The incentive for corruption and self-enrichment in office is increased by term limits:  With term limits, a legislator will, after he enters his final permitted term of office, not have to face the electorate again, meaning he can do whatever wants, to an extent. This encourages corruption and self-enrichment on the part of legislators in their final term of office when they do not need to face the people to answer for poor management. There is likewise less incentive to follow through on election promises to supporters, since their withdrawing support can have little tangible impact on a lame duck. A study into term limits in Brazil found that "mayors with re-election incentives are signi?cantly less corrupt than mayors without re-election incentives. In municipalities where mayors are in their ?rst term, the share of stolen resources is, on average, 27 percent lower than in municipalities with second-term mayors."(Ferraz, 2010) Furthermore, lame duck politicians can devote time to buddying up to businesses and organizations in order to get appointments to lucrative board seats after they leave office. This has often been the case in Western democracies, where former parliamentarians, cabinet ministers, senators, etc. find themselves being offered highly profitable positions upon their retirement (Wynne, 2004). Imposing term limits necessarily increases this sort of behavior, as politicians look more toward their retirement during their final years of office, rather than to the interests of the people. 1 Ferraz, Claudio and Finan, Frederico, (2010). "Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments" Berkeley, 2 Wynne, Michael. 2004. "Politics, Markets, Health and Democracy". University of Wolongong.