There Exists Either Irrefutable or Reasonable Grounds for Believing in the Existence of God

In this round I will respond only to the Ontological argument. Next round, I will criticise the Kalam Cosmological Argument (the world limit means that splitting them up will allow for more detail) The Ontological Argument To the ontological argument I will make three main critiques, plus the response to Pro's pre-empt of 'parodies'. 1) Circular reasoning Pro says: "In modal logic, we infer that if some entity is possible then this entity is exists in some possible world. To exist in some possible world however, there must also contain no type of contradiction involving this entity" The criteria, therefore, for existing in a possible world is that there is no contradiction involving this entity. Pro argues that, because God exists in a possible world, there is no contradiction in God and thus there is no contradiction in saying he exists in all possible worlds. The justification for God existing in all possible worlds is granted by his non-contradictory status (as inferred from his existence in a possible world). However, the justification for his existence in a possible world is that he is non-contradictory (as stated in Premise one of Pro's argument). If I were to put it in plainer terms: "God exists in all possible worlds because he exists in one possible world" "God exists in one possible world because there is no contradiction in God" However: "God can only exist in a possible world if he exists in all possible worlds (i.e. there is no contradiction)" This, however, is what is trying to be proven in the first place. We must remember Pro's definition for existing in a possible world: "To exist in some possible world however, there must also contain no type of contradiction involving this entity" Thus, for a God, defined as existing in all possible worlds (maximally great), to exist in a possible world, he must exist in all possible worlds (else that which exists in one possible world does not match the definition of God). If he did not exist in all possible worlds, he would not be able to exist in one. Thus existing in one possible world cannot be the reason for existing in all (as the reason for existing in one must be that he exists in all). This is the precise flaw in logic. The ontological argument is difficult for people to understand because this flaw is well hidden. 2) Overload Objection With the same logic proposed by Pro, we can define any object into existence, so long as it is maximally great. The common example is of the maximally great island. P1: "It is possible that a maximally great island exists" P2: "If it is possible that a maximally great island, then a maximally great island exists in some possible world." P3: "If a maximally great island exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world." P4: "If a maximally great island exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world." P5 "If a maximally great island exists in the actual world, then a maximally great island exists." This form of logic leads to the conclusion that indeed the perfect cell phone or alien exists. Response to parodies Pro says: "Some people think this argument can prove the existence of a maximally great cell phone. However, a cell phone is a contingent but to be maximally great is be necessary." God is also contingent. What makes him 'necessary' is defining him as maximally great. We could equally define him as the Greek Gods; fallible. Thus a fallible god is contingent while a maximally great God is necessary. Equally, a phone is contingent while a maximally great phone is necessary. Pro says it himself: "to be maximally great is be necessary". As such a phone defined as maximally great is necessary while a other phones are contingent. The overload objection stands. 3) Definition of maximal Pro says: "Now, it is self evident that it would be greater to exist in all possible worlds rather than simply just one possible world (3 > 2, 4 > 3 ect.)." It is not self evident. It is perhaps widely accepted but it is not self evident. Characteristics do not follow a numerical scale as Pro implies. I accept that 3 > 2, but why is existence 3 and non-existence 2? Take the following example. Say I am a thief. It would be better for me for a God not to be able to see and judge my actions than it would be for a God to see and judge my actions. As such, a greater being that Pro's definition of God is a God which is not omnipotent. Therefore, the maximally great being is not omnipotent. Pro has taken the liberty of defining God according to his standards. As Pro has offered not objective description of God, his definition cannot be said to be superior to the thief. As an atheist, God not existing would be greater than God existing for me (else I would go to hell) so the ontological argument leads to the conclusion that God necessarily does not exist. (As maximal entails necessity and also non-existence). The following argument demonstrates counterfactually why God doesn't exist. 1) God is the maximal being. 2) A being that gives cookies to everyone and cures all cases of childhood cancer is greater than one that doesn't. 3) However, childhood cancer is not always cured 4) Therefore the maximal being does not exists. As the idea of maximally great is subjective (e.g. A being that cures childhood cancer is greater than one that doesn't, no?), using this subjective idea to reach an objective conclusion is more than dubious. Conclusion The circular reasoning of "he exists in all because he exists in one because he exists in all" demonstrates that Pro's argument is illogical. It is the reason why the ontological is criticised as defining God into existence, i.e. defining him as maximally great is defining him to exist. This point also demonstrates why the overload objection works. We can define anything into existence. Point 3 on the definition of maximal is a broader critique that also shows why Pro's argument is a illogical. In order to uphold the ontological argument Pro needs to do the following: 1) Resolve the issue of God "existing in all because he exists in one but needs to exist in all to exist in one" circular problem (i.e. why is his argument different to defining God into existence) in such a way that the overload objection no longer works. 2) Outline precisely why his definition of a maximal being should be used over a different one (e.g. one that gives cookies and cures cancer)