The evidential argument from evil is valid.

Theism is not a naturalistic explanation for the universe; and my opponent cannot treat it as if it were. The "fundamentally distorted understanding of science" is in fact exactly what we must expect from the totally different set of starting premises supplied by theism, contrasted to those supplied by atheism. In an atheistic universe, the idea of supernatural creation is untenable. It goes against everything, against the most basic principles of science. How could it not? It requires a God, which contradicts atheism; everything else is peripheral. In a theistic universe, the most basic principles of science are the rules God set. An omnipotent God could undoubtedly create the universe in whatever way He wanted; and the inability of physical science to deduce a supernatural God can be attributed to the limitations of science, bound by experiment, natural observation, and man's ability to comprehend. I have no burden to contradict any science my opponent adds to this debate supposedly as evidence. This debate is not about proving one side or the other, it is about probabilities; is one side more probable than the other based solely on its ability to predict the known amount of E? As such, one side holds to evolution, and the other to creation; each system requires its own paradigm to work properly, and I insist on that being respected in this debate. No matter how ludicrous my opponent may find the claims of YEC, he cannot dismiss them as false for the purposes of this debate. We are not here to discuss the relative merits of the two systems, nor even the merits of atheism vs. theism. We are here to debate the resolution: "The presence of E makes the existence of a theistic God highly improbable. " I gave five systems of theistic thought, none of them original with me. Each one explains the abundance of E as consistent with the nature of God, and each one explains the presence of E at least as well as the naturalistic view. On that count, then, the two are equally probable. My opponent also introduced the idea that naturalism is more plausible than theism. His statement: "Theism posits two different realms of causation, the natural and the supernatural realm. Naturalism only posits one realm of causation, the natural realm. " Were that correct, my opponent might be able to claim a slight advantage in plausibility. It would not fulfill the resolution, for which he must show theism as highly improbable based on these two criteria. However, theism does not demand two separate realms of causation. The natural ream is seen as a subset of the supernatural, not a separate entity. God is the upholder of the universe, keeping things going, providing the stability; the "natural laws" we observe is His power active in the universe making all things run consistently. All power derives from Him, the Uncaused Cause and First Mover. Naturalism, without a First Mover, must either assume an infinite past chain of natural causation, or a timeless uncaused singularity. Neither one is consistent with the currently observed natural laws of causality. On this count, then, both atheism and theism are equal. Neither one can explain how there can be an uncaused cause; both assert that there must be. Both claim only one realm of causation. Both have reasons to expect E to exist in the quantities we see. And my opponent can go on saying that "there is no good reason for God to allow" E to exist; I have shown five ways in which God could exist without getting rid of E. My opponent need not be satisfied with God's supposed reasons of allowing it; the point is that God and E are not mutually contradictory, and the presence of E does not shed doubt on the existence of God. If my opponent would like to address himself to showing that theism is actually inconsistent with the existence of E, rather than calling them "logically incoherent," he will have my attention. Though it is not strictly necessary, as I'm not trying to prove these views, I will briefly defend each of the theistic positions in order: 1. I pointed out the circular nature of this argument. Pro is absolutely correct, this definition allows God to do anything He wants. He caused all the suffering that there ever has been, and He was perfectly within His rights to do so. His creation He made for His own purposes; if your purpose is to die painfully, you don't even have the right to complain under this argument. It is philosophically unsatisfying, but it does allow E; much in the same way cynicism is unsatisfying, but does predict human behavior accurately. Think of this approach as jaded, cynical theism. 2. Dualism is a form of theism; my opponent is wrong. It does satisfy the description given, which does not limit God to being the only omnipotent being extant. Dualism has two, equally omnipotent. Sort of a cosmic version of mutually assured destruction. 3. My opponent offers his opinion. It has been noted. However, he offers no objection with substance to this view. He does not have the authority to say that God can create and sustain a corrupt world while remaining incorrupt; in fact, his argument against 1 suggests he feels otherwise. He cannot have it both ways. 4. I do not have to specify what those reasons are; the view claims that HE has them, and that is enough. Again, for the umpteenth time, there is no reason for either of us to prove our view. My burden is to show that theism is not incompatible with E; that E does not significantly reduce the probability of God's existence. If God has reasons to allow E that are not incompatible with his perfection, then E can and will exist without in any way contradicting God's existence. I could speculate about the substance of those reasons, but I see no point, at least in this debate. The difference between my temporal and His eternal viewpoints should be sufficient to make whatever reasons He may have completely incomprehensible to me. And the resolution will not be affected by my imagination in this area. At least from God's viewpoint, though, we are fairly safe in assuming that this is the best of all possible worlds. Our choices may have limited that selection for Him, though, meaning that the perfection He created was ruined; and suffering introduced by our actions. He did not create suffering and death, but He allows it as the consequences of our collective choices for a time. Which gives us option 5. In rich irony, my opponent objects to this version first as "theologically dubious" and then as inconsistent with evolution. Yes, it IS inconsistent with evolution. This is the traditional viewpoint of the three main theistic religions, after all; all of which posit a supernatural creation. My opponent is to be excused if he chooses to consider this approach "theologically dubious. " Few theologians are that bold; when four thousand years of Jewish tradition and two thousand years of Christian apologetics demand this interpretation, those that teach otherwise risk being labeled heretics. There are departures from this teaching, especially in recent times as modern Christianity attempts to fit itself into an atheistic paradigm (theistic evolution doesn't hold this view, for instance); but this is still the traditional view. In short, my opponent has no reason to doubt this views ability to predict E. ---- Conclusion----- E exists. Both atheism and the various views of theism predict the levels of E we observe equally well; and there is no significant difference in complexity between the two worldviews. On neither count, then, can the existence of a theistic God be described as "highly improbable. " The resolution is negated.