What is Undesirable May Very Well Be Appropriate

My apologies. I took Pros statement (the one I quoted last round) to mean that he agreed the exemption shouldn't be there. Since that seems to have been a misunderstanding, I will henceforth argue with the definition of desirable being nothing more than "having pleasing qualities or properties".However, this doesn't have much of an impact on my position, so much of this round is going to be a rewording of my previous round, to better explain my position, but I will also be explaining why the exemption is unimportant to that position. Specifically, at this point, my position is that it is impossible for anything to be both undesirable and prudent, and that this prevents anything undesirable from being appropriate. If something is prudent, then prudence is a property of that thing. Furthermore, as prudence entails a desired result, prudence is a pleasing property. If something has a pleasing property, that thing is desirable. So for anything that is prudent, prudence itself is a pleasing property of that thing, which means that thing is also desirable.As such, the exempted portion of the definition for desirable is simply a more targeted aspect of the accepted portion.The first and third definitions my opponents presented for "sky" are very similar to this.1. the upper atmosphere or expanse of space that constitutes an apparent great vault or arch over the earth.3. weather in the upper atmosphere. When talking specifically about #3, you're talking about a targeted aspect of the upper atmosphere, and so the rest of the upper atmosphere is likely irrelevant. In this regard, I agree with Pro.However, the reverse is a different story. When talking about #1, you're talking about the upper atmosphere as a whole. This includes "the weather of the upper atmosphere", and so, in this case, the two can be discussed together.So again, going back to the definitions of desirable, the accepted definition includes the exempted portion. So while we could exclude other pleasing properties, to talk about prudent things, we cannot exclude prudent things to talk about pleasing properties as a whole, because prudence IS a pleasing property. Long story made short, the point is, something cannot be both undesirable and prudent.By Pros final truth table, this would mean the green portion (that which he must prove possible) is impossible. ((not A) and B) will ALWAYS be false. So again, Pro must show that something can be appropriate without having any pleasing properties. Because prudence is a pleasing property, anything prudent will not work to show this (including his example of working out).Here's a simple syllogism to sum up the above argument.P1: If something is prudent, then prudence is a property of it. P2: Prudence is a pleasing property.P3: If something has a pleasing property, then it is desirable.C: If something is prudent, it has a pleasing property, and is therefore desirable. Of course, the above is ONLY to prove that something prudent is also desirable. I still must show that something undesirable can't be appropriate. No amount of examples can do this, but since Pro did not respond to my argument for this from last round, I will restate it. What makes something appropriate?There must be a reason in order for something to be fitting. That reason could be simply that it is pleasing in and of itself, or it could be that it results in something pleasing (that it's prudent). Therefore, if something's appropriate, it's because it is desirable or because it's prudent. If prudence is the reason, then it also causes it to be desirable. As such, nothing undesirable is appropriate.Again, if Pro has an alternative answer to this question, I'd be happy to hear it. Otherwise, I still consider my burden fulfilled.