That society ought to recognize animal rights

Without further adeiu, I shall begin. Society - What is it? As we've both agreed, society is to be defined in the most general terms, but as society is the actor in the resolution, the one who will be recognizing the rights of animals, I feel that we should be discussing what society really actually is. Is society the state of government? Is society just a group of people in the same social circles? Or is it everyone who interacts with one another in some manner? Regardless, we can derrive one thing from the thought: that whatever society is, it's necessary for some sort of agreement to be a society of any kind. Much like the government has an agreement with the citizens it governs and a hospital has an agreement with the people it doctors and employs, these societies, no matter the size or form, pose some form of contractual agreement, whether literal or verbal. From this we can conclude, in the most general sense as to be conplient with the definition provided and agreed upon, that society is formed by these contracts, and from these contracts are where we derrive things like permissibility and obligation from. The reason why we have to look to morality stemming from contractual agreements is because these contracts actually create an obligation to do something. For example, a paramedic has a legal obligation stemming from his employment contract to attempt to save anyone in danger while on the job. Other theories, though, do not create an obligation, like utilitarianism. If morality doesn't actually obligate us to do something, then we have no reason to actually accept its premises and moral skepticism follows, which prevents us from actually having an obgligation in this first place (meaning resolution is negated prima facie). That is why I must contend that society has no contractual obligation to regonize the rights of animals. Contention One - Inability to formulate a contractLet's consider the example of a worker negotiating their employment contract with their employer. The exchange of words and language is what allows them to reify their contract together and make any changes necessary to ensure that the contract is mutually beneficial. The only problem here is simple: when was the last time you heard an animal speaking fluent english (that isn't Scooby Doo)? Since they cannot communicate with society, they cannot be a part of the contract, and thus reap benefits from said contract. This means that society cannot possess an obligation to recognize animal rights. A point my opponent may bring up is that certain animals possess the ability or aptitude to communicate with humans through sign-language, such as apes, as an attempt to prove that they can communicate. The only problem with this is that this point forgets the instinct of animals for immediate pleasure. They're smart enough to be able to figure out that if they repeat whatever the humans are doing, then they will receive some sort of treat or reward. That's not communication, but merely instinctive repetition. Contention Two - Nature of a contractLike I had mentioned a litle bit previously, contracts are based off of being in mutual benefit. If both people benefit from the contract, then they have all the reason in the world to abide by the contract and reap the benefits from it. If, however, one side of the contract is gaining a benefit whereas the other side is not gaining any benefit, it a) breeds corruption since the side in benefit will push his benefit and control and dominate the side not getting benefit, and b) doesn't create a stable contract, as the side not gaining any benefit has no reason to keep abiding and being a member of the contract and can leave to enter a different, more fair contract. Thus, contracts must be mutually beneficial. The nature of contracts being mutually beneficial means we have no obligation to give them these rights for a few reasons:First: Animal's don't benefit from us testing on them and using their fur for clothing and their innards for food, which means there's no mutual benefit for them to rationally agree to a contract on. Second: Human's don't benefit from a contract with animals where we have to respect their rights. Only animals would benefit from a contract, but this isn't mutual benefit since only one side would be gaining benefits while the other side wouldn't be gaining any sort of benefit. Third: The way that humans treat animals is unreciprocal - animals don't perform tests on us or use our skin for clothing. This means that even if both groups benefit from a contract together, the content of their obligations would still inherently differ. As such, there's no reason to affirm the resolution, as we possess no obligation to extend to animals these rights. With that's let's look at my opponent's case. The main problem with my opponent's case is he attempts to pull the fast one of blurring the line of permissibility versus obligation. My opponent's case is about how humans have vastly more power than animals do, and it's our responsibility to use our power wisely and respect the rights of animals. The only problem with this approach, however, is that it only establishes the permissibility of doing the action, but not that it's morally obligatory, which is his burden through the mutually agreed upon definition of 'ought'. Sure, we would be living in a much better, consistent world if everyone helped elderly women across the street, but we hold no obligation to do so, as elderly women can probably get across the street just fine on their own and if they couldn't they shouldn't be trying to cross the street in the first place. As I'm the only one proving some form of obligation, you have to look to the negative case, which means you ultimately negate the resolution as there is no contractual agreemenet between humans and animals.