Any definition that conflates Atheism with Agnosticism is not Atheism by any sense.

I agree the dictionary definitions are insufficient. The "better definitions" rest upon a common mistake elucidated with some epistemology. What most theories of knowledge purport knowledge to be is namely, a justified true "belief." Distinguishing between knowledge and belief, is therefore like pealing away the skin of an orange, for who thinks a pealed orange is anything but an orange nonetheless? So far from being distinct from knowledge, belief is a fundamental member of knowledge. The skin in this case would be the superficial claims of gnosticism (I'm in a good epistemic position to have knowledge about God's existence) and agnosticism (I deny that I'm in a good epistemic position to have knowledge about God's existence). In simple prose, gnosticism is logically equivalent to saying "I can know." While agnosticism is logically equivalent to saying "I cannot know." The former affirms knowledge, the latter denies knowledge. Lack of vs. Denial of: [a] in Gnosticism So I agree that gnosticism bespeaks one's epistemic position regarding the existence of God. Notice [a]gnosticism is not the lack of ones epistemic position (eP) regarding the existence of God, but the denial of such a position. For the notion of a "lack of an epistemic position" seems to immediately place one into affirming the denial of an eP before one lacks anything at all regarding knowledge or belief whatever. Agnosticism therefore cannot be a lack of an eP, rather it's the denial of an eP. Lack of vs. Denial of: [a] in Theism Now when we get to theism and atheism one can plainly note that theism is not merely a belief, it is one which claims to be true and also have justification, which is a claim to knowledge. This makes theism is a philosophical position, which is written about as such. Atheism isn't the "lack of belief" but, like [a]gnosticism, the [denial] of a belief which claims to be true and to have justification for its truth: any denial of such is purporting a denial-based knowledge. A lack of belief on the contrary, is merely a biographical description. Atheism means "denying of theism" as noted here in Sanford's encyclopedia http://plato.stanford.edu... Any statement which claims a lack of belief is immediately placed into a category of agnosticism, which says it denies an epistemic position adequate enough for knowledge: more simply put, "I don't know." When an atheist says they lack belief, they're not claiming knowledge, they're saying "I don't know," which is agnosticism, a biographical claim ABOUT knowledge. The definition is of a higher order in that sense. My opponent therefore is missing steps in defining his position. For atheism is the denial of the claim, "I believe God exists." Whereas agnosticism is the denial of the claim, "I can know if God exists." Which is basically saying "I don't know." Therefore my position is not refuted (even with the all-convincing wiki-diagrams) that Atheism with Agnosticism says, logically formulated; "God doesn't exist & I don't know if God exists." One can see that this redefining isn't just for some helpful "granular" understanding, it's a viscously circular definition hidden as granular. Burden of Proof Now I never suggested that a non-theist must prove if God exists. Rather an atheist must justify his "God doesn't exist" claim by showing somehow that God, in fact, does not exist. Otherwise he's left with agnosticism. Rather what I said is, that the burden of proof is on the Atheist (who denies God exists) to justify his claim by showing "that if God existed, then He would provide greater evidence than what I, the theist, have." Such a statement for the atheist position may be conditional, namely that if God existed we would have more evidence than what we have now. If the atheist were to show this, than theism would be false, not true and therefore the atheist would, in fact remain an atheist, not a convert. At the cost of handing over horses to the other camp, I recommend perhaps a quick review of bayesian inference in this area, or perhaps examining my careful words once more for an adequate response. Moving on, my opponent rightfully claims the theist has the burden as the "affirmative position." But then sidesteps his burden of proof by saying that the opposite of theism; atheism, the denial position; somehow has no burden of proof. My opponent does this by claiming, again, mistakingly, that atheism is a lack of belief, not the denial of a belief. The difference is subtle yet important if any fair discussion is going to commence between both parties. Notice the Subtlety While my opponent on the one side of their mouth claims the theist takes an affirmative position, thus demanding proof, out of the other side of their mouth my opponent claims the equally affirmative position, albeit one consisting of a denial, magically has no burden of proof. This subtly, when closely examined, becomes a fundamental double standard, striking any honest seeker of truth with vagueness and dishonesty right out of the gates. For when a philosophical position can't be clear and frank on what it claims from it's very beginning, how then can it ever take off with any rational integrity? Conclusion My opponent thinks they've demonstrated a successful distinction between Knowledge (a justified true belief) and a Belief itself. By showing what the Stanford professionals hold, and what I've argued under "Lack of vs. Denial of: [a] in Gnosticism," I've tried to show that this subtle difference is a retreat from the Atheist's own burden of proof. Though it may be true that theism is a belief, it's not true that theism also does not claim justification and claims to be true, which is knowledge. Whereas Gnosticism bespeaks our epistemic position regarding that knowledge, it nevertheless seems that Theism & Atheism alike are both claims to knowledge, whereas the former gnosticism is a claim about one's knowledge. Taken in simple terms, atheism says "I know God doesn't exist," and agnosticism says "I don't know if I can know if God exists." Therefore any equivocation of these terms not only charades by hiding from their burden of proof, but also begins their worldview with a viscous circle of terms.