The Cosmological Argument is Sound

Ave.Let’s note some important words before I begin. If something exists necessarily, then it didn’t begin to exist. It exists inexplicably because of its own nature. If something began to exist, then it’s contingent, which means that its existence depended on some other event causing it to begin to exist. [1]Con brings up an important objection to the cosmological argument. If everything that begins to exist has a cause, then how can an uncaused cause exist? Thankfully, Con doesn’t use the classical misunderstanding of the argument and ask ‘’Then what caused god?’’. Rather, he suggests that if there is a first cause that exists necessarily, there is no reason to think that the universe couldn’t also exist necessarily.Premise two states that everything which begins to exist has a cause. In classical theism, god is considered to exist necessarily. Since god exists necessarily, god never began to exist, and there is no reason to think god had a cause of his existence. [2]There are also good reasons to believe that the universe began to exist, and therefore had a cause. If the universe began to exist, then by definition, it couldn’t exist necessarily and without cause. I have already cited the overwhelming astrophysical evidence which proves that the universe had an absolute beginning. I quoted physicist Alexander Vilenkin to show that it’s very implausible for the universe not to have had an absolute beginning. Con doesn’t dispute any of this evidence in his rebuttal. So, as long as the evidence cited in favor of the universe’s absolute beginning stands, there is no reason to think that the universe exists necessarily.Science is, indeed, the study of reality. If there is something in reality that leads to the conclusion that something can begin to exist without cause (reason), then it would be scientific to say so. However, there is no reason to think that there are things that begin to exist without cause. Why aren’t there widespread violations of the PSR all around us? For each way that things could go in accordance with the laws of nature, there is an uncountable infinity of ways that things could, for no reason at all, go contrary to the laws of nature. Our empirical observations suggest that the probability of such events is very low. If one rejects the PSR, then our knowledge of evolution may be undercut. For if one weren't confident of something very much like the PSR, it would be hard to be justifiably confident that no biological features of the human species arose for no reason at all. I think that inference to the best conclusion would lead us to accept that there is nothing that begins to exist without a reason for its existence.I gave two arguments to support the metaphysical principle ex nihilo nihil fit. The first argument was the argument from potentiality, and the second argument was the argument from properties. Con doesn’t respond to any of these arguments in his rebuttal. Instead, he arbitrarily dismisses ex nihilo nihil fit as being nothing but a ‘’philosophical principle’’ that has nothing to do with reality. I find this dismissal of philosophy to be insulting. Firstly, ex nihilo nihil fit is best described as a metaphysical principle. Secondly, science has metaphysical claims built into it from the start. These are metaphysical claims like the existence of absolute truth and empiricism. There’s no way to have any foundation of science without metaphysical principles. So, it seems absurd to act like you can separate metaphysics and science without ruining what it means to do science.A metaphysical principle is a statement about reality. If a metaphysical principle is true, then it’s true for all of reality. It’s not just true within philosophy. We both agree that science is a way of working out what reality really is. If ex nihilo nihil fit is a true metaphysical principle, then it’s true for reality, so it’s true for science as well. You can’t just act like a metaphysical principle is true for philosophy, but not for science. I’m disappointed that Con would argue against this metaphysical principle with an arrogant dismissal of philosophy, rather than actually engaging with the two arguments presented. [3]Con tries to give reasons for why something can come from nothing. He makes an argument based off the idea that even if there’s nothing, the laws of physics would still exist, which can cause something to come form nothing. This argument makes the fallacy of equivocation. [4] He’s using nothing to mean something different from the metaphysical definition of nothing. We’re talking about nothing as in the universal negation of anything. That means there is nothing. There no laws of physics that describe how things act even if those things don’t exist yet. Con’s argument tries to refute ex nihilo nihil fit, but it’s predicated on a meaning of ‘’nothing’’ that’s not used for that principle.Zeno’s paradox is an argument against an actual infinite, but it’s not relevant to anything I said in my opening argument. I gave entirely different reasons for why an eternal universe could not exist. Con says ‘’Just like Zeno’s paradox is wrong, so is the other paradox as well.’’ This doesn’t seem to make any sense. Why think that one argument against the infinite is wrong just because another one happens to be? In fact, Con is actually committing the fallacy of fallacy. [5] The fact that one argument is false does not mean it’s conclusion is false. For example, if I argued that everyone thinks other people exist, so therefore, solipsism isn’t true, then that would be a fallacious way of arguing. It doesn’t follow that the conclusion (solipsism isn’t true) must also be false, however. It just means the way that person came to that conclusion is false.Con argues that my definition of god isn’t how god is typically defined. This isn’t a issue that Con can debate. In round one, I defined the definition of god for the purpose of this debate. When Con accepted the debate, he accepted my framework, which also means that he accepted all of the definitions. Con can’t accept the debate and then argue that the definitions I gave aren’t valid. If Con didn’t like the definitions, he shouldn’t have accepted my framework. That’s DDO conduct.Con also cites the famous omnipotence paradox. It follows the logic of ‘’Can god create a rock that is so heavy, he can’t lift it?’’. This is supposed to show that omnipotence is logically impossible, so therefore, an omnipotent being is also impossible. This paradox isn’t a paradox at all, because it misunderstands what it means to be omnipotent. Omnipotence isn’t the ability to do anything. It’s the ability to do anything that’s logically possible. It’s logically impossible for god to create something that he can’t lift. Does this mean that god isn’t omnipotent? No, because omnipotence only requires him to do the logically possible, not the logically impossible. [6]In my last round, I argued that the cause of the universe is most plausibly personal. Con’s objection to this point is weak. He simply refuses to accept that the argument shows a personal cause. That’s not a strong objection at all.Con also seems to misunderstand what a personal cause is. A personal cause isn’t an explanation of why the water was boiling and why it was in the situation in which it could boil. A personal cause is “in terms of the intentional action of a rational agent” (Swinburne, 1979, 20). None of those have anything to do with rational agency. [7]Vale.References[1] http://www.unc.edu...[2] http://plato.stanford.edu...[3] http://en.wikipedia.org...[4] http://www.fallacyfiles.org...[5] http://en.wikipedia.org...[6] http://ubphi212.wordpress.com...[7] 1979, The Existence of God, Oxford: Clarendon Press.