Zaradi's Prized Tournament Final: Food Security

Thanks, Beginner. Onto my case!OVERVIEWSPro CONCEDES OV1 and essentially CONCEDES OV2 insofar as he doesn't respond individually to any of the three justifications I provide for why "ought" implies "can." Pro also CONCEDES OV3's interpretation of what it means to ensure food security: "to unconditionally and totally obtain reliable supplies of affordable and nutritious food that is accessible to and sufficient for every single citizen." Extend these points.The only objection Pro really raises is that because a just government is defined as one that ensures food security, it is tautologically true that such a government ought to ensure food security, regardless of whether or not it "can" do so. It does not matter, from Pro's viewpoint, if the definition imposes unfair or impossible obligations, because the definition is still valid. This leads me to my first objection:1. Again, Pro really does not individually rebut my three justifications for why "ought" implies "can" (OIC). All Pro really says is that because the definition of a just government includes ensuring food security, only those governments that can meet this obligation are just. Ergo, Pro argues, a just government "ought" to ensure food security. This confuses the kinds of "ought's" we're talking about. To say that something follows from a definition is NOT the same as saying something is a moral obligation. So, saying that it follows from the definition of what a just government is that it would ensure food security does not make the necessary link to morality; it also commits an is/ought fallacy. Pro says, for instance, that the bald man "ought to be" hairless just as the just government "ought to" ensure food security. Where "ought to be/ought to" are, you can put in "is/does." The "is/does" is actually more accurate in Pro's sentences because they describe what Pro sees to be definitional facts. Surely, it would be patently ridiculous to say: "the bald man has a moral obligation to be hairless" instead of "the bald man is hairless." Simply put: just because something is the case, has nothing to do with whether it ought to be the case or whether it is a moral obligation. 2. If the obligation is unfair or impossible, it is invalid--at least in this case. If it is both true that OIC and that just governments cannot ensure food security, then the "ought" of the resolution is false, even if a just government is one that--by definition--provides food security. Note that if something is unfair, it cannot be moral. We can think of any number of examples to support this, from slavery to cheating to bribery, etc. More generally, we can say that morality involves some concept of right and wrong, and that fairness is widely regarded as "right." Therefore, if the obligation is unfair, it invalidates the more nature of it. Therefore, even if Pro shows that a just government tautologically ensures food security, the "ought" in the topic is false. 3. The way Pro sets up his definition of a just government is a false equivalence with the examples he gives. Baldness has a single qualification, a female has a few qualifications, god has the qualifications of omnipotence, omniscience, and (perhaps) omnibenevolence or omnipresence. A just government, on the other hand, if we treat each "ought" as its own qualification, has literally innumerable qualifications--it ought to provide food security, health care, national security, park services, clinics, roads, etc. And, of the examples Pro gives, the only one that requires action on the part of the agent is the one involving just governments. It's just logically impossible to suggest that any government can meet absolutely all of the qualifications a just government would have, because many will work at cross-purposes (e.g. a just government ought to respect privacy vs. a just government ought to ensure national security) or require resources that just aren't there. Pro's conception of a just government then is literally something that is inconceivable--it violates the law of noncontradiction by having attached to it a bunch of competing mandates that it MUST all meet to be just. To paraphrase Pro: "Since a just government is a logical contradiction, I assert that a just government is impossible." Something that cannot exist cannot have moral obligations; for instance, if I don't exist, I cannot be obliged to do anything. Thus, we can negate.4. Pro DROPS that moral obligations are meaningless if they are highly unreasonable or unattainable. Pro makes a lot of arguments about the "purpose" of things being important--it seems that the purpose of moral obligations is to delineate between actions that are praiseworthy and those that are blameworthy. So, such obligations should actualize their purpose; it is also irrational to have moral obligations that are pointless or don't serve any moral objective. Since ensuring food security is impossible, it cannot be a moral obligation, since that would defeat the purpose of what a moral obligation is. It is another reason why the "ought" in the topic is false.5. A just government would not--definitionally--recognize or accept unfair obligations. Surely, then, it would reject the resolution because it unfairly requires the impossible, which is unjust. At the very least, we could not logically say that to be a just government, a government must meet unfair or unjust obligations. OV MUSINGSPro writes: "Since the condition of ensuring food security isn't a logical contradiction, I assert that the condition of ensuring food security is possible given that we have an infinite set of possible solutions to choose from." I--unsurprisingly--have several objections. But first, let me for a third time remind everyone what it means to ensure food security: "to unconditionally and totally obtain reliable supplies of affordable and nutritious food that is accessible to and sufficient for every single citizen." Recall that this clarification was DROPPED by Pro. Therefore, "ensuring food security" is more than just maximizing or promoting food security, it is making certain that all citizens, all of the time, everywhere within the country, are food secure. If even one person out of millions in a single month of a year is food insecure, a government has failed to ensure food security for all its citizens that year.1. That something isn't logically contradictory doesn't mean it is actualizable. Consider, a unicorn is not a logically contradictory concept; therefore, it is "possible" that it exists. Yet, if I searched every spot in the universe, that doesn't mean I would ever find it. Similarly, even if ensuring food security is theoretically possible, that doesn't mean it will ever become actually possible. There is a big difference there.2. It is impossible to ensure food security. There will ALWAYS be risks to or flaws in the food supply and delivery systems. It's impossible to eliminate all risks, especially when many of those risks are atemporal (i.e. they are timeless), such as agroterror or disease. 3. Pro's line of argument rests on the idea that at some nebulous point in the future, it might be actually possible. It also might never actually be possible. Who knows? Maybe by the time we figure it out (if we ever do), Marx's communist utopia will have come to pass and no governments will exist to have obligations. We just don't know. We should not allow Pro to extend the timeline of this debate out into the ether for several reasons: (1) it's just too much of an unknown and we should operate in more knowable parameters to keep the debate meaningfully debatable and to avoid dubious speculation, (2) conceptions of justice tend to evolve over time, and so we should limit our discussion to a more current timeline in order to keep our discussions of justice pertinent, and (3) a shorter timeline will make the impacts of our arguments more clear (as time goes on, it does become harder to weigh, evaluate probability, see the links, etc).4. Ultimately, the core of my arguments in the OIC revolve around fairness, so even if you buy that it is or will be "possible" to ensure food security, that doesn't devastate my case, because the obligation is still incredibly unfair, and so it still incurs the same impacts and the same arguments are still valid. It may be "possible" for me--and asthmatic, unathletic guy who has had back surgery in the past--to climb Mt. Everest and return alive, but it would still certainly be unfair to obligate me to do so. We can conceive of other "possible" but unfair obligations too, the point being that unfair but possible obligations are still unjust, immoral, and meaningless. Ensuring food security is still an unfair obligation because we would literally have to explore infinity in order to be able to even hope to solve it, and that is analogous to me climbing Everest, if not worse.5. Otherwise, Pro DROPS all the specific arguments I make about the impossibility of ensuring food security. Extend them.OFF-CASE1. Centralization is inherent to food security in the sense that it places "food" under more government control or supervision. It's not the private sector ensuring food security, it's government. The government is the actor. Pro DROPS that this centralization would be bad if it occurs.2. World grain production has actually shown signs of diminished growth since 1980, and is below projections that factor in new technologies. [1] In a rapidly growing world, this is concerning because food may not keep up with population. We you factor in rapid biodiversity loss and climate change, this problem is only amplified. So, the scarce resources argument stands.GENERAL NOTESince this will be Pro's final speech, he cannot rebut any arguments he dropped or conceded this or last round (per rule 3), whether I explicitly extend them or not.SOURCEhttp://www.sciencedirect.com...Thus, I negate. Over to Pro...