The USFG should substantially increase its military capability in Southeast Asia

Rebuttal: SEA Impact 1) Con’s analysis is not very good for multiple reasons. i) The U.S. can increase military capability without approval and without escalating to “total war.” This is because the U.S. Navy can be stationed at friendly naval bases, e.g. in the Philippines, and operate over huge area via international waters. The U.S. already has security capability in SEA- the status quo disproves Con’s argument. Expansion of US military presence in the region does not involve putting troops in the ASEAN bloc. The strategy includes posting a contingent of 2500 marines in northern Australia, adding a second carrier group to the region, and potentially strengthening forces in Japan and South Korea. Contrary to Pro's assertion, there are already US bases on the Japanese main islands. Increasing military capability can also take the form of prioritizing deployment of new military assets- e.g. ensuring that new military intelligence tech, radar systems, and sub-ocean equipment are strategically placed in the Pacific rather than elsewhere. ii) Con says regional disputes are “nonmilitary” and cites the South China Sea disputes as evidence. But china has used military force to intimidate SEA countries into backing off of territorial disputes. [1] We also have a slew of evidence in R1 showing how China is ramping up militarization and increasingly using force in dispute. [1] http://www.washingtonpost.com... iii) Con says SEA only wants the U.S. when China “misbehaves,” but half of our R1 case was showing exactly how China IS misbehaving. It follows from Con’s argument that SEA should be welcoming the Us with open arms right now. iv) Even if SEA unanimously rejected increase US presence, Con has provided a shred of evidence that they would do anything about it. Again, in R1 we showed that SEA perceives China as a bully that threatens SEA interests- even if SEA doesn’t want the US around, SEA will put up with the US rather than side with China. 2) Even if SEA would prefer to try and handle China on their own- it is best to let the US respond. The most effective security response for a collection of weak SEA states is the pursuit of nuclear weapons. Leaving SEA to their own devices will result in the nuclear proliferation we outlined in R1. 3) The U.S. has plenty of carrots to get SEA countries on board. Con points out that ASEAN wants to expand economic ties with the U.S. and move down a path to modernity- these countries have a natural incentive to cooperate with the U.S. ASEAN as an organization is more afraid of lack of U.S. engagement than an overbearing U.S. [2] [2] http://www.ibtimes.com... 4) ASEAN has deep seated internal conflict and needs sustained U.S. involvement to remain viable. There is a rift within ASEAN between those countries with SCS disputes with China and states which could become client states of China. Without U.S. counterbalancing China, ASEAN will fall apart under the weight of Chinese influence. [2] The organizations Con claims have been successful in SEA benefit from U.S. support and are harmed by Chinese influence. USA Impact 1) Con offers little analytical support and zero empirical support for the claim that the Resolution will destabilize the region. 2) Our disaster response and piracy arguments show how US military presence preserves economic stability and build good-will in SEA. 3) Con ignores all our R1 analysis how SEA is unstable without US counterbalancing. An unchecked China will lead to military action in Taiwan, expansion of Chinese aggression in territorial claims in the SCS, conflict with Japan and North Korea, and the risk of a nuclear arms race as SEA countries take it upon themselves to seek protection 4) SEA countries are already starting to ramp up militarization in response to Chinese aggression. South Korea and Japan are both planning on building new bases to safeguard shipping lanes vital to their economic interests. This escalation is in response to perceived lack of commitment from the U.S. [3] This is especially notable considering Japan’s cultural antipathy towards securitization in the aftermath of WWII. Japan has relied heavily on the U.S. for security post-WWII and the change in attitude signals an alarming perception that the U.S. is not the reliable source of security it once was. [3] As more countries militarize, the risk of miscalculation grows, making war more likely. What is at risk is the multipolarization of SEA geopolitics. A strong U.S. presence will reassure SEA actors, preventing risky independent security measures and stabilizing the region. [3] http://www.nytimes.com... 5) Pro’s S. Korea evidence is flat out wrong. In 2013 South Korea signed an agreement for additional security cooperation with the U.S. and requested that the US postpone a scheduled transfer of a military base. [4] [ 4] http://www.reuters.com... 6) Allies like Japan are already lobbying for greater US involvement in maintaining maritime security in SEA- including bringing the rampant piracy issue under control. Even if some SEA countries oppose U.S. involvement, regional allies of the U.S. will work for acceptance from ASEAN countries. [5] http://www.eastasiaforum.org... 7) Pew Polls show that the major SEA countries overwhelmingly trust the U.S. more than they trust China. This is sword cuts two ways. First it shows that the region will be receptive U.S. involvement, especially in light of recent Chinese aggression. Second, the alarming amount of distrust between China and its neighbors means territorial disputes are unlikely to be resolved peacefully. 90% of Japanese distrust China- this decreases the likelihood of trust-based agreements and diplomacy in the absence of outside influence from the U.S. [6] http://apdforum.com... China Impact 1) Con is again flat out wrong in claiming that China is only relevant insofar as China tries to balance US aggression. Again, we presented a slew of evidence that China is pursuing the military capability to enforce territorial claims and secure control of SEA geopolitics. 2) A policy analysis performed by George Washington University entitled “Balancing Acts: The U.S. Rebalance and Asia-Pacific Stability” [7] summarizes the need for a US build up: “The new U.S. policy is also based on the need – widely felt throughout most of the Asia-Pacific region – for strategic reassurance in the face of a rising and increasingly assertive China. The rebalance is also driven by a desire to reassure U.S. allies, friends, and other countries in the region that the United States has not been exhausted after a decade of war, that it has not been weakened by economic and political problems at home, and that it is not going to disengage from Asia-Pacific affairs.” The GWU analysis shows that Southeast Asian nations want balance restored. Besides China, “Almost every other regional power in Northeast, Southeast, and South Asia holds to two positions. First, most regional powers have been publicly or privately pleased to see the stronger U.S. commitment to the Asia-Pacific region. Second, regional powers are also keen to avoid having to choose between the United States and China.” [7] http://www.gwu.edu...