God more than likely does not exist

Cosmological argumentI admit that I made an oversight by claiming that everything is made up of 18 fundamental particles. I knew that dark matter existed but I forgot to include it in. Just because Con has caught me out on this mistake it does not mean that my initial point is false. Pointing out that dark matter exists is a red herring. It is like myself claiming that;'all computer components are inorganic because they are all inorganic hard drives and inorganic monitors'Of course there are other computer components other than hard drives and monitors, but pointing this out and claiming that; 'inorganic graphics cards are also computer components' does not refute my initial point that all computer components are inorganic. The only way that this initial point could be refuted is by the postulation of an organic component. To summarise, I have supported my claim that everything is contingent by showing that dark matter is also contingent. The only way Pro could have refuted my proof of P1 is if he argued that there is sufficient reason to suppose that physical entities that are non-contingent exist. Yet he has not done so. I would also highlight that this debate is pertaining to the probability of God, so an inductive argument with inductive premises is still sound. Of course I cannot deductively prove that every physical thing is contingent, but I have asserted that it is highly probable that this is the case. Again, Pro insists I commit the fallacy of composition. Yet I maintain that it is logically impossible for a deductively valid argument to be logically fallacious, as there is no room for a fallacy to hide. What Pro does here is simply point out that P1 is about parts and P2 is about the whole. Yet discussion of parts and wholes within a logical framework does not entail that the fallacy of composition has been committed. I would have been guilty of using this fallacy if P2 is the conclusion to P1. Yet this is not the case. P1 and P2 are veridically independent; whereas the fallacy of composition requires veridically dependent assertions. Pro returns to defend his use of the Kalam argument. I do not need to refute it because it remains a straw-man. Yet I will humour the argument to show that the conclusions he draws from it are invalid. Firstly, he states that: 'X beings to exist if and only if X exists and there was a time prior where X did not exist'Yet if one considers the definition of 'begin':'come into being or have its starting point at a certain time' (1)This does not entail a time prior to X, all it entails is a specific point in time at which X came into being. This time could be t=0. Hence Pro fails to show that the universe could not have begun to exist. Pro goes on to claim that my argument rests upon the scientific conception of causation, and hence is invalid because science cannot be applied outside the universe. Yet this claim is not correct, I do not rely on scientific causation but on logical conceptions of causation. Logic transcends physical reality and so it can transcend the universe. Hence Pro's use of the KCA is both a straw man and invalid. Ontological argumentPro opines that I contradict myself because the argument rests upon the conceptual equivalence of the God existing in the mind and the God existing both in the mind and in reality. However, this is not the case because X can exist only in the mind even if that mind cannot know the entire essence of X. For example, if I imagine a ghost then a ghost exists in my mind, I do not need to understand the entire metaphysical essence of the ghost should it exist in reality. My opponent states that a non-physical being has no physical properties to transcend. I'm not sure what he means by this, as that is the very definition of a non-physical being; that which has no physical properties. Returning to my original point, a non-physical unicorn is tautological because a unicorn is wholly defined by its physical properties - there are no grounds to call a non-physical unicorn a unicorn at all! Yet a person with a mind is defined by both its physical and metaphysical properties. It is not tautological to postulate a non-physical person. I don't just assert what can and can't be non-physical; logically speaking, anything which has non-physical properties can be non-physical. Furthermore, qualifying the argument does not render it unsound. The very process of defending an argument includes qualifying the veracity of its premises and logic. Therefore, the ontological argument remains unrefuted. GDE/GDNE/Divine SilenceAs my cosmological and ontological arguments have shown to remain sound despite numerous attacks by Pro, these three of Pro's arguments are not valid. Moral Paralysis / Free Will defencePro continues to misunderstand what free will actually is. It is not granted on a situational basis upon the merit of the parties. God is not sitting up on a cloud and throwing down doses of free-will. No, free-will is a concept that gives us autonomy in situations where one can choose what to do. If I can do either X or Y, then free-will allows me to choose X or Y autonomously, yet if I can only do X, I can only choose X because I can do nothing else. Free-will cannot create alternate choices ex nihilio; it only applies to preexisting choices. So in the example, a child can only choose X (be raped) because X is the only choice. It is the only choice because adults are physically stronger than children. This disparity in strength is not intrinsically bad and can mostly be good so God would not be justified in making everyone equally strong just in order to prevent instances of rape. Free will & no moral evil? Pro is hoisted by his own petard here. Literally the line above this argument states:'My argument still the same here, logically possible ? sure, plausible. .. .. .. .. nah. 'Yet three lines below he states:'cause it has not being shown to be impossible ergo it is possible. 'One minute he denies the significance of proving possibility and the next he claims that it is significant enough to support his whole argument. Ultimately, it may conceivably be possible that everyone simply chooses to do good, but it is not plausible in the slightest. I am still at odds with the very possibility that it could be ensured that every single autonomous person throughout all of history does not make the wrong choice. Not ever. Of course it is possible but it is so improbable that it does not pertain to a debate regarding likelihood. As I have said before, the only way that it could be plausibly ensured that everyone chooses to do good is to implement some mechanism that ensures that this is the case. Yet this would still infringe on free will. Finally, I would like to highlight that all my arguments are based on plausible principles - it is only at Pro's insistence that they are actually implausible possibilities. Closing statementsI thank UndeniableReality for such a riveting intellectual debate. He has proved a worthy opponent. Nevertheless, his rebuttals do not succeed in refuting either my cosmological argument or my ontological argument. Hence prior likelihood of God's existence is established. This prior likelihood renders most of Pro's arguments invalid. His best argument is the moral paralysis argument, yet I have shown why free-will necessitates the existence of moral evil whilst acknowledging that it is still worthy to prevent its manifestation. (1) Google: 'Define begin'