God Exists

While it is unfortunate that Pro forfeited, this shall not really impact me as I need to rebut Pro’s case in this round. I shall, thus, attempt to refute Pro’s case. R1) Omnipotence Overviews Ob1: If I can render omnipotence contradictory or impossible, it automatically follows that omnipotence is impossible in a non-existent God. Ob2: This argument only argues for the *possibility* of God’s existence, by saying “God can break the barrier of existence”. That is irrelevant to probability, as the resolution implies. But the argument essentially draws out of modal logic and is, in broad essence, an ontological argument. Ob3: I reject Pro’s definition of ‘exist’--to affirm the resolution, Pro must demonstrate that God has reality, not just interacts with it, thus this argument is valid if and only if it utilizes possible world semantics, i.e. the idea that omnipotence allows God to interact with reality, thus God breaks the barrier of existence in one possible world, which extends to all possible worlds. a) Omnipotence Is Incoherent This is best illustrated by the ‘paradox of the stone’, or the omnipotence paradox, which is generally structured as such: If a being can perform any action, then it should be able to create a task which this being is unable to perform; hence, this being cannot perform all actions. Yet, on the other hand, if this being cannot create a task that it is unable to perform, then there exists something it cannot do [1][2]. The only way to refute the argument that says justification of omnipotence is sophistry is to introduce ad hoc hypotheses that fail Occam’s razor [3]. Thus, the property of ‘omnipotence’ is incoherent and cannot be used to justify the existence of God. b) Possible Worlds & Reverse MOA This argument is, essentially, a rephrasing of the modal ontological argument--omnipotence demonstrates that God has interacted with reality in some possible world, ergo exists in all possible worlds. This is true because even if God is omnipotent, it only means God *can* interact with reality, not that he does. Which would mean, to reach the affirmation that God exists, one would have to multiply existence in one possible world to existence in all possible worlds, via. a Plantingan interpretation of S5 axioms, which allows for the following axiom: `33;◊A → `33;A → A, i.e. If possibly necessarily A, then necessarily A, and A [4]. The multiplication of possible worlds is flawed as the negative of A can be used to demonstrate it is incorrect--in an ontological argument, A is the statement “God exists”, but A can also be the statement “God does not exist”. The reverse premise, “It is possible that God doesn’t exist”, entails the reverse conclusion “God doesn’t exist” via. the exact same logic [5]. R2) Descartesian ontology This argument can be structured in the following syllogism: 1. If properties are ascribed to a being, it exists. 2. Properties are ascribed to God. 3. God exists. First, I question the first premise, since the first premise begs the question. This argument is easily subject to a reductio ad absurdum: 1. If properties are ascribed to a being, it exists. 2. Properties are ascribed to the Flying Spaghetti Monster. 3. The Flying Spaghetti Monster exists. The same can be substituted for anything which is imagined, so the basic ontology: “If something can be imagined, it exists.” This is because imagination requires perceiving features of a subject, thus perceiving properties of a subject. By this logic, any and every product of imagination has to exist, but this has to be justified, and is absurd, thus the statement “God exists”, derived from this argument, is absurd by the very nature of this Descartesian ontology. R3) Infinite universes a) Atheistic assumption is *not* always one of simultaneous causality--there are several other explanations, e.g. retro-causality, ex nihilo, bubble universe, and ekpyrotic universe. Thus, this is a bare assertion. b) Once more, Pro conflates possibility with necessity. If it is possible that there are many universes does *not* imply that there are necessarily many universes. Furthermore, it does not assume there would be infinite universes--‘many’ and ‘infinite’ are distinct. c) Naturalism does not assume space is infinite. Space is actually finite, and general relativity predicts that space is constantly expanding [6], and rates of expansion may change as the curvature of the universe is likely flat [7]. d) Infinite universes don’t require “infinite creative power”. This is a bare assertion, since it assumes universes need to be caused. But according to physicist Sean Carroll, causality is not required sans time directionality and physical constraint [8], and the zero-energy universe hypothesis supports a universe caused ex nihilo [9][10]. R4) Argument from religious experience This is, essentially, an argument from religious experience, and I shall address it in that manner. When appealing to which explanation is more likely via. abductive reasoning, these criteria are generally ubiquitous regardless of what philosophy or field of study (including science) is undertaken [11]. 1. Has good explanatory power. 2. Is simple (Law of Parsimony). 3. Invokes minimal ad hoc explanations. 4. Is in line with background knowledge. 5. Makes testable statements. Using an abductive inference to best explanation, I will demonstrate how metaphysical naturalism offers a much better explanation to religious experience than the existence of God. Except #1, metaphysical naturalism offers much better explanations to all the criteria; #1 is probably a tie between naturalism and deism. #1. For the ‘explanatory power’ argument, I will present a reductio ad absurdum argument to counter religious experience. Recently, there have been ‘scary’ sightings of *fairies*, thus there have actually been experiences of fairies. Does this imply that fairies are real and triggered the sightings? That would be an absurd conclusion, thus an experience is not definite. Thus, metaphysical naturalism has equal, if not greater, explanatory power in explaining religious experience. #2. The naturalistic explanation to religious experiences pose that these experiences are entirely within the mind, which has one assumption: that it is purely psychological. The theistic explanation is that a deity (assumption 1) interacts with the mind (assumption 2). The theistic explanation has more assumptions, thus naturalism fulfills Occam’s Razor here. #3. There is an *enormous* diversity in religious experiences, but the naturalistic explanation explains this by saying there is an enormous diversity in already inherent beliefs, while all varied theistic explanations defend one kind of God and can only account for this with ad hoc explanations. While theistic explanations can account for this, it severely weakens the statements with ad hoc explanations. #4. Metaphysical naturalism roots its very basis with background knowledge, viz. a scientific explanation for the universe not involving God. Background scientific knowledge generally dictates the likely non-existence of God via. quantum superposition, etc. #5. Naturalism holds that existing physical laws are responsible for everything that happens within the mind, including religious experience. One of the theories for religious experiences are the contact with psilocybin, a naturally-occurring compound produced by more than 2,000 species of mushrooms. “Under supportive conditions, 20 and 30 mg/70 kg psilocybin occasioned mystical-type experiences having persisting positive effects on attitudes, mood, and behavior.” [12] In the 1980s, Dr. Michael Persinger, a neuroscientist, stimulated the temporal lobes of human subjects with a weak magnetic field; the subjects reported an ‘ethereal religious experience.’ [13] A new neuroimaging study with PET scans suggest *physical* stimuli in the brain, specifically in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, superior parietal lobe, and caudate nucleus [14]. There have been no studies that show in any way that God’s existence fueled these religious experiences, thus the naturalistic explanation makes more testable statements. R5) Belief in God This argument doesn’t argue for God, thus is irrelevant to the resolution. It merely attempts to convince me to believe in God with no justification, thus can be discounted. Belief in God is not only explained by the existence of God. The resolution is negated. 1. http://www.jstor.org... 2. http://plato.stanford.edu... 3. http://plato.stanford.edu... 4. http://plato.stanford.edu... 5. http://wiki.ironchariots.org... 6. Stephen Hawking and Leonard Mlodinow. A Briefer History of Time, p 52. 7. http://map.gsfc.nasa.gov... 8. http://p2c.com... 9. http://aether.lbl.gov... 10. http://www.astrosociety.org... 11. http://plato.stanford.edu... 12. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov... 13. http://www.rexresearch.com... 14. http://www.sciencedirect.com...