Abortion Is Morally Permissible

I really do appreciate the time and care that Con has put into defending his position. But I must confess that I remain unconvinced. Let me explain why. C1: The sanctity of life doctrine is morally untenable. 1. The substance view is subject to counterexamples that render it false. My opponent persists in falsely claiming that the substance view entails that the irreversibly unconscious are non-persons without a right to life even when the evidence that he's wrong is placed right in front of him. Con doesn't address my evidence and merely falls back on his talking points. My opponent must accept that irreversibly unconscious humans are persons with a right to life and justify this view or he must reject the substance view as false. Moreover, Con merely appeals to the authority of Trent Horn to try to show that his two arguments are compatible. Well, Trent is demonstrably wrong and Con doesn't actually deal with the merits of my objection. My opponent's arguments when combined entail that anencephalic fetuses are both intrinsically valuable and not intrinsically valuable at the same time. This is a logical contradiction that can't possibly be true.[1] Even the preeminent defender of the substance view Patrick Lee admits this![2] 2. The substance view is false because it's based on a morally irrelevant biological property. Once again, Con's response begs the question and doesn't engage my argument. He has failed to explain why the biological property of being a human is morally important when biological properties are morally inconsequential in all other areas (e.g., race and sex). 3. Humans can't be intrinsically valuable because there are at least some possible worlds where humans would reasonably have no moral value. Con says that the conclusion I draw is a non-sequitur. He is simply incorrect and doesn't engage my logic. My conclusion follows necessarily from the axioms of modal logic and the definitions of intrinsic value and essential properties. As philosopher Paul Teller points out in the scholarly Journal of Philosophy, "An essential property is usually taken to be a property a thing has necessarily."[3] Con's response demonstrates nothing more than confusion about modal logic and also his position. Contrary to what Con claims, his argument maintains all humans have the inherent capacity to be rational beings merely by being human.[4] 4. It is plausible that the right to life is an accidental property. Con says that my argument is based on pure speculation since no one can currently perform a cerebrum swap. But thought experiments can help produce valuable information in science (e.g., Maxwell's demon, Einstein's elevator and Schrï¿½dinger's cat).[5] I am not just making an assumption like Con. I made a reasoned argument that Con hasn't responded to. Once more, Con says that rights can't be tied to properties that come in degrees. I've already refuted this argument. It's self-defeating since natural capacities come in degrees as well. Con doesn't offer a response. What about this claim that I'm taking Josh Brahm's words out of context? Josh said in our debate that it's ok to kill brain-dead people.[6] Given that there is no real moral difference between brain-death and anencephaly, I'm lead to believe he feels the same way about anencephalic fetuses. I'm not taking anyone's words out of context. C2: A fetus is not a person and thus cannot have a serious right to life. Contrary to what my opponent claims, the term "person" cannot be defined any way that one wishes. The concept of what a "person" denotes in philosophy has a rigid meaning that is not subject to arbitrary revision. A "person" is a being that has a serious right to life. Anyone who went around calling black individuals "non-persons" would obviously be unjustified in their views. Now what about my reasons for accepting the psychological criteria for personhood? 1. My first argument was that only beings that have had conscious desires in the past can be harmed in any morally significant sense. First, I don't have to agree with Warren's view on infanticide to accept her general argument. Second, the reason many pro-lifers think that this objection is so devastating is because the acceptance of infanticide runs deeply contrary to some people's moral intuitions. But I've given pretty unequivocal evidence that moral intuitions aren't always reliable. Thus, the infanticide objection can't go through on moral intuitions alone without rational support. I submit that Con's general argument doesn't provide that support. In any case, I've given an argument that my view doesn't necessarily entail infanticide and so Con's point is moot. Con objects to my argument by saying that it's ad hoc and asks why fertilization wouldn't be a good dividing line. First, Singer's argument isn't ad hoc because the line can't be between existence and non-existence, since virtually no one seriously considers existing brain-dead people to be valuable. Second, assuming the non-personhood of the fetus, granting a right to life at fertilization would run afoul of what even pro-life philosophers have called "the important value of reproductive choice."[7] 2. My second argument was that my view properly accounts for why the irreversibly unconscious don't have a right to life. I've already responded to Con's false claim that the substance view and FLO argument are not mutually exclusive. My opponent raises the sleeping and comatose person objection once more as if I haven't addressed it. My opponent simply drops my counter argument. Con then goes on to say that I have somehow trapped myself into accepting that brain-dead people also have a right to life because they've been conscious in the past. My argument simply doesn't imply this. According to my argument, brain-dead people are no longer psychologically continuous as persons and would therefore lack a right to life. 3. My third argument was that the psychological account of personhood can offer a non-arbitrary and species free account of personhood. I will grant that my opponent's argument and mine are effectively tied in this one small area. 4. My fourth argument was that the psychological account of personhood explains numerous issues in personal identity. Con objects by saying that conjoined twins are two separate biological organisms. This response is subject to a number of strong objections. First, it is very implausible that these dicephalic twins are two distinct organisms when there is very little duplication of organs and the organs all function together as a single unit.[8] Second, it is possible for the cerebrums of dicephalic twins to emerge from a single brainstem. Because there would only be one brainstem to regulate the single autonomic nervous system for a single set of organs, it should be clear that there is only one biological organism. After all, it is the brainstem, not the cerebrum, that regulates the functioning of the various organs and somatic systems within the organism.[9] 5. My fifth argument was that it's plausible that rights function to protect interests. I've already anticipated Con's objection to my argument and refuted it. Ideal desires require actual desires. The fetus doesn't have any desires that can be corrected for cognitive distortions. Con is trying to impute an ideal desire out of thin air and attribute it to the fetus that doesn't have any desires to begin with. My opponent may think his maneuver is reasonable, but it clearly seems incoherent. | Conclusion | The weakness of Con's position is attested by both his refusal to substantively engage with my arguments and also by the inadequate justification he has given for his own position. By contrast, it would seem that all of my arguments remain intact despite Con's refutations. And for that reason I remain enthusiastically in support of the important value of reproductive choice. Sources: http://tinyurl.com...