Resolved: All but the nihilist shares an operative form of faith.

Con's definition of moral nihilism in the second round: "The moral nihilist believes that moral questions have no meaning." From this definition flows a criterion for deciding your vote: Has Con provided a rational basis for believing that moral questions have meaning without any form of faith? If not, Con loses. If so, Con wins because the resolution presumes only two alternatives: faith or nihilism. Con must provide another rational alternative. Con would decide moral issues by asking two slightly different questions (the "Con's Questions"): 1."Is that action in accord the normal behavior of the human species?" or 2."Is that person's genetically coded software operating to the specifications for the species?" There is not a rational basis for concluding that Con's Questions have meaning. Application of Con's Questions would find that every action consistent with either normal behavior of the species or our genetic code is, by definition, moral. Con, of course, emphasizes lines of the code like survival instincts while ignoring reptilian coding which is not as warm and fuzzy. If all actions we are programmed to perform are moral, questions about morality become meaningless. For that matter, despite my repeated challenges, Con has failed to explain why acting outside of the norm or the genetic code, as did the Unabomber, would be immoral. Reductio ad absurdum, all actions are moral. Con has has provided only nihilistic alternatives to faith. In an attempt to put some meaning in the broth, Con hints that there is something inside of that code, a kernel of human nature, not entirely pure, but which tilts humanity towards a better society. It is in this context that Con argues that "self-evident" truths can be "derived." Con ignores my evidence that Jefferson was accused of copying these concepts from Locke, whereas Locke based his Second Treatise firmly on religious grounds. Even here, who cares if the founding fathers had said something entirely different so long as one of Con's Questions is answered positively? In the end, Con has not improved his initial bare position: morals questions, for Con, answer the Con Questions. How can we know Con's second question regarding genetic coding is true? We just now decoded the genome only to reveal more complexity. An atheist insisting on empirical evidence should wait to understand our software/genome before making such any argument based on genetic structure. By his own definition, Con must find something "meaningful" embedded in the evolution of life on this planet both biologically and culturally. I agree there is something meaningful happening on this planet but refuse to put a name on it without evidence. I am completely agnostic but have faith (i.e. choose to act as if) how we treat each other matters. Con states, "Pro supposes that social evolution did not occur in pre-history, and that it's not occurring in prehistory undermines the case that it occurs at all." Con attempted to argue from recorded history that social progress is linked to a better understanding of human nature. One of my responses was that there is a lack of empirical data for the vast majority of human history. I made no assumptions as to what that data would reveal and neither should Con. Con argues, "Human sacrifice is gone; slavery has been well purged; and authoritarian rule is at least in decline." Why is it meaningful whether one genetically coded entity is enslaved to another? Using the Con Questions, anti-slavery advocates were acting immorally against what had been the "normal behavior of the species" since history began. Anti-slavery advocates wanted to act in one great leap of change instead of moving in small increments. Further, there is no basis for making any conclusion as to the general direction of history. We have less chance of knowing in 2009 what will happen in the next fifty years than did Americans in 1909. Those Americans saw trench warfare, a rise of Eugenics, racial genocide, the rape of Nanking, indiscriminate bombing of civilians, the Holocaust and the birth of nuclear weaponry. We may well live in a temporal and spatial oasis which will not hold. I have never contended that people act in lockstep with their faith although they do typically act as if human life matters. When put up against their genetic coding, some may still drive the trains to Treblinka or turn up the dial for a Milgram. Faith's failing in moments of crisis does not deny its ultimate power. We learn from Milgram. Eugenics, considered a viable science, died in 1945. Even as there are Schindlers, Scholls and Sendlers, there are the survivors, the repentant, all of us who viewed the films of death on an industrial scale who knew viscerally and with utter certainty, "evil was here." With this knowledge, comes determination, "never again" even as it happens again in Cambodia and Darfur. However Con wants to slice this point, the world did not see the Holocaust and shrug its collective shoulders, only to say, "There goes that damn genetic coding again." Noting that complex moral questions are arising from emerging technologies, Con proclaims, "If Pro's claim of a common leap of faith were true, we would have common resolutions of moral issues." Hardly. From the core faith that humanity matters, we have certain universals: The birth of a child is a cause for great joy. The Holocaust was a great evil. Sendler should have been given the Nobel Prize, not Gore. (But I digress…) From this commonality, reasonable minds will differ on complex issues. Con believes the self-evident inalienable rights of life, liberty and pursuit of happiness can be derived without faith much as Newton derived physical laws from observing the operation of inanimate objects. Con does not actually apply the Con Questions to derive the proposition that all men are endowed by their genetic coding and subsequent societal evolution, with certain rights, which are never for sale. Con's Newton analogy is inapt. Con emphasizes that the founders were Deists. Consider what deists of the 18th Century actually believed. Such deists would not have known of evolution or even of the antiquity of humanity. An 18th Century deist would see a divine hand directly behind what exists and had always existed for a mere 10K years or so. Ignoring Locke as Con repeatedly does (and must), the divine hand would only recently have been removed from Its creation. This is a powerful faith. Con concludes: "Pro wants some transcendental basis of human morality that would be compelling to space aliens and other species. . . . No faith is required to affirm morality derived from and consistent with human nature." Actually, Pro wants Con to satisfy Con's own definitions. A nihilist believes moral questions have no meaning. How meaningful is this contention: "Morality is only defined relative to genetic coding." Genetic coding matters because, Con says, "For x ‘to matter' with respect to an outcome y means that changing x produces a change in y. Thus a self-preservation instinct matters for human morality. It makes self-defense morally permissible, for example." Therefore, any action caused by genetic coding, "matters" and is therefore, somehow, moral? Con provides no basis for distinguishing between good and evil, right or wrong, moral or immoral. Con's Questions have no meaning. I never contended genetic coding does not influence humanity; however, the mere fact that our genome defines our predispositions, Con posits, wins the argument. Operate according to your programming, obey the latest cultural evolution and, bingo, you are moral. The voting criterion is whether Con has presented a rational basis for believing that "moral questions have meaning." Because Con failed to meet this burden, I affirm the resolution. [I thank Con for the fun and interesting debate. I hope he and persevering others enjoyed it as m