The Kalam Cosmological Argument is Sound

Premise 1:My opponent has failed to address most of my argument regarding causation and beginning of existence. Instead he has argued points I've already made in my round such as the claim regarding quantum mechanics while being largely unable to deal with the impetus of my points.Quantum mechanics: My opponent argues an irrelevant point, claiming that it doesn't refute the claim that "from nothing comes nothing". What he failed to do is note that I've made this exact point, and in fact explicitly noted that quantum fluctuation takes place in a low-point energy which is NOT a "philosophical nothing" or an "absence of being". what he had failed to note is that the QM has NOT in fact been demonstrated to have a cause of exstence. The virtual particles pop in and out of existence, appearing and disappearing in "quantum foam" without cause. If there is a cause, I'd like for my opponent to point to it. He makes a vague claim that seems to say that "it came out of pre-existing materia, therefore it has a cause" which he has not substantiated. The beginnings: He seems to rest much of his argument with the notion that I argued things pop into existence out of nothing without cause, which I have not done so once. Once he does so, however, he attempts to obfuscate the issue by conflating and thus equating the two qualitatively different cases of "beginnings". He defines beginning as " an object that did not exist now exists, so at some point it came into existence or "began."" And yet that clearly highlights the issue of the definition of "beginning". We do not have any examples of a creatio ex nihilo, caused or otherwise. Of the "beginning" that we are aware of, the above definition clearly is not adequate. The fact the he is unable to point out exactly when a beard begins, or when the beach becomes the ocean points to the fact that therefore we cannot say we have examples of "beginnings". In short, the "beginnings" that we are aware of in fact do NOT meet the requirement of the definition of beginning. Furthermore, it's worth pointing out the qualitatively different nature of the said "beginning". One is well established, if not exactly a "beginning" as much as a "transition" from one state to another or a rearrangement. The other is thus far an assertion that has not been demonstrated. The methods of causation are of course different. One simply involves a mode of transition- a sculptor takes a pre-existing block of marble to convert it into a statue for example. The other isn't even well understood, not to mention as it stands that it is simply a bare assertion. It also has an interesting implication of causation since causation is understood as "causing an effect". With this creation ex nihilo, there is no "effect" TO cause... so does this even make for a cogent case? To put it short, we have no examples of anything beginning to exist in the sense that the argument requires as was my statement in the previous round. Given the strict definition that the KCA requires (a creation ex nihilo) this is a claim without evidence and hence commits the fallacy of begging the question. Informal Fallacy: My opponent fails to note the portend and the entire point of the fallacy of composition. Simply because certain things within the universe had "beginning" (from pre-existing materia) does not therefore mean the universe itself had a beginning. It might indeed be the case that the universe in fact had a cause (not a concession here, by the way) but the reasoning does not follow from the point that "things within the universe has cause of existence". He claims I must explain the fundamental difference between the objects within it and the universe itself. I should ask him, then, what are the fundamental differences between a human cell and the human body? Premise 2:It seems that he does not understand his example against infinity is in fact the Hilbert's Hotel paradox, which points to his further misunderstanding of the argument he himselfhas proposed. The fact that it does not actually point to a philosophical contradiction but to the peculiar nature of infinity with any "contradictions" arising from a misunderstanding of how infinities work. He further misunderstands my objection to his argument, and fails to address that at all. in his counterargument b.i, he fails to meet the point that I was not saying mathematics were real objects, but that he in fact denied the relationship of mathematics with the real world by denying the possibility of infinity- a mathematical concept and hence mathematics itself - from actualizing in the real world. When he does deal with infinity, all he effectively does is further highlight the very objection I've made in this paragraph as well as in my last response.This extends to his b.ii objection in which he once again claims it to be "contradictory" is in fact simply counter-intuitive nature of infinity. If something were contradictory it would mean infinity was conceptually invalid... But that is once again not what my opponent is arguing. In the following objection he misunderstands calculating with infinity and claims that one is not allowed to "subtract from infinity". This is false. Subtracting from infinity is possible. It is also simply does not change the answer, per the nature of infinity. With that said, I will simply re-state the argument that my opponent has failed to deal with. "My opponent is therefore stuck between two equally absurd conclusions: either actual infinity is conceptually invalid, in which case he denies works regarding it by the likes of Cantor for example as well as many other mathematical works which involves infinity (which funny enough provide no problem in either mathematics or physics calculation, I might add), or that he denies the link of the mathematical realm with the real world- another absurd conclusion." Cosmology:With regards to cosmology he further misses the point of my objections and in fact unwittingly highlights the problem as well. To begin with, I do not need to rely on any cosmology due to the fact that as of yet no pre-planck cosmology have been established. What does remain, however, is the fact that none of the posit a violation of the First Law of Themodynamics, that energy was ever created- that it is even possible. This extends to all existing theorem.That being said, it seems he thinks I've made a claim against the Big Bang, when this is clearly not the case. I do object to the notion that the Big Bang points was a beginning of time. In fact, Alan Guth has been noted as saying: “So far, it’s been made to sound, I think for the purposes of simplifying things, that until the cyclic model, all scientists had believed that the big bang was the origin of time itself. That idea is certainly part of the classic theory of the big bang, but it’s an idea which I think most cosmologists have not taken seriously in quite a while” [1] With regards to the Vilenkin theorem, I'm not sure exactly what he's proposing here except that instead of actually proving that Vilenkin's theorem does not posit a "time-less" pre-universe, he instead quotes a criticism of it which ultimately renders his objection irrelevant. Furthermore it's worth noting that his quote does little to actually validate his position, pointing out effectively the very point I've been making all along- that there was a pre-existing energy and that a physicist defines the term "universe" within a specific context of "spacetime" and not simply "all that exists" as I've differentiated previously. Friendman's model further of course provides problems for my opponent in fact, positing, much like the Hartle-Hawking model, essentially a universe that does not have a "cause" but is acting entirely within its own nature and confines, among other things.