Unanimity requirement gives an enormous bargaining leverage to the hands of individual states  Unanimous voting provides states seeking additional gains with a tool to actually achieve their egoistic goals. In order for the whole Union to pass legislation that would be beneficial to all, a single state has power to negotiate further benefits for itself, thus holding up a deal and sometimes making it less beneficial for others. Similar concerns were expressed in the EU Commission White Paper on European Governance as consensus requirement “often holds policy-making hostage to national interest”. [1] What is more, such behavior sets dangerous precedents that nations can put national interests in front of communal, effectively deteriorating the cooperative spirit of the EU and eventually destroying it altogether. As Sieberson claims [2] , such was the case of French objections to the Treaty of Rome regarding the wider use of qualified majority voting in the fields of agriculture and the internal market. In the ‘empty chair crisis’ France boycotted Council meetings for seven months, until the deal called Luxembourg accord [3] was struck. “The Luxembourg accord is widely believed to have created a period of stagnation in the Community… Paul Craig describes this period as “the prime example of negative intergovernmentalism.” [4] It prevented consolidation of Europe and ensured the EC remained intergovernmental by effectively curtailing qualified majority voting as any state could veto by invoking national interests.  [1] European Governance, A White Paper 2001, Commission of the European Communities, pp. 29, viewed 29 September 2013, &lt;  .  [2] Sieberson, SC 2010, ‘Inching Toward EU Supranationalism? Qualified Majority Voting and Unanimity Under the Treaty of Lisbon’, Virginia Journal of International Law, vol. 50, no. 4, pp. 934, viewed 29 September 2013, &lt;  .  [3] Eurofond 2007, Luxembourg Compromise, viewed 29 September 2013, &lt;  .  [4] Sieberson, SC 2010, ‘Inching Toward EU Supranationalism? Qualified Majority Voting and Unanimity Under the Treaty of Lisbon’, Virginia Journal of International Law, vol. 50, no. 4, pp. 934, viewed 29 September 2013, &lt;  .