Tier Tournament [Top], R1: All nations have a right to nuclear weapons

RebuttalFirstly, MAD does not require all actors to be "perfectly rational". The principle of MAD simply requires the realisation of the threat of retribution which would be so if a nuclear missile was fired. Therefore religious extremism could be a case for the firing of a nuclear missile, but if there is said realisation then it would not be so. The same applies for hatred economic woes, a disintegrating power base and a long standing enemy. The point of MAD is that any cause for war is negated due to this. Your point about rationality infers that a country with perfect rationality would not be inspired by any of this. Economic woes, disintegrating power base, long-standing enemy cults of personality and mental deficiency were all issues involved in the Cold War. After all, respectively, the USSR were economically and politically weakening, they had been enemies with the U.S for a while by the time of the Carter Administration or even the Cuban Missile Crisis, Stalin did have a propensity for war and he was paranoid due to a brain condition[1]. Clearly the level of rationality needed isn't perfect, simply enough to think logically.Serious irrationality, cults of personality or mental deficiency could result in this. But any country which would be that militant about inflicting pain most likely would not obsess over how they did so. Nuclear weapons can be very expensive, and any country with that much irrationality poses a threat with or without nuclear weapons. Any country being this irrational, there would likely not be trade, and the risk of sanctioning would be very high. They would be on high alert and long story short, the threat would increase but also the awareness and prevention, therefore there wouldn't be a proportional increase. Their irrationality would have unparalleled drawbacks. For a country to be willing to drop a nuclear bomb on another country amidst all of the obvious retribution, the level of irrationality needed means that nuclear weapons would not be a cause of this problem. If this bill was passed, and then a dictator decided to invest in nuclear weapons, it meant he had adhered to the law beforehand and could not possible be that irrational.To somebody of supreme irrationality, nuclear weapons only gives him the opportunity to do more damage cheaper than he would have already wanted to do, therefore with or without nuclear weapons his irrationality would have caused the same amount of damage. Irrationality isn't an issue unless it is on a level in which nuclear weapons do not make much of a difference to what he would do. After all, there would be obvious retribution and succinct ramifications, and if they adhered to the law before, they cannot possible be that irrational. Land capacity and density does not make much of a difference to MAD in principle. After all, if a country did know one of its threats would be large, like Israel does, they would stockpile nuclear missiles and not to mention that the possibility of mutually assured destruction is still possible with enough nukes, therefore the deterrent idea is still valid.The main reason MAD survives is because, when one nation attacks another, the nation being attacked will be capable of retaliating powerfully. The advancement of technology has dramatically altered this dynamic, since the capacity to retaliate can be ameliorated, and as such, has removed the benefit of psychology.But the capacity to retaliate is still present. The key word is chance/capacity. If there is any possibility of retaliation, MAD survives, but unless nuclear defense of all sorts fail, and another countries' nuclear firing abilities are all destroyed, and no other country could help, then the capacity remains. That previous example there is too specific to base a whole policy on.Third, as I pointed out in R2, MAD ensures that the capacity to intervene in humanitarian crises is essentially nil. Many leaders would be concerned with the precariousness of their seat of power if they allowed other nations to intervene in their countries, and thus they would always at least respond with the threat, if not the actual usage, of nuclear strikes Intervening in humanitarian crises is still possible, because MAD logically only works with weapons of mass destruction. If the U.S for example send troops into Iran, what would happen is that Iran may want to retaliate with nuclear weapons, but then MAD will start from here, therefore the most they can do is attack via means which wouldn't attract nuclear intervention. Yes, there would be a slight decrease in intervention, but this will not be proportional as the amount of humanitarian crises would decrease, because the same instigator's would be more afraid to engage. But it would still be possible because MAD works by bluffing with your most powerful weapon. But the problem isn't just external - it's a method for holding power over the country's own people. Many nations have shown a willingness to utilize their superior firepower to level any rebel forces or perceived opposition, often with wide collateral effect. We can look to Syria, where Bashir al'Assad and his father were responsible for countless deaths in their efforts to quell opposition forces. There's no reason to believe that, given access to a nuclear weapon, people like Assad would not at least make a very real threat to use that weapon, preempting any efforts at unseating him.This is a very valid point, but allowing countries to have nuclear weapons does not mean no legislation on the use. It is obvious that it would be frowned upon, and that there is a risk of intervention. However, in this case, possibly nuclear in order to stop it. Dictators would fear the worst, as attempts to quell their leadership can now be done easily via nuclear missile, especially illegally from any opposition. Also, there is greater risk of their persecution as they now have availability to nuclear weapons. The level of protection and prevention would scale with the risk, and in cases of extreme danger, increase. There will be anomalies, which would be greatly dealt with.Fourth, even if we buy that MAD prevents nuclear wars, it doesn't prevent warfare as a whole. Despite the threat of nuclear launch, Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, the Middle East, the Balkans, as well as many African and Latin American nations have experienced tremendous conflict.[16] And each war creates another opportunity for their use.But then the principle of MAD prevents their use, as well as greater risk of persecution, and not to mention that the irrationality needed is not displayed by these countries just yet. Even North Korea, for if they were that irrational, South Korea would have already been attacked at the same scale. Nuclear missiles will just mean North Korea is on higher watch, and has a higher chance of being in trouble. Now, with the issue with the Cold War. Uncertainty is the key here, and I agree. But the uncertainty only arises because both parties have nuclear weapons. If we did not have this system, and we were caught in a scenario where one country has a nuclear weapon, then it is better to fear than to not have it, than for almost certain nuclear warfare. The capacity of any nation to engage in this sort of behavior is nil. In regard to your next point, if a country is as irrational as needed to pose a threat within the proposed system, then the country is irrational enough to pose a threat. Retaliatory benefit does already exist, but it doesn't excuse the fact that the holder of the nuke is more likely to fire if retaliatory benefit is lower when his opposition does not have a nuke. I urge the floor to realise that on the whole of things, even if you accept whiteflame's arguments, that overall war will decrease, as there are not that many irrational leaders who could get their hands on a nuclear missile easily, and that all dangers are highly situational and specific, not enough to build an argument upon.I do thank whiteflame for this challenging debate however.Sources:As before.