DA Tournament: The Most Accurate Meta-Ethical Theory. Moral Realism (Pro) vs Moral Relativism (Con)

Thanks for the debate Envisage, it's been fun. This debate will be won on one thing: Is moral realism or moral relativism the most accurate meta-ethical theory? Let's go back to the core issues. Lots of off-topic discussions went on that was irrelevant in affirming the resolution. First, I'll attack pro's case. Let's see if he upheld his BoP to show that 'ethical sentences express propositions that refer to objective features of the world that are true independent of opinion. 'Argument from Telos (design). Problem #1, the argument from design doesn't affirm moral realism. Problem #2, deism is fully compatible with the teological argument. Pro says “telos would rule deism as impossible”. If Deism is true, it's fully possible that the universe was designed by God and had been left alone without getting involved in moral affairs. “All the teleological argument does is simply state the existence of a natural phenomenon, in the case of a phenomenon such as the universe, when its complexity is considered, the argument may indicate that it X was designed by an intelligent being. ”. http://www.themystica.com...Pro started with 4 major arguments for moral realism:(1) Grounding moral truths(2) Moral sense theory(3) Functional realism(4) Categorical argumentFirst,(1) Grounding moral truths:Entirely dropped after my R3 rebuttal. Moral realism is left foundationless. (2) Moral sense theoryPro leaves “Moral Sense Theory” undefined. He said things like 'moral sense is the best inference to how people behave'. 'Altruism shows no evolutionary benefit' and 'We have innate feelings/intuitions about right and wrong'. What purpose do any of those points make if they're just supporting an undefined concept? What exactly is Moral Sense Theory arguing for? Recall my round 4 questions: If two people have conflicting 'moral sense' how does this in any way support his claim that "ethical sentences express propositions that refer to objective features of the world"? Per last round I said it was a “huge problem” that he “never argued that 'moral sense' is homogenous. ” He also never addressed my contention that moral realist propositions would be true/false independent of whatever 'moral sense' we may have about it. The argument ultimately falls apart in an abyss of confusion over what “moral sense theory” meant. (3) Functional realismFunctional realism argues that moral disputes are resolvable because moral truths exist. Pro supports this by focusing his case on foreign countries that the US gets involved in to resolve moral disputes. I said that the reason that the US becomes involved in foreign affairs is not over 'moral content' it's about asserting the country's values as the more powerful country. History is replete with examples of countries imposing their values on the weaker country. I showed a great many of them with my ethnocentrism arguments. His only rebuttal to this in the final round was that it's still “outside of the immediate interest of the countries involved”. Interest is what leads to involvement so this is just incoherent. (4) Categorical argumentThis argument states that if all actions are inherently 'amoral' then a concept of 'moral' wouldn't exist. He assumes this premise: “If “morality” is a coherent concept then moral realism is true “. I already answered this in R3 under the header “morality existing as a cogent concept”. (In R4 pro skipped this along with my rebuttals on descriptive relativism, ethnocentrism, grounding moral truths, morality existing as a cogent concept, and functional realism. ) “"Moral" is a cogent concept because societies have defined what those truths are. It makes no difference if the truth of it is objective or not. "Amoral" is just the negation of whatever is being considered as a truth proposition. We have shared ideas of what it means to be moral vs. amoral because humanity shares the same instinctual tendencies so common morality is to be expected. “My opponent offers rebuttals no longer than a couple sentences for my major points on ethnocentrism, egoism, and descriptive relativism. Ethnocentrism: I explained that ethnocentrism shows us that: “[r1] our notions of 'right' and 'wrong' are thought to be matter-of-fact but are irreparably conditioned by our culture, customs, and social norms” but perfectly explains societies that condemned other societies using moral realist claims but in retrospect were actually using relativist claims that are easily describable by ethnocentrism. Egoism: He says that Nazi society was at odds with the Nazi Regime for moral reasons. In round 3 I said Nazi germany was able to function internally without succumbing to supposed objective evils. History shows us that outside forces are what defeated the Nazi regime, not Nazi society imploding on itself for moral reasons. For his second contention, modern economic theory posits that egoism is responsible for the most efficient free market economies so “good enough” is false. My opponent just dismisses my numerous examples of descriptive relativism. Remember that Descriptive relativism just holds as fact that moral beliefs vary from society to society. My examples have shown exactly that. The trend is that societies vary greatly on moral beliefs. Remember, if there are moral differences between societies it undermines the claim that there are 'objective' moral facts. I'll address the more off-topic/irrelevant arguments here then conclude why moral relativism is the most accurate meta-ethical theory. Math vs evolutionCon says that if math is contingent on human beings, math would be subjective. This is not true. Mathematics is the abstraction of real objects. Anything abstract requires a mind to conceptualize. Real objects have an objective basis. Therefore, mathematics is contingent on higher functioning minds. Since his first premise is false (it's not relative) and he provided no other arguments attacking my formulation, mine remains standing. Evolution as a basis for moralityI pointed out that morality has been shown in animals (great apes, chimpanzees) and has been observed to aid in social cohesion. Pro never rebutted my points on this. Morality appears fit whatever role it has in a large group and this explains the relativist component. Evolving morality vs. perceptionAside from this being mostly off-topic, pro focuses on extracting a point I made for conveying a logical concept and wants me to answer it literally. His questions on the literal point are just irrelevant because I wasn't affirming it. Morality is a construct – so whatever is being constructed, like music, literature, or art, has no objective basis either. I've largely affirmed my position through rebutting pro's arguments but I'll summarize them here again briefly. Moral relativism means that 'right' and 'wrong' are relative to the moral norms of society and aren't objectively superior to any other society. I've shown that moral relativism converges with evolutionary theory because simplistic forms of morality have been observed to emerge from animals. Egoism shows us that we are motivated by our own self-interests. Modern economic theory is based on it. Our desires and self-interests form our values. Our values result in a shared moral code with others. Since 'desire' is inherently subjective, egoism only affirms moral relativism. Descriptive relativism drives home this point. We can observe numerous examples of societies that share different moral codes than us. It goes to show that morality is a construct of shared values that depends on perspective and nothing more. This perspective is described by ethnocentrism where we believe our culture is the standard on which other culture's values are measured against. Moral relativism is the only coherent meta-ethical system. Our desires and values aren't representative of objective features of the world that could exist independent of our opinion about it. That would be absurd.