WAR GAME SCENARIO: Russia Versus Chosen Nation

OK, you blatantly refuse to follow the rules, so I will do the same. Don't say that I didn't warn you. >:D.June 18: 2:30 localRussia declares Total War on Muslims. Every suspected Muslim within the borders of Russia is shot on site. In Chechnya, a 20 megaton nuclear device is detonated in air at 1000 feet over Grozny. The nuclear fire spreads throughout Chechnya, and the fallout spread is 0, as there is no wind blowing. Thus the fallout covers the Chechnyan landscape.At 12:00 local, all muslim prayer areas are subjected artillery fire due to the killing of innocent people.At 13:00 local, Russia increases border security and releases the statement that anyoen who comes within 1 mile of the Russian border is to be killed immediately.Scenario 6 Spring-summer weather patterns (low humidity and high temperatures; low rain probability); westerly and southwesterly winds of 10 to 30 km/hr at ground level, indexed for altitude; use of highly persistent agents against communications nexi, POMCUS sites, airfields, supply, and nuclear weapon storage facilities (normal computed delivery error rate, see Appendix F of Annex 1). As with Scenarios 1, 3, 4, and 5, any warning of over 15 minutes will ensure virtually complete MOPP-4 protection of alerted combat and support personnel. The problem of civilian casualties remains, since over a hundred targets of the categories cited above are near major population centers. Biodegradation of persistent agents such as GD (the expected Russian agent of choice; for an analysis of Russian literature on this topic, see Appendix C of Annex 2. Biodegradation will be slowed by generally mild temperatures and weather-reduced sunlight photochemical action. This will allow the agents in aerosol form to drift on wind currents. Given minimum source concentrations of 2 milligrams per cubic meter, predicted vertical temperature gradients, and cloud-width inputs, we see that the downwind toxic vapor hazard to large areas of the FRG and DDR will be 0 approximately 0.3 (plus or minus 50% in our calculations, allowing for expected impurities and chemical breakdown in the chemical munitions) as great as that at the targets themselves. Since open Russian literature calls for source (that is, target) concentrations well beyond median lethal dose (LCT-50), we see that the entire German civilian population is at the gravest risk expected retaliation to such chemical strikes would be largely psychological in nature-the use of Russian munitions alone will effectively contaminate most of Greater Germany; it is expected that no part of Germany east of the Rhein can be considered safe to unprotected personnel, beginning 12 hours after the first munitions are expended. Similar effects may be expected in parts of Czechoslovakia, and even western Poland, depending on wind direction and speed. Such contamination must be expected, moreover, to continue at least 1.5 times the mean persistence level of the agents used. This is the last (and statistically most likely) of the scenarios outlined by the contract specifications. SECTION VIII: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY As the reader will appreciate, although given tactical warning of only a few minutes, alerted military formations can confidently be expected to suffer few casualties (albeit with 30-50%degradation of combat effectiveness;this degradation likely, however, to equate to both sides),expected casualties of civilians will actually be greater than those anticipated from a Level-2exchange of tactical nuclear weapons (200 warheads @<100 kt. yield, seeAppendix A of Annex1) at a mix of military and civilian/industrial targets. Thus, despite the fact that chemicalmunitions are not of themselves directly damaging to fixed industrial assets, serious near- and long-term economic effects must be expected. Even the use of non-persistent agents at the FEBA (Forward Edge of the Battle Area) cannot but have major impact on the civilian population due to the heavily urbanized character of the German countryside and the patent inability of any government to provide adequate protection for its civilian population. In terms of immediate effects, the 12,000,000+ civilian fatality floor figure in Scenario 2 represents a public health problem worse by an order of magnitude than that following the Bangladesh Cyclone disaster of 1970, and is likely to include synergistic effects well beyond the scope of this study. (Contract specifications specifically excluded investigation into bidecological effects from a major chemical exchange. While the difficulty associated with an in-depth examination of this subject is impossible at this writing to estimate, the reader is cautioned that such far-reaching effects are less easily dealt with than studied. It might be necessary, for example, to import tons of insect larvae before the simplest food crops can again flourish in Saudi Arabia.) For the moment the ability even of organized armies to dispose of millions of civilian bodies in advanced stages of decomposition is not something to be taken for granted. And the civilians needed for the reestablishment of industrial production (under what are almost certainly optimistic estimates) will have been at the least decimated in the literal, classical sense. An Analysis of the Effects of Chemical Warfare in the Saudi Theater Utilizing Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability (ARAC) Prediction Lawrence-Livermore National Laboratories LLNL 88-2504 * CR 8305/89/178 SIGMA 2 Specified External Distribution Only [>>SECRET<<]June 20, Saudi Arabia, 07:27 localAll-purpose (chemical, radioactivity, biological agent, &etc.) exposure suits are dissiminated throughout the Russian ranks. By 16:45 local, all Russian troops are equipped to survive a chemical attack.At 14:03 local, a DG Chemical detonation occurs at 14:27 local at 25 degrees and 50 feet N, and 43 degrees and 29 feet E.Due to the dry and arid climate, the chemical spreads throughout Saudi Arabia, into Yemen, Oman, UAE, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, and parts of Afghanistan, Jordan, Syria, Egypt, and Sudan.At 14:30 local, Russia pulls out all forces from Saudi Arabia.At 15:00, Russia launches 10 ICBMs with 6 20-megaton nuclear warheads each. All 60 nuclear warheads are detonated 1000 feet over the Middle East; 5 over Kazakhistan; 3 over Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan, Algeria, Egypt, and Albania; 2 over Pakistan; 1 over Turkmenistan, Tajikisatn, Uzbekistan, Iraq, Azerbaijan, Syria, Bahrain, and Kyrgyzstan. The remaining 27 detonate over randomly designated areas 1000 feet over the Middle East. At 15:45, 2000 15 ppm DG chemical weapons are detonated in the former Soviet satellites with the same parameters set in the given scenario, and are then followed by 1000 radiolocigal devices . By 16:11, the Soviet satellites are devoid of life and the Middle East has practically been turned into a sea (figure of speech, NOT literal).At 17:30, strategic and tactical nuclear devices are detonated in Siberia near known separatist locations.U.N and NATO nations (those that are left, anyway) release statements proclaiming that the if the war is to continue, they will begin using their own nuclear and chemical weapons on Russia (as Saudi Arabia -- much less the Middle East -- no longer exists).Before you say anything, this is realistic. Russia (and the U.S, just as a side-note) is fully capable of carrying out the actions described in this round, they just choose not to for the well-being of the planet.