The KCA is sound

Pro implies that the concept of "beginning to exist" is essentially a non-controversial concept, defining it as "If X comes into being at a point in the finite past, such that it had a first moment of its existence, X necessarily has a cause" and that he bears no particular burden of proof but that "IF things DID begin to exist, then they would have a cause." Firstly, how would one define the case of something "beginning"? One could invoke common sense and intuition to point out for example the opponent himself, to me, to a chair- just about anything in the universe. After all, if things do not begin to exist, did he or I or a chair ALWAYS exist? It's important to note "You" or the "chair" are labels given to particular arrangements of pre-existing materials that have formed in a constant state of flux. In this one could say they "began to exist" as the formation. Certainly this satisfies the opponent's criteria of "X", in this case a particular arrangement had "begun" to exist from a finite past. However, what follows in his definition is problematic since because of the constant state of flux, the idea of its "first moment of existence" isn't very well defined and are often times arbitrary. For one, from what point does the ocean become the beach? To claim despite this that there is a "first moment of existence" here is as nonsensical as claiming "Y" (a label given to one cheerleader formation) begins to exist in an ever-changing series of cheerleader formations. In any case, even if we were to gloss over these points and accept this loose sense of "beginning", it's worth pointing out that always, there are material existing already for it to be caused and for it TO cause anything. This brings the question of "cause", the second important key word in the first premise of the KCA. It is important to note, however in quantum mechanics, however, things such as quantum fluctuation occur spontaneously, perhaps not without cause but certainly without any external ones. Once again this already requires things to exist for there to be any form of cause. But what does this have to do with the KCA? It's important to point out what's evidenced in the case of anything "beginning to exist", and one that the argument requires. Pro will have to agree that the "beginning" referred to in the first premise points to a qualitatively different kind than one we are familiar with. This "beginning" of course alludes to something "beginning to exist" via a creative god, as the conclusion alludes to, causing the universe to exist without any physical ingredients. However, this particular brand of "beginning to exist" is not of being evidenced, and it is importantly to stress just how qualitatively different it is from the previous case of "causality". Certainly, ANYTHING beginning to exist in this sense would in fact be a direct violation of the First Law. Despite this, Pro goes on to claim that he doesn't have to prove THAT things begin to exist, but that IF they do, they would have a cause. Given the fact that we have no evidence of things beginning to exist in the creative sense, this is essentially nothing more than a bare assertion. The question of cause is of course similarly important, in that we now have a question of what evidence we do have of god conceivably being able to cause a creation from nothing. In what Pro called a purely efficient cause, god is said to have caused, without material to act upon, to create the material. The problem of course is that this, like the concept of a "beginning" as a creative process, is but a bare assertion and one that is in fact incoherent. In any and all examples of efficient cause/causation, it requires a material cause TO be effected. A sculptor must chip at a block of marble to form a statue. Otherwise, how could there be any statue to begin with? Arguably, it is the connection of the second premise that the universe "began to exist" with the first premise that "whatever begins to exist has a cause" in that under the "evidenced" variety of the first premise is truly uncontroversial. The latter, qualitatively different flavour of a creation from nothing, however, is not and because of this, does not pass the test of scrutiny for it to be accepted. Pro began with pointing out the purported absurdity of an "actual infinite". However, even a cursory glance at the objection proves to be misguided, in that essentially he mistakenly treats infinity as a finite number, and not a concept. In essence he had attempted to put a cap at each "ends" of infinity, treating them as if they're finite numbers, rightly deriving absurd conclusions from this, then proclaiming therefore infinity itself is impossible. Indeed, Josh Dever has pointed this exact thing in his critique of the attack on "actual infinity" in saying that "this oddity, mathematicians have long since conceded, is not indicative of any problem – it's just a failure of ideas about the finite to extend to the infinite".[2] Furthermore, it is worth pointing out that infinity is an important aspect of physics and cosmology. Pro continues to argue the 2nd premise, citing the Second Law of Thermodynamics as evidence that the universe could not have existed in the eternal past, which would have resulted in maximum entropy and thus a heat death in which life is impossible. This of course is false, as of course life DOES exist and that we are nowhere near heat death. The problem here of course is that this isn't an argument for the beginning of the universe but one against the outdated Steady State theory. However, we have more than ample evidence of a change in entropy in a finite past in a cataclysmic expansion of space, time and energy in an event called The Big Bang. The Pro then cites the BVG theorem which seems to be a knock-down evidence of the beginning of the universe: that not only did the universe begin to exist, it HAD to have begun to exist, and that even if there is no evidence of anything "beginning to exist" in the sense that the Kalam Cosmological Argument requires, the theorem proves that is in fact the ONLY solution. But is it truly the case? Simply put, Pro has rather been presumptuous with what the conclusion of the theorem states, and that though the theorem states "our universe probably doesn't exist infinitely into the past" , this doesn't automatically translate to the notion that the "universe began to exist", not least of which because it fails to rule out many other theorems, such as the No Boundary Proposal which suggests time to be finite but without beginning (much like a sphere), or even Vilenkin's works which suggest that the universe "began" in fact without the aid of a god. In fact, the BVG itself states: "What can lie beyond the boundary? Several possibilities have been discussed, one being that the boundary of the inflating region corresponds to the beginning of the Universe in a quantum nucleation event." This is a direct reference to Vilenkin's 1982 paper which discusses the "birth" of a universe through quantum mechanics from a quantum "nothing", which is still "something" or in short, a "universe". Even this "creation from nothing" in fact requires the existence of pre-existing material, which here is in the form of a quantum vacuum field. In short, it directly contradicts the claim that the BVG posits an "absolute nothing" from which the universe arose as Pro suggests. This finally leads to the conclusion of the Kalam Cosmological Argument, that the universe therefore has a cause of its existence. The argument follows deductively, but given the lack of evidence to support the previous premises, especially the first, the conclusion can be deemed as not sound. [1]http://www.merriam-webster.com...... [2]https://webspace.utexas.edu...... [3]http://www.onpointradio.org......