One Should Not Presume Atheism

This debate is will be relatively simply due to my opponent's misunderstanding of my argument.PresumptionFirst with the background information that provides the backbone of my case. My opponent claims that I said that presumption is the only way of knowing and then cites induction and deductionas ways of knowing; however, this is not my argument at all. I actually agree with my opponent in that induction and deduction are ways of knowing and would even go as far as to say that presumption was not, and the presumption was not even sufficient for knowledge. This does not harm my case in the least bit because my argument is that presumption is not a way of knowing, but that it is prerequisite for acquiring new knowledge. That is to say that in order to induce or deduce a fact, one must have presumed there is a fact to be known. Had they not, they would have never seeked an explanation because there would be no explanation to be had. This does away with my opponent's first objection to my case.Contention 1: Knowledge is More Valuable than True BeliefMy opponent's refutation to my first contention is an appeal to the value of ignorance. First he questions the significance of having epistemic value at all. I would say the one, he declared this to be an epistemic debate in the first round, and two epistemic understanding is a prerequisite the the value judgments he cites as being valuable. To declare that something is good, bad, effective, defective, etc. is to claim to have some epistemic understanding about that thing and to be describing it based on that epistemic understanding. Epistemology is concerned with the nature of knowledge. It seems hard for me to believe that one can claim that a concept such as value judgments which require knowledge about the objects and actions we deem valuable or detrimental can be valuable independent or the epistemic knowledge that allows us to make these value judgments in the first place.My opponent then questions whether or not something may be valuable if not epistemically. He raises the question of Pascal's wager. He claims that while Pascal's Wager has epistemic value, it is negative in that it decreases the likelihood of God's existence. I would note that this is, to be quite frank, wrong. By decreasing the likelihood of God's existence the epistemic value of Pascal's Wager is not decreased or negative. This simply proves that the ontological probability of God's existence is decreased. The epistemic value of knowing Pascal's Wager remains unchanged. In fact, it would be positively valuable to know Pascal's Wager. He states that the knowledge gained outweighs the possibility of the argument converting you to atheism. Now let's convert this into logical terms. He states that the epistemic value gained outweighs the lowered ontological probability of God's existence. The statements are equivalent. Logic_on_rails prioritizes epistemic value to other conceptions of value.The next two claims of happiness and liberty may be grouped. Both of these claims can be simply refuted when one realizes that to claim value of any sort to happiness of liberty you must have some epistemic understanding of those concepts. Once again epistemology seems to be a gateway issue and prerequisite for my opponent's case.Contention 2: In Order to Normatively Claim That one Should not Presume Atheism, They Must Utilize Induction or DeductionThis contention internally rejects my opponent's second refutation to my case. He does not argue that we should presume and answer to what we should do, but that we should deduce the most efficient choice in economic terms. He gives three compelling mathematical arguments, however none of them prove why you should presume something as they are all deductive or inductive arguments. There cannot be reasonb behind a presumption. By providing arguments at all my opponent concedes to this contention.ConclusionMy case precedes my opponent's in this round. As I have shown in round 1, he not only has a flawed conception of presumption but I am refuting the logical coherency of affirming the resolution at all. Of course whether or not we can rationally affirm is a question to be asked before we hear arguments as for why we should affirm. This brings me to my two, properly defended I believe, contentions. First, knowledge is more valuable than true belief and second that one cannot affirm the resolution without using an inductive or deductive argument, in which case they are no longer advocating a consideration of presumption as they have provided a reasoned argument.