God is a Sound Moral Basis

Dr. Craig, whom Pro uses verbatim, has an interesting definition of objective morality. He defines objective morality as right and wrong independent of human opinion. However, this definition can be used to prove that objective moral values do not have to come from god. What if I were to base the foundation of objective moral values in a bonobo named Joe? Would this be 'objective morality' under Craig's definition? After all, I'm not basing anything in human opinion. His idea of objective morality is clearly absurd. Craig could define objective morality as right and wrong independent of any conscious entity, but that raises the question of whether god is consciousPro argues that we need an afterlife in order to punish wrongs that were never righted during our human life. This view is irrelevant to moral ontology. Indeed, we are only discussing a deistic god at most. There is nothing about a deistic god that implies afterlife, or an afterlife where god makes right, as Cardinal Newman said. In this debate, we have defined god as a being worthy of worship. How, exactly, does Pro invoke the existence of an afterlife? That is merely an assumption about the 'being worthy of worship', and a wholly unjustified one.Pro asserts that on atheism, altruism and self sacrifice are 'stupid'. Pro never does anything to justify this claim, and instead goes on to proselytize about Jesus Christ. We can consider this a bare assertion, and we can dismiss it.Corn does not have any range of experience. Corn cannot feel sad, lonely, happy, angry, joy, content, satisfaction, etc. Our actions cannot possibly alter the state of corn. Ergo, we are justified in ignoring any questions about the morality of our actions in regards to corn. The question is simply a non-starter.Craig's 'knockdown' argument is logically valid, but it can be used against moral ontology from god as well.P1) If there exists some possible world where god is not identical to good, then there is no possible world where god is identical to good.P2) There exists a possible world in which god is not good, but evil.C) God is not identical to good.I've already answered Pro's objection about tautologies. My argument was that tautologies can be correct, so even if P1 was a tautology, you have not disproved it. Pro did not answer these assertions.The first part of Pro's statements on the is-ought gap is really just a rehash of his last round. Pro more or less argues that we can not get an is from an ought, and then name-drops in his usual WLC style. There's nothing new in that paragraph. It's just the same song and dance, so I won't say anything more on it than that.Duty has no basis in atheism? This is a positive claim made by Pro. If he had said 'Con did not prove duty can have a basis without god', then I would have to make a positive case. However, Pro does not do that. He made a positive claim, and positive claims require evidence. Unfortunately for Pro, no evidence is given at all. This positive claim is unjustified and unproven.Human beings are animals irrelevant of whether god provides a sound moral ontology. Homo saipens saipens will be classified as part of the animal kingdom no matter what. Human beings are 'just animals' even if only one of us is right, so what's the point of Pro saying this?I did not state that there is no purpose to life. I stated that there is no objective purpose to life. I did not exclude subjective purposes for the purpose of life, as Pro suggests.The is-ought distinction is false, as is statements and ought statemens can be easily connected through thought experiments. For the sake of this thought experiment, let's say that getting from Point A to Point B in the fastest way possible is a moral value. 'The fastest way from point to another is in a straight line' is an 'is' statement.Moral value: Getting from A to be B in the fastest way possible.Is statement: The fastest way from A to B is in a straight line.Ought statement: You ought to travel in a straight line.Therefore, 'is' statements can be connected with 'ought' statements.Ultimately, the is-ought gap refutes theistic ontology. Is god an is, or an ought? God is an 'is', as he exists. Pro argues that we ought to do something because god says it to be moral. Ergo, Pro gets moral values (oughts) from an is (god), closing the supposed gap between the two.A 'knockdown argument' as Dr. Craig might say, eh?Pro calls my reconciliation of determinism and moral responsibility 'outlandish', but he never actually shows anything about the particular claim to be false. Rather, he only claims that it is inconsistent with my worldview (inconsistent ≠ false), so we should dismiss it. I will address these apparent contradictions.Pro wonders how I can assert that thoughts and actions are not free, while suggesting at the same time that we can change the thoughts and actions of other people. When I say that we can change the thoughts and actions of other people, I am not suggesting that we can choose to change the thoughts and actions of other people. I am stating that we, by our actions (determined by past events), can change other's actions (also determined by past events). It is possible for me, in an action determined by past events, to do things to other people that would change their future behavior, as my action would become a past event that influences their future choices.Perhaps the person had no other choice. This still does not prevent us from doing things to that person that would influence their future actions for well-being. Sure, it could seem strange to impose consequences when no other choice was possible. Yet, from a determinists perspective, that's the history of punishment for you.Desire is an aspect of well-being. It is reasonable to talk about desire when well-being is discussed, as whether or not desires are fufilled contributes to our sense of well-being. Pro asserts that I am 'equivocating', but this claim goes without any argumentation behind it. It's safe to ignore that claim, then.The rapists desires were most fufilled *at the time*, but it ignores the larger well-being that is at play. We know from our third-person, narrative perspective that it is not good to live in a world where Bob can rape Mary, regardless of whether or not she was conscious. I've already explained why such a world would not be good, but that explanation went untouched.Here are my five questions for Pro to answer in R4, if he accepts. 1: If god is the moral ontology, what is the moral epistomology? Essentially, I am asking how we come to know what god wants. 2: Is something god because god says so, or does god say so because it's good? 3: How do you know that god is not evil? 4: How do non-existant beings provide a basis for anything? 5: What is the ontology of ontology?I told Pro that if he were to answer the questions I asked in R4, then neither of us could further any arguments. However, I want to allow him to answer some points that I brought up in this round. So, he can answer my questions and argue in R4, while I will simply answer his questions.Vale.