the Naturalist has better reason for the assumption that nature is uniform then the Christian

Meatros has added to the list I need to answer, but I welcome his thoughtful challenges. The reason I did not go through a list of rebuttals in my opening statement, is because it was just that: an opening statement. Contention 1 Meatros, in order to drive home his point, quotes a paper explaining that “From this philosophical perspective, scientific theory represents convenient intellectual structures for predicting or describing in more abstract terms observable data, not actual structures in the world.” In this statement is revealed the two classes of experiences that instrumentalism creates; scientific theories (T), which are really “convenient intellectual structures” and observable data (O). Now, since we lack access to the actual structures of the world, we use O in order to make our own intellectual structures (T). But, since we cannot simply compare T with the actual structures, we test T by how well it allows us to predict O. This is simple enough... provided there can exist a distinction between O and T, wherein we have real access to O and T is a construct. For, if O and T are identical, then the means of testing T is... well, by T. But Karl Popper noticed that predication transcends experience, even in the seemingly singular and mundane statements, providing him reason to reject instrumentalism: Here I will only say that I reject instrumentalism, and I will give only one reason for rejecting it: that it does not solve the problems of the 'abstract' or 'occult' or 'structural' properties. For such properties do not only occur in the 'abstract' theories which Berkeley and his successors had in mind. They are mentioned all the time, by everybody, and in ordinary speech. Almost every statement we make transcends experience. There is no sharp dividing line between an 'empirical language' and a 'theoretical language'... (1) Think about your eye. How is it that you “see”? Is it not through the process of light hitting your eye, which is then turned into signals sent to the brain, where it is then (usually) combined with signals sent from the other eye and interpreted into one image? Then, there is also a “blind spot” which is filled in! I could point out similar things in each of the other senses. There is no brute fact, only interpretations that might be described as “convenient intellectual structures”. So, in what way can something be justified because it 'works'? Contention 2 Would it be reasonable to assume that Nature is Uniform, given a deterministic, naturalistic universe? Yes, but only because you have already done so. How does one move from Naturalism to determinism? How is it that things are “determined”? The laws of nature? More specifically, the UoN. I wouldn't doubt that many Naturalists are determinists, but they are by nature of their belief in the UoN, not vice versa. And as for negating “outside” interruptions, I think that is fine. But what is it that prevents “internal” interruptions, or prevents there being chaos inside of a Naturalistic system instead of order? Contention 3 My confidence that God will continue to govern with regularity is not based upon some inductive generalization, but bases upon who God is, given his immutable character and nature. Contention 4 My opponent asks how I can extend God's governing the seasons to his governing of the cosmos. My answer is quite simple: I haven't. God's governing of the weather is just an example of his sovereignty, not the justification of it. As Nebuchadnezzar put it, “he does according to his will among the hosts of heaven and among the inhabitants of the earth; and none can stay his hand or say to him, 'What have you done?'” (2) Likewise, Job confessed that “no purpose of yours [God's] can be thwarted” (3) when confronted by “him who works all things according to the counsel of his will.” (4) On the other hand, what is the cause of the seasons but the tilt of the axis, earths orbit of the sun, etc? Likewise, what sort of physics and chemistry are needed for the weather patterns we have? And did not God, in the creation account, give the stars as signs for seasons, days, and years? (5) In fact, in Genesis, it seems as though God gives general purposes – along with regularities – to all of his creation. Does the day the sun stood still for Joshua mean it won't rise tomorrow? Do singular anomalies ruin our ability to do science, or overturn scientific theories? Do you think Newton would have revised his description of the motion of the planets if he had lived in Joshua's time? Did he revise it, knowing and believing the story of Joshua? Now, consider another problem raised with this example. One day the sun doesn't rise... or one day it doesn't go down. But is the sun rise actually a law of nature? Is it dependent on laws alone or is it also dependent on the size and rotation of the earth, etc.? In other words, there are varying degrees of regularity in observable events. Induction does not produce 100% certainty. But, it can produce nothing without regularities by which to generalize. God produces those regularities, albeit with sparse and obvious interruptions. Contention 5 My opponent has conceded that miracles presuppose the UoN (i.e. if it is an interruption of something, there must be something to interrupt), but now questions if we can distinguish between regularities and miracles. Now, it seems somewhat odd that Meatros on the one hand says he accepts my distinction between miracles and providence, but ends up questioning this very distinction. For, if it is by governing that God maintains the UoN, and by governing that miracles occur, then the difference between them must be that one is general, while the other is special. If we determine that a miracle is a special intervention or interruption then we cannot expect them to have regularity, but instead appear as anomalies. So, we should not expect something like the orbit moon to be considered miraculous (besides which, we have an example of its intended regularity described in Gen. 1:16). Meatros himself seems to be able to determine the difference between a miracle and a regularity, as demonstrated by his list of them in his opening statement. Contention 6 Meatros pithily points out that I have “doubled down” by quoting Van Til. Indeed I have. Meatros has twice quoted Kelly Clark in opposition to my position. But he is mistaken in his conclusion – it is not the lack of autonomy that undercuts Van Til, but the presence of it that undermines Clark. For, if autonomous reason “is the best (and only tool) that intellectually free human beings have to discover the truth”, then the obligation to believe anything is destroyed. God's revelation is not an authority to be obeyed, but an opinion to be scrutinized. Man becomes the measure of all things. And, if God's revelation were dependent on man's autonomous reasoning, by what means can man be said to be “without excuse”(6) when they do not honor God? Though, I do not have the ability, within this debate, to answer all of Meatros' challenges to presuppositionalism, I will try to also give a positive answer to Clark, by letting Van Til defend himself: God has absolute self-contained system within himself. What comes to pass in history happens in accord with that system or plan by which he orders the universe. But man, as God's creature, cannot have a replica of that system of God. He cannot have a reproduction of that system. He must, to be sure, think God's thoughts after him; but this means that he must, in seeking to form his own system, constantly be subject to the authority of God's system to the extant that this is revealed to him.(7) Sources 1. Popper, Karl. The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Kindle Locations 8014-25. 2. Dan 4:35, ESV 3. Job 42:2, ESV 4. Eph 1:11, ESV 5. Gen 1:14-15 6. Rom 1:20, ESV 7. Van Til, Cornelius. A Christian Theory of Knowledge, p. 16.