The Kalām Cosmolgical Argument attempts to prove very little.

"Virtually all of my opponents [sic] claims were addressed in my opening arguments, to which he did not respond."This bold statement is wildly inappropriate. In one sentence, Pro claims that his arguments naturally refute mine yet mine are implied to not naturally refute his. It will be seen throughout this round that my opening arguments do in fact respond to his position. Moreover, I explicitly stated that I was withholding my direct rebuttal for later. Shame on Pro for causing me to waste 500 precious characters pointing this out.RebuttalR1. Morality is important, the God question alone is notMorality is indeed so important that the existence of God factors greatly into the discussion. This premise begs the question via the Loaded Words fallacy. [1] By accepting that the either/or proposition is valid, I end up buying into unwarranted naturalism. In other words, the proposition only works if God is already proven not to exist. If he does exist, then it changes the whole ballgame. My opponent must first prove that the two subjects are mutually exclusive before we can even begin to consider the rest of the arguments for this proposition.R2. A KCA first cause might be naturalThis premise was rebutted in my opening round when I argued that the first cause must be personal. Any cause of this universe that is also temporal suffers from the same philosophical problems. It cannot be eternal unless it is abstract. Pro's premise is a red herring. My opponent wants the reader to focus on the cause of this universe and ignore the fact that such causes do not solve his dilemmas. We are talking about the first cause, which could be the cause of any other temporal universe leading up to ours. He cannot get away with such diversionary tactics.R3. The Kalam god is amoralThis premise only matters to Pro's case if his first premise is true, so this third premise is also a red herring. Pro is twice asking us to prematurely accept that morality is an independent subject from God. Pro throws in a lot of random assertions in this third premise as well, such as God possibly not being able to reason. However, my opening round directly counters such a notion when it argues that the first cause must be a "mind" (which by definition entails reason) rather than other abstract entities such as numbers.DefenseFor my opponent's benefit, transcendental necessity simply means that we determine the necessary conditions of the first cause using process of elimination, impossibility of the contrary, etc.D1. The KCA points to a personal creator.Timeless. Time cannot be infinite: An actually infinite number of things cannot exist A beginningless universe involves an actually infinite number of past things Therefore, a beginningless universe cannot exist Pro is mistaken in calling this the fallacy from incredulity. It's not that I personally find the idea too wacky to be believable. I can't even think it if I wanted to. It is logically incoherent. An actual infinity of things leads to a violation of the law of non-contradiction. Hilbert's Hotel exposes the problem. It leads to the claim, "it is true that the hotel is full and that the hotel is not full."Pro's multiverse is 11-dimensional, which includes time. The multiverse suffers the same problem as any temporal existence: the problem of an actual infinite number of past events. Therefore, even if the multiverse is the cause of this universe, it must itself have a beginning. The only way to avoid an infinite regress is to have a non-temporal cause.Spaceless. Space is also cannot be actually infinite. Infinitely expanding space relies on infinite time, so Pro's rebuttal fails. The only entities that can exist without time are abstract entities such as minds or numbers, neither of which are spatial. Therefore, we can rationally conclude that that the first cause is spaceless.Changeless. My opponent rebuts this characteristic with circular reasoning, saying that there was no time, even though he has been appealing to a multiverse with a time dimension. I guess he wants it both ways. If there was no time, then the first event came from nothing. Jim Sinclair best summarizes the problem this poses for Pro:"If things can pop into being, then anything and everything can, without restriction and with no probability attaching to the fact. Thus you can't say, 'It can happen, but only for universes.' . . . The full implications of this would be the maximum skeptical scenario: no thought, no observation, nothing at all could ever be safely attributed to some evolutionary process based on physics. . . If knowledge is possible, then there must be a metaphysical principle 'Ex nihilo nihil fit,' meaning 'Out of nothing nothing comes.'" [3]Immaterial. Pro's rebuttal is equivocating nothing (no being) with nothing (no matter). Vacuum energy is still something. If things come from total nothingness, then we can't know anything because we can never be sure that anything didn't just come from nothing. Pro's rebuttal completely obliterates the science he relies upon to make his case.Personal. I'm not sure how Pro thinks the multiverse is timeless. It has 11-dimensions precisely because it needs those dimensions in order for the universe bubbles to have any of those dimensions. How can it have 11-dimensions of its own and produce 11 different dimensions in the bubbles? Pro goes on to argue that minds aren't abstract because we only observe material brains. In philosophy, a mind is "one of two basic modes of existence, the other being matter." [4] Pro is just yet again equivocating terms.D2. The KCA undermines naturalistic presuppositions.Naturalism is a worldview that presupposes that "all phenomena can be explained in terms of natural causes and laws." [5] How am I misrepresenting this? Even if a naturalist admits that there might be something outside of the cosmos, they reason as though it doesn't matter anyway. So, we have another red herring instead of a real rebuttal here. The fact is, if the KCA is sound, then attempts to reason as though there is not a personal creator is fallacious. That refutes the resolution that the KCA proves "very little" as it undermines everything my opponent wants to rely upon this debate: multiverses, natural first causes, naturalistic morality, etc.D3. The KCA makes the resurrection plausible.My opponent is correct that the KCA does not directly prove Christianity, but this debate is about the KCA having inconsequential implications or meaningful ones. The number one criticism against Christianity is the probability of resurrection, which my opponent brings to our attention. However, the only reason to reject the resurrection on probability is alone is if plausibility of miracles is ignored or denied. The KCA points to a personal free agent with total power over creation. Therefore, if the KCA is sound, then the resurrection must be denied on grounds other than or in additional to probability. That is hardly a "little" issue for the non-theist.ConclusionThis debate is about the implications of the KCA, not about the KCA itself. As such, my opponent wants us to accept that even if the KCA is sound, it proves "very little." This is the philosophical equivalent to plugging your ears and saying, "I'm not listening!" He is using naturalistic probabilities, alternative naturalistic theories, and naturalistic views of morality to make his case, yet the implications of the KCA kicks naturalism to the mat. My opponent wants to show that the KCA proves very little using theories that the KCA itself undermines, making the KCA something that proves much more than "very little."Sources http://www.fallacyfiles.org... http://www.reasonablefaith.org... http://en.wikipedia.org...'s_paradox_of_the_Grand_Hotel http://www.thefreedictionary.com... http://www.thefreedictionary.com...