Man probably has freewill

Introduction How can Con reasonably dismiss perception within the absence of a defeater? If I have the immediate experience of the external world & no defeater other than speculation, then I'm rational to trust my noetics. We almost universally perceive freewill (testimony = external proof), the only defeater Con's offered is not only self-defeating, but based on a false dilemma & irrelevant studies.Con presupposes materialism without argument & never proves a physical mind. But even if materialism is true, QM leaves room for indeterminacy anyway. If materialism is false, a substance can be free. This takes care of all of Con's empirical arguments. Contra-Rational Determinism The false dilemma is found in P3, for the real issue isn't if we're free to do what we want, but whether if we're free to want at all (ability condition). Now if a mind is a substance then the action fundamentally differs from it. Thus actions are cause by a responsible 1st mover who by the very nature of the case must be free in order to cause any action. Contra-Empirical Determinism Study.1 Mele criticizes that there’s no reason to interpret such brain states as option consideration. Thus what Libet calls a decision could be a series of urges. Hence we’re at a stalemate with Libet, for there’s no more reason to prefer his interpretation over Mele’s. Study.2 Here, physical methods tested physical activity. But LFW involves the mind as a substance that is irreducible to physical states. Matter doesn't have teleos. Humans experience teleos, therefore our minds aren’t reducible to matter. The apprehension of non-material universals like numbers, contingent truths, or their creation can't be material. Thus fMRI methods can only make statements about the piano, not the pianist. Consciousness remains the phenomena to be explained in the first place since we experience it, we don't find it a posteriori. Con presupposes that correlation is causation. That's false, & all that's left is the faith of a naturalist, "It's possible that what are now correlations could at some point become causal ..." (Glannon). But possibilities come cheap for Con's case. Also nobody even knows when/where consciousness is! How can anything at all be said of it a posteriori when we still just experience it a priori, as free? Fried hastily concludes that “decisions could be predicted … prior to the patient being aware that he had made a decision." But a scientist who presupposes naturalism can’t speak on awareness. That’s a philosophy of mind, not science. All we’re presented with is physical activity acting on physical activity in succession. Big whoop! Neuroscientist-Philosopher Roskies says “this isn't enough to claim that you can see the brain making its mind up before conscious awareness … all it suggests is that there are some physical factors that ‘influence’ decision-making." Neuroscience can't speak to the issue of determinism. In the article Haynes himself admits LFW over his own results, “[determinism is] virtually impossible to keep hold of." Impressive Results These results are compatible with LFW & merely show that the brain responds to physical events in succession & only stimulates involuntary response, it doesn’t say anything about in situ awareness. We’re just witnessing the faith of a naturalist when Con asserts science denies freewill. If a scientist were to stimulate my perception of red in the lab, would my eyes not see red on a normal day? Objections to Determinism Problem of Fatalism Fatalism doesn't violates logic, logic just shows it's just as unreasonable as determinism. Logically, P1) If Determinism is true, then fatalism is true P2) Fatalism is false P3) Therefore, Determinism is false Modus Tollens! P = Q~Q ~P Self-Defeating DeterminismRational to accept = Pr: >.5, not certainty, rookie mistake. Anyhow the factual merit of LFW is that we experience it &, well basically everyone's testimony of it. It's a phenomena to be explained until we find a defeater for it; its not assumed false until we find a defeater. No Mind Projection Fallacy here: http://bayes.wustl.edu...I don't imagine freewill I experience it & testimony of nearly the entire plant including Con says that its as immediate to us as all other perceptions, including the reliability of logic, the external world, morals, etc. Con then confuses physical law with logical law & just because we gradually apprehend a realm of necessity, doesn't mean we're determined. I also wonder what's free enough to retrieve brain data, perhaps it plans, thinks, experiences & imagines... Materialism is found wanting in the extreme. An interactionist mind also cannot retrieve damaged information (stalemate again). We would expect the mind to improvise, which is exactly what we observe the effects of for blind people, etc; their lobes for hearing improve. (Science Daily)http://www.gemmlearning.com... Lastly, Con admits in his debate with PCP, “The central tenant … hammered by every determinist … is the notion that we cannot trust our senses.” & “Rational Deliberation relies solely upon common human perception – the very faculty in question.” Once Con doubts his cognitive faculty he ought to doubt the doubt itself: hence he affirms determinism is a self-defeating defeater. Arguments for LFWPrecise CharacterizationNot an argument for interactionism, just intrinsic coherence of LFW. But rational options imply irrational ones & as PCP says “reasons don't act on you, you act on reasons.” Kane's Freewill I argued future contingency & that it remains contingent in the past, & that free SFC's contribute to our nature, so when we act out of habit, we trace the UR for those actions back to those SFCs. With the perception of free will untarnished & the self-defeated determinism, it remains that LFW is more probable.