A god exists, as defined by PRO; Take 2

Thanks, Con.1. Burden of ProofI thank my opponent for acknowledging that his statement was a bit misleading and I accept his apology. That being said, I do think it's unfair to switch the burden of proof in the fourth round of the debate. But I suppose that will be for the voters to decide. 2. Arguments Against GodMy opponent has asserted that the "problem of evil" shows a logical contradiction between the existence of God and the existence of evil. His argument is as follows:P1: There is evil in the world.P2: An omnibenevolent god would want to stop that evil.P3: An omnipotent god would be able to stop that evil.P4: If a god that was both omnipotent and omnibenevolent existed, there would not be evil in the world.C: There is no omnipotent and omnibenevolent god.As I previously stated, it is P3 (and P4 as follows) that I take issue with. In my last argument, I showed that it is contradictory for God to (1) create creatures endowed with freedom of the will and (2) force these creatures to not commit evil acts. If it's true, as I think it is, that (1) and (2) are contradictory, then it follows that there is no logical contradiction between the existence of God, on one hand, and the existence of evil on the other.How does my opponent respond to this? He seems to agree with me that it would not be possible for God to have (1) created creatures endowed with freedom of the will and at the same time (2) force these creatures to not commit evil acts. So, what is the problem? My opponent claims that because God knew that his created creatures (humans) would commit both good and evil acts, He should not have given humans free will. This is a very strange line of reasoning. Let's consider (A) to be the actual world (with the existence of both free will and good/evil) and (B) to be a different possible world (in this world, there is no free will, and hence no good/evil.) My opponent seems to be arguing that (B) is a better world than (A) and that God ought to have created (B) instead. But what reason is there to think that? Why should we think that (B) is better than (A)? It seems to me that this is pure speculation. The assertion that (B) is better than (A) is unwarranted. In order to show that there is a logical contradiction between God and evil, my opponent would need provide justification for thinking that (B) is better than (A). I just don't think this is possible, as any such argument would purely speculative.My opponent has presented two new arguments, which I will now address:P1: God is omnipotent.P2: God wants people to believe in him. (I acknowledge that you may not agree with this, but I;m putting it up in the case that you do.)P3: If God is omnipotent and wants people to believe in him, everyone would believe in him.P4: Atheists exist.C: God does not exist.My opponent has not provided justification for any of the premises of his argument. As such, I am able to dismiss the argument completely. As there is only one more round, however, I will point out the premise I believe to be false so that my opponent has a chance to address it before the debate ends. It seems to me that P1, P2, and P4 are all fine, but P3 is false for the same reason that the problem of evil fails. There is no reason to think that "If God is omnipotent and wants people to believe in Him, everyone would believe in Him". My opponent previously agreed with me that it is not possible for God to (1) create creatures with free will and (2) force these creatures not to commit evil acts. In the same way, it seems to me that it is not possible for God to (1) create creatures with free will and (2) force these creatures to believe in Him.P1: God is perfect (let's call it "maximally great", for your sake)P2: God created the universe.P3: If God created the universe, he must have needed or wanted to.P4: A maximally great being has no needs or wants.P5: A maximally great being could have not created the universe.C: God does not exist.Again, no justification is provided for the premises. As such, there is no reason to accept the argument as sound. Again, I'll point out the premise that I take issue with so that my opponent has a chance to respond in the final round. P4 is trivially false. What reason is there to think that a maximally great being has no wants? Is it not obvious that a being, if it is truly maximally great, would want love, justice, goodness, etc.? 3. Arguments for GodRecall that I provided three arguments in favor of God's existence at the beginning of the debate. I'll now proceed to address my opponent's responses to these three arguments:P1: Everything that begins to exist has a cause.P2: The universe began to exist.C1: Therefore, the universe has a cause.My opponent seems to concede that the conclusion of this argument is true, but argues that the "cause" of the universe does not need to be God. As I stated in the last round, this "cause" must be all-powerful, eternal, timeless, spaceless, and immaterial. Is there anything that fits this criteria aside from a maximally great being? It seems to me that we can work by the process of elimination here: What sorts of things are immaterial, timeless, and spaceless? Candidates (aside from a maximally great being) might include numbers, propositions, shapes, moral laws, etc. (if my opponent has any other suggestions I'll gladly consider them). But it seems to me that none of these candidates, with the exception of a maximally great being, fit the bill. None of these candidates stand in causal relations; the number 3 can't "cause" anything. Furthermore, these candidates are not all-powerful; a triangle is clearly limited in power. So, it seems to me that as my opponent has conceded the conclusion of the argument to be true, the only rational "cause" that follows is an all-powerful, eternal, timeless, spaceless, and immaterial God.P1: If God does not exist, objective moral values and duties do not exist.P2: Objective moral values and duties do exist.C1: Therefore, God exists.In my opponent's initial rebuttal to this argument, he proposed that evolution was the source of objective morality. He has now conceded this argument: "I acknowledge that evolution may not be the sole origin of morality." Even if my opponent asserts that evolution played some minor role in morality, he must account for the basis (or origin) of morality. My opponent wants to believe that objective morality exists but that God does not exists, but he cannot have his cake and eat it too. My opponent must either abandon his belief in objective morality or else acknowledge the existence of God as the foundation of morality. P1: It is possible that a maximally great being exists.P2: If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.P3: If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.P4: If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.P5: If a maximally great being exists, in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.C1: Therefore, a maximally great being exists.My opponent takes issue with P3 here, which is surprising as it is widely acknowledged that if P1 of this argument is true, then the conclusion necessarily follows. In any case, I will address the concern with P3. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, which my opponent seems to acknowledge it is, then it follows that there is a possible world in which God exists. But recall that for a being to be maximally great, that being must by definition hold maximal greatness in all aspects. So, the being must be all-powerful, all-loving, all-knowing, and among other aspects this being must also be necessary. If we think of necessary entities (entities which can't not exist, i.e. the proposition that 2+2=4), contingent beings (beings which can exist but don't have to exist, i.e. humans), and incoherent entities (entities which can't exist, i.e. square circles) it is clear that being necessary is greater than being contingent or incoherent. Therefore, a maximally great being, if it is truly maximal, must hold the property of necessity. If a maximally great being is even possible (i.e. it exists in some possible world) then it follows logically that this being must exist in every world (otherwise the being wouldn't be necessary and therefore wouldn't be a maximally great being). So, in order to reject the conclusion of this argument, one would have to assert that it is not possible for a maximally great being (God) to exist, an assertion which no atheist has ever been able to justify. 4. SummaryMy opponent provided three arguments against God, each of which I have refuted through showing at least one premise to be false. Moreover, my opponent has failed to provide justification for a single premise in any of his arguments. As such, even if my responses are completely false, there is no reason to accept the conclusions of his arguments as true (they remain unwarranted). On the other hand, I have provided three sound arguments in favor of God. My opponent has thus far failed to knock down any of these arguments. As such, we can reasonably conclude that it is more likely that theism is true than that atheism is true.