God exists

Introduction In the last round of this debate I will defend my original arguments from objections raised by Pro and then conclude with my closing statements. With that said, let me begin. Pro is right to point out that my evidential argument from evil has no effect on arguments for the existence of any type of God. This is because there could exist a God that is morally indifferent to good and evil. But if you remember correctly, the type of God whose existence we are debating over is morally perfect. As such, the evidential argument from evil is relevant to our debate. The Moral Argument In response to my evil God objection to skeptical theism, Pro has put forth a modified version of the moral argument in order to demonstrate that the evil God objection is unsuccessful. The first premise of this argument claims that if God does not exist, then objective moral values do not exist. By objective moral values we mean moral values that are true independently of whether people believe in them or not. [1]In support of premise one, Pro claims that if God did not exist then there would be no basis for objective moral values. This is because If atheism turned out to be true, then only the natural world would exist. Before I move onto my main objection to this argument, I would like to point out that Pro, like William Lane Craig and Alvin Plantinga, for some reason don't make a distinction between atheism and metaphysical naturalism. Atheism, as pointed out in the first round of the debate, is the belief that God, so defined, does not exist. Metaphysical naturalism is, roughly speaking, the view that only the natural world is real. So, if one is an atheist that does NOT mean that they are also a metaphysical naturalist. An atheist could believe in ghost, spirits, immaterial beings ect. as long as they believe that God does not exist. However, if one is a metaphysical naturalist, they will necessarily be an atheist. The reason for that is because God is a supernatural being and therefore could not exist if naturalism is true. With that misunderstanding corrected, I will now move on to my main objection. My objection to this argument is going to be the standard Euthyphro dilemma. The Euthyphro dilemma puts pressure on the first premise of this modified moral argument put forth by Pro. In order for this modified moral argument to be true, the meta-ethical view of divine command theory will also have to be true. Under this view, an action is wrong if and only if God commands someone not to do it. So, here is the Euthyphro dilemma:1. Is that which is good commanded by God because it is good? OR2. Is it good because God commands it? If we choose the first option, then morality will not be dependant of the existence of God. Things would be right or wrong independently of whether or not God exist. But if that's right, then the first premise of the moral argument will be false. This is because objective moral values could exist even if God did not. If we choose the second option, then morality is subjective rather than objective. This is because God could decide arbitrarily whether or not a thing is right or wrong. For example, if God said that torturing small children for fun was morally good, then performing that sort of action would be right. Either way, the Euthyphro dilemma shows premise one of this argument to be mistaken. However, Pro may object that the Euthyphro dilemma is a false dilemma. He might reply that morality is not independent of God nor is it something that he arbitrarily creates. But rather God's nature or his essential properties is the standard of morality. In other words, it's not something he creates or appeals to but is something he is. But this move creates another Euthyphro dilemma, which can be formulated as follows: 1. Does God have control over his nature? OR2. Does God not have control over his nature? If God does have control over his nature, then God could choose his nature and therefore decide for himself what is good and what is bad. This would again make morality subjective rather than objective because God could arbitrarily decide what is right and wrong. If God does not have control over his nature, then something other than God would be laying down what God's nature is. That would mean this external force would be the true ground of morality. Not God. So, the Euthyphro dilemma provides strong reason to reject this modified moral argument. Finally, Pro makes the claim that if the perfectly evil God exist, then the morally perfect God of monotheism must also exist. But this can't be correct. If you remembered correctly, perfectly evil God is omnipotent or all-powerful like the God of monotheism. So, given the fact that both the perfectly evil God and morally perfect God are omnipotent, they couldn't both exist at the same time. This is because there would be potential for conflicts of will between them. [2] For example, perfectly evil God would want to bring about a great deal of evil in the world, whereas morally perfect God would want to bring about a great deal of good. If perfectly evil God could prevent perfectly good God from bringing about good, then that would show that he is the truly all-powerful being. Whereas if perfectly good God could prevent perfectly evil God from bringing about evil, then that would show that he is the truly all-powerful being. As you can see by the example, these two types of Gods could not coexist. Since Pro did not give a satisfactory response to the evil God hypothesis, it remains a powerful objection to skeptical theism and does not get the monotheist around the evidential argument from evil. ConclusionIn this debate I have provided an argument in defense of the claim that God, so defined, does not exist. I want the voter reading this to keep in mind that even if my argument against the existence of God is unsound, one will still be committed to vote for me if they believe that I kept Pro from meeting his burden of proof. I enjoyed this conversation with Pro and I hope he continues to engage in more debates on this site. Sources: [1] . http://www.reasonablefaith.org...;[2] . http://link.springer.com...;