Epistemic Justification is possible

Now just to clear up a few misconceptions. As per debate rules, I need not justify the conclusion or ~A. Pro only needs to indirectly show that A relies on a random arbitrary suspension of the principle of sufficient reason which evidently leads to a lack of justification for any justification for A. I can also show that the conclusion follows logically which leads to a paradox the dogmatist must grapple with, assuming the laws of logic are objectively true. While an academic skeptic may make the negatively dogmatic assertion that justification is impossible, the pyrrhonian skeptic such as myself, withholds assent to truth claims of this sort. This is my position in this debate. Therefore if Pro attempts shifting the goalposts, he will be committing a red herring. That being said, we can move on to the arguments. Pro states “…we cannot use circular reasoning or an infinite regress to justify our proposition ~A. “Pro lacks justification for this assertion, and if he tries to justify it via Foundationalism (A) then he would be begging the question. Coherentism(C) and Infinitism (I) has also been conceded as impossible by Pro, therefore I see no other way for him to justify it without alluding to one of the horns within the dilemma, which he must first prove to be possible. Are we supposed to just take Pro’s assertion as truth without justification? I see no reason to do so. It should be noted that when Pro concedes ~I and ~C (which also required justification), therefore A, he is being inconsistent in his argument as he assumes only A is not problematic. However, he has yet to fulfill this burden regardless of his apparent contentions. Pro’s two main arguments are:(1) ~A lacks justification(2) The MT’s conclusive corollary is self-refutingResponse to 1Pro asserts that ~A would itself entail Foundationalism. This is a red herring, as it is Pro’s burden to prove that A is not problematic. Assuming the laws of logic are true, basing knowledge on arbitrary assumptions cannot work, because someone else can infer the exact opposite knowledge claim from other arbitrary assumptions. Then it would possible to infer both a proposition P and its falsehood ~P from a set of arbitrary axioms. This would mean all statements are both true and false simultaneously. This follows from an argument known as the principle of explosion. If we allow contradictions then ~A can be accepted, as it is internally contradictory. Therefore, a break in searching at a certain point, which indeed appears principally feasible, would mean a random suspension of the principle of sufficient reason, and thus certain justification which is needed to uphold the resolution. Pro would thereby need to make an argument for Foundationalism. Argument against FoundationlismP1. If Foundationalism is true, beliefs can justify themselves (Assumed Indirect Proof)P2. Grounds for that belief are due to autonomous warrant (anything else would appeal to Coherentism)P3. Propositions with autonomous warrant are not more likely true than falseC1. Ergo, Beliefs cannot justify themselves and are thus, arbitrary Defense of P3If Pro argues that they are more likely to be true, then this would implicitly lead to coherentism (as it would imply that he is justified by the claim that propositions with autonomous warrant are more likely to be true). Another possible objection to P3 may be that while it is true that propositions with autonomous warrant aren't more likely to be true, it may still be the case that a set of propositions with autonomous warrant are true. " However, that would be a red herring as the problem is not about truth, but justification. It does not matter if such claims are true or not, only if they are justified. If Pro wishes to defend the arbitrariness of foundationalism, I will extend my arguments in the next round. Defense of C1If the foundationalist agrees with P3, then that belief would be arbitrary by definition, since they don’t claim that their belief is connected to truth. If Pro argues for intuition (which is subjective at best) and its reliability (which suffers from coherentism, and the problem of induction), then he is defending Foundationalism based on an appeal to consequences. Problems in LogicFor debate purposes, I will show contradictions inherent in the very laws of logic Foundationalists use regarding propositions since he is implicitly alluding that a proposition must either be true or false. ExampleP1. The laws of logic are true (AIP: Assumed Indirect Proof)P2. All propositions are either true or false (LEM)P3. The proposition "this proposition is false" is neither true or false (Liar's paradox)P3a. If the statement is true, then it is falseP3b. If the statement is false, then it is trueP4. There exists some proposition that is neither true or false (p3 existential generalization)P5. It is not the case that all propositions are either true or false (p4 change in quantifier)p6. It both is and is not the case that all propositions are either true or false (p2, p5 conjunction) Contradiction in the very laws of logicC1. Therefore the laws of logic are not true (1-6 Indirect Proof)Defense of PyrrhonismP7. The laws of logic are either not true or x (where x is an infinite long proposition) (1-6 Indirect Proof)P8. Infinitism is impossibleC2. One cannot assent to an infinite long propositionDefense of P7It may be the case that the laws of logic are not true or x. Where “x” may be replaced with “I made a mistake in the proof or I was tricked by an evil deceiver or I am brain in a vat or I am in the matrix, or an infinite list of possibilities…. .”. Ergo, one cannot assent to the conclusion of an infinitely long proposition but merely only suspend judgment on its truth value, thus entailing pyrrhonism. Therefore, not all propositions are either true or false. If Pro wishes to argue against P3, then I will further defend this premise in my next round. Response to 2 Pro implies that Munchhausen’s Trilemma (MT) is self-defeating, however, Munchhausen’s trilemma is not a proposition, theory or statement. It is a conjunction of several inconsistent but intuitive propositions that does exactly what it sets out to do. That is, it shows the impossibility to prove any truth including the truth of the conclusion (as it also lacks justification). So the trilemma cannot be true or false since it is a set of propositions. Even if the conclusion cannot itself be justified, Pro has neglected to give justification for its possibility since the conclusion logically follows and I have shown that not all propositions are either true or false (LEM: Law of Excluded Middle). Since I have already argued against foundationalism as shown above, the conclusion must either be accepted or Pro must abandon logic all together. MT does not set out to prove that objective justification is impossible, only that we cannot know if justification is possible or not, by the contradictions it entails and problems inherent in all three horns of the dilemma, thus the resolution has not been upheld. Objective TruthWe have reasonable belief that we only have access to our own mental states. Everything we postulate fundamentally comes back to our experiences. Thus, the notion of “objective truth” is problematic for the following reasons since:1. The subject is inherently divorced from the objective2. Even if the subject is not inherently divorced from the objective, it is impossible to obtain justification (shown from arguments above)3. A subject's beliefs are grounded in his experiencesIf beliefs are grounded in our incorrigible experiences, it follows logically that the contents of these is inherently subjective. We operate on the following assumptions:1. Other subjects are functioning within a similar framework2. Our experiences are tied to the objectiveOfcourse, these axiomatic assumptions lack justification. However, a subject can merely state a subjective truth, which is insufficient for knowledge, as knowledge is purported as "Certain" justified true belief. Certain meaning indubitable. Pro states that "if ~A is merely possible, then it is not necessary. So A is also possible. " For Pro to assert this, he would have to know A or ~A can be the case. Since he cannot know which hypothesis is objectively true and if there is an objective reality, we cannot purport anything as a fact, therefore, we cannot say we know if anything is epistemologically possible or not, in any objective sense. It is also logically possible that the Brain In A Vat (BIV) / the Matrix/ Evil Deceiver hypothesis is equally plausible if we assert foundationalism as sufficient grounds for justification. However, even justified true belief would be insufficient to say that we know what is a basic belief or an objective justification. This faces what is known as the Gettier Problem and furthers supports ideals such as epistemological nihilism. Back over to Pro and good luck!