Objectivism is not a logically valid philosophy.

1. Existence Part I a. "according to Leibniz, these "truths" tell you absolutely nothing about anything in existence." My question is, why not? Leibniz's saying it doesn't automatically make it true. The fact it, the law of identity and subsequent axioms tell you a great deal about existence. A is A. A thing is itself, has a specific nature and attributes (as distinguished from other entities with their own properties and natures), and cannot simultaneously have and not have a particular attribute at the same time and in the same respect. For example: A carrot is a carrot. My opponent is my opponent, and he cannot be not-my-opponent (in the same respect, and at the same time). Only given the law of identity can any other knowledge be possible. In fact, my opponent has to assume identity as the foundation of existence to refute the proposition that it is the foundation of existence. After all, the law of identity is the law of identity. b. He says that the proposition that "existence exists" is incorrect based on the fact that (1) "existence" is not a thing, and that (2) "concepts" do not exist, even asserting that (3) existence is nonexistent, and dependent on human cognition. (1) Existence obviously isn't an object. The axiom that "existence exists" is contingent on the premise that existence = identity. My opponent fails to recognize that. So, the fact that identity exists – that A is A – disproves my opponent's assertion. (2) Concepts are integrations of multiple percepts bound by a specific definition. A concept doesn't exist as a tangible thing, certainly, given that they are a "reference point" if you will, so that man can interact with reality. Rather than simply perceiving two apples, he can identify, through the use of reference, the concepts both of "two" and of "apple". Concepts, to put it simply, are man's means of objectively identifying, defining, and judging reality for what it is. (3) To assert that existence doesn't exist is to say that identity doesn't exist – that A is not-A. Funny thing is, contradictions don't exist in reality. Carrots aren't non-carrots. My cell phone isn't a non-cell phone. My opponent isn't not-my-opponent. A is A. Existence exists. Also, I would love some proof that the existence of objective reality (which is independent of man's mind) is contingent on human perception of it. 2. A Selfish Trick a. I don't understand what he's trying to get at by quoting Peikoff. An axiom, by definition, is a self-evident proposition. A is A, for example. It's foolish to think that Rand would need to prove something that is self-evident. b. Once again, my opponent seems to have misconstrued the notion of "Existence". Ayn Rand never argues that existence is a physical object; rather, existence is identity. A is A. I don't know how else to explain it, to be frank. c. The question at the heart of the argument is, if reality exists independent of man's mind, how does it exist? Here's the thing: reality exists independent of human hopes, fears, desires, wishes, and whims. If I want $1 million to start existing in front of me, it changes nothing. Humans can perceive and (through use of reason) identify reality, but their perception doesn't change the state or nature of existence. A is A, regardless of how differently Donald Trump sees it. In layman's terms: man's mind doesn't shape reality – it identifies it. 3. "Ding an Sich" (this argument is mostly about the ana-syn dichotomy) a. Kant's flaw in establishing this dichotomy is that he discounts the origin of referential concepts as irrelevant to acquiring knowledge; it's akin to starting a race at the halfway point while consciously ignoring that the actual starting point was a long distance back. At face value, it makes sense to say that one class of knowledge is based on experience, and one isn't; however, definitions and concepts aren't the same. A definition represents the essential characteristics of a concept which differentiate it from other concepts. Definitionally, a bachelor is unmarried; however, we don't know if the bachelor is happy. It's nonessential to the concept of a bachelor. A concept is, partially, the known, in terms of the essential characteristics, but also consists of all possible nonessentials – both known and unknown. For example, the concept of a fire truck isn't definitionally restricted to red, or yellow, or blue. Conceptually, we haven't a clue which it is. In this sense, Kant fundamentally misconstrues both the nature and the use of concepts. Concepts, being nothing more than integrated percepts, are a function of "experience". Sensory experience and rational abstraction are two parts of the same function of concept-formation and knowledge-acquisition. Neither gains knowledge on its own. Concepts cannot be formed without sensory input (consider the hollow "concept" of a "flipperdoo"), and perception alone is useless if not integrated into one's conceptual knowledge (consider an animal who perceives two trees, and the human who knows, conceptually, that he is perceiving two trees, understanding both the concept of numbers and of trees.). Simply put: all knowledge is a posteriori (by Kant's definition) because all knowledge is necessarily derived from and verified through [integrated] experience. 4. Selfishness biological? a. His essential argument is that the goal of life is to reproduce, and that all "experts" agree. First of all, why must that necessarily be the objective goal of humanity? Because a biologist tells me that my life is good for nothing but producing another life who is good for nothing but reproduction? Ethics is a guide to action – a guide to living. Rational selfishness – concern with one's own interests – is the best way to maximize life and the enjoyment thereof. Reproduction can be a goal or pursuit, but it isn't some kind of inexorable ethical commandment (which in itself is a contradictory concept). b. Also, to answer your question about the socialist – it's because he's an idiot who has no desire but to destroy himself, presuming that he is truly altruistic. 5. Selfishness? a. Objectivism never claimed to be "ethical egoism". People attribute it to EE, but Rand never claims it to be EE in the sense that you're describing it. b. In a society under the jurisdiction of a government controlling retaliatory force, it isn't in one's self-interest to violate another person's rights. Pursuing his own rational interests requires him to respect the pursuits of his neighbors. That's why the government is delegated a monopoly over retaliatory force: so that people couldn't jew each other out of their life, liberty, and/or property. Plus, it's completely impractical to deal with men by pointing a gun at them. It may work for the urges of the moment, but it can never end in the successful achievement of one's rational values. Look, historically, at individuals and states who have dealt with others solely by force, rather than by the principle of trading value for value. See the logical conclusion of that morality. Pol Pot, Hitler, Stalin, and the like. c. Objectivist Ethics tells you the best way to live. It doesn't tell you that people will follow the rules. I'm sure that there are irrational people who would be more than happy to relieve innocents of their rights. Objectivist Ethics is a code, not a commandment. d. Laissez faire capitalism bans the use of force from all human relations. There's no slavery. 6. The Sanction of the Victim a. The concept of "the sanction of the victim" refers to the victim's willingness to take punishment/unearned guilt for no other reason than his virtue, and his accusers' lack of it. Objectivism specifically says not to accept anything that isn't earned, especially when it comes to unearned guilt. There's also, again, no slavery.