the Naturalist has better reason for the assumption that nature is uniform then the Christian

I want to start by thanking Meatros for setting up this debate. I'm sure it will be a good one. Opening Statement I am here to deny that the Naturalist has better reason for the assumption that nature is uniform than the Christian. This can be accomplished a number of ways. First, I could take a strict and narrow understanding of what it means to demonstrate this denial by arguing that the Naturalist and the Christian are equals in their reasons for assuming the uniformity of nature (UoN), rather than the Naturalist having the advantage. But, while this is a minimum, it wouldn't make for a very interesting or sporting debate. Secondly, it could be shown that the Christian has better reason to assume it. And, as the last and strongest position, it could be argued that the Naturalist has no basis for believing in the UoN, and the Christian does. I will attempt to show the last position to be true; though, failing to do so, showing at least one of the other two positions will suffice. My opponent must take the following steps in order to prove his thesis: 1. Show that Naturalism provides reasons to believe in the UoN. 2. Show that Christianity's reasons are weaker than the Naturalist's. Christianity's reasons for believing in the UoN Christianity receives its understanding that nature will operate with regularity from revelation. Vern Poythress explains: The regularities that scientists describe are the regularities of God's own commitments and actions. By his word to Noah, he commits himself to govern the seasons. By his word he governs snow, frost, and hail. Scientists describe the regularities in God's word governing the world. So-called natural law is really the law of God or word of God, imperfectly and approximately described by human investigators. (1) Christianity declares that there is a mind governing this world, giving rationality to this world. God has also purposed that we can understand this world; that our thoughts can correspond to it. Christianity's so-called denials of the UoN When it is argued that Christianity undermines the UoN, etc. it is almost always done on the idea that one cannot both believe in miracles and the UoN. But before I address whether or not these are compatible or exclusive, I think it is appropriate to distinguish between miracles and providence. John Feinberg sheds some light on the difference, saying: Though God provides sometimes by miraculous intervention in our world, Brian Hebblethwaite reminds us that typically theologians distinguish direct miraculous intervention from divine providence. As to the latter, it normally refers to God's action “in and through natural agencies to bring about his purposes.” (2) And, C.S. Lewis, in an essay concerned with the very topic we are discussing, describes miracles as such: ...if there was anything outside of Natrue, and if it interfered – then the events which the scientist expected wouldn't follow. That would be what we call a miracle. In one sense it wouldn't break the laws of Nature. The laws tell you what will happen if nothing interferes. (3) Now consider my opponent’s definition of the UoN: The assumption is that the same natural laws and processes that operate in the universe now, have always operated in the universe in the past and apply everywhere in the universe. (4) I wonder what exactly is meant by natural law. Are “natural laws and processes” to be taken to mean the regularity itself? Does it refer to some amoral prescriptive rules? Or, does it refer to descriptive laws? If they are prescriptive and meatros insists on pragmatism, upon what grounds does he differentiate miracles from these laws? After all, he has no access to these laws – he has what may or may not be useful fictions. If, on the other hand, these are descriptive laws, then they are indeed subject to change with the advance of science. At any rate, it is a curious thing to pit miracles against the assumption of UoN. After all, the idea of miracles presupposes the UoN. Or, at least, the identification of events as miraculous does. How is it that one knows a miracle has occurred? Specified criteria aside, the first indication that an event may be a miracle is that it perceptively doesn't fit with what normally occurs in the natural world. This means that there is an expected regularity, a uniformity perceived to be interrupted. Naturalism's Problems The Naturalist is faced with the problem of induction; how can the Naturalist make generalizations in order to make predictions based on past observations? If nature acts with regularity over space and time, then such generalizations can be made. Bertand Russel explains: It is obvious that if we are asked why we believe that the sun will rise to-morrow, we shall naturally answer 'Because it always has risen every day'. We have a firm belief that it will rise in the future, because it has risen in the past. If we are challenged as to why we believe that it will continue to rise heretofore, we may appeal to the laws of motion: the earth, we shall say, is a freely rotating body, and such bodies do not cease to rotate unless something interferes from the outside, and there is nothing outside to interfere with the earth between now and to-morrow. Of course it might be doubted whether we are quite certain that there is nothing outside to interfere, but this is not the interesting doubt. The interesting doubt is as to whether the laws of motion will remain in operation until to-morrow. If this doubt is raised, we find ourselves in the same position as when the doubt about the sunrise was first raised. (5) If the Naturalist assumes the UoN in order to use induction, could he then immediately turn around and justify his belief in the UoN inductively? Or, if he were to argue that since assuming the UoN allows for induction and induction produces knowledge, that he ought to believe in the UoN, on what basis does he argue that induction will continue to produce knowledge. Or, if induction instead produces useful fictions, on what grounds does the Naturalist suggest that it will continue to produce fictions that are useful? Surely not induction! This desire to use induction, but lack of grounding to do so is due to the Naturalist's synthesis of rationalism and irrationalism inherent in his worldview. Van Til sums it up when he writes: The two systems, that of the Non-Christian and that of the Christian, differ because of the fact that their basic assumptions or presuppositions differ. On the non-Christian basis man is assumed to be the final reference point in predication. Man will therefore have to seek to make a system for himself that will relate all the facts of his environment to one another in such a way as will enable him to see exhaustively all the relations that obtain between them. In other words, the system that the non-Christian has to seek on his assumption is one in which he himself virtually occupies the place that God occupies in Christian theology. Man must, in short, be virtually omniscient. He must virtually reduce the facts that confront him to logical relations... It is true that in modern thought there seems to be no such striving after exhaustive knowledge. But the reason for this seeming “irrationalism” of modern thought lies in the fact that it puts stress upon another non-Christian assumption: that all reality is temporal throughout. Hence all facts are assumed to be what they are simply as products of chance. (6) Sources 1. Poythress, Vern. Redeeming Science: A God-Centered Approach, p. 15. 2. Feinberg, John S. No One Like Him: The Doctrine of God, Kindle Location 15103-14. 3. Lewis, C.S. God in the Dock: Essays on Theology and Ethics, Kindle Location 816-26. 4. See the comment section of this debate. 5. Russell, Bertrand. The Problems of Philosophy, Kindle Location 641-61. 6. Van Til, Cornelius. A Christian Theory of Knowledge, pp. 13-14.