Mind Over Matter? (2)

Thanks to my opponent for a stimulating debate and I fully understand the circumstances of him not having the space to attack my argument; we will definitely have to continue this debate where he has an opportunity to attack my argument. I did not realize (silly me) how involved and detailed this debate would become. My apologies to my opponent and the readers. Jumping straight to my rebuttals: ========== Hempel's Dilemma ========== Here, I think Con misses the full force of what choices the dilemma forces the physicalist to make; either one is an extremely unattractive choice (at least to me standing over in the dualist cam) and I do not think Con has successfully offered a way to escape the dilemma. Remember: on the first horn of the dilemma there is the option for the physicalist to define physicalism in terms of contemporary physics - but no one in their right mind what say that contemporary physics is at all finished and so physicalism would not have a complete ontology. Imagine if materialist ("physicalists") philosophers one hundred years ago had decided to define physicalism as only those things that are countenanced by their own modern physics were the only things that existed. Fast forward one hundred and take a look at present day modern physics which is a vastly different landscape. This would would serve as a refutation of their physicalism. Now what principled reason could one give to deny that it is highly likely that this will happen again and again and again in the future while holding on to the definition of physicalism as only things that can be described by physics existing? On the send horn we have the option that the physicalist might take where they define physicalism in terms of whatever future, ideal, complete, finished physics looks like. That's all well and good but, naturally, we have no idea what that will look like. For we all we know immaterial substances might end up being described by "physics". If "physics" is as malleable as to study non-physical mental properties or substances in the future it couldn't even properly be called physics for one and it would basically make "physicalism" be logically compatible with dualism (if not the same thing) for two. Physicalism is supposed to be the denial of substance dualism, and what's more, is supposed to be logically incompatible with substance dualism. That would render it trivial at best or false at worst. This dilemma isn't just about the problem of incomplete understanding of what is to be properly understood as something being physical. It's a bit hard to exclude substance dualism if no one knows precisely what physicalism is supposed to be. I'd also like to quibble a bit with this: "Does this mean that anything not described by physics doesn't exist? No, of course there is still the possibility of souls and what not. However, at the same time there exists NO evidence for their existence either." It seems to me to be that by "evidence" Con means scientific evidence. But there are more kinds of evidence then scientific evidence. For example, I tend to find some arguments for an immaterial mind or soul convincing and I count that as evidence of their existence. That Con doesn't find these arguments convincing is not the same as there being no evidence of souls. ========= Non-Reductive Physicalism ========= My opponent's main criticism of Kim's argument seems to be Kim's alleged conflation of Causal individuation with Alexander's dictum. My reply would be first to ask Con if he believes that mental properties have any causal powers at all? It seems that he does with his explication of how downward causation could possibly work between the mental and the physical with an apt example of the movement of tectonic plates. If he doesn't believe that, again, that would entail epiphenomenalism which is pretty much a reductio ad absurdum of any theory in philosophy of mind. So I think it reasonable to think that Con does think that mental properties do have causal power. The problem is that causal powers are inherently irreducible. What this means is that causal powers aren't capable of being reduced to anything else or analyzed in non-causal terms nor can they be reduced to something that is more basic. A causal power would be something like a particular property being instantiated and when it is the cause then that property is one of the factors that make the effect instantiate the way it does. This would certainly seem to be the case when certain mental properties are instantiated like that of "being in pain". That seems to cause me withdrawing my finger from where it was jammed in the car door moment before. And a non-reductive physicalist would, just like me, assert that the mental property of "being in pain" is irreducible or not reducible to any particular physical system. If the non-reductive physicalist affirms all of this I can't see what is stopping the non-reductive physicalist from having to use the Causal individuation principle. If they have to use the Causal individuation principle then Kim's argument from mental causation remains and emerges from the battle unscathed and more importantly remains as a very serious objection to all forms of non-reductive physicalisms. Thanks for reading and vote for you feel had the best arguments.