God most likely does not exist

Unfortunately, it's not hard to see where his arguments fall flat. Argument From Incoherence: Omnipotence/ OmnibenevolenceMy opponent is claiming I am contradicting myself with these two statements on my end:"God could still hypothetically be the author and source of morality and be malevolent. " "first off, (ii) is how God is defined and would be an attribute of his essence if he exists. "Of course, these two do nothing to contradict each other. Thus, my opponent has created a false problem. God could be the author and source of moral authority (this is of course, under the assumption that I didn't dismantle this idea already) with this being an attribute of his essence, all while God being malevolent as well. You see, the source of morality could (and most likely) also be the source of immorality. Therefore, there is no conflict between moral authority being part of an omnipotent beings essence, while being benevolent and malevolent at the same time even. Basically, I'm shocked that my opponent would even suggest a contradiction here. I have stated nothing incoherent, if it came off this way, it is only due to Con straw-manning/ not comprehending my stance. Now, my opponent also states:"Evil is only defined by what God's nature is not" - ConThis is absolutely absurd. This means, if God's nature was that of a rapist, then not being a rapist would be evil. This is an irrational view of morality and extremely counter intuitive, also this has not been justified by Con (I do not think this position can even be rationally justified). "So in order for my opponent's argument to work, he HAS to show that God, as an omnipotent and omnibenevolent being, would be bound by a moral authority apart from himself by which we may judge his actions as evil. " - ConI have shown this already extensively. I already proved that morality cannot be grounded in God ontologically in my last round. I even quoted a prominent theistic philosopher who agrees. If moral goods exist, then certain acts are immoral no matter who commits them. Philosopher Philosopher Michael Ruse also states:"the man who says it's acceptable to rape a child is just as mistaken as saying 2+2=5! " This is how morality is generally viewed by people who adhere to objective morality. My opponent's argument basically boils down to, "2+2=5 is incorrect as far as us sentient beings are concerned, but this would not be incorrect as far as this special sentient being is concerned". This obviously involves some shaky reasoning. 2+2=5 is wrong no matter what, just like raping a child is wrong no matter what. My opponent simply doesn't understand, that moral truths are necessary truths. Con is also claiming that my use of modal logic was embarrassing, well this is false. The only thing embarrassing I see, if Con's irrational and radical view on moral good and God (which, once more, he has failed to justify sufficiently). Regardless, I never said God was omnibenevolent in every possible world. I really wish my opponent would either read my arguments, or quit straw-manning them. I stated that being B would be more benevolent than being A, thus being A cannot be omnibenevolent:(A) If it impossible for Being A to exist, then Being A commits an act of evil in one possible world(B) If it is possible for Being B to exist, then Being B commits an act of evil in no possible worldBeing B would obviously be omnibenevolent, but not Being A. However if God is omnipotent then we would have to combine this with Being A, and not Being B. Why? Well, Being A would be more powerful than Being B (in this new scenario):(A) If it is possible for Being A to exist, then being A commits an act of evil in one possible world (benevolent/ malevolent)(B) If it is possible for being B to exist, then being B commits an act of evil is no possible world (omnibenevolent)A being who can commit both good and evil acts, is obviously more powerful than a being only limited to acts of good. The contradiction is as clear as day, a being cannot both be omnipotent and omnibenevolent. My opponent's responses are based on a ridiculous view of moral goods and God which cannot be rationally supported. Thus, this argument from incoherence still stands firm, completely unscathed. Also, Con states:"There is nothing inherent in the definitions given in round one that this God is sentient" - ConDue to this and the other previous arguments presented by Con, I am started to believe he may be legitimately trolling. You cannot be benevolent or knowing unless you are sentient. I mean, how could one know anything, unless they were consciously aware of certain information? The definitions I provided, clearly necessitate sentience. "If a game programmer made it wrong for his programmees to engage in the act of juggling, would it be wrong for the programmer to juggle? "**Face palm**Objective moral truths, are necessary truths (like 2+2=4). If God can rape a child and have it not be evil, then this means God could also make 2+2=5. Of course, this goes against my opponent's view of omnipotence. My opponent simply hasn't supported the idea that acts of evil which are objectively bad, could be objectively good if God did them (this is utter absurd and incoherent). This would be like saying that if God wrote the equation 2+2=5, then it would be correct. Paul Draper's Argument From Evil (Gratuitous Suffering)My opponent states:"I am saying that if we ASSUME an objective measurement for morality APART from God as defined in round 1, then we are begging the question" - ConI am sincerely in shock here. I didn't simply assert, or assume that an objective measurement had to be apart from God, I proved it extensively with my argument regarding moral goods and God's nature. I supported the idea that morality cannot be grounded in God several times throughout this debate. Now my opponent's main argument here in a nutshell, is that if God exists, we would have little to no knowledge of his knowledge regarding reasons for allowing gratuitous suffering, this gratuitous suffering could not even be evil by God's standard. Thus, Pr(O1 & O2 & O3|T) < Pr(O1 & O2 & O3|HI), Pr(O1 & O2 & O3|T) > Pr(O1 & O2 & O3|HI), and Pr(O1 & O2 & O3|T) = Pr(O1 & O2 & O3|HI) are equally as supported. However, I have argued that moral truths (truths regarding good and evil), are necessary truths (like 2+2=4). Thus, you cannot exclude one sentient being from these necessary truths while all other sentient beings are subject to them. Not only does this make (ii) an illogical attribute of God (thus, affirming the resolution), but this also further solidifies Draper's argument. One who causes or knowingly allows gratuitous suffering when it can be prevented, is either evil, or good. There are no exceptions, because the second there are exceptions, then moral truths cease to actually exist. This would still negate the resolution, because if morals don't exist, then God cannot be the author/ source of them. ConclusionMoral truths regarding good and evil are necessary truths about certain actions. If raping a child is evil, then it can't, not be evil, if God commits this act. This would mean, that moral truths don't actually exit. Objective moral truths, cannot be grounded in God. Thus, if objective morality exists, God is bound by this morality. If God authored this morality, while he himself was not bound by it, this would make morality subjective (thus, non-existent in reality). It already would be subjective, because morals would be dependent on God's mind, making them subjective by definition (nothing about the definition of subjective, implies that it is limited to just human beings). Since my opponent's refutations all revolved around this idea regarding "God" and "good" that cannot be justified rationally, then both of my arguments clearly remain standing without a scratch. The resolution firmly stands affirmed.