God Probably Doesn't Exist

Thanks Con. Great presentation for new formulations of the ontological and cosmological arguments. Ontological Argument I will attack the ontological argument in an original way and an old way. These objections will not necessarily (pun intended) attack any specific premise, but attack the concept of using a positive property to demonstrate God exists. We see from Con’s definition that a positive property is related to greatness or excellence. What could he mean by this? What is the standard of excellence he’s using? Some sort of standard of excellence could be subjective, or objective. Of course, we can’t state the standard of excellence is subjective, as that would entail that one could just reject the idea that “A” is positive, and we would be correct. A subjective standard cannot be used to prove something in objective reality. So, if we want the OA to work, then we must agree the standard of excellence is objective. When we say “x” has some positive property, it is objectively true that it doesn’t reduce its excellence. This seems to beg the question of what this standard actually is. Perhaps it is because of God that we have this standard. God after all is the the being with the ultimate strongly positive properties. However, this would render the argument circular. Whenever you’re talking about a positive property, you’re referencing something dependent on God’s existence to prove God’s existence. It seems our only option left is to state the standard comes from something other than God. This fails too when you consider what a standard of excellence is. It is highly important to remember that a standard of excellence is relational. Understanding this will prevent any type of false analogies. For example, if all the TV dinners we have ever eaten have been microwaved, we have a standard of excellence which is based on the best microwaved TV dinner. When we invent an oven and taste an oven cooked TV dinner, our standard goes up. We now have a relation between the microwaved TV dinner and the oven cooked TV dinner, which raised the standard. If we had something other than God that the standard is dependent on, then that means there is something better than God. Something that has more positive properties to make it possible for God to have the excellence he has. This fails, because God is suppose to be the thing which has the ultimate perfect positive properties. If something can be more excellent that God, then it would be God, since it would mean it can be more perfect. Being under the essence of excellence is a negation to being the very essence of excellence. Which is a negative property, not a positive one. Since we cannot appeal to a subjective standard of excellence nor an objective standard of excellence, then we cannot appeal to excellence at all to prove a perfect being. Therefore, we cannot appeal to positive properties to prove God, and thus the ontological argument fails. Furthermore, his entire argument is based on the assumption that existence is a property. This doesn’t seem correct. If I describe a chair as being brown, wooden, heavy and existing, I haven’t added anything to the function or look of the chair. Existence is something that allows for properties, not a property in and of itself. One might say although existence isn’t a property, necessary existence is. A triangle necessarily by definition has three sides, but this says nothing about the existence of the triangle itself. There is no good reason to think existence is a property, thus using it as such fails. The argument is refuted. Argument from Contingency In Con’s first premise it seems he is describing David Lewis’ Counterfactual theory of causation. However this theory isn’t without problems. Lewis’ early theory dealt with a problem of preemption. Using Hall’s example “Billy and Suzy throw rocks at a bottle. Suzy throws first so that her rock arrives first and shatters the glass. Without Suzy's throw, Billy's throw would have shattered the bottle. However, Suzy's throw is the actual cause of the shattered bottle, while Billy's throw is merely a preempted potential cause. This is a case of late preemption because the alternative process (Billy's throw) is cut short after the main process (Suzy's throw) has actually brought about the effect.” [1] We see there is no dependence with Suzy’s throw and the shattering of the bottle. If Suzy were not there, Billy’s rock would have broken the glass. To handle problems of preemption Lewis modified his theory [2], however this theory implies some counterintuitive views about causation. “The theory implies that any event that influences another event to a certain degree counts as one of its causes. But common sense is more discriminating about causes. To take an example of Jonathan Bennett : rain in December delays a forest fire; if there had been no December rain, the forest would have caught fire in January rather than when it actually did in February. The rain influences the fire with respect to its timing, location, rapidity, and so forth. But common sense denies that the rain was a cause of the fire, though it allows that it is a cause of the delay in the fire. Similarly, in the example of the poison victim discussed above, the victim's ingesting poison on a full stomach influences the time and manner of his death (making it a slow and painful death), but common sense refuses to countenance his eating dinner as a cause of his death, though it may countenance it as a cause of its being a slow and painful death” [ibid] Furthermore, the contingency argument doesn’t seem to take in account brute facts. Eventually, we have to fall back on a brute fact. Why is modal logic the way it is? Why does God exist? Why is it true that 2 + 2 = 4? Why does one contingent thing exist and not another? Eventually, we have to appeal to brute facts. So, why can’t someone say the existence of the BCCF is simply a brute fact? It would afterall cut down on the number of brute facts in existence, since if we posit God, we still have to rely on brute facts for him. I also see no reason why other contingent things can be an explanation. I don’t mean in the way Con described. What I mean is that, if some contingent thing were to not exist, some other contingent thing would exist. If my keyboard were to not exist, these letters would not exist, even though they are both contingent, one is reliant on the other. There is no reason why the BCCF can’t be similar. However, I think the biggest problem with Con’s argument is that at best, he has demonstrated there is something necessary that is the explanation for the BCCF. Con has done nothing to show the nature of this necessary thing. He focuses too much on proving there is a necessary explanation, but he uses a bare assertion and claims he has proven it is a being. Con’s argument fails simply because his argument doesn’t show this necessary thing is sentient being and since it would be an entirely new argument, Con cannot posit an argument for it, only defend his original. An atheist can still be an atheist while admitting there is something necessary that explains the BCCF, thus his entire argument is irrelevant to the debate. The argument is refuted. Conclusion The ontological argument fails since it relies on a standard of excellence that is incompatible with the argument and relies on the unproven assumption that existence is a property. The cosmological argument fails because it creates false examples of causation, ignores brute facts, ignores other possible non-god explanations, and is not evidence of being. It is only evidence of a necessary thing. Sources [1] Collins, J., Hall, E., and Paul, L., 2004. Causation and Counterfactuals, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. [2] http://plato.stanford.edu...