Israeli-Style Behavioral Profiling in Airports is Superior to the American Tech-Based System

R1: Mormons and Catholics. My statement that “the fact remains that Mormons and Catholics --and Jews--are not attempting to blow up the world” was pulled out of context by Con, who chose to ignore where I specifically mention airborne terrorism. This debate is about airport security. Con ignores the statistics on airborne terrorism and Islamic terrorists’ role in it, and instead focuses on a statement that can be taken out of context to mischaracterize my argument. He then extrapolates his statement and accuses me of “polarizing hate speech,” claiming that I am calling all Muslims terrorists. I'm not. Con makes one true statement, that “both the included and excluded group could, in theory, be the enemy. ” Theoretically, this is true. However, as I showed at the beginning, the facts support the idea that statistically speaking, Muslim terrorists are responsible for a staggeringly large portion of airborne terrorism. Thus, Con has failed to disprove my argument. One last thought: The Munich bombers were Muslim (if you’re referring to the 1972 Black September attack). R2: Implementation of the American system “sucks”. Con makes the argument that incompetence on the part of American TSA agents is “irrelevant,” and sees the debate as being between the “relative superiority of [each system], not the people who administer [them]. ” It is relevant who does the screening. Incompetence in the American system is not due to computer failure, but human judgment error on the part of TSA agents who lack the training and education to do their job properly. As for the use of military personnel in the Israeli system, this is also part and parcel of the debate, for it goes to the heart of why the Israeli system is superior. Certainly, the IDF could use a technology-based system like us, but they won’t—because it fails. It only takes cursory research to find a long list of events that have occurred in the American system that resulted in delayed flights, security breaches, or even unauthorized people getting onto planes with loaded weapons. Richard Reid was able to get on a flight with a bomb in his shoe. A Nigerian Muslim was able to smuggle explosives in his underwear. Last week someone left a stun gun in the seat compartment of a JetBlue flight. Clearly, the system is flawed. Isaak Yeffet, the former head of security for El Al and now an aviation security consultant in New York, explained why behavior is important. "In 2002, we had Richard Reid, the shoe bomber. This man gave the security people all the suspicious signs that any passenger could show. The man got a British passport in Belgium, not in England. Number Two: he flew to Paris, he bought a one-way ticket from Paris to Florida. He paid cash. He came to the airport with no luggage. What else do I need to know that this passenger is suspicious? " He goes on to say that the American system had the opportunity to change how they look at passengers. .. but they dropped the ball. "What did we learn from this? Just to tell the passenger from now on, you take off your shoes when you come to the airport? This I call a patch on top of a patch. " Umar Farouk AbdulMutallab's father called the embassy and told them that his son had contacted him and said his father would not be hearing from him again. He said his son was planning an airborne terrorist act, but nothing was done, even though he was on the list of people connected to al Qaeda. AbdulMutallab paid $3000 cash for his ticket. No one in the TSA knew that, or that he had called his father and was planning an attack. No one knew he was al Qaeda. And because the American system doesn't care about people, only weapons, Abdul Mutallab got on a plane, and tried to detonate plastic explosives in his underwear. Under the Israeli system, both of these men would have never made it onto a plane, because their heightened security net--based on the fact that these men were part of a demographic statistically known to be responsible for almost all airborne terrorism--would have unearthed their motives during the interview process. TSA agents did not catch either of these men because a) they were not paying attention to the passenger, and b) their technology-based system failed. If Con wishes to argue that their education or training is irrelevant, then he must explain why this system failed so miserably. The scanning equipment and technology didn’t fail. The humans running the technology did. R3: Feelings can compromise safety. Con brings up an un-cited example of a "lady just randomly decided to take out her problems on a whole bunch of innocent passengers. ” He claims that under the Israeli system, she would not have been caught. Without any further information on this particular incident, I cannot effectively rebut the argument. I call for Con to post sources for this incident. Until then, this argument is null and void for lack of verifiable sources. I will address his statement that “the true danger of profiling [is] it relies on feelings towards particular religions or ethnicities. ” This is incorrect. Raul Sela, the president of a global transportation security consultancy, explains very simply that “The word 'profiling' is a political invention by people who don't want to do security…To [Israelis], it doesn't matter if he's black, white, young or old. It's just his behavior. So what kind of privacy am I really stepping on. .. ?” “The whole time [they are asking questions], they are looking into your eyes — which is very embarrassing. But this is one of the ways they figure out if you are suspicious or not. It takes 20, 25 seconds. ” He follows this up with a chilling statement that “There is absolutely no intelligence and threat analysis done in Canada or the United States. Absolutely none. ” Israel’s system has nothing to do with “feelings,” it has to do with threat awareness based on statistical analysis of past terrorism attacks and a refusal to trade their safety for political correctness. R4. Israel hasn’t had a major hijacking. Con makes the claim that there are only two ways to hijack an Israeli flight: an inbound flight, or an outbound flight. He tries to box us in by leading through a series of “logical” conclusions based on this premise. a) If you try to get on an inbound flight with a bomb, foreign security forces (not Israeli Shin Bet agents) will stop you. This is incorrect. El Al has agents at the ticket counter and the gate. It doesn’t matter where you’re coming from—if you’re getting on an El Al plane, you’re going to be subjected to Israeli security, no matter where you take off from. Con goes on with the reverse situation: b) If you take an outbound flight, you are either an Israeli or a foreigner. –True. c) If you are a foreigner, you would have been stopped bringing the bomb in. –Assuming you actually brought the bomb in on the plane, this is also true. d) Therefore all Israeli terrorists must be Israeli nationals taking outbound flights. –What? e) Since the sale of “bomb-makeable materials is highly controlled and restricted in Israel,” (? ?? ? ), “making a bomb…would be too difficult. ” Says who? f) “Therefore, any such domestic terrorists must use a non-bomb weapon. ” This entire line of reasoning fails. There are not “thousands of reasons” why Israel hasn’t had a hijacking, just one: they do what needs to be done to ensure that it is impossible to get past their security. Con argues again that “this debate isn’t about the agents, it’s about the system. ” However, I submit that the agents administering the system ARE the system. Lastly, Con states that he would choose the line that “logic dictates will catch all the terrorists. ” Considering TSA has had 25,000 security breaches in 10 years, and Israel has had none…I think he just proved my point. . http://www.thestar.com... . http://biggovernment.com...