The moral argument for the existence of God is sound

Rebutting Objection to P1Con said P1 somehow doesn't follow, yet surely many prominant secularists are indeed dedicated to the premise, Neitzsche, Sartre, etc. Failed Parody First Con attempts to parody P1 with with a straw-man, "If the objective moral ferries do not exist, then objective moral values & duties do not exist" ^ the problem with this parody is that I'm not arguing for a contingent being (fairy). Rather I'm positing a metaphysically necessary non-contingent being, who's existence is either possible or impossible: a far cry from river sprites! Of course P1 for river sprites don't follow, but that's not what's being proposed. P1, hence, stands firm against this silly (albeit all to common) objection. Euthyphor's dilemmaThe Euthyphro’s Dilemma also fails as a strong objection since it not only takes the argument out of context, but alse becomes a false dilemma; it presents me with choosing either, 1) a Theistic-Independent moral theory or; 2) a Theistic-Dependent theory, but which is arbitrary First let's look at (1). The dilemma is construed for Atheistic Moral Platonism (AMP), against theism. For the non-nihilist, AMP is needed in place of non-explanatory assertions of moral objectivity being that such assertions have proved arbitrary & implausible. But does AMP fair any better since it attempts to anchor morals in a non-theistic transcendent ground by essentially saying they “just exist?” It doesn’t appear so, since what does it mean to say 'justice' just exists? A person can be just, but with the absence of people, how can justice “just exist?” Since an abstract 'justice' itself isn’t just, then without people justice can’t exist! But that idea seems to contradict the AMP hypothesis. As an important aside, with the Christian God certain virtues would exist as a unity between the Father, Son & Holy Spirit in a timeless and space-less state prior to creation. God is, in essence, a Trinity of persons. Just as you have the mental faculties and capacities to constitute one person, so God has the mental faculties and capacities to constitute 3 persons, 3 seats of consciousness, all in a love unity from eternity past. Now at best, AMP leaves moral truths floating in an unintelligible way, lacking any adequate foundation. Furthermore, moral obligation is incompatible with AMP: for suppose duty indeed "just exists" Platonically, how then does that result in obligation? An obligation towards wrong may exist too; why not commit wrong actions? Theism, however, as described above, provides a more plausible basis for the moral realist under Divine Command Theory. http://www.iep.utm.edu... We’ve seen how AMP is a highly arbitrary basis for morals, but how does the plausibility of AMP fair? Well it seems absurd to think that creatures would blindly evolve to correspond to abstract moral realms! (It’s almost as though the moral realm knew we were coming). It's more plausible that the moral and natural realm would coincide under a Creator-Law-giver hegemony then to think these two realms "just meshed." So it seems that at first glance the Atheist-moral realist is beholden to the same dilemma, all I have to do now is show which moral ontology is more plausible and less arbitrary then that of AMP. Second, let's look at (2) a Theistic-Dependent theory, but which is arbitrary. The proper context: Plato's Republic, deals witha mythology of gods, which is something very different from the dilemma presented by the modern atheist. For a plurality of gods with different moral opinions is no doubt a hard problem for Euthyphro, but modern Christians do not believe in a multiplicity of gods with differing opinions; they're simply so utterly unlike the Christian God. The Trinity is the true source of morals for the Christian. It is clear that in this understanding of God, He could not be other than what He is, not only because it is ontologically inconceivable for God to be other than what He is, but also because of the fact that for the Persons of the Trinity to relate to any other way would mean the dissolution of the Trinity itself! Hence the very identity of God is this unity, or basis of value. Therefore, for God to not be the standard of Good, is to cease having his very identity; and identity is a necessary relation. There is no possible world in which some entity A is not identical to A. This doesn’t at all seem arbitrary once one grasps the concept of a maximally great being. What could BE a more plausible and less arbitrary ground for moral truth? The love, which God commands, is not arbitrary for it is grounded in the ontological and ethical necessities of His own being. So asking what makes God good would be like asking what makes the number 5 possess it's five-ness? The question is just as meaningless as asking why can't God make a round circle, or create a stone which he himself cannot lift? Such questions come from misguided preconceptions of Theology unstudied. Would Socrates have posed the same kind of questions about this kind of God? He certainly could not have referred to jealousy and strife between the Persons of the Trinity and questioned our ability to know what pleases God, as if what were pleasing to the Father might not be pleasing to the Son. Moral duties, then are grounded in Divine Commands, and moral values are grounded in God as the triune unity of all love and goodness. So neither are God’s commands arbitrary or independent, for they are necessary reflections of himself. Why pick God’s nature as definitive of the Good?” Because God, by definition, is the greatest conceivable being, and a being that stands as the paradigm of goodness is greater than one who just exemplifies it. Thus the non-nihilist must recognize some ultimate standard and God has been offered as the least arbitrary, hence the more preferable.Rebut Conclusion Now I've just shown how Con gave a straw-man parody, and an out-of-context dilemma. Further, one can see how Martin's revised dilemma amounts to nothing more than a semantic game, similar to meaningless and out-dated parodox's. Argument DefensePremise 1: If God does not exist, then objective moral values & duties do not exist.In support of premise one, the argument doesn't explicitly reach God as a basis for objective morals, rather it's implicit in the first premise and emerges in its defense (as witnessed). Contra-Martin, observe that the issue before us is NOT,〻 Must we believe in God to have moral lives?〻 Can we formulate an ethics system without reference to God?〻 Can we recognize the existence of objective morals without reference to God?These questions are all based on a misunderstanding of the argument. For it confuses God's existence with belief in God's existence: the argument isn't whether belief in God is necessary for objective morality, rather it's that God's existence is necessary for the existence of objective morality. Thus moral ontology shouldn't be confused with our moral epistemology.Theists and secular humanists alike, indeed everyone can appeal to their intuition of morals; for even the bible says God's law is "written on the hearts" of all men-- Christian or non-Christian. Thus the central question about morals concerns their ontological foundation, not how we can know them.It's not obvious to see that atheism provides a logical foundation for objective morals, for our sense of morals on naturalism is only an illusion wrought by socio-biological conditioning.Premise 2: Objective moral values & duties do exist.It seems that our moral experience is on a par with our sensory experience. We perceive external truths just as we perceive the internal truth of morals. In moral experience we apprehend a realm of objective morals, just as in sensory experience we apprehend a realm of the physical world. Yet Con concedes premise 2 already. Therefore, since premises one and two are more plausible and obvious, it necessarily and logically follows that God exists. Objective moral prescriptions requires a prescriber.