The Kalam Cosmological Argument Is Sound

Premise 1: Everything That Begins To Exist Has A CauseMy opponent is mistaken, as this first premise is not self-evident. Pro claims that our experience confirms that things that begin to exist have causes. This is true. However, our experience does not confirm the notion that everything that begins to exist has a cause. This is an unjustified leap of faith; we do not have access to everything to make such empirical assumptions. Our every day conscious experience is limited to that which is within space-time and at the macroscopic level. We cannot make claims about everything in this sense.-- A Priori SupportPro mentions Aristotelian causality, but even Aristotelian causality's four causes can be placed under the framework of either necessary causation, or sufficient causation[1]. Therefore, my opponent mentioning Aristotelian causality is a fallacious red-herring. Also, Aristotelian causality requires all four causes to be present, or we do not have causality:"Aristotle offers his general account of the four causes. This account is general in the sense that it applies to everything that requires an explanation."[2]If something has a causal explanation, then the four causes apply. If the universe lacks a material cause, then it lacks a full causal process, as Aristotelian causality is split up into four categories as a necessary condition for this. You cannot have 3/4 of a causal process anymore than you can 3/4 of a pregnancy. It the universe comes into being without a material cause, then this actually violates Aristotelian causality. Thus, Pro is both appealing to Aristotelian causality and going against it simultaneously. This makes his case self-refuting. "I think it's very dubious that there really is a possible world in which something comes from something else uncaused, but let's assume for a moment that it is possible. This still proves nothing about the actual world."There doesn't seem to be anything logically or metaphysically incoherent about it. Also, Pro has not shown that a scenario similar to the one I mentioned with the paper could not be the case in reality. He also says something rather bizarre below:"Finally, the dent is not an example of a thing coming into existence." - ProYes it is. The dent exists at t, but it did not exist before t. Thus, it began to exist at t. Just because it did not begin ex nihilo, it still began to exist ex materia. The dent is part of the paper, but it is still something which began to exist ex materia. If you see a message appear indented in the sand, would you say the message did not begin to exist because it is a part of the sand? No, that would be absurd.-- A Posteriori SupportMy opponent says that if we can infer something about the macroscopic level, we can infer it at the sub-atomic scale. This is false. As Relativity holds classically at the macroscopic scale for example, but not so much at the quantum scale:"In our macroscopic world, we are used to energy conservation, but in the quantum realm this holds only on average." - Taner Edis. Department of Physics Truman State University Kirksville [3]The above is a valid Argument from Authority, as it shares consensus and it is a quote from an expert in the field. The rules at the quantum scale seem to be quite different than at the macroscopic scale. Therefore, my opponent is drawing a false equivalence. Since all of Pro's support for Premise 1 crumbles; Premise 1 can be dismissed.Premise 2: The Universe Began To Exist-- If The B-Theory Of Time Is True...An Ad Populum fallacy would be present if I was arguing that my position was correct because most philosophers of time believe so. However, I was arguing that my position is probably correct because the Minkowski space-time interpretation of Special Relativity is probably correct. The quote was additional to my argument, as perhaps a potential "bulk up". It was not my argument itself. "I exist now because my parents conceived me in December of 1980. I would not exist now if they hadn't." - ProThis commits the fallacy of presumption. He has to presume A-Theory to make that claim. When you say they "hadn't", that presumes an ontological motion. However, if B-Theory is true, then your birth, existence, and death all exist tenselsssy on a 4d or n + 1d space-time block. "Similarly, even if time exists tenselessly, the universe would still require a cause as to how it exists now." - ProNo it does not. My opponent just simply does not understand the metaphysics of time. If the universe is tenselessly eternal, then my opponent did not come into being in the 80's, it only appears that way as temporal becoming is just an illusion. Pro confuses:(i) What appears to be due to the illusion of temporal becoming(ii) What ontologically isIf time is tenseless, then nothing begins to exist, as temporal becoming is a necessary condition for something to come into existence, and temporal becoming is an illusion if B-Theory is true. If Nothing begins to exist, then the second premise is false necessarily. Now, Pro mentions arguments against an actual infinity. However, they fail because they assume classical arithmetic. Cantorian Set-Theory makes coherent use of infinities[4]. Also, the absurdities with regards to things like the Grim Reaper Paradox only arise once you try to add, subtract, divide, or multiply with regards to infinity, on top of any finite representation. If you have an actual infinity that is "frozen" tenselesslsy, then you cannot add, subtract, divide, or multiply this block. Therefore, the theist has no argument that there would be any absurdities when dealing with a 4d or n +1d block that extends infinitely in the later than direction. Also, if the block extends finitely in the earlier than direction, this still says nothing in favor of an ontologically real beginning in context. Pro has no case.Also, A-Theory is logically impossible. Ergo, it has to be false. McTaggart's Paradox shows that each "now" moment has all three classical A-Properties, because it is the present, it is the past to the future, and the future to the past. However, each "now" moment can only have one A-Property (the property of being "present") if A-Theory is true. It cannot both be true that each "now" moment both:(i) Entails only one A-Property(ii) Entails three A-PropertiesTherefore, A-Theory is incoherent. Lets get back to the science, as my opponent ignored my scientific argument for B-Theory and just hand-waved it away. Special Relativity, under the Minkowski space-time framework, tells us that time is relative to a specific reference frame and is not absolute. This has been confirmed by experiment[5]. This means A-Theory is false because it requires a universal "now" moment. "Special relativity [by itself] appears to provide a definite proof of the block universe view." -Vesslin PetkovThe only way to avoid this would seem to be a Neo-Lorentzian view of Special Relativity. Why is the Minkowski space-time interpretation more scientifically sound than the Neo-Lorentzian view? This is because Special Relativity under a Minkowski space-time framework predicts time dilation and length contraction. Both which have been confirmed[6]. Special Relativity under a Neo-Lorentzian view cannot be explain length contraction, and its prediction of luminous ether came up short with no results. The Neo-Lorentzian view also violates the scientific symmetry principles of Earman[7].-- If The A-Theory Of Time Is True...My argument still stands unscathed. A finite past =/= a true coming into beingConclusionThe resolution has been negated.Sources[1] http://std.about.com...[2] http://plato.stanford.edu...[3] http://atheism.about.com...[4] https://en.wikipedia.org...[5] http://ston.jsc.nasa.gov...[6] http://hyperphysics.phy-astr.gsu.edu...[7] http://philpapers.org...