God exists. You can't escape it. (TAG debate)

IntroductionIn my last round, I want to revisit the 2 basic contentions I laid out in R1:1. There are good reasons to think TAG is flawed.2. There are better alternatives to TAG which are compatible with atheismNotice, if either of these contentions have been met, it is enough to negate the resolution. I contend that in actual fact, both of these have been surpassed beyond any reasonable doubt, and will try to show this as best I can. Some general criticisms - the fallacies of TAGIn my second post, I began by highlighting 3 fallacies generally present within Pro’s argument - the fallacy of false dichotomy, the argument from ignorance and straw-manning. By R4, Pro finally managed to dissolve 2 of these fallacies by acknowledging that his internal critique of atheism was neither sufficient, nor even primary in determining the affirmation of the debate resolution. As a result, most of his case was self demoted, and I invited Pro to present a detailed, positive case for TAG in its place, which he failed to do. He also managed, rather belatedly, to distance himself from wildly generalised and factually inaccurate statements, such as atheists necessarily acknowledging only the material, or having to believe morality to be subjective or non-existent. Yet again, this came at a price. In order to disentangle himself here, Pro basically recognised that criticisms which saturated his first 2 or 3 posts were simply inapplicable. Yet again, much of these criticisms were rightly recognised as irrelevant by Pro himself. Lastly, the biggest criticism I have of Pro’s TAG is that it is blatantly arguing from ignorance. In every single area, Pro picks a particularly vexing philosophical problem, announces that God accounts for it in his worldview (with no more detail than this), and then demands solutions to these problems from the atheist. The most brazen example of this was in the uniformity of nature point in R2:“Only the Christian worldview has a rational basis for the uniformity of nature and make induction rational. Con has no rational basis to assume the uniformity of nature, he is again borrowing from my worldview. I would like to know Con's view on the problem of induction.”When pressed about this, he gave a similar response in R4:“God created and governs the universe, as I already stated. Con has yet to give any rational basis for the uniformity of nature and induction.If there is an argument in here, I cannot find it, and this only one example of Pro’s constant assumptions for the existence of God.MoralityWith regards to morality, I want to return to 3 key areas. Firstly, I said in the beginning that I saw no good reason to think that morality requires CW. Pro made no attempt to show a logical incoherence or even some sort of tension in my view, and responded only by insisting that I had to bear the BoP in his argument! I then gave a general account of atheistic moral realism, noting that whatever framework one adopts, certain basic actions are wrong, and as such even by ignoring contentious issues in normative ethics, we can ground morality within the natural world. Pro did not respond. Secondly, I asked how Pro would show that morality existed, even if he were successful in proving secular morality to be false. His answer was baffling:“Yes I assume that God accounts for morality because he revealed it to me (and to all).”Again, Pro presumes both that morality necessarily requires God (the whole point of TAG), that morality exists, as well as demanding that everyone else “have a rational basis for it”. This is the mother of all circularity. Thirdly, I gave the Euthyphro dilemma, and Pro responded to my last post by selecting one of the horns, affirming that God cannot have control over his own nature. The problem here however is that if God is not responsible for His omnibenevolent nature, how can He be responsible for morality? In conclusion then, I see no reason to discard secular ethics, no reason to believe in morality at all if Pro was successful in demonstrating the failure of atheistic moral realism, and justification for believing that there is huge difficulties with theistic morality.EpistemologyFoundationalismHere, I presented and defended an alternative epistemic justification to RE, and Pro now gives 2 new criticisms, finally making his way to briefly responding to FB’s criteria, and also stating that it is controversial. As regards to the first point, I simply disagree with Pro that there aren’t some things which are conceptually self-evident. I know, for example, that married bachelors do not exist, not because I assume this, but by understanding that a married, unmarried man is a contradiction in terms. This is true by DEFINITION. As for claiming that FB is controversial, while I agree, this is no grounds for negating it in favour of an even less fancied position in RE.REHere I gave 4 criticisms of RE, only 2 of which have recent responses. First, Pro admits there is a conflict between RE and evidentialism, and bites the bullet in favouring revelation. Obviously, this seems, by definition to be irrational. We should instead follow the evidence wherever it may lead, and since RE can deny even the most compelling evidence, we should reject its application as the grounds for knowledge. Also he claimed unbelief affirms biblical truth. Right, but non-resistant non-belief doesn’t:Be content with what you have, for God has said, "Never will I leave you; never will I forsake you." So say with confidence, "The Lord is my helper; I will not be afraid." - Hebrews 13:5,6Given that RE has to deny that this exists, it is again simply at odds with the evidence we have.Pro also dropped the Great Pumpkin objection, and never once responded to the criticism I gave of RE as a form of reliabilism. Extend all arguments.To return to the argument from R1:P1 - If CF is more plausible than RE, then belief in the existence of God must be justified evidentially in order to be a rationally held belief.P2 - CF is more plausible than REC - Therefore, the existence of God must be justified evidentially in order to be a rationally held belief.Both of us seem to agree that P1 is true. As for P2, given the intractable problems of RE and the ease with which CF was defended, I contend that P2 has been affirmed, and thus that TAG has been defeated here as well.LAHere I gave 3 criticisms of TAG from LA, and Pro’s only response in the last round was to my additional argument for atheism using LA. He simply denied P2 by appealing to God’s absolute mind, but as I said previously, God cannot account for LA here because God’s mind is what it is and not something else. In other words, it is bound by the law of identity, and cannot account for it anymore than anything else can. Given that both Pro and I agree that God must account for LA if He exists, since He can't, he does not exist.Pro also dropped my 3 criticisms of TAG:1. Knowledge of LA (R3)2. Distinction between conceptual and existent LA (R1)3. Fallacies shown in R2. Extend all arguments.Uniformity of NatureHere, Pro alludes Strawson and the absurdity of inductive scepticism by conflating them both, and then concluding that while the alternatives to believing induction are ridiculous, this in no way rescues induction. Apart from the fact that he undermines his entire case with this reasoning, he is still wrong. Strawson wasn’t critical of inductive scepticism because it was an inconvenient problem, his claim was that it self-refuting “because the statement of reasonable expectation is analytically true”. As for inductive scepticism being absurd, this, along with prima facie support for the usefulness and necessity of induction,in conjunction with Strawson is strong justification to accept the uniformity of nature, although I still maintain this is an argument from ignorance. ConclusionAll in all, I don’t think Pro succeeds in even presenting a proper case for TAG, and certainly not one that the atheist need worry about.