Speciesism is unjustified given a preference utilitarian framework

Thanks to Pinko for holding this match :D C1: A PU framework is fundamentally specisist As noted by my opponent there is a preference difference between a brain-dead human and a dolphin. This is important because it highlights a quantity/quality dilemma that is occasionally faced by utilitarian philosophers. Essentially this dilemma is that to what extent does the quality of one’s welfare or preference outweigh a quantity of people being affected? The point about the dolphin demonstrates that in weighing preferences the quality of the preference is important. For example take the famous run-away trolley scenario, however lets alter it slightly. Instead of each group being persons, one is a human which will be hit by the trolley; the other is a group of 5 pigs. Even though the group of 5 pigs is quantitatively more, the quality of the preference of the one human being is considerably more so. The person has a family to support, a job to maintain, friends to maintain connection with etc. At the least both groups feel pain, but the pigs act on instinct and their preferences will be negative preferences, as opposed to the positive preferences of the adult human. My opponent would say this does not work in the marginal case of a brain-dead human vs. the preferences of a healthy dolphin. I would contend that the PU framework functionally excludes cases of marginal analysis since it is fundamentally theoretical and not practical. This is warranted thus: In Practical Ethics, Singer points out that he believes deontological approaches to ethics are inferior to utilitarian approaches because deontology are impractical and cannot be instituted into real-world moral dilemmas. The key here is Singer’s distinction of the impractical with the real-world – deontology fails to have end goals in mind relating to plausible moral dilemmas. (Im not saying he is right on deontology, but rather descriptively that’s what he is arguing). Why is this important? Because the theoretical comparison of a marginal braindead human to a dolphin will never be needed in a cost-preference analysis. The PU framework brings the theoretical to the actual = it is a calculus to determine case scenarios for real world preference conflict. The argument from marginal cases since they are theoretical comparisons, and cases of which will never occur in real life, is excluded from the PU framework. Since marginal cases are excluded from the PU framework, what should we use in determining weight of preferences in a situation lacking an actual moral dilemma? Answer: a normal human being in the face of a possible moral dilemma. By normal human being I mean non-marginal (marginal itself is defined as situated at the edge or margin of something). Thus, when creating a PU framework we can morally deduce that a hierarchy is established where human beings will have more preferences (both positive and negative) in this world compared to most animals. Therefore, a PU framework in and of itself is specisit because it it aligns basic and non-marginal preferences via species. Since human beings are capable of poessing both negative and positive preferences, weight must be given to human beings first The quality outweighs that of the animal. C2: Specisism is a belief system and does not inherently entail preference violation Specisism is defined as: act or support of discriminating or treating members of different species differently purely on the basis of their membership in their respective species. Impact? There is none. Nothing inherent in specisism is preference violation, animal abuse, or animal violence. Specisism is a belief system at its core – that animals are morally inferior to humans. Does this mean that they deserve violent action? No it doesn’t. In order for my opponent to have a link to unjustifiability under a PU framework it is his burden to prove that specisism by definition or in principle harms or violates the preferences of other animals. This however is not the case since simply ascribing a lower moral status does not functionally mean I must treat those animals in a cruel way. The resolution is that assuming a PU framework determines a moral course of action specisism is unjustified, which according to him is strictly prohibited. Preference utilitarianism is not deontology, meaning it does not base itself in the mind, rationality, intent, etc of the agent. It is determined solely by the end which is established. A PU framework can only establish an act as unjustified if it violates the preferences of the object (the animal). But simply treating members of different species differently does not in and of itself mean preference violation. C3: Specisism is permissible if X group of animals feel no pain The resolution nor do the rules establish that only animals which can feel pain are applied to the definition of specisism. There are many species out-there which do not feel pain, for example the species of animal’s sponges, and thus they have no negative preferences which is the basis for the PU framework applying to animals. Insofar as this is true, the resolution cannot be applied to the cases where a certain species of animals cannot feel pain and therefore specisism cannot be labeled unjustifiable.