Interventions can fail and eventually cause more harm than good  Interventions are not a panacea for failing states; they do not ensure the success of either the military offensive or subsequent reconstruction efforts on the ground during the occupation. If the intervention fails to overcome local forces, civilians are powerless to overcome a political hierarchy boosted by military victory and reliant on violence. Furthermore, even if the military offensive is successful, the underlying causes of the failure of the state are still present and may be exacerbated by the presence of an intervening force. As such, intervening forces must be aware that the decision is not simply whether intervention is necessary, but whether it will do more harm than good. Coyne describes this fallacy as the ‘Nirvana Fallacy’, whereby states assume that the ‘grass is always greener on the other side’. ‘It is assumed that the foreign governments can generate, via occupation and reconstruction, an outcome preferable to that which would occur absent of these interventions’. The reality challenges these assumptions, for Minxim Pei calculates just a 26% success rate for U.S.-led reconstruction efforts since the late nineteenth century. [1] If an intervening force can’t be certain, even remotely, of the benefit to the state concerned, it has little justification in deploying and risking the exacerbation of an already-precarious problem.  [1] Coyne, C. (2006). Reconstructing weak and failed states: Foreign intervention and the Nirvana Fallacy. Retrieved June 24, 2011 from Foreign Policy Analysis, 2006 (Vol. 2, p.343-360) p.344