It is probable that objective moral facts exist

Since much of what I have to say overlaps over various points, I have removed subheadings. It may be helpful to start with a very brief analysis of what objectivity is and what it entails, since much of my opponent's argument rests on a misunderstanding about the nature of objectivity. Peter Kreeft and Ron Tacelli give the following explanation:1. The word objective in the phrase "objective truth" does not refer to an unemotional, detached, or impersonal attitude. Truth is not an attitude. Truth is not how we know, truth is what we know.2. Objective does not mean "known by all" or believed by all." Even if everyone believes a lie, a lie is still a lie. "You don't find truth by counting noses."3. Objective does not mean "publically proved." An objective truth could be privately known -- for example, the location of a hidden treature. It could also be known without being proved; to know is one thing, to give good proofs or reasons for our knowledge is another.What objective means in "objective truth" is "independent of the knower and his consciousness." [1]Especially of interest are points (1) and (2). Con's arguments and corresponding rebuttals rest on a conflation between moral epistemology and moral ontology -- the order of knowing versus the order of being. Our moral concepts may vary, but this does not prove that moral facts are themselves not objective or that we cannot reliably grasp them. Indeed, our scientific concepts may vary, but obviously we do not draw the conclusion that there are no objective scientific facts. Con notes this, and writes in response that it is fallacious to say that "our intrinsic and inherent belief system is not influential upon objective facts whatsoever."But this simply repeats his mistake! Amidst the flowerly language of his rebuttal, is argument seems to be that moral facts are dependent upon our belief system. He writes that the "foundational concept of all epistemic normatives, or even ideologies for that matter, exists in the subjective context." However, this is simply an assertion that just begs the question in favor of relativism. Why should one believe that moral facts are dependent upon our subjective states of mind as opposed to the (more plausible) idea that they exist independent of our minds? Absent an argument, Con simply makes a question-begging assertion.It is crucial to note that our moral judgements to some extent influenced by our own subjective point of view, but this does absolutely nothing to prove that these judgements are not about objective facts of the matter. Indeed, our sensory judgements are to some extent influenced by our certain cognitive presuppositions, but this does nothing to prove that we cannot know objective facts about reality. So we see that despite his stern rebuttal, Con completely fails to defend himself against the charge that he has conflated epistemology with ontology. Arguing that moral ontology is dependent on moral epistemology is of no use, especially when this is just asserted without argument. Con needs to flesh out the nature of this dependence relation, since it is not at all clear that such a relationship even exists.Con argues that my position is filled with contradictions, yet this isn't evident. He writes, "To say that a moral principle or value is objective or as PRO states, ontologically sound is to question the very basis for moral semantics as well as the concept of morality. It undermines what the concept of morality is based upon, rather than achieving what he feels is an adequate refutation."First off, what does this even mean? I am tempted to dismiss this simply because it makes no sense, but in the spirit of charity he seems to be saying that since moral semantics are the ontological ground of morality, that morality cannot be objective since different people have different opinions on what moral terms mean.This begs so many questions that I don't even know where to start. First, Con simply assumes relativism by asserting that morality is based on moral semantics. But only someone who already accepted relativism would accept this. Con this argues in a circle. Second, to say that morality is based on moral semantics just shows that one does not understand either. Moral semantics deals with the meaning of moral terms, but this in turn presupposes that there is such a thing as morality. To base morality on moral semantics is thus to put the cart before the horse. He continues, "it would be rather absurd to ascertain that a moral value may be objective or factual in nature, for the inherent existence of such a value only exists in the minds for which we feel it holds certain value or importance." Like all of his other arguments, this flagrantly begs the question. The topic being debated is whether or not moral facts are objective. To assume that moral relativism is true as an argument that objectivism is false is simply circular reasoning. We want to know why "such a value only exists in the minds for which we feel it holds certain value or importance." Con simply assumes what he is trying to prove. His next argument too begs the question. He argues that to say that there are objective moral facts about epistemic normativity is inherently problematic because it violates the concepts of morality and normativity. But such an argument will only work if he assumes that morality and normativity are to be interpreted along relativist lines! Everywhere we look, Con's argument is tangled in a web of circularity. Perhaps the clearest example of the fallaciousness of his reasoning can be found in the following statement:"Morality in of itself is completely subjective, because of a basic principle: It only exists in the subjective context, and we choose to apply it to our actions."If that doesn't strike anyone as being a paradigm example of circular reasoning, then I don't know what does. Con's claim here amounts to "Morality is subjective because it is subjective." We see that Con hasn't actually given any argument against my position -- he has simply assumed his own as true to prove that it is true. So my point remains that Con must give an actual positive argument for his position.Throughout his rebuttal Con emphasizes that I have made "logically contradictory claims." Yet how my claims are contradictory are unclear, indeed Con just asserts them. Even if my claims are false, they're not "contradictory," and Con has yet to show us how they are (without begging the question in his own favor!). In reply to my claim that moral perception is like sensory perception, he simply dismisses it as "fallacious in its intrinsic construction and logically contradictory to even his own case." Yet it's unclear how it falls under any of this.He does make the point that by appealing to sensory perception as a parallel argument for the reliability of moral judgements (which support the conclusion that there probably are OMFs), that I somehow revert to his case. Yet this again fails to appreciate the difference between moral epistemology and moral ontology. The point of my parallel argument is to show that just as our perception of sensory phenomena justifies the existence of an external world, that our moral intuition justifies the existence of a realm of OMFs. To say that moral intuition justifies belief in OMFs is not to say that OMFs are somehow dependent on our moral intuition. Our knowledge of OMFs may be, but OMFs themselves are not. Con once again misunderstands this point.As we see, Con's rebuttal is a horrible mess of question-begging and circular reasoning.__________1. Peter Kreeft and Ronald K. Tacelli, Handbook of Christian Apologetics (Downers Grove, Ill: InterVarsity, 1994) 363-364