These Arguments Against the God of Christianity Are Valid - 1C.

It doesn't get said enough that debates are like fractals. We can focus on any one point and have a discussion just as detailed as the one we're having now. One can't claim victory just because his opponent has not tunneled down far enough in his arguments. Instead, I will shift the focus to the two most important questions that my opponent is demanding I answer: Is God justified in wanting us to have free will, and why doesn't God do more to reduce suffering? Ultimately if these two questions are addressed, every other point falls into place. According to my opponent, there must be a rational basis for God's will. If he does something for no raisin, then he is irrational. God can not be irrational, so if giving humans free will has no rational basis then God can not exist. What qualifies as a "rational basis"? The most common is that one wills X because X leads to Y, and one wills Y. Another is that one wills X because failure to do X would lead to one's nonexistence. The first definition is circular, and the second does not apply to God since he is incapable of not existing. Unlike people who have to work for a living, there is nothing to stop God from sitting on his cosmic *** all day. However, there is a third definition, one wills X….just because. I am certain my opponent would not consider this to be a valid justification, and in most cases he'd be right. Some of these "just because" wills, however, are a lot like the axioms of a formal system. In formal logic, it is tempting to believe that any logical statement can be reached purely from the law of non-contradiction. If you believe this, there's this delightful chap named Kurt that I'd like you to meet. Axioms are not derived from any truth, but instead form the foundation of a system from which other statements can be derived. Likewise, axiomatic wills form the foundation from which all of God's other wills ultimately derive. They are what make the Christian God, one logically possible omnieverything being, different other omnieverything beings of other religions. It is actually absurd to argue that God can not have axiomatic wills. With this in mind, we can ask "Is God's desire for us to have free will an axiomatic will?" You could certainly make the case that it is: free will permeates every aspect of the Christian faith. The entire system of original sin and salvation is centered on it. However, I gave an alternate explanation, that free will is a necessary consequence of what may be the axiomatic will for God to have made man in his own image. (I'd suggest that my opponent think over my previous argument a little more before claiming that I just "picked 3 traits that God and humans happen to share"). If these are not satisfactory justifications of free will, my opponent will have to lay out the rules for what does and doesn't quality as a valid explanation. The second question, "Why doesn't God do more to reduce suffering?" was answered in my last argument, so this will simply be a recap. I do not try to be obscure but its clear my original message did not entirely get through. It may or it may not be possible for God to have devised a formula which results in a universe where there are no natural disasters. It is completely impossible to argue one or the other, therefore if my opponent's argument depends on God being able to do this but unwilling to, then he must add that as a qualifier to his argument. As long as there is suffering, there is "the worse suffering". Therefore, if God were to stop earthquakes, floods, plagues, and other such major catastrophes, then our perception of what the worst suffering is would change. In another universe, you'd be asking "Well if God is so loving, then why does he allow the agonizing pain of stubbing your toe?". Who knows, perhaps the universe just happens to produce Killer Laser Bees, the ultimate in aerial pain delivery, but we never noticed them because God is nice enough to keep them away from us. Therefore, the only possible world in which one can NOT make this claim is one where there is no suffering. Pain, however, is a biological necessity. To eliminate pain would require a micro-managed universe, and this violates the principle of elegance (which I'm taking to be an axiomatic will. We could argue this all day but let's not stray too far from the original points). This would be absurd anyway, because in no way does the statement "God loves Man" imply "God must maximize the pleasure and minimize the pain of Man". Let's back up though. "Fine fine fine, but why would God just LET earthquakes happen? I can understand the need for pain but hasn't God gone too far in how much pain we can feel?" The problem with this is, again, there is no unambiguous definition for what the appropriate amount of pain is. However, I addressed this anyway by bringing up the fact that God will give you an eternity of peace. How long is eternity? So long that the duration of the known universe, times 9 raised power of 9, 9999 times, times the number of possible games of Go, times the number of subatomic particles in the universe, times the number of Turing machines that halt on or before 1000 steps on a blank tape, is still infinitesimal compared to eternity. Therefore, ANY amount of suffering we feel on Earth is immaterial. Yes, that even involves being raped by a gorilla. For a fricktillion years. It doesn't mean there's any real reason to go to your local zoo and seduce the primates there, only that the suffering you'd feel would be nothing compared to the joy of Heaven. Finally, I will quickly do away with my opponent's argument that God has no justification in keeping himself hidden, since revealing himself would not dampen our free will and thus wouldn't effect our ability to choose whether or not to accept him as a savior. My answer is yes. Yes it would. Majorly so. It would change the entire dynamic of the salvation system. If this is really not obvious to my opponent, I will explain it in further detail in the last round, but it seems very clear to me. Of course savalation hadn't even been implemented before the crucifixion so I'm not sure why he's bringing up Jesus' miracles as a counterexample. I would also ask my opponent to read over my "teacher analogy" again. He is making a common logical fallacy that any analogy must be wrong if there is some fundemental difference between the analogy and the actual application of it. The take home point was that a will can be foundational (an axiomatic will), or an indicator of another will. Hence, a teacher may want her students to score well on the test, but this is not a foundational will. I'm actually not entirely sure why my opponent was confused by this.