The Problem of Evil (PoE) is sound

Contra-P1ContradictionsBy convention; take 'evil' to be synonymous with 'pain.' Pro failed to address the difference between my Contra-P1 containing "in principle" arguments, and my Contra-P3 containing "in fact" arguments. My case can be affirmed as "Contra-P1 or Contra-P3" if one remains unconvinced that my case can be affirmed as "Contra-P1 and Contra-P3." God of Law Pro fails to deal with his argument being informally invalid, even IF his this argument was meant for something different, the implications of his thought experiment entails that his PoE contains an inflated conclusion. And thus he must deal with these implications if he is to remain in the game here. Otherwise the resolution is won for Con, and that's regardless of my other arguments. Pro admits, "the world isn’t what we’d expect given God or Anti-God, so doing this [inferring from the good or evil that transpires in the world, either deity's existence,] would be absurd…" His only point against my NEW argument is that Pro is "not arguing for an Anti-God on the basis of the world." That's fine, but it must still be shown that the PoE's conclusion is not inflated as a theoretical proof (as opposed to a practical proof) given that the moral occurrences in the world are too ambiguous to prove or disprove any deity- a 'given' that was shown by Con's use of the anti-god thought experiment, regardless of how Pro used it. Hence even IF Contra-P1 & Contra-P3 arguments fail, or are contradictory- the resolution is still lost given the inflated conclusion. Thus I declare victory. Regarding the hypothesis of indifference, just because God may've decided to create free creatures at a certain epistemic distance in order for meaningful decision making, it doesn't follow that he's therefore indifferent to such creatures; his creation is! What Pro has to give us with the PoE is a non-theistic conclusion , NOT an agnostic one. And Flew's "death by qualification" gives us merely an agnostic conclusion (at best). Pro then complains that the God of Law argument at least shows the ad hoc nature of responses to the PoE. But there are variegated reposes to a parent's permission of inflicting pain on their child, dentistry, virtue, moral lessons, freedom, etc. Who knows how many more reasons an infinite mind may have! This objection just fails to understand the complexity of human-God relations in a fallen world. Also, I never admitted my responses to Pro's PoE and his anti-God are "equal" … instead, I affirmed that inferring from the moral occurrences in the world a deity's existence or non-existence is equal. RA Refer to R2 for my defense of Origins Essentialism, somehow Pro overlooked it. Pro then thinks that the anthropic condition, [*R] is the morally sufficient reason for permitting evil. It's not, the RA views creaturely existence in light of prior divine teleology; not evil used for some greater good, as P1 expects. The RA doesn't presume to know God's motives, it just shows that its epistemically possible that God would have good reasons for creating a world with free agents distinct from himself, and that such a world possibly requires [*R]. Hence God is compatible with the notion of his non-intervention. For the justification of RA- God seemed to have morally sufficient reasons to enter into [*R], for if mankind were created without [*R], then there’s no way of knowing whether mankind would be something different altogether in such a world. Hence evil in light of divine teleology provides no reason why there wouldn’t be any pointless suffering given [*R] BA Here I charged that we've no reason for thinking it's possible to know the moral baseline necessary for the WSA PoE. All Pro has to offer here, isn't a method for determining such a threshold, but instead the extreme worse worlds and extreme better worlds. But that's irrelevant, we want to know whether it's knowable the threshold that God mustn't cross to fulfill both his plan for humanity and to not allow his creatures to suffer gratuitously- not whether there can be best & worst worlds. Pro admits there exists no knowable level of evil, but says there is ideally the least amount of evil for the greatest available good. But this doesn't solve the problem since he's admitted it's impossible to know the least amount of evil for the greatest available good! Therefore Pro affirms that P1 has an inherent fallacy of false precision. Contra-P3 ST I showed that Pro's notion of Epistemic Consistency & Nature of Evils are contingent upon Pro showing that we stand within a good epistemic position to demand these points to begin with. He hasn't yet show we are in such a privileged position. "Noconeiveum" contradicts Epistemic consistency. Since if it's difficult for us to see morally sufficient reasons for some evil, why think we're able to demand Epistemic consistency regarding the purpose of that evil in light of an infinite mind as opposed to Epistemic consistency in light of looking for unicorns in our garage? These epistemic positions simply aren't on a par and Pro's great BoP is to show they are in order to demand such points. Regarding Prima Facie, Swinburne’s principle of credulity states that, all things being equal, “it is reasonable to believe that the world is probably as we experience it to be.” But Swinburne affirms that "if it seems to a subject that x is present, then probably x is present" so this doesn't apply to experiences of absences. And Pro is attempting to prove an absence, regardless. For the negative principle, "if it seems to a subject that x is not present, then probably x is not present," would only be a good one in cases where it is reasonable to believe that if x were present then the subject would experience x. There is no reason, however, to suppose that if God existed then the atheist would experience his morally sufficient reason years later possibly in another region, and so the negative principle of credulity does not apply to atheists‘ experiences of the absence of God. What Pro seeks to use as "evidence" is an absence, and this goes contrary to both our epistemic position and the principle of credulity: He's misused both in order to erect his epistemic consistency. Pro asserts Kripkean essentialism does "nothing to counter belief in gratuitous evils" in R2, yet offer no reason why. Also, Pro doesn't show how a Kripkean essentialist theist must also be a evil-teleologist: that every evil must occur FOR some good. In fact it's my argument that a Kripkean essentialist theist is compatible with much natural evils in a fallen world. Skepticism doesn't reasonably apply to certain historical events written about in history or ones memory of the past- it does apply to a finite viewer's absence of a infinite being's reason for allowing something to happen. Pro has yet to show otherwise. Theodicy Recall that it's not just an actual virtuous response to whatever existential event that makes evils justified, but also the potential virtuous response to, say, preventing ebola ourselves. There are little examples of the rich in America experiencing ebola, why? Isn't it that no virtuous responses are given to those in Africa prior to worse conditions avail themselves so as to make things like ebola possible? Here, it's mankind that's at fault rather than God. Virtuous responses can be potential- evils like ebola are defeat-able & outbalance-able, hence evils like ebola aren't gratuitous. And just because evil may beget evil, doesn't mean that such events can't be defeated or outbalanced.