Placing political conditions on humanitarian aid to foreign countries is unjust.

I will begin by attacking my con's case, and then I will move on to rebuild my own.Opponent's CaseDefinitionsNone of my con's definitions have sources, and con never explains why their definitions should be looked to instead of mine, so my definitions must flow through. I'll touch on several of the important ones. Con defines political conditionality as "of or belonging to formal administration." The problem with this definition is that it does not explain exactly what type of conditions are "political." Political conditions actually have to involve the changing of some policy regarding the behavior of the government in order to truly be considered political. Also, my look to my definition of Humanitarian Aid rather than my con's because humanitarian aid is actually only used during and slightly after emergencies, which is not included in con's definition. Value/CriterionBased on resolutionalty, Justice should be the paramount value, but justice and morality essentially achieve eachother, so I'm goingto focus more on the criterion debate. Con is in no way solving for their criterion of utilitarianism; I will explain why throughout the round. Also, look to preserving of human dignity as the ultimate weighing standard for the round. Con did note that I did not include a definition. I'd like to apologize for not clarifying: my definition is "treating humans with respect because they have inherent worth." My beyond intractability card notes that, "Human rights are the articulation of the need for justice, tolerance, mutual respect, and human dignity in all of our activity." Basically, justice achieved through human dignity is human rights, making this value/criterion pair the most important.ObservationsCon explains that I must prove that in all cases, political conditionality on humanitarian aid to foreign countries is unjust. I agree with this. Placing political conditions is ultimately unjust because the donor/recipitent countries ultimately never know what is going to happen when such conditions are placed. There are negative impacts for both the donor and the recipient, and it is unjust to take such a risk. This is especially true because we are talking about humanitarian aid, a short term cause that is desperately needed by foreign countries after disasters.Contention OneCon explains in their first contention that that countries with more liberal regimes tend to positively respond to humanitarian aid in comparison to countries with oppressive regimes (note that the evidence never explains whether this aid was conditional or not). Also, con explains that countries with liberal regimes tend to have less poverty. I would agree with these points, but my opponent cannot prove that countries with oppressive regimes will actually accept conditions that aim to change the way the government works. The one choosing whether or not to accept the conditions is not the people in the recipient country who need the aid, but the government in that country. The flaw with the evidence my opponent shows, it that there is no actual proof that oppressive countries will accept and follow such conditions. I have provided multiple examples (North Korea, West Africa, Haiti, and Afghanistan) of countries not accepting/following such conditions, showing that political conditionality on humanitarian aid is inneffective. Con states in the end, "Allowing the elite of countries with poor governments to eat up humanitarian aid is a violation of the value criterion." The evidence says absolutely nothing about this. Generally countries with large amounts of corruption do not possess much money, and if they do, that money certianly does not go to the people. This means that they actually need unconditional humanitarian aid more because that way the citizens will have some means of survival during an emergency. Contention TwoCon's second contention goes over how in theorey political conditionality will lead to two things: productive government spending and productive public spending. Again, look to the fact that if the country is at a level of corruption that would result in negative government spending will most likely not accept such conditions. This evidence, like the card con used in their first contention, give no example of a country who has seen long term or even short term benifits from political conditionality. Also, there is no example given of exactly what type of political conditions are solving these problems. In fact, many times the spending promoted by political conditions is rather counterproductive. My third contention notes that policy changes that make sure the recipient country only buys products from the donor country often end up decreasing the value of the aid by up to 40%. My IPS card notes that in the Netherlands, 90% of the aid was used up due to trade concessions.To end the attack on con's case:It actually is very possible to give successful unconditional aid to corrupt countries. For example USKUP notes that Turkey has given unconditional and bilateral humanitarian assistance (in the form of military aid) to Macedonia, positively impacting the country. Macedonia (as noted by the Corruption Perceptions Index) would be considered corrupt, yet the aid is still successful. This shows that unconditional aid has potential to work out well, rendering it to be the just option.My CaseValue/CriterionI'd like to cross-apply what I said when attacking my opponent's case. I'll go over the criterions a little more during the conclusion. Contention OneCon attacks this contention by explaining that inneffectiveness of the political conditions does not make political conditionality itself unjust. It is not the inneffectiveness itself that makes such conditions unjust; it is what is caused by the inneffectiveness: either no aid at all or aid/suspensions and reductions. This was the primary reason foreign aid to Haiti failed. So essentially, if the country does not meet or accept the conditions aid will either not be given or be suddenly cut off, ultimately punishing the citizens in the recipient country for the actions of their government. Here human dignity is not preserved, making political conditions unjust. I reconize that this will not happen all the time, but there are multiple negative impacts that I listed in my other contentions.Contention TwoCon explains that since I only listed one example, it does not apply to all cases. This is not necessarily the truth; it is common sense that if the donor tries to force a country to change a policy to obtain aid, conflict is likely to occur. Con goes on to say that the second warrant only warns of a risk; not a certainty. It is important to realize this debate is not over political conditions on humanitarian aid, rather it is about placing political conditions on humanitarian aid. There is a difference. Basically, when a donor attaches conditions to the aid, there is no way of knowing what will happen, making it unjust due to the multiple risks attached. Also, this action goes against the very principle of utilitarianism, since the end result is unknown.Con misunderstands my last point which talks about the credibility of the donor. I am not talking about countries no longer needing assistance. I am simply explaining that if unreasonable conditions are placed on aid, conflict and rejection of the conditions will occur. Recipients of the aid will go somewhere else to obtain unconditional aid, and ultimately the donor will lose credibility; this actually decreases diplomatic relations.Contention ThreeCon references the Boone and Svensson cards; for this point please cross-apply my attacks on their first and second contention.ConclusionPlacing political conditions on humanitarian aid (has resulted in) and always has the potential to result in. no aid suspensions and reductions conflict loss of credibility of the doner low quality aid Really, political conditions cause more problems than they even aim to solve, and often times the goals of the political conditions are not reached, proving them to be unjust when applied to humanitarian aid.