If the fetus is a human person, then abortion is generally immoral

Introduction: I introduced my approach in the previous round. The general thesis is that regardless of the moral status of the fetus, the absolute dominion of owner of property grants a mother the right to expel an unwanted visitor from her premises. I will show through logical argument that an attempt to deny self-ownership and the inalienability of the will must lead to inconsistency and contradiction. Moral Framework: C1: Habermasian Discourse Ethics To justify a claim as rational and non-arbitrary to a dissenter, we engage in argumentation. Argumentation makes certain presuppositions about the actors involved. It is assumed that each individual is free and autonomous and that their consent is necessary (sans these assumptions, argumentation becomes meaningless). It is especially noteworthy that without the assumption of initial freedom, debating norms becomes absurd. This limits the scope of argument to such propositions that don’t contradict these assumptions. For instance, we can’t argue for permitting slavery without implicit inconsistency. [1] C2: Hoppe’s Argument Property rights are a necessary means of allocating scarce resources. If you and I cannot use the same object, it is necessary to fairly determine who shall have priority. Even in the Garden of Eden, our bodies are scarce resources that need to be owned. In order to determine just ownership, an objective link must be established between an individual and an object. In the case of bodies, this is not so difficult: it is clear that we necessarily and inalienably exert our will over our bodies. My occupation of and will over my body provides an objective grounds for me to claim ownership of it which no one else can counter with a similar claim. That it is natural to refer to our bodies reflexively affirms our innate assumption of bodily self-ownership. Thus, each person exerts ownership of his body as any other property object. [2] If we accept Habermas’ theory of discourse ethics, and to engage in debate without doing so would be impossible, Hoppe’s theory of private ownership becomes undeniable. Autonomous individuals engaging in discourse must respect the property of others. To interfere with an individual’s exercise of property rights would mean the cessation of discourse and the resort to force. Force is inherently non-rational and is not a means of resolving normative claims. A further and more significant problem with the denial of self-ownership through argumentation is that one exercises this same right in the act of argument. Hoppe makes this argument [3], but it is considered most significant by Roger Pilon, who argues that we cannot deny the premises that we presuppose merely by acting [4]. This argument is used to justify property in the traditional sense of material possessions as well, but for the purpose of the debate I will include only the argument for ownership of one’s body. C3: The Nonaggression Principle The conclusion from C1 and C2 is that we may not violate the property rights of other people if we hold discourse to be a rational means of normative inquiry. This ‘if’ has already been conceded by our agreeing to debate. We then find ourselves at the cornerstone of libertarianism: the Nonaggression Principle (NAP). The NAP prevents us from ever acting to deprive a person of their property rights to any extent. If expelling a fetus constitutes a use of property, we cannot act to prevent this action without eschewing our commitment to logical discourse. C4: Incoherency of Positive Rights A negative right is a limit on the actions others make take against an individual. Discourse ethics, in its establishment of normative rules, places constraints on action which are negative rights. A positive right is a claim to have an act performed by another person. The existence of such a right would automatically violate the negative right of self-ownership of someone else through binding him to act in a certain way and would therefore be unacceptable. Positive rights also lack specificity in their obligations. Suppose a starving man is owed a piece of bread; from whom is he owed it? From you, me, or some person in a faraway land? We cannot rationally justify why a certain individual should be obligated to fulfill a certain positive rights obligation. Such claims as a right to education, healthcare, or indeed life are therefore unwarranted by any individual. C5: Inalienability of the Will If I agree to take you on an airplane ride under the obligation that I will not “ask you to leave” at 20,000 feet, I cannot change my mind and toss you out because I have given up my ownership of the airplane to that extent. With bodies, this is not the case: it is not possible for me to give up control of my body. For instance, I cannot contract the use of my arm to you because my control over it is totally and uniquely mine. Our ability to exert or will over our bodies prevents us from ever being forced to uphold such a contract. If I agreed to work for you for a year for free and then change my mind, the most you can do is demand material property as compensation; you cannot enslave me without aggressing against my rights. [5] Application to Abortion C6: Bodily Invasion We can only use a person’s body when that person consents to that use. If a person does not consent to our use of his body and we proceed to use him anyway, we are violating his rights and the NAP. We ourselves are therefore no longer operating within the bounds of rational discourse and our victim is justified in taking action against us to defend his rights. Through our rejection of the principle of nonviolence, we have lost our claim to negative rights. In using a mother’s body against her will, a fetus carries out exactly this kind of aggression. It may have the rights of an adult, but surely we would not permit an adult to use another person’s body as a life support system against her will. Such action would warrant violent self-defense even if it were carried out without malign intent. The mother therefore may remove a fetus from her body if it is violating her rights in this fashion. Neither she nor anyone else is bound by the fetus’s inability to survive independent of the mother; it does not have a positive right to life. [6] This point can be confusing because there is no direct action taken to violate the mother’s rights. However, this situation is not so unusual: if B is sitting on A’s lawn and A changes his mind about whether B is permitted to, B may or may not violating A’s rights with no change in his actions. If A were unable to communicate with B, he could still justifiably remove A from his property using the minimal necessary force. If the area outside the property is inhospitable to B or the process harms him, that is no fault or responsibility of A. C7: The Fetus and Contract There is no agreement between the fetus and the mother regarding the right of the fetus to use the mother’s body. The fetus, regardless of its rights, is by circumstance incapable of contract. Consider a comatose person dropped onto a boat. There is not and could not be an agreement, implicit or otherwise, that he may remain on the truck. The owner may remove him regardless of the resulting damage to his body. A contract that the fetus may remain in the mother’s body cannot exist simply due to the act of intercourse: the fetus doesn’t exist at the time and the mother may be taking every measure to ensure this remains the case. [7] References: [1] http://plato.stanford.edu... (from the SEP, a much more detailed analysis than I thought necessary to include) [2], [3] http://mises.org... (primarily Chapter 2) [4] http://www.stephankinsella.com... (Rights and Action, pages 6-8) [5], [6], [7] http://mises.org... (Chapter 7 and Chapter 14)