BeIR/webis-touche2020 huggingface dataset:
Outside powers want oil so support dictatorial regimes who can deliver it.

In the Libyan case the dictator remains (as of 20th April 2011) but cannot sell oil even if he retakes the refineries. The rebels cannot sell oil either (legally) even though they control most of the infrastructure. The sanctions imposed against Gaddafi apply to the whole of the country.[1] Therefore the desire for oil pushes for further support of the rebels in this case as the sanction regime is only likely to be deconstructed following a rebel victory. Should Gaddafi remain in power the west may have to cut itself off from Libyan oil for years to come. Obviously the above case represents a regime in flux. Once a regime is toppled then anything can happen. There is then no reason why outside actors should want to encourage another dictatorship rather than a democracy. A dictatorship may bring stability faster but a democracy is much more stable in the long run. Countries ideas of their strategic interests can be very divergent. An example is the Suez crisis. Prime Minister Eden considered it “an obvious truth that safety of transit through the canal…[is] a matter of survival [however] world opinion seemed to be that Nasser was within his rights in nationalising the Canal Company.”[2] As Nasser promised “freedom of navigation would not be affected by nationalisation” reducing the matter in the view of the US Secretary of Defence to “a ripple”.[3]So while Britain was still willing to fight for control over the Suez canal the US condemned that very action forcing a withdrawal. [1] Libya oil stuck in legal limbo as UN panel shunned, Reuters Africa, 20th April 2011, http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE73J04Q20110420 accessed 19/5/11 [2] Sir Anthony Eden, Full Circle: The Memoirs (Cambridge, 1960), p.533. [3] Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace 1956-1961 (New York, N.Y., 1965), pp.39, 41-3.   improve this
Rentier economies lead to dictatorships.

For these states perpetuating the resources that give their regime its legitimacy, as a provider, is absolutely vital, the regime needs to be able to fulfill its side of the bargain with the people.[1] This is exactly what Egypt and other Middle Eastern states have been failing to do for the last couple of decades. Increasing food prices sparking riots shows that this is the case. Instead they have to rely more and more on force. Once a rentier system has begun to break down there may well be an opportunity for a more democratic system to take hold and better redistribute the economic resources of the state that have previously been so concentrated in a few hands. [1] Gerd Nonneman, ‘Rentiers and Autocrats, Monarchs and Democrats, State and Society: The Middle East between Globalisation, Human “Agency”, and Europe’, International Affairs, Vol.77, No.1 (Jan., 2001), pp.141-162, pp.146-147.
There are preexisting institutions in Arab countries.

Many middle eastern states already have institutions that are similar to the representative institutions that a stable democracy needs so can easily become the real thing. Arab dictators have grown adept at holding elections, setting up parliaments; constitutional courts etc. as window dressing to show either to their people or to the outside world that they are reforming and are ‘democratic’. No matter how undemocratic these regimes have been the simple existence of these institutions is useful when there is a revolution as they allow some continuity and the possibility of a transition to democracy. To take Egypt where protests toppled the Mubarak regime as an example. It has a parliament with the Majilis Al-Sha’ab (People’s Assembly) as its lower house and Majilis Al-Shura (Shura Council) as its upper house. In both houses a majority of the members are directly elected.[1] Egypt held elections for its parliament as recently as November 2010, these elections had very poor turnout and blatant ballot rigging while the main opposition the Muslim Brotherhood have to stand as independents.[2] Egypt also has previously had local elections for 52,000 municipal council seats in some 4,500 towns and cities. These elections are just as fraudulent as those for the national parliament. According to Muslim Brotherhood MP Jamdi Hassan “The ruling party used to allow opposition candidates to run and then simply rig the elections. Now, it has adopted a new strategy to ensure its continued domination: preventing the opposition from fielding any candidates at all.”[3] This may not be the best democratic tradition but at least it is a start. Similarly Egypt has a Supreme Constitutional Court that is supposed to be independent.[4] While these institutions may have ceased working in a democratic way they could quite easily be changed in to being fully democratic. This would create the necessary checks and balances to sustain democracy over the long term. The people are used to elections and will know what to do when they have the option to vote freely, they would vote in a broad range of candidates. Many of them may be islamist but it would be democratic. [1] Wikipedia, ‘Parliament of Egypt’, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parliament_of_Egypt accessed 19/05/2011 [2] Egypt hold parliamentary poll, 28/11/2010, BBC News, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11855691 [3] Adam Morrow and Khaled Moussa al-Omrani Opposition Squeezed in Local Elections, IPS News, 17/3/08, http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=41618 [4] The Supreme Constitutional Court, ‘Historical Overview’, http://hccourt.gov.eg/About/history.asp   improve this
Progress has been made.

Egypt as the biggest Arab state and one of only two so far that have had largely peaceful revolutions is perhaps the best example of the progress that has been made. There was a referendum in Egypt in March on amending the constitution that passed with a yes vote of 77.2%. That there was a referendum at all surely counts as progress. It limits the number of presidential terms to two, promises to strengthen the judiciary and abolish some of the emergency laws. A turnout of 41% is not as good as it could have been but it was a great advance compared to other polls in recent Egyptian history. Mohamed Ahmed Attia, the chairman of the supreme judicial committee that supervised the elections, explained its significance as being “the first real referendum in Egypt's history, we had an unprecedented turnout because after Jan. 25 people started to feel that their vote would matter.”[1] Because Egypt has historically been at the center of the Arab world success in Egypt will be vital to show that a stable Arab democracy can be created. [1] Egyptian Voters Approve Constitutional Changes, New York Times, Mar. 20, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/21/world/middleeast/21egypt.html?_r=1&par...   improve this
Islamic parties have led governments before

The economic, social, and political history of the region show there are many obstacles to establishing stable democracies in the Middle East. Many in the West fear that Islam is among these barriers, with claims that Islamist parties like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Ennahda in Tunisia will turn their countries into theocracies like Iran. However, there are majority-Muslim states with Islamist parties that have succeeded in creating stable democracies, including Turkey and Indonesia. Both countries are good case studies that disprove the widespread notion that Islam is incompatible with democracy. Turkey is most often cited as a good example for the Arab spring to follow. The election of the AKP has shown that an Islamic party can also uphold democracy, so providing a good example for the powerful Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab world. Elections are free and fair and the press is relatively free. The Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has faced down coup threats from the military, again something that may well be necessary given the large role the military has had in the previous regimes. Turkey’s economy is growing briskly and Turkey is following a foreign policy of reaching out to everybody and is touting itself as a model for Arab countries to follow.[1] In Indonesia in 1998 there was a revolution that ousted President Suharto who had like Mubarak been in power for thirty years. This revolution progressed in a very similar way to the ongoing revolution in Egypt – in both countries the protesters were middle class and young, the president went relatively peacefully and the military helped during the transition.[2] Indonesia is now the largest Muslim democracy in the world and while there are islamist parties in parliament their support is now below 30%.[3] Indonesia can therefore provide a road map for moving from an interim government with the military in control to a fully functioning and successful democracy. [1] A Muslim Democracy in Action, The Economist, 17th February 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/18185813accessed 20/05/11 [2] Banyan, Remember 1998  The Indonesian Example, The Economist, 7th February 2011, http://www.economist.com/blogs/asiaview/2011/02/indonesian_example accessed 20/05/11 [3] Thomas Carothers, Egypt and Indonesia, The New Republic, 2nd February 2011,  http://www.tnr.com/article/world/82650/egypt-and-indonesia accessed 20/05/11
The west only supports democracies that fit with its world view.

Fincial and diplomatic engagement with the international community is essential for democracy to take hold. Tensions turn to conflict when governments are unable to provide basic services to the people, as was the case in Gaza when Hamas was elected in 2006 and the US and EU immediatey froze nearly all the funds and resources that were reaching the occupied territory. Furthermore, support from the West is necessary to provide the financial resources to rebuild after the revolutions damaged business and scared tourists away. However the West’s does not support democracy unless the ruling party is guaranteed to act in the interests of the West. Throughout the latter half of the 20th century, the United States has either directly aided or executed the overthrow of over thirty foreign governments, many of which were popularly elected.a  The US has in the past warned that aid to Lebanon could be jeopardized if Hezbollah was dominant in the government.[1] The US has a history of confrontation with the party that is the main political representation for the Shia element of Lebanese society which has eroded rather than supported Lebanese stability.[2] The victory of Hamas in the 2006 Palestinian elections, winning 76 of 132 seats, did not result in any rapprochement with the Bush administration despite their professed desire to see democracy in the Middle East.[3] The result was that aid from Europe and the US was reduced to humanitarian aid only, rather than as before being a major element of Palestinian government income and expenditure.[4] The result being that in 2007 the ‘country’ was rent in two as Hamas seized control of Gaza. Of course another Middle Eastern state that holds democratic elections, Iran, is the very model of a pariah state from the western point of view. It seems that the west is less concerned about democracy in the middle east and more about stability. a. Wikipedia, 'Covert United States foreign regime change actions;, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Covert_United_States_foreign_regime_change_... [1] ‘U.S. warns on ties with Hezbollah-backed Lebanon gov’t’, Reuters, 25 January 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/25/us-lebanon-government-usa-idUS... [2] Nicholas Noe, Lebanese government collapse: a history of missed opportunities, guardian.co.uk, 14th January 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/jan/14/lebanese-... accessed 19/05/11 [3] Scott Wilson, Hamas Sweeps Palestinian Elections, Complicating Peace Efforts in Mideast, Washington Post Foreign Service, 27th January 2006,  http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/26/AR2006012600372.html accessed 19/5/11 [4] Palestinian Parliamentary Elections 2006, GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/palestine/pa-elections2006.htm accessed 19/5/11
Outside powers want oil so support dictatorial regimes who can deliver it.

Oil creates interdependence between the producing states in the Middle East and the consumers in Asia and the West. Although rising prices are good for producers they can also threaten the world economy and create inflation that in turn will damage the producers by reducing demand.[1] The consumers have to listen to Saudi Arabia and the other Arab regimes who provide their oil whereas they often don’t for poor countries in Africa who would otherwise be no different.  Oil is the main reason for external interest in Arab regimes some of the strongest alliances in the Middle East are built with oil as their foundations.[2] Saudi Arabia is a US ally due to it being a major supplier while Egypt is an ally due to its vital position controlling a major trade route – the Suez canal. In neither case would any external powers such as the EU nor the U.S. really want a long an unstable transition to a democracy making a strong man a much easier option. This is shown by how the Obama administration has always been behind events, being unwilling to call for democracy in Egypt and President Mubarak to go. Instead the administration made statements such as that by Secretary of State Hilary Clinton “Our assessment is that the Egyptian government is stable and is looking for ways to respond to the legitimate needs and interests of the Egyptian people”.[3] Many previous administrations would probably have been even more supportive of Mubarak. [1] Daniel Yergin, The Prize The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power (New York, N.Y., 1993), p.703. [2] Eric Watkins, ‘The Unfolding US Policy in the Middle East’, International Affairs, Vol.73, No.1 (Jan., 1997), pp.1-14, p.1 [3] John Barry, Inside the White House’s Egypt scramble, Newsweek, 30/1/2011, http://www.newsweek.com/2011/01/30/inside-the-white-house-s-egypt-scramb...   improve this
Rentier economies lead to dictatorships.

Most economies in the middle east are oligarchic with the wealth in the hands of a few. Oil has created rentier economies. These economies rely upon systems of patronage relying upon kinship groups, merchant communities and patron-client relationships, economic considerations become subservient to political considerations.[1] This occurred because of the small size of Middle Eastern private sectors forced the creation of state centred development programs.[2] While it remains the case there is a very small group of people in each Arab country that need to keep political power in order to perpetuate their economic power. As they already have the economic power and are often the best educated they are the most capable of forming any new government. In such an oligarchic society it would be very risky for these people to allow the creation of a democracy that may well wish to redistribute resources more equally. [1] Michel Chatelus and Yves Scehmeil, ‘Towards a New Political Economy of State Industrialisation in the Arab Middle East’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 16, No. 2 (May, 1984), pp.251-265, pp.261-262 [2] Timur Kuran, ‘Why the Middle East is Economically Underdeveloped: Historical Mechanisms of Institutional Stagnation’, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol.18, No.3 (Summer, 2004), pp.71-90, p.87.
There are preexisting institutions in Arab countries.

While the presence of pre-existing institutions is an advantage in transitioning to a democracy, that advantage may be compromised when these institutions are largely seen as illegitimate and have not fostered a democratic political culture.  Key to the development of a democratic political culture is confidence in institutions and a willingness to accept the popular will as carried out by those institutions. The predominance of the Executive over the Legislature is rather reminiscent of the Imperial Russian State Duma (1905-1917) as with Tunisia and Bahrain the lower house was directly elected, although the system was heavily weighted to produce pliant Dumas from 1907 on, and the upper house appointed. There was quite a plurality of parties and the Duma had control over a wide area of legislation but not over areas such as military policy and the Tsar had veto powers.[1] It certainly cannot be said that the Duma’s existence proved to be conducive to the creation of a stable democracy after the fall of the Tsar, or even a stable state of any sort. The existence of the necessary institutions therefore does not mean anything if those very institutions are not seen as legitimate. [1] E. A. Goldenweiser, ‘The Russian Duma’,Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Sep., 1914), pp. 408-422   improve this
Progress has been made.

The referendum is not an example of progress. It is not hard to see why many of those who demonstrated in Tahrir square were in the no camp for this referendum.  “The president remains extraordinarily powerful. The amendments do nothing about due process and neglect other authoritarian aspects of the state”[1] The referendum was attacked for not dealing with large scale structural issues. Leading opposition figures such as Mohamed El Baradei argue “The referendum deals only with minutiae. It doesn't talk about the imperial power of the president, it doesn't talk about the distortion of the parliament, it doesn't talk about the need to have an independent constituent assembly that represents everybody. So we are going to say no.”[2] This means that the institutional problems that helped create an over-mighty presidency and autocracy have remained in place. These countries have also not become much more stable. There have been clashes between Christian Copts and Muslims following the burning of two churches on the 7th of May, which have left 180 injured and raises the specter of sectarian violence.[3] Meanwhile in Tunisia the government has re-imposed night time curfews after four days of demonstrations were ended by police firing tear gas.[4] It is difficult to consider such unrest progress. [1] Steven A. Cook, ‘Interview, Egypt’s Referendum: Nervous Steps Forward’, Council on Foreign Relations, 21st March 2011, http://www.cfr.org/egypt/egypts-referendum-nervous-steps-forward/p24452 accessed 19/05/11 [2] ‘Large turnout for Egypt's constitutional referendum’ BBC News, Mar. 19, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12793484 [3] Egypt Christians protest in Cairo after church attack, BBC News, May 9., 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-13331628 [4] Post-revolution Egypt and Tunisia gripped by unrest May 8, 2011, http://www.globalpost.com/dispatches/globalpost-blogs/casbah/post-revolution-egypt-and-tunisia-gripped-unrest   improve this
Islamic parties have led governments before

While these examples prove that in some iterations Islam can work with democracy, it is likely that other factors made democracy viable in Inodnesia and Turkey. Indonesia is free of the hostile relationship with the West that often undermines the stability of the Middle East, and has benefitted from a strong trade relationship. While the AKP in Turkey is Islamist, it operates within the Turkish constitution which requires the military to dissolve any government that threatens the secular nature of the state. Without a constitutionally defined commitment to strict secularism, like in Turkey, the Islamist parties in Egypt and Tunisia will resort to undemocratic practices.  While Indonesia’s revolution superficially looks similar it should be remembered that no two revolutions are really the same. They are different in almost every respect, culturally, geographically, economically. Indonesian Minister Natalegawa argues “I think the lesson form us is that it is possible for the democratization process to return to the military to it must be its original function.”[2]However this really shows a difference. In Indonesia the military never stepped in to take over the government as they have done in Egypt. If the key is reducing the role of the military Egypt has barely begun. [1] Wolfango Piccoli, Full steam ahead on Turkish Constitutional reform, ForeignPolicy.com, 29th May 2011, http://eurasia.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/05/19/turkey_full_steam_ahead_on_constitutional_reform accessed 20/05/11 [2] Julia Simon, Reformasis and Revolutions, Asia Calling, 17th April 2011, http://www.asiacalling.org/ur/news/others/1966-reformasis-and-revolutions accessed 20/05/11   improve this
The BIAs are at best bad faith compliance, and worst a blatant violation of the Rome Statute

The text of the Rome Statute is clear. Article 98(2) is unspecific as to the variety of international agreements that it covers, unlike the narrower Article 98(1) covering diplomatic immunity. Article 98 Agreements are a tool that is a legitimate method of the US ensuring that US citizens are not subject to trial and punishment by a court which the United States is not a part of. This would run against the principle that a treaty only affects states that have signed and ratified it, rather than any others.
The rationale for the BIAs is flawed

While they undermine the court, they are an inevitable quid pro quo of part of diplomatic relations with the US, the last remaining superpower. While impunity is not ideal, it is better than not signing and taking part in international criminal justice at all. Creating BIAs does not mean that the countries in question will absolve their own citizens of wrongdoing instead they are likely to be tried at home and in some cases may still be handed over to the ICC.
The BIAs were only granted following bully tactics from the United States

The United States is not under any form of responsibility to other states to provide them with military and other aid. Aid has always been provided with strings attached to those whose receipt of aid is considered beneficial. It is within the purview of the US to decide who they give aid to, based on their own priorities. This is simply part of the diplomatic process. If the US wishes to provide aid to countries that sign up to treaties then this is its right, it is perfectly normal to provide a sweetener to encourage states to sign up while punishing those that don’t. This then is a good reason why these European states should not pull out of their BIAs. To do so would mean losing the financial benefits being provided. At the same time it would also show that these states are not to be trusted when they sign up to international agreements.
Article 98 Agreements are a crucial tool in maintaining American national sovereignty

The Rome Statute itself does not bind any state to be put on trial – it binds individuals. Individuals violating the criminal law of a state (the Rome Statute also integrating the international criminal law in to the national criminal law) have always been subject to trial and punishment by that state, barring cases of diplomatic immunity or other separate cases. This is nothing new – the Rome Statute respects the sovereignty of a nation within its territory. If anything, it is the use of coercive tactics by a state to give its citizens immunity from the ordinary law that is the violation of national sovereignty. Even without the BIAs it would only be possible to prosecute Americans if they commit an international crime in the jurisdiction of another state. When this occurs due to the principle of territoriality it has traditionally been the case that the state upon whose territory the act was committed is able to try those who committed the act. It is not a violation of sovereignty to allow the ICC rather than the other state the right to bring the defendant to trial.