The Objectivist Account of Free Will is Nonsense

My opponent says that I have “not provided a sensible mechanism by which a soul’s identity could lend itself to many different behaviors.” I do not recognize that I have to provide a “mechanism” by which the soul has the identity it has any more than I would have to provide a “mechanism” by which a tree is a tree or by which an atom is an atom. I have shown that the free soul is, and nothing else is relevant. If it is necessarily true that free will exists, my opponent’s claims that such free will cannot arise from physical matter are baseless (and, in fact, he has merely asserted that the physical brain cannot produce a free soul – he has not backed this up with anything). “If two physically identical brains produce different results, then the physical world is inadequate to explain all physical phenomena” This statement is blatantly false – if it is the physical nature of an entity to choose its own cause, then its doing so is explained directly by its nature. There is not any more contradiction here than there is in saying that “if a tree sways in the wind, then the physical world is inadequate to explain all physical phenomena”. The tree sways because of the nature of the tree, and the soul chooses because of the nature of the soul. Each is explained by its own qualities, and, if these qualities do exist, there can be no argument that they are “unexplainable” – they are, and that is all that matters. My opponent continuously implies that a free soul somehow “goes against” a deterministic brain, but he does not recognize that, if the result of deterministic processes is an entity capable of volition, then the result not being free would be the true contradiction. He accepts as a given that free will cannot arise from deterministic entities for no real reason and ignores the fact that free will must exist (and, by extension, his stance must be baseless), and yet he continues to argue his position as if it has any validity. He says things like “[i]f the overall nature of an entity cannot contradict its individual parts, and if the parts are entirely deterministic, then obviously a volitional being is restricted to only those behaviors which are consistent with the deterministic parts in question”, which, while perfectly agreeable at face value, imply that free will is not “consistent with the deterministic parts in question”. He offers nothing in defence of these assertions other that it is “obviously” the case. If it is the nature of matter to, when configured in a certain way, produce a volitional entity, there is no grounds for calling such an entity “inconsistent”. It is, by definition, the only thing that can be consistent with reality, considering that it is the result of those deterministic processes. My opponent attacks my tapestry analogy – his changes, though, don’t make a difference. If the colors of the individual threads, when combined, produce one singular color, then there is no contradiction. I do not have to explain why, just that it is the case. My opponent’s entire argument just assumes that such a result “isn’t possible”, which is directly contradicted by the axiomatic nature of free will. “People make honest mistakes all the time - according to Bossy, I must be consciously aware that my position is false. I know no such thing, and I consider it rude of him to even suggest it.” You may not know that this particular position is false, but you chose (and you know that you chose) to evade reality at some point leading to its acceptance. That is the primary choice – to evade or not – and it is just that – a choice. Validation requires the choice to validate – without such a choice, there is no basis for belief. If one chooses to validate a belief, if one does not equivocate, he, by definition, must validate said belief. There is nothing fallible in this process for, if there was an error, it would be a different process entirely (a process not of validation but of evasion) and could not be called by the same name. This entirely applies to self-evident truths – how can you validate that they are self-evident if you cannot choose to do so? My opponent surely wouldn’t say that it’s impossible to be wrong about a statement such as “2 + 2 = 4” – for instance, look at the case of the young child first learning math who subtracts instead of adds. If nature makes him believe that it is “self-evident” that 2 + 2 = 0, he has no way to know that his position is false. Yes, he was not justified in holding his belief since it was truly not a self-evident proposition. However, he had no way of knowing that. To him, it was as valid as things could be, yet he still was wrong because he was unable to avoid evasion. He was completely at the whim of nature and cannot know anything for certain, as the very process necessary for knowledge is not for him to pursue. Knowledge of even self-evident knowledge requires the choice to validate such knowledge, and determinism does not offer this choice. “According to this view, there can be no such thing as an honest conceptual error; everything is either deliberate evasion or a valid recognition of reality.” That’s entirely accurate. Restating my argument isn’t an argument in itself. “Self-evident truth is self-evidently self-evident. If determinism is true, ultimately we don’t have control over whether we come up with self-evident truth. However, when we do come up with self-evident truth, all else is irrelevant; the truth of the proposition is given by its definition, and we are faced with a proposition which, if denied, would lead to contradictions.” And what if you were just determined to think this? What if contradictions can exist but you’re hardwired to believe that they cannot? How can you justify any beliefs, even those necessary for belief in general? You cannot without free will, and this is the downfall of determinism. “The argument is only justifiably circular if it is logically impossible that we are deterministic minds. In that case, no argumentation from bossy is needed, and my opponent might as well keep his mouth shut for the remainder of the debate.” I agree – it is logically impossible that we are deterministic minds, and I thank my opponent for pointing out the point of my entire case. I proved my case by choosing to write the first word. Leaving it at that isn’t any fun, though, which is the only reason that I continue to debate the topic. “How can it be logically impossible for a consciousness to be aware of a fixed train of thought? If we attempted to construct such an awareness, would we be magically prevented from doing so? That seems silly to me.” If the consciousness was “aware” in the sense my opponent is describing, this does not solve the problem – for for it to be aware of the fixed train of thought, it would have to have a train of thought which governed it being aware, and if it were aware of this train of thought another would be necessary, and so on to infinity. It is obviously absurd that such an entity would both exist and be able to validate its thoughts. My argument for free will being axiomatic stands, and, as such, my opponents arguments necessarily fall. He will need to show that free will is not axiomatic, else he will be logically unable to fulfill his BOP even to the slightest degree.