Rawslian theory is a justified form of government.

Let's jump right into his 3 criticisms: Problem of universal support Problem of self-interest (extreme risk-aversion) Problem of an actual contract Problem of universal support and Problem of an actual support Now, truth to be told I'm not entirely sure I understand this criticism (perhaps it may be due to some uncareful wording). From what I can tell, he sees it as an issue that unless there is universal consent to the proposed policies in the original contract, you can't have a valid contract as not all parties under the contract would be consenting. I can see the problem, as after all how can a contract be binding if not all the affected members have consented? The response is simple: in the original position, there will be a consensus. There has to be one. The original position is to be conceived as a consesus, where rational deliberators are convened to agree on a set of politices. "In a series of pairwise comparisons, they consider all the conceptions of justice made available to them and ultimately agree unanimously to accept the conception that survives this winnowing process. In this regard, the original position is best conceived as a kind of selection process wherein the parties' deliberations are constrained by the background conditions imposed by the original position as well as the list of conceptions of justice provided to them. They are assigned the task of agreeing on principles for designing the basic structure of a self-contained society under the circumstances of justice." But one could object by arguing we are not rational deliberators but actual human beings, who rarely if ever come into unanimous agreement! That is the criticism of the 3rd point, which my opponent is suffice to say that a hypothetical contract is not an actual one - just because I give you a set of rational reasons to sign contract X doesn't mean you have signed contract X (even if you find it reasonable!). This common criticism of social contract theory, has been addressed many times and is especially null against Rawls' brand. Here is why: "It has been objected that hypothetical agreements cannot bind people; only actual contracts or agreements can impose obligations and commitments (Dworkin, 1977, 150ff). In response, Rawls says that the OP is to be used “to help us work out what we now think” (CP, 402); “it incorporates conditions…we do in fact accept,” (TJ 587/514) and is a kind of “thought experiment.for the purpose of public- and self-clarification” (JF, 17). Hypothetical agreement in the original position does not then bind anyone to duties or commitments he/she does not already have. Its point rather is to explicate the requirements of moral concepts of justice and enable us to draw the consequences of considered certain moral convictions that we all presumably share. Whether we in turn consciously accept or agree to these consequences and the principles and duties they implicate once brought to our awareness is irrelevant to their justification. For surely it can matter little to the justification of moral principles whether or not existing people actually do accept or agree to them. The point rather of conjecturing the outcome of a hypothetical agreement is that, assuming that the premises underlying the original position correctly represent our most deeply held considered moral convictions, then we are committed to endorsing the resulting principles and duties whether or not we actually accept or agree to them. Not to do so implies a failure to live up to the consequences of our own moral convictions about justice." To put it simply, the original position tells us what we should do! Problem of self-interest (extreme risk-aversion) It's a common criticism of Rawls that the rational deliberators have no rational reason to be risk averse, but rather it can be rational to be any other form of risk-taking (such as the extremely risking). Rawls has replied that risk-aversion is in this case rational, for the original position is a highly constrained situation/ He admits that in normal situations there is no rational reason to be risk-averse over being not, but given that primary social goods are at stake in the original position (that is, goods which would further and faciliate the obtainment of any other non-primary social good - examples of the former being justice, money, etc.), we must be conservative. Am I risk averse for investing in auto insurance or fire insurance? Of course not. In fact, even if one were a risk taker it would still be in their interest for their primary social goods to be considered in a conservative fashion! "The original position is such a situation writ large. Even if one knew in the original position that the citizen one represents enjoys risk-taking, this would still not be a reason to gamble with his or her rights, opportunities, and starting position in society; for if she were born into a traditional, repressive, or fundamentalist society, she might well have little opportunity for risk-taking, gambling, entrepreneurship, and the like. It is rational then even for the risk-taker to choose conservatively in the original position and guarantee her future opportunities to take risks. (And assuming that the parties are trustees, then it would be not simply irrational but a dereliction of duty to choose otherwise.)" References http://plato.stanford.edu...