The United States should have used atomic weapons on Japan.

1a. Comparing the relative sizes and populations of Okinawa and the Japanese mainland is misleading—there are many other differences between the two. One, by the time we dropped the atomic bombs on Japan, the Japanese military was almost completely defeated, and wouldn't have been able to put up much of a fight. Two, there's no reason to think an invasion would have had to be a conquering of all of Japan, in the same way we conquered Okinawa. Military estimates at the time said that the worst-case scenario for an invasion of mainland Japan would result in 46,000 American deaths, [1] rather than the half-million or even "millions of lives" (George W. Bush) many claim would have been lost. But this point is irrelevant, since there's absolutely no reason to believe that invasion of Japan or atomic bombing were the only two choices America had, as I will explain below.1b. While some people in the Japanese government did plan an all-out defense of Japan, arming all their civilians with bows and swords and such, there's no reason to think anyone would have actually gone along with this plan. While some Japanese believe that the Emperor was a god and would be willing to die for him, this was definitely a minority belief—popular among the ruling class, but not among the general population. It's part of the Shinto religion, but Japan is (and was at the time) a mostly Buddhist country.Furthermore, the Japanese actually did try to surrender months before the atomic bombings. From Truman's handwritten diary, on July 18th, 1945: "Discussed Manhattan (it is a success). Decided to tell Stalin about it. Stalin had told P.M. (Churchill) of telegram from Jap emperor asking for peace…" [2] Military leaders at the time agreed that the atomic bombings were not necessary for peace. "Norman Cousins was a consultant to General MacArthur during the American occupation of Japan. Cousins writes of his conversations with MacArthur, "MacArthur's views about the decision to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were starkly different than what the general public supposed. When I asked MacArthur about the decision to drop the bomb, I was surprised to learn that he had not even been consulted. What, I asked, would his advice have been? He replied that he saw no justification for the dropping of the bomb. The war might have ended earlier, he said, if the United States had agreed — as it did later anyway — to the retention of the institution of the emperor."" [3] Dwight Eisenhower agreed that the bombings were unnecessary. "In [July] 1945… Secretary of War Stimson, visiting my headquarters in Germany, informed me that our government was preparing to drop an atomic bomb on Japan. I was one of those who felt that there were a number of cogent reasons to question the wisdom of such an act… The Secretary, upon giving me the news of a successful bomb test in New Mexico, and the plan for using it, asked for my reaction expecting a vigorous assent. "During his recitation of the relevant facts, I had been conscious of a feeling of depression and so I voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought our country should avoid shocking world opinion by use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives. It was my belief that Japan was, at the very moment, seeking some way to surrender with a minimum loss of ‘face'. The Secretary was deeply perturbed by my attitude…" [4]John McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War under Truman, said, "I have always felt that if, in our ultimatum to the Japanese government issued from Potsdam [in July 1945], we had referred to the retention of the emperor as a constitutional monarch and made some reference to the reasonable accessibility of raw materials to the future Japanese government, it would have been accepted. Indeed, I believe that even in the form it was delivered, there was some disposition on the part of the Japanese to give it favorable consideration. When the war was over I arrived at this conclusion after talking with a number of Japanese officials who had been closely associated with the decision of the then Japanese government, to reject the ultimatum, as it was presented. I believe that we missed the opportunity of effecting a Japanese surrender that was satisfactory to us, without the necessity of dropping the bombs." [5]1c. The Potsdam Declaration seems reasonable at first glance, but upon further examination, is not, and was probably deliberately designed to make sure the Japanese did not surrender. The declaration calls for "stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners." This fails to make an exemption for the Emperor, which the Japanese demanded even after the atomic bombings, and the Americans accepted. If I wanted to make peace with a leader, the last thing I'd do is say or imply that I was going to try him for war crimes and execute him, especially if I was perfectly willing to grant him amnesty and let him remain on the throne.The Potsdam Declaration also threatens Japan with "prompt and utter destruction" if they failed to surrender. While it's obvious now what that refers to, at the time, it is a vague and completely meaningless threat. A far more effective threat would have been something along the lines of, ‘we're going to bomb two of your cities to dust, and the Soviets are going to invade.'Conclusion:In conclusion, the atomic bombings were unnecessary and immoral because the Japanese were willing to surrender without them, as long as we let their Emperor stay as a figurehead, which we eventually did anyway. For dropping them, Harry Truman is a mass murderer and a war criminal, and ought to go down as one of history's greatest monsters.Sources:[1] Barton J. Bernstein, "A Post-War Myth: 500,000 US Lives Saved," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 42, no. 6 (June/July 1986): pp. 38–40; and idem, "Wrong Numbers," The Independent Monthly (July 1995): pp. 41–44.[2] http://www.pbs.org...[3] Norman Cousins, The Pathology of Power, pg. 65, 70—71[4] Dwight Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, pg. 380[5] McCloy quoted in James Reston, Deadline, pg. 500