Moral Relativism (Pro) vs. Divine Command Theory (Con)

Thank you to Con for their rebuttal.I would like to begin by clarifying a few points in response to opponent's observations. "1) This debate is not about the existence of God, though that question will inevitably come up. Therefore, my opponent needs to show that moral relativism would be be a better option than divine command theory even in a theistic universe."While I do agree with the basic idea of this observation, it is important to note that as my opponent does not address my fourth contention in any other way, this statement by itself must be treated as the sole rebuttal to my fourth contention. A fundamental premise of Divine Command Theory is the existence of God. Therefore, if I logically demonstrate that God cannot exist, I have demonstrated subsequently that Divine Command Theory is false. This is not a minor matter either, but the philosophical equivalent of losing one's arm."2) This debate is set up as one ethical theory against another. If Pro wins, then Cons loses and vice versa. There is no third option. In this particular discussion, it comes down to divine command theory or moral relativism."This is entirely correct. With that noted, my above comments pertaining to my fourth contention are of a much more dire status.I would like to mention that only my third contention received a rebuttal by my opponent. While they have stated that they were going to rebut it in the next round, the only legitimate reason to delay part of one's argument would be due to character constraints. But my opponent's case only occupied approximately 5000 of the allotted 8000 characters, leaving plenty of room for a rebuttal. Therefore my opponent had no legitimate reason to not rebut my arguments this round.I will now rebut my opponent's arguments.First Argument Rebuttal"Rape, murder, theft, perjury, may make the moral relativist feel bad, but he must remember that morality is relative. There is no objective standard to point to."This is completely correct. And the reason that we feel bad about these activities is because, as I pointed out in my second contention, we have evolved that way, and species that feel good about those activities, as I discussed earlier, do not survive. Humans only feel the way we do about them because we could not exist in any other way. But to say that some higher and all-permeating standard is the reason for these feelings rather than the necessity of natural selection is a claim that requires justification, even if we intuitively feel that these things MUST be immoral. Intuition is no substitute for logic."the moral relativist cannot even have this debate if he wishes to be consistent. How are we to judge ethical theories without an objective ethical standard by which to judge them? If there are no objective standards, then this debate is pointless. By necessity, we need a standard if the voters are going to decide who wins this debate."Not at all. The purpose of this debate is not to fulful some moral obligation but to establish which model of reality is factual. Even if that goal is arbitrary, that doesn't mean that I'm being inconsistent. I can perform an arbitrary action knowing full well that it is arbitrary. In fact, if we go back to ideas of evolution and its relationship with morality as discussed earlier, we can even conclude that I am making these arguments because I have been hardwired to seek knowledge of the true state of reality by evolution."Moreover, we need an objective standard if we want to stop someone from killing us! If MR is true, then all we can say is "to each his own." MR does not supply a rallying cry against the evil in the world. Therefore, if the relativist wants to live consistently with MR, he must sit back and watch the world burn while the rest of us put the fire out."Incorrect again. This statement presupposes that in order for a model of reality to be correct, it must make a statement against immoral actions. But this commits the fallacy of begging the question, as that in and of itself presupposes the statement that you are trying to prove, making your argument here circular. Additionally, we are prevented from murdering each other by our evolutionary hardwiring, as I have discussed before.Second Argument RebuttalThis argument is, unfortunately, merely a description of my opponent's beliefs about morality without an actual justification for it. This once again begs the question. My opponent may believe in the tenets of Divine Command Theory, and has summarized them here, but they once again are presupposing their conclusion. This argument rests upon the first, and seeing as that one was not valid, this one is not either. Additionally, the statement at the end is fraught with errors."Even within MR, we can ask "if morality is relative, what is morality relative to?" As soon as the relativist gives an answer, he has proven that there is some sort of standard that is objective."There are two important problems here. The first is that this is a fallacy of equivalence, taking the name of an idea literally and making arguments based on that literal (and usually wrong) interpretation. The second is that this question is answered in the definition of Moral Relativism. It is simply relative to different groups and eras of people. But because it can differ, any standard for morality cannot be objective. Being relative to something does not imply objectivity.Third Argument RebuttalThis argument is composed of two parts. The first seeks to prove the linking of an objective moral standard with God, but is based on the previous two arguments, which I have already rebutted. The second part is my opponent's response to the Euthyphro dilemma."His commands are not based on his divine fiat: he commands us to be as he is. God is not a father who tells his son to stop looking at porn and then goes to the strip club. He is not a father who tells his children not to steal and then cheats on his taxes. His own character is the basis for his commands. Therefore, the Euthyrphro dilemma is already dealt with. Goodness does not dwell outside of God."Here my opponent has stated that the origin of morality is in God's nature. Unfortunately, this does not deal with the Euthyrphro dilemma, it merely dodges it. We are once again faced with the same question: is God's nature good according to some separate standard, or are actions good because it is in God's nature to do them? If the former, then morality does not come from God. If the latter, then morality is meaningless to God. Either way, a fundamental premise of Divine Command Theory is undermined.Conclusion Rebuttal"If we have an objective standard rooted in a person who issues forth commands to his creation, then we have a moral obligation to obey them."The key word here being "if". My opponent has failed to demonstrate that such a standard or person exists."This mean that we can be obedient or disobedient to Him, but we can also make sense out of the evil in the world. MR does not make sense out of the evil in the world because it does not say that people are obliged to behave in a certain way. As a Christian divine command theorist, I can point to the evil and call for change and progress."Once again, my opponent's statements here only hold up if you presuppose their ideology, that a quality known as "evil" even exists objectively in reality. My opponent has not demonstrated this."Moreover, because I believe that these commands come from a God who himself is the basis of morality, who himself is morally perfect, then these commands must be in accord with his character. If God's commands line up with his moral perfection, then that means when he tells us to do something he is telling us to behave in moral perfection."Which in and of itself merely leads to another Euthyphro dilemma. An argument that was not rebutted but only dodged, as I mentioned before.With that, I hand it over to Con.