This House Asserts Ontology Necessitates God's Existence!

== Overviews == (1) I did not break the rules, since I didn't admit to using "deconstructional semantics." I did not use any of these *at all.* This is false. Discredit this assertion. (2) If I am able to refute any part of the argument, the argument fails. Thus, I needn't attack everything Pro has said in this debate. (3) I don't understand what Pro means. My imagination rebuttals would still stand if Pro justifies that "all that is not imagined is true." Pro just straw-mans me at this point. According to Pro, "[W]hat he says my argument should read as to avoid contradiction is exactly what my argument reads as." I didn't say *anything of the sort.* I said the argument *does* read like that. (4) I explained Hilbert's hotel clearly in Round 3. (5) I concede Lem. 4. (6) Once more, Pro fails to recall what I said. Pro *clearly* says, "False ideas or unprovable ideas are solely from the imagination faculty," and "All our fantasies have limits of senses." Pro defines "fantasy" as a "false thing," essentially. Which means, Pro *does* say that everything false is imaginative. (7) Pro is claiming that neutrinos, dark energy, and atoms are not devoid of sensations. Pro fails to justify this claim. (8) The "relevance" argument rested upon a modal definition of "necessary." == Rebuttal == (1) Non-cognitivism *So* many straw-men, at this point. I said the FSM is *not an intrinsic conception.* Pro keeps missing every time I mentioned "not." Also, I already defined what an "intrinsic conception" was: something that is conceived that is in cognition *independent of experience or word of mouth.* Further, my non-cognitivism does not depend on the gap. All my non-cognitivism depends on is God lacking any primary attributes, and only having relational or secondary attributes. Pro concedes that God lacks any primary attributes, and concedes that God is only as cognitively meaningful as a rabbit defined as "40lbs." Let me summarize the argument: (A) Pro fails to justify that God is cognitively meaningful. That is the "gap" in the argument. I did mention that Pro just *assumes* God is meaningful and coherent. The argument in justification of the premise "we have a conception of God" is basically: P1) If humans do not intrinsically conceive of God, the idea of God would be meaningless P2) ??? C. Humans intrinsically conceive of God The P2 is -- implicitly -- "the idea of God is not meaningless," since modus tollens is the only valid deductive way to continue this argument. Pro fails to justify that "God" is meaningful. (B) Drop. I argued that (a) to be meaningful, one should have an adequate description, like that of a normal rabbit, and (b) God does not possess such a description; lacks any cognitive meaningfulness. All of this is completely dropped. This is what I meant by "dropping the argument." Pro drops non-cognitivism's essence -- that God is not cognitively meaningful. He just focuses on the FSM, the gap, and other things that are irrelevant to the core of this argument. Extend these points. God is not cognitively meaningful, therefore humans lack conception of God. (2) Ad infinitum I did address the claim that Pro's argument just allows infinite entities. First, it was a bare assertion in itself. Second, we can just replace the word "God" with "God #2" and "God #3," and go on and on. The *same logic* applies to infinite of the same "God," since it would still deductively follow that ontology necessitates infinite gods. The argument: Assm: God does not exist. Lem 1: The idea of God is false (is a fantasy). Lem 2: The idea of God has been imagined*. *By virtue of our above principles where false ideas or unprovable ideas are solely from the Imagination faculty. Lem 3: [By virtue of Lem 1 &2 and above principles] The idea of God has been formed by combining other ideas, is subjective, and is limited by sense parameters. Lem 4: Lem 3 is false. Con 1: God does not exist is a false statement. Con 2: God exists is a true statement. The same can be written with "God #2," who is a second entity with identical attributes, a third entity, and so on, until infinite "Gods" are achieved. (1) Infinity cannot exist. (2) By this argument, infinite gods exist. (3) The argument is false. Pro concedes (2), and I have defended (1), therefore the argument does not work. (3) The argument (A) Pro argues that "xghsx" is not meaningful, so is not in our model. I have demonstrated that *God is not meaningful,* a point that isn't even contested by Pro, and, thus, have demonstrated that God does not fit into this model either, and ontology doesn't necessitate God's existence. (B) Pro still fails to justify that God is a simple idea. So even if all simple ideas are true, there's no reason to think it is impossible to imagine God. == Conclusion == Pro drops non-cognitivism's offense, only addressing its impacts to the specific proposition I was also addressing. Pro also fails to justify that God is a simple idea. For these reasons, vote Con. [Note: I don't have much time for this round, and apologize for the briefness.]