Substance Dualism is true

Thanks to Pro for what has been a fascinating debate! Unfortunately, I have to drop the discussion about debate theory due to a lack of characters, and instead use the space for more important issues. As I'll be expanding on later, epiphenomenalism is wrong for the same reason as substance dualism -- the Principle of Parsimony mandates that when you have two experimentally equivalent explanations of the same event, the one with unnecessary addendums (such as the mind being a function-less "shadow" of the brain) should be rejected. == Case for Physicalism == Pro keeps saying that all I did was show "mind/body correlations". However, that blatantly misrepresents what I was trying to argue here. I did not merely show that mind-functions are "correlated" with brain activity; it showed that mind-functions are *caused* by brain activity -- they originated entirely from physical processes within the material brain. The electrochemical mechanisms which are responsible for mind-functions like personality and emotion have been clearly mapped out as being wholly materialistic in nature. Out of all the mind-functions, only the faculty of consciousness has any room for entertaining the notion of non-physical causes, and even that gap is quickly being closed by the latest developments in neuroscience, which indicates that a certain portion of the brain is responsible for integrating all our sensory input and cognitive processes into a single, seemingly-irreducible web of conscious experience. I have already explained all this in my first round, yet Pro is making me waste characters on repeating it by insisting that I have only showed "correlations". I have demonstrated that all scientific evidence leads us to the conclusion that the analogy's violin is, indeed, automated and self-playing. Pro's analogies are inapplicable because they assume that I was presenting correlation, when in fact I was demonstrating direct evidence of identity. That all being said, Pro is correct in stating that I must address his positive arguments for dualism in order for the principle of parsimony to actually select physicalism as the superior philosophy of the mind. However, this means Pro is conceding that if I can show that both of his arguments are probably unsound, then I have automatically won the debate. == Problem of Interaction == 1. Pro tried to use the examples of objects & electromagnetic waves as evidence that mind and body can react to each other without directly interacting. I objected that there is no equivalent for electromagnetic waves in the analogous context of mind/brain interaction. His only response is that I'm "taking the analogies too far". I'm not really sure how to respond; the *only* way that any of the objects in his examples were able to "react" to each other was through a third substance, so if he is using those examples to demonstrate the indirect reaction is also possible between mind and brain, then it is only reasonable to assume that mind and brain also would need a third substance to interact. My criticism stands. 2. Firstly, I would like to observe that quantum entanglement is a scarcely understood phenomenon; scientists have very little understanding of *how* particles are able to transmit information non-locally. Many scientists have even began to turn to deterministic versions of quantum mechanics which are more consistent with the rest of reality, such as the Many Worlds interpretation and hidden variables theory, neither of which involve such strange non-interactionist interaction between particles. Secondly, my original criticism stands as well; even if quantum entanglement is a result of non-local interaction, that *only* occurs between identical particles under specific circumstances -- there, is no reason at all to believe that can also occur between ontologically different substances. "Possible" does not translate to "probable", and Pro needs to demonstrate that this form of interaction is *probable* in order for his rebuttal to hold up. My argument still functions to negate the resolution if it can show that metaphysical substances *most likely* cannot interact. 3. Pro says that it is my burden of proof to show that counterfactual causation doesn't allow for inter-substance causation, rather than his burden of proof to show that it does. However, at present, Pro's argument isn't even coherent enough for me to refute. From the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: "the basic idea of counterfactual theories of causation is that the meaning of causal claims can be explained in terms of counterfactual conditionals of the form 'if A had not occurred, C would not have occurred'". Pro does not explain how it logically follows that "if the Cartesian mental event of willing a hand to raise exists, then a raised hand would occur. " What do those two concepts have anything to do with each other? Pro leaves it a mystery. .. == Philosophical Zombies == Like I've already clarified, my "case for physicalism" did not merely show "correlations" -- they showed identity. All of modern neuroscience supports the proposition that functions traditionally attributed to the "mind" actually *originated* within the brain. The "mind" is nothing more than a name which we have given to the agglomeration of characteristics which the processes of the brain produce in human beings -- it has no independent existence of its own. A functional brain, by virtue of its structure, necessarily produces the processes which we associate with the "mind". Thus, the idea of a functional brain which does not produce these processes is every bit as incoherent as a spherical cube. Pro's argument is circular. He claims that because it is possible for a functional brain to not produce mind-processes (i. e. for philosophical zombies to exist), the mind and the brain are metaphysically distinct substances. However, the only justification he gives for a functional-yet-non-functional brain being possible is the assertion that the mind and the brain aren't the same metaphysical substance! Unfortunately for Pro, my case for physicalism was much stronger than the string of correlations which he purports it to be. The only way one can "imagine" a philosophical zombie is by blatantly ignoring the structure and function of the brain, and by doing that they aren't really imagining a "philosophical zombie" anymore because philosophical zombies must, by definition, be structurally and functionally identical to human beings. Consider the statement "If X then Y". If true, then there IS something wrong with saying that it is simultaneously possible for the statement "If X then not Y" to be true. Similarly, there IS something wrong with claiming that a C-fiber firing doesn't cause pain, OR that a functioning brain doesn't entail mind-function: because both of these things *do* cause their respective functions to occur. == The Knowledge Argument == My rebuttal to this argument was that first-person sensory knowledge and third-person descriptive knowledge are not interchangeable -- that they represent distinct aspects of the totality of knowledge which one can learn about any given object. When two things seem blatantly dissimilar, it is the BoP of the person claiming that they are the same to demonstrate that to be true; the only place where Pro has tried doing this is R2, and his explanation ultimately seems to boils down to the bare assertion that it is impossible for experience to simultaneously be a result of first-person and third-person causes. I fail to see why this is the case: in physics, if two forces are simultaneously exerted on the same object, then the object's resulting movement will account for both of its causes. This is no different. Having two independent causes of the same event is certainly possible. 1st person and 3rd person knowledge are clearly distinct, and thus Mary did not have complete information on human color vision. . The resolution is negated.