Spinkos tourney,Partial Semi-Finals: Assasination of US citizens is constitutional

Targeted Killings and Assassinations Framework Before I analyze the constitutional reasoning behind assassinations, we must first establish the reasoning as to why assassinations would be necessary. Assassinations, in the context of international and domestic jurisprudence, is referring to targeted killings against enemy combatants and terrorists. An example would be the targeted killing of Awlaki in Saudi Arabia. Awlaki was an American citizen who left the United States and joined AQAP (Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula). Awlaki was a high ranking member of AQAP in charge of propaganda for Al Qaeda and in charge of various terror cells targeting the United States, an example being the Underware Bomber. Thus, my advocacy is that assassinations are constitutional when applied to national security threats such as enemy combatants or terrorists even if they are U.S. citizens. Con Case Since my advocacy is applying to enemy combatants and terrorists I will directly respond to my opponent’s argument relating to treason. According to Article 3 Section 3: “Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.” My opponent argues that unless two people testify or one confesses in court assassination attempts are unconstitutional. I’m sure a lot of you have noticed the issue with this argument as I have. Article 3 Section 3 does not preclude the use of assassination (i.e. a targeted killing) against a U.S. national. But rather it establishes side-constraints which must be adhered to in order for those assassinations to be constitutional. For example, search and seizure of one’s property is not unconstitutional simply because provisions are added to ensure a check against police or prosecutorial abuse. The same applies here: assassinations aren’t unconstitutional; they are unconstitutional if the individual is assassinated prior to two witnesses confirming the treasonous act. In Haupt v. United States, the Supreme Court ruled (amongst other holdings) that federal agents investigating a crime, such as the CIA or NSA, count as witnesses in treason cases. As such, federal agents working in the field are admissible witnesses. Thus, as long as two of our agent’s testify before a court that X U.S.citizen-now terrorist has committed treasonous acts against the United States, then an assassination order is constitutional. [1] Insofar as I have demonstrated that assassinations are not precluded by Article 3 Section 3, de facto I have given constitutional reasoning granting the validity of assassinations. My opponent uses the Declaration as an independent warrant for his argument but you can ignore this since the Declaration isn’t a legal weighing mechanism for the Constitution. Pro Case C1: The Executive Branch [2] The means by which an assassination takes place is completely open for debate within foreign policy and constitutional literature, and that is not why we are debating here today. However, my sole contention will argue the Founder’s understanding of the Executive Branch and why that permits the use of assassinations even if it contradicts other provisions in the Constitution. According to Harvey Mansfield, a Straussian political philosophy professor at Harvard University makes this claim in his essay The Case for the Strong Executive. He makes several claims: First, the use of the word fortify as referenced by Madison refers to Locke’s understanding of the Executive Branch. Mansfield writes, “But as the argument proceeds, Locke gradually "fortifies" (to use James Madison's term) the executive. Locke adds other related powers to the subordinate power of executing the laws: the federative power dealing with foreign affairs, which he presents as conceptually distinct from the power of executing laws but naturally allied; the veto, a legislative function; the power to convoke the legislature and to correct its representation should it become corrupt; and above all, the prerogative, defined as ‘the power of doing public good without a rule…The American Constitution signifies that it has fortified the executive by vesting the president with "the executive power," complete and undiluted in Article II, as opposed to the Congress in Article I, which receives only certain delegated and enumerated legislative powers. The president takes an oath "to execute the Office of President"... Second, the concept of “the executive” was almost always associated with “necessity”. Mansfield continues, “The test of good government was what was necessary to all government. Necessity was put to the fore. In the first papers of The Federalist, necessity took the form of calling attention to the present crisis in America, caused by the incompetence of the republic established by the Articles of Confederation. The crisis was both foreign and domestic, and it was a crisis because it was urgent...And what must be the character of a government's response to an urgent crisis? Energy. And where do we find energy in the government? In the executive. Actually, The Federalist introduces the need for energy in government considerably before it associates energy with the executive…One should not believe that a strong executive is needed only for quick action in emergencies, though that is the function mentioned first…The case for a strong executive begins from urgent necessity and extends to necessity in the sense of efficacy and even greatness. It is necessary not merely to respond to circumstances but also in a comprehensive way to seek to anticipate and form them. "Necessary to" the survival of a society expands to become "necessary for" the good life there, and indeed we look for signs in the way a government acts in emergencies for what it thinks to be good after the emergency has passed. A free government should show its respect for freedom even when it has to take it away.” Third, the Founders made a distinction between “natural liberties” and “civil liberties.” Mansfield elucidates, “...opinion assumes that civil liberties have the status of natural liberties, and are inalienable. This means that the Constitution has the status of what was called in the 17th-century natural public law; it is an order as natural as the state of nature from which it emerges. In this view liberty has just one set of laws and institutions that must be kept inviolate, lest it be lost. But Locke was a wiser liberal. His institutions were "constituted," less by creation than by modification of existing institutions in England, but not deduced as invariable consequences of disorder in the state of nature. He retained the difference, and so did the Americans, between natural liberties, inalienable but insecure, and civil liberties, more secure but changeable. Because civil liberties are subject to circumstances, a free constitution needs an institution responsive to circumstances, an executive able to be strong when necessary.” Thus, the conclusion of Mansfield is that the oath the President takes: “to uphold the office [implied responsibilities] of the President,” coupled with framers intent shows that the President out of urgency and necessity can use his or authority even if it must suspend parts of the Constitution. National security, being an extension of the enforcement arm of the office of the President, would naturally fall under the Founder’s understanding of necessity and urgency since, as argued by both Hamilton and Madison, threatens the security of the free state. As such, assassinations, in times of national security threats, can be constitutionally valid. [1] http://supreme.justia.com... [2] http://www.claremont.org...