The Problem of Evil

Introductory Remarks The resolution need not be stated as a conditional in order to lift the onus of establishing that both evil and God exist. Implicit premises are logically acceptable and don’t invalidate their related arguments. [1] It’s perfectly acceptable to extend this same sort of understanding to our resolution. It is impossible to say what, both, perfect goodness and moral perfection entail. Deriving from these two inscrutable qualities that God cannot be evil is utterly baseless and arbitrary. This definition is given ad arbitrarum. It is an even further assumption on Con's part that the Judeo-Christian God must be a logically coherent entity. In fact, I submit, as the combined attributes of omniscience and omnipotence in a single entity is not logical coherent, the onus is Con's to demonstrate that the Judeo-Christian is a logical entity. Finally, the fallacy of composition is irrelevant here as God is “a being than which no greater can be conceived” [2]. A unified being is more perfect than a divided one, therefore to say that God is evil doesn’t refer to some part of God that is evil but to God in his totality. DisputationsEvil Does Not Exist Con nicely highlights the subtle difference in meanings that he conveniently forgets when dealing with our resolution. It was never our aim to prove that evil exists in an epistemic sense (as a fact of the world, that it is out there and that can be stopped) but that the ontological structure of evil implies some feature about God. For example, Con's own ontological understanding of evil states that evil isn’t a kind of existence but the absence of a certain kind of existence, similar to how ignorance isn’t a kind of knowledge, but a lack of certain types of knowledge. Furthermore, Con plainly lies when he says: “ I argued evil does not exist.” I’ll remind Con and the rest of readers that Con’s previous argument stated: “Even if God created all things and evil exists, it does not follow that God created evil.” (underlining is my own) His argument assumed not only that my first premise was true (God created all things) but that my second premise was equally true and evil did exist. Now he states that he rejected our second premise all along which is demonstrably untrue. As this prospective refutation finally merits consideration, I will address it. Once again, earlier Con conceded to the incompleteness of his own definition of God and by this concession I add that omnipresence is a characteristic that is commonly attributed to the Judeo-Christian God. Should God be omnipresent, this argument fails as there is nowhere where God is not, thus the notion is absurd.[3]**Expression Implies Intention Con’s particular argument from this academic motif depends on the contradictory idea of the absence of an omnipresent God. Aside from this, there is the glaring misunderstanding that God is subject the logical consequence of the existence of good. I preempt this in round one and explain that the principles of everything cannot be independent of God whilst God remain the creator of everything. If evil emerges after the fact, it is because God made it that way. Any other interpretation is inconsistent with the idea of a Judeo-Christian God.Expressions are merely representations of an underlying nature or principle In his first paragraph, Con provides with a non-sequitor. Should we as humans be unable to comprehend how it is that what we call evil is, sub specie aeterniatis, actually good, it does not then follow this means that expressions do not point to an underlying meaning or nature. In his second paragraph Con attempts to refute my claim that ‘expressions are contingent representations of an underlying nature or principle.' He explains that much of semiotics holds that words or expressions of any sort don’t refer backwards to some real essential nature or thing that is the word or expression. I will show that Con’s statement that words never refer to the essential nature or the essential thing that the representation is, doesn’t hold in all cases. Take for example the esteemed Russian filmmaker Andrei Tarkovsky [4]. It is a known fact that Tarkovsky yearned to, but never adapted Doestoyevsky’s “The Idiot”. Now imagine a world wherein Tarkovsky was able to adapt “The Idiot” as it is certainly plausible. The point is that in talking about Tarkovsky being present in this world we are actually referring to Tarkovsky. That is to say, all possible worlds, mutatis mutandis, will have the same Tarkovsky in it should Tarkovsky be part of the description of that world, for each thing that might happen differently to him, happens to him. Thus, there is something the name “Andrei Tarkovsky” is referring to that is immutable, essential, and constitutive of Tarkovsky; that “Tarkovsky” refers to something that is the same in all possible worlds. I hold that this ratifies my claim that expressions are contingent representations of an underlying nature or principle. Moreover, this is a refutation for Con’s claim that my premise “cannot be proven” and that “a representation of any kind... does not point back to an underlying nature. As a corollary, my argument awaits a proper refutation, and until given, must be accepted on its own basis. As a kind of footnote, Con concedes my point that one philosopher’s interpretative framework is as good as another and that there is no apparent reason why we should prefer one’s to the other’s. Thus, until Con can provide an adequate argument for why meaning is produced temporally (this means something besides: “...Heidegger argues...” as, here, it is your job to do the arguing, not Heidegger’s). Finally, I’ll point out that, as much as I would have liked to debate Con’s claim that he has offered more reasonable alternatives to the problem of evil, he has failed to explain at even the most marginal level, how he has arrived at this claim in that he hasn’t yet put forth an explanation of what he means by “the problem of evil”. I can only imagine Con is referring to the ‘Epicurean problem of evil’ [5] which radically differs from the problem presented by our resolution in that our resolution doesn’t begin from the premise that evil (epistemically) exists. Rather, our resolution is concerned with the ontological existence of evil. It should be considered unfair for Con to carry on with this point in any more detail in this closing round as it would mean that, should he have a legitimate argument, I will be unable to answer to it. Though the terms of this debate do not specify that arguments will not be accepted in our final round, I entreat that our spectators recognize the treachery of such an action and consequently exclude it from consideration. Peroration So we have arrived at our debate’s denouement. Here I’ll maintain that Pro’s argument, from every facet, has been defended and that Con’s argument, from every facet, has been adequately refuted. My arguments have demonstrated a valid defense for the affirmation of the resolution “the existence of evil suggests that the Judeo-Christian God (God of the Bible) is evil.”Vote Pro. Citations[1]: http://en.wikipedia.org...[2] http://en.wikipedia.org... Aselm’s argument, premise 1.[3]: “God is naturally present in every aspect of the natural order, in every level of causality, every fleeting moment and momentous event of natural history...”(Psalm 8:3, Isaiah 40:12, Nahum 1:3)[4]: http://en.wikipedia.org...[5]: http://en.wikipedia.org...