Experts' Debate Competition R2: Just Societies and War

I thank Phantom once again for an awesome R3 of debate! I will kick this round off by addressing the debate over the moral framework for the debate. and then by addressing the contention-level clash. FRAMEWORK (A) Deontological Theory Firstly, Con does not contest my point that the statement "if killing is wrong, it's almost always wrong" is not, in fact, tautological. Con then never challenges that we should presume in favor of moral absolutes and rules, for the following reason: "If X is always or nearly always wrong, then in any given situation it is more likely that X is wrong than right. Therefore, we should presume in favor of absolutes and rules of thumb." Con's main point is that I provide instances in which killing is right, and therefore contradict myself. But, as I said in my prior rounds, Con's point does not hold up. Consider that X is wrong, and Y is wrong. Both actions are wrong, but X is less wrong than Y. It would be wrong to do either action, but it would be worse to do Y. It's like stealing 5 dollars versus stealing five dollars and beating someone up. You shouldn't do either action, but stealing is a lot less bad than stealing and beating someone up. My point here is that I am saying that killing is ALWAY wrong, but that it may occassionally be the lesser of two wrongs. Con does say that my analysis here falls down on the basis of moral obligations. For example, that if it is morally obligatory to kill, then it cannot be immoral to kill. That was never my argument. In fact, I said killing was ALWAYS wrong. If you have two options, kill 1 person or kill 2 people, it is morally wrong to take either action. But, it is less wrong to do the former over the latter. It's a matter of degrees, whereas Con is dealing in stark shades. (B) Con's standard Con also clarifies his standard as seeking to maximize moral values in a given scenario. This is still highyl problematic. Let us say that option X serves the interests of the moral value of freedom, whereas option Y serves the interests of the moral value of fairness. How do we decide between the two? Is fairness more important than freedom? Moral values come into conflict all the time, but it is unclear how we would balance them under Con's standard. In this way, the fact that it is case-by-case, and that it cannot resolve competing values, Con's standard is utterly subjective. (C) Rule Utility Con stated, "There is no reason at all to apply a standard of morals that provides broad general rules to live by when plausible exceptions can be found to them." Human rights are broad general rules to live by. For example, the human right to vote is a broad general rule which has exceptions, e.g. exclusions for criminals, minors, the mentally handicapped, etc. Insofar as Con reject "borad general rules" he is also rejecting human rights as they currently function. So, Con's complaints about rule uility can also be applied to human rights. At this point, Con loses some internal consistency, because he lauds human rights while condemning rule utility. So, not only is there some contradictory logic in Con's points, but my point, that rule utility (just like human rights) adds to humanity's moral dialogue, is reaffirmed. Con has also failed, twice, to show that rule utility fails to maximize benefts, and has dropped rule utility's clear connection to the resolution via the term "never." (D) Definitions At this time, I want to reemphasize one particular definition: "Never means 'as a rule.' I provided this specific example to illustrate this term: 'I never drink soda, but maybe this one time.' When we talk about doing things 'as a rule,' we accept that there may be rare exceptions to the rule in which case it is permissible to act outside of the rule; however, in the vast majority of cases, conformity to the rule is ideal. This can be evidenced by such statements as 'I don't lie, as a rule, but if it will spare her feelings, maybe I should.'" Therefore, my BOP is not tp show that a J.S. can not ever initiate war, but merely that it cannot, as a rule, initiate war. At this point, rule utility becomes basically irrelevant, because whether or not you buy into rule utility, you must accept that, under the agreed-on definition of the resolution, I only need to show that in most cases a J.S. can't initate war. (E) Synthesis We can synthesize points A-D into thre simple steps: 1. Presume in favor of moral rules 2. I only need to show that in most cases a J.S. can't initate war. ARGUMENTS C1: Deontology Con is accusing me of bending the resolution. Yet, he accepted the definition I offered, which reads: " as a rule. For example, if I say, 'I never drink soda, but maybe this one time,' I am saying that I don't drink soda as a rule, or I don't drink soda as a principle. In this way, 'never' is oftentimes used to express something very rarely done, or, as noted in the example, a rule-of-thumb." This is a VERY CLEARLY WORD definition, and I am not to blame if Con simply accepted the term without reading. Definitions are a crucial part of any debate, and he has not only accepted the definitions, but failed to rebut them when given the chance in R2. Killing innocents is wrong in that they are INNOCENT. They are not combatants, bear no responsibility nor culpability, and are widely regarded as illegitimate targets in war. Inasmuch as we accept that killing innocents is almso always wrong, we agree that we should never do so. Therefore, since war involves the death of innocent, we extrapolate that we should never inititate war. C2: Utility SA) Weapons Con says that the lines between offensive and defensive weapons are blurry, but states we can delineate the two. Moreover, he complains re: the fact that I only cite Japan. I do this because we are debating a topic about initiating war, and Japan is the only (as far as I can ascertain) nation that CANNOT initiate war. Therefore, it is the example the best fits this resolution. My example is nto rebutted other than in this brief way, and so it is dropped. It is a great empirical example to bolster my argument here. Con then accuses me of making a new argument. I did not--rather I turned Con's argument back upon him. Con says that offensive weapons will be accrued. My argument is that, even if this is true, that these weapons will deter and prevent war, rather than cause it to escalate. At this point, this argument is moot. Firstly, one could argue that if the Jews resisted, they would start a civil war with Germany, and then the J.S.could go in to aid the Jews. Secondly, there are other ways to work to control genocidaires besides war--humanitarian intervention is not always war, for example. Evacuations, sanctions, political pressure, etc. could also assist. SB) More Violence Con drops a bunch of arguments here: (1) that wars of aggression are illegal, and (2) that straying from a rule of strict self-defense will increase cycles of violence. Con focuses exclusively on only one of my two cards. What he does say is that the world is endlessly in a state of violence, and the best way to combat pursuits of power is to go to war. All this does, however, is create violence and embroil societies in needless war. Violence legitimates violence. If Hitler had been attacked first, it may have seemed that the allies were the unjustified aggressors, badgering the axis powers. The U.S. attack on Iraq, for instance, has legitimized a whole new era wherein soveriegnty's meaning is being constantly downgraded. Strong defense is better than preemption. C2: Preemption Con says that he cannot find my source (which I have only in hardcopy). Fine, we can disregard the last part of the source, but the first part of the source does correspond with the link; namely: "In July 1949, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimated that the Soviet Union would not be able to construct a nuclear weapon until mid-1951, though the first Soviet nuclear test occurred only some weeks later in August 1949...The day before the first Chinese nuclear test, the CIA estimated a Chinese test within 6 to 8 months." At no time does Con contest this half of my source. Con drops my point here: "Con has put emphasis on obeying UN doctrine, yet preemption is illegal according the UN. This seems contradictory." Con says he has shown that preemption is usually justified, but his only example is the 6-Day War. His source then says, rather vaguely, that "history is replete with examples when preemption worked" but he never specifies. I would point out that I proved two examples of preemption's failure, and I showed examples of how poor information and intel is not uncommon. I actually provided more examples than Con. Preemption is not usually justifed because: (1) of poor intel, (2) it's illegal, and (3) Con fails to show that preemption usually works. Con then backtracks. He stated, in R2: "Tension alone is not at all justification for preemptive action. In fact preemptive war is, "an attack initiated on the basis of incontrovertible evidence that an enemy attack is imminent.'" Con even took time to underline "incontrovertible." Con now says that "even if this definition is correct, [he] would amend [his] contention." Bascially, he acknoweldges that he cannot meet the burden he set up for himself, and is now trying to escape that burden. He set the burden, now he should be forced to meet it. Con never explains his point re: cooperation. The Japanese incursion would have qualified as a border skirmish, and therefore would not be an initiation of war. I'll impact my SD later on. Again, a J.S. may defend itself against any and all strikes, it simply is prevent from initating conflict, including with anti-ICBM tech. C2: Rights In the Revolution, it began with isolated skirmishes met with large scale British opposition. The British initiated, as I define it. I woudl argue that there is a distinction between humanitarian intervention and war, as well.