Science has shown/is about to show God to be implausible/unecessary as an explanation

I believe that Con has adopted a narrow definition of what exactly the word ‘science” constitutes. Con, based on his objections to my arguments, seems to interpret the strict empirical results of science as constituting “science”, while anything else is taken as philosophy. This is all done to allow Con to say that it’s not science which has refuted his argument, but philosophy. However, I would agree with the scientist Sam Harris in arguing that science should not have such a narrow definition. Harris writes “I am, in essence, defending the unity of knowledge—the idea that the boundaries between disciplines are mere conventions and that we inhabit a single epistemic sphere in which to form true beliefs about the world…. Is there really a boundary between the truths of physics and those of biology? No. And yet it is practical, even necessary, to treat these disciplines separately most of the time. In this sense, the boundaries between disciplines are analogous to political borders drawn on maps. Is there really a difference between California and Arizona at their shared border? No, but we divide this stretch of desert as a matter of convention.”(http://www.samharris.org...). In other words, distinctions between philosophy and science are mere convention, so this does not constitute a sound objection to my argument. In the words of Noam Chomsky, “The status of philosophy as distinct from the sciences or history is artificial. Until the nineteenth century there was no such distinction. You can't answer the question whether Hume or Kant were philosophers or scientists-they were both.“ (http://www.chomsky.info...)Again, I like to remind the audience of how weak my burden of proof is in this debate. In order to win the debate, I simply have to show that science offers logically possible explanations of the physical universe as opposed to god. It doesn’t even matter if the explanations I offer are implausible; The only thing I have to do is to show that they are least possible. Unless Con can show that the alternatives I have mentioned are impossible, which he has failed to do as of this point, then a Pro vote is justified, as the resolution is upheld.Con indicates his support for eternalism when he says that “your argument seems to presupose presentism over eternalism which I think in light of modern physics and philosophy considerations is indefensible.” I flipped this argument in the following way; If Con admits that science supports the idea of eternalism, then it would follow that science supports the idea that temporal becoming is an illusion. Since science entails that temporal becoming is an illusion, then it would follow that any argument about god causing the beginning of the universe is false, as the universe simply is at the first instant, but never begins. Therefore, from Con’s own admissions, science helps to establish the implausibility of god as an explanation of the universe.Con is conflating two different senses of "beginning". When I say that eternalism means that the universe had no beginning, I mean that eternalism entails that the universe had no beginning in the sense of temporal becoming. There can be a first instant of the universe, but this first instant of the universe never comes into being, because all moments in time are equally real. When Con attempts to get around my argument by pointing out that there are theistic arguments which are consistent with the universe being eternal in the past, he is talking about the word "beginning" in the sense of having a first instant or interval of existence, rather than the beginning in the sense that I am talking about. Con has missed an important philosophical nuance.Con objects to my argument from the WFU by arguing that its prediction of the universe having a 95% chance of coming into being presupposes a space-time which has not been explained by the theory and requires further explanation. First, this is going into a different problem (the origins of the universe), and would not pertain to the WFU problem. Secondly, his standards are clearly too strict; Every scientific theory takes something as fundamental. Einstein's general relativity takes space-time as a given, and the theory of natural selection takes life as a given. Are we prevented from using Darwinian evolution to argue that human life did originate ten thousand years ago because it takes certain things as fundamental Clearly not. Why is it any different from the WFU? It is not a problem to use a scientific theory to establish a conclusion just because this scientific theory takes certain facts to be fundamental and then works from these facts to establish the theory. Thirdly, I have already explained the origins of space-time in my third argument, so these two scientific theories taken together do away with Con's objection.Furthermore, Con's solution to the WFU problem is not physically coherent. Part of his argument rests on the idea that there could be two universes with a 95% chance of coming into being, and one of these universes is brought into being by god while the other one does not. According to Hawking's cosmology, this does not make any physical sense. If both universes have a 95% chance of coming into being, then they have the same mathematical properties describing them, so they are in fact the same universe under Hawking's cosmology, not different ones. Furthermore, this scenario arguably violates god's rationality. If god does something, then he has a reason for it. However, what reason could god have for choosing one universe over the other, when it has been established that they are both exactly the same? God would be indicating a preference for one thing over the same exact thing, which is illogical, entailing that god is not rational. These two reasons lead me to reject Con's answer as implausible from even a theistic perspective.Con doesn't object to my third argument as much as he asks conceptual questions about space and time. In response to his first question, an instant in space-time has the power to cause another instant in space-time to come into being through a relationship of sufficient causation. It is obvious that once T=5 exist, then this will inevitably lead to the existence of T=6, so instants of space-time cause each other by way of sufficient causation. In response to the second question, god cannot cause the whole interval of space-time points, because the interval of space-time points is instantiated by each indivudal member, and each individual member is provided with a causal explanation by the scenario I presented.In his fifth point, Con states that there are arguments for the existence of god, and the resolution cannot be affirmed because science cannot touch on these arguments. While I would agree that there are arguments for the existence of god that science cannot say much about, this does not entail that the resolution cannot be affirmed. The resolution can be affirmed by providing examples where science has shown god to be unnecessary or implausible as an explanation, so it is not pertinent that there are arguments for god which science has little or no imput.