The Problem of Evil (PoE) is sound

General criticismsContradictaries: In his response, Con, at various times, holds 3 distinct positions:(i) God cannot act to prevent gratuitous evil (denial of P1)(ii) God acts to prevent gratuitous evil and we know His means (theodicy)(iii) God’s actions are completely beyond our ken (ST)Each of these approaches is obviously contradictory, and Con‘s standing in this debate is significantly weakened, given he adopts these simultaneously.For example, if (i) is true, Con’s theodicy is false, as is ST (as we’d know God’s means and motive, according to Con). We could do this for each case, and see that Con offers rebuttals to his own points, such is his predicament. Con must therefore drop 2/3 of his case and argue from a coherent point of view, or continue in the knowledge that his position is false. God of Law (7): Also, we can show this responses are absurd with reference to Law’s Evil God hypothesis (EG) and the “problem of good” thought experiment. Perhaps EG cannot prevent gratuitous good, because of an “overriding motivation” (Con‘s first point). Alternatively, we know of cases where good happenstance destroys character - it creates jealousy, lust and so forth (theodicy). If all else fails, we can play the mystery card - EG’s reasons to permit gratuitous good may be simply beyond our ken (ST). My point here is that none of these positions are remotely plausible when it comes to EG, and I don’t see why it’s any less ridiculous here.Defending P1P1 states that if God exists, gratuitous evils do not exist.Readers will remembered, I offered a conceptual and a plausibility defence of P1.Con responds first by doubting God’s motivation to prevent gratuitous evil, asserting that God may have an “overriding motivation” of divine non-interference with exceptions.First, Con provides no justification, nor much detail for any of this. He doesn’t explain or identify this motivation, why it is more pressing than gratuitous evil, or how he knows it exists in the first place.Second, this point seems conceptually doomed. Either God’s distance itself is logically necessary for an adequately compensating good (i.e. not gratuitous), which affirms P1, or it isn’t, which would mean He should intervene. Con’s second criticism is that it is impossible for God to know “the minimum amount of suffering that God is to allow if he is to fulfil both his plan for humanity and to not allow gratuitous pain”.But this just doesn’t really undermine P1. Measuring suffering is admittedly imprecise, but it just doesn’t follow that approximations are impossible. As Drange points out, even if there is “no minimum” amount of salt in food, there is clearly “an excess”. The only way to determine if this “excess” of evil exists is to evaluate the strength of P3 (8).Defending P3P3 affirms that gratuitous evils exist.Readers will remember I offered 4 justificatory points to defend P3.Prima facie case: I argued here that apparent gratuity supports the fact of gratuity.Con replies that we’re in a “severely limited epistemic position” to judge (ST).First, the prima facie case is pretty modest, and given Con accepts the principle of credulity, the level of scepticism would have to be extreme. If our epistemic limitations are so such that we can’t even make probabilistic judgements (as it would have to be) about God’s actions, how could we discount, even probabilistically, an illusory past, for example?Second, Con begs the question. He just assumes that we are so epistemically limited, without any justification.Third, Con’s position is clearly contrived. Con believes in Christ’s atonement. This means either (i) God’s actions are not completely beyond our ken (ST is false), or (ii) ST is true and Christianity is completely beyond our ken (theological scepticism). Obviously Con wants to be the arbitrator in when we can make judgements about God. Not only is this blatant special pleading, but such an approach undermines the strength of ST.Next, he characterises my argument as:"I see ~x, therefore ~x."He says that the principle of credulity doesn’t apply to these cases, therefore my inference is flawed.First, I’m arguing from “absolutely everything we know of evil” - i.e. a positive case for gratuity, so this is a straw-man. Second, negative evidence is relevant, if not defining. The apparent lack of Unicorns in my garage is a reason to think there are none. As such, we can be supremely confident that apparent gratuity supports actual gratuity.Epistemic consistency: Here I argued that the PoE should be treated like other inductive beliefs.Con’s response is merely to ask how we are in a good position to conclude gratuity.Besides giving ample argument for it, my reply is obvious - I don’t arbitrarily discriminate with evil because I’m epistemically consistent! As such, we should instead be asking, “why the double-standard?” He then gives a quote by Alston about inductive judgement, but unless he justifies this, I need not respond.Unless we are going to be general inductive sceptics in general, we should accept P3. Even Con recognises how ridiculous his position is, by constantly dropping ST to make claims about God.Nature of evils: Here I pointed to the abundance, dispersal, necessity and sheer horror of evil, as well as divine silence, all evidencing gratuity.Con disputes none of these points. All he offers in response is a bare assertion that the “world contains on balance more good than evil”. Even if this were true, it is irrelevant. Gratuitous evils could still exist, and the above would still be evidence for it. Billions of years of pre-human suffering also negates Con’s point as well.Con also says animals and infants can’t feel pain, given dualism.Not only is this pure assertion, but it is false. Animals and infants exhibit various pain behaviours and physiological changes (heart and brain activity) which strongly indicate they feel pain. Evolution also requires pain and pleasure to reinforce behaviour. What's more, this belief is easily compatible with dualism.Notice how ordinary beliefs are held hostage to Con’s scepticism, while he is able to access God’s innermost workings. Totally contrived nonsense.Noconceive’um: Here I claimed that our inability to even conceive of a morally sufficient reason for some evils is evidence of gratuity.Con agrees, saying this is just what would we would expect, given theism.Like a conspiracy theorist, the lack of evidence for a conspiracy is itself a conspiracy! This is bewildering. If theism is consistent with any possible evidence, then as Flew notes,“Someone may dissipate his assertion completely without noticing that he has done so. A fine brash hypothesis may thus be killed by inches, the death by a thousand qualifications.” (9)Otherwise, this remains a crippling problem with denying gratuity.TheodicyCon here tries to argue that evil builds virtue.First, this response is hopelessly narrow - it doesn’t attempt to cover most suffering, and so is at best incomplete.Second, evil is primarily destructive - evil begets evil. Acts like torture or rape tend to completely change lives for the worst, particularly when these are so-called horrendous evils (10) .Third, it is completely implausible that the best means to an omnipotent being is to allow things like child rape, or that it is indeed morally permissible to allow it to build virtue.Con also hints at Kripkean essentialism, but this does absolutely nothing to counter belief in gratuitous evils, nor is it remotely justified by Con, so I'll hold off responding for now.Sources 7. http://stephenlaw.blogspot.co.uk...8. Trakakis, Nick, “The God beyond belief”, P316.9. http://www.politik-salon.de...10. http://www.sevenoaksphilosophy.org...