God's Existence is More Plausible Than His Non-Existence.

I thank Con for his arguments and for continuing the debate. My opponent forfeited in my last few debates, so it's nice to have someone continue with it.Con's First Argument: Free WillCon's argument is unsound, as I will demonstrate.I agree with Con's premise one. Humans have free will. Without it, it makes no sense to punish someone for doing wrong or to reward someone for doing right.I take issue with his premise two. Free will is the ability to determine your own actions, to make decisions freely. Your moral actions are not uncaused or caused by another. [1] Thus, you can have your will taken away (such as being forced at gunpoint to do something). But in that case, you are still a free moral agent who is temporarily having your free will usurped by another. Which means that even if God were to force someone to perform an action, this does not mean that we are not free moral agents, just that we had our will temporarily usurped.Con's premise three is demonstrably false, and hence his argument is unsound. Being a maximally great being does not entail that you can do absolutely everything. God can't do what is logically incoherent (more on that when I address the Omnipotence Paradox, below). As such, God doesn't have to be able to control everything in order to be maximally great. First, being able to control everything means that he could certainly control his own actions, so that he would not have to be in control of human beings at all times. But second, since God has made us free moral agents, then he can't control our behaviors. This is why people have been allowed to perform some atrocious evils in the past (such as the recent school shooters, Hitler, Stalin, etc.).Due to Con's premise three being false, his argument is unsound.Con's Second Argument: The Omnipotence ParadoxCon's argument here is also unsound.Con's first premise is false. Omnipotence does not entail the ability to do everything. As a maximally moral being, God can't do anything immoral (e.g. he can't lie). Also, God can't do the logically incoherent (such as creating a square circle, a married bachelor, or a stone so heavy he can't lift it). As such, Con's argument fails because it relies on a false definition of omnipotence.Con's premise two fails for the reasons outlined in my examination of his first premise. Omnipotence means "almighty in power," not the ability to do everything. [2]The Omnipotence Paradox has essentially been rendered academic by philosophers like Alvin Plantinga, who show that an omnipotent being can't do what is logically incoherent. God can't create a square circle because squares, by their definition, have four sides and four corners, and circles have no sides and no corners. Likewise, God can't create a stone so heavy he can't lift it because any stone he could create, he could lift.Con's premise three collapses because, again, it relies on a faulty definition of omnipotence.Con's argument is unsound.My first argument: The Kalam Cosmological ArgumentCon has conceded my premises and argument, so my argument succeeds.The problem with Con's rebuttal is that he is comparing himself baking a cake with God creating the universe, which is a false analogy. Con can bake a cake because we know about cooking, and we have the raw materials to bake the cake with. It takes an all-powerful being (read: an omnipotent being) to create the universe for two main reasons.First, the universe is not eternal. Who- or whatever created the universe did so from nothing. Something cannot come from nothing uncaused, because "nothing" is literally "no thing" -- it has no qualities, no potentialities, it literally does not exist. In order for something to come from nothing, it requires a cause -- an intelligent cause.Second, considering the absolutely massive scope of the universe, we know that the Creator had to be omnipotent because a being of limited power would not have been able to create a universe of this scope and this amount of order. It simply boggles the mind (to put it mildly) to argue that the creator of the universe wasn't an all-knowing, all-powerful entity.I agree with the Big Bang (and it was originally seen as a problem by atheistic scientists because of its Theistic implications). But just like with any explosion, the Big Bang needed a Big Banger. The Big Bang was the start of the universe, but it required an all-powerful entity to cause it.Regarding quantum physics, it has not proved that something can come from nothing. These particles come from a quanutm vacuum, which is a "sea of transient energy." That's not nothing; to claim it is is to equivocate on the word "nothing." Plus, the argument assumes that even though we don't know the answer now, we never will. But who's to say we won't discover the cause sometime in the future?The argument does not say that everything has a cause, only that everything that begins to exist has a cause. No Theist argues that God began to exist; God has existed eternally. This is not special pleading. The universe was once seen as eternally existent. We now know it had a beginning, so we are postulating that God is the eternal entity who created the universe (since an infinite regress of causes is impossible).My second argument: The Ontological ArgumentPremise one succeeds, as I have shown that a maximally great Being is not impossible. It is possible that a maximally-great Being exists, so the rest of the argument follows necessarily.Con has misunderstood the second premise. By "possible world," scientists do not mean "another world," such as another planet or another universe in the "multiverse." It is simply another way of viewing a possible reality. For example, unicorns exist in some possible worlds. They do not exist in our world (the actual world), but they exist in some possible worlds because there is nothing logically incoherent about a unicorn. As such, if it is possible that a maximally-great Being exists (as it is possible that unicorns exist), then a maximally-great Being exists in some possible worlds (as do unicorns).The rest of my argument also succeeds. God is a necessary entity, which means that he exists in every possible world, including this one (the actual world).The argument succeeds.My third argument: Thomistic Cosmological ArgumentI don't believe that Con has negated the first premise. Our intuitions tell us that we move around. If I can stand up and walk out my door, but I have not stayed in one place -- I have changed my location. We know that the Earth revolves around the sun (even though common thought was that everything else revolved around the Earth). I would encourage Con to support his contention with evidence and/or quotes from these physicists. Otherwise his argument can be rejected as having no support.Con has conceded premises 2 and 3.As for premise four, even if Con is correct and everything moves around us, that still shows that there is movement. A First Mover would still be required. Con has simply exchanged one problem for another.The First Mover would have to be an intelligent agency, one who is pure act and no potentiality (since he exists as the first in the causal chain of movers). As I indicated last round, a thing's potentiality cannot be actualized unless acted upon by an outside force. That outside force must be an intelligent one, one in charge of his own actions, who has a reason for setting everything into motion.The argument, again, succeeds.ConclusionI have shown that Con's arguments fail and I have supported my own arguments.It is more plausible that God exists because an all-powerful entity needs to create the universe, if God's existence is possible then logically he must exist, and in order to account for movement in the universe God must be the First Mover.I look forward to Con's rebuttal.[1] Geisler, Norman L., Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics, Baker Books, p. 262.[2] http://www.youtube.com...;