Rawslian theory is a justified form of government.

Pro seems to have misunderstood my first point. I don't see how it was unclear, but I'll try restating it. Actors in the Original Position are deciding what kind of society they want. But they aren't just choosing systems of organizing society (like democracy or anarchy). Rawls argues that they will pick a democracy that has a certain set of policies (specifically, policies following the ‘minimax’ principle, maximizing the well-being of the poorest in society). But, if we can pick not only what system we want, but how exactly the people in that system behave, then why pick a society with a government? Why wouldn’t actors in the OP say they want an anarchist society where everyone’s a really nice person and donates a lot to charity? Universal consent: You can’t just assert that people in the OP will agree on something, you have to prove it. Rawls argues that there is a specific set of policies that rational actors will agree on in the OP. I argue that there is no such set of policies, and that many different sets of policies can be equally rational (see: previous argument and risk-aversion argument). The only consensus people could reach in the OP are either A) No government, or B) A government. If A, then I’m right, and Rawls’ theory doesn’t justify a government. If B, then the views of some are necessarily forced on others, because there is disagreement and you can’t have everyone’s vision of society at once. But this isn’t even hypothetical consent, much less actual consent, so it can’t be considered a valid social contract. Risk-aversion: Rawls’ claim that we must be conservative for “primary goods” is nothing more than his subjective opinion on the matter. If someone values a small chance at being king more than he values a guarantee of getting welfare, then you can’t objectively say that he’s wrong. You can disagree, but it’s nothing more than a difference of opinion on the matter. “Am I risk-averse for investing in auto or fire insurance?” Yes, you are! I’d also buy those forms of insurance if I had a car or a house, but I wouldn’t presume that my purchases would be objectively rational and anyone who disagreed with me was irrational--we're both just at least somewhat risk-averse. As for the idea that risk takers would rationally choose a free society over a society where they wouldn’t be allowed to do risky things—this really misunderstands the idea of risk taking. If I’m a risk taker, is it irrational for me to go skydiving, since there’s a chance I might die and never be able to take risks again? Of course not—that’s a risk I accept, because I value the chance of the thrill more than I disvalue the chance of danger. But by Rawls’ logic, I, as a risk taker, wouldn’t rationally take this risk—which is obviously an absurd conclusion about risk takers. It misses the whole point of risk taking—accepting the chance that bad things could happen. Actual vs. Hypothetical consent: This takes liberal elitism to a whole new level. Not only do you and Rawls presume to know what’s best for me better than I do, as ordinary liberals do with the nanny state, you guys actually presume to know what I believe is right better than I do. Rawls’ conclusions about morality don’t necessarily follow, they only follow if you first accept his premises about how we ought to think about morality. And, as Rawls said, he “define[d] the original position so that we get the desired result,” egalitarianism. [1] He’s basically saying, ‘if you accept the premises of egalitarianism then you should be an egalitarian!’ Yeah, no sh­it. I’m quite certain that I don’t accept Rawls’ moral system, deep down or otherwise, and I’m sure many others would agree with me. His system is only the deeply held conviction of egalitarians. But even if Rawls’ beliefs were our hidden convictions, that wouldn’t make his hypothetical contract equivilant to actual consent. You can’t force someone to do something because you somehow just know that deep down, they really agree to it. Even if it were true, that deep down they really did agree with you (something that is, of course, not actually possible for you to know), it wouldn’t be consent. If I somehow knew that deep down, a girl really did want to have sex with me, but just didn’t know it yet, and I had sex with her, I’d obviously be a rapist. Even assuming that my knowledge of her beliefs was true, it still wouldn’t be consent—people have to bring those beliefs to the surface and act on them for consent.