The Cosmological Argument

Thanks to wiploc for the debate, but, unfortunately I shall show that all of his arguments fail.Every Contingent Fact Has an ExplanationCon attempts something like a reductio ad absurdum but it fails from the get go starting with this:"Let's take two facts: Fact A is the fact that I had cereal for breakfast, a contingent fact. Fact B is the fact that two plus two equals four.Now the conjunct of those two facts (fact C) is a contingent fact."No, it isn't. If the fact is itself a conjunctive fact but contains necessary facts the fact itself can't be contingent. If every conjunct in a Big Conjunctive Fact (BCF) is contingent, naturally, the BCF will be contingent. Similarly, if every conjunct in a Big Conjunctive Fact is necessary, naturally, the BCF will be necessary. If the BCF the is a mixed compilation of necessary and contingent facts then all that follows is that the BCF itself has some components that are contingent and some that are necessary. Robert Koons explains:"Lemma 2 Every contingent fact has a wholly contingent part.Proof. Let a* be a contingent fact. If a* is wholly contingent, we are through, since a* is a part of itself. Otherwise, a* has a necessary part. By Axiom 2, (Pro's note: Axiom 2 is the assumption that any set of facts can be aggregated or conjoined together like I assumed with the BCCF) there exists a fact x* that consists of the aggregate of all the necessary parts of a*. Since a* is contingent, a* itself is not a part of x*. By Axiom 1, there is an b* that overlaps a* but not x*, hence there is a part of a*, say c*, that is not a part of x*. We can show that c* is wholly contingent. Suppose that d* is a part of c*. Then d* is part of a* but d* does not overlap x*. Hence, d* is not necessary. Since d* was an arbitrary part of c*, c* is wholly contingent." (Edits adding asterisks and removing the symbolic logic are mine). [1]The above argument proves that every contingent fact has a wholly contingent part and since the PSR only concerns wholly contingent facts Con's addition of a necessary fact to his BCF fails to proves his attempted reductio ad absurdum. What the above argument essentially does is it groups the necessary part(s) of a* (in this instance 2 + 2= 4) and separates them from the contingent parts of a* which are, in this instance, that Con ate a hot dog. Modal argumentAgain, Con's arguments are just confused. Supposing we accept that God is a necessary fact (as Con has done) and exists it follows that God exists in all possible worlds. That's simply what just follows from the concept God being a metaphysically necessary being. At most, all Con is doing here is conflating metaphysical possibility with epistemic possibility. For instance, it seems epistemically possible to me that Goldbach's conjecture could be true or it could be false. [2] But Goldbach's conjecture is the type of statement that is either necessarily true or necessarily false. So the mere epistemic possibility of Con conceiving that God doesn't exist in some possible world does not really entail that God (the necessary being) does not exist in some possible world. Con to needs to actually argue for this point instead of just asserting it.Con has further issues with the modal argument. He says I can't generalize from impossible worlds to possible worlds. Despite the the wording this seems to be mistaken because the argument form of proof by contradiction is a valid one. [3] I did exactly this in arguing that allowing that p* had no explanation results in an absurd contradiction so therefore p has an explanation.No, I would not agree with Con that there are impossible worlds in which God does not exist for the main reason because I'm doubtful that there are impossible worlds. Suppose there is a world where something can both exist and not exit at the same time in the same sense. That would be an impossible world. It also seems to be incoherent to even think of it.Con tries a substitution by replacing "contingent fact" for "necessary god" in p but that doesn't work but it is generally though that God, being necessary, explains himself. God exists by his very nature so the supposition that God has no explanation is unmotivated.SkepticismCon is tilting at strawmen. I never argued that if God doesn't exist we can't figure out probabilities. What I did argue, however, is that if the PSR doesn't obtain then we have to accept the skeptical scenario that our perceptions (which are surely contingent states of affair) can happen for no reason at all. One could not even argue that this is an implausible scenario since the way we would use to determine that would be to factor in objective probabilities with appeal to the laws of the nature and other scientific matters (which are also contingent). If the PSR holds we have to accept this absurd scenario. So, yes, my original assessment holds - Con's argument here is "not but rhetoric and is irrelevant".Necessary Being = GodCon objects that there is no reason to believe the world was created by a necessary fact - which is a strange objection considering I presented an argument for that claim that Con has not refuted. (Note that Con doesn't seem to understand that beings are indeed facts. I could say that I am a contingent being and a contingent fact and nothing would be lost in translation.) An aside: Con that presents a litany of charges that simply, again, are irrelevant to the conversation at hand. Although, one charge did particularly and amusingly jump out at me because of how misguided it is. "There is no logical reason to believe in a benevolent god who tortures people forever in Hellfire." Con seems to think I am arguing for a God like that that even though I've explicitly argued against that proposition. [4] Con also alludes to some other scripture based contradictions. The answer would be - so what? This isn't a debate about biblical inerrantism or anything of the like. That my argument entails the existence of God doesn't entail anything about scripture should be read. Conclusion1. Con has u failed here. Even if my modal argument fails for the PSR (which it doesn't, or, at least Con hasn't shown so) I presented two other arguments for the PSR. Con completely just ignored my "mundane explanations" argument for the PSR and his response to my skepticism argument amounts to Con attacking something other than the actual argument I gave.2. Con thinks that, somehow, a contingent fact (the BCCF) can "contain" a necessary fact which literally makes no sense at all. As shown by Koons the argument is only concerned with wholly contingent facts - i.e. facts that only have contingent parts. Otherwise, this amounts to saying that a contingent fact can be a necessary fact. This amounts to saying that there is a fact that can both obtain and not obtain in different possible worlds and at the same time obtain in all possible worlds. This is just plain incoherence. It wouldn't be a contingent fact if it contained necessary facts.3. See above point.4. Because of the PSR and because contingent facts don't explain themselves or have no explanation. If the conjunction of all contingent facts can't explain itself and can't have no explanation then a necessary fact is needed to explain the BCCF.5. Again, pure rhetoric and another attempt to distract from the issue.Thanks for the debate!----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------[1] http://www.arn.org...[2] http://en.wikipedia.org...[3] http://en.wikipedia.org...[4] http://www.debate.org...