The Non-Aggression Principle is ethically sound

For my part, I only hope not to let him down. It seems to me that the case set forth here in favor of the libertarian non-aggression principle rests on the idea of self-ownership (having oneself as property). This is so much the case that my opponent is quick to assert that its acceptance is not an object of ethical discourse but a premise to it. I am afraid, however, that this is far from uncontroversial, and I am far from willing to take it for granted. In my turns during this debate I hope to show that taken strictly the idea of self-ownership has tremendously problematic ethical implications, and that when more loosely considered it is too open to interpretation to provide a firm framework for any system of ethics. I also hope to show that, aside from its internal inconsistency, it is rather circular logic to state that rights stem from a property right to oneself. Problems with self-ownershipPro conflates self-ownership with personal autonomy, makes an argument for the latter, and then hopes we will be satisfied with the former on pain of being declared nihilists. Now, although it would pain me greatly to be counted amongst the Nietzcheites, I must disagree. Rights, including the right of property, are a characteristic of relationships and therefore require a subject and an object. Humans, as rational beings capable of entering into relationships which entail duties and privileges are the subjects of rights. This necessarily excludes self-ownership for two reasons. 1. Humans are not objects of rights: The main contention against slavery is that human beings cannot be objects of rights but only subjects of rights. Their relationships to others, to community or to property entail obligations, but they themselves remain autonomous. As the right to property is transferable by definition (by sale or lease or gift) the idea of self-property contradicts this basic principle. 2. Ubi societas ibi ius (where there is society there is law) Where there is only one individual there are no relationships, therefore no rights, property or law. Property cannot be an innate characteristic of personhood because not only are we positing the rather odd notion of the subject and object of a right being one and the same entity, we are also implying that property exists as some sort of platonic idea, apart from and previous to the interaction of subjects. Once having seen that the idea of personal autonomy does not necessarily rest on a notion of self-property, the rest of the argument falls apart. The exclusive recognition of the rights to life, liberty and property become arbitrary. Given the non existence of self-property and this arbitrary nature of the libertarian ethical system we simply cannot posit this principle as one capable of upholding morals, and must therefore conclude it to be ethically unsound according to the definitions of this debate. Even if we did accept that we could own ourselves, however, it would not provide a firm basis for rights, and much less for a list of rights that includes property. If it is property that justifies property we are in something of a predicament. I mentioned before that the initial argument for the right to self-property was not supported by anything beyond the mere (and in my view false) assertion of its necessity for any moral argument. I would go further and say that there is no further justification because any argument for self-ownership would have to justify property, and make the circular nature of this particular instance of libertarian reasoning painfully evident. A proposed alternativeThere is, of course, an alternative. The view could be taken that the reason that human relationships (their relation to people, groups, institutions or objects) foster rights is the dignity inherent in them as creatures endowed with the faculty of reason. Due to this dignity we must recognize personal autonomy, recognition of this dignity and personal autonomy requires a respect for life, and this respect for life requires the defense of private property as the best way to sustain human life. It also, however, serves as a limit to rights such as property as the same principle which justifies property (respect for human life and dignity) would hold it to be a criminally immoral act to withhold a vial of insulin to a diabetic going into a diabetic shock, for instance. Under the non-aggression principle, this would be moral behavior, as the man is not actively infringing the sick man's right to life, but merely exercising his own right to property. While we may hold this to be the very epitome of depraved greed, a rigorist interpretation of the non-aggression principle would not only be forced to accept this, but even to go so far as to consider a thriving slave trade perfectly moral, so long as the initial enslavement of each man were voluntary. As things stand, and unless Mr. Madara can give a reasoned defense of the idea of self-ownership and either show that his view is sufficient to condemn (or morally justify) these and other universally condemned behaviors, I hold we must consider this principle somewhat less than sound as an ethical principle.