The Non-Aggression Principle is ethically sound

Since I will most likely be busy attempting to leave an impression upon the voters towards the end of the round, I would just like to take this opportunity to express my sincere thanks to Mr. Travieso for his participation in this debate; it has been the most enjoyable debate I've done on this site so far, and also one of my most challenging ones. I will now proceed to present my final rebuttals and a closing statement. 1. Subjects vs. Objects Con gives a more elaborate explanation of the concept at hand, pointing out that there are generally three parties involved when discussing a "right"-- the active subject (possesses the right), the object (what the right applies to), and the passive subject (is obligated to respect that right). He then engages in some convoluted rhetoric to try proving his point: "we say instead that people are objects which can be owned by other objects (or the selfsame object) but also can sell themselves to other objects as long as this is done with consent of said first object. This certainly sounds confusing, but only because it is absurd. " However, that only sounds absurd because Con is already having us assume that 'objects' refer to *inanimate* things which are incapable of 'giving consent' and 'selling themselves'. In other words, Con is assuming that objects are inanimate in order to show that humans cannot be objects (because humans aren't inanimate). Without first establishing that objects *must* be inanimate, Con's argument is fallacious, as it basically assumes its conclusion. Regarding Con's argument that self-property justifies slavery (which I refuted), he simply shifts the focus of his argument from actual slavery to debt bondage; however, he makes no attempt at showing why debt bondage is unethical. .. what is so bad about a person *agreeing* to work to pay off his debts? No answer is given. Over all, Con has provided no compelling reason for us to accept that a human being cannot simultaneously be the subject and object of a right. This objection is refuted. 2. Rights and Relationships I have clearly shown in my constructive that that by assuming self-ownership, we can logically reach the conclusion that rights exist as intrinsic human characteristics. Con tries to form an argument against self-ownership by pointing this conclusion out and calling it false on the basis that "rights are not metaphysical entities"; however, this is nothing more than a bare assertion-- where is the support for that claim? If only one human being were to exist, there is no reason for us to believe that he wouldn't still possess all his rights; those rights may lose their relevance, since there is no chance of them being purposefully violated by an external entity (i. e. passive subject), but this does *not* entail the non-existence of those rights. 3. Personal Autonomy vs. Self-Ownership Con misses the point of my rebuttal, mistakenly claiming that I have not fulfilled my burden of proof and declining to say anything further on the subject. But I did, indeed, fulfill my burden of proof by showing that the very definition of personal autonomy *assumes* self-ownership by its inclusion of possessive pronouns; we cannot possess personal autonomy/free will (i. e. the ability to make choices and act of our own volition) without first having exclusive control and ownership over our own person. That, alone, serves as sufficient basis for us to believe that the two go hand in hand. Thus, Con did have the burden of proof to differentiate between the two, and he failed to meet it. And, in accordance with the debate rules, it is now too late for Con to do so, as I would not get a chance to respond. Instead of fulfilling his BOP, Con simply confirms his concession that personal autonomy exists, and by extension, his concession that self-ownership exists. 4. Circular Reasoning Reading over Con's rebuttal, it becomes clear that we must distinguish between 'self-ownership' and 'property rights', two similar terms which Con conflates in order to make his semantics-based case regarding my supposed circular reasoning more convincing. Whereas property rights refer specifically to the the products of our labor, self-ownership / personal autonomy is a meta-ethical truth justified by the fact that it is necessary for humans to have any sort of moral significance (just like how the uncaused ultimate first cause's existence is justified by it being necessary for the universe to have any sort of starting point). Property rights are not at all used to justify self-ownership-- they are solely the *implications* of self-ownership; the justification for self-ownership is completely independent of property rights regardless of the similarities between the two. Thus, the essential Y >> X component of circular reasoning fallacy is missing, and Con's objection fails. ~ An Alternative ~ Con claims that his alternative ethical system was merely meant to show that there are ways to affirm the existence of rights without acknowledging self-ownership. However, that only means that his ethical system ignores an important factor of ethical relevance in order to more closely match up with our ethical intuitions; it is the equivalent of creating the 'perfect' solution to the problem of national debt by ignoring the roles that inflation and international relations play in it. We are given no compelling reason to give precedence to an undefined, vague, and subjective concept such as 'dignity' over the much more objective, axiomatic idea of self-ownership (besides the irrelevant notion that it coincides more with our ethical intuitions, I mean). The mere existence of this alternative has no bearing on the ethical soundness of the NAP; Con must show that it is *preferable* to the NAP, and his only viable attempt at doing so thus far is with his insulin hypothetical, which *only* favors Con's alternative on the basis of ethical intuitionalism and ignores the NAP's ethical incentives and potential condemnation of acts of omission. ========================= CONCLUSION ========================= None of Con's objections to the concept of self-ownership hold up, with all of them having their basis in bare assertions and semantics; by failing to make a significant distinction between personal autonomy and self-ownership, yet evidently accepting the existence of personal autonomy, he essentially concedes that entire line of argumentation. Regarding his alternative ethical system, we are given no substantial reason to prefer it over the NAP, and thus, it cannot really serve as an argument against its ethical soundness.