The Philochistos 1973 commemorative debate

I’m generally liable to be sympathetic towards misunderstandings in debates like these--and I’m sure I’ve made my own--but unfortunately Pro has made some pretty incredible statements this last round that simply cannot be put down to inevitable misunderstandingsPro claims, that my position is “that statements like, ‘Stalin is evil’ mean ‘I don't like Stalin’ and that statements like "Rape is wrong" mean ‘I don't like rape.’” This is a pretty astounding claim that prompts me to accuse Pro wholeheartedly of either dishonest or extremely careless misrepresentation. The reason is because Pro knows full well, or used to, that that is not what I was saying. Let me quote his third round statment: “I suspect, based on the clear things Con said, that it was not his intention to equate morality with desire and that it only seemed that way…” Last round I even clarified my position, saying “I would not go so far as saying that every distinct moral sentiment directly corresponds to a set of desires...” Apparently, Pro understood my argument when I first made it based on “clear things Con said”, but now he’s suddenly confused by it even though my last round made it abundantly clear what I meant. This entire section of his rebuttal can be disregarded since it rests on a distortion. My very first statement that Pro take for me equating morality with desires states that desires matched up with "general institutionally formed notions of morality." The rest of my argument should have made clear I’m not equating morals with desires; I’m describing a relationship between the two, and that desires [interests and goals] are the primary first cause of moral feelings and closely relate to them today. Con accuses me of making a string of unfounded assertions in my account of morality. While I dispute this, Pro’s argument has hardly challenged me to do otherwise since his assertions are much more requiring of evidence and much more lacking of it. In the severely limited space that this debate permits, my aim is to provide an account of morality that is harmonious to the scientifically grounded description of the world. A scientific worldview must accept evolution as the explanation--or at the minimal least, the tool--for the characteristics of the human race (or most of them if compelling evidence provides an exception). Furthermore, naturalistic explanations are desired unless shown to be inadequate. There is nothing contradictory between science and the supernatural, but naturalism very much underlies scientific methodology, and only compelling evidence removes this principle. As reminder, Pro does accept evolution so there is no dispute over the theory being true, and thus, that the human race is at least largely here because of evolution. Saying that the moral element of humans is here because of divine authority departs from the scientific framework, and thus requires substantial support. Corresponding to the scientific facts is a prerequisite for a convincing descriptive account of any feature about the world. In this case, both Pro and I are providing descriptive explanations of morality. Pro says that objective morality arose with God. My claim is that both God and morality being objective are unnecessary postulates in explaining morality. Instead, moral feelings and beliefs began in some form during the course of evolution out of the collectivization of desires, goals, and interests, gained strength due to the survival advantages of kin and group altruism, religion, and law. Pro says that our strong moral intuition is indicative that objective morality is a basic fact of the world to be taken prima facie. I argue that objective morality is not at all obvious when considering it’s origins, and that evolution can explain the strong intuition we feel since every force mentioned above can generate intense emotions and because religion and government are institutions which strongly enforce universal morals and provide authority to them. This is a fully plausible explanation that fits within the scientific framework, without contesting whatsoever, any known facts. I'm quite confused at how anti-realism supports Pro's view, which is realism. He defines non-realism as believing moral claims don't correspond to objective facts of the world then says that calling my view "non-realism" implies I'm agreeing moral language refers to something outside. By non-realism, moral properties--evil, good, immoral--do not correspond to anything about the outside real but are subjective constructs, so I can’t fit my head around Pro’s argumentI have literally argued that morals are socially constructed institutionalized norms that arose out of desires, goals, and interests and that nothing further than this account is rationally justified or necessary. This is so strongly subjective that Pro cannot distinguish the God imperative from the legal edict. If God issues commands on us they can only be valid contractualy, like laws in government. Saying that God imposes moral obligations on us circular. God imposing commands is supposed to be how morality arises, so the fitting statement would be that God’s will create moral obligations. Pro’s argument for Jesus rising from the dead is unconvincing. It is a common human tendency that has constantly manifested itself throughout history to follow religious and mystical leaders regardless of their validity and it wasn’t Jesus but his followers who made Christianity popular. Christianity was not even prominent until a while latter. If Jesus genuinely rose from the dead, we would have seen a massive explosion at that time, not after. You simply cannot attribute the sustaining of Christianity to Jesus rising from the dead.Unfortunately I’m writing this on the back of an all-nighter and writing two essays and have to cut my case slightly short, but I said most of what I wanted to say and feel confident that I have provided ample evidence for my case.Thanks to Pro and all the voters!