The 'Problem of Evil' never succeeds (Attempt 1), Pt. 2

I thank Ryft for this debate - despite never getting into the meat of my argument that I would usually debate about, it's novel to see a new criticism presented. In his last round he has explained in excruciating helpful detail about the progression of our debate. It was dead on on with everything...except one point. Needless to say, I'll leave no extended commentary on every section before "Argument:Section 3". He has accurately depicted what my intended argument was, it's effect, and how he replies to it. Our main point of disagreement that has been running along for the past couple rounds is at the point of whether my argument begs the question. At this point, it would seem that I'll be overkilling this point about possible worlds, and what not. I noticed, however, that there is something helpful to demonstrate further the nature of my argument. ==================== Begging the question? ==================== My opponent claims the following: "But this exception, too, fails him because the question-begging fallacy is still present; if a premise of his argument assumes the non-existence of God in the actual world, then his argument is viciously circular because the non-existence of God in the actual world is the very thing to be proved." This is an inaccurate depiction of my argument. When we posit the possibility of GE, we do so IN A POSSIBLE WORLD, NOT THE ACTUAL WORLD. To say that "X is possible in the actual world" is redundant, since possible means "exists in at least one world". This world can be the actual world or it isn't, figuring out if it IS the actual world is the job of the probability aspect of my argument (i.e. showing GE's existence to be probable). So when I claim both GE and BG are possible, this translates to me claiming both GE and BG exist in at least one world - ones that are obviously distinct. Further, you give a misrepresentation of how we would conceive of possibility. To assume something is possible is not to belive it has a probability greater than zero, rather it's to assume such a scale of probability EVEN EXISTS. If we were to actually draw a scale of how probable something is to exist, then: The negatives would demonstrate less likelihood. The positives would demonstrate more likelihood. The zero would demonstrate a purely agnostic position; aka neither more or less. ==================== God is an absolutely necessary being? ==================== On numerous occasions my opponent has claimed that God is a being that is necessary in every possible world, and he claims that such a thing is provided by his definition. The problem is that if that this is pretty much THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD. He is claiming that God is an absolutely necessary being given his definition -- obviously I contend this but we aren't focusing on the ontological argument, are we? Further, the very idea of an absolutely necessary being is challenged by Kant. He remarks that while it is necessary that triangles have three side, it is a conditioned necessity that triangles exist. In other words, "a triangle has three angles" yields only the conditioned necessity that, if a triangle exists, then necessarily three angles exist. So to claim anything is an absolutely necessary being is quite suspect. Ironically, my opponent commits circular reasoning right here. ==================== Conclusion ==================== There isn't much left to say. Simply put, my opponent's argument crumbles on two very weak points. He makes a simple error about possible world semantics, and inadvertently declares the truth of the ontological argument without even arguing for it.