The Moral Argument is Not Sound

What's the Problem? Must God ground morality? Philosophers have been doing moral philosophy without reference to God for millennia, so it's not clear what the problem is supposed to be. Philosopher Richard Swinburne affirms, "Some moral truths are clearly moral truths whether there is a God or not; it is surely wrong to torture children for fun whether or not there is a God"[1] and "I cannot see any force in an argument to the existence of God from the existence of morality." Implicit in P1 of the moral argument are two main contentions: (1) Theism can provide a foundation for morality. (Theistic morality is possible) (2) AFM cannot provide a foundation for morality. (Non-theistic morality is impossible.) Supported and defended, these contentions would set up a necessary relation between God and OM, affirming P1. If the theist fails to support and defend even one of these contentions, then their argument breaks down. As Stephen Law says, "The onus is on [the theist] to show that all such atheist friendly accounts are wrong—even the ones we haven't thought of yet."[2] My main focus will be on contention (2). I. Epistemological Argument for Ontological Grounding Given epistemological warrant to accept OM on atheism, and in the absence of good arguments against OM's ontology on atheism, we have good reasons to accept AFM, including it's ontological nature, even if we don't have a fully realized and explained model of ontology on atheism. Imagine the following argument, given an atheistic framework: 1: If we are warranted in believing x exists, then we are warranted in believing that x has an ontological grounding in reality. 2: We are warranted in believing OM exists. 3: Therefore, we are warranted in believing OM has an ontological grounding in reality. The first premise is supported by a metaphysical intuition that something isn't nothing! Existence entails having a "state of being", which is the same thing as saying it has an ontological grounding in reality. If it exists, it must have an ontological grounding, even if we cannot specify what exactly that grounding is. The second premise is supported by the Prima facie appearance that OM exists, which the theist is committed to allowing the atheist, even in a non-theistic epistemological framework (for if one needs to appeal to God to justify belief in OM, then that shatters P2 of the moral argument by making it circular!) Con has one option: he must provide a good argument against the ontology of AFM, which if successful would rebut P2 of my epistemological argument without shattering their own argument. The importance of this good positive argument against moral ontology given atheism cannot be stressed enough, for without it, the theist cannot hope to say that God's existence is necessary for grounding OM. (Note that I don't have to defend any particular ontological view of morality here for this argument to work. However, I'll sketch an ontological view anyways, in the interest of an entertaining debate.) II. Non-Reductive Ethical Naturalism (NREN) Moral Values On NREN, facts about moral value are made true by objective features of the world. The ontology of these facts is reducible to non-moral facts (like suffering and happiness,) however the expressivity of these facts is not reducible to any non-moral fact (they are greater than the sum of their parts.) Properly understood, this provides a foundation for the existence of objective moral values in virtue of the existence of things like suffering and happiness.[4] That may sound confusing. To elucidate these concepts, consider the following analogy about colors, which mirrors the above passage: Facts about color are made true by objective features of the world. The ontology of these facts is reducible to non-color facts (like reflected light particles.) However, the expressivity of these facts is not reducible to non-color facts (describing the reflected light particles to a blind man still wouldn't convey the concept of color to him. The expressivity of color is greater than the sum of its parts.) Properly understood, this provides a foundation for the existence of colors in virtue of the existence of things like reflected light particles. So the question is, do properties like suffering and happiness objectively exist? Of course. Properly understood, this account provides a possible foundation for objective moral values, even on atheism. Read both of the above paragraphs again carefully to solidify the concepts. Moral Duties When we talk about duty, we are talking about what you ought to do, morally speaking. To facilitate your understanding about how we might get objective moral oughts on atheism, you should: (1) understand what ought means, (2) understand how practical oughts work, and then (3) understand how moral oughts work. (1) Meaning of Ought: Ought means "reasons for action exist."[5] If we say, "What Lin should do is X" or "What Lin really ought to do is X", we are saying there are reasons for action that exist, and that those reasons recommend that Lin do X.[6] For if it were not the case that reasons for action which recommend Lin do X, then it is not the case that Lin ought to do X; whereas if it is the case that reasons for action which recommend Lin do X, then it is the case that Lin ought to do X. (2) Practical Oughts In practical reasoning, a combination of beliefs and desires acts as a recipe for constituting a practical reason for action.[7] For example, if you desire to keep your job, and you believe you must get a haircut to keep your job, this desire-belief system constitutes a practical reason for getting your haircut. Thusly, it makes sense to say you ought to get your haircut. So the ontology of this practical reason for action (or practical ought) is based in your desires and beliefs, because desires and beliefs exist and they provide reasons for action. (3) Moral Oughts What is a moral ought? It's a moral reason for action, as opposed to a practical one. In the practical reasoning section, we provided a recipe of beliefs and desires which constitutes practical ought. But practical reasoning won't get us moral duties (what if, for example, someone wanted to kill others for fun? An individual's own desires don't seem to count as a moral reason for action.) How then can we derive a moral ought? What "recipe" of conditions and properties can we supply which constitutes a moral reason for action? I propose that an objective value, like goodness or badness, counts as a moral reason for action upon a moral agent recognizing that moral value. Just like a combination of beliefs and desires constitutes a practical reason for action or practical ought, a recognition of goodness or badness constitutes a moral reason for action or a moral ought. Because things like suffering and happiness exist, and because recognition of goodness and badness can constitute a reason for action, non-theists have a foundation for objective moral values and duties. Conclusion If Con wants to prove P1, they must show that AFM is impossible by providing a good argument against the ontology of moral values and duties on all versions of AFM. References: [1] Richard Swinburne, Is there a God? [2] Stephen Law, My Criticisms of Craig's Moral and Resurrection Arguments (Note: Blog post. Not an academic article.) [3] James Rachels, The Elements of Moral Philosophy [4] Michael Huemer, Ethical Intuitionism [5] Patricia Greenspan, Practical Reasons and Moral ‘Ought' [6] Alonzo Fyfe, The Meaning of ‘Ought' (Note: Blog post. Not an academic article.) [7] James Rachels, Naturalism (Essay originally appears in The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory)