Adolescents ought to have the right to make autonomous medical choices

== Clarification == Pro's first observation is objectively incorrect. Pro says that I must argue that there's a moral obligation for adolescents to not have the right to make autonomous medical choices. That's nonsense. The meaning of "Con" is to argue "against" the resolution. In other words, I must merely *negate* the resolution, which states, "Adolescents ought to have the right to make autonomous medical choices." My sole burden is to argue that their isn't an obligation to grant them that right. Pro says this is unfair because I need only refute Pro's arguments to win -- but that's incorrect. I also need to show that such a right does not exist; in other words, I also need some offense supporting my position. Considering that, there's no way I have a "greater" burden. In fact, this is an LD debate topic for real life formal debate, and it has never been interpreted the way Pro wants it to be interpreted. DDO must seek to emulate real life debate, and, as such, my burden remains based on my interpretation of it. Under his second observation, Pro says that I need to prove that moral nihilism is true. But that's incorrect -- I'm merely challenging an *assumption* made by Pro. Pro is assuming moral realism, and I need to challenge that assumption. Rejecting that assumption is a default position. With regards to the issue of moral realism, the greater burden is with Pro, because moral realism is a fact claim -- and, when one debates a fact claim, the one who makes the affirmative statement has the burden of proof. Under the "ought" issue, the burdens of persuasion are shared, but when Pro assumes an "is" within their "ought" issue, the burden of proof lies with Pro. I'd like to further clarify what "morality" is. Morality is about making a distinction between what is "right" and what is "wrong." Right doesn't exactly mean "justified." Instead, it refers to what one is obligated to do, as opposed to what one is obligated to not do. Morality is all about intrinsic obligations, i.e. the obligation to do a certain action which exists objectively and abstractly. == My case: Nihilism == Acceptability isn't morality. Merely because a dictionary says so doesn't mean it is so. There are multiple contradicting definitions from dictionaries as well. "Right" is defined as "morally good, justified, or acceptable." [3] Pro is seeking to prove the "justified" and "acceptable" aspects, but the definition is clear in making a *distinction* between "morally good" and the other two. The definition implies that "morally good" is different from "justified" and "acceptable." Pro is merely using semantics to prove that it's "acceptable" and "justified" to have such an obligation. But that isn't Pro's burden -- Pro must show there's a *moral* obligation, which is beyond merely acceptance of society. Social acceptance deciding morality is a concession of the lack of an objective standard of morality. Furthermore, Pro doesn't show that "our understanding of morals" are objective. Why should we judge this debate under subjective human standards? The debate doesn't regard whether humans *consider* a moral obligation as described above to exist -- this debate is about whether such a moral obligation *actually exists.* Pro drops that the "libertarian framework" is a normative framework, not a metaethical one, and my argument regards metaethics, which is an assumption within all normative ethics. Pro also drops that the libertarian framework is justified by utilitarian standards that actually contradict it, and that there's no justification for utilitarian standards. Pro then appeals to a third framework of morality, a Buddhist framework which regards suffering as immoral. Once more, this is a normative framework. My argument doesn't concern normative ethics, it concerns metaethics -- whether normative frameworks are actually *objective.* Pro merely says "causing suffering comes under the definition of wrong." This is a bare assertion and is false -- "wrong" is defined as "immoral," and it's up to Pro to prove that causing suffering is immoral. Pro's normative frameworks may show this, but the normative frameworks lack coherence under moral nihilism. Mental illnesses, suffering, etc aren't morally wrong because objective morality doesn't exist. Pro then responds to the argument that morals aren't always followed. Pro entirely misunderstands the argument. I first argued a dichotomy: either morals are abstract and governed by some supernatural authority, or morals are natural and ingrained into people. If the former is true, there has to be some transcendent authority to decide what a moral "fact" is, else morality is subjective. God is the sole one who has such power. But there's no indication or evidence for God's existence. What can be asserted without evidence can be dismissed without evidence. The Law of Parsimony, also known as Occam's razor, posits that -- among a set of possible hypotheses -- the hypothesis with least positive assumptions is a priori most likely. In other words, any unnecessary assumptions must be discarded. [4] Take, for instance, a box of crayons that hasn't been opened yet. Person X and Person Y are speculating about the characteristics of the crayons within the box, without seeing those crayons. Person X proposes that there are twelve crayons in the box, while Person Y says there are twelve red crayons in the box. Neither has any evidence, but since Person Y has the additional assumption, it's a priori more likely that there are twelve crayons in the box, than there being twelve crayons that are all red " since there's no proof for either assertion, but the latter has more assumptions. In further justification, take Russell's celestial teapot analogy. Russell argues that people claim God exists without any evidence, and that God is neither demonstrable nor falsifiable. To assume that God exists is like assuming the existence of an undetectable, invisible teapot between Earth and Mars -- such a claim is ridiculous, but is neither provable nor falsifiable. One rejects such a claim regardless, as result of it being an unnecessary, unproven assumption. Everything in the universe can be explained without God, so God is exactly the assumption rejected by Occam's razor. If the latter is true, what Pro holds to be "moral fact" must be followed by everyone. Pro says they aren't "taught it," but if objective morality is natural and not abstract, then it's ingrained into the species, so people shouldn't need to be "taught" it. It should come naturally by definition. But moral standards vary, and, as such, morality is subjective. Pro says animals, etc don't have "moral understanding," but if natural morality is true, then moral understanding *must* exist naturally. There's no evidence of natural "morality." Pro might provide an example of biological altruism, etc but that isn't morality -- that's just survival instinct. The "state of nature," the one where survival instinct prevails, is one where might would make right and social Darwinism would be true. But even Pro rejects social Darwinism, so their framework contradicts itself and supports my point: morality is incoherent because natural standards don't exist. God and nature can't act as standards for morality, therefore moral nihilism is true. == Off-topic arguments == This utility-based argument is actually irrelevant due to moral nihilism, and is merely a link turn of Pro's case. My argument is that the child's maturity is already lower than the adult's, and when confronted with a situation of stress, it becomes *worse* than the adult's. Despite the doctor's explanations, children make immature and impulsive decisions. That's been established in my Rd. 2 argument -- children, with underdeveloped parts of their brain, act impulsively and make wrong decisions. Their parents, in such a situation, can make a much better informed decision. In fact, like Pro says, even adults could act immaturely; but one can't deprive adults of this right because they don't have anybody to make the decision for them. Children have parents who are capable of making the call. Pro then goes on irrelevant arguments about psychological torture, which Pro doesn't establish as "immoral," and so their arguments there are incoherent. Pro tries to use a utility-based framework here, but analyses of pleasure and pain are subjective, because the "degree" of pain and pleasure has no objective measure. In short, moral nihilism is true, and, as such, an "ought" obligation is incoherent. No such obligation exists about anything, including adolescents having the right to make autonomous medical choices. For those reasons, vote Con. [3] Google ("define right") [4] http://plato.stanford.edu...