The evidential argument from evil is valid.

Allow me to begin by thanking my opponent for his time and thorough argument. It would seem as though there are still many things we disagree on. While attempting to discredit the second premise of my argument, he has raised five separate assertions which aim to demonstrate theism's ability to predict natural evils. I have done my best to understand these five arguments, and I will respond to them in the order that they were presented in the previous round. After that, I will tackle his claim that theism is a simpler hypothesis than naturalism. Alright, let's see if we can make some more headway. C1: Naturalism is far more plausible than theism. 1: God is "morally perfect," but is also the definition of "moral perfection." My opponent's assertion that whatever God does is moral is tautological. Not only this, it is entirely vapid and devoid of any real content. Perhaps I can illustrate this point with an imaginary dialogue between myself and Chrysippus in which he attempts to explain what moral perfection is to me. Freeman: What is moral perfection? Chrysippus: God is morally perfect. Freeman: Ok, what does it mean to be morally perfect? Chrysippus: To be morally perfect is to have the moral characteristics of God. Freeman: Why does being morally perfect mean having the moral characteristics of God? Chrysippus: Because God is morally perfect by definition. Freeman: I think you might be arguing in a circle. Chrysippus: Perhaps. Under my opponent's circular concept of "moral perfection," God is entirely free to torture all conscious beings to the point of madness for no particular reason and still be "morally perfect" by definition. As such, this is not a rational way to deal with the argument from evil because the definition my opponent provides for moral perfection is tautological and self-serving. 2: There exists an equal and opposite force of evil that prevents God from alleviating all suffering. The claim that there is an "equal and opposite force" to God cannot possibly be valid. God, by definition, has no equals; he is all powerful. In other words, the so called "God" that my opponent has described in this section is made of nothing but straw. It is not the God of theism (i.e., an omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent God). So, even if my opponent's theological considerations on this point were completely valid, they would do absolutely nothing to undermine the truth of the second premise of my argument because the "God" he is defending isn't actually a theistic God. 3: God is morally perfect and cannot deal with physical things without becoming impure. To speak about God becoming "impure" by his contact with physical things is to speak in a manner that is not logically coherent. An omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent God cannot become corrupted or made "impure" by anything. It's not logically possible for a perfect and all powerful God to become "impure" anymore than it is logically possible for a circle to keep its shape and become a square. The properties at hand exclude each other by their very nature. Consequently, this argument defeats itself by being logically incoherent. 4: God has a morally sufficient reason to allow natural evils. It is not enough to claim that God might have morally sufficient reasons for allowing natural evils without specifying what those reasons are. Anything that doesn't defy logic is logically possible. Elvis could possibly be alive at this very moment swiveling his hips on the dark side of the moon. However, we have no good reasons to think that this is true. And we do have good reasons to suppose that it isn't true. As it so happens, his death in 1977 has proven to be a rather daunting obstacle for such a feat. Because I am using an evidential argument from evil, which involves the use of induction from known information, my opponent must provide some plausible reason why God would allow such a gratuitous amount of natural evils. Up until this point, he has not attempted to give any sort of solution to this issue. Furthermore, the claim that we live in the best of all possible worlds is truly amazing, given the realities of the world around us. Consider, for example, some of the ecological factors that drive evolution and that cause humans and animals to suffer. Tsunamis, earthquakes, volcanoes, flash floods, viral outbreaks, wild fires, famines and fatal diseases regularly contribute to the deaths of tens of millions of people each year. [1] For the moment, it is sufficient to realize that all of this suffering is much more likely to occur given naturalism than it is given theism because there are no good reasons to suppose that God would allow so much suffering; and as I've shown before, there are good reasons not to expect this under theism. Therefore, theism is very likely to be false with respect to the current state of the evidence. 5: Suffering exists, but it's our fault. Even if I were to grant the rather dubious theological assertions my opponent is assuming, his claim that humans have caused the existence of suffering would still be without merit. Humans could not possibly have caused suffering and natural evils to enter into the world because suffering and natural evils predate the existence of the human species. [2] The only possible way for my opponent to escape this particular criticism would be to argue for the truth of young Earth creationism. Needless to say, I would find that particular maneuver to be quite amusing. 6: (P3) Naturalism is more probable than theism independent of all evidence. My opponent claims that theism is a simpler hypothesis than naturalism because it makes less assumptions. However, this claim is completely false. Theism posits two different realms of causation, the natural and the supernatural realm. Naturalism only posits one realm of causation, the natural realm. Paul Draper summarizes this point quite well when he writes that, "On the one hand, theism postulates that one sort of entity--a perfect God--is the ultimate cause of other entities of a fundamentally different sort--natural entities. Naturalism, on the other hand, attributes one kind of ontological uniformity to the world: all entities that affect the natural world are themselves natural. Since naturalism attributes greater uniformity to reality than theism, it is simpler than theism in the crucial sense of the word." [3] Further, everything in science works under a purely naturalistic framework. If my opponent wants to misrepresent or deny well established mainstream science in physics or biology, he has a burden to demonstrate the truth of his claims. ::Conclusion:: Though I do admire my opponent's valiant attempt to uphold his side of the argument, I cannot help but conclude that the reasons he has given for rejecting the argument from evil are not satisfactory. Four of the five arguments he has used to try and discredit the second premise of my argument are logically incoherent. Similarly, his other assertion that God has sufficient reasons for allowing natural evils has not yet been properly supported. Moreover, his attempt to show that theism is a simpler hypothesis than naturalism is clearly reliant on a fundamentally distorted understanding of science and ontological simplicity. It goes without saying, this is a very precarious basis from which to assert that the evidential argument from evil is invalid. Sources: 1. Tyson, Neil DeGrasse. "Stupid Design." YouTube. 1 Dec. 2006. Web. 16 Nov. 2010. http://www.youtube.com... 2. Gibbons, A. "Human Evolution (2 of 2)." Evolution 101. University of California Berkeley, 2003. Web. 16 Nov. 2010. http://tinyurl.com... 3. Draper, Paul. "Natural Selection and the Problem of Evil." Secular Web: Atheism, Agnosticism, Naturalism, Skepticism and Secularism. 2007. Web. 15 Nov. 2010. http://tinyurl.com...