Speciesism is an unjustifiable form of discrimination.

Of all the various forms of discrimination in the world, one of the most common can be found in the way in which humans have treated non-human animals, both in history and in the present day. For as long as the historical record goes back, speciesism (i.e., prejudice on the basis of species membership) has lead most humans to treat animals as if they were mere tools for human fulfillment with no significant moral status. What's more, these views have been defended not just by the general public, but even in the Ivory Tower. For instance, Saint Thomas Aquinas has suggested that there is nothing intrinsically wrong with animal cruelty insofar as it doesn't desensitize people to hurt humans.[1] Some philosophers like H. A. Bedau have even been keen to speak about "the intrinsic dignity of the human individual"[2]; others have talked of the "intrinsic worth of all men" as though humans alone had some unique worth that other beings did not have.[3] Of course, these attitudes have been criticized by dissidents. Mahavira, the Jain patriarch, recognized the value of all animals with the following utterly wise moral pronouncement: "Do not injure, abuse, oppress, enslave, insult, torment, torture, or kill any creature or living being."[4] In the 19th Century, the English philosopher Jeremy Bentham argued that the capacity to suffer was the only important characteristic a being could hold to establish its moral value.[5] Things have certainly improved a great deal for many animals since Bentham's time. Laws against animal cruelty along with the public's evolving standards have helped make many positive inroads for the well-being of non-human animals. In particular, a 2008 ballot initiative in California known as Proposition 2 outlawed the confinement of animals in cages that are so small that they prevent the animals from being able to stand up, turn around and lie down.[6] As a matter of policy, many of these improvements to animal treatment would seem to be a step in the right direction. Humans and animals can both suffer and can thus hold preferences, which grants them a certain moral status. The future of animal rights initiatives and animal rights in general rests in large part upon this proposition. Now, let us consider whether it's valid. The Vindication of the Rights of Animals C1: Animals can suffer and thus should be given basic moral considerations. Given the criteria for the justification of equal treatment among humans, people are on shaky grounds to not extend basic notions of fairness to non-human animals. Many factors have certainly contributed to the view that the moral considerations of humans should not extend beyond membership in the human species. In particular, the religious notion that humans are sacrosanct and separate from the rest of the animal kingdom has created an arbitrary firewall in the moral outlook of most humans that has put non-human animals on a precariously low pedestal. This separation, however, is not warranted because it does not represent any sort of intelligent distinction about actual concerns of suffering and happiness. Like humans, animals are capable of suffering and should thus not be treated in ways that cause them to suffer without good reason. For starters, it is well established that many animals can suffer. We can know this more or less the same way that we know that humans can suffer. Animals exhibit behavioral traits in response to painful stimuli by moaning, writhing and yelping.[7] In his book The Spectrum of Pain Richard Sarjeant writes: "Every particle of factual evidence supports the contention that the higher mammalian vertebrates experience pain sensations at least as acute as our own. To say that they feel less because they are lower animals is an absurdity... Apart from the complexity of the cerebral cortex (which does not directly perceive pain) their nervous systems are almost identical to ours and their reactions to pain remarkably similar..."[8] While it is reasonable to wonder whether or not some animals can suffer, it is not reasonable to wonder this in the case of most of the farm animals that humans rear for consumption. Indeed, to deny that animals are capable of suffering (both physically and emotionally) would require something like a willful ignorance of the facts or an untenable form of philosophical skepticism. C2: Membership in a species is an arbitrary characteristic with respect to moral considerations. Membership in a particular species is a biological property, and the notion that biological properties makes discrimination against animals justifiable cannot withstand even mild scrutiny. As the Princeton philosopher Peter Singer has pointed out over 30 years ago in Practical Ethics, biological properties alone do not have any moral significance whatsoever.[9] In the same way race and gender are morally irrelevant biological properties, so to is species membership. Insofar as racism and sexism are both unjustifiable, then it stands to reason that speciesism could be no more justifiable. For these reasons, any attempt to try to justify unequal treatment to animals based purely on biological characteristics is self-defeating as long as this principle is deemed inconsequential for humans. C3: Different levels of intellectual acuity between animals and humans cannot justify speciesism. Of course, the proponent of unequal treatment to non-human animals may concede that biological properties are unimportant, but they may wish to argue that animals do not deserve basic considerations because they do not have the same psychological and intellectual capacities as humans. In this context, some people may wish to claim that higher level mental states found among humans grant humans rights over animals. But this objection cannot be valid - for we clearly do not value this standard when we assert that all humans should be treated equally. Furthermore, many animals such as chimpanzees have mental capacities that often exceed those of many humans that have neurological shortcomings (e.g., the mentally handicapped).[10] The basic principle of equality among humans is, therefore, not based on any empirical facts about the intellectual differences between different groups of people. Consider, for example, that an average toddler certainly does not have the same mental capacities as someone like an Albert Einstein. What does it mean, then, when people assert that both of these individuals should be treated equally? If we are sensibly referring to anything in ethical terms on this matter, we are referring to the fact that the toddler, like an intellectual prodigy, has interests and preferences that should not be violated without justification. These preferences merely require sentience (i.e., the ability to suffer and feel pain), which animals do have. As such, the foundation for equal rights among humans and non-humans rests entirely on the same grounds as the notion that all humans should be treated equally despite their gender, intellect and physical characteristics. | Conclusion | If humans are to be consistent in ethical matters and simultaneously affirm the validity of the egalitarian society which most of us desire, then there is no more reason to deny basic moral considerations to non-human animals than there is to deny this principle to humans with brain damage. As was demonstrated earlier, animals are capable of suffering much in the same way that humans are. Further, the commonly held justifications for speciesism have been shown to be fallacious. Where human societies go from here in terms of public policy is anyone's guess. But the foundation has been set. Animals deserve basic moral considerations and to assert otherwise is to endorse an unjustifiable form of prejudice. Sources: http://tinyurl.com...