Logic should not be trusted.

Responding DirectlyMy opponent believes that I have, in fact, not judiciously summarized his argument and have gravely misunderstood its thesis. Thus, we’ll have to adjust where necessary. (Though you’ll find that my argument in the former round is still applicable on many points.)“Actually, what I was trying to say is that since our conception of logic and our justification of it could be false, there is no reason to believe it since the justifications for logic are based on the validity of logic and are therefore circular.“Now let’s try and dissect this in an even more judicious manner than before. There are actually two separate and distinct premises for two different arguments here. Firstly, my opponent says our conception of logic could be wrong. Then he states that there is something wrong with logic because it depends upon the assumption of itself. Thus, of course, it is circular. What he has described, as the cautious reader has probably already observed, is an axiom. An axiom is a properly basic belief that must be assumed as true. That is to say, there is no way to prove its truth without first assuming its validity. This much is conceded. So what have we shown thus far:(1) Logic cannot be proven without assuming itselfOr perhaps:(1’) Our conception (perception?) of Logic could be false.What follows from (1) and (1’) respectively are what exactly? So far as I can see, (6), from my former round, that “logic could be false,” is precisely what results from both (1) and (1’) respectively. Without writing these out in full syllogism, I trust that the reader can observe this without difficulty.I will not be addressing his reformulated syllogism with Occam’s razor because it is observably invalid and unsound, inasmuch as Occam’s razor is not a law of logic, does not depend upon itself, and the conclusion clearly does not follow from any of the premises.Further, his examination of the phrase, “all logic could probably [sic] be false,” is bizarre. For he states: “There are two possibilities here.“This is clearly false, for there are only “two possibilities” if we assume logic to be true (namely that non-contradiction, law of identify and law of excluded middle are all true). Thus we must trust that at least the aforesaid laws are true.Another bizarre point my opponent makes is that certain laws are not founded in logic proper, but rather intuition. If intuition can be trusted however, then we can clearly point to the observable fact that virtually all logical laws are intuitive. Problem solved?The Damnable PointProbably the most damning argument to made in all this is that in order for my opponent to even render his argument against logic proper and the trust therein, is to first trust that logic itself will aid him in achieving this desired result. To be more clear, he must trust logic in order to attempt to refute its trustworthiness. This is the traditional begging of the question, wherein his argument depends upon the truth of the very thing he seeks to refute.Reiterating the UnrefutedI won’t respond to his latter points that depend upon a strict Cartesian epistemology and land him in the mucky waters of solipsism. Because their irrelevant. It has already been conceded that it is possible, in the strictest sense of the word, that all my perceived experiences of physical reality and the like are mere illusions. The relevant point is whether or not I should trust logic. On this point, my opponent did not respond. I can easily trust things that are possibly wrong. It is especially easy to trust those things that are literally the only things I experience (e.g. the existence of physical reality, that logical laws exist, or that other human minds exist besides my own, etc.). What we need, then, is some good reason for not trusting the very basic makeup of our experiences – the possibility (equaprobable?) of their falsity notwithstanding.