Martial Law in Iraq Would Have Been a Sound Strategy, #2

I thank CON for engaging in my arguments in rigorous debate, which was quite enjoyable.I note that CON is new, so I will chalk it up to inexperience and not more insidious debating tactics that CON asks PRO for sources in the final round, when neither PRO/CON can proffer new sources.I will also note that CON accuses PRO of dropped points; this is more due to CON's excessive use of third-person and passive tense, which at times did not lend to clear argumentation from CON. Regardless, as CON has clarified dropped points, I will address what CON thinks PRO dropped.RebuttalCultureCS1) Again, PRO/CON agree that the number of graduates in the Middle Eastern languages was atrociously low. I will note that CON's 120,000 hour number is specific only to the FBI, and not to the government as a whole, and that the FBI, being a domestic organization, may have had much lesser need in ordinary circumstances for such translation skills, which may have led to the FBI specifically being overloaded. Military operations in the Middle East would have been irrelevant to the FBI's situation specifically.Furthermore, CON focuses only on the shortfall numbers in linguists, not accounting for what has already been sourced and documented as a much greater preponderance of area studies graduates in the Middle Eastern field. America also is home to millions of Muslim Americans, many of whom are first-generation immigrants fluent in Middle Eastern languages. With enough monetary incentive, it is easily conceivable that had the US government been serious about such a cultural awareness program, it could have and would have been implemented. One billion dollars annually into such a program would have been around 1% of what was spent on the concomitant military campaign, and would have afforded a robust cultural program several times the size of all government grants to the civilian academic sector.On logistics, CON's point cannot be taken seriously. Logistics is probably the easiest part of the puzzle. The US has no shortage of bureaucratic and administrative personnel for such efforts, and the military would have easily provided the logistical backbone of any local administration.SecurityS1, S2) CON's point here also cannot be taken seriously. CON's point in comparing Japanese to Iraqi demographics and the comparative loss of civilian lives in Japan is all but advocating that the US cull the Iraqi population. While such a culling of any civilian population save that of nuclear powers would have been a relatively simple task for the US military, it is simply not an effective means of quelling resistance or gaining support. The population loss in Japan made little difference as to whether or not the Japanese people would have resisted; this is evidenced in CON's own chart, which shows that Afghanistan faced a similar decrease in population in the 80s, only to have mounted an even fiercer resistance against the Soviets (CON's round #3 source #13). Bottom line, CON's demographics argument is absolutely wrong-headed and totally irrelevant to getting the local population to comply with US demands.Capitulation is capitulation; the US got both Iraq and Japan to capitulate to terms the US demanded. Had the US been able to properly secure Iraq with a proper military contingent, and show cultural respect as they did in Japan, the insurgency that CON speaks about would have been prevented, as it was in Japan.S3) CON ignores my arguments regarding the fact that Bosnia was home to a much more heterogeneous population than Iraq, and that by following Shinseki's advised amount of occupation forces in that theater, resistance decreased dramatically. CON's point about heterogeneity is thus not credible. Again, had the US brought a proper occupation force into Iraq per Shinseki's advice in the video, sectarian violence would have been much less of an issue, if even an issue.S4) CON is asking for evidence that without security, Japan would not have been able to industrialize. This is non-sensical and trivial. Without proper security, not even the basics are available - there would be no courts, no police, rampant crime, zero government services, and more than likely a chaotic civilian sector with unstable food/water/health care provisions. CON's request pertaining to the Domino Theory is wholly off the mark and again non-sensical. As already stated, any and all "cold war dynamics" pertaining to Japan were first made possible by securing the country. CON is for whatever reason advocating that we build a house without laying a proper foundation.Bottom line, the recovery of Japan was first and foremost contingent upon properly securing the country, which was accomplished first and foremost by imposing martial law in the country. After security had been assured, then and only then did the US begin to utilize Japan as part of a containment strategy against communism.S5) CON's point about "imperialist" Middle Eastern scholars is ridiculous. These scholars are all well-versed in Said's writings - indeed the Slate article I sourced explicitly named Said as the intellectual architect of the "peacenik" sentiments prominent amongst Middle Eastern studies academics. To think that such scholars would have seemed "imperialistic" is absurd.The more likely conflict, once the cultural program was initiated, would have been between these well-compensated peacenik scholars and the rest of the US government establishment. Such conflict would have served as an example of a vibrant democracy where all opinions are voiced, heard, and given proper accord and respect. As long as the administration remained steady with prioritizing the cultural awareness program, the perspective of these academics would not have been marginalized.S6) CON's point about a "weak" Japanese economy is absolutely absurd. Japan is one of the most prominent economies in the world. Japan's economy is much stronger than most if not all of Western Europe, has some of the highest standards of living in the world, as well as one of the highest GDP-per-capita. Japan turned out just fine.S7) My scenario assumes that the US government actually followed Shinseki's recommendation of "several hundred thousand troops" deployed to Iraq. I don't know how or why CON thinks that there was no mention of a troop buildup. That has been the entire focus of this section on security throughout this entire debate. It seems CON has completely misunderstood PRO's case on this critical point.The US easily had enough troops to meet Shinseki's target - we did it in the first Gulf War, we could have done it in the Iraq War.CON's point about more troops equating to less security is ridiculous. Perhaps CON would also recommend that we de-fund local police departments in order to deter crime.War BondsI did not understand what CON was originally referring to regarding Patriot Bonds, as I originally assumed CON was talking about WWII bonds. CON's source only mentions it in one sentence from an article almost entirely about WWII war bonds."Patriot bonds" were not war bonds. Without a clear cause or a clear enemy, there's every reason to think that these bonds did not have any appeal and thus resulted in CON's anemic number.As already stated, Bush had a 90% approval rating following 9/11. Had he advocated for war AND sacrifice, there's every reason to think he had the political capital to do so, and that these war bonds would have sold well - as stated (and CON ignored), there is ready precedence for such sacrifice via war bonds from WWII. Instead, Bush advocated for war WITHOUT sacrifice from the American people, and so instead of floating war bonds, we borrowed $1 trillion from China instead (far more than my $500 billion number), thereby selling our future to foreign powers. ConclusionThe US has a deep multi-cultural reservoir from which it can source a cultural contingent that can fit any theater, to include Iraq. Beyond the government numbers that CON myopically focuses upon, PRO has demonstrated that there was a robustly funded area studies Middle Eastern program in the civilian sector, in addition to millions of Muslim Americans that, with enough incentive, would have made such an initiative feasible and actionable.This cultural contingent would have softened the footprint of an adequate occupation force, per Army Chief of Staff General Shinseki's recommendation. With proper security, Iraq would have been secure. CON does not contest that such a force would have been able to secure all of Baghdad, instead of just the Green Zone, and that this alone would have dramatically decreased violence in Iraq's most important city. With proper security, sectarian violence would have been minimized, US objectives would have been more easily accomplished, and a proper transition to US-friendly autonomous Iraqi government would have occurred. Troop withdrawals also would have begun earlier, as they did in Japan following WWII. The US initially occupied Japan with over a half million troops...almost all of these withdrew within 5 years, and left Japan in better shape than it was before the occupation. Much of this would have been funded by war bonds, so that America would have understood the meaning of sacrifice that accompanies any war. Such sacrifice would have led to belt-tightening, which would have stemmed the tide of the profligate debt binge that nearly destroyed the US economy in 2008. War bonds sold directly to the American people would have also made the US less reliant upon foreign governments to fund its own operations.I thank CON for a rigorous debate, and remind audiences that this is a NO SCORING debate. You are welcome to vote, leave an RFD, give constructive feedback and declare a winner - I only ask that scoring be left out of the vote. Thank you.