This house believes churches should not involve themselves in political campaigns.

In Defence of 2.1: If one says that “not everything that a church does has to be motivated by religion”, he is, in essence, saying that “not every drawing of a square must have four sides” or “not every blue wall must be blue”. The principle is the same: the essence of a church, the factor that distinguishes it from all other groups, as my opponent points out, is religion, so one cannot claim that a church can, insofar as it is a church, cast aside religion. It is impossible, by definition, to imagine a church wherein the members are not religious. Religion is the binding quality of the individuals in the group. This can be shown by a simple thought experiment: imagine two sets of individuals. One of these sets is full of those who believe in the Christian god, while the other is full of atheists. For my opponent’s objection to stand, he must argue that, caeteris paribus, the two groups are both equally deserving of the title of “church”. Such an assertion would be obviously absurd, and the only reason that can be found is that a church must be inherently religious – there are no other factors that could cause this distinction. My opponent tries to make a distinction between “belief” and “action”, but this is a half-hearted attack – it’s clear that believing in something is, in fact, an action in itself, and it is an action which, if it is taken to its logical ends (i.e. if the “believer” is not a hypocrite (in which case he would no longer be able to be considered part of a church, by my opponent’s definition, since he would have shown that he does not truly believe)), will affect future actions (it is obvious that one must act in accordance with their beliefs). As such, belief is not merely a “passive quality” like my opponent is portraying it to be – it is a chosen framework for all mental work done after its adoption. “Not everything that a church does has to be motivated by religion. To say that this is true is to say that a church who supports a mission to rebuild storms after a home suddenly isn't a church anymore, but rather some other kind of organization.“ Either A.), the church is somehow nonreligious (contradicting the definition of a church, making it, in that moment, decidedly not a church), or B.), the church is acting in a religious capacity (i.e. as a church). To say that a nonreligious church can exist is absurd, as is saying that a religious group of people acting with an emphasis on their religion is distinct from a church. Since churches are inherently religious, for a church to act as in my opponent’s example (as a church) means to act in a non-secular manner, meaning that my arguments about the irrationality of religion still apply to every case wherein a church is involved. My warrant for my argument was the definition of a church – the same definition that my opponent has just cited. It, if anything, bolsters my point. In Defence of 2.2: My warrant for 2.211 was given, albeit not explicitly (one need only to infer the implicit parts of the argument). It is as follows: P1) That which is infinite cannot be comprehended Justification: The incomprehensibility of the infinite is implicit in the term “infinite” itself - for one to comprehend the infinite, one must be able to know all there is to know about it, but, since “it” in the sense referring to an infinite is not able to be put into finite terms (as I have said, breaking an infinite into finite pieces is absurd, and, if one breaks it into infinite pieces, the same problems arise), and since the infinite will always have more qualities than one is able to imagine (for this is just the implication of an infinite being), one is unable to know anything about the infinite in its entirety. P2) God is infiniteJustification: Via definition. C) God cannot be comprehended My opponent says that, since many people have come up with theories about God, God must be a reasonable entity. My response is that, if my argument holds water, it is literally impossible for any of those theorists to be right, and, since their fallibility is not impossible while the falseness of a sound syllogism is, it holds to reason that those droves of theologians are simply fools who, no matter what they claim, are really as far from true reason as possible. Being so, my opponent’s attacks are held off. In Defence of 2.3: The definition of “faith” as “belief without warrant” is commonly accepted - Wikipedia defines it as “confidence or trust in a person or thing or a belief not based on proof.“ [1], and the Oxford English Dictionary gives a similar perspective, defining faith as “Strong belief in God or in the doctrines of a religion, based on spiritual apprehension rather than proof.” [2] Since adherence to reason is the only route to certainty (A is A is surely a certain proposition, and it is certain that A =/= A cannot ever lead to truth), reason necessarily leads to warranted beliefs. Since faith is literally defined as “belief without warrant”, faith and reason, by definition, cannot coexist. As I have said, “Faith requires the absence of reason, and therefore insofar as one has faith one rejects reason and vice-versa” - this is clear just by looking at the definitions of the terms. If my opponent advocates the use of faith (for example, in “practical” scenarios), then he is rejecting reason (as proven above), and, therefore, I have no need to address his points - if he is right, then anything I say cannot be judged to be more reasonable than anything else, since reason is rendered impotent by his case, and this also applies to his case: his case cannot be more reasonable than mine, ergo he has negated his own claim to victory. If he operates under the framework of unreason, then he has already undercut himself in any rational debate, and no rebuttals are needed. On Con’s Case, First Half: My opponent has yet to explain how my case reduces autonomy. The resolution makes no reference to disallowing churches to participate in politics; the resolution only states that churches should not be involved in politics. Even if I affirm the resolution, it does not necessarily follow that I’m advocating laws against churches being involved in politics, much like how a Libertarian may argue that one should not regularly inject heroin while still holding that one should be free to do so. There is no violation of rights here since I have offered no plan to force churches to conform to my ideals - I have only justified said ideals. In addition, if my case holds and faith is held to be irrational (and therefore not beneficial), choosing to have faith in the power of faith cannot produce any benefits, regardless of whatever autonomous entity chose to do so. Given that I have proven my case beyond a shadow of my doubt, it is the conflicting assertion given by my opponent that must be discarded out-of-hand. On Con’s Case, Second Half: Again, I have only maintained that the noninvolvement of churches in politics is a theoretical ideal, not that it should be imposed on the country by the Government, nor that it should even be put into practice voluntarily at the current moment (as a result of the irrationality that already pervades the system). My opponent is essentially asking me to choose between theocracy and tyrannism. This choice is entirely artificial, as the nonexistence of religious people in the world does not necessarily entail anything outside of itself. The resolution is over whether churches should vote or not - it does not specify “in the current system”. Taken in the abstract, the resolution is only referring to churches generally - there are only two factors to consider here: abstract politics and abstract churches. My opponent’s attempt to concretize the resolution fails for this reason - much in the same way as the statement “It is good if everyone is happy” is not disproved solely by the fact that the status quo is not one of universal happiness, just because the removal of the Republican party now would result in devastation does not mean that the removal of the Republican party in itself is a bad thing. Conclusion I have defended every link in my proof, and thus it is necessarily valid (as even my opponent admits that the conclusion will follow from the propositions if each is supported properly). I have also disarmed my opponent’s misinterpretations of the subject of the debate. As such, I have fulfilled my burden of proof, and my opponent has yet to start to negate my position. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org... [2] http://www.oxforddictionaries.com...