Resolved: The Leibnizian Cosmological Argument is Sound - 4

The Leibnizian Cosmological Argument Every existing thing has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause. If the universe has an explanation of its existence, that explanation is God. The universe is an existing thing. Therefore the explanation of the universe is God. Premise 1 An Overview of Modality The CON's first refutation will be addressed under Premise 2. My opponent's second rebuttal to my case is to claim that classifying all existing things into two categories does not necessarily entail that they are both non-empty and provides the excellent example of unicorns. I would like to note however if we know all beings exist either contingently or necessarily and solely contingent beings cannot explain their own existence, then logically we may conclude that necessary beings must exist. Furthermore, if everything existed necessarily then the intuitive part of the PSR would be rejected as everything would constitute its own existence and things would simply pop in and out of existence. The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR)This is conceded.Premise 2My opponent's initial rebuttal (of my first premise) is a claim that I do not prove that the explanations of the universe, being necessary or contingent are intended. I would invite him to read my second premise. Along with that I will offer further evidence of God's omnipresence, as well as a necessary conclusion that is derived from a personal creator of the universe. First though, I would like to note that the LCA defends God as the personal, necessary creator of the universe. The LCA does not implicitly defend the attributes granted the Lord by Christian Theologians, but it is a logical conclusion to make from the validity of the LCA. Brandon C. Look [1] explains Leibniz's argument.First, insofar as the first cause of the entire series must have been able to survey all other possible worlds, it has understanding. Second, insofar as it was able to select one world among the infinity of possible worlds, it has a will. Third, insofar as it was able to bring about this world, it has power. (Leibniz adds here that “power relates to being, wisdom or understanding to truth, and will to good.”) Fourth, insofar as the first cause relates to all possible, its understanding, will and power are infinite. And, fifth, insofar as everything is connected together, there is no reason to suppose more than one God. Thus, Leibniz is able to demonstrate the uniqueness of God, his omniscience, omnipotence, and benevolence from the twin assumptions of the contingency of the world and the principle of sufficient reason.Now onto the first objection my opponent labeled under the second premise of the LCA. He would like to argue that I have simply proved that this objects within the universe are contingent but not the universe itself. I would say that I have proved the contingency of the universe in various ways. First, if the very nature of the universe - i.e., the objects that constitute its being - are contingent then the universe itself must be contingent by proxy. You see, necessary existence would require the quality of being unchanging and eternal, so it follows that if the elements that constitute the nature of a being's existence are contingent - i.e. changing and temporal - then the being itself must be contingent. Second, if that was not convincing enough, there is a simply test we can use to prove the universe exists contingently without referring to its internal structure. To have necessary existence, it must be logically impossible for that being not to have existed. It is no absurd to claim that the universe itself may not have existed. That proposition is perfectly valid. It is possible indeed that the universe as we know it may not have existed at all. This is reinforced by my opponent's concession that the universe indeed may have developed in a far different manner. If the universe may have developed differently, then there is reason to say it may not have developed in this manner, and also may not have developed at all. Therefore, the universe may have failed to exist.Next, my opponent tries to pigeon hole me into defending the God of Christian Theology. I will note to the audience that the debate of which God created the universe is another one altogether, but nonetheless I have previously proved that the LCA logically concludes that the God that created the universe must possess, at the very least, the basic qualities attributed to the Judeo-Christian God.Finally, my opponent claims that this universe could have been created by contingent being in another universe. I would simply claim that this falls back into infinite regress as yet again we face the problem of a series of existential-causality consisting of solely contingent beings. If all beings within the series are contingent then it is impossible to explain the existence of the first being, even if the series is infinite. You cannot simply provide more contingent explanations at the beginning of the series, for the infinite regress will not resolve itself without there being a necessary first cause. My opponent preempts this response in saying that this universe must be proved to have been created by God. I would claim that if God created an alternative universe that caused the creation of this one, then by proxy he is responsible for creating this universe. Any rejection of this argument is simply a semantic concession of the validity of the LCA.Premise 3My opponent concedes the validity of my third premise.ConclusionMy opponent has failed to refute the premises of the LCA, therefore it logically follows that the conclusion is valid. Risking myself sounding redundant, I would like to again point out that the LCA seeks to prove the existence of a personal necessary creator of the Universe, and therefore I am not burdened to defend any specific God. I simply provide defense of the attributes ascribed to Him by Judeo-Christian belief as it is a necessary conclusion drawn from the validity of the LCA.Sources1. http://plato.stanford.edu...