The Iran Nuclear Deal

It seems to me that your concerns about the Iranian nuclear deal are primarily focused on the consequences for the US and for Israel. I'll try to address this point-by-point. 1. Yes, Iran does have the ability to possibly delay an inspection of undeclared sites. However, a key part of the deal with Iran is a set of rather robust inspections of its known facilities. With this deal in place, there is now some idea of the consequences of cheating on these inspections. An article I read the other day (I can't seem to find it now) made a rather good point that should Iran start constructing a nuclear weapon now, it's highly unlikely that they'd use the material that we know they have (the same material we will be very actively monitoring). The terms of the deal would require Iran to try and siphon resources away from the facilities outlined in the deal (resources that have already been scaled back in terms of potency), which if the inspections are performed correctly should be quite noticeable. Iran only has a few sources for the major resources (centrifuges, uranium), all of which will be under heavy inspection per the requirements of the deal. 2. Yes, Iran will receive sizable sanctions relief payments. Yes, I also agree it is naive to believe that the vast majority of this will go to domestic programs. However, while Tehran continues funding Hezbollah and while America remains their "Great Satan," you might also recognize a threat within the region that does not show any signs of going away soon. I personally find it hard to imagine that Iran and Hezbollah would prioritize a fight against the US. The predominantly Shiite state and its favorite terrorist organization are likely placing greater focus on the (Sunni) Islamic State forces working their way through that part of the world. In fact, earlier today the Independent (UK) released a piece entitled "Iran offered Iraq an 'open cheque' to help them battle Isis, says ambassador." Besides, as you said, Iran funnels money to these organizations regardless of sanctions, so we may as well offer them sanctions relief as a concession in this deal which otherwise heavily favors the US. 3. While the restrictions placed on Iran will expire or be removed in the coming years (and the deal itself expires 10-15 years from now), in the long term this move is beneficial. With this deal, we lengthen the "breakout time" -- the time needed for Iran to produce a nuclear weapon if they started today, dedicating all possible resources to that program. Currently, the estimated breakout time is two to three months. Once the terms of the deal are in full effect, this time is estimated to be one year -- at the very minimum. Not only does this arrangement "buy time" should Iran decide to pursue nuclear weaponry, but when the deal expires we will have a far more accurate estimate of what Iran is capable of. Iran may seem like a relatively crazy foreign state: however, they are not suicidal. Iran's population of 80-odd million people is lower than the US's estimated 140 million people who are supposedly fit for service. A war between conventional militaries is still an ugly possibility, however I think myself and many politicians would agree that it's better than the smallest of nuclear exchanges. On top of this, I don't think it's quite fair to claim that increased difficulty in taking military action for the US would be a particularly bad thing. With the deal we have been given here and the current military balance of power, we have very little to worry about even if Iran decided to take full advantage of lifted arms embargoes. 4. This last point you have is particularly shaky, although it seems it's based on an incorrect assumption about the nature of the sanctions on Iran. An article on Vox about the matter I thought did a good job explaining how the "snapback" (the actual word used) will work, so I'll just paste a small portion from that: " 'The snapback thing is really clever, I had to read it a couple of times to make sure it said what I think it said,' Jeffrey Lewis, the Middlebury nuclear expert, told me. If the US thinks Iran is cheating, the first step is taking it to a special commission of the seven countries that signed the deal plus the European Union. 'But wait,' you're saying, 'can't Russia or China just use this process to stall or outright block the US?' Nope, they can't, because if the US is still unhappy, after a few weeks it can kick the issue up to the UN Security Council. 'But wait,' you say again, 'won't Russia and China just veto anything the US brings up there?' Nope, they can't meddle there either. If the US complains to the Security Council, and after 30 days the Security Council does nothing " and the US can ensure it does nothing by vetoing any resolutions " then under the deal the sanctions will automatically come back into force. 'It sounds like the US can blow up the deal any time it wants and revert to sanctions,' Lewis said. And there's a good reason for that: 'That's just how things are anyway.' " In summary, the way the sanctions are arranged is done so that the US can nuke (excuse the pun) the deal at any time they like, regardless of what China and Russia (the two UNSC members most likely to veto) think about the matter. If the US doesn't like the way it's going (because of cheating or because "I just wanted to change my mind"), they can throw out the deal and revert things to their previous state. In closing, the Iran Nuclear Deal is a complex deal in which the US has a significant advantage. Any concessions made to Iran may seem frightening but are ultimately either insignificant or cancelled out by a long-term benefit to the US.