Free Will

I am taking the position that free will is a coherent position. My opponent is arguing against the very idea of free will. This means they must show that free will is not only not true, but that it is somehow necessarily not true. Now, we must not equivocate on what we are talking about here. I take it from reading my opponent's opening argument that they are an incompatibilist, as am I. They take the position that free will is not compatible with determinism and determinism is true. I take the same position, but I think determinism is false. I believe in libertarian free will. I will defend two argument to support free will. The consequence argument and an argument from rationality. The first argument goes as such: 1) If we do not have free will, we are not responsible for our actions. 2) We are responsible for our actions. 3) Therefore, we have free will. Now this isn't precisely the form that the consequence argument normally takes, because it's purpose was to argue for incompatibilism. But, the conclusion of the consequence argument is what makes up premise 1 in my argument. I will cite Peter Van Inwagen's formulation of the consequence argument to support premise 1: If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature and events in the remote past. But it is not up to us what went on before we were born, and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore, the consequences of these things (including our present acts) are not up to us.(1) My opponent has already said they agree with premise 2, that we are responsible for our actions. Therefore, it would follow that we in fact have free will. Notice that this is a deductive conclusion. Even if I couldn't answer all of the questions posed, my opponent would still need to find a way to defeat Van Inwagen's argument, which is my premise 1. My second argument: 1) If we don't have free will, then we necessarily believe as we do. 2) If we necessarily believe as we do, then rationality is an illusion. 3) Rationality is not an illusion. C1) Therefore we don't necessarily believe as we do. C2) Therefore we have free will. I think the only controversial premise would be number 2. 1 is just a short definition of determinism. 3 is obvious, otherwise why would my opponent want to have a debate. In defense of premise two, think about what the process of rational thought is. Rational thought is the weighing of ideas and considering of options in coming to a conclusion. If determinism is true, you must necessarily choose what you do in fact choose. You cannot choose otherwise. So if you are considering two different options, A or B, then on determinism it is already decided which you will choose. You aren't actually weighing any options. The option you will choose has already been determined. Thus, if determinism is true, you aren't really considering and weighing options, but simply going trough the motions of a puppet. And if that is true, it would follow that rationality is an illusion. But, seemingly my opponent agrees with me and does not think that rationality is an illusion. Therefore it would follow deductively that we have free will. Now, as it pertains to the questions my opponent has asked, I'm not sure how they are relevant. I don't see an argument from my opponent that the existence of free will depends on adequate answers to these questions. Really, there hasn't been an argument against free will at all. My opponent has simply criticized agent-causation, which I didn't even need to argue for my case. If my opponent can give some reason to think that answering these question is necessary for my argument to succeed, then I will answer them. So, as I have been the only one to offer an argument, my opponent must first tear down my arguments and then construct one of their own that shows that free will actually doesn't exist. (1)Peter van Inwagen, An Essay on Free Will, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), p. 56.