The state should not pass legislation regarding drugs.

Foreword Since Con admitted his mistake in putting up the R1 case, it's up to voters on the conduct point.. Framework Con retorts that we have to look to morality in this debate because it centers on values, but this isn't the case at all. When evaluating political philosophy, it is possible for one to be influenced by ethical theory; however, this is merely descriptive ethics, not normative ethics. That discussion may be influenced by moral principles does not imply that proving a moral imperative is necessary for victory. As I noted, it's perfectly fine for Con and I to make moral arguments, but the resolution is not intended to be framed as a moral imperative for the state. Con attempts to argue that even my "you should go to the doctor" statement is a moral claim, but it's one which makes use of a colloquial notion of "should", which implies "it would be beneficial for you to go to the doctor", rather than "you're morally obligated to see a physician". Moreover, I would like to point out that Con is making a slippery slope argument. He claims that we shouldn't have "unlimited freedom", because it would force us to accept freedom to murder, rape, and so on. First of all, I never advocated "unlimited freedom", so his objection is irrelevant. Second of all, we're talking specifically about the freedom to use drugs, not to initiate violence against other individuals. This distinction between limitations on self-harm and limitations on harming others is actually central to my case. Arguments Argumentation Ethics and Self-Ownership There are many theories of rights encompassed in ought-ethical theories like utilitarianism and deontology; however, these theories all fall victim to problems of normative contingency and crushing subjectivity. Argumentation ethics explains rights as presuppositions resulting from engaging in the act of argument, rather than engaging in violence. Hans Hoppe argues [http://mises.org... (starting around 339-340)] that we must necessarily allocate scarce resources--our bodies. By the very act of making an argument, I am exercising self-ownership. By arguing, my opponent and I both acknowledge each others' right to control exclusively our own bodies. In turn, we see that the nonaggression principle is also presupposed. Thus, communication with others necessarily assumes self-ownership and nonaggression. Should we attempt to engage in force, we must abandon argumentation, as we are, by using force, necessarily discarding that which is required to engage in argumentation. Conversely, we cannot therefore argue against that which is required for argument. My opponent cannot attempt to convince me to become a slave without running into a contradiction, as he must suppose free and autonomous agency to engage me (an idea originally pioneered by Habermas [http://plato.stanford.edu...]. Discourse ethics is distinguished from traditional "ought-morality", as it does not tell us what we ought to do--rather, it frames human action in a way which explains to us what it is logically impossible to do. Consequently, Con cannot make arguments which contradict concepts like nonaggression and self-ownership without contradicting himself by arguing to undermine that which is fundamentally necessary for communicative rationality. On Meth and Self-Harm I accept the harms, but contend they have no impact. Con seems to be presupposing that banning, regulating, or otherwise penalizing self-harm is justified. Whereas my discussion of presuppositions (such as self-ownership and nonaggression) is justified on the basis that we're arguing (the act of argument implicitly validating those presuppositions), Con is merely fiating presuppositions which have yet to be justified. Legal action against any substance is unjustified, regardless of self-harm concerns. It's true that the government could simply cease with argument and initiate violence through taxes, bans, and regulation; however, at the point that violence is used in lieu of discourse, we can no longer argue about justification. In other words, there is no way for Con to warrant this violence, as he cannot logically justify action to undermine that which he must presuppose to argue his justification. On Meth and Society 1. Con cites how cheap, easy, and addictive meth is on the black market, and uses that as a justification for a ban. Though saying "X is really addictive, therefore we should ban it" is, despite the emotional appear, a glaring non sequitur, the part about meth being cheap and easy provokes a bit of economic analysis. Earlier, Con opposed the War on Drugs in terms of marijuana, but argued that we shouldn't let that trick us into letting all drugs go free. Apart from the fact that the "improvements" in meth use (e.g. higher prices and lower use) were basically only temporary as the US heaped on a few billion dollars more (not even counting that violent crime rates didn't shrink) [http://people.ucsc.edu...], Con may still still argue that we have to maintain the WOD for symbolic reasons, as a show of our tough attitude on a social pollutant. Unfortunately, that doesn't hold up to the economics. The WOD has the effect that sugar tariffs had on sugar and HFCS (sugar, while not being healthy, is at least better than the zero-nutrition syrup, much like how some drugs, while not being good for you, are obviously much better than meth). When putting tariffs on sugar, prices spiked, and HFCS became the cheapest, easiest thing to mass-produce [http://en.wikipedia.org...]. Similarly, the WOD succeeded in driving up the prices and risks of many drugs. Production costs increased, finding ways to distribute became more difficult, and so on. For people just looking for a high, meth offered significantly lower costs, both in terms of money and in terms of risk (not to mention the "forbidden fruit" or "potency" effect highlighting the backlash of prohibitive policies) [http://mises.org...]. On the supply side, savvy dealers can make massive profits because of conditions creating increased demand for meth, sometimes playing with returns of up and around 500% [http://nymag.com...] [http://www5.semo.edu...]. Obviously it varies, but it's often tremendous. 2. His second argument about crime also doesn't offer a compelling reason to ban meth. First, if you're going to punish an individual for a crime involving harm of others, then the drug is irrelevant vis-a-vis crime. Second, the principle here is basically that we can ban things to prevent crime; however, there's no reason to believe this is the case, as A) he's already admitted that he's okay with marijuana, for which arguments can be made about committing a crime while high, and B) he would have to commit himself to banning things like rage and sadness, since those emotions can also severely compromise one's judgment to the point of committing a criminal act. Third, look to the contradictions I listed earlier regarding argumentation ethics--he can't argue a ban without having to abandon the very things allowing him to argue his justification (which is ironic, since he criticized meth as detrimental to autonomy). Fourth, his study also says that meth use isn't significantly predictive about violent crime recidivism, which means that it could just be going back to jail for drugs (which means that his study doesn't justify meth bans). Fifth, you can get the advantages of restorative justice/rehab through private intermediaries, like contracts with insurance companies and employers to refrain from drug use, and mandatory rehab and probation (like higher premiums or routine drug tests) as a stipulation for breaking the terms, which means we don't need coercion. Good luck to Con in R2.