onal americas politics government house wants line item veto amendment

The present system of earmarking in Congress is wide open to abuse. The party leaderships in each house can use the offer of pork, or the threat to withhold it to enforce party discipline. “Logrolling” occurs whereby an earmark is obtained in return for support on an unrelated piece of legislation. All this leads to legislators who put party above country and vote for bad legislation in pursuit of their own vested interest. They basically “are federal dollars that members of Congress dole out to favor seekers — often campaign donors. In the process, lawmakers advocate for the companies, helping them bypass the normal system of evaluation and competition.”1Forcing pork out in the open by making Congress vote to defend it after a Presidential line-item veto is the best way to remedy matters. Overall the President is more accountable to the people as a whole than individual representatives, and with their national mandate, more able to stand up to powerful interest groups.  1 David Heath and Hal Bernton, $4.5 million for a boat that nobody wanted, The Seattle Times, 15/10/07 , accessed 5/5/11

There are other means by which cutting earmarks could be achieved, without the drastic step of mutilating the work of the Founding Fathers. For a start, Congress could just ban the use of earmarks, unfortunately an attempt in 2010 was defeated 39-56 in the Senate.1 Existing rescission powers could be toughened by requiring Congress to hold a prompt vote on Presidential requests for appropriations cuts, rather than ignoring them as invariably happens now. The Impoundment power removed in 1974 could be restored. The convention that spending items in committee reports should be binding on the executive could be challenged. And the practice of legislating massive omnibus spending bills could be ended; more, smaller and more focused bills would make pork more obvious and make it more viable for a President to veto a whole bill without causing the federal government to collapse for want of funding.  1 Rushing , J. Taylor, 'Senate votes down ban on earmarks 39-56', The Hill, 30/11/10,accessed 5/5/11

The use of the line-item veto power by President Clinton in 1997 demonstrates the advantages of such authority. Although the power was declared unconstitutional in 1998 by the Supreme Court, while he held it Clinton demonstrated what could be achieved. He acted cautiously, only cancelling 82 appropriations, but these totalled nearly $2 billion1– a useful contribution in itself to reducing the federal deficit, and one that suggested that much bigger savings could be achieved by a more determined President. The Congressional Budget Office agreed according to the Congressional Budget Office "The 1997 cancellations had a relatively small impact on the budget's bottom line, but that outcome may have resulted in part from temporary factors, such as last year's balanced budget agreement."2 This period also demonstrated that Congress would still retain the power of the purse, as it was able to overrule one of Clinton’s deletions, on the Military Construction bill worth $287billion, by majority vote in both houses.3  1 It is time for congress to kill the pig, Center for individual freedom, 11/11/04, accessed 6/5/11  2 The line item veto act after one year’, Congressional Budget Office, April 1998, accessed 6/5/11  3 Marc Lacey, ‘Senate Votes 1st Override of Clinton Line-Item Vetos, Los Angeles Times, 26/2/1998, accessed 6/5/11

This amendment would only give the President a limited power for a limited but worthwhile purpose. The media and interest group scrutiny that accompanies the Presidency will ensure that the White House will have to justify every line-item decision made. It does not affect the Congress's power regarding policy-making, entitlement programmes or taxation. Indeed, it is little different to the existing convention of executive "Signing Statements" whereby the President can sign legislation while making it clear his intention not to fully implement aspects of it. It would create a budgetary separation of powers between the president and congress so introducing checks and balances against the abuse of power.1  1 Ferro, Lucas and De Magalhaes, Leandro M. 'Budgetary Separation of Powers in the American States and the Tax Level: A Regression Discontinuity Design', Bristol University, Oct 2009,accessed 5/5/11

The constitution should not be amended  We should always be cautious of altering the United States’ Constitution. Once an amendment is passed, it is extremely hard to overturn, even if its consequences are clearly negative (as the experience of constitutionally-mandated prohibition of alcohol should make clear). It would be both difficult and unnecessary. There are problems of wording and interpretation. The 1996 Act covered 22 pages and went into great detail to define the extent and limits of Presidential authority under the legislation, including the exact meanings of “single item of appropriation”, ''direct spending'' and ''limited tax benefit'', as well as the means by which Congress could override his decisions.1 It is hard to believe that a one-paragraph amendment to the Constitution could achieve such precision, opening the budgetary process up to confusion, shifting interpretation and constant legal challenge. It is also unnecessary. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia argues "The short of the matter is this: Had the Line Item Veto Act authorized the president to 'decline to spend' any item of spending ... there is not the slightest doubt that authorization would have been constitutional… What the Line Item Veto Act does instead -- authorizing the president to 'cancel' an item of spending -- is technically different."2 Thus the act could simply have been worded differently in order to make it constitutional. This would not change the substance of the ability of the ‘veto’ to cut spending.  1 One hundred fourth Congress of the United States of America at the second session, “Line Item Veto Act”, 3/1/1996, The Library of Congress, accessed 6/5/11  2 Supreme Court Justice Scalia quoted in Michael Kirkland, ‘Under the U.S. Supreme Court: Like the South, will line item veto rise again?’, upi.com, 17/4/11 accessed 6/5/11  improve this  COUNTERPOINT  "I do not take these matters lightly in amending the Constitution. However, I am convinced in this case it is the only way to provide the President with the same authority that 44 Governors already have to influence spending."1It would in general be preferable to make such a change through normal legislation, but that was attempted in 1996 and found unconstitutional. Supreme Court Justice Stevens in his majority opinion for the Supreme Court argued that it was necessary for there to be an amendment to make it constitutional, "If there is to be a new procedure in which the president will play a different role in determining the text of what may "become a law", such change must come not by legislation but through the amendment procedures set forth in Article V of the Constitution."2  1 Item veto constitutional amendment hearing before the subcommittee on the constitution of the Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives, 23/3/00, accessed 5/5/11  2 Clinton, President of the United States, et al. v. City of New York et al. No.97-1374, United States Supreme Court, 1998,accessed 5/5/11  improve this  APPENDIX

Has made little difference in the past  The precedent of the Line Item Veto Act under President Clinton should warn against a constitutional amendment. The sums saved were laughably small, $355 million, in the context of the entire federal budget, $1.7 trillion, (0.02% of spending)1 but nonetheless provoked considerable friction between elected representatives and the White House. There was unhappiness that the large majority of his cuts were of earmarks requested by Republican members, and an allegation that the Administration had threatened a Congressman with the veto of an item dear to them unless they supported an unrelated piece of legislation.  1Virginia A. McMurty, 'Enhancing the President's Authority to Eliminate Wasteful Spending and Reduce the Deficit', Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information, Federal Services and International Security Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Committee Hearing 15/3/2011, p.9

A President would be able to abuse the power given to them in a line-item veto authority, leveraging it into undue influence over other elements of the legislative process. By threatening to veto items dear to particular Congressmen, they could obtain assent to bills, treaties and appointments that otherwise would not be forthcoming. Such intimidation would be subtle and hard to prove, but it would erode checks on the executive and fundamentally alter the balance of power within the constitution. This means that budgets are politicised even more than is currently the case. When the line item veto was previously used by Clinton republicans such as Rick Santorum argued that every decision "has political overtones, but that's fine, it comes with the territory," Senator Ted Stevens went further "We're dealing with a raw abuse of political power by a president who doesn't have to run again".1  1 Hugliotta, Guy and Pianin, Eric, 'Line-Item Veto Tips Traditional Balance of Power', Washington Post, 24/10/97,accessed 5/5/11

We should always be cautious of altering the United States’ Constitution. Once an amendment is passed, it is extremely hard to overturn, even if its consequences are clearly negative (as the experience of constitutionally-mandated prohibition of alcohol should make clear). It would be both difficult and unnecessary. There are problems of wording and interpretation. The 1996 Act covered 22 pages and went into great detail to define the extent and limits of Presidential authority under the legislation, including the exact meanings of “single item of appropriation”, ''direct spending'' and ''limited tax benefit'', as well as the means by which Congress could override his decisions.1 It is hard to believe that a one-paragraph amendment to the Constitution could achieve such precision, opening the budgetary process up to confusion, shifting interpretation and constant legal challenge. It is also unnecessary. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia argues "The short of the matter is this: Had the Line Item Veto Act authorized the president to 'decline to spend' any item of spending ... there is not the slightest doubt that authorization would have been constitutional… What the Line Item Veto Act does instead -- authorizing the president to 'cancel' an item of spending -- is technically different."2 Thus the act could simply have been worded differently in order to make it constitutional. This would not change the substance of the ability of the ‘veto’ to cut spending.  1 One hundred fourth Congress of the United States of America at the second session, “Line Item Veto Act”, 3/1/1996, The Library of Congress, accessed 6/5/11  2 Supreme Court Justice Scalia quoted in Michael Kirkland, ‘Under the U.S. Supreme Court: Like the South, will line item veto rise again?’, upi.com, 17/4/11 accessed 6/5/11  improve this  COUNTERPOINT  "I do not take these matters lightly in amending the Constitution. However, I am convinced in this case it is the only way to provide the President with the same authority that 44 Governors already have to influence spending."1It would in general be preferable to make such a change through normal legislation, but that was attempted in 1996 and found unconstitutional. Supreme Court Justice Stevens in his majority opinion for the Supreme Court argued that it was necessary for there to be an amendment to make it constitutional, "If there is to be a new procedure in which the president will play a different role in determining the text of what may "become a law", such change must come not by legislation but through the amendment procedures set forth in Article V of the Constitution."2  1 Item veto constitutional amendment hearing before the subcommittee on the constitution of the Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives, 23/3/00, accessed 5/5/11  2 Clinton, President of the United States, et al. v. City of New York et al. No.97-1374, United States Supreme Court, 1998,accessed 5/5/11  improve this  APPENDIX