If God is omnipotent and omniscient, then God cannot be omnibenevolent at the same time.

What needs to be pointed out before I get into my argument is that my contentions need not be plausible or even true; they need only be possible for my opponent to fail in fulfilling his burden. My opponent has made the absolute claim that God cannot be omnibenevolent, omnipotent and omniscient simultaneously – he asserts that there is a necessary and explicit contradiction. If I can, at bare minimum, show that it is POSSIBLE for there to be no explicit contradiction then my burden is fulfilled and my opponent fails – for my opponent cannot say that what possibly can be, cannot be. =============== Contention 1: There are things even an omnipotent God cannot do =============== A world that contains free creatures is more valuable than a world that contains no freedom at all. It is indeed possible for God to create free creatures, but, as Plantinga points out, "He can't cause or determine them to do only what is right FREELY. To create creatures of moral good, therefore, He must create creatures capable of moral evil, and He can't give these creatures the freedom to perform evil and at the same time prevent them from doing so. (1)" To put it more simply by way of syllogism: P1: It is possible for said God (omnipotent, omniscient, and omni-benevolent) to create a being that has moral freedom. P2: If it is possible for said God to create morally free beings, then it is possible for said God to create a being who freely chooses to act evilly. C: It is possible therefore, for said God to create a being who then freely chooses to act evilly. This can account for evil acts. And with God, we can rightly call them evil as there is an objective standard by which to do so. Moreover, and with contention 1, God cannot force a free action – it is a logical contradiction. Stepping into modal logic here, let's take Bob as an example. Bob has a choice to beat up Larry. If the decision is a free one, then there must be a possible world where Bob beats Larry and also a possible world where Bob does not beat Larry. Now one of these worlds even God cannot actualize. Which world becomes reality depends on the free action of Bob, not God. =============== Contention 2: improper assumption =============== John Hick has pointed out the errant presupposition held by many propagators of the problem of evil (an assumption my opponent seems to hold) (2). They assume, like David Hume, that the purpose of an omni-excellent (this includes all three properties in question) God is to create a "hedonistic paradise. " Hick's analogy of their thinking is a human with a caged pet. In any respect that the animal's cage falls short of the veterinarian's ideal, then it is immediately attributed to a lack of benevolence, limited means, or both. David Hume talks of an architect that builds a home and if the economy of the home led to any discomfort or misfortune (e. g. noise, darkness, fatigue or etc. ) then we would not hesitate to blame the architect. And to argue that by changing a defect in the house would lead to more bad or less good would be in vain, as Hume said, "If the architect had had skill and good intentions, he might have formed such a plan of the whole, and might have adjusted the parts in such a manner, as would have remedied all or most of these inconveniences (3). " My opponent's observation would only be a valid one if his assumption that an omni-excellent God would want to create a hedonistic paradise on earth. But an alternative understanding would see earth not as what Heaven ought to be – an environment for perfected finite beings – but rather as an environment for finite beings who are in the process of being perfected. John Hick says it best when he writes: "For if our general conception of God's purpose is correct, the world is not intended to be a paradise, but rather the scene of a history in which human personality may be formed towards the pattern of Christ. Men are not to be thought of on the analogy of animal pets, whose life is to be made as agreeable as possible, but rather on the analogy of human children, who are to grow to adulthood in an environment whose primary and overriding purpose is not immediate pleasure but the realizing of the most valuable potentialities of human personality. " I certainly hope that my opponent does not suggests that a parent is a malevolent one if she wishes moral integrity, magnanimity, compassion, courage, humor, honesty, and the capacity for love as greater values than mere unalloyed pleasure. Certainly a parent will wish pleasure for their children, but is it morally deviant to see this NOT as the highest priority? =============== Contention 3: Our limited perspective =============== My opponent does not possess the necessary knowledge to determine evil. For it cannot ALWAYS be evil for one to suffer. Take for example a man who slowly awakes to find a woman cutting his stomach. The man will rightly fuss that such an action is evil! But say he finds out that the woman is a doctor who is trying to remove a malignant mass that will ultimately kill him. Will he not then realize that what he perceived to be evil was not evil at all? It is possible for our perceptions to be incorrect. Therefore our conceptions of natural evil may be incorrect. =============== Contention 4: Good and Bad? =============== My opponent defines good but not bad. The problem is, he presupposes an alternative objective standard by which we may determine good and bad. Such a presupposition will not be granted and needs to be explained. It is my contention that, if God does not exist, then neither does an objective standard for good and bad. If no objective standard for good or bad exists, then good and bad do not ACTUALLY exist at all – they are mere subjective ideas akin to one's favorite color. However, if God DOES exist, then there is an absolute and objective standard by which to judge good and bad. Since the crux of my opponent's argument hinges on the idea that, if God is truly omnibenevolent, he would prevent suffering where it occurs, it is my opponent's burden to prove that (1) it was not a result of free action and (2) it is not possible that such an event is occurring so that greater good may come. =============== Conclusion =============== My opponent's assumptions need to be explained and he needs to prove that it is NOT AT ALL possible for God to be omni-excellent. I look forward to his response. Sources: (1) . http://philofreligion.homestead.com... (2) . http://mind.ucsd.edu... (3) IBID