Does God Exist: An Ontological Argument

The Ontological Argument and Kant (1.1)My opponent pointed out that "God is defined as the greatest conceivable thing, and God can’t be great unless it exists. " Furthermore commenting that "Kant pointed out the problem with this. " However, various philosophers have written extensively on Kant's critique of Anselm's argument (Clark 1973, Rowe 1974, Plantinga 1967, Maydole 2012, etc. ) in a spirit of disagreement. Notably I want to consider the general problem regarding the "existence is not a predicate" objection. This line of criticism (stemming from Kant to even A. J. Ayer) has gone on to say that if existence were a predicate, then certain existential propositions are either tautologies or are self-contradictory. Considering the difference between (1) affirmative existential propositions (x does exist) and (2) negative existential propositions (x does not exist), x is still a given thing that we presuppose to exist. Thus, affirming x’s existence would just be redundant, and denying x’s existence would be self-contradictory – since, in predicating x we are presupposing that x exists: why would we say then that x does not exist? This is obviously problematic since this objection wrongfully presupposes that concepts must apply to the actual world. As William Rowe explains: "The plain fact is that we can talk about and ascribe predicates to many things which do not exist and never did. Merlin, for example, no less than Houdini, was a magician, although Houdini existed but Merlin did not. If, as these examples suggest, the claim that whenever we ascribe a predicate to something we assert or presuppose that that the thing exists is a false claim, then we will need a better argument for the doctrine that existence is not a predicate. " [1] More so, Kant's critique is ultimately irrelevant. As E. J. Lowe (2007) writes, "Nothing in… the ontological argument implies that… existence… must be a divine attribute or property, in the way that omniscience or omnipotence are… [T]he Kantian objection… is just a red herring with no real bearing on the soundness of the ontological argument. " (Lowe 2007, 337) Furthermore, Alvin Plantinga criticizes Kant on the same grounds: "Unfortunately, it seems to have no particular bearing on Anselm’s argument. For Anselm can certainly agree, so far as his argument is concerned, that existence is not a real predicate in the explained sense. Anselm maintains that the concept the being than which none greater can be conceived is necessarily exemplified; that this is so is in no way inconsistent with the suggestion that the whole concept of a thing diminished with respect to existence is equivalent to the undiminished whole concept of that thing. Anselm argues that the proposition God exists is necessarily true; but neither this claim nor his argument for it entails or presupposes that existence is a predicate in the sense just explained. " [2] Thus, Gordon Clark (1973) summarizes three problems with Kant's critique to which I will finish with: Kant has not substantiated his view of what it means to "annihilate" something in thought [3]. Kant did not disprove the existence of God (nor Anselm’s argument in particular). Kant has not exposed an adequate critique of Anselm’s argument. My Opponent, William Rowe, and Begging the Question (1.2) My opponent made the comment that "the ontological arguments presented essentially boil down to, God must exist by definition. " Interestingly enough, William Rowe (2001) has raised the same objection, particularly that the argument boils down to defining God as the greatest possible being, and also suggests that the property of existing in reality is great-making. Thus, "In granting that Anselm's God is a possible thing, we are in fact granting that it actually exists. . . the argument begs the question: it assumes the point it is trying to prove. " (Rowe 2001, 41). Robert Maydole (2012) critiques Rowe on the grounds that he equivocates the word "grant" to mean "assume" and "implies. " We assume (grant) the premises of an argument, and in granting these premises, we are in fact granting (implying) its conclusion if the argument is valid. According to Maydole, "Surely, the fact that the premises of an argument imply its conclusion does not mean that the argument begs the question" [4]. Furthermore, the proposition that a greatest possible being possibly exists in reality is not at all equivalent to the proposition that it actually exists in reality. Of course, "the former does not even imply the latter, unless we assume that the other premises of Anselm's argument are logical truths" (Maydole, p. 562). Thus it must be understood that those two propositions are independent of one another; "the argument would beg the question only if the latter were given as a reason for believing the former" (Maydole, p. 562). Thus, looking at Anselm's argument (along with Plantinga's), I do not see the argument committing the question begging fallacy. Great-Making Properties (1.3) Anselm's understanding of God as "that than which nothing greater can be conceived" is a definite description which refers to the only thing than which none greater can be conceived; namely, God (even if there is no such being). Thus, the given proposition: (1a) The definite description "that than which it is not conceivable for something to be greater" is understood. Seems to show that first conjunct is true by definition, while the second is introspectively true. As Anselm even suggests: "[M]any people appear to understand it when they hear it - even the fool. " Thus, this point by Maydole I think is respectively important: "This assumes, of course, that the relational phrase 'is greater than' is meaningful and understood by those who claim that they understand it when they hear use it and hear it. . . Perhaps the absence of a plausible theory of great-making properties would constitute a challenge to the meaningfulness of 'is greater than. ' However, the burden of proof of a claim that a word or phrase is meaningless must always fall on the challenger, especially when the word appears to be used with understanding by a great many people. " (Maydole, 557) The point I think becomes more important once Maydole finishes: "And the predicate "is greater than" is just a term. Indeed, many philosophers from Plato to the present, including most neo-Platonists, scholastics, and rationalists, believe the things of the world can be ordered in terms of both ontological and/or normative greatness, the absence of a nearly complete and coherent theory of great-making properties notwithstanding. " (Ibid. ) Thus, I think the point I drew in my first affirmative from Anslem's Monologion (1077) is still relevant for my opponent's consideration. Ryan Stringer's Modal Arguments for Atheism (1.4) The problem I would say with the A-premises is particularly that you are finding counter-factuals to theism in general and thus are stipulating that weighing the plausibility of God's existence over those counter-factuals are absurd. What is the demonstrability of that argument? If God is understood as so defined by Anselm, and thus must exist in every possible world (hence even the actual world), then in what possible world could an evil deity exist? or being morally perfect be impossible? I do not think the conclusion of Stringer's argument necessarily obtains as true. Conclusion (2.0) I have provided sufficient replies and criticisms towards my opponent's argument(s) as seen in the first negative. I do not think that my opponent has succeeded in refuting the ontological argument, both Anselm's and Plantinga's version. I therefore urge a vote in the affirmative. ______________________Notes: [1] Quoted from Reason and Responsibility, ed. Joel Feinberg and Russ Shafer-Landau (Thomson and Wadsworth: 2005) pp. 16-17 [2] Alvin Plantinga, God and Other Minds, 2nd edn. (Cornell University Press: 1992) p. 36 [3] See "The Impossibility of an Ontological Proof," in Critique of Pure Reason (p. B. 629) [4] Robert Maydole, "The Ontological Argument" in The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, ed. William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland (Wiley-Blackwell: 2012) p. 562