Libertarian philosophy supports the pro-choice position

===Incoherence of Positive Rights===My opponent here makes an interesting case against Rothbard's conception of children's rights. He misinterprets Rothbard's thought in such a way so that it would appear that Rothbard was against the core libertarian concept of contracts. This is because Rothbard held self-ownership to be a higher-order right than any other "lower-order" rights, contractual with them. But this far from means that Rothbard did not accept the existence of a contractual society, he merely disagreed with contractual slavery and SOME other aspects of contractual theory. For instance, Rothbard disagreed with the idea that one could be physically coerced into fulfilling a contract. This does not mean however that no contract holds any weight, far from it. In reality, under Rothbard's contractual theory, contracts could still be enforced, just not in the way which my opponent conceives. A contract under Rothbardian theory can still be enforced via restitution. This means that by going back on the contract in question, the one who forfeits the contract owes the one forfeited against restitution and damages for (A) the time lost and (B) for breaking one's contractual obligation (herein an extension of negative rights as my opponent agrees) and therefore aggressing against the negative rights of the one forfeited against. Contracts may still be fulfilled, just not in a manner in which one's self ownership is compromised. Therefore Rothbard's contractual beliefs are in no way conflicting with the larger picture of libertarianism and hence Rothbardian thought may be applied to the case of children's rights.===Foetus as an Aggressor===My opponent in his response to this point appears to have ignored entirely my points posited in the previous round. I showed that in a purely physical manner, the foetus is aggressing against the right of non-interference in the mother's person and thus the mother is within her rights to dislodge it. My opponent argues that the right to life must always supersede the right to "choose" (a euphemism for the mother's property right in her person). But does this really follow? Libertarianism (referring to the ethical framework with which this debate is modeled under) posits no "right to life" as separate from the right to control of one's body. The right to life is merely an extension of it. Take any scenario in which someone tries to murder another who has not invaded their property rights. In every single case the attempt to murder that person is an aggression against their self-ownership, not some mystical right to life. As Murray Rothbard and later libertarian theorists formulated, all "human rights" are simply extensions of property rights in one's person and their justly acquired property[1]. Besides the fact though that my opponent is unnecessarily separating property rights (encompassing self-ownership) from the vague notion of human rights or the rights to life and thus confusing libertarian rights theory, but even if this separation were a necessity, it would still fall in on itself of it's own contradictions. For consider an example of a man A who walks into another man B's yard and refuses to leave. Consider that man B reasons all he can do persuade man A to leave but he refuses. Now consider that man B decides to use physical force to remove man A, but here man A fights back and in the struggle man A is killed. Man B has here violated man A's "right to life". But if the right to life supersedes property rights or the "right to choose", how are property rights ever to actually be upheld? One must see that not only are "human rights" and property rights necessarily connected, but cannot be separated without both losing all meaning.===Contracts as Rights===I by no means suggest that libertarianism stands for freedom without consequence of choices, again far from it. My opponent has grossly misinterpreted my point in arguing that the only way to keep one responsible for the consequences of their actions is to destroy the very notion of contractual rights. That is what my opponent is doing if a contract may be deemed ethically or legally valid wherein only one part of the contract has been a party to it. I do not own your shoes simply because I have entered into a "contract" for them unless you also agree to the contract. Likewise, as the foetus has no legal standing (actually even less than no legal standing, the foetus did not have consciousness or even existence prior to the pregnancy) and no capacity to enter into a contract with anyone, it would be insane to infer a contractual obligation to create quasi-positive rights (by this I mean the genuine rights which are created as contractual obligations between parties to a voluntary contract) when there is only one party to that transfer. My opponent has not only failed to show that a foetus has the capacity to enter into a real contract with the mother, but in lacking this justification has failed to show why any contractual rights have been created on the foetus's behalf.===Sources===[1] Murray Rothbard. The Ethics of Liberty. Ch. 15. Human Rights as Property Rights. Available online at: http://mises.org...