Resolved: Sentience is of ethical relevance to the treatment of living things.

Framework He responds to my observation by claiming that I must show that the ethical framework that I propose is more likely true. This is nonsensical because morality is a subjective norm that individuals use to determine the extent of their obligations. Thus, I cannot possibly prove that any ethical framework is more true. So, you must extend the observation at the top of my framework which explicitly states that my burden is to only prove the resolution false. If I provide even a single example of an ethical theory that does not take sentience into account for the ethical consideration, then I win because sentience is not required. Multiplicity of frameworks does not prove the validness of an ethical idea. If my opponent proposed five ethical frameworks that justified the Holocaust, that does not mean that the Holocaust was moral even if I am only able to provide one example of a framework that dejustifies it. In addition, the multiplicity idea is unfair in the realm of this debate because every single traditional Western philosophy has placed humans on a pedestal above the rest of life. The notion that all life has inherent worth is relatively new in the Western world, so there are obviously going to be fewer theories that support it as compared to his traditional theories. The affirmative’s position is abusive. If you adopt his framework, my burden is to disprove all of his ethical theories, but his burden is to only prove one true. He can drop anything and win as long as he wins one argument. That skews the burdens against me. Either take down his framework and accept mine or negate based on abuse. Deep Ecology There are two justifications, one of which I provided. First, all life is interconnected to the fact that it belongs to ecosystems that connect living beings. This means that ethical emotivism justifies the inherent worth of all beings. Michael E. Zimmerman of TulaneUniversity explains, “Deep ecology is founded on two basic principles: one is a scientific insight into the interrelatedness of all systems of life on Earth, together with the idea that anthropocentrism - human-centeredness - is a misguided way of seeing things. Deep ecologists say that an ecocentric attitude is more consistent with the truth about the nature of life on Earth. Instead of regarding humans as something completely unique or chosen by God, they see us as integral threads in the fabric of life. They believe we need to develop a less dominating and aggressive posture towards the Earth if we and the planet are to survive.” (Source: http://www.context.org...). Second, the inherent worth of all living creatures stems from the fact that they have a purpose. Judging life based on human traits is meaningless because each species can fulfill its purpose in different ways. This renders rationality moot because a bacterium, for example, does not need rationality in order to fulfill its role and reproduce successfully. He next claims that deep ecology does not prove the irrelevance of sentience. First, given that the ethical theories that he proposes argue that organisms without sentience ought not be included in ethical discourse, his ethical ideas are not compatible with deep ecology. Next, two justifications for the inherent worth of all life, one of which was given last round, prove that sentience is not morally required. Third, the fact that deep ecology requires humans to not interfere with other forms of life unless it is vital to human survival indicates that deep ecology does not take sentience into account for moral consideration. This is nonsensical because not distinguishing based on sentience is the function of deep ecology. His vital interest of hunger is solved because eating otherspecies is part of the ecological framework: gorillas, chimpanzees, tigers,etc. all do this as well. Deep ecology does not differentiate between foodsources because there is no need to; life should not be ranked based on itsutility in solving human desires. This is also solved by the theory that I outlined. If an action does not solve for vital interests of survival, then it is unjust to interfere with the lives of other organisms. See point three. Other species have this right as well because it is part of our ecological interactions. First, other ethical theories cannot solve for lack of sentience because they explicitly treat non-sentient beings as lower than humans and say that because they are not ethically relevant, humans can use them as they please.Utilitarianism would argue that plants and fungi are ethically irrelevant, so the most ethical treatment of them would be whatever makes humans happy. Second, if you do not buy this, turn the fact that he claims thatUtil. solves for non-sentience. This puts my opponent in a double-bind: eitherhis ethical theories do not solve for non-sentience and he falls prey to myanthropocentrism kritik, or they do argue that non-sentience is ethicallyrelevant, so you negate. Anthropocentrism Hisfirst point here is moot because if we do not treat non-agents in an ethicallyrelevant manner, then they are not being considered. He is trying to mask thiswith empty rhetoric. Henever actually explains why he can solve for these individuals; at the veryleast, he is ethically required to provide them with the right to life, whichis something that his ethical theories do not require him to do. By definingsentience as a necessity for certain rights, the following classes ofindividuals are excluded from traditional Western ethics: infants (Peter Singerdefines them as non-sentient in his book Animal Liberation), mentally incompetentindividuals who cannot feel pain, and humans in a vegetative state.Preference-based utility cannot account for them because they cannot expresstheir preferences, which is also why discourse ethics does not account forthem. Theargument was not simply that his ethical theories do not account for other lifeforms; rather, it was that sentience based theories do not even account for theimportance of every human life. This leaves a gaping hole in his ideas becauseare not enough to even explain how humans should be treated. In addition, theycreate an exploitable idea that can justify many atrocities. All someone has todo to justify senseless slaughter is claim that the individuals in question arenot rational and sentient. Deep ecology provides for respect of all forms oflife and thus covers treatment of both agents and non-agents. Util Hedefined sentience as “The ability to feel, perceive, or be conscious, or tohave subjective experiences.” Animals do not perceive, are not conscious, anddo not have subjective experiences, so they are not sentient. This keeps theMill point alive. In addition, Mill would contend that individuals who cannotfeel pain, and are mentally incompetent and/or are in a vegetative state alsoneed to be accounted for, which his conception of util. does not. Thisfalls because of the dropped idea that rule util. collapses back into act util.He dropped it and can no longer address it, so you can apply it here and takeout this argument. Rationalism Thisis rendered moot by his advocacy of ethical emotivism. Emotivismis what causes us to relate to an individual and condemn his mistreatment.Rationality does not do this; extend the dog example from the last round. Discourse Ethics I provided an attack when I gave two general attacks on hisphilosophical frameworks. This debate is being taken care of above; he issneakily attempting to unfairly extend an argument that is already beingdiscussed. Emotivism Ido not concede advantages. The dog example was a traditional example thatexplains emotivist ethics. Deep Ecology extends this by explaining why humansare connected to other forms of life; traditional emotivism emphasizes thereasons that humans are distinct. Apply the double-bind here. If DE iscompatible, I win because his theories say that non-agents are just asimportant as agents.