Abortion is Prima Facie Morally Wrong

One of my criticisms of my opponent's argument is that his usage of human nature is ambiguous and he would have to clarify it - it turns out that he designates it (albeit with vagueness) it to be a biological underpinning, given his usage of the term human being. ==================== Response to my opponent's case - Potentiality ==================== Upon reviewing my opponent's argument, it can be concluded that his a fortiori argument concerning potentiality still fails. He states that the purpose of such an argument was to demonstrate that EVEN if my criteria were to be a sound classification of what constitutes a person, a fetus is a person because it posses "intrinsic potentials". However, before that he admits that an argument that shows unborn are persons because they have the persons to become persons is absurd...and yet that is what his a fortiori argument does. If you are working under Warren's framework of personhood, then to say that an entity has intrinsic potentials to become a person is the EXACT SAME THING as saying the entity in question has yet to become a person. If he agrees that to say the unborn are persons because they have the potential to become one, then his argument here is invalid. ==================== Response to my opponent's case - His criteria of personhood ==================== Interestingly enough, my opponent has been using the term human nature since his first round as a presentation and in Warren's article I cited it goes into detail to demonstrate the ambiguity of such an argument. What does he mean by human nature? It seems that he states that it is a human being that is seen as human nature, i.e. it is a biological basis of personhood. He brings up the point about essential properties, and yet is frustratingly unclear about what essential properties a fetus has - supposedly it's biological basis of being a human being. This then continues the discussion: why should I accept such a criteria as opposed to Warren's? He denies my example of the A.I. analogy on the basis that he believes human nature entails personhood (though he should realize that example was in defense of any potentiality argument), but still demonstrates absolutely NO rationale for why we should accept his criteria. I propose Warren's criteria is not only much more intuitively appealing, but it's sound under the reasoning that such criteria is a sound basis for a person to have their own personal identity (the synchronic problem). I believe we can find a convincing link between personal identity and personhood. ==================== Conclusion ==================== Before I conclude, I want to respond a few remarks that I don't find incredibly important to our main discussion but nonetheless deserves some attention: "Con also seems to neglect the difference between intrinsic rights with extrinsic rights." ----> I have never heard of a distinction before, what validates such a dichotomy? You state there is a difference between the right to vote and the right to life, and yet I see no substantial difference. The right to vote is dependent on varying factors, most notably the cognitive capability of the voter. The right to life is dependent on varying factors as well, such as psychological capacities (my view) or a biological underpinning in yours. He makes a further note about a supposed problem of capacity, and even adds the fact that this wold mean six week old infants do not deserve full moral respect under my criteria. First of all, that criticism would only work in a specific form of psychological criteria that Warren does not uphold. After all, can't an infant feel pain? Even if does validate infanticide, so what? And if he is really confused about the importance of capacity, then just take into account the act of voting. We do not give others a greater vote power based on their intellectual prowess but by their capacity to make a reasoned, mature judgment.