The war in Afghanistan is necessary for US and NATO security  The timetable for withdrawal from Afghanistan means withdrawing by the end of 2012, regardless of the security situation, and handing over the conflict against the Taliban and Al Qaida (which will almost certainly still be going on) to a largely Afghan force which is ill-prepared to handle the war on its own. This means that proponents of the timetable withdrawal must support pulling NATO forces out of Afghanistan even if the war is going badly at the end of 2012 and it is clear that the withdrawal will benefit the Taliban and Al Qaeda on the battlefield. "Afghan forces simply do not currently have the capacity to do the protecting themselves at this point and, given the challenges of building up new institutions in Afghanistan after decades of war, will not necessarily have the ability until by the end of 2012.” US and NATO forces are needed to mentor and partner with Afghans as they build up an army and police force largely from scratch. Withdrawing before this task is completed adds up to a prescription for a drying up of intelligence and a Taliban victory. [1]  If the Taliban were thus to come to power in Afghanistan after the timetabled withdrawal, al-Qaeda would not be far behind. The USA's top nemesis would be able to salvage a victory in the very place from which it launched the 9/11 attacks eight years ago. Al-Qaeda would have its favourite bases and sanctuaries back, as well as a major propaganda win. [2]  This defeat for the West in Afghanistan would embolden its opponents not just in Pakistan, but all around the world, leaving it open to more attacks. [3]  The West has a security interest in preventing the region from slipping into a maelstrom of conflict. Pakistan, with 170m people and nuclear weapons, is vulnerable to the Taliban’s potent mixture of ethnic-Pushtun nationalism and extremist Islam, as its state power is tenuous. Anarchy in Afghanistan, or a Taliban restoration, would leave it prey to permanent cross-border instability. [4]  Therefore success in Afghanistan is key to the security in Pakistan. The US has even more reasons to care about the security of Pakistan when the India-Pakistan conflict is considered, especially as both sides of this have nuclear weapons. India and Pakistan have come within a hair’s breadth from nuclear conflict twice over Kashmir. If Pakistan were to fall apart, it would potentially leave nuclear weapons and a large military in the hands of extremist Muslim groups, which could lead to a regional war with India. It is a compelling and vital American interest to prevent nuclear conflict in South Asia—which makes “fixing” Afghanistan in some way also a vital American interest, even if this means keeping the troops there past the timetabled withdrawal. [5]  The War on Terror cannot be won if the US and NATO pull out of Afghanistan and rely more simply on offshore military resources. During the 1990s, when the US tried to go after Osama bin Laden without access to nearby bases by using ships based in the Indian Ocean, the two- to four-hour flight times of drones and cruise missiles operating off such ships made prompt action to real-time intelligence impractical. [6]  Since 1979, the US has been involved in a long, complex conflict against Islamic extremism. It has fought this ideology in many ways in many places, and it is uncertain now how this conflict will evolve. However the US should understand that the conflict is unavoidable and that when extremism pushes, it is in the US and NATO'S long-term interests to push back — and that eventually, if they do so, extremism will wither. [7]  The timetabled withdrawal from Afghanistan could mean withdrawing before this struggle has been won, and handing a base for exporting terrorism to the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Security comes before other state interests, largely because the rights of all citizens depend on their security first, and so the security dimension here is key. Therefore, in order to protect the security of the US and other NATO countries, the timetable for withdrawal from Afghanistan should be abandoned, and the troops should remain there until the job is done.  [1] Bruce Riedel, Bruce and O'Hanlon, Michael. "Why we can't go small in Afghanistan". USA Today. September 4, 2009   [2] ibid  [3] The Economist. "Obama's War". 15 October 2009.   [4] ibid  [5] Foust, Joshua. "The Case for Afghanistan: Strategic Considerations". Registan. 27 August 2009.   [6] Bruce Riedel, Bruce and O'Hanlon, Michael. "Why we can't go small in Afghanistan". USA Today. September 4, 2009   [7] Brooks, David. "The Afghan Imperative". New York Times. 24 September 2009.