God Probably Exists

I want to clarify a point about the rule against multiplying entities. Saying that entities should not be unnecessarily multiplied because X is more probable than X and Y is not involved in this debate. My opponent seems to be saying that the probability that one god exists and no other god or gods exist is more probable than that a god exists and another god or other gods exist. This argument is closer to the form: X and not Y is more probable than X and Y. Saying just X is true is different than saying X and not Y is true. If I only say X is true then the scenarios in which I am right are X and Y, and X and not Y, and so on. However, if I say X and not Y is true the range of scenarios narrows: X and Y is out and X and Y is as likely as X and not Y. A similar statements can be said about the mental/non mental issue. My opponent's argument seems to take the form of that consciousness exists and everything but consciousness does not exist is more probable than that consciousness and non-mental items exist. Why should we rule out that conscious may be the product of physical processes? In the opening examples my opponent gives, I would say in such cases I rely only on basic inductive reasoning. I will define inductive reasoning as the idea that the more examples of two things occurring together in the past the more likely they will occur together in the future. In the closing door example, I have many examples of people closing doors and no examples of plain doors closing themselves. Accordingly I conclude someone most likely closed the door or the wind caught it etc. This type of reasoning does not seem to be applicable here because we are dealing with a god or gods. I do not directly have a set of examples involving a god or gods acting to use to allow me to say that when this happens it is usually one god doing it. In addition, there is a diiference between saying something is not useful for an explanation and saying that it probably does not exist. If something truly has no additional explanatory value, then I would save mental energy and not worry about it. If X provided an explanation, I would not worry if X and Y were true or if X and not Y were true or if X and Z were true (assuming Y and Z had no other implications to worry about). However, if someone told me that the truth of X and not Y was definitely more probable than both X and Y being true, the evidence needed would be different and I would then care if Y or not Y was true. The probability of Y, not Y, and Z becomes important differently than just being useful originally. The existence of more than one god has important implications in a wide range of debates. I will pick just one example. The arguments go as follows: if there is one god and we are living in the mind of god, then to the extent there are truths of morality and justice, they must come from this god. Why, then, do we see so much evil? If god knew there would be so much suffering, why did he create or at least create the way he did? Also, if there is no non mental stuff, why would we have experiences in which it seems so obvious the non mental suff exists? Did god intend the trick? These are often questions people use in concluding no god exists. But besides that and for the present purpose, introducing multiple gods provides distinct explanations: i) There are multiple supernatural beings with different rules for what is just, ii) One of many gods created this world, this god is capable of mistake, and did not get things quite right. iii) There is not one single god on which all truths are based, and we are not looking at one set of truths in one Mind. Finally, Occam's Razor does not demand we just adopt the simipiliest explanation. Such a rule would lead me to believe that only my mind exists. My own mind is the only thing of which I am certain. Sure there could be other minds and non mental things, but I can explain everything without them. Everything I see, experience, and think about could exist ony in my mind like in a dream. This is simple and all that is needed is sonething that I am certain is true: my mind. But saying that all I need is my mind to explain things is different than saying other minds or other non mental things probably does not exist. Saying that one god is all that is needed to explain things is different than saying other gods probably do not exist.