The Logic of Religion--Belief in an After-life

Haha, I must say, it's an unhealthy boost to my ego to realize that some idea I conceived when I was probably about ten years of age is a published idea by a philosopher. Anyway, enough marvelling about how awesome I am, and on to the debate. I will accept the fact that simply believing in a deity would most likely not be enough to gain whatever eternal paradise might be promised you, or however you want to say it. My argument, however, dealt more with the basic satisfaction of being right or wrong, regardless of how things played out after that, and also eliminating much of the moral aspect of this argument. Thus, I can technically say that you did not specifically address the exact point I made. I'm not going to, however, because that would pretty much be a really obnoxious tactic to get out of an obviously potentially interesting debate. So, I'll augment my argument to be more than just dealing with a small bit of personal satisfaction: It is better to live in such a way that will ensure (or, at least, make likely) happiness in an afterlife than to not, because of not believing in one, live morally. So, yes, it is probably true that as long as you do live morally and virtuously but do not believe in a deity you will be, more or less, as well as an otherwise similar person who did beleive in a deity, but this would also be covered with my argument, I believe. And while the argument I posed would make it seem like the logical choice would be to believe, it does not necessitate that one do so, and thus there is not need to consider coersion. True, it is always a possibility, but this is because people tend to have the habit of trying to impose their beliefs upon others, especially when dealing with religion and salvation, and is not so much about what the logical choice would be. With regard to the utilitarianist aspect of this, I still think the argument is sound. Let's assume that that some--or, for the sake of argument, even all--religious moral codes that lead to eternal salvation are counterproductive to one's earthly happiness. I believe this would still not negate the logic in following it. Assuming that the end result would involve more happiness than what was sacrificed to obtain it, utilitarianism still defends working for an afterlife regardless of sacrifices. Indeed, one must agree that just because excerise may cause discomfort, fatigue, and muscular soreness does not mean that it is intrinsically bad, because in the long run its benefits of health outway its cost of temporary discomfort. Now, let's assume that one causes, because of faith, an increase in unhappiness without the ultimate reward of an after-life--that is, their sacrifice was in vain. My rebuttal would be a callous "so what?" It may seem cruel, but if there is nothing more to this life, what does it matter what pain we cause? If our existence is limited to our life on earth, with nothing proceding, then our significance is nullified. If there is no reason for us, and there is no greater purpose, then one could contend that all is pointless besides working for our own pleasure to enjoy our finite existence, and if we take joy in the belief that there will be something greater for us, then we should do that. Lastly, I do not think living virtuously in order to obtain happiness is a bad thing. I will concede it may be better to do the right thing because it is right, and not because it will benefit you. However, I do not think it fair that one should be punised for not have the purest of motives. Let's say two boys each help an old lady cross the street. One boy does it because it is the right thing to do; the other does it because he enjoys the feeling of altruism, and knows he will be happier for helping the lady. Would we say it is just to reward the first boy and punish the second? I certainly doubt it.