Inaction in the face of injustice makes an individual morally culpable.

Many thanks again to my opponent for engaging with me in this debate. The Unique Topics tournament has been interesting and fun. I would also like to thank all participants, readers and judges for following along. Hopefully you have found our discussions to be enlightening. Cheers to you all! RE: Morality Doesn't ExistThe resolution mandates that we reconcile inaction with an injustice. Injustice describes a situation where one's rights have been violated, or where unjust or unfair action or treatment has occurred [1]. I've explained that (by Con's own admission) we are debating about the moral culpability of a person who perceives a situation to be unjust. Therefore, if the agent considers a situation to be unjust, he or she believes in morality. Thus Con cannot argue from a position of moral nihilism.Moreover, it's important to consider what my opponent has just done. By arguing in favor of moral nihilism, he has completely negated the arguments he put forth in the aforementioned rounds. Previously, Con had argued from a position of utilitarianism. His claim was that if an agent chose to not react to injustice because they feared the backlash, their inaction would be justified. This supposes the agent morally values one outcome over another. Now, Con is arguing that morality doesn't exist at all. Thus he has rejected his own standard from the previous rounds. It would be impossible for an agent to morally value one outcome over another if morality doesn't exist. His entire Round 2 argument therefore must be scrapped all-together. RE: Determinism Alleviates CulpabilityCon argues that we have no free will in any context, because everything that occurs is inevitable. First, let's note that no evidence at all was provided in order to justify the claim that the universe is determined. Second, even if the universe is determined, most people accept the compatabilist framework of determinism. That is to say they believe we have free will even in a determined universe. Compatibilists often describe "free will" as a situation where the agent had freedom to act according to their own motivation, meaning the agent was not coerced or restrained [2]. This is the most widely accepted metaphysical view of reality. Because Con has not provided any evidence in favor of hard determinism, and because I do not have the opportunity to respond to any analysis on this subject going forward, this argument should be rejected. Further, some hard determinists embrace some level of moral realism that assigns culpability to the [in]acting agent anyway. "In a necessitarian world, recourse to merit and blameworthiness is toned down, but adherence to ethical and legal values is not ruined. Persons may be appreciated as carriers, executers and defenders of morality" [3]. What that means is people are still expected to uphold a standard of behavior (that is perceived by society to be ethical). This goes back to what I said in Round 2 regarding a citizen's Duty of Care. Con dropped this argument. As a reminder, Duty of Care is what we call the implicit responsibilities held by individuals toward others within society. Thomas Hobbes argued that in a civil society, a social contract provides all members of the community with a security gain, and in return they are responsible for subjecting themselves to an absolute Sovereign or collective set of guidelines. These guidelines look to provide general security and make all members of the community responsible for establishing that end. Note that Con has not challenged the idea of a social contract thus far. Moreover, this details how even if moral nihilism were valid (which so far we have no reason to accept), a person would still be culpable for behaving in such a way that is in accordance with social standards.Philosopher Sam Harris agrees, noting "Those hard determinists who defend ethical realism would object to the premise that contra-causal free will is necessary for ethics. Those who are also ethically naturalistic may also point out that there are good reasons to punish criminals: it is a chance to modify their behavior, or their punishment can act as a deterrent for others who would otherwise act in the same manner. The hard determinist could even argue that this understanding of the true and various causes of a psychopath's behavior, for instance, allow them to respond even more reasonably or compassionately" [4]. The determinist philosopher Bertrand Russell has explained moral culpability as such: "Among physically possible actions, only those which we actually think of are to be regarded as possible. When several alternative actions present themselves, it is certain that we can both do which we choose, and choose which we will. In this sense all the alternatives are possible. What determinism maintains is that our will to choose this or that alternative is the effect of antecedents; but this does not prevent our will from being itself a cause of other effects. And the sense in which different decisions are possible seems sufficient to distinguish some actions as right and some as wrong, some as moral and some as immoral" [5].* * * So to re-cap, in order for Con's argument to hold water, hard heterminism must be sound. My opponent failed to prove that it is. He also failed to explain why we should assume the [in]acting agent in question is a hard determinist. Meanwhile, I pointed out that we should assume the agent is NOT a moral nihilist. He or she perceives an (immoral) injustice to be occurring; therefore, they believe in morality. Furthermore, Con failed to explain why hard determinism necessitates a total lack of culpability. I've highlighted several theories on why even if hard determinism were valid, moral culpability can still exist. Conclusion In the last round, we have seen that Con's argument rests on fallacious and undeveloped bare assertions. His response is essentially "There are these two theories that exist - here's a link to them." There is no analysis regarding whether those theories are proven, valid, or what their applicability is in context of this debate. The vast majority of people do not believe in moral nihilism nor hard determinism, so my opponent cannot use those philosophies in his favor when they are highly disputed and he hasn't attempted to reconcile their validity. Moreover, I've highlighted why we cannot argue from those positions per the resolution of this debate. We must also keep in mind that Con's new argument (moral nihilism) has negated his earlier one (utilitarianism). Thus Con can only win this debate if he proves that #1 hard determinism is sound, and #2 hard determinism definitively establishes a complete lack of culpability. As I've explained, many hard determinists reject that idea. And more importantly, I won't have the opportunity to debate the merit of hard determinism's validity nor its association with morality going forward. Because Con waited until Round 3 to make the case for hard determinism and moral nihilism, and because he did not provide thorough analysis to verify those theories, it is highly unlikely that he will be able to win this debate. Remember, no new arguments can be presented in the final round.In contrast, I have explicitly and consistently maintained my position from Round 1. I explained that we are responsible for our actions and thus logically our inaction. An agent is still culpable for their behavior, regardless of how an observing individual subjectively weighs the morality of the agent's decision. I've explained how people can understand a person's decision to remain inactive and even agree with it, while the agent is still morally culpable for their inaction regardless of our subjective perspectives. Thank you. [1] https://www.merriam-webster.com...[2] https://en.wikipedia.org...[3] Pereboom, Derk. Meaning in Life Without Free Will. Oxford Handbook of Free will: Oxford University Press, 2002. Pp. 477-488[4] http://www.samharris.org...[5] http://tinyurl.com...