The Problem of Evil

Points On Introductory Statements“Among other things, The Judeo-Christian God is defined as morally perfect being, omnipotent, omniscient, and the creator of all things. A morally perfect being, by definition, cannot be evil.” Firstly, Con makes a claim of a rather tall order in stating that a morally perfect being cannot be evil, by definition. There is no generally accepted understanding of what it means to be ‘morally perfect’ and, more to the point, some have argued that only God can truly know what it means to be ‘morally perfect’. I might say that the ability to reconcile evil and good would imply an even greater moral perfection than simply eschewing the former. Nonetheless, if there were one, Swineborne’s own definition of ‘moral perfection’ would be the most widely accepted and it defines ‘moral perfection’ as that state of not having done anything that is morally wrong. This definition is patently behaviouristic, thus not in any direct contradiction with the statement “God is evil”, as evil here refers to the essential nature of something, not behavioral aspects; God is not evil because he does evil things, but because evil is accounted for by God. Defining a term ad arbitrarum in order to suit the needs of an argument is less than sufficient and implies question begging. Thus, we shall reject Con’s proposition that 'a morally perfect being cannot be evil by definition'.“Because there are explanations for the existence of evil that are more logical and thus proabable than concluding God is evil, it is not reasonable to believe the existence of evil suggests God is evil.”Note, this statement is, itself, Con’s argument against the resolution. Any points brought up concerning my argument are merely auxiliary points. This is Con’s refutation of our resolution. This seems like an argument from parsimony, but Con is fails to adequately explain this point so it's hard to say exactly. I’ll return to this later.RejoinderThe first and most important refutation in this rejoinder will be the rejection of Con’s apercu regarding my case. That is to say, we reject Con’s statement that those propositions and conclusion enumerated 1 through 6, stand as a summary of my argument. Con attempts to refute many of these by construing them as mere premises when, in fact, many are valid conclusions, belonging to a syllogism. These attacks are part of an overall straw man as he is attacking a respective point as if it were a premise, independent from the syllogism to which they belonged in my original case. To be more exact:“1. Evil exists” Rejected outright as it was never asserted that evil existed, nor was it implied (enthymeme). The aim of this argument isn’t to prove evil exists, only that its existence (should it exist) suggests that God is evil. “2. God created evil” A validly derived conclusion from my first syllogism. Con concedes that God created everything, therefore he must provide an argument demonstrating the negation of the second premise of my first syllogism, viz., “evil is a member of the set of all things.” which he never does. Therefore, we reject any refutations herein. At the same time, if we decide to entertain Con’s argument: Con concedes the incompleteness of his own definition of God when he says “Among other things...” His argument that evil is the absence of God, therefore not a creation, is at odds with one of the many “other things” he refers to, namely, omnipresence.“3. Creation is a form of expression” We shall accept any refutations offered here by Con, as this point was not the conclusion of any of our syllogisms. Con emphasizes that “Expression implies intention”. However, the illustration he offers is malapropos as it aims to show that some things are created accidentally and, thus, express nothing. This point is already dealt with in the section of my argument entitled “Omniscient”. This section explains that God is an intelligent being and the act of creation for God must have a noetic component as God must have perfect knowledge of everything, including those things he creates. A leaky pipe has no intelligence and, thus, has no relevance. “4. Evil is thus an expression of God” Once again, refutations here will be rejected as Con must treat this as a valid conclusion where, in order to refute, he must demonstrate the invalidity or unsoundness of its respective syllogism. Furthermore, his rejected argumentation relies on an equally rejected definition of moral perfection. 5. Expressions are “merely contingent representations of an underlying nature or principle.” We shall accept any refutations herein as a proof of this assertion was never syllogistically provided by my case. However, Con’s argument implicitly depends on an already rejected premise, viz., that moral perfection is mutually exclusive with evil. Should we decide to entertain this argument for the sake of finality, we could show that con’s position doesn’t demonstrate what he purports it to. Con states the logical consequence of this statement would be:“What we think is evil is actually good.” If evil is good then good is evil, why should we prefer one term to the other when they are, demonstrably, synonymous? Additionally, this renders Con’s definition of ‘moral perfection’ either logically invalid, or utterly meaningless. Per his definition, either God cannot be evil, which is tantamount to saying he cannot be good, which is tantamount to saying he cannot be himself, or the definition presents a false dilemma in that being evil was never a problem in the first place. Con’s points on atheistic existentialism are more or less harmless. Con indulges in a bold assertion fallacy when he claims that “existence precedes essence” is a “truth”. Any analyses led by Sartre on this matter are extremely dubious as Heidegger, who Sartre professed was the starting point and inspiration of his work, disavows Sartre’s analyses as he says they are predicated out of a fundamental misreading of his works and are, thus, utterly worthless. [1] Furthermore, Heidegger’s particular brand of existentialism is just that, a brand of existentialism. Why should we prefer it to, say, Kierkegaard's theistic existentialism, wherein Kierkegaard argues, each thing is a more constituted self insofar as it is more constituted in God. That is to say, In order to reach the highest level of self-hood, or essence or meaning, you must have God: “in relating to itself and wanting to be itself, the self is grounded transparently in the power that established it.” (describing the state of the self when despair is completely eradicated: the true self.).[2] This implies meaning comes from God. First Comments on Parsimony I’ll leave more to say in the next round, but for now, I will say that applying parsimony, here, is at best questionable as my argument aims to reduce all dichotomies to a single resolution, which is, in some ways, simpler. Nonetheless, parsimony is not a law of logic nor is it an infallible arbiter in judging the truth of two already established and competing claims. Moreover, I entreat that we simply cannot accept this as a cogent refutation of our resolution until Con effectively demonstrates, in detail, how these “other conclusions” are more logical and more probable. Conclusions I entreat that our readers recognize that, in fact, none of the components of Pro’s case have been adequately dealt with and all components have yet to be refuted. Con’s arguments either misrepresent my case and proceed to attack the misrepresentation (straw man), or fails to adequately refute my claims. Citations[1]: http://plato.stanford.edu... Point 4.[2]: Kierkegaard, Soren. The Sickness Unto Death: A Christian Psychological Exposition for Edification and Awakening. London, England: Penguin, 1989. Print.