Animals Rights

Pro and I have agreed that I can post my rebuttals in this round. Observation One: Pro fails to offer an epistemological framework for morality. They talk about how the rights of animals should be recognized, and how some rights is sufficient to affirm, but they don’t justify that there is a generic right against suffering. Under my framework, animals only have those entitlements that are beneficial to humans, and they -- nonetheless -- can’t live free of exploitation. Pro drops my framework. Observation Two: Both of Pro’s contentions misinterpret the resolution. The Round 1 definition of “animal rights” doesn’t match Pro’s new definition. Pro is adding a new definition, which can be rejected, as compliance with the R1 definitions is a rule. Section 1: FrameworkPro doesn’t contest my framework, nor do they offer a framework of their own. This is problematic for Pro, since, under my framework, “animal rights” as defined cannot be recognized, and recognition of animal rights would be unjust. Pro merely presumes that “rights” and entitlements exist, and fails to justify such a framework where rights are recognized. Till that is justified, presume Con. Section 2: Pro’s constructive case(R1) Moral consideration for animalsPoint 1: TopicalityPro fails to note that “animal rights” encompasses the right to be free of *exploitation. * Other rights are irrelevant to this debate. I observe that -- for any topicality within the resolution -- the concept of animal rights encompasses only animals being entitled to the possession of their own lives. The argument isn’t topical. Animals having *some* rights doesn’t mean they are free of exploitation. Pro doesn’t offer a framework for morality, so prefer egoism -- under egoism, we help animals when *we want to,* and don’t help animals when we don’t want to. The argument isn’t topical, since some rights does not equal all rights. A “right” is only gained when humans *wish* to recognize that right, strengthening an egoistic framework. Point 2: Animals do not require moral considerationTurn the argument. Moral consideration for humans is entirely different from moral consideration for animals because of humans being able to achieve moral status by *having* some level of moral consideration for other species. It is *exactly because* humans have moral consideration for other species that animals cannot have the right to be free of all human exploitation. Addressed under my “moral community” contention -- without rationality, we cannot recognize animal rights. Point 3: Human rights versus animal rightsPro argues that human rights can allow direct violation of animal rights, but that doesn’t stop animal rights from existing. This is a bare assertion. “Animal rights” are not “rights gained by animals,” rather they are the right to be free of *human* exploitation. So if this can be violated by the *exact same* human exploitation that exists today, then “animal rights,” by definition, don’t exist. I strongly affirm that all exploitation practised *today* is justified, and that’s what the Affirmative has to refute. The Affirmative basically concedes this, but still argues “animal rights can still exist. ” Note that Aff hasn’t shown that animal rights *do* exist as defined. Conclusion: Pro has only shown that animal rights *can* exist, not that they do. Pro’s suffering argument doesn’t show how animals must be free from *all* suffering, even those permitted under my egoistic framework. Pro fails to justify any form of a framework where suffering is immoral. Prefer egoism, and this contention loses all offense. (R2) Animals have rights as long as humans are restricted from harming them“Animals have rights” is *not topical. * The definitions say nothing about “animal rights” being two separate terms -- it is an individual term, and is defined as being “the rights of animals to live free from human exploitation. ” Here is the problem for Pro. Humans not harming animals in *some* way doesn’t mean animals live free of all human exploitation; living *free* of exploitation implies living free of any exploitation. Animal testing, for instance, is exploitation. Further, Pro fails to justify a framework in which suffering merits non-violable rights. Till that is warranted, presume Con.