This House believes that abortion is morally permissible.

In order to address my opponent’s arguments, I’ll split them into the major reactions: the criticisms of my case, the substance view, and the potentiality argument which my opponent has dubbed the FLO. The fact that I still refer to it as the potentiality argument highlights my major objection to it. However, if only to build interest, I’ll address this point last. Infanticide is one of the most common objections to these views of abortion: Anne Warren has had to address it, J.J.Thompson has had to address it, and of course Singer has had to. Singer himself, universally acknowledged as one of the most important bioethicists of our time, cannot teach in Germany any more due to the attacks done on him and the lectures he has hosted by his opponents. The opponents, however, are not “pro-lifers”, but instead the disabled community, who attack his position. The most evident point about the pseudo-scholarly attacks on his position, however, is the misrepresentation of his case. To quote him: “I was advocating euthanasia not for anyone like himself [those who are in wheelchairs or with mild autism, for example] … my views cannot be a threat to anyone who is capable of wanting to go on living, or even of understanding that his or her life might be threatened.”[1] With this in mind, the slippery slope argument clearly becomes one of misrepresentation. For example, low IQ does not in any way justify the claim that individuals are not people. The claim about “children” is in fact a complete misrepresentation. To add the context to the quote, the paragraph goes: “In thinking about this matter we should put aside feelings based on the small, helpless, and – sometimes – cute appearance of human infants. To think that the lives of infants are of special value because infants are small and cute is on a par with thinking that a baby seal, with its soft white fur coat and large round eyes deserves greater protection than a gorilla, who lacks these qualities”[2]. To claim this says it is acceptable to kill all newborn infants is a complete misrepresentation, which only can come from a misrepresentation of his position by those wishing to slight him, of which there are many, or – worse – a purposeful malice. However, I wholly believe the former reason is much more likely. Inequality also comes from a similar problem. One cannot be “less of a person”: one either is, or one is not. I concede there is a ‘grey area’ – there is much ethical debate about the limits of euthanasia. However, the life of that which has no characteristic of personhood – namely a fetus – is clearly not relevant. And finally, the episodic problem again does not exist when we realise that one is still has characteristics (2), (3), (4) and (5) when asleep, and (2), (4) and (5) when in a coma, of Warren’s code. One either asleep or in a coma still has values (1) and (3) of mine. As Warren points out, our language constrains us somewhat in discussing this issue, but ‘consciousness’ can be replaced with ‘sentience’[3]. Sentience excludes sleep, and therefore grants us all characteristics of personhood, though as Warren states, the characteristics are “very rough”. However, the importance is that “All we need to claim, to demonstrate that a fetus is not a person, is that any being which satisfies none of (1)-(5) is certainly not a person.”[4] Now, the substance argument can be quickly dismissed as it begs the question: “What makes one of any particular species?” There is no justification for the argument, which allows to simply claim anything regarding a “type”. There’s no reason why all human beings must share a disposition to being a moral agent – in fact, my argument states that many genetic humans (embryos) are not moral agents. To claim genetics is all that matters is to leave one wide open to the claim of speciesism: “Membership of a species is no more relevant in these circumstances than membership of a race or sex.”[5] The mindless collectivism reminds us “we ought to treat people as individuals”[6], not their group. Furthermore, we have no reason why “type”, being genetic, seems to not extend to spermatozoa. In fact, as taxonomy is “entirely vague and arbitrary”[7], we might as well include apes and others: they share our genetic type very strongly. A banana shares 50-55% of its genes with humans[8] – how strict are we going to be? I push this ad absurdium to highlight the speciesist nature of this approach. The only valid form of this case is that anything of the kind of being a person is valuable, which includes most, but not all, humans. Which includes developed, but not undeveloped, humans. Which includes the born, but not the unborn. And finally with regards to the potentiality argument. Again, I refer to it as the potentiality argument. Why? Because in reality there is no difference between it and the potentiality argument itself, except the shifting of the goalposts. What I claim, among others, is that it is not “having a valuable personal future”[9], but is that we “have a valuable personal present”. It simply replaces the word potential with future, and I have to replace actual with present. Boonin, I believe, puts forth the same point: “it argue[s] that the fetus has the same right to life that we have because it has the potential to have a property that we already actually have.”[10] {Emphasis added} So again, I shall reiterate my criticisms. The first (the delaying problem) points out that an abortion does not deny “a potentially valuable future”, but merely delays it. If a delay is seen as immoral, we need justification, as there is more benefit to both parties if a birth is delayed. Secondly, denying a potentially valuable future by use of contraception, or even abstinence, is still immoral. And finally, IVF leads us to conclude that the risks of natural abortion are too high, and it is immoral to have natural insemination over artificial insemination, three times over! To conclude, I shall reiterate the words of pro-life advocate John Noonan: “life itself is a matter of probabilities…if a spermatozoon is destroyed, one destroys a being which had a chance of far less than 1 in 200 million of developing into a reasoning being, possessed of the genetic code, a heart and other organs, and capable of pain.”[11] Actuality of life from spermatozoon is negligible at best, yet its potential is an entire human life. A sperm-and-egg’s potential is one-in-ten to developing into a human being, yet its potential is of course a human being. And yet IVF tells us even this is too little of the story: “Up to about 14 days after fertilisation, we cannot even tell if the embryo is going to be one or two [or more, theoretically an infinite number of] individuals”[12]. So any theory which claims the life of a fertilised egg is worth more than a human person needs to be rejected instinctively. My opponent’s ethical theory should be held to the same standard, and dismissed on the same ground. Regarding the boring issue of technicality, namely sources, whilst I do not hold it against my opponent as it was entirely accidental I am sure, he has misrepresented a source and thereby strawanned (again mistakenly) Singer’s position, and as such I feel this ought to be kept in account. However, regarding the issue of the debate itself, I wish to reiterate Hursthouse’s sentiments: she and I are in agreement that abortion is something not to be taken lightly. However, it is a perfectly morally permissible action, and ought to be accepted as just. Thank you. [1] Peter Singer, Pracitcal Ethics p345 [2] Ibid, p170-1 [3] Mary Anne Warren, Moral Status, p51 [4] Mary Anne Warren, On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion [5] Peter Singer, Practical Ethics p76 [6] Ibid, p75 [7] Charles Darwin, On The Origin, p48 [8] http://tinyurl.com... [9] Boonin, David, A Defense of Abortion p62 [10] Ibid, p62 [11] The Morality of Abortion: Legal and Historical Perspectives, John Noonan p56-7 [12] Peter Singer, Practical Ethics p137