[en] In June 2015, the Spanish Constitutional Court rendered a judgment on the appeal filed by a pharmacist that had received an administrative penalty as a consequence of his conscientious objection to sell prophylactics as well as levonorgestrel (the so-called "morning-after pill"). The judgment recognized the right of conscientious objection of the pharmacist with regard to the latter product but not to the former. In this paper, the author analyses the content and reasoning of the judgment as well as its Spanish and European context. He argues that the protection offered to the objector's freedom of conscience is correct, but he finds especially two aspects of the judgment that deserve criticism. On the one hand, the Court did not face the general question of conscientious objections as part of the freedoms guaranteed by article 16 of the Constitution, and grounded its decision on the precedent case law relating to conscientious objection to abortion. And on the other hand, it excluded the objection to selling prophylactics from the constitutional analysis without providing any reason. In the author's view, it would be desirable to have a consistent constitutional case law on the situations of conscientious objection, making clear that —with or without a specific legislative provision— such situations must be subject to a balancing process to determine the prevailing legal interest in each case, from the perspective of the freedom of thought, conscience and religion guaranteed by article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights as interpreted in Bayatyan; with the consequence that such process must include a serious scrutiny of the refusal to grant the legal exemptions requested by objectors taking into account that limitations on freedom of conscience only are legitimate when deemed "necessary in a democratic society".

[es] En junio de 2015, el Tribunal Constitucional español dictaba una sentencia relativa al recurso de amparo presentado por un farmacéutico que había sido sancionado por la Junta de Andalucía como consecuencia de su objeción de conciencia a dispensar preservativos y levonorgestrel (la llamada "píldora del día después"). La sentencia reconoce el derecho de libertad de conciencia del farmacéutico por lo que se refiere al segundo producto pero no al primero. En este trabajo, el autor analiza el contenido de la sentencia, tanto en su contexto español y europeo como en lo relativo a los argumentos concretos que utiliza. A juicio del autor, aunque resulta positiva la tutela del objetor, hay dos aspectos particularmente criticables en la sentencia. Por un lado, el Tribunal omite afrontar la cuestión general de las objeciones de conciencia como parte de las libertades garantizadas por el art. 16 de la Constitución, y fundamentó su fallo en la precedente doctrina jurisprudencial relativa a la objeción al aborto. Y por otra, excluye del análisis de constitucionalidad la cuestión de la objeción a los preservativos, sin razonamiento alguno. Sería deseable —concluye— un planteamiento jurisprudencial que clarificase que las situaciones de objeción de conciencia, exista o no un específico reconocimiento legislativo de las mismas, han de someterse a una ponderación de intereses desde la perspectiva de la libertad de pensamiento, conciencia y religión garantizada por el artículo 9 del Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos según su interpretación en el caso Bayatyan; y por tanto ha de procederese a un serio examen de la negativa a conceder la exenciones legales solicitadas por los objetores teniendo en cuenta que las limitaciones a la libertad de conciencia sólo son legítimas cuando puedan considerarse "necesarias en una sociedad democrática".