Warfare: Land Power (Pro) vs. Air Power (Con)

Thanks for a good round Con. I will finish with a response to Con's rebuttals and a brief conclusion. == Response == Con's rebuttal to my doubt of Industrial Bombing's effectiveness was to say that Total War seeks to destroy everything. This is a slightly confusing response, because, once again, I do not dispute that bombing can cause great destruction. Con claims that it's factually indisputable that WWII was "decided primarily through industrial attrition...." However, I see no citations or hard facts proving the truth of that claim. The facts show that, yes, the Allies bombed lots of stuff, but there is no hard or proven link to that being the DIRECT cause of Axis defeat. Contrary to Con's accusation, I 100% agree that industry, production, lend-lease, and mass mobilization of wartime resources were very important factors toward winning the war. But "important" is not the same as "decisive." Doctrinally, there can only be one decisive factor, and I maintain that factor was the overwhelming ground forces of the Soviet, American, and British armies. The Germans did not surrender after Dresden was firebombed or after the (alleged) destruction of their oil. They surrendered after Allied ground forces captured Berlin. A 2010 study by the Rand Corporation supports this conclusion: "Strategic bombing campaigns failed to produce the sort of rapid, decisive results originally envisioned by many of their proponents. Populations subjected to terror bombing did not rise up against their governments, demanding capitulation in order to stop the carnage as Douhet had predicted. The British and German war economies proved to be resilient under attack . . . ultimately economic collapse did come in both Germany and Japan, through the COMBINED effects of bombing, blockade, losses on the battlefield, and Axis economic mismanagement." [1] (emphasis mine) I once again argue that there are very few (if any) wars since the invention of the airplane where industrial attrition through bombing was the direct cause of victory. History has shown (North Korea, North Vietnam, Taliban, Al Qadea, ISIS...) that a determined enemy cannot merely be bombed into submission. Morale and industrial attrition simply does not work unless it is back with overwhelming ground force. (Again, nuclear weapons excluded...) Pro's rebuttal to the oil industry argument is quite interesting. Since I showed that total German oil production actually increased throughout the war, Pro has shifted the discussion to synthetic oil only. But even the Allied bomber's effect on synthetic oil can only be seen as a Shaping Operation at best. Consider the following from Pro's own source: It took a total of 6,552 bomber sorties dropping 18,328 tons of bombs over the course of an entire year just to cripple ONE German synthetic oil plant, while in the process losing 1,280 airmen and 119 planes. And even then, the plant was never totally destroyed. After the first bombing run, the plant was repaired and back in production after 10 days. After the next attack, it was repaired in 6 days. And after the next attack, repaired and operating in 2 days. And on, and on.... until the end of the war. In fact, the plant was still operating at 75% capacity a month after the D-Day invasion, despite the bombing attacks. This cannot be what a "decisive blow" looks like. We must also consider what was already happening by the summer of 1944 when the Allied bombing increased. Germany had already lost North Africa and was retreating rapidly through Italy. The German Army had been steadily retreating through Eastern Europe since early 1943, and after June 1944 they were also retreating rapidly from Western Europe. So, even before the Allies began targeting synthetic oil, the tide of the war had already decisively turned thanks to the ground forces. The Germans (and Japanese) had been in steady retreat since 1942 - the bombing merely sped it up (Shaping Operation), it certainly did not cause it directly. Air Campaign vs. Japan - Con misunderstands my question of "did nothing decisive occur between 1937-1943?" I was referring to decisive ground campaigns, not airpower. As noted above, Japan was already retreating on virtually all fronts before the bombing started in 1944. I was also alluding to the fact that the majority of the Japanese Army spent the war fighting in China and Burma, which was certainly a decisive land campaign. Con claimed earlier that Air Power sunk more Japanese naval/merchant vessels than US navy ships, but they forgot to factor in submarines. The majority of Japanese naval vessles were destroyed by Allied surface ships and submarines [2]. My point with the London Blitz was that attempts to bomb civilian populations into submission do not work. In fact, they often have the opposite effect. Korean War - Con accuses me of making "what if" projections for the Allied Force example, but they do the same thing here by implying Korea would have turned out differently if air power had bombed Chinese territory. In any case, Korea serves as a great example of how "total aerial destruction" still isn't enough to win - by 1953, the air force was having trouble finding any enemy buildings that were still standing. As Robert Pape confirms in his book "Bombing to Win," "The B-29s quickly ran out of targets and were stood down on 27 October, having achieved no perceptible effect on the course of the war." [3]. And yet, despite such total destruction, the North Koreans kept fighting. This once again proves that industrial and morale attrition from the air is not decisive enough by itself to win. Vietnam - massive strategic bombing may have led (indirectly) to US-Vietnamese negotiations.... but not victory. I would kindly remind my opponent that the U.S. lost Vietnam, retreated from the conflict under the thin veil of "peace with honor," and ultimately saw South Vietnam conquered soon thereafter..... and all in spite of North Vietnam's almost total lack of air power. How does this prove air power is decisive? Gulf War - I agree that the USAF totally devastated Iraqi C2 infrastructure, power plants, water facilities, and airports.... and I also agree that's the exact definition of a Shaping Operation: Targeting support infrastructure in the enemy's rear to make his army easier to defeat on the ground. It was the ground invasion, short as it was, that directly caused the Iraqi army to abandon Kuwait, not the air campaign. There is absolutely no evidence that the ground invasion occurred simply because Schwarzkopf was "old school" and wanted to thump his chest. Afghanistan - sure, the Taliban retreated early on, largely due to aerial bombing (as well as the 1000's of Northern Alliance fighters, Green Berets, and Army Rangers on the ground). But that retreat was only to re-arm and re-group. The Taliban are back in force, and all the bombs in NATO's arsenal have still not been able to defeat them. Iraq - same thing. Initial victory achieved by Shock and Awe is not the same as ultimate victory, which remains elusive. Once again, we're discussing winning wars in general, not isolated tactical victories. == Conclusion == Air power helps, but there are virtually no examples in history where it directly achieved victory in war. Conversely, there are multiple examples of ground forces achieving victory without the use of a strong air force. As such, air power can be no more than a Shaping Operation. Thanks to Con for a great debate, well done. As always, I look forward to debating you again any time. [1] http://www.rand.org... [2] http://en.wikipedia.org... [3] https://books.google.com...=