A human Soul exists

Argument from fungibilityMy first argument is split into 2 parts/syllogisms. The first syllogism is merely to establish a starting point and a line of reasoning; the second syllogism is the actual argument. First some definitions:Fungibility: Mutually interchangeable; [1] changeable with no intrinsic value lost or gained. Derivatively: Originating from, based on, or influenced by [2]Syllogism #1P1) All purely material objects are fungible. P2) No persons are fungible. P3) So, no persons are purely material objects. At first, this first syllogism seems cogent. For P1, say you changed every single atom of a watch, for identical atoms. It will perform the exact same function and look exactly the same as before. It will be identical both before and afterwards, with no intrinsic loss or gain of value. The same cannot be said of humans, however. If you clone or replace a human atom by atom, there will be something different; for one, there will not be the same experience, memory or nurture. Secondly, an intrinsic part of human experience is introspection, which will inevitably be different. We at least have a prima facie view that in the subjunctive scenario that there exists two human beings - one real and one cloned, that they are not mutually interchangeable, hence P2. However, there seems to be an inconsistency. For at least some material objects seem to be non-fungible - for example, the Mona Lisa, or Grandpa's old Bible, as even if you replaced such objects atom by atom, there would still be some sort of intrinsic quality missing - that is, the actual involvement of a famous artist (Da Vinci) or the actual reading of the Bible by Grandpa. However, the non-fungibility of such objects are in themselves derived from fungible processes - id est, the painting by Da Vinci, or the reading by Grandpa. But if you take away the external involvement - if you take away the derived qualities, you are simply left with a fungible object; if Grandpa never read the Bible, you would be left with a fungible book; if Da Vinci hadn't been involved in the Mona Lisa, you would be left with just a fungible painting. But if we take away external influences from humans, then we still appear to be non-fungible. Sans external, derived factors, it would be hard to admit, for thought experiment, that if some scientist were to take every individual atom from a person's body, then put each atom back together in the exact same place, that the resulting person would be the identical person as before. We have prima facie reasons for admitting this premise - it certainly appears to us that ceteris paribus, each person is both unique and irreplaceable. Perhaps part of this reasoning is because innate to a person is introspection, which don't appear to be fungible or replaceable even in the slightest; or, perhaps it is due to an intrinsic value we place in each individual human. Either way, we have reason to accept the notion that each person is non-derivatively non-fungible. So, we alter the argument. We take away the external influences, and the argument is valid. It will state as follows: Syllogism #2 (actual argument)P1) No purely material object is non-derivatively non-fungible. P2) Every person is non-derivatively non-fungible. P3) So, no person is a purely material object. Which is sound. Why this results in a SoulIf no person is a purely material entity, then it follows that there is a part of a person that is immaterial. If there exists a part of a person which is immaterial, then it is not then subject to material degeneration and as such, will exist forever. This is, in essence, a Soul. Modal ArgumentNow, we come to my second argument. It's called a modal argument simply because it concerns possibility, not because it uses modal logic. First, some definitions:'body':The physical structure, including the bones, flesh, and organs, of a person. [3]'epistemic possibility': true, for all we know; conceivably true. [4]P1) It is epistemically possible that a person could exist without their bodyP2) It is not epistemically possible that a person's body could exist without their bodyP3) Whatever is epistemically possible in is also logically possibleP4) Therefore, what is logically possible of a person is not logically possible of their body (from 1,2,3)P5) Therefore, a person and a body are not identical (from 4)C) Therefore, a person is not their body (from 5) [5], [7] Defense of P1 P1 seems to be cogent. I could conceive that my thoughts, introspection etc. could still possibly exist sans my physical body: for instance, in another sort of physical existence, or without a physical embodiment altogether. I see no reason to reject that. Plantinga illustrates this notion by citing 'The Metamorphosis' by Kafka, where a man wakes up to find he has the body of a huge insect. While this is obviously fictitious, it does at least show the coherency of the conceivability of existence without a human body. It doesn't appear that a human body is a necessary feature of human existence (though a general feature, but general doesn't equate to necessary). Defense of P2The second premise is evidentially true, by definition. If a body existed without a body, then nothing would exist - it simply isn't possible that a body could exist without a body. It is a self-contradiction. Defense of P3Essentially, the same reasoning is used in both epistemic possibility and logical possibility, for whatever is epistemically possible is logically possible, and vice versa. Whenever someone tries to establish logical possibility, they must conceive of the essence of the entity, and test it in accordance to logical laws. The same is with epistemic possibility - after all, we can't, by definition, conceive of something that is logically impossible, like a square circle. It simply isn't possible. Equally, if we could conceive something, assuming that we know of its essence, then it must be logically consistent - how else are we to conceive of something? Hart states that no example has been given such that: "one can imagine that p (and tell less imaginative folk a story that enables them to imagine that p) plus a good argument that it is impossible that p". [6] In other words, nothing that is epistemically possible can also be shown to be logically impossible. If we can imagine of an entity existing, then it entails that it doesn't do so in violation of any logical truths. Equally, we can't imagine of, say, a square circle, as it is a logical impossibility. There is a logical and deductive connection between the two possibilities. [7] Premises 4 and 5P4 and P5 both follow from the previous premises. If it is logically possible that a person could exist without their body, yet it isn't possible that a person's body could exist without a person's body, then it follows that a person and their body are not identical, in accordance to Leibniz' law, [8] which states that in two identical entities, a and b, whatever is true of a is also true of b. However, it then follows that a person and their body aren't identical, for there is a difference: namely, possibly exists when a person's body doesn't. The Conclusion should then follow; a person is not their body. Why this results in a Soul If I am not my body, then it follows that I either exist as another sort of external physical embodiment, or as an immaterial substance. However, my existence appears to be at a constant with my physical embodiment - yet I am also not my body. Therefore, there must be a coexisting, immaterial part to my being, which is not subject to physical degeneration, which is, in essence, my soul. ConclusionIn both the arguments, I have shown that each premise is more plausibly true than not. As a result, the arguments succeed and the resolution is upheld. Back to Con! Sources: [1] . http://www.oxforddictionaries.com...[2] . http://www.oxforddictionaries.com...[3] . http://www.oxforddictionaries.com...[4] . http://en.wikipedia.org...[5] . http://philpapers.org...[6] Hart (1994) p266[7] . http://plato.stanford.edu...[8] . http://www.oberlin.edu...