A creator of the universe exists.

My opponent doesn't realize he must post a case that supports his point of view(namely God doesn't exist). Proving God is unnecessary doesn't prove he doesn't exist, but even so I refuted those arguments as I will continue to do in this round. Russell's TeapotMy opponent brings up a interesting analogy that seems to be the core of his case. He seems to think that positive truth claims bear a burden of proof while negative truth claims do not. He seems to use this false and misleading analogy to do it so if I must I will refute Russell's Teapot, but let me make one thing clear, negative truth claims have just a much burden of proof as positive truth claims, for example if I were to say the universe doesn't exist, I would have the burden of proof not you. Russell's Teapot while seems plausible on the face is really a false analogy. God may not falsifiable scientifically but God can be falsifiable philosophically. To assume that the criteria for falsifiablity would be to presuppose Scientism. AfRThere are big problems with my opponents refutation of the Argument from Reason. Obviously I was ready for this objection as I put a reason that this probably isn't the case in my last round argument. My opponent begs the question in his argument because he must presuppose that these beliefs are true given naturalism and evolution, this is why it is important to analyze this in terms of if naturalism and evolution were true. Remember that my opponent simply asserts that the probability of evolution selecting for true beliefs. For example if we had a belief that produced a belief that water is in the south, as long as the behavior actually made you go north and the water be north, what does it matter the truth validity? As long as something increases survival ability it doesn't matter the truth of such belief. The underlying neurology of human being may select for particular beliefs and these beliefs may when put into a certain neurology produce behavior which is favourable from a evolutionary standpoint. But nothing inside of that information specifically selects for true beliefs. This is the core of the argument for the conceptual links, because my opponent failed to justify. Plus another presupposition my opponent makes is the internalist claim that beliefs are naturally appealing. I do not find that true by necessity, and my opponent failed to justify that claim. My opponent must justify the externalist outlook and the conceptual links, or allow this argument to go threw. I should also mention my opponent has accepted(by not refuting) that Occam's razor(at least if the argument from reason stands) then it refutes the naturalistic/atheistic standpoint. So I would like make it clear even if one of my argument succeeds his core argument(which really isn't a argument for non-existence of God) fails. He says God isn't necessary but if God is necessary in one respect then my opponent loses. T. A. Now I would like to point out that my opponent admits that the early state of the universe, if it we were talking about the early state of the universe than it wouldn't be relevant. I am unclear about the context of you quote, but since we are talking about the early universe producing the early conditions for life(which is what is important) he needs to clarify if this quote applies to the early universe as well as now. If it does, does it also apply to all 37 constants(entropy,electromagnetic,strong nuclear force,etc) in the early universe? I am not saying it is impossible, it is simply highly unlikely. The premise only needs to be more likely than its denial to be considered valid. I have a sound deductive argument and my opponents assertions of infallibility to God or to my rebuttal of refutation can be seen as incoherent at best. The point of my opponents argument is too show some kind of inefficiency on the part of God. However, something outside a spacio-temporal realm cannot be bound by temporal reality and not by physical things as physical things did not exist yet. Remember this isn't begging the question I am just taking my opponents objection to its logical conclusion. With regards to the number he presses in this debate, I would like it would be really irrelevant if the universe never was conditioned for life at all. What I mean by this is that if this universe never was able to form the necessary elements for life or the formations of stars than the number of potential planets is irrelevant. Remember the number I gave at the beginning a figure, this figure applies to any universe. Furthermore, life requires many elements to exist. This number is debated(I have seen numbers up 24) but at least 5 elements is needed for sure(I am not explicitly talking about the construction of DNA). Granting the fine-tuning(since my opponent isn't disputing any of the other premises) deductively it follows logically that the universe is designed. The truth is if my conclusion follows logically than Paley's Watch is a applicable thought experiment that we can visibly compare. My opponent is likely to bring up Hume but we can compare the universe reliably to a watch for several reasons. One would be that it is extremely complex, along with regulated by natural laws, and the last one is that it is fine tuned. Now I am not presupposing this it was part of my initial argument in the first round. So being finely tuned seems to imply creation via Paley's Watch. This is supporting argument for the final conclusion of the teleological argument. KCAMy opponent seems to admit the second premise on the face at least. My opponent says we cannot reduce infinity to set of anything, this is correct. Infinity is a potential rather than a actual number, it is purely theoretical and has no qualitative value. My opponent mentions the volume of the universe, my opponent is right, the universe has a potential infinite volume. It would never actually reach a value of infinity as the concept is incoherent for practical applications. My opponent further puts his analogy even further with suggesting the mass is likewise infinite but unfortunately for my opponent this simply suggests the same thing. Infinity is introduced as a concept typical theoretical physics and mathematics not as a literal value in which it is suppose to suggest that infinity means actual number. But it doesn't matter in this case in which my opponent admits a beginning of the universe since my opponent affirms the big bang, he refute the Borde-Vilenkin-Guth theorem. My opponent has admitted fundamentally from a Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics that the universe began to exist. Now we confront that first premise once again. I would like to point out that my opponent has dropped the point about depending on the interpretation of quantum mechanics one adheres too. Regardless of the uncertainty principle, the virtual particles are caused nonetheless regardless of whether we are unsure of position, amount, or velocity. My questioning of connection between the principle of uncertainty was to clarify the point of contention however this doesn't help his case because of his presupposition of non-deterministic quantum mechanics, which my opponent seems to concede since he doesn't answer it. Furthermore, my opponent has not addressed the issue of ontological vs epistemological justifications of causation with regards to virtual particles. As to quantum vacuums, it is important to point out, because a vacuum isn't nothing we know that while if my opponent is right they may not be causally necessitated, they may very well be causally conditioned, in fact they must be causally conditioned in that they are reproducible within the quantum vacuum. So this appears to have no effect on the KCA rather confirm it. My opponent seems to not understand inductive argument, as he says probability isn't relevant to truth value this is clearly nonsense. ConclusionMy opponent has failed to justify his burden of proof while I have succeeded.