It is morally permissible to kill one innocent person to save the lives of more innocent people.

The text program I was using to write my last argument kept correcting “Utility” to “Unity” whenever it was typed and it escaped my notice. I apologize for the confusion. Pro notes that I have not presented an alternate moral theory. He states that he expects to see an alternative if we are to throw out Utilitarianism. But why? If someone presents a theory of something that is wrong, then even if we don’t have an alternative we shouldn’t simply believe in what is wrong. In the face of an irrational theory which dominates a discipline, the only rational thing we can do is withhold judgement. If justification for a finite qualitative value of life fails, then we justified in the belief that all lives are invaluable. In which case we cannot morally prefer five lives for one. That is the main point Pro presents Mill’s proof of utility. One’s happiness is desirable and good, therefore the general happiness is desirable and good. However, an individual’s happiness being good doesn’t entail that the majority's happiness is good. Reasoning from a part of something to the whole is known as a fallacy of composition [1]. Since the argument is based on flawed reasoning then, it cannot be accepted. Furthermore, if Mill is correct in believing that if something is desirable, then on a whole it it is desirable, then all I need to do is show that there is another value which we desire. If Pro is consistent, then he must believe that on a whole it is also desirable. If such a desire contradicts Util, then Pro must give up a position. Next, Pro states we can adequately justify the Utilitarian calculus by appealing to the past evaluation of utility. Take note that Util relies on facts about future utility, but why should we believe that actions only affect up to a certain point in the future? The point I made in the past round was that there is always a possibility that some context exists that invalidates any evaluation. It is impossible to know the amount of utility that a past action has produced, is still producing, or will produce. Imagine a situation in which a young man takes interest in dictatorships. Due to future events in his life, he will become corrupted and strong enough to overthrow his government, expand his territory, and become the most horrible dictator the world has ever seen. However, in reading about the Third Reich, he understands the horrors of a dictatorship and takes a new optimistic point of view in which the events which would’ve corrupted him instead made him into a peaceful person who used direct action to change his country for the better. This situation could take place any time in the future, yet the past event of the Third Reich had a huge impact on it. This shows that a past action cannot be used to justify Util calculus, because a past action’s utility can never be known. Pro argues this is trivial, because we are arguing what is permissible, not what is perfect. This makes some subtle mistakes. It assumes that we are arguing Util is permissible, not a specific action. We are debating if a specific action is moral, which Pro is attempting to justify by implementing Util. If Util is unworkable, then we cannot rationally believe what it entails. Second, he strawmans my arguments. I’m not claiming Util must be morally perfect, in the sense that it has some flaws in some situations. My argument shows it is epistemically unsound and therefore impossible to act accordingly. Pro states I haven’t given an argument for the existence of rights. However, I did. The story above shows we have the moral intuition that rights exist. Furthermore, rights are desirable. If everyone believed that you were guilty of a murder when he weren’t , you wouldn’t want to be imprisoned. If rights are desirable and if Pro is consistent he must argue for a maximization of rights. However, Pro implicitly conceded that moral rights would contradict utility since he went after my argument for rights, not my inference that it contradicts Util. Therefore, Pro must reject Util or reject Mill’s argument. Also, the situation above demonstrates we imprison not only for utility, but for reasons of justice. Pro states that Util argues for equality. Util only accepts equality if it brings about more happiness. If an act is unfair, but brings about utility for 10,000 people, then it’s okay, even if it reduces utility for a 100 people. Is Pro really claiming equality is only that which benefits the majority? This is clearly not what we think of when we think of equality. He claims it is hard to claim slavery brings about more utility than not. Why not? As I said before, there is necessarily more of the majority than the minority. Even if the minority suffer, all that is required is that the majority get more pleasure out of it. It also doesn’t take into account the possibility of a slave being happy in his slavery. There have been cases where this is true [2], yet we still value his freedom. Pro states that the utility monster is impossible. I must state that this is a thought experiments. It doesn’t matter that there aren’t aliens that love our displeasure, the point is that they are devices that help us understand our beliefs on and aspects of a concept. If you can’t decide which girl to ask out, I can ask you “Whose life would you save if you can only save one?” Your answer will tell you which one you like the best. It doesn’t matter if you will always have the ability to save both, the point is thought experiments give us insight. His point about resources actually demonstrates Util monsters do exist. I have a better appreciation for money than Gates, therefore I will gain more happiness from it. With the experience machine, Pro hasn't demonstrated that reality is a higher pleasure. Why should we care about reality when we can have a perfect life without it? Shouldn't that trump reality? I’m sorry, but I don’t have enough space to deal with moral duty. Back to Pro. 1 http://tinyurl.com... 2 http://tinyurl.com...