God is existant

Good luck in getting the job you wanted! In this round I will clarify my position, and present the reason why my arguments succeed in proving that God exists, or that it is at least probable that he does. Ontological ArgumentDefinition of GodThe starting point for the argument is the definition that I have presented, which is a 'maximally great being'. Note that this is also synonymous with 'greatest possible being', as if something has the property of being 'maximally X', then it has the property of X but to the greatest possible extent. For example, a 'maximally small particle' is synonymous with a 'smallest possible particle'. The wording is all that differs between them. So, throughout any arguments I make, these two definitions of God are effectively interchangeable. Is this definition non-cognitive? Con's only argument against the resolution is that the definition of God is incoherent, which would refute any notion of God being logically possible (which the ontological arguments relies upon). First I affirmed that, as a logical implication of the definition, a maximally great being would possess all 'great' qualities to a maximum extent. But are 'great' qualities objective or subjective? It seems that we cannot know by reason or empirical evidence, so I propose that the fact that we intuitively know that certain qualities, such as love, power or knowledge, are objectively great, lends credence to the conclusion that 'great' qualities are great objectively, not subjectively. Of course, intuition is often unreliable, but this does not mean that it can give an insight as to the veracity of claims. This is how reductio ad absurdum arguments work; if we find that a proposition is absurd (absurdity is an appeal to intuition), then we can reasonably discount it. So, in the absence of reason or empiricism, our intuition can assist us - we would be naive to ignore it. Con makes a valid point that intuition is inapplicable to modality, higher scientific principles and the like, because such concepts transcend our everyday lives that cultivate our intuitive sense. However, this does not refute my point because the nature of love, knowledge, power etc. . are part of our lives, inextricably so. I do not even attempt to use intuition to affirm scientific, mathematical or modal propositions because, as Con said, such applications are beyond the sphere of intuitive knowledge. But our intuition is valid when assessing concepts we are inherently connected to because our intuition if fairly reliable when dealing with our being and fundamental concepts surrounding it (such as love, power or justice), despite intuition being inapplicable outside our personal existence and being. My opponent also drops my arguments regarding hypotheses as the Brain in a Vat or Philosophical Zombies, in which we intuitively conclude that these hypotheses are false. This implies that intuition is epistemologically valid, and so an inductive argument built upon intuition is not a poor one. Of course, intuition cannot be epistemically certain of such knowledge, but it at least suggests the truth of certain propositions in the absence of conflicting empiricism or rationalism. As inductive arguments are valid as well as deductive ones, I need not deductively 100% prove that the contents of greatness are objective, but I at least need to infer that they are (which I have done). Therefore, intuition infers that the essence of a 'maximally great being' is actually objective, which refutes the notion that such a being is incoherent. Metaphysical vs Logical possibilityI agree that the world is metaphysical, insofar as the actual content of the world is of a metaphysical/physical nature. But if we are looking at ontological possibilities (in other words, the possibility of things' existence), then logical possibility is what we use. This is because the only thing limiting something's possibility of existing is whether it is logically sound. If something is illogical, then it could not have possibly have existed and hence exists in no possible world. Yet if something does make logical sense then it is possible that it could exist, so there is at least one possible world in which it exists, even if this is not the actual world. Throughout the entire debate, Con has been unable to actually give an agreed definition of metaphysical possibility, nor is there one (from my research). So bringing it up is meaningless and a red herring. Subjunctive possibilityI never even brought up epistemic possibility, nor did any of my arguments rely upon it, so it is just another red herring. At no point did I equivocate epistemic possibility with logical possibility. Logical possibility of GodIn this sub-debate, Con brings up three main points:'Possibility of modal collapse'Modal collapse may be logically possible, but it we have no reason to suspect that it is actual, since there are no circumstances that could bring it about. 'Reverse possibility premise is mutually exclusive'It seems that way, but the premise of the reverse argument entails an absurdity ('the greatest possible being is not possible'), whereas the premise of the ontological argument does not. From this basis, we have grounds to reject the reverse argument's premise. On these grounds, the entire reverse argument fails. 'Assuming this for other well-established purely logical propositions such as mathematical theorems entails absurd conclusions'This forgets that I am only assuming ontological logical possibility; which is whether or not something possibly exists. Assuming logical possibility to mathematical theorems becomes convoluted and confusing, which is unnecessary since we are discussing ontology and so we need not discuss whether we can assume logical possibility with mathematics. Therefore, this objection is a red herring. Non-cognitivismCons states that:'Pro has provided no non-question begging objective definition of "greatness" within this debate'But the reason that the content of greatness is question begging is because 'great' qualities are intrinsically great. They are great in and of themselves (affirmed by intuition) and so it is misguided to enquire for an external criteria. Next, Con claims:'we do not have a concept of what "maximal great being" is'But we do, quite clearly. A maximally great being is that which possesses all intrinsically great qualities to maximal extent. We know which qualities are intrinsically great by intuition, but even if we didn't know what these qualities were, it still does not follow that these qualities do not actually exist. Hence we do have a clear concept of what a 'maximally great being' is, so the argument from non-cognitivism fails. Religious ExperienceCon states that one can still be mistaken and yet remain in sound mental health. I agree if we are talking about all propositions, but if we are focusing on experiences, especially those as vivid as religious experiences, then if one has a religious experience that was not caused by any God, but instead by a mental event, then this surely does imply poor mental health. For example, if someone claims to have been abducted by aliens then if their experience is not veridical, then they are probably at least slightly mentally unstable since their experience would have been a hallucination. In short, given that the mystic is not lying, we have two options:1. The mystic is right2. The mystic is mistakenThe latter implies some sort of hallucination, and hallucinations are a characteristic sign of mental instability. The implication is, therefore, that most religious experiences are not cases of the mystic being mistaken, because most mystics report sound mental health. Con continues to deny that the sceptic has the burden of proof. I maintain that the burden of proof is on the sceptic because people generally tell the truth unless sufficient reason is given that they have lied. Likewise, if people believe that they have experienced something, then they probably have experienced that something unless we have sufficient reason why they may be mistaken. The burden of proof is on Con to give a sufficient reason why all religious experiences are either the result of a delusion or a lie, because the default position is that people generally tell the truth and that people generally have veridical experiences. Con claims that my assertion that 'it’s absurd to think all religious experiences have a natural explanation' is unsupported. This is incorrect. The assertion is based on probability (which an inductive argument depends upon). Let us suppose that in a given religious experience, the probability that it has a naturalistic explanation is ~99% (a very generous estimate). So if all religious experience out of millions (let us say 10 million) have a naturalistic explanation, then the probability that they all have a naturalistic explanation is:0.99^10000000 ~ 0So my assertion is not unsupported - it is mathematically supported by probability. The example of rain does not apply to religious experiences, because we have good grounds for supposing that the probability of rain being caused naturalistically is 100%, because, as Con says, there is a common mechanism that we see every time that it rains. Con opines that religious experiences also have common mechanisms, but they simply do not:Hallucinations: No, because most mystics have sound mental healthDrugs: No, because most religious experiences aren't drug-inducedDreams/daydreams: No, because people do not claim to believe their dreams, yet they do believe religious experiences. Religious experiences are also much more life-changing and profound than dreams. Therefore, I have fulfilled my burden of proof which is to assert that the best inference for religious experiences is that they are actual experiences of God. Ergo, God exists. Thanks for the debate!