Some remotely interesting philosophical issue.

I want to run with the idea my opponent mentioned, namely that "a refutation of one theory both fulfills a negative burden to refute the opponent's case a positive burden to bring one's own case." This is particularly important and useful to remember as sustaining a debate on the merits of both ethical naturalism AND non-naturalism at the same time is quite unpractical in this medium. Given that my opponent has continued my discussion concerning Moore's open question argument - a once and perhaps still preemptive argument against ethical naturalism - I will discuss the merits of the argument. Furthermore, since I wouldn't fulfill my burden by simply defending an attack on my position, I will also muster an argument against non-naturalism. Thus, my case is twofold. Open Question ArgumentTo begin, I'm not exactly sure if my opponent's understanding of the open question argument (OQA) and the naturalistic fallacy is accurate - at the very least, his representation of it is not. To avoid any confusion, let's set out with defining the two concepts before I reject the OQA.The naturalistic fallacy is somewhat of a misnomer (something that Moore himself acknowledges), for it need not refer only to 'naturalistic theories'. Rather, more specifically it is an attack on reductionism in ethics. He argues that philosopers err when they say "good is pleasure", and thus equate the two concepts as one. It is coherent to say "I am tall", and understand that "I" and "tallness" are not the same. However, when it comes to goodness, philosopers make a meaning analysis of good when they claim "good is pleasure", instead of detailing a constituent property.The OQA isn't in reference to the ability of one to keep asking "why", or letting us ask any successive question. Rather, the point is if a philosopher were to tell us "good is pleasure", would it make sense for us to ask "is pleasure good?". For example, when we deal with the proposition that "all bachelors are unmarried", the question "are all unmarried men bachelors" is a closed question -- it is meaningless to ask such a question, since the very apprehension of the question answers it already. Given that we can always ask an open question of any moral property, Moore claims goodness is irreducible.Several points can be made about the OQA: it is circular in it's argument (as brought up by Frankena) for calling a question meaningless is to say the two constituents are equivalent. Moore states that asking "is it so that x is y?" is meaningless if x and y are equivalent, therefore saying a question is meaningless implies equivalency! It implies that "good is pleasure"! Further points regarding Frege's sense-reference distinction helps emphasis the point that the naturalistic fallacy is moreso a "definitionalist fallacy", and indeed one that is too harsh for it eliminates any meaningful discussion in analytic philosophy. Supervenience ArgumentIt's a simple but powerful argument, one that demonstrates ethical naturalism as having an easy and satisfying explanation, whereas non-naturalism at a peculiar loss. If we can accept the premise that given 2 worlds were exactly identical in every natural property, there will be no moral difference in the world, then the conclusion is easily reached. This is a relatively uncontroversial premise: we can all agree that if nothing changed about the situation surrounding Hitler, he would still remain evil. It would be a philosophical circus trick to imagine how he can be thought of as a saint if NOTHING about natural facts were to change.Given this apparanet supervenience of natural facts on moral facts, how does non-naturalism explain this? This lack of an explanation is an argument for pointing at the defeciency of a non-naturalist theory.