The argument from evil establishes the probable nonexistence of God.

I thank Con for his kind words and, based on his win percentage, must return the compliment.Con's response to the argument from evil is twofold: first that free will is a good for the sake of which God is morally justified in permitting at least one of E1 or E2, and second that such goods, if they exist, are epistemically inscrutable by humans. These two positions are mutually exclusive. One cannot claim that the existence such of a good is epistemically inscrutable, and simultaneously that it does exist and is thus-and-such. Con can take one position or the other, but not both.Nonetheless, I will consider both defenses on their merits.Free Will Defense (FWD)1) Con correctly states that the free will defense only applies to one of the two scenarios in the argument, the one in which a moral decision applies. Since a good for the sake of which God is morally justified in permitting both E1 and E2 is called for in this argument, and since by Con's own admission the free will defense, even if successful, would only apply to one of these scenarios, this defense fails on its face.2) Moreover, the question of whether libertarian free will even exists is highly controversial. If an omniscient and infallible entity knows that I am going to do X, then it is not possible for me not to do X. Con might argue since I had reasons for doing X and made (or believe I made) the choice myself, I had free will in choosing to do X even if it was impossible for me to not to X. However, many philosophers would disagree.[1] Any free will defense must therefore be accompanied by a compelling argument for compatibilism, which Con has not provided.Epistemic Inscrutability Defense (EID)Con argues that we humans do not have access to "The Big Picture;" that is, we are not in an epistemic position to be able to ascertain the existence or nonexistence of evil-permitting goods, and therefore cannot justify the inference from P to Q based on the principle of induction. There are several replies to this; here are just a few.1) If Con's argument were applied consistently, then we would not be in an epistemic position to ascertain (for example) the existence of goods for the sake of which God would be morally justified in lying to humans in John 3:16, and sending everyone, Christian and non-Christian alike, to Hell. Thus, we cannot say that John 3:16 is true. In addition, employing this principle, we are unable to rule out the existence of goods which would permit God to have created the universe and everything in it in situ last Thursday. Thus, EID leads to radical and unacceptable (to Christians) theological and epistemological skepticism, and must be rejected.2) EID also leads to radical moral skepticism. To extend Con's analogy of the deer: if a human were standing nearby, saw that the deer was about to die and was in a position to rescue it, he might reason as follows: "Why is God allowing this to happen? Being a good god, he must have a reason. Perhaps if that deer lived, it would eat all of a particular plant, thus causing an ecosystem imbalance which would lead to mass starvation in the future. That would be even more terrible! Of course, I can't see 'The Big Picture,' and have no way of knowing myself that that will happen. But obviously it, or something like it, is good enough to justify God's not intervening. Therefore, it's good enough to justify my not intervening! I don't want to be responsible for mass starvation, or for preventing whatever good God wants to bring about by allowing this deer to die!" And he walks away. This is obviously morally absurd; yet it is an unavoidable consequence of EID.3) In any case, it is generally accepted that permitting another person's intense and involuntary suffering is immoral unless the positive conscious experiences of that other person plays a key role in the good for which that suffering is justified. For example, a mother permitting her son to endure the pain of a flu shot is justified by her son's positive experiences that winter in not having to endure the flu. It follows, then, that any goods for the sake of which God might permit humans to suffer would consist of, or include, positive conscious experiences on the part of humans. And neither the humans who would suffer nor the positive conscious experiences that they would have are epistemically inscrutable to humans. So it seems that we are in an epistemic position to ascertain the goods for which God is justified in permitting suffering, and thus to make the inference from P to Q.[2]4) If goods of the type mentioned in P and Q exist, and if the existence and nature of the goods were epistemically inscrutable to humans, then it is logical to assume that God would make his existence and/or his love sufficiently clear to humans so that we would know that Q is false. This stems from God's desiring a reciprocal loving relationship with all humans. To return to the flu shot analogy: even if the child were unable to comprehend the reasons for his mother allowing this suffering, a maximally loving mother would nonetheless make every effort she could to be consciously present to the child, so that she could give him assurances of her love and care for him. So, too, a loving god would always be consciously present to us (at least to humans) when they are permitted to suffer for goods they cannot comprehend, giving assurances of his love and care. That this does not happen gives support for the P-Q inference sufficient to overcome EID.[3]Each of the foregoing reasons, by itself, defeats EID. I conclude, then, that the argument from evil stands unscathed.[1] cf. Vihvelin, K. ed., "Arguments for Incompatibilism," at Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available at http://plato.stanford.edu... (2011).[2] Rowe, W. "The Empirical Argument from Evil," in Audi, et al, eds., Rationality, Religious Belief, and Moral Commitment (Cornell University, 1986).[3] Rowe, W. Philosophy of Religion: An Introduction, 3rd ed. (Wadsworth, 2001).