Resolved: The Ontological Argument is Sound

I am sorry. You are not answering the argument. The argument does not rely on the individual definition of its parts. The definition of a MGB as defined by Alvin Plantinga, who developed this argument, is as was defined by me in round one. You are quibbling about nothing Extension One: Everyone can extend the argument I made in the first rebuttal about how his definitions game was irrelevant. The argument does not rely on the definition of particular words. Rather, the argument proves the definition to which I appealed. I demonstrated this in the following way, an argument to which he did not respond: 1. It is possible that an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent and necessarily-existent (O^3NE) being exists. 2. If its possible that an O^3NE being exists, then an O^3NE exists in some possible world 3. If an O^3NE exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world 4. If an O^3NE exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world 5. If an O^3NE exists in the actual world, then it exists 6. Therefore, an O^3NE exists in the actual world 7. Therefore, an O^3NE exists See, using "MGB" is not needed; its just three words used to defined a being with the properties mentioned above. The argument functions the same and proves that a being with O^3NE exists. The conclusion follows unless he attacks one of the premises, which he has yet to do. Extension Two: I also proved the above argument by showing that using specifically "MGB" is necessary if I simply replace it with "GOD." God is defined as an omnipotent, all knowing all good and necessary being. Now, working under this definition, the argument still works into the conclusion, PROVING THAT INDIVIDUAL DEFINITIONS ARE IRRELEVANT: 1. It is possible that God (as defined) exists 2. If it is possible that God exists, then God exists in some possible world 3. If God exists in some possible world, then He exists in every possible world ....The rest follows. Moreover, the use of individual definitions, I argued, is misleading. There are dozens of definitions of the word "great." None of the encompass the philosophy of religion since, a common dictionary is not a good reference when having discussions like these. First I will offer a collective definition of a MGB from an authority (since I seem to be inadequate) and then use individual definitions to do the exact same ridiculous things hes doing to undermine his positions: From Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: "The "victorious" modal ontological argument of Plantinga (1974) goes roughly as follows: Say that an entity possesses "maximal excellence" if and only if it is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect. Say, further, that an entity possesses "maximal greatness" if and only if it possesses maximal excellence in every possible world—that is, if and only if it is necessarily existent and necessarily maximally excellent." It matters not individual definitions, but the collective definition since no matter what you call it, the argument proves that an All knowing, all good, all powerful and necessary being exists. Call it a MGB or not. Call it a sandwich (this would be equivocating but if you define "sandwich" as having these properties, then the argument STILL works and it proves a God in whom you do not believe) But now I will employ reductio ad absurdum to show how your use of definitions is pointless. OMNIBENEVOLENCE: A definition of "GREAT" is "having unusual merit, very admirable." "Of noble character" Well, one of the dozens of definitions of this word encompasses the above. So if individual definitions matter, I guess being all-good is a part of "merit," "admiration" and "nobility." So in order for you to dispute this, you would have to attack even more words. This shows the absurdity in your tactics. You make an unwarranted assertion and finally attack the idea of being all-knowing as "may not be logically possible." That's nice, can you provide an argument? There is no explicit logical incoherence of an unembodied mind; there is therefore a possible world in which these things could exist. They are metaphysically possible. I do not even need to defend dualism-interactionism because you make a devastating concession. Namely, you concede that a MGB exists, but it only has the property of omnipotence. Extension 3: This is devastating. You have not responded to the fact that you are equivocating. Omnipotence means, for the third time, the ability to do all things that are logically possible. If this being is omnipotent and does not have the property of consciousness, and by extension, the ability to think, feel, act in purpose etc., then there are logically possible things it cannot do. Hence, not omnipotent. But you conceded it was omnipotent. Therefore, it follows necessarily that it does have a mind not bound by physicality. You object: You accuse me of improperly using the word "omnipotent." I should point out that existence need not do anything in order to be able to do everything. Taking advantage of omnipotence is not required under the terms of omnipotence. This is demonstrably fallacious: Sure, an omnipotent thing need not do anything if IT CHOOSES NOT TO. But that entails its ability to choose. Sure God does not need to do something, but in order for Him to be omnipotent, He must have the ability to do all of that which is logically possible. If something cannot think, reason, etc. the fact that it does not do this is irrelevant insofar as it cannot do these things, hence it not being omnipotent. Again, equivocation. For the sake of everybody else, I cannot stress how irrelevant his points are to the truth of the argument. You may disagree with the argument, but we can all agree, through the laws of logic and deduction, that if the premises are true, the conclusion must be true. And he has yet to respond to a single premise. Once again, his entire argument rests on the word "great," having one of many definitions. I will repost: 1. It is possible that an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent and necessarily-existent (O^3NE) being exists. 2. If its possible that an O^3NE being exists, then an O^3NE exists in some possible world 3. If an O^3NE exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world 4. If an O^3NE exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world 5. If an O^3NE exists in the actual world, then it exists 6. Therefore, an O^3NE exists in the actual world 7. Therefore, an O^3NE exists Notice here how "great" or MGB is nowhere in the argument. Why? Because it is NOT needed, "great" and "MGB" are not necessary for the argument.