There is no God

Burden of Proof: The pro must provide arguments for the proposition. Arguments should lead into the conclusion that there is no supernatural realm, not that there is no evidence for supernaturalism. I must provide evidence and arguments that there is a supernatural realm. Contention One: Kalam Argument Formulated by Dr. Craig: 1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause 2. The universe began to exist 3. Therefore, the universe has a cause P1: This seems true by definition, since its negation is to affirm creatio ex nihilo, or creation from nothing. But nothing, by definition, has no properties, especially causal properties. Therefore something cannot come into being from nothing, or non-being. P2: The universe began to exist a) Actual infinities cannot exist in reality. If the universe did not begin, that means the number of past events is actually infinite. This leads to absurdities. For example, suppose that I have an actually infinite number of cards. Now suppose I take out every even-numbered card. Infinity-infinity= infinity. But now suppose I take out all cards except the first three. Now infinity- infinity=3! These absurdities obviously cannot happen in reality. In concept, adding and subtracting the infinite is prohibited because of contradictions. If actual infinites could exist in reality, you can add and subtract things because there could be an infinite number of concrete objects. But since this leads to contradictions, the infinite does not exist in reality. But that entails that the universe began. b) Science. The above conclusion has been confirmed in modern science. Let me just quote from the Vilenkin et al paper: "Our argument shows that null and time- like geodesics are, in general, past-incomplete in infla- tionary models, whether or not energy conditions hold, provided only that the averaged expansion condition Hav > 0 holds along these past-directed geodesics. This is a stronger conclusion than the one arrived at in pre- vious work in that we have shown under reasonable assumptions that almost all causal geodesics, when ex- tended to the past of an arbitrary point, reach the bound- ary of the inflating region of spacetime in a finite proper time." This conclusion works for any universe in a state of expansion since the only assumption on which their theorem is based is that the expansion is greater than zero (Hav>0). I could provide more evidence, but this should suffice for evidence that the universe had a beginning. P3: Therefore, the universe has a cause. By definition, this cause must be beyond space and time since it is the cause from which space and time originated. It is therefore beyond the natural world. Moreover, this cause must be immaterial since all of the material world was created. Thus, this suggests that the cause is supernatural, and not natural, since we know of very little in the natural world about immaterial things causing physical events (except our own minds). Contention Two: Modal Arguments (Plantinga's modal arguments) Possible worlds are ways the world might have been but is not actually. If something is possible, it exists in some possible world. For example, unicorns do not in fact exist, but their existence is possible and therefore they exist in some possible world. God is a being who is omnipotent, omniscient, etc. and who exists in every possible world. So IF God exists, He exists necessarily since its absurd to say that something contingent could bring into being God. Thus, IF God exists, He is necessary. IF God does not exist, then, necessarily, he does not exist. 1. Its possible that God exists 2. If its possible that God exists, then God exists in some possible world 3. If God exists in some possible world, then God exists in every possible world 4. If God exists in every possible world, then God exists in the actual world 5. If God exists in the actual world, then God exists 6. Therefore, God exists If P1 is true, the rest follows necessarily. 3 follows from 2 because God, as we have seen, cannot as a necessary being exist in only one world. Necessary beings exist in every possible world. Thus, if it is the case that God is possible, the He exists. So, why should we think that God is possible? Because the concept seems coherent and void of contradictions. Anything that is coherent is metaphysically possible. For example, it is coherent that I could have been born with three legs. Therefore, this is possible. Another modal argument: Let M represent the MIND and let B represent BRAIN or BODY. This argument shows that our minds are independent of our physical parts. Leibniz's law is the following: if A=B, then every property A has, B has. So if M=B, then every property M has B has. Some of these properties are modal properties, or properties of what is possible for M and B. 1. If M=B, then every property of M (mind) is also true of B (body) 2. If there is a property of M that is untrue of B, then M is not the same as B 3. If it is possible that M exists independently of B, then there is a property of M that is untrue of B; namely the property of that which is possible of M but not of B 4. It is possible that M exists independently of B 5. Therefore, there is something that is true of M that is untrue of B (from 3 and 4) 6. Therefore, M is not the same as B (from 1 and 2) Thus, supernaturalism is true. Contention 3: Fine Tuning This is the argument as formulated by Dr Craig, again: 1. The Fine Tuning of the universe is due to physical necessity, chance, or design 2. It is not due to physical necessity or chance 3. Therefore, it is due to design. Is there fine tuning? Well, this is just a scientific fact. By fine tuning, I mean the fact that the constants have extremely precise values in order that life can exist. Fine tuning, in itself, does not lead to God. Many physicists recognize fine tuning but do not affirm God, instead wishing to appeal to the anthropic principle with the multiverse. One example of fine tuning is the rate of expansion. Stephen Hawking calculates that if the rate of expansion changed by one part in 100,000 million million a second after the Big Bang life would not exist. Physical necessity: this seems false since even if our laws may be necessary (even this is questionable) the constants are not. In fact, string theory predicts that there are 10^500 different possible universes consistent with our laws but which contain different values for their constants. Thus, it is not physically necessary that we have to have the values that we have. Chance: The problem with chance is that the odds of there being a life permitting universe is overwhelmingly more improbable than a life prohibiting universe. For life, all of the constants have to be extremely precise or else life could not exist. So the only way to escape this problem is to appeal to the Multiverse hypothesis so that there exists enough universes to ameliorate the problem of chance. Dr. Craig refutes this well: "Roger Penrose calculates that the oddsof our universe'slow entropy condition obtaining by chancealoneareon the order of 1:1010(123),an inconceivablenumber.If our universewerebut onemember of a collection of randomly ordered worlds, then it is vastly more probable that weshouldbeobservingamuchsmalleruniverse.17 AdoptingtheManyWorlds Hypothesistoexplainawayfine-tuningwouldthusresult inabizarreillusionism: it is far more probable that all our astronomical, geological, and biological esti- matesof agearewrong and that theappearanceof our largeand old universeisa massive illusion (recall the dreaded Boltzmann brains). Or again, if our universe is but one member of a World Ensemble, then we ought to be observing highly extraordinary events, like horses popping into and out of existence by random collisions, or perpetual motion machines, since these are vastly more probable than all of nature's constants and quantities falling by chance into the virtually infinitesimal life-permitting range."