There is no fundamental reason for keeping some type of evidence inadmissible

As the proposition we have a duty to prove why all intelligence evidence can be used in the courts of law. To do this properly, we need to consider the fundamental role of intelligence agencies in our society. We have a number of questions that need to be answered before the debate could be developed further. First, why do we need intelligence agencies and what do they do? Second, what methods do they employ? Third, what are the differences of powers of intelligence agencies among different countries and why do they arise? Fourth, when and why do we allow the use of some intelligence evidence in the court of law? Fifth, what are the reasons of prohibiting the use of certain kind of evidence? Common sense suggests us that the main reason of creating intelligence agencies is to collect information to ensure national security. Intelligence agencies are used for strengthening the states by preventing internal and external threats. Intelligence agencies track down huge organized crime. They are involved in prevention of terrorism. They are given rights to collect information which sometimes infringe on the rights of privacy for the reason that the overall benefit for the society and the state is simply greater. For achieving their goals, the agencies employ a number of methods. The main methods include espionage, cryptanalysis, interception of communication, etc. This collection of information entails a certain level of intrusion into private lives of individuals. The intrusion to private lifes happens at the point when agencies actually listen to the conversations or make other secretive actions. The disclosure of the information later on bears little relevance to the action - the information had been collected already. The harm, if any, is already done and there is little reason not to use the evidence we already have. Instead, the whole purpose of collecting evidence is to be able to use it later on for prevention or for conviction of criminals. Gathering intelligence but not using it infringes on privacy while not benefiting us too much, since the criminals cannot be convicted. Ultimately, the methods that can be employed by intelligence agencies depend on the legislation of a country. We believe that the methods of surveillance that can be used to a large extent depend on the society and what power they are willing to give to intelligence agencies. For instance, after an increasing number of terrorist attacks there has been a lot of pressure from the people to actually increase security measures although some freedom would have to be forsaken to achieve that greater security. The Guantanamo Bay example shows that there is substantial negative attitude towards intelligence agencies pushing too far; the people condemn torture and find it repugnant in a free society. So we think that in modern democracies it is the society which is somewhat able to put the limits to how far intelligence agencies can go. The reasons for the use of intelligence evidence in the courts of law are quite apparent. The evidence is simply relevant to the cases and can influence the decisions, convicting criminals and terrorists. This will be developed later in our case. Finally, so what are the reasons of prohibiting the use of certain kind of evidence? Once we accept the notion that some kind of evidence collected by intelligence agencies is admissible in the courts of law because of its relevance to the case, the reason for excluding a certain type of evidence must be a fundamental difference between the two types of evidence. For instance, the UK prohibits the use of intercept evidence. On the other hand, it allows eavesdropping. To prove that the prohibition must be kept in place either a) the fundamental difference between two cases should be proven; or b) it should be proven that the use of any evidence collected by intelligence agencies should be prohibited. Usually it is contended that the most fundamental difference between, say, intercept evidence and more open methods of surveillance is the extent of intrusion into personal privacy. Here we would like to develop a case that any difference is a) weak, b) completely arbitrary. Here we want to continue taking the UK as the example. The legislation is quite confusing. The law forbids the use of intercepted evidence (mails, telephone calls) in courts of law. However, it allows evidence collected by eavesdropping[[http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/ukpga_20000023_en_1]]. Conceptually, we see no difference as in both cases the individual is unaware that he is under surveillance. Say, there is a bug in the room. Two persons talk to each other. In another situation they talk with the phone while being intercepted. The substance here is the same: two people exchanging information under an expectation that nobody else hears them. The substance here is more important than the form. The fundamental difference is weak indeed, if any. The legislation is even more confusing. In the UK, any intercept evidence gathered by foreign intelligence is fully admissible or, for instance, interception in mental hospitals is admissible too. We see that the distinction between the cases is rather arbitrary. Sometimes it is claimed that people might be framed by intelligence agencies by revealing only a part of evidence and taking it out of context. However, if that is true, the intelligence agencies can take information out of context in any case – it does not matter whether it would be interception or a direct conversation. This is why some checks on balances on the whole system are needed. For instance, this is why we have a separation of intelligence agency and the court in the first place – to ensure more fairness.