The Modal Ontological argument for God's existence is sound

Interesting topic, thank you for posting it. I accept the burden of proof to explain why Pro's logic is unsound. According to Pro, "1) It is possible that a maximally great being exists" A) "Maximally great being" is vague, I understand this is just another way of expressing "god," which is also amorphous at best, but Pro will need to address what maximally great is, so as not to deteriorate this debate into semantics. Maximal seems like an odd word choice: What is "max" in contrast to infinity, eternity, chaos? Another significant point I would like to address is that a "maximally great being" seems to point towards a consciousness or a being capable of intent and free agency; I would like Pro to address the characteristics of what it means to be "great" and to what"being" entails. Without these basic definitions, I don't think there could be a proper debate. Indeed, I need to know what "Maximally great being" is before I can attempt to refute it in its entirety. But let us humor the ambiguity and tread along. "2) If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world." B) Essentially, this begs the question of what is or is not possible, and who gets to decide? No amount of science will tell us the limits of our own human body, not to mention the planet, the galaxy, the universe, at least, not yet. But even granted that this "maximally great being" is possible, I do not see why it must necessarily exist... which brings us to premise 3. But before I continue, I must emphasize again, as long as there is no real standard (unless we are liberally using our imagination/faith) of what is possible or impossible of "some possible worlds," I could claim that the pixie fairy created the universe in some possible world under the same logic, since essentially, anything is possible (until proven otherwise). Of course, this sort of logic is what I am precisely noting as "unsound" as far as the resolution of this debate goes. There is such a thing as the negative proof fallacy. "3) If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then a maximally great being exists in every possible world" C) This logic is the equivalent to arguing that because there is an apple in my room, there are apples in all other rooms. This is arbitrary at best and is nothing short of a non-sequitur. Also how can the premise suggest that there is a "maximally great being in SOME possible world" and then follow that there is "a maximally great being in EVERY possible world"? At what point does the "some possible world" become "every possible world?" At what point does the potential for a "maximally great being" to exist, become a certainty on the virtue of it being possible? Again, just because it is possible that there is an apple in this "world" so to speak, does not equate that there are apples in other possible worlds. At best, there is only uncertainty. There also is no reason to believe that other worlds have the same "maximal great being" as other worlds, as the standards of worlds may vary, and some worlds may be lesser or greater than others (the standard of which may be relative, introducing new problems of its own). "4) If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world 5) Therefore a maximally great being exists in the actual world 6) Therefore a maximally great being exists 7) Therefore God exists" D) The rest of these premises don't follow because the preceding points are unstable at best. I would like to urge Pro to demonstrate why God or a "maximally great being" must necessarily exist to begin with and also what it even means to be "maximally great." "Burden of proof is on Con, to show why the argument is unsound." I accept this burden, and I believe I have demonstrated as to why Pro's bit of syllogistic argument is unsound.