The Argument from Evil Makes the Existence of the God of Christianity Unlikely

Introdcution: In Freeman's opening words about the current state of the debate, he suggested that my argument would not falsify the proposition. But remember, any proposition made that is unknowable ought to be rejected just as if it were false - inasmuch as it is an assertion based wholly on ignorance. He goes on to say that since we can make an equal hypothesis that God might have morally sufficient reasons for needing to prevent as much evil as he possibly could, this somehow cancels the hypothesis that God may have morally sufficient reasons for allowing it. This is sophistry and not substantive argument. ALL the supposed evidence in favor of the resolution make assumptions based on unknowable premises - that is the point. Let's remember: 1. Christian Theology teaches that God's ways and reasons are unknown to us and, in fact, transcend our comprehension. Plain reason dictates that an omni-excellent God would mostly likely know of reasons for allowing suffering that are not aware to us (remember the reason given in my round one: progress of knowledge). 2. Even if we could know that gratuitous evil exists, Christianity predicts it. 3. Even if we could know that gratuitous evil exists, it remains to be proven that a minimum amount of allowable evil exists. If no minimum amount exists, then we cannot expect God to manifest the logically impossible. So let's break down the current state of the debate in syllogism: P1: God's ways and reasons are unknown given Christian theology and plain reason. P2: The way in which God cares for us is a product of God's ways and reasons. C: The way in which God cares for us is unknown (From P1 and P2). So what can we make of Freeman's assertion that, if God cares for us, he would inform us as to why we are suffering as we do? It seems it is a statement without force. Also: X1: It cannot be known if we would likely discern God's reasons for action (Christianity teaches that we cannot and plain reason dictates its improbability). X2: The assertion that gratuitous evil likely exists is an inference based upon God's reasons for action. C: The assertion that gratuitous evil likely exists cannot be known (from X1 and X2). C2: Gratuitous suffering and pointless premature deaths probably occur. The aforementioned syllogisms have not taken any serious flack. In this section of the debate, Freeman suggests that he does not need to know all of God's reasons in order to make a reasonable assertion about them. For instance, "we should expect to know about God's morally sufficient reasons for allowing evil because this would help us better bear our suffering. I think it is quite telling that my opponent doesn't directly challenge this claim or the analogy I use to help affirm its truth. " One wonders, why is it that Freeman thinks he does not need to known God's reasons when considering the matter of better bearing our suffering? First, it assumes that (1) God cares about us better handling our physical suffering, (2) that it would serve God's purposes just the same and (3) that we could understand even if he somehow decided to whisper this knowledge to us. So far as I can tell, all three of these assumptions stem from God's reasons and are thus wholly contingent upon what my opponent has considered irrelevant to know. As for the analogy, perhaps the source of my opponent's confusion is that he thinks a physician and God are comparable in the first place - you cannot compare a person whose reasons and ways are all known with one whose are wholly other and unknown. "Of course, he is free to add any theological assumptions to this debate that he wants by quoting scripture; however, quoting scripture cannot settle this issue. Remember, the argument from evil seeks to point out an inconsistency within the Christian worldview. " See, but that is what is so ironic! There is no inconsistency being shown in the Christian worldview. When was the inconsistency shown? Was there some sort of contradiction that Freeman neglected to mention or articulate? This debate is about the existence of the Christian God and therefore must directly confront the theology regarding the Christian understanding of God. "The knowledge of God's morally sufficient reasons for allowing evil would have helped the victims of the Holocaust better bear their suffering before they died. " HOW does my opponent known this? How is he quantifying what is better? Is the metric he is using contingent upon his subjective biases and limited cognitive understanding? What is better is a product of God's mind and is thus not known (see the aforementioned syllogisms). C3: The objections to the argument from evil are without merit. "God, if he exists, is more powerful than Satan. My opponent's previous assertions about Satan doesn't resolve the issue or show that (P2) is false, it only pushes the problem further back. " Well, wait a minute. .. is it true that my argument does not show that (P2) is false? What does (P2) say exactly? : "Gratuitous suffering and pointless premature deaths are incompatible with the God of theism. " If we take Christian theology seriously and Satan is the reigning force on earth, one would thus expect there to be pointless and premature deaths. But isn't that exactly what (P2) says we should not see given Christian theism? So the argument as to whether or not it pushes the problem further back is irrelevant to whether or not it resolved the problem in (P2). So (P2), given Christian theology, is false. THE NEW PREMISE that my opponent wishes to show as inconsistent, is the following P2': Satan as a reigning force over the earth is incompatible with Christian Theism. But isn't this an entirely different premise? What Freeman is really asking for is an explanation for an explanation. Moreover, Freeman assumes that if God has a morally sufficient reason for allowing Satan to be a free entity over earth, than all the suffering caused by Satan is not pointless or unwarranted. Does that seem like a non-sequitur to you? Purpose for liberty does not mean there is a purpose for everything done with its freedom. In response to Peter Van Inwagen, Freeman suggests that, "The fact that these cases are ambiguous doesn't prove that they don't have answers (or a range of answers). " The point being missed here is that it is precisely because it is ambiguous that the person making an affirmative claim based on its actual existence must first prove its actual existence. No minimum standard of evil does not mean that any amount will do, just as no minimum amount of illegal parking fine means any amount will do. What it means is that any amount will be essentially arbitrary (meaning there will be gratuitous excess either way) because a small change in either direction will not in any way causally change the outcome. What this means is that gratuitous evil can exist if there is no such thing as a minimum amount of evil. Conclusion: In this debate I have not only given good reasons for doubting our ability to discern gratuitous evil, I have also given good reasons for its compatibility with Christian theism if it just so happens to exist. So far as I can tell, the argument has been negated on both fronts, where (P1) cannot be known and (P2) is false on Christian theism and unknown by virtue of an unknown yet necessary stipulation (minimum amount).