A god exists, as defined by PRO; Take 2

Thanks, Con.1. Burden of ProofMy opponent claims that I have misrepresented his position. I do not think this is the case, as I used a direct quote from my opponent's opening argument in order to show his position. To reiterate my opponent's words on his very own position:"However, I can state, within reasonable doubt, that a God does not exist"This seems to me to be a pretty clear assertion that has not been justified. As it is my opponent's position that God does not exist (claim) and it is my position that God does exist (claim), we are both equally responsible for providing evidence and argument in order to support our respective claims. Thus far, I have provided three sound arguments in favor of my position, while my opponent has failed to bring forward a single argument in support of his own position. Thus, I think it is reasonable to conclude that I have fulfilled my share of the burden of proof at this point of the debate while my opponent has not fulfilled his own share.2. DefinitionI am sorry if the definition I have provided is a confusing one; I did not intend it to be. If it provides more clarification, I'm happy to point out that "a maximally great being" entails maximal power (omnipotence), maximal knowledge (omniscience), and maximal goodness (omnibenevolence). 3. RebuttalRecall that in the last round, I responded to three assertions made by my opponent. These assertions included:(1) "This hypothesis (God exists) has nothing to stand on"(2) "It may be the case that such a God can actually be disproved"(3) "God can be counter-acted with the problem of evil, and so forth"With regard to assertion (1), I pointed out that no justification was provided to think that it is true. My opponent responded by stating that this view was a result of previously encountered theistic arguments that were unconvincing. He went on to acknowledge that his position "may change" if provided with "sufficient persuasion". I commend this honest approach taken by my opponent and I hope to be able to provide him with sufficient persuasion.With regard to assertion (2), I pointed out that again no justification was provided to think that it is true. I went on to request evidence from my opponent that might disprove God. My opponent responded by conceding that assertion (2) was aimed only towards "a logically impossible God" and that "not all God hypotheses are logically impossible". Again, I commend my opponent's willingness to make an honest attempt at conceiving a logically possible "God hypothesis". With regard to assertion (3), I pointed out that I saw no "problem of evil" with regard to God's existence. I requested that my opponent explain why evil might be a problem. My opponent responded by presenting a deductive argument in attempt to show the problem of evil. I will now explain why I think this argument fails.P1: There is evil in the world.P2: An omnibenevolent god would want to stop that evil.P3: An omnipotent god would be able to stop that evil.P4: If a god that was both omnipotent and omnibenevolent existed, there would not be evil in the world.C: There is no omnipotent and omnibenevolent god.I agree with P1 (though I'm not sure how anything can really be "evil" on an atheistic worldview, but perhaps that's a debate for another time).I agree with P2.I take issue with P3. What reason is there for thinking that God could both (1) create creatures endowed with freedom of the will and (2) force these creatures to not commit evil acts? Surely (1) and (2) as described are contradictory, and as such, impossible. If this is true, then there is no issue with an omnipotent God not being able to stop evil, as it isn't logically possible that this omnipotent God could stop evil. We must recognize that omnipotence does not include the power to do the logically impossible. For example, God cannot create a square circle, or a married bachelor. In the very same way, it seems to me that God cannot (1) creatures endowed with freedom of the will and (2) force these creatures to not commit evil acts.P4 fails for the same reasons as P3.Thus, the conclusion "there is no omnipotent and omnibenevolent God" does not follow.I have demonstrated that the problem of evil is not really a problem at all with regard to God's existence. If my opponent wishes to continue with this argument, he must show that there is a logical contradiction between (1) the existence of an omnipotent and omnibelevolent God and (2) the existence of evil. In other words, he must show that (1) and (2) are contradictory in the same way that a square circle or a married bachelor are contradictory. 4. ArgumentsI provided three arguments to support my position that God exists. I'll now address my opponent's response to these arguments.P1: Everything that begins to exist has a cause.P2: The universe began to exist.C1: Therefore, the universe has a cause.In response to this argument, my opponent asks a question: "What if it was Satan" who created the universe? From the argument I provided, we can deduce certain properties of the "cause" of the universe. For example, this cause must be all-powerful, eternal, timeless, spaceless, immaterial, and so on. Each of these are characteristics of a maximally great being. It is greater to be all-powerful than less-powerful, greater to be eternal than finite, greater to be timeless/spaceless than be constrained by time/space, etc. Satan does not fit this description as he is clearly (assuming we are taking the Biblical view of Satan) not all-powerful. My opponent then argues that the universe "may not have begun to exist" and that the universe could have existed "for an infinite amount of time". These statements are just trivially false. According to the Borde-Guth-Vilenkin Theorem, our universe must have had a beginning (as it is on average in a state of constant expansion). Furthermore, actual infinities do not exist in reality (as shown by the coin example I gave, Hilbert's Hotel, etc.) http://sites.middlebury.edu...http://now.tufts.edu...So, it seems to me that my opponent's two objections have no grounding and as such do no damage to the first argument in favor of God's existence. I would add that in order to accept the premises, one need not be 100% certain of their truth. The condition that must be met is that the premises given are more likely true than their negations. In other words, to say that P2 is sound is not to say that the universe must have had a beginning (though this could be plausibly argued). It merely says that it is more likely that the universe had a beginning than not. I find this very difficult to disagree with, especially given the evidence provided through the Borde-Guth-Vilenkin Theorem, the impossibility of an actual infinity, etc. I invite my opponent to consider these things.P1: If God does not exist, objective moral values and duties do not exist.P2: Objective moral values and duties do exist.C1: Therefore, God exists.In response to this argument, my opponent agrees that P2 is true, taking issue with P1 instead. He argues that "objective morality might exist in a world with no God". I see no reason to think that this is the case. If there is no God, then why should anything be truly "good" or "evil"? On what basis are acts like rape, torture, and murder any more "evil" than they are "good" in the absence of God? These are questions my opponent must answer if he wishes to affirm the objectivity of morality while denying the existence of God. My opponent argues that the foundation of morality could be found in evolution. As an evolutionary biology major, I think it is blatantly obvious that this is not the case. My opponent argues that acts like rape would decrease the fitness of an organism and as such would not be passed on to future generations. There are two issues with this, the first being that rape occurs all the time in the animal kingdom (so it's incredibly strange that this action should be "evil" for humans yet perfectly acceptable for our primate relatives). Secondly, and more importantly, if my opponent were correct it would mean that if we were to rewind time so that human evolution occurred in a different way, it's entirely possible that rape would be advantageous. Would this make rape "good"? The problem with inferring evolution as the basis of morality is that there is a clear distinction between "good/evil" and "advantageous/disadvantageous". The former refers to morality, while the latter refers to fitness. An act might be "good" yet decrease fitness (i.e. self-sacrifice) while another act might be "evil" yet increase fitness (i.e. adultery). But how can this be, if evolution is the basis for objectively "good" and "evil" moral acts? Clearly evolution is not concerned with whether an action is "good" or "evil". In this regard, evolution is completely indifferent; evolution is only concerned with the passing on of genes, whether this occurs by "good" or "evil" means is irrelevant. As such, evolution fails as an explanation for objective morality.P1: It is possible that a maximally great being exists.P2: If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.P3: If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.P4: If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.P5: If a maximally great being exists, in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.C1: Therefore, a maximally great being exists.In my last argument, each P2-P6 follow necessarily from P1. In other words, if P1 is true, then the conclusion follows inescapably. So, in order to deny the conclusion of the argument, my opponent must assert that it is not possible that a maximally great being (God) exists. 5. SummaryArguments in favor of God: 3Arguments against God: 0