The state should not pass legislation regarding drugs.

Given that he has admittedly left many points unaddressed--argumentation ethics, the economic analysis, Section 2 of On Meth and Society, and others--I believe it's now impossible for Con to win this debate. Too many critical arguments have been dropped. Since Con has agreed to simply give a final acknowledgement in R4 (to make up for the R1 blunder), I won't extend these analyses. I'll simply redirect to my arguments in R3 to highlight the importance of dropped points, and will concentrate only on the "Contract Analogy".One point of clarificaton--Con comes from a viewpoint of "common agreement" whereby some contracts are considered legally impermissible, giving the example of "slavery contracts". Extend the argumentaton ethics analysis here, because A) contracts are voluntary agreements, in which case one cannot use legal action to control the contract without running into the problem of force and the dissipation of contract rights, and B) there is no such thing as a "slavery contract". The very notion of slavery is defined as involuntary servitude. That I am asking you to sign a contract binding you in lifelong service forces me to suppose free agency and the need for your consent. That I engage in negotiation demonstrates that you aren't a slave, and that it is logically impossible to bind you in "voluntary involuntary servitude".At the very heart of the contract analogy are the arguments about retrospective agency and opportunity cost. Though I may enter into a contract which severely compromises my future options (say, consenting to a major lobotomy), it does not follow that we should control such contracts by virtue of their nature. In the case of meth, the writing of the "implicit contract" is irrelevant (though I disagree that one is necessaily agreeing to addiction as much as agreeing to the risks). By using meth, individuals accept the opportunity costs in using their time and money for some other pursuit. Additionally, they accept the risks. By acting, people necessarily give up retrospective agency (i.e. the ability to look back on a bad decision and say "But this isn't what I wanted!") in nearly every conceivable case (though I'm sure exceptions can be found, like trying on clothes in a dressing room and deciding you want a different shirt. We could argue about how one cannot retrospectively change their decision to where they didn't try that shirt at all, but it's really neither here nor there). This is especially true of meth given the facts about its use as presented by Con.Regardless, Con doesn't make a compelling argument here where he simply reasserts that meth use is dangerous and harmful, thereby warranting legal action. He seems to take the position that this should be illegal by default, and that it is my burden to disprove this. "Why", he asks, should these self-regarding contracts be legal? Well, these answers have been given again and again throughout the debate.They have been dropped.What we are arguing is whether such contracts should be permissible--whether legislation regarding drugs should exist. After several rounds, Con's final strategy is simply to restate his initial thesis with no additional warrant or analysis. I've given reasons why self-harm should not be regulated (see: On Meth and Self-Harm), and why social problems resulting from meth can be dealt with in other ways (see: On Meth and Society). The social, political, ethical, and economic arguments all sway overwhelmingly in my favor. Checkmate, Con.Cheerio.