Ethical development must continue into adulthood

Again, amalgamated in all their splendid consistency: (a.) "ethical development doesn't has nothing to do with the objects of morality," "my argument is not advocating the development of the objects of morality;" (b.) "I am advocating the development of those capacities which are not of an intellectual nature," "there is learning occurring in moral and ethical development but the objects are different." Ethical development is not done through dealing with objects of morality and the learning in ethical development is not intellectual because the objects are different. I am not advocating that one continue into adulthood learning in the intellectual manner of morality (as it is detached from the circumstances and hence deals in maxims and other rules or regulations--generalities); I am advocating continuing the project of ethical development whereby one learns how to be engaged in the circumstances, dealing in particulars, and thus cannot be done by abstract generalities but must be done through educating an attunement Style, the issue of learning but not intellectually and the proof, all in one swoop. (a.) I'm sorry all you have ever known is that learning is a process of an intellectual nature; learning may happen in lived experiences, it takes place by doing things—practicing, habituating--in the world, it is virtually worthless to undertake this type of learning in one's mental autism through abstractions and general rules of thumb—the learning I am talking about is departing from the (your) mentalism of Western thought and getting into some thinking in the flesh. (b.) An example through an artist: Camille Pissarro was a mentor but more of a compatriot painter to Paul Cezanne; Pissarro could tell, early on, that Cezanne had talent but feisty Cezanne was often overtaken by his unbridled emotions and painted huge paintings in under an hour, wicked fast; Pissarro, employing the brush handling techniques with the choice utensils of the impressionists decided to get Cezanne thinking in the flesh, he decided to make Cezanne copy one of Pissarro's works with a special scalpel so as to control Cezanne's handling (instead of painting alongside Pissarro); when Pissarro did this he unlocked a whole new way of seeing the world in Cezanne's painting and Cezanne was never able to (and probably never wanted to) drop this new way in which he thought on his canvas, it was slower and provided him with more ability to, as he said, collect the feeling and then pain; that is, Pissarro stylized Cezanne's gaze and his handling such that he could never have the same attunement to painting again. This is what I mean by style, the way one responds, or as personality psychologists call it: one's responsive style.—Telling Cezanne how to do it, giving him an abstract rule to model the situation, these never would have worked, he needed an exercised to change his comportment so as to become attuned in a new way—no mentalist pedagogy would do here—abstractions need not apply. (c.) A different smell? How about a different distinction in smell, how about broadening the palette? The problem, as I have contended, with the of morality abstractions is that they are just too darned slow, the ethical individual is one who is trained to shoot from the gut and always for the good. But, as the good is quite an ideal, the circumstances may require diligence in sorting detail quickly, having a new style of response, having a broadened palette, all this allows for one to feel their way through a dilemma with greater attention to the ultimate particulars—and, as in the case of Cezanne, it allows one to take on a wholly different attunement to a situation. The problem is simple, if your habit is just to go to some maxim, then you really don't pay much attention to the circumstance at all, you could lead your life in a vacuum if you were to do such a thing. (e.) Your example that I now have to go to task to exemplify style in the instance is again part of the problem with the way you are trying to burden my proof. Such an example is too simplistic, dilemma's are not so explicit and there are actions which must be done almost instantaneously. If you keep supplying counter-examples based upon this application then you are still trying to usurp authority by forcing me to prove myself in your scheme. I will only explain what I am advocating in terms of that example if you supply me with (1.) why can he lie?, (2.) why would he want to lie?, (3.) why does he have to choose?, (4.) why is it implied that lying is somehow opposite something else?, etc. Personally speaking, when I am in a situation where there is the possibility of lying, because of my continued engagement with the arts and other forms of play which through thinking in the flesh have endowed me with greater sensitivity and precision in my affective attunement, I try to look to what is good; what is commonly held to be "lying" is not always bad, very often the mean (which is oh so hard to find with maxims) of a given circumstance may say that it is necessary for me to lie, it is necessary for me to insert something false in what I say—it could save someone's life!—Aristotle addresses this issue when he treats the problem of error; error occurs when one's assessment and one's inclination toward the good become distorted from what is fitting, sometimes one's eye toward the good will be skewed because there is information withheld from the situation—and withheld information is not a problem that can always be overcome, hence why it is necessary to train the gut and work on one's habituation so as to constantly be in the act of attaining what is good, for a mere maxim will not assuage the problem but continuing the development of one's character will allow one to take a murky situation and make it into an exercise for another situation. My opponent has schematized the situation by modeling the domain of my resolution upon the following generic and all too simplistic dilemma: I think it's wrong, but I want to do it, should I do it? It has bypassed more crucial issues of development, of character, of habit, and gone to a dulled down schematizing of the problems in the domain in question. You have evidenced my position. You say that occasions to develop morally happen non-stop as an adult (but, again, as is evident, moral development is by means of abstractions, one doesn't need to keep developing rules—otherwise one would have a rule for every particular circumstance—how would one keep track of such rules?) but because this is the case you have to be done developing. The problem, again, with developing morally is that it (a.) is not effective, (b.) overwrought with generality (as is evident in your example of a "moral choice"), and (c.) has no way of connecting to more embodied and affective portions of the individual so as to be wholistic in its account—hence why it is implied in my resolution that developing by this means is lame. The reason why one needs to continue the project of developing ethically is precisely because, as you said, when you're an adult your character is your own BUT when you are an adult your character is NOT subject to change and corruption, in fact, it has the possibility of being cultivated in the way one thinks is fitting for their style of response and thus is not only necessary to maintain (for maintaining abstractions and maxims are just too damned simplistic) BUT it is an opportunity to prescribe what is necessary for one's character as one sees fitting to continue dealing with an eye towards the good.