[en] John Rawls shows a deep influence of David Hume's thought, mainly at his Theory of Justice, though also at the rest of his works. This influence is well-known in the field of political philosophy, much less in the field of moral philosophy. Rawls reads Hume's thought with a sceptic and naturalistic key, attributing him what he calls a "nature fideism". Besides this, attributes to Hume an ethical and political position linked with the classical utilitarianism. Nevertheless, his sceptical epistemology will move away, paradoxically, to Hume from the utilitarian positions. Hume's ethics and politics will finish, according to Rawls, showing a purely descriptive character and a lack of normative purposes. Hume does not have in the strict sense a theory of practical reason. This article examines and puts in question this interpretation of Hume proposed by John Rawls. The philosophy of Hume is not aporetically sceptical, articulates the moral roles of reason and the passions; and finally, is not only connected with utilitarianism; his defence of the role of utility frees to his theory of some of the main contradictions of classical utilitarianism. Besides this, the theory of the "judicious spectator" can be considered a form of a theory of practical rationality.

[es] John Rawls muestra una profunda influencia del pensamiento de David Hume, especialmente en su Teoría de la Justicia, aunque también en el resto de su obra. Esa influencia es muy conocida en el ámbito de la filosofía política y mucho menos en el de la filosofía moral. Rawls interpreta el pensamiento de Hume en clave escéptica y naturalista, atribuyéndole lo que llama un "fideísmo de la naturaleza". Junto a eso, atribuye a Hume una posición ética y política vinculada con el utilitarismo clásico. No obstante, su epistemología escéptica alejará, paradójicamente, a Hume de las posiciones utilitaristas. La ética y la política de Hume acabarán, según Rawls, mostrando un carácter puramente descriptivo y carente de propósitos normativos. Hume no tiene en sentido estricto una teoría de la razón práctica. En este artículo se examina y pone en cuestión esta interpretación de Hume propuesta por John Rawls. La filosofía de Hume no es aporéticamente escéptica, articula los papeles morales de la razón y de las pasiones, y finalmente, no sólo está conectada con el utilitarismo, sino que su defensa del papel de la utilidad libera a su teoría de algunas de las principales contradicciones del utilitarismo clásico. Junto a eso, la teoría del "espectador juicioso" puede considerarse una forma de teoría de la racionalidad práctica. [ABSTRACT] John Rawls shows a deep influence of David Hume's thought, mainly at his Theory of Justice, though also at the rest of his works. This influence is well-known in the field of political philosophy, much less in the field of moral philosophy. Rawls reads Hume's thought with a sceptic and naturalistic key, attributing him what he calls a "nature fideism". Besides this, attributes to Hume an ethical and political position linked with the classical utilitarianism. Nevertheless, his sceptical epistemology will move away, paradoxically, to Hume from the utilitarian positions. Hume's ethics and politics will finish, according to Rawls, showing a purely descriptive character and a lack of normative purposes. Hume does not have in the strict sense a theory of practical reason. This article examines and puts in question this interpretation of Hume proposed by John Rawls. The philosophy of Hume is not aporetically sceptical, articulates the moral roles of reason and the passions; and finally, is not only connected with utilitarianism; his defence of the role of utility frees to his theory of some of the main contradictions of classical utilitarianism. Besides this, the theory of the "judicious spectator" can be considered a form of a theory of practical rationality.