God doesn't exist.

Thanks Dokieman Onto the final round Analytic/synthetic distinction First off, I want to say something about the analytic/synthetic distinction. It seems that for Pro to even assert his first case, he must first assume that there is such a distinction to begin with. Unfortunately, this is far from clear. I could simply take the view of W.V.O Quine and reject it [1]. But I would even contest that the view that 'God exists' is an issue if it is synthetic. It might be an issue if I were to present an argument from deductive syllogism, but it is not the case in the argument I presented: it was a deductive revelation from a single premise (viz. it is possible that God exists). Furthermor, I think that one can deduce existential conclusions from synthetic statements. If we take the synthetic statement: "Ophthalmologists are rich", it certainly can be proven"through logical deduction. For, we could show that there is a minimum wage of say $200,000 for"Ophthalmologists, or that in some survey, 100% of Ophthalmologists were found to be rich. Thus, in the analogous statement: "God exists", we can deduce 'exists' from 'God' in a way similar to 'rich' from 'Ophthalmologists'. I therefore see no issue here. Atheist ontological argument I'm going to give three reasons as to why we should reject this argument. The premises have not been shown to be true." Perhaps vital to any modal ontological argument is support for the metaphysical possibility of something - if that is not given, then the rest of the argument does not follow. If you note, in round one I gave a separate argument for such a notion. However, Pro has failed to support his premise altogether. We therefore have reason to accept my premise, but no reason to accept Pro's premise. A modal-counterfactual argument against the possibility of a world without minds This is my own creation... I thought it would be interesting to try it out. I think we all agree that minds actually exist. This is true whatever ontology one takes - we cannot doubt the existence of at least one mind, namely our own. By the brouwer axiom (p-->[]<>p), as minds actually exist, then in all possible worlds, it is possible for minds to actually exist. Now, for a reductio, suppose that there is a world without minds."This will contradict a necessary truth - namely, the existence of a necessary being (God). Therefore, by Lewisian counterfactual semantics (p[]-->q is true iff p is necessarily false), this must in itself be a necessary truth in all possible worlds, for if there are no minds in some possible world, then God does not exist (provided we take Pro's logic and conclusion to be sound). So, by Lewisian counterfactual semantics, the notion that 'There are no minds' must be a necessary truth if true in some possible world like Pro claims. However, a world without minds is a Kripkean a posteriori impossibility in the actual world (and thus the negation is a modal possibility). Moreover, by the Brouwer axiom, in all possible worlds, minds are a metaphysical possibility, as at least one mind exists in the actual world. But this is contrary to the original assumption, viz. that premise 1 is true. So, premise 1 is not true. So, to summerise, the very fact that there are minds entails that it is not possible for Premise 1 to be true for if it were, then by Lewisian counterfactual semantics, it would be a necessary truth. But this contradicts system B of modal logic when applied to the actual truth that minds exist. An argument from Alethic modality against the possibility of a world without minds This is another creation that I want to try out. For another take on this, suppose an Aristotelian Essentialist account of Alethic modality (this would be a de jure move by the theist). Anything that is possible is instantiated at some times and not others, and whatever is necessary is instantiated at all times. This means that whatever is possible in some possible world will be instantiated in the powerset of each possible world. Now take the the Brouwer axiom (p-->[]<>p). As a world containing minds is actual (we cannot doubt the existence of our own minds), then by the Brouwer axiom, it is possible in all possible worlds and, via this Aristotelian account of Alethic modality, is instantiated in all possible worlds. This is contrary to Premise 1 of Pro's argument and is a de jure objection to it. We should, therefore, render the atheist ontological argument entirely unsuccessful. Reductio ad absurdums Pro now gives a series of reductio ad absurdum arguments. However, I see at least three reasons as to why we should not accept them. ii) The level of greatness is unclear What is it that makes such entities greater? Is it a greater or lesser density of palm trees? Is it more or less froth on the beer? Is the teenager skinny or does he have more muscles?"I see it to be entirely unclear. We cannot therefore make sense of maximal greatness in respect to these entities. [2] iii) Each Premise One is a logical absurdity I take it that to say that there is a 'maximally great island/beer/teenager' is quite simply, a logical impossibility. For, surely it is greater for the island to have more palm trees and beaches; the beer to be bigger; and the teenager to do more chores. But this goes on ad infinitum - there can always be more palm trees, be bigger, and do more chores. Therefore, a logical contradiction arises: for however great the entity is, it can always be greater. iv) The same does not apply to God It seems that these criticisms do not apply in the case of God - we can quantify God's qualities as a being with perfect freedom and perfect efficacy of the will; knowing all true truths; and doing the most perfect action possible in any given circumstance. "Moreoever "God is by definition necessary and so S5 applies to Him; and, God is not a material being. Therefore, God does not suffer from the same deficiencies as the other examples Pro gives. Conclusion So how should we conclude? Hopefully, I have shown that the Ontological argument is entirely sound, supported and not subject to Pro's criticisms. This means that God must exist; moreover, it renders the argument from suffering redundant, for God must have some reason for suffering to exist:"he actually exists and so does evil. So, the resolution is negated. I won't give rebuttals to Pro's last round to keep it fair. Finally, thank you Dookieman for a most enjoyable debate! I hope we can debate again sometime! God Bless Though I walk in the midst of trouble, you preserve my life. You stretch out your hand against the anger of my foes; with your right hand you save me. -Psalm 138:7 Sources: [1] http://www.iep.utm.edu... [2]"http://www.fordham.edu...