The Kalam Cosmological Argument is Invalid

The classical Kalam Cosmological Argument (KCA) is as follows[1]:1. Everything that has a beginning of its existence has a cause of its existence; 2. The universe has a beginning of its existence; 3. Therefore: The universe has a cause of its existence. I will be arguing that the KCA is not only unsound, but is invalid! That is, even if the premises (#1 and #2) were to be true, the conclusion (#3) does not logically follow from them. Beginning of Existence Herein lies the crux of the argument. What does it mean for something to have a beginning of its existence? Let us look at the first premise: "Everything that has a beginning of its existence has a cause of its existence;" Or, as more popularly and succinctly stated: "Whatever begins to exist has a cause." What begins to exist? In looking at the world around us, it is clear, even from first-hand observation, that it is transient. It is in a constant state of change. Nothing is permanent or eternal, even if long-lasting. Thus, it would appear that things are constantly coming into, and going out of, existence. But where do these things come from, and where do they go? Nothing. Even early philosophers recognized rudimentary forms of the Law of Conservation of Mass and Energy[2]: "For it is impossible for anything to come to be from what is not, and it cannot be brought about or heard of that what is should be utterly destroyed" - Empedocles "[T]he totality of things was always such as it is now, and always will be..." - Epicurus So, if everything that was, is, and will be, what are we talking about when we are talking about things which begin to exist? When we talk about something coming into existence, say a tree, we are not talking about the creation of the matter that makes up the tree, but rather we are talking about the reorganization of preexisting matter into a configuration we recognize as "tree." The tree, as a material object, doesn't begin to exist, but rather the abstract concept tied to that material object, does. And that is all we have, relying merely on observation: we have existing matter and energy that is in constant motion. We humans assign arbitrary labels to certain patterns that appear in amid this movement and it is those patterns which come and go, which "begin to exist" and have "causes" for their existence. From this we use induction to generate the first premise: 1. All observed physical patterns have a cause for their existence.2. All physical patterns have a cause for their existence. So, while the first premise of the KCA ostensibly has the scope of "everything," it is clear that the scope can only logically refer to the types of things which we observe coming into existence: things which are merely specific arrangements of preexisting matter. The Beginning of the Universe In applying this to the Universe, it becomes readily apparent that it does not quite fit. After all, the Universe, by any definition, includes all existing matter, regardless of the configuration; that is, the label "universe" doesn't refer to any specific set of configurations in the manner of other labels used, such as "tree" or "car." Ergo, the beginning of the universe is not merely the formation of a specific arrangement of matter; it necessarily refers to the creation, from nothing, of that matter. Why does this matter? It matters because the term "beginning of its existence" is used identically in both of the premises. The use of the same phrase, verbatim, indicates the same kind of event. Indeed, it has to refer to the same kind of event if they are to entail the conclusion. But, as I showed in the previous section, the "beginning of existence" referred to in the first premise is a result of induction based on observations that has its scope in things coming into existence as specific configurations of preexisting matter. The creation of the universe, not being a specific configuration of preexisting matter, falls out of this scope. We must inexorably conclude, then, that: The manner in which things begin to exist in the first premise is not the manner in which the universe could have begun to exist! In using the same phrase, the argument implies identical meaning. But they can't mean the same thing, meaning the argument commits the error of equivocation[3]; it is using a phrase which can mean different things in order to try and transfer some logical property tied to one meaning (causes of things coming into existence as we observe) to another meaning (a cause of the universe). Without some additional logic that shows the type of beginning applicable to the universe has to operate under the same rules as the types of beginnings in the mundane objects we see around us, the property of being caused cannot logically be transferred from one to the other. Merely being able to describe both using the same phrase does not grant us magical abilities in spreading logical properties around. Conclusion and Summary 1. In order for the premises of the KCA to entail the conclusion, the term "beginning of its existence" must refer to the same type of event in both premises.2. The term "beginning of its existence" does not refer to the same type of event in both premises. It refers to specific patterns of matter in the first and creation ex nihilo of matter in the second.3. Ergo, the premises of the KCA do not entail the conclusion, making the argument invalid. [1] http://en.wikipedia.org...[2] http://en.wikipedia.org...[3] http://en.wikipedia.org...