Compatabilism is a flawed philosophical doctrine.

The basic intuition that lies behind an incompatibalist position is obvious, however. Determinism entails that our choices are invitable. Another way of putting it is that prior to willing an action, we imagine that lying temporally ahead of us are different 'routes' that we could go along. When Alex comes across a fork in the road, he believes that both of the routes are open to him - if determinism is true, though, only one route has ever been open to him - the one he will eventually walk down. Here is an argument to the effect that the whole notion of an 'alternate possibilities' account of free will gets the wrong end of the stick. Imagine that I resolve to kill popculturepooka. Danielle knows about my plan and wants me to kill pooka (without getting her hands dirty herself). However, concerned that I will waver in my resolve, she secretly plans a mind control chip into my head such that if I show any signs of hesistation about killing pooka, the chip will take over my mind and force me to kill her anyway. I carry out my plan to murder pooka without hesistation, however, and the chip remains inert. [1]It certainly seems in this case that, despite having no options other than attempting to kill popculturepooka, my choice was freely willed. Therefore, alternate possibilities are not a necessary condition of acting freely. Danielle presents the following argument: "1. We have no control over circumstances that existed in the past, nor do we have any control over the laws of nature.2. If A causes B, we have no control over A, and A is sufficient for B, then we have no control over B.3. All of our actions and thoughts are consequences of past events and the laws of nature.4. Assuming responsibility requires control, we are not responsible for what we do or think (2, 3)"The problem with this argument is that it doesn't take into account the causal role that we play in changing the past into the future. To see this, suppose that we apply this same argument to a thermostat. Substitute a thermostat into the same argument and we will come out with the conclusion that a thermostat cannot control the past or the laws of nature, therefore it has no control over the present. But the whole point of a thermostat is that it controls the temperature. Thermostats, and people, have control by virtue of a causal role 'from the inside' of nature. Premise 1, therefore, is false. Danielle notes in response to my introduction of counterfactuals that "Hard Determinists believe that free will refers to absolute, ultimate alternate possibilities for choices rather than merely counterfactual ones. As such, this is irrelevant. ". It is only irrelevant, of course, as far as one maintains that these 'ultimate' alternate possibilities are necessary for the exercise of free will. As argued above, alternate possibilities are not required for this. These 'ultimate' alternate possibilities boil down to randomness in any case as far as I can see, so the special status Danielle attaches to them is unwarranted. Danielle argues that no matter how informed our choices are, this does not stop them being inevitable. This is true - that wasn't the argument the notion of increased knowledge equating to increased freedom was directed towards. Imagine a teenager brainwashed by advertising to spend large amounts of money on cosmetics. These adverts have convinced her that her social life, image, reputation and so on are contingent on her buying all kinds of dubious expensive chemical creams and procedures. In this case, her freedom to buy or not buy cosmetics seems infected by false information and brainwashing. She still has a degree of flexibility in response to new information and arguments (say, from friends and family), but it is curtailed. The point is, while it is still true in a sense that her buying cosmetics is 'set' by the decision making modules in her brain even if she is not brainwashed by advertising, there is a compelling distinction to be drawn here. We would not hold the girl responsible for wasting money on the cosmetics if she were brainwashed into it. And if she were not brainwashed into it, she would be able to better evaluate the particulars of the situation and respond in a way sensitive to considerations surrounding it. What I am saying is that lumping in all causal processes together as though they are equally threatening to free will seems foolish. Only some circumstances badly 'fix' people's decisions in a way that curtails free will (martians controlling your mind, advertisers brainwashing gullible teens). Others do not. This is a degree of flexibility independent of determinism, and this is what we tap into when we hold people responsible for their actions. [1] This is Frankfurt's argument against the princinple of alternate possibilities: . http://plato.stanford.edu...