God more than likely does not exist

Thanks for your arguments, Pro! :)Cosmological ArgumentFirstly, I will show that the existence of dark matter does not refute P1.To recall, P1 stated that:'All physical entities have contingent existence'The only way that this premise could be refuted by the existence of dark matter is if dark matter is not shown to be contingent. I argue that dark matter is not exempt from having contingent existence. Besides, as contingent existence is the norm in terms of existence, if no conclusive evidence is presented either way then we ought to conclude (applying Occam's Razor) that dark matter is contingent, for contingent existence makes less assumptions than non-contingent existence.There are two principle candidates for dark matter (1):1. Weakly Interacting Massive Particles (WIMPs): Just after the Big Bang, countless particles and antiparticles were created and then annihilated, however, particles such as neutrinos are 'weakly-interacting' so they were not all annihilated. When the universe expanded, the residue from these annihilated neutrinos is, coincidentally, just the right mass to explain the disparity of mass that dark matter is posited for. (2)2. Axions - These particles are small, uncharged and relatively inert (3). These properties are consistent with the hypothetical properties of dark matter.WIMPs are contingent because they are formed from neutrinos - hence their existence is dependent on the prior existence of neutrinos. Therefore WIMPs have contingent existence and so, if dark matter is made up of WIMPs, the veracity of P1 is not refuted by the existence of dark matter.Axions were created abundantly after the Big Bang (4), so they are contingent on the prior existence of certain events proceding after the Big Bang.To summarise, dark matter does not refute P1 - the premise therefore stands.Pro goes on to commit the straw-man fallacy not once, but twice. Instead of refuting my arguments, he misconstrues my argument and instead refutes what he mistakenly thought I was originally arguing!Firstly, Pro appears to believe my argument uses something similar to the following logic:P: Everything in the universe is contingentC: Ergo, the universe is contingentBut I simply do not do this! My logic was as follows:P1: All physical entities are contingentP2: The universe is a physical entityC: The universe is contingentThis logic is categorically and irrefutably sound; there is no room for accusations of fallacy because the logic is entirely deductive. I am bemused why Pro believes I make the fallacy of composition, as such a fallacy requires a jump in logic - yet there is no such jump anywhere within the above argument!Secondly, Pro creates a giant straw man by presenting the Kalam Cosmological Argument and going on to refute it. I have no idea why he does this - it does not refute any of my points because I never use the Kalam Cosmological argument in the first place.One cannot refute argument A by presenting argument B and then only proceeding to refute argument B. If Pro's rebuttals do actually address my argument, then he should not have needed to bring another argument onto the scene.Ontological ArgumentPro questions why we cannot use a non-physical unicorn or other miscellaneous non-physical object, considering we use a non-physical person (in the form of God). The reason we cannot do this is because a person's ontology transcends their physical properties - the greatness of a person can be considered without considering their physical presence. In contrast, a unicorn, table or banana is ontologically bounded to its physical properties; a unicorn is only a unicorn if it has the form of a horse with a pointed horn - without such properties we would have no grounds to call it a unicorn. Thus a non-physical unicorn is tautological.Pro goes on to state that his argument that 'just because you can imagine something exists doesn't mean it does exist.' goes undisputed.The reason I did not deign to respond to it is because it is another straw-man fallacy. It is a gross oversimplification of the ontological argument to state that it is simply a matter of imagining something into existence.Finally, Pro disputes the premise that we can conceive of God. Yet this is quite an odd sentiment, as the very fact that we are debating God surely entails that we can conceive of him?Consider the definition of 'conceive':'to form a notion or idea of' (5)Note that this does not presuppose a complete idea of the very essence of God, all that is required is some notion or idea of God.Therefore, both my cosmological and ontological arguments remain sound. This is significant considering their veracity determines the veracity of many of Pro's arguments.Divine SilenceI can't help thinking that this argument can only be resolved once we agree that my above two arguments are sound. However, I doubt that Pro will do so. As of yet, this argument remains unsound because it depends on the false premise that my two arguments are false.Best Possible worldFirstly I would add that this argument continues to be unsound for the same reasons as the 'divine silence' argument is.Pro disputes my criticism that Sam Harris's quote commits the emotional fallacy. He instead invites me to look at the facts instead.Yet the problem with this is that the reason that one can move from the facts (statistics regarding infant mortality) to the conclusion (that this is not the best possible world), is if one appeals to emotion. This is because we have no logical basis for asserting the properties of the best possible world.Pro has two options, that we either do or we do not live in the best possible world. Without any prior evidence for or against God's existence, instances of infant mortality would inductively lead us to conclude that the latter is the case. However, we have got prior evidence for God's existence (my two arguments), so using Leibniz's syllogism we can use reason to conclude that it is actually the former that is the case.Moral ParalysisThere appears to be a misunderstanding of my rebuttal, I do not claim that 'that we need to have actual child rape to persevere the alleged greater good of the concept of child rape'. Let me reiterate in simpler terms:1. Free will is a greater good.2. The ability to rape a child is a consequence of free willErgo, the ability to rape a child is necessary for a greater good.This does not mean that we ought to not prevent child rape, but the existence of the intrinsic capability to commit such an act is necessary for the adequately compensating good (free will).Free Will DefenceAgain, Pro does not understand what free will actually entails. As I said before, free will is not a matter of:1. Person Y wishes X2. X occursOne actually has to have the ability to manifest their desires. So it is not free will for a child to simply wish not to be raped and the rape stops. No, free will is more like this:1. Person Y can do X or Z2. Y autonomously chooses to do X or ZSo to summarise, free will is only relevant to situations where a decision can be made. A rapist can decide to rape a child, but a child cannot decide to not be raped because the child does not the ability to actualise their desires.Free will & No Moral Evil?Pro continues this argument, but gives no reason how it could possibly work. He postulates that people could simply choose not to commit evil acts.The fault in this argument is this: for what reason would everyone choose to not commit evil?The only way that God could guarantee that everyone would choose good would be to somehow create them so they could not choose to do anything other than good. Yet this infringes free will.To conclude, both my arguments remain unrefuted, and, hence or otherwise, Pro's arguments are unsuccessful.(1) http://cdms.berkeley.edu...(2) Ibid.(3) http://en.wikipedia.org...(4) http://iopscience.iop.org...(5) http://dictionary.reference.com...