Humanity ought to allow animals access to basic rights.

My thanks go out to phantom for a) providing me with an interesting case to read and think on, and b) not once making a point over how they are encaged (because we all know that's a -completely- sound argument). I feel that, while in appearance it may be sound, upon closer inspection my opponent's case falls apart in a few places. Let us first begin at his first premise, where he illustrates the criterion in which animals fit the qualifications for rights.Right off the bat we hit a snag with self-ownership. I feel that in modern society the average animal does not actually own one's self, but is rather owned much as a commodity is. In the same way I can go to a store and buy the laptop I am currently typing on, making it in all senses of the word "mine", I can go into a store and purchase a puppy. I would have paid the wage necessary to change contractual ownership of that puppy from the ownership of the store to my ownership, thus making it (for the most part) mine. So long as none of my actions violate the contract upon which the pet store agreed to sell me the puppy (or accepted social protocolls pertaining to the treatment of animals. And yes that was a Michael Vick joke), I have full control over what the puppy does and does not do. The same applies with other animals, such as cattle, pigs, roosters, and other animals that serve a practical purpose in society other than bringing joy and companionship to onesself. Of course, this could all just devolve into a debate over contractual rights versus bodily rights, but I will go further on taht point if pro wishes to go down that path. I hesitate now since I have the feeling it will be a bit messy.On consciousness, I do not object per se, but would rather think that it could better be described by cognitive ability, or rather more simply, sentience. While things such as animals, insects and plant-life surely are conscious enough to feel emotions such as pain and joy, we hardly give consideration to their rights in every day activity (when has the average human being paused to consider the moral rammifications of eating a hamburger, or of swatting a fly off of your table, or of mowing your lawn). However, to sentient beings (such as human beings) we are more apt to consider their feelings before making an action that may infringe upon their well-being. And since the majority of animals lack the capacity for sentience (cognition, speech, etc.) they do not deserve the same basic liberties and rights. Feeling I do not object to animals possessing, but rather it's qualification as a standard to judge what deserves moral consideation. As I stated earlier, things such as insects and plant-life are capable of feeling things such as pain and pleasure, yet are hardly considered to be deserving of rights (have you ever felt guilty about mowing your lawn because of the thought of killing all those poor blades of grass? I thought not). Intrinsic worth is something that I feel should be mentioned. I don't think that the mere fact that something exists gives it intrinsic worth. Saying that would mean things like feecle matter and radioactive byproduct have intrinsic worth, as they exist in society. As such, animals do not have intrinsic worth in themselves necessarily, but rather, I believe, in what they are able to produce (i.e. food products and other assortments of things that are able to be produced from animals ingredients). A cow is just a cow; a large bovine animal that sits around, eats grass, deficates manure, and eventually dies or is slaughtered. But what it can produce has intrinsic worth as it provides society with a necessary material to remain alive (food in the form of meat). But because animals themselves do not have intrinsic worth, his argument falls here as well.Since my opponent's qualifications were refuted, premise one drops. As he was kind enough to use a syllogism, all I need to do is successfully refute one premise and the entire thing is de-railed. But let's keep going, shall we? I do not object to the rights my opponent wishes to bestow, as those were what I was thinking of the basic rights. It is my opponent's BOP to prove that animals possess them or ought to possess them. From there, let's move on to where my opponent attempts to show that society has an obligation to provide animals with basic rights. I feel that while my opponent's flow of logic is sound, his conclusion is in error. My opponent has proved to you that giving animals these rights (presuming they fit the qualifications for them) would be a moral action. Bingo boingo. This only proves, however, that it would be a morally PERMISSIBLE action to take, but not a morally obligatory action to take. My opponent is missing the step between why we have an obligation to give them these rights, as he never establishes the need, but only the should. As my opponent's logic currently flows in syllogistic form:P1 - Morality is concerned with how we should act.P2 - Animals have/deserve rights.P3 - It would be a morally good action to recognize those rights, as the rights themselves are moral.P4 - Thus, because we should, we ought to.P4 is, of course, the jump in logic my opponent makes.My opponent may try to extend out the fact that he said "Moral obligations to recognize facts exist within moral facts themselves", but the warrant for this statement is lacking. He merely warrants it with a bland "That is why it's morality" assertion that proves little to nothing. If my opponent wishes to use this statement to prove he has achieved a moral obligation, he will need to warrant it with something more substantial.As such, not only has he yet to prove that rights exist for animals, but also that we have an obligation to recognize these rights, should they exist.And since I'm not arguing that our moral framework only applies to humans, the paragraph addressing that issue can be ignored.The hypothetical assessment my opponent proposes meets the same problem as it did before: if we envision a world where it is morally better to give animals their rights than not, we know it is a morally permissible action to give them the rights. The fact that we realize they can have rights does not obligate us to give them rights, as there must be some outside force to obligate us (such as a contractual obligation or something of the like, for instance). So in summary:I have refuted premises one, three, and four in his syllogism (two and five are arguably just conclusions and merit the validity of the others to be valid themselves). As such, my oppoent's case is entirely de-bunked. The resolution is negated.