If terrorists were really unintelligent and unimaginative enough to be beaten by such a blunt tool as security profiling, we would have been able to stop them long ago and would not have the difficult security situation we do now. Rather, if we introduce invasive security profiling similar to the procedures used in Israeli airports, terrorists will simply adapt their methods in order to circumvent it. Terrorists will recruit from different, non-profiled groups. They will alter their dress and train their operatives to act differently.  With respect to American air transportation, al-Qaeda already appears to be changing its tactics in response to the stricter screening and checking processes introduced by the Department for Homeland Security: since 9/11, two attempted attacks on US aviation involved a non-Arab Nigerian and a Briton with the last name of “Reid.” [1]  Terrorists can adapt in countless ways which will render security profiling not only useless but also counter-productive. Innocent men and women who fit the profiles designed by the security services are subjected to further scrutiny when passing through airports. In American airports, they are frequently removed from queues by TSA officials, segregated from other passengers and exposed to close contact body searches. Prima facie, these individuals will understand that they have been singled out because of their race or religion. This does nothing to address or rebut religious radicals’ attempts to portray America as inherently racist and imperialist, and its foreign policy as arbitrary and cynical. The resolution may serve to alienate migrant communities that could otherwise provide valuable intelligence to the security services. Members of these communities will be less likely to voice their concerns if they feel that the authorities will use the information they provide to justify further summary searches and interrogations of air passengers.  Moreover, an Israeli-style profiling system would simply not be scalable to the volume of passengers passing through major airports in America or other countries larger than Israel. As Mark Thompson argues: "I think it’s pretty clear that the reason a “profiling” system would not work and indeed has not been attempted in the US is that it’s not scalable. Israel has one major airport, which by US standards would only be “mid-sized.” Yet look at the security line at that airport, which is more befitting of Newark or Atlanta than it is of Pittsburgh or St. Louis. A good profiling system is labour-intensive in a way that our system simply does not have the capacity to implement, and would unacceptably undermine the numerous sectors of our economy that rely heavily on air transportation. And this says nothing of the direct economic costs of appropriately training and paying security officers charged with conducting the profiling. Nor, as the article above suggests, does it say anything about eliminating the bureaucratic infighting and secrecy amongst American intelligence agencies in a manner that would allow tens of thousands of airport security personnel access to the intelligence necessary to adequately do their jobs." [2]  [1] Thompson, Mark. "Profiling, Political Correctness, and Airport Security." The League of Ordinary Gentleman. 29 November 2010.   [2] Thompson, Mark. "Profiling, Political Correctness, and Airport Security." The League of Ordinary Gentleman. 29 November 2010.