The USFG should permit the use of financial incentives to encourage organ donation

In this round, I will present my arguments. In the next round, I will refute my opponents arguments.I affirm. I offer the following observation: The Center for Law, Ethics, and Society explains that moral arguments against doing something, even if successful, do not justify banning that something.[i] Additionally, as a result of the clear practical benefits of lifting the current ban on Financial Incentives, the Center concludes that any argument to the contrary could only have bearing on moral, not pragmatic, grounds.[ii] Thus, that some alternatives to financial incentives may exist does not justify the banning of incentives. Contention 1: The Current System is Racially Discriminatory The American Journal of Kidney Disease reports that the single largest racial group needing transplants are African-Americans; for kidneys alone, Blacks make up 35% of the demand, despite being only 10% of the Population.[iii] This is disconcerting, as the current donation-based system is formed on racism. Michelle Goodwin of the Health Law Institute explains that to receive federal funding necessary for operation, hospitals must adhere to the OPTN regulations.[iv] Unfortunately, these regulations are based on discriminatory and disproven medical theory. Goodwin furthers that matching antigen markers A, B, and DR are used to determine who may receive an organ for transplantation; it is important to note, though, that these antigens are completely arbitrarily chosen from a pool of hundreds as a means to exclude minorities.[v] The OPTN even admits that the regulations selecting Human Leukocyte antigens are less common in blacks and minorities[vi]. The impact of this is disastrous for minority groups. Dr. Robert Gaston of the University of Alabama concludes that as a result of this unnecessary exclusion, African Americans receive only 1-in-33 Kidneys available for transplant[vii]. Liver patients are as harmed, with the Daily News finding that despite making up greater than 50% of severe liver disease patients, minorities only receive 4% of the transplants.[viii] This is not medically necessary; As Dr. Clive Callender concludes, blacks are medically able to accept organs from 80% of the population.[ix] The UNOS explains that This means that blacks and minorities wait longer than anyone else for organs, and have a greater risk of dying while on the list.[x] By allowing for financial incentives for organ donation, there will be an increased number of available organs for transplant. The VU Law Review explains, that as a free market in organs is formed, discrimination will substantially decline, as the current system is removed.[xi] Accordingly, by allowing for financial incentives, you not only save lives, but also save human rights. Contention 2: Financial Incentives for Organ Donation would end the shortage, saving lives. The current shortage of organs for transplantation is explicable in simple macroeconomic analysis. As Professor McConnel explains in his textbook, “Macroeconomics”, when the government sets a price ceiling, or a maximum possible price, it necessarily causes shortages as demand outpaces supply, due to a lack of profitability.[xii] In terms of organ donation, The National Organ Transplant Act set a price ceiling of $0–an organ may be given away, but not sold. As The US Department of Health Explains, this has resulted in nearly 90,000 people in need of organs, but unable to obtain them.[xiii] Fortunately, resolving this problem is a simple matter of allowing supply to meet demand. Professor Kaserman of Auburn University elaborates, using both macroeconomic analysis, and representative sampling of potential donors, a price level of only $1000 per donor would be sufficient to alleviate the current shortage.[xiv] This is because as price level increases, the willingness of those on the margin to donate also increases. This analysis is further supported by The Journal of Economic Literature, which explains that that incentives would enable an additional 20,000 donations per year a minimum, allowing complete solvency of the woes of the state quo in less than five years.[xv] The impact to this is immense. As Professor Wilkinson explains, allowing for a market in organs that corrects current shortages would save or improve the lives of 7.5 Million Americans that would otherwise lie dying in vain at some point in their lives, in the current system’s waiting lists.[xvi] This economic analysis is proven empirically. Harvard University explains, that “12% of individuals said incentives would make them more likely to donate.”[xvii] This is important because only 0.24% of the 12% would have to donate in order to solve the entire shortage. Furthermore, the increased donation improves patient outcomes As Dr. Sally Satel of the Yale School of Medicine explains, because of the current shortage, surgeons have begun using less healthy organs. Faced with a patient on the verge of death, they might transplant, for example, a virus-infected liver from a deceased intravenous drug abuser.[xviii] This is further affirmed by Professor Friedman of NYU Medical Center, who explains that there is greater acceptance of what previously had been termed unacceptable kidneys, now renamed 'expanded criteria donors' from potentially unhealthy donors.[xix] Accordingly, by allowing for a market in organs, both the quantity, and quality, of organs are improved.This, I affirm. [i] Professor Stephen Wilkinson, Keele University, “Bodies for Sale”, Page 103 [ii] Ibid. [iii] Organ Procurement Transplant Network Data, http://optn.org... ( Goodwin pg. 6) [iv] Budget Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 + Section 1138 of the Social Security Act (Goodwin pg. 97) [v] UNOS, “Who we Are: Membership: Histocompatibility Labs”, http:// www. Unos.org/whoweare/histolabs.asp (Goodwin pg. 100) [vi] OPTN/SRTR 2000 Annual Report, iii (Goodwin pg. 102) [vii] Robert S. Gaston, et al, “Racial Equity in Renal Transplantation: The Disparate Impact of HLA-based Allocation”. (Goodwin pg. 104) [viii] Kevin McCoy, “Deadly Disparity in Transplants: Blacks and Hispanics deprived”, Daily News. (Goodwin pg. 91) [ix] Dr. Clive [x] UNOS Annual Report 2003 (Goodwin pg. 46) [xi] Michelle Goodwin, DePaul University, In her book “Black Markets: The Supply and Demand of Body parts” [xii] McConnell, Macroeconomics, “The Law of Supply”, Page 47 [xiii] Organ Procurement Transplant Network Data, http://optn.org... (Goodwin pg. 85) [xiv] Professor Robert Kaserman, Auburn University, “Markets for Organs: The Question of Supply”, Journal of Contemporary Economic Policy, Vol. 17, No. 2, April 1999, 147-155 [xv] Gary Becker, Professor of Economics @ U Chicago and Fellow @ Hoover Institution. “Introducing Incentives in the Market for Live and Cadaveric Organ Donations”. Journal of Economic Literature. Fall 2007. http://home.uchicago.edu... [xvi] Professor Stephen Wilkinson, Keele University, “Bodies for Sale”, Page 116 [xvii] William DeJong et al, Professor of Community Health Services, Harvard University, “Options for Increasing Organ Donation”, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov... [xviii] Dr. Sally Satel, Practicing M.D., Resident Scholar at AEI and lecturer at the Yale University School of Medicine. “The Waiting Game: The Struggle to Find Organ Donors is More Difficult. April 1, 2006. John Templeton Foundation . http://incharacter.org... [xix] E. Friedman, Professor @ NYU Medical Center and A. Friedman, Professor @ Yale School of Medicine. "Payment for Donors: Pros and Cons” Kidney International Journal. International Society of Nephrology. Volume 69, pp960-962. February 15, 2006. http://www.nature.com...