The Ontological Argument

Explaining the argument(P1) It is possible that a maximally great being exists. As my opponent states in his first contention, "Anything is possible". This first premise heavily relies on that notion. Even if by some means my opponent would disprove the possibility of a maximal existence, it is still possible that the logic used to disprove maximal existence is false, making it again possible that maximal existence is possible. So premise 1 is correct by all means. (P2) If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world. To some, this premise might seem like quite a leap, going from simply "possible" to "actual in some possible world". However, the argument is not stating that a maximally great being exists on some other world like Mars, nor is it stating that he actually exists at all. It simply reiterates that he possibly exists. An example of this that is popular in physics is Schrödinger' s cat. If you were to place a cat inside of a bunker with a bomb strapped to it, which's timer was randomly set to explode at any time, and sealed the cat in, you could not know if the bomb went off and if the cat died until you opened the bunker to check. So until you do open the bunker, the cat must maintain the traits of both being dead and alive. However, something cannot be dead and alive at the same time, so our world is one of two possible worlds; one where the cat is alive, and one where the cat is dead. This is not expressing that the cat is actually dead or alive, but simply reiterating possibility in a new context, while still relating it to the actual world. (P3) If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world. This premise is usually where the key defense lies for someone who advocates the arguments truth. What exemplifies the maximally great being from one possible world to another, much less all of them? This is where maximal greatness comes into play. Necessary existence entails more greatness than possible existence. But so far, the maximally great being only entails possible existence. But since the maximally great being is maximally great, and exists in some possible world, it follows that it is necessary that he exists in the possible world in which he exists. But if it is necessary he exists in a possible world, then what possible variables could impede him from necessarily existing in any possible world? None, because that would mean that those variables could stop that being from being maximal. Then you could simply imagine a greater being who would not be impeded by such variables and continue to exist necessarily in every possible world. So the maximally great being necessarily exists in every possible world. (P4) If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world. Since our world is apart of all possible worlds, and not separate, it can be concluded that the maximally great being exists in our world as well. (P5) If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists. This is really a no-brainer. If something exists in the actual world, then it exists. (Conclusion) Therefore a maximally great being exists. RefutationsMy opponents first problem with the argument is the flow between premises 1 $ 2. However, the argument does not state that a maximally great being exists, but only reiterates how it is possible. I believe my above explanation in (P2) is adequate. My opponents next problem is "possible" in premises 3 & 4. Quite a unique objection to the argument, one I admittedly have never heard before. As I have always understood it, our actual world is included in the list of possible worlds that P3 is talking about. So for now, I do not understand your objection, and I urge you to reiterate it with more depth in our next round.