There probably exists a necessary, external cause to the universe

Thanks Con! Onto the final round.Con gives 3 objections; let's go through each of them.AnalogyCon argues that maths cannot be used to prove anything in the universe because it is an unsound analogy. However, it seems that the axioms of maths are universal, necessary and infallible. Even if I were creating an analogy, the very fact that we are dealing with logical truths makes it possible to create such an analogy. If I were to make an analogy which stated that in the universe there are no married bachelors, I say that because it is a logical truth. The same would be truth with maths, because mathematics is a necessary truth.Indeed, this is how physicists create their calculations all the time! If it weren't for maths equations, we would know very little about numerous aspects of the universe. The reality is, however, that this exact analogy is used by scholars habitually. Knowledge In terms of knowledge, it seems that well that may be so. Especially considering that the argument just is an argument for a reality external to the universe, it hardly makes sense to dismiss it by claiming, without interacting with the premisses of the argument, through denying the epistemology involved, as the argument itself is an argument contra that form of epistemology - the objection, therefore, is very much an ipse dixitAnd I would dispute Con's epistemology anyway. Why, exactly, can't we make such claims? No argument has been given, and I think certain models of epistemology, viz. properly basic foundationalism, and the Knowability Thesis, both provide answers constituting a de jure case against Con's premise [1]. Indeed, if physicists can make predictions about multiverses, why can't we make similar claims?I also think that the objection is counter-intuitive, for if Con is to even argue about the topic at hand (i.e. whether there is an external cause) then he himself must claim knowledge about it - i.e that there probably isn't such a thing. What, then, is the difference between claiming that there is such a cause, and that there isn't? It seems that both make some sort of claim to knowledge about the transgressions of the universe.He states: "Whether or not there is an external to the universe is beyond the ability of human knowledge". It should, of course, be noted that Con is not taking an agnostic position on the matter, for he is Contra the motion that there probably exists an external necessary cause of the universe - i.e. a knowledge claim. His own premise goes against his position.Logic Con argues that because whatever caused the universe must be actual, it cannot be external per se. What might follow from this objection though? Well, not much. The nature of Kuratowski-Zorn's Lemma means that of any given set (i.e. the universe), there is a maximal element of that set [2]. This necessitates its separation from the rest of the set and thus, at least titularly, is external. Moreover, though I admit that the definition I gave was confusing, it doesn't cause any intrinsic problems, for I didn't specify what the cause was external to - the fact is that it only needs to be external to everything other than itself, of which, Zorn's Lemma proves, in order my onus to be fulfiled. In any case, this objection is just semantics, which is hardly a cogent objection to the content of the argument.ConclusionFirst, thanks Con for a short but entertaining debate. Hopefully it was enjoyable for you too. In this debate, I have given an argument from maths for a necessary, external cause. Con objected by arguing from three fallacies; but I have shown how they fail in basic ways. It turns out that I can indeed use such an analogy, as mathematics is a tautology and is true in whatever it is applied to. I can also make such an epistemological claim concerning the external universe, for provided it is a truth, the knoowability thesis shows that it is knowable; the same premiss can moreover be applied to Con's stance. Finally, there are indeed no logical problems wit the argument, as it is only semantics which Con objects to; nonetheless, the nature of Kuratowski-Zorn's Lemma means that there is no issue anyway.Thanks Con.Sources:[1] http://plato.stanford.edu...[2] http://en.wikipedia.org...'s_lemma"We brought nothing into this world, and we take nothing out. The Lord gave, and the Lord has taken away; blessed be the name of the Lord" - Job 1:21