Man probably has freewill

Introduction In my opening round I'll give 2 objections to determinism & offer 1 argument for libertarianism [LFW]. Con seems to claim that we’re determined by physical states, desires, beliefs, etc; called a causal chain of events [ccE]. Yet LFW claims that ccE can strongly influence our choices without necessitating them. Thus ccE can have a sort of impact on one’s action—however, an impact that stops short of being sufficient for the action to occur. My central claim explicates this, 1) In order to show that mental states aren't just, as they're perceived, influenced by, but actually determined by ccE carries with it an unmet BoP. Objections to Determinism Problem of Fatalism Fatalism implies actualism; i.e. everything that happens does so necessarily, making contingent truths literally impossible. If one thinks this is as ridiculous as it sounds, then one should understand that determinism implies this same conclusion. Self-Defeating Determinism LFW is immediate; we're best acquainted with ourselves as free deliberators & any argument used to contradict LFW not only contain premises which are less obvious than our perceived ability to have alternate possibilities [AP] available to us, but also calls into question our perception about how we more or less freely come to our decisions; namely rationality itself. Thus even if determinism were true we wouldn't have a good reason to believe it. Taken in conjunction with 1, this supports LFW as more plausible. A loose sketch of my contention, P1) All things equal, human perception involves freedomP2) The nature of the jump from influence of ccE to determined by ccE involves a self-defeating defeaterP3) Determinism is unreasonable (from P2)P4) Therefore, general human freedom remains reasonable to accept (from P1) For P1, we're more aquainted with LFW as social laws presuppose responsibility which presupposes LFW: such laws are generally global in that human perception on the matter involves LFW, not determinism. In contrast, the arena in which determinism arises is generally not perceptual. LFW only yields that actions are influenced by ccE: for there exists the possibility of AP: "Determinism is necessarily retrospective; e wasn’t 'necessarily' determined until after e happened. Before it happened it’s contingent. Determinism therefore confuses deduction and necessity with contingent truth." (J.R. Goldbas, email). For P2, any argument on behalf of determinism is such that it not only involves less obvious premises, but also hijacks rationality to essentially undercut rational deliberation, leaving only arational deliberation- which seriously calls into doubt everything including beliefs of determinism. LFW offers a more preferrable alternative. Argument for Libertarianism LFW Precise Characterization In order for person P to be free 5 conditions must be met, a) Ability: P’s power to choose differently from the way P actually does b) Control: P must be in control over his actions c) Rationality: P must have a personal reason for acting d) Causation: relationship between cause & effect e) Person as Agent: P must maintain the self or personal identity On LFW, P is a substance (which mean’s Con’s property-thing-based empirical ‘evidence’ has no claim on P’s freedom either way) and so there are no external causes acting upon P to bring about event e here. There is no logical contradiction with this characterization, and it doesn’t fall prey to Con’s dilemma since P is a 1st mover (b) with a categorical 2-way ability to choose (a). P’s reasons for acting are teleological (c) & P exemplifies agent causation / non-causal agency (d). Libet’s & the other experiments make statements about brain states, but not mental states. If he supposes these are one in the same he must give an argument prior to presenting his empirical case otherwise his case is circular. In summation then, P could be a substance that had the power to bring about e P exerts its power as a 1st mover to bring about e P had the ability to refrain from exerting its power to bring about e P had some reason that was the final cause for the sake of which he did e Kane's Free Will The existence of AP is a necessary condition for acting freely & yet determinism is not compatible with AP. However AP aren't chosen randomly since what Kane calls ultimate responsibility [UR] stifles our actions from happening without our control. Essentially AP is the agent's power to do otherwise & determinism precludes such power. UR insures that agents are the ultimate originators / sustainers of their own purposes & that choices aren't random (which falsifies Con's dilemma, for a 1st mover just IS the cause of an action). AP insures a person's contingent life paths (falsifying fatalism). Wherever the path goes, it must be based in the person's willing actions, which entails responsibility (justifying LFW). Furthermore, an agent's ultimate origination of an action is a self-forming choice [SFC]; or a moment of indecision involving conflicting wills (not random wills). SFC's are undetermined & voluntary & entail AP even when the self is already formed. It would also seem that a new choice would be determined upon a formed self. For AP is still true, & no good argument forces us to view them as necessarily false, since there's nothing absolutely hindering a new SFC. Hence we can surmise that an agent's originative control is a set of possible choices, which originated from nothing else over which the agent himself does not also have control. UR thus assures that the sufficient conditions for one's actions do not lie before one's own birth, meaning the ccE is irrelevant prior to a SFC, which isn't determinism but LFW. Conclusion My next round will be dedicated to illuminating the false dilemma of Con's rational support & the hasty conclusions of Con's alleged empirical support for determinism. Then my case will un-box more as I rebut his objections.