Animals are not entitled to protective rights.

1. This is an ad populum fallacy. Because people support it does not mean it is desirable. We are debating the validity of animal rights, not democracy. I do not believe that ad populum can be relevant to democratic demands – which must be popular by definition. At times when popularity itself is to decide an issue, such as the public right to demand restrictions on persons’ ability to needlessly harm animals, then measurements of relative popularity do not represent logical fallacies. As to his proposition that “we are not discussing democracy,” I believe that we are. After all, we are discussing whether or not humans should set up societal rules. In this case rules regarding the treatment of animals. 3. People who participate in animal cruelty may very well be exhibiting psychological issues. However, this is not meant to protect the animal, but to protect other people. As a matter of public health, people who participate in this may be required to submit to psychological tests, but animals' welfare is not relevant, and does not need to be protected. On another note, my opponent's pathos is delightful. We agree, and I note that we are both presenting the same propositions, but with different conclusions. 2, 4, 5, 6. I group these arguments together because they are essentially the same argument. Laws protecting animals are helpful to humanity. I dont deny there are many ways(a great deal more than 4) that hurting animals hurts us, and not protecting them hurts us. But consider the arguments my opponent is making. Their 'rights' are dependent on whether they help us or not. Again, we are using the same propositions to reach different conclusions. I also agree that “animals do not have rights as we apply them to humans.” Which is how I restate my partner’s final statement here. I am arguing that human behavior can, and should be regulated – even as pertains to animals. It would make sense that a veterinarian may treat a cow in order to prevent it from giving diseased milk. By that same token, if the cow stops producing milk, the cow will probably be slaughtered. So, in truth, the cow has no 'right' to life, we just need it to live long enough to suit our purposes. I will post this as a final example of how we are agreeing on most of the propositions, yet concluding very different arguments from these propositions. Again, we agree here: the cow does not enjoy the same right to its life as a human would, nor should it. But we must regulate the behavior of people – including the people who handle this cow. If a government or company realizes that a certain species is being overhunted, then they can make laws regulating how many can be killed per year. My partner makes several other points in presenting this argument, but I want to isolate this statement in particular. This statement essentially lines up our conclusion to our premises, and should count as more or less a full concession to my case, that in at least some cases, animals should be spared mistreatment. My partner makes the case that we should spare them mistreatment if it serves our interests, I agree, and the debate is settled. Animals are to be afforded some protections in some cases. That there are those instances where animal rights also benefit human welfare is simply not relevant to my case: it was my task to demonstrate that there exist certain circumstances where animals should be spared some mistreatment, I have done so, and my partner has agreed that what I say is so. The only substantive variance is in the stances of the competing arguments: my partner feels that because the animals themselves have o lawmaking ability, there should be no laws for humans pertaining to their welfare and proper handling. I feel certain that I have demonstrated that this is beside the point: the laws pertain only to humans, these laws are properly implemented, and there are good reasons for the public to demand such laws.