The Argument from Evil Makes the Existence of the God of Christianity Unlikely

Introduction I have always been intrigued with variations of the alleged "problem of evil." This probably has do with my awareness that it's actually the nonexistence of evil that would prove Christianity false not its existence - gratuitous or otherwise. Of course, my sentiments on the matter are neither unique nor rare -- as anyone versed in Christian theology is abundantly aware of the varied and various shortcomings of arguments from evil. My criticisms of the argument in question are twofold and can be summarized as questions: (1) What are we asked to assume and is it reasonable? And (2) is this true given Christian theology? What are we asked to assume? The proposition in question is valid and will not be disputed. In this area I will discuss why I believe we have very good reasons for doubting the soundness of the first premise, "Gratuitous suffering and pointless premature deaths probably occur." This variation of the evidential argument of evil is clearly reminiscent of the work of renowned philosopher and professor, William Rowe. I mostly know this because I am familiar with the work of Daniel Howard-Snyder (and his refutations of Rowe's various arguments) and will subsequently be relying upon his work. Reasonabes The inference inherent in P1 can fall into 1 of 3 different categories. The first category contains reasonable inferences like, after checking my fridge, saying, "it seems to me that there is no milk in my fridge, therefore there probably is no milk" Or as Snyder suggests, " suppose that, on viewing a chess match between two novices, Kasparov says to himself, 'So far as I can tell, there is no way for John to get out of check,' and then infers that there is no way." Kasparov would be using the same evidential line of thinking to arrive at this conclusion. We will call these types of inferences, Reasonables. So then, is the saying "it seems to me that gratuitous evil exists, therefore it probably exists" fall into this category of inference? Let us look at the next before deciding. Nonreasonables There are similar inferences that can be made using this same framework that seem far less compelling. For instance, imagine I am sitting in my house and, looking out my kitchen window at a garden about twenty yards yonder, say to myself, "it seems to me that there is no slug in that garden." Would it be reasonable for me to thereafter infer that there is no slug in the garden? Or consider this example. Imagine I am listening to two seasoned brain surgeons discussing the particulars of a very specific neurological diagnosis. With their brobdingnagian medical vernacular, I may say, "it seems to me that what their saying makes no sense." Could I reasonably infer, then, that what they are saying actually makes no sense? I think we are justified in categorizing these sorts of inferences as, Nonreasonables -- inasmuch as we have very good reasons for thinking they are probably false. I actually believe that P1 probably falls into this category, but my reasons are theological and will be addressed later. Instead, I will argue why P1 most likely falls into the forthcoming third category. Doubtables Snyder characterizes this category using the following question: How likely is it that extra-terrestrials would contact us if they existed? The only fair and legitimate answer, it seems, is "I don't know." We have no way to quantify such a probability. First, how do we know they would be intelligent enough or even have the means to contact us. Moreover, how do we know that they would even care? So far as I can see, we must rightfully admit that we are in the dark on this matter. Therefore, we have very good reasons to be skeptical of anyone who makes the brash assumption that extraterrestrials, if existent, would try and contact us. From my vantage point, it seems that Freeman will have to convince us that the inference made in P1 is more like the inferences in the Reasonables category and not like those in the Nonreasonables or Doubtables category. But here is why I think we have legitimate epistemological and philosophical reasons for believing that the inference in P1 falls into the last category. To state that gratuitous evil exists is to say that there is such thing as evil that, if prevented, would not cause any greater evil or prevent any greater good from transpiring - that is, an evil completely absent of a morally sufficient reason. In order to conclude that such evil is probable, it must be concluded that "the insights attainable by finite, fallible human beings [is] as an adequate indication of what is available in the way of reasons to an omniscient, omnipotent being." Snyder suggests that it "is like supposing that when I am confronted with the activity or productions of a master in a field in which I have little expertise, it is reasonable for me to draw inferences about the quality of her work just because I 'don’t get it.'" What good reasons do we have for believing that if such morally sufficient reasons existed we would likely discern them? To the contrary, we have good reasons for doubting our ability to conclude that since 'we don't see 'em, they ain't there.' The Progress of Knowledge We are continually making discoveries about previously unknown parts of reality. With the great progress in virtually all fields of science and other studies, we have good reasons for believing that there are goods (and evils) yet to be discovered. We have made moral discoveries even within the last centuries. So far as I can see, anyone who makes the inference that gratuitous evil probably exists is not sufficiently skeptical and is, in fact, being quite unreasonable. The Theological Oversight Another problem with this argument is that it assumes Christianity false from the onset. If Christianity is true, we actually have very good reasons for believing that gratuitous evil exists. Anyone who has read C.S. Lewis' Space Odyssey or is sufficiently aware of basic Christian doctrine knows that God is not the reigning power over this world. In fact, Christian scripture teaches that it is the Omni-malevolent Satan who is the "god" or "prince" of this world. Christian doctrine teaches that even an omnipotent God is a weak God, inasmuch as liberty prevents forced action. So how can one legitimately claim that gratuitous evil proves that Christianity is likely false? It is like using accurate predictions as evidence against the person who made them. More clearly, like saying, "look at all these things this person got right, can't you see that they are wrong?" It is simply poor reasoning. Conclusion In Freeman's forthcoming round, he will have to show us why we are to toss aside skepticism and assume that, given our fallible and obviously finite observation of reality, we still would likely discern the morally sufficient reasons of an omnipotent and omniscient God if they existed. It seems to me that, given our limitations, we are far more reasonable in concluding that we simply do not know. Moreover, Freeman must tell us why it is reasonable to ignore Christian Theology when considering its relationship to evil. Sources: http://faculty.wwu.edu...