Sam Harris' 'The Moral Landscape'

Ave. I don’t understand what implications Sober’s paper is supposed to have. I don’t disagree that you can make an ethical conclusion if you combine a factual premise with an ethical premise. I even quoted as much as in the previous round. The problem is that science cannot establish an ethical premise like ‘maximizing the well-being of conscious creatures’’ on its own. The only way for science to establish an ethical premise is if you define science in a way that’s completely foreign to what science actually is. There also aren’t any good reasons to accept the ethical premise in the first place, even outside of science, other than appeals to the obviousness of its truth. Incredulity, however, does not an argument make. It doesn’t matter if Sam Harris or Pro think that it’s obvious to accept that ethical premise. There are a myriad of false propositions that are obvious to many people. A relationship does not exist between truth and obviousness. I only see one argument from Pro that does not appeal to obviousness. Pro says ‘’If moral good is not to be understood as something akin to ‘that which supports the well-being of conscious creatures’ then I would very much like to know what else you could possibly suppose the definition should be.’’ This is just a classic argument from ignorance. Pro is asserting that moral good is that which supports the well-being of conscious creatures by way of the fact that nobody else has offered a definition of moral good. Your definition of moral good does not become true just because nobody else has offered a definition of moral good. Things aren’t true just because a negation has not been offered. Pro says that he doesn’t understand why Sam Harris is using ‘’value’’ and ‘’ought’’ in a context that is different from morality. I’ll try to explain why. TheFreeDictionary notes four uses of the word ‘’ought’’[1]: 1. Used to indicate obligation or duty: You ought to work harder than that. 2. Used to indicate advisability or prudence: You ought to wear a raincoat. 3. Used to indicate desirability: You ought to have been there; it was great fun. 4. Used to indicate probability or likelihood: She ought to finish by next week. If you say that ‘’If you want to do science, you ought to respect evidence and consistent logic’’, then you are referring to definition three. It is desirable, when doing science, to respect evidence and consistent logic. You are describing a requisite for doing science, not a moral obligation, so are not using ought in the moral sense of definition one. Consider the statement ‘’If you want to drink water, you ought to have hands’’. This is just describing a requisite for drinking water. It’s not morally wrong to lack hands. Respecting evidence and consistent logic works in the same way. At this point, it may seem like I’m repeating myself. I apologize for this. It’s just that Pro hasn’t given me anything to work with other than ‘’let’s just agree to disagree’’. The first premise of Pro’s argument is that someone people live better lives than others. Pro falsely claims that I conceded this. In no place did I agree that some people live better lives than others. The only thing I conceded was that the two people in each life felt different emotions. How does that I mean I also conceded that one lives a better life? Also, there is still the problem I brought up in the last two rounds, which Pro has ignored. Why should we think that there are reasons to associate misery with moral good/evil or pleasure with moral good/wrong? There’s nothing but static from Pro on this point. Finally, we come to Dr. Craig’s argument, which makes use of modal logic to disprove Harris’ ontology. Here are the premises for context. 1: If there is some possible world where moral good is not equal to the moral landscape (peaks of well-being), then there is no possible world where moral good is equal to the moral landscape. (Supported by the law of identity.) 2: We can conceive of a possible where the peaks of well-being are occupied by evil people who take pleasure in the suffering of others. (Supported by the existence of psychopaths.) 3: Since there is a possible world where moral good is not equivalent to the moral landscape, there is no possible world where moral good is equivalent to the moral landscape. (Logically follows.) 4: Ergo, Sam Harris’ moral landscape is not a moral landscape, but just a measurement of well-being. (Logically follows.) I asked Pro to state which premise he disagreed with and why. The only premise Pro responded to was the first one. The other three have gone untouched for the entire debate. If I can defend the first premise sufficiently, then the rest of the argument goes through. The only objection to premise one that Pro gives is to ask ‘’Why does moral good have to be equal to the moral landscape?’’. This should be very easy to prove. For one, if moral good is not equivalent to peaks on the moral landscape, then there’s nothing good about bringing people from the bad life to the good life, as Harris asserts. Secondly, if moral good is not equal to peaks on the moral landscape, then there is no difference between harming the collective well-being and improving it. Thirdly, you should consider an action like charity. Charity would bring us closer to peaks on the moral landscape, because it helps the well-being of conscious creatures. If moral good is not equivalent to bringing us closer to the peaks of well-being, then there’s nothing good about charity by implication. There’s no way for Harris’ ontology to make any sense if moral good is not equivalent to peaks of well-being, or doing actions that us bring us closer to peaks. So, if Harris’s ontology is to make any sense, moral good has to be equal to the moral landscape (peaks of well-being). But there are possible worlds where evil people occupy the peaks of well-being rather than good people (psychopaths). Therefore, there is no possible world where moral good is equal to the moral landscape (law of identity). If that’s true, then Harris is just measuring well-being, and isn’t saying anything about morality. Pro suggests that he will respond to Craig’s argument in the last round. I think this is very improper. Is he implying that he had a rebuttal to Craig’s argument in mind, but decided not to post it until the last round of the debate, so that I wouldn’t have a chance to reply? I think any new arguments brought up in the last round should cost conduct points, and should also be considered impermissible. Hopefully, I’ve misunderstood Pro somewhere. I’m not too optimistic, however, because he even said that his last round actions would cost him conduct points. Harris tries to connect is and ought by using words in non-moral contexts. He also asserts that science can determine human values, when there is nothing within science that cannot establish an ethical premise. There is also the problem with modal logic, which Pro has barely tried to answer during this debate. I believe that these fatal problems are not answered sufficiently enough to give Pro the preponderance of evidence. Thus, a Con vote is the most justified. Vale. References 1: http://www.thefreedictionary.com...