It is probable god exists

In this debate, I'll be presenting several arguments in favor of the proposition that it is probable that God exists. Without further ado, let me begin:1. The Ontological ArgumentDating back all the way to St. Anselm of Canterbury, the ontological argument has been both praised as brilliant and reviled as a trick by philosophers on both sides of the spectrum. I'll be defending a version of the argument made popular by Alvin Plantinga. Plantinga's argument makes use of S5 modal logic and thus is immune from the standard objections posed by Gaunilo and Kant. I'll be defending a simplified version offered by William Lane Craig. 1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists.2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.4. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.5. If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.6. Therefore, a maximally great being exists.Premise (1) is relatively modest, for it states only that the existence of an MGB is possible. An MGB is a being who exemplifies the greatest possible array of great-making properties, such as omniscience, omnipotence, etc... In order to falsify (1), Con must show that the existence of an MGB is impossible due to its being self-contradictory -- quite a tall task. Now from (1), (2) follows, since the very idea of something to be possible means that it must exist in at least one possible world. P3 is simply a statement of axiom S5 of modal logic, which is that:S5: If possibly necessarily P, then necessarily P.If an MGB is possibly necessary, then it exists in at least one possible world. But it follows from this that it must also exist in all possible worlds qua maximally great, since maximal greatness entails necessary existence. Since the actual world is part of the set of possible worlds, the MGB must also exist in the actual world. Therefore, a maximally great being exists.2. The Kalam Cosmological ArgumentThe KCA is deceptively simple, and consists of three premises:1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause.2. The universe began to exist.3. Therefore, the universe has a cause.The first premise expresses the metaphysical truth that something cannot come from nothing, the denial of which is absurd. If something could come into existence without a cause, then it's odd as to why we do not have any examples of this constantly happening. Why doesn't everything and anything pop into existence without a cause? Indeed, why doesn't a black hole suddenly appear and consume our solar system? It can't be because nothingness is constrained by physical laws, for there is nothing to constrain. To deny the first premise is to thus deny causal regularity.Moving now to the second premise, which is supported by both philosophical and scientific examples. Scientifically, the beginning of the universe has overwhelming support in modern cosmological. Phenomena such as redshift, the cosmic background radiation, the expansion of the universe, and the second law of thermodynamics all point toward the idea that the universe began to exist over 14 billion years ago. More recently, the Borde-Guth-Vilenkin theorem has demonstrated that any universe in a state of cosmic expansion must be finite in past duration.Philosophically, if the universe were eternal in its past duration, then this implies the existence of an actual infinite. However, since it is impossible for an actually infinite set of things to exist, the universe must be finite in its past duration. An actual infinite is a set which has attained infinite status. Its existence is impossible because one yields contradictory answers when applying mathematical operations to it. From this is follows that the universe has a cause. But why think this cause is God?It must be noted that since there is nothing prior to the cause of the universe, it cannot be explained scientifically, as this would imply the existence of antecedent determining conditions. Because there are no prior determining conditions, the cause of the universe must be personal and uncaused, for how else could a timeless cause give rise to a temporal effect? Moreover, the cause must transcend both matter and time to create matter and time. Finally, in order to create the universe ex nihilo, this cause must be enormously powerful, if not omnipotent. One is warranted in concluding that therefore, God exists.3. The Leibnizian Cosmological ArgumentAs formulated by Joshua Rasmussen, the LCA goes as follows [1]:1. Every contingent fact concerning the existence of contingent beings has an explanation.2. The BC (the contingent fact that there are or were contingent beings).3. Therefore, the BC has an explanation.4. No fact concerning the existence of contingent things can be explained solely in terms of one or more of those very things it contains.5. Every contingent thing is contained within the BC.6. Therefore, the BC is explained at least in part by something that is not contingent.P1 is a very modest statement of the principle of sufficient reason (PSR). Why should we believe PSR? First, it enjoys a priori support. Take any collection of contingent things -- say one hundred cookies. It's plausible to say that if this set of cookies were to exist, that it would require an explanation of its existence due to the fact that it need not have existed. From an empirical standpoint, P1 is also plausible. Our everyday experience reveals that the existence of various contingent things requires an explanation. Indeed, science presupposes this and it is safe to say that PSR has never been falsified. Finally, there are skeptical epistemological implications that may arise from denying P1. One's cognitive states might be appearing to him for no reason at all. We would also have no reason to think that a given hypothesis has an explanation or to assume causal regularity.P2 is simply the contingent fact that there are or were contingent beings. Because P2 is itself contingent, it requires an explanation if (1) holds. According to P4, the set of contingent beings cannot be self-explanatory as it would be circular. Suppose that there exists a possible world with a set of an unspecified amount of cookies. It would be circular to explain a cookie in terms of another cookie in the set, for the question is why the entire set of cookies should exist. We thus see that to explain why a set of contingent things exist, the explanation must be located outside of the set in something that is itself not contingent. The explanation of the BC must thus be found in a necessary being.What might this necessary being look like? It must be eternal by virtue of the fact that it is non-contingent, and it must exist in every possible world by virtue of being necessary. It must also be personal because if it lacked the capacity to choose to actualize non-necessary things, then everything must be necessary. From this, it is reasonable to conclude that this necessary being is God. 1. Joshua Rasmussen, "Cosmological Arguments from Contingency" Philosophy Compass 5.9 (2010): 806-812.