The Kalam Cosmological Argument for the Existence of God is Sound

Pro begins his argumentation in round four by claiming that he explicitly stated in the OP he would not be proving a specific conception of deity. Please examine the OP, as nowhere in that text does such an explicit claim appear. Pro goes on to say that his goal was to prove a "personal cause with attributes that closely resemble a monotheistic conception of God. " In my round three argument, I gave two specific reasons to reject that argument. The first was that it was not a definition. Pro claims whether it was or was not a definition "in the strict sense" is irrelevant. It is very relevant. Pro was not defining God in that clause. To use the format pro suggest we view the clause in, it was "Some say the KCA proves a cause other than God, but there are good reasons for believing that the KCA demonstrates a being that resembles a monotheistic conception of God. " That is not a definition of God, nor is it a limitation to a generic conception of a god. Quite the opposite. Pro disagrees with people who claim the KCA indicates a cause other than capital-G God and offers perceived similarities to a monotheistic conception of God as evidence for his disagreement. God, the proper noun, the Christian conception, is a monotheistic concept. Even here, in his supposed generic definition, he has used the proper noun. This proper noun can be written as "The Christian God. " Here is the full text of the supposed generic definition with that replacement made: "Some object that the first cause need not be the Christian God, but was rather an impersonal in nature. There are, however, good reasons to believe that the cause of the universe was a personal cause with attributes that closely resemble a monotheistic conception of the Christian God. " This is semantically coherent and logically equivalent to the use of the proper noun, capital-G God. We can see that this in no way suggests a generic god, and pro should not be allowed to use that as a defense. I note that the Christian God was chosen as pro was offered the choice of a different singular conception and declined. The second reason to reject this clause as a defense, is that even if we were to grant that this argument was really a definition, pro still has to define and defend "a" monotheistic conception of God. Pro's response is that he has only argued for a deity, not which deity. That is the response that my second reason pre-empted. Even if we are to accept his clause as a definition, it is "a" monotheistic conception of God. The capitalized form of 'God' means a specific conception, but one that is not specified. Given that there are multiple monotheistic conceptions of God, when pro points out that he hasn't defined which he was talking about, he is making a concession, not a defense. If the phrasing was "the monotheistic conception of a god" he might have ground to argue, but he consciously avoided that phrasing and thus his arguments should not be accepted as if he had. I remind the judges that I reject the use of this clause as a definition, but it fails on these grounds as a defense even if you grant it could serve as a definition. Pro goes on to claim an ad hominem attack was made against him. An ad hominem attack occurs, simply put, when one attacks the arguer instead of the argument. In this instance, pro has interjected himself as part of the argument. If his defense of using the proper-noun form of God is that he did it out of reverence, it is only fair to discuss what he would have been reverent to. Pro reiterates that he used a proper noun in place of a common noun because he believes the Christian God exists. I have no objection to him doing so, but I must insist that he accept the logical consequences. If he chooses to use the proper noun of the God he believes in rather than the generic term god, he must recognize that he is referring to the proper noun capital-G God that he believes in rather than some generic god. Whether would like us to interpret it otherwise is irrelevant, we must go by what he has actually written, and pro concedes that he has continually written the proper noun name of his specific God, thus we must hold him to that when he claims "The Kalam Cosmological Argument for the Existence of God is Sound. " In short, Pro has failed to show that the resolution does not refer a specific conception of God and has not attempted to show how the KCA supports such a conception. Pro is still losing the debate on this point and this should be a voting issue before further points are considered. Pro's arguments as to initial considerations and timeless are still lacking. Before going further, I note that the 'minor contention' that the universe might be infinite was part a conditional argument activated if pro argued that there was no singularity outside of a mathematical abstraction. As he explicitly said "I will not respond . .. as I do not believe that the initial singularity was a mathematical object," I have no need to engage his infinite universe or thermodynamic arguments as they do not relate to a point actually under discussion. In regard to the initial conditions debate, pro agrees that his formulation of the KCA relies on initial conditions including "no prior determining conditions. " Pro also agrees that initial conditions were unknown, but then states that we CAN know that "there was nothing 'before' these initial conditions" The problem with this argument rests in the word 'before. ' As discussed previously, the use of the word 'before' in relation to the beginning of time is meaningless. It is a nonsense word in this context. He might as well say that we can know that "there was nothing xxxxxxxxxx these initial conditions. " Apart from a descent into semantic meaninglessness, pro also fails to recognize the problems of causality involved, or more specifically, the problem the lack of causality involve. His is arguing that certain things had to happen to cause the universe to be created in the way that it was. This is the same kind of argument he uses in his ice analogy. Both involve certain causal conditions being satisfied to bring about an effect. However, when causal physics are removed you can't make causal arguments. Pro has failed to engage this argument, and he needs to in order for his interpretation to be accepted. His response was to claim physics was irrelevant and to ignore them. You can't DO that. It doesn't work. This entire argument is about causal argumentation. When it's pointed out that causal physics aren't in play, you can't just say you're ignoring physics and move on. Yet, that is what pro has done, and that is why his argument here fails. As to timelessness, Pro still has not engaged arguments about how agency is not a counter to timeless, instead relying on argument by assertion in an attempt to bypass objections. In a timeless universe no change can happen. No one can stand up, no thoughts can take place, no wills can change. However, pro argues that the man could will something and that would start time. No reason was given why the man would be an exception to everything else in the universe. No explanation was given as to HOW he could will something if the universal constraints are such that willing is impossible. Pro simply asserts that beings possess the ability to will, even in situations where willing is impossible by definition. Pro claims that he never meant for his agent to be free from logical constraints, yet that is what must be the case for this argument to be accepted. As stated, it is illogical and should be rejected. I also note that pro's final line suggests an omnipotent, existent God, which is not supported by the KCA but which is part of Christian theology, relating back to my main point.