traditions law human rights international law society family house would require

Opposition agree that the culture and law of a nation has a prodigious impact on the conscience of its civilians. However, according to Alcinda Honwana, an anthropologist and authority on the topic of child soldiers, the problem does not "have its roots in African traditional culture." [i] Although culture has an impact on society, the issue of child soldiers is not affiliated with it.  Side proposition implied that conscripting children should be excusable if it is permitted by an authoritative body of local law. However, are laws based on value-sets that do not aspire to an accessible law making process more valid than the abiding law of that nation? No. Side opposition believe that the "rule of law is a legal maxim according to which no one is immune to the law.” The fundamental purpose of government is the maintenance and promotion of basic security and public order. Without it the nation will deteriorate.  The proposition mentioned the Democratic Republic of Congo as an example. The DRC signed the “Convention on the Rights of the Child” on 21 September 1990. During this time era, Congo was not a declared democracy. However they have hitherto developed a more democratic and stable government. Additionally, DRC has not withdrawn from the Convention on the Rights of the Child, thus accentuating the fact that they are strongly against conscription of children.  Being oblivious of the fact that conscripting child soldiers is illegal is no defence. As side opposition’s substantive material will show, both national and international systems of law are expected to take account of the fact that cultural, environmental and social plurality will lead to variable rates of compliance with particular laws. While it may be difficult to make community leaders liable for the creation of child soldiers, the ICC frequently seeks to make officials linked to state actors liable for failing to protect children from military recruitment [ii] .  Moreover, cultural relativism originally assumed some degree of parity and open exchange between communities with diverging cultural values. There is no parity between the value-sets of stable liberal democratic states and the adaptations that vulnerable cultures undergo in order to survive amongst prolonged military conflict.  Finally, it would damage the reputation and reduce the efficiency of the ICC if states were permitted to argue that regions in which child soldiers were active had an established tradition of military activity among the young.  [i] “Children’s Involvement in War: Historical and Social Contexts”, Alcinda Honwana, The Journal of the history of Childhood and Youth, Vol 1 2007  [ii] The Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dylio, The International Criminal Court,

The proposition understates the extent to which the needs of child soldiers are catered to by international justice bodies. The Paris Principles [i] , which are used to guide the formation and functions of national human rights organisations, state that  “3.6 Children who are accused of crimes under international law allegedly committed while they were associated with armed forces or armed groups should be considered primarily as victims of offences against international law; not only as perpetrators...  3.7 Wherever possible, alternatives to judicial proceedings must be sought, in line with the Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international standards for juvenile justice.”  Although not strictly binding, an onus is placed on bodies such as the ICC to seek alternatives to the trial process when dealing with children. (The Principles define a child as anyone less than 18 years of age).  Even where children are placed in the role of officers or recruiters, they are unlikely to be tried in the same fashion as an adult.  This leaves only the issue of social exclusion following the process of demobilisation and treatment. Many of the problems of reintegration highlighted by the proposition do not seem to be uniquely linked to ICC prosecutions. Columbian child soldiers are as likely to be perceived as threatening whether or not they have come to the attention of the ICC. The ICC does not create negative stereotypes of former child soldiers.  As noted above, it seems perverse to give military commanders an opportunity to use cultural relativism to excuse their culpability for what would otherwise be a war crime. Ranking officers are much more likely than Yemeni tribesmen or orphaned Sudanese boys to understand the intricacies of such a defence, and much more likely to abuse it. Realistically, the commanders of child solders, and the politicians who sanctioned their use are the only class of individuals pursued by the ICC.  Where the boundaries between community leader, military officer and political leader become blurred, the court will always be able to fall back on its discretion. Practically, however, this mixing of roles is only likely to be observed in marginal communities a few major conflict zones. This does not favour stepping away from established judicial practice in order to create an entirely new form of defence.  [i] “Principles and Guidelines On Children Associated With Armed Forces or Armed Groups”, International Workshop on National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 2007,

Side proposition are attempting to make an argument in favour of reforming the ICC’s prosecution guidelines, but are doing so in terms of the culturally relative definition of adulthood. In other words, side proposition are trying to discuss war, realpolitik and international justice using the language of social anthropology. This approach is flawed.  Arguments about the appropriate age to allow a child to hunt, to leave school or to marry pale beside the life-and-death significance of participation in warfare. A child does not become an adult by acting like a soldier, and those who recruit children into military organisations do not necessarily view them as adults. Indeed, children are seen as easy targets for recruitment, due to their emotional immaturity, their gullibility and deference to those who wield authority.  Children may join armed groups out of necessity, and in the interests of survival, but this does not mean that those armed groups should accept child volunteers, or should escape criminal liability when they do so. Although the west is now a safe and prosperous place to live, the categories of war crime that the ICC prosecutes were created in response to the depravity and ruthlessness of conflicts that liberal-democracies experienced directly.  The developed, liberal democratic world is not blind to the sense of necessity that drives children to take up arms. However, it understands only too well that child soldiers are unnecessary. Children do not autonomously organise into armed militias – they are recruited by states and groups with defined political and military objectives. Such groups should be aware that there is no value or necessity underlying the use of children in combat, and should be made legally accountable when they flaunt this norm.

The ICC is not likely to target children or the leaders of marginalised communities when prosecuting the use of child soldiers. Officials of states parties who play a role in commanding and deploying military units can be held liable for failing to prevent the use of child soldiers at a local level.  If the agony of their circumstances forces a community to recruit ever younger boys into its militia, then officers, ministers or heads of state, along with the commanders of non-state actors, can be brought to trial for allowing children to be used as soldiers. This will be the case whether these individuals do so negligently or by omission. A guilty party need not engage in a positive act.  ICC prosecutors and judges exercise their discretion in order to avoid the types of injustice that the proposition describes. The lack of prosecutions relating to the ad-hoc use of child soldiers by pro-independence groups in South Sudan underlies this fact [i] .  Moreover, the ICC is bound by the principle of complementarity, an obligation to work alongside the domestic courts and legislators of the states that refer potential war crimes to the international community. If a state’s corpus of law allows for a margin of appreciation in judging the actions of isolated and endangered communities, these principles must also be reflect in the investigation and inquiries conduct by the ICC.  Complementarity enables the ICC to function with the flexibility and insight that proposition assume it lacks.  [i] “Raised by war: Child Soldiers of the Southern Sudanese Second Civil War”, Christine Emily Ryan, PhD Thesis, University of London, 2009

As noted above, the definition of adulthood accepted within western liberal democracies is not a cultural absolute. It can be argued that the legal cut-off point- be it sixteen, eighteen or twenty-one years of age- is largely arbitrary. Children who care for disabled parents take on adult responsibilities inconceivable to many undergraduate students. Many developing world cultures would regard the under-emphasis of practical skills and physical training that exists in the education systems of knowledge-based western economies to be tantamount to neglect.  In both war-torn Afghanistan and peaceful Botswana, a boy of fourteen is considered old enough and able enough to hunt; to protect his younger siblings; to marry or to be responsible for a harvest. Why should an Afghani child or his parents be condemned for allowing him to participate in the defence of his community? A family in a similar position in Botswana may never have been confronted with that choice. Although they might find the idea appalling in peace-time, the pressing necessity of war can cause opinions and beliefs to become highly flexible.  This restatement of cultural relativism goes hand in hand with side proposition’s concluding objection. Although a culture can quickly assimilate and normalise necessary practices- such as arming children- it need not think that they are objectively good and valuable. It may be keen to abandon the practice.  A community that responds to an urgent need to arm children may not want to arm children.  Side opposition regard the use of child soldiers as symptomatic of cultural depravity, of a callous attitude to suffering. This approach patronises communities subject to privations and abuses now unknown in the west. It assumes that traditions cannot be overturned and that societies in the developing world will hasten to use their children as cannon-fodder for without devoting any thought or debate to the risks involved.

The purpose of the resolution is not to eliminate conflict in the developing world. Side proposition are merely seeking to remove the harmful side effects of the way in which the use of child soldiers is currently prosecuted – the risk of criminalising children and teenagers, the stigma attached to being a child soldier, and the condemnation of communities that rely on child soldiers for protection.  Children are already the victims of atrocities perpetrated against civilians. They already volunteer to engage in military service. Armed groups that target civilian populations have already broken international law and have proven willing to do so repeatedly. Children will always be a target, whether or not they have sought out the means with which to defend themselves.  With the international community unwilling to provide wide-ranging policing and supervision of international legal norms, it is not just to condemn individuals and communities who unwillingly take up arms to try to survive attacks by groups who flagrantly disregard international law.  Peaceful communities forced to adopt abnormal survival strategies in the face of lawless aggression should be given the opportunity to compel the ICC to make situation specific judgments.

It is not sufficient to observe that there exist groups that use brutality to recruit and control child soldiers. As accounts of conflicts in South Sudan and Myanmar show, politically motivated recruitment of children is less common than children volunteering through necessity.  Side opposition should not overlook the fact that there are few constructive alternatives available to children in such situations. Educational institutions are often the first forms of state support to be withdrawn when war breaks out. Many children are orphaned as a result of the indiscriminate targeting of civilians. Taking flight as a refugee may postpone a child’s exposure to conflict, but is rarely useful in escaping it.  Proposition have already established that child soldiers do not originate exclusively within state-based bodies or organised opposition groups seeking control of a state. They are just as likely to be the products of necessity or non-western conceptions of adulthood. The status quo is blind to this distinction, failing to recognise that military involvement is entirely consistent with other norms of adulthood in certain non-western cultures. Further, taking up arms as part of an organised, coherent force is often preferable to remaining a vulnerable, untrained civilian.  Finally, it should be noted that very few opposition-side speakers are likely to argue that individuals, including children, do not have a right to defend themselves against aggression. However, a right to self-defence can be rendered meaningless if weak individuals are not permitted to combine their strength and resources to defend themselves. For ICC prosecutors this would likely be seen as the first step to forming a militia. For a physically weak fourteen year old, it is simply a survival strategy.