The Problem of Evil Against the God of Christianity Is Valid.

Introduction: My opponent insists that when the two premises (1) God Exists and (2) Evil Exists are dually stated, there exists an actual and necessary contradiction. My argument then, need not be true or even known to be true, all it actually needs to be is possible. Much of my argument stems from the renowned philosopher, Alvin Plantinga, who achieved something quite rare in philosophy – consensus among both theist and atheists that it works (save for a few atheist philosophers who either admit that their arguments still fall short or fail by disanalogy). Plantinga's argument has been so openly accepted in the philosophical realm that the philosopher Peter Van Inwagen, commented in his book, "It used to be widely held that evil—which for present purposes we may identify with undeserved pain and suffering—was incompatible with the existence of God: that no possible world contained both God and evil. So far, as I am able to tell, this thesis is no longer defended." I would also like to briefly inform my opponent that Assumption (1a) need not be apart of the Christian God, but, for the sake of this debate, I will accept it. ON TO THE DEBATE! .;'*?.;'*?.;'*?.;'*?.;'*?.;'*?.;'*?.;'*?.;'*? Contention 1: whence came this evil? This is a very important contention, and I would like my opponent to consider it closely. My opponent's premise (2) states that evil exists. It is my contention that if the first premise (God exists) is removed, then so is the second premise (evil exists). My opponent is either engaging in the traditional begging of the question, that is, premise (2) depends on the truth of the very matter in question, or he is presupposing an alternative objective standard by which we may determine evil. Such a presupposition will not be granted and needs to be explained. If evil can only exist if God exists, then it stands to reason that premise (1) and premise (2) actually work in favor of theism. .;'*?.;'*?.;'*?.;'*?.;'*?.;'*?.;'*?.;'*?.;'*? With Contention 1: The contradiction clause in my opponent's syllogism implies that evil exists apart from God. My opponent must therefore show what objective standard he uses to determine evil (and also why this standard is universal). If my opponent asserts that evil exists, but God does not, he must prove this to be that case – a mere tenuous assertion will not suffice. .;'*?.;'*?.;'*?.;'*?.;'*?.;'*?.;'*?.;'*?.;'*?.;'* Contention 2: There are things even an omnipotent God cannot do A world that contains free creatures is more valuable than a world that contains no freedom at all. It is indeed possible for God to create free creatures, but, as Plantinga points out, "He can't cause or determine them to do only what is right FREELY. To creature creatures of moral good, therefore, He must create creatures capable of moral evil, and He can't give these creatures the freedom to perform evil and at the same time prevent them from doing so." One must rightly admit that if it is possible for God to create such creatures, then my opponent's syllogism fails. To put it even more simply: P1: It is possible for said God (omnipotent, omniscient, and omni-benevolent) to create a being that has moral freedom. P2: If it is possible for said God to create morally free beings, then it is possible for said God to create a being who freely chooses to act evilly. C: It is possible therefore, for said God to create a being who then freely chooses to act evilly. .;'*?.;'*?.;'*?.;'*?.;'*?.;'*?.;'*?.;'*?.;'*? With Contention 2: God cannot force a free action – it is a logical contradiction. Stepping into modal logic here, let's take Bob as an example. Bob has a choice to beat up Larry. If the decision is a free one, then there must be a possible world where Bob beats Larry and also a possible world where Bob does not beat Larry. Now one of these worlds even God cannot actualize. Which world becomes reality depends on the free action of Bob, not God. .;'*?.;'*?.;'*?.;'*?.;'*?.;'*?.;'*?.;'*?.;'*? Contention 3: Our limited perspective My opponent does not possess the necessary knowledge to determine evil. Take for example a man who slowly awakes to find woman cutting his stomach. The man will rightly fuss that such an action is evil! But say he finds out that the woman is a doctor who is trying to remove a malignant mass that will ultimately kill him. Will he not then realize that what he perceived to be evil was not evil at all? .;'*?.;'*?.;'*?.;'*?.;'*?.;'*?.;'*?.;'*?.;'*? Conclusion: My opponent must adequately refute the three presented contentions before his argument can stand. But since he has neither adequate perspective nor an objective standard to which he appeals, I am not sure that his burden is capable of being fulfilled. Sources: http://philofreligion.homestead.com...