The Argument from Logic

Thanks to DakotaKrafick for his response. I admit that these objections weren't what I had expected. I still don't think they work.Con challenges two my premises; let's go through some salient points:Propositions (such as the LNC) are real entities, but cannot be physical entities; they are essentially thoughts."Firstly, to say that something is non-physical, and therefore must be a thought is contradicting."Well, I didn't really say that. I don't believe - nor did I imply - that merely because something is non-physical that entails that it must be a thought. After all, I believe God is non-physical but I don't literally believe that God Himself is identical to a thought. Sure he has thoughts but that is not the same as saying he is a thought. What I said is that since the LNC is a necessarily true proposition that means it cannot be physical since no physical entity is necessary in that sense.Con says thought is just cell activity in the brain. There are a couple of overwhelming difficulties for Con's contentions here:1) That's just begging the question. I gave an argument for the conclusion that the LNC when conceived of as a thought is non-physical; Con gave us a bare assertion that just automatically assumes the falsity of my argument without any, well, argumentation. Con just assumes at the outset that my position is false and then by proceeding from that position no doubt finds it an easy thing to do show how my position is false.2) No thought isn't literally a physical thing. Say that I'm thinking right now about my upcoming vacation; what Con wants us to believe is that if the chemical reactions and the neuron synapses ("neural realizers/correlates" in philosophy of mind-speak) which realized this thought are located my thought is literally nothing but these neural realizers. That is literally identical with these neural realizers. So what Con is saying is that my thought has mass - my neural realizers sure do and since they are identical to my thought that means my thought has mass. Or that my neural realizers (the neuron snapping and the chemicals whirring) literally have semantic content; that these mean something and have content in the literal sense. One of the attributes of my thought is that is only privately accessible by me; i.e.. it is necessarily first personal and subjective (in that it's had by a subject). What Con wants us to believe is that a material object/event (which is always describable in third personal "objective" terms) literally is first personal as well. This makes absolutely no sense.2a) This merely assumes the highly controversial thesis of identity theory. [1][2] And when I say highly controversial I mean that even most self-identified who specialize in philosophy of mind (or even some neuroscientists and psychologists) as physicalists or materialists or naturalists or what have you don't subscribe to the theory. Most are non-reductive physicalists. [3] And for very good reason. Con is certainly welcome to argue that identity theory is true (and I rather hope he does because philosophy of mind is one my favorite subjects) but I'm not willing to just grant this (nor should the audience). 2b) A real problem here is that if propositions (and therefore the LNC) are identical with beings' brain inscriptions that means that the LNC could have possibly not existed. It makes no sense to say that a necessary truth like something can't both be true and not true at the same time is identical with the brain inscriptions of beings who might not have existed. The implications are staggering. If the LNC is identical with brain inscriptions in human beings that means the LNC didn't exist before human beings evolved. That means it was possible for something to both be true and false at the same time. Really?For three, Con's argument seems to be a non-sequitur and another instance of begging the question. It seems to go like this:1) Thoughts in organisms that have an evolutionary history are produced by a physical organ2) Therefore, all thoughts are necessarily produced by a physical organWait, what? That doesn't even follow! What about thoughts that are had by beings that are neither organisms nor have had evolutionary histories? Con could just say that there are no beings that are neither organisms or don't have evolutionary histories but that would just be assuming the falsity of my argument on the onset to show how wrong I am. That's begging the question. Or Con could provide an argument that thought can only be necessarily had by beings with the with evolutionary histories but it would be just that - an argument that needs support. Not an unsupported assertion like Con's argument is.Con goes on to say that the laws of logic are just concepts yet they are an intrinsic part of physical reality; no non-physical minds need apply!There's a bit of a difficulty for Con here. Let's look at the dictionary: con·cept  [kon-sept] noun 1. a general notion or idea; conception. 2. an idea of something formed by mentally combining all itscharacteristics or particulars; a construct. 3. a directly conceived or intuited object of thought. [4] Doesn't this speak for itself? It'd be nonsense to have a concept without a conceptualizer. If Con agrees that the LNC is a concept he is merely agreeing with me that my argument is sound."Indeed, the evidence seems to point to the opposite conclusion: concepts are merely the necessary result of a materialistic universe. The laws of physics do not allow for something to be both itself and not itself simultaneously; therefore, there is a concept which interprets this intrinsic aspect of reality (the logical law of identity). "This is just confused.1) Con seems to be confusing logical possibility and physical possibility. [5] For example, it's physically impossible to escape from black hole; it's not logically impossible to do so.2) If Con agrees the LNC is a concept he's already conceded my point. And "interpreting" something is necessarily an act done by some mind; physical processes or descriptions of those physical processes (physical laws) don't interpret each other. This just ignores my point about the LNC being a proposition and a proposition necessarily being "intentional" in that it is directed toward or about something else. Physical entities (nor laws) are not directed toward or about something else so to say that this would be an "intrinsic part" of a purely physical reality makes no sense.If there are necessarily existence thoughts, there must be a necessarily existent mind; and if there is a necessarily existence mind, there must be a necessarily existent person.Con's amazement here ought to be curbed because he seems off base. Con makes a perplexing claim that thinking a thought make that thought a reality. ...then what does that make it? A non-reality? Is Con saying that your thought literally doesn't exist when you think? Con must mean "reality" as in "outside the mind". And Con provides the answer to his own questions when he says (more or less) that God thoughts act as genuine applicable concepts to govern reality. He actually agrees with the author of the original article I posted; Welty thinks that some of God's thoughts function as abstract objects for us finite thinkers. [7]Con misunderstands my claim here. What I said is that these necessarily existent thoughts can't literally be (I mean as in a literal identity claim) our thoughts as we are not necessary persons. We can entertain these thoughts but these thoughts can't literally be identical with our own thoughts.Sources[1] http://www.iep.utm.edu... [2] http://plato.stanford.edu... [3] http://en.wikipedia.org... [4] http://dictionary.reference.com... [5] http://en.wikipedia.org...[6] http://en.wikipedia.org... [7] http://www.proginosko.com...