A human fetus has personhood at conception

As per my opponent's request I will argue in order to simply negate the points which my opponent has brought forth. I look forward to an interesting debate seeing as the personhood aspect of pregnancy in the abortion argument is one that I tend to disregard in most debates on the subject. 1-Viability. My opponent argues that a foetus is a person in that it is viable outside the womb by the age of 34 weeks. It's an interesting point, considering it is entirely in my favor. The resolution which the Pro is defending is that person-hood begins at conception. But since my opponent uses viability as a requisite for person-hood, by their own admission the foetus is not a person until it is 34 weeks old. 2-Bodily Similarity. While the ability to feel pain is a general characteristics that one would generally ascribe to persons, this point runs into a problem. If pain is a requisites to person-hood, my opponent must support that people suffering from congenital analgesia (the inability to feel pain)[1] are not really persons. However, since this seems prima facie absurd, one must accept that there are some other features which are the requisites to person-hood other than pain sensors. On free will, it is still up for debate whether or not any humans actually possess such a thing[2]. On whether a functioning nervous system is relevant to person-hood, I challenge my opponent to show why it is actually relevant in this case and what defines a functioning nervous system. Must one's nervous system be in optimal condition or are nervous system disorders such as multiple sclerosis or locked-in syndrome within the still functioning spectrum? The word 'functioning' in this context is all too ambiguous. 3-Genetic Uniqueness. On whether being a genetically unique individual contributes to relevant person-hood, my opponent must realize that a zygote does not possess the characteristics relevant for person-hood in the same way that a seed does not contain the characteristics relevant to a full grown tree. For instance, persons as is generally conceived are rational, conscious, etc., characteristics which a human zygote is entirely lacking. A seed cannot be said to be a tree if it lacks the necessary characteristics of a tree (possessing a trunk, branches, leaves in most cases) and so likewise, a zygote cannot be said to have the relevant characteristics of person-hood. 4-Positive vs. Natural Rights. My opponent must realize that whether or not a foetus possesses the characteristics relevant for person-hood is not something to be determined by mere government edict. In reality, all that the Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004 showed was that a good amount of people BELIEVE that a foetus is a person. It would be an argument ad populum (a formal fallacy) to argue that mere popular opinion changes the facts of reality and could actually be a deciding factor in whether a foetus is a person. 5-Life and No Life. My opponent here argues that conception is the only rational time one can observe a moment where life actually begins. I would remind my opponent that life and person-hood are not one and the same. Dogs are clearly alive but it is not clear whether they possess the relevant characteristics necessary for person-hood. Therefore when life actually begins is irrelevant to the debate at hand. The only thing that matters is when a foetus becomes an actual person and my opponent has not upheld this resolution. ===Sources=== [1] http://www.psychologytoday.com...