It is probable god exists

I will, however, summarize my arguments and my responses to Con's objections. Regardless, there is nothing new to be said anyway, as Con either misunderstood or ignored my objections.1. The Ontological ArgumentCon objected to the modal ontological argument on the grounds that it was possible that maximal greatness was not possibly exemplified. I criticized this response with conflating epistemic possibility with metaphysical possibility. Con, however, doesn't seem to have understood this objection, as he merely repeats his already refuted argument. I get the impression that Con is simply blindly repeating what he has read in some books without actually comprehending the issues at hand. His counter-syllogism fails from the beginning. P1 is false because it conflates epistemic possibility with metaphysical possibility. It may be epistemically possible that a maximally great being does not exist in some possible world, but its metaphysical possibility does not follow. After all, it's epistemically possible that Goldbach's conjecture is either true or false, but it does not follow that either is a genuine metaphysical possibility. In the same way, one may be able to conceive of assert the non-existence of an MGB, but there was no metaphysical implications from this. Conceivability does not entail possibility. [1]Is P1 of the OA more extravagant than Con's P1? Perhaps, but I could care less whether or not it is. Either way, it has no bearing on the argument. It is not enough to show that Con's P1 is less extravagant. As I pointed out before, whether or not Con's P1 is true depends on whether or not the possible non-existence of an MGB is metaphysically possible. But this is an enormous task, as it would have to amount to showing that the very idea of an MGB is logically incoherent. Con would thus have to show that the idea of an MGB is self-contradictory, something which he has failed to do. Extravagance matters little, for as long as P1 of the OA is even possible, then it is true -- regardless of how extravagant it may be. On Ockham's RazorCon evidently does not understand how Ockham's razor is used. As pointed out in a previous footnote, Ockham's razor states that entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity. To assume that theism multiplies entities because is not necessary is basically to presuppose the falsity of the ontological argument. This is patently circular, as it amounts to assuming the ontological argument is false to show that it is.2. The Kalam Cosmological ArgumentEither Con is blind, or he admits the force of my criticism. His one paragraph rebuttal does not even begin to touch on my rebuttal to his objections to the KCA. He simply repeats objections I have already refuted. As such, I will simply repost my counter-arguments from the previous round:The first thing to note is that the fallacy of composition is an informal fallacy. Informal fallacies are only fallacious given certain situations. For example, it is not fallacious to assert that because every brick in a wall is red, that the wall itself must be red. Thus, it will not do for Con to simply say the KCA is guilty of the fallacy of composition without showing why it does, as part-whole reasoning is not always fallacious. Secondly, the KCA does not rely on part-whole reasoning. The KCA is not saying that because every part requires a cause, the whole too requires a cause. Rather, it is claiming that whatever begins to exist has a cause. The universe, regardless of whether it is a part or a whole, still requires a cause if it began to exist. Con's criticism is thus wholly inapplicable. Con's criticism of the second and third premises are completely off point too. He asserts that there is no evidence for the second premise, yet he does not even attempt to refute the two lines of evidence that I brought up in my opening argument (That P2 is supported by the big bang and the impossibility of an actual infinite). Moreover, his statement that we do not know "what happened before the big bang" is mistaken as well. There is no such thing as "before the big bang. " As Quentin Smith (himself an atheist) notes, "It belongs analytically to the concept of the cosmological singularity that it is not the effect of prior physical events. The definition of a singularity. .. entails that it is impossible to extend the spacetime manifold beyond the singularity. .. This rules out the idea that the singularity is an effect of some prior natural process. " [2]Con has also completely misunderstood the reasoning behind P3. It is not claiming that "everything has a personal cause," but that the cause of the universe must be personal because there cannot be antecedent conditions in which event causation can take place. Event causation is when an event A causes event B, and agent causation is when an agent A causes an event B. The mode of causation operative at the beginning of the universe could not have been event causation because there were no prior conditions under which natural causes could operate. As a matter of necessity then, the cause of the universe must have been a personal agent. 3. The Leibnizian Cosmological ArgumentCon charges the LCA again with the fallacy of composition. Yet, as I have already pointed out in my response to his objections to the KCA, this is simply an unjustified charge. That fact aside, Con's latest response strikes one as being self-contradictory. He writes that "Yes contingent beings require and explanation and any contingent fact requires one as well. " Yet a few sentences later, he states "It could just be brute fact that there would be a set of contingent beings. " These two statements are mutually exclusive. Either contingent facts require an explanation, or they are brute facts. You can't have both. So which one will it be, Con? He also makes the charge that the explanation of contingent facts need not be God. Yet this charge is without warrant, as I provided arguments in my opening argument which demonstrate the the explanation needs to be personal. I simply extend my arguments. More can be said on this and other topics, but I am prohibited from introducing new arguments/rebuttals. SummaryThe resolution stands affirmed. The existence of God is probable given the ontological argument, KCA, and LCA. Con's objections have been found to be weak and inept; moreover, he has not demonstrated the existence of God is improbable. I urge that the audience vote accordingly. 1. It's worth nothing that some dispute whether or not one can even conceive of the non-existence of an MGB (Who is incorporeal). 2. W. L. Craig and Q. Smith, Theism, Atheism, and Big Bang Cosmology (OUP) p.120