There is no compelling reason to believe that objective moral facts exist.

Regarding the concession of normative contingency: the only differentiation between morality and ethics on Con's part is to say that the former is a personal phenomenon, the latter a cultural phenomenon. It's really the same concept, just on different scales. In other words, the premise isn't fallacious, and he's conceded the argument's validity. Con's First Paragraph 1. The only one of my arguments that's akin to pointing out a fallacy is the presupposition problem; however, this argument's purpose is more to establish that a burden of proof exists for anyone making claims to moral objectivity, and to act as a primer for the subjective value problem. It doesn't alone say "objective moral facts don't exist", but it does cast doubt on whether there is sufficient reason to believe that they do exist, which is the subject of this debate. 2. His argument against value subjectivity basically boils down to distinguishing between moral facts and moral values. Up until now, I've been using the two terms semi-synonymously. If it's troublesome, allow me to clarify: simply put, you could probably classify "moral values" as a subset of "moral facts". Looking back on normative contingency, all subsequent moral facts are based on fundamental moral values like human life, sentience, or rationality; however, the offense of value subjectivity is to point out that values, by their nature, are the product of individual judgment, not an inherent property of objects. Even if the "value of life" is held to be true by all humans, it does not therefore follow that life is valuable; rather, what follows is that all humans value life. I trust that everyone sees the difference between the meta-ethical claim and the descriptive claim. 3. My claim isn't that moral facts don't exist because all of his arguments are fallacies. I put forward the positive case for nihilism in R1, and subsequently argued that his responses are fallacious. On top of that, he's conceded 2 of his 3 contentions, so I'd say that's on him. Additionally, even if we accept his argument that all of my claims come down to "X is fallacious", and therefore fail to disprove moral facts, this is a far cry from a positive argument for the belief in moral facts. Personally, I would also argue that a stream of fallacies by Con leaves you with absolutely no reason to subscribe to moral objectivity, but that's not my call to make. As for the "consequences" argument at the end of paragraph one, I'll address this in a moment. Con's Second Paragraph 1. I've got a couple of responses to the "consequences" argument. First, this argument is an appeal to consequences (pun). It basically asserts that, if we reject moral facts, rapists won't be punished, law will cease to exist, etc; therefore, moral facts exist. This is obviously a fallacy. A second layer of fallacy, I think, is consequent affirmation. His argument is structured to say that, if objective morality exists, then actions will have consequences (presumably, he means legal consequences). Actions have consequences, therefore objective morality exists. The problem with his reasoning is that objective morality is not the only possible cause for legal action to be taken against people for certain actions, which make legal consequences insufficient evidence for moral objectivity. I, for example, would make the argument that the alleged "immorality" of murder is only peripheral to legal bans, and that the practical consequences of openly allowing people to murder, rape, and steal were grave enough to warrant countermeasures. 2. I'll be honest: I can't really make heads or tails of this whole "contextuality" argument. When he starts talking about how individuals have to apply their own moral codes to make sense of events, it sounds like some kind of weird relativism or something. From what I can tell, though, the argument doesn't really have anything to do with positing the existence of objective moral facts. It's more to say "if we don't interpret things in some way or other, we can't make sense of anything", which is irrelevant. Conclusion Truthfully, there's not much left to argue here. All Con has really done is rehash a couple of old arguments and make a new defensive argument that his fallacies shouldn't count as evidence that objective morality doesn't exist. Given, however, that he's conceded most of the arguments in the round--both on his case and mine--I don't see how he can salvage the case for realism. This last Round has been a little less eloquent on my part than I had hoped, but I honestly think that the debate has been decided already. He can't evade normative contingency or value subjectivity, he's conceded most of his case, his only offensive argument, the "consequences" argument, is fallacious in two different ways, and he can't introduce any new arguments in the last round, since I would be unable to respond to them. I'll be doing a second and third iteration of this debate with Contradiction and Kinesis soon, so, if you enjoyed this, make sure to check those out as well. Cheerio.