The principle of Utility is true

Morality and Meaning.Con begins by mischaracterizing what the aim of an ethical theory (in the scope of this debate) is. The aim will always depend on what field of ethics one is regarding. For instance, normative ethics will apply to the ought factor of ethics, what one ought to do in a given situation or what is the correct standard of action. What my opponent is describing however is what the goal of meta-ethics is. The PoU does not deal with the meaning of moral language. Moreover, even if we normally mean the opposite of what the PoU states, that would not be an argument against it since the PoU deals with what is ACTUALLY good or moral. Any attempt to ground morality in the conventional meaning of common language is at best an appeal to popularity (at worst an attempt to extrapolate real world conditions solely from beliefs) and thus by definition not " logical, coherent and complete explanations of morality" as my opponent argues.Morality and Objectivity.(A) The "Moral Organ"The defense which my opponent brings for the objectivity of morality is interesting. Con argues that the source of our moral convictions originate in some "moral organ". However, he was extremely ambiguous in explaining how this arose. I feel as though it has great significance with regards to whether those convictions can be regarded as moral or not. For instance, if this organ arose by purely natural processes (as I'm guessing my opponent believes) then his argument is nothing but an appeal to nature. In doing so Con would be making the same mistake which he identified in natural law theory. Nothing about nature necessarily translates to what is moral.(B) Begging the QuestionA minor though important observation; in attempting to show the "moral organ" to be universal to humanity, my opponent has attempted to simply define non-conformers out of existence (morally speaking). For instance, in dealing with psychopaths or anyone who would have different moral convictions than what my opponent is attempting to universalize, Con merely chalks it up to "mistaken understanding". But the entire point of this argument is to define what the "moral organ" states in the first place. Just defining anyone who doesn't agree as mistaken is simply begging the question in this instance since we haven't properly defined what is moral yet. My opponent is basically taking the PoU as a premise in justifying the PoU.(C) "Moral Organs" and ObjectivityNow obviously the main contention in my opponent's point is to prove the objectivity of morality. Unfortunately for Con, this is where his point is most lacking. In order to defend the supposed objectivity of these "moral axioms", my opponent argues that they are objective in that they have their root in neuronal processes. Con likens moral beliefs to bodily processes like blood circulation in that even though they exist contingently (on the existence of the body), we would still not be able to deny that they have actual objective existence.I would agree with this last point, but would reject the conclusion which it predicates. Just because we might be able to measure things like beliefs objectively with the advancement of neuro-science does not actually prove the content of those beliefs to be objectively true. Con's point in actuality actually proves too much. For instance, take an indisputably subjective belief like the proposition, "Blue is the best color." We know that it's purely subjective but under my opponent's conception it would be rendered objective since the belief has objective base in neuronal processes in the brain.But this entirely misses the point! Con's argument deals only with physical objectivity and ignores completely the concept of content objectivity. All beliefs and valuations (depending on whether the mind has materialistic basis) have physical objectivity, even purely subjective valuations. However, this is a wholly different characteristic then content objectivity such as the proposition that 2+2 is 4 or that the Sun is roughly 93 million miles away from the Earth. In failing to recognize this distinction, my opponent has failed to justify the content objectivity of the covinctions and beliefs arising out of our "moral organ".Self Defeating Personalities.In the last round, Con made the argument that it would be illogical to argue that it is bad to inflict pain on one's self but permissible to inflict it on others. I conceded this point. However, I showed that it doesn't prove my opponent's case by showing that this contradiction is definitely not a necessary truth in regards to reality. That is, there are instances where someone could defend the first part but not the second. One can defend pain on ethical grounds without denying it on personal ones. Con's case is based on a possible instance of illogical thought, not based off of any necessary truths. Therefore, my opponent's argument would be contingent on the actual argument being put forth by the arguer. Since this argument is contingent, it cannot actually be objective. It's merely an if-then type of prescription. This can be distinguished from a non-conditional prescription, such as the prescription to act rationally. It could be argued that to act rationally is a universal prescription since one cannot possibly argue against such a proposition. For in doing so one is in effect admitting the truth of that which they attempt to defeat. Denial is therefore self-refuting. The way this plays into the debate at hand is that my opponent has argued that denial of the PoU is self-defeating. But as I have shown, it can only be really self defeating if it is self refuting in every instance. But since my opponent's argument rests on a non-necessary characteristic (in fact, it only deals with one instance) of denial of the PoU, it is not universally self-defeating as my opponent attempts to argue.This criticism strikes at the heart of my opponent's contention. His rebuttal though lies simply in arguing that even sadomasochists (or people with SDPD) are actually acting according to a PoU framework by seeking pleasure in their sexual acts. The problem with this defense is that Con has misinterpreted my point. Instead of going after the crucual refutation which I re-outlined above, Con has latched on to a flawed example of my point which I apologize for making. In the previous round I argued that people who do accept pain as universally permissible could logically exist and could make internally coherent arguments for such a position that do not entail denying the permissibility of violence against themselves. Sadomasochists were merely a real life example. Now I concede my opponent's point that they might just be seeking pleasure in a different form but conceding this does nothing to refute my case. Remember that my opponent's point rests on the very act of denying the immorality of pain to be contradictory. This would mean that the actual content of the denial would have to be incompatible with either the presuppositions of speech acts or one could not logically offer an internally coherent argument for such denial. This would mean that one could not POSSIBLY logically accept that pain is permissible. But as I have shown, the irrationality my opponent points out is not a logically necessary condition of denial. My opponent's point that people can believe anything and that the act of believing does not refute the truth misses the point entirely. Con's argument itself rests on the inherent irrationality of thinking that pain is morally permissible. My argument shows that this is not in fact the case. My argument is in now way geared towards extrapolating empirical conditions of reality based purely off of opinions. It is merely based on the fact that my opponent is misrepresenting a single case of irrationality and using it to generalize against anyone who dismisses pain as inherently immoral.