Homosexual Acts are Immoral

In what follows I will show that Pro has not succeeded in refuting my objections to his overall case.One: Is/OughtI did use -- and I specifically said that I was using -- the adjective "good" in the attributive sense when I asked, "Action X aligns with its proper function, but is it good?" Pro's use of Geach's argument is faulty, in that he is trying to use it to defeat Moore by arguing that all sentences of the form "(noun) is (attributive adjective)" are unintelligible. This is false; attributivity simply requires qualification that makes the adjective part of a noun phrase. In this case, "good" is used in the sense of being part of the noun phrase "good action." This, in context, is a proper use of the term. However, I do not have to use it attributively; moral terms help to guide actions, and action-guiding words must of necessity be, to some extent, prescriptive.[13]I also made this point in a way that does not rely on Moore: Pro's definition of morality is circular because it uses the term "ought," which assumes a prior understanding of morality. Pro responded that he is grounding moral normativity in biological normativity. If I understand Pro correctly, then this definition of "ought" refutes his argument entirely -- see 6B below. If I do not, then Pro should once and for all explain, clearly and non-circularly, what he means by "ought" in his final statement.Two: TeleologyContra Pro, I did address the medical argument in teleology, by showing how it actually subverts his argument (see 6B above and below). If he desires a response beyond that, then I would add that every biological process can in principle be defined solely in non-teleological terms. For instance: if the heart is contracting and expanding, then the heart is sending blood through the circulatory system; if it is saturated with oxygen, it causes certain chemical reactions. And so forth.[14] Pro must explain how expressing these processes in teleological-sounding terms is more than merely a linguistic convenience.Regarding the evolution of mind, Pro recycles the Plantigan argument that natural selection produces beliefs that are pragmatic toward survival, not beliefs that are true. However, there is no reason to think that an information-processing algorithm under which a coherent and consistently applied set of false beliefs that happen to ensure an organism's survival from birth to puberty exists, or can exist, still less that a being with such an algorithm is more likely to propagate its genes than a being that forms true beliefs.[15] Moreover, this response has no effect on those whose philosophy of mind is pragmatic rather than Cartesian.[16]Pro argues that teleology can exist in nature even if there is no intention of an end goal, so long as there is an end goal. First, however, he does not specify whether he means internal or external technology. Indeed, he does not indicate that he is even aware of the difference. (It is laid out in this footnote.[17])Second, Pro is confused about his own notion of teleology. His notion about "ends in nature" in the context of evolution suggests he is arguing for external teleology; however, he refers to this as an "Aristotelean (sic) teleological view." The notion of a goal imposed from without is Platonic, while the internal teleological notion of functionality derives from Aristotle.[18]Finally, Pro does not establish that external teleology, either agent-directed or not, exists in nature. He simply assumes it. He also accuses me of simply assuming a mechanistic view. Even if this were true -- which it is not, as evolution is quite compatible with indeterminacy, and indeed natural selection arises from stochastic processes[19] -- the best that Pro will have achieved here is a stalemate of competing assumptions. This stalemate is to Pro's detriment, however, and not to mine; he has assumed the burden of proving that the teleological view upon which his argument relies is, in fact, correct. So far he has not done this.Three: FoundationPro argues that a "slew" of natural law theorists have argued that we can have natural law without theism. He cites exactly one such theorist to make his point, Larry Arnhart, whose naturalistic natural law theory has been thoroughly debunked (by one of Pro's own sources, no less).[20] Pro has not shown that any naturalistic construal of natural law theory does, or can, escape the charge of insufficiency due to the lack of special revelation in the form of the Bible[21] (and this is a proper citation; while Pro and Moreland are defending different aspects of teleology, Moreland is here addressing all naturalistic accounts of natural law), nor that it does or can escape Pro's own argument that no non-theistic account of morality whatsoever can bridge the is/ought problem.[22] He has therefore not refuted my argument that natural law requires the truth of theism. And since he did not even attempt to address 3A and 3B, establishing the nonexistence of God, Pro's argument for the resolution fails.Four: DCTPro relies here on the refuted argument above. This objection stands.Five: HandstandsPro reaffirms that organs can have a plurality of proper functions. This reinforces the point that, in theory, the genitals can used solely for pleasure, just as handstands can be done solely for pleasure. Pro does not address, and therefore, I take it, concedes this latter point. This in turn concedes Pro's statement in his opening that pleasure "is not to be sought after as an end in itself," which was a key component of his argumentWith regard to the question of why sexual pleasure cannot be a proper function of the genitalia, Pro's response here is, "One may have sex for pleasure as long as he does it properly (that is, by respecting the proper function of our sexual organs). However, this response begs the question, as it assumes that the proper function of our genitalia is what Pro says it is, which is what is at issue here.Also, given that andropause and menopause are proper functions of the human body -- since they are functions that every human will undergo unless an external force prevents it from happening[23] -- why do sex acts between senior citizens of opposite sexes count as procreative-type?Pro must address these problems in his final statement in a manner that does not beg the question -- that is, in a manner that does not assume the conclusion of his argument. Failing to do that, this objection stands.Six: Pleasure6A: Given the lack of connection between female orgasm and procreation, it is incumbent upon Pro to explain why pleasure should not be a proper function of the genitals -- especially given his concession that sex for pleasure alone is, at least in certain circumstances, perfectly moral. He has not done this.He states, both here and in response to 6B, that pleasure exists as a motivation for us to engage in certain activities. But given functional plurality, pleasure can be both motivational and an end unto itself. This objection stands.6B: Pro himself stated that moral normativity is grounded in biological normativity. This being the case, it seems self-evident to me that the status of female orgasmic disorder as a medical malfunction -- normatively nonfunctional, and therefore normatively bad -- establishes pleasure as a proper function of the female genitalia. This objection stands.6C: Pro states that he opposes FGM on the grounds that mutilation of any sort is inherently damaging and should be opposed. However, we have assumed that Pro also believes that FGM is significantly worse than my own medically unnecessary toenail removal, also a mutilation. Pro must either explain why this belief is rational, or admit that he does not believe this -- thus laying bare a consequence of his natural law theory the acceptability of which the reader must decide for herself.This concludes the penultimate round. All objections stand. Pro has still not established the resolution.Sources: http://bit.ly...