BeIR/webis-touche2020 huggingface dataset:
Dictatorships assure low cost political stability

Due to the lack of rotation in office, a dictatorship allows for a more stable government with more ability to plan for the long term, which is crucial for attracting foreign investment. Given that a democracy requires regular elections, each election can change the economic environment of a country. A change in government may lead to a switch in policies, partisan appointments to government bodies, and a medium term focus always set on the next election. Close elections can lead to disorder as votes are recounted and appeals lodged in the courts. After the 2006 Mexican presidential election, tight results lead to popular unrest and mass protests calling for a recount. The president elect had to deal with a large legislative faction that did not recognise him, and his opponent refused to concede defeat.[1] Without a stable framework, the lack of foreign confidence may impede development. The countries that have developed rapidly have tended to be those that have managed to attract this foreign direct investment thus in 2012 China managed to get $243 billion of FDI (18% of the total) against only $175 billion for the United States which is still a much bigger economy.[2] Additionally the resources needed to operate a democratic society and run elections are a large expense for the state and society as a whole; the US presidential election costs $6bn,[3] money which would be much better spent investing in building infrastructure or businesses. [1] See for example the case of Mexico’s 2006 elections. ‘Mass protest over Mexico election’, BBC News, 9 July 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/5161862.stm ‘Fracas mars Mexico inauguration’, BBC News, 2 December 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/6199356.stm [2] OECD, ‘FDI in Figures’, April 2013, http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/FDI%20in%20figures.pdf [3] Hebblethwaite, Cordelia, ‘US election: How can it cost $6bn?’, BBC News, 2 August 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-19052054
Dictatorships can prevent social unrest

Dictatorships are better at controlling discipline and order within society. They generally promote a state based on hierarchical values, through strict policies based on security. This allows them to prevent financial losses due to strikes and riots, and reduce crime rates, making the country more stable. Singapore is a de-facto one party state, in which the ruling People’s Action Party, is accused of stopping the operation of opposition parties. A former Foreign Minister of Singapore has asked “How many Singaporeans really want free speech anyway? They want orderliness, a decent living”[1]. This both makes the country more competitive because there are more productive days and more attractive to invest in as expats will want to live in countries with little crime. Moreover when it comes to attracting immigration for sectors of the economy there is none of the opposition that would occur in democracies. Autocracy may be the only way to stabilize some countries that have never had a democratic government. It has been suggested by Mancur Olson, a leading economist, that “anarchy not only involves loss of life but also increases the incentives to steal and to defend against theft, and thereby reduces the incentive to produce[2]”. A dictatorship may be the only way to restore order and create a political framework stable enough for trade and investment. [1] Huff, W.G. (1994). The economic growth of Singapore: trade and development in twentieth century”. Cambridge; New York; Melbourne: Cambridge University Press. p. 358 [2] Olson, M. (2000). Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictatorships. New York: Basic Books. p. 64
Democracy acts in the interest of the general population, which is good for development

It can be argued that a good economic policy, such as China’s economic policies, have helped development. But a free market policy can be done with any form of government, and cannot be exclusively attached to a dictatorship or a democracy. Any political system can use it. Although it has been noted that South Korea was an autocracy during economic ‘takeoff’ its economy has also grown significantly since democratization with GNI per capita growing from $3,320 in 1987 to $22,670 in 2012.[1] Another example is that Spanish economic growth in the 1950-2000 period. The 1960s economic miracle in Spain was not necessarily caused by Franco’s regime – he controlled the country in the 1950s, when the country did not have such economic success. In 1959, Franco opened up the Spanish economy internationally, ending the isolationist economic policies established following the Civil War so making the country free market bringing dividends. As a result Spain also grew economically after the collapse of the Franco government, continuing on following on from EU membership. [1] The World Bank, ‘GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US$)’, data.worldbank.org, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD/countries/KR--XS?display=default
Development is about more than economic growth

Amartya Sen has argued that “the removal of substantial unfreedoms […] is constitutive of development [in so far as give people] the opportunity of exercising their reasoned agency[1]”. In a broader sense, democracy is necessary for a developed society because a precondition of a developed society is for that society to be able to decide for itself what its objectives are. It is society as a whole that needs to define what it considers to be development. The Myanmar under the junta may have considered its goals to be a strong military showing that Burma was developed. But without the citizenry agreeing this would not make Burma a strong state. Quite the opposite the lack of freedoms would show the country is not actually developed. Development means more than economic growth, it has to include other indicators as in the Human Development Index, but also things that are not even captured by that measurement such as freedom of speech. Economic growth and GDP are even worse at demonstrating which countries are developed. Development only occurs when the wealth, and the choices it brings, reaches the people which is why Equatorial Guinea is not a developed nation despite its high income. Even in the economic realm therefore it is not just the absolute growth that matters but how it is distributed.  Przeworski and Limongi show that from 1951-1990 dictatorships had higher growth rates than democracies (4.42% against 3.95%) yet the growth rate in GDP per capita was higher in democracies (2.46% against 2%).[2] [1] Sen, A. (1999). Development as Freedom. Oxford: Oxfor University Press. p. xii [2] Przeworski, Adam and Fernando Limongi, 1997a; in M. ANTIĆ: “Democracy versus Dictatorship: The Influence of Political Regime on GDP Per Capita Growth”. EKONOMSKI PREGLED, 55 (9-10) pp. 773-803 (2004)
Political regime has a limited impact on development

It can be argued that a good economic policy, such as China’s economic policies, have helped development. But a free market policy can be done with any form of government, and cannot be exclusively attached to a dictatorship or a democracy. Any political system can use it. Although it has been noted that South Korea was an autocracy during economic ‘takeoff’ its economy has also grown significantly since democratization with GNI per capita growing from $3,320 in 1987 to $22,670 in 2012.[1] Another example is that Spanish economic growth in the 1950-2000 period. The 1960s economic miracle in Spain was not necessarily caused by Franco’s regime – he controlled the country in the 1950s, when the country did not have such economic success. In 1959, Franco opened up the Spanish economy internationally, ending the isolationist economic policies established following the Civil War so making the country free market bringing dividends. As a result Spain also grew economically after the collapse of the Franco government, continuing on following on from EU membership. [1] The World Bank, ‘GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US$)’, data.worldbank.org, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD/countries/KR--XS?display=default
Expansion is in the interests of NATO

Expansion to include Georgia and Ukraine is in the interests of NATO. After more than a decade without a clear role, the alliance now once again stands for the principle of solidarity between western liberal democracies. The hopes of the 1990s for a new world order in which a democratic and liberalising Russia would see partnership with NATO and other western clubs as strongly in its own interest died during the Presidency of Vladimir Putin. Russia once again poses a threat to Europe and needs to be contained or at least shown that NATO has not forgotten about it. This is shown by President Putin’s continuing lashing out at foreign countries for funding NGOs and plans to boost defense spending.[1] Extending NATO up to Russia’s southern border will signal the West’s strength and determination and force Russia to respect the alliance and its members. [1] Cullison, Alan, ‘Putin Warms West on Interference’, The Wall Street Journal, 28 November 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204753404577064260032325868.html?mod=googlenews_wsj
There is a strong precedent for expansion

There is a strong precedent for letting Ukraine and Georgia join NATO. Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia are also former Soviet states, and Russia objected to their entry into NATO quite as much as it objects today about its Black Sea neighbours.[1] Yet Russia was not allowed a veto over their futures, and it soon got over its annoyance, continuing to participate in joint forums with NATO and to cooperate with the USA over Afghanistan, North Korea and nuclear non-proliferation. So NATO is already committed to the defence of states in Russia’s near-abroad, and should not fear further expansion. [1] Black, Stephen J., ‘NATO Enlargement and the Baltic States: What Can the Great Powers Do’, Strategic Studies Institute, November 1997, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/summary.cfm?q=146
The West needs to deal with Russia

Western countries should seek to compromise with Russia, as they need its cooperation in a whole range of areas. Global efforts against terrorism, nuclear proliferation, climate change, energy security and organised crime will all fail without Russian participation. Russia’s veto power on the United Nations Security Council also means that alienating Moscow could frustrate international efforts to bring security and freedom to states such as Sudan, Myanmar, Zimbabwe and Iraq. In particular the west needs Russian help in Syria; the UNSC has only been able to get humanitarian resolutions on the country when Russia has been cooperative.[1] And NATO depends on Russian goodwill to allow supplies into Afghanistan via the safer northern route,[2] cooperation that is likely to be withdrawn if Georgia and Ukraine remain candidates for membership. [1] BBC News, ‘Syria crisis: UN Security Council agrees aid resolution’, 23 February 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-26311212 [2] Cullison, Alan, ‘Russia Considers Blocking NATO Supply Routes’, The Telegraph, 28 November 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204753404577066421106592452.html
The West is reliant on Russia’s Gas reserves

NATO’s European members have an additional reason not to offend Russia by continuing to expand the alliance in defiance of Moscow. Much of Europe depends on imports of Russian gas for their energy needs, Russia currently supplies 25% of European gas and this may rise to as high as 55% by 2020.[1] Unfortunately the Kremlin has made clear over the past three years that it is prepared to use its control of energy as a political weapon. It has already limited the flow of energy to states (e.g. Ukraine, Belarus, Estonia) who have annoyed it on several occasions, and may well be prepared to turn lights, heating and factories off across Europe in retaliation for interference in its near abroad.[2] Russia’s energy riches in a time of high oil prices also mean that it is far richer and self-confident than at any time since the fall of communism. The profits of its energy wealth have also enabled its military to be strengthened. This means that even if Moscow backed down in response to western assertiveness in the past, it is now determined to overturn past humiliations. [1] Paillard, Christophe-Alexandre, ‘Rethinking Russia: Russia and Europe’s Mutual Energy Dependence’, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 63, No.2, Spring/Summer 2010, pp.65-84, http://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/russia-and-europe%E2%80%99s-mutual-energy-dependence [2] Weir, Fred, ‘Why Russia is cutting off gas supplies to Belarus’, The Christian Science Monitor, 21 June 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2010/0621/Why-Russia-is-cutting-off-gas-supplies-to-Belarus
NATO is divided on how to deal with Georgia

The conflict in Georgia showed how NATO is already badly divided over how to respond to Russia. Old European states such as Germany and Italy are much readier to accommodate Russian interests than America,[1] which is supported by newer NATO members such as Poland and the Czech Republic. The same fault has been seen in relation to the response to Russian moves in Crimea; Germany has been much more cautious.[2] The United States faces a danger that if it pushes for NATO expansion in the face of Russian objections, it will split the alliance completely. [1] Traynor, Ian, ‘Nato allies divided over Ukraine and Georgia’, guardian.co.uk, 2 December 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/dec/02/ukraine-georgia [2] Dempsey, Judy, ‘Europe Is Completely Divided Over How to Respond to Russia’, Carnegie Europe, 4 March 2014, http://carnegieeurope.eu/2014/03/04/europe-is-completely-divided-over-how-to-respond-to-russia/h2gi
The people of Ukraine and Georgia want to join

It is far from the settled will of the Georgian and Ukrainian peoples that they wish to join NATO. Georgia’s President Saakashvili did wish to join, but after his disastrous attempt to regain control of South Ossetia was unable to bring his country with him. Saakashvilli was defeated in parliamentary elections and ran up against his term limit at the end of 2013[1] opening the way towards better relations with Russia. Public opposition to NATO membership in Ukraine since the US-led war in Iraq 2003 outweighed support for joining the alliance.[2] Ukraine is split over NATO membership, with most of the Russian-speaking East of the country firmly opposed to the idea, and only about 30% support overall.[3] The crisis of Ukraine’s pro-western coalition over how to respond to the conflict in Georgia showed how divisive the question is; the President firmly supported Georgia while the PM kept quiet.[4] In any case, NATO membership should not automatically be extended to every nation which wishes it, but only offered when the current members of the alliance judge it to be in their strategic interest to do so. [1] Traub, James, ‘The Georgia Syndrome’, ForeignPolicy, 13 August 2010, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/08/13/the_georgia_syndrome [2] Katchanovski, Ivan, ‘The Orange Evolution? The “Orange Revolution” and Political Changes in Ukraine.” Post-Soviet Affairs, 24 (4), 2008, p. 376. [3] Atwell, Kyle, ‘Two Different Paths to NATO: Georgia and Ukraine’, Atlantic Review, 7 November 2008, http://atlanticreview.org/archives/1206-Two-Different-Paths-to-NATO-Georgia-and-Ukraine.html [4] Arel, Dominique, ‘Ukraine Since the War in Georgia’, Survival, Vol.50, No.6, pp.15-25, http://www.ukrainianstudies.uottawa.ca/pdf/Arel%20Survival%20Final.pdf, p.16  [4] Arel, Dominique, ‘Ukraine Since the War in Georgia’, Survival, Vol.50, No.6, pp.15-25, http://www.ukrainianstudies.uottawa.ca/pdf/Arel%20Survival%20Final.pdf, p.16
Expansion is in the interests of NATO

Further expansion is not in NATO’s interests. The alliance is based on the principle that the security of one is the security of all, so that all members will go to war if any one member is attacked. This is a very serious commitment and should not lightly be extended to new nations. The irresponsible manner in which Georgia provoked a conflict with Russia, ignoring US warnings, shows the danger of being sucked into quarrels in which most NATO members have no strategic interest. It was obvious from this conflict that Georgia could not defend itself so the burden would fall on NATO.[1] Like the breakaway regions of Georgia, Ukraine also contains many Russian-speakers who look to Moscow for protection, especially in the Crimea which hosts Russia’s Black Sea fleet.[2] If Ukraine had been a member of NATO when Russia moved troops into Crimea then NATO would be a dangerous confrontation with Russia. [1] Tayler, Jeffrey, ‘Russia: Back to the Future’, the Atlantic, September 2008, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2008/09/russia-back-to-the-future/7029/ [2] Varettoni, William, ‘Crimea’s Overlooked Instability’, The Washington Quarterly, Vol.34, No.3, Summer 2011, pp.87-99, https://csis.org/files/publication/twq11summervarettoni.pdf, p.89
There is a strong precedent for expansion

In retrospect, the decision to welcome the former Soviet states in the Baltic into NATO appears foolish. They continue to have a prickly relationship with Russia, which has some legitimate concerns about the treatment of large Russian minorities in Latvia and Estonia, and about the siting of US nuclear defences. Their entry into NATO was forced upon Russia, which naturally saw it as an aggressive move designed to humiliate it, and marked the point when its pro-western policy shifted to a more nationalist and confrontational approach.[1] It also weakened the unity of NATO as there are quite legitimate doubts as to whether all the alliance’s members would really go to war with Russia over the integrity of, say, Estonia. Given this history, it would be madness to compound the problem by extending NATO membership to Georgia and Ukraine. [1] Fraser, Malcolm, ‘Ukraine: there’s no way out unless the west understands its past mistakes’, theguardian.com, 3 March 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/mar/03/ukraine-theres-no-way-out-unless-the-west-understands-its-past-mistakes
The West needs to deal with Russia

We do not need to buy Russia cooperation by sacrificing Georgian and Ukrainian sovereignty. The West would like Russian cooperation in a whole range of areas, but this isn’t a zero sum game where if one side wins the other must lose out. Russia should also worry about issues such as terrorism, nuclear proliferation, climate change, and the threat posed by failed states, so it is in its own interests to work with international partners to find global solutions. It also wants World Trade Organisation membership to continue its economic growth, especially if oil and gas prices should fall. For these reasons Russia will not make its whole foreign policy dependent on the expansion of NATO, but can be relied upon to continue existing partnerships because they are of mutual benefit.
The West is reliant on Russia’s Gas reserves

Russian strength is illusory – the country’s wealth is highly dependent on the energy exports and its economy is very vulnerable to a fall in oil and gas prices. Russia needs to sell its oil at $115 per barrel for the budget to balance.[1] Despite recent hostility to foreign oil firms attempting to operate in Russia, in the long term the country also needs western investment and technology if it is to maintain its energy output by opening and exploiting new fields. Indeed, Europe cannot be held hostage to Russian energy policy – who else could Russia sell its oil and gas to? Russia’s apparent military strength is also deceptive – its army and air force actually performed badly in Georgia and are no match for the modern forces available to NATO. [1] Nikishenkov, Oleg, ‘Oil muddles Russia’s budget debate’, themoscownews, 16 May 2011,  http://themoscownews.com/business/20110516/188670156.html
NATO is divided on how to deal with Georgia

Dramatic and depressing as events in Georgia in 2008 were, the loss of Abkhazia and South Ossetia actually make Georgia better suited to NATO membership than before. There would have been a clear danger of allowing Georgia into NATO if the status of these breakaway regions was unsettled, with the obvious potential for conflict with their Russian patron. Once Georgia can be brought to accept the permanent loss of these territories to Russia, then it becomes a much more united country, without any other obvious grounds for Russia’s future interference. This is similarly the case with Crimea; The Russian Black Sea Fleet based in a NATO member would have clearly been a risk.
The people of Ukraine and Georgia want to join

Many people in both Ukraine and Georgia wish to join NATO, and that is the best reason for welcoming them into the alliance. NATO is an alliance of democratic states and should respond positively to the request of a sovereign nation. In Georgia a non-binding referendum on whether to join NATO showed 77% of voters in favor of joining.[1] Polls show that some 50% of Ukrainians in 2002 said that would support Ukraine’s membership in NATO if a referendum on this issue were held.[2] Both states are at risk of being pushed around by Russia, partly because their desire to adopt “western” democratic values is at odds with the more autocratic values of Russia’s leadership. They also fear that Russia has designs on their territory and sovereignty, knowing that many in the Russian elite have never fully accepted the collapse of the old Soviet Union. These fears have been realised with Russian forces in South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Crimea. Joining NATO offers Georgia and Ukraine the protection of a proven alliance and a clear route to European Union membership that has already been travelled by other former Soviet states. Ukraine and Georgia as European states have a right to join NATO if they would satisfy all criteria for NATO membership.[3] [1] NATO, ‘Backgrounder, Deepening relations with Georgia’, NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2011, p.15, http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20111109_backgrounder_nato_georgia-eng.pdf [2]Katchanovski, Ivan, ‘The Orange Evolution? The “Orange Revolution” and Political Changes in Ukraine.” Post-Soviet Affairs, 24 (4), 2008, p. 376. [3] Katchanovski, Ivan, ‘Puzzles of EU and NATO Accession of Post-Communist Countries.’ Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 12 (3), 2011, p 309.
Chess lacks the necessary physical activity

Sports are about the perfection of our bodies, and therefore the competitive aspect of sport should relate directly to that perfection. In the Fundamental Principles of Olympism in the Olympic Charter the first is “combining in a balanced whole the qualities of body, will and mind”.13 Although we value the mental battle between athletes, we find that kind of exertion secondary, and not the core of sport which is the physical aspect. Chess consists only of the mind and to a lesser extent the will. It does not matter how well you can move the pieces from one square to the other. Therefore, chess celebrates a different aspect of the human condition than the Olympics and sports as a whole do: it cannot be an Olympic sport. [13] “Fundamental Principles of Olympism”, Olympic Charter, 8 July 2011, http://www.olympic.org/Documents/olympic_charter_en.pdf p.10