The Argument from reasonable Non-Belief (ANB)

Thank you, unitedandy, for the good debate.Personal relationship with GodPro says, "All else being equal, an optimal relationship with God (involving knowledge of Him, interaction, and so forth) requires de dicto belief in Him." In the previous round I asked if this meant de dicto belief must be maintainedat all times which his argument seems to commit him to. Even if Pro admits to one case where a sub-optimal relationship for a period of time can be beneficial (as many religious people have reported) then he's admitting that his principle (or premise) is false. Pro simply just hasn't motivated this statement because for his argument to work "at all times" needs to be added into to it which makes it incredibly implausible. Second, in the last round I included another good that can come from a period of time in which there is a sub-optimal personal relationship with God. I said: "Especially when you consider the fact that sub-optimal or not wholly fulfilling relationships (like my prisoner example) can blossom into something fuller and deeper when, for example, the prisoners finally make it out and meet each other face to face for the first time...This provides a nice analogy because, on Christianity, it is said that everyone will one day gain de dicto, explicit knowledge of God in the afterlife and surely the relationship between a de re believer and God would have a whole new type of significance added onto it." As far as I can tell, this was not addressed.Third, simply speaking, the truth is I don't even have to offer a "greater goods" defense (which I why I haven't focused much attention on them) in order to defeat the ANB. Note that if my epistemological objections work, and I think they do, then this undercuts the warrant anyone has for believing P1 of Pro's argument. If you have no good reason to believe "P1 - If the Christian God exists, we have good grounds for thinking that reasonable non-belief in Christianity does not exist." then that's it for the ANB. Notice that this P1 had to be suitably qualified to take into account Con's implicit assumptions like a high degree of credence, de dicto, belief that occurs that all times. Me undercutting the warrant for these assumptions means that no one has any reason to believe P1 is true. Fourth, Pro asks about what about cases we non-belief causes character defects. It's hard to see how this a moral development good wouldn't cover this. For example, Saul clearly had character defects as a result of non-belief (what with killing Christians and the like) yet when he converted we get a new sense of how redemption is possible - even for the most depraved of us.Fifth, I have to admit it was a fairly clever strategy of Pro to use my own words against me in one of my earlier debates...the problem is I was playing devil's advocate at the time. I implied as much when I said on the said on page 2 in the comments: "Well, I don't necessarily believe everything that I'm saying...I just thought it would be a fun exercise." That tactic must be considered a failure.Impact of non-beliefAs I said in my third point - I need not detail all the greater goods in order to defeat the ANB. All I'm doing is showing there is no good reason for believing P1 of the argument. All Pro is doing here is just saying is that how he conceives reasonable non-belief is incompatible with God and what I'm saying is that his conception is simply and flatly wrong and I've provided reasons why. Pro is just restating the whole point of contention here and not arguing for it. When Pro quotes Matt 7:7 and Bill Craig to make bolster his case I can't help but think this is not actually helping him at all. This is because as I've been harping on - time matters. Matt says "seek, and ye shall find". What it doesn't say is "seek, and ye shall find right now." It doesn't imply that either. As I have said before sub-optimal forms of belief in God (low credence, de re) can be permitted and are compatible with God for a time(as evidenced by the "dark night of the soul") and Pro hasn't made a plausible argument to contrary that God must provide sufficient evidence for de dicto belief in Him at all times.RationalityNo Christian I know of believes that God actually "governs" our cognitive faculties. Neither does Plantinga, I would presume. And Pro just simply has it backwards - it's not that God utilizes false de dicto beliefs for a greater good; it's that he uses true de re beliefs for a greater good.CriticismsPro's ANB alleges that reasonable non-belief is in some sense incompatible with God. The natural understanding of "incompatibility" here would have to be logical. This natural understanding would seem to affirmed by Pro's multiple attempts to show that explicit, de dicto belief is required to be in a personal relationship with God (and saved) which would imply that all who don't have this type of belief won't be saved (among other things). Pro seems to be arguing incompatibility. So, all I needed do in this debate is show how reasonable non-belief can be compatible with God existing; and considering the fact that beliefs are held by subjects who have "privileged access" [1] to their mental contents it seems absurd for Pro to ask that I justify this empirical claim, well, empirically. This is even more difficult in the case where implicit, de re beliefs are held because the subject often doesn't even know they hold those beliefs. One can't very well go around asking people if they have beliefs they don't realize they have - they might even deny they have those beliefs! Me making that distinction (that all de dicto non-belief need not be rescued by de re belief) does nothing to undermine my case as surely the difference would between the cases would be those involving moral considerations such as moral culpability, superogation, fulfilling obligations, having good virtues and the like.Heaven and HellHonestly, Pro's case here seems to presume a shallow hermeneutic, non-sequiturs, and a confusion of necessary and sufficient conditions in making his case for exclusivism from the bible. Basically, Jesus and other biblical texts and verses say that one may get into heaven if you (de dicto) believe in him. (I say may because of verses like Matt 7:21: "Not everyone who says to me, 'Lord, Lord,' will enter the kingdom of heaven, but only he who does the will of my Father who is in heaven.")I'll even make Pro's prima facie case stronger here and cite a verse he missed or was unaware of - Rom 10:9: "That if you confess with your mouth, 'Jesus is Lord,' and believe in your heart that God raised him from the dead, you will be saved." Surely, this ruins inclusivism? Not so quick. Imagine if I said this: "If you get good straight A's in all your AP classes and apply you'll get into a good college." It hardly follows from this that getting straight A's in all your AP classes is the only way to get into a good college. It hardly follows it's a necessary condition for you to get into a good college. You could get into a good college by getting A's in all but two of your AP classes and having numerous extra-curricular school activities that you are involved in. All the first statement implies is that it is a sufficient condition that one gets straight A's in all of their AP classes that they will get into a good colleges; what it DOES NOT imply is that it is a necessary condition for getting into a good college. It simply doesn't follow from Rom 10:9 or the other verses Pro cites that de dicto belief in Jesus is a necessary condition. At all. Given that verse and other verses like Matt 25: 34-40 or Rev 5:9 the most reasonable conclusion to make is that there are multiple sufficient conditions for salvation. Pro's case here simply doesn't prove his conclusion.Sources[1] http://en.wikipedia.org...