The Problem of Evil is Reasonable

IntroductionThanks to kasmic for accepting my challenge. Objection 1: Free WillIn his first objection my opponent deploys the free will defence: the idea that God would not infringe with our ability to choose, therefore we are free to do evil. I will present two responses to this defence.1. Unexplained SufferingFree will does not explain a vast number of evils in this world, like the suffering of animals or natural disasters.God gave man free will, but did he give it to animals, too? The answer to this question does not actually matter, because even if we accept the idea of animals freely choosing to harm human and non-human animals, it still does not free God of his charge for creating carnivores. What God creates beings who need to kill others and feed on the flesh of their corpses? Even if he gave them free will and does not interfere with it, the curse he placed on them still contradicts the definition of a perfectly good God.But we can ignore everything I just said about the suffering of animals and look at rather human-centered suffering not chosen for by anyone. Earthquakes, tsunamis, diseases, volcanos, lightning. None of them is a consequence of anyone's choice and yet innumerable people have lost everything to them, family, friends or possessions. They are the very definition of gratuitous suffering, they are examples par ex­cel­lence for things a good God would not allow to happen.2. Libertarian Free WillThe Free Will Defence commits the theist to libertarian free will (1).Libertarian Free Will (FW): "the view that a person is free with respect to a given action if and only if that person is both free to perform that action and free to refrain from performing that action; in other words, that person is not determined to perform or refrain from that action by any prior causal forces."(1)This is not to be confused with the political notion of libertarianism. The FW-libertarian holds that [1.] we have free will and [2.] that determinism is false, our decisions are uncaused by physical determinations.The evidence however, suggests otherwise. Think about ordinary criminals or immoral people for that matter, is there something many of them have in common? Exactly, many of them were raised in poor households or had a difficult childhood in some other way (I am of course not generalizing here) (2). It is the upbringing of people which determines their personality (genes might be involved, too, but that is disputable and if true would contribute to my case anyway). Therefore, if you bring someone who had a rough childhood, who wasn't cared for by his parents and who committed some lesser crimes before in a situation which might only anger the average citizen, chances are this person might become violent. He did not choose his action freely without any determination, it was the result of his upbringing. The same applies to (stereotypical) psychopaths or others who face a mental condition responsible for their compulsive actions.By now the reader might ask why this kind of free will is necessary for the FW defence. If God gave man say compatibilist free will (freedom of will is the freedom to do what I desire), then he would be guilty of allowing for mental conditions like psychopathy or troubling childhoods, because they shape an agent's desires in a way that makes them more likely to commit immoral acts. Evidentially this is the case, meaning that the FW defence does not get off the ground.Objection 2: Opposition In All ThingsIn his latter objection Con argues that evil is necessary for there to be good and if there could not be a morally bad act then there could not be a morally good act either. Here I will again present two responses to this objection.1. How much Evil? (4)For this first response I can accept the necessity of evil, but then simply ask: how much evil is needed for us to recognize the (morally) good?In 2013 malaria caused an estimated 584 000 deaths, most of which were children (3). This is makes about 1600 children who die from a preventable disease every day. Do we really need this much suffering? Imagine an Inuit who never heard about Africa or malaria. Is he not able to distinguish the good from the bad? We don't even need to imagine such a far-fetched example. I assume most people here have [1.] heard about similar numbers, yet [2.] think they could act morally even without this unnecessary suffering. If we do not need this incomprehensible evil in our world, then how much is the minimum?P1) If God exists then he knows this minimum amount of evil, he has the power to prevent evil from exceeding this amount and he wants to prevent this excess.P2) If God exists there would not be the gratuitous amount of suffering described above.P3) There is such a gratuitous amount of suffering.C) Therefore, God does not exist.My opponent's objection raises a number of strange metaphysical question he needs to answer before anyone should accept his defence.2. Linguistics and Ontology (4)It is quite true that if evil would stop existing tomorrow / never existed at all then we would over time loose our / never develop linguistic conventions to describe good and evil. However to say if there is no property "badness" instantiated then there is no property "goodness" instantiated either is a non-sequitur:P1) p & qThere is something capable of instantiating "goodness" and there is something capable of instantiating "badness".P2) ~qThere is nothing capable of instantiating "badness".C) ~qTherefore nothing is capable of instantiating "goodness".The non-sequitur should be apparent to everyone. To illustrate this, consider some analogies:1. No LightImagine a world in black where noone knows the difference between brightness and darkness simply because there never was any light. Now, looking at this world from our perspective we can certainly say there is no property "brightness" instantiated, but claiming the property of "darkness" is never instantiated makes no sense.2. No ShadowWe can make the same analogy the other way around by imagining a perfectly spherical room with a point light at it's center. It makes sense to say that the property "darkness" is never instantiated, but to say "therefore "brightness" is never instantiated, too" is really just a non-sequitur.ConclusionIn this first rebuttal I have presented strong responses to Con's objections and I await his subsequent arguments.Sources(1) http://www.iep.utm.edu...(2) http://www.bjs.gov...(3) http://www.who.int...(4) J.L. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism Chap. 9