Resolved: Abortion is morally impermissible

He is an excellent advocate of the Pro-Choice position, so hopefully we can have a worthwhile exchange. In this first round, I will put forward an affirmative argument that abortion is impermissible. Also, I want to make it clear that the debate resolution is whether abortion in general is morally impermissible (i. e. abortion in the case of normal pregnancies). DefinitionsAbortion – the intentional termination of a pregnancy through surgical or other meansMorally permissible – ethically acceptableThe Future Like Ours (FLO) Argument In arguing that abortion is morally impermissible, I will outline and defend the following version of the Future Like Ours (FLO) argument:P1 – Any action that foreseeably deprives a being of its FLO is morally wrong, ceteris paribus P2 – Abortion is an action that foreseeably deprives a being (the unborn) of its FLO-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------C – Abortion is morally wrong, ceteris paribus (1)Before attempting to justify this argument, I will explain some key terms. First, a FLO is simply a future of value. That is,“all the experiences, activities, projects and enjoyments” that a being will or could come to experience. In short, it is all the potential goods of one's future. (2) However, merely having a future does not entail one has a FLO. Mosquitoes, for example, certainly have futures, but these are not experientially rich enough to be considered having moral weight - they do not have a future like ours (FLO). Whilst it may be difficult determining when futures become sufficiently valuable to accrue moral weight, we can leave such questions aside, so long as we accept that depriving a being of its FLO is what makes killing wrong (as I shall show in defending P1). (3)Also, this argument contains a ceteris paribus (“all things being equal”) clause. There are rare circumstances where foreseeably depriving a being of their future by killing them is indeed permissible (e. g. just war). However, these do not impact the general principle that prohibits killing, precisely because things are not equal in such cases. As such, it will do Con no good to dispute P1 by pointing to exceptional cases where killing is permissible. Defending P1Perhaps the defining question of the abortion debate is this: what is it that makes killing generally wrong? (4) In order to answer this, we have to develop a general account of the wrongness of killing. P1 proposes the FLO account, which explains the wrongness of killing by identifying a specific wrong-making property found in all killings – namely, that they deprive each victim of a future of value (FLO). An obvious objection at this point would be that there could be an alternative explanation of why killing is wrong which makes abortion permissible. As such, I will contrast FLO with a plausible Pro-Choice alternative - a simple desire account. On this view, killing is wrong because it thwarts our most fundamental desire – the desire to continue living, in the most egregious way. As such, this view would exclude the unborn from having the right to life, assuming that they lack these features. (5) In what follows, I will attempt to justify the superiority of the FLO account against the desire alternative, showing that the FLO account is the best explanation for the wrongness of killing. Before doing so however, we must revisit some basic terminology, as this helps us see the enormity of Con's task in rejecting FLO. Philosophers commonly distinguish between necessary and sufficient conditions. Necessary conditions for X are those that are required to obtain for any instantiation of X. By contrast, sufficient conditions are those which are enough to instantiate X. (6) P1 states that depriving a being of their FLO is sufficient to judge an action as morally wrong. In other words, I merely need to provide sufficient conditions for the wrongness of killing to eventually establish that abortion is indeed impermissible. By contrast, in order to successfully diffuse P1, Con's rival explanation must instantiate the necessary conditions for why killing is wrong. If a simple desire account, for example, merely provided sufficient conditions to explain why killing is wrong, Con's account could be compatible with the FLO account being correct (e. g. killing may be wrong because it thwarts our desires AND because it deprives a being of its FLO). (7) As such, Con's task here is much more difficult than mine. To show that the FLO account is superior, I will focus on the following 4 cases:i) a normal adult ii) a brokenhearted, suicidal teenageriii) a temporary comatose patientiv) an infant (8)Any prospective account for the wrongness of killing must explain why killing in each of these cases is impermissible. I will show that only by appealing to one's FLO can we have principled moral prohibitions in these cases. As such, rejecting the FLO account ultimately means we have to reject our basic moral intuitions, which is untenable. Normal human adultFLO account: Clearly, killing on this view would be wrong, as it deprives adults of their FLO. Desire account: Likewise, the desire account easily mirrors our intuitions. Killing an adult would thwart their basic desire to live and must be regarded as impermissible. So far, so good for each account. Broken-hearted suicidal teenagerFLO account: As killing such a teen would deprive them of their future of value, it must be prohibited as impermissible, despite their momentary and fleeting despair in the immediate present. Desire account: This is where the the desire account becomes problematic. A suicidal teen has an explicit desire to die. As such, killing them would not thwart any desires and so could not be judged as morally impermissible. Yet, this is clearly absurd. The suicidal impulse felt by a teen nursing a crush is held irrationally and superficially by a person at an emotionally vulnerable time in their lives. Moreover, these feelings are notoriously fleeting – lasting days or weeks in most cases. In short, the volatile nature of teen's desires, as well as their lack of perspective and maturity to make such important decisions, means that any account where the right to life is contingent upon desires leads to untenable moral consequences (i. e. making killing in such cases permissible). As such, we have to reject the desire account for the wrongness of killing. Temporary comatose patientFLO account: As such a person would have a FLO, killing them would be impermissible on this view. Indeed, this example becomes even more favourable to the FLO account. Consider coma patients in a Persistent Vegetative State (PVS). Why is it we think it impermissible to kill those in a temporary coma, yet most of us think it justified to pull the plug on PVS patients? One cannot anchor the moral worth of these patients by referring to properties in the present or past, as such properties are identical between temporary and PVS patients. Yet, clearly our intuitions differ in these cases. Why? The reason we think it is permissible to end the life of PVS is precisely because killing does not deprive such persons of their future of value. (9) In other words, only FLO makes sense of this distinction. Desire account: It seems hard to think why killing a temporary comatose patient would be wrong on this view. Such persons certainly seem to have no occurrent desires at all, so these would not be thwarted. In any case, any desire that they do have would seem to be no different than of the PVS coma patient, so this view must hold that temporary and PVS coma patients have the same right to life. As such, the desire account seems yet again to be wildly counter-intuitive. InfantFLO account: A typical infant will also clearly have a future of value, consisting of a lifetime of experiential goods and enjoyments. Killing newborns would undoubtedly deprive them of these goods, making infanticide impermissible on the FLO account. Desire account: It's not clear that the desire account could prohibit infanticide. It's difficult to see how the desires of a newborn differ significantly from a well developed foetus, which seems like an important distinction for the Pro-Choicer. (10) Moreover, typical personhood accounts like that advanced by Singer regard newborns as not developed enough to be regarded as persons with desires to thwart. So, the permissibility of infanticide seems like a looming problem if we reject the FLO account. In summary, the FLO approach is much more able to explain and preserve our deeply held moral intuitions in these cases. As such, P1 is strongly affirmed. Defending P2P2 makes two uncontroversial claims. First, that the unborn have a FLO. As Marquis comments, “The future of a standard fetus includes a set of experiences, projects, activities, and which are identical with the futures of adult human beings and are identical with the futures of young children. ” (11)We can dispute whether a FLO has moral significance, but it seems undeniable that in normal pregnancies, the unborn possess a FLO, no less than any of the examples above. Second, the practise of abortion foreseeably deprives the unborn of their FLO, by ending the pregnancy. Again, this is not remotely contentious, even for those who dispute the pro-life view. There is much more that could be said of P2. However, given limited space and the anticipation that Con will broadly agree with it, I'll stop here. . ConclusionAs we have seen, the best general explanation for the wrongness of killing (FLO) ultimately gives the conclusion that abortion is impermissible. Over to Con to prevent the affirmative case for the Pro-Choice position. Sources 6 - The Philosopher's Toolkit, Julian Baggini and Peter Fosl, P1748 – A Defense of Abortion, David Boonin, P57All other references come from: . http://faculty.polytechnic.org...