Animals Rights

Observation: There’s no basis for debating this. The resolution is merely “animal rights,” without any being specific, and no full resolution drafted. A direct interpretation of the resolution would be “animal rights ought to be recognized,” since it actually offers a contextual basis while simultaneously forming a synonym of the resolution. One can interpret that it is human society that ought to recognize animal rights, per the Affirmative. Framework The resolution debates the requirements of normativity. Because of this, morality comes first in the debate. When one asks what society “ought” to do, one presumes a moral obligation. Thus, the debate shall come down to whether morality demands an obligation towards recognition of animal rights. This entails the question -- what is moral? Providing a framework for morality answers this question. Under my framework, I will critique aggregate theories and offer my own framework for morality -- normative egoism. Under the resolution, we require some measure of desirability. An “ought” can only indicate moral desirability, and we require a framework that recognizes any moral desirability to link to the resolution. Only if recognizing animal rights is desirable, in some way, to a just society can it be considered an obligation to a just society. Mercer explains, “To understand what another has done is … to have a … description of the action he has performed, one that reveals it to be intentional … to know an agent’s reason for performing … action involves understanding his motivation in doing it. … It is not enough, … to understand what a person who intentionally sips from a saucer of mud has done … An interpreter has also to comprehend what in desiring to sip from a saucer of mud was attractive to him. … One way is to connect that piece of behaviour to one or more of the strange agent’s self-regarding ends. If we can see in sipping from a saucer of mud a way of maintaining self-respect, or even a way to delight in the taste of mud, we can understand the desire the agent had to sip from a saucer of mud. We need not connect his self-regarding end to an intention to realize that end in or through his action; we need only … connect it to an expectation of realizing it.” [1] Understanding our actions can be explained by moral egoism. Ultimately, our own self-regarding ends ultimately decide what we do, and what we ought to do as well. Mercer continues: “[W]eak … egoism is the doctrine that all actions are performed in expectation of realizing self-regarding ends. … [E]goism is the doctrine that behind any action whatever that an agent performs intentionally, ultimately there lies the agent’s expectation of realizing one or more of her self-regarding ends, an expectation without which the agent would not have performed the action. … if an agent does not expect to forestall his own unhappiness or to promote his self-image, …, in … performing an action … then that agent will not intentionally perform an action of that type. … some other self-regarding end, not as a consequence … but directly as part of engaging in that activity … To enjoy tennis is to take pleasure in playing tennis, and not, … to attain experiences of pleasure through playing tennis.” There is more a priori evidence for egoism. Mercer argues,“Though weak psychological egoism is a doctrine ultimately answerable to empirical evidence, we presently have excellent a priori reasons for accepting it and attempting to construct psychological theories that include it as an organizing principle. … to understand the motivation behind an action, we need to understand the force of the consideration that motivates the agent, and the way to do this is to find a self-regarding end associated in the agent’s mind with acting on that consideration.” To add on to the warrant, there is plenty of a posteriori means of verifying egoism. Most researchers agree that morality itself has evolutionary origins. [2] Many species display that they protect themselves. In fact, the purpose of evolution is to promote the survival of *the individual,* and all species have mechanisms that aid the individual. This egoism has been observed in evolutionary psychology. [3] Substance Egoism would entail that what is most moral is what ultimately benefits the moral actor. Thus, with regards to the issue of animal rights, it is moral for human society to do what benefits human society most. And I argue that recognition of animal rights would be a net detriment to society. Animal testing can be cruel, but it is necessary. The former is easily affirmed, since animal testing involves exploitation of animals via cruel means. It violates the principle of animal rights, therefore is directly contrary to animal rights. But I argue that it’s moral, because it benefits society as a whole. Current treatments for multiple sclerosis, Parkinson’s, strokes, schizophrenia, depression, anxiety disorders, PTSD, and polio would not have existed without animal testing. [4][5] Penicillin is a result of animal tests. [6] In fact, “virtually every medical breakthrough in human and animal health has been the direct result of research using animals.” [7] Non-veganism is beneficial to health. [8] Recognition of animal rights would entail no animal testing, which is not beneficial for society. Therefore—per egoism—society is obliged to *not* recognize animal rights. Animals are not part of the moral community To have any form of moral status, one requires rationality to process what that “moral status” even is. The moral community intrinsically demands for rationality. An animal cannot process what a “right” is. Take the home example. Rational beings *invented* the concept of “rights,” therefore rational beings can choose whether to bestow upon animals rights. Animals do not have concepts such as “murder,” or laws that do not permit exploitation. Exploitation exists in the animal world—predators kill prey, many species use “bait,” chimpanzees even use “weapons” (i.e. twigs) to catch and kill ants. If exploitation is moral for animals, it is moral for humans to do to animals as well. “The moral community is … organized around something shared in common by all of its members. This common factor is none other than the capacity for rational agency. … the capacity for rational agency is both necessary and sufficient for having moral status … rational agency is a necessary condition for having any sort of moral standing.” [9] R.G. Frey argues that animals lack interests. They don’t “want” to be free of suffering, for instance, or free of exploitation. He writes, “If someone were to say, e.g. 'The cat believes that the door is locked,' then that person is holding, as I see it, that the cat holds the declarative sentence 'The door is locked' to be true; and I can see no reason whatever for crediting the cat or any other creature which lacks language, including human infants, with entertaining declarative sentences.” [10] Thus, as morality is based on desirability, we have no reason to bestow upon animals rights. Rights can only be bestowed due to desire. Professor Carl Cohen says that, to merit being in the moral community, one has to respect the interests of others. He writes, “The holders of rights must have the capacity to comprehend rules of duty governing all, including themselves. In applying such rules, [they] ... must recognize possible conflicts between what is in their own interest and what is just. Only in a community of beings capable of self-restricting moral judgments can the concept of a right be correctly invoked.” [11] I will preempt a possible objection from Pro: why are the rights of infants and the mentally disabled recognized? Cohen argues, “Between species ... humans on the one hand and cats or rats on the other--the morally relevant differences are enormous, and almost universally appreciated. Humans engage in moral reflection; ... are morally autonomous; ... are members of moral communities, recognizing just claims against their own interest. Human beings do have rights; theirs is a moral status very different from that of cats or rats.” [11] Frey writes, “to include the baby by means of the potentiality argument: the baby is potentially rational....to include the severely mentally-enfeebled by means of the similarity argument: in all other respects except rationality and perhaps certain mental accomplishments, the severely mentally-enfeebled betray strong similarities to other members of our species,...One might try to include both babies and the severelymentally-enfeebledby means of the religious argument: babies and the severely mentally-enfeebled possess immortal souls....the religious argument does separate both from Fido, who is not conceded an immortal soul by the argument's proponents.” [12] --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- I’ll put my references in the comments section due to character constraints.