Sex with animals is ethically permissible

Rebuttal and Counter-rebuttal"If you want to argue for the value of infants* based... [grief of the family]... many people see their pets as children."It is the choice of a person to treat any animal that they own, be it animal shaped or person-shaped, in the way that has the greatest utility to them. It happens that most people form emotional attachments to various animals they own and being destructive to their pets, regardless of their shape, is generally self-destructive for the person. I'm not arguing that infants* have ethical value, merely that there is currently pragmatic value in treating them as if they have ethical value."I still do understand what evolution and surviving planetary events and so on have to do with ethics...."In this particular context, it is not just that memetic evolution is faster, but that it is predictive. There is no way for non-memetic Darwinian systems to be adapted for extremely rare catastrophic environmental events. If there is no reason to waste our time and resources taking them with us, why would we have an obligation to do it? There is already a clearly established ethical (and pragmatic) reason to save the people. "How does game theory represent a satisfactory theory of normative ethics which is preferable to some form of consequentialism or deontological ethics?"It is not a basis for a theory of ethics, but a valid question of whether animals (Darwinian species) can benefit from ethical agency. Game theory is not a theory of normative ethics but rather the informer of the application of normative ethics. It cannot be rationally denied that Darwinian evolution requires death imposed by the envronment, and death is the end of all freedom, therefore he continued survival of any Darwinian species relies not only on imposing but on being imposed upon, and being fit for specific impositions is utimately beneficial to animals. I turn it back to CON to give a suitable explaination as to "from whence comes ethical agency?".II.B.2 "by definition infants* will never grow up."First, I would like to point out that this particular argument is symantic: so far as we know there is no possible world in which the future may be known with absolute certainty. As per agreement on what makes a thing a person, I have outlined what I see as the basis for personhood in my sections on game theory and ethics: that which is fully capable as a memetic evolver, and that which accepts to be bound by the responsibilities required for freedom. In my estimation, these two groups converge on the same community.III.A.1-2 "I personally think that much of this kind of treatment of animals cannot be morally justified and is thus not morally permissible."A computer can be made to feel, and thus attain sentience in the classical sense of "an agent that feels". It is quite an easy thing to develop a computer program which illicits a pain reaction in response to a stimulus (or to give it pain in response to ANY stimulus). In fact, I have a process running right now which is essentially a "hell program", where no matter what the process tries within its available options, it suffers. If you want I can share the source code."feeling" is merely an innate subjective reaction to a stimulus which results in a change in the system pressure towards or away from a given stimulus. Here I'm arbitrarily excluding here cases where stimulus/response is 100% causal and fixed, though I suspect that such are still within the realm of "feelings". Jeff McMahan makes his case ultimately as an appeal to emotion, largely of the vein "it feels and suffers therefore it has ethical value". But you and he both are responsible for establishing why the feelings or interests of an animal warrant granting of ethical agency. I have explained reasons why it is particularly against their interests to grant them such agency. I do believe I have established why people have ethical agency, though feel free to request additional support for round 5.III.B.2 "[I]f you live in many [places]... there is no official imposition on semi-wild animals."For the places you listed, there is indeed official imposition upon non-domestic animals. We hunt deer, wolves, coyotes, and all manner of animal, and there are official encouragements and regulations to do so. In some cases, wild animals are actually eradicated, exterminated, or imposed upon en masse for convenience sake or to preempt a possible harm. While it is not in the list of places you mentioned, Australia utterly eradicated the tasmanian tiger, and I'm fairly certain that if and when it is possible, the malaria mosquito will be eradicated.In response to your summation, no explaination is necessary as to why animal differ from infants*, as they do not differ ethically from infants*. It is merely pragmatic to treat them as if they do.