Objectivism fails to describe an adequate meta-ethical answer for the is-ought problem.

Seeing as how my opponent has made a brief case of Objectivism's meta-ethical merits, I will directly attack that in this round. However, my opponent has also included some claims that I find to be wrong, so I will touch upon those issues (though they won't be necessary for me to defeat Objectivism). That being said, my round here will play as follows: I will first make my clarifications and notes on some auxiliary things my opponent has said that I find to be wrong. After that, I will attack the meat of her argument for Objectivist meta-ethics, and demonstrate sufficiently why it is inadequate. ==================== Touching upon auxiliary issues ==================== 1. My opponent's definition of Objectivism My opponent has given a good list of the tenets of Objectivism, and she has done no wrong here. I simply want to clarify that the focal point of this debate should focus on the idea that "the proper moral purpose of one's life is the pursuit of one's own happiness or rational self-interest", namely the justification inspiration for this normative dictum. The other tenets do not need to be discussed, though I thank my opponent for fleshing them out. 2. My opponent's claim about meta-ethics To put it simply, moral relativism is not the only opposition to Objectivist meta-ethics. Whereas moral relativism is definitely at conflict with Objectivist meta-ethics, there are other schools of thought that conflict - such as Kantian ethics, Utilitarianism, Divine command theory, etc. These different theories, though they share the same characteristic as Objectivism in advocating objective moral standards, come to this conclusion with a different path. In other words, if I am opposed to Objectivist meta-ethics this does not predispose me to either moral relativism or moral skepticism. ==================== Criticism of Objectivist meta-ethics ==================== Since in the following sections I will heavily refer to Objectivist meta-ethics, I will simply refer to it as Objectivism for the sake of convenience. Also, I'd like to add that since there is so many problems with Objectivism, I will simply list the ones I find to be more appealing to discuss about: ==================== Criticism of Objectivist meta-ethics : Existence as the ultimate value of all living beings ==================== Though many times the grounds for meta-ethics is found in metaphysics, Rand claims to ground her philosophy in the facts of reality. What I find interesting is that though she claims it's an empirical fact that existence is the ultimate value of all living beings, this obviously is not the case. For example, there is the clear example of the male praying mantis'[1] who mate while knowing the end of the process sometimes concludes with their head being eaten. "An animal is equipped for sustaining its life; its senses provide it with an automatic knowledge of what is good for it or evil. It has no power to extend its knowledge or to evade it. In conditions where its knowledge proves inadequate, it dies. But so long as it lives, it acts on its knowledge, with automatic safety and no power of choice, it is unable to ignore its own good, unable to decide to choose the evil and act as its own destroyer. [2]" Obviously, Rand believes otherwise - which empirical evidence dictates to be WRONG. There seems to be no reason to suppose existence is the ultimate value of all life. However, this criticism is more trivial than the others, which brings me to the following: ==================== Criticism of Objectivist meta-ethics : Life or death as the fundamental value choice ==================== Rand's philosophy is partially hinged on this claim, that "since life requires a specific course of action, any other course will destroy it. A being who does not hold his own life as the motive and goal of his actions, is acting on the motive and standard of death. [3]" It's from this idea that Objectivists draw their belief that the initiation of physical force against the will of another is immoral. However, on further examination it can be seen that this proposal that life or death is the fundamental value choice is horrendously wrong: If we are to interpret Rand as saying that there is a specific course of action required for life and any other course will destroy it, then we come with some problems. Reality begs otherwise. There are actions that have different degrees of preserving or facilitating death - if acting contrary to a specific course of action required for life puts us on the standard of death, then we'd commit suicide when the situation allows for us. In other words, only die hard Objectivists would be alive, which is obviously false. On the other hand, if we interpret Rand as simply saying that if we don't choose life as our primary motive/standard, meaning we are drawing a higher probability of death, then this is true. However, it becomes irrelevant for her task at hand. This would make similar attempts at making other values fundamental the same, such as a utilitarian telling one who is acting in a non-utilitarian fashion that they are not acting in a way that maximizes the greater good. All one has done is simply picked up the same formula as Rand, and stuck it to another ethical maxim. It becomes evident, then, that there is nothing intrinsically motivating in Rand's thoughts here to view the fact of life as the foundation of a satisfactory meta-ethical theory. ==================== Criticism of Objectivist meta-ethics : The shift from surviving by reason to Objectivist ethics: ==================== Objectivists will say that though actions like stealing from others may seem like it can be conducive to your life (after all, stolen money is still money), you have other worries such as having to escape the crime of stealing, etc. , and that's why it's wrong (since it's contrary to the standard of life). The problem with this is that Rand is making an absolute claim from a generalization. There is no reason to believe that ALL acts of fraud will bring about a high probability of death/impediment of one's life, making Objectivism impotent. Objectivists love to ask, at least on this website, why one would evade certain actions that bring a high probability of death to me (eating cyanide, doing drugs, etc. ). They seem to imply that there is a moral dimension for preserving life, when I'd argue it's simply a preference. ==================== Conclusion ==================== When you boil down Objectivism to it's core and carefully examine it, you'll find that it's far from fulfilling the is-ought problem. Riddles with faulty presumptions, false connections, vague relations, hasty generalizations, and even some scientific errors, it's no wonder Objectivism is labeled as a "popular philosophy". Though an admirable effort, Rand has ultimately fell short of her goal. Obviously, I draw large inspiration from reading arguments, articles, opinions, etc. from other people. The format of my criticism and general guideline in this round is reflected from this source[4]. I won't simply stick to this source; I am merely using it as a stepping point for the beginning of my argument. Clearly, I drew my opinions about Objectivism from more than just this source (I simply found it convenient for this debate since it's concise and neatly outlined) so if my opponent wants more reading material, I can reference more. And as a last note, I reserve the right to add more arguments in my following round if the situation desires (though I likely won't stray too far, if any, from the arguments I have presented here). ---References--- 1. . http://en.wikipedia.org... 2. . http://freedomkeys.com... 3. . http://colveyco.com... 4. . http://www.daviddfriedma...