The Cosmological Argument

Thanks, Popculturepooka, for this interesting and challenging debate. And thanks to any readers for entertaining our discussion. Pro argues as follows. (1) Every contingent fact has an explanation. (2) There is a contingent fact that includes all other contingent facts. (3) Therefore, there is an explanation of this fact. (4) This explanation must involve a necessary being. (5) This necessary being is God. Number 2 is true, though self-servingly arbitrary. Obviously there is a contingent fact that contains all facts, contingent or otherwise. Numbers 4 and 5 are wildly non-sequitur. Pro's attempt to plaster over the cracks have overtly failed. Numbers 1 and 3 are dubious, and not effectively supported. Therefore, none of Pro's contentions withstand inspection. Let's take them one at a time. (1) Every contingent fact has an explanation. I take this to mean that all contingent facts have causes. That's using the principle of charity. What pro actually said is that all contingent facts are explained by propositions, which clearly isn't true. Some contingent facts have never been discovered or imagined. No one has thought about them. No one has explained them. No one has made any propositions about them. Therefore, if we held Pro to his own definition, (1) would be clearly false. That's a trivial objection, voiced only to make the point that I'm trying to understand Pro's point of view; I'm not striking for a weak spot to score rhetorical points. When I take "explanations" to be causes, I'm putting the best face of Pro's argument that I know how to. If Pro believes that all facts have causes, then he is going in the teeth of what we know about quantum mechanics, which posits many uncaused events. Pro responds to that observation by pointing out that the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics is not the only possible interpretation. Yes, there are other possible interpretations, but they do not have the support of the scientific community. Pro has pitted his own authority against that of the scientific consensus. Yet he has offered us no credentials, no scientific reasoning. His opinion can have no weight. As laymen, the responsible thing to do is to either accept the opinion of science, or have no opinion at all. Thus, we must take (1) as either wrong or not established. --Pro also has another angle; he attempts to support (1) with a modal argument. He says that we can ignore the scientific consensus because of his modal proof. But does Pro's modal proof actually persuade? No. He posits thusly: There is a world with an unexplained fact. There is, in this world, annother fact. Further, there is an explanation for the conjunction of those two facts. And---at least in this world---if a conjunctive fact is explained, then the facts conjoined in it are also explained. Now Pro is correct in saying that this is contradiction. Those four cannot all be true. Obviously, if Pro is right about this being a possible world, if (1) and (2) are true, then (3) or (4) is false. Might (3) or (4) be false? It seems to me that the only reason Pro has for believing that (3) is true is that he believes in principle of sufficient reason. He has used the PSR as a premise in order to prove the PSR as his conclusion. His argument is circular. If Pro wants a possible world in which a given fact is unexplained, then he doesn't get to say that any fact conjoined with the unexplained fact can thereby explain it. -- Pro says contingent facts have explanations. And he says an explained conjuntive fact explains their conjuncts. I pointed out that if this is true, then all facts, not just contingent facts, have explanations. My example was my breakfast cereal (contingent fact) and 2+2=4 (necessary fact). The conjunction . .. I ate cereal for breakfast, and two plus two is four. is a contingent fact. We know this because Pro defined contingent facts for us. If they could be different, if they aren't the same in all possible worlds, then they are contingent. Well, there are possible worlds in which I ate a hotdog for breakfast and two plus two is four. So, that fact conjunctive fact is, by Pro's own definition, contingent. Pro's response is that he wasn't talking about that. Suddenly, in the final round of the debate, the PSR is only about purely contingent facts, those with no necessary componants. Does this mean, according to Pro's logic, that the creator of the world may be a mixed conjunctive fact? Next, Pro quotes Robert Koons, who, when handed a Lemma, tried to make lemmanaid. Koons argued that mixed facts (facts conjoining both necessary and contingent facts) will have a subset of purely contingent facts. True, but this helps Pro not at all. Koon did not say that mixed facts are not contingent. -- I pointed out that there are possible worlds with no gods, so therefore it is obvious that there can be no necessary gods in this world. Pro says I should support my claim that there are possible worlds without gods, which is a bit like asking why two plus two equals four. That's what the words mean. A possible world is one without logical contradictions, by definition. No square triangles, no married bachelors. Is godlessness contradictory? No. I believe the actual world to be godless. Even if I'm wrong about that, I cannot be wrong about there being godless possible worlds. Such a world would not necessarily involve a contradiction, therefore it is possible. By definition. And since there are godless possible worlds, no gods in this world are necessary. It therefore cannot be that this world was created by a necessary god. This argument is dispositive. Pro set out to prove that our world was created by a necessary god. Not only is that unproven, but it cannot be true. Skepticsm Pro claimed that if the PSR isn't true, then we can't figure probabilities. Something like that. He doesn't like how I restate his point. Well, I'm doing the best I can. If he stated his case more clearly, then I could refute it more clearly. In the meantime: a) Pro overstates his case. The PSR fails if any single contingent fact lacks explanation. That fact wouldn't have to have to be anything to do with probabilities. And, b) If there is a magic-throwing god around, that could screw up probabilities as much as a failure of the PSR. Necessary Being = God Pro thinks some one individual necessary fact caused all contingent facts. He thinks we should believe that this necessary fact is the Jewish god. His reason? His fact is powerful (he says), and tradition says the Jewish god is powerful. There are, he says, other similarities between his fact and the traditonal Jewish god. Therefore, he says, we should believe they are one and the same. It's like arguing that I must be the president because I favor universal health care. I pointed contradictions among traditional beliefs about the Jewish god. Pro dismissed them because they come from the bible. He wants us to focus on non-biblical traditions about god? Our fundamental traditional belief about the Jewish god is that he is described in the bible. Any non-biblical god would be non-traditional. Conclusion: Thanks to, Popculturepooka, and thanks to all (any) readers. Pro's argument was interesting, and he was unfailingly polite. Nonetheless, he never persuasively supported his premeses. Nor was he able to bridge the outlandish gaps between his premises and his conclusions.