[en] The sexual autonomy of persons subjected to forced prostitution is in practice still less intensively protected than that of other persons. The continuous conduct of a person who forces a woman, with violence or intimidation, to have sexual intercourse for a period of time with numerous clients is generally considered only as a crime of coercive pimping (Art. 187.1, 1st paragraph, punished with imprisonment of 2 to 5 years and a fine), disregarding the concrete acts of sexual assault or rape suffered by the victim, which one by one would have a similar or even greater penalty than the one for coercive pimping. In other words, how is it possible that the penalty for somebody who violently rapes a person is imprisonment for 6 to 12 years, but that the penalty for a pimp who forces his victim with violence or intimidation to have sexual intercourse with numerous clients is imprisonment for 2 to 5 years? This paper attempts to answer the problem in a way that is not only more satisfactory but also more respectful of the legal text, by addressing two different questions. Firstly, how the liability of the pimp should be structured, not only for the crime of coercive pimping, but also for the specific sexual aggressions committed against the prostituted person due to his violent or intimidating domination. Secondly, the possible criminal liability of the client who has sexual relations with someone who knows that he/she is being forced to do so by a pimp. All of this requires an analysis of the arguments that have traditionally been adduced to avoid the attribution of criminal liability for rape or sexual assault to the pimp and the client in these cases; arguments which today, although not expressly defended by most of the doctrine, seem to have a certain inertial validity in judicial praxis

[es] La libertad sexual de las personas sometidas a prostitución coactiva aún es en la praxis objeto de una protección menos intensa que la de las demás personas. La conducta continuada de quien somete a una mujer, con violencia o intimidación, para que a lo largo del tiempo mantenga relaciones sexuales con numerosos clientes por lo general es calificada únicamente como un delito de proxenetismo coactivo (art. 187.1, 1o inciso, que prevé pena de prisión de 2 a 5 años y una multa), prescindiendo de los concretos actos de agresión sexual o violación sufridas por la víctima, que uno a uno tendrían pena similar (en el caso de la agresión sexual) o mayor (en el caso de la violación). Con otras palabras: ¿cómo es posible que la pena para quien agrede sexualmente a una persona con violencia o intimidación, penetrándola, sea prisión de 6 a 12 años, pero que la prevista para el proxeneta que fuerza con violencia o intimidación a su víctima a que sea penetrada por numerosos clientes sea prisión de 2 a 5 años? En este trabajo se intenta dar respuesta al problema de forma no sólo más satisfactoria sino también más respetuosa con el texto legal, abordando dos cuestiones distintas. En primer lugar, cómo debe estructurarse la responsabilidad del proxeneta no ya por el delito de proxenetismo coactivo, sino también por las concretas agresiones sexuales cometidas contra la persona prostituida debido a su dominación violenta o intimidatoria. En segundo lugar, los presupuestos de la responsabilidad penal del cliente que mantiene relaciones sexuales con quien sabe que está siendo forzada a ello por un proxeneta. Todo ello exige analizar los argumentos que tradicionalmente se han aducido para impedir la atribución de responsabilidad penal por violación al proxeneta y al cliente en estos casos, y que hoy, aunque no sean expresamente defendidos por la mayor parte de la doctrina, parecen tener cierta vigencia inercial en la praxis judicial