Wittgenstein's "beetle-in-the-box" analogy and the Lockean Interpretation of Language

INTRODUCTIONPro did not satisfy his burden of proof, but instead asked a question he should have probably asked in the comments.Pro asks, "They both seem pretty good to me. We do indeed have our own private definitions and things we think of when a word is mentioned, and we cannot see into anyone else's mind. They both say pretty much that. Why wouldn't they work together?"Response: The Lockean interpretation of language claims that when I say "apples are red," I'm basing my claim on my inner samples of the two terms "apple" and "red". Wittgenstein argues that I could be only mimicking the public usage of such terms in the outside world, independently of my inner samples(if we assume they even exist), which means that inner samples do not denote outer objects as Locke claims, but are simply irrelevant to the study of language and meanings. The beetle in Wittgenstein's analogy resembles my inner sample of the word "beetle" which is completely isolated from the outside world; if such an inner sample exists, then the public usage of the word "beetle" is not contingent on an inner sample, and so I can use the word "beetle" exactly like everyone else in my public language and have an inner sample of a "beetle" that is actually different from everyone else. While in the Lockean interpretation, my inner sample decides my public usage of the word "beetle," and so if my inner sample is different than everyone else, my public usage of the word would be also different from everyone else.MY CASEPro has the burden of proof in establishing the resolution of this debate which was presented in the opening statement.Full resolution: Wittgenstein's "beetle-in-the-box" analogy establishes a difficulty in the Lockean interpretation of language where such difficulty is only limited to inner objects.In simpler terms, Pro has to show that Wittgenstein's analogy only applies to inner objects, while I have to undermine this argument and show that it could also apply to outer objects. This so far has not been done.Although Pro has not supported his position with any argument, I will present an argument on why Wittgenstein's "beetle-in-the-box" analogy can also apply to outer objects, which was introduced by Willard Van Orman Quine.Imagine a world with two people who can communicate with each other, Alpha and Betty. Alpha refers to Dog as Dog, Cat as Cat and Rock as Rock. While Betty refers to Dog as Dog*, which refers to everything in the universe with the Dog erased, much like sets and subsets, where Betty says "Dog" but means Dog* through considering everything in the universe excluding that particular Dog. Betty also does that for every other term in such a way that Betty refers to Cat as Cat* and Rock as Rock* and so on.Now if Alpha and Betty are communicating, Alpha would look at a beetle and say Beetle, Betty will look at the same beetle and say Beetle, because in her language Beetle is equivalent to Beetle*, where Beetle* stands for everything in the universe excluding that particular Beetle. Therefore, miscommunication will always be avoided although both Alpha and Betty would be referring to different things while they communicate. Therefore, the outer objects would be like the beetle in the box in the sense that they won't affect the public usage of words even if they are different than each other, and therefore Wittgenstein's analogy applies on outer objects in the same vein, adding no special difficulty for inner objects and the Lockean interpretation of language which relies on inner objects.Professor Arif Ahmed puts it as follows, "So if Wittgenstein's beetle-in-the-box argument establishes the semantical irrelevance of inner objects then it establishes the semantical irrelevant of outer ones. Hence, it establishes no special difficulty for the Lockean interpretation of our language on which words denote private or inner objects. What is wrong with the beetle-in-the-box argument is not that it fails to establish its conclusion. It is that one could travel much further in its direction, from the perspective that one then attains, Wittgenstein's limitation to the private sector looks arbitrary[1]."CITATIONS[1] Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations: A Reader's Guide. By Arif Ahmed. Bloomsbury Academic; First Edition edition (September 23, 2010).