This House Believes That Sense Experience Is The Ultimate Source of Knowledge!

Thank you to Ajab for presenting his arguments – I don't think he should be so quick to check into that clinic, though. We'll see if I can send him there. I'm going to start with some general rebuttals that cover the rationalist perspective in its totality, which applies to all of the points he's provided, and then I'll get into some specific refutation. 1. Truth The biggest requirement Con has yet to meet, is the establishment of what a truth is and how rationalism can lead to that truth. To quote Hume: “All the objects of human reason or inquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit, 'Relations of Ideas,' and 'Matters of Fact.' Of the first are the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic, and, in short, every affirmation which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain. That the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the square of the two sides is a proposition which expresses a relation between these figures. That three times five is equal to half of thirty expresses a relation between these numbers. Propositions of this kind are discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe. Though there never were a circle or triangle in nature, the truths demonstrated by Euclid would forever retain their certainty and evidence. Matters of fact, which are the second objects of human reason, are not ascertained in the same manner, nor is our evidence of their truth, however great, of a like nature with the foregoing. The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible, because it can never imply a contradiction and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness as if ever so conformable to reality.”[1] In other words, the rationalist acquisition of knowledge can never result in acquisition of truth. It may provide us with a concept for further research, but the sole way to establish these as truths is to establish their veracity with sense experience. Sense experience is the sole manner by which hypotheses can be confirmed or denied, and while rationalism may establish those hypotheses, they are not knowledge themselves. Without proving that rationalism leads to the acquisition of truth, Con cannot meet his BoP in establishing that the knowledge gained is substantial. What's more, Con must prove that it's knowledge of the external world that is being established, and need not be verified to establish its truth. 2. Intuition Con only mentioned intuition once, but this is a very large part of his case, since it's the only mechanism he provides for obtaining knowledge without empirical means. So I'll define intuition to start: “an immediate cognition of an object not inferred or determined by a previous cognition of the same object.” http://dictionary.reference.com... Essentially, it's assumed knowledge. However, that knowledge is not inherently truth, as Con assumes. The reality is that intuition only manages to acquire relations among concepts rather than facts about the external world. Con has to show specifically how intuition provides the necessary warrants to support a concept's being true. In order to do this, I would say one needs to engage in sense perception, which provides a sense of reliability that is absent from intuition. Only with sense perception can we create a causal link between how external objects are and how we perceive them. Con will need to explain how, since each of his examples goes beyond what external objects are available for our experience, intuition specifically manages to warrant these explanations rather than just providing a claim. A warranted claim is necessary to access the truth, and therefore a link between intuition and warrants must be established. Alright, onto his contentions. 1. Mathematics 1.1 – Just sets up his burden on this position. I will state that it's insufficient for him to assert that theoretical portions of mathematics are substantial truths, as they don't apply to the external world. 1.2 – Con makes two faulty assumptions here. Let's look more deeply at the equation he provided. If he's right, then his statements should equally apply to equations with larger numbers, but if anything, it becomes more concerning as we move up in number. Con doesn't give us a mechanism for assessing the truth value of these statements, so I don't know how he'd do so synthetically. However, I would argue differently. Let's take a random equation: 535,716+294,015=829,731. Without ever having intuition towards any of those number, we can still assert its truth, and even empirically prove it. Hence, the proposition must, by necessity, be analytical, bringing it in line with empiricism. Therefore, we can reject the notion that mathematics is inherently synthetic. The second assumption is that what makes a statement analytic is solely whether the predicate concept is contained within the subject concept. I would argue Gottlob Frege's notion that analyticity includes a number of logical properties and relations beyond containment, including symmetry, transitivity, antonymy, and negation. All of these are aspects of analytic statements.[2] He's oversimplifying a complex issue, and must show how mathematic statements can't fulfill any of these properties. 1.3/1.4 – In both cases, I would say that evidenced support is required before it becomes a truth. The empirical testing of the equations he provides in 1.4 is required in order to achieve that truth, otherwise this stands as just an assumption. Overview of 2 and 3: While spatial/time intuition may indeed set a basis for understanding something, that basis may be in conflict with that garnered through scientific inquiry. It's an iterative system – empirical observations that are framed by a set of intuitions can subsequently demand modification of those intuitions. Neither of these positions leave open the possibility of a conflict between scientific experience and intuition, thereby limiting the applicability of those intuitions as truths. I would also argue that a sense of time and space are simple sensations in and of themselves. Our capacity to sense it with an individual sensory organ is unnecessary, since a sensation could be defined in terms of what could merely be reliably measured, since that makes them an a posteriori truth. Regardless of how we might experience them, time and space are measurable quantities, and therefore are a part of our sensory experience. 2. Space The definition of “space” is vague. Con essentially says that it is the quality of possessing certain dimensions and relations, however he switches back and forth between space as being an occupied entity with some invisible physical aspect to be filled and this basic quality that lacks physical presence. Rather than argue both views, I will simply state that the former is entirely measurable (as we can always measure and determine what is within empty space, so long as we bound it by some real or imaginary lines), and the latter is entirely based on the relation of ideas rather than fundamental truths. Con assumes that sensory analysis is predicated on the existence of space. This is necessary to prove that space is an a priori concept. But the explanation for why it must be a foundation doesn't make sense. Without actual objects placed in a given space, there's no actual difference between one point of space and another. The sole way in which space becomes a factor is if we're relating two unlike points, and therefore space is actually predicated on things existing in order to show that relation. This isn't just supported logically, but also geometrically. We have two ways of evaluating it – either through pure geometry and applied geometry. In the former case, there is no appeal to spatial intuition or other experience. In the latter, there is a direct dependence upon interpretation in the physical world, requiring empirical investigation. This directly contradicts the fundamental claim that lies behind all of Con's argumentation here – that we can know the proposition of this mathematical analysis a priori. We can only understand it a posteriori. If Con is correct that we only possess the idea of space, then the lack of verification through evidence would make me question whether the concept space is a truth or not. I would opt for skepticism over rationalism in this regard. The idea of infinite changes in a given volume of space once again simply calls into question what space actually is, leading me to uncertainty rather than truth. In neither case does rationalism reveal a link between the concept and truth, simply an assumption that could be true and is, perhaps, unprovable. 3. Time Essentially, this point is based on making a separation between physical time, which can be measured, and psychological time, which Con asserts cannot be measured. Two responses. First, even our psychological conception of time is based on the events that occupy it. Without those events, we cannot determine whether time as passed at all. This, again, tacks back Con's assumption that time is required for causality, since causality itself is what allows us to perceive time. Second, as physicist Michael Dummett's constructive model of time implies, time is a composition of intervals rather than durationless instants.[3] In other words, even if we're talking about moments, perceived segments of time that aren't apparently measurable, we can still detect them via physical processes. If we can measure a moment, we can measure any time, regardless of whether it's physical or psychological. Con will have to state specifically what kind of time cannot be measured in this manner. Citations 1. Hume 1748, Section IV, Part 1, p. 40 2. Jerrold J. Katz (2000). "The epistemic challenge to antirealism". Realistic Rationalism. p. 69. 3. http://exordio.qfb.umich.mx...