The Argument from Desire is a sound argument.

The argument I will be defending will be the Argument from Desire, as laid out by Peter Kreeft:Premise 1: Every natural, innate desire in us corresponds to some real object that can satisfy that desire. Premise 2: But there exists in us a desire which nothing in time, nothing on earth, no creature can satisfy. Conclusion: Therefore there must exist something more than time, earth and creatures, which can satisfy this desire. [1]In defense of Premise 1: Every natural, innate desire in us corresponds to some real object that can satisfy that desire. CS Lewis once wrote, ". .. Creatures are not born with desires unless satisfaction for those desires exists. A baby feels hunger: well, there is such a thing as food. A duckling wants to swim: well, there is such a thing as water. Men feel sexual desire: well, there is such as a thing as sex. If I find myself a desire which no experience in this world can satisfy, the most probable explanation is that I was made for another world. " [2]The idea behind the first premise is that there are two kinds of desires. One is an innate, natural desire like the desire for sex, food, drink, justice, etc. And every natural, innate desire has a real object that can satisfy it: we naturally desire sex, so there is sex. We naturally desire food, so there is food. And so on. We can also recognize corresponding states of deprivation of these desires: if you don't eat, you starve. If you don't drink, you dehydrate. And so on. The second kind are artificial desires, which one does not desire naturally but come from without, from society. These desires are desires for things like sports cars, the planet Risa (Kreeft usees the Land of Oz as an example, but I figure I'll use my own analogy since it's my argument), that the Saints would win the Superbowl again. Unlike innate desires, there may or may not be satisfaction of these desires. Some, like the acquisition of sports cars, can be satisfied, and others, like traveling to Risa or the Saints winning the Superbowl again, cannot be. Kreeft points out that on top of this, we do not, for the most part, recognize corresponding states of affairs. There is not Risalessness to correspond to sleeplessness. Another difference is that all humans innately desire the natural desires, but the artificial desires vary from person to person. Kreeft additionally points out, "The existence of the artificial desires does not necessarily mean that the desired objects exist. Some do: some don't. Sports cars do; Oz does not. But the existence of natural desires does, in every discoverable case, mean that the objects desired exist. No one has ever found one case of an innate desire for a nonexistent object. " [1]In defense of Premise 2: But there exists in us a desire which nothing in time, nothing on earth, no creature can satisfy. Lewis, again in the same book, writes, "Most people, if they had really learned to look into their own hearts, would know that they do want, and want acutely, something that cannot be had in this world. There are all sorts of things in this world that offer to give it to you, but they never quite keep their promise. The longings which arise in us when we first fall in love or first think of some foreign country, or first take up some subject that excites us, are longings which no marriage, no travel, no learning, can really satisfy. I am not now speaking of what would be ordinarily called unsuccessful marriages, or holidays, or learned careers. I am speaking of the best possible ones. There was something we grasped at, in that first moment of longing, which just fades away in the reality. I think everyone knows what I mean. The wife may be a good wife, and the hotels and scenery may have been excellent, and chemistry may be a very interesting job: but something has evaded us. " [2]The idea behind this premise is that when we look back through all of human history, I scarcely think we should find anyone who was perfectly happy with everything they had acquired. Someone can spend their life chasing after women, or money, and no matter how many women they sleep with, or how many shiny new toys they buy, they are never really happy. There is always the feeling that life can't be all there is, there is the longing that there must be something more. Peter Kreeft explains, "The second premise requires only honest introspection. If someone defies it and says, 'I am perfectly happy playing with mud pies, or sports cars, or money, or sex, or power,' we can only ask, 'Are you, really? ' But we can only appeal, we cannot compel. And we can refer such a person to the nearly universal testimony of human history in all its great literature. Even the atheist Jean-Paul Sartre admitted that 'there comes a time when one asks, even of Shakespeare, even of Beethoven, "Is that all that there is? "'" [1]Conclusion: Therefore there must exist something more than time, earth and creatures, which can satisfy this desire. This argument is not a rock-solid proof of God's existence. I don't think there is such a thing. This argument may not even, necessarily, refer to God, though if used in a cumulative case could support God's existence by being the thing that this argument points to. This debate is not about whether the argument supports God's existence, but just about whether the argument, itself, is sound. Kreeft tells us that the conclusion of the argument is not "God" as already conceived or defined, but a moving and mysterious X which pulls us to itself and pulls all our images and concepts out of themselves. This mysterious X is unknown, but the direction of this X is known. The desires of this earth are fulfilled by finite satisfactions; the X in question is more. Not more in terms of quantity (so not more food to satisfy your hunger). But more as in quality. The mysterious X this argument points to is infinitely more, as we are not completely satisfied with the finite and partial. So while the argument points to God and the existence of Heaven, as an infinite satisfaction of the desires that this world can never truly satisfy, it is not meant to be absolutely evidence of God's existence. I await Con's reply. [1] . http://www.peterkreeft.com...[2] CS Lewis, Mere Christianity, Book 3, Chapter 10.