Argument for the Non-Existence of God

I apologize if my response was disjointed or confusing - there were many points at which I said that the logic stealspell was using followed from the previous points, but that the previous points were false, which was actually something stealspell tried to indicate in the beginning. Sorry if that was confusing, although the relevant responses can still be found from last round. Let's get started:Proposition 2:a) My opponent notes that I began to require a definition of being at proposition 2 even though it was used in proposition 1. As I said in my granting of the first proposition, anything that is thinking (present tense) also has thoughts that exist in time (present tense). Hence, I could grant that a thinking being had thoughts that existed in time. However, in proposition two my opponent began to go deeper into the idea of being, stating that God is a being. Hence, a definition of being became necessary. b) My opponent basically refuses to define being except by saying that we must understand "being" in the sense that people are "beings" and can interact with God in a personal way. This requires that God is more than simply something that created the universe, but also conscious and personal. This assertion is totally unwarranted, so I reject it on that basis. Objection 2-1:My opponent makes a distinction between forces and beings, essentially stating that his conception of God is as a being and not a force. As I just mentioned a moment ago, this interpretation is unwarranted. I reject it on this basis. Objection 3-3-1:My opponent basically says that, since I can't quantify something beyond both of our levels of intelligence, this point is moot. This in ability to quantify does not, however, needlessly muddle things. The point that I was making in 3-3-1 is that, like my opponent says, "thoughts" is an appeal to human experience. I have no idea what "greater" than that feels like, but that doesn't mean that it doesn't exist and that I can't understand the possibility. I understand the distinction between the intellectual capacity of an ant and my own; I am merely applying that massive gap in the direction greater than human intelligence. At this point, proposition 3, that God, being a being, must have thoughts, is untrue. Even if God can understand the intellect if individual humans from an intellectually superior position, just like we understand the simplistic mental functions of ants, that does not mean that s/he doesn't have a greater intellect above thoughts, just like our human understanding of ants without the ability of ants to conceive of our intellect. Therefore, we can reject proposition 3. Objection 6/7-1:My opponent rejects my argument about nuclear decay not having a cause. I'll clarify: nuclear decay can be driven by weak nuclear force, but the point at which decay begins to occur isn't calculable - in that sense, it is not as if there is a quantifiable event that spurs nuclear decay, only some process that we haven't been able to pinpoint. Moreover, the example isn't relevant. Even if all known events have been caused in some way or another, that doesn't mean that all events are caused in some way or another. Induction is good for making "soft" rules, but we can never prove our findings beyond all doubt. Objection 6/7-1-1:My opponent makes a semantic argument against the universe without a cause argument that I made in the rebuttal, claiming a difference between being in time and having a quality of time. As stealspell claims, "the universe is not something that is in time. " Semantic defenses are interesting, but my opponent doesn't come close to explaining what the difference between what "in time" and "quality of time" is. To me, having the quality of time apply to something means that the temporal characteristics are relevant to it and it is, in other words, in time. Extend that not something in time does not need to be caused. Objection 8-1:My argument was that the claim that a caused God could still be omnipotent (why not? ). My opponent stated that I got confused, but I think I did actually reference the same line of thinking that stealspell made. As they say, "[i]f God is caused then the there must be something of greater potency than God to cause God. " Well, simply put, why not? I understand the thinking here, it just isn't logical. If one thing is omnipotent, then it can do anything, including creation of another omnipotent being. Omnipotent = omnipotent. Objection 9-1:My opponent repeats that God has to be omnipotent. Reject this since it's totally unwarranted. I offered two bible verses in support of my point, which I'd like to extend since they are both biblical illustrations that the Judeochristian God evidently cannot do literally anything. It's still not clear that we're speaking of that specific God, but I'm responding specifically and generally just to cover all bases. My opponent offers another Bible verse. The argument is basically that "almighty," as used in the Bible, means omnipotent. That's certainly one take on "almighty," but I'd say that God of the Bible couldn't be truly omnipotent given the limitations referenced in the Bible verses that I offered. "Almighty" could just mean "really powerful. " Moreover, just because nature shouted that God was almighty, doesn't make that so. God might be almighty with respect to nature, but not with respect to something else. Objection 9-1-1:My opponent concedes that God can't do things that contradict his being. My opponent says that this fact doesn't make God not omnipotent, but omnipotence means the power to do anything. If God can't contradict himself (or lie, which was conveniently left out), then God cannot do anything. My opponent makes a couple of responses to my summary. This is just a summary, though, so I don't think it needs going into. I was just trying to make my position clear. Meta-objection:The core of the meta-objection is that "proof" is a quite large burden to fulfill. As far as a generic (not Judeochristian specifically) God goes, disproof is impossible because, even if something else created the universe, maybe a God created what created the universe, or what created what created the universe, and so on. Total disproof of a generic God is impossible since proof requires such great lengths in this case. My opponent makes three responses:1. My opponent rejects my notion of "proof" requiring certainty. My opponent actually references proof beyond reasonable doubt in a court, but "beyond reasonable doubt" is a qualifier on proof, meaning that proof in that case is meant on a level of probability with respect to reasonable doubt. Proof in general, however, is a higher standard. I referenced a definition in the rebuttal, but here it is in full (see my citation there [6]):"1. a) the cogency of evidence that compels acceptance by the mind of a truth or a fact. "In other words, proof isn't just likeliness, it compels acceptance. It's proof. It's certainty.2. My opponent basically strays from my point in the second response and goes to the argument about an impersonal God being useless, which is irrelevant to whether or not God can be demonstrated not to exist. It's not relevant to the meta-objection either, which is pretty clear since stealspell says my point is superfluous compared to his.3. This argument is the same as the second: that God must be perfect and all powerful and such, which is unwarranted and can be rejected on that basis. I look forward to stealspell's response.