Ideological Diversity is not a Virtue

1A. Pro claims that paradoxes are not true or false in the sense that normal propositions are; where they exist, they show the inabilities of a logical system. Indeed there are logical systems where "true contradictions" exist. For example, Dialetheism is the view that some statements can be both true and false simultaneously. More precisely, it is the belief that there can be a true statement whose negation is also true. My opponent's syllogism from R1 utilizes formal logic. Contradictions are problematic in this system. "Dialetheists, on the other hand, respond to this problem by accepting the contradictions as true. Dialetheism allows for the unrestricted axiom of comprehension in set theory, claiming that any resulting contradiction is a theorem" [1]. Dialetheism resolves certain paradoxes. According to Dialetheists, some statements are not derived from logic, but are instead descriptions of experience. The assertion "there are no absolutes" appears to be a contradictory statement, however, that is only the case if we use classical logic. Since many paradoxes exist in formal logic, we have no reason to accept this standard as the singular, definitive, absolutely correct form of logic since Pro admits it is problematic, i.e. paradoxes. Therefore Pro's 5th premise that two contradictory propositions cannot both be correct is not definitively true. Indeed it's possible they are, and nondualism is another philosophy that accepts this supposition [2]. 1B. Pro states that (assuming Compatabilism is correct) valuing Compatibilism would be the only optimal theory, leaving diversity with no place. However if the theory of Compatibilism was derived from combining aspects of Free Will and Determinism, then valuing the diversity between Free Will and Determinism is specifically what will have led to the realization of Compatibilism in the first place. If we accepted one ideology as definitively correct while dismissing the other, we may not have reached a conclusion that marries aspects of the two. Accepting that both ideologies make valid points allows the opportunity to expand one's perspective. More about this in Point #2. 1C. I'm dropping this contention. I don't have much time left to post this round, and it's hardly the strongest point against the resolution. 1D. Pro has not proven that objective morality exists. He's written, "If a moral agent seeks to hold an ideology, they are expressing that the ideology is a value to them, and thus, that they perceive it as furthering the good." However just because an ideology holds value to an individual doesn't mean that it is in fact true or good, therefore diversity has merit. It allows the individual/group to assess various propositions. "As a product of blind Darwinian evolution, our morals will have developed solely from the pragmatic consideration of what works - what enables us to benefit from cooperation and thus leave more descendants. For interacting with another human, what matters is not what is 'objectively' moral (whatever that means), but what that human considers to be moral" [3].Pro writes that moral agents do not seek to hold faulty world views; they believe that one’s worldview is not faulty, so an undercutting of fundamentals is impossible. In other words it would be illogical for one to hold two different positions simultaneously. Ignoring the fact that I've explained this is not necessarily the case (1A, 1B) #1 an individual can weigh the values of an ideology differently, and #2 the resolution is not necessarily referring to one specific individual. Pro claims "The is/ought problem ceases to be a problem when a goal has already been specified." Suppose one's goal is to pass the Bar exam. They could cheat and risk getting caught, or they can try passing on their own and risk failure. The goal is specified and yet what one ought to do is still a concern. The Non-Aggression Principle is a moral value system, and yet it does not answer the is/ought problem even when the goal is clearly stated: non-aggression. If there was an absolute moral standard, something could be immoral even if every human on the planet disagreed. But if people's feelings and desires are what ultimately count because they "perceive" it as furthering the good, then that is a subjective morality. It doesn't mean that they are actually furthering the good, assuming an objective standard for goodness could even be determined.2. This is the crux of my argument. Contrary to Pro's claim, incorrect ideologies (assuming they are objectively incorrect) can still have value - just less value. I've explained that there is still value in the diversity of opinion; there is an inherent value in the discussion, exploration and acquired knowledge, practice and experience gained by challenging different ideas and considering various outcomes.Pro writes, "One must try to get away from all wrong world views and move towards the singular ideal. If it were not the case that the ideal ideology should be aimed towards, the benefits my opponent cites have no impact (since critical thinking would be useless)." My opponent makes the mistake of assuming a definitively true, objective goal exists. However the sciences for example are constantly evolving. We don't even know what our goals are or what advancements to expect in the near or distant future. As such, the benefits of critical thinking cannot be overlooked. Science relies on creativity, exploration, innovation and new ideas (testing hypothesis) -- all of which can be nurtured through trial and error. And while Pro says that working toward a singular truth is the goal of this trial and error, he #1 supposes singular truths exist and #2 assumes that everyone has the same values. This is a grave error. Pro claims that the utility of critical thinking is derived from the search for truth or a singular righteous standard. But let's use this debate as an example. Pro's goal and value might be to establish truth, whereas my goal and value might be to pass time, sharpen my debate skills or have fun. The fact that Pro and I might disagree ideologically (as we are doing now in this debate) still has value, because it allows me to accomplish all 3 of those goals. My opponent writes, "When one analyses a faulty argument, no value is gained from the argument; the value is gained from eliminating the argument’s influence as best you can and replacing it with one which is coherent. The value is in the negation of diversity, not its existence." However this is a nonsensical statement. In order for there to be value in negating diversity (value that Pro accepts does exist) then diversity needs to be present in the first place. Otherwise there is no scrutiny, no analysis and no gain at all. When we disagree with people, we are prompted to work harder. Diversity jolts us into cognitive action in ways that homogeneity simply does not [4]. Contextuality and Conclusion Pro states, "Something being right in one scenario and wrong in another poses no problem to objectivity; they would be independent judgements." This is a straw man. I did not argue that something being right in one scenario and wrong in another eliminates objectivity. What I said was that since what is "right" in a given scenario can change (something that Pro accepts), it's all the more reason to value diversity and different approaches and outcomes to different problems. That way people are more informed and prepared on the best way to handle various situations regardless of circumstance. Pro concludes, "Would we not think bad of a world wherein every ideology was accepted equally? Surely despicable and nonsensical ideologies being placed alongside moral and rational ones is indefensible." This is another straw man. I never said that every ideology ought to be accepted equally; I've said ideological diversity is a virtue. [1] "Transfinite Numbers in Paraconsistent Set Theory."Review of Symbolic Logic 3. 2010. pp. 71-92.[2] http://plato.stanford.edu...[3] https://coelsblog.wordpress.com...[4] http://www.scientificamerican.com...