One Should Not Presume Atheism

Welcome ladies and gentlemen to my grand finale. I hope you all have enjoyed the show thus far, but the best is still to come I assure you. My formidable opponent, Logic_on_rails, claims that this debate has come down to issues that form the basis of our modern understanding of logic. I agree with his assertion, but disagree with his conclusion. There are several issues I would like to address before I arrive at the core content of today's show.What Does it Mean to Affirm?There has been a case of benign neglect presented by the PRO on this issue. He claims that one should presume agnosticism. He even asserts that my drops in the first round force me to concede to the conclusion that one should presume agnosticism. To that extent I agree with him. Let's say, for the purposes of this debate, that one indeed should presume agnosticism. What do we as intellectuals make of this? Does this mean that one should not presume it's alternatives? The PRO seems to think so. Logic_on_rails provides quite the compelling argument when he talks about mutual exclusivity and how it is incoherent to actually presume agnosticism and atheism simultaneously. I agree with this analysis as well. But does that mean we affirm? It would seem as such, not doesn't it? Can we can agree that we should presume agnosticism? Indeed that seems the case. Is the actual presumption of agnosticism mutually exclusive with the actual presumption of atheism? I think that is a fair claim to make. So why haven't I conceded this debate. The clever ones in the audience will have already noticed that I have been italicizing the word actual and its derivatives. Now the brightest among you will already be thinking of what possible plan I have for the word actual. Well here it is (and they say a magician never reveals his secrets): Mutual exclusivity only makes since in discussions of actuality not potentiality. Let me attempt to clarify. Suppose person X has $100 dollars and he had to option of feeding a starving child in America or sending it over seas to a Syrian relief fund. Let's also suppose, for the sake of mutual exclusivity, that he can only do one or the other, i.e., he cannot split his funds. Now it appears perfectly logical that he cannot actually support both causes. However, it does not follow that he should only support one cause. In fact, it is fair to claim that he should support both the child and the relief fund, however the actions are mutually exclusive. You see, mutual exclusivity is a problem that arises among analysis of actual events. Questions of what should be done are to be answered in terms of potentiality for it inherently speaks to the future which is undefined as opposed to actuality which is restricted to the confined past. In the same way, one cannot actually presume both agnosticism and atheism but it does not follow that agreeing one should presume agnosticism concedes that one should not presume atheism. This is essentially the mentality that I have been trying to break down throughout this debate. With that it seems that the claim that one should presume agnosticism does not affirm the resolution as it does not prove one should not presume atheism.But wait my mesmerized crowd, don't think the show is over quite yet. There is still hope for the PRO, I have not fully done my job. He goes on to claim that their is some vague and undescribed guiding principle that allows us to choose one presumption over another. There are two flaws in this argument, and they come from varying definitions that my opponent uses for this guiding principle. First, if he uses the more abstract and accurate definition of basically a gut instinct then he falls into the trap previously outlined. This actually triggers another one of my marvelous tricks. It would seem that in this case, what you actually do is not necessarily what you should do, for there is no reason for you to believe it to be other than a mere hunch. Second, he tries to use a more concrete definition for what this guiding principle is, stating that it is the reason behind our presumptions. In this case I would point the readers back to my previous, "dropped" argument that presumption is inherently unreasoned for if there were reason to believe a presumption then you would be necessarily utilizing either induction or deduction and in fact would not be presuming nothing at all. My opponent cannot advocate a reason to affirm without abandoning presumption altogether and therefore he would not be affirming at all. That is clearly outlined in my second contention. My opponent asserts that dropped arguments are concessions and as such his dropping of my second contention should be a game-over issue per se, for it proves that one cannot consistently provide a logical reason to affirm without negating, yet one can provide consistent logical reasons not to affirm.Finally my opponent pulls out a trick that I thought was below him. He attempts to appeal to straw men. Logic_on_rails claims that my analysis proves that we should presume guilt instead of innocence. My analysis is truly that he cannot normatively claim that one should not presume something. What one should presume has nothing to do with this debate at all. To be quite honest the PRO here attempts to appeal to the reader's presuppositions about what is "right" or "wrong" in order to get them to indirectly reject my argument. Don't let this fool you, his secret has been revealed and it is nothing more than an illusion of the mind.On the Value of KnowledgeFirst to the issue of Pascal's Wager. My opponent does not do enough work on this subject and simply ignores the internal warrants in my argument. Sure, he quotes himself from a previous round, we we already know what he said, what we want to discuss is my response. He simply reasserts in the final round that epistemic value is not the only type of value. His failure in extending this argument are two-fold. First, he fails to define other types of value. Sure, I took the step of indicating ontological value for him, but that only leaves us with ontological and epistemic value which I addressed in my past round. He cannot appeal to types of value he has no defined. Second, and this follows from the first, he did not refute my actual rebuttal. I have given logical evidence that his statement on Pascal's Wager is logically equivalent to the claim that "the epistemic value gained outweighs the lowered ontological probability of God's existence" and thus epistemic value is prioritized over ontological value. I cannot agree with my opponent enough that dropped arguments should count as concession, and that means that he has conceded to my opponent."But wait, what about happiness" you ask. Logic talked about how we can't epistemically understand happiness and thus my analysis that epistemic value is a prerequisite to happiness is misguided. He even gives psychological studies to prove it! This seems rather damning for me. Well thank goodness I don't have to defend epistemic understanding for my first contention to hold and I only need to prove that epistemic knowledge is valuable. Even if we can't epistemically understand happiness, our epistemic knowledge of its existence still remains a prerequisite for us claiming it to have value. For if one does not know that happiness exists, how can only claim to be happy? Indeed, it appears that refuting understanding alone is not enough to defeat my case.On my Second ContentionPRO claims to have addressed this with his claims of mutual exclusivity and guiding principles. Just remember that these guiding principles must necessarily be induction and deduction for his argument to logically follow. He has made no direct nor adequate response to my second contention in this debate.With that you have my final performance of the night. I urge you to come back again and remember as you are leaving that my first contention is enough for me to win this debate, and the second is supplemental.