In The United States, Jury Nullification Is A Just Check On Government

I will begin by defending my case and conclude by refuting Pro"s. From the beginning, my opponent misinterprets my stance on the value of equality. Equality cannot and should not be mandated throughout every aspect of any society. The equality that I speak of is the equal beginning that all individuals must be allowed to share. Through personal choices they may add or detract from their initial equal position, but to assert that equality should be violated on any issue other than the actions of the individual for some arbitrary characteristic or circumstance is immoral. Additionally, my opponent mentions that this equality that I claim as a value is a growing concept in the Western world of what used to differ between small communities. I negate this, and insist that the equality rightful due to all women and men exceeds the boundaries of any nation and is simply a necessary competent of an ethical and functional society. I.My main contention with my opponent"s criticism of this first point is her apparent belief that jury nullification allows unjust verdicts. If these verdicts that I refer to are indicative of a "much deeper societal rot" is that not a clear condemnation of the same values necessary to support jury nullification? When good laws are violated negatively as a result of the moral decay of a representative group of peers who serve as jury, this clearly present solid reason to condemn jury nullification. It simply cannot be excused by blaming society as a whole institution, when the laws of that society would be just. Additionally, I do not see how any impact is lessened by the fact that these examples of unjust jury nullification lend a degree of credibility to the complaints of oppression by minority groups. Surely in instances involving minority groups, it would be ideal to have an objective law than entirely face the subjective whim of a jury group that does not adequately represent their peers. II.Pro seems to be under the false impression that when I claim that jury nullification does not differentiate between good and bad laws that I must advocate blind legalism. This is not the case. There is a definite middle ground between inflexible laws and a legal system ruled by the whims of the masses. This middle ground is offered in proper legal reform and in the presence of a jury to take into account circumstances in a trial that may lawfully pardon the otherwise guilty party. This is not jury nullification, this is jury analyzation. The jury"s duty in the courtroom is not to understand the purpose of a law but simply to distinguish circumstances that might make the generalized application of the law against the law"s intent. This is not jury nullification, as one can see by a brief return to our shared definition of "where a jury deliberately rejects the evidence or refuses to apply the law either because the jury wants to send a message about a social issue or because the result dictated by the law is against the jury"s sense of justice or morality". III.My opponent seems to present a false dichotomy in regards to this final point of my case. She tells us that jury nullification is more ideal than an immoral law, and that moral rulings assigned from a group of peers is more ideal than that from an "unelected bureaucrat". Are these exclusively our choices? I continue to assert that there exist legitimate legal ways that corrupt laws may be reformed that does not require a dilemma of absolutes such as the one presented here. Surely being judged by a group of our peers is not ideal in many scenarios. The racial climate in the south eastern states is radically different from that in north western states. Surely in scenarios like this and in many others, allowing legal judgments to flow from the whims of the majority and not through politically appropriate means offers the greatest risk to justice and societal welfare. My opponent comes dangerously near a complete abandonment of the value of justice that we both agreed to ultimately uphold. -My Opponent"s Case- My opponent"s introduction in defense of her case is not only fallacious but also contradictory to her contention in point two regarding my explicit advocacy of the jury"s duty to consider mitigating circumstances. One need look no further than my post in round two to see that I have clearly advocated the importance of the jury, and so to claim that I advocate a legal system in which "everyone committing the same crime gets the same sentence without any regard to aggravating or mitigating factors" is blatantly untrue. There is a fast difference to the consideration of mitigating circumstances that permit exception in what is universally understood as an otherwise just law and pronouncing a guilty individual innocent because one "rejects the evidence or refuses to apply the law either because the jury wants to send a message about a social issue or because the result dictated by the law is against the jury"s sense of justice or morality." I will continue to refer to this definition because it is of vital importance to this case, specifically in regards to my opponent"s increasing misinterpretation of it. I.An important clarification here is that much of my argument regarding this point pertains to legitimate risks and ideals rather than concrete historical example. Simply because an atomic bomb was not used to harm any individuals prior to 1945 does not mean that it certainly held the potential to. This example is clearly imperfect and I am sure my opponent would not mistake it for an attempt at absolute comparison, but a vital distinction can be made nonetheless. My contention addresses the potential of the system for abuse, while she defends with retrospective agreement. My attempts to reform this system are preemptive while hers are optimistic (and notably unreasonably so). Simply because a system has not exclusively been misused does not make it desirable, especially when it poses such risk. However, the most important contention I offer is this: my opponent states "Con continually characterizes the idea of jury nullification as anarchic but this is uncompelling for four reasons: First, even if this was true he doesn't explain why this is bad." If my opponent does not agree that an anarchic state is intrinsically negative to the well-being of society, than this debate is already resolved. Anarchy cannot account for justice and the welfare of society. In an anarchic world, society does not exist. To advocate a system of ideals that revolves on the absence of government can uphold neither our value of justice nor societal welfare. II.Finally, this attempt to entirely discredit my case is explicitly fallacious. My statement was "It seems that the two primary reasons for the jury that my opponent points out in her second contention are the jury"s ability to interpret poorly written laws and the ability to make situational exceptions, such as providing a necessary delineation between a murder trial in cold blood and one in self-defense. However, is this truly what jury nullification is?" I proceeded to rehash our mutual definition if jury nullification which I have already done twice in this round. The interpretation of poorly written laws and making informed decisions based on mitigating circumstances consisting with an otherwise moral law is not jury nullification. I will again repeat that jury nullification is "where a jury deliberately rejects the evidence or refuses to apply the law either because the jury wants to send a message about a social issue or because the result dictated by the law is against the jury"s sense of justice or morality", not an instance in which the jury considers mitigating circumstances such as murderous intent and self-defense and necessary clarification in vague laws. These are not issues of personal conviction or a clash of values with current laws; these are simply appropriate duties of the jury. Jury nullification is something else entirely. In summary, my opponent has grossly misinterpreted and misused the term jury nullification in the previous round. Her claims of my concession are invalid. Jury nullification risks the conviction of the innocent and a sort of mob-mentality in the court room that is detrimental and subversive. I have shown this and this not only supports my case but undermines my opponent"s first contention. Her second may be dismissed entirely, as it revolves exclusively around a fallacious representation of jury nullification. Again, this debate is not between "blind legalism" and jury nullification. My stance is not one that advocates a law so rigid that individuals with mitigating circumstances must be condemned with the intentional murderer. However, the decision of which laws to follow and which laws to dismiss should not lie in the hands of the jury. To advocate a legal system as subjective as this undermines the equality guaranteed to us by a functioning system of justice, without which societal welfare would diminish. For these reasons, you must vote Con. Thanks for the debate, Pro. It was truly enjoyable.