"Wealthy" is a relative term, rather than an absolute one.

1. Definitions: how illogical is too illogical? Firstly, definitions need to be logical in order to be coherent. Given that logical "laws" are the rules by which we understand, identify, and conceptualize reality, definitions can only be legitimate if they're consistent with logical rules. If one has a definition which is intrinsically self-contradicting, then one has no business speaking as if that term implies anything, absolute or relative. Secondly, it's not that I've "decided" that some accepted definitions are illogical. It isn't up to me. To say that a definition ought to be accepted because a lexicographer included it in the dictionary is an intellectual copout. The validity of a definition needs to be evaluated by its correspondence to logical facts; this is precisely what I'm doing. 2. "Any reputable dictionary…" I don't doubt that many dictionaries probably support Pro. In any debate, both sides are likely to have sources to support their position; however, this is a debate about the /validity/ of the definition – not whether the definition, as stated by pro, currently exists as it does. 3. The meaning of "wealthy" My definition is only incoherent if you don't distinguish between descriptor and degree, which is an argument that went completely unaddressed. To say that a person who is wealthy possesses wealth is metaphysically consistent; however, the degree of wealth has been left out. A person could be very wealthy, not so wealthy, lavishly wealthy, and so forth. Additionally, I never acknowledged that no one would accept my definition. The proposition I made was that, even if you /don't/ accept my definition, I would still win the argument. I considered it fair play to make a case for both definitions. On to arguments. 1. Shades of grey a. Frankly, I think that feverish is blowing the "color" example far out of proportion. This isn't a debate about the validity of "race labels", nor is it a debate on how easy it is to tell what shade a person with a diverse heritage is. He's actually pulling a lot of equivocation in terms of "white" and "black". I'm not using the terms in the sense of racial heritage (like someone who is "part white" and "part black"). I'm talking strictly in terms of skin color. I'll use "brown" and "pasty beige" if Pro prefers. Here's the thing, though. Black and white are opposites, and are absolutes. Scientifically, the color black is the color you get when no light is reflected whatsoever [http://en.wikipedia.org...]. If even one ray of light escapes, you'll see a different color. With white, the opposite is true [http://en.wikipedia.org...]. Those two colors are mutually exclusive. They're pure absolutes. If you mix the two colors together, you'll get grey, which is neither color [http://en.wikipedia.org...]. Simply put, the wealth/poverty dichotomy isn't analogous to the black/white dichotomy. b. I gave a clear explanation for dismissing the death example. I quote, "Pro fails to realize that not all descriptors have degrees attached to them. Death is one which does not; solidity, however, is, and is a better fit, example-wise." It goes back to the unaddressed descriptor/degree argument. He goes on to argue that solidity is relative to fists and axes. However, we look (yet again) to descriptor and degree. The descriptor, solid, stays the same. The degree, however, is what changes. Oak is solid enough to withstand the hit from a fist; not so much so with an axe. Steel is solid enough to withstand hits from both fists and axes. Something Pro needs to understand: descriptor tells you "is it, or isn't it" – degree tells you "how much". c. When I say that absolutes aren't contingent on other entities, I mean that in a comparative sense – that one is wealthy in his own right. By your definition, for example, a man who possesses more than enough wealth to fulfill his needs is wealthy. Even if you compare him to Bill Gates or Microsoft (other entities), his status as wealthy does not change. 2. Back to definitions a. You're omitting something in that first statement. The logical coherency of a term depends on the /logical coherency/ of its definition. The point of the debate is to argue the term, and thus, the validity of certain definition. That a term is defined a certain way by default is part of the issue we're discussing. b. By my definition, one would still possess wealth. It certainly isn't enough to grant him potent purchasing power, but it's wealth all the same. The degree must simply be noted to be "infinitesimally little". By your definition, the term would still be absolute. At any given moment in time, a person either is or isn't wealthy. One moment, he may be wealthy. The next minute, the entire financial structure may crumble, and he may not be wealthy any longer. That a person's /status/ can change in no way alters the fact that the descriptor itself is of an absolute, either/or nature. Also, I think that Pro misunderstands by use of the phrase "dependent on context". Allow me to clarify. When I say that absolutes aren't dependent on /other/ contexts, I mean just that. Let's say that I live in my hometown, and I have $1 million. That's enough to live like a king for a long while. By Pro's definition, I'm wealthy. I have wealth exceeding the cost of my needs. In that context, I'm absolutely wealthy. In another context, say, an America marked by hyperinflation, where $1 billion won't buy a can of beans, I wouldn't be wealthy (according to Pro's definition, mind you); however, the absolute fact that I am wealthy in the former context isn't at all affected by the fact that I'm miserably poor in the latter context. Simply put, the truth of an absolute in a given context isn't affected by how things might be in another context. That I'm wealthy at home isn't altered because I'm poor during hyperinflation. Different contexts have no metaphysical impact upon one another. c/d. To say that there are people who are neither wealthy nor not wealthy makes absolutely no sense. A person has to be one or the other. Law of the excluded middle, Pro [http://en.wikipedia.org...] e. Sure. Different individuals might have different "needs" (beyond basics like food, water, etc.) for different purposes: the middle class American "needs" to pay down his mortgage so that he won't get into massive financial trouble. He "needs" to pay his premiums so he doesn't lose insurance. He "needs" to pay for his child's education because he cares for his child. Saying that one "needs" anything implies a purpose. The point is, however, that the lives of individuals are in themselves a context. Look back to the definition of an absolute. It either is or isn't, regardless of outside contexts. The middle class American either is or isn't wealthy. That absolute isn't affected by whether the African child is wealthy. It isn't affected by whether he'll be wealthy in a different context – say, in London, 20 years from now. I said that the truth of absolutes don't depend on /other/ entities and contexts – not that you can drop context and discuss circumstances of a void. 3. Meaninglessness a. If, however, the established definitions aren't logically sound, then we have a bit of a problem. Part of the debate is definitional validity. With either definition, it's clear that wealthy is an absolute descriptor, regardless of degree, and regardless of Pro's attempts to amalgamate contexts and claim relativity based on the observation that things might be different in different circumstances. And according to me, short = a more convenient term for "not very tall", and poor = a more convenient term for "not very wealthy". "Short" and "poor" are negative terms, and you can't measure in terms of negatives. If anything, they're linguistic reifications of low degrees of positive descriptors.