Human Beings have a Moral Responsibility to preserve Biodiversity on Earth

As this will be my closing argument, I wish to take the time to thank Belle for this debate and her pleasant conduct throughout. It is always refreshing, in my opinion, to experience a civil and intelligent debate without gratuitous invective and insulting tone. This was enjoyable for me, so thank you, Belle. CLOSING ARGUMENT: The central issue in this debate was the proposition that human beings do not have a moral obligation to preserve biodiversity on Earth. In essence, that is the conclusion Belle had set out to prove or argue in support of. And she chose to tie moral obligation inextricably to values, such that the very question of moral obligation is determined by a set of values; if we have no moral obligation to that which has no value, then whether or not nonhuman entities have value lies at the very heart of the question. So, given this stance she presented, we realize that if we assume a particular set of values, then a particular set of moral obligations will follow necessarily. That means making such assumptions ends up begging the very question. Consider: if nonhuman entities have 'intrinsic value', then we do have a moral obligation toward them. Unfortunately, Belle did not even attempt to interact with the notion of their possessing 'instrinsic value'. She simply assumed it was false, asserting that "nothing is intrinsically valuable" with a dismissive wave of her hand. But the standards of sound reasoning expects her to prove—not just assume—the falsehood of 'intrinsic value' before attempting to employ 'instrumental value' in drawing her conclusion about moral obligation. As she presented quite clearly in her final round, there are two types of value: intrinsic and extrinsic. Intrinsic refers to the value a thing possesses in itself, while extrinsic refers to the value a thing possesses in virtue of its relation to something else (e.g., instrumentality). And since the issue of moral obligation was tied inextricably to values, the set of values one employs determines the whole case. So the question of intrinsic vs. extrinsic is fundamentally crucial. When it comes to forming her own views, she is at liberty to simply assume one thing in favour of another. But when it comes to competing in the marketplace of ideas, assuming the very point at issue will not do. She could have chosen to do one of two things: either she could have demonstrated the weakness of the 'intrinsic' view, or she could have demonstrated the strength of the 'extrinisic' view. But she never bothered to do either one. She simply assumed the falsehood of the 'intrinsic' view—even going so far as to assert that it was false—and assumed the truth of a particular 'extrinsic' view. And having done so, with a set of values in hand her conclusion followed quite naturally, because values determine moral obligation, as she said. It should not surprise anyone that her conclusion was inevitable, because the determining set of values was in place all along, and (despite my attempts) never questioned. As Dr. Carroll points out, "If one's premises entail one's conclusion, and one's premises are questionable, one is said to beg the question." [1] MISCELLANEOUS RESPONSES: With respect to the fact that she begged the question, Belle countered by saying, "I believe that this assumption is justified, in that I have no more reason to believe biodiversity intrinsically valuable than I do my television set or my dead skin cells; I have been given no reason to assent to it." There are two things I wish to say about this. First, whether or not she has reason to believe that nonhuman entities have instrinisic value is irrelevant. The truth or falsehood thereof was at issue, not its believability for her. And as demonstrated, she at once both assumed and asserted its falsehood, and with no reason given. Second, to hold that something is false because it has not been proven true is a logical fallacy known as 'argumentum ad ignorantiam' (argument from ignorance). [2] She also said, "My argument is not that biodiversity is not intrinsically valuable; it is that we do not have a moral obligation to preserve it." This statement seems to forget that Belle had tied moral obligation inextricably to values. We do have a moral obligation to preserve Earth's biodiversity if it has intrinsic value. So does it? Belle says no, which we are supposed to take on her word alone—because she never bothered to demonstrate the weakness of the 'intrinsic' view nor the strength of her 'extrinsic' view. She simply assumed in favour of one against the other and presented the inevitable conclusion that follows from doing so. With regard to the modus tollens syllogism she presented, Belle said, "If my opponent wishes to provide argumentation to challenge this premise I invite him to do so." I accept the challenge. Her modus tollens syllogism was: 1. If we have an obligation to X, then X is intrinsically valuable. 2. X is not intrinsically valuable. 3. Therefore, we do not have an obligation to X. There is a serious problem with the first premise (and therefore the entire argument). The first premise is actually an inversion of her argument, which held that moral obligation is determined by values, not vice versa. She did not say that values is determined by moral obligation. She said the exact opposite, that moral obligation is determined by values. In other words, her argument was, "If X has value, then we have an obligation to X." Therefore, her syllogism must be restructured as follows: 1'. If X is instrinsically valuable, then we have an obligation to X. 2'. X is not intrinsically valuable. 3'. Therefore, we have no obligation to X. And this, of course, is no longer a modus tollens argument. It is, in fact, a formal fallacy known as denying the antecedent: [3] 1'. If P, then Q. 2'. ï¿½P. 3'. Therefore, ï¿½Q. She also said, "I challenge my opponent to defend the goodness of absolute biodiversity at the cost of everything else." There is a certain confusion here, insofar as that wasn't my task in this debate. I did not instigate this debate for arguing in favour of the proposition; Belle instigated this debate for arguing against the proposition, which means it was my task "to uphold the proposition against her critical attempts to defeat it, or at least undercut it. In other words, as the Con side of the debate she has proposed, she has shouldered the burden of proving that humans do not have a moral responsibility to preserve biodiversity on earth." [4] And finally, it is true that Belle "presented a clear case against the contention that humans have a responsibility to preserve biodiversity." However, it is also true that she did so by committing two fallacies: denying the antecedent as regards the argument overall, and begging the question as regards the second premise specifically. While she claims that I have not presented any real challenge to her argument, I am at a loss to explain how she could think that. ==== REFERENCES ==== 1. Robert Carroll "Begging the question." The Skeptic's Dictionary. Web. (http://www.skepdic.com...) 2. Robert Carroll. "Argument to ignorance." The Skeptic's Dictionary. Web. (http://www.skepdic.com...). See also: Lee Archie. "Appeal to ignorance." Lander University Philosophy Pages. Web. (http://philosophy.lander.edu...). "Argument from ignorance." Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Web. (http://en.wikipedia.org...) 3. Gary Curtis. "Denying the antecedent." FallacyFiles.org. Web. (http://www.fallacyfiles.org...); "Denying the antecedent." Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Web. (http://en.wikipedia.org...) 4. Taken from my opening remarks in Round 1.