Three Philosophical Topics - 1F

This makes for an intriguing perspective, given that he has used some arguments I have yet to encounter; I praise him for this. ==================== Hard Determinism is Self-Refuting ==================== I'm a little disappointed that my opponent didn't expand on this argument - after all, in his previous section he did clarify that he would explain this argument in further detail. Nonetheless, I will try my best to interpret and attack it. My first argument is. .. why do you presume hard determinism is necessary for denying the existence of free will? In fact, as I go on I will demonstrate that we do not need hard determinism to rule out free will. I take conflict with the premise that "If determinism is true, then whatever can be done, is done. " This would seem to be blatantly wrong; determinism in no way states that whatever can be done IS done, for this would apply that every event that could be done has already past - placing us right now at the most awkward of situations. .. a moment in time in which everything has finished beforehand? This is an incoherent and absurd idea that even one completely new to the philosophy of time would recognize, and the determinist in no way upholds this. It seems to be me quite the jump from step 6 to step 7. You denote that premise 7 is accumulated from 4 and 6, and in such you commit an error. The premise of you believing in minimal free will can't fulfill the demand we refrain from believing falsehoods. As you've stated, simply believing in minimal free will doesn't mean it's true - simply that you do believe it. Further, you claim that in light of the contradiction between step 7 and 8, you rule out hard determinism in favor of minimal free will. .. I can't see how this can be anything else but arbitrary. For what grounds do you have for choosing minimal free will over determinism? Can't I on the same foot see the contradiction and thus declare free will to be false while determinism to be true? ==================== The Godelian Argument ==================== As stated before, I have yet to read deeply into such a field - indeed, it was my opponent's mention of Godelian related arguments that has led me to begin to read on the subject, albeit I have not enough time to comprehensively understand it for this debate in time. However, even if I were to grant him this effect of Godel's incompleteness theorem, I believe I can still expose a flaw in his argument that substantiates my point of him not being able to prove free will. As I've stated in the previous section, at best what you can achieve here is to undermine hard determinism. .. which I would agree to be an unscientific position given new insight in quantum mechanics. I will develop this point in the following sections (the consequence argument mostly) - what I will add here is to ask how you can free will here. So, let's assume that anthropic mechanism is false (that one can explain all of human behavior in mechanical terms), this darkness, if you would, would not necessarily lead to free will. This is akin to the God of the Gaps argument amongst the religious -- simply because there is no explanation, either practically or theoretically, does not allow for the affirmation of the existence of something else unless shown otherwise. You have yet to give us any reason to believe how free will would be sprung upon his given these uncertainties. You agree that unpredictability is not a sufficient reason to believe in free will", but you just go on to explain that the reason why L(m) can't reliability predict m's action is because of mathematics that denies mechanism. .. where's the difference? ==================== The Source Model ==================== I'm not sure why you are claiming the source model to be false in light of "ad absurdurms", whom are simply examples of when free will are denied. For is this not my goal? I find the Source Model to be an accurate model of control, and upon understanding it we realize that free will is incoherent - this is THE POINT OF USING THE SOURCE MODEL. Of course, one would ask why in the world we should accept such a model, but you don't garner any attack except supposed ad absurdum and the Jack example. As I'm sure you know, the idea of Frankfurt counterexamples[1] is something I have mounted in defense of the Source model, and given that I recall you agreeing with such examples I'll focus on your Jack analogy. If the voters take issue with this, then so be it - I don't care so much about pleasing the voters but rather having a healthy debate with my opponent in which intellectual progression actually takes place. To make your analogy effective, you would have to demonstrate how such a free will would differ from a similar example except free will being denied (obviously you find no difference, and find my definition to be overly restrictive). But we would have a weird standstill here - what would prevent me from calling your conception of free will inadequate? Indeed, the issue then boils down to how we conceive of control, which is exactly encapsulated in the Source Model. To use an example that would deny the Source model while assuming another framework of control is begging the question. You give an outline of what constitutes free will, and yet fail to clear up the mystery. What is "adequate determinism"? If you reject the Source Model, would free will be conceptualized in the ability to have alternative possibilities? If so, how would you handle the Frankfurt counterexamples? As you can see, your failure to expand on such a fuzzy but crucial word will undermine your position. ===================== The Consequence Argument ===================== Indeed, it would be absurd to employ a definition of freedom the power of an entity to perform an impossible action - such a demand would be simply uncalled for. However, let's take your analogy with Jack again. Obviously, there is nothing impossible about him taking either R1 or R2 -- UNLESS, as you are apt to point out, he has already chosen R2. The point is, the consequence argument calls for us to look into the PAST as well. Given that one past will correspond with one future, if Jack lived in a world in which such conditions led to the conclusion of him choosing R2, then such will happen. This doesn't erase our idea of could because it can simply refer to other possible worlds[2], in which OTHER EVENTS COULD have happened. As I've stated many times before, I don't need determinism to deny free will - given the Source Model is adequate enough. If we take it to be true, then we would realize that an agent only has free will if "some condition necessary for her action originates with the agent herself. [3]" We see this to be manifested in no circumstance. ==================== Argument from consciousness and experience ==================== I hardly see how decision making would be equated with free will - a computer can make decisions. You have yet to demonstrate the necessary connection between reason and free will. Reason is simply a mental faculty humans possess - a machine can eventually easily come to handle this, EVEN IF they are fundamentally different between man and machine. ==================== Conclusion ==================== While my opponent makes interesting arguments against determinism (which I have clarified is not something I need to support), he never makes a case for free will himself. It would seem that he finds a safe haven for free will in the unpredictably found in Godel mathematics; such a truth may be the starting point but it has yet to point us at the nature of free will. ---References--- 1. . http://en.wikipedia.org... 2. . http://en.wikipedia.org... 3. . http://plato.stanford.edu...