Individuals have a moral obligation to assist those in need.

Procrastination for the win. case is below since I can post google doc links for cases.https://docs.google.com...=With that, let's return to my opponent's case for some rebuttals. Starting with an overview to his contentions:The problem with his contentions is that he presupposes we are morally responsible for the welfare of other people, yet provides no warrant for why we hold this responsibility to other people. The entire driving force behind his argument for altruism is that we are being constantly held morally responsible for them, and thus are obligated to act in an altruistic manner. The problem is he never warrants the existence of this moral responsibility, but only pressupposes it's existance. Without this warrant, there's literally nothing linking altruism to being morally obligatory. If he fails to prove this link, presume neg.But secondly, his presumption that moral responsibilty towards others exists is abusive, because presupposing this is equivalent to presupposing we are morally obligated to others. By presupposing this, he presupposes the resolution is already true, which is abusive since we're still debating if the resolution is true. Don't let him get away with this presumption without warranting it, since it abusively presumes the resolution is true. With that, let's go to the first contention specifically.The problem with altruism is it in itself is not morally obligatory. Under egoism, we can act altruistically if we so choose to, but in no way are we morally obligated to do so. Even if we decide to act in an altruistic manner, the reason can be some self-fulfilling reason and something that isn't actually morally obligatory. If I see a kid fallen on the side of the street, the aff would argue that I would have to help him because it's morally obligated. However, under egoism, I can do the exact same thing because it makes me feel good inside for helping someone out. The only difference is one is obligated and one isn't: the action was the same, but the cause of the action differed. This means two things in terms of how the round breaks down:1. Don't let my opponent throw body-count numbers around in an attempt to appeal to some outside emotion (as he tried to in the top of his case) in an attempt to paint the negative world as horrible, unethical beasts. In the negative world, we are able to do the exact same thing as the affirmative world, but the only difference is there isn't any moral obligation.2. Any offense my opponent gains off of altruism flows negative as much as affirmative, since we can do the exact same things as the affirmative in the negative world, effectively making the contention non-unique.Now to move onto his contentions two and three (as they both talk about the same principle):The same problem with his first contention applies to his second and third contention. Under egoism, we can still follow Kant's Categorical Imperative, but still not be morally obligated to do so. Because we can do the same thing in the negative world as in the affirmative world, you flow these contentions as offense for the negative just as much for offense as the affirmative, thusly making it non-unique.In summary:The main problem with my opponent's case is that he provides literally no warrant for why we are held morally responsible for other people's welfare. He's made quite the compelling case for all the good that would come out of it if we WERE, but has yet to warrant the 'if we were'. Until he does, we can still do the same exact things in the negative world as he's described in the affirmative world. The only difference between the two is that you vote con because there's no moral obligation to act altruistically, but rather we have the choice to act altruistically or not to act altruistically. This missing link between obligation and altruism is what will ultimately cost my opponent the debate.Thank you.