LD Debate: Attorney-Client Privilege

I would like to take this opportunity to thank TheOncomingStorm for his prompt reply, and for engaging with me in this debate. In this round, I will defend my own case, rebut Pro's case, and then conclude with some reasons to VOTE CON. CON's CASE V: Justice - Pro agree with my definition and interpretation of justice. This is sufficient for the purposes of this debate, regardless of the source. Moreover, Pro drops my lengthy analysis of Rawls's argument, which can best be summed up in three succinct points: (1) justice requires us to help the vulnerable, (2) rights are deontological and absolute protections, (3) distribution helps the vulnerable, but so do many other things, including the right to life and attorney-client privilege. Rawls's theory is not defined by distribution, as Pro would have us believe. Rather, it is defined by an enduring belief that justice requires us to treat everyone fairly and equally, and that the vulnerable should be protected. This belief gives rise to the notion of distribution, but the belief itself is not characterized by what it begets. For example, libertarians believe that government should be limited, but this is not their only, or even their primary, belief. The same can be said of Rawls's notion of justice. Distribution is a component, but so too are the need to protect the vulnerable and the need to be fair. Therefore, Rawls's ideas have direct relevance to the topic at hand. Those accused of crimes are vulnerable. This is something I have always contended, and my opponent has NEVER disputed. As I said in the tagline of my contention in my very first speech: attorney-client privilege is essential to protecting the vulnerable, i.e., those facing prosecution. Consequently, if we accept that attorney-client privilege has tangible benefits to the vulnerable, and that it is a right, we must also accept that it is an absolute, inviolate protection under Rawlsian Theory, and therefore trumps truth-seeking efforts. C: VOI - Here I have shown how Pro's own source directly bolsters my own claims. Pro also NEVER addresses the fact that there are two criteria inherent within justice: rules must (1) be the same for all and (2) be advantageous for the vulnerable. If justice requires rules to be advantageous for the vulnerable, like those accused of crimes, then the only way to ensure justice is to equally attorney-client privilege, which protects the accused. Pro makes a new argument here in the final round regarding the notion of a "veil." The veil serves a purpose in obtaining an objective, impartial view of justice. There is no actual "veil;" it is merely a thought experiment through which one can abstract oneself from the confines of society to think about moral norms in a different way. Thus, there is no actual loss of knowledge. Moreover, even if the veil where real, it is only a temporary occurrence that would soon restore truth after the creation of moral laws. It seems as if Pro does not understand Rawls's argument here. Behind the veil, truth is actually a bad thing because it allows us to be biased. If actors behind the veil knew that they would be rich in the real world, they would create rules that benefit the rich--this skewing of the system would be inherently unfair. Thus, truth in that case would actually be harmful. Finally, I am not saying that the criminal justice system should be under a veil, rather that rules from under the veil should be applied in the system. Thus, we are not hiding truth from the law enforcers as Pro seems to imply. Most importantly though, this argument of Pro's is new in the last round, and therefore illicit. C1: Pro says he is confused by the notion that privilege is not a significant barrier to truth. Here is my explanation: attorney-client privilege encourages a client to reveal, in secret, incriminating information to his attorney. The attorney cannot reveal this information to the court due to the privilege. Conversely, in a world without attorney-client privilege, client's would not reveal incriminating information to their attorney. The attorney cannot reveal this information to the court because his client has not given him the information. In both scenarios, one with privilege, one without, the exact same information is withheld from the court, meaning that regardless of which scenario you choose, there is no tangible benefit to truth-seeking efforts. Logically then, privilege is not a significant impediment to truth. This analysis was laid out more succinctly in my Harvard evidence [1] and can be extended. Pro NEVER rebuts this evidence; this will become significant in the debate. DROPS: Pro asserts that the arguments he dropped last round are not vital insomuch as those rights are unimportant in the face of truth-seeking. Sure--I'll grant that if you buy truth-seeking then you buy that these rights are so important. But, if you buy my fairness interpretation, which treats rights as things which cannot be violated, then you must accept that I am upholding my framework through these points. PRO's CASE V: Justice - Pro contends that he can argue the ideal--that is not what LD is about. LD is about philosophical clash, not ill-defined utopian societies in which police never abuse power. Philosophy recognizes the fact that the world is not perfect, and therefore both Pro and Con must confront that reality. My argument here is that truth-seeking NECESSARILY involves an abuse of power. To argue for truth-seeking, we must argue for the restriction or wanton dismissal of a right, in this particular case the right to attorney-client confidentiality. By trampling upon that right, authorities are NECESSARILY abusing their power. If you refer back to the cop example I offered, you can see relevant parallels. Just as the cop ransacked the house to discover incriminating evidence, so too will officials violate your private conversations to discover incriminating statements. Both are fundamental incursions into your rights sphere--one is a violation of the sanctity of your property, the other is a violation of the sanctity of your privacy. If Pro asserts that rights can be violated in one case in order to find the truth, I do not see how Pro can claim that other such violations would be preventable. Pro tries to say that he doesn't have to defend the cop example because of the nature of LD. Yet, if he defends truth-seeking as a doctrine of the criminal justice system, which is his burden, he must also defend the cop ransacking the home for this reason: there is no non-arbitrary distinction between it and loss of privilege. Pro has never even TRIED to differentiate between these two cases. Therefore, if one is permissible, so too is the other. The ends do not justify the means, as Pro himself implies when he shuns the idea of the cop ransacking the home. This example, and Pro's reaction too it, destroy the idea that we can justify the search for the truth based on the results we achieve. Let us apply this analysis to an example Pro has brought up in the course of this debate. Pro says it does not matter how the evidence was acquired as long as the verdict is correct. But, inasmuch as Pro agrees that the cop's actions were wrong, Pro defeats his own argument because it DOES MATTER how the evidence is collected. The process must be fair in order to legitimate the verdict. Therefore, if the judicial process is unfair--as my contention one proves--then we must VOTE CON. C: I have already addressed what LD is. Cross-apply my evidence [1] here--privilege is not barrier to seeking the truth. Thus, I'm not precluding linkage into Pro's C. Moreover, truth is subjective. If this is so, we can never understand it absolutely. Therefore, epistemologically, Pro CANNOT achieve his own C of understanding truth--it's not comprehensible in that sense. Pro states that we cannot be partial to the facts--yet, we can still interpret those facts partially. If you give two lawyers the same piece of evidence--the same fact--they can come up with alternative interpretations of what occurred. Thus, truth, what happened according to the fact, is indeed subjective. C1: (1) Again, Pro concedes that few innocents are harmed. Also, because privilege does not impede truth-finding, privilege won't actually cause innocents to die. (2) I hardly think the Constitution is the system. It informs the system, but it is not the same thing as the system. There a hundreds of codified rules and law as well as judicial customs that make up the system. My argument is that there are certain fundamental rights expressed within the Constitution that must be upheld within that complex system. I am using Constitutional rights to prove a concept that has grown out of custom--that's not begging the question. Moreover, Pro drops that the Constitutionality is an important principle--earlier Pro argued that we should debate principles, and I have met that standard here. C2: Cross-apply Harvard [1] and my rebuilt Cop example/clarification here. VOTING ISSUES 1 - Pro concedes my interpretation of justice. Therefore, justice is fairness. It is not fair to further disadvantage the vulnerable, i.e. the accused 2 - Privilege does not impede truth-seeking. This takes out a lot of his offense against my case, because Pro claims that I am preventing the acquisition of the truth. In fact, I am doing no such thing. 3 - The Cop example goes Con. It shows that the process must be fair in order to legitimate the verdict. Therefore, if the judicial process is unfair--as my contention one proves--then a Con ballot is in order. Ultimately, privilege provides due process protections for the vulnerable and increases judicial fairness while not actually impeding truth-seeking goals. Therefore, privilege is beneficial and fair, and ought to take precedence in this debate. Thank you, and VOTE CON! SOURCE 1 - Dashjian, 1982, "The Attorney-Client Privilege...," CA Law Review, No. 70, p. 1052-4