Aquinas' First Way succeeds

Having read a good deal of Aquinas (and Aristotle) myself, I feel that I have a good understanding of the argument from motion. With that being said, I've never seen the argument presented in exactly the way Pro does; this looks to be interesting! Clarification of the Burden of Proof (BOP) Before I get into objections to the argument Pro has presented, I would like to clarify the BOP which was agreed upon. Pro has assumed the burden of proof to show that "Aquinas' first way succeeds. " Thus, in order to win the debate, Pro is obligated to give arguments for why Aquinas' first way succeeds. However, I am not necessarily obligated to show that Aquinas' way is unsound. All I have to demonstrate is that the argument is not necessarily sound. Pro states: "my opponent must demonstrate that either premise 1 or 2 is false. " However, I am under no obligation to show these premises are, beyond a doubt, false. All I have to do is demonstrate that Pro's argumentation in favor of these premises do not succeed, or that the premises may be false, and thus the argument cannot be considered sound. Confusing terminologyPro states, "The word 'existence' will mean: the changing space/time reality" however, this terminology is extremely confusing. Surely, Aquinas' first way would argue that, as purely actual, the unmoved mover would be "existence" itself. However, this is clearly meant in a different sense than how Pro defines the term in his argument. I would like to point this out, and ask Pro to be clear in future rounds when he says "existence" whether he means "the changing space/time reality" or not. Otherwise, this could lead to confusing equivocation later on. Unsupported PremisesPro states his argument thus:1. Existence is continually actualized.2. Something cannot actualize itself. C: Therefore, existence must be continually actualized by its source, which does not need to be actualized. Premise 1Premise 1 of the argument is unfounded. By "existence," Pro means "the changing space/time reality. " But what reasons have we for assuming that space/time requires actualization? Why can't space-time simply persist in being without any actualization? Pro must give reasons for accepting this premise as true, since it is clearly not self-evident. Premise 2Likewise, Premise 2 of the argument is unfounded. Why can't something actualize itself? This seems very plausible, and "self-actualization" should remain as an option until shown otherwise. Pro once again, needs to demonstrate that self-actualization is impossible. Until he does so, this option remains on the table, and the argument cannot yet be considered sound. Non-being to being as a change-an attack on premise 1Pro makes an example of actualization, saying:"To actualize means to make something potential, actual. For example an ice cube is potentially melted, until it becomes actually melted. To go from frozen to melted is an example of an actualization. "It should be noted here that the potential is said of something existing. An extant ice cube has the potential to be melted. When this potential is elevated to actuality, actualization has occured. But this is not clearly the case with the conservation of the existence of something. If the existence of something can be seen to be a change, it must be from one state to another, since as Aquinas says, "Passage is always understood as being from term to term. " [1]But is the non-existence of the ice-cube a state of the ice cube? It seems obviously not. Let me try to illustrate my point a bit further. Ix---------->Iy"Ix" means "ice-cube in x state" while "Iy" means "ice cube in y state. " Clearly, this can be identified as a change, since the ice cube is changing from, say, a frozen state (x) to a melted state (y). However, with the existence of something, this is not quite clear, since the first state is non-being, or nothing. ---------->IeIn this example, "Ie" stands for "ice-cube existing. " The existence of something cannot be viewed as a change from a potential to actuality, since actuality is always said of something actual. Professor Edward Feser states, "A potential is always a potential for a certain kind of actuality. .. It is incoherent to speak of something as both existing and being purely potential. " [2]But if the first state is non-being, how can non-being (non-actuality) have any potential for existence, precisely because it is non-extant? Why pure act? For the sake of argument, let's say that I accept Pro's argument, and accept the first half of his conclusion. That is, "Therefore, existence(space/time) must be continually actualized by its source. "But what of the extra phrase "which does not need to be actualized"? This phrase seems to appear from nowhere. Maybe the actualizer of space/time is itself also actualized! Why assume that it is not? I would imagine that at this point, Pro would argue that if the actualizer of space/time were actualized by another (actualization of existence, which we noted earlier, seems to be incoherent), then there could be a regress of actualizers. And I also assume that he would argue that an infinite regress of actualizers is impossible, and thus we terminate in an unactualized actualizer. To use our original terms, an "unmoved mover. " But even if this is the case, how does it follow that the unmoved mover is unmovable, or purely actual? Remember, Pro must demonstrate that the unmoved mover is also purely actual, that is, unmovable. But why think this at all? Perhaps the unmoved mover is unmoved, and does move (or actualize) all else, but still has some degree of potentials. Perhaps these potentials are just never actualized, since there is no other actualizer to do so. But even if this is the case, the unmoved mover would not be purely actual and thus not immovable. ConclusionI look forward to Pro's responses. In summary, keep in mind that at this point, he has not yet demonstrated the truth of his premises. Thus, the argument cannot yet be considered sound. Furthermore, even if we do accept his premises, and accept his conclusion, it does not follow that the unmoved mover is purely actual. This is critical to his success. Pro needs to respond to my arguments regarding premise 1, support reasons for accepting his premises as true in the first place, and demonstrate that the unmoved mover is purely actual. Back to Pro! (Please forgive the length of this argument. .. I lack the time to make it shorter! )[1] . http://www.newadvent.org...;[2] Aquinas, Edward Feser, pg. 12