Aquinas' First Way succeeds

The conception argumentPro disagrees with the second premise of my conception argument. Recall that the argument states:P1: IF self-actualization is metaphysically impossible, THEN self-actualization is inconceivable.P2: Self-actualization is not inconceivable.C: .'., Self-actualization is metaphysically impossible.So the question is really whether or not self-actualization is conceivable.Pro brings out a distinction between conceiving an image, that is imagining something, and really conceiving something, that is actually grasping what is happening.While I agree that self-actualization, or something changing without a cause, or even something changing with an unseen cause, may all have the same visual image, it's not clear how it follows from this that self-actualization, or acausal actualization is inconceivable. For it seems straightforwardly intuitive that we can conceive of something self-actualizing itself, or being actualized without a cause. Regardless of the mental image I create in my mind, it seems that I can conceive of something moving without a cause.Inertial motionWhile Pro argues that Inertial motion does not undermine premise 2 of his argument, I shall maintain that Inertial motion is deadly to the second premise of the argument, and in fact shows that it is false.Pro disagrees with premise 1 of my argument, and argues that objects in Inertial motion do in fact have a cause, and that cause is the law of physics. However, this response does not work. Let's look at two options:(i) Assuming the laws of physics have causal ability.Let's assume, as Pro argues, that the laws of physics have causal abilities. If this is the case, then the cause of an object in Inertial motion is the laws of physics, as Pro also maintains. But if this is the case, then it's not clear how Pro's argument will succeed in general. If the laws of physics can "cause" anything, then wouldn't these laws of physics be the unmoved mover? Surely, the laws of physics themselves are not "actualizing" or changing. But if this is the case that the laws of physics are the unmoved mover, it's not clear how these laws can be shown to be "purely actual" as is required for the unmoved mover.(ii) Assuming the laws of physics do not have causal ability.In any case, (i) does not matter, precisely because the laws of physics do not cause anything. When we apply a "mathematical law" to something we see around us, we are simply explaning what we see. David Oderberg states, "the laws of nature are the laws of natures," [1]. Let me explain what I mean."Laws of nature" or "laws of physics" are just abstractions for how things normally behave. Thus, since the "laws of physics" aren't existential things in themselves, causal responsibility cannot be attributed to them.Finally, with the understanding of (ii) it should be clear how Inertia undermines Pro's case. For Inertia says that objects just will continue in motion, or in their actualization, without any force acting upon them until something stops them.Free willPro disagrees with premise 1 of my argument from free will. Premise 1 stated that free will, and the impossibility of self-actualization cannot co-exist, since they are in conflict.Pro argues that free will, and the principle of non self-actualization are compatible, stating:"actualization is the act of bringing something from one state to another, in accordance with the nature of that thing...it is an ice cube's nature to be frozen until it melts. God does not necessarily directly cause the ice cube to melt, rather God brings the state of heat to a new state and brings the state of the ice cube to a new state, which results in the ice cube melting...in regards to humans' wills, God brings the state of the person's will to a new state, but what that person chooses to will in that new state is up to that person, because the nature of the person is to will freely. So, the person can't bring themselves to the new state (self-actualize), but they still decide what they do in the state that they are in."However, I don't think this reply, as stated, quite solves the problem.If it is our nature to will freely, and to will is a type of change, then how would God not be the cause of our choices? While I agree with Pro, that the states one finds oneself in may not be due directly to someone's will, the act of the will itself seems to be a sort of self-actualization.Let's use the analogy of a compass again. The compass right now is pointing say to the right. However, it is possible for the compass to point to the left, at something else. This is clearly a sort of change (or actualization) on the part of the will. Is God, the unmoved mover, the cause of this change? Due to Pro's argument, the answer would be yes. But if God is the cause of the acts of our will, whether direct or indirect, it seems highly implausible that this will can be free.Pro's restatement of P2Pro seems to re-state his position regarding self-actualization slightly. He instead states:2. The universe cannot actualize itself.He defends this premise thus:"to actualize means to be brought to a new state of being. In order for the universe to be brought to a new state of being: it would have to bring itself to the new state of being, be brought to the new state by nothing, or be brought to the new state by something else. Now, obviously I think that only the third option is reasonable...Con may again object though that perhaps the universe is brought to the new state without a cause, so not by nothing but just not by something. But agan, I think this is absurd. The only logical option left if the universe is not brought by itself or something else is to say that it is brought by nothing."So our options for the actualization of the universe are...(i) Self-actualization(ii) Actualized by nothing(iii) Actualized by anotherUnfortunately, Pro gives little argumentation other than he personally finds the first two options absurd, and assumably his intuition argument from earlier. The conception argument can be made for (ii), the inertial motion argument can be made for (i) and (ii), and the free-will argument can be made for (i). "Caused by nothing" vs. "having no cause"Pro understands my argument correctly when he states "Con thinks that a false dichotomy or apparently a sort of equivocation is at play between "caused by nothing" and "having no cause"", and argues that, in reality, the two are actually the same thing. He argues for this conclusion thus:"For something to change uncaused is to say that some sort of being is generated for that thing not from something else or from itself, so where does it come from? I think one would have to conclude that it comes from nothing."However, when Pro asks "so where does it come from?" he misses the point. Pro also argues that, in any case, even if "cause by nothing" and "having no cause" are two different things, they are both as implausible. But as we've seen above, there are good reasons to think that these are plausible options.Pure actFinally, I'd like to question Pro's argument regarding the unmoved mover as purely actual. Pro argues that any actualizer which has potentials is itself actualized. Along with the impossibility of an infinite regress ordered per se, it should be clear; the only way to end a per se regress is in something which is purely actual.First, I'd like to concede that this reasoning is valid. However, Pro's premise that "if the actualizer of the universe has potentials then those potentials would be actualized when it actualizes the universe" is false.Don't magnets and gravitational attraction actualize other things, without themselves being actualized? It seems quite clear that if I hold up a magnet, which does have potentials, it can actualize other things without having any of its potentials actualized. Thus, Pro's premise is cast into doubt.ConclusionI'd first like to appologize for the rambling in this reply. I've been sick lately, and haven't gotten as much sleep as I'd have liked to, so if my arguments seem irrelevant in any way, this would be the reason why.Secondly, I'd like to point out that Pro's arguments in favor of premise 2 are very few. They rely on intuition, and the way something seems. On the other hand, I have presented several arguments to show that premise 2 is dubious. If even so much as one of these arguments succeeds, or seems more plausibly sound than unsound, then premise 2 of Pro's argument has been undermined.Thirdly, Pro's arguments for why the unmoved mover must be purely actual do not work either. Thus, even if all his other arguments succeed, he has failed on this part, and there are no reasons to believe in the existence of a purely actual unmoved mover.Finally, I would like to also remind Pro that new arguments are not allowed in round 5. If he has any new arguments he'd like to bring up, he should do so in his next reply. Also, even though I have presented numerous amounts of arguments against Pro's argument, this does not mean that I necessarily adhere to them. I've had a great time so far, and I look forward to Pro's response.[1] David S. Oderberg, Real Essentialism, p. 144