Cognitive meta ethical theory is valid

Thank you for the debate, Pro, It has been fun. I'm going to go over the debate and make some final responses to my opponent's contentions and rebuttal. Observation 1 does indeed ask what Pro claims it did. I ask for no proof of an objective morality, seeing as a claim for or against objective morality would imply the involvement of propositions. Arguing that vampires don't exist implies that the word "vampire"refers to something in particular. Observation 2 requires a little bit of an expanded look on my part, as I have clearly failed to make my thought process clear enough for all to understand. There are "connotative" elements to morality. I put the word connotative in quotation marks, because technically connotative implies the existence of a denotative base. When you say "lying is wrong", you succeed in communicating some ideas. I wholeheartedly agree with that statement. However, the communication in question has far less to do with meaning than you have assumed thus far. A scream communicates several things, but attempting to use it in a proposition will prove to be a futile effort. When I say that "Lying is wrong" I have communicated many ideas, but nonetheless the statement cannot be proved true or false. When we think of the word wrong, what comes to mind? Murder, pain, suffering, torture, rape, and several other things that have been given such a title. The reason we group such things linguistically, is because identifying them has helped us survive thus far. In order for the word "bad" to actually have any meaning, however, it cannot simply refer to a vague and debatable group of ideas, but rather a unifying quality that the word directly refers to. In order to prove the resolution, you must prove that there is indeed a specific quality that the words in moral statements refer to. When you think of the word "colpoyt", vague ideas of me and the concept of non-propositions come up. If such a fake word were used on an intensively regular basis, you would treat it as if the word referred to something in particular, but it wouldn't. The word "good" expresses emotions such as happiness, pleasure, relief, and several other so called "positive" feelings. This absolutely does not mean that the word "good" or even "positive" in this context would refer to any unifying aspect of these emotions, and therefore does not mean that they can be used in propositions. We never did define propositions, so I figure that we had better get that straight for once: "A proposition is that part of the meaning of a clause or sentence that is constant, despite changes in such things as the voice or illocutionary force of the clause." [1] If several things fit into a supposed category, but there isn't any specific differences between what lies within and outside of that category, it would be very misguided to say that such a category exists at all. We know that many people think of certain things as being "good" or "bad", so such things are communicated upon their mention. This does not in any way reflect the truth value that can be held with those words. I present the following example in an attempt to clarify: Bananas, kleptomaniacs, and integrity might be examples of colpoyts. Cumulus clouds are colpoyts. Now, if consistently enforced enough, the notion of bananas, kleptomaniacs, and integrity will be communicated with the use of the word "colpoyt". I urge the floor to consider whether or not the latter sentence will therefore be a proposition. We can easily explain the use of moral statements to be very similar to our example. If something caused death, we initially labelled it as being bad. We went on to label pain as being bad as well. From there, it moved on to selfishness, lying, assault, the lack of tact, and so forth. Nowadays, when we hear the word "bad", we think of things like those. Observation 3: The debate is about whether or not they are propositions, so this point is completely null, and the floor should treat it as such. 1a) I do not argue that values do not exist. I argue that the term "existential value" does not refer to anything specifically. I say that in order to prove that it is, there must also be the concept of intrinsic values, as the concept of extrinsic values cannot exist on its own. I would advise pro to read what I am saying with more attention. Also, the word "vampire" refers to a specific concept, and can indeed be used in a proposition. The same cannot be said for colpoyts or morals. 1b) Firstly, your use of the word "meaning" has everything to do with value. It is a phenomenon where value is created. Secondly, what does this have to do with the fact that there is no such thing as the idea of existential value? What is it? What quality does it refer to? Pro needs to provide satisfactory definitions in order to fulfill his burden of proof. 1c) I am irrevocably lost as to how this contention made any sense to my opponent. It is an absolute insult to the intelligence of the voters. My entire argument revolves around how unintelligible the term "moral obligation" truly is when objectively analyzed. If we used the word "afrotion" to describe vague emotions and acts, seemingly at random, for thousands of years, the word would seem completely pedestrian and intelligible. I am asking the voters to look closely at what a "moral obligation" truly is, and find out for themselves that the term lacks unifying qualities. Only vote Pro if you know what the words "good" and "bad" specifically mean, as opposed to just having something to do with happiness and murder. My response makes perfect sense, as the obligation in question was clearly a moral one. Why on Earth would "happiness" be the value-laden term? Happiness refers very specifically to the emotion that deals with endorphins, oxytocin, adrenaline, and various other specific and scientific terms. Scientists have studied the exact nature of happiness, but they can do no such thing with "good". Also, I would advise Pro to read carefully in the future. My 1) attempts to prove that the idea does not exist. 2a) What idea does it refer to? Pro gives no evidence for this. This point is nonsense. I am referring to the word "good", I am not using it under the pretence of it referring to anything itself. Since the meaning of the word "good" does not exist, the meaning cannot hold truth value. Likewise, I can refer to the word "colpoyt" with a truth within the reference. I cannot make any statement that surrounds "colpoytesque" ideas. 2b) Pro needs to prove that we are conceptualizing "good". I don't at all need to prove that the word "good" can't ever refer to anything. We could make a satisfactory definition of the word "colpoyt" and then use it in propositions. Right now both "colpoyt" and "good" have not been conceptualized, and therefore cannot be used as the basis for propositions. The word "vampire" has clear and objective meaning. It can be used in propositions. If the concept of a vampire did not exist, then that would not be the case. 3)Pro has failed to uphold his burden, while mine is quite secure. The claim that "colpoyts are real" is not false, because it has no meaning. I have already elaborated on this."All x are y" is not a false claim, it is a yet-to-be-defined claim. 4) Statements that use the supposedly "ethical" terms do exist. They depend on connotative content and ambiguity, and not at all on the underlying concepts, as they do not exist. All said, I thank my opponent for an enjoyable debate. Voters, please note the obscenely superior content of my contentions and the incomprehensibility of my opponent's logic. Please do not vote based on preconceived notions, but rather the cases that we have both presented. I strongly urge the floor to side with Con in this debate.