God is Incapable of Dictating Morality

Actually, I'm going to make a much stronger assertion: God is incapable of justifiably dictating what is moral and what has meaning, value, and purpose for humans, outside of appealing to a human interpretation of morality, meaning, value, and purpose. Def 1. I'm just going to use "God" to mean god, goddess, goddesses, gods, or some combination thereof. It could correspond to any religion where that God commands that something is moral or has meaning, value, or purpose. God here could be a creating God, an all-powerful, all-knowing, all-good, all-present God, or a most-knowing, most-good, most-powerful God. It doesn't matter, the important thing is that it is making a claim about the afore mentioned things and, presumably, holds some seeming "power" or "claim" to these things. Def 2. By morality, meaning, value, and purpose, I don't mean in a subjective, personal sense. I mean in the sense of, "These things have objective or absolute moral, meaning, value, or purpose." Which, as will be shown, is not only impossible but illogical to argue. Def 3. By justification, I mean that if I asked you "Why does God say that X is moral or Y has meaning, value, or purpose?" God would have a justification for why X was wrong (or right) or a justification for why Y has meaning, value, or purpose. Now, if you asked this question to a person, there's are two possible flavors of responses: Possibility 1: "God says that these things are moral or have meaning, value, and purpose, and therefore they have morality, meaning, value, or purpose." Presumably, the statement "I have faith in that what God says is true" is not to be found too far from this statement. Unfortunately, the statement "I have faith" quite literally is an admission that "I do not have justification for what I believe." But let's ignore this and move on. If this is the case, then it should first be noted that in order for this statement to be true, you must first valuate the statement "If God puts value into something, then that something has an absolute value" (e.g. "If God says that X is wrong, then I ought not do X") as being true in the first place. But this is independent of anything that God could ever justify, or, more precisely, be used to justify. This requires you, the human, to make the first "move," so to speak, in order to justify God's morality; you have to put meaning into God, otherwise everything that God says has no justification. Ergo, what God says has no ultimate justifiable meaning, because it requires a human to say, "I agree with this" in the first place. So it cannot be "absolute" in any sense of the word. Why is this true? Why can't "God says so, therefore it's so" be a justification in and of itself? This is because of the distinction between descriptive and normative claims. A descriptive claim is a statement which involves a description of the universe "It is the case that all living leafs are green." is a descriptive claim. A normative claim is a claim which deals with what "ought" be the case, an example of a normative claim is "You ought not steal." A descriptive claim cannot justify a normative claim; this the logical fallacy of "is-ought" or the "Naturalistic fallacy." This is to say, you cannot take a description and logically infer something moral or value/purpose-creating out of it. So if you state that, "God says X is wrong (or right) or Y has meaning, value, or purpose." this cannot, on its own, imply that "You out (or ought not) do X or that you are obliged to find meaning, value, or purpose in Y." To attempt to make this statement on it's own (that is to say, without your already valued "if-then" statement) is an outright logical fallacy. Why? The statement "It is the case that God thinks that X is wrong (or the Y has meaning, value, or purpose)" is simply a descriptive claim; it is not a normative claim until you formulate, and accept, the "If God says X, then X is good/purposeful/etc". So if it's just a descriptive statement about God's opinion, then as a descriptive claim it cannot be used to justify God's normative claim. So then, it is not the case that you ought or are obliged to agree with God unless you personally give meaning to the idea that God has this power. But this means that God can only be justified by your subjective opinion/value judgment. (Note: Supposing that God has the ability to judge and punish you doesn't give him the power over "oughts." Hitler said "Humans ought not be Jewish" and had the power to punish Jews for being Jewish (and in fact did punish Jews), but that didn't mean his "ought" statement is justified), it just means he can hurt you if you don't agree with him, which is an ad baculum fallacy, if you attempted to argue this.) And the second possibility: Possibility 2: "God says that things are moral or have meaning, value, and purpose, and therefore they have morality, meaning, value, or purpose because of X, Y, or Z reasons." If this is the case, then we trivially realize that God has no power to justify his statements outside of human interpretation. Just like the statement, "Because God says so," any other justification requires you to already valuate X, Y, and Z as "good things" independently, again, of God. Otherwise, these things could not justify God's opinions in the first place. Therefore, if you believe that there is a justification for God's statements, you have to valuate the reasons as good in the first place. Which requires human interpretation to justify God's statements. So we are still left with a human value judgment being used to justify God. (You can claim that "It just is." but, aside from being dismally unimpressive, this is the logical fallacy of bare assertion, and more or less still is subsumed under the first possibility) Ergo, God is incapable of justifiably dictating what is moral and what has meaning, value, and purpose for humans, outside of appealing to a human interpretation of morality, meaning, value, and purpose." Note I: There are several direct consequences of this, most notably the corollary that "There is no such thing as morality outside of human interpretation" and its corollary, "There is no such thing as an absolute or objective morality." Note II: Actual professional, academic philosophers/ethicists have argued this, considerably better than I, as the absolute logical fact that all morality, meaning, value, and purpose has no absolute justification outside of human interpretation and preference. And this is, by the by, the predominant opinion of the philosophical academic community.