Atheism is a more reasonable position than theism

Opening PRO doesn’t seem to understand that Burden of Proof is on him to affirm the resolution. PRO is making a positive claim, PRO must provide evidence. Sans any evidence or argument to make the resolution plausible, the resolution cannot be affirmed and points for arguments (should) go to me. PRO asks “Why should we believe personal revelation in an epistemological sense?” I never said personal revelation. The term I used was personal experience. Personal revelation has to do with true belief; God, supposedly, reveals itself to us. Personal experience, however, has to do with reasonable belief, and we already understand personal experience in an epistomelogical sense. I will put the basic argument into a syllogism P1. For all propositions p, unless there are plausible defeaters for p presented* to S, if a subject S’ personal perceptions and experiences entail p, it is prima facie reasonable for S to believe (assent to) p. P2. There are no plausible defeaters for the belief that [God exists] presented to S. P3. S’ personal experiences and perceptions include [spiritual experiences of God]. P4. A necessary condition for S’ spiritual experiences is that God exists. P5. S’ spiritual experiences entail [God exists]. C.. Hence, it is reasonable for S to believe that [God exists]. Pragmatic-Necessary Assumptions If I have an experience E or perception C which would require that p be the case, E or C entails p, on the assumption that *there are no skeptical scenarios at play.* This seems to be a pragmatic assumption for the purposes of ascertaining what could be rationally held beliefs. On one hand, if this assumption is not made, no beliefs can be reasonable, not even belief in an external world or the reliability of our senses, which is a prerequisite of using evidence to justify belief. In other words, we must assume that the evidence we are collecting is accurate. So, not only is this a useful day-to-day assumption, it is also a necessary assumption for any field, group, or person claiming to study the world. On P1 If I experience pain, it is reasonable for me to believe the proposition [I am in pain] However, if I see a shadow on my wall and form the belief [Someone is behind me], a defeater for this belief would be that no one is, in fact, behind me. The belief is falsified. However, if the shadow on the wall is mine, and I come to realize this, that would be a defeater as well. However, what is not a defeater is the idea that I am “just seeing things”. It is possible that I’m just seeing things, but it’s also possible I am, in fact, seeing a shadow. Without a way to tell if it is true that I’m “just seeing things”, this is not a plausible defeater, although it is a possible defeater. *This presentation doesn’t have to be from another person. S cannot present themselves with a defeater. EX: I check behind me to see if the shadow is being cast by someone behind me. On the inference from P4 to P5 I will explain what I mean by “entails” in this argument; to be sure, having a belief that p does not make it true that p. Rather, similar to how my perception of a tree or experience of pain presupposes the reliability of my senses and existence of an external world, so too would at least some spiritual experiences presuppose the existence of God. Responses to PRO Logical Equivalence Those two claims are not logically equivalent. As I have argued through this entire post, the very act of expecting to be provided or providing evidence presupposes the existence of a physical world from which to gather evidence, as well as the reliability of our senses through which to interpret evidence, yet we don’t ask for evidence of either of these. Yet we still consider belief in the external world and reliability of our senses reasonable. That being the case, evidence is not the only thing which can make a belief reasonable. If evidence is not the only thing that can make belief reasonable then, (even without evidence) belief in God can be reasonable, in the very same way belief in the external world is reasonable. Without any positive reasons to consider belief in God reasonable, it is as reasonable lack-of-belief in God, which means the falsehood of the resolution that “Atheism is a more reasonable position than theism”. Affirmation of Deism Deism can be a form of theism. Even if deism and theism were wholly distinct, I never even presented the Cosmological Argument. I merely said that God can explain the existence of the universe, in the same way that my shirt being wet and it being cold outside can explain my cold. God can be posited for several other things, but that doesn’t mean belief in God is unreasonable. A “God dunnit” belief is only tangential to the belief that God exists. I was pointing out differences between God and the Yeti.ClosingI look forward to PRO's positive arguments for the resolution. No arguments have yet been provided, and I hope the one's to come will be enticing.