A duplicate of you is not you.

"A problem arises though when discussing two distinctly separate yet seemingly identical individual persons in geographical space. Person x has a completely different set of environment variables; photons, air molecules, point of view, sensory inputs, mental activity, etc., and is, as a whole, an completely independent compositional set and instance unto himself, than person y, by virtue of there being two distinct and separate bodies in two separate locations." Irrelevant as to whether the clone is you; there is nothing prohibiting two instances of self ipso facto by cloning technology itself, which you specifically stated prior is not up for debate - nonetheless the majority of properties you list are relative to, and not properties of, I am now currently relative to my chair, I step forward, I am now distinctly different relative to the chair from prior to the step, I am however not a separate person. Mental status is also irrelevant, the clone is contained of all the thought instances prior to the cloning, and as such contains all the same concepts and thought hierarchy as the other - each entity would act the same. "Mathematically, I'm sure Leibniz does not mean 1 and 1 = 1 when his law claims x = y. This does not mean x IS y." The Principle if Discernibles relates to what constitutes uniqueness, your resolution is about whether multiple extensions of the self are discernible, and thus far saying my clone is not me because it is a clone is begging the question. You have yet to detail differentiation of identity. " 'Same' is often mistakenly used in place of what is actually meant 'similar'." Straw man: - adjective 1. identical with what is about to be or has just been mentioned My arguments were quite clear about usage not being "similar" but identical. "There are two possible senses of what can be meant by 'sameness'..." There is only one relelvant usage, the one I used. "In scenario C however, I am killed, and then a duplicate of me is created on his planet. So a question is begged... How is it that because duplicates are made of me that I should have to go anywhere?" Your original presence is arbitrary as to whether the clone is you - identical to you - and you have yet to sufficiently argue as to why and how it would differentiate apart from relative conditions like location - which are not inherent properties of either. "I clearly die in scenario C. I don't die in scenario's A and B. Yet in NONE of them do I actually go anywhere (except in C where I am disintegrated/killed)." Still irrelevant. You act in X manner, your clone will act in X manner, you will think in Y fashion, your clone will think in Y fashion, you are composed of Z particles your clone is composed of Z. Your clone is you, its location is irrelevant as to it's *identity* which does not differentiate from yours. "Now, if I truly were the same person (sameness 1) as my duplicate, and the alien decided to stab the duplicate to death, technically I should die also, here on Earth (see my explanations on sameness earlier on)." You are confusing identity with causality. "My opponent continues on using 3 different analogues, ranging from confusing and dubious, to irrelevant, in order to refute my over all argument. I'm unclear what my opponent means by "...person A's life as being a film...". Do you mean a motion picture film? Regardless, this analogy does not address the problem of a copy being a separate and distinct entity from its original, yet not having ever been the original." You already addressed it when agreeing with me the nature of the clone is exact. Not an imprint of just that moment of time, but the totality of all instances of the person prior. "An original can never experience being the copy as I have illustrated, even though he may, for all intents and purposes, SEEM like he's "the same" person, he cannot ever be." Again, unneeded. The child at t will never have the experiences of t~ at t. Likewise, different experience at cloning. "As for the photo analogue, an image on the photo can be described as 'representing' the actual living person, in 2 dimensions, who posed for it. The image is identifiable as person A. Yet that image was not something like a voodoo picture that you could stick a pin into resulting in person A bleeding. If it were, the photo could be described as perhaps, 'having his sameness (1)' but in 2 dimensions on a piece of photo paper." Ignoratio elenchi. I never stated the photo was a perfect copy, specifically the opposite. "None of my opponent's points written after each of my alien scenarios makes any actual reference to the relevant point intended in those scenarios, nor explains clearly my opponent's rationale overall." Ignoring arguments does not make them not there, though it is useful for your purposes I guess. You did not and still have not shown adequate differentiation of identity, and the scenarios you proposed result in absurdities.