There Are Good Secular Reasons to Disallow Same-Sex Marriage

I must say that I am not sure that Con read my opening argument closely. Though I do not doubt his sincerity, many of the questions he put forth were addressed from the very beginning. He seems to think that I have merely asserted the conjugal understanding marriage as true; but this couldn't be more wrong! I provided an explicit argument in my OP as to why we should accept the conjugal picture as correct: Its model of marriage as a comprehensive bodily union (and only this model) justifies (a) the public dimension of marriage [state's interest] and (b) the private dimension of marriage [real sexual union]. All other attempts fall short in either regard. Con has not attempted to question the integrity of this argument. 1. The "Harm Principle" Endorsement of the harm principle is a key part of my opponent's argument. A generic form of the principle was first articulated by J. S. Mill, who argued that the state may restrict autonomy only when one's action harms another. [1] Accordingly, Con argues that unless same-sex marriage results in harm to society, that it may not be restricted. But this principle can be attacked on various grounds, none of which he has adequately responded to: First, what does it mean to harm another? We can't know what harm consists of unless we first know what well-being is. Harm is defined as an attack on well-being, flourishing, or proper functioning. So in order to know whether same-sex marriage is itself harmful or results in harm, we first need to know what a proper marriage policy looks like. We have to answer the question: What is marriage? This must be settled before we look at the harms question. Playing the "harm card" by itself is flagrantly question-begging.Indeed, if the arguments made in my OP are sound (and Con didn't really give a non-question begging reason as to why they go wrong), then same-sex marriage is itself -- in virtue of promoting a false view of human sexuality -- a harm to society. It may not leave a tangible harm, but it is nonetheless a moral harm to society because it enshrines into the public understanding an incorrect view (so I've argued) of what marriage actually is. Social institutions are just as real as the people who partake in them, so a harm to one is necessarily a harm to another. Con's distinction between harms to marriage and harms to society is arbitrary. Both matter, and recognizing same-sex marriage will result in moral harm to both.None of this, mind you, requires saying that homosexuality is immoral. Con misinterpreted my comments about same-sex marriage being a false view of human sexuality. Homosexual unions may be valuable social relationships with their own unique goods; the argument being made is that they should not be recognized as marriages in virtue of their being a private emotional union with no inherent link to the comment good. [2] This is why I emphasized the point of kind-membership.Hence, the falsity of same-sex marriage lies not in the immorality of gay relationships per se, but in the fact that it misidentifies what is proper to marriage.Second, it is not clear why we should even accept the harm principle. Acceptance of the harm principle requires acceptance of the entire political framework (i.e. contemporary liberalism) from which it is built. Con has offered no reason for us to accept this very controversial and heavily criticized approach to political philosophy. [3]Finally, Con argues that by my own admission, my arguments are not secular. This is a ridiculous charge. A secular argument is simply one which makes no appeal to divine revelation or private religious premises. My arguments clearly meet that requirement. Secular reasons may be consequentialist, deontological (such as mine), or virtue based. There is no requirement that secular arguments be exclusively consequentialist. Indeed, many political liberals, such as John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin, have rejected consequentialism in their writings. 2. Does Marriage Have a Core Essence? One difficulty with a constructionist understanding of marriage is that if there is no way that marriage should be, then we are left without a standard by which to judge any given marriage policy as just or unjust. Con denies this. He proposes that we can evaluate a marriage policy by "judging its effect on society." But this is precisely the problem! Which effects are relevant and which are not? Any marriage policy will inevitably exclude some from entering, so it is important to determine which groups are and are not entitled to entering into marriage. But in order to know what forms of union are entitled to marriage, we need to know what marriage ought to look like. We can't judge effects without a relevant standard to judge by. Con has not avoided the initial difficulty. Con's driver license comparison works to undercut his own argument. Consider the following thought experiment: Suppose, following his own view, that marriage is a social practice that depends on prevailing conventions and social utility. Now suppose we have a time period in which (1) there is vast agreement that marriage should be between individuals of the same race and (2) there would be a great deal of conflict (i.e. negative utility) should interracial marriages be recognized. If marriage is a wholly constructed institution, then it seems that the right thing to do would be for the state to deny marriages to interracial couples because that's what they think marriage is. But surely this is absurd; they deserve marriage rights regardless of what people may think of them. But how can this be if marriage has no core essence? Con only pushes the problem back one level. Whatever standard we use to evaluate a social construction is arbitrary. His mistake is this: Simply because a social institution may be partly constructed does not mean that it is entirely constructed. [4]The cultural variation argument does not establish its conclusion. As I pointed out (with no reply), the mere fact that different societies treat something differently does not imply that it has no objective nature. This is merely an anthropological commentary on the culture's epistemological views, not the object of inquiry itself. Cultures can be right or wrong, a mere difference of opinion doesn't show that there is no right answer (cf. historical disagreements about mathematics and science). And in fact, cultural variation on the man-woman requirement has virtually been non-existent. [5]Finally, Con argues: "What determines the nature of a relationship or marriage is what the participants decide to orient it towards." This is simply begging the question against me. Although this may be true for socially constructed relationships such as business partnerships, I have argued that marriage should be construed as a natural institution rooted in an act of comprehensive bodily union (viz. coitus). This argument only works by presupposing the falsity of my position. Moreover, this principle is false for certain family relationships that are non-consensual (such as a son's relationship to his father and siblings). [6] Family relationships are just one kind of natural biological relationship; its structure is irrelevant to what its participants think it is about. A son who thinks of his mother as his wife and not as his mother does not thereby change the fact that she is his mother. At any rate, absent an argument, I see no reason to accept his assertion.The resolution is affirmed._______NOTES1. Mill, On Liberty, various trans.2. Nevertheless, a good case can be made that such unions are in fact immoral and lead to tangible harms. See bit.ly/1asHWRy and Gallagher, "The Case Against Same-Sex Marriage," respectively.3. cf. Christopher Wolfe, Natural Law Liberalism (Cambridge: 2007) 4. Girgis, Anderson, and George, What is Marriage? (Encounter: 2012): 47. 5. Gallagher, ibid.6. cf. Christina Hoff Sommers, "Philosophers Against the Family" reprinted in Oddie and Boonin, What's Wrong? (Oxford: 2005)