"There is reason to believe a God exists"

In this round, I only need to oppose the argumentation of my opponent in order to support my position. As he maintains the Burden of Proof, If I can successfully show the flaws in his reasoning, Then I am able to show that by default, There exists no reason to believe in God. I'll begin with the ontological argument because the moral argument is slightly more nuanced so I would like like to end with it. Ontological ArgumentAs stated by my opponent, The premises involved here are:P1. It is possible that God exists. P2. If it is possible that God exists, Then God exists in some possible worlds. P3. If God exists in some possible worlds, Then God exists in all possible worlds. P4. If God exists in all possible worlds, Then God exists in the actual world. P5. If God exists in the actual world, Then God exists. My opponent then goes on to state that P1 is the only premise that is worth arguing over. However, I completely grant him premise 1. It is indeed possible that God exists as long as that God is within the realm of logical thinking (he cannot create a stone so heavy he cannot lift it for example). However, Premise 3 has numerous flaws which devastate the argument. And if sentience is a prerequisite quality of God, Which indeed it is in this debate, Then a further fallacy exists. Existence is greater than Non-ExistencePremise 3 states that if God exists in some possible world then god must exist in all possible worlds. This is because God is a maximally great being, And it is greater for something to exist than to not exist. This may sound agreeable, But actually has no logical backing. We may very well subjectively agree that existence is better than non-existence. But the operative word there is subjective. We cannot inherently and objectively show that existence adds value to a concept such as a maximally great being. Existence as a perfection is simply something that sounds nice to humans. To show the absurdity of this, Imagine the following thought experiment. If all humans thought that it is greater for something to be big than it is to be small, Then God would also be as big as possible as it is greater for something to be big, And god is maximally great. If then humanity changes its mind a century later and we all now agree that it is better for something to be small, Then smallness would be greater, And god, A maximally great being, Would be as small as possible. Evidently, Using qualities ranked by humans as the basis for a definition of God is logically incoherent and incredibly fallacious. Existence as a PredicateOne of the famous objections to the Ontological argument, By Immanuel Kant: it states that "existence is not a predicate". A predicate is simply a defining characteristic of something or it is something that is said of something else. For example, Something said about Frankenstein's monster (who I'll call Frankenstein to annoy the pedants) is that he has a rectangular head. So a rectangular head is a predicate of Frankenstein. But I cannot define Frankenstein as existing as the actual existence of something isn’t how we describe its concept, And must be verified through other means. As a further example pointed out by the University of Colorado[1], Imagine the concept of an existing unicorn, Where it existence is a predicate of the concept. By definition, It must exist. However, Clearly an existing unicorn does not exist, So it would be fallacious to add existence as part of the concept without further experimentation proving its existence. Begging the QuestionBy stating that god is a "necessary being", My opponent commits a fallacy known as begging the question. Begging the question occurs when the premises of an argument assume the conclusion to be true in order to prove the conclusion. [2]My opponent makes god a necessary being in order to show that he exists in all world. However, By doing so, He insinuates that god necessarily has to exist. By doing so, He defines God as existing, So that he can prove that God exists. Therefore he begs the question and is in a logically circular loop. God's existence cannot be made as part of the definition as God, And he therefore does not have to exist in all possible worlds and does not have to exist in our world. Sentience is better than non-sentienceEven if the above objections did not exist, My opponent still assumes God to be sentient. I imagine he would state that sentience is greater than non-sentience and God is maximally great so he must be sentient. But much like existence, This is an arbitrary human made conclusion from which we cannot conclude that God has simply because he is "maximally great". These are the bevy of fallacies and flaws in the Ontological argument and even if one were to hold, The ontological argument would be disproven. However, With all these fallacies, The Ontological argument can definitively be said not to prove the existence of a sentient God. Moral ArgumentMy opponent gives the following premises to morally prove why God existsP1. Morality is a rational enterpriseP2. Moral Realism is true, Meaning moral facts and duties existP3. Moral problems and disagreements among humans are too much for us to assume that moral realism is groundedin a human source of rationality. P4. Premises 1, 2, And 3 confirm that Moral realism is grounded in a source of necessity (necessity meaning it must existence)P5. The source of necessity is what we call GodCon. Therefore, God exists. My issues surround Premise 2, Where he argues that moral realism (or objective morality) exists. There also exist issues around Premise 3 if Premise 2 is granted, But I don't have the space for both so I'll only address Premise 2 and address Premise 3 in the following round. My opponent gives 5 arguments for why an objective morality exists and I'll go through each one to show why it's fallacious. IntuitionMy opponent argues that objective morality is true simply because certain things are intuitively abhorrent to all of humanity. Not only is this false, It's a non-sequitur. Yes certain things seem intuitively true. How in anyway does that mean something is objectively true? It may seem intuitive to a caveman society that the Earth is flat. But in what way does that prove that the Earth is objectively flat? One simply doesn't lend itself to the other. Moreover he assumes that some things are universally abhorred by all humans throughout history. This simply isn't the case. Throughout Mary I's reign, Protestants were burned at the stake by other humans who thought it just. Our intuition is clearly incredibly subjective, So how can we use subjective intuition in order to prove objective truth? It simply doesn't follow. ExperienceMy issues with experience surround my opponents first premise:P1. If Moral Realism is false people would not live like it is trueMuch like intuition, This is a non-sequitur. It is not stated how acting as if something is true makes it objectively true. And indeed, The opposite is true. Many people may live as if something is true without that thing being true in the first place. For example, If all human beings acted as if you needed to wait an hour after eating to swim, It would still be false. It just doesn’t follow that many or all human beings acting some way makes something objectively true. Moral Disagreement and Moral ProgressMy opponent states that there is no basis for moral disagreement if moral objectivity is true. That the actions of Hitler cannot be said to be objectively immoral if moral objectivity is untrue. Moreover we cannot think to have made moral progress from our forefathers if morality is not objective. This without a doubt presents a real problem in our ethical thinking. However, It is ultimately irrelevant. We cannot say something is objectively true because we find the conclusion of the opposite to be unsavoury. If I would prefer to believe that I am actually a demigod who just hasn't realised his powers yet, It doesn't change the fact that it is objectively untrue. We cannot say that objective morality is true just because we find its conclusion convenient. That is antithetical to logical thinking. I would also like to say that a lack of objective morality need not mean we default to chaos. Perhaps we should all strive to be as comfortable as possible and let our morality derive from that. Perhaps we should agree to some axioms and go from there. This is all irrelevant to the debate, But it is important to note that a lack of objective morality is simply the start of the conversation, Not its end. Epistemic FactMy issues around my opponent's argument for epistemic fact and moral oughts are similar to my issues around moral disagreement. As an example for the existence of moral duty, He states:"In the debate, One should and will assume that the other will uphold epistemic duties such as not misrepresenting statements, Not make logical fallacies, And being honest. The person prescribes epistemic duties and expects for them to be upheld but that is exactly the problem. Why should I uphold these things if they are all relative? "Indeed, Why we should uphold these duties if it is all relative is an incredibly interesting question. And one debated by philosophers throughout history. But it is ultimately irrelevant. Saying that having these moral oughts is preferable to not having them does not make it true, However much we may wish it. ConclusionsAs shown, My opponents moral and ontological arguments have serious flaws in the way of proving a sentient god. Lacking that, There exists no reason to believe a God exists. Sources1. http://rintintin. Colorado. Edu/~vancecd/phil1020/AgainstOnto. Pdf2. https://www. Txstate. Edu/philosophy/resources/fallacy-definitions/Begging-the-Question. Html