Utilitarianism can properly uphold the value of justice

Thanks for the response Cameron. I'll proceed to a rebuttal of my opponent's points. == Definitions == My opponent tries to make me advocate the Bentham/Mill's version of utilitarianism. This makes no sense. Advances in philosophy have corrected for many of the flaws in their original formulation of utilitarianism. If I were advocating for air travel as upholding the value of safety, it goes without saying that we are talking about *modern* airplanes not the airplanes of the Wright brothers. Although Bentham and Mills invented utilitarianism, there have been many advances in consequentialist thinking since their time. In addition, I should get to choose which version of utilitarianism I endorse. == Observation == My opponent says he does not *need* to endorse an alternate ethical system. However, I asserted that utilitarianism is the *only* way to assess competing rights claims and uphold justice. Without an alternate system, that point should be considered conceded. Secondly, he says he endorses deontology, which includes the categorical imperative. Thus, he must win the CI is preferable to util to win deontology. == Utilitarianism derives from happiness and does not justify morality? == My opponent really makes two distinct arguments under this heading: that util justifies genocide and the (reformulated) murdering doctor objection. First, I'd like to remind the reader that I endorsed *rule consequentialism,* which asks whether you would rather live in a world where X happens or a world where X doesn't happen. This also incorporates aspects of the veil of ignorance. The veil of ignorance asks you to pretend that you don't know anything about who you are (your race, gender, ethnicity, etc). Given that you could be *anyone* within a given society, would you rather live in a world where X happens or where X never happens. Since rule consequentialism asks people to consider their own moral stance on issues and to use the veil of ignorance, most people would generally conclude that they'd rather live in a world where genocide did not happen since they would not enjoy being the targets of the genocide themselves. Thus, rule consequentialism *cannot* be used to justify genocide. Secondly, rule consequentialism is not incompatible with natural rights, like the right to life. If people would rather live in a world where a right to life is guaranteed and respected, then rule consequentialism states that we should have a right to life. The only difference between rule consequentialism and the CI is that rule consequentialism allows important exceptions. Now let's move on to the murdering doctor objection, or rather, cameron's perversion of it. He says that 5 serial killers can be saved by murdering 1 innocent person. Since most people would not want to live in a world where innocent people can be murdered to save the lives of death row inmates, this scenario would not be allowed under rule consequentialism. == Util disregards equality? == Firstly, the veil of ignorance already answers this argument, since someone would not know where in the social hierarchy they will fall while under the veil, so people would prefer a world with protections of minority rights. Secondly, my opponent is unclear what he means by "giving everyone their due." In most societies today, people take "giving everyone their due" to mean providing equality of opportunity, as opposed to equality of outcome, which would be communism. Third, utilitarianism seeks to provide the *greatest good* for the greatest number. My opponent seems to think that *all* that matters is the greatest number, but he completely ignores *the greatest good.* Imagine two axes: on one is the magnitude of the good done and on the other is the total number of people affected; util considers *both* factors. For example, preventing genocide, even if the group is small, provides a massive good, even though it is to a smaller number, because a group that does not die derives massive good from keeping their lives, whereas genocide provides only marginal benefits to the majority (slightly greater per capita resources). The greater good done to the smaller group outweighs the tiny amount of good done to the larger group. == Consequentialism is flawed? == My opponent claims that the government could kill 20% of the population to benefit the other 80%. I've already answered this above with rule consequentialism and the veil of ignorance. In addition, it is doubtful that the U.S. economy, for example, would benefit from 20% of the population dying, even if the worst 20% of society was somehow targeted. My opponent says that consequentialism is bad because it allows immoral intentions that result in moral outcomes. This may be true, depending on the circumstances – for example abortion is allowed because of the negative consequences of banning it, not because the intentions of the mothers are necessarily "moral" - but this is better than deontology and the CI which allow *moral* intentions that result in *immoral* outcomes. Remember the examples I already provided: letting 50 people die because you refuse to shoot one person and letting one million people die because you refuse to torture one terrorist to find the location of a bomb. My opponent next says that if a father tries to protect his son and fails, and they both die, this is deemed immoral by util. This is false. When outcomes are unclear (outside the realm of thought experiments, where outcomes are guaranteed), util looks to *expected* outcomes. In addition, the father clearly derives more utility for *trying* to save his son, even if he fails, than he does from watching his son die. My opponent says it is absurd to punish someone who is mentally handicapped for killing someone. Rule consequentialism *has* resulted in an insanity defense exception to murder, although the person will most likely be institutionalized as a danger to himself or others. I actually turn this argument: the CI says that murder is always wrong, regardless of the mental deficiencies of the aggressor. The CI would allow no such exception. == The Property Flaw == If a company being allowed to dump chemicals creates more *total* utility than the damage that the chemical dumping does, then theoretically the dumping should be allowed, but total utility is equal to the utility of the dumping minus the aggregate utility of everyone the dumping hurts. So if a company gets 1 million utility from dumping and the dumping does one util of damage per person to 2 million people, the dumping would not be allowed. In addition, some release of chemicals is inevitable. Although we would like companies to emit zero CO2, for example, this is an impossible goal. We must somehow determine the "acceptable" level of CO2 emissions, meaning the level at which we as a society derive more (economic) benefit from the release of the CO2 than the expected damage of the CO2's release. My opponent's only possible alternative would be to pass a law that NO release of CO2 is allowed, which would eliminate nearly every industry in the world. The only way to weigh harms vs. benefits is utilitarianism. My opponent also fails to explain how we can evaluate competing rights claims without utilitarianism. If my rights and yours come into conflict, how else do we decide who prevails? == The CI == My opponent doesn't really answer either of my objections to the CI. == Rule consequentialism == My opponent claims this system does not value the morality of the people. This is *precisely* what it *does* do by asking people if they would rather live in a world where X is allowed or banned. People's moral decisionmaking is *central* to rule consequentialism. My opponent claims that util is quantitative not qualitative. He clearly does not understand that util functions along two axes – a quantitative one (greatest number) and a qualitative one (greatest good) – rather than one. In addition, my opponent has failed to show how we could uphold justice without util, either qualitatively or quantitatively. I now open the floor once again for my opponent.