The Modal Ontological Argument Is Unsound

I take his introduction remarks to be in jest, so I don't view that as a conduct violation. In this discussion, I will show why the modal ontological argument is not sound. My opponent must not only knock down my arguments, but present a case of his own for the soundness of the modal ontological argument. Begging The Question "This is an informal fallacy where the conclusion that one is attempting to prove is included in the initial premises of an argument, often in an indirect way that conceals this fact. "[1]"Begging the Question is a fallacy in which the premises include the claim that the conclusion is true or (directly or indirectly) assume that the conclusion is true. "[2] I am going to show that the modal ontological argument entails question begging on the arguments behalf. Thus, it is fallacious and invalid. If it is invalid; it is not sound. Argument P1: The proposition "it is possible that a maximally great being exists" assumes that a standard of greatness exists P2: If the proposition "it is possible that a maximally great being exists" assumes that a standard of greatness exists, the standard of greatness the proposition assumes exists is a maximally great being C: Therefore, the proposition "it is possible that a maximally great being exists" assumes that a maximally great being exists - The Validity Of My Argument The argument is clearly logically valid. A entails B. If A entails B, B entails C. Therefore, A entails C. Similarly, if a premise entails the assumption that a standard of greatness exists, and that standard of greatness that exists has to be God; the premise entails the assumption that maximally great being exists. - Defending P1Defending P1 is easy, as the proposition in question posits possible "greatness". Without a standard of greatness that exists the proposition is meaningless and arbitrary. The proposition self-evidently assumes a standard of greatness (as proponents attribute omniscience, omnipotence, and omnibenevolence to greatness). - Defending P2P2 is true because if the proposition "it is possible that a maximally great being exists" assumes a standard of greatness exists, and it is not a maximally great being that is being assumed as the standard, then what is being assumed is that a maximally great being does not exist. Why? Well, if a maximally great being did exist, then he would be the standard of greatness; not whatever else is being assumed! If he doesn't exist though, then he is not possible (if he was possible, then we would exist). Thus, if the standard of greatness the proposition in question assumes is not a maximally great being, then the proposition "it is possible that a maximally great being exists" both assumes:(i) A maximally great being is possible(ii) A maximally great being is not possibleThat is a self-refuting proposition. The only option to avoid this is to posit that a maximally great being is the existing standard that the possibility premise of the Ontological Argument presupposes (Law of Excluded middle). Thus, P2 has to be true or else the Theist is required to admit that the proposition "it is possible that a maximally great being exists" is contradictory. - Conclusion The conclusion follows necessarily. The argument begs the question, and is unsound. Summary The resolution has been negated. Source [1] Garner, B. A. (1995). Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage. Oxford Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage. Oxford University Press. p. 101