Morality is an Idea

Like he, I think it is a vital issue and hope our discourse can encourage future discussions on the topic. As a point of clarification, the resolution can be read "Morality is just an idea. " (See the comments. ) Jason opens his first round by explaining his position, and while I agree with its premise, I do not agree with its conclusion. I stand beside my opponent in asserting that morality cannot be found in the physical universe. However, my opponent comes to the conclusion that since it cannot be found in matter, then it must be a product of human thought. His reasoning is that "by default, nothing should be assumed to exist until proof is given. " What "nothings" are assumed not to exist and what constitutes enough "proof" to accept their existence? Given the ambiguity of the statement, my opponent has licensed himself to claim that anything he disagrees with does not exist. This is question begging. My opponent must prove his position, not merely say "it is so. " My opening round predicted the worldview nature of this debate. My opponent wants to simply dismiss metaphysics, but fails to explain why we all should take his assumptions for granted. In his worldview, metaphysical entities do not exist because--according to his aforementioned axiom--metaphysical entities have not been proven to exist. Proof, however, will always fall short because his view on epistemology will always reject the evidence. Ultimately, in a worldview that is only matter and motion, morality must either be made of matter or a result of natural forces, such as the brain patterns of a person. All this is to say, my opponent should explain why his assumptions about reality should be accepted over all others before using them as irrefutable proof. I will now answer my opponent's rebuttals to my opening arguments. My point about the seriousness of evil was not meant as singular proof. No single sentence in my argument stands alone as proof. I ask the readers to reread my opening paragraph. In it I state that "We are discussing the nature of reality itself and in so doing must consider the real implications of our theories. " We must ask which theory works in practice and makes sense of human experience. In order to accomplish this, I made two observations about morality which I called moral distinctions and moral obligation. This should answer my opponent's question, "How is your definition of moral obligation anything other than a physical act, one that is exercised in accordance with an idea? " In laying out my case, I am making a distinction between the act of determining the rightness or wrongness of an action (moral distinction) and the act of holding someone accountable to good conduct (moral obligation). I am merely giving names to two observable actions. I argue that the act of moral obligation assumes--consciously or unconsciously--absolute morality whereas my opponent attributes the act to an attempt at persuasion. Pressuring someone to conform to one's ideals is no proof that morality is just an idea, since the idea being offered might be based on adherence to an absolute moral law. Indeed, the only reason one would want to press their ideas on another is if they feel they are unequivocally correct about their idea--that it were more than opinion. In this way, any attempt at moral obligation is an absolute stance on the position, as though the idea were correct regardless of society or circumstances, an idea which flies in the face of subjective morality. To clarify for my opponent, a subjective morality is one in which there are no moral absolutes. If morality is an idea, then it is subjective since all ideas generate from many subjective human minds. An objective morality is one in which there are moral absolutes. If morality is a set of absolute moral laws (for instance), then man's opinion on the matter is irrelevant. If subjective morality can be shown to be irrational then morality cannot be just an idea. That's what I intend to show. My opponent argues that "ideas can very easily function as 'objective' moralities. " He goes on to say, "A whimsical insistence that everyone must wear purple hats on April 13 of every year ending in 0 is every bit as objective and universal as Kant's categorical imperative if one is to take a lack of relativism to be the definition of objectivity. " The statement itself is a logical contradiction. He says relativism (whimsical insistence) equals objectivity (objective and universal), and in the same sentence he says objectivity could be taken to mean the lack of relativism. My opponent cannot have it both ways. Either relativism and objectivity are opposing notions or they are equal. He must select just one of these definitions if his argument is to be taken seriously. In my opening remarks I said, "The only way to be TRUE to the notion that morality is an idea is to remain wholly within the realm of moral distinction and avoid moral obligation altogether," (emphasis added) to which my opponent responded, "Are you saying that morality can't be an idea because people force others to act in accordance with it? This would imply that people can't act on ideas. " Once again my opponent refutes a single sentence out of context. In the preceding sentence I say, "Telling others what they ought to do contradicts the very philosophy of relative morality. " My argument is not that people CAN'T act on ideas. My argument is that people who insist their ideas are correct DENY the premise that morality is relative. Since this theory of morality leads to irrationality in practice, it ought to be rejected. My opponent says that "individual thoughts and feelings are not wholly subordinate to physical might. " Again, my opponent is not reading my debate. My very next statement says, "In other words, those in power make the rules. " Physical might is not necessary. Might-makes-right can be understood that those able to enforce their ethics are the ones whose ethics are correct. In a relativistic moral system, this must be the case. If morals are just ideas, then the only ideas that matter are the ones enforced. Of course, my opponent rejects this as would most of us. My argument is that subjective morality leads to might-makes-right thinking, which is evidence of the theory's flaws. My opponent wraps up by saying that I've "succeeded merely in proving that to treat morality lightly is disastrous. " I will reiterate my argument since my opponent does not wish to read it in full. I am arguing that morality cannot be just an idea because of the impossibility of it. It leads to relativistic morality. Relative morality fails since engaging in moral obligation contradicts the premise. To say morality is subjective but insist that others follow it is irrational UNLESS one believes their idea to be based on something with greater authority. To insist that others adhere to your ideas is to assume your ideas represent truth and not mere opinion or fantasy. In conclusion, my opponent struggles to rationalize his position. First, he argues that morality is an idea based on a vague assumption of what can't exist. Second, he argues that relative morality equals objective morality without making a case as to why these two notions should be considered synonymous. Third, he attempts to refute my argument out of context--a straw man defense. I have shown that relative morality cannot be rationally used in practice. Relative moralists behave like objective moralists. They cannot walk the talk. Only objective morality is rational both logically and in practice. Morality, if it is just an idea, cannot be objective. Therefore, morality is not just an idea. I look forward to his second response, which is sure to keep this debate engaging and interesting.