Naturalistic evolutionism cannot be rationally affirmed

Hey Con!Let's go straight into the rebuttals.Instinctual vs Learned BeliefsI think some clarification is needed. I explicitly mentioned in my opening round and indeed the round after that, that because under naturalistic evolution, neurology in itself is adaptive, the products of such neurology cannot be relied upon. Learned or unlearned, all beliefs that arise must be unreliable under such a scenario - learned beliefs are merely learned from neurology - if the neurology is unreliable, so too must be the beliefs that are derived from it.However, my opponent seems to have ignored my argument and instead has become fixated onto differentiating between instinctual and learned beliefs. Indeed, while this may be a relevant objection sans unreliable cognitive faculties, that is not what I am arguing for. I do not argue against the beliefs in themselves - rather, I argue against the neurology from which the beliefs arise from There is a distinct difference between the two. Unfortunately, my opponent spends much of his energies defending the former rather than the latter. As a result, this objection is largely irrelevant to my argument and is futile his cause.Cognitive faculties and truth under naturalistic evolutioni) Evolution and reliability Con proceeds to state that natural selection will favor reliable cognitive faculties, listing five points. However, all five of these characteristics can apply equally to unreliable cognitive faculties as much as they can do to reliable cognitive faculties. I see no reason as to why they should be exclusive, and why unreliable neurology cannot produce all the aspects listed.Furthermore, I think that I should clarify here. 'Unreliable' does not mean 'faulty'. Rather, in this context, it means fully functioning, but not in accordance to an accurate sense or assessment of external existence. In such a context, it is clear that this contention has no force - each of the five points are in relation to functioning neurology. However, I never deny that under evolution, neurology is 'functioning'. I argue that it is 'functioning' in accordance to an unreliable sense of the external environment.ii) Learned and Composite learned beliefsCon asserts that as the number of learned beliefs increases, the number of false beliefs decreases. However, there is a missing part to this - as I have already explained, until neurological reliability is established, these learned and composite learned beliefs will remain to be figurative platonic shadows of the figurative unreliable platonic forms of our cognitive faculties. I have no doubt that they will be true in accordance to the subjective sense of the environment, but they will not in turn be objectively true in accordance to objective reality. It appears therefore that Con falls into the same trap.Con's response to the unreliability of underlying neurologyMy opponent's objection to this area of my argument states that 'beliefs are defined according to our sense perceptions' and that 'All that is necessary is that our sense perceptions are consistent'. However, I see this to be wrong. This is because there is a divide between the subjective experience of the external environment and an objective perception of the external environment. Unreliable cognitive faculties will produce the former and not the latter. Indeed, my entire argument asserts this! The vital point to make is that when establishing what objectively occurred in the past, it is entirely dependent on the objective perception and not the subjective perception; in which case, even if the beliefs are 'consistent', they still produce inaccurate results in an objective sense, which is all that matters.Is it self-defeating to contest that naturalistic evolution correlates with truth?As a side-point, I think that it is relevant to mention that when Con asserts that bothi) Instinctual beliefsAnd ii) Learned beliefscorrelate with truth under Naturalistic Evolution, then it seems that he has glossed over perhaps one of the most central instinctual/learned beliefs during human history - that being religion and religious belief. [1][2]The human condition is and always has been to believe in the supernatural and religious belief. Thusly, through subscribing to truth and natural selection, you are consequently admitting that religious belief and the supernatural are in themselves likely to be true, in accordance to the truth of composite learned beliefs or instinctual beliefs (both of which Con claims to be reliable). This discredits the naturalistic evolutionist's claims. If this is denied, then one must also deny that cognitive faculties are reliable and consequently admit that you cannot make a reliable decision concerning naturalistic evolution itself.Supernaturalism and Truth Con states that supernaturalism is self-defeating through the same logic, and that the differing opinions among humans show 'a failing in their faculties'. However, this misrepresents what I stated. I don't claim that under supernaturalism, everyone should be right about everything. It doesn't follow. However what I do claim is that unlike naturalistic evolution, when one subscribes to supernaturalism, you do not in turn subscribe to any particular process that puts into question the whole notion of supernaturalism. It cannot possibly be self-defeating. Argument #2Con's response here appears to be rather lacking. He dismisses much of my argument as 'bald assertion', despite previous justification in prior rounds.Is Telos Subjective?Con's main contention is that teleology in a basic sense is subjective. However, I simply do not see this to be true. As I already stated, objective telos is determined through the meeting of certain criteria - namely, exhibiting a function with regularity as to achieve a final cause. This can take many forms. However, it by no means follows that teleology is subjective. Just as the water cycle may take different forms, it is still too objectively determined through the meeting of certain criteria - namely the changing forms of water. The same is with teleology. Though the individual instances may differ, it is objectively determined through the meeting of criteria.Justification for P1Con dismisses much of what I stated because it is apparently 'bald assertion'. However, this seems to ignore all of the justification I gave in the previous round. For Con's convenience, let me quote my argument: "A useful way of seeing this is through Aristotelian possibility and actuality. An unintelligent entity that has the capacity to exhibit a function 'X' is said to be 'possibly X'. In order to move to possible function X, that same entity must be moved from possibly X to actually X. However, if it is in motion like that, then it must be moved by another, actual entity - an unintelligent and unconscious entity cannot move itself with regularity towards a purpose. As such, a final cause (telos) implies a guider towards the final cause.It is the specification that implies the intelligence. The mover, in order to constantly and with regularity move from state Y to state X must possess knowledge of X - how else can X be achieved with such regularity? P1 therefore stands."Con simply ignores this justification and so the the claim that my argument is 'bald assertion' is simply wrong. I give justification.What determines a prescriptive or emergent end?I would say that there are 3 criteria to determine a prescriptive end:1) The entity achieves the end with regularity2) Sans external forces, the entity has no capacity to enforce the end by itself3) Without the end, the entity exhibits no obvious function or purposeSo a being which exhibits a final cause regularly, without the capacity to achieve it solely by itself, is prescriptive. I argue that there cannot exist an 'emergent' end, and that all final causes imply a guider, so the question of how an emergent end is determined is null. I argue that anything which shows telos (an end) in any sense, must have a guider.ConclusionIn this debate, I have given two arguments against the affirmation of naturalistic evolution, the first stating that the notion is self-defeating, and the second giving contrary evidence. However, Con's reponses to these arguments have been unsatisfactory. My opponent seems to side-step the central points in my arguments, and gives accusations that I gave 'bald assertions', despite clear justification of the issues. Consequently, my burden of proof is fulfilled and the resolution is maintained.Finally, I would like to thank Envisage for a really great, interesting, and challenging debate. It has been thoroughly enjoyable for me and I hope it has been for you too. Thank you also to the readers, commenters and future voters.God Bless Sources:[1] http://evolution-of-religion.com...[2] http://www.npr.org...