Theism v Atheism

Why Theism is More Probable I. Atheists have always affirmed that the cosmos is necessary and so not in need of explanation outside of itself. But things which begin to exist are not necessary. What else than explains the cosmos if not a necessary reality? The argument isn’t that because the first cause is causally potent than therefore it’s God, rather it’s that God is the necessary and sufficient cause given the contingency of the cosmos. And the reason God would possess those 3 omni’s as great making properties is because if it’s greater to have such properties then God has them; they're greater to have, so God has them. Con would have to show that such properties aren't great. But the cosmological argument only establishes a necessary personal ultramundane being. The nature of such a being establishes the omni's. The scientifically naive claim that that the singularity is the cause of the universe fails to understand that the singularity is a mathematical idealization where it's used to make sense to speak of all geodesics becoming nil since any 2 points of distance equals 0 at t=0, it marks the absolute origin of the cosmos. It’s not some preexisting physical state that later exploded. Now there’s several reasons why the cause is personal. First a scientific explanation of the first cause won’t do, since all matter, space, time and energy came into existence, and so the cosmos’ birth can’t be explained in terms of physics, but rather personal explanations. Second since time itself began, if the cause is sufficient to produce the effect, then why isn't the effect co-eternal with the cause? The only plausible explanation is agent causation in terms of volition. Here Con mistakes God’s being causally prior with being temporally prior to the cosmos. Third, the cosmos includes embodied moral agents, why is it the case that this cosmos came into being from an impersonal cause? Fourth, the cause of the cosmos is ultramundane and necessary, but the only things which are ultramundane and necessary are abstract concepts or a mind. But abstractions can't cause anything, so we're left with a mind. II. Con affirms that “God is indeed a supreme being” and so he should then affirm that God exists in some possible world. But since God, as a supreme being would be greater than anyother being in that world, and since "greater than" is asymmetric, then God exists. And the reason I gave that a necessary being explains all reality is based on temporal contingency. "If only a finite amount of things have existed to date for a finite period of time, then not only are such things contingent, but then there was a state when nothing existed. But if there was such a state, then nothing would presently exists, which is absurd.” Con then asserts that morality depends on physics. But it makes no sense to reduce morality to physics or regard physics as a sufficient explanation of it. It’s notoriously difficult to get an ought from an is, and norms of physics and rationality are norms for what is. Furthermore physics is descriptive whereas rationality and morality are prescriptive, why then reduce prescriptions to a descriptive discipline? Indeed if the laws of physics were different, would it then be ok to rape? Would 2+2=5? Why Theism is Less Probable? III. Con attempts to reason that atheism is more probable, but by reasoning, he disconfirms his position in the process. For if atheism is true, then some of the fundamental causes of existence is not mentalistic, but materialistic. Con must first answer why it’s more probable that reason itself should emerge if some of the fundamental causes of the universe are not more like a mind? Ceteris paribus, worldviews which render it improbable that reason should emerge should be rejected in favor of worldviews according to which it is not improbable. And since materialistic views, like atheism, render it improbable that reason should emerge, then we’ve reason to reject atheism in favor of theism. [8] A. Kierkegaardian Fideism Con thinks that we should “prove God in his entirety” in order to know that he exists. But I've already said certitude isn't necessary. Insofar as we can gradually discover God and his properties through either reason or experience of him, then that does nothing to show a belief based on such discoveries is irrational. Con’s misunderstanding of this shines through here, “God already has an infinite number of characteristics, and we cannot prove there is a spiritual force which has them all.” Even if it were true that God has an infinite number of characteristics, why would it matter that since we can’t prove them all, then therefore God probably can’t be known? Indeed Con is claiming that nothing about God is known, but at least we know that, so his position is self-refuting. But in fact God's characteristics are qualitatively infinite in the sense that he's all good, not that he has an infinite set of quantitative goodness. That's silly. I invite Con to show us which deities successfully parody God in the sense that he’s a necessarily existing reality, who has at minimum those three omni's. And all the denominations of Christianity differ over things like hymns and how the sacraments should be taken and free will, they don’t differ over God and his properties, so Con’s bringing up irrelevancies here. This argument fails for three reasons then. First it's too hasty because it discounts the project of natural theology. Kierkegaard lived in a culture who placed reason above faith, and so it comes to no surprise that his attack on the cold-hearted rationalized Christians would be an attack of knowing God through reason alone. Kierkegaard attempted to show the cold Christians in his time that a leap of faith in God is more important that what they had thought. He failed to properly characterize faith as an experience of God and the reasons to vindicate those experiences against potential defeaters. Second, the argument is self defeating. If God's properties are unexplainable, how then can Con explain to us something about those properties? Namely that they're so immense and complex and that the normal realm can't apprehend it? Third, this argument is a strawman, it attacks the proper epistemological foundation of how one knows theism to be true instead of the truth of theism itself. Kierkegaard attacked theological rationalism (today; evidentialism), which states that belief in theism must be based on reason and evidence. But theism for folks is based on a basic belief as an inner witness of the Holy Spirit, which isn’t grounded on arguments. Nevertheless showing theism to be true by way of argument can't be dismissed either, since in this very debate Con is attempting to show that theism is false! Many times we’re shown something to be true and assent to it by way of argument. Then later our knowledge becomes more foundational once we experience that thing. So this objection does nothing to undercut a case for showing theism to be true. It merely questions how we know it. B. Falsificationism Even if it were true that theism was unfalsifiable that wouldn't matter so much because falsifiability isn't the only method for gaining knowledge. There's also positive justification for a position that may itself be true, yet unfalsifiable! (Justificationism) But in fact God is falsifiable! One might prove a God as incoherent or evil could disprove God, etc. Indeed how else could Con claim that evil defeats theism, or that Christianity is false if it were impossible to disconfirm theism? C. 1000 Qualifications? When it’s said that God loves us, that’s not meant to be taken as an argument or proof. It’s an “in house” reminder to folks who are already theists that God cares for us even in the hard times. D. Evil Note what Con is attempting to disprove here, an all knower and all good being. Such a being, if it exists, would have a morally sufficient reason for instances of evil that he permits to happen, regardless if we, partial knowers, fail to know it. Con then must show that God would have no such reason for evils, and that we partial knowers can know about them in principle. Huge BOP which hasn’t even begun to be addressed! Partial knowers have a duty to act within their moral purview. But a partial knower’s moral purview isn’t an All knower’s moral purview (Con has to show it is), nor is God under any obligation, rather he would act consistently with his all good nature. Con would have to also show that God doesn’t have a morally sufficient reason to keep from revealing advanced tech to humans. But what if iron age men had tech comparable to nuclear energy? Leave that aside however, Con has to show that God and evils are logically incompatible in the first place. I'm not so sure they are, for if we suppose that a divine resolution of non-interference (with exceptions) is essential to the nature of man or that our essence is such that it requires a binding resolution for God not to intervene on every instance of evil (post-fall) which isn't relevant to his plan of ultimate redemption, then such a resolution can't logically count against the claim that God loves his creation. For whatever is necessary to bring about my existence can't count as morally wrong. Before I exist, God can't be said to have a duty to me. [9] Secondly, for God and evil to be incompatible it must be possible for any being to know the moral baseline from which God must not cross if he is to fulfill both his plan for humanity and to not allow his creatures to suffer gratuitously. Since God can't know what's impossible to know, then there is no incompatibility between God's knowledge and love, and the evil he permits if it’s impossible to know this baseline. [10] E. (Objections specifically to Christianity are irrelevant to the general debate about theism) Sources 8. Victor Reppert, 2003, p 96 9. http://www.robkoons.net... 10. http://faculty.wwu.edu...