What is Undesirable May Very Well Be Appropriate

Ok, I do sense a logical inconsistency in CON's arguments, so I hope people will be able to tolerate what I'm about to do.CON makes an error in logic in the following statement: "As my opponent said in round one, the latter is a quality of prudence. And, as he says here, either the former or latter, not necessarily both, would mean something is desirable. So, if something is prudent, the latter is a quality of it, and so it is also desirable." As expected, CON equates prudence with desirability, which has been specifically excluded as a condition for accepting this debate.A (very short) guide on the relevant symbolic logic used below: (http://www.math.csusb.edu...)Logical Deconstruction1) First and foremost, I want to re-emphasize that I need not prove that all things that are undesirable are appropriate. There is a material difference between the following resolutions:a) What is undesirable is appropriate.b) What is undesirable may very well be appropriate.The resolution for this debate is b), not a).Conversely, this also means that CON must prove that "what is undesirable MUST BE inappropriate", i.e. CON must prove it in ALL cases.2) The exclusion is absolutely necessary in order to convey the intended meaning of this resolution. Allow me to demonstrate.If we were to consider both definitions of "desirability" (the one for this debate as well as the excluded definition), we would necessarily reach the conclusion that desirability entails AT LEAST one OR the other and quite possibly both. The following truth table would apply:Desirability = A or BA = having pleasing qualities or propertiesB = worth seeking or doing as advantageous, beneficial, or wiseTruth Table: Without the exclusion, undesirability would necessarily have to be neither A nor B (the red portion).---With the exclusion, "desirability" becomes very simple:Desirability = ATruth Table: Undesirability would thus be either of the highlighted portions (red or green). For this debate, I am talking about things that are undesirable yet prudent, i.e. ((not A) and B), the green portion of the truth table.---This is a valid semantical approach, further substantiated by looking at the definition of the word "sky" (http://www.merriam-webster.com...) 1. the upper atmosphere or expanse of space that constitutes an apparent great vault or arch over the earth 2. heaven 3. weather in the upper atmosphere Let's look at just definitions #1 and #3. As you can see, it's not possible to intelligibly talk about "sky" as if it was both the weather and the expanse of space above our heads simultaneously...therefore, you can only talk about one or the other. If a debate was about "sky as weather" then if someone talked about the expanse of space above our heads, for the purposes of such a debate, they are not talking about the "sky". 3) To deconstruct this resolution, I proffer another truth table:A = having pleasing qualities or propertiesB = worth seeking or doing as advantageous, beneficial, or wiseC = especially suitable or compatible : fittingA and B are the definitions of desirability and prudence, and C is the definition of appropriateness. Symbolically, including the exclusion, this resolution is the simple statement:((not A) and B) -> C All I am stating is the green portion of the truth table. As you can see, it essentially states, "if something is undesirable and prudent, then it may very well be appropriate". I only need to provide one case of this, and I did so via my working out example in round #2. CON must prove the red portion to uphold his burden, that if something is undesirable and prudent, it must be inappropriate. CON needs to prove this in ALL cases.ConclusionI have provided a logical proof to deconstruct the semantics of this debate and demonstrate how the exclusion is absolutely necessary to demonstrate the specific meaning of this particular resolution. The logic is valid, thus I have upheld my burden of proof.