An infinite substance exists and exists alone

To preface this argument: S. T. F. U. NON-EXISTENCE DOES NOT REQUIRE A CAUSEI'm going to go ahead and agree with everything Pro said about the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR). It's all fine up until the part where he makes the following blatantly-false assertion -- "the natural extension of [the PSR] is that everything which does not exist must have a reason for its nonexistence". That is most certainly NOT the natural extension. To understand why, let's rephrase the PSR in the form of a conditional statement:"If an object exists, then it must have a reason for its existence"Basic knowledge of formal logic indicates that if the conditional statement is true, then the ONLY proposition whose truth is necessarily entailed is its contrapositive statement [. http://math.stanford.edu...]. In this case, that would be: "If an object does not have a reason for its existence, then it does not exist"However, Pro is attempting to assert that the statement's OPPOSITE is also necessarily true, which is simply not the case. Thus, one of the most crucial links in Pro's chain of reasoning is broken -- there is no reason to believe that Pro's alleged "natural extension" of the PSR is actually necessitated by the PSR at all. But in addition to Pro's lack of warrant, we have positive reason to reject the idea of non-existence requiring a cause. Pro defines a "cause" as a "quality which makes one more conducive to actualization". It is patently absurd to suggest that a non-existent object can possess a quality because qualities are only meaningful insofar as they relate to a subject; in other words, qualities are predicates, and predicates are contingent on the existence of the subject they describe. This is obviously problematic for Pro because, in the case of non-existent objects, the subject (by definition) does NOT exist, and is therefore incapable of having a predicate [. http://www.thefreedictionary.com...]. Given that [causes = qualities = predicates], we can then apply the law of substitution to arrive at the obvious conclusion that non-existent objects are incapable of having causes (and thus cannot be caused into non-existence). Pro's ontology of non-existence is deeply flawed. The more plausible (and prima facie obvious) explanation is that non-existence is the default state. It is existence which requires a cause in order to escape that default state, and Pro has yet to demonstrate such a cause for his "infinite substance". Just because it lacks a reason for non-existence doesn't automatically mean it exists. Remember the contrapositive of the PSR -- "If an object does not have a reason for its existence, then it does not exist". Burden of proof remains on Pro to demonstrate a positive reason for the existence of an infinite substance. I was also going to argue that an infinite substance would be incoherent due to its contradicting attributes, but Pro seems to have pre-empted that, and it's worded way too confusingly for me to even try comprehending it, much less refuting it. As for the remainder of Pro's case, I'm not sure why he included it, as the terms of the debate do not require me to advocate substance dualism. The resolution is a positive claim, so burden of proof is on Pro; all I have to do is refute his argument and demonstrate that Pro's burden has not been fulfilled. I believe I have accomplished that task.