[en] The thesis developed in this study is that the Act 12.846/2013, also known as anticorruption law, will not trigger an increased use of compliance programs or simplified compliance measures by Brazilian companies. Administrative and civil sanctions are not as deterrent as criminal sanctions. Using an economic approach we have proved that a rational economic agent would not invest in compliance, because the expected utility arising from the offense greatly exceeds the utility a company could get in case they did not commit the offense on account of the extremely low probability of being caught and punished. Besides that, the incentives offered ? a partial reduction of the administrative fine only, without the possibility of reducing the civil sanctions ? do not compensate the costs of compliance. And ultimately, the possibility of either a non-prosecution agreement or a deferred prosecution agreement, reducing the fine up to two thirds eliminates the advantages of companies which use compliance programs in comparison to the ones which do not. The research is structured in four chapters. The first chapter analyzes, in light of comparative law, the regulatory choices available to the legislatures to punish legal persons, as well as the types of culpability and the criteria to attribute the acts of individuals to legal persons. The second chapter examines compliance in the context of regulatory capitalism, as a responsive regulation strategy for imposing corporate criminal liability. The third chapter shows that the administrative and civil regime of Act 12.846/2013 is not as deterrent as a criminal regime would be. In addition, the chapter examines the act through the lenses of the economic analysis of law, concluding that there is not a credible threat of punishment in Brazil for acts of corruption. Comparing the fines that would be applied to five different fictitious companies, the research has proved that companies, when reflecting on costs and benefits of compliance programs, would prefer to direct their resources into other activities. The fourth chapter presents the elements of compliance programs and proposes standards for the assessment of its effectiveness under two criteria: the presence of structural components and the effectiveness of their performance. The conclusion is that, so as to unbalance the market of corruption, it would be essential to greatly enhance the probability of detection, investigation and punishment of illicit acts, and, at the same time, increase the benefits offered to the companies which implement an effective compliance program. Otherwise, relying on the inefficiency of the system and thus not implementing compliance will still pay off, though.

[es] La tesis expuesta consiste en que la Ley n. 12.846/2013, tambi?n conocida como ley anticorrupci?n, no ser?a capaz de incentivar a las empresas brasile?as a la adopci?n de programas o medidas simplificadas de compliance. La responsabilizaci?n administrativa y civil no es tan disuasiva como podr?a ser la responsabilizaci?n criminal. Por medio del an?lisis econ?mico del derecho, se ha probado que un agente econ?mico racional no invertir?a en compliance porque la utilidad esperada con la pr?ctica del delito es muy superior a la utilidad, caso la empresa no hubiese practicado el delito, debido a la baj?sima probabilidad de ser punida. Adem?s, los beneficios ofrecidos ? reducci?n parcial solamente de la multa administrativa, sin posibilidad de atenuar sanciones civiles ? no compensan el coste del compliance. Finalmente, la posibilidad de firmar un acuerdo de colaboraci?n y reducir la multa en hasta 2/3 elimina la ventaja de la empresa que posee y aplica un programa de compliance en relaci?n a la empresa que no adopta estas pr?cticas. El trabajo fue estructurado en cuatro cap?tulos. El primer cap?tulo ha estudiado, desde la ?ptica del derecho comparado, las posibilidades regulatorias a disposici?n del legislador para la responsabilizaci?n de las personas jur?dicas, as? como las modalidades de culpa y la forma de atribuci?n de los actos de las personas f?sicas a las personas jur?dicas. El segundo cap?tulo ha examinado el compliance en el contexto del capitalismo regulatorio, como una estrategia de regulaci?n responsiva para el control de la criminalidad empresarial. El tercer cap?tulo ha verificado que la esfera administrativa y civil, elegida por la Ley 12.846/2013, no es tan disuasiva como la esfera criminal, para la responsabilizaci?n de las empresas. Adem?s, ha examinado la ley en el marco de an?lisis econ?mico del derecho, concluyendo que no existe una amenaza cre?ble de punici?n en Brasil, por actos de corrupci?n. Por medio de la comparaci?n del c?lculo de las multas aplicadas a cinco empresas ficticias, se ha demostrado que una empresa, al analizar costes y beneficios, no invertir?a en un programa de compliance, prefiriendo utilizar estos valores de otra manera. El cuarto cap?tulo ha examinado los elementos de un programa de compliance y ha fornecido par?metros para la evaluaci?n de su eficacia, proponiendo un m?todo estructurado en dos criterios: la presencia de los elementos estructurales y la apuraci?n de la eficacia de su funcionamiento. La investigaci?n ha concluido que, para desequilibrar el mercado de la corrupci?n y hacer que las empresas adopten el compliance, ser? necesario incrementar la probabilidad de que los actos lesivos sean descubiertos, apurados y efectivamente punidos y, al mismo tiempo, ampliar los beneficios ofrecidos a las empresas que poseer?an un compliance eficaz. En caso contrario, continuara valiendo la pena apostar en la ineficiencia del sistema y no implementar un programa o medidas simplificadas de compliance.