We Cannot Create Artificial Intelligence via Computation Alone

Thanks. I don’t find any problem with the definitions of mind, however any definition must take into account that it’s exactly the same as a human being’s mind in the sense that it possesses phenomenal consciousness [1] or in other words possess intentionality [2]. As long as these are included, Con’s definitions are accepted. The argument I am going to present is centered around the notion that what computation is, isn’t sufficient to produce a mind by positing a thought experiment where computation is done, but actual understanding doesn’t occur. History of the Chinese Room Argument The philosopher John Searle while on a plane traveling to give a lecture on AI was reading a book on the subject of researchers trying to create a mind by making a computer answer questions about said story as if it understood the story. He was very confused at the this idea that one could create strong AI via computation alone because computation doesn’t pass what Searle called “The Me” test. The me test involves one introspecting to see if something is sufficient for the creation of a mind. Or if the thing proposed can exist without a mind [3]. We can apply this test to AI via computation. When we do, we find it fails. Searle was certain he missed something, yet the responses at the conference were varied, he found no answer, and was unconvinced of the proposition. The Chinese Room Argument We must first notice computation is a shuffling around of syntax (moving around symbols). It’s just printing 0’s and 1’s , following algorithms, ect . If I can show syntax isn’t sufficient for semantics (mental content), then I have affirmed the resolution. Let’s say we put a man in a room. In this room contains a book that tells him what to write if he comes in contact with chinese symbols (I know the chinese symbols will probably not appear completely, but bare with me). An example might be “If “什(636;是兔子” then reply “動物”. The man receives a piece of paper that says “什(636;是兔子” and properly follows the algorithm and replies “動物”. The man has followed this algorithm and is only engaged in syntax and yet there is no understanding of Chinese. The man is functionally equivalent to someone who speaks Chinese and can pass the Turing test, yet there is no semantics. A computer is analogous to the man. No matter how much or how well we program a computer, it is still operating under syntax which is insufficient for semantics. Searle lays out the argument in a formal way [4]. (A1) Programs are formal (syntactic). (A2) Minds have mental contents (semantics). (A3) Syntax by itself is neither constitutive of nor sufficient for semantics. (C1) Programs are neither constitutive of nor sufficient for minds. A1 is true by definition. A2 is self-evidently true. A3 is known by our thought experiment and the conclusion follows. Not much else to say, the argument is very simple, yet is hard to argue against. I await your reply, the resolution is affirmed. [1] http://charlessiewert.com... [2] http://plato.stanford.edu... [3] The Teaching Company, Philosophy of Mind by John Searle Lecture 4 The Chinese Room Argument and Its Critics [4] Searle, John (1984), Minds, Brains and Science: The 1984 Reith Lectures, Harvard University Press