The United States should use private military firms abroad to pursue its military objectives.

Thanks, Con! I. BOPCon agrees that PMCs are not confined to combat uses. To successfully negate, Con must show that the US should not even use non-combat PMFs. II. PMFs are CheaperA. CostsCon drops that vet benefits yield $1.73 trillion in long-term costs. Con says we spent $300 billion over 8 years of one war in PMF contracts. It would take the US almost 48 years for those contracts to add up to the costs of those vet benefits if the cost of those benefits remains stagnant. But, that cost won't remain stagnant; as more soldiers are injured, that $1.73 trillion number will steadily rise. That number will also rise if Con gives vets the additional benefits he proposed. Plus, since we're no longer engaged in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to the extent we were when those contracts were awarded, we're probably spending less on PMFs now then we were during the timeframe Con cited. Add to the $1.73 trillion the billions in media costs and bonuses needed to replace the loss of PMF manpower, as well as the costs of training new recruits, and it's clear that, in the long-term, conventional soldiers are far more expensive. Turn: only PMFs will yield savings to reinvest into our vets. The double-bind does exist. Public opinion on military spending, per Con's source, is volatile, and would likely change if the debt ballooned. Even if public opinion didn't changed, officials may not support higher spending due to their knowledge of the risks; this is already true of many generals. [31]B. CorruptionCorruption is problematic among regular soldiers too. Some examples: (1) a Marine and his wife stole nearly $2 million; (2) one ring of US military personnel stole $52 million. [29] Conventional soldiers--no less avaricious than any other human being--have a greater incentive than contractors to steal because (b/c) of their lower salaries. Also, the $10 billion figure Con cites doesn't significantly change any of the math I just explained, esp. as that figure may be cumulative over several years. Re: warlords, this is non-unique. The CIA paid President Karzai "[t]ens of millions of US dollars" to buy influence in his administration. This money found its way, via corrupt officials, to warlords and the Taliban, all without PMF involvement. [32] Con cannot show that PMFs in/directly fund the Taliban more than other US actors do. Re: my contention IV, just b/c it's theoretical doesn't mean it's wrong; Con oft-uses theoretics too. PMFs may not spend in the US, but their spending in war zones is good; it stabilizes local communities and gives locals a stake in missions. III. ResponsivenessA. RapidityCon is not only supporting reduced war-making capacity, but also reducing our ability to respond to sudden crises, e. g. a sudden attack on an ally. Con never contests that PMFs have rapid-deployment abilities. Con never disputes that a draft is the alternative. The draft is bad for 3 reasons: (1) it violates the liberty of conscripts, (2) draftees have poorer prospects after service (Con places much importance on vet welfare, yet accepts the goodness of the draft), and (3) conscripts are less able/ready/motivated to fight. Con wants the US to respond to emergencies with less able troops (conscripts) instead of trained contractors; that is something we ought to reject. Rwanda (had nothing to do with rapid deployment) may be theoretical, but the reality that the US will face emergencies that require fast responses is not theoretical, it's fact. Only PMFs offer those responses. Rwanda shows how PMFs give the US greater flexibility to respond when necessary even when responding may be controversial. B. AccountabilityI already showed that soldiers (conscripts are soldiers) are not more accountable than contractors. Con's only reply was that the US used PMFs as shields from accountability, but I showed that the US ignored enforcing the ICCPR for even its own troops. It seems that human rights laws aren't applied to either group. If Con cannot show that his alternative leads to greater accountability, than accountability cannot be an advantage for Con. US soldiers committed 68% of the offenses at Abu Ghraib and committed massacres like Haditha. Both cases harmed US-Iraqi relations. [18, 20] Con cannot prove that PMFs harm the US's reputation more than conventional soldiers do. Con also cannot have it both ways. He cannot say that PMFs "caused permanent damage to US perception abroad" and also say that the US hides dubious actions with PMFs. IV. EffectivenessA. TrainingCon's source 7 states, "There are a number of. .. pretty experienced reputable security companies. .. those are the big companies that get the multimillion-dollar contracts. " These PMFs hire "[s]pecial Forces, Navy SEALs, Army Rangers and. .. SAS [Special Air Service. .. ] from other countries. " It seems the linchpin PMFs--the ones in the most vital missions and most present on the ground--are highly experienced. His source 2 notes that the "shortage of quality labor" came during the Iraq war, indicating that PMFs, like the military, had trouble recruiting as the war dragged on, as many of the available hands were already fighting. This doesn't impact a PMFs ability to provide troops early on in a conflict (when rapid deployment is often most essential), nor does it mean that PMFs have unqualified staff. And even if PMFs hire someone who "does not apply to the country or situation," like a retired cop, that person still is likely to have more skill with firearms and with lethal situations, than a fresh recruit. The other harms Con notes seem, again, to only apply to a small number of PMFs. His source adds, "Many. .. express admiration for the professionalism of and the difficult jobs carried out by [PMFs]. .. But all realize that not every firm can be the best. " Again, given the info from Con's source 7, it seems that smaller, less involved PMFs may have these problems, but that PMFs that matter and are used most are very well-trained. Training others was never a main impact of my case; this is a side issue. Con has not shown that US trainers are any better than PMF ones, but PMFs can be successful in this regard. The US used PMFs to train Croatian soldiers, who used their newfound skills to launch "a stunningly successful attack on Serbian-held Krajina" and force Serbia to the negotiating table. [10] The theoretical harms Con cites (e. g. commoditization) did not materialize there, nor does Con ever give concrete examples of their materialization. B. Working TogetherCon's own source notes that PMFs do have partial access to US intelligence, and have their own ways to collect data. US intelligence agencies also often fail to share information, leading to failure to ID threats, or agencies acting at cross-purposes. [30] This issue is non-unique. This is fixable through better regulatory frameworks (e. g. setting up channels of communication). Recently, we've increased all kind of PMF regulations. Given the inertia towards regulation, it's likely that regulation will increase. [15, 21, 23] There is also an incentive to fix problems to improve results. Even if it weren't likely, it's still possible, and so some weight should be given to regulatory fixes. Other fixes (e. g. civil litigation) are already happening. [22]C. Brain DrainSoldiers are increasingly seeking corporate jobs. [33] Businesses actively recruit vets, b/c "[i]t makes marketing much easier b/c we are able to show how we are different. .. People really want to get behind veteran-owned and -operated businesses. " One group managed to bring "203,890 former service members" out of the military and into the franchise industry. [34] All this shows that brain drain is going to happen no matter what: civilian businesses pay better, are safer, and actively recruit vets. At the very least, PMFs can bring a vet who may have gone to the franchising industry into the defense industry instead where their training won't go unused. PMFs help retain talent. PMFs aren't creating deficiencies in the military, b/c while they augment US capacity in key areas, the US still has its own soldiers performing tasks in those areas, so the skills sets aren't being lost. In fact, the US is increasing recruitment of its most specialized and elite forces. [35] And, the very fact that PMFs were needed to fill the void implies that the military was always deficient in these areas; there's no reason to believe the military will stop being deficient without PMFs. Finally, it's hard to say that depriving "some" personnel of experience is sufficient to lead to the harms Con discusses. This unquantified issue doesn't outweigh the quantified ones, e. g. not being able to afford conventional troops. V. ConclusionA. PMFs Good PMFs (1) are cheaper (even if they weren't, Con's in a double-bind), (2) are better trained on balance, (3) demographically less apt to be abusive, (4) help stabilize local communities, + (5) allow effective responses to emergencies. Also, many PMFs won't cause the harms Con cites. B. Con's Issues (1) Many of Con's harms are non-unique: accountability, warlords, abuse. .. (2) Con drops that PMFs profit-motive "acts as a break on US. .. willingness to go to war. " (3) Without PMFs, the US may spread itself too thin to try to protect as many positions as possible, or to respond to threats. (4) Con relies on a few examples to make his case; points like my demographic data are more encompassing. (5) Con has no examples of PMFs destabilizing countries not already at war; there's no net-negative. (6) Many risks of PMFs are fixable; more regulation is likely and possible; other fixes are happening already. (7) Con has no alternative for rapid-deployment. VI. Sources29 - . http://tinyurl.com...30 - . http://tinyurl.com...31 - . http://tinyurl.com...32 - . http://tinyurl.com...33 - . http://tinyurl.com...34 - . http://tinyurl.com...35 - . http://tinyurl.com...Thanks!