Science can determine human values.

Pro has asked me to postulate my own moral system in this round. I take a deontological view of ethics. Each person has a responsibility to themselves, and to the people around them. In order to be ethical people, we must consider whether a certain action that we are going to take will have adverse reactions to anyone else, and if they do have adverse reactions to anyone else, it takes a sufficiently strong reason to perform that action. For example, lying is immoral for many reasons, one being that it damages your relationship with other people if you lie to them, and another that it damages your credibility if you lie. However, what about the age-old moral dilemma that you're alive during the Holocaust and holding Jews in your house. Do you give the Jews up, or do you lie to the Nazis in order to protect innocent Jews. I believe that protecting innocent life is a sufficiently strong reason to justify lying, though you would ordinarily be obligated to tell the truth. The problem here is that the resolution is negated before we even really get started. The resolution is "science can determine human value," but the problem lies in that the very statement is self-refuting. You can't arrive at the truth or falsity of that statement through science. It takes philosophical reasoning. In fact, Pro even gave a philosophical argument to support the resolution. Pro's argument is also invalid. The conclusion doesn't follow. At best, his conclusion only shows us that science can determine one human value, not all of them. I will now turn to addressing Pro's argument. Premise 1 -- Moral questions are about the well-being of conscious creatures. Well-being is a human value by the definitions made in Round 1. Here Pro asserts that moral questions are about the well-being of conscious creatures, but he neglects to state why we only have obligations to conscious creatures, and what our obligations are to those conscious creatures. For example, is Pro a vegetarian? If not, does he not believe that it's wrong to kill cows for food, since they are conscious creatures? If so, why is it wrong to kill cows for food, or to hunt game, but not wrong to kill ants? What is it about consciousness that bestows obligations of well-being, and can Pro arrive at this answer through science alone? Pro does state that we don't feel obligations to rocks or lightbulbs, but why does this absolve us of responsibility? If a parent doesn't feel any obligation to their children (perhaps because their father is a jerk), does this remove any obligation from the parent to care for her children? On the other hand, some people do feel obligations to non-conscious entities. Trees, for example. There are people who have started organizations to protect rain forests, claiming that we have a moral obligation to leave the Earth the way it is and not to cut down trees for furniture or paper. It seems that simple "feeling" is not enough to justify a moral obligation or lack of one. Pro has asked that I present a moral issue that does not relate to the well-being of conscious creatures, but I don't think there is one. As rational, moral agents, issues of morality concern all of us. But what I have shown is that our obligations don't necessarily end with conscious creatures, and Pro has not presented a case as to why only conscious creatures deserve our value. Premise 2 -- Well-being relates to physical states of the brain. This premise is true, but it doesn't relate to the overall argument. In fact, it falls into what David Hume called the is-ought gap. Premise two shows that well-being relates to physical states of the brain, but it does not show us why we should only peform actions that relate to those physical states of the brain. This premise shows a descriptive reality (the way things are), but does nothing to show a prescriptive claim (that we ought to do something based on this description). Premise 3 -- Science can tell us what actions improve or hurt human well-being. I don't think Pro has supported this premise. Science may be able to determine certain things that give us pleasure, but people derive pleasure from different things. Pro used the example of forcing Muslim women to wear hijab. But what if that Muslim woman is utterly convinced that her faith is true, so wearing hijab would give her pleasure because she believes that wearing the hijab pleases her God. But an American woman not raised in the Muslim faith would be insulted and feel degraded by being forced to wear it. Science can't determine whether or not something always contributes to someone's well-being because different things contribute to different peoples' well-being. ConclusionAs I have indicated, the conclusion does not follow. It only shows (at best) that science can determine one human value, not multiple or all of them. ConclusionTo reiterate, Pro's resolution is self-defeating. You can't arrive at the statement "science can determine human values" scientifically. Pro even used a philosophical argument to arrive at his statement about science. Pro's argument is also invalid because the Conclusion doesn't follow from the Premises. Pro's first premise fails because he didn't show why our obligation is only to conscious creatures, and why we don't have obligations to non-conscious entities. He also failed to show why our feelings are sufficient to grant "human value" to an object. Pro's second premise fails because it's purely a descriptive claim that doesn't show a prescriptive obligation for human beings towards another human being or another conscious creature. Pro's third premise fails because science can't show whether or not someone will value something that someone else will not. You can't derive human values from science because human beings are all different, and the things they value are established by a number of different factors, including their beliefs, environment, etc. I look forward to Pro's rebuttal.