The Existence of God is unlikely

Pro has offered a revised version of his previous argument (Which I take to be a concession). He argues that God's mind is complex in regards to the "steps that it took to process, store, create, and link together information." But as I have shown previously demonstrated, God's mental self is irreducibly simple. There is only one "part" which engages in the one activity of thinking -- the "I." There is nothing complex about an immaterial mind with only one "part" who engages in conscious activities. Additionally, in lieu of Pro's reformulated argument, how is complexity defined? Pro argues that it is possible that God would lack necessary existence, but this is not at all clear. Clearly, we know that necessary existence is a greater mode of being than contingent existence. Is it not greater to exist independently instead of being dependent on another being for your existence? Dependency indicates weakness and fragility by virtue of relying on another for existence, and thus the greatest possible being would not have the property of existing contingently. Thus, it is impossible for God not to be necessarily existent, the very concept of God entails it. In regards to the problem of evil, Pro maintains his argument that the skeptical theist's response is unparsimonious. Additionally, he also charges me with begging the question. On the condition that God exists, however, we would be perfectly warranted in assuming that God has morally sufficient reasons for permitting evil by virtue of his nature. That is, given what we know about God's nature on the condition that he exists, it is very likely that he does have morally sufficient reasons for permitting evil. In such a case, all things would not be equal. Thus, evil is not prima facie inconsistent with theism. I am not presupposing God's existence. Instead, I am arguing on the condition that if God were to exist, then he would likely have morally sufficient reasons for permitting evil, which is not question begging at all. So, in order for Pro to refute this argument, he must demonstrate that it is unlikely that God have morally sufficient reasons for permitting evil. Only then will evil render God's existence unlikely. Pro states that naturalism is the simpler and more probable explanation for evil. How is this? Naturalism denies that evil even exists! Prima facie, however, evil appears to be a very real phenomena which naturalism cannot explain. Thus, one can argue a fortiori that it is theism which gives the best explanation for evil: 1. If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist 2. Objective moral values exist 3. Therefore, God exists Pro argues that I have not demonstrated that theism is a superior explanation to basic phenomena that we observe. This is false, I have stated that since theism tends to affirm the reality of phenomena such as free will, objective morality, intrinsic value, real evil, and purpose to life, it is prima facie the more plausible view. It has a superior explanatory scope. =KCA= Pro argues that it is puzzling as to how the universe could have been caused if there was no moment prior to the first moment of the universe. He thinks that it is more reasonable to conclude that causation occurred within time. However, like his previous argument, this is a false dilemma. Why not suppose that the cause of the universe with simultaneous with the first moment of time, such that the first act marked the beginning of time? Though causation is indeed usually understood in a temporal sense, there is no problem in supposing that simultaneous causation is possible. Indeed, Kant provides us with the example of a bowling ball resting eternally on a cushion. Though Pro drops the ekpyrotic model, he states the point of his argument was to show that competing cosmologies are just as likely a the theistic explanation for the universe. This seems to be a rather weak response. Modern science strongly confirms the fact that the universe had an absolute beginning. From there, a relatively uncontroversial causal principle comes into play, thus requiring the universe to have been caused. It is thus not enough to simply state that other possible theories exist, Pro must demonstrate that they are plausible and should be accepted over the standard big bang model. =Quentin Smith's Big Bang Argument Against God= 1. Pro argues that because God is good, it would be very likely for him to create life. But on what grounds should I accept that assumption? Simply because something is good does not entail that God is likely to do it. God simply could have chosen to refrain from creating at all, or he simply could have chosen to create a world in which goods of another type were in abundance. 2. Pro argues that a perfectly rational being would create the universe with life-permitting properties. This seems to place anthropomorphic constraints on God, for why must we think of him as conforming to our standards of efficiency? Efficiency is only an issue when there is limited time and resources. In the case of God, he has neither. Writes Thomas V. Morris: "Efficiency is always relative to a goal or set of intentions. before you know where a person is efficient in what she is doing, you must know what it is she intends to be doing, what goals and values are governing the activity she is engaged in… In order to be able to derive the conclusion that if there is a God in charge of the world, he is grossly inefficient, one would have to know of all the relevant divine goals and values which would be operative in the creation and governance of a world such as ours." Furthermore, I previously pointed out two plausible reasons as to why God would want to be dynamically engaged with creation. These being to take delight in the splendor of creation and leaving in nature a general revelation of himself to which his creations could observe. [1] =Necessity & the LCA= Contrary to Pro, is it not ad-hoc at all to posit God as necessary. Necessity follows from the very concept of God, since it is better to exist independently instead of dependently (which indicates weakness). God, being the greatest possible being, must thus have this higher mode of being. In regards for the universe, there is no reason to posit it as necessary. Everything about it seem radically contingent, it undergoes change constantly. Indeed, I can conceive of the non-existence of the universe. In order to present an effective argument against the LCA, Pro must thus give good reasons for taking the universe to be necessarily existent, instead of pointing out a mere possibility. =Argument from Reason= Pro responds by stating that the human beings in his analogy simply "destroyed whatever did not suit their needs out of primitive anger and not in a conscious attempt to rationally design a better computer." It's not exactly clear how this helps his position. In his analogy, the computers are selected for their pragmatic value, not because they are rational, per se. So instead of helping his argument, this seems to make it even worse! Pro also uses the existence of computers as counter-examples. This is problematic for several reasons. Firstly, the computers were the product of rational humans who designed them. Pro's response that this "does not negate the fact that the reasoning of computers is arising from the workings of its material parts" is ineffectual, since in not an example of reason arising from a purely mechanistic chain of causes (Which is what is required on naturalism). Writes William Hasker: "Computers function as they do because they have been constructed by human being endowed with rational insight. A computer, in other words, is merely an extension of the rationality of its designers and users; it is no more an independent source of rational thought than a television set is an independent source of news and entertainment." [2]