it is not possible to know whether or not categorical imperatives exist

My contention is that it is not possible to know whether categorical imperatives exist. Definitions: knowledge - justified true belief belief - attitude toward the truth or falsehood of a proposition justification - indication of truth via logical/rational inference and/or relevant warranted data (aka evidence) truth - that which corresponds with reality Categorical imperative- an 'objective ought'/'unconditional ought' or an objective moral proposition that some person must perform some action regardless of circumstance. Specifically; a proposition is a categorical imperative if performing the action implied by it, produces results that are objectively good or that the action is objectively good in and of itself. -it is of the form 'you ought to perform some action, period' Hypothetical imperatives- a 'subjective ought'/'conditional ought' or a moral proposition that some person must perform some action given some reason or circumstance(s). Specifically; a proposition is a hypothetical imperative if performing the action implied by it produces results that are good/ in accordance with the condition or set of circumstances. -it is of the form 'if a certain state of affairs is desired, you ought to perform some action' Note :( I acknowledge the variety of philosophies on truth, but as we are talking about the existence of something (categorical imperatives) it is useful to (in this case) define truth in relation to existence/reality.) Rules: -if my opponent does not believe my definitions accurately reflect the concepts being addressed, then they may present alternative definitions, but they must explain why their definitions are superior to my own. -if my opponent provides alternative definitions, he/she must number them, (Def1, Def2 etc.) otherwise we will assume we are using my definitions. -first round for me - definitions, rules, starting argument -first round for opponent - alternative definitions, starting argument, first counter from then on we shall argue back and forth until we run out of rounds -the winner will be the one who is most persuasive. -sources will not be counted for this debate. Special rule: accepting this debate means accepts a shared burden of proof. I will have to demonstrate my burden (the unknowability of the existence of categorical imperatives) and my opponent will have to demonstrate the inverse claim (categorical imperatives are knowable) we will both (as in any argument) defend our own positions and attack each other’s position. To do so, I have established a 10,000 character limit. Failure to comply will be counted as a loss a loss. Note: I understand that normally only I would have the burden, but as I am interested in seeing the alternative position defended (as well as defending my position) I have made this special rule. BEGIN: my argument: p1) if two worlds are indistinguishable from one another and one of the worlds has something in it that the other does not, it cannot be known whether the thing exists or not. p2) a world with categorical imperatives and a world without categorical imperatives are indistinguishable from one another. c) It cannot be known whether categorical imperatives exist. Defense of p1 imagine 2 worlds. A and B. these two worlds are similar in all ways except that chairs do not exist in some room in A but in that same room in B they do exist. If one were to go from one world to the other, looking for chairs in that room, the difference between the two worlds would be apparent. That is to say, the two worlds were distinguishable. One could know via the relevant warranted data, that in one world chairs existed but in the other, they did not. Now imagine another 2 worlds C and D. these worlds are absolutely similar in all ways except that C has an imperceptible horse in a room and in D it does not. A dimensional traveler having been in the two rooms would have no reason to assume that the imperceptible horse was in that room in C and not in D. the existence of an imperceptible horse is indistinguishable from the nonexistent of it. There would be no way to justify any belief in the horse being in the room. Since knowledge is justified true belief and the condition of justification cannot be met in either world, then the traveler cannot know that the horse exists in C and not in D. I believe this sufficiently defends the premise: if two worlds are indistinguishable from one another and one of the worlds has something in it that the other does not, it cannot be known whether the thing exists or not. Defense of p2 this is perhaps the fundamental premise. Imagine a world X with the categorical imperative 'you must never sing'. Now imagine a world Y without that imperative. Now again imagine a traveler going between the two worlds. As imperatives are not physical laws that (or things that cannot not be obeyed) than you will not find that people are always not doing what is prescribed. In fact, I imagine the traveler could find many singers. the traveler would not be justified in believing that the imperative existed in X and not in Y. (and thus would not know it) as categorical imperatives have nothing to do with crime and punishment, mortal or divine, even if people were put in prison in either world or people were put in X's equivalent to hell, that would not indicate anything about the existence of that categorical imperative. the traveler would not be justified in believing that the imperative existed in X and not in Y. (and thus would not know it) as categorical imperative would have no influence upon what people feel about complying with them or not then even if the traveler found that people felt guilty about singing in X he would not be able to justified believe that the categorical imperative to not sing exists. The traveler would not be justified in believing that the imperative existed in X and not in Y. (and thus would not know it) categorical imperatives are (though conceivable) imperceptible. This same process may be applied between any worlds that are similar in all ways except some set of categorical imperatives. If something does not have a method to distinguish its existence from its nonexistence then it is definitional indistinguishable from non-existing. If a world with categorical imperatives and a world without categorical imperatives exist and they are similar in all ways except that, then there is no way to tell the two worlds apart. Thus p2) a world with categorical imperatives and a world without categorical imperatives are indistinguishable from one another.