Induced Abortions for Personal Reasons ought to be Illegal in the United States

Thanks for the debate. And here goes my rebuttal as the contender: "I am having an issue understanding this question and ask my opponent to please clarify. Do you mean: a. Is any member of the Homo sapien species that has altered DNA (perhaps due to mutation) still the same individual, or are they a different one? (fictional example: Spiderman) b. Is any member of the Homo sapien species that has altered DNA (perhaps due to mutation) still an individual [of the same species], or are they [of] a different one? (example: individual born with gills instead of lungs)" I was originally intending A (if a member of the species acquires gene mutation later in life, such as the fictional example of Spiderman). "It is therefore logical to accept my definition of "men" with regards to this country's present state." What I meant was my opponent's definition of "human." When saying "men" in the DoI, it is difficult to tell if that was intended to mean "any individual of the genus Homo, esp. a member of the species Homo sapiens," or if it may have merely meant "a fully developed humanoid." I am not talking about gender, though. I, however, doubt they referred to dictionary.com back then. The fact set forth that documents from over 225 years old are not infallible, in fact, IS relevant in this debate. As well, such rights as referenced do continue to be amid the nation's legal system. Admittedly, the ideas referenced in the Social Contract, for the most part, should continue to be a part of the nation's legal system. However, what must be determined is when these rights are acquired. The inherent rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, I concur, are evident, and also should be a part of the nation. "In that case, all humans act as a "parasite" on the earth. By my opponent's logic, doesn't this mean that we, the entire human race, should be considered guilty and our rights revoked?" If my opponent is claiming that humans are parasitic on the earth itself, I remind my opponent that the earth does not specifically have the same rights given to humans, and therefore, would invalidate such an analogy. However, my point was, fetuses may not be as "innocent" as one might think. Obviously, to survive, a fetus may need nutrition from the mother. However, one could consider such an act to be depriving the mother of essential nutrients. This would fit under my opponent's definition of "Social Contract." "It appears that my opponent recognized that his previous argument was fairly weak and has conceded that the fetus should be considered innocent." Instead, I only was attempting to recognize the fact that I do not need to win that specific sub-argument in order to potentially win this debate. As I said, the right to life is desired, but not always feasible. As my opponent claims, however, "Based on the precedents set forth, the right to Life of a human being is an inherent right." Such a statement if somewhat flawed, as firstly, based on the precedents set forth (i.e. I am assuming the Social Contract and DoI), the right to life of a human is an inherent right. However, what they define as human is claimed to be an inherent right. This definition (i.e. when such rights are acquired), seemingly, is the main point of contention between my opponent and myself. "[It is understood for] a human being's life to begin at conception." As I have pointed out in my Round 1, conception is no single point in time, but rather a series of events spanning around 24 hours long. To pinpoint the exact time during the process for which acquisition of the natural rights is to be given seems rather arbitrary. For example, would my opponent place this arbitrary moment when the two sex cells seemingly fuse, or when the genetic transfer initiates, or perhaps even when the genetic collaboration is complete? Well, my opponent claims that conception (fertilization, fecundation, syngamy) "is the fusion of gametes to produce a new organism of the same species." However, like I said, this concept is a gradual process, not a moment in time. Then, my opponent, seemingly answering the above question, states the following: "Until such time as the haploids completely fuse into a diploid, no new individual human life exists. Thus, on their own, the sex cells cannot be considered a human life." Thus, my opponent is essentially implying that the acquisition of natural rights begins at the end of the process of conception. However, I ask for my opponent's reasoning. Why must the acquisition of natural rights begin only after the diploid number is obtained? Conventionally, many consider the life of a human being to begin at conception. Quite frankly, I am currently inclined to agree in this debate that a "human being" does indeed begin at, if not before, conception. This is because, as the definition provided in my opponent's Round 1 states: A human being is "any individual of the genus Homo, esp. a member of the species Homo sapiens." "A species is often defined as a group of organisms capable of interbreeding and producing fertile offspring. While in many cases this definition is adequate, more precise or differing measures are often used, such as based on similarity of DNA or morphology." Thus, "similarities of DNA" are evident in haploid sex cells, as well as the diploid zygote. Either way, the "similarities of DNA" are seemingly evident. "[A human being is deserving of the referred rights] at the point where the zygote (diploid cell) has fully formed. Being that as it may, I would like remind my opponent the topic he is supposed to be attacking hinges on Induced Abortions." This is not so. Thus far, my opponent has given no solid reasoning to prove why the referred-to rights are acquired specifically at the diploid level. I plan on briefly giving my reasoning as to when such natural rights should be acquired. Therefore, my opponent would not be able to win this debate, by not sharing the reasoning for why natural rights are acquired once diploid, and therefore not solidifying my opponent's own claim. As well, I remind my opponent that, in order for me to adequately defend my position, I felt the need to go into the realm of life itself. What I have done has been to attempt to pinpoint the most reasonable point during development to allocate natural rights. I claim it to be most reasonable to place this point at the state of sentience. Sentience, associated with consciousness, can scientifically be determined based upon cerebral cortex activity. Therefore, one can deduce that when one has significant cerebral cortex activity, it is sentient. It seems as if my opponent is saying that the deceased still have the right to life even if one cell (diploid) remains living. So if there were a small piece of tissue, for example, in a body, the body should be kept on life support to continually feed that strand of tissue, to keep it alive. After all, it is diploid. Mandating such would be outrageous. "If my opponent extends his own logic to sentience, it would follow that consciousness is the beginning of rights and unconsciousness would necessarily have to be the end of them. Therefore, any coma patient, regardless of whether or not they could actually awake, has lost their right to Life and can be killed without consequence." Sentience is associated with consciousness, of which is associated with cerebral cortex development. Therefore, significant cerebral cortex development should be an indicator of acquired natural rights. Even in coma patients, who happen to be unconscious, there is still significant cerebral cortex development. Because of this, such patients should still retain such rights. Sentience is vital in this debate. I look forward to my opponent's response, and the remainder of this debate. **Out of space ... continued in comments**