Resolved: Viewing Pornography is Morally Wrong

Kant Pro starts off by asking: 'Why ought we treat people how we want to be treated?' Good question. The answer is that we ought to treat people how we want to be treated because this is morally rational to do (as to not do this would be to have inconsistent double-standards). We ought to act rationally because we are intrinsically rational beings, which entails that we are intrinsically ordered towards using reason. To return to my earlier analogy, a clock is intrinsically ordered towards telling the time, hence a clock ought to tell the time. In this way, man is intrinsically ordered towards using reason, hence man ought to use reason. Using reason entails being morally consistent. Next, JVN postulates that using people as a means to an end is justified insofar as the person being used consents to it. Yet this ignores the crucial caveat; that a person cannot rationally consent to being used solely as a means to an end. And as reason is the determining factor for morality, if one cannot rationally consent to something one cannot morally consent to something. What Kant is saying in Pro's quote is that it can be rational to consent to being used only if the other person is also being used. In a way, it cancels out because nobody is taking advantage of the other. This does not justify pornography however, because the pornography-viewer does not grant the pornstar rights over the viewer. In the trolley scenario, the person on the track who is yelling to be sacrificed for the good of the many, I would hazard that this is a difficult scenario and has achieved fame because of its difficult nature. Yet the person still cannot be used as a means to an end because they cannot rationally consent to being sacrificed. This is because self-preservation is rational. Pro opines that my claim that a pornstar is being objectified is unsubstantiated. I'm surprised that he calls me up on this claim in particular, as it is fairly self-evident. When one masturbates to pornography they do not consider the person, they consider the body alone. This is to say that only the physical essence of the pornstar is being valued (which is objectification). It is evident that a pornstar is not considered as an intrinsically valuable person when one watches pornography. JVN asks for some more examples of treating people solely as a means to an end, very well, I will provide some: 1. Having sex with someone just to gain sexual pleasure is using someone only as a means, and not an end in themselves. 2. Buying groceries from a shopkeeper is using someone as both a means as well as an end. The means is to obtain groceries, but so long as the shopkeeper is respected as a person and treated as such, he is also being treated as an ends. 3. Donating a kidney to a total stranger is using someone only as an end and not as a means. The donor is not using the person as a means to an end, but only as an end. Pro goes on to highlight that, since Kant only values intention, the consequences of watching pornography ought not be morally considered. However, Kant maintains only that consequences ought not take precedent over a good intention; yet if no good intention is present (as is the case in watching pornography) then the consequences can be considered insofar as they are intrinsic to the action. What this means is that, since moral maxims are synthetic (truth is contingent on experiential conclusion)(1), if we experience that a given action almost always gives rise to a given consequence, then the moral worth of that action is still in a way influenced by that consequence. It is only consequences that are unforeseen or unusual that can be discounted, as they are not intrinsic to the action itself. In relation to pornography, the act of viewing it almost always brings about the consequence of providing financial support to those who make pornography, then viewing pornography is immoral because part of the act itself entails the support of immoral practice (production of pornography). Bentham/Nozick Here, Pro appears to concede that our actions are motivated by concepts other than pleasure. Instead, Pro maintains that: 'its just you doing what is best for yourself, with the knowledge you have' But under Bentham, doing what is best for yourself is equivalent to maximising one's own pleasure. Nozick refutes this notion, so another criteria for 'best for yourself' is needed. This also goes against empirical observation; as many people overwork themselves, especially carers, and ultimately they are not doing what is best for themselves, they are doing what is best for those that they care for. This is empirical evidence that people can act outside of egoistic motivations. Pro states: 'This further proves that humans ultimately are going for the best possible idea and always use people as a means to achieve that end, thus making literally every interaction immoral' Yet he does not realise that the 'best possible idea' could be the best interests of other people. Also, Pro forgets that Kant does not forbid using people as means to an end, he only forbids using people solely as a means to an end. Physical Effects JVN begins this section by claiming that: 'Watching porn is the same as watching two people have sex live' Yet this is not true at all; pornography is in no way representative of normal sexual intercourse (2). Furthermore, Pro asserts that simply watching sex will not make you a depressed rapist. But I do not say that this is always the case, I maintain that watching pornography increases the likelihood that one will have aggressive attitudes towards women, as this study shows (3). Supposedly all my evidence is unreliable since 'everyone watches porn'. Of course a lot of men watch porn, but then again there are a fair few who don't. Only about 68% of men watch pornography regularly (4) which leaves about 42% of men with which control groups could be made. Albeit some of my studies did not have control groups, but this does not entirely discredit their findings, it merely limits their conclusive veracity. On the other hand, my other studies use control groups yet have similar conclusions. Ross JVN highlights that perhaps pornography could be good insofar as it encourages teenagers to go out and reproduce, and hence continue the species.Yet this only considers the quantity of reproduction, not the quality. Monogamous procreation within marriage ensures the best quality upbringing for children (5), which is just as important if not more important than quantity of reproduction.As pornography promotes a casual and non-loving approach to sex, this does not constitute quality reproduction that is essential to the promotion of our species. Moral Agency Finally, Pro claims that pornography is good because it 'combats sexism'. I'm sorry but this is a blatantly misguided claim. Firstly, pornography worsens sexist attitudes in men (6). Secondly, women in pornography are rarely being pleasured; they only exist to pleasure the man and this enforces this damaging and sexist framework in wider society. The man almost always dominates the woman in a pornographic film and he never fails to get what he wants from a woman. To conclude, I have successfully upheld my arguments as to why pornography is immoral, coming from a deontological framework that I have defended sufficiently as well as a sociological framework. (1) http://www3.nd.edu... (2) http://www.quora.com... (3) http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov... (4) http://www.covenanteyes.com... (5) http://www.evanmarckatz.com... (6) http://www.everydayhealth.com...