imate international global house believes outcome paris climate conference

While there are sure to be some countries that won’t live up to their pledges this is also the case with binding agreements even if they have built in penalties. This has been shown by the European Union where Germany and France both flouted budget rules that allowed a maximum deficit of 3% at the start of the millennium despite the threat of fines. [1]  [1] Osborn, Andrew, ‘France and Germany to flout budget rules until 2006’, The Guardian, 30 October 2003,

Only an international treaty can create penalties for non-compliance  A non-binding agreement will not have any penalties for any countries that do not comply with it, this sets the agreement up for failure. Without a binding agreement a government will find it difficult to bind its successors who may back track in the decades that follow. Some states are backtracking even before the agreement is finalised; the UK has been abandoning its green policies – cutting subsidies for renewables, cancelling carbon capture and storage, reducing funding for domestic energy efficiency, and selling the green investment bank. [1] If governments will take such measures before the agreement is even finished then what hope does it have in the future if there is nothing to persuade sovereign governments to comply with their pledges?  [1] Monbiot, George, ‘On climate change this government is indifferent to life, in love with death’, The Guardian, 2 December 2015,

Voluntary measures have got much further than previous attempts to get a binding agreement – at least there is going to be a good working agreement to build on in future this time. The changes that could mean countries ultimately targeting 2C or even 1.5C are technological; if solar becomes the cheapest form of electricity generation, if electric cars become competitive with petrol, and biofuels taken up for aviation fuel. [1]  [1] Mathiesen, Karl, ‘Should we be aiming to keep global warming to 1.5C, not 2C?’, The Guardian,. 2 December 2015,

The hard part is the cutting of emissions  The problem with a non-binding agreement, even one where the targets have been submitted by the governments themselves is exactly that it is non-binding. If governments are not bound to cut emissions then there is a good chance that many of them wont. [1] The British government, which has binding targets, has been on course to miss its 2025 targets with reductions of only 23% against targets of 31% due to a decision to reduce subsidies for housing insulation. [2] If countries which have set targets for themselves in the past are missing them what hope do we have for these voluntary targets?  [1] Taylor, Lenore, ‘Paris climate talks: the real test is whether countries will keep their word’, The Guardian, 30 November 2015,   [2] Harvey, Fiona, ‘UK on track to miss carbon targets, climate change advisers warn’, The Guardian, 15 July 2014,

Each government has put in targets that they believe are realistic and that they are willing to try to reach. The countries involved are therefore much more likely to want to meet the target than if they had been imposed on them by a binding international treaty. Europe has found that binding refugee quotas are almost impossible to agree and equally difficult to implement. [1] Instead it has generally been accepted that only voluntary systems will work when it comes to taking in the majority of refugees with Hungary willing to take legal action to prevent mandatory quotas. [2] The same is the case on greenhouse gas emissions.  [1] Euractive, ‘Commission ready to drop mandatory quotas for refugees’, 17 September 2015,   [2] BBC News, ‘Migrant crisis: Hungary challenges EU quota plan in court’, 3 December 2015,

It is too late for half measures  Two degrees Celsius has generally been regarded as that safe level which agreements should be aiming for. This agreement does not go so far with it expected to keep the temperature increase to around 2.7 degrees if everyone sticks to their commitments and makes deeper ones after 2030. [1] Unfortunately however the world will still most likely be heading towards a 3.5 degrees rise if no further cuts are made later. [2] Now is the time to be much more ambitious and part of that means binding cuts to prevent backsliding or those agreeing carrying on as usual.  [1] Nuttall, Nick, ‘Global Response to Climate Change Keeps Door Open to 2 Degree C Temperature Limit’, UNFCCC Press Office, 30 October 2015,   [2] Romm, Joe, ‘Misleading U.N. Report Confuses Media on Paris Climate Talks’, thinkprogress.org, 3 November 2015,

The United States Senate would be a potential sticking point for any treaty however it would be unlikely that the United States would hold out against the rest of the world. At the worst case it would simply sign next time the democrats gain a majority.

Sovereignty is often taken to mean that states can do what they like without interference. This is not the kind of mentality that will help solve climate change or ensure that this deal sticks. Unfortunately climate change is a global issue where what happens in one country affects everyone else just as much as the miscreant. The atmosphere is a global commons, currently free for everyone to use, and more often abuse. As such the principles of sovereignty and non-interference can have no place.

Only a non-binding agreement would get the targets necessary  Fully binding treaties with mechanisms for compliance are the gold standard for agreements between nations. But because they are onerous they are the most difficult kind of treaties to get agreed to start with. If the aim were such an agreement it would unfortunately never happen. This has been demonstrated by the years of successive failures in crafting climate agreements. COP 15 is the most notable; expectations were immensely high for a binding international treaty but there was a failure to deliver, largely because governments did not want a binding international solution which is what was being negotiated at Copenhagen. [1]  [1] BBC News, ‘Why did Copenhagen fail to deliver a climate deal?’, 22 December 2009,

A more informal agreement avoids the US congress  The United States Congress is a potential hurdle for any climate agreement. While President Barack Obama is keen to make tackling climate change a legacy of his Presidency the Republican dominated Congress is both likely to try to block the President for that very reason and is sceptical of climate change. It is therefore a major benefit to have an agreement that will not need to be submitted to Congress for approval as any treaty needs to be confirmed by the Senate.  The Secretary of State Kerry argues that it is “definitely not going to be a treaty,” and “not going to be legally binding reduction targets like Kyoto”. It won’t need to be passed to the Senate because the President already has the power to implement the agreement through existing law. [1]  [1] Mufson, Steven, and Demirjian, Karoun, ‘Trick or treaty? The legal question hanging over the Paris climate change conference’, Washington Post, 30 November 2015,

Sovereign states should be allowed to set their own targets and be trusted to meet them  States are sovereign entities meaning that only they have power within their borders and climate change should not be a cause for groups of countries meddling in the business of others. Each state making its own commitment and then doing its own monitoring and enforcement is the right way to go about preventing climate change. By doing it this way no countries will feel unduly burdened or persecuted.

There is little reason why countries can’t voluntarily come up with their quotas and then be bound to them by treaty. Being willing to be bound by a treaty would show that the targets submitted are really the targets that countries are setting for themselves rather than a public relations exercise.