This House Asserts That Ontology Necessitates God!

SummaryCan we prove the existence of God through abstract thought alone? Not just any God, but one with infinite powers, goodness, and the answers to metaphysical questions? I think the notion of such a proof is preposterous, because the realm of thought is distinct from the realm of physical reality, and everything interesting about God happens in the realm of reality, not in the realm of thought. Thoughts and dreams make no sense unless or until they are subject to application.Pro's propositions and concept of God Pro's case requires that he independently prove each of four propositions: 1. The idea of God exists in cognition, independent of experience. 2. If an idea of cognition which exists independent of experience exists, it is either false or necessarily true. 3. If an idea of cognition which exists independent of experience is false then it is imaginative. 4. The idea of God cannot be imagined. Pro explicitly acknowledges that his argument references the “tri-god” which is the God that is omnipotent, omniscient, and and omni-benevolent. Moreover, the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, referenced by Pro as the standard for definitions describes the standard conception of God has having those three characteristics. There an additional characteristics of God that are important for the debate: either the God interacts with humanity or the God does not interact with humanity. This distinction is important because Pro is attempting and ontological proof, which is to say that the proof is in the domain of thought alone. One can have the idea of, say, “black swans,” but any proof depends entirely upon the real world and so the proof is not ontological. Pro claims I have been inconsistent. I do not think so, but I have no obligation to be consistent. I am free to launch independent attacks on Pro's premises. If all my attacks fail except one, then Pro's case fails, no matter the causes of the other failures. Pro's Premise 2 -- Ideas may be true, false, or nonsense In the second premise, Pro's says an idea is true if the idea exists in the real world. “The idea exists” is a proposition which is true of false.. Pro supposes that either “the idea exists” or, if the idea is not true, then “the idea does not exist.” I claim that there is at least one other alternative to idea being true or not true, which is that the idea and hence the proposition which asserts its truth is meaningless. To examine the proposition “the tri-god exists” which is in Pro's parlance, “the tri-god idea is true,” we look at two cases. Case 1: God does not interact. If the tri-god does not interact with humans, then the tri-god idea is nonsensical. That is because the concept includes omni-benevolence, and benevolence is only defined by interaction with humans. Without human interaction, the proposition is like claiming “rocks are omni-benevolent.” It is not that rocks are not benevolent, it is that without human interaction benevolence is undefined so the concept of rocks or a tri-god being benevolent has no meaning, it is impossible to be benevolent entirely in the abstract. Pro did not attempt to find meaning in abstract benevolence. Pro claims I did not prove that “nonsensical” is an alternative to being true or false. To prove it is an alternative, a need only give one valid example. It is like proving that black swans; I need only produe one example. I gave three valid examples of nonsense ideas and propositions. Pro rebutted that a jabberwocky either exists or not. The reason that is an inadequate response is that to exist, a jabberwocky must be “brill and twillig in the slithy toves.” Since that requirement has no meaning, we can never say whether some creature meets it or not. If the words had meaning, perhaps sea otters would qualify as jabberworckies, but we can never know. I also cited Chomsky's “green and colorless” example of nonsense. That's the same time of nonsense by inherent contradiction as “all-powerful, omni-benevolent and never interacting with humans.” Finally, asserting a logical contradiction is a self-evident example of nonsense. Pro made no attempt to assert meaning in the latter two examples, so the “nonsensical” alternative to “true” or “false” stands.Case 2: God interacts. The other case is that the tri-god interacts with humans. In that case, the idea of the tri-god is meaningful and can be tested in the same sense that “black swans exist” is a meaningful and testable proposition. However, if this is the case, the proof is no longer ontological, it is empirical. I claim that the study of philosophy has arrived at disproof of the tri-god by the Argument from Evil and the Argument from Non-belief. Pro need not accept those proofs as valid, but whether accepted or rejected, they are not in the domain of ontology. The God may or may not exist, but if the God exists the proof is not ontological. Pro's Premise 4: God is not simple, and is nonsensical if not imaginable. Pro claims that the idea of God is simple, quoting Hume in defining“The complex are contrary to these and may be distinguished into parts. Tho' a particular colour, taste, smell are qualities all united together in an apple, 'tis easy to perceive they are not the same, but distinguishable from each other.” In setting up the debate, Pro asserted “God is a transcendental entity, who escapes the boundaries of human cognition, and holds the answer to key metaphysical concepts.” there are many metaphysical concepts, so God must have aspects that treat them all. The tri-god is omnipotent, omniscient, and omni-benevolent, three aspects that help answer metaphysical concepts. These demand a marvelously complex God, with, it turns out, contradictions. But suppose the properties of the tri-god are not implied, so God is vacuous. Then God is simple, but is also not a god that can answer anything. Pro is clear that we are discussing a God that offers answers. If the idea of God cannot be imagined, there are two possibilities. One possibility is that the experience of our senses limits what we can imagine, and those limits are exceeded by the idea. For example, we cannot imagine two-dimensional time because it is beyond our senses. . The other possibility is that the idea is nonsense. For example, we cannot imagine an object that is green and colorless. If an idea exceeds our senses then we can still imagine something as a mathematical or abstract concept if the results of which are observable. We cannot imagine quantum mechanics directly, but we can imagine that the theoretical concept succeeds in describing the world. A tri-god cannot be imagined directly, but we can certainly imagine, for example, the results of godly benevolence. But once God is given meaning through interaction with the world, we have left the realm of ontology. Pro argues that God is not imaginable, either directly or by potential interaction with the real world. If that is true then the concept is nonsense. Sensible things are either sensed directly or constructs verified by the senses.