Persons do not possess temporal parts.

========== Intro ========== Thanks to Vi_Veri for agreeing to debate this with me. I look forward to this being a learning experience. In the following round I will present the "too many thinkers" argument against the doctrine that persons possess temporal parts. I am inspired by arguments from Dean Zimmerman, [1] and Jim Stone. [2] ========== Am I PCP-present or PCP? ========== Assume that I have temporal parts for the following thought experiment: Let's designate a temporal part/stage of me; call it PCP-present (where "present" designates this exact moment in time). PCP-present isn't me, however, because according to temporal parts metaphysicians I perdure over time and I, PCP, am just an aggregate of all my temporal parts. I have temporal parts that go way back further then PCP-present; in fact I have perdured for 22 some odd years. So, obviously, I, PCP, cannot be PCP-present. PCP-present is just the part of me that is extended over some specific time period called the present. Think about this, though - PCP-present is quite literally indistinguishable from me, PCP. PCP-present has all the same physical qualities, is thinking all the same thoughts, and feeling all the same emotions that I am yet he is not me. He is feeling happy that he gets to debate Vi_Veri just like I am. He is thinking that is going to be a tough debate just like I am. His stomach is full from just eating dinner just like mines is. There is a dull ache in his feet just like mines are. He's thinking "Man, I want to go play basketball and then play some Mass Effect 2" just like I am. He's thinking that he better hurry up and finish this debate round soon before time runs out just like I am. His brain chemistry is the exact same as mine. He somehow has my own exact DNA code as well! I think everybody gets the picture by now. Somehow, PCP-present has every single quality in common with me in the present moment yet we are different. That means there are two different thinkers thinking all my thoughts, feeling all my feelings and looks and acts exactly as I do in this very moment. If we are indistinguishable in this sense then how do I know which one I am? Am I PCP-present or PCP? If I, PCP, think "I am a person" I think this thought truly. If PCP-present thinks the thought "I am person" he thinks it falsely because PCP-present is not a person; he's just a mere temporal part of a person. How can this be? We are both thinking the very same thought at the very same time with nothing to distinguish us yet PCP-present thinks the thought mistakenly and I, PCP, think it correctly. If this is the case how can it be that I can even tell the difference between me, PCP, and PCP-present? How do I know which one I am? Maybe "I" am actually PCP-present? I don't know - there's no way to tell. So, even if I was PCP-present I'd still think I was actually the person PCP because that is what PCP thinks. That seems like the height of delusion on PCP-present's part to actually think he is a person when he really isn't...but, if you think on it, if PCP-present has all the same properties as I do in this very moment then wouldn't that make him a person as well? So, wait, are there really two distinct, different people sitting here who share all their properties in common? This is the "too many thinkers" argument against persons possessing temporal parts. There are too many thinkers here to make sense of and try to fit into a coherent framework. If you add the above considerations with these two very plausible assumptions: 1) I can differentiate myself from other thinkers. 2) Other persons have the same ontological status as I do (meaning other persons aren't fundamentally different than I am; they share the same nature with me that makes them count as a "person"). We now have good reasons to reject the thesis that persons possess temporal parts. I look forward to Vi_Veri and Vi_Veri-present's next round! ;) ======== Sources ======== [1] http://fas-philosophy.rutgers.edu... [2] http://philpapers.org...