Bohmian Mechanics Is Probably False

Bohmian Mechanics Is Not Experimentally Equivalent To Standard Quantum Theory It is simply not true that the predictions Bohmian mechanics makes are necessarily experimentally equivalent to orthodox quantum theory. In the paper "Is the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation of quantum mechanics really plausible?" By Physicist Kurt Jung, he states: “[P]redicted properties [in the Bohmian interpretation] of atoms and molecules are in conflict with experimental findings.” – Kurt Jung[1] Physicist Ilja Schmelzer drives this point home: “... it is not true that the de Broglie-Bohm theory gives the same predictions in general. It can be arranged to do so in the case of one spinless particle. But in the real quantum theories we find relevant today, such as quantum field theory, de Broglie-Bohm theory cannot be constructed to match probabilistic QFT exactly, and one can see that its very framework contradicts observable facts.” - Ilja Schmelzer[2] Even if the math is the same, the idea that Bohmian mechanics inherently experimentally equivalent is absurd. People are thinking of experiments right now that could test whether a wave-function actually collapses or not. P. R Holland published a paper called "Testing Wave-Function Collapse"[3]. The abstract of the paper is as follows: “The technique of measuring the wavefunction of a single system suggests a method for distinguishing between epistemological interpretations of quantum mechanics which postulate wavefunction collapse and ontological interpretations such as that of de Broglie and Bohm in which no collapse occurs.” - P.R Holland [3] If the wave-function collapses for real, then interpretations like the Copenhagen interpretation remain unscathed. However, this would spell death for the Bohmian mechanics. Therefore, it should be clear by now that Bohmian mechanics can be ruled out by experiment without necessarily harming other interpretations. As far as the paper from R. Plaga, it only deals with the Many-Worlds interpretation. If the test proposed came up negative for that interpretation; other interpretations would not be harmed. --- The irony of my opponent’s argument here is that if it holds; he admits that his “hidden variable” theory is unfalsifiable. However, as Con rightly notes himself: “[T]he hypothesis is fundamentally bad, as it cannot be falsified.” – Sargon[4] If “hidden variables” are really unfalsifiable as my opponent claims (which follows from his notion that we cannot disprove Bohmian mechanics without disproving the Copenhagen interpretation), then my opponent admits his that his hypothesis involving “hidden variables” is fundamentally bad. This is because we can explain the data without that unnecessary assumption; it is improbable. Violations In Leggett’s Inequalities I never claimed that violations of Leggett’s inequalities necessarily effected Bohmian mechanics directly. If my opponent read my entire round he would know this. I stated specifically: “Violations of Leggett's inequalities by Anton Zeilinger in 2007 falsified a broad range of non-local hidden variables and realistic pictures. However, there were still some loopholes.” – Me I left open the clear possibility that Bohmian mechanics wasn’t harmed by this particular experiment. Antoine Suarez And The Before-Before Experiment My opponent is correct about the before-before experiment. I failed to take into account the fact that Bohmian mechanics entails a single preferred frame in context, which does seem to get passed my objection. Quantum Erasure With Causally Disconnected Choice My opponent denies that this experiment hurts Bohmian mechanics by claiming that the interpretation of Special Relativity that this argument against Bohmian mechanics depends upon (Minkowskian spacetime) is false. He cites the Alain Aspect’s experiments with Bell’s inequalities which show instantaneous interaction, which seems to hurt the Minkowskian framework which predicts that there is no absolute simultaneity. However, this is not necessarily the case if entangled particles are entangled across time. A recent experiment by E. Megidish, A. Halevy, T. Shacham, T. Dvir, L. Dovrat, and H. S. Eisenberg shows this to be the case in the paper "Entanglement Between Photons that have Never Coexisted"[5]. Since this experiment shows entangled particles that are entangled across time, the idea that quantum entanglement harms the way we usually think about Special Relativity is false. The Minkoskian interpretation should be accepted over other views because any physical system whatsoever will exhibit the exact same contraction. This would be extremely unlikely if Minkoskian spacetime was false. In the paper "Presentism and Relativity", Yuri Balashov and Michael Janson write: "The universality of the behavior of the rod suggests that space and time are Minkowskian. Length contraction is part of the normal spatiotemporal behavior of systems in Minkowski space-time." - Yuri Balashov and Michael Janson[6] Additionally, the idea that space and time are not married in reality violates the symmetry principles of Earman (which are taken seriously in science).This particular experiment by Anton Zelienger shows that Bohmian mechanics is probably false. -- The team’s chief result doesn’t necessarily depend on interpretations of Special Relativity anyway: “No naive realistic picture is compatible with our results because whether a quantum could be seen as showing particle- or wave-like behavior would depend on a causally disconnected choice.” - Xiao-song Ma, Johannes Kofler, Angie Qarry, Nuray Tetik, Thomas Scheidl, Rupert Ursin, Sven Ramelow, Thomas Herbst, Lothar Ratschbacher, Alessandro Fedrizzi, Thomas Jennewein, Anton Zeilinger[7] They show in the paper that no naïve realistic picture (this includes Bohmian mechanics, as it denies wave-function collapse as real) is combatible with the experiment because any hidden variables would have to ‘know’ what choices the experimenter would choose before the experiment took place, and change the quantum states accordingly; which is, of course, seemingly impossible without further fundamental grounding for such an outrageous mechanism. Therefore, Bohmian mechanics should be rejected due to this experiment regardless of interpretations of Special Relativity. Richard Feynman And The Uncertainty Principle My opponent completely misunderstands the argument here. When I said that Feynman argues for the Uncertainty Principle, I meant that he argues for it being ontological and not just epistemological. This should have been evident, as the whole argument is about the problem with hidden variables. Also, in my summary of my last round I said: “I also showed that the Uncertainty Principle is not just epistemic.” – Me I was referring to Richard Feynman’s argument. Therefore, my opponent hasn’t actually addressed Richard Feynman’s argument. His rebuttal is based on a misunderstanding regarding the assumption that when I was talking about an argument for the Uncertainty Principle; I wasn't speaking about its ontology (I was however). Con hasn’t sufficiently rebutted the argument against hidden variables here. Therefore, it stands. Occam’s Razor And Ad Hocness Occam’s Razor is about making less assumptions. “It states that among competing hypotheses, the hypothesis with the fewest assumptions should be selected.”[8] Claiming that there are “hidden variables” making it look “as if” the wave-function collapses, is like saying that evolution is false, and this “hidden variable” Diety is planting fossils and DNA making it look “as if” evolution is true. It’s an unnecessary assumption and should be rejected. Con mentions Einstein’s intuition that the moon is there when nobody looks. However, in some interpretations of the Copenhagen interpretation, it is the measurement device which causes collapse of a wave-function (not conscious observation)[9]. Therefore, as long as there are classical systems interacting with quantum systems; the moon is still there. Either way, this type of intuition doesn’t trump a prima facie case like mine. It truly seems like the wave-function collapses (this is just some of the weirdness of quantum mechanics commonly accepted). Thus, we should believe it lacking any defeaters. My argument regarding Occam’s Razor and Ad Hocness stands. My Opponent’s Philosophical Argument My opponent hasn’t presented any argument in favof Bohmian mechanics being probably true. Con is only trying to undermine the Copenhagen interpretation. Even if that interpretation is false, that doesn’t mean Bohmian mechanics is probably true; that is a non-sequitur fallacy. Many-Worlds could be true, or the Ghirardi–Rimini–Weber interpretation (there are tons of interpretations). Since the Copenhagen interpretation being false wouldn’t automatically mean that Bohmian mechanics is probably true; this argument from Con can't hold up his burden. My opponent’s argument does fail though, as it only tries to undermine the notion that the Copenhagen interpretation is necessarily ontological based on the verificationalism which implies it. It doesn’t follow from this that the Uncertainty Principle is probably epistemological (Con made this odd leap) just because he undermined one reason to believe it is true that isn’t even necessary for reasonable belief in the Copenhagen interpretation in the first place. Feynman’s argument already shows the plausibility of the Uncertainty Principle being ontological (which Con essentially dropped based on a misunderstanding). Sources [1] http://iopscience.iop.org...[2] http://motls.blogspot.ca...[3] http://users.ox.ac.uk...[4] http://www.debate.org...;[5] http://arxiv.org...[6] http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu...[7] http://arxiv.org...[8] Wikipedia [Occam's_razor][9] http://aflb.ensmp.fr...