It is morally permissible to kill one innocent person to save the lives of more innocent people.

1. We're not looking at individual morality; because that's hardly morality at all; that's selfish desire, which is exactly why we have to look to an objective system; someone either is, or is not acting morally. There is no relativism. 2. If, as you say, they stem from personal convictions, then those are moral convictions; morality is, again, objective; a person either does act morally, or does not; a person's convictions, no matter how strong, can be immoral; for example, someone can have the conviction that hurting or murdering someone is acceptable because he/she is a 'bad person'; however, the taking of life is objectively immoral, obviously, because every life has value; convictions can be immoral; if they are, acting from those convictions is in no way ethical. 3. I think it's quite clear whether something meets one of the three tiers; for example, saving someone's life would be protecting dignity; therefore, that would be a moral action; the intention is to save a life; the method I'm not sure of, say, pushing someone out from in front of a car; the effect, a human life is preserved. But, the converse, taking a life, for whatever reason, would be immoral; because obviously, murder is objectively immoral; you can try and argue otherwise, though. 4. I assumed the government would be doing the killing, since it's supposed to act the way its people tell it to; if you want to argue a mob of innocents trying to take the life of another innocent, please, go right ahead. 5. I'm hoping that we're talking about the verb form, which is defined to be killing another human being in an inhumane or barbarous way. 6. First of all, the resolution does not say "In a democratic society..." so, if you argue solely on democracy, then you're not fulfilling the affirmative burden of universality. Second of all, I believe democracy to be an immoral form of government, personally; like Thoreau pointed out, the only reason we sanction majority rule is because the majority is more powerful, and it would get what it wanted anyway; third and most importantly, if you want to argue that individual life can be nullified by a vote, or that individual life belongs to the majority, once again, go right ahead. 7. First of all, it's irrelevant whether killing in war is legal or illegal; this is a moral issue. And, second of all, the road to hell is paved with good intentions; even if a war is for a noble cause, no one associated with a war, whether on the front lines or not, is innocent in that respect. 8. I can see you're going to try and argue the paradigm of 'kill one, or kill all', but again, I only have to prove that killing the one is not morally permissible; on the assumption that you do try to argue that I'm promoting the death of the majority, just know that I don't have to prove that this is permissible; in fact, neither situation is morally permissible; through Synderesis, both scenarios would be immoral for whoever was doing the killing. 9. Dignity; also known as moral worth; the inherent value given to human life. Simple as that. 10. Within the context that you are trying to put sacrifice, it's absolutely the same as murder; killing someone for the benefit of another is most certainly murder, objective of whatever 'benefits' might come out of it; like I said in refutation, what's the point of a 'greater good' if the individual that's 'sacrificed' is not around to share in it? I myself have but three questions. 1. Can you put some kind of physical value on a human life? Can a life be measured in value in units of currency, or time, or anything like that? Yes or no is all I need. 2. Does an individual's life belong to the government or to the majority? Again, yes or no is all I need. 3. As far as utilitarianism is concerned, when we discuss the greatest good for the greatest number, how do we measure the quality, extent, intensity, duration, etc. of this so-called happiness? And, furthermore, when we talk about the greatest good for the greatest number, both Bentham and Mill discuss the greatest good possible for the greatest number; so they say that we should achieve the greatest good possible, but simply try to find the biggest number upon which that good would be distributed; so, with this note from two utilitarian philosophers in mind, is is acceptable under your criterion to distribute the greatest good possible on a smaller number of people, knowing that the good you were distributing was the GREATEST good possible?