The categorical imperative vs. the principle of utility

We must first start with the basic principle of what is morality, or what is ethics. Of course, if ethics isn't anything, this becomes problematic. I assume to begin with ethics is a non-cognitive system which evaluates the rules we wish to govern our private lives by. That is, it is non-cognitive as without moral beings morality will not exist. Similar to aesthetics or politics, without humans they lose their raison d'etre and simply cannot be. Ethics is also a governance system. Politics governs the public life (the life of government and legislation etc. ) while ethics governs the private life (our life of how we act and what we do and don't do etc. ). If ethics governs the self, it governs every individual, individually. Thus, ethics is the evaluation of one's actions. Ethics is whether we should do what we do. As everyone has their own "ethic", if everyone lives by their ethic people will come into conflict. This is known as a state of nature - people will assault each other for foods and lands and, as there is no public ethic, or politics, people will punish each other violently and act violently as a result, much more violently than people will think is fair. Thus, the state of nature will be seen by the aggregate as unfair. Even those who are successful in the state of nature will be in deep fear at all times: they are worried they will be stolen from, or hurt when asleep and cannot defend themselves, or that a more powerful person will come along and simply beat them. The weak, of course, will be even more fearful. People rationally then come together (as that is the alternative: stay apart or group together, and both will happen). People make an agreement: "You don't hurt me", the first person says. The second person agrees: he doesn't want to be hurt. And this incredibly crude system is created, a system of morality. This is a prescriptivist moral system. It's people coming together and stating commands both parties agree upon. Let's take stock, and look at criticisms. One could contend this simply will not happen. However, this seems pointless to assume as given the thousands of years this did go on for, and the millions it theoretically could, there's very good reason to assume this will occur. One could criticise this as a normative judgement: they should group together. However, at this point, I am only pointing out the two options. Finally, one could criticise this as being a way of forming something like morality, but in fact is a bad moral system. I'll address this point now. If it is a bad moral system, it's a system people reject. Why would one reject a system? Let's assume you value your freedom, and wish to preserve it. Or you wish to preserve your traditions. Or preserve your virtues. Prescriptivism accepts all of these, as when people come together, they all come together because they have something in common: a value they all wish to promote. This is where discourse ethics can slide in: you want to value discourse, or reason. My problem with discourse ethics is that it stops a step early: its assumption that discussion is good is because we like reason. It's our enjoyment, or happiness, that is why we came together. We want to protect this value. Let's take stock, and look at criticisms again. You can reasonably argue that this is a system of relativism. The reasoning is clear: if it simply depends on who made the agreement, then ethics is just relative and there is no principle. However, the problem is that the principle of utility underlies everyone's barter. The axiom is this: when people do something, they want to do it. Whether it's the lesser of two evils, whether it's only an apparent good, they do it because they want to. This principle is in every single action humans do, and as such it is not relative on who signs the contract. This is the motivation of action, and this is why people agree to an ethical system: they have a common ethical principle everyone abides by, and everyone has as a result the same moral virtue. The moral virtue is the value of preference. This is key: it may be that you dislike their values, but that is no impetus to stop them. Otherwise, people may similarly dislike your value and go against you, and kick you from society, or you may force back to a state of nature, which is worse. Something is good if it promotes the net preference. If their value goes against the net preference, then you can rightly condemn that ethical system. However, if people live their life in ways you do not like (e. g. commit euthanasia), you cannot morally stop them as their right to freedom is paramount. Again, let's take stock. One can criticise this system as not consequentialist, but as deontological. Personally, I don't see the dichotomy, but many say this is a problem. Ethical systems like Natural Law, Kantian Ethics and Divine Command Theory all say there are moral laws which are morally required to be followed: "Do not steal" is usually a common one. The problem is that these ethical principles are not founded in anything, and are too rigid in many systems. Utilitarian ethics goes past this, and simply claims ontic goods. Ontic goods are goods which are not material or obvious, but values which ought to be promoted. So while giving money to charity is a good, the ontic good is generosity to good causes. Clearly, giving money to charity is usually good, but not always (giving money to the "Help us bomb Spain" fund probably isn't a good use of money) but generosity to good causes is always good. The ontic good of utilitarianism is the principle of utility: maximise preference. This is the equivalent of the moral principle. While deontological systems have these moral laws which are rigid and lead to intuitively horrid events, the consequentialist approach of the principle of utility simply lacks this fault: its flexibility gives it its true advantage. One may reasonably contend I have contradicted myself: I have said at the beginning that an example of a prescriptivist law is "do not hurt me", which is clearly not an ontic good, but now I say that it is only the ontic good that matters: maximise preference. This is a valid criticism. The solution is this: a wholehearted acceptance of these rules. Some subscribe to the utilitarian system known as Act Utilitarianism, where actions are to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. I do not see that as being easily logically derived. Instead, I accept Rule Utilitarianism, where there are certain rules which can promote preference, or maximise utility. However, I am not a Hard Rule Utilitarianism, meaning we should always follow these rules. Instead, I am a Soft Rule Utilitarian. Mill explains this well: "particular cases may occur in which some other social duty is so important, as to overrule any one of the general [rules] of justice [such as "do not kill"]. Thus, to save a life, it may not only be allowable, but a duty, to steal, or take by force, the necessary food or medicine, or to kidnap, and compel to officiate, the only qualified medical practitioner". Rules are good to live by as rules provide order and promote stability and thus ease for justice to be done. However, they are not sacrament, and can be broken in order to promote a clear good. For example, killing people who disagree with your political views is a morally bad thing to do, I am sure we'd agree as a principle at least. However, if someone is a Nazi and is about to put their view into practice, I would say, in the words of Mill, we have not just a moral allowance but a moral duty to stop them. The principle of utility can thus be derived from my case presented. I have not 'split it up' as most debates as that would ruin how philosophy should be done, I feel. Instead, I have given a full coherent view of ethics and how to draw conclusions. I look forward to responses and rebuttals, (and ask my opponent to look at the comments section before rebutting). Thank you.