Vegans practicing on moral principle ought to become Freegan instead

(1) Since my rebuttals will be (partly) predicated on Pro's arguments being irrelevant to the resolution, I suppose it would be pertinent to explain exactly what the resolution means. Let's begin with "Vegans practicing on moral principle". This essentially means that the debate will be made from the moral perspective of veganism. Our focus will necessarily take into account the moral foundations of vegan practice. Next we have "should". We are arguing what vegans should do based on the "moral principle" expressed in the first part of the resolution. Lastly is, "become Freegan instead". This means that, given the 'moral principle' (yet to be defined) which vegans operate under, they should drop veganism to practice freeganism. Pro instead argues that freeganism is prima facie morally superior (without defining or defending the moral perspective which informs this argument). This is irrelevant to the resolution as Pro is actually tasked with showing why the moral principles behind veganism support freeganism as morally superior. Given that vegan principles are expressly stated as supporting the abandonment of animal suffering, it seems at least implausible that freeganism could be shown to be born out of veganist principle. Pro has failed to follow the resolution, choosing instead to argue (without a coherent moral foundation) why Freeganism is a better choice regardless of the unique moral sensibilities of veganism.Note: This is not a semantical argument, but a necessary elucidation of what the resolution means in light of an argument which appears to ignore its necessary implications.(2) Even if we ignore the first point of criticism, it cannot be ignored that Pro has decided to offer points based off of a complete lack of moral justification. That is, even if one could coherently maintain that this debate is over which practice is prima facie morally superior, Pro would have failed in that he fails to offer a compelling moral justification for eating only that which is wasted. It's not as if it's obvious why curtailing animal suffering is morally inferior to consuming waste after all. In fact, given that pain is inextricably linked to our own moral sensibilities [http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov...] it seems rather obvious why veganism would be morally superior to freeganism (as opposed to the other way around). Pro's arguments are maintained only by presuming at the outset that stopping waste is not only morally right, but morally superior to allaying the suffering of animals. I do not intend to concede either of these principles. Therefore the onus is on Pro to argue in favor of them.(3) But since the BoP is to be shared, I will also elect to provide an argument for the moral superiority of veganism over freeganism. As stated previously, it seems prima facie reasonable that allaying the suffering of conscious creatures is morally superior to reducing waste. But seeing as this is essentially a philosophical debate, mere prima facie reasonableness will not do. Instead I will draw on Peter Singer's preference utilitarian argument against the inflicting of unnecessary suffering against conscious creatures capable of feeling pain. Other standards of moral worth such as inclusion in the human species or cognitive ability are either arbitrary (the former) or non-universal in humans (the latter) which would put the severely, mentally handicapped at the same moral worth as animals. Suffering appears to be the best measure of moral worth both because of our own evolutionary history (see above) and given the inconsistencies which arise given other standards of moral worth. A vegan diet attempts to allay animal suffering by refusing to lend support practices which inflict unnecessary suffering on animals. Further credence is lent to the position by virtue of the fact that veganism does not present serious health risks that can't be allayed by nutritional supplements [http://ajcn.nutrition.org...].