Epistemic Justification is possible

Sincerest apologies for missing the last round. Life does happen (in fact I really don’t have time to be doing this even now but what the hell). Let’s begin by addressing some of Con’s ancillary arguments: Liar’s Paradox Con’s argument and, really, all forms of the liar’s paradox fail once we recognize the monumental presumption P3 makes when it asserts that “this proposition is false” is a proposition. We simply reject the claim that “this proposition is false” is a proposition and, thus, disarm the argument. Note, the onus is on Con to show that the liar’s statement is a proposition (as he is the one who is asserting it is). Also, note that the property ‘is a proposition’ need not be the same in all Languages (we more accurately mean Model). For this reason we can deny each attempt Con makes at supplying another liar’s statement in a case by case fashion, whilst keeping intact the other features of our Language (Model). Therefore, any attempt Con makes can be refuted by simply denying the instantiated liar’s statement the property of being a proposition. Con will predictably rebut with some “different” and “better” formulation (Liar’s Revenge for example) of the liar’s statement. One formulation “This statement is either false or not a proposition” fails since if we hold that it isn’t a proposition, then it really is not a proposition. In other words, it fails to assert that it is not a proposition since, not being a proposition, it proposes as much as the string of characters “abc7789” - nothing. In fact, so long as the liar’s statements are not propositions (which we can assert quite arbitrarily) we avert the purported paradox. If Con presses this, we can get on this merry-go-round but, unless we are presented with an especially taxing formulation by Con, I entrust any prospective reader to apply our stated approach to show that Con’s argument fails. P3 also suffers from ambiguity. Con fails to indicate what “This statement” refers to in “This statement is false”. Should he try to elucidate this point in a predicable way, we continue iterating our question and find that Con will be unable to remove this ambiguity. Observe that different interpretations of “This statement” yield different meanings. By reasoning we shall reveal should a need arise, it follows that changing the name of a statement can change its meaning. Munchhuassen’s Trilemma (MT) I’ll preface my arguments by summarizing our original position. I’ll then move on to novel and, as of yet, undiscussed arguments. Our original position was to show that so long as MT maintains a defensible interpretation (more on this later), it fails to present a problem with upholding the resolution “Justification is possible”. It should be obvious that MT fails to present a problem for our resolution if we can assert C or I. That is, if one of these is true, then we are done as justification is possible by C or I. Clearly, for MT to “do what it sets out to do” (Con’s specious terminology here) we must have ~C and ~I (and ~A: see link below). We then showed that, even granting this major concession (~C and ~I), the strengthened form of MT (p implies A), whilst assuming a meaningful interpretation, cannot prevent us from upholding the resolution. MT has that justification is not impossible so long as C is possible, or I is possible, or A is possible. However by MT (p implies A), the conclusion ~A (which MT depends on: see link below) could only be justified by A. But this is contradictory, so ~A cannot be justified. So ~A can be true of false, we don’t know. Thus A can be true. Since justification is possible so long as A is possible, and A must be possible (true or false), Justification is possible. Given Con’s professed skepticism, we anticipate his disapproval. He may beat his dead horse and continue that ~C and ~I are not justified. We ask that he demonstrate how MT “does what it sets out to do” should we be unable to have ~C and ~I. (Hans Albert, the progenitor of MT was not even so silly as to demand something like this: http://en.wikipedia.org... [First sentence in the section “Albert’s Formulation”]. He may repeat that it’s my job to show that A is not problematic. We point out that we are showing that ~A is problematic. But MT must have ~A (see link above). Since we can justify neither ~A nor A we can only conclude that ~A or ~(~A) (tautologous and non-contradictory by above arguments) which is equivalent to saying ~A is possible (either true or false) which is equivalent to saying A is possible (either true or false) which is enough, by MT, to uphold the resolution. If Con (or our readers) are bothered by our arbitrary choice of considering ~C and ~I instead of, say, ~C and ~A we ask that the obvious substitution be made: p implies X where X is some means of justifying p. We are saying MT is equivalent to the argument stating that, if p is justifiable, then p is justifiable by some means X (Albert’s formulation just makes the means, X, explicit). By defensible interpretation we simply mean one that allows MT to be meaningful and non-contradictory. For example, we understand that if MT is to make any sense at all it must already make assumptions of its own, for example, the meaning of logical inferences, the notion of certainty, etc. Again, it’s a shame we should even have to discuss this as Hans Albert himself conceded these obvious points ( http://en.wikipedia.org...) [ Last paragraph in section “Albert’s Formulation”]. Keep these points in mind now as we move on to some new considerations. Truth, Doubt, and Certainty We find Con’s defense of Pyrrhonism bizarre and misconceived. It’s best to ignore it altogether and propose a different means of attack on his skepticism and skepticism in general. We’d like to clarify that, at this point, we have demonstrated that the resolution is upheld and that our further comments are only for clarifications, and elucidation. Let us begin with the (translated) original statement of MT given by Hans Albert “ Here, one has a mere choice between: An infinite regression, which appears because of the necessity to go ever further back, but is not practically feasible and does not, therefore, provide certain foundation. A logical circle in the deduction, which is caused by the fact that one, in the need to found, falls back on statements which have already appeared before as requiring a foundation, and which circle does not lead to any certain foundation either. A break of searching at a certain point, which indeed appears principally feasible, but would mean a random suspension of the principle of sufficient reason. ” (Italics added) These, Albert argues, are the only means of justification; to sufficiently answer “how do I know?”. So, MT itself has already adopted at least two assumptions. Firstly, there is the mention of the principle of sufficient reason [ http://en.wikipedia.org...;]. 3) argues that the random suspension of inquiry fails to satisfy the principle of sufficient reason and, thus, leaves us without certain foundation. Assuming the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) is, at once, unwarranted and contradictory to the aims of MT. Not only does it invalidate it’s result, but, in fact, I find reason to outright reject PSR. There is great ambiguity with what PSR purports is constitutive of “a reason”. Should something be a reason if it has explanatory power over something else? This seems to be faulty in that the Theory of Gravity might provide an explanation as to why my pencil falls when I let go of it, however, the Theory of Gravity is hardly the reason why the pencil falls when I let go of it. This example motivates the thought that something is a reason so long as it is the cause. But it would seem strange to ask myself then what causes 1 to be equal to 1. What would I would be thinking if I doubted this? This leads us to point out the arguably more sinister and unstated assumption made by MT: that we can doubt everything at once. To doubt at all, one must already presuppose certainty. That is, in order to doubt, I must already understand and accept the logical understructure of doubt itself: that doubt is something that challenges certainty, that where there is doubt there is no certainty, etc. To doubt that a person understands doubt is either contradictory or no doubt at all: you must be able to doubt. Thus whenever you are doubting, there is also something else that you are not doubting. The sort of complete skepticism Con purports to practice is completely impracticable. There can be no meaningful skeptic. Returning to our point on the PSR, given it’s arbitrary acceptance by Albert, we declare our rejection of this principle. It could very well be the case that there exist things which are simply true; brute facts which have no “reason”. That is, there can be no meaningful way of understanding how or why these facts are true but this does not entail that we do not know them nor do they have to be arbitrary. Defense of Foundationalism Let U be a model with respect to some set A wherein the axioms (formulas) A_(1),…,A_(n) are interpreted (and true). U is either objectively real or not objectively real. (Notice U is just an agreed upon notation. Our concern is whether what U is referring to has either an objective reality or not). If U is not objectively real then every formula, phi, in U which is true by U must be true since there is no objective reality which could contradict with phi being the case. If U is objectively real then every formula, phi, in U which is true by U must be true since whatever U refers to was determined by A_(1),…,A_(n) and U already. We conclude that, what is true in U must be true in U either objectively or non-objectively. So whatever is true in U must be true. A_(1),…,A_(n) are true axiomatically. Therefore there are axiomatic truths.