abortion should be illegal in first trimester, but not investigated nor punished*

I hope my opponent will not hold the fact that I did not post any fully expanded argumentation in the former post. Usually, the first round is saved for acceptance and some sort of opening statements. However, as my opponent would like to consider those his arguments, we can go from there. Really, all in all, the argumentation that my opponent claims come from the first speech is unsubstantiated. The Pro here has provided a great number of claims that are not supported by an real evidence or theory that binds them together and makes them substantial in the debate. At this point, I feel it is rather clear that the Pro has not fulfilled his BOP and therefore, you should vote for the Con in this instance. Even when presented with the opportunity in the second round, he provides only rebuttal to points that I have yet to make. So, with the preceding conclusion that you, the judge, are going to vote for the Con, let me further explain why abortion should not only be legal in the first trimester but is also morally permissible. From both his Round 1 and Round 2, we can conclude that the main claim coming from the Pro is that there is no way to easily identify person-hood. How it thus follows that abortion should be illegal in the first trimester is beyond me, but let us continue. I vehemently disagree with this claim that person-hood is difficult to determine. We must determine that personhood is achieved at viability. This is a point that is determined far past the first trimester (approximately 28 weeks). At the point where a fetus is viable, it is certain that it is a person and deserves all the rights and duties afforded to any other human. As John Stuart Mill explains in his work On Liberty [1] the Harm Principle justifies a restriciton on one's liberty only when the excerices of that liberty infringe upon another's liberty. In the case of abortion, it cis clear that if a fetus is not a person, because it lacks viability during he firt trimester, we must agree that the act of abortion does not infringe uon the rights of anotherhuman being. Thus, we can conclude that it iwould be unjust of a government to institute restrcictions on abortion given those definitions. Further, when we look to Judith Jarvis Thomson's explanations in her marvelous essay A Defense of Abortion, regardless of the personhood of a fetus, there is no way that we can intuitively defend abortion restrictions as a matter of defending life. Simply put, there is always an answer to situations that would not justify abortion. What we have to recogniz is that a fetus does not have the irght to use a mother's body. Even if we assume that a fetus is the exact equal of a full grown human being, and has the rights thereof, we must realize that the fetus is--in a sense--a guest of the mother's womb and body. Thus, the fetus has no rights that trump the mother's right ot her own body. Thompson argues for this point by giving the example of a burglar. Even if a person engages in risky activity by livin in a dangerous neighborhood and leaves her door open (or has sexual intercourse without protection) if a burglar enters that person's house (or an egg is fertilized) the person is in no way obligated ot facillitate the needs of the burglar (or provide a comfotable home for a fetus for nine months). The issues here are one and the same. A person's sovereignty over their own body rtrumps any right to life an unfeeling clump of cells has, even if you afford that clump of cells the exact same rights as a human being--a point that my opponent has failed to argue. Thus, at the point where a women does not give consent for an infant to use her body, the fetus has no right to the women's body. Thus a government regulation on the performing of abortion is an exact rejection of the principle that youmy opponent praises in his second speech. He likes the idea that we should not establish regulations other than those that are in defense of another's liberties and prevent the infringement on them by others. However, after praising that idea, my opponent does not reject the idea that a law shod be instituted that would make it illegal (though not pursuable) for a woman to have an abortion. Thus, they are, in essence, forcing a woman to endure an infringement upon her rights to her body rather than defending her against it. My opponent is going to try, in his last attempt to defend his position, that the law is not enforcable and, therefore, the consequences of this law are not as I portray them. However, you as a judge must realize this: if there was a law (unenforcable and un-investigable, of course) that made being *[insert Race, Gender, Religion]. * Would not it be our duty to rebel against that law? Would not it be unjust for a government to institute such a law, even if it were only ceremonial. An act of governmental condemnation, even if it is not punishable, is still a governmental condemnation. At one point in time, it may be enforcable. And at the point where we recognize that it would be unjust for a government to enforce a law of such kind we must reject the idea of a ceremonial law that states the same thing illegal. Thus, we must reject the resolution. Abortion during the first trimester must neve4r be made illegal. Thank you.