It is possible that we are in the matrix right now

Pro has the burden to prove his hypothesis that there could possibly be no way that we could not be brains in vats. Good luck, pro. The idea was presented that we might possibly be in a sort of "Matrix" world, or, as I will clarify for him: a world that is a simulation. My opponent also presents only one restriction on the debate (direct quote from Pro) : there is no reason we can't be in it, if my opponent can disprove this then he wins, if he can't I win, it's that simple. Your opponent (she in this instant ;) instead of he) will now deconstruct his "unshakable" hypothesis. All I, as con, have to do, is show proof for any sort of way that the "matrix" theory could not work, just one, and I will come away with a victory in this debate. All my opponent is asking for is one reason. So here it is: The argument Pro presents is a famed argument in the realm of Philosophy. Instead of calling it "The Matrix" (like the hit movie based on this philosophical construct I am about to present), we call it "brain in a vat." My argument will have to include a rejection of metaphysical realism and will follow from the Causal Theory of Reference. Say there is a brain in a vat named "Neo," and Neo thinks, "I am not a brain in a vat." First of all, Neo and his linguistic community does not know what a real brain or a real vat look like, so his true sentence statement really reads, "I am not a brain-image in a vat-image." That statement is incoherent. And similarly, if Neo is a brain in a vat, saying that he is a brain in a vat is equally incoherent (this time because he actually means the opposite). The syllogism to this argument is as follows: "Let ‘vat-English' refer to the language of the BIV, let ‘brain*' refer to the computer program feature that causes experiences in the BIV that are qualitatively indistinguishable from normal experiences that represent brains, and let ‘vat*' refer to the computer program feature that cause experiences that are qualitatively indistinguishable from normal experiences that represent vats. A BIV, then, is not a brain* in a vat*: a BIV is not a certain computer program feature located in a certain other computer program feature. Here is DA: a. Either I am a BIV (speaking vat-English) or I am a non-BIV (speaking English). b. If I am a BIV (speaking vat-English), then my utterances of ‘I am a BIV' are true iff I am a brain* in a vat*. c. If I am a BIV (speaking vat-English), then I am not a brain* in a vat*. d. If I am a BIV (speaking vat-English), then my utterances of ‘I am a BIV' are false. [(b),(c)] e. If I am a non-BIV (speaking English), then my utterances of ‘I am a BIV' are true iff I am a BIV. f. If I am a non-BIV (speaking English), then my utterances of ‘I am a BIV' are false. [(e)] g. My utterances of ‘I am a BIV' are false. [(a),(d),(f)]........... (ï¿½SK) I am not a BIV. To establish (ï¿½SK) we need to add a couple of further steps: (h) My utterances of ‘I am not a BIV' are true. (T) My utterances of ‘I am not a BIV' are true iff I am not a BIV. (ï¿½SK) follows from (h) and (T). Step (h) itself follows from (g) on natural assumptions about negation, truth, and quotation, but (T) is problematic in the current anti-skeptical context. The assumption of (T) seems to beg the question against the skeptic. Putnam's semantic externalist picture is this: if I am an non-BIV (speaking English) then (T) is the correct statement of the truth conditions of my sentence ‘I am a BIV', using the device of disquotation; but if instead I am a BIV (speaking vat-English), then the correct statement of my sentence's truth conditions is the strange one given in (b) of DA, not using the device of disquotation. So in order to know that (T) is the correct statement of my sentence's truth conditions, I need to know that I am a non-BIV (speaking English). But that is what the anti-skeptical argument was supposed to prove. According to this objection, Supplemented DA (DA plus (h) and (T)) is epistemically circular, in William Alston's sense: knowledge of one of its premises — (T) — requires knowledge of its conclusion." (Stanford Metaphysics Research Lab) To cleanly end this argument, Hilary Putnam states in his book, "Reason, Truth, and History" "This is a form of epistemological externalism: knowledge or justification depends on factors outside the mind and is not solely determined internally. By showing that such a scenario is impossible, attempts to show that this notion of a gap between man's concept of the world and the way it is in itself is absurd. Man cannot have a "God's eye" view of reality. He is limited to his conceptual schemes. Metaphysical realism is therefore false" Regards, Vi Veri References: http://plato.stanford.edu... Philosopher Hilary Putnam, "Reason, Truth, and History"