January/February LD debate topic

I affirm the resolution resolved: It is morally permissible for victims to use deadly force as a deliberate response to repeated domestic violence. For clarity, I offer the following definitions: Morally permissible acts are those which are not prohibited by valid moral laws. Deadly force is defined as an amount of force that is likely to cause serious bodily injury to another person. A victim is an individual who suffers from a destructive or injurious action or agency. Domestic violence is the willful intimidation, physical assault, battery, sexual assault, and/or other abusive behavior perpetrated by an intimate partner against another. (National Coalition Against Domestic Violence) I’ll begin with a brief resolutional analysis. Since the phrase "deliberate response" in the resolution implies that the victim was provoked by the attacker, we know that the victim, in this sense, would only use deadly force if provoked. Additionally, the affirmative is not bound to defending that it’s morally permissible to use deadly force in every single case of repeated domestic violence. The resolution does not contain a universal qualifier such as the word "all", enabling me to defend a general statement. Furthermore, forcing me to defend the application of the resolution in all circumstances would destroy reciprocity which is a key to fairness. I value justice which is the administering of deserved punishment or reward. Justice mandates the existence of basic human rights for at least those individuals who are innocent. These human rights must be described in terms of relationships among people. Robert Grant (a practicing lawyer and former judge) explains, “A right is only one side of a relationship; your right must be the duty of another. A human right is a contractual right that imposes upon all others the necessary and universal duty to act or refrain from acting in a certain way. Human rights should not be confused with possessions, like an apple or a house. Rather, a human right is a relationship between an individual and all others that entitles a person to certain conduct from every other person and from society“ (1). Therefore, as Roger Scruton, a visiting professor at Oxford University, concludes, “Human rights cannot be had for free. [They] cannot be invented without also inventing the social and legal relations that enable us to uphold them. [A] society cannot be based in rights alone but must also inculcate a strong sense of duty in its members, if rights are to be anything more than useless bits of paper” (2). The only way societies can inculcate such a strong sense of duty in their members is by giving them a self-interested reason for conforming to morality. As the psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg observed, a large proportion of the population is not motivated by an unselfish concern for others. Julie Hough explains, "On the basis of his research, Kohlberg identified six stages of moral reasoning. At the first level, a person's moral judgments are focused on avoiding breaking rules that are backed by punishment. The reasoning of stage one is characterized by ego-centrism and the inability to consider the perspectives of others. The stage two orientation focuses on the instrumental, pragmatic value of an action. Morality is of the form, "you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours." At stage two, one follows the rules only when it is to someone's immediate interests. What is right is what's fair in the sense of an equal exchange” (3). In other words, people in the first stage of moral development will only conform to societal rules if they avoid harm in doing so. Meanwhile, people in the second stage of moral development will follow these rules only if they directly benefit from doing so. Clearly, individuals in both of these stages will not be motivated by an entirely selfless concern for the interests of others. Therefore, if we want to protect human rights in general, we must give these individuals a self-interested reason to fulfill their duties to others. To accomplish this goal, societies must uphold the social contract. The social contract is an agreement between citizens to refrain from violating each other's basic rights. This contract produces unique benefits for those who choose to accept it. As Robert Grant notes, "Human rights are the benefits negotiated by reasonable persons and received by each of them as a result of their agreement to accept the natural duties imposed by the social contract. Human rights are the consideration for the obligations assumed under that fundamental agreement. Recall that when parties enter into a contract each becomes obligated to the other and each reciprocally acquires a right to what is promised by the other” (1). In other words, under the social contract, individuals can earn their basic rights only by fulfilling duties to each other. If an individual violates his end of the contract by harming another, the victim no longer has any duties towards him or her. Therefore, this contract gives all individuals a self-interested reason to perform only those actions which are consistent with justice. A few entirely irrational individuals may choose to violate the social contract, but the overwhelming majority of individuals will not do so out of self-interest. Therefore, upholding the social contract is key to upholding human rights in general. For this reason, my criterion is respecting the social contract which includes taking away the rights of those who fail to meet their duties. I contend that, in perpertrating domestic violence, an attacker violates his or her end of the social contract and forfeits his rights including the right to life. As Kasachkoff writes, "Everything else being equal, persons have the right not to be killed. However, rights, even the right not to be killed may sometimes be forfeited. [Anyone] who attacks or threatens another without an objectively valid moral reason (as do unprovoked attackers), forfeits his or her right not to be killed" (4). As explained at the top of the case, domestic violence is the willful intimidation, physical assault, battery, and sexual assault perpetrated by an intimate partner against another. If individuals are to have any duties under the social contract, they certainly must have the responsibility to protect other’s basic right to bodily integrity. Therefore, in resorting to domestic violence, an individual is necessarily violating their end of the social contract. The repeated failure of the abuser to perform their moral duties under the social contract undoubtedly entitles the victim to rescind the contract. Under recession, the victim is no longer morally required to uphold his or her duties to the abuser. Therefore, we must recognize it is morally permissible to use deadly force as a deliberate response to repeated domestic violence. Sources: 1. Grant, Robert. "The Social Contract and Human Rights." Humanists, Humanism, and Rational Thinking in Utah. Utah Humanist, June 2000. Web. 14 Dec. 2011. 2. Scruton, Roger. "Animal Rights." City Journal (2000). Web. 22 Aug. 2011. 3. Julie Hough. "Moral Development and Moral Education: An Overview." Studies in Social and Moral Development and Education. University of Illinois at Chicago. Web. 14 Dec. 2011. 4. Kasachkoff, Tziporah. Killing in Self-Defense: A Unquestionable or Problematic Defense? Law and Philosophy. Volume 17, Numbers 5-6, 509-531.