The Problem of Evil (PoE) is sound

Before I begin, I just want to make 2 observations. First, Con's constant reduction of this problem to pain and pleasure is a gigantic straw-man. It's called the problem of evil, and I'd ask Con engage with that. Second, while I don't mind Con's use of the gish gallop, he should be held to account to defend all these spurious arguments, and be punished for dropping so many already.ContradictariesHere I charged that Con held 3 contradictory positions on God‘s action.Con claims that his position in P1 and P3 are between in principle (it) and in fact arguments. Con claimed that P1 was logically impossible for God, yet had God preventing gratuitous evil for P3 so this distinction doesn’t cut it.But even if we accept Con’s point, it is no less contradictory to say:(i) God won’t prevent gratuitous evil (Contra P1)(ii) God does prevent gratuitous evil (theodicy)(iii) God’s actions are completely beyond our ken (ST)Second, Con asserts when it comes to evil,“we’re too limited in time to presently discern God’s reasons with good enough confidence to warrant P3”If this is the case, how can he say,“any evil we experience in this life counts as raw material for forming the self in a just way in the pursuit of happiness.” (R2)Con’s position is still contradictory on multiple levels. As such, whatever happens, Con’s position is certainly false. God of LawHere, I made a reductio of Con’s responses using Law’s Evil God Challenge.Con first insists we call it “Anti-God”. Fine.Con then says given the moral ambiguity of the world, we simply can’t make a judgement on God or Anti-God, and my doing so actually undercuts the PoE. Con misunderstands my point. I’m not arguing for an Anti-God on the basis of the world. As Con admits, the world isn’t what we’d expect given God or Anti-God, so doing this would be absurd. As such, the charge that I undercut my own argument by doing so is based on a crude straw-man of both the PoE and the challenge.The problem for Con however still remains. A morally ambiguous world supports the hypothesis of indifference, and thus gratuitous evil. At the very least, divorcing God from the external world is just another example of Flew’s death by qualification.Second, how exactly does Con reason a good God? This problem is even more stark given Con’s adoption of ST and his admission of the failure of the moral argument for God. Third, my primary aim was to show how ad hoc responses to the PoE can be. Given that Con admits his response and that of an Anti-God hypothesis are “equal”, I‘d submit this shows how utterly ridiculous and contrived these responses are.Defending P1 P1 states that if God exists, gratuitous evils do not.Con presented 2 challenges to this.First, Con sought to dislodge P1 with claims of general divine non-interference.However, Con’s only justification for this is to cite origins essentialism - something else which has yet to justify. He also just asserts moral insignificance. Second, Con’s response is contradictory. Origins essentialism (if justified) would provide morally sufficient reason for evil, confirming P1. If not, why did Con use it Contra P3? Same with moral significance. All Con says in anticipation of this is that P1 is an “anthropic condition” - with no explanation or justification.Third, how does Con know what God’s motives are, especially given ST? He still hasn’t answered.Con then asserted that God couldn’t determine a minimum level of evil.Given my response, Con now charges that there is no precise metric for “better/less than” worlds.So what? I can still know some states (like eternal torture) are worse than others (eternal joy) regardless. I know, ceteris paribus, that a victim is worse for being raped. Clearly, this fails as a criticism. All this does is give another terrible consequence for Con’s position (moral absurdity). Second, while there maybe “no minimum” level of evil, there is an ideal - the least amount of evil for the greatest available good. Problem solved.As for his Williams quote, this is unsourced and neglects my theological scepticism point anyway.Defending P3P3 states that gratuitous evil exists.Con hasn’t responded to my rebuttal to:- Epistemic consistency- Nature of evils- NoconeiveumExtend arguments. Prima facie case: All Con does here is repeat his earlier claim which I rebutted - straw-manning my position as “negative” when I’ve given 4 extensive points to support P3. Second, negative evidence is still relevant,"For if an instance of suffering appears not to have a point, that is a reason for thinking it has no point." (1)Con then accuses me of “ignoring our ignorance” for every possible theodicy. This retreat to the possible won’t do. When it comes to the evidential PoE, all that is relevant is evidence (hence the name), not pure supposition. Everything we know about ebola et al points to it being bad simpliciter, and this provides good evidence for gratuity.“Unanswered arguments”Con’s first point is to merely offer a possibility for moral evil through noetic sin. First, this one-line assertion has no justification whatsoever. Besides, this would have to more plausible than my support for gratuity. Second, Con’s assumption of specific Christian doctrine, especially given ST, is wholly unwarranted (theological scepticism). Third, Con offers no detail or justification on how ebola or cancer are moral evils which humans are responsible for. Indeed, this notion is patently ridiculous.Con then claims I never dealt with his Kripkean argument. First, I did (see R2 - under theodicy). Second, his justification for this was it’s “quite plausible”. That’s no argument. Third, I’m not arguing ebola be impossible, only that it would have a morally sufficient reason, so Con attacks yet another straw-man. STReaders will remember I gave 3 criticisms of STIt would have to be extreme, which would lead to absurdities (no way to discount an illusory past).No justification that we are so epistemically limited.It is contrived and leads to huge problems (theological scepticism)Con doesn’t answer any of these points. Extend arguments.Animal PainCon now claims merely that we don’t know animals feel the same pain as we do.First, yes we do. Con accepts the principle of credulity, and animals appear to suffer, therefore, ceteris paribus, we should believe they do.Second, I gave further reason to think animals feel pain, and Con doesn’t dispute any of this, he just says we don’t know. He also doesn’t dispute my point about dualism.Lastly, if all we’re debating here is degrees of suffering, this does almost nothing to help Con. Animals would still suffer, we’d just not be sure how extensive the suffering is.TheodicyHere Con presented a Virtue response.I criticised it as narrow - it doesn’t cover animal suffering, or those who suffer ebola alone, for example.I also made the point that evil begets evil and that it is not plausible that allowing things like child rape is either the best way to build virtue, or morally permissible. No response. Extend arguments.Con also admits that his theodicy is a mere “possibility”. While this is enough to derail the logical PoE, such a tactic is tilting at windmills here. Con has to show that this is more plausible than my 4 lines of support for P3, and he admits he can’t do this. Case closed.Con’s last hurrah is another unsourced quote, which also begs the question - assuming an afterlife where God rights wrongs. Sources1. Wykstra, Stephen J. 1984. “The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments from Suffering: On Avoiding the Evils of ‘Appearance’,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 16: 73-93.