There are no compelling proofs or arguments for the existence of God

Premise 1An Overview of ModalityNothing has been refuted about my understanding of modality. Clean extension.The Principle of Sufficient ReasonFirst I'll address my opponent's three objections.1) This objection concedes the validity of my argument. My opponent claims that scientists explain existences by preceding causes and conditions. This is exactly what the Leibnizian Cosmological Argument does, as explained by my overview of modality. If my opponent chose to actually do research rather than plagiarize he would know why this blog-post does not refute the LCA, or even the PSR. It in fact doesn't even address the PSR in terms of the LCA. What the blogger was saying is that the PSR independent of other logical tools cannot be used to derive the existence of a necessary being. In other words, you know that everything has an explanation with the PSR, but with that knowledge alone you cannot derive what the explanation is. This is a completely valid objection to an argument that claims PSR ergo God, but that is not what the LCA does. The LCA is a synthesis of many resources, such as the PSR, modality, infinities, and science.In effect this objection says that without analysis of prior causes, the PSR is incapable of proving the existence of God. My overview of modality provides such an analysis, thereby supporting the use of the PSR. I would even go as far as to say that my opponent would agree with me in that my overview of modality combined with the PSR is fully sufficient in proving the existence of God. After all, the person he quoted claimed that it would be sufficient if and only if we had an understanding of the prior causes. We cannot have any more of an understanding of casual chain than we have derived from modality.2) This objection simply states that the PSR's validity results in a deterministic universe. This is Peter van Inwagen's response to the version of the PSR presented by Leibniz in his original iteration of the LCA. I have two responses.A) Leibniz's original version of the PSR is not equivalent to the version that I utilize in my defense of the PSR. Leibniz's variation is stated in The Monadology as, "we hold that there can be no fact real or existing, no statement true, unless there be a sufficient reason why it should be so and not otherwise, although these reasons usually cannot be known by us."In other words, nothing occurs for which it would be impossible for someone who has enough knowledge of things to give a reason adequate to determine why the thing is as it is and not otherwise. You may have noticed that this formulation of the PSR is stronger than the one I presented. The PSR I defend is presented by Alexander Pruss: all contingent facts must have explanations.Leibniz's PSR (LPSR): Q is a sufficient reason for P if and only if Q explains why P is just so and not otherwise.Pruss' PSR (PPSR): Q is a sufficient reason for P if and only if Q explains P.When we break these two version down into technical terms we can see that LPSR requires a sufficient reason to be a necessitating fact. In other words, the validity of the explanation provided must necessitate the occurrence of the event if explains. The PPSR does not suffer from the same fault. The explanation must simply explain why the event may occur.Pruss' variation is not only compatible with the LCA, but it also breaks free of Inwagen's criticism. You see, the reason Inwagen's criticism works is because the explanation of CC (all contingent facts) would have to necessitate that those contingent facts are true, and by necessitating such a proposition the contingent facts wouldn't be contingent at all, but rather necessary facts. This results in determinism. The PPSR does not fall into this as the explanation needs only prove why CC may be true, but not why it must be true.Now, one may ask how is this much weaker PSR a sufficient substitution for the LPSR in the LCA? That answer is simple. The only reason why the PPSR would not suffice is if there were multiple plausible explanations for the universe. Using modal logic we may deduce that there are only two possible types of explanations, those that are contingent and those that are necessary. My opponent's concession of my second premise allows for the following assertion to be accepted on face: a series of solely contingent causes cannot explain themselves as their causes would need explanations ad infinitum. Therefore every series of contingent causes must be explained by a necessary cause. Now, the necessary cause an be one of two things itself: personal or natural. I.e. it can be a material cause or an external mind. I explained in the last round why it could not be a natural cause in my example utilizing N1 and P1 under my second premise. As we can see, a necessary, personal first cause may explain the universe under the PPSR. My opponent may object and claim that other explanations may serve the same purpose, but as we can see I have ruled out every other type of explanation. Contingent explanations fail, as do necessary, natural explanations. Therefore the only possible answer is a necessary, personal explanation by process of elimination. Ergo, if the universe exists then the explanation if it's existence is God.3) This objection fails under modal logic. The proposition of a contingent-yet-independent being is absurd in that the very definition of contingency is dependency. In other words my opponent postulates a dependent-yet-independent being. To be independent the being must be necessary, not contingent. As shown above, only a personal being can coherently be a necessary being.Premise 2My opponent did not refute my second premise. Clean extension.Premise 3No objections were raised against my third premise. Clean extension.ConclusionThe blog writers' My opponent's poor grasp of modal logic has proved his three objections to the PSR inadequate. As the PSR is the only part of my argument that my opponent refutes if it is valid then the LCA is held as valid.Note to my OpponentBecause you are new I am not going to push for you to lose based on plagiarism, but changing one word per sentence does not constitute making an argument your own.