The Normative Contingency Thesis (NCT) is a compelling objection to Moral Realism.

First, let me remind the reader that my job is not to defend moral realism. Rather, the resolution is whether the NCT is a compelling rebuttal of the moral realist position. On these grounds, I think it fails and I remain unimpressed with the critique. The bulk of Pro’s argument is a critique of axioms as essentially not a valid source of self-verification. Pro is kind enough to offer the tl;dr version in his last paragraph for the lazy reader, but my response will be direct and simplistic. In sum, my response is that Pro is arguing against the validity of the propositions needed to make his own case. In presenting his own case, Pro does not argue in a vacuum or from a point of dogmatic “beyond questionability” but presents a case which presupposes a network of its own first principles. I contend that first principles are necessary for discussion of whatever nature – even the expression of skepticism. In short, skepticism requires its own first principles from which it begins. As Wittgenstein writes “The questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn” [1]. In fact, Pro’s very first statement is reminiscent of one of those first principles: “Nobody will contest that moral propositions require justification--like epistemological questions, moral propositions require an underlying substance for validation. ” It should be clear that Pro begins with his own set of first principles, and from these concludes that any first principle leading to objective morality is unfounded. I just disagree. Pro interestingly comments “As all roads are said to lead to Rome, so too do all propositions eventually reach a space where justification is no longer possible--you reach assertions, circularities, but never bona fide certainty. ” I ask: Is bona fide certainty the only grounds for a defensible belief? I have my reasons for believing in moral realism, but again the debate only concerns whether the NCT is a compelling critique. If Pro can at least allow – as he should if he wants to maintain the (relative) coherency of his own argument – the validity of some first principles that he cannon immediately dismiss any moral first principle as he does the same in other philosophical fields. My job is not to convince the reader or Pro of moral realism, just that any attack on first principles will inevitably collapse under the weight of its own instability. In his doubt, Pro presupposes certain acceptable standards for truth and the grounds for doubting (i. e. what is legitimate to doubt, namely, moral first principles and what is not – that assertions require justifications. ) In conclusion, Pro appears to be a zugzwang here. I ask:is the adoption of all pre-justification first principles illegitimate? If Pro answers “yes” he has clearly made his own case completely untenable which should warrant not only a “Con” vote but a serious revision on Pro’s behalf of his own philosophical beliefs. However, as already mentioned if Pro can allow for the validity or legitimacy of some of these first principles he would be unjustified in any immediate dismissal of the moral realist position at least on the grounds of the NCT. Indeed, the very nature of reason is grounded in intuitive “first principles. ” It does us no good to attack them. Back to you, Pro. [1] Wittgenstein, On Certainty sec. 341.