The Kalam Cosmological Argument for the Existence of God is Sound

My goal in this debate is to demonstrate that the Kalam cosmological argument is sound. My OP will be a very general outline and defense of the KCA, and I will leave it to my opponent to deliver and develop his specific criticisms in his OP before I go in depth, lest I attack straw men that are not a part of my opponent's argument. [1] The Kalam cosmological argument for the existence of God is one of the most popular arguments of natural theology today. Its foremost contemporary defender is philosopher William Lane Craig. Other proponents include Mark Nowacki, J. P. Moreland, and David S. Oderberg. According to atheist Quentin Smith, "A count of the articles in the philosophy journals shows that more articles have been published about Craig's defense of the Kalam argument than have been published about any other philosopher's contemporary formulation of an argument for God's existence." [2] The KCA is formulated as follows: 1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause 2. The universe began to exist 3. Therefore, the universe has a cause PREMISE ONE The first premise is relatively uncontroversial, and is rooted in the metaphysical principle that out of nothing, nothing comes. The denial of the first premise, although strictly logically possible, is metaphysically unactualizable. By definition, nothing has no potentialities. Thus, it is impossible for something to arise out of nothing, for how can its existence be actualized if the potential is not there? [3] The truth of the causal premise is additionally supported by our everyday experience. If the causal premise were false, then it is quite odd as to why we don't observe things coming into existence uncaused and out of nothing in our everyday experience. Presumably, nobody lives their life worrying about the possibility of an elephant suddenly appearing out of nothing in their living room. Writes Craig: "Why is it only universes that can come into being from nothing? What makes nothingness so discriminatory? There cannot be anything about nothingness that favors universes, for nothingness does not have any properties. Nothingness is the absence of anything whatsoever. As such, nothingness can have no properties, since there literally is not anything to have any properties. Nor can anything constrain nothingness, for there is not anything to be constrained." [4] PREMISE TWO The second premise of the kalam cosmological argument is supported by both philosophical and scientific arguments. Arguments under the former category involve showing that the existence of an actually infinite number of things is metaphysically impossible. If the universe never began to exist, then its past duration would be actually infinite. [5] Since actual infinities cannot exist, then the past duration of the universe must have been finite, implying that the universe must have begun to exist. Even if one grants that it is possible for an actual infinite to exist, it still cannot be formed by successive addition, and henceforth the past duration of the universe must be finite. From a scientific perspective, the beginning of the universe is strongly supported by modern big bang cosmology. The proponent of the KCA thus finds himself comfortably seated in the midst of mainstream cosmology. Combined, these two reasons lend strong support to the truth of the second premise. Additionally, an eternal universe is ruled out by the second law of thermodynamics. Before I move on, I just want to offer some definitions of the different types of infinity lest my opponent choose to attack that particular argument. Potential infinities are sets that are constantly increasing toward infinity as a limit, but never attain infinite status. A more accurate description would be to say that their members are indefinite. An actual infinite, by contrast, is a set x that contains a subset x' that is equivalent to x. "The crucial difference between an infinite set and an indefinite collection would be that the former is conceived as a determinate whole actually possessing an infinite number of members, while the latter never actually attains infinity, although it increases perpetually. We have, then, three types of collection that we must keep conceptually distinct: finite, infinite, and indefinite." [6] PREMISE THREE Since it has been established that the first two premises are true, the conclusion follows logically; the universe must have been caused to exist. But caused by what? Some object that the first cause need not be God, but was rather an impersonal in nature. There are, however, good reasons to believe that the cause of the universe was a personal cause with attributes that closely resemble a monotheistic conception of God. Firstly, it must be noted that since there is nothing prior to the cause of the universe, it cannot be explained scientifically, as this would imply the existence of antecedent determining conditions. Hence, because there are no prior determining conditions, the cause of the universe must be personal and uncaused. Moreover, the cause must transcend space both matter and time to create both matter and time. It must also be changeless, since there was no time prior to the creation of the universe. Interestingly enough, this also lends credibility to the notion that the cause was personal, for how else could a timeless cause give rise to a temporal effect? It seems that the only way this could be possible is if the cause was a free agent who has the ability to effect a change; for if the cause of the universe was impersonal, then it would not have created. Finally, in order to create the universe ex nihilo, this cause must be enormously powerful, if not omnipotent. One is warranted in concluding that therefore, God exists. __________ FOOTNOTES: [1]. My OP incorporates modified excerpts from my essay "The Kalam Cosmological Argument" http://scaeministries.org...... [2]. Quentin Smith, "Kalam Cosmological Arguments for Atheism" in Michael Martin (ed), The Cambridge Companion to Atheism (Cambridge University Press) p. 183 [3]. In fact, denial of P1 entails a contradiction, although I will not elaborate on this unless P1 is attacked in my opponent's OP. [4]. William Lane Craig and James D. Sinclair, "The Kalam Cosmological Argument" in William Lane Craig (ed) and J. P. Moreland (ed), The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology (Oxford: Blackwell, 2009) pp, 18 [5]. This assumes the validity of the tensed or A-theory of time. Although there are good reasons to accept the validity of tensed time over tenseless time, I will not cover this in my OP due to space constraints. I will elaborate on this only if my opponent chooses to attack this point. [6]. Craig and Sinclair, "The Kalam Cosmological Argument", in TBCNT, pp. 105