It is morally permissible for victims to use deadly force as a deliberate response to repeated domes

Now, the definitions proposed by my opponent as CON are absolutely fine in the context of this resolution, for they have no impact on my case or the overarching contextual impact on her's as well. My value premise will be the same as my opponent, as morality, for it provides the best means for basing jurisdiction upon. However, my value criterion will be self-defense, as it provides the best means by which the moral permissibility can be judged. Argument: The moral as well as social contract is made up of categorical imperatives that support the intrinsic notion that you either meet the standards by a moral benchmark, or you fail to do so. As such, an individual who engages in repeated forms of domestic violence thus fail to meet the social or moral contract that we are all burdened with. Thus self-defense in all forms by the victim is justified once the abuser terminates his/her social contract. Self-defense, including that of murder, would be thus morally permissible for the very fact that it provides a means by which retributive justice is served when the victim is repeatedly abused by the violater. Proposed 'alternatives' to killing are irrelevant to the actual and inherent nature of the action, merely endorsing the fact that there are more moral forms of solvency, however failing to actually testify against the explicit resolution. Indeed, the perpetrator of the repeated domestic abuse would be thus forfeiting and violating his/her end of the social contract, thus giving leeway for the complete termination of intrinsic rights as proposed for all individuals on a social context as well. As Robert Grant notes, "Human rights are the benefits negotiated by reasonable persons and received by each of them as a result of their agreement to accept the natural duties imposed by the social contract. Human rights are the consideration for the obligations assumed under that fundamental agreement. Recall that when parties enter into a contract each becomes obligated to the other and each reciprocally acquires a right to what is promised by the other". [1] Additionally so, the moral permissibility of a murder rests upon the sole consideration of the meeting of the social contract for which is instrumental to determining morality. Ethical concerns are justified if I uphold an intrinsic moral contract in which I am entitled as well as obligated to give to all individuals moral consideration and respect as well as acknowledge the social contract that endorses justice. By negating and forfeiting my end of the social contract, there would be thus nothing to cause preventative measures to be taken for my rights to still be protected from any individual or society. As such, all murder is justified if it is, in fact, a form of retributive action in the main form of self-defense. Indeed, the laws as well as policies endorsed by the United States themselves advocate for a legal standpoint on which all individuals may be justified in their actions to commit murder on the adequate and sufficient grounds of self-defense. Justice, thus, is upheld in such a case, and through the ethical consideration that it inherently grants all individuals, moral permissibility as well. Proportionality is not the problem being considered here; it is merely the fact that an individual has violated his end of the social contract that gives moral and social allowance for the termination of ALL natural rights, including the right to life. Refutations: --------------- Now, my opponent's criterion of respect for human life is, if I may say, not only unfair as a biased criterion that violates the intrinsic guidelines for the composition of a criterion, but also invalid because of its negligence of the undermining social contract. I may, for example, obviously advocate for the 'unity as well as peace in my interactions with other humans', but the moral permissibility of reciprocal retribution in the form of murder is absolutely still intact if I am faced with repeated violence and my abuser no longer possesses the intrinsic natural rights in his/her violation of the social contract. It is the circumstance in which we justify actions, and it is exactly this for which my opponent fails to acknowledge. And by the very rules of LD, if my opponent fails to provide us with an adequate criterion, all her arguments may be considered irrelevant to the context of the debate and may be disregarded without exception. Contention 1: Again, my opponent introduces the so called 'alternatives' that, as she states, completely negates the moral permissibility of murder in consequence. However, to provide an alternative is beside the point when considering individuals who have already terminated any entitlements under the social contract; it is, in simpler words, saying that an individual already possesses no rights or entitlements, and we can choose to use alternatives than murder on him/her. This would obviously be a form of moral consideration that surpasses the retributive action of murder, but it would still fail to negate the intrinsic moral permissibility OF murder. Thus we can see that such a contention is irrelevant and is invalid. Contention 2: Now, even starting off, my opponent makes a completely fallacious argument that states that the violation of a social contract is only justified by the proportionality to which it is violated. It is the ultimate termination of the social contract itself which justifies termination of natural rights as well. If I have violated a moral and social contract, I either *have* or *have not*; their is no middle ground in which I am violating it to a certain degree. Now, the form of violation must be explicitly defined; for the violation of mere laws does not necessarily justify the violation of the intrinsic moral and social contract. For example, if I shoplift, or ignore a red light, I would obviously be entitled to punishments or the loss of certain societal privileges or liberties, but on a societal context, I would not be violating a moral or social code. On the other hand, if I were to walk into a store with a baseball bat and repeatedly attack the clerk, he/she would be entitled to respond in a way for which he/she deems fit, no matter how severe the retribution turns out to be, for I have sufficiently given up all forms of natural rights that I once possessed once I started the attack. As such, the proportional response as endorsed by my opponent is obviously invalid in its composition, and the intrinsic moral permissibility of an action is untouched upon. Contention 3: Her interesting statement is that murder in of itself can never be moral. Now, we find immediately a huge array of problems with this on a social and individual context. First off, saying that something is morally permissible does not make it entitled to the highest of ethical consideration, merely that in the context in which it was applied, morality did not provide a substantial barrier. Moral permissibility bases itself intrinsically off of the circumstance in which the violation or the action occurred; and just for such a fact, the retributive form of murder seen in the resolution is absolutely permissible by moral standards when used to respond to individuals who have terminated and violated their side of the social and moral contract. Thus I urge an affirmative ballot. Cross Ex: 1. Is a social contract intrinsically categorical? Or is it conditional? 2. How does the severity of an action justify the moral permissibility of it? 3. How does an alternative actually justify that murder is NOT morally permissible, when it is the social contract which provides us with the form of determination? 4. Do you feel that retributive moral actions are justified?