Logic Presupposes God: a Transcendental Argument for God's Existence

Thanks to Con for the well-thought out round. On to the arguments! I will be using his headings as a convenient example to follow. ========== 1. The fallacies of TAG ========== I think Pro's counter-arguments here rest on the simple mistake of not distinguishing universals from particulars. [1] When I say that the Law of Non-Contradiction exists I'm NOT referring to a particular entity that instantiates the LNC. I'm referring the "universal" of the LNC - or if you want to get more esoteric and Plato-like - the Form of the LNC. The statements that Con refers to are just representations of particulars of the LNC. The distinction between conceptual LAs and the LAs as the nature of existence is contentious. Presumably existence is just the aggregate of all things that, well, exist - or all things that have actual being. This tells us nothing interesting by itself but it's implications are very interesting for Con's argument. If LAs only Con claims the LAs just are (part) of the nature of existence but neglects important talk of essences. [2] Essence precedes existence. Obviously, existence can exist in different modes as well. If something exists only in mind - or found to be only instantiated by the mind - then there is literally no distinction between conceptual LA and nature of existence LA as they are the same thing. So if these type arguments work it would make sense to place LAs in the nature of a rational being like God. The problem is if we accept Con's wide ranging nature of existence argument we'd have place LA in things that aren't essentially rational like matter. I maintain there is no conflation. One of the essential properties of the LAs is that they are conceptual. Logic and reason are very clearly a process of the mind as I argued in the earlier round. Note that even if were to accept that LAs are just part of the essential properties of the nature of existence then we'd have to accept that they are abstract objects that are completely mind-independent. I detailed the problems with this particularly Plato-esque philosophy in the last round. So even if I'm wrong, Con still has to deal with my epistemological objections to his implicitly held Platonism. ========== Fallacy of Division? ========== Con accused me of committing a fallacy of division - the problem is that neither TAG nor I commit the fallacy. The fallacy of division is an informal fallacy and it's not a problem of logical form; there can be valid cases of reasoning from whole to parts. I am not even sure what to make of the suggestion that the nature of an object can tell us nothing of their source as this seems almost overly dismissive to me. Consider the field of philosophy of mind arguments that figure heavily in the debate between reductive/eliminative physicalists and non-reductive physicalists/property dualists are so called knowledge arguments involving qualia. [3] They argue from the particular *properties* of subjective experience to the conclusion that subjectivity is not reduce to the physical. If those arguments work (and a lot contemporary philosophers - perhaps the majority - think so) then it is positively the case that properties of an object can tell us something about it's source. I maintain that such is the case with the TAG. We look the nature of LAs and conclude that certain options just can't be sources of them and certain objects can. ========== The futility of TAG ========== I think this part of Con's contention misses the point. TAG tarts from the assumption that LAs exist and that they are self-evidentially true. Indeed, a TAG proponent wouldn't disagree with Con when he states they are axioms. TAG isn't about trying to prove that LAs exist so therefore God exists. I would only argue for the existence of LAs if someone was foolish enough to deny them. The very definition a transcendental argument is to take some feature of the world that is (mostly) immune to doubt and figure what conditions make that feature intelligible. That is what TAG purports to do. What question is given the essential properties of the laws of logic *what world view do they fit the best with*. TAG argues that certain features of the law of logic only make sense within a (certain) theistic worldview. Con states that the argument is supposed to conclude that LAs exist - actually that isn't the point. The point is to conclude that God exists given certain features of LAs and seeing the preconditions necessary for them. ========= Defending P2 ========= Assuming my points earlier didn't work Con's assertion that the logical laws don't "exist" flat-out contradicts his assertions that LAS are simply the nature of existence. If they are the nature of existence then they exist - that is trivially true. To assert otherwise is to say that a necessary condition of existence (the LAs) are non-existent. This is obviously untenable. If all he means by that is that the LAs don't exist as particulars then I agree with Con; they don't and I never said nor implied as much. I see no anthromorphization here and Con slightly misconstrues my argument - I never said that God *governs* logical laws. I said they were based in his nature - no theist I know of (besides, maybe, Descartes) thinks that God *governs (as in controls) his own nature. God can no more change his nature then you and I can. You could just say that LAs are just representations of the way God thinks. ========= Epistemology ========= Note that just stating that LAs are a reflection of the nature of reality doesn't actually explain HOW we came to know this truth. Do we humans have a mysterious intuition that detects necessary truths? How did that come about? The theist has a possible answer; I see no others forthcoming from non-theistic philosophies. It's not enough to just say that LAs are part of the nature of reality and leave it at that. Con says I am essentially excluding Islam and other religions but it's hard to see how given what I said: "A Christian could, for example, argue that God created people in his image and as a result gives people the ability to have knowledge of LAs..." That doesn't necessarily exclude any other philosophy or religion that has a God that endows humans with a capacity to know necessary truths (among other things). I was just coming at it from a Christian perspective which should be fairly non-surprising considering that I am a Christian. For example, it is often supposed among Christians that being made in the image of God entails certain God-like (to a much lesser extent of course) capacities like love, morality, rationality, etc. ========= TANG ========= Con's objections here also seems to miss the mark. He objects that if God's nature is the source of LAs then how could anything exist that is contrary to the nature of God? The problem here seems to lie with the very ambiguous word "contrary". If one were to say that nothing could exist that is contrary to the LAs that I would take that to mean there is a *logical contradiction* in asserting the relationship between two or more concepts. The problem with Con's TANG is that he doesn't specify how the existence of say, evil, is logically contrary to God's existence. Is the existence of a omnipotent, omnibenevolent, and omniscient being logically incompatible with the existence of evil? Con would have to show that. In fact, in previous debates Con has argued that it is UNLIKELY that a God so specified existed not that it is LOGICALLY IMPOSSIBLE that a God so specified exists. [4, 5] It would seem this objection doesn't work. ========== Sources ========== [1] http://www.iep.utm.edu... [2] http://en.wikipedia.org... [3] http://plato.stanford.edu... [4] http://www.debate.org... 54] http://www.debate.org...