If a tree falls in a forest, and there is no one to hear it, it does not make a sound

Definitions This debate obviously relies heavily on the definition of "sound. " That being said, the definition of sound as "The sensation stimulated in the organs of hearing by such vibrations in the air or other medium. "(1) is more in keeping with the original definition I explained earlier. However, I am not much concerned about the exact definition of the word "sound. " Rather, I believe that any definition of "sound" will rely heavily upon our inner sensations to understand it. That being said, I think we should stick with the original definition of "sound" I provided, and which Con agreed upon by accepting this debate. I am not, however, hostile towards any arguments Con wishes to give in favor of his definition of the word "sound". If Con wishes to present arguments for that particular definition of the word "sound" I will reply to them and take them into consideration, but I do not think that they should be weighed as heavily in voting, and he should have that BoP, in keeping with the original context of the debate. Trees Now this might come as a surprise to some, but I shall first turn towards what a tree is. Now, when you read the definition of the tree above, you probably had a visual image of a tree. Perhaps you imagined a shape, or perhaps you remembered when you were a child and climbed in a tree. In any circumstance, in understanding what a "tree" is, you have not actually understood what a tree is at all. Rather, you have a subjective experience of what a tree is; a sensation or mental phenomena of what a tree is. That being said, in reality, "trees" do not have any color (2), do not feel hard, do not taste woody, do not have any way they "look" like. These are all inherently internal mental constructs which exist only in our minds. Thus, a tree, as it exists in reality, has absolutely no qualities of which we perceive with our senses. There is no "look" to a tree, no "smell" to a tree, no "feeling" or "size" of a tree. It just exists, out there in the dark world, utterly imperceptible to us. Now you may be wondering: "Ok, sure, but that's pointless. We're talking about a tree in reality, it's still out there. " To which I answer: "How do you know? " If my opponent wishes us to believe that a tree exists in reality, he must provide us with a definition of what a tree is (a difficult task, considering what a tree really is, is imperceptible) and must give arguments for why such a thing even exists in the first place! The existence of something which is utterly imperceptible to us, is very dubious. That being said, I shall present other possibilities to the view that the tree really exists: 1. You are dreaming, or hallucinating, or an evil genius is simulating the world around you. 2. All that exists is mental phenomena, and we exist in the mental phenomena of a higher intelligence. Or. .. (which my opponent must prove) 3. Reality really exists, and there really is a "tree" out there, even though we have no knowledge of it, and it is utterly imperceptible to us. My opponent must demonstrate that the third option actually is the case. Under the original definition of "sound". .. Under the original definition of sound, it should be quite clear that when a tree falls, and no one hears it, there is no "sound" as such. P1: We only experience mental phenomena. P2: We experience "sound" P3: . '. , "sound" is a mental phenomena P4: IF there is no mind present, THEN there is no mental phenomena present P5: There is no mind present when a tree falls. P6: . '. There is no mental phenomena present when a tree falls. C: There is no "sound" present when a tree falls. (from 6 and 7) P1 has been defended above. P2 also seems obvious, in keeping with the definition of "sound. " P4 is also obviously true, since mental phenomena exists only inasmuch as the mind it exists in exists. P5 is assumed for the debate. Thus, the conclusion follows: There is no "sound" present when a tree falls. Under my opponent's definition of "sound". .. Now, my opponent, obviously has a different definition of "sound. " However, this definition also falls prey to the above arguments. "Vibrations that travel through the air or another medium and can be heard when they reach a person's or animal's ear" What exactly is a vibration? We obviously know what a vibration is. .. we sense it all the time at rock concerts! Of course, we can know that this sort of vibration exists, but, as with the tree example, we do not really understand what a vibration is out there in reality, if such a thing even exists. So if we assume that the vibration is a mental phenomena, then the syllogistic argument above disarms it. If we assume that it is something physical, then it is utterly unknowable to us, and its existence is very dubious. The second definition my opponent presents is rather useless, since it references the word it attempts to define. The third definition, "Transmitted vibrations of any frequency" also can be dealt with as above. A horned argument I should now like to present a horned argument! P1: EITHER "sound" is non-mental phenomena, OR it is mental phenomena. P2: IF "sound" is non-mental, then it is utterly unknowable to us, since we only know mental phenomena, and something utterly unknowable to us is dubious, and should not be assumed as existing. P3: IF "sound" is mental phenomena, THEN the syllogistic argument above shows it does not exist when a tree falls. C: Therefore, in the first case, my opponent has the BoP, since we automatically assume something utterly unknowable to us does not exist, and should remain unconvinced until given sufficient proof. In the second case, "sound" clearly is not present when a tree falls. A final argument against realism. .. My final argument against the existence of a real world would be the interaction problem. Minds, as immaterial things, cannot interact with material things, if we assume there is a material (or physical) realm of existence. Minds are non-material things, because they have different modanic properties than anything material. Conceivability entails metaphysical possibility. So while it's not metaphysically possible for my mind to not exist as I think this thought, it is metaphysically possible for matter to not exist as I think this thought. Following Leibniz's law (3), the mind cannot be matter. But if this were the case, it could not interact with the material world. Something which is of a completely different nature cannot interact with something else. A mind couldn't interact with my brain if they are separate things. But obviously, they can, and they do. Since this debate really isn't about the mind/body problem, I just wanted to touch upon it briefly to cast even more doubt upon the already-dubious physical realm. This argument is not meant to be an essential part of this debate, it's only a cherry on top. In conclusion My opponent seems to be in a difficult situation. Under his definition of "sound" the existence of reality, as such, is very dubious. Something utterly imperceptible to us, must be proven to be the case. Else, we should not assume it even exists. On the other hand, if my opponent admits, that sound, as for the purpose of this debate, is entirely a mental phenonema, then sound is not present when a tree falls. So my opponent must demonstrate the existence of an utterly imperceptible physical reality, or assume "sound" is inherently mental, and dispute my arguments. Over to Con! (1) . http://www.thefreedictionary.com...; (2) . http://epluribusunum56.com...; (3) . http://www.oberlin.edu...