Induced Abortions for Personal Reasons ought to be Illegal in the United States

I offer greetings to my opponent, CP. May the most logical argument win. I accept all of my opponent's addressed definitions for use in this debate. To the discrepancies: Regarding a human fetus as a human being: As my opponent claims, a human fetus is necessarily a human being. The reasoning for this is because it is of the same species, and it contains "an individualized set of DNA. " I ask my opponent the following: Is any member of the Homo sapien species that has altered DNA (perhaps due to mutation) still the same individual, or are they a different one? Regarding human rights in the United States: It is fallacious to quote the Declaration of Independence (DoI) in this debate. First, my opponent is using a separate definition, and merely incorporating this definition to fit under "men" in the quotation used. As for as I know, there is no definitions section of the DoI, and therefore, it is quite possible that the definition intended by its writers would not interchangeably match the definition put forth by my opponent. However, for the sake of argument in this round, let me briefly assume that "men" in the DoI would indeed refer to fetuses as well. My main argument here to counteract the resolution is that documents from over 225 years ago are not infallible. It is possible that any such documents could contain some flawed logic that would no longer apply at the current. It would be fallacious to assume that 200-year-old documents must still explicitly apply today (i. e. argumentum ad antiquitatem). As for the theories in regards to Social Contract, I am mostly in agreement. Regarding the innocence of a human fetus: I have one main point as to why a human fetus is not innocent. The human fetus is seemingly a parasite of its mother. This, even if it does not directly put the mother at a life-threatening situation (which was established to be irrelevant in this debate), still may harm the mother, thus effectively breaking the Social Contract most logical in the United States. Besides for the above, a human fetus is seemingly innocent, as in not having done anything wrong. Regarding the hierarchy of natural rights: The right to life is desired, but not always feasible. In fact, my main argument here is that a fetus acquires these fundamental rights (including the right to [developed] life). The human being does not suddenly acquire such rights at conception, but rather, acquiring them later in pregnancy. Also, while referring to the right to life (desired, but not always feasible), I ask my opponent why conception (collaboration of haploid cells to a diploid zygote) is the point of acquisition for such rights. There are various other times when one could consider a being's rights acquired. Why does this time have to be at the diploid stage? Why not at the individual sex cell stage? After all, each sex cell has the potential to become a zygote, just not all indeed become one. Surely, each of these sex cells would be considered innocent. Why is it relevant that they are haploid? Each human sex cell is life (from that of a human). When joined during fertilization, the resulting zygote is no more alive than the individual sex cells. Perhaps the real question should not be about when a life begins, but when a person begins (i. e. acquiring natural rights). Why must, in accordance with the Social Contract, a being be diploid in order to apply? In fact, the act of conception is not even considered a particular moment, but rather a long, multistage process. As an example, the moment when a sperm enters an egg occurs an entire 24 hours before both sets of genes come together to create a new genetic potential. Conception is a gradual process, not a point in time. Therefore, my opponent must clarify when, specifically, a human being is deserving of the referred rights. As of now, all I must say is that my opponent has given no reasoning as to why natural rights should be given according to diploid status. I also would like to say (but wait to explain until my opponent answers my questions) that, perhaps the most sensible point for the acquisition to natural rights is at the point of sentience. Sentience – state of elementary consciousness. As well, one is considered to be dead once their brain ceases to function. However, even though their other vital organs operate for a time, once the brain stops, the person dies. Therefore, unless my opponent contends this claim, if one does not yet have any brain to begin with (such as a fetus before brain growth), it would be logical to conclude that they have not yet developed to the point of acquiring the rights associated with life. Regarding inherent risk and undesirable results: To the contrary of my opponent's argument, it should still be legal to have abortions (as defined) for personal reasons. Regardless of whether a fetus would be intentional or not, as I concur with my opponent, is irrelevant. However, to point out (although my opponent did not seem to use it), it would be wrong to punish parents for merely engaging in intimate relations, and receiving unexpected results. Such would not be an adequate punishment. In fact, whether my opponent meant for me to infer it or not, I claim that punishment is not the main point in this sub-argument. What is important, in my view, is that the respect of rights (life mainly) for sentient life remains intact. The killing of a being with such rights is what is deplorable and inappropriate. Thus, the main point of contention is when such acquisition of rights should begin. Regarding self-defense: Such will be irrelevant in this debate, as my opponent has claimed. As my opponent has stated, the rights to life are more important than other rights. Does my opponent eat meat? If so, why does such a right to do so trump the rights of the animal? Judging by my opponent's subsequent response, I may get more into this in the next round. As well, if the rights to life are more important than other rights, then perhaps it would be logical to also ban the use of automobiles, lawnmowers, and the such, as (a) they pollute and can diminish wildlife, (b) contribute to global warming, which would have a profound effect on life around the world, and (c) can cause accidents. In the name of the right to life, is my opponent prepared to do this? Conclusion: "It is considered immoral and illegal to revoke the right to Life of an innocent human being in the U. S. , especially for the lesser rights of another. " To the contrary, allow me to rephrase: It should be illegal to revoke the right to life of an innocent, sentient being in the United States. The point of sentience, which I argue to be the point of acquisition of inherent rights, occurs at a different time than when my opponent's definition of human life (and, therefore accordingly, to my opponent, natural rights) occurs. The point of sentience ought to be considered most relevant in this debate. I have negated the initial resolution thus far.