[en] 'Experimental philosophy' involves a homonym that often generates confusion, since it is possible to characterize with the same name two lines of philosophical research that at first sight are quite different. In the first place, in a narrow sense it refers to a perspective that emerged with the purpose of questioning the methods generally used in traditional philosophical analysis, considering them purely speculative (Knobe et al., 2012). Specifically, it focuses on the criticism of the type of a priori analysis that is usually carried out in analytic philosophy. Broadly speaking, it takes as the starting point for its research the intuitions that people without philosophical training hold about certain philosophical problems (Knobe and Nichols, 2017). Secondly, 'experimental philosophy', in a wider sense, refers to a much older perspective, which emerged around the 17th century. Some representatives of this approach are Francis Bacon, Robert Boyle, John Locke, Blaise Pascal and David Hume. In this article we will argue that the 'broader' versions of experimental philosophy in its narrow sense share several points in common with the wider sense. In other words, we will analyze the hypothesis that behind the most recent trends in contemporary experimental philosophy it is possible to find continuities with the tradition initiated by the natural philosophers of the 17th century. These continuities would be relevant enough to make plausible the idea that experimental philosophy, in its general sense, can be understood as a philosophical tradition that, despite its intermittences, still persists nowadays and, even more, is currently in process of reconsolidation.

[es] 'Filosof?a experimental' involucra una homonimia que suele generar confusi?n, dado que es posible caracterizar con ese mismo nombre dos l?neas de investigaci?n filos?fica que a primera vista resultan bastante diferentes. En primer lugar, en sentido estrecho se refiere a una perspectiva que surgi? con el prop?sito de poner en cuesti?n los m?todos generalmente utilizados en el an?lisis filos?fico tradicional, por considerarlos netamente especulativos (Knobe et al., 2012). Puntualmente, se enfoca en la cr?tica al tipo de an?lisis a priori que suele realizarse en filos?fica anal?tica. A grandes rasgos, toma como punto de partida de sus investigaciones las intuiciones que poseen las personas sin formaci?n filos?fica sobre determinados problemas filos?ficos (Knobe y Nichols, 2017). En segundo lugar, 'filosof?a experimental', en un sentido m?s general, alude a una perspectiva mucho m?s antigua, emergida alrededor del siglo XVII. Algunos representantes de dicho enfoque son Francis Bacon, Robert Boyle, John Locke, Blaise Pascal y David Hume. En este art?culo argumentaremos que las versiones 'ampliadas' de la filosof?a experimental en su sentido estrecho, poseen puntos en com?n con el sentido m?s general. En otras palabras, analizaremos la hip?tesis de que por detr?s de las vertientes m?s recientes de la filosof?a experimental contempor?nea es posible hallar continuidades con la tradici?n iniciada por los fil?sofos naturales del siglo XVII. Dichas continuidades ser?an los suficientemente importantes como para hacer plausible la idea de que la filosof?a experimental, en su sentido general, puede entenderse como una tradici?n filos?fica que, a pesar de sus intermitencias, persiste a?n hoy en d?a y, a?n m?s, actualmente se encuentra en proceso de reconsolidaci?n.