God most likely does not exist

IntroductionFor the areas where you did not refrain from using exact phrases, quotes are needed—this much is certain. Now I really am quite disappointed that my opponent has quite significantly missed my meaning on the most crucial points and has instead laid claim to meaning that I did not intend. We'll be judicious and assume that this is due to some wanting clarity on my own part, and for that I am sorry. Let us begin in order.RE: Argument From Incoherence: Omnipotence/ OmnibenevolenceFirst, my opponent states that, "God could still hypothetically be the author and source of morality and be malevolent." Now, granted, this much is true, if we take his authorship to be the arbitrary creation of rules of morality for which he is free to break. But my opponent seems to disagree with himself here, as in his later section he states, "first off, (ii) is how God is defined and would be an attribute of his essence if he exists." The former statement assumes that God arbitrarily creates moral values and thus is free to break them, while the latter assumes that goodness is defined in accordance with his nature. Thus, what is Good is NOT defined by what God arbitrarily deems but by whatever God is. Thus, the argument is reduced to God can do whatever God is not. This is a logical contradiction and therefore itself subject to the criticism of incoherence.This being can literally do whatever it wants to do, and is not bound by the limitations of a supposed supra-divine moral code. That is to say, it can do any act possible for an omnipotent God to do with TOTAL freedom from the semantic value of evil. Evil is only defined by what God's nature is not. So in order for my opponent's argument to work, he HAS to show that God, as an omnipotent and omnibenevolent being, would be bound by a moral authority apart from himself by which we may judge his actions as evil. He must show that omnibenevolence is a set of precepts that God must conform to and not the very state of his nature, insofar as believing that God can do evil is tantamount to saying God can break the law of identity.What's worse here, though, is that my opponent misuses modal logic in his "possible world claims." And it's quite embarrassing. First, God would be omnibenevolent in every possible world ONLY if we intend to say that this is a necessarily true proposition. If my opponent intends to say that this is a necessarily true proposition, he must also admit that God not only likely exists, but necessarily exists. Instead, in order for him to avoid committing to the necessity of omnibenevolence and thus the necessity of God, he must simply be content with saying that God as an omnibenevolent being is a possible proposition, meaning it obtains in at least one possible world. Thus, my opponent's misuse in using modal logic to reformulate an ontological disconfirmation has failed by parity of modal misuse.A few direct responses:"It would be intellectually insane to think that moral truths do not apply to one sentient being, while they apply to all others."There is nothing inherent in the definitions given in round one that this God is sentient. Moreover, if it is not intellectually insane to believe that a programmer is not bound by his own programming, it is similarly intellectually sane and reasonable to think God is not bound by any rules, physical or abstract, for which he authored."For example, if raping a child for no reason but purely for pleasure is wrong, then it would be objectively wrong even if God commits this act."If a game programmer made it wrong for his programmees to engage in the act of juggling, would it be wrong for the programmer to juggle? Objective morality only refers to the fact that moral categories exist independent of HUMAN apprehension. Morality is SUBJECT to the nature of God, but so what?RE: Paul Draper's Argument From Evil (Gratuitous Suffering)"Most moral philosophers simply do not believe that God is necessary for objective morality, and moral philosophy has been done without appealing to God for centuries."I'm not terribly concerned with atheistic failures to lay claim to an objective moral foundation anymore than I am concerned with the theistic claim to the same thing. I am saying that if we ASSUME an objective measurement for morality APART from God as defined in round 1, then we are begging the question, inasmuch as my opponent's argument against (ii) presupposes that (ii) is false from the beginning. Instead, we are tasked with the burden of pondering what we would intend to observe if (i) and (ii) were true. My contention is that we have literally NO IDEA what we would observe if (i) and (ii) are true. That is to say, if God were the author of moral authority we would be tasked with the burden of knowing the content of the morals he authored. Since it would be perfectly within his power to author morals that our current sensibilities are appalled by, it is possible that Pr(O1 & O2 & O3|T) > Pr(O1 & O2 & O3|HI). Now, you'll notice that my claim is not that Pr(O1 & O2 & O3|T) > Pr(O1 & O2 & O3|HI) is, indeed, true, but rather that we have no idea whether or not it is. Thus, since Pr(O1 & O2 & O3|T) > Pr(O1 & O2 & O3|HI) or Pr(O1 & O2 & O3|T) < Pr(O1 & O2 & O3|HI) or Pr(O1 & O2 & O3|T) = Pr(O1 & O2 & O3|HI) are all unknowable but epistemically possible outcomes, we have no legitimate way of determining the likelihood. This means the probability equation as listed is utterly inscrutable and meaningless."The problem with this line of thinking, is that if Earth was one big torture chamber, this would be good because God allowed it. Why is this a problem for the theist? Well, in defense of the moral argument the theist appeals to intuition. Basically, we all know deep that certain things are objectively wrong."Now this is completely off-topic. I am not defending a moral argument and don't care to. Further, knowing "deep down inside" is a nice and romantic image, but it is wholly an empty appeal to human emotion. We have literally NO IDEA whether or not what we believe "deep down inside" corresponds in any meaningful way to the morals that this God has decided to author. Unless my opponent can show HOW we can claim to know the CONTENT of the morals that this God has authored, we have no idea whether or not our observations make his existence likely or not. If the hypothesis in question is whether a God who authored moral authority exists, we must seriously consider that this God could author literally anything as morally good, like, for instance, that the world be indifferent to suffering. Until my opponent can grasp the profundity of this rebuttal, he may continue to miss the point, grasping earnestly at straws. But I sincerely hope he does grasp this point, as that may make his next round more interesting.You simply cannot weigh the probability of the hypothesis of indifference, whose functions are known, against the probability of a wholly epistemically inaccessible, infinite being, whose functions are not known.Conclusion: My opponent's first section fails because it does not account for the fact that omnibenevolence can be easily defined as inherent in God's nature and/or wholly defined by whatever God chooses to do. This would better fit with the idea of a "wholly" free God whose actions/thoughts/nature are not bound by rules but rather define them. Secondly, his modal logic is demonstrably false, inasmuch as there is nothing inherent in the definition of omnibenevolence that requires it to obtain in all possible worlds, because, if it did, it would be a necessarily true proposition that requires it to exist in the actual world--making God's existence by orders of magnitude more than likely, as it would be wholly necessary. Instead, we must say that omnibenevolence is a possible proposition. Lastly, he seeks to make probabilistic claims based on unknowable information.