The Problem of Evil

Burden of ProofRecall the resolution states: "The existence of evil suggests that the Judeo-Christian God (God of the Bible) is evil." The resolution does not state, "If evil exists, its existence suggests..." The resolution clearly implies that both evil and God exist. My opponent, as instigator/Pro, has the burden to show both evil and God exist, and therefore, that God is evil.Definition of GodMoral perfection connotes perfect goodness. The Judeo-Christian God is perfectly good and morally perfect. The concept of an evil God is incoherent and logically impossible. Unless Pro can prove God can be good and evil at the same time, the Judeo-Christian God cannot be, by definition, evil.Fallacy of CompositionPro's argument commits the fallacy of composition, which "arises when one infers that something is true of the whole from the fact that it is true of some part of the whole." [1] Pro argues that because evil must be a part of God, God must be evil. This commits the fallacy of composition, and therefore, Pro's conclusion is false.Evil does not existPro claims God created everything, therefore God created evil. This implies evil exists. I argued evil does not exist. Pro drops this argument. Pro states:"it was never asserted that evil existed, nor was it implied (enthymeme). The aim of this argument isn't to prove evil exists."By dropping my argument, and claiming the existence of evil was never "asserted," "implied," nor "prove[n]," Pro admits evil does not exist. This could be taken as a concession.Expression implies intentionPro claims everything God does or creates must have an intention. I disagree. Perfect knowledge of everything does not imply intentionality behind everything. If God creates goodness, and evil emerges after the fact as the absence of good, does that mean God created evil with an intention? No. It means evil was created as the expected (because God is omniscient) but unintended side-effect of creating goodness.Expressions are "merely contingent representations of an underlying nature or principle"Pro misunderstands the meaning of the statement, "what we think is evil is actually good." The key word here is "we" and "actually." Hence, correctly interpreted the statement reads: "Although human beings may believe God is evil, in actuality God is good." Recall I argued the following: because God, by definition, cannot be evil, God's hypothetical expression of evil does not in and of itself make God evil. The point is to show that expressions do not point to an "underlying nature or principle" behind them. Expressions imply a system of representation in which they are expressed. In short, expressions imply a language through which they are expressed. According to the linguist Saussure, signification in languages occurs through negative differences. For example, the word "cat" means "not dog." Words are defined by what they are not. As such, Derrida noticed that no expression or word has an "underlying nature." The reason is because every expression or word produces never-ending stream of negative significations, in which meaning is always deferred. A quick look at the dictionary illustrates this point. Words are defined by other words. But you can never reach the essence or nature of the word through the word itself.Pro's premise that expressions are representations of an underlying nature or principle cannot be proven. A representation of any kind, whether it be a word or some other kind of symbol, does not point back to an underlying nature. As Heidegger might say, it projects towards future possibilities. On the point of Heidegger, notice that Pro elevates Heidegger to the status of an authority by using Heidegger to contest Sartre. I agree with Pro, Heidegger is right about the temporality of being and meaning.ConclusionI have fully addressed and refuted all of Pro's case. In closing, I remind readers that I offered two superior conclusions to the problem of evil. First, I argue that the problem of evil suggests that God does not exist. Second, I argue the problem of evil suggests God allows evil to exist because it serves a greater moral purpose. If God cannot be evil by definition, then both of these explanations are more logically consistent with the definition of God provided in this debate. As the definition of God is implied by the problem of evil itself, it seems reasonable to conclude that these explanations are more logically consistent not only with the definition of God but with the problem of evil. Pro left both of those arguments unrefuted.[1] http://en.wikipedia.org...;