One Should Not Presume Atheism

I thank Mestari for his response. As readers are no doubt aware, this debate is getting to foundational issues, and this requires a proper addressing. Without further ado, I’ll begin.PresumptionFirstly, I withdraw my statement that Mestari asserted abduction was the only way of knowing.The second point to raise is precisely what both myself and Con are advocating. I advocate a presumption of agnosticism. Due to R1 drops it is clear that Con would also presume agnosticism. The problem for con is that his position is for a presumption of atheism! There is no false dichotomy here. It’s impossible to presume atheism and agnosticism simultaneously. Con’s case for presuming atheism is terribly undermined because of this absurdity.Limitations on presumptionThe first limitation is that of mutually exclusive positions. It’s impossible to presume 2 mutually exclusive things. Atheism, theism and agnosticism are mutually exclusive. While a presumption on God’s existence would be a prerequisite for knowledge of God’s existence, that’s not to state that all presumptions would garner the same degree of knowledge. Imagine you are presented with Pythagoras’ Theorem. It is obvious (before evidence on the theorem’s truth) that a presumption will be made. These types of presumptions are a prerequisite for knowledge. However, will the presumption that the theorem is wrong be exactly equally (what Con is advocating) as helpful as the presumption that the theorem is true? No. Believing it’s true will save you much time. Given a positive value of time, we should not presume that which will waste time.What am I driving at here? One doesn’t have time (besides the aspect of presuming multiple positions without evidence) to presume everything. One must prioritise; me and Con agree that agnosticism is a logical presumption to make. It is preferable to presuming atheism, and so due to time constraints we can’t presume atheism – we want to learn about others things. Obviously, presumptions take time.To quote Con “one must have presumed there is a fact to be known. Had they not, they would have never seeked an explanation because there would be no explanation to be had.” The fact we want to know is God’s existence. Clearly, we make a single presumption which is a prerequisite for knowledge.However, Con will state, say, ‘you can’t have a reason for a presumption’, which if true makes my case a little useless. I implied in R1 that we were debating given a lack of evidence on God’s existence. What’s important is how presumption occurs. Con says there can’t be a reason for a presumption, but is there a guiding principle behind how one presumes anything? There has to be some manner or method by which we choose one presumption over another (ie. Mutually exclusive positions). There’s a principle behind how we make presumptions. Take the presumption of innocence for instance. Con’s logic would be fine asserting the presumption of guilt! I humbly suggest that there’s a principle behind our presumptions, with the principle varying depending on the type of presumption. In the case of God’s existence we presume agnosticism for the principle outlined in R1.I’ll leave it up to readers as to whether they consider that last argument to be changing what I’m saying to something other than a presumption.Knowledge is more valuable than true beliefMestari decided to put some arguments under this title. I’ll will for simplicity.Pascal’s WagerThe point of this argument was not to make a bulletproof argument or anything of the sort. The point was that knowledge can be harmful to learn. Obviously ‘should’ can entail more types of value than just epistemic value. Con also completely misinterprets me here. He asserts that I claimed that the epistemic value of Pascal’s Wager changed. I did note. I said last round “Imagine that you learn an argument against God’s existence. This has epistemic value. This also lessens the likelihood of God’s existence. However, the gains you receive from this knowledge and the likelihood it will convert you to atheism are negligible in contrast to the potential losses you could receive...” I’m clearly talking about the argument against God having epistemic value, and applying Pascal’s Wager to show that this epistemic value may not outweigh other forms of value. Con’s reply here misses the boat, quite unlike his other responses. Clearly, there are other forms of value besides epistemic value, and these can outweigh epistemic value.A need of epistemic understanding?Con tries to state that happiness is of minimal value (that epistemic value is more important; ignorance is bliss) when he says “these claims can be simply refuted when one realizes that to claim value of any sort to happiness of [readers, should be ‘or’] liberty you must have some epistemic understanding of those concepts.”Con is terribly dismissive here. Readers, do you feel you have an epistemic understanding of happiness? An epistemic understanding of liberty? Do you think those answers were unwaveringly strong on your part?Readers, psychologists have spent years trying to discern what causes happiness and in trying to understand happiness. Despite their inability to understand we still feel happy. Hundreds of years ago people valued happiness and felt happy. One can value something even if he can not precisely explain why he values it. The idea that one must have an epistemic understanding of that which he values seems odd.Furthermore, even if I grant that epistemic understanding is necessary, this doesn’t mean that things like happiness aren’t taken into consideration. Just because epistemic understanding might be a prerequisite doesn’t mean it’s more valuable. Say I have an epistemic understanding of happiness (or anything else for that matter). Does this mean that epistemic value is more valuable than other conceptions of value? Does this mean epistemic value is more valuable than the value one can attribute to happiness?The above demonstrates the fact that Con doesn’t show that epistemic value is paramount. Nor does Con address the idea that even if it were paramount that it could be outweighed by a multitude of other factors.Con has made no case for epistemic value being of unparalleled value. This point and the previous point undermine Con’s contention that knowledge is more valuable than true belief. I’ve shown that there are instances when this isn’t. By undermining this contention Con’s entire case is lacking.In Order to Normatively Claim That one Should not Presume Atheism, one Must Utilise Induction or DeductionCon’s structure; simplicity.I addressed this point under presumption and limitations on presumption. I drove at the idea of principles behind how one makes presumptions. If unsure, I urge readers to reread that section. Readers can decide if the creation of principles for presumptions prior to a presumption’s making counts as a reason for a presumption.ConclusionThis debate hasn’t had a lot of direct clash. It’s been a case of trying to uproot/ignore the opponent’s case and also questioning whether these instances of uprooting are related to the topic at hand.Con conceded to everything in R1. He hasn’t made a case for presuming atheism that doesn’t run into issues of time, mutually exclusive positions or the idea of principles behind presumptions (discussed and conceded to in R1!). Con also hasn’t shown why epistemic value should be prioritised over other conceptions of value. By failing to show why epistemic understanding should be valued his case weakens sharply.Due to the reasons stated in the debate, one shouldn’t presume atheism. One should presume agnosticism given a lack of evidence.--------------------My thanks to Mestari for a fine debate. Also thanks to MIG for hosting this tournament. I urge voters to carefully consider their vote and vote according to what is said in the debate, not personal beliefs.