Persons do not possess temporal parts.

Hello, DDO! This is a few temporal parts of Vi's whole reporting in to post the first con argument in this wonderful debate. Again, I'd like to thank my esteemed opponent for taking up such an intriguing question in philosophy with me. Hopefully as we pit our arguments against one another, the puzzle will unravel and we will be one small (tiny really) step closer to figuring out human identity. -------------------- Counter Arguments -------------------------------- First - physical beings have spatial parts. A person, for example, has arms, legs, hair, cells - the list could go on and the parts could get very minuscule or very large, but the being can be divided into parts. This is undisputed. What I will be arguing is that a person can be divided into temporal, or time related parts, due to our existence in the 4th dimension. We begin with Einstein. This brilliant scientist proved to the world that time and space are essentially the same thing (this has been experimentally verified) [1]. We call this "space-time". Through the special theory of relativity, I will show that human beings do in fact have temporal parts. I will also refute my opponent's "too many thinkers" argument. Endurantists believe that only this instant in time exists - or presentism. The past is long gone and the future isn't here yet. Endurantists MUST believe in presentism because without it, they can't make the claim that a person is traveling throughout time as a whole single being. Relativity teaches us otherwise. Euclidean space says that time is constant and universal. This is the theory of time that an Endurantist must accept if they are to believe that a person endures through time with no temporal parts. Unfortunately Euclidean space was disproved by STR which states that there is no fact to the matter of what is the present. This creates a big problem for presentists - which in turn creates a big problem for endurantists - which then leads to a problem for the instigator. Because time is relative to the observer depending on which speed they are traveling (and gravity), then time becomes a measurable dimension. Because it is a measurable dimension, it can be divided into parts. Thus - temporal parts. So now let us take the person of PCP and put him into prospective. PCP from birth to death is identified as one whole being. Picture PCP as a straight line through the fourth dimension. Birth------------Death When PCP says the word "I," he is referring to the entire picture of PCP. That is essentially what PCP is. When PCP says "I'm a person," he is referring to the big "I" - the whole picture of PCP. What makes PCP a person is his essential identity. Therefore, PCP from birth to death will always be PCP, but that does not mean that PCP's full length 4th dimension existence can not be divided into parts. During a slice of temporal part of PCP, he may be hungry. He could say, "I am hungry." By saying "I am hungry," PCP doesn't mean that he is always hungry. He is talking about a certain instant in time (particularly this slice of temporal time). If we go forward in time - to when PCP gets something to eat - he can say "I am not hungry." We understand, again, that he is talking about a particular moment in time - in other words, he is describing a particular part. It is like the difference between saying (again with the spatial definition) "I have a hand," and, "I have a body." Now Pro says, " We are both thinking the very same thought at the very same time with nothing to distinguish us yet PCP-present thinks the thought mistakenly and I, PCP, think it correctly. If this is the case how can it be that I can even tell the difference between me, PCP, and PCP-present? How do I know which one I am?" First of all - PCP present is referring to PCP as a whole when he says "I am a person." Now to clear up the whole "we are both thinking the very same thought at the very same time." What I infer that my opponent is saying is that if present PCP is a part of whole PCP, then the present thoughts of present PCP are also a part of whole PCP - and thus they are having the same thought twice - once in the present slice, and once as the whole. This is essentially the "too many thinkers" argument. What is unfortunate about the "too many thinkers" argument is that it is a silly play on words. When one actually takes into perspective what a believer in temporal parts is saying, one would know to compare it to spatial parts (as we have been doing). Let me put it in a different format. Let me present to you the "too many grabbers" argument. Say I go to grab a cup of water. First of all, my muscles are grabbing the cup of water. Secondly, my hand as a whole is grabbing the cup of water. THERE ARE TOO MANY GRABBERS. We have a problem! Not really. Just as the part of the hand (the muscles) is grabbing the glass, present PCP is thinking his particular thought. And just as the muscles are a part of the hand that is, as a whole, grabbing the glass - PCP present is a part of the PCP that is, as a whole, thinking the particular thought - because it is a part of what the whole PCP is. I look forward to PCP's counter argument! :) ------------SOURCES---------------------------- 1. http://www.edu-observatory.org...