Naturalism and evolution cannot sensibly both be believed.

Thank you Con."Evolution can select the trait of accurately understanding the world because beliefs are proportional to actions."There seems to be misunderstanding here. The concern is not whether or not beliefs are proportional to actions, it is whether the beliefs are objectively true or not. So, to use the example given by Con: Say a person is worried about being attacked by a tiger, in order for him to have the instinct to run away, he must have some other instinct that understands why a tiger is deadly."Con is correct in stating that the belief (or perhaps the neuron signals from the brain, on naturalism) is what causes this individual to run away in order to avoid the tiger attack. However, this is not the point. Evolution is selective of beliefs that produce adaptive behavior, but evolution does not care whether or not these behavior-producing beliefs are objectively true or not. The individual in this case doesn't need to know that the tiger is dangerous. The individual might even believe that the tiger is friendly, but so long as this belief produces the behavior of running away, it matters not whether the content of the belief is true. The only thing that matters (with regard to evolution) is that the behavior of running away is produced. Evolution is not concerned with whether or not the belief that produces this behavior has any truth content."A false belief that is safe in one situation isn’t safe in all situations."Again, whether the belief is false or not is irrelevant so long as the false (or true) belief produces "safe" behavior. "While the system isn’t perfect, it is enough to trust our cognitive abilities to a reasonable degree and not the the extent that Pro wishes to demonstrate."With the extremely low mathematical probability of our cognitive abilities being reliable given that evolution does not select for true beliefs, but rather behavior-producing beliefs, I do not think it is enough to trust our cognitive faculties on naturalism."the EAAN only applies to evolutionary naturalists who subscribe to Cartesian-esque theories of the mind. Only those theories that claim one can only observe your inner subjective mind would apply. Those theories that claim you are really seeing the world can still be sensibly believed"Whether one endorses a Cartesian-esque theory or a pragmatic one, these theories are independent of whether the beliefs are true or not. This seems to be an attempt to avoid rationalizing the issue. It is circular logic to argue that because one holds, say, a pragmatic theory of truth, that person is thereby absolved from an issue that cannot be solved through practical investigation. It does not matter whether one claims that they can only observe their inner subjective mind or they claim that truth is found only through inquiry when the question at hand takes issue with whether or not the very idea of inquiry itself can be trusted, given what we know about naturalism and the theory of evolution. Thomas Reid [1] summarizes this point:"If a man's honesty were called into question, it would be ridiculous to refer to the man's own word, whether he be honest or not. The same absurdity there is in attempting to prove, by any kind of reasoning, probable or demonstrative, that our reason is not fallacious, since the very point in question is, whether reasoning may be trusted." "This entails that if our world is the antithesis and if one came to the conclusion that the EAAN is false, their cognitive faculties would be reliable and the belief would be reliable. If one’s beliefs are usually reliable and if the antithesis holds, then it is likely that the EAAN is false. So if the EAAN is likely true, then the EAAN is likely false."Con has seemingly looked over a crucial point in the argument here. Con attempts to argue that if it were true that we could not trust our cognitive faculties, then the argument itself (if our cognitive faculties brought us to the conclusion that it was sound) would then have to be false. However, the argument hinges on whether or not naturalism holds true. So, if one believes naturalism, then the argument gives a defeater for the cognitive faculties that produce the belief in naturalism, and therefore a defeater for naturalism. However, if one does not affirm naturalism, then the argument is irrelevant, as our "beliefs" would no longer be considered purely material. 1) The probability that our cognitive faculties are reliable given both naturalism and evolution is low.2) Anyone who affirms both naturalism and evolution and sees that the probability that our cognitive faculties are reliable given both naturalism and evolution has a defeater for the reliability of their cognitive faculties.3) Anyone who has a defeater for their cognitive faculties has a defeater for any belief he thinks he has (this would include the beliefs regarding naturalism and evolution.)4) Anyone who affirms naturalism and evolution has a defeater for naturalism and evolution.5) Therefore, the belief in both naturalism and evolution is self-defeating and cannot sensibly be accepted.It seems to me that Con has given no defeater for the argument. In premise 1, we see that the mathematical probability of our cognitive faculties being reliable, given the 50% chance of truth multiplied by the number of beliefs we hold, is very low. In premise 2, we see that the one who affirms naturalism and evolution both to be true is given a defeater for the reliability of their cognitive faculties. In premise 3, we see that this in turn produces a defeater for any belief one who affirms both naturalism and evolution thinks he has. In premise 4, we see that this defeater goes to knock down the belief that naturalism and evolution are both true. The conclusion, then, that belief in both naturalism and evolution is self defeating and cannot sensibly be accepted, holds true for now.Sources:http://www.calvin.edu...