The United States Should Arm the Kurds

Con argues that the fact that the US's intention in Syria is to topple Assad, in the hopes of countering Russian influence in the region has a material impact. But it doesn't matter what the US's intent or purpose in the region is, because this doesn't have an impact in the debate. As long as it results in defeating ISIL, as it does, my argument still stands. And it doesn't have any impact for Con's side, as it isn't a reason to not arm the Kurds. So whether the US's *intent* is to topple Assad is irrelevant. Con then argues that my plan to fund the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs in order to unite the Kurdish forces doesn't work because: a) unification of peshmerga has been met with resistance I looked at the source that Con uses to warrant this claim and it does not talk about any peshmerga forces resisting unification. Thus this can be thrown out as a bare assertion. b) the US already attempted to do this but failed due to economic, political, socio-political, and militaristic factors. My plan resolves all of these factors because the source I used for my plan is the same source Con uses for the factors. And since the article comes up with actions to resolve all of the factors it finds preventing unification, it inherently proves that my plan will resolve the factors Con brings up. c) Syria and Iraq do not want to unify Kurdish forces because it might cause a civil war The source that Con uses to back up his claim does not say that the countries of Iraq and Syria have qualms over the Kurdish forces unifying, the Kurdish forces becoming too powerful, or the US providing aid to Kurdish forces. It doesn't even have the word Syria in it once. The source that Con provides to back up his claim does not actually back up his claim. Thus this argument can be thrown out as a bare assertion. Next, Con says that the Zerevani, the Emergency Force, and Units 70 and 80 are not under control of the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs. I agree. When I mentioned these units I said that they were private militias controlled by the KDP and PUK armies. Con also claims that the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs is a political branch Kurdistan, which makes it limited due to Kurdistan being suppressed. Con does not give evidence or explain how Kurdistan is being suppressed, and if it was how it would affect the Ministry's effectiveness. Since these aren't met, the argument doesn't work. Con then contests my claim that the PKK are an insignificant force. He does this by pointing out that the total amount of Kurdish forces are spread among many different groups. While this is true, 70% of the total force is controlled by the main two parties, the KDP and PUK [2]. And that's not even including the YPG, which has around 65,000 troops [3]. Where the PKK fits in here is very low on the bottom, and my point is still made. And Con's claim that none of the groups want to unify is a bare assertion, so throw it out. In Con's last argument, he claims says that if it wasn't for the Syrian insurgencies, that the US supporting them, the Syrian army would be able to focus on and defeat ISIL. Thus, we ought to arm the Syrians in order to defeat ISIL. The problem with this is that Con's source does not say that the Syrian army would be able to defeat ISIL if the insurgencies ceased. This is an unwarranted claim, and can then be thrown out. This alone is enough to negate the argument, but a further point can be made about the dangers of arming Syria, a country run by Assad's regime. Of which is, if not more dangerous than ISIL itself. Arming them would be a bad idea indeed. That's it from my end, Peace and Love . https://youtu.be... [1] . http://carnegieendowment.org... [2] . https://en.wikipedia.org... [3] . https://www.google.com...