Strong Atheism is a Sound Position

I appreciate Daley for taking this debate for what is probably one of my most optimistic resolutions, and indeed should be an entertaining one. A priori stance of non-existence This argument is a stronger version of Occam’s Razor and ‘Burden of Proof’, and gives ground to a higher probability of a proposed entity X not-existing a priori. This is before we assess the evidence and positive arguments in favour of God’s existence, which I argue have been unsatisfactory in mitigating this argument.[1] A: A priori, it is more likely that God exists than it doesn’t (assumption) P1. If A is true, then all entities are more likely to exist then not (a1, a2, a3… etc) P2. a1 is mutually exclusive to a2, a3... etc. P3. a2 is mutually exclusive to a1, a3... etc. ... Ad infinitum C. A entails a contradiction (2 & 3…ad infinitum), therefore A is falseThis can be applied to each and every one of God’s attributes (as defined), such as Omnipotence, Omniscience, etc. It is impossible for there to exist more than one omnipotent being for instance, so any being defined as ‘omnipotent’ with different attributes (such as only finitely intelligent, or completely unintelligent, non-conscious, not the creator etc) would be impossible, yet all these putative entities exists as plugs for 2&3. Pro can contest P1, but then our justification for assuming God more likely to exist a priori falls, and in either case a standalone argument can be made. P1. All entities are more likely to exist then not a priori (a1, a2, a3… etc)P2. If a1, then not a2P3. a1 is more likely to exist than not (from p1)P4. a2 is more likely to exist than not (from p1)C. P1 entails a contradiction (2 & 3…ad infinitum), therefore P1 is false The only premise that can be objected to here to maintain a high a priori likelihood of something’s existence is P2, but this would require Pro to reject the notion of contradictory properties, which is prima facie absurd. Hence the conclusion follows that only a case of special pleading would allow God to escape this argument. The most reasonable stance is to accept the non-existence of God. Theological Fatalism This is an argument against divine foreknowledge being compatible with free will, this argument also applies to human free will (assuming they have it), but given that only God is defined as having free will in this debate, this argument only needs to involve God himself.[2] P1) If God exists, he knows the results of all choices that will occur P2) If he knows the results of all choices that will occur, then the future existsP3) If the future exists, then God could not have chosen differentlyP3) If God cannot have chosen differently, then free will does not existC) If God exists, then free will does not existC2) If free will does not exist, then God does not exist Defence of P1: This is part of the definition of omniscience, God knows the future the same way that God knows the past. It doesn't matter which series of time is true (although B series raises serious free will questions anyway) since the description follows. To reject this premise is to reject omniscience of God (and hence such a being’s existence) Defence of P2: Let's say I have a choice to eat weetabix or toast for breakfast tomorrow, if free will is true then I can at any moment choose differently. However if God already knows my choice, then for me to choose differently is to violate God's omniscience, God would have been incorrect, which is absurd given P1. Therefore for God to know the future, the future would then be 'set in stone', similarly to how the past is. Essentially God has a recording, and knowledge of everything that has and ever will happen in the future. To deny this would require the denial of either omniscience, or omnipotence. With this in place, Fatalism entails. Defence of P3: Already partially defended in P2, there are a handful of compatibilist arguments (all of which are unconvincing). It gives up on the notion that free will gives us the power to do otherwise (doctorine of free will). Going back to my breakfast example, let's assume that the breadbox is empty, and that toast is impossible to make. However in the morning I choose (in ignorance of the lack of bread) to eat weetabix. Now, did. I choose to eat weetabix? Clearly the answer in this case is no, one's ignorance has no bearing on whether or not one actually had a choice, since choosing to do otherwise would yield an impossible solution (there is no break for toast, so I must have weetabix). Similarly, this is the equivalent of compatiblist defences, which essentially assert that we can enjoy being puppets so long as we like our strings. Conclusions: These logically follow via. modus ponens, in either case God’s existence is impossible as defined, and hence strong atheism is affirmed. One of the best advantages of this argument that it is time-independent, it doesn’t matter whether God exists within, or outside of time (assuming that’s even a coherent concept), hence the only defences against this argument are compatibilist-type arguments, none of which have been accepted as sound by philosophers.[3] Non-Cognitivism of God In this argument I will attempt to show that the concept of God as defined is meaningless, and in fact, to make God a meaningful concept would result in limiting God in some way (and hence violating some notion of omnipotence).[4,5] I have adapted the argument from the attached reference, and contain the same concepts involved. P1) “God” lacks a positivity defined attribute (A) P2) If “God” lacks a positively defined attribute (A), then secondary (B) and relational attributes (C) cannot be justifiably applied C1) “God” lacks a justifiable attribute (A, B or C) P3) All attribute-less terms are meaningless C2) Therefore, “God” is a meaningless concept If God is a meaningless concept, then it follows its impossible to argue sensibly for the existence of such a concept, or to talk about it in any rational manner at all. The existence of such an entity would be able as logical as asserting the existence of a square circle. To defend these premises, we need to consider what God is, in the rules round I defined God as follows: “omnipotence, omniscience, creator, perfect, and free will” In order to meaningfully describe something, the primary nature of an entity needs to be established, for example to state something has “10 lbs”, it is reasonable to assert “10 lbs of what?”. It is meaningless to then response “well, you know… 10 lbs!”. The weight of something is a relational attribute, and gives no information on what the essence of the entity is. To speak meaningfully of anything we need to have a description of the fundamental character, or nature of the being. Take a chair for example, a primary attribute would be “A wooden mass with a sitting base and four posts made of wood”, here we have the material and primary attributes of a chair, we can reasonably talk about it’s existence and apply secondary and relational attributes to it (such as its colour, mass, style, etc). Now let’s have a look at the attributes of God which I have provided: 1. Omnipotence 2. Omniscience 3. Creator 4. Perfect 5. Free will None of these go any way in defining God’s primary attributes, they are all secondary or relational attributes. Omnipotence regards power, or ability, but isn’t an entity in itself. Omnipotence can be applied to anything (my sister is omnipotent) as a secondary attribute, but is meaningless without the primary essence. Omnipotence in fact is meaningless without a physical universe to relate to. The same applies to the all five of these attributes.[6] Often God is portrayed further, such as “metaphysical”, or “immaterial”, however these are not attributes of God, they are precidely descriptions of what God is not, the statement “I am not Barack Obama”, gives zero information about my primary attributes, and hence goes no way into demonstrating my essence. In order to actually provide a positive attribute of A (fulfilling P1), then we run into serious problems of the perfection, and omnipotence of God, since giving such an attribute would present limits to God, which violates the necessary secondary attributes of God, hence such a definition is impossible to attain. Conclusion: I have packed in three arguments in favour of the non-existence of God, I will probably follow up the next round with an additional argument. I hope you find them interesting! References: 1. http://plato.stanford.edu... 2. http://plato.stanford.edu... 3. http://www.alanrhoda.net... 4. http://infidels.org... 5. Rudolf Carnap, "The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language," originally published (in German) in Erkenntnis, vol. 2 (1932), and translated by Arthur Pap for the anthology Logical Positivism, p. 66. 6. George Smith, Atheism: The Case Against God (Buffalo, New York: Prometheus Books, 1979), Chapter 3. 7. Atheism: The Case Against God, Chapter 3.