The 'Problem of Evil' never succeeds (Attempt 1)

I hope that we can have this debate in the future, albeit with more rounds seeing as we have only delved into this issue halfway through, if not less. My opponent claims two distinct ideas here: he first claims that my evidential formulation of the problem of evil is actually a logical one, and further he claims that I have committed several fallacies in my argumentation. I will thus do the following in reply: first I will demonstrate his error in understanding my argument, then demonstrate that he has been quick to label my arguments with such fallacies. ==================== Accusation that my AE is in fact logical rather than evidential ==================== According to my opponent, "the nature of [my] first premise turns [my] PoE argument into a logical version. " He claims correctly, I would add, that God with the aforementioned attributes and gratuitous evil are are mutually exclusive. Indeed, for such a logical argument to be sound I must, as he has aptly pointed out, prove the truth of it. The problem is that he forgets to take heed of the inclusion of the term "probably. " My purpose isn't to demonstrate the certainty of this premise, rather I must show that it is PROBABLE that gratuitous evils PROBABLY exist. Yes, this sounds almost funny to argue for but when thought through it is coherent and sensible. Most theists and atheists will agree that it is NOT true that, by definition, God is incompatible with evil. God would not exclude all evil if He had morally sufficient reason for allowing some. However, what I am claiming is that the existence of evil, although logically consistent with the existence of God, counts against or lowers the probability of the truth of theism. The following paragraph from an article from the IEP (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy)[1] makes clear the distinction: "In evidential arguments, however, the evidence only probabilifies its conclusion, rather than conclusively verifying it. The probabilistic nature of such arguments manifests itself in the form of a premise to the effect that It is probably the case that some instance (or type, or amount, or pattern) of evil E is gratuitous. " This probability judgment usually rests on the claim that, even after careful reflection, we can see no good reason for God's permission of E. The inference from this claim to the judgment that there exists gratuitous evil is inductive in nature, and it is this inductive step that sets the evidential argument apart from the logical argument. " Take note of the last sentence - it is the INDUCTIVE MOVE that enables us to call this an evidential argument. ==================== Accusation that my AE is fallacious ==================== At the onset, he claims that I commit the argument from ignorance (and on a specific instance, the argument from personal incredulity). I'm afraid this only occurs if he had a blurry inspection of my arguments. Most fallacies have exceptions to their rule, or of course more conditions that are needed to fulfill such a error in reasoning. Allow me to explain: He accuses me of an argument from ignorance, but my reasoning was that if a baby's life was full of suffering then it is highly unlikely that there would be an amount of good in it's life that would overrule it before death. It is commonly stated by the theist that evils are commonly meant for a greater good, but what I am proposing is that there are many instances (starving kids in Africa, natural disasters, victims of unheard crimes, etc. ) that are highly improbable to do so. If this is so, then such an evil is GRATUITOUS. It is thus now my opponent's burden (as such a thing can shift) to show me otherwise. An argument from ignorance only works if I ASSUME a premise is true because it can't be proven wrong -- this was not so. I proposed the claim and then reasoned that victim of unheard crimes (who will benefit from them each time? ), victims of natural disasters (do we need that many people to die, and if so what good does it do? ), etc. demonstrate that such evils are unnecessary. For my opponent to overrule this, he must demonstrate that a greater balance of good can be achieved from such instances. It is my argument that under his theological framework, he is unequipped to do this. On a separate instance, he also claims that I am committing the argument from personal incredulity, which is the fallacy of asserting that a proposition must be wrong because he or she is incapable of accepting that it may be true. It's a very common version of the argument from ignorance. Is he right though? He reminds us that "being unable to imagine or conceieve of something does not constitute as evidence for (or against) anything," which is true. .. under another condition - that such a premise has no evidence for against it. He should remember that it is not only possible but COMMON for academic philosophers to argue that the inconceivability of X leads to the falsehood some other claim (philosophical zombies, modal argument for dualism, etc. ). My argument escapes the fallacy as well - for it proposes a claim and a reason behind it demonstrating that it's probably true. If there is an instance of evil that I have shown likely to be gratuitous, then it is my opponent's burden to demonstrate that this false. If he is empty of any reasoning, then I will have succeeded in showing such an instance to be evidence against the existence of God. IN LIGHT OF MY REASONING, the burden of proof shifts unto my opponent. ==================== Conclusion ==================== My opponent misunderstands my argument for what it's worth - it is an evidential argument precisely because of the inductive move it employs. Further, his fallacy labels fall apart seeing as my argument is not as simple as he presents them to be; many fallacies are inappropriately applied given certain conditions in one's argument. The inability to conceive CAN count as evidence is such a premise is set up correctly - this is shown to be a conventional issue in philosophical issues of the mind. ---References--- 1. . http://www.iep.utm.edu...