Strong Atheism is a Sound Position

A priori stance of Non-Existence Con essentially drops this argument, since he has not challenged the validity of the argument, or the soundness of the premises. I gave the argument in 2 parts: “P1. All entities are more likely to exist than not a priori (a1, a2, a3… etc) …. C. P1 entails a contradiction (2 & 3…ad infinitum), therefore P1 is false” And “P1. All entities are as likely to exist than not a priori (a1, a2, a3… etc) …. C. P1 entails a contradiction (a1,a2,a3…ad infinitum), therefore P1 is false” So here I have ruled that assuming God more likely to exist than not a priori is absurd, and also as likely to exist than not is also absurd. Hence we are only left with the antithesis, that God is unlikely to exist a priori. There is no middle ground here due to the law of the excluded middle, God’s either likely to exist, or is not likely to exist. Hence the antithesis logically follows from the arguments. I have supported all these premises in my argumentation in the previous rounds and Con has not disputed any of them, and hence drops the argument altogether(!). Con seems to confuse the argument I am making: “So I don’t see any evidence behind the premise that all entities are more likely to exist than not” That was the entire point of the argument! It demonstrates that such a claim is absurd, and hence all claims including God are unlikely to exist a priori. The argument is an analytical argument, and hence the premises are derived a priori, so Con’s evidential complains are void since those are necessarily a posterori. This argument, coupled with an absence of positive tangable reasons to believe the existence of an entity is indeed evidence of absence, it just isn’t ‘proof’ of absence, as I already argued. Theological Fatalism Con’s only significant objection seems to in fact be a rejection of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), a well-regarded philosophical principle for which both free will and also moral responsibility.[1] PAP: “If you cannot do otherwise when you do an act, you do not act freely” This leads from Con asserting that ‘I will not, but I can’, however it also entails ‘I could not, even if I wanted to’. Denial of this principle (Hyper-Incompatibilism) unsurprisingly puts Con in seriously compromising positions when it comes to moral decisions, for example: “A person who has a choice between knowingly putting salt in his cereal, or knowingly putting poison in a friend’s cereal, however the salt has run out, leaving the person with a choice, but only logical outcome (his poisoning of his friend).” According to Con, this person poisoned his friend by his own free will, and consequently is responsible for the death of his friend. The person is aware of the possibilities, yet can only choose to do the undesirable one. This may sound somewhat absurd, and it is, but it logically follows from Con’s assertion that one who could not have chosen to do otherwise would still have ‘free will’. Furthermore, such a stance would lead to the absurd notion of being responsible for one’s essential properties. For example, a being that necessarily does action X (such as obeying God’s divine foreknowledge) mean’s that being’s situation is described by de dicto necessity. Necessarily, that being obeys God’s foreknowledge, which is synonymous with one obeying their necessary property of obedience. There is nothing to distinguish one from having the necessary property of ‘obedience’ and extrinsically ‘necessarily obeying’. Hence that being’s alternative possibilities don’t exist, since it is nature (albeit extrinsically) .[2] Similarly, a necessarily evil person cannot be held morally responsible for his evil deeds, since that is his nature, to choose to do otherwise would violate his nature, indeed this is something that Con affirmed in his first rebuttal, hence for Con to deny this objection would be to deny one of his own objections! A modal formulation of the PAP is given below: P1. If free will exists, then s2 AND s3 are logically possible situations after a choice event in the same situation (s1)P2. s2≠s3≠s1 P1 arises from the PAP. My argument for fatalism plugs into P3: P3. Necessarily, either s2 or s3 is not logically possibleC. Free will does not exist (modus tollens, from 1 & 3) Con has attempted to assert that both situations are logically possible, but this is just a direct contradiction of what omniscience entails (where it becomes necessary only one logically possible situation exists). Moreover, it is possible for someone to relish the opportunity to see what would happen if fate could be changed, hence if God told some of a predestined future they would want to violate it in some manner. It is prima facie absurd that they would not if given the choice to violate predestination if given. Yet Con’s reasoning demands this be impossible. The choice clearly exists (I can choose to, or choose not to violate fate), yet I can logically only ever choose not to. This not only violates the PAP, but is also prima facie implausible. Non-Cognitivism of "God" Con again misunderstands my argument here, as such I will give it in a horned dilemma to make things clear: P1) Either God has a positively defined primary attribute, or does not P2) If God has a positively defined primary attribute, then he is necessarily limited P3) If God does not have a positively defined Primary attribute, then “God” is meaningless C) In either case, God does not exist Even without assuming that a primary attribute of God’s is impossible, it also follows that ignorance of God’s primary attribute(s) means we cannot meaningfully and justifiably apply secondary attributes to it. It is impossible to argue or talk about a being without an understanding of how those secondary attributes apply to the primary nature of the being. For example, a ‘brown chair’, the term ‘brown’ only has meaning when we have an understanding of the nature of the chair, what it’s made of, it’s geometry etc, and hence what ‘brown’ means with regards to the primary nature of a chair. Similarly applying attributes such as ‘omnipotence’ or ‘omniscience’ or ‘creator’ is completely meaningless unless we have an understanding of what the primary nature/attributes of God is. The term “God” remains meaningless. Con described God in terms of ‘unlimited size’ for example, but this limits God to within spacetime, which would ironically contradict God’s limitless nature (omnipotence, omniscience). The same applies to a limitless source of energy, since God is limited to the nature of what ‘energy’ is, and qualities such as omniscience and omnipotence can only be applied frivolously to such a being. Con’s only other defence was appealing to ‘love’, the primary nature of which would clearly be an emotion, which has tangable physical and mental qualities, and indeed is limited in nature. Hence even in ignorance of what its primary nature is, we can sensibly assume there is one. Moral Argument I am struggling to see what Con’s argument for the existence of God is here, but it appears to be something like the following: P1) If God does not exist, then objective moral values do not existP2) Objective moral values existC) God exists Con needs to actually positively support these premises objectively. I, as a moral nihilist would obviously strongly object to P2, that objective moral values do not exist, and I provided evidence that this was likely the case given even the most abhorrent examples Con seems to give actually have positive supporters, the Jews would perceive such an act (the Holocaust) as ‘wrong’, the opposite was true for the Nazi’s performing such actions. Moreover, I could also positively object to P1, and argue that objective moral values can be possibly derived from our psychology, how humans perceive things (such as pleasure, pain, fear, emotions) and hence moral values be derived from a knowledge of how humans find actions ‘preferable’ or ‘non-preferable’.[3] Indeed numerous secular moral systems exist which surmise morality as objective (objectivism, utilitarianism etc.), hence clearly atheism does not necessarily lead to nihilism. I gave a rudimentary example last round of how humans as a society tend to act in certain cooperative ways, for mutual benefit, to which Con has not attempted to refute. I would argue such values are in fact subjective, but because humans generally perceive similar things in similar ways (humans generally prefer not to be in pain, suffering, etc) then we generally converge on the same subjective values (and hence confuse them with objective values). Evolution is not necessary to affirm this, only an understanding of our psychology and our abilities to learn with our cognitive faculties. Con’s only defences of the existence of objective moral values are contained in the following: “All humans know that something’s are just, wrong.” “….its all relative, and I simply ask the readers of this debate if they agree that the holocaust was not absolutely wrong regardless of whether other humans agree with you or not” Both are entirely appeals to emotion, what the reader thinks is wrong has nothing to do with whether or not something is objectively wrong. Hence I can just reject these out of hand sans further evidence from Con. Fine Tuning & ‘Miraculous Encounters’ Con simply has not presented the evidence required to make these full arguments that I can rebut, and since he is going to be presenting them in the following round where I am unable to mount a response, I request voters to take this into consideration, especially the ‘Miraculous Encounters’ argument. My rebuttals stand. Conclusion My summary from the last round remains unchanged, Con’s positive arguments have been completely unsubstantiated and fail for making unwarranted assumptions or false assumptions. All three of I have thoroughly enjoyed this debate, I wish Con luck in voting! References 1. http://tinyurl.com... 2. http://tinyurl.com... 3.Sam Harris ‘A Moral Landscape’ Ch 2-3