God Exists

Thanks to Con. I’d like to mention I meant “active power” rather than “active potentiality” when discussing the omnipotence paradox.Non-Cognitivism No, no, no. Con has pretty much trapped himself in his own argument – his rebuttal is that one would cognitively halt at dress, but it doesn’t follow that the dress’s existence is therefore metaphysically cessative. While fashionable humans may have a mutual cognitive understanding of the term “dress,” this doesn’t imply that the dress is a terminal point in existence – in fact, the very question “what is a dress?” posed in Con’s attempted rebuttal demonstrates that the dress’s existence is not terminal – for the only way one could answer this is in terms of its essence, i.e., a “sartorial cloth,” which are secondary attributes. So cognitively halting at “dress” doesn’t show that the term “dress” therefore corresponds to something in reality. The so-called “primary attribute” of substrata is a cognitive construct and does absolutely nothing to advance Con’s argument that “God” is meaningless. Sure, any number of alphabetic randomizations can produce words that correspond to nothing in reality – but words that are cognitively meaningful aren’t so because they are metaphysically cessative, as they, too, are described in terms of their “secondary attributes.” Secondary attributes are what makes any word cognitively meaningful. I find it hard to believe that Con honestly feels I gave “a hierarchical series of motion mandates a mover with no potentials” as a “definition” of God. I was describing how we can deduce from the Aristotelian concept of change that the essence of God corresponds to reality. This demonstration was not a “definition” of God, as I’ve already described God’s essence as Pure Act such that God’s existence is not prior to his essence, but rather equivalent to it. Con simply has no grasp on the Thomistic doctrine of divine simplicity, which I’ve demonstrated through the nature of actuality and how it relates to existence. Con fails to realize that his call for “primary attributes” fail to be cognitively meaningful in their incessant nature as artifacts of “secondary attributes,” and that God’s essence of Pure Act is equivalent to his existence as Pure Act, thus erasing the need for a “primary attribute” at all. First Way Con confuses Newton’s laws of motion, which concern the nature of spatial translation, with Newton’s law of universal gravitation, which concern the nature of material attraction, but this is beside the point, as neither refute Aristotle’s conception of motion as change. Both represent a potential being actualized by that which is actual (a compulsive force in both cases), which is the primary notion of Aristotle’s ideas. Remember, the Aristotelian principle of motion does not state that all actuals are raised by Pure Act; for instance, the actualization of the elevation of my microwave oven is dependent on my actual refrigerator. It does, however, state that independent actuals must be raised to act, as only that which is actual can actualize. Spatial translation and such therefore presuppose Aristotle’s principle. Anent his campaign to advance modern relativistic physics into conflict with Aristotle’s conception of motion, Con uses three sources that describe Aristotle’s theory of absolute motion, which concerns Aristotle’s physical theories of spatial translation, not Aristotle’s metaphysical theories of change. In my initial case, I stated clearly, “motion did not mean spatial movement, it meant change.” In every round, I’ve provided a clear distinction between motion as change and motion as spatial movement. Con claims that I’ve misrepresented his case, and that he means there is no reason to assume a “being” with the “properties” of atemporality and immateriality. On the contrary, I’ve shown multiple times that as Pure Act, God’s essence is actuality, which is existence. This is what classical theists mean by “being” – existence. Atemporality and immateriality are natural artifacts of God’s essence as Pure Act, for to be temporal or material implies intrinsic potentialities. This brings us to Con’s rehashed rebuttal concerning the possibility of a material with no potentialities. That Con continues to raise this objection demonstrates his misunderstanding of the concept of a “potential.” All material, as finite spatiotemporal configurations, have inherent potentialities – that is, as I’ve repeated, the potential to spatially translate, the potential to temporally translate, the potential to heat, etc. There exists no material which does not have these potentials, since these potentials are inherent to the nature of matter. Quantum particles are themselves subject to such potentiality, as they are actualized into existence by the actual quantum vacuum, and exhibit other such potentials, such as the wavefunction's collapse onto a position. Materials are intrinsically subject to potentiality. Con’s criticism to the two types of power makes no sense. He claims that I have thrown “potentiality” into the mix without responding to his initial critique, which I believe to be the response anent the fallacy of the excluded middle. I’ll make this simple: God is Pure Act, which devoids Him of any potentialities. As such, God has all active power, the ability to actualize potentials, but no passive potentiality, the ability to have a potential actualized. Con claims there is no need for God to have all active power; but less active power would represent a potential, absent in Pure Act, for more power; more active power, however, is not a potential for less, since less power is a privation in what is actual, rather than an actuality in itself. Thus God has all active power. Next, Con presents two new paradoxes based in confused notions of metaphysics.First, there is no design in metaphysical possibility; no one “decides” what is possible and what isn’t possible. A square circle is metaphysically impossible not because God arbitrarily made it so, but because a square circle is incompatible with existence – an artifact of reality rather than divine preference. Consequently, the assumed necessity of a “decision” behind possibility is a perplexing one indeed. Second, Con questions the principle of motion. He argues that if it is possible to move without a mover, then we needn’t a First Mover, and if it is impossible to move without a mover, then the First Mover must be moved itself. But this is again based in confused interpretations of Aristotelian metaphysics. The answer to the paradox is that it is impossible to move without a mover; but to move is the actualization of a potential by an actual. Thus, hierarchical series of motion mandate there exist Pure Actuality, moving things while being unmoved itself. That which is in motion is moved by another; Pure Act, devoid of potentials, is not in motion. As such, a First Mover is necessarily unmoved in its essence of pure actuality, while necessarily moving things in accordance with the very principle of motion we observe around us. Next, Con claims that I’m espousing a Platonic theory of forms that I explicitly rejected in the previous round. I’m not arguing that cups are good in the extent to which they resemble an ultimate cup; I’m arguing that cups are good in the extent to which they instantiate the form of a cup (the essence or pattern of a cup). Hence the objective standard of goodness exists as the extent to which it actualizes its essence. This is a pretty simple Aristotelian explanation of goodness, one that transcends specific instantiations of cups, instead based in their form. That God is Pure Actuality reveals that God’s essence is existence, and thus is absolutely perfect in goodness, as there is no greater instantiation of essence than its existence. I’ll reiterate that I did in fact argue from a hierarchical series in round 1, exemplifying this with the simultaneous motion of a microwave oven upon a refrigerator.