The Leibnizian Cosmological Argument is Sound - 2

Premise 1An Overview of Modal LogicRebuttal to: Modal logic depends on generalization from limited experienceThis is a strawman created by equivocating the term "necessary." Roy's refutation attacks the epistemological definition of necessary knowledge, whether or not we can know a fact a priori. The LCA operates under the ontological definition of necessity, that an entity's existence is explained by its own nature. In other words, that the entity would exist in all possible worlds. His reference to mathematics simply questions whether or not mathematic axioms are a priori in nature, whether or not they are analytic or synthetic. These are epistemological concerns, not ontological ones. Redefining X to Y and claiming that Z refutes Y does not mean that Z also refutes X. It simply means that Z refutes Y. Don't look at Roy's definitional refutation of modal logic. This dismisses his claim that we only apply contingency to our current universe for a failure to imagine alternative universes. I agree that we do not know what other possible universes could have been like, but that is because those universes do not exist. What we do know is that this universe exists and we know that it exists contingently. At worst my opponent's rebuttal is a strawman. At best it invokes epistemic nihilism in which case we reject it because in the rules it was stated that, "We should rationally accept an argument as sound if the affirmation of its premises is more plausible than the negation" and epistemic nihilism makes it impossible to weigh arguments. That would make it impossible to determine a winner. Even if we accepted epistemic nihilism, however, we could still use this debate as a thought experiment within our skeptical world and assume that knowledge can be obtained for the sake of the debate.Roy's next rebuttal of modal logic is the claim of incredulity, which leads me to my:The Principle of Sufficient ReasonRebuttal to: How does Pro know that an event cannot occur without a cause?There really ought not be any discussion on the PSR given that my second argument for the PSR has gone unrefuted and is a stroger logical formulation of the first argument. This means that if the second argument, The Explanation of Negative States of Affairs, is true, the first must be true as its conclusions are logically included within the second. Roy's only discussion of my second argument is that, "The argument is then that the person so asserting has accepted the PSR. So what? How does that apply the LCA? Specifically, when Hawking claims that time may be finite and unbounded, or that the universe may have created itself, how is he accepting the PSR?" Let's take this in two parts. First of all, I have already shown that the PSR contradicts Roy's argument for natural creatio ex nihilo. For example, let's assume for a moment that Roy's quantum fluctuations were supposedly uncaused. According to Roy, my argument posits that "if a dog did not bark, it must be for the lack of a reason." The corollary would then be, if a dod did bark, it must be for a reason. Now let's apply this to quantum fluctuations. If a quantum fluctuation did not occur, it must be for the lack of a reason. If a quantum fluctation did occur, it must be for a reason. This very easily applies to quantum fluctions because we can ask, "if quantum fluctuations occur sometimes without cause, why do they occur all the time without cause?" Because quantum fluctuations occur sometimes, and not other times, they must have a reason to occur at the times in which they do, and the times in which they do not occur can be explained by the lack of a reason. We may not know what this cause is, but there must be a cause.Furthermore, let us exam quantum fluctuations from an ontological perspective for a moment. All beings exist either contingently or necessarily. This does not seem to be something that can be disagreed with. Either they exist contingently and their existence can be explained by an external cause, or they exist necessarily and theri existence is explained by their own nature. For Roy to prove that quantum fluctuations are uncaused he would have to prove that they exist necessarily. If quantum fluctions exist necessarily, they exist in all possible worlds. This again begs the question, "if a quantum fluctuation could not have failed to exist, why do quantum fluctuations only happen at some times, but not others?" Roy cannot argue for a probabilistic occurance of quantum fluctuations because the very nature of probability assumes causation, for there would have to be a reason why sometimes the event occurs and sometimes it fails to occur. Probabilistic arguments from the contingency of quantum fluctuations.Do not let Roy argue that I in any way must prove my first argument for the PSR true. He conceded the second argument in both rounds 1 and 2, even though I explained that the second argument is logically stronger than the first, and logically inclusive of the first, in both rounds. The rules state that, "No new arguments should be presented in round 3 unless in direct response to a new argument presented in round 2." The logical ordering of the two arguments has been present since round 1. Letting him make this objection in round 3 denies me the chance to refute it, challenging the integrity of the debate.Do not let Roy expand on the claim that I did not sufficiently apply the second argument for the PSR to the LCA. Not only did I apply the PSR to the LCA directly in rounds 1 and 2, but Roy had the opportunity in round 1 to question the link between the second argument and the LCA and chose not to bring it up. As a result, I was forced to provide the link in round 3 as a response to his round 2 objection. The rules allow for this.Do not let Roy refute the second argument for the PSR in any way in round 3. He has conceded it for two straight rounds, and I cannot refute his round 3 arguments. The second argument was not introduced as a new argument in round 2, it was introduced in round 1.Premise 2Rebuttal to: How does Pro know that in every sequence of events there must be a first cause?Roy's only new argument here is a re-formulation of Hawking's argument. Hawkin's argument as stated by Roy's source is that time exists both horizontally, real time as we perceive it, and vertically, imaginary time. The universe exists within real time, and has a definitive beginning. In fact, Hawking says himself in Roy's source, "The conclusion of this lecture is that the universe has not existed forever." Therefore there is a specific first-cause of the universe, which Hawking calls, again in Roy's source, "The beginning of real time ... a singularity." Do not let Roy suddenly lie about the implications of Hawking's lecture as a last-resort argument.Rebuttal to: God in the LCAThis is my second premise argument from round one. Necessary, natural first causes are impossible due to their inability to create themselves as confined by the laws of physics. This argument went unrefuted aside from the quantum fluctuations argument which has already been addressed. Therefore the first cause must be non-natural. Anything abstract or mindless is causally impotent, therefore the first cause must be personal. Roy did not refute this directly in round 1, do not let him provide a new argument in the next round. His only leg in the debate is quantum fluctuations, which have been addressed.Rebuttal to: Perhaps the answer is unknowable to usAgain, this only concludes in epistemic nihilism. Either the debate is unresolvable, or we treat it as a thought experiment and accept that answers are knowable - the purpose of a debate. Premise 3Conceded.