God exists

Pre-ontology The primordial (i.e. the most basic and fundamental) question of philosophy is the meaning of being. All other areas of study in philosophy are less fundamental. For example, ontology, which seeks to study what entities exist, takes the meaning of being as a given, and assumes what it means to be rather than investigating the question at all. Therefore, if we do not have an answer to this fundamental, primordial question, then any philosophical ‘jump’ from the fundamental issues to less fundamental issues is on a weak foundation. I argue that Dylan is attempting to make a jump of his own, from pre-ontology to ontology, without a proper answer to the questions of pre-ontology. Dylan’s most recent objection to this argument is to ask how I can identify entity and non-entity as things which need definition if there is no difference between the two. I don’t believe that I’ve stated that there is no difference between entity and non-entity at any point in this debate. Rather, I’ve only stated that the meaning of being escapes exact definition. While an understanding of being is already included when we ask about the meaning of being, this is the average, everyday approximation of being which serves as a foundation for further investigations into the meaning of being, not an end to the questions of being! Dylan’s argument is predicated on a straw man--that I believe there is no difference between entity and non-entity. This is far from the case; I only contend that the difference between entity and non-entity has not been fully discovered and escapes exact definition. Creation ex nihilo In his last round, Dylan helpfully clarifies aspects of the UBT. He states that there are real potentials, and that the only potentials which can emerge are those potentials which can self-actualize (i.e. form an identity of itself). Dylan takes reality to be the only potential that can self-actualize from UBT. While it is a dubious assertion that only reality can self-actualize from UBT, the notion that there exist real possibilities has come under scrutiny in this debate. As I pointed out earlier, the relevant logic for dealing with the concept of possibility is modal logic. In modal logic, however, there are logical systems where “modal collapse” is accomplished, which entails that there are no possibilities and that everything which exists does so necessarily. The implication of these modal collapse ideas is that possibilities aren’t real. Obviously, this is detrimental to any ontology based around the idea of possibilities actualizing themselves. Dylan has done nothing to address the problem of modal collapse theories. He offers no argument that modal collapse does not occur, or any proof of a system where modal logic does not occur. He only assumes that modal collapse doesn’t occur. His entire notion of possibilities self-actualizing from the UBT depends on an assumption about logic which has not been justified throughout the entire debate, so it is rational to reject his notion for this reason. Another important issue in this debate is Dylan’s reliance on two valued logic. I pointed out in my last round that empirical findings from quantum mechanics demonstrate that the principle of bivalence is false, and that an empirically formulated logical system is multi-valued rather than two-valued. Dylan responds to this by asking if two-valued logic needs to be readdressed in light of quantum mechanics, or if quantum mechanics needs to be addressed in light of two-valued logic. Consider Aristotle’s notion that a heavier object will fall faster than a lighter object. Experiments in physics showed that this notion is false. Dylan’s counter-argument is rather like asking if Aristotelian ideas need to be reevaluated in light of empirical evidence, or if experiments in physics need to be reevaluated in light of Aristotelian ideas. Dylan’s other argument is a quote from Christopher Langan, the inventor of CTMU, which is the basis of Dylan’s argument for the existence of god. However, this quote does not make an effective argument. Langan argues that multi-valued logic must be a two-valued theory because it needs two-valued logic in order to distinguish its reference and its complements from each other. Firstly, this assertion is never justified, so one can dismiss Langan’s argument for this reason alone. However, I will construct what I believe to be the argument that Langan is getting at. In logic, a referent is a relationship where one object designates another object. A logical complement is another word for “negation” (e.g. “not X”, “not P”.) From these definitions, I presume that Langan is arguing that multi-valued logic needs two-valued logic in order for the objects in referents to distinguish themselves from each other and from their negation. However, in multi-valued logic, objects in referents can distinguish themselves from each other and from their negation through the law of excluded middle (simply because they are distinguished by either being X or not being X). It may seem as if I’m contradicting myself by using the law of excluded middle, but this ignores a very important philosophical distinction. Two-valued logic depends on the principle of bivalence, which is a semantic principle stating that any declarative sentence which expresses a proposition is either true or false. There are logical systems where the principle of bivalence is false while the law of excluded middle is true, as the former is a semantic principle while the second is not. As Princeton University’s website states, “The difference between the principle and the law is important because there are logics which validate the law but which do not validate the principle, and vice versa.” [1] Therefore, one is not contradicting themselves in using the law of excluded middle to distinguish objects in references from each other and their negation. Ontological Argument Dylan offered the following argument for the existence of god: Denying the existence of god entails that there is something external to god which prevents it from existing, but since it belongs analytically to the definition of god that he cannot be constrained by something external, it is not rational to deny the existence of god. The first premise is false because denying the existence of god can also entail that god is logically inconsistent. As such, the first premise is false because denying the existence of god does not necessarily entail that there is something external to god which prevents god from existing. By making this objection, do I have to prove that god is logically inconsistent as a concept? Not at all. Even if such a contention remains unproven, it would still be the case that the first premise is false on the grounds that it does not exhaust all possibilities as to what denying the existence of god entails. Dylan asserts that this argument proves the logical consistency of god, but this is plainly false. The philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz, himself a proponent of ontological arguments, “recognized that proving the coherence or logical possibility of God’s nature is crucial to the success of a priori attempts to prove God’s existence”.[2] In other words, an a priori argument for the existence of god such as Dylan’s depends on the logical possibility of god, and therefore can never prove god to be logically possible. Reality Dylan objects to the notion that the UBT (infinite, unbound ontological potential) is real. Rather, the UBT only has its properties with respect to existence, not properties intrinsic to itself. This answer to my argument entails a “chicken or the egg” causal paradox. Phrased logically, this paradox asks “Which came first, X that can’t come without Y, or Y that can’t come without X?”. Reality self-actualizes itself from the UBT, yet the UBT receives a definition of its properties from reality. Perhaps this is why Dylan describes UBT as “contradictory” and “paradoxical”. Even if Dylan accepts that the UBT is contradictory and paradoxical, this does not help his argument, for accepting that your ontology is contradictory and paradoxical still makes it contradictory and paradoxical, and therefore unbelieveable to any rational person. Conclusion Thanks to Dylan for participating in this debate with me. Dylan is an extremely intelligent debater whose ELO is not becoming of his skill. I know more about CTMU and Dylan’s beliefs than I do when I came into this debate, and for this reason alone I consider it an accomplishment. With this being the final round of the debate, issues about voting are now pertinent. First, there is a difference between reasoning and rationalizing. If you're going to choose the winner before the debate and rationalize a vote for that person, then don't waste your time. I do not want anybody voting for me out of pure bias towards my position, and I am guaranteed that Dylan feels the same way. I want voters who use reason to make their decision, which is to take away as much bias as possible and vote on who truly won. Secondly, I want to call attention to remarks that a DDO user made in a forum thread. The simple fact that another user had more sources than another user does not mean that they deserve a sources vote. Sources are to be judged on their quality and how effectively they were utilized, not quantity alone. In addition to this, arguments should be weighted. The winner of the debate is not a tally of who responded to the most points and who ignored the most points. It's a tally of who won what arguments and how important they were. Debates are not mere mathematical quantification. Finally, I am extremely gracious to the audience for taking the time to read this debate and vote. Without this, the very heart of DDO would be missing. Vale References https://www.princeton.edu... Fundamentals of Philosophy, pg 302