The concept of "choice" contradicts determinism and causality

I was going to address the issue of epistemological justification that you touched on in the last paragraph of your first response, but I felt my post was running longer than most attention spans, so I'm glad you brought it up again here. I can see from the structure of your arguments that you are an empiricist of the JTB variety (justified true belief), which is just as well; we all have to believe something ; -). But as I mentioned, I am a skeptic, specifically a pyrrhonist, so the justification for knowledge accepted by empiricists does not convince me. The Gettier paper of 1963 clearly shows that justified true belief can easily be an illusion, and it is just such an illusion that I am suggesting humans are under, with regards to their freedom of action.(1) For those who are unfamiliar, the epistemological school to which my opponent ascribes holds that a belief is justified as knowledge when (2):a) it is believedb) it is truec) the believer has good reason for their belief (a very tenuous condition if I may say)Edmund Gettier objected to this justification with a series of examples that clearly illustrate instances in which a believer is justified in a belief, but in which the justification was not actually "good" and the belief was only true by coincidence. Accidental knowledge. He, Bertrand Russell and many other philosophers have complained that the leniency with which the third condition of JTB is defined allows for an unacceptable margin of error when we consider how easy it is for a human to be convinced of something which simply isn't true. (3) Sunrise anyone?Consequently, I cannot accept a human's justified true belief in the freedom of their actions as evidence that they are indeed free. You have asserted that "if all possible finite observers cannot tell the difference there is no difference." So if everyone believes it, it must be true? Really? Believing that you can choose freely does not grant you the power of actually choosing freely. It has to be possible to happen, and if every event is the direct result of a prior cause, including everything we believe is a free choice, then it is not logically possible for choice to exist. Alternatively, if we are not in a deterministic universe, and there is randomness, then it really doesn't matter if humans believe they can choose freely because you cannot choose what is random. It's another logical paradox. Every which way you turn with "free will" and "choice" you run into logical paradox. Belief has no bearing on the matter, justified or not. What we learn, or fail to learn, about the universe does not change what the universe is actually doing.So my answers to your questions, if you haven't inferred them already, are these: there's no way to tell the difference and it doesn't matter, and I have no model for free will because it's an illogical concept and requires paradox to exist. And I will pose you a question in turn: regardless of whether or not there are observers, how can a completely determined system arrive at an un-determined event through complexity? How can a system in which everything is caused arrive at something that is not caused? Thank you again for a good debate. I hope we'll have the opportunity again. 1) http://en.wikipedia.org...2) http://en.wikipedia.org...3) http://en.wikipedia.org...