God probably exists

Thanks Con! Ontological argument Pro states: "I think this is the real fishy part of the argument for 1). A being cannot be defined within one possible world in such a way that the definition transcends to all other possible worlds. Think in terms of the following analogy. A possible world could be a fiction novel. However, it is impossible to write a novel that has a character that is so powerful, that it transcends the novel and enters every novel known to man." So the main contention here is that nothing can transcent possible worlds, and compares the notion to a novel. While this may seem obvious at first, the simple fact about this part of the argument is that it follows the laws of Modal logic, and so does transcend possible worlds. That is what Modal Logic is all about - more specifically axiom S5, which states that if it is possible that "A" is necessary, then "A" is necessary. This is a logical truth: S5: 00"`33; = `33; and 00"`74; = `74;, where each 0 is either `33; or `74; [1] Con then compares the idea to a novel. The analogy, however, fails. Modal Logic cannot apply to a novel, and the challenge of writing "a character that is so powerful that it transcends the novel and enters every novel known to man" simply shows a lack of understanding of Modality. "There is no shape that has both "great making properties". So there is no "Maximally Great Shape"." Absolutely not - I do not dispute this! But this is because there is no abstract object with any sort of great making property. It is simply non-sensical. Red, for example, is no greater than yellow. Similarly, a triangle is no greater than a hexagon. To have the attribute of symmetry is not 'great' per se. Nothing is 'great' about having a lot of sides. But with a maximally great being though, it is obvious that each great making property it possesses, adds greatness. Such as omniscience - the being knows everything, rather than just a few things. Or, omnipresence - the being is everywhere, rather than just in a few places. Abstract objects, in other words cannot be great - and so the analogy fails. "I did not understand this argument (not just because of the spelling and grammar mistakes). It is not clear at all that there are no contradictions between different "great making properties"." The point I was attempting to get across is that we can look at binary code to convey how there are no contradictions in the concept of a maximally great being. A logically inconsistent being would have a binary code of, say, 2 or 3 - logically impossible for binary code, or contradictory 0 and 1 for a single property - like omniscience and knowing absolutely nothing. But a maximally great being simply has every great making property to a maximal extent. There are no '2's' or '3's'. "The notion of "great making property" is subjective. Who decides what a great making property is?" We do, through logic. You cannot simply argue from ignorance - dsagreement about whether a property is great does not imply that there is no objective standard. However, we can form somewhat of an argument. I think that it is blatantly obvious that it is greater to be omnipotent than to not be able to do anything. It is greater to know everything rather than to know nothing. It is greater to be necessary, and exist in all possible worlds, than to be contingent and to exist only in some possible worlds. It seems just obvious. [2] "If God is omnipotent, then God can create a stone that is so have that no-one -- even God -- cannot lift it. But if God cannot lift the stone then this contradicts his omnipotence. We have to conclude that: God does not exist" Here, Con presents an omnipotence paradox. However, this is a basic misunderstanding of what "omnipotence" means. It does not literally mean 'to be able to do anything'. Rather, a more fitting definition would be "to be able to actualize any logically possible series of events" [3]. And so God could not - despite being omnipotent - make a square circle, or a married bachelor. These are logically impossible events. Likewise, God could not, as Con says, "create a stone that is so have that no-one -- even God -- cannot lift it". Despite the spelling/grammar errors, the idea is that God cannot make a stone so big that he can't lift it, and so God cannot do one of those, and thus is not omnipotent. However, this is again just logically contradictory. No omnipotent being could do such an action. It is logically impossible, and so does not impede on God's ability to "be able to actualize any logically possible series of events". [4] "If we would assume that God has to exist right from the start, then the whole debate is pointless. Also, the title of this debate is "God probably exists". This means, that PRO claims that it is likely that God exists, but that it is possible that God does not exist." Of course, I agree with this. Nothing can be proven for certain, and as with all things, we make a probablistic claim of God's existence. Also, we can differentiate between a logical proof and an epistemological proof. The Ontological Argument is certainly a logical proof of God, but is by no means an epistemological proof of God.. We now come to our final objection to the ontological argument: "PRO claims that it is likely that God exists, but that it is possible that God does not exist. Since God does not necessarily exist, God does not exist in some possible world. So, if a maximally great being exists in some possible world, it has to exist in every possible world. But since a maximally great being does not exist in some possible world, we have to conclude that: A Maximally Great Being cannot exist in ANY possible world." The issue with this argument is that the chain of reasoning in my argument shows that if the concept of a maximally great being is coherent, then that being is thereby necessary. And so when you say "a maximally great being does not exist in some possible world", you are really saying 'a necessarily existent being does not exist in some possible world', which is obviously fallacious and incoherent. Now, we arrive at the introspection argument. Introspection argument To begin with, Con quotes from Daniel Dennet. However, nothing really is achieved. The quote just says is that what we consider to be a soul is just neurons. This is merely a bare assertion. No evidence is used to back this up, and is in fact, not all that relevant to the argument - I do not argue for a soul per se, I argue only that our mental properties are not properties which matter can have. "Whenever you put an electrical charge on a certain nerve, it will hurt. Every time you hit your thumb with a hammer, an electrical signal will go from your thumb to your brain and it will hurt... Consciousness, pain, is all part of matter." This only skims over the surface of the argument, and it is what I indeed admit - I do think that we experience a correlation between mental and physical properties. However what I argue is that there is more than merely a correlation - there is a distinct difference that is fundamental between the two. Take schizophrenia, for instance. Someone who suffers from schizophrenia hears sounds just like any other person. [5] But there are no sound waves. Sound, usually produced by sound waves, is purely mental, so matter and mind are not identical, supporting the second premise. "We are limited and we cannot know every physical fact about the brain. But if we did, perhaps we would be able to deduce everything about our mental states. I do not believe in demons, but if Laplace's demon existed, perhaps he would know everything about consciousness. It seems that you have rejected the idea that Laplace's demon would be able to know everything about consciousness with out any argument for it." The idea with laplace's demon is that it seems at least logical and conceivable that if you knew everything about every last atom, the experience of consciousness, pain, or taste cannot be understood. Understand that this is not a definite, certain scenario - it is a probabilistic scenario, supporting the title of the debate "God probably exists". Nevertheless, I still do agree that a demon could not know what the feeling of consciousness, pain or taste is like purely through knowledge of matter. That just seems logical. "This so-called "fundamental mind" is just the Universe. I do not disagree with the fact that the Universe exists. But we should not label it as "God". Monistic idealism asserts that the universe is a mental state - like a thought. A thought is fundamentally mental. However, a thought, by definition, requires a mind. And so if the universe is fundamentally mental - just like a thought - then the universe must be the thought. It cannot be the mind. This is certainly not compatible with the definition of God that was given by PRO in the beginning of the debate" The case for the definition given at the beginning of the debate is a cumulative one - the Ontological argument gives support for the other attributes of God. Thanks Con, I now hand the debate over to you. Sources: [1] http://plato.stanford.edu... [2] http://www.reasonablefaith.org... [3] http://www.iep.utm.edu... [4] https://www.princeton.edu... [5] http://www.schizophrenia.com...