Free will exists.

As we discussed before in private PM's, I got a little fed up with most of the free will defenses on this website -- I find them to be philosophically naive. Most, if not all, of the arguments consist usually of classical compatibilism, which most philosophers would say has been trumped. However, in the 1960's a wave of new development among the compatibilists brought forth contemporary compatibilism. It is from these influences in which I will argue for compatibilism, the view that determinism and free will are compatible. Do note, however, that I am most definitely NOT a proponent of free will. I am simply playing devil's advocate. ==================== Contemporary physics + Interpretation of opponent's position ==================== First, to set a background for this debate it must be known that our current understanding of physics mandates an indeterministic world; this is known due to quantum mechanics. Of course, I'm adhering to the Copenhagen interpretation, so if my opponent want's to argue for some other interpretation (such as Bohm's), then feel free. However, I will say that while Bohm's interpretation (the most common alternative to Copenhagen) has not been completely refuted, it has been rejected. Secondly, I want to distinctly flesh out my opponent's argument. He defines a free choice as something that is "ultimately not influenced by any outside entity". In other words, he states that person X must be the ultimate source of action A. This mode of control is known as the Source Model, in which he believes that for a person to have free will he must be the ultimate source for his actions. That said, I will argue that instead acting with free will requires alternative possibilities. This mode of control, namely the Garden of Forking Paths/Leeway Model, is something I will argue that we to have free will, instead of the Source model. Since we have two important models here, they will be referred to as regulative control (Garden of Forking Paths Model or Leeway Model) and guidance control (Source Model). I know these terms may be foreign, but I certainly did not make them up. Blame the philosopher John Martin Fischer. Besides, this kind of terminology should be useful in helping make this discussion more clear and understandable. Since this is so, this is how my argument for compatibilism will play out: I will demonstrate that the ability to choose among alternatives is sufficient for free will, thus whether or not origination of choice exists in humans or not doesn't matter. So in a way, I am challenging my opponent's definition -- which should be fine since a large part of the free will debate depends partially in focusing on a certain mode of control. Once this is so, I simply give a compatibilist view that coincides with regulative control. ==================== Regulative control is relevant to explaining an agent's moral responsibility for action ==================== As stated before, I will argue that regulative control is more fundamental to understanding moral responsibility, and thus free will. Of course, there are some of those who argue that moral responsibility can exist WITHOUT free will, but if my opponent wants to argue for this position then he can feel free to do so - however, I will tell him that I can't guarantee it's going to be easy ;). Until then, I will take it as an underlying assumption between both of us that free will and moral responsibility and inextricably linked. Here is the notion of alternative possibilities I will be using[1]: "For an alternative possibility to be relevant per se to explaining an agent's moral responsibility for an action it must satisfy the following characterization: she could have willed something other than what she actually willed such that she understood that by willing it she would thereby have been precluded from the moral responsibility she actually has for the action. " I will leave further details in later rounds. ==================== A compatibilist theory coinciding with regulative control - Frankfurt's hierarchical theory ==================== The viewpoint I will be advocating is Frankfurt's ideas concerning first-order and second-order desires. It is described as follows[2]: "Frankfurt distinguishes between first-order and second-order desires. This serves as the basis for his hierarchical account. The former desires have as their objects actions, such as eating a slice of cheesecake, taking in a movie, or gyrating one's hips to the sweet sounds of B. B. King. The latter are desires about desires. They have as their objects, desires of the first-order, such as the desire to have the motivation to exercise daily (something that, regrettably, too many of us lack): "If only I wanted to go to the gym today, then it would be easy for me to get my tail off this couch! " I'll leave further detail for later rounds. ==================== Conclusion ==================== The forward point of my argument is that we do not need the source model -- which my opponent supports -- to define moral responsibility. Instead, I believe the availability of alternative options is a necessary and sufficient account of free will. Therefore, I will be justified in bypassing my opponent's definition. You will notice that for both of the important part of my round -- concerning regulative control and Frankfurt's hierarchical theory -- I have, with perhaps good suspect, left further detail for later rounds. This is because character limits mandate that I can't explicate as much as I would like to. Therefore, seeing as how my opponent responds, I will reinforce parts of my position that I see fit. ---References--- 1. . http://www.calvin.edu... 2. . http://plato.stanford.edu...