The argument from evil establishes the probable nonexistence of God.

FWD1) I have made one argument, the argument from evil, any defense against which must account for both E1 and E2. By Con's own admission, FWD does not refute this argument. Yet he made it anyway. So any confusion on my part is, I think, understandable.2) By stating that I have failed to refute libertarian free will, Con is shifting the burden. He did not offer a case, even a prima facie case, for me to refute in his first argument, and offering such a case in the second might be construed as a new argument in the final statement. So Con has not given FWD even token support. EID1) Con argues that the objection I present regarding radical epistemological and theological skepticism does not, in itself, invalidate the EID, as it is logically consistent with EID being true. This reply might have force if I were making a logical argument from evil, but I am making an evidential argument, one that says that God probably does not exist. The debate resolution so reads. If to avoid the thrust of a given argument one is forced to commit to absurd views such as radical epistemological skepticism, then the argument in question is generally viewed as a success.Con further argues that I am " imply(ing) that God could have a morally sufficient reason for doing something morally wrong." This is wrong in two respects. First, the implication is that God could have a morally sufficient reason for doing something that without that reason would be morally wrong. Second, I'm not implying it; EID is.2) Con argues that the objection I present regarding radical moral skepticism again does not invalidate EID, as it is logically consistent with EID being true. This is addressed above.Con suggests that God might not be preventing E1 and E2 because he is giving humans an opportunity to exhibit moral behavior. But Con can only say this if he is able to say that giving humans this opportunity is a greater good for the sake of which God is justified in permitting E1 and E2. However, EID prevents him from drawing that conclusion, or any conclusion about the existence or nonexistence of evil-permitting goods from God's inaction. Con doesn't have access to "The Big Picture." So as a defense of EID, Con's point is self-defeating.3) Con argues that my objection regarding humans and their positive experiences being within our "scrutinized zone" only applies to E2, which has been covered by FWD, because "negative experiences that happen to animals are not relevant." In the first place, one can only hope that Con is not a pet owner, for his response suggests that he does not view cruelty to animals as immoral. In the second place, as I've argued above, Con cannot consistently argue both FWD and EID -- see first paragraph of my second statement.Con further proposes to define experiencing positive conscious experience as not experiencing a greater negative conscious experience. But it cannot be so defined. From a moral standpoint they may be equally permissible, but a positive conscious experience is an experience, while an absence of a greater negative experience is not. In any case, Con seems to have missed the point of this objection. The point is that positive conscious experiences -- and, for that matter, the absence of negative conscious experiences -- are things which fall into our epistemic realm. Further, I am not asserting that humans can know all of their positive conscious experiences, only that they are a type of good that we know, as are humans themselves. The point of this objection was that since goods which morally permit suffering generally involve positive conscious experiences of the sufferer, and since both sufferers and their positive conscious experiences are things that are not inscrutable to us, we have reason to believe that if there were goods that permitted God to permit E1 and E2 we would know about them. Con has not refuted this.4) Again, with his father-son-dishes analogy, Con contradicts EID by presuming to know what the good which permits God to allow E1 and E2 is. Additionally, this analogy seems inapplicable since, to the sons, the existence of the father is not in question.Con also argues, "this is not to claim that God does not attempt to make himself and his actions clear to us humans." However, the very definition of omnipotence entails that if an omnipotent being attempts to do something, it succeeds. Period. Perhaps what Con meant to say was that he does the best he can without thereby forfeiting another greater good. But this again commits he who would reject the argument from evil to absurdity. Con is asking us to believe that an infinitely powerful, completely omnipotent god is: Unable to prevent E1 and E2 without thereby forfeiting a greater good, Unable to enable the sufferers to know what that good is without thereby forfeiting another greater good, Unable to be consciously present to the sufferers, despite their despair and loneliness, without forfeiting yet another greater good, and Unable to enable the sufferers to know what that greater good would be without forfeiting still yet another greater good![1] Logically possible? Sure. Inherently plausible? Not on your life.ConclusionIn my opening, I made a prima facie case for the resolution. Con then presented two defenses against my argument, FWD and EID. In the ensuing discussion, I have shown that FWD fails on its face, and presented four objections to EID, any one of which is sufficient to reject it. I have defended these objections against Con's replies. The argument from evil therefore stands, and the resolution is affirmed.I thank Con for an engaging and enjoyable debate. I thank the readers for their attention, and ask them to vote Pro.[1] Trakakis, N., The God Beyond Belief: In Defence of William Rowe's Evidential Argument from Evil (Springer, 2007), pp. 196-197.