The Moral Argument is Not Sound

I. Problem? (1) Theism can provide a foundation for morality. (Theistic morality is possible) (2) AFM cannot provide a foundation for morality. (Non-theistic morality is impossible. ) [/]To support P1 of the Moral Argument is that God is necessary for OM. [/] I agree here but my opponent has confused my stance and maybe that is my fault. I agree with it to some extent. I avoid simple good/evil dichotomies. I think there are some things where are always objectively wrong, things like murder, assault, abuse or otherwise in direct violation of the golden rule. I also maintain that some things can be objectively considered good. I selected subjective because between the extremes (good and evil), I find there is a third area where things are highly subjective and determined by personal morality. In this area are things like theft, which in some circumstances is, though not good, is also not evil. A persons motivations and circumstances are relevant and the determination of good and evil is down to personal preference and is thus subjective. So where do we get that objective good and evil from? I suggest it stems from our creator which is God. At any rate, you have just defined "AFM" as the reduction or reducing of suffering. And yet there are people who believe that in some circumstances making someone suffer is in fact a good thing. And clearly some people do not strive to reduce suffering; there are plenty of murderers, rapists, and thieves, as well as those who voluntary increase their own suffering for the sake of reducing others. If we can fully interpret morality and it is objective, then it shouldn't matter how our brains came to be the way they are nor should we be viewing it differently; If God is not the cause then what is? What makes an act "good" or reducing suffering doesn't depend on the particular discussion its ingrained. Say if you say, I propose x as an objective definition of good then it is your subjective view of what objective good is. The same for any individual proposing a, b, or c, as an objective definition of good. ALL we can do is to try to recognise IF anything seems to be objectively good or bad to a degree where the doubt upon not being so is negligible, e. g. it is objectively bad to torture children for gratuitous fun. II. Epistemological Argument for Ontological Grounding 1. Atheist Friendly Morality My opponent confuses his self when he uses the word friendly and then tries to back out of it as if he didn't. To consider the word friendly is to suggest that you are friendly. My opponent gives himself as a atheist a label called ATF for the obvious objective morality that we all have but then gave us no reasonable explanation for his claim. As so he suggested that I prove it wrong before he states the structure for his claim just the declaration of his subjective theory. Then he says I am using a straw-man when I'm using the exact wording he implied. My opponent suggest that an atheist's morals are friendly to themselves and others. I simply ask how and why are we assuming they are friendly to all, how is anyone? 2. God can be seen at the roots of moral reflection My opponent claims that I made an assertion but I think it is he that is making them. He starts up a debate then claims his opponent must provide the burden of proof while he has to do nothing to valid the his claim that the moral argument is not sound. Though what he does provide us is his own subjective argument. But so long as you are focusing on human definitions of good you are not providing an objective definition of it but a subjective definition of it. What matters here is that we objectively do not think that suffering leads to bliss. Since people are ingrained with these set of beliefs, there's no basis to assert that there exists no objective moral standard. Subjective Morality is caused by culture/intelligence/religion. These are the things that make good/bad subjective. But my point is that the definition of good or suffering that my opponent uses is still subjective. However, we still use the same definition of good. We both still behave in a way that we think reduces suffering. It is just that one of us is wrong. The definition of good or suffering is "universal", and it is somehow not subjective? 3. Objective moral values require a standard I do assert OMV requires a standard, and my opponent never actually argues for his point. God is the standard and only receive a portion of his moral quality. Why should we do so for moral facts? No, Why shouldn't we! [/] I've also provided a theory which grounds objective moral values independent of a standard, proving this contention false. [/] Yes you have randomly thought one up that is stuck inside subjective morality. 4. Moral law requires a lawgiver Because we humans also value encouraging positive social behaviors. Never mind that we too admire a person who is willing to suffer to prevent the suffering of another. Never mind that we too greatly respect a person dying in an attempt to save a fellow. Never mind that we're ALSO primates who, due to our higher level of intelligence, exhibit more sophisticated expressions of those very same behaviors. Never mind all that. 'Those animals aren't human, and so morality does even apply to them. They're inferior to US. We're SUPERIOR to them. WE have OBJECTIVE morality. 5. Requirements for an adequate theory of moral duty The question is what we should do, not what we would (as a matter of empirical psychology) would do. Morality doesn't describe how humans do or will act, it describes how they should. So therefore unless God is the cause of objective morality then it is only subjective duty or theory. III. Non-Reductive Ethical Naturalism Conclusion I thank my opponent and suggest he define his authority for his motions. Until he does we can not properly know objective morality. Thanks, back to Pro. Resources: . http://gakuranman.com... . http://ezinearticles.com... . http://wiki.ironchariots.org... . http://www.davidsonian.com...