Argument for the Non-Existence of God

Thanks DraggledBovid for taking part in this debate. Proposition 1 was granted. Proposition 2 was objected to because the word “being” needs to be defined. This is an odd objection since my opponent used the word “being” in the previous proposition successfully and without difficulty. Yet, we need a definition? Response to 2 (in general): a) I dismiss this objection on the grounds that definitionism is an inadequate way of attacking a proof. E.g. what’s the definition of a definition? b) “Defining” being, I’d say, is equal to defining human being, i.e., what it means to be human. Everyone knows this is a strenuous and impossible task. But I say this because most cultures believe humans to be in the image of God (or God to be within us). So God’s being cannot simply stand to mean "existence". It must be understood through the meaning of human being. But is it necessary for us to "define" what it means to be human before we go on to understand what it means for God to have being? I should think not. We understand what it means to be human not logically, but emotionally and through everyday life. Likewise, we can say that what it means for God to have being is shared in how we understand our own being emotionally and through everyday life. When we refer to God's being we are using our own. This does not, however, diminish the rest of God's more clearly established qualities of omnipotence and omniscience. But insofar as God is personal, this must be the case. Thus thinking would naturally be part of the perfect being because we ourselves think. Objection 2-1: “My opponent says in their defense of this assumption that God does not deserve worship if s/he is only a "force."” Response to 2-1: A crucial part of my argument is to understand what I mean by God. I state that "If God is not a being but a force..." meaning forces and beings are separate things. So if being means existence, and forces clearly exist, then I could not mean being means existence. In other words, I see no reason to refer to God as a force. Moreover, I say that God existing without being would not deserve worship or listen to prayers i.e., would not be personal. Response to 3-3-1: "Perhaps God has something greater than intelligence and thoughts. For example, ants cannot conceive of the type of intelligence that humans have; it is a totally separate plane. Perhaps God is "above" beings like humans." This would, as I described in my earlier defense, require redefining the understood meaning of intelligence and thoughts. How are we to understand the intelligence and thoughts as being "greater"? As I wrote in R2, we use our own experiences when we refer to God. Saying it is something "greater" is acknowledging our own experiences as beings, and then using the word "greater" to mean essentially "I don't know. It's just God." I'm not going to go further on this objection because it would require me to address things like "What is it like to be a bat?" There are not specific qualities that successfully allow us to accurately understand what it means to be an "ant" or a "bat". So, I'll simply say that saying they’re “greater” without definite clarity just muddles things and essentially extends or redefines the meaning of intelligence and thoughts. Proposition 5 was granted. Response to 6/7-1: "Some events, such as radioactive decay, have no clear "cause."" I reject this part of the objection. See: weak nuclear force. "While inductive reasoning generally points in a deterministic direction, some events are inconsistent with this viewpoint of cause and effect." I reject this objection because "some" events is ambiguous. Response to 6/7-1-1: I'm actually glad this objection was made, and perhaps I should have included it in my opening defense. "If something is in time, then it must be caused." The assumption is carefully worded. The universe is not something that is in time. A quality of the universe is time. So I reject this objection on warranted grounds. Response to 8-1: I reject this objection as I specified in my justification (perhaps my opponent got confused) that this comes from the meaning of God. To elaborate: If God is caused then the there must be something of greater potency than God to cause God. To borrow from Aristotle's terminology, if this serves of any help, if God is NOT actuality i.e., what is actual cannot be made actual since its already actual, thus God is potentiality coming from some actuality. I believe this assumption is well within the understanding of an omnipotent being. Response to 9-1: "If it's just a reference to a generic God figure, I would say that there is no reason that such a figure would need to be omnipotent." If we are talking about anything but an omnipotent God, then I do not think we are talking about God. "Moreover, I would actually argue that the Bible doesn't claim that God is omnipotent." Then I heard what sounded like a great multitude, like the roar of rushing waters and like loud peals of thunder, shouting: "Hallelujah! For our Lord God Almighty reigns. (Revelation 19:6) [1] The key word is Almighty. Response to 9-1-1: "If God cannot deny himself, then he lacks a capability and is not omnipotent." God lacks capabilities that would contradict his being. Just because God is all-good doesn't mean God lacks the capability of evilness and is therefore not omnipotent. Responses to 3-1, 3-2, 3-3, 4-1, 9-1-2: See R2 "To sum up, there are a number of key issues. First, my opponent ascribes a couple of characteristics to God needlessly, such as the ability to think and omnipotence." The word "characteristics" implies God has a character, and is therefore a being (as described in R2). The qualities applied to God are not unwarranted. See R2. "Second and more fundamentally, my opponent assumes that everything has a cause, which is not a universal truth." I do not declare "everything has a cause is a universal truth". I say that experience affords us with the fact that "all things in time have some cause", meaning we are reasonably justified to believe it. Anyone who believes it is false must demonstrate why it is false. Our belief is inherently justified in experience and no one rational person would doubt it. "Proving something is not as simple as searching for it and not finding it; proof refers to establishment of absolute certainty of a claim beyond any doubt" I disagree with this because in a court of law we only need proof beyond reasonable doubt. Not proof to establish absolute certainty. Could you establish why we need to establish absolute certainty? But most importantly... "With respect to the claim that a generic God exists, this is impossible: the claim of a "God" or creator of the universe, most fundamentally, is too nebulous. If the universe is shown to be created otherwise, then maybe God created what created the universe, and so on. A generic God is impossible to disprove." ...Insofar as we are speaking of the being we are able to consider most perfect, then we speak of God. God creating what created the universe is superfluous. God who does not think and is impersonal is meaningless to us, as explained in R2. Could it be that a non-personal God is meaningful to someone? Could it be that a non-thinking God is meaningful to someone? It's hardly in our nature to believe this. "My opponent attempts to get around this by ascribing traditionally Judeochristian characteristics to God; however, it not being clarified that we speak only of that God (and, moreover, the proof being invalid), I urge a Con vote." This is simply false. First the proof is valid. You probably meant sound. Second, God Brahman shares many of these characteristics. True, not every god may share them. But is that god really God or a human like figure with more strength and more good and more knowledge? Isn't the highest conception of God the being with most strength and most good and most knowledge? Pro rests. [1] - http://bible.cc...