The Problem of Evil

Apology: I apologize for misrepresenting Con. One gambles when stating another's case. But doing so brings clarity; it gives the other party opportunity to correct the mistake. Moral Good? Con says Plantinga says god might not be able to make a world with more "moral good" in it than this one. I don't know what that argument is about. I don't know what Plantinga and Con mean by "moral good." Con has declined to explain, even though I invited him to. So Con has not actually articulated an argument here. I have no chance to refute what he has not explained. In any case, if god had the will and the power to prevent evil, there would be no evil. What this has to do with whatever Con means by "moral goodness" remains a mystery. Free Will: Con says "free will is what gets in the way of a perfect world. It is not up to God to decide if we do good or bad with our free will." But there are possible worlds in which we have free will and are perfectly happy. They don't involve logical contradictions, so they are possible worlds. They are not impossible, so they are possible. They are obviously possible, and Plantinga clearly states that they are possible. [1] An omniscient god would have known about these goodworlds. Plantinga states that god knew, at the time of creation, every decision that would ever be made in every possible and impossible world. He knows everything, including the future. [1] An omnipotent god would have been able to create one of the free-willed goodworlds instead of this world where people suffer. An omnibenevolent god (totally against evil) would have selected one of those worlds to create. So free will isn't really a problem. It is perfectly compatible with absence of evil. Plantinga deals with this by equivocating on the meaning of "free will." If god created a goodworld, Plantinga simply doesn't count that world as having free will. But if god created a badworld, Plantinga says those people do have free will. He dances back and forth between two definitions of free will, and hopes we won't notice. Con isn't guilty of that equivocation. He just says free will is a problem, without really explaining why. And now, because this is my last post, if he gives an explanation, I won't be able to respond to it. I ask voters to keep this in mind. In any case, Con accepted the definitions in my opening post. According to those definitions, a god isn't omnibenevolent if he is more interested in free will than in preventing evil. An omnipotent god wouldn't have to choose anyway. If he had to choose, he wouldn't be omnipotent. An omnipotent god can do anything that doesn't involve logical contradiction, and there is no logical contradiction involved in creating one of the infinity of worlds in which we have free will and don't do evil. And an omniscient god would know which worlds could be created to avoid all evil while still having free will. So it is implicit in Con's argument, even if he denies it, that the god he describes as able-to-coexist with evil is isn't is lacking in one of the omnis. He isn't omnipotent or isn't omniscient or isn't omnibenevolent. Con has done nothing to refute the case I made in my opening post. Con wrote: "Asking God to make free creatures who only choose good is an absurdity. For then that would not be free will. It would be a contradiction." On the contrary, if we had to choose evil, then we wouldn't have free will. It is only because we don't have to choose evil that we can be said to have free will. And in some possible worlds, we do not choose evil. Omnibenevolence: Con writes: "pro somehow gets the idea that when I said, "It is logically possible that God has morally sufficient reasons for permitting evils" that somehow implies I think God is not omnibenevolent." I defined "omnibenevolent" in my opening post. Con didn't object to that definition. He agreed to this debate using that definition. For the purpose of this debate, "omnibenevolent" means totally, purely, infinitely, strongly, and unconflictedly opposed to evil. It does not mean "totally, purely, infinitely, strongly, and unconflictedly opposed to evil unless he happens to have a "morally sufficient reason" for not opposing evil." Therefore, a god that wants something else (like free will) more than it wants to prevent evil is not omnibenevolent, by definition. Con quotes C. S. Lewis to the effect that if we were good we would be automata. That makes no sense. If god forced us to be good, then we wouldn't have free will, but if god chose to create one of the infinity of worlds in which we freely choose the good, that wouldn't make us automata. Con writes: "Of course God knew what would happen if they used their freedom the wrong way: apparently, He thought it worth the risk." Con posits risk, that god was creating blindly, without knowing how the world would turn out. This is move #2 (God is not really omniscient). It's true that a non-omniscient god might coexist with evil, just as a non-omnipotent or non-omnibenevolent god might. But no tri-omni god would tolerate evil. Con suggests that evil may be a reasonable price to pay for free will. But an omnipotent god could have both. There is no inherent contradiction between free will and the absence of evil. Therefore, an omnipotent (able to do anything except violate logic) god could do both. (The only thing that logically conflicts with having no evil is having some evil. Even omnipotent gods can't have both evil and no evil. But they can have anything else and no evil.) Con writes: "In order for Pros (sic) argument to stand he has to show that free will is not valuable enough to exist over a world with creatures with no free will and no evil." But, no. If a god chose free will over evil, that god would not be totally and unconflictedly against evil. He would not be omnibenevolent, as we are using that word in this debate. In addition, if he found that he couldn't give us free will without giving us evil, he wouldn't be omnipotent. Omnipotence is the power to do anything that doesn't involve contradiction. There is no contradiction in free-willed people always choosing good. If they couldn't always choose good, if they had to choose evil, then they wouldn't have free will. An omnipotent god would know in which possible worlds we have free will and always choose good. An omnipotent god could have chosen to create one of those free-willed goodworlds. An omnibenevolent god would have done so. If a tri-omni god existed, evil would not exist. Thanks: Thanks to Con for this debate, and I hope to continue the discussion elsewhere. And thanks to DDO, and any readers and voters. Conclusion: Nothing Con said has undermined my case. If a god were tri-omni (as defined in my opening post) he would have the will and the power to prevent evil. If he had the will and the power to prevent evil, he would do so. Therefore, if a tri-omni god existed, there would be no evil. Con's main point is that some gods would prefer free will to preventing evil. But those gods are not tri-omni (as defined in my opening post). They aren't omnibenevolent because they put something else ahead of preventing evil, and they are not omnipotent because they can't have free will without evil. Vote Con. --- [1] Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil.