United Nations peacekeepers should have the power to engage in offensive operations

This debate is about whether to have a mixed offensive/peacekeeping force, or whether to keep offensive and peacekeeping forces separate. While Thett would have us blur the line between peacekeepers and peacemakers, I argue that such blurring entails serious risks with no unique benefits. Definitions:The term "peacekeeping" isn't in the U. N. Charter, so there's no correct definition of the term. For purposes of this debate, I define U. N. peacekeepers as "a force authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VI of the U. N. Charter, composed of personnel voluntarily provided by member states, to assist with the maintenance of peace. " In fairness to Thett, this definition intentionally leaves open the question of how much force a peacekeeping operation has the authority to use. The term "U. N. enforcement" is also important. "U. N. enforcement" refers to "a situation where the Security Council uses Chapter VII authority against an opposing state either by imposing sanctions or through the use of physical force under Article 42. " Thus, "enforcement" refers to a type of activity where the Security Council has authorized offensive force. An famous example of "enforcement" is Operation Desert Storm (i. e. the U. S. -led coalition to expel Iraq from Kuwait in 1990). Traditionally, the key difference between "peacekeeping" and "enforcement" has been the level of force each mission was authorized to use. The U. N. peacekeepers were only authorized to use force in self-defense, which has traditionally included a defense of the mandate, but not offensive force. Meanwhile, enforcement operations have traditionally been authorized to use offensive force. The other important distinction between the two is that peacekeeping operations must recieve the consent of the host state, while enforcement operations don't. What are the limits of the self-defense principle? In 2003, the U. N. Secretariat described self-defense as "the right to protect oneself, other U. N. personnel, U. N. property, and any other persons under U. N. protection. " Thus, U. N. peacekeeping operations have traditionally authorized the use of force to defend U. N. personnel or the mandate, where the mandate sometimes requires protecting civilians within the mission's area of operation. The self-defense principle has been described as "integral to the whole concept of peacemaking. " It's precisely what legitmizes U. N. peacekeeping as an impartial operation. So peacekeepers currently have the authority to use force in self-defense. And that isn't (or shouldn't be) at dispute in this debate. What the peacekeepers traditionally haven't been allowed to do is use offensive force (i. e. initiate the use of force). And Thett's arguing that peacekeepers should be given that authority. What are the disadvantages of an offensive peacekeeping force? There's four problems with mixing offensive/peacekeeping forces. First, giving peacekeepers the power to use offensive force means there will be fewer enforcement operations. This happens because offensive peacekeeping operations will let states who other would contribute to a U. N. authorized enforcement operation "off the hook. " This is a major problem because enforcement operations have historically been shown to be better at protecting civilians than peacekeeping operations. Thett expected me to argue that offensive operations don't work. But that's a massivley stupid argument. And I'm surprised Thett would think me that stupid. What I argue is much more nuanced: enforcement operations are far more likely to protect civilians than peacekeeping operations, when offensive force rather than self-defense is required. Unlike Thett, I don't feel like spending 15 minutes reseraching this sh! tty topic, but I'm 99% certain that were I to do the reserach, I'd find source after source proving that point. Second, peacekeepers traditionally have received special protections under the Geneva Conventions. This is because international humanitarian law distinguishes between combatants and civilians. And the only legitimate use of force in an armed conflict is against combatants. Civilians are thus protected. Traditionally, peacekeepers are classified as civilians, because they only use force in self-defense. But if peacekeepers start using force beyond self-defense (i. e. offensivel), then they'll become combatants under international humanitarian law. And that classification will eliminate a range of protections that is otherwise available to peacekeepers. It means peacekeepers will become legitimate targets. Of course, that'll lead to the routine targeting of U. N. forces, even if a particular peacekeeping mission isn't actively engaging in offensive force, because they'll be understood as combatants under international law (i. e. having the authority to use offensive force). And the problem isn't just that peacekeepers will become legitimate targets, but it'll also compromise the ability of international laws to hold attackers accountable. From the perspective of forces on the ground, there will no longer be any need to distinguish peacekeepers from others in planning attacks. And that means peacekeepers will often be attacked simply as collateral, without having to apply any principles of proportionality (as required in attacking civilians). Third, blurring the distinction between peacekeepers and peacemakers may undermine impartiality. And the importance of impartiality cannot be overstated. It protects the legitimacy and credibility of U. N. interventions, maintains the peacekeepers status as an independent third party to the conflict, and thus allows the U. N. to act as a meaningful independent monitor of conflicts. Impartiality is crucial to effective peacekeeping. But when you have an offensive peacekeeping force, there's a risk that parties on the ground won't perceive the operation as impartial. This also has implications for authorizing peacekeeping in the first place (how do you know consent is still there if parties on the ground no longer see the force as impartial? ) And how will parties know who is responsible for the use of force on the ground if peacekeeprs are allowed to use offensive force? Finally, expectations. "In this world, with great power there must also come—great responsibility. ” An increase in the U. N. peacekeepers power to use offensive force means increased responsibility. And increased responsibility means increased expectations. What hapens when those heightened expectations aren't met? The Rwandan genocide already demonstrates the harm to legitimacy when the U. N. fvcks up. Notably, if expectations aren't met, it compromises the entire peacekeeping mission. And related to this problem, how will peacekeeping commanders decide when offensive force is appropriate? Those decisions will be scrutinized, attacked, and ultimately will undermine the legitimacy and credibility of peacekeeping. What are the advantages of offensive peacekeeping? Thett argues that we need offensive operations. I agree. That's why we have enforcement operations. So the benefit of having offensive operations isn't unique. Thett cites the Rwandan genocide. No doubt that was one of the United Nations' greatest failures. But that wasn't a failure to authorize offensive force. The peacekeepers in that case easily could have justified force in self-defense. And even if force in self-defense wasn't possible, the U. N. should have authorized an enforcement operation. The failure to enforce international law has nothing to do with failing to give the peacekeepers authority to use offensive force. Thett doesn't really cite any other benefits to offensive peacekeeping that we wouldn't already get through enforcement operations. Don't make peacekeepers into peacemakers. Let the peacekeepers do what they do best. And let the peacemakers do what they do best.