Resolved: The USFG should eliminate its nuclear armed ICBM force

==== CP Solvency ====Pro arguing I should less than halve the Bomber force (75% cut) is a waste of time since that is exactly what I advocated. Pro gives no breakdown of NNSA costs or how much they allocate for each purpose. NNSA manages the nuclear stockpile. Smaller stockpile means less costs. Bureaucratic inefficiencies are negligible impacts in nuclear war. Pro doesn't quantify them.I have not used conservative estimates for mine and liberal estimates for Pro's. See Table 1 of his source 1. LRSB is between $55-100b. Minuteman follow-on is between $20-120b. I said they were comparable. ==== How to judge this debate? ====Decisions on whether to keep or destroy a nuclear triad leg should be based on:1. Presenting a credible deterrent2. Ensuring survival should an adversary attack us firstMy CP does them best. 1: DeterrenceA) Deterrence credibility in the eyes of the world takes a hit upon switching to a dyad. Pro says ASW is underdeveloped. Doesn't answer my arguments that a) It is the threat of advancement in ASW that will undermine our deterrence credibility, b) Historical precedent shows the stealth/ASW race oscillates. B) Enemy states could easily sponsor terrorists and rogue agents to conventionally destroy our subs. Pro drops that if it takes decades to build subs, the attacks need not be simultaneous. The possibility will worry people under the US nuclear umbrella as well.C) Pro claims that the same people will also carpet bomb silos but drops that a) Only Russia has enough nukes to carpet bomb, b) They will be exhausted, and c) It will be a direct, open attack on US sovereignty.D) Miscalculation/signaling turn doesn't work when we still retain a smaller number of bombers.E) US has more nukes quantitatively than any other state and similar to Russia. By FORCING our adversaries into symmetric warfare rather than asymmetric warfare, we retain our advantage. Only ICBM threaten our opposition with the daunting task of matching our arsenal rather than asymmetrically destroying our subs and bombers.2: SurvivalA) Solely focusing on deterrence is foolish when a) The US-Russia nuclear rivalry is increasing again [26], b) Deterrence only works on rational actors. Pro drops this. B) Inherent value of exhausting our adversaries nukes is so they can't directly attack cities. Pro acts like the alternative is our enemy will simply hold onto those nukes and do nothing if we lack ICBM. This is illogical. If they committed to attacking the US, they will hit our industrial and population centers. But with ICBM, they are forced to exhaust their power, bombing silos in a desert. C) Pro drops that people can relocate and adapt in the event of environmental degradation. If silos in North Dakota are bombed, people in nearby cities can relocate to California. But if 900 warheads are directed at the 900 largest US cities, there is very little chance of Americans surviving. Pro drops Hiroshima example. US has large land area increasing likelihood that some parts will be unaffected. C) US population 300 million. Pro says tens of millions will die if silos are bombed. Why should we not care about the survival and welfare of the remaining 200+ million people? This isn't a post-apocalyptic fantasy. It is the difference between tens of millions dying and America existing. D) Reserves: Even if tens of millions die, it is a small proportion of our population. Military and political chains of command are specific and fixed. The president has 17 backups in case of death [25]. Nukes can be secured post-war. USSR analogy fails, not under threat of occupation. ==== Pro's case ====What does Pro offer to counter deterrence and survival? He argues for 1. conventional war, 2. nuclear terrorism. He also has a politics impact which is non-unique and not well developed: 1251 report also mentions ICBM and its replacement and reducing Bombers can be spun as re-balancing for Minuteman IV so it works for my side as well.1. Conventional WarPro says there aren't enough B-2 Bombers to project power in China. But why is conventional "power projection" something that we should aspire for? In a day when Obama has been trying to reverse Bush's interventionist policies, the last we need is to project power and threaten the airspace of China which causes regression of the progress made against the world's perception of the US as a police state. Pro's source on Iraqi Freedom says that while Bombers were useful, this was primarily due a "benign air-defense environment" and lack of Iraqi aerial capability . This won't be true in China. Precision Guided Munitions or Smart Bombs have actually been used extensively in Desert Storm - by Fighters. They aren't new. The F-35 Lighning is a stealth aircraft as well. Stealth is not synonymous with Bombers. Pro provides no reason why stealth fighters can't be used to counter "Area Denial" technology.Weigh "power projection" less than nuclear deterrence because it is offensive as opposed to defensive, does no good to image of the US, and only creates resentment. 2. Nuclear terrorismThe main issue here is that the link to nuclear terrorism is weak. Pro talks about low morale and soldiers wanting a different assignment. He does not counter that the Minot Air Force Base is freezing and accounts for the low morale. He does not counter my refutation of his source that low morale is prevalent among all three triad legs and not just ICBM. He makes a leap of logic to conclude that in his view, ICBM are useless, therefore the soliders stationed there have morale problems. Weigh nuclear terrorism less than my impacts because we ought not to eliminate ICBM as a solution to reduce terrorism. We have not stopped using commercial aircraft after 9/11. The solution is to increase security. Pro mentions a simulation. The Air Force clearly will use it to improve security. Pro's source says that modernizing will improve morale so this destroys the morale argument altogether.Sources[25] http://tinyurl.com...[26] http://tinyurl.com...