Geopolitical Strategy Shift: India

Resolved: The U.S. should shift its geopolitical strategy to create a stronger alliance with India instead of Pakistan. Foundational Info The U.S. has played a strategic game of geopolitics with the South Asian region stretching far back as the beginning of the Cold War. The two regional powers are India and Pakistan – and they generally have divergent views on pretty much every issue pertaining to South Asian politics. The U.S. in starting the WoT understood the importance of the region and had to make a decision: support Pakistan or India. Logically, due to the nature of the issue, the U.S. chose Pakistan. However, it is time to change that. C1: Pakistan’s ISI is rooted in Islamic fundamentalism and has ties to terror organizations One of the major distinctions that the Pakistanis make in their decision calculus in the War on Terror is the separation of the “good” Taliban and the “bad” Taliban: the “good” being the Afghani Taliban and the “bad” being the Pakistani Taliban. This fact had come to light to the public via Wikileaks cabals that were realized which indicated that the Pakistani ISI were continuing to fund and train the Afghani Taliban in despite of the United States seeking Pakistani assistance. What seems more disturbing is the attempt by authorities to portray Pakistan as assisting us in eliminating the Taliban, however at the same time omitting the fact that this Taliban is not the Afghani Taliban, but rather the Pakistani Taliban. The Pakistanis do indeed engage the Pakistani Taliban, who is located in Eastern provinces, but they do not engage the Afghani Taliban located in the Southern provinces. This is a crucial distinction in the War on Terror because, even though as will be seen further in the paper that the Pakistani Taliban does pose a threat to internal stability, the primary adversary for the United States is the Afghani Taliban. 180 Wikileaks cabals has indicated that it has been reported that leaders of the ISI have met and provided assistance to the Afghani Taliban. [1] Matthew Waldman, a fellow at the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy and the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University has published a work called The Sun in the Sky: The Relationship between Pakistani’s ISI and Afghan Insurgents. This work was based off of numerous interviews with current and formers members of the Taliban: “The author conducted semi-structured interviews…with nine insurgent field commanders…ten former senior Taliban…5 twenty-two Afghan elders, tribal leaders, politicians and analysts; and thirteen foreign diplomats, experts and security officials”. This interviewed work demonstrates clearly the relationship between the Pakistanis and the Afghani Taliban and Haqqani network. Waldman isolates numerous points of contention when evaluating the impact and extent of the relationship between the ISI and these groups. First, that the Taliban and the ISI are involved in a reciprocal relationship which has developed into a necessary synthesis of the two groups. The interviews indicate that to sustain the Afghani insurgency, the Afghani Taliban need and are dependent upon the Pakistanis for supplies, training and sanctuary. This in turn gives the Pakistanis the advantage of increased regional strength and influence. Second, that the collusion between the Pakistani government, the ISI and the Afghani Taliban are much stronger than what appears prima facie. The interviews indicate that the Pakistanis understand that the United States cannot stay in the region forever, and thus must just wait the United States out. At this point, they see their relationship with the United States as temporary. The impact of this is that the Pakistanis need only put in the minimal effort in the War on Terror. This further elucidates the seemingly double faced or contradictory nature of Pakistani policy in that it can be taken as the Pakistanis simply placating the United States for the time being. Waldman writes: “According to a Talib… President Zadari told them they were arrested because he was under a lot of pressure from the Americans and that, ‘you are our people, we are friends, and after your release we will of course support you to do your operations’”. Throughout the interview it becomes clear that the government, as indicated by top level officials, is indeed colluding with these terrorist groups. [2] C2: Supporting India would force the Pakistani’s hand Essentially all of Pakistani’s regional actions are a result of counter-balancing the actions of India, and visa versa. The balance of the South Asian region is fundamentally due to the actions of the U.S. – otherwise, India would have the regional advantage. This balance is something Pakistan cannot lose. According to Krauthammer the main geopolitical action that the U.S. can do to force Pakistan to uphold its WoT agreements is to strengthen our alliance with India. This is true because if we shift our aid, our diplomatic ties, our military ties then Pakistan will be at a severe disadvantage to the Pakistanis.Moreover, Pakistan relies on U.S. assistance to fight, as mentioned above, the “bad” Taliban which is internally destabilizing to the Pakistani government. Without our assistance the domestic government will be fighting alone against a complex terror network. This has led to the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan to attack Pakistanis including even members of the ISI. To put this in perspective, in 2009 alone 3,021 Pakistani citizens were killed due to Islamic militant violence in the country, and the numbers keep rising as tensions increase. On November 23rd the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan had carried out an attack on a Pakistani police station which resulted in 2 casualties and 7 injuries.[3] [1] Rooney, John. "An Inconvenient Truth: Pakistan's ISI and the Afghan Taliban." [2] Waldman. The Sun in the Sky: The Relationship between Pakistani’s ISI and Afghan Insurgents [3] http://www.realclearpolitics.com...