It is probable that God exists

Re: TCA 1 and 2Premise 1 from the TCA1 ("whatever is in motion is moved by another") and the central assumption of the TCA2 (contingent beings alone cannot provide an adequate causal account of existence) are both dubious. As the philosopher David Hume argues, there is no reason to believe motion or contingency must have a cause.Science suggests Hume is right. For example, quantum fluctuations demonstrate the existence of particles appearing out of nothing. Energy in the quantum world spontaneously appears and disappears out of nowhere. Some physicists have suggested thermal quantum fluctuations produced the Big Bang. [1] Hence, quantum physics provides strong evidence that motion can occur without a "first mover."In the TCA1, Pro states an "external being" is necessary to "impart motion." But claiming a being can exist outside of existence is an incoherent claim. If God exists, God must be part of existence by definition. As such, the "external being" the TCA1 refers to cannot be God.In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant argues the TCA2 is simply the ontological argument in disguise. Because it defines a necessary being into existence, the TCA2 presupposes the cogency of the ontological argument. But Pro has not defended, or provided any reason to believe, the ontological argument. The OA is in fact false (a being cannot be defined into existence), so the TCA2 must likewise be false.Pro also assumes, without warrant, that a first mover or necessary being must have the attributes of God. Pro admits "intelligence" derives from the teleological argument, not the TCAs. As such, if a first mover or necessary being does exist (they probably don't), there is no reason to identify it with a "personal" Judeo-Christian God.Re: The Teleological ArgumentPro erroneously conflates the word "end" with the word "purpose" in his argument. When Pro uses "purpose," Pro already assumes an intention behind the "end" as well as a "person" behind the intention. Hence, anytime Pro conflates the word "purpose" with "end," Pro's argument is circular, question-begging, and thus empty.Pro assumes "natural entities" have an "inherent goal-directedness." If this is true, inherent ends are nothing but descriptive facts about the way entities function. Descriptive facts are best explained through science; a "purpose" or "person" above or behind the end is not needed for an explanation.Ends given to entities by persons are normative. While Pro's example of a heart pumping blood is descriptive (it is explained by science), medicine is normative. Medicine is a human construct with the intention of maintaining healthy bodies. Another way of saying this is: descriptive ends are ontologically and epistemically objective, normative ends are not.Pro's argument clearly blurs the distinction between the normative and descriptive. Pro argues all descriptive facts about reality require a "person" or "intelligence" to be explained. Pro thus conflates the descriptive and normative, the telos inherent in natural entities (explained by science) and the telos given to natural entites (explained by human beings). Fundamental descriptive facts exist, usually determined by science, that explicitly call Pro's account of intentionality into question.Furthermore, Pro falsely claims that causes have a one-to-one relation with their effects. For example, consider the U.S. Constitution. Although the framers may have had a specific intention in mind, the interpretation and effect of the Constitution has been inconsistent and often unrelated to that original intention. This does not mean the Constitution can mean anything we want it to mean. Its meaning is limited by the text, but that text holds more meanings than could have possibly been intended by the framers. The relation between cause and effect is not one-to-one. Hence, there is no reason to assume ends are the products of intentions. Naturalism is more probable than theismAn overarching theme has already emerged in my counterarguments to Pro's case: naturalism is more probable than theism. Naturalism is testable, theism is not. The problem with theism is that it requires an a priori commitment to God's existence, such that any evidence found to the contrary is denied and its denial rationalized. God must know the position of every particle in the universe, impossible knowledge according to the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle. [2]In The God Delusion, Richard Dawkins presents what he calls "The Ultimate Boeing 747 Gambit." Dawkins interrogates the statistical probability of cosmological explanations, and argues that any God capable of designing a "finely tuned" universe would have to be incredibly complex and is thus less probable than the mere existence of the universe.By definition, theism requires supernatural explanations and complex rationalizations that defy the bounds of reason. Comparatively, naturalism has produced far more confirmed theories than theism. Over time, science has regularly provided naturalistic explanations for phenomena not previously understood; and in doing so, science has regularly overtaken supernaturalistic explanations for the same phenomea. By contrast, theism or supernaturalism can point to no comparable track record of scientific advances produced by successful supernaturalistic explanations: there are no cases of supernaturalistic explanations overtaking naturalistic ones.Argument from Physicalism of the MindThe Judeo-Christian tradition hypothesizes the existence of a nonphysical God. If physicalism of the mind is probable, it would follow that God's existence is not probable.There is no evidence of mental phenomena occurring without a body or required material. The evidence clearly favors physicalism. All human mental phenomena are dependent on neural phenomena. Numerous studies have confirmed that, in any mental state or mental process that a person might be in or undergo, in order for that person to be in or undergo that mental process, there must be simultaneous neural activity of some distinctive kind going on in the brain. [3] Hence, there is a strong empirical case for physicalism.Because physicalism is probable, it is not probable that God exists.Argument from IncoherenceIt is not probable God exists because the concept of God is incoherent. Like the concept of a round square, God's omniscience is not logically possible. If God is omniscient, God would have to know the following fact: (A) There are no facts unknown to God. According to Roland Puccetti, God cannot know A because A is an unrestricted negative existential statement. [4]As an illustration of Puccetti's point, consider the existence of an infinite number of mathematical entities and relations. There is no way God could know that He knows every mathematical fact. This is self-evident because of the fact that there are an infinite number of mathematical facts. Therefore, an omniscient, Judeo-Christian God cannot exist. The Argument from Evil (AE)Simply put, why does a perfectly-good and all-powerful God allow unnecessary evil and suffering? In syllogistic form, here is one formulation of the evidentiary AE:1. Gratuitous suffering probably occurs. 2. Gratuitous suffering is incompatible with a Judeo-Christian God.3. Therefore, a Judeo-Christian God probably does not exist. I want to conclude with the words of Christian philosopher Alvin Plantinga: "Why does God permit all this evil, and evil of these horrifying kinds, in his world?... The Christian must concede he doesn't know." [5] As Plantinga says, theism cannot explain the cruelty and suffering in the universe. Naturalism can.God's existence is not probable. The resolution is negated.Sources[1] http://en.wikipedia.org...[2] http://en.wikipedia.org...[3] Melnyk, Andrew. A Physicalist Manifesto: Thoroughly Modern Materialism, pp. 298-304.[4] Roland Puccetti, "Is Omniscience Possible?", Australasian Journal of Philosophy[5] Alvin Plantinga, "Self Profile" in Alvin Plantinga