The Leibnizian Cosmological Argument Is Sound

Like I mentioned in the last round, this argument will be more of a "catch-all" due to the nature of this debate having arguments that tie into each other. Quantum MechanicsI'm not arguing that a quantum vacuum is "nothing"; what I am arguing is that a quantum vacuum is acasual – in other words, that it is uncaused: "The singularity itself is also regarded in the GTR-based Big Bang theory as uncaused, although for a different reason. It is defined as a point beyond which space-time curves cannot be extended, and thus which cannot have causal antecedents. " As I mentioned in my first argument, during the Planck era, the convoluted nature of spacetime made causality impossible. [1][2] I also mentioned Heisenberg's uncertainty principle in my first round. Let me elaborate as to why that is important: "The conservation of energy seems to be violated by the apparent existence of these very energetic particles for a very short time. However, according to the above principle, if the time of a process is exceedingly short, then the uncertainty in energy can be very large. Thus, due to the Heisenberg Uncertainty principle, these high-energy force-carrier particles may exist if they are short lived. " These fluctuations are uncaused, due to the nature of the quantum vacuum I just mentioned. "There is observational evidence, albeit indirect, that this uncaused emergence of energy or particles (notably virtual particles) frequently occurs. "[3][1] Overall, I'm arguing that the singularity was acasual, and thus did not require a God for its existence. Also, my opponent argues that the universe was fine-tuned for us. While life-prohibiting universes are far more common than life-permitting ones, according to multiverse theory, there are around 10^120 (probably more) universes in existence, and it only seems probable that at least one supports life, and that we live in one. So it seems that the universe was not fine-tuned for us – we were fine-tuned for the universe. Defining an External Cause My opponent's objection to gravity being the necessary "force" for the creation of the universe is essentially a red herring. The third premise of the LCA states that if the universe has an explanation for its existence, that explanation is God. Our existence as human beings and the existence of objective moral values are irrelevant to this debate. We are only considering the "being" that created the universe. With that being said, gravity is the result of matter curving space-time. While there is no single accepted "supergravity" theory, this "superforce" is the result of an acasual event, meaning gravity is acasual as well. As for the quantum superposition argument, my opponent is forgetting the very characteristics of the God he is describing. Anything that is omniscient, by definition, knows everything. The only way to definitively know something is to observe it at every time. Therefore, God would have to observe all quantum superpositions, and thus make them collapse. Also, while the collapsing of quantum superpositions do create particles and waves, not all quantum superpositions are collapsed: "When measured afterwards, the resonator was sometimes in its non-oscillating ground state and sometimes in an oscillating "excited" state. The number of times it was measured to be in each state followed the probabilistic rules of quantum mechanics. " Logically, by this argument, an omniscient God cannot exist. [4] Simultaneous CausationMy opponent never really gets to the point of this argument. Imagine atoms A, B, and C. A comes into existence and instantaneously causes B, which instantaneously causes C, which instantaneously causes A. All the atoms have a casual explanation, and they all begin to exist at the same time. "The idea of a physical system containing an explanation of itself might seem paradoxical to the layman but it is an idea that has some precedence in physics. While one may concede (ignoring quantum effects) that every event is contingent, and depends for its explanation on some other event, it need not follow that this series either continues endlessly, or ends in God. It may be closed into a loop. " In other words, each effect is its own cause, which creates a closed loop and makes a creator unnecessary. EPR correlations support this theory. [5][6]Principle of Sufficient Reason My opponent's sole objection to my refutation of this is dependent on the existence of free will. He does not accept that no necessary proposition can explain a contingent proposition, and the latter cannot explain itself. However, if the former were false, the contingent proposition would itself be necessary, because it would be the consequence of something necessary, and if the latter were false, an infinite regress would result (which, I might add, my opponent does not believe in) and cannot explain anything. What results from these premises is that everything is determined. Nothing in the past could have gone differently, and nothing in the future can go differently than is already determined by the past. In other words, if we accept determinism, this refutation of the PSR is still valid. BVG Theorem Here, my opponent seems to just ignore my point - I showed part of the abstract of the paper that presented the BVG theorem which showed what the BVG theorem really stated. Just to prove that what I posted was the actual BVG theorem, here is the chief result of the paper: ". .. inflation alone is not sufficient to provide a complete description of the Universe, and some new physics is necessary in order to determine the correct conditions at the boundary. This is the chief result of our paper. " In other words, the chief result was not that the universe necessarily had to begin to exist. [7] There may still be a question on this, so here is part of a second paper published after the above paper that talks about the BVG theorem: "This important result is sometimes paraphrased to imply that there is no escape from the big-bang. This is not the case. .. Thus, the LQC resolution of the big-bang singularity can evade the original singularity theorems of general relativity even when matter satisfies;es all energy conditions because Einstein’s equations are modified due to quantum gravity effects, and it evades the more recent singularity theorem of which is not tied to Einstein’s equations because the LQC universe has a contracting phase in the past. " What they are saying is that the universe could have had a contracting phase in the past, which extends infinitely into the past. Nowhere is an initial beginning ever argued for. Further, it also gets rid of the De Sitter solution problem my opponent talks about, and also presents a third option to the list of universal creations. [8] This makes my opponent's only objection to the Ekyprotic universe theory I presented, and therefore that theory is still a relevant alternative to the immaterial, universal God my opponent argues for. Also, while Occam's razor cannot choose which theory is correct, it can make a prediction as to which theory is correct, and predictions made with Occam's razor have been probabilistically shown to be more correct than those that go against Occam's razor. All Occam's razor does is make the idea of a God unnecessary and unlikely. Again, my opponent's argument is more ad hoc than mine, so his question at the end of his argument seems to just make his argument even worse off. Conclusion The LCA is a very unsound argument, both in assuming that everything that exists has an explanation for its existence, and in necessitating an immaterial, universal God for said explanation. Quantum mechanics has shown how the former premise is incorrect due to the impossibility of causality during the early universe and alternative theories can show how such an immaterial, universal God is unnecessary even if the former premise were true, and quantum mechanics has also shown that an omniscient God makes quantum superpositions impossible, even though they have been shown to exist. I also hope that my opponent had a Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year, and again thank him for participating in this fantastic debate. Sources [1]: . http://infidels.org...[2]: . http://abyss.uoregon.edu...[3]: . http://pdg.web.cern.ch...[4] . http://www.newscientist.com...[5]: Davies, Paul. God and the New Physics. p. 47. [6]: . http://www.worldscientific.com...[7]: . http://arxiv.org...[8]: . http://arxiv.org...