Moving nuclear diplomacy away from the fear of Mutually Assured Destruction undermines world stability.  Tactical nuclear weapons undermine the overarching structure of deterrence in nuclear diplomacy. Nuclear weapons create stability, as described in the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). Countries with nuclear weapons have no incentive to engage in open military conflict with one another; all recognize that they will suffer destruction if they choose the path of war1. If countries have nuclear weapons, fighting simply becomes too costly. This serves to defuse conflicts, and reduce the likelihood of the outbreak of war. When states have nuclear weapons they cannot fight, making the world a more peaceful place. Furthermore, armed with a nuclear deterrent, all states become equal in terms of ability to do harm to one another 2. If a large state attempts to intimidate or to invade a smaller neighbor, it will be unable to effectively subdue it, since the small state will have the power to seriously injure, or even destroy, the would-be invader with a few well-placed nuclear missiles3. The dynamics created by MAD are entirely lost when miniaturized, tactical nuclear weapons are brought into the equation. By considering nuclear weapons to no longer fit into the rigid framework of MAD, which ensures that they are not used except in response to existential threats, their use becomes more likely and more accepted as a strategic tool. For example, the 2002 United States Nuclear Posture Review recommends the integration of nuclear weapons into the broader strategic framework of the military and defense department. Such reconsideration can only make the use of nuclear weapons more likely4. Clearly, the development of tactical nuclear weapons will only destabilize world relations, not offer greater security. 1 Waltz, Kenneth. 1981. "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Better". Adelphi Papers 171. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies. 2 Jervis, Robert. 2001. "Weapons Without Purpose? Nuclear Strategy in the Post-Cold War Era". Foreign Affairs. 3 Mearsheimer, John. 1993. "The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent". ForeignAffairs. 4 Arkin, William. 2002. "Secret Plan Outlines the Unthinkable". Los Angeles Times.