THW ban biological parents from contacting children they gave up for adoption

There are a few key issues that form the criterion as well as the philosophical basis for which fundamental values can be judged in the context of this resolution, that are also imperative for any side, especially my opponent as the CON to achieve and justify through her point constructions. The meta-ethical framework for which we base all values empirically justified by epistemic normativity in this round bases itself off of subjective judgment and the modal operator of belief in of itself. Indeed, by looking at the overall framework for which my opponent feels has the sufficient and adequate grounds for which PRO can achieve her premise and values, we find a few fundamental obstacles to the logical flow in of itself, and obvious issues that are seen without the usual necessary inspection. Indeed, she specifically addresses my arguments and contentions with the statement intended to refute of: "Though the legal stipulations do favour the fact that biological parents loose the rights they have to their children when they put them up for adoption, the law does not forbid adopted children from communicating with them. " The fundamental and basic framework for which she values her criterion of jurisdiction is opposed flagrantly and contradicted in this statement itself. This not only does not provide any grounds for which her arguments can be justified, but in its inherent nature, again goes to supplement points that I use for the framework of my case. My overall statements in the last constructive sufficiently established the point that as the PRO, it is my obligation in the context of this resolution to provide the point that states that individuals who have forsaken a child for certain societal and moral liberties and freedom from ethical obligations ascertains the basic fact that thus they should not be allowed to contact the children, as I have sufficiently provided all with points in my contentions. Furthermore, what my opponent states in her first two paragraphs of refutations completely neglect the FUNDAMENTAL RESOLUTION itself. Looking to the exact specifications of the resolution, we see that: "THW ban biological parents from contacting children they gave up for adoption" not only implies but also EXPLICITLY states that the basis and grounds for which this debate rests upon is the overarching issue of individuals seeking their children that they have given up for adoption. It is not in the context nor capacity of this debate and resolution itself to concern itself with any points regarding 'curiosity' or 'subjective willingness' of children to seek out their parents; we can thus immediately see that my opponent's refutations are irrelevant not only in context to the debate and my contentions, but even to the resolution itself. Now moving on to the last argument that my opponent again imposes upon this debate to further her validity; she says that the motive behind an individual who has given up his/her child does not necessarily mean that he/she did not merely want the child, and that it may be due to other concerns. Again, we look to the meta-ethical foundations for which jurisdiction must be based upon because of the subjective nature of this resolution in of itself. Indeed, it does not matter in any form of relevancy what the motive was behind an individual's discretion to give up his/her child for adoption; the objective fact that is tangible remains that as the individual who had given up the child, he/she loses certain societal responsibilities and obligations that form the basis for which they also lose control over their child. "In discussing what constitutes morality, the actual behavior is less important than the underlying capacities. " (Flack and deWaal 2000) The fundamental value is not the motive behind an action, mainly because we see through deontological justification that it does not matter because the individual gains specific societal liberties, namely without social and moral obligations to fostering a child, at the expense of losing it in a legal or moral manner. Even if you discard this argument as inadequate for refutation, I will once again present you with a discretional value that is fundamental to values in this debate. The motive behind an action is always justified by subjective concerns and ideologies that form the basis for an action. For a tangible example, the individual who specifically ascertained that it was necessary or preferrable to give up his/her child for adoption must have had a motive, which my opponent obviously and extraneously points out. Yet the underlying issue is that in the example that my opponent has imposed, financial difficulty and conflict, as well as including but not limited to all other aspects of such a decision, was always available for consideration before the parent conceived the child. Before a parent conceives a child, he/she must take into consideration all aspects of such fostering of an individual replendent with life, including social and moral obligations as justified by our present societal framework and contract under which we all live, and any issues that might come into direct conflict with such an action of raising a child. Thus, when the child is conceived and born, it is into a societal and moral contract into which it is born, with strings of moral and social obligations that the parent cannot refuse to take and handle, with pain of loss of certain societal liberties and/or expulsion from the moral and social contract. The specific societal liberties that I refer to will be the as stated intimate and close associate contact that the parent is forbidden to maintain with his/her biological child. From such a logical and metaphysical standpoint, I provide the much better grounds for which this debate can be judged, and how I, as PRO, achieve the premises for jurisdiction on this debate much better than my opponent. ________________________ Further points of consideration: Moral Realism/Relativism: From the standpoint of metaphysical and ethical concerns that concerns epistomology and deontology for any form of subjective judgment, we find a key and core issue that becomes apparent in this debate: Moral realism. Understood, it is a conjunction of metaphysical, epistomological, and semantic views. By looking to a moral contract and the relativism it imposes in the context of this debate, we consider the primary subjective views of belief. By saying that an individual may not have considered certain aspects of the moral/social contract that entails specific obligations, you are doing so under pain of advocating for IRRATIONALITY itself. The primary modal operator is belief; yet when we disregard the capability as well as the obligated responsibilities of an individual parent when deciding to conceive a child, we are thus so advocating for irrational decisions without any form of justification by epistomological and meta-ethical views. This not only flagrantly goes against the basic foundational building blocks on which all subjective moral or tangible arguments are constructed, but also the inherent logical framework in of itself. Indeed, justifying by deontology gives a clear such concept: S is justified in believing that p if and only if S believes that p while it is not the case that S is obliged to refrain from believing that p. [11] The belief system is rooted in the epistomological and semantic contexts for which a rational framework and a rational normative is imperative and mandated for validity. As my opponent goes against these basic foundational and pivotal points, as well as providing little to no valid refutations as I have proved to my contentions, all of my points may be extended across the flow and be subjected to consideration when voting. Thank you so much. Sources: . http://plato.stanford.edu...