The Kalam Cosmological Argument Successfully Demonstrates its Conclusion.

Well, a big "thank you" to Raistlin for setting up this debate. It is turning out to be a very fun and eventful debate. I believe that we will both be better informed after all is "said and done." Raistlin begins in a most amusing manner by comparing the universe to various objects and he ends by comparing the universe to something eternal and changeless. But it has long been recognized and more recently confirmed through scientific investigation that the universe had a beginning or origin. "As the great English astronomer Arthur Eddington once put it, if the universe can be compared to a clock, the fact that the clock is continually running down leads to the conclusion that there was a time when the clock was fully wound up. The universe originated with its full supply of energy, and that is the fund that has been dissipating ever since." [1] But is Raistlin correct that the B theory of time debunks a beginning of the universe and of time itself? Or is this theory irrelevant to how and why the universe began at all? I would like to argue along three different lines of evidence to show that Raistlin's counter-Kalam arguments are ineffective. 1.) The universe cannot transcend time or contain time, if the universe is co-existent with time. My opponent dismisses this argument too quickly; thus, I will spend more time elaborating upon it. If the universe does not transcend time, then it can, indeed, have a beginning, which I will show. 2.) Despite what my opponent believes, his B theory of time has to apply to our specific universe, not merely to any universe which may (or may not) transcend the laws which governs its existence. This cannot be over-emphasized! 3.) My opponent does not present a solid reason, besides the fact that he doesn't like it, against the deduction which leads inevitably to the conclusion that the universe does have a cause [U > C]. Regarding #1, my opponent seems to be unaware of different types of causality. In fact, he is confusing causal priority with temporal priority. One cause may be temporally prior to its effect. Another cause may be causally prior (but simultaneous with) its effect. In fact, it is "temporal priority" which leads to so much confusion regarding causality. Our "common sense" gets a rude awakening from philosophers on causality. Thus, there is no temporal distantiation between the origin of the universe and the origin of time. The two are blurred together and interdependent on one another. At this point, the B theory of time not only does not refute the KCA, it may actually support and reinforce it. [1] It is the case that only if causal priority is incorrectly identified with temporal priority would the B theory of time challenge the basis of the KCA. But causal priority is clearly not to be confused with temporarl priority. Ergo, the KCA stands. As I pointed out in the previous round, philosophers who have specialized in causality, such as British philosopher, J.L. Mackie, can readily dispel the notion that cause and effect cannot have real simultaneity. In fact, much of our common-sense ideas about the non-simultaneity of cause and effect (i.e., that some event which is causal in nature must precede its effect) are actually wrong! As Mackie writes: "Our proposal to make the possible world just like the actual one up to the point of time at which the proposed antecedent X occurs in the actual world would have the undesired result of making temporal priority necessary, though not sufficient, for causal priority. For if Y had occurred before X in the actual world, it would have already been included, by the above proposal, in the possible world: we should have left no chance that the exclusion of X from the possible world might, as that world ran on, exclude Y also. But temporal priority is not conceptually necessary for causal priority." [2] I would like you to focus your attention, Raistlin, on that latter sentence. It is key for grasping this debate. I will return to it under section #2. Thus, when you write under "Causality sans time" about the absurdity of extrapolating about a point before time based upon the origin of the universe, I would say that not only is that not absurd, but it is necessary for our own formulations of causality. Based upon what Mackie is saying, we do not have a full grasp of causality if we cannot logically distinguish between temporal and causal priority. And if we can distinguish between them, then we can grasp a point beyond time since causality need not be time-based or time-contingent. Regarding #2, all that my opponent has asserted in favor of the B theory of time pertaining to this particular universe is that in this universe, time is contained within the universe. But then he jumps to the conclusion that the universe transcends time since it contains time. Nonsense! The set of all abstract objects is a set containing these objects. It does not follow that the set "transcends" the objects. Finally, Mackie's observations on the non-temporality of causality refute the idea that the B theory of time applies to just this universe. In order for non-temporality (and hence, causality) to be intelligible, there has to be a sense of temporality and becoming. The B theory of time denies this per the Craig video. [3] Thus, it cannot apply to this particular universe since non-temporality must be intelligible. Regarding #3, my opponent does not like my phrase "beyond time," even though he uses similar terminology to describe the relationship between the universe and time. OK. I can adjust the wording to suit his preference. That which is "beyond time" can become that which lacks time or is non-time [~T] where C is "cause" and U is "universe." Thus, ~T > ~C, and, ~[~T] > C U = ~[~T] Ergo, U > C. Thanks again for this intellectually stimulating conversation on time and causality. I am really looking forward to our next round together! [1] Dinesh D'Souza, What's So Great about Christianity (Carol Stream, IL.: Tyndale House, 2008) 118-119. [2] J.L. Mackie, The Cement of the Universe: A Study of Causation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974, 1980) 52. [3]