God Probably Doesn't Exist.

Thanks Con. H.O.P.O.E. Con claims there is no reason to believe puzzlement is gratuitous. He states appealing to intuition fails to account for this. But Con fails to demonstrate why appealing to intuition is invalid. Certainly intuition can be wrong in various circumstances, but it can also be correct in a variety of situations and should be considered correct in seemingly obvious circumstances until demonstrated false. For example, it strongly appears that I am typing right now, therefore it should be accepted that I am typing right now until proven wrong. We would have to adopt some very strange beliefs if we didn’t go by this. Similarly, Someone who becomes an atheist because of the problem of evil, then later dies doesn’t appear to have any benefit whatsoever. It should be accepted that there isn’t such a benefit. Con then states that appealing to a ton or even an infinite amount of puzzlements isn’t sufficient to demonstrate the premise. This is because all puzzlements have the same logical structure. All puzzlements may have the same structure, but this doesn’t entail that everyone uses the structure correctly or understands such structure. This is evident because different people have different views of the problem of evil. This shows that the raincloud example is a false analogy. Unlike reasoning, a raincloud isn’t formed by an intelligence. Con states that various theories of morality can explain P1 and P2. With normative morality, I’ve already answered. There doesn’t appear to be any benefit and since there is a huge number of puzzlements it’s likely that there’s one case that isn’t. In regards to moral scepticism, it seems that we’d also have to be skeptical about God’s moral nature. There’s no way we can state God is evil or good. Con appeals to divine command theory, but DCT can tell us what is morally correct or morally wrong. It’s simply whatever God commands [1], this contradicts moral scepticism. If Con’s version of DCT is true, then God’s benevolent nature is redundant and tautological. Benevolence becomes a term for what God says is good, therefore the term benevolence simply refers back to God. However, our agreed definition includes benevolence as a property. Con’s argument entails it’s not actually a property, but something tautological. Therefore, Con is very subtly arguing for a different version of God, instead of what is relevant to the debate. Appealing to divine command theory or moral scepticism doesn’t leave Con in a defensible position. His raincloud analogy is a false analogy, and appeals to normative morality fail. The Universe Argument I accept the definition of the universe that Con has given. Con first attacks my benevolence defense, although this circles back to the first contention, which I’ve defended. He then brings up two arguments in accordance to both possible definitions. Although, I was thinking of a de re definition, I don’t think either of Con’s arguments are good. In regards to de re, Con argues, God’s nature isn’t contingent, but his actions can be. He gives an analogy with the proposition “Pie”. However, it is a false analogy, as “discovered in babylon and computed by humans to 13.3 trillion digits in 2013” doesn’t follow from the nature of Pi. An action done by God would follow from his nature, as actions aren’t made in a vacuum at random. If God didn’t create the universe, then something within his nature is different. He might have no benevolence, no curiosity, no power to do so, and ect. If Con’s rebuttal was correct, an action doesn’t need to follow from God’s nature. That entails God can do something unwise or ignorant and this wouldn’t contradict omniscience. This is clearly contradictory, God is omniscient and cannot do anything unwise because that would entail he isn’t omniscient. Is it contradictory to state “My nature isn’t one to binge drink, but I binge drink on a regular basis.”? It seems it is. A nature is “The basic or inherent features of something, especially when seen as characteristic of it:” [2] If I don’t have the inherent feature to binge drink, then it follows I don’t binge drink. If I do binge drink, then I have that feature. If God created the universe, something in his features was the motivation. In a possible world where God didn’t create the universe, he has some component missing. Next, Con attempts to argue against a de dicto definition. He states since there are different entities in different possible worlds, then they are contingent. Therefore, such worlds are contingent, as they contain contingent entities. The problem is that the definition of the universe is “everything that exists in a metaphysically possible world” , such definition doesn’t entail that every specific thing is metaphysically necessary. Just the totality of things (everything) that exist in a possible world. Something exists in every possible world, but the exact entities are contingent. If they didn’t exist, something else would. Con’s response is self-contradictory. He states “It would follow that the proposition “a universe exists in every possible world” is true, but it certainly would not follow that each of these hypothetical universes are metaphysically necessary”. But, something is necessary if its truth value remains constant throughout possible worlds [3]. Con’s statement is essentially “It would follow that the proposition “The truth of the existence of a universe is the same in every possible world”, but it certainly wouldn’t follow that each of these hypothetical universe's exists in every possible world.” That simply makes no sense. Since a universe exists in every possible world, then a universe is necessary. Lastly, Con goes on to attack my modal realism/TRIV dilemma. He claims coherency makes something possible. If we look at the debate between conceivability and possibility, we’ll see that people argue that conceivability entails possibility [4], or is a guide to possibility [5]. This may seem unimportant, but to the argument it is. A compass may be a guide to where north is, or entail where north is, but it doesn’t make the direction of north. If we mess with the compass using a magnet, the direction of north doesn’t change. The same is true for conceivability/possibility. Conceivability tells us what is possible, it doesn’t make possibility. Something is conceivable because it’s possible. We do have cases where our conceivability changed when we learned something wasn’t possible. Before we understood chemistry, we could easily conceive of water being made of practically anything. When we discovered water is H2O, it made it so we couldn’t conceive of water being anything else than H2O. We can now only conceive of substances like water being made of other molecules, not water itself. Possibility changed our conceivability, conceivability isn’t the truthmaker of possibility. I don’t think I’m shifting the BOP. Either the truthmaker for modal claims is made true by some state of affairs in the world or not. Either way, something unhappy for the theist comes up. Wanting an answer is hardly shifting the BOP. My argument isn’t that the universe wouldn’t have some efficient cause, but that God wouldn’t be it, since he isn’t the reason for its existence. If God didn’t exist, the universe still would’ve since it’s still possible. There is no link to God. Efficient causation was a tool to get to the conclusion that God is the reason for the universe’s existence. Con brought up some challenging objections. However, they don’t succeed. Actions follow from God’s nature, they are linked. If an action is missing, so is a part of his nature. A universe can be necessary, but contain contingent entities because only something needs to exist. Conceivability guides us to possibility, it doesn’t make possibility. Thanks for one last time Con. Sources [1] http://www.iep.utm.edu... [2] http://www.oxforddictionaries.com... [3] http://www.iep.utm.edu... [4] http://consc.net... [5] http://www.mit.edu...