Official Tier Tournament Upper Tier Finale - Targeted Killing

All ethical decisions are made with regard to a social narrative defined and created by interaction and openness to the other. Butler 1: Butler, Judith. Giving an Account of Oneself. diacritics, Volume 31, Number 4, Winter 2001, pp. 22-40 (Article) “the “I” encounters the Other not as a specific set of contents, but as a being fundamentally exposed, visible, seen, existing in a bodily way and of necessity in a domain of appearance. It is, … this exposure that I am that constitutes my singularity. I cannot will it away, for it is a feature of my very corporeality and, in this sense, my life, … the social theory … in its insistence on the impersonal perspective of the norm, establish my substitutability? …, I am exposed, and this is as much a part of my publicity, if not my sociality, as the way that I become recognizable through the operation of norms.” The negative burden is to show that our relation to the other justifies a prohibition of targeted killing whereas the aff burden is to show it is morally permissible. Moreover, prefer this standard because ethics is impossible without understanding the relation to the other because that rejects subjective narrative’s and allows ethical violence. Butler 2: "to … not … have the grounds for agency and the conditions for accountability, it may be that this way in which we are, from the start, interrupted by alterity and not fully recoverable to ourselves, indicates the way in which we are, from the start, ethically implicated in the lives of others. … our incoherence … establishes the way in which we are implicated, beholden, derived, constituted by what is beyond us and before us. If we say that the self must be narrated, … then we say that we cannot survive with an unconscious. … In the language which articulates the opposition to a non-narrativizable beginning resides the fear that the absence of narrative will spell a certain threat, a threat to life, and will pose the risk, if not the certainty, of a certain kind of death, the death of a subject who cannot, who can never, fully recuperate the conditions of its own emergence." Moreover, my framework precludes the AC because it is grounded in the ontological way we create and understand ethics. Ontological justifications precludes metaethics because it is the mode in which we exist and thus determines the way we adopt normative principles. I contend using TK violates the framework: First: The face to face encounter with the other requires a prohibition on violence no matter what the other has done. Butler 3: “We do not take responsibility for … Other’s acts as if we authored those acts. … we affirm the unfreedom at the heart of our relations. I cannot disavow my relation to the Other, regardless of what the Other does, regardless of what I might will. … responsibility is not a matter of cultivating a will, but of making use of an unwilled susceptibility as a resource for becoming responsive to the Other. Whatever the Other has done, the Other still makes an ethical demand upon me, … There are situations in which responding to the ‘‘face’’ of the other feels horrible, impossible, and where the desire for murderous revenge feels overwhelming. But the primary and unwilled relation to the Other demands that we desist from both a voluntarism and an impulsive aggression grounded in the self-preservative aims of egoism. …" Second: targeted killing denies our shared vulnerability and denies we can always be affected by the other. Butler 4 concludes: Giving an Account of Oneself. Judith Butler [Maxine Elliot Professor of rhetoric at Berkley] University press. “It is always possible to say, ‘‘Oh, some violence was done to me, and this gives me full permission to act …’ Many atrocities are committed under the sign of a ‘‘self-defense [or realiation]’’ … because it achieves a permanent moral justification for retaliation, knows no end and can have no end. … It delineates a physical vulnerability from which we cannot slip away, which we cannot finally resolve in the name of the subject, but which can provide a way to understand that none of us is fully bounded, utterly separate, but, rather, we are in our skins, given over, in each other’s hands, at each other’s mercy. …” Now, go to his case. The first thin you look at is that I'm the only one providing any kind of ethical framework under which to judge what is "morally permissible" or not. This means you're instantly defaulting to my framework because I'm the only one actually answering the question his contentions beg. And this means that you negate since any kind of violence or killing is always going to violate the framework, which means that targeted killing is never permissible for any reason.Then, go to his first argument from self-defense. It's K time baby! A sub-point: the link: The affirmative’s plea for self-defense as an exception to traditional moral prohibitions on violence cedes the value of a person’s life to what roman law refered to as Homo Saccer. A grey zone where we don’t execute someone but their killing is permissible. They negate individual autonomy of a person in favor of the permissibility of killing. Agamben 1: Giorgio Agamben. HOMO SACER: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Stanford University Press 1995. “the sovereignty of the living man over his own life has its immediate counterpart in the determination of a threshold beyond which life ceases to have any juridical value and can, therefore, be killed without the commission of a homicide. The … category of “life devoid of value” … corresponds exactly – …---to the bare life of homo sacer and can easily be extended beyond the limits imagined by Binding. … every “politicization” of life … implies a new decision concerning … which life … becomes only “sacred life,” and can as such be eliminated without punishment. … Bare life is no longer confined to a particular place or a definite category. It now dwells in the biological body of every living being.” Thus the AC creates a zone of life devoid of value that we are permissible in killing. Sub-point b: impacts: The aff’s return to homo sacer turns the AC both ideologically and contention wise because they turn the purpose of self-defense but also permit more violations of worth. Their approach to politics creates a structure that allows violence to replicate rather than defending a victim. Agamben 2: “homo sacer is … the particular character of the double exclusion into which he is taken and the violence to which he finds himself exposed. This violence – the unsanctionable killing that, … anyone may commit – … this violence opens a sphere of human action that is neither the sphere of sacrum facere nor that of profane action. … once brought back to his proper place beyond both penal law and sacrifice, homo sacer presents the originary figure of life taken into the sovereign ban and preserves the memory of the originary exclusion through which the political dimension was first constituted. The political sphere of sovereignty was thus constituted through a double exclusion, as an excrescence of the profane in the religious and of the religious in the profane, which takes the form of a zone of indistinction between sacrifice and homicide. … sacred life … is the life that has been captured in this sphere.” This turns the AC because 1) it internal link turns their framework because they say we have to protect ourselves but they permit constant violations of worth of people by replicating bare life. 2) it turns the AC contention because homo sacer allows exclusion of people that permits their killing within politics and ethics and thus they allow for more domestic violence by justifying exceptions to our traditional moral framework. Sub-point c: The alternative is to adopt a non-violent embrace of the grievability of life. No life is viewed as homo saccer when life is viewed as grievable and precarious. Butler 5: Judith Butler, PhD, Yale, Maxine Elliot Professor of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature, “Frames of War: When is Life Grievable?”, Verso, 2009, “non-violence is … the norms that differentiate between those lives that count as livable and grievable and those that do not. Only on the condition that lives are grievable … does the call to non-violence avoid complicity with forms of epistemic inegailitarianism. The desire to commit violence is thus always attendee by the anxiety of having violence returned, since all the potential actors in the scene are equally vulnerable. Even when such an insight follows from a calculation of the consequences of a violent act, it testifies to an ontological interrelation that is prior to any calculation. …, we do not need to know in advance what a life will be, but only to find and support those modes of representation and appearance that allow the claim of life to be made and heard. … It is also to struggle against those notions of the political subject that assume that permeability and injurability can be monopolized at one site and fully refused at another. …” Then, go to where he says that TK is effective.First, whether it's effective or not doesn't actually matter. Shooting someone in the head is an effective way to kill someone, but that doesn't make it morally permissible to run into a highschool and start firing away. Second, TK only makes things worse. Empirics show that TK leads to more terrorism. Moorehouse:Matthew Alan Morehouse, M.A. University of Nebraska, 2011HELLFIRE AND GREY DRONES: AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF TARGETED KILLINGS. The Graduate College at the University of Nebraska In Partial Fulfillment of Requirements For the Degree of Master of Arts Major: Political Science Under the Supervision of Professor Patrice C. McMahon and Professor Ross Miller Lincoln. "The … regression … found that for every one-unit increase in targeted killings per week, there was an increase of over 5 terrorist attacks in the following week. This result was statistically significant, with the p-value being .000. …"