One Should Not Presume Atheism

I thank Logic for providing such an excellent topic or discussion. I would like to inform readers that my acceptance of the con position is not an endorsement for atheism. I myself am a believer in the God of the Holy Trinity as described by Christian theology and a profound advocate of Christian apologetics. The Bible claims that, "Iron sharpeneth iron; so a man sharpeneth the countenance of his friend" (Proverbs 27:17 KJV). As such, I find it important that we test our beliefs by exploring the opposition, for how can we truly claim our faith to be reasonable if we are unable to understand the objections to it and thereby properly defend it? In the same vein I ask the voters to be unbiased in adjudicating this debate. A vote for myself is not an endorsement for atheism just as a vote for Logic is not an endorsement of theism. Rather, a vote for either of us is an indication of the superiority of our respective arguments. With that said I will begin my case. Overview of the Resolution The resolution is a normative statement. That is to say in order to affirm that one should not presume atheism is to attribute normative value to the statement that one should not presume atheism. When we reanalyze the resolution in terms of normativity we then realize that to say that one should not presume atheism is to tell one not to presume atheism. As such, we can reformulate the rather vague language of the resolution into a concrete burden for both the Pro and Con. The Pro must demonstrate that there is normative force behind the command not to presume atheism. The Con must prove that there is no normative force behind the command not to presume atheism. Presumption There are three fundamental forms of reason: induction, deduction, and abduction. Induction is defined by the Commens Peirce Dictionary as reasoning that depends upon our confidence that a run of one kind of experience will not be changed or cease without some indication before it ceases [1]. Deduction is reasoning which depends on our confidence in our ability to analyze the meanings of the signs in or by which we think [2]. Abduction is a form of non-necessary reasoning in which processes of thought capable of producing no conclusion more definite than a conjecture are used [3]. It is important to note that the conclusions of abduction are not necessarily true and one may find difficulty proposing that they are even probably true. Abduction is also known as retroduction, hypothetic inference, and presumption. This leads us to the argument I will be defending. Abduction is a prerequisites for acquiring any new knowledge at all. Without abduction one cannot engage in deduction and induction. Thus, to deny that one should presume a world-view is to limit the possibility of acquiring knowledge about that worldview. But again as we reanalyze the resolution at its core we realize that it presupposes that there are things that one should not presume. Indeed, it would appear that Logic_on_rails is thus rejecting the acquisition of knowledge. Thus, my case will have two primary contentions. First, that knowledge is more valuable than true belief. Second, that in order to arrive at the conclusion that one should not presume atheism, at least in a manner that instills normative force, one would have to utilize an inductive or deductive argument. As such, one would not be presuming anything, but rather would be deducing or inducing that theism or agnosticism are more rational world views as my opponent proposes. Contention 1: Knowledge is More Valuable Than True Belief Before I can attempt to make a case to prefer knowledge to belief, I feel it is necessary to define both terms. Belief is something we hold to be true. A belief can be true or false. There need be no reason to hold a true belief or a false belief as a belief. Knowledge, however, is a justified true belief. This means that knowledge is necessarily true and we have a reason to hold it as such. It is also important to note the difference between objective truths and subjective truths. One may subjectively hold the belief that the sky is blood-shot red as true, however this does not deny that it is a false belief for it can be objectively proved to be false. Indeed, holding a belief as true does not make it true in objective terms. I believe that it goes without question that knowledge is more valuable than a false belief when analyzed in epistemic terms. As such I will simply compare the value of knowledge to the value of true belief. If my opponent would like to defend the epistemic value of false belief then he may raise objections to my claim in the next round and I will answer them. My first attempt to defend knowledge is to cite Plato's Meno. The Meno Problem raises the question of what is it about knowledge that makes it more valuable than mere true belief [4]. Plato's answer to this problem is to state that when one possess' knowledge, they are bound to the truth. For example, both knowledge and true belief of the fact that the moon is always in the sky provide us with the same conclusion: that indeed the moon is always in the sky. Now, suppose one were to take a walk on the night of a new moon. Somebody with knowledge that the moon is always in the sky will hold to the true belief that the moon is always in the sky. Another person who only possesses the true belief that the moon is always in the sky, yet lacks the justification may abandon the belief and adopt the false belief that the moon is only sometimes in the sky. It seems reasonable to claim that our confidence in knowledge necessarily makes it preferable to true belief. Second, I would like to present the argument from virtue epistemology. Note that this argument supposes that understanding is more valuable than knowledge as justified true belief, but as such it necessarily argues that understanding is more valuable than any belief. Kvanvig offers two arguments to distinguish knowledge from understanding [5]. The first is that understanding, unlike knowledge, admits to degrees. As varying degrees of understanding are more epistemically accurate than a single, unvarying degree of knowledge, understanding is inherently more epistemically valuable. Next, understanding is not subject to epistemic luck. Epistemic luck is the putative situation in which an agent gains knowledge even though that knowledge has come about in a way that has, in some sense to be specified, involved luck in some significant measure [6]. Thus, as understanding is immune to epistemic luck, it is more epistemically valuable than knowledge. Contention 2: In Order to Normative Claim That one Should not Presume Atheism, They Must Utilize Induction or Deduction This contention is simple enough. Presumptions arise simply from guesses. Thus they cannot be normative in any way, as there is no reason behind them. In order for my opponent to claim that one should not presume atheism, they must provide an inductive or deductive reason for that to be true. In other words, you cannot determine what you should presume on the basis of somebody else's argument, for you would by proxy have to accept the inductive or deductive logic they are proposing. A presumption must necessarily be internally founded. Conclusion My arguments present a more formal understanding of logic and presumption, and thus more accurately address the topic than my opponent's. I am out of character space, but if my opponent sincerely believes his case to still be relevant I will refute it next round. Sources 1. http://www.helsinki.fi... 2. Ibid. 3. http://www.helsinki.fi... 4. http://plato.stanford.edu... 5. http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk... 6. http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk...