Speciesism is unjustified given a preference utilitarian framework

===Alleged speciesism is a PU framework===First to my opponent's re-definition of the trolley problem. My first objection is that he takes a single scenario and unjustifiably generalizes from it. It is true that in this scenario (5 dolphins vs. 1 presumably normal human), the human would win out as far as preferences go. However, this does not mean that (A) humans will always win out or (B) that the human won out by virtue of it's species membership i.e. because they were a human. On A, it is clear that the scenario could easily be redesigned to where the dolphins would win out. Consider the case of speeding trolley going towards a group of three normally healthy dolphins, another going towards a brain-dead loner with no friends, family, or current acquaintances to speak of. In this scenario the dolphins are clearly capable of more preference violation, thus PU is not inherently speciesist towards humans. Humans merely happen to *generally* have more preferences than most animals. On B, this is obvious. The human won out because we assumed it had a family, was conscious, etc. However this is not inherent to humans and we could easily imagine a human without these things (as in the case of my refutation of A). Not all humans have positive preferences and not ALL animals have only negative preferences[1][2].My opponent predicts my marginal objection and attempts to co-opt my refutation. He argues that a cost-preference analysis will never require (or at the very least will very rarely require so) taking into account a brain-dead human vs. animals capable of preferences whereas most humans are not brain-dead and are capable of holding more preferences than most animals. From there my opponent argues that on balance, one would be justified in speciesist discrimination as in most cases it will lead to greater preference satisfaction. My opponent makes an interesting though futile case. He makes the mistake in applying an unnecessary and unreliable meta-preference to ethical analysis within the framework. However, there is no reason to add in a preference for humans over animals to a PU framework when (A) species is not a reliable indicator of preferences (life decisions, random tragedies, mental illness, etc. are marginally common enough) and (B) a catch-all preference for humans inherently goes against taking preferences into account alone. It simply clouds it with specie labels which at best only provide a generalized view of probable preferences.===Speciesism and possible non-preference violation===I admit I was caught rather off guard by this argument by my opponent. However, my personal surprise aside, this argument fails in it's purpose. In this debate, my opponent and I are not arguing about whether or not HOLDING a specific view goes against preference utilitarianism, but whether or not that view IN ITSELF is in line with preference utilitarianism. Holding the belief that Kant was wrong in his first formulation of the categorical imperative may not go against the first formulation per se (since Kant's ethic regard actions and not thought content), however one would certainly be justified in saying that the mental negation of the first formulation (referring to the specific content of the thought, not the act of having it) is not in line with Kantian ethical principles. So the same principle is applied in this case. Even if one is not going against the principle of equal interests by not believing it is correct, the CONTENT of the thought is not in line with the CONTENT of preference utilitarianism.===Speciesism and the lack of pain===**Non-speciesism of example**My opponent makes the observation that speciesism does not differentiate between animals that can feel pain and animals that cannot. Speciesism is a catch-all term for ANY discrimination between species, irrespective of whether they are capable of holding preferences. Therefore, my opponent argues, one may discriminate against certain species (i.e. engage in speciesism) within a PU framework. An interesting argument, however this ignores the fact that my opponent is reasoning that discrimination against (for example) sponges is justified NOT because they are members of a specific species, but specifically owing to their lack of preferences. Therefore my opponent (and the prospective sponge discriminator) is operating within a PU framework. Whenever someone discriminates based on species membership alone as opposed to the potential victim's ability to have preferences, one is going against our PU framework since taking into account the preference level of the victim in question is necessary to deciding whether the action will lead to an outcome in which the least amount of preferences are gone against. **Need for rational rule on balance**While one might get lucky and acting on speciesist impulse might lead to situations in which the least amount of preferences are violated in some cases, on balance, without rationally taking into account preferences more preference violations will be made than if they were taken into account. Take the example of one arguing that having a light on is not necessary to avoid running into obstacles when crossing a room. While this may be true in some cases, on balance (and this is important as we are operating within a consequentialist framework) having the light on will lead to running into obstacles less than with the light on. Likewise, if one's goal is to violate the preferences of preference holding beings as little as possible, some sort of rational principle is necessary to determine when we are doing that. We may get lucky at times but we're basically walking blindly.===Sources===[1] http://www.sciencedirect.com... [2] http://www.springerlink.com...(Though both sources deal with chimpanzees, they are far from the only animal species capable of positive preferences)