There are no compelling arguments against same-sex marriage

Theoretical IssuesYou cannot derive an evaluative/normative conclusion from only descriptive premises if you want a formally valid argument. An argument is formally valid if and only if it is an instance of an argument form all of whose instances are valid.”1 Thus, such an argument relies on a suppressed premise. This premise may be true or false, but it’s going to be normative. I should clarify my views on social value, because I did not mean that persons can only have extrinsically value. There can be two kinds of values: (1) social/political and (2) pre-political. The intrinsic value of life is pre-political. That is, if humans never formed societies, they would still have intrinsic value. Again, something has social value if, “it brings about, sustains, or improves the quality of society and it does so in a just way.” Not everything that has pre-political value has social value. A rapist or a thief may have intrinsic value as a person, but he has very little social value and thus imprisoning him (i.e. removing him from society) is a good thing to do. The imprisonment of such a person has more social value than the freedom of the person in that the former improves the quality of society.I doubt that “intrinsic” social value can exist and therefore I doubt that sex kinds or unions or marriages can have “intrinsic” social value. Why? Because something x has intrinsic value to the extent that x has value that is due entirely to what x is intrinsically and apart from x’s relations to other things. But to call a value “social” is to relate it to society, otherwise it’d just value qua value. Thus, by definition, something can only have social value because of it’s relation to society. Only if a sex kind or union or marriage has a positive effect on society can it have social value. Philosopher Judith Jarvis Thomson has identified two uses of “ought,” an expectation sense (“The train ought to arrive at 3”) and an advice sense (“You ought to drink some hot lemonade”).2 My opponent is clearly appealing to the former when he says that an eye ought to be able to see. Sex KindsIn talking about “sex kinds” my opponent is unconsciously assuming some metaphysical claims that he has not justified. I think this because all he seems to be describing is the fact that there are two sexes (male and female) and yet he seems to think he’s talking about something more. He lists essential features of sex kinds as: certain chromosomes, male/female form, sexual organs, brain structure and sexual attraction. Apart from the last feature, homosexuals have all the same features. In correspondence, he has listed chromosomes as the essential feature of the sex kind. Here the essential feature of X is such that something fails to be X unless it has this feature. But again, homosexuals have the exact same chromosomes as their straight counterparts. My opponent writes that the purpose of these sex kinds is “to fulfill their potential for procreation through an intimate bodily union.” However, in correspondence he has gone so far as to consider a straight man that never engages in any romantic activity nor even desires to as “participating in a heterosexual sex kind (henceforth HSK).” Such a person would not be fulfilling their “purpose” and yet would still be part of a HSK. If this is possible, then why can’t homosexuals participate in this sex kind as well? If he’s deriving the “heterosexual” in HSK from engaging in heterosexual sex or other romantic behavior, then he’s just contradicted himself. Even if it was the behavior that was necessary for the value of HSKs, that would mean they derive their value from behavior and thus can’t be intrinsically valuable.He goes on to write, “The SSV is intrinsic to the purpose of these kinds [procreation through bodily union], as the effects could not exist without them.” If the SSV is intrinsic to the purpose, then anyone who does not participate in this purpose cannot have intrinsic value. Yet he’s admitted that a person who doesn’t participate in this purpose is still part of a HSK. Furthermore, infertile couples can’t “fulfill their potential for procreation” by definition. One could view gay people has having a kind of infertility like post-menopausal women. Both are infertile in principle. But we let post-menopausal marry and I’ve never heard anyone say something negative about it. Further, the quotation at the top of this paragraph seems to suggest that the SSV of sex kinds comes from their effects (procreation). But, then again, infertile couples don’t count.Thus, it seems to me that if a straight person has intrinsic value in virtue of his/her HSK, then homosexuals possess this intrinsic value too. Marriage and Bodily Unions“The nature of marriage is between heterosexual sex kinds who have entered into a contractual agreement to establish and form a relationship that is intrinsically apt for procreation and child-rearing.” No relationship is intrinsically apt for child-rearing. Not every fertile couple would make good parents, that’s why we have adoption sometimes. Moreover, infertile people are not “intrinsically apt” for procreation. Post-menopausal women are certainly not apt. Some women are born without a vagina and/or a uterus, while some men are born without a penis or the ability to produce sperm. None of these people are intrinsically apt. My opponent’s definition of marriage would allow for adult incestuous marriages, but would this be a good idea for children or society? If they were infertile they would still be of a heterosexual sex kind.He claims that marriage is valuable in itself, because it involves a “one-flesh” union that covers the bodily, emotional and spiritual aspects of a couple’s being. First, spiritual aspects don’t exist, we agreed not to resort to the supernatural and the “one-flesh” union is a concept from the Bible.3 Second, PVI doesn’t result in a “one-flesh” union. The man and the woman are at all times completely separate bodies. The sperm and the egg unite, but not most of the time and certainly not when infertile people have sex. Third, any emotional union that happens can happen in SSMs as well. Fourth, if this union is metaphorical, then I see no reason why SSMs can’t engage in them. SSM and ChildrenI fear that my opponent has inadvertently cited studies that are irrelevant to this matter. He gave no citation or link for the first two studies and thus I could not examine them myself. Thus, I think those two can’t be considered evidence. When the founder and president of the Institute for American Values, David Blankenhorn, testified in the Prop 8 he cited the Child Trends study as evidence that the presence of both biological parents was necessary for proper adjustment. The judge in this case found that Blankenhorn “lacks the qualifications to offer opinion testimony.”4 Furthermore, the judge wrote, “he has no degree in sociology, psychology or anthropology despite the importance of those fields to the subjects of marriage, fatherhood and family structure.”5The Child Trends study isn’t useful because it only compares children raised by married, biological parents with children raised by single parents, unmarried mothers, step families and cohabiting parents. It doesn’t include children that were adopted or conceived via in vitro fertilization or raised by same-sex couples. Thus, it is not relevant to our discussion.On the other hand, numerous studies by qualified scientists have found that children that are adopted or conceived via reproductive technologies are just as like to be well adjusted as the children raised by two biological parents.6 According to Ellen C. Perrin, MD, “The vast consensus of all the studies shows that children of same-sex parents do as well as children whose parents are heterosexual in every way,”7 Given all this, I think that my opponent has failed to provide a compelling case against SSM.