The Kalaam Cosmological Argument is Unsound

Defence of P1Firstly, I would like to apologise for my glaring error - I stated that the KCA is an inductive argument where it is actually deductive. What I meant to say is that it is a deductive syllogism - it is a deductive argument that uses some cogent premises (premises that are strongly inductive). Therefore the KCA is sound insofar as its premises are at least cogent, in other words the premises need not be deductively verified, but they can be inductively verified. The reason this must be the case is that all a posteriori premises are inductive because it is a presumption that our experiences our veridical. To assert that a deductive argument requires deductive premises would then entail that only a priori arguments can be deductive, which is not the case, given the nature of deductive arguments (1).Pro attacks my P1 induction by attempting to discredit the PSR. He says:1. The PSR does not necessarily exist and so cannot be accepted a priori2. Our experience does not give us sufficient knowledge of causaility so cannot be accepted a posteriori.I agree with the first assertion; instead I assert that the veracity of the PSR is affirmed a posteriori.Pro cites the problem that 'correlation does not imply causation', yet this is clearly flawed. Considering the definition of 'imply', we can see that X need not deductively entail Y for X to imply Y - X only needs to inductively suggest Y.So, to say that correlation does not imply causation is to say that correlation does not suggest causation; yet it most certainly does do this! If I experience that virtual particles never appear without interaction with a magnetic field, then this implies that the appearance of virtual particles is caused by interaction with a magnetic field.Of course, correlation does not deductively entail causation, but I can still assert the veracity of P1 using inductive reasoning so I need not rely on a deductive application of causation.Hence the second option is incorrect, our experience does give us inductive grounds to verify the PSR because we have observed uncountable events of entities coming into existence and every single one abides by the PSR - if this is not inductive proof of the PSR I don't know what is.Pro uses a form of reductio ad absurdum to try and disprove the PSR. Yet the flaw in this syllogism is premise 4, which states:'Something with a necessary explanation must be necessary.'This is not verified, nor does it seem evident that it can be verified. There is no logical reason why a necessary entity (X) cannot be the explanation as to why a contingent entity (Y) exists. Just because X is necessary it is non sequitor that Y is necessary.So, to summarise, I acknowledge that we cannot logically prove the PSR, but there is very strong inductive support for the PSR so this contributes to the overall inductive veracity of P1, which renders it a cogent premise.Defence of P2Pro states that I appeal to incredulity when I appeal to the intuitional absurdity of an illusory present. However, this is only fallacious if incredulity is appealed in support of a proposition when one is presented with cogent arguments against the proposition. I maintain that the arguments for the B theory of time are not cogent and so, if intuition infers the veracity of the A theory, then it is more prudent to trust our intuitions (in the absence of rational evidence).The syllogism that Pro uses as a rebuttal does not appear to pertain to my arguments, and even if it does, premise 2, that:'Some t is past, present and future'Is not asserted by A theory. Hence it cannot be used to present a contradiction within the A theory.Intuitional argumentPro attempts here to show how both A theory and B theory appear the same from intuition, yet in doing so he consistently refers to tenses such as the past, the present and the future. Yet B theory is a tenseless theory of time.The fact remains that our intuition maintains the reality of tenses, that at the present (the point at which we actually exist and experience reality), the period of time previous to the present that has the property of being in the past tense, and that the period of time after the present has the property of being in the future tense. Intuition asserts this theory of time, which is the A theory and not the B theory.Rebuttal of the B theoryTime dilations and the assorted theories of relativity are cited in order to conclude the idea that events do not have an objective tense. However, these do not refute the central premise of A theory; which is that there exists a constant flow of time which entails tenses relative to the present experience of an entity. All time dilations prove is that time can speed up or slow down; time still flows forward and tenses still exist, albeit they are relative to the present of the experiencer.To use an analogy, we are fish floating down a river (the progression of time) and the section of the bank that we see at a given time is the present. Sections of the bank that we previously saw are the past and sections of the bank that we will see are the future. For the fish, they only observe that the sections of the bank change, which is to say that their 'present' changes. However, sometimes a fish can get caught in a series of rapids which causes the rate at which they experience the changing bank-sections to increase - when the rapids end they have a different present to the rest of the fish that were not caught in the rapids (ananologous to time dilations).Yet this does not disprove the reality that a river exists, and that there are bank-sections that form the past as well as other sections that form the future. Hence the existence of time dilations does not refute the A theory, which entails that they do not provide sufficient evidence to verify the B theory.Therefore, my appeals to intuition still remain significant, as only sufficient evidence in favour of B theory would render them insignificant. Yet none has been presented thus far.Defence of P3Pro presents supposed problems with the concept of a personal God:1. A number/logical device or a mind is a false dilemma2. There is no proof that an disembodied mind can exist3. Free will does not exist if the PSR is true.Number 1 is a fair point, but remember that the premises of the KCA need only to be inductively proved. So even if there logically could be immaterial entities that are not numbers, logical devices or minds, the fact that we cannot conceive of any provides inductive cogency to the proposition that an immaterial entity could only be one of the above three options.Number 2 is refuted by the inductive inferrance that minds are not inextricably material and physically present within the brain, which would entail that a disembodied mind is a possibility.What is this inductive inferrance? You may ask.A pioneer of neuroscience, Wilder Penfield, wrote in his book that even when the brain is stimulated by electrodes in order to move a patient's hand or vocalise, the conscious patient does not consciously decide to do these acts. As he put it:"There is no place in the cerebral cortex where electrical stimulation will cause a patient . . . to decide" (2)This suggests that there is an immaterial aspect to the mind that contains one's decisions and contemplations.Furthermore, there is a distinct difference between the brain and one's self/mind. Let us suppose that I am kidnapped by an evil scientist who plans to remove my brain and swap the left hemisphere with the left hemisphere of another kidnapped victim. The end result being that half of my brain will be in one body and the other half will be in another body.Yet, despite all the progress in neuroscience, it is not vacuous to ask: 'what will happen to me?'. If the self was contained in a particular physical part of the brain then this question would be easily answered, but it is not clear as to what actually happens to the self. This suggests that the self/mind transcends the physical brain.Number three is based on Pro's syllogism that concludes that the PSR is mutually exclusive with the existence of free will.Yet this syllogism is based on a false premise, namely:'If free will exists, then there exists a world 1 and a world 2 where a conscious entity took two different choices (t=0).'This is not correct, either w1 or w2 is only a potential world, they cannot both be actual worlds. The actual world is determined by the actual decision of the agent. I will remind voters that potential worlds do not actually exist and so they do not require a sufficient reason. This premise asserts that when an agent makes a dichotomous choice, there exists two actual worlds where the agent made different choices. Yet this is not verified to be true, indeed it seems fanciful that it could be verified to be true.Pro goes on to assert that omniscience raises problems, stating that: 'if A (God) is a necessary object that must exist, then B (The Universe) must necessarily exist too since it is impossible that B cannot exist.'If God exists and he desires that the universe should exist, then the universe will exist. But if God did desire the universe NOT to exist, then it would not exist. Therefore the universe only exists insofar as God wishes it to exist, and hence the universe is contingent and not necessary. If it is necessary that God wishes the universe to exist, then the universe necessarily exists, yet this prerequisite is not met because God could have not wished that the universe exists. Hence the resolution is negated, and the KCA remains sound. (1) http://www.iep.utm.edu...(2) Penfield, Wilder: MYSTERY OF THE MIND p77