God most likely does not exist

IntroductionI appreciate this topic and I look forward to debating this with my opponent. As an important reminder to my opponent, merely citing the website at the bottom of your round is not a proper sourcing of content when many sections of text in your argument are verbatim. I’ve followed Luke at commonsenseatheism.com for quite some time; please be judicious and avoid plagiarism by quoting him specifically when you make use of his exact phrases.In regards to the arguments presented, you’ll perhaps notice that they suffer from some pretty significant weaknesses even without yet delving into the details of them. Perhaps you’ve noticed already, as I have, that my opponent’s second argument (argument from gratuitous evil) ignores the definition (ii) of which it intends to refute. But let’s start from the beginning.RE: Argument From Incoherence: Omnipotence/ OmnibenevolenceThis argument is a nonstarter for at least one very distinct reason: omnibenevolence and omnipotence do not entail what he thinks it does. He claims, “This means that it is possible for God to freely chose to commit an act of evil if he wishes, thus, he commits an evil act in some possible world.” First, we can see that this assumes (ii) to be wrong from the onset, inasmuch as it assumes that God is bound by some supra-divine standard of Good and is not himself the author of it. Secondly, his very first sentence entails that this very next is false. He says, “Omnipotence (‘all-powerful’) entails being ‘all-free’.” Being “all-free,” as it were, entails that he is not bound by any limitation (definitionally true); committing an act of evil implies that God is bound by a moral metric for which he is presumably not the author, which is a limitation. Thus, my opponent’s first and second sentences are incoherent and suffer from the very criticism he wishes to levy. Just as a scale exists outside of its own measurements, insomuch as it cannot weigh itself, so God exists as not something to be measured, but as the very object by which we measure. In fact, logic dictates that the creator of the universe not only has the right but has the capability of setting the standards for his creation. The verity of this claim is confirmed every day when a programmer creates his own gaming "universe." It would be intellectually insane to assume that a programmer ought to be bound by his own programming. As the quip goes, "His game, His rules."Thus, though omnipotence and omnibenevolence may by incoherent, we certainly cannot deduce as much from the argument presented by my opponent.RE: Paul Draper's Argument From Evil (Gratuitous Suffering)This argument fails for a great number of reasons, not least of which is the fact it begs the question from the beginning. My opponent began his first round with the definition (ii) of God, which states, “The divine author of moral authority. “ But if this were truly the case, then the argument from evil could never begin! It would be a true nonstarter, for it is only a problem if evil exists wholly apart from God’s authorial handiwork, wherein we can actually claim evil to be a standalone concept. But if the definition of good and evil are bound inexorably to God, then we cannot call actions evil unless we presuppose that God exists. Draper and my opponent have called certain actions evil (gratuitous suffering) apart from God and have thus begged the question. For all we know, God may very well enjoy the needless suffering of animals of every sort—hominid and otherwise. Moreover, if God is the author of moral authority, we have no basis for thinking it a contradiction with his omnibenevolence. So far as I can tell, my opponent is assuming a CHRISTIAN God, wherein we have at least some basis for determining the CONTENT of morality. But that is not what this debate presumes; it presumes to be able to show that an omniexcellent God who is the author of moral authority is unlikely based upon probabilistic arguments that have literally no epistemic scope. And by this I intend to mean that we have literally NO idea whether suffering of any magnitude is evil or whether God very much likes it—we have no access to his mind and thus have no idea what sort of morality he has in fact authored and how it may or may not correspond with our own dim visions of it.So logical calculations like the following: Pr(O1 & O2 & O3|T) < Pr(O1 & O2 & O3|HI), are really quite meaningless, as they depend upon information for which we have no access. In philosophy, we call scenarios like this inscrutable, inasmuch as they are impossible to know because they exist outside of our epistemological access.Needed ClarityI don’t intend to believe that it is easy to be clear with so few words. But I would very much like to be as clear as possible on these points, as I think a careful reader will recognize that they are damning to my opponent’s argument.The first argument is weak enough and I think needs no more time. The second, being more complicated, may need some clarification. First, we must recognize that there is nothing inherent in my opponent’s definitions of (i) and (ii) in round 1 that give us the impression that we would know the content of the morality that God authored and whether or not it corresponds with our own impressions. Further, the observation of our own finiteness and cognitive shortcomings coalesced with our acknowledgement of God's omni-excellence gives us very good reasons for believing God's mind and reasons are completely foreign to us - inasmuch as we have no good reasons for knowing what he would and would not do. This means that PR(O1 & O2 & O3|T) may be incredibly high, because it may very well be the case that God enjoys gratuitous suffering and, by virtue of his moral authority, has rendered it Good. Thus, it could be that my opponent’s formula: Pr(O1 & O2 & O3|T) < Pr(O1 & O2 & O3|HI) is actually Pr(O1 & O2 & O3|T) >> Pr(O1 & O2 & O3|HI). Even worse, the two formulas juxtaposed have not yet been shown to be in contradiction! That means that both indifference and theism (as defined) can be true! It may very well be the case that it is good to God that he not care about the wellbeing of any of the living organisms that came about after his creation of the universe. Since the formula can go in either direction by virtue of our inability to epistemologically access crucial and necessary information, it is only fair to conclude that the probability is inscrutable. By deeming the probability as inscrutable, my opponent has failed to show that God’s existence is unlikely based upon his arguments. Probablistic arguments of this nature simply fail by nature of assuming to know too much. Our epistemic range is finite and we cannot intend to make sound arguments in areas of infinite magnitude.Definition of formula:PR(O1 & O2 & O3|T)Translation: The probability of our three respective observations of pain suffering on theism. Pr(O1 & O2 & O3|HI)Translation: The probability of our three respective observations of pain suffering on the hypothesis of indifference. Pr(O1 & O2 & O3|T) < Pr(O1 & O2 & O3|HI)Translation: The probability of our three respective observations of pain and suffering on theism is less than the probability of our three respective observations of pain and suffering being true on the hypothesis of indifference. Pr(O1 & O2 & O3|T) > Pr(O1 & O2 & O3|HI)Translation: The probability of our three respective observations of pain and suffering being true on theism is greater than the probability of our three respective observations of pain and suffering being true on the hypothesis of indifference.