A Maximally Great Being is Possible

Pro's First Equivocation: Pro claimed that most philosophers believe "God" is necessary. When I pointed out that that's hardly likely, Pro changed his claim to, "necessary existence is either possible or impossible," which is not the same claim at all. It's nothing like the same claim. And Pro calls my doubt "odd," even though I never doubted his new claim. If my doubt of his old claim was odd, he wouldn't have had to retrench. He could have defended the old claim instead of changing it. - Greatness is Subjective: Pro argued for a maximally great being. I pointed out that greatness is subjective. Pro answers that maximal greatness is ontologically objective. But can that be? Greatness is a value. Value requires a valuer, an opinion. Opinions are always subjective. Greatness, then, is in the eye of the beholder. Some people may like gods who torture people endlessly in Hellfire. I am against torture. So I prefer gods of Hellfire to be nonexistent. To me, when it comes to gods of Hellfire, nonexistence is greatness. Pro makes some noise about nonexistence not being a "property," but Hellfire is still bad. - Pro's Big Objection: I Pointed Out That He's Wrong. He doesn't like my pointing out that he got the wrong answer. That's funny. If I had a wrong answer, I'd want to know about it. But Pro acts like I'm somehow cheating by revealing that his conclusion is in error. He wants me to start with his first premise, and work my way thru his argument, showing where he went astray. He says I can't know if he's wrong unless I do that. Does that make sense? Can we know an argument is wrong by looking at the answer? Let's consider examples: If a math teacher sees "2+2=5" on a student paper, does he need to know how the student got that answer? Or can he know that the student made some error, since the answer is wrong? If you try to sell an engineer the plans for your perpetual motion machine, does he need to examine your calculations, or can he tell you that he knows you made a mistake somewhere, since, obviously, your conclusion is false? If a car won't start, do you have to look under the hood to know there's a problem? No, Pro is just wrong. He said, "you don't start by refuting the conclusion. You must show which of the premises are false. This is a rule of logic. " That's not true. Pro made it up. There is no such rule. Consider this example, from . http://www.math.toronto.edu... [Okay, never mind. The superscripts won't show up here. But if you follow the link, you'll find a brief and entertaining argument that appears to show that 1 equals 2. Worth looking at even if maximally great gods bore you. ] The conclusion is 1=2. We all know that's wrong. We know a mistake was made, even if we don't know the nature of the mistake. Let's look at Pro's argument again. Plantinga’s Argument 1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists. 2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world. 3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world. 4. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world 5. If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists. 6. Therefore a maximally great being exists. I used the same logic to "prove" that gods don't exist. I define Xal-xe (pronounced Zal-zee) as being a. logically incompatible with gods (no gods exist in worlds in which Xal-xe exists). b. Necessary. (If Xal-xe exists in any possible world, then he exists in all possible worlds. ) Plantinga’s Logic, as applied to Xal-xe: 1. It is possible that Xal-xe exists. 2. If it is possible that Xal-xe exists, then Xal-xe exists in some possible world. 3. If Xal-xe exists in some possible world, then Xal-xe exists in every possible world. 4. If Xal-xe exists in every possible world, then Xal-xe exists in the actual world 5. If Xal-xe exists in the actual world, then Xal-xe exists. 6. Therefore Xal-xe exists. And, therefore, since we know (by definition) that gods don't exist if Xal-xe does, then we know that no gods exist. So Pro's logic proves both X and not-X. It proves both that god exists and that god doesn't exist. We know then, even if we don't look under the hood, that Pro's argument is bad, flawed, erroneous, unsound. It leads to logically conflicting conclusions; we know it is wrong. It doesn't prove anything; it is worthless; it weighs nothing in the scales of persuasion. - Xal-xe Is God? Pro says I don't get to define Xal-xe as "maximally great in all possible worlds," because that would make him god. First, I never did that. I pointed out that "maximal greatness" is subjective and undefined. I never defined Xal-xe as maximally great. Second, even if Xal-xe were a god, he wouldn't be Pro's or Plantinga's god. Xal-xe is logically incompatible with Pro's and Plantinga's gods. (Xal-xe is neither forgiving nor just; he is neither omnipotent nor unable to defeat iron chariots; he is neither omnipresent nor dependent for transportation on columns of flame. Xal-xe doesn't mind doubt and disobedience, so, in Xal-xe's worlds, there is no such thing as sin. ) So, fantasizing that Xal-xe is a god doesn't help Pro's case at all. - Cosmological, Moral, and Conceptualist arguments: In round one, Pro named three arguments, and claimed they showed the existence of Plantinga's maximally great god. I pointed out that they do not. Even if the cosmological argument worked—-which it does not—-it wouldn't prove or tend to prove Pro's maximally great being. There are possible worlds that never began. They can't have creator gods. Pro's god does not exist in those possible worlds. The cosmological argument does not prove or tend to prove that the gods of all created worlds are the same god. It doesn't even purport to do so. The cosmological argument, therefore, is not relevant to Pro's case. The moral and conceptualist arguments are equally irrelevant. Even if morals required gods, they wouldn't require the same god in all worlds that had morals, let alone all possible worlds. And if concepts required gods, they wouldn't require the same god in all possible worlds. None of these arguments supports or tends to support a maximally great god. - Summing Up: Pro's logic is flawed. His argument fails. Pro purports to prove that that a maximally great god exists, but the same logic is equally good at proving that gods do not exist. Any argument that proves both X and not-X is worthless. It proves nothing. It fails utterly. Pro fields three other arguments in support of a maximally great god. But they do not support such a god. They do not address that topic. They are about another subject altogether. Proving that one world had a creator god would—-even if the argument worked, which it doesn't—-would not tend to prove that all worlds have creator gods, or that all worlds had the same creator god, or that any alleged greatness of such creator gods would be maximal. The other two arguments (moral and conceptualist) fail to address the topic of this debate for the same reason that the cosmological argument fails to. - Concluding: The logic of Pro's main argument is bad: It proves that there are no gods as readily as it proves that there is a god. Therefore, it is bad, wrong, totally unpersuasive. Pro's three supplementary arguments have nothing to do with maximally great gods. They are not relevant to this debate. Pro has the burden of proof, but he has failed to prove anything.