Determinism renders moral responsibility impossible

With regards to his first comments, everything he says on contradiction is true. Hence, I would like to amend my presentation slightly: S1. All actions that are not free are not subject to moral responsibility . S2. All human actions are not free. S3. All human actions are not subject to moral responsibility. With this in mind, I would like to refer back to his comments regarding the weightlifter. Now, I will interpret 'on his best day' to mean 'on a day such that a mixture of internal and external factors that are beyond his control enabled him to lift the maximum weight that he is at that time capable of lifting'. With this in mind, note that Con proceeded to argue that the weightlifter might fail to lift 299lbs. If this were true, then the period of time 'on his best day', would be finished (by Con's own admission that 'on his best day' he is capable of lifting more than this). Is it his fault that this day is over? Is he blameworthy because the factors (that are beyond his control, including natural laws, forces and particle interactions) that would allow him to lift that weight are not present? I may have misunderstood Con completely, but I believe that this is what he was arguing. Con then argues that 'doing exactly what you want' is being in control of your actions. And yet, as I have already shown, your brain activity demonstrates that it sends signals to your muscles before you know you want to move. Your brain is acting independently of your conscious self - 'doing exactly what you want' is really 'doing what your brain decided you would do, and you attributed a 'want to do' it after the fact'. And also, he argues that 'doing exactly what you want' is 'the very definition of being in control of your actions'. What Con then forgets is that you are not in control of your actions, as I have pointed out. Your brain begins the movement, your conscious self attributes a 'want' to it after the fact. With this in mind, consider that his comment to that effect in ineffectual - whilst it may have been true that, in a world where 'doing exactly what you want' and 'being in control of your actions' were possible, I would recognise that statement as true, however what it is actually saying is that x (which cannot happen) is the definition of y (which cannot happen). Consider the pointlessness of that remark. With regards to S1, both I and Con agree on this ("if some physical state is such that it determines your action, then your action is not your fault"), unless I misunderstand him. With regards to S2, the evidence that I have provided is in my view sufficient to support this statement, and if it is not, I would like to ask Con exactly what evidence I would have to present to successfully assert it. With regards to S3, I believe that my conclusion is sound. If that is not the case, then I invite Con to correct it. Also, with regard to the implicit contradiction needed for my argument to succeed, here I present it: 1. Our actions are determined. 2. No actions that are determined can engender moral responsibility. 3. We are morally responsible for our actions. If there are any significant mistakes that I have made in this argument, I look forward to them being exploited by my opponent in his next argument.