Naturalism and evolution cannot sensibly both be believed.

Thank you Con."I am stating overall the true beliefs are necessarily tied to the action."The claim that true beliefs are "necessarily" tied to the action is an unwarranted one. What reason, on naturalism, do we have to think that our beliefs must be true in order for them to produce a specific action? The purpose of evolution is survival and reproduction. It matters not whether the behaviors that work towards this goal are caused by true beliefs or false beliefs. The only thing that matters for evolution is that the behaviors themselves occur. The idea here is not, for example, that thinking tigers are friendly corresponds to the behavior of running away from them. The key is why it matters if we think tigers are friendly or dangerous, so long as the belief corresponds to the behavior of running away. In one possible world, I might think that tigers are dangerous, and this belief might send neuron signals that correspond to the behavior to get away from the tiger. In another possible world, I might think that tigers are friendly, and this belief might send the very same neuron signals that correspond to the very same behavior to get away from the tiger. Given these two possible worlds, one can ask the question: Which would evolution prefer? As evolution is concerned only with beneficial behaviors, it is clear that evolution would not have a preference between the two possible worlds. The behavior in each of the two possible worlds (to get away from the tiger) is the same! Both are equally beneficial. This goes to show that even if each of our individual beliefs corresponds to a correct behavior, the probability of the belief itself being objectively true could be said to be 1/2 (50%.) This supports the given argument that naturalism and evolution cannot sensibly both be believed."Furthermore Pro ignores my other defenses. Such as “An understanding of injury and threat is an a better and more efficient solution than a false belief” and “A proper understanding of the threat is less likely to fail”." This defense (I use the singular version of the word because the second statement is repetitive of the first) builds off of the misunderstanding of the original examples, of which I discussed in the last round as well as in this one. There is no reason to think that "understanding" or "believing" something to be a threat should make any difference on naturalism. Look back to the example above of the two possible worlds. In one world, the situation was believed to be a threat. In the other, the situation was not. However, the same behavior (remember it is only the behavior that matters) occurs. So given naturalism, a belief of the threat is certainly not "less likely to fail" so long as the probability of the behavior occurring without belief in the threat is the same, as has been demonstrated. "Pro is narrowly focused on one situation where one belief will cover it. This is also a fallacy of composition. A false belief in one situation doesn’t cover safety in all situation. I am talking about the totality of all beliefs, but Pro is only talking about one."To the contrary, I am not talking about only one situation. We both discussed a specific example or two, but I would be happy to discuss further examples so as to not be accused of a fallacy of composition, as I wouldn't want Con to think I am only focusing on one example (an example that was provided by Con.) A new example has been provided, which demonstrates Con's misunderstanding on the subject:"Another example. Let’s assume evolution selects the belief that tigers are friendly to calm a man’s nerves when he is trying to sneak past them. The man doesn’t want to bother the lions as that would be rude. It may help him in that situation, but when a lion wanders into camp, this belief will kill him."Con mistakenly equates the belief that tigers are friendly to the behavior of calmness. That is a misrepresentation of evolution given naturalism. On naturalism, as in one of the possible worlds described above, it could be that the belief that tigers are friendly corresponds to the opposite behavior of calmness. Maybe in this possible world the belief that tigers are dangerous corresponds to the behavior of calmness, putting the man at risk. This goes to show that the content of the belief does not matter as long as it corresponds to the desired behavior. The only thing taken into consideration on naturalism is which neuron signals (or beliefs) will correspond to the behavior which benefits survival and reproduction. There is no room for the need of true beliefs given naturalism and evolution."Objectively true beliefs are better overall"I am curious as to how Con justifies the idea of objectively true beliefs at all. I don't want to get off topic, but I would quickly point out that on naturalism, there is no warrant for thinking that anything at all is objectively true. This is demonstrated by Alex Rosenberg and several other naturalists who deny the existence of objective truth."Under a pragmatic theory of the mind beliefs are formed by the environment and can be identified by understanding the environment."I have no disagreement with how beliefs are formed on pragmatism. My objection is that there is no way of identifying any sort of objective truth content to these formed beliefs. I fail to see the relevance of pragmatism vs a Cartesian-esque theory. The argument I have given is not concerned with how beliefs are formed, but with the truth content of the beliefs. Affirming pragmatism doesn't quite absolve you from the argument's conclusion, but it's a nice try."The argument hinges on what the would would be like if the antithesis of naturalism was true."I disagree. If the antithesis is true (objectively), then it follows that naturalism is objectively false. If the thesis is true (objectively), then it also follows that naturalism is objectively false. Inherent in the antithesis would be that naturalism is false. Con cannot take one part of the antithesis and leave out the part with which they disagree. Let's take a look at the proposed thesis and antithesis:Thesis: The probability that our cognitive faculties are reliable given naturalism and evolution is low.Antithesis: The probability that our cognitive faculties are reliable given theism and evolution is high.If our world is the thesis, then naturalism and evolution cannot both sensibly be believed due to the low probability of the reliability of our cognitive faculties which produced these beliefs. If our world is the antithesis, then theism is given. Either way, naturalism cannot be accepted so long as the theory of evolution is affirmed.To recap, Con has given us no reason to think that true beliefs are tied to adaptive behavior. I have responded to each of Con's defenses (most of which contain the same objection stated several times with varied wording.) Con affirmed objective truth, though this is in direct conflict with the same naturalism Con accepts. The idea that pragmatism excludes one from the conclusion of the argument has been shown to be false. We saw that whether our world is the thesis or the antithesis, naturalism and evolution cannot both be sensibly believed. We looked at two possible worlds, one in which a true belief was held, and another in which a false belief was held. We saw that in both possible worlds, the belief corresponded to the same behavior. This supports the idea that evolution selects for beliefs that correspond to behavior, but that the truth content of these beliefs are irrelevant. Con has been unable to show that any of the premises of the argument (which I will post not to be repetitive but for the convenience of readers) are more likely false than true. Thus, we have been given no reason to deny the conclusion that belief in both naturalism and evolution is self-defeating and cannot sensibly be accepted. 1) The probability that our cognitive faculties are reliable given both naturalism and evolution is low.2) Anyone who affirms both naturalism and evolution and sees that the probability that our cognitive faculties are reliable given both naturalism and evolution has a defeater for the reliability of their cognitive faculties.3) Anyone who has a defeater for their cognitive faculties has a defeater for any belief he thinks he has (this would include the beliefs regarding naturalism and evolution.)4) Anyone who affirms naturalism and evolution has a defeater for naturalism and evolution.5) Therefore, the belief in both naturalism and evolution is self-defeating and cannot sensibly be accepted.Sources:http://www.calvin.edu...http://www.iep.utm.edu...