Logical absolutes are dependent on god

IntroductionIn my opening speech, I detailed 7 criticisms of TAG and a counter argument (TANG). Unfortunately, Pro completely ignored 6 of my criticisms of TAG. Not only that, but his response to my attack on P1 and TANG argument is self-confessedly rushed and all too brief, and entirely unsatisfactory. In this round, I will respond to each of the points Pro makes, but I stress that he must address all of my arguments made in R1, otherwise TAG fails by default.Attacking P1Pro argues that my distinction between conceptual LA (the human process of logic) with existent LA (the consistency of existence) is “meaningless” because, even with this distinction and “without a human mind the square circle would not exist“. The problem here is that either Pro unwillingly concedes the point which my distinction aimed to show (that LA are not conceptual), by agreeing that they hold irrespective of human minds existing, or he begs the question by assuming God accounts for them conceptually. Either way, TAG unravels because of my distinction. Secondly, by distinguishing between conceptual LA (the human process of logic), and existent LA (the nature of existence), we can see that while cLA (logic) are conceptual, contingent upon persons (Aristotle and others), finite, and exist (as conceptions do), LA as the nature of existence (TAG’s LA, according to Pro) are not conceptual, transcendent, absolute, but do not “exist” in the relevant sense (see below). The purpose of the distinction was to show that Pro fallaciously conflates these, committing the fallacy of equivocation. His only denial of this is to deny that he was referring to cLA at all, and admit, through his square-circle and ball examples, that these things would conform to LA just as they would "without a human mind". Therefore, Pro's own words strongly suggest that existent LA (the referent of TAG) either are not conceptual, which is a denial of his conclusion, or he begs the question by assuming LA are conceptual because God accounts for them. Either way, my distinction highlights this dilemma, and so seems highly relevant in refuting TAG, as either option is fatal. This leads me to my final (and most important point) regarding P1 which Pro failed to respond to, which is the denial that LA “exist” at all. As I said, this is a categorical error. My position is that P1 (LA exist) is false, because, as I said in R1:“do logical laws "exist"? No. This is a categorical error, akin to asking what colour justice is, or what kind of fruit a triangle is. What the law of identity refers to is not something that exists, but the NATURE of existence, and all things that exist. LA are therefore not things which exist with a nature, but the nature of ALL things. In light of this, P1 makes no sense”All Pro does here is explicitly take this as a given, saying:“Logical absolutes are a given at this point”I honestly don’t think I could have made myself clearer in disagreeing here, spending 3 paragraphs entitled “Attacking P1”, only for Pro to surmise that P1 is somehow “a given”. I can’t stress the importance of this point enough. In light of this, Pro must a) respond to these 2 challenges to P1 AND b) provide some justification to accept P1, rather than somehow assuming that I accept a premise which I explicitly deny.Attacking P2A3 -P2 proves God does not existA4 - Highlights false dichotomy, which destroys the structure of TAG, as Pro presents it.No response. Extend all arguments.3 General criticisms of TAGA5 - Unjustified argumentationA6 - Fallacy of divisionA7 - The futility of TAGNo response. Extend all arguments.TANGHere, Pro denies that God conforms to LA to try and defeat TANG. Again, this response actually defeats TAG in 3 way. First, if God is not bound by LA, then LA are not absolute! Secondly, Pro throws logic under the bus, and hints at a logical relativism, saying:“My opponent is limiting it to one set of logic. What may be logical to you, does not mean god has to hold by it.”Who is he kidding here? Pro uses (or abuses) logic to try to show that atheism is untenable, yet when we have an argument to suggest God may be bound by LA, logic quickly becomes collateral damage. This is merely contrivance to save a bad argument, and it only seeks to weaken TAG yet again. Thirdly, Pro (while denying God is bound by LA) says that although the idea that God does exist and does not exist “ just doesn’t make any sense, it isn’t that he wouldn’t be capable.” Huh? Saying that God is outwith LA destroys any reference we can have to God. Given that Pro himself attributes several properties to God (transcendence, omnipotence, etc), clearly he has to think of God as being bound by LA. Does it really make sense to speak of an omnipotent, impotent being? No, because it is logically contradictory. Therefore, to attribute any qualities to God (rightly or wrongly), we simply have to assume that the law of identity and the law of non-contraction hold for God as well, in order to make sense of God at all, and if we do this, TANG shows that God simply can‘t account for LA, as He is as bound by LA as anything else is. Lastly, I didn’t claim that God could exist and not exist simultaneously, as Pro claims. Rather, I showed that accepting this nonsensical proposition brings the 3 problems above, while denying it admits God cannot account for LA, as He is bound by them.Yet again, Pro is caught in a dilemma, with either option burying TAG.ConclusionIn short, Pro’s inadequacy in responding to these points is only surpassed by his sheer lack of engagement with my criticisms of TAG (6 of which were entirely ignored), and my counterargument (TANG). His short and rushed post to supplement his unjustified and poorly argued TAG does not come anywhere close to showing that logical absolutes depend on God.Lastly, I ask that Pro actually answer my criticisms, rather than ignoring the vast majority of them. Given the huge mountain Pro has to climb in what remains, I wish him the best of luck.Questions1. Where does logic come from? I’ve actually answered this numerous times already. If you mean LA as the nature of existence, I don’t accept that it comes from anywhere, as it doesn’t “exist”, but is the nature of all things which do or could exist, rather than a thing that exists with a nature. Secondly, I think trying to account for LA is futile, and I answered this in my “Futility of TAG” section. But even if I were to drop these contentions, and accept the question on what I believe are faulty grounds, I’d simply say that they were necessary truths. There is no world in which x could be not x simultaneously, and this is shown by the denial of this as being self-contradictory.2. Name something that is neither physical or conceptualGod, if He exists, as I argued in my attack of P2. Essence would be something else which is neither physical or conceptual. I think there’s also a problem with defining physical, in light of contemporary physics as well (which is part of the reason I don’t hold to physicalism), but in any case, if any these options are even possible, P2 presents a false dichotomy, and TAG is refuted. If God is possible, P2 is false.Lastly, if we are eliminating possibilities this easy, I could make a similar compliant. I could ask Pro to name an agent which we know exists outside of time, or any mind which has no constituent, physical parts, other than the one in question. Any move that can be made here to save God could equally be made to LA, even if I don't believe for a moment that they are either physical or conceptual.My questions1. If God isn’t bound by LA, why does anything else (e.g. chairs) follow the laws of identity and contradiction?2. If God “does not hold to our standards of logic”, how on earth can you meaningfully identify specific properties of God, without assuming the laws of identity and non-contradiction hold?