Resolved: Iran is not developing nuclear weapons

Regarding my opponent's first contention that Iran's development of a nuclear weapon is evident as a result of the lack of transparency with the international community, the International Atomic Energy Agency's November 2011 report misrepresents the facts. Addressing the first sub-point, Iran has time and time again blatantly denied any accusations of "the prospect of using uranium enrichment for military purposes". It has expressed its policy that its uranium enrichment program is solely purposed for energy and medical programs that pertain to nuclear science. Going into the IAEA's report, my opponent expressed that Iran has failed to address the nuclear technology information and documentation received from a clandestine network and its development and testing of nuclear components. First of all, this information and documentation regarding nuclear technology was, as was mentioned in the IAEA report, given to the state of Iran by the clandestine network during the late 1980s. Iran did not actively seek out this information; it was simply given to Iran by the network without its prior knowledge or request. Second of all, these nuclear components being developed and tested by Iran, although able to be used for weapons purposes, can also, as the IAEA report states, be used "in connection with non-nuclear applications". One prime example of a component that is being highlighted by the IAEA for connections with a weapon is the fast functioning detonator. Although needed for a nuclear weapon, the IAEA admits, there can be other civilian applications such as the EBW (exploding-bridgewire detonator). The procurement and testing of certain components have been admitted to be potentially used for civilian, non-nuclear purposes by the IAEA, itself. Thus, it is completely irresponsible to say confidently that they are inevitably traceable to the development of a nuclear weapon. Rather than basing conclusions off of the evidence available, the IAEA seems to be fitting the evidence into its predetermined conclusion. Finally, regarding the refused entry into military sites, Iran is simply upholding its national sovereignty pertaining to its military; however, Iran and the IAEA have been engaging in serious discussions recently about its program which will hopefully lead to more negotiable transparency. Regarding my opponent's contention based on the increased enrichment of uranium, there is another potential explanation: highly-enriched uranium for medical purposes. In the entirety of my opponent's case, there is a honing in on Iran's desired energy program which, although playing a large role in Iran's mission for a nuclear program, is not the only desired program. Iran has confidently argued that its nuclear program will serve both its energy and its medical sectors. Nuclear energy can be utilized in order to harness the power of radioisotopes which can better diagnose and treat its citizens. This medical program requires uranium of the highly-enriched sort and, thus, the high 20% enriched uranium cannot be solely linked to a weapons program. My opponent's next contention is somewhat difficult to follow as it moves from the building of nuclear sites to the inefficiency of its current energy programs. However, let me address the first sub-point by saying that this activity of importing highly-enriched uranium in exchange for low-enriched uranium and importing fuel for nuclear reactors is completely normal for a developing nation wishing to quickly achieve ANY form of a nuclear program, be it peaceful or military. Secondly, the inefficiency of its current programs should not be seen as evidence that the pursuit of a nuclear energy program is impossible. Yes; Iran is somewhat wasteful and inefficient in its current means of producing electricity. However, from an economic standpoint, it makes perfect sense that Iran would also want to seek an alternative means of providing energy to both its own citizens and its neighbors in addition to its current methods, such as natural gas and petroleum. Also, this alternative means gives Iran the potential to export more and more oil and gas, thus further adding to its economy. From a political standpoint, as is stated in my case, the possession of a fully-operational peaceful nuclear program elevates Iran's influential standing both regionally and globally. The truth is, Iran is not solely concerned with becoming an "energy powerhouse"; in a sense, Iran wants to be an overall technology powerhouse in the Middle East. Moving on to affirm my case, my argument that a weapons program is highly improbable due to its religious and political leaders' clear rejection and condemnation of such activities still holds true. More specifically, Ayatollahs Khomeini and Khamenei have issued official Islamic and Iranian orders not to pursue a nuclear weapons program which they see as anti-Islamic. Secondly, as was previously stated, Iran will have the exact same influence if in possession of a peaceful program as it would with a weapons program. After the development of a peaceful program, the potential to develop a weapon in a matter of months would cause any belligerent force to hesitate in attacking Iran. This possession of a peaceful program (i.e. energy and medicine) is completely permissible under the NPT and is a legitimate source of influence. Lastly, beyond the influence achievable by a nuclear weapons program, one other possible "benefit" for having a nuclear weapon is to completely annihilate one of its strongest enemies: Israel. However, this benefit quickly switches to a negative cost as attacking Israel with a nuclear weapon would consequently result in Israel's own nuclear strike against Iran along with an immediate response from Israel's allies. Thus, there are no added benefits of having a weapon as its use is futile.