It is Probable That God Exists

Con has graciously replied to the arguments I set forth in R1. I'd like to thank him for this wonderful debate. In this final sound, I'll summarize my conclusions and respond to the counterarguments that Con has raised.The KCA Con endorses Quentin Smith's argument, according to which the the initial singularity is incompatible with the existence of a creator by virtue of its being inanimate. This is because there are no laws governing an inanimate singularity which would require a transition from an inanimate state to an animate one; and this is taken to be incompatible with the existence of God, who would presumably have ensured its transition to an animate state. Smith's proposal is flawed for a number of reasons:1. The singularity is a useful fiction and is not actually realOne need not adopt a realist interpretation of the initial big bang singularity. Just as the concept of an ideal gas, the big bang singularity is a useful fiction that is taken to mark the point in which there is no universe. It is used to describe a condition which itself has no ontological status. As Craig writes:"[T]he singularity has no positive ontological status: as one traces the cosmic expansion back in time, the singularity represents the point at which the universe ceases to exist. It is not part of the universe, but represents the point at which the time reversed contracting universe vanishes into non-being... Just as there is no first fraction, so there is no first state of the universe. The initial singularity is thus the ontological equivalent of nothing." [1]2. Why think that no laws governs the singularity?Why should we think (as Smith does) that there are no laws or conditions which would necessitate that the initial singularity to pass into an animate state? This just seems to beg the question in favor of atheism, for a creator would presumably ensure (and why think this must be done via physical laws?) that the singularity transitions from an inanimate state to an animate one.There are many other problems with Smith's argument, but I won't spend too much time on this. [2]Con attempts to explain the cause of the universe's existence by appealing to the big bang. Yet it is hard to see how this proves anything. Indeed, I appealed to the big bang myself as a defense of P2 of my argument. Recall that according to P1, whatever begins to exist has a cause. If the universe began to exist at the big bang, then the big bang event too requires a cause. So Con's appeal here doesn't solve anything. We both agree that the universe began to exist at the big bang, but that fact by itself doesn't account for what caused the big bang itself, nor does it rule out the need of a divine cause.In attacking P3, Con misunderstands big bang cosmology. The cause must be non-physical and personal in nature because there cannot be any moment prior to the singularity. As Smith himself says, "It belongs analytically to the concept of the cosmological singularity that it is not the effect of prior physical events. The definition of a singularity... entails that it is impossible to extend the spacetime manifold beyond the singularity... This rules out the idea that the singularity is an effect of some prior natural process." [3] If the singularity requires a cause (Which Con agreed to when he accepted P1), then it cannot be some prior physical process. This would imply that the universe would have had to begin ex nihilo. "At this singularity, space and time came into existence; literally nothing existed before the singularity, so, if the universe originated at such a singularity, we would truly have a creation ex nihilo." [4]The Thomistic TACon's response here is quite lacking. He responds along reductionist lines, attempting to reduce teleology to mere adaptations. He also attempts to distinguish between natural and artificial teleology, yet this distinction is irrelevant to the argument I provided. As employed in my argument, teleology is understood to be mere goal-directedness (ie: final causality), which is shared by both natural and artificial teleology (Both involve goal-directnedness). His distinction is thus useless.Con attempts to give an etiological reduction of teleology. Yet this fails. For one, even if organic teleology can be given a reductionist explanation, Con has nowhere near attempted to explain the teleology present in natural processes (ie: the water/rock cycle) and the even more basic teleology found in efficient causation itself. Second, explaining organic teleology through evolutionary means does not give an account of teleology, for the evolutionary processes themselves are teleological. Evolution does not in principle rule out teleology.Moreover, a reductionist explanation of teleology amounts to the denial that teleology exists as such. This falls pray to a host of problems. For one, causal regularity and efficient causation become completely unexplicable if goal-directedness toward certain effects does not exist. Con's ArgumentsOR becomes RedundantRecall that my charge against Con's use of OR was that it simply begged the question. In order to say that atheism is more parsimonius, one needs to assume that God is not necessary to explain certain phenomena. But since that's what we're debating over, Con assumes his conclusions. He responds by saying "In my refutations, I believe I have proved that God is indeed largely, if not completely, unnecessary to explain teleology and the animate universe’s origins."But that means that his use of OR becomes completely redundant. If one cannot use OR until criteria (2) has been established (A criticism which Con implicitly conceded), then one cannot use it as an independent argument against God (Since whether its use is justified first depends on whether other arguments succeed). It becomes the equivalent of beating an already dead horse -- an argument against God that only works if God doesn't exist. Either way, OR fails. If used as a standalone argument, then it begs the question. If not, then it becomes useless.GP 1. Can a perfect God create?Con argues that a perfect being would not create because it "would not want nor need change, as He is perfectly complete as is." This is patently false and frames the issue as a false dilemma. Change need not be ontologically positive or negative, there can be such thing as neutral change. Suppose I paint my red wall blue. My wall has changed, but this change does not add or detract to its being, it is neutral. In the same way, God's creation of the universe need not be construed as implying a deficiency on his part. One must also distinguish between a want and a need. A needs indicates something that would make something a better being, whereas wants are ontologically neutral and do not necessarily indicate a lacking. There is thus no problem with God having wants. For that simple reason, Con's argument here fails. 2. God, freedom, and evilPro concedes omnipresence and omnipotence and focuses largely on evil. He writes "So, if it is logically possible to destroy even just the source of evil, Satan, then God should be obligated to do as such." This conclusion follows by no process of logic. Recall Plantinga's argument that if it's merely possible that God has a morally sufficient reason for permitting evil, that it does not follow that God is morally obligated to destroy it. There is thus simply no incompatibility between God's attributes and evil. In order for Con's argument to work, he must prove that it is impossible for God to have a morally sufficient reason to permit evil. This is quite a tall task, one which no philosopher (Let alone Con) has been able to do thusfar. 1. W. L. Craig and Q. Smith, Theism, Atheism, and Big Bang Cosmology (OUP) p.2272. See Craig, "God and the Initial Cosmological Singularity: A Reply to Quentin Smith." Faith and Philosophy 9: 237-247.3. Craig and Smith, TABBC, p.120 4. J. Barrow and F. Tipler, The Anthropic Cosmological Principle (Clarendon) p.442