Ideological Diversity is not a Virtue

1.) Where multiple ideologies exist, only one may be correct. 1A. Paradoxes are not true or false in the sense that normal propositions are; where they exist, they show the inabilities of a logical system. No paradox exists unless one already accepts the logical system the paradox exists within, meaning that 1B. If compatibilism is correct and distinguishable from both determinism and libertarian free will, then it must be the case that there is something in compatibilism which is both a) correct and b) not in either of the other theories, and, if compatibilism is merely a container of determinism and free will, there can be no “diversity”, for positing compatibilism is the same as positing the “other” theories. In either case, compatibilism would still be the only optimal theory, leaving diversity with no place. 1C. In the example my opponent gives, there is still either a contradixion between the two ideologies or there is, in fact, only one ideology. Using my opponent’s phrasing/definitions, say that person A claims that “Joe is here”, while person B claims that “Joe is not here”. Substituting definitions, A claims “Joe is on or close to the premises”, while B claims “Joe is not in my presence”. Either each party accepts their own claim and the other’s claim, in which case they would have exactly the same ideologies (in this context), or one or more of the claims is rejected (or, at least, not accepted) by one or more of the parties. This would require at least one false belief in an ideology. For example, if A rejects B’s true claim as false, A has a faulty ideology. Even if A just doesn’t take a stance regarding the truth value of B’s true claim, A is still making a claim - that “B’s claim should neither be judged true or false” – which is itself false, for it is clear that B’s claim, having a truth-value, must be judged for the ideology to be complete, or at least aim at completeness. 1D. “Now suppose it is 1940 Poland and Nazi officers ask a Jewish person to identify their religion. If the Jewish person told the truth, they would be killed by the Nazi officer. Would lying in that instance be definitively immoral?” Note: I am not espousing nor rejecting Kantianism directly. While the above lines may have emotional and rhetorical impact, I fail to see its relevance. If logic dictates that one must answer yes, the bullet must be bitten, regardless of how uncomfortable that would be. Therefore, if objective morality exists (further support will be given for this), it must be taken as primary over all intuitions. “But suppose Pro wants to argue that Kant's value of motive dictating righteousness in and of itself presents an objective standard of morality. That is problematic because it does not answer the is-ought problem in moral philosophy; that is it does not answer how one ought to behave.” The is/ought problem ceases to be a problem when a goal has already been specified. Hypothetical imperatives may constitute a moral system if the “then” portion of the “if, then” statement is specified. For instance, assume that it is a moral goal to be in New York. To decide what you should actually do (the normative part of the moral system), simply find what would fit the “x” in “if x, then you will be in New York”. Kant did recognize that hypothetical imperatives only hold water if the goal is set (hence the “hypothetical”). All that must be done to pass by the is/ought problem is to show that a certain goal must be accepted by any moral agent within the context. I have done this at the end of my first round: “If a moral agent seeks to hold an ideology, they are expressing that that ideology is a value to them, and, thus, that they perceive it as furthering the good. Moral agents do not seek to hold faulty worldviews, for any act, including seeking worldviews, relies on the presupposition that one’s worldview is not faulty, and thus such an undercutting of fundamentals is impossible.“ Again, I am not arguing from a Kantian basis. I have only given a metaethical framework which states that all ethical systems must have certain premisses built-in to be self-consistent; this is enough to prove my case. Discussions on motives are thus not relevant, as I have shown that all moral action must be delimited by objective rules. 2.) An ideology which is incorrect cannot have moral worth and should not be valued. My opponent proposes that diversity of opinion leads to better critical thinking skills, reasoning, etc., by way of allowing people to engage (and refute) wrong ideas, ergo such diversity is a virtue. However, this is exactly the point: one must try to get away from all wrong worldviews and move towards the singular ideal. If it were not the case that the ideal ideology should be aimed towards, the benefits my opponent cites have no impact (since critical thinking would be useless), and if the above is the case, then diversity is admitted to not be a value. When one analyses a faulty argument, no value is gained from the argument; the value is gained from eliminating the argument’s influence as best you can and replacing it with one which is coherent. The value is in the negation of diversity, not its existence. Contextuality Something being right in one scenario and wrong in another poses no problem to objectivity; they would be independent judgements. A proper ideology, shown in 1C., would deal with this. Conclusion Would we not think bad of a world wherein every ideology was accepted equally? Surely despicable and nonsensical ideologies being placed alongside moral and rational ones is indefensible. And if it is so that there can only be one ideology of the latter sort, then the existence of any other should provoke the same reaction as the original hypothetical did.