Resolved: A just society ought to presume consent for organ procurement from the deceased.

Well, my opponent has misunderstood pretty much the entirety of my argument and so hasn't managed to actually provide a rebuttal. This is unfortunate, but I'll hammer it out further in this round and perhaps he might make some hand at it in the next (though I don't think he will; the argument is pretty solid).Reactance: http://en.wikipedia.org...(psychology)Reactance is the phenomenon by which the sociologists my opponent references suppose that presumed consent actually reduces organ donaiton. Now, this would be fine, and my opponent's arguments would have merit in this ... were it not for the resolution dealing in the justness of a society specifically, which is removed from simply saving lives, the individual's notions of what his rights are, etc., but instead subsumes them all and calls us to weigh them all moralistically. A society of people whose aim it was to save lives, then, might say that, yes, mandatory choice perhaps has some benefits over presumed consent, because presumed consent might elicit reactance. Or a society of people whose main interest was ensuring autonomy might say that madatory choice was best, because uh... because maybe they might forget or something and they have really bad OCD (really, presumed consent does not encroach upon autonomy). But we are dealing solely in what is just; not what is best for this, or for that--these are still up for grabs. And so we come back to my observations of this sort of scheming, which is to prevent reactance,--to control the individual as you might control an animal--in the consideration of are such manipulations actually just? My argument is that they are not--at least not of a society; perhaps of a single man. A just society, then, I argue, should need no such steering, but do right in itself. And so we come to the morality of organ donation: is organ donation not virtuous? Hardly anyone could argue that it isn't. And so a society that is just ought consist of people who will simply donate their organs, no rigmarole about it. And no, that is not the resolution, but the wording of the resolution anthropomorphises society and so I think this is a more than fair interpretation of the resolution. Simply put, being good or just should presuppose organ donation.Now, we might come to trifling matters besides ... such as: a just society needs not for presumed consent, but might consist of people who will all opt for organ donation through mandatory choice ... but this is, as I have said, trifling. And again, being good or just should presuppose organ donation, and so why the rigmarole? And granted, in presupposing good people to a good or just society, there is little in the way of argument for presumed consent over madatory choice, besides in that madatory choice would then be trifling/superfluous, but even this should do as sufficient argument--sense should not say of a thing that it is not heavier than the next thing because it it not much heavier; indeed, it is still heavier: why should a just society concern itself with such triviality when there are more pressing matters at hand? Really, this is an easy one, presumed consent being obviously morally superior. Autonomy does not come into it, unless to be unjust, and that autonomy should be considered part and parcel in the justness of its society as a whole. Indeed, how can it not?I'll let my opponent finish this off. Perhaps a society is something other than its people, perhaps some god or some such (blasphemy! false gods!), but I think otherwise. Interesting debate, williamfoote. Was fun.Peace.