Kalam argument is sound

== Rebuttal == 1. Attacking Conclusions: Pro slightly misread what I wrote in Round 2. I said I was going to attack the conclusion by showing that "the conclusion does not necessarily follow the premises." This is completely valid, since a deductive argument is one where the conclusion must follow given the premises. If I can show the conclusion does not necessarily follow, I win. 2. Composition Fallacy: I fail to see how this is a Red Herring. Let's examine Pro's example of "if every brick of the wall is yellow then the wall will be yellow" and replace the bricks and walls with causes and universes. Pro's example now reads "if every thing of the universe has a cause, then the universe will have a cause." It's the same thing and it's clearly a fallacy. Pro is taking a property of everything within the universe and applying that property to the universe as a whole - this is pretty much exactly the definition of a Composition Fallacy. Pro says Composition Fallacies only apply to specific situations... is the beginning of the universe not a specific enough situation? My opponent protests and insists that they are using deductive reasoning. But merely saying your reasoning is deductive doesn't make it true, no matter how insistent you are. I maintain that the Kalama Argument is not deductive because the conclusion is reached through a Composition Fallacy and therefore does not necessarily follow the premises. On top of that, Pro accuses me of objecting to induction and the foundations of science. This is a strange accusation given that later on Pro seems to support assuming the supernatural exists (quite an unscientific assumption indeed). But more on that later. For now, suffice it to say that I have no problem with induction, per say, but you cannot use inductive reasoning to support a deductive argument. The two are antithetical. Since the Kalama Argument is, by my opponent's own admission, deductive, then any inductive reasoning is fully null and void. 3. Metaphysics of Causation: I fully understand the arguments laid out by Pro in Round 2. My point was merely that if induction is all we need to conclude a metaphysical absolute, then there are other absolutes we can conclude as well that destroy the Kalam Argument. To affirm otherwise is Special Pleading. 4. Pro attempts to show why the other metaphysical absolutes I mentioned cannot be equally valid compared to "Everything that begins has a cause." I'll address them one by one: Material things are only caused by material things: In what must be the strangest rebuttal I've ever heard, Pro says this is invalid because it assumes the supernatural does not exist. Well......... of course it does. If Pro thinks rejecting inductive reasoning destroys the basis of science, then this certainly takes the cake. If we could just assume the supernatural exists, then there's no need for scientific inquiry whatsoever! Such an assumption would be, as Pro so eloquently put it in Round 1, "worse than magic." Using Pro's' very own laws of induction, we have no reason to believe that something material can come from something immaterial, therefore the Kalama Argument fails. Nothing is ever caused by an entity that is not itself within time: Again, very strange rebuttal here. Pro asks us to imagine a reality without the passage of time, thereby allowing for timeless causes. But this would destroy the Kalam Argument! The Kalam Argument needs the passage of time to work, because only when time passes can something "begin to exist" as Pro's premise 2 states. So again we see Special Pleading - does time pass or does it not? Pro can't have it both ways. Furthermore, the idea of an "eternal cause" goes against Pro's concept in Round 2 of the impossibility of traversing an actual infinite. If a cause spans infinity then one would never arrive at the affect. All minds are physically embodied: Pro merely asks "how do you know?" For that, I would point them to induction, the foundation of science, remember? We universally observe every mind to be physically embodied. If universal observation is enough to deduce that everything that begins to exist has a cause, then it is also enough to deduce that every mind is physically embodied, which destroys the Kalam Argument. I'm not trying to use deductive or inductive proof, I'm exposing Pro's Special Pleading fallacy. If Pro wants to use universal observation to declare metaphysical absolutes, then we can use the same method to arrive at all kinds of absolutes that render the Kalam Argument impossible. 5. Semantics on Time: All my opponent does here is merely call foul. You can define things all you want, but you don't get to complain when those definitions are attacked or questioned. Sure, "began to exist" refers to a finite past, but that assumes the past is finite, specifically, it assumes an A Theory of time. But we cannot assume A Theory time is true, at least not without a fight. I am not challenging that "began to exist" works when the past is finite - that is quite true. But if the past is NOT finite, i.e., B Theory time is true and we live within spacetime, as proposed by Einstein and Minkowski's interpretation of Relativity, then things do not begin to exist and the Kalama Argument is wrong. I don't have time to give a detailed rebuttal of Pro's points on B Theory time, but suffice it to say they are woefully mistaken. I will go more into detail in the next round. So far, I believe Pro's case falls short.