Monarchy and Democracy

Introduction: I agree (or at the very least, do not need to disagree) with almost—read that again, almost—every argument Pro attempts to make in Round 2. In fact, the primary site of contest in my argument will be the "inherent superiority" of a naturally undesignated "absolute authority," i.e., a "head-of-state" who derives his power from a "social contract" made by the "people," as opposed to a naturally pre-determined "absolute authority" who derives his power from a natural right given by birth. Pro argues in favor of the "pre-determined" absolute authority of a Monarchy, whereas I will argue for the ad hoc absolute authority determined by the formal legalism of a Democracy. Let me flesh some of this out. Pro begins the debate with Hoppe, I will end it (I hope) with Hobbes. Hobbes has, more often than not, been associated with a Monarchic system. I argue that if read correctly, Hobbes is in fact the liberal philosopher par excellence, and that his position does not exclude Democracy (in the form of a Republic). Hobbes begins, as all liberals do, with the insight that values and desires are plural and therefore the source of conflict. Hobbes reasons that since "some men's thoughts run one way, some another" (135) and no man is a God, no one person is authorized by "nature" to "judge" his fellows. At this point, however, Hobbes departs from the rest of the liberal tradition (Locke, Kant, Mill, Rawls, etc.), arguing that the fact of equality does not mean the best government is the least government—a structure of minimal constraint that leaves equal men equally free to pursue their equally authorized or unauthorized visions. Hobbes concludes exactly the reverse: because equality of right and ability breeds "equality of hope in the attaining of our Ends" and because each man's ends are naturally to be preferred to his rival's, the two will inevitably "become enemies," and in the absence of a neutral arbiter they will "endeavor to destroy, or subdue one an other" (184). In short, Hobbes argues that if a "plurality of voices" is left to itself, there will be no mechanism left in "nature" to end conflict. Furthermore, Hobbes notes that the "Fundamental Law of nature" is that "every man, ought to endeavour Peace" (190). Because "nature" itself has no way to end "perpetuall war" (266), Hobbes proposes as a solution, to generate a "social contract," the "artificial mechanism" of a "common Power to keep them all in awe" (185), to "conferre all . . . power and strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of men . . . and therein to submit their Wills, every one to his Will, and their Judgements to his judgment" (227). As such, the material operations of government are no different than in a Monarchy, but the formal system by which a person is invested with absolute power is. For Hobbes, every man surrenders their natural rights precisely because no one's view can be demonstrated to be absolutely right (and also because everyone prefers his own view and believes it to be true). And it is precisely because there is no principled way of adjudicating disputes between opposing orthodoxies, Hobbes tells us, that someone occupy the position of absolute authority. I argue, then, that for the "ruling of nation-states," a Hobbesian "representative democracy," a Democracy in which the "people" choose one person to represent them in a position of absolute authority, is "inherently superior" to a Monarchic system. I also note, the operative terms for the way I frame the debate are my opponent's, not mine; so I assume no problem with the frame. Why is a Hobbesian Republic superior to a Monarchy? The answer is blindingly obvious: the underlying assumption of a Monarchic system is that some person is "naturally" in a position of "absolute authority," a position determined by heredity. Not only is the assumption false – no person can be proven to "naturally" be in such a position, but heredity, as a formal measure or principle for determining "absolute authority," makes no substantive claims for the superiority of that ruler. However you look at it, the Monarch has no claim to be a superior ruler as result of heredity. On the other hand, the twin premises animating Hobbes's position—first, that we live in a world of plural orthodoxies (a descriptive fact about our reality), and, second, that we lack an independent measure for assessing these orthodoxies (also a descriptive fact)—these premises do suggest a "substantive" claim of superiority over "heredity" as a procedural system for determining "absolute authority." It could be asked, why? Because an authority chosen by people (or the formal legal framework instituted by said people) will more closely resemble the plural and always changing will and interests of the people. The difference is, in Hobbes's scheme, the operation of power is acknowledged and agreed to by all parties, each of whom can then be said to have authorized, in an original act of contract, "all the Soveraigne doth" (232); in the other, the operation of power—the imposition even on those who reject it of a political agenda that the Monarch favors—is performed under cover of heredity, a find-sounding abstraction that, in the end, is empty and meaningless. In one case, people are given a choice—perpetual war or a limitation on your desires; in the other, they are given no choice (not even a hearing) and told that if they do not assent, they will be ruled anyway because they will be in conflict with a "higher order," where "highest order" is nothing more than an empty procedure of heredity. It's not hard to see that the person invested with absolute authority by a social contract is probably going to be a better ruler, that is, a ruler who acts according to the desires, will, and interests of the people he/she represents. What these desires are, of course, is assumed to be plural and constantly changing. My Response to Pro's Arguments: First, by replacing "King" with "Sovereign," I will simply agree with most of Pro's claims. In the space I have left, I will disagree with as many of Pro's claims (because they are simply wrong for both our cases) as the space allows, and will address the rest of Pro's points in the next round. War. Pro writes, "Wars are no longer funded by a soveirgns personal wealth, but rather by tax payer dollars." There is no reason to assume taxation as necessary in a Republic headed by a "sovereign" or the lack of taxation in a Monarchy. Pro writes, "democratic rulers are not fighting wars for profit, but rather for ideology and thus will not hesitate to destroy territories, economies, and peoples." There is no reason to assume that a "King" or "Sovereign" will not wage war in the name of "ideology," and no reason to assume that "democratic rulers" will not wage war for the sake of "profit." Pro makes a distinction between democratic rulers and sovereign, and suggests that certain things (war for profit, war for ideology) are exclusive to one of them. On the contrary, there is no reason to limit either kind of ruler to one of these – both can wage war for either purpose. Diplomacy. Pro writes, "since Monarchs hold their position for life, an incompetent or abusive Monarch runs the risk of being assassinated by either a member of his own family or a member of the populace. Since Democratic rulers have limited terms, they are rarely assassinated." A Monarchic system does not account for an "incompetent or abusive Monarch" by introducing assassination as a legal term; assassination is treason, and thus to assassinate the Monarch is to betray the system itself, admitting that it is not "superior" to another form of government. Also, Pro argues that assassination, as a legally impermissible action, is a better form of political change than one that a legal system can account for, i.e. "limited terms." Pro makes my case for me: Democratic legal systems account for actions Monarchic ones do not.