Hitler's lack of persistence costed him the Battle of Britain

The Luftwaffe lost the Battle of Britain not so much because they lacked persistence in fighting the RAF, but in the costly mistakes that eventually made the initial German advantage in numbers disappear. There were three key mistakes that the Luftwaffe made, one of which almost decided the war before it even began. Mistake 1: No Long-Range BombersEngland was not like other countries that Nazi Germany had overrun prior to its attempted invasion of Britain. It often used short-tange dive bombers to clear the way for its troops. The problem now was that these were no longer effective for such a long distance target as Britain was. In other words, the Germans could not clear the way for its troops in much of the same fashion as it had done before. "Germany had no long-range bombers and would not field its first strategic bomber, the Heinkel 177, until 1944. What it had in 1940 was an assortment of twin-engine medium bombers, notably the slow-moving He 111 and Do 17. They had been adequate to supplement the Stuka on the continent, but they were out of their league in the Battle of Britain. "[1]This, in effect, reduced their force potential during the Battle of Britain before it even began. Even so, it still could have won the battle if it had paid better attention to what was important. Mistake 2: Discounting Force MultipliersWhile the Germans had more planes, Britain had two things that Germany did not - radar and high-octane fuel. In the case of the former, the Germans actually discounted its importance, a crucial mistake as it allowed the British to defend the island so easily. "Dowding was an early champion of radar. Britain had a chain of 29 RDF stations along its southern and eastern coastlines. The radar was effective for more than 100 miles out. Once Luftwaffe formations crossed England’s coastline, the Royal Observer Corps began tracking them. The RAF knew when and where to respond, and could delay scrambling its fighters until the last moment. "[1]Further, the Luftwaffe rarely took out the radar stations, and even when they did, their bombings did little to stop the use of radar by the British. "Finally recognizing the value of the radar sites, the Luftwaffe tried to destroy them, but did so by aiming bombs at the radar towers, which were easy to replace and almost impossible to hit. The radar site buildings where the trained operators worked would have been easier targets but were seldom attacked. " The Germans were later told to stop targeting radar stations again, as a result. [1]As for the high-octane fuel, the British obtained it from its allies, the Americans, and this allowed their planes to acheive more horsepower, and therefore have greater strength against the Germans. "Finally recognizing the value of the radar sites, the Luftwaffe tried to destroy them, but did so by aiming bombs at the radar towers, which were easy to replace and almost impossible to hit. The radar site buildings where the trained operators worked would have been easier targets but were seldom attacked. "[1]Overall, the Germans cared little about the important force multipliers. While the Germans may have had more planes than the British did, it could very well be argued that the Germans' disinterest in those force multipliers gave Britain the upper hand. Mistake 3: Changing TargetsThis was the biggest mistake of all. Instead of attacking the RAF itself, Hitler ordered the Luftwaffe to bomb London itself. This allowed for the RAF to regroup, reinforce, and get ready to attack the Luftwaffe. "That took the pressure off Fighter Command at a critical time. RAF fighter losses fell below the output of replacements. In diverting the offensive from the RAF, the Germans had lost sight of the valid assumption with which they had begun: The key objective was destruction of the RAF. Otherwise, the Sea Lion invasion would not be possible. ""By 15 September, Hitler’s deadline for the invasion preparations to be finished, Fighter Command had been able to rotate many of the units in the South-East, and had recovered its balance and nerve. In fact, they were now stronger than ever before. "[1][2]Essentially, the Germans allowed for the badly damaged RAF forces to recover, and this destroyed any chance the Luftwaffe had of gaining superiority over the British skies. ConclusionThat battle on September 15th ended in a spectacular defeat for the Germans. They were never able to get the same advantage that they had on the British at the beginning of the battle because of the sheer losses they had suffered. The Luftwaffe lost 1652 planes, whereas the RAF lost only 1087. By the end of the October of 1940, Britain had produced 2354 planes since June of that same year, whereas the Germans had only been able to produce 975 planes since June of that same year. This annihilated the German advantage, as not only had the Germans lost more planes, they had only been able to make less than half of what the British made. The British came out of the battle with more planes, whereas the Germans came out of the battle with fewer. [3]"At the end of the Battle of Britain, Fighter Command had slightly more airplanes than it did at the start. Surging British industry produced replacements at an encouraging rate. Fighter Command also had more pilots than in July, but had taken terrible losses in its most experienced airmen. The German aircraft industry was unable to surge its production, and between August and December 1940, Luftwaffe fighter strength fell by 30 percent and bomber strength by 25 percent. "[1]Overall, the Germans did not lose the Battle of Britain because they lacked persistence, but because they made a number of costly mistakes that eventually allowed Britain to take the advantage. Sources[1]: . http://www.airforcemag.com...[2]: . http://www.raf.mod.uk...[3]: . http://cz-raf.hyperlink.cz...