The Open Question Argument by G.E. Moore

To make it clear, what my opponent has run is the Fregean fiat to the argument - meaning in short that two words that are tautologically the same, such as H20 and Water, refer to two completely different ideas. Further, he then runs a criticism of internalism: the theory that, when we act, we are motivated internally, rather than moved externally (distinct from the determinism/free will debate). Finally, and that which shall be addressed first, he claims that I have not justified any of the premises. Validating the argument There is no doubt of the validity and consistency of each premise. Each one is internally consistent (meaning it does not contradict itself): there is no internal contradiction in any of the premises. An internal contradiction would be a premise that is necessarily false: for example, "I punched a seven" or "All bachelors are women". A valid argument is one that logically necessitates the conclusion. The argument is a modus tollens. Meaning the argument takes the following form: P necessarily imples Q. Q is false. Thus, P is false. This is the same flow as the argument. Thus, we can conclude the argument is logically valid. Of course, this is not questioned. The important point is then the truth of the two premises (as the conclusion necessarily follows if the two premises are accurate). The First premise: Internalism, amorality, and Wikipedia Now, I mention wikipedia here because my opponent seems to use phrases very common to wikipedia's rebuttal here. This is not a criticism, of course: it simply highlights a problem my opponent had with Moore. That is, I think it highlights an agreement with me that the first formulation is somewhat question-begging. I say somewhat, to be clear here, as the argument itself is difficult to access the merit behind it. The new formulation is very reasonable. The first premise, then, without further ado. "If X is good, then X will in itself motivate an individual to pursue it." Now, this premise presupposes internalism. To be clear here, as my opponent seems to not pick up on this, our morality has to come from either inside ourselves, or outside ourselves. Meaning, when one knows of a moral thing, either one is necessarily motivated to do it, or they are not. The former is internalism, and the latter is externalism. The presupposition itself needs justification, and so I shall provide it. Firstly, presuppositionalism makes intuitive sense. We go after what we think is moral. That is, when I give to charity, I give to charity because I see it to be moral. That doesnotmean that I do whatever is moral by necessity: I see a lot of charities, and I do not give all my money to them, even though I'd see it as a moral action. I am motivated towards it, but other motivations - narcissism, for example - motivate me not to do it. The criticism of amorality is that some people know what is moral, yet have no inclination to do them. However, this position is absurd and nonsensical: what we see as moral is, by necessity, what we are inclined to do: we by necessity see being moral as a good thing. We are motivated to do what we see as good. Thus, we are motivated to behave morally. Further, we have never seen, experienced, or observed a truly amoral person. Hitler, the layman's standard of amorality, strongly believed in nationalism and fascism as a political ideology that will save Germany, and saving the German nation was the internal motivation driving Hitler. Taking Machiavelli, the philosopher's standard of amorality, was equally driven by pragmatism and nationalism. In fact, these things make internalism sensical: internalism says the reason why we act is because we are motivated to do them. That is,thereasons for action must be able to explain one's action; and only internal reasons can do this. One only acts in a certain way if one has the relevant desire. Meaning, we may, for example, not stealif and only if we follow a moral system that says we cannot. The externalist claims somewhat bizzarely that our beliefs do not effect our actions. The internalist argues, then, that if we think X is good, then we will be motivated to pursue X. To take examples, if we think stealing is bad, we will be motivated to not steal. If we think pleasure is good, we will be motivated to give to increase pleasure. This idea is in fact quite a simple one, which is why many are internalists. It's not that the first premise presupposes internalism as such, but more that, if you accept internalism, you by tautology accept the first premise. Conversely, by accepting the existence of amoral people, we have to reject internalism. As previously shown, however, there are no examples of amoral individuals, and further there is no argument my opponent poses to state amoral people exist. Of course, ignoring my opponent's lack of reason for believing in externalism, suppose it for a moment. This means that our actions are determined by forces outside of our control. In fact, all of our actions are caused by events before even our existence: our acts which are the consequences of the laws of nature are surely out of our control. Thus, there can be no moral responsibility, and thus no morality, and thus the conclusion of the original OQA - that no moral property exists [in nature] is affirmed. This is the vicious nature of the criticism. The second premise: Consequentialism, Singer and Drowning Children. "To challenge my students to think about the ethics of what we owe to people in need, I ask them to imagine that their route to the university takes them past a shallow pond. One morning, I say to them, you notice a child has fallen in and appears to be drowning. To wade in and pull the child out would be easy but it will mean that you get your clothes wet and muddy, and by the time you go home and change you will have missed your first class.I then ask the students: do you have any obligation to rescue the child? Unanimously, the students say they do. The importance of saving a child so far outweighs the cost of getting one"s clothes muddy and missing a class, that they refuse to consider it any kind of excuse for not saving the child. Does it make a difference, I ask, that there are other people walking past the pond who would equally be able to rescue the child but are not doing so? No, the students reply, the fact that others are not doing what they ought to do is no reason why I should not do what I ought to do. Once we are all clear about our obligations to rescue the drowning child in front of us, I ask: would it make any difference if the child were far away, in another country perhaps, but similarly in danger of death, and equally within your means to save, at no great cost " and absolutely no danger " to yourself? Virtually all agree that distance and nationality make no moral difference to the situation. I then point out that we are all in that situation of the person passing the shallow pond: we can all save lives of people, both children and adults, who would otherwise die, and we can do so at a very small cost to us: the cost of a new CD, a shirt or a night out at a restaurant or concert, can mean the difference between life and death to more than one person somewhere in the world " and overseas aid agencies like Oxfam overcome the problem of acting at a distance."[1] That analogy is very long, but is a very important one by Singer. We know, or many of us do, that pursuing general interest is the good, X. We know that giving all our wealth to charity, X*, produces general interest, X. But we do not give all our money to charity, X. Ihopethat I am, as well as Singer and countless others, cognitively sound and competent at the english language (As a native speaker, I'd be worried if I were not!) But this fulfils all characteristics of the second premise. This can be applied to any value of X. Thus, premise 2 is naturally affirmed. Conclusion and Miscellanious As long as the two previous premises are true, then one must accept the logically necessary conclusion. Not much else is needed to be said here. To go further, my opponent's other points become moot. Frege's criticism - which my opponent barely asserted - holds no weight, for it criticises no premise. In short, my opponent must falsify a premise explicitly to make his argument stand. I thank my opponent for their response, and await their rebuttal. 1 -http://www.newint.org...