Abortion

Thank you Con for presenting further arguments.Closing StatementThis debate revolved around two things, firstly my justification for abortion and secondly my opponents anti-abortion arguments, since my final objections to his arguments have not been rebutted, due to my opponents argumentation structure, this closing statement will only be about the objections to my justification. In my opening statement I stated that, because a fetus do not have preferences, an abortion is not doing any harm to it and hence is morally permissible. At no point was this addressed by my opponent, rather he focused on on his own arguments and supposed implications of my view. He ignored my critique of moral intuitions in all of his rebuttals and even goes forward and uses them as an argument against post-natal abortion: "Despite this being contrary to most people's moral intuitions, he is unwilling to abandon his arguments." This is first of all not the topic of this debate and most importantly blatantly talking past my arguments against intuitions as a basis for morality. Sure most people find it counterintuitive, but there is one thing that I should make absolutely clear: I never said that having an abortion is an easy choice, it is one of the hardest some parents could possibly face in their lifes and post-natal abortion even more so. The Suicidal Teenager Objection My original response to the suicidal teenager objection (STO) still stands as Con misses the point of consequentialist theories, when he says that: "It's no longer about frustrating desires, but rather the bad consequences that result out of killing." It is still about frustrating preferences, but not of an individual. A preference to die does not exist from the very beginning of a depression for example. Initially a teenager has to endure a lot of other frustrated preferences like being loved by her parents. If we help them at that point, there will not be a preference to die and we ought to help them at such an early point. But this is completely derived from job experience, so anyone can take this how they want.As for the altered version of the STO, the latter part of my original response still applies:"It is really hard to tell whether someone has a genuine desire to die or is calling out for help. In reality ordinary people cannot know that, since it requires profound psychological investigation."Should it be the case that, after being diagnosed with a mental health disorder and long, unsuccessful treatment, the person in question still wishes to die, then yes, we should relive her suffering.The temporarily comatose Adult ObjectionIn his last defence of the temporarily comatose adult objection Con said that this person specifically lacks the desire to live and my response is still: How would anyone know that?I said many coma patients are aware of their surroundings, now postulating that they lack the most basic desire of all is mere assertion.A quote from David Boonin should close that topic:"When I wake up in the morning I do not have to learn everything that I believed the day before. I seem to have almost all the same beliefs, concepts and desires I had yesterday. This suggest that these mental items were retained in some form or other while I was asleep."(1)Sleeping and temporary coma can be taken interchangeably in respect to unconsciousness.The indoctrinated Slave ObjectionIn dealing with my response to the indoctrinated slave objection my opponent claims that it could lead to good consequences. I disagree, to benefit anyone serious harm has to be done first. Even if we say that those slaves are helping society, there is another principle of PU that is left out: The Principle of declining marginal Utility.Consider the following:A salve owner earns 500€ a week, he owns a slave that helps him earn additional 100€ every week. The slave earns nothing and gets only a minimum to eat.We can now ask ourselves how we can achieve the best consequences. Who is better of with 100€ more a week? Someone who earns enough or someone who earns nothing? If the slave owner was to pay 50€ a week to his servant the overall consequences would be more desirable. Or in other words, who would benefit more from 100€? Bill Gates or a starving child?The brainless Human ObjectionThe creation of brainless human beings is surely logically possible, but so are unicorns, should we now take unicorns into consideration when discussing environmental issues? I think not, they have the same impact on real life decisions as hypothetical brainless humans and divine persons.The enlightened Buddhist and the divine Person ObjectionOf course it is possible to violate the rights of the latter without causing them harm, but that is only if we first suppose an ethical theory that revolves around moral rights, PU does not.An enlightened Buddhist would never proclaim that he is in fact enlightened and it is nothing Buddhists really talk about, since only death gives you certainty."Enlightened Tibetan masters traditionally stay in their bodies for three days after death."(2)The body of Rangjung Rigpe Dorje, the sixteenth Gyalwa Karmapa, stayed warm for three days after his death just as the quote describes. This is the only sign recognizable by others that indicates enlightenment in the form my opponent asks for, which means that you cannot know whether they are enlightened while they are alive.This brings me to some final notes on all these objections:"However, clearly you did something seriously wrong" "Surely most of us would think" "it still seems wrong" "But surely what I have been doing is morally wrong." "But clearly it's wrong""But surely this absurd"These are the justifications for the objections to what Con calls the Desire View of Personhood, they boil down to gut feelings. One can ignore all what I have said to show how these objections miss their mark and still have no reason to reject my view, other than ones intuitions and I think I have covered the issue of moral intuitions more than enough by now.Of course it is true that all forms of utilitarianism trade in the well being of some for the well being of many, but so do all ethical theories, they are just less obvious about it. Satisfying everyone's needs in their entirety is just not possible.ConclusionLast round I conclusively refuted Con's anti-abortion arguments and this round I again redeemed preference utilitarianism by showing why these acts are not entailed by it and why they give no reason to reject it. Over the course of several rounds my opponent has not addressed the problems of moral intuitions and failed to give justification for any of his objections other than that they 'seem wrong'.It has been an insightful debate and I thank Dookieman for accepting my challenge and playing Devils' Advocate.Sources(1)David Boonin, A Defence of Abortion(2)http://en.wikiversity.org...