It is more likely that we live in a simulated reality than a real reality (2)

First, I'm going to clarify something again, because my opponent seems to have difficulty understanding what "physically" is in a philosophically interesting sense. "Physically" does not have anything to do with the world being built out of physical constituents. Instead, when philosophers use physical, they mean 'in this world.' 'In this world' means in the context of the debate not only the "reality" we're in, but also the reality that would be simulating this one. This means that his arguments "I never said it had to be physical" Next, a metaphysical possibility is a possible world where the contingent laws of nature are otherwise, such that things that are not possible in this "physical" or nomological world are possible. This is also known as logical possibility.This should trace out the problem my opponent has had since the beginning, which he has not answered.1. My opponent's first premise is that if it is not logically impossible, then it is logically (or metaphysically) possible. Remember that logical possibilities do not interfere with the nomological world, there's no relation between the two. 2.This means that this premise tells us nothing about the physical (in the philosophically interesting way) world, because logical possibility doesn't connect to what is nomologically possible.3. My opponent has to explain why it is nomologically possible, IE he needs to give a hypothesis as to why it conforms with the current world. A definition doesn't work, a positive argument that isn't about possibilities needs to work. Remember that his entire argument is based on his first premise, which doesn't matter because it has nothing to do with the nomological world. Hence the two horns: He had to choose (but didn't, making this debate extremely untidy) whether he was advocating a metaphysical possibility or a physical possibility, and I outlined the problems for him in both. If he goes for physical possibility, his premise 1 has nothing to do with the argument, if he goes with metaphysical, then it can't explain how we could be in a simulated reality, only a that there could be some possible world. If my opponent doesn't understand this, I suggest that he read Lewis' account on metaphysically possibility worlds before continuing [1]. The two horns also contain sub arguments, which I will get to later.Re-extend my attack on his conclusion C3, and how it doesn't obtain. This is the second time he'd dropped it, and it's twice over conceded for the entire round. This means that the rest of the arguments on Pro's case shouldn't matter, because he doesn't show how something more likely existing in a simulated reality leads to us being more likely to exist in a simulated reality; it's a complete non sequitur. THIS HAS BEEN DROPPED, DON'T LET HIM BRING IT UP IN HIS LAST SPEECH.On Substitution:"Then show how."Well, I did, let me lay it out again:Create some world where people believe that they are in a simulated reality, and someone argues that they are more likely to be in a real reality. Replace all of my opponent's "real reality" with "simulated" and visa versa in his argument structure. Replace Premise 2 with some ad hoc, as follows:1. Inference to the best explanation, (which is a wonderful argument that went unaddressed and misunderstood, as I will show)2. If we were simulated there would be more problems3. Why would the world be so rich and colorful?4. I can't imagine of anything creating a simulated realityetc, for whatever reasons people would believe that they are in a real reality instead of a simulated reality. This shows that my opponent's argument is only justified by ad hoc, not by substantial reasoning.On The Two HornsMy opponent makes a few arguments answering back the ground work I laid out, but I think this was out of misunderstanding. I have hopefully cleared that up at the top of this round.Horn AThis is where I talk about physically in the non-interesting sense. The argument is that nothing can represent the information found per piece of matter other than a said piece of matter representing it. A proton cannot give complete data about anything other than a proton. Hence, the only way for this to be simulated, is for it to be the universe. My opponent drops all of my warrants and basically says "nuh uh", without looking at the reason for why I made the argument. Horn A still obtains.Horn BMy opponent drops set theory and makes an argument that has no bearing on it. He failed to address validity of the argument. Saying "there would be more than one" doesn't answer the argument back. For every [universe where there is n], regardless of n, there are infinite other worlds where n = 0.On IBEFirst: My opponent totally dropped this, and I extended this argument. On face, you shouldn't accept any of his new arguments against it that weren't in Round 2. If he concedes the argument, he shouldn't be able to go back later and argue against it. I'm going to address his blips in any case.I would also point out, that you don't need a real cat to exist, in order to simulate one, that's the great things with simulated realities, you don't have to simulate things that are real.This is a complete failure to understand the argument. The argument on pseudo-ness is that you have to posit an extra "pseudo" in order to justify it not being the real thing. This fails parsimony.Con themself posits extra "stuff" when they add to their perception of the cat. If Con does perceive a cat, then why add the extra stuff of "real" to it. If adding "Pseudo" is unwarranted, why isn't adding "real" unwarranted to our feline friend ?This is again a total failure to understand the argument, and the metaphysics of 'simulated realities'. I don't have to "add" real, it's the basic assumption. When I perceive a cat, I perceive it as being real, it is in the nature of perception, as well as interacting with the world, in all the relevant ways, that we start from the ground point that this is a real reality. Arguments about simulated realities or alternate realities build up from there. [2] Again, to reiterate: ALL of our immediate perceptions about the world are formed with an intrinsic notion of reality, hence the RWH is our starting point. There's no double standard, and there is no "extra" real. Without 'real' it exists nowhere and notime [3]. How does the real world Hypothesis explain why our world is the real world ? How does it explain why our world even exists ?Seeing it doesn't account for all relevant information, doesn't this by your own standard show that the RWH is not the best explanation ? I'm not exactly sure what argument this is supposed to be making. The real world hypothesis is just the hypothesis that our world is the real world. It gets there from inference to the best explanation: This is laid out in round 1 and 2. It isn't designed to explain why our world exists, and that is entirely out of the scope of this debate. This debate is only about probability of this world being real or simulated. Hence, I'm not sure where the idea that it doesn't account for all the relevant information comes from; it does. Instead of saying that things are as they are because an evil demon is tricking us, it explains that things are as they are, because they're real. This accounts for all relevant information in the real world, including our mathematics and physics. It gives total completeness of information, something that was never challenged. Inference to the Best Explanation has not, throughout this entire debate, been adequately challenged, and in fact was dropped by my opponent in round 2. It gives us good reason to not posit other worlds, as was shown in both round 1 and 2, if you'd feel like rereading it. The basic argument has not been challenged. 1. Lewis, David Counterfactuals, Harvard University Press 19732 Hales, Steven D. Metaphysics: Contemporary Readings. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing, 1999. 3. Kant, Immanuel Critique of Pure Reason