Resolved: On balance, philosophical naturalism is true.

Thanks Con for your response.After reading Con's remarks, I have no reason to change anything I've posited thus far.Con has failed to show anything lacking particles/radiation/energy, and further, Con has failed to provide us with an example of supernature.*Con's Rebuttal*Con reminds us:"This debate is fundamental to understanding the nature of the universe..."My response:Yeah, we're attempting to understand the *nature* of the universe, not the *supernature* of the universe; Con's not even approaching the universe from a supernatural perspective.*Con's Challenge to Naturalism*Con claims:"...if naturalism is true then it is impossible to endorse rationally..."My response:If naturalism's true, it's impossible to endorse rationally?I'm baffled.This was Con's description of my burden, and now, Con has made his "Challenge to Naturalism" impossible to fulfill.If I show that naturalism is true, then it can't be endorsed rationally...that's some challenge you've issued, huh Con?Con supposes:"Let us assume for the sake of argument that naturalism is true, what does that entail?"My response:Other than the fact that you claim if it's true it's not rational to endorse?That everything that exists is either made of particles/radiation/energy or is contingent on such...so far, Con has not shown any reason to reject this truth, other than Con claiming that if it's true, it isn't rational to endorse. Con furthers:"This doesn"t mean that all knowledge comes from experience but all knowledge originates from it."My response:Naturalism means that knowledge itself, experiential or otherwise, is contingent on physical matter, namely the brain, neurons, and other neural substrates.Con teaches us terms:"Now knowledge gained from experience can be contrasted from knowledge gained by reason alone(the classic a priori versus a posteriori)."My response:Ok, let me make this clear.Any knowledge, including a priori and a posteriori, is a construct contingent on the physical brain, neurons, and other neural substrates, and attacking this point is where Con should be focused...let's see if he can access his knowledge without using his carbon-based brain, neurons, or other neural substrates; readers can attempt this too.Con asserts:"Under Naturalism...there is simply no way to know whether verification really works because it could [be] mere chance and nothing is necessary knowledge given this system of belief."My response:Nope.In naturalism, when we have a demonstrated truth, we can use it to make accurate predictions about what will occur with respects to this understood truth, so, if Con wishes to reduce everything in naturalism to "mere chance," then he'll have to explain how it is that we can use our verification to make repeated accurate predictions.Con, how do you describe repeated accurate predictions made under naturalism as "mere chance?"Accurate predictions show us whether verification really works.Regardless, mere chance does not negate the necessity of particles/radiation/energy, so naturalism still makes perfect sense, and Con has not refuted this crucial truth.Also, Con tried to say that causation under naturalism relies on post hoc ergo propter hoc, which is the assumption that because A happened before B therefore A caused B, but accurate predictions negate this assumption as well, because if we predict that demonstrated A will cause result B, and we can produce B over and over again with exclusively A, we have verification; this is how we verify in science/naturalism.*Con's Mental Causation Argument*Con attempts logic:"If naturalism is true, then no event can cause another event in virtue of its propositional content."My response:This sentence kind of whirled around in my head, and I had to read this like 5 times to even understand what Con is saying here, but here's my attempt at understanding Con.Con is claiming that if all things that exist are made of or are contingent on particles/radiation/energy, then no event can cause another event simply by rational inference.What Con neglects is that inference itself is contingent on the physical, since inference is derived from the physical brain, neurons, and neural substrates.Therefore, any inferential event necessitates the physical, because a brain/neurons/neural substrates would be required to infer anything.Con just can't seem to get past this fact.Con continues:"if you accept the premises, you must accept the conclusion logically."My response:Ok, well all of Con's premises' components are contingent on the physical, so this attempt to reason the non-physical into existence is refuted by its own "propositional content;" inference itself is contingent on the physical.Con adds:"However under naturalism it seems the mental causation is impossible hence rational inference doesn"t seem to be possible as well."My response:The mind is a construct contingent on the brain, which is physical because it's made of particles, and rational inference is merely a function of the brain...I fail to see what Con is saying here.Con attempts to clear up his argument:"Suppose that a 400 pound weight was used in Mark Henry"s fourth world record lift and fell off the rack breaking someone"s toe."My response:Supposed.Con continues:"What determines whether the toe breaks is a function of the velocity of the weight falling and the strength of the toe and it"s use as part of the world record lift has no causal connection and is thus irrelevant."My response:So the weight, made of particles, caused the toe, made of particles, to break...so what?This all seems perfectly natural to me, irrespective of Mark Henry's intentions, which are contingent on his physical brain anyway.The question "Did Mark Henry use the weight to break the toe?" really amounts to "Did Mark Henry intend to make the weight break the toe?"Once you ask questions about intentions, you are asking about constructs contingent on the physical brain and neural substrates and calling these intentions "events" is disingenuous; intentions are thoughts contingent on the brain/neurons/neural substrates, not necessarily an "occurrence" as Con would describe.Con keeps at it:"if intentional states can be reduced to true or false, it would still be the case that one mental event cannot cause another by virtue of its own content."My response:Intentional states can be reduced to physical matter contained within every brain, neuron, and neural substrate.This idea of a mental event would necessitate a mind, which necessitates a brain, which necessitates particles.*Consciousness is Irreducible*Con asserts:"Supernaturalism has primacy due to the subjective self....the transcendental ego is the thing which we can be the most sure of...the denial of the metaphysical and ontological existence of the self is...not the default position."My response:So now, Con is claiming that ego is transcendental.Con, is there an ego without a brain or neural substrates?If yes, Con has to demonstrate how we can have an ego without a brain, else Con's just asserting that the ego is transcendental.In fact, if Con doesn't ever get to something that isn't reducible to particles, there's not much more responding I can do.Con reasons:"In our world, there are conscious experiences"My response:Yup.Con continues:"There is a logically possible world physically identical to ours, in which the positive facts about consciousness in our world do not hold."My response:If there were a logically possible world *physically identical* to ours, then all of the *physical* things required for consciousness would be there, thus the "positive facts" that may not hold about consciousness wouldn't be a lack of anything physical...the physical components of consciousness must be there because as Con puts it, the world is "physically identical to ours."So, Con cannot just conclude that "facts about consciousness are over and above the physical facts," given this idea of a physically identical world.Then Con mentions:"The most clear question when it comes to consciousness is the question of whether it is logically supervenient on the physical."My response:Yes."[E]vidence indicates that non-human animals have the neuroanatomical, neurochemical, and neurophysiological substrates of conscious states...the weight of evidence indicates that humans are not unique in possessing the neurological substrates that generate consciousness."http://fcmconference.org...Neuroscientists, neuropharmacologists, neurophysiologists, and neuroanatomists at Cambridge have confirmed that there are particular neurological substrates that generate consciousness.Not one thing that Con has brought up gives us any reason to doubt this fact.Con goes zombie:"It is conceivable that there could [be] a physically identical universe with my twin which looks exactly like me physically in every way...this twin may not have any phenomenal consciousness...my opponent must show why my philosophical zombie is not logically possible, as it seems to be conceivable."My response:Your twin, in this example, is in a universe identical to ours, so the phenomena that occur in our universe must also occur in this identical universe, so, if you grant that your zombie twin has psychological consciousness AND there are physically-identical-to-our-universe phenomena, then your zombie twin has a phenomenal consciousness.Therefore, a zombie with consciousness and phenomena to apply their consciousness to has phenomenal consciousness by default and your zombie is not logically possible.*Conclusion*Con's just not casting enough doubt on the fact that constructs like consciousness, the mind, intention, and knowledge are all contingent on the physical brain, neurons, and neurological substrates.Con?