BeIR/webis-touche2020 huggingface dataset:
A robust missile defense shield will provide the protection previously afforded by the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction, allowing the US to dismantle much of its dangerous nuclear arsenal

Nuclear capability has historically created more stable international relations between countries, as described in the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). The United States and Russia never engaged one another in open conflict during the whole span of the Cold War, for example, for fear of setting off a nuclear cataclysm neither could survive (Waltz, 1981). MAD breaks down, however, with the advent of national missile defense systems. This is due to the fact that when a state cannot guarantee its second-strike, or even first-strike capability it becomes vulnerable. Countries without missile defense systems will be defenseless against those that have them. Furthermore, as the technology is disseminated and more countries possess missile defense systems, stability decreases as it will become a gamble as to which country can more successfully counteract the offensive and defensive missile systems of the enemy. Missile defense makes the world less, not more safe.
Strategic missile defense technology is substantially more advanced and discriminating in application than nuclear weapons, making potential future wars less potentially devastating

Conventional war is a nasty thing, and can be just as destructive as nuclear war, if not as immediate. The threat of war is only increased with the breaking down of MAD, as countries will be able to engage one another without fear of the existential threat of nuclear holocaust. Furthermore, if many countries have access to missile defense systems they will likely be able to employ countermeasures against their enemies’ systems, bringing the chance of nuclear weapons deployment back to the fore.
Mutually Assured Destruction breaks down when national missile defense systems are introduced, destabilizing world security:

MAD is not an effective means of maintaining world security. It relies upon states being too afraid to ever attack one another with nuclear weapons, but the risk of one doing so remains, irrespective of the doctrine. In terms of deterring conventional warfare, that assumes that the state being attacked would chose mutual destruction over potential, transitory subjugation. MAD has too many inherent risks and raises the very real chance, as weapons amass and proliferate, of their being used (Sagan, 1993). National missile defense systems provide a very real defense against not only full-scale attacks by other states, but against nuclear-capable rogue states, such as North Korea, which is seeking to develop intercontinental ballistic missile technology of its own. Should North Korea ever be able to attack the United States or its allies with nuclear weapons, the world will need the ability to counter it. National missile defense is simply a strategic necessity of the modern world in which nuclear weapons may fall into the hands of unstable, aggressive states who might actually try to use them.
The political consequences of the system make the world less safe

The United States has rarely bent the knee to international pressure with regard to issues directly affecting its security, nor should it. Not only does the United States have a right, as do all states, to defend itself against any potential foreign aggression, it is also the primary purveyor of the public good of international security, policing the sea lanes and serving as the United Nations’ primary peacekeeper (Brooks and Wohlforth, 2008). This role places the United States in particular danger because it means it often contends with, and gains the enmity of, some of the most dangerous groups in the world. North Korea, for example, has been at odds with the United States for many years. Furthermore, the United States’ development of a missile defense shield has allowed it to feel safer. It is thus more willing to engage in dialogue concerning and implementation of nuclear arms reduction programs, as occurred with the recent New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) with Russia (Associated Press, 2011). This reduction is in compliance with the wishes of the United Nations, and is arguably more important for international security. Additionally, in the case of Russia, the United States has been able to reach a compromise by which Russia will not oppose its sea-based missile defenses, so long as they are not built on land on the Russian frontier.
The system is an incredibly expensive venture that may not even work

While missile defense technology still has problems that need to be worked out, its future is very promising. The most recent technology, Aegis, is far more effective in testing than its predecessors and has been deployed on a number of Navy warships and in Japan and Australia (McMichael, 2009). The technology will with time become extremely effective at stopping enemy missiles. In a world with more and more countries developing nuclear weapons, many who oppose the United States and its allies, it is imperative that the United States has an effective defense against them. A missile defense system is the most promising such defense.
As a matter of principle, every country, including the United States, has the right to defend itself to the best of its technological and economic ability

The nation-state is the fundamental building block of the international system, and is recognized as such in all international treaties and organizations (Mearsheimer, 1993). States are recognized as having the right to defend themselves, and this right must extend to the possession of a strategic national missile defense system. The United States has every right to develop such a system if it will furnish a greater measure of defense for its citizens and interests. US military technology is the most advanced and prodigiously financed in the world, which is why it is generally the United States that stands at the forefront of new defense and combat systems. The National Missile Defense program is simply the newest tool in the arsenal of the world’s greatest military, whose purpose is entirely defensive. To shield itself from potential ballistic missile, and even nuclear, attack the United States has the right to build a missile shield to defend itself and its allies under its aegis. There is no principled justification for a country to not pursue defense initiatives that benefit itself and that it wishes to pursue.
A strategic missile defense shield will be an effective defense against ballistic missile attacks targeted at the United States and its allies

The missile defense shield the United States intends to build is the most effective and complete ballistic missile shield ever devised. When fully armed with a complement of anti-ballistic missiles both within the United States itself, and in allied nations in Europe, the shield will be virtually impregnable to external missile attack. This means the chance of a nuclear attack succeeding against it will be very unlikely, reducing the chance not only of a full-scale nuclear war between the United States and another nuclear power, but also against missiles fired by rogue states or terrorists, the biggest threats in terms of actual use of nuclear weapons (The Economist, 2009). Technologically speaking, anti-ballistic missile missiles have developed by leaps and bounds in recent years. The current system being put into operation by the United States is the Aegis combat system, designed for deployment on US Naval vessels. This new development has served to sidestep the problems associated with ground and space-based missile defense arrays, due to the slow response time of ground missiles, and the still unfeasible orbital deployment. The sea-based defense array, furthermore, lacks the problem of the land-based system in that it does not need to be placed in countries other than the United States in order to be effective (thus avoiding the political problems of the past). Technology and diplomacy have clearly made a national missile defense system highly desirable.
A robust missile defense shield will provide the protection previously afforded by the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction, allowing the US to dismantle much of its dangerous nuclear arsenal

With a fully functioning missile defense shield deployed, nuclear-armed ballistic missiles become obsolete, unable to ever reach their targets. This means countries’ strategic obsession with second-strike capacity, the ability to return fire with nuclear weapons should they be attacked by them (Mutually Assured Destruction), will cease to be an issue, as first-strikes are destined to be wiped out before they hit a single target. What this means is that countries with missile defense systems can feel secure without the need of retaining massive nuclear arsenals. This will alleviate the pressure to have stockpiles of warheads and will promote disarmament. Mutually Assured Destruction has become a far less secure strategy as nuclear proliferation has occurred to states with different strategic conceptions. This has been seen in the United States, which since its full adoption of the Aegis system has actively pursued a policy of reaching a new accord with Russia on nuclear arms reduction. This culminated in 2010 with the signing of the New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty), an accord to reduce the number of strategic nuclear missile launchers by half (Associated Press, 2011). This new step toward nuclear disarmament could not be politically possible in the United States without a replacement defense, which only a national missile defense system can provide.
Strategic missile defense technology is substantially more advanced and discriminating in application than nuclear weapons, making potential future wars less potentially devastating

An operational national missile defense system renders nuclear weapons, and intercontinental ballistic missiles generally, obsolete. When a country can shoot down all enemy missiles, those weapons lose their power. The future of war, once countries have access to the technology to build missile shields, will no longer be marked by fingers held over the proverbial red button. Rather, the incentive for conflict between states armed with effective missile defenses will be to seek diplomatic solutions to problems. The technology will likely be in the hands of many nations very soon, as the United States has already provided the technology to Japan and Australia, and will be building defense batteries in Romania from 2015 (McMichael, 2009). Furthermore, even should war break out, they will necessarily be far less destructive, as they will not feature the city-leveling power of nuclear missiles. With missile defense, war will be less likely and, should it occur, less destructive.
Mutually Assured Destruction breaks down when national missile defense systems are introduced, destabilizing world security:

Nuclear weapons create stability, as described in the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). Countries with nuclear weapons have no incentive to engage in open military conflict with one another; all recognize that they will suffer destruction if they choose the path of war (Waltz, 1981). If countries have nuclear weapons, fighting simply becomes too costly. This serves to defuse conflicts, and reduce the likelihood of the outbreak of war. When states have nuclear weapons they cannot fight, making the world a more peaceful place. Furthermore, armed with a nuclear deterrent, all states become equal in terms of ability to do harm to one another (Jervis, 2001). If a large state attempts to intimidate or to invade a smaller neighbor, it will be unable to effectively subdue it, since the small state will have the power to seriously injure, or even destroy, the would-be invader with a few well-placed nuclear missiles (Mearsheimer, 1993). The dynamics created by MAD are entirely lost when national missile defense systems are brought into the equation. Anti-ballistic missile missiles effectively eliminate the surety of MAD; it becomes a gamble of whether one’s nuclear arsenal will be able to penetrate the missile shield of the enemy. This increases the chance of a nuclear war, since an aggressor state can count on its missile shield to deflect the second-strike attempted by its opponent. Furthermore, in the case where both states in a conflict have missile defense arrays, as will likely occur as the technology is disseminated, the outbreak of war is also more likely, since each will try to race the other to the ability to counter each other’s offensive and defensive missiles. Clearly, the technology will only destabilize world relations, not offer greater security.
The political consequences of the system make the world less safe

Many countries look upon the national missile defense program of the United States as a serious threat to their security. Russia stands at the forefront of this group, and has for several years actively opposed the development of an anti-ballistic missile technology. If the program is a success and only the United States and its close strategic allies possess the ability to develop such defenses, they will have a marked advantage over all other countries in terms of fighting ability, as the United States would be able to use its own ballistic missiles to intimidate and attack its opponents while being effectively immune to retaliation. Fears over the development of the system have led Russia to make extremely threatening postures on its European border; when the United States planned to deploy a battery of interceptor missiles in Poland in 2008, Russia responded by increasing troop numbers along its European borders and even threatened to deploy its own battery of short-range nuclear missiles on the border (Harding, 2007). This sort of conflict is extremely dangerous, and raises the chance of international conflict escalating into war. Such an outcome is extremely undesirable, and the defensive capabilities of a missile shield are not enough to warrant such risks. Furthermore, the United Nations has sought to end research into anti-ballistic missile technology, and has on several occasions called on the United States to stop its testing (Reuters, 1999). Much of the international community fears the instability that might arise from the breaking down of the current world order of nuclear deterrence between states.
Agreeing to preconditions can damage a leader’s position at home.

If, in order to meet with his counterpart, a ‘rogue leader’ needs to compromise on his and his country’s position even before he gets to the table, this would be a signal of weakness to his opponents at home and those vying for his job. For example, in North Korea, which is going through a dynastic transition[1], the new leader Kim Jong Un is yet to become established and consolidate his status as dictator. Any concession to the sate’s designated mortal enemy, the US, might jeopardise the succession. Similarly, in Iran where Ahmadinejad has fallen from the graces of the supreme religious leader, the Ayatollah[2], agreeing to preconditions in order to get a meeting with Obama would signal to the Iranian President’s rivals that it may be a good moment to attempt to force a change of guard.   [1] “Profile: Kim Jong un”. BBC. 31 December 2011. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11388628 [2] “Ahmadinejad v Ayatollah: Who will win Iran dustup?” BBC. 8 July 2011. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14061556
Preconditions are an essential gesture of good will.

Preconditions are not about posturing or scoring some easy, early points. They play an essential diplomatic role. By agreeing to make some concessions before negotiations start in earnest, a ‘rogue state’ would signal its good faith in the negotiating process and its willingness to compromise and work diligently toward a common goal and reaching an agreement. Without such proof of commitment, the US should have every reason to doubt the true intentions of leaders like Ahmadinejad.
Rogue regimes can use such meetings as a dilatory tactic to stall sanctions against them.

Nuclear countries like North Korea and Iran have been keen to use such a meeting as a stalling tactic against the onslaught of sanctions prompted by its nuclear programme[1]. Negotiations can be continually spun out with very little result in order to keep the United States from taking action simply by encouraging the United States to believe that there will be action after a meeting. Again, if there is no cost to them sitting down to negotiate, then negotiations are an easy way to deflect pressure, while they continue to pursue their nuclear and WMD programmes. As a result the preconditions need to be met before the negotiations to prevent such tactics from being possible. [1] Yeranian, Edward. “Iranian President Offers to Meet President Obama.” Voice of America. 2 August 2010. http://www.voanews.com/english/news/middle-east/Iranian-President-Ready-...
Doing away with ‘US arrogance’.

While legally all the world’s leaders are equal, morally they are not. For decades, the US has been the standard of what it means to be a liberal democracy and have respect your citizens’ rights and liberties. That is not arrogance; it’s moral leadership. This is a vision that the US should aggressively promote in its foreign policy. The President of the United states should not meet as equals with tyrants and dictators who oppress their own people, and endanger world peace and security. Not unless these people give any indication they are even vaguely committed to moving toward some common goals.
Preconditions can damage a country’s negotiating position.

That is true. But that is mostly the case with preconditions that are strategically flawed or an attempt at political gamesmanship, when a leader makes outrageous demands the other party cannot possibly meet in order to paint them as unreasonable and unwilling to negotiate. However, chosen carefully, preconditions can set talks and negotiations on the right course, and give a strong indication of the sincerity and commitment of both parties.
Rogue leaders can exploit such meetings to bolster their legitimacy

The President does not just sit down with a foreign leader without previous groundwork. No preconditions does not mean no preparation. Diplomats can be dispatched in advance to gage the level of interest and the intentions of the other party. Intelligence can be gathered to take the pulse of the regime and understand what is going on in the country, whether the moment is auspicious for change and diplomacy or whether the rogue leader is just looking for a popularity boost. The President should always have a very good idea of what to expect when he or she meets with a foreign leader. They don’t just find out once they get there.
Doing away with ‘US arrogance’.

From its early days, the Obama administration has strived to change the tide of US foreign policy, by moving away from America’s unilateralism and dismissiveness of other nations.[1] Its treatment of its foes is a product of that same attitude. The general policy not to meet or negotiate without preconditions is akin to dangling a spot at the table like some sort of prize that foreign leaders need to work for. In international law, all states are sovereign and equal with no one having a right to interfere with other’s internal affairs. This means that all leaders should treat each other with respect and deference. [1] Harnden, Toby. “Barack Obama: ‘arrogant US has been dismissive’ to allies.” The Telegraph. 3 April 2009. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/barackobama/5100338/Barack-Oba...
Preconditions can damage a country’s negotiating position.

No country is likely to agree to conditions that will significantly reduce its bargaining power once it gets to the table. It would be diplomatically foolish to agree to preconditions that would essentially be the subject of the negotiations and the reason why the negotiations were needed in the fist place[1]. If North Korea agreed to freeze development of its nuclear arsenal, or if Iran agreed to stop its nuclear enrichment programme, once the meeting between the two leaders took place, the position from which they started negotiating would be significantly weaker than the US’s. [1] Klein, Rick. “Obama’s Evolving Take on Meeting with Iran.” ABC News. 20 May 2008. http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/Vote2008/Story?id=4896002&page=2#.Tv7nzCN...
The more the US waits, the stronger its opponents become.

Preconditions delay engagement and negotiations. Sometimes it can take years before the parties even start talking to each other. In that time, Iran will continue to enrich uranium[1] and North Korea will continue to expand its nuclear arsenal[2]. If the US waits for preconditions to be agreed on and met, by the time president Obama gets to talk and negotiate directly with the leaders of these states, he will have a much bigger crisis to deal with. It may have even gotten to the point where diplomacy can no longer be used effectively. [1] Borger, James. “Iran’s acceleration of its nuclear programme angers the west.” Guardian. 19 July 2011. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jul/19/iran-acceleration-nuclear-an... [2] Neuman, Doug. “North Korea expands nuclear relationships with outcast states.” Examiner. 11 May 2010. http://www.examiner.com/korean-headlines-in-national/north-korea-expands...
Rogue leaders can exploit such meetings to bolster their legitimacy

If no proper groundwork is done before such a meeting, and no preconditions are laid out, such events can easily be used by these foreign regimes as propaganda at home to try to bolster their own legitimacy[1]. A meeting with the leader of the free world would give an opportunity to Ahmadinejad or Chavez to portray themselves as great statesmen and leaders, equals to the president of the United States. The same is true of North Korea, which is a regime that rules almost entirely through the strength of state propaganda[2]. If they don’t have to agree to any preconditions, there is no cost to these leaders exploiting a meeting with Obama to their own advantage, while having no intention to actually engage in genuine negotiations and diplomacy. [1] “Clinton: Obama is ‘naïve’ on foreign policy.” Associated Press. 24 July 2007. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19933710/ns/politics-the_debates/t/clinton-o... [2] Myers, B. R. “The Cleanest Race: How North Koreans See Themselves and Why It Matters”. Melville House. 2010.
Meeting with these leaders today might jeopardize America’s interests tomorrow.

The Arab Spring demonstrated just how unpredictable and unstable some of these regimes could truly be. And the new governments coming to power are unlikely to forget America’s role in supporting their former dictator. For example, Egypt’s transition from dictatorship has led to a rise in anti-American sentiment, as the US is perceived to have been a supporter of the Mubarak regime[1]. It may not be wise for President Obama to associate himself, and the US, so closely to leaders like Assad or Ahmadinejad who are susceptible to being deposed through the same type of massive demonstrations that swept through the Arab world in 2011. Doing so without preconditions would signal a trust and deference to these leaders that may be unforgivable to their successors, and to the people of Syria and Iran. [1] Lee, Mathew. “US troubled by rising anti-Americanism in Egypt”. Associated Press. 10 August 2011. http://news.yahoo.com/us-troubled-rising-anti-americanism-egypt-18084318...
Preconditions are like granting a veto to the extremists.

Not allowing any meetings with the President does not mean no negotiations can take place. Groundwork can be done by diplomats, negotiators, third parties, and even high-ranking administration officials from the state department, like the Secretary of State. Such tactics can also strengthen moderates. However, a meeting with the President is a powerful symbol, and it should only take place if either significant headway has been made, or if the leaders of these regimes are fully committed to negotiating, which they can prove by agreeing to preconditions.