Meta-Ethical Moral Relativism Is An Incoherent Position.

My opponent states, "It seems evident to me that my opponent doesn't believe in MMR, but actually something akin to emotivism, the "view that moral judgments do not function as statements of fact but rather as expressions of the speaker's or writer's feelings[1]." I'll explain why this is so in my following responses:" However, we have both posted definitions of MMR, these definitions have been mutually agreed upon. My opponent despite being instigator has yet to attempt to meet the burden of proof for his argument that MMR is incoherent or unsound. My opponent also should now indicate how the position of emotivism fails is mutually exclusive with MMR. My opponent argues that, "I want to first touch upon an issue that has become a pet peeve of mine: people misusing logical fallacies. My opponent accuses me of committing a straw man (when I claimed his position entails epistemological relativism), but this is an inaccurate response even if my argument were false. I properly represented his argument (when he claims that moral statements are entirely relative and subjective), and in this case no straw man appears. The step that my opponent has troubles with is the fact that I drew the conclusion of epistemological relativism as a logical entailment of his position. He can argue that this doesn't follow, but sticking the "ha, straw man" label is silly." I have stated that this is a strawman and demonstrated why this is the case, the above paragraph is merely my opponent stating his disagreement, not actually why he or anyone else should disagree. It appears he has conceded this point, but does not want to acknowledge it. Because it has been ignored here is a reiteration, I am arguing that for MMR, this entails to me the argument that morality is subjective, a matter of opinion akin to fashion or taste. Epistemological relativism entails that all truths are subjective and relative (my opponent has accepted this definition anyway). It is clear that the former, does not equal the latter. The onus is on my opponent to demonstrate that MMR requires epistemological relativism, he has not done so. Should he establish the connection the onus is upon him to argue against epistemological relativism. "Now about MMR...my argument will shift, as it has become evident to me that his position is more akin to emotivism than MMR. If I can therefore demonstrate that this is the correct interpretation of his stance, then his arguments crumble as he isn't even properly arguing for the correct position. " If my opponent wishes to debate emotivism then they should offer me a new debate challenge when this debate has been completed. It is not acceptable to change the topic of the debate at this late stage. Even if my opponent is correct and I am arguing the wrong position, he is still pro, the burden of proof is upon him, and thus far he has failed to offer a single argument to try and meet that burden of proof. My opponent states that, "If you refer to the previous rounds for the definition of MMR (I won't re-copy&paste), it maintains that though moral values are relative on factors such as social upbringings, economic standing, religious influences, etc., moral statements are STILL TRUTH-APT. This is the crucial element, because though MMR claims moral values are relative, they are still capable of being truth or false. On the other hand, emotivism is specifically a non-cognitivist position that asserts moral utterances are representations of the speaker's feelings and are NOT truth-apt. A clear analogy to this are sentiments concerning favorite food dishes or music - there is no superior song or superior flavor of ice cream." This appears logically flawed. MMR argues that moral values are relative, I therefore take that to mean that morality is subjective. Therefore moral statements are subjectively true or false. You will notice if you check former rounds that I have constantly made the objective/subjective distinction. Emotivism acknowledges that moral statements are representative of the speakers feelings, and are not objectively true. They are still subjectively true. In addition we are not arguing over emotivism. To summarise, my opponent stated in R1 "My position in this debate is not only is meta-ethical moral relativism unsound, it's logically incoherent. From here on out, I will refer to this position as meta-ethical relativism, and to be more precisely it's abbreviated form MMR. The following is a definition of MMR[1]:" My opponent has failed to offer a single valid argument in support of his position, in sumary 1: My opponent has failed to demonstrate how Epistemological relativism is synonymous with MMR, and furthermore how this invalidates it. 2: My opponent has failed to demonstrate how MMR conflicts with the logical law of identity and appears to have conceded this point. 3: My opponent is now claiming that the debate is concerning emotivism. My opponent has failed to demonstrate how MMR is unsound or logically incoherent.