The Modal Ontological argument for God's existence is sound

MAXIMAL GREATNESS Con asks for a definition of 'Maximal Greatness'. And I would simply describe such a being as All-Powerful, All-Knowing and All-Good. There are a number of 'sub-properties' that this being therefore has, which comes under the umbrella of the 3 main properties. These would include examples such as infinite creativity, all-loving, and most importantly, necessity in it's existence. Con then asks whether a maximally great being points towards a consciousness. And I would say so, yes; I personally think that to be a decision-making agent is greater than to not be. A 'Great' property is a property that is greater to have than not. It is the highest standard of goodness. (but not as in morally "good") 'Being' is anything that is in existence. So, a 'Maximally great being' is something that is in existence (or potentially in existence), possessing all great-making properties. While we are on definitions, a 'possible world' is possible description of reality [1] - but I assume you knew that. OBJECTION #1 Ok so my opponent asks the question, "what is or is not possible". And that is a good question; as it is essential to the Ontological argument. So, I will explain. So what is possible, and what is not possible? Well just about everything we can conceive of is possible. That Romney will win the 2016 election, that the letter 'Q' never existed, or that unicorns exist. These things are logically coherent - and therefore possible. If these things are possible, then they exist in some possible world. That is, some conception of reality that is logically coherent. [2] But what is not possible? Things that are contradictory are not possible - square circles, married bachelors, anything that is logically incoherent. Such things exist in no possible world - there is no world where these things exist. [3] But why is a Maximally Great Being Possible? Well, because the concept is logically coherent. There is no logical contradiction between a being that is All-Loving, All-Powerful and All-Knowing. We can conceive of a world where such a being exists with there being no logical contradictions. Furthermore, we can bring in other arguments for God's existence - such as Cosmological, Axiological, or Fine-Tuning arguments. [4] But that is for another debate! So, we can conclude that the first 2 premises are correct; that the concept of a maximally Great Being Existing is possible - and that if it is possible, then a Maximally Great Being exists in some possible reality. OBJECTION #2 This brings us to the crucial part of the argument - the jump from 'some possible world', to 'every possible world'. I have already defined what a Maximally great being is; it is something that exists, and has all great-making properties. So what this means is that a Maximally Great Being is one that has necessary existence; as necessary existence is a great-making property. So if it exists in one world (some possible world), then it exists in all of them. [5] Contingent beings - unicorns for example, or as my opponent says, apples - only exist in some possible world(s). There is no jump, as they are not maximally great and therefore do not have necessary existence. So when Con asks "At what point does the potential for a "maximally great being" to exist, become a certainty on the virtue of it being possible? ", the answer is that it is revealed within the nature of a Maximally Great Being - such a being is one which possesses necessary existence. When it exists in one possible world, by definition, it exists in every possible world. It should be worth nothing that we can't just apply 'Maximal Greatness' to anything, like the famous comparison to a Maximally Great island. Because it is simply not possible for such an entity to be Maxinally Great, as it is by definition a contingent, physical being. [6] OBJECTION #3 Con concludes that the rest of the premises therefore do not follow. However, as I hope I have shown and explained, premises 1-3 are entirely sound and so the rest of the argument 4-7 therefore follow. CONCLUSION I think that maybe it would have been beneficial to give a few definitions at the beginning of the debate. Nevertheless, Con has raised some important questions. But, I have responded to them and shown why and how they are insufficient in showing the unsoundness of the Modal Ontological argument. I look forward to the next round. God Bless Sources: [1] . http://plato.stanford.edu... [2] Ibid [3] Ibid [4] . http://www.reasonablefaith.org... [5] . http://www.reasonablefaith.org... [6] . http://www.reasonablefaith.org...