Resolved: The Ontological Argument is Sound

This is a terrible parody. The reason why a MGB under the definition I presented applies to all possible worlds is because a property of a MGB as defined is that the explanation for its existence, if it actually exists, is necessary rather than contingent existence. If you define a MGB as one that is most "tolerable" of spicy food then the premises would not follow from this definition. So by using this example, which is fallacious, and comparing it to the definition I gave, which does lead into the conclusion, you have proven that the definition to which I have appealed is sound. Necessary existence is existence in every logically possible world. Necessity is a property, existence is not. Then, FINALLY, you attempt to deny a premise of the actual argument. The arguments without the word "great" in them are NOT different arguments. They are the same exact arguments I gave in the first post. What you have not refuted is that the word "great" is meaningless since the argument functions by replacing it with "God" and O^3NE the same exact way. Thus, definitions like the ones you gave do not matter when determining the soundess of the argument. "I am currently thinking of a world in which necessary existence is not a property and which is inaccessible via other possible worlds" This shows your ignorance of the modal realm. In no possible world can necessity not be a property. This is true because anything that exists has an explanation of its existence. These explanations are of two sorts: (1) they exist by a necessity of their own nature or (2) they exist by an external cause (contingency). The property of necessity exists in every possible world. These are the two explanations of being. I will address your parodies by addressing the first. My objections will apply to all of them: On Maximal Horribleness: This is bad. "Maximally Horrible Being" just is to say that there exists a being that is omnimalevolent (this is what it means to be maximally horrible). But, Maximal Horribleness does not, in itself, warrant the application of omnipotence and omniscience. Thus, it is impossible for this being to have these properties as well as necessity since "Maximal Horribleness" only entails one of the properties you described: omnimalevolence. On the contrary, a MGB as defined as a "being than which none greater can be conceived (I stated this in round two)" necessarily must have omnipotence etc. since if it did not, one could conceive of a greater being. But a "maximally horrible being" does not have the same application since I can conceive of a Maximally Horrible Being not being omnipotent; that is, I can conceive of a being that is about to inflict horror, but this does not mean that it must have the ability to do all of that which is logically possible (omnipotence). In order to be a Maximally Horrible Being it does not need to be able to create the universe for example. So the argument fails because it actually contradicts omnipotence. Let me just say a word about irritating and competitive: these things are illogical. There cannot be a MG irritating or competitive being because such a being would necessarily have to rely on things to irritate and things to compete with (as you demonstrate). This, it is CONTINGENT on the existence of other things. Hence not necessary. Hence not applicable. So you have not given a successful parody. You then ask to defined Maximal Excellence in the Stanford definition. Ironically, they did that for you, once again. Maximal excellence is an entity which possesses: "omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect." What makes it MG is that it is necessary. "An omnibenevolent being would be just as benevolent if restricted to one possible world." But it could not be restricted to one possible world. It is a contradiction to say a necessary being (exists in all possible worlds) is "restricted to one possible world." "There is no way, at least that you have presented, to get from mindlessness + omnipotence to a contradiction, therefore implying mindedness. The non-conscious entity's omnipotence remains intact." This is hopelessly fallacious. You claim that minds cannot exist without brains. You have made an assertion, you have not given an argument. So I will attempt to anticipate since this is my last chance: all arguments for substance materialism are that we know of no minds that do not depend on the brain. Notice how this is specific to our experience and to homo sapiens. There are no logical inferences that allow one to say that because humans don't have embodied minds, that therefore they are impossible. You have to show that the concept is like a round square, and clearly it is not. Additionally, you are ONCE AGAIN, equivocating on omnipotence: Your claim is that an omnipotent being exists but it cannot be called God since it is not conscious. This is a contradiction. By definition omnipotence is a being's ability to do all things that are logically possible. But we know that consciousness is logically possible. Which means your being is not omnipotent since it does not have consciousness. Which means omnipotence is reliant on consciousness. An unconscious all powerful things cannot have consciousness hence not making it all powerful. You lose here. "A rock need not do anything if it chooses not to." This is just ABSURD. You beg the question here. "A rock need not do anything if it chooses not to." A rock cannot choose! Thus my argument still stands: an omnipotent being must be conscious since by definition it must be able to choose but choice is only possible with consciousness. REASONS TO VOTE FOR ME: 1.Definitions DO NOT matter in terms of taking one word out of MGB an defining it. Remember that I defined such a being as being omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent in every possible world AND as "a being than which none greater can be conceived." My opponent has tried to refute it by saying "great" can mean different things. This does not matter since the argument proves the definition I gave as a collective thing: MGB. Moreover, the word "great" is not needed in the argument: 1. It is possible that an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent and necessarily-existent (O^3NE) being exists. 2. If its possible that an O^3NE being exists, then an O^3NE exists in some possible world 3. If an O^3NE exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world 4. If an O^3NE exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world 5. If an O^3NE exists in the actual world, then it exists 6. Therefore, an O^3NE exists in the actual world 7. Therefore, an O^3NE exists This is the same exact argument as I originally offered. It proves the existence of the same exact being. The argument stands. 2.I proved that the use of individual definitions, which is what he is doing, is fallacious. He has yet to respond to this: "A definition of "GREAT" is "having unusual merit, very admirable." "Of noble character" Well, one of the dozens of definitions of this word encompasses the above. So if individual definitions matter, I guess being all-good is a part of "merit," "admiration" and "nobility." So in order for you to dispute this, you would have to attack even more words. This shows the absurdity in your tactics." 3.My opponent CONCEDED that a MGB exists. He just said it is not "conscious," but that it is omnipotent. This is the reason you should vote for me: he concedes an omnipotent being exists, but an omnipotent being MUST BE CONCIOUSS because if it is not then that necessarily means it cannot do something that can logically be done: perceive, think, choose etc. So my opponent tacitly concedes the entire debate.