Does God Exist: An Ontological Argument

I would like to take the affirmative position in respect to the topic of this debate. However, to first note, the topic of the debate is in one sense "perspective neutral"; namely that a negative position could challenge my affirmative position or even an agnostic position that doesn't necessarily know whether or not God exists but in fact rejects the argument that I am presenting. This argument which I will be using is known as the Ontological Argument. This argument has had a rich history since it was first presented in St. Anselm's Prosologion (1077-78) found in chapters 1-4. Thus, to be clear, I will be presenting an Anselmsian scheme of the Ontological Argument as seen in Robert Maydole (2012), but will allow the thurst of the argument to take place in its reinterpretation of Anselm's argument under Alvin Plantinga (1974). The Argument Stated (1.1)William Lane Craig once wrote in regards to Anselm’s formulation of particular arguments for the existence of God and his dissatisfaction with them. According to his essay on the Ontological Argument, "Anselm remained dissatisfied with the complexity of his demonstration and yearned to find a single argument which would on its own prove that God exists in all his greatness” [1]. This would later set up what Anselm would call [according to his conception of God] as "the greatest conceivable being."As Anselm writes: "When the fool hears mentioned a being than which a great is inconceivable, he understands what he hears [ ... ] Moreover [ ... ] if this being is understood, it is in the understanding [ ... ] For as what is conceived, is conceived by conception, and what is conceived by conception, as it is conceived, so is in conception; so what is to understood, is understood by understanding, and what is understood by understanding, as it is understood, so is in the understanding. What can be clearer than this?" [2] According to Anselm, the greatest conceivable being is one who exists in the understanding alone - or so as he begins the argument. However, noticeably along with other Middle Age philosophers, properties regarding existence-in-reality, power, goodness, completeness and so forth were all apart of a great chain of being, where "God is an upper bound to the great chain of being" [3]. Anselm writes in his Monologion: "Furthermore, if one considers the nature of things, one cannot help realizing that they are not all of equal value, but differ by degrees. For the nature of a horse is better than that of a tree, and that of a human more excellent than that of a horse [ ... ] It is undeniable that some natures can be better than others. None the less reason argues that there is some nature that so overtops the others that it is inferior to none" (Charlesworth 1998, p. 14). Thus, saying that a being existing in reality is greater than the greatest conceivable being existing in the understanding emerges as a contradiction. Since, the greatest conceivable being can have no "ontological superiors." Especially, according to Anselm, as existence in reality is greater than existence in the understanding alone. Therefore, this being must have existence in the understanding as well as in reality. Thus, we can schematize Anselm's argument as such: (1) God exists in the understanding but not in reality (2) Existence in reality is greater than existence in the understanding alone. (3) A being having all of God’s properties plus existence in reality can be conceived. (4) A being having all of God’s properties plus existence in reality is greater than God – from (1) and (2) (5) A being greater than God can be conceived (3), (4). (6) It is false that a being greater than God can be conceived – by definition of “God” (7) Hence it is false that God exists in the understanding but not in reality – (1)-(6), reductio ad absurdum. In regards to conceivable, I simply mean to say that “there is no logical impossibility in the supposition that it obtains” [7]. In other words, there is nothing logically hindering something from being the case – indeed, it is conceivable. Furthermore: "…to say specifically that a being having all of God’s properties plus existence in reality is conceivable, is simply to say that it is possible that there is a being having all of God’s properties plus existence in reality – that is, it possible that God exists" [4] Anselm’s argument is thence suggesting that (2) existence in reality is greater than existence in the understanding alone. This isn’t simply a matter of intuition that the adherent of the argument hopes his interlocutor agrees with, but denotes Anselm’s idea regarding the chain of being that we saw back in his statement in the Monologion. Thus, an acceptance of (2) leads us to a consideration of premises (3)-(6), where, taken along with (1) and (2), collectively make the contradiction that a being existing in reality is greater than the greatest conceivable being, which exists in the understanding. Therefore, God exists in reality. Alvin Plantinga's Version (1.2)Plantinga (1974) states his argument as the following: (1) It is possible that there be a being that has maximal greatness. (2) So there is a possible being that in some world W has maximal greatness. (3) A Being has maximal greatness in a given world only if it has maximal excellence in every world. (4) A being has maximal excellence in a given world only if it has omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection. This argument avoids the previous dilemmas of necessary existence being a perfection (Anselm), since, a being cannot be omnipotent (or all-knowing, wholly good, etc.) in a given world unless it exists in that world. With (1), (3), and (4) taken collectively, you receive the conclusion that such a being who is omniscient, omnipotent and morally perfect actually exists. I think the argument becomes interesting once we consider (3) and (4) as consequences of a definition. Plantinga explains thus: Accordingly these premises, (1), (3), and (4), entail that God, so though of, exists. Indeed, if we regard (3) and (4) as consequences of a definition – a definition of maximal greatness – then the only premise of the argument is (1). [5] Therefore, the defender of the ontological argument is only left to deal with premise (1): that it is possible that such a being so defined exists. However, premise (2) which follows from (1), speaks of a possible having such characteristics of maximal greatness. Hence, we are left to address the concerns of what exactly it means to be a possible being. As Plantinga suggests, "the version of the ontological argument we’ve been considering seems to make sense only on the assumption that there are such things” [6]. To fix this dilemma of assumption, Plantinga thence invokes instead the property of maximal greatness, or being maximally great. The premise corresponding to (1) then states that maximal greatness is possibly instantiated in a given being; or, that (5) There is a possible world in which maximal greatness is instantiated. And the analogues of (3) and (4) spell out what is involved in maximal greatness: (6) Necessarily, a being is maximally great only if it has maximal excellence in every world and (7) Necessarily, a being has maximal excellence in every world only if it has omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection in every world. Hence, with the conjunction of (6) and (7) we no longer have the problem of dealing with possible but nonexistent beings. As Plantinga finishes: “if (5) is true, then there is a possible world W such that if it had been actual, then there would have existed a being that was omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect; this being, furthermore, would have had these qualities in every possible world. So it follows that if W had been actual, it would have been impossible that there be no such being” [7]. Hence, if W had been actual, (9) There is no omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect being would have been an impossible proposition. Furthermore, impossible propositions are not only impossible in one world, but in every world. Therefore, there actually exists a being that is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect, and who exists in every possible world.Summary (2.0) These are what I consider the sronger versions of the ontological argument. By all means, I am not using this argument so as to coerce religious belief, but I do think that the conclusion of the argument has considerable merit for theism. Interlocutors are welcome to challenge my argument. ___________________Notes: [1] William Lane Craig, "The Ontological Argument" in To Everyone An Answer, ed. William L. Craig, F. Beckwith, and J.P. Moreland (IVP Press: 2004) p. 124 [2] Anselm, Basic Writing, 2nd edn. Trans. S. N. Deane (Open Court: 1962) p 157 [3] Robert Maydole, "The Ontological Argument" in The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology", ed. William Lane Craig and J.P. Moreland (Wiley-Blackwell: 2012) p. 554 [4] Alvin Plantinga, God and Other Minds (Cornell University Press: 1967) p. 29 [5] quoted from The Mystery of Existence, ed. John Leslie and Robert Lawrence Kuhn (Wiley-Blackwell: 2013) p. 116 [6] Ibid., p. 117