The Kalām Cosmolgical Argument attempts to prove very little.

My first reaction in reading Pro's final round is that he read my words but didn't make a sincere effort at understanding them. So much of his rebuttal takes my previous round out of context that I will be hard pressed to correct his many misrepresentations.Morality is important; the God question alone is notMy opponent commits argumentum ad populum when pointing out that people are still able to approach morality regardless of belief in God. It does not matter whether or not everyone in the world agrees on moral principles. Pro argued that morality is a more important question than God but uses public opinion as his only defense. What about metaphysical necessity? What about moral absolutes? Neither of these questions can be answered by polling Buddhists, atheists, et al.If the KCA were settled, and a personal creator exists, even if it leads to deism, it still points to universal mind that in the very least means sociological and naturalistic explanations of morality can't automatically be adopted. It changes the conversation entirely. All religions can no longer be tossed aside like yesterday's newspaper. So, when my opponent says the question of God is not important, he's simply wrong. If the KCA is true, then the question of God moves to the forefront of philosophical discussion. That's not at all "very little."A KCA first cause might be naturalPro criticizes my assertion that the multiverse is temporal, citing that Hawkins and Mikaku contradict my claims. Really? Pro's citation of Hawkins speaks nothing of the multiverse whatsoever, and the link to Mikaku makes it quite plain when calling it an "11-dimensional arena." In fact, Mikaku goes on to say, "But within 11 dimensions you can have bubbles that are 3 dimensional, 4-dimensional, 5-dimensional." Mikaku is clearly indicating that the multiverse can only contain bubbles that exhibit as many or less dimensions. The multiverse doesn't have 11 dimensions, it is 11 dimensions.Once again he accuses me of incredulity. It's not that I have trouble imagining that the mutliverse is timeless—the multiverse is temporal as a matter of fact. My opponent has completely failed to show otherwise other than to appeal to authority without citation. If the multiverse is temporal, then it has the exact same problem as our temporal universe and does not solve the problem of infinite regress.The Kalam god is amoralI get what Pro is trying drive home here. Just because the creator is personal doesn't automatically mean he is morally good and we are morally accountable to him. So what? This premise only matters if Pro's first premise is true: that morality is a more important question than God. However, if God is indeed a very important question, than this statement is just a mere guess at his nature. If the KCA is true, then it is intellectually dishonest not to examine all the world religions as possible candidates for his revelation. This premise fails to show that the KCA proves very little. It's just an arbitrary claim based on wishful thinking.Arguments from incredulityWhen I say something is unthinkable, I'm not saying it is unimaginable or just too darn hard to think in my little brain. I'm saying it is nonsensical in every traditional philosophical sense of the word. I thought I made that clear when I showed that it violated the law of non-contradiction. Instead of a rebuttal to that claim, he just falls back on the good ol' argument-from-incredulity.Pro claims that so long as equations work with observations, then it doesn't matter. That is a very serious claim on Pro's part that cannot simply be ignored. Does he really want us to accept that math always represents reality? Do imaginary numbers represent the real world? I've never once observed a bushel with i apples in it. No one has ever once observed an actual infinite number of things. This is pure wishful thinking.Pro argues that God suffers from time as well since we've only observed thoughts to operate in temporal sequence. Now who's arguing from incredulity? Of course our minds are limited to temporal sequencing, but the definition of "mind" that I provided refers to the abstract notion of rational intelligence itself. My opponent is equivocating "mind" to a "brain," but true abstract minds are entities of pure thought and reason independent of time. A mind is the abstract notion of intelligence, just as a number is an abstract notion of matter. Even if there were no universes, the number 2 and the notion of logic would still exist. They are metaphysically necessary.Spaceless. Pro's rebuttal is a bare assertion without evidence to support it. He didn't even name an example of something other than abstractions that can exist outside of time except for his multiverse, which I already showed to also be a bare assertion on his part.Changeless. Pro continues to rely on the multiverse for his win, but he still doesn't substantiate anything. The multiverse is clearly not changeless. In fact, it has bubbles expanding and contracting over time. Therefore, it changes, and anything that changes needs time to do it. An abstract mind is does not have this problem because it is the abstraction of rationality and will. For a mind to will something is not to alter the nature of the mind, and therefore it is changeless. If, however, the mind were a brain (like a computer), then it would no longer be changeless or timeless. Thus, changelessness and timelessness go hand in hand, and Pro has failed to show otherwise.Immaterial. All hail the multiverse again, assuming of course we buy into Pro's bare assertion that the multiverse is timeless, which his own source flatly denies.Personal. I think I've adequately explain how a timeless mind works above and I've certainly beaten Pro's timeless-multiverse claim to death, and then some.The KCA has very little effect on naturalismMy opponent once again glides over my actual argument here and fails to actually deal with the dilemma I've placed before him. I never argued that naturalists have trouble coming up with natural first causes. The point is that, if the KCA is true, then naturalism as a whole cannot be taken for granted. Taking naturalism for granted (and treating it like it is the only unbiased epistemology) is exactly what my opponent has done all along. That's the irony. He wants to argue that the KCA proves very little using naturalism, when the KCA undermines naturalism. Pro refutes himself.It's not enough to simply say that the KCA replaces naturalism with deism. Once the KCA is accepted, than all world religions must at minimum be placed under philosophical scrutiny. To simply move to deism and stop there is intellectual ignorance. Therefore, the KCA is a pretty big deal and naturalists are better off refuting it altogether.The KCA makes resurrection little more plausible than without it.Probable alternatives are just that, probable alternatives. Context is everything, however, and if the KCA is true, than any alternatives (no matter how probable) must be examined in light of the existence of a creator. Therefore, resurrection itself becomes an even more probable alternative, even if my opponent is personally turned off by the idea.ConclusionThe only thing Pro has shown is that he is personally unimpressed. But that's not his burden. His burden is to show that the KCA proves very little and he has attempted to do so with presumption and bare assertion. He has failed to use his own sources with accuracy and he has misrepresented my arguments repeatedly. I showed the KCA to point to personal creator, which undermines naturalism and brings religions into academic discourse. I contend that, on balance, I have done much more to advance my position than my opponent has done to advance his. Therefore, I think it reasonable to vote in negation of the resolution.I thank the readers for their time and consideration and respectfully request that all voting be done responsibly. Thank you.