Impeding a Rising China

U.S. Interest AnalysisMy opponent concedes that there are grave issues within the Asian region meaning it is a vital area of the world for U.S. interests. However, he argues that hedging was attempted against the U.S.S.R. and it had minimal effects. The first problem with this argument is that my opponent conflates hedging with containment. These are two strategies which always get conflated within the realm of international relations. It is possible to have containment within a hedging strategy, but that is simply one aspect. Containment is a much more rigid and inflexible strategy used to destroy the target nation by restricting outside life forces and to prevent the spread of an ideology. Hedging doesn’t seek to destroy the target nation, but rather prevent an increase in power. [1] The second problem with this argument is that Containment was used against the U.S.S.R. when its dominance was more or less equal to the power of the U.S. The world in which containment was utilized in was a bipolar world, which meant the U.S.S.R. could act militarily through proxy agents to block U.S. containment. As evident by my opponent’s argument under C1: China is far behind the U.S. in terms of military capability making an outright military block to hedging unlikely. The third problem is that my opponent’s comparison to Korea and Vietnam are false comparisons. The geopolitical makeup of the region is completely different from the East under the U.S.S.R. China has only one true proxy agent in the region, and that is North Korea. Hedging in the comprehensive sense of the word is to create various agreements and alliances around China without directly confronting China unless necessary, e.g. attack on Taiwan. Even Vietnam is helping the U.S. hedge against China – Jordan writes, “The effort by Hanoi to define the basis for expanded defense and security cooperation with the U.S. can partly be explained as part of a Vietnamese attempt to hedge bets in a contest with a vigorously assertive and aggressively inclined China, and encouraging economic relationships that will contribute to modernization. Hanoi sees the acceptance of the formality of a defense relationship with Washington as one way of coping with China’s strategic intentions of increasing its influence in East Asia. Beijing’s efforts to prevent what it portrays as Washington’s “containment” of China have actually compelled Vietnam to enter into a closer relationship with the U.S., especially in the realm of defense and security.” [2] In other words, the inflammatory Chinese remarks of containment and breaking out of U.S. influence has create a backlash of Asian nations against China and to revert to U.S.-strategic alliances. Vietnam is on the lower end of these agreements but considering Vietnam is an ideological brother of China demonstrates the fear Asian nations have of Chinese adventurism. C1: China has been acting more aggressively as its military and economic prowess grows My opponent’s argument about Chinese development is true within the context of the status quo, but hedging is a proactive and preventive strategy. Whereas China cannot truly compete with the U.S. now, it is important that the U.S. prevents Chinese blocks to U.S. access and influence. As evident by my argument in the first round, China is building defense layers around the strategic seas, such as the South China Sea. The reason for this is to block access of the U.S. Thus, hedging is a method of preventing the time when China can actually push U.S. influence out of the region. C2: Hedging Advantages Again my opponent falls into the mistake of misapplying my argument to points of direct conflict. Hedging is to deter Chinese aggression in the region – as long as the U.S. can assist its allies in creating a military force which makes it disadvantageous for China to act coercively then hedging has achieved part of its goals. That being said, my proposals help to contextualize the specifics of hedging. If the U.S. should sell F-16s or F-15s the principle holds true that the U.S. should assist in some capacity to deter China from acting against its neighbors. The argument you make against trilateralism mistakes the intention of the proposal. This trilateral agreement deals with intelligence and defensive security, such as protecting the freedom of navigation. Moreover, as clear by the evidence from round 1, it is in the clear interests of both countries to form a trilateral agreement to protect themselves from the acts of North Korea and aggressive acts by China. Whereas other countries in NATO may not have had direct interests in Vietnam, both countries have dire interests when it comes to their neighbors in the region – one of which is viewed as an irrational nation and the other who seeks regional dominance. C3: preventing a nuclear arms race. My opponent has only responded to one small aspect of the argument. On balance, U.S. conventional forces, missile deployments and naval and airpower reinforce U.S. prowess in the region which reassures our allies. If the U.S. is kicked from the region due to an expanding Chinese presence, it only makes sense that other countries counter-balance the North Korean and Chinese nuclear threat. Even if the U.S. deploys a nuclear umbrella in the region, China would be put into a situation of MAD. Thus, China would be balanced. This is preferable to an arms race between multiple competing countries, because it would simply be between two major powers and one minor power. [1] http://www.lowyinterpreter.org... [2] http://www.heritage.org... My opponent has conceded the source points to me.