Atheists have not properly refuted the arguments "proving" god.

Hi Con, I accept the rules of the debate. In the first round, I will post 2 arguments - the Modal Ontological argument and the Introspection argument. I will back both arguments up. Ontological argument The Modal Ontological Argument is as follows: 1) It is possible that a maximally great being exists 2) If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world. 3) If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then a maximally great being exists in every possible world 4) If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world 5) Therefore a maximally great being exists in the actual world 6) Therefore a maximally great being exists 7) Therefore God exists A couple of definitions may be helpful here: Possible world: some description of reality that is logically coherent Maximally great: possessing all great-making properties Premises 2-7 all logically follow from premise 1 - if it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then such a being exists in some possible world. However, considering it is greater to be a necessary being rather than a contingent being, if a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world. The actual world is a sub-set of "every possible world" So what reasons do we have in support of premise 1? If there are no contradictions in possessing great making properties (which would include all the classical attributes of God - all-powerful, all-knowing, all-good, etc.) then premise 1 stands. And it only seems logical - the fact is, there are no logical contradictions with a being that is maximally great. So if Con is to refute this argument, then he has to refute premise 1 - I await his response. Introspection argument The introspection argument is as follows: 1. The mind exists 2. The properties of the mind are not those which matter can have C1. Mind is not reducible to matter 4. Substance dualism is impossible C2. Monistic idealism is true First some definitions: Substance dualism: Substance Dualism is a variety of dualism in the philosophy of mind which states that two sorts of substances exist: the mental and the physical. [2] Monistic idealism:" A system of philosophical idealism emphasizing the primacy of the One (as the Absolute or Nature) rather than of the many [3] Not many would deny premise 1 - as Rene Descartes said, "I think therefore I am". If there is consciousness, then there is mind. As Sam Harris remarks, "consciousness is the one thing in this universe that can't be an illusion" [1] Premise 2 is the crucial premise. It states that mind and matter are not identical, and we can, as a result, deduce that the properties of mental states are not that which physical states can have. We can divide our senses into 2 categories - physical properties and mental properties. And to give an example - the mental property would be the feeling of pain, and the physical property would be the sending of electrical signals to the brain. The sending of electrical signal to the brain causes pain. However, these are not the same thing - an electrical signal to the brain can occur without the feeling of pain. All we experience is a correlation. As Thomas Nagel remarks; "If a mental event really is a physical event in this sense, and nothing else, then the physical event by itself - once its physical properties are understood - should be sufficient for the taste of sugar, the feeling of pain, or whatever it is supposed to be identical with. But it doesn't seem to be. It seems conceivable, for any physical event, there should be a physical event without any experience at all. Experience of taste seems to be something extra, continently related to the brain state - something produced rather than constituted by the brain state. So [taste] cannot be identical to the brain state in the same way water is identical to H2O.[4] In other words, Qualia (our individual experience of any event) is not a physical substance, and so is not identical to our physical brain. This means that the mental substance is something separate, and yet all we truly experience. So we can arrive at our first conclusion - mind, or our mental state, cannot be reduced to matter, or our brain state. But what are the implications of this? We have already established that mind and matter are not identical. Substance dualism asserts that there are 2 kinds of fundamental substances - mind, and matter. However, this immediately raises problems concerning interaction - as if there are 2 fundamental substances, then they have to interact via a shared property. This means that they are not seperate substances - they are both interlinked, as one. However, we have established that mind and matter are not identical, rendering substance dualism false. This leads us to our final conclusion: all is mind (otherwise known as Monistic Idealism). If mind is fundamental, and mind cannot be reduced to matter and substance dualism is false, then the only option left is that all is mind. This is backed up through quantum mechanics through the double slit experiment, which stated that nothing is certain until we measure it. (what happened is that electrons were fired through a double slit - when they were not observed, the electrons took a wave form, and showed up going through both slits; when it was observed, the electrons went through only one slit [5]). What this means is that nothing is certain until we measure it - mind is the sole determinant of the world around us. Now the implications of this is that God exists. If consciousness in the universe is fundamental, then there must be a fundamental mind. This fundamental mind must exist outside of space-time. The only conclusion is that God exists. Sources: [1] http://www.samharris.org... [2] http://www.philosophy-index.com... [3] http://www.merriam-webster.com... [4] http://www.iep.utm.edu... [5] http://abyss.uoregon.edu...