Moral Relativism (Pro) vs. Divine Command Theory (Con)

The parts-whole fallacy largely only applies to quantitative properties such as size, age or currency. This is why your example of the fallacy seems absurd, because you are using the quantitative property of age. Contingency, on the other hand, is not quantitative and so the fallacy cannot be seen to be a clear refutation of the concept of a contingent universe. Something can either be necessary or contingent, Pro asserts the former. But when we assert the necessary existence of a finite thing it would be absurd and contradictory to suggest that it could not have existed. Yet it is not absurd or contradictory to assert that the universe could not have existed so this implies that the universe does not have necessary existence. As necessity and contingency are dichotomous, the universe is therefore contingent. I take issue with Pro's point that my leap from 'outside the universe and non-contingent' to the God of classical theism. I will justify my 'leap'. God's properties are omnipotence, omniscience and benevolence. Admittedly this argument cannot prove the latter but all I need to do is assert that an omnipotent and omniscient being exists before I can go on to assert His benevolence (although this is a largely existential conclusion). The fact that God is outside the universe results in His omnipotence because a lack of omnipotence suggests a limiting factor. For example my power to jump up a tree is limited by the force of gravity. If this limiting factor (among a few others) was not present I would be able to jump up a tree. As God is transcendental (outside space-time) there can be no limiting factor to His power aside from logical contradictions; therefore he is omnipotent. I also struggle to see how Pro thinks that an infinite chain of oscillating universes is more justifiable than God, besides, the contingency argument can be extended to ask why the chain of universes has necessary existence. That too could have its contingent existence asserted. In his next rebuttal, Pro misunderstands what MR is. Agreed, it does not state that an objective standard of morality exists, but it still holds that subjective morality exists. MR asserts that a moral truth is true or false relative to the society (1), it does not deny that there are no such thing as a moral truth exists, only that its exists objectively. Pro is confusing moral relativism with moral nihilism (2), which is the theory that does refute the existence of both objective and subjective moral truths. Nonetheless, this does not escape the conclusion that premise 2 is false, for if morality is subjective then God cannot be said to have defined it. However, so long as we prove that God exists (which I argue in premise 1) then an objective morality can be said to exist. For if God cares how we ought to live (which I believe He would) then He would set objective moral rules for us to live by. Indeed, the only respected refutation of objective morality is that God does not exist, but if He does exist as a creator of the universe (as I have argued) then it is intuitive that He would create an objective morality. 'The statements "Morality exists" and "MR is true" are irreconcilable.' This statement by Pro is therefore false, as he confuses moral relativism with moral nihilism. MR does not deny that morality exists, it only denies that it is objective. Pro points out that the enticement to adhere to God's commands does not translate to morality. I agree, the concept of enticement answers the question of WHY we ought to act according to God's will, I do not maintain that the enticement of eschatological reward grants God's commands moral weight (for His commands have moral weight due to how He created the universe), but if God commands X then it is not unreasonable to say that we ought to do X. To support this, I would argue that the Is/ought gap as a principle is self-refuting. Hume claims that non-emotivist morality cannot exist because the is/ought gap shows prescriptive statements to be rationally unjustified, but by saying this Hume subtlety states that we ought to epistemically value rational justification. According to his own theory, such a prescriptive statement is unjustified. Therefore the is/ought gap collapses when subject to its own logic. Admittedly, I did employ Hume's Law to refute MR in round 2 but that was not the only way that I refuted MR; the other refutations stand. In response to your point about atheist motivation to act morally, perhaps it is empathy, self-preservation or duty. I cannot answer for them as I do not deny that an afterlife exists. Note that I do not say that heaven is the only enticement to be moral, but it is one such enticement. Pro claims that our perceptions of morality are derived from evolution, and is keen to highlight that he does not advocate evolutionary ethics. However, this only provides a possible source of our sense of morality, Pro does not present any evidence to prove that our sense of morality DOES come from evolution. I would argue that the evidence of moral values that contradict evolution inductively disprove that evolution is the source of moral perceptions. I agree that, if God did not exist, it is possible that our moral perceptions come from evolution, but there is no actual evidence to say that it actually does. As of yet, Pro is engaging in idle speculation about the source of our moral perceptions; it is merely a hypothesis and so does not help him meet his BoP. I will now defend the concept of necessary moral truths. Pro commits the naturalistic fallacy by attempting to define what is good in terms other than itself. In reality, 'good' is a semantic prime (3) meaning that it is concept that cannot be defined in other terms. Semantic primes cannot form tautologies due to their indefinable essence. I argue that necessary moral truths are necessary due to their own essence; not some external deliberator. For example, needless cruelty is bad in a similar sense that a triangle has three sides. There is no tautology in saying that a triangle has three sides because having three sides is part of the essence of a triangle. Hence a necessarily good act is good because its goodness is part of its own essence. 'Are necessary moral truths necessary because God says so, or are they necessary because they conform to a standard outside of God?' They are necessary irrespective of God's commands; He could not change their moral essence in the same way that He could not make a circle square. They are also not necessary because they conform to an external standard because their necessity comes from their essence, which is by definition not some external standard. The two prongs of the dilemma are avoided. Pro misunderstands my rebuttal of his initial contention, as I do not attempt to define omnipotence in a broad sense, I only define what is theologically meant by God's omnipotence. Therefore you cannot apply the definition to humanity to suggest that humans are omnipotent because that would not then be God's omnipotence. All I am saying is that God is omnipotent insofar as His actions are not contradictory to His nature. This means that His omnipotence is not limited by His inability to create or do contradictory things. It is not tautological because I do not assert that "God can do whatever God can do"; I assert that "God can do whatever is not contradictory to His nature'. A stone that God could not supply the force to lift is impossible. God could provide an infinite force due to His omnipotence, but according to Newton's 2nd Law, a rock that God could not lift would have to have infinite mass. The universe has finite mass so such a rock would be impossible. This does not limit His omnipotence. (1)http://plato.stanford.edu... (2)http://www.philosophybasics.com... (3)http://en.citizendium.org...