A negotiated peace would have been preferable to the dropping of the atomic bombs  It is conventional to argue that Japan was defeated already and so the bombings were unnecessary as Sadao Asada points out this confuses defeat with surrender. However such a position seems equally to confuse surrender with peace. That there had to be an unconditional surrender seems almost unquestioned. Most wars do not end in an unconditional surrender of one side or the other, Japanese defeat was plain so a negotiated peace would normally have been set in motion when the US saw the terrible casualties it might be forced to take in its push for total victory. The Americans learnt of Japanese willingness to negotiate in July, on the 13th Secretary of the Navy Forrestal wrote in his diary “The first real evidence of a Japanese desire to get out of the war came today... Togo said further that the unconditional surrender term of the Allies was about the only thing in the way of termination of the war” [1] Stimson, Grew and Forrestal aimed at persuading president Truman to offer the Japanese promise of the preservation of the monarchy as an alternative to unconditional surrender. [2] Ultimately the Potsdam declaration set the unconditional surrender policy in stone. [3] Offering such a condition would certainly have strengthened the peace party within the Japanese cabinet and allowed them to present further resistance by the generals and admirals as endangering the monarchy. [4] However, on its own this would probably not have lead to peace, the cabinet would still have been split 3-3 with the Army and Navy ministers both opposed and with vetoes on policy. Even the most belligerent of the Japanese Cabinet, Army Minister Anami’s conditions were preservation of the Imperial institution, no military occupation of the home islands, Japanese forces were to demobilize and disarm themselves and war criminals were to be prosecuted by the Japanese themselves. [5] While these conditions are obviously ripe for exploitation, would they really disarm and try war criminals? they are not unreasonable. Just because there was no hope that the US would accept these conditions, they fly in the face of the Potsdam Declaration from which the allies would not deviate, does not mean that another alternative to unconditional surrender should not be considered as an alternative to the dropping of the Nuclear bombs.  [1] Secretary Forrestal quoted by Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Racing the enemy: Stalin, Truman and the surrender of Japan, (Cambridge MA, 2005) p134.  [2] Campbell Craig and Sergay Radchenko, The Atomic Bomb and the Origins of the Cold War, (New Haven, 2008) p.69  [3] Potsdam Declaration,   [4] Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Racing the enemy: Stalin, Truman and the surrender of Japan, (Cambridge, 2005) pp.290-1.  [5] Sadao Asada, ‘The Shock of the Atomic Bomb and Japan’s Decision to Surrender - A Reconsideration’ in Hiroshima in History: The Myths of Revisionism, p. 39.