Ontological and teleological arguments cannot accurately tell us whether God exists

I used an a priori bias [bias or basis?] to arrive at that intuition . . . . I would gladly ignore the issue, if it didn't point to your misunderstanding of a priori judgments. My points here are vital because the ontological argument is a priori.There only two ways of judging the truth and falsehood of any claim. The first is empirical. We know empirical judgments are true or false by observation. Most scientific judgments are empirical. Examples of these judgments: "my chair is green" and "there is a rabbit in my yard. The only way you know if these judgments are true or false is to come here and look. The curious thing is that all empirical judgments are contingent, or changeable. It was true that, "there is a rabbit in my yard," it is no longer true. If a judgment is not empirical, not known by observation, then it is a priori.A priori judgments are known to be true or false but not through observation. They are known through reason or logic, if that's easier to imagine. Mathematics and logic are example of knowledge known a priori. I know that "7 + 5 = 12" a priori, without observation. Because my knowledge is not based on observation, I know that "7 + 5 = 12" is necessarily true, true in all times and places. Something that is necessarily true is known in modal logic as being true in all possible worlds. That is, you cannot imagine a world where "7 + 5 = 12" is false. Whereas empirical judgments are contingent, a priori judgments are non-contingent, or necessarily true or necessarily false. ("7 + 5 = 13" is necessarily false or false in all possible worlds.I fear that casting aspersions on a priori is a mistake. Newton's discoveries about gravity are known a priori. The fact that nothing cannot produce something is known a priori; that every action has an equal opposite reaction; the principle of natural selection (that animals facing life-threatening conditions either die or change), and many more matters of science and mathematics are dependent on a priori knowledge. In short, and there is much more I should say about a priori judgments, a priori judgment are not without evidence; their evidence is simply not observable.Of course, we first learn that "7 + 5 = 12" empirically. The teacher sets out a group of five pencils and a group of seven pencils and we count them. We do the same experiment with balls, children in the room, windows, etc. until we make the jump from knowing "7 + 5 = 12" empirically to knowing it a priori. And thus, we know it is true in all times and places. I know that seven moon rocks added to five more moon rocks equals twelve moon rocks, and I never seen and counted the moon rocks to make sure I'm right. I don't need to count them. Again, I can assure you that seven chitles added to five chitles equals twelve chitles, and I have no idea what a chitle is. I just now invented them. This understanding of empirical and a priori judgments helps answer Dawkins.Sometimes I cannot figure out if Dawkins knows where he goes wrong and so set out tricks, or if he is completely in the dark. He claims that the biblical god is like those of Zeus and Thor. Ancient Judaism is probably the first theology to suggest that God is a single entity rather than an assemblage of gods. As the Bible develops, especially from the Old to the New Testament, the concept of God shifts from being like Zeus or Thor to something resembling our modern conception of God. That is, the concept develops from something empirical to something a priori. In Genesis, for example, God talks, walks, smells, hears and sees things. This conception is empirical. By "empirical" here, I mean that God can be seen not that God is seen, much like the descriptions we have of Zeus and Thor. As monotheism develops, so does the concept of God. At least since the time of Anselm and Aquinas God is known only a priori because the concept of God is of a being that exists necessarily. (He is also perfect, omnipotent, etc.) When Dawkins claims that anyone who believes in God, our modern conception, is as silly as anyone who believes in Thor, he fully misunderstands the development of our concept of God.Now we can see how the conception of God leads to the ontological argument. If God exists necessarily, then he can be known only through an a priori argument. That argument is the ontological argument. Pro suggests that a priori judgments and their arguments are without evidence and they are virtually without value. If he is right, then he destroys much scientific and mathematical knowledge, as I argue above. So if there is a problem with the ontological argument, that problem does not lie in the assumption that a priori arguments are void of substance and meaning. The problem with the ontological argument occurs elsewhere, a fact that Pro has yet to identify.I fully understand Pro's frustration with the ontological argument, especially when he referred to Russell: there is something about the argument that makes one think it's wrong, and yet it is more difficult to find the flaw. Somehow, you must find that flaw. It is curious that my presumably Christian opponent would choose the example of slavery. Oh, that’s not nice. Now you’re just baiting me. . . . even your allies [i.e., Plantinga], . . . admit that they are not proof of God’s existence! I certainly do look forward toseeing how you will try to prove them wrong. I don't think Plantinga's conclusion is a bit more complicated than that, but let’s assume it for the moment. If you think I am taking on Plantinga all by my lonesome, you’re frightfully mistaken. If anything I’ve said opposes Plantinga, what I have said is supported by Anselm, Aquinas, Descartes, Leibniz (sometimes), Norman Malcolm, RichardSwinburne, and Fr. Copleston. If forced to choose between "Team Plantinga" and the bench of heavy hitters I’ve just listed, I’ll side with the latter any day. (P. S. So would Plantinga)