Israel's military operations were aggression, not self defense:  Israel has sought to justify its military attacks on Gaza by stating that they amounted to an act of 'self-defense' as recognized by Article 51, United Nations Charter. This contention should be rejected: the rocket attacks on Israel by Hamas deplorable as they were, did not, in terms of scale and effect amount to an armed attack entitling Israel to rely on self-defense. Under international law, self-defense is an act of last resort and is subject to the customary rules of proportionality and necessity.  Operation Cast Lead caused the deaths of over 1,400 Palestinians, over 300 of whom were children, injured 4,500 more and resulted in the destruction of schools, mosques, houses, UN facilities and government buildings. If, as Israel has stated, Cast Lead was carried out in accordance with the terms of international law, and the safeguards incorporated into the contemporary law of war, then Israeli forces had a duty to protect civilian infrastructure under the fourth Geneva Convention. The death and destruction that Israeli forces wrought throughout the Gaza Strip was not commensurate with the losses caused by Hamas rocket fire, no matter how horrific those attacks may have been.  Israel’s actions amount to aggression, not self-defense, not least because its assault on Gaza was unnecessary. Israel could have agreed to renew the truce with Hamas.(15) Israel's attack on Gaza was also not an act of last resort. Israel could and should have tried to negotiate a truce with Hamas based on the principle that Hamas stop firing rockets at Israel in return for Israel lifting its siege on Gaza. This is the deal Hamas offered Israel before it started Operation Cast Lead, and Israel should have taken it then and seen how went before resorting to military force.(6)  Israel arguably provoked the entire conflict by targeting Palestinian civilians with its blockade on Gaza. According to Hebrew University international law expert Yuval Shani, "It is my opinion that in this situation, and given the question marks regarding Israel's status in Gaza and Gaza's long-standing dependency on Israel, cutting off its water and electricity supplies would be equivalent to a direct attack on a civilian target, especially given that the motive for doing so is one of collective punishment, which is, in itself, a problematic motive."(26) Hamas had offered to renew the ceasefire if Israel reopened Gaza's border crossings. The strip had been sealed by Israel in an economic siege aimed at toppling Hamas. The blockade had brought the territory near economic collapse.(21) Therefore this blockade must be seen as the true cause of the conflict, and thus Operation Cast Lead was not a legitimate act of self-defense.  The lack of efficacy of Operation Cast Lead also undermines its legitimacy as 'self-defense': while Hamas's offensive capacities were blunted for a while, the likelihood, as with Hezbollah after Lebanon in 2006, is that it will quickly rebuild its military strength. Indeed, the assassinations of its leaders by Israel over the years- and the raids on its weapons workshops- did little to limit its rise to power.(16) Israel's overall strategy, moreover, is not one of 'self-defense' against Hamas, but rather to make ordinary Palestinians suffer in hopes of creating ill will toward their Hamas government. This is why, beginning in 2007, Israel cut back fuel shipments for Gaza’s utilities, and why, in the aftermath of the bombings, 800,000 Gaza residents were deprived running water. As Sari Bashi, the executive director of Gisha, an Israeli human rights group that works on Gaza issues, argued: “The Israeli policy on Gaza has been marketed as a policy against Hamas, but in reality it’s a policy against a million-and-a-half people in Gaza.”(10) Rashid Khalidi added to this argument: "This war on the people of Gaza isn’t really about rockets. Nor is it about 'restoring Israel’s deterrence,' as the Israeli press might have you believe. Far more revealing are the words of Moshe Yaalon, then the Israeli Defense Forces chief of staff, in 2002: 'The Palestinians must be made to understand in the deepest recesses of their consciousness that they are a defeated people.'"(17)  Israeli internal politics may also have played a role in determining the size and scope of Cast Lead. Israel was preparing for general elections on 10 February 2009. The prospect of a return to power by the hawk Benjamin Netanyahu, leader of the right-wing Likud party, promising tough action against Hamas, hardened the positions of Israel's more moderate political leaders, and may have caused them to launch such an operation to 'look tough', rather than judging its proportionality on its own merits.(21)Therefore Operation Cast Lead should be regarded not as legitimate self-defense, but rather as an act of aggression against the Palestinian people of Gaza, and consequently w