Expert's Debate competition R1: On balance, free will is more likely to exist than not

I play trap hole. I will concede all arguments leading up to "Causality the prerequisite for free will." They are quite inconsequential at this point. Causality the Prerequisite for Free Will(.)This time I'll begin by dealing with a small issue of quantum mechanics in the brain. My opponent states, "Quantum events are minuscule. The unpredictability of a certain quantum outcome entails, not, which choice I make, but something minuscule in nature. It has nothing to say about ordinary decision making." However, just a few sentences before he unknowingly answers his own question, " Is the uncertain position of an electron supposed to allow me to choose what to put on my hot dog?" In fact I will contend that hot dogs are the key to this question. The brain's decision making processes, at its base, is governed by a series of electrical feedbacks. The ability for neurons to send actions potentials (electricity) across synapses is only possible because of electrons[1]. The fact that electrons exhibit the wave/particle duality necessitated by quantum mechanics means that the brains very communication mechanism is dominated by quantum mechanics [2]. I'll agree with my opponent, quantum mechanical effects are minuscule in nature; neuro-communication effects are also quite minuscule in nature. =)Finally let's consider the topic of this contention. As I argued last round free will necessitates causality. In a world sans causality, free will could never be exercised. Free will requires causes to react to, otherwise the term becomes meaningless. Consider this thought experiment: "in a world devoid of all things, what free will could ever be enacted"? There is no free will that could be enacted. In that world there exists no brain, no causes, and nothing to act upon. In this way my opponents position is supporting the existence of free will. Causality is a necessary prerequisite. The Two Stage Model of Free WillAnd now for some definitional analysis that should make this debate pretty clear. Remember my opponent agrees that microscopic properties define the quantum world. Also recall that he is comfortable with macroscopic entities possessing emergent properties in addition to their microscopic properties. In this debate I am arguing free will as an emergent property confined within one basic definition:"I will define the 'Actor' of free will as the conscious mind. That is, the part of the human brain capable of self reference."In other words, if the conscious mind is capable of making decisions then we have found an emergent property called free will. At this point my opponent is not disputing that the conscious mind can make decisions. He is only arguing that those decisions are predictable and/or probabilistically defined. Regarding decision making processes the core of Con's argument is this: "More realistically we would say it's mostly due to determined factors with a small amount of quantum probability, but the fact remains the same that if quantum probability affects one decision over the other it is due to chance and not self causation."The faulty linchpin of all of this analysis is, "self-causation". Think about it. First of all, free will requires a causality in order to exist. Con's argument is tantamount to saying, "if we can predict the effects (or if they happen randomly) then there can be no free will." That's not coherent with any definition of free will. A conception of free will must be grounded in logical thought processes, otherwise free will is simply nonsense. Logical thought processes are predictable by their very nature; predictability and causality are therefore tenants of free will. The fact that my opponent (with the aid of a super computer that can account for quantum effects) could predict which shoe I would tie first has no bearing on free will. It only reflects on my personality and proclivities. If it did have bearing on my free will then newcomb's paradox could exist, this is obviously logically inconsistent. Secondarily I chose my actor for a very specific reason. The conscious mind can be it's own cause. On a very general level the conscious mind is capable of using conclusions to derive additional conclusions. We'd generally call this logic, but in terms of my opponents case it would be an instance of 'self-causation'. In more specific terms the conscious mind is capable of reflecting on past actions and deactivating or activating parts of the genome [3]. This serves as a meta-weighing mechanism for future actions (not governed by the conscious mind) and thus, the conscious mind can again become it's own cause. Let's Recap1. Choices are not inherently predictable because quantum effects underlay the brains basic mechanisms.2. Free will, outside of the probabilistic mechanism in #1, must rely on causality in order to exist. A universe sans causality could never have any conception of free will. 3. Free will should be predictable. Because the concept of free will must be grounded in logic and causality. 4. The conscious mind is capable of self-causation. The conscious mind will initiate effects which will become causes for future actions. Since the actor is defined (the conscious mind) and since my opponent agrees with emergent macroscopic properties (free will, in this case) this debate is quite clear. My opponent, who agrees that the question of free will is definitional, is only supporting the existence of free will inside of this framework. In order for him to win this debate he will need to clarify his own version of "self-causality" and be able to refute it. Otherwise, the definition which my opponent is fighting against is tantamount to "magic". I believe that the two stage model of free will is a much more cohesive definition.Sources1. http://www.mind.ilstu.edu...2. http://www.examiner.com... 3. Ridley, Matt. Genome: The Autobiography of a Species in 23 Chapters. HarperCollins 2013. Print.