TT2 Expert Final: U.S. militia groups pose a greater threat to our national security than do FTOs

Thanks again to bsh1. Before I get into it, I'll state that we shouldn't conflate domestic terrorism and USMGs. The former encompasses individuals who do not identify with any paramilitary group, acting entirely alone. Individual school shootings that have resulted from all manner of mental illness and angst, for example, should not be considered unless they are an outgrowth of the efforts of USMGs. I don't think it was Pro's intention to include them, but I'm ensuring that that delineation is made. With that, I'll get into some rebuttal. The analogy: Pro sets up an interesting analogy from the outset. He outlines a straightforward scenario in which we compare two dangers to evaluate which constitutes the larger threat. These include a bomb, which has a 50-50 chance of killing everyone in the room, and a knife-wielding maniac (which I'll abbreviate KWM), who is certain to kill 6% of the room's occupants. I agree with him that the bomb is the bigger threat. However, there are two problems with how well it links to the topic at hand (and with how well it supports Pro's case). The first is that neither the bomb nor the KWM represent either of our factions. Both of our cases make it clear that we're discussing large potential threats, not small actual threats, as the main concerns. If we must analogize, though, the history of violence among USMGs places them as the certain but smaller threat by comparison. The second problem is that the actual situation is not nearly so straightforward as the analogy portends. We cannot possibly analogize to a certainty or even a 50% chance what harm these groups present for us in the future. To a certain extent, we can assess them for likelihood, ranging from very likely to very unlikely. If a likelihood is vanishingly small, then no matter the possible impact, it should be ignored. At the same time, if the danger itself is incredibly small but the probability high, it should bear little weight. It is each of our burdens to present a case that carefully balances both substance and probability. Onto the arguments proper. While many of Pro's points are, indeed, factually correct, those same points only establish a level of harm caused by USMGs. He uses connecting arguments that often fail to address the realities in FTOs in order to make USMGs sound more dangerous. I'm going to go through each of the points he listed at the end of his case, and evaluate his surveys. 1) Radical ideology I agree that radical ideologies are spreading in America, however this is non-unique. I've already shown that this is also the case abroad, and that their allies are no longer confined to a particular ideology, let alone a national or ethnic group. 2) History of violence Pro's evidence has only shown there to be small, isolated instances of violence resulting from USMGs. I've shown a much more dramatic trend of violence among FTOs, as well as their proclivity for highly destructive and extremely deadly acts of terror. 3) Membership This is an extension of #1, as the spread of radical ideology is linked to an increase in membership and number of organizations. The separate implication made here is that more organizations is more problematic, but Pro never supports that claim. I would argue that the more disparate set of USMGs actually harms their capacity to execute large feats of terror due to conflicts between groups, especially since they all function in the same country. Pro also assumes that increased membership translates to an increased propensity for violence. 300,000 is a lot of people, but without a direct link to violent tendencies in a significant portion of that group, it is just a empty figure. Meanwhile, the strength of a group like al Qaeda (which has roughly 6,000-8,000 members)[8] and that of ISIS (15,000, and possibly doubling)[9] matters quite a lot. The major reason for this discrepancy is that there are very different messages being used by sovereign citizens than there are in FTOs. Whereas sovereign citizens believe that they are above the law, and therefore that it is their patriotic duty to disobey it,[10] those in FTOs “subscribe or belong to the global jihadist movement,”[11] showcasing a clearly violent agenda. This means that, while USMGs do present a threat, that threat doesn't always – and, I would argue, only rarely – plays out as violence; in fact, the majority seem to focus on issuing threats, filing bogus lawsuits, cyber-stalking, and tax evasion. When they do lash out, it's often without a plan of action, committed in the moment and therefore with an often small impact.[10] The same cannot be said of FTOs, where the main goal is to commit orchestrated acts of terror that incite fear and inflict as much physical harm as possible.[12] Thus, every member of these FTOs is very likely to commit themselves to violence, whereas only a small percentage of those in USMGs will do so. 4) Lone-wolf elements This is non-unique - lone-wolf elements are common in FTOs as well. There's Amine El Khalifi, who attempted “to detonate a bomb in a suicide attack on the U.S. Capitol,” believing “he was conducting the terrorist attack on behalf of al Qaeda” and Rezwan Fredaus, who “planned to use unmanned, remote-controlled aircraft to attack locations in Washington, D.C., including the U.S. Capitol,” espousing “loyalty to Bin Laden and al Qaeda,” as more prominent examples.[13] There's also those like Jose Pimentel, who used publications written by al Qaeda specifically for the purpose of encouraging the lone wolf model of attacks,[14] or are simply inspired by propaganda like ISIL.[15] Some are even trained directly, but allowed free rein, like Najibullah Zazi. Richard Reid, Iyman Faris, the Lackawana six and Ali al-Marri.[16] However, we shouldn't assume that lone-wolf elements are the most dangerous simply because they're more difficult to identify. A major reason why USMGs and FTOs are far more dangerous than their lone-wolf counterparts is because they present a continuous threat that their untrained counterparts simply cannot achieve. Now, Pro might say that training can spread through the Internet; however, not only is this entirely non-unique (though publications like Inspire), it's also insufficient for producing trained terrorists with sufficient expertise to prevent them from killing themselves accidentally, let alone remaining a continuous threat.[17] 5) Heavily armed Much of my case showcases how well FTOs are armed, their capacity for acquiring further, more dangerous arms, and from where they derive those arms. Pro has not done that. In support of his claim that they are heavily armed, he presents only the Bundy Ranch as evidence, which only showcases the use of sidearms and assault rifles. 6) Response/Tracking Pro says that law enforcement doesn't track USMGs in the same way that they do FTOs. He's right. However, that's not nearly so big of a problem as he asserts. Quoting his [1]: “The Federal Bureau of Investigation does not track militia groups unless they are alerted to violent or extremist activity.” I already showed in the previous round that they are alerted to this activity by the SPLC. Pro will have to show how this and other avenues are ineffective reporting structures. He'll also have to explain why the normal system of arrests is insufficient. I'd say that local monitoring through groups like the SPLC is infinitely better than attempts to identify and monitor targets by more distant means. 7) Potential for explosive violence This remains a bold claim with little in the way of support. FTOs have shown a p ropsensity for large scale violence with tremendous loss to human life. I spent much of last round detailing that very real harm. Pro simply doesn't establish a high probability of this kind of violence being utilized by USMGs, only claiming that USMGs are a powder keg ready to explode. He provides weak warrants through evidence of small, isolated acts of violence, and growing numbers of people becoming involved, each of which lack any solid link to an explosion of violence on a large scale. 8) Surveys This is an appeal to authority. There is no reason why we should accept the opinions of law enforcement as evidence of USMGs being a greater threat. Public perception doesn't establish the reality, even among police officers. Even if it did, neither of the studies provided by Pro establish USMGs as the greater threat, as both of them showcase how law enforcement perceives the two threats individually, not how they compare to one another. While a larger percentage of officers might view sovereign citizens as a threat, this doesn't show that the percentage that view both as a substantial threat view sovereign citizens as the larger threat. Moreover, the view that they're the bigger threat comes from constantly having to deal with USMGs personally, something that police cannot say with regards to FTOs. They're biased by their experiences and by the increased likelihood of facing down sovereign citizens, which actually makes USMGs akin to the KWM from Pro's analogy – an actual, obvious, but small threat staring them in the face. Back to Pro. 8. http://en.wikipedia.org... 9. http://www.dailymail.co.uk... 10. http://www.forbes.com... 11. http://www.trackingterrorism.org... 12. http://www.thirdway.org... 13. http://www.fbi.gov... 14. http://www.huffingtonpost.com... 15. http://abcnews.go.com... 16. http://www.huffingtonpost.com... 17. http://www.nato.int...