The Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy is Not Rational

An analytic proposition is essentially a tautology. For example, saying that a bachelor is unmarried is like saying an unmarried man is unmarried, because “bachelor” literally means “unmarried man”. An analytic proposition is thus in some sense unnecessary, because it says nothing that we didn’t already know. We don’t even need to look beyond the definition of bachelor to know that all bachelors are unmarried - we don’t even need to consider what actually exists - because in order for something to be called a bachelor in the first place, the man in question can’t be married. On the other hand, a synthetic proposition is not a tautology. A synthetic proposition is basically a statement whose truth cannot be ascertained by only considering the statement. Rather, the truth value of a synthetic proposition can only be determined by looking at what actually exists, and seeing whether it corresponds to what the statement says. With an analytic proposition, this step is totally unnecessary because you already know what you’re going to find (or not find). For example, you know you’re not going to find a married bachelor even before you begin looking, because if you were to find it, it wouldn’t be an example of a bachelor in the first place. The proposition that all bachelors are messy, on the other hand, is not redundant or tautological, because nothing in the meaning of “bachelor” clarifies whether the man is messy or not, only whether he is married. You need to actually look and see if all bachelors are messy.Saying that all bachelors are messy is necessarily not redundant, even if it happens to be true, because the issue of “messiness” has not already been covered in the notion of “bachelor”. You aren’t just repeating yourself by saying it. In order to falsify the statement, you must find an example of something that is at once a bachelor and neat. Since these characteristics can, in principle, apply to the same entity, you have to actually see whether a neat bachelor exists, because its existence would not be inconsistent and thus cannot be ruled out a priori. If there is, in fact, no difference whatsoever between analytic propositions and synthetic propositions, then why are philosophers able to distinguish between them so reliably? It’s quite remarkable that two people who have never met can nevertheless produce lists of analytic propositions and synthetic propositions which they other can agree to. The obvious explanation is that there is, in fact, some fundamental difference between analytic propositions and synthetic propositions allowing philosophers to distinguish between them. In order for my opponent to plausibly maintain the proposition that the analytic-synthetic dichotomy is false, he must identify some other fundamental difference between propositions which everyone agrees are analytic and propositions which everyone agrees are synthetic. Otherwise, he has to adopt the ridiculous position that philosophers, despite being able to place propositions into two categories with great reliability, are actually just guessing. I’ve come up with a functional definition for analytic/synthetic propositions: “A proposition is analytic if we cannot even imagine a particular which would prove the proposition false were it to exist; a proposition is synthetic if we can.”This simple formula correctly accounts for the choice of classification (analytic or synthetic) of every example I’ve ever come across used to explain the difference between analytic and synthetic propositions. Why should this work? My opponent must explain why either a) this formula is actually unusable or b) the propositions assigned to a certain category (e.g., analytic) in fact have nothing in common that the propositions in the other category (e.g., synthetic) do not also possess. It’s self-evident that the formula works because some statements are true by virtue of their meaning (and thus preclude even imagining particulars to the contrary), while others require you to look at what exists and judge whether the statement is true on that basis (not only on the basis of the definitions used).A concept is not equivalent to the particulars which happen to meet its definition. As Michael Huemer observes, “Objectivism's rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction is based on the failure to distinguish the sense and the reference of a word.” A concept like “tree” or “circle”, is an abstract set of criteria which tells you if a concrete belongs to that class. This is true because the meaning of such concepts does not change even when you mess with (or eliminate altogether) the particulars to which the concepts apply. Concretes merely help us form concepts. Once formed, a concept is totally independent and unchanging. Concepts don’t exist (at least not in the physical sense). A physical manifestation of a concept embodies that concept’s criteria, but also has features which have no relevance whatsoever to the concept. This is why no general concept like tree or car can ever exist in isolation; they are always seen in conjunction with variables that don’t affect the concept. In other words, an example of a concept is only identical to the concept up to isomorphism (which leaves open the question of whether one is bigger than the other). I am a human, but not everything about me partakes of “humanness”. There are tons of variables which don’t affect the fact that I am human one way or the other. If you are still unconvinced that concepts are independent of concretes, perhaps a little thought experiment will help.Imagine a world in which a single, unmarried man exists. Both the concept “bachelor” and “human” now only apply to (are embodied by) a single particular. Since they both describe the same thing, are they therefore synonymous concepts? Obviously, they are not synonymous concepts by definition. Therefore, the meaning of those concepts is abstract and not dependent on the particular(s) to which they apply. According to my opponent’s reasoning, it is actually contradictory to say “Fairies might exist”. For if fairies don’t in fact exist, then saying “Fairies might exist” would be like saying “That which doesn’t exist (fairies) might exist”. Or, if fairies do exist, it would be like saying “That which exists might not exist”. Either way, it would be contradictory (not just false, mind you) if concepts were actually synonymous with their concretes (or absence thereof).