The Problem of Evil falsifies the Christian God's Omnibenevolence

Thanks Con for his rebuttal. *Cracks knuckles* I. Preface I see no reason to drop the evil god hypothesis, it's far from irrelevant from the resolution given it utilizes the evidential problem of evil to disprove omnibenevolence as a necessary attribute of God (and therefore God himself). II. Modal Argument from Evil I will begin by defending this sub-argument, since it sets the tone for the other two angles of attack I have presented. Con makes a number of ad homenum’s towards the argument, and against the person I have borrowed it from, despite it being a known argument in philosophical circles. It really doesn’t matter how much one dislikes the argument, or finds the logic absurd. So long as the premises are true, and the argument is valid, then the conclusion follows inescapably. It doesn’t matter how much one dislikes it. Allow me to reformulate this argument and lay down all the presuppositions contained within it. P1. Necessarily, God is a being that necessarily exists (must exist in all metaphysically possible worlds) P2. If God necessarily exists THEN, necessarily no gratuitous suffering exists (exists in not one metaphysically possible world) P3. Gratuitous suffering is possible (it exists in some metaphysically possible world) C1. From 2 & 3, God does not necessarily exist C2. From C1 & 1, God necessarily does not exist ~(in any metaphysically possible world, including this one) This put into modal form gives the following: Note the modal form of premise 3, the statement “not necessarily no gratuitous suffering” is logically equivalent to “Gratuitous suffering is possible” via. De Morgan’s Laws. Also “necessarily no gratuitous suffering exists” is interchangeable with “gratuitous suffering is not possible”. Also please note that in modal logic, metaphysical possibility is different from physical possibility. Metaphysical possibility addresses how the world could have been, and physical possibility addresses how the world is now. My arguments primarily address the former. The argument seems to be logically water-tight (valid), so Con needs to dispute the premises to avoid the conclusion. Which he has not yet even attempting to do. I have absolutely no idea what Con is attempting to state with the following: “Gratuitous suffering is a contingent possibility not a necessary possibility. In Modal logic a contingent possibility wouldn't necessarily exist in some possible worlds.” Which in modal form is just: Or in plain English, a contingent possibility is not a necessary possibility, since metaphysical possibility is logically equivalent with existence in some metaphysically possible world. In order words, Con’s objection is just word salad which doesn’t actually state anything meaningful. I have already given reasons why we should accept gratuitous suffering as a metaphysical possibility, it’s very conceivable, and is not inherently logically contradictory. Moreover we can easily envisage a world akin to our own, and take the cases of apparently gratuitous suffering as possibly genuine cases of gratuitous suffering. This is plenty enough to satisfy premise 3 of the reformulated argument. Objection probability – the problem is God is a necessary being that must exist in any metaphysically possible world, which is an attribute that is pretty much undisputed. Therefore anything that would contradict it (denying the consequent in this case) would thus falsify God in any metaphysically possible world. It doesn’t matter whatsoever if gratuitous suffering is 99% likely, 1% likely or 0.0001% likely, the fact that it is possible renders God unnecessary, and from premise 1, non-existent (falsified). Therefore, the modal argument from evil is plenty affirmed. III. Original Problem of Evil: First of all, let’s get this non-concession out of the way: “My opponent actually concedes the point that some evil would exist.” I never conceded for a second that necessarily some evil would exist given an omnibenevolent, omnipotent god (quote me if I did). Not at all. But for the sake of the branch of argument I gave, it is unnecessary to account for all evil to prove my conclusion. That would be taking on an unnecessarily high burden. This can be summarized in the following horned dilemma: P1. Either the suffering argued is gratuitous suffering or is with a possible justifiable purpose P2. If suffering is gratuitous suffering, THEN God is falsified (as per original PoE) P3. If there is a possible justifiable purpose, THEN God cannot be omnipotent, falsifying God C. In either case, God is falsified Pro disputes that any example of suffering I have given would fall into the category of gratuitous suffering, and thus fulfilling premise 2 of this horned argument, and has argued for some form of unknown purpose defence to give God a ‘way out’ for these examples of suffering. However this, and other “purpose defences” like it suffer from exactly the same problem that was put forward by Epiricus 2300 years ago, the problem is that God is allegedly omnipotent. “Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is impotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Whence then is evil?” This means, any purpose that God has intended for a certain example of suffering and certainly every single example Con gave, could have been accomplished by not going via. that intermediate stage (as he is omnipotent). There is nothing inherently logically contradictory with this conception, and given that God has free will and deliberately chooses to go through unnecessary intermediate stages that will inevitably cause suffering (God is omniscient) he would need to be either malevolent, or impotent (falsifying God). In my original argument I pointed out that otherwise identical individuals would suffer in unequal amounts, and for no apparent purpose or benefit whatsoever. Especially given that there are inevitably individuals (such as non-humans) that do not receive heavenly redemption (even this has problems, as it would be a greater good to achieve both no suffering in life and the same level of redemption in heaven). However, the problems do not stop there at all for the unknown purpose defence, for this forfeits any claim to be able to know God’s goodness. If we cannot claim to know that God’s actions are done for a good purpose, of that they are intrinsically good then how can we claim to know that he genuinely is such? This feeds straight into the evil God hypothesis. Any knowledge of an act of God’s goodness requires at least some understanding of God’s motive or intent, which this line of argument forfeits. Moreover this exposes any ‘Act of God’ to confirmation bias, if it’s a good act then it’s by God, if it’s an act that causes most convincingly gratuitous suffering it’s ‘God acts in mysterious ways’. Given we have so many examples of gratuitous suffering, arguably far more than clear examples of good, it actually makes the evil god hypothesis more plausible than the good god hypothesis. Furthermore, a direct problem is, are we not acting against god by preventing such acts of seemingly gratuitous suffering from occurring. Such as by vaccination, medication, purchasing insurance, building Earthquake-proof homes and having tornado sirens in high risk towns. This is a rather obvious inconsistency which seems to affirmed in the bible. Jesus cured a women of her paralysis and told her to walk, would it be wrong for us today to cure people of their paralysis? There are of course, many, many other examples mentioned biblically. "Absence makes the heart grow fonder" I feel I have already addressed this argument in it’s entirety in my opening argumnent where I stated that it’s perfectly conceivable and possible that realisation of good, and tendancies to do good are accomplishable by other means than introducing evil/suffering. Such as by making morally good acts inherently pleasurable. A similar argument can be made to know God’s love, therefore this is simply not a sustainable objection. God is allegedly omnipotent, so it’s well within his power. Furthermore, even if God logically could not have make all humans know his love (which I argue is absurd anyway), then it runs into the question of whether or not this trade-off still fits under the umbrella of omnibenevolence, it seems obviously false that any trade-off fits the definition of omnibenevolence, and is therefore a self-refuting argument. IV. Evil God Hypothesis:I am somewhat perplexed Con did not even attempt to touch this argument. The evil god hypothesis is very much a branch of the problem of evil, and deals with very much the same elements. I will briefly add some argumentation to cement the issue. 1. If the Christian God exists, THEN God is necessarily good 2. If God is necessarily Good, THEN any world created (including this one) by an AntiGod (malevolent God) must different to a world created by God 3. Therefore, if God is necessarily good, THEN this world cannot have been created by AntiGod 4. It is possible this world was created by AntiGod C1. God is not necessarily good C2. (From C1 & 1) God does not exist This of course is more of an inductive argument, as it depends entirely on the best explanation of evil/”gratuitous evil” in this world, and how easily is satisfies each hypothesis of an all good (omnibenevolent) God and an AntiGod (malevolent). I would strongly argue that all the examples of evil I have given in the first and second round are easily explained by an AntiGod, and all the common theodicies to make the world consistent with omnibenevolence can be easily flipped on their head to yield a very plausible argument for malevolence. V. Conclusion: The resolution is affirmed, I expect strong arguments from Con to stand.