Solipsism is entailed by logical extension of Idealism

1. Con's case for Idealism onlyIt doesn't work, and here's why: P1: All contingent ideas are caused by some mind. P2: I experience ideas that are independent of my will. P3: Ideas that are independent of my will must be caused by a mind other than my own. C1: Therefore, a mind other than my own exists.Premise 3 is false. In a mental reality, you create the entire reality, including things that you don't want to see or interact with. Imagine it like a person with delusions of persecution. They don't want to be persecuted, but their mind shows them the persecution independently of their will. Likewise with mental realities, things that are beyond your control are still evolved from your own mind. Another example is taking a hallucinogenic drug. This induces your mind to show you things that you didn't ask for, and are beyond your control. The source is still your mind, therefore the argument is false.He then goes on to provide an argument for why God should exist, which isn't really in the scope of this debate but I'll address it for the sake of sportsmanship. Here I've copy pasted the argument and shown why it's invalid by switching out 'God' for 'a matrix that holds every brain in a jar' without invalidating the conclusion: P1: Every existing thing has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause. P2: If I have an explanation of my existence, that explanation is a matrix that holds every brain in a jar P3: I am an existing entity. C1: Therefore, the explanation of my existence is a matrix that holds every brain in a jar.Besides that, premise 1 is wrong because it assumes everything is caused, except for presumably an uncaused caused which is God. In a mental reality however, if God can be uncaused, then so can everything else, because an Objective mind has the same properties as my own mind.The next argument he brings up is an ontological argument for God, but this is too far beyond what I made this debate for. We are arguing over whether or not Idealism infers solipsism, not whether or not there is a god. I'm not going to respond to this argument, as it's a new debate in itself, one which I've done many times and don't intend to do here.unfortunatetly this is all the new material Con brought up to support his BoP. Before moving onto my arguments, I'm going to demonstrate the sort of reality that Con is building with his entire case and why it doesn't work: Shown here is S(M)1, which is me/you, the person who is reading this. You live in a mental reality that is evolved from your mind. ~S(M) is a mind separate to self. They are the minds that Con needs to show as being independent minds in order to have Idealism without solipsism. What Con has failed to show however is that ~S(M) is not actually created by your mind. They live in your mental reality, but how are they different to a potted cactus sitting by your window? Con claims it's because they can do things which are against your will, but this is absurd because a tree can fall on me against my will and that doesn't mean a tree is a mind separate to me. There are no identifyable properties that allow us to identify other minds. Not only this, but there is no way for other minds who live in our mental reality to perceive the same reality we do. It lacks an epistemic mechanism to share information. I've shown why an E(M) cannot exist and Con has agreed that it can't. there is therefore no method by which an Idealistic universe can exist without it being inherent solipsistic.in this summary of the Aff case I will deal with any issues that Con took with the premises:A) Epistemological necessity of solipsism in mental reality1. Minds separate to self exist if and only if entities perceived as separate to self express like properties to minds separate to self.Con agreed in round 3, other minds are things we should be able to identify.2. If both Mind of self and Minds separate to self exists, there must exist an external epistemeological mechanism that causes entities perceived as serparate to self to express like properties to minds separate to selfAs shown, in order for us to perceive the same mental reality and not different mental realities, there needs to be a mechanism by which information from one mind can reach another mind. 3. An external epistemological mechanism defeats IdealismCon agrees.4. There is no external epistemological mechanism.Con AgreesC: Minds separate to self do not exist. Because we cannot perceive the same reality without information exchange, your reality is necessarily solipsistic.B) Modal argument against Idealism without Solipsism1. There exists a possible world in which Idealism (I) is instantiatedThat is to say, Idealism is not impossible.2. There exists a subset Solipsism (S), contained in the set of all I.That is to say, All solipsistic realities are Idealistic.3. I minus S exists if and only if there exists a essense P who is both a property of S(M) and it's own discrete entity.For Idealism to exist without Solipsism, there needs to be something that can link minds together, and such a thing would therefore be both an entity of itself and a property of the mind. Con both agreed and disagreed with this point. He took issue with it, but later argued that a god-mind is indeed necessitated. 4. In no world I, can P exist simultaneously as an entity and a property.A mind cannot be another mind's property without being inherently evolved from it. It either exists independently of that mind or is evolved from that mind. There is no middle ground, and thus a linking mechanism is not possible without an external reality.C: The subset I minus S does not exist.Conclusion:Con attempted to show that I minus S can exist by claiming that:1. Logical truths transcends the mind and thus must be external to it, which means Solipsism is false.2. Things that occur in my mental reality against my will must be the product of other minds.3. My mind must be created by another objective mind.1 was shown to be false because it's actually true of Idealism, not Solipsism specifically. It was also shown to be false because logical laws apply to only reality, as there is nothing beyond reality, thus a solipsistic reality comfortably explains how logical laws exist.2 was shown to be false because inanimate objects in a mental reality can also act against my will, yet they don't have minds, therefore things acting against my will is not evidence for another mind.3 was shown to be false because my mind doesn't need a cause any more than a god mind does. Furthermore, even if minds did need a cause, it could well be a physical cause like the matrix, where all our brains are in a jar.The affirmative case showed that I minus S cannot exist because:1. The subset would require an epistemic mechanism to share information between minds, which (as Con agreed) defeats Idealism2. A god-mind or any other information sharing mechanism that is itself a mind cannot exist because then it would be both evolved from the mind and not evolved from the mind, which is a contradiction.Therfore, Solipsism is entailed by logical extension of Idealism.Heil Smithis.