The modal ontological argument is sound

It isn't enough, in this debate, to merely proclaim an argument is intuitive and therefore must be correct. My intuition happens to say that there is no God, but that has no more bearing on reality than the delusions of an individual with multiple personality disorder. As the burden of proof is on my opponent, and his personal intuition is not a proof, it follows that my opponent has already failed to meet his burden.Let me make a very similar argument that is intuitively false. It is possible that I have one million rubies. I have exploited every available opportunity to become a ruby millionaire (not that I've had many in my life to date). Therefore, either it is not possible for me to be a ruby millionaire, or it is necessary that I am a ruby millionaire. Therefore, it is necessary that I am a ruby millionaire. And therefore, given my opponent's argument - the one million rubies that I must so obviously possess are equivalent to God.My aim in this debate will be to show why this logic must fail. Here's at least 6 distinct logical errors I can immediately see committed by the argument.1. The problem of definitionThe modal ontological case begins with the assertion that God is defined as a being that is a necessarily existent being. The very thing that the argument seeks to prove - that God must exist - is therefore implicit in the very premise that God is a being that must necessarily exist. Framing it as a "necessarily existent being that might not exist" is self-contradictory and thus the proof is in fact tautological if this definition is accepted.2. The argument is self-refutingThe only way in modal logic for God to be necessary is for it to be not possible that God does not exist (take note of the double negative there). The conclusion therefore rejects the first premise of the argument. The problem with that is that if the first premise is rejected, then the alternative of the second premise that it excludes must logically be accepted as possible (as my opponent put it, that "it is not possible that God exists"). If it is possible that God's existence is impossible, then the conclusion cannot be true. Therefore, the conclusion is self-refuting.3. Problem of certainty"Possibility" represents an unknown state, while "necessity" represents a known state (or at least that's how it is in modal logic). The problem with the conclusion is that it rejects that element of the second premise that claims it is not possible for God to exist, merely because in the first premise we claimed we did not know whether God exists or not - failing to discriminate between two distinct types of possibility. Claiming the possibility of the existence of God does not logically deny the impossibility of the existence of God.4. Non sequiterSpecifically, that a necessary being cannot be contingent. No element of necessity in modal logic necessitates non-contingency. For example, consider the phrase "It is necessary that you brush your teeth provided that you do not forget". There is a possibility that you will brush your teeth (just as there is a possibility that God exists), the necessity of brushing your teeth (just as God has been defined as having a necessity of existence for some reason), and a perfectly valid contingency. My opponent's logic as it stands cannot defeat the proposition, for instance, that "God exists, but only if it's Tuesday".5. The argument is circularThe claim that God is [insert any given attribute here] - as in God is not contingent or God is necessarily existent - requires first that God "is" at all. However, at this point the argument has not proven that God "is" at all yet, but rather only that God "might be". Thus the premises only make sense if you have already accepted the conclusion - but the whole point of the argument is for the premises to prove the conclusion, not the conclusion to prove the premises. It can therefore be only rationally concluded that the premises contain no useful evidence that is not in the conclusion, and therefore must be rejected.6. God lies outside of logicIf we start from the premise that we don't know whether God exists or not, how can we know that any given proof of existence actually works for God, such that it allows us to actually reach our conclusion "God exists"? The standard answer here would be that the proof is logical according to the principles of modal logic. But how do we know that there is not an exception in those principles when we deal with God specifically? The standard answer would again be that the principles can be induced from reality. However, there are no necessarily existent beings that are a part of our reality (no, I'm not a ruby millionaire for those wondering). Therefore, the existence of God cannot be logically deduced.... but even if all of the above is true, what kind of a God is that? Take the concept of "time", for example. It may well be that time must exist in every possible world, and that therefore time is not contingent. It would be deceptive, however, to fail to distinguish "time" from "God", if for no other reason that I do not believe anyone reading this debate actually would believe me if I claimed that a mere dimension is God. The word "God" denotes a far more specific concept that the argument generalizes to the extent that almost anything, from a horde of millions of rubies to a vaguely-understood metaphysical phenomenon, can be proven with the formula my opponent provided.That's not intuitive. That's not logical.The argument is negated.