An Omniscient God and Human Free Will are Incompatible

Dispute Over Definition My opponent has taken the definition of free will and disputed it. He has chosen my usage of contingent and defined it to mean subject to chance. This definition of contingent fails to be appropriate in context of the definition free will. Free will as I have defined is the ability to make a conscious and contingent decision. However, if we define it as my opponent has, free will would mean the ability to make a conscious decision that is subject to chance. However, chance implies a lack of conscious control over the subject of the decision. Allow me to provide an example. If I flip a quarter, there is a chance that it may land on heads or tails. I have no conscious decision in what the quarter lands on, for what the quarter lands on is subject to chance, and not on a conscious decision. The concept of free will meaning subject to chance does not make sense, for that is not free will at all. Considering my usage of conscious in the definition, my opponent’s definition of contingent fails. Rather, when I speak of contingent, I mean not necessary. For example, if there is a Coke and a Pepsi and front of me, and I choose to drink the Coke, it was not necessary that I chose the Coke since in a conceivable situation I could have chosen the Pepsi. Begging the Question My opponent’s argument begs the question on two points: - Whether foreknowledge causes actions - Whether actions are necessary because of foreknowledge As my opponent has the burden of proof, he must show both of these to be true. If he does not, his argument fails to be supported logically and he therefore loses this debate. Misunderstandings My opponent’s argument could be put as follows: P1. Necessarily, if God foreknows X, then X will happen. P2. God foreknows X. C1. Therefore, X will necessarily happen. The problem with this argument is that the conclusion does not logically follow from the premises. As stated earlier, the conclusion begs the question as to whether foreknowledge causes actions (as opposed to actions causing foreknowledge) and whether actions are necessary because of foreknowledge. Both of these things assume that foreknowledge has some sort of causality. However, this does not make sense since the concept of foreknowledge and the future are abstract and therefore cannot cause. The assumption that these abstract concepts can cause stems from a misunderstanding of what these abstract concepts are. The future is defined as what will come to be. The definition essentially states that what the future is depends on what actions will take place. This is important because my opponent’s argument is that the future determines actions, but by the definition of future it is clear that the future depends on what actions will take place, as opposed to actions taking place because of what the future is. In other words, action X determines future Z. This means that whatever action X may be, Z is determined by that action. Let’s say I am in a situation where I can only choose either Coke or Pepsi, and whatever I will choose is the future. My choice of Coke or Pepsi represents action X. Whatever I will choose represents future Z. If I will choose Coke, then consequently future Z is that my choice will be Coke. However, action X is subject to change. If I will choose Pepsi, then consequently future Z is that my future choice will be Pepsi. This is what is meant when I argue that choices are contingent. It is not necessary that I will choose Coke over Pepsi, because there exists a conceivable situation where I could choose Pepsi over Coke. Whatever this decision will be determines what the future is. A better formulation of the same argument would follow: P1. Necessarily, if God foreknows X, then X will happen. P2. God foreknows X. C1. Therefore X will happen. Although strikingly similar to my opponent’s argument, it leaves out the main component to my opponent’s position, which is that X must necessarily happen. Unless actions happen necessarily, my opponent’s argument fails. If actions are both contingent (which I have argued) and conscious (which is assumed for the sake of this debate), then free will therefore exists and is compatible with God’s omniscience.