Three Philosophical Topics - 1F

===> Introduction <=== My opponent has conceded that I have disproved determinism, but have still not won the arguments. This is incorrect for several reasons. First, P2 of the Consequence argument and P5 of the Source argument assume that determinism is true. If determinism is false, the arguments are not valid. It has been an established fact for over half a century that physical determinism is false, however, in philosophical discussions it is still common to refer to the position of "INCOMPATIBILISM" (my opponent's position) as simply "determinism." However, this was not my intent. Disproving physical determinism is not sufficient to ensure Free Will. I have used the phrase "adequate determinism" over the course of the debate, which essentially concedes that physical determinism is true, allowing, of course, for the (very) minimal effects of quantum uncertainty on macroscopic models which has come to light over the course of the last century. Since I am arguing that physical determinism and Free Will are compatible, my arguments have NOT been focused on disproving this, but on disproving INCOMPATIBILISM. ===> Consequence Argument <=== PRO has missed the point – I am accusing him of equivocation (he doesn't distinguish between the two different meanings of the word "could" in the ship analogy). What is more, he has painted himself into a corner – if his definition of the word "could" IS to be taken seriously, all this does is give support to P3 of my argument that Hard Determinism is self refuting. ===> Hard Determinism is Self-Refuting <=== As I stated in the intro, "hard determinism" has been used interchangeably with "incompatibilism." Whether physical determinism is true or not is really beside the point since it is my opponent's incompatibilist premise that I am attacking. Apart this, however, PRO has correctly interpreted the argument and I will now proceed to answer his objections. P3: What can be done is done – As I said in my answer to the consequence argument, this comes directly from the definition of incompatibilism that my opponent has put forth. He stated explicitly in Round 3 that "[Jack] will ALWAYS TAKE R2 given the same set of causal chains in the past," implying that using his own definition of "could" (which again, I hold to be fallacious) Jack COULD have done no other; whatever IS done is literally all that CAN be done. P4 simply states that I believe in Free Will. Is this arbitrary? Yes, I freely admit this; however, it does not detract from the argument. Therefore, we are left with two possible outcomes, either of which negates PRO's arguments: 1) My definition of could is fallacious, in which case PRO's definition of could is fallacious. 2) Minimal Free Will is true. PRO also attacked P4 (that I personally believe in Free Will). I freely admit that this is arbitrary, however, that is beside the point: it is only necessary that I believe it. Substituting "incompatibilism" for "Free Will" will yield the conclusion that incompatibilism is true; however, that is also not the point of the argument. The point is to show that in certain circumstances, minimal free will is true. The fact that my belief is arbitrary does not make the argument any less valid. ===> The Source Model <=== This is not so much an ARGUMENT against Free Will as a DEFINITION of Free Will that basically excludes everything (P1. Any agent, x, performs an any act, a, of her own free will iff x has control over a; P2. x has control over a only if x is the ultimate source of a). And how convenient a definition for my opponent to give! He essentially postulates an absurd definition of Free Will, admits to its absurdity, and claims, therefore, that Free Will is absurd! If this were an ARGUMENT, then he is correct that a reducto ad absurdum argument would be fallacious. However, since it is a DEFINITION, the ad absurdum stands. I hold that my definition (which I stated informally in the Jack example) is superior. Stated formally, any agent X is free iff X performs any act A, when he COULD HAVE done B. I attacked the fallacious definition of the word "could" put forth by PRO in the consequence argument. To cap off the absurdity, even if we grant that my opponent's definition is valid, it can only disprove Free Will in HUMANS, the alpha particles emitted by a deposit of U-238, ironically, would have it while we would not. As a sidenote, Harry Frankfurt, like me, is a compatibilist.[1] In the in the past, my opponent has used Frankfurt counterexamples to support his use of the Source model. While he gave no explanation, what they basically are is a situation in which we would intuitively say that an agent had acted freely when in fact no alternative course of action existed. What this adds to his case is the possibility of retaining moral responsibility under an incompatibilist model, and while this may be true, it has no bearing on whether or not his definition of Free Will is right or wrong. Yes, moral responsibility can be retained under the Source model, just as it is under a compatibilist model. ===> Goedelian Argument <=== My purpose here was not to disprove physical determinism and the argument retains its validity even in the face of quantum indeterminacy. Under a system of hard indeterminist incompatibilism, P1 might be modified to say "For any human h there exists at least one logical system L(h) which reliably predicts h's actions in all circumstances [excepting randomness caused by indeterminacy]." And the rest of the argument go unchanged. PRO claims that there is no difference between the unpredictability of a quantum particle and human behavior. This is not the case. Certain ASPECTS of human behavior CAN be predicted by L(h), and other aspects can be predicted by other logical models, but both models cannot be accurate at once unless the system of arithmetic is inconsistent. However, these rules apply only to the machine that is attempting to draw conclusions for L(h): "h" himself CAN predict all aspects of his character while retaining a system of consistent arithmetic. This is a fundamental difference between minds and machines. This is NOT an instance of the "God of the Gaps" fallacy: predictions CAN be made, but only by "h," not by the mechanist. ===> Argument from Consciousness/Experience <=== Again my opponent has badly misrepresented my position: I do not hold that without Free Will there can be no reason, but given consciousness and experience, to deny Free Will is to distrust our ability to sense and perceive, without which there can be nothing to rationally evaluate. Since when can computers make decisions? Computers respond to input in a predetermined way based on lines of written program code. Because we clearly perceive the act of decision making, and there is a clear distinction between this and the "decisions" that a computer makes, the Free Will Premise must be true. As I stated in R3 (citing G.E. Moore) "Our futures are often INDETERMINATE. Because we recognize that we cannot know, in advance, that we would NOT choose something, we often make choices NOW to reduce the likelihood of making those choices later." ===> Conclusion <=== Hard incompatbilism runs completely contrary to reason. It goes against our perception without explaining why we perceive wrongly. In light of this, it should be clear where the burden of proof lies. My opponent states that I have disproved physical determinism without proving Free Will, but this i simply not the case. In addition to removing support for the aforementioned premises in PRO's arguments, I have made positive arguments for Free Will in all five contentions. I thank my opponent for a vigorous debate and hope that it has been as much of a learning experience for him as it has for me. SOURCE(S) [1] http://en.wikipedia.org...