On balance, abortion is immoral

IntroductionMy opponent seems to contradict himself in his arguments - as he claims that 'morals don't really exist' yet he bases most of his arguments on how abortion could reduce suffering. But this makes the implicit assumption that it is moral to act in such a way as to reduce suffering.If there are no morals, then we have no reason to prohibit abortion. But equally, we also have no reason to prohibit torture, murder, child-rape or anything else that we intuitively know to be wrong. Yet I'm sure Con does not support the permissibility of these actions.Con uses the following argument:Premise: Abortion can help a woman's mental healthConclusion: Abortion ought to be legalYet the only way that Con can make the logical step from premise to conclusion is if it is established that we ought to help a woman's mental health. However, if Con is right and there are no morals, then there are no moral 'oughts'. In other words, who cares if abortion helps a woman's mental health? If there are no morals, why should we legalise abortion on the grounds of helping women? This question cannot be answered without appealing to moral principles.So I am not sure as to which position Con actually believes, as the assertion that we ought to reduce suffering coupled with the assertion that there are no morals is a contradictory pairing. One cannot rationally believe both at the same time.But for the purposes of this round, or until Con specifies otherwise, I will presume that Con believes that we ought to reduce suffering, and that he is disingenuous in claiming that there are no morals.RapeAs explained above, this argument here is based on the controversial premise that an abortion can help a woman's mental health.Although in the short term, abortion may increase a woman's mental wellbeing, but in the long term (which is what the law should prudently consider), women who have had an abortion have 'significantly higher rates of subsequent generalized anxiety'. (1)But, even if abortion did help mental health, it still does not follow that abortion in cases of rape is justified.The reason for this is that Con's argument is a utilitarian one, in which it follows the following criteria for law-making and correct action:'an action as right if it produces as much or more of an increase in happiness of all affected by it than any alternative action, and wrong if it does not' (2)Con clearly appeals to this principle, as he states that abortion in cases of rape is right because it produces an increase in happiness for the mother.However, whilst the actual principle seems to be correct, Con does not apply it to abortion very well. Remember that it is both the mother and the foetus which is affected by abortion, so the happiness of the foetus should also be considered as well.Weighing up the relative amounts of happiness:Abortion: Foetus loses around 80 years worth of happiness (3)No Abortion: Mother loses 9 months worth of happinessClearly, more happiness is contained within 80 years than within 9 months, so ultimately the action of not having an abortion is the right action, as it is the action that 'produces as much or more of an increase in happiness of all affected by it than any alternative action'.Therefore, if Con argues that abortion is justified for rape victims because it reduces suffering and promotes happiness, then it turns out that considerations of happiness and suffering actually highlight how abortion is not justified.Lastly, my opponent commits the Ad Hominem fallacy by claiming that I cannot understand the dilemma since I am a man. I would ask that he concentrates on refuting my actual arguments, not who is making them.Human GenepoolCon makes the point that a living person has had a 'history of consciousness', but this is just another red herring. In other words, it is not demonstrated that history of consciousness has any relevance to the permissibility of killing.Why should the fact that a person has been conscious in the past affect how we should treat them now? Moreover, a dead person has a history of consciousness, yet clearly dead people aren't entitled to be treated as well as living people.Next, Con states that:'Genetically ill patients also do not live up to the quality of life, it would be better to abort them to prevent them from suffering while inside the womb.'But the latter part of the statement does not follow. If we are justified in killing people who do not live up to 'the quality of life', which is an extremely arbitrary qualifier by the way, then this justification isn't logically limited to the womb. We would be just as justified in killing them outside the womb, since the reason why we are killing them in the first place is not dependent on whether they are born or not.Although the fatal flaw in the argument lies in Con's last line:'I understand that going around killing people with disorders is very bad, but abortion is different as I have explained.'The thing is, whether a person is born or not has no relevance to the eugenical aim of why we are killing them. So if killing people with disorders outside the womb is 'very bad', then killing people with disorders inside the womb is also 'very bad', which refutes Con's whole argument.ConsciousnessCon is yet to give a reason why brain activity affects the permissibility of killing. There are many differences between a teenager and a foetus, but there are few, if any, relevant differences pertaining to the permissibility of killing.For example, it would be fallacious to say:'A teen is over four feet tall and they are a developed individual. More importantly, a teenager has facial hair. Does an embryo/fetus have facial hair? No, it does not'The reason why this is fallacious is because the height and hairiness of people is not relevant to whether we are justified in killing them. Likewise, Con has not demonstrated that having conscious, brain activity or a history of consciousness is actually relevan.Finally, Con's assessment of sperm and eggs is quite simply incorrect. A sperm exists before conception, but when it fertilises an egg, the actual sperm does not exist after this point - it merges with the egg to form an entirely new being.Put in the form of an equation, fertilisation is:Sperm + egg --> embryonotSperm + egg --> embryo + sperm + eggThe first equation is scientifically accurate. Notice how, after the process, it is only the foetus that exists, the sperm does not exist after the process of fertilisation, hence it can't live a future human life because it does not exist after conception.Therefore, the sperm does not have a future human life, unlike the foetus. And as the capacity to live a future life is what determines the permissibility of killing (see round 2), this elucidates the reason why it is impermissible to kill a foetus but permissible to kill a sperm or an egg.MoralsSee my introduction.Black-market abortionsI accept that the website I cited was biased, but the statistics themselves actually came from the National Center for Health Statistics, and was used on the floor of the US Senate. For Con to support his claim that the statistics are biased, he must provide evidence that the National Center for Health Statistics itself is biased.Con goes on to quote the high amount of deaths that result from illegal abortion, but note the ending of the quote:'which is hundreds of times higher than that for safe, legal abortion in developed nations.'Coincidentally, abortion is generally legal in medically-developed countries and generally illegal in medically-undeveloped countries. (4) The implication of this is that there is only an international correlation between legality of abortion and safety of abortion, but correlation does not necessarily entail causation.The correlation is better explained by the fact that medical science is far more developed in countries where abortion is legal than countries where abortion is illegal, and so the fact that abortion is safer in countries where it is legal is not because it is legal, but instead it is down to superior medical development.As my graph in round 3 shows, it is medical developments, not legislature, that statistically determine the danger of abortions.Therefore, it is still unproven and unlikely that legality has a significant causal effect on the safety of abortion, it seems far more apparent that medical developments are the main factor affecting abortion safety.Besides, it remains true that women have a choice in the matter. They understand the risks of abortion and so if they choose to have one, they understand that they may be harmed. This is the same with any risky medical procedure, such as gender reassignment, for example.Finally, Con writes:'It is also cruel to risk a woman's health, possibly life because they disagree with one on abortion.'But this can be absurdly applied to other scenarios, for example:'Stealing is dangerous, so it is also cruel to risk a woman's health, possibly life, because they disagree with one on stealing'.In other words, just because someone believes that a wrong action is right, it does not entitle them to considerations of their safety when undertaking said act. (1) http://www.sciencedirect.com...(2) Peter Singer, Practical Ethics 2nd Edition, page 3(3) http://www.localhistories.org...(4) http://www.womenonwaves.org...