Originalism is the correct principle for interpreting the Constitution.

As a disclaimer, the reason I did not make further arguments in the previous round is because I didn"t want to have a disproportionate amount of character space to my opponent, even though he did forfeit his last round, in the interest of good sportsmanship. Some points of clarification: I didn"t say that objectivity is THE goal towards which legal theorists necessarily strive, but rather the goal that Textualists aspire. I then demonstrated how Textualism, the strongest version of Originalism, falls short of achieving that objective. That being the case, however, does not prima facia invalidate it as a paradigm of constitutional interpretation. Rather, because of the limitations of textualism (and other forms of originalism), it cannot be affirmed that Originalism is the ONLY valid paradigm of constitutional interpretation -where sole validity implies both the absence of limitation and universal sufficiency (which is to say that a given paradigm is the best in every case) of a paradigm as such. It is my contention that while originalism does hold merit as a paradigm of constitutional interpretation, it is NOT the ONLY valid paradigm of constitutional interpretation -because no form of constitutional interpretation is objectively more correct than another. It is permissible to disagree on HOW to interpret cases and precedent, but the very fact that not all justices in the highest legal authority in the land (The Supreme Court of the United States) do not subscribe to an Originalist paradigm demonstrates that Originalism can not be the only valid paradigm of constitutional interpretation. That established, my opponent further misunderstands what legal objectivity is. To be objective as a jurist is only to be a third party, which is to say that the person adjudicating is not party to the conflict in question. The fallacious misconstruction as objectivity as something which my opponent seems to define against his understanding of "living constitutionalism," but what he means is judicial activism. Once more, he is not refuting what I said, but what he thinks I mean -and he has simply missed the mark. Even assuming that the constitution exists prior to all other forms of legal authority in the United States, that does not mean that Originalism is the only valid paradigm of constitutional interpretation because, as I mentioned earlier, it is the task of the law to order society which necessitates the expansion and equally the evolution of legal precedent to apply constitutional principles to answers of legal questions presented to the court. It is from those constitutional principles being applied to cases from any paradigm of interpretation that legal opinions are formed. Again, while my opponent attempts to philosophically ground a theory of proper constitutional interpretation, he in doing so ignores both (1) the reality of the bench of the highest court in the nation, (2) the reality of how legal opinions are written and (3) the necessity of appropriating constitutional principles to legal cases as a practice of law. (1) As I mentioned in Round II, Scalia"s textualism does not exist as a legally sovereign paradigm and my opponent concedes the limitations of both textualism and originalism. He furthermore misunderstands applied forms of originalism (such as Scalia"s textualism) and elects rather to refute a claim of "epistemic objectivity," which I never asserted. Scalia, a justice of the Supreme Court of the US, by contrast, did -and here my opponent highlights his lack of distinction between the three forms of originalism I mentioned in Rd. II. (2) My opponent"s claim that "The reason Living Constitutionalism is incoherent is because if we allow that the Constitution's meaning. .. expand or change over time, then it follows that the Constitution does not in actuality have any meaning. " is likewise flawed because it ignores the reality of how legal opinions are written. There are two sources of legal authority used in writing legal opinions: (I) The Constitution and (II) Relevant case-law -the latter being the exposition of the principles of the former, as new legal questions are presented to the court. Each new opinion becomes case-law after it is handed down. The task of the jurist is to apply previous decisions and constitutional principles to arrive at cases consistent with previous decisions, pursuant to the doctrine of stare decisis. My opponent categorically ignores this reality. (3) The expansion of case law (that is the exposition of constitutional principles) over time follows from the presentation of new legal questions to the court, because of both the changing of society and the changing of society"s laws. Time progresses, and so too does the nature of legal questions. For example, the question of surveillance by GPS technology would have been inconceivable at the time of the constitution's being authored, but the right to privacy (stemming amend. s 1, 3, 4, 5, 9 and 14) is an intangible constitutional principle regardless of the time in which a question involving it was presented to the court. Because of the enduring novelty of legal questions, exposition is necessary as principles are appropriated to cases over time. The meaning, however, remains static (unchanged) in that process -regardless of which constitutional paradigm a jurist subscribes to. So, my opponent has misunderstood the nature of originalism, the mechanism of legal adjudications, and equally misunderstood my case. He refuted that misunderstanding, and proceeded as such. Consequently he has failed both to refute my points, and equally failed to affirm the resolution.