Resolved: The evidence supports the Abortion-Crime link

My case also serves as a rebuttal to many of his points. 1. Donahue and Levitt’s (DL) theory relies upon faulty assumptions DL’s hypothesis, first published in the late 1990s, argues that increased abortion rates will decrease the amount of ‘unwanted’ children after abortion legalization. I will first explain what their theory relies upon, and why its assumptions are weak. DL’s theory relies upon the following formula [1]: CR = k*CRk + (1 – k) * CR (1-k). CR is the total crime rate, and k are high risk ‘unwanted’ groups. (1 – k) are ‘wanted’ low risk groups. High risk groups could contain children raised in poverty or by single mothers. Based on this formula, abortion can affect crime rates in three ways. First, the amount of those in ‘k’ decrease—fewer teens or single mothers are having children. Abortion may also reduce criminogenic inclinations: a reduction in CRk or CR (1-k), or both. Children would become more wanted, and crime would be reduced. And the final way in which abortion can effect crime is to reduce cohort size—fewer children are… alive to reach their teenage years or early twenties. This means fewer people around at their criminal ‘peak’. Fewer males at their ‘peak’, and therefore a reduction in crime occurs. This is referred to as the cohort size effect. DL’s theory, therefore, relies on two major assumptions. First, increased abortion rates lead to a reduced amount of “mistimed and unwanted births”, and second people from mistimed and unwanted births are positively associated with crime rates [2]. DL actually never produce evidence for these assumptions, but rather rely upon previously published literature. This is essentially what PRO argued in his case. They present two main lines of evidence. First, states that are pre-Roe (legalized abortion before Roe v. Wade) had a 5% decrease in fertility rates relative to states that legalized abortion after Roe—Roe states. And the evidence that the fertility changes was the greatest amongst teens, unmarried and minority women. DL falsely assume that these decreases in fertility mean reduced unwanted childbearing. However, there is little evidence that abortion rates are inversely related to fertility rates. Indeed, after Roe, we see that Roe states and pre-Roe states had an increased abortion rate since legalization. And Roe states have a lower abortion rate than pre-Roe states. However, both Roe and pre-Roe states have very similar fertility levels, and as the abortion rate increased fertility rates ceased declining—indicating abortion rates may increase fertility rates, meaning more unwanted children. The fact is, there is no association between abortion rates and fertility rates, as demonstrated by the following graph [3]: One would expect higher abortion rates to be associated with lower fertility rates if, in fact, DL’s assumptions were correct. Newer research indicates that greater acceptance of abortion led to more sex and pregnancies, and did not reduce unwanted births. Why? Even though many had the option to abort their unwanted children, the increased sex also led to more people hesitant to do so. Meaning there is, overall, little change in the amount of ‘unwanted’ children when abortion is legalized—meaning abortion cannot decrease crime [4]. In fact, the association between mistimed and unmarried births is weaker than the association between abortion and fertility. This means that DL’s theory to explain any crime drop simply does not hold up [5]. What also harms DL’s hypothesis is that abortion may reduce the wellbeing of women. In fact, economist John Lott argues that these ‘high risk’ cohorts increased in size. As noted above, more sex occurs because people perceive the threat of a child as low—they have a way out of it. However, the amount of women reluctant to get an abortion increased dramatically compared to those who actually underwent abortions, meaning there was an increased amount of out-of-wedlock births. As John Lott notes, “there was a tremendous increase in the rate of out-of-wedlock births, from an average of 5 percent (1965–69) to over 16 percent 20 years later (1985–1989). Among blacks, the number jumped from 35 percent to 62 percent” [6]. Therefore, the assumptions made by DL’s empirical models are flawed. There is no mechanism which legalized abortion could reduce the crime rate. 2. Criminological evidence denies an Abortion-Crime link DL are aware that criminologists in this field deny any abortion-crime association. They criticize criminologists for using simple models which do not accurately gauge the effect of abortion on crime. Criminologists, however, have eviscerated the cohort effect. DL’s hypothesis predicts an increasing crime rate, and then a decreasing crime rate when those affected by abortion come of age. Indeed, criminologists find that “downturn in age-specific crime rates does not line up with the cohort’s exposure to legalized abortion” [7]. However, it is ironic that DL ignore these arguments, as they present very similar statistics in order to support their theory. Indeed, criminologists make a similar argument as I have above. More babies were born to single mothers under age 19, and it is impossible that this would reduce crime. They generally argue that these basic demographic statistics, if anything, mean that there would be more people in the risk cohort. Therefore, if anything, crime would increase [8]. 3. DL’s research is flawed It is interesting to note that DL’s hypothesis has not been replicated. And in most cases, when economists attempt to replicate the finding, they cannot do it. In fact, economists have told me that the “argument it over” [9]. Abortion simply does not reduce crime, and DL’s hypothesis is in ruins. Ted Joyce, one of the most vocal critics against DL, has published a lot of research on the topic. Using basic time series data—like criminologists—he finds “no consistent relationship between abortion and crime”. He then uses more sophisticated methodology, relying upon regressions. He finds that “the association between legalized abortion and crime rates is weak and inconsequential . . . [this] undermines a causal interpretation of Donohue and Levitt’s findings” [10]. PRO cites specifically DL’s 2001 paper, and this paper has received the most criticism of the bunch. Two economists from the Federal Reserve found many coding errors in DL’s regressions. When the error is corrected for, the results become much weaker. The cross-sectional analysis, of comparing different states over time, was also found to not be robust. They found that there is “no evidence that abortion reduces crime” [11]. In 2001 John Lott and John Whitley published a rebuttal to DL’s 2001 paper. Their models suggest if abortion does decrease the amount of unwanted children, crime would decrease. But they also had models which assumed an increase in unwanted children, via the research above (increased high risk births). They then, using empirical methods, must find that is the *net* effect. Overall, they found that abortion rates actually increase homicide by 0.5 – 0.7% [12]. DL’s research also assumes that the abortion rate was 0 before abortion was legal—and the pre-Roe states had more abortion than the Roe states before legalization. However, this is untrue. As criminologist James Q. Wilson argues, “there were at least as many abortions per 1,000 live births pre-Roe as in states that had made abortion legal” [13]. 4. Other factors can explain the crime drop The reason this theory became popular was due to the ‘mystery’ of the crime drop after the 1980s. There are a lot of factors, and it is still under research. Increased gun ownership and liberalized concealed carry laws could easily have contributed to the large decrease in crime [14]. The death penalty has been demonstrated to be a strong deterrent, and its increased use may have led to a significant decrease in crime [15]. In the 90s, the economy grew. The crack-cocaine epidemic ended. Policing measures became more effective. Children with lead in their blood are more aggressive, and lead exposure actually fell dramatically in the 90s [16]. There are a plethora of reasons that crime fell, and the explanation needn’t involve abortion legalization. Conclusion PRO’s case—mostly relying upon DL's assumptions—are put into question. DL’s research is flawed, criminologists dismiss the theory based off of basic data, and economists using more rigorous techniques continue to refute the theory. Crime fell due to other reasons, not liberalized abortion laws. 1. . http://www.nber.org... 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid. 5. Ibid. 6. . http://www.foxnews.com... 7. Joyce, op cit, 24. 8. Ibid. 9. Joyce, personal correspondence. “[N]o young PHD candidates study the question anymore, a sure sign that the argument it over. ” 10. Joyce, Ted. “A Simple Test of Abortion and Crime,” The Review of Economics and Statistics 91(1) (2009): 1-12. 11. . https://www.bostonfed.org... 12. . http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu... 13. . http://isteve.blogspot.com... 14. . http://www.press.uchicago.edu... 15. . http://www.debate.org... 16. . http://www.wsj.com...