Free will probably exists in humans.

"He seems therefore to be conceding that, while free will may be theoretically impossible (because all events are "still theoretically predictable given all relevant information") for practical, human purposes, events are unpredictable so free will may indeed be a possibility." This is a very interesting point. However, it is still invalid. Free cannot exist if events are fundamentally predictable, whether predictable in practice or not. "Additionally I do not think there is any foundation to my opponent's assertion that an 'entity with free will must be capable of acting unpredictably'." As my opponent asserts, a being with free will will act predictably sometimes. I agree. However, my own assertion is that for an entity to have free will, it must be at least CAPABLE of acting truly unpredictably. If it is not, then its actions are entirely determinable; definitionally, if its actions are entirely determinable, then it does not possess free will. But, of course, if a being acts truly unpredictably, then it is not exercising free will (as explained/debated in the randomness section). ==== Randomness. "A calculated action can have a random outcome." And if it's calculated, then it's predictable and therefore not free will. In the end, this point is irrelevant to my case. "Con: 'if an entity is merely selecting a choice in a completely random manner, this is not a free, rational choice.' Agreed." This concession negates the resolution once and for all. Everything is either unpredictable (random) or predictable. In either case, it is not free will, and my opponent has conceded in both cases. His argument that a predictable event can lead to a random outcome is irrelevant. "Con: 'randomness (unpredictability) is the only alternative to determinism (predictability), this leaves no other option.' Saying it does not make it so, there is another option: choice." Choice is a completely separate issue. That is similar to saying "there is another option: bacon." A choice is either predictable or unpredictable; there is nothing else that it can be. "[A rational actor] does not need to be in control, he (or she) may choose to relinquish control." At some point, the rational actor must be in control. I have proven that at no point is the rational actor in control. "It seems a more reasonable assumption to me than to assume that human beings will behave in the same way as numbers." This statement is nonsensical; numbers do not behave. And it still begs the question. My original point was that new information cannot be created. The point is actually irrelevant to my primary case, since it supports determinism and determinism alone is not necessary for the sustenance of my case. However, I will indulge in it anyway. I was showing how information cannot be created in a numerical sense; though humans are not numbers, all information can be represented with numbers. So if you can't add 2 and 3 and get 5 OR 6, you can't have a person make a choice and have two possible outcomes. The comparison is simplified, obviously, but the main point is understood. "The point is not that the decision appeared to be random but that it appeared to be chosen." Choice and free will are distinct. A computer can make a choice. Only a free choice requires free will. But as I have proven, free choice is impossible. "Personally, I don't think entities with absolute knowledge are likely to be possible so I'm not sure why we should create such an unnecessary entity in this debate." Even if such an entity cannot exist, the entity is theoretically possible. But the entity is not really necessary for my case. "My opponent accepts that human actions can be impossible to predict in practical terms, therefore "in humans" not everything is predictable or truly random therefore free will probably exists." If an action is theoretically predictable but not practically predictable, then my logic still applies. If something is theoretically predictable, this just means that it is caused by a previous event or set of events, or predetermined. Even if the choice is not practically predictable, it is still predetermined. ======== I remind the reader that Libet's experiments are not particularly important, as I have proven that free will is impossible under any circumstance. "Is the RP really a signal that a decision has been made?" Yes. "Might not the RP merely signal a quickening of attention, rather than a moment of decision?" Possibly. There is not much of a reason to believe this, though. And it raises further questions, such as, Why does attention quicken 500 milliseconds before a decision is made? "isn't it possible that we need a certain amount of time just in order to report the awareness to ourselves?" Possibly. But evolutionarily, this makes less sense. If the subconscious reacts quickly but the conscious takes a moment to catch up, there are no real consequences. But if it takes an entire half second just to register and become aware, that is far too slow to adequately react to fast-paced stimuli (such as being chased by a bear) and most people with such a lag would be long dead. "Libet himself is reported as believing in free will in this article if only at a limited level." I'm sure my opponent only meant this as a side point, but nonetheless it is a baseless appeal to authority. "He rightly points out that free will is important partly because it underpins the idea of moral responsibility: but morality, he suggests, is mainly a matter of vetoing things we have a built-in tendency to do." This is not a legitimate argument: it is only an appeal to consequences. He only believes in free will because he thinks that something unfortunate will happen if he doesn't. But the truth is often unfortunate. "The fact that a decision is formed unconsciously, milliseconds before it is perceived by the conscious mind does not disprove free will." Right, that's what my proof does. Libet's study only reduces the probability of free will existing. "Free will does exist, but it's a perception, not a power or a driving force. People experience free will. They have the sense they are free." This is using a different definition of free will than the one that is being used for this debate. "a human can very well do what he wants, but cannot will what he wants." This means that he is capable of making choices based on his desires, but the choices are not free (willful). This supports the negation. "A vote in favor of free will comes from some physicists, who say it is a prerequisite for inventing theories and planning experiments." Theories and experiments (or the ideas for them) can be seen as results of the great problem-solver known as evolution. Besides that, I can easily refute this claim: computer programs can plan, solve problems, and even invent theorems [1]. Daniel Dennett's arguments, while interesting, do nothing to counter my proof. Let's go over it one more time: -A choice is either predictable or unpredictable. If a choice is predictable, it is predetermined, since non-predetermined information comes out of nowhere and is therefore unpredictable. -If it's predictable or determined, then it is not free. -If it's unpredictable, then the choice is not a rational or free one. (My opponent conceded this point in round 3.) This leaves no room for free will. I request that the reader not vote based on which side they like best (which is very tempting considering the subject), but vote on who presented their case most effectively. Resolution negated. Vote Con. Thanks for this great debate! [1] http://www.math.rutgers.edu...