One can rationally support the claim that they are the only individual in existance with free will.

Thanks PRO, for your round 2 arguments. I do understand your resolution a bit better now; I hope anyway. It does seem to have many contractions, which make it hard to follow. Let"s explore each premise of your resolution. 1) Everything in the universe is calculable and thus, predetermined. This understanding of the universe is aligned with the philosophical position of determinism. I have accepted this, but the important components to take from this premise are that: A) According to the definition of determinism, there are conditions that "could cause no other event." There is only one possible outcome; the word "event" is not plural here. Having multiple possible outcomes would be a contradiction to the root word, "determine". DETERMINE: establish EXACTLY, a DEFINITE result [6][7] B) This is a universal truth, as PRO states, "everything in the universe." Therefore, determinism applies to both the observed AND the observer. 2) PRO states: "Thus, given enough information, I could theoretically be put in a viewing room which allowed me to watch and anticipate another person"s every-move. This would prove to the me in the story, that other people's actions are predetermined." Pro claims that since the observer can anticipate every person"s move, they do not appear to have free will. However, this is incorrect, as I stated in ROUND 1. My definition of free will, is aligned with compatibilism because it is compatible with determism [4]. To quote my ROUND 1 argument: Free will only requires that we are the agent that acts and that no other agent acts on our behalf. In other words, it is not important that we have but one choice but that we make the choice ourselves. The freedom to act affirms our free will, not the freedom to choose. Therefore, determinism does not prevent free will at all. This definition of free will prevents us from accepting PRO"s premise that the observer can negate the possibility that those with anticipated actions have free will. They indeed still have free will. PRO claims that this definition of free will would allow a computer to have free will as, "a simple action constitutes free will". This is an incorrect interpretation of compatiblistic free well. The acting does not demonstrate free well; it is the fact we act according to our own will. "We are the agent that acts and NO OTHER agent acts on our behalf." PRO claims that I drew relevance from a biblical example but this argument is a poor straw-man. My example used biblical characters, yes, but it was not dependent on Christian doctrine. I will demonstrate this in another example: Dimitri wants the Democratic presidential candidate to win the upcoming presidential election. Johann is an undecided voter. The night before polling begins, Dimitri installs a device in Johann"s brain. This device is unknown to Johann and gives Dimitri the power to force thoughts into Johann"s mind. Dimitri plots the morning of the election. If Johann thinks about voting Republican, he will force the thought of voting Democratic into his mind. When Johann receives his ballot, however, he votes Democratic and Dimitri did not need to use his device." Johann could only vote Democratic, since any other vote would have been prevented by Dimitri"s device. However, was he still not responsible for his vote? His will was to vote Democratic and that was still accomplished, even if there were no other options and even if an omniscient observer could predict that he was going to vote Democratic. He was still able to act according to his will. After Johann left, a computer was rolled next to the ballot box. It had the latest version of Microsoft Vote installed on its hard drive. It voted Democrat as well. The fact that the computer voted does not demonstrate that it has free will. It did not act according to its will as it could only vote according to the software algorithms dictating its logical processing and decision making. It does not act freely, it is constrained by its programming. A computer cannot be original or have original thoughts. It can only duplicate what it"s instructions demand. PRO claims that free will requires, choosing from a set of options". Since an observer sees that the observed only have one option, they do not appear to have free will. They are restricted by 1A: there is only one option for those in a deterministic universe. That is the option that is yielded from the innumerous initial conditions, that is predictable according to the observer. This style of free will is aligned with Incompatibilism [8]. As you might have predicted, it is called incompatibilism because it is incompatible with determinism. Within incompatiblism, one must deny free will, deny that the universe is determistic or deny both free will and that the universe is determisitic. In this case, PRO has denied free will as he states that those that are observed do not contain free will since they do not have the ability to choose from a set of options. However, let"s consider the other restriction from PRO"s first premise: 1B: Being that both the observer and observed are in a deterministic universe, they both are held to restriction 1A. The omniscient observer must know that: like the observed, being that he resides in the same universe, he also is permitted from free will. Herein lies the contraction of free will in PRO"s resolution. If we hold premise 1 true, we have a deterministic universe, then we can also accept premise 2. Premise 2 being that the observed do not have free will according to PRO"s incompatiblistic form of free will. However, since the observed and observer both reside in the same deterministic universe, we must strike down premise 3 and, as such, the resolution falls. Likewise, if PRO were to adopt the compatible form of free will, then in accepting the deterministic universe premise we would have to strike down premise 2 as the observed would now have free will. Either way, the resolution falls. 3) PRO claims that he could not be put in a position to calculate his next action. To quote him, "you would never reach your actual next move", "you would be actively changing your next move by trying to predict it." As I stated previously, PRO uses circular reason to demonstrate his own free will. PRO claims that it is a paradox to be put in a position to calculate your next action because you would be actively changing your next move. One can only actively change their next move if they have free will. PRO clearly assumes he has the free will capable of changing his next action, thereby creating this so-called paradox. How lucky for PRO that the paradox allows PRO to make the assumption needed to prove the resolution instead of demonstrating a severe contraction in its logic. To demonstrate, the logic of the third premise is as follows: PRO can predict PRO"s next move >> PRO uses free will to change to a different next move for all infinity, creating a paradox >> Therefore PRO cannot predict PRO"s next move >> Therefore PRO has free will The circular logic dictates that PRO requires free will to show PRO has free will. If we accept PRO"s definition of free will, where free will does not exist if PRO"s next action can be determined, then the premise changes to the following: PRO can predict PRO"s next move >> PRO cannot change to a different next move >> Therefore PRO does not have free will. SOURCES [6] https://www.google.com... [7] https://www.google.com... [8] http://en.wikipedia.org...