Morality Debates: Abortion Edition

"By this definition, one cannot be considered human until they have reached the level of wisdom and knowledge, so, as guided by the meaning of the word, not even a toddler or even a teenager can be considered human until they have fully developed and have reached the mental capacity, hormonal balance and overall wisdom to be considered human. By extremely technical definition, I am not human." The view on of humanity defended by Con faces a vast number of challenges. Firstly, it flies in the face of modern science. Con proposes that we define humanness in terms of cognition -- a being can be considered human if he is morphologically similar to the species homo sapiens and possesses an advanced level of reasoning. However, Con conflates humanity with personhood. Con's proposed definition is simply _not_ how embryologists define humanity. [1] The embryo is most certainly human, there is virtually no controversy among leading abortion advocates and embryology textbooks that the embryo is human (Rather, they deny that the unborn are _persons_ while affirming that they are humans). The unborn have human DNA, human parents, and the active disposition to develop themselves into a mature human being. The very fact that the embryo develops in the way it does is due to the fact that it has a human nature that develops toward maturity. The salient point is that the embryo could never develop human traits if it weren't already human to begin with. Hence, I did not come from a fetus, I was once a fetus. Did I come to exist after my body? Obviously not. Yet Con's criteria implies the very denial of that, which is absurd. The unborn do not develop into humans, but develop according to the human nature they already have. By all accounts, therefore, the unborn are human. It may be an immature human, but it is a human nonetheless. What I think Con wishes to say is that the embryo is not a _person_, that is, a rights-bearing and intrinsically valuable being. This distinction, however, is still problematic. Writes Robert P. George and Christopher Tollfesen: "[W]e must distinguish between two senses of the capacity (or, as it is sometimes called, the potentiality) for mental functions, psychological states, and so on: an immediately exercisable one, and a basic natural capacity, which develops over time. But if this is so, then there is little mystery in how an embryonic, fetal, or infant human being, incapable at the time of exercising his or her mental capacities, is nevertheless a person: that a human being does, by its nature, have the radical capacity for such mental acts. And is by a self-directed process developing that capacity to the point where it is immediately exercisable." [2] Con thinks that only properties that are true of the mature human (Such as self-consciousness) can count toward personhood, "but where could such properties have come from if they were not already roote din the nature of the being that possessed them?" [3] Secondly, if Con wishes to propose that not even a toddler or teenager can be considered human, then it follows logically that since they are not moral agents, we are warranted in killing them for trivial reasons. But obviously we know that it is wrong to kill toddlers and teenagers. Similarly, Con's criteria entails that humanness comes in degrees, since some individuals are "more human" than others by virtue of having developed the cognitive abilities to a higher degree. This, I contend, is plain absurd. It is the same motivation that fostered slavery and racism. People have equal rights regardless of their mental ability or socioeconomic status. "But what if the baby was indirectly threatened? Would you really want to force a misshapen not-even-human-yet to endure the hardships of permanent mental and physical mutations for its entire, horrible mistake of a life?" If it were not human, I would have no qualms about terminating it. However, since this point hinges on the above arguments, which I have already shown to be wrong, then it follows that the termination of a human person is immoral even if they will be born with deformities. If the unborn are human, then they have a basic right to life of which they ought not be deprived of. "But the ending of his life before it has begun shall save him from being a victim! If he is never able to experience the pain accompanied by his deformities, then why force him into existence? After, and only after, the baby is born does its end become murder. Any time before its birth can honestly be considered an act of great justice. But that's just my morality speaking here." How exactly is killing someone without their consent considered to be "an act of great justice?" As I have shown, since the unborn are human persons, they deserve the basic right to life. Con states that "After, and only after, the baby is born does its end become murder." How, pray tell, does he justify the assumption that a journey of a few inches through the birth canal turns the unborn from a nonhuman tissue mass into a human being with a right to live? That is a completely arbitrary and flat-on-its-face absurd notion. Why does it suddenly become murder to kill the baby once it has been born? That is a completely arbitrary criteria that has no rational grounding whatsoever. One's location is completely irrelevant to whether or not one is a human being. Regarding Con's point on morality, I do not share the moral relativism that he does. Instead, my position is that morality is objective, that it exists independently of human opinion. In regards to jurisprudence, I affirm natural law. As such, morality and law are inseparable. Thus, to answer to my opponent's question:"So, I restate in inquiry, how can you say that abortion is morally wrong for me as an individual?" My reply is simply that taking the life of the unborn is depriving them of their right to life, a basic right that is grounded in every human person, regardless of size, level of development, dependency, and environment. Moreover, the substance view of persons that I defend grounds human equality and dignity better than my opponent's conception of personhood as contingent on one's cognitive abilities. On the substance view, all humans are equal regardless of their size, level of development, degree of dependency, and environment. However, on Con's view, personhood comes in degrees. People who exercise their mental abilities with greater skill are "more human" than others. Babies and infants who do not immediately exhibit the criteria for personhood can be freely killed. Thus, the substance view of persons is intuitively superior to my opponent's conception of personhood, giving us another reason to reject it. ~-~ One a sidenote, I have a question for my opponent: Do you affirm that women have a right to abortion, and how would you react if the Supreme Court overturned Roe vs. Wade? ____________ [1] -- See Keith Moore and T. V. N. Persaud, "The Developing Human: Clinically Oriented Embryology (Philadelphia: Saunders/Elsevier, 2008) 15 and T. W. Sadler, "Langman's Embryology" 5th ed (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders, 1993) 3 Also see Merriam-Webster's Medical Dictionary, http://www.nlm.nih.gov... [2] -- Robert P. George and Christopher Tollefsen, "Embryo: A Defense of Human Life" (New York: Doubleday 2008) 80 [3] -- Ibid, 81