Morality is an Idea

After my last debate (. http://www.debate.org...), he and I disagreed over the nature of morality so decided to debate it here instead of in the comments. Hopefully, I can better clarify my position within this format. I am against the resolution that morality is an idea. When discussing the nature of morality, it's important that it be taken seriously. Evil is very real, and those that experience it firsthand are not content to reduce it to a simple academic matter. My opponent and I will make specific claims about the nature of morality, and I urge the reader to consider the ultimate truth of our claims. We are discussing the nature of reality itself and in so doing must consider the real implications of our theories. As such, I will examine my opponent's theory in two areas. Morality, as a concept, functions on two levels: moral distinction and moral obligation. Moral distinction is the act of assessing the moral value of an action. Moral obligation is the act of holding another person or group of people to a specific moral standard. Saying murder is wrong is a moral distinction. Saying that people ought not to murder is a moral obligation. The first deals with what "is" and the second deals with what "ought" to be. I submit that any theory of morality must rationally account for both functions, since one function becomes meaningless without the other. If morality is an idea, then it is a subjective morality. Ideas are not to be found in one place, as though science could empirically analyze them. Instead, ideas are generated, discussed, rationalized, and refuted. Some ideas become convention and others become passï¿½. No matter how well reasoned a moral idea might be it nevertheless remains one idea among many. This is not a problem when making moral distinctions, since we all can have our own ideas of what is right and wrong. However, a serious logical problem is presented when applying this theory of morality to moral obligation. As soon as one person or group obligates another person or group to adhere to their moral distinctions, they are taking an absolute, objective moral position. They are, in essence, declaring their moral ideas to be objectively true, as though it were a matter of utmost truth and reality, not merely an idea. Telling others what they ought to do contradicts the very philosophy of relative morality. The only way to be true to the notion that morality is an idea is to remain wholly within the realm of moral distinction and avoid moral obligation altogether. Yet moral distinctions are meaningless without moral obligation. What value is there in assessing the rightness or wrongness of conduct if we never require people to adhere to it? Indeed, there is none, as moral distinctions are reduced to matters of mere opinions to be taken no more seriously than one's preferred choice in pie. In order for moral obligation to be rational, subjective morality must be false. Morality as an idea is subjective. Therefore, morality as an idea is false. Allow me to further illustrate my point though example: using the pro-life/pro-choice controversy. Pro-life groups believe abortion is wrong whereas pro-choice groups believe limiting the rights of women is wrong. So far, this is just a matter of moral distinction--two groups with two ideas about morality. Now, the pro-life group claims that potential life is so great that the pro-choice group should be obligated to adhere to the pro-life moral position. We've now engaged in moral obligation. If morality is an idea, then how does it handle this scenario? If my opponent says one idea is greater than another, then morality cannot be an idea, but something with greater authority. If my opponent says both ideas are equivalent, then moral obligation is irrational and morality becomes meaningless. The theory is self contradictory. It can only be true if morality is meaningless, ergo, morality is not an idea. All theories must be measured against human experience, and the truth my opponent and others that share his view on morality must face is that it can't be lived out. If you truly believe morality to be subjective, then you must also believe by rational necessity that might makes right. In other words, those in power make the rules, and in a democracy, the majority represents the moral norm and can never be wrong. Let me emphasize this point clearly. If morality is relative, then the only ones that can possibly be right are the ones able to enforce their morality. For the powerless to condemn the powerful is itself proof that morality cannot be confined to an idea. If morality cannot be relative, then the only remaining options are the morality is a big meaningless waste of time or that it is an objective, absolute reality. I argue for the latter. I submit that morality is an objective truth against which moral distinctions can be measured and to which we appeal for moral obligation. I maintain that an immoral action is immoral regardless of the states of society or individuals. By way of example, I contend that stealing has been, is, and always will be immoral whether or not humans are around to think of such things. This view of morality extends from my worldview and my belief in a transcendent, unchanging God. In the Christian worldview, good is that which reflects God's character. God did not create morals nor is he bound to them as though morality were a greater God. God simply is. Likewise, morality simply is. In his mercy, he has revealed much of his nature to us allowing humanity to derive from it all we need for living. The unchanging laws of science, logic, and morality are reliable only because they reflect an unchanging God. Of course, I have not proven God's existence in this debate, nor do I intend to. This is the worldview through which I interpret reality, and my opponent will operate within his own worldview. At the heart of this debate, as with all philosophical debates on the "big" questions, are our presuppositions regarding the nature of reality. All people make these assumptions, be it Postmodernism, Idealism, Empiricism, Rationalism, Naturalism, Solipsism, Hedonism, or what have you. My opponent will make claims about what can and cannot be, expecting the reader to take his worldview for granted. No doubt, our worldviews differ, and that is why I will challenge his assumptions about reality, especially those that affect his view of about the nature of morality. In the final analysis, my view of morality is only of secondary importance in this debate. My burden is to show that morality cannot be an idea, and I've done so. Since the resolution leads to subjective morality, and since subjective morality cannot account for moral obligation, morality cannot be an idea.