God is existant

My opponent makes the following main arguments that argue against the coherency of a maximally great being.1. The definition and content of greatness is subjective2. Greatness requires a standardI will refute these arguments before defending my own.GreatnessThe first argument posits that the definition of greatness is subjective. Yet this can easily be dismissed by the existence of an objective definition of greatness, namely:'being such in an extreme or notable degree' (1)Granted, what constitutes 'notable' could be construed as subjective. But our intuitive awareness of the intrinsic (and therefore objective) greatness of various properties (knowledge, power, beauty etc...) lends inference to the notion that there exists properties that are intrinsically and objectively great; they are great in essence. Of course our intuition should be taken sceptically, but it should not be ignored entirely - and in the absence of rational argument for or against the objectivity of greatness, the fact that our intuition suggests that it is objective can constitute evidence in favour of this proposition. Therefore, if one asserts that God is maximally great, then this maximum greatness is an objective property insofar as God possesses all properties that are objectively great. For example, knowledge, power and love are all objectively great (this is inferred by intuition), so to say that 'God is maximally great' is to say that 'God is maximally knowledgable, powerful, loving and so forth'.Con goes on to suggest that being great is subjective because it is a relational attribute. For example, saying that a person is tall is subjective dependent on the height of other people.However, the flaw in this argument is that it would only refute the notion of saying 'God is great', not saying that 'God is maximally great'.Being maximally great is not relational, as maximal properties are not relational. For example, being maximally tall is not dependent on other people's heights. Even if nothing else exists, saying that a being is maximally tall is a coherent statement because it makes the coherent proposistion that it has the greatest possible height. Hence there is no incoherency in asserting that something is maximally great even if there is no standard to compare its level of greatness to. To conclude my rebuttals:'Greatness has a subjective definition'This is a bare assertion - it has not been demonstrated that greatness is subjective. So in the absence of any rational arguments for or against the subjectivity of greatness, the fact that our intuition suggests the intrinsic greatness of some properties can be taken as evidence that greatness is indeed objective.'Asserting that a being is great requires a standard'I agree, but only if the assertion is 'X is great'. As this is a relational assertion, it requires some external standard to compare to if it is to be a coherent assertion.Yet the assertion 'X is maximally great' is not relational because it is qualified. Something can have a maximal property even if there is no external standard, for example something can be maximally large even if there is nothing in existence to compare its largeness to.Defence of the Ontological argumentCR1 - Maximally Great Being = Necessary ExistenceMy opponent states that I present a false dichotomy between contingent and necessary existence. He postulates impossibility (necessary non-existence) and incoherency as alternatives.Yet these alternatives have been refuted above, by my rebuttals of Con's arguments regarding the supposed incoherency of God. So my dichotomy remains valid, as the other two options have been refuted (even though the two options are essentially the same).Next, Con argues that necessary existence is not entailed by maximal greatness.I will remind voters of the implications of 'maximal greatness'. A maximally great being is a being that is such that it is incoherent to conceive of a greater being. This is true by definition.So we have two options:1. A contingent being that could not have existed2. A necessary being that could not have not existedAll other things being equal, it is self-evident that the latter being is greater. As the former being is contingent, it is subject to something external for its existence. In contrast, a being that exists necessarily and is not subject to an external cause is greater. This is self-evident.Therefore, a maximally great being must necessarily exist in order for it to be maximally great.CR2 - possibilitiesI apologise for not defining possibility in round 1 - I was not aware of the level of philosophical knowledge my opponent had so I did not want to dive into sophisticated modality right from round 1.To clarify, the ontological argument and its possible-worlds framework is based around logical possibility, not epistemic possibility; as epistemic possibility cannot be used to reach an ontological conclusion.Although Con talks a lot about metaphysical possibility, his source containing its definition admits that metaphysical possibility does not have an agreed definition. Nonetheless, there is no need to discuss metaphysical possibility because the ontological argument is based on logical possiblity - whether or not metaphysical possibility is equivalent to logical possibility is irrelevant.So, applying this to possible worlds, a possible world is a world containing any logically possible circumstance or entit(ies). If something is logically possible, then there exists at least one possible world where it exists. If something is logically impossible, then it does not exist in any possible world. If something is logically necessary, then it exists in all possible worlds.The ontological argument uses logical possibility when it asserts in P2 that 'God is possible'. Con seems to argue that the argument is fallacious because I supposedly assert that God possibly exists in an epistemic sense. But this is a strawman because I use logical, not epistemic possibility, in P2. CR3 - Reverse argumentThis objection is no more than a bare assertion that there is no possible world that God exists. My opponent's reverse argument begins with the premise:'God does not exist in at least one possible world'Yet this would only be the case if God was logically impossible, which has not been demonstrated.As this premise is unwarranted, the entire reverse argument is unwarranted.Furthermore, the conclusion of my argument (that a necessary being exists) entails that there is no possible world in which this being does not exist. So there is no possible world where God doesn't exist.Defence of the argument from religious experienceMy opponent's attempt to refute this argument consists of a parody with alien abductions: many people have witnessed alien abductions, so surely they must exist?The reason this is a poor parody of the argument is that we have solid arguments against the proposition that alien abductions have happened; namely that any alien life would be hugely far away across the cosmos and would be very unlikely to have reached earth. In contrast, we do not have solid arguments against the existence of God, so evidence of people claiming to have experienced God is evidence that God probably does exist.But if there were not good arguments against the existence of alien abductions, then eyewitness testimonies would indeed lend proof to the reality of alien abductions.ConclusionI have refuted Con's claims that God is an incoherent concept, as well as defended the ontological argument and the argument from religious experiences.______________________________________________________________________________________(1) http://dictionary.reference.com...