The US vs China (war game debate)

First, since this scenario has solidified around nuclear warfare, some definitions (all from wikipedia to remain consistent with my opponent):First strike: In nuclear strategy, a first strike is a preemptive surprise attack employing overwhelming force. First strike capability is a country's ability to defeat another nuclear power by destroying its arsenal to the point where the attacking country can survive the weakened retaliation while the opposing side is left unable to continue war.Second strike: In nuclear strategy, a second-strike capability is a country's assured ability to respond to a nuclear attack with powerful nuclear retaliation against the attacker. To have such an ability (and to convince an opponent of its viability) is considered vital in nuclear deterrence, as otherwise the other side might be tempted to try to win a nuclear war in one massive first strike against its opponent's own nuclear forces.MAD: The doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) assumes that each side has enough nuclear weaponry to destroy the other side; and that either side, if attacked for any reason by the other, would retaliate without fail with equal or greater force. The expected result is an immediate irreversible escalation of hostilities resulting in both combatants' mutual, total andassured destruction. The doctrine further assumes that neither side will dare to launch a first strike because the other side will launch on warning (also called fail-deadly) or with secondary forces (a second strike), resulting in unacceptable losses for both parties. IntroductionAs expected, CON has argued against the validity of nuclear warfare as a means of achieving strategic goals in TOTAL WAR, and has argued that non-military considerations would make prosecution of the war extremely difficult for the US. Both of these points are not applicable to this scenario for several reasons:1) Nuclear warfare is a valid strategic concern for all nations.2) Non-military considerations are irrelevant to this scenario. TOTAL WAR demands a MILITARY solution, especially since the parameters of this scenario preclude "diplomatic, economic or cultural opportunities to avoid full scale war".CON has also brought in possible retaliation from other nations. Again, this is irrelevant. Even if parts of Russia and east Asia are subject to fallout from nuclear warfare, their subsequent actions are irrelevant to this debate, as CON has clearly stated that "The conflict is entirely isolated to the US and China (unless the players agree to a spillover, such as troop movements in Mexico, Canada, North Korea, or etc.) The UK and Russia are sidelined. "PRO does NOT agree to spill-over, as anything and everything can be attributed to "spill over", to include stationing of troops in Japan by the US, or China positioning nuclear silos along the Sino-Russian border to provoke a Russian nuclear counter-strike if the US attempts to neutralize the Chinese deterrent in a first strike. RebuttalChina does NOT possess a credible second strike capacityCON's case rests upon a credible Chinese second strike capacity, but according to West Point, this capacity DOES NOT EXIST: The small ICBM force (roughly two dozen missiles) is structurally and doctrinally configured for MAD, though its second strike has historically lacked credibility. The deployed continental United States (CONUS)-capable ICBM force is based exclusively in silos. It has no strategic early warning infrastructure to permit launchunder-attack (LUA)/launch-on-warning (LOW). As a result, the operational survivability of China’s nuclear retaliatory capability vis-à-vis major nuclear powers was and probably still is open to question, particularly in the context of an all-out preemptive decapitation strike. [1] As of 2004, China possessed only two dozen CONUS-capable ICBMs, no early warning structure, all housed in silos (i.e. no mobility), easily destroyed by a US first-strike. This is not a credible retaliatory capability.As of March 2013, a working group on this specific issue recommended assuming that China had a second-strike capability, but also acknowledged the inherent weaknesses in China's current capacity. China currently has less than 15 mobile ICBM systems that could strike CONUS, leading the working group to readily acknowledged the lack of credibility in a Chinese second strike:""Trying to retain the credibility of its nuclear deterrent in the face of a [ballistic missile defense] system, China may increase its nuclear arsenal until it is beyond doubt that it is large enough." Chinese writers rarely provide specific numbers, but Chu and Rung suggest that perhaps 200 nuclear warheads would be needed today, with that number increasing to 300-400 in the future." [2]Basically, a credible second-strike capacity requires 200 warheads, China has at most 15 that would stand any reasonable chance of surviving a pre-emptive US strike. PRO concedes that China is rapidly modernizing, but we are talking about TOTAL WAR NOW, not about strategic future plans.CON attempts to argue that silos are hard to detect, and oddly enough presents a detected US nuclear silo from Google Earth as evidence of how difficult it is to find one. CON's point is counter-intuitive enough...satellite technology easily detected a US-based silo, they can detect Chinese silos as well. There are not many silos anyway, since China does not have a large ICBM component. What lends credibility to a second-strike capacity is the mobility of ICBMs, either through mobile launch platforms or through submarine-based systems inherent in American platforms like the UGM-133 Trident II (http://en.wikipedia.org...). China does not have either capacity in an appreciable degree, and so does NOT have a credible second-strike capability. Bottom line, most of China's nuclear capacity is theater-specific and confined to east Asia. America on the other hand has the world's pre-eminent nuclear capacity, capable of annihilating the entire world several times over. There is no contest here. CON is not presenting a credible argument about the nuclear capacity of both sides. ---CON's point about "Congressional obstruction, public outrage, international interference and public appeals for mercy from the Chinese people" are irrelevant. Both sides know about the nuclear capacity of both nations, and will be consumed with warranted fear due to the unprecedented nature of nuclear war between nuclear powers. For China to make "public appeals for mercy" is ridiculous given CON's stipulations of "no diplomatic, economic or cultural opportunities to avoid full scale war." This is TOTAL WAR, not merciful conflict.There is only one solution to end this conflict: a military solution.--- CON assumes that B-2 stealth bombers "cannot realistically travel across the Pacific Ocean, into Chinese airspace, and accurately deliver nuclear weapons onto hardened Chinese DF-5A missile silos in large enough quantities to destroy them." This is simply not accurate for several reasons: 1) B-2 bombers can strike anywhere in China from Hawaii undetected.2) This point is irrelevant given US ICBM technology and lack of Chinese early detection systems.3) Conventional precision-guided munitions [PGMs] are capable of disabling nuclear silos. [1] ConclusionNuclear war is all that matters between nuclear powers. The US will outright win any nuclear conflict against any opponent save Russia. This war-game scenario involving China is a non-starter, although PRO will readily acknowledge that as soon as 5 years from now China may indeed possess an independent, credible second-strike capability, and thus a credible deterrent. However, we are not talking about 5 years from now, we are talking about TOTAL WAR NOW. CON thus does not have a credible case. [1] http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil...[2] http://csis.org...