BeIR/webis-touche2020 huggingface dataset:
The military operations were necessary for long term peace:

As Michael Oren and Yossi Klein Haleviargue explain, “the Israeli public will not make territorial concessions on the West Bank or the Golan Heights if Gaza is allowed to become a neighboring terrorist state that can launch attacks with impunity. Israel had already had a bad enough experience letting that happen with Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon.”(1) Without the assurance that they will be allowed to protect their homes and families following withdrawal, Israelis will rightly perceive a two-state solution as an existential threat. They will continue to share the left-wing vision of coexistence with a peaceful Palestinian neighbor in theory, but in reality will heed the right's warnings of Jewish powerlessness.(4) Meanwhile, the stronger Hamas becomes, the more resistance moderate Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas will face to making any concessions to Israel.(1) Therefore damaging Hamas, via Operation Cast Lead, actually aided the peace process in the long run, and was necessary in order to make an eventual two-state peace solution possible. The Israeli attacks may also eventually help force Hamas to accept a more durable ceasefire. Unlike the botched invasion of Lebanon in 2006, when Israel set itself the unattainable goal of eliminating the military capability of Hezbollah, during Operation Cast Lead it was made clear that the objective was not to wipe out Hamas, but instead to force the radical group to accept a durable cease-fire on Israel's terms.(8) This was necessary as prior to Operation Cast Lead Hamas showed no interest in peace, opting instead to pursue its political objectives through the use of terrorism. When Hamas came to power in Gaza in January 2006, it failed to control the rocket fire from the variety of miltary brigades, including its own al-Qassam brigade, into Israel and failed to establish internal stability. The widespread violence between Fatah and Hamas, which ended in June 2007, when Hamas took control of Gaza and ousted leaders of President Mahmoud Abbas's Fatah movement, made Israel more wary of the security threat an unstable Gaza could pose.(9) In Israel's view, Hamas' behavior and its reliance on terror tactics will never change if it thinks it can attack with impunity, and so the Israeli military operations were necessary and justified in the name of restoring Israel's deterrent and weakening Hamas, both of which make long term peace more likely.
The military operations were proportionate to the threat:

Operation Cast Lead was justified as it was proportionate to Hamas' rocket attacks against Israel. It should be remembered that 250,000 Israelis living in the southern part of the country had lived under years of terrorism before Operation Cast Lead was launched, often in bomb shelters, and the economy has suffered. The world's media may only have paid attention when Israel responded to Hamas' barrage, but this does not mean that Israel was not already under severe attack by this point.(1) Moreover, the Israeli strikes were rightly measured to disable Hamas rocket attacks.(11) Terror groups fire indiscriminately at innocent Israelis and then complain of excessive or disproportionate force when Israel fires back. But according to internationally accepted laws of war, Israel is permitted to respond with the force necessary to end the conflict.(2) Israel was legitimate in using full force to win its war on Hamas; Israel was under no obligation to restrain itself in what is, on Hamas' own terms, an existential war. Provoked by Hamas, Israel had every right to wage a disproportionate and overwhelming response. Hamas has repeatedly stated that its objective is to destroy Israel. Such an existential threat goes beyond simply Hamas' rocket attacks, as it portends much more destructive attacks in the future. This justifies defensive attacks from Israel that go beyond responding merely to the Hamas rockets, and would even justify Israeli efforts to fully demobilize or destroy Hamas.(12) In spite of this, Israel was actually far more restrained and proportionate than it was obligated to be. Israeli precision strikes sought to minimize civilian deaths, as Benjamin Netanyahu argued: "In launching precision strikes against Hamas rocket launchers, headquarters, weapons depots, smuggling tunnels and training camps, Israel is trying to minimize civilian casualties."(13) Unlike Hamas, Israeli strikes targeted military sites, not civilians. As Gary Grant argued: "Even if you target your action at military sites, civilians are inevitably going to get killed...these need to be contrasted with the actions of Hamas where every single rocket is designed to attack civilian populations, so every single act of Hamas in firing these rockets is clearly an illegal act without any legal justification."(2) Israel may have been justified in acting disproportionately, but instead chose to respond in a proportionate and limited manner which minimized civilian deaths in Gaza, and thus the Israeli military operations were certainly justified.
Israel's military operations were disproportionate and harmed too many civilians:

The killing of over 1,400 Palestinians, mostly civilians, and more than 4,500 injuries, accompanied by the destruction of schools, mosques, houses, UN compounds and government buildings, which Israel has a responsibility to protect under the Fourth Geneva Convention, is not commensurate to the deaths caused by Hamas rocket fire. For 18 months Israel had imposed an unlawful blockade on the coastal strip that brought Gazan society to the brink of collapse. In the three years after Israel’s redeployment from Gaza, 11 Israelis were killed by rocket fire. And yet in 2005-8, according to the UN, the Israeli army killed about 1,250 Palestinians in Gaza, including 222 children. Throughout this time the Gaza Strip remained occupied territory under international law because Israel maintained effective control over it.(15) The targeting of civilians, whether by Hamas or by Israel, is potentially a war crime. Every human life is precious, but the numbers speak for themselves: 800 Palestinians, most of them civilians, were killed during Operation Cast Lead. In contrast, around a dozen Israelis were killed, many of them soldiers.(17) Precision strikes which avoided civilian deaths were never going to be possible in the crowded Gaza Strip. As Akiva Eldar argued: "The tremendous population density in the Gaza Strip does not allow a 'surgical operation' over an extended period that would minimize damage to civilian populations. The difficult images from the Strip will soon replace those of the damage inflicted by Qassam rockets in the western Negev. The scale of losses, which works in 'favor' of the Palestinians, will return Israel to the role of Goliath."(24) It is notable that Israel is more culpable for the civilian deaths it causes than Hamas is with its rockets, as Israel had options (such as ending the blockade and negotiating with Hamas) which could have caused fewer civilian deaths, whereas Hamas did not. Rather Hamas responds as the disproportionately weaker party; the Palestinians were compelled to use the crude means at their disposal to free their lands from Israeli occupation, even if this meant being unable to target them well and some civilian deaths resulting.(25) Israel's Operation Cast Lead was less legitimate as it was not Israel's only option, and so cannot be regarded as proportionate. Furthermore, Israel's use of white phosphorous in Gaza was a humanitarian crime. The use of white phosphorous by Israel to shield its military movements in Gaza was a humanitarian crime, as the chemical causes serious health problems to civilians that inhale it. And, by all accounts, the chemical was inhaled by many Gazan civilians.(25)
The military operations were legitimate as Israeli self-defense:

Israel similarly violated the ceasefire prior to 2008, and had unlawfully kidnapped and imprisoned hundreds of Palestinians.  Furthermore, Israel's attack on Gaza was not an act of last resort. Israel could and should have tried to negotiate a truce with Hamas based on the following principle: an end to the Israeli siege on Gaza in exchange for an end to Hamas-led rocket attacks on Israel. This is the deal Hamas offered Israel before Operation Cast Lead was launched. Israel should have accepted Hamas’s offer and assessed whether Hamas’s intention to be bound by its terms was genuine before launching a military attack.(6) If an action isn't truly an act of last resort, it cannot be legitimately termed 'self-defense', and so is not justified. Hamas were prepared to enter into negotiations with Israel and it was prepared to discuss the more intricate details of the deal it had proposed. Its attempts to avoid conflict were committed and consistent enough to suggest that Gaza’s leaders were not engaged in diplomatic posturing or sabre rattling. Israel targeted more than just military targets, including UN warehouses holding medical and food supplies, UN schools, and hospitals. Its imprecise tactics and refusal to allow access of humanitarian workers show that it was not merely self-defense.
The military operations were necessary for long term peace:

The long-term security of Israel rests in a stable peace agreement with the Palestinians, not in attempting to bludgeon Hamas into a truce 'on Israel's terms'. To the extent that Israel's large scale assault on Gaza eliminated the hopes of such an agreement, the attacks worsened Israel's long-term security. A crucial step towards peace is to bring Hamas to the bargaining table. Israel's levelling of Gaza emboldened Hamas' message of resistance, and allowed Gazans to continue to rely on Hamas. As long as Israel continues to justify Arab and Palestinian anger through its disproportionate response, it is unlikely that enough trust can be established to reach a peace deal. Even Israelis recognize that this assualt has created an even larger barrier to peace. “This policy [Operation Cast Lead] is not strengthening Israel,” noted Sari Bashi, the executive director of Gisha, an Israeli human rights group that works on Gaza issues. “The trauma that 1.5 million people have been undergoing in Gaza is going to have long-term effects for our ability to live together."(10)
The military operations were proportionate to the threat:

Under the same logic, over 1 million residents of Gaza have been under occupation since 1967, facing limited rights of movement, regular air raids, military checkpoints, random searches and seizures, random arrests, the destruction of sanitation facilities, homes, schools, roads, shops, markets, and health facilities, and therefore Hamas has the right act in its own self-defense by whatever means it sees fit. If Palestinians do not have an army to call to its defense, how can the entire population be punished for the actions of non-state military groups?   Israel’s right to take positive steps of some kind in the interests of its own safety does not mean it has the right to do anything it wishes in order to protect itself. It is also evident that Israel violated international law and committed war crimes, was was reported in the Goldstone Report.  Between the time when the shelling from Gaza started in 2001 and Operation Cast Lead, 20 Israeli civilians were killed by rockets or mortars, according to estimates by Israeli human rights groups. That doesn’t justify an all-out ground invasion that killed more than 1,400 people.(10) As Javier Solana, chief of foreign policy for the European Union, said in late December 2008, "the current Israeli strikes are inflicting an unacceptable toll on Palestinian civilians."(14) It is a widely accepted principle of international law that actions taken pursuant to a state’s right to defend itself must be proportionate to the danger that the state faces. While the 20 deaths that resulted from the actions of Hamas and its associates were tragic, the nature of these attacks did not justify a full scale military invasion of the Gaza strip, or the mass destruction of infrastructure essential to life in the strip.
Israel's military operations were aggression, not self defense:

None of these arguments change that fact that 250,000 Israelis in southern Israel lived under constant fear of Hamas rocket attacks, which Hamas escalated after a ceasefire which it refused to extend. It is notable that Syria, an implacable enemy of Israel, actually played a significant role in triggering he conflict. The Damascus office of Hamas, which operates under the aegis of the regime of Bashar al Assad, vetoed the efforts of Hamas leaders in Gaza to extend the cease-fire and insisted on escalating rocket attacks.(4) The role of foreign powers in proving the conflict through Hamas has been recognized outside of Israel was well: Egypt's Foreign Minister, Ahmed Abul Gheit, assailed Israel's air strikes but also held Hamas responsible. The Egyptian government understood that Hamas, like Hezbollah, is increasingly allied with Iran and its goals for fomenting regional instability.(1) Israel could not possibly have been expected to thus not take military action to defend itself when coming under rocket fire from a terrorist government dedicated to Israel's destruction and under the direction of foreign states which are mortal enemies of Israel's existence. There was simply no other way to stop the rocket attacks. Moreover, Israel's blockade of Gaza was not a justified reason for Hamas' rocket attacks. Israeli control of Gaza’s borders was a response to Hamas’ exploitation of Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza to turn it into an armed, Islamic state dedicated to the destruction of Israel above all else, even its own economy. Hamas was not provoked. Quite the contrary. Hamas’ arms smuggling was the provocation. Then, on top of this provocation, Hamas fired rockets indiscriminately into Israel. The idea that Hamas was provoked leapfrogs the facts.(27)
Israel's military operations harmed the chances of peace in the long term:

The most important thing for regional peace in the long run is not the belief among Israelis that there is a 'military solution' to the conflict, but rather the belief of Hamas and its backers in Syria and Iran that Israel can be 'solved' militarily. It is this belief that causes them to constantly return to using force against Israel, as they did with the rocket attacks. Therefore to establish peace in the long run, Israeli deterrent and demonstration that its citizens cannot be targeted with impunity are the most important factors, and these are exactly what Operation Cast Lead re-established. Moreover, Hamas may promotes itself as the legitimate power in Gaza, but in reality, Hamas is at its core a terrorist organization that refuses to renounce violence or recognize Israel's right to exist. Hamas is listed as a terrorist organization by the United States and the European Union. Hamas came to power in Gaza through a violent coup against the Palestinian Authority government. Since Hamas refuses to live in peace with Israel, the Israeli government has no choice but to seek Hamas' replacement.(2)
Israel's military operations were disproportionate and harmed too many civilians:

It is indisputable that Hamas has launched violent attacks against civilian targets. Israel, on the other hand, conducts its operations exercising all due care to limit civilian casualties. Hamas terrorists, however, set up their headquarters and store weapons in private homes, schools, colleges and mosques. Both Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Egyptian Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit have blamed Hamas for provoking the Israeli attack on Hamas targets embedded in civilian areas.(28) Israel's air assault has resulted in more Palestinian casualties, but that is in part because Hamas deliberately locates its security forces in residential neighborhoods. This is intended both to deter Israel from attacking in the first place as well as to turn world opinion against the Jewish state when it does attack. By all accounts, however, the Israeli strikes hit their targets precisely enough to do significant damage to Hamas forces.(1) Israel actually put its own troops in harm’s way to minimize civilian casualties during Operation Cast Lead.(13) This shows Israel's commitment to preventing civilian casualties and thus the justification of Operation Cast Lead. The disparity between Israeli and Palestinian casualties can be explained by the fact that Israel has early warning systems and hospitals. Israel invests significantly more in stable buildings that do not crumble when subjected a blast, systems that can detect incoming rocket fire, and an extensive and modern network of hospitals and emergency response teams. This, and the fact that Israel does not attempt to shield its military installations behind civilian homes and businesses, helps lower the number of civilian casualties as compared to in Gaza.(2)  The claim that Israel violated the principle of proportionality, by killing more Hamas terrorists than the number of Israeli civilians killed by Hamas rockets, is absurd. There is no legal equivalence between the deliberate killing of innocent civilians and the deliberate killings of Hamas combatants. Under the laws of war, any number of combatants can be killed to prevent the killing of even one innocent civilian.(29) Moreover, if Israel were to be 'proportional' and respond to the Hamas attacks in the same way, what would that mean? Would this require that it launch rocket attacks back against Gazan civilians? Obviously not (this would result in even more civilian deaths), and this is where the logic of proportionality against terrorist attacks makes little sense.
Alliances not open skies

Alliances create an oligopolistic market. The promotion of alliances creates two key market results – controlling supply and demand. Firstly, choice is restricted. Customers are restricted in what prices and services are available. Secondly, the market competitiveness is restricted. Different airlines are not able to compete with each other, but merely cooperate as the leading company takes the largest proportion of profits. Alliances fail to stimulate a competitive market or place companies on an equal platform to compete for profits. Open skies are also seen as a means to ensure safety and reduce the rising accident rates. The World Bank (2014) note accident rates would fall if African states use bilateral sanctions to ensure airlines meet safety standards; currently Africa’s aircraft hull-loss accident rate is more than 6 times higher than Asia and Latin America and 12 times Europe. Open-skies ensure bilateral collaboration and intervention.
Focusing on national development first

Several points require countering. Firstly, the focus on the brain drain suggests air travel will continue to be dominated by an elite class, however, open-skies acts to enable a broader customer base. Secondly, migration brings a range of benefits – we cannot promote keeping people in their place as a developmental solution. Even if national development comes first people may still want to move. Finally, people will not be discouraged from moving if there is no open-skies agreement. Migration is historic in Africa, with multiple transport modes used. Migration will continue to operate with or without an open-skies agreement. Therefore it is important to recognise the role open-skies can play for Pan-Africanism. An open sky will assist in dispersing access and availability to development opportunities. It will create new network hubs within Africa; and create new market opportunities by introducing frequent airlines to places previously inaccessible. The agreement would ensure capital is spread across Africa. Africa will begin to operate cohesively. The open-sky agreement sets the future agenda for Africa’s development – a step towards Pan-African cooperation.
A competitive airline industry

The introduction of a Pan-African Open Sky agreement will ensure competition. A competitive airline industry will have a cumulative effect on prices and safety standards. First, prices will be reduced as the market is no longer monopolised by a few airlines. Currently national governments are able to place strict regulations, high fuel and passenger taxes on airlines. Liberalising the industry would mean that airlines are increasingly controlled by the hand of the market, not the state. Competitive airline prices will ensure air travel is no longer exclusively an elite luxury. Secondly, introducing new competition will force airlines to implement higher standards - of service and safety. Power is redistributed to the consumer and traveller, who are able to pick and choose the best service. Therefore the companies need to be on the top of their game. Evidence in Europe has shown the competitiveness of liberalisation, resulting in the rise of cheap air travel. Such low-cost carriers now account for a third of intra-EU travel (ECMT, 2010).
Liberalisation enables national development

The aviation industry is vital for economic growth for bringing Africa into the positive side of globalisation. The state-owned Ethiopian Airlines Enterprise is one example of a success story for an African airline. Ethiopian Airlines has the greatest amount of traffic as a result of air traffic liberalisation. The returns gained from Ethiopian Airlines have been central to promoting Ethiopia’s national growth strategy. Governments can only gain from liberalisation in multiple sectors, including airlines. Liberalisation, and deregulation, of airlines acts creates cumulative causation, where one event causes multiple changes, for tourism, production networks, jobs, and infrastructure development. In Ethiopia, air networks are building industries and the pushing regions economic development[1]. In Kenya’s case, deregulation of airlines may improve the speed and availability of key global commodities, such as tourism, and flowers[2] - booming industries that require rapid transport. In Africa 20% of tourism-related jobs are supported directly by the aviation industry (World Bank, 2014). [1] See further readings: Anna Aero, 2013. [2] See further readings: Lawrence, 2011.
Incorporating foreign airlines

Introducing a treaty whereby flights are liberalised across Africa, and foreign airlines incorporated, will provide benefits for Africa. For example, foreign companies will be able to tackle gaps in the market. Currently there is a lack of direct flights between key destinations. Direct flights mean direct interconnections to desired; and new, places. For example, with new business opportunities emerging in Nigeria a direct flight connecting Cape Town and Lagos requires investment. Air traffic in the EU is a positive example. As a result of deregulation budget airlines have expanded throughout the continent EU air traffic and new flight routes introduced. There has been a 120% increase of intra-EU routes and 320% increase in the number of routes provided by at least two companies (ECMT, 2010).
Environmental Impact

Development is shifting from just GDP growth towards promoting a sustainable approach to growth. The UN has created the Sustainable Development Goals for development post-2015, which emphasise developmental policy and practice today has to meet the needs of the present without jeopardising future populations. Therefore how can a new Open Skies agreement be justified on environmental or sustainability grounds? Encouraging more air traffic will act to increase the human burden on the environment.  Key concerns are noise and atmospheric pollution, deforestation, and the use of space. Flights produce around 628,000,000 tonnes of CO2 annually adding to climate change (Clean Sky, 2014). With numbers rising the pressures will too.