The Death Penalty--With a Twist!

Thanks to Kbub! I will now respond to Con's case.CON's CASECon's case can be very simply summarized by this excerpt from French existentialist Albert Camus: "But what is capital punishment if not the most premeditated of murders, to which no criminal act, no matter how calculated, can be compared? If there were to be a real equivalence, the death penalty would have to be pronounced upon a criminal who had forewarned his victim of the very moment he would put him to a horrible death, and who, from that time on, had kept him confined at his own discretion for a period of months. It is not in private life that one meets such monsters." [1] Con is arguing that, irrespective of how vile any criminal may be, revenge is never morally permissible, and that the death penalty is nothing more than that: revenge.Con's case, like Camus's assertion, rests on several faulty assumptions that I will attempt to expose and examine. I shall now embark on a section-by-section analysis of those flaws.Section OneThe first portion of Kbub's case ("my opponent...own violence") seems merely designed to score rhetorical points in a build-up to subsequent sections. Nothing much of substance is remarked upon at this stage, though Con does concede, interestingly enough, that "there may indeed be such instances of humans who are so evil that they deserve to die." Con also notes, specifically, that the Criminal described in the scenario: "symbolize[s] the worst of humanity--he is guilty of mass rape and murder...[he] does not seem remorseful in the least." Keep these quotes in mind, as they may become important later.Section TwoHere is where the substance of Con's case emerges, in this middle slice ("we know...heartless murder.")Con states that the defendant is no threat to anyone. Certainly, while this may be a philosophical discourse, that does not mean that we should abandon reality's reference points. Incarcerated wrongdoers could, theoretically, still find means of communication with their supporters, act as rallying points or living symbols of defiance, or even attempt to mount an escape. It is therefore, not wholly accurate to say that the criminal is no threat to anyone; yet, as this is not important to my own argument, I will not linger on this line of analysis. Rather, let us discuss the root of Con's objection to the death penalty as outlined in round one: P1: "The State is calculated and cunning...The State is cold and precise in its execution."P2: "What reason could the State have for enacting violence, if not for protection, accident, correction, or prevention? The answer of course is reciprocity."P3: "The State seeks neither change for the better nor morality, but revenge."This is not a syllogism, as P3 is not necessarily a direct derivative of P1 and P2, yet it describes Con's general logical flow well. The State is not acting on any pressing need, as one might do in an act of self-defense; nor is the state seeking to reform the criminal, since death is an absolute. What then is left, but to say that the State is acting on a vengeful influence? If the death penalty is vengeance, then, Con posits, it is nothing more than "cold and heartless murder."Let us deal with these problems one by one. I have three responses to make:Firstly, Con erroneously assumes that the State is the one choosing to put the criminal to death. Rather, it is the criminal choosing to have himself put to death. Surely, this logic seems counter intuitive, but if we refer back to my case we find that, while counter intuitive, it is not illogical. For example, let's say I am a parent, and I tell my child not to pilfer the cookie jar, or he will be placed into timeout. The child disregards my warning, and raids the cookie jar anyway. I confiscate the cookie, and send him to a timeout. Let's review: the child chose to act of his own volition. By choosing the course of action he did, he also accepted the consequences that may arise as a result of that decision. Therefore--indirectly--he chose to be put into timeout.In this example, the parent is the State, and the child is the Criminal. Similarly, by committing such heinous offenses, the Criminal chose the death penalty. The State set the possible punishment in advance, and it was the Criminal who chose to incur that penalty. Thus, the State cannot be accused of revenge any more than the parent can, because the Criminal and the child both chose to undergo their respective admonitions. So, when Con inquires, "what reason could the State have for enacting violence," we can respond by saying, "to respect the choices of individuals."Secondly, Con has failed to justify why revenge is inherently wrong. Let's consider what a wrong is, in a philosophical sense. When we think of wronging something, we envisage something that can think, or--at a bear minimum--can feel. It makes no sense to talk about wronging a chair, because, quite simply, what does the chair care if you incinerate it, feed termites with it, or saw it up? Therefore, "to say that a being deserves moral consideration is to say that there is a moral claim that this being has on those who can recognize such claims. A morally considerable being is a being who can be wronged." [2] Yet, not all beings who can be wronged, can wrong others. To wrong someone also implies a choice; if I accidentally spill wine on your brand new Armani suit, I haven't wronged you. If I did that deliberately, than I have done something wrong. So, while an animal can be wronged, it cannot wrong others. Animals are morally considerable, but not full moral agents like humans. That is why humans have a special dignity unlike other entities.So, to return from my digression, to wrong someone is normally construed to mean to violate their rights. Let's say there is a basket on bananas in the grocery store, and you and I are both bona fide members of banana-lovers anonymous. Yet, there is only one ripe banana left in the whole basket! So, we line up in true competitive spirit, and race towards the basket. I beat you to there and claim my prize! While I have denied you something you desired, perhaps I have even made you feel bad, I have not wronged you. You participated under fair conditions, and lost. Yet, if I purposefully tripped you during the race, I would have wronged you because I would've denied you your right to a fair chance at victory. If we recognize that a right is simply "to have a claim to something and against someone," [3] we can say that by tripping you up, I violated your claim to a fair race and your claim against me impeding your ability to compete.Dissimilarly, a criminal has no such claims. Rights are voluntary, and by my actions I can choose to give them up. A criminal, by choosing to act against just rules, has chosen to waive his rights. For instance, I have a right to freedom of intercourse (not sexual intercourse, but rather freedom of movement.) By choosing to commit theft, I waive my right to free intercourse and can be imprisoned. The worse my crime, the greater the rights I waive. Insofar as I commit some of the worst crimes possible, I waive my most fundamental rights--including, potentially--my right to life. Therefore, if I have no right to life, no right to free intercourse, etc. it is not wrong to deny me these things, because no rights violation actually occurs. Thus, I submit that revenge is not always wrong, because that assertion presumes that the person against whom revenge is being taken has a right against such revenge. Kbub may try to argue that revenge is inherently immoral in itself; but I will observe now that Con hasn't presented any substantive arguments supporting that claim. If and when such arguments are made, I will address them. Until such time, assuming that revenge is bad merely begs the question.Thirdly and finally, there is, perhaps, a contradiction in Con's own case. First, let me take a moment to define "revenge" as "to avenge (as oneself) usually by retaliating in kind or degree." [4] Clearly, any punishment meted out by law enforcement is an act of revenge. If I steal, and am imprisoned as a result, the State has retaliated against me. Con asserts that revenge is always wrong, as a moral absolute, with the statement: "there is no amount of immorality that excuses the State from acting immorally." Therefore, if an act entails revenge, it is always wrong. This would mean that any punishment for any crime was an immoral act.Yet, curiously, Con still asserts that punishment is morally permissible if it seeks to "modify behavior." In other words, rehabilitative punishment is acceptable, but retributive punishment is not. But this distinction falls flat. Even if I'm locked up in prison to modify my own behavior, it was still done as an act of retaliation, in kind or in degree. I did X, so now the State will do Y to me. Thus, if we accept Con's premise, we must abandon the notion of punishment altogether--even rehabilitative punishment. But Con seems unwilling to venture to this extreme, arguing that some punishment is allowable; hence, there is a contradiction in Kbub's case.Section ThreeI would just use this opportunity to note I have not used my case to demonize anyone. In fact, Con's opening, which talked about the vile nature of the Criminal, otherized the Criminal far more than my own discourse did.REBUTTALI believe Con has just given a cursory glance to my case. My framework has logical warrants in it, and I would urge Kbub to examine them more closely. If need be, I can always expound upon points later. But, as R2 was not meant for rebuttals, just constructives, that's all I'll say here, for now.SOURCES1 - http://www.iep.utm.edu...2 - http://plato.stanford.edu... 3 - http://www.animal-rights-library.com... 4 - http://www.merriam-webster.com...Thanks! I now hand things back over to Con...