God exists.

My opponent asserts that God is a necessary condition for knowledge and moral facts. In other words, this is the premise he needs:1. If and only if God exists, we have knowledge and there are moral facts.However, I think what he has really defended is only the following:2. If God exists, then we have knowledge and there are moral facts.In other words, he has really been arguing for the premise that God is a sufficient condition for knowledge and moral facts, not that God is a necessary condition. He does try to address the possibility of a secular account of these phenomena to some extent, but his objections are not strong enough to bear the weight of his case.Transcendental Arguments and SkepticismMy opponent argues that anyone who attempts to argue for skepticism has to assume that we have knowledge in doing so, so we must have knowledge. I agree, but note that this response is in tension with his main argument. In defending the claim that we have knowledge, he has appealed not to God, but an entirely secular argument that any atheist could agree with. So an atheist is justified, on entirely secular grounds, in believing that we have knowledge - we don't have to appeal to God for that. But maybe my opponent is making a metaphysical argument, to the effect that the theist can provide an account of how we know things and the atheist cannot. However, there is really no problem with providing a secular account of how we arrive at knowledge. We observe the world and classify objects into different categories, then identify causal connections between the categories, building up a body of inductive knowledge. From this body of inductive knowledge, we can deduce conclusions and implications for future investigation. All an atheist has to appeal to in order to account for knowledge is our ability to observe the world, our ability to form concepts and draw inductive conclusions, and our ability to deduce further implications of our knowledge.I suspect my opponent will try to argue that an atheist has no reason to believe in induction. However, it is self evident that induction is valid, so no further validation is necessary. People like Hume who argue against induction always assume inductive premises in their arguments, so all of their arguments are self refuting. Moreover, this argument only replaces the uniformity of nature with the uniformity of God. That is, the theist is merely assuming that God always acts consistently to show that nature always acts consistently, so we should stop with what we actually know to exist, namely nature.God's Cognitive FacultiesMy opponent argues that God's knowledge would be "self contained" in a way that ours is not, because it is not the result of investigation. However, if it is not the result of investigation, that renders it all the more fallible. If knowledge based on investigation is flawed, "knowledge" that you have not validated must be even less reliable. This argument only multiplies the necessity of a higher creator for God, given my opponent's premises. In addition, of course, my opponent has here conceded that a being's cognitive faculties do not have to be made by a conscious designer to be valid, which contradicts his proper functionalism.Fallibility and OmniscienceMy opponent says that "we cannot gain any true knowledge to even begin to build on" in the absence of God, but this contradicts his analogy with the jigsaw puzzle pieces. He concedes that the atheist has some pieces of the puzzle, which represent knowledge in the analogy.Aside from the contradiction in his argument, it's not really clear why my opponent thinks we can't have knowledge, at all, without God. How does our ability to observe the world and form inductive inferences depend on God at all? If God doesn't exist, does that mean I can't look at my chair and see that it is a black chair? That seems absurd.Maybe my opponent is relying on the idea of Descartes' evil demon or some other form of radical skepticism that he thinks the atheist has to fall into. But I said earlier, the standard for certain knowledge is "beyond a reasonable doubt," not "I can't even imagine how this could be wrong." Doubting that we know anything at all because there might be an evil demon deceiving us (or whatever form of skepticism my opponent appeals to) is not a reasonable doubt, so it does not count as undermining certainty. I don't think there any forms of skepticism that my opponent could appeal to that survive this observation. Whatever we may think of them as thought experiments, it surely is not reasonable to doubt on the grounds that our senses might be systematically wrong, or that our inductive inferences might be systematically wrong, or that we might be deceived about 1+1=2, or anything like that. You can't reasonably doubt reason.Cognitive Ability, Evolution, and NaturalismMy opponent has not really addressed my statement that "There is no reason to think that naturalism will not be able to explain why our cognitive faculties are so well adapted to get at the truth." He seems to think it is just an arbitrary assertion, but (a) he has the burden of proof to show that there is no such explanation for his argument to work, and (b) the claim I made is a basic assumption of all mainstream science given methodological naturalism. I don't think he can just dismiss this out of hand. Moreover, there is also the account of knowledge I provided above.My opponent claims that an omniscient being would have to be omnipotent based on the premise that you have to have created all of the facts to know what all of them are. I don't think he has provided any real reason to believe that premise, though, and I don't know how one would even begin to establish it. I can certainly imagine an omniscient being who did not create all the facts; such a being would have knowledge of all the facts brought to him by a kind of telepathy even though he did not create them. Moreover, my opponent has not established that the being who allegedly created our cognitive faculties would be the same being as the omniscient being of his omniscience argument. They could be completely distinct beings for all he has shown. Moreover, there are facts that God did not create even if he exists, like the facts that are brought about by the free choices of humans. This argument would imply that God cannot know these facts.In response to my account of proper function, my opponent says that "it is not obvious that the truth generally serves your life." But I would argue that it obvious. It serves my life to have the true beliefs that I'm sitting in a chair typing on a keyboard, that my car runs on gasoline, that refrigerators are not explosive, and a million other trivial beliefs that we rarely even think of. These beliefs provide the foundation for everything that we do, and it is critical for our lives that these beliefs be true. Sometimes it would serve your life to believe something false, but these situations are rare enough that it is better to operate on the principle of seeking the truth.The evolutionary argument from naturalism overlooks the fact that evolution is unlikely to select for specific beliefs, it is more likely to select for the faculties that produce those beliefs. And, contra my opponent's claim, it is beneficial overall for an organism to have faculties that are oriented toward producing true beliefs.The Moral ArgumentMy opponent uses the following premise for his moral argument:2. The basis of moral facts is not natural.However, there is good reason to believe that the basis for moral facts is natural, because they supervene on natural facts. For example, wrongness consistently supervenes on natural facts like murder and gratuitous harm. So, we should expect moral facts to turn out to be natural, not supernatural. Some examples of naturalistic accounts of morality are virtue ethics (morality is based on virtue), utilitarianism (morality is based on the greatest good for the greatest number), and egoism (morality is based on enlightened self interest). My opponent needs to show that none of these could be the basis for morality for his argument to work.Also, even if moral facts are supernatural, that doesn't necessarily a person is the cause of them. They could have a basis in something like Plato's realm of Forms.In addition, even if sound, this argument does not establish that the being who causes morality is the same being as the omniscient being from the omniscient argument, nor does it establish that it is the same being as the being who created our cognitive faculties in the proper functionalism argument. So, my opponent has provided no arguments that actually prove all three attributes of God, even if we assume that all of his arguments are sound.The Trinity ArgumentMy opponent argues that ultimate reality cannot be united or plural: "The reason that ultimate plurality destroys knowledge is that facts are not ultimately related to one another. The reason ultimate unity destroys knowledge is that facts are not ultimately distinguishable from one another." Well, if that's true, maybe there just is no ultimate reality above and beyond the mundane facts we are acquainted with. A concept that leads to contradictions cannot be instantiated.In addition, his conclusion is "the ontology of the universe must be such that unity and plurality are co-ultimate," which is (a) a contradiction as noted, (b) not a Trinity, and (c) not necessarily the same being as the being who created our cognitive faculties, or the omniscient being from the omniscience argument, or the moral being from the moral argument. These could all be distinct beings, even if all of my opponent's arguments are sound, which would leave him well short of establishing the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent, all good God.