People do not have free will.

I will be using the same headings and organization as throughout the debate.PsychologyMy opponent continues to commit the fallacy that I pointed out several times in my previous speech. Since I apparently was not clear enough, my opponent is moving from:1. SOME aspects of our behavior are determined by our biology.to2. ALL aspects of our behavior are determined by our biology.The premise, 1, is obvious and uncontroversial, but the leap from 1 to 2 is enormous and question begging. It's like saying "if I hit you over the head with a baseball bat, you will fall unconscious; therefore, you do not have free will." Some aspects of our behavior, like whether we have schizophrenia, can be caused by our genes without that taking away our ability to make free choices within the bounds of our nature.My opponent makes an inference almost exactly as absurd as my hypothetical example above when she says "My opponent never once contests the fact that our brain dictates if we have mental illness; the brain dictates every single thing about our personality including our choices." The non-sequitur is obvious, and my opponent repeats it over and over.Another obvious problem with all of this is that we can all see that we do make free decisions that aren't determined by chemical reactions in our brains. Think about what goes on when you evaluate this argument, or think about a mathematical problem, or weigh the evidence in support of a scientific claim. You can choose whether or not to focus, and what logical steps to perform - this is self evident.My opponent claims I "dropped" the PTSD example - no, I took care of it implicitly, by covering the relation of free will to our biology in general. If free will isn't incompatible with the existence of mental illness, then any intelligent person can see that it isn't incompatible with the existence of PTSD. This isn't experience "controlling" the brain, it's experience overloading the brain, and overwhelming the capacity we normally have for free choice, resulting in damage.The same mistake shows up when my opponent confuses the ability of a brain injury to influence our decisions with the brain dictating every aspect of our lives. Again, this is the fallacious switch from some to all. Just because a brain injury can influence a person's decisions doesn't mean they don't still have free choice within a certain range, or that we don't have free will in the normal case.My opponent asks me to present a value that arises without experience, which shows a misunderstanding of my position. I have agreed, throughout this debate, that values require experiences. We choose between the reasons presented to us by experience. That is the key point - whether we can freely choose between the reasons provided by the experiences, not whether experience is necessary. I do not know why my opponent has been so confused about this throughout the debate.Pro writes, "How do we choose between possible reasons? We consider the outcomes which requires that we are exposed to the information (our experience) in order for us to make assumptions about the outcomes." This is the same misunderstanding. The question is whether we make free choices between the outcomes, not whether they are presented to us by experience. (My opponent then recites a bunch of "evidence" she claims she has given, some of which I have addressed already and some of which I will get to momentarily.)Pro repeats these mistakes again, then says "The point is that the choice is not FREE from antecedent states of affairs: nature (physical forces of nature and biology) and nurture (events from the past and our personal experiences). All of these things are out of our control, so our choices are not free but determined by these factors." For the umpteenth time, no, that is not the question. The question is not whether there are reasons for our decisions, the question is whether our decisions are caused deterministically, which has never been demonstrated.Regarding the brain study, Pro claims that it doesn't matter that the study only studied people who were moving their finger because "we make split second choices all the time" and because some of our purchases are subconscious. I'm not denying that, when we are thinking quickly or making an impulse buy, our automatic subconscious processes might play a disproportionate role. But that is not what my opponent is claiming.My opponent has claimed throughout the debate that we are simply at the mercy of our brains, all the time. She has claimed that we never make a free choice, even in our most focused, careful, abstract deliberations. If that's her claim, she needs to do better than a study on finger twitching.PhysicsIn this section, my opponent continues to try to get out of the fact that she said in Round 1 that she would be defending determinism and then proceeded to accept that indeterminism might be true, directly contradicting the burden she accepted. I don't see any need to highlight this further, since it is a simply matter of deduction from the burden and definition she laid down in Round 1.Pro says, without evidence, "the scientific community has reached near consensus that free will doesn't exist." Even if that's true, the relevant community is not the scientific community but the philosophical community, since this is a philosophical issue. Most philosophers believe in some form of free will.My opponent then goes on at length about physics but at the end of the day seems to concede that consciousness may not be composed of matter as currently understood by science. I don't think any of the physics is really necessary, here, since all we have to do is appeal to introspection, as I previously described (Pro has never directly addressed this introspective argument for dualism).Self RefutationMy opponent concedes that "It's true that I don't know why I believe in determinism, but I am 100% certain that it has to do with my prior experiences which Con does not (can not) contest."This is a total concession. If my opponent does not know why she believes in determinism, then she has no reason to be a determinist, so the argument that determinism is self refuting goes through. If determinism is true, no one can know that determinism is true, which makes justifying the resolution impossible.Asserting that one's belief in determinism has to do with one's prior experiences does not help the determinist. For one thing, the belief that one's belief in determinism has to do with one's prior experiences would itself be the product of deterministic processes, and therefore itself unjustified. For another thing, just because my opponent's belief in determinism allegedly "has to do" with her prior experiences doesn't mean it is based on evidence, since on my opponent's view my belief in free will also "has to do" with my prior experiences. Everyone's belief in anything "has to do" with their prior experiences on my opponent's view, so that clearly doesn't count for anything, which leaves my opponent without any justification for any of her beliefs.My opponent says that "My deliberation was rooted in my exposure to the philosophy and the fact that my brain functions well enough to reason the way it does." But she doesn't know this, given determinism. As I said, on her view it could be the result of an early childhood experience or a chemical reaction in her brain. She herself concedes that she does not know why she is a determinist.For these reasons, we should negate the resolution.