Moral Relativism (Pro) vs. Divine Command Theory (Con)

The Parts-Whole FallacyMy opponent states that the parts-whole fallacy does not apply to qualitative properties, merely quantitative ones. However, this is not true. I will illustrate this with two examples:I am not able to drive the chassis of a car to work. I am not able to drive the steering wheel of a car to work. I am not able to drive the seat of a car to work. I am not able to drive the gas pedal of a car to work, etc. Being able to drive something to work is not a quantitative property, so therefore I should not be able to drive a car to work. Carl likes pickles. Carl likes tea. Liking tea is not a quantitative property. Therefore, Carl likes pickles in his tea. Contingency of the UniverseMy opponent claims that the universe is contingent because it cannot be necessary, and therefore must be contingent, as contingency is the only other option. However, this ignores serendipity. If an event happens purely by chance and not due to necessity or dependence on another event, then it is due to chance. For example, physics embraces the possiblity of alternate realities as mathematically consistent. [1] This means that whichever reality we are in may be a chance event. Which identifies a third possibility aside from contingency and necessity. However, even if I concede that the universe is contingent, this does not entail the existence of God. My opponent discusses the meaning of the omnipotence of God but fails to demonstrate how non-contingency and transcendency entail omnipotence. Further, they fail to demonstrate how omnipotence entails God. God is defined by other properties as well, and even if I concede the rest of my opponent's argument they still fail to demonstrate why this entity couldn't simply be an omnipotent entity that is not omniscient or omnibenevolent. Additionally, the mere existence of logically consistent alternate explanations proves that God is not proven. The chain of universes is not itself an object to have consistency, but rather that each individual object in the chain is contingent on another until it loops back onto itself. My opponent calls this absurd but does not explain why it is absurd. As I mentioned before, it is a logically consistent model. Moral Relativism vs. Moral NihilismMy opponent points out that MR does not directly stipulate that morality does not exist, as this is a belief of MN. However, I would argue that MN is merely a subset of MR. This is because the definition of morality as I provided points not a set of rules relative to different societies but to all societies, an objective standard that would always be put forward by rational thinkers. In what sense is this not an objective standard of morality? Given this, we can conclude that "subjective morality" is an incoherent concept. Therefore, MR entails MN. Even if there were subsets of MR that did not stipulate MN, that does not mean that I cannot argue for MN. Being a subset of MR, MN would necessarily prove MR if it was proven. Thus I am capable of arguing for MN to support MR. God and Objective MoralityMy opponent rests their case for objective moral standards on the existence of God, which I have already cast into doubt. However, even if we accept the existence of God, how does objective morality follow? My opponent says that "f God cares how we ought to live (which I believe He would) then He would set objective moral rules for us to live by. " However, this contradicts another statement later in my opponent's arguments: "necessary moral truths are necessary due to their own essence; not some external deliberator. " This is an internal contradiction. Hume's Is/Ought GapMy opponent claims that the gap is self-refuting because it implies moral obligation, a type of knowledge which it rejects. However, my opponent does not justify this, except by claiming that Hume claims we ought to value rational justification. The problem with this is that it merely tends toward Hume's goal of explaining the tru state of reality. If his goal is arbitrary because there is no moral reason to do so, then so be it. Hume may do this because it makes him happy, which, as I have explained before, derives from our evolution and is merely a property of being human. Evolutionary Origins of MoralityMy opponent's main argument against my contention that morality is derived from evolution is that it is merely a hypothesis. My opponent says that moral values that contradict evolution are evidence that evolution is not the origins of morality, but my opponent does not provide any such evidence. Additionally, the evolutionary origins of morality are far more than "idle speculation". Not only did I provide several examples of how evolutionary pressures lead to the development of moral faculties, but the field of evolutionary game theory is strong in mathematics and has conducted several experiments and simulations validating that natural selection and time tend to favor species that develop a sense of morality. Len Fisher writes:"In this case the Tit for Tat strategy seemed to work quite well to initiate and maintain cooperation, but its main value has been to help us think about the problem from a new perspective. It has especially been taken up by evolutionary biologists, who have always been puzzled as to how cooperation could have evolved in the face of 'survival of the fittest'. The have discovered an answer in Tit for Tat, which does not have to mean retaliation and counterretaliation, with the strongest eventually coming out on top. It can also mean 'you scratch mu back and I'll scratch yours', with evolution favoring those who are most adept at promoting and maintaining cooperation. The ability to cooperate with other members of a group, it seems, has often been a key to survival. In the case of the human race, anthropologists now believe that it has been a major factor, with small cooperative social groups better able to adapt and survive than isolated individuals or groups rent by social schism. " [2]As can be seen here, evolutionary origins for morality are far from a mere hypothesis and have been supported time and time again by biologists, game theorists, and social scientists alike. Necessary Moral TruthsMy opponent claims that because morality cannot be defined in terms of anything else, that it must therefore be incapable of forming tautologies. This is false. What this actually entails is that morality can only form tautologies because it can only be defined by itself. That is the very definition of a tautology. In addition, my opponent first claims that morality cannot be defined by anything else. They then say that unnecessary cruelty is immoral in the same way that a triangle has three sides. The problem here is that triangles do not always have three sides because of some fundamental property of nature, but simply because they are defined that way. Therefore, if my opponent means that unnecessary cruelty is immoral in the same way that triangles have three sides, then they are defining morality in terms of something else, which contradicts their earlier statement. Additionally, my opponent has not avoided the prongs of the dilemma, but simply dove into one of them. As Russel said: "you will then have to say that it is not only through God that right and wrong came into being, but that they are in their essence logically anterior to God. "My opponent has conceded this, which undermines the fundamental premise of DCT, which is that morality comes from God only and nothing else. I have more to say but I have closed in on the character limit. Arguments on omnipotence will be posted next round. Sources:[1]. http://iopscience.iop.org...[2]Fisher, Len. "The Seven Deadly Dilemmas. " Rock, Paper, Scissors, Game Theory in Everyday Life. New York: Basic, 2008. 165. Print.