Homosexual actions are immoral

===Framework===As I mentioned in the last round, the reason why I dismissed the choice/innateness dichotomy as relevant is because I take issue with Pro's moral reasoning at its base. If I were to accept the existence of natural law or admit that the health repercussions of homosexuality make it immoral, then perhaps whether someone has a choice in the matter would become relevant to the debate. But since it is the base moral framework that Pro operates under that I contest, the choice/innateness dichotomy is not. Pro is reasoning ahead of himself here and I don't think he can actually get to this step yet since his moral reasoning's are dubious. If Pro is able to justify his moral standards of natural law and negative health effects as legitimate means to deem something immoral, and homosexuality specifically, then he will win the debate. ===Natural Law===(A) TeleologyPro is mistaken in assuming that I did not deny the existence of teleology. This may stem from the fact that when I pointed out that Pro mistook descriptive references to the "use" of an object for a normative prescription for how it ought to be used, I was in some sense implicitly admitting that objects have a natural use. This is not the case though, or it's not the case in the sense that natural lawyers seem to think. The reason why "use" exists only descriptively (in that we do use our eyes to see our hands to grasp) and not normatively (wherein we should use our eyes to see, etc.) is because purpose itself requires certain conditions.Why do we think a blender's correct purpose is to blend or that a book's correct purpose is to be read and communicate its message effectively? We do this because blenders and books were made with that specific purpose in mind. Likewise, the same criterion applies to anything which one says possesses a legitimately normative teleology. Of course this is merely a necessary though not sufficient condition. As Pro correctly pointed out, we don't hold blenders to moral standards because they lack consciousness and free will. So along with free will, something also must have been designed for a specific purpose. We may accept without argument the free will condition, but the design condition has yet to be fulfilled. Furthermore, unless Pro seeks to argue for an alternative conception of human creation (i.e., through some process other than unguided evolution) then he may do so. But barring the existence of a deity or some other transcendental creator of humankind, the necessary conditions to justify normative teleology remain unfulfilled. I don't wish to turn this into a theological debate, but since natural processes alone are not sufficient to design something (since there is no consciousness to do the designing), a deity would be necessary. Natural law is necessarily theistic and as of yet Pro has given no reason to accept the theistic worldview.(B) Is-Ought ProblemPro attempts to bypass the is-ought problem by simply saying that purpose is "built into" something. However, this fails to actually bypass the problem as Pro hasn't cited any further epistemic criterion than simple intuition. Take as an example a human hand. We can clearly see that a human hand does a lot of things. It grasps, it signs, it strikes, etc. But even if we were to catalog each and every way that one uses their hand , the frequency in which this happens, or the general well-being brought about by various hand movements, we'd still have no justification to make the epistemic jump from "the hand does this" to "the hand ought to do this". Pro is making an ontological assumption about the human body and other entities. He's taking it as an intuitive premise that some purpose is built into the ontology of an object, but he fails completely to justify this intuition by any epistemic reasoning. How do we justify the derivation of teleology in regards purely to knowledge claims? Pro provides no reason to and thus we have another reason not to accept the existence of normative teleology.===Health===(A) HIV Transmission(i) On the point of ambiguity in regards to Pro's standards for how damaging an action must be in order to be considered immoral, he rebuts by arguing simply from generalities. But this obviously cannot do, since there's no conceptual part of homosexuality or homosexual acts that necessitate an "epidemic". As I pointed out in my last rounds refutation, it is certainly conceptually possible that people would continue to engage in homosexual acts while at the same time not necessitating an HIV epidemic. As I mentioned before, the simple use of condoms, staying relatively monotonous, and combined with progress concerning treatment, could stamp out HIV as a widespread problem. Con's only response is that condoms break "very easily" (a claim that is ludicrously false[1]) and that the "nature of the act was not meant to be" (an incredibly ambiguous claim at best).(ii) On the health arguments utter lack of applicability to lesbians, Pro attempts to defend the exclusion by reference to the fact that this debate has an emphasis on sodomy. Regardless of this, female homosexual acts are conceptually a part of the set of homosexual actions and are thus a necessary factor to take into account when assessing the morality or immorality of homosexuality. Pro also claims that it's difficult to find statistics on whether female homosexuality has negative health effects. Now though figures are admittedly less precise concerning lesbian rates of HIV contraction, the available evidence does suggest that the rate is lower than the rate for male homosexuals or heterosexuals[2] when one focuses only on lesbians who only have sex with women[3]. At the very least, Pro's argument from "HIV epidemic" is moot in regards to an entire segment of the homosexual community (not counting the fact that they're also moot regarding homosexuals who haven't contracted HIV, see points (i) and (iii)).(iii) On my point that Pro is applying a non-conceptual generality to a conceptual act, Pro tries to defend his point by arguing that his argument just as well applies to "all males who commit sodomy." I don't see where that point follows. Pro further argues that the spreading of HIV and other infections applies "to all male homosexual acts". Again, refer to the fact that Pro is comparing a non-necessary trend that we know can be stopped to the conceptual nature of an act. In this debate Pro is saying homosexual acts themselves are intrinsically immoral. Since one can engage in homosexual acts without becoming infected with HIV or some other infection, Con's criticism can only logically apply to someone who engages in a homosexual act and contracts HIV. Since we can easily point to homosexuals who are not HIV-positive (yours truly being one example), Pro's point fails.(iv) In this point, Pro again makes the point that sodomy more easily facilitates the spread of HIV. Refer to my point Ai where I refute it in full.(B) Mental IllnessThe most glaring problem with Pro's argument here is that he's mixing up the causal relationships between engaging in homosexual acts, "prior negative parental relationships", and mental illness. Now even if I concede that homosexuality is caused by the factors argued by Pro in his framework, homosexual acts themselves would still not be causally relevant to the contraction of mental illness. Since Pro argues that a negative relationship with a same-sex parent causes gender non-conforming behavior, which in turn plays a part in causing homosexuality, the contraction of mental illness would clearly be causally connected to the original negative relationship with the same-sex parent. Studies have shown that this contributes to the development of mental illness[4] whether the child turns out to be gay or not.Sources: (http://www.debate.org...)