[en] This article examines several recurring philosophical and political questions regarding interpretive methods in the history of political philosophy. It does so through a study of the theoretical premises and practical application of Quentin Skinner's interpretation of Machiavelli's thought. The aim is to interrogate the relationship between the methodological principles of Skinner's hermeneutics and the concrete application of such principles in the attempt to recover Machiavelli's fundamental intention. In other words, is Skinner actually doing what he says one should do as a historian of ideas? Does his interpretation of Machiavelli's intention correspond to his approach as an historian of ideas, or is it rather derived from an attempt to reflect on contemporary political issues? To address this question, I proceed in three steps. In the first section, I outline the foundations of Skinner's contextualist approach by focusing mainly on his critique of traditional methods of historical investigation and on his renewed conception of intentionality. In the second section, I turn to the analysis of Skinner's reading of Machiavelli in order to illustrate both the fruitful results and the limits of his interpretive theory when applied to a concrete example. The last section sets forth a critical analysis of the political project underlying Skinner's interpretation of Machiavelli. I attempt to demonstrate that the relationship between the methodological and political dimensions of the Skinnerian project is marked by a tension. On the one hand, Skinner argues that the historian of ideas cannot – and should not – study the writings of political thinkers for the purposes of retrieving lessons from the past. According to him, the very notion of perennial problems in the history of political thought, exemplified by the idea of a " Great Tradition ", is illusory. On the other hand, he claims that the study of Machiavelli's thought allows for a renewed understanding of the concept of liberty, against the contemporary perspectives of negative freedom put foward by authors such as John Rawls or Isaiah Berlin. Skinner suggests that, in reading Machiavelli, it is possible to revive a forgotten conception of republicanism rooted in the tradition of Italian civic humanism, in which individual liberty is inseparable from active citizenship. Exploring both the methodological and political aspects of Skinner's approach, I seek to interrogate the nature of the ambiguity between his position as a historian of political ideas and his more normative claim as a theorist interested in present-day political problems.

[fr] Dans cet article, nous cherchons à penser les enjeux philosophiques et politiques de l'application des méthodes interprétatives en histoire de la philosophie politique. À partir d'une étude de l'interprétation de Machiavel développée par Quentin Skinner, nous interrogeons la relation entre l'exposition théorique de sa méthodologie et son application effective à la pensée machiavélienne. Dans un premier temps, nous exposons les fondements du contextualisme skinnérien, en insistant d'une part sur sa critique des méthodes orthodoxes en histoire des idées, et d'autre part, sur sa conception de l'intentionnalité d'un auteur du passé et sur la relation étroite entre théorie politique et vie politique qu'elle présuppose. Dans un second temps, nous analysons la mise en œuvre de cette méthode à partir du cas Machiavel, en illustrant les résultats féconds ainsi que les limites d'une telle théorie interprétative. Nous terminons par une analyse critique du projet politique qui sous-tend l'application de cette herméneutique. La thèse défendue est que la relation entre la dimension méthodologique et la dimension proprement politique de l'entreprise skinnérienne est marquée par une certaine tension. D'un côté, Skinner affirme que l'historien ne peut, et ne doit, retirer de leçons intemporelles de l'étude des auteurs du passé; la notion même de continuité entre les époques – l'idée d'une " grande Tradition " – serait un leurre. De l'autre, il critique la conception négative de la liberté mise de l'avant par des auteurs tels que John Rawls ou Isaiah Berlin, et propose une vision renouvelée du républicanisme qui puiserait à la source machiavélienne et permettrait de réconcilier liberté individuelle et participation citoyenne. En explorant tour à tour ces deux volets et l'articulation parfois problématique entre les deux, nous interrogeons la nature de cette équivoque entre les visées méthodologiques de Skinner en tant qu'historien des idées et son propos en tant que théoricien politique.