Resolved: On balance, philosophical naturalism is true.

This debate is fundamental to understanding the nature of the universe as well as establishing other ontological and epistemological philosophies. First thing my opponent asks for is a clarification on what Supernaturalism is. The thesis that non-physical things exist is what I will be defending. Now the major problem with my opponent’s case so far is it fails to show that naturalism is the default position with regards to the universe. For my opponent to win this debate he must show not merely that supernaturalism is improbable but that naturalism is a plausible thesis to hold. That is, if supernaturalism is shown to be as plausible as naturalism, the affirmative has not met his burden. The Transcendental Challenge to Naturalism: The fundamental problem of ontological naturalism is the epistemological challenges which it implies. In fact, if my arguments are successful, the thesis of ontological naturalism will be shown to be unsupportable epistemologically. That is, if naturalism is true then it is impossible to endorse rationally. The first argument to address this concern is the transcendental challenge. Let us assume for the sake of argument that naturalism is true, what does that entail? This entails that all knowledge is gained via experience with the external world since external objects(physical) are all that exists. This doesn’t mean that all knowledge comes from experience but all knowledge originates from it. Now knowledge gained from experience can be contrasted from knowledge gained by reason alone(the classic a priori versus a posteriori). Knowledge that could be considered a posteriori might be that it is currently raining. This knowledge cannot be known by reason alone because the only thing that could refute it would be if it were not in fact raining(that is experience is the only thing that can in principle refute it). The problem with this type of knowledge is that it is contingent but not necessarily true. To contrast it with truths of reason, a triangle is three-sided by the very definition of what a triangle is. That is, the concept of triangle is completely connected to three-sidedness. This is an analytic judgment, because the predicate is completely contained within its subject. However when we take truths from experience we find that they cannot be analytic in nature. For example, nothing about now includes the concept of raining. You cannot intuitively know whether Denver is indeed a mile high without checking experimentally. Judgments like this are called synthetic because you cannot reason into them without experience. From this we can conclude a few things, however the most pertinent to this debate is the a priori synthetic judgments. A priori synthetic judgments are essentially statements which can be gained by reason alone and therefore necessary but also synthetic in that the predicate is not completely contained in the subject. This is the knowledge that is the prerequisite for mathematics, science and all metaphysics because Science relies on truths being necessary and always the case for the principle of Verification, mathematics relies on it for working in real life and metaphysics if it exists has to rely on it to be meaningful. Hence if you want to believe in any of these things you must accept a priori synthetic judgments. However, under Naturalism causation relies on the fallacy of post ergo propter hoc. There is simply no way to know whether verification really works because it could mere chance and nothing is necessary knowledge given this system of belief. Each independent sensation of a posteriori knowledge is separate and not connected logically speaking to the next. The reason for this is under empiricism it is only possible to derive a posteriori synthetic knowledge, you can only rely on instances which have no necessary connection to the truth of any other time. Hence if you want to have science, mathematics, causation, or metaphysics you cannot adopt Naturalism. The Argument from Mental Causation: “We are compelled to admit between the thoughts of a terrestrial astronomer and the behaviour of matter several light-years away that particular relation which we call truth. But this relation has no meaning at all if we try to make it exist between the matter of the star and the astronomer’s brain, considered as a lump of matter. The brain may be in all sorts of relations to the star no doubt: it is in a spatial relation, and a time relation, and a quantitative relation. But to talk of one bit of matter as being true about another bit of matter seems to me to be nonsense. ” CS Lewis, p.64, Christian Reflections This argument has its roots from C. S. Lewis in his book Miracles: A Preliminary Study although the ideas have existed in various forms for many years before Lewis. This particular formulation comes from C. S. Lewis’s Dangerous Idea, p.80: If naturalism is true, then no event can cause another event in virtue of its propositional content. But some events do cause other events in virtue of their propositional content. (implied by the existence of rational inference) Therefore, naturalism is false. The structure of this argument is sound and placed in modus tollens, hence if you accept the premises, you must accept the conclusion logically. The second premise is relatively uncontroversial. Rational inference is the basis for much of the reasoning used in debates and in our everyday lives, the person who denies rational inference seems to have difficulty arguing in formal debate since he admits people cannot rationally infer to conclusions. Simply to clarify why premise two is implied by rational inference, in order for rational inference to be possible it must be the case that one could come to the conclusion 3 by virtue of one accepting premise 1 as well as 2 and that those states cause the thinker to accept the conclusion 3. However under naturalism it seems the mental causation is impossible hence rational inference doesn’t seem to be possible as well. The basic problem here is that if all causation is in fact physical causation then how can the content of any mental state could possibly be relevant to what causes what in the world. In order to better understand the connection here, an analogy would be useful. Suppose that a 400 pound weight was used in Mark Henry’s fourth world record lift and fell off the rack breaking someone’s toe. We could say the weight was used to break the toe, but it would not follow that the toe was broken by virtue of the weight being used by Mark Henry. What determines whether the toe breaks is a function of the velocity of the weight falling and the strength of the toe and it’s use as part of the world record lift has no causal connection and is thus irrelevant. Whether the computer’s activity is interpreted as a video game or a chess program will not affect the output of the computer though it will affect the input of the players. What this means is that even if intentional states can be reduced to true or false, it would still be the case that one mental event cannot cause another by virtue of its own content. Consciousness is Irreducible: “If a physically identical zombie world is logically possible, it follows that the presence of consciousness is an extra fact about our world, not guaranteed by the physical facts alone. ” David Chalmers, p.123 The Conscious Mind For this argument, there are two issues of significance which I want to rise. The first issue is the presumption of naturalism my opponent has that is simply unjustified. As mentioned in the opening statement, my opponent must make a case for Naturalism as the natural attitude. However, I would like to make an epistemological note regarding this issue, the fact is Supernaturalism has primacy due to the subjective self. As Descartes pointed out, the transcendental ego is the thing which we can be the most sure of, rather than the existence of any physical thing. Hence, the denial of the metaphysical and ontological existence of the self is the counterintuitive position, this does not make it wrong but definitely not the default position. The other issue I would like address with this argument is materialism or ontological naturalism in the experience of consciousness. This argument is from The Conscious Mind by David Chalmers: In our world, there are conscious experiences. There is a logically possible world physically identical to ours, in which the positive facts about consciousness in our world do not hold. Therefore, facts about consciousness are further facts about our world, over and above the physical facts. Thus, naturalism is false. The first premise is relatively undeniable, unless my opponent is claiming that he himself does not experience consciousness then it seems he would be a contrast to the rest of the world implicit proving the second premise since we can at least be sure that we are ourselves conscious. The ontological primacy of the self is evident. The most clear question when it comes to consciousness is the question of whether it is logically supervenient on the physical. Essentially the argument is no a priori entailment from physical facts to phenomenal facts exists. I pose the classic logical possibility of Zombies in defense of premise 2. It is conceivable that there could a physically identical universe with my twin which looks exactly like me physically in every way. However, it is conceivable that this twin may not have any phenomenal consciousness. He would still have psychological consciousness(he could still perceive things). The empirical question is a non-starter because it conceivability which is necessary for premise 2. In order to defeat this my opponent must show why my philosophical zombie is not logically possible, as it seems to be conceivable. Thus the resolution is refuted, Naturalism is untenable.