Lincoln-Douglas Debate on Euthanasia

CON CASE: I define "ought" as expressing moral desirability (Encarta) and "permit" as to make something possible under the law. (Oxford) I Value Justice, defined by Aristotle as giving each their due. Prefer this value because it is the inherent goal of a just society. In other words, if an action is not just, it would not be permitted in such a community. Ultimately, all of our dues arise from human dignity--we are due pay for work, we are due food and shelter, we are due respect--all because we have worth as human beings, and our time, our emotions, and our lives matter. But, should that life become brutally painful and unbearable, can we say it respects human dignity to keep that life going? That is the issue I will explore in my contentions; but this notwithstanding, for now, suffice it to say that dignity is the root of what we are due. Thus, I offer the Criterion of Consequentialism, where one's human dignity is the desired consequence. Hugo Badau describes human dignity as entitling one to a "life sufficient for self-respect, relief from needless drudgery, and opportunity for the release of productive energy." [1] Contention One: Human Dignity is violated by degrading conditions and/or by constant suffering. Prof. Jeremy Waldron writes, "Law is not brutal in its operation...[people] will not be herded like cattle or broken like horses...the rule against torture functions as an archetype of this very general policy. It's vividly emblematic of our determination to sever the link...between law and the enterprise of breaking a person's will." This comparison is not wildly out of proportion to the case at hand. Pain and degradation are both tools of torture, and patients can feel both, often at excruciatingly high intensities. Therefore, it would seem that if we also hold torture to be a fundamental violation of human dignity, we must also classify the pain of a euthanasia candidate similarly. For the torture victim, it is simple enough to end his pain; but for the patient, it requires more. In both cases though, the pain and humiliation are seen as wrong, and thus, should be halted. Euthanasia is the only way to do this for the patient, but it seems worth it in light of the pain they are undergoing. Contention Two: Medical ethics/bioethics permit the use of euthanasia. The AMA permits doctors to withhold treatment from afflicted individuals, allowing them to die. James Rachels posits that there is no real difference between passive and active forms. [2] In both cases, one is knowingly allowing another to die, and by one's actions or omissions, is consciously permitting the patient to die. Hence, if one type is allowed, both ought to be. Additionally, doctors are instructed to act in the interests of the patients, and life is clearly not in every patient's interest. REBUTTAL: I agree with Pro's definition of euthanasia, with two caveats. Firstly, "serious" implies grave to the extent that it is either highly degrading and/or so painful as to make life hellish. Secondly, the resolution also specifies "active," meaning that the patient is not allowed to die, but actively has their life terminated. VALUE FRAMEWORK Morality - Pro fails to define what his value actually is. But even if he did, the definition would likely be insufficient. Morality is a vague concept unto itself, and people each have a different take on what it is. I'm prochoice, someone else is prolife, we both think we're in the moral right, how do we decide between us? There is just no way for us to reach consensus on what morality means. So, how can we determine whether it is achieved if we don't know what it is? Deontology - I'm going to make three attacks here. (1) Deontology asserts that there are several inviolate moral duties that we have, and that we cannot abridge them for some perceived greater good. These moral duties arise from the categorical imperative, which commands us to obey those moral rules we would wish to make universal. In other words, if we believe everyone should not steal, then there is a duty not to steal. Deontology, thus, does not exclude euthanasia. Here's why: if we believe that everyone, were they to become seriously injured, has a right to euthanasia, then euthanasia can be universalized, and so it is permissible. (2) By denying individuals the right to request and receive euthanasia, you are denying them their autonomy. In that case, you fail to treat people as ends in and of themselves, because you are denying them agency. This is contrary to the basic ideal of deontology, and to the Kantian notion of morality, (3) Utility is the core of morality. David Hume, in his essay "An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals" uses the example of two armies at war to illustrate this point. These two armies are from different cultures, and share no mutual rules of fair conduct in war, Thus, each respective army must suspend their own rules in order to counter the other, and not suffer a bloody defeat. Hume extrapolates, "The rules of equity or justice depend entirely on the particular state or condition in which men are placed, and owe their origin and existence to that of utility, which results to the public from their strict and regular observance." Contention One: Again, I have three attacks against this. (1) This has no connection to your criterion. Whether or not animals do it has little if any bearing on if it should or can be universalized, nor does you contention explain what relevance less developed animals have on morality. There are many things animals do--such as killing young, cannibalizing, and beating others--that humans find morally repulsive. Also, you don't provide any warrants within your contention to support the claims you do make. (2) People can make rational decisions regarding euthanasia--if I know that I would have to live in incredible pain, constantly rely on others to clean up my waste, and be subjected to routine and privacy-destroying medical examinations every week or month, I can logically come to the conclusion that my life would not be worth continuing. You're assuming that distressed people are unable to come to rational conclusions--that's just not true. Even a depressed person can make logical decisions; for example, they know that 2+2=4, that watering the plants will make them grow, and so on. Doctors can also be there to help them through the process. Additionally, by saying that a patient cannot make rational decisions, you're saying that for as long as they live, they're not competent to manage their own lives. This seems incredibly degrading, especially as some euthanasia candidates can live for a few years or more. (3) Lastly, you're saying that because of a few instances in which people might not be acting of their own accord, the practice as a whole should be abolished. That's not so. You would have to show that in most cases people are unable to act rationally--but when people have time to make decisions and are presented with information they can make best-interest choices. Contention Two: This is incredibly unlikely--just because something might happen, doesn't mean its probable. Under that rationale, if I were diagnosed with a painful caner five years ago, I should live with the pain. Let's say I died today, I would have suffered needlessly for 5 years of my life. I categorically reject the notion that needless suffering is in any way moral. Miracle cures, medical advances, and alternative treatments have been shown to occur, but at very low rates. Plus, rates have been slowing recently. [3] Finally, you again fail to provide a clear link to your framework. Contention Three: I don't think the families of the patient are as morally significant as the patient himself. It is the patient whose autonomy is at stake, it is the patient who is enduring the most suffering, and it is the patient who the doctors have a duty towards. No matter how much grief the family endures, it is not enough to outweigh the sheer magnitude of physical pain and emotional tribulations being felt by the patient. It is self-centered and unjustifiably cruel to keep someone alive for your own pleasure and wellbeing. Contention Four: You ask "how long will it be before" persuading becomes forcing. You ask this ominous-sounding question, but then fail to answer it, or even to give us an idea of this. On top of that, you fail to provide concrete logic as to why a slippery slope will necessarily occur--your only warrant is the very generic, unsupported assumption that people "will naturally go corrupt with it." Institutional checks and review boards have been successfully overseeing doctors for years, preventing them from forcing their patients into surgeries they don't want or to take medications they refuse to take. Why would euthanasia suddenly be the exception to this precedent of good regulation and oversight? You provide literally no justification for your argument. Next, your MacDonald card is U.S.-specific, whereas the topic is not. Furthermore, it is not infeasible that the problems MacDonald cites could be fixed. Contention Five: In fact, deontology has little to do with intentions. Deontology has everything with examining the nation of the action--is the action itself right or wrong. [4] Moreover, I would make a key distinction--we all agree it is not okay to murder people, but killing in some circumstances is permissible. This is evidenced not just by euthanasia, but also in cases of self-defense or the death penalty. Contention Six: I have already discussed the ambiguity of "morality;" cross-apply this here. Thus, I firmly Negate. Sources: 1 - http://www.jstor.org... 2 - http://books.google.com... 3 - http://medicalxpress.com... 4 - http://www.iep.utm.edu...