BeIR/webis-touche2020 huggingface dataset:
Vocational courses produce better employees

The courses which are generally offered at the moment are not serving students well when it comes to providing the skills for employment. 65% of businesses complain of being unable to hire people with the right skills.[1] Increasingly, universities are offering as a selling point the fact that they have extra-curricular courses to teach people business skills, but this is a tacit admission that they are selling people degrees which are not fit for purpose. Solving this requires us to teach more vocationally.  There are schemes underway in many areas to do just that – to give one example, in Maine, USA, a bill has been passed to improve local colleges.[2] Our policy moves these efforts from the fringes to the core of the system: isolate as far as possible the specific things which make good employees and teach those to people. This will help them get jobs more easily, and also ensure that companies are able to operate effectively. The consequences of such a policy would be good all round. [1] Personnel Today, ‘Skills gap ‘hindering UK business growth’, say CEOs’, agr, 29 April 2013 [2] State House Bureau, ‘House Oks bill to plug ‘skills gap’, Portland Press Herald, 21 May 2013
The 'Middle Way' has international support

The USA, the most powerful nation in the world, has been vocal in its support for the 'Middle Way' strategy. Concurrently, the US has not given any indication that it would support complete Tibetan independence – nor is it likely to. America is unlikely to jeopardise trade relations with China over the Tibetan issue by giving political legitimacy to those advocating complete independence.[1] The European Parliament and the Scottish Parliament have also both passed motions advocating for the 'Middle Way' as a solution in Tibet.[2][3] Such international support for the 'Middle Way' should be compared to the fact that no country in the world has ever recognised Tibetan independence.[4] Only the involvement of international actors and inter-governmental organisations can guarantee that Tibet and China will be able to attain a peaceful and equitable equilibrium with each other. International support means that the international community would accept any change when it occurs and gives China a further incentive to negotiate for some form of the ‘Middle Way’ as it would positively benefit its international relations. [1] Valdes, Manuel. “Dalai Lama to begin 6-day U.S. visit in Seattle to discuss compassion amid turmoil in Tibet”. Associated Press. 10 April 2008. http://legacy.signonsandiego.com/news/state/20080410-0236-dalailama.html [2] TibetCustom. “European Parliament Discusses Current Situation of Tibet”. TibetCustom. 26 March 2010. http://www.tibetcustom.com/article.php/20100326083417443 [3] Australia Tibet Council. “Sino-Tibetan Dialogue Presented to Scottish Parliament”. Australia Tibet Council. 2011. http://www.atc.org.au/content/view/263/91/ [4] The Economist. “Britain's suzerain remedy”. The Economist. 6 November 2008. http://www.economist.com/node/12570571?story_id=12570571
Tibetans want independence, not the 'Middle Way'

The Dalai Lama's 'Middle Way' is far from popular amongst the Tibetan population. Many ordinary Tibetans have criticised the Dalai Lama's conciliatory approach to China. His refusal to call for a boycott of the Beijing Olympic Games is symbolic of this conciliatory approach where the majority of the Tibetan population, particularly the young disagreed with him. "China does not deserve to host the Olympics. It's evident that they do not deserve the Olympics," said Tsewang Rigzin, the leader of the Tibetan Youth Congress, at Dharamshala in 2008.[1] Tsewang Rigzin also stated “There is a growing frustration within the Tibetan community, especially in the [younger] generation... I certainly hope the Middle Way approach will be reviewed. As we can see from the protests here and all over the world, the Tibetan people remain committed to achieving independence.”[2] The (sometimes violent) 2008 protests made it clear that many Tibetans don't support the Dalai Lama's peaceful, non-revolutionary, non-independence 'Middle Way'. The Dalai Lama even had to threaten to resign if violent protests continued. Clearly, these protests showed that the Dalai Lama's  'Middle Way' lacks support amongst the young of Tibet – the individuals who will comprise successive generations of political, religious and business leaders.[3] Within Tibet, pro-independence protesters have recently had more leverage than 'Middle Way' voices. The 'Middle Way' is a nuanced approach to the Tibetan issue and, therefore, is a less potent rallying for Tibetans who have been marginalised or excluded by Chinese policies in the region. Calls for Tibetan Independence mobilise more support among grass-roots activists in other areas of the world.[4]This is valuable, and is an argument in favour of, at least, continuing to call for Tibetan Independence, not merely the 'Middle Way'; it has a greater impact. In this situation, it makes no sense for the Dalai Lama to alienate so many of his young people, so many of the most dedicated to the Tibetan cause, by preaching his 'Middle Way' when he should be calling for what his people truly want and need -Tibetan independence. [1] Bell, Thomas. “Tibetans criticise Dalai Lama's 'middle way'”. The Telegraph. 18 March 2008. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1582113/Tibetans-criticise-Dal... [2] Bell, Thomas. “Tibetans criticise Dalai Lama's 'middle way'”. The Telegraph. 18 March 2008. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1582113/Tibetans-criticise-Dal... [3] The Economist. “Trashing the Beijing Road”. The Economist. 19 March 2008. http://www.economist.com/node/10875823?story_id=10875823&CFID=1092371&CF... [4] The Economist. “A flaming row”. 9 Arpil 2008. http://www.economist.com/node/11003821?story_id=11003821
The Chinese government is exploiting the 'Middle Way' against Tibet's interests

The Chinese government manipulates people every day, and it is clear how Beijing is manipulating the good intentions of the Dalai Lama and his 'Middle Way'. The Middle Path is therefore not only hopeless, but also dangerous. Henry Kissinger once said that in politics, one never pays for goods that have already been delivered. True to form, China is using the moderate stance of Tibet’s leadership-in-exile to extort concessions while giving nothing of substance in return. For example, Beijing spread false rumours that the Dalai Lama would be invited to China to prevent demonstrations when Hu Jintao visited the U.S. The 'Middle Way' policy is sapping momentum from the Tibet movement, depriving it of focus, and obscuring its goals. People are drifting away from a movement that appears to be drifting itself; political fervour can be difficult to sustain – especially when the Tibetan government-in-exile actually asks its supporters to behave in a passive a non-confrontational fashion.[1] By asking Beijing for an official agreement to grant autonomous status to Tibet, the Tibetan government-in-exile will be surrendering many of the rights they are now entitled to and locking the entire Tibetan people into a constricted and precarious situation from which they cannot withdraw. Chinese restrictions will remain on the practice of Tibetan religion, culture and traditions within "autonomous" Tibet, the promotion of Tibetan culture, religion and traditions abroad will either be prohibited or restricted as it concerns foreign affairs, and all foreign travel will be controlled and restricted by the Chinese.[2] Accepting the Dalai Lama's 'Middle Way' will forever close the door on independence but leave Tibet still victim to China's cultural repression and control, and so it should not be supported. [1] Dondup, Ketsun Lobsang. “Independence as Tibet’s Only Option: Why the ‘Middle Path’ is a Dead End”. Phayul.com. 25 January 2007. http://www.phayul.com/news/article.aspx?article=%E2%80%9CIndependence+as... [2] Shakabpa, Tsoltim N. “The Case Against Autonomy for Tibet”. Tibet Writes. 2 January 2008. http://www.tibetwrites.org/?The-Case-Against-Autonomy-for
The 'Middle Way' is the most realistic path for Tibet and China

The 'Middle Way' is no different from the current situation. Although, theoretically, the 'Middle Way' proposition offers the Chinese authorities and ordinary Tibetans a way to harmonise their conflicting interests, it is practically no different from the political accommodation that Tibet currently subscribes to. Under the ‘Middle Way’, the Dalai Lama has expressed willingness to accept socialist rule in Tibet. He has also dropped former Tibetan demands that their homeland be offered a political relationship as expansive as China’s offer in the early-1980s to Taiwan in favour of an insistence on a Hong Kong-style ‘association’ relationship with Beijing. Since the early 2000s, in keeping with the ‘Middle Way’, his hints about a residual international personality have been kept to a minimum. Further, the autonomy arrangement sought is an amalgam of the Hong Kong ‘one country, two systems’ formula and the existing autonomy provisions of the PRC Constitution.[1] This gradual dropping of Tibetan demands under the name of the ‘Middle Way’ means that it offers little improvement from the status quo. The background in terms of political events that led to a proposition of a "Middle Way" sheds more light into the fact that his strategy is just a new name on the board for the same as the provisions currently existing within the PRC constitution.[2]  If the PRC sees that the ‘middle way’ is slowly reducing the demands for more freedom for Tibet then they are unlikely to embrace it as they can equally wait for more concessions. Despite all these concessions to the PRC position there are still things that China will never accept such as any idea that Tibet will be transformed into a ‘zone of peace and non-violence’ or that there should be a popularly elected legislature – it would inevitably mean others in China would believe they should have more democracy. By giving away so many concessions before negotiations but still making it impossible for the PRC to accept the Dalai Lama makes it unlikely that his middle way will get anywhere in negotiations so it is not really ‘realistic’. [1] Gupta, Sourabh. “The Dalai Lama’s Middle-Way approach needs re-adjustment”. EastAsiaForum. 8 March  2010. http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/03/08/the-dalai-lamas-middle-way-approach-and-the-need-for-re-adjustment/ [2] ChinaDaily. “What is Dalai Lama's 'Middle Way'”. ChinaDaily.com.cn 26 July 2007. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-07/26/content_649545.htm
The 'Middle Way' has international support

The opinions of foreign governments and the international community have frequently failed to have any real impact upon the situation 'on the ground' in Tibet. For example, The US joined most other UN members in condemning the Chinese 'aggression' and 'invasion' of Tibet in 1950, however the Chinese exerted their authority there anyway.[1] The international community will therefore acquiesce with whatever is decided between Tibet and China – they will applaud any deal or condemn any repression but this will not affect the positions of either side. Rather, what matters is what the Tibetan population support, and there is good reason to believe that the 'Middle Way' does not satisfy them. Many younger Tibetans would prefer that the Dalai Lama push for total independence, an regret that he did not pursue a more confrontational path with China over the 2008 Olympics.[2] [1] The Office of Tibet, New York. “Historical Overview”. The Office of Tibet, New York. http://tibetoffice.org/tibet-info/historical-overview [2] Bell, Thomas. “Tibetans criticise Dalai Lama's 'middle way'”. The Telegraph. 18 March 2008. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1582113/Tibetans-criticise-Dal...
The 'Middle Way' respects China's right to territorial integrity

China's supposed strategic interests in Tibet are also why the promised autonomy under the 'Middle Way' will never truly emerge. If China's need to hold onto Tibet is really so important as made out, China will always need to keep tight control over all happenings in Tibet so as to further guarantee its security. This of course assumes China really does have vital strategic interests in controlling Tibet (as the Chinese Government claims, and as is argued opposite), however it is not entirely clear exactly what these strategic interests are. The 'Middle Way' is just a smokescreen for perpetuating the predominance of China's security interests as the most important issue in Tibet. Thus, if China does have vital strategic interests in Tibet, it will never allow it true autonomy (and so the Middle Way is hopeless), and if it has no vital strategic interests in controlling Tibet then Chinese rule there is unjustified -and independence, not the ‘Middle Way’ should be adopted.
Tibetans want independence, not the 'Middle Way'

The average Tibetan does not actually want independence from China. For example, Dr. Lobsang Sangay, who was born in a refugee camp in India in 1968 and was named Prime Minister of the Cental  Tibetan Administration (Tibetan exiles) on April 27, 2011, was once a militant of the Tibetan Youth Congress, a group that unequivocally supports Tibetan independence, but who now says he has matured and now supports the Middle Way Approach.[1] Certainly, many Tibetans want independence- of a type different to that proposed by the Dalai Lama- and some protest in favour of it. The Tibetan exile population is particularly vocal in this regard, but this should not be taken to mean that a majority of Tibetans want complete independence from China. Most Tibetans like everybody else would be happy with more freedoms within China rather than full independence. This is reflected in the views of the Dalai Lama, who seeks only greater freedoms and autonomy, but not independence, under the 'Middle Way'.[2] [1] Editorial Board of The Tibetan Political Review. “Investigating the Candidates on the Middle Way”. The Tibetan Political Review. 15 March 2011. http://sites.google.com/site/tibetanpoliticalreview/project-updates/investigatingthecandidatesonthemiddleway [2] Barnett, Robert. “Seven Questions: What Tibetans Want”. Foreign Policy. 26 March 2008. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2008/03/25/seven_questions_what_ti...
The Dalai Lama is no longer relevant to Tibet's future

The Dalai Lama is the only solution for Tibet. His political advocacy as a leader and religious figure is imperative for the problem of Tibet. His commitment for non-violence and cohabitation and cooperation serves the peaceful interests of Tibet while accommodating for moderate changes. His 'Middle Way' platform is the bridge between China Tibet and world-wide international consensus on the Tibetans' right to self-determination. If resistance to China becomes more violent, as it did in 2008, then the Dalai Lama’s third way will become much more relevant as a solution that both sides can potentially sign up to. It may become the only way forward towards a compromise. Irrespective of some discontent, the Dalai Lama still enjoys the loyalty and respect of most Tibetans.[1] During the 2008 protests in Tibet, the protesters regularly chanted the Dalai Lama's name, displayed his picture and recited a "long life" prayer for him.[2]  He remains the undisputed moral leader of Tibetan people, and as such his 'Middle Way' path still has weight. [1] The Economist. “A colonial uprising”. The Economist. 19 March 2008. http://www.economist.com/node/10880709?story_id=10880709&CFID=1092371&CF... [2] Bell, Thomas. “Tibetans criticise Dalai Lama's 'middle way'”. The Telegraph. 18 March 2008. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1582113/Tibetans-criticise-Dal...
Turkey has an effective and legitimate government

Democratic legitimacy cannot simply be equated with economic growth even if most people see the economy as the main issue when it comes to voting. The economy is important but there are plenty of countries which have used economic growth to buttress undemocratic regimes; China being the obvious example where the state’s legitimacy is intimately bound up with economic growth.[1] [1] Li, Eric X, “The Life of the Party”, Foreign Affairs, January/February 2013, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138476/eric-x-li/the-life-of-the-party?page=4
Turkey does not have the freedoms associated with democracy

The rule of law, limits on the power of the state, and the provision of personal rights are key to any country being considered to be a liberal democracy but these are being undermined in Turkey. This is most noticeable when it comes to freedom of the press. Turkey’s press freedoms have been in decline. It is a dismal 154th on the press freedom index[1] and most notable is that it is the country with the most imprisoned journalists with at least 76 imprisoned, mostly without having been convicted and as a result of their work.[2] The lack of freedom of the press and how cowed the press is has been shown in the recent rioting; CNN covered the protests live, at the same time its Turkish language subsidiary CNN Turk was broadcasting a cooking show.[3] [1] ‘21013 World Press Freedom Index: Dashed Hopes After Spring’, Reporters Without Borders, 2013, http://en.rsf.org/press-freedom-index-2013,1054.html [2] Greenslade, Roy, ‘Turkish press freedom crisis’, guardian.co.uk, 23 October 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/greenslade/2012/oct/23/press-freedom-turkey [3] Cook, Steven A., and Koplow, Michael, ‘How Democratic Is Turkey?’, Foreign Policy, 3 June 2013, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/02/how_democratic_is_turkey
One party state

Under the AKP Turkey has effectively become a one party state; this means that there is not the competition necessary to make Turkey a genuine liberal democracy. Yes alternative parties exist but this does not mean they are going to get any power any time soon if the government can help it. The AKP has been able to get twice as many votes as its nearest rival making it by far the dominant party. The party consolidates power and there are signs that competition in the party is more important than with other parties.[1] The rioting across the country has shown this in several ways. First the resort to violent and street protest shows the opposition don’t think they can oust the AKP at the ballot box. Secondly the response from the leaders of the AKP have been mixed. While Erdoğan has vehemently condemned the protests while President Abdullah Gül has taken a more nuanced line saying “Democracy is not just about elections” and that “If there are objections, there is nothing more natural than voicing them” effectively endorsing some protest.[2] [1] Yinanç, Barçin, ‘AKP ushering in 'dominant-party system,' says expert’, Hürriyet Daily News, 17 June 2011, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=akp-ushering-in-8216dominant-party-system8217-says-expert-2011-06-17 [2] ‘Democracy is no just about elections, says Turkish President’, Hürriyet Daily News, 3 June 2013, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/democracy-is-not-just-about-elections-says-turkish-president.aspx?pageID=238&nID=48100&NewsCatID=338
Decline of secularism

The AKP is not just making Turkey authoritarian it is making it an Islamic authoritarian state. Since a 1928 amendment to the constitution Turkey has been a secular state. Recently Turkey rushed through restrictions on the sale of alcohol prohibiting sale overnight.[1] More worryingly than minor restrictions is a decline in gender equality and respect for religious minorities; in 2002, the year the AKP came to power Turkey was ranked 63rd in the UN’s Gender Empowerment Measure, by 2009 it had dropped to 101st out of 109 countries.[2] Without respect for these groups it is difficult to see how Turkey can be considered a liberal democracy that provides for equal and personal rights. [1] Letsch, Constanze, ‘Turkey alcohol laws could pull the plug on Istanbul nightlife’, guardian.co.uk, 31 May 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/may/31/turkey-alcohol-laws-istanbul-nightlife [2] Onanç, Gülseren, ‘Women’s place in Turkey is alarming’, United Nations Development Programme, New Horizons Issue 47 November 2009, http://www.undp.org.tr/Gozlem2.aspx?WebSayfaNo=2196
Less army influence – no coups

There has now been more than thirty years without an army coup but it has only been during the AKP government that the army has finally been cowed with the army being forced to defend its actions in court.[1] The AKP has brought about a fundamental transformation in the relationship between the military and civilian governments reducing the military’s influence; consistent with military subservience to civilian authority in other democracies. The National Security Council was turned from a executive body into an advisory board that was dominated by civilians and Parliamentary control over the military’s budget was strengthened. The Government’s control over the military was shown by the Ergenekon trials where senior army generals were accused of plotting a coup, with the result that the government showed the power of the judiciary over the military and took control over promotion.[2] [1] Demir, Firat, ‘Here's What You Need to Know about the Clashes in Turkey’, Foreign Policy, 1 June 2013, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/01/here_s_what_you_need_to_know_about_the_clashes_in_turkey?page=0,1 [2] Balta-Parker, Evren, and Akça, Ismet, ‘Beyond Military Tutelage? Turkish Military Politics and the AKP Government’, in Ebru Canan-Sokullu ed., Debating Security in Turkey, 15 December 2012, http://www.academia.edu/3426148/Beyond_Military_Tutelage_Turkish_Military_Politics_and_the_AKP_Government, pp.80, 87
Turkey has an effective and legitimate government

It is clear that the government is legitimate; it received 49% of the vote in the 2011 elections, an increase. By comparison Tony Blair’s ‘landslide’ win in 1997 was achieved with 43.2% of the vote.[1]  And it is a legitimate government in large part because it is an effective government. This has particularly been the case on the economic front. There are of course a few problems, as there always are even in booming economies, but Turkey has an enviable record over the ten years of AKP rule. Public debt fell from 74% in 2002 to 40% in 2011, productivity growth has averaged 3-3.5%, economic growth has hovered around 8% and inflation took a tumble from almost 70% when the AKP was elected to high single figures.[2] It is no surprise that the electorate has rewarded the government that has pulled this off. [1] Johnson, Ron, et al., ‘Anatoimy of a Labour Landslide: The Constituency System and the 1997 General Election’, Parliamentary Affairs, 1998, http://sasi.group.shef.ac.uk/publications/1998/johnston_et_al_landslide_1998.pdf, p.1 [2] ‘Istanbuls and bears’, The Economist, 7 April 2012, http://www.economist.com/node/21552216
Attempts to change into an executive presidential system

It is clearly too early to condemn Erdoğan’s desire to change Turkey to a presidential system. We do not yet have much idea what this actually means and there is no clear reason why this could not be a step forward. Erdoğan clearly wants a powerful presidency but there is no saying that this is what he will get once the horse trading is done and even if he does there are systems with powerful presidents that are clearly democratic such as the US and French systems. The change to a presidential system could also solve problems; it would replace a constitution that was drafted under military rule, and it would increase regional autonomy,[1] but much more importantly if done correctly it could create strong durable institutions that will ensure democratic rule far into the future.[2] [1] ‘Presidential Dreaming’, The Economist, 16 March 2013, http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21573554-how-peace-deal-kurds-could-pave-way-new-turkish-constitution-presidential [2] Tremblay, Pinar, ‘Will Presidential System Move Turkey Forward?’, Al Monitor, 14 April 2013, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/04/turkey-erdogan-sultan-regime-transparency-elections.html