Thomson's Violinist Analogy for Abortion

The pro-life argument is a sound one, that if it is prima facie wrong to intentionally kill an innocent human being, and abortion intentionally kills an innocent human being, then abortion is prima facie wrong. However, the violinist scenario Pro outlined in his opening argument presents a possible counterexample for how it can be morally acceptable to intentionally kill an innocent human being. Does this argument hold up under scrutiny? I would argue that it does not for at least three reasons. Parental ObligationOne objection is that the violinist is a complete stranger, whereas a mother surely has responsibilities to her own child, such as to feed, clothe, and not harm the child. However, Thomson’s argument hinges on the fact that she believes a parent does not have special responsibilities to her own child. They are assumed, not naturally grounded. She writes, “Surely we do not have any ‘special responsibility’ for a person unless we have assumed it, explicitly or implicitly. If a set of parents do not try to prevent pregnancy, do not obtain an abortion, and then at the time of birth of the child do not put it out for adoption, but rather take it home with them, then they have assumed responsibility for it, they have given it rights, and they cannot now withdraw support from it at the cost of its life because they now find it difficult to go on providing for it. ” [1]The problem with this belief, though, is that it is intuitively ludicrous. Who among us believes that a parent has no more responsibility for their own child than for a complete stranger? If the neighbor kids raids your fridge, it’s stealing. If your own kid does it, it’s not. Suppose you find a baby has been left outside your door. If you close the door on the child to allow it to die by the elements, you have certainly done something wrong. Suppose you also find a note that says “this is your child. ” Have you not done something worse, now, by abandoning the child to death? Plus, there is no reason to assume that she cannot revoke her responsibility for the child after birth, since it is not grounded on anything (as it would be if she had a natural obligation to her child). Why not say if she allows the pregnancy to progress past the first trimester, she has now assumed responsibility for the child? To say nothing of the fact that having sex, she has implicitly given consent to the child’s presence there (more on that below). Additionally, pro-choice philosopher Michael Tooley rejects Thomson’s violinist argument specifically because you can conceive of a pregnant woman on a deserted island who isn’t able to abort, but gives birth to her child. What grounds her responsibility? Since she couldn’t abort before birth, what reason is there that she couldn’t now kill the child because she can’t care for him? [2]Additionally, John T. Wilcox argues that the violinist scenario is rare and basically an impossible scenario, whereas pregnancy is natural and normal. Even though it is so unique as to be near impossible to create a good analogy to regard it, there is nothing so normal as pregnancy. It is how we all enter life as human beings. Because of this it is very plausible to regard them differently from an ethical point of view. He writes, “It is at least arguable, and many theoriests believe, that the moralities we have represent some ways of dealing with the realities and regularities of human life; and they may not fit well the irregularities or impossibilities. ”The Violinist Does Not Adequately Portray the SituationTrent Horn has pointed out that philosopher Peter Unger has shown that thought experiments sometimes twist our moral intuitions based on the point of view in the experiment. Thomson’s analogy is from the perspective of the pregnant woman, but he and Tony George have constructed a thought experiment which argues from the point of view of the unborn child: “Imagine you wake up in a hospital and you’re connected to Thomson’s violinist. You decide, ‘you know what? It would be nice to stay plugged in but I’m going to unplug from this guy. I can’t stay here for nine months. ’ So you unplug, you start to walk out of the hospital, and start to feel really nauseous and light-headed. The director of the hospital runs in and says, ‘oh my goodness! Plug back in or you’ll die! So you scramble into the bed and you plug into the guy. The director says this to you: ‘I’m terribly sorry, but last night you were kidnapped by the Society of Musical Pranksters, and these Pranksters, of which the violinst is a member, have a lot of fun together. But because they’re pranksters, every now and then they’ll end up plugged into an innocent person. And when that happens, it destroys the innocent person’s kidneys. But don’t worry, if you stay plugged in to the violinist in nine months your kidneys will heal, and then you can go on your way. ’ And you pass out. “The violinist wakes up. He looks over at you and says, “hey. .. he doesn’t have a right to use my body without my consent. I’m not going to let him use my kidneys without my permission. ’ He unplugs frmo you, walks out of the hospital, and you die of kidney failure, and you’re thrown into the hospital incinerator. Now the question is: does the violinist in that case have the right to unplug from you? ” As Trent points out, it seems trange to suggest that the violinist, who is a member of the SMP, has the right to unplug from you, since he’s the reason you’re in the predicament in the first place. He’s responsible for you needing that life support. Which brings us to. .. Responsibility ObjectionTo put it simply, the woman willingly engages in an act, sexual intercourse, that is procreative in nature. Because she willingly engaged in that act, she is responsible for the child’s creation and for placing the child in a state of dependency upon her. She Is responsible for the child’s need, so she is responsible for meeting it. To sum up, Thomson’s violinist fails to justify abortion for at least three reasons: parents have natural obligations to their offspring, it fails to correctly capture the situation of pregnancy, and she is responsible for the child’s existence and state of dependency. [1] Judith Jarvis Thomson, “A Defense of Abortion”, The Abortion Controversy, ed. Frank Beckwith and Louis Pojman, pp. 128-129. [2] Tooley expounded this to me in personal correspondence. [3] John T. Wilcox, “Nature as Demonic in Thomson’s Defense of Abortion,” The Ethics of Abortion, 3rd Ed. , ed. Robert M. Baird and Stuart E. Rosenbaum, p. 260. [4] ;(6:45)