Palmer should not receive the inheritance from the will.

1) The respondent, a lad of sixteen years of age, being aware of the provisions in his grandfather's will, which constituted him the residuary legatee of the testator's estate, caused his death by poison in 1882. (6.2.1) 2) For this crime he was tried and was convicted of murder in the second degree, and at the time of the commencement of this action he was serving out his sentence in the state reformatory. (6.2.2) 3) This action was brought by two of the children of the testator for the purpose of having those provisions of the will in the respondent's favor canceled and annulled.(6.2.3) 5) Now that the testator is dead, defendants claim that Elmer should not be entitled to what was promised to him in the will. (1.1.6) 6) The appellants' argument for a reversal of the judgment, which dismissed their complaint, is that the respondent unlawfully prevented a revocation of the existing will, or a new will from being made, by his crime, and that he terminated the enjoyment by the testator of his property and affected his own succession to it by the same crime. (6.3.4) 7) But the matter does not lie within the domain of conscience. (6.4.2) 9) We are bound by the rigid rules of law, which have been established by the legislature, and within the limits of which the determination of this question is confined. (6.4.3) 10) The question we are dealing with is, whether a testamentary disposition can be altered, or a will revoked, after the testator's death, through an appeal to the courts, when the legislature has, by its enactments, prescribed exactly when and how wills may be made, altered and revoked, and, apparently, as it seems to me, when they have been fully complied with, has left no room for the exercise of an equitable jurisdiction by courts over such matters. (6.4.4) 11) To the statutory restraints, which are imposed upon the disposition of one's property by will, are added strict and systematic statutory rules for the execution, alteration and revocation of the will; which must be, at least, substantially, if not exactly, followed to insure validity and performance. (7.1.3) 14) The capacity and the power of the individual to dispose of his property after death, and the mode by which that power can be exercised, are matters of which the legislature has assumed the entire control, and has undertaken to regulate with comprehensive particularity.(7.1.6) 27) The appellants' argument is not helped by reference to those rules of the civil law, or to those laws of other governments, by which the heir or legatee is excluded from benefit under the testament, if he has been convicted of killing, or attempting to kill, the testator. (7.2.1) 28) In the absence of such legislation here, the courts are not empowered to institute such a system of remedial justice. (7.2.2) 29) The deprivation of the heir of his testamentary succession by the Roman law, when guilty of such a crime, plainly, was intended to be in the nature of a punishment imposed upon him. (7.2.3) 32) But these principles only suggest sufficient reasons for the enactment of laws to meet such cases. (7.3.4) 34) The words of the section of the statute are: "No will in writing, except in the cases hereinafter mentioned, nor any part thereof, shall be revoked or altered otherwise," etc. (8.1.2) 35) Where, therefore, none of the cases mentioned are met by the facts, and the revocation is not in the way described in the section, the will of the testator is unalterable. (8.1.3) 36) I think that a valid will must continue as a will always, unless revoked in the manner provided by the statutes. (8.1.4) 37) Mere intention to revoke a will does not have the effect of revocation. (8.1.4) 38) The intention to revoke is necessary to constitute the effective revocation of a will; but it must be demonstrated by one of the acts contemplated by the statute. (8.1.5) 41) The finding of fact of the referee, that, presumably, the testator would have altered his will, had he known of his grandson's murderous intent, cannot affect the question. (8.2.1) 42) We may concede it to the fullest extent; but still the cardinal objection is undisposed of, that the making and the revocation of a will are purely matters of statutory regulation, by which the court is bound in the determination of questions relating to these acts. (8.2.2) 45) The whole of this subject is now regulated by statute, and a mere intention to revoke, however well authenticated, or however defeated, is not sufficient." (9.1.5) 48) I cannot find any support for the argument that the respondent's succession to the property should be avoided because of his criminal act, when the laws are silent. (9.2.1) 51) To allow their argument to prevail would involve the diversion by the court of the testator's estate into the hands of persons, whom, possibly enough, for all we know, the testator might not have chosen or desired as its recipients. (9.3.6) 53) The laws do not warrant this judicial action, and mere presumption would not be strong enough to sustain it. (9.3.8) 55) In the trial and punishment of the respondent the law has vindicated itself for the outrage which he committed, and further judicial utterance upon the subject of punishment or deprivation of rights is barred. (9.4.2) 56) We may not, in the language of the court in People v. Thornton (25 Hun, 456), 'enhance the pains, penalties and forfeitures provided by law for the punishment of crime.' (9.4.4) 57) Therefore, the judgment should be reversed and the provisions left in the will must be awarded to defendant Elmer Palmer.