There is no universal moral standard.

1. Let's use Pro's line of argumentation to attempt to prove that how tall a person is is not genetically predisposed. P: "People vary considerably in height. If there was a genetic predisposition, then they would all be the same height, and that's not the case. We know that factors like nutrition affect height. If there is any doubt that there is no genetic commonality, observe that some adults are three feet tall and others are seven feet tall. That proves there is no genetic commonality." C: "You are looking at it far too finely. Bees are typically a quarter inch tall, mice an inch tall, giraffes seventeen feet tall. Humans are around five and a half feet tall. Even though there is variation, the genetic commonality is clear." P: "You cannot use other species in an attempt to prove a point about humans. I repeat that the fact that some humans are three feet and others seven feet proves there is no genetic predisposition." With respect to our present debate, the reference to other species is to illustrate how genetic characteristics determine relevant moral standards. We can imagine humans having genetic characteristics being more akin to praying mantis or bears or caribou, while remaining intelligent and contemplative. It's clear that the "nature of the beast" determines the rules related to social interaction. In intelligent beings, that is the basis of moral behavior. 2. I pointed out the error in Pro's definition of "murder" and Pro did not respond. Pro falsely equates "murder" with any killing for any reason, then claims there is no commonality in the moral rules that are applied by different societies. If the definitions are properly sorted out, there is great deal of commonality. Is there any large society that does not believe that killing to defend one's family is not morally justified? The morality is very nearly universal. Is there any society that does not find killing for personal gain morally reprehensible? Again, the morality is very nearly universal. How about a tribe killing to defend itself against annihilation by another tribe? One can go down the list and find great commonality. The commonality derives from the nature of man to protect his kin and his tribe. 3. I pointed out that there are instincts to be loyal to one's family and to be loyal to one's tribe (society) and that usually instincts do not produce a conflict, but sometimes they do. Unsatisfactory resolution of moral conflict produces errant moral behavior. I argued that evolved instincts do not have to provide perfect problem resolution, but rather only a net positive survival rate. Con ignored the argument in favor of restating the belief that moral inconsistency proves that there are no moral instincts. 4. In the case of perpetually warring tribes, I argued that in those circumstances the strong bonding to the tribe that results may provide a positive survival benefit that outweighs the loses due to warring. If the warring has been going on for generations, then obviously neither tribe has perished due to the practice. This is not a claim that there is no better way to live; it is aberrant. Nonetheless, the explanation based upon conflicting moral instincts is a much better one than Pro's notion that it is a random artifact of society. 5. Pro claims, "We do have a genetic subconscious that encourages species survival. That is a scientifically sound argument. However, as we have found empirically, the more advanced human societies become, the more the "universality" of morality slips away." Pro's claim is false, and clearly so. Track the progress of human rights over time as societies have advanced. For example, consider the acceptance of slavery as being morally justified. The moral justification was widespread 400 years ago and has all but disappeared today. The same trends can be observed for equal rights, freedom of expression, the divine right of kings (and allied concepts), the unacceptability of genocide, and so forth. What is the driving force behind this commonality? It is that what is better is accepted in favor of what is worse, and what is better is determined by what is most consistent with the nature of mankind. Freedom is preferred because mankind inherently wants to be free, and that's what makes it a human right. This is not to argue that civilization has achieved perfection. There is a continual tension between what is best for society, generally a moral good, and what is best for the individual, generally another moral good. Moreover, circumstances that affect the tradeoffs change. If a primitive society not having prisons has to deal with a psychotic serial killer, they have fewer options to debate than a more advanced society. Nonetheless, the net advance is unquestionable. 6. Pro argues with respect to free speech, "Then, you take countries like China, which restrict it even further. We as citizens of the US call it a human rights violation, but how can we be sure? Is it only US law that determines what universal rights should be?" We know it because we observe that people inherently want to be free. This is the way the Founders knew it. There is no shortage of Chinese who want it; they are repressed by their government who denies the right. The limits of free speech can be argued in terms of conflicting rights, but there are always moral conflicts and difficult issues of resolving them. That does not deny the inherent fundamental right. 7. Pro asks, "Canadians don't feel oppressed because they have no access to fire power. However, a significant sect of the US population objects strenuously... How do you account for this difference?" There is an innate desire for personal security. That leads to a human right to defend oneself, either personally or through society. What the two approaches have in common is a recognition to a right to have security. No one argues, "If some people like to kill other people for their personal satisfaction, they have as much right to do that as the people who want to be free from assault." 8. Pro argues, "The things you describe are a natural want of any animal, but the application of those instincts is vastly different, and THAT is morality. It isn't a moral standard to be secure. It is a moral standard to dictate what secure means." Here is the semantic argument that I earlier pointed out as a potential problem. I claim that the fundamental human right is to seek security, and that to deny a person from seeking security by any means is immoral. Pro argues that a "moral code" is not about what is moral or immoral, but about the detailed mechanism by which the underlying morality is believed to be achieved. No, the implementation is subordinate to the morality. 9. I argued, that when Pro asserts that a universal code may be worse than no code, she is admitting that there is a biological basis that defines human rights. That is the only way she could know what is worse. Pro did not respond. 10. I claimed that if one believes that there is no inherent basis for morality in the nature of man, then one must, to be consistent, be fundamentally indifferent about what rules of moral conduct are accepted. Pro argues that one can simply vote on morality and that determines it. But if you believe that all moral decision have no basis in human absolutes, there is no basis to passionately support one side or the other. How would one vote on the morality of genocide, for example, without supposing that it was contrary to human nature? Would one make some sort of economic argument that the country would be more or less prosperous without the group proposed to be purged? It makes no sense without a moral framework derived from the nature of mankind.