Consequentialism is the most justifiable ethical theory.

Definitional side? I'm unsure as to what you mean here. My claim is that most of your attacks try to pin me to an action that will result in an awful society. What I'm saying is that you can't make these attacks because you are implicitly assuming the principle of utility. Sorry if I boiled down to something tautological like "good things are good." What I mean to get to is that the fulfillment of wants is good. This must be true because everyone does this for themselves continuously. It is impossible to bring me a situation in which the fulfillment of a want is bad unless you stipulate that the fulfillment harms the wants of others. Naturally the violation of someone's negative want would follow as the intrinsic bad, whereas anything between would be morally neutral. It's not meant to be any kind of universal truth or divine type idea, it's merely what people want. Furthermore, if every individual seeks to fulfill his wants then society's actions should follow. In other words, if everyone acts consequentially to themselves then society should act consequentially to itself. This 3rd paragraph of yours is a little hard for me to interpret but I think I have a response that will work. I think you want to claim that our intuitions line up on more than they actually do. It is my claim that the ONLY common factor between all humans is the desire to fulfill wants. As for the utility monster. Your Responses: 1) Not enough defense. What about a world with many UMs? 2) Quantifying. A stipulation that corrects for my objection. 3) Morality is bound to intuition. If we construct something false then the system is false. 4) Ignoring contradicts the principle of utility. My Responses: 1) Other than mitigation, what was mainly intended with this response was another implicit argument. (Sorry for not making it more clear.) The point is that hypothetical, earthly-impossible, extreme examples will most likely exist for any theory. Sure it may cast some form of intuitive doubt onto the idea but to say that this type of thought experiment can be considered decisive would throw us into nihilism. For example, what if everyones intuition thought that it was acceptable to enslave someone (as they once did). Would this now become moral? You may not think that this is a powerful enough example but you should at least see my point. With enough deliberation almost any kind of thought experiment can arise. The question is how important and probable is the example. I say that this one is too far-fetched. As for your last concern under this objection. I'm not exactly sure what the society would do. I would guess that people would be rationed to the UMs. Whatever the response was, the system wouldn't fall apart it. 2) My goals were mitigation. (I'll address quantifying later.) 3) Here is where my biggest objection lyes. This can and will serve as my response to most all of your case. I have 2 objections here. First I would like to question your assumption. Morality is NOT bound to our intuitions. Bodily reaction to an idea is nowhere near relevant to truth. For example, it is almost everyones natural intuition that heavier objects fall faster however this is simply not true. Intuition is frequently flawed and is by no means infallible. (For more depth here, look for a moral dilemmas debat that I will propose soon.) But even if intuition isn't flawed right now, it is certainly possible to imagine that everyone could have a clearly flawed intuition. (Take for example the slavery thing that I proposed earlier.) Moreover, everyones intuition is different. Therefore, intuition cannot be a defining mark or otherwise an individuals action could be both good/right and bad/wrong. That's logically impossible and proves that the intuition cannot establish any moral truths. Now, if for some reason you disagree with my evaluation of intuition then I will bring you a second argument working off of your assumption that morality is bound to our intuition. The problem here is that intuition will inevitably be different as according to the planet that you live on. The point is that you are trying to apply an Earthly intuition to a situation that does not exist on Earth. Intuition roots from our existence, experiences, past, present, ancestors, biology, and more. It would be unjust to apply Earth intuition to the workings of a far different hypothetical society. Seeing that we don't know what the disposition of intuition in this place would be, it is impossible for you to claim that it is intuitively false. In fact this proves that it could be intuitively true. 4) You're right in that it does maximize utility to let the UM do whatever she wants but I think you're unjustly categorizing me into act utilitarianism. (I know I claimed that they might converge and I still do uphold that but for the purpose of this round I will let them separate.) The point of rule utilitarianism is to apply the principle of utility to the set of all possible rules for society and uphold the one that maximizes wellbeing. This makes it much easier to overcome your pragmatic worries of calculation and is one of the reasons that I support rule consequentialism. The claim is that society would inevitably include a rule that says that utility gained specifically from the disutility of others shall not be respected. Therefore, a rule consequentialist society would not allow for this act. Onward to the Repugnant Conclusion. Your argument is that: A) With my response I have conceded the impossibility of using a utilitarian calculus. B) I have stated that pragmatic analysis is unimportant. My responses: A) Not true. With my response I have conceded the impossibility of knowing the EXACT total utility in the present and future. But this has not eliminated utilitarianism. One point is that there is reason to believe that if adding more people sacrifices everyone, then it could be said that the disutility of others in society would prevent this. But in truth I don't need to show that it would decrease utility because the burden is on you to show that in some way it would likely increase utility. Until then a utilitarian society wouldn't do anything in regards to population manipulation. Also, if necessary you can cross apply my attacks on your intuitive belief that this is wrong. You haven't shown why it would be and, as I've said before, if you were to do this then you would undoubtedly rely on the negative consequences of population inflation. Meaning that you would show exactly why a utilitarian society wouldn't take that action. B) When I say that pragmatic analysis is not important I am claiming that pragmatism can never disprove utilitarianism in a ultimate truth sense. Utilitarianism could easily be the ultimate truth in morality, it may just be that unfortunately it cannot be practiced. But in truth I think you have bastardized utilitarianism and I will talk about it in ethics. Unfortunately I have reached my character limit and must keep ethics as short as possible. My claim is that any system that maximizes wellbeing AND was chosen because of this is, in fact, consequentialist. Your arguments are not anything other than a rule consequentialist's. If the underlying reason why we select your "Ontological" rules rests on consequentialism then I have won this round, regardless of what we teach children. You have based your reasoning for ontological rules on the consequences of their existence. Your strategy (not deliberately) has never once been to claim that anything is intrinsically or a priori bad. That is what you needed to do to win this round. Instead you have chosen the path of rule consequentialism and tried to win by pinning me to act utilitarianism. PS: I have loved reading everything you have written, it's much better than what I experience face to face with my friends. I look forward to your response.