The Modal Ontological Argument for God's existence is logically valid

Thanks to Pro for this debate, and this topic. And thanks to any readers and voters for their comments and illumination. God Does Not Exist in All Possible Worlds. We know he doesn't. We know it because of the definition of "possible world. " A possible world is one without logical contradictions. Godless worlds have no inherent contradictions, so some of them are possible. Godless worlds are possible. Gods cannot exist in godless worlds. That would be a contradiction. Therefore, since some possible worlds are godless, no god exists in all possible worlds. P1 and P3 Cannot Both Be True: P1 says that god (a maximally great being) possibly exists. P3 says that if P1 is true, then god exists in every possible world. But we have established that god does not exist in every possible world. Therefore, either P1 or P3 is false. We have stipulated that P1 is true, so it follows that P3 is false. What if P1 And P3 Were Both Stipulated to Be True? That would be nonsensical. I would not have accepted the debate. P3, then, is in contention. And, as established above, it is unequivocally false. If P3 Is a False Premise, Does This Entail Invalidity? Pro doesn't treat P3 as a given. He reasons his way to it. I offered him the chance to define maximally great beings as existing in every possible world. He didn't take the bait. Instead, he tried to reason his way from "maximally great" to "exists in every possible world. " There is no valid way to do this. Why Not? Because maximal greatness is undefined and undefinable. Greatness, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder. Are strawberry gods greater than the dark chocolate kind? It's entirely subjective. Are gods greater for existing in a greater number of hypothetical worlds? It would only seem so if you liked that kind of thing. When Pro was challenged on this point, he claimed that greatness is what results from "great-making properties. " In other words, he defined his term in terms of itself. That's begging the question. That's circular argument. That's logical fallacy. That's an invalid step in Pro's argument. Could Pro Have Claimed P3 to Be a False Premise? This question is suggested by the title of this debate, which claims that the modal ontological argument is logically valid. Could Pro have used that phrasing to suggest that he should win this debate if P3 is a false premise rather than a logical invalidity? First, Pro never argued that, never made that move. That is no part of his position. Second, that move would be inconsistent with the obvious intent of Pro's opening post. He said, " My position in this debate is that if premise 1 is true, a maximally great being must in fact exist. " In other words, if Pro's argument contains any error as to either truth or validity (aside from an error in the truth of P1), then victory belongs to Con. Third, Pro didn't treat P3 as a premise. He didn't say it was a given. He argued his way—-using fallacies—-to the conclusion that if P1 then P3. Fourth, nothing is to be inferred from the label, "P3. " Pro labeled every step of his argument P[something or other]. Even his ultimate conclusion, "Therefore, a maximally great being exists," is labeled "P6. " Summation: We know that some possible worlds are godless. Therefore, no god can exist in all possible worlds. Therefore, we know there is error in any argument purporting to show that a god exists in all possible worlds. That's a false conclusion. Since Pro's conclusion is false, we know that he used either false premises or invalid form. We have isolated Pro's error in P3. (P3: If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world. ) But the error must exist even if you don't accept my explication of what's wrong with P3. Some problems with P3 involve the undefined terms, and the arbitrary and subjective conclusion that a god is greater if he exists in more possible worlds. Begging the question and circular argument are among the demonstrable fallacies that Pro employed in his attempt to defend P3. Conclusion: Pro undertook the burden of proof to show that this argument does not use logical fallacies, but that turns out not to be true. Pro's version of the ontological argument employs logical fallacies.