Libertarian free will is false.

Thank you, wjmelements, for this debate. I have only one contention left regarding pain and consciousness, but it is also my strongest argument. The debated scenario is that a brain has been separated into individual neurons that still communicate with each other via a computer that transmits their signals to each other as if they were still a whole brain. My opponent claims that the original consciousness of the brain would be uninhibited. Now, if I am the consciousness, my opponent and I have agreed that I would feel pain due to the processes of the entire system of my brain. This means that if section A of my brain creates some pain, I will feel that pain, and if section B of my brain creates other pain, I will feel that pain. However, how do I receive this pain from two separate sections of my brain? The neurons only communicate through electric and chemical signals; one part of my brain cannot transmit actual pain to another part of my brain, but only a signal that can be interpreted as pain. The signal must be translated into pain within an individual section; pure pain cannot be transmitted, but only encoded in signals to be translated later. The two separate parts of my brain cannot create pain in a single consciousness unless one part of the brain only sent basic material signals, and the other part interpreted the signal as pain. This logic can be applied recursively, breaking down the section of the brain into neurons and the neurons into molecules. However, my opponent has claimed that pain is more complicated than a single neuron or single molecule. For the entire complex structure of the brain to together create a feeling of pain that can be felt by an overall consciousness by only communicating using electric and chemical signals is indeed a paradox. I also had a paragraph asking what would happen if the individual neurons were stimulated at different times, independently of each other. What would happen to this consciousness that is supposed to be altered by the actions of neurons? My opponent has, unfortunately, failed to address this important point. There is no logical reason that I can think of so that a long time delay would have any more of an impact than a short time delay, and yet, there is no physical reason for a consciousness to be able to be affected by the actions of two neurons that are not even connected anymore by time or space (a computer program has replaced their interactions with each other). No neuron knows this, and they all act as if they are in a brain, even though they have no physical connection to each other whatsoever. My opponent, too, has no explanation for this paradox that is only contradictory if we continue to assume that organic material behaves in the exact same way that inorganic material does. If I, the consciousness, can still feel pain after neurons are stimulated independently, how did I receive all of this pain? If I, the consciousness, cannot feel pain anymore, what logical reason makes this situation different from any previous one in a significant way? We finally come to the double-brain problem, in which one brain has essentially been split into two. My opponent claims that there would be two new consciousnesses, because of the lack of connection. However, why is a connection important? Both halves are performing in the exact same way as if one brain were interacting with itself; even the connection between the original half and the supplemental half performs in the exact same way. Why would the original consciousness be destroyed while its two halves remain essentially untouched, each still thinking that the other exists, if there were no superphysical connection between the two halves? To conclude, while my opponent's syllogism relies on the idea that matter does not alter its own behavior when present in life, there are many situations within the human brain that seem contradictory and paradoxical without the assumption that a superphysical connection exists between all parts of the brain. With a falsified syllogism, my opponent's only argument in favor of the resolution carries no weight. The resolution is not negated.