The Problem of Suffering

To summarize, Pro seems to argue that while it is possible that we have free will, there is no evidence for it. Furthermore, free will is a scientific question, and yet physics has not found a need to appeal to free will, so Ockham's razor weighs against the existence of free will. In response, I would say that we have not found empirical evidence for free will because it is in principle not a material phenomenon. The notion of an immaterial mind goes beyond what physics could detect. So it is outside of the domain of physics. So, I think it is a philosophical question and philosophers deal with it most commonly. Pro raises the difficulty of why coveting another person's spouse is considered a sin when one can't control their thoughts. In response, this topic is a separate debate, but traditionally Christians at least have understood coveting to be a sin when a person chooses to dwell upon the covetous feelings, not merely having a thought pop into their mind. Pro also raises the consideration that brain scans can predict what a person will choose. In response, I think this would only demonstrate that a person has begun sub consciously choosing before they have fully realized it. For example, if a person is asked 'are you going to grab an apple? ' And the brain scans revealed that the person was going to reach for an apple, then that would only indicate that the person was subconsciously beginning to think about choosing the apple. Admittedly, I have not studied these experiments at length, but I know they have different interpretations and I am skeptical that they disprove free will, as are some who have studied the experiments. Pro continues to argue that omniscience is incompatible with free will. Pro specifically says: "The assumption of free will is that you can chose at any moment whatever you want. " In response, I am not sure I agree with Pro's description of free will. I define free will as the ability to have chosen otherwise than what you chose. Yet, if Person A is placed in Circumstance B, I think Person A would still choose the same way every time they were in that hypothetical circumstance. So, the fact that God knows what Person A would choose in Circumstance B, does not entail that Person A could not have chosen any differently than they did. Person A could have willed otherwise, but God would know that as well. So, it's not that God's knowledge constrains Person A. Rather, it's that God is simply aware of what Person A would do in Circumstance B. God knows that fact just like God knows 1 + 1 = 2. God is aware of all truths. The truth of what Person A would do could have been different if Person A would use their will differently in that circumstance. The causality here is reversed because of course God knows what Person A would do before Person A is even created, but that is because God knows everything about His creation even before He creates it. Pro still maintains that theism entails that God "decides what is morally good or bad. If this weren"t the case he wouldn"t as explained above be omnipotent. " In response, I disagree that theism entails that God must decide what is morally right and wrong. I don't think God decides truths of logic or math, rather He knows them. Similarly, God does not decide moral truths, He simply knows them. The standard of morality is derived from God's nature, but God did not decide it. I don't see that this compromises His omnipotence though because God did not have to decide truths in order to be omnipotent. Rather, I define omnipotent as meaning that God is the creator/sustainer of all things. Many theists would agree with this. Pro argues against the claim that angels could account for the natural suffering by arguing that there is no evidence in its favor and it's ad hoc. In response, I agree that there is no evidence in its favor. Yet, it is something beyond the physical universe, so there could be no evidence in its favor. Rather, IF one thinks it is reasonable to believe in God, then it is a possible consideration. Since, the problem of suffering is working with the assumption that God exists, then I think a defense can propose hypothetical solutions which maybe wouldn't be proposed otherwise. This is because a defense is attempting to square two pieces of a puzzle. So, I don't see a problem with a theist appealing to angels as part of the explanation. I do agree though that my proposal about appealing to human will in regard to natural evil, may not hold up as well, however I think appealing to angels is still a legitimate approach. Pro also argues that an all loving God would not create evil angels. In response, I think it is reasonable that God does not refuse to create people just because they reject Him and refuse to obey the moral law. If God were to deny the angels the possibility of helping create, then God would perhaps be denying the angels part of their nature. It would perhaps be unjust for God to do this and so due to His justice God permits it, even though He knows that some angels will rebel. In the end though God will make everything right in heaven for those who choose to be in union with Him. So God can rectify suffering on earth. So, in conclusion, Pro has made some interesting objections, but I still see the free will defense working as a viable solution in answering why an all powerful, all loving, and all knowing God could allow suffering.