Animal rights

Thanks to Pro for accepting. Since he hasn't posted his argument I'll go ahead and just post mine.== Case ==Morality isn’t truth functional with independently competing truth claims but is instead based in rules of interaction that guide our decisions. Our decisions come from self-interest and intending to recognize desired ends. Mercer [1]: And, this lays the basis of normative egoism. Mercer 2: “weak … egoism is the doctrine that all actions are performed in expectation of realizing self-regarding ends. … egoism is the doctrine that behind any action whatever that an agent performs intentionally, ultimately there lies the agent’s expectation of realizing one or more of her self-regarding ends, an expectation without which the agent would not have performed the action. … if an agent does not expect to forestall his own unhappiness or to promote his self-image, …, in … performing an action … then that agent will not intentionally perform an action of that type. … often we take … some other self-regarding end, not as a consequence … but directly as part of engaging in that activity, …. To enjoy tennis is to take pleasure in playing tennis, and not, … to attain experiences of pleasure through playing tennis.” So, we are moral in intending to further our own self-interest. I don’t deny that there are decisions that are to benefit those external to the self but we are motivated to take those acts in trying to recognize self-benefiting ends. Contention 1: We aren’t required to respect animal rights under egoism. There are two reasons: First: People aren’t required to respect the rights of animals because we can choose if we want to respect rights but we aren’t required or obligated. Kalin [2]: “If I' can be established, then so can I since a person's self-interest consists in those wants and desires most important to him as deter-mined by his own informed preferential valuation. There is no restric-tion on what a person can want or have an interest in. His wants may be selfish, confined to his own pleasure and advancement, or they may be nonselfish, directed toward the pleasure and well-being of another, …The ethical egoist may have an interest in the welfare of others, but if he does, it is only because that other has some special connection with his wants and desires, such as being loved. Only in virtue of this connec-tion can another's wants and desires provide reasons for acting …” Winning we respect animals for net-utility gains isn’t requiring us to respect their rights because that recognizes animals only instrumentally. Second: Animals don’t pose a threat that would compel us to respect their rights. I.e my dog doesn’t threaten me if I don’t respect it and thus doesn’t harm my self-interest. Navreson [3]: “Consider the non-[human] … beings. Their behavior will, … affect the interests of many rational beings they might be threats, or sources of food, for instance. … one cannot usefully predict their behavior on the basis of one's results in such deliberations. But consider rational beings. Figuring out what it would be rational for them to do is useful, … there is a pretty significant probability that they will do what it is rational for them to do. … this, … drives … a set of restrictions on our behavior which are not just reactions to immediate threat or prospect of short-term obvious gain, …These commitments are, … the product of self-interest and are very like … agreements. … To talk of "rights" … is to talk of the basis of claims which we have self-interested reason to make and do make, in varying ways; and the reason for others to concede these rights to us is that they have an interest in our respecting them in their case, … No … basis … is, … available for beings which cannot make this kind of claims and commitments, … beings which, whatever interest they may have in coming in for these benefits, simply do not have the sort of rational equipment which would enable them to pose the right kind of threat if we don't, …” == Conclusion ==I've shown that animal rights aren't something that animals have as we have no egoistic reason to respect them. We may act in favor of animals occasionally, but that's not out of a respect of rights, but rather out of a desire to fulfill our own egoistic intentions. As such, the resolution is negated.== Sources ==[1] MARK MERCER. IN DEFENCE OF WEAK PSYCHOLOGICAL EGOISM. Erkenntnis 55: 217–237, 2001.[2] Jesse Kalin. Two Kinds of Moral Reasoning: Ethical Egoism as a Moral Theory. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Nov., 1975), pp. 323-356 [3] Jan Narveson [University of Waterloo ]. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Mar., 1977), pp. 161-178