Science has shown/is about to show God to be implausible/unecessary as an explanation

Since Con and I spent the last few rounds debating over the minutiae of our arguments, I am going to spend this round taking a step back in order to address some conceptual issues which are vital to deciding who the winner of the debate is. If a voter feels that there is some point Con made in the last round that I did not address in this round, it is for this reason.Firstly, and at the expense of sounding repetitious, I would like to once again clarify the burden of proof for this debate. The resolution asks if "Science has shown/is about to show God to be an implausible/unnecessary as an explanation". It is fair to interpret "explanation" to mean "explanation of the physical universe" because Con states in R1 that "I want to debate whether or not science has shown or is on the verge of showing that God isn't needed to explain the universe," Therefore, we are debating whether or not science has shown, or will show, that god is implausible or unnecessary to explain the physical universe According to this resolution, I simply have to show that scientific theories allow us to conclude that god is not necessary to explain the universe. This means that if the scientific theories are even logically possible, then they are sufficient to uphold the resolution.I have presented three scientific theories which explain the universe naturalistically, making god unnecessary as an explanation of the physical univee. These scientific theories were the Hartle-Hawking model, the Carroll-Chen model, and Vilenkin's quantum tunneling model. I argued that these scientific theories are all logically possible because they are all consistent with the laws of physics. Con did not make any arguments as to why these scientific theories are not logically possible, and he did not respond to my reasoning as to why these scientific theories are logically possible. For this reason, the voter should conclude that I have presented three logically possible scientific theories which make god unnecessary, sucessfully affirming the resolution.An important part of this debate is what exactly constitutes science. Con states that it would be pointless to have a debate over what constitutes science and what constitutes philosophy, but I strongly disagree. Debates over what constitutes science and what constitutes philosophy are incredibly pertinent because a significant portion of this debate comes down to whether or not my arguments against god are scientific or philosophical. I argued that my arguments are scientific because distinctions between philosophy and science are merely artificial conventions rather than a genuine separation. Con objects to this broader definition of science on the grounds that science uses empirical methods to understand the natural world, while philosophy does not. However, I think this distinction is clearly false if we look at the current state of academic philosophy. For example, the philosopher of science Tim Maudlin works in the area of the foundations of space-time, which asks questions about what space-time really is ontologically. He, as a philosopher, is using empirical methods to understand the natural world, but the questions he answers about the natural world are not addressed by scientists, as scientists do not do experiments on the ontology of space-time. Therefore, he must be using empirical methods to understand more about philosophy, not science, entailing that philosophy can also be an empirical discipline. Another relevant example is the area of logic, where the physicist John von Neumann created an entire system of logic based on the empirical findings of quantum mechanics (quantum logic). Logic is an area of philosphy, yet logic has been modified to be empirical, so we again see that the separation offered by Con is a false one.Con's biggest argument against the resolution is that since there are arguments for the existence of god which cannot be touched by science, then it must follow that science cannot make god an implausible explanation. This argument is a non-sequitur. Even if there are arguments for the existence of god which cannot be touched by science, it does not follow that science cannot make god an implausible explanation, for there are other ways that science can make god an implausible explanation aside from refuting theistic arguments. For example, science can do as I have done and try to show that there are contradictions between physical facts and some attribute of god, establishing the implausibility of god's existence. His (or her) argument fails to take this into consideration.For me, another big theme in this debate is Con's assumption of certain modal logic theories. Con's argument assumes that there are contingent beings, which are beings that do not exist necessarily. However, as I pointed out, Con has to assume that a system of modal logic is true where modal collapse does not occur in order for his argument to be sound. Con has not provided any justification for a system of modal logic where this does not occur, so the argument is unsound. Furthermore, Con's objections to the WFU argument face a similar problem. Con's objection to my WFU argument involves a thought experiment with two different possible worlds, one which is actualized, and one which is not. Obviously, this thought experiment depends on a modal logic system as well, because if modal collapse is true, then there are no possible worlds, as everything is logically necessary. Con has made unjustified assumptions in his arguments which prevent them from being sound. (I would also like to note that many philosophers of science, such as Quentin Smith in the article "A radical re-thinking of quantum gravity", argue that science has a lot to say about modal collapse and the Triv modal logic system.) A useful guide to reading Con's arguments is to refer to issues relating to modal logic every time he makes an argument based on notions like "possibility" and "contingency".Another issue that became important towards the end of the debate was that scientific theories always suppose something physical before they begin. While Con did not say that WFU presupposes space-time, I made the statement that "Con says WFU presupposes space-time" because this, in fact, what the WFU presupposes. Perhaps Con did not say it himself, but I was simply substituting "space-time" for "physical structure" because space-time is the physical structure that the WFU presupposes.The relevant question to ask ourselves is "Does the fact that a scientific theory presupposes some kind of physical reality prevent us from making conclusions based on that scientific theory?". Con and I agree that this is not the case. Therefore, the fact that the WFU presupposes some kind of physical reality, or the fact that general relativity presupposes some kind of physical reality, does not prevent me from making an arguments against the plausibility of god's existence based on them.In conclusion, a Pro vote is the most justified because I have offered logically possible alternatives to god, affirming the resolution.