The 'Problem of Evil' never succeeds (Attempt 1), Pt. 2

========== INTRODUCTION ========== And so here we are, the final and concluding round in this debate between myself and Skeptic. Taking my cue from certain remarks made in the Comments section, I shall do everything I can to not only state plainly and clearly what the arguments have been but also to identify the principal issues of each. And I shall do this by exploring how the arguments have played out, indicating the logical sequence of each step that was made. ========== THE DEBATE RESOLUTION ========== Against my debate resolution, Skeptic claimed to have an argument from evil that can and does successfully prove the non-existence of God. Let that be the first thing our readers understand clearly. At no time has this debate been about unbelief being reasonable, for even if it were that would not prove the non-existence of God. So the central question the reader MUST keep in mind is, "Has Skeptic provided an argument that defeats the resolution?" Has he successfully demonstrated the non-existence of God? ========== THE ARGUMENT: STEP 1 ========== There are two things Skeptic made clear from the start: that the existence of Gratuitous Evil would be the centerpiece of his argument, and that his argument would turn on the issue of probability. In other words, if the existence of Gratuitous Evil is probable, then the existence of God is improbable. (We shall remember that evil is 'gratuitous' when it is purposeless or unwarranted, and that God is defined biblically.) So our debate launched from his premise that Gratuitous Evil probably exists, a premise I hit the brakes on. If Gratuitous Evil is supposed to prove the non-existence of God, and it definitely would, then its probability must be proved. Skeptic countered this objection by saying that we have no good reason to believe certain evils are warranted or have a purpose, citing Rowe and his examples. But it commits the argument from ignorance, I responded, for him to infer from a lack of evidence for purpose or warrant that certain evils are gratuitous. [1] He disagreed, claiming that his premise qualifies for the presumption of truth; i.e., that it's reasonable to suppose certain evils as gratuitous in the absence of evidence to the contrary. I acknowledged that there are cases where the presumption of truth is a valid move, but it is clearly an INVALID move if doing so would end up begging the question. ========== THE ARGUMENT: STEP 2 ========== And so that was recognized as the fundamental issue upon which the entire debate hinged: Would that presumption of truth end up begging the very question? If so, then he would be denied that presumption and forced to prove that there is no purpose or warrant for some evils. As I have demonstrated from scholarly sources, a person commits the question-begging fallacy when the truth of the conclusion must be assumed in order for one of the premises to be true. [2] So must the non-existence of God be assumed in order for any evils to be gratuitous? Clearly. Given the definition of God [3] and the definition of gratuitous evils, the two are necessarily mutually exclusive. Just like one must first assume the non-existence of an Irresistible Force in order to assert that an Immovable Object is possible, so one must first assume the non-existence of God in order to assert that Gratuitous Evil is possible. And Skeptic has rightly conceded this point—as he must, since it is true by definition. It is logically impossible for the two to have occupancy the same world. ========== THE ARGUMENT: STEP 3 ========== As with his earlier attempt at circumventing the argument from ignorance, so here too he tried to lay claim to an exception, calling upon possible-world semantics to illustrate that he was not positing them as possible within the same domain (thereby averting the logical contradiction, and thus the need to assume the non-existence of God). But this exception, too, fails him because the question-begging fallacy is still present; if a premise of his argument assumes the non-existence of God in the actual world, then his argument is viciously circular because the non-existence of God in the actual world is the very thing to be proved. The reader simply must keep this in mind. In order for Gratuitous Evil to have a probability greater than zero in the actual world, Skeptic needs to remove the existence of God from the actual world—which no premise can assume if it's the very thing the conclusion is supposed to prove! And possible worlds notwithstanding, it's the actual world being considered; i.e., his argument succeeds in defeating my resolution only if Gratuitous Evil exists in the actual world. (If it doesn't, then he has no argument.) To clarify the argument for the reader in light of his possible-world semantics: (1') If an omnipotent, omniscient, and all-good God exists (in the actual world), then gratuitous evil probably does not exist (in the actual world). (2') Gratuitous evil probably exists (in the actual world). (3') Therefore, an omnipotent, omniscient, and all-good God probably does not exist (in the actual world). Remember, the debate resolution is that there are literally no versions of the Problem of Evil argument that succeed at proving the non-existence of God—and "non-existence" is a term with reference to the actual world; i.e., to say that God is possible but not actual is to say that he is non-existent (which his argument had to prove, not assume). Skeptic can invoke possible-world semantics if he likes, but it's the actual world his argument was supposed to target. And his argument had to address God as defined in the Bible, for that's what this debate was about. In other words, for him to posit that God need not exist in every possible world is for him to build a straw man, since the God of the Bible is necessary being. Fairies and Zeus and pyramid-building aliens are not posited as necessary beings, so there is nothing inappropriate about assuming there is a possible world in which they don't exist. And God as necessary being is NOT something I have to argue; the God of the Bible is the very entity in question and has been all along (recall the agreed definitions). ========== CONCLUSION ========== Since applying the presumption of truth to (2) would end up begging the very question, he is denied that presumption and must therefore prove that Gratuitous Evil (purposeless or unwarranted) has a probability greater than zero in the actual world. And since this cannot be done with any valid argument (only invalid ones, like the argument from ignorance variety), my debate resolution stands undefeated. ========== REFERENCES ========== 1. Gary N. Curtis, Ph.D. "Appeal to Ignorance." FallacyFiles.org. (http://www.fallacyfiles.org...); "Argument from ignorance." Wikipedia. (http://en.wikipedia.org...). 2. Douglas N. Walton, Ph.D. "The Essential Ingredients of the Fallacy of Begging the Question." Fallacies: Classical and Contemporary Readings. H. Hanson and R. Pinto, eds. Penn State Press, 1995. pp. 229-239; Robert Carroll, Ph.D. "Begging the question." The Skeptic's Dictionary. (http://www.skepdic.com...); Gary N. Curtis, Ph.D. "Begging the Question." FallacyFiles.org. (http://www.fallacyfiles.org...). 3. God is defined in this debate and Skeptic's argument as omnipotent, omniscient, and infinitely good.