"Conspiracy Theory" is, in most contexts, a Thought-Terminating Cliché.

In round two, pro argued that the phrase "conspiracy theory" makes a piece of information seem illegitimate, and thus resolves cognitive dissonance. My response was that there is no link between the legitimacy of the information and the degree of cognitive dissonance, especially when the prior assumption of the individual is that the information is illegitimate. I further protested that "conspiracy theory" doesn't actually communicate anything about the legitimacy of the information at all, as pro seemed to accept when he made his definitions, or when he argued that conspiracy theories are often true. Finally, I said that this theory does not fit with empirical data we have on the history of conspiracy theories.In round three, pro argued that when "conspiracy theory" makes something seem illegitimate, that applies whether that information is held by the conspirators or not. My opponent is right to note that I have only been questioning whether there is a link between confirming biases and being a conspiracy theorist from the perspective of conspiracy theorists, so I'll explain the logic from the alternative perspective.Remember that what pro needs to prove is that because something is a conspiracy theory, cognitive dissonance (whether that be related to the legitimacy of information as pro has been arguing thus far, or anything else) needs to be resolved - to the extent that it actually becomes a substitute for finding more information on the subject.Alternative narrative - pro conspiracyI distrust the government account because I think they're really grey aliens trying to eat my brain. I believe that because I heard it on a radio show I trust. I am a conspiracy theorist. Now, let's look at how that dynamic changes when somebody says to me that I'm a conspiracy theorist. I'll agree. It's not because I am called a conspiracy theorist that I'm not reading government accounts any more, it's because I've always believed (both before and after being called a "conspiracy theorist") that the government account is wrong. It's also not because I am called a conspiracy theorist that I'm more likely to read the narratives of other conspiracy theorists - it's because I read those narratives in the first place. So the whole dynamic of information gathering isn't affected.I'm going to go a step further and, once again, explain to you why this is. First, it's because the phrase "conspiracy theory" says nothing about the legitimacy of information. This can easily be checked by looking at either my or my opponent's definitions of "conspiracy theory." In order to show that "conspiracy theory" was a thought-terminating cliche, my opponent still needs to tell us why conspiracy theory is more just a statement of fact that the person already knows and agrees with, and rather actually communicates some information about the type of information that the conspiracy theorist ought to look up.Second, let us assume that it does tell the conspiracy theorist that their conspiricies are legitimate. The question is now whether that vindicates the conspiracy theorist's position. In fact, according to the pro conspiracy narrative, the conspiracy theory is already vindicated, as it was used to resolve some form of cognitive dissonance in the beginning. Since the cognitive dissonance surrounding whether a conspiracy is true or not has already been resolved, bringing it up again doesn't pose a new problem. So basically, if calling somebody a conspiracy theorist did cast doubt over the legitimacy of information, then that person must not have made a decision about what side's evidence they believe and as such could not be accurately termed a "conspiracy theorist."Let me also remind you of my empirical proof of this. If calling people conspiracy theorists would be enough to polarise, then conspiracy theorists would never come up with new or alternative interpretations of the evidence. In fact, they do. I gave you the example of the Hindenburg last round. Actually, let me source that for you: http://en.wikipedia.org.... It's not an amazingly unusual example either - people have come up with new theories for everything from what sank the Titanic to who killed Malcolm X, despite having previously been labelled conspiracy theorists.Alternative narrative - con conspiracyThe same is true of people who oppose conspiracies. If I really believe that there is no cover-up in the shooting of JFK, then being told that alternative theories are "conspiracy theories" will do nothing to make me more satisfied with my own position or entrench my biases. It's simply a statement of fact - something I had already believed. Put another way, my alternative idea is that these people will post on facebook or scan the internet for conservative opinion articles whether they call pro-conspiracy people "conspiracy theorists" or not. They would not be doing this because they label them "conspiracy theorists", but because they disagree with the theory they put forward.This is a classic case of assuming causation when really there is only correlation. It's true, for instance, that biases become entrenched, but what I'm saying is that this is a natural consequence of conspiracy theories and nothing else. That's not a strawman; that's just a different level of analysis. Even if the entrenchment of biases does happen, it still does not prove that the term "conspiracy theory" (as opposed to the facts of the theory) was the catalyst - and even if it did, that still does not prove that "conspiracy theory" qualifies as a thought-terminating cliche.The core disagreement we hold is this assertion made by my opponent: "cognitive dissonance is removed, because the phrase is a TTC that makes me default to my confirmation bias." My opponent has the burden of proof in this debate. Despite the fact I have already provided strong evidence why this is not true, my opponent is yet to justify that "cognitive dissonance" is in fact a thought-terminating cliche.I look forward to the final round.