Daniel Dennett's arguments against qualia fail

You didn't even refute those ponts you whining baby.Here are some thought experiments: The coffee-taster case. As Dennett argues, the idea or “intuition” that qualia exist is a robust one that dies hard. It is very natural for us to assume that there are such properties, just waiting to be discovered or understood. So Dennett uses another thought-experiment to soften up our assumptions about qualia. He asks us to imagine two coffee-tasters, Chase and Sanborn. Both are charged with ensuring that the taste of Maxwell House coffee is held to the same high standard over the years. But both eventually become dissatisfied with their job: they don’t like the way the coffee tastes anymore. But they have different interpretations of what has happened. Chase thinks the coffee tastes just the same as always – he is getting the same quale – but he just doesn’t enjoy that taste, that quale, anymore. Sanborn, by contrast, thinks the taste (the quale) itself has changed: where he used to get the taste of good coffee, now he’s getting another, different quale, one that he doesn’t enjoy.The problem for both Chase and Sanborn is: how much of the change in their judgments results from the qualia themselves, and how much from their judgments of them? If qualia are real, this question makes sense, and there is a real difference between Chase, whose qualia have stayed the same while his judgments have changed, and Sanborn, whose qualia themselves have changed. But according to Dennett, there is no real difference between the two cases. We could never tell, from any of their behavior, reactions, or judgments, which of the two are correct, or even which of the two are telling the truth. They are talking about a difference that makes no difference; and we ought accordingly to deny that there is any real difference between Chase and Sanborn. The whole idea that qualia themselves exist, independently of our actual judgments about colors, tastes, and the properties of things in the world, is a false and confused one. The Inverted Spectrum. In order to argue against the very idea of qualia, Dennett has to argue against the thoughts and thought-experiments that have made it seem convincing. One of the most prominent such thought-experiments is the idea of the inverted spectrum. When you look at the sky, it looks a particular way: you have the visual impression of blue. When you look at a fire engine, it looks a different way: you have the visual impression that you call “red.” Now, imagine someone whose spectrum is inverted. When they look at the sky, they get the visual impression that you get when you look at a fire engine; when they look at the fire engine, they get the visual impression you get when you look at the sky. It seems at first obvious that there could be someone whose spectrum is inverted in this way, and indeed that the person’s spectrum could be inverted from birth. If that were the case, though, there would be no way to detect it: for the inverted-spectrum person would use just the same words that we do. Seeing the fire engine – even though they have the visual impression or quale that we call “blue” – they would nevertheless call this visual impression or quale “red.” So even the inverted-spectrum person would behave in all respects just like we do. I couldn't be bothered to find a third.