This House would limit the amount of food aid that developed nations can freely provide.

I fully accept Con's analysis of what my position, if put into practice, would yield – it's certainly true that my stance would necessitate a global genocide and I've made no effort to hide that fact. He raises the question of how this genocide would be carried out – these specific details are irrelevant if I have shown that, no matter if such a thing would work or not, the strong must try to implement a system of mass extermination. In other words, the strong need to succeed or die trying, thus eliminating the need for specifics to be addressed – there can be no potential alternative plan to advocate in place of whatever plan for genocide actually arises, so the merits of the plan for genocide do not need to be comparatively weighed against any other plan, negating the need for them to be stated. Con asks what benefits can come from a mass genocide. The answer is simple: the rightful domination of the strong. No potential cost can outweigh this, considering how there is no other conceivable state of affairs that is acceptable. It is, by definition, the right order of things – is that not benefit enough? My opponent makes the argument that, since might makes right, a strong person could decide to provide food aid, and, by virtue of their strength, make such a practice acceptable. This point was already preempted in my first round – see: “any citizen that would desire such a thing is weak enough to deserve to rot with the rest of those creatures.” My opponent makes the mistake of assuming that it is even possible for one to be both strong and altruistic – my arguments show exactly why charity precludes the giver being considered strong by any metric. True strength cannot coexist with charity, and, as such, my opponent's argument is shown to be based on nothing but a misunderstanding of what strength is. Food aid cannot be justified through strength because none who are in favour of food aid can, by definition, be strong, thus neutralizing any potential problems with my position. My opponent claims that I have not justified the fact that the strong have an obligation to cleanse those beneath them, but this justification was given in my previous round: “It is evident that nations, being representatives of the will of the populace, should be regulated for the same reason that the will of any individual should be regulated: in order to promote the right order of things.” Unless my opponent wishes to contest this on the grounds that the right order of things should not be pursued, in which case he can offer no case of his own, considering he would see no reason to pursue one course of action over another, no further justification is needed. Exterminating the weak would result in the proper triumph of the strong, and, thus, should be pursued by all. My opponent talks about assuming that life has inherent value, but admits himself that he has no proof for this claim. He can only point to the fact that most people would agree with it, which is completely insufficient – the truth of a proposition is not dependent on how many people accept it. If acceptance was sufficient to alter the truth value of a proposition, my opponent must admit that, throughout history, many positions were widely held that would completely contradict his own; he would have to accept as once being valid, for example, Nazi Germany's acceptance of ethnic cleansing and the Mongolian philosophy of rape, pillaging, and conquest. Taking this even further, even the most basic truths that my opponent likely would view as self-evident would turn out to be falsehoods if this relativism was accepted – the Earth would be flat and the Sun a God. Given that my opponent offers no warrant for his position outside of this appeal to acceptance, it has no solid basis and can be discarded out-of-hand. With this in mind, his arguments reduce to “But that's wrong!” with no further explanation, which is a far cry from being able to fulfill his BOP.