Resolved: Sentience is of ethical relevance to the treatment of living things.

Framework 1) The shared burden means each side must show their position to be more likely than their opponent’s. In this round this means I must show that sentience is more likely to be of ethical relevance than not, while Con must do the converse. It then follows that it is not enough for Con to simply show that an ethical framework exists which negates the Resolution, but that it is in fact MORE LIKELY true than the competing frameworks I offer. 2) Moreover, the multiplicity of frameworks that affirm the resolution must be weighed against the multiplicity which negate. In other words, if I offer 4 frameworks that are 15% likely to be true and Con offers one framework with 40% probability of truth, this still means I have shown the Resolution is 60% likely to be true and so have won the round. 3) Con’s claims of abuse are totally unwarranted. The fact that I advocate shared burden means that the strategy I am taking is perfectly open to Con. Con could have advocated for multiple frameworks if she chose. 4) Note my unaddressed R2 point 3) that restricting either side to a single position erases the purpose of the Resolution. The Resolution implies the ability to run multiple ethical systems and so my strategy is legit. Con agreed to the Resolution, if she thought it was unfair we could have worked out an alternative (but she didn’t). Deep Ecology 1) The premises used to derive deep ecology are simply asserted without justification. Con provides no reason to accept that all life has inherent value or that humans have an obligation to preserve that value. Compare this to my arguments A-D, which offer justifications for their premises. 2) Deep Ecology is compatible with all the moral systems I advocate, meaning it does not necessarily exclude sentience as an ethically relevant trait. For example, I can acknowledge that “humans have no right to reduce the richness and diversity [of all life] except to satisfy vital human needs” while at the same time contending that the nature of discourse imposes additional restrictions on how sentient beings are treated. I can respect the intrinsic value of all life while also claiming that the nature of discourse means it is categorically wrong to impose my will on a human but not to do so for a plant. Deep ecology, then, does not show that sentience is irrelevant. 3) Deep ecology as formulated results in ecological egalitarianism- all life forms are valued the same. Con’s case states that all life has intrinsic value but offers no mechanism to distinguish between greater and lesser value. This means if I need to satisfy my “vital human need” of hunger, deep ecology makes no distinction between eating a tomato, a bug, a cow, or a human. 4) Deep ecology is too vague to be ethically useful. How can I tell if I am harming the intrinsic value of a lifeform? Is moving a plant from my back yard to a pot in my kitchen harming the plant’s value? How do you compare richness of human life against richness of plant life? Is cutting down a forest to build an art museum wrong? 5) Con’s point 3 is contradictory to the principle of deep ecology- If all life has intrinsic value why do humans have any right at all to reduce the richness and diversity of life? 6) Respect for ecology is a principle that generally falls out of the systems I advocate. Utiliarianism says that pollution and destruction of the environment is bad, even that we should preserve ecologies for aesthetic utility. The strong connection felt by humans for their environment also means that the value of the environment falls out of emotivism. Anthropocentrism Con charges all my arguments are flawed via anthropocentrism, but her critique fails: 1) I agree that the absence of discussion of non-agents in the theories I advocate absolutely does NOT entail that these non-agents needn’t be considered. What I DO contend is that in all theories I advocate, sentiency is critical in establishing rights or principles of action concerning the treatment of living things. This is related to my Deep Ecology point 2, that my ethical theories are in fact compatible with the theories that place some value on non-sentient life. 2) The critique that I cannot account for infants and the cognitively impaired is misguided and shallow. Preference utilitarianism accounts for all living things with preferences- infants, cognitively impaired, and those that cannot feel physical pain still have preferences and so are accounted for. Additionally, my B) and C) arguments only say that non-agents and living things incapable of discourse do not have certain rights (generally speaking, autonomy and freedom). But these are rights no one ascribes to infants and the cognitively impaired anyways! Furthermore, this charge is far more applicable to Deep Ecology, which is unable to distinguish between an aphid, and infant, and a human. 3) Even if Con’s charges of anthropocentrism are right, they do nothing to attack the legitimacy of my arguments. It could well be the case that my arguments are correct and ethics just has certain anthropocentric features. To gain leverage Con must actually attack the structure of my arguments. Utilitarianism 1) Animals are sentient per the agreed upon Round 1 definition insofar as they have the ability to feel. Animals feel pain and so are sentient. This renders Con’s objection concerning Mill irrelevant. 2) Two-level utilitarianism solves this objection. Note that I specifically stated in R2 that I may advocate this type of util. Two-level util advocates the everyday use of rule utilitarianism (act on those rules which when generally adhered to result in the greatest happiness) while resorting to act utilitarianism in extraordinary or problematic ethical situations. Under this model genocide is not permissible because the rule “the majority can subjugate the minority” is a rule that does not maximize utility. Ethical Rationalism Con’s entire attack here is simply a support of Emotivism. I will maintain that rationally founded ethics are more likely than Emotivism, but that even if they fail, Emotivism still values sentience. Con offers no justification for the claim that “morality is determined by sentiment.” She comments that it offers some explanatory power over our ethics system, but rational ethics also have explanatory power and this is far from demonstrating that my argument for ethical rationalism fails. Ethical rationalism establishes the freedom and autonomy of ethical agents through the very nature of agency. This places restrictions on how ethical agents can be treated that do not apply to non-agents. Discourse Ethics Con makes no attack of the basic argument I put forth for either E.R. or Discourse Ethics, outside of her charges of anthropocentrism. This effectively concedes my case for E.R. and D.E. Discourse ethics recognizes that by engaging others in discourse I am implicitly recognizing their autonomy and freedom. On pain of performative contradiction, I must then recognize that freedom and autonomy. This can only be done by recognizing that only ethical norms which meet with the approval of all affected as discursive participants are valid. The implication is that it is unethical for me to forcibly relocate a person from one place to another, but not to do the same for a plant. Sentience is therefore relevant. Emotivism It may well be the case that Deep Ecology extends emotivism into the realm of other species, this in fact supports my point that D.E. is compatible with all of my theories. Even if this is the case, it doesn’t change the fact that our moral sentiments distinguish between sentient and non-sentient life. This is why all over the globe if you kill an innocent man for no reason you will be met with outrage but if you trample a few blades of grass no one cares. Note that Con even concedes that moral sentiment privileges sentience in her defense of emotivism: “This explains why individuals are more likely to be concerned with the death of a human than that of a dog.”