Science, by itself, can determine moral truths

Closing StatementIn my closing statement, I will summarize my position and then criticisms of my opponents posiiton. My positionScience is solely concerned with discovering matters of fact. Thinkers reflecting on science have made concerted efforts to remind other scientists to avoid talk of design, direction, or value in their scientific theories (1). This is because science maps out natural regularities that are totally valueless and mechanistic. It produces statements about what exists, not what should exist. In addition, there is considerable difficulty in moving from statements of fact (the only thing science produces), and statements of value. As mentioned above, Hume felt that it was impossible to derive the commanding quality of moral statements from statements of bare facts alone (2). GE Moore thought that goodness could not be logically identical to anything in nature (3) as nothing in nature seems self-evidently good. It seems impossible to move from statements of fact to value and therefore science cannot produce moral truths on its own. My opponentMy opponent cites Kant and Pirsig, two philosophers who do derive theories of value. However, he does not show that these two derive their theories from science. In fact, Kant derives value from theories of reason and his theories are essentially a priori (4). Nowhere does he claim that we can derive moral axioms from the natural sciences. Pirsig, a pop philosopher from the 70's, while interesting in his views, adovacates an ambiguous and byzantine metaphysics based on his own personal reflections (5). He definitely does NOT define moral values as emanating from the sciences and is in fact, critical of societies that rely solely on scientific discourse (at the expense of other types of discourse) (5). In addition, my opponent suggests that my criticism that he is equivocating is semantics. I will counter-claim that my opponent is engaging in the Ambiguity Fallacy (6) - the technical name for equivocation. This is when a construct is used with different meanings in different parts of the argument. If my opponenet is doing so, then their argument falls apart. Here they use good in the sense of useful in the premise and then when it reappears in the conclusion, goodness now means morally good. Yet what is useful is not necessarily the same as what is morally good. My opponent has to provide an argument as to why goodness is just that which is beneficial and citing the dictionnary is most assuredly not a fair way to resolve one of the central philosophical questions of human civilization. In sum, my opponent cites two philosophers who do not believe science produces moral truths on its own. Both of these two would have said you need to consult other discourses like philosophy or the humanities to get at moral truths. Then my opponent offers an argument for how goodness might be identicial to several arbirtray traits that is both ambiguous and invalid. I conclude that I have fairly demonstrated the difficulties present for those who wish to make morality a scientific project. I also conclude my opponent has offered little resistance. ________________________________________________________________________________________(1) Reiss, John O. (2009) Not by Design: Retiring Darwin's Watchmaker. Berkeley, California: University of California Press(2) Hume, David (1739) A treatise of Human Nature(3)Moore, G. E. (1903) Principia Ethica(4) . http://en.wikipedia.org...;(5) . http://en.wikipedia.org...(6) . http://www.logicallyfallacious.com...;