The Metaphysics of Star Trek: Dr. Ira Graves failed to Cheat Death

Thanks for accepting Con. Psychology isn’t sufficient The main reason why it seems Dr. Graves survived is because of the intuition that the continuation of psychology is sufficient for personal survival over time. This can clearly be demonstrated as false, as personal identity is singular. Two people cannot be identical to the same one person. Yet it’s possible that two people can have the same psychological continuation. In the Star Trek universe this has happened. In the 24th episode of the 6th season Commander Riker meets himself [1]. Due to a transporter accident two Rikers were made. One Riker was left behind and the other went on to be promoted. Both have the same psychological continuation and history. But they cannot be both identical to the same person, as that would entail contradictions. The same person would both be a Commander and a Lieutenant. The same person would be in two mutually exclusive positions at once. "He's not Will. He is Will, but... you know what I mean." – Beverly Crusher A psychological view of identity would have problems accounting for this. There doesn’t appear to be anything wrong with two people having the same continued psychology therefore merely uploading Graves’ consciousness into Data isn’t enough to make him survive. This is reminiscent of the Swampman thought experiment, except both parties live. “Suppose Davidson goes hiking in the swamp and is struck and killed by a lightning bolt. At the same time, nearby in the swamp another lightning bolt spontaneously rearranges a bunch of molecules such that, entirely by coincidence, they take on exactly the same form that Davidson's body had at the moment of his untimely death.” [2]. There is nothing wrong with proposing a modified version of this where the Davidson is only knocked out and both parties live. The same contradictions come up as before. One could possibly state that the continuation of mental events themselves aren’t what’s relevant, but the mental events themselves. This is even more problematic. One, people can lose mental events. But, how can it be said they become a new person? Two, what makes mental events mine? What makes my memories and thoughts mine? This shows in order to hold this theory, they must presume facts about identity in the first place. Furthermore, If something like the modified Swampman happened how can it be said that the mental events can indicate identity, both men have the exact same mental events but are nonetheless two different beings. Counter-Intuitive At first glance the concept of transferring consciousness seems reasonable enough, but when you think about it in a certain way you see the concept is very counterintuitive and unlikely. Let’s say Graves messed up and failed to transfer himself all the way. Data acts like Graves, but Graves is still alive for another hour. Would Data be Dr. Graves? No, since Graves still existed when Data acted like him. What about if Graves were alive for another 10 seconds? Still no, since there is overlap. There can be no overlap (since two people cannot be identical to one person), not 1 second or a microsecond. This entails that in order for Graves to live, he must first be dead. This is clearly absurd. In order to survive you must die? As David Kyle Johnson said “Quick, kill me so I won’t die.”[3] Our most basic common sense tells us dying will kill you, not help you survive. The resolution is affirmed. To Con! [1] http://en.memory-alpha.org... [2] Davidson, Donald. "Knowing One's Own Mind." Reprinted in Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective (pp. 15–38). New York and Clarendon: Oxford University Press. Originally published in Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 60, 1987 [3] http://www.thegreatcourses.com...