Resolved: Abortion is morally impermissible

I will respond to them in the next round. In this round I will present my own objections to your future-like-ours argument. Personal IdentityWith regards to premise 2 of the future-like-ours argument, Pro claims it is uncontroversial that the fetus has a future of value, and abortion denies it from being realized. However, is this true? Well, it’s not entirely clear that it is. Implicit in Pro’s argument is that the somatic or animalist view of personal identity is true. Pro gives no argument for why we should believe in this view, and so his future-like-ours argument makes an assumption that is not obviously correct contrary to his statement. Let me explain what I’m talking about. Personal identity, as far as I understand it, is concerned with the question of what makes someone the same over time. So, how am I the same individual in the past, present, and future? The two popular views among philosophers that try to answer this question are the animalist view and the psychological view. The animalist view claims what makes us the same individual over time is the fact that we have the same body. So, you are identical to your past, present, and future self if you have the same body. By same body I simply mean that you are the same biological organism over time. The animalist view of identity says that organism or animal reading this debate right now is you. If somebody asked you “what makes you the same individual through time? ” A believer in the somatic view would reply “being in the same body makes me the same over time. ”The other popular view is the psychological account of identity. This view takes many different forms, but it can roughly be described as follows. The psychological view claims what makes us the same individual over time is the fact that we have the same consciousness or mind. By same consciousness or mind I mean we have the same *basic* memories, personality traits, beliefs, desires, and intentions. The psychological view of identity says that conscious mind reading this debate right now is you, and that your body or flesh and blood is not you. You can think of your body as akin to a vehicle you drive around in. When we apply these views to the abortion issue, Unitedandy’s argument must accept the animalist view of identity as true. This is because under the psychological view of identity, the killing of a fetus prior to consciousness would not involve depriving it of a future of value. Although abortion uncontroversially kills a human organism, we, according to the psychological view, are not fundamentally or essentially organisms. Therefore, the killing of a pre-conscious fetus would not deprive it of its future of value. Indeed, on this view, it has no such future. The conscious being that will later emerge, however, will be the individual that has such a future. Perhaps an example will help illustrate my point. Imagine a pro-lifer said to me “what if your mother aborted you when you were an embryo? You would have missed out on your future! ”If I believed in the psychological view of identity, then I would respond to this person as follows, “You’re mistaken, my friend. You see, I never was an embryo. I don’t think I existed until I became conscious at a late stage of pregnancy. Therefore, the destruction of the embryo would not have killed me, but merely prevented me from coming into existence. ” The idea is that we are not identical to the fetal stages, since we had no consciousness or mind at that time. However, under animalism, we would be identical to the fetal stages, since we are identical to our organism throughout the entirety of our existence. Therefore, the fetus would, under animalism, have a future of value since it will be identical to the adult human animal in the future. Now that I’ve briefly explained my understanding of personal identity, I want to give two objections to the animalist view of identity that my friend Unitedandy’s argument is predicated on. The Brain Swap AnalogySuppose my friend Unitedandy and I are driving around in my car. While driving we get into a terrible accident, and are quickly rushed to the hospital once paramedics arrive. Once in the operating room, the surgeons discover that my body has been completely destroyed, but my brain is still intact. By contrast, Unitedandy’s brain has been completely destroyed, but his body is still intact. The surgeons start operating and put my brain into Unitedandy’s body. After the operation is complete, the patient who received it wakes up. We discover that he has the same body as Unitedandy, but the same memories and personality traits as Dookieman. The question is this. In this situation, who are we inclined to think survived? I think virtually everybody would agree that I am the one who lived. Even defenders of the animalist approach to identity, such as Eric Olsen, shares the transplant intuition that everyone else has. [1] If that’s right, that suggest it makes more sense to believe that what makes us the same individual through time is not our body, but our mind. Conjoined TwinsPhilosopher Jeff McMahan has pointed out a real-life counter-example to animalism, that doesn’t rely on a science fiction case like the one just described. Professor McMahan observes that conjoined twins, such as Abigail and Brittany Hensel, are two persons that share one organism. If that’s right, then neither girl is identical with that organism. For they cannot both be identical with the organism, as that would imply that they were identical with each other, which they are not. [2] Under animalism, there would have to be only be one person here, since there is just one organism. But clearly this is not the case. How can animalism explain away this difficulty? Electronic and Divine PersonsUnfortunately, animalism also doesn’t seem to provide an account of identity for beings that are not organisms. [3] This is a problem, since these are things that can exists, and might be deserving of a right to life, but would not be included since they have no identity over time under Unitedandy’s view. ConclusionWe have seen Pro’s future-like-ours argument can only succeed if the animalist account of personal identity is true. Pro gave zero arguments for why we should believe in this view, and so he should in the next round. In addition, I have given three objections to this account of identity, which Pro must also respond to. Sources:[1] Olsen, Eric. “The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology. ” Page 44. [2] McMahan, Jeff. “The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life. ” Page 35. [3] Don Marquis and Michael Tooley's discussion on "Philosophy TV" at 52:29:. http://www.philostv.com...