The Belief in atheist Dogma is a Mental Disorder

Initial Rebuttals:1.Pro says he never made the claim that deviancy is corresponding to a mental disorder per se. Pro states:"In fact, most psychologists define "insanity" as displaying behaviors and beliefs that fall outside the standard range of normalcy, and that is exactly what the belief in atheist Dogma is " a collection of beliefs and behaviors that fall outside the standard range of normalcy"I never stated pro did; I was merely pointing out that his definition of insanity was conflated with deviancy, and further that insanity is an obsolete clinical concept. Pro's argument is incredibly disorganized, so it's quite difficult to pin his thought, so I was attempting to inference. 2.Pro says that they did not make a claim that the failure to account for objective morality translates into a clinical issue. However, this is implied. Pro argues that the atheist cannot account for objective morality, which in turn degrades moral character which produces immoral acts that therefore are deviant, or insane per pro's nomenclature; ergo, the failure to account for objective morality entails a clinical disposition; this is entirely sequitur. 3.Pro says: "Without God, nobody could make an objective distinction between better and worse."Well, I'm going to argue against this. However, pro fails to substantiate this assertion in the first place.4.To my claim of better being a pain-pleasure dichotomous function, pro states:"No it isn't"This, again, is not an argument.5.To my claim that I shall argue objective is not transcendent, pro states:"I didn't make such a claim either, so again, straw man on your part."Once again, implicitly pro did. The statement that without God there is no objective distinction between better and worse, is an appeal to transcendent. To invoke the Christian philosopher William Lane Craig, he writes: "If God does not exist, then objective moral values do not exist. When I speak of objective moral values, I mean moral values that are valid and binding whether anybody believes in them or not". This seems to be exactly what you are saying, and if you are not, please express the difference. The connection, to me, is that since the claim morality is not self-produced, then it must be transcendent, coming from God, and surely you believe God is transcendent."[1]So, Pro has made no well-defined argument, and additionally, is quite rude.A Mental Disorder:I expected pro to explicate an account of morality; remember the onus is on pro, he is shifting the BoP. Technically, pro has made no substantial argument, so I don't have to say anything; however, I will address the proposition. Recall, the proposition is if atheist dogma is a mental disorder. Pro has failed to define the atheist dogma, so it is hard to address the proposition. However, let's see if we can extrapolate if the common-sense idea of atheism is.The American Psychiatric Association defines mental illness as follows:"Mental illnesses are health conditions involving changes in thinking, emotion or behavior (or a combination of these). Mental illnesses are associated with distress and/or problems functioning in social, work or family activities."[2]It is a pretty hefty task to display that atheism is a mental disorder. Not only would pro need to show that there are no atheists who have the aforementioned problems, they would also need to show that the aetiology is atheism. Furthermore, if pro wishes to assert that atheism is a mental illness, they will have to identify what sort it is, e.g., psychoses, dissociative, developmental, cognitive. Also, clinically speaking, can pro rule out that the issues are caused by say, a vitamin deficiency, anemia, dehydration, a neurological ailment, liver failure; there are a multitude of physical ailments that manifests and are misdiagnosed as psychiatric. How can we be sure the atheist dogma is a psychological issue, if an issue at all?Even so, how can pro differentiate atheism as a symptom from atheism as an aetiology?Recall, the proposition is that atheist dogma is a mental disorder. Disorder, syndrome, diseased, symptom are all not the same thing. A link to the DSM-IV will be in the references, I couldn't find the term anywhere. So, please clarify in what sense atheism is clinical, and additionally psychiatric.[3]Atheism and MoralityPro has not been very rigorous so I will not go all out, but I will give a short account of my thought on morality.Pro gave no objection to my view that morality has to do with better or worse conduct, in which the better is moral and the worse is not.so, to me this creates a translation to pain or pleasure. Now, this is the only context in which morality makes sense. For example, imagine a state of affairs in which there are only rocks. How does morality exist here? Imagine a state of affairs in which there are only P-Zombies, how would it exist there. If there is no property of consciousness, there is no morality; thus, morality is only referential to consciousness. Now, the University of Chicago describes Searle's ontological distinctions as follows:"Second, there is an ontological variety of the objectivity/subjectivity distinction, which concerns the nature of a thing. Some things have a subjective sort of existence (tickles and itches), and others have an objective existence (mountains and architectonic plates). Searle argues that there are no conceptual problems with the project of carrying out epistemically objective investigations of ontologically subjective states."[4]All things that exist because they are experienced are ontologically subjective, thus sense morality only makes sense in mental context, it is ontologically subjective. However, that doesn't preclude an epistemically objective account of it, i.e., it isn't a matter of opinion.Now, if there were no minds, there would be no math because only minds can produce math. Hence, the equation: 2+2=4 can only exist in the context of mind; it is not ontologically objective. Where do you see this per se in nature? A mind has to express it and apply it to an ontologically objective set of things. So, what is it about math that allows it to be epistemically objective yet ontologically subjective? It is constructed. That is, it's merely how we've designed it. Likewise, morality's property of better or worse is how we've defined the thing, e.g., the oughtness, or shouldness of it. What had a mindless entity ought to do? The question is incoherent. Now, if one says 2+2=5, this is objectively wrong. One can't just say we have a different view of math. Likewise, to say an act wasn't wrong isn't merely opinion; this is because it is a function of pain and pleasure, something also ontologically subjective but epistemically objective.Now, the nexus of better and pleasure is apodictic. By pleasure, we aren't only saying x makes me feel good, we are concerned with the pleasure of all parties. And we aren't only talking about immediate pleasure, but also the long run. When we say X shouldn't murder, we are saying that murder would result in a net decrease of well being. However, we don't analyze these things ad hoc, we have a rule that says not to murder because it has such a propensity. I'll leave it to you to object, but since pleasure is an ontologically subjective property, we can know it because we are conscious; there is not transcendent appeal needed. I will clarify things next round; I'm out of room.References:[1]http://commonsenseatheism.com...[2]https://www.psychiatry.org...[3]https://justines2010blog.files.wordpress.com...[4]https://lucian.uchicago.edu...