There Are Good Secular Reasons to Disallow Same-Sex Marriage

Like my opponent said of me, there is much to go over in his response. I'll focus on key parts in his response, with smaller points being grouped under them.Does Marriage Have an Objective Nature? Yes!My opponent doesn't think so; but in many ways this very debate must presuppose that marriage does have an objective nature. Here's why: If there is no way that marriage ought to be, then how can we say that any given marriage policy is just or unjust? How can restrictions on who can enter into a legal marriage be bad if marriage is just something we invent? [1] Presumably my opponent thinks that bans on interracial marriage were unjust -- but suppose everyone in a society were to agree that such bans were necessary. There's no doubt that they would nevertheless be wrong, and they would be wrong because they imposed a criteria irrelevant to what marriage issupposed to look like.Indeed, he has given no argument to the extent that there is no such thing as an objective nature to marriage. By contrast, many of the (purely secular!) arguments I have offered serve the dual function of demonstrating that there is a core essence to marriage. He has, therefore, given nothing but an assertion. Now while it is true that societies throughout history have had varying (but limited) views on marriage, this does not by any means show that marriage is simply whatever we want it to be. The mere phenomenon of disagreement doesn't verify metaphysical conventionalism. [2] This is an incredibly weak argument.Procreation and Child-Bearing: InseparableI gave substantive arguments in R1 and R2 that procreation and child rearing go together: Any union that is not oriented toward procreation is not oriented toward child rearing. Con's response completely misunderstands these arguments; the claim is not that all heterosexual conjugal unions are good parents, nor is it that non-conjugal unions are incapable of raising children. Rather, the claim is that conjugal unions are naturally suited toward raising children, in the same way that an eye is naturally suited toward seeing. Not all eyes may see, and not all conjugal unions may exercise the virtues of parenthood, but that has nothing to do with my argument. Con's strategy was to argue that procreation and child-raising are unrelated, and hence homosexuals are capable of achieving the latter even if not the former. On that basis, they should be allowed to enter into legal marriages. But as I argued, the mere capacity to raise children is not enough. We exclude many different kinds of social unions from entering into marriage (e.g. triad of three+ people, a group of nuns or fraternity brothers, friends) even though they are capable in a broad sense of raising children. To be called a marriage, a union must not merely be capable of raising children; it must also be specially suited to having children to begin with. Hence why procreative ability is important.Con ends up attacking a strawman. My arguments remain unaffected.The 'Harm' Principle: Yet Another Question-Begging Argument!My opponent argues that if my case is to succeed, that I need to produce an instance of a societal harm that results from same-sex marriage.There are two things to note about this. First, my argument is thoroughly non-consequentialist. Same-sex marriage is unjust not because of any consequences that it may bring about, but because it promotes a false model of human sexuality. I don't care whether same-sex marriage harms anyone; I care about getting marriage right. This is not co-extensive with the issue of harm. Con's demand, therefore, is simply irrelevant. Another more fundamental problem is that his demand begs the question. If the arguments I have given are sound, then same-sex marriage is itself an harmful in virtue of its promoting a false understanding of human sexuality. If marriage is supposed to be a comprehensive union with a special link to children, anything else promotes a false understanding of marriage and qualifies as a moral harm (harms come in different types, not just physical!).Herein lies the core mistake in my opponent's argument: You cannot know that society is being harmed with respect to some institution without assuming some idea of what that institution is. The harm question is of course a very important one, but it is secondary to this more fundamental issue. If marriage revisionists are right about what they think marriage is, then allowing same-sex marriage harms no one. Conversely, if they are wrong, then allowing same-sex marriage is an intrinsic harm that necessarily harms the culture-at-large. Harms are always defined in relation to a state of proper well-being. Hence we first need to know what marriage is before we can answer whether same-sex marriage is itself harmful or leads to external harms. My opponent has not even attempted to take up this challenge.Brief Comments on Kind Membership, Benefits and The State's Interest.1) Con argues that I confuse an institution's intrinsic purpose with other purposes that some other entity might have for it. Nonsense. The state's job is to promote the common good. The common includes the various social institutions which make up civil society. If the state is going to regulate these institutions, then it should regulate them correctly, viz. according to their own intrinsic purpose. The purpose of marriage, as I have argued several times, is its link to children. To ignore this and impose a completely different meaning on marriage is to impede a societal good. My opponent's argument relies on a conventionalist account of marriage, under which it has no objective purpose or structure. But this was asserted without argument.2) Con misunderstands my response to the benefits argument. I pointed out that in order for the benefits argument to work, that one must first show that individuals are entitled to those benefits. The state may, of course, dispense benefits at its own discretion apart from the demands of justice, but in the case of a social institution like marriage (which, as I've argued, has an objective nature), benefits must be dispensed in relation to what marriage is supposed to be. Once again, we can't determine who gets marriage benefits unless we first know what marriage is. Marriage may turn otu to be a social construction, but this requires independent argument.3) The state's interest is in marriage is first and foremost in its link to the creation of children. There are, of course, other benefits related to marriage, but these are all ancillary to that purpose. This is confirmed by the weight of American legal precedent. [3], [4], [5], [6] The resolution is affirmed._______NOTES1. One might try to argue that marriage is a social practice; albeit one that is governed by rules. This response fails, since social practices are instrumental goods aimed at furthering other basic goods. Marriage, by contrast, is a fundamental good. cf. Girgis, Anderson, and George, What is Marriage? (Encounter: 2013) 46.2. And in fact, any disagreement on complimentarity is nearly non-existent. See Maggie Gallagher, "The Case Against Same-Sex Marriage" and "Reply to Corvino" in Gallagher and Corvino, Debating Same-Sex Marriage (Oxford: 2012) 3. “Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.” – Skinner v. Oklahoma(1942) 316 U.S. 535, 541 4. “[Marriage] is the foundation of the family and of society, without which there would be neither civilization nor progress.” – Maynard v. Hill (1888) 125 U.S. 190, 211. 5. “[T]he first purpose of matrimony, by the laws of nature and society, is procreation.” – Baker v. Baker (1859) 13 Cal. 87, 103.6. Conaway v. Deane, 903 A.2d 416, 620 (Md. 2007), though not a SCOTUS case itself, summarizes the relevant precedents: “Virtually every Supreme Court case recognizing as fundamental the right to marry indicates as the basis for the conclusion the institution’s inextricable link to procreation, which necessarily and biologically involves participation by a man and a woman.”