Resolved: The United States Ought Not to Provide Military Aid to Authoritarian Regimes

LD Case Neg Does the world really need the U. S. "s help? The world is at war, Constantly, And the U. S. Is considered one of the largest military powers in the world, And their budget proves it. The short answer, Yes, Even Authoritarian regimes deserve the power of the U. S. Military. It can benefit the country and can benefit the U. S. In many ways. In this way do I prove the Neg in Resolved: The United States ought not to provide military aid to authoritarian regimes. Value: Philosophical Absolutism https://www. Merriam-webster. Com/dictionary/absolutism According to Merriam Webster Dictionary, Absolutism is the: advocacy of a rule by absolute standards or principles. With this in mind, We can prove that the resolution of today"s debate is an absolutist resolution. So, By proving that at least One of the Countries I will list ends in aid being-overall- more beneficial than the Aff can prove, The Neg will have won, Because it has proven the U. S. Ought to militarily aid at least one country. Value Criterion: Disaster Relief Smith, James. "The Importance of Military-civil Coordination for International Disaster Response. " American Military University. May 29, 2014. Web. December 08, 2018. . The U. S. Is the major contributor of military assistance in disasters around the world. The military by necessity is expert in getting personnel and equipment into areas where infrastructure is damaged or absent, As is usually the case after a major disaster. Military resources are often irreplaceable for general functions, Such as logistics, Mobility, And damage assessment, And specialized functions, Such as air traffic control and hospital ships. Contention 1: Without U. S. Seapower, The government would suffer influential Subpoint A: Bahrain Cropsey, Seth. "The US Navy in Distress. " Strategic Analysis. January 2010. Web. December 10, 2018. American maritime strategy has played a major role in binding together the international system that US foreign policy has aimed to establish since the beginning of the twentieth century. What are the consequences for the United States and its allies if those bonds crumble as a result of a shrinking Navy with reduced international presence, And a weakening ability to project power, Provide stabilizing presence, And respond to serious crises? The widely-shared current assumption that the immensity of US"China trade eliminates the possibility of serious Sino-American conflict recapitulates the United Kingdom"s decision a century ago that alliance with Japan was prudent and sufficient to secure the Crown"s interests in the Far East. If this assumption proves wrong the consequences for US influence in the Pacific would be as disastrous for us as they were for Great Britain. The historically unprecedented half century of relative naval peace in the Mediterranean may continue indefinitely, But such a prolongation would be a freak of history. The re-deployment of major United States naval force from the Mediterranean to support operations in the Middle East and Central Asia, Added to the declining US naval fleet would leave us with terrible choices if, For example, Turkey"s drift towards Islamism yields a naval force with ambitions similar to those of her fifteenth century Ghazi Ottoman rulers. What are the long-term consequences as our ability to maintain a global naval presence which heretofore has been judged beneficent erodes? The size, Shape, And strategy of the US Navy are a critical element of America"s position as the world"s great power. Our ability to protect or rend asunder the globe"s ocean-going lines of communication is inseparable from our position as the world"s great power. But very few outside a small community of naval officers and selected military/foreign policy analysts appreciate the strategic results of American seapower"s slow but steady diminution. The eventual impact of this weakening includes, But is not limited to, A major shift of power away from American influence in Asia; the shattering of such key maritime alliances and partnerships as those we currently maintain with Australia, India, Japan, And Singapore; the rise of China as a hegemonic power; a debilitating loss in America"s ability to shape the future global strategic environment; and a powerful reinforcement of the perception that the United States is in decline. Globally, The continued attrition of US naval force also means a serious threat to the security of the world"s sea lines of communication and the choke points " such as the Straits of Hormuz " through which pass an increasing volume of global commerce, The departure of a visible and stabilizing American presence from allied ports as well as potential worldwide flashpoints, And the international perception that the United States is abandoning the critical element of military capability that undergirded the world system American policy has sought for over a century, Seapower. The consequences of a much-diminished US fleet are complemented by the American public"s ignorance of them, The slow yet steady pace of naval deterioration, And the increasing time and dismayingly large resources needed to recoup seapower surrendered slowly over decades. The cornerstone of U. S. -Bahrain defense relations is U. S. Access to Bahrain"s naval facilities; the United States has had a U. S. Naval command presence in Bahrain since 1948. MIDEASTFOR (U. S. Middle East Force) and its successor, NAVCENT (naval component of U. S. Central Command), As well as the Fifth Fleet (reconstituted in June 1995), Have been headquartered in Bahrain, At a sprawling facility called "Naval Support Activity (NSA)-Bahrain. " It is also home to U. S. Marine Forces Central Command, Destroyer Squadron Fifty, And three Combined Maritime Forces. 46 The "on-shore" U. S. Command presence in Bahrain was established after the 1991 U. S. Led war against Iraq; prior to that, The U. S. Naval headquarters in Bahrain was on a command ship docked and technically "off shore. "Bahrain is uniquely key to the Fifth Fleet--no other alternative in the region. Katzman, Kenneth. "Bahrain: Reform, Security, And U. S. Policy. " FAS. 2015. Web. December 10, 2018. . The cornerstone of U. S. -Bahrain defense relations is U. S. Access to Bahrain"s naval facilities. The United States has had a U. S. Naval command presence in Bahrain since 1948; MIDEASTFOR (U. S. Middle East Force), Its successor, NAVCENT (naval component of U. S. Central Command), As well as the Fifth Fleet (reconstituted in June 1995) are headquartered there, At a sprawling facility called "Naval Support Activity (NSA)-Bahrain. " It is also home to U. S. Marine Forces Central Command, Destroyer Squadron Fifty, And three Combined Maritime Forces. 37 The "on-shore" U. S. Command presence in Bahrain was established after the 1991 Gulf war against Iraq; prior to that, The U. S. Naval headquarters in Bahrain was on a command ship mostly docked in Bahrain and technically "off shore. " Some smaller U. S. Ships (e. G. , Minesweepers) are home-ported there, But the Fifth Fleet consists mostly of U. S. -homeported ships that are sent to the region on six-to seven-month deployments. Ships operating in the Fifth Fleet at any given time typically include a carrier strike group, An amphibious ready group, And some additional surface combatants, And operate in both the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean/Northern Arabian Sea. In March 2012, The U. S. Navy doubled its minesweepers in the Gulf to eight, And sent additional mine-hunting helicopters, As tensions escalated over Iran"s nuclear program. In May 2013, The U. S. Navy move five coastal patrol ships to Bahrain to join five already there. The naval headquarters in Bahrain serves as the command headquarters for periodic exercises intended to signal resolve to Iran, Such as a mine-sweeping exercise involving 41 countries in May 2013. The naval headquarters also coordinates the operations of over 20 U. S. And allied warships in Combined Task Force (CTF) 151 and 152 that seek to interdict the movement of terrorists, Pirates, Arms, Or weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-related technology and narcotics across the Arabian Sea. Bahrain has taken several turns commanding CTF-152, And it led an anti-piracy task force in Gulf/Arabian Sea waters in October 2010. These operations are offshoots of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan, Which ousted the Taliban in 2001. To further develop the NSA, The U. S. Military is implementing a planned $580 million military construction program in Bahrain. 38 That construction, Which began in May 2010 and is to be completed in 2017, Is nearly doubling the size of the 80-acre facility by improving the decommissioned Mina (port) Al Salman Pier, Leased by the Navy under a January 2008 lease agreement and adding a new administration building and space for maintenance, Barracks, Warehousing, And dining facilities. The expansion will support the deployment of additional U. S. Coastal patrol ships and the Navy"s new littoral combat ship and permit larger U. S. Ships to dock at the naval facility. A separate deep-water port in Bahrain, Khalifa bin Salman, Is one of the few facilities in the Gulf that can accommodate U. S. Aircraft carriers and amphibious ships. 40 An earlier military construction program, Costing about $45 million, Expanded an apron at Shaykh Isa Air Base, Where a variety of U. S. Aircraft are stationed, Including F-16s, F-18s, And P-3 surveillance aircraft. About $19 million was used for a U. S. Special Operations Forces facility. The naval headquarters took on additional significance in December 2014 when Britain announced a deal with Bahrain to establish a fixed naval base in part of the Mina Al Salman pier.