Vegans practicing on moral principle ought to become Freegan instead

(1) ResolutionPro makes a few unsupported contentions in regards to my first point. He calls it semantic when in effect it was a serious and genuine point in relation to the disconnect between the resolution and Pro's argument. I accepted this debate because the resolution obviously implies a certain angle. The fact that Pro entirely disregards what is implied by the resolution should not go unnoticed or unmentioned. Pro doesn't attempt to show why this point was "semantic abuse" or why it is an abusive framework argument. Pro said in R1 that this debate would be about on-case arguments. I fail to see how a discussion on a very relevant aspect of debate could be considered abusive, even in the context of Pro's overly demanding and ambiguously worded rules.(2)Moral Justification--Con's "moral justification" lies in presuming at the outset that reducing waste should be a highly ranked moral value. For this point he presented absolutely no argument or justification. Therefore we may simply discard it. This is a debate on principles so a priori assumptions should not be tolerated. If Pro wishes to present a compelling reason for acceptance of this principle I'd be happy to debate it. I believe Pro to be sufficiently philosophically aware so that he can attempt to provide a reason why one *should* be morally concerned with waste.--Con further argues that Vegan values are not injured by the adoption of Freeganism. However, this is a side-issue. The resolution argues that Vegans *should* adopt Freeganism. This means that Pro must show Veganism to necessitate Freeganism, not simply that they are capable of co-existence.(3) The Ethics of Veganism and Abstaining(a) Con's argument against abstaining from using animal products lies entirely in that merely abstaining ignores the present market demands for meat and other products seen as immoral by vegan philosophy. This is a bit of a confusing point in that it's so open to reductios. For instance, in the first half of the nineteenth century in the U.S. there was a booming market for slavery. Abstaining from this practice probably wouldn't have put a dent in the practice by *others*. But is that really the only reason to abstain from immoral activities? Obviously not. We would abstain from holding slaves because we wouldn't want to personally contribute to suffering and oppression. Likewise, abstaining from the use of animal products finds its moral weight in that one does not lend themselves to the practice. Whether or not it will continue to happen is another matter entirely. Remember that the debate concerns an onus on Vegans (from Vegan principles). Arguing that one should give up moral principles because others will violate them anyways ignores our reasons for acting on those principles in the first place.(b) Con next argues that veganism doesn't reduce suffering of animals since they've already died. This is ostensibly true but Con is again missing something; that is, the separation of means from ends. The fact that animal products were brought about through immoral means certainly has an effect on the moral status of consumption. Pro is presenting the issue through a thick (and decidedly non-moral) lens. An action does not become morally acceptable because of a previous immoral occurrence. If we accept the moral principles of Veganism (which Pro hasn't taken issue with- the application of those principles appears to be the issue) then consuming animal products is wrong regardless of whether or not abstaining can take back the immoral action in question. Consumption *as well as* production are immoral activities under vegan morality.