The Federal Government should permit the sale of human organs for transplantation

Observation: (1) The federal government has a compelling state interest and sufficient reason to ban X if X produces unintended, negative consequences to health when other, less risky alternatives exist. (2) If X has negative consequences to health and the problem of organ shortages can be solved without a market, the federal government has no good reason to open a market that causes X. Contention One: The sale of organs for transplantation spreads disease According to the American Medical Association, "Financial incentives would encourage individuals to donate even if they are of poor health because it encourages donors to conceal disease, or drug use."[1] This is further proven by UCLA's School of Medicine, which reports that "Recipients of vended kidneys have been reported to suffer a high rate of infectious complications, which could not have been prevented easily by routine evaluation."[2] Thus, screening is fallible. Moreover, according to the American Medical Association, "an open market for organs from living donors could result in a large number of private exchanges of organs for dollars, making quality control extremely difficult."[3] This argument is empirically true, as the Journal of Transplantation explains that 35% of paid kidneys fail or are rejected after 36 months, while only 5% of non-paid kidneys suffer the same fate.[4] This is further proved by the transmission of disease from blood. Blood forms a crucial role within transplantation. As Professor Thomas G. Peters of the University of Florida explains, Blood group matching is important in transplantation, being as critical to the success or failure of the transplant, as it is in blood transfusions themselves.[5] This is because of the deeply entrenched relationships between vital organs and blood. As explained by Colorado State University, the liver alone contains nearly 15% of the blood in the body.[6] This is greatly disconcerting because according to the Journal of Transfusion, "in heart surgery patients, 51% of those that received blood from paid donors acquired hepatitis, while 0% of those in non-paid donors acquired hepatitis,"[7] and in general, "41% of paid donors had hepatitis, while 0% of non-paid donors did."[8] Furthermore, Screening for these diseases is ineffective. This is pointed out by the Sanquin Blood Supply Foundation: "Paid donors are more likely to donate when blood viruses may not be detectable in screening tests. Screening without this ‘window-period' does not exist and probably never will."[9] Accordingly, by utilizing the organs and therefore contaminating patients with the latent blood of donors, disease is spread and outcomes of both the organs, and patients, are severely undermined. Contention Two: It is possible to solve the organ shortage without a market According to Harvard University, "When families were first informed about their relative's death and then offered the option to donate as part of a separate conversation- 61 percent of families agreed to donate, a 17% increase compared to when the request came immediately, as occurring now."[10] Thus, the way in which a simple question is asked means organ donations go up significantly. Moreover, according to Dr. Gabriel Danovitch, "the 3-mo average deceased kidney donation rate has risen 29% since January 1, 2001, and these increases have largely reflected increases in recovery of kidneys from standard criteria donors…In 2004 alone, there was an increase in the number of deceased donors by 11%, and this trend is continuing."[11] This is important because the Journal of Regulation points out that "Incentives wont aid the shortage, as recent empirical evidence suggests that an increase in the number of living donors has a negative impact on the number of deceased donors." This is proven to be true in the Iranian market system, as the Lancet reports, deceased cadaveric donations in Iran have plummeted as a result of financial incentives.[12] The Mayo Clinic explains the superiority of cadaevaric donations: "by donating your organs after you die you save as many as 50 lives."[13], compared to living donations, which aid only 1. My opponent must show (1) that a market does not facilitate the spread of disease/decreased quality and (2) a market would actually work and provide UNIQUE benefits that cannot be provided in the status quo. Any non-unique benefits should be ignored since they can, by definition, be derived through other, less risky means. [1] American Medical Association.. "Financial Incentives for Organ Procurement: Ethical Aspects of Future Contracts for Cadaveric Donors" Arch Internal Medicine Journal. 1995 Mar 27; Vol. 155. http://www.ama-assn.org... [2] Gabriel M. Danovitch, Professor @ School of Medicine at UCLA, Division of Nephrology and Alan B. Leichtman, Professor @ University of Michigan Division of Nephrology. "Kidney Vending: The "Trojan Horse" of Organ Transplantation" October 4, 2006. American Society of Nephrology. Published in the Clinical Journal of the American Society of Nephrology. http://organdonorincentives.org... [3] American Medical Association.. "Financial Incentives for Organ Procurement: Ethical Aspects of Future Contracts for Cadaveric Donors" Arch Internal Medicine Journal. 1995 Mar 27; Vol. 155. http://www.ama-assn.org... [4] Professor Thomas G. Peters, University of Florida, "Kidney Transplant Matching: What It Means", http://www.aakp.org... [5] Professor Thomas G. Peters, University of Florida, "Kidney Transplant Matching: What It Means", http://www.aakp.org... [6] R. Bowen, Colorado State University, "Physiology of the Hepatic Vascular System", 2002, http://www.vivo.colostate.edu... [7] T. Eastlund, "Monetary blood donation incentives and the risk of transfusion-transmitted infection", Journal of Transfusion, Volume 38, September 1998 [8] Ibid. [9] C. L. Van Der Poel et al., Sanquin Blood Supply Foundation, Blackwell Science, "Paying for blood donations: Still a risk?", 2002 [10] William DeJong et al, Professor of Community Health Services, Harvard University, "Options for Increasing Organ Donation", http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov... [11] Gabriel M. Danovitch, Professor @ School of Medicine at UCLA, Division of Nephrology and Alan B. Leichtman, Professor @ University of Michigan Division of Nephrology. "Kidney Vending: The "Trojan Horse" of Organ Transplantation" October 4, 2006. American Society of Nephrology. Published in the Clinical Journal of the American Society of Nephrology. http://organdonorincentives.org... [12] Priya Shetty, "Tax cuts for organs?", The Lancet, Volume 374, Issue 9698, Pages 1315 - 1316, 17 October 2009 http://www.thelancet.com...(09)61807-9/fulltext [13] Mayo Clinic, "Organ Donations: Don't let these myths confuse you," http://www.mayoclinic.com...