Jihad on a woman's face IS permitted.

"Examination combines the techniques of an observing hierarchy and those of a normalizing judgement. It is a normalizing gaze, a surveillance that makes it possible to qualify, to classify and to punish. It establishes over individuals a visibility through which one differentiates them and judges them." "It is ugly to be punishable, but there is no glory in punishing. Hence that double system of protection that justice has set up between itself and the punishment it imposes. Those who carry out the penalty tend to become an autonomous sector; justice is relieved of responsibility for it by a bureaucratic concealment of the penalty itself" "The soul is the effect and instrument of a political anatomy: the soul is the prison of the body" - Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish Keep in mind that "double system of protection that 'justice' has set up between itself and the punishment it imposes." Also bear in mind that to Foucault, normative statements concerning freedom, liberty and justice cannot apply in contemporary society. "Those who carry out the penalty tend to become an autonomous sector; justice is relieved of responsibility" The Pro has successfully repeated that he his his wife for HER sake - it's this "expiation of evil-doing" that he claims to accomplish via a bodily attack but also through an attack on her soul that lets us see what his true intent is. I did not contest that Jihad allows violence, or even that it involves resolving martial disputes. I did, however, contest the idea that one can blame their actions on religious motivation. Whether the religion allows it or not, the responsibility for the event of the decision and the responsibility for the decision-making within the event fall on the Pro. The Pro responded by attempting, again, to blame religion for the decision he made. This is unacceptable. On to my answers: 1. "It's the certainty of being punished and not the spectacle of public punishment that must discourage crime." There are a few implications to this: a. Living under the fear of punishment: this is where the 'internalized subjectivity' from my first speech comes in. In making it known to your wife that you intend to punish her, and that if she deviates from your norm, regardless as to where that norm originates as you are the individual responsible for enforcing that norm, she will be punished. An important note: Discipline and Punish doesn't glorify fear of punishment. It condemns it as a form of bio-political manipulation, used to control the futures of the subject. b. "must discourage crime" is an incomplete quote: "As a result, justice no longer takes public responsibility for the violence that is bound up with its practice. If it too strikes, if it too kills, it is not as a glorification of its strength, but as an element of itself that it is obliged to tolerate, that it finds difficult to account for. The apportioning of blame is redistributed... Now the scandal and the light are to be distributed differently; it is the conviction itself that marks the offender with the unequivocally negative sign" - Michel Foucault While Foucault encourages a shift away from the old disciplinary society and towards a new 'control society,' he realizes this allows the punisher to escape responsibility for their actions. The 'offender' is marked as the reason the event occurs, as undeniably guilty - use of legal systems or trials, even if by an impartial jury, offer a means of commensuration that proves to be illusory. 2. In response to the Pro's insistence on his logical use of force: 'I was HELPING her!' He says "Knowledge is not for knowing, it's for cutting" like it's offense for HIM - he misinterprets the quote. This ties in closely to something Foucault called the power/knowledge relation - that one cannot produce knowledge without a corollary of power also present, and cannot produce power without a corollary of knowledge present. Let's look at the ways this implicates our situation: a. the assertion of power over knowledge-production: the Pro attempts to define the situation as he has pre-interpreted it, as opposed to being open or capable of epistemological inquiry - this is shown by his recourse to religion as a determinant. Instead of justifying his actions by claiming responsibility for them, he uses a textual interpretation of a holy book - that's a Derridean no-no on quite a few levels - to justify his actions. This lets go of responsibility one main reason: His singular interpretation of communication: the communication model goes like so: [][][][][] intent (what is intended by the author) -> iteration (what is said by the author) -> meaning (what the reader thinks the author intended) [][][][][] Obviously the communication model is imperfect. Rarely will an interaction occur when the meaning matches the iteration - one would need a numinous or some other messianic opening, which is constantly a venir (to come) and therefore will never be reached - to attain perfect communication. The only instance when intent matches iteration matches meaning is through a decision. A responsible decision goes like this: [][][] Do I hit my wife? Why would I do so? Because she took initiative and empowered herself? That is not a sufficient reason to merit a violent act, therefore I will refrain from use of force. [][][] Unlike the Pro's act of decision-making, which went like this: [][][] Could I hit my wife? I interpret the holy book I believe in to say it is allowed, therefore I will draw from this that I should. The holy book is forcing me to do this, and therefore I will. (notably not: 'my interpretation of the holy book is forcing me to and therefore I will) [][][] Obviously, drawing the conclusion that one SHOULD hit one's wife from a passage (among many) that has quite a few conflicting meanings is bad enough. However, blaming the decision one made both pre-event and post-event on one's 'universal' interpretation of a holy book is much worse. b. the assertion of knowledge-production over power: the Pro uses his wife's attempt to leave as a justification to hit her. He implies, in his last speech, that it is not the act of punishment but rather the fear of being punished that should affect his wife. His assertion that "[T]here is no glory in punishing" only backs this confusing theme further into its own antithesis - that it is for her benefit that she should not be the one to think freely or do as she pleases. But this raises a question: who is to determine the future values of one's thought? Apparently the Pro believes it is he, that he must be the one to decide whether his wife acts in disobedience or in accord with his perception of the law. Foucault said it best when he remarked that we must be wary to let the State[in this case, as was explained and conceded last speech, the Pro] define what is and is not legal, for at times an act breaking the law - as Chomsky puts it in their debate, running a red light to stop a shooting - can be justified, even under the law. No one in their right mind, no jury, no judge, would convict the individual who ran the red light. However, the Pro has decided he is the sole arbiter of both how ad when to interpret the law. This is especially shown in how he bends Jihad - not an inherently violent concept - to allow himself to exercise violence on his wife. 3. This ties in to 2b. The Pro says, "Her act was egregious to me. I made it egregious to her." This implies the act was not inherently egregious - it also implies the wife did not intend to act egregiously. The Pro also says, "If she felt comfortable leaving home without my consent, what's next, leaving town?" To this we must ask, who determines hoe the Other feels? Who must answer to whose consent? And most importantly, why? How was the wife listening to 'Satan?' Who determines this? If we find the reasoning behind the prioritization of a masculine figure's consent is lacking, there is no way we can vote for him.