The Existence of God is unlikely

My thanks to Nick for engaging me in this debate. I will be arguing that the existence of God is likely on both a priori and a posteriori grounds. I will first analyze Pro's arguments and show that they are unsound. I will then erect a case of own using positive arguments. =Argument from Ordered Complexity= Pro argues that God, because he is a being of immensely ordered complexity, must require an explanation. But since this cannot be the case, God probably does not exist. Unfortunately, P2 is almost certainly false. Pro defines ordered complexity to be a "system composed of several parts that are arranged in such a way as to produce some specific function that is otherwise improbable." With regards to God, he has no parts, he is an immaterial being. Pro's argument is a category mistake, since the property of ordered complexity does not apply to God. Classic theism has historically portrayed God to be immaterial, and Pro even acknowledges this in the definition of God which he states he is working with. Because God is an immaterial unembodied mind, he is on the contrary a very _simple_ being. More importantly, it is important to note the difference between two modes of being: contingency and necessity. By trying to account for God's origins, Pro is presupposing God to be a contingent being (Which begs the question). He is by definition a necessary being, such that even if he requires an explanation, it would be that he exists through the necessity of his own nature. The fact that God is a necessary being removes any chance of there being an external explanation for his existence. =The Problem of Evil= Pro argues that an omnibenevolent, omniscient, and omnipotent God would destroy evil, and the fact that He has not strongly suggests that such a being does not exist. Though Pro formulates his argument exactly like the logical version of the POE, he distinguishes it from the evidential version that he is defending. The traditional theistic response to this argument is that God has morally sufficient reasons for allowing evil, though what these exact reasons cannot be known. Since Pro's argument is evidential, we must ask whether or not the skeptical theist's reply is probable. We must thus ask ourselves whether or not we're in the best position to state that evil renders God's existence improbable. Why think that if God had morally sufficient reasons, that we would be able to know them? Pro engages in what is called a noseeum inference -- if we can't see morally sufficient reasons, then they probably don't exist. "Given the immensity of divine goodness and the finitude of our human cognitive and moral faculties, it seems likely that there are some, perhaps many, types of goods with which we are not acquainted. If we cannot even grasp the full range of goods that evils _might_ be aimed at securing, then our attempts to make judgments about whether or not evils are gratuitous will be futile." [1] Hence, it does not seem we are in the best position to assert that evil renders God's existence implausible. =Argument from the Simplicity of Metaphysical Naturalism= The chief fault I find in this argument lies in P3. All beings being equal, it is theism, and not naturalism, that has greater explanatory power. Ockham's razor states that all things being equal, entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity. But what is necessary to explain the phenomena that we have? That is the very fact that we are debating over. Pro seems to beg the question by presupposing theism to be unnecessary in explaining the phenomena that we have. As I have previously stated, I think that it is theism, and not naturalism which has superior explanatory power. Hence, I will argue a fortiori that it is probable to conclude that God exists. Very briefly, we tend to recognize phenomena such as self-consciousness, free will, objective morality and intrinsic value, purpose and meaning to live, real evils, religious experience, and a host of other phenomena to be basic to our everyday experience. Though both theism and naturalism can account for these phenomena, theism's explanation is superior in that it tends to affirm the reality of phenomena that we find basic to life. Using abduction, therefore, God seems to be the best explanation. ______ I will now offer several _very brief_ positive arguments for the existence of God. I will not go into the details in my OP, as I will wait to see what details Pro disputes about these arguments, and then reply specifically to those objections. =The Kalam Cosmological Argument= 1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause 2. The universe began to exist 3. Therefore, the universe has a cause Premise one seems to be intuitively true, it is rooted in the metaphysical principle that out of nothing, nothing comes. The second premise too is confirmed by a wealth of evidence. Big bang cosmology has demonstrating that the universe began over 14 billion years ago in an infinitely dense singularity. Additionally, premise two is confirmed by the impossibility of the existence of an actually infinite set. Since transfinite operations with infinite quantities are impossible, the universe could not have an infinite past duration. Finally, the cause of the universe must be a personal agent in order to freely bring about an effect without prior determining conditions =The Leibnizian Cosmological Argument= 1. Anything that exists has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause. 2. If the universe has an explanation of its existence, that explanation is God. 3. The universe exists. 4. Therefore, the universe has an explanation of its existence. (from 1,3) 5. Therefore, the explanation of the existence of the universe is God. (from 2,4) The only controversial premise of this argument would seem to be premise one, which is a form of the principle of sufficient reason. Unlike Leibniz's original version of the PSR, I will be defending a more modest version of it, one which concerns "the giving of reasons sufficient _to explain_ the explanandum, not the giving of reasons logically sufficient for _entailing_ the explanandum" (Emphasis mine) [2]. Now, P1 certainly seems to be more plausible than its denial. "If PSR is not true, then I could not know why an individual or collection of contingent facts exist. We couldn't even make a true statement without knowing "why" it is true. [3] It is thus reasonable to conclude that God exists. =The Argument from Reason= 1. No belief is rationally inferred if it can be fully explained in terms of nonrational causes 2. If naturalism is true, then all beliefs can be fully explained in terms of nonrational causes 3. Therefore, if naturalism is true, then no belief is rationally inferred 4. If any thesis entails the conclusion that no belief is rationally inferred, then it should be rejected and its denial accepted 5. Therefore, naturalism should be rejected and its denial accepted. [4] If naturalism is true, then our origins can be explained mechanistically in terms of natural processes. It thus follows that our cognitive faculties are ultimately the product of nonrational causes. But if our cognitive faculties are the product of nonrational causes, then we should have little reason to trust them. Reason does not come from nonreason -- would we trust the printout of a computer that was produced through nonrational processes? But obviously, we know that our cognitive faculties are reliable. Naturalism is at a loss to account for why this is so, for the naturalist must believe that reason is the end result of millions of nonrational causes. Since naturalism undercuts the foundations for rationality, we are warranted in rejecting it. Theism is a much better explanation, since given the theistic perspective, reason comes from reason as opposed to reason from nonreason.