Animal Rights

I will begin by addressing Con"s opening remarks, then I shall address the overviews I made, rebut the Con, and defend my own case. I"ll conclude with voting issues. Con contends that I"m avoiding the straight-on debate about whether a just government should grant animals rights. Con further argues that I have twisted the rules to benefit myself. However, Con, by accepting this debate, agreed to those very terms. It is disingenuous to now, in round three, voice objections to those rules. If Con had a quarrel with the rules, he should have messaged me, posted a comment, or voiced those objections in round one, prior to the debate proceeding. However, in the spirit of honesty and fairness, I will ask that you dismiss my speciesism argument. This is a small argument that has little impact on my case, and I would rather earn win in a debate in which both parties felt the rules were fair, than cling to one point. OV1: Con did, as a matter of course, drop my clarification of a right as a claim. Not once in his previous speech did he mention this definition or attack it. Con further states that the definition is "ambiguous" and "tantamount to "qualified for a right"" yet these points are largely unwarranted. Never does Con explain why my definition is tantamount to qualification, nor does he explain why it is vague. It seems then that Con"s points are more ambiguous than mine. Ultimately, if I have a claim to my life or my property, and I have a claim against being killed or against theft, then I have a right to my life and to my property. Thus, my points stand. But even if you accept Con"s argument, if having a claim connotes that one is qualified for right, then if animals can have claims, it means they are the type of agents to whom rights can meaningfully be ascribed. Animals would be "qualified" to be right-holders. Turn this against the Con"Con"s positive law argument relies on the fact that animals, as Con noted in round two, "are precluded from anything we could consider a "right". " By Con"s own logic, if animals have claims, then they are qualified for rights, and so are not precluded from them. OV2: Con concedes that his case relies on the notion that only agents capable of rational thought or developing rational thought have rights. By rational, con means that agents can communicate consent and possess free will. Thus, if I can show that to confer rights an agent does need one or both of these traits, a Pro ballot is in order because the fundamental premise on which Con makes his assertions will be shown false. Con then engages in a discussion of what "interests" really are; I will get to this later in my speech. OV3: Con asks for clarification; I would be happy to oblige. Con essentially agree that it is true that a just government would not inflict "undue pain and harm" upon "any agent. " Therefore, a just government would not inflict undue pain or harm upon animals. Based on the Stanford evidence, which shows that victims of undue suffering, those who are wronged, have claims against harm, and thus have rights. Animals can be wronged, and as a just government would not wish to wrong animals or inflict undue suffering, a just government would grant animals rights. REFUTING THE PRO 1-2: Con did not break the rules, as my definition of positive law was not stated in round one, it came up in the course of my rebuttal. Please evaluate his argument regarding positive law. I will offer some reasons to evaluate in my favor however. Cross-apply my own contention one here, which demonstrates that animals are not "powerless to negotiate" because they can do so through proxies representing their legal interests. A Second reason to reject Con"s argument is that of my very own analysis of positive law. Even if the government is formed by consenting individuals, that does not preclude it from granting rights to non-consenting groups. For example, in the U. S. the mentally ill have a right to life that is considered just as legally and morally valid as my own. Another example might be that foreign nationals in our nation are still entitled to a fair trial, despite their not being part of our social contract. In other words, the government is fully able to grant rights to those not strictly members of the social contract, the laws are "imposed. " And, as I noted in OV2, Con admits that animals are "qualified for rights," seemingly acknowledge that a government could extend rights to animals. Con tries to rebut this by claiming I would be granting rights to mountains and inanimate objects because such things have immunities. However, I would argue that you need to at least be alive to have rights, at the most basic level. Animals are alive, as are the mentally ill. The reason you need to be alive is because only things that are alive can be wronged, i. e. can have pain inflicted upon them, or have their biological or emotional interests denied. A mountain has no "appetites, conative urges, and rudimentary purposes. " Nor can it feel, physically or mentally. Without these things, it has no morally considerable harm to be immune from. Therefore, based on the arguments I have presented, I would not ascribe rights to such mere things. They, unlike animals, are not "qualified for rights. " Lastly, I would take exception to Con"s claim that immunities aren"t rights; he did accept the definitions, and could have objected prior to beginning the debate. But, the above analysis also addresses Con"s reason as to why immunities aren"t right, because immunities are designed to shield against pain and no true interests, as described by the Fienberg quote. Con then goes on to assert the livestock has no rights because it is property. Yet, under the notion of positive law, and even under the social contract, what rights we grant and to whom or to what we grant them can change as new social contracts can be formed and new laws can be passed. Simply saying that because the farmer has always had possession over the cow or sheep, does not mean that those sheep or cows should always be without rights. That is the essential question of this debate, should society alter its view and grant animals rights. The Con notes, "no one has ever argued that all human behavior toward any animal, under any circumstance is permissible. " At that point, I would say that Con is granting animals some sort of rudimentary claim against harm, constituting a right. The Farmer may own the cow, but he should not be permitted to beat the cow unconscious. The cow has a right against that, against being wronged. 1-3: Con is again misconstruing my argument. Con states that "protection by law is not based on a claim. " That"s not what I"m contending. I"m arguing that it is not that protection by law is based on the claim, but that the claim for protection is based on the law. If, for example, I pass a law against inhumanely killing animals for food, then the animal has a claim, which arises from the law, against being inhumanely killed for food. The law in this case enables the claim. And, if the law comes before the right, then you don"t need consent to attain the right, because the law is being imposed on you, it is not a right your choosing to make into law. Ultimately, it is through such man-made laws that animals can get rights. In the scenario I presented, the animal does not need to be cogent to have the claim, and the agents of the government or a legal proxy acting on behalf of the animal can easily assert the claim on the animal"s behalf. But even if you don"t buy that proxies can assert the right, the animal still has the right regardless of whether it can exercise that right or not. Hence, animals can have rights. DEFENSE OF PRO C1: Key extension: Con drops the fact that animals have a claim to their inheritance. He never addresses the existence of this claim in any of his speeches. This claim is enough to prove animals have some rights and warrant an immediate Pro vote. Con"s rebuttal focuses instead on clarifying his earlier remarks and attacking the notion of proxies. A Proxy doesn"t need to communicate to represent well. Let"s say an animals has inherited $100. It is the Proxy"s duty to secure for the animal that money, to which the animal has a right (the existence of this right was dropped. ) The Proxy can then care for the animals biological interests, as I discussed earlier. An animal doesn"t need a will to have rights in this case, thus it is not the duty of the Proxy to represent the will of the animal, merely to ensure it is treated as best as possible. C2: Extend my Stanford evidence. Con concedes dropping it. Thus, if animals can be wronged, i. e. have undue pain inflicted upon them, they have rights against such treatment. SPA: Pain does not need conscious evaluation to be bad. Neither humans nor animals enjoy pain, that"s why pain is painful. To the extent that pain is a harm, and in conjunction with the dropped Stanford card, animals can be physically wronged, meaning they have claims against being harmed, granting them a right. Ultimately, even if you buy everything that the Con says, as long as you agree that pain is undesirous, then a Pro ballot is in order. SPB: Con agrees that I nailed it when I stated that his girlfriend had a right to be with whomever she wanted, i. e. to dump him. Con then proceeds to ignore the accompanying analysis I offered. If she has a right to leave, and he has a right to be free from emotional turmoil, then the two rights cancel out. At which point, we have an issue of a conflict of rights. The key thing here is that Con still has a right to be free from emotional pain, even if it is mooted out. Con doesn"t directly dispute the fact that he doesn"t have a right against emotional distress, even if it cancels out. Thus, he still has some rights, just like animals. Undue pain, purposeless violence, is a wrong, and we all have a right against it. I would argue that if his girlfriend were that sadistic has to purposelessly harm him, he has a right against that, even if not recognized in law. So, even if you don"t by SPA, SPB shows how emotional pain can be inflicted upon animals. Never does con dispute the evidence I offer showing how animals are victims of emotional pain. Extend this point. Therefore, under the Stanford evidence, animals have rights because they can be emotionally wronged. C3: Con states that projections of disgust are insufficient to grant rights because they are not reflective of moral consideration. This only rebuts half of the points I made. Con never rebuts that following argument: "If an immunity is a protection, and an immunity is a right, then protections are rights, and animals should have a right. If a = b, a = c, then b = c. It really doesn"t matter for whose sake the animal has the immunity, because the resolution isn"t asking whether or not animals have rights inherent in them. It merely asks if animals should be granted rights. If animals should be granted immunities to spare the owners, that doesn"t change the fact that animals should be extended rights. At this point, a Pro ballot is in order. " In other words, we could grant animals immunities, and thus rights, to spare us of our own unsettling projections of disgust. C4: In regards to the utility argument, it really doesn"t matter whether animals "want" anything, because I was discussing their physical welfare, which you don"t address. If we evaluate their pain on par with our own, naturally we are giving them a right to have their welfare taken into account. By "better off," I"m referring to the animals not be maltreated, abused, or starved by people. Their pain can relatively easily be eliminated. VOTERS: 1-Con dropped that a claim = a right. 2-Animals have a claim, and thus a right, to their inheritance. 3-A Just Government would not inflict undue pain upon even animals, and would thus grant animals certain immunities against such harm. Those immunities are rights. 4-We should grant animals rights to spare us of our own pain. Once we immunize animals from unnecessary harm, we give animals a claim against that harm. 5-Animals, from a utilitarian perspective, have a right to have their welfare considered. 6-Consent is not necessary. Even if the government is formed by consenting individuals, that does not preclude it from granting rights to non-consenting groups. For example, in the U. S. the mentally ill have a right to life that is considered just as legally and morally valid as my own. 7-My arguments about proxies, the fact consent is not need, my arguments about how animals can still have rights, like inheritance, without needing thought, or my assertion that animals can have rights without being able to exercise them illustrate that rationality isn"t needed to have a right. Under my OV2, any one of these is sufficient reason to vote Pro. 8-Animals are "qualified for rights," and so they are the types of agents to whom rights can meaningfully be granted, contrary to Con"s suggestions. 9-The dropped Stanford evidence, which shows that if you accept either SPA or SPB then a Pro ballot is merited. Any one of these is sufficient to vote Pro. No new arguments are allowed now. Thanks for a good debate.