Science is not objective.

(R3.1a) Round 1 summary PRO Agreed on definition (s.1). Disagreed on ad hoc definition (o.2). Noted that (o.2) is not substantively or qualitatively distinct from (sj.1). Noted that "objectivity" and "subjectivity" are mutually exclusive. (R3.1b) Round 1 summary CON CON's key support, "On my view, the [undefined] nature of the knowing subject and the [undefined] nature of the object, together, create [undefined] rules for cognition that the knowing subject must follow." CON does nothing to explain what these undefined (and presumably ad hoc) "rules" might be or why we "must" follow them. CON frames this debate in terms of Plato vs. Hume and says he rejects both without any reference to a third (established philosophical) option that might support their ad hoc definition (o.2). CON attempts to dispute (o.1) by insisting it be split into part "a" and part "b", but does nothing to explain why a common definition should be rejected wholesale in favor of their ad hoc (o.2). CON attempts to characterize logically sound deductive reasoning, based on a common definition as a "straw man". This is a provably false characterization unless CON has decided to create a brand new ad hoc definition of "straw man" that I am unaware of. CON dismisses Karl Popper and Immanuel Kant and in-fact all "authorities" in order to protect thier precious ad hoc (o.2). CON specifically rejects "falsifiability" (without citation of proposed alternative) in (3a) which is, for the record,[1] An important distinction to be sure, but seemingly completely off-topic. CON closes round 1 by reitterating their unfounded and ridiculous "straw man" accusation. (R3.2a) Round 2 summary PRO Noted that the "rules" in (o.2) are undefined. Noted that CON is perfectly free to choose any common definition of "objectivity" they wish, seeing as I am fully prepared to explain how they are all in conflict with (s.1). Noted that it would seem impossible to criticize "science from outside reality". Noted that the mere existence and apparent utility of "science" does nothing to imply that it qualifies as "objective". Lack of consensus on standards for "objectivity" would seem to imply "subjectivity" since "objectivity" would be something that people could presumably all agree upon easily. Noted that forcibly retrofiting a definition of "objectivity" to fit into the framework of "science" is a completely unnecessary pursuit. The only identifiable motive could be to embrace the "affirming the consequent" logical fallacy, which in this case (the consequent that MUST be affirmed) would be something like "we must be able to label science as objective". The key terms here are "intersubjective" and "basic statements". According to Popper, all scientific observations are based on intersubjective basic statements. There is no imaginary "objectivity" is required at all. CON seems to be basing their entire case on a perfectly unique and fabricated definition of the concept of "objectivity" (o.2) which strangely seems to be indistinguishable from the concept of "subjectivity". I cannot agree to this definition. I am not able to determine any sound logical support for this highly personal ad hoc definition, CON's repeated attempts to "affirm the consequent" not withstanding. (R3.2b) Round 2 summary CON CON opens round 2 by promising to clarify (o.2) but then goes on to retrofit the previously uncontested (s.1) with their contaminated (o.2) bringing (s.1) squarely back into the contested defintions category. CON states, "Sensory observation is objective". This is contrary to common definitions and established philosophical traditions as previously noted (Plato, Hume, Popper, and Kant). CON appeals to "direct realism" which is more commonly known as "naive realism" or "common sense realism"[5] which is[5]. The key implication here would be that "what you see is what you get" and that the observer is presumed to be infalliable. " 1.If one is directly aware of something, then one can have non-inferential knowledge of facts about it. (Premise.) 2.If one knows non-inferentially that p, then one's belief that p is infallible. (Premise.) 3.No belief about the physical world can be infallible. (Established by the possibility of illusion, hallucination, etc.) 4.Therefore, no one can have non-inferential knowledge about the physical world. (From 2, 3.) 5.Therefore, no one is directly aware of anything physical. (From 1, 4.) "[6] CON states, "Logic is objective". This is a slightly more debatable claim but a moot point seeing as the previous claim is obviously false and both of these claims must be accepted in order for CON's "logic" to be considered sound. Besides the fact that this could only hold true if all scientists explicitly stated full logical support for their scientific claims in order to have that logic verified by unbiased and infalible logical authorities (which is not currently the common standard). CON also seems to be forgetting that sometimes what we call "logic" is not infalliable (for example, modal logic, inductive reasoning). How could someone know if their logic was sound unless it was verified by unbiased and infalible logical authorities? CON states "(a) If the senses are deceptive [...] then science is not objective [...]" I would think it would be obvious that the senses can be deceptive (for example, the Gettier problem[3]) (or even by merely being imprecise) and quite beyond that, human language is often ambiguous and open to broad interpretation (not to mention the memory problem). So even if someone could be theoretically 110% confident in their "observations", their ability to mitigate the complexities of actually communicating them unambiguously to other people are severly impared and therefore not "objective". CON further states "[...] if concept formation or induction are subjective or invalid processes, then science is not objective." It is perfectly clear to me that "induction" (inductive reasoning) is often considered unreliable and perfectly subjective (open to multiple interpretations). For example, "Hume presents us with a dilemma. If we try to justify induction by means of a deductively valid argument with premises that we can show to be true (without using induction), then our conclusion will be too weak. If we try to use an inductive argument, we have to show that it is reliable. Any attempt to do that leads to the same dilemma all over again."[2] CON states, "My opponent cites a paper which allegedly presents evidence that many published papers are biased." This actually does show definitively that there is a lack of "objective" standards in science. CON's reference to "[...] well established science [...]" is strange because "well established" conforms perfectly to Karl Popper's idea of intersubjective confirmation. The term "well established" simply means that it is currently accepted by most modern scientists. This is perfectly compatible with an intersubjective viewpoint. There is absolutely no reason to jump to the conclusion that any sort of "objectivity" is a logical necessity. When CON says, "There are no authorities on how to define terms in philosophy [...]" this would seem to suggest that CON believes that terms defined by "philosophy" are essentially subjective, and I would tend to agree. CON suggests that we reject Plato's Forms and Kant's noumenal realm and presumably adopt CON's personal ad hoc definition (o.2) instead. I would like to politely disagree, based on the currently available reasoning and evidence, I am unable to comply with this suggestion. CON then proposes the question, "Does everyone agree with him, or is there widespread disagreement? It can't be both." To which my reply would be, there is disagreement, but the prevailing view would seem to carry more weight than a personal ad hoc definition such as (o.2), based on the mutually verified concept of intersubjectivity[4]. CON suggests that "[...] matters of philosophical truth are not settled by a public opinion poll, but by the facts." but then notably neglects to present "the facts" which they are ostensibly referring to. CON struggles to use their personal ad hoc definition (o.2) to distinguish astrology or mysticism from science. However, I believe that astrologers and mystics might very reasonbly presume that their observations could be perfectly described by CON's, "constitutes a grasp of an object in a form appropriate to the subject."(o.2) I believe the following standard to be much more distinct, "Popper stresses the problem of demarcation"distinguishing the scientific from the unscientific"and makes falsifiability the demarcation criterion, such that what is unfalsifiable is classified as unscientific, and the practice of declaring an unfalsifiable theory to be scientifically true is pseudoscience."[1] In their round 2 conclusion, CON claims that Popper's "intersubjective basic statements" which comprise the foundation of science cannot be intersubjective. Intersubjective: existing between conscious minds; shared by more than one conscious mind.[4] This definition is perfectly reasonable and merely proposes that all observations, in order to qualify as scientific, must be verified by at least one other person. (R3.3) Logical support for positive implications of "Science is not objective." (IFF) "science is not objective" is true (THEN) science is subject to constant scrutiny and refinement. (R3.4) Logical support for negative implications of "Science is not objective." (IFF) "science is not objective" is false (THEN) science is infallible and authoritative. (R3.5) Sources [1] https://en.wikipedia.org... [2] http://philosophy.wisc.edu... [3] https://en.wikipedia.org... [4] https://www.google.com... [5] https://en.wikipedia.org... [6] https://plato.stanford.edu...