Abortion is Prima Facie Morally Wrong

My response will be conducted out of order, since I want to dedicate as much space as possible to the points that I think warrant the most attention. First, I need to rectify some more misunderstandings that arose: Con attacks a strawman. My argument was not that the unborn are persons because they have the potential to become persons (Which is rightly absurd), but instead they are persons by virtue of their human nature (Which happens to include the potentials for the actualization of some criteria that Con listed). It is their human nature which makes them persons, not possession of certain potentials. The purpose of my a fortiori argument was to demonstrate that even if Con's criteria was necessary for personhood, the unborn already meet the criteria by virtue of their nature endowing them with intrinsic potentials. So at the bottom line, it is not possession of certain potentials that makes one a person, rather it is the having of a human nature. Something can have those the criteria outlined and still fail to be a person. "Because one can only develop certain functions by nature (i.e., as a result of basic, intrinsic capacities) because of the sort of being one _is_, a human being, at every state of her development is _never_ a potential person; she is _always_ a person with potential even if that potential is never actualized due to premature death or the result of the absence of deformity of a physical state necessary to actualize that potential." [1] "What is entertaining about this is that it's self-defeating, the essence of an entity is described BY THE SET OF PROPERTIES IT POSSESSES. " By properties, I was referring to contingent/accidental properties, instead of essential properties. If there was a misunderstanding, I apologize. Something is what it is by virtue of having an essence, and not by what accidental properties it has (Such as being five feet tall). Similarly, I was stating that the unborn are persons because of their human nature and not because of certain properties they acquire throughout their lifetime. Con also seems to neglect the difference between intrinsic rights with extrinsic rights. Of course, some rights vary in regards to location, maturity, circumstances, etc... Such as the right to vote. Other rights, however, are inherently intrinsic in the individual regardless of extrinsic factors, this would include the right to life. Regarding Con's use of the A.I. analogy, psychological characteristics are neither necessary nor sufficient for personhood, which is not determined by one's level of cognitive functioning, but by possession of a human nature. Hence, the A.I. analogy fails on account of the machine's not having a human nature. As I stated in my OP, I am defending a view of personhood in which it is essential to human nature (Human nature entails having personhood). I am not defending a view of personhood in which individuals are persons because they have the potential for certain cognitive abilities. Finally, Con accuses me of a strawman when I described his position as being discriminatory on the basis of cognitive abilities. First, this is not a strawman, I was offering it as an advance reply to a possible argument, hence my use of "If my opponent retorts that..." If my opponent chooses not to use it, then so be it. Moreover, in spite of Con's assertion that "what matters is not to what degree you have actualized certain psychological traits, it's that YOU HAVE THE CAPACITY to utilize them," it is hard to see how this solves the problem. Just exactly what is meant by "capacity?" If Con means the immediate ability to exercise any of the criteria he listed, this fares no better, for "if moral respect were due only to those who possess a nearly immediately exercisable capacity for characteristically human mental functions, it would follow that six-week-old infants do not deserve full moral respect." [2]