My 100th Debate: God Exists

Pro drops my argument. The abductive reasoning argument, the argument from eternalism, and the argument from atemporal minds are all completely dropped. I extend those arguments, that make up much of my offense, and demonstrate that God most likely does not exist. The only small mention Pro makes is that Occam's razor fails since their arguments use a priori reasoning. But Occam's razor is an a priori principle in itself, so it specifically applies with a priori reasoning. Thus, presume Con. --Onto the rebuttals. First, the teleological argument. Pro drops my objections to the second premise of the teleological argument, that made up the crux of my rebuttal. I argued that there is a distinction between telos that is prescribed, and telos that is attributed. Prescriptive telos is where telos actually, objectively exists, while descriptive telos is where we subjectively attribute purposes. All Pro has demonstrated so far is subjective examples of telos. Without objective demonstration that telos exists, it's impossible to discern that an ordering intellect exists. The watchmaker analogy is just garbage. It is overly circular in nature. The very premise, "[i]f telos exists . . . an ordering intellect exists," employs circular reasoning. The analogy of a watch is a hasty generalization. All Pro's examples are merely hasty generalizations. The moment those generalizations are applied to everything, then Pro *presumes* that everything requires an ordering intellect, i.e. that God exists. Two fallacies are employed, and telos is subjective. Further, Aquinas' argument is a bare assertion, and commits a fallacy of appeal to authority. Due to this fallacious reasoning, the teleological argument fails. Pro drops the first premise of the cosmological argument. Pro's justification employed the Conservation of Mass, which I refuted by saying it doesn't apply outside of the universe, so the universe's causation cannot be limited by it. Extend this point, and the KCA is refuted. Onto idealism. Pro is frequently contradicting himself, making absolutely fallacious, circular arguments that I just don't buy into. Pro presumes that the mind is separate from matter, and makes all justifications from there. I gave valid reasons -- from special relativity and abductive reasoning -- that the mind is a result of physical processes. Pro drops all of this. Pro then attempts to defend the solipsism argument against physicalism with a zombie argument. Note that this argument is *irrelevant entirely* to the solipsism argument. Pro doesn't even explain what the zombie argument has to do with solipsism. Pro's argument in favor of idealism says, "[T]he mind, which isn't physical, can interact with reality." Where does Pro get the justification for the mind not being physical? There's no explanation given, except the zombie argument. Now, to the zombie argument. The zombie argument explicitly contradicts with Pro's position that "reality is mental." It is an argument for substance dualism, which Pro argues against in the first round. Further, the zombie argument is circular. The zombie argument says zombies are metaphysically possible -- i.e. beings with brains that lack qualia are possible. But they wouldn't be possible if physicalism is true. There's no justification for them being possible outside of "physicalism is false." They entail a logical contradiction assuming physicalism is true. Therefore, the premise that zombies are metaphysically possible presumes that the mind isn't physical, thus it fails. I will refute the zombie argument using Keith Frankish's reverse zombie argument, a reverse of the zombie argument meant to refute the zombie argument. [1] The argument follows:P1) If anti-zombies are possible, then consciousness is physicalP2) Anti-zombies are metaphysically possibleC. Therefore, consciousness is physicalWhat is an "anti-zombie?" Frankish explains:I begin by introducing the notion of an antizombie. I shall call an object x a bare physical duplicate of an object y if x is a physical duplicate of y and has no further properties of a non-physical kind. Then we can define anti-zombies as beings which are bare physical duplicates of us, inhabiting a universe which is a bare physical duplicate of ours, but none the less having exactly the same conscious experiences as we do. That is, in the anti-zombie world consciousness is a physical phenomenon, supervening metaphysically on the world's microphysical features — in virtue of token identities. [1] Therefore, the argument applies via the same logic of the zombie argument. A being with qualia that lacks non-physical conscience is possible, therefore consciousness is physical. The premises are based on the same justification as Pro. The argument doesn't prove physicalism in itself, but it merely shows the flawed logic of the zombie argument. [Note: God's operating sans the universe does not prove their existence, and Pro entirely fails to explain that point, therefore it is a bare assertion.]For these reasons, vote Con. Sources:1. http://oro.open.ac.uk...