Intellectual Property

Property: Pro writes, "For instance someone else must get my permission before expecting to benefit from my labor without paying me; they are not simply entitled to it without my consent (that's slavery)." While her conception of what constitutes property and theft seems right at first glance, it becomes absurd when closely examined. Simply benefiting from your labor without your permission does not constitute slavery, unless I forced you to do that labor. Take, for example, positive externalities. If I work hard to get an education, the economy as a whole benefits, even though I never gave anyone my permission to benefit from my labor. Is this slavery? If I keep a nicely-kept lawn and house, my neighbors have higher property values than if I had been lazy and had a messy lawn and crappy looking house. They benefit from my labor without my permission, and give me nothing in exchange for their benefits. Are my neighbors enslaving me? Obviously, using the benefits from labor as the criterion for what property is and isn't leads to ridiculous conclusions. In addition, labor itself isn't the basis for property. If I throw a can of paint into an un-owned ocean, and the paint dissipates through the water, do I then own that body of water? Do I get to decide who may or may not use it? If not, then why does mixing my labor with farmland grant me ownership of that land? Is it because farms are useful—but, then, how does one define "useful"? The correct way to determine how one acquires property is through use. Building a farm on un-owned land grants me the right to continue growing crops on that land. Throwing paint in an un-owned body of water grants me the right to throw more paint in that water. So what is ownership? Ownership merely means the right to use something as you see fit. If I own a car, then I have the right to use it however I like, as long as I don't infringe on anyone else's rights. If you take my car and are using it, then I can no longer use it—that's what makes it theft, and an infringement of my rights. That's what makes scarcity important—your use of the air doesn't stop me from using air, so the idea of "ownership" of air is absurd. Ideas are the same as air—my use of an idea does not stop you from using it, so it is not theft. Programmers example: This scenario does sound rather unfair. But what seems "fair" or "unfair" is not how property rights are determined. Regardless, that is not exactly what would happen in the absence of IP laws. The first programmer does have property rights in the original copy of the algorithm—the 2nd programmer isn't allowed to hack into his computer to get it. The 1st programmer can use it himself—it wouldn't matter that the 2nd guy had more resources; the 1st guy could get his operation up and running before the 2nd programmer knew the algorithm existed. Sure, the 2nd programmer could copy the 1st—just as the 2nd person to learn how to plant crops copied the 1st. The copier is benefitting from the innovator's labor, but the original creator isn't losing anything he actually owns. The 1st programmer and farmer would probably have higher future profits if their copiers couldn't compete with them, but people do not have property rights in potential profits; they can only have property rights in things they actually have. Or, he could sell it to the 2nd programmer, and make a profit that way. Neither situation involves theft. Economy: My opponent states that, "The market determines a product's value, therefore an item that is priced too high would not be embraced. The laws of supply and demand would be effective at decreasing the product's cost." That is what would happen—in a free market. In the case of IP, the market cannot decrease the product's cost, because the granting of a monopoly artificially restricts the supply. Pro correctly points out that granting a temporary monopoly for the sale of an idea increases the profits and therefore the incentives of innovators, which results in more innovation. But that's only half of the equation—intellectual monopolies also increase the costs of innovation, because the vast majority of innovations are built on the innovations of others, and those innovations would also be patented. This increase in costs decreases profits, decreasing incentives to innovate. But which effect is greater—the increase in revenue for innovators or the increase in costs? Let's look at the empirical evidence. The examples I used before stand. Pro claims that the Watt anecdote does not, because IP laws were more stringent back then, but this is blatantly false. IP laws have only gotten more and more stringent since Watt's time. In addition, she failed to address my points about the pharmaceutical industry. Even if an example from a long time ago doesn't count, the evidence that pharmaceutical patents did nothing to increase innovation is fairly recent, and clearly still applies. If patents really did increase innovation, then surely the evidence from the pharmaceutical industry, of all industries, would reflect this. Pro's arguments—that innovation requires a large investment of money, labor, and time—fit perfectly with the pharmaceutical industry, where drugs cost hundreds of millions of dollars and years, or even decades, to develop. But the empirical evidence shows that IP laws did not increase innovation in this industry. Studies of IP's effect on other industries have the same results. IP laws do not increase software innovation, for example. [1] [2] Pro also claims that "IP-intensive" industries generate 72 percent more value than other industries, but so what? This proves nothing, unless Pro can show that IP laws were responsible for that success, rather than something inherent about those industries. She can't do this because it isn't true. Studies comparing these industries before and after IP laws, such as the evidence from pharmaceutical industries mentioned earlier, show that IP does not increase innovation. Pro suggests IP pools as a potential reform of IP law. These already exist—and the result is cartels rather than monopolies. Large firms often pool their patents with each other, but not with new firms, to keep competitors out of the market. Is this situation better than if they didn't pool at all? Yes—but that doesn't contradict my argument that having no IP law would be even better. [1] Bessen, J. and R. M. Hunt (2003), "An Empirical Look at Software Patents," mimeo, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, May. http://opensource.mit.edu... [2] Levine, L. And K. M. Saunders (2004), "Software Patents: Innovation or Litigation?" paper presented at the IFIP 8.6 Working Conference: IT Innovation for Adaptiveness and Competitive Advantage, Leixlip, Ireland.