BeIR/webis-touche2020 huggingface dataset:
Great Men: Nicholas II

In Russia even after the 1905 revolution the Tsar’s character and political preferences were the key elements in Russian decision-making.[[Rogger, Modernisation, p15]] This posed a problem with Nicholas II who appeared to agree with whoever he had last spoken too, meaning no one knew what he would do next. Nicholas also believed it was his sacred duty to uphold autocracy, but also had a sense of mission for his country, particularly in Asia.[[Seton-Watson, Russian Empire, pp.547-548]] However as Arthur Nicholson puts it: Sir Arthur Nicolson “The emperor had a conscientious sense of duty towards his own position and towards his country. I am afraid that on occasions it was difficult to reconcile the two; and that the former became the governing factor.”[[Nicolson, Nicolson, p213]] As an example of Nicholas’ weak mindedness: “I [Nicholas II] ask your agreement to acquaint the government of France with this project [the Bjorko treaty]” this sensible idea was probably brought about by Count Lamsdorff. However Wilhelm had changed Nicholas’ views within four days “You [Nicholas] have given me [Wilhelm] a new proof of your perfect loyalty by deciding not to inform France without my agreement.”[[Herman Bernstein, The Willy-Nicky Correspondence Being the Secret and Intimate Telegrams Exchanged Between the Kaiser and the Tsar, New York, 1918, pp.83, 88, 85]] This demonstrates how different Nicholas’ views are depending on what faction has his ear at the time. This impacted on the convention as Nicholas’ agreement was needed, thus at the start of negotiations Nicholas believed “I [Wilhelm] can well imagine that the English are, as you [Nicholas] say fiddling around you, about asia”.[[14 June 1906, Grant, Letters, p231]] By March 1907 Nicholas stated, “he had been gratified to learn… that a substantial advance had been made towards an agreement… and said this must occur.”[[Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey: March 1 1907, Gooch, BD IV, p276]] And when it came to needing his agreement Nicholas would agree if his ministers gave unanimous consent, in effect he would not decide.[[Churchill, 1907, p174-5]]
Great Men: Iswolsky

Iswolsky’s predecessor Count Lamsdorff had been overcautious and inclined to preserve the status quo,[[Iswolsky, Fateful, p193]] therefore unlikely to have been willing to negotiate a far ranging convention with the British. Iswolsky’s character also had its downsides: Sir Arthur Nicolson “Again he was nervous and timorous, and was exceedingly sensitive to public criticism. This necessarily led to some want of continuity in his foreign policy”[[Nicolson, Nicolson, p217]] This meant that Iswolsky could potentially be persuaded by the opposing bureaucracy not to back the agreement.
International level: Naval competition

The rise of Germany was due to unification and expanding industrial power. Unification meant that Germany was the most powerful European state in place of Prussia, the weakest.[[Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic change and military conflict from 1500 to 2000, Fontana Press, London, 1989, p.242.]] The Kaiser thought that Germany had to have a Navy in line with its new economic power. Naval rivalry was enforced by the general feeling within Germany that Germany must colonise due to geographical constraints on her population.[[Paul Kennedy, ‘The Kaiser and German Weltpolitik: reflections of Wilhelm II’s place in the making of German Foreign Policy’, John C.G. Röhl & Nicolaus Sombart eds., Kaiser Wilhelm II New Interpretations, Cambridge, 1982, pp.143-168, p.149.]] Both Britain and Germany realised that: “(1)The more we arm at sea, the more we push England into the arms of France... (4) it is a threat and a challenge to England to say openly that the armaments are directed against England.”[[Holstein to Maximilian von Brandt, 20 November 1906, Rich, Correspondence, p.449.]] The Kaiser’s impatient erratic policies, continually setting off crises were another problem in Anglo-German relations. It was the Kaiser who created challenges to Britain in Congo, Samoa and Transvaal, and aimed, even if in the far future, of becoming the colonial successor to Britain was bound to result in a clash.[[Kennedy, Kaiser, p155, 158-9.]]
International level: Anglo Russian Competition

Anglo-Russian competition dominated international relations throughout the 19th century. This was because Europe had emerged from the Napoleonic wars with the two ‘flank’ powers, Russia and Great Britain, dominant.[[Paul W. Schroeder, ‘Did the Vienna Settlement Rest on a Balance of Power?’, The American Historical Review, Vol.97, No.3, (Jun., 1992), pp.683-706, p.687.]] India underpinned Britain’s status and pride as a world power; commercially it took one fifth of British exports.[[Lawrence James, Raj, The Making of British India, London, 1998, p.365.]] British power in India was seen as being very fragile. This made the protection of India paramount for Britain creating a policy of creating buffer states. Russia turned to Central Asia due to the disappointment of the straits convention 1856, with Central Asia being the only direction now open after the closing of the Near East.[[Jennifer Siegel, Endgame, Britain, Russia and the Final Struggle for Central Asia, London, 2002, p.3.]] The only way for the Russia to strike at Britain was through India, enabling Russia to counter British naval supremacy that allowed a strike at the heart of Russia as in the Crimean war. It was also defensive to create a barrier against any British advance, after all Britain had engaged in three wars in a row around Russia’s periphery in the 1850’s.[[David Gillard, The Struggle for Asia 1828-1914, A study in British and Russian imperialism, London, 1977, pp.96, 108, 116.]] As with other imperial powers there was a civilising element “all civilised states which are brought into contact with half-savage, nomad populations…it always happens that the more civilised State is forced, in the interest of the security of its frontier and its commercial relations, to exercise a certain ascendancy over those whom their turbulent and unsettled character make most undesirable neighbours.”[[Dominic Lieven ed. British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part I from the Mid-Nineteenth Century to the First World War, Series A Russia, 1859-1914, Vol. I Russia 1859-1880, 1983, p.287.]] Britain was particularly fearful of the Russian construction of railways into Central Asia: “she [Russia] has a line of steamboat and railway all the way… and she can move half a million men against Herat with far more ease and safety than she moved them into Turkey in 1877. And from Herat there are no physical obstacles to prevent a march on India”[[‘The Russians at the gates of Herat’, Science, Vol. 5, No. 117, (May 1, 1885), pp.368-369, p369 Of course this is nonsense but it is that they believed it that is important.]] By the turn of the century fear of the Russian menace was becoming more threatening when combined with a growing power of Germany and colonial incidents with France, newspapers were even helping to undermine the British position claiming Russian government was more humane than the Raj.[[James, Raj, p.389.]]
National level: Introduction

The national level of analysis focuses on the importance of domestic politics on the formation of foreign policy. Jack Snyder identifies several myths that cause states to pursue imperial expansion. First, that conquest means power. Second, taking the resources of the periphery creates security. Third, that the best defence is offence, a fear of a domino effect. And fourth, threats make other states compliant creating bandwagoning. Imperialism is made by narrow domestic political coalitions such as economic sectors and bureaucracies that have an interest in expansion. And is justified to the public through control of the press.[[ Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire, Domestic Politics and International Ambition, Ithaca, 1991, pp.2-5, 35]]
National level: Both Britain and Russia overstretched

By 1900 both Britain and Russia were becoming overstretched in their competition across Asia. It however took a military reverse in both cases to realise this. Britain was facing competition and crises right around the world; Morocco, Persia, Afghanistan, and China.[[Monger, Isolation, p3-7]] Britain had been forced to respond to Russian and French building programs to keep its navy as big as the next two navies creating financial strain, Britain was for example left three battleships short in 1903. However there were also new threats from armoured cruisers as commerce raiders, Britain’s Merchant fleet was 6 times the Franco-Russian total making it very difficult to defend in the event of war.[[Neilson, Tsar, p119-121]] The Franco-Russian alliance created an unfavourable balance of naval forces in the Mediterranean, along the key route to India.[[Monger, Isolation, p1-2]] This, along with the Boer war, caused the treasury to be under strain. Military expenditure climbed from £38.7 million in 1897 to £119.6 million in 1900.[[Correlates of War]] Against Germany such Naval competition was a reason to negotiate with Russia and France, so should the Russian and French naval competition be a reason to make a deal with Germany. Russia’s position was not much better. In the Far East the single track Trans-Siberian was the only lifeline, and it had a gap around lake Baikal, it took more than a month to deploy a battalion from Moscow to Mukden, and then it had to be kept supplied.[[Richard Connaughton, Rising Sun and Tumbling Bear, Russia’s war with Japan, London, 2003, p29-31]] Russia was spending almost as much as Britain on a manufacturing base less than half the size.[[Kennedy, World War, p8, 12, 17]] This meant that both sides were a threat to the other and conflict could occur at the very edge of empire where neither side had much central control.
National level: Boer War

Similarly the Boer War had brought home to Britain the difficulties of isolation forcing, when Lansdowne took over the Foreign Office, a re-examination of Foreign policy.[[Neilson, Tsar, p205]] The incident of the Kruger telegram could have been a lot worse as “the Kaiser wanted to intimidate England… he planned to support the Boers with German colonial troops”.[[Rich , I, Memoirs, p185]] The Kruger telegram was the first time Britain had clashed with Germany on an issue vital to British security.[[Paul Kennedy, The Realities Behind Diplomacy, Background Influences on British External Policy 1865-1980, London, 1995, p108]] More serious was the Boer war itself as continental public opinion was united against Britain, particularly German: Valentine Chirol “the hostility of the German people may not have been greater than of other continental nations, but they have shown more ingenuity in driving it home”[[Valentine Chirol to Holstein 28 December 1901, Rich, Correspondence, p243]] Britain’s defences at home were severely weakened leading to an invasion scare.[[Kennedy, Diplomacy, p113]] More crises at the same time, such as the Boxers, forced Britain to look for alliances. Snyder contends that Britain’s aggressiveness in the scramble for Africa had resulted in the Boer war and every major European power being against her, creating a fear in Britain of an erosion of the naval balance which in turn causes a retrenchment of Britain’s position through Alliances.[[Snyder, Myths, p7]]
Bureaucratic Politics: India Office against

Before Grey’s arrival at the Foreign Office the Foreign Office had had little say in the direction of foreign policy, Salisbury ran it as a clerical office.[[Zara Steiner, ‘Grey, Hardinge and the Foreign Office, 1906-1910’, The Historical Journal, Vol. 10, No. 3, (1967), pp.415-439, pp416-417]] So the Indian Government had had a lot of influence over policy in Central Asia. Indeed the Indian Government was the one area where the Convention came up against serious opposition to the Foreign Office proposals on all three areas, Tibet, Afghanistan and Persia.[[Churchill, 1907, p142-3, 186, 272-3]] So large were their demands in relation to Persia that Sir Edward Grey “it would have to be secured by independent action and eventually by occupation of the whole of southern Persia, a very serious addition to Imperial responsibilities.”[[Sir Edward Grey to King Edward: September 24 1906, Gooch, BD IV, p395]] Britain ultimately went ahead without consulting India.[[Churchill, 1907, p172]] Grey gave an impression of the Indian Government’s opposition when he congratulated one of his staff: Sir Edward Grey “the Government of India would have blocked every point and Morley has removed mountains in the path of the negotiations.”[[ Viscount Grey of Fallodon, Twenty-Five Years 1892-1916, Vol. 1, London, 1925, p165]] Curzon who had been viceroy to India from 1899-1905 gave the view from India, particularly in relation to Persia, in his speech to the House of Lords in 1908: Lord Curzon “it seems to me that they have applied the telescope to their blind eye… the real strategical danger to India on the Persian side lies from the direction of the Persian gulf.”[[Hansard, The Parliamentary debates Fourth Series, Third session of the twenty eighth parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Vol. CLXXXIII, 29Jan-11Feb, London, 1908, p1010]]
Great Men: Sir Edward Grey

At the individual level the figures on the British side are more important than the Russian as it was Britain who pushed for an agreement. The change to Grey in the Foreign Office marked a move from Lansdowne in terms of attitude towards Germany from attempt at settlement to a hard line.[[Lyle A McGeoch, ‘On the Road to War: British Foreign Policy in Transition, 1905-1906’, The Review of Politics, Vol. 35, No. 2, (Apr., 1973), pp.204-218. p207]] Grey was rigid in his policy of firm support for France: “My own opinion was that if Germany forced war on France in order to destroy the Anglo-French Agreement, we ought to go to the help of France.”[[Viscount Grey of Fallodon, Twenty-Five Years 1892-1916, Vol. 1, London, 1925, p77]] This was in part due to his inexperience. This was emphasised, as Grey was the only member of the Cabinet, apart from Lord Ripon, the leader of the Lords, who had any interest in Foreign affairs.[[McGeoch, Transition, p208, 211]] Grey believed that “If we were to get out of the old, bad rut in which we had so often come to the verge of war with Russia, we had to work for a definite agreement.”[[Grey, Twenty-Five, p152]] It was Grey who was kept trying to speed up the slow negotiations, adding in friendly suggestions such as the British fleet visiting Kronstadt which had to be dropped due to unrest in Russia and Liberal opposition in Britain.[[Churchill, 1907, p130-131]] Or else trying to prevent negotiations stopping altogether, shown in a letter to Nicolson: Sir Edward Grey “I do not wish negotiations to go to sleep. But, on the other hand, we must avoid raising in M. Isvolsky’s mind the suspicion that we wish to force the pace in order to take advantage of Russia’s present situation.”[[Grey, Twenty-Five, p161]] Grey finally persuaded the Russians to fast movement on the agreement by implying that Britain would no longer confront Russia at the straits[[Churchill, 1907, p158]]: Sir Edward Grey “I [Grey] had felt all through these negotiations that the good relations with Russia meant that our old policy of closing the Straits against her, and throwing our weight against her at any conference must be abandoned.”[[Memorandum by Sir Edward Grey, Gooch, BD IV, p280]] However at the same time he managed to keep it out of the area of negotiation as it would force what was a bilateral negotiation to be turned into a general European matter, or at least the French would have to be brought in.[[William A. Langer, ‘Russia, the Straits Question, and the European Powers, 1904-8’, The English Historical Review, Vol. 44, No. 273, (Jan., 1929), pp.59-85, p68]] Though for Grey “the worst is that things would be said in Parliament, and in our Press, which would mightily offend the Tsar and the Russian Government”.[[Grey, Twenty-Five, p164]]
International level: Balance of Power

However structural theory cannot explain other very real alternatives: a continental league or British alignment with Germany. Moreover a balance of power does not always occur. It would have been possible for Britain to pass the buck over the threat of Germany. Germany was mostly a threat to France and Russia as her defence spending was concentrated on the army despite a rapidly growing navy. Britain could therefore afford to stay out of the balance until a conflict occured or Germany appeared to potentially become hegemonic.
Great Men: Iswolsky

On the Russian side the main player was the Foreign Minister Alexander Iswolsky. The British Ambassador to Denmark (where Iswolsky had previously been posted) thought, “Isvolsky had held the scales pretty evenly balanced between his French and German colleagues”.[[Sir A. Johnstone to Sir Edward Grey: May 27 1906, Gooch, BD IV, p235]] Iswolsky was a liberal, had supported the creation of Duma and asked to resign when it was dissolved,[[Iswolsky, Fatefull, p193, 194, 196]] this would obviously make him a more palatable negotiating partner for the British. This made it all the more important that Iswolsky stood up to the Russian bureaucracies, it was Iswolsky who had to overcome the attitudes of the military party.[[Churchill, 1907, p147, 149]] In Greys’ words: Sir Edward Grey “It is no wonder that the Russian Foreign Minister had some difficulty in getting military authorities in Russia to give up something of real potential value to them, while we gave up what was of little or no practical value to us.”[[Grey, Twenty-Five, p160]] Thus it was Iswolsky who was the negotiator who was being bold, carrying on with little support. Iswolsky was still in the minority when, on the 24th August the final proposal was presented to the council of ministers, which they rejected, as Britain could not offer any more concessions, it was thus entirely down to Iswolsky to turn their views around which he did by the 18th.[[Churchill, 1907, p174-175]]
International level: Fear of a continental league

This was not necessarily something to be feared. Freedom from alliances was seen as the traditional British policy. This ‘Splendid isolation’ was the glorification of Britain having no need for allies, safe behind her navy; continental events did not affect her.[[George Monger, The End of Isolation, British Foreign Policy 1900-1907, London, 1963, p.1.]] Nonetheless isolation was not necessarily glorious, it had been consistently imposed upon Britain, in the mid 1880’s Gladstone’s moralism had managed to alienate all of Britain’s potential continental friends.[[John Charmley, Splendid Isolation? Britain, the Balance of Power and the Origins of the First World War, London, 1999, pp.190-194.]] Britain had still not escaped the potential position of the whole of the Continent arrayed against her demonstrated by the abortive continental leagues.
International level: Anglo-German Alliance possibility

Bülow and Holstein were against, noting “All the negotiations on the English alliance…coincide with the Boer War, that is, with a period of English weakness.”[[Norman Rich & M.H. Fisher eds, The Holstein Papers, The Memoirs, Diaries and Correspondence of Friedrich von Holstein 1837-1909, I, Memoirs and Political Observations, Cambridge, 1963, p.184.]] Moreover at precisely the same time Germany was turning to Weltpolitik making domestic politics unfavourable to any alliance.[[Paul Kennedy, ‘German World Policy and the Alliance Negotiations with England, 1897-1900’, The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 45, No. 4, (Dec., 1973), pp.605-625, pp605-606.]] “The Kaiser wants a fleet like that of England and wants to direct his entire domestic policy to that end, i.e. to a fight.”[[Holstein to Paul von Hatzfeldt 14 April 1897, Norman Rich & M.H. Fisher eds, The Holstein Papers, The Memoirs, Diaries and Correspondence of Friedrich von Holstein 1837-1909, IV Correspondence 1897-1909, Cambridge, 1963, p28]] This was obviously not compatible with any moves towards an Alliance.
National level: German policies could derail an agreement

Russia and Britain were fortunate that Germany did not try to prevent their entente. Bülow, the German chancellor, believed of Britain’s protestations that Bülow “The conventions with Russia had concerned the security of the Indian frontier, they were a guarantee of Anglo-Russian peace, and therefore a contribution to the peace of the whole world.”[[Prince von Bülow, Memoirs, Vol III 1903-9, London, 1931, p297-298]] Bülow did his best to calm the Kaiser and Public’s justifiable fears explaining that encirclement “did not alarm me in the least.” He explained that: Bülow “We had been encircled… ever since the treaty of Verdun-that is to say for one thousand and sixty-five years...But difficulties are made to be overcome, with calm, with prudence and common-sense.”[[ibid, p309-310]] He had been similarly relaxed over the entente cordiale.[[Fay, Secret, p54]] The lack of German response can be explained by Germany’s economic interdependence with Britain, as an example one fifth of Germanys demand for raw materials was supplied by the British Empire, financed by the city of London.[[Paul A. Papayoanou, ‘Interdependence, Institutions, and the Balance of power: Britain, Germany, and World War I’, International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4, (Spring, 1996), p55]] Similarly Germany was confident of her relationship of monarchical solidarity with Russia, and that Russia and Britain would inevitably clash.[[Kennedy, Alliance, p611-612]] Despite a tacit agreement between Grey and Iswalsky over the straits in 1908 Holstein believed: Holstein “For an understanding between England and Russia is only conceivable if England is either indifferent or hostile to Turkey.”[[Holstein to Bernhard von Bülow, 8 October 1908, Rich, Correspondence, p577]]
National level: British public opinion

British public opinion slowly came round to the view that a deal with Russia over Asia was a sensible idea. In 1900, still at the height of antagonism with Russia an article in Fortnightly Review argued: J.W. Gambier “In looking around the world one cannot see a single power less antagonistic to our commercial interests than Russia. The world is wide enough for us both… The closer and more seriously this question of an Anglo-Russian friendship is studied, the more clearly does it stand out as the only possible guarantee of the peace of the world.”[[J.W. Gambier, ‘A Plea for Peace - an Anglo-Russian Alliance’, Fortnightly Review, (Jul-Dec., 1900), pp.998-1008, p1002, 1006-8]] Throughout 1906 and 1907 the press speculated about an agreement. When it came the press gave very positive reactions, The Spectator “The relaxation of the strain which is brought about by the convention is thoroughly grateful to both sides… [in the interests] of the peace of the world”[[‘The Anglo-Russian Convention’, The Spectator, Sept 28 1907, Vol. 99, (Jul. 6-Dec. 25, 1907), London, p420]] In Britain public opinion did make a difference, it could provide an easy get out clause to justify to other governments why Britain was not supporting them on an issue. Britain was therefore seen as being inconsistent by the more autocratic powers; Britain’s foreign policy was ultimately accountable to the public even if not decided upon publicly.[[Charmley, Splendid, p198-199]] In Snyders’ theory a pluralistic press is needed to guarantee a broad range of views preventing an information monopoly.[[Snyder, Myths, p39]]