DA Tournament: The Most Accurate Meta-Ethical Theory. Moral Realism (Pro) vs Moral Relativism (Con)

I'll provide my rebuttals then attack my opponent's case.Rebuttals"Moral nihilism is explicitly different to moral relativism"I spent a mere 5 sentences touching on moral nihilism last round so this part of my case was insignificant. I'm not affirming nihilism. I said: "Moral relativism is a viewpoint that has a logical foundation in existential nihilism". If there's no ultimate meaning, purpose, or reason for existence as existential nihilism posits, this lays a *logical foundation* for morality to have relative - rather than factual - truth value. There aren't any intrinsic ends with moral relativism or moral nihilism and both are anti-realism views with a fact-value gap problem. Nihilism doesn't allow subjective truth values while relativism does but I acknowledge their differences. Moral sense is an incorrigable statePro claims that it's "easily arguable" that we all have moral sense but doesn't offer a single argument in support of it other than just saying so. This also does nothing to help Pro's case, since the "moral sense" that everyone is claimed to have doesn't support his burden that "ethical sentences express propositions that refer to objective features of the world." Ethical sentences that express propositions referring to objective features of the world would be true independent of your current emotional state. Saying things like "slavery is wrong" would still be true/false regardless of whether you sensed it to be wrong or not. Evolution cannot say anything about morality except how we experience and bias certain stimuliResearchers document that human morality is the product of 'primate sociality'. These are the moral characteristics that have been observed from the great apes (one of our closest living ancestors):"attachment and bonding, cooperation and mutual aid, sympathy and empathy, direct and indirect reciprocity, altruism and reciprocal altruism, conflict resolution and peacemaking, deception and deception detection, community concern and caring about what others think about you, and awareness of and response to the social rules of the group"http://en.wikipedia.org...If morality is an evolving process, our moral propositions can't describe "objective" features of the world. Something objective cannot be in a state of dynamic change like the process of evolution is. Also, in a pre-human era, there would be no such thing as moral propositions. How can our moral propositions refer to 'objective features of the world' if this feature is simply contingent on the existence of human beings? 1. If evolution is true, then mathematics is emergent & relative2. Mathematics is not emergent & relativeC. Evolution is false My opponent's logic is the same as my argument was, but the scenarios used aren't analogous. 1. If morality is emergent then moral relativism is true2. If evolution is true, then morality is emergent3. Evolution is trueC. Moral Relativism is trueMathematics doesn't exist *apart* from human beings. You won't find the number 7 anywhere in the universe. Mathematics exists as a human *abstraction* of reality. Evolution was ongoing before the first human beings ever evolved. Therefore his example is disanalogous to mine because my point wasn't contingent on the existence of human beings.Since evolution is objective nothing inherently subjective can derive from it.Morality is in the same category as art, literature, music... They're all human constructs. My opponent also brings up the is/ought problem but this actually hurts his case. My opponent is claiming that what we 'ought' to do is objective by affirming moral realism but evolution only deals with what 'is'. It can't affirm that we ought to do anything. EgoismEgoism has been tested in reality. I said last round that the father of modern economics, Adam Smith, wrote "It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest." The "invisible hand" that results in free-market efficiency is the result of everyone pursuing their own self-interests. If we posit that we act out of our own self-interests, this gives us a clearer picture of what forms our moral framework. In order to achieve our interests, we must work with others in society to achieve those wants. Thus, morality serves as a method of social cohesion. This is how a society such as Nazi Germany was able to function without internally succumbing to supposed objective evils. Descriptive relativismSocieties can have largely similar stances on ethical issues such as murder and child rape in a relativist worldview. Whatever the society values as being true is true relative to that society. Many societies value the safety and well-being of a child and innocent person so many societies will view it as wrong.Non-cognitivismNon-cognitivism doesn't serve much purpose in proving moral relativism to be true other than acting as a moral anti-realist view so I'll focus my case on my other points.Ethnocentrism Ethnocentrism is the tendency to think that *your own* cultural or ethnic group is centrally important while all other cultures are measured in relation to it. This explains why moral realists make claims condemning other societies for not acting in accordance with their own moral propositions. Such condemnations were made by Midieval Christianity or during the Spanish Inquisition as part of their ethnocultural moral realist philosophy.Pro's argumentsMoral sense theoryMy opponent introduces moral sense theory without telling us what "moral sense theory" even is. He says that we would expect strongly general moral statements if we have moral sense. He hasn't shown that this is an 'objective' moral sense that allows us to express propositions that refer to objective features of the world. Human beings have an instinctual need for survival by having enough shelter, water, food, protection, etc., so strongly general moral statements are to be expected of a species that shares all of the same needs. Others that harm this chance of survival in any way can be expected to be quarantined or punished in some fashion. Thus, my opponent's argument that we have moral sense doesn't show it to be objective in any way. Grounding moral truthsMy opponent says that there doesn't need to be a God to ground moral realism, only that a concept of God does. But this is incoherent. If there is no moral authority, such as God, that enforces moral law, what we "ought" to do is neither objective nor binding. Moral realism couldn't express any objective features of the world. The same is true for utilitarianism. Under what obligation are people to obey a utilitarianist view of morality? No obligation. Therefore it cannot be grounded in a utilitarian view either. Morality existing as a cogent concept"Moral" is a cogent concept because societies have defined what those truths are. It makes no difference if the truth of it is objective or not. "Amoral" is just the negation of whatever is being considered as a truth proposition. We have shared ideas of what it means to be moral vs. amoral but humanity shares the same instinctual tendencies so common morality is to be expected.Functional RealismPro makes the mistake in thinking that moral disputes are resolvable based on moral content. Humanitarian crimes are settled on whichever country holds the most power. Countries that commit 'humanitarian crimes' would just as equally enforce their own interests on another country if they had enough power to do so. The weaker country would then be seen as the ones committing 'humanitarian crimes'. It's all based on perspective and is easily explained via ethnocentrism.