[en] This paper focuses on Ian McEwan's Machines Like Me and People Like You (2019). McEwan modernizes the uncanny by turning Hoffmann's Olympia into an android named Adam. The narrator, Charlie, observes: "But as I looked into his eyes, I began to feel unhinged, uncertain. Despite the clean divide between the living and the inanimate, it remained the case that he and I were bound by the same physical laws" (129). Who is human? Who is the machine? Those ethical questions invite us to address the way McEwan builds his reflection around visual concerns and a dialectics of resemblance. The ambiguity is first to be found in the tension between the title and the first-person narration. Moreover, Charlie explains that the development of AI derives from "a monstruous act of self-love" (1). While "self-love" sheds light upon man's narcissism and leads us to question the issue of ethics, "monstrous" invites us to consider the visual aspect of the scientific undertaking. The term "monstrous" insists on the visual paradigm of Man's self-focused endeavor. We will therefore turn to monster studies to consider the polysemy of the word "monster", which designates both the creature and the revelation in monstration, and think of Adam as an image that emerges "like Botticelli's Venus rising from her shell" (25). We will also question the portrait the android duplicates. Although Adam seems to project the image of hegemonic masculinity, we would like to study the way McEwan complexifies the gaze placed upon him so as to outline an androgynous android. This paper will ultimately examine how the theme of the posthuman leads McEwan to create a poetics of the monstrous and of monstration.

[fr] Cet article se concentre sur le roman Machines Like Me and People Like You (2019) de Ian McEwan. Dans ce roman, l'auteur réactualise le concept d'inquiétante étrangeté en transformant l'Olympia de Hoffmann en Adam, un androïde acheté par le narrateur. Charlie déclare : " But as I looked into his eyes, I began to feel unhinged, uncertain. Despite the clean divide between the living and the inanimate, it remained the case that he and I were bound by the same physical laws " (129). Qui est machine, qui est humain ? L'ambiguïté s'annonce dans le parallélisme du titre et la narration à la première personne. McEwan semble soulever de nouvelles questions éthiques et il s'agira de déterminer en quoi son interrogation se construit autour d'enjeux visuels et d'une dialectique de la ressemblance. Par ailleurs, le roman s'ouvre sur le constat que la création d'androïdes est motivée par un " monstrous act of self-love " (1). Si " self-love " suppose le narcissisme de l'être humain et nous renvoie à la question éthique, le terme " monstrous " nous invite à considérer la dimension visuelle de l'entreprise scientifique. L'origine du terme " monstre " travaille la polysémie entre la créature et la révélation dans la monstration. Adam n'est dès lors pas seulement une créature à observer de près (4), mais une image qui se montre, " like Botticelli's Venus rising from her shell " (25). Il conviendra d'interroger le portrait que l'androïde reproduit. Alors qu'Adam semble projeter l'image de la masculinité hégémonique, McEwan problématise le regard afin de proposer un androïde à l'identité trouble. L'article se propose enfin d'envisager en quoi un tournant vers le post-humain permet à McEwan de forger une poétique du monstrueux et de la monstration.