This House Concludes that Abortion is Murder

Thanks to my opponent who initiated this debate, and as always to all judges who may read it. Before I begin, there is one more thing I want to clarify. It may be clear to most already, but I think we're running the risk in confusing what this debate actually is and is not about. We are not arguing whether abortion 'should be considered' murder. Rather, we're arguing whether abortion 'actually' is murder, and so within a very specific context. This will become relevant as I begin to refute my opponent's case, and in so doing logically distinguish abortion and murder. I'll begin by refuting my opponent's arguments in the order that they are listed, and then I'll offer some thoughts of my own. PRO's first argument makes the analogical comparison between those who oppose abortion and those who oppose eating meat. If we were arguing about how certain acts that might entail killing 'ought' to be classified, then his argument would be more on point and perhaps even persuasive. But, regretfully for PRO, that is not the case here. As PRO stated, with which I agree, abortion is the unlawful killing of one person by another person. In order for abortion to be murder, abortion must satisfy two components: it's got to be unlawful, and it's got to entail the killing of another human being. Planned Parenthood of South Eastern Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992) (1) offers clarity to both of those elements: (1) Casey reflects the principle that legal personhood does not exist before the point of viability in a pregnancy. This means that at no point before the point of viability in a pregnancy is a fetus legally considered a person. If a fetus is not a person within the scope of our laws, then the act of aborting it cannot be considered murder. Whether we, individually, take ethical issues with delineating personhood and non-personhood ad the point of viability is extraneous to this debate -even though the arguments for and against it have contributed to a rich moral and ethical discussion among lawyers, ethicists and others who take an interest in this issue. So, even if we individually think that personhood happens at some time other than viability, we cannot hold today that abortion is murder because the law does not consider non-viable fetuses murder. (2) Casey makes it explicitly clear that abortion up to the point of viability is legal. It is written: "viability marks the earliest point at which the State's interest in fetal [p836] life is constitutionally adequate to justify a legislative ban on nontherapeutic abortions." In that abortion is not illegal, and cannot be constitutionally restricted before the point of fetal viability, abortion cannot be murder. As that is the case, my opponent's "constitutional" argument falls, as do all the others. Indeed, he is just factually mistaken about what the law says. As best I can tell, PRO's third argument is more intellectually curious because he has noted what would appear to be a contradiction within US law. So, PRO asks "how can it be....that abortion is not murder when we have people being charged with first degree murder for killing a child in the womb?" While this answer may be unsatisfying to him, it is nevertheless the case. What murder "is" in a general sense is defined by common law, and different jurisdiction interpret things different ways. I'm sure there are interesting and creative reasons for this (many of which stem from varying positions on personhood interposed in conflict with Supreme Court precedent), but the apparent contradiction can be reconciled in the following way: The law generally assumes that a woman who is pregnant is going to carry her fetus/child to term until she actually has an abortion, for the purposes of prosecuting murder (2). So, even if the child/fetus was not viable, it is reasonable for the law to conclude that (absent evidence to the contrary) the child would have been born. This is not a universal way of resolving that paradox, but it is one method by which it can be accomplished. Basically that means that a person who murders a pregnant woman whose child/fetus was not viable could be charged with two counts of murder in some but not all jurisdictions, whereas almost surely, consistent with the Casey ruling, a person who murdered a pregnant woman whose fetus was viable would almost surely be charged with two counts of murder in many if not most jurisdictions. But even still, that does not make abortion murder because the law distinguishes abortion (which is lawful) from murder (which is unlawful) in the manor described above. To win this debate, my opponent had to demonstrate that, legally, abortion is murder. I have prevented him from doing so, therefore I have already won. Nonetheless, once more, thanks to my opponent for this and to all judges who may read it. Peace out. (1) http://www.law.cornell.edu... (2) I use the term "child/fetus" to imply a degree of apathy towards the debate about personhood, because that question has already been answered for our purposes by Sandra Day O'Conner in the case cited in (1).