Objective morality exists

Thanks for accepting! I will state my argument. The first part of my argument states that the linguistic properties of the word 'good' make it impossible for it to be subjective. Morality is loosely defined as what is 'good' and bad'. But what is good? This may seem like a good question, but really it is not appropriate. Good is a fundamental linguistic building block and irreducible concept. Good requires no definition in the same way that the word 'not' has no definition. It is an unavoidable fact that some words, like not, are fundamental and cannot be defined further. Let us suppose that I pick up a dictionary and look up a word; the definition of this word is the same meaning expressed in simpler word(s). If I then flick through to define those simpler words I would get a definition formed of even simpler words. This cannot go on to infinity as there are a finite number of words, nor can it be a circular definition because then they would not be definitions. Therefore, I am correct in stating that some words are fundamental and are defined by themselves and themselves alone. These are called 'semantic primes' and good is one of them (1). The reason why it is a semantic prime is that attempting to define it leads to circular reasoning or absurdities, as I will explain in the second part of my argument. Why does this property of 'good' mean that it is not subjective? Because something can only be subjective insofar as it is defined by the individual or the society. As I have already verified that 'good' cannot be defined, it is hence impossible for society or an individual to define it. Therefore what is good (morality) is not subjective, and as subjectivity and objectivity are dichotomous, morality must therefore be objective. The second part of my argument explains why morality is not subjective in a metaethical sense. Defining 'good' in terms of subjectivity will always fail when scrutinised. Let me illustrate this. If I say that what is good is what is socially approved then this forms the equation: Good = What is socially approved But if this were true then the statement 'whatever is socially approved is necessarily good' would be true. This is clearly not the case because it would mean that it would be impossible to disagree with society's morality. Furthermore, the holocaust would be good because it was socially approved under the society in which it occurred. This is absurd and shows that the above definition of morality is false. So morality cannot be socially subjective. Equally, I could say: Good = What I like Again, this fails because it would mean that 'whatever I like is necessarily good' and this is clearly false, as it would say that if I like raping children it is good to do so. This same consequence crops up whenever we try to define 'good' in terms other than itself. David Hume deduced that it is illogical to move from an 'is' to an 'ought' insofar as we try to define moral terms (what ought to be) using naturalistic terms (what is). The two above examples show that subjective morality is false. The third part of my argument examines the normative reasons behind the veracity of an objective morality. The illusion of subjective morality is based on reasonable disagreements on specific moral issues. For example, one can argue both rationally for or against euthanasia which would suggest that morality is subjective. However, if we keep questioning why someone holds a particular moral view then it becomes clear that morality is objective. Let us postulate a classic euthanasia debate: John: I am for euthanasia Jack: I am against euthanasia Both moral views can be seen to be rational despite being opposing, which would suggest that morality is subjective. However if I keep questioning John on his stance, we get something like this: John: Euthanasia is good Philocat: Why is it good? John: It eases needless suffering Philocat: Why is that good? John: Needless suffering is bad Right, so the basic premise is 'suffering is bad'. Yet watch as I question Jack, who has the opposite view to John: Jack: Euthanasia is bad Philocat: Why is it bad? Jack: It threatens the intrinsic value of life Philocat: Why is that bad? Jack: It can make people fear that they won't be valued when they are ill Philocat: Why is that bad? Jack: Because fear causes needless suffering Philocat: Why is that bad? Jack: Needless suffering is bad See what we have? These are two opposite moral views that would initially suggest that morality is subjective. Yet when we scrutinise their claims we see that their disagreement does not come from contention over moral values, but over interpretation of what leads towards and away from these values. They both have the same fundamental moral values. I would be willing to bet that if you boil down all rational moral disagreements you will find that they have the same moral values. To conclude, I haven't deductively proved that morality is objective but I have shown that there is significant indication that moral values are objective. Conclusion: Subjectivity and objectivity are dichotomous; something can either be one or the other. I have asserted in this round that morality is not subjective, so it follows that morality is objective. I have also shown that even in cases of moral disagreements, fundamental moral truths are not disputed, which insinuates the existence of objective morality. (1) http://en.wikipedia.org...