The Modal Ontological Argument

Did he offer a defeater of the argument that I presented? I don't think so. It is worth mentioning that he accepting my definition of God, and he also accepted the validity of the argument. So, where do we disagree? He said "the problem with the argument seems to be P1". So let us be reminded of P1. P1: It is possible that a maximally great being exists. So what is the problem? He said "The problem is that there are other possibilities which seem just as plausible as the possibility of God existing, if not more plausible, that make god impossible if possible". Then he presented a counter-argument by Ryan Stinger, at which is titled "The Modal Ontological Argument for Atheism", and I will get to that in a second. But what about my opponents claim that "The problem is that there are other possibilities which seem just as plausible as the possibility of God existing, if not more plausible, that make god impossible if possible". My response: Remember, the argument makes at the very least a minimum case for a maximally great being. The argument says nothing about who or what such a being is. So these "other" possibilities that my opponent is referring to is granted, but what he fails to realize is ANY possibility that he thinks of, that "thing" or that "being" is. .. .God. So for example, lets say my opponent imagines a flying spaghetti monster as the possibility. Well, that flying spaghetti monster is God. See my point? It doesn't matter what you postulate the being to be, that being will be God, because remember, my opponent already granted the definition of God as defined in the argument, so any being that he wants to assume such a being to be (by names and titles), would be God. The argument DOES NOT make any claims of who the being is, the argument makes a minimum case for a MGB (maximally great being). So these "other" possibilities that he is referring to does NOTHING to negate the argument, as it stands. Now, on to his "Modal Ontological Argument for Atheism". He has P1 (A): A. It is possible that p. He then went on to defend P1 (A) by saying "we can plug the p with lots of things". He gave an example on what the variable p could be plugged as, "We could plug p with "omnipotence is not actualized in the actual world". My response: If omnipotence is not actualized in the actual world, then that would be a direct attack on my P4, which states that it is possible for God to exist in the actual world. What my opponent doesn't seem to realize is, if it is possible for a MGB to exist, then it cannot be impossible for it to exist. If a MGB's existence is even POSSIBLE, then my opponents P1 (A) is immediately false, because all possible necessary truths must exist in reality, based on the nature of "necessity". He then said "It certainly seems at least possible that omnipotence is not actualized in the real world and is just a concept". My response: Not so fast. God, by definition (that you also granted), is a necessary being, whose attributes are also necessary. If such a being exists, then its omnipotence MUST be actualized in the real world. If its omnipotence is not actualized in the real world, then it is not a maximally great being. Once you grant that the existence of a maximally great being is possible, you are granting that such a being exists, because all possible necessary truths must exist in reality. Either God's existence is necessarily true or necessarily false, and to negate one is to grant the other. So if a MGB's existence is even remotely possible, it must be true. He then went on to state the possibilities of other things, such as "gratuitous suffering" and all sentience being "physically realized". Gratuitous suffering would contradict the character of an omnibenevolent being, which is one of the attributes that my opponent granted in the definition of God, and "all sentience being physically realized" is not a necessary truth, and all I need to do is use myself as an example, as I do not experience all sentience so therefore there is at least one possible world at which all physical sentience is not possible, which is the actual world. I will accept my opponents "Defense of B" and move right along to "Defense of C". He stated: "Since it is possible for omnipotence to not be actualized in the actual world (based on A), then it follows necessarily that God does not exist. " My response: To say it is possible for omnipotence to not be actualized in the actual world is to state that it is impossible for a MGB to exist. My opponent was given a definition of a MGB, that he granted. If it is possible for such a being to exist, then my opponent is in error when he postulates possible worlds at which such a being DOESN'T exist. A maximally great being is a necessary being, and if a necessary being's existence is even possible, there can be no scenario or possible world at which such a beings existence is impossible. So what he is doing is stating "there is a possible world at which a maximally great beings power is not actualized". But how can there be a possible world at which a MGB's power is not actualized? That would make such a being NOT so maximally great, now wouldn't it? But at least the definition of a MGB was granted, and once that has been granted, if such a being DOES exist, then it is irrational to think of an actual world at which such a being's power is not actualized. In reference to his D, he stated "it is not possible that God exists". My response: My opponent's premises were false, so there is no need to accept the conclusion as true. Why? Because he fails to give reasons why there isn't at least one possible world at which a MGB's existence is true. In order for him to successfully refute the argument, he has to point out some kind of logical incoherency based on the concept of God, which I don't think he can do. The concept of such a being certainly seems logical. There are no logical absurdities based on the concept, so it is not irrational to think that there is a possible world at which such a being could exist, at the very least. The problem is, if it can be true in some possible world, it can be true in all possible worlds. And if it can be true in all possible worlds, it must be actually true in all possible world, including the actual world, because all possible necessary truths must be actually true. My opponent then concluded that it is a stalemate between both of our arguments. He states "I can say that God cannot be possible, because all those plugs for p are possible, and they make God impossible if they are possible". My response: I've offered refutation of my opponents "p's", and I will wait for his response. He states ". .. all I have to do is undermine the Modal Argument for Theism to be favored in the debate. Both arguments follow modal logic perfectly, and both of the things they propose as possible seem reasonable, but they both cannot be true. Pro has to show why we must go with the Modal Argument for Theism, because a stalemate doesn't prove God exists, and he has the burden to prove God exists". My response: I must maintain that my opponent offered no good reasons why his premises were true, and I believe I've stated why. Conclusion: The Modal Ontological argument remains valid. I believe I've successfully refuted the Modal Ontological Argument for Atheism. What Con must do to refute Pro is to demonstrate how the concept of a MGB is logically absurd, as that is the only way the argument can be refuted. I don't think neither he nor anyone can do this. But I would love to see them continue to try.