This house believes in Utilitarianism over its rivals.

Foundationalism Robert Nozick offers a compelling response to Pro. He explains, "the fact that a particular theory has a fixed point does not show that this very same point must or will be held fixed by every plausible theory. And it does not show the theory under consideration is unable successively to transform itself by using its own then accepted standards, so that this point and even these very standards get modified." [1] Nozick thus shows that there are different kinds of logics with different foundations. The point is that these so-called "foundations" are always conditional (they are assumed but never proven), and these foundations can be doubted if a different set of assumptions are taken as a starting point. Pro claims that, even so, at least the simplest law of non-contradiction must be indubitable. Again, Pro is wrong. Nozick himself emphasizes that "logic and reason would not crumble if the law of non-contradiction is given up." Furthermore, the law of non-contradiction itself is a formal determination bereft of any content: what is and is not a contradiction will vary depending on distinctions that are already in place. A contradiction must be a contradiction between something and something else, and the shape of those somethings will always be the product of an interpretive act. Even abstract logical operations, including the law of non-contradiction, rely on an interpretive framework which is itself open to doubt. Pro's claim that there are indubitable truths is therefore false. Every single truth can be doubted on the basis of a different set of assumptions, and this applies even in the case of logic and reason. Coherentism I never said truths prove themselves. I am saying that every belief is the product of a certain set of assumptions which must be established as a starting point on faith alone (see Nozick above). Even statements like "I am" rely on interpretive determinations about what it means to identify yourself as something that exists (not to mention a fully-functioning language necessary to utter or think "I am" in the first place). Within a different paradigm or interpretive framework, given a different set of assumptions, a statement such as "I am" may be false. Point is, there are no indubitable facts that prove themselves; every fact relies on some other fact which is itself open to doubt on the basis of other plausible facts. Meta-Ethics The typical pragmatist employs what Aristotle calls "practical reasoning": an understanding of your goal, a survey of alternative ways of reaching it, a calculation of likely consequences, an effort to identify the relevant considerations, an analysis of what happened last time, and so on. The pragmatist thus employs many forms of moral reasoning, including the use of our moral intuitions. This does not mean pragmatism is the equivalent of moral intuitionism. Pro's argument equivocates between the meaning of "moral intuitions" and the philosophical doctrine known as "moral intuitionism," and thus Pro attacks a straw man. Even though pragmatists may appeal to their intuitions, they nevertheless make it a point to continuously analyze and revise their moral positions on the basis of practical reason. The primary point I was attempting to make in R2 is that pragmatism is more practical than utilitarianism in part because pragmatism is more in tune with our moral intuitions than utilitarianism. I explained this is a good thing because it helps us make quick and efficient moral judgments. For example, utilitarians cannot deal well with novel situations in which there are no applicable "rules of thumb," as no one can actually perform the complex calculations required by utilitarianism on the spot. This inevitably leads to moral paralysis, as utilitarians are unlikely to use their moral intuitions out of fear they will conflict with the correct moral judgment. Pragmatists, on the other hand, can fall back on their moral intuitions, thereby avoiding moral paralysis when other forms of moral reasoning are doomed to failure. It is better to act, the pragmatist reasons, than remain paralyzed. This does not mean that pragmatists establish their moral intuitions as the sole source of moral knowledge (often pragmatists will derive moral knowledge from a utilitarian calculus). The point is, pragmatism is about making practical decisions in the moment, while also demanding that we refine our moral positions over time as best we can. In some sense, it could be said pragmatism relates to moral intuitions in the way science relates to untested theories: it is a starting point to be used practically until further experience, experiment, and contemplation can refine or revise these intuitions. Normative Ethical Systems, or Why Pragmatism is Better Than Utilitarianism Pro's claim that pragmatists are "unable to make ethical judgments" is patently false. Just because pragmatism is more "flexible" than utilitarianism does not mean pragmatists are unable to have moral positions: it is a simple matter of using practical reason (defined further in the Meta-Ethics section). The pragmatist can safely say that stealing is immoral in X case and moral in Y case. The difference is that pragmatists are constantly ready to revise their moral position (under the belief that human understanding is fallible) whereas utilitarians are not. To put it another way, pragmatists make conditional moral judgments because it is practical to do so. The key point here is that pragmatists nonetheless preserve the "marketplace of ideas" by continuing to revise their moral judgments as new discoveries are made (and for the record, just because a utilitarian coined the phrase "marketplace of ideas" does not mean utilitarians preserve it). The utilitarian calculus is supposed to produce moral absolutes, so once moral judgments are made, why would utilitarians continue to scrutinize and revise them? The answer is, they wouldn't. If Pro claims they would, it would imply the utilitarian calculus does not produce moral absolutes, in which case Pro is actually a closet pragmatist. Pro's "nuclear power plant" analogy completely and utterly misrepresents pragmatism. The pragmatist would not simply tell the man "do what works." The pragmatist would teach the man how to operate the plant, and then (and this is the most important part as it locates the primary difference between utilitarianism and pragmatism), the pragmatist would tell the man that there may possibly be better ways to operate the plant. The pragmatist would tell the man that he should therefore constantly refine how he operates the plant on the basis of his experience, whereas the utilitarian would tell the man that there are no better ways to operate the plant. I never said "science is better than all else," Pro is yet again misrepresenting my argument. I said a pragmatic ethics functions similarly to science insofar as it responds to new discoveries by revising its moral criteria. Thus, the argument I made in R2 was that pragmatists respond to change better than utilitarians. Pro claims that the version of utilitarianism he defends is value-plural. This still does not address my point: if a utilitarian places multiple values on an equal footing, then the utilitarian calculus is doomed to failure. It would be unable to produce a coherent set of moral judgments. There will inevitably arise situations where one value must be chosen over others. Pragmatists can do this, as a matter of practical concern, while maintaining equality. It is practical and reasonable to give each individual certain basic rights (John Rawls has justified these rights through practical reason). This is a fact about our society. And this is why pragmatists conclude that killing a healthy patient to save 5 lives is immoral. Utilitarians, on the other hand, advocate killing an unwilling healthy patient to save 5 lives. I find this result utterly detestable. [1] Robert Nozick, Invariances