BeIR/webis-touche2020 huggingface dataset:
Bureaucratic politics: Conflict in Russian bureaucracy

However in autocratic Russia coordination of departments was poor and the emperor had the last say on everything, the bureaucracy could not make policy.[[Hans Rogger, Russia in the Age of Modernisation and Revolution 1881-1917, London, 1983, p47-48]] In Russia the leading Ambassadors and the Foreign office were in support of a move towards strengthening the alliance with France by adding close co-operation with Britain.[[Iswalsky, Fateful, p200]] Even ministers relied upon the Tsar, always having to see what way the Tsar was leaning on a policy, and following it even if the minister privately objected so if the Tsar came down on the side of the diplomatic corps the military side of the bureaucracy would comply.
Great Men: Sir Arthur Nicolson

Nicolson also had the task of smoothing relations whenever the British newspapers printed articles that touched on the autocratic nature of Russia that could have derailed the negotiations. Nicolson’s task was made yet more difficult as he believed “It would be impossible to induce Iswolsky to put his signature to any document which he considered would cause umbrage at Berlin.”[[Nicolson, Nicolson, p222, 253]] Thus Nicolson had to walk a tightrope between the Russian establishment and the British foreign office while persuading Berlin that such a convention was not aimed at them.
Further Research

Obviously this is not a No point/point against the question but this should go at the end. Essentially this is my bibliography. As a lot of the references I make only used summerised citations you may well need to come and look at this to work out what precicely the book or article is rather than finding the first mention of that book. This should also help anyone who is looking to do further research on the 1907 treaty or any of the surrounding topics. Primary Sources: Bernstein, Herman, The Willy-Nicky Correspondence Being the Secret and Intimate Telegrams Exchanged Between the Kaiser and the Tsar, New York, 1918. Bülow, Prince von, Memoirs, Vol III 1903-9, London, 1931. Gambier, J.W. ‘A Plea for Peace - an Anglo-Russian Alliance’, Fortnightly Review, (Jul-Dec., 1900), pp.998-1008. Grant, N.F. ed., The Kaiser’s Letters to the Tsar, London. Grey, Viscount of Fallodon, Twenty-Five Years 1892-1916, Vol. 1, London, 1925. British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898-1914, Vol. III The Testing of the entente 1904-6, London, 1928. Gooch, G.P. & Temperley, Harold eds., British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898-1914, Vol. IV The Anglo-Russian Rapprochement 1903-7, London, 1929. Hansard, The Parliamentary debates Fourth Series, Third session of the twenty eighth parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Vol. CLXXXIII, 29 Jan.-11 Feb., London, 1908. Lieven, Dominic ed. British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part I from the Mid-Nineteenth Century to the First World War, Series A Russia, 1859-1914, Vol. I Russia 1859-1880, 1983. Nicolson, Harold, Sir Arthur Nicolson, BART. First Lord Carnock, A Study in the Old Diplomacy, London, 1930. Rich, Norman & Fisher, M.H. eds, The Holstein Papers, The Memoirs, Diaries and Correspondence of Friedrich von Holstein 1837-1909, I, Memoirs and Political Observations, Cambridge, 1963. Rich, Norman & Fisher, M.H. eds, The Holstein Papers, The Memoirs, Diaries and Correspondence of Friedrich von Holstein 1837-1909, IV Correspondence 1897-1909, Cambridge, 1963. Savinsky, A., Recollections of a Russian Diplomat, London, 1927. Yarmolinsky, Abraham, trans., The Memoirs of Count Witte, London, 1921. ‘The Russians at the gates of Herat’, Science, Vol. 5, No. 117, (May 1, 1885), pp.368-369. ‘Convention Signed on August 31, 1907, between Great Britain and Russia, Containing Arrangements on the Subject of Persia, Afghanistan, and Thibet’, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 1, No. 4, Supplement: Official Documents. (Oct., 1907), pp. 398-406. ‘The Anglo-Russian Convention’, The Spectator, Sept 28 1907, Vol. 99, (Jul. 6-Dec. 25, 1907), London.
Bureaucratic Politics and Great Men: Summary

Krasner’s criticism of Allison’s model seems to apply in the case of bureaucratic politics in relation to the 1907 agreement. Witte is an example of a decision maker not standing where he is sitting.[[Stephen D. Krasner, ‘Are Bureaucracies Important?’, Foreign Policy, No. 7, (Summer, 1972), pp.159-179, p165]] He opposed the convention despite his interests in commerce with Britain and “I soon perceived that only two things could save the dynasty… namely, a large foreign loan”[[Abraham Yarmolinsky trans., The Memoirs of Count Witte, London, 1921, p285]] that Britain could provide. In Russia the Tsar had complete control, although he did not take a particularly active role the bureaucracy was always very sensitive to his values. Meanwhile Campbell-Bannerman’s appointment of Grey reflected the wish of his Liberal Government to come to an agreement with Russia, an example of the chief executive setting the rules and choosing who heads the bureaucracies.[[Krasner, Bureaucracies, pp.166, 169]] The bureaucracies, such as the Indian Government, that were following their own interests were just bypassed. The individuals certainly had an impact. Edward Grey and Iswolsky magnified the slow movement towards rapprochement that already existed. Without Nicolson’s skill at negotiating along with Grey and Hardinge’s ability to come up with solutions to stalling points the Convention would not have been agreed. Iswolsky and the British kept Nicholas on a path to rapprochement. In this case the individuals may well have tipped the scales enough to create the convention, however they were not the primary cause.
International level: Fear of a continental league

Kaiser Wilhelm had been engaging in secret diplomacy in an attempt to create a continental wide alliance against Britain. He persuaded the Tsar while on his yacht to sign a secret alliance on the 24th July 1905 in Björkö Sound.[[Sidney B. Fay, ‘The Kaiser’s Secret Negotiations with the Tsar, 1904-5’, The American Historical Review, Vol. 24, No.1, (Oct., 1918), pp.48-72, p.48.]] With it Wilhelm promised Nicholas “The dual alliance combining with the triple Alliance gives us a Quintupel Alliance” in which “even Japan may feel inclined to join it.” Given Wilhelm’s earlier attempts to encourage an Anglo-Russian war with declarations like “India’s loss is their death stroke”[[27 July 1905, 17 November 1904 N.F. Grant ed., The Kaiser’s Letters to the Tsar, London, pp.191-192, 148.]] the alliance was obviously directed against Britain. For Wilhelm, once the alliance was concluded either France would act as he hoped creating a continental alliance or else he would have detached France from Russia.[[Fay, Secret, p.52.]] Germany’s aim was to create a peaceful hegemony in Europe. This was also the aim also in attempts to force France into dependence on Germany by challenging France in Morocco.[[A.J.P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1971., p.427.]] Britain realised Germany’s aims and the dangers of not supporting France in any crisis: Sir Edward Grey “If France is left it the lurch an agreement or alliance between France, Germany and Russia in the near future is certain. This…is the Kaisers ideal, France and Russia becoming satellites within the German system.”[[Memorandum by Sir Edward Grey: Febuary 20 1906 (Notes by Sir C. Hardage), Gooch, BD III, p268]] Showing the importance of keeping Russia and France on Britain’s side.
International level: Anglo-German Alliance possibility

In 1898 and 1899 there was a chance of an Anglo-German alliance when Chamberlain approached the German ambassador desiring to co-operate against Russia in China. This was part of Joseph Chamberlain’s determination to end Britain’s isolation with a ‘natural alliance’ with Germany.[[Christopher Howard, Splendid Isolation A study of ideas concerning Britain’s international position and foreign policy during the later years of the third Marquis of Salisbury, London, 1967, pp.28, 32.]]
National level: Russo-Japanese War and 1905 revolution

The shock of the defeat against Japan forced a complete reassessment of Russian foreign policy she had been shown to have serious weaknesses domestically, financially and militarily.[[Neilson, Tsar, p267]] Many in Russia had been unwilling to accept defeat: Savinsky “It also pained me that Russia, so great and powerful, should be invited to enter peace negotiations with Japan, just at a critical moment when their efforts and resources were perhaps at the point of exhaustion.”[[A. Savinsky, Recollections of a Russian Diplomat, London, 1927, p128]] It was international opinion that forced Russia into negotiations, Witte the Russian negotiator managed to effectively dictate the terms of the peace despite Russia’s loss of her navy, one army captured and another routed.[[Richard Connaughton, Rising Sun and Tumbling Bear, Russia’s war with Japan, London, 2003, p342-344]] Russia had however been badly weakened in terms of balance of power this would have been the ideal time for Germany to strike, Russia had reached her relative low in 1894 while Germany her high in 1902.[[Kennedy, Rise and Fall, p311]] Germany was dismissive of Russia’s power after 1905 particularly emphasising Russia’s weak societal cohesion.[[Wohlforth, Perception, p361]] This weak societal cohesion was caused by the 1905 revolution. On 9th January troops had opened fire on a peaceful protest killing over a hundred sparking revolution. During this revolution there were numerous peasant revolts and in October, general strikes including on the railways, brought Russia to the point of collapse resulting in a promise of a constitution and an elected Duma.[[Hugh Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire 1801-1917, Oxford, 1989, pp598-600]] In 1905 Iswolsky believed that “The interior situation dominates everything”.[[Helene Iswolsky, ‘The Fatefull Years: 1906-1911’, Russian Review, Vol.28, No.2, (Apr., 1969), pp.191-206, p195]] It is not surprising that other Great Powers believed “internal disorders began to undermine Russia’s whole position as a power that must be reckoned with”.[[Memorandum by Mr. Eyre Crowe, January 1 1907. Gooch, BD III, p399]] Britain however was the country that was least influenced by these internal events believing that Russia would still make a good account of herself in a war in Europe in which public support could be assured.[[Wohlforth, Perception, p356]] This meant Britain was in a good position to take advantage to get a settlement as “Russia had had difficulties with every country but England, who had acted loyally and cordially with Russia.”[[Mr. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey January 26 1906, G.P. Gooch & Harold Temperley eds., British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898-1914, Vol. IV The Anglo-Russian Rapprochement 1903-7, London, 1929, p222]]
National level: German policies could derail an agreement

Germany had the opportunity to interfere with the convention due to her growing interests in the Persia and the near east.[[Rogers Platt Churchill, The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, Cedar Rapids, 1939, p134-137]] Although the treaty set out as one of its principles “as well as the permanent establishment of equal advantage for the trade and industry of all other nations.”[[‘Convention Signed on August 31, 1907, between Great Britain and Russia, Containing Arrangements on the Subject of Persia, Afghanistan, and Thibet’ The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 1, No. 4, Supplement: Official Documents. (Oct., 1907), pp. 398-406. p400]] It also set out spheres of influence that could only be detrimental to German interests. Ultimately Only the Kaiser made any reaction and his ludicrous attempt to create a German-American-Chinese entente was bound to end in failure. This was based upon Wilhelm’s fears of a ‘yellow peril’ that Japan would dominate Asia thereby threatening the world.[[Luella J. Hall, ‘The Abortive German-American-Chinese Entente of 1907-8’, The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 1, No. 2, (Jun., 1929), pp.219-235, p222]] In his telegrams to Nicholas he spoke plainly “They are going in for the whole of Asia, carefully preparing their blows and against the white race in general!”[[28 December 1907, Grant, letters, p239]]
National level: Summary

In Britain the right conditions were in existence to counter any more imperial expansion. Britain had a pluralistic press and a parliament empowered to ask questions of the bureaucracy preventing any information monopoly. Early industrialisation created diffuse economic interests this made it easier for the elite to adjust to a slow loss of power.[[Snyder, Myths, p55, 59]] Democracy acted as a check on concentrated interests, voters would only support profitable imperialism,[[ibid, p49]] the Boer war had shown imperialism was no longer profitable forcing Britain to pull back from over-expansion and create alliances to retrench her position. 1905 acted in a similar way in Russia, helping to break the elite with the creation of the Duma and forcing retrenchment that forced rapprochement with Britain.
International level: Structure of the International System

Whilst this may be the case, Mearshiemer has pointed to other behavioural reactions to imbalances of power at the system-level, incuding bandwagoning and buck-passing. Moreover, if it were rational for Britain and Russia to attempt to balance the threat of Germany, the result was surely less than they had desired, with the deaths of millions upon millions being the result of an isolated and cornered German people.
Bureaucratic politics: Conflict in Russian bureaucracy

There were many vocal critics of any potential agreement such as Ivan Zinoviev who served in Persia and published a tirade against this policy: Russia, England and Persia.[[Siegel, Endgame, p21]] It can be argued that it was the bureaucracy that ran Russia at this time and almost any bureaucracy is opposed to change.[[Werner E. Mosse, ‘Russian Bureaucracy at the End of the Ancien Regime: The Imperial State Council, 1897-1915’, Slavic Review, Vol. 39, No. 4. (Dec., 1980), pp. 616-632, p618]] The Russian bureaucracy was locked in conflict in the first decade of the twentieth Century between a modernising bureaucracy aligned with the bourgeoisie and old bureaucracy aligned with the landed gentry. This created an inherent instability in the regime. Therefore the Anglo-Russian convention was bound to be opposed. Britain recognised that “The military party, to my mind, are a stumbling block”.[[Extract from Annual Report for Russia for the year 1906, January 2 1907, Gooch, BD IV, p259]] Witte, the Finance Minister, in particular was opposed due to Britain’s support of Japan “This, the English hoped, would teach Russia a lesson and be of service to them when it came to regulating certain moot points of the Anglo-Russian Relations.”[[Abraham Yarmolinsky trans., The Memoirs of Count Witte, London, 1921, p162]]
Great Men: Sir Arthur Nicolson

Grey was therefore instrumental in the making of the treaty however it was not him who negotiated it. That fell to Sir Arthur Nicolson. Nicolson held similar views to the other main players in the foreign office[[Churchill, 1907, p124]] this was: Sir Arthur Nicolson “in dealing with both France and Russia, we had honestly no other object than to place our relations on a safer and more secure basis… [not] to disturb the peace or to impair the relations between themselves and Germany”[[Harold Nicolson, Sir Arthur Nicolson, BART. First Lord Carnock, A Study in the Old Diplomacy, London, 1930, p236]] It was up to Nicolson to do the negotiating, unlike previous foreign secretaries Grey allowed his civil servants to give advice.[[Steiner, Hardinge, p417]] The instructions Nicolson were given were not in the form of a treaty but simply giving the government line allowing Nicolson considerable room to manoeuvre. It was up to Nicholson to slow down the negotiations when the Russians could not keep up with the pace Grey wished.[[Churchill, 1907, p144-145]]
International level: French Encouragement

The alliance situation also favoured an Anglo-Russian Rapprochement. Russia and France had signed an alliance in 1891 as much by Russian initiative as France’s due to increasing German designs in the near east. It is possible in longer-range plans Tsar Alexander III wished Britain to be part of an alliance that would also include Italy as well as France.[[Laurence B. Packard, ‘Russia and the Dual Alliance’, The American Historical Review, Vol. 25, No. 3, (Apr., 1920), pp.391-410, pp.402, 404, 394.]] Similarly Britain and France had patched up their differences. By 1898 France was prepared to barter its claims on Egypt for territorial compensation.[[Christopher Andrew, ‘France and the Making of the Entente Cordiale’, The Historical Journal, Vol. 10, No.1, (1967), pp.89-105, pp.89, 91.]] Germany to complement this realisation rejected Chamberlain’s overtures for an alliance by insisting Britain submit guarantees to aid Germany if attacked, while embarking on Weltpolitik making a Anglo-French agreement inevitable.[[Harold Nicolson, ‘The Origins and Development of the Anglo-French Entente’, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 30, No. 4, (Oct., 1954), pp.407-416, pp.409, 411-412.]] In December 1902 rebellion in Morocco made Britain willing to support France therefore a full agreement was possible.[[Andrew, France, p.101.]] Meanwhile Edwards VII’s visit to Paris changed public opinion in the two countries from being frosty to being cordial.[[Nicolson, Entente, p.411.]] From the outset the French “hoped one day to bring about an understanding between Russia and Great Britain.”[[Sir E. Monson to the Marquess of Lansdowne: November 9 1904, Gooch, BD III, p.11.]] As early as 1887 in Dieppe the French had mentioned the possibility of a triple entente.[[Packard, Dual, p.399.]] This hope quickly became official French policy: Sir F Bertie “It would continue to be friendship and intimate relations with England and alliance with Russia, and the French Government earnestly trusted that an understanding would be come to between His Majesty’s Government and the Russian Government on the various questions at issue between them.”[[Sir F Bertie to Sir Edward Grey: October 27 1906, Gooch, BD III, p393]] The Russo-Japanese war proved the Anglo-French entente could survive a crisis in which France and Britain would naturally be on opposite sides, the entente also provided a way for France to persuade her other allies that a triple entente was desirable.[[Keith Neilson, Britain and the Last Tsar: British Policy and Russia 1894-1917, Oxford, 1995, p264]]
The recent agreement on the EU reform treaty and the creation of a post for an ‘EU Foreign Minister’...

While seemingly groundbreaking, the current agreement on the EU reform treaty was nothing but a lame attempt to salvage a much bolder initiative: an EU Constitution. The rejection of the EU Constitution in the Dutch and French referendums, as well as the extreme difficulty in getting even its tamed down version – the reform treaty – to pass, shows, if anything, the extent to which the member states of the EU are not yet ready to think and act in unison. The significance of the ‘EU Foreign Minister’ post has already been jeopardized by a hesitation to name it as such – it was instead named the EU High Representative – as well as by a clear reluctance by EU members such as the UK to support it. The UK representatives successfully insisted that the language of the reform treaty clearly state that major foreign policy decisions will continue to be taken at the state level.
While the new ‘EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy’ marks only a bold first step ...

This language is not much different from what we have heard with every attempt the EU has made to push for further political integration. The role of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), as agreed upon back in 1993 during the Maastricht Treaty, was in fact presented very much along similar lines. Fifteen years later however, that united front has not been created. If anything, the EU’s political union, and certain any attempts towards a common foreign policy, have completely disintegrated when faced with the War in Iraq and the larger war on terror. Consultation, collaboration and the attempted creation of a common set of values has not worked and is not likely to work in a climate where the ‘New Europe’ in particular is claiming its own identity and interests.
The High Representative will not only act as a spokesman for EU nations when they agree on foreign p...

The position of High Representative will be largely powerless, because the member states have such divergent interests that agreement will be rare, and that attempts to devise a common foreign policy for the EU are doomed. And because control of foreign policy is such a key aspect of sovereignty, it would be wrong for national governments to give this power away to the EU, which is less democratically accountable. If the EU and its High Representative do try to pressure states into common positions this may well backfire, creating strong anti-EU feeling in both national governments and public opinion. Pushing too hard for a common foreign policy and giving too much power to an unelected High Representative may instead begin to tear Europe apart.
Creating a common EU foreign and security policy will in fact be easier than many people suppose, be...

Creating a position of EU High Representative is not objectionable in itself. At present the EU is in the ludicrous situation of having two foreign affairs spokesmen, one from the Council and the other from the Commission. Rivalry and duplication of efforts, staffs and resources results, and so focusing all the EU’s external affairs work around one person makes some sense. What it does not mean is that the High Representative should lead a drive for a stronger common foreign policy position. Only when member states agree (which may not be often) will he or she have a role. In fact, by removing a foreign affairs role from the Commission, this development may actually limit the pretensions of Brussels to develop its own agenda and dictate foreign policy to the member states.
One should not forget that a uniting Europe in itself has been a very bold undertaking that has take...

The War in Iraq, along with previous notable failures to deal with the breakup of former Yugoslavia, has been an excellent test for the extent to which the EU can claim to have a common approach to world politics and foreign policy in particular. It has clearly pointed out a whole range of diverse and often opposed national interests, and national publics that were unwilling to make compromises along EU lines of commitment. It has also showed that the economic power of the EU is not enough to turn it into a major player on the international scene: the lack in military power and presence speaks for itself. The EU still lies very much under the umbrella of NATO and US military power and as long as this military dependency continues, the EU will not be able to have its own independent voice in world politics.