This House Asserts That Ontology Necessitates God!

I should like to start off by thanking Roy for this debate. I must however concede that I am disheartened by his reply. I expressly asked readers to go through the some ten pages I posted for better understanding of my stipulations. Due to Roy not doing that his entire argument is besides the point. Before I start out I should like to clarify some things about the onus. While the onus of the motion rests upon me, if Roy should make any positive claims (of which there are many) then it is his onus to prove them. He must prove the premises of his argument against my case. He has provided much rhetoric but if you scan his argument you will see little proof. I shall not appraise his individual parts until I have addressed the two major assumptions his entire case is based on. Following that I will show a principle contradiction in his argument, and then I shall end by rebutting his individual points. I will use A for assumption, C for contradiction, and P for individual points; if necessary I will use F for counter refutation. 5. A1: That an idea is a proposition: (5.1) I must say, this point significantly surprised me, especially considering that I gave a clear enough definition is my first argument. An idea is not a proposition, it is a construct. If an idea is true then the construct that it refers to exists, if it is fault then the construct is illusory. The idea does not propose the construct, it represents it, and this can be gauged by reading my citation. I will however, for clarification provide Immanuel Kant's definition of an idea (the same definition I use above, but in clearer words): 'the species of representation which gives rise to metaphysical beliefs. Ideas are special concepts which arise out of our knowledge.'[4] Here the knowledge is innate, and so hidden. We are only debating whether this construct which represents God directly connects to an actual object God, or whether this construct is a simple mixture of other constructs and therefore represents an illusory object. Another meaning that might help clear up is the one used in the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy: 'In philosophy, ideas are usually construed as mental representational images of some object.' From Plato to Locke to Hume you will not find any philosopher coy enough to say that an idea is a proposition. (5.3) It is then clear what my definition of an idea is. One can gain the same definition from reading my citation. If Roy should assert that all ideas are necessarily propositions then he must prove this claim. Roy has provided no evidence of this claim. In any case does the idea of pain propose anything? It represents the feeling of pain but does it propose a statement? Does the idea of a cake propose anything? No, it is a construct which may refer to an actual object (a cake from memory) or may be a made up construct. In any case it is foolish to think that ideas are propositions without any evidence. 6. A2: To be meaningful a proposition must in principle be testable: (6.1) Roy does try to show how his assertion may apply to my case. I do not really see what he tries to prove here. In any case, not to label it, but this assertion is a theory known as Logical Positivism. Just read Roy's words, now read the words of A. J. Ayer[5]: 'that only statements about the world that are empirically verifiable or logically necessary are cognitively meaningful'. I still won't make this about Logical Positivism strictly, I will use Roy's words against Roy. Roy says for any proposition to be meaningful it should be testable, and assumes this test to be empirical. The proposition that everything meaningful should be empirically testable is not testable. How do you test the belief that everything ought to be empirically tested? There is no such test, and the theory then is self refuting. (6.2) The above was enough to convince A. J. Ayer who stated later: 'the problem is, nearly all if it is wrong', speaking of this theory.[6] Another problem is that of Induction, and the repudiation of the deductive-nomological model. I find that since Roy never presented any proof for this theory, and since an adequate rebuttal is given I need not expand on these until time comes. I have linked a scholarly source [7] which is part of my argument against Logical Positivism. This point however is moot in any case because as I once again remind the readers, an idea is not a proposition, it is a construct which represents an object. If the idea is true then the object it represents exists in Reality, if it is false then the object it correlates to is not an object of reality, rather the construct is made by jumbling up simpler constructs. 7. C1: That the condition of meaning is both imagination, and empirical testing: (7.1) There is a principle contradiction in Roy's case. He states firstly that anything that can be experimentally tested is meaningful. He then says that anything which cannot be imagines is nonsensical or unmeaningful. This is a contradiction which Roy needs to clarify. (7.2) To show this contradiction I will simply give one example which would be meaningful for the first condition, but utterly meaningless for the second condition. This will also serve as a refutation to Roy's point entitled: 'That which cannot be imagined is nonsensical'. Sir, I quote one thing: Quantum Physics. Now Quantum Physics is a most baffling concept. There is a reason even the mighty Feynman stated: 'I think I can safely say that no one understands Quantum Mechanics'[8]. The reason can in another quote be summarized: 'we cannot imagine, nor conceive what might happen, it is based on randomness. Ask someone to conceive that an electron can be in multiple places at once, and they will not be able to'.[9] This is Quantum Physics where the human mind is left completely baffled and cannot imagine nor conceive the process. This is why it is called the 'most counter-intuitive subject of all'.[10][11] (7.3) According to Logical Positivism Quantum Mechanics would have meaning because it can be empirically tested, however according to the second criterion it is nonsensical. Do you see the impossibility of Roy's argumentation? He is arguing that one of the most important theories ever conceived is 'nonsensical'. So not only here do we have a contradiction between two of Roy's arguments, but we also have both arguments failing miserably. I have therefore by now shown that firstly ideas are not propositions, that secondly the criterion of meaning should not be logical positivism, and thirdly that to say that that which cannot be imagined is nonsensical is nonsensical. Now I may be told that I need to provide an alternate theory of truth and I could present Pragmatism, but I have no need to. The only reason he could have used Logical Positivism as an advantage is because he believed ideas are propositions. Without that belief I think it is clear that his entire case goes to folly, for this was his primary assumption: that ideas are propositions, and this we have shown to is foolish. 8. P1: That the idea of God is the idea of perfection, and that perfection is complex: (8.1) Pray thee where did I say the idea of God is the idea of perfection? God may be perfect, but that is besides the point. Currently we see only the construct of God or the representation of God as an idea. Roy may say we are arguing for a tri-omni God but then I would direct him to the definition. God is only a metaphysical Being who transcends Time, Space and Number. Now when we talk about simple, as I defined it we talk about whether it can be divided into parts. Prithee what is the taste of God? What is the smell? There is no answer which possess the conception of necessity and is same for each person. The idea of God is only a faint representation of God, that is it. Either this representation is correct and the object God is real, or it is incorrect and the object God is fake. There are no grey areas. Conclusion: My argument stands uncontested. For the first premise there was no attack. To attack the second premise Roy lived on one assumption that ideas are propositions. By giving examples, and clarifying my answer with further postulates and arguments I have shown that ideas, are in fact not propositions. Roy never proved ideas are propositions but added inside a short argument based on Logical Positivism, which he also did not prove. I showed with sources how Logical Positivism is absolutely absurd. I need not give a counter theory because ideas are not propositions. A counter theory of knowledge is not needed here because it is not necessary to prove my points. If Roy wants to use Logical Positivism as an argument against God as a whole then he must first make an attempt to prove it, and only then need I present a counter theory. He has currently given no proof. As for the next premise his first attack is that that which cannot be imagined is nonsensical, this I debunked easily by giving the example of Quantum Theory. His next attack was on the second part of my argument that the idea of God is not simple. I ask him, most humbly, to tell me the distinguish the parts of the idea of God. Not the attributes or anything, but the representation of God. Then Roy dropped one of my arguments! He never tackled my argument about how God is a priori and no amount of a posteriori ideas combined in whatever ways can result in an a priori idea. He never tackled this, and I deserve to win here and now for this! The premises are then sound and therefore the conclusion is as well: God exists! [4]Critique of Pure Reason, Transcendental Logic http://www2.hn.psu.edu... [5]http://en.wikipedia.org... [6]Ibidium [7]http://mechanism.ucsd.edu... [8]http://en.wikiquote.org... [9]Ibidium [10]http://www.slac.stanford.edu... [11]http://plato.stanford.edu... Ajab