Consensual Necrophilia

As the debate seems to have shifted to a discussion of what is meant by the word "consent," I'll be spending most of this post responding to Con's analysis on that. Before I do, however, I have ot point out that Con has granted my entire argument from R2. Extend all benefits to the individuals involved and the benefits that result for society at large. Much as Con granted these arguments, I don't think he fully realizes just how much he did grant. Con granted that I'm providing additional security for necrophiliacs by providing information on how to stay safe while engaging in the act. Con granted that they are far less likely to engage in more extreme criminal acts, meaning that society is made safer as a whole. Con granted that these individuals will be more mentally sound, meaning they will drain fewer resources, and provide more to society at large through their actions. Given all of this, Con's argument that "we call into question the entire structure of consent" is simply not going to stack up. Not only is this dramatically embellished " we're talking about a group of people who sign a contract before their death saying that they want this, so it hardly represents every single form of consent " but there's no warrants here at all, nor evidence to support it. I'll get into evidence that actually goes against it as I get into the definitional arguments. So what's the problem we're having here on that end? It stems from a definition that Con presents in this round. He cites and recites the same portion because it's integral to his topicality argument here: "there must be a choice between resistance and acquiescence. " In other words, what he's trying to argue here is that consent must be able to be withdrawn after a period of time. Since it is not possible to withdraw that consent when one is dead, and since a person providing their body for this purpose is certain to be dead when the act occurs, there is bound to be a period where they can no longer withdraw that consent. Therefore, it's no longer consent. (I hope I have this right, it took me a couple of reads to be certain) I've got several responses. 1) I hate to play this card, but let's quote Con in R1: "I accept the CON side in the debate over the resolution and subsequent policy outline provided, and move forward with all definitions provided in the opening statement. " The definition I provided in the first round did not include any of the verbiage he uses here. Con agreed to the definitions, and is now trying to alter them to suit his needs. By itself, that is at least a borderline conduct violation. 2) Let's look at the full definition. Much as Con cites a great deal of it, he leaves out the context for that most important part. "In the context of rape, submission due to apprehension or terror is not real consent. There must be a choice between resistance and acquiescence. If a woman resists to the point where additional resistance would be futile or until her resistance is forcibly overcome, submission thereafter is not consent. " Note the important words here. This is within the context of rape, which means no prior consent could have been provided. Submission due to apprehension or terror isn't possible for a dead person. You cannot resist or acquiesce, because you're no longer alive. In other words, this has nothing to do with consensual necrophilia. Con is trying to apply a standard that cannot exist for a dead person to a dead person, stating that they are incapable of consenting solely because they cannot engage in resistance. But this person has already acquiesced. The choice was made, and therefore consent was garnered. 3) Now, let's address the way that Con interprets that definition. What Con's saying here is that a person cannot consent so long as they are not given the option to back out at any point up to the actual act. I'd say that's just plain wrong, on so many levels. To understand that, let's look at another definition of consent: "A concurrence of wills. Express consent is that directly given, either lira voce or in writing. Implied consent is that manifested by signs, actions, or facts, or by inaction or silence, which raise a presumption that the consent has been given. " . http://thelawdictionary.org... This is important. It means that a person can give consent at any single point. As Con says, a person can also remove that consent. But that act of removal is required for the consent to disappear. In other words, if a person gives consent that their body should be used for sexual purposes after they die, their consent doesn't die with them. Until the moment they die, they can rescind that consent. The fact that they cannot rescind it after death doesn't make their choice in this regard less consensual. Signing that agreement is a form of express consent, which is given in writing. This conveyed by the definition: ". .. consent in writing, including consent conveyed electronically that bears an electronic signature. .. " . http://definitions.uslegal.com... So when Con says that my case "might fit under the idea of 'contractual necrophilia' but it is in no way 'consensual,'" he's actually making a delineation where there is none to be made. Consent occurs at the point of signature. Whether it can be rescinded after death doesn't change the fact that contractual and consensual are one in the same in this regard. To understand this further, let's look at some examples. If a person wants to donate organs following their death, they sign an agreement to become an organ donor. When the doctors cut this person open to get their liver, the doctors are doing so with that person's consent. The same would be true if the person decided to donate their whole body to science " medical students would have the consent to cut up that corpse and further their understanding of human anatomy. Let's look at other examples. A person writes and signs a will. That will guarantees that certain family members and friends will receive items of certain monetary values over a specific period of time. They die. The lawyer of that person still has that person's consent to distribute the items as specified in the will, in spite of the fact that the dead person is no longer alive to consent to it again. Another example. Let's say instead of a will, you sign a living will. You want to be resuscitated in case of any medical emergency, no matter how dire. You go into a coma, and experience cardiac arrest. Your consent to pursue resuscitation still exists, despite the fact that you are incapable of affirming it. In essence, consent does not disappear on death, no more than it does when one goes into a coma. Legal precedent backs me up on this. The laws governing organ donation and making anatomical gifts in general are spelled out plain as day in both the UK and US, and they all say that a person can consent before death to providing pieces of themselves or their entire body to groups or individuals. . http://en.wikipedia.org... . http://en.wikipedia.org... I'd really like to see applicable court cases regarding consent from Con, though I imagine that all of the cases he would provide don't state that prior consent ends upon death. That's not to mention that, from a common sense perspective, this would be absurd. Sure, we'd all like to be able to commune with the spirit world and make sure that the owner of those organs is still cool with giving them away to a worthy cause, but we can't. And we shouldn't pretend that that's what is necessary to obtain consent for something that already received it. Unless my opponent is suggesting that we end organ donation for want of consent upon receipt of the corpse, I think this point is pretty moot. With that, I'll hand the debate back to my opponent.