LD Debate: Attorney-Client Privilege

I shall be defending my own case, rebutting Pros, and then crystallizing the round thus far. With that, I'll launch into the debate. .. CON's CASE V: Justice - Pro is attempting to render my framework irrelevant by mistakenly labeling it as a distributive system. True, Rawls argued for distribution of resource, but he also held deontological views of rights. Rawls believed that, under a veil of ignorance, society would create rules that would benefit the disadvantaged, and that these rules would function as absolute protections. From this he surmises that societies would implement distribution of resources as ONE of MANY programs to protect the vulnerable. What this shows us is that distribution arises from Rawls's idea that justice = fairness; but, more importantly, distribution is only one very small facet of Rawls's argument. My focus, throughout my case, has not been on "distribution," but rather on the reason that lead Rawls to support distribution; in other words, my focus has been on fairness. Justice, at its core, is fairness, and society, under the veil, would make rules that are fair, and that are designed to protect the vulnerable. Distribution is one of those rules, but so too is attorney-client privilege. In this way, Pro FUNDAMENTALLY MISCONSTRUES my value premise for this round. Justice is fairness and equality, and, under the veil, it would only be fair to institute attorney-client privilege as an absolute right. Pro attempts to twist my value of Justice into one of distribution, but that is neither true to Rawls or true to my own presentation of my framework. Even if you buy none of what I have said, distribution of rights still matters in this debate. We should be distributed what we are due, and we are due due process of law. If you buy that, you can vote Con, because I show in my contention that due process is a due owed to all persons arising from the fairness doctrine and the veil of ignorance. C: Veil of Ignorance - cross-apply my defense of Rawls's theories here. In fact, Rawls is not an economic theory, it is a justice theory. Yes, justice has an economic component, but it also has a rights component, which is deontological in nature. As I said before, I am focusing not on Rawls's economic ideas, but rather his ideas concerning the nature of rights. Pro's own source even states, "Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme for all; and in this scheme the equal political liberties, and only those liberties, are to be guaranteed their fair value. " [1] This quote directly supports the two criteria for justice I offered in my constructive: (1) rules must be equally applied/the same for all, and (2) advantageous to the vulnerable/fair. Pro's own source supports my earlier claims--extend these points. An action is just if, and only if, it can meet BOTH of these criteria. If I can show that Pro violates either one of these criteria, we must vote Con. Extrapolation: Pro basically misinterprets my application of Rawls's philosophy within this round. He does not actually clash with the interpretation I am offering, so my points go unrebutted. Extend them all. At this point, there are no applicable attacks against my framework, and so we should default to my V and C to evaluate the round. C1: Pro claims that I "assert a disjunction between truth and justice. " In fact, I do not. My assertion is that rabid, at-all-costs truth-seeking is detrimental to fairness, and consequently is detrimental to justice. There is nothing wrong with the truth as such, and we should try to find the truth within the confines of respecting attorney-client privilege. Truth-seeking is good, except when it is placed above procedural checks designed to protect the vulnerable. Additionally, The Harvard Law review observes, "to the extent that the privilege induces a client to reveal information to his attorney, it keeps from the court only sources of information that would not exist without the privilege. As the Supreme Court has recognized: "Application of the attorney-client privilege"puts the adversary in no worse position than if the communications had never taken place. "" [2] This evidence shows how there is, as a matter of course, no disjunction between truth and privilege; privilege is no a barrier to truth-seeking. Moreover, Pro DROPS the ALL the following arguments: (1) attorney-client privilege is necessary to prevent a client from self-incriminating (catch 22), (2) attorney-client privilege is necessary to ensure the accused have an adequate defense, (3) truth-seeking at-all-costs undermines the system. Extend all points--they go unrebutted. They clearly illustrate how I am achieving my framework by promoting judicial fairness, and how Pro is failing to do so. PRO's CASE V: Justice - it seems that we agree on the name of our value, Justice, but not on what it means. If "just" indicates impartiality and fairness--an argument that is DROPPED by Pro--then it seems that my interpretation of the value should be preferred. Justice is not just giving each their due, it is giving each their due fairly. In fact, we are due fairness, because without it, any number of horrors could be subjected upon us in pursuit of some nebulous, subjective truth. Consider, a cop believes--based on no reasonable suspicion whatsoever--that there is incriminating evidence in my home. He ransacks my house and finds something, and arrests me. The cop's actions are justified under the truth-seeking doctrine; the ends are justifying the means. But the fact that the means were inherently unjust and wrong taint the ends, and render them unjust was well. There must be limits on truth-seeking, otherwise nearly anything could be justified in pursuing it. That is not justice--remember Black's Law saying that justice connotes "fair administration of the law. " C: Truth - Let me clarify something. LD is not designed to talk about the "ideal world," but rather the "philosophical world. " Simply because Pro says he will seek truth does not mean he will necessarily find it--that is not automatically granted to him because LD is philosophical. Therefore, epistemologically, he may never obtain the truth, and thus never further that knowledge. Furthermore, Pro DROPS the following points I made against his Criterion: (1) his interpretation of justice as understanding the truth ignores other components vital to justice, including respect for rights, impartiality, etc. (2) truth is inherently subjective; there is always interpretation involved. C1: (1) Pro concedes that very few innocent people are convicted. Cross-apply my Harvard evidence [2] which shows that attorney-client does not unduly harm truth-seeking. Finally, allow me to reiterate that if we buy that judicial fairness trumps truth-seeking, then, while those tragedies are certainly bad, on balance, attorney-client privilege still outweighs. (2) Pro absolutely DROPS that attorney-client privilege is a Constitutional guarantee. Extend this point. This shows that fairness is an essential part of our justice system, and functions as a check against the rabid truth-seeking I've talked about. Pro's only quibble here is that we are questioning the Constitution. I disagree. The resolution says within "the U. S. criminal justice system" which implies a discussion of U. S. laws and customs. Pro could have argued that the Constitution only gives very limited privilege rights, but he did not. Instead he decided to dismiss the Constitution altogether. Pro wants to talk about principles, but does not the Constitution enumerate our core principles as a nation? Does the principle of following the Constitution itself not matter? Moreover, when we look at my analysis, the principles that everyone has a right against self-incrimination and a right to effective counsel necessitate attorney-client privilege. C2: To paraphrase Kant, justice is not the doctrine of how we can attain truth, but rather of how we can do so fairly. Pro says erroneously that the means of acquisition is irrelevant, but is it really? If that cop ransacks my house, can we really say he did nothing wrong--especially if he had no reason to search it. That is arbitrary and random exercise of power, which is inconsistent with our social contract, but Pro would say that such acts are okay because they obtain truth. But again, truth is subjective, not always attained, and nebulous. So, we would be justifying horrendous acts for uncertain gains. CRYSTALIZATION My ultimate point is best encapsulated by the syllogism I offered earlier: P: Fairness is a prerequisite to justice P: ACP increases fairness C: ACP increases justice SOURCES 1 - . http://plato.stanford.edu... 2 - Dashjian, Michael B. , 1982, "The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Criminal Defendant's Constitutional Rights," California Law Review, July, 70 Calif. L. Rev. 1048, p. 1052-4 Thanks for a great debate thus far!