The argument from evil (AE) is sound

IntroductionIn this last round, I want to try and end the debate by systematically resolving any outstanding issues, showing that my argument is indeed sound. I’ll only focus on P1 and 3, given we both accept P2.Before I do this however, I want to return to a crucial debate rule I laid out in R1:“Any arguments dropped will result in a conduct violation. Numerous such offences will result in a forfeit.”Given that Con has dropped 3 whole arguments from my P3 (as well as others), this must result in his forfeiture of arguments and conduct.Con’s sourcing is also deficient. Books are referenced without page numbers, and some sources (Alston, 1991) aren’t even specified, making it impossible to check context. This vote however is discretionary.Defending P1Remember, P1 states that if God exists, gratuitous evils do not.I supported this with conceptual analysis, and defended it from 2 previous objections, which Con has now largely dropped.He offers 3 more criticisms: Con’s first attack is that P1 depends on a poor understanding of omnipotence, and proceeds to give Craig‘s definition of it instead. The problem is Con’s “new” definition is fully compatible with P1. God would still be able to actualise a world without gratuitous evil, given that it is both broadly logically possible and isn’t “described by counterfactuals about the free acts of others”. Craig even admits this, saying,“The Christian theist is committed to the truth that Evil exists, but not that Gratuitous evil exists.” (1)Second, Con says that P1 is false because God may have a “binding resolution not to interfere with human freedom” to prevent evils. Con unwittingly supports P1 here, as even in his example, God permits necessary evils for the greater good of preserving free-will. Again, Pro seems to be denying only that gratuitous evils exist, but this simply isn’t relevant to (and is fully compatible with) P1. Lastly, Con charges that I commit the fallacy of accident, but P1 is a conceptual point, not an empirical generalisation, so this irrelevant as well.P1 is thus affirmed.Defending P3Readers will remember I offered 4 justifications for P3.Con failed to respond to:- Prima facie case - Rowe’s Noconcieveum- Nature of evilsExtend arguments. Resolution affirmed.Epistemic consistencyThe only criticisms Con offers here are his very general epistemic limitations point (see below), and accusing me of mistaking proximate and ultimate goods.In reality, I’m open to considering any good, so long as it’s adequate and probable. I certainly don’t dismiss ultimate teleos without consideration, so this is just posturing from Con.Nowhere does he directly engage with my analogy or my argument really, except in very general, indirect ways, so this also stands with barely any scrutiny.General criticismI previously said that holding that God’s ways are beyond are ken while asserting reasons for evil was contradictory. Con responds that he has partial knowledge of teleos, while not understanding why certain evils occur.First, this again ignores some the points I’ve made (theological scepticism). But also, what this amounts to is theistic whack-a-mole. When Con is feeling brave, he’ll spin us a just so story. When this falls apart, then comes the mystery card. It's contrived nonsense.Sceptical TheismReaders will remember that Con offered 2 criticisms here.Arguing from IgnoranceI gave 2 refutations of this: that I provided 4 lines of evidence to support P3 and that the PoE utilises the principle of credulity, which is “primary and indispensable“. Con hasn’t responded. Extend arguments.Epistemic limitationCon also makes the epistemic limitations argument again, arguing P3 can’t affirm gratuity.I answered this in R3. I gave 4 justificatory points for P3 to argue for gratuity (above) and criticised ST (below) to deal with this objection. I address Con’s responses/drops to these elsewhere.Apart from this, I provided the Clinton analogy to demonstrate that even if we are limited, it doesn’t mean we can’t make reasonable inferences (e.g. Obama is more probable to be president than Bill). Con’s response to this is to say that such judgements are limited and we have to consult background evidence.First off, limited knowledge can’t be a just criticism of AE. If it were, science and everything else would be equally dismissed as incomplete. Con’s view would have to amount to inductive scepticism to deny AE. As for background evidence, it’s pretty obvious that this debate assumes ceteris paribus. If not, Con would still have to argue that God’s existence is more probable than gratuitous evils, and he hasn’t even tried to do this, so the background evidence for the purposes of this debate is 50/50 anyway. Lastly, you don’t need background evidence to make a prima facie case, or a conceptual case, so 3 of my justifications would still be intact regardless..ST criticismsCon dropped:- moral paralysis and theological scepticism- his hypocrisy on perceptionExtend arguments.As for ST making God unfalsifiable, Con says that certain things could still falsify theism conceptually.In essence, Con wants to discount the evidence of evil by making God totally insular from “events in the external world”. But given Con believes in the resurrection, for example, we know this standard is contrived. Second, as Flew notes:“Someone may dissipate his assertion completely without noticing that he has done so. A fine brash hypothesis may thus be killed by inches, the death by a thousand qualifications.” (2)Con’s position makes his undetectable being no different from a non-existent one.Animal sufferingCon seeks to avoid this, arguing “there is no victim”, because animals don’t have a higher awareness of pain.The problems here are obvious. First, it’s almost certain that many animals do feel pain, at least to some extent, which eviscerates Con’s point .Various pain behaviours and physiological changes (heart and brain activity), as well as the evolutionary continuum are 3 obvious defeaters for this point as it relates to mammals. Second, the only justification for this is Murray’s form of dualism, which Con didn’t even try to defend, and which is hugely implausible anyway, as his own source notes (3). TheodicyJust-so storyCharacter destructive pointCon never responded. Extend arguments.Con provides a theodicy for babies with an intestinal blockage, saying we can entertain the idea that they may be reincarnated to a have a future life. He also mentions the defeat of evil through character building and hints at a laws of nature theodicyThe problems with this are not only does it fail to account for the baby suffering, we know it’s well within God’s capability to fix such problems, because we can, with a simple operation. Also, the suffering of the infant simply isn’t accounted for, even if Con’s story were even plausible. In reality, even Con admits it’s not apparent, so I think we can say it’s purely contrived. As for the defeat of evil through a virtuous response, these babies couldn’t build character - they died after days of suffering. Also, again see my character destructive point Con never responded to.WSACon’s last attack was to say that we couldn’t apply our moral standards to God. I pointed out that goodness is both an objective feature of reality and that Con has to use our concept to speak intelligibly to God.Con responds that we’re partial knowers, so it‘s “fallacious” to judge God by our standards.Again, my 2 points above are ignored. Extend arguments.I’ll just add that even if Con were right here, theism would be meaningless, if we can’t conceive of what “good” means. Moral perfection isn’t a relative term. Sources1. http://www.reasonablefaith.org...2. http://www.politik-salon.de...3. http://ndpr.nd.edu...