The use of Torture can be Morally Permissible

Groundwork and LimitationsIn his first argument, my opponent has laid out 2 systems with which to judge morality and 3 hypotheticals in which to demonstrate that there are situations in which torture could be moral.I will discuss the systems of measure momentarily, but I would first like to address the hypotheticals, because 2 of them are redundant, and there are truly only two situations which were covered:1. Coercive, torture-based interrogation2. Meeting the demands of the hostage taker in a hostage situationNow, to address the systems by which these systems are judged:Not knowing that these two systems would be used, I need to request that we limit further hypotheticals as follows:1. In situations that involve some sort of large-scale destruction, large-scale murder or large-scale casualties (hypotheticals number one and two listed by my opponent), the controlling morality belongs to a person of at least average intelligence who has at least some training in the practice of interrogation.2. In those like number three, the controlling morality also must belong to a person of at least average intelligence. In the actual hypothetical number three, I also think it should belong to someone with at least some training in hostage negotiations, but because I can foresee a plausible scenario where this would not be the case, I will refrain from requesting that portion of the rule requested.I request these rules not because of the use of Consequentialism as a measure of morality, as they are not meaningful to that measure, but because of the use of Deontological ethics as one.Obviously, a mentally retarded toddler has a lesser duty in all things than does an adult of average intelligence, so in an effort to prevent this from becoming a battle of increasingly ridiculous “What If” inquiries, I request that the rules above be adhered to, and that any additional hypothetical scenarios presented, while potentially fantastical in their setting, be controlled by a realistically intelligent, or at least realistically unintelligent, group of human beings, because obviously, under the Deontological System of judging morality, the use of a lobotomized monkey would render the entire debate completely moot.Refuting The Hypothetical ExamplesExample numbers one and two - Coercive InterrogationIn the first category of situations Pro used, coercive interrogation, Pro's assumption is that the techniques he proposes to employ will be effective in quickly gaining the actor performing the torturing the necessary information to morph what he recognizes as an initially moral wrong, into a moral right (location of X or Y, which, once known, will be saved/rendered inert).Here’s the issue he faces - they won’t.Now, I can, and will, cite numerous psychological studies, statistical studies, as well as expert opinion by former and current interrogation experts, should this be requested of me, but since we’re talking about a looming moral dilemma, and time is of the essence in each scenario, more than anything the controlling factor is common, and not specific, knowledge, because if the actor in the scenario doesn't have time for standard interrogation methods, they don't have time to look up copious amounts of information on the effacacy of torture as a means of interrogation.Most people of average intelligence, and certainly those with even a modicum of training in interrogation techniques, understand that coercive interrogation is more likely, and in fact much more likely, to yield incorrect information than it is to produce correct information.Therefore, after performing an act that Pro concedes needs to lead to an act which nullifies what he has admitted to be a moral wrong, the hero act that Pro is counting on to wipe away the morally unacceptable means, thus justifying the ends, won’t be available to the actor in his scenario.If these techniques showed any evidence of being effective, I’d actually agree with Pro, but since they don’t, his argument doesn’t even hold up in hypothetical, make believe world. It fails both measures he has set for this debate, and does nothing to advance the idea that torture is morally permissible.Example number three - giving into the demands of a terrorist In his second category, Pro suggests that capitulating to the hostage taker and having one bystander torture another bystander will ultimately lead to the release of the hostages, and no further torture.Now, in the Fairy Tale Land where this were true, that would be wonderful, and again, I would agree with Pro. However, in the real world, there is a reason why one does not give in to the demands of someone who has taken hostages - once you do, you give the hostage taker carte blanche to make more demands, and when the demand to which you capitulated was the torture of one person, the guaranteed successive demands will be the torture of additional people.Moreover, once others with the hostage taker’s proclivity for watching the suffering of others get word that if they can secure the capture of 10 children they can have free reign to watch others torture themselves all day long, that one act of torture which Pro postulates will save the torture of 10 children, will have actually caused the torture of thousands of people for ages to come.There’s a reason we don’t give in to terrorists, and there’s a reason we aren’t supposed to act like them. Terrorist techniques are not tactically sound, and to pretend that they are in order to justify them is almost as morally deplorable as the tactics themselves.