The United States should suspend all assistance to Pakistan.

I would negate the resolution: United States should suspend all assistance to Pakistan. Going by the arguments provided by my opponent, he is rooting for a permanent suspension of all the aid given to Pakistan. I would accept the framework provided by Pro. Arguments:1. The war on terror: A major chunk of US aid to Pakistan is meant to further the war against terror in the region. What we need to focus on in the debate is not on whether Pakistan is doing its ‘best’ to further that sentiment, but on the effect that a suspension of all the aid will have on that objective. My opponent mentions that US should try its best to maintain a good relationship with Pakistan after the suspension of aid. I would contend that it is simply an impractical suggestion. Observing the Pakistani reaction when Mr. Barrack Obama suspended 800 million dollars aid, the circumstances suggest that Pakistan would not take a cut in aid lying down. It is unwise to expect the Pakistanis to buckle under what would be a publicly delivered snub. It will strengthen those elements in the armed forces that have always had grave misgivings of the relationship with the United States. Also, one should note that even now, US is pretty open in criticizing the Pakistan Government on its efforts (or lack of) in the war against terror. After the suspension of aid, if the rebuke continues- and the experience suggests that it will- hoping to maintain ‘peaceful relations’ with Pakistan, with no aid to lure it to cooperate, is a farfetched proposal. What would happen, most likely- as indicated by past experience, is that a suspension of aids would undermine all the efforts done till now on the war against terror The fact that Osama Bin Laden hid in the military complex at Abbottabad points towards two prospects: Either the Pakistani military is corrupt or ineffective. Both of the prospects are deeply troubling. However, these are the two facts that we need to grapple with now. Suspending Pakistani aid would not magically lead to solution of either of these problems. It would only complicate them. An abrupt cut in US aid would chop down the only security cooperation that has been effective, if inefficient, in making America safer. C1: Nuclear weapons: Keeping the nuclear weapons away from terrorists require continuous government cooperation. Pakistan’s civilian government is extremely fragile, while the military is strong, more powerful, with a larger public support. Coupling with it the fact that the allegiance of the military has been extremely ambiguous, considering it is suspected to have helped one of the most wanted global terrorist, and it has been one of the key players in orchestring the 26/11 attacks on Mumbai. Leaving Pakistan under the influence of the military would only strengthen the extremism in the country- a country with quite a supply of nuclear weapons- something which can be devastating. Devastating for America, for India, for the world. C2: Proximity to Afghanistan: Afghanistan is like a battleground for the war against terrorism. Considering that US has started withdrawing troops from Afghanistan, the next few years are imperative in describing the path the country takes. A responsible withdrawal of U. S. forces depends on an Afghan political solution that Pakistan will influence. And a volatile Pakistan is not a good influence. C3: Pakistani stability affects neighborhood: The stability of Pakistan effects India, Afghanistan, and Iran. Considering that India definitely has nuclear weapons, and the nuclear capability of Iran is debated- an instable Pakistan would have disastrous consequences on the region. A betrayal from America would lead to a stronger Pakistan- Chinese bond- and with their mutual hatred for America and India, this might offset the global politics for the worse. 2. Humanitarian, Economic assistance should not be dispelled: It would not be an exaggeration to say that Pakistan has been an aid dependent nation since its inception. Suspension of aid would severely affect the humanitarian and economic development of the terror- infused nation. The conclusion by the 17 member working committee to examine the broad principles governing the KLB aid program ( a long term program providing non-security assistance to Pakistan) stated [3]: The list of reasons why Pakistan cannot be ignored is multiplying alarmingly. A perfect storm of internal social, economic, and political crises is bearing down on Pakistan; the storm may dwarf U. S. concerns about terrorism and insurgencies in the “AfPak” area over the next decade. Pakistan’s most serious problems have more to do with a selfish elite wedded to a status quo that consigns some 40 percent of the population to dire poverty with little or no education or health care, than with terrorism or religious fundamentalism. Some astute Pakistanis discern an emerging conflict between powerful haves and disenfranchised have-nots. Chaos in Pakistan would serve no U. S. interest According to the experts, If delivered, the $7.5 billion of U. S. development aid to Pakistan over five years promised by the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 would return non-military U. S. assistance to Pakistan, for the first time, to the real levels of the early 1960s, at the height of U. S. -Pakistani engagement. Something that America ought to continue, if not for the altruistic reasons, just for the selfish interests a stable Pakistan would serve in strengthening the US influence in the Global politics. Given the instability of Pakistani government, US should not, under any circumstances, discontinue its aid. It would lead to disastrous impact on the Pakistani civilians, and on the stability of the neighboring countries. As the report concludes: Although both sides of the KLB debate are fraught with confusion and suspicion, we believe that the benefits of continued assistance far outweigh the costs. Conversely, if Washington were to end KLB civilian aid now, as some in Congress have proposed, the impacts could be considerable. Granted, the immediate economic impact of ending KLB civilian assistance would be small—an estimated 0.014 percent decrease in annual GDP. Islamabad’s budget problems, however, mean that it is not funding development programs of its own, increasing the relative importance of KLB development aid. For example, the Benazir Income Support Program (BISP), which makes targeted cash transfers to the poorest Pakistanis for basic necessities, currently relies heavily on U. S. support. The state of Pakistan’s economy at the time also would determine the impact of any KLB aid cut-off. As discussed earlier, economic growth in Pakistan depends on external flows—foreign aid and remittances from overseas Pakistanis. With neither multilateral loans nor aid flowing and with repayments to the IMF coming due in 2012, remittances would become a lifeline to the economy as well as to overseas workers’ families. Anecdotal evidence suggests, however, that the safety valve of labor migration to the Middle East is starting to close as key receiving countries stop renewing contracts for Pakistani workers for a range of reasons. Many poor Pakistanis could face unbearable hardship. Thank you. [1] . http://dawn.com... [2] . http://www.washingtonpost.com... [3]. http://www.wilsoncenter.org...