jennifer, ‘Sending soldiers to Mali may be the only solution’, The Globe and Mail, 14 January 2012, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/commentary/why-france-couldnt-wait-for-a-regional-solution-in-mali/article7318783/ [2] Bamat, Joseph, ‘Mali-based Islamists pledge attacks on French soil’, France 24, 14 January 2013, http://www.france24.com/en/20130114-mali-france-intervention-terrorist-attacks
It is a humanitarian intervention

Ban Ki Moon has also stated that “I am profoundly aware that if a military intervention in the north is not well conceived and executed, it could worsen an already fragile humanitarian situation and also result in severe human rights abuses”[1] so French military intervention is not necessarily the right course to take if the intention is to be helping the people of northern Mali. Equally we can ask if this will really end the civil war? Mali has suffered from several Tuareg rebellions in the past. In particular there was a civil war between 1990 and 1996[2] which has had over a decade of sporadic peace negotiations while a cease fire held. So while outside intervention may end the civil war unless the French propose to remain in place for decades or work instead on a diplomatic solution in the long run Mali will be no better off. [1] Tisdall, Simon, ‘UN urges caution over military intervention in Mali’, guardian.co.uk, 29 November 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/nov/29/un-caution-military-intervention-mali [2] Humphreys, Macartan, and Mohamed, Habaye ag, ‘Senegal and Mali’, January 2003, http://www.columbia.edu/~mh2245/papers1/sen_mali.pdf pp.19-28
Western countries should not be interfering in African internal affairs

Self-determination should first be internal rather than external.[1] In other words self-determination means autonomy within the existing state not a new state unless there is no other way of resolving the conflict. In Mali therefore the rebels need to put down their weapons and accept the authority of the central government, whose will the French and others are trying to enforce. It is clear that the people of northern Mali would prefer a solution within the state of Mali as half the population has fled to the south[2] and Ansar Dine and MNLA have walked back their declaration of independence promising “respect for Mali's national unity and territorial integrity” in December.[3] [1] “Reference re Secession of Quebec”, Supreme Court of Canada, 1998, 2 S.C.R. 217, http://scc.lexum.org/en/1998/1998scr2-217/1998scr2-217.html [2] Fessy, Thomas, ‘Mali Tuareg rebels declare independence in the north’, BBC News, 6 April 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17635437 [3] Agencies, ‘Mali rebels agree to respect ‘national unity’, AlJazeera, 5 December 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/12/201212420515159568.html
African organisations should have lead the way

This is ignoring both that African nations are taking a leading role in this intervention and that it is them who have asked for intervention by western states. First of All Nigeria is going to send 600 troops, Senegal, Burkina Faso, and Togo 500 each, and Benin 300. These numbers far outweigh the 550 being sent by France and logistical support provided by other countries such as the UK and US.[1] It can therefore be said that this is an African mission. Secondly the resolution in December did call for “coordination with the European Union and other partners”. [2] ECOWAS had already in December called for the United Nations to intervene[3] and “thanks the French Government for its initiatives to support Mali.”[4] [1] ‘Mali: France pledges ‘short’ campaign against Islamists’, BBC News, 14 January 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-21007517 [2] Security Council 6898th meeting, ‘Security Council authorizes deployment of African-led international support mission in Mali for initial year-long period’, United Nations, Resolution 2085, 20 December 2012, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sc10870.doc.htm [3] AP, ‘ECOWAS calls for UN-backed intervention to reclaim north’, France 24, 7 August 2012, http://www.france24.com/en/20120707-mali-ecowas-tuareg-al-qaeda-rebels [4] Ouédraogo, Kadre Desiré,  ‘Statement of the President of the ECOWAS Commission on the Situation in Mali’, Reliefweb, 12 January 2013, http://reliefweb.int/report/mali/statement-president-ecowas-commission-situation-mali
Quagmire

The French have rejected any parallel with Afghanistan and other quagmires. Fabius, France’s Foreign Minister, has said that "Later on, we can come as back-up, but we have no intention of staying forever,"[1] the handover may be slower than anticipated but there is no evidence the French will be in Mali for an extended period. [1] ‘Mali: France pledges ‘short’ campaign against Islamists’, BBC News, 14 January 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-21007517
The expansion of Heathrow is vital for the economy

Expanding Heathrow would ensure many current jobs as well as creating new ones. Currently, Heathrow supports around 250,000 jobs.[1] Added to this many hundreds of thousands more are dependent upon the tourist trade in London which relies on good transport links like Heathrow. Loosing competitiveness in front of other European airports not only could imply wasting the possibility to create new jobs, but lose some of those that already exist. Expansion of Heathrow would also be building a vital part of infrastructure at a time when British infrastructure spending is very low as a result of the recession so helping to boost growth. Good flight connections are critical for attracting new business and maintaining current business. This is because aviation infrastructure is important for identifying new business opportunities. The UK’s economic future depends on trading not just with traditional destinations in Europe and America but also with the expanding cities of China and India, cities such as Chongqing and Chengdu.[2] Businesses based in these cities will be much more likely to invest in Britain with direct flights.[3] [1] BBC News, ‘New group backs Heathrow expansion’, 21 July 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/london/3081745.stm [2] Duncan, E., ‘Wake up. We need a third runway’. The Times, 2012, http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/opinion/columnists/article3520054.ece [3] Salomone, Roger, ‘Time to up the ante on roads and airports’, EEF Blog, 2 April 2013, http://www.eef.org.uk/blog/post/Time-to-up-the-ante-on-transport.aspx