Logic Presupposes God: a Transcendental Argument for God's Existence

= = = Intro = = = Before beginning, I would just like to state a few problems apparent in Pro's first response. Firstly, I think he missed a couple of key points (argument from ignorance, etc), & without dealing with these, he cannot establish TAG. And the example I mentioned really is a key point, because it is essentially how LA are accounted for by God's nature. So, Pro, how does God's nature account for LA? Secondly, many of Pro's responses themselves need to be argued for, & referring to an unsupported & controversial claim to answer an unsupported & controversial claim is inadequate - 2 unsupported assertions don‘t make an argument! Lastly, although recognising that some issues are "contentious", Pro must show his approach to be clearly superior. If my approach is even plausible, Pro has a massive problem in supporting TAG. Now for the crux of the debate. = = = The Fallacies and flaws of TAG = = = As for my distinction between conceptual LA (cLA) & existent LA (1), here's where the most problems lie. Now I contend that LA are not things with a nature, but the nature of all things, therefore to ask whether they exist is just a category error, like I said before, akin to asking what kind of fruit is a triangle. Now talk of essences (2) & universals (3) fail, as does references to LA as "abstract objects" because LA are not objects or things with a nature, LA ARE a nature - the nature of existence. Such references show a projection of criticism at arguments closer to his own than mine, relating to points I never made or implied (Platonism). As for LA being conceptual, they are not. Logic (which cLA are the basis of) is conceptual, but as I said, accounting for this requires history, not philosophy, & they are most definitely contingent upon historical figures (Aristotle), therefore TAG must be addressing existent LA (from now on just LA). These LA are not conceptual by nature (a key point of TAG) primarily because they do not have a nature, rather THEY ARE A NATURE - THE NATURE OF EXISTENCE & ALL THINGS THAT EXIST! (4) So in order to get the desired properties for the theist, they have to conflate these 2 things, and Pro does this (despite denying it) in order to make TAG work - he has to, committing the fallacy of equivocation, as I said before. This also deals with P2 - that LA don't fall into the category of existence since they are the NATURE of all things that exist. Pro's rebuttal to the fallacy of division is incomplete. He rightly points out that there are times when this doesn't apply, but neglects to show that this is one of these times. As for what the properties of LA say about their source, consider this: My mind can conceive of abstract objects My mind can conceive of physical objects What does this tells us about mind? That it's both abstract and physical? No. My mind can also conceive of chocolate, this doesn't tell us that my mind is tasty. If Pro's argument tells us anything, it would be tentative at best, & since he has only deferred his argument to authority (another fallacy), it tells us nothing. But this is the bridge of TAG from LA to their source - God. If such an important step in the argument can only really hope to be a weakly pointed direction (at best), instead of, say, a logically deductive necessity, Pro has a huge problem - one which he must address. = = = The futility of TAG = = = On the futility of TAG, Pro answers by saying I have missed the point of TAG, that: "TAG isn't about trying to prove that LAs exist so therefore God exists." Pro also says that he agrees LA are axioms & that accounting for LA was ridiculous. Notice that in round one, in a section called the "TAG mission statement", I quoted Slick saying that the aim of TAG is to create a situation where: " The only way to account for . . . LA is by postulating God's existence." (5) But the thing is, Pro even agreed to this, calling my characterisation of TAG at this point (which the statement above was part) to be an "excellent primer", going on to say that he would be using Slick's "general outline". Even the title of the debate suggests I am right here. So it seems Pro shares my sentiment that accounting for LA is utterly ridiculous, but fails to realise that this is the whole basis of the TAG argument - thus TAG's whole contention is predicated upon what Pro himself calls something "foolish". Notice further futility of TAG, accounting for LA with something which is itself unaccounted for - God. = = = Epistemology = = = On epistemology, how would the Christian know that the law of identity was an example of an LA (even conceding the argument to this point)? Is it in scripture? No. So what other means does the Christian posses - let's hear it. Be it revelation, or other forms of knowledge, this point is both unsubstantiated & controversial, & as TAG's ontology argues for a merely "a" God (not exclusively Christian), then answers to this problem will inevitably contradict. Heck, even deism is an option from TAG's ontology, which would certainly be incompatible with all methods of knowledge (e.g. revelation). This is no small problem. = = = TANG = = = Clearly evil was an emotive example here, so I'll use another. Now here I am just going to quote Slick: " The LA are a part of God's nature & essence. God cannot make A be not A anymore than God can lie or stop being God, because God has a certain nature, & He must operate in a manner consistent with His own nature. God cannot make a squared circle because it is a logically impossible thing." (6). Now, if LA are ONLY a part of God's nature, then making something logically inconsistent (making A = not A, or a squared circle) should be no different that making something which can lie. Clearly, God can make something which can lie, so why not a squared-circle, as according to Slick, both are equally inconsistent with God's nature. TBS continues: "So God should be able to create a squared circle, which is no more inconsistent with His nature than lying is, as you (Slick) just explicitly said (in the quote above) . . . Thus we can conclude: "While the inability to lie is the nature of God specifically, logical consistency is the nature of God & everything else which could or does exist. In other words, it is the NATURE of existence of all things that exist to be what we call logically consistent." (7) Conclusion - not only can God not account for LA, but LA are redefined to my contested definition by Slick himself, thus defeating TAG. Now point 2 of TANG can be expressed much more clearly: P1 - If God's nature is bound by LA, He cannot account for LA. P2 - God's nature is bound by LA C - God cannot account for LA. Clearly, if God is to be considered logically consistent, then He has to conform to LA. If God's nature is bound thus, & he cannot change it (God cannot be both God & not God at the same time for example), then not only are LA still unaccounted for, but it would seem God cannot be their source, as He Himself is as bound by them through His own nature as anything else. Conclusion - God cannot account for LA. LA are still unaccounted for. = = = Conclusion = = = It is clear to me that even in trying to tackle some of my problems already, TAG requires many assumptions that are just wrong or at least controversial, & that Pro argues his position as if one of consensus, while at many times, I just completely disagree with many of his key points. Now it is not enough to merely win all the individual battles of the various points, but to maintain the essence of TAG. Pro has done neither - he even disagrees with the most fundamental aspect of the argument - it's aim! Sources (1) TBS youtube video, "Slick Logic", (4) (7) "Borrowing worldviews" (2) http://www.thefreedictionary.com..., (3) ibid/universal (5) Matt Slick youtube video shown in round 1, (6) http://www.youtube.com...