Resolved: Economic sanctions ought not be used to achieve foreign policy objectives

My opponent states my value of morality is flawed simply because it is not the only link to the resolution; he puts forward efficiency as a superior value. However, in my turning of my opponent's value I showed that consequentialism achieves both morality AND efficiency as consequentialism is based off idea that the most "efficient" (meaning the resulting in the maximum prosperity/happiness) is in fact the most moral. My opponent then attacks my opponent of consequentialism by putting forth a car crash as an example where consequentialism cannot be applied correctly. However, look again to my definition of consequentialism. It can only be based off of the "forseeable consequences." In the case of the car crash, my opponent himself admitted it as unforseeable, so there is no discrepancy between consequentialism and morality in this case. Against my first contention my opponent asserts that the potential harm to human rights overcomes the benefits. However, the benefits provided by sanctions are simply too important to justify not using. A citizen of a country in the future would not want his city nuked because sanctions were not used in the past due to potential harms that simply pale in comparison. Nuclear war would kill far more people than any sanction; my opponent has not weighed this. My opponent's source does not state that sanctions were not effective in Libya, only that they were used in conjunction with US air power; thus, his analysis is faulty. On my next point, my opponent states that I have failed to prove sanctions prevent human rights violations because it was the threat of sanctions that worked, not sanctions themselves. However, threatening sanctions can only be effective if in fact sanctions are utilized. In order for the hammer to be taken seriously, it must be brought down every now and then. Thus we see that the cases were the threat of sanctions working should be put under the benefits of sanctions. Against my second contention, my opponent states that a pro-business could have worked in Burma. Besides the dubious fact that there was no practical evidence to back this up, only an assertion, there is a further problem: If diplomacy works - great. If war works - great. They don't all have to be bad to make sanctions the best choice in certain situations. For example, we would use a screwdriver to put in a nail; we would use a hammer. We wouldn't use a hammer to put in a screw; we would use a screwdriver. Each method of achieving foreign policy can be effective without making the others not effective. Each method has its use: in the case of sanctions I have shown that they prevent human rights violations, nuclear proliferation, and terrorism. These are not a few examples of moderate success; they are significant. The burden of proof showing that diplomacy/war is better than sanctions as a general principle lies on my opponent and has not been met. In response to subpoint B, my opponent states that sanctions will not work when placed upon Afghanistan or Iran. This may be true, but that does not make sanctions "futile." By trading with Afghanistan and Iran, all we do is help out an implacable enemy develop militarily. If we don't trade with Afghanistan and Iran, we keep such power out of their hands. Even if their policies remain unchanged, their ability to carry them out has been lowered. Thus any country we are at war with or could be at war with must be sanctioned. Using my opponent's definition of sanctions thus must be applied to countries we are at war with, despite his claims to the contrary. We stopped trading with Germany during WWII. This was a "government mandated limitiation and domestic penalty...on customary trade." Our goverment mandated the limitation on customary trade to penalize Germany. Finally, my opponent states the notion that sanctions minimize impact upon innocents is laughable. However, I've shown throughout my case that not sanctioning has clear ramifications on innocents. Allowing nuclear proliferation, terrorism, and totalitarianism is a far worse offense than causing starvation through sanctions. On to my opponent's case: If, as my opponent says, benevolence and efficiency are related to the impact on a national basis, then the situation I have presented still shows how the two values may be at odds with one another. I never stated that it was a cruel dictator - I stated that it was a leader hostile to the country carrying out the assassination. To the nation carrying out the assassination, it was an extremely efficient thing to do. To the rest of the world except the nation and its allies, it was not a benevolent action. My opponent's failure to specify the agent of action and the viewpoint from which benevolence and efficiency are judged allows for such contradictions. My opponent's defense of his first contention is based on the idea that targeted sanctions are not sanctions and thus humanitarian impact cannot be minimized; this will be addressed later. Furthermore, whether civilians are being endangered in war zones or throughout the country is not relevant to the overall point made. Whether 1000 civilians were killed in a bombing of a war zone or 1000 starved to death throughout the country is of no overall significance to either consequentialism or happiness/prosperity caused. On Serbia, my oppponent states that the sanctions were only "effective", not that they played a pivotal role. However, my source, the Peterson Institute for International Economics, judges this "effectiveness" with two factors: The result: "Index value of 1: Failed outcome Index value of 2: Unclear but possibly positive outcome Index value of 3: Positive outcome, meaning the sender's goals were partly realized Index value of 4: Successful outcome meaning that the sender's goals were largely or entirely realized Sanctions contribution Index value of 1: Net negative contribution to the outcome Index value of 2: Little or no contribution to the outcome Index value of 3: Substantial contribution to the outcome Index value of 4: Decisive contribution to the outcome The two elements are multiplied to obtain the success index, scaled from 1 to 16. A success score of 9 or higher is characterized as a successful outcome." The Serbian sanctions were classified a twelve, meaning that they had at very least a "substantial contribution to the outcome." On my attack on his third contention, my opponent simply states that "smart sanctions are indeed different than nomral ones; they are specially aimed in order to minimize extra damages." This, however, in no way disqualifies smart sanctions from counting as economic sanctions, "government mandated limitations and domestic penalties applied by one or more countries on customary trade or financial relations among nations."