The United States Should Suspend all Assistance to Pakistan

First: Before any other evaluation of the resolution we must evaluate the effects on human ontology that the resolution has. Campbell writes[1]: “the relevance of ontology to all other kinds of thinking is fundamental and inescapable. For one cannot say anything about anything that is, without always already having made assumptions about the is Any mode of thought always already carries an ontology sequested within it. What this ontological turn does to other- regional – modes of thought is to challenge the ontology within which they operate. The implications of that review demand[s] a reappraisal as fundamental as the reappraisal ontology has demanded of philosophy.” I affirm. The thesis of the affirmative case is that acting on the basis of minimizing suffering via assisting others is wrong because suffering is needed in order to understand human fatality of the ontological mode of being. Eugene Long[2] explains the way humans exist: “we exist in the future that is coming towards us. Our being is such that in the present we recollect the past and anticipate the future. Our transcending or becoming, however, comes up against many boundaries along the way which set limits to our transcending or becoming. Suffering stands over against our transcending, our acting the process of becoming in which we act to realize some state of affairs that we desire and through which we find meaning in existence, the experience of suffering appears to be the opposite of activity. Suffering may bring us up against our finiteness and suffering may be accommodated into our human becoming. for example, that although we would not have sought suffering we are better persons for having undergone the experience of suffering” Thus, the way in which humans exist is through the experience of suffering in order to know the distinction between gods and humans. This allows for human becoming and transcendence to happen. Long 2[2] explains why suffering is needed: “suffering is necessary to a greater good or that it will be transformed or overcome in the future by a greater good. persons are called not only to condemn such evil and suffer with those who suffer, but assume responsibility for working for new possibilities for good. Human suffering on this account is at one and the same time an experience of emptiness or nullity and the giving or loving of Being, the on-going creative activity or providence of divine reality. In this giving of Being in reaction to the suffering of beings in the world” Thus suffering allows prospering over future problems; the on-going creative activity of the divine reality, which allows people to come to their fullest being This proves that suffering is a necessary part of human existence in order to find solidarity with others and confront our finiteness as human beings. The suffering of others calls us to question who we are what actions we take as human meaning that it is necessary to understand the true function of being a human. This argument functions as an apriori because it disproves the assumptions the affirmative framework is founded upon.Additionally, confronting notions of death and suffering is how individuals conceptualize good and bad and this confrontation is the only reason why life has value Strauss[3] explains: “Dasein is the term to speak of individual human consciousness, and is Unique among entities in that it puts Being itself Death, in turn, puts the whole of Dasein's own being at stake. In part, this is because death is "nonrelational," which is to say that no one else can represent me or stand in for me at my inevitable demise. Dying is something that I must do for myself. I am therefore alone in the face of my death, and that mortal isolation informs me of my separation from others, makes me aware of my finitude in relation to them. The non-relational character of death, as understood in anticipation, individualizes Dasein down to itself.” I’m capable of being a whole to myself, and I actually do become whole to myself through my attitude toward that death. it is that a privative limit can structure experience into subjectivity and existence into a life. One's relation to death is either authentic or inauthentic. In the latter case a person tries to forget that he is finite and must die by imagining that he is the same as the indeterminate The authentic Anticipation turns out to be the possibility of understanding one's own most and utter most potentiality-for- Being-that is to say, the possibility of authentic existence. The ontological constitution of such existence must be made visible by setting forth the concrete structure of anticipation of death. The structure of our relation to death makes our authentic individual existence apparent to us as a whole, and it is, consequently, through anticipating death that we authentically exist as whole individuals.” Thus it is necessary to confront death in order to find meaning in life. This case ties in with the resolution as assisting others with their suffering causes a lessening of suffering, which ruins the value we place in life. In order to return the value to life, we must end all assistance to Pakistan. This case has a few implications and a few impacts on the debate here. 1) I’m affirming the resolution by providing a valid reason why we should not assist Pakistan and should end all current assistance. 2) This pre-empts any arguments my opponent may make that without assistance, life will get worse for Pakistanis because without suffering, we wouldn’t be able to categorize something as better or worse, since we would not be able to place any inherent value in life. 3) My arguments are going to function on a higher level than my opponents, as they question the assumptions that normative arguments take for granted. So if my opponent doesn’t read a countering meta-ethical or ontological argument, you can prefer my case as more indicative of the truth. Thus, I must urge an affirmative vote. Sources: [1] Campbell & Shapiro 99 (Michael, and Campbell, professor of International Relations at the University of Lancaster, Moral Spaces: Rethinking Ethics and World Politics, p. 97-8) google books [2] Suffering and Transcendence Eugene Thomas LongInternational Journal for Philosophy of Religion Vol. 60, No. 1/3, Self and Other: Essays in Continental Philosophy of Religion (Dec., 2006), pp. 139-148 Published by: Springer Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org... [3] Jonathan Strauss. “After Death.” Diacritics. 30.3 (2000) 90-104.