It Is Possible That A Maximally Great Being Exists

IntroductionMy opponent charges me with a tactic involving accusing him of not understanding the argument. However, it is not at tactic, but rather additive commentary on top of my arguments and "tactics". For example, my opponent speaks about probability when the argument is about possibility. This shows a clear misunderstanding of the argument. The debate is not whether it is probably true or not that a maximally great being is possible, the argument is about whether it is true or not that a maximally great being is possible. As I have demonstrated, Pro has not even shown that a maximally great being is more probable in the first place.My Case From Non-Sentient WorldsKeytarHero states that there are no possible worlds in which God fails to exist. However, this is only true if God is possible. God is only necessary, if possible. Pro has not shown that God is possible. Therefore, we have no reason to believe God exists in any possible world; let alone all of them. My opponent says that a non-sentient world is impossible if God exists, and if God is possible. I agree. However, a maximally great being is impossible if a non-sentient world is possible. My opponent seems to be delving into the world of double standards. He has given 0 good reasons to prefer one over the other, and has failed miserably. My opponent also has not shown how God is more metaphysically probable than non-sentient worlds. To support the false claim to the contrary, Pro says:"[S]ince whether or not a non-sentient world is even possible is predicated on whether or not there are sentient necessary entities..." - ProThe above is just embarrassing, as Pro is committing an elementary special pleading fallacy. My opponent is correct that whether or not a non-sentient world is possible is predicated on their being no necessary sentient entities (and no possibility of such an entity). However, the possibility of a necessary sentient entity is predicated on there being no non-sentient possible worlds! Either proposition requires the impossibility of the other. Since I have shown even grounds here, Pro's argument that a maximally great being is more probable falls flat. Even if it succeeded, it wouldn't matter, because a non-sentient world has to be metaphysically impossible, not metaphysically improbable. Now, God being necessary is dependant on God being possible. God does not exist in any possible world unless he is possible. Pro has not shown that God is possible. We have no real reason to believe God exists in any possible world. Also, Pro says that in order to defeat the first premise, I would have to show God is incoherent. That is false. That would only be true if I was trying to falsify the first premise, not undermine it. However, as the burden of proof is not shared here; I do not need to show God is incoherent to win this debate. The theist has to show that God is not incoherent to meet the burden of proof and win the debate. To do that, the theist has to rule out that which would make God incoherent. Non-sentient worlds would make God incoherent, and Pro has not ruled them out. Thus, the resolution has not been affirmed. No One Has Shown God To Be ImpossibleThis argument has no bearing on the resolution, so why would I engage it? Even if not a single Atheist has shown that God is impossible, it would not follow that God is possible. This section from Pro is shifting the burden of proof, and a non-sequitur at that. We Have Warrant For God's Existence"As Atheist Kai Nielsen has pointed out, all arguments for God could fail and God could still exist." - ProHowever, the above would only mean, at best, that God could be possible epistemically, this does not indicate subjunctive possibility. This has no bearing on the modal possibility relevant to this debate. Pro also says that we are warranted in believing in God based on evidence for God's existence. This just begs the question, as Pro has not even argued for the notion that there is evidence of God's existence. He mentions arguments, which, if fail, are not evidence of God's existence at all. Pro has to show how these arguments succeed. He has not done so. Therefore, it is truly baffling how Pro is trying to use these external arguments as an argument for God's possibility. ConclusionPro provided two arguments in favor of the resolution:(i) No Atheist has shown that God is impossible(ii) There is evidence of God's existence(i) fails because it is based on a shifting the burden of proof fallacy. The theist must show that God is not impossible, the one critiquing the argument need not show that God is impossible. (i) is also a non-sequtiur, because even if no Atheist has shown God to be impossible, it wouldn't follow from this that God's existence is not impossible. Since (i) is based on two logical fallacies; Pro's first argument is invalid, and it is not sufficient support for the resolution. (ii) does not succeed as it is based on a fallacy of presumption. Pro has to presume that all the external arguments for God's existence succeed, or else they are not really evidence for God's existence. Also, (ii) is based on a fallacy of equivocation with regards to the word "God". Arguments like the fine-tuning argument, or arguments for a first mover, even if succeed; say nothing on a maximally great being. Even if an intelligent fine-tuner who was the first mover exists, what does this say about this being's greatness? Absolutely nothing. Pro mentioned "Moral Law" and a "Moral Law Giver", but if there is objective morality, there is objective immorality. One could argue for an immoral being, or "Immoral Law Giver". This intelligent fine-tuner could be manevolent (which is why humans are wired and prone for evil), with the entity in question not being omnibenevolent, or maximally great in the slightest. None of these external arguments for God's existence even attempt to show that a maximally great being is possible, just some sort of "intelligent fine-tuner", "first mover" ect... How would the existence of a fine-tuning/ first mover show that a maximally great being is possible? It wouldn't. (ii) fails almost as badly as (i).The above is sufficient to deny Pro the debate. However, I went above and beyond that showed what the theist would have to do to win this debate. I said:"[F]or the theist to meet their burden of proof in support of the first premise of the Modal Ontological Argument, they would have to show that it is not impossible for a maximally great being to exist. To do that, they would actually have to rule out that which would make a maximally great being impossible. What would make a maximally great being impossible? Lots of things. Lets just take for example non-sentient possible worlds (which include no sentient beings). They would make a maximally great being impossible because if a maximally great being is possible, there would have to be at least one sentient being in every possible world. A maximally great being cannot just exist in one possible world if a maximally great being is possible, as a maximally great being would have to exist in all of them essentially by definition if a maximally great being is possible. This follows from the modal axiom S5. Therefore, the theist would have to rule out non-sentient possible worlds before the burden of proof on the first premise is to be met." - Me Pro did not even attempt to rule out non-sentient possible worlds without begging the question. He also committed the special pleading fallacy by claiming that a non-sentient world's possibility is predicated on the impossibility of a maximally great being. He is correct about this. However, the possibility of a maximally great being is predicated on the impossibility of a non-sentient world. Since it works both ways, Pro's argument for metaphysical probability fails.Every single argument Pro presented was logically fallacious and invalid. Therefore, the resolution has not been established as Pro had the burden of proof.