My 150th Debate: Animal Rights

BurdensPro admits the purpose of assigning burdens is to resolve disputes. Shared proof burdens allow ties. And ties don’t resolve disputes.The burden is typically placed on those arguing for change because change involves more uncertainty than the status quo. That’s why the law puts the burden on those justifying new rights (a point Pro drops).I don’t argue for change – because my frameworks don't prohibit universal rights. So justice neither requires nor prohibits the status quo.Pro admits he’s arguing for change, as only a tiny fraction of countries currently recognize animal rights. So the burden of proof should be on Pro.And note: Pro dropped his underview after I exposed its inconsistency with shared burdens. So whatever you do, don’t presume animal rights. If anything, presume Con, because depriving humans of their dues is more unjust than depriving animals of their dues.JusticeI accept Pro’s definition of non-arbitrariness. It dooms his case.Pro’s C1(1) Pro drops my argument that animals can’t experience needless suffering because animals can’t experience (or even understand) needlessness. The concept is inherently humancentric. Remember, humans decide when suffering is needless. And humans decide what the standard is. And those determinations are ultimately arbitrary, because no objective mechanism exists for distinguishing needless suffering from reasonable suffering. And those arbitrary determinations are then imposed on animals by humans.(2) Pro admits that a needless suffering right will lead to different results for similarly situated individuals, based on the biases of the specific judge in each case. Different results for similarly situated individuals is arbitrary. Justice cannot allow such a system, let alone require it.(3) Pro’s justification is self-refuting because it’s both consequentialist and deontological. It’s deontological because it justifies animal rights as intrinsic goods based on a capacity to experience suffering. It’s consequentialist because it justifies human rights as instrumental goods that prevent needless suffering – and the concept of needless suffering is inherently utilitarian. No suffering is absolutely gratuitous because even the sadist has reasons for inflicting suffering (e.g. she derives pleasure from it). So “needless suffering” is an entirely meaningless concept unless you measure/weigh the reasonableness of the suffering (i.e. the value it provides vs the harm it inflicts). Of course, that weighing is arbitrary and insufficient to justify rights. And just because Pro says his framework isn’t utilitarian, deontological, or humancentric doesn’t mean it’s not – Pro’s self-descriptions simply aren’t consistent with his actual argument.Pro’s C2(1) Pro drops my example of unjust laws, which shows that the law’s promises aren’t required by justice. The law is inherently arbitrary: it’s determined by some humans, not necessarily the majority, in a particular time and place. So you can’t derive the requirements of justice from the law – because requirements are necessary whereas the law is contingent (and therefore arbitrary).(2) Pro admits that animals neither rely on nor give consideration for any promises. So there’s no harm to breaking such promises. Animals certainly won’t know the difference. There might even be an obligation to break our promises if breaking the promise is efficient (i.e. it produces a net benefit).Pro’s response isn’t compelling – his “interest” standard is vague (what’s an interest?), arbitrary (different people will have different interests), unsubstantiated (what do arbitrary interests have to do with the requirements of justice?), and humancentric (again, Pro imposes arbitrary human interpretations on animals). Pro offers no evidence that animals have non-arbitrary interests. How do humans even know what animals as a group want? And why should these arbitrary human-imposed animal interests outweigh the human interests in breaking a promise? Pro offers no answers.Pro’s C3(1) Pro’s advocacy is inconsistent. When talking about burdens, Pro says my frameworks deny universal rights. But when it comes to C3, Pro says my advocacy requires universal rights. Which is it? Neither. I argue that justice doesn’t require or prohibit the status quo.(2) Pro says the status quo isn’t self-justifying and Pro argues to change the status quo. So don’t let Pro base his argument on the status quo without first justifying the status quo.(3) Showing that justice requires animal rights in the status quo doesn’t show that justice requires the status quo. Remember, the status quo is contingent but requirements are necessary. So at most, Pro’s C3 only shows that justice allows animal rights, not that it requires them. This is consistent with my rights frameworks.(4) Even if my advocacy somehow requires universal rights, that doesn’t justify animal rights. Rawls and Forst justify universal rights systems without animal rights. And Pro drops membership in a species being relevant to justice. And Pro drops my points about the uniqueness of humans compared with animals (see R4's utility section). So there are non-arbitrary bases for distinguishing humans and animals.What is my advocacy?I argue that we live in a postmodern world where rationality alone cannot justify human rights. Rationality alone can't justify rights because rights aren't objective truths that exist independent of beings who intentionally/subjectively create them. That leaves only two options for justifying rights: faith or consensus.Pro drops my point that rationality alone cannot justify human rights. In fact, Pro somehow thinks it was his argument: "Con admits rationality alone cannot justify universal rights." This concession is fatal to Pro’s entire case, because none of Pro’s justifications rest on faith or consensus. In effect, then, Pro concedes that his own justifications are arbitrary/insufficient.In Pro's wake, I offer three potential frameworks, one based on faith, two based on consensus. These frameworks are the only viable justifications for human rights. All other justifications are arbitrary/insufficient because they rest solely on rationality, which Pro admits isn't sufficient to justify rights. So justice only allows rights through one of my frameworks.Pro argues that Rawls/Forst rely on rationality. But that's not true. Rawls and Forst justify rights through an intersubjective consensus. While rationality might play a role in creating a consensus, it's neither necessary nor sufficient.Pro's "kettle" criticism isn't compelling because each framework is self-contained. There wasn't an agreed-upon framework in this debate, so any number of frameworks were up for debate. That's why I said they negate independently. Remember, I only need to show that justice doesn't require animal rights. And showing that the only viable justifications for rights don't require animal rights meets that burden without needing to show which framework actually applies. In other words, I argue that justice doesn't require animal rights because justice is only possible through one of these frameworks.[Note: Pro hasn't shown that justice requires any rights, so while justice obviously allows human rights, it doesn't necessarily require any rights frameworks. That's yet another reason to negate, or at least to presume Con.]FaithPro argues that justice prohibits faith justifications because they produce inconsistent rights frameworks. Under a non-arbitrariness definition, that's a compelling argument. So I'm dropping faith.Rawls(a) Rawls says animal rights aren't required. But Rawls doesn't prohibit humans from protecting animals. In fact, Pro's "card" admits that Rawls allows some protections for animals: "Rawls ... claim[s] that we have moral obligations to animals, including an obligation not to treat them cruelly." [Pro's 20](b/c/d/e) Bare assertions that rest on a misunderstanding of the original position. Pro incorrectly assumes it's not possible to come to a unified conclusion. And Pro says the consensus is arbitrary when the whole point is creating a non-arbitrary consensus via universal acceptance (i.e. the original position is a heuristic for establishing universal acceptance).ForstPro's response misses the point.In particular, Pro strawmans Forst's principle of justification, which requires more than mere body language.Also: Forst says justificaiton requires the capacity of taking responsibility for their action. Since Pro drops my point that animals can't take responsibility for their actions, animals are excluded.UtilityPro offers no reason to give animals a right to equal consideration. It's just Pro's assertion. And it's not based on a utilitarian justification, as nothing Pro argued shows how a right to equal consideration will maximize utility. Nor is it based on faith/consensus. So it's not a valid justificaiton. Pro hasn't shown animal suffering is equivalent in value to human suffering. It's not, because any value determinations are inherently humancentric, determined by humans, and thus inherently give humans greater value than animals. Ironically, Pro admits that animals shouldn't get "equal rights," which implies that animals are inferior to humans.In short, Pro's advocacy ignores the uniqueness of humans, including the fact that humans alone make value determinations, humans alone make laws and enforce rights, and humans alone hold each other responsible for their actions.Since Pro's responses aren't compelling, extend all my analysis and impacts.ConclusionVote Con because Pro's justifications are arbitrary, humancentric, unjust, and incoherent, because Pro fails to justify any rights through faith or consensus, because animal rights would create an unfair asymmetry (since animals can't be held responsible for their actions), because the only viable justifications are Rawls/Forst, and because artificial human-imposed human-constructed rights for animals will inevitably lead to arbitrary and unjust results.