The Modal Ontological Argument for God is Logically Sound

P1: God is a greatest possible being that would exist necessarily. P2: It is possible for a greatest possible being to exist in some possible world.P3: If it’s possible for a greatest possible being to exist in some possible world, then necessarily, it’s possible for a greatest possible being to exist in all possible worlds.P4: If it’s possible for a greatest possible being to exist in all possible worlds, then it’s possible for a greatest possible being to exist in our world, or our reality and universe.P5: Based on the last four premises, a greatest possible being exists in all possible worlds including ours. P6: Therefore, a greatest possible being, or God, exists in all worlds including ours.P1: God is a greatest possible being that would exist necessarily. My opponent claims, "the idea of a person like that as outlined in his rebuttal does not entail his existence, but in my argument, the idea of God does." But he doesn't exactly explain why. First of all, I don't see any reasons to believe that such a being is physically impossible. Secondly, it could be the case that the steak-hating vegan is immaterial. Thirdly, couldn't I just say the same about God; God is physically impossible, since no physical being is omnipotent, and a purely immaterial being is impossible.Either an immaterial being is possible, or it's not. If it's possible, then why can't an immaterial necessary steak-hating vegan exist in this world as well? If it's impossible, then the steak-hating vegan and God are both impossible.So I can just add "necessary" to anything, and get the same result. It's possible that a flying invisible spaghetti monster (which is a necessary thing) exists, therefore it does exist.It's possible that invisible pink unicorns (which are necessary things) exist, therefore they do exist.The reason why we are led to these absurdities, is because of the "necessary" being added in here. We're putting the things existence alongside its other properties like "blue" or "tall".I maintain that these are absurdities, and that invisible pink unicorns and steak-hating vegans don't really exist. Why? Because existence is not a predicate. Therefore, it cannot be predicated of God either.The Reverse MOAMy opponent states,"Exactly how is that a valid point or a rebuttal to my premise? The idea was to point point anything logically inconsistent or absurd in the premise or in the truth behind it, and it appears that he has failed to do just that. This would also be a contingent proposition, since naturally, my premise also stated that it was possible that a greatest possible being didn’t exist."Let me try to explain this once again. We have the two statements...(i) It is possible God exists(ii) It is possible God does not existThese two statements can NOT both be true. When my opponent states, "my premise also stated that it was possible that a greatest possible being didn’t exist" he is admitting defeat. Remember, a greatest possible being is a being which exists in all possible worlds. But my opponent admits that there's a possible world in which the being which exists in all possible worlds does not exist.That is a contradiction.Why accept the possibility of God's existence over his non-existence? The two statements above cannot both be true. So why accept one over the other? Why accept (i) over (ii)?However, there are good reasons to think that (ii) is true. If it is possible that no omniscient beings exist, then (ii) is true. If it is possible that no omnipotent beings exist, then (ii) is true. If it is possible that gratuious suffering exists, then (ii) is true. If it is possible that there is no omniscient being, then (ii) is true.And remember, if (ii) is true, then (i) is false.Now I maintain that each of the above seem like likely possibilities. As such, we have many many good reasons to think (ii) is true, and thus (i) is false, but we do not have any good reasons to think that (i) is true, and (ii) is false.Each of these seem like metaphysical possibilities. We can easily conceive of a world in which there are no intelligent beings.So my opponent could start by showing us why any of these possibilities are actually metaphysically impossible, and why we should think that (i) is metaphysically possible.The MAEI don't think my opponent understands the modal argument from evil. I am saying that since it's possible that gratuious suffering exists, then it's impossible for God to exist.Let's put it this way...(a) It is possible God exists(b) It is possible gratuious suffering existsThe two above statements cannot both be true. So which is more plausibly true? Well I would maintain that we know much much more about evil and suffering than we do about "immaterial" "omnipotent" and "omniscience". Do we really know if such things are possible? Not really. We're just guessing.Do we know that someone could suffer for absolutely no reason, with absolutely no good outcome? It seems entirely metaphysically plausible. I can easily imagine such a thing, can't you?Therefore, it is impossible for God (defined as a being which exists in ALL possible worlds) to exist.ConclusionIn conclusion, I'd like to end with a quote from St. Augustine..."Si comprehendis, non est Deus." [1]Which I translate as..."If you understand it, it is not God."So it seems entirely implausible to suggest that God, a maximally great being who is omniscient, omnipotent, etc. is conceivable, since such a thing is just beyond our comprehension.That puts a damper on my opponent's case.Over to Pro![1]http://www.goodreads.com...