Genetic enhancement that enriches emotional well-being is ethical

Let me begin by rejecting Con's definition of happiness because it limits it to today's standards. A genetically enriched emotional palette may assume textures conceptually unimaginable to us. I will go through Con's response to my case first, and close with my response to Con's case.QuotesAristotle: increasing happiness does not take away from the meaning and purpose of life. Con assumes an incoherent concept of maximum possible happiness, which becomes meaningless after it is attained.Kant: Con's distinction between "ourselves" and "others" is flawed, because "ourselves" implies collective society, not individuals against individuals. Bentham: Con's effort to misinterpret this quote is one of the most incoherent attempts to twist meaning I've ever seen. The quote states that happiness is the foundation of morals. Con responds by interpreting the quote to mean "happiness would not require morals." Con has completely misinterpreted the point of the quote, which is that morality is itself determined by the greatest quantity of happiness. Responsible ParentingAccording to Con, because "this debate is about the genetic enhancement of average humans to replace negative emotions with degrees of happiness," my entire argument about parenting is irrelevant. Such quick dismissals are usually a sign of misunderstanding or misrepresentation. In this case, I think Con understands the argument and attempts to downplay its obvious strength via quick dismissal.This is what I was arguing: that responsible parenting means choosing the best possible life for your child. This is the same argument that Julian Savulescu makes, and that's important because Savulescu is a major proponent of ethical pragmatism, the same ethical framework that Con herself chooses. Savulescu is the director of the Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, and argues for "procreative beneficence," which is the idea that parents are ethically obligated to choose the best possible life they can for their children. That is the argument I made, and I agree with it. Con did not respond to it, and instead drops it entirely. I went even further, and argued that the ethical consequences of parents not choosing the best life for their children is to equate parenting with gambling. In my opinion, that is an unacceptable ethical consequence. Con does not respond to that argument either, implying that Con thinks it is ethical for parents to gamble with their children's lives. Ethical systems that support enhancementCon completely drops my arguments mobilizing various ethical systems in support of genetically enhancing our degrees of happiness. Con argues that these ethical systems cannot apply to a "completely new human biology" because it would be "different from the biology that was the result of thousands of years of evolution." Why not? Why should the medical ethic -- "do not do harm" -- be applied, but these carefully worked out ethical systems be completely abandoned? What Con does in this argument is dangerously facile and simplistic: Con implicitly and selectively equates natural human biology (as the process of evolution) with the morally good in all these ethical systems. Of course, Con completely ignores the fact that the morally good in these ethical systems has nothing to do with nature, human biology, or the process of evolution. I will help Con out here: Plato's concept of justice in the Republic is an example of an ethical system predicated on equating the good with what is natural. But the systems I offered in support of genetic enhancement are not dependent in any way on nature or human biology. I ask Con and our readers give it some thought. Utilitarianism is an objective standard (greatest quantity of happiness) that holds regardless of changes in human biology. Kant's categorical imperative, as a moral system based on practical reason, is objective and independent of human biology. The Buddhist imperative to end suffering applies to all sentient beings and holds regardless of human biology. The divine command of the Islamic and Judeo-Christian God, again, is independent of how things are, and moreover, the benevolence of such a God would support our choice to seek happiness. In each of these cases, it is important to distinguish descriptive ethics (the ways things are) to normative ethics (the way things should be): these are normative ethical systems. Finally, Con agrees with ethical pragmatism, yet Con drops my argument that ethical pragmatism supports genetic enhancement to end suffering. Con should revisit that argument, where I argued it would be pragmatic to end suffering because it would solve the problem of suicide. I look forward to Con's responses on these ethical systems in the next round.Con's Case: Is Genetically Enhanced Happiness Harmful?I will try to keep this brief, as Con only offers a single argument in support of her position. This is what it boils down to: depriving humans of negative emotions is harmful, and causing harm is unethical. Con's reasoning goes something like this, because human evolution originally selected for negative emotions as a way to avoid harm, therefore selecting against negative emotions will cause harm.I counter: if human evolution selected for negative emotions at a time when they were necessary, does it not make sense that human evolution will select against negative emotions when they are no longer necessary?The obvious problem with Con's position is that it conflates descriptive ethics with normative ethics. Con's argument also makes use of the following incorrect assumptions and faulty logic: 1) the assumption that humans cannot continue evolving; 2) circular reasoning by arguing we should not continue human evolution because human evolution is over; 3) the assumption that selecting against a trait automatically produces the effect it was originally chosen in response to.My extended responses: 1) With the advent of genetic modification, human evolution is about to accelerate. Artificial selection will replace natural selection, producing a different kind of selection pressure that will favor a different set of adaptations than traits that were genetically adaptive in the world of natural selection. 2) Arguing that it is unethical to continue human evolution because human evolution is over is a circular argument. I argue that human evolution is not over, and the very possibility of genetic enhancement proves that it is not over. Thus, we can discredit Con's circular argument as fallacious. 3) It does not follow that, because negative emotions were selected to avoid harm, not having negative emotions will cause harm. As Con herself notes, because human biology after genetic enhancements will differ from current human biology, any comparison of this kind of misguided. Con's logic works against her. Another point: although negative emotion has been adaptive in our evolutionary past, there is no reason to suppose negative emotion is the ONLY way a complex adaptive system can avoid, and respond to, harm. In fact, by preserving our preference architecture, recalibrating the hedonic treadmill will facilitate critical discernment, rational decision-making, and motivated behavior. Truth is, our psychologically super-fit descendants will not need negative emotions as coping-mechanisms. Happy people generally love life, and their resourcefulness should make them far better equipped to deal with life's practical inconveniences. Also, Con underestimates the harm caused by depression. I've already listed suicide, but other harms follow as well. For example, depressed people often fall into a lethargic stupor because they realize, no matter how much effort they put into life, they're still depressed. Besides suffering, this causes learned helplessness and an inability to "get out of bed." What reason do we have to suppose the harms caused by happiness outweigh the harms caused by suffering? Hint: Con provides none because there is none.