The Non-Aggression Principle is ethically sound

1. Subjects vs. ObjectsIt seems I was unclear as to what I was trying to say. The impression seems to have been given that I have given as a mere opinion what is a common understanding of what constitutes a property right in Western legal systems from the time of the Romans (the system which gives us the very language of "rights" in the first place, and under which we necessarily labor if we speak of them). Since this is central to the topic under examination it is worth going into with greater detail than my previous (evidently excessive) simplification.For rights to exist there need to be three elements: an active subject, a passive subject and an object. A subject is the person (juridical or physical) or group party to the juridical relationship which entails a right while the object is the "thing" (whether a physical object, a service or a faculty) at issue. The active subject is that which holds title to the right (for the purposes of this example let's say the right to property over a particularly shiny piece of obsidian rock), while the passive subject is the one that is obliged by this right to a certain conduct (positive or negative), in this case the negative conduct of abstaining from its use without the active subject's permission.In the case of self-ownership we have departed from this schema in which it is people who are regarded as subjects of law who have rights over things, the which rights must be respected by other persons; we say instead that people are objects which can be owned by other objects (or the selfsame object) but also can sell themselves to other objects as long as this is done with consent of said first object. This certainly sounds confusing, but only because it is absurd.Mr. Madara is correct to say that the premises of a syllogism ought not to be accepted simply because the answer is one we wish to accept, but rather the conclusion of must be accepted if the premises both be true and the logic valid. My argument, however, does not hinge on slavery being an outcome. The idea of self-ownership is contradictory in itself, I merely point out that as a consequence of its acceptance debt-slavery, among other aberrations, would once again be considered morally appropriate. A particular which would be avoided under my view of rights stemming from the dignity of man rather than from a particular right to property which we leave unjustified.2. Rights and Relationships"Even if there was some hypothetical situation in which only one person existed, it is true that this individual would still have the rights to life, liberty, and property... the question I pose to Con, then, is why does this matter?"It matters because they wouldn't. Rights are not metaphysical entities. Due to pre-legal considerations such as the dignity of man, those rights flow immediately from any interaction of one human being with another (both becoming in the instant of their interaction subjects of rights). We cannot, however, speak of a right to property (of oneself or anything else) as a "Meta-ethical" axiom, much less base an entire ethical system on this misconception.3. Personal Autonomy vs. Self-Ownership"Unless Con gives us a compelling reason to differentiate the two, we must continue to assume that the two go hand in hand."We must do no such thing. When one sets forth the claim that personal autonomy and self-property go hand in hand, one cannot eschew the burden of proving this is so. No one has the obligation to assume the libertarian worldview as if it were neutral, and much less when faced with its evident contradictions. In any case, this debate has given more than enough compelling reasons not to accept the novel idea of self-ownership and to instead consider autonomy as stemming from mankind's nature as individuals endowed with reason and free will.Personal autonomy does not stem from reducing people to the status of objects, but rather from the very nature and exercise of free will, which cannot truly be bought or sold. I can no more own my free will than I can hand it to someone else. I could, if I were forced to or felt there were compelling reasons for it, submit my own will to that of another; this submission however would either be one of mere actions (I only do what I am allowed or compelled to do, even if I will the contrary) or would be a willing submission, which could not be contrary to my free will. In no case would another be able to will for me. We do not need property to justify what stems necessarily from the object being considered4. Circular Reasoning"Circular reasoning is a very specific logical fallacy in which proposition X is used to support proposition Y and proposition Y is used to support proposition X. We do not see this here at all" We do indeed: Self-ownership leads us to the conclusion of property rights, but self-ownership is a property right over oneself. This is self-evidently circular reasoning, no matter how we try to hide our fallacy in unsubstantiated metaphysical language. Now, I am as much a fan of metaphysics as the next Thomist, but one can hardly posit a contingent reality such as a right to property as the first cause of legal rights and moral duties. Much less when one of the legal rights it is supposedly the cause of is the right to property itself. A self-caused cause to replace the uncaused cause. Odd to say the least.~ An Alternative ~As to my opponents three responses:a. Ethical Intuitionism While I am thrilled and flattered that Mr. Madara has enjoyed my desecration of Latin I must disagree that this is a correct portrayal of my argument. I do not propose in proposing the alternative of an ethical system based on the recognition of human dignity that self-ownership allows for slavery and is therefore wrong. What I am dong, however, after proving the inconsistency of the idea of self-property is showing that an alternative moral framework can exist which does not fall into nihilism and yet affirms the rights spoken of before, as well as offering greater protection of human dignity than that which is provided by my opponent's model. This model cannot be said to depend on ethical intuitionism because it does not begin with the conclusion but first affirms that human dignity must be recognized due to mankind's free will and capacity for reason, then it notes that slavery (even when initially not a fruit of coercion) is opposed to this dignity and is therefore immoral. From here it would no longer be a matter of simply not liking the conclusions of the non-aggression principle, but of openly rejecting them as immoral.b. Moral DesirabilityMy opponent seems to think that, as under the non-aggression principle it could conceivably be held that not allowing the death of a fellow creature due to our own greed could be less desirable than parting with what he needs to survive, we ought to excuse the fact that it deems both behaviors to be morally sound. Providing insulin to a man in death throes would in this scheme of things not be a moral obligation, but an act of extraordinary (even heroic) virtue. Something along the lines of St. Francis kissing the wounds of a leper. This hardly satisfies the accusation of being an insufficient moral code.c. Commission vs. OmissionLet us remember that, as per my opponent's definition, the non-aggression principle states “that only actions which violate another person's natural rights can be considered immoral”. In attempting to add acts of omission he is stretching the definition to its breaking point.If we base the right to life on the right to self-property, then we must consider there is a moral equivalence between helping a man avoid injury and helping a man not to stain his new suit. We do not ordinarily accuse a man of staining a suit simply because he didn't warn his fellow that the finger-food he is sampling has somewhat more sauce than he anticipated. We cannot accuse a man of taking another man's property right over his life simply because he did not want to lose his property right over his vials of insulin. It is only in recognizing the intrinsic dignity of mankind that we can see that the life of one man trumps the property of another. It is the recognition of the dignity of man which leads us to affirm that it is not only aggression but also inaction that can be regarded as a callous act of immorality. The impossibility of the non-aggression principle to truly protect the dignity of man is also evinced by Mr. Madara's answer to my objection to a possible slave trade. He says: “It isn't really 'slavery' anymore if the 'slaves' are giving their consent to being 'enslaved', in which case there is nothing about it that can rationally be called immoral.”Quite the contrary. Under the view of self-property once a man has sold himself into slavery (say to pay the college debts of a prodigal son) he no longer owns anything that could be considered to flow from his person. He no longer owns his free will, his work or even his life. He can be sold to another whatever his preference be on the matter, he can be separated from his family, whipped, worked to extenuation or even hanged for disobedience. Under a view which first defends the primacy of human dignity, there is nothing about this that can rationally be called moral.===============CONCLUSION=============== The existence of personal autonomy does not justify a belief in the self-contradicting notion of self-property. The moral significance of man stems from his intrinsic dignity and not from a right to property which has not so far been justified (mostly because such a prospect would involve evincing some of the internal contradictions). The non-aggression principle, in assuming the idea of self-ownership rather than human dignity as the basis of rights and morality is insufficient to uphold anything remotely recognizable as moral values and therefore must be considered unsound as an ethical system.