God is the Best Explanation for Morality

My thanks to CA for adopting my format -- not that I have anything against fisking, I just think that it makes a debate hard to navigate. On to the arguments.Premise 1CA argues that I am "making the assumption that these commands come from God. God itself is the ad-hoc construction." [1]. There is no assumption being made here. I gave an argument as to why moral duties implied the existence of God, I did not merely assume it. To repeat: Commands are imperative statements which carry force behind them. Commands, however, must be intentionally legislated by an authoritative person. For example, if I accidently knock over a box of Scrabble tiles which spell "Go to the store," the command is not binding because it is not (1) intentional, (2) authortative, and (3) issued by a person. If objective morality exists, then, it must be legislated by a lawgiver that is higher than man. [2]. CA asserts that God is ad hoc. Yet once again, how is it ad hoc? He once again leaves out the explanation. To say something is ad hoc is to say that it is arbitrary, but how is it arbitrary to argue that moral duties originate from God, a supreme moral legislator. This seems to be a perfectly reasonable position. One may disagree with it, but surely it isn't ad hoc. CA also seems to be mistaking the point of the moral argument. The point of the MA is that God is the best explanation of morality. Consequently, to charge the moral argument with "assuming that objective morality is proof of God" as if it were a bad thing completely neglects this point -- that's what the moral argument is supposed to argue for. Moreover, I did not assume it, I gave reasoned arguments for it.The strawman charge, moreover, was not directed toward that particular statement. Rather, it was toward CA's claim that "You operate under the assumption that if there is objective morality, God is the only explanation." As I explained earlier, this misrepresents my position.Additionally, notice that P1 is offered in the form of a conditional statement ("If objective moral facts exist, then God exists). To charge P1 with assuming that morality is objective is to neglect the conditional. Such a criticism is more directed toward P2, to which I will now move.Defense of Premise 2 CA portrays my argument as follows: "A man believes that something is wrong, and doesn't feel justified in believing so unless it is objectively true. Therefore, objective morality is true."Not quite. Once again, note that the topic of the debate is: "God is the Best Explanation for Morality." My argument is simply that objective morality better explains elements of our existence, such as our tendency to make moral judgements, our moral intuitions, and our belief in moral progress. Because it is a better explanation, it should be preferred to competing theories of morality. The argument need not even prove objective morality in a strict sense, all that is sufficient is that the explanatory superiority of theism is established.CA claims the burden of proof on me, as I am making the claim. That's not entirely true. Also of consideration in determining the burden of proof is who advances the more plausible claim. Suppose I claim that the external world exists. The burden of proof is not on me to prove this, even though I may have made the claim. Rather, it's on the skeptic who wishes to deny this (By positing that we are, say, brains in a vat) who shoulders the burden of proof.In regards to the example I used in which I compared moral experience to sense experience, that one is physical and the other non-physical is incidental. I could very welll substitute sense experience with knowledge of mathematical truths, which are not empirical in nature.CA's response to (2) and (3) also misses the point. Once again, my argument is based on the fact that God is the best explanation for morality. Human experience may have subjective elements, but we cannot conclude from this that it cannot give us any accurate knowledge of how reality actually is. Such a thesis would lead to global skepticism, in which one doubts everything, and presumably CA doesn't want to go down that route.Challenges to the Human Dignity and Equality Argument For the most part, my responses to the aforementioned points carry on to this argument as well. Now, it isn't clear whether or not CA denies that human beings have equal dignity and rights, but surely this is an utterly indefensible position to hold. On what grounds does he deny the equality of humans? Surely it is more plausible to hold that human beings enjoy equal rights than its negation? My defense of P2 was more of an appeal to its self-evidence. If CA wishes to deny that, then he owes us an explanation as to why he adopts such an implausible position. The burden of proof is on him.He then writes, "At the same time, even if I were to go along with your assumption that human beings are equal, this in no way implies that God exists. This is a non-sequitor like your first argument."Once again, this is not an assumption. I offered an argument for this thesis, which I'll reproduce: "Theism, on the othe hand, furnishes a rich and substantive explanation of both dignity and equality. On the theistic scenario, humanity is endowed with intrinsic goodness by a God who creates them in his own image. Humanity is equal because they each are made in the image of God, and not because of some degreed property they have." Surely it makes sense to posit that if God exists, then he would have endowed his creation with equal dignity and rights. On The "Best Explanation"How is this an argument from ignorance? I am simply following the parameters of the debate. In order to show that something is not the best explanation (As you are arguing), you have to offer an alternative which provides a better explanation. Otherwise, how can you say that it's not the best explanation? "Best" is a comparative term which only makes sense in light of other competing theories.