[ADVANCED DEBATERS ONLY] This house believes in karma

Assume for a moment that there are no objective values. How does this affect us? Mackie (1977:30-35) thinks the main tradition of European moral philosophy and even our everyday language refers to such non-existent objective values. Ian Hinckfuss (1987:3-10) also seeks to define 'morality' as an appeal to the existence of absolute/objective values. Although not everyone does define morality in this way or believe in the absolute/objective nature of their moral claims, Hinckfuss (1987:3) argues that this sense of 'morality' "is very widespread." This claim is supported by empirical investigation (Trainer in Hinckfuss 1987:3,9). But if morality (as Hinckfuss defines it) is based upon non-existent objective values then all moral claims are false: to say „there exists a moral obligation to do x' is false, as no such obligations exist. The logic of this systematic falsehood of moral claims is challenged by what Charles Pigden (2007) calls the Doppelganger Problem, but as Pigden successfully argues, this objection fails. Here is a brief summary of the argument. If all moral claims are false then the moral claims 'killing is wrong' and 'killing is not wrong' are both false. But this appears to be a contradiction: if it is false that 'killing is wrong' then it is true that 'killing is not wrong.' The solution to this problem is to refine the nihilist‟s claim: we can say that all moral judgements are false provided moral judgements are defined as claims to the existence of objective values. Thus 'killing is wrong' is false if by it one means that the property of 'wrongness' exists and is instantiated by the act of killing. But 'killing is not wrong' is not a moral claim (and so can be true) because it does not claim that any objective values exist. Of course (and this is essential) we must recognise that on this definition 'killing is not wrong' is not equivalent to 'killing is permissible': 'killing is permissible' does make a claim to the existence of an objective value i.e. 'permissibility.' Pigden (2007:451-454) proposes a similar solution: "It is not analytic that actions that are not wrong are morally permissible. For it does not hold in worlds where there are no moral properties, which is precisely that kind of world that nihilists think we inhabit" (Pigden 2007:454) So, let us grant that claims to the existence of objective values (i.e. moral claims) are all false, and that it is not logically contradictory to say this. Immediately, then, we are faced with a hypothetical imperative: we ought to cease using moral language if we wish to speak the truth. If we grant all the assumptions made so far, then this imperative is undeniably true. But why should we wish to speak the truth? Works of fiction fill our libraries and we do not think we should remove these books because they do not speak the truth. However, the difference is that moral discourse is intended to reach the truth, whereas fairytales have no such intention. I have never yet seen a book on morality that began with the disclaimer: 'the following is a work of fiction. Any resemblance to the way the world actually is is purely coincidental.' There is, then, at least a prima facie reason to give up moral language, and this is often the first instinct of the moral nihilist. This position is usually referred to as abolitionism. On the other hand, maybe there is some goal more important than truth, e.g. preservation of society. Indeed, many moral nihilists (perhaps including Mackie) seem to have come this far only to blanch at the idea of giving up moral language. Since morality is a fiction, we can make-believe whatever we want about it. This position is usually referred to as moral fictionalism. Now this does sound childish as I have put it but the argument is not (quite) as ridiculous as it sounds. Mackie (1977:107-111) argued that morality is a device that is necessary to counteract men's limited sympathies. Society requires morality in order to keep us working together, co-operating. [The fiction of morality can] salvage the important role moral discourse is widely thought to play in co-ordinating attitudes and regulating interpersonal conflict in cases where people disagree about what they are to do, especially where collective action is needed or the proposed actions of different people interfere with each other. (Nolan et al. 2005:312) Although it is a fiction and our first instinct is abolitionism, morality is necessary or at least useful and so we must find a way to preserve it despite its systematic falsity. In response to this I shall do two things. Firstly, I shall briefly summarise an argument that moral fictionalism is an illogical position that cannot be rationally maintained. If we are given reason to doubt the necessity of morality then we have no need to preserve it in this irrational, fictional form anyway so secondly, in Section Two I shall argue that morality is not necessary or even useful as the fictionalist thinks. Perhaps the opposite is true: that we would be better off without it. The moral nihilist should only be forced into moral fictionalism if she is certain that morality is necessary, and even then she is still in a rather problematic position. Source: [1] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Volume 10 [2] http://www.google.co.uk...