It is Probable That God Exists

My opponent has advanced three arguments for the contention that the existence of God is improbable. Putting the Cart Before the HorseOckham's razor states that all things being equal, entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity. This means that when one has two equally competing explanations, the one which contains the least number of assumptions is to be preferred. It is important to highlight that Ockham's razor only applies under two conditions: 1. Both explanations are equal in their explanatory power.2. The necessary explanatory criteria are identified.If these conditions are not satifisfied, then one cannot use Ockham's razor in selecting what counts as the best explanation. An explanation might be simpler yet fail to explain the necessary criteria, or an explanation might posit more entities yet have greater explanatory power. The question then is whether or not the theistic and atheist explanations meet these criteria, and it is evident that they do not. Recall that according to the razor, entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity. Yet what entities are necessary to explain the universe and features within it? It is patently question-begging to assume that God is not necessary to explain certain facets of the universe, for this is exactly what I am arguing. In my opening argument, I argued that it is necessary to posit the existence of God to explain both the beginning of the universe and the existence of teleology. Con may believe that God is not necessary to explain these features, but he cannot simply assume this; he must argue for it. One cannot use Ockham's razor until he first identifies what is necessary. Only if God is not necessary will the use of OR be justified. But this has to be shown, not assumed.Second, why think that both explanations are equal in their explanatory power? This was simply assumed by Con without any argument behind it. KCA, IRP, and Why Con's Argument BackfiresImmediately Con attacks a strawman of the KCA. Recall that the first premise of the KCA is that "whatever begins to exist has a cause." This is not equivalent to "everything that exists must have a cause," nor does the KCA assume that everything that exists begin to exist. Hence, the IRP is in no way similar to the KCA.At any rate, the IRP is demonstrably false. Both premises one, two, and three are unsound. Con adduced no evidence beyond mere assertion of the claim that everything which exists must begin to exist. Nor did I agree to this in my OP. At any rate, P1 is false. Philosophers distinguish between two types of existence: contingent and necessary. Contingent beings are those whose non-existence obtains in some possible world, whereas necessary beings are such that their existence obtains in all possible worlds. Examples of necessary beings would include numbers, laws of logic, universals, etc... Another way to look at this is that the existence of contingent beings is dependent on certain conditions. The existence of liquid water, for instance, is dependent upon certain atmospheric conditions obtaining. Is God then a contingent being? Evidently not, for since God is viewed in the Judeo-Christian tradition to be a maximally great being, his existence is not dependent on anything qua maximally great. Thus, both P2 and P3 are false.Moreover, this argument actually works against Con! If Con agrees to the first two premises, then his own position generates an infinite regress. He thus fares no better. Either his argument then is false, or it does nothing to help his position (It cancels itself out).Finally, this argument can be turned against Con in another way. If Con agrees that infinite regresses are impossible, then he is logically committed to the belief in a first cause. Suppose that I want to borrow a typewriter. I go to my neighbor's house and ask him. Unfortunately for me, he doesn't have one. "But wait" he says, "Let me go ask my neighbor!" He then goes to his neighbor and asks him for a typewriter. Unfortunately, his neighbor doesn't have one and thus his neighbor goes to his neighbor to ask for one. Now it's evident that if this keeps happening, then nobody will end up with a typewriter. However, suppose that I do get a typewriter -- what would that imply? That would imply that there was a first member of the series who just had a typewriter. The same analogy holds true for existence. If I exist now, then there must have been a first member of the causal series which just had existence and did not derive it from any other source.Against GPThe main thrust of GP, also known as impossibility arguments (Cf. Micharl Martin [ed], The Impossibility of God), is that God cannot exist because the very idea of God is self-contradictory. However, the arguments advanced by Con are unsatisfactory.1. Can a perfect God create?It is true that since God is completely perfect that he has no needs and is beyond improvement, yet it is wholly unclear how this would prevent him from creating a world. Indeed, in the Judeo-Christian tradition, God's creation of the world was a free act that did not express any need on his behalf. He could, had he chosen otherwise, have refrained from creating. Desires do not necessarily express deficiency: my desire to spontaneously raise my hand does not indicate anything lacking on my part. 2. The coherence of theismCon advances several incompability arguments which aim to show that God cannot possibly have certain attributes in cojunction. These arguments too are mistaken. First, omnipresence has been historically understood to refer to the state of being casually active at every location in the universe. [1] To say that this entails that God must exist before he existed simply does not follow. Indeed, it is a misnomer to even speak of "before" God's existence. If all reality is dependent upon God, then there cannot be a "before" God's existence because time would not exist. Moreover, the argument assumes that God began to exist, which was shown to be fallacious.But more fundamentally, the objection rests on a faulty conception of omnipotence. As understood in the Judeo-Christian tradition, omnipotence is not the ability to do everything, but only the ability to do what is logically possible. [2] God cannot create square circles, married bachelors, or actualize contradictions of any sort because these "tasks" are really pseudotasks -- no amount of power can actualize them, nor are they actualizable in principle. This is not to say that God has limitations, rather it is God's perfection expressed in the negative. When you're perfect, you're unable to be unperfect, but that isn't a limitation -- it's the perfection itself.There is an even more devestating reply to this objection. If omnipotence is indeed the ability to do anything, then God can exist before he existed. Who is to say he can't? After all, he's omnipotent. As Harry Frankfurt pointed out: "If an omnipotent being can do what is logically impossible, then he cannot only create situations which he cannot handle but also, since he is not bound by the limits of consistency, he can handle situations which he cannot handle" [3]Either way, impossibility arguments are a lose-lose case for the skeptic. Now Con seems to advance the logical problem of evil when arguing that God's omniscience, omnipotence, and omnibenevolence are incompatible. However, the logical PoE was thoroughly refuted by the philosopher Alvin Plantinga decades ago. Plantinga pointed out that as long as it's logically possible that God has morally sufficient reasons for allowing evil, that these three attributes are not incompatible with eah other. [4] Hence, there is no incompatibility here. [1] JP Moreland and W. L. Craig, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Wordlview (IVP Academic) 509-511[2] Ibid, 527-529[3] H. Frankfurt, "The Logic of Omnipotence" The Philosophical Review, 76:2. 262-263 [4] A. Plantinga, "God, Freedom, and Evil" (Eerdmans: 1974)