The Kalam Cosmological Argument Successfully Demonstrates its Conclusion.

Thanks for the opportunity to engage on this interesting topic. My opponent focuses a great deal of attention on different theories of time. The main problem with his critique of various theories of time is that they do not substantially relate to the issue at hand. He argues that the A theory emphasizes the "present" in contrast to the "past" and "future" and the B theory blurs those three categories. While this may seem like an interesting question, it is materially irrelevant to the fact that the universe had a beginning. Let me use an example. Does the "B theory" of time de-emphasize the "present" so much that my opponent does not believe that there was a beginning point when he wrote his initial posting? Is it possible or plausible, since others might have not observed the beginning or reported it as occuring at the same moment, that the beginning [of his posting] did not happen? Of course not. That would be ridiculous. Thus, while the "B Theory" of time may emphasize the relative dimensions of time, it can never subtract, pure and simple, a beginning point for an event. And since it cannot subtract a beginning point, it cannot, therefore, subtract a cause. The short version of the critique of my opponent's argument against the beginning of the universe is that the observation that the universe had to have a beginning and therefore a cause is not that scientists have merely inductively observed that all natural effects up to this point have had natural causes. If it were the case that the *only* reason that we had to believe that things had a beginning and cause was that inductive reason and probability had led us to do so, then we could not be absolutely certain that this was the case. But that is not the only reason. There is also intuitive or abductive (from the parts to the best "whole" conclusion) reason which can also lead us to believe that all "effects" must have a "cause" by definition. My opponent has a woeful lack of reference to the great Scottish philosopher, David Hume. Hume is famous for noting that our habits of connecting causes and effects are often mistaken and misleading.[2] So, for my opponent to assume that *every* effect in the natural world has a material cause not only ignores major parts of the history of philosophy, but it violates his last paragraph (which refers to the limitations of induction). The absolute best that my opponent can do, given his premises, is as follows: a.) If the beginning of the universe is dependent on one's subjective perception of a "present" as opposed to a past and future, then the universe may not have a cause; b.) The theory of time that is currently favored relies on subjective perception of the "present"; c.) Therefore, the universe may not have a cause. Obviously, this argument does not work for presenting a necessity. That the universe *might* not have a cause is not strong enough to refute Craig's KCA or any similar argument. In order to be effective (or even interesting), my opponent has to present an argument for why *this* particular universe does not have a beginning or need a cause as we would expect from any other phenomenon, whether in this universe or any other. I will move retroactively to my definitions for this debate. I had argued that what is "beyond time" [BT] does not have a cause or any obvious cause [C]. Thus, BT > ~C, and, ~BT > C. My opponent seems to accept this as valid or as more reasonable than not. So, in the formulation [where U is the universe]: ~BT > C U = ~BT Ergo, U > C, my opponent actually objects to the minor premise rather than the major premise. He argues that since the universe contains or encompasses time, that it must transcend time. Interestingly, he also notes that the universe cannot exist before time. Of course, time cannot exist "prior" to the universe. That would be either impossible or contradictory or both. Yet my opponent overlooks one obvious possibility: the instantiation of the universe and of time itself (whether viewed in "A" or "B" theory) are entirely coeval or contemporary. In that event, the universe does not "contain" time, per se, but is dependent upon time just as time is dependent upon the advent of the universe. Thus, Time and the Universe are co-original and co-terminous. If the instantiation of the universe and time are co-eval, then the universe is clearly not transcendent to time which lays to rest the objection to the minor premise. Also, my opponent seems to assume that the cause cannot be simultaneous to the effect which is the only believable reason that he would have to objecting to the simultaneity of universe and time. I would refer him to J.L. Mackie's book, The Cement of the Universe, or other works based on Mackie's seminal work in order to better understand this simultaneity and coterminosity. [1] With that objection thoroughly refuted, there is no plausible recourse left but to affirm the efficacy of Craig's KCA. [1] https://books.google.com... [2] http://www.iep.utm.edu...