Cognitive meta ethical theory is valid

My rebbutals are as follows: Observation 1: I am confused as to where Pro got the impression that I disagreed with this observation. This is indeed the perameters of this debate. I would like to add, that I need only prove that any assertions upholding the validity of Cognitivism are erronous. Observation 2: Pro asserts that most humans behave in a way that assumes that ethical statements are propositions. However, no proof of such a claim has been presented. Not only that, but Pro continues on to make an argument from authority, where his evidence lies on the assumption that humanity's views on morality have an integrity that I must adress directly. I have absolutely no obligation to explain how we could make such a mistake. Observation 3: Actually, such is my entire stance, as defined in R1. Ethical statements don't have a meaning, because if they did, such a meaning could have truth values applied to it. However, the terms surrounding ethics (such as good, false, morally positive, morally negative, etcetera) are meaningless, and because of that, no truth values can be assigned. In order for a statement to be true or false, the terms surrounding the statement have to be defined. I could claim that no X is Y, but that statement is neither true or false until X and Y have meaning. 1a) I have provided evidence for P1, but seeing as the point has not been conveyed, I will issue some elaboration. I have, however mispoke in my contention. The idea of intrinsic values must exist, there does not neccesarily have to be a physical manifestation of it (as demonstrated by moral anti-realism). If values could only exist as extrinsic, then they would not exist as abtract ideas; a world full of extrinsic value would be a world where nothing holds value, and that's because if anything held value that would be intrinsic. Nothing could ever be said about value, as no contexts could ever hold value from a hypothetical standpoint. To say that value could exist is to say that intrinsic value could exist. The idea of existence demands a manisfestation that would demand intrinsic values. This really applies to anything. If we were talking about whether or not apples could exist if apples nothing was an apple, and that apples could be created, that would be ludacris. Apples can not be made if nothing can be an apple. 1b) A definition for meaning is required for this contention to be asserted. Not only that, but Pro never really explains why meaning has value at all. "Meaning is valuable because it gives value to life" in context, it would seem Pro is simply claiming that meaning has intrinsic value. This does not at all explain his reasons for making such an assertion. Pro has given absolutely no defense of the claim "Meaning has intrinsic value", and so this rebbutal should be disregarded until sucha defence has been presented. 1 c) This ignores my point by placing my thought process in the wrong places. Let's reconsider the statement: "You have an obligation not to decrease the happiness of others" If I am correct, this idea can not be proved true or false, as there is no such concept as a moral obligation. Let us consider the following statement: "You have an afrotion not to decrrease the happiness of others" This statement can not be false, and it can not be true, as "afrotion" does not refer to anything. 2a) Pro's point here is plainly false. You cannot assign truth value to a meaningless statement. Saying that colpoyt's cannot exist is not a false statement, and it is not a true statement. "Colpoyt" does not refer to any idea, but you can't say that nothing is a colpoyt, as there is nothing that can be said about colpoyts. If colpoyts did not exist, then that would be, to some extent, a defining factor of what it means to be a colpoyt. The idea of non-existence would be applied to colpoyts, rendering the statement: "All dogs are colpoyts" to be a meaningful statement in that it suggests that dogs are something that does not exist. We can treat undefined terms as variables. "All dogs are X" is not a false statement. We must know something about X before we can say that not all of dogs fit with that idea. I am saying that defining a sociopath's desires as good does not fit with the contectual ideas that relate to "good". I am stating that things that are not "good" can easily be desirable. I will provide the following example: "I desire for no other desires to be fufilled. " If no desires were fufilled besides this one, that would be "good" according to that definition. It would also clearly not be desirable, and that disqualifies it from being "good". My real point is, that this definiton is one that has no viable place in the terms of ethical discussion. Generally, quenching desires is an example of a good thing, and not a defining factor. 2b) Once again, this is the argument from authority. Plus, I have presented arguments. The first being a non-referential term, and the second being exempt from its place in ethics. We are currently discussing meta-ethics, which is where we are the people disagreeing on what good and bad are. I am not at all arguing that people have disagreements on the topic. I have no idea as to where Pro got such an idea. I am arguing that good and bad have no meaning, and Pro should be attempting to prove that they are meaningful enough to be true or false. 3)I have provided a substantial amount of reasons as to why this is false. To win this debate, Pro must give an account of ethical propositions. I must continue to prove why there cannot be ethical propositions. I do not need to find any accounts of ethical propostions, as any ethical propositions would prove the resolution. 4) I do agree that the resolution fails due to my argument, however responses to the Observation 3 do not require me giving any sort of meaning to ethical statements. i) "I wonder if lying is wrong" I can solve this easily. If we equate this to a statement with the same meaning, it becomes "I wonder if lying is colpoytesque". ii) Lets rephrase this, once again, using what I can only describe as synonyms: P1: If tormenting the cat is A, getting your little brother to do it is A. P2: Tormenting the cat is A. Ergo, getting your little brother to torment the cat is A. If P2 could be true, the ethical statements would be propositions. Considering that it can be neither true nor false, they are not propositions. What are they instead? Meaningless. . http://plato.stanford.edu...