The Problem of Evil (PoE)

Definitions and clarificationI assume that Con accepts both the definition of God I gave and the definition of evil given as neither has been explicitly challenged. I assume that as Con spent his whole round basically seeking clarification, and chose not to dispute these definitions (while disputing things like the very existence of evil), that we agree here. On the PoE itself, the easiest way to clarify would be say that it is a probabilistic argument, but that this is based largely on the inference from apparent to existing gratuitous evils. The argument here us not that a certain amount of evil tips the balance of atheism, nor is it the logically problem of evil. Put simply, it renders belief in the kind of God defined less likely, on the basis that gratuitous evils exist.IntroductionIn order to deal with the PoE, Con basically follows the same approach to doubt all 3 premises of the argument by charging that the argument is never justified, rather it’s points are merely asserted. While I provided justification for each premise, Con rather crudely claims that the argument appeals to intuition or common-sense. This is largely straw-manning, particularly regarding P2 & 3. While these points are made, it is after a lengthy discussion and analysis of the issues that I use these to further bolster the case. Now Con hasn’t really engaged with the argument much except to lazily make the same point about the 3 premises, and I think especially when we look in depth at P2, it is abundantly clear how inept this response really is.Defending P1Here Con appeals to the absurdity of modern physics, using examples to show that what is wholly counter-intuitive is often still true. The problem here is that (as I stated in post 1), God is by definition at odds with gratuitous evils. God is defined as: Omniscient = God knows anything logically possibleOmnipotent = God can do anything logically possibleOmni benevolent = God is morally perfectGiven these attributes, God knows, can and wants to prevent any evils. Now given that, any evils which do exist do so necessarily because God allows them or because he doesn’t exist. Now if God exists and allows evils, it must be (given that he is morally perfect) that He has morally sufficient reason to do so. If the permitted evils are not logically necessary or have no adequately compensating good, then again God does not have a morally sufficient reason to permit them. This is all that P1 states, and it is easily shown to be true analytically. The most mind-boggling thing here is not only has Con accepted these parameters before (in forum discussions), but even the Plantinga paper (which he mentions) USES this exact principle to “soundly refute” the logical PoE. Asking for justification for P1 isn’t so much like a physics problem, where a fact about the external world shatters our expectations, like he suggests. Rather, it is an extrapolation of the necessary implications of a definition. Just as we can know that all bachelors incompatible with marriage by definition, so can we know that the God defined above is incompatible with gratuitous evil for the very same reason.Defending P2Now I think I should probably remind the readers that ALL P2 stated was that were lots of evil in the world. Given the way I defined evil, I am truly astonished that Con denies P2. Of course disability and death exist, and I went into length to discuss them later on, but here it seems to me that either Con has misread the argument completely and conflated P2 with P3, or we do have a denial of the real world. Just to be thorough, I will just give the example of Ebola:“Ebola hemorrhagic fever is potentially lethal and encompasses a range of symptoms including fever, vomiting, diarrhoea, generalized pain or malaise, and sometimes internal and external bleeding. The span of time from onset of symptoms to death is usually between 2 and 21 days.” (1)Now given that Con doesn’t dispute my definition of evil, we are left to conclude that the above, as well as things like the various cancers, wars and so on absolutely constitute an acceptance of P2. Even trying to dispute definitions here would be incredibly problematic, because any ethical system that sees the examples I gave as evils would still almost certainly be susceptible to my argument.Defending P3Con again follows the familiar line, again using examples such as gravity to try and blunt the force of P3. The problem here is that this is disanalogous, because we have reason to suppose gravity exists in the first place. If someone tells me there’s an 8 foot elephant in the garage, and I see no evidence for it at all, and every reason to jettison such a story (the person that told me was a notorious liar, my garage is too small, elephants don‘t tend to live in UK, etc), no amount of retreats to the possible and appeals to absurdity will give me pause to doubt my conclusion. Secondly, Con essentially creates an invisible gardener type scenario, where God is as undetectable and untraceable as something which doesn’t exist. Lastly, I gave a rather extensive account of an evil which I justify as being gratuitous. Con refuses to interact with this account, by-passing it, and therefore the most contentious premise is left largely ignored.ConclusionIn his first post, Con has spent more time talking about physics than philosophy. Instead of seeking clarification on a few points and engaging with parts of the argument he disagreed with, Con merely provides anecdotes and concludes that we shouldn’t be too hasty rejecting the seemingly absurd. Also, the denial of things like death (P2) is either solipsism masquerading as serious thought, or a mistake characteristically drastic of his opening post (mistaking evil for gratuitous evil). An already well supported P1 and P2 have been bolstered, while in the case of P3, Con has wasted space by retreating to the possible, rather than what is plausible or even feasible. Given that this is Con’s last chance to put something substantive and challenging to the argument that I can interact with, I welcome him to get on with stating his objections to the argument at hand. Sources(1) http://en.wikipedia.org...