The justification for the second bomb relies principally upon the argument that Japan would presume there was only one A-bomb if another was not dropped, so the destruction of Nagasaki was a necessary evil to force surrender just as much as that at Hiroshima. Indeed senior Japanese figures did argue that there was only one bomb, and even in one case that the bomb dropped on Hiroshima was not atomic at all, simply a very big conventional bomb. The Chief of the Naval General Staff Toyoda Soemu thought “it is questionable whether the United States will be able to use more bombs in rapid succession.” [1] This was a view that Anami Korechika, the army minister, shared until it was shattered by the second bomb although even then he said “The appearance of the atomic bomb does not spell the end of war” [2]  [1] Admiral Toyoda quoted by Sadao Asada, ‘The Shock of the Atomic Bomb and Japan’s Decision to Surrender - A Reconsideration’ in Hiroshima in History: The Myths of Revisionism, p.37.  [2] Army Minister Anami quoted by Sadao Asada, ‘The Shock of the Atomic Bomb and Japan’s Decision to Surrender - A Reconsideration’ in Hiroshima in History: The Myths of Revisionism, p.40.