Cognitive meta ethical theory is valid

Overview: Observation 1 notes that the Resolution asks “are moral statements propositions?” NOT “is there an objective morality?” “Vampires live in Africa” is a proposition regardless of the whether vampires are real. Arguing that vampires don’t exist or that people don’t agree what vampires are doesn’t change the fact that the statement is a claim which can be true or false. To be clear, cognitivism does NOT depend on objective morality. Observation 2 makes 2 points: 1. Ethical statements have SOME meaning. 2. People overwhelmingly act as if the content of ethical statements are propositions. The first claim should be obvious. When I say “Lying is wrong,” everyone can make some sense of what I am saying. There may be disagreement on what the meaning of that statement is, but the statement has SOME communicative content. We know ethical statements are at the least intelligible because people successfully use them to communicate. The second point notes that the way people use ethical statements strongly suggests that they are propositions. This debate is about the meaning of statements people make; how people use those statements is at the heart of what those statements mean. If we are arguing over the meaning of “vampires live in Africa,” the way the terms in that statement are used is relevant to our argument. We would reject an argument that equates the statement to “aliens built the pyramids” because the argument does not make sense of how people use the terms in the original statement. That people appear to use ethical statements as propositions is therefore a major obstacle for Con to overcome. Observation 3 builds on claim 1 of Observation 2. Ethical statements are intelligible, people use them to communicate. Con must account for why this is the case. Cognitivism accounts for this by taking the statements at face value- ethical statements are intelligible because they are propositions. If cognitivism is incorrect, then Con must account for how it is possible for people to sensibly use ethical statements. Observation 4: Con should not be allowed new arguments in the final round of the debate since it skews the fairness and clarity of the debate. Con is limited to the account of ethical statements he has so far provided: “Ethical statements don't have a meaning.” This account is patently false. If ethical statements had no meaning, the statement “Lying is wrong” would be unintelligible. Everyone reading this has SOME understanding of that statement, so the statement isn’t meaningless. On this point alone I should win this debate; only Pro can explain how ethical statements function in everyday language. Line-by-Line Observation 1: I contend that BOP is shared; Con and Pro are offering competing interpretations of what ethical statements mean. The winner is whichever side best interprets what ethical statements are. Observation 2: People explain their actions via moral justification and argue and wonder about ethical statements as if they could be true or false. These all evidence the fact that ethical statements are widely treated as propositions. This is not an argument from authority. I am not arguing “Moral statements are propositions because everyone says they are,” but that the meaning of ethical statements is tied to how these statements are used. The widespread use of ethical statements as propositions offers strong support for the cognitivist position. Con has an obligation to account for the communicative role of ethical statements as they are used or suffer a massive explanatory deficit to the non-cognitive position. Observation 3: Cross-apply my overview; regardless of whether they are propositions, ethical statements have meaning because they are intelligible. 1a) Pro still hasn’t supported P1. He argues that values don’t exist but not why values must exist in order to make propositions about morality. We can make propositions about things that don’t exist. “Vampires live in Africa” is a proposition about something that doesn’t exist. 1b) “Meaning as value” is totally distinct from the linguistic meaning in the Observations; the two arguments are 100% independent and unrelated. There exists a phenomenon where people create value in activity or life, and I am calling this Meaning. Anyone engaging in Meaningful activity finds value in the activity and this value isn’t founded on the value of some other thing. An artist finds value in the act of painting regardless of whether it will ever be seen or will ever make him rich. The activity isn’t the object of value, the Meaning individuals find in it or bestow on it creates the value for them. We know Meaning exists by experience; anyone who has ever felt that doing something was “worthwhile” knows that activity can be given value by meaning. 1c) Con relies on an obviously inapplicable analogy. “Afrotion” is unintelligible, while “obligation” is intelligible. This underscores my Overview: Con’s entire case fails to account for the fact that ethical statements function as a means of communication in language. The only reason his analogy is at all convincing is because we literally can’t make sense of the word “afrotion.” Only vote Con if you are actually as confused when you see the word “wrong” as you are by the word “afrotion.” Con’s response doesn’t make any sense because “obligation” has meaning independent of moral concepts: there are legal and practical obligations. Con isn’t even replacing the right word in his analogy; the value-laden term is “happiness.” Also, Con’s 1) doesn’t attempt prove that value-laden concepts are unintelligible, only that they don’t exist. 2a) Cross-apply my overview. Moral terms aren’t nonsense words; “good” DOES refer to an idea. Con’s response treats ethical statements as propositions: Con makes claims about why defining good as “what is desirable” fails. He constructs an argument about what can and can’t serve as an understanding of “good;’ he makes truth claims about the nature of good. If ethical statements are not propositions, Con should have nothing to say about what is or isn’t “good” because nothing CAN be said. Con isn’t treating “good” as a meaningless word, he is evaluating why certain definitions of good fail. Con actually makes a claim: “’What is desirable’ fails as a definition for what is ‘good.’” This is a truth statement about an ethical term! Con is making propositions about ethical terms. 2b) Con has not offered an argument that NO satisfactory definition of “good” exists. He offered two sample arguments against very poorly formulated conceptions of the good. Even if Con offered a negative argument against each one, this would only show that we don’t know what the good is- not that no concept of the good is possible. What Con needs is a positive argument that no concept of “good” is possible. But again, this debate isn’t about whether or not there is an objective “good.” This debate is about whether ethical statements are propositions. People can argue about what a “vampire” is (Edward Cullen or Dracula?) or if they exist (they don’t), yet “Vampires live in Africa” is still a proposition. 3) Con has failed to meet this burden. His account of ethical statements is that all ethical statements are meaningless nonsense. This invalidates the claims of i) and ii). If it is true that all ethical statements are meaningless, then there is never a moral justification for any action. By invalidating the claims of i) and ii) Con has shown them to be making truth claim and thus propositions. The statement “There is categorical moral justification never to murder” is incompatible with the claim “all moral claims are nonsense,” since any moral justification would be nonsense and thus not offer a reason not to murder. 4) The embedding problem stems from a point Con misses: that ethical statements exist and that ethical statements are used in complex ways that seem to depend on propositional content. Con is trying to fiat away the content of ethical statements.