January/February LD Debate Resolved

Thanks for the debate! :) I negate the resolution. My opponent's definition of DV includes escalating violence; however, the resolution does not describe this escalation. Since the action is only "repeated"— meaning it has happened more than once— this escalation is not necessarily present; "repeated DV" may refer to an abuser hitting a victim a couple of times. This is too low of a standard to allow for killing. According to Hodge, "All men thus judge the sins of others. The consciences of all men are grateful when the just penalty of the law is executed upon the offender, and outraged when he escapes." Hobbes tells us that justice is the basis of morality; the object of a moral action is to create justice. My value is justice, defined as giving each his due. If I can prove that the use of deadly force as a response to repeated DV is unjust, you negate. My criterion will be retributive justice. Retributive justice is a theory that says that punishment, if proportionate, is a morally acceptable response to crime. Proportionality requires that the level of punishment be scaled relative to the severity of the offending behavior. This does not mean the punishment has to be equal to the crime. A retributive system simply must punish severe crime more harshly than minor crime. As the Stanford Encyclopedia of philosophy explains, Fairness in sentencing seemed most likely to be achievable if a criminal sentence was of a determinate rather than indeterminate duration. But even determinate sentencing would not be fair unless the sentences so authorized were the punishments that convicted offenders deserved. Thus was born the doctrine of "just deserts" in sentencing, which effectively combined the two ideas. By this route the goal of retribution came to dominate. Contention 1: The act of killing someone in response to DV is not a just response. Based on retributive justice, a moral response to a crime must be proportional. If I strike you, you can strike me back, but cannot shoot me. Since an abuser's acts have been repeated in the past and the victim survived, in most cases the abuse is not severe enough to kill. The abusers' actions infringe on victims' quality of life, but not to their life itself; thus it is not morally permissible to kill them in response. In order to achieve justice, each must be given his due; however, in the aff world, each is given more than his due by suffering unjust murder. To uphold justice, retribution must be upheld. Contention 2: The victim can pursue court orders. Proportionality requires that response to an action be scaled relative to the severity of the offending behavior. If a response offers a way to stop the person's actions without direct retaliation, this solution is also morally permissible. Calling the police is an alternative solution for victims to take advantage of. According to a family violence law report, 17.7 percent of police family violence reports submitted in 2004-05 resulted in criminal charges a 73.2 percent increase on the previous year. We can see from this statistic that many victims are successful in contacting the police, and that their abusers then receive punishments as deemed appropriate by our society's legal system. Although it is difficult to escape abuse through the law, it is possible. Since this alternative exists, we can solve for abuse while upholding retributive justice. Saying it is moral to kill in response to abuse skews proportionality in the aff world. Instead of unjustly murdering their abuser, a victim should use the legal system to end the situation and give their abuser due punishment. Now to my opponent's case. As an overview, my opponent simply does not affirm; his case doesn't even mention moral permissibility. He provides us with no mechanism for passing judgment on an action's permissibility, thus you cannot affirm. On his framework: even if you prefer his definition of escalating DV, we still have a low standard for deadly force in the status quo, because this means there is a beginning point in every abusive relationship when abuse is minimal, has not escalated, and deadly force is unnecessary. Look next to his Clarke 2 card and the way he stereotypes women. Clarke talks about the portrayal of women in pornography as weak; however, pornographers do not represent society. Defining victim with this limited perception is bad for 2 reasons: First, it is inaccurate. This masochistic, powerless view of them has no real truth. Stereotyping women in this way only creates social barriers for women. Secondly, my opponent focuses on a subgroup and ignores male victims. According to an Oregon law survey, approximately 40 percent of DV victims are men. Since he ignores these victims, his case does not affirm. He doesn't define justice, but says "When these beatings continue and Society fails to stop them Justice has been lost." However, abuse is not the only thing threatening justice. In this round we define justice as "giving each his due." Allowing victims to take their abusers' lives is giving them more punishment than they are due. By doing this we fight injustice with injustice, and two wrongs don't make a right. He provides no link from his criterion of reducing oppression to the value of justice. He also gives no definition of what constitutes this oppression. Killing an abuser oppresses their right to life. Also, oppression is not the only thing threatening justice. Look to my criterion since it is applicable to any response situation. Under his 1st contention, he says society doesn't deliver justice; however, he doesn't prove this. Instead he proves with Clarke 2 is that letting criminals go encourages them. There are 2 reasons to reject this. 1- this can be turned; if we allow victims to kill their abusers, imagine the message this will send to society! If victims are allowed to kill at the 2nd instance of abuse, where is the line drawn? What stops a child from killing his bully because he felt threatened? Affirming condones homicidal vengeance. 2- I can solve for this in my case. The legal system is an alternative solution to deadly force. We don't let abusers "keep his place in the family and community." We punish abusers, but instead of killing unjustly, we give them due punishment agreed on in court and accepted by society. Even if you buy his tagline that society fails, this doesn't lead to moral permissibility. This contention deals only with legal matters and does not address morality. Under Clarke 3, he inflates resolutional abuse. "Hacking a woman to death" is not topical, since in the resolution victims are alive and able to act. If the abuse was repeated before and the woman survived, future abuse is unlikely to kill. Also, the resolution covers minimal cases, and killing in return for a couple of slaps is obviously too severe. This response skews proportionality and justice, and is not morally permissible. Now to his 2nd contention that affirming reduces oppression. First of all, I've already pointed out that my opponent never addresses morality. Even if his second contention is true, we still have to ask —"But is the act morally permissible?" The fact that affirming reduces oppression is not enough since (1) oppression is not the only threat to justice and (2) the case lacks any mechanism to prove the response morally permissible. Even if you don't buy that, the benefits of affirming do not outweigh. Affirming increases oppression by allowing victims to infringe on their abusers' right to life and condoning homicide. In Clarke 4, my opponent shows the benefits of violent resistance. He ignores that fact that violent resistance doesn't equal killing; the only violent force necessary is enough to incapacitate the abuse. On Clarke 5: Clarke tries to balance an equation of violence by saying the victim prevents future killings, but she ignores the effects of affirming on society; telling society that killing is ok in any circumstance will escalate violence.