God more than likely does not exist

Thank you, Illegalcombatant.I will start by arguing that it is at least likely that God exists. I will do so by first using a posteriori evidence to prove the existence of a supernatural being, and then I will argue a priori that God must logically have the characteristics defined in round 1.Cosmological argumentP1: All physical entities have contingent existenceP2: The universe is a physical entityP3: To prevent reductio ad infinitum, there must exist a non-contingent entityP4: A non-contingent entity cannot be a physical entityC: A non-physical (supernatural) entity existsThis forms an inductive syllogism - which is to say that the conclusion deductively follows so long as the premises are verified either inductively or deductively. As this debate is concerning likelihood, an inductive argument will suffice.P1 is known a posteriori. Every single physical entity we have ever experienced has contingent existence (which is to say that its existence is dependent on certain other entities or events). Obviously our experiential knowledge does not deductively affirm the veracity of this premise, but it does so inductively which is all that is needed for an inductive argument.P2 is verified when we consider the definition of 'universe':'all existing matter and space considered as a whole' (1)Matter and space are physical entities (or lack thereof), so it does not make sense why matter considered as a whole will not be a physical entity. Therefore the universe is a physical entity.P3 is supported by the fact that an actual infinite cannot exist - as shown by paradoxes such as the Hilbert's Hotel Paradox (2). A contingent entity would exist contingently on another contingent entity and so on. As an actual infinite cannot exist (or at least it is very unlikely that it can), the buck must stop at a certain entity. This entity must be non-contingent in order to stop the chain.P4 logically entails from P1.As I have verified all the premises, it logically follows that a supernatural being exists, that which created the universe. Albeit this argument does not assert this being is necessarily omnipotent, personal, loving etc.. but these characteristics are proved by my next argument for the existence of God"Ontological ArgumentP1: God = That of which nothing greater can be conceivedP2: We can either conceive of God existing only in the mind (A), or conceive of God existing in both the mind and reality (B)P3: B > AC1: A is a contradictionC2: A & B are bivalent, so B is correct This is a reductio ad absurdum argument; A's assertion regarding God (that God only exists in the mind) is absurd because we can conceive of B's assertion regarding God, which asserts a greater God. As the bivalent negation of an absurd conclusion must be true, B must be correct.Therefore, God exists in reality as well as the mind.What is important about this argument is that, when we conclude that 'God' exists in reality, we conclude (because of P1) that 'That of which nothing greater can be conceived' exists in reality. This being must be omnipotent, omniscient, loving, morally good and personal because these are all attributes that contribute to the greatness of a being. Thus it is absurd to accept that God exists but he does not have these attributes, because we could conceive of a greater being (that DOES have these attributes).Using the two argument presented above, I have proved that it is it is likely that God exists. Thus I negate the resolution.Occam's RazorCon's first argument is based on a misunderstanding of the correct applicability of Occam's Razor. It is not, as commonly perceived, simply a matter of choosing the simpler (less assumptions made) explanation. This is only the case where neither explanation has any previous evidence for or against its veracity.For example, we have two propositions for a given scenario:1. A2. BWhere A has less assumptions than B but neither has any external proof of their relative veracity.In this case, it is prudent to use Occam's Razor to choose A because we have no prior proof to assist our choice. Yet if it turns out that there are sound arguments in favour of B, we ought to choose B regardless of the fact that it has more assumptions.Applying this to the argument, Pro's use of Occam's Razor would be correct if we have no prior arguments for or against God's existence. However, my arguments prove that it is more likely that God exists; so it is a misapplication of Occam's Razor to pick GDNE simply because it makes less assumptions. The previous evidence supports GDE and not GDNE, and so we ought to pick GDE despite it making more assumptions.Divine SilenceAgain, the application of Occam's Razor is incorrect as explained above, because prior evidence asserts the likelihood of God existing.In response to the more general point though, it is a common misconception about prayers that it is simply a matter of asking God for something and him just giving it to you or explaining his reasoning vocally. Instead, prayer is about focusing on one's relationship with God and becoming more spiritual just by the act of meditation. If God does answer prayers in a actual sense, then he does so by inspiring ourselves and others. As St Paul wrote:'for it is God who is at work in you' (3)Best possible worldPro makes the following syllogism:1) If God exists then we live in the best possible world2) More likely we don't live in the best possible worldC) Therefore more likely God does not exist'In order to refute the conclusion, I deny premise 2. I do this by using Leibniz's argument which Pro has already written.Leibniz's argument presents the argumentation that takes the premise (God exists) to the conclusion (we live in the best possible world).Before Pro accuses me of begging the question, I would point out that I have affirmed the premise (God exists) in my cosmological and ontological arguments, it would only be begging the question if I did not rely on other arguments. Therefore the only way that Pro can disprove that we don't live in the best possible world is if he does one of the following:1) Refutes the premise that God exists2) Refutes Leibniz's logic3) Presents evidence that we definitely do not live in the best possible world.So far, he has done none of these. Thus he has not adequately verified premise 2 and so the conclusion is negated.Moral ParalysisPro opines that if all evil is necessary then we ought not to stop it.I will respond in both the context of natural evil (caused by non-human sources) and moral evil (caused by human free-will).Natural EvilMore often than not, natural evil is necessary because it invites us and gives us the responsibility to stop it. Pro is mistaken in believing that its necessity lies external to our own development by means of attempting to prevent it. In his example of Down's Syndrome, the necessity of it is that it engenders human compassion and medical development.Moral EvilMoral evil is caused by human free will. The two concepts are mutually inclusive - we cannot have one but not the other. As free will is a good thing (I commend to the voters that they accept this), then moral evil becomes necessary insofar as it allows free will to exist.Just because moral evil is necessary, it does not mean that we ought to refrain from preventing it where we can. We can still have free will so long as each individual being has the potential to abuse it (i.e moral evil). Obviously potential moral evil will always lead to some actual moral evil, but we can still work to minimise the actual moral evil.Sources(1) Google: 'Define universe'(2) http://ed.ted.com...(3) http://biblehub.com...