God Probably Exists

X And YMy argument was X and not Y is more probable than X and Y unless we have an overriding reason to accept Y. One reason to accept Y would be because it better explains reality, or because it is necessary. However, a physical world cannot better explain reality because anything that can be deemed as "physical" could just be explained under Idealism as actually mental ontologically. For example, instead of a brain being composed of non-mental stuff and existing as a part of some grand non-mental universe, it could be composed of mental stuff and exists as part of a mental universe. So adding some extra metaphysical category of "non-mental" is useless. If the non-mental was necessary then it seems hard to imagine that we could even conceive of Solipsism. Since we can, then this shows that it most likely is not the case that a non-mental world is necessary. Perhaps it is necessary but we don't know it, if this is the case then we might as well say that the invisible fairy on my shoulder that I cannot detect has to be there but we just don't know it. Without an actual reason for why it is necessary, we are justified in assuming that it is probably not.My opponent claims that if I say X and not Y is true the range of scenarios narrows: X and Y is out and X and Y is as likely as X and not Y. I'm not sure what this is even supposed to mean and it is unnecessarily confusing. What does he mean by "X and Y is out"? How can he conclude that X and Y are as likely as X and not Y based on the statement before it? Then my opponent claims that a similar statement can be said about the mental/non mental issue. He says that my argument seems to take the form of "consciousness exists and everything but consciousness does not exist is more probable than consciousness and non-mental items exist". Then, he asks why should we rule out that conscious may be the product of physical processes? For one, we can rule out a physical (if by physical we mean it to have essential non-mental properties) world due to the interaction problem I mentioned. Coherence between properties is necessary for interaction. Since the feeling of love, sadness, thoughts, perceptions, mental imagery, and all these other mental properties have nothing in common with mindless particles, forces, and fields then they cannot interact as they have no common properties. This is one strong reason to deny that anything non-mental interacts with our minds. However, if the world we experience is non-mental, then it would have to interact with our minds (or else we couldn't say we experience it in the first place). Ergo, the "physical" world we experience being non-mental can easily be ruled out because it is contradictory. Now, even if it couldn't be ruled out, ruling out "physical processes" is not necessary for this debate; it only has to be shown to be unlikely. The fact that it is a useless post makes it as unlikely as any other useless posit, such as the useless posit that little invisible angels live on the tips of my grass outside.Inductive ReasoningCon claims that examples of doors opening and closing work because we have direct examples of that. However, since we have no direct examples of a God or Gods then my comparison here is invalid. The problem is that this example was not to show that one God is more likely than many, but that a purely mental reality is more likely than one that includes the non-mental. This is because we have direct access to the mind (when we introspect and isolate thoughts) but we have no direct access to a non-mental world. If we had direct access to a non-mental world then we couldn't even ask questions like "are we in The Matrix?", or "is the 'brains in vats' theory true?", "is Solipsism true?"... This is because if we had direct access to the non-mental then we would know these scenarios cannot be true (obviously, as we would have direct access to a non-mental world and thus ruling out those scenarios). The very reason we can even contemplate Idealism is because we don't have direct access to the non-mental. Even if the non-mental world exists you would never have direct access to it. The light that bounces off of your computer monitor reaches your eyes and then sends a signal to your brain and that creates a mental image of a "computer monitor". But all you have direct access to is the mental image; not the computer monitor itself. For all you know, what you refer to as a "computer monitor", in real life, is nothing as your brain interprets it. So the argument is that we have direct access to the mind, but not the the non-mental. So, if we are going to model reality, then sticking with what we know to be true (a mental reality) will most likely be correct without a defeater (which I argued most likely doesn't exist, or, at the very least, there is no reason to believe it exists).Con says that there is a difference between saying that X is not useful, and saying that X probably does not exist. This is correct that they are different, the point is that one entails the other. If X is a useless posit, then X probably does not exist. Why? This is because that which can be posited far outnumbers what actually is! Unless we have use for a posit then based on sheer probability it most likely isn't the case.The Problem Of Evil"If there is one god and we are living in the mind of god, then to the extent there are truths of morality and justice, they must come from this god. Why, then, do we see so much evil?" - ConI never once claimed that if God exists he is all moral, or all just. For all we know God could ground truths regarding morality and justice and still be evil himself. Perhaps God is morally indifferent; who knows? Either way, the existence of evil does no harm to the generic Grand-Mind I am defending here.Is It Obvious That Non-Mental Stuff Exists?I don't believe that it seems obvious that non-mental stuff exists at all. This is based on a simple logical fallacy... The fallacy is assuming that because something seems to exist outside of our finite human/ animal minds, that it means it seems to exist outside of any mind. That is an unjustified jump; a non-sequitur[1]. My opponent may look at a block of cheese and say it seems clearly non-mental but whats not clear is how an object can seem "non-mental" in the first place. How does one determine what seems non-mental and what doesn't? I don't think God is trying to "trick us" as he may actually be giving us clues. For example, when we dream we experience objects (like a block of cheese), but these objects are undoubtedly mental (they exist inside your mental dream world). This could be God telling us "Hey look, you can experience objects that are completely mental!". Another clue would be hallucinations... If you had a vivid audio hallucination of someone saying "hello", and compared the experience to someone actually saying "hello" you would have no way to tell the difference. This could be God telling us "Hey, look you can experience things that are completely in your mind that you can't distinguish from a non-mental reality!". So, if God is seemingly leaving us all these potential clues about the nature of his mental reality it wouldn't seem right to say he is trying to trick us. Also, as I explained, all we have direct access to is a mental reality. So, if you try to infer that a non-mental reality exists, or even probably exists fallaciously off of that, this wouldn't be God tricking you; but you tricking yourself.So, it cannot seem obvious that non-mental stuff exists in the slightest. This line of reasoning is based on fallacious reasoning, and is not logically justified.One God Or Many?I already have explained why one God is more probable than many. This is because if we invoke 2 Gods, then why not 3? If we invoke 3, why not 4? There is no limit, why not posit 1,000,000,000 Gods? It just delves into unnecessary absurdity. If we can establish that the empirical world we experience stems from a mind, then there is literally no reason to posit another mind. Again, that which we can posit far outnumbers that which is. Ergo, without justification, a random posit is most likely not the case. Now, is it possible that there are 1,000,000,000 Gods? Sure. I am not ruling this possibility out in the slightest... This is simply a probability argument; which is all that is necessary to establish the resolution.Occam's RazorThe simplest explanation is usually correct with regards to entities... Unless we have an overriding reason to "complicate" things. You have an overriding reason to believe that you are not the only mind in existence. This is because the aspect of mind you identify yourself with correlates with a virtual avatar (or "body"). If you experience other bodies that move like you, cry like you, and laugh like you, and you have a conscious experience that is correlated with these things; then based on induction you can conclude that other bodies probably do to (after all, what makes you so special?). Similarly to how if I throw a rock at your face it causes pain, if you threw a rock at my face it would probably cause me pain too. Now, it is possible that only one mind exists, however, I believe we have reasons to believe that is probably not the case. Either way, even if only one mind existed that mind would be "God" as far as the debate outline is concerned. So, we have overriding reasons to believe that you are not the only mind, however, we have no such reasons to conclude that God is not the only God. Therefore, my opponent is comparing apples and oranges and his argument falls flat on its face.ConclusionNot only did my opponent not address many of my crucial arguments, the arguments he did address were done in a fashion which in no way questions my position in the slightest. The resolution has clearly been established.Source[1] http://www.logicallyfallacious.com...