The Non-Aggression Principle is ethically sound

Many thanks to Mr. Travieso for a great round of rebuttals! It seems that my opponent has chosen to attack the NAP primarily by objecting to the notion of self-ownership. I will separately address each of his objections. 1. Subjects vs. Objects Con claims that humans cannot be the objects of rights, but his only support for this assertion is that by accepting such a notion, we get an argument against slavery (i.e. objects of rights are transferable, and transferring humans = slavery). There are several problems with this. Firstly, we cannot accept a premise solely on the grounds that by doing so we can derive a conclusion that we know to be true. Consider the following syllogism: P1: If I am a monkey's uncle, the sky is blue P2: I am a monkey's uncle C1: The sky is blue It would be absurd to accept either of the premises on the basis that we know the sky is blue. Similarly, we cannot accept Con's assertion that humans cannot be the objects of rights on the basis that we can use it to create a valid argument against slavery. Secondly, the concept of self-ownership results in the condemnation of slavery, as well. If I am the sole owner of my own person, then it becomes logically impossible for anyone else to proclaim ownership over me and my labor (i.e. enslave me). Con claims that because property is transferrable, accepting self-property equates to allowing slavery. But this totally ignores the role of *consent* in property transfers; it is true that accepting that self-property would allow me to "sell" myself to someone, but since it would be occurring with my consent, it would no longer be considered slavery (coerced labor). 2. Rights and Relationships Con's argument here does not make much sense... he proclaims that by accepting rights as being intrinsic properties of human beings, "we are also implying that property exists as some sort of platonic idea, apart from and previous to the interaction of subjects." Yet Con never goes on to explain why this is implausible or why this has any bearing on the NAP's ethical soundness. Even if there was some hypothetical situation in which only one person existed, it is true that this individual would still have the rights to life, liberty, and property... the question I pose to Con, then, is why does this matter? 3. Personal Autonomy vs. Self-Ownership Con claims that I wrongly conflate personal autonomy and self-ownership, yet he never draws a clear distinction between the two himself... There are a variety of definitions of personal autonomy, but all of them generally refer to a person's ability to independently control their own person free from external influence. This does more than simply rely on the idea of self-ownership-- it *assumes* self-ownership simply by utilizing a possessive pronoun (i.e. his, their, my, etc). Unless Con gives us a compelling reason to differentiate the two, we must continue to assume that the two go hand in hand. Furthermore, as far as I can see, Con accepts the idea of personal autonomy being a distinguishing characteristic of human beings, so until he draws a distinction, he has also conceded that self-ownership exists. 4. Circular Reasoning Con argues that it would be circular reasoning to derive the existence of property rights from self-ownership, since self-ownership is a form of property right. However, circular reasoning is a very specific logical fallacy in which proposition X is used to support proposition Y and proposition Y is used to support proposition X. We do not see this here at all; self-ownership leads us to the conclusion of property rights, but property rights are not used to justify self-ownership. Self-ownership (i.e. personal autonomy) is assumed as a result of it being a meta-ethical truth underlying any system of morality. It is similar to the notion of an uncaused ultimate first cause (ref: Kalam Cosmological Argument). ~ An Alternative ~ Con provides an alternative ethical system to the NAP. Since this alternative system directly contradicts the prescriptions of the NAP, it certainly can serve as a contention against the resolution; however, the burden of proof is on Con to demonstrate that this alternative is superior to the NAP. His primary approach to doing so seems to be to simply point out that his previous 4 objections do not apply to it, but seeing that all 4 have been refuted, it will take more than just that for us to prefer his alternative ethical system. And he does, indeed, attempt to provide "more": "[The alternative ethical system] serves as a limit to rights such as property as the same principle which justifies property (respect for human life and dignity) would hold it to be a criminally immoral act to withhold a vial of insulin to a diabetic going into a diabetic shock, for instance. Under the non-aggression principle, this would be moral behavior," I have three responses to this... a. Ethical Intuitionalism Con's point, here, relies heavily on ethical intuitionalism, or, as Con himself put it in another debate, "argumentum ad idontlikeitum". The major problem with ethical intuitionalism is that there is no reason at all for us to accept the conclusions of our ethical intuitions, which are nothing more than the product of evolution-- a feature of human psychology existing for the purposes of adaptation. The purpose of ethics is to objectively prescribe what we ought or ought not to do under the assumption that humans possess some sort of moral significance (i.e. possess personal autonomy)-- whether or not those ethical conclusions we reach coincide with our ethical intuitions is irrelevant. b. Moral Desirability And besides that, there is definitely some ethical incentive for providing the diabetic with the insulin; withholding the insulin and providing the insulin would not be morally equivalent acts. Since the NAP is entirely centered around the protection of rights, preserving someone's right to life would be the ethically superior act because it advances the cause of of the NAP. So, while no moral obligation to provide the diabetic would be generated, the NAP would still render acts of generosity to be morally desirable. c. Commission vs. Omission Furthermore, there does exist some potential justification that even under the NAP, such an act would be considered immoral. An act of commission is one in which harm is actively inflicted upon someone; an act of omission is one in which harm is passively allowed to be inflicted upon someone. From a consequentialist outlook, these acts become morally equivalent (assuming equal degree of control)-- pushing someone off a cliff is just as bad as watching someone fall off a cliff when you could have easily saved them because both result in a person falling off a cliff and dying, and in both cases, abstaining from "committing" the act would have spared the victim that fate. In that sense, abstaining from offering the diabetic insulin (an act of omission) would be just as bad as causing him to go into diabetic shock in the first place (an act of commission), which would have been considered a rights violation. Thus, the NAP could, indeed, render such acts of omission to be immoral. Another objection by Con: "[The NAP would] consider a thriving slave trade perfectly moral, so long as the initial enslavement of each man were voluntary." There is not much more to say to this than "so what?". As explained before, it isn't really "slavery" anymore if the "slaves" are giving their consent to being "enslaved", in which case there is nothing about it that can rationally be called immoral. =============== CONCLUSION =============== The existence of personal autonomy is a fundamental meta-ethical truth that must be assumed in order for morality to exist in any form, as it is the defining characteristic that grants humans moral significance in relation to the rest of the amoral universe. Self-ownership is an essential component of personal autonomy, and from it, we are logically led to the conclusion of the NAP, as shown in my constructive case. None of Con's objections to the concept of self-ownership hold up to scrutiny, and thus, all of the above does hold true. Con proposes an alternative ethical system to the NAP, but he has the burden of proof to demonstrate that we should prefer it and accept it as evidence of the NAP's unsoundness, and I have refuted all his attempts at doing so. The resolution is affirmed. I look forward to Mr. Travieso's response!