Negative campaigning leads to negative governance.  Information on demographics, on taxation rates, on the state’s finances are made publically available precisely so that voters can arrive at reasoned, rational and nuanced decisions as to whom they should vote for. Governments are judged by evidence of the efficacy of their policies.  Analysis conducted by political scientists William Riker, Michael Davis and Michael Ferrantino [i] show that where negative campaigning is permitted, even politicians with no history of running attack campaigns will adopt aggressive electoral tactics. If a politician wins on a positive platform- by promising to implement new policies and reform existing ones- then his chances of re-election will be affected by his success or failure in bringing about those changes. The electorate are able to test and assess a politician’s positive claims. However, if a politician campaigns on a negative platform, portraying his opponent as incompetent or his policies as damaging, an electoral victory will make such claims unassailable. The attacking politician will be free to state that his election has prevented the dire consequences he warned from coming about. Non one will be able to prove otherwise, notwithstanding the spluttering of his defeated opponent.  By portraying opponents as reckless or dangerously radical, an attacking politician immediately sets himself up as the lesser of two evils. This may do little to convert undecided voters, but it still allows the successful candidate to take credit for “protecting” the electorate. Although this strategy may be the easiest to implement, it does not fit with the ideal of critical and ideological transparency that characterises contemporary liberal states.  The increasing amount of information produced by governments, think tanks, universities and political parties is intended to make the state- and the electorate- more responsive to the success and failure of particular policies. By closing the gap between the proposal of a policy, its implementation and the indicators of its success, information-led democracy supposedly makes governance and democratic choice more efficient. Negative campaigning circumvents this feedback system. It distorts ideas, by misrepresenting them and rendering them unacceptable, before any objective assessment of their merits has taken place.  Moreover, negative portrayals of candidates and policies, as noted above, are more likely to dominate media coverage, than the sober, balanced information produced by academics and analysts. This line of argument also leads to equally damaging distortion of the attacking candidate’s platform and proposals. By diverting resources to negative campaigning and attack adverts, candidates have less time and money to expend on the creation of positive policies. Indeed, the fewer testable claims that a candidate makes about his own policies, the less likely he is to be subject to effective criticism by opponents or the electorate if he takes up office.  Negative campaigning incentivises a distant, evasive, conservative approach to government. It creates an adversarial relationship between politicians and those wishing to gather and disseminate information about the effects of policies – academics, political analysts and engaged citizens.  [i] The Rational Attacker in Russia? Negative Campaigning in Russian Presidential Elections. Sigelman, L and Shiraev, E. New York University, April 2001.