The Problem of Evil is an Insufficient Argument Against the Christian God

In this round, I want to defend the argument I laid out in R2 by systematically responding to each of Pro’s criticisms thus far. General criticismsI. Tu quoquePro’s first criticism is to say that the PoE is as much a problem for the atheist than the Christian.My response will be similarly brief. The first thing to say is that it’s laughable to me Pro deems this an argument at all, let alone a good one. A bizarre, one-line assertion does not a good argument make. Second, the conclusion of my PoE is that traditional theism (and thus Christianity) is false. Just read it. If Pro thinks this does anything other than support atheism over theism, perhaps he should explain how this is so. 2. Non-sequitorAnother attack from Pro is to claim that my version of the PoE is logically invalid, and that the conclusion doesn’t follow from the premises. The first fatal problem with this is that Pro point blank refuses to identify where the structural problem with my argument lies:“ I will not aid Con in adding the missing premises. However, if he does not do so, I must conclude that the syllogism is invalid.”Again, Pro needs to actually make an argument here. This means that he has to both identify and justify his point, if he expects to be taken seriously, rather than hinting at some phantom criticism. This even more imperative given that Pro mistakenly labels P1 as having a conclusion, when in reality it is a premise - that from which a conclusion is derived. If Pro makes such a basic error here, why should we even entertain him until he puts his cards on the table and actually presents a case?More importantly however, this argument in its simplified form is textbook modus tollens (1). It is unquestionably logically valid. Even prominent apologist Bill Craig concedes this version of the PoE to be such (2). To be frank, I just don’t know where Pro is coming from here.Defending P1P1 states that if God exists, gratuitous evils do not.Readers will remember that I offered some conceptual analysis to defend this claim. Pro hasn’t responded to this point. Extend argument.Pro instead takes the indirect route, offering general criticisms. His first move is to continue to ask why God must remove evil.First, the focus of P1 however was gratuitous evil - evil which by definition can’t lead to a greater good. I qualified this in my last round, yet Pro doesn’t acknowledge the difference between evil and gratuitous evil. While (in theory) evil may be reconciled with God (as it may lead to a greater good), gratuitous evil, by definition, has no morally sufficient reason, if it exists (the remit of P3). Pro is essentially confusing the logical PoE with the evidential PoE (3) in his response, and as such, is unwittingly straw-manning my argument . Asking why a tri-omni God would eliminate easily preventable, unnecessary suffering strikes me as an absurd question, especially given I‘ve already defended my view in R2. The reason God would prevent such things is that they are bad simpliciter - they cause untold misery for billions of sentient beings with no upside. By analogy, it’s like asking why think a perfect mathematician would be able to do long division. It is true by definition.Pro then asks why we should impose our notions of good upon God.This is a point even Christians routinely rebuke:“if we shroud God in total mystery, the claim the God is good becomes compatible with any motives or behaviors or commandments we might possibly attribute to God. But if that is right, what are we saying when we say God is good?” (4)A good being would prevent suffering, all else being equal, simply because this is what it means to be a good being. Feeling apathetic about easily preventable suffering is characteristic of an indifferent God, not a wholly benevolent one.As such, P1, having been well-established in the previous round, easily bests the challenge of a crudely constructed straw-man and contrived moral scepticism. As such, P1 is confidently affirmed.Defending P3 P3 states that gratuitous evils do exist. Readers will remember I offered 4 justificatory points in support of this premise.1. Prima facie case2. No conceiveum3. Nature of evils4. Epistemic consistencyPro only barely responded to 4 (which I'll respond to below under natural evil), while completely ignoring 1-3. Extend arguments.Moral evilsFocusing moral evils, again Pro is content with literally a 4 word response:“ morally significant free-will”Again, this is totally outrageous, and in no way passes as an argument. Being ultra generous to Pro, I’ll respond. As Pro noted in his last round, my primary focus is natural evil. I neither needed nor intended to delve much into moral evil in this debate, but given that Pro’s other points are so concise, I might as well.First, Pro never explains why free-will is so sacrosanct, particularly given some of the horrendous evils it facilitates. Second, unfettered free-will is as impractical as it is morally bankrupt. If we granted unconditional free-will to murderers and rapists without reprisals, the liberty of the victims will be constantly crushed in order to satisfy these perverse whims. Lastly, assuming Heaven has morally significant free-will, we do know moral evil can be totally absent from an autonomous community, so Pro's response doesn't even answer the problem.Natural evilsReaders will remember I focused my justificatory points and 2 examples on these kinds of seemingly gratuitous evils.Pro asserts that these evils can be explained with reference to the Christian story of the Fall.Again, this just is unbelievably general and doesn’t engage either with my examples, nor with my justificatory points. In any case, this response suffers from intractable problems.Begging the question (5): Pro can’t assume Christian doctrine to be true (the Fall) when the truth of Christianity is exactly what is at stake! Pro has to provide justification for the story itself, rather than assuming it to be true. He would have to show it to be more plausible than our general experience, conception and observation of the nature of evil. In short, he would have to be show it to be more plausible than P3.As for his claim that Genesis is more authoritative than the PoE because of its date, this commits the fallacy of appealing to tradition (6). The only thing that matters in this context is the justification we have for belief. I’ve given 4 substantive points for P3, whereas Pro has yet to substantiate his claim at all in a non-question-begging way.Relevance: How exactly does this story explain the suffering of millions of infants with an intestinal blockage? Surely even if such a story demonstrated the origin of natural evil (which Pro would still have to justify), it simply doesn’t explain the scale and continuation of this suffering. Pro also says that God uses natural evil for punishment and that He should not be expected to prevent them anyway.Again, all of the above points about begging the question and such apply and God's need to prevent gratuitous evils has been dealt with in P1. As for punishment, the only thing I need say here is that neither babies nor fawns are moral agents. They don’t have the capacity to exercise free-will and therefore to face punishment, so this is simply a red herring.Given that these very timid responses are all that has been offered in response to P3, it is abundantly clear that this premise is overwhelmingly justified.The PoE is thus affirmed.Sources1. http://en.wikipedia.org...2. God, P139.3. http://joseph041167.hubpages.com...4. Taken from http://www.debate.org...5. http://www.fallacyfiles.org...6. http://en.wikipedia.org...