God is a Sound Moral Basis

Contentions1: Theism provides a more plausible and less arbitrary objective moral ontologyValue (Good / Evil)Con confuses 'objective' for subjective when he bases morals in a contingently existing animal, as opposed to a necessarily existing maximally great being (clearly this fails to parody). To say that morals aren't dependent upon human opinion, is to say that they're not dependent upon contingently existing opinion - 'humans' just fit better semantically. Con then asserts that we're discussing deism, not theism. This ignores how I defined God in R1 and the terms of the debate. We are in fact talking about a maximally great, personal agent who is by definition worthy of worship. And it's in this classical view of God that makes an afterlife possible. As for atheism, an afterlife isn't even on the table! Hence the reason altruism is stupid on atheism is because it strictly goes contrary to ones well being in the face of absolute death, the great equalizer. Con's parody of Craig's 'knockdown' argument actually supports my first contention! Consider his 2nd premise, "There exists a possible world in which [G]od is not good, but evil"What support has Con provided for this? Indeed there seems to be NO possible world in which God is evil, for that wouldn't be what we mean by God- for God by definition is a being worthy of worship, and evil beings are avoided. Hence an “evil-God” is a contradiction in terms since God is the maximally great being, and since it's greater to be all good rather than evil, then it follows that God is necessarily good by definition: a being worthy of worship. Therefore, God IS the Good, the very paradigm and locus of all moral value. What could be a more sound ontology? For asking can God be evil is like asking if the number 5 can be 0? ... it's a meaningless question. Duty (Right / Wrong)Con supposes the is-ought gap refutes a theistic moral ontology. Recall that on theism our moral duties are constituted by the commands of an essentially just and loving God. Now this does derive an “ought” from an “is,” but justifiably so—though not in the way Con imagines, and unlike his case. For just because God is the paradigm of goodness, it doesn't follow that because God is a certain way we ought to behave in certain ways.No, our moral obligations and prohibitions arise as a result of God’s commands to us. God’s nature serves to establish values (good & bad) while God’s commands establish moral duties (right & wrong). Grounding moral values in God no more derives an “ought” from an “is” than does Plato’s grounding values in the form of the Good. The theist just has a more sound ontological ultimate than Plato, hence the theist's derivation of an “ought” from an “is,” far from being objectionable, captures a central feature of moral duty and plausibly grounds it.Duty arises in response to an imperative from a competent authority- and in virtue of being the Good, He is uniquely qualified to issues such commands as expressions of His nature. Whereas on atheism, there just is no moral authority. Thus I welcome Con to derive an ought from an is- but it must be more justified than the theistic ontology of duty. And I don't see how he can do this without re-defining morals. 2: Atheism provides a less plausible and more arbitrary objective moral ontologyValue Problem (Contra-P1)I agree that less-conscious beings don't have as full a range of experience, but then why pick ranges of experience as definitive for well-being? What makes this somehow more special than the range of pigs to thrive in it's limited range of experience as compared to us? This is more arbitrary. Duty Problems (Contra-P2)Is-Ought: On atheism, I said that "human beings are just animals, and animals have no moral obligation to one another." This entails that duty has no basis on atheism. Whereas on theism, humans are endowed with God-given rights and morality as we're "made in the image of God" and are indeed commanded by God to treat even our enemies with love. Yet on atheism does such duty arise? Where on atheism can we find a competent authority to issue such moral imperatives? Con hasn't provided a sufficient account. Craig says in the video, “On atheism, rape and incest may not be biologically and socially advantageous, and so in the course of human development have become taboo, that is, socially unacceptable behavior. But, that does absolutely nothing to prove that such acts are really wrong. Such behavior goes on all the time in the animal kingdom. On the atheistic view the rapist who chooses to flout the “herd morality” is doing nothing more serious than acting unfashionably, the moral equivalent, if you will, of Lady Gaga. If there is no moral lawgiver, then there is no objective moral law, and if there is no objective moral law, then we have no objective moral duties.”Con then asserts that the is-ought distinction is false by re-defining moral statements yet again. He equates the trivial statement, "Getting from A to be B in the fastest way possible" with moral value. But how in the world does the speed from A to B contain any moral content? Also, how is traveling in a straight line a moral obligation? The only way Con can show is statements are moral ought statements, is by redefining moral ought without moral content. But by moral ought, one doesn't mean that this is the most practical way to do a thing!Ought-Can: A view that contradicts itself means that view is incoherent. And if incoherency is what Con is resorting to for his case, then the resolution is won. Now how does Con think that moral responsibility exists in a determined world? Here he simply says that the past actions can be used to "change" future actions. Of course that's true, and also irrelevant. The question isn't, "can a causal chain of events change" .. rather it's "how can a determined person be responsible for his actions?" And Con's only answer to this is that you're stuck with a history of punishment.*Mary Scenario: Why isn't it good for Bob to rape Mary if it contributes to his well-being, and doesn't take away from the well being from anyone else? Here Con's answer is most telling of his incoherent equivocation of morals with well-being. He simply says "it ignores what's good in the world." Right, but then that's not what well-being is! Here's another case then of how Con's position is patently incoherent. Practical Case Darwinian Worry There are immoral implications of calling "good" what allows a society to flourish reminds us of some leaders that have appealed to science dogmatically in order to justify certain moral claims. The results, like social Darwinism, have later come to be seen as undesirable, misguided, wrong or evil and this could be taken to imply that future attempts at a science of morality could very well be later seen in the same critical light. What’s stopping this science of morality that could produce an ethical system where everyone hedonistically pursues merely their own interests? Lewisian Worry C. S. Lewis predicted the effective end of the human race if human nature was changed "through eugenics, pre-natal conditioning, and an education and propaganda based on a perfect applied psychology" so that all future generations will be involuntarily imprinted with its moral values (or lack thereof) which they would presumably justify through science. Lewis regarded God-givel natural law to be the essence of humanity, and that if this God-given law was ever modified, then it would dehumanize persons to objects to be manipulated by scientific technique, rather than fellow persons who use scientific techniques on objects. He says, "A dogmatic belief in objective value is necessary to the very idea of a rule which is not tyranny or an obedience which is not slavery." My challenge to Con is, on atheism, how is this solved by science? ConclusionI'll asnwer Cons' questions and pose mine on this debate on this thread,http://www.debate.org...