It is more likely that we live in a simulated reality than a real reality (2)

I'll begin by looking to my opponent's argument and taking out the syllogism in two ways; first, showing that some of the premises fail to obtain, and then an argument by substitution. Thirdly, I will argue that the only conceivable, physical simulated reality just would be the real reality. Finally, I will argue that it's more likely for us to exist in this reality than in any others using IBE. Part 1: My opponent's syllogism1. It is possible to create a simulated reality My opponent points out that if it isn't logically impossible, than it is logically possible. I completely grant this, however, there is a very large gap between logical possibility and physical possibility. We have absolutely no reason to believe that this is physically possible. At the very least, it's metaphysically possible, but that brings nothing to the topic at hand, because we're talking about this world, not any possible other world. This should already bring the debate to a screeching halt, because there's no reason to think that it is physically possible; the burden of proof is on him to show that it is.2. My opponent attempts to say that just because something is able to do something, it will. I find the reasons he gives unsatisfactory for two reasons:a: He is anthropomorphizing said creature; there's no reason to think they'd have similar motivations. b: There's no reason to think that ability entails probability. I have the ability to go do many things, but there's almost no reason for me to do so. C1: Fails to obtain, because there's no reason to believe that a simulated reality could even exist in the physical world, only in possible metaphysical worlds. C2: Also fails to obtain both because C1 fails to obtain, and because he never defines what it is for something to exist in a simulated reality. The question of what it is for something to exist in a simulated reality needs to be clarified by Pro. C3: Fails to obtain because it doesn't follow from the premises, in that it makes no link between what some vague and potentially metaphysical "something" existing in a simulated reality, and us existing in a simulated reality. That is to say, that something could potentially exist in a simulated reality gives us no reason to believe that we live in a simulated reality. Part 2: Argument from SubstitutionThis part will serve to outline just how easy it is to make my opponent's argument. Let's replace the words "simulated reality" with "reality made of sub-atomic marshmallow", given that these marshmallows are so small they will not ever be able to be learned about, and that the world is just as it would be without these marshmallows.1) It is possible to create a reality made of sub-atomic marshmallow. (Logical possibility)2) If something/s can create a reality made of sub-atomic marshmallow, then it probably will (Fun, tastes good, profit, and so forth)3) If something/s does create a reality made of sub-atomic marshmallow it will probably create more than one (Argument from Disjunction)C1) Therefore its probable that reality made of sub-atomic marshmallow outnumber real realitiesC2) Therefore its more likely that something exists in a reality made of sub-atomic marshmallow than real realityC3) Therefore we are more likely to exist in a reality made of sub-atomic marshmallow than an real realityThis illustrates that there really isn't a lot going for the simulated reality hypothesis, given that a simple substitution can reach the same conclusion. Because both Marshmallow hypothesis and the simulated reality hypothesis are untestable, they both give approximately the same amount of explanatory value. This means that there's a reason to think that we aren't in a real reality, but there is no reason to prefer a simulated reality over a marshmallow hypothesis. While you might think that this is a vote in favor of Pro regardless, remember that we could also substitute "simulated" with "real" and "real" with simulated, just in case we're in a simulated reality. This is another death knoll for Pro, since by his own argument, we could also show that we're more likely to be in a real reality than a simulated reality. Part 3: Simulated = RealAs far as we know it, an sort of simulated reality would have to perform all the calculations present in the universe , it would have to simulate every sub-atomic particle, and so forth. However, it is not epistemically possible to calculate information perfectly to such a scale of degree without having the observed system being the size of the system. That is to say, to calculate the products of all chemical reactions in the universe, there's no reason to think that the best calculator for this wouldn't just be the universe itself. In other words, the only way to represent the universe computationally, is with the universe itself. If the universe were simulated by something far larger, than it's only simulated from their perspective, however, from ours, the universe isn't simulated, even if we found out that we were created by hyper-dimensional beings. The "simulated" universe would still be our universe, because it would be composed of the same 'stuff. ' (Note that this argument is a further refutation of a simulated reality being physically possible, and says nothing about metaphysical possibility)Part 4: Inference to the Best ExplanationThis argument will largely be borrowed from Vogel [1]. My opponent lays out a minimal skeptical hypothesis (MSH) in that he is laying out an argument that when I claim that I see a cat in front of me, something is causing to not actually see a cat in front of me, and in this case, that something is the statement that I am in a simulated reality. This lacks explanatory value compared to the Real World Hypothesis, which states that I simply see a cat. MSH is weaker further because it can't explain the consistency that we see in the world: Why would a simulated reality behave as this world does, beyond it just being this world? I think my opponent would want to say that his simulated reality conforms to our reality in the measure that it is predictable, that it is an Isomorphic Skeptical Hypothesis (ISH), in that it conforms strongly to the reality we think we're in. However, this ISH requires a lot of add-ons for it to work. For everything in the universe, it would require pseudo-time, pseudo-location, pseudo-properties, and so forth. So when I see a cat in my opponent's ISH, I'm not actually seeing a cat, I'm seeing a pseudo-cat with all the pseudo-properties that a real cat would have, in a pseudo-location at pseudo-time t1. On the other hand, the RWH lets me say that I see a cat, sitting on the table, at 10PM. This is a clear reason to prefer the RWH for two reasons:1. It has more explanatory value, because rather than having to posit what it is that these pseudo-locations, properties, and so forth are, it lets me just call these things locations, properties, and so forth.2. There's no need to posit extra "stuff". I have no reason to add on the pseudo, if I get just as good an explanation from the RWH. Adding on other stuff, in the sense of Occam's Razor, just makes the proposition less likely and less parsimonious. You should prefer the RWH because it doesn't need to conform to what we imagine is real, it just is, and hence is more likely. Us being in the real world is the best explanation for why we perceiving things as being in the real world, without having to come up with theories that tell us otherwise, with no strong reason to believe these alternate hypothesis. By logical abduction, the RWH is most likely. Overview:Part 1 shows the various ways in which my opponent's argument's don't obtain. Part 2 shows a weakness in the Pro's BoP. Part 3 is a further refutation of physical possibility. Part 4 gives you conclusive reason to vote Con. I now hand it over to Pro.1. Vogel, Jonathan Refutation of Skepticism