It Is Possible That A Maximally Great Being Exists

The Modal Ontological Argument is one that is commonly misunderstood. Many people try to knock down the logic, and fail. People question P3 for example, but this is founded on a basic modal axiom (S5)[1]. The problem with the Modal Ontological Argument is the first premise. First of all, I would like to qualify the different types of possibility, and the possibility relevant to this debate: (i) Epistemic Possibility[2] (ii) Subjunctive Possibility (Modal Possibility)[3] To say something is epistemically possible is to say that it may be true. It might even be subjunctively impossible; we just do not know. This is how most people use the word. However, to say that something like a maximally great being for example, is subjunctively possible (which the Modal Ontological Argument necessitates) is to say that a maximally great being is definitely not impossible. Or, more precisely; it is not possible for it to be subjunctively impossible that a maximally great being exists. That is a basic modal inference. This means, for the theist to meet their burden of proof in support of the first premise, they would have to show that it is not impossible for a maximally great being to exist. Noone Has Shown God's Existence To Be Logically ImpossibleThis whole section from Pro is based on a fallacy called switching the burden of proof[4]. Since claiming a maximally great being is possible is equivalent to the claim that it is not impossible for a maximally great being to exist with regards to modal possibility, then the advocate of the Modal Ontological Argument has to show that God is not impossible; the skeptic does not have to show God is impossible. Do We Have Warrant For Accepting God's Existence As Possible? Arguments that exist for God's existence do not show that God's existence is possible. This is a non-sequitur[5]. One can argue for something that is impossible, even if the argument fails miserably, and nobody even knows that the conclusion is impossible. Both lines of argumentation from Pro are fallacious. Thus, they can be dismissed. What Pro Must Do To Establish The ResolutionAs I previously stated, for the theist to meet their burden of proof in support of the first premise of the Modal Ontological Argument, they would have to show that it is not impossible for a maximally great being to exist. To do that, they would actually have to rule out that which would make a maximally great being impossible. What would make a maximally great being impossible? Lots of things. Lets just take for example non-sentient possible worlds (which include no sentient beings). They would make a maximally great being impossible because if a maximally great being is possible, there would have to be at least one sentient being in every possible world. A maximally great being cannot just exist in one possible world if a maximally great being is possible, as a maximally great being would have to exist in all of them essentially by definition if a maximally great being is possible. This follows from the modal axiom S5. Therefore, the theist would have to rule out non-sentient possible worlds before the burden of proof on the first premise is to be met. Now, the theist might be tempted to, but could not say that non-sentient worlds are impossible by asserting that "God exists in every possible world already", because that would assume that the first premise is true, which is the premise the theist is attempting to defend in the first place by trying to rule out non-sentient possible worlds! Thus, this line of refutation to my objection here would be begging the question. Now, I am not making the positive claim that the first premise is false. I have no burden to show that non-sentient worlds are indeed possible, and exist in some possible world as I am not making the assertion that this is the case. I simply assert that neutrality, or non-acceptance on the first premise is more reasonable than acceptance, which is a position I sufficiently supported as true (Pro has not shown that non-sentient worlds are impossible). This means that God's existence has not actually been established by the Modal Ontological Argument in context, as there is a huge question mark hanging over that sneaky first premise. There has to be a reason for the notion that non-sentient worlds are impossible before accepting the first premise of the Modal Ontological Argument. This is due to the fact that the first premise of the Modal Ontological Argument necessarily depends on non-sentient worlds being impossible. It cannot both be true that a maximally great being (a being who has necessary existence if existing in some possible world) is possible, and a possible world exists with no sentient beings. Non-sentient worlds being impossible is a required foundation of the first premise that remains as nothing more than an unjustified assumption. We are given no reason to think non-sentient worlds are impossible. Also it is in no way self-evident, or intuitively true that non-sentient worlds are impossible. There must be further external argumentation from Pro in order for him to meet his burden of proof on the first premise of the Modal Ontological Argument. ConclusionMy opponent's first argument in favor of the resolution was shifting the burden of proof, and his second argument was a non-sequitur. I argued that Pro has to rule out non-sentient worlds as impossible before we should reasonably accept the first premise of the Modal Ontological Argument as actually true. This is because these two statements cannot both be true:(1) There are non-sentient possible worlds(2) A Maximally Great Being exists in some possible worldSince (2) rests on the negation of (1), and Pro has not shown that (1) is false; the resolution has not been established. Sources [1] . http://plato.stanford.edu...[2] . https://en.wikipedia.org...[3] . http://en.wikipedia.org...[4] . http://www.nizkor.org...[5] . http://rationalwiki.org...http://www.youtube.com...