Abortion is always Morally Permissible

Thanks to Envisage. I apologize in advance for any formatting errors made due to C/Ping from word; I tried to correct them all, but I can't guarantee that there aren't any. I'll now rebut Pro's case.MORAL EGOISMPro takes the position that an action is moral if it maximizes conscious self-interest with intent. What this essentially means is that an action is morally permissible if it is uncoerced and in accordance with what we believe to be our self-interest. In the comments section, Pro has refused to specify whether his stance is one of psychological, ethical, or rational egoism. Yet, his own source indicates that: "[e]thical egoism claims that it is necessary and sufficient for an action to be morally right that it maximize one's self-interest." [1] Therefore, if we use Pro's own source, we can see that he is, in fact, arguing for ethical egoism. Furthermore, Pro never laid the groundwork for an absolutist psychologically egoistic stance in his case or in the comments, and so it seems that it is at least possible for someone to act immorally; if Pro wants to advance a hard psychologically egoistic position later, I will rebut it at that time. But, because the possibility of immoral action exists, it is still possible that someone will choose to abort their fetus in circumstances where that goes against their believed self-interest. That's all we really need to negate the resolution right now.But, now let's talk a bit more about ethical egoism and Pro's justification for it. Pro writes: "Moral egoism holds one, unparalleled advantage over any other ethical definition, and that is its moral facts, and moral values are identical...because what 'ought' to be the case is synonymous with what 'is' the case." He goes on to justify this assertion by saying that it is (a) incoherent for someone not to value their self-interest, and (b) in other moral systems, a party may not care about the value appealed to in that system.This is, essentially, one big is/ought fallacy. [2] Just because something is the case, does not mean it ought to be the case. Applied to Pro"s logic, just because we value X, doesn't mean we ought not to value Y instead. Moreover, Pro gives us no reason or justification as to why our self-interest is necessarily a moral criterion; he never explains why our self-interest necessarily is linked with morality. Without that connection, most of his moral claims are just bare assertions without sufficient warrant. Finally, one could also say that egoism gives us no means of resolving conflicts between interests, and is thus incomplete. For instance, it is equally in my self-interest to do A and to do B, but I cannot perform both A and B. Egoism gives us no way to decide between these actions, and so puts the actor in a moral limbo where they have no guidance on how to act.But, we can also rebut Pro's idea that it is incoherent not to value one"s self-interest. Recent genetic evidence hints that humans may have a genetic predisposition to altruism [3, 4], where "altruism" refers to "'a motivational state (where)' 'actions are meant to benefit another person' 'at a cost to themselves' '(that are) voluntarily done' 'and requires a group of two, at least'." [4] The presence of an altruistic gene means that it is possible for humans to feel motivation--to want--to act contrary to what they believe to be their self-interest. If this is true, then egoism does not successfully marry moral facts with moral values, and falls prey to the same criticisms Pro levels at other moral theories. In fact, this holds true if we can ever decide to act, want to act, contrary to what we believe to be our self-interest, even if this want isn't genetically ingrained.ABORTION AND SELF-INTERESTThe MotherPro makes the assumption that his first point is immune to "coercion-type rebuttals," as it is within the woman"s self-interest to submit to whoever is coercing her. The problem here is that this really isn"t an action done with intent, i.e. done voluntarily. The whole point of coercion is that it forces you to make a decision you would otherwise not have made, by limiting your pool of options such that you see few viable courses of action. The absence of meaningful alternative negates choice, and so the woman really isn"t acting voluntarily. If Pro asserts that she is acting voluntarily, then there can be no such thing as coercion because I will always have a choice of some kind. So, in fact, it is not immune to coercion-type rebuttals.Moreover, it is possible for someone to choose to act against their self-interest, so it is feasible that a mother chooses to abort even when she believes it will not maximize her self-interest.The FetusPro writes, "when we consider values, they must always be done from the perspective of beings capable of holding subjective values." By subjective values, I am going to assume that Pro is referring to subjective sensations--a rock, as Pro notes, cannot have intrinsic value in that it has no interests of its own. I disagree, however, with Pro's claim: "self-interest is necessarily predicated on being intelligent and aware." Firstly, this is just barely asserted. Secondly, we can reasonably discuss a baby's self-interest, a comatose person's self-interest, or a dog's self-interest, while simultaneously stipulating that none of the three is, in their current state, "intelligent." Why are awareness, consciousness, and intelligence necessary to have self-interest? All that I need to do is show that the fetus has some form of interest in order to show that an abortion violates that interest, and thus commits a moral wrong under Pro's own framework.We can reasonably say that a fetus has an interest in a FLO. Pro can agree that a normal person like himself or myself has an interest in our future--that"s why we make decisions designed to improve our future quality of life. It is also part of the reason why, more often than not, we say that death is not in our self-interest; our access to our future is prematurely cut off. Even if we say that death isn"t always wrong, we can agree that it is often against our self-interest. If that is the case, we can say that a fetus has an interest in not being aborted, because it will have lost access to its FLO and that this is true for some of the same reasons I have an interest in not being murdered.We can also justify or ground a fetus's interest in its ability to feel pain. "The majority of the scientific literature on the subject finds that the brain connections required to feel pain are not formed until at least 24 weeks." [5] Others argue that a fetus can feel pain at just 20 weeks. [6] Regardless of when this threshold arrives, it is significant that a fetus can feel pain at any point in time. Certainly much of our self-interest is rooted in our desire not to feel pain, and, hopefully, to feel pleasure. I do not touch a hot stove because I find the resultant pain a negative sensation. I do not fail to turn in assignments, because I believe an "A" will bring me happiness/pleasure. I, and most people, would describe such things as being in our self-interests. Consequently, I would argue that a fetus's ability to feel pain is sufficient to say a fetus has interests of its own, that abortion can be said to violate.Moreover, in some countries the fetus is recognized as a person or granted certain legal rights. In these countries, it can be said that the fetus has legal interests, in that it has rights, protections, statuses, or guarantees that can be denied or affirmed. So, when Pro writes, "it is impossible for abortion to positively or negatively fulfil [sic] [the fetus"s] self-interest," Pro is incorrect. It is possible for abortion to negatively fulfill the fetus"s interests by denying it a FLO, by causing it pain, and/or by violating its legal rights and protections.Moreover, I would just briefly note that abortion may be against the father's self-interest or the family's self-interest, and that Pro has failed to explore these possibilities. It is wholly conceivable that an abortion may violate these agents' self-interests.SocietyPro writes: "we need to consider, does society influence whether or not one will have the self-interest to abort. The answer, quite clearly, is no. It is precisely because of society that the option to consensually abort a child even exists, as such society is acting within its own self-interest when it facilitates the abortion of a child." Firstly, in my case I explain how abortion is not necessarily in the interests of society. If this is true, then, under an egoistic paradigm, a society ought not to facilitate abortions. Secondly, however, many societies have made abortion illegal, and, in so doing, they do directly "influence whether or not one will have the self-interest to abort."Pro writes next that, "one of the core values of society is autonomy of its citizens...Abortion simply isn"t one of those actions which impinges upon the self-interests of others within society in a direct way."Firstly, I have already explained how abortion does abridge the interests of a fetus. Secondly, not all societies place such a premium on autonomy, and instead prefer to emphasize collective or theocratic values. Abortion, if it isn"t net beneficial, may harm those collective values, and abortion is very clearly not in line with the values of many faiths.SOURCES1 - http://plato.stanford.edu...2 - http://en.wikipedia.org...3 - http://www.geneticliteracyproject.org...4 - http://www.ukessays.com...5 - http://www.motherjones.com...6 - http://www.mccl.org...Thanks. Over to Pro...