Moral Relativism (Pro) vs. Divine Command Theory (Con)

I will make two arguments, the first will explain why the divine command theory (henceforth referred to as DCT) is a valid ethical theory and the second will refute relativism. I will then respond to Pro's contentions. Divine Command Theory The basic argument to support the DCT is as follows: Premise 1: God exists Premise 2: Morality exists Premise 3: God created everything that currently exists Conclusion: God created morality Taking this conclusion that God created morality, then He has ultimate moral authority. It is then not unreasonable to conclude that morality comes from God and to do good is to adhere to His commands. Now to verify the premises: God exists because every thing and every event in the universe has contingent existence, meaning that it depends on something else for its existence. If everything in the universe is contingent then the universe is contingent, because the universe is by definition simply every physical thing as a whole, and lots of contingent things do not make a non-contingent thing simply by being compiled together. As the universe is contingent it depends on something else for its existence, this thing must be outside the universe and non-contingent (in order to avoid infinite recurrence). This is God. Morality exists because both intuition and reason agree that there is a certain way we ought to live. If morality did not exist then both relativism and DCT would be refuted, thus ending the debate in a tie. Pro must therefore agree that morality exists in order to have any chance at winning the debate. God created everything that exists due to the logic employed when verifying the first premise. Now I have affirmed the veracity of all three premises, the conclusion deductively follows. If God created morality then DCT is by far a more veridical account of morality than relativism, for God has a much greater understanding of morality than society does. Refutation of Relativism Relativism is the belief that: X is good = X is socially acceptable (where X is a particular action) Yet this (which I will refer to as the relativistic equation) contravenes Hume's Law. It takes a descriptive statement (that X is socially acceptable) and makes it into a prescriptive statement (that we ought to do X). This leap is logically unjustified. (1) It is also refuted of the open-question argument (2), the relativistic equation logically entails that 'whatever is socially acceptable is necessarily good' is true. Yet it is not vacuous to assert its falsity. Indeed, it is almost certainly false. For example, slavery was socially acceptable in the 18th century but this did not make slavery good. It also makes the statement 'what is socially acceptable is good' tautological if the relativistic equation is correct. Another counter-intuitive implication of relativism would be that it is impossible to disagree with social standards. Bizarrely, if relativism was correct then Nelson Mandela would have acted immorally by standing against the social norm of apartheid. Therefore, relativism is an innately flawed ethical theory, and even if DCT is refuted this does not make relativism any better, which is Pro's BoP. Responses to Pro's Contentions Pro's use of the is/ought gap does not necessarily refute DCT because DCT is based on hypothetical imperatives. What this means is that DCT does not simply say: 'We ought to do X because God wishes X' The qualified version of DCT recognises that all men rationally desire heaven, or eudaimonia. Therefore our morality is formed by the following: 'If we desire heaven, then we ought to do X if God wishes X' This is a hypothetical imperative; it provides a reason WHY we ought to do as God wishes. This avoids Hume's Law as it does not assert an unqualified 'ought'. Pro's second contention is that morality is evolutionary based (supporting the worldview of evolutionary ethics). However, in the context of this debate I am unsure why Pro is advocating evolutionary ethics because the debate is about moral relativism and DCT, bringing another ethical theory is outside the scope of this debate. Anyhow, I will refute evolutionary ethics in order to prevent it being misconstrued as a contention to DCT. Firstly, it commits the naturalistic fallacy as it defines what is good by what is evolutionary beneficial. Just because some of our ethical maxims coincide with that which is evolutionary beneficial, does not mean that they are one and the same. Secondly, not all of our morality can be accounted for by evolutionary benefit. For example, many believe that homosexual marriage and relations ought not to be banned, despite the allowance of it not actually having any evolutionary benefit. Now I will respond to the Euthyphro dilemma. The dilemma is based on the misconception that all moral truths are identically sourced. Instead, there are two types of moral truths: Necessary moral truths: These moral truths are always good/bad regardless of any moral authority or the structure of the universe. For example, unnecessary cruelty is necessarily bad. God could not command it to be otherwise in the same way that he could not create a square circle. Some moral goods are necessarily good in a similar way that circles are necessarily circular. Therefore God is not limited by some external 'good' as some things are good/bad in their own essence. There is no higher or separate criteria. Contingent moral truths: The moral status of these truths are contingent on the structure of the universe. And so God defines contingent moral truths inasmuch as he defines the structure of the universe. For example, throwing someone on a fire is morally bad because the universe was created in such a way that humans are flammable. We can conceive of a universe where fire does not harm humans. Therefore the immorality of the act of throwing someone on a fire is a contingent moral truth. To conclude, both prongs of the euthyphro dilemma are avoided by differentiating between kinds of moral truths. God defines contingent moral truths by the way He designs the universe, not simply on a whim. God is subject to moral truths that are necessary, but this does not infringe on His authority in the same way that His inability to create a square circle does not. Finally, I will respond to your attempts to disprove God's existence. The paradox of the stone is based on a misunderstanding of God's omnipotence. God's omnipotence is that he can do anything that His nature allows. His nature does not allow Him to create a stone that he cannot lift because 'a stone that God cannot lift' is as nonsensical as saying 'a square circle'. Furthermore, the concept of an unliftable stone is nonsensical. Lifting is another way of saying 'moving up', so the paradox becomes 'can God create a stone that he cannot move up?'. The only way a stone could not be moved up if there was no space in which to be moved up into, but that would imply that the stone is large enough to encompass all of space. Yet if this stone exists it would encompass the earth as well. Empirically, such a stone cannot exist because the earth is not all stone. To summarise, a stone that cannot be lifted cannot exist, so the paradox is sophistry. The prediction paradox does not infringe on God's omnipotence because he imposes his own limits by virtue of his omniscience, as opposed to an external limiting factor. You are also making the mistake of comprehending God's existence in a temporal sense, as if God is a being inside space-time. Instead, God is a transcendent being; that which is outside time and space. If He is outside time then the concept of prediction is invalid, so the paradox fails. (1)http://rationalwiki.org... (2)http://plato.stanford.edu...