The Nazis could have defeated the Soviet Union is WW2 in 1941

I will respond to his points as they are listed. 1) The Nazi"s did not help their situation by having to supply 3 armies simultaneously. This was the case with Army groups north, center and south. Resupplying the advancing German army would not have proven to be so difficult if the German high command would have advocated a policy of prioritizing supplies to army group center once Leningrad had been sieged by army group north, and the Ukraine was occupied by army group south. Keep in mind that Leningrad was helpless until its liberation in by the Red Army in August 1944. In the Ukraine the Germans were greeted as liberators. Army Groups North and South had achieved their aims, and therefore no longer needed the vast supplies in order to advance further. Considering these facts, it is safe to say that sufficient supplies could have been provided for Army Group Center in its drive for Moscow. 2) Although the Russian Rasputitsa is absolute atrocious and even impassible at certain times, it did not prevent the German army from reaching within 20 miles of Moscow. As mentioned in my thesis, the additional summer month of May would have proven more than enough time to assemble a much better position and supply network for the final drive on Moscow. I would also note that 1941 was an exceptional season for both rain and cold. These conditions were much milder in years past, and even years to come. With this being said I feel that the Nazi leadership was absolutely conscious of "General Winter", however they could not have expected the enormous amount of rainfall that created the muddy terrain in the fall months. These are variables in war that cannot always be calculated in advance. Regardless, given that the season proceeded as it did; the German invasion being launched in May would have put the German well in striking distance of Moscow with time for much better planning and preparation. 3) The Soviet Union did have an incredible ability to stay on the ropes and prolong the war longer than the German high command could have ever anticipated. With that being said, they were suffering loss after loss and at some point the Soviet people would have recognized that their governments leadership was leading them to endless destruction and ruin. Also, in many territories the indigenous Soviet people saw the Germans as liberators. Keep in mind that they had not committed the war crimes that were propagandized later in the war. I do not see a situation where Stalin and the Communist government could have packed up and moved East to reconstitute their government in exile. The symbol of the Soviet capital being occupied by foreign invaders would simply have proven too much to hold the already loosely bound Soviet Union to endure. We would have seen a total collapse of its sovereign government had this happened. 4) To this point I must take note that Hitler was not confident in the Empirical Japanese"s capabilities and therefore most likely did not base his war plans on their politics. He simply used them as a place holder ally to help the balance of power and counter the emerging American power opposing him in the Atlantic. As for tying down the Soviets; the Japanese never truly threated the Soviet Union. Since most of the Soviet Union"s population resided in the west, and all of Siberia would have acted as a natural defensive barrier from an Japanese army it is safe to say this even if the Japanese tried a land invasion, it would not have been a serious operation. They simply did not have the resources or the desire to take on another enemy knowing that the Chinese were yet to fall. Also, the Soviet war policy can be understood in terms of distance and time. The Soviets had the luxury of vast distances of territory, but what they did not have was time. So naturally they did everything in their power convert that distance into time. Even if the Japanese attacked the Soviet Union you would have seen the Soviet leadership sacrifice the territory in order to buy the time to first deal with the Germans, then the Japanese after they stopped the bleeding to their country. No divisions would have been left to fight the Japanese with the Germans lingering at the gates of Moscow. Stalin had already order the relocation of most Eastern and Siberian units prior to Pearl Harbor and Japans entry into the war against the allies. 5) I would argue that this would be less of a factor than it first appears to be at face value. The German leadership was very clear that although casualties were mounted, that they would be unrelenting their brutality and persistence to crush the Bolsheviks. Examining later events in the war we can see that this "Hold all ground to the last man. " mentality was common place right up to the Battle for Berlin. This fanaticism was expected of the Wehrmacht. Hitler was increasingly irrational on orders of retreat or withdrawal. Sacrificing entire armies did not seem to deter him; as seen in Stalingrad. Although your number of 734,000 men out of force seems a bit high, I can cite the Deutsche milit"rische Verluste im Zweiten Weltkrieg which states that 357,000 of that figure were reported dead or missing. Despite the enormous loss of life, we can presume that extending the war an additional month would not have caused losses which would have substantially inhibited or deterred the final drive on Moscow from taking place. At most we could expect another. Keeping with statistics we would note approximately 50,000 causalities per month until the end of 1941 (as averaged from the death toll of June 1941- December 1941). In closing; I do not disagree with your premise that the Nazis grossly underestimated the Soviet Union in the planning and execution of Operation Barbarossa, I do feel that the reasons cited are no enough to persuade me that the war could not have been won by Germany in 1941.