It Is Possible That A Maximally Great Being Exists

IntroductionThe Modal Ontological Argument is one of the most interesting arguments for God. However, the failure of it becomes self-evident after critical examination. There is a world which seems just as possible on the face of it as a maximally great being, but this world being possible and a maximally great being being possible cannot both be true. Either one relies on the other being impossible. Has Pro shown non-sentient worlds are impossible? No, and that is the problem.My opponent lists three different definitions:(i) Impossible Entities(ii) Contingent Entities(iii) Necessary EntitiesPro is correct that God has existence in every possible world. However, this is only if it is possible for God to exist. God doesn't just automatically have necessary existence like the Law of Identity for example. It has to be shown God is possible, then God is necessary. Pro states that he is not sure if it is true that for something to be subjunctively possible, it must definitely not be impossible. However, this is the case. If it is possible that God is impossible, then God cannot be possible as God necessarily exists if he is possible. Thus, to say God is possible, is to make the specific claim that God is not impossible. Either it is possible, or impossible that God is not impossible. The claim God is possible rests on it not being possible that God is impossible. Once more, this is a basic modal inference. Subjunctive possibility is much stricter than epistemic possibility. Now, Pro says:"Similarly, there is nothing logically incoherent in the concept of God" - ProHere is the problem. To say there is nothing incoherent about God is to say that there are no non-sentient possible worlds. This is because, if there are non-sentient possible worlds, then God is incoherent. God would entail a sentient being in every possible world if he is possible, but if there are non-sentient possible worlds; God is contradictory. Pro has not ruled out non-sentient possible worlds. Therefore, his claim that God is not incoherent has not been substantiated. The issue here is that there is nothing incoherent about non-sentient possible worlds. Yet, both non-sentient possible worlds and a maximally great being being possible cannot be true. So Pro has to rule out one in favor of the other. No One Has Shown God's Existence To Be Logically ImpossibleMy opponent provided no positive case with regards to this section. He simply claimed that no Atheist has shown God's existence impossible. However, the burden is not on the Atheist to show God is impossible, the burden is on the Theist to show God is not impossible (to say that something is possible subjunctively, is to also say that it is not impossible subjunctively). This whole section from Pro is a fallacious shifting of the burden of proof. Even if not a single Atheist can show that God is impossible, it wouldn't follow from this that God is possible. This is another non-sequitur from Pro. We Have Warrant For Accepting God's ExistencePro has to assume his arguments for Theism succeed to make his case. He has not shown that there is even one sound argument for Theism. Therefore, his section here does not show that God is possible. All arguments for Theism could be unsound with untrue premises, and the conclusions of those arguments could be impossible even if nobody knows they are impossible. Unless he shows that there is at least one sound argument for Theism, there is no way he can use an external Theistic argument as evidence that God is possible. "God is possible" does not follow from "there exists arguments for God". Thus, this section is based on a non-sequitur. Both of my opponent's arguments for the fist premise of the Modal Ontological Argument are based on logical fallacies and can be dismissed.My ArgumentPro claims that if God is possible, then a non-sentient world is impossible. This is true. However, if a non-sentient world is possible, then God is impossible. Ergo, the theist has to show that non-sentient worlds are impossible before we can accept that a maximally great being is possible. Pro has not shown that non-sentient worlds are impossible. He asserts that God is more probable than a non-sentient world. However, Pro gave no argument for this! Thus, his claim that God is more probable can be discarded, as it is nothing more than a bare-assertion. He claims that to be metaphysically possible, there has to be more reasons than just logical possibility. However, Pro gave no reasons to think God is metaphysically possible, but a non-sentient possible world is not metaphysically possible. [1]Why couldn't the world have consisted of no sentient beings? It doesn't seem metaphysically impossible like something coming from nothing, or something coming into being without temporal becoming. The only reason one would claim the metaphysical possibility of non-sentient worlds is non-existent is if they already presupposed a maximally great being exists and is possible, and thus, there is a sentient being in every possible word. I don't see how Pro can defend the first premise without begging the question. The fact that arguments exist for God does not suffice, as I devised an argument against the possibility of a maximally great being. I can just accept non-sentient possible worlds on those grounds, just like the theist accepts that a maximally great being is possible based on other theistic grounds. This just puts us back at square one; without the resolution established. Also, Pro mentions that many Christian philosophers believe the argument proves God, but many theists believe the Ontological Argument is a bad argument that proves nothing. Take esteemed Christian philosopher Richard Swinburne for example, in an interview, this was said:"So the Ontological Argument, which has been used in various forms, fails as even help in anyway?" - Dr. Lawrence Kuhn"It fails, totally." - Richard Swinburne[2]Not everyone agrees with Craig and Plantinga. I know many Christians who scoff at the very definition used in the argument. Anyway, since Pro left us with no good reason to prefer the possibility of God, over the existence of non-sentient possible worlds, his argument fails. "Plainly enough, if you do not already accept the claim that there is an entity which possesses maximal greatness, then you won't agree that the first of these arguments is more acceptable than the second. So, as a proof of the existence of a being which possess maximal greatness, Plantinga's argument seems to be a non-starter. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, Plantinga himself agrees..."[3]Regardless, Pro misunderstands the Modal Ontological Argument. This argument has nothing to do with probability. A non-sentient world has to be impossible for Pro to meet his burden. However, Pro has not even shown probablity. ConclusionThe Atheist has no burden to show that a maximally great being is impossible. Pro's first argument in favor of the resolution is worthless. Arguments that exist for God do not show God's existence is possible unless they are sound. KeytarHero has not shown that there exists even one sound argument for God. Additionally, Pro gave us no reason to think that a maximally great being's existence in some possible world is more probable than a non-sentient possible world. Pro also never gave reasons as to how God is metaphysically possible, but a non-sentient world is not. These were just assumptions. Since Pro has not shown that non-sentient worlds are impossible; the resolution has not been affirmed. The first premise rests on non-sentient worlds being impossible. There doesn't seem to be anything logically impossible, or metaphysically impossible with non-sentient worlds.Sources[1] http://www.jimpryor.net...[2] http://www.closertotruth.com...[3] http://plato.stanford.edu...http://www.youtube.com...