Free will

Con started the debate by claiming that either we have free will or everything is pre-determined. He said, "I am arguing that free will does not exist and that all events, past present and future, were determined at the big bang." Posing those alternatives implicitly defines free will. Free will was not being subject to determinism. However, in R2 Con conceded that modern science has disposed of determinism. We don't have a deterministic universe and do not even know how a deterministic universe might be constructed in theory. So my challenge to Con in the last round was to define "free will" without using the concept of determinism. His original definition failed, so I want to know what his new definition is. He completely ignored my challenge to define "free will." He claimed that I "has however, not explained how the random quantum fluctuations give us any more free will than my theoretical mechanical universe." I cannot possible argue that there is more or less free will, when Con has no definition of free will. I pointed out that "a theoretical mechanistic universe" cannot exist, at least not with our present understanding of how our present universe works. We do not just have to put up with wave-particle duality and the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, we need them for the universe to function consistently. Con appears to be claiming that it is self-evident that a mechanistic universe could exist, buffered no evidence of that and it clearly contradicts apparently necessary features of our universe. I suggested that it may be impossible to have a meaningful definition of "free will" once determinism is disposed of. Con is obliged to provide a meaningful definition in order to assert it does not exist. I again challenge Con to produce a definition, so we can debate it. Con asserted, ""However, the unpredictable variables are not influenced at all by the human mind, so even if future events are not predictable, humans have no influence over them." How, exactly, does he know that with certainty? Does he claim it is self-evident? He said that claiming anything to be self-evident was not allowed. I don't think we have any influence over quantum fluctuations and such, but Con is right in asserting that it isn't self-evident. I said that we choose whether or not to go to the store. I did not claim that to be proof of free will. I was only contradicting Con's claim that we have no influence over the universe. When determinism left the building, it took with it the notion that human actions were nothing but products of external forces. We at the very least interact with the universe in unpredictable ways. We perceive that we are making "free will" choices. My claim is that it isn't possible to define "free will" until we understand "perceived choice." In other words, the problem of subjective consciousness needs to be solved before we know if there is meaningful definition of "free will" and if so, whether humans have it. To try to explain this, consider the following toy definition, "Free will is a the self-modifying unpredictable process that governs the non-autonomic actions of sentient beings." I'm not claiming that is correct, or even very close, but it suggests that the problem with resolving the question of free will lies in the definition. I await Con's clear and concise definition of "free will" that does not rely upon determinism, and I await Con's solid proof that humans have no power to shape the probabilities of seemingly unpredictable events.