Resolved: Sentience is of ethical relevance to the treatment of living things.

Framework Con seems to take it as a prima facie fact that morality is subject so that no one framework is more true. This is a bold claim or relativism that requires a thorough defense, a defense which Con does not provide and may not provide in the final round- per the R1 rules of no new arguments in final round on pain of disqualification. Moreover, each of my core arguments serves as an independent argument AGAINST relativism. Each argues for a binding morality that can support truth claims about what is right and wrong. This debate is clearly about competing ethical theories; the winner of the debate is whoever shows that sentience is/isn’t more likely to be relevant to ethical concerns. As such, refer back to my R3 1) and 2) that the multiplicity of moral systems should be weighed against each other to see which side of this debate is more likely. Multiplicity of ethical systems does not prove the validness of an ethical issue, but if highly likely ethical systems all suggest the same conclusion it stands to reason the conclusion is more likely to be true than false. If one could show that the most likely ethical systems justified the Holocaust, then it would absolutely mean the Holocaust was more likely ethical than not. But of course you cannot justify the Holocaust in such a way, since no tenable ethical system which supported the Holocaust would stand up to philosophical rigor. In fact, all the ethical systems I propose would vehemently condemn the Holocaust, demonstrating that weighing the multiplicity of ethical systems is in fact reliable. Obviously the tradition of Western philosophy value human life highly- my position is that the reason for this is because humans do possess uniquely relevant ethical traits. If Con’s position- that sentience is not relevant- is correct, she should be able to point out the glaring errors in the systems I put forward. Its not my fault if the burden is skewed- Pro had the option to run multiple ethical systems but chose not to. I only have to disprove one because she chose to put forward one, if she had advocated more then I would have to disprove more. Deep Ecology Con’s justifications are superficial at best. How does all life being interconnected prove humans have an ethical obligation to respect the diversity of life? Furthermore, the idea of all living things having a “purpose” relies on outdated Aristotelian teleology. What is the “purpose” of a ladybug? What justification do we have for believing anything has a purpose at all? Occam’s razor suggests we disregard such a claim in favor of theories unburdened by outdated teleology- for example literally all of the theories I advocate. Nothing about my theories implies that non-sentient agents must be neglected in ethical discourse. I can say that I must respect the autonomy and freedom of sentient beings while also maintaining we respect the diversity and value of non-sentient beings; there is no conflict between my ethical systems and deep ecology. Also, I don’t need to show that deep ecology takes into account sentience- it doesn’t- I just need to show that deep ecology does not necessitate that sentience be disregard in the realm of ethics. Deep ecology allows for additional constraints when sentient beings are involved and so does not negate the Resolution. 4,5. The central problem with Deep Ecology is its inability to define what the intrinsic value of a non-sentient being is. Note that all my questions from R3 go unanswered. Is it wrong to forcibly transplant a flower? How do I way the richness of life caused by building a museum to the loss of diversity caused by cutting down a patch of trees? Deep Ecology is too vague to be of any use. I maintain this is precisely because it relies on a teleology that makes no sense in a post-enlightenment world. 6. This double-bind reflects a misunderstanding of the Resolution. I only have to show that sentience is ethically relevant. I can clearly affirm the resolution by saying that sentience bestows an ethical distinction but also that non-sentient life has some ethical standing, though this standing is different from that of sentient beings. Such a position clearly demonstrates that sentience is an ethically relevant trait. Refer back to my arguments that both Utilitarianism and Emotivism offer some moral standing to non-sentient life. Anthropocentrism Noting that my advocacy allows room for ethical standing of non-sentient life is not empty rhetoric. For example, Discourse ethics derives ethical obligations out of the nature of discourse; such obligations do not discount the possibility that obligations of a different sort may exist toward non-sentient life, only that strict obligations DO exist for certain classes of sentient life that do NOT exist for non-sentient life. I do not need to derive a right to life for all sentient life- such a claim is well beyond the limits of the Resolution. The rights entailed by my B) and C) arguments aren’t applicable to infants and humans incapable of reason and so it is unproblematic that they are not included. Just because a being cannot express their preferences does not mean their preferences are discounted by utilitarianism- Con is conflating Discourse Ethics and Util. Util. requires that all preferences be taken into account, the ability to articulate those preferences is not relevant. This is why the utilitarian Peter Singer is a staunch animal rights advocate. First, utilitarianism does account for all human life. All humans have preferences and so fall within a utilitarian framework. Emotivism clearly provides ground for all life, as humans are repulsed by acts like infanticide. Con even argues that Deep Ecology is an extension of Emotivism- if Deep Ecology accounts for all human life then so does Emotivism. Additionally, my B) and C) don’t need to account for all human life because they don’t claim to. B) and C) set out to establish a limited set of rights and do only what they set out to do. Util I am not tied to Mill’s specific views, but anyways when I trip over my dog while he is asleep he jumps up and barks at me- seems to me like he felt my foot and perceived that I was to blame for waking him up. The evidence overwhelmingly suggests animals are sentient. Im not advocating rule util. I am advocating two-level util, which relies on rule util in the general cases but requires critical interpretation to determine when act utilitarianism is important. Moreover, Con has never provided an argument for how rule util collapses into act util. She just asserts it- so I assert that it does not. Rationalism and Discourse Nothing sneaky on my part- Con has failed to address any of the substance of these arguments. This, to me, suggests that she has no substantial argument against them. Due to the lack of attacks by Con, these are the most probably ethical systems in this round. On these systems alone I should win. Emotivism Again, the Double Bind is a misinterpretation of the Resolution, as I described above. You can’t just claim emotivism is true and then choose to disregard the moral sentiment that privileges sentient life. Emotivism requires us to inform ethics by our moral sentiments, so it privileges human life. Con has conceded that Emotivism is true and so concedes the Resolution. Conclusion I have presented 4 ethical systems that all make moral distinctions based on sentience. I contend that each of these theories is more adequate than Deep Ecology and so I have better supported the Resolution. Moreover, the multiplicity of the solutions shows how much more likely the Resolution is to be true than false. Even if you don’t accept this, I have also shown the Deep Ecology alone doesn’t demonstrate the irrelevance of sentience and so Con has failed to even present an ethical system that negates the Resolution.