The categorical imperative vs. the principle of utility

I'll rebut first: 1) Firstly, can I judge rivalling moral systems? Yes, of course. I gave a coherent complete view of how to get moral truths. Moral statements are imperatives of how we want people to behave: in that sense, they are non-cognitive as they do not express propositions. Morality, then, exists not as statements which are true or false like deontology, but express imperatives or commands we want others to do, based on our desires. Everyone wants their desires to be fulfilled. As morality is imperatives, then morality is the fulfilment of desires: good is the net fulfilment of desire, or preference, while bad is the net unfulfilment of desire, or preference. I can easily judge whether an action is moral or not. I criticise other moral systems for simply being wrong. 2) My opponent's building criticism that it is unclear that people will reject a bad moral system is irrelevant. It is an is-ought fallacy. Yes, some people accept bad moral systems. People are not perfect - people will do the wrong thing. We are rational, but not perfectly rational. Indeed, if this is a valid criticism of my argument, it's valid for all arguments, as there is no majority opinion on what ethical system is right. My point is that, as my opponent points out, morality is preference. What promotes the general preference is good is good, what doesn't is bad. This makes genocide wrong, as it goes against general preference, not presupposed sacred rules appearing from nowhere. 3) My opponent criticises preference ethics by saying that it is individual valuations that is the measuring stick. This simply isn't true. I made the case clearly: everyone has different values, but there's a value underpinning each of these that is really being promoted: preference. We simply cannotnotwant our preferences: it is illogical. Proceding to promote preference, then, is the only logical conclusion. Preference Utilitarianism is the science of promoting net preference, which means any values which don't impede others. My opponent's argument in favour of discourse ethics makes no sense. Yes, in the medium of debate, we have to accept reason. If we accept this argument, we have to accept that we cannot discuss discourse ethics in the medium of debate, and is necessarily unwinnable. Moreover: http://www.debate.org... On more serious issues, outside of discourse, my opponent has to justify why we should accept it. Saying "It's a NECESSARY presupposed norm" isn't a defence: it's just saying "yes, it's an assumption, but you'vegotto assume it!" Notice the imperative: We must assume it. "Assume discourse ethics!" is an ethical statement, as it deals with ethics. But now, as I pointed out in the first round, we have a plurality of ethical systems, each with supposedly "necessary" assumptions on what is ethically right. What they have in common, and what I have pointed out we should value, ispreference. This incorporates discourse ethics into preference utilitarianism. This, then, is aturn. 4) My opponent is correct that the base motivation for action is desire. He then says this cannot be universalised. However, his problem is he subjectivises then objectivises preference with no lack of interest. If we remove the personal touch to the problem, it is instantly obvious: "I'm perfectly justified in presuming that preference is objectively valid and others' that contradict preference aren't." Preference is not "mine" or "yours", anymore than discourse is mine or yours: it is what ought to be promoted. 5) My opponent says I presuppose utilitarianism: this clearly is false. I put forth a large argument to how I reach my conclusion to specifically show how we can rationally conclude utilitarianism. My opponent conversely simply has presumed that discourse is valuable, and thus discourse[-based] ethics is true. The flaw is obvious: discourse ethics, unlike preference utilitarianism, has no basic foundation. This clearly then is aturn. Moreover, his premise, that we discuss ethics rationally, does not follow his conclusion: that we ought to value ethics. The fact of the matter is this entire format for discussing ethics can be flat out wrong. The justification is just a "nuh-uh!" which should not hold any weight. I urge my opponent to understand the distinction between a conclusion and an assumption when he criticises my case: I derive my conclusion from the brute fact that ethics is a group effort. If my opponent disputes this, then contend with it, or if he disputes the logical validity of my case, then by all means, it may be disputed. However, if the base premises are true, and the argument does not commit any logical jumps, then the conclusion of the principle of utility is necessary, far from being an assumption. To build my case: Discourse ethics is circular Outside of debate, there is no discourse to have discourse ethics. Discourse ethics is based on the idea that everything is discourse, but clearly this is not true. Yes, in debate, the discourse rules apply. However, in for example the trolley problem, there is no discourse to be had: the values of discourse are meaningless. When discussing these virtues with others, we should observe these rules because they create fruitful debate, but this is a hypothetical imperative, not a categorical one. We observe them as they promote good discussion, not for their own sake. The danger is one of conflation: when discussing what is the right thing to do, we must observe the ethics of discourse to have meaningful debate. However, these ethics only apply inside discourse. They are there because it makes debate easier to have and both sides benefit from it and consent to it: Indeed, discourse ethic's failure is the PU's triumph. We as debaters value discourse because we prefer to have rational discussion on issues rather than irrational spats. That is what makes us follow moral rules: our desire to have good discourse. Of course, though, we cannot apply our values outside of debating. Discourse ethics is self-contradictory In discourse, if we have anything over someone else which they cannot access, we coerce them outside the medium of debating, which is immoral (as via absurdum, everything becomes a coercion game). Thus, total egalitarianism is required with no ownership. However, if no one had the right to acquire and control anything except his own body then we would all cease to exist and the problem of the justification of normative statements simply would not exist.Its acceptance leads to contradictory positions on issues. Note both of these arguments are accepted as conclusions: one by Habermas, and the other by Hoppe. Of course, I can point out more contradictions here, as there are many, so my opponent's burden is to show that there is a coprehensive set of rules to follow, or a more clear-cut way of what the rules are rather than "if they contradict, then it is immoral". Discourse Ethics supports the principle of utility I already alluded to this, but to make it clear: the principle of utility can be derived from discourse ethics. My opponent already pointed out a principle of not killing as one of the derivations from discourse ethics. However, consider the trolley problem: you can either kill one man to save the lives of five, or let five men die to save the life of one. Kantian Ethics can say don't kill the man because it would be using him as an end. However, discourse ethics cannot similarly discriminate. Do we rationally kill one or kill five? Saying as both contradict discourse ethics they are both equally wrong is intuitively wrong: killing more people is immoral than killing one person. Thus, we have a principle of utility concluded as an addition to discourse ethics. With that, I'll pass the final round of debating to my opponent, and look forwards to a strong response. Thank you. [Also, @PRO, check comments]