Free will is an illusion

Thanks for your really interesting replies, this should be a great discussion.On the common sense argument for free will: I agree that ‘common sense’, or what seems to be the case pre-theoretically, can be wrong. The earth is not flat, etc… My argument is an attempt to shift the burden of proof to those rejecting free will. Pre-theoretically, we seem free, so we default to free will until shown otherwise. An analogy would be external world skepticism. Pre-theoretically, we seem to be in touch with reality. We may not be. But, we should default to our experience being veridical until someone proves we are stuck in the Matrix. So, the purpose of this argument is: if the argumentation on free will vs. determinism ends in a draw, free will should be endorsed.On the moral responsibility argument for free will: Yes, I am arguing that an ought implies a can. More specifically, a cannot implies an ought not, but I don’t think I will need to quibble. You reply: sometimes an ought occurs without a can, as in the case of the soldier/medic. I don’t agree. Either the medic really can treat the soldier, in which case he ought to. Or, the medic really can’t, in which case he ought not. Whether the medic can or cannot really treat the soldier is murky in your illustration. May I change the illustration a bit? The medic is handcuffed to a tree, so he literally cannot help the soldier. In this case, he ought not anymore. Now, the medic is freed from handcuffs, and able to reach the soldier, so now he ought to help him. Fortunately, there is no need to quibble on this issue either, since you agree that the loss of free will implies the loss of moral responsibility. So, the real disagreement occurs elsewhere. You think the loss of moral responsibility does not sink your view. I do. Without moral responsibility there is no criminal responsibility, so the edifices of society lack foundation. One may say: so what, we will build other structures. Ok, but then we ask: why did blind physical processes give rise to human societies that were founded on the bizarre and incorrect view that moral responsibility exists? It seems unlikely. And then another awkward question: how will we change the fabric of society, given that we lack free will. Ultimately, the same blind physical processes that gave rise to a ‘free will founded’ society will cause the existence of a ‘no free will founded’ society at precisely the time when epiphenomenal abstract reasoning concluded that free will does not exist. That is too coincidental to be likely. The causal processes of blind quantum frothing is in no way privy to, or responsive to, the epiphenomenal musings of macro objects such as humans. Then we have to draw deeper implications: not just moral responsibility fails, but the reactive attitudes as well. Praise and blame, gratitude and shaming, condemnation, being appalled, feeling contempt, all make no sense anymore. Neither does pride in one’s accomplishments, or guilt, or many other emotions. Again we ask: why are our reactive attitudes set up in such a way as to presume moral responsibility, when in fact there is none. Why would the brain waste resources on such a delusion?On the evolutionary argument: yes, free will could be an epiphenomenal by-product of fitness enhancing brain processes, just as the weight of a polar bears coat is a by-product of the fitness enhancing warmth of the polar bears coat. But then we start asking awkward questions again: given that our mental life is epiphenomenal, why should it be commensurate with how we act? For example, why does my brain process leading to McDonalds eating behaviour subvene the exact belief/desire states that would also have caused me to eat McDonalds, if those mental states were efficacious. Why doesn’t the brain process leading to McDonalds eating behaviour subvene the belief that a teapot is floating around the solar system, and a desire to taste a cloud, leading to me acting by eating at McDonalds? It is all just a remarkable coincidence that our mental states and choices exactly correspond to what the brain is doing anyway. The more likely option is that our choices caused our behaviour, which is the free will view.On the epistemic argument, I packed too much into a small sentence. The argument is that knowledge is justified true belief, where the true belief is caused by the justification, not other non-rational forces. For example, the juror has the true belief that John is guilty, and the juror is justified in arriving at this view based on the evidence presented at trial. But, the juror flips a coin and decides to come to her guilty/innocent verdict based on the coin flip. The coin flips ‘guilty’. The juror has justified true belief, but her reasons did not cause her true belief, so it is not knowledge. Likewise, your argument against free will is based on reasons, and let us say it is a true belief that ‘free will is false’. You do not know free will is false, since, on your view, mental states do not cause beliefs. Rather, blind brain processes, which are in no way privy to, or beholden to, the epiphenomenal abstract reasoning going on in your mind, are causing your conclusions. If determinism is true, you were determined from before birth, based on blind physical processes, to argue against free will right now. If a mad scientist re-wired your brain chemistry a bit, you would start to argue in support of free will. The reasons your provide yourself matter nothing, since they do not influence you. And, the reasons against determinism I am presently providing also matter nothing, since blind chemical processes entirely determine your brain structure tomorrow, and those blind chemical processes do not alter based on reasons.On the free will to want what we want, we trace our character back to a self-forming action at some time in our past. Self-forming actions typically occur in genuine 50/50 cases, when there is equal reason to perform two conflicting acts. Indeterministic quantum processes select one of the choices, and our free will supervenes upon these indeterministic processes, leading the behaviour to be indeterministic, though caused by physical forces, but also having an agent cause, hence free will. You object: at the moment of self-forming actions, we are actually determined to choose path A. Well, I don’t think that fits with quantum physics. At best, the foe of free will says the probability of path A is fixed by quantum forces, so we don’t have free will. That is fine. I add: free will supervenes upon those quantum forces, and also causes the behaviour. So, we get free will.I will add: your argument takes the cause of our ‘wanting’ to be unconscious and uncontrolled brain processes. But, our wanting is not random, it is a logical extension of our beliefs/desires. As I mentioned, I did not have a random ‘want’ to start a discussion in the movies thread, but instead my wanting to discuss free will is logically connected to my character. If my wanting was only caused by unconscious brain processes, and unconscious brain processes are not logical/rational but chemical, it is mysterious why the ‘wants’ that pop up are usually logically aligned with my beliefs/desires. It is as if my beliefs/desires cause my wants! Why not just acknowledge that our beliefs/desires cause our wants!