Individuals Have A Moral Obligation To Assist People In Need

Though we could certainly conceive of a world in which it is morally obligatory to assist the needy, it isn't clear to me, based on DP's opening arguments, that this is the case in our world. Thus, I'm forced to negate.Let us first consider quality of life. Though undeniably valuable, the conception he lays out leaves much to be desired. While he defines quality of life in terms of well-being, we are left without a clear understanding of what this actually entails. There are, I think, various sorts of well-being (e.g. financial, social, physical). Unfortunately, the only weighing mechanism with which we're provided is a concern for security. While the need of safety is important, there are two critical errors with this approach:First, Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs [1] suggests that, with respect to the maintenance of a society, there is more at stake than superficial security concerns. There are other concerns, however, even within the realm of safety: for example, security of employment, reliability of income, and a reasonable guarantee of health. Though these could potentially be construed as "security" concerns, these don't seem to be significant considerations in DP's security calculus.Second, bare security seems insufficient to maximize average quality of life. We can, for example, think of states which place much emphasis on security and protection while falling far short of other developmental indices (e.g. infrastructure, health, education). Therefore, I don't find compelling the claim that security is the optimal route to maximizing quality of life. At most, I would agree that security is a necessary (albeit insufficient) condition.Moving on from here, however, he presents us with a contention which details the high casualty levels in the less-developed states. The line seems to be, due to a shortage of international humanitarian aid, that these crises will not only linger, but perhaps worsen. Though I sympathize heavily with this argument, I disagree that these crises imply a moral obliagtion. If my understanding is correct, then the argument is as follows:Preserving life is good.Humanitarian aid to suffering countries preserves life.Therefore, humanitarian aid to suffering countries is good.Assuming the premises to be true, it's perhaps a strong argument for greater international contributions; however, there isn't any concrete discussion of moral obligations. It seems that DP is jumping from the empirical fact of suffering to an ethical obligation to assuage that suffering. Again, while I think that lending aid to minimize these individuals' suffering is something to be proud of, it doesn't seem as though DP has bridged the is-ought gap. In leaping from the fact of suffering to a moral obligation, there is an implicit premise that there exists a moral obligation to prevent suffering; however, because this is the subject of our debate, you cannot accept this hidden premise at face value.Let's move now to the second contention, in which he argues that assisting the needy is useful, perhaps necessary, for the survival of our species. Though I grant this may be true, it seems we must revisit the problem previously discussed: from some mere fact, one cannot thereby deduce a moral obligation. Hidden between the first premise and the conclusion is an implicit value judgment which declares a moral obligation to promote the survival of one's own species. I wholeheartedly agree that our instincts ask us to promote those interests; however, I disagree that such a proposition carries any ethical connotations.Further evidence of this implicit premise is that, near the end of this contention, he makes it explicit:"Though all agree that the person who fails to affect an easy rescue is a moral monster, there is a good deal of disagreement about why. At the level of moral theory, there should be no room, for disagreement: The duty to rescue is a duty of beneficence, a positive duty requiring people to benefit others, even total strangers."I submit again that one cannot accept this obligation to beneficence at face value, as the question of an obligation to others is the subject of our discussion. Still, DP does refer back to the standards earlier mentioned, arguing that accepting such an obligation results in increased security and quality of life. I accept that this, too, may be true; however, we must make a distinction: what DP's argument suggests is that a particular pattern of behavior could result in desirable consequences. This is not what I am contesting. Rather, I take issue with the equation of this fact and the proposition that such an obligation does exist. The consequences of acting in accordance with this proposed obligation, no matter how desirable, do not affect the truth-value of the proposition. Imagine a world in which the world is mysteriously unified under a single religion. Such a world would almost certainly be devoid of any further religious conflict. The standards DP has set before us might suggest that this conflict-minimal world in an excellent one in which to live. True or not, the fact that unifying our species under a single religion would reduce conflict does not demonstrate that the content of that religious belief conforms to reality. In other words, the fact that we might benefit from a particular pattern of behavior, e.g. a religion or supposed moral obligation, does not in itself justify accepting the principles underlying that behavior as true.Finally, let us deal with the third contention, which argues that there is a strong consensus on the obligation of beneficence. Like the facts underlying the other two contentions, this is likely true. His evidence, in fact, indicates that there is really no outstanding disagreement on the subject; however, appeal to a social consensus does not constitute incontrovertible proof. Consider 2 + 2. By basic arithmetic, we know the answer to be 4; however, suppose that we introduce mathematics to a sentient species on a distant planet not yet cognizant of mathematical operations. Though they try hard to master addition, there emerges a strong, solid consensus that 2 + 2 is 5. Though we know this is not the case at all, the strength of this other species' agreement is so high that they refuse to entertain dissenters. Similarly, there may or may not be a consensus on the question of a moral obligation to the needy; however, that consensus has no justificatory bearing on the answer to that question. If we suppose that, in fact, there is no such obligation, we must then acknowledge that the consensus was misguided.So, although I acknowledge a possible world in which we may actually possess an obligation to assist the needy, I am skeptical that DP case provides a sufficient ontological grounding from which to claim that our world is such.[1] http://tinyurl.com...