Freedom of Speech Is Superior to Freedom of Assembly

To start, Pro is not considering how offers themselves can constitute harassment by forcing offerees to "unwillingly rally" with the offers of offerors. In law, there is another term that deals with this called "duty of care". Those who exercise freedom of speech must exercise duty of care so they don't harass others.The first article considers indecent broadcasts on TV. When people watch TV, they consent to assemble with decent broadcasts, not to "unwillingly rally" with harassing indecent broadcasts.The second article leads with saying, "Although indecent speech is protected by the First Amendment, speech in broadcast media has been restricted because of its omnipresence and its accessibility to children." Omniscience and accessibility involve assembly. Later, the article refers to "community standards" and how "sexually explicit media" can "negative affect how men behave toward women" and is concerned about "the effects of profanity on behavior". These are all concerns of how people assemble peacefully with one another.Regarding the third article, I'm not sure how my opponent honestly believes stalking and harassment don't contradict freedom of assembly. The victims of stalking and harassment are being forced to assemble without consent.Regarding the fourth article, I will directly cite the segments. Pardon me for its length, but my opponent's poor conduct in refusing to "[type] up another paragraph that would only contain rehash" merits its necessity. Also, pardon the lack of indentation. Formatting wasn't working: Many scholars presently believe that “no single value or interest explains the speechclause [of the First Amendment] and no simple formula [i.e., no “grand” or “unified”theory] can implement it” (Cass 1987, 1490; Shiffrin 1984). This belief has clearedthe way for theories, such as those of Justice Brandeis, driven by “romantic” notions ofwhat the amendment ought to protect (Shiffrin 1990). Critics of constitutional romance correctly point out that the approach is shallowly rooted in the subjective values dearest to the interpreter, including such values as individual development, democraticgovernment, social stability, and the search for political and philosophicaltruths (Cass 1987, 1411). Some scholars, also laboring in a romantic vein of sorts, argue that First Amendmentissues must be decided on a fluid bed of “practical reason,” because “foundationalismcripples our ability to resolve constitutional issues by limiting ouranalytical tools to deductive reasoning. Practical reason allows the use of the full rangeof cognitive abilities. Solving constitutional problems . . . requires no less” (Farber andFrickey 1987, 1617). The difficulty with both constitutional romance and practicalreason is that they are rhetorical rather than logical methods, consisting of little morethan “a grab bag that includes anecdote, introspection, imagination, common sense,empathy, imputation of motives, speaker’s authority, metaphor, analogy, precedent,custom, memory, [and] experience” (Posner 1990, 73). Theories developed from suchfoundations necessarily represent a skillful weave of desired outcomes. For example,“To have pragmatic value, a theory of First Amendment construction must ensurestable protection of fundamental speech and press liberties, must be directed againstthe actual threat posed to those liberties, and must not upset the delicate balance ofpower among the branches of government and between the public and private sectors” (Emord 1991, 119). In sum, romantic traditions contribute relatively little to the formulation of robust First Amendment theory, although they are highly descriptiveof contemporary First Amendment doctrine. The existence of that descriptive powercorrectly suggests that the scope of speech freedom enjoyed today is not so mucha product of substantive First Amendment principle as it is a product of substantivedue process wrought through the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments, a point to bedeveloped shortly. Methodological difficulties aside, however, constitutional romance clearly has resulted in private expression rights being protected to a far greater extent than property rights in general have been protected by other, more restricted constitutional theories. So great is this disparity that classical liberals (economists mostly) cite the high protection accorded expression rights as the appropriate constitutional standard for protecting all property rights, while neoliberals (lawyers and social scientists mostly) conversely cite the low protection accorded property rights as the appropriate standard for protecting expression rights. The justification for this reference goes as follows: The first bolded section refers to subjective values which are how people choose whether or not to assemble with something. Those values also include the integrity of freedom of assembly itself, and how it's subject to "practical reason" as mentioned before. The second section refers to the first amendment in general, but prioritized freedom of speech in particular. The third section refers to conflict previously described between freedom of speech and property rights, a form of freedom of assembly. To conclude this round, my opponent seems to believe that speech and assembly are necessarily complements. The problem is that speech can be used to harass others into assembling without consent.