I will PROVE that a finite past of the universe doesn't equate to it coming into being

Introduction It is not obvious in the slightest that dissenting opinions implies an issue is unresolved, it could only mean that one side hasn't acknowledged the resolution. For example, the issue of Evolution has been resolved in science; we know it happened and does happen. The existence of creationists with different points of view in no way dents the fact that the issue is resolved. Con still hasn't supported his assertion that the issue of the Kalam is actually unresolved. Thus, we can write that off as a bare-assertion B-Theory By not addressing my 2 arguments for why we can talk about a past on a tenseless theory, Con concedes all points; and thus the debate. My opponent continues to commit the fallacy of presumption by just assuming that his objection is correct, when I have proven his objection wrong many times in this debate. Sidewalker claims that events are not sequential under B-Theory but that is not true. Any point on the 4d or n+ 1d block could be hypothetically selected, and there are moments in the earlier than direction, and the later than direction (which can be also considered a past or future). There only cannot be a past, or future with respect to an objectively existing present on a tenseless theory, but that doesn't mean we cannot speak about a past, present, or future at all on a tenseless theory. Also, the idea that conclusions don't follow from premises on the B-Theory is absurd. It doesn't matter what theory of time is true, conclusions will obviously follow from their premises as the laws of logic are necessary regardless of time, so I am not sure where Con is deriving these random assertions from. To sum up, I presented two arguments in the favor of being able to talk about a past on B-Theory: "i) B-Theory entails that the past, present, and future are all real (which Con's own source supported, and my sources in my last round supported)ii) There can be a past on the B-Theory of time, as long as it is a past with respect to a hypothetically selected point on the 4d or n+1d block, and not to an objective present" Con did not refute either of them sufficiently. As it stands the resolution is affirmed off of my B-Theory argument alone. A-Theory My opponent starts off his round by claiming my burden was to prove my argument, not simply claim it is self-evident. The problem with this is that it equates a premise of the argument with the argument itself, which is a fallacy of composition. Even if one of the premises is self-evident, I still proved the conclusion with the logical argument as a whole itself. Thus, pointing out that one of the premises is self-evident does not mean that I didn't prove the argument is true. Con then claims that the assertion that there is nothing metaphysically or logically impossible with there being no "prior" to the universe is not self-evident, when it clearly is (just like it is self-evident that there is nothing metaphysically or logically impossible with the idea that my dog didn't have to exist). The fact that someone does not use there Modal intuitions, or does not pick up on a self-evident truth in no way undermines the fact that a truth is self-evident. He then claims I would have to explain why something is self-evident, yet that goes against the very definition of what "self-evident" means, so his assertion violates the law of noncontradiction. If he tried to reverse the claim and assert that the negation of what I am saying is self-evident, it wouldn't work because if one of the laws of logic or metaphysics was broken by the the idea of no "prior" to the universe, then there would have to be a reason for that. We only have to use our Modal intuition to come to the conclusion that no "prior" to the universe (finite past or not) is at least possible. He then claims that I don't understand Quantum Physics based on my post about the PSR and virtual particles, but the problem with this is that I actually quoted physicists who assert that quantum events are uncaused. All we have is Sidewalker's word, which means much less as he is not a physicist! If physicists conclude that quantum events are uncaused, then that is more convincing than Sidewalker's words. He did not source anything to back up his arguments with regards to Quantum Mechanics or causality, thus his arguments can be dismissed. With virtual particles, there would be no sufficient cause for their coming into being, only a necessary condition (the vacuum itself). However, as Wes Morriston points out, we cannot call something "caused" unless a sufficient cause is present. A summary of this principle is as follows: "How could it be that necessary, but not sufficient, conditions can cause something to come into existence? Causation requires both."[1] Also, the uncertainty principle [(delta-E • delta-t >= h/(4*pi)] does imply acausality: "[A]n amount of energy delta-E can spontaneously come into existence and then (before the interval has elapsed) cease to exist. There is observational evidence, albeit indirect, that this uncaused emergence of energy or particles (notably virtual particles) frequently occurs." - Philosophy of physics Quentin Smith[2] Con then states: "If it is possible that it is necessary that a cause of some sort exists, then it is necessary that a cause of that sort exists, which 'proves' my assertion, not his." - Con I can just reverse that, and say that if it is possible that it is necessary that there was no cause of some sorts, then it is necessary that no cause of some sorts was the case. Thus, the two argument nullify each other. It was also said that:"RT asks us to consider a 'first' state of the universe 13.7 billion years ago, it logically follows that temporally prior to that first state nothing exists and the Universe necessarily came into being." - Con Actually, that is a non-sequitur fallacy as it doesn't follow. It's possible that there was no "prior" to the universe at all, thus making the above assertion false by default. My opponent also states that because all numbers have one before, and one after, that a time before the first state of the universe was the case. This is another non-sequitur. Just because we can imagine a time before the first state of the universe that corresponds to a number, doesn't mean it had to be the case. Being able to imagine something doesn't make it necessary. Also, I never said that "no reason" was the reason for the first state either (Con clearly doesn't even know what the PSR is, and he straw-manned my argument). The PSR states that everything exists either because it has to, or because it has a cause [3]. If the first state existed because it had to, then it satisfies the PSR. The A-Theory Of Numbers Actually, it is not possible for there to be an number you cannot add one too. If we represent this number as X, we can always write down "X + 1". Thus, P1 of his argument is false, which means that his conclusion has not been established as true (even if the argument is logically valid). The B-Theory Of Numbers This argument has nothing to do with the resolution, and is a red-herring because of it. Conclusion I conclusively proved that a finite past doesn't necessarily equate to the universe coming into being because under B-Theory the universe would have a beginning edge (a finite past from any selected point on the 4d or n+1d block), but not come into being. As far as A-Theory is concerned, there may not even be a "prior" to the first state at which it did not exist. Thus, even with a finite past of the universe we cannot say it came into being off of that alone. All of my opponent's objections were either based on logically fallacious arguments, false premises, or claims that had no sources to back them up with. My arguments all remain unscathed, and the resolution has been established. Sources [1] http://commonsenseatheism.com... [2] http://www.infidels.org... [3] http://www.reasonablefaith.org...