Physics is not able to determine whether or not A or B theory is true.

(As a note, the term "universal present" is not the conventional vernacular of relativity. When one wants to describe the notion that all observers will measure all events as taking place at the same time, the term "absolute time" or "absolute simultaneity" is invoked. If one wants to test whether the term "universal present" is a term used by relativity, they only need to do a google search of the term, and a concerning lack of information about relativity will come up.)Con completely skips over my argument, one which concludes that the fundamental vocabulary for this debate should be philosophical rather than scientific, and that scientific vocabulary should only be invoked when necessary. His argument is that physics is a science, so we should address this from a scientific perspective. While physics is certainly a science, we are not discussing an empirical question, and therefore are not discussing a scientific question. We are looking at the whole body of evidence from physics and debating what it can and cannot determine, which is a decidely non-empirical practice. To provide an analogy to academia, a meta-analysis of experiments is not an experiment in and of itself. We are not attempting to perform an experiment, but rather, we are using pure logic and thought, which is in the domain of philosophy. The fact that we are doing this in regards to physics is, as I argued in the previous round, only indicative of the fact that we doing philosophy of physics.It is also worth nothing that the crux of Con's argument is a conceptual mistake. While science defines a theory in empirical terms, there are non-scientific uses of the term "theory" which are not defined in empirical terms. When one refers to a "theory" in philosophy, they are simply referring to a philosophical position, one which is not always intended to be empirical. As an example of the fact that the use of the word "theory" does not always entail a scientific theory, one can look at abstract algebra and what is called "ring theory". This is a completely mathematical, non-empirical study of algebraic structures. It is a theory, but it is not empirical, and it is clearly not a theory in the scientific sense of the term. No philosopher has ever intended the "theory" in the A-series and B-series to mean a scientific theory.It is also apparent that Con has not read the literature on the arguments. Con asks how the scenario he described is consistent with the A or B theory. For one, the scenario he described is a classic re-telling of Einstein's interpretation of special relativity, and its implication of the relativity of simultaneity. The contemporary A-theorists who write in the philosophy of physics, such as Quentin Smith and William Lane Craig, do not even grant that this interpretation is accurate, so asking how this interpretation is consistent with the A-theory is confused. Con also makes a bizarre move in arguing that Einstein's special relativity is actually inconsistent with the B-theory as well. This would strike anyone who has read the literature as absurd, because anyone who has read the literature would know that most B-theorists take special relativity as a proof of their philosophy of time, while no contemporary A-theorist argues that it is inconsistent with the B-theory. Con's analysis is incorrect in that he is describing an epistemological problem between two observers, and not an ontological thesis about the reality of the past.Con asserts that my third paragraph commits the fallacy of the argument from ignorance. As somebody who is aware of what this fallacy is, I see no warrant for such an allegation, and no warrant is stated by Con other than the act of assertion. Considering Con's lack of argument, I can do nothing more than explain what the fallacy is, and why my third pargraph does not commit it. The fallacy of an argument from ignorance is one reasons that because nobody has proven a proposition to be true, it must be false, or because nobody has proven a proposition to be false, then it must be true. In order to address this claim, one must remember what this debate is about. We are debating whether or not the current state of physics allows it to determine whether or not a given philosophical view of time is false. Obviously, it follows from the nature of the debate that we will discuss what physics has established, and what physics has not yet established. I believe that Con read my remarks on what knowledge physics currently has and doesn't has, and erroneously inferred that must be making a fallacy of ignorance for simply describing what physical theories haven't been confirmed. If I have truly committed the fallacy of ignorance, then I invite Pro to point out which proposition I affirmed to be true on the basis that it has not yet been proven to be false, or which proposition I affirmed to be false on the basis that it has not yet been proven true. And remember, the argument is not that physics cannot say anything about either theory of time in principle, but that the current state of empirical evidence does not allow it to do so. This was the clarification stipulated in the beginning of the debate which Con agreed to.Con appeals to Newton's flaming laser sword in affirming that there is no connection between philosophy and science. While I fail to see the relevance to the resolution, I must note how comically self-contradictory this epistemological principle is.The principle states that what cannot be decided by experiment is not worth debating. This is viciously self-contradictory, for what experiment could possibly justify this principle? Furthermore, this principle puts severe epistemogical restraints on inquiry. What about debates on politics, religion, ethics, or literature? Was the Rhwandan genocide not worth talking about because there's no experiment which can determine whether or not it was unethical? Even Adler himself admits that his principle is incredibly restraining. As he writes in the essay that Con linked, "[Newton's flaming laser sword[ undoubtedly cuts out the crap, [but] it also seems to cut out almost everything else as well".Con's use of special relativity allows me to reiterate an important point in this discussion. Special relativity is a theory of inertial reference frames. It does not work with non-intertial reference frames, nor does it work on the quantum level. Therefore, it is only an approximation of physical reality, and is not strictly "true". For this reason, one cannot affirm a proposition to be false based on special relativity, but can only make the statement that if special relativity is true, then the proposition is false. Con seems to have missed this entire point when he devoted time to explaining what special relativity proves and disproves.Con has mischaracterized my position in his last round. At no point did I state that A or B theory could be empirically disproved. Rather, all I did was show that Con's initial two arguments, if they are both true, contradict each other. I would like Con to quote which portions of my argument stated, or even so much as implied, that I believe either of the two theories can be empirically falsified.In conclusion, Con has failed to offer any convincing arguments against the resolution, and my arguments in favor of the revolution clearly stand at this point in the debate.