Free will does not exist

Hi AndrewB686,Really enjoyed reading your initial arguments, and I like where this discussion is headed!In my opening statement I will providing argument's from Professor at Dartmouth University, Peter U. Tse.The Neural Basis for Free Will?Most arguments for "Free Will" often are metaphysical in nature, proposing some kind of dualism. I will not take this course and reject the concept of contra-casual free will. This will be like your argument, derived from testable and falsifiable information in the physical world.Since I am not a neuroscientist, I will be largely drawing my argument from Professor Peter Tse. Here is an introduction to his argument. "The idea is that large numbers of neurons (a complex of cells or "cell assembly") are likely to be involved in even the simplest thoughts and actions. Tse argues that the brain may be able to modify dynamically the probabilities that individual neurons are "firing." He calls this "dynamical synaptic reweighting." Since the process by which a pre-synaptic neuron releases chemical neurotransmitters into the synaptic cleft is a statistical one (large numbers of neurotransmitter molecules must diffuse across the cleft to activate ion channel receptors on the post-synaptic neuron), Tse says that there is some ontological randomness in the process. He argues that this is real "ontological" indeterministic chance, quantum mechanical in origin. How exactly such weights or probabilities of firing might work is not understood, but Tse argues that weights would constitute "informational" criteria as opposed to being simply physical. They could represent mental events that supervene on the physical brain events. Tse accepts the Basic Argument of philosopher Galen Strawson, that we are not free to change the way we are at any moment, that we cannot be "causa sui." But since ontological randomness can dynamically reassign weights to the synapses, we can change mental events in the future."[1]Since my opponent has taken up the strong stance of "hard determinism," these findings are particularly troubling for this perspective. Even if the conclusion of this argument resulted in a failure to prove the existence of free will, it still prevents a level of randomness at the neural level that would refute a hard deterministic view.However, Peter Tse does have a working criteria for what his position on free will would be."I argue that it is possible to be a physicalist and ontological indeterminist and adhere to a strong conception of free will. A strong free will requires meeting some very high demands. We must have (a) multiple courses of physical or mental behavior open to us; (b) we must really be able to choose among them; (c) we must be or must have been able to have chosen otherwise once we have chosen a course of behavior; and (d) the choice must not be dictated by randomness alone, but by us. This seems like an impossible bill to fill, since it seems to require that acts of free will involve acts of self-causation. The goal of this chapter is to describe a way to meet these demands, assuming ontological indeterminism and criterial causation among neurons, that does not fall into the logical fallacy of self-causation."[2]Note that this criteria is met by the observations he made earlier because the neurons then have the ability to in a way assess the input received from other neurons, and would possibly change the criteria for how a neuron would transmit in the future. This is illustrated in Peter Tse's example of Mozart contained in his book."Mozart's brain can generate numerous musical sequences that meet his preset criteria for a happy melody, and his executive circuitry can choose from among these on the basis of the degree to which these criteria are met, or on the basis of other criteria realized in his nervous system. Because of noise in the system, there is no guarantee that he would choose the same sequence as the best one if we could "rewind" him in time and play the sequence over. The same musical sequences might not even be generated for executive consideration by the lower-level systems because they in turn generate possible solutions by setting criteria on their own lower-level inputs, and so on. Such hierarchies of critical selection can, even at the lowest level, harness noise for the generation of novel solutions to problems posed by higher levels in the system. However, the choice is not dictated solely by randomness, but, in the present example, by criteria that Mozart's nervous system set up to solve the problem of finding a happy melody."[3] If this information is accurately portrayed by the Professor, then unconscious neuronal activity is not as clear as my opponent would have us believe. It might be because of unconscious activity in the brain that lends us the ability to act otherwise in a given situation.Concluding Statements:I wanted to be a little more brief with my introductory statements, and primarily provide the argument for the Neuronal basis for Free Will as presented by Professor Peter Tse. While I do not believe these findings are 100% conclusive on the matter, I do believe they reveal an area where many neuroscientists and philosophers have jumped the gun on. That the physical origin of our decisions necessarily leads us to the conclusion that our decisions are absolutely determined.I personally believe that a cautious agnosticism should be held on the matter, and we should eagerly investigate the evidence provided for both without reserve. Many neuroscientists such as Sam Harris are also dedicated anti-theists who search for findings to destroy the concept of free will in order to support his case against religion. To me, in order for his findings and others as well, to be of any value, they should contend with what I believe is the strongest case for free will that is out there and is not built upon any kind of religious presupposition.Kind Regards,TrueScotsman[1] http://www.informationphilosopher.com...[2] The Neural Basis for Free Will pg. 133[3] The Neural Basis for Free Will pg. 139