The Problem of Evil is an invalid argument

I am going to offer my own case, and then rebut Pro's in the next round. FrameworkNote that, in order to prove this argument valid, I must only demonstrate that, per our criteria, the Tri-Omni God is not logically coherent. If I’m able to demonstrate, for instance, that per our criteria the Tri-Omni God is either not omnipotent, omniscient, or omnibenevolent -- mind you, all three of which must hold for Pro to win this debate -- then the argument is sound. Prelude and Thought Experiment Consider the following scenario: you’re in a hospital, witnessing a tragic event unfold before your eyes: a baby has been born, and despite several interventions by medical professions, he isn’t breathing. You hear that he doesn’t have much time left and will surely die. The family is heartbroken, and would give anything to save their beloved son. Now, consider that you are the only person who can save this child. You alone have the power and the means to save him. Effectively, you are playing the role of God. The family is begging you to intervene. Note that you are infinitely powerful and intervening will not in any way inconvenience or harm you, and you are also infinitly knowledgeable, so you know that saving this innocent life would in no way upset the “natural order.” Moreover, this is an innocent child without the capacity to make decisions. He hasn’t had the chance to do wrong, so this isn’t a matter of “interfering with free will.” Would you save him? The answer for most is an unequivocal “yes.” If you had such power, why wouldn’t you save this innocent life? Life has intrinsic value, the child has done nothing wrong because he hasn’t had a chance to do wrong, and only you are able to save him. As a person with such power, do you not possess a moral obligation to intervene? Let’s say that you decide, for whatever reason, not to intervene. You’re able to, but don’t. Why didn’t you? What could possibly be your justification? Do you not care for the suffering of this innocent infant, or of his family? If you didn’t intervene but could, wouldn’t we rightfully call you “evil?” Now, let’s take a different turn: what if you wanted to intervene, but didn’t? The reason you didn’t was that you weren’t able to. In such a case, you may well be all-good, but surely we couldn’t call you omnipotent; if you were omnipotent, you would have the power to intervene. To syllogize this argument: P1) If gratuitous suffering exists, then the Tri-Omni God does not.P2) Gratuitous suffering exists.C1) Therefore, the Tri-Omni God does not exist. Note that, as Pro and I have agreed to and as is stated in the opening rules, neither of us are making categorical statements with espect to God's existence; that is, the fact that the Tri-Omni God doesn’t possess truth value will not be a valid objection the Problem of Evil. Rather, our concern is in evaluating the merits of this argument. If the argument, on balance, stands by the end of this debate, I have won. Defense of P2 P2 seems relatively uncontroversial, but nevertheless I’ll evidence it. Let’s point to quite possibly the most troubling example I’ve come across. Phil Carroll, in summarizing the results of a recent Lancet Series, notes the following: “Each year, 5.5 million babies enter and leave the world without being recorded, and one in three newborns—over 45 million babies—do not have a birth certificate by their first birthday. Babies who are stillborn, born too early, or who die soon after birth are least likely to be registered, even in high-income countries” (1). I don’t believe my opponent will contest that gratuitous suffering exists, so I’m going to take this time to move on to my defense of P1. Defense of P1 That’s a startling amount of infant deaths per annum. If there were something we as humans were able to do in order to mollify this, surely we would act. We have, for instance, private charities and foundations which try to donate to impoverished families or channel vaccines to countries high rates of preventable diseases. Intrinsic to humans is a nurturing desire: we don’t want people to suffer. In fact, we can identify and empathize with others, and this is intrinsic to our neurology, as we know from the discovery of mirror neurons (2). The crux of mirror neurons is that we can identify intentionality in other minded creatures by way of observing goal-directed actions: for instance, if someone lifts a cup, we identify with it based on our experience of having lifted a cup. The same goes for suffering. Humans have, as part of their material nature, a capacity for empathy. Now, bearing in mind that people are generally compassionate and well-meaning, how could a God which is omnibenevolent -- which should be the very standard of morality -- not feel the same way? How could an omnibenevolent God stand by idly while innocent people suffer and die completely preventable deaths, particularly preventable by virtue of the fact that he, and only he, could intervene. If he doesn’t intervene but can, how can we call him omnibenevolent? If he doesn’t intervene because he can’t, can we truly call him omnipotent? Another relatively uncontroversial point that most people wouldn’t contest -- I trust that this argument will go unrefuted -- is that we all would, in response to the scenario I delineated in the prelude to this debate, intervene. Nevertheless, I’m now going to introduce several arguments as to why there is a categorical moral imperative to intervene such that, if one can intervene but doesn’t (especially knowing that one only is able to intervene), we must only look at the person as evil. Of course, if one wants to but can't, he isn't omnipotent, once again. F.L.O., or “Future Like Ours” This was a popular argument created by Don Marquis against abortion (3). It’s particularly applicable in this case because not only does it establish a basis for a categorical right to life, but it is in fact in line with the Christian view on abortion (4). The crux of the argument is that a premature death is categorically wrong because it deprives someone of their future experiences. To syllogize it: P1) It is categorically wrong to deprive a person of a meaningful future.P2) A premature death deprives a person of a meaningful future.C1) Therefore, murder is categorically wrong. Again, if we establish that a premature death is categorically wrong, then we are left with one conclusion: if a God created the universe, he created it such that disgraceful acts of violence could occur, but doesn't intervene to rectify them. Why would gratuitous suffering even EXIST in a world created by an omnibenevolent God? We are left with one logical conclusion: P1) There is evil in the worldP2) God created evilC1) Therefore, God is not omnibenevolent If this syllogism holds, this debate is over. Utilitarianism Utilitarianism, essentially, involves the notion of the “great good for the greatest number,” emphasizing the maximization of utility and the minimization of suffering (5). In the case of a Tri-Omni God, we have an interesting case. Unlike in a discipline such as economics where we consider what is utilitarian by weighing costs and benefits -- you learn in Econ 101 that economic efficiency is a condition such that one person cannot be better off without another person being worse off, which leads us to make qualitative distinctions to assess the relative value of propositions -- we are not weighing costs and benefits. As I noted in the prelude, if God is omnipotent, there is no cost to his intervention. God intervening to stop the deaths of millions of babies would ONLY increase happiness and reduce suffering: there are no trade-offs.If this is the case, why wouldn’t God intervene? How can we accept that a supposedly omnibenevolent God would not intervene when there is nothing to lose and everything to gain? A common argument against utilitarianism is that it places far too much of an emphasis on consequentialism: for instance, you could commit (x) action expecting (y) outcome when in fact (y) outcome is morally undesirable, but end up with (z) outcome which is morally desirable. However, this case is utterly irrelevant in the case of am omniscient Tri-Omni God: he would know the future and know that (x) action would result in (z) outcome. Deontology First, to quickly elucidate deontology: “The theory of deontology states we are morally obligated to act in accordance with a certain set of principles and rules regardless of outcome” (6). The case made by Immanuel Kant is that what matters when considering the morality of an action is not its results, but its intention. This is because humans are rational beings and thus we are to act with respect to a series of duties grounded in nature, acknowledging that we must pursue some actions objectively -- that is, act in such a way that our action could be accepted as a universal maxim. You could consider this simply the Golden Rule: “Do unto others as you would want others to do unto you.” A famous line by Kant which also further my cases is as follows: “Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never merely as a means to an end but always at the same time as an end” (6). The point is that actions should be an ends in themselves, rather than a means to an end. Instead of using people as a means to some end, we should act with respect to a moral duty that factors in the categorical imperative that people are intrinsically valuable and doing harm to another person is thus categorically wrong. I’m now going to cross-reference the aforementioned syllogism: unless Pro can refute Kant’s philosophy, provided that he accepts that gratuitous suffering does in fact exist, or account for why God would allow this to occur, he cannot win this debate. Sources (1) http://tinyurl.com... (2) http://tinyurl.com... (3) http://tinyurl.com... (4) http://tinyurl.com... (5) http://tinyurl.com... (6) http://tinyurl.com...