The Kalām Cosmolgical Argument attempts to prove very little.

It's always appropriate to question responsiveness. Readers will decide if Con has addressed the whole chain of logic needed to get from the KCA to issues of importance. Morality is important; the God question alone is not I derived step-by-step that God is only important to morality if God exists, is concerned about humans, imposes a moral code, communicates a moral code, and the moral code is understood unambiguously. Buddhists recognize this situation and consider the question of the existence of God irrelevant. They instead consider the questions of morality directly. Deists believe in the existence of God, but that God does not reveal a moral code so it must be derived from observation. Christians, Muslims, Jews, Hindus, and others agrees that a moral code is mandated by a God, but do not agree what the moral code is. Many atheists reject the existence of God, but derive a moral code by observation of human nature. Religions generally agree on some important moral principles, but Buddhists, Deists and non-believers agree on those points as well. The sole fact of the existence of God does not settle moral questions, but moral questions are what is important. If the KCA were settled, and additionally it were proved that the first cause is a god, Virtually no one would change their moral behavior as a consequence. I do not understand Con's rebuttal. He says, “the proposition only works if God is already proven not to exist.” Not only is it possible to consider that question of the importance of the existence of god to morality without presupposing the existence of God, I cited many who have done in a very serious way. A KCA first cause might be natural I referenced modern theories of multiverse in which temporal universes are “bubbles” within the multiverse. While the multiverse has temporal universes within, they appear in a space that does not have time. Con incorrectly argues that because some of the multiverse has time, all of it has time. Physicists Hawkins and Mikaku contradict Con's unsupported claim. Modern physicists accept that anything that can be described by equations can exist, provided it agrees with observations. Con makes an argument from incredulity, that a multiverse without time cannot be imagined and therefore cannot exist. However, Con also argues that God can exist outside of time and even can have thoughts and plans without the temporal sequence we ordinarily believe inherent in a thought process. So Con finds a God that exists outside of time acceptable, but a multiverse that exists outside of time is claimed inconceivable. Note that God's universe has a temporal part forming our universe, but God is allowed to keep our universe distinct while the multiverse is not. If the same standards of credulity are applied, God cannot exist either. Modern cosmology seems to support the universe beginning with an uncaused cause, but a natural one. The Kalam god is amoral Con says I “prematurely acceptthat morality is an independent subject from God.” There is no doubt that in practice morality is independent, because believers do not agree on morality. Deist, Buddhists, and naturist atheist derive morality from human nature. Those who believe in revelation accept the moral code as an act of faith, no as a matter of dependence from the KCA. A god that causes the existence of a temporal universe has no properties other than than needed to cause existence. Con asserts that a god that causes existence must be a “mind.” If so, the mind need not do anything but think of causing existence. The god need not be concerned with morality or human affairs, nor have powers other than being a first cause. So even if Con is correct, it has no relevance beyond what a purely natural first cause implies. Arguments from incredulity Con claims that arguments from incredulity can be valid. He says, “It's not that I personally find the idea too wacky to be believable. I can't even think it if I wanted to.” That is a fundamental mistake. I cannot even think of a God that personally controls every particle in the universe; the bandwidth alone is inconceivable. Yet I grant my inability to think of it proves nothing. I pointed to the speed of light being an absolute limit. Can one even think of that? All of ordinary experience tells us that no matter how fast we go, we can always go faster. That we cannot go faster is incredible. Physics is resplendent with such inconceivable facts, ranging from wave-particle duality to vacuum energy. Yet they are proven true, despite our inability to conceive of them. What science does is ignore whether things are conceivable to us or not. Scientists write equations and see if nature conforms to the equations. If the equations work, our ability to conceive of the mechanism is irrelevant. What makes something impossible is contradiction with observation, and nothing else. Con argues that time extending into an infinite past is impossible. If the equations work and the implication agree with observation, then it is possible. Nothing else counts. Actually, to my understanding is that modern theory is that time starts and stops in universes that appear in the multiverse that exists outside of time. Time start and stopping is no more conceivable than time being infinite. Con says, “Therefore, even if the multiverse is the cause of this universe, it must itself have a beginning.” No, because beginnings are phenomena of time, and the multiverse exists outside of time. Con has no problem conceiving of God living outside of time, without a beginning. The multiverse is the same in that respect, but the multiverse is simpler. Spaceless. Con is wrong in his claim that only abstractions can exist outside of time. Physical theory is developed to the contrary. Changeless. Con again errs in asserting that because a multiverse has a time dimension, that all of it must exist in time. That is like saying that if a house has glass, all of it must be made of glass. Immaterial. “Being” in the from of the multiverse is postulated to exist a level above matter and time. Personal. Con does not explain how a mind can exist independent of time, unless there is a higher space than time. He asserts that for God. That may also be the case for the multiverse. The KCA has very little effect on naturalism Con argues that he cannot even think that a first cause could be a natural cause, but scientists have no trouble with conceiving of a natural first cause. Whether current multiverse theory is true or not, the concepts that allow a natural first cause are already in play. Scientists have not ruled it out based upon arguments of it being inconceivable. If the KCA is proved, then the naturalists will accept that a first cause is likely a natural cause. Let's suppose the KCA is somehow also proved to imply a creator god. Naturalists would become Deists, but none of their moral beliefs are likely to change. Deist Jefferson wrote “We hold these truths to be self-evident ...” That is exactly what a naturalist has always maintained. Proof of a divine first cause does not even go as far as Deism, because Deists further assumed a God that would return in judgment. Those are additional needed proofs. KCA makes no difference to people who always believed, and it makes no difference to those who always found morality in human nature. The KCA makes resurrection little more plausible than without it. I gave many ways the story of resurrection might be plausibly explained, all much more probable than a religious miracle. Con did not deny any of the alternatives, so the KCA does not advance the plausibility. All of the alternative are so much more probable, that skeptics would not be impressed. Many religions recount miraculous events, so would proving the KCA put all miracles on solid ground? I think it would advance none. No one's beliefs are upset by the KCA. It proves very little. The resolution is affirmed.