Resolved: The Ontological Argument is Sound

Thank you for finally expressing your position on the use of the word "great." I do find it saddening that you have waited until round 4 to do so, but I hope that my points will become clear now that you have done this. You suggest that the argument proves the definition to which you appealed. This is true if and only if your definition allows your argument to be valid. For example, if I define a maximally great being as a being with the highest tolerance for spicy food, it does not logically follow that its existence in a possible world implies its existence in all possible worlds. Until you define the word "great," it is unclear if your argument follows logically. You then present, again, another form of the argument which does not use the word "great." I should first note that this is not the same argument that you were arguing for the validity of. Reminding the voters to keep this in mind, I shall do the extra work of dismantling it anyway: I am currently thinking of a world in which necessary existence is not a property and which is inaccessible via other possible worlds. This is a possible world under your definition. Under your "new" definition of a maximally great being, premise 3 has thus been falsified. Furthermore, in philosophy, validity is determined by truth tables. Any form of argument in which the conclusion may be false given true premises is invalid. I shall now define a few other gods: A maximally horrible being is a being which is omnipotent, omniscient, necessarily-existent, and omnimalevolent A maximally irritating being is a being which is omnipotent, omniscient, necessarily-existent, regularly intervenes in the universe to play practical jokes on people and confuse them, and has an inexplicable love of Miley Cyrus music. A maximally competitive being is a being which is omnipotent, omniscient, necessarily-existent being and which has only one goal: to undo everything the maximally great being does. If the ontological argument were valid to prove the existence of any being you define, it is also valid to prove the existence of any being I define. Unless you concede the existence of those beings which I have defined, the argument structure is invalid. Fortunately, the existence of all of these things is negated by the falsity of premise 3 under their definitions. In response to extension 2, this is what I was countering when I first said that I conceded the existence of a maximally great being if and only if it allowed for the validity of the argument. Any maximally great being which would fit would not be considered God. If you propose to use the definition of a maximally great being that the Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy uses, I then ask you to define "excellence" just as I asked you to define "greatness," and for the same reason. I also bring forth the possible world which is inaccessible via other possible worlds and in which necessary existence is not a property. Thank you for providing a definition of the word "great" which allows your being to be omnibenevolent. Unfortunately, if this is what is meant by "great," premise 3 of your argument is false. An omnibenevolent being would be just as benevolent if restricted to one possible world. Your flaw resides in attempting to combine all definitions of the word "great." This is the nature of the equivocation fallacy. A problem arises when we decide which definition will take priority. For example, if great means "Powerful. Possessing the ability to accomplish," and "of major significance or importance," one of two things is called into question: whether this maximally great being should be considered a god, or the validity of the argument. If the former takes priority, then the same problems I have presented before arise. If the latter takes priority, then I declare that I am greater than God. On the necessity of consciousness, note that I was careful in my wording. I suggested that a disembodied mind may not be logically possible. However, this appears to be distracting you from the main issue. My statement was that a maximally great being need not be conscious, depending on the definition of great. If this being does not have a mind, then it cannot think, reason, etc. However these are things which are logically impossible to do without a mind. There is no way, at least that you have presented, to get from mindlessness + omnipotence to a contradiction, therefore implying mindedness. The non-conscious entity's omnipotence remains intact. Extension 3 is but a reiteration of this point. I have already addressed this. "Sure, an omnipotent thing need not do anything if IT CHOOSES NOT TO. But that entails its ability to choose." This does not follow. A rock need not do anything if it chooses not to. This does not entail an ability to choose. It is possible that the thing simply cannot choose due to a logical impossibility to do so. Remember that omnipotence is not necessarily useful. In response to your final statements, if the word "great" was not required in the beginning, then you should not have used it in your definition. This was a flaw in your own planning. Definitions are best kept specific and exclusive. Your original definition was neither. I will, for the last time, suggest that you present a definition of the word "great" so that your original argument can be valid and your maximally great being will retain the status of "god." You may want to present another argument, but this is not relevant to the validity of your original argument, which you were arguing for. Furthermore, based on my past experience, your original argument is the one which will be the easiest to defend due to its vagueness. It is my recommendation that you focus your next round on it instead. I await your decision.