The existence or non-existence of Absolute Certainty cannot be proven.

On LogicLogic, how I interpret it, is, at its foundation, simply the idea that any proposition can be categorised as true, false, or what may be true or false. To develop this further, propositions are attempts (which may be dishonest) to describe what is and what is not the case, as otherwise they are meaningless and therefore not propositions. Therefore, a true proposition describes what is the case, or what is fact. Propositions such as ‘X is beautiful’ can be seen as statements regarding the subject’s personal opinion of whether or not X is beautiful. I shall now show why attempting to criticise this idea of logic is fruitless. Logic cannot be considered falseLogic’s proposition is that truth can be distinguished from falsehood. You cannot claim that this is a false proposition without accepting its truth. Logic is not meaninglessAn alternative to claiming logic is false may be to say that the idea of logic is meaningless, that is to say, it is not a proposition. Seeing as logic attempts to describe what is the case, it is clearly a proposition and may not be declared meaningless. Accepting that logic is not meaningless, we can return to other criticisms.What is true is incompatible with what is false You may ask: what if everything is true? (This also applies even more obviously to ‘everything is false’.) Then ‘there are no truths’ is also true, and there we find a contradiction. You respond: ‘but how do you know that what is true cannot also be what is false? How do you arrive at this principle of non-contradiction?’. Very well; if we accept that that what is true is what is the case, and that what is false is not the case, then it follows that truth is that which is not false and vice versa, and we arrive at this conclusion by investigating descriptions and meaning.The Meaningfulness of Descriptions Descriptions are given meaning because of their compatibilities and incompatibilities, for if something that is described as having a property which is in direct opposition to another property can also be truthfully described as possessing that very same conflicting property, these descriptions must be meaningless, or they cannot both be true. I arrive at this conclusion because it is not possible to grant that a combination of propositions such as ‘This elephant has four legs, and that very same elephant has three legs’ is wholly true, because while each separate proposition does describe ‘what may be the case’, together they cannot. It cannot be the case that the elephant has exactly four legs and exactly three legs – in combination, the propositions become meaningless, as they do not provide any statement of what the case actually is. I propose that the ‘elephant’s legs’ statement cannot be true, because if it were true, then it would become a meaningless statement, and meaningless statements cannot be considered true. Likewise, the idea that what is true may also be false is similarly meaningless, and so cannot be true.To recapitulate:So far, I have reached several conclusions. These are:1. Logic cannot be criticised as false, as to do so is to accept it2. Logic cannot be described as meaningless, as it clearly expresses meaning3. The meaning of the descriptions of true and false make them incompatibleThe direct implications of that reasoning being:1. Logic is true2. Logic is meaningful3. That which is true cannot also be falseIn conclusion, I believe I have proven, with ‘absolute certainty’, that these statements are true. Where do I fall foul of the Münchhausen trilemma? I believe my argument is primarily one of semantics, and here we find that my axiom is circular. The only way to interrogate my argument, at its very foundation, is to ask ‘Is meaning meaningful?’. Of course, it is. This assumption is not a careless, or uncertain, for it is an assumption forced upon me by the very fact that I can think. Absolute certainty can therefore only exist if there is something to comprehend that certainty (this is fully compatible with the definition of existence given earlier), and I myself constitute proof that there is something capable of comprehension. Now, to discuss ‘I’…On the Cartesian ‘Cogito’Your refutation of this is that it is circular; however, circular reasoning is only false if the premises are not true, and therefore your refutation is an example of ignoratio elenchi. Nellie is an elephant, therefore Nellie is an elephant - this is perfectly valid reasoning, and if it is true that Nellie is an elephant, then the conclusion is sound. You demonstrate the self-evident nature of the Cogito perfectly, actually, because the assertion ‘I’ is in fact evidence of my own existence. You say that these thoughts of ‘I’ may come from ‘something else’, and I am not sure what you mean by this, but regardless, I am, regardless of what constitutes the sense of ego I have, my sense of ego exists. A man who is deluded into thinking that he is Napoleon does not have any less of a sense of ego than a man who believes he is ‘himself’, and in this same way any explanation of how my ego exists does not detract from the fact that my ego exists. If I am a strange fluctuation of energy inside a vial of equally mysterious chemicals, that does not detract from the fact that I am. If I am a constituent part of a larger programme, that still does not detract from the fact that I am. The implications of Solipsism to this debateMy argument is perfectly compatible with any reader, solipsist or not. I have proved the existence of absolute certainty to myself, certainly, but anyone who reads this may also have it proved to them. If there are other minds, then this argument should convince them, as they have a sense of ego, if not, then I have proved it to the only mind there is - my own. I do not see any significance at all of solipsism to this debate.ConclusionOver the course of my argument, I have proven many absolute certainties. I feel that my opponent failed to contemplate that circular arguments are not always false, and that initially much time was wasted concerning the existence of a world outside of the mind, but that was partly my fault too. The law of identity was indeed defended, particularly in the paragraph on meaning and also in the discussion of truth. I am conscious both of the time and the character constraints, and so I will not discuss my opponent’s arguments concerning ‘nothingness’ and quantum physics, because I believe that I have already proven my case, and that my position on those things is defended by this argument. I respectfully ask that voters focus on my argument this round, as it is comprehensive. I credit Wittgenstein and his writings On Certainty with inspiring my approach to logic, and of course, I thank Descartes for his Cogito. I apologise to my opponent for not being able to respond to everything he has written, but I had to meditate deeply to come up with the argument I have, and this has left me with little time to respond every detail of your impressive and lengthy thesis.With less than five minutes and fewer than a thousand characters remaining, I submit my argument to the consideration of other minds, should they exist.