It Is Possible That A Maximally Great Being Exists

I thank Con for his rebuttal. Let's continue on.Con has falsely accused my arguments of being fallacious, but I believe his dismissal of my arguments to be in error. And I think, if the reader honestly examines the arguments, you will agree, also.I already addressed the question of epistemic vs. subjunctive possibility in the first round, though I didn't use the ten-dollar words. In the first premise of the OA, subjunctive possibility is in view. Let's review a few more key definitions for the OA.Impossible Entity -- an impossible entity is one that does not exist in any possible worlds. It's not just that an impossible entity doesn't exist, it's that it can't exist. Impossible entities are logically incoherent. Square circles and married bachelors are examples of impossible entities.Contingent entities -- a contingent entity is an entity that exists in some possible worlds, but not others. It is possible for contingent entities not to exist at all, or not to exist at some point and then to exist at others. A contingent entity may or may not exist in the actual world (which is included as a possible world). Humans and unicorns are examples of contingent entities.Necessary entities -- a necessary entity is an entity that exists in all possible worlds. By their very nature they exist and can not not exist. Numbers, the laws of logic, and God (if he exists) are examples of necessary entities.I'm not sure that for something to be subjunctively possible, it must definitely not be impossible. However, even if that's the case, then I think the same can be said of God. For example, we know for sure that square circles are impossible entities because squares, by their very nature, have four sides and corners. So there cannot exist square circles because circles, by their very nature, have no sides or corners. Similarly, there is nothing logically incoherent in the concept of God, as Christians understand God, so the existence of God is a subjunctive possibility. If Con expects anything more, then it seems he is expecting me to prove that God actually exists, which is beyond the scope of the first premise of the OA, and is really not possible for me to accomplish. It's not possible to even prove the external world exists beyond the shadow of a doubt. All that is needed is to show that God's existence is at least a logical possibility.1 -- No one has shown God's existence to be logically impossible.Con has falsely accused me of shifting the burden of proof. This is incorrect, since I gave positive arguments for my position. I did not simply assert that God's existence is logically possible, then expect Con to do all the heavy lifting in the debate. This argument in particular was used to show that no one has ever succeeded in showing God's existence to be logically incoherent, so God's subjunctive possibility remains. We know square circles are impossible entities because it is a logically incoherent concept. God's existence is not logically incoherent since there is nothing logically incoherent about his attributes, and no one has ever succeeded in showing God to be logically incoherent.On top of that, I gave a second positive argument for my position.2 -- We have warrant for accepting God's existence as possible.Con has also falsely accused me of making a non-sequitur (which just means that my conclusion does not follow from my argument). However, the arguments do, in fact, show that we have warrant for accepting God's existence. The very nature of logical arguments is such that if a logical argument is a sound argument, it is impossible for its conclusion to be false. Con is correct that you can argue for anything, impossible, possible, correct, or not correct with a logical argument. For example, take the following argument:P1: Socrates was human.P2: Humans can breathe underwater.C: Therefore, Socrates could breathe underwater.This is a logically valid argument, but we know it to be unsound because the second premise is incorrect. However, take the following argument:P1: Socrates was human.P2: Humans are mortal.C: Therefore, Socrates was mortal.Not only is this a logically valid argument, but it is also sound. The nature of valid arguments is that if the premises are true, then it is impossible for the conclusion to be false. So the first argument is valid (if the premises were true, the conclusion could not be false). However, the argument fails because it is unsound. If the argument were a sound argument like the second argument, then not only would it be valid but the premises would, in fact, be true. Since the premises are true, the conclusion must necessarily be true because it follows necessarily from the premises.Therefore, if the other arguments for God's existence are sound argument (which is debatable, of course, but beyond the scope of this debate to argue for), then we do, indeed, have warrant for accepting the first premise of the OA as true. In fact, it would make the first premise of the OA much more likely than if we didn't have other arguments for God's existence.William Lane Craig and J.P. Moreland add, "The theistic arguments need not be taken to be like links in a chain, in which one link follows another so that the chain is only as strong as its weakest link. Rather, they are like links in a coat of chain mail, in which all the links reinforce one another so that the strength of the whole exceeds that of any single link. The ontological argument might play its part in a cumulative case for theism, in which a multitude of factors simultaneously conspire to lead one to the global conclusion that God exists." [1]So Con's assertion that my arguments are fallacious are unfounded. The premises stand affirmed.Responding to Con's case.So Con responds by bringing up the possibility of non-sentient possible worlds. While this objection seems reasonable on its face, the problem is that we have much more reason to accept the existence of God than to suppose that a non-sentient world is possible (especially since, as Con suggests, if God really does exist, then a non-sentient world would be impossible). God's possibility goes beyond just logical possibility. God's existence is a metaphysical possibility. Fewer things are metaphysically possible than are logically possible, and for something to be metaphysically possible there must be other reasons to accept it as true (as I argued in my second point above). As Peter S. Williams says, "the repeated failures of attempts to show that God is an incoherent concept justify a pessimistic inference." And some, like Trent Dougherty, have been convinced by this (concluding that the Ontological Argument, in fact, proves God's existence). Since the existence of God is more probable than a non-sentient world, it is more reasonable to conclude that God's existence is possible and a non-sentient world is impossible, given that God is a necessary entity. [2]To reiterate, Con's assertions that my two arguments are fallacious are unfounded, and I have successfully shown that God's existence is more probable than a non-sentient world, so the first premise of the Ontological Argument stands affirmed. I await Con's rebuttal.[1] William Lane Craig and J.P. Moreland, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview, (InterVarsity Press, Downer's Grove, Il, 2003), p. 499.[2] http://www.youtube.com...;(the relevant portion begins at 5:50).