Aquinas' First Way succeeds

As long as one of the premises is in doubt then I accept that the argument has not been proven, so what I meant by showing that a premise is false is to show that the premise could be reasonably doubted, so I think that Con and I can agree on that. Also, I do phrase the argument slightly differently than Aquinas did, but I think that my phrasing does justice to what Aquinas' articulation was getting at. To clear up ambiguity I will re-phrase the argument. 1. The universe actualizes. 2. Something cannot actualize itself. C: Therefore the universe must ultimately be actualized by something outside of it, that does not need to be actualized, which can only be God. This rephrasing is saying the same thing that I originally intended, hopefully it makes things clearer. Premise 1: Con seems to object to premise 1 by saying "potential is said of something existing" . So, something non-existent cannot be rightfully described has having potentiality, so it cannot rightfully be described as being actualized. I agree that a non-existent thing itself does not have 'potentiality', but the non-existent thing is still 'potential', in that it can potentially exist. So I don't think that Con's stipulation demontrates a problem with premise 1. The other objection that Con seems to be making is that perhaps the universe does not need to be actualized. Except that actualization means to go from one state to another (eg. ice cube going from frozen to melted). Premise 1 is not saying that the universe "needs" to be actualized, but rather that it is an empirical fact that the universe actualizes in the fact that it goes from one state to another. So, if Con wants to object to premise 1 then Con must argue that the universe does not go from one state to another. Again, I take it as an empirical fact that the universe goes from one state to another. Premise 2 This premise seems to be true because in order to actualize, something must go from one state to another. It seems intuitively certain that something does not move itself to a new state (again it is absurd to think that an ice cube melts itself). This can be explained by recognizing that to actualize means to change in 'being' and something cannot give itself a new state of being, which it lacked before. In other words, something cannot give itself what it lacks, out of nothing. So, Con must explain why it is coherent to accept that something can bring itself to a new state or give itself what it lacks out of nothing. Conclusion Con asks: If the universe is actualized by something else, must the actualizer be fully actual/lacking in potentiality? Except, if the actualizer of the universe needs to be actualized then the actualizing process would go on for an infinite regress and nothing could be actualized. If the actualizer is actualized in the process of actualizing something else, then the actualizer would need to be actualized by something else (which would then go on for an infinite regress). So, if all things that are actualized must be actualized by something else (per premise 2) and we accept that an infinite series per se is impossible (which I take to be necessarily true) then the actualizer of the univese must be without even the possibility of being actualized, which means the actualizer lacks potentiality. Now perhaps Con will object that an infinite series per se is actually possible. Except, I will respond by saying that this is tantamount to denying premise 2. For, a process that goes on for infinite never reaches a beginning, and this does not allow for actualization to be transferred, which amounts to actualization not taking place. Con may object to this, but I take it as necessarily true. So, Con now must explain why premise 1, 2, or the conclusion could be placed in doubt.