It can be argued that conventional bombing could have brought about a Japanese surrender without the recourse to the use of the atomic bombs. Compared to conventional bombings the atomic bombs caused disproportionate amounts of civilian casualties. The Strategic Bombing survey estimated that in the 9 months prior to the surrender there were 806,000 Japanese civilian casualties inclusive of A-bombs, of which 330,000 were deaths. Therefore nearly a third of civilian deaths were as a result of the atomic bombings (and that is only counting those who died immediately). In Hiroshima 72% of buildings were destroyed, in Nagasaki 37.5% of buildings were destroyed. However in a conventional raid Yokohama was 47% destroyed in an hours bombing, for the comparatively light cost of 5,000 civilian fatalities. [1] Of course some conventional raids, particularly fireraids caused very heavy casualties, in particular the Tokyo firebombing of March 9th 1945 killed 100,000 and destroyed 15.8 square miles. However that is still three times the area destroyed of Hiroshima. Since the only possible justification for attack on cities is the destruction of infrastructure conventional bombing was similarly effective while being the cause of many fewer civilian deaths.  According to the United States Strategic Bombing Survey “Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts, and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated.” [2] The accuracy of this prediction has since been called into question, [3] after all the allies dropped far more bombs on Nazi Germany without securing surrender. However the fact remains that the conventional bombing campaign was only just starting to get going and might have achieved decisive results.  Possibly even more important for the prospects of a conventional victory, and one not clouded by the stigma of massive bombing campaigns against civilians, was the maritime blockade. By the end of the war Japan had only 700,000 tons of shipping remaining, she had started the war with 6,337,000 tons. Of 122,000 sailors in the merchant marine 27,000 were killed 89,000 wounded. For an island nation reliant on imports not just to run its industry but also to keep its people fed this was devastating. The result was starvation in the Japanese home islands. After the war it was reported that up to 10 million would die of starvation without American food aid, as a post war report to the Diet (Japanese Parliament) put it ‘the greatest cause of defeat was the loss of shipping’. [4]  [1] United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Summary Report (Pacific War),  pp.20, 23-24.  [2] United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Summary Report (Pacific War),  p.26.  [3] Gian Peri Gentile, ‘Advocacy or Assessment? The United States Strategic Bombing Survey of Germany and Japan’, in Hiroshima in History: The Myths of Revisionism, (Columbia, 2007) pp.123-4.  [4] Joel Ira Holwitt, “Execute against Japan”: The US decision to conduct unrestricted submarine warfare, (College Station TX, 2008) pp.166-9