The 'Problem of Evil' never succeeds (Attempt 1), Pt. 2

INTRODUCTION I rather appreciate the conviction my opponent displays with regard to his PoE argument, as it makes for an invigorating philosophical exploration, but to think that I have misunderstood anything he has said is an idea that is contradicted by a wealth of evidence. I actually have understood what he has said (for he has expressed himself with refreshing clarity), which can be seen by the fact that I've been using what he has said as the very defeater of his argument; i.e., it defeats itself by being invalid, which I show by analyzing the very reasoning he provides. By saying that my criticism is weak because it's based on a misunderstanding, my opponent implies that my criticism has attacked a kind of straw man. But where is the evidence that I have made straw of his argument? He does not tell us. Moreover, I suggest that the evidence points to the contrary. THE ANALYSIS Although my opponent agrees with me that probability (if greater than zero) assumes possibility, it's a backdoor tactic for him to suggest that the simple possibility of gratuitous evil (GE) is a trivial point. There is nothing trivial about it, in this debate. If that is the very thing by which his argument renders itself invalid (by begging the question), then it's not trivial but central. It would be irresponsible for him to ignore dismissively the very thing that cripples his argument—and disappointing, yet obvious, to those who want to see his argument succeed. In the last round, my opponent said he was going to demonstrate a "simple error" in my criticism, by showing that GE and the biblical God are not mutually exclusive in every single case; i.e., that there can be a relevant case in which they're not. If he is right, then my entire criticism collapses upon itself. Given the importance of such a defeat, he devoted his entire last round to this counter-argument. And he is right to stress its importance that way, because there is no other means by which to defeat my criticism. This is the last assault available. So, does it succeed? Of course not, and for two significant reasons. First, even if we grant him this point, his PoE argument is still question-begging! Let me repeat that: his counter-argument fails to salvage his PoE from my criticism. Possible worlds notwithstanding, if any premise of his argument assumes God as non-existent (not actual), then his argument is viciously circular because the non-existence of God is the very thing to be proved. In this debate, my opponent resolved to argue that the probability of gratuitous evil proves the improbability of God—but his argument fails if the probability of gratuitous evil is zero, which it must be if God is actual. In order for gratuitous evil to have any probability greater than zero in the actual world, God cannot have occupancy in the actual world. But that cannot be assumed if it's the very thing to be proved. Second, the fact that my criticism still stands even if we grant him the point he was making, it must be understood that we actually can't grant him it. The other and perhaps more important reason why his counter-argument fails is because it's constructed out of straw; he compounds his fallacies rather than relieving himself of any, by describing a God different from that of biblical Christianity. He states very clearly that he is positing GE and BG as contingent states of affairs, as true "in some possible worlds and false in others." However, the God at center of this debate is the one revealed in the Scripture as self-existent, unchanging, eternal, pure actuality, etc., the attributes which define necessary being. What this means for my opponent is that if his PoE argument targets some deity other than "God as revealed in Christian scripture canon ... and possessing all the commonly recognized attributes thereof," [1] then he will have failed to defeat my resolution and I win the debate. His argument professes to prove that BG is probably non-existent (i.e., probably not the case in the actual world). If his argument succeeds, it would mean that God is not necessary being (viz. by failing to occupy this world, he does not occupy all possible worlds), that gratuitous evil is probable and that my resolution is defeated. But as my criticism relentlessly points out, he cannot assume, directly or indirectly, the very thing he intends to prove. Viciously circular reasoning is neither valid nor compelling. REFERENCES 1. Taken from the definitions laid down in Part 1 [http://www.debate.org...], where I described the God at center of this debate. When I said there are literally no versions of the PoE argument that succeed at proving the non-existence of God, I meant the God of Christianity as revealed in Scripture. Throughout this debate I have been clear about that.