Airstrikes would likely be politically ineffective  Military intervention, unless launched against the Sudanese state itself, was very unlikely to have been effective.  While a no-fly zone would have limited the participation of the Sudanese air force in Darfur, the Sudanese air force was and is not vital to the continued genocide, as Sudanese ground forces and the Janjaweed would still be able to operate.  Any air operations would furthermore have required over flight rights from Libya, Egypt, Ethiopia and either Somalia or Eritrea. Libya until Gaddaffi’s overthrow was unlikely to work with the West, and the new government is moving closer to Khartoum . [1] Chad would have feared military retaliation, whereas Revolutionary Egypt is in no condition to make major decisions about anything. Both Ethiopia and Eritrea have human rights concerns of their own.  Avoiding overflights would limit NATO to using carrier based aircraft from the Red Sea that would have had to cross more than a 1000 KM of Sudan to reach the area. This would have made it very difficult to supply a force in Darfur and would have limited operational effectiveness even of the air force.  As for the deployment of ground troops, there are few overland supply routes to the Darfur region, and supplying a military force there would have been next to impossible with the opposition of a still existent Sudanese government.  [1] Newman, Alex, ‘Libya Rulers Vow ‘Integration’ with Sudan Terror Regime’, NewAmerican, 26 November 2011,