Justice requires the recognition of animal rights

In closing, I will provide a brief summary of how the debate has progressed, followed by my concluding statements and responses to Pro's claims in the final round.Pro's argumentPro falsely claims I concede the debate by conceding the following points:1. The "second Singer card"The majority of my argument in R2 and R3 focused on attacking "equal consideration of interests," which directly addresses the "second Singer card." I showed how equal consideration produces results that conflict with our deepest moral intuitions. As an example, I provided evidence that Singer's equal consideration principle leads to the absurd conclusion that a dog's pain is the moral equivalent of an infant's pain.Posner's thought-experiment furthered my argument: given the option between inflicting severe pain on a dog or letting the dog inflict slightly less pain on an infant, would you spare the dog or the infant? Pro states we should spare the dog. I argue we should spare the infant. Our deepest moral intuitions tell us that an infant's pain has greater moral consideration than a dog's pain.2. Nussbaum 3Nussbaum 3 states the "starting point" for "our ethical duties" is a "basic concern for sentient life." In R2, I directly responded to Nussbaum 3 with two points. First, I claimed that Nussbaum 3 and Nussbaum 4 are logically incompatible. Nussbaum states killing animals is permissible. Hence, I argued Nussbaum allows the destruction of "sentient life" and other capabilities of animals. This directly contradicts Nussbaum 3, which states that "justice must allow capabilities to flourish." I also gave the example of computers, which have the same capabilities as animals, but are nonetheless categorically excluded from moral consideration. Finally, I also addressed Nussbaum 3 through my "property status" argument. I argue that human ownership of animals is more important than animal rights.In R3, I continue defending the killing of animals, the categorical exclusion of computers from moral consideration, and the "property status" of animals. Nussbaum 3 was thus fully addressed.3. Nussbaum 4Nussbaum 4 states, "a tiger's capability to exercise its predatory nature so as to avoid the pain of frustration may well have value, if the pain of frustration is considerable." I addressed this in multiple ways. In R2, I showed that Nussbaum 3 and Nussbaum 4 are logically incompatible. Pro offered no response. In R3, I gave the example of a grizzly bear who exercises its "predatory nature" against humans. I argued the grizzly bear therefore does not have equal moral consideration. Nussbaum 4 argues the grizzly bear should be given moral consideration.Nussbaum 4 also supports "Zoos" and "direct human support and control" of animals. On this point, I agreed. Humans should be allowed to use, kill, support and control animals. Human use and ownership of animals does not support "equal consideration of interests" or "animal rights."4. Daws evidenceThe Daws evidence states the following: "[T]here may be cases where the perceivable mistreatment of animals is potentially justifiable, such as the killing of animals for food and the experimentation on them for medical research."I agreed. I argued that the Daws evidence supports human ownership of animals, not animal rights. Pro agreed that the Daws evidence supported the property status of animals.The Daws evidence thus supports my case, not Pro's. By conceding this evidence, I support human ownership of animals, not animal rights. 5. Rowlands evidenceThis was addressed in R2 and R3. By arguing for the property status of animals, I directly advocate a "resource-based" use of animals, which counters the Rowlands evidence. Furthermore, the Rowlands evidence is logically incompatible with Nussbaum 4 as well as the Daws evidence. These points were addressed in the debate.ConclusionAs it can be seen, Pro's claim that I conceded and dropped arguments is unsubstantiated and clearly false. The only evidence I agreed to was the Daws evidence, and that was only because the Daws evidence supported my case that human ownership of animals was just and therefore animals should not have rights. Just because Pro provides "evidence" does not mean his evidence supports his case. Pro thinks that, by agreeing with the Daws evidence, I concede the debate. No, by agreeing with Daws, I actually derive support for my case from Pro's own. The rest of Pro's evidence was fully addressed and refuted.Pro's concessionsPro concedes the following points:1. Killing and exploiting animals is permissible.2. Human ownership of animals is permissible.3. Human ownership has benefited animals.(1) was conceded in Round 2, Round 3, and Round 4. In R2, the Nussbaum and Daws evidence supports (1). In R3, Pro writes: "the killing and exploitation of them would be a permissible action." In R4, Pro writes: "killing them and owning them is justified."(2) was conceded in every R3 and R4. In R3, Pro writes: "ownership of animals isn't prohibited by justice." In R4, Pro writes: "justice doesn't prohibit owning animals." (3) was dropped, and therefore, conceded.Why human ownership of animals is incompatible with animal rightsIn R3, I wrote: "Human ownership of animals is incompatible with animal rights. When an animal becomes the property of a human, it becomes the equivalent of a slave. We are allowed to do whatever we want to our property. If an animal has rights, it cannot be property. Pro admits that justice allows animals to be property. Hence, Pro admits that justice does not require animal rights."Pro contests this statement by claiming that I conceded the Daws evidence. How does conceding the Daws evidence contest my argument? Pro expects readers to figure it out. I have no figured it out. I agree with Daws because I think Daws suppots my case, not Pro's. Think about it: the Daws evidence states that, as long as some moral consideration is given to animals, humans can do whatever they want with them. The central premise of the Daws evidence is that moral consideration of some kind is given to animals. But, moral consideration is the not the same as equal moral consideration.Pro's burden is to show "equal consideration of interests," which is to say, equal moral consideration. Pro fails to show this by conceding the Daws evidence, which excludes equal consideration. By allowing humans to use animals, exploit and kill them, Pro admits that animals do not have rights. The Daws evidence, in effect, says the following: as long as the interests of humans and animals do not conflict, animals deserve to be treated like "humanely." That means animals deserve to be treated like humans, as long as animal and human interests do not conflict. But when an animal's interest conflicts with a human's, it no longer deserves "humane" treatment.I made this argument in R3. The Daws evidence supports my argument. Therefore, this argument is not refuted.Burden of ProofPro has the burden to show justice requires animals be given "equal consideration of interests," and then to show that "equal consideration of interests" requires the "recognition of animal rights."Throughout this debate, I have shown that justice does not require "equal consideration of interests" be given to animals. Most prominently, I argued human ownership of animals is justified. Pro agreed. Therefore, Pro admits that animals do not deserve equal moral consideration as humans. Justice does not require animal rights. Pro has not met the burden of proof. The resolution is negated.