The Problem of Animal Suffering (Round II)

In our first debate, I was more than happy to extend Kinesis the benefit of the doubt when he said I was misrepresenting his argument. After all, this is why we took a second crack at it. Now I'm calling shenanigans. In Kinesis' own words, "this argument aims at the internal consistency of the Christian world view." How else can one hope to show even the probability of God's existence without appealing to a logical contradiction? Indeed, he does exactly this. In round one he asks, "How is this to be reconciled with the proposition that an omniscient, omnipotent, omni-benevolent God created and maintains the natural world?" In round two he asks, "Does a perfectly loving God seriously not give a damn about near-sentient or even sentient animals suffering terribly as they die?" In both cases he questions the LOGICAL validity of the Christian Worldview. Either animal suffering is compatible with God or it is not. Renaming his argument into a probability is a scapegoat and dismisses my argument rather than addresses it. My logical defense is that animal suffering is compatible with the existence of God since God has a morally sufficient reason to allow it. Instead of responding to this argument, he simply says it's inapplicable. I think, given his wording in both rounds, such a tactic is intellectually dishonest. At the core of his argument is the premise that God would keep animal suffering to the absolute minimum. I have asked, on what basis does Kinesis claim to know this to be true? Is this a fact? Is it a Christian presupposition? I claim it is not. No where does the Bible state that God can only be good if he minimizes animal suffering. On the contrary, I have given a good reason why God would not want to minimize animal suffering: because doing so would constitute a lesser good. It has nothing to do with whether or not God cares, as I'm sure he cares very much. In fact, I'd go as far to say that animal suffering breaks his heart. However, how God feels or thinks about animal suffering has no bearing on whether or not he would minimize it. We might care that a butterfly struggles to escape the cocoon, but the educated nature lover knows the struggle is good for its subsequent survival. The butterfly might wonder why we stand idly by, but we know better. In the same way, God knows better. God can simultaneously care deeply about the plight of his animals and willingly allow that plight to subsist, provided he has a morally sufficient reason to do so. That reason does not need to be known to Kinesis, me, or the rest of humanity. The fact that Kinesis cannot imagine a God that would allow for gratuitous animal suffering is not proof that He doesn't exist. Kinesis ASSUMES God would minimize animal suffering at all costs, which is a presupposition on his part not supported by scripture. Ergo, he is using an outside presupposition to show an internal inconsistency within the Christian worldview. If he can show the Bible teaches that God would indeed minimize animal suffering, then his argument has merit. Until then, all he has shown is that Kinesis' presuppositions are incompatible with Christian presuppositions.