Choose one of them Kleptin!

I will now post my final rebuttal. My opponent's last response was a two parter. He first commented on how my alleged misinterpretation of his argument renders my counterpoints null. He then counters my example for free will using his clarified syllogism. I shall attack his argument and link it together with his counterpoint, showing both that his argument is logically flawed and that my argument holds under his accusations at once. First, let us retrace the exchanges we have had regarding my opponent's argument. At first, my opponent's argument has the following format: P1. We have no control over the events of the past that determined our present state and no control over the laws of nature. P2. Since we can have no control over these matters, we also can have no control over the consequences of them. C. Since our present choices and acts are the necessary consequences of the past and the laws of nature, then we have no control over them and, hence, no free will. It is plain to see that my opponent's argument only makes sense because it begs the question. Free will is the ability to have an active role in controlling our fate. If free will exists, then our choices should determine events in the future and since time goes on, those future events will become events of the past. Our lives will be a series of choices, limited by nature and by the choices we and other free willed agents make, but not limited to just one determined result. My opponent's argument hinges on the premise that we can in no way control the events of the past. However, what basis does he have for saying this? The answer is equivocation. A feather is light. What is light is not dark. Therefore, a feather is no dark. Double meanings can lead to flawed arguments. What does this argument mean by "light"? Similarly, what does my opponent mean by "control the events of the past? " This led to the first confusion. My opponent is claiming that he meant "we cannot time travel and change the past", which we all know to be true. But then, he points at the premise again in order to say "If we can't control, then we can't control the present or the future! " Of course, this is a completely different meaning. His argument of course, follows, but only due to this equivocation fallacy. How do I know this is the case? If he truly meant "we cannot time travel to alter the past" he would be able to use that exact phrase and still come up with a solid syllogism. It is impossible to do so. He then changes his argument into this format: 1. Events of the past determine our present state 2. Our present choices and actions are the necessary consequences of the past 3. We have no control over the events of the past. 4. Since we have no control over either the events of the past, we have no control over the consequences of them. :. Therefore, we have no control over our present choices and acts. Notice how the wording is exactly the same? The vagueness, and thus, the double meaning carries over, thereby carrying over the fallacy. This syllogism is flawed in exactly the same way. I tried to make this clear by showing that there is assumed lack of free will in each part of the syllogism. However, my opponent then decides to change his argument a third time. This time, he emphasizes his point about how the past leads to specific consequences. He cites the following example: "If Jane Doe decides to sit on a chair with her own free choice, the necessary consequence is that she is sitting on a chair! The past events is her deciding to sit on a chair (and presumably walking towards it, leaning towards it, bending her knees, etc. ) while the present state is her sitting on the chair. " A very convincing argument, is it not? This is because just like all his other ones, this very example assumes determinism. How? My opponent is portraying this situation from a biased angle: That of the future! Before Jane Doe decides to sit on the chair, there exists two universes of possibilities at least. One where she does sit in the chair, and one where she does not. My opponent's argument saying that a necessary consequence occurs would only make sense because he knows what the result is. The actual decision to sit in the chair is not the illustration of free will. He atempts to include the process of choice as past in order to avoid dealing with a situation in which choosing can be in the present. The fact that there is a moment in which she can make the choice is the evidence of free will, and at that moment, my opponent cannot conclude any sort of "necessary consequence" because at that moment, the decision is unpredictable. This is the frame in time where my opponent's argument fallas apart and thus, why he wants to avoid it. My opponent's absurd equivocation rests with the premise "We cannot control the past". However, even in this very situation, it is plain to see that Jane Doe can control the future, which will eventually become her past. She can decide either to sit or not to sit. Sitting will eliminate her choice of offering the seat to another person, for example, but for every choice we make, we open up an infinite number of other choices. Thus, while my opponent can justify determinism while arguing from the future into the past, his argument is completely irrelevant when we change the viewpoint from the present into the future, and regretfully for him, this is the way that mankind experiences the world. We cannot use arguments and analogies that require us to be able to see the future in order for them to be coherent or useful. Let us then take one last look at my opponent's argument: 1. Events of the past determine our present state 2. Our present choices and actions are the necessary consequences of the past 3. We have no control over the events of the past. 4. Since we have no control over either the events of the past, we have no control over the consequences of them. :. Therefore, we have no control over our present choices and acts. Even if we cannot change the past, our decisions in the present can control the consequences that take place in the future. My opponent attempts to gloss over this easily understandable truth by saying that the present is necessary consequence of the past. This is just fancy language for saying that everything we do in the present is a result of the past. And as I said above, my opponent conveniently decided to place the act of decision making into the past. Once we move it make into its place in the present, it is plain to see that our "present choices" are limited by the past, but not limited to one mandatory result. The necessary consequence is unpreidctable and the result of the variable known as free will. My opponent's final comment on my proof- That performing six random actions of my own free will demonstrates the existence of free will is demonstration of agency and not free will, hinges on two arguments: 1. That I have no empirical scale by which to measure the sense of freedom. 2. That his syllogism makes his explanation of agency superior. First, I have shown that his syllogism is logically flawed for the third and final time. Second, I do have an empirical scale. We all know what restriction feels like, what helplessness feels like. To be able to act on the universe as you imagine so in your mind is freedom. Free will feels like moving through air instead of molasses. It is the lack of restriction between an action you want to perform and an action you actually do perform. I did not feel forced, nor did I feel restricted, and this is my empirical, observed, sensed interpretation of free will, making it more plausible than the more unnecessarily complicated view that free will is an illusion.