The Tri-Omni God chooses life

Thank you to GCL for accepting. I'm going to tackle my negation of this resolution with two primary points: i. The concept of the Tri-Omni God is logically incoherent, and thus we have no reason to believe that one in fact existsii. Even if a Tri-Omni God exists, he wouldn't be able to "choose" per our definition of the termProving either of these points would negate the resolution. Point iP1) If the existence of the Tri-Omni God is logically incoherent, one cannot choose life.P2) The existence of the Tri-Omni God is logically incoherent. C1) Therefore, the Tri-Omni God is logically incoherent. Bearing in mind that we are operating off a preponderance of evidence as our criterion, I don't need to prove a negative; that is, I don't need to prove that the Tri-Omni God definitely does not exist; rather, I must prove that he may not exist or that, based on the assortment of evidence provided in this debate, he probably does not exist. By accomplishing that, meaning that my adversary is unsuccessful in proving that the Tri-Omni God exists or probably exists, the resolution will be negated. iC1) Lack of evidence and necessityThe fact remains that the question of God, unlike subjects within the reach of empirical scientific inquiry, is not falsifiable. The question has no truth value because there is no evidence for the existence of a creator. However, there is no reason to think that there is a God by virtue of the fact that he isn't necessary. My adversary may be inclined to raise the "God of the Gaps" argument; however, from what we know of modern quantum mechanics, we can conclude that the universe could function without a God. Dr. Michio Kaku explains: “If you do the math, you find out that the sum total of matter in the universe can cancel against the sum total of negative gravitational energy, yielding a universe with zero (or close to zero) net matter/energy. So, in some sense, universes are for free. It does not take net matter and energy to create entire universes. In this way, in the bubble bath, bubbles can collide, create baby bubbles, or simple pop into existence from nothing" (1). Therefore, it is possible for "something to come from nothing." Moreover, if my opponent ran the Kalan Comsological Argument to claim that the universe must have a cause, she must explain what the cause of God is. Of course, her argument would that God is "uncaused" and in fact the" "first cause." This would mean that God would need to have existed in a spaceless, timeless, and immaterial state and would necessarily be eternal, meaning that he never began to exist but always was. Thus, as I have demonstrated, for God to exist, we would need to make a number of assumptions. A simple appeal to Occam's Razor would therefore settle the issue of probability. Alan Baker provides a succint account of Occam's Razor: “Occam's Razor may be formulated as an epistemic principle: if theory T is simpler than theory T*, then it is rational (other things being equal) to believe T rather than T*. Or it may be formulated as a methodological principle: if T is simpler than T* then it is rational to adopt T as one's working theory for scientific purposes" (2). In other words, theory T is the theory that the universe can come from nothing, and theory T* is the theory that an uncaused God existed in a spaceless, atemporal, immaterial, uncaused state and set off the process of creation. We have two competing hypotheses, one of which is borne out by evidence, the other of which is not. My opponent’s theory has significantly more assumptions than mine, and thus mine is more plausible. iC2) Absence of Evidence is Evidence of Absence We may often hear theists argue that we cannot categorically disprove God. This happens to be true, as it is virtually impossible to prove a negative to the effect of “X doesn’t exist.” In the same way that I can’t disprove the existence of God, I cannot disprove that there is a flying purple unicorn in this room, or that the universe wasn’t created 10 seconds ago and we were brought into existence with our memories. The point is, I don’t have to: the burden of proof lies with my opponent. I trust, for instance, that she doesn’t believe in fairies, or unicorns, or the flying spaghetti monster. However, there is as much evidence for those as there is for the Christian God: zilch. The Celestial Teapot analogy provides a framework for this line of thinking: “If I were to suggest that between the Earth and Mars there is a china teapot revolving about the sun in an elliptical orbit, nobody would be able to disprove my assertion provided I were careful to add that the teapot is too small to be revealed even by our most powerful telescopes. But if I were to go on to say that, since my assertion cannot be disproved, it is an intolerable presumption on the part of human reason to doubt it, I should rightly be thought to be talking nonsense. If, however, the existence of such a teapot were affirmed in ancient books, taught as the sacred truth every Sunday, and instilled into the minds of children at school, hesitation to believe in its existence would become a mark of eccentricity and entitle the doubter to the attentions of the psychiatrist in an enlightened age of of the Inquisitor in an earlier time" (3). As Russel points out, though we couldn’t prove that an undetectable teapot is orbiting the sun, we would rightfully accept that absence of evidence could lead us to the rational conclusion that there isn’t a such a teapot. We could apply this same logic to Santa Claus, the tooth fairy, the Easter Bunny, and many other mythical creatures. This affirms my opponent's burden to provide evidence, not on me to categorically disprove God, as obviously that is, in principle, an impossible task. iC3) Epicurean Paradox The argument goes like this: “If God is willing to prevent evil, but is not able to Then He is not omnipotent. If He is able, but not willing Then He is malevolent. If He is both able and willing Then whence cometh evil. If He is neither able nor willing Then why call Him God?” (3) To express the argument in other terms: P1) For the Tri-Omni God to exist, he must be omnibenevolent, omniscient, and omnipotent. P2) If God is omnibenevolent, he would want to stop gratuitous suffering; if God is omnipotent, he has the power to put a stop to it or prevent it. P3) Yet, gratuitous suffering occurs. C1) Therefore, the Tri-Omni God doesn't exist.The point is that, because gratuitous suffering exists, one of the following must be true: if God is able to stop or prevent gratuitous suffering but doesn't, he is not omnibenevolent. if God wants to stop gratuitous suffering but doesn't, he isn't omnipotent. If one of these arguments hold, the Tri-Omni God does not exist. We could take this argument a step further and note that, if God is omniscient, he knows that suffering will occur and when it will occur, so he is in a position to end it or at least mollify, yet he does not. IC4) Paradox of Free WillSome people may offer as a defense to the Problem of Evil that God has given us free will. In order to sin, for instance, people must make a conscious choice to do wrong. Though the degree to which we have free will is subject to question, the Heinsenberg Uncertainty principle does suggest to us that some degree of free will exists. However, there are several problems with this. First and foremost, per our definition of God, he is omniscient. This means he has complete and total knowledge of the past, present and future. If this is the case, then how could human beings have free will? Free will implies randomness, and we know from Heinsenberg that some degree of free will does in fact exist. He showed this to us and modelled mathematically by noting that we cannot concurrently know both the position and momentum of a particle and thus there is a certain degree of variability as to its position as it isn't subject to the laws of causality (4). If randomness exists, God isn't omniscient. The second problem with this, and why it doesn't refute the Problem of Evil, is that intervening to stop gratuitous suffering does not in fact violate anyone's free will. If a neonate is suffering and dying, a god would the ability to end his or her suffering. This infant hasn't done anything wrong, nor does it have the capacity to make a free choice. "Free will" doesn't even enter the fray until much later. Again, the argument stands: if God doesn't intervene but can, he isn't omnibenevolent. If God wants to intervene but can't, he isn't omnipotent. Point ii. The affirmation of the resolution requires my adversary to prove that God makes a "choice" toward life. However, this cannot possibly be the case. iiC1) Per Omniscience, God doesn't have free willBeing omniscient means that you must act in such a way that you prove omniscience. If you have the possibility to make a choice, you are not omniscient. Having free will requires that one consider both choice (x) and choice (y), with choice (y) being the inferior decision, and has the capacity to do wrong. However, we accept the conception of God as perfect, and thus it isn't possible for him to choose what we consider the lesser option. By virtue of the fact that God chose it, we consider it the "right" action. If my adversary posits that God makes a "choice," she concedes that he isn't omniscient, in which case the resolution is negated. Moreover, there are also futher ramifications for her argument. If God is omniscient and knows the future, not only do we not have free will, but God would have free will. That would mean that God should be aware of his own future actions. If God is aware of his own future actions, he doesn't. If he isn't aware, there is something he doesn't know, meaning he isn't omniscient.Sources(1) http://tinyurl.com...; (2) http://tinyurl.com... (3) http://tinyurl.com...;(4) http://tinyurl.com...