The Problem of Evil (PoE)

DefinitionsGod - An omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent personal being who created the universe and is concerned with the well being of His creatures.Evil (minimalist account) - (At least) anything which causes suffering, pain, disability and death. (Note: Even though the notion of evil as an extensive and controversial one, it is merely to avoid controversy and semantics that I restrict myself to this definition of evil.)IntroductionThe Problem of Evil (PoE) is widely regarded as the biggest challenge to belief in a God of the kind described above. In this debate, my role is to present a version of this argument, and to defend it against Con's objections. The type of PoE I will present is the evidential form, which states that while evils themselves are not necessarily logically incompatible with God, the existence of gratuitous evils present what most recognise as a very powerful argument against the existence of God:The WSA Evidential problem of evil (1) (P1) If there were an all-powerful and all-good God, then there would not be any evil in the world unless that evil is logically necessary for an adequately compensating good.(P2) There is lots of evil in the world.(P3) Much of that evil is not logically necessary for any adequately compensating good.(C) Therefore, there is no God who is all powerful and all good. Defending P1P1 states that in order for an evil to be reconciled with God, it has to be "logically necessary for an adequately compensating good." This means that the evil cannot be avoided, and that the reason for permitting outweighs preventing the evil. For example, those with tooth decay have reason to permit an evil (painful drilling) if this is the only way to relieve them of a greater evil. Such an evil would be compatible with the conditions of P1, iff this relieved the pain in the most efficient way possible. Likewise, goods like free-will are said to be so valuable that God has a morally sufficient reason to permit them, even in the face of horrendous evils. So what reasons do we have for believing P1 to be true. As Christian philosopher Daniel Howard Snyder remarks,"on the face of it, the idea that God may well permit gratuitous evil is absurd. After all, if God can get what He wants without permitting some particular horror (or anything comparably bad), why on earth would He permit it?"Almost all Christians and atheists agree on this point, because not only is the attributes of God seemingly logically inconsistent with the existence of gratuitous evil by its very definition, but the denial of P1 leads to massive problems elsewhere. Defending P2If P1 is virtually undeniable, P2 is even more so. The fact is that there are many things which cause suffering, pain, disability and death. Indeed, there are many things which cause all 4. In short, there is lots of evil in the world. There is torture, there is rape, murder, and a host of natural evil, from floods to droughts. However, in my defence of P2 it is merely sufficient to establish that these things exist and do so in abundance.I'll say very little else of P1 and P2, because I don't seriously expect Con to deny either that gratuitous evils are incompatible with an omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent being, nor do I expect Con to deny that evil exists in our world - that much is obvious. Rather, the objector to the PoE most commonly aims to direct fire at P3, that there are actually existing evils which are not logically necessary for an adequately compensating good, and it is to this which I know turn.Defending P3P3 states that some evils in the world are not logically necessary for an adequately compensating good - they are gratuitous (in the sense that I am using the term). An all powerful being is able to prevent the evils that occur, and an all good being is obviously willing, so the question becomes, is there always justification for the evils in the world, in the ways described above? The answer, I think, is quite clearly, no. Consider the examples of mass murders, torture, rape and other unimaginable cruelties in Indonesia, under Suharto, in Pinochet's Chile, in Stalin's Russia, Pol-Pot's Cambodia, or in Nazi Germany, and many, many more. What possible reason could there be for this horrendous evil? What compensation can there be for such barbarism? The short-term costs of such evil are so frighteningly high, so intuitively horrific and so apparently unnecessary that to attempt to justify it would is a tremendously difficult and, I suspect, an insurmountable task. Yet there is more.In conjunction with moral evils, there are natural evils, one of which is described in the following example:"Many babies each year are born with Down's syndrome. Most of these babies, with normal paediatric care, will grow up healthy. A significant number, however, have intestinal obstructions that will kill them if they do not receive an operation. Without the operation, dehydration and infection will cause these babies to wither and die over a period of hours and days. Today this operation is relatively simple, but not long ago these babies could not be saved . . . This baby (one born in the past with this) suffers for days, then dies." (3) (Sinnott Armstrong,2004, P84) Now given the examples above, does it remain rational to affirm that these evils are logically necessary for an adequately compensating good? Well, it certainly is hugely problematic to even suggest scenarios which would plausibly deal with the with suffering and death of a child in such a circumstance as above. We know (beyond reasonable doubt) that this child suffers. We know that if God exists, then this suffering must be necessary for an adequately compensating good (as P1 states). Yet what is also abundantly clear is that the prolonged suffering and inevitable death of this child and thousands like them brings absolutely no conceivable benefit whatsoever, let alone that the compensatory for this evil AND that this in turn be logically necessary. As Rowe points out:"In light of our experience and knowledge, of the variety and scale of human and animal suffering in our world, the idea that none of this suffering could have been prevented by an omnipotent being without thereby losing some greater good or permitting an evil at least as bad seems an extraordinary, absurd idea, quite beyond our belief." (4) (Rowe, 1979, P4).Now, of course, the PoE, being as old as it is, has attracted all sorts of solutions to try and puncture its intuitive, emotional and intellectual grounding, but the all the solutions I have heard thus far fail on so many different levels, but I'll let Con present the reasons he finds persuasive and we can discuss it further.ConclusionIn order to refute the argument, Con must deny at least 1 of the 3 premises, assuming he accepts that the argument is logically valid. In order to do, he must present both a plausible and coherent account of why the argument is unsuccessful. I invite him to make his case, closing with the words of the prominent Christian scholar N.T.Wright:"If you think you have solved the problem of evil, lie down. It will pass." (5)Sources1,3. God? Debate between a Christian and an Atheist, William lane Craig and Walter Sinnott Armstrong, 2004, Oxford University Press, p84.2. Howard-Snyder, Daniel, and Frances Howard-Snyder. 1999. "Is Theism Compatible with Gratuitous Evil?" American Philosophical Quarterly 36: 115-29.4. Rowe, William, The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism, American Philosophical Quarterly 16: 335-41.5. http://commonsenseatheism.com... (debate can be found here).