Taxation is not theft

===Moral ownership and Land===My opponent offers a most interesting argument in his refutation. He argues that moral ownership of objects themselves does not necessitate ownership of land. Therefore, he argues, there is no reason why forcing monopolized rule over a given geographical are could possibly constitute theft. There are two fatal problems with this proposition though. (1) It ignores the fact that land ownership is a necessity in justifying ownership of things derived from it and (B) It legitimizes any and all theft against legitimate ownership.(1) Land ownership as necessary for ownership of its derivatives.Without land ownership, there is no way that we can naturally come to own anything legitimately. In my opponent's own conception of moral ownership which we expands on in his R2, my opponent simply starts with the example of a person morally owning an umbrella and then moves on to show his point about the relevancy of acquisition (which I bring up in refuting his justified conditions argument below). However, where do we obtain the original point of moral ownership? It would appear my opponent only thinks that we are justified in morally owning a piece of property after it has been created from materials coming from land itself (everything from metal to wood to wheat which we use to make morally owned property originates on land). But this lends itself to two specific problems.A. It doesn't justify the original source of acquisition which my opponent makes a point to argue is morally relevant to justification of ownership.B. This distinction fails to hold any relevant meaning. My opponent has failed to justify why we can come to own things from land but not land itself.(2) Non-land ownership as legitimizing theft of morally owned possessions.My second criticism of my opponent's point on land ownership is that in itself it compromises property which is legitimately acquired even by my opponent's own standards. For instance, if all that is necessary to legitimize sovereign jurisdiction over someone is to grant it to one's self on the basis that one believes it is in the best interest of those who one proclaims it over then it grants every level of theft as justified as long as one simply claims jurisdiction over and around the land that someone lives. If you don't really own the land you live on then I am not acting unjustifiably in proclaiming sovereignty over your land for your own good and extracting your wealth. This is basically the same description of government actions just applied to a smaller scale to show more accurately the moral relevance.===Justified Conditions===My opponent's argument rests on the supposition that land does not fall under the confines of moral ownership. Therefore, since I have refuted this necessary supposition in the above point the argument my opponent posits here is moot. Moral ownership necessarily extends to land. Otherwise moral ownership itself could not exist and would invalidate legitimately held property. Even ignoring this point though my opponent's points are open to internal inconsistencies, two of which I will elaborate on here.===My opponent attempts to argue that the way in which an institution is formed ought not be relevant, that that "does not negate that the entity exists". However, my opponent here ignores the moral relevance in origins. Consider the lottery. Now let's say that I steal $100,000 from a wealthy neighbor and use it to buy a huge number of lottery tickets and end up actually winning. Am I morally entitled to the winnings? Of course not because I was only able to win the money as a result of prior theft. Likewise the government is only able to exist because of prior illegitimate extension of quasi-sovereignty over a large area. This is clearly a morally relevant matter in deciding its own legitimacy.===My opponent argues that a government can do what it needs to do to protect the interests of its people and one of these things is to tax. But where are these interests defined exactly and wouldn't a general interest of people be to not have an institution form that assumes their obligation to it regardless of choice? My opponent would be able to salvage this point if he added the point that generally grants legitimacy to every other institution, that of voluntary association. If someone explicitly wants to be granted the services of a government then they may do so but the government simply refrains from providing services to anyone who does not want them. They would not be afforded police services as well. If they choose to receive services by the government then they would be subject to taxation.Now my opponent argues that this is already the case and that we already choose to get government services by living within its borders. However, he is equivocating two types of interaction, action which is legitimately voluntary and action which is merely assumed to be. To explain my point with an analogy, consider a city grocery store that decides that it is in the best option of the citizens of the city to exclusively patron it and no other stores. Therefore the city proclaims jurisdiction over the entire city and claims that anyone residing in the city agrees to only use its services. Obviously this is not voluntary interaction as one must either patron the store exclusively or leave their own property. The action is clearly coerced.===Social Contract===In his argument regarding the social contract, my opponent argues that it is not "necessarily that of a conscious decision, but rather the decision one ought to make". This alone should prove once and for all that the social contract does not exist in reality as any real contract that imposes any legitimate obligation. For instance, we do not apply this sort of analysis to any other contractual relationship. Just because we think it would be in one's best interest to make an agreement with me does not in itself mean that they have actually made such an agreement and it does not mean that I therefore possess the right to coerce an exchange. Likewise, the belief that one would be better off under a real social contract does not legitimize its enforcement over the unwilling.