Political Conditionality and Humanitarian Aid

Once again, I thank Such for this debate. In this round, I will rebut Con's case.PREMISESSyllogism 1There are two key issues with Con's analysis: (1) P2 assumes that Conditions are not, by their very nature, unjust, (2) P1 assumes that the fact that conditions are there is not as relevant as the justness of those conditions themselves; yet the resolution talks about "placing political conditions," implying that the presence and nature of conditions is worthy of consideration.Syllogism 2This debate is neither focused on discussing whether, historically, conditions have been just or not. P1 is simply an extension of the first syllogism.OverallWhat Con seems to be doing here is setting up a framework for his case. Really, I don't think the syllogisms are as important as some recurring themes in the text of his arguments are. Let's examine these briefly:- "conditions can actually improve aid provided by making it more helpful"- "political conditions that can change the nature of such conflict"- "political conditions can help to, 'change the behavior of populations within countries'"- "risks can be mitigated by proposing conditions" We can conclude, from the above, that many of Con's arguments rest on the idea the conditionality actually has positive effects. Whether or not Con is using consequentialist logic to justify his stance--and I would say that he is, at least tacitly, doing so--his impacts rely on it.CONTENTION ONE: Conditionality is not Necessarily UnjustThe idea that people suffering in humanitarian crises should "earn" assistance is also misguided. Innocent people placed in extreme suffering do not deserve their predicament. There are many things in life that should be earned, but our basic rights and our human dignity are not some of those things--they just inhere within us because of our very nature. If I am suffering famine, I should not have to earn food because I have a right to it. In there most basic sense rights are entitlements [1], and so their conditions should be met sans any action by the right-holder.Additionally, distinctions as to who to give aid to can be made in ways that do not involve conditions, and so this seems like a rather non-unique point of discussion. What this paragraph really seems to boil down to is this: do conditions make humanitarian aid any more beneficial? Con suggests that they do, but I will endeavor to illustrate otherwise.CONTENTION TWO: Conditions Have been JustFirstly, this contention seems to provide a laundry list of reasons why political conditions are useful. Why does usefulness translate to justness? Con provides no clear link here. Just because something produces benefits or is practical does not mean it is just. It may be beneficial or expedient to do many immoral things, including killing prisoners, vice trying them, but there is no link to justice. Con's tagline is that these conditions have been just, but why is that so? He never explains. I will be doing a macro-analysis of conditions' efficacy shortly, but let's look at the micro-level of Con's specific points first:GeopoliticsWhy are conditions necessary to maintain security and peaceful relations? Why are they the best way to do this? Why is Pro's world any less safe than Con's? Con never explains, nor presents any reasoning in the text of his debate. Clearly, I do not preclude the use of diplomacy, just conditions.ConflictPerhaps providing security for humanitarian convoys would be a better solution than making aid conditional. Why is conditionality the only way to solve this problem? Why is the best way, morally-speaking? Again, Con never says.SecurityI will make broader arguments about the efficacy of conditionality momentarily. Apply these here.FailingsCon says "some governments will turn against their own people in light of humanitarian aid from other countries." To me this implies that if the U.S. gives aid to an anti-U.S. nation, the nation will turn on their own people. Surely, the nation permitted the aid to flow through its borders? Even so, how prevalent are these instances? Can Con provide some examples?Again, cross-apply my general utility arguments here. Also, humanitarian aid is emergency relief aid; it is not structural aid. Thus, nations are far less likely to become dependent on humanitarian aid.Domestic PolicyThe rights to life supersede any superficial ideological goals. Simply because Uganda passed an anti-gay law does not mean aid should be withdrawn allowing its people to suffer. Then the donor becomes no better than the immoral recipient.Liberal GovernanceThis seems to espouse a neo-colonial paradigm whereby conditions are used to bring about a change in ethics. What gives donors the right to decide what is or is not permissible (in terms of social mores and cultural practices) in recipient states? Neo-colonialism is, in itself a harm, because it otherizes and degrades others and their right to their own belief systems and customs. Con even compares recipients to people with "mental issues," which seems to reflect imperialistic superiority complexes as the seek to "civilize" the rest of the globe.RiskAgain, make the cross-application here.Powercertainly, there is a power disparity between the donor and recipient. the goal is, however, to avoid exploiting that advantage for the gain of any one side. "Influencing" more so resembles coercion when discussing the strong impacting the weak.GENERAL UTILITY ANSWERSPolitical conditionality is ineffective. My off-case also supplements the following points.Conditionality Overwhelms Recipients“For all the heightened concern with the promotion of 'good governance' in Third World countries, it is quite conceivable that one effect of the various external initiatives and involvements in this regard is, paradoxically, to reduce rather than strengthen Third World governments’ capacity for policy-making and implementation. At the micro-level the externally-induced creation of autonomous institutions for improved management may undermine local government capacity. Diversion of aid flows via NGOs may similarly weaken the government departments charged with responsibility for the areas concerned. Demands for compliance with contradictory instructions from different donors may result in confusion and distortions in addition to overburdening qualified manpower which is in short supply.” [2]Conditionality Backfires: NGOs“Political conditionality...has significant implications for [NGO’s] operations in developing countries and relations with governments and donors...the suspension or termination of bilateral aid programs to countries which are judged to have poor records on human rights or repressive political systems can have significant repercussions for NGO programs. The poorest people, who are the principal clients of NGOs, can be adversely affected by political conditionality if aid is reduced or terminated...It can also provoke retaliation against NGOs and human rights agencies by recipient governments.” [3]Historically, Donors Fail to Acquire Needed Information“Donor officials are apt to exert pressure on the recipient government to create a context in which policies are formulated without adequate analysis of objective local economic and social conditions. Insufficient attention is paid to the need for consistency between the proposed policy environment and the development goals and needs of the recipient country.” [4]Conditionality Interferes with Saving Lives"While donors’ political concern vis-a-vis engagement with an illegitimate authority is understandable to many, what is of concern is that such a policy restricts the capacity of the international assistance community to adequately meet even the short term goals of life saving. This flies in the face of received wisdom…the assistance community may be able to save the lives of Afghan children, of whom one out of four dies before the age of five and 85,000 die each year from diarrhea, if they were able to receive unconditional humanitarian resources and allowed to work with the public health authorities in a principled manner." [5]Conditionality Backfires: Violence“Aid shocks…decreases in aid revenue…shift the domestic balance of power and induce conflict. During aid shocks rebels gain bargaining strength vis-à-vis the government…Rapid changes in aid flows—aid shocks—can grow large enough to materially affect the balance of power between a government…and potential rebels…[Therefore] aid shocks…will be associated with a higher likelihood of armed conflict.” [6]Cannot Determine if Goals are Met“It is harder to monitor outcomes than policies, and data on outcomes are often not available or are fraught with methodological problems. Finally, even if there is a clear link between government actions and outcomes and data on outcomes are available, outcomes typically change slowly and can be monitored only over the medium term – implying that current governments would be held responsible for the actions of their predecessors. Linking disbursements to outcomes would also be impractical for policy-based lending, which usually involves disbursements over periods of less than three years.” [7]SOURCES1 - http://www.merriam-webster.com...2 - Martin Doornbos, Institute of Social Studies-The Hague, 1995, Aid and Political Conditionality, ed. Olav Stokke, p. 386-73 - Mark Robinson, Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, 1993, Political Conditionality, ed. Georg Sorensen, p. 964 - Mosharaff Hossain, Economics Professor, Dhaka University, 1995, Aid and Political Conditionality, ed. Olav Stokke, p. 2695 - http://www.odi.org.uk...6 - http://themonkeycage.org...7 - Koeberle, previously cited (R2) Thanks! Over to Con...