The Moral Argument is Sound

OverviewOnly 2 objections are relevant but I extend Con the offer of a debate with remaining objections to P1/2; whether by debate or email. Nevertheless these 2, if rebutted successfully, will lead Con to affirming P1 as by his own admittance he “may” affirm a weak P1. So in order to prove the moral argument sound, all I must do is move that "may affirm" to a "will affirm" (by dealing with the circularity objection) then that "will affirm a weak P1" to a "will affirm a strong P1" (by dealing with the subjective objection). & Since Con already affirms P2, the conclusion follows & the argument is sound by his own admittance.“Begging the Question” Objection Were it not for his perceived circularity Con would affirm a weak P1,“If God existed, it may well be His nature that grounded some sort of morality.”I take “some sort of” to mean subjective, which will be discussed. But now his only reservation here is that he thinks I assume God in my defense of P1. This is not true, for my defense of P1 carries a perpetual conditional:IfGod, a maximally great being, exists then his moral worth would be maximally great, & so therefore an objective standard of moral value.Likewise P1 affirms the conditional that if we don’t have God, then we don’t have a moral standard to make moral values objective, & valid & binding regardless of human opinion. As with Leff’s quote,“Now, what would you call such a thing if it existed? You would call it Him."All Con needs to do is provide a more plausible standard that's necessary for objective morals. But it seems P1 & thus it’s defense doesn’t prove God—affirming P2 proves God’s existence upon affirming P1. All I must defend in P1 is that God is the moral standard if he exists. Con says this is the petitio principii fallacy though.Yet in P1 God isn’t used as an affirmation, he’s used as a condition, “God would be necessary for objective morality if objective morality exists." Likewise is this circular, “if food exists, it would be necessary for eating”?But then I’ve defended God’s necessity for moral truths by stating,“If one separates God's moral essence from God—i.e., maximal goodness, then he's no longer God. But any objective value judgment requires an objective standard, likewise a maximally great good is just as necessary for objective morality as any standard is necessary for a value judgment.”I've also presented an argument for why we should think God is the objective standard of moral value: God is a maximally great being, & since it's intuitively greater to be the standard of moral perfection rather than exemplify it, then it follows that God would be the moral standard were he to exist. But morals are objective, which implies there’s a transcendent standard! Con already affirms moral objectivity, so on pain of irrationality the theistic conclusion must be accepted; such is the nature of a deductive argument.All he says is that we shouldn't’t use God to justify P1. But I’m not—indeed I don’t even need to. I just have to show that God is the moral standard—If God exists, then he is the maximal moral good since he is a maximally great being… Con simply says this is pure assertion… really?First, any logic taking the form: If ~P, then ~Q; is an assertion. But then my assertion is backed by rational warrant that Con hasn’t negated. Is it logically incoherent that God is maximally good? Con hasn’t shown this. He simply says that an ontological-type argument is irrelevant. How so? I’m arguing for an ontologically maximally great being aren’t I? Plus the argument only relies on the definitionof God from the ontological argument, not its conclusion. Were the MGB definition of God shown to be inadequate I can simply say I argue for a perfect God & so therefore so is his fairness, goodness, etc.What really matters is if the moral argument is sound. & since all P1 states is a conditional of God & his implication to moral truths, then so far we have no petitio principii. But now Con says it’s in the defense… but that’s not what petitio principii is!Even so,Conclusion = God existsP1 Defense = If a maximally great being existed then it’s moral goodness would be maximally great, which is an objective standard that’s necessary for objective morals.“Subjective Moral Values” ObjectionRemember Con would affirm a weak P1 if it were shown that the argument isn’t circular, & since I’ve shown that it’s not; then we’re brought to the only other reason Con doesn’t affirm a strong P1.Con says moral facts are person-independent, which is true, but persons like we know them. So theistic reflectance is required when we speak of ‘persons’ as we know them. For although God is described as personal, a necessarily existing maximal moral agent isn’t influenced by culture, trend, parental upbringing, etc; like we are: i.e., contingent & less than maximal moral agents. In fact would anyone regard a metaphysically necessary all good agent as on a par with a subjective humanoid like myself?Con seems to think so, oddly enough, by rejecting the notion that a moral value is objective if based off of God’s maximally great & necessary moral essence... His only grounds to such a rejection is: God’s still a person… ? It seems this last ditch argument is wholly obtuse & narrow-minded.First, I argued thatmaximal valuebecomes anobjective standardfrom which all other values are judged, hence the objectivity of such a standard just is its maximal value, which is logically based off of a maximally great being; God.Sure, call God a subject in the sense that He has Qualia like all other minds. But this goes nowhere to show that the values of [less maximal contingent moral agents] cannot be objectively judged from a [maximally great, necessary moral agent].CruxCon clearly confuses objective good as in God’s mind (like the awareness of moral good or attitudes) but rather I’ve argued ad nauseam that objective good is of God’s mind, or of God.This “of” is important to grasp—the preposition is used to indicate origin, or source: “a man of good family; the plays of Shakespeare,” the breath of me, the maximal moral goodof God.Since maximal greatness is, by definition, possible or impossible, & thus necessary if it exists, then any moral goodofGod is maximally great & so too exists necessarily & hence objectively.If such moral good is maximal, then it’s a standard from which all other morals are judged whence lesser morals arise from other less than maximal moral agents.AMP wasn’t belabored since Con never responds to my initial questions like what it means for the value “fairness” to just exist, especially since fairness isn’t itself fair; it needs personhood. But if such a personhood is less than maximally great, then the fairness of such an entity would be less than maximally fair, or subjective.But if God were fair, he would be maximally fair, the highest fair possible, & so the standard by which all other fairness is judged. If I’m only fair to some people but not all, while God is maximally fair, then I’m less fair than maximally fair: here we have an objective value standard.So the objection that “any moral theory which grounds morality in the nature of a subject is subjective” isn’t true. For although God may have Qualia, it doesn’t follow that his necessarily existing essence isn’t itself an objective moral standard.On the Christian perspective God has the mental faculties & capacities to constitute 3 triune consciousnesses, or persons; all of whom love each other with maximal goodness, etc: An extraordinary revelation if true! So a Christian seems to have a very sound moral foundation (albeit one we often fail to follow—but Grace is maximally great). ConclusionWith the misunderstanding of a circular argument out of the way, along with identifying the subjective objection as false, Con should affirm P1. He already affirms P2 so it inescapably follows that God exists... Sound argument!