Animal Rights

My opponent’s arguments are in quotation marks.P4) Existence of human rights necessitates abstention from infringing upon the rights of other humans.“Why is this? The only justification for human rights is being human, as Con defined. Thus, the only way for human rights to stop existing would be for human beings to stop existing. Infringement does not do this.”If existence of human rights doesn’t necessitate respect of human rights, they are self-evidently worthless. A right is, quoth the definitions, “something that one may properly claim as their due/a moral or legal entitlement to.” If rights don’t need to be respected, the possessor of said rights cannot “claim as their due” the entitlements of such rights--for example, not being murdered, and thus, they aren’t rights.P7) If living is what entitles an entity to rights, then both plants and animals have the same rights as humans“[P] does not have to be grantable on a broad spectrum, it merely has to ground moral status. That is its only qualification.”“Animals” = broad classification. According to the resolution, therefore, it does. I demonstrated that the argument that there must be a specific, universal trait P to be nonsense, because it is impossible to do so, and because rights aren’t recognized universally. The example of criminals (which I shall later defend) proves this). Regardless, this is irrelevant to this particular argument (and seems to contradict Pro's argument from marginal cases).“I directly challenged Con to justify the property of living over any other moral status grounding property such as sentience or rationality. Con uses circular reasoning to justify it; “any entity is entitled to such rights by belonging to the group in question that has rights; in other words living.” By “group” Con is referring to beings that are alive. Sentience is also a property that belongs to the group that in question has rights. So is rationality. This does not justify “living” over any other property and thus the premise does not stand; it's a bare assertion.”Saying that living beings are granted rights by virtue of their living is not fallacious in the first place, and that wasn't the point. Substitute in "sentience". "7. If sentience is what entitles an entity to rights, then only humans have rights." I would be able to end the argument right there. Pro has not contested that humans have rights, so regardless of whatever quality entitles beings to rights, this still works. If it were "having color", the rest of the premises would still work. The point [which I mentioned last round] was that Pro has not made any claim that animals and plants have DIFFERENT rights than humans; ergo, they must have the same rights, but it is impossible for them to have the same rights (the point of premises 8-10).My argument stands.Argument from Marginal Cases“Con’s rebuttal is that not all humans have equal moral status. Saying that criminals lose their moral status somewhat by not obeying society’s laws. Does this make criminal’s suffering less morally undesirable? Is it no longer morally wrong to needlessly torture a criminal? Is it any less morally wrong to torture a criminal than a non-criminal? By Con’s argument all these statements are true. But the criminal still feels pain. Disobeying society’s laws does not hinder the criminal’s ability to suffer. Thus, criminals’ moral worth is equal to any other human, and humans do all have equal moral status. “The answer to all those questions is indeed yes. Pro has provided no evidence whatsoever throughout this debate that “suffering” is what morality must be predicated on--an egregiously bare assertion. Therefore, the worldwide practice of denying criminals rights--even in countries like Norway, crime still restricts freedom of movement, for example--shows that marginal cases are irrelevant because they may be excluded in any moral calculus.“Con also suggests that a moral worth grounding property that only humans exclusively possess is a “conscious willingness to obey the laws of society”. I find this strange, since many species of animals. For example; wolves. Wolves have an orderly social structure in which there are specified roles; the omega through alpha. Roles entail special privileges; who is first to eat, breeding rights, etc. These societal rules are expected to be followed, if not, the “criminal” is driven from the pack. Complex social structure is displayed in many other species such a gorillas, dolphins, orcas, whales. But simplistic ones are displayed in every species that interacts with other organisms; ants, bees, penguins, bats, etc. Even plants are showing social structure to some extent [3].This is not a property that animals lack by any means.“The key word is “conscious”. So, yes, all or at least the overwhelming majority of non-human organisms do (and recall that marginal cases, as I’ve shown, are irrelevant).Argument from Suffering“2) Con argues that there is no moral obligation to prevent suffering. Suffering is an inherently undesirable state. It is undesirable for the person experiencing the negative mental state. Morality is recognizing what is desirable and undesirable. Any moral obligation is to do a morally desirable action, or prevent a morally undesirable action. Preventing a morally undesirable state such as suffering is a moral obligation. “Suffering is undesirable, certainly, but, as I said last round, that has nothing to do with morality. Christians and Muslims may find tithing undesirable, for example, yet it is considered a moral act. A married couple killing themselves to save a little child is undesirable, and produces net suffering (2 deaths vs. 1 life), yet would generally be considered moral. Pro has provided no basis as to why suffering is immoral, and at this point, it is too late to do so, so all the arguments about suffering are not supported by any evidence.“3) Con questions the term “moral worth”, suggesting that it is meaningless. “Moral worth” is the right to not be killed, to not suffer; a moral requirement to be treated in a certain way. If animals and humans have equal “moral worth,” then it would be equally morally wrong to kill a human as it would to kill an animal, as well as any other moral principle.”Allow me to substitute in his definition.1) Animals can suffer (feel pain).2) If one can prevent suffering without sacrificing any rights of equal worth, then one is obligated to do so. 3) Granting animals rights would prevent suffering without sacrificing any rights of equal worth.4) One is morally obligated to grant animals rights. The phrase is still meaningless, because there is no justification as to why A) suffering morally must be prevented, B) how equal moral worth is determined, and C) how exactly rights can be sacrificed if they are truly universal or at least broadly classifiable to the level of all animals.“Con argues that if animals were granted rights, human suffering would ensue. But Con also says that the amount is irrelevant. I agree that some suffering will ensue on humans as a result of veganism. Such as loss of pleasures such as enjoying steak, bacon, etc. But this is only relevant if it outweighs the amount of suffering that would be reduced by granting animals rights. Suffering can be weighed. Cutting off two of my fingers is more painful than cutting off one finger. The drastic reduction in animal suffering greatly outweighs the suffering that not being able to eat meat brings on. When I am referring to animal suffering, I am literally referring to animals suffocating to death over the course of three to four days after experiencing muscle paralysis and severe nausea [1]. Putting animals through a cage washing machine while still trapped in the inside, getting scalded to death in a 180 degree machine [2]. The amount of suffering that animals experience is enormous. It is truism to say that the suffering that animals experience outweighs the suffering that not eating meat produces. Thus the argument stands.”How does one quantify the suffering of animals? Ask them to rate it on a scale from one to ten? Even if we could, how would we know what their 7 is in human terms? The suffering of humans regardless of quantity is relevant because, absent any reason to believe in animal rights (suffering has not been tied to immorality, and the argument from marginal cases simply doesn’t work), we must emphasize what we know exists--human rights. If Pro truly believes in reducing suffering as the basis for morality, we ought to end this injustice of demanding accommodations for animals at the expense of human luxury.Absence of Evidence is Evidence of AbsenceIn conclusion, the very first point of mine is ultimately what has decided this debate. Pro has provided no moral grounds on which he may justify that animal rights exist. His attempt at marginal cases fails because marginal cases are in fact exempt from the understood meaning of the word “rights”. His attempt at justifying through suffering fails because we are given no reason to believe that suffering is morally wrong. Without any reason to believe that animal rights exist, we must believe that they do not exist.Thanks to my opponent for this certainly interesting and engaging debate, and thanks to Fire_wings for hosting.