The Fool will refute any argument for the existence of god.

I thank Fool for the excellent debate; however, there are several key flaws in her arguments. For this round I will be addressing the final rebuttals she has made to the LCA.Premise 1Overview of ModalityMy opponent's only refutation is her F6 under "I no he didn't". I would simply respond that the PSR is not incompatible with modal logic as it is founded in modal logic. She claims that everything has a reason and thus nothing is contingent. The labeling of contingency is not a claim to be unreasoned, but that the reason lies in an external cause, but there is a reason nonetheless.The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR)Sadly, the Fool's primary rebuttal of the PSR comes down to semantics. She objects to my interpretation of the PSR stating that everything must have a cause. She instead states that everything must have an explanation. If we remember round 3, the Fool bases this objection in her belief that an explanation entails a knowable reason. I have addressed this perspective in my own round 3 and she has chosen not to acknowledge it. Don't let my opponent simply restate her arguments without defending them from my prior criticism. Furthermore, she goes on to reformulate the PSR in round 4 (Is this the 3rd or 4th version she has presented? I have lost count.) to state that everything has a reason. I would claim that explanation does not necessarily entail a knowable reason, but is equivalent in meaning to reason. A reason for why something exists is equivalent to an explanation for why it exists. If the reason is unknowable then so is the explanation, but that does not deny that there is a reason/explanation. Her final semantic strike on the issue is that an explanation is only a sufficient condition for knowledge, but again I would propose that in terms of modal logic (which the PSR is heavily based in) that an explanation, cause, and reason are all the same thing. It is inconsistent to state that the PSR does not require explanations but requires causes when a cause necessarily is an explanation and vice versa. My opponent labels my version of the PSR as committing the equivocation fallacy and thus my source is an unwarranted appeal to authority. I find this quite amusing as although Anaximander was the first philosopher to use the PSR, it is attributed to Gottfried Leibniz. Can confirm that with her OWN source from round 2. Leibniz was the first philosopher to formalize and successfully defend the PSR, so it appears incoherent for my opponent to refute his formulation. Even so, she claims that the source I used to defend Leibniz's PSR Alexander Pruss', The Principle of Sufficient Reason is an appeal to authority. Nowhere does my opponent explain how this is an appeal to authority, and I am so confident that it is not that I invite the voters to reread the part I quoted and if you find an appeal to authority you can disregard the evidence. But I assure you, no such fallacy is committed. Pruss explained a line of reasoning that we naturally accept and claimed that accepting such explanations for the negative states of affairs, we tacitly accept the PSR as I have defended it. Now, if my opponent is claiming that my citing of a source itself is the appeal to authority, then that once again proves that she does not even read my arguments. Nowhere did I say to accept it because Pruss said to, but because of the argument Pruss made, not because Pruss made it, but because it is true.My opponent continues to claim that I am defining God into existence. This has nothing to do with the PSR but instead deals with my second premise, so I will address it later in the round.The Fool ends her refutation of my first premise by iterating that the first three fallacies she proposed in my first premise still stand. I invite her to read my third round where I addressed every one of them. Just because I didn't say "F1, F2, and F3" does not mean that I didn't cite the arguments she was making and refute them. Again, do not let my opponent blindly spew out arguments without defending them.Premise 2My opponent begins by trying to tackle the paradox of infinite regress that arises from a series of solely contingent beings. Her first rebuttal is proposing that determinism makes everything exist necessarily. I have three responses to this. First, she must prove that determinism is true before she can claim it refutes my argument. To deny this is to affirm that it is legitimate for me to state that zombies disprove that the sky is blue. As debaters it is our burden to warrant our arguments rather than throwing around claims. It seems rather desperate to me that she would not only raise an entirely new objection to the LCA in the final round of the debate, but would refuse to warrant it. My second response to determinism is that it explains how things happened the way they did in a casual sense. It does not speak for why casual relationships exist themselves though. Sure, she can explain how X leads to Y, but it does not explain why X leads to Y, or more significantly why Y requires X to exist in the first place. In other words, it may explain how a contingent being came into existence, but not why it did. Knowing how does not make a being necessary. For a being to exist necessarily it must not have possibly failed to exist. The laws of mathematics exist necessarily due to their inability not to exist. You and I exist contingently because we could have failed to exist. Third, multiple worlds theory solves for the questions of determinism. Just because things have happened a certain way due to past events does not mean that the initial past events in the chain had to happen as they did. It holds plausible that those initial causes could have happened entirely differently in another world. Thus, each world, including ours, exists contingently as it developed as a result of certain events and did not have to develop the way it did.Next she claims that an infinite regress is not necessarily paradoxical because there can be an infinite number of points within a finite distance. This is a red herring as I am not claiming that an abstract infinite regress is impossible, but that a concrete system containing solely contingent beings is paradoxical. Using points A and B as boundaries, you create a finite system. Solely contingent beings could not be explained by a finite system insofar as there would always have to be another contingent being that explains the first being in the casual chain. This is why infinite regress becomes a problem in concrete reality and not in abstract mathematical equations.Next she claims that I simply don't know all of the causes and thus conclude that there cannot be an infinite number of causes. I agree that we may not know all of the causes, but this does not premise my argument. My argument comes from logic and modality. A system of only contingent beings, either finite or infinite, is logically incoherent. Logically there must be a necessary being that serves as a first cause. Even if there is an infinite number of causes, it must have a definitive beginning in a necessary cause.Her next argument (F4) supports the LCA. If the universe is not explained by its own nature, it is then contingent. If it is always changing then it is not eternal or necessary and thus is again contingent. The Fool has just proved my second premise true.Next, she must explain how we are begging the question in order to raise an objection with the fallacy. Simply throwing out fallacies in bare assertion is not a very convincing style of debate.As for inductive inference. I would say first that inductive inference is logical, and second that the LCA is a deductive argument.---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Finally my opponent presents her opening position once again. Remember that I have refuted it in round 2 and she has not defended it from those refutations.