The Cosmological Argument

Every Contingent Fact Has an ExplanationPopculturepooka (Pro) claims that every contingent fact has an explanation. From this beginning, he attempts to proove that there is one non-contingent fact which explains all contingent facts, and which is the Jewish god. A contingent fact is anything that could have been different. I might have had a hotdog for breakfast instead of cold cereal, so the fact that I had cereal is contingent. A non-contingent, or necessary, fact is anything that couldn't be different. That two plus two equals four is, in Popculturepooka's view, something that couldn't be different, a necessary fact. Pro supports his claim that all contingent facts have explanations with something called the principle of sufficient reason (psr). I confess to not understanding the psr generally, but I now understand Pro's explanation of it well enough to realize that it doesn't work. Pro is after one unexplained thing (a necessary Jewish god) that explains everything else. That's his goal. But his psr is incompatible with that goal. Let's take two facts: Fact A is the fact that I had cereal for breakfast, a contingent fact. Fact B is the fact that two plus two equals four. Now the conjunct of those two facts (fact C) is a contingent fact. C comprises A and B. A is contingent, so C is also contingent. Any conjunct of facts is contingent if any of the facts it conjoins is contingent. If I had a hotdog for breakfast, A would be different, and C would be different. C is a contingent fact. Now, Pro claims that if C (or any conjunctive fact) has an explanation, then A and B (or any conjoined facts of a conjunctive fact) are also explained. Thus, not only is there an explanation of my having cereal for breakfast, but there is also an explanation of two plus two equalling four. It follows, then, that all facts have explanations. The BCC (big conjunctive fact) conjoins all facts necessary and contingent. The BCC is itself a contingent fact, since some of its parts are contingent. The BCC would be different if I'd eaten that hotdog. And all contingent facts have explanations, according to Pro's first premise. And all the conjuncts of an explained fact are also explained. Therefore, according to Pro's logic, all facts must have explanations. Thus, if Pro's logic is correct, there can be no unexplained first cause, no god. Pro's Modal ArgumentPro makes a modal argument involving possible and impossible worlds. This seems to me a mistake, since there are possible worlds with no gods. That sinks his entire case right there. Since there are possible worlds without gods, it is possible that gods do not exist. Therefore, gods are not necessary. Therefore, this world was not created by a necessary god. That should dispose of the Pro's modal argument, and his entire case. Anyone reading this now knows how to vote. But there are other problems I can point out. Again, I don't understand the PSR, so I'm not saying anything bad about it generally. But Pro's modal proof of the PSR has problems. He takes a hypothetical unexplained fact, puts it in an impossible world in which it is both explained and not explained, and concludes that it must therefore be explained in our possible world. That doesn't make sense. You can't generalize from impossible worlds to possible worlds. But suppose you could. Even Pro will admit, I assume, that there are impossible worlds in which gods do not exist. Will he generalize from those and conclude that there is no god in this world? Pro's logic "proves" more than he wants it to. One little substitution, and we see that his first premise should be that all facts have explanations. p = a necessary god that has no explanation.p* = that p and there is no explanation for p.z* = a possible world in which p* has a complete explanation.a* = completely explains p*. Thus, there is no reason to single out contingent facts as explainable. That is as arbitrary as singling out cheeseburgers because everything else is explainable, and then concluding that cheeseburgers must have created the universe. SkepticismIn his first post, Pro argued something not-very-clear about probabilities. If god doesn't exist, we can't figure probabilities. I pointed out that this argument, such as it is, backfires on him. Las Vegas is full of Christians praying that god will adjust their odds. If a magic-throwing god existed, then we couldn't rely on probabilities. P1: If god exists, then we can't calculate probabilities. P2: We can calculate probabilities. C: Therefore, god does not exist. Pro now dismisses this as "nothing but rhetoric and is irrelevant." I agree that it's a silly argument, but Pro is the one who brought it up. He is the one, therefore, who is saddled with the argument's logical implications. Necessary Being = GodThere is no reason to think the world was created by an unexplained necessary fact. (Not that Pro tries to conflate facts with beings.) But if there were logical reasons to believe in a UNF, would we assume that the UNF and Jehovah are one and the same? Obviously not. There is no logical reason to belive in an omnipotent, omniscient omnibenevolent god who coexists with sin. There is no logical reason to believe in a benevolent god who tortures people forever in Hellfire. There is no logical reason to believe in an omnipotent god who can't defeat iron chariots. There is no reason to believe in an all-knowing god who repents and changes his mind. There is no reason to believe in a god who both can and cannot be looked upon. Jehovah, in short, is a collection of contradictions. As such, he is what Pro calls, "an obvious and clear absurdity." Jehovah then is comperable to something that is red and green all over, and pro stipulates that the nonexistence of such things is a necessary fact. It is not logical, therefore, to believe in Jehovah. If there were logical reasons to believe in the UNF, then, clearly, the UNF would not be Jehovah. ConclusionPro's argument is as follows: (1) Every contingent fact has an explanation.(2) There is a contingent fact that includes all other contingent facts.(3) Therefore, there is an explanation of this fact.(4) This explanation must involve a necessary being.(5) This necessary being is God.1. I have no idea whether (1) is true. But Pro has the burden of proof here, and his arguments fail. Not only do they fail, but if we accepted them anyway, then they would "prove" too much. We would have to conclude that all necessary facts have explanations, as well as all contingent facts. This is a defeater of Pro's argument. 2. The second premise is clearly true. But, again, logic doesn't stop where Pro would have it do. Not only is it true that there is a contingent fact that includes all other contingent facts, but, undeniably, there is a contingent fact includes all other facts, including all necessary facts. This, again, is a fatal flaw; it destroys Pro's case. 3. This depends on (1) which is uncertain and unproven, and (2) which has implications beyond what Pro would wish. If we know that the BCCF has an explaination, then we know also that the BCF (including all necessary facts) has an explanation. Again, this defeats Pro's case. 4. This seems a huge unexplained leap. Even if we stipulated that contingent facts have explanations, why must the explanation be a necessary fact? And, in any case, for reasons explained above, if we accept Pro's reasons for thinking contingent facts have explanations, then the same logic proves that even necessary facts have explanations. Therefore, there there can be no unexplained fact to explain all the other facts. Thus, Pro's case fails either way, either because (4) is unproven, or because (4) proves too much, denying him his unexplained first cause. 5. Even if there were an unexplained necessary fact, it would clearly not be the contradiction-filled god of the bible.