The categorical imperative vs. the principle of utility

Refutation of Con's caseLack of evidence for intrinsic goodness of pleasureThe central premise of utilitarianism is that pleasure or happiness is an intrinsic good d thus one should pursue it as a moral good. However, a requisite for this would be for Con to provide evidence of the intrinsic goodness of pleasure which she has failed to do. If pleasure cannot be shown to be good than it cannot be shown to be morally good to pursue.Whether consequences are necessary in moral calculationObviously the more general debate over consequentialism and deontology will come up and my opponent makes a preemptive case for consequentialism. She argues that since the amount of pleasure or pain an action creates is vital in the calculation of its moral worth, consequences are therefore a necessity in determining what is moral and what is not. However, the intrinsic goodness of pleasure or happiness has yet to be proved and until my opponent shows this, her defense of consequentialism lacks warrant.Whether the FF supports the PUMy opponent argues here that some sort of moral standard must be applied in order to achieve universalizability. Con argues that a heroin addict might want to universalize addiction to heroin and thus universalizability by itself is not enough. However, this point illuminates a basic misunderstanding of the first formulation. The FF doesn't argue that anything which can be universalized must be acted on, but that anything which cannot be universalized ought not to be acted upon. For instance, one could take the example of being a race car driver. If we universalize the maxim that everyone should be a race car driver, we don't run into a contradiction of either will or nature since a world of only race car drivers is logically possible to exist and there is no contradiction in willing everyone to be one. However, the FF doesn't say everyone should therefore be race car driver, it just doesn't rule it out.Defense of the Pro casePremise 1 and concessionMy opponent seems to have conceded that a denial of the apriori of argumentation and communication results in a contradiction. I see no reason to argue this point hereon then. My opponent does however express doubts as to how this translates into universal law. I cover this in my premise 2.Premise 2 and circular reasoningMy opponent argues that I applied circular reasoning to arrive at the conclusion of the soundness of the FF by applying it to my premise. This is a mere misconception on my opponent's part. Far from using circular reasoning, I employed an argument from the contrary, using the contradiction of the denial of FF to show it's truth.Refer to my example in R2, that the universalization of lying is a contradiction in will since you basically will that your lie should fail. It might look on the surface that circular reasoning was employed, however my case relies on assuming the contrary, namely that univeralization of maxims for actions do not result in contradiction. As I showed however, it does, thus affirming the FF.My opponent's next point is that in a world without lying, there would be no basis not to believe a lie. Besides the fact that lying is only a single example of the FF and a refutation of this one example does nothing to disprove the principle on which it is based, my opponent's reasoning behind this point is lacking.My opponent offers as an example, a movie called The Invention of Lying. Obviously though this movie was not intended to demonstrate any philosophical principle but was a comedy lampooning gullibility and some aspects of religion. Nevertheless, my opponent makes the mistake of believing that the laws of logic would not exist in a world without lying. Obviously lying entails a contradiction from the truth. Otherwise it wouldn't be a lie. Assuming of course that the laws of logic are still known, finding out that something is not the truth would still be possible, even if people didn't understand the motivation behind someone speaking an untruth.Defense of my conclusion from P1 and P2My opponent argues that I never provide justification for universalization as a requisite for argumentation. However, as I showed in my defense of P2, a denial of universalization entails a contradiction. This is what ties in my P2 with my P1. The same line of reasoning is used, namely performative contradiction. Just like a denial of the apriori of argumentation and communication results in contradiction, so does a denial of universalization as a requisite for non-contradicting maxims for action.