Individuals have a moral obligation to assist those in need

Thank you for an excellent first constructive. I'll do my best to work with a subject I've never even philosophically considered; it should be fun.A quick overview: Aff has provided a definition of moral obligation that I will indeed accept, however, the resolution in and of itself appears to be absolute, with 0 caveats and exceptions to this resolution, meaning that Aff's burden is to show that the resolution is absolute and not contingent upon any other caveats, granted it is a rather broad resolution. Essentially, a moral obligation is one which someone has a moral duty to perform, yet not necessarily a legal duty, though many situations may include both. But I will now move on to absolute obligations.1. What Obligations Exist Absolutely?a. Categorical vs. Hypothetical ImperativesKant identifies two types of imperatives, both of which command us to direct our will towards certain actions through morality rather than law. The categorical imperative:" commands us to exercise our wills in a particular way, not to perform some action or other. It is categorical in virtue of applying to us unconditionally, or simply because we possesses rational wills, without reference to any ends that we might or might not have. It does not, in other words, apply to us on the condition that we have antecedently adopted some goal for ourselves."The hypothetical imperative, on the other hand:" is a command that also applies... in virtue of our having a rational will, but not simply in virtue of this. It requires us to exercise our wills in a certain way given we have antecedently willed an end ...a command in a conditional form. But not any command in this form counts as a hypothetical imperative in Kant's sense... Further, ‘if you want pastrami, try the corner deli’ is also a command in conditional form, but strictly speaking it too fails to be a hypothetical imperative in Kant's sense since this command does not apply to us in virtue of our willing some end, but only in virtue of our desiring or wanting an end."http://plato.stanford.edu...So which ends ought we will unconditionally?b. Kantian EthicsThe Categorical Imperative compels us to ask ourselves if situations exist in which it would not be morally preferable or in which acting would not be a moral duty when assisting the needy. This will be covered later on. But insofar as nearly all ostensible categorical imperatives can be placed into a situation in which, if acting in accordance with the imperative, an actor would violate the rights of others, especially Kant's most important imperative, then the action should not be committed. The only categorical imperative that Kant actually provides and is defendable is his "kingdom of ends":"(i) it requires that we conform our actions to the maxims of a legislator of laws (ii) that this lawgiver lays down universal laws, binding all rational wills including our own, and (iii) that those laws are of ‘a merely possible kingdom’ each of whose members equally possesses this status as legislator of universal laws, and hence must be treated always as an end in itself. The intuitive idea behind this formulation is that our fundamental moral obligation is to act only on principles which could earn acceptance by a community of fully rational agents each of whom have an equal share in legislating these principles for their community"http://plato.stanford.edu...Let us now examine how far empathy goes under Aff's naturalistic framework2. Contingency of Resolution a. Humans as Tribal AnimalsAff's first source under his empathy argument merely observes that humans have the capacity for empathy. But empathy is merely defined as "the feeling that you understand and share another person's experiences and emotions."http://www.merriam-webster.com...He merely observes that humans have this capacity and asserts that it is utilized in all interactions between humans. However, he must then make the jump from capacity to understand another to the obligation to assist another, or altruism, as Aff puts it. He then provides a source that merely states that compassion is good for society because "reciprocity" and people like altruism. But is this proof that we always have a moral obligation to assist those in need?First, it is evident that, while empathy may be omnipresent in relations with others, this does not make it compelling in an absolute manner. Empathy can be measured, can vary from person to person, and is certainly not absolute. In fact, people display greater empathy towards dogs than humans.http://www.bostonmagazine.com...This notion of reciprocity may be salient within societies, but using Aff's naturalistic framework, we can see that humans have an inclination to assist those within a group to a greater extent than those outside of a group. This is why, given the choice of saving the life of your mother and a Nicaraguan child that you've never met, you will most likely choose your mother every time. Humans have the capacity to feel more obliged to assist those closer to them than those sharing no similarities beyond biology. "...conducted punishment experiments, which allow 'impartial' observers to punish norm violators, with indigenous groups in Papua New Guinea. ...show that these experiments confirm the prediction of parochialism. ...punishers protect ingroup victims—who suffer from a norm violation—much more than they do outgroup victims, regardless of the norm violator's group affiliation. Norm violators also expect that punishers will be lenient if the latter belong to their social group. As a consequence, norm violations occur more often if the punisher and the norm violator belong to the same group." http://www.nature.com... It is evident that victims of any violation of norms, which are certainly culturally contingent yet consistently altruistic according to Aff, are naturally seen as more worthy of protection when they belong to a the group of the punishers. When it comes to helping those in need of protection, humans are biologically inclined to assist those they know and those who are part of their groups, and under a pure naturalistic framework, which Aff is using, this means that we have a greater obligation to those closer than those further, even though they may be equally needy.b. Rights vs. DutyThis ostensibly omnipresent duty to assist those in need potentially conflicts with the inherent rights of an individual, insofar as the end of helping the needy is a preferable consequentialist goal of action under the resolution. There is no caveat in the resolution stating "so long as the rights of others are respected". There is only obligation, absolute and based not on circumstance. To determine whether or not we should act, we can use Kamm's Principle of Permissible Harm (PPH):"...it is not permissible for an act to require lesser evil as a means to a greater good."Kamm, Frances. Intricate Ethics. New York City: Oxford University Press, Inc., 2007. Print.So, for example, if I am homeless, and I wish to purchase a dinner for my starving homeless friend, but the only way I can purchase a dinner is by pickpocketing a passerby who is reasonably well-off, it is still not permissible for me to rob the man despite Aff's assertion that helping the needy is a moral obligation, and I would be fulfilling that obligation in this situation. This man has a right to his money and I have no right to steal from him according to the PPH. Similarly, I have no right to push a man off a bridge to stop a trolley barreling towards 5 people, even though the aggregate necessity of the action derived from the 5 people certainly outweigh that of the man. I have acted in accordance with the resolution, yet I have violated the PPH and the imperative not to use people as merely means. c. Contradictions in Aff's FrameworkAff values acting in accordance with what is best for society and with naturalism. However, as stated in his own constructive, this often requires acting in direct opposition to the resolution. It would appear that Aff's argument asserts the need for reciprocity rather than the resolution at hand. Gintis et al, as cited by Aff:"...and a willingness to punish those who violate cooperative norms."Now, this would seem to suggest that, under Aff's values, helping the needy is not always an obligation. In fact, we would occasionally be obligated to punish the needy. For example, if a homeless man committed murder, we would, under this notion of reciprocity and justice, be obligated to punish him. His actions did not make him any less needy. He still owned no home and had little to no money, but reciprocity naturally drives us to punish him. Aff’s resolution is absolute and is not contingent upon relevant circumstantial factors, yet certain circumstances under Aff’s own arguments would call for action antithetical to his resolution. This is an irreconcilable issue that Aff cannot resolve without knifing part of his own proof to rid himself of his contradiction.3. Individuals vs. SocietyThis will be short, lack of space. Aff provides no evidence as to why society cannot relieve individuals of this obligation. The institutions that govern a society can be structured to behave in a manner conducive to assisting those in need to an acceptable extent. A thought experiment: you see a man whose house is on fire while walking to work. You have called the fire department and they will arrive in 5 minutes. You have a bottle of Powerade. Do you have an obligation to forgo quenching your thirst to assist the owner in a manner that is both marginal (inconsequential) and negligible in comparison to what you foresee the fire department is capable of? If society can fulfill the obligation, then Aff must warrant why individuals still have this broad, amorphous duty. I will elaborate in later rounds.