Free will exists.

==================== Source Model vs. Leeway Model ==================== At first glance, it seems my opponent's criticism of regulative control is justified - after all, who in their right mind can attribute free will to computers? However, what he would realize is if he read my definition of regulative control carefully is that I have circumvented this problem. If I simply defined it as the ability to choose among alternatives, then this criticism would be the death of my position. .. but I didn't. I will copy-paste my definition again for convenience, then list the important criteria embedded in said definition: "For an alternative possibility to be relevant per se to explaining an agent's moral responsibility for an action it must satisfy the following characterization: she could have willed something other than what she actually willed such that she understood that by willing it she would thereby have been precluded from the moral responsibility she actually has for the action. " 1. Regulative control is privy to agents. In philosophy of action, an agent is something that can act[1]. An important aspect of an action is that it has an INTENTION. A computer does not have intentionality[2]. 2. The agent, when willing an action, must take into her understanding moral dimensions. Thus, we can see that my definition of regulative control must require moral agency[3], which is "a being who is capable of acting with reference to right and wrong. ". Since computers obviously do not have moral agency (as of our current technological status), my opponent's criticism crumbles. ==================== A response concerning the importance of moral responsibility ==================== "My opponent argues that moral responsibility is linked to free will. But this goes against his entire argument. " ----> How so? Where in my argument have I said something in which you can infer such a contradiction? "But his assertion that moral responsibility must be linked to free will is completely unwarranted. He states that it is difficult to argue otherwise, and yet he has not provided any evidence to support his burden of proof. " ----> Very well, I will demonstrate that that moral responsibility is linked to free will. However, I take issue with my your claim that this is somehow my burden - where is YOUR reasoning for the claim that agent's can have moral responsibility without free will in a deterministic world? Because in fact, most philosophers believe otherwise; the least you can do is to defend this somewhat controversial position. I see you cite Fischer, a noted philosopher who's works deal primarily with free will, and yet I can't find where it's a reference to. All I can assume is that you believe in his idea of semi-compatibilism, which I have explained already. While I will go on to show that moral responsibility is necessary for free will, even in a deterministic world. Anyway, here's my defense: ==================== Defense of the link between moral responsibility and free will ==================== 1. If moral responsibility (MR) exists, then free will (FW) exists. 2. MR exists. . : Therefore, FW exists. This is the syllogism my opponent has provided (though I made a tiny modification). Since my opponent states both premises' of this argument is unsupported, I will do so: The existence of moral responsibility entails the existence of free will because the very concept of MR implies FW. I will argue for the merit-based view[4], "according to which praise or blame would be an appropriate reaction toward the candidate if and only if she merits — in the sense of ‘deserves' — such a reaction. " For this to hold, an agent must be able to choose among alternatives, otherwise there is no rational justification for upholding them for praise or blame. In other words, they need regulative control (which is the definition of free will I am advocating). To show that MR exists, my argument will be inspired by Strawson's idea of reactive attitudes[4]. People have a reaction towards a certain action that will elicit feelings of love, depression, anger, etc. , this is almost universal. Based on this idea, Strawson claims that "the reactive attitudes are a natural expression of an essential feature of our form of life, in particular, the interpersonal nature of our way of life. .. their justification refers back to an account of the reactive attitudes and their role in personal relationships, not to some independent theoretical account of the conditions on being responsible. [4]" So in other words, not only does MR exist because "the desire for good will and those attitudes generated by it possess no truth value themselves, thereby eliminating any need for an external justification. " He argues that other discussions about moral responsibility are over-intellectualized, and that whether or not determinism is true has nothing to do with moral responsibility. Refer to the link for more detail. ==================== Frankfurt's hierarchical theory - An accident and a revision ==================== Ah, my sincere apologies. I did not intend to advocate Frankfurt's hierarchical theory (it's specifically a compatibilist theory developed from the Source model of control), since as you can see it obviously contradicts the entirety of my round. When I was typing my initial round, I was deciding on which mode of control I should use (since I am not a compatibilist in truth). After some musing, I decided to do with regulative control but I failed to fully erase all of my arguments that had to do with guidance control. So I apologize to my opponent for such a confusion - however I do want to point out that my opponent really hasn't responded to it (waiting for my elaboration), so not much is lost. I will present new dispositionalism as the compatibilist thesis I will be defending. ==================== New Dispositionalism ==================== Due to character limits, I'm unable to defend this thesis so I will simply detail it first. My opponent is obviously welcomed to criticize it - however do remember it must be in the context of regulative control UNLESS he can prove guidance control to be superior. New dispositionalism is an "updated" version of classical compatibilism, which traditionally argues that free will is realized by simply fulfilling one's desire and acting out one's accord. However, the vast majority of philosophers view this position to be crude and simplistic - I agree. To summarize, "we assess claims about the disposition constitutive of the ability to do otherwise, or the dispositions in the bundle, or the possibilities in the raft, by attending to the intrinsic properties of an agent in virtue of which she acts when she tries, or the causal bases of the pertinent dispositions, or the underlying structure of a rational capacity. [5]" This is how new dispositionalism is able to circumvent the problem that classical compatibilism had with simple counterfactual conditionals. ==================== Conclusion ==================== "My arguments remain entirely unchallenged except for my definition of "free choice", and my opponent has barely even explained why my definition is inadequate. " ----> I can throw this question back at you. Why should we take guidance control as more fundamental and important than regulative control? The reason why my definition is adequate is because it clearly defines the important link between moral responsibility and free will (as I have already defended), but you have yet to give any rationale for your definition. ---References--- 1. . http://plato.stanford.edu... 2. . http://plato.stanford.edu... 3. . http://www.thefreedictionary.com... agent 4. . http://plato.stanford.edu... 5. . http://plato.stanford.edu...