Substance Dualism is true

Thanks Khan. Deciding on a philosophy of mind is definitely a difficult and confusing thing to do. Hope to be of some help. Mind/Body Correlations Con’s first argument has to do with the mind/body correlations we’ve observed in neuroscience. At best, this is an argument against interactionist dualism. The problem with this is, not all dualist philosophies are interactionist. Epiphenomenalism, for example can take a substance dualist form. Stating that the mental substance is caused completely by the physical as a by product. Like a shadow of the brain, separate from it, yet still caused by it [1]. Con’s argument only attacks a specific type of dualism, not dualism in general. However, the argument itself doesn’t refute interactionist dualism either. Descartes himself thought the such correlations may exist [2]. Descartes gave the analogy of a violinist, if his violin is broken it would appear his skill is poor. However, it’s not that the violinist is a bad player, but the way he produces his skill is broken. The brain is just a way we produce our abilities. If it’s damaged, then of course we wouldn’t be able to function. There’s also ways that interaction can still occur, which I will get to when that section comes. I had another argument in this section, but due to space limitations I couldn't include it. The argument is refuted. Problem of Interaction Con presents the infamous problem of interaction. As I’ve said before, there’s philosophies of dualism that don’t accept interaction. Like the above argument at best an argument against a specific type of dualism. However, interactionism could perhaps be saved. I will present three possible solutions, only one need succeed for the problem of interaction to no longer be a problem. One, the mind and body may not interact in the way say billiard balls moving interact with each other, but they can still interact with each other by reacting to each other. If we imagine a person seeing a snake and flinching we notice there isn’t some connection with the snake the person has that made him flinch. The person was caused to flinch by the snake by way of reacting, not by way of interaction like physical objects moving into each other. Another example is something like a motion sensing device such as the Xbox Kinect. You’re not causing through some similar link with such a device to move your character, but the device senses you and reacts. The mind and body interact with each other, not because of some connection, but because they’re reacting to each other. Two, one key component to the problem of interaction is the idea that in order for two things to interact, there must be some fundamentally common connection between them. This intuition is challenged by quantum mechanics. Quantum entanglement is where “multiple particles are linked together in a way such that the measurement of one particle's quantum state determines the possible quantum states of the other particles.”[3] The interaction’s speed happen at 10,000 times the speed of light [4]. This means there cannot be any connection between the particles or else they would entail contradictions in relativity [5]. The mind and brain might interact just like quantum entanglement, no connection between the two, but still in interaction with each other. Three, William Lycan points out the problem of interaction assumes a specific theory of causation [2]. Under certain theories like David Lewis’ counterfactual theory there doesn’t appear to be any problem. The counterfactual theory states that “An event E causally depends on C if, and only if, (i) if C had occurred, then E would have occurred, and (ii) if C had not occurred, then E would not have occurred.” [6]. Basically, a fire causes a house to be burnt down because if the fire didn’t exist, the burnt house wouldn’t exist and if a house is on fire, a burnt house would occur. Lycan goes on to state “no reason has been given why physical events could not depend counterfactually on Cartesian mental events.” [2]. Interactionism can still be saved, as it may be that the mind and body react to one another, interaction doesn’t need a common link, and there’s other theories of causation that allow for remove the problem. Furthermore, this also solves the problem Con mentioned in the above argument. The argument is refuted. The Zombie Argument Con here says he doesn’t understand my justification for premise one. I’m sorry if I didn’t make it clear enough, as I thought filling in Leibniz’s law of identicals would make sense. In a nutshell, if the mind = the brain then any property the mind has the brain has and visa versa (that’s tautological). Just like any property Mr. Obama has Mr. Barack has. If it’s possible for the brain to function like it has a mind, but not really be conscious then there can exist a property that the mind has that the brain doesn’t. It would then follow that the mind =/= the brain. Con strawmans my appeal to authority. I am claiming it supports premise one, not that it positively makes it true. A valid appeal to authority is only ever a probabilistic argument [7]. Furthermore none of his parody arguments match a valid appeal to authority. Geocentrism and Young Earth Creationism fail to meet criteria 5 “The area of expertise is a legitimate area or discipline.“[ibid] Neither discipline had nearly inductive content to be considered legitimate. Young Earth Creationism also fails to meet criteria 1 “The person has sufficient expertise in the subject matter in question.” as it’s roots are in religious traditions [8]. I also can't find any evidence that YEC was ever widely accepted by experts. The father of geology held that the Earth was infinite [9] so I’m not sure where Con got that idea. Also Darwin had nothing to do with the Old Earth Theory, Hutton came up with it and Lyell popularized it [10]. Finally Logical Positivism never met criteria 3 “There is an adequate degree of agreement among the other experts in the subject in question.” as there were numerous internal debates within the movement. [11] I also couldn’t find evidence that it was ever widely accepted in philosophy. I have restated my justification for P1 and have shown how Con’s attempt to refute my appeal to authority fails. The Knowledge Argument Here it seems Con is advocating for a type of non-reductive physicalism. Con is saying that first person experience cannot be derived from third person information. I agree with this, where I disagree with Con is where he says that first person information is physical. This presents some questions for Con such as why can’t first person information be reduced to the scientific third person information if it’s fundamentally the same? How is first person experience physically different from the third person? Why is consciousness the only thing that is non-reducible? This would also seem to present a problem of causal overdeterminism (two causes for one event). Events would be caused in a first person sense and in a third person sense. Sensory information is caused in a third person sense by wavelengths of light entering the eyes and in a first person qualia sense. We would have two distinct causal events neither reducible to the other. This is absurd, as it’s like two privately funded snipers hired to take out the same target and both kill the target at the exact same moment. Con’s model fails under scrutiny. The resolution is affirmed. Back to Con Sources in comments due to space limitations.