It is rational to place faith in the invisible pink unicorn.

Introduction:Con continues to thrash with all the finesse and efficacy of a fish out of water. Unlike a hapless trout instinctively flopping in an attempt to resist its capture, Con actually believes that he is winning. If my observations are correct, a fish is at least smart enough to know when it's fried. This is unfortunate for him: one must be at least as intelligent as a fish to be me in a debate.Because Con does not have any particular method of organizing his arguments and prefers to mindless rant format, I'll pick through them myself and attempt to organize them into some coherent structure so that it can be rebutted.Probability and Belief:Consider my argument K K → P P Con points out that given what is meant by K and K → P, there are multiple possible P's. This is not in itself an issue. Suppose that K means “it is raining.” P could mean that the road will be wet, or P could mean that the game will be canceled. The fact that there are multiple possibilities cannot itself invalidate the argument.However, Con specifically refers to the case of multiple mutually exclusive possibilities. First, remember that this fails automatically. I can just fiat that KRF's argument only implies the existence of the invisible pink unicorn. If this is not the case, that would falsify premise 2 or it means there is an antinomy. The problem would not pertain to validity. However, it is worth taking the time to demonstrate just how wrong Con's objection to this is. Consider these two problems:I. The invisible pink unicorn (assuming it has only the properties implied by the words “invisible”, “pink”, and “unicorn”) does not conflict with the other deities Con thinks are implied by KRF's argument. There is no inherent logical reason why the invisible pink unicorn cannot be Jesus' trusty steed.II. Con's handling of probability is epistemological nonsense. Consider that P is the set of mutually exclusive cases A, B, and C. The set can be of any size, but we will limit it for convenience. Formally:P → (A, ~B, ~C) V (~A, B, ~C) V (~A, ~B, C)Any of these could be the case if P is true, and there is no reason to choose one over the other. We should be agnostic as to which is true, and if forced to pick we should select one at random. Con is proposing that instead we accept (~A, ~B, ~C). It is proved that this solution cannot possibly be the correct one. He argues that we should select it anyway because we will on average have the most true beliefs. This line of reasoning cannot because if applied more widely it leads to beliefs that contradict reality. Consider this argument.I will write the argument out informally because I don't know logic or set theory well enough to do it formally. (:-P)I know that this is poorly set up and has way more steps than necessary. Ideally someone familiar with formal logic can teach me how to do it correctly.Assume a thing refers to an object. All things are possible (ignore logically impossible things for the purposes of this argument). There are possible things. If there are possible things, there is a set of possible things. There are existent things. If there are existent things, there exists a set of existent things. The set of existent things is a subset of the set of possible things. The set of possible things is infinite. The set of existent things is finite. An infinite set contains infinitely more elements than a finite set. The set of possible things contains infinitely more elements than the set of existent things. The number of possible, nonexistent things is infinitely greater than the number of possible, existent things. We do not know for sure which things are possible and nonexistent and which things are possible and existent. We seek to maximize our number of true beliefs. We believe that all things are possible and nonexistent It is false that all things are possible and nonexistent. We believe that which is false. Basically, the logical consequence of Con's argument is that, all else being equal, we should never believe anything without absolute evidence. Unless he can solve the regress problem, this would require us to believe that nothing exists. It is plainly false that nothing exists (if it were the case that nothing exists than epistemic principles would not be of much use), and so his argument cannot be correct.AntinomyWhile it is logically and physically possible that there exists a fish that understands the concept of antinomy, it is the case that Con does not.Con asserts that if a valid argument leads to a logically impossible conclusion, the argument is logically invalid. For instance, assume A, A → B, A → C, B V C. It cannot logically be the case that all of these assumptions are true, but if they are it does not invalidate the conclusion B ʌ C. It means that there is an inherent problem in logic. This would mean that there is an unresolvable problem. I don't think that this is the case; it is actually the case that a premise is wrong. If a premise is false than an argument can still be valid.This resolves all Con's arguments from contradictory conclusions.ConclusionCon says that I debated using semantics because I don't think KRF's argument really was sound and I'm just too cowardly to defend my real view. I'm not sure if KRF's argument is sound, but Con did not successfully rebut it in his other debate. However, the main issue is that Con was asking me to do something different than what the original argument was intended to do. KRF's argument was that all true beliefs are based on faith, so if we believe in one specific god there must be at least some faith involved. Con's interpretation of this argument was that it is rational to believe in anything based on faith alone with no other considerations, and he asked me to defend that conclusion using an argument that was not even intended for that purpose. With only very minor adjustments to the conclusion of KRF's argument, I was able to demonstrate that this conclusion can be shown to be valid based on the premises provided by Con.Remember that I am not the one using semantics. Con is the one ranting about how everyone here understands philosophy so poorly, so it should be understood that as an expert in philosophy he means to use the terms correctly. I took the most rational interpretation of what Con meant and he asked use to use the word differently than how we normally would to help his case (special pleading anyone?).Voting Points:Conduct: Con is a jerk. He regularly insults me and the reader throughout the debate on the basis that we do not understand his arguments. We do understand them and he is wrong about anything. I also make fun of Con, but my jokes are funnier and he deserves it. Vote Pro on conduct.Spelling and Grammar: Con regularly uses run-on sentences, misspells words, does not capitalize, and makes other elementary mistakes. I have a few minor typos missed in editing throughout the debate. My sentence structure and vocabulary are much more advanced then Con's. Vote Pro on S&G.Arguments: I refuted all of Con's arguments in much more detail than was required. Con is wrong on so many levels he will never understand all of them. He also makes the debate very unfair on purpose and manages to get destroyed anyway. My arguments have philosophical issues that need ironing out, but these issues are way above Con's head. Vote Pro on arguments.Sources: Didn't really impact this debate. I urge no vote on sources, or you can give the vote to me because 1 point is not enough for how badly Con failed at conduct and S&G.