The mind is probably not entirely physical

I would like to ask any readers to consider the arguments I shall present with an open mind; this debate is not that the mind is non-physical, beyond a doubt. Rather, I shall argue that it is more probable, or more plausible, that the mind is at least somewhat non-physical. Con shall attempt to refute my arguments. Leibniz's law argumentMy first argument shall invoke Leibniz's law of the Indiscernibility of Identicals. (1) This law states that if two things are, in reality, the same thing, then whatever is true of one is true of the other, and vice versa. We can state Leibniz's law thus: "If x is identical to y, then for any property x has, y has and for any property y has, x has. "This may seem obvious and irellevant. But it is important to notice, that if we compare two objects, and there is something which is true of one, but not the other, then they are not the same object in the first place. Hence, my argument:P1: IF the mind and the physical matter of the brain are identical, THEN there is nothing true of one, not true of the other. (Leibniz's law)P2: There are some things true of the mind, which are not true of the physical matter of the brain. C: . '. The mind and the physical matter of the brain are not identical. This is a logically valid modus tollens argument; so if it is unsound, one of the premises must be false. (2)I shall now proceed to argue that P2 is more plausibly true than false. (i) The mind is first-person (has a self), the physical matter of the brain is third-person (has no self). (ii) Real images exist in the mind, but real images do not exist in the brain. (iii) The "mind" has no weight and no apparent lenghth, but the brain does. Each of these seem intuitively, and plausibly true. Thus, the second premise stands as more plausibly true than false. The conception argumentIf two things are identical, it is metaphysically impossible for them to exist without each other. For example, my pet rabbit is named Thumper. Now it is metaphysically impossible for "my pet rabbit" to exist while "Thumper" does not exist, since they are the same thing. Furthermore, conception gives us grounds for accepting something as metaphysically possible. That which is metaphysically impossible, is also inconceivable, such as "square triangles" or "the part is greater than the whole". Thus it follows that if something really is conceivable, then it is at least metaphysically possible. P1: IF the mind and the physical matter of the brain are the same, THEN it is metaphysically impossible one to exist without the other. P2: IF it is metaphysically impossible for one to exist without the other, THEN it is impossible to conceive of one existing without the other. P3: We can conceive of the mind existing apart from the physical matter of the brain. C: . '. , The mind and the physical matter of the brain are not the same thing. This is a logically valid modus tollens (2)I can easily conceive of not having a body. I can conceive that all this physical world I see is merely an illusion, and that in fact, no physical world exists at all, and consequently neither does my brain. But if this is the case, then we have grounds for accepting that it is metaphysically possible for my mind to exist without my brain. But if my mind could, in a metaphysical sense, exist without my brain, then they cannot be the same thing, and the mind is not entirely physical. The zombie argumentOn the flip side of the conception argument, I would like to present the zombie argument. Imagine that you were to clone yourself. But don't stop there. Imagine that your clone is particle for particle, exactly identical to you. Physically, it's the same. But now I present this possibility: Is it possible for your clone to not have consciousness? In other words, your clone acts exactly like you, talks exactly like you, and would fool anyone. But "inside" it is all dark so to say. If this is possible, then why do you have consciousness? Physically, you're both identical, but one has a mind, and one does not. Thus, the mind cannot be physical. P1: IF that which is physically identical to me could possibly not have awareness, THEN awareness (the mind) is not physical. P2: It is possible that something could be identical to me, yet not have awareness. C: . '. , Awareness (the mind) is not physical. Once again, since we can conceive of something being physically the same as me, yet lacking consciousness, this shows that such a situation is at least metaphysically possible. An argument from experiencesWe perceive colors, sounds, feelings, tastes, etc. Yet each of these things is known only to us, and no one else. If, however, one were to analyze my brain while I smelling a delicious lasagna, one would not find the smell of lasagna in my brain. (Hopefully not, since I do not want my brain to smell like lasagna. ) I will admit that one might see the neuron firing patterns in my brain of the lasagna smell, but the smell itself wouldn't be there. But wait a minute, if the smell of the lasagna is purely physical, how come it isn't present in my brain? The answer is: because the sensations we experience cannot be explained in physical matter. P1: IF my experiences are purely physical, THEN they would be able to be viewed by a third person. P2: My experiences are not able to be viewed by a third person. C: . '. , My experiences are not purely physical. The experiences or sensations we have, are inherently first person. However, nothing physical is first person; everything physical is third person. Thus, the experiences or sensations I have cannot be purely physical. Argument from free willFinally, I would like to make a quick argument from free will. P1: If the mind is purely physical, THEN there is no free will. P2: There is free will. C: . '. , The mind is not purely physical. If the mind can be explained in purely physical means, then the actions of these physical means can be shown to be determined by some sort of physical cause. But if this is the case, then we never really "choose" anything. Rather, I eat lasagna because of my hunger for lasagna, not because I choose to do so. But free will seems intuitively true. In fact, it seems so true that society, and all forms of punishment, assume free will. To deny free will seems extremely counter-intuitive, and demands extreme amounts of evidence. For if there really is no free will, why do we have an experience of it which seems so obviously true? ConclusionIn conclusion, I'd like to stress something. Namely, that if even one of my arguments is more plausibly true than false, then the resolution has been affirmed. My opponent must show that every single one of my arguments are more plausibly false than true. If even so much as one argument remains at the end of this debate, it has been established that the mind is probably not purely physical. Also, I am not burdened to show that the mind is probably not physical at all, but rather that it is not entirely physical. Please keep this in consideration. Thank you! Now over to Con! (1) . http://www.unc.edu...(2) . http://en.wikipedia.org...;