Aquinas' Natural Law Theory cannot accurately explain moral objectivism

==Opening== I will start off by explaining some things and then go on to my opponents arguement. I would like to make links between laws of nature and ethicial principles. My opponent suggested Moral objectivism is in contrast with Natural Law and in fact is moral in itself. I also would like to dispell both notions. I provide some deffinitions: Natural Law- or the law of nature, is a system of law which is purportedly determined by nature, and thus universal. Moral objectivism- The meta-ethical position that ethical sentences express factual propositions about robust or mind-independent features of the world, and that some such propositions are true. Consequentialism- is the class of normative ethical theories holding that the consequences of one's conduct are the ultimate basis for any judgment about the rightness of that conduct. "Objectivism" denotes that morality is objective. Subjectivism holds that morality is subjective. Relativism holds that morality is relative. Natural law holds that morality is natural. We want to know whether there are objective values (which I take for the same question as whether morality is objective). It may be asked, what shall we say if it turns out that some values are objective and some are not? Or another what if basic morals are natural for most? ==Validation of Natural Law by Thomas Aquinas== Moral objectivism is probably the subject concerning which more nonsense has been written and said in modern times than any other in moral philosophy. I suspect this is partly because people wish to provide arguments in favor without first having a clear idea of what morality is. I am not chiefly concerned herein to defend any particular moral claims, although I shall mention some uncontroversial moral truths for debative purposes. For the natural law theorist, without moral validity, there can be no ethical validity. That is, if a man-made law goes against the higher code of morality, following the man-made law is in no way obligatory. One might then suppose that for a natural law theorist the question of when a law is legally valid reduces to the question of when a law is morally valid. But when is a law morally valid? This is not a question to which natural law theorists devote much time because they consider morality to be fixed and known naturally, or innately, to all men. Moral validity, then, is intuitive. For a system of law to be valid, it must satisfy at least the following criteria: rules must be decided and promulgated in an understandable way in advance of being enforced, and rules cannot be contradictory, applied retroactively, or otherwise impossible to follow. According to natural law, the force of validity, even for legal systems themselves, stems from morality. In contrast to natural law theory, Laws are not facts of nature to be discovered; instead they are rules posited by men. It is important to note that legal positivism does not deny the existence of a correlation between law and morality; rather, it claims that morality is not necessary for legal validity. Legal positivism is open to much criticism. The natural law theorist is not at all satisfied by legal positivism because legal positivism may admit legal validity to immoral laws. Natural law theory, which is immune to these problems, depends on a fixed morality for a society which is known to the members of the society. To speak of a morality for a given society there would have to be a set of morals which the society would adopt. Then, however, every law becomes optional, and people can choose to break laws because they go against their personal moral preferences, their likes and dislikes. This would lead to the dissolution of a system of law entirely. Thus, the non-optional obligation of law can be seen as a necessary feature of morality also. As the positivist asserts, a law is a law, even if we do not like it or if we believe that its content is wrong. To think otherwise would lead to the state of anarchy. In which objectivism is headed. It is perhaps too easy for the modern American legal and moral objectivist to respond that morals are not obritary as they can abolished or amended. But there are many legal systems that deny moral value in which there is either no procedure for change or such a procedure is inaccessible to some members of the society. ==Rebuttal to opponent== Moral objectivness stands in contrast to other categories of normative ethical theories such as consequentialism, which holds that the morality (in the wide sense) of an act depends on the consequences or the context of the act. :The argument is logically valid but is it sound? : IS LICKING A IMPROPER FUNCTION OF THE TONGUE? Licking is a proper useage of the tongue and licking envolopes is valid. It maybe unhealthy or unimportant biologically but very valid as a use. :My second objection is to Aquinas' belief that the Natural Law, which is supposedly objective, flows directly from the Eternal Law which Aquinas' claims is God's nature. This would mean that any action forbidden or allowed by Natural Law is part of God's nature. Since God cannot contradict His own nature, He could not commit an action that violates Natural Law. But God did contradict the Natural Law when He commanded the sacrifice of Isaac. : DID ABRAHAM SACRIFICE ISSAC? God did order abraham to sacrifice Issac but He stopped him before hand. This was not that God wanted Issac to die but a test of faith and loyalness in Abraham. ==Close== Thanks again to my opponent and I send it back his way. .. . References: Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologiae in The Philosophy of Law. Ed. Schauer. pp. 12-14. ``Philosophy of Law'. . http://www.utm.edu.... Schauer, Frederick and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Ed. The Philosophy of Law: Classic and Contemporary Readings with Commentary. Harcourt Brace and Company, 1996. . http://www.philosophy.hku.hk... . http://www.iep.utm.edu... . http://www.aquinasonline.com... . http://en.wikipedia.org... . http://en.wikipedia.org...