The Ontological Argument For God's Existence Is Sound

IntroductionIf an argument as interesting as the Ontological Argument is going to be defended sufficiently on DDO, then my confidence lies with KRFournier. However, as I will demonstrate in this round, the argument from Pro, presented as is, does not establish the resolution at hand. Model Logic SemanticsI do not have many issues with this section, accept for one minor detail. Below, my opponent defines a possible world as:Possible World – "A possible world is a reality that is logically coherent. A possible world may or may not exist. This is a modal term for 'what can be.'"When Pro defines a possible world (or what is "possible"), he essentially defines it simply as a state of affairs that is logically coherent. However, this does not seem like a sufficient definition. A possible world is also metaphysically consistent. This means that even if a proposed world is logically coherent, it can still be impossible if there is a metaphysical violation which doesn't necessarily violate the laws of logic specifically. For example, something coming from nothing violates ex nihilo nihil fit, and is the case in no possible world if one accepts this principle as a strict metaphysical necessity. The fact that this scenario doesn't violate any of the deductive laws of logic doesn't change the conclusion that in no possible world does something come from nothing. According to my opponent's definition, all that is required is logical coherency for a state of affairs to be possible; this is false. Additionally, I would like to define some terms of my own:(i) Epistemic Possibility[1](ii) Subjunctive Possibility (Modal Possibility in context)[2]To say something is epistemically possible is to say that it may be true, and it might even be subjunctively impossible; we just do not know (it may be true "for all we know"). This is how most people conceive of possibility. However, to say that something like a maximally great being for example, is subjunctively possible (which the Modal Ontological Argument necessitates), is to say that a maximally great being is definitely not impossible with no epistemic room for error. Or, more precisely; it is not possible that it is subjunctively impossible that a maximally great being exists. That is a basic modal inference based on modal axiom S5 (necessarily possibly A, follows from possibly A)[3]:Diamond ("possibly")Square ("necessarily") GodOf course, I will accept the definition of God as a "maximally great being" for this debate. Argument Is the Modal Ontological Argument for God's existence even logically valid? I would say that it is. If the first premise is true, then the rest of the argument just follows naturally. If God is possible, he would exist in some possible world. We would come to know this truth simply by unpacking the concept of a possible world. If he exists in some possible world, does he exist in all of them? Well, if God is conceived us as a necessary being (which he is), then the anwer is yes. This is based on the modal axiom S5[4]:Diamond ("possibly")Square ("necessarily") Possible necessity, entails actual necessity (just like how possible, means necessarily possible via S5). If God exists in every possible world, that includes our world as it is self-evidently possible. If God exists in the actual world, then God exists. The argument is pretty straight forward and it is obviously logically valid. The question that remains pertains to what reason we have to accept the initial first premise as true that the rest of the argument follows from. It Is Possible That God ExistsAs I outlined earlier on in this round, something has to be metaphysically possible to exist in some possible world, not just logically possible. Therefore, claiming that God is possible simply because he is not logically impossible is not a sufficient foundation for the crucial premise in question. Regardless, the implication that God is logically coherent is nothing more than a presumption. Pro must show that God is necessarily possible in order to meet his burden of proof. Therefore, any prima facie cases which leave room for epistemic error do not seem to apply to our Modal situation here, as this type of case would at best show that God is merely epistemically possible, which entails that we accept his possibility because because we lack knowledge of anything that contradicts the possibility of God; not metaphysically possible, which entails that it is necessary that nothing contradicts the possibility of God. It must be shown that, necessarily, God is not impossible (this follows from axiom S5). Since this has not been demonstrated, then the conclusion that God exists has not been shown to be true.ConclusionThe Ontological Argument presented by Pro is logically valid. However, the support for the initial premise is insufficient. Pro has not proven that God is logically coherent, or metaphysically coherent for that matter. Also, he simply bare-asserts prima facie warrant for the first premise (which I see no reason to grant). In any event, a prima facie case may warrant the epistemic possibility of God, but is not clear how it would warrant the subjuctive possibility of God.Since Pro has not supported the crucial premise of the argument properly; the resolution has not been established.Sources [1] https://en.wikipedia.org... [2]http://en.wikipedia.org...[3] http://en.wikipedia.org...[4] http://www.unc.edu...