Mandatory sentences do not eliminate undue discretion; they merely shift the power from judges to prosecutors. Prosecutors may decide whether or not to charge defendants for violations other than the main charge. For example, a prosecutor may add weapons possession to a charge for drug sales- this additional count can drastically increase the defendant’s sentence. In the United States, defendants often cooperate with prosecutors and provide information in order to avoid such hefty sentences. Michael Simmons explains, “[…] A cooperation departure is usually the only significant sentencing factor over which a defendant has any control and– because the average cooperation departure cuts a defendant’s sentence in half- it is often a defendant’s only hope for a reduced sentence. Thus, it is not surprising that cooperation departures have fundamentally changed federal prosecutions.” [1] Prosecutors may wield this power to coerce defendants into accepting a plea bargain in cases where they might reasonably be acquitted at trial. Because prosecutors are part of the executive branch, they are more susceptible to political influence than federal judges, who are often appointed, not elected. Thus for a balance of power, it is better to allow judges to have discretion.  Debaters might instead argue that mandatory sentences are not an effective means of subduing corrupt judges, as a judge has many venues for disrupting a trial.  [1] Michael A. Simons, “Departing Ways: Uniformity, Disparity, and Cooperation in Federal Drug Sentences,” Villanova Law Review, Vol. 47, Issue 2, 2002, 935.