R: It is morally permissible to kill one innocent person to save the lives of more innocent p

" The value for this debate ought to be societal welfare, because society is the agent of the action this resolution encompasses, and because in order to determine the moral permissibility of such an action, we must analyze the cause-and-effect calculus of the action. If the effect of the action is that of society attaining societal welfare, and if the affirmative can show the moral grounds behind it, the affirmative wins the round. " There is no such thing as societal welfare, society is not an agent nor an evaluator. It is an unchosen collective, and an ambiguous one, I.e., it contains elements whose welfare contradicts one another's , and therefore can have no welfare as a whole. The welfare of the robber contradicts the welfare of the rich man, the welfare of the rapist contradicts the welfare of the women walking in an alley, yet all of these exist in "society." " The standard I will use in this round will be Amitai Etzioni's New Golden Rule. Amitai Etzioni's "new golden rule" argues for the rebalancing of values. Specifically, Etzioni contends that freedom and morality must be balanced as well as autonomy and community. Etzioni's golden rule is "Respect and uphold society's moral order as you would have society respect and uphold your autonomy." " This statement in this context is essentially equivalent to "Respect the murderers' right to slaughter you just as you would have them respect your right to live." It is an impossible self-contradictory mess. Further, it contains an ipse-dixetism, it doesn't tell us what makes the "order" here moral. Using it to demonstrate said morality is therefore begging the question. " Actual and Hypothetical Consent Volenti nonfit injuria ("No wrong is done to one who consents") is an established moral principle which the law sanctions. " I do not consent. Nor does the innocent in question. Therefore that principle is not applicable here. "When, moreover, consent is given explicitly not to die but to bear some risk of being killed that falls far short of certainty, and when the benefits seem reasonably to rival the costs, legal objections motivated by the fear that consent to suffer harm might not in some cases be completely voluntary typically fall away. " I have given no such consent, and neither has the innocent in question, indeed, if he had, he would not be innocent, he would be guilty of placing himself at such risk, and therefore fully liable for what happened to him, so it doesn't address the resolution. "Analogous considerations should apply to risks people freely assume of being killed intentionally. Situations in which killing some people might save others are rare, but in some instances one can imagine people assenting to their being killed in the unlikely event that those situations occurred. " You can imagine whatever the hell you want, your imagination does not affect the reality of the matter. If someone actually gave such consent, they are not innocent in regards to its consequences, if they did not, your argument for killing them falls apart. In neither circumstance does it address the resolution. "Providing medical assistance to an unconscious person is the stock example. " Because people will generally consent to medical assistance. They will not generally consent to being killed. Further, such is not a moral question. Though legal liability is removed when someone resuscitates someone who turns out not to have wanted it, such an event is an accident and an error, and not morally permissible with full knowledge of the context. "In a legal sense, contract law supplies another example of hypothetical consent: when contracts fail to specify how some unanticipated event should be handled, arbitrators or courts typically attempt to determine what arrangements the parties would have made had they foreseen the unexpected event and accord them rights against one another on that basis. " In the case of arbitrators, that's fine, arbitration only happens when both parties agree to abide by the arbiter's verdict. In the case of courts, that is not acceptable. If the contract does not address a given situation, it's statement is not relevant to that situation's resolution. There is no standard by which to "attempt to determine" such. "Hypothetical consent is simply the consent that somebody would actually have manifested in a normatively authoritative situation of relevant knowledge and rational choice that never in fact occurred. Thus, the standard I am endorsing merely attempts to explain and guide our intuitive reactions to particular cases by holding people to bargains they would have made, insofar as they would have wanted themselves held to those bargains. " Anyone who would have made such a bargain could not be classified as "innocent" in this context, and you have no reason to believe they likely would have. Further, it is entirely possible for someone to be conscious and yet be in a situation in which killing them would save lives, indeed, most situations posited in this event have all parties conscious. When they are right there and aware, you have no right to assault them without asking, even were you under the idiotic impression that they would "hypothetically consent" to it, which they wouldn't have. In either case, speaking of consent does not deal with the question of innocents, you have not addressed the resolution. People who have consented to death in a certain situation are not without liability for the consequences.