Taxation is not theft

Let me begin by pointing out that my opponent is mistaken in his assumption that by arguing for land as legitimate ownership, I am denying our agreed upon adherence to moral ownership as the foundation on which the debate is based. Far from it, in my point on land ownership I was arguing to show that if one accepts the moral ownership theory, then one must logically also accept that land is a justified form of ownership. I would like to stress to readers that there is nothing in my opponent's initial R2 description of moral ownership theory which states that it is incompatible with land ownership. In fact, as my own argument showed, it logically necessitates it.===Moral Ownership and Land===The first point my opponent makes against my land theory of moral ownership is that I have supposedly argued against creation as a valid starting point in ownership. From this, he argues that my own forwarded theory is invalid in that it is vulnerable to the same criticism. I agree with the part stating that without a valid creation point, neither theory can be valid. However, it is my opponent's justification and not my own which fails according to the creation criticism. My opponent believes that all one has to do is come to acquire something legitimately in order to own it. But as I previously showed, my opponent provides no legitimate starting point wherein someone may begin to legitimately own property. He simply asserts that land cannot be owned while simultaneously arguing that we can own the products of it without logical reasoning as to the relevant difference. Can we pull dirt out of the ground and own it but not own it while it is still attachde to the Earth? If so wherein lies the relevant distinction?My opponent's next point lies in the idea of agreement. He argues that the starting point in ownership is agreement and derives the rest of his argument from there. I will argue that this assertion is patently false and my opponent never justified the point. He merely asserted it as a starting premise. However, this merely strawmanns land ownership theories. The point I asserted in my own conception of land ownership was the point of legitimate acquisition. To be legitimate is not to necessarily imply agreement with others as someone might envy my own land and thus not agree. But this would not invalidate my claim. The point of acquisition lies in the first use of the land, not agreement with others.-Monetary System-At this point my opponent moves on to another point, the monetary system. He argues that if the government is morally unjustified, then so is the monetary system which it puts in place. My opponent then claims that this means that one cannot claim entitlement to money. This is a flawed point though in that he fails to take into account the distinction between fiat money and wealth value. In performing a service one is payed for they are always paid in wealth value from some monetary system, whether it be a gold system or fiat varies. Under a government, it forces employers to pay according to their own fiat system and holds a monopoly on the monetary system. My opponent makes the flawed point here in thinking that (1) those opposed to government sovereignty want repayment in governmental monetary terms and (2) a monetary system is solely possible under a government. Both are incorrect given that historically market forces have created independent means of transferring wealth that adhere to certain characteristics i.e. elementary, durable, holding other industrial uses, etc. (with the dominant historical means being gold, silver, and copper).Even in refuting my opponent's point on its face value, my opponent's point at its base lies in the flawed assumption that any system setup by the government is justified so long as one is within that system. Of course he makes the fatal flaw again of assuming the legitimate sovereignty of the government (and so its ability to make legitimate rules for a given area) in attempting to defend its legitimacy in the first place. How can my opponent argue for taxation as non-theft if the government's legitimacy is not only a premise in the argument itself (that we accept living under the dominion of government) but is a reason specifically used to defend that very premise (that we choose not to leave the dominion of government)? The point employs horribly circular logic.===Justified Conditions===In attempting to refute my point on justified conditions, my opponent brings up basic public goods theories. However, let me remind voters that this is the last round of the debate and thus my refutation of this point will not be able to be defended by my opponent. Seeing this though, I still cannot drop an argument, even if my opponent surfaced it in the last round.My opponent argues that without taxation, things like defense would not be feasible. However, note that my argument is not against collectively funded services, but against coercively funded ones. Note that nothing within my argument precludes people from voluntarily funding things like defense or police in a communal like manner, so long as everything is voluntary (being against theft). My opponent's point here makes a flawed equivocation of coercion and collective action which he nowhere justifies and is an extreme mis-characterization of both types of acts. Non-government theft does not mean that people cannot voluntarily agree to live in communities wherein they communally fund services such as collective or personal defense. The thing that separates this from government funding is that a government arbitrarily extends its sovereignty whereas a communal organization is created from the bottom up by people who voluntarily pool their and only their own property and capital. Furthermore, he makes a category mistake in that we are not defending ownership based on utilitarian concerns, but on MORAL OWNERSHIP concerns. ===Social Contract===I can certainly claim that a social contract does not exist while simultaneously maintaining moral ownership seeing as the acquisition theory I'm defending does necessarily rest on agreement, but merely on one acquiring a given property in a justified manner. This was the definition set out by my opponent in defining moral ownership. He merely implicitly assumed some connection between it and agreement as made evident by his total ignorance of any but contractual origination of property (which are actually characteristic of societal ownership that he defined, making a social contract in fact antithetical to moral ownership).===Summary and Conclusion===My opponent argues that one may come to legitimately own property by acquiring it in a justifiable manner, however denies the fact that there is no relevant distinction between owning land and owning its derivatives, a point he never responded to. My opponent also makes the flawed presupposition that land ownership could only be justified by agreement without taking into account the fact that I was defending moral ownership (acquisition theory) and not societal ownership (contractual theory). He merely assumed that I was defending agreement in justified acquisition without arguing as to why this must have been the case. Furthermore, my opponent presupposes government legitimacy not only in his defense of taxation as non-theft, but even in his defense of government sovereignty itself. He argues that we give it legitimacy by not moving away. He actually mentions relocation multiple times. But obviously one would not call someone moving into your house and demanding your subordination legitimate sovereignty so long as you stay there. Furthermore, he continuously argues against land ownership while maintaining legitimate government claims to land sovereignty. Due to these contradictions and my own case showing that legitimate land derivatives ownership logically necessitates primary land ownership, I urge a Con vote.