The Argument from reasonable Non-Belief (ANB)

I thank unitedandy for his reasoned response to my argument. RelationshipsPro's case here seems to trade on the relative vagueness of the concept of what a "personal relationship" is and what it would entail. I'm highly doubtful that Pro is going to provide a list of necessary and sufficient conditions to specify what would count as a personal relationship - and considering the vast number of types and sorts of personal relationships (dad/mother, business/client, friends, etc) - I think it a little more than hasty to declare that the thought experiment relationship I presented is "not personal". Surely it doesn't follow from the fact that a relationship is not particularly fulfilling or is not optimal that it is not personal. As to Con's objections to my example he seems to miss the point. The whole example was designed to show some elements of a personal relationship (like reciprocity) where the prisoners did not have a high degree of credence about each others existence yet they were interacting with each other through taps because they thought that it was just as likely as not that there was a discernible pattern. Neither is it much an issue with my arguments that that type of relationship is neither optimal or substantially fulfilling at all times. This leads to another point of ambiguity in the way belief is used is Pro's P1. Does "...reasonable non-belief in Christianity does not exist" = "...reasonable non-belief in Christianity does not exist at any time"? This would be an incredibly strong claim and it's hard to see how Pro would argue for it especially considering the phases(s) of life that Christians call "the dark night of the soul". [1] This is a phase where people may doubt or even actively disbelieve in or be agnostic about God's very existence. Many have reported that after these phases they spiritually and morally grew which makes it especially hard to see how Pro could affirm the second reading of P1 that I proposed; yet this seems to be what his argument implicitly commits him to. So allowing for phases in which a personal relationship is neither optimal nor fulfilling isn't a strong objection against my case. Especially when you consider the fact that sub-optimal or not wholly fulfilling relationships (like my prisoner example) can blossom into something fuller and deeper when, for example, the prisoners finally make it out and meet each other face to face for the first time. It would add a whole new layer of significance when the prisoners weren't even sure if the other existed yet they were communicating with each other. This provides a nice analogy because, on Christianity, it is said that everyone will one day gain de dicto, explicit knowledge of God in the afterlife and surely the relationship between a de re believer and God would have a whole new type of significance added onto it.Benefits of de dicto beliefPro points to some benefits of de dicto belief in God but, yet, this seems to presuppose that reading of P1 as "...reasonable non-belief in Christianity does not exist at any time" and the problems with that reading have been noted. All that my arguments require is that the benefits of having explicit, de dicto belief in God will eventually be had whereas, now, in the case of some people, de re belief in God is sufficient. Pro is welcome to argue that God is/should be required to provide sufficient evidence to everyone at all times in order to prevent reasonable non-belief but I happen to think this move is not compelling due to some other benefits of not believing at certain times.Problems of de dicto non-beliefMy case was that the kind of belief that Pro's argument assumes is not actually a necessary condition for being in a personal relationship with God. Saying that certain kinds of de dicto non belief cause actions or beliefs that are antithetical to God doesn't at all even suggest that all cases of de dicto non belief cause actions or beliefs that are antithetical to God. This is just the nature of humans in general where we can have contradictory beliefs. For example, one can hate all Jews and think they are liars de dicto yet have positive affectations and think some particular Jewish guy (who one doesn't know is Jewish) is a truly honest person. That some de dicto non-belief causes evil doesn't give us any warrant to suppose that all de dicto non-belief is inharmonious with God.RationalityTo be honest, I can't really make much of this objection. Basically Pro argues that since Christians like Plantinga think God guarantees us having reliable cognitive faculties (as opposed to atheistic alternatives) and de dicto belief in God isn't required then we lose our grounding for thinking our cognitive faculties are reliable.This confuses metaphysics and epistemology as put that way they are two clearly separate subjects. Saying God "grounds", or in layman's terms, God makes it so that it is the case that our cognitive faculties are reliable is clearly a metaphysical proposition. One need not know that that metaphysical proposition is true in order to have reliable cognitive faculties. As the ancients used to say the order of being is different from the order of knowing. [2]Also, on no sensible account of "reliable cognitive faculties" does it follow from the fact we have some false de dicto beliefs that we have reason to doubt our cognitive faculties as a whole.Criticisms extendedPro seems to intimate that I'm making an illegitimate move by "assuming" the truth of Christianity. This is puzzling because I can't see the force of this. If I, for example, say "naturalism can't accommodate objective moral facts" and the naturalist replies with several different theories on how naturalism might do just that it'd be ridiculous for me to shout "But you're illegitimately assuming naturalism!" And furthermore, my position does not entail at all non belief is rescued by de re belief in God. Me presenting a situation in which a reasonable non-theist could be saved and have a personal relationship with God - by, say, unknowingly loving the Good - does not entail that my position commits me to the claim that all de dicto non-belief is rescued by de re belief. Heaven and HellAssuming objections go through Pro claims that it's unclear de re belief in God is sufficient citing John 14:6 and Mark 16:16. Without any arguments for this is utterly begging the question by assuming that belief in question is de dicto. Inclusivists believe wholeheartedly in John 14:6 and Mark 16:16 but take a wider (I would say accurate) view of what belief really means.John says, "Jesus answered, 'I am the way and the truth and the life. No one comes to the Father except through me.'" Juxtapose that with this:Matt 25: 34-40"Then the King will say to those on his right, ‘Come, you who are blessed by my Father; take your inheritance, the kingdom prepared for you since the creation of the world. For I was hungry and you gave me something to eat, I was thirsty and you gave me something to drink, I was a stranger and you invited me in, I needed clothes and you clothed me, I was sick and you looked after me, I was in prison and you came to visit me.'"Then the righteous will answer him, ‘Lord, when did we see you hungry and feed you, or thirsty and give you something to drink? When did we see you a stranger and invite you in, or needing clothes and clothe you? When did we see you sick or in prison and go to visit you?'"The King will reply, ‘I tell you the truth, whatever you did for one of the least of these brothers of mine, you did for me.'"Is there really any tension here? None that I can see. They followed the ways of Jesus and presumably believed in the Good yet they did not know it.Sources[1] http://en.wikipedia.org...[2] http://apologetics315.blogspot.com...