Three Philosophical Topics - 1F

Rather, I will supply two propositions that should be taken into consideration: the consequence argument against free will and in conjunction the source model of control. I will argue that if both of these arguments are valid, then the existence of free will should be denied. So first is the consequence argument: ==================== Consequence argument against free will ==================== Formulated by Carl Ginet, the consequence argument[1] is as follows: P1. No one has power over the facts of the past and the laws of nature. P2. No one has power over the fact that the facts of the past and the laws of nature entail every fact of the future (i. e. , determinism is true). :. Therefore, no one has power over the facts of the future. This is a very powerful argument that has helped in the transition from classical compatibilism to contemporary compatibilism. It seems pretty obvious that if determinism were to be true, then there will only be one future. However, it seems that my opponent will negate it's prowess, by stating "the fact that things WILL play out a certain way does not negate free will". This would only hold up if he has a correct understanding of free will, of control. This is a second-order question that brings me to the following, the Source Model: ==================== The Source Model of Control ==================== The source model[2] conceives of control if one is the "ultimate origin" of it - it conceives of control as emanating from one's self. Thus, if an agent is not the ultimate source or origin of her actions, then she can't be rightly in control - and thus rightly have no free will. Therefore, if we take this into conjunction with the consequence argument (that which upholds determinism), then we get the following formulation: P1. Any agent, x, performs an any act, a, of her own free will iff x has control over a. P2. x has control over a only if x is the ultimate source of a. P3. If x is the ultimate source of a, then some condition, b, necessary for a, originates with x. P4. If any condition, b, originates with x, then there are no conditions sufficient for b independent of x. P5. If determinism is true, then the facts of the past, in conjunction with the laws of nature, entail every truth about the future. P6. If the facts of the past, in conjunction with the laws of nature, entail every truth about the future, then for any condition, b, necessary for any action, a, performed by any agent, x, there are conditions independent of x (in x's remote past, before x's birth) that are sufficient for b. P7. If, for any condition, b, necessary for any action, a, performed by any agent, x, there are conditions independent of x that are sufficient for b, then no agent, x, is the ultimate source of any action, a. (This follows from 3 and 4. ) P8. If determinism is true, then no agent, x, is the ultimate source of any action, a. (This follows from 5, 6, and 7. ) :. Therefore, if determinism is true, then no agent, x, performs any action, a, of her own free will. (This follows from 1, 2, and 8. ) ==================== Conclusion ==================== Obviously, these arguments will have to be defended and worked on. But I think I have done enough for my first round to show that there is a plausible attack on the existence of free will by fleshing out both the first order question (does free will exist) and the second order question (what do we mean when we ask "does free will exist? "). Seeing as how my opponent will likely reformulate the notion of control, I'm in great anticipation as to how he would do so. Good luck! ---References--- 1. . http://plato.stanford.edu... 2. . http://plato.stanford.edu...