Naturalistic evolutionism cannot be rationally affirmed

Preface I would like to separate a few definitions of beliefs: Instinctual Belief - Innate beliefs that are not learned, and not involved by reason Learned Belief - Learned eliefs that are not necessarily innate, but are accepted by our conscious cognitive faculties IIA. Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism From Pro's rebuttal, it is clear he accepts that we are capable of having beliefs (such as learned beliefs) that are largely independent of those brought on by natural selection (NS) (instinctual beliefs). By making this rather large (and easily defended) concession Pro's case loses virtually all of it's punch. Belief in evolution and naturalism is very simply one that is essentially exclusively a 'learned belief', and most definitely not an instinctual one. Pro might have a case that subset of instinctual belief contents don't necessarily correspond with truth to yield their (naturally selected) effects/behaviours. But a learned belief doesn't suffer from these same problems (which I will argue isn't as clear as Pro makes it out to be anyway), since these learned beliefs are not naturally selected for. An individual with a beneficial belief might have a better chance of surviving, but those beliefs don't intrinsically become passed on to the next generation. Therefore are not subject to the same criticism that virtually all of Pro's argument makes. So now Pro attacks the trustworthiness of our cognitive faculties to make beliefs that generally correspond with truth, after all I agree that the brain and it's ability to form learned beliefs is one that is driven by NS, and built for survival and reproduction, and not intrinsically for having accurate beliefs. But now this is all besides the original point, since Pro has given no argument why the brain would construct learned beliefs that are likely to have content that is likely not true. None. IIB. Learned Beliefs & Trustworthiness of the Brain: So now I will defend the trustworthiness of our learned cognitive faculties, but there are several reasons why we would evolve to develop cognitive faculties that tend to correlate with truth: 1. It offers a much more rapid method of acquiring new, unique beliefs - allowing for rapid adaptability 2. It allows for changes in these beliefs as circumstances change 3. It allows for introspection/problem solving 4. Ability to form/utilise complex language & communication 5. Versatility All of these factors come into play, and when taking into account the fact that we have interacting belief contents, and the testing of our beliefs in different circumstances, it is quite transparent why it would inevitably converge on truth. Incorrect 'learned' belief content despite being true in one context, would inevitably be falsified when applied to a new situation. Last round I presented an example with math of 2x2=4. If we look at this example, there are only so many easily accessible belief contents which would satisfy the 'x' sign in this equation, with the 'true' belief content being amongst them. As we apply this 'learned belief' to more and more examples, of which the false belief contents would eventually get weeded out as they would no longer satisfy the equations, we converge on the truth. I would also like to add we have interacting beliefs, and composite learned beliefs. I.e. Beliefs that depend on a foundation of prior 'learned beliefs'. One example is how to make tea, where you will rely on your prior 'learned beliefs' of where the milk and water is, along with a summating belief of how to combine them into tea. With each step up this pyramid, or 'web' of complex beliefs, it it quickly realised that beliefs with incorrect belief contents would make each 'complex learned belief' increasingly unsound, and therefore more liable to falsification against future experiences. None of this is at all affected by Pro's original argument that our brain faculties are intrinsically tied to what is driven by evolution. True belief contents are inherently efficient, and yield far fewer false 'learned beliefs' and false 'learned complex beliefs' than false belief contents. And it is very easy to see how species with cognitive faculties that tend to form true 'learned belief contents' will be preferred via. NS over those who are more indifferent. Especially in species where more complex belief contents or more rapid change of these belief contents with such faculties favoured by NS (primates, herds with rapidly changing ). Another note I would like to expand upon, is the inherent efficiency of holding one true belief contents over multiple false belief contents. For example we can take the following set of equations: 1.) 3 x 3 = 9 2.) 4 x 3 = 12 Holding the bare minimum true belief contents about what multiplication means, and what the numbers represent will solve these perfectly. However to hold a false belief content (such as x 3 from (1)means 'plus six') means that in order to be able to solve other otherwise contradictory examples (such as from (2)) one must make additional 'ad hoc' false beliefs contents to satisfy this truth (such as 4 actually means the number six). This is inefficient in time/memory/resources/*versatility*, and thus it is easy to see that even instinctual, along with learned belief contents will tend towards truth. Note that this very conceivably extrapolate to reality, unlike what Pro asserts. Pro's objections such as his square/concrete entities are now attacking how we sense the environment. This doesn't particularly matter even if it was an obstacle since beliefs can be defined according to our sense perceptions. A C# note is defined in our beliefs according to how it sounds! although of course we define it in reality to a certain frequency. All that is necessary is that our sense perceptions are *consistent*. I see absolutely no weight to Pro's argument that Naturalistic Evolution being an instinctual belief, he simply bald asserts it. Prima facie I don't see how such a belief confers even a smidge of reproductive survival advantage. Also I do not appreciate Pro attacking my own cognitive faculties, and I can just as easily put the same question towards his own position. The position I have represented so far is that naturalistic evolutionism does allow for some false belief contents, but it has mechanisms as described that naturally cause it to converge on truth. All beliefs are provisional in this sense and become increasingly refined with time and experience. This seems to strongly correlate with the facts of the world we live in, as people clearly do hold false belief contents, as many do hold contradictory ones. That being the case there seems to be a much stronger case for naturalistic evolutionism than there is readily explained by any other hypothesis, and in fact makes for a positive case on my part! IIC. Supernaturalism: Pro's bald assertion that the fact that truth is grounded in my supernatural entity means he can trust his cognitive faculties. If that is the case we would expect everyone to have fully reliable cognitive faculties. But this is evidently false, as I have already mentioned people do have conflicting beliefs with each other, some of these people therefore must have had a failing in their faculties. Which contradicts Pro's bald assertion that supernaturalist makes it reliable, and therefore is evidence against supernaturalism. III. Telos Stuff I don't believe I need to spend much time on this part, as Pro's argument is entirely subjective, and also is a head-on argument against evolution. Either Pro needs to either assert that evolution is false, or that evolution is guided by an intelligence. Given that evolution is overwhelmingly *objectively* supported and verified by science, it seems Pro needs to assert the latter for his argument to stand a chance. First let's get to Pro's bald assertions: "If one admits that direction towards a purpose exists, you also admit a form of intentionality." "An entity cannot be directed towards a purpose without some form of director of any sort." Pro gives zero reason for accepting these to be true. Given that telos is a subjectively determined factor, and are labels that we humans assign to processes that appear to fulfil an 'end', it Is a non-sequitur to assert that this process could only have been guided by intelligence. For one this assumes the conclusion, and secondly there is no way to determine if that end was ever pre-planned, or was instead an 'emergent end'. The thought experiment I gave last round was a clear example of an 'emergent end', which just happened to be beneficial for self-propagation, and thus requires no purposeful planning, or any guiding intelligence whatsoever to become such. And as far as Pro has demonstrated, there is absolutely no way to tell between something with a prescriptive end, or an emergent one. Thus rendering Pro's assertion flatly unsound. I also gave the whale fin example, but there are many other documented examples of body parts which fulfil a new 'end' without the requirement of a guiding intelligence. Their current purposes are entirely emergent. Another favourite example are bird feathers,[1] which originally were just reptile scales, which became frayed, likely because they worked as better heat insulators, and then finally became tuned to flight as they were found to be useful for gliding purposes. At no point was this ultimate 'end' of achieving flight 'chosen' by NS from scales, but all points in the hump are driven by survival. Pro attempts to assert that evolutionary processes are also telogocal in themselves. Even if this was the case, he offers zero reasons to believe it required a guiding intelligence. IV. Conclusion I have presented a case for why we should trust our cognitive faculties, and why the evidence heavily favours naturalistic evolutionism to be true in this case. V. References 1. http://ed.ted.com...