Morality is an Idea

>What "nothings" are assumed not to exist and what constitutes enough "proof" to accept their existence? I am saying that the burden of proof lies with those that make positive claims, nothing more. Please do not misunderstand me. >This is question begging. My opponent must prove his position, not merely say "it is so." I did not say this. What I said was that all I must do is prove "it is not so". A different proposition altogether. >Proof, however, will always fall short because his view on epistemology will always reject the evidence. What evidence have you given me aside from appeals to custom and popular opinion? You have shown me no physical evidence, nor have you put forth anything resembling a formal logical proof. >My point about the seriousness of evil was not meant as singular proof. No single sentence in my argument stands alone as proof. What I did to criticize your opening paragraph was dismiss it as irrelevant, not attack its validity. There is a difference. >We must ask which theory works in practice and makes sense of human experience. You mean human ACTION. Humans do not act solely on rational laws of reality. They act also on thoughts, emotions, and shared beliefs in ghosts. Subjective "experience" is based on very similar things. If you are basing your proof primarily on human experience and actions, then how does your belief in the existence of morality as more than an idea have any more validity than a belief in ghosts? >In order to accomplish this, I made two observations about morality which I called moral distinctions and moral obligation. This should answer my opponent's question, "How is your definition of moral obligation anything other than a physical act, one that is exercised in accordance with an idea?" In laying out my case, I am making a distinction between the act of determining the rightness or wrongness of an action (moral distinction) and the act of holding someone accountable to good conduct (moral obligation). I am merely giving names to two observable actions. Exactly. Your idea of moral obligation is simply an action based on an idea we haphazardly call morality. How does this make morality something other than simply an idea? >I argue that the act of moral obligation assumes--consciously or unconsciously--absolute morality whereas my opponent attributes the act to an attempt at persuasion. False. I call your concept of moral obligation an ACTION in accordance with an IDEA. It has two parts, and it is very loose and imprecise concept that is poorly named. >To clarify for my opponent, a subjective morality is one in which there are no moral absolutes. If morality is an idea, then it is subjective since all ideas generate from many subjective human minds. An objective morality is one in which there are moral absolutes. If even a categorically imperative, perfectly rational, non-relativistic idea of morality is subjective by virtue of it being conceived by a human mind, then what kind of morality isn't? A code of ethics generated by God wouldn't escape this trap, either. God is simply another entity. Even if he was omniscient, he wouldn't qualify as "objective", since he is simply another entity. >He says relativism (whimsical insistence) equals objectivity (objective and universal), and in the same sentence he says objectivity could be taken to mean the lack of relativism. My opponent cannot have it both ways. I was attacking the idea that all humanly conceived moralities must by nature be selectively applicable. What I implied was that humans can create moralities that are universally applicable. >My argument is that people who insist their ideas are correct DENY the premise that morality is relative. Since this theory of morality leads to irrationality in practice, it ought to be rejected. Morality isn't granted objectivity by virtue of people being willing to coercively invoke it just as the idea of Aryan supremacy isn't granted truth by virtue of the Nazis carrying out the Holocaust. Even if people deny the premise that morality is relative doesn't mean it's untrue. People deny many things that are true and assert many things that are patently false. >My very next statement says, "In other words, those in power make the rules." Physical might is not necessary. Might-makes-right can be understood that those able to enforce their ethics are the ones whose ethics are correct. If there isn't a metaphysically existent entity called "morality", then how can the mighty be ethically correct or incorrect in a cosmic sense? They can still be in violation of rules drawn up in private or held within the hearts of those they oppress. In fact, this is the case no matter what the historical epoch. >In a relativistic moral system, this must be the case. If morals are just ideas, then the only ideas that matter are the ones enforced. No. Like I said, if morals are ideas, then they exist as ideas whether they are implemented, trampled upon, or ignored. Outside of final solutions, might has little to do with this. >My opponent wraps up by saying that I've "succeeded merely in proving that to treat morality lightly is disastrous." I will reiterate my argument since my opponent does not wish to read it in full. I am arguing that morality cannot be just an idea because of the impossibility of it. It leads to relativistic morality. Relative morality fails since engaging in moral obligation contradicts the premise. To reiterate, engaging in acts motivated by ideas does not legitimize or validate those ideas in any way, shape, or form. >To say morality is subjective but insist that others follow it is irrational UNLESS one believes their idea to be based on something with greater authority. Believing that you act in accordance with a higher power does not make ANY idea more rational. If this was the case, then the Crusades and the Salem Witch Trials were perfectly rational. >To insist that others adhere to your ideas is to assume your ideas represent truth and not mere opinion or fantasy. Assume, but not prove. >In conclusion, my opponent struggles to rationalize his position. First, he argues that morality is an idea based on a vague assumption of what can't exist. Invoking the burden of proof is not a vague assumption of what can exist. It is simply stating the objectives that we must achieve in order to claim victory in this debate, and that said objectives are asymmetric. You have to prove something, and I merely have to refute you. >Second, he argues that relative morality equals objective morality without making a case as to why these two notions should be considered synonymous. I was attacking your assertion that since moralities can be universally applicable, they must be guaranteed by some metaphysical reality that is more than an idea. I did not equate objective morality and subjective morality. If you were not making such an assertion, then please tell me so. >Third, he attempts to refute my argument out of context--a straw man defense. I have shown that relative morality cannot be rationally used in practice. Relative moralists behave like objective moralists. They cannot walk the talk. Only objective morality is rational both logically and in practice. Morality, if it is just an idea, cannot be objective. This statement assumes that the actions of moralists must by necessity be rationalized by the canonization of morality. No one but you would argue that philosophical approval of one's actions is a human right.