Dualism is probably not correct about the relationship between mind and matter.

I thank JCMT for his response - he's definitely a challenging opponent. Since we both agree that the focal point of this debate is about perception qua perception, which is just the fancy Latin way of saying perception in general, there is no further discussion needed about other issues. As a convenient side note, I will use the example of the red apple as the de facto term for stimuli. So when I refer to , redness, "leaf-on-a-stem-ness", and so on, it is all synonymous to the predicates of apple-ness. This is just to make the debate easier to read and comprehend. My opponent makes an interesting case for dualism, and it's comprised of a main argument - that the processes that the brain uses during perception are not the same type as the predicates of stimuli; they are ontologically different. His main reason for this argument is that the process of perception, which is a complex array of interacting chemicals and electrons, is not the same as the predicates of apple-ness, which include spherical-ish shape, redness, etc. So in reply, my main counterargument is that this is too "shallow" of a view of perception. I argue that fundamentally, the predicates of a red apple is still the same type or 'medium' as the processes of perception - namely in some sort of physical data. ==================== Relationship between the process of perception and stimuli ==================== A key paragraph in my opponent's argument is as follows: "when these elements enter my brain, chemicals and electrons move about, none of which could properly be described as predicates of an apple." Yes, of course. The neurochemical activity perception does when interpreting stimuli can't sensibly be categorized as being red or sphere-like; it would just be plain absurd. However, to take the extra step and say therefore perception is ontologically different from apple-ness is flawed, because even though they don't share the same predicates (properties XYZ of the apple), this wouldn't make them ontologically different. This is actually something my opponent espouses in one of his responses to my argument - he states that "to be ontologically equivalent, both would have to have identical predicates, which they obviously do not." When you perceive a red apple, the chemicals and neurons in your head do not have to contain the properties of redness or sphere-ness because the physical information of redness that one perceives when seeing a red apple gets' changed or interpreted otherwise. Essentially, I'm arguing that the predicate will change when the physical properties/substances/entities that it accompanies is transferred through different mediums, namely the the light gleaming off the apple, then being detected by the eye, and finally being received by the brain. For example, all the properties of an apple are all fundamentally physical data. The color red, the figure of a sphere, the image of a stem, and such. These concrete particulars are ontologically physical, so it's no problem for the sensory organs in this case to perceive them and subsequently "translate" them into neurochemical activity. So even though we would attack different properties or adjectives to the processes of the brain and the properties of the red apple, they are both still ontologically the same - they are both physical. True, in different forms, but still the same. ==================== Conclusion ==================== My opponent states in his conclusion that in fact I cannot equate perception and stimuli on the basis of identity (in respects to them both being physical) but rather predication. I would ask why this is so, since it seems folly to do so.