Libertarian free will is false.

Thank you, wjmelements, for your response. Again, there are two issues raised here: randomness and life. My opponent claims that the universe is incapable of randomness. He uses real-life examples that I agree with, but to carry these arguments to the quantum level would be a rather derivative application of inductive reasoning. Many things that make sense macroscopically mean nothing microscopically. Even Newton's laws, commonly accepted as true for most of the universe, breaks down when scales are small enough [1]. My opponent provides a rather lengthy source about Bohmian mechanics to explain how true randomness can't occur even on the quantum scale. Given how long it is, it would help if my opponent would identify a sentence or two to explain how Bohmian mechanics eliminates quantum randomness; the only match I can find on the page is actually an objection to its incompatibility. There's also the fact that Bohmian mechanics is merely a version of quantum theory, one among many [2], and isn't necessarily true at all. Different quantum theories may be true instead; in fact, perhaps none of the variants are true. My opponent must give some reason to believe this interpretation over others. We then come to my life-related argument. My opponent calls pain a "processing of an electrical stimulus designed to direct a defensive reaction"; however, a process among atoms and molecules wouldn't require an actual emotion. Why are the signals interpreted as pain? Why can't they be interpreted directly into a defensive reaction? Pain doesn't seem to have a true reason. My opponent dubs pain a "complicated impulse," but the question is, at what point is it not just a signal to be transmitted to another part of the brain but instead a signal to be translated into actual pain? There must be some part(s) of the brain that do exactly this. However, if the pain is being processed in multiple parts of the brain, then how is all of this pain felt by the same entity? My opponent claims that I use the fallacies of division and composition, but I haven't, really. The computer example is that because of all the parts put together, the end result of the simulation of StarCraft is achieved. With the neurons, however, each individual neuron in the brain is kept alive, and signals are sent and received from it just as if it were still in a brain, tricking the neuron into thinking that it is still in a brain. In this case, with StarCraft, we'd have some pixels still creating visual output, some vibrating parts still producing audio output, and some mouse still receiving manual input; they'd just be disconnected. However, while the computer is supposed to be producing output to an external system, the brain is supposed to be processing and creating pain within itself. If a bunch of neurons are individually creating the feeling of pain, is the original owner of the brain feeling all of this pain? This is, essentially, the first thought experiment, dividing up the numerous parts of the brain which are supposed to process pain, and tricking them into "thinking" that they are still part of the complete brain by sending the same signals that they would have received otherwise. We could even say that we created artificial brains out of natural materials to supplement the rest of the brain that each part was missing. My opponent claims that communication would not occur, and so pain would not be felt. However, how is this any different from the scenario involving a complete brain? The exact same halves of the brain are sending and receiving the exact same signals, and yet the once perfectly believable creation of pain within a single individual suddenly seems to violate logic; was there some super-physical property of these signals? I will drop my second thought experiment, as my opponent's counter-argument handles it further than I can continue to argue. My first thought experiment would serve its purpose well enough. To conclude, the fact that an individual feels pain due to a system of processes in the brain seems physically impossible when properly analyzed, necessitating super-physical properties in the brain and creating a hole in the only syllogism used to affirm the resolution. Good luck with Round 3, wjmelements. 1. http://en.wikipedia.org...'s_laws_of_motion#Importance_and_range_of_validity 2. http://en.wikipedia.org...