January/February LD Debate resolved

I affirm the resolution that states: Resolved: It is morally permissible for victims to use deadly force as a deliberate response to repeated domestic violence. For clarity in the purpose of this debate, I will provide the following definitions: Moral Permissibility: Permittedï¿½[means] "refers to" behavior that is within the bounds of the moral system. It is morally permitted to act in any way that does not cause others unjustified harms (Ethics in the First Person, Deni Elliott) Deadly Force as an amount of force capable of causing serious bodily injury or death to another person (Thomas Gale Legal Dictionary). Domestic violence: The inflicting of physical injury by one family or household member on another; also: a repeated or habitual pattern of such behavior. [6] (Merriam Webster) Deliberate: Done with or marked by full consciousness of the nature and effects; intentional (The Free Dictionary) My endorsed value is morality, or the principles concerning right and wrong, as according to The Oxford Dictionary. I advocate the contractarian view of morality that concerns the mutual agreement established to achieve ethical grounds. The criterion that provides full consideration for the context of the resolution would be Contractualism, and thus I uphold permissibility under the social contract. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Contractualism, which stems from the Kantian line of social contract thought, holds that rationality requires that we respect persons, which in turn requires that moral principles be such that they can be justified to each person. The social contract has two fundamental elements: a characterization of the initial situation, called variously the "state of nature" by the modern political philosophers, the original position" by Rawls, or the initial bargaining position" by Gauthier, and a characterization of the parties to the contract, particularly in terms of their rationality and motivation to come to agreement. The initial situation posits what in bargaining theory is called the "no agreement position," the situation to which the individuals return in case of failure to make an agreement or contract or by violation. (1988, 148) Observation 1: The explicit wording of the resolution as confined to "moral permissibility" makes it a burden for me only to uphold and endorse the enactment of deadly force that does not cause unjustified harm, and for the lowest bar of morality in which impermissibility is complete intolerance. As such, the affirmative has no need to provide consideration for ALL circumstances, but only those in which the intrinsic safety of the victim is being violated. Contention 1: The doctrine of self defense is morally permissible under the social contract. Subpoint A: Self defense upholds inalienable rights that give definition to morality. The mutual agreement that forms the backbone of the social contract mandates the protection of inalienable rights, such as life and intrinsic safety. Our present social community revolves around such an assumption, that the social contract is present and preserves every individual's inalienable rights. As Kimberly Kessler from the Institute of Law and Philosophy explains it concisely, "Self-defense is a relationship that exists within the state of nature that is preserved through the social contract. In forming the social contract, man could not alienate the right to self-defense and retain the right to use deadly force against anyone." It is exactly such a contract that gives a definitive benchmark for the permissibility of morality, as it shows the impermissibility of infringing upon another individual's intrinsic rights. Subpoint B: The abuser forfeits his/her intrinsic rights when repeatedly abusing the victim. The social contract makes it a central value that all individuals refrain from infringement upon others' inherent rights, under penalty of forfeiture of theirs. As Kasachkoff writes, "Everything else being equal, persons have the right not to be killed. However, rights, even the right not to be killed may sometimes be forfeited. [Anyone] who attacks or threatens another without a valid moral reason forfeits his or her right not to be killed." Proportionality is derived from the assumption that the social contract is still intact; certain responsibilities and obligations come with the preservation of such rights, and without them, the social contract deteriorates. Robert F. Schopp states, Professor of the University of Nebraska College of Law, 1998, In a liberal society, any culpable criminal conduct infringes on the victim's concrete interests and violates her sphere of sovereignty. The aggressor [is] violating the victim's protected domain...The victim may exercise any force necessary, therefore, to protect her sphere of self-determination against an aggressor whose culpable conduct extends beyond his own protected domain. Indeed, according to the National Clearinghouse in Defense of Battered Women studies show that the vast majority of women who use deadly force do so as a last resort in defense of their lives or the lives of their children. At such a point where self-defense is exacted as a last resort, the obvious moral permissibility of such actions becomes objective and unquestionable. My criterion of permissibility under the social contract is upheld in the full consideration for exactly such a contract, and hereby the resolution as well. Contention 2: The failure of legal parameters or alternatives to preserve the social contract gives permissibility to individual response. Subpoint A: Lack of plausible alternatives provides moral permissibility for deadly force. Moral permissibility in the context of the resolution is determined by the right and tolerable course of action in the imminence of the occurrence. In such a vein, the exact lack of plausible alternatives gives leeway for the obvious permissibility of deadly force on ethical grounds. As Elisabeth Ayyildiz explains, "Deadly force on the part of the battered woman [is] justified in several ways. The battered woman may not be able to confront the batterer without a deadly weapon because of disparities in size, strength and emotional control." Even if the option of leaving were plausible, a study National Coalition Against Domestic Violence found that women who leave their batterers are at a 75 percent higher risk of being killed by the batterer than those who stay, which provides the fundamental barrier to a plausible alternative. To such a point, the lack of a plausible alternative gives full permissibility on ethical grounds to deadly force. Subpoint B: Lack of legal policies to promote the social contract and preserve rights morally justifies individual response. Now, on a global context, especially in third-world countries, where the sovereign neglects to acknowledge the inherent value of the social contract, such individuals are abused without repercussion, for which abuse is not only tolerated, but also expected. In such cases, individual reciprocity in the form of deadly force, known as "vigilantism" is absolutely permissible on moral grounds. As Joshua Dressler writes, "Under the social contract theory if the state fails in its obligation to protect citizens the people are entitled to provide for their own protection." Indeed, the exact failure of a legal system's preservation of such inalienable rights endorses full moral permissibility for deadly force. Ayyildiz, Elisabeth. 1995. "When Battered Women's Syndrome Does Not Go Far Enough: The Battered Woman as Vigilante." American University Journal of Gender & the Law. 4:141.] Vigilantism as a permissible mode of self-help for battered women may be justified under social contract theory in two ways. First, the breakdown of the social contract occurs when the state fails in its obligation to protect the individual. This breakdown justifies the individual's resort to self-help. Thus I strongly urge an affirmative ballot.