Jan/Feb 2011 LD Topic

https://docs.google.com... The Negative Case is in the above link, since it was accepted I can use google docs to post my case. With that said, let's return to my opponent's case. Let's start at the top with the link between his value and criterion.The link between my opponent's V and C is exactly where my case links in and prevents my opponent from affirming. Utilitarianism presumes that morality is objective, which is exactly what my case disproves. For him to actually reach his value, via his criterion, he would have to prove that Utilitarianism disproves a subjective morality in order to reestablish the link that he does nothing to warrant.Okay, let's sidetrack a bit. I just want to point out that there literally isn't so much as a single shread of warrant or analysis in his framework. Generally one needs to prove how his criterion links to their value and why their value is the best value for the round, but he doesn't even bother with that. Since he does nothing to establish a link between his value and criterion, we can safely presume there isn't one. With that said, let's go to his criterion specifically. There's numerous problems with Utilitarianism: First: Utilitarianism fails because the definition of what our results are, good or bad, is all relative. I could say that the result of punching a baby in the face meant that I received a piece of candy, which could be defined as a good outcome or that if I were to tackle my friend in order to save him from being hit by a car and break his ribs in the process, even though I possibly saved him, I injured him in possibly a worse way which could be seen as a negative outcome. Second: Utilitarianism doesn’t make sense because we can never really be sure what an end is and what is just a link into a different impact. We can never know that if nuclear war were to happen, it would cause aliens to come and give us some amazing technology that betters humanity as a race. Moreover, it stops us from acting because we can never finish calculating the infinite possible things that make an end good, making it self-effacing because it doesn’t actually bring about good ends. Third: Under Utilitarianism, we can never be sure that a proposition is 100% true. As long as someone promises that an action will bring about an end with a massive profit for all, society then has to take that route, even if they don’t believe it to be true. As long as someone promises a large enough impact, society then has to follow what he says, making consequentialism self-effacing. Fourth: Conceptions of morality that are based off of desirability are circular. Parfit[1] writes: According to desire-based theories, such reasons wouldhave to be provided by facts about what would fulfill our present desires. If, after informed deliberation, we want future happiness as an end, this factcould give us instrumental reasons to have certainother desires, since it would give us reasons to want whatever would make us happy. But the fact that we had this desire could not be truly claimed to give us a reason to have it. Desires cannot be self-supporting. Our wanting happiness as an end could not give us a reason to want happiness as an end. And Utilitarianism bites into this loop because our desire for happiness, under utilitarianism, supports our desire for happiness. Under Util, if I want to be happy, it gives me reason to want happiness, which is entirely circular. Fifth: Utilitarianism doesn’t work under the JAN/FEB resolution because as per the resolution, no actions have been taken. Since utilitarianism relies on an action having been already performed, it is impossible to generate some sort of happiness gained or lost. This is going to nullify all aff impacts for the round because it’s not going to be possible to determine if those impacts are what my opponent’s actually claiming. With that being said, let's go to the contention level arguments, which you can group together, as my response applies to all of them.There is one massive problem with all of his contentions and it goes along the lines of thus: all he is talking about is reasons why domestic violence itself is bad, but not that killing is the best and/or only way to respond to the situation. Since he never warrants that it's permissible to respond to deadly force, he's never actually affirming the resolution, but rather a twisted version of it. There are plenty of alternatives to using deadly force, such as calling the police, running away, or simply not killing the abuser and using non-lethal force. These are massively more preferable because they prevent death from ever occuring, which under his standard would be much more preferable (if the standard were even true).With that being said, I will wrap it up by explaining, summary how his case fails and how the debate breaks down.1. My negative case functions before his affirmative, since his affirmative makes the presumtion that morality is objective, which ym case disproves. 2. Even if he proves morality is objective, his criterion fails for the above five reasons I gave.3. Even if his criterion stands, he fails to actually prove through substance that it's permissible to use lethal force. All his contentions prove is that domestic violence is bad, but not that using lethal force is permissible.For the above reasons, I urge a negative vote. [1]Parfit, Derek (Philosophy Professor, Oxford University). Climbing the Mountain (Unpublished).