Atheism is a non-stance.

I will accept that it is possible that most atheists do not get into materialist metaphyics and so do not hold a materialist correspondence theory of truth. Metaphysical materialism is of little interest to me. I am a stuff monist, believing in both bricks, magnetism and numbers constants even. Con is perfectly correct in his observation that it is possible to deny the existence of 'God' without meeting the charge of being committed to the existence of something which you then deny the existence. Russell is right that at least in first order logic we are not committed to the use of 'existence' as a predicate. Indeed it is not clear that we can meaningfully use existence as a predicate; say for example that some things exist and some things don't . This is a point that I happily cede to traditional atheism. I merely question whether the stance they take is a real stance since if it is not predicative but quantitative then it neither asserts nor denies anything about anything. You can't treat existence in a non-predicative way at one moment and then borrow it back later as a predicate at a later point, without openness to the charge of fallacy. New atheism as far as I can tell is probabilistic methodological atheism although it is often argued for in a style that comes across as dyed in the wool correspondence truth theory. In countries where religion is less prevalent it is difficult to understand how real the participants take these issues to be. In countries where discotheques bands and even Mexican food to be awesome it is natural to treat all arguments as being about ultimate facts. The scientism of the Popperian variety which is ostensibly the basis of Dawkins' position is not replete with such hard facts. Contemporary Science makes essential use not only of of probabilities but orders of probaility. This makes it very difficult decide what the meaning of "God exists with a probability of 0.00001 -.000001 might mean. It certainly seems to allow the existence of God relative to some modalities or possible worlds. The content however is mysterious no answer to the question of what two minimally different possible worlds one with a God the other sans God would be like. If they would be phenomenologically identical what would the import of 'There is no God be' Why might it not be that the one with a God is less religious. Cons second point the about substantive nature of the statement 'God exists' is doxastic. Religious beliefs have consequences, people commit acts they would otherwise consider unethical in support of their beliefs. The initial problem with this stance is of course that if there is no God there is nothing for people to have beliefs about, wars over soccer matches make more sense since, at least there are National teams to support. Strictly speaking that should be an end to the matter. Swift parodies the European wars of religion as a dispute over which end of the boiled egg one should crack at breakfast. No God then no belief in God, no belief in God no doxastic cause. Dawkins does not claim that God is to blame for war he claims that belief in God is responsible for religion which is responsible for war. It is an ambiguous and controversial area in theology whether we can know God. The ineffability of the divine as it were gets in the way. Atheist religions take this reasoning to the extreme maintaining that we live in a world that is ultimately unfathomable from our own perspective in any way. Buddhism and to extent Jainism being prominent examples. It is difficult work out what Ancient Egyptian Religion believed in, its gods seems to represent aspects of reality that we recognise today motherhood, death , law, wisdom, fate. Judaeo-Christianity a transcendent but sometimes imminent God. Within these a great many variant epistemology especially persist. Arguing against religions is like arguing against a Hydra. A general scepticism about what one is taught or told and a willingness to base one actions and behaviour on well validated beliefs is a trait to be encouraged, privileged hidden and externally unverifiable facts are generally to be distrusted. A clear case is the Jewish belief that God confers land rights. I can always be argued that this is not what Jews absolutely believe that you can be a Jew without a commitment to Zionism etc. This has to be taken in a context where most nationals would maintain a right to a homeland and where the claim for an inalienable right can be freely substituted for God-given right. There are certainly atheist Jews who maintain they have the right to a homeland as a homogenous people. The causal role of beliefs is genuinely handled by counter-factual or modal logic. if a beliefs F1,F2,F3 then a would D do P,Q,R. . It is certainly the case that beliefs have consequences on the whole if someone believes there is a bomb in his house then he leaves his house. (Unless as some do, we deny the existence of beliefs, as opposed to intentional stances.) The atheist claim here is that the belief 'There is a God' leads to deviation from the actions we would otherwise commit ceteris paribus. The real question however is whether religious beliefs differ from other beliefs, Is the belief 'There is a God' more directly involved as a causes bellum than 'my country right or wrong' patriotism, honour communism belief in the right to self-preservation, social Darwinism (Darwin's son was a leading Eugenesist' for persons and nations nations, belief in the right to maximise national wealth.... Is it possible that religious beliefs good or bad have no real effect on the behaviour of religious groups. Was Martin McGuiness fighting for catholics as believers or for catholics from a sectarian view.