Individuals have a moral obligation to assist those in need

This round is imperative for anyone voting to read, as it will hammer the nail into the coffin, ensuring that there is absolutely no way that anyone could possibly vote Aff on this resolution. Concerning his value framework: My opponent fundamentally misunderstands what he himself is advocating for in this debate and the impact of this advocacy. He, in the first round, initially warrants the assumption that Aff is superior because, if we are wrong, then “the duties denied and ignored would be insurmountable violations”. However, as I’ve shown, an obligation of this sort would still lead to a certain level of duties denied and ignored, which would also be insurmountable violations. My opponent will claim that he still wins because he mitigates these violations to a greater extent than I do. However, he fundamentally misunderstands what a statement of value is and how it functions. A statement of value is essentially what one ought to do. To see if the statement of value is valid, we must subject it to actual examples to see if the obligation leads to permissible actions. If we find situations in which the obligation leads to impermissible actions, we caveat situations in which the obligation does not exist. While Aff’s argument essentially asserts that not voting for his resolution leads to the incurring of an opportunity cost, namely the forgoing of duties, he does not realize that, by enacting this resolution, we still incur an opportunity cost. We forgo dutiful actions in certain situations merely because the resolution lacks comprehensiveness. All I have to do to defeat this resolution is propose a counterplan that is both mutually exclusive in regard to the resolution and superior in terms of opportunity cost. If I propose the counterplan, through caveated severance, that “individuals have the moral obligation to assist the needy so long as such an action does not impinge upon the inviolable rights of others and acts in accordance with societal reciprocity”, then I win outright. Why? Because I solve for issues that Aff chose not to solve for when proposing this resolution. This is a superior counterplan, and a vote for Neg is a essentially a vote affirming the existence of a superior alternative forgone if you were to vote Aff. According to this site on LD, "As long as the opportunity cost is less than the cost of the action, then you should do the counterplan instead of the plan"https://sites.google.com...The ResolutionI love this next part. My opponent offers us a resolution that is, in essence, a statement of value. But not a contextual statement of value. Aff gives us a sweeping, broad resolution about a single moral obligation with absolutely no context whatsoever. Then, when I try to provide some context, Aff defends his resolution by stating that "the view that the affirmative must show that the resolution is worth enacting is silly." What is silly is the notion that a value claim does not need to be tested to see if it truly produces desirable results. Why does Aff need to show that the resolution is worth enacting? I don't know, why does any debater need to show that his resolution is worth enacting? Showing that something is worth enacting and actually produces the desired results is the entire point of a debate. Then he fallaciously equates two examples with the example at hand. He merely words the first example of Keystone to sound absurd, but to debate whether or not the pipeline should be constructed, would you not think it wise to deliberate over what benefits and costs the pipeline will provide? The next example is a statement of fact, and the implications of existence bear no weight on such a statement, but the existence of an obligation can be tested, because stating that someone has an obligation is just a different way of saying that they ought to act in a certain way. In no manner is the existence of an obligation comparable to the existence of my laptop. A value claim can always be reworded to the existence of an obligation, but that does not make it a claim of fact. Even if the existence of an obligation is seen by voters as a statement of fact, I win merely because, by definition, an obligation means that one ought to do something, and attacking the notion that we ought to do something is sufficient by definition to refute an obligation. ObligationsMy opponent's response to every extension I use is "well that's just cherry picking" and "that's irrelevant". Essentially, my opponent concedes that, in these situations, we ought not assist the needy. Are these examples really "cherry-picking"? Well, sort of. It depends how you define cherry-picking. A better simplification of what I'm doing through the examples would be "finding situations in which the resolution is markedly false." Because my opponent has refused to accept that these display that the resolution is sometimes false, namely that the obligation to assist the needy often does not exist, let us visit a syllogism to prove my point. Obligation defined as “A duty which one… ought to perform”A. An obligation to assist the needy existsB. You ought assist the needy A ⇒B ~B Therefore ~ABecause my opponent has not engaged with specific examples in which we ought not assist the needy, he cannot contest this proof that, in the situations I have provided as well as all extensions of the conceptual basis of those examples, the obligation does not exist. Therefore, the moral obligation isn't universal; it does not always exist ergo not a CI. Insofar as the moral obligation does not always exist, and the resolution merely states that it does, the resolution is unacceptable. I apologize if this is not the strategy that Aff would have liked me to use to attack the resolution, but I cannot be blamed for a faulty resolution. The resolution is phrased as an obligation. Unlike the existence of God or Santa Claus, the existence of an obligation requires circumstantial analysis. This is why most claims of value are actual applications of the value, not sweeping generalizations about what one ought to do. An obligation suggests how one ought to act. If we are given the resolution “You are walking down the street and you see an emaciated homeless child lying on the sidewalk. You have a bag of trail mix in your backpack, and you are fairly well-off financially. You have an obligation to give the bag of trail mix to the child”, we can analyze it in a direction that Aff probably would have liked the debate to have gone in. But insofar as the debate is a sweeping value claim with literally no caveats, we are FORCED to apply the value to see if it truly is an obligation. When making a value claim, you must ensure that it outweighs competing values that may better explain how we ought to act. If there is a superior moral calculus which we ought to subject our actions to, then the obligation cannot truly be stated to exist sans contingency. Even if the broader calculus suggests that we assist the needy on one occasion, the obligation is to act in accordance with this higher, more consistent calculus, which just so happens to, in this instance, require us to assist the needy. If your resolution dictates how one ought to behave and will occasionally lead to people acting impermissibly, then your resolution is unacceptable and ought to be replaced by one either broader or caveated. Aff could have caveated his case to solve for contradictions within the realm of permissible action. Aff could have rewritten his case to solve for inconsistencies by broadening the resolution so that it actually was universally applicable. But Aff did neither of these things and left us with this faulty value claim. A value claim should not be weighed on whether it makes us better off than the status quo. A value claim should be weighed on whether or not it is consistent, complete, and holds up to scrutiny, none of which apply to Aff’s resolution. It was his choice to run the case. It was his choice to omit caveats and definitions. And it was his choice to condemn his resolution to defeat. A rational voter could not possibly vote Aff with such a faulty resolution. My opponent makes the mistake of calling for a warrant from me to prove that assisting people can violate the rights of others. He then later realizes that he should probably throw in the argument "you should find a way to help without harming" just in case. He misunderstands what a hypothetical situation is. I imagine a situation that is possible and apply Aff's resolution to it. Aff acknowledged earlier that situations may exist in which we shouldn't assist but that's just cherry picking and doesn't prove the obligation doesn't exist to him. If these situations happen, they could be "outliers". But he misses the point. He actually drops this next contention, and, unfortunately for him, cannot address it without making a new argument. I suggest that there is a broader obligation at work, such as accordance with naturalism or empathy, that may often extend to altruism. But it may just as easily extend to punishment, which harms the needy, as Aff concedes by lack of response. The resolution states that the obligation exists without contextual basis! But Aff drops my point about the "obligation" being a mere extension of an actual obligation, which may just as easily dictate that you behave differently. This concession alone should raise enough doubt to vote Neg. And my hypothetical included no other way to help. Now Aff's the one skirting the issue. I aimed to explore the possibility of superior overriding duties that render the "obligation" non-existent. Yelling "irrelevant" at every contention a victory does not make.And no, you aren't obliged to punch your sister's boyfriend in the face. You're obliged to contact authorities if anything. For lack of space, you'll find my pseudo points of crystallization of the round to be both bolded and underlined.