The Kalam Cosmological Argument is Sound

Thank you for your response, Miles. In my previous round, I outlined two types of things: (a) things that are temporally subsequent to something else, and (b) things that are not temporally subsequent to something else. Most things we imagine are (a) things: tables, people, cars, airplanes, planets, stars, plants, etc. They are things which proceed something else; things which there is some point in time X when they exist and some point in time prior to X when they did not. Then there are (b) things: things which there was no other thing temporally prior. These include such things as the laws of physics, the laws of logic, time itself, and, indeed, the universe. If my opponent had merely made the claim "All (a) things which begin to exist have an efficient cause" I would be much less hesitent to disagree; instead, he makes the bold claim "All (a) things and (b) things which begin to exist have an efficient cause". Since I concede the likely truth of the former claim, the only part of the latter claim of any interest to me is that (b) things which begin to exist have an efficient cause. Can it be proven more plausible than not that all (b) things which begin to exist have an efficient cause? I don't think it can be, though my opponent has partially adopted the tactic of shifting the burden of proof in his most recent round, something done when one's own claim has little to no warrant backing it up. If my opponent and I were medically ignorant and were discussing what caused cancer and he claimed it was demons, he would have to prove to us demons are probably the cause of cancer; if I pointed out he had no evidence to support such a claim, he would be out of bounds to turn it around and ask "If not demons, then what does cause cancer, smart guy? " My inability to answer this question is not to be confused with supporting evidence demons are, in fact, the cause of cancer. With that in mind, let's take a look at my opponent's three warrants for this claim and why they fail:(i) Something cannot come from nothing. My opponent objects to my accusation of warrant (i) being a mere rewording of premise (1), but I'm happy to report nothing he said actually refutes that accusation. He says warrant (i) grounds the truth of premise (1) and explains why it is true; premise (1) is true because warrant (i) is true. We can clearly see that if warrant (i) were true, then premise (1) would also have to be immediately granted, but that is only precisely because they are tautological! Premise (1) states "If something begins to exist, then it must have an efficient cause" whereas warrant (i) states "If something begins to exist, then it can't have no efficient cause". Sure, premise (1) is true because warrant (i) is true, but that's like saying "It's true that I'm wearing a top hat because it's not true that I'm not wearing a top hat. " I haven't proved to you I'm wearing a top hat merely by pleading it's absurd to think otherwise; I simply said the same thing twice and put the word "because" between them. Which brings me to this line my opponent wrote: "Someone might think that things can begin to exist without a cause, but then reflect that that would entail being coming from non-being, and so change their minds. " Someone might think that things can begin to exist without a cause, but then realize that would mean things can begin to exist without a cause, so change their mind. .. I'm not going to change my mind by simply realizing what it is I was thinking to begin with, regardless of how many times my opponent repeats his claim with different wording. He asks, "How could the potentiality for something’s existence be actualized without a cause? " But the word "actualized" here implies that the universe is something which did not exist at some point in time (which is patently false); as I've been trying to say for three rounds now, the universe was not "actualized". It did not "come into being" or anything else of the sort. It simply always was; for all past points in time, it always was. The question is therefore misguided. (ii) If (b) things can begin to exist without cause, why isn't it happening nowadays? Here, I explained that this question clearly misses the point of distinguishing between (a) things and (b) things. (b) things are those which nothing was temporally prior to. If something began to exist right now, uncaused or not, it would not qualifiy as a (b) thing. My opponent continues to miss the point by stating "there can’t be anything which causes things to come into being without a cause at T=0 and not at later points in time". Firstly, this sentence is utterly meaningless since it talks of something causing something to be uncaused. Think about that. Of course, it makes no sense. Secondly, it continues to ask "if things could be uncaused at T=0, why can't they be uncaused at T=1 or T=2 or so on? " In other words, if (b) things can be uncaused, why can't (a) things? Because there is a huge difference between (a) things and (b) things, thus the separation of terms: that there are points of time prior to (a) things to enable a chain of causes. Anything which is temporally finite ((a) things) is logically contingent (which is to say, neither logically necessary nor impossible). My opponent would like to use inductive reasoning to conclude that all (b) things have causes because all (a) things do; should we then grant that all (b) things must be logically contingent because all (a) things are? Of course not! For many, if not all, (b) things, we can clearly see they exist because they are necessary, such as the laws of logic. It is not unreasonable to believe that some state of existence (such as our universe in its infancy) is logically necessary. My opponent claims I can't explain why it is that the Big Bang existed the way it did if it were uncaused and not anything else, like a two-ton giant cheeseburger or something. That's true; I'm a layman when it comes to theoretical physics so, just as I can't explain what causes cancer, I can't explain why the Big Bang wasn't a giant cheeseburger. (iii) Common experience varifies the truth of the first premise. Again, warrant (iii) does its job to support premise (1) to the extent of (a) things and no further. As explained previously, there is no reason to grant my opponent's leap in inductive reasoning from (a) things to (b) things; in fact, there is reason to disallow such a grant! To conclude, warrant (i) is nothing more than a sly use of tautology, warrant (ii) is point-missingly misinformed, and warrant (iii) is irrelevant as our common experience says nothing of the causes (or lack thereof) of (b) things.