On balance, theism is more plausible than naturalism.

I'll begin by noting that Con has not made any arguments either for naturalism or against theism. While this would be fine within the framework of logical positivism or hard empiricism, it is not fine within the framework of reformed epistemology, which Con has not addressed. Formulating a sound theory of epistemic justification is necessary insofar as it places the debate in context and shows how it ought to be evaluated. Unless and until Con provides an alternative set of guidelines, the debate goes to Pro by default. ============ Cosmological argument ============ Con challenges "Premise" 4, which is actually a conclusion drawn from the three previous steps. He alludes to the regress problem, which ignores the fact that this is not a Kalam-type cosmological argument but a Leibnizian version. The whole point of the LCA is to sidestep the regress problem by showing how even an infinite chain of logically contingent events or contingent facts still can't explain why the universe exists rather than nothing. Marc Lange of UNC at Chapel Hill explains "even if 'F' does indeed make A necessary, the account will not have succeeded in revealing what necessity consists in, since 'F' is the very same kind of fact that the account was supposed to be explicating."[1] Contrary to what Con states, it is not my claim that the universe was created by a necessary being that is self refuting, but his claim that the universe is the product of contingent events. This was established in Step 3, which my opponent has not contested. Step 5 is not a separate conclusion, as Con seems to think, but rather the observation that such a necessary being is what we would recognize as God. ============ Teleological argument ============ First, I must concede that my opponent's caricature of my argument is indeed invalid. Con raises six objections to this strawman. These objections fall into three basic categories: that other explanations can account for fine-tuning, the appearance of design does not necessarily point to a creator, and the fine-tuning argument must paradoxically apply to God Himself. I'll tackle them in this order. Con claims that there may not be any potential variation in the values of the physical constants of the universe. He has not sourced this claim or bothered to explain it in any kind of depth. What does it even mean to say that "the physical laws of the universe are fixed by the pre-existing nature of reality?" How exactly would this work? What about the "nature of reality" makes the seemingly arbitrary values of the dozens of physical constants fall within precise, life permitting ranges? Even if this account succeeds, Con still needs to explain why "the pre-existing nature of reality" is such that it causes these physical constants to fall within the correct ranges. Alternatively, he suggests a multiverse could account for fine-tuning. However, this leaves the naturalist no better off. In the most popular inflationary model, the "universe generator," so to speak, would itself need to be fine tuned. Robin Collins explains that the inflaton field, which gives empty space a positive energy density, would expand enormously during the formation of a universe. In order for matter to be created, the amount of energy would have to increase proportionately at a constant rate. Additionally, there would have to be some mechanism that allows for sufficient variation of the paramaters of physics to explain the fine tuning. Finally, many of these parameters are entailed by the structure of string theory and can't be explained by the multiverse.[2] Next, Con argues that the occurrence of low-probability events and the appearance of ordered complexity is not evidence of God. Yes, the odds of the two of us finding eachother on a debate site are fairly low. However, far from refuting my argument, this actually demonstrates the same principle at work. In order to account for such a low-probability event, we would seek to explain it in terms of antecedent states of affairs: psychological and environmental factors that may have led us here, such as genetics and upbringing. He objects that the intricate design of a snowflake does not prima facie point to a divine creator. However, I pre-empted this objection by formulating my Bayesian inference within the framework of the existence of intelligent life; "embodied moral agents of the sort that can form meaningful relationships with each other and potentially with God." This specific type of design is strong evidence for theism. Finally, Con cites Dawkin's "Ultimate 747 Gambit," arguing that the teleological argument would have to apply to the creator as well. This is really a silly objection that is wrong on two distinct fronts. If God exists, He must be, by definition, a necessary being. Moreover, God is ontologically simple. Richard Swinburne explains: "theism postulates a God with capacities which are as great as they logically can be. He is infinitely powerful, omnipotent. That there is an omnipotent God is a simpler hypothesis than that there is a God who has such-and-such limited powers...A finite limitation cries out for an explanation why there is just that particular limit, in a way that limitlessness does not."[3] According to Dawkins, something is complex just in case it has parts that are "arranged in a way that is unlikely to have arisen by chance alone."[4] Of course, God is spirit, not a material thing. As such, he doesn't have "parts arranged in a way unlikely to have arisen by chance." Thus, even by Dawkins' own definition, God is not complex. Even if I concede for the sake of argument that God is complex, this still doesn't pose a serious problem. There is nothing wrong with explaining one instance of organized complexity in terms of another. Alvin Plantinga writes "suppose we land on an alien planet orbiting a distant star and discover machine-like objects that look and work just like tractors; our leader says 'there must be intelligent beings on this planet who built those tractors.' A first-year philosophy student on our expedition objects: 'Hey, hold on a minute! You have explained nothing at all! Any intelligent life that designed those tractors would have to be at least as complex as they are.' No doubt we'd tell him that a little learning is a dangerous thing and advise him to take the next rocket ship home and enroll in another philosophy course or two."[5] ============ The historical Jesus ============ My opponent has either misunderstood or intentionally distorted my argument here. I am not claiming that the existence of Jesus proves that there is a God; I've built a cumulative case based on five historical facts (the crucifixion, burial, empty tomb, appearances made by the risen Christ, and the sincere belief of the apostles) for the resurrection, which strongly implies that there is a God. Con has not disputed any of these historical events, so I assume he agrees they occurred. In the first round, I called on my opponent to give an alternative explanation for them and alluded to several attempts made by secular historians. Rather than actually defending such theories, he blithely asserts that "these claims are far more likely, and far more probable than the assumption that the Christian God exists." This is a clear case of begging the question.[6] If these theories are really as plausible as Con seems to believe, he should have no trouble defending one or more of them. || CONCLUSION || My opponent has not addressed the single most important argument of the debate: the classification of God as a properly basic foundational belief within the reformed epistemological tradition. His attempts to answer the the Leibnizian cosmological argument and the Bayesian teleological miss the mark and his flippant response to the case for the resurrection of Jesus begs the question. The resolution is affirmed. References: http://tinyurl.com...