Human Beings have a Moral Responsibility to preserve Biodiversity on Earth

I would like to start off by apologizing for using the terms "moral obligation" and "moral responsibility" interchangeably. You are correct in assuming I meant the same thing by both phrases. Now, if I understand properly, my opponent's argument hinges on the idea that I have assumed biodiversity has no intrinsic value without proving it. I believe that this assumption is justified in that I have no more reason to believe biodiversity intrinsically valuable than I do my television set or my dead skin cells; I have been given no reason to assent to it. This is not begging the question, because my argument is not that biodiversity is not intrinsically valuable, it is that we do not have a moral obligation to preserve it. Biodiversity need not be intrinsically valuable for this obligation to hold. Consider the following argument: If A, then B or C not B not C therefore not A It is perfectly valid, and indeed, the form of my argument here. "If we have an obligation to preserve biodiversity, then it is intrinsically valuable, or it is valuable for some other reason It is not intrinsically valuable It is not valuable for any other reason therefore we do not have an obligation to preserve biodiversity" If my opponent wishes to provide argumentation to challenge this premise I invite him to do so, but simply saying it is unjustified and leaving it at that is no disproof of it. However, as he has called it into question, I will defend it the best I can. valï¿½ue (vly) n. 1. An amount, as of goods, services, or money, considered to be a fair and suitable equivalent for something else; a fair price or return. 2. Monetary or material worth: the fluctuating value of gold and silver. 3. Worth in usefulness or importance to the possessor; utility or merit: the value of an education. 4. A principle, standard, or quality considered worthwhile or desirable: "The speech was a summons back to the patrician values of restraint and responsibility" (Jonathan Alter). 5. Precise meaning or import, as of a word. 6. Mathematics An assigned or calculated numerical quantity. 7. Music The relative duration of a tone or rest. 8. The relative darkness or lightness of a color. See Table at color. 9. Linguistics The sound quality of a letter or diphthong. 10. One of a series of specified values: issued a stamp of new value. tr.v. valï¿½ued, valï¿½uï¿½ing, valï¿½ues 1. To determine or estimate the worth or value of; appraise. 2. To regard highly; esteem. See Synonyms at appreciate. 3. To rate according to relative estimate of worth or desirability; evaluate: valued health above money. 4. To assign a value to (a unit of currency, for example). (from http://www.thefreedictionary.com...) Note that in every case, value is defined in relation to either another entity, or a scale of measure. inï¿½trinï¿½sic (n-trnzk, -sk) adj. 1. Of or relating to the essential nature of a thing; inherent. 2. Anatomy Situated within or belonging solely to the organ or body part on which it acts. Used of certain nerves and muscles. (http://www.thefreedictionary.com...) If to define the value of an object one must refer to an external entity, value cannot be intrinsic by definition. There can be no "value" without someone (or something I suppose) which values. As for the ethical concept of "intrinsic value", SEP defines it thusly: "That which is intrinsically good is nonderivatively good; it is good for its own sake. That which is not intrinsically good but extrinsically good is derivatively good; it is good, not (insofar as its extrinsic value is concerned) for its own sake, but for the sake of something else that is good and to which it is related in some way. Intrinsic value thus has a certain priority over extrinsic value. The latter is derivative from or reflective of the former and is to be explained in terms of the former. It is for this reason that philosophers have tended to focus on intrinsic value in particular." (http://plato.stanford.edu...) Intrinsic values are desirable "in themselves", or "for their own sake". The same SEP article references a thought experiment by G.E Moore: "He advises us to consider what things are such that, if they existed by themselves “in absolute isolation,” we would judge their existence to be good; in this way, we will be better able to see what really accounts for the value that there is in our world. For example, if such a thought-experiment led you to conclude that all and only pleasure would be good in isolation, and all and only pain bad, you would be a hedonist.[13] Moore himself deems it incredible that anyone, thinking clearly, would reach this conclusion. He says that it involves our saying that a world in which only pleasure existed — a world without any knowledge, love, enjoyment of beauty, or moral qualities — is better than a world that contained all these things but in which there existed slightly less pleasure.[14] Such a view he finds absurd." I challenge my opponent to defend the goodness of absolute biodiversity at the cost of everything else. Under this conception a world populated by billions of difference species of bacteria would be "better" than the world that we have now. As said bacteria cannot experience happiness, love, knowledge, wisdom, justice, or any of the other myriad of virtues commonly considered valuable by human beings this is a highly counterintuitive conclusion. I have presented a clear case against the contention that humans have a responsibility to preserve biodiversity. Ryft has not challenged this proposition at all, but only falsely accused me of begging the question. His challenge to the premise that biodiversity isn't intrinsically valuable is nothing but a "brute assertion" as he himself would put it. I accepted the burden in this debate to refute the most common arguments against biodiversity in addition to any my opponent might come up with and have done so. Consider the resolution negated.