Resolved: The USFG should eliminate its nuclear armed ICBM force

*As a reminder to judges and Con, this round is artificially restricted to 6000 characters*a) Solvency Con has no evidence to support his cost analysis. As the CBO notes, simply cutting the number of bombers does nothing to fixed costs like the cost of R&D in modernization or upkeep of facilities. Con can’t leverage savings from the NNSA budget; this is cost specifically associated with fixed costs like maintaining the chain of command, engineering, and logistics. Eliminating the entire ICBM leg guarantees solvency - my savings estimates are reliable. Savings from elminating ICBM could exceed projected costs as reduction of inefficiencies like bureaucracy and procurement spillover to the other two legs of the triad. My [1] specifically cites the difficulty of managing multiple modernization programs. The CP requires modernization of the existing fleet as part of extending the life of the fleet to 2050. Con has no solvency for managerial simplification. Con's estimate is based on a CONSERVATIVE ICBM saving of 25% of a trillion dollar estimate not allowing for budget over runs and poor project management - and a LIBERAL LRS-B saving of 100 million. In the best case Con has to get rid of 75% of long range bombers to match my solvency. This is a clear indication of a solvency deficit in the CP I'm kicking the Perm. b) Conventional War The bomber force has been used in Iraqi Freedom, Afghanistan, Kosovo, Libya, and against ISIS. New smart bomb technology has amplified bomber’s efficacy since Con's Desert Storm report- bombers were crucial to Iraqi freedom. [15] “Operation Iraqi Freedom: A First-Blush Assessment” CSBA 2003 The B-2 stealth bomber plays a huge role in reconnaissance and power projection. The bomber has longer flight range than drones and is more flexible and quickly deployable than subs. The US relies on multiple platforms but bombers are essential. Stealth, range, and speed maked bomber critical to power projection. The stealth capabilities of the B-2 are critical to maintaining a credible deterrent against Chinese aggression towards Japan. One report notes the biggest weakness of the B-2 is “there are simply not enough of them.” The CP hurts our deterent capability. [16] http://www.project2049.net... Con’s sources are generic links to wikipedia, prefer my specialist authored reports specifically addressing modern security. My [11] gives many examples of B-2 enabling US power projection and stabilizing global conflict. Stealth bombers are critical as Pacific countries like China and Russia develop “Area Denial” technology designed to monopolize strategic commons like airspace. The China Sea is just one example of the man flashpoints for conflict that are held in check by the US bomber force- I could spend this entire round listing specific ways bombers are used to prevent conflict. Even if we can maintain the B-2 for 40 years, Con calls for a 75% reduction in the existing force.Cross apply all my R1 impacts regarding US security guarantees. c) Nuclear Terrorism First, all these morale and security problems also undermine ICBM strike capability. Terrorists try new attack venues all the time- 9/11 was an unprecedented attack method. All it takes is one officer to intentionally allow a catastropic breach in security. One of facility failed inspection “...because security forces did not respond adequately to a simulated hostile takeover of a silo housing a nuclear missile.” [17] http://www.foxnews.com... Study after study has shown chronic low morale in the program over the past decade [6]. Go read Con’s source on PAL codes, it is terrifying- his argument is “we used to be TERRIBLE at ICBM security, now we're OK.” Terrorists can steal codes or torture officers who know the codes. d) Nuclear Readiness The only standard by which to measure nuclear capability is deterrent capacity. The US doesn’t actively use nukes or even threaten to use them. This means the strategic role of nukes is deterrence. Subs alone provide adequate second strike capability - Con’s CBO source calls submarines “the most survivable leg.” Retaining a full-strength bomber force gives us redundancy. Second strike capability is sufficient to provide deterrence. ASW is not a threat to nuclear deterrence-the navy paper cited has no credible warrants. No country is even close to the tech required to coordinate a strike on all our airbases/ports harboring nukes AND rely on attack helicopters to simultaneously take out 10 subs. Anyone willing to try that would be willing to do so while carpet bombing an ICBM force anways. Whether we have ICBM or bomber we will still have a sizable nuclear force after a limited nuclear war. We have a huge warhead stockpile and could convert conventional medium range missiles and aircraft to nuclear delivery systems. Turn: Cutting bombers increases risk of miscalculation and nuclear war- ICBM require a decision to launch or not launch, while SLBM and bombers allow for de-esculation: Con’s [2] “ Bombers provide the most flexibility, because the tempo of their operations can be ramped up or down, signaling intent to an adversary.” Con effectively concedes my environmental argument. ICBM require an opponent exhausting their nuclear arsenal, guaranteeing that any war results in an environmental apocalypse- "tens of millions would die" [14]. Exhausting an opponent’s nukes is not inherently valuable. Nuclear war probably will cause extinction or societal collapse. Con is sacrificing real world security concerns for post-apocalyptic fantasy scenarios. Post-war ICBM would be geographically diverse WMD’s in a country with broken infrastructure and chain of command. The US spent billions after the dissolution of the USSR to prevent exactly what Con is advocating. e) Politics No link- axing ICBM can be spun as rebalancing while we modernize subs and bombers. CP directly links - My [4] states that the 1251 report was key to getting support for START; this report specifically commits to a new bomber.