It is morally permissible for victims to use deadly force as a deliberate response

I value morality. All ethical decisions are made with regard to a social narrative defined and created by interaction and openness to the Other. Butler writes:[1] “the “I” encounters the Other … as a being fundamentally exposed, visible, seen, existing in a bodily way and of necessity in a domain of appearance. It is, … this exposure that I am that constitutes my singularity. I cannot will it away, for it is a feature of my very corporeality and, … my life, … the social theory … in its insistence on the impersonal perspective of the norm, establish[es] my substitutability? … , I am exposed, and this is as much a part of my … sociality, as the way that I become recognizable through the operation of norms.” Thus the standard is actualizing our relation to the Other. My burden is to show that our relation to the Other justifies a prohibition of deadly force. Moreover, prefer this standard since ethics is impossible without understanding our relation to the Other. Butler 2: “this way in which we are, from the start, interrupted by alterity and not fully recoverable to ourselves, indicates the way in which we are … ethically implicated in the lives of others. …our incoherence … establishes the way in which we are implicated, beholden, derived, constituted by what is beyond us and before us. If we say that the self must be narrated …then we say that we cannot survive with an unconscious. … In the language which articulates the opposition to a non-narrativizable beginning resides the fear that the absence of narrative will spell a certain threat … to life, and will pose the risk… of a … the death of a subject who cannot … fully recuperate the conditions of its own emergence.” Moreover, my framework precludes the AC since it is grounded in ontology. The way we create and exist under ethics precludes metaethics since it determines the way we adopt normative principles. I contend using deadly force is a violation of our actualization to the Other. First, the face-to-face encounter with the Other requires a prohibition on violence, no matter what the Other has done. Butler 3: “I cannot disavow my relation to the Other, regardless of what the Other does … responsibility is … a matter of … making use of an unwilled susceptibility as a resource for becoming responsive to the Other. Whatever the Other has done, the Other still makes an ethical demand upon me…I am … precluded from revenge by virtue of a relation I never chose. … [sometimes] responding to the ‘‘face’’ of the other feels horrible … But the primary and unwilled relation to the Other demands that we desist from … aggression “ Second, deadly force denies our shared vulnerability to always be affected by the Other. Butler 4: “It is always possible to say, ‘‘Oh, some violence was done to me, and this gives me full permission to act … Many atrocities are committed under the sign of a ‘‘self-defense’’ … because it achieves a permanent moral justification for retaliation, … and can have no end. … Violence … delineates a physical vulnerability from which we cannot slip away … but which can provide a way to understand that none of us is … utterly separate, but, rather, we are … in each other’s hands, [and] at each other’s mercy. “ With that, let's respond to my opponent's arguments. My opponent's sole argument was, essentially, that it's human nature to respond with deadly force when we're in this kind of situation.To start with, there's absolutely no warrant to anything that he's said what-so-ever. His only way of kind of justifying his argument was that snakes only attack you if you aggress on them first and Rome became a successful empire because they fought people? Nothing in it makes any kind of sense. But moreover, even if he's right that acting violently is in our nature, that doesn't make it a permissible action. That's like saying that if it were in my nature as a person to go on a mass killing spree and burn down fifty orphanages that I would be justified in doing so "just because", which makes no kind of sense. But furthermore, his argument is essentially the is/ought fallacy where he's saying that because humans are this way, that they ought to be this way. But that's like saying that because we're all jumping off a cliff to our deaths that we ought to jump off a cliff to our deaths. But even if you don't buy any of that, even if you buy his argument, it's not sufficient to win the debate. If he's winning his argument, all he's proven is that it's in human nature to be violent, but that doesn't prove why it's a permissible response to the resolution. He's not providing any kind of argument for that, so he can't win the debate. What's an even more damning flaw is that my opponent has provided no kind of framework or weighing mechanism under which to weigh arguments presented in the debate. I'm the only one with any kind of framework to go off of in this debate. This means that a) you have to operate under my framework, which means you negate because killing people for any reason is bad under my framework and b) it's impossible for him to fulfill his affirmative burden of proving the resolution true if we have no way to weigh his arguments, which means you negate anyway. [1] Butler, Judith. Giving an Account of Oneself. diacritics, Volume 31, Number 4, Winter 2001, pp. 22-40 (Article)