A human Soul exists

Fungibility It is still a strawman. As I agree some set of atoms is fungible. A continuation of something isn’t the same as the set of something. This is clear, as a continuation is the progress of the fungible items. He tries to respond to the idea of a continuation being non-fungible by saying the atoms can be replaced to form a new continuation. This fails because it wouldn’t be a new continuation in the first place. Since it is the progress of something, it would be the same continuation. He states I have only asserted that a continuation is non-fungible. This is untrue. I stated clearly in the last round that you cannot interchange a continuation with something new, because you would affect the physical continuation of someone’s brain. Furthermore, Pro has dropped his argument about a “distinction to be made between 'identical' and 'fungible'”. Perdurantism Pro hasn’t said what he meant by “That’s going on my profile”. So, I’ll let the voters decide if this warrants a conduct point against Pro. Pro drops one of my argument and strawmans the other. I never rejected the idea that Perdurantism has a derived personhood, I rejected the idea that it’s derived from dynamic processes. Pro dropped my other argument entirely. If the temporal worm theory proposes persons are derived, he needs to point out a flaw in the theory, otherwise premise two would be refuted. This went unaddressed, thus this objection remains untouched. Pro makes a quite damaging claim to his case. Pro stated “...any argument that has an underlying assumption that is innately controversial is an argument best left unargued for”. Well, recall in his conceivability argument, Pro must argue for the controversial premise that conceivability entails possibility. This is highly controversial [1]. According to Pro his argument from conceivability is “best left unargued for”. His first argument is also subject to this. As his argument contains the assumption that persons exist as we think of them. Even this is controversial, it is argued against by Hume and various Buddhist philosophers [2]. If Pro really wants to accept this line of thinking, he has just destroyed his case. However, I see no problem if I present sound arguments for this theory of time. As if an underlying assumption is soundly argued for, then it’s just a part of the argument and should be argued for. If Pro wants to be consistent, he would have to object to making arguments in favour of a controversial proposition. This would leave Pro in an awful contradictory position, because he has been trying to provide arguments for controversial propositions from the start. Pro attempts to respond to my arguments by citing Craig and Prior. What I consider to be the strongest argument for an existing past and future is the experiment from quantum mechanics which was performed in April of 2012 [3]. Unless Craig and Prior are time travelers, they couldn’t have rebutted this experiment. They most likely responded to deductive arguments and the argument from special relativity. I don’t know, as Pro never cited their actual work, just their names and the year. I do know Craig responds to the argument from relativity by proposing a new interpretation of relativity called the Lorentzian Interpretation. The problem is that this interpretation still allows for the moving spotlight theory to be true, as it ..posits a 3+1 dimensional ontology featuring a privileged time and a privileged rest frame. Lengths contract and time rates dilate in the usual relativistic way only for systems in motion relative to the privileged rest frame. [4] The temporal worm theory can still be true as the past and future still exist, but the just dilate relative to a privileged frame of time. Thus Pro’s arguments here fall. My objection remains standing Conceivability Pro tries to argue that all you need to know is the contents of the mind to determine what the mind is. He states the mind is “simply a means of introspection and qualia.” This is wrong, the mind contains introspection and qualia. The mind isn’t introspection or qualia. This seems correct prima facie, as the mind is something that allows us to introspect and experience qualia. If you defined the mind as introspection and the experience of qualia, then you’re defining the mind as a verb, but the mind is clearly a noun. The very definition of a mind supports this [5]. The element of a person that enables them to be aware of the world and their experiences, to think, and to feel; the faculty of consciousness and thought: It also seems like there can be some type of simple consciousness that doesn’t introspect of experience qualia, but is a mind. Thus, it seems very very wrong to state the mind is simply a verb, making Swinburne’s objection fail. What of Bailey objection? Pro agrees it gives him an increase BOP, but not an impossible one. It doesn’t seem that Pro has fulfilled his increased burden. Remember, Pro must demonstrate that we have the “adequate cognitive capacities”, and are “in possession of all the relevant factual and linguistic background information” with “no additional distorting beliefs” Pro’s argument for this in a nutshell is “It seems so”. However, I presented an argument refuting this, which was dropped. We don’t have all relevant factual knowledge of the body, because physics isn’t complete. It also seems we can have distorting beliefs, as we are still trying to learn about the physical body. Physics and psychology are incomplete[6], thus Pro’s prima facie argument fails secunda facie. Pro concedes that non-reductive physicalism is compatible, but he says it’s an ad hoc. First, the reason I brought this up was to show a soul is not a necessary conclusion, thus the argument is a non-sequitur. That went unaddressed and Pro is now attacking on explanatory grounds.Second, even on explanatory grounds, non-reductive physicalism wins. A dualist hypothesis would be more ad hoc as non-reductive physicalism is more parsimonious. NR physicalism only proposes the physical world exists, it doesn’t propose this immaterial world where minds exist and reach into the physical to interact. My objection still holds for those reasons. Problems with the soul Throughout the debate, Pro has ignored the problems I’ve presented with Locke’s proposition of personal identity. Pro here just gives prima facie reasons why Locke’s idea is a good one. However, since in the last round he defined consciousness as “memories, experiences, thoughts etc” then this proposition falls under the first horn of the dilemma. Since Pro has ignored my objections, my objections remain untouched. Next, Pro states knowledge-that and knowledge-how should be the same if qualia is physical. However, he just asserts this. There is no reason why tha is should be the case. If I know that a guitar can make a pleasant sound, this doesn’t mean I know how to play a guitar. There is clearly a distinction. Jackson’s argument only proposes that Mary has all knowledge-that, however this wouldn’t entail a falsification of physicalism. Jackson himself agrees with this, this argument has caused Jackson to reject his early formulations of the argument and he now tries to show that Mary has learned a knowledge-that [7]. Pro has dropped my argument that if qualia is physical, then the entire thought experiment is incoherent from the start. If you claim Mary has all knowledge of the color red, then that means she already knows what red is because her brain processed that information. It rejects the idea that Mary has all physical knowledge of red. Interaction It seems Pro has essentially dropped just about everything I’ve said. He acts as if there was never a round 3. Pro says he can only restate what he has said before, that interaction doesn’t entail a monism. This is dropping my argument from the color analogy and Johanan Raatz argument. He also says there are solutions in place, but this drops my arguments against those solutions. He cites Scott Calef saying if there was a problem, then we just don’t know how to solve it. This is an ad hoc. I can defend any and every position the same way Scott Calef defends dualism. A square circle seems incoherent right? Well, so what, it just proves squarecirclists don’t know everything about Geometry or the proper way of defining these shapes. The problem is, either dualism is incoherent or bares the huge improbably absurdity that the mind and body don’t interact. Calef is responding to a question form of the interaction problem, not this one. Pro next proposes the same solutions again, however he has yet to respond to my objections to them. Pro has failed to respond to the interaction problem. He ignores tons of my arguments, attacks a different formulation of the problem, and ignored the problems I have presented with his solution. It is best to reject the soul entirely, than to bare these assumptions. Conclusion Pro has dropped a lot of arguments. * The argument that there is a distinction to be made between 'identical' and 'fungible' * That Perdurantism refutes premise two. * Bailey’s argument that we’re not in relevant epistemic conditions. * My objections to Locke’s view of identity. * The qualia argument being incoherent. * My color analogy against dualism * Johanan Raatz’s argument against dualism. * The problem with the ethereal emission solution and occasionalism Pro’s argument fail as he has never successfully refuted Unger’s conception of physical identity or Perdurantism. Swinburne's objection fails to have a proper conception of what the mind is. Bailey's argument was dropped, as we’re not in relevant epistemic conditions. That is enough right there, as the BOP is on Pro. However, I presented arguments of my own. Pro has failed to object to the problems with Locke’s view of identity and Pro has failed to answer the problem of interaction. My objections and argument remain standing, Pro’s case fails. Thanks Pro. Sources http://tny.cz...