Resolved: God Exists

Right, let's get started.The burden of proof is on myself to argue cogently that God exists, or that it is probable that he exists. Con need only refute my arguments successfully in order for him to win.I will present three arguments in favour of God's existence.Cosmological ArgumentThis argument forms the following premises and conclusion.P1: Everything in the universe exists contingentlyP2: Contingent existence is a property that is transferable from part to wholeC1: The universe is contingent.P3: To prevent reductio ad infinitum, there must be a necessary entity on which all other things are contingent.P4: A necessary entity would be the creator of all contingent entitiesC2: The universe was createdC3: God exists.Now to justify the cogency of the premises/conclusions:P1This premise is known inductively a posteriori, in other words it is verified to be highly probable by experience.Everything in the universe exists contingently; which is to say that its existence is dependent on something else (an event, an entity or a state of affairs). For example, a lamb's existence is contingent on the event of a ram and a ewe having sexual intercourse.Everything we experience exists contingently, and as we know that the fundamental particles that make up everything are the same here on earth as throughout the universe (1), we can inductively conclude that it is highly probable that everything within the universe is contingent.P2The argument I am making is often accused of committing the fallacy of composition (2); where a property shared by parts of a whole is ascribed to the whole by virtue of its parts. For example, each individual human (the part) has the property of having a mother, but it does not follow that the whole human race (the whole) has that property too.Yet notice that not all properties fall foul of this fallacy; take colour for example:If a brick house is made up entirely of yellow bricks, then it does follow that the house is yellow.So we can conclude that some properties are transferable from part to whole, whereas others are not.P2 asserts that the contingency is transferable, but how can we tell?Well, the distinction between transferable and non-transferable properties becomes apparent with thought experiments. For example, we can easily conclude that 'having a mother' is not a transferable property, because as soon as we have a group of mother-possessing people it becomes apparent that the whole group doesn't have the property of having a mother.Yet if we think of colour, we can easily conclude that if we group together multiple yellow bricks; the group as a whole would also have that property; it is absurd to think that it might not be yellow.It is the same with contingency; if we have a group of contingent entities, then it is evident that the group as a whole is also contingent; it is absurd to think that the whole could not be contingent, as simply amassing multiple contingent entities would not make the whole a non-contingent (necessary) entity.Hence contingency is a transferable property, and so it doesn't commit the fallacy of composition.C1Following the reasoning in P2, if all entities in a group have a transferable property, then the group as a whole would also have that property. So if all entities in the universe are contingent, then the universe as a whole is contingent.P3If there is no necessary being, then there is an infinite regress of contingency. For example, A would be contingent on B, and B would be contingent on C etc...If everything was contingent, then this would go on for infinity, yet an actual infinite is an impossibility, as shown by paradoxes such as Hilbert's Hotel (3).Therefore, the chain must start somewhere. This start point must be a necessary being, as a contingent being would just continue the chain further back.P4If the start point is necessary, then we are prompted to ask: why do contingent entities exist at all? If the necessary being did not create the contingent entities, then there is no reason why the contingent entities exist at all. Hence we can inductively conclude that this necessary being created the contingent entities, based on the fact that the latter exists.C2Logically follows from C1 and P4.C3A necessary, transcendent entity that is creator of the universe? That sounds like God to me.Ergo, as a necessary, transcendent entity that is creator of the universe has been proved with the above argument, it is highly probable that we can give this being the title of 'God'. Therefore, God exists.Ontological ArgumentP1: God = 'That of which nothing greater can be conceived'P2: We can conceive of God and it is possible that he exists in reality as well.C1: God either exists solely in the mind (A), or both in the mind and in reality (B).P3: B > AC2: A is incoherentC3: BC4: God existsP1This is what many understand God to be. It fits well with the concept of the God of classical theism.P2We can conceive of God (we can imagine him), otherwise we wouldn't be able to have this debate!Secondly, it is possible that God exists as an existent God is not logically incoherent even if he didn't exist.C1From P2, we have two alternatives:1. We can imagine God, but he doesn't exist in reality (A)2. We can imagine God and he does exist in reality (B)As we know from P2 that we can imagine God, the only variable is whether he exists or not. As existence is a dichotomy, we only have two options.P3The God in B is greater than the God in A, this is because it is greater to exist both in mind and body than just solely in the mind. This is clearly demonstrated in how theists think God is great (because he exists) and atheists think God is not great (because he doesn't exist).C2The God in A is logically incoherent, because if God only existed in the mind, then we would be able to conceive of a greater being (the God in B). Yet this contradicts God's own definition in P1.C3Again, as we can either choose A or B, we have to pick B because A is logically incoherent.C4B entails that God exists.Ergo, God exists.Argument from Religious ExperienceThis is a probability argument, in which I will use the existence of millions of testimonies of religious experience to provide inductive proof of God's existence.Before I start, I would like to highlight that religious experiences are very common; nearly half of all Americans report having had a religious or mystical experience (4). So these are not rare occurrences at all.For a given report of a religious experience, there are three possible explanations:1. The mystic is lying2. The mystic is mistaken3. The mystic is rightOut of all the millions of religious experience reports, only one case where the mystic is right (No. 3) is needed to prove that God exists. As even if all the other mystics are either lying or are mistaken, one instance of a mystic being right would logically entail that God exists.So if God does not exist, then we would have to support the assertion that every single one of these religious experience reports is either a case of a lying or a mistaken mystic, yet this is unduly and irrationally sceptic. Probability would infer that at least some of the mystics are neither lying or mistaken.This forms the following argument:P1: Many religious experiences are reportedP2: The mystic is either lying, mistaken, or right.P3: It is improbable that all mystics are either lying or mistaken.C1: It is probable that some mystics are right.P4: If a mystic is right, then God exists.C2: God exists.P1 This is empirical fact.P2I have explained this above, anyhow, its veracity is self-evidentP3On the whole, people tell the truth unless there is sufficient reason to lie. So if there is no reason to lie (as is the case in many religious experiences), then it is probable that they are not lying.Moreover, if people report something, then it is probable that they actually experienced that something. It is unnecessarily and imprudently sceptic to deny this without prior knowledge that the person might be in such a state as to be hallucinatory or mentally unstable.Yet this is not the case with most mystics. Most of them are of sound mind and have no psychological problems whatsoever. This would imply that they are not mistaken in what they believe they experience, as they have no reason to doubt that their experience was of actual reality.C1This follows from P3P4This is self-evident, as if a mystic is right when they say they experienced God, then this means that they actually did experience God. God must exist if he is to be experienced.C2Follows from C1 and P4Put into logical form, where:GPE = God Probably ExistsL = The mystic is lyingM = The mystic is mistakenGPE ⇔ [ ΣP(L) + ΣP(M) ] < 1 I will now hand over to Con, so he can attempt to refute my arguments. (1) physics.info/standard/(2) http://www.logicallyfallacious.com...(3) http://en.wikipedia.org...(4) http://www.pewresearch.org...