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Reducing nuclear arms through New START will not compel others to stop pursuing nukes. The logic behind New START asserts that for every neg­ative development in the area of nuclear proliferation the US needs to take a substantive step in the direction of nuclear disarmament. Ultimately, this approach effectively assumes that the possession of nuclear arms by the US (and Russia) is the incentive driving other nations to pursue nuclear weapons programs so as to be able to deter the United States. Not only is the assumption misplaced, but the policy will undermine deterrence and increase the likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons. It is foolish for the U.S. to take substantive steps toward nuclear disarmament at the same time the nuclear proliferation problem is growing worse. [1] The US should also not seek to improve relations by bribing them with New START at the cost of damaging US defence capabilities.  [1] Spring, Baker. "Twelve Flaws of New START That Will Be Difficult to Fix". Heritage Foundation, The Foundry. 16 September 2010.

The New START treaty will help against Iran’s nuclear program.  New START will help bolster US-Russian cooperation, which is necessary for solving the problem of Iran’s nuclear proliferation. On Nov. 19, 2010, the Anti-Defamation League released a statement, which came from Robert G. Sugarman, ADL National Chair, and Abraham H. Foxman, ADL National Director: "The severe damage that could be inflicted on that relationship by failing to ratify the treaty would inevitably hamper effective American international leadership to stop the Iranian nuclear weapons program. The Iranian nuclear threat is the most serious national security issue facing the United States, Israel, and other allies in the Middle East. While some Senators may have legitimate reservations about the New START treaty or its protocol, we believe the interest of our greater and common goal of preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons must take precedence." [1] New START is crucial in getting Russian support against Iran and other rogue nuclear states.  Although the United States needs a strong and reliable nuclear force, the chief nuclear danger today comes not from Russia but from rogue states such as Iran and North Korea and the potential for nuclear material to fall into the hands of terrorists. Given those pressing dangers, some question why an arms control treaty with Russia matters. It matters because it is in both parties' interest that there be transparency and stability in their strategic nuclear relationship. It also matters because Russia's cooperation will be needed if we are to make progress in rolling back the Iranian and North Korean programs. Russian help will be needed to continue our work to secure "loose nukes" in Russia and elsewhere. And Russian assistance is needed to improve the situation in Afghanistan, a breeding ground for international terrorism.  Obviously, the United States does not sign arms control agreements just to make friends. Any treaty must be considered on its merits. But the New START agreement is clearly in the US’ national interest, and the ramifications of not ratifying it could be significantly negative. [2] As US Vice President Joe Biden argued in 2010: "New Start is also a cornerstone of our efforts to reset relations with Russia, which have improved significantly in the last two years. This has led to real benefits for U.S. and global security. Russian cooperation made it possible to secure strong sanctions against Iran over its nuclear ambitions, and Russia canceled a sale to Iran of an advanced anti-aircraft missile system that would have been dangerously destabilizing. Russia has permitted the flow of materiel through its territory for our troops in Afghanistan. And—as the NATO-Russia Council in Lisbon demonstrated—European security has been advanced by the pursuit of a more cooperative relationship with Russia. We should not jeopardize this progress." [3] Therefore, because New START will have significant positive consequences in terms of aiding relations with Russia, and thus in dealing with rogue nuclear states like Iran, it should be supported.  [1] Weingarten, Elizabeth. “How did New START become a Jewish issue?”. The Atlantic. 1 Decemebr 2010.   [2] Kissinger, Henry A. ; Shultz, George P. ; Baker III, James A’ ; Eagleburger , Lawrence S. ; and Powell, Colin L. "The Republican case for ratifying New START". Washington Post. 2 December 2010.   [3] Biden, Joseph. "The case for ratifying New START". Wall Street Journal. 25 November 2010.

New START will cause American missile and nuclear capabilities to atrophy, not to be maintained. This is because it locks the US in to agreements of defensive reductions which are tied into Russian offensive reductions. This could eventually leave the US badly under-defended by its missile systems when compared against the offensive capabilities of other nuclear states. Moreover, New START leaves in place the pre-existing Russian tactical nuclear advantage harming US capabilities by comparison. [1] Overall New START hams US missile and nuclear capabilities, and further advantages Russia and other nuclear powers, and so should not be supported. As Mitt Romney argued in 2010: "Does New START limit America’s options for missile defense? Yes. For the first time, we would agree to an interrelationship between strategic offensive weapons and missile defense. Moreover, Russia already asserts that the document would constitute a binding limit on our missile defense program. But the WikiLeaks revelation last weekend that North Korea has supplied Iran with long-range Russian missiles confirms that robust missile defense is urgent and indispensable." [2]  [1] Spring, Baker. "Twelve Flaws of New START That Will Be Difficult to Fix". Heritage Foundation, The Foundry. 16 September 2010.   [2] Romney, Mitt. "Stop START." Boston.com. 3 December 2010.

The New START treaty will make for a safer world.  Reducing US and Russian nuclear weapons stockpiles makes for a safer world, as Dr. David Gushee states: "The issue on the table is a nuclear arms reduction and verification treaty between the United States and Russia. The treaty, called New START, would reduce Russian and American deployed nuclear weapons to 1,550 and delivery vehicles to 700 each. This would be a 33 percent reduction in the existing arsenals, which is worth achieving and celebrating even as we know that countless cities and millions of precious human beings could be destroyed by the use of even part of the remaining arsenals. Still, these reductions would be a great step on the way to a safer world, as would the re-establishment of bilateral, intrusive verification measures for both sides, also part of the treaty." [1]  The world is simply a much less secure place without New Start, and not just because New START means there are physically fewer nuclear weapons and thus a lesser chance of nuclear disasters (although this in itself is compelling). Rather, New START also has immense symbolic value, in demonstrating that the two greatest powers have enough in common and are interested enough in their mutual security that they can agree to deduce nuclear weapons together. It shows that these nations regard each other as partners for world peace, not as enemies.  The alternative world, without New START, would be one in which the mutual suspicion and animosity of the Cold War might continue. It is notable that Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said in an interview released in early December 2010 that Russia might be forced to build up its nuclear forces against the West if the United States fails to ratify the New START treaty. [2] The threat of Russia, or even the US, resuming nuclear build-ups is a frightening thought for both nations, for the world and for peace.  On top of its other benefits, New START is key to opening Russian nuclear weapons up for verification, which contributes to trust and peace. As former Secretaries of State Kissinger, Shultz, Eagleburger, Baker and Powell argue “the agreement emphasizes verification, providing a valuable window into Russia's nuclear arsenal. Since the original START expired last December, Russia has not been required to provide notifications about changes in its strategic nuclear arsenal, and the United States has been unable to conduct on-site inspections. Each day, America's understanding of Russia's arsenal has been degraded, and resources have been diverted from national security tasks to try to fill the gaps. Our military planners increasingly lack the best possible insight into Russia's activity with its strategic nuclear arsenal, making it more difficult to carry out their nuclear deterrent mission.” [3] Therefore New START should be supported as it represents a positive step for peace and cooperation in the world.  [1] Gushee, Dr David P. "Security, Sin and Nuclear Weapons: A Christian Plea for the New START Treaty". Huffington Post. 4 December 2010.   [2] Abdullaev, Nabi. “Putin Issues Warning on New START”. The Moscow Times. 2 December 2010.   [3] Kissinger, Henry A. ; Shultz, George P. ; Baker III, James A’ ; Eagleburger , Lawrence S. ; and Powell, Colin L. "The Republican case for ratifying New START". Washington Post. 2 December 2010.

New START is about national politics, not about the interests of the world or peace. As George Will argued in 2010: "The (Obama) administration's ardor for ratification is understandable, as is Russia's. The president needs a success somewhere; Russia needs psychotherapy. It longs to be treated as what it no longer is, a superpower, and it likes the treaty's asymmetries." [1] New START is about serving these domestic political interests, not securing peace, which it will not achieve as the inspections it puts in place are highly flawed, and there remains a high probability that Russia will cheat on the treaty and augment its nuclear capabilities regardless. All this treaty does is weaken the US, and a situation where one power weakens and the other grows stronger is not good for world peace.  [1] Will, George. "Obama's time-warp focus on the New START treaty". Washington Post. 2 December 2010.

The New START treaty maintains US nuclear and missile defence.  The US’ Nuclear armament will be modernized along with New START. “The Obama administration has agreed to provide for modernization of the infrastructure essential to maintaining our nuclear arsenal. Funding these efforts has become part of the negotiations in the ratification process. The administration has put forth a 10-year plan to spend $84 billion on the Energy Department's nuclear weapons complex. Much of the credit for getting the administration to add $14 billion to the originally proposed $70 billion for modernization goes to Sen. Jon Kyl, the Arizona Republican who has been vigilant in this effort. Implementing this modernization program in a timely fashion would be important in ensuring that our nuclear arsenal is maintained appropriately over the next decade and beyond.” [1]  Both US Military and civilian leaders insist that the new START treaty will still allow the US to deploy effective missile defenses, something which Russia was opposed to, and so will not affect US missile defense plans. The main limit on missile defense is that the treaty prevents the conversion of existing launchers for this purpose this would be more expensive than building new missiles specifically for defense purposes. [2]  Furthermore, as Joe Biden argues, New START is important to Russian cooperation on missile defense: "This [missile defense] system demonstrates America's enduring commitment to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty—that an attack on one is an attack on all. NATO missile defense also provides the opportunity for further improvements in both NATO-Russian and U.S.-Russian relations. NATO and Russia agreed at Lisbon to carry out a joint ballistic missile threat assessment, to resume theater missile-defense exercises, and to explore further cooperation on territorial missile defense—things that were nearly unimaginable two years ago. These agreements underscore the strategic importance the alliance attaches to improving its relationship with Russia. But trust and confidence in our relationship with Russia would be undermined without Senate approval of the New Start Treaty, which reduces strategic nuclear forces to levels not seen since the 1950s, and restores important verification mechanisms that ceased when the first Start Treaty expired last December." [3]  In many ways, in the 21st Century having an abundance of nuclear weapons, particularly having too many, is more of a liability than an advantage. The United States will be far safer with fewer nuclear weapons in the world and a stronger, more stable relationship with Russia under New START, and this is desirable. Therefore it is clear that New START maintains the important parts of US nuclear capabilities while removing the over-abundance which may become a liability due to security and medical concerns, and so New START should be supported.  [1] Kissinger, Henry A. ; Shultz, George P. ; Baker III, James A’ ; Eagleburger , Lawrence S. ; and Powell, Colin L. "The Republican case for ratifying New START". Washington Post. 2 December 2010.   [2] ibid  [3] Biden, Joseph. "The case for ratifying New START". Wall Street Journal. 25 November 2010.

Agreements between the biggest nuclear powers are a good starting point towards disarmament. We cannot expect countries with a very small number of nuclear weapons to be disarming if the countries that have the vast majority of the world’s arsenal have not already begun the process of getting rid of their own. Even the reductions in New START will not bring either Russia or the United States anywhere near the level of any other nuclear power whose nuclear weapons number in the hundreds not thousands. Both countries would need to reduce a very long way before they lose deterrence against China, let alone North Korea. As former secretaries of state argue America has “long led the crucial fight to protect the United States against nuclear dangers… The world is safer today because of the decades-long effort to reduce its supply of nuclear weapons. As a result, President Obama should remain similarly courageous with New START.” [1]  If linkage between the New START and Russian action on Iran exists then this would not always be a bad thing. Linkage has been used successfully in the past, and to the advantage of the U.S., for example Kissinger credited the peace agreement with North Vietnam in Paris in 1973 as being down to linkage which resulted in pressure on North Vietnam from the People’s Republic of China and the USSR. If linkage could be successful in bringing Russia onside in pressurizing Iran on the issue of nuclear weapons it could be to the benefit of the United States.  [1] Kissinger, Henry A. ; Shultz, George P. ; Baker III, James A’ ; Eagleburger , Lawrence S. ; and Powell, Colin L. "The Republican case for ratifying New START". Washington Post. 2 December 2010.

Many of the worries about the impact of the treaty are much more of a political problem than problems with the treaty itself. U.S. missile modernization in particular is still up to the President and Congress to sort out the funding between them – the restrictions are minor. [1] Worries about the impact on missile defense are also a red herring. Missile defense is not aimed at Russia and the United States simply needs to make sure that its defenses are obviously aimed at who it says they are aimed at: rogue states such as Iran and North Korea. Regarding other defence capabilities, the New START Treaty preserves America’s ability to deploy effective missile defenses, and simply prevents it from being effective enough to undermine deterrence, something which Russia would be right in worrying about if the United States had any intention of building such a comprehensive missile defence. The prohibition on converting existing launchers will have little impact on the United States as the military believes that such conversion would be more expensive and less effective than building new purpose built defensive missiles. [2] Finally if Russia did exercise its right to withdraw then both parties would be in no worse a position than they would have been without the new treaty and could simply restart negotiations.  [1] Spring, Baker. "Twelve Flaws of New START That Will Be Difficult to Fix". Heritage Foundation, The Foundry. 16 September 2010.   [2] Kissinger, Henry A. ; Shultz, George P. ; Baker III, James A’ ; Eagleburger , Lawrence S. ; and Powell, Colin L. "The Republican case for ratifying New START". Washington Post. 2 December 2010.

The New START treaty helps Russia more than the US  Not only does New START leave in place Russia’s extant tactical nuclear advantage but it has further loopholes for Russian weapons. As Mitt Romney argued in 2010: "Does the treaty provide gaping loopholes that Russia could use to escape nuclear weapon limits entirely? Yes. For example, multiple warhead missile bombers are counted under the treaty as only one warhead. While we currently have more bombers than the Russians, they have embarked on new programs for long-range bombers and for air-launched nuclear cruise missiles. Thus, it is no surprise that Russia is happy to undercount missiles on bombers." [1]  New START also fails to limit rail-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), which Russia could potentially make use of. The definition of rail-mobile ICBM launchers was established in the expired START as “an erector-launcher mechanism for launching ICBMs and the railcar or flatcar on which it is mounted.” [2] This and associated restrictions and limitations in START, are not in the New START. This makes it possible for Russia to claim that any new Rail Mobile ICBMs are not subject to New START limitations. [3] Mitt Romney worries that Russia is already working to take advantage of these omissions: “As drafted, it lets Russia escape the limit on its number of strategic nuclear warheads. Loopholes and lapses -- presumably carefully crafted by Moscow -- provide a path to entirely avoid the advertised warhead-reduction targets. …. These omissions would be consistent with Russia's plans for a new heavy bomber and reports of growing interest in rail-mobile ICBMs." [4]  This means that under the treaty limits, the United States is the only country that must reduce its launchers and strategic nuclear weapons. Russia has managed to negotiate the treaty limits so that they simply restrict it to reductions it was already planning to do. As a result the United States is making what are effectively unilateral reductions. [5] Therefore, New START is an unequal treaty as it offers more to Russia than to the US. This is bad for the balance of power and thus bad for world peace, and so New START should be opposed.  [1] Romney, Mitt. "Stop START." Boston.com. 3 December 2010.   [2] ‘Terms and Definitions’, The Treaty Between The United States Of America And The Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics On The Reduction And Limitation Of Strategic Offensive Arms And Associated Documents, 1991,   [3] Spring, Baker. "Twelve Flaws of New START That Will Be Difficult to Fix". Heritage Foundation, The Foundry. 16 September 2010.   [4] Romney, Mitt. "Stop START." Boston.com. 3 December 2010.   [5] Romney, Mitt. "Stop START." Boston.com. 3 December 2010.

Problems with Verification.  Verification is vital in any agreement to limit arms. Both sides need to trust each other a bit but a lot of this trust needs to come from comprehensive mechanisms to monitor and ensure that both sides are carrying out their commitments. If the verification system is not good enough then neither side will have faith in the agreement and will be more likely to try and bypass it.  Unfortunately the expired START’s verification regime was robust when compared to that for the New START. Baker Spring at the Heritage foundation lists some of the specific areas that are significantly less robust: A narrowing of the requirements for exchanging telemetry (electronic transmissions that give details of missile performance that helps give a good idea about whether Russia is complying with the treaty) , A reduction in the effectiveness of the inspections (the Russians feel that inspections are unfairly biased against them), Weaknesses in the ability to verify the number of deployed warheads on ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), Abolition of the START verification regime governing mobile ICBMs, and A weakening of the verification standards governing the elimination of delivery vehicles. [1]  [1] Spring, Baker. "Twelve Flaws of New START That Will Be Difficult to Fix". Heritage Foundation, The Foundry. 16 September 2010.

The New START treaty sets a bad approach for a changing world  New START reduces US deterrence in world that is arming, not disarming. The United States has relied on deterrence for sixty years and as a result has prevented war between the great powers. A US drawdown, especially as other new powers are arming, will undermine deterrence. This will then encourage rivals to try to catch the United States while the reductions show that the United States is in decline. [1]  While proponents of reducing nuclear weapons, or reaching global zero, argue that possession of nuclear weapons by the nuclear weapons states is the incentive behind proliferation, this is not true. The US has consistently taken leadership in the reduction of nuclear arms through treaties but this has so far had no effect in encouraging other nuclear powers to reduce their arsenals and indeed new powers have joined the club. Reducing nuclear arms through New START will therefore not encourage others to stop pursuing nukes. The U.S. should not be taking steps towards disarmament without all nuclear weapons states, including those not signed up to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty, also being involved. [2]  New START also fails to speak to the issue of protecting and defending the U.S. and its allies against strategic attack. The treaty fails to recognize that deterrence is no longer simply between the U.S. and Russia and that the whole policy should no longer be based on just against strategic attacks on the United States or very close allies. Instead it is much more critical to deal with nuclear policy towards ‘rogue’ states and rising powers. [3]  Finally, the US should not set a precedent that it will sacrifice its own interests to bribe Russia over issues like Iran. As the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA) argues: “we are told that the real purpose of New START is to create a stronger U.S.-Russia bond in a broader international effort to restrain Iran's nuclear weapons program. Such a justification is wrong. Iran's nuclear ambitions are no secret; neither are Russia’s past efforts in aiding that program. We seriously question whether Russia is serious about stopping Iran, with or without New START. There is no reason why the United States should be required to sacrifice its own defense capabilities to inspire Russia to a greater degree of diplomatic fortitude. If Russia is indeed concerned with a nuclear-armed Iran to its immediate south, it should need no extra incentive to take the action necessary to stop it." [4] If the U.S. bribes Russia over Iran China might expect to get similar treatment over North Korea. New START puts the US in a disadvantaged position in a changing world, and consequently should not be supported.  [1] Brookes, Peter. “Not a new START, but a bad START”. The Hill. 13 September 2010.   [2] Spring, Baker. "Twelve Flaws of New START That Will Be Difficult to Fix". Heritage Foundation, The Foundry. 16 September 2010.   [3] Ibid.  [4] Weingarten, Elizabeth. “How did New START become a Jewish issue?”. The Atlantic. 1 Decemebr 2010.

The New START treaty harms US nuclear capabilities  As David Ganz, the president of the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA), argues: "This treaty would restrain the development and deployment of new nuclear weapons, missile defense systems, and missile delivery systems." [1] The atrophying U.S. nuclear arsenal and weapons enterprise make reductions in the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal even more dangerous. The new START treaty allows nuclear modernization but while the US capacity to modernize nuclear weapons is limited and either congress or the president is likely to prevent modernization on cost grounds. The Russians have a large, if unknown, advantage over the United States in terms of nonstrategic, particularly tactical, and nuclear weapons. The New START treaty however ignores these weapons entirely as it is focused on strategic arms. This therefore leaves the Russians with an advantage and potentially reduces the potential for deterrence in areas beyond the US. [2]  New START also restricts US missile defence options. The Obama Administration insists the treaty doesn’t affect it, but the Kremlin’s takes a different view: "[START] can operate and be viable only if the United States of America refrains from developing its missile-defense capabilities quantitatively or qualitatively." [3] New START imposes restrictions on U.S. missile defence options in at least four areas. First the preamble recognizes “the interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms” it seeks to make sure defensive arms “do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic offensive arms of the parties” so defensive arms must be reduced to allow offensive arms to remain effective. [4] Russia also issued a unilateral statement on April 7, 2010, Russia reinforced this restriction by issuing a unilateral statement asserting that it considers the “extraordinary events” that give “the right to withdraw from this treaty” to include a buildup of missile defense. [5] Second, Article V states “Each Party shall not convert and shall not use ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers for placement of missile defense interceptors” and vice versa. [6] There are also restrictions on some types of missiles and launchers that are used in the testing of missile defense. And Finally, article X established the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC), the treaty’s implementing body, with oversight over the implementation of the treaty which may impose additional restrictions on the U.S. missile defense program. [7]  [1] Weingarten, Elizabeth. “How did New START become a Jewish issue?”. The Atlantic. 1 Decemebr 2010.   [2] Spring, Baker. "Twelve Flaws of New START That Will Be Difficult to Fix". Heritage Foundation, The Foundry. 16 September 2010.   [3] Brookes, Peter. “Not a new START, but a bad START”. The Hill. 13 September 2010.   [4] Obama, Barak, and Medvedev, Dmitri, ‘Treaty Between The United States of America And The Russian Federation On Measures For The Further Reduction And Limitation Of Strategic Offensive Arms’, U.S. Department of State,   [5] Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, ‘New START Treaty Fact Sheet: Unilateral Statements’, U.S. Department of State, 13 May 2010,   [6] Obama, Barak, and Medvedev, Dmitri, ‘Treaty Between The United States of America And The Russian Federation On Measures For The Further Reduction And Limitation Of Strategic Offensive Arms’, U.S. Department of State,   [7] Spring, Baker. "Twelve Flaws of New START That Will Be Difficult to Fix". Heritage Foundation, The Foundry. 16 September 2010.

The verification requirements of New START have satisfied not only the Obama Administration but also a large number of foreign policy experts. A panel including Henry Kissinger argues that New START “emphasizes verification, providing a valuable window into Russia's nuclear arsenal." [1] Howard Baker argues that: "President Reagan was famous for his adage about dealing with the old Soviet Union: “Trust but verify.” Since the last START treaty expired in December 2009, we’ve had no right to conduct inspections of Russian nuclear bases, and thus no way to verify what the Russians are doing with their nuclear weapon systems. For us veterans of the Cold War, that’s an alarming fact and a compelling reason to ratify this New START treaty without further delay." [2]  When the allegations are gone through individually they do not stand up to scrutiny. On the telemetry issue the treaty does not limit throw-weight so the data is not needed; the number of warheads per missile can be verified by other means. There are less facilities being inspected, but more inspections and the decline in Russia’s nuclear forces means that not so many facilities need to be inspected. [3] There is no reason to be worried about the numbers of missiles as there will be a database detailing all the weapons both sides have and inspections to confirm this, [4] this will also mean that there are unique identifier tags on each missile, launcher and bombers so helping inspectors in their counting. [5] Mobile launchers are much less of a problem than they were as we already know the base number the Russia has whereas when START was originally negotiated the US did not know. Technology to track such mobile launchers has also become much more powerful. Finally if worried about the verification of the elimination of delivery vehicles both sides will have the right to inspect the debris and to demand demonstration of the procedures. [6] Neither side will be able to get around the new START’s verification regime.  [1] Kissinger, Henry A. ; Shultz, George P. ; Baker III, James A’ ; Eagleburger , Lawrence S. ; and Powell, Colin L. "The Republican case for ratifying New START". Washington Post. 2 December 2010.   [2] Baker, Howard. "Dangerous if we reject New START." USA Today.   [3] Blook, Oliver, ‘Nothing to Fear with New START Verification’, Center For Strategic &amp; International Studies, 8 July 2010,   [4] Woolf, Amy F., ‘The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions’, Congressional Research Service, 24 October 2011, p.3,   [5] ‘Verification of New START’, Union of Concerned Scientists, 13 July 2010,   [6] Blook, Oliver, ‘Nothing to Fear with New START Verification’, Center For Strategic &amp; International Studies, 8 July 2010,

The New START treaty does not help Russia more than it does the United States. Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates argued at the time the Russians are currently “above the treaty limits. So they will have to take down warheads.” [1] If there really is undercounting of missiles on bombers then it affects both sides equally – as Romney says “While we currently have more bombers than the Russians”, so this too should not be a worry. Russia does not currently deploy rail-mobile ICBMs and neither does the United States, explain why the definitions are not there. However the State Department argues that “If a Party develops and deploys rail-mobile ICBMs, such missiles, their warheads, and their launchers would be subject to the Treaty.” As the definitions of ICBM launchers would include them. [2] Finally we should recognize that we do not know that Russia would have reduced its bomber and missile forces without a new treaty, while Russia has more difficulty maintaining its nuclear forces than the United States so has more incentive to reduce them, but without a treaty it might even increase its forces due to a desire to keep parity with the United States while the US has a big lead in conventional weapons. [3]  Furthermore, any agreement made between Russia and the US needs to be one that benefits both parties, it does not matter if someone is getting more than the other. Getting an agreement that meets the needs of both countries is far more important, because it will be upheld more so than one that simple gives both countries the same. Fair and efficent does not mean spilting a pie in half, if one only wanted the crust, and the other only wanted the filling.  [1] Isaacs, John, ‘Rebuttals to Additional Arguments Against “New START”’, The Center For Arms Control And Non-Proliferation,   [2] Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, ‘Rail-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs and their Missiles’, U.S. Department of State, 2 August 2010,   [3] Isaacs, John, ‘Rebuttals to Additional Arguments Against “New START”’, The Center For Arms Control And Non-Proliferation,