It is probable that objective moral facts exist

I once again appreciate PRO's arguments, and his courtesy throughout this debate as well. Preface: There exists, fundamentally, an issue for which it is not only a point of consideration for all judgments and jurisdictions made in this debate concerning morality, but also for which PRO neglects to acknowledge, which provides for the intrinsic flaw in all of his arguments. In retrospective, I have repeatedly reinstated just such a fact; I feel that it would be tedious to implement it once more, and yet it is imperative for me to do so. PRO fails to understand the very nature of 'morality', in of itself. __ He bases most of his framework off of a few fundamental points that attempt to justify his refutations toward my case, namely confusion between 'epistemology' and 'ontology'; the order of knowing and then the order of being. However, what I have asserted as well as justified provides only the basic nature of morality, for as I have REPEATEDLY implemented, morality is a conceptual value for which we as 'seperate' individuals assign meaning to for which we feel is necessary on a basic ETHICAL level for our actions. To suppose that morality in of itself has an objective aspect is thus absurd in its presupposition. Indeed, in much the same light, morality, as well as all ideologies or entities, whether they be in the subjective mind or in the objective reality all possess a relation to tangible and objective reality. This concept is exemplified in the fact that morality has a correlation with our decisions for our factual actions, and yet the nature of morality is subjective, because it varies by personal justification. PRO asserts the following principle: *If A feels that it is morally right to do something, and B shares the same or similar belief, then such a moral principle is objective. We find this not only absurd in its supposition, but also extremely ignorant of the basic and fundamental principles of morality. Looking to just a point of consideration, having same beliefs, as my opponent as PRO asserts, has no impact upon the nature of such moral causes, for which it is subjective in nature. Thus by PRO's assertion that ontology is what justifies his position, not only is such an ideal going toward my framework and points, as it justifies and solidifies the very nature of subjective morality, but also contradicts flagrantly his own case. Now, PRO asserts that I beg the question in favor of relativism. And yet, I question the inherent knowledge of PRO himself in such fallacies and his plausibility in his tendencies to use them. His only justification for such is that I am missing a specific claim, for which we immediately find contradictory proof and justification. I state very clearly and ascertain that morality is once again in its nature, subjective. This is a foundational concept for which my opponent disregards and dismisses in favor of his so called 'ontology'. And yet, this is not only NEGLECTING to understand the very concept of morality, but also cherry picking in his distortion for his argument. Indeed, even by doing so, his 'ontological' grounds fall sadly short of what is necessary to refute my points, for they base themselves off of the very NATURE of morality, for which he provides ABSOLUTELY no response. Now looking further, PRO once again distorts the meaning of a statement that I have made in his self-minded favor. Looking to thus: "To say that a moral principle or value is objective or as PRO states, ontologically sound is to question the very basis for moral semantics as well as the concept of morality. It undermines what the concept of morality is based upon, rather than achieving what he feels is an adequate refutation." This statement is, in of itself, not only clear to the point of vividness, but also states clearly that the concept of morality is based upon personal subjective values; to have a concept that is subjective in nature and contorting a common belief to justify objectiveness is a flagrant contradiction of the very definition in of itself. A normative, as implemented explicitly by PRO in his 'epistemic normativity', is also invalid in its plausibility, for having a common subjective belief does not make a moral fact. An example would be thus: *If multiple individuals shared the common belief that God exists, then he does. Now, this absurd presupposition is countered by my opponent by referring ONCE again to his invalid 'ontology', for which I have already provided, in numerous cases, sufficient justification. Looking further, he brings up that my arguments are circular in composition, as exemplified in such: "Morality in of itself is completely subjective, because of a basic principle: It only exists in the subjective context, and we choose to apply it to our actions." Now, looking in retrospective, we find immediately that this statement was only introduced in order to provide for a re-phrasing of my original statement, that inherently introduced the claim that questions the intrinsic nature of morality. This statement is not only not an argument, but it would be absurd to contort it to be so. His accusations of 'circular reasoning' and 'begging the question' are merely hypothetical, for they have no justification, for there are no tangible evidence for which he may support himself. Looking to just such points of consideration, we find that amidst PRO's harsh refutations and accusations, there is, in truth, NO justification for his introduced fallacies, for which I have responded to adequately because of his ineptitude to realize just such the fact and the nature of morality. Such a confusion allows us to question the very VALIDITY and PLAUSIBILITY of arguments and all statements introduced by PRO in today's debate. Further on, his only response to my refutations to his intrinsically flawed sensory perception is ONCE AGAIN 'ontology'. At this point, I question if my opponent, PRO is consciously and purposefully contorting the nature of morality in his favor, or merely neglects it in his misconception. As I have repeatedly justified, morality is only able to exist in a subjective context, when we choose as seperate individuals to assign meaning to it. His argument of ontological grounds is logically contradictory to the whole of the debate, if not going to implement my case. Such ontological grounds merely go to reinstate my point that states that we consider the very nature of morality, for which PRO has NO justification or refutation whatsoever. Now, we find that PRO furthermore has no refutation to my point concerning the irrational nature of his so called 'sensory perception', for which an objective fact may never be established. Looking to the following: "So, if a moral belief such as 'murder is wrong' is trustworthy, then it is PROBABLY TRUE,..." Once and again, PRO distorts rational discourse with no justification. Furthermore, PRO drops his own point of 'epistemic normativity' in favor of accusing me of circular reasoning. Now that I have proven and justified why such is not inherently true, we find that none of PRO's points stand, for he makes no effort whatsoever to support them after my refutation. Looking to thus, we see that his case is not only intrinsically flawed, but also nonexistent at such a point. Now, in conclusion, we find that PRO has furthermore failed to acknowledge or address my rational framework argument which clearly impedes his validity and arguments. In addition, my addressing of definition naturalism and the intrinsic ideology-fact relation is dropped, for PRO fails to provide justification for the first, and insufficient for the latter, for he once AGAIN refers back to his so appreciated yet inherently fallacious 'ontology'. Looking to all of these factors, we immediately see that PRO has failed to provide adequate justification for refutations, merely resorting to false accusations for which we see no grounds. Thus, I strongly urge a CON vote.