Resolved: On Balance, Human Childbirth is Immoral

Thanks Con. I. Preface Pro takes an interesting approach from utilitarianism, although utilitarianism is not necessarily incompatible with antinatalism. Antinatalism isn't specifically a system that purely reduces suffering, as it specifically deals with discomfort, which Con has problems separating. II. Utilitarianism - Unknown Value This appears to be Con's most important, yet prima facie his weakest argument against antinatalism. First we need to clarify Con's thesis: "Maximizing the Number of Sentient Living Entities Increases the Probability of Determining Ultimate Value" This is what Con's argument boils down to. There are a number if problems with this line of argumentation. If I could give an analogy, this is like seeing smoke coming from your car engine, yet adding more fuel to the car since by not adding fuel, you lose the opportunity to discover the source of the smoke if the engine runs out. The problem is you have fuel in the car in hence first place! It is on fire! By comparison, by maximising the number of human lives in the quest to discover 'ultimate value', you go against what we already know, which is that we know it will just make the situation worse. If we have good reason to accept that the value of human life's stasis is generally negative,then why should we create a system that goes against what we already know just because we are ignorant of all possible values? Indeed this argument is simply just one big appeal to ignorance, and I see absolutely no reason to suspect that there is an 'ultimate value' given we are products of evolution, and simply just adapted to propagate our own species. It doesn't matter how we are programmed to achieve that 'end', just so long as the job is done, our species will continue to exist. III. Comfort/Discomfort The axiom for antinatalism is that discomfort is a negative value. Do not confuse discomfort with suffering, although suffering does fall under the umbrella of discomfort, discomfort encompasses other areas, such as dissatisfaction (sexual frustration, hunger, an entertaining job). This is rather self-evident and it would be irrational for a sentient being to strive for a state other than discomfort. This is also compatible with some utilitarianism stances, as utility also bases itself off the same values which can be perceived as states of discomforts. Indeed the greatest possible state that could be achieved in utilitarianism is generally perceived to be the state that achieves the greatest level of happiness/comfort for the greatest number of people. However, for utilitarianism, on it's basic principles and values as currently known to actually support the notion that we should maximize the number of sentient beings (and hence making childbirth moral) Pro would actually have to demonstrate these values, or states of comfort are indeed positive ones. Under utilitarianism, if all values are indeed simply just fulfilment a of states of discomfort, then it follows that humans are generally all in a negative state, thus in order to achieve the greatest possible level of comfort/happiness for the greatest number if people,MIT would be better if there were no people whatsoever. A million people in debt is a financially poorer entity than no entity whatsoever. Thus Con needs to show that these people actually have something. IV. Intrinsic Human Value If we accepted Con's premise that we should maximize the number of sentient beings in existance in order to maximize utility/potential for discovering value, then it runs into a rather straightforward reducio ad absurdum. That being, it is hence intrinsically immoral for male and females NOT to have unprotected sexual intercourse whenever possible, in order to maximise the number of pregnancies and hence new conscious beings. When the well-being of everyone is affected due to overpopulation, it doesn't necessarily matter, as this has no bearing on Con's premise that we need to maximise utility/potential. It doesn't matter if we must suffer a miserable existence, possibly living in our own faeces, so long as we maximise the utility for the future. This of course clearly goes against popular values of today, and would be outright rejected. Any argument that values something divorces of the well-being of the conscious beings involved leads to absurd scenarios such as this one, it follows that any and all moral theory needs to take into account physical and mental well-being, and yes this will include suffering, a strong form of discomfort. V. Problems of Utilitarianism Note that utilitarianism has it's own problems as a moral philosophy, one of the most significant ones is that it neglects people's entitlement to rights, which are generally considered to be of value following Pro's current line of reasoning. One such thought experiment is sacrificing an innocent in favor of preserving the many guilty would be ruled moral under these systems. The popular example is if 5 patients all need an organ to survive, and an innocent walks into the clinic and by some miracle is a match for all 5 patients.[1] Would it be moral assuming utilitarianism's axioms to (forcably) kill that person and take his organs for the greater good of the 5 victims. Indeed this case of maximising utility is clearly against most people's values from the perspective of the victim. It would also very conceivably be immoral for someone to commit suicide, or as already mentioned, to not procreate, and as such assuming life to be of inherent value actually appears to be a self-defeating premise in the context of utilitarianism. Whereas by accounting non-existence as a viable and desirable state, then we avoid essentially all of these problems. VI. Animal Values Please note that pro has largely dropped my first line of reasoning, which is the negative effect that humans have in both Earth's environment and on Earth's other animal species. Even if one were to completely reject the lime of reasoning provided so far, Con still runs into the problem of why human values are greater than animal values. I have given clear facts that humans cause a disproportionate amount of suffering to animals by existing. It seems Pro's appeal to ignorance of ultimate value just doesn't cut it VII. Values Pro has listed a number of things that we may see as values, such as being scientifically engages, educated, freedom. However essentially all of these just beg the question, why are they values to us? Indeed it seems very much insufficient to accept these ipsie dixit, where in fact it seems clear that they are values because they are mechanisms for reducing discomfort one way or another. Intellectual fulfilment isn't an entity in itself, and there is nothing to value about it other than it's effects, such as mental well being, the status of one's peers, the type of career available. But when you peel back the layers of 'why?' These values are values, you eventually reach bedrock, which is that each of these lead to a state of discomfort, in which we are trying to avoid/escape from. Embarrassment is a negative mental state, and a state of discomfort, which can be caused by having a bad job, which is rectified by being intellectually fulfilled for example. You can take virtually any example Con throws at the resolution, and see that they boil down to the same things. This also addresses Con's main argument which is 'Unknown Ultimate Value', which is very conceivable just another state of fulfilling one's discomfort. It doesn't escape the problem that life is generally a negative state, it just compounds the problem. I challenge Pro to come up with just one genuinely positive value, which is not intrinsically fulfilling a state if discomfort (scratching that itch..). I daresay it is not possible. VIII. Counter-Rebuttals I actually found Con's following rebuttal most interesting, even if was not meant to be a serious proposition: "If we really wanted to prevent future suffering, why not wait until humans have enough scientific knowledge to destroy the universe and whatever (if anything) created the universe, to prevent future evolution of living sentient entities?" This might be pragmatically true, but it does not undermine the resolution of this debate. Just because the greater good is that absolutely no one ever could be born doesn't mean that the means to achieve that end is intrinsically moral, instead it is just the 'lesser of two evils', it doesn't make the lesser evil innocent. Perhaps my stealing of a thief's car will prevent him from raiding a bank, but that doesn't make my act of stealing his car a moral one. Moreover all of Con's response to: "Bringing in new life ... without ... consent ... is selfish[.] .... '[A]ny selfish action is immoral'[.]" Completely ignores liberty and rights as already argued, moreover speaks towards the avoidance of suffering, which is not what my argument is about. I actually quite like Con's formulation of my additional justification for comfort not being a positive state, it is true that P1 doesn't necessarily follow from A1, but inductively given what we observe from discomfort states, we would expect states of comfort to be possess similar 'boundaries' if true positives. Indeed this seems to be the most reasonable explanation, of the facts we have at hand, it is an inductive argument. P1: If comfort is a positive state (if A1 is true), then when a person has more stuff, they *should* be more happy. Emphasis *should*. Con's other objections seem to strawman my position. My argument principally addresses comforts/discomfort. Whilst pleasure/pain are subsets of these, it doesn't follow they are diametrically opposed. IX. Conclusion Con has really yet to attack my axioms and premises regarding the futility of existence and living. Indeed his arguments are mostly from pragmaticism rather than being honest with the facts already at hand. 1. http://degreesofclarity.com...