God is not real.

I’d also like to note that the burden of proof is on me, Con, to demonstrate that there is good reason to think God exists. Before I begin, I’ll define God as a divine Creator with the general Judeo-Christian attributes (i. e. omniscience, omnipotence, etc. ) but not any specific deity with an exclusive religious affiliation. Introduction In my opening round, I’ll provide two arguments for God’s existence. The first argument, the kalām cosmological argument, seeks to prove a divine Creator of the cosmos, and the second, the modal ontological argument, adds to this Creator the general Judeo-Christian attributes while simultaneously explaining his existence through necessity. Kalām Cosmological Argument I’ll use the famous version of the KCA popularised by Dr. William Lane Craig. [1] 1. Everything which begins to exist has a cause 2. The Universe began to exist 3. The Universe has a cause P1 is basically a corollary of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) attributed to Leibniz. The PSR explains that “for every entity x, if x exists, then there is a sufficient explanation for why x exists. ” There are two possible explanations for any existing entity: it either exists in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause. Thus we must distinguish between a necessary and contingent entity. Now recall that P1 states whatever begins to exist has a cause. For an entity to begin to exist, it is contingent, meaning it could have failed to exist – otherwise, if it could not have failed to exist, we’d label it as necessary. Thus because something beginning to exist is contingent, and because contingency requires an external cause, everything which begins to exist has a cause. Now take a look at P2. A Universe which does not begin to exist implies a past-eternal Universe, meaning there are an actually infinite number of past events. The problem is that an actual infinity is impossible in nature. For instance, consider Hilbert’s Hotel. A hotel exists with an actually infinite number of rooms, and all of these rooms are occupied. Now suppose that a guest asks for a room. Although the entire hotel is occupied, the manager proceeds to move the guest in room 1 to room 2, room 2 to room 3,…, room n to room n+1, emptying a room for the guest. But whasn’t the hotel already fully occupied? [2] This situation is absurd, and shows that an actual infinity presents too many logical incoherencies to be possible in a Universe which operates on logic. Thus a past-eternal Universe is impossible, and thus the Universe had a finite beginning. From P1 and P2, the conclusion follows. Let’s now analyze the necessary properties of such a cause. Because the cause transcends all of spacetime reality, it must be nonspatiotemporal. The only candidates that fit this critera are abstract mathematical entities, such as numbers, or an unembodied mind, as neither require spacetime to exist. Because numbers and sets don’t exert causal influence, we can deduce the cause must be a nonspatiotemporal mind. The mind must also have caused the Universe out of free-will, for if the mind necessarily caused the Universe in the same way freezing temperature water necessarily causes ice, then the Universe would once again be past-eternal – we’ve however seen that’s absurd. Thus, an unimaginably powerful transcendent mind willed the Universe into being. The next argument will extend the PSR to this Creator. Modal Ontological Argument I’ll use a condensed version of the modal ontological argument as put forth by Alvin Plantinga. [3] 1. If a maximally great being possibly exists, a maximally great being exists. 2. A maximally great being possibly exists. 3. Therefore, a maximally great being exists. This argument is easy to misinterpret, so it’s important an explanation is given of each of the premises. P1 is affirmed by considering how we define a “maximally great being” (MGB). An MGB is one who embodies all great-making properties (i. e. , power, knowledge, love) and to their maximal extent (i. e. , omnipotence, omniscience, omnibenevolence). As stated earlier, there are two modes of possibility – contingency and necessity. Because necessity is greater than contingency (existing in all possible worlds rather than some possible worlds), an MGB must embody necessity. Thus, P1 is affirmed by an MGB’s property of necessity – if it possibly necessarily exists, it necessarily exists (axiom S5 of modal logic). If the MGB necessarily exists, it exists in our own world as well. This conditional statement is relatively uncontroversial among philosophers. As for P2, for an MGB to be possible, there must be no logical contradictions in its nature. We see that omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence, etc. , present no logical inconsistencies; therefore, an MGB is at least possible. The conclusion that a maximally great being exists follows logically from P1 and P2. Recall that the PSR requires an explanation for the existence any given entity, either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause. God is no exception to this rule – and we see that he satisfies the first possible explanation, necessity, through the modal ontological argument. Conclusion With the kalām cosmological argument, I demonstrated that anything which exists contingently requires an external cause through the PSR. Next, I demonstrated that the Universe began to exist; and thus could have failed to exist, meaning it was contingent. I concluded with an analysis of the external cause of the Universe, showing that it must have been a personal nonspatiotemporal mind. Next, with the modal ontological argument, I showed that this divine Creator has all great-making properties to their maximal extent, including necessity over contingency, and thus must exist in the actual world. These two arguments build a cumulative case for God’s existence – the first shows the necessity of a Creator given the Universe while the second not only reaffirms God’s existence but explains the Creator’s existence through the property of necessity. The resolution has been affirmed. I won’t introduce any new arguments in the final round, but I may or may not introduce new arguments until then, especially to demonstrate the unlikelihood of atheism. Good luck to my opponent. Sources 1. Craig, William Lane and JP Moreland. Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview. p. 468. (. http://goo.gl...) 2. Pace, Gordon J. Mathematics of Discrete Structures for Computer Science. p. 250. (. http://goo.gl...) 3. Craig, William Lane and JP Moreland. Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview. p. 496. (. http://goo.gl...)