This House Asserts That Ontology Necessitates God!

I thank Roy for his reply. I would like to state one thing, Roy enjoys bringing up different theories like the problem of evil and using them in his debate rounds. As he did with Logical Positivism he did not prove the Problem of Evil but will now expect me to answer that. I only ask that as he brought up the points voters realize it is his burden to prove it. I should have won the debate by now because Roy never proved his contentions. Also I gave the reading for a better understanding, only because Roy misunderstood where I believe any rational person would believe my definitions did suffice. I should point out that Roy accepts that he made a principle contention and has now amended himself to a newer definition. 9. A1: That ideas are propositions, and that these ideas may be nonsense: (9.1) There is again no proof that ideas are propositions. I already mentioned how ideas are simply constructs which direct us to objects. Now I mentioned this in my original argument and I shall reiterate it for Roy. I accept that ideas may be meaningless, but in a different way. My premise itself states that ideas can be false. How so? What is an idea? It is a representation of an object. If that object which it represents is real, then the idea is true. If that which it represents is false then the idea is also false or illusory. (9.2) Coming back to the idea of pain we have two situations: that the idea of pain is false and that that pain does not really exist. Or that the idea of pain is true and that pain does truly exist. It is the same thing: if the idea of God is true, then then God is real, if it is false, then God is also false. My argument is free from the messiness of propositions. These are two different approaches. Remember I am connecting ideas not propositions. As long as my logic is sound I win. If Roy wishes to argue from a propositional point of view let him build his case up from scratch. (9.3) The same applies to a Jabberwocky. The idea of a Jabberwocky exists in cognition and if the idea is true then a Jabberwocky is real. If the idea is false then the Jabberwocky is not real. Seeing how the jabberwocky is not real he must be a product of imagination. (9.4) As for God and the rock how about Roy gives it as a separate proper argument and proves his premises and I will tackle that then. The same applies to the Problem of Evil and Argument from Non-Creation. Roy speaks as if they were proven phenomenon so let him prove them. The burden is on him to prove his own assertions, let him do so. (9.5) Again Roy assumes the proposition: the tri-omni God exists is meaningless but that works for propositions and I am arguing from ideas. Also Roy assumes Logical Positivism, providing no refutation to the argument I gave against it. As I never argue from propositions, and in any case the proposition: the tri omni God exists only is nonsensical in the debunked logical positivists I win this point. Roy must prove Logical Positivism before he calls this proposition meaningless. For other theories like Pragmatism find this proposition meaningful. 10. A2: Logical Positivism: (10.1) And the theory that Roy uses to attempt to show that my ideas are meaningless is logical positivism. I wrote down Ayer's own words to show how congruent they are, and then I provided three arguments against (through the source) and in my argument against Logical Positivism. (10.2) Now Roy says that he thinks Logical Positivism only applies to some concepts. Could he at least prove his theory first? Could you show why Logical Positivism applies to certain things and not others? Or will you make assertions? 11. A3: An idea is meaningful if it has a sensible application: (11.1) Roy has conceded his earlier point which stated that: 'all that which cannot be imagined is nonsensical', and now accepts that 'quantum physics cannot be imagined'. This concession should influence the votes of the debaters. Now he once more changes his theory, and once more it is in contradiction to his earlier theory. Firstly he shifts his claim from absolute logical positivism to it applying on some things. Now God has a sensible application. God can be applied to metaphysics to answer many questions, God can be applies to ethics to make an ethical difference. What constitutes a 'sensible application' here? If God exists morals would be different, therefore a difference is made. Now earlier Roy argues that the proposition God exists is meaningless, and here he shows it to be meaningful. Another contradiction. (11.2) God may potentially be verified. He may be verified from reason (remember we use Roy's word "potency"). Since there is a possibility that God can be verified, because arguments for God can be given, then Roy's own theory states that the proposition of God is meaningful. This all again is useless because it has nothing to do with my original argument. Roy has not yet once tackled my original argument, he has only tackled the proposition of God. You are right I talk about the tri-omni God. I will not hide it as you try to do, but will openly admit it. It still does not make a difference because of two things: firstly even the idea of a tri-omni God is a simple one. The idea of DNA can be broken down into size, shape, and color but the idea of God cannot. Secondly (this being very important) lets go into some burden of proof analysis. My job is to show necessarily O, and my opponents job is to show not necessarily O. This means the motion does not allow my opponent to argue the Problem of Evil, or any other argument. It also means I win now because my opponent has to show a flaw in my logic, not provide a parallel case. Until my opponent can show that not necessarily is God proven through Ontology I must win this. Even if his argument of propositions is sound, the resolution is very explicit in this matter. As for God's benevolence you once more need to prove that assertion. I already informed you of my definitions, a complex idea is one which can be distinguished into sensory parts. That is why the idea of benevolence is a simple idea and of course not imagined. Roy may object to my definitions but the fact is he is not allowed to change the definitions in my arguments. You see if he argues that my definition to simple is incorrect then he must rebuild the case with his definition before tackling it down. This is a dirty game called deconstruction, if my argument is wrong please show a problem in my logic. So I will say it again just so people understand. An idea is not a proposition. While Roy may find an argument against God from a proposition I do not need to even attack that because the resolution is clear. I must show necessarily O, and he must negate it. In negating it he must show a deficiency in my logic not make arguments of his own. Why can an idea not be a proposition? Well I have already shown how pain does not propose anything and 'tis be true for all ideas. The idea of God is an idea, it may be true and represent a real object or fake. It is not a statement, a proposition is a statement. I once more remind everyone that Roy has made two contradictions, and two concessions by now. I must also remind the voters that he has not proven what he has preached. Please remember (and a quick google search and some reading will verify this) that philosophers use their own definitions. And I am using the definitions approved by everyone from Hume to Kant to Leibniz, and Hume was an atheist. He is known as the King of the Skeptics. For all these reasons I beg to propose.