General Theism Contains a True Proposition for God's Existence

(2) The question here is: Does Pro have warrant for his claim? Pro claims he was "unaware" of this, a claim I find dubious considering the positions he has put forward; I find it hard to believe someone knows those arguments but doesn't know the very basics of asserting a philosophical claim. "When debating any issue, there is an implicit burden of proof on the person asserting a claim. "If this responsibility or burden of proof is shifted to a critic, the fallacy of appealing to ignorance is committed". This burden does not necessarily require a mathematical or strictly logical proof, although many strong arguments do rise to this level (such as in logical syllogisms). Rather, the evidential standard required for a given claim is determined by convention or community standards, with regard to the context of the claim in question. " My opponent has made a claim. It is his burden to show his warrant for that claim. As regards to us seeing being certain to see the teapot, if we didn't see the Russian Asteroid until it hit us, the idea that we WOULD see a celestial teapot for certain is laughable. [2] To quote Russell's original formulation (emphasis mine): "Many orthodox people speak as though it were the business of sceptics to disprove received dogmas rather than of dogmatists to prove them. This is, of course, a mistake. If I were to suggest that between the Earth and Mars there is a china teapot revolving about the sun in an elliptical orbit, nobody would be able to disprove my assertion provided I were careful to add that the teapot is too small to be revealed even by our most powerful telescopes. But if I were to go on to say that, since my assertion cannot be disproved, it is intolerable presumption on the part of human reason to doubt it, I should rightly be thought to be talking nonsense. "[3] (3) Pro attempts to claim that he has established agency within the CA. He has not. To repeat Pro's argument: "(1.0) Everything that begins to exist has a cause. (2.0) The Universe began to exist. (3.0) Therefore, the Universe has a cause. " Beyond the fact that Pro still has not established that the universe "began to exist" (we know that the universe in its current incarnation began to exist about 15 billion years ago. But that says nothing about what was before; Pro presumes it was a nothing, but it could have been another universe, there could be eternal cycling (although at present that is not the cosmological model that seems most likely due to the accelerating expansion of the universe). It could be the nature of true nothingness to spawn universes. But even if accepted as a valid and sound argument, there is nothing in there which justifies agency. The "Cause" need not have a will. Pro would like to establish that "through his power he brought the universe into being out of nothing by the faculties of his own power and will", but the CA give no grounds whatsoever to assert that. Pro makes no arguments in favor, rather, he quotes philosophers who have already accepted personal agency. He has no warrant for the claim. "If this Cause is a First Cause, and brought the universe into being a finite time ago, then it follows that this Cause has personal agency to his willing of the universe to come into being. " Pro says. It does not. Where did we get to "willing of the universe into being" from simple "cause"? We didn't, as noted by my unrebutted point about nebulae. (Note: I typed nebulas out before, rather than the proper "nebulae". I apologize) Pro notes that ". .. Impersonal causes do not will things into existence", and he is quite right. But the CA does not establish that anything was WILLED into existence, only that it was caused. (3.2) My opponent questions what I mean by "Nothing". This amuses me, as my opponent fails to realize that the "something cannot come from nothing" argument is one of induction. We assert that something cannot come from nothing because we "know" it doesn't. Even though we have literally no experience with a space which is "void of space, matter, energy, etc. ". Such a state has never been duplicated, for all we know if we ever did duplicate it, a space with no space, no matter, no energy, it would immediately spawn a universe. How would it do this? Presumably through a similar mechanism as God's, only without him. After all, God is said to have created something out of pure nothingness; if Pro doesn't know how that was done, how does he know it's possible? Pro claims "Indeterminism does not mean "lack of cause", but rather expresses a matter of uncertainty, or even freedom from the bondage of certainty, to make a point. " And yet, "Indeterminism is the concept that events (certain events, or events of certain types) are not caused, or not caused deterministically (cf. causality) by prior events. "[4] Pro is the one who doesn't understand the terms he's using here. When an event is indeterminite, there is no cause for it. When that event is something's existence, it follows that there is no cause for it. Pro does not rebut the argument that his own quote invalidated his argument, except when he misunderstands the term "indeterminism". (3.3) "I am suggesting that the universe is not a brute fact that contains the explanation of its existence within itself. That would constitute the universe to be a logically necessary being (indeed it is not, the universe is only contingently so). " Why? Pro has given no ARGUMENT for the universe's existence to be contingent rather than necessary. It certainly contains contingent things. But is it contingent itself? "As such, the universe requires an explanation of its existence outside of itself. I had argued for this in my first and second affirmative. I lay the burden on my opponent to show how this is not so. " No. Bare assertion does not a case make. To simply say "Well, I suggest X based on nothing. Disprove it! " is ridiculous. Pro laid out no case for this beyond assertion, and as such, it can be dismissed out of hand. (3.4) Perhaps Leibnitz made an actual case, but certainly Pro did not in his assertions or his quote, which simply said "According to Leibniz, the fact that the entire set extends to an infinite amount of contingent things accounting for one another outside of themselves is not an explanation for why the entire set itself exists. " Pro claims "my opponent suggests that "it's no more illogical than something having agency yet being 'outside time', or even something 'outside the universe'". I had established this case in my (3.1), my opponent confuses the proper definition of causality. " Agency requires will and the ability to execute it. Executing will requires change. Change requires time. So to have something which has agency yet is 'outside time' is a contradiction. And anything 'outside the universe' is, as I noted, outside of our comprehension. (4) Unfortunately, my opponent has rested his entire case on the Cosmological Argument towards a First Cause. He has, however, given no warrant to believe any of the attributes that he posited in R1: "(a) Omnipotent (All-powerful) (b) Omniscient (All-knowing) (c) Perfectly Free (d) Transcendent (e) Immanent (f) Creator (g) Perfectly Good (h) Omnipresent" To give just one example: There is nothing in the CA which requires "perfectly good". In short, my opponent has completely failed to show warrant for his position, and as such I urge a vote for Con, even from theists, for Pro has not done well for your position. While I thank Pro for this lively debate, I hope in the future he either simplifies his claim, or makes arguments which actually support the totality of it. [1] . http://en.wikipedia.org... [2] . http://io9.com... [3] . http://en.wikipedia.org... [4] . http://en.wikipedia.org...