Abortion is Prima Facie Morally Wrong

Of course, I still find both his a fortiori argument and his criteria for personhood to be deeply flawed so here we go: ==================== Potentiality ==================== Your explanation of the evolution of our response is accurate, but then your final conclusions seemingly betray your comprehension of our discussion. If we both agree that the potentiality for gaining a status (being an adult, becoming a person, etc. ) does not entail you to have that status, then fetus' ARE NOT PERSONS. You state that "the unborn DO have [Warren's psychological] characteristics, but that they are not immediately actualizable. " This makes no sense. If you possess a characteristic at the present moment, then you have actualized it - in the sense that you have a capacity for it. You're conclusions are merely a play with words, and upon a simple examination is falls flat on it's face. ==================== My opponent's criteria of personhood ==================== Since my opponent refers to his position as Thomistic hylomorphism, I will refer to it as TH. He creates a false dichotomy. He states that he argued for his position by showing it's the best explanation in comparison to Warren's view - sure, but this would only work if our views were the only one on the table. Obviously, there are many other positions that this debate hasn't examined, so to use this argument is foolish and fallacious. Then, he fails to develop TH in which case the only sensible conclusion we can derive from his position is that to be a person, you must be a human being. .. which upon further thought proves to be intuitively absurd. For example, according to your criteria if an alien species were to arrive on our planet, then we would consider them to NOT be person simply in virtue of them not being Homo Sapiens. However, if aliens were to arrive on planet Earth they would likely be much more intelligent and capable in comparison to humans. .. and yet you would have us treat them as if they were morally below us. It's more sensible to show that humans possess an essential characteristic for personhood that can be actualized in other forms of life instead of concluding on the exclusive fact of biological makeup. Secondly, his argument against my criteria is simply an equivocation of the word "I". The statement "I was once a fetus" can be either false or true, depending on how you conceive of "I". If you use it to refer to your physical body, then of course it would be correct (given the biology of human development). However, if you use it to refer to one's personal identity then it would incorrect to say so, given the psychological criteria. Lastly, he has given no response to my explanation of using Warren's criteria - using psychological facts is a much more suitable answer to the problem of personal identity, thus giving it justificatory foundation. ==================== Conclusion ==================== There are two other issues of interest to discuss, so I will respond to them here: The distinction you create between intrisic and extrinsic rights befuddles me, and I can't find any relevant source material on such a distinction. If you mean to make a distinction between legal and moral rights, then I see the merit. However, to say that moral rights are "intrinsic to all entities regardless of their time, place, or situation" smells of a deonotolgical nature to me - which itself is contentious given the scope of the norative ethical debate thus far. Lastly, yes late term fetus' can feel pain and thus under Warren they should be attributed rights (I noted this in the beginning, so this is not a concession). However, you seem to believe that fetus' are able to feel pain even in their second month, based on a flaw test conclusion. The inspiration for such a conclusion is inadequate, it's agreed that pain occurs only in the last trimester[1][2].