God exists. You can't escape it. (TAG debate)

IntroductionAlthough Pro has yet again neglected several key points, I will address the defining themes of the debate thus far, and show why TAG fails to be convincing.General criticismsFalse dichotomyIf Pro now accepts that falsifying my position is not sufficient to affirm his own, then all of his “internal critique of atheism” is largely secondary to the resolution, and he should now make arguments of his own justifying TAG. Dissolving his own false dichotomy then causes problems for Pro. No longer can he merely criticise atheism, but has to erect justification of his own to support TAG, and then tear down all the alternatives I have offered in the debate. Thus far, he has only really attempted the latter, and has, I contend, been totally unsuccessful in this endeavor. Argument from ignoranceThis is definitely the biggest problem I have with Pro’s TAG. Mumbling “God“ to serious philosophical issues is not grounds for anything, let alone claiming this answer is the sole guarantor of rationality. Secondly, he seems to suggest that I reject TAG because of trenchant atheism. Irony aside, not only do I deny this, but there are many Christians who reject TAG as well, and given Pro’s attempt, it’s easy to see why. Lastly, Pro alleges an inconsistency as I affirm LA foundational, while God is not. Again, I gave justification for this: unlike LA, denying God is not incoherent, God does not meet the criteria of FB (which Pro has yet to challenge), and there is evidence available for/against God.Straw-man/AtheismHere I documented that Pro had assumed atheists to have both a monolithic view of morality and non-material things, as well as his equivocation between atheism (my position) and radical physicalism. If he now accepts my definition of atheism, then he is no longer straw-manning, but much of his criticisms are simply inapplicable.Moralitya) Here, I maintained that Pro could provide no reason to think that atheistic moral realism was incoherent or even unlikely. All he does here is to argue about Swinburne, which I see is a concession of the main point. As for the quote, this was simply to express MY position, and I will reiterate it here: I see no reason why secular ethical theory cannot account for morality, if it exists.b) Not only did I pre-empt this by arguing that reliabilism is not sufficient for knowledge, but also I think that this reduces discussion to absurdity. Meta-ethics is a pretty vibrant area of philosophy, and Pro seeks to reduce it to iron-clad assumption and pronouncing moral realism by fiat.c) Pro merely announces that only CW can account for morality, but again, has given no reason to justify this, and this is what he has to show. As for the Euthyphro dilemma, he splits the horns of this dilemma by citing God’s nature as the standard of goodness. But the problem here is that the same dilemma arises again: Does God have control over His own nature (in which case, morality is again arbitrary), or does God have no control over His own Nature (which would externalize morality)? As well as this, I also showed that even basic propositions invite all normative theories to reach the same conclusion, regardless of the justification given. All 3 normative theories agree on moral ontology without entering the debate of moral epistemology, and Pro didn’t really respond to this distinction at all.EpistemologyFoundationalismAgain, Pro just repeats that FB are unavoidable. While not only unwittingly giving credence to my position, Coherentism (1) denies FB and is certainly plausible, so Pro is simply wrong, and I pointed this out before in R2. His second question was to ask how one determines FB. Again, I laid out the criteria in R1, and have repeated them throughout. Lastly, CF is only supposed to give epistemic justification for beliefs, either in terms of FB, or that which is built on FB. If I have satisfied this, then my role in providing an alternative to TAG is fulfilled.Foundationalism seems not only a far better epistemic position than RE, but able to give a plausible account of knowledge in its own terms.Reformed epistemology1. The conflict is clear between RE and evidentialism when it comes to BELIEF. Whether these revealed truths can be false is irrelevant (even if it does show the sheer circularity of TAG), it is about the rationality of these beliefs. These truths could have no evidence in their favour, yet be true. The problem however is believing in creationism, for example, is still irrational, even if it turned out to be correct, because of the evidence at present.2. Pro misses the point here. It doesn’t assume RE false, it points both the absurdity of RE in rejecting evidentialism, and the ability of anyone to justify anything by following a similar process (e.g. belief in the Great Pumpkin).3. Here, Pro quotes the bible in denying non-resistant non-belief. I could be flippant and dismiss this as a false authority, but a far more serious objection is that it simply does lead to one denying what seems to be evidentially undeniable.Pro also dropped my criticism of RE as a form of reliabilism. Extend all arguments.Logical absolutes (LA)Here he both asserts that LA could be false, and that accounting for them (if they exist) through FB is circular. I have already answered the second point here by reference to FB criteria. The first point is simply incoherent. Even denying LA relies on the Law of Non-contradiction (LNC), so Pro is just stuck in the mire of absurdity here. Also, denying LA would nullify TAG, so this seems highly strange from Pro. Assuming LA do exist, we can turn this into an argument for atheism: P1 - If God cannot account for LA, atheism is trueP2 - God cannot account for LA C - Atheism is trueP1 is the logical equivalent of Pro’s TAG, so seems undeniable, without undercutting TAG‘s whole LA argument. Pro says that God accounts for LA with his mind, thus denying P2. But even God’s mind must be what it is and not something else, and is therefore subject to law of identity and the LNC. Another example is that God's mind either exists or doesn't exist, but cannot simultaneously exist AND not exist, thus obeying the LNC. Given that God's mind is as subject to LA as everything else, it clearly cannot account for LA anymore than a tree can, which affirms P2. Thus, LA actually show that God does not exist.Points dropped by Pro:1. Knowledge of LA (R3)2. Distinction between conceptual and existent LA (R1)3. Fallacies shown in R2. Extend all argumentsUniformity of NatureStrawson dissolves the problem of induction, explaining not only is it reasonable to accept inductive generalisations, but that:“To deny that it is reasonable to expect a specific conclusion to follow from premises of an inductive argument would be to contradict oneself, because the statement of reasonable expectation is analytically true by virtue of its constituent terms.” (2)Also, inductive scepticism is absurd. If anyone really thinks past events tell us nothing with regards to all that follows, then they would (if they were consistent) have no qualms about jumping out of a 50-storey building. Lastly, I still maintain that Pro just appeals to a word, rather than actually give an account of the problem, much less showing it to somehow critique atheism.ConclusionAs we enter R5, the TAG argument has not just been merely refuted and dwarfed by an atheistic alternative, but shown to be a shallow pretence of question-asking, and even if it were clean of all these criticisms, would be equally applicable to Islam, for example.Sources1 http://en.wikipedia.org...2 Mastering Philosophy, Anthony Harrison Barbet, P39