A human Soul exists

Thanks Con! Onto the final round. Argument from fungibility Continuation Con claims that I create a strawman when I object to the whole of atoms as opposed to a continuation of atoms. However, this would be to create a strawman within itself; I do in fact object to the continuation of atoms. What I stated is that anything wholly composed of atoms (of which, a continuous formation would be inclusive of) must be fungible, for anything wholly composed fungible matter (parts) must be fungible. A continuation of atoms is wholly composed of fungible matter and thus, is fungible in itself. I see no reason why a continuation of atoms can't be replaced atom by atom in the exact same place and the exact same formation/bond between other matter, to form a new continuation and have no intrinsic loss or gain. A continuous formation is a fungible one. Indeed, there hasn't been any justification by Con concerning exactly why a continuation of atoms is non-fungible - it has merely been asserted. Perduantism The crux of the issue is, as I stated, that while non-fungibility is there, it is derived. As Sider (2001) (and indeed, perduantists in general) proposed, enduring objects have temporal parts. In such a case, it is arguable that there would be derivability - viz. in the temporal parts themselves, which upon perduantism, is the source of identity. [1] Con concedes that eternalism is assumed in the argument. This seems to weaken the argument - for any argument that has an underlying assumption that is innately controversial is an argument best left unargued for. Indeed, presentists like Craig (2000) and Prior (1959) have criticised eternalism as an unsound theory of time. As such, it appears that Con's case is compromised. Modal Argument Epistemic Knowledge and The Mind Con responds to Swinburne's objection by stating that the contents of the mind don't equate to the substance of the mind, which is required for conceivability claims. However, surely knowledge of the content is all that's needed? For if we are to conceive of anything, then we must evaluate its essence in the face of logical truths - but the contents of the mind are its essence. It seems that the mind is simply a means of introspection and qualia - of which, we have direct access to. But if we have such knowledge about introspection and qualia (id est, the mind) then surely we have plausible a priori justification for conceivability of the applicability of introspection and qualia sans a physical body. This is all that's required for the argument, it seems. Possible Worlds Con claims that if I am to argue that metaphysical epistemic claims prevents the regress, then I give myself an unattainable burden of proof. And while I certainly agree that this gives me an increased burden, I would contest that it isn't unattainable: some aspects of the previous paragraph can certainly be applied to this. It seems that we have perfect a posteriori knowledge of consciousness in the actual world and as such, are in a position to state whether or not it is epistemically possible in the actual world for mind to exist without body. We have knowledge of the mind and the body (albeit with some imperfect knowledge) ,that appears to be sufficient mouth to make metaphysical epistemic judgement. Non-Reductive Physicalism While Con concedes that if 'body' is defined as the entire physical reality of a person then non-reductive physicalism is ruled out, he claims that the argument should be expected to be sound if it is true. I see no reason to deny this in general, but it does appear that if one has to resort to non-reductive physicalism to deny the argument then the argument is a relatively successful one; not to mention, it would be ad hoc to avoid the conclusion by positing an extra hypothesis like non-reductive physicalism. And so while this could certainly be asserted by the physicalist, it doesn't seem to be particularly reasonable to do so. Issues With The Soul Identity Con states that a Neo-Lockean view of the soul is denied in the first horn of the dilemma. However, it seems that a Neo-Lockean view is a reasonable alternative to the first horn - for it certainly seems cogent to view two identical consciousnesses to be identical persons - equally, if you were to replace your current conscious with a different consciousness, it seems cogent to view that you were to become a different person. We at least have prima facie reasons to think this, for individual consciousnesses are correlational with individual identities. And since consciousness is a component of the mind, it is a feasible view to think that the contents of the soul/mind preserve identity. In relation to non-physical qualia, Con claims that there is a distinction to be made between what-knowledge and how-knowledge. However, i don't think that this helps his case. It seems that if we follow Jackson's thought experiment (1982) on the Ability Hypothesis, then that-knowledge should equate to how-knowledge iff qualia truly is physical. For if all qualia is purely physical, what-knowledge should be sufficient enough for how-knowledge; under physicalism, there is simply no difference. And so if anything, the fact that there even is a distinction is support for non-physical qualia in itself. [2] [3] Interaction In response to interactionism, I can only state what I have already said; one, that a shared property or even interaction doesn't entail monism, and two, that with everything being said, it is ultimately irrelevant: there are solutions for the dualist in response to this and even if there weren't, it wouldn't make much difference. As Philosopher Scott Calef states: "To be bewildered by something is not in itself to present an argument against, or even evidence against, the possibility of that thing being a matter of fact. To ask “How is it possible that . . . ?” is merely to raise a topic for discussion. And if the dualist doesn’t know or cannot say how minds and bodies interact, what follows about dualism? Nothing much. It only follows that dualists do not know everything about metaphysics. But so what?" [4] So, to object to interactionism isn't sufficient enough to put into question the truth value of dualism or even a soul. It is an internal problem for the dualist, as given the truth value of dualism, interactionism is not an intrinsic issue; as I stated, there are many solutions - namely, ethereal emission, or occasionalism. But even if these weren't successful, it can be argued that nothing of value is lost for the dualist. Conclusion First off, thanks to n7, who is an amazing debater. Thanks also to the viewers/future voters for following the debate. In this debate, I have given 2 arguments which have been defended by me and rebutted by Con. However, These rebuttals have rested on unsound premises, as i have hopefully shown. Furthermore, Con's arguments against the soul have been largely unsuccessful, failing in several respects: they have failed in their assertions and even if they were successful, it doesn't follow that no soul exists. Consequently, the notion of a soul has emerged to be more plausible than not, and the resolution is affirmed. Sources: [1] http://en.wikipedia.org... [2] http://plato.stanford.edu... [3] http://plato.stanford.edu... [4] http://www.iep.utm.edu...