A monotheistic God does not exist

Ok, let us start over again. I thank my opponent for accepting this debate. Argument From Incoherence: Omnipotence/ Omnibevenvolence Omnipotence ("all-powerful") entails being "all-free". This means that it is possible for God to freely chose to commit an act of evil if he wishes, thus, he commits an evil act in some possible world. For example, if raping an innocent woman without a compensating good is objectively evil, then God commits this act in some possible world due to his omnipotence and freedom. There is no contradiction in a omnipotent being freely choosing to commit an act of evil. A being who could freely chose to commit an act of evil, is more free and powerful than a being who is not free to commit an act of this nature. This doesn't mean there is a high probability he would commit this act in the actual world, this just means there exists one possible world where God commits an act of evil. Now, an omnibenevolent being commits an act of evil in no possible world. If an omnibenevolent God committed an act of evil in some possible world, this would render the being not omnibenevolent, because a being who committed an act of evil in no possible world, would be perfectly moral, and more morally good than a being who did commit an act of evil in some possible world. There cannot both be a possible world where God commits an act of evil, and no possible world where God commits an act of evil. Thus, the idea of God is incoherent and he cannot logically exist. There cannot be a being who is both omnipotent and omnibenevolent. Paul Draper's Argument From Evil (Gratuitous Suffering) Paul Draper's article "Pain and Pleasure: An Evidential Problem for Theists" [1] involves a highly sophisticated argument supporting Naturalism over Theism. I am going to run down the basics of this argument. Basically, our knowledge of the biological utility of pain and pleasure is extremely troubling for Theism, but this is exactly what we would expect if Naturalism was true. Thus, this argument demonstrates the probable disconfirmation of Theism. First, we are going to analize two different hypotheses: (T) The hypothesis of theism (HI) The hypothesis of indifference According to T, the universe was created by God, the same God defined in my opening round. According to HI, neither nature nor the condition of sentient beings here on this planet is the result of benevolent or malevolent actions on the part of personal being(s). HI is completely consistent with metaphysical Naturalism, but it is not compatible with the existence of supernatural personal beings. There are certain observations (O) we have made regarding the nature of human/ animal pain and suffering that are severely less probable on T than they are on HI. This could be described as: Pr(O|T) < Pr(O|HI) Pr (O|T), which equates to "the probability of our observations about suffering given theism" is much lower than the Pr (O|HI), which equates to"the probability of our observations about suffering given the hypothesis of indifference." **The Biological Utility Of Pain** If one lives a sanitized lifestyle (which I'm sure all of us on DDO do), then it's not hard to fail to acknowledge the grim cruelty in the nature of the world. Hearing the squeal of a pig as his throat gets slit for example, would definitely wake you up to this. Draper"s argument here isn't like most PoEs, it predicates itself particularly on a problem arising from the biological utility of pain. This is basically, the pain of the type experienced by the pig as its throat is slit. Draper states: "A system (S) is goal-directed, just in case for some property or characteristic (G) that S exhibits, environmental changes are such that (i) if no compensating changes occurred in S then S would no longer G; and (ii) if compensating changes occurred in S, then S would continue to G or would repeat G." Biological utility itself, refers to sub components of a biological system (Xs) which are biologically useful if (i) they causally contribute to a biological goal and (ii) their contribution is not accidental. Now the key to understanding this argument is that pain and pleasure are biologically useful, in (S), which is a goal-directed system. Pleasure helps us to come forward to biologically useful things and pain helps us detract from biologically damaging things. People who can't feel pain for example, damage themselves often (a condition known as congenital analgesia)[2]. It is also true to say that not all pain and pleasure is biologically useful. Sometimes it is biologically gratuitous. For example, the pain felt by the squealing pig was biologically gratuitous because although pain may often help organisms avoid bad situation, it did not help on this occasion, yet the pig still felt the pain. Something similar can be said about the pleasure experienced by a heroin addict, it didn't help him biologically, but he still felt the pleasure. Now, O (observations) can be split in three ways: O1. Observations of moral agents experiencing pain or pleasure that is biologically useful. O2. Observations of sentient beings that are not moral agents experiencing pain or pleasure that is biologically useful. O3. Observations of sentient beings experiencing pain or pleasure that is not known to be biologically useful (and likely to be biologically gratuitous). This means our original equation, can be restated as: Pr(O1 & O2 & O3|T) < Pr(O1 & O2 & O3|HI) Now, God as a morally perfect being, would need to have some moral reason for allowing moral agents, such as human beings, to experience pain. A biological reason for allowing pain would clearly not be enough. Of course, the problem for T is self-evident. Even if pain could be somehow morally justified it is also clearly observed to be biologically useful. This, obviously makes more sense if there is not a personal being (HI) than on Theism (T), regardless if the theist posits some hidden reason or not. I would add that God could and would have not included this biological utility of pain, and this would not hinder with any free will (a being who is responsible for less suffering, while maintaining our free will, would be more benevolent). A hidden reason for the allowance of what seems to be gratuitous pain, may possibly raise the probability for T, but the point is, not enough to disconfirm the probable truth of HI. I would even add, that positing this "reason" appeals to the Law of Parsimony less, thus lowering the likelihood of T by definition. Possible Objections to Draper's Argument Richard Swinburne, a prominent Theistic philosopher, argued that non-moral pain is required if human beings are to have genuine freedom over serious moral issues. This seems to be an objection to Draper's argument that may have merrit. Does Swinburne's argument however, undermine Draper's argument at all? I think not much at all, it at all. There are three crucial problems with it. This does not explain the need for pain of which we have no knowledge of. This does not explain the mass volume and magnitude of non-moral pain. Several theists, like Eleanore Stump have actually argued that God could let us know how our decisions lead to mass suffering, without letting us know of his existence. Stump proposes that God could send us message-laden dreams that do not compel us to believe in his existence. Another possible objection is that if God exists, he would have a vast amount of knowledge about good and evil and how they are related that humans that we do not have. This is where everything connects. For while it might be true that God has a reason for O, we have no antecedent reason to expect O to obtain. Regardless, (HI) already accounts for O, making it more likely anyway. Conclusion I have established the likely non-existence of God with my two arguments. Sources [1] http://commonsenseatheism.com...... [2] http://en.wikipedia.org......