It is most probable that a god exists.

Ave!Contingency ArgumentCon argues that there is no reason to think the necessary cause of the universe is god. To the contrary, I think we have very good reasons to affirm that to be true. Material or Immaterial?: A maximally great being wouldn't be material, because material is contingent. If material were contingent, then the maximally great being would not be maximally great, as it's not necessary. So, a maximally great being has to be immaterial.Personal or impersonal?: A maximally great being would be personal because if it weren't, it would be a material explanation, and we've already ruled that out.Timeless or temporal?: Time began to exist. If the maximally great being were temporal, it would also have to begin to exist. A being that began to exist wouldn't be necessary, so it wouldn't be maximally great. Therefore, the MGB must be timeless.Spaceless or sans space?: Same reasoning as above.The contingency argument establishes a timeless, immaterial, spaceless, omnipotent (likely), and personal cause. A maximally great being, in order to be maximally great, has to be timeless, spaceless, omnipotent, immaterial, and impersonal. Most plausibly, the maximally great being is the cause of the universe that the contingency argument posits.PSRCon argues that there is no reason to apply the PSR to things outside of the universe. The problem is that we're not applying it outside of the universe. The theist is saying that the universe began to exist, so it had an external cause. At that point, we stop using the PSR and begin using deductive reasoning to determine what that cause would be. The PSR is only used to show that there is an explanation of the universe's exists. It is not used to tell us what the cause would be like (timeless v.s. temporal, etc).The PSR is used to demonstrate that the universe had an explanation, and we use deductive reasoning to demonstrate what that explanation is. At no point do we apply the PSR to things outside of the universe.Argument against the PSR RefutedCon seems to think that anything that forces you to pick between two options must be a false dichotomy. That's just not the case. It's only a false dichotomy if a third option is available. So, what is the third option besides a scientific or personal cause?Ontological ArgumentIt seems to me that this argument will come down to the plausibility of P1. Is it more plausible that P1 of the ontological argument is true, or is it more plausible that P1 of the parody argument is true? I would argue that the former is more plausible. There seems to be nothing that would prevent a maximally great being from existing in some possible world. The only way to show otherwise is to prove that the maximally great being has some contradictory properties, like a square circle or a married bachelor.Con has attempted to demonstrate that the MGB has contradictory properties because it can’t be greater than itself. Because of this, it has a limitation, and it can’t be maximally great, as such a being would have no limitations. I think this argument fails to understand that limitation is not inherently a lesser-making property. It’s logically impossible to conceive of a being that is greater than a being that is the greatest thing you can conceive of. In other words, it’s logically impossible to think of something greater than the MGB by definition. The fact that the MGB can’t be any greater is just a logical rule. It’s not a lesser-making property.Premise three of Gaunilo’s parody cannot be substantiated. There is a logical state of affairs where no land exists, and therefore, no islands! So, there’s no way that the maximally great island could exist in all possible worlds! Yes, I realize that you could argue there is some possible world where the MGB doesn’t exist, but the only reason to think so has been refuted above.Con gives another argument for why a MGB can’t exist. An actual infinite can’t exist, a MGB is infinitely great, ergo a MGB cannot exist. This severely misunderstands what it means to be maximally great. A maximally great being has all great making properties to their maximal extent. It does not have all great making properties to an infinite extent. Con’s argument fails because its definition of a MGB is flawed.A necessary being has great making properties that last eternally and in all possible worlds. A contingent being has great making properties that are finite and don’t exist in all possible worlds. Ergo, it is greater to be necessary than contingent.Moral ArgumentIn my opening statement, I gave an argument for why objective moral truth exists. The argument went like this: For any action A affecting some person P, if A has moral content, then A cannot be amoral. If such morals exist, then they would exist necessarily. Some objective moral knowledge exists. Moral truth existsThe only objection to this argument from Con was that there is no reason to believe that the action has moral content. Sadly, defending this premise is trivial. As I explained in my opening statement, moral content simply means that an action can be thought of in terms of right and wrong. I gave several examples of actions that can be thought of in terms of right and wrong. It simply requires one person to say “I think that this action is morally wrong’’ to give the action moral content! I’m stunned that Con would choose this premise of all to attack.Con tried to show that objective morality could exist without god if we based it on alleviating suffering and promoting happiness. I demonstrated that this was only an assumption and that it falls under the is-ought gap. Con never answered this objection, so we have no reasons to believe that objective morality can exist without god.So, we have one weak objection to the argument for moral truth. This objection doesn’t stand, so moral truths must exist. God is the best explanation of objective moral truth, so god exists.Vale!