Resolved that the deal to free Bowe Bergdahl was unjustified.

1. Pro"s premise assumes that terrorist responses are roughly predictable but I discern little if any pattern in history. Sometimes we negotiate with terrorists and conditions improve (PLO @ Camp David Accords, IRA @ Good Friday Agreement), sometimes we negotiate with terrorists and conditions deteriorate (Iran-Contra). Sometimes we refuse to negotiate and the threat fades away (Somali Pirates), sometimes we refuse to negotiate and the threat only increases (James Foley). Sometimes we pay the ransom and the hostages die anyway (Martin Burnham). Sometimes hostages are released for no apparent reason (Scott Darden).... What hard evidence can Pro provide to support the claim that negotiating with terrorists increases the likelihood of terrorism while refusing to negotiate decreases the likelihood of terrorism? 2. Pro characterizes the presumed incentivization of the Taliban to capture US soldiers as an increased jeopardy, but that presupposes that the Taliban are not already maximally incentivized to kill US soldiers at every opportunity. During the 14+ years of the War in Afghanistan, 2,039 US soldiers have been KIA"d but only one US soldier has ever been captured. [1]. Assuming that the risk of capture has been increased by Bergdahl"s release (which I don't) and assuming that it's better to be captured than be killed (which I do), wouldn't an increased incentivization to capture rather than kill represent a decreased jeopardy to US soldiers, not increased? 3. In the case of the Taliban, I find the line drawn between enemy combatants and terrorists indiscernible- a distinction without a difference. But the US would never say "we don't exchange POWs." How does Pro delineate the exchange of the Gitmo 5 from a POW exchange during any previous American war? 4. Does Pro believe that the US Military is less obligated to recover an AWOL soldier than a non-AWOL soldier? 5. Does Pro believe the US Military"s policy of "leave no soldier behind" should be amended to preclude increased risk to other soldiers? That is, "leave no soldier behind unless another soldier might get killed."? 6. Pro states that there was no pressing reason to make a deal at the time it was made. This contradicts the Department of Defense"s intelligence that Bergdahl's health was rapidly deteriorating in early 2014. [2]. Indeed, a year after his emancipation one of Bergdahl"s healthcare providers reported that permanent damage to his nerve and muscle tissue would likely prevent him from ever lifting heavy objects or walking more than a couple of miles. [3]. Does Pro have any evidence to counter the Secretary of Defense"s claim that a deal had to be made urgently in order to save Bergdahl's life? 7. Pro suggests that trading 5 officers for one PFC is necessarily a bad trade, but doesn't expound much on the matter. I wonder if Pro has considered factors other than rank. That is, has Pro considered Bergdahl's superior value as an intelligence asset? and 8. Has Pro considered Bergdahl"s trade in terms of propaganda value? It certainly says something of American Democracy to value the life of single US citizen of little importance above the collective value of multiple Afghani officers of rank. 9. Does Pro find that the Army"s re-enlistment of Bergdahl in 2008 with the knowledge that Bergdahl was discharged for mental health deficiencies from the Coast Guard in 2006 conveys an increased responsibility for Bergdahl"s bizarre behavior on the day of his capture, in part or in whole? 10. Does Pro acknowledge that criticism of the Bergdahl trade falls generally along partisan lines and that most pundits" opinions regarding the trade would reverse given a Democratic congress and a Republican president making the trade? My compliments to Pro on choice of topic. I look forward to Pro's response. [1]http://www.icasualties.org... [2]http://www.usatoday.com... [3]Bowe Bergdahl will require lifetime of care for injuries suffered in captivity - http://wpo.st...