The Ontological Argument is Sound

Recall the controversial premise, that "It is possible a maximally great being exists."a priori Warrant for P1Definitions for God's properties are found in the first post- here, http://www.debate.org...Con focusses his case against the coherency of the great making properties. But he simlpy asserts that such properties aren't actually great, "Items noted to be great making properties are only asserted as such and not demonstrated to actually be as such..."But it just seems obvious that the property of knowing all true propositions is great (omniscience). Likewise it is clearly greater to be all good rather than all evil, for an all good being is worthy of worship, whereas an evil being is avoided, and therefore is not what we mean by "great." Do you avoidn great things? Certainly not.But let that pass, Cons objection does nothing to undercut the notion of our finite ability to gradually discover what great making properties there are. Just because we might not know yet, doesn't imply such properties are incoherent. We simply havent discovered what they are yet. Rather what Con must do, is show is that a maximally great being is logically incoherent, like a married bachelor, or a round square. But a greatest concievable being is just that, conceivable! Hence his burden of proof here is more than he can bear. Con next tries to show paradoxes concerning omnipotence compared to omniscience. He attempts to show that a maximally great being exists if it lacks a great making property. But surely that doesn't follow. For since we may not yet know what a great making property is, then the definition of a maximally great being doesn't stand or fall with our knowing its great making properties in full. Hence the ontological argument. But in fact there's just no reason to give up such properties as not great or incoherent. First, omnipotence is admitted by theologians to be poorly understood. Second, asking God to do what is logically impossible is like asking your teacher a meaningless question. If something is a logical impossibility, then it's not a thing. Therefore, you're not asking God anything when you ask him to know something that is impossible to know. But notice this isn't what Con is asking! He simply says that there are things which are "unknown" ... but unknown by whom? Surely it's coherent that a being who knows all true propositions would know what is unknown to us. Third, if we take a conceptualist model of divine knowledge that also includes Molinism, then omniscience means God has natural knowledge of what could happen, middle knowledge of what would happen (given the combination of different possible circumstances), & free knowledge of what will happen.For the first type, natural knowledge, God"s knowledge here is self-contained like a contingent mind's ideas: God knows all true propositions, including ones about future contingents, the range of possible worlds, etc.In middle knowledge, God also has knowledge of all contingently true counterfactual propositions, including those of creaturely free actions. Thus God not only knows of the range of possible worlds, but then also the range of feasible worlds. The basis of middle knowledge here, is that God knows the individual essence of every possible creature so well that He knows what that creature would do in any possible combination of circumstances that God may actualize him in, and also that God simply discernes all truths including counterfactual truths.Then for His knowledge of the actual world, God follows the knowledge of his own decree, the actual world.Here we see that Cons paradox dissolves, for simply knowing all true propositions rules out, by definition, the notion of not knowing what it didn't know. Why? Because "all true propositions" includes no unknowns! Thus Con presents a false paradox. This is a coherent notion of all power, Omnipotence- God is all powerful just if he can actualize any state of affairs that isn"t described by the counterfactuals of the free acts of others and that is broadly logically possible for someone to actualize, given the same hard past and the same true counterfactuals about the free acts of others.Lastly, Con says that because God's actions are somhow unknowable, then it follows we wouldn't know if he is all good or not... But this is confused, even if God is unknowable, He isn't determined to be good because of any obligation he fullfills. Rather God is good and to be praised in the sense of adoration for his axiological perfection, not in the sense of commendation for fully executing his duties. God by definition is singularly worthy of worship, and only a being that is the locus, source, and standard of all value is both worthy of worship and greater than an evil being. It is greater to be good than not, therefore God is good. a posteriori Warrant for P1Case dropped by CONCitations(Definitions of God's properties): [Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview], WL Craig, JP Moreland