There are no good reasons to think theism is true

DefinitionsTheism - By theism, I mean the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good, personal being who created the universe, and is (to a greater or lesser extent) active within the universe.The ResolutionIn my first round, I will present an argument to try and establish that no such being exists. I'll leave it to Con to present reasons for theism, which I will address in my next round. The WSA Evidential problem of evil (1) (P1) If there were an all-powerful and all-good God, then there would not be any evil in the world unless that evil is logically necessary for an adequately compensating good.(P2) There is evil in the world.(P3) Some of that evil is not logically necessary for any adequately compensating good.(C) Therefore, there is no God who is all powerful and all good.Defending P1P1 states that in order for evil to be morally permissible, then it has to be unavoidable, and the reason for permitting it outweighs preventing the evil. Such an example would be in the case of tooth decay. If painful drilling were the only way to prevent lots of future suffering, then it would be sufficient to meet P1, as it minimises evil in the most efficient way possible. Given that God is a being who is aware of all evil, has the power to prevent it, and would want to limit it as much as possible, it follows that only evils which are described by P1 would exist. As Christian philosopher Daniel Howard Snyder remarks,"on the face of it, the idea that God may well permit gratuitous evil is absurd. After all, if God can get what He wants without permitting some particular horror (or anything comparably bad), why on earth would He permit it?"(2)Thus, P1 holds that if God exists, gratuitous evils do not.Defending P2If P1 is virtually undeniable, P2 is even more so. There are things in the world which cause immense suffering, which for the purpose of the PoE is synonymous with evil. Things like droughts, disease and actions like torture are things which one would class as undesirable for a wholly good being to permit, all things being equal. Unless Pro adopts solipsism, I can't seem him denying P2. Typically, the theist will see P3 as his most promising target.Defending P3P3 states that it is reasonable to believe some evils in the world are not logically necessary for an adequately compensating good. In short, there exists gratuitous evil. An all powerful being is able to prevent the evils that occur, and an all good being is obviously willing, so the question becomes, is there always justification for the evils in the world? The answer, I think, is quite clearly, no. Before I begin to outline the justification for P3, I want to use 2 particularly horrendous examples of suffering on a massive scale: "Many babies each year are born with Down's syndrome. Most of these babies, with normal paediatric care, will grow up healthy. A significant number, however, have intestinal obstructions that will kill them if they do not receive an operation. Without the operation, dehydration and infection will cause these babies to wither and die over a period of hours and days. Today this operation is relatively simple, but not long ago these babies could not be saved . . . This baby (one born in the past with this) suffers for days, then dies." (3)Another example given by Rowe is that of animal suffering:"Suppose in some distant forest lightning strikes a dead tree, resulting in a forest fire. In the fire a fawn is trapped, horribly burned and lies in terrible agony for several days before death relieves its suffering. So far as we can see, the fawn's intense suffering is pointless." (4)What reasons do we have to believe these evils are actually gratuitous? The first is what we might call the prima facie case, and this is not a belief we should give up lightly. From absolutely everything we know of the first case, there was nothing to suggest that from the length, extent or even the very existence of the suffering of these babies that this was anything other than gratuitous. A baby destined to die suffered days of seemingly unnecessary, excruciating pain, with helpless relatives helplessly looking on in many cases. Given the fact that no hint of any reason at all seems evident to allow these babies to suffer, it is reasonable to conclude on this basis from the appearance of gratuitous evils, to the fact of gratuitous evils. As critic Stephen Wykstra reasons,"For if an instance of suffering appears not to have a point, that is a reason for thinking it has no point." (5)Secondly, it is difficult even to conceive of some examples of evil being morally permissible. In the case of the Rowe's fawn, there seems to be no conceivable reason to allow the extent of the suffering, nor any benefit which could even come from it. As Rowe points out,"In light of our experience and knowledge, of the variety and scale of human and animal suffering in our world, the idea that none of this suffering could have been prevented by an omnipotent being without thereby losing some greater good or permitting an evil at least as bad seems an extraordinary, absurd idea, quite beyond our belief." (6)The difficulty even to conceive of a plausible, morally sufficient reason to permit some evils also supports P3. Another reason I want to add could perhaps best be termed epistemic consistency. In essence, this simply means applying the same or similar standards to the PoE as we do to normal beliefs, and only to take seriously beliefs which are at least plausible. Sinnott-Armstrong explains the absurdity of abandoning this standard,"Would it benefit my family in the long-run if I were to burn down our house tonight? Possibly. Does that possibility make it reasonable to believe that we would benefit? No. Why not? Because we do know one thing: Burning down my house would cause serious problems in my family in the short term. Those known costs set up a presumption or burden of proof that needs to be overcome before contrary beliefs can be reasonable." (7)The same is true of evil. Given the massive short-term cost it causes, and (as well as we can judge), it's seeming ability to lead to long-term costs, the standard we follow must be consistent with our daily lives. Otherwise, as Sinnott-Armstrong quips, theists would be agnostic towards burning down their houses! The point is this: unless we genuinely adopt such scepticism with regard to decisions we make in our lives and beliefs, then we (if we are to be consistent) have to act on the information we have in respect to gratuitous evils. The only information we have in the debate thus far compels us to believe that they exist, and thus affirm P3.Lastly, the attempts to deny that there gratuitous evils run into a host of problems, which I will show in my defence of P3 in the next round. Given this, it seems all 3 premises are justified, and with this, the conclusion necessarily follows.ConclusionIn order to refute the argument, Con must present both a plausible and coherent account of why the argument is unsuccessful. I invite him to make his case, closing with the words of the prominent Christian scholar N.T.Wright:"If you think you have solved the problem of evil, lie down. It will pass." (8) Sources1,3. God? Debate between a Christian and an Atheist, William lane Craig and Walter Sinnott Armstrong, 2004, Oxford University Press, p84.2. Howard-Snyder, Daniel, and Frances Howard-Snyder. 1999. "Is Theism Compatible with Gratuitous Evil?" American Philosophical Quarterly 36: 115-29.4, 6. Rowe, William, The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism, American Philosophical Quarterly 16: 335-41.5.http://www.calvin.edu......7. God? . . . P1428. http://commonsenseatheism.com............ (debate can be found here).