Resolved: The Leibnizian Cosmological Argument is Sound

OverviewI do not claim that the LCA "is an argument for why god exists if he does and not an argument for the existence of God" as my opponent quotes me, quite out of context if may add. What I claim is that the nature of God's existence explains why God exists if he does, and the LCA explains that God exists. I would like to remind readers that in round 1 it was agreed that an argument should be accepted as sound if the affirmation of its premises is more plausible than the negationPremise 1My opponent's refutation of premise one has collapsed down into two separate claims.Rebuttal 1: The Fallacy of CompositionI apologize for not touching on this argument in the previous round as I had reached the character limit as it was quite literally only developed as a one sentence blip. The fallacy of composition appears to be a very appealing rebuttal to my first premise; however, it is important to note that the fallacy of composition is an informal fallacy. Indeed, while the fallacy of composition may adequately explain some lines of reasoning, there must be an explanation as to why that reasoning is fallacious. For example, to claim that a wall made entirely of bricks is a brick wall is not in the least bit fallacious, although the conclusion was deduced through the same logic that would be refuted under the fallacy of composition. To reject the conclusion would be absurd and thus the refutation must be rejected in this case. In the same way, the universe's contingency may be explained through composition. Indeed, if the universe developed in a far different manner, would the nature of the universe's existence not have changed? If the nature of a being's existence may change, then we may conclude that it does not exist necessarily as necessary existence is derived from the nature of the being. We may also derive that the universe exists contingently without relying on composition. Let's look back at my overview of modality. Everything exists either contingently or by necessity of it's own nature. To have necessary existence, it must be logically impossible for that being not to have existed. It is no absurd to claim that the universe itself may not have existed. That proposition is perfectly valid. It is possible indeed that the universe as we know it may not have existed at all. This is reinforced by the M-Theory that my opponent proposes. This will be addressed later in the round.Rebuttal 2: Bare AssertionMy opponent labels the second rebuttal as being that a force is more reasonable than a being but what is claimed in his refutation is that my explanation of God having the attributes he does is a bare assertion. I would claim first that the foundation of his refutation is based on misunderstanding. When I state that "It is in the nature of God that he is a perfect being, for if he were not then he would not be God" I am not claiming that because God is God, he must be perfect. If we refer to my definition of God, he is a perfect being. By basic substitution we can see at I am stating that it is in the nature of a Perfect Being that he is a Perfect Being, for if He were not then He would not be a Perfect Being. In other words, it would be logically contradictory to claim that a Perfect Being is not indeed perfect. This isn't the same thing as saying that because a Perfect Being is defined as such, he must be such. If God were not perfect, he could still feasibly exist, but we would not claim that he is God, he would be a near-perfect being. The conclusion that God is perfect, is a simple deduction arising from the validity of the LCA, so it is a separate debate altogether than what we are discussing. However, as my opponent still appears to be confused about why this follows I will formulate the argument here, but remember voters, this is a separate debate and should not influence your decision. Brandon C. Look [1] explains Leibniz's argument.First, insofar as the first cause of the entire series must have been able to survey all other possible worlds, it has understanding. Second, insofar as it was able to select one world among the infinity of possible worlds, it has a will. Third, insofar as it was able to bring about this world, it has power. (Leibniz adds here that “power relates to being, wisdom or understanding to truth, and will to good.”) Fourth, insofar as the first cause relates to all possible, its understanding, will and power are infinite. And, fifth, insofar as everything is connected together, there is no reason to suppose more than one God. Thus, Leibniz is able to demonstrate the uniqueness of God, his omniscience, omnipotence, and benevolence from the twin assumptions of the contingency of the world and the principle of sufficient reason.If the LCA is sound, it cannot be denied that God is a Perfect Being. This also serves to point out the fallacious strawman my opponent makes in the previous round.P1: The girl down the street likes me P2: If the girl down the street didn't like me, then she wouldn't be the girl down the streetshould actually beP1: The girl down the street likes me P2: If the girl down the street didn't like me, then she wouldn't be the girl down the street who likes me Now, back to my opponent's second rebuttal of premise 1. My opponent begs the question of why the external cause of the universe must be a conscious being instead of a force. I would claim that the force first of all would be refuted by my example of N1 and P1 as plausible first causes of the universe, as it would by definition be a natural cause. Second, I would reinforce the logic of modality. My opponent "barely asserts" that a force could explain the universe without formulating an argument in support of the possibility of a force possessing necessary existence. Forces are by definition exerted energy, thus they would logically be the link between cause and effect, and not the cause itself. As such, not only would they fail to serve as a first cause, but their existence is contingent on some external being exerting them.Premise 2First off, an issue of clarification. When I state that, "an infinite number of contingent beings cannot explain their own existence" the term beings can refer to anything that "is." Anything that "can be" and is such, is in the process of "being."Now, onto M-Theory. M-Theory fails to refute the LCA. Let's say for instance that we granted the soundness of M-Theory. The universe was caused by the transfer of energy from an external universe. Now, this would explain the existence of this universe, but simply begs the question of what caused the other universe. This also brings me back to the argument for the universe's contingent existence. If the universe was caused by another universe, then it is by definition contingent. But in the same way, we may ask what caused the other universe, and what caused that cause, ad infinitum. My opponent claims that M-Theory explains the how of existence, but only so for this universe. The energy transfer is coming from another physical universe. But again, the physical must be created by something immaterial in order to coherently exist. Matter cannot explain matter. Sure, the force of energy may have caused the existence of matter in this universe, but again forces are intermediary beings, they are exertions of (and thus contingent upon) other beings, and by definition cannot be the first and necessary cause of existence. As we can see, M-theory does not disprove God's existence, and is in fact perfectly compatible with it.UnderviewMy opponent grants me the dual burden of circumventing the fallacy of composition as well as M-theory. I have explained the fallacious logic of the fallacy of composition and the compatibility of God and M-theory. As such, I have met my opponent's requirements for winning the debate. Again, for the LCA to be sound, the affirmation of its premises must be more sound than the negation, which I believe they are.(Unnecessary) Source1. http://tinyurl.com...