God almost certainly exists

Thanks Con Semantics Con asks me to elaborate on the resolution, and my response would be that 'almost certainly exists' is not a 100% proof claim, but a probablistic claim. I am not looking to say that certainly without a doubt, God exists - rather, I am looking to assert that most probably, God exists. Argument from evil Con briefly presents an argument from evil and poses a question. However, such an argument cannot be rationally upheld. The simple fact is that the notion that genuine, binding evil exists is epistemically inscrutable. We humans, with finite knowledge and finite capacities cannot possibly make the claim that God, in a wider framework, could not have a morally sufficient reason for permitting an instance of evil that leads to a greater good. We are talking subjunctive possibility that humans cannot possibly know; indeed, Plantinga showed that if it is even subjunctively possible that God has a morally sufficient reason for permitting evil, then the POE falls Flat on its feet. [2] This obvious lack of knowledge makes the claim that evil and God cannot coexist redundant: God could, for all we know, permit evil because it is the most moral course of action available. We simply lack the necessary knowledge to make such a positive claim. Argument #1 God of the gaps? Con makes this accusation, but at no point is the argument i presented a God of the gaps argument. If you look at how I set it out, I give reasons as to why a God should be inferred through deductive reasoning; firstly to show that the universe has an external cause and secondly to show that such an external cause has the characteristics of God. I did not argue that there is an unknown cause 'X' and that we know nothing about 'X' but must be God because there is a gap in the scientific knowledge and there no other explanation I can think of - rather, I gave reasons why such a cause 'X' must be God, through deductive reasoning, given the truth value of the established premises. P1 Con makes two charges against the first premise - firstly that"the PSR doesn't mean that there is an external creator and secondly that quantum events occur without any obvious cause. But the first charge seems to misunderstand the argument and/or creates a strawman. I did not make such a claim - indeed, the first premise stated that everything has an explanation which is either external to it, or internal to it. And so I agree, when Con states that this 'does not necessarily mean that there is an external cause'; as I explicitly mention that the explanation can also be through an entity's own necessity. Though, I argued the universe cannot be necessary namely due to how it isn't changeless. The appeal to quantum mechanics is equally as fallacious. Firstly, such an indeterministic interpretation of quantum mechanics, that is required for Con's objection, is one of many - none of which can be known for certain. There are more than 12 interpretations of quantum mechanics [3]. Amoung these, there are multiple deterministic interpretations, like the De Broglie-Bohm interpretation, where Con's objection simply has no force. Furthermore, even if we accept an indeterministic interpretation, we still have to make the jump that the indeterminacy is ontic as opposed to epistemic, and there is no reason to suppose that. Secondly, the quantum events that Con mentions are still in the contex of the quantum vacuum so that without the quantum vacuum, the events could not take place. [4] they still therefore have an external explanation and P1 still stands. P2 Can gravitational energy waves take the place of God? In short, no. The concept in itself is highly speculative and by no means scientifically proven. However, the underlying contention is that such an entity, if exists, would philosophically still be the universe, which is defined as 'all of space-time' [5]. Such a hypothesis has no philosophical relevance to the argument, which is in reference to 'the universe' - of which, the gravitational energy waves discussed would be a part of. Even if it were possible that such an entity could be the explanation of what we commonly refer to as our local universe, philosophically, it would remain to be 'the universe' and is not as such an external cause - it is very much internal. 'What created God?' This is a nonsensical question. By definition, a necessary entity has no creator - it exists in metaphysical necessity. A universe, energy and space are contingent entities of which, it is metaphysically possible that they be different. So while God, if such a being exists, would be necessary by definition; a universe, energy or space are intrinsically, innately, contingent. Their form, whichever they take, are not necessary and could be different. So the answer lies in the nature of such entities, were they to exist. Does creation impact on immutability? It doesnt appear that it does. Put simply, God's nature stays the same. While it is a change in the external environment to God, it is not a change to the nature of God himself. However, it is the nature of God which we are to consider if we are to debate about God's immutability, not the external environment. This is an irrelevant objection. Are quantum waves truly transcendent? As it has already been discussed, quantum waves still exist in space-time, and so philosophically, they are not transcendent to the universe. Power Con uses the phrase "all-powerful" in relation to creation but I make no such claim - I make the more modest notion of 'hugely powerful'. And I ask, how else is an entity supposed to be the cause of the universe without huge power? It seems highly unlikely that a being with extremely limited power could be the cause of something as great as the universe. Is God given an explanation? Con makes the charge that God is given no explanation but this is simply false. I explicitly argue that God's explanation is through the necessity of his own nature. P3 Con briefly mentions that we may merely perceive the universe's existence rather than the universe genuinely existing - however, it doesn't follow that the universe 'doesn't exist' - it still exists, but in a mentally constructed form. You can compare it to thoughts - which obviously exist, but in a distinct form. P4 and P5 The rest of Con's contentions are reiterations of already established points which have already been responded to. Argument #2 Genetic fallacy Firstly, Con appeals to evolution in explaining away objective morality. However, this commits the genetic fallacy. [6] By stating the origin of phenomena like morality does nothing in discrediting the objectiveness of morality. It could well be that the means by which objective morality came to be was via evolution. In which case, evolution is true and objective morality exists. An independent argument has to be provided as to why objective morality does not exist. You cannot simply appeal to its origins. P1 Con's objection seems to totally misunderstand the argument, and is a confusion I explicitly tried to avoid when distinguishing between absolute and objective morals. When Con states "there is a reason that the Aztecs thought that Child sacrifice was perfectly acceptable, but we find it abhorrent", he is fundamentally confusing epistemic and ontological morality. The argument has no concern with the epistemic side of morality. It is concerned with the ontological status. As such, differing opinions concerning morality are an irrelevance in establishing its objectiveness. To give an example - if half the population believe that the world is flat, and the other half believe it is round, the differing opinion has no impact on the objective nature of the earth's geometry. In other words, the relative nature of morality has no binding on the objectiveness of it. Con asks what binds morality and my response would be the same laws that bind logical truths - simple necessity. Con also makes the basic error of bringing the Judeo-Christian God into the debate when he states that "God has permitted genocide". This debate is not concerning the Abrahamic God even in the slightest and as such, the comment is an irrelevance in the context of the debate at hand. P2 A strawman against the argument is presented, when Con says that it states that "humans often have moral instincts. Therefore, binding morals exist". This is not at all what I argued. Rather, I argue that human moral experience and reasoning of genuinely binding morality proves the objectiveness of morals, as we have a prima facie experience of objective morality that is a properly basic belief and should therefore be assumed correct unless proven otherwise. This is clearly distinct from arguing that moral instincts prove objective morality. Con should therefore reassess his case against my argument that doesn't rely on ridicule. Back to TruthHurts for the next round Sorry about the length but there is a lot of material to work through! God Bless Sources: [1] http://www.philosophyofreligion.info... [2] http://www.reasonablefaith.org... [3] http://www.princeton.edu... [4] http://www.reasonablefaith.org... [5] http://philosophicalconceptions.blogspot.co.uk... [6] http://www.nizkor.org...