My 150th Debate: Animal Rights

BurdensThe purpose of assigning burdens is to resolve disputes. The law assigns burdens, science assigns burdens, and philosophy assigns burdens. So too should debate. After all, the purpose of debate is to decide issues, not to leave them open.And it shouldn’t matter if the topic is normative. The law places the burden on those trying to justify new rights. And philosophy places it on those trying to justify any rights. Why should burdens operate differently in a debate?The burden is typically placed on those supporting change, because there is substantial uncertainty in any change, including unpredictable costs. Recognizing animal rights would undoubtedly change our society. Pro admits that animal rights would impose new restrictions on humans. And Pro admits animals can’t be held responsible for their actions (effectively admitting that animal rights create an asymmetry under the law).Unlike Pro, my position doesn’t require any change. Even if my frameworks don’t require universal rights, that doesn’t mean they prohibit such rights.[Note: shared burdens is inconsistent with Pro’s position on presumptions – because presuming animal rights is no different than putting the burden on Con.]RightsThe kettle fallacy only applies when claiming two inconsistent reasons apply simultaneously (and hence refute each other). But I never argued my frameworks apply together. Each framework negates the resolution independently.Since my burden isn't to show which framework is best, and since I don't know which is best, I show that it doesn't matter which framework you apply: neither requires animal rights. These frameworks are the only non-arbitrary justifications for human rights in our postmodern world. Since rationality alone cannot justify universal values, rights don't exist as objective truths independent of beings who intentionally (and subjectively) create or agree to them. Thus, any rights must come from God (i.e. faith) or humans (i.e. an intersubjective consensus). So the frameworks don’t actually refute each other. They apply the same logic but draw different conclusions.[Note: I don't argue that utility justifies rights.](1) FaithIf only faith justifies rights, justice allows animal rights. But that's irrelevant – because the issue is whether justice requires animal rights.Many religions don’t recognize animal rights (and in fact recognize human dominion over animals). Pro hasn’t argued that justice prohibits these religions. So justice allows these religions. And if justice allows these religions, justice doesn’t require animal rights.True, not all faiths grant universal human rights. So what? If faith is the only viable justification for universal rights, it doesn't matter if some faiths don't justify universal rights. And, Pro’s observation begs the question, why does justice require universal rights?(2) Rawls(a) Rawls doesn't prohibit animal cruelty. But that doesn’t mean the law can't. The law often prohibits things on the basis of utilitarian calculations even though justice doesn’t require such prohibitions.(b) From Pro’s source: “The answer is that we do not need to know everything about ourselves to make rational decisions about the background conditions needed to pursue our primary purposes.” Persons in the original position “know that they require an adequate share of primary social goods (rights and liberties, powers and opportunities, and income and wealth) to effectively pursue their purposes, whatever they may be.” This knowledge is enough to make a rational choice. [Pro’s 21](c) The original position imposes constraints on individuals in such a way that there is only one possible conclusion that every individual in the original position will reach. This allows an intersubjective consensus. And that consensus forms a non-arbitrary basis for human rights. Of course, no consensus forms around animal rights, so animal rights aren’t required. (d) The original position inherently excludes animals because they aren't rational or moral beings. Animals lack the ability to even know what rights are, let alone recognize or agree to them.(e) Since individuals in the original position don't know their lot in life, they'll want to make sure they receive rights even if they're severely retarded. This justifies universal human rights.(3) ForstThere are no universal values. No social relation is beyond justification to someone. Thus, Forst argued that justice requires that norms be “reciprocally and generally valid and binding with reasons that aren’t based on contested ‘higher’ truths or conceptions of the good that can reasonably be questioned and rejected.” So a justification is “adequate” if it’s “reciprocal” and “general.”“Reciprocity” means “that neither party makes any claim to certain rights or resources that are denied to others (reciprocity of content) and that neither party projects its own reasons (values, interests, needs) onto others in arguing for its claims (reciprocity of reasons).”“Generality” means “that the reasons for such norms need to be shareable among all persons affected, not just the dominant parties.”These requirements aren’t vague. They’re procedures that establish binding moral norms through universal acceptance. But the only way for justice claims to be unversally accepted is if they’re universally reasonable (i.e. reciprocal and general). The right to justification thus allows people to pursue their own view of the good life up until the point where interfering with someone else’s view of the good life cannot be justified reciprocally and generally.Pro asks why justifications must be reciprocal. Because it's necessary to establish an intersubjective consensus. Because virtually every theory of justice requires reciprocity. And because reciprocity ensures that norms aren't arbitrary. If no counterreasons speak against a norm, it means not only that you should adhere to the norm, but also that you can demand its observance by others (i.e. reciprocity). In short, justice requires reciprocity, fairness requires reciprocity, and non-arbitrariness requires reciprocity.(c) Animals can’t justify their actions because they don’t have language or self-reflexive knowledge of morality. But even if animals could justify, they can’t demand justifications, understand justifications, veto justifications, or take responsibility for their actions. “A moral person must be able to take responsibility for his or her actions” (emphasis in the original). So animals aren’t moral persons.[Quotes from 4]Utility(1) Pro drops my attack on utilitarian justifications for rights. And Pro admits that utilitarian concerns are relevant to justice.(2) Pro’s C3 extends all universal human rights to animals. And Pro’s C1 suggests the same: If, as Pro says, “all rights are designed to insulate people from being the victims of [needless] suffering,” and “any agent that can experience needless suffering deserves rights protecting them from it,” why not give animals all these rights? So, yes, Pro advocates sweeping new rights for animals.(3) Animals aren't due equal consideration because they aren't morally equivalent to humans. Humans are unique. After all, what other species blushes, has five-year plans, moves around the world simply for a change in scenery, cooks its food, clothes itself, seeks entertainment, shows concern about the welfare of other species, “builds civilizations, records history, creates art, makes music, thinks abstractly, communicates in language, envisions and fabricates machinery, improves life through science and engineering, or explores the deeper truths found in philosophy and religion?” [5] None. And even if not all humans actively embody these capacities, only humans can embody them. Animals never embody them; the vast majority of humans do.Judge Richard Posner clarifies the absurdity of equal consideration: “Suppose a dog menaced a human infant and the only way to prevent the dog from biting the infant was to inflict severe pain on the dog—more pain, in fact, than the bite would inflict on the infant. [Pro] would have to say, let the dog bite, for [Pro's] position is that if an animal feels pain, the pain matters as much as it does when a human being feels pain, provided the pain is as great; and it matters more if it is greater. But any normal person ... would say that it would be monstrous to spare the dog, even though to do so would minimize the sum of pain in the world.” [5](4) Pro’s demand for 100% certainty in disease models is a utopian fantasy. In isolated cases, substitutes might be better. But those are isolated cases, and they’re still nowhere close to Pro’s impossible standard of accuracy. On balance, animal research lets us do things that we can’t do in humans, and thus discover things that can’t be discovered using just cell culture or human experimentation. For instance, seminal observations about tumor angiogenesis would have been virtually impossible without animal models, because angiogenesis requires an interaction between tumor cells, cells in blood vessels, and the surrounding tissue stroma. [6](5) No limiting principle means no slippery slope fallacy – so the risks are real. If we can violate animal rights, why not human rights? If the standard for animals is low, why not lower it for humans?(6) Re: judicial system – Pro's response is yet another utopian fantasy resting on bare assertions. Courts can't even handle the status quo, so pragmatic concerns inevitably end up outweighing justice, leading to many unjust results. Adding billions of new plaintiffs means even more emphasis on pragmatism over justice.(7) The harms are clear. But what is the unique benefit of animal rights? Why extend rights to animals when the law can protect them through other avenues (e.g. legal prohibitions, flexible regulations, and so on)? If animal welfare regulations were less harmful than rigid rights, would justice even allow animal rights?Sources5. http://tinyurl.com...6. http://tinyurl.com...