BeIR/webis-touche2020 huggingface dataset:
An ICC enforcement arm would be unduly expensive

What price justice? The ICC has been supported by a large number of states who accept that, while it does cost money, the ICC is the only effective way to bring war criminals and those who commit crimes against humanity to trial, provide them with a fair trial and sentence them appropriately. If that is the goal, states should be willing to finance means towards it. While the ICC’s existing budget of over €100M is substantial, it is dwarfed by, for example, the £4bn budget of London’s Metropolitan Police. In such context €100M is not a large amount to pay to bring international criminals to justice. The people the ICC pursue often engage in widespread destruction, apprehending them quickly may actually save rather than cost money by preventing such damage.
An ICC enforcement arm would be highly detrimental to the relations between the ICC and state parties

Those arguments are similar ones to those used against the ICC. An ICC police force, comprised of officers from individual state and supervised by an independent authority appointed by a similar mechanism to the judges, would use the existing frameworks in place for the use of the ICC. If states are happy to have their nationals indicted for international crimes then it stands to reason that these nations should welcome a force that can enforce such indictments and bring these war criminals to trial.
ICC enforcement would create resentment

Apart from the visibility due to the diversity of the force the ICC force may well be very similar to national forces in this regard. Often a problem with arresting wanted international criminals is their support in the community – that they have often been claiming to be fighting for. The national government’s enforcement arm may be as unwelcome as the ICC. In such circumstances the ICC at least has the advantage of being a new quantity with a blank slate rather than being known for any excesses, human rights violations or bribery. The ICC force will be able to treat the local populace fairly and win their trust.
An ICC enforcement is a necessity if there is to be international criminal justice

The remit of the ICC is unlike the remit of any national court. It deals exclusively in crimes so unacceptable there is an international consensus behind their illegality and the need for prosecutions. The parties that signed up to the Rome Statute’s reason for the creation of the ICC was “that such grave crimes threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world” the perpetrators of such crimes clearly need to be brought to book, and to do that they need to be apprehended. The same agreement said the signatories were “Resolved to guarantee lasting respect for and the enforcement of international justice” if this is the case then there should be agreement on enabling that enforcement by creating an ICC enforcement arm. Again the Rome statute makes clear that the agreement “shall not be taken as authorizing” intervention by another state. This is why the enforcement needs to be done by a separate international force who could not be considered a threat to any state.[1]  Quite simply there is little point in international criminal justice if there is no force to bring the criminals to the court. [1] ‘Preamble’ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1 July 2002, http://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/ea9aeff7-5752-4f84-be94-0a655eb30e16/0/rome_statute_english.pdf
Celibacy reduces the pool of people wanting to become priests

Protestant churches, which do not require celibacy, are also having problems recruiting clergy. Worldwide, the number of new priests is increasing. Only the developed world has seen a decline in priestly vocations, although even here devout countries such as Poland buck the trend. A recent study showed that vocations were on the rise in dioceses in the USA that were loyal to the teachings of the church, including priestly celibacy.
Celibacy draws sexually dysfunctional men into the priesthood

Celibacy and paedophilia are not connected. Sexual abuse also occurs in religions where clergy are permitted to marry. Studies have shown that sexual abusers account for less than 2% of Roman Catholic clergy, a figure comparable to clergy in other denominations, or even less than in the wider male population as a whole.[1] Sexual abuse in the church is undoubtedly a serious problem to be addressed, but not one that is linked to the issue of celibacy. [1] Oddie, William, ‘Now we have real evidence – sexual abuse is not a ‘Catholic problem’, Catholic Herald, 9 August 2010, http://www.catholicherald.co.uk/commentandblogs/2010/08/09/now-we-have-r...
Principles should be maintained even when it is convenient to change them

The insistence on priestly celibacy is one of the major stumbling blocks to church unity. Discussions with the Orthodox church (which has always allowed married priests) and protestant denominations such as the Episcopal (Anglican) church often founder on the different conception of priesthood held by the Catholic church. Yet there is a precedent for allowing married priests - in the 1990s when British Anglican priests who could not accept women priests left the Church of England to become Catholics, they were allowed to serve as Catholic priests despite being married. Changing the rule more generally would make ecumenical dialogue more possible and open the way to the healing of historic schisms in the body of Christ.
Celibacy allows a priest to devote himself entirely to his vocation

Protestant clergy, for example in the Episcopal church which has similar parish structures to Roman Catholicism, successfully balance their work in the church and their families. Were priests permitted to marry and have families, their families could serve as examples to others. In addition, marriage can provide a priest with increased social support and intimacy. Too many priests burn out through overwork and stress, having no one at home to support them and tell them its time to stop working.
Priest have not always been celibate

While celibacy had been encouraged since the beginning of the church, until the beginning of the twelfth century, when it was banned by the Lateran Councils of 1123 and 1139, Priests in the Western church were permitted to marry.[1] The Bible does not mandate celibacy and, in fact, St Peter, the first pope, was married. Even today within the Catholic Church celibacy is not universal as Eastern Rite Catholics can marry and it is the norm that they do,[2] and there are some Lutheran and Episcopalian ministers who have converted to Catholicism.[3] The true history and traditions of the Roman Catholic Church include the option for priests to marry or at least for married men to become priests. [1] Parish, Helen, Clerical Celibacy in the West: c.1100-1700, Ashgate Publishing Limited, Farnham, 2010, pp103-4, http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=DP5TL63BbNQC&lpg=PA104&ots=JC7wi8wmCE&dq [2] Brom, Robert H., Bishop of San Diego, ‘Celibacy and the Priesthood’, Catholic.com, 10 August 2004, http://www.catholic.com/tracts/celibacy-and-the-priesthood [3] Johnston, George Sim, ‘The Case for Priestly Celibacy’, Catholic News Agency, http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/resource.php?n=1265
Celibacy reduces the pool of people wanting to become priests

The number of priests in developed countries is on the decline. In Ireland in 2007 160 priests died but only nine were ordained to replace them. It is expected that the number of priests in Ireland will fall from 4758 in 2008 to 1500 by 2028.[1] As a result almost 50,000 parishes worldwide are without a priest despite the number of parishes not having risen with the increase in numbers of Catholics.[2]  The prohibition on marriage pushes some men away from the priesthood. The requirement of celibacy drastically reduces the pool from which the church can select priests and means that the church is not always getting the “best and the brightest”. As a result even many within the church believe the demand for celibacy should be ended.[3] [1] McDonald, Henry, ‘Psychological vetting of would-be priests exacerbates decline’, The Guardian, 11 September 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/sep/11/catholicism.ireland [2] Center for Applied Research in the Apostolate, ‘Frequently Requested Church Statistics’, 2011, http://cara.georgetown.edu/CARAServices/requestedchurchstats.html [3] Staff reporter, ‘European theologians call for end to priestly celibacy’, CatholicHerald.co.uk, 7 February 2011, http://www.catholicherald.co.uk/news/2011/02/07/european-theologians-cal...
Celibacy is outdated

Priestly celibacy is out-dated. It sets the priest apart from the modern world and the experiences of his parishioners. Originally, around 1100 the Gregorian Reform movement in the church was keen to enforce celibacy for fear that too many married priests would leave church property and benefices to their children, or create local priestly dynasties.[1] At the time these fears were reasonable and necessary to maintain the property and discipline of the church, but today they are utterly unnecessary. [1] Thurston, Hernert, Celibacy of the Clergy Second Period, The Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol.3, Robert Appleton Company, New York, 1908, http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/03481a.htm
Celibacy grants an understanding of self-control

The celibate priest has a unique understanding of the power of self-control and the giving of self, which are key ideas in marriage. The celibate priest is in a very good position to counsel people on how to keep the marital vows such as fidelity as they have experience of keeping the much stricter vow of celibacy.[1] The priest is married to the church and can counsel couples and families using that knowledge. [1] ‘5 Arguments Against Priestly Celibacy and How to Refute Them’, catholiceducation.org, http://www.catholiceducation.org/articles/facts/fm0014.html
Principles should be maintained even when it is convenient to change them

The Catholic church should not bend its principles for the sake of expediency. Many more issues divide Roman Catholicism from other churches (e.g. the authority of the Pope, the nature of the sacrament, even the wording of the creed). If the church accepted this change for the sake of convenience, where would it stop? Should women also be allowed to become priests? What about practising homosexuals? More likely such a compromise would see a further split in the church, as those who upheld traditional Catholic teaching rejected the change. Look how the Episcopal (Anglican) church is falling apart over the ordination of gay priests and women bishops, including some bishops leaving the Anglican for Catholic Church.[1] In any case, allowing priests to marry would undoubtedly lead to a two-class priesthood, with many good Catholics continuing to feel that clergy who continue to choose celibacy are superior to those who reject it. That would hardly be a healthy development for the unity of the church or for the authority of the priesthood. [1] Butt, Riazat, ‘Archbishop of Canterbury accepts resignation of Anglican bishops’, guardian.co.uk, 8 November 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/nov/08/archbishop-canterbury-accept...
It is in the national interest for democracies to support those seeking to oust dictators

Democracies should support moderate groups seeking to oust dictators because the result will hopefully be a moderate, democratic state. This would then be a reliable partner for the future that would be more willing to help engage and resolve the region's problems. But this is not all about being high minded and wanting to promote democracy in the Middle East, arms need to be provided in order to ensure future influence in Syria. We already know that there are jihadis operating in Syria so it is plain that this is a conflict that will eventually have wider implications for the west. If we want to have influence in Syria after Assad is overthrown then we need to begin helping opposition groups. It is in our interest to build up the moderate groups so as to deny support to the extremists; once this is over we would be in a much better position if we have grateful friends on the ground rather than groups who are resentful that we provided fine words but no real help. We don't want to find ourselves having to root out terrorists from the air using UAVs.[1] [1] Hokayem, Emile, in ‘Roundtable: arming the Syrian rebels’, Foreign Policy, 21 February 2013
Would balance the support for Syrian government

Syria's government has been receiving outside support from a variety of sources; Russia and Iran being the most prominent. Iran has been training the Jaysh al- Shabi, a Syrian government-controlled force modelled on Iran's Basij militia. Far from just providing weapons, both Iran and Hezbollah from Lebanon have been sending fighters to support the Syrian government.[1] The rebels have received some support for Qatar and Saudi Arabia but not to the extent the Syrian government has. Anyone with an interest in the free Syrian cause should realise that they cannot do so simply by sitting on their hands expecting a victory when those doing the fighting are only provided diplomatic support. [1] Doran, Michael, and Shaikh, Salman, ‘Arm the Syrian Rebels. Now’. Foreign Policy, 8 February 2013
Sovereignty and non intervention in internal affairs

It is a clear international rule that nations are sovereign and other states are simply not allowed to be making interventions into another country’s domestic affairs. The UN Charter emphasises “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state”.[1] Within a state only the government is legitimate as the supreme authority within its territory.[2] This is to prevent the bigger and richer powers from doing exactly this sort of thing to obtain the result they want inside another country. This is why Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated "International law does not permit the supply of arms to non-governmental actors and our point of view is that it is a violation of international law," in response to suggestions that the UK would arm the Syrian rebels.[3] [1] UN General Assembly, Article 2, Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945 [2] Philpott, Dan, "Sovereignty", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) [3] Abbas, Mohammed, ‘Russia says arming Syrian opposition would be illegal’, Reuters, 13 March 2013
Unforeseeable consequences

We do not know where arming the rebels will lead. The most obvious parallel has to be Afghanistan in the 1980s where the United States armed the mujahideen and succeeded in their objective of damaging the USSR through a war of attrition much as the US had suffered in Vietnam. Afghanistan became an albatross around the Soviet Union’s neck.[1] But the US did not win the peace, Afghanistan descended into civil conflict which had a Taliban victory that sheltered Osama bin Laden; US arms in Afghanistan unintentionally lead more than a decade later to September 11. In this case we would be arming a movement that has many jihadi elements that could end up with the weaponry. Other countries such as Turkey are also worried about where powerful weapons such as anti aircraft missiles could end up if provided to the rebels. They fear they could easily find their way across the border to militant Kurds.[2] Other paths that this could lead to are just as bad; for example helping the Libyan rebels lead to the conflict in Mali.[3] In this case the short term consequences could be just as bad. Arming the Sunnis could provoke retaliation from either Iran or Hezbollah who could feel undermined by the move, in the worst case scenario they could even attack western assets in the area.[4] [1] Hoffman, David E., The Dead Hand: Reagan, Gorbachev and the Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race, Icon Books Ltd, 2011, p.211 [2] Hokayem, Emile, in ‘Roundtable: arming the Syrian rebels’, Foreign Policy, 21 February 2013 [3] Jones, Owen, ‘The war in Libya was seen as a success, now here we are engaging with the blowback in Mali’, The Independent, 13 January 2013 [4] Yacoubian, Mona, in ‘Roundtable: arming the Syrian rebels’, Foreign Policy, 21 February 2013
Diplomacy is not going anywhere

Simply because there is stalemate in diplomacy and on the ground does not make arming the rebels the option that should now be taken, indeed it does not mean that outside powers need to take any action at all. Those with Syria's best interests at heart would remain on the sidelines, provide humanitarian assistance, and encourage new diplomatic initiatives. The response should not be to turn Syria into a rerun of the proxy wars of the Cold War with the west arming be side and Russia the other.
Possibility of being drawn into a long drawn out conflict

The strategic situation in Syria is nothing like that which meant the US felt it could not withdraw from Vietnam. There is no line of 'dominos' that could be knocked over in a row as a result of a victory by the Syrian government. Far from it, some of Syria's neighbours like Jordan may be strengthened by a government victory as it would halt the momentum of protest against rulers in the region. There is also no large scale outside power that would take advantage of Syrian government victory as was the case with the USSR in the Cold War. In this case such a result would mean a return to the status quo, not something the west would desire, but hardly a strategic disaster so cutting losses if the policy does not work would be comparatively easy.
Syria clearly meets the standards for intervention

The Assad regime has clearly lost its legitimacy and has precipitated a humanitarian crisis in Syria. The February estimate of 70000 killed[1] is up from an estimate of 60000 only a month before,[2] so clearly the violence is escalating. The conflict is also affecting neighbours; refugees have flooded into Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey, and Israel is already believed to have attacked a convoy or research facility involved in chemical and biological weapons development.[3] Clearly the presence of these weapons show how much worse the situation could get if Assad is not overthrown. Not intervening risks the whole region being slowly destabilised and drawn in to the conflict.[4] [1] Nichols, Michelle, ‘Syria death toll likely near 70,000, says U.N. rights chief’, Reuters, 12 Feb 2012 [2] ‘Data suggests Syria death toll could be more than 60,000, says UN human rights office’, UN News Centre, 2 January 2013 [3] ‘Q&A: Israeli ‘strike’ on Syria’, BBC News, 3 February 2013 [4] Byman, Daniel, in ‘Roundtable: arming the Syrian rebels’, Foreign Policy, 21 February 2013
The Free Syrian Army is outgunned

The Syrian army is one of the biggest armies in the world; it is nothing like the poorly equipped Libyan army that was beaten by western backed rebels in 2011. The government has aircraft, and helicopters that are used to bomb the rebels, and heavy Russian built tanks that are impervious to most of the small arms the free Syrian army has. Providing arms would quickly even the odds; light anti-tank weapons would be effective against Syrian armoured vehicles repeating the success with which Hezbollah employed them when they knocked out sixty Israeli armoured vehicles in 2006,[1] while man portable air defence systems would quickly make the skies too dangerous for the Syrian airforce so protecting free Syrian controlled areas from the threat of attack from the air.[2] [1] Cordesman, Anthony H., ‘Preliminary “Lessons” of the Israeli-Hezbollah War’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 17 August 2006, P.18 [2] Doran, Michael, and Shaikh, Salman, ‘Arm the Syrian Rebels. Now’. Foreign Policy, 8 February 2013
Diplomacy is not going anywhere

The best solution would be a ceasefire between the two sides in the Syrian civil war and a negotiated settlement, but it is clear we are long past the point where this approach stood a chance of success. The United Nations peace effort under Kofi Annan failed in the middle of last year[1] and there has been no progress since. Similarly all attempts to bring pressure to bear throughout the security council have failed as a result of Russia supporting Assad's regime. This leaves the unilateral initiatives to help the rebels. No state wants full intervention as France did in Mali[2] so the only alternative is simply to help the Free Syrian Army. To do so means providing what they need to win the conflict; primarily arms that can defeat the Syrian army. This need not be considered to be exclusive with diplomacy; the intervening state should continue to try to find a diplomatic solution just as before the Dayton accords NATO helped the Croats militarily while at the same time looking to diplomacy to provide an overall solution to the conflict.[3] [1] Plett, Barbara, ‘Syria crisis: Kofi Annan quits as UN-Arab League envoy’, BBC News, 2 August 2012 [2] See the debatabase debate ‘This House believes France is right to intervene in Mali’. [3] Hokayem, Emile, in ‘Roundtable: arming the Syrian rebels’, Foreign Policy, 21 February 2013
Arming the rebels would be unpopular

Ten years after the Iraq war interventions in the Middle East are no more popular than they were back in 2003. Getting involved in Syria would not be popular no matter how small the commitment. In the United States voters oppose the idea of supplying arms to Syrian rebels by 45% against to only 16% in favour, in the United Kingdom opinion is even more opposed; while there are still 16% in favour there are 57% opposed.[1] Clearly arming the rebels would not be popular with voters - there can therefore be no domestic reason for this policy. [1] Clark, Tom, ‘US and UK public reject stronger military support for Syrian rebels’, guardian.co.uk, 22 March 2013
Possibility of being drawn into a long drawn out conflict

Even just providing the rebels with arms risks drawing the powers that supply those arms into the conflict.[1] This is because it gives the intervening power a stake in the conflict. Once weapons have been supplied allowing the Syrian government to reassert control would be a large foreign policy reversal and would damage relations with the Syrian government for years to come. We need only look at the Vietnam conflict to know that what starts out as a very small commitment can rapidly escalate when the government decides it cannot afford to back down. What starts as just arming the rebels could quickly lead to troops on the ground. Indeed it might require men on the ground right from the start as if we were to be providing heavy weapons the rebels would need training in how to use those weapons if they are to seriously be considered an equaliser. [1] Byman, Daniel, in ‘Roundtable: arming the Syrian rebels’, Foreign Policy, 21 February 2013
It is in the national interest for democracies to support those seeking to oust dictators

The west has historically not been good at picking the winner in the Middle East; take its backing of Saddam in the 1980, the Shah in the 1970s, or the mujahideen in Afghanistan. All have either lost power or turned on those who supported them. If we back the wrong group in Syria then we end upon a worse position than backing none at all; the west is already perceived as being pro Sunni and is seen as being partisan rather than attempting to build a broad inclusive democracy for all communities.[1] So backing any group simply undermines longer term western aims to create a democracy. [1] Yacoubian, Mona, in ‘Roundtable: arming the Syrian rebels’, Foreign Policy, 21 February 2013
Sovereignty and non intervention in internal affairs

This makes the assumption that the Assad government is considered the legitimate authority within Syria, the Russians accept this, but other countries are less sure. Both the US and UK now recognise the Syrian opposition as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people[1] which would mean arming them would be legal in the same way that the Russians consider arming Assad to be internationally legal. [1] Malas, Nour, and Solomon, Jay, ‘U.S. Formally Recognizes Syria’s Main Rebel Group’, The Wall Street Journal, 12 December 2012