The Ontological Argument For God's Existence Is Sound

IntroductionPro says that he is going to outline reasons as to why is it more probable that God is possible, over any of my plugs for p. First of all, I would like to qualify the different types of possibility, and the possibility relevant to this debate:(i) Epistemic Possibility[1](ii) Subjunctive Possibility (Modal Possibility)[2]To say something is epistemically possible is to say that it may be true. It might even be subjunctively impossible; we just do not know. This is how most people use the word. However, to say that something like a maximally great being for example, is subjunctively possible (which the Modal Ontological Argument necessitates) is to say that a maximally great being is definitely not impossible. Or, more precisely; it is not possible for it to be subjunctively impossible that a maximally great being exists. That is a basic modal inference. This means that even if Pro shows that God being possible is more probable for any of my plugs for p, he still hasn't met his burden of proof on the first premise. To meet the burden of proof on the first premise, Pro must show that any plugs which would make God impossible, are impossible (not merely improbable). Thus, my plugs for p (assuming they would make God impossible if possible) must be shown to be impossible. After all, the first premise doesn't say that it is more probably true than not that God is possible, it states as a matter of fact that God is indeed possible. In any event, I will examine Pro's two arguments and see if they even raise the chance of God being possible, I will also address Pro's claims that my plugs for p really wouldn't make God impossible in the first place.The Cosmological ArgumentPremise 1: Everything That Begins To Exist Has A CausePro claims that we know this due to science and immediate experience. The problem with this is that science only assumes causality at the macroscopic scale and assuming classical mechanics, and all of our immediate experience is at the macroscopic scale. At the sub-atomic scale though, quantum mechanics (not classical mechanics) rules. It is commonly held by physicists that quantum mechanics does radical damage to causality:"Quantum events have a way of just happening, without any cause, as when a radioactive atom decays at a randomtime." - Taner Edis. Department of Physics Truman State University Kirksville[3]"Uncaused, random quantum fluctuations in a flat, empty, featureless spacetime can produce local regions with positive or negative curvature" - Victor Stenger. American Particle Physics[4]"As a result of the tunnelling event, a finite-sized universe, filled with a false vacuum, pops out of nowhere ("nucleates") and immediately starts to inflate...Remarkably, the answer is that no cause is required." - Alexander Vilenkin.Director, Institute of Cosmology, and. L. and J. Bernstein Professor of Evolutionary Science[5]So, I clearly disproved the notion that any reasonable person would accept the first premise, as I cited plenty of reasonable and respected people in their field who find it false. Causality is also not a scientific principle, if it was, the then scientists I quoted wouldn't be rejecting it. Either way, Pro must show why the common view in science that causality doesn't always hold at the sub-atomic scale is wrong, as he has the burden of proof in the debate. Premise 2: The Universe Began To ExistWe know scientifically that the universe had some type of beginning, but not that it came into being, or "began to exist".Conclusion: The Universe Has A CauseThis as not been established.Must The Cause Be A Maximally Great Being?Pro says that the cause must be timeless, changeless, and immaterial. The issue is that this means the cause cannot be a mind, because a mind would have to think. Thinking by definition is a process, and a process is an event (which requires time). Thus, the idea of a "timeless mind" is incoherent. Also, Pro hasn't shown why only a mind and an abstract object can be the only two options.The kicker is that even if we grant the Cosmological Argument, it does not help Pro's case. If a mind created the universe, the mind might not be omnipotent, omniscient, or omnibenevolent. Maybe the mind that created the universe was evil (which would mean it is not maximally great at all!). Pro must show why this mind would raise the probability of a maximally great being; he has not done so, and just presupposed it.The Fine-Tuning ArgumentIf there enough universes, then the odds of a universe with the specific qualities we have become quite high. Pro hasn't even shown that one God is more likely than multiple universes (sometimes, even one of something adheres to Occam's Razor more than multiple objects). Even if an intelligence fine-tuned the universe, how do we know this being is maximally great? Maybe it could have only fine-tuned the universe 6 ways, while a maximally great being could have fine-tuned many more universes.Do My Plugs, If Possible, Show God Impossible?"Omnipotence is not actualized in the actual world"Pro argues exactly what I argue without even knowing it. He states:"[W]ere a maximally great being to exist, it is not possible for omnipotence to not be actualized in the actual world."I agree with the above, which is why if omnipotence not being actualized in the actual world was possible, a maximally great being could not exist! Thus, he basically proves my point that this plug would make God impossible. He hasn't shown however, why we should believe a maximally great being is possible, over the idea that omnipotence is not actualized in the actual world. He just begs the question. "All Sentience Is Physically Realized"By physically realized, I mean dependent on the physical realm. Pro admits that God wouldn't be dependent on the physical realm (if God existed, then it would be impossible for all sentience to be physically realized). So, if it was possible for all sentience to be physically realized, then God couldn't exist, because if he did, then in every possible world it would be false that all sentience is physically realized. Thus, this plug, if possible, clearly makes God impossible."Gratuitous Suffering Exists"If there existed a morally perfect being, then all suffering would be for a benevolent reason, which means it wouldn't be gratuitous by definition. It would hold necessarily that there exists no gratuitous suffering. Thus, this plug would definitely make God impossible. ConclusionPro commits straw-man argument below:"Any 'plug' that implies that it is possible that a maximally great being cannot do something (as my opponent has suggested) is self-contradictory and therefore invalid as an argument."This above is logically fallacious, as the plugs show God cannot exist; not that he cannot do something. Also, God would actually have to exist for us to expect that there was nothing he cannot do in reality, but this presupposes that God is possible (which is what Pro is trying to prove in the first place). Thus, this is simply begging the question. He also states that I have to disprove the first premise. This is a fallacious shifting the burden of proof. Pro has to show his argument is true, I do not need to show it false (the rules clearly state that I only have to undermine the argument).None of Pro's support for the Ontological Argument goes through. They were all based on false premises, or logically fallacious argumentation. I mentioned possibilities which make God impossible, which sufficiently undermines the argument until Pro can show them impossible without beginning the question, and assuming God is possible already. Sources[1] https://en.wikipedia.org...[2] http://en.wikipedia.org...[3] http://atheism.about.com...[4] http://www.infidels.org...[5] Alexander Vilenkin: "Many worlds in one: The search for other universes" (P. 181)