The Ontological Argument For God's Existence Is Sound

Although he did not really defend the crucial premise, or show that the argument is even valid, I will still show why the argument fails to prove that God exists. Is The Argument Logically Valid? P1: It is possible that a maximally great being existsP2: If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible worldP3: If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then a maximally great being exists in every possible worldP4: If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual worldP5: Therefore a maximally great being exists in the actual worldP6: Therefore a maximally great being existsC: Therefore God existsObviously, I will grant that a maximally great being is what God as defined as. Also, the argument follows modal logic just fine, and makes use of the S5 axiom. Even though Pro did not argue for the validity of the argument, I will concede that the argument is indeed logically valid. What Is The Problem? The problem with the argument seems to be P1. One might think right off of the bat; why is this a problem? It certainly seems reasonable enough to think that its at least possible that a maximally great being exists. Since the rest of the argument flows logically, then God has to exist. The problem is that there are other possibilities which seem just as plausible as the possibility of God exists, if not more plausible, that make God impossible if possible. Thus, I will be presenting a counter-argument by Ryan Stringer[1]: A. It is possible that p. B. Necessarily, if it is possible that God exists, then it is necessary that God exists. C. Necessarily, if God exists, then it is not the case that p. D. Therefore, it is not possible that God exists. (from A, B, & C) This is the Modal Ontological Argument for Atheism, and it follows modal logic just like the Modal Ontological Argument for Theism. Defense Of ASo, what can we plug for p? Lots of things! For instance, we could plug p with "omnipotence is not actualized in the actual world". It certainly seems at least possible that omnipotence is not actualized in the real world and is just a concept. We can also fill the variable p with "all sentience is physically realized". I mean, all sentience we know of depends on brain activity, so it seems at least possible that this is the case, even if we don't know it to be the case. Another plug could be "gratuitous suffering exists". The list can go on and on and on, but all these seem at least possible. Defense Of BThis is a premise of the Modal Ontological Argument for Theism, so Pro must accept this premise or else he forfeits the argument. Defense Of CLets consider my plugs for p. What about these possibilities makes God impossible? Well, take the possibility of omnipotence not being actualized in the actual world for instance. .. If a maximally great being existed, he would be omnipotent, as this is a great making property. He would also have omnipotence in every possible world (be necessary). This means that omnipotence would be actualized in every possible world, and it wouldn't be possible for omnipotence not to be actualized in the actual world. Since it is possible for omnipotence to not be actualized in the actual world (based on A), then it follows necessarily that God does not exist. Also, God wouldn't have a brain, or have sentience physically realized if he existed. God is conceived of as an immaterial being, and this would hold true in every possible world if he was a maximally great being. Since it is possible that all sentience is physically realized (based on A), then it follows that God cannot exist, because if he did, then all sentience wouldn't be physically realized, and this would be the case necessarily (God would be excluded from that category). Additionally, God is conceived of as an omnibenevolent being, and this cashes out from maximal greatness. However, if it is possible that there is gratuitous suffering, then God cannot exist. This is because, if God existed, then it would hold in every possible world that any suffering would have a morally sufficient reason for it (it would not be gratuitous). Thus, no possible world would have gratuitous suffering if God existed, and this would be a necessary truth. Since it is possible that there is gratuitous suffering (based on A), then it follows logically that God cannot exist. Defense Of DThis conclusion follows inescapably. StalemateIt seems the Modal Argument for Atheism and the Modal Argument for Theism are at a stalemate. I can say that God cannot be possible, because all those plugs for p are possible, and they make God impossible if they are possible. Pro could say that none of those plugs for p are possible, as God is possible, and those things wouldn't be possible if God is possible. There are arguments to support the notion that the Modal Argument for Atheism is stronger than the Modal Argument for Theism, but all I have to do is undermine the Modal Argument for Theism to win the debate. Both arguments follow modal logic perfectly, and both of the things they propose as possible seem reasonable, but they both cannot be true. Pro has to show why we must go with the Modal Argument for Theism, because a stalemate doesn't prove God exists, and he has the burden to prove God exists. ConclusionI countered the Modal Argument for Theism with a Modal Argument for Atheism. They seem to be at a stalemate, which means that Pro hasn't met his burden of proof. I only have to undermine Pro's argument, not show it false. However, he has to show the Modal Argument for Atheism false to win the debate. Since my rebuttal was sufficient to undermine the argument at hand, I believe the debate is in my favor. Sources [1] . http://www.infidels.org...