Teleological Theory vs Deontological Theory

I will rehash the past rounds' arguments and their various responses, and address them either separately or collectivelyBoth my opponent and I have that the deontological system is straightforward. My conclusion that it is much more efficient in application thus stands. If nothing else, my opponent has conceded deontological ethics' efficiency. My opponent then objects by saying that society is complex and that therefore deontological ethics, being simplistic, is less applicable societally. This claim fails under several points. First, as I've contended and as my opponent has conceded, laws exist deontologically. Their wide societal implementation thus stands as a testament to its greater functional applicability relative to teleology. This directly negates my opponent's claim of deontology's inapplicabilitySecond, how is teleological ethics having complexity alone make it more applicable to society than deontological ethics? I argue that society's containing the element of complexity that deontology lacks holds no objective relevance or objection. Complex systems are products of simplistic elements. Even a complex computer program is only a collection of boolean bits. A complex society is made simply of individual people who make series of simple, everyday decisions from the moment they live unto the moment they die (unless they're vegetative or something). In any case, my opponent necessarily needs to further prove that the idea deontology's lacking complexity makes it less applicable than teleology; that teleology containing the element of complexity, regardless of all its other aspects, makes it objectively superior to deontology in terms of societal applicability. As I've already shown, deontology enjoys great societal applicable as evidenced by the existence of laws in our societies' structures. Earlier I stated that teleological ethics is, in practice, simply unfeasible. My opponent responds by saying, "Far from unfeasible, teleological ethics is much more plausible and practical then deontological ethics. "However, my opponent neither addresses the arguments which lead to that statement to which he nor presents any contention in favor of this assertion. The teleological extreme for which my opponent argues is, as I've put forth in my previous round, literally impossible to apply in practical scenarios. Let me reorganize my argument:1) There are an infinite number of potential actions in a given scenario or set of scenarios.2) Every action has an infinite number of potential consequences3) There are an infinite set of combinations of actions since the set of possible actions is, by itself, infinite.4) Teleology necessitates the evaluation of every set of actions and consequences in order to determine the single consequence which holds the greatest value under teleological calculi. This is impossible. My opponent presents a potential to this argument later in his rebuttal to my subjectivity argument in which he states that teleological systems do not dictate that a decision, based on consequential evaluations, is moral, rather that it can be moral: that it is suggested. This is not teleology. If, as according the the child-saving example, saving the 2 children and allowing the other to die is only a moral suggestion, then saving the 1 child and letting the other 2 die is only suggestively immoral. It means that, given one knows the results of some actions, whether or not these actions are moral is uncertain. If this is so, then the man who allowsthe 2 children to die in order to save 1 child can say that, under this additive definition my opponent as pinned on teleology, that no teleologst can declare him having done something immoral because no teleologist knows whether or not what he did was objectively moral or immoral. Again, this is not teleology. A real teleologist can say assertively that saving that 1 child and sacrificing the other 2 instead of vice versa is objectively immoral and that the objectively moral action is to save the 2 and let the 1 die. “(ii) Consequentialist Theories (or Teleological Theories): Theories that claim that what determines whether an act is right or wrong are its consequences. ”Teleology does not determine what may or may not be right via consequences, it determines what is or is not right. This is the established and correct definition as given in round 1. Thus my opponent's objections to my argument which says teleological ethics is much too objective stands. Taking the same example in deontological ethics, as long as the man who saves the 1 child did not commit any explicit immoral actions, he is allowed to save the child while remaining within moral bounds: his subjectivity is accounted for. New argument: Teleology is also much too subjectiveTeleological ethics, in practice, necessarily requires its practitioner to imagine the consequences of the actions he should perform. Here is where teleology becomes too subjective. Since the consequences being considered are arbitrarily contrived within the head of the practitioner of teleological ethics, resulting 'moral' decisions may ultimately be simply objectively immoral. Example 1: a group of friends is taken captive. The captors tell one man within the group that if he doesn't kill another member of the group, the entire group will be gassed and killed immediately. The man commits the objectively immoral action of killing another in his group since consequential ethics dictates it. The entire group is then beheaded. The man is then sent to hell for killing another for no reason. He burns for an eternity and, to this day, curses the person who told him that teleology is more correct than deontology. See what you guys have done? Example 2: A man, let us name him Obito, believes that the periodic mass extermination of humans will produce peace. He considers the consequence, the elimination of war and suffering, an end which justifies the means: killing massive numbers of people. Does Obito know for a fact that what he proposes will work as he proposes? No he does not. He does not know the future. Does the end justify the means (mass killing)? Obito thinks so. Will the end come about via those means? Obito thinks so. Is what Obito doing morally justified? Teleologically speaking, Obito believes that killing a lot of people will result in a greater peace which is ultimately, according to his own teleological calculus (however he determined it), more beneficial than not killing a lot of people. What's wrong with this picture? First, the teleological calculus used by Obito is arbitrarily contrived: it is Obito's own calculus; what Obito himself believes to be right; it is purely subjective. The consequential value of Obito's proposed result is subjectively determined by Obito alone. Second, the teleological consequences of his proposed action, mass human extermination, is also arbitrarily contrived by Obito. Thus, under teleological ethics, it is morally correct to do anything to anyone as long as the practitioner believes that his teleological system and calculations are correct. Far worse than deontological ethics, teleological ethics allows for a user to do anything at all (murder, rape, etc. ) and still consider it moral. Teleological ethics can be used to justify anything and everything as long as the user believes that it does. Closing statementI have shown that teleology is full of problems. It is impossible outside of hypothetical scenarios, especially when applied to complex situations, it is completely subjective and allows for massive loopholes, it is too objective in that it dictates moral decisions which ignores individual subjective desires (quite contrary to my opponent's argument), and that it is inefficient at best. Deontology, on the other hand, enjoys wide societal success via its placement in societal laws. It is much more efficient due to its simple, straightforward nature, and, unlike teleological ethics, accounts for individual subjectivity more so than teleology does. I do not claim that deontological ethics is perfect nor do I support extremist adherence to the deontological model. I agree that there are case examples that would indeed render deontological systems silly at times. My concluding statement from my previous round implied as much. My statement, however, also argued that the deontological system's faults (i. e. potential moral paradoxy) are far exceeded by those of the teleological system. Moreover, the benefits of deontology in general far exceed those of teleology. I apologize if my not explicitly naming specific arguments titularly was confusing, but I believe I've rebutted every rebuttable argument either with direct rebuttal or indirectly via my own arguments. ///.