[en] Bentham's democratic theory is often understood in relation to his belief that an aggregation of individuals' votes will ultimately reflect the public interest. As a result, scholars have historically paid more attention to the design of Benthamite institutions which reflect this aggregative notion of the public interest rather than to the character of public deliberation before voting. This article examines two contemporary exceptions to that trend: Peter Niesen and Oren Ben-Dor. Both present a potentially rich understanding of public reasoning using "Political Tactics" and the "Constitutional Code" respectively. I outline a challenge to each. First, whilst Niesen acknowledges the value of well-ordered deliberation within an assembly, his reliance on "Political Tactics" in doing so limits the scope of his argument. As Niesen himself implies, the subject matter and provenance of this work necessarily limit the extent to which it can justify conclusions about Bentham's views on public reasoning. Second, Ben-Dor's original and compelling view makes innovative use of much of Bentham's writing on persuasion and the provision of incentives to individuals by their community. His argument that a form of public reasoning helps to shape a "utilitarian consensus", however, neglects the fact that Bentham never used that particular term. In addition, this type of consensus runs counter to Bentham's more fundamental democratic views. Given Bentham's work on fallacies and deception, the expectation of consensus risks promoting the kind of manipulated agreement, fuelled by the influence of elites, that he wanted democracies to avoid. Both of these readings should thus be welcomed as a departure from the historical implication that Bentham was an aggregative democrat with little to offer our understanding of public reasoning. For the reasons stated, however, an understanding of Bentham's views on public reasoning based on either Ben-Dor's or Niesen's arguments must also be contested. This leaves open the possibility that an alternative view could be discerned which responds to the challenges outlined.

[fr] Selon une lecture classique, la théorie benthamienne de la démocratie est fondée sur le principe du principe selon lequel l'agrégation des suffrages individuels reflète l'intérêt public. C'est pourquoi les commentateurs ont en général porté leur attention sur la façon dont le vote réalise l'agrégation des intérêts individuels plutôt que sur les délibérations publiques qui précèdent le vote. Récemment, Peter Niesen et Oren Ben-Dor ont pourtant étudié les processus de délibération collective chez Bentham. Cet article pointe des difficultés avec ces deux approches. D'une part, en s'appuyant principalement sur la Tactique des Assemblées législatives, P. Niesen limite la portée de sa démonstration. L'analyse originale d'O. Ben-Dor prend en compte les écrits de Bentham sur la persuasion et les pressions exercées par la communauté sur les individus pour montrer comment se constitue un " consensus utilitariste " dans une société politique donnée. Pourtant, il néglige le fait que Bentham ne parle jamais de " consensus ", et que cette idée même est contraire à ses idéaux démocratiques. En effet, Bentham dénonce à plusieurs reprises l'influence manipulatrice exercée par les élites et cherche à en briser les mécanismes. Faut-il faire de Bentham l'un des penseurs de la délibération publique, au risque d'occulter des aspects importants de sa théorie démocratique ?