## Humanitarian Emergency Response Review

28 March 2011 Chaired by Lord (Paddy) Ashdown 

## Forewordtothehumanitarianemergency Responsereview

"The water started to rise, and it did not stop…the water was already so high and strong that I could not hold on to one of my children and the water swept her away. Luckily someone was there to grab her."
Gonaïves,OgèLéandre,Haiti2008
ThepeopleoftheUnitedKingdomknowwhywerespond,individuallyandasasociety, tohumanitarianemergenciesaroundtheworld.Theyunderstandthatwhenweare confrontedbytheimageofachildtrappedintherubbleofanearthquake,orofafamily clingingtotheroofofafloodedhome,wedon'tsomuchcommittohelp,asfeel committedtodoso;committedbyoursharedhumanity.

Itisbecausetheimpulsetorelievesufferingisrootedinmoralitythat our interventions to relieve suffering at times of disaster must always be driven by need and need alone. Nevertheless, the fact that Britain is prepared to play a full part (and often a leading part) as a member of the international community in order to relieve suffering at times of crisis makes for, not only a more compassionate world, but a safer one too - and that benefits all of us.

Whatiscrucialisthatwhenwedecidetoact,wedosoeffectively.Thefactthat, acrossthecountry,householdbudgetsareunderparticularstrainatthemoment,only underlinesthepoint.Peoplewanttoknowthateverypoundtheygivewillbeapound spentsavinglivesandlivelihoods.

InlookingatthewaytheUKgovernmentrespondstohumanitarianemergencies,this ReviewhasidentifiedmuchinwhichtheBritishpeoplecantakepride.TheDepartment forInternationalDevelopment,asapolicymaker,afunderandadelivererofaid,hasbeen widelypraisedforitsleadingrolewithintheinternationalhumanitariancommunity.

Butbeinggoodisnotgoingtobegoodenoughgiventhechallengesahead.Thescale, frequencyandseverityofrapidonsethumanitariandisasterswillcontinuetogrowin thecomingyears,andatanacceleratingpace.Expertspredictthatclimaterelated disasterscouldaffect375millionpeopleeveryyearby2015,upfrom263million in2010. Thereasonsforthisaremany.Rapidpopulationgrowth,especiallyindisasterprone areas,isakeyfactor,especiallywhencombinedwithcontinuedmassurbanisation,much ofitunplannedandunsafe.Sotooarethechangesalreadyunderwayinsealevels,and inglobalrainfallandstormpatterns–changesthatwillcontributetosignificant additionalpressureforfoodandwaterintheyearsahead.

Wearecaughtinaracebetweenthegrowingsizeofthehumanitarianchallenge,and ourabilitytocope;betweenhumanityandcatastrophe.And,atpresent,thisisnota racewearewinning. Somerecentlyaffectedcountries,likeChinaandChilehavedemonstratedremarkable resilienceinthefaceofnaturaldisasters.EvenJapan,wherethetriplecatastrophehas ledtotremendoussuffering,thingsmighthavebeenfarworsewithoutpreparation. Butothers,likeHaitiorPakistan,haveneededlargescaleoutsidehelpandwillcontinue todoso. Theabilityoftheinternationalhumanitariancommunitytoprovidethishelpis threatenedbyanumberofproblems,somenew,somefamiliar.

Thefirstistheglobaleconomiccrisis,whichcouldmakethealreadyslowergrowing countriesoftheWestlessableorwillingtoprovideresourcesfordisasterrelief.Thisgap couldbefilledbythefastergrowing'emerging'worldeconomies,butthisisfarfrom guaranteed.Thesecountriescurrentlycontributefarlesstodisasterrelief,andinany casearelikelytoremainpreoccupiedwiththerelativelyhighlevelsofpovertywithin theirownborders. Thesecondistherisingsecuritythreatfacedbyhumanitarianworkersontheground, andtheincreasingdifficultiestheyfaceinaccessingaffectedpopulations.Thetaskof providinghumanitarianassistanceimpartiallyandonthebasisofneedishugely complicatedbyconflict.Theneed,onoccasion,toworkalongsideorwithhostile–even proscribed–groupsalreadypresentshumanitarianworkerswithanumberofmoraland practicalproblems.Thesetooarelikelytogrowinnumberandcomplexity.

Regrettably,theleadership,managementandcoordinationoftheinternational community'seffortshavenotriseneventothechallengeswecurrentlyface.Unlesswe radicallyimprovethequalityoftheleadershipoftheinternationaleffortinhumanitarian crises,wewillnotsucceedindealingwithwhatisahead.

Forallthesereasons,wehaveconcludedthatmerelyimprovinguponwhatwehave doneinthepast–enhancingthestatusquo–willnotbesufficient.Wemustdevise newwaystomeetthenewchallenges. Thereareseventhreadstothisnewapproach.Theseformthestructureofthisdocument.

First,weneedtodevelopamore**anticipatory**approach,usingsciencetohelpusboth predict,andprepareforfuturedisastersandconflict. Second,weneedtoplacethecreationof**resilience**attheheartofourapproachbothto longer-termdevelopmentandtoemergencyresponse.ThiswillrequireDFIDtomake humanitarianresponseapartofitscoredevelopmentwork,engagingmorecloselywith localpeopleandinstitutionssoastostrengthenlocalcapacity.

Third,weneedsubstantiallytoimprovethestrategic,politicalandoperational leadershipoftheinternationalhumanitariansystem.

Fourth,weneedto**innovate**tobecomemoreefficientandeffective.

Fifth,weneedtoincreasetransparencyand**accountability**towardsbothdonorand hostcountrypopulations.Farfrombeingburdensome,thisisinfactapreconditionfor theimprovementswewanttoseeintermsofvalueformoneyandimpact.

Sixth,weneedtocreatenewhumanitarian**partnerships**toallowDFIDbetterto influenceandworkwithinanincreasinglycomplexhumanitariansystem.Infuture,the effectivenessofDFIDwilldependmoreonwhatitcandowithothers,thanonwhatit candoalone.DFIDwillneedtoworkmorecloselywiththeemergingworldpowersand withtheprivatesector,aswellaswiththemilitary.Inaddition,itwillneedtonurtureits existingpartnershipswiththeEU,theUS,otherdonors,theRedCrossandthe internationalNGOs. Finally,asemergenciesbecomebiggerandmorecomplex,soweneedtodefendand strengthenthe**humanitarian space**.Thisreferstotheneedforhumanitarianworkersto begrantedaccessandprotectionastheyseektoprovidehumanitarianassistancein conflictaffectedareas.Thisinturnwillrequireustoreassertthecorehumanitarian principlesofhumanity,impartialityandneutrality;thepromisetoassistpeopleonthe basisofneed,regardlessoftheirgender,religion,ethnicityorpoliticalallegiance.

AsDFIDseekstomeetthesechallenges,itwillneed,ineverythingitdoes,tobecome evenmoreinnovative,evenmoreofalearningorganisationthatisalwaysopenand welcomingtonewideas.

IhavebeenprivilegedtochairthisindependentreviewandamgratefultoSecretaryof StateAndrewMitchell,notonlyforaskingmetodothis,butforenablingmetowork withaSeniorAdvisoryBoardwhosetalent,experienceandwisdomhascontributedso muchtothiswork;withagiftedandcommittedteamofDFIDofficialswhohave supportedusoutstandingly;andwithmyfriendoffortyyears,RossMountain,who,as theReview'sDirector,hasdrivenandsteeredusthroughoutthesevenmonthsofthe reviewprocess. DFIDenjoysapositionofrespectandleadershipintheinternationalcommunityforthe workthatithasdoneinthepastandstilldoestoday.Itisourhopethatthisreportwill assistDFIDtomaintainthatpositionofinternationalleadershipinthefaceofthe challengesthatlieahead.

## Lord (Paddy) Ashdown, Chair Humanitarianemergencyresponsereview

 
Director:RossMountain SeniorAdvisoryBoardMembers:AndyBearpark;BarneyMayhew;
CarolynMiller;DavidBryer;ElisabethRasmusson;GilbertGreenall;
GordonConway;JodaSilva;MarkBowden;NiciDahrendorf;
RandolphKent;SimonMaxwell;SteffenStenberg;
SueWardell;YaseminAysan.

## Executivesummary

Thereviewcomesatatimewhenthehumanitariancommunityfacesanumberof dauntingchallenges.Disastersareincreasing,asarethenumbersofpeopleaffectedby them.ThesearesetoutstarklyintheChair'sforewordandinthereportitself. TheUKisamajorcontributorinhumanitariancrises,andishighlyrespectedforitsrole. SomeofthebestknownhumanitarianorganisationsareUKbased,andtheBritishpublic givesgenerouslyinappeals.TheUKgovernmenthasbeenthesecondlargestbilateral donorforhumanitarianreliefinrecentyears,aftertheUS. ThisreviewhasfoundthattheUKDepartmentforInternationalDevelopment(DFID), themainconduitthroughwhichthegovernmentresponds,isalsowellrespectedand wellregarded.Ithasexcellenthumanitarianstaff,andhasplayedapositiverolein improvinginternationalresponse.Nevertheless,thereviewhasalsoconcludedthatin lightofthepotentialneedinyearstocome,therewillhavetobeastepchangeinthe wayDFIDresponds.Thereviewmakesaseriesofhighlevelpolicy,andsomedownto earthpractical,recommendationsintendedtobringthischangeabout.

## Anticipation

If we are to meet the challenges ahead, we have to be "ahead of the curve" rather than always behind; preparing for disasters, as well as reacting to them.

Itisinthenatureofdisastersandconflictthattheycannotbepreciselypredicted.But wecanbemoreanticipatoryinourapproach.Hurricaneseasonsarewellknown,asare earthquakefaultlines.Droughtscanbequicklyidentified.Climatescienceisimproving allthetime.Politicalinstabilityandtheconflictitcanleadtoarereportedearly.But theseearlywarningsandpredictableeventsareoftennotactedoninadvance,or quicklyenoughwhentheyarehappening.Partoftheanswerisbetterpresentationof thescienceforbetterdecisionmaking.Partoftheanswerisfordecisionmakerstoact onthisinformation.Devolvingdecisionmakingtothoseclosesttoeventsisanother part,includingequippingatriskgovernmentsandcivilsocietywiththemeanstoact.

## Resilience

The more resilient a nation, the less lasting damage disasters cause and the quicker they can recover.Resilienceisaboutbeingpreparedfordisasters,andhaving goodsystemsforrespondingtothem.Itisaboutinvestingininfrastructure,likebuilding housesandhospitalsthatcanwithstandearthquakes,orschoolsthatdoubleupas cycloneshelters.Butitisalsoaboutinvestinginhumancapacity;strengtheninga government'scapacitytorespond;creatingdisastermanagementstructuresandplans;
givingpeoplesupportbeforedroughtforcesthemtosellalltheirpossessions.Itisabout economicplanningthatrecognisesdisasterscanhappenandmakesprovisionforthem. Wheregovernmentsarecapableofbuildingresilience,thentheUK,throughDFIDshould helpthemtodoso.ThisshouldbeacorepartofDFIDdevelopmentworkincountries thatareatrisk,whichisthemajorityofthe27inwhichDFIDnowworksbilaterally.

Investinginresiliencewillsavelivesandmoneyinthefuture.Mozambiqueaskedthe internationalcommunityfor£2millionin2006tohelpprepareforthefloods,anamount itcouldnotsecure.Afterthefloodstheinternationalsystemspent£60millionresponding.

## Leadership

Wheregovernmentsarenotabletorespondtodisastersorinconflictsituationsthey needastronginternationalsystemtohelpout.Buttoooftentheinternationalsystem failsthem.CasestudiesforthisreviewinHaitiandPakistanmakethisdepressinglyclear. TheUNistheonlylegitimateauthoritythatcanleadbutisoftentooweakandslowto doso. Changeisneededatthestrategicandtheoperationallevels.The UN needs to invest in a leadership cadre and ensure its best people are deployed quickly to the biggest and most complex disasters.Theseleadersneedthesupportoftheirheadquartersand theagenciesthatdothemajorityofthework.Thesameistrueoftechnicalleadership
–the'clusters'.Theseneeddedicatedleadershipinthebiggestemergenciesandthey needtobestrategic,decision-makingbodieswithnationalandlocalgroupsfully integrated.Linesofauthorityneedtobeclearer,andwherenecessary,institutional changesshouldbemadetomakethemso.Overallthelevelofprofessionalisminthe humanitariansectorneedstoberaisedthroughbetterinvestmentinskillsandtraining.

TheUKhasbeenastrongproponentofchangeintheinternationalsystemtodate,and canhelppushthisnewagenda.AlreadytheheadsofthemajorUNagencies,ledbythe UNEmergencyReliefCoordinator(ERC),arepushingtheseideas.DFID should encourage and support further reform, and work with others to deliver the change needed to face future challenges.

## Innovation

Whenitcomestosavinglivesinanemergencyweneedtobeasefficientandeffective aswecan.Oneofthewaysthiscanbeachievedisthroughgreateruseofnew technologiesandnewpractices,harnessingthebestofnewscience,newprocessesand thenewideasfromthoseaffected.

Thehumanitariansectorhasbeenslowtochange.Newapproachessuchasgiving peoplecash(insteadofbuyingthemblanketstheymaynotneed)havetakenyearsto gotoscale.InPakistan,satelliteimagerywasavailabletostrategicplanners,butnotto thoserespondingontheground.Intractableproblemssuchasthetimelyprovisionof shelterremainachallenge.Whilsttherehavebeenafewsuccesses,suchasinnutrition wherenewfoodproductshaveprovenrevolutionary,thesehavebeendrivenby committedindividualsusuallywithoutsupport.

DFIDhasagoodtrackrecordinsupportinginnovation.Ithasprovidedstartupfunding formanynewinitiatives,andcontinuestoseeksolutionstoproblemslikeshelter.

Ithelpedsetupanewinnovationsfund,withotherdonorsandNGOs.Thiswork needstobeaccelerated,andnewinnovationsneedtobetakentoscalefaster.Crucially, there is a need for more investment in research and evidence, as well as new ways of working.

## Accountability

Humanitarianaidhelpsmillionsofpeoplearoundtheworldeachyear.TheNigercase studyforthisreviewalonemakesclearthattensofthousandsofchildrenweresaved fromstarvationthroughpromptaction,withDFIDfundingplayingameaningfulpart. Butthereisanaccountabilitydeficit.Thepeoplewhoareonthereceivingendofour assistancearerarelyifeverconsultedonwhattheyneed,orabletochoosewhohelps themorhow.This means that gender based issues and the needs of the vulnerable are too often overlooked.Whilstthishaslongbeenrecognisedasanissue,toolittle hasbeendoneaboutit.

Understandingtheimpactofhumanitarianassistanceisanotherareawheremuchwork isneeded.Thisisconnectedtotheaccountabilityissue;thosewhodeliverhumanitarian aidcanonlyunderstandtheirimpactiftheyunderstandwhatpeopleneed.DFIDcan helpwithmeasuringimpactandmakingthosewhodeliverhumanitarianaidmore accountable. Linking impact measurement and accountability better to the funds agencies receive is a key recommendation of this review. Humanitarian agencies should also be more accountable to donors, be they governments or the public.Donorshavearighttoknowhow–andhowwell–their moneyisspent.

## Partnership

TheUKisnotalargedirectproviderofhumanitarianassistance,preferringinsteadto workwithandthroughpartners.The review endorses this approach; partnership will become even more important as the world becomes more interconnected, as power shifts towards the newly emerging economies, and as greater challenges require more capacity. The UK should remain a committed multilateralist in its approach.Workingwith partnersinothernations,withtheUnitedNationsandwithcivilsocietyorganisations makessense.Itcombinesscarceresourcesforthebesteffect. ManyofthepartnersDFIDworkswithinhumanitarianresponseareworld-class organisations.Nevertheless,thehumanitariansectorinrecentyearshasbeenseenby manyasa'closedshop'withahandfulofagenciesanddonorsdominating.Whilstthis canbeexplained(partlybytheneedfororganisationstobeseenasneutraland impartial)thesystemdoesneedtochange.This review concludes that DFID needs to become more of a 'network enabler', working with existing partners but also developing new and dynamic partnerships with emerging nations, NGOs, the private sector, faith groups and the diasporas.

## Humanitarian Space

Inconflictzonesorfailedstates,DFIDoftencannotworkdirectlythroughthe authorities.Insuchcasesthereisafragile'space'intowhichhumanitarianagenciesare admittedtohelpthosemostinneed.Theyareonly'allowed'in,however,whentheyare viewedasgenuinelyimpartial.Whereaidislinkedtopoliticalormilitarygoals,access canbedeniedandthesecurityofstaffcompromised,makingitdifficulttoreachthose mostinneed.Hencetheimportanceofthekeyhumanitarianprinciplesofhumanity, neutralityandimpartiality.

The review concludes that DFID humanitarian policy should be to support, defend and where possible enlarge this fragile space; to work with agencies that can access and help those in dire need, and not to politicise humanitarian aid.The reviewalsorecognisesthatincomplexconflicts,andinsituationswheretheauthorityof thestatehasbrokendowntherewillbetimeswhenmilitaryforce,mandatedbytheUN, willbeneededtoprotectciviliansandhumanitarianworkers.Insuchcases,creatinga secureenvironmentbothfortheciviliansandfortheconductofhumanitarianworkcan oftenbeafirstpriority.

## Delivering Transformational Change In Dfid

Todeliverastepchangeinthewayhumanitarianassistanceisconceivedanddelivered, DFIDwillhavetomakesignificantchanges.Themostradicalchangewillinvolveseeing humanitarianconcernsasacorepartofDFIDprogramming,ratherthansomethingthat needstoberespondedtowhenithappens.There should be a closer, more integrated relationship between DFID's core development work and the way DFID responds to meet rapid onset emergencies.Suchworkshouldalsobeofcentralconcernto DFID'sdevelopmentpartners,suchastheWorldBankandtheUN. DFIDshouldactivelysupporttheUNinitseffortstoreformitshumanitarianleadership.

FundingformultilateralandNGOpartnersneedstobecomemorepredictable,sothat theycaninvestintheskillsandstructurestheyneedtobebetterprepared.Thereisa needforfastandflexiblefundingforthe'criticalperiod'immediatelyaftera humanitarianemergencyhashappened.Fundingshouldalsobeavailabledirectlyto governmentsforresilienceandresponsework,wheretheyarecapable,willingand transparent.

To introduce a new dynamism into the humanitarian sector DFID needs to reach out to new partners. It needs to work better with new donors and the private sector. It needs to promote innovation and bring new innovations and processes to scale faster. It needs to put the measurement of impact at the heart of its work, and demand accountability and transparency of itself and its partners. It needs to seek value for money, not crudely through comparing costs but through focusing on achieving the best outcomes for affected people and improving the quality of future decision making. It needs to drive radical change, for instance in the supply chain. It needs to improve the way it provides leadership and coordination across the UK government when responding to humanitarian emergencies. Finally, it must become better at communicating what it does, both to those who provide the money, and to those who are the beneficiaries of it.

## Tableofcontents

1.  Introduction
1
Howthereportisorganised
1
Howthereviewwasconducted
2
2.  The international humanitarian system
3
DFID:Aleadingactorinhumanitarianresponse
5
3.  Challenges
9
Increasingdisasterrisk:themajortrends,threats,andprobabilities
9
Respondingtoincreasedneed
12
4.  Findings
13
4.1  
Anticipation
13
4.2  
Resilience
15
Embeddingresiliencewithindevelopmentprogrammes
16
Regional,nationalandlocalcapacities
18
Innovativefundingmodelsforrisktransfer
18
4.3  
Leadership
19
Strategicleadership
20
Operationalleadership
20
Humanresourcecapacities
21
4.4  
Innovation
23
Cashbasedapproaches
24
Shelter
25
Technology
25
4.5  
Accountability
26
Impact
27
Addressingtheneedsofthemostvulnerable
29
Gender
29
4.6  
Partnership
30
WorkingwiththeUnitedNationsanditsagencies
30
WorkingwiththeEuropeanUnion
31
Workingwithbi-lateraldonors
32
Workingwithnewdonorpartners
32
WorkingwithNGOs
33
WorkingwiththeRedCrossandRedCrescentMovement
35
Workingwiththeprivatesector
36
Workingwiththemilitary
38
4.7  
Humanitarian space
40
Protectionofcivilians
40
Securityofhumanitarianworkers
41
5.  Delivering transformational change in DFID
42
5.1  
Changing the policy
42
5.2  
Delivering differently
43
ShapingtheInternationalSystem
43
Changingthefundingmodel
44
Fastmobilisationfundingandpre-crisisarrangements
45
Fundingrecoveryfromdayone
46
Deliveringsmarterdirectaid
46
WorkingstrategicallyacrosstheUKgovernment
47
5.3  
Changing the structure, shifting resources
49
Managingtheresponse
50
Managingrisk
50
5.4  
Driving results and value for money
51
Outcomesandeffectiveness
53
Outputsandefficiency
53
Inputsandeconomy
54
Theglobalsupplychain
54
5.5  
Getting the message across
55
6.  Recommendations
58

## 1. Introduction

ThisindependentreviewintohowtheUKrespondstohumanitarianemergencieswas commissionedbytheSecretaryofStateforInternationalDevelopmentandledbyLord PaddyAshdown.ItwasaskedtoconsiderhowtheUKshouldbestrespondto humanitarianemergenciesoverseas,andtheroletheUKshouldplayintheinternational humanitariansystem. TheUKisconsideredoneoftheleadingnationsinhumanitarianresponse.Inrecent yearsithasbeenthesecondlargestbilateralhumanitariandonorglobally,andiswidely regardedinternationally.TheUKisastrongsupporterofthemultilateralsystem, providessignificantfundingandconsistentlyprovidesexperiencedstaffandreliefitems tosupporttheresponseinmajoremergencies.

TheBritishpublicexpectstheUKtobeamajorhumanitarianresponder.TheBritish publicitselfgivesgenerouslytoemergencyappeals.InJanuary2010,theDisasters EmergencyCommittee(DEC)AppealforHaitiraised£101millionfromthepublic. Theresponsewasespeciallynotableatatimeofglobaleconomiccrisis. ThisreviewofhowtheUKcarriesoutitshumanitarianresponseworkcomesata momentofreflectionfortheinternationalsystem.Asthehorrendouseventsunfoldin JapanandoverayearaftertheHaitiearthquakeandsixmonthsafterdevastatingfloods inPakistan,manyofthoseinchargeofmajoraidagenciesarewonderinghowtomeet thechallengesofthefuture.Italsocomesatatimeofchange forDFID,whichhas recentlypublishedthefindingsofitsBilateralandMultilateralAidReviews.

Thereviewisforwardlooking.ItisnotanevaluationofDFID'sworkinemergenciesto date.Rather,thereviewnoteswherepastresponsehasbeenmosteffectiveandlooks forwaystoenhancewhathasbeendonewell.ItaimstobuildontheUK'sstrengths. Thescopeofthereviewdoesnotcoverlong-termchronichumanitariancrises.Itfocuses onsuddenonsetdisastersor'spikes'inconflictsituations,butmanyofthe recommendationswillalsoapplytochronicsituations.

CreatingthebestUKresponsewillonlygopartofthewaytowardsimprovingthewhole system.ThereviewlooksatthewaytheUKcanworkwithotherinternationalbodies andUNagenciesinemergencysituationstoensurethattheglobalresponsetodisasters improves.TheUKmustworktoinfluencetheglobalsystemifrealimprovementsare tohappen. TheUKworksthroughandwithpartners.Workinginpartnershipisabigpartofthe reviewandtheproposedfutureapproach.ThereviewsetsoutwhereDFIDcandeepen thesepartnershipsandhow.ItalsolookstonewpartnershipsandhowDFIDcanwork bestwithintheUKgovernment.

## How The Report Is Organised

Thereportislaidoutinsixsections.Thisintroductionisfollowedbysectiontwo,which brieflydescribestheinternationalhumanitariansystemandDFID'sroleinit.Thethird sectionlooksatpotentialfuturehumanitarianchallengesandthecapacitiesthereareto copewiththese.Sectionfoursetsoutthefindingsofthereview.Thereview's conclusionsonhowDFIDshouldpositionitselfinordertomeetthefuturechallenges areoutlinedinsectionfive.Sectionsixliststherecommendations.

## How The Review Was Conducted

ThereviewwaschairedbyLordPaddyAshdownandwasentirelyindependentinnature. ASeniorAdvisoryBoard(SAB)of15metonamonthlybasisthroughoutthereview periodtosteerthedirectionofthereview,examinematerialandsetoutthemain themesandrecommendations.Theadvisoryboardservedinapersonalcapacity,but representedthroughtheirexperiencethemajorinstitutionsandtraditionsinvolvedin humanitarianresponse.

Asmallreviewteamcarriedoutconsultations,literaturereviewandpreparedmaterial fortheboard.Anindependentdirectorwasappointedtoheadtheteam.

2.
Theinternationalhumanitariansystem
Theformalinternationalhumanitariansystemismadeupofproviders(donor governments,foundationsandindividualgivers)andtheimplementers(RedCrossand RedCrescentMovement,NGOs,UNAgenciesandIOMandnationalandregionalNGOs andcivilsociety).Anumberofkeyactorsalsoofimportancearestillseentobeoutside theformalsystem,namelyaffectedgovernments,themilitary,andbusinesses. Remittanceflowsarealsonotcapturedbytheformalsystem.Thechartaboveshows themaincomponentsofthesystem.

Theinternationalhumanitariansystemrespondstohumanitarianemergencieswhere thereisanappealforinternationalassistance,orinextremecaseswheredirectedbythe UN.Thelegalframeworkforaninternationalhumanitarianemergencyresponseisset outinInternationalHumanitarianLaw,HumanRightsLaw,RefugeeLawandUN
Resolutions.

Theselegalnormsestablishthathumanitarianaidshouldbeguidedbytheprinciplesof:

i.Humanity–thecentralityofsavinglivesandalleviatingsufferingwhereveritisfound.
ii.Impartiality–humanitarianaidshouldbeimplementedsolelyonthebasisofneed,
withoutdiscriminationbetweenorwithinaffectedpopulations.
iii.Neutrality–humanitarianactionmustnotfavouranysideinanarmedconflictorother
dispute.
iv.Independence–humanitarianobjectivesareautonomousfrompolitical,economic,
militaryobjectivesorotherinterestsrelatedtothelocationwhereassistanceis
provided.
Theinternationalhumanitariansystemhasgrownrapidlyoverrecentyearsandthereis oftenalackofclarityastowhatthetermactuallyreferstoandwhereitsboundarieslie.

Themaindeliveryactorsfallintothree'pillars':theUNanditsspecialisedagencies;the RedCrossandRedCrescentMovement;andNon-GovernmentOrganisations(NGOs).

Governments,nationalandlocalinstitutionsinaffectednationstypicallyleadthe responseandprovidemuchoftheassistance,withtheinternationalsysteminsupport.

Inrecentyears,internationalmilitaryforcesandlargeprivatecorporationshave increasinglybecomeaidproviders,asthisreportexplores. Theinternationalsystemisfinancedbygovernmentdonors(ofwhichtheUKisa significantone)andprivatecontributions.Figuresfortotalinternationalhumanitarian resourcesvarydependingonthesource.Althoughfundingtotheinternational humanitariansystemhasincreasedfasterthantherateofofficialdevelopment assistance(ODA)inrecentyears,thelatestGlobalHumanitarianAssistance(GHA)
reportclaimsthathumanitarianaidfellby11%from2008($16.9billion)to2009 ($15.1billion).

Therangeofactivitiesundertakenbytheinternationalhumanitariansystemhasalso expanded.Thecorehumanitarianactivitiesremain:healthservices;waterand sanitation;foodsecurity;nutritionandfoodaidandshelter.However,many humanitarianoperationsnowincludeawiderangeofotheractivities,including: protection;education;agriculture;mentalhealthsupport;incomegeneration;
infrastructurerehabilitation;humanrightsadvocacyandsupporttothereestablishmentoftheruleoflaw1.

Thetotalnumberofstaffworkingfortheinternationalhumanitariansystemis estimatedat210,800(mostlynationalsintheirowncountry).ItismadeupofUN agenciesandtheIOM(49,500),theRedCross/CrescentMovement(48,400)and NGOs(112,900).Aidworkerpopulationhasincreasedby6%yearonyearoverthe last10years2.

Inconflictsituationsthereistypicallyapeaceandsecuritydimensiontohumanitarian emergencies.Insuchcasesothermultilateralmechanismsandinstitutionsarealso involvedsuchastheUNSecurityCouncil,whichdetermineswhenandwhereaUN
Peacekeeping(DPKO)operationshouldbedeployed.

## Dfid: A Leading Actor In Humanitarian Response

TheUK,throughitsDepartmentforInternationalDevelopmentisthesecondlargest bilateralglobalhumanitariandonor.The2002InternationalDevelopmentActprovides thelegalbasisforDFID'sresponsetohumanitarianemergencies.ItgivestheSecretaryof StateforInternationalDevelopmentpowerstoprovidehumanitarianassistance,with thesolepurposeto"alleviatetheeffectsofanaturalorman-madedisasterorother emergency"outsidetheUK.Latterly,theUKhasalsosignedtheEUconsensuson humanitarianaidthatenshrinestheprinciplesoutlinedabove.Asadonor,theUKhas alsosigneduptothePrinciplesandPracticeofGoodHumanitarianDonorship.DFID delivershumanitarianassistanceinfourdistinctways:

## 1. Dfid Shapes The Humanitarian System

AsasignificantUNmemberstateandalargedonortotheinternationalsystem,theUK (throughDFID)workswithUNagenciestodelivereffectivelyandimproveperformance. DFIDcontributescorefundingtotheUN,aswellasadditionalfundinginbig emergencies.Institutionalstrategicpartnershipshavebeenformedaroundthiscore funding,allowingDFIDandtheUNtosetlong-termgoals.

In2009/10totalDFIDhumanitarianspendwassplitasshowninthefigurebelow.3In severalsuddenonsetemergenciesresearchedaspartofthisreview,theUNcomponent wassignificantlysmaller,closerto40%withlargerpercentagesgoingdirectlytoNGOs andtheRedCross/CrescentMovement.Exceptionally,inthecaseoftheHaiti earthquake,morethan50%wentondirectexpenditure.

In2005DFIDsupporteda'humanitarianreform'processthatsoughtmorepredictable response.Thereformscalledformajorchangesinfunding,leadershipandcoordination ofhumanitarianemergencies.Asaresult,DFIDhasworkedtoenlargetheCentral EmergencyResponseFund(CERF)andcreatecountrypooledfunds,whichhelpUN
agenciesrespondrapidlytoemergencies.TheUKhasbeenthelargestdonortotheCERF –morethan$420milliontodate–andtocountrypooledfundingmechanisms.Aswell asleadingbyexample,DFIDworkstoinfluenceothermemberstatestoincrease contributionstotheCERF.In2006therewere52countrydonorstotheCERF.By2010 thatfigurehadrisento82countries. DFIDalsosupportedtheestablishmentofthe'cluster'approach4,anewcoordination mechanismthatmadeagenciesresponsibleforparticularareaslikeshelterorhealth.

DFIDfundedglobalclusterappealstosetthesystemupandhascontinuedtopush agenciestodeploypeopletoleadthese.Throughitsfunding,DFIDcontinuestoplayan influencingroleencouragingclusterleadagenciestoviewhumanitarianleadershipand co-ordinationactivitiesaspartoftheircorework.

## 2. Dfid Funds Humanitarian Aid Agencies And Is The Second Largest Bilateral Donor After The Us Government

In2009/10DFIDspentabout£528milliononhumanitarianassistance.About£100
millionofthiswentthroughtheEuropeanCommunityHumanitarianOffice(ECHO),the EU'sfundforemergencies.ECHOthenspentthismoneythroughUNagencies,theRed CrossandNGOs.AlargeproportionofthefundsspentthroughtheUNwerechannelled toimplementingNGOs.

11%wentonrapidonsetfundingforhumanitarianemergencies.Theremainderon protractedcrisessuchasDRCongoorSudan.TheoneoffamountsthatDFIDspendson rapidonsetemergencies,however,changesignificantlydependingonthecontext.In 2010/11DFIDspent£134milliononrespondingtothefloodsinPakistanalone. SeveralmillionpoundseachofcorefundingwenttoallofthebigUNagenciesinvolved inemergenciesandtheRedCross/RedCrescent.TheannualcontributiontotheCERF constitutedabout10%ofDFID'snon-ECHOhumanitarianspend. ECHOwasthebiggestrecipientofUKaidatabout£100millionin2009/10,followedby theICRCat£66million,andthenOCHA(includingCERF),WFP,UNDPandUNICEF(see figure3onpage75).

Inabsoluteterms,theUKhasbeenthesecondlargestbilateralhumanitariandonorafter theUS.Asapercentageofnationalincome(GNI)however,theUKcomesafterSaudi Arabia,Kuwait,Denmark,Ireland,Sweden,Luxembourgandsomeothers.

## 3. Dfid Is Also On A Small Scale A Direct Deliverer Of Aid, Providing Goods In Kind, Search And Rescue (Sar) Capabilities, And Supporting Secondments Where Appropriate

HavingadirectresponsecapabilityallowsDFIDtostrengthenandinfluencethe internationalhumanitariansystem.In2009/10DFID'sin-kindgoodsorpersonnel supportamountedto£7million.DFIDhasastandbyarrangementwiththeUKfire servicetodeploysearchandrescueteamsaftermajorearthquakes.Italsohasitsown standing'operationsteam'(CHASEOT)thatcandeployrapidlytoemergenciesandruns alldirectdeliveryfromLondon.Theoperationsteamisonstandby24/7andisa contractedoutfacility,currentlymanagedbyCrownAgents.Ithasstandby arrangementswithairfreightcontractorsandcandeployrapidlynichecapabilitieslike airporthandling.ItprovidesexpertpersonneltotheUnitedNationsonrequestand assemblesteamsspeedilyforDFID. InthecaseoftheHaitiearthquakeresponseover50%oftheexpenditurewasspent directly,asoutlinedbyfigure4onpage8.

## 4. Dfid Leads The Hmg Response To Humanitarian Emergencies

DFIDworkswithotherWhitehalldepartments,principallytheFCO,MODandCabinet OfficetocoordinatetheUKresponsetoahumanitarianemergency.DFIDleadson makingthehumanitariancase.DecisionsonwhethertodeployUKmilitarycapabilities aretakenonacase-by-casebasis.

## 3. Challenges Increasing Disaster Risk: The Major Trends, Threats, And Probabilities

Allcurrenttrendssuggestthatmorepeople–particularlyindevelopingcountries–will beaffectedbyhumanitarianemergenciesinthecomingdecades.Notonlywillthey becomemorefrequent,theywillalsobeincreasinglyunpredictableandcomplex. Lastyear,263millionpeoplewereaffectedbydisasters–110millionmorethanin
2004,theyearoftheTsunami.By2015,climate-relateddisasters,suchasfloods, faminesanddroughts,arepredictedtoaffectanaverageofover375millionpeople everyyear6.Otherdisasters(suchasearthquakes),andman-madeconflicts,willaffect manymore.

In2009UNHCRreportedits'totalpopulationofconcern'at36.5million,including refugees,statelesspersonsandthosedisplacedwithintheirowncountry.Bydefinition thesearepeoplefleeingconflictorpersecution.Anestimated27.1millionofthesewere displacedwithintheirowncountriesasaresultofarmedconflict,generalisedviolenceor humanrightsviolations7.Thisfigurerepresentedanincreaseofoveramillioninthe numberofinternallydisplacedpeople(IDPs)comparedwiththe26millioninternally displacedin2008andalsoin2007.Whilstthetrendforrefugees(fleeingtheircountry)
hasgonedowninrecentyears,thoseinternallydisplacedhasconsistentlyrisen.The
27.1millionreportedin2009weredisplacedin54countries.

Therisingworldpopulationandgrowthinurbanareas(demographicstress)willalmost certainlyincreasethehumanitariancaseload,particularlyinlessdevelopedcountries.

Alreadyanaverageof1,052peopledieinanygivendisasterinlessdevelopedcountries, comparedto23indevelopedcountries8.Theworld'spopulationispredictedtoreach
9.1billionby2050,withvirtuallyallpopulationgrowthoccurringinlow-income countries,includingPakistan,Nigeria,Bangladesh,EthiopiaandtheDemocraticRepublic oftheCongo. By2030,over61%oftheworld'spopulation(5billionpeople)willliveinurbanareas, mostlyinlowandmiddleincomenations9.Theconcentrationofpopulationsinurban areaswillchangethenatureofmanyhumanitariandisasters.Morepeoplewillbeliving onmarginalland,inovercrowdedandpoorlyplannedhousing,lackingaccessto adequatewaterandsanitation,healthcareandeducation.Whilstavailabilityofservices andinfrastructureshouldmeanfewerfatalities,damagemayhavefarreaching consequencesmakingrebuildingcostlier.Theimpactofdisastersonurbancentreswill haveeconomicconsequencespotentiallygreaterthaninthepast,atlocal,nationaland regionallevel.

Growingfoodinsecurityislikelytocreatenewhumanitarianemergencies,within countriesandregionsandalsoglobally.Theexistenceofnearlyabillionchronically hungrypeople,primarilyinAsiaandAfrica,alreadyexacerbatestheconsequencesof emergencies.Thereispotentialforrepeatedfoodpricespikessimilartothoseofrecent years,whichhaveespeciallydamagingeffectsondevelopingcountries.Underlyingthese challenges,theworldasawholefacesthetaskofincreasingfoodproductionby70to
100%by2050inordertocopewithagrowingpopulationwithagreaterlivestockbased diet.Thereisagrowingdemandforbio-fuelsandincreasingconstraintsareposedby thepriceoffertilisersandfuels,theshortageoflandandwaterandtheirincreased degradation.Climatechangewillreduceyields,sometimescatastrophically, necessitatingtheproductionofstoredsurplusesinsomeregionstocompensatefor losseselsewhere. Globalisationandtheincreasinglyinterconnectedworldinwhichwelive,meansthat disastersoftenhaveaglobalimpact.Pandemicsspreadrapidlythroughairtravel.

Economicshocksinoneregionspreadthroughcommoditypriceincreaseandlossof remittanceflows.Conflictdoesnotrespectborders,andspilloverfromconflict-affected areascontributetoregionaldestabilisationandrefugeeflows.Migrationandchanging employmentpatternswillcontributetovulnerabilityinunexpectedways,withthe potentialtocreatenewsecuritythreats. Futurecrisescoulddifferfundamentallyfrompastexperienceandtheprospectof
'synchronousfailures'isagrowingconcern,aswiththenuclearthreatinJapancaused bytsunami.Newsourcesofdisplacementorconflictarealsopossible,forinstanceas waterresourcesbecomescarce10.

TheDiasporacommunityisplayinganincreasinglysignificantroleinhumanitarian responses.Remittanceflowsarealreadythesecondlargestsourceofforeigndirect investment(FDI)fordevelopingcountriesandincreasesignificantlyafteranemergency. TheDiasporacommunitycanalsoinfluencethesizeandtypeofdonorresponse, dependingonitssizeandvociferousness. AseconomiesinChina,India,BrazilandtheGulfStatescontinuetogrow,theyare playinganincreasinglyimportantroleglobally.Theyarebecomingmoreinvolvedin humanitarianemergencyresponses,particularlyintheirneighbouringregions.China wasanimportantactorintheresponsetothePakistanfloodsattheendof2010.The internationalhumanitariansystemneedstoworkmorewiththesepartners,particularly asitispossiblethattraditionalDACdonorswillbeabletoprovidefewerresourcesfor disasterreliefinthecomingyears.TheUSCongressisconsideringwhethertocut America'shumanitarianassistancebudgetin2011,reducingU.S.foodaidprogrammes by41%($687million)andOfficeofForeignDisasterAssistancefundingby67% ($875million).

Timelyandunimpededaccesstoaffectedpopulationsisbecomingmoredifficultdueto theincreasinglycomplexnatureofemergencies.Therehasbeenanunprecedented growthinviolentattacksonhumanitarianworkers(177%increasefrom1997to200811)
andthereisagrowingneedforincreasedprotectionandsecurityaspartofthe humanitarianresponse.Governmentsandnon-stateactorsinconflicthavebecome increasinglysophisticatedintheirattemptstomanageinternationalhumanitarianism, makingtraditionalwaysofinterveningmoredifficult.

Mediareportingofhumanitarianresponseshasgrownoverthelastyearsandwill continuetohaveanimpactonthepoliticalandpublicreactiontodisasters.Donorswill havetomakedifficultdecisionsonhowtorespondtoadisasterinthefullglareof24/7
mediaattention.

Increasedmediacoverageandnewwaysofcommunicatingthroughsocialmediatools, suchasTwitterandFacebook,willallowclosercontactbetweenrecipientsofaidand thosedonatingthemoney.Togethertheywilldemandgreateraccountabilityofthe deliverersandtheofficialdonoragencies.

## Responding To Increased Need

Theincreaseintheinternationalhumanitariancaseloadandchallenges,havethe potentialtobreakanalreadystretchedinternationalhumanitariansystem,whichis strugglingtocopewithcurrentlevelsofneed.Thereweretwomajorhumanitarian disastersin2010,whichrequiredinternationalhumanitarianassistance–theearthquake inHaitiandfloodsinPakistan.Inbothcases,theinternationalhumanitariansystem showeditselftobelessthanthesumofitspartsandtheresponseswerecharacterised byweakleadership,poorcoordinationandaslowresponse.

Theinternationalhumanitariansystemevolvedover150years,itwasnotplannedor designed.Asaresult,therearegaps,overlapsandnumerousinefficienciesinthewayit works.Thefuturechallengesoutlinedabovewillneedamoresophisticatedoperation. Newandinnovativewaysofworkingneedtobewidelyintroducedtoimprovethe efficiencyandspeedofdisasterresponse.Strongerlinksbetweenhumanitarianand developmentwork;betterleadershipandcoordination;accesstonewresourcesthrough improvedpartnerships,andengagementwithnewactors;betteruseoftechnologyand innovations;andincreasedaccountability,willallbevitalpartsofahighperforming internationalhumanitariansystem,whichisgreaterthanthesumofitsparts. Fortoolong,theperformanceoftheinternationalhumanitariansystemhasbeen inconsistent,failingthosemostinneed.Numerousreportshavebeenwrittenbythe UN,NGOsandotherinternationalactors,inresponsetosuchconcerns.Seriousissues havebeenidentified,butnotaddressed.Nowisthetimeforastepchangeinthe approachtohumanitarianreform.Merelyimprovinguponwhathasbeendoneinthe pastwillnotbeenoughtomeetthechallengesofthefuture.

## 4. Findings

Thefirstpeopletorespondtodisastersandconflictaretheonesaffectedbythem.

Friendsandneighbourssearchthroughtherubbleforlovedonesafterearthquakes;local hospitalsworkthroughthenighttocarefortheinjured. Inmanycountriesgovernmentsroutinelyaffectedbydisastershavebecomeadeptat responseandprevention.Casestudiesforthisreviewshowdramaticgainsinplacessuch asBangladeshandIndonesia12.Butalltoooftentheinternationalresponsearrivesas thoughthiswerenotthecase,sweepingasidelocalrespondersandaddingtothechaos ratherthanalleviatingit. Inconflictsituationstheinternationalsystemoftenbecomesthelasthopeforpeople livingintheworstcircumstances.Whereitisslow,orgetsthingswrong,itisthese peoplewhosuffer. Iftheworldisgoingtogetbetteratthechallengessetoutintheprecedingchapter,then thishastochange.DonoragencieslikeDFIDhavetoworkwithgovernments,andwith affectedpeople,aswellaswithaidagencies.Theyhavetosupportlocalinstitutions ratherthanweakenthem,especiallywherethereisconflict.

Wherenationalgovernmentsarecapable,theyinvariablyleadtheresponsetodisaster evenwhenitisonaninternationalscale.Whengovernmentsareoverwhelmedthey eitherstruggletoassertthemselves,orfindtheyarecompletelyunabletocoordinate.In someinstancesgovernmentsareactivelybelligerent,orhostiletointernationalresponse (ortoaparticulargroupintheirpopulationbeinghelped).Thissuggestsfourbroad categories:

•Strongandcapablegovernmentswhotakethelead(e.g.India).
•Capablebutunderresourcedgovernmentswhoneedhelptolead(e.g.Mozambique).
•Governmentswhoareunabletolead,andneedtheinternationalcommunitytodothis
ontheirbehalfforatime(e.g.Haiti).
•Governmentswhoareunableorunwillingtoleadandareobstructive(e.g.Nigerin2009).
Inthesefourbroadcategoriestheinternationalcommunityhastoresponddifferently,
buttheapproachhasnotalwaysreflectedthisreality.
DFIDtoohastendedtorespondasifalldisasters,andallgovernments,werethesame.

Thisreviewsuggestsadifferentapproachisneeded.Suchanapproachwouldrequire muchmoreworkontheanalysisofrisksandcapacitiesinadvance,incorporating disasterresilienceintodevelopmentprocesses.Italsorequiresmoreworkonbringinga disparateinternationalresponsetogethersothatitperformsmorereliably.Mostofall,it requiresbeingapartner,abuilderofcoalitionsandawillingparticipantinthem.This reviewhascalledthisbeinga'networkenabler'.

## 4.1 Anticipation

Disastersareoftenviewedinthepublicimaginationas'actsofGod'.Inrealitymanyare predictable.A2005WorldBankreport'globalhotspots'13identifiescountriesexposedto multiplenaturalhazards(earthquakes,droughtsandstorms),andthereareplentyof credibledataavailableidentifyingcountriesmostaffectedbydisasters.

TheUKDefenceConceptsandDoctrineCentre(DCDC)goesfurtherinits'horizon scanning'reportof200714.Itidentifiesareasof'multiplestress',factoringin demography,economyandconflict.Climatechangeisanotherobviouselementof stress,orvulnerability,witharecentreport15identifyingsub-SaharanAfricaasoneof themostatriskareas. Whatisclearisthatprediction,althoughfarfromperfect,ispossibleforsomehigh-risk nations.HurricaneseasonsintheCaribbeanandtheBayofBengalarewellknownand monitored.ElNinoandLaNinaoceaneffectslastforsomeyearsandchangeweather patternsinwaysthatarepartlyunderstood.Rainfalldataforregionsandcountriesin aridzonessuggestsdroughtcyclescanbeidentifiedearly. Whatisalsoclearisthatasclimaterelateddisastersincrease,thebetterwewillneedto becomeatpredictionifwearetohaveanyhopeofcopingwiththese.Butdisaster managersdonotmakeenoughuseofsuchscience,andscientistsdonotroutinely produceinformationforthisaudience16.TherainfallthatproducedPakistan'sterrible floodsof2010happenedamonthbeforethefloodwatercauseditsgreatest devastation.Theeffectswerepredictedbutnotactedon.

Thiscanalsobethecasewith'foodsecurity'crises(famines).Thereareprovenearly warningsystemsthatmonitorpotentialcrises,notablytheUSAIDsupportedFEWSNET.

Despitethis,andproofthatpriorinterventionnotonlysaveslivesbutischeaper,these 'slowonset'disastersareregularlymissed.TheNigercasestudyforthisreviewshows howclearevidencedoesnotalwaystriggeraresponse(theblockageinNigerwas domesticpolitics),andhowtimelyinterventioncansavetensofthousandsoflives.

ManyagencieswereabletoactinNiger,despitetheintransigenceofgovernmentand thetardinessoftheUnitedNations.Partlythiswasduetopromptactionbythe EuropeanUnionhumanitarianorganisationECHO;itwasalsobecauseDFIDhasan innovativeregionalfundinWestAfricaforcrisisresponse.Thisregionalfundallows agenciestogetmoneyquicklyforunexpectedandunnoticeddisasters–itallowsfor earlyaction.Thousandsofchildrenweresavedasaresultoftheseearlyactions.

Earlyactionisatleastasimportantasearlywarning,andisamatterofpoliticalwill.

TheexpansionoftheCentralEmergencyResponseFund(CERF)wasinpartawayof makingsuchdecisionsmoretechnicalandlesspolitical.Supportingresilienceinatrisk nationswillfurtherincreasethelikelihoodthatearlyactionwillbetaken.Buttherewill alwaysbeanelementofrisk,howevergoodthescience.Beingabletotoleratefailure–
gettingitwrongoccasionally–isimportant.Thecostbenefitofninetimely interventionseasilyoutweighsonewrongjudgementcall.

Oneareawherepredictionisimproving,butstillhasawaytogo,iswithearthquakes andvolcanoes.Thesegeo-physicalhazardsaredifferenttothehydro-meteorological onestouchedonabove(floods,droughtsandstorms).Theytendtohappenless frequentlybutcauseseveredamage.

Althoughearthquakescannotbepredictedwithanycertaintyinshorttimeframes,the locationofmajorfaultlinesiswellknown.ThequestionofearthquakesinKathmanduor Tehraniswhenratherthanwhether.Therehavebeensignificantadvancesin understandingearthquakeriskandwhentheymightoccurthroughmonitoringground motion.Likewise,understandingthereasonsforbuildingdamageandcollapsesothat codesandstandardscanbedevelopedtoensuresafeconstructioninthefuture.Science inthisareahasproventohaveverysignificantlyreducedfatalitiesanddamageinmany countriesandiscritical,butresearchandinvestmentisneededelsewheretopromote safeconstruction. Anticipatingandpredictingconflictisanotherareathathasimprovedinrecentyears. RegularcrisesindicesfromtheInternationalCrisisGrouportheFundforPeacearebeing usedbygovernmentstoinformdecisionsonearlyaction.Theseareimportant,asin contrasttoearlywarningfornaturaldisasters,therehasneverbeenashortageof warningaboutpendingconflictsinahostofplaces.

Whilstpredictingsinglehazardsispossiblebutoftenneglected,anticipatingunexpected hazards,orcombinationsofhazardsisafactorofmagnitudemoredifficult.The possibilityofalarge-scalefloodcausinganuclearspillforinstance(asJapanhasproved), ordroughtsinRussiaandfloodsinAustralialeadingtofoodpriceriotsinWestAfricais difficulttoseeinadvance.Nevertheless,inaninter-connectedworldtheseeventsare evermorelikelyandpolicymakersneednewtoolstohelpthemanticipate.

1
Assemble and regularly update a global risk register for DFID using information gained from its country teams and international organisations.
2
MakebetteruseoftheDFIDChiefScientisttosupportUKscienceinanticipatingcrises.
3
Makethisavailableasacontributiontopre-crisisarrangementsacrossthesystem.

## 4.2 Resilience

Theimpactofadisasterdependsonhowwellpreparedacountryistocopewithit.

Somearebetterabletobouncebackthanothers.TheHaitiearthquakeatthebeginning of2010killed230,000people.AmuchlargerearthquakeinChilelaterintheyearkilled
3,000people,almostonehundredtimesfewer. Butthisisnotonlyaboutrichnations;a1970cycloneinEastPakistan(nowBangladesh) killednearlyhalfamillionpeoplewhereasasimilarstrengthcyclonein2008killed 3,000.ThedifferencewasthatintheinterveningthirtyyearsBangladeshhadbecome betterprepared.

TheearthquakeinHaitihassetbackthedevelopmentofthatnationmanyyears.Banda AcehinIndonesiawasdevastatedbythe2005tsunami,butmanagedtorebuild
100,000housesinthreeyears.BringingtheresourcesoftherestofIndonesiatobear enabledthisrapidrecovery.Beingabletochannelinternationalresourceseffectivelywas anotherkeyaspect.ThiswassimilarlytrueforKhyberPakhtunkhwaprovinceinPakistan whichwasbetterpreparedasaresultofitsresponsetothe2005earthquake.

Beingprepared,andbeingabletorecoveriswhatmakesnations*resilient*.Conversely, wherenationsarefragiletheyaremuchlessabletocope.Beingabletoanticipate disasters,havingshockresistantinfrastructure,socialprotectionmechanisms,financial andhumanresourcesareallpartofbeingresilient,asistheabilitytoadapt.

Embedding resilience within development programmes Disasterscanhavesignificantimpactoncountries'development.Between2000and
2009MunichReestimateseconomiclossesfromdisasterswere$670billion17.Some smallcountrieshavesustainedlossesthroughdisasterofseveraltimestheirGDP,setting thembackyears.Vietnamlosesover1%ofitsGDPannuallydealingwithdisasters.

Floodsanddroughtscanhaveknockoneffectsintermsoffoodproductionand internationaltrade. AseminalWorldBankstudyin2004foundthatdisasterssloweconomicgrowthinthe longtermaswellasshortterm18.Thisisespeciallytrueincountriesthatdependon agriculture.Thismeanspoorercountriesaredoublyaffected,astheyhavelessabilityto copefinanciallywiththecostofdisasters,andtheireconomiesareworseaffected overall.Disastersalsoaffecttheeconomiesofmiddle-incomecountrieshowever,as theytendtohavemanufacturingsectors(forexample)connectedtoagriculture.Droughts insouthernAfricainthe1990sledtobigswingsinGDPgrowthacrosstheregion.

Theseriskslooksettoincreasewithpopulationgrowth,climatechangeandresource scarcity.InthefragilecountrieswhereDFIDisincreasinglyworking,achievingpoverty reductionwillgetharder.Reducingmaternalmortalityandothermillennium developmentgoalswilldependonnationsbeingresilient.

Ultimatelydevelopmentistheanswertobeingabletocopewithdisasters–the exampleatthebeginningofthischapterillustratesthat–butgettingtodevelopment candependonbeingabletobouncebackfromdisasters.Bangladeshismoreresilientto disasterseconomicallybecauseofstructuralchangesinitsagriculturalsector(the deregulationofagriculturalinvestmentledtomoredisasterresistantirrigation).The earlywarningandactionsystemsinBangladeshhavealsopreventedhighdeathrates.

Thisanalysishasimplicationsfordevelopment,andespeciallyfortheoverallgoalwithin DFIDofreducingpoverty.Disastersoftenhitthepooresthardest.Evenwhenacountry copesquitewelloverallwithadisaster,thepoorestandmostvulnerablecanbe disproportionatelyaffected. TheWorldBankrecognisesthisinitsguidelinesforpovertyreductionstrategies(PRS).

Oneofthefourdimensionsofpovertyis,"exposuretoriskandincomeshock",ata householdlevel,acommunitylevelandanationallevel.Despitethis,littleisroutinely doneaboutdisastersindevelopmentstrategies,noraretheymentionedinthe MillenniumDevelopmentGoals.Conventionalthinkinghasbeenthatscarceresources shouldbeusedtopromotegrowth,andthatthisisultimatelytheansweranyway. Thisapproachisnolongerdefensible.Thebodyofacademicevidencethatdisastersand shocksmustbetakenseriouslyisgrowing,asistheevidencethatinvestmentin reducingdisasterriskshowsgoodreturns.Flooddefenceandretrofittingbuildingsfor earthquakesintheUSfoundanaveragecostbenefitofonetofour19.Thesameistruein developingcountries.Incorporatingdisastercostsintolongertermeconomicplanningis necessaryifvaluabledevelopmentresourcesarenottobedivertedtorecovery. Anewresilienceapproachwillincludeworkingatregional,national,communityand householdlevel.Atnationallevelthereneedstobemoreworkondisastermanagement. Workonlegalframeworks,workonplanning,andworkonbolsteringthedepartments thatrespondafterdisasters,suchasnationaldisastermanagementagencies.Civil societyorganisationsthatrespondtodisastersshouldbesupportedtoplaytheirroletoo.

Atcommunityandhouseholdlevelthereneedstobeworkonmechanismsand institutionstorespond(suchascivilcontingencycommittees),andoninfrastructurethat canwithstanddisasters,orplayadualrolelikeschoolsthatareusedascycloneshelters.

Governmentsandcivilsocietyorganisationsalsoneedhelptoprovidesocialprotection mechanisms.TheNigercasestudyforthisreviewdemonstratesthattargetedcash distributionsattherighttimecanstophouseholdsslippingintostarvation,sellingassets andincurringdebtalongtheway.Relativelysmallinputsattherighttimecansaveyears ofmiseryanddisease.Crucially,thecombinationofsuchmeasurescanprovidethebasis foreconomicdevelopment.Peoplelivingontheperilousedgeofextremepoverty cannotaffordtotaketherisksneededtoescapethissituationotherwise. Thiskindofworkistakingplaceindifferentsectors.Disasterriskreduction(DRR)work seekstobuildlocalresponsesystemsandsmallmitigationinfrastructure.TheHyogo FrameworkforActionsetsoutfivebuildingblocksforeffectivedisasterriskreduction; governance,riskassessment,knowledgeandeducation,riskmanagementand vulnerabilityreduction,anddisasterpreparednessandresponse.Butasthemoneyis usuallyhumanitarianitisonlyavailableafteradisasterhasstruck.DFIDhadastanding pledgetospend10%ofitsresponsebudgetonDRR,butthesemeasuresareneeded before,notaftertheevent.Climatechangeadaptationworkisoftenaboutmitigation worktoo–fromplantingmoremangrovestonewseedvarietiesforwarmersummers.

DevelopmentinplaceslikeEthiopiaisfocusingmoreonsocialsafetynetsandis exploringexcitingnewideassuchasmicroinsurance.Allofthisneedstobebrought togetherformaximumeffectiveness.

Intheaftermathofthe9/11atrocitiesintheUS,theUKputinplacea'national resilienceplan',recognisingthatitdidnothavethewherewithaltodealwithsucha disaster.Thisplansetsoutprotocolsforincidentcontrol,establishesthecapacities neededforresponseandensurestraining,equippingandregularpractising.Many countrieshavenationaldisasterprotocols,buttheyarenotresourcedorplannedindetail.

Thisreportwasnotmandatedtolookatprotractedconflicts.Itisclearthough,thatin fragilestates,orstatesinconflict,theinternationalhumanitariansystemisoftenthe provideroflastresorttotheverypoorest.ThecasestudyinDRCongoforthisreport highlightedthevulnerabilityofstatesandsocietiestoeventhesmallestshockswhen theyareveryfragile.Alackofinstitutionsandcapacitiesmeansthataccidentsleadto muchhigherlossoflife,smallconflictscannotberesolvedandgrowtobigonesand communitiesarenotabletoprotectthemselves.InDRCongothereareemergencies almostconstantly;boataccidentsthatkillhundreds,petroltankerexplosionsthatdo thesame.Afishingconflictin2009thatledtotheexodusofthousandsofpeopleacross theborderwhenitturnedviolent.Massrapesandrobberyarecommittedintheeastby rovinggroupsofbandits.

Allofthisisavoidablewithworkinginstitutions.Alicensingauthoritythatdoesnot allowferriestorunwithoutcheckingthemforsafety;afireservicethatcanattend accidentsbeforetankersexplode;ajudicialprocessthatallowsdisputestoberesolved beforetheybecomeviolent;apoliceorsecurityservicethatarrestsbandits. Inthisvacuum,muchofwhatistodaycalled'humanitarian'inDRCongoissimply substitutionservicedelivery.Healthcareisnotprovidedbythestateandpeoplearetoo poortopayforit.Sohumanitarianagenciesprovidebasichealthcareandrespondwhen majorkillerslikecholeraormeaslesbreakout.Resilienceisanimportantwayto understandthiswork,andwillbeimportantasDFIDworkstobuildinstitutions,making stateslessfragile.Ensuringhumanitariananddevelopmentworkcloselytogetherwillbe vitallyimportant.

Regional, national and local capacities DFIDhasnottraditionallyfundedgovernmentsdirectlyinhumanitariancrises(lessthan
1%inthelasttwoyears),althoughithasfundedmulti-donorreconstructionfunds throughtheUNandtheWorldBank.Similarly,whilstDFIDhasbuiltupconsiderable expertiseinrapidprocurement,itusuallydonatesitsinkindassistancethroughaid agencies,ratherthangovernment.Therehasbeenfundingfornationaldisaster preparedness,typicallythroughtheUN,incountrieslikeBangladesh.Thisisnot routinelylinkedwithsubsequentresponsehowever.InMozambiquethegovernment askedfor£2milliontohelpthemprepareaheadofanticipatedfloodingin2006.This wasnotforthcoming;whentherewasfloodinglaterthatyeartheinternationalresponse costover£60million.

NeitherdoesDFIDroutinelyfundlocalNGOsorlocalorganisationsinrapidonset emergencies,althoughitfundsthemindirectly,asmanygrantstointernationalpartners arepassedontonationalandlocalorganisations.InBangladeshUNDPhasalistofmore than30pre-approvedlocalNGOsthatitgaveDFIDmoneytoafterthe2008cyclone.

ManyoftheinternationalNGOs(andespeciallyfaithbasedorganisationslikeChristian AidandCAFOD),routinelyworkthroughlocalpartners.TheRedCrossandRedCrescent Movementalwaysworkthroughitsnationalsocieties.Despitethis,thefundingof nationalandlocalNGOsbyDFIDremainshitandmiss.Itisnotaconsciousstrategy,but moreofaby-product.

Anapproachtailoredtogovernmentcapacitywouldofferseveraladvantages.

GovernmentslikethePhilippinesandIndonesiacanalreadyrespondtoquitelarge disasterswithoutinternationalhelp.Preservinginternationalcapacityforthosedisasters thataretrulyoverwhelmingmakesmuchmoresensethanhavingtodeployexpensive internationalworkerstofloodssimplybecausethelocalsystemwassounderresourced. NationalDisasterManagementAgenciesexistinmostcountriesthatsufferregular disasters,butoftenlackequipmentandtraining.Withanestablishedrelationship,it wouldalsobepossibletogivemoneyandgoodsdirectlytothegovernmentaftera disasterknowinghowsuchresourceswouldbeused.Specialfundingchannelscouldbe setupinadvance,makingtransparencyandreportingeasier.

Thesameistrueofcivilsocietyorganisations;organisationssuchastheRedCrossand RedCrescentNationalSocietiesoftenhaveformalresponsibilitiesinthenational disasterplan.Withproperresourcestheycanpreparejointlywithgovernmentandother privateorvoluntaryagencies,leadingtopromptresponseintheeventofdisaster. Anincreasedfocusonnationalandlocalcapacitiescouldalsoincluderegionalbodies. TheAssociationofSouthEastAsianNations(ASEAN)playedapivotalroleinfacilitating theresponsetocycloneNargisinBurmainMay,2008.Thisregionalcooperationaround disasterresponsehascontinued,withjointprotocolsondeploymentofmilitaryassets oneofthelatestdevelopments.Increasinglygovernmentsatriskfromdisastersare sharingexpertisethroughsuchregionalforums,spreadinggoodpracticeanddeveloping jointearlywarningsystems.

Innovative funding models for risk transfer Asthecostofdamagecausedbyextremeweatherconditionsissoaring,more sustainablewaystotackleweatherriskareneeded.Public-privatepartnershipsinrisk financinghavebecomemorepopular,inparticularparametricinsurance.Catastrophe bondsarealsoissuedmorecommonlynow,e.g.byMexicotoprovideresourcesinthe eventofsevereearthquakeorhurricanedamage.

Insurancecanplayaroleinguaranteeingpredictableandreliablepayouts,allowingfor long-termplanning,increasinggovernments'self-determinationandownership, protectinglivelihoodsanddiminishingnegativeeffectsofreliefinterventionsonlocal markets20.Thelimitationsarethatpremiumscanbetoohighwithhighopportunity costs,andthatitisnoteasytotelliftheinsurancegivesvalueformoney.Thereisalso thedangerofmoralhazard–governmentsnotfocussingenoughonriskreductionand preventionbecausetheyfeelinsured.

TheCaribbeanCatastropheRiskInsuranceFacility(CCRIF)isthemostprominent exampleofapublicprivateinsurancemechanismthatDFIDhasfunded.Thereview welcomesthisgroundbreakingwork.DFIDisnowalsoinvestinginthedesignofthe AfricaRiskCapacity,leadingtotheestablishmentofanAfrican-ownedriskpooling entityforweatherrisk.

4
Ensure that building resilience is part of the core DFID programme in at risk countries, integrating the threat from climate change and other potential hazards into disaster risk reduction. Country offices should undertake contingency planning.
5
Promote national response capacities of governments and civil society in at risk countries including: 
•Thedevelopmentofnationalresiliencestrategies.
•Theestablishmentofdirectfundingmechanisms.
•Regionalresponsemechanismswheretheyaddvalue. •ThroughcivilsocietyorganisationssuchasRedCrossandCrescentSocieties. •Nationalandlocalprivatesectorcompanies,whichareableatthecountrylevelto
supportentrepreneurial,andmarketsolutions,whichwillincreaseinresilienceand improvedisasterresponse.
4.3  
Leadership
Insituationswherethegovernmentofanaffectedcountryisunabletolead humanitarianresponse,theUNremainstheonlylegitimateauthoritythatcandoso. Overtheyearsacomplexsystemhasbeenputinplacetodothis,withadedicated globalEmergencyReliefCoordinatorsupportedbythebigspecialisedUNagencies.

AlthoughtheUNhasthemandatetolead,itsperformancehasbeenverydisappointing overall.InallbutoneofthecasestudiesforthisreviewUNleadershipwaspoor.

Thiswasespeciallytrueinthelargerdisasters.Itistrueatastrategiclevelandatan operationallevel.Itistrueacrosstheinternationalsystem,andinindividualcrises.

Thereisrarelyavisionbeyondfundraising,andrarelyanorganisingnarrativethat drawstogetherthedisparatecapacities. Whatisneededisacompleteoverhaulofstrategicandoperationalleadershipinthe UN.Thisreviewfindsthatthereisappetiteforthiswithinthesystem,andthatitisin theinterestoftheUKtochampionit.Theissueisattheheartofensuringaffected peoplereceivewhattheyneedandachievingvalueformoney.Onthestrengthofthese findingsthereviewconcludesthatthereisaneedforfurtherhumanitarianreforms.

Strategic leadership Firstandforemost,thereisaneedforvision.ThereisaneedfortheUNatthehighest leveltosetoutthechallengesaheadandhowitplanstodealwiththem.Thereisaneed forthisvisiontobebackedpolitically,andforthispoliticalbackingtoextendinto responseswhentheyoccur.Leadersonthegroundmustbeconfidenttheyhavethe backingoftheirseniors,andofthememberstatesoftheUN.

Secondlythereisaneedfortherightpeople.DuringthereviewsconsultationsinNew Yorktheideaofa'standaside'mechanismwherebythebesthumanitarianleaderscould bedeployedintomegacriseswasdeveloped.Thisideahassubsequentlybeentakenup intheIASCandthereviewstronglysupportsthisprocess.

TheUNneedstodevelopacadreofcapablehumanitarianresponseleaders.Itneedsthe rightapproachtotalentmanagementandtherighttermsandconditionstounderpin this.Itneedstolookoutsideitsownnarrowbasetosecurethebesttalent.

Finally,thereisaneedfortherightsupportsystemsandstructuretoenableleaders. Someofthesestructuresareinplaceandworkwell;forinstancefinancingwhichhas improvedasaresultofthelastroundofreform.Butplanningandprioritisationremain weakandpoliticised.LeadersofthevariousUNhumanitariancoordinationmechanisms havenoformalauthorityandreportinglinesbetweenclustersandcoordinatorsare unclear.Therearefewstandingsupportstaffanddeploymentoftherightteamcantake weeks.Thesehavebeenseenasintractableissues,butwillhavetochangeif performanceistoimprove.

FortheUKasastrongUNsupporter,andalargedonortothesystemitisimportantto workontheseissues,asoutlinedabove.TheUKisalsooneofthebestplaced.Itdrove thelastroundofreformsandwillreceivemuchsupportforinitiatinganewround.Todo soitwillneedtobuildcoalitionsofsupportandworkcleverlywithitspartners.Thisis expandedinfurthersectionsofthisreport.

Operational leadership OneofthefundamentaldrawbackstoachievingamorereliableresponsefromtheUN
isthatitismorealoosecollectionofstrongandseparateagenciesthanawell functioningsystem.WFPistheworld'spremierfoodagency,withlogisticsthatrival manymulti-nationalcompanies.UNICEFistheworld'slargestchildren'sagency providingeverythingfromcleanwatertotemporaryeducation.Therefugeeagency UNHCRcansetupcampsforhundredsofthousandsofdisplacedpeoplefleeingwaror persecution.Eachhasseparatemandates,boards,missionsandhistoriesandallare suspiciousoftoomuchcentraldirection.Allthreeneedtofundraiseinbigemergencies, asdotheWorldHealthOrganisation(WHO)andtheFoodandAgriculturalOrganisation
(FAO)whoarealsoinvolvedinhumanitarianemergencies.Thiscreatescompetition, makingprioritisationespeciallydifficultasitcanhavefundingimplications.

Theclusterapproachwasdevelopedasthelatestattempttosolvethecoordination problem.Itsoughttofillgapsinhumanitarianservicedelivery.Improvedcoordinationof allplayersbyanamedleadagencywasexpectedtoeliminategapareasandavoid overlaps.Keyagenciesweregivenresponsibilityforleadershipandcoordinationforeach sector;forexampleWFPleadsthelogisticscluster,WHOleadsthehealthcluster.The clusterleadisusuallyaUNagencyalthoughIFRCleadstheshelterclusterandSavethe Childrenco-leadstheeducationclusterwithUNICEF. Butperformanceofclustershasbeendisappointing.Clustercoordinatorsoftenlack experienceandthetrainingrequiredtoprovidestrongleadership.Toooftencluster meetingsareinformationsharinggatheringsinsteadofthestrategicdecisionmaking forumstheyshouldbe.Andthesystemhasmerelyreplicatedagencydivisionsmeaning prioritisationremainsjustasdifficult.

Theclustersystemneedstoberevisedtoaddressthesefailings.Theroleofthe internationalsystemistosupportnationalgovernmentintimesofdisaster,nottotake over.Agreateremphasisthereforeshouldbeputonclusterleadershipbynational governmentwhereappropriate.NGOsshouldplayagreaterroleinco-chairingclusters.

Wherethishappens,theclusteroftenhasabetterunderstandingofthesituationon theground. Inmegacrises,thereisaneedfordedicatedandexperiencedclusterleadership.Where thisisnotthecaseexperiencedcoordinatorsshouldbedeployed,securedbypredictable donorfunding.Inlargeremergenciesclustersshouldbecometwo-tier,consistingofa 'strategicbody'groupandan'informationsharing'group.Thisallowsallpartnerstobe includedbutalsoallowsforacoregrouptosetstrategicdirection. Somedisastershaveseenanoverproliferationofclustersandsub-clusters.Thiscanlead toless,ratherthanmoreeffectivecoordination.Infact,notallclustersareneededin everyemergency.Thetypeofdisasterandtheeffectivenessofexistingcoordination mechanismsshoulddictatehowmanyandwhichclustersneedtobeactivated.In naturaldisastersthisshouldbeanationalgovernmentleddecisioninconsultationwith theUNHumanitarianCoordinator(HC).

TobefullyeffectiveclustersneednationalNGOsandlocalgroups.Butthesearethe verypartnersthatgetexcludedfirstduetosecurityreasons,languagebarriersorsizeof cluster.Thiscouldberectifiedifdonorsmadelocalparticipationaprerequisitefor clusterfundingineachemergency.Clustersalsoneed'nontraditionalactors'suchas theprivatesectoriftheyaretobeeffectiveincoordinatingthefullresponse.

UNagencyautonomymeansthatclusterleadsoftenreportthroughtheiragencyrather thanthroughtheHCandOCHAcanbeexcludedaltogether.Clearreportinglinesshould beestablishedbetweenHC,clusterlead,agencyandOCHA.

Human resource capacities Theunevenqualityofpersonnelisamajorlimitingfactorinhumanitarianresponse.This isparticularlytrueattheleadershiplevel,butalsowithclusterleadership,technical expertsandmid-levelmanagers.Onemajorissueisthatthereisnostraightforward professionalrouteintohumanitarianwork.Aidagencieswanttohireexperiencedpeople buthowdopeoplegetexperienceunlesstheyareofferedajob?Gettingstartedin humanitarianworkbecomesachickenandeggconundrum. Thereisaneedtogrowthepoolofcompetentprofessionalsinvolvedinhumanitarian work.Thisrequiresinvestment,andacommitmentfromhumanitarianagenciesto createcareerpathsforhumanitarianprofessionals.Manyaidagenciesgrewupwithouta cultureoftraining,insteadvaluingrapidactionandon-the-joblearning.Thisapproach hasstrengths:aidagenciesremainnimbleandkeeptheircostslow.Butitalsomeans that,toooften,managersandstaffdonothavealltheskillstheyneed. Therehasbeenprogressonstaffskillsinthepastdecade,andanumberofworthwhile initiatives.Butineverymajoremergencytherearestillsignificantnumbersofaid personnelwholacksomeoftheskillsessentialtotheirjobs.Theconsequencesarehard tomeasurebutareboundtoincludelostlivesandwastedfunds.

ThegulfisstarkestwhenoneconsiderstheinvestmenttheUKmilitarymakeintheir preparedness.Typicallyprofessionalmilitaryforcesspend95%oftheirtimetrainingand 5%oftheirtimeinaction.Forhumanitariansthisfigureisreversed;95%oftheirtimeis spentinactionand5%ofthetimetrainingwouldbeahighfigure.

Trainingisnottheonlymethodoflearningandshouldcomplement,notreplace, learningonthejob.Itneednotbeexpensiveorlengthy.Itshouldbebasedonan assessmentoftheskillsneededforthejob,takingaccountofskillsthatarealready there.Ideallyitshouldbecombinedwitharangeofcareerdevelopmentmeasures, which,overtime,resultinstrongindividualswithinwell-managedteams.

Intheprivatesectorthislessoniswellknownevenifnotalwaysfollowed.Themost successfulcompaniestakecaretoinvestintheirstaff,andfasttrackthemwhenthey provecapable.Andindeed,someofthebestaidagencieshavebeendoingsoforyears.

Someaidagenciesmaybereluctanttoinvestintrainingforfearofincreasingthe percentageoftheirfundsspentonadministration.Theyknowthepublicarerightly sensitiveaboutthis.Iftheyincreasedtheiradministrationbudgetsfrom,say,anaverage of10pinthepound,to12pinordertopayfortraining,theymightworrythatitwould appearwasteful.Butifthe2pspentontrainingincreasestheimpactoftheremaining88p, everyoneshouldbepleased.Aidagenciesshouldexplaintodonorsandthepublicthattheir beneficiarieswillbebetterservedifthereisamodestinvestmentinstaffdevelopment. Skilledstaffwillmakebetteruseofthefundstheyhavebeenentrustedwith.

Professionalisationoftheaidindustrywillcomethroughbetterpreparationandtraining ofstaff.DFID'scommitmenttothiscouldbedemonstratedbyinvestinginagencyskills developmentandbybettertrainingofitsownstaffworkinginhumanitariansituations.

DFIDshouldinvestigateandsupportthedevelopmentofprofessionalstandardsthatit canuseitselfandwillbeofusetoothers.

## Recommendations

DFID should:

6
Build coalitions to drive forward humanitarian reform based on improving leadership, including;
•Rapiddeploymentofexperiencedleadershipteamsinbigcrises.Thisshouldincludea
'stepaside'systemtoensurethebestleadershipisinplaceatboththestrategicand
operationallevel.
•EncouragetheconveningofaUNHighLevelPaneltolookatwaysofimprovingthe
internationalhumanitariansystemtofacefuturechallenges.
•WorkcloselywithUKmissionstobuildcoalitionsforreformoftheinternationalsystem,
includingmorecoherentuseofUNexecutiveboardpositions.
•WorkwiththeUNtocreateanewcadreofhumanitarianleadersandthetalent
managementsystemsandtermsandconditionstosustainthis.
•WorkwithotherdonorsandtheUNtoresolvesomeofthedeficienciesinmanagement,
recruitment,prioritisationandplanning.Thismustincludetherightsupportstaff
availableforrapiddeployment.
•WorkwithotherdonorsandtheUNtostrengthenandprovidebetterleadershipofthe
clustersystem.
7
DFIDshouldmakeasustainedefforttoimproveskillsinthehumanitariansector.This shouldinclude;

•Worktocreateasetofstandardsforhumanitarianleadership.
•TrainingwithinDFID,aidagenciesandgovernmentsandcivilsocietyindisasterprone
countries.
•Ensuringpre-qualifiedpartnersdemonstrateadequateinvestmentinskills
development(seesection5.2).

## 4.4 Innovation

Theinternationalhumanitariansystemisfacinggreaterandmorecomplexchallenges.

Newsocial,demographic,environmentalandpoliticalproblemsincreasinglydemand innovativeproducts,organisationalprocessesandwaysofthinking.Synchronousfailures suchasthoseseeninJapan;simultaneousdisasterstaxingglobalcapacitywillneednew approaches.Itisnowwidelyacknowledgedthathumanitarianactorscannotsimplydo moreofwhattheyhavealwaysdone.

Buthumanitarianpractitionersandanalystsbemoantheslowpaceofchange.Relatively straightforwardideaslikecashtransfershavetakenalongtimetobecomeaccepted.

Thebarrierstoinnovationareoftenmoretodowithpoliticsandinstitutionalinterests. Recentresearch21hasidentifiedanumberofsuccessfulhumanitarianinnovations.And majororganisationsarebeginningtounderstanditsimportance.USAIDhasmade innovationacentralpillarofitsongoingstrategicrenewalinbothpolicyand operations22.TheWorldFoodProgrammeisinnovatingthewayitdeliversfoodaid23.

Thiscontextofgrowinginterestandcommitmentpresentsclearopportunities.DFIDhas areputationforbeing'outaheadofthedonorpack'intermsofflexibilityand responsiveness.Ithassupportedspecificinnovationsprocessesbothatpolicylevelsuch astheGoodHumanitarianDonor-shipinitiative;andinoperationalcontextssuchas community-basedfeedingtherapy.Thisexperienceandreputationareassetsthatcould beleveraged,establishingtheUKasaninnovativeleaderinglobalhumanitarianefforts.

Evidenceshows24thatsuccessfulinnovationshaveanumberofcommonenabling factors,includingeffectivesupportfromdonors,headoffices,seniormanagersandlikemindedpeersinotherimplementingorganisations.Alsoimportantaregood partnershipswithactorsoutsidethetraditionalhumanitariansector.Anydonorseeking toimprovethesystemmustworkonthebasisthatitisnotpossibletosinglehandedly reformacomplexsystemwithmultipleactorsandfactors.Coalitionbuildingisvital. Giventhelimitedresourcesthatwillbeavailablerelativetoothersectors(e.g.the privatesector),itisessentialfordonorstotakean'openinnovation'approachfromthe outset.Collectively,DFIDanditspartnersneedtoinvestinrobustinnovationprocesses focusingonbothlongstandingunresolvedproblemsandnewemergingchallenges.DFID needstobecomemoreconsistentinusingevidenceandsystematicanalysistodecide wheretoinvestandhow.Resourcesforstrengtheningtheinnovationscapacitiesofhigh valuepartnerswhichwillalsobeessentialtocreatethetimeandspaceneededfor reflectionandgenerationofnewideas.

Amoreinnovativeinternationalresponsetodisastersneedstobefirmlygroundedin humanitarianprinciplesandvalues.Theyneedtobuildontheprincipleofbetterlearning fromandwith,andgreateraccountabilityto,affectedcommunities.Manyofthemost importantinnovationsofthepast30years–fromcashtocommunityfeedingtherapy
–havecomefromrethinkingthiscentralrelationship. Thereisanurgentneedtoleverageappropriateformsofscience,research,technology andprivatesectorknowledgetosupporthumanitarianinnovation.WhileDFIDhas placedconsiderableimportanceonresearchfordevelopment,withsignificant investmentinresearchcapacityNorthandSouth,therehasbeenrelativelyless attentionpaidtoresearchforhumanitarianaction,andnoneofithasfocusedon Southerncapacities.Asnotedpreviouslyinrelationtoinsuranceandnationalresilience, thereisscopefortransformativedevelopmentsinthislastarea. 

InnovationalsopresentsanumberofinternalopportunitiesandchallengesforDFID. Oneofthekeyfindingsofthisreviewisthatthereareopportunitiestobenefitfrom freshideasthroughoutDFID'shumanitarianpolicyandoperationalwork.Moreworkis neededtosystematicallyidentifywheretheneedforinnovationismostpressing.DFID
staffmembersareavitalassetfortheorganisation,withawealthofexperienceand knowledgefromarangeofdisastersettings.Butstaffarenotencouragedtoinnovate, noraretheyconsistentlyrewardedforit.Thereisnotimetodevotetodevelopingideas, andthereisoftenahardbattletogetnewwaysofworkingaccepted. Anyefforttoenhancehumanitarianinnovationsneedstobuildonandenhancethe entrepreneurialandcreativecapabilitieswithintheorganisation.Thereisaneedto provideappropriatetraining,secondmentsandreflectionspaceforDFIDstaff.Effective innovatorsandinnovationfacilitatorsshouldberewarded,andthisshouldbebuiltinto appraisalsystemsandultimatelycareerdevelopment.Leadersneedtofosteran atmosphereofenquiry,feedbackandchallenge,wherethereistoleranceofrisk.

DFIDalsoneedstoworktojointhedotsbetweenthesuccessfulinnovationsitfunds andtheproposalsitsubsequentlyapproves.Forinstance,DFIDprovidedsomeofthe firstfundstotrialthe'plumpynut'ideainnutrition,sincehailedasoneofthemost excitinginnovationsofthelastdecade.Butitdidnotpushthisnewwayofworking throughitsfundingdecisions.ThisurgentlyneedstochangesothatDFID'sresearch fundscansupportthedevelopmentofsuccessfulinnovationthataretakentoscale throughoperationalfunding. Twoapproachesarehighlightedherefortheirimportanceforaneffectivehumanitarian response,andalsoforhighlightingtherangeofwaysDFIDcansupportinnovations.

Cash based approaches Oneoftheexcitingadvancesinrecentyearshasbeentheuseofcashforreliefand recovery.Traditionally,humanitarianagencieswouldsupplygoods,butawealthof academicworkhasprovencashtobemoreflexible,moreefficientandmoreeffectivein certainsituations. Whilstthebenefitofusingcashiswidelyacknowledged,itsadoptionatscalehasbeen frustratinglyslow.Themajorityofreliefoperationsstillsupplystrickenpopulationswith blankets,potsandpans,soapandsoon.DFID,despitebeingafunderofresearchinto cash,andasupporterofitasanapproachatapolicylevel,doesnotroutinelyrequireits partnerstoworkwithcash.Thishastochange.

IntheNigercasestudyforthisreview,twoaspectsoftheresponsestoodout.ECHO
insistedthatitspartnersusedcash,requiringthemtoargueagainstitsuseratherthan forit.ConcernWorldwide,anNGO,demonstratedthatcashdistributionscouldprevent malnutrition.Concerndidhalfoftheircashdistributionsusingmobilephones–they distributedthephonesandthenusedatransfersystemcalled'zap'toallowrecipientsto buygoodsinlocalshops.Withanestablishedinfrastructurefortransfer,costscanbe marginal.Itispossibletoenvisageasystemwherebyinleanyearstargetedcash distributionsforseveralmonthswouldpreventmalnutrition,andfarcostliermedical interventions. ThisreviewhasconcludedthatDFIDshouldfollowtheleadofECHOandmakecash basedresponsestheusualreliefandrecoverypositionforitspartners.Partnersshould berequiredtoexplain*why they are not using cash*,ratherthantheconverse. Inevitablytherewillbetimeswhencashisnotappropriate.Wheremarketsdonot functionefficiently,largevolumesofcashmightpushpricesup.Wherethereare extremesecurityconcernsthismightalsobeanissue.Twoofthecasestudiesfromthis reviewsuggestthatthesecircumstancesmaybelessfrequentthanimaginedhowever.

InNigerthecashdistributionsbyConcern,SavetheChildrenandotherstookplacein remoteareasatatimeofabsolutefoodshortages.Despitethispricesdidnotriseinthe markets,astradersefficientlydrewinsurplusfromneighbouringNigeria.SimilarlyinDR
Congo,'voucherfairs'demonstratedthatlocaltraderscouldbringgoodstoneedy populationsfarfasterandmoreefficientlythanaidagencies.

Onefearthathasconsistentlydoggedthescalingofcashisthatofcorruption.The extensiveliteratureoncashhasfoundnoincreasedriskofthiscomparedtootherrelief goodshowever,andwithsystemssuchasmobilephonetransferandmicrobank accountsitmayinfactbeless.

Shelter Providingadequateshelterisoneofthemostintractableproblemsininternational humanitarianresponse.Tentsaretoocostlyanddonotlastlongenough.Plastic sheetingcanbegoodbutmostoftenislowqualityandfallsapartimmediately. Rebuildinghousestakesyears,evenwhenlandissuesarenotmajorobstacles.

Tosolvethisissue,agencieshaveincreasinglyused'transitionalshelter',awiderangeof alternativesolutionsincludingcash,communalbuildingsandtemporaryshelters.

Typicallyacompromisebetweenatentandafullhouse,transitionalsheltercanlastfor threeyearsuntilproperreconstructionisachieved.Atbestituseslowcostlocal materialsandisbasedonasimpledesign.Materialscanbeusedafterwardstoo,when peoplemovetotheirnewhome. Whilstthisapproachshowspromise,therearealsochallenges.Transitionalshelterscost morethanafewbitsofplasticsheeting,andinemergenciesthatarenotwellfunded 'transitional'canquicklybecome'permanent'.Argumentsbetweenexpertsoverdesign, qualityandcostcanslowtheprocess,andweakcoordinationinthesectoroftenleads toawidevarianceinwhatisprovided.Thatcanmeanaffectedcommunitiesgetting differentlevelsofprovisiondependingontheagencyallocatedtobuildtheirshelter.

Theissueofweakcoordinationwasattheheartoftheestablishmentofthecluster system.Assection4.3ofthisreviewsetsout,insomeareasthishasworkedwell.

Logistics,foodandwaterhaveallimproved.Otherareashaveimprovedinparts.In shelter,theInternationalFederationoftheRedCross(IFRC)wasnominatedasthe clusterleadagency,andthishasnotworkedwell.Partlythisisbecauseshelteris difficult.PartlyitisbecausethereisanartificialsplitwherebyIFRCisresponsibleinthe immediateaftermathofadisaster,butnotbeyondtheemergencyphaseofdisplacement. DFIDhasbeenheavilyengagedinsheltersincetheIndianOceantsunamiin2004.Ithas fundedresearchandpushedqualitystandardsandcoordination.Thisreviewconcludes thatDFIDmustcontinueandintensifyitseffortstofindbettersolutionstoproviding shelterafterdisaster.Shelteriscriticaltohealth,employment,familyandsafety. Withoutadequateshelter,inallbutthemostbenignclimatespeopleareterribly vulnerable.Partlythismayinvolveresolvingtheclusterissuestouchedonabove.Partly itwillinvolvemoreresearch.Partlyitmayinvolvebringinginnewactors,suchasthe privatesectorconsortiumrecentlyfoundedthroughtheWorldEconomicForum.

Continuingtofundandresourceshelterduringresponsewillalsobeimportant.

Technology Technology,althoughnotasilverbullettotheproblemsofhumanitarianaid,alsoneeds moreconcertedsupport. Someexistingtechnologiesofferconsiderablepotential.TheNigercasestudyforthis reviewhighlightedtheuseofmobilephonesforcashtransfers(alsosuccessfullyusedin Kenya).Thisrapidlydevelopingtechnologycouldbecomethestandardinafewyears, revolutionisingthebankingandremittancesectoralongtheway.Satellitesarealready widelyusedintrackingstormsandinprovidingimageryforhumanitarianoperations. "Crowdsourcing",suchasthatusedinKenyaandHaitimayprovetobeanimportant newwayofdoingneedsassessment.Socialmediaisdrivingnewaccountabilitytouched oninthesectionbelow.Googlehaspilotedseveralsoftwareapplicationsfor humanitarianoperationsincludingthroughitsGoogleEarthmapanditspeoplefinder softwarenowbeingusedinJapan. Thereareemergingtechnologiesthatalsohaveconsiderablepotential(andrisks). Foremostamongtheseisnanotechnology,whichiswidelyseenashavingthepotential totransformmedicine,watersafetyandfoodstuffswithinthenext5-10years.Another isagentbasedmodelling,increasinglyusedineconomics,whichmayhaveapplications inunderstandingthespreadofepidemicsorevenpopulationmovement.

8
Nurture innovation and its application in dealing with and preparing for humanitarian emergencies, including through partnership with operational agencies, private sector, technological innovators and science and research communities.
9
Appoint a Humanitarian Senior Research Fellow, reporting to the Chief Scientific Officer with a dedicated budget tasked with developing evidence and innovation. 

| 10                                           | Investinthreekeytechnologies;mobiletechnologies,satellitesanddatamanagement   |
|----------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| anddisplay.                                  |                                                                               |
| 11                                           | Supportexplorationofemergingandcutting-edgetechnologiessuchasnanotechnology,  |
| andnewcomputermodellingapproaches.           |                                                                               |
| 12                                           | Workwithpartnerstoensurecashbasedresponsesaregivenfullconsiderationand        |
| whereappropriatebecomemuchmorewidelyadopted. |                                                                               |

## 4.5 Accountability

Accountabilityinsuddenonsethumanitarianemergencieshasparticularcharacteristics:
thepresenceofacuteneeds,lackofchoice,lackofvoiceandaccesstoformal procedures,disconnectbetweendonorsandsurvivors,andtheprevalenceoflifeand deathdecisions.Allofthesemakeaccountabilitymorechallengingbutalsomore important. TheparadigmisstillviewingtheaffectedpopulationtoomuchaswhateconomistJulian LeGrandhascalled"pawns"(passiveindividuals)andtheinternationalcommunityas "knights"(extremealtruists).Thisapproachcosts.Localcapacitiesarenotutilised,the beneficiaryisnotinvolvedenoughandthequalityofdeliveryislowerthanitshouldbe.

Sincethelate1990sthehumanitariancommunityhasinitiatedanumberofinteragencyinitiativestoimproveaccountability,qualityandperformance.DFIDhasbeen fundingthemostwidelyknownones:theActiveLearningNetworkforAccountability andPerformanceinHumanitarianAction(ALNAP),HumanitarianAccountability Partnership(HAP),PeopleInAidandtheSphereProject.

Theseinitiativesandothershaveimprovedstandards,quality,learningandtransparency inthesectorbutnotenoughprogresshasbeenmade.Itistimenowtoputthese approachesattheheartofhowthesystemworks.

Thecasestudiesforthisreviewshowthatinvolvementofaffectedcommunitiesand provisionofinformationaboutprogrammestorecipientsofaidwaspatchyeverywhere. Ingeneral,performancewasworstduringthereliefphase,andimprovingduring recoveryandreconstruction.Theveryfactthatthemostinnovativepractices highlightedearlierarethosewhichfocusonrecipientcapacitiesandneedshighlights howfarthesystemhastogo. Theinternationalhumanitariansystemneedstoputaccountability,learningand transparencyintothecentreofitsresponse.Withthetechnologyandmethodsnow available,thereisnoexcusenotto.Assistancehastobeinaccordancewithwhat affectedpeoplehavemadecleartheyneed,ratherthanwhatthesystemispreparedto offer.Andtheinternationalsystemhastobeheldtoaccountforthat,andforlearning howtodeliverimprovedservices.Thiscanbedonethroughbetterfeedbackloopswith theaffectedpopulation,througharangeofmechanismssuchasListeningProject-style assessments,HAPcomplaintsmechanismsandperceptionsurveys.

DFIDisbeingaskedtobemoreaccountablethaneverbeforetoUKtaxpayersinaperiod ofheightenedgovernmentbudgetaryconstraints.DFIDhastakenimportantstepson transparencyasasteptowardsgreateraccountabilityandisattheforefrontamongst donorsonthis.UndertheUKAidTransparencyGuaranteeDFIDhasstartedpublishing detailedinformationaboutallnewprojectsandprogrammesonthewebsince1January
2011.DFIDrecognisesthattransparencycreatesbetterfeedbackfrombeneficiariesto donorsandtaxpayers.Ithelpstobetterunderstandwhatworksandwhatdoesnot.It alsohelpsreducewasteandtheopportunitiesforfraudandcorruption.

DFIDisalsocommittedtopushforfulltransparencyacrosstheinternationalaidsystem byaskingpartnersandotherdonorstoadheretosimilarstandardsoftransparency. Andtosquarethecirclefromtransparencytoaccountability,DFIDhascommittedto providingopportunitiesforthosedirectlyaffectedbyDFIDprojectstoprovidefeedback ontheirperformance.Thiscommitmentneedstoapplytoallhumanitarianemergency workaswell.Evenifputtingthemintopracticewillbemorechallengingthanin otherareas. Improvingaccountabilityisintimatelytieduptotheworkonimpactassessments–for credibleimpactassessmentsthereisaneedtoputdisaster-affectedpeopleatthecentre oftheanalysis. Thiscanbesupportedthroughinnovativeuseofappropriatetechnologythatimproves communicationstoandfromaffectedpopulations.Hi-techwasseeninHaitiwiththe Ushahidi"crowdsourcing"platform,low-tech–menonbicycleswithmegaphonesin BangladeshandBurmaforearlywarning.Mobilephonesandradioarebothimportant toreachpeople.

Impact Theemergencyresponsesectordoesnotroutinelyassessimpact.Whatthismeansis thatforsomeoperationsitisalmostimpossibletosayhowtheassistancehelped people,orevenwhetherithelpedthem.

Therearegoodreasonsforthissometimes.Inemergencies,thereislittletimeto measureintheearlyhoursanddaysofaresponse,inwhatthereviewseesas"the CriticalPeriod".Inconflictitcanbedangerous.Andsavinglivesisthepriority.Itisalso moredifficulttomeasureavertingnegativechange(e.g.topreventfamine)than bringingaboutapositivechange(asindevelopment)becauseofthelackofdecent counterfactuals.Deliveringinsomeofthemostimportantsectorsofhumanitarianaid, suchasprotectionanddignity,isdifficulttoassess.Aidisonlyoneofanumberofinputs intothelivesofdisaster-affectedpeople.Anyattempttoassessevenatasystem-wide levelisplaguedwithattributionissues,neverminddowntothelevelofindividual donors'contributionstoaparticularproject. Otherreasonsfornotdoingimpactassessmentscannotbesoeasilyjustified:itis convenientnottohavetodoit;theneedforhighvisibilityaction,shapedbydonorsand themedia;thecompetitionbetweenagenciesandthelackofseriousconsultationwith thepeopleinneed;thefailuresinleadership.Perhapsmostimportant,impact assessmentsrequiretimeandresourcesthatarenottrivial,andtodatefewdonorshave beenwillingtosupporttheseeffortsonthehumanitariansideofthesystem.

Thisisnolongeracceptable.Thesectormustincreaseitseffortstodemonstrateimpact, anditmustuseevidenceonwhatworksandwhatdoesnotandwhytoimproveits performance.Lessonsneedtobelearnedandapplied.DonorslikeDFIDneedtochange theincentivesinthefinancingsystemtoensurethatimpactis*routinely*measured, ratherthanfitfullyifatall.Perfectionisnotpossibleforthevalidreasonsoutlinedabove butalotmorecanbedone.

Thisreviewfoundthattoolsexistorarebeingdevelopedtoovercomethe methodologicalchallenges.CasestudieshavebeencollatedbyALNAPandothers.A
frameworkformonitoringandevaluatingresultsandimpactisbeingdesignedforDR
Congo'sHumanitarianActionPlan.Thiswillprovidefurtherinsightintowhatcanand cannotbedone.Whatisnecessaryistomoveawayfromasystemwheremany agenciesstillcontinuetomeasuresuccessinvolumeoffood,goodsorvaccinesdelivered ratherthantheimpactontheaffectedpopulation.Aparticularlyimportantand necessaryareaforimpactassessmentswillbeininnovation,testingtherelativeimpact ofoneapproachcomparedtoanother. Tomeasureanddemonstrateimpact,actionneedstobetakenatvariousstagesofan emergencyresponseaswellasinresiliencebuildingprogrammes.Itcannotbedoneas anadd-onalone.Andthroughoutallstages,participatoryapproachesshouldbetaken wherepossible. Intheory,needsassessmentsshouldprovidebaselinesagainstwhichimpactcanlaterbe measured.Needsassessmentsshouldalsobedesignedandcarriedouthavingtheviews ofaffectedpeoplecentrestage.However,therealitylooksdifferent.Needsassessments routinelylackbaselinedata.Theyaremoreaboutgatheringinformationforplanning andfundraisingbyspecificagenciesthanbuildingacomprehensivepictureofneedand prioritisation.Thereiscompetitionbetweenorganisationsandsectors,theprocessisnot transparentandsharinginformationissometimesdiscouragedasitmightposeariskto aninstitution'sroleintheresponse.Needsassessmentsarequiteoftentoolateto informfundingdecisions. Thelackofbaselinesisnottheonlyproblem.Withoutacommonstrategyandagreed definitionsofhumanitarianoutcomes,impactassessmentsaredifficulttocarryout.For that,leadershipandstrongpartnershipsareessential(seesections4.3and4.6). Monitoringhasalsobeenfoundtobeweakandsuffersfrompatchy,inconsistentefforts.

Incomplexemergencieswheresecurityandaccessaremajorconstraints,monitoringis anevengreaterchallenge.Remoteprogrammingisincreasinglyused,especiallyin countrieslikeSomalia. Ex-postevaluationstendtoevaluateactivitiesratherthanimpactanddonotoften enoughincludeaparticipatoryelementsothatdisastersurvivorscanholdagenciesto account.Becauseofalackofresourcesandnarrowagendas,mostevaluationsfocusona particularprojectorprogramme;system-wideassessmentsarestillrare.Thequalityof evaluations,asassessedbyALNAPfrom2000to2008hasbeenconsistently disappointing.Impactassessments,whetheragency-specific,sector-wideorsystemwide,arenotusuallycarriedout. Technologicaladvancessuchassatelliteimageryarestillnotusedenoughtocollect dataacrosstheprogrammingcycle,includingforneedsassessments,monitoringand impactassessments.Neitherarenationalcapacitiesusedenoughinmonitoringand evaluativeefforts–whetheroperationalagenciesorthinktanksandacademics.

Addressing the needs of the most vulnerable Thehumanitariansystemispoorlyequippedtoensureanequitableresponseforthe mostvulnerable.Whilstissuesspecifictochildren,age,oldpeople,womenandthose withdisabilityarewidelywrittenabout,therearefewmechanismstodealwiththem.

Thereisnoformalplatformforcollectiveengagementonspecificissues,andthereis littleifanydisaggregateddataonneedsandimpactonvulnerablegroups.Alotofthe evidencebaseisanecdotal,pickedupbysomeonewhowasawareoftheneedsof vulnerablegroupswhiledoingsomethingelse.Culturallyinsensitivepracticessuchas deliveringreliefitemsinsinglelanesarestillroutinelypractised.DuringthePakistan earthquakethispreventedwidowswithoutmalecompanyfromaccessingaid.Astudy byHelpAge25showsthatadisproportionatelylowamountofhumanitarianassistance wasdedicatedtoensuringthattheneedsofaparticularvulnerablegroupindisasteraffectedpopulations–olderpeople–aremet.

Children,definedbythoseundertheageof18,makeupatleast50%ofaffected populationsinmostoftheemergenciesaroundtheworld.Humanitarianassistancethat doesnotassessandaddresstheneedsofchildrenmaybeignoringthemajority–and wouldthereforepotentiallybefailingtohavethegreatestimpact.

AmnestyInternationalreportedthatwomenandgirlslivinginthemakeshiftcampsin Haitioneyearafterthedevastating12January2010earthquakefacedanincreasingrisk ofrapeandsexualviolence.Thecampsprovidedshelterandaccesstobasicservicesin theimmediateaftermathbutnoadequateprotectionforwomenandgirls.

Gender Accountabilitycannotimprovewithoutthehumanitariansystembecomingmoregender aware.Povertyexperiencedbywomenandmenisshapedbyinequalitiesthatdiscriminate againstandmarginalisecertainsocialgroups.Themostpervasiveoneisgender inequalityandthisismagnifiedbytheimpactsofclimatechangeanddisasters.26Astudy bytheLondonSchoolofEconomicsshowsthatnaturaldisastersandtheirsubsequent impactonaveragekillmorewomenthanmenorkillwomenatanearlierage.27
Anapproachthatdoesnotrecognisethatwomen,men,girlsandboysinanemergency situationhavedifferentneedsandareexposedtodifferenttypesofriskwillinthebest casebebadqualityprogramming,intheworstcaseitcancauseharm.Projectsthatare genderblindriskmissingoutonthemostvulnerableindividualsandmayalsoprovidean inappropriateresponseduetolackofanalysisandlimitedunderstandingofwhatthe genderspecificneedsare. Atthesametime,theroleofwomeninprevention,reliefandrecoveryisnotrecognised enough.Previousevaluationsshowthatwomendrivethemovefromimmediate concerns–reunitingfamilies,findingshelterandfood–toidentifyingwaystogenerate income.Andwomenhaverepeatedlyledinitiativestoadapttotheimpactsofclimate change,andtheirknowledgeandresponsibilitiesrelatedtonaturalresource managementhaveprovencriticaltocommunitysurvival.28Womenandgirlsneedtobe consultedontheirneedsimmediately,appropriatelyandcomprehensivelythroughoutall stagesofassistance.

13
Promote and support mechanisms to give recipients of aid a greater voice.
14
Promote the development of improved needs and robust impact assessments. 
15
Workwithotherstocreateanover-archingsetofstandardstoassessbeneficiary accountability.
16
Encouragethespreadofbestpracticeinthisarea.
17
Givegreateremphasistobeneficiaryaccountabilityfactorswhenmakingfunding decisions.

## 4.6 Partnership

TheUKisnotalargedirectgiverofhumanitarianassistance,preferringinsteadtowork withandthroughpartners.Thisreviewendorsesthisapproach;partnershipwillbecome evenmoreimportantasourinterconnectedworldgetsmoresoandaspowershifts towardsthenewemergingeconomiessuchasBrazil,China,IndiaandtheGulfStates.

TheUKcanachievemorethroughandwithpartners,usingitsresourcestobring togetherorganisationswithdifferentskillstorespondtoacuteneed.Inthemodern worldthemostimportantpartofwhatanorganisationcandoiswhatitcandowithothers.

ManyofthepartnersDFIDworkswithinhumanitarianresponseareworld-class organisations.Amultilateralaidreview,commissionedatthesametimeasthisreview, foundthat80%ofhumanitarianagencieswereeithergoodorverygood.

Nevertheless,thehumanitariansectorinrecentyearshasbeenseenbymanyasa closedshopwithahandfulofagenciesanddonorsdominating.Whilstsomeofthishas beenforgoodreason–theneedtobeseenasneutralandimpartialinconflictand beingabletoaccesspopulationsmostly–someofthisissimplynotworking.Thisreview concludesthataseachangeinthinkingisrequired,sothatDFIDrecognisesthatitisthe qualityofitspartnershipsthatmatters,asmuchifnotmorethanitsownstandalone capacity.Itsroleshouldbemore'networkenabler'thanindividualdoer.

Working with the United Nations and its agencies TheUnitedNationsasawholeisthelargestpartneroftheUKinhumanitarian emergencyresponse.AsapermanentmemberoftheSecurityCouncil,andafounder memberoftheUN,theUKhashistoricallybeenactiveinsupportingmultilateralism. Thisreviewhasconcludedthatthispositionshouldbemaintained,withmultilateral responsethedefaultpositionoftheUKandDFID. UNagenciesareamongstthelargestdeliverersofhumanitarianaid.TheWorldFood Programme(WFP)delivered44billionmealsin2010,mostofitinresponseto emergenciesorongoingcrises.UNagencieshavethereachandthepresencetodeliver
28A.Araujoetal(2008),GenderEqualityandAdaptation,IUCN.

aidatscale,andtheirinternationalstatusoftenmeanstheyhaveabetterrelationship withgovernment.ThereviewdocumentedsomeexcellentexamplesofUNagency-led response;fromWFPrapidlydeliveringfoodto7millionpeopleinfloodhitPakistan,to UNICEFsupplyinginfantfoodnationallyforstarvingchildreninNiger.Therehavealso beenfailures,notablytheinabilitytotreatandcontaincholerainHaiti. Thesectionsonleadership,finance,accountabilityandimpactinthisreviewmake thepointthatthereisstillmuchworktobedonetoimprovetheperformanceofthe internationalsystem.Clusterleadershipneedstobeimproved,theUNagenciesneed tobettersupportOCHAandtheERC,andneedtoworkmorecollegially.Agenciesneed togetbetteratreportingresultsratherthanwhattheyhavepurchased. DFIDneedstosupporttheseefforts.Asoneofthemajordonors,itneedstoprovide greaterpredictabilityoffundingsothatthemainUNagenciescaninvestintheir humanitarianresponsecapacities.Itisdifficulttokeepstaff,chartcareersandinvestin peopleifyoudonotknowwhetheryouwillhavemoneynextyear.Agenciesneedmultiyearfundingtomaketheseinvestments.ButDFIDcanalsolinkthismoreclearlyto resultsandperformance.Themultilateralaidreviewcanbeagoodbasistostartthis rebalancingoffunding. ThisreviewconcludesthatalongsidemorepredictablecorefundingtheCERFisa valuablemechanismandshouldcontinuetobesupportedandexpanded.Italso concludesthatNGOsneedsimilarsupport.PooledfundsliketheoneinDRCongohave generallyworkedwell.Astheyapplymostlytoprotractedcrisesthereviewhasnot studiedtheseindepth,excepttogenerallyendorsethisapproach.

UNagenciesarethebackboneofmanyresponses,andtheUKisconsistentlyoneofthe largestcontributors.Thedefaultpositionofmultilateralismmeanstheseagenciesneed supporting,asdoestheoverallinstitution.Butsupportcannot,andshouldnotbe uncritical.Agenciesmustcollaboratewitheachother,withgovernments,withNGOs andwithUNappointedleadership.Theclusterapproachisthecorrectvision–strategic networksbringingtogetherthemainactorsinvolvedinresponse.Butitsimplementation hasbeentooinflexible.Clustersneedtobegroupedaroundneedratherthanmandate, includingallkeyactors,notjustUNagenciesandinternationalNGOs.Theyneedtobe strategic,andoftentheyneedtoworkonseverallevels.Theyneedtobecreative, decisionmakingbodies,notuninspiringtalkshops.ResourcesfromDFIDshouldfollow successonthesecriteria,andnotberoutinelyallocated.

Working with the European Union TheEuropeanUnioncollectivelyprovideshalfofallofficialhumanitarianaid.Italsohas itsownhumanitarianaidagency,ECHO,whichisthesecondlargestglobaldonorinits ownright.AndalthoughtheUKprovidesasixthofitsfunding,itdoesnotengagewith ECHOstrategically.Thisneedstochange.

DFID'spolicylevelrelationshipwithECHOisweak.DFIDandECHOtoooftenworkin parallel,failingtocommunicateeffectively.Thisresultsinduplicationofworkandcostly overlaps.IndisastersituationsECHOisroutinelyunawareofwhatDFID'sresponsewill be.Atpolicylevel,DFIDfocusespriorityattentiononthemajorUNhumanitarian partnersratherthanotherdonors.ThelackofeffectivepartnershipwithECHOisa wastedopportunity.TheUKholdsauniquepositionamongstEUmemberstates,with capacitytoprovideeffectivehumanitarianaidwhenactingalone.Thisexperienceif bettershared,couldbebeneficialtobothagencies. AtpresentDFID'srelationshipwithECHOappearstobedelegatedtojuniorstaff.What isneededisbetterengagementatpolicylevel,andbetteralignmentatdeliverylevel.

DFIDneedstohaveamoreconsistentstrategicdialoguewithECHO.Itneedstobe awareofECHO'sstrategicplanningprocessesandengagewiththese.

Mostimportantly,DFIDneedstogetsmarteratsharingresourceswithECHO.Nigerisa goodexampleofhowthiscanwork.ECHOhasstrongtechnicaladvisorypresence throughitsspecialisedofficesandpermanentrepresentationthroughtheEUdelegation.

DFIDreliedonECHOtoleadtheresponse.ButDFIDalsoperiodicallysenthumanitarian advisorstoreinforceandcomplementECHOleadership.InothersituationsECHOmight followaDFIDlead.

Working with bilateral donors TheUSgovernmentistheworld'slargestindividualhumanitariandonor.Itisvery influential,withtheheadsofWFP,UNICEFandtheWorldBanktraditionallycoming fromtheUS.TheUSgovernmentisalsothelargestdonortoUNHCRandtheICRC.

ThismeanstheUShasanopportunitytoinfluenceUNagenciesatahighlevel.Thisis oftennotusedcoherentlybecauseofthefragmentednatureoftheUSaidbureaucracy.

Butevenso,DFIDdoesnothaveasustainedpolicydialoguewiththehumanitarian agenciesoftheUSgovernment,andisoftenperceivedbytheUSasaloner.

TheUSwasconsideringasignificantreductionintheamountofhumanitarianaidit givesasthisreviewwenttopress(40%offoodaidanddisasterresponseby70%).Were thistohappen,forDFIDitwouldmeanthatconversationsaboutburdenshare–similar tothosewithECHO–wouldbeevenmorevital.Itwillbeimportanttounderstand wheretheUSwillfocusitsefforts,andtoensurethatscarcehumanitarianresourcesare spreadmosteffectively.WheretheUSwillobviouslylead–Haitiwasagoodexample –thenDFIDshouldbeabletofitaroundthis.

TheGoodHumanitarianDonorship(GHD)grouphasplayedaroleinachievingchangein thehumanitariansystem.DonorssuchastheNetherlands,Sweden,NorwayandCanada havebeenclosealliesforDFID.GHDhascreatedaspaceforcollectiveactionthatdid notpreviouslyexist,andprovidedDFIDwithitsmostconsistentallies.Lately,ithaslost momentum.DFIDshouldworktoreinvigoratethisgroup,bothgloballyandincountries likeDRCongowhereitplaysapivotalrole.

DFIDsharesthebasichumanitarianprinciplesofhumanity,neutralityandimpartialityas astartingpointforpartnershipwithothertraditionalhumanitariandonors.The principlesofGoodHumanitarianDonorship(GHD)bindlike-mindeddonorstogether aroundafurthersetofcoredonorprinciples.TheGHDgroupisastartinggroundfor moreeffectivedonoraction.ButmoreneedstobedonebyDFIDtodemonstratea collegialapproach.

WideningthegroupwhoadheretoGHDprincipleswouldbeapositivewayforward.

DFIDisoneofthestrongergroupmemberswithcapacitytoinfluencehowtobring othersin.TheannualMontreuxmeetingmightbetheforumforthisandcould potentiallybewidenedinscopeandambition.

Working with new donor partners Theworldischanging.Chinaisnowthesecondlargestglobaleconomy.Nationssuchas India,SouthAfrica,Russia,Brazil,andSaudiArabiaareimportantregionalpowers.The globalpictureofwhorespondstohumanitarianneedischangingtoo.Increasing contributionstodisasterresponsearebeingseenfromdonorsoutsidethe'traditional'
OECDDACgroup. Allofthenationscitedabovesignificantlyrespondtodisastersintheirregions.China's contributiontoWFPdoubledin2005andwasoneofthelargestdonorsinBurmaafter CycloneNargisin2008(andinPakistanduringthefloodsin2010).Brazilwasamajor responderinHaiti.SaudiArabiawasthesinglelargestdonortoBangladeshfollowing cycloneSidr(andwasoneofthetopfiveglobaldonorsin2009).Indiagavethrough multilateralchannelstoPakistanfloodrelief.

Theemerginggroupofnon-traditionalpartnersisanopportunityforDFIDtoestablish newrelationships.Todoso,DFIDmustlookforareasofcommongroundthatalready exist.Similarviewpointscanbeusedasstartingpoints.Forexample,Brazil'sviewon humanitarianresponseis,likeDFIDtobuildownershipbyworkingwithlocalauthorities. DFIDcancombineitsexpertisewiththatofnationsthatregularlyexperiencelargescale naturaldisasters,andworkwiththemtosharelearningwithotheratrisknations.

Russia'sEmergencyControlMinistry,EMERCOMhasvastcapacityandexperience.India hasacadreofexperienceddisastermanagersingovernment,followingdisastersin Orissa,GujuratandTamilNadu.China'shandlingoftheSichuanearthquakeresponse wasexemplary.China'scurrent5yearplan(2006–2011)includesdisasterrelief, highlightingtheimportanceofmultilateralcoordination. Chinahasenormouscapacitytorespondanddeepexperienceofhumanitarian emergencieswithinitsownborders.AnydisastersintheregionoftheHinduKushwill likelyseeChinarespondinginasignificantway.Toremainahumanitarianleaderintothe
21stcentury,DFIDshouldreachouttoseektobuildnewrelationshipswithChinaalong thelinesoftheirrecentWhitePaper. TheGulfStates,suchasQatar,theUAEandSaudiArabiaaresignificantdonorsinthe humanitarianassistanceandareincreasinglybecominginvolvedinotherways.TheGulf CooperationCouncil(GCC)hasanewhumanitarianmechanism.DFIDisalreadyworking withtheGCCandhumanitarianassistanceisagoodareaofcommoninterest.

Inforgingnewhumanitarianrelationships,DFIDshouldnotrisk'goingitalone'.Alliances mustbebuiltwithothertraditionalhumanitariandonorstowelcomenewpartnerson board.SupportmustbecorralledfromwithintheDACgrouptocreateareceptiveforum fornewdonorstojoin.DFIDwillhavetolookwideracrossWhitehalltoinfluenceinthis action.ClosecollaborationbetweenDFID,FCOandotherWhitehalldepartmentswillbe vitaltodevelopopportunities.TheFCO'scapacitytobuildrapidconsensusthrough cablesinsupportofASEAN'sroleinresponsetoCycloneNargisin2008hasalready beendemonstrated.DFIDshouldmakemoreuseofthediplomaticnetworksandother governmentdepartmentsinordertobuildwidercoalitionsitneedstodrivethroughthe internationalreformagenda. DFID'scommitmenttohumanitarianprincipleswillbecomeincreasinglyimportantas partnershipsaredeveloped.Demonstratingthevalueofthesewillbeanimportantpart ofnewrulesforinternationalhumanitariancollaboration.

Working with NGOs TheUKhassomeofthemostrespectedandimportantinternationalnon-government organisationsintheworld.OrganisationslikeOxfamandSavetheChildrenareknown worldwide.TheirworkhashelpedmillionsindisasterfromEthiopia,toBangladeshto Haiti.Theirpioneeringtechnicalworkhasoftensetthestandardforotherhumanitarian agencies.TheyarehighlyregardedbytheUKpublicandreceivegeneroussupportwhen massivedisastersstrike. Non-governmentorganisations(NGOs)alsoprovidemuchoftheimplementation capacityinhumanitarianemergencyresponse.IndigenousandfaithbasedNGOsare oftenthefirsttorespond,andunderstandbothcultureandcontext.InternationalNGOs areadeptatdeployingquickly,oftensettingupbigreliefoperationsweeksbeforethe UNcranksintogear.In2008NGOsspent$5.7billiononhumanitarianassistance29.

NGOsoftenhavelargeprogrammesinaffectedcountriesbeforedisasterstrikes,have experienceinresiliencebuildingespeciallyincommunitybaseddisasterriskreduction andmanyworkwithnationalandlocalorganisations.

29GHAreport2010.DevelopmentInitiatives.

ThetermNGOcoversadiversityoforganisations.WorldVisionhadaturnoverof$2.1
billionin200630,rivallingUNICEFat$2.7billioninthesameyear.In2006Medecins SansFrontieres(MSF)spent$575milliononhumanitarianaid.Onlytwogovernments
–theUKandtheUS–spentmoreonofficialbilateralhumanitarianassistancethatyear.

TheCatholicChurchnetworkCaritas'svoluntaryspendwasequivalenttothebilateral humanitarianassistanceofSweden,thesixthlargestdonorin2006.Insomecases,a singlememberofanNGOfamilymakesamoresignificantcontributionthanitshost government.Forexample,MSFFrancespentanestimated$81millionoftheFrench public'smoneyonrespondingtocrisesin2006,comparedwithbilateralspendingof only$48millionbytheFrenchgovernment. NGOsarealsorapidlygrowinginscaleandgeographicspread.Indiahasamillion indigenousorganisationsthatdescribethemselvesasNGOs.BRACinBangladeshclaims tobetheworld'slargestNGOifnumberofemployeesisconsideredratherthanfinancial turnover.MercyMalaysiahasbecomeawell-knowninternationalNGOrunning programmesasfarafieldasAfrica;AfricaHumanitarianActioninEthiopiaruns programmesacrosstheHorn.

WhatNGOsrepresentattheirbestiscitizens'action.OrganisationslikeMSFhavevery generouspublicsupportacrossEuropeandtheUS,receiving86%oftheirfundsfrom privatedonations.Theirglobalspreadistestimonytotheirenduringappeal. Forofficialdonorsandtheinternationalsystemthiscreatesbothanopportunityanda challenge.Theincreasedcapacity,especiallyofnationalandlocalNGOsprovides untappedpotential.TheHaitiearthquakeprovidesanexamplethoughoftheheadache thattryingtocoordinatetheNGOsectorcanbe,withmorethan1,000international NGOsflyingintoPortauPrincereadytohelp.SomeNGOsareanintegralpartofthe system.SavetheChildrenco-leadstheeducationclusterwithUNICEF;Oxfamprovides peoplereadytogoforthewaterandsanitationcluster.ButotherNGOseitherdonot know,ordonotacceptthissystem.Manyturnuplookingforguidance.Otherstryto pushapoliticalagenda. FaithgroupsareanotherexampleofagrowingNGOsectorwithpotentialtoimprove responsesthroughtheirstronglinkswithandaccesstolocalcommunities.Theyraise considerabledonationsfromfaithandDiasporacommunitiesoutsidetheDECappeals.

TheinternationalNGOsectorhasgonealongwayintryingtoself-regulate.Thereisan industrywideCodeofConduct,technicalstandardsforeachsectorofactivityandlots ofworkonaccountability.Unfortunatelythishasnotbeenenoughtostemthetideof firsttime"wellwishers",manyofwhomdonotknowaboutstandards,codesandthe ideathattheirhelpmightdomoreharmthangood.Neitherhasitmadeanimpacton thecompetitionbetweeninternationalNGOs.AswithUNagenciesthiscompetition meansthatassessmentinformationisoftentreatedascommerciallysensitive,leading tomultiplesurveysandorganisationsjostlingforfundingforparticulargeographicareas ortechnicalsectors. AsaresultofthehumanitarianreformeffortswiththeUN,DFIDhasratherneglected theNGOsectorinthelastfiveyears.Latterlythishasbeenchangingwiththe establishmentofinnovativeconsortia,bothforimprovingrapidresponseandin-country forlocalNGOs.TheConsortiumofBritishHumanitarianAgencies(CBHA)andtheWest AfricaRegionalHumanitarianFund(WARHF)offertwoprovenmodelsataglobaland regionallevel.Theseareeffectiveandshouldbeexpanded.

DFIDshouldalsoconsider,eitherthroughconsortiaorindividually,investinginNGOs withspecialistresponsecapabilitiestoensurethesecanbedeployedrobustly.Thiscould
30DIreportfor2009Montreuxdonorsconference.

belinkedtoclusterneedsandresponsibilities(forinstancewithCAREwhosupportthe sheltercluster,orMerlinwhohaveco-chairedcountryhealthclusters).

IncountrieswhereDFIDhasapresencethistypeofapproachcanbeextendedto nationalandlocalNGOsandapplytointernationalNGOswithsubstantialpresenceand experience.ThecivilsocietyfundinDRCongocouldserveasamodel,wherebyone NGOactsasthegrantholderonbehalfofthecollective.USAIDusesthesetypesof
'umbrellagrants'routinely.AnothermodelisUNDPinBangladesh;anotheristhe recentlyformedCBHA. Whilstthesetypesofapproacheshavethepotentialtoimprovetheeffectivenessof manyofthebiggerinternationalNGOs,itwillnotsolvetheissueofeverincreasing proliferation.OnepotentialmeasurethathasbeendebatedwithintheNGOcommunity formanyyearsisfor'accreditation'ofsomesort,allowingaccreditedNGOseasier accesstocoordinationmeetingsandsoon.Thisideahasbeenresistedonthegrounds thatitwouldbealmostimpossibletoachieveandthatitmightunfairlyexcludeNGOs withrealcapacityorinsighttooffer–especiallynationalNGOs.However,thereview findsthatasystemisneededtohelpshortcutsomeofthechaosofcoordinationof NGOs,perhapslinkedtopre-crisisarrangementsandplanning.Thisworkcanonlybe conductedbytheNGOsectoritself.ButDFIDshouldencourage,helpandsupportthis process.Whateveritlookslike,ithastohelpaffectedgovernmentsandthosecharged withcoordinationtounderstandwhereareputableorganisationhasprovencapability andhowitcouldbestbedeployed.

Working with the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement TheInternationalRedCross/CrescentMovementistheworld'slargesthumanitarian network.Thereare186NationalSocietieswithaSecretariatinGenevaaswellasthe InternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross(ICRC),aprivateSwissorganisationdedicated tohelpingvictimsofconflict.TheICRCreceivesthelargestamountofDFID
humanitarianfundingofanysingleagency,at£66millioninfinancialyear2009/2010.

TherelationshipbetweenDFIDandtheRedCross/RedCrescentMovementhas traditionallybeenmediatedbytheBritishRedCrossSociety(BRCS).TheBRCSisoneof thestrongerNationalSocieties(NS)intheMovement,alargecontributortootherNSin itsownright,andastrategicvoiceintheIFRCSecretariat.Forthepastdecade,DFID
fundsforboththeIFRCandICRCpassedthroughtheBRCSinwhatwascalleda
'tripartite'relationship.ThisrecentlychangedfortheICRC–DFIDfundsnowgodirectto Geneva–butremainsthesamefortheIFRC.

Thedifferentarrangementsreflectthestrengthsandcharacterofthedifferent organisations.TheICRCiswidelyadmiredforitsprofessionalismanditsadherenceto mandate.ItscoreshighlyininternalDFIDanalysis,includingtherecentmultilateralaid review,andwithcountryoffices.ThismakestheICRCapartnerofchoiceinconflict situationsandthisreviewendorsesthatview.DFIDshouldcontinuetoworkwiththe ICRCasitis,atrustedandprincipledpartnerinconflictsituations. TheNationalSocietiesandtheIFRCSecretariataredifferent.Thenetworkhas tremendouspotential,rootedasitisinitsnationalbase.NationalSocietiesarerequired tohaveauxiliarystatustogovernmenttobeamember,andinmanycountriesthisisa significantrole.TheChineseRedCrosshasaround20millionvolunteersandoften respondsalongsidethePeople'sLiberationArmyindisasters.TheIranianRedCrescent Societyistheofficialresponsearmofgovernment,withhugereliefstocksandlogistics assetsincludinghelicopters.TheAmericanRedCrossisresponsibleformasscarein domesticdisasters. Butthenetworkdoesnotroutinelyachieveitspotential.Itislessthanthesumofits parts,withmanyNationalSocietiesthatareunder-resourcedandunder-performing.

Particularlyinsub-SaharanAfrica,manyoftheNationalSocietiesaremarginaltotheir nationallifeandincapableoflarge-scalemobilisation.Partlythisisaquestionof resources–whenahighachievingofficerfromtheIFRCSecretariatbecameSecretary GeneralofaweakperformingNationalSociety,andwasremuneratedatan internationallevel,therewasastepchangeinperformance.Itisalsoaquestionof managementandgovernance. InthenewdirectionrecommendedforDFIDinthisreview,focusingonnational resilience,thereisamajorroleforRedCrossandRedCrescentNationalSocieties.

WorkingthroughandwithNationalSocietiescanbeagoodwaytoengagewith NationalDisasterManagementAgencies,andwithnationaldisasterlegislation.National Societiesareoftenclosetocommunities,throughtheirvolunteernetworksandthe Federationhaspioneeredworkoncommunitybaseddisasterpreparedness.

TheIFRCalsoremainsamassivenetworkfordisasterresponse,oftentheveryfirstto helpthroughlocalvolunteersandmobilisingthenetworkofNationalSocietiesata regionalorgloballevel.Theirperformanceinresponsehasbeenmixedhowever.This criticalrolecouldbeimprovedwithgreaterclarityoffocusonimprovingtheglobalRed Cross/RedCrescentresponsesystemfromtheFederation,andstrengthenedbetter capacityattheNSlevel.

Butthiscanonlyworkifsomeofthefundamentalproblemscanberesolved.Working withandthroughtheBritishRedCrossisasensiblehalfwayhouseforthetimebeing.

TheBRCShasauxiliarystatustogovernmentintheUK,althoughinpracticethishasnot oftenbeeninvokedinrecentyears.DFIDshouldworkcloselywithBRCSandtheIFRC
SecretariattoinvolvetheFederationinitsresiliencework.Itshouldalsocontinueto supporttheglobalreadinessoftheFederation.TheBRCScanactasaninterlocutor, giventheotherwisetimeconsumingnatureofapotentialengagement.

TheroleoftheBRCSasanauxiliarycouldbere-invigoratedinotherways.TheBRCS
alreadyprovidesadegreeoflegaladviceonthelawsofwartotheMOD;thiscouldbe extendedtoDFID.BRCSalsokeepsanumberofhighqualityemergencyteamson permanentstandbyfortheFederation.Thenationalsocietyhasofferedtoextendthis typeofsurgearrangementtoDFID,somethingthatshouldbeexplored.

Working with the private sector Theprivatesectorrepresentsahugesourceofuntappedcapacityandexpertiseto reducesufferingandhelprebuildcommunitiesintheaftermathofadisaster.Itcanalso helptomitigatedisasterriskthroughpreventionandpreparedness.Thispotentialmust beunlockediffuturechallengesaregoingtobemet.

Theemphasisneedstoshiftfromseeingtheprivatesectorasadonortobeinga'doer', andasavaluedpartnernotacontractedentity.Newmodalitiesofengagementare requiredinordertoenablethehumanitariansectortohaveaccesstoskillsandproducts asandwhenrequired.Examplesofthisincludepublic-privatepartnershipsthatenable thesharingofrisks,creditandinvestment(e.g.theCaribbeanCatastropheRisk InsuranceFacility,theBritishEarthquakeConsortiumforTurkey).

Butthereisstilldistrustfromthehumanitariansectorthatcharacterisesitselfas'nonprofit'towardsprivatesectororganisationswhoseprimemotivationisperceivedas 'profit'.Thisbarriertocollaborationneedstobeovercome,andDFIDshouldbeactivein helpingtoachievethis.Theprivatesector'smotivationforengagementisbasedona widerbusinessinterest,includingbrand,newmarkets,corporatesocialresponsibility, andstaffmotivation.Andinviewofthisfirmsareoftenwillingtoengageonareduced rateor'atcost'basis,asforexamplewithDigicellinHaiti.Humanitarianorganisations suchasMapActionandRedRrelyontrainedpersonnelfromtheprivatesectorbeing availablewhenneededforcriticalshort-termassignmentsintheimmediateaftermath ofadisaster,oftenonavolunteerorpartialcostbasis.

Companiesandgovernmentshaveoutsourcedservicesforyears,concentratingontheir coreadvantage.Thehumanitariansectoralsohasasetofquasi-commercial relationshipsinitsgrant/recipient/sub-contractingmodel.Protectionistrhetoricneeds tobereplacedwithafocusonwhocandowhat,mosteffectively.Again,DFIDshould encourageandstimulatethisprocess.

Thecurrentmodelsofprivatesectorengagementinhumanitarianactiongenerallyfocus onlargemultinationalcompaniesandinvolvepro-bonocontributionsoftheirproducts, skillsandexpertisetoresponseoperations.Thisismostlyinthesectorsoflogistics,IT andcommunication,mapping,engineeringandmedicalsupplies.Thebestknown exampleinthesectoristhecollaborationofAgility,TNTandUPSinprovidinglogistics andtransportationservicestoWFP.Therehavealsobeenproactiveeffortsbythe privatesectortobetterunderstandhumanitarianaction,andvariousinitiatives,suchas theWorldEconomicForumDisasterRiskPartnershiptofacilitateaccesstoprivate sectorexpertiseinengineeringandconstruction.

Theprivatesectorcanbringprofessionalism,leadershipandmanagementbestpractice, toolsfordrivingefficiencyandmanagingrisk,andtheuseofcuttingedgetechnology andinformation.Suchskillsneedtobecontextualizedtothechallengesofpost-disaster situationsthroughworkinginpartnershipwithhumanitarianorganisationsandbuilding long-termcollaborativerelationshipsthatenableknowledgetransfer.

Recognitionofthevalueoftheinternationalprivatesectorneedstobematchedwith understandingoftheimportanceoflocalbusinessesandcompaniesinimmediate responseandincatalysingeconomicrecovery.Thisimportanceislikelytochange significantlywhencashtransfersbecomemoreprominent.

Thelocalprivatesectorisusuallythefirstthatcanrespondwithreliefitemsandfood.It canprovideemploymentandcontributetonormalisation.HindustanConstruction CompanyinIndiahasbeenabletorespondtofloodsinOrissaandfloods/landslidesin Laddakhwheretheyhadconstructionsites.Notablyitisnationalcompanieslikethese whohavethecapacitytorespondaswellastherelationshipswiththelocalgovernment andcommunity. InHaiti,theruralhinterlandwasnotmuchaffectedbytheearthquakeandmarkets resumedquickly.Large-scalefoodaidwasneverthelessimported,withapotentially detrimentaleffectontheagriculturaleconomy. Thelocalprivatesectorcanalsoprofiteerfromdisasters.ThereisevidencethatNiger's cerealmarketisstrictlycontrolledbyarestrictedgroupoftraders.Thesetraderskeep cerealsoutofcirculationuntilthemaximumpriceisreached.

Alltheseexamplesshowthatpositiverelationshipswiththeprivatesectorneedtobe establishedpre-disastersothattheycanbebestusedwhendisasterstrikes.InDFID's resilienceandpreparednesswork,thelocalandnationalprivatesectorneedstobea keypartner. Disastersareincreasinglytakingplaceinurbanenvironments.Urbanenvironmentsare characterisedbyahighconcentrationofprivatesectorinterests(markets,labour,the supplychain).Urbanareasarealsodependentoninfrastructureforthedeliveryof essentialservices(water,solidwastemanagement,sanitation,drainage,energy) Damagedinfrastructureneedstoberapidlyreinstatedandissueslikerubbleremovalare criticaltomakinglandavailableforcamps,andintegratedurbanplanningisneededin ordertoprovideabasisforrecoveryandreconstruction.Reinstatingtheseisoutsidethe skillssetofNGOsorUNagencies,andfundingandprocurementbarriersoftenprevent suchskillsbeingaccessedinatimelyfashionfromtheprivatesector.

Local,nationalandinternationalcompaniesholdtheknowledgeandexpertiseto respondtourbandisasters.Theycouldbeofgreatvaluetohumanitarianorganisations operatingoutoftheirtraditionalareasofexpertise.Thereareexamplesofmunicipal governmentsturningdirectlytotheprivatesector,forinstancetheDujiangyan MunicipalGovernmentaftertheChineseearthquake,andapublic-privatepartnership (PRES)betweenArauco,theministryofhousingandlocalmunicipalityinSantiago,Chile.

DFIDhassetupanewPrivateSectorDepartmentinJanuary2011tohelpraisethelevel, extentandeffectivenessofDFID'sengagementwiththeprivatesector.Thisisan excellentinitiative.Existingandnewprogrammescouldaddressmanyoftheissues raisedabove.FacilitiessuchasthePrivateInfrastructureDevelopmentGrouporthe BusinessInnovationFacilitycouldhavehumanitarianwindows.Knowledgegeneration anddisseminationactivitiescouldincluderelevanthumanitariancases.Andwhere appropriate,CHASEandthePrivateSectorDepartmentcouldworktogetheron galvanisingprivatesectorexpertisearoundspecificopportunitiesthatneedunblocking.

Anexamplewouldbefastinfrastructurerehabilitationinurbanareas.Anothermightbe encouragingtheprivatesectortohelpstrengthenthehumancapacityoflocal governmentsandstructurestomanageemergencies.

Working with the military Themilitaryhaslongbeeninvolvedindisasterreliefoperations.Domesticmilitaryare oftenthefirstresponseofgovernment.Internationalmilitaryinvolvementindisaster reliefhasbeenmorecontentious,especiallywherethereareobviouspoliticalormilitary objectives.Buthumanitarianworkersneedtobeabletoacknowledgeareasofmilitary comparativeadvantageandrecognisewheretheycanworktogether.Itisvitaltouphold humanitarianprinciples.Itisequallyvitaltousethemosteffectiveresourcesatour disposaltomeettheneedsofthoseaffected,especiallyifpredictionsofincreasedneed materialise. ThereviewtakestheviewthattheBritishmilitarydoeshavearoletoplay insupportoftheUKresponseledbyDFID. Itisthenationalgovernment'sresponsibilitytodecidewhethertocallinmilitary resourcesinsupportofahumanitarianresponse.Thismaybeadecisiontousethe country'sownmilitaryortoaccepttheuseofforeignmilitary.Inmanycountries,calling intheirownmilitarytorespondtoalarge-scaledomesticdisasteristhemostobvious thingtodo.Aftertheearthquakeof2005,thePakistanarmywasthefirstresponder, savingthemostlivesbypullingpeopleoutoftherubbleandbyprovidingthefirstrelief items.Whenbigdisastershit,oftenacountry'smilitaryistheonlyactorwithadequate resourcestorespondatspeedandscale.DFIDshouldrecogniseacountry'srighttouse itsownmilitaryindisasterresponseandbesupportive.

Anationalgovernmentmayrequestassistancefromforeignmilitary.Followingthe tsunamithathitBandaAceh,Indonesiain2004militaryhelicoptersfrominternational forceswereneededtoreachcutoffpopulationsandmanynationsprovidedmilitary assetstowardthisoperation.Asubsequentreviewfounditoneofthemosteffective partsoftheinitialinternationalresponse31.Chinaprovidedmilitaryhelicoptersand medicalteamsafterthePakistanfloodsin2010.Theseexamplesdemonstratethe benefitofextramilitarysupportwhendisastersaresolargethatthecombined resourcesofdomesticmilitaryandthoseoftheinternationalhumanitariancommunity areinsufficienttomeettheneedsoftheaffectedpopulation.

Inarmedconflict,orsensitivepoliticalsituations,usingmilitaryassetsassociatedwith partiestotheconflictcancompromisetheperceivedneutrality–andthereforesafety
–ofhumanitarianworkers.Thereisanobviousneedtobeabletodistinguishbetween thesesituationsandmakesensiblepolicydecisionsbasedoncontext.Indisasterscaused bynaturalhazard,attherequestofgovernmentandwithclearcomparativeadvantage,
31TECcoordinationstudy:www.alnap.org/initiatives/tec/thematic/coordination.aspx militaryplanningandassetscanbehugelybeneficial.Inconflict,thisisnotusuallythe case,althoughUNmandatedforcescanhelpinsecuringhumanitarianaccess.

Twoinstrumentscurrentlyexisttoguidetheappropriateuseofmilitaryresourcesin humanitariansituations,the'Oslo'guidelinesfordisasters,andtheUNguidelines32for conflict.TheOsloguidelinesestablishtheprincipleof'lastresort'.Thisisusefulasit makesgovernmentsandpolicymakersthinktwicebeforedeployingmilitaryforces.This reviewhasconcludedthattheOsloguidelinesarestillrelevant.DFIDshouldinterpret andwherepossibledefinetheprincipleoflastresortas,'onlyusingmilitaryassetswhen nothingelsewilldo'.Thiswillopenthedoortotheuseofnichecapabilities,without openingthe'floodgates'tounwelcomedeploymentofmilitaryassetsforeverybig emergency. NichecapabilitiesoftheBritishmilitarymayincludestrategicplanningandsurge deployment.Itmayalsoincludeagreateruseofmilitaryassets.Thereisanassumption thatthiskitistooexpensive.Therealissueiswhetherthereareessentialassetsfor savinglivesthatcannotbesecuredintimeanyotherway.

InconflictsituationsdeploymentofmilitaryassetsshouldbeinlinewiththeUN
guidelines.Butthereisawiderpointabouthowhumanitariansengagewithmilitary forces,andthedifferencebetweenthem.Whenmilitaryforcescontrolareasthereisa needforahumanitariandialoguetoensurepopulationsinneedcanbeaccessed.Many UNforcesareroutinelygivenmandatestoprotectcivilians,andinsuchsituations humanitarianorganisationsneedtoworkwiththem.33

18
Reach out to create new partnerships with new donor partners (including China, India, Brazil and the Gulf States).
19
Maintain its default position that humanitarian response is multilateral33. In 
particular it should:
•EngagemoreeffectivelywithECHOonapolicylevel,andexplorethepossibilityof
co-financing.
•WorkwithotherstosupporttheUNEmergencyReliefCoordinatorinthereformof
OCHAandthesystemmorewidely.
20
WorkwithpartnerstopromotedonorcoordinationandrevitalisetheGood
HumanitarianDonor-shipgroup.

| 21                                                                           | EnsurethatthenewPrivateSectorDepartmentgivesfullconsiderationtothoseareas   |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| whereprivatesectorexpertisecanimprovehumanitarianresponseeffectiveness,      |                                                                             |
| includingatthecountrylevel.                                                  |                                                                             |
| 22                                                                           | UsemilitaryassetsinsituationswhereareconsistentwithOsloguidelinesandoffer   |
| capacityotherscannot,orprovidebettervalueformoneythancommercialalternatives. |                                                                             |
| 23                                                                           | WorkwithNGOstopromotetheconceptofaccreditationorcertification.              |

## 4.7 Humanitarian Space

Whenthereisconflict,wherestateshavefailed,whengovernmentsarebelligerentor venalDFIDcannotworkdirectlythroughtheauthorities.Insuchcasesthereisafragile
'space'inwhichhumanitarianagenciesareacceptedandworktohelpthosemostin need.DFIDneedstodowhatitcantonurtureandexpandthisspace;byobservingthe keyprinciplesofhumanity,impartialityandneutrality,andbyleadingwhereithas influencetoensureothersdo. Humanitarianprincipleshaveevolvedovertimetohelpagenciesaccessandprotect populationsmostatrisk.Wherethoseagenciesareseenasneutral,impartialand independenttheycanbuildtrustwithcombatants,allowingthemtodeliveraid.

Whereaidislinkedtopoliticalormilitarygoalsthesecurityofstaffcanbe compromised,makingitdifficulttoreachthosemostinneed.

ThisreviewconcludesthatDFIDhumanitarianpolicyshouldbetoprotectandwhere possibleenlargethisfragilespace;toworkwithagenciesthatcanaccessandhelpthose indireneedandtocontinuetoresistthepoliticisationofhumanitarianaid.Thereview alsorecognisesthatincomplexconflicts,andthebreakdownofstateauthoritythat therewillbetimeswhenmilitaryforce,mandatedbytheUN,willbeneededtoprotect civiliansandhumanitarianworkers.

Protection of civilians Inconflictsituationsandaftersomedisasters,particularlyinurbanareasciviliansneed protectionfromviolence.Oftentheneedforsecuritycomesbeforeanythingelse. Thisreviewwasnotmandatedtoconsiderthefullrangeofconflictsituations,focusing onlyonnaturaldisastersandspikesinconflict.Insituationsofconflict,itisclearthat protectionofciviliansandhumanitarianaccessisparamount. TheUKcanplayameaningfulroleinsuchsituations,evenwhereitisapartytothe conflict.Itmustobserveinternationalhumanitarianlaw.Itcanuseitsinfluenceto remindothersoftheirobligationsunderinternationalhumanitarianlawandhuman rightslaw.Itcanworkwithlegitimatehumanitarianagenciestoassistthemintheirrole.

AnditcansupporttheworkoftheUnitedNationsinpeacekeeping,byensuringthat peacekeepingmandatesincludetheprotectionofcivilians,andthatpeacekeepingforces areresourcedforthis. InthecasestudyforDRCongo,itwasclearthatUNpeacekeepinghasmadeprogressin itsprotectionwork.Whilsttherecontinuetobehorrificattacksagainstcivilians(mass rapesbygovernmentaffiliatedforcestonameone),thepeacekeepingforceunderstands ithasadutytotryandpreventtheseandworkswithhumanitarianstothisend.This shouldbereinforced.Itishardforsoldiers,trainedinthetacticsoffightingbattles,to findwaysofpreventingattacksoncivilians,especiallywhenresourcesarescarce.Mobile operationalbasesofthetypetrialledinDRCongohavemerit,especiallywhencoupled withwaysforcommunitiestotriggerthem.

DFIDcanworkwithagenciesliketheICRC,theUNHCRandOHCHRtoenablethemto carryouttheirprotectionwork(visitingprisoners,registeringrefugeesandpromoting rights).InparticularDFIDmustensurethatinconflicthumanitarianbudgetsfund neutralandimpartialagencies,andsubstitutionofbasicserviceswhereappropriate.

DFIDcanworkwiththeUN,includinginpeacekeepingassetoutabove.Thisistechnical work,andhasmerit.Thebiggerpictureisthatconflictispolitical.Humanitarianwork cannotbethestickingplasterforalackofpoliticalaction. CasestudiesinDRCongo,GazaandBurmademonstratethelimitedinfluencetheUK workingonitsownhasinsituationsofconflict.Thesamecasestudiesshow,however, thattherearethingsthatcanbeachieved,especiallyworkingwithothers.InBurma followingcycloneNargis,workingwiththeASEANgroupofnationsitwaspossibleto gainaccessforhumanitarians.InDRCongo,thepatient,patchybuild-upofinternational humanitarian,militaryandlegalactiontriestocontainconflictandhelpthoseaffected byit.InGaza,DFIDsupportedtheUNincoordinatingaccessadvocacythrougha HumanitarianAssistanceFramework,praisedbyBanKi-Moon. Aparticularissuerelatingtocounter-terrorismlegislationhasariseninseveralcomplex emergenciesrecently(Somalia,Colombia,SriLankaandGaza)andislikelytocomeup moreofteninthefuture.DFID,onoccasion,hadtostopfundingthehumanitarianwork ofinternationalNGOsandotherimplementingpartnersbecausetheycouldnot100%
ensurethataterroristorganisationwouldnotindirectlyordirectlybenefit.European legallybindinginstrumentsoncounter-terrorismandUKlegislationstipulatethat anybodydirectlyorindirectlyfundingterroristorganisationswillbeprosecutedunder criminallaw.However,exemptionscanbemadebytheEuropeanCouncilon humanitariangrounds. Thisreviewfindsthatinthesecircumstances,andinallcasesofconflict,anessentialpriority istonegotiatehumanitarianaccessonanunimpededbasis.Allpartiesarerequiredto grantsuchaccessunderInternationalHumanitarianLaw.Thisshouldbenegotiatedat thehighestnecessarylevel,andnotlefttofieldworkerstomanageontheirown.Inthe casesabove,thelegalproblemshouldbeovercomebyapplyingforexemptionson humanitariangrounds.Thehumanitarianimperativeshouldbeaprimaryconsideration.

Security of humanitarian workers Humanitarianworkisbecomingmoredangerous.Statisticsquotedinthechallenges sectionofthisreviewoutlinehowmoreandmorehumanitarianworkersarebeingkilled andwoundedinthecourseoftheirwork.HavingUNinyourtitleandflyingaUNflag onyourvehiclenolongerprovidestheautomaticprotectionitusedto.Partlythisisthe resultofamorecomplexandlesscertainworld;insomeplacesitisalsoaperception thathumanitarianworkerandeventheUNispartisan. Theissuesaffectingthesafetyofhumanitarianworkersarebeyondthescopeofthis review.Whatisclearisthattheyareinmoredanger,andthatprotectingthemis necessaryiftheworkisgoingtogetdone.

Traditionallyhumanitarianagencieshaveworkedonthebasisofbeingacceptedbythe localpopulation.Thishasmeantmoreinvestmentinexplainingwhattheyaredoing, andrelyingontheirgoodworkstospeakforthemselves.Thislargelyremainsthecase.

Deterrence,asemployedbypartisanmilitaryforcesandforeigngovernmentsin conflicts,islargelycounter-productive.

DFIDneedstoensurethatthoseagencieswithwhichitworkstakesecurityseriously.

WiththeUN,thismeanscontinuingtohaveacloserelationshipwithitssecurity department(UNDSS),fundingwhennecessary.WithNGOs,thismeansputtingsecurity intoanyauditingprocessconnectedtopre-qualification,andinvestingininter-agency securityinitiativeswhenthesehaveprovenworth.

24
Re-assert the premise that humanitarian action should be based on need, reaffirming the key principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality in the new DFID humanitarian policy.

| 25       |
|----------|
| workers. |

## 5. Deliveringtransformationalchangeindfid

Todeliverthestepchangeinthewayhumanitarianassistanceisconceivedanddelivered outlinedabove,DFIDwillhavetomakesignificantchanges.Themostradicalchangewill involveseeinghumanitarianconcernsasacorepartofDFIDprogramming,ratherthan somethingthatneedstoberespondedtowhenithappens.Workonanticipationand resilienceshouldbepartofDFID'severydayworkincountrieswhereithasapermanent presence(seesections4.1and4.2).Suchworkshouldalsobeofcentralconcernto DFID'sdevelopmentpartners,suchastheWorldBankandtheUN. Thestepchangesoughtbythisreviewwillalsohaveconsequencesforthewaythat DFIDprovidesfundingbeforeandduringhumanitarianemergencies.Fundingfor multilateralandNGOpartnersneedstobecomemorepredictable,sothattheycan investintheskillsandstructurestheyneed.Fundingshouldalsobeavailabledirectlyto governmentsforresilienceandresponsework,wheretheyarecapable,willingand transparent. Asoutlinedintheintroduction,DFIDisashaper,afunderanda'doer'.Thissectionsets outhowitshouldengageintheseroles,andlooksattheresourcing,structureand accountabilitymechanismsitneedsinplace,aswellassomecriticalareasfor investmentsuchasresearchandinnovation.

## 5.1 Changing The Policy

TheInternationalDevelopmentAct2002isthekeypieceofUKlegislationthatframes overseasassistance.Intheact,humanitarianassistanceisdefinedas,"assistanceforthe purposeofalleviatingtheeffectsofanaturalorman-madedisasterorotheremergency onthepopulationofoneormorecountriesoutsidetheUnitedKingdom".

Inadditiontoitsdomesticlegalobligations,theUKissignatorytoEUandinternational law.TheEUconsensusonhumanitarianaidinparticularcommitstheUKto,'providea needs-basedemergencyresponseaimedatpreservinglife,preventingandalleviating humansufferingandmaintaininghumandignitywherevertheneedarisesif governmentsandlocalactorsareoverwhelmed,unableorunwillingtoact'.

Theconsensusalsosubscribestoanumberofotherprinciplesandcodes.Notablyit
'firmly'commitstothe'fundamentalhumanitarianprinciplesofhumanity,neutrality, impartialityandindependence'.DFIDhasalsocommittedtotheseprinciplesinits2006
humanitarianpolicy. IftheinternationaldevelopmentactandthekeypiecesofEuropeanandInternational lawdeterminetheoverallframeworkforDFIDhumanitarianaction,thenthe2006
humanitarianpolicyisthekeyinternaldocument.Ithadthreepolicygoals:

•Improvetheeffectivenessofhumanitarianresponses.
•Beabetterdonor. •Reduceriskandextremevulnerability.
Thispolicyneedsupdating,notleastbecauseofthisreview.Anewpolicyshouldbe groupedaroundthemajorthemesidentifiedinthisreviewofanticipation,resilience, leadership,accountability,innovation,partnershipandhumanitarianspace.

Thepolicyshouldalsosetoutwhy,where,whenandhowDFIDresponds.Theconsensus ofthisreviewisthatthedefaultpositionforthisresponseshouldbemultilateral,inthat DFIDwillworkwithandthroughitspartners.Wherethescaleoftheneedexceeds regularresources,thenDFIDshouldstandreadytomakeadditionalfundsavailableinto themultilateralsystem.OccasionallyDFIDwillalsoresponddirectly,basedon comparativeadvantageincludingpresence.Thissuggeststheformulashouldbe:

•Why:becauseofinternationaldevelopmentact,EUconsensusandBritishpublic
support.
•Where:onthebasisofneed.
•When:throughmultilateralpartnersinthefirstinstance.InmegadisastersUKto
routinelyrespondwithadditionalfundinganddirectdelivery.
•How:throughregularfundstomultilateralandNGOpartners.Whereneedexceeds
thislevelofresources,additionalfundingtobeconsidered(basedonadvice).DFIDto
responddirectlyonlywherethereiscomparativeadvantageoroverwhelmingUKpublic interest.
Buttheimplicationsofthisreviewgofurther.ThereneedstobeapolicychangeinDFID onthe*development*sidetoo.Thisneedstoplacethecreationofresilienceinatrisk countriesintheheartofdevelopmentprocesses,seennotasa'humanitarian'activity, butasadevelopmentnecessity.

## Recommendations Dfid Should: 26 Incorporate Resilience Into Its Development Policy And Programmes.

27
Develop a new humanitarian policy setting out why the UK responds, where, 
when and how. Thepolicyshouldbuildonthereviewthemesofanticipation,resilience,
leadership,innovation,accountability,partnershipandhumanitarianspace.

## 5.2 Delivering Differently

Shaping the International System TheUKisamajorcontributortotheinternationalsystem,withthemajorityofits humanitarianresourceschannelledthroughpartners,asoutlinedinprevioussections.

ThismeansthatDFIDhasadirectinterestinmakingtheinternationalsystemwork. Aninternationalsystemthatworksprovidesthebestvalueformoney,andhelpsthe mostpeople. ThisreviewhighlightsinseveralsectionstheinfluencetheUK,throughDFID,exerts withintheinternationalhumanitariansystem.Butthishaswaned.DFIDhasbecome tooshrill,andtooinconsistent.Internationalagencieshavecometorealisethatwhile humanitarianstaffmightbehighlycriticalofanoperation,politicalandsenior organisationalleaderswillnotexpendpoliticalcapitaltofixit.Thesameistrueacross government.IntheUN,onbudgetarygroundstheUKhasdriventermsofservice changesthathavemadeithardertorecruithumanitarians.Atthesametime,DFID
beratestheUNfornotdoingmoretorecruithumanitarians.DFID'sinfluenceinbringing aboutmuchneededchangeandreformswillbeincreasedifitspendsmoretimebuilding alliances,andlesstimeactingalone. Sincethehumanitarianreformsof2005,DFIDhasbeenoneoftheleadingvoicesin pressingforreformsinfinancing,leadershipandcoordination.Thereviewhasconcluded thatthisefforthasbeenbeneficialandshouldcontinue,givingspecialemphasistothe changesinleadershipstructuresandcapacitythereviewrecommends,andwhichthe IASChasrecentlyendorsed. AnewapproachisneededifDFIDwantstocontinuetoshapetheinternationalsystem. DFIDwillhavetolearntobemorestrategic.Humanitarianadvisorsneedtobesureof topmanagementandpoliticalsupportbeforeengaginginnegotiationswiththeUN
systemonreform.

TheUKmissionsinNewYorkandGenevaarevaluableassets,andwhenusedwellcan deliverimpact.ButDFIDdoesnotuseeithermissionsystematicallyforitshumanitarian lobbyingandalliancebuilding.Thisneedstochange.TheNewYorkmissionhasa sizeableDFIDpresence,whichshouldbebetterusedtoplanadvocacy.Genevadoesnot haveaDFIDpresence.ButUKMISinGenevacanneverthelessalsobeusedmore effectivelytohelpbuilddiplomaticalliancesinthepursuitofDFID'sreformagenda.

DFIDalsoneedstoworkbetterwithitsdonorpartners,asoutlinedinprevioussections ofthisreport.WherepolicymessagesarecommonbetweentheUK,ECHOandtheUS, theyarefarmorepowerful.TheGHDgrouphasbeenanengineforchange–theUK needstoworkwiththisgrouptoseethishappenagain.

AboveallDFIDneedtobemorestrategicinitslobbyingwork.ManyintheUNseeDFID
asthesinglemostinfluentialdonor.Theabilitytoleverageitspositionasthethird largestdonortoachieverealchangegivestheUKuniqueopportunities.Theseneedto becarefullymanaged,notsquanderedinfrustration.Maintainingapositionasatop donorwillbeessentialifthisinfluenceistoberetained.Butbetteruseofpositionson UNagencyboards,withinthevariousUNcommittees,andsharperadvocacybyleaders withinDFIDisneeded.Betterallianceswithestablisheddonorpartnersandthenew emergingeconomieswillbeessential,aswillnewrelationshipswithregionalbodies.

Changing the funding model ThemajorityofwhattheUKgovernmentdoesinhumanitarianassistanceisfunding others.DFIDhaslongbeenseenasafastandflexiblehumanitariandonor.Thisposition shouldbemaintained.ButDFIDalsoneedstouseitsfundstopromotechange–to ensurethatagenciesareequippedtorespondfastanddeliverwhatpeoplereallyneed. Donorsshapetheinternationalresponsesystembythewaytheyfund.Someofthisis intended,butmostisnot.DFID,asoneofthemostinfluentialdonors,hasapowerful effectonthesystem–aslaidoutabove.Butthesystemisnotservingtheneedsof affectedpeopleaswellasitmight.Fundingisnotproportionatetoneeds,itisnot equitable,itisnotcoordinatedorharmonised,itdoesnotfocusenoughonprevention anditdoesnotdemanddemonstrableperformanceoffundedagencies. DFIDcanchangetheincentivesinthewayitfunds,bettershapingtheinternational system.Indevelopmentaid,DFIDhasbeenastrongadvocateofgreateraid effectiveness,throughseveralinternationalinitiatives.ForDFIDtoachievebetterresults andgreatervalueformoney,thesameprinciplesofaideffectivenessneedtoapplyto thefundingofhumanitarianpartners.Astepchangeisneededongreaterpredictability
(includingmulti-yearcommitments),coherence,transparency,accountability,focuson resultsandvalueformoney.ThemainpriorityshouldbetoequipDFID'spartnersto buildtheircapacityandmanagehumanitarianresponse. DFIDcurrentlyfundsthemultilateralhumanitariansystemthroughacombinationof corefundingandadditionalnon-corefundingatthecountrylevelforemergencies.The splitoverthelastfewyearshasbeenstronglyinfavourofadditionalnon-corefundingin responsetoUNFlashAppealsforsuddenonsetdisasters.TheBilateralandMultilateral AidReviewsarechangingthissplit.ThroughtheMAR,thebestperformingagencies shouldreceivesignificantlymorecorefundinglinkedtoresults.TheHERRwelcomesthis andrecommendsthatDFIDtakesafurthersteptowardsmulti-yearcorefundinglinked toperformancesothatthemajoragenciesandtheRedCrossMovementget predictabilityforfinancialplanningandcapacitybuilding.34
Forgreaterglobalequityinallocationsandcoherence,theHERRalsorecommendsa highercontributiontotheCERFlinkedtoresults,inlinewiththeMARfindingongood performance.TheCERFshouldbeenabledtofundpreparedness. Keepingwiththesameprinciplesappliedabovetothemultilaterals,thebestperforming NGOsshouldgetmorepredictablelong-termfundinglinkedtoperformancethrough strengthenedProgrammePartnershipArrangements.Andforgreaterequityin allocationsandcoherence,theCBHAandotherregional,nationalandlocalconsortia,as theCERF,shouldgetincreasedfundingonamulti-yearbasis.

Asaresultofmorecorefundingformajoragencies,theFlashAppealsandConsolidated Appealsshouldbecomeproportionatelysmallerovertimeapartfrominexceptional circumstances.DFID'scontributiontothemwillalsogodown.However,DFIDneedsto retainitscommitmenttofundinghumanitarianneedsatthecountrylevel.Often,thisis whereDFID'sseatatthetableprovidesgreatvaluebyimprovingoverallaideffectiveness, asdemonstratedforexamplebyitsinvolvementintheDRCongopooledfund.

Whatisrequiredisastepchangeinlinkingcountrylevelfundingtoperformance.This reviewrecommendsDFIDlinksdemonstratingresultsandimpactcloselytofuture country/emergencyfunding.Inreturnforanagreedenvelopeoffundingforanemergency, implementingpartnershavetobeabletodemonstrateresultsandreportaccordingly. AsDFID'scontributiontoECHOisfixed,DFIDshouldlookforwaysofco-financing ECHOresponseswherethiswouldaddvalue.

Fast mobilisation funding and pre-crisis arrangements Aparticularchallengeinfundingsuddenonsetdisastersisthefirstweekafterdisaster strikes,inwhatwerefertointhisreportasthe'criticalperiod'.DFID'sabilityand willingnesstoprovidefastfundingtogetthewheelsrollingandenablingthewider systemtostartprovidingreliefiswidelypraised.ItisoneofDFID'smostimportantand valuablecontributionstoemergencyresponses.Itdoescomeatacosthowever.Having todecidequicklywhattofundandwhatnotanddealingwithmanydifferentfunding streamscarrieshightransactioncostsforDFID.Butmoreimportantlythecurrent approachdoesnotprovidetherightincentivesforagenciestodeliverhighqualitywork forthebestvalue. Oncefundingisapproved,partnershavefewpressurestoprovideinformationonhow theirprojectwillachievethedesiredimpact,howitwillbeaccountabletobeneficiaries orhowspecificissuessuchasgenderareaddressed.Importantareasofperformancejust getbox-ticking.Programmeauditsarerarelycarriedout.

Generally,thewayhumanitarianfundingisallocatedactsasa'complexincentive system',promotingbothpositiveandnegativebehaviours.Oneoftheperverse incentivesitcreatesisforimplementingagenciestoproposethehighestbeneficiary numberspossiblefromtheirprogrammes.Henceaboxofwaterpurificationtablets 'servesthousandsoffamilies',wheninfactthisisonlytrueifeachfamilyreceivesa handful–somethingimpracticalinmostdistributionmodels.Inmanyemergenciesin facttheseboxesusuallyrotinwarehouses.

Nevertheless,agenciesdoneedsubstantialfundingtomobilise–tohirepeople, transport,purchasegoods,useequipmentandsoon.Thesemobilisationfundsare connectedtothe'programmes'andsohighlyspeculative'proposals'aremadesimplyto allowagenciestomobilise.Onceapprovedhowever,thislocksagenciesintoacourseof actionthatmayonreflection(i.e.whentheyactuallyhavetimetomakeaproper assessment),notbethemostjudiciousone.

Similarly,whileDFIDasksforgreatercoordination,itoftenfundsimplementing organisationsindividually,therebycreatingacompetitivedynamicwhichcanerode collectiveactionandcompromisestheoutcomesfortheaffectedpopulated.

Thenumberofprojectgrantsinemergencieshasalsobecomeoverwhelming,52inthe aftermathofCycloneNargisor27afterOperationCastLeadinGaza.Becauseinsuch complexemergenciesobjectivesandcontextschangefrequently,DFIDdoesneedvaried fundingmechanismsandaflexibleapproach.Butthesenumbersoffundingstreams resultinhightransactioncostsofstafftimeandprovideastrainonhumanresourcesto adequatelymonitorandfollowupprojectsfunded. Toincreaseitsflexibility,whilstsolvingsomeoftheissuesoutlinedabove,DFIDneedsa fundingmodalitythatcanprovidefastmobilisationfundinginthefirstweek.This shouldbebasedonpre-qualificationratherthanspeculativeproposals.

Funding recovery from day one Internationalfundingforemergenciesisusuallysplitintothreelevels.Theimmediate reliefphase,recoveryandreconstruction.The'criticalperiod'iswheninternational actorsandmoneypourintocountriesintheaftermathofanemergencytryingtosave lives.Afterthefirstmonth,recoveryneedsassessmentsarecarriedoutandlonger-term humanitarianprogrammingbegins,targetedatsavinglivelihoods.Adonorpledging conferenceisheld,typicallywithlessmoneypledgedthanrequired.Andthen,the reconstructionphasestartssometimeduringrecoverywithdifferentfundingcomingon streamfromtheWorldBankandIMFoftentorepairpre-existinginfrastructure.

Whatthissplitfundingmodelhascausedisafalsedichotomyinseparatingrelieffrom recoveryandreconstruction.Thisreviewhasfoundthatwhataffectedpopulationswant andneedmostisanimmediatestarttolivelihoodsrecovery.Theneatdonorsplitdoes notworkforthem.Evaluationsshowthatwomen,forexample,drivethemovefrom immediateconcerns–reunitingfamilies,findingshelterandfood–toidentifyingways togenerateincomeveryquickly.OrtheexamplefromCycloneNargisinBurmaofthe privatesectorsellingthepotsandpansthatenabledthepreparationofcookedfood andareturntonormallongbeforetheinternationalpotsandpansarrived.Bythen, beneficiarieshadincurreddebtunderminingtherecoveryoftheirlivelihoods.Thevalue formoneyofthereliefitemsdeliveredhasbecomequestionable. Cash-basedapproachestoacceleraterecoveryareonewayoutofthisfalsedichotomy andeasethewayintodevelopmentprogramming,forexampleintocashbasedsocial protectionschemesthatcanreducevulnerabilityandbuildresilienceforthenextcrisis.

Evidenceisbuildingupontheeffectivenessofcashresponses.Itisimportantthattheir impactisassessedinrelationtothesegoals.

Infrastructurerehabilitationisanotherexamplethereviewfounddoesnotgetenough attentionintheimmediateaftermathofanemergency.Theun-clearedrubbleinHaiti highlightsthis.Theresultinghighercostsofrecoveringlostlivelihoodswillhavetobe pickedupbydevelopmentprogrammes.DFIDneedstorecogniselivelihoodsfundingis legitimatefromdayone.

Delivering smarter direct aid Inthebiggestemergencies,DFIDcandeliveraidrapidlythroughitsstandingemergency team.Itcanalsodeliverhighqualitypeopleintotheinternationalsystem.Bothofthese capacitiesarehighlyappreciatedandhavebeenproventomakearealdifference.

Inadditiontotheinternalcapacity,DFIDhasacalldownarrangementwiththeUKfire serviceforSearchandRescue.ThisprovidesforoneUNclassified'heavy'team(64
people,dogsandequipment)tobedeployedwithinhoursofbeingcalled.Onoccasion, theUKalsoprovidesmilitaryassetssuchasships,aircraftandhelicopters.InHaiti,DFID
helpeddeployateamofhighlyqualifiedsurgeonstoworkoncomplicatedtraumawounds.

Alloftheinterventionscitedabovehavevalue.TheSearchandRescueteamsarehighly visibleanddemonstratemuchvaluedsolidarity.Theseareespeciallyusefulinthe
'criticalperiod',lesssoafterwards.FromaUKperspectivesuchdeploymentsoffer uniqueopportunitiesforteamstoexperiencearealdisaster–invaluableshouldtherebe somethingsimilarintheUK.ButSearchandRescueunderthismodeliscostlywithover
£250,000perlifesavedinHaiti.Andastherearenomajorearthquakefaultlinesclose totheUK,theycanarrivetoolate.Thesurgicalteamscostaboutonehundredthofthe searchandrescueteams(littleover£2,500)perlifesavedinHaiti.InNigeragencies spentlittleover£100perchildsavedinfeedingprogrammes.

WhatthismeansisthattheUKneedstobesmartaboutwhereandwhenitdeploys theseassets.Italsoneedstothinkaboutthefuture,asthisreviewmakesclear.TheUK
hasotherassetsthatcouldbeharnessedfordisasterresponseas'nichecapabilities'.The same'resilience'teamsintheUKfireservicehavenuclear,chemicalandbiological capabilities–thesecouldberapidlydeployedincircumstanceswheretheycouldmakea realdifference,ascouldothersciencebasedassets. WhereUKdirectassistanceconsistentlymakesadifferenceiswiththedeploymentof personnel.ThisisoneofthemostcosteffectiveandinfluentialactionsDFIDundertakes. DFIDdeploymentsaretypically'enablers'–aircrafthandlerstomakesureaidflows swiftly,informationmanagerstosetupsystemsquickly.Thiscouldeasilybeextended
–onoccasionswheretheUKhasdeployedclusterleadsquicklythistoohasmadea hugedifference.DFIDshouldworkwiththeUNtoensureithasthemostneeded enablingstaffonstandby(andnotsimplytakerequestsforcheappeoplethrough traditionalagencystandbyschemes).Itshouldworkwithotherstobetteralignthis surgecapacity(forinstanceNRCandtheBritishRedCross).

DFIDhasalsobuiltanicheexpertisein'enablingequipment'.Thismightbemachines forunloadingaircraft,orhighqualitysheltermaterials.Thistooisvaluable,andinthe workrecommendedaroundsupplychainbythisreport,thedirectdeliveryofDFID shouldberetained.

Working strategically across the UK government TheUK'sresponsetointernationaldisastersneedstobecoordinatedacrossgovernment departments.TheresponseisusuallyledbyDFID,andDFIDusuallyprovidesthe majorityofresources.Othergovernmentdepartmentsprovidesupportinwayswhere theyhavedistinctadvantage.ForexampletheFCOandCabinetOfficethroughtheir informationnetworkscanproviderapidsituationupdatestocomplementthoseof DFID'sownstaffandagencycontacts.TheNHSprovidessurgeonsforresponseinthe
'criticalperiod'.However,evidencefromthereviewsuggestswecandobetterat integratingtheseseparateinputs. Thereisforexample,noformalmechanismforconveningallgovernmentdepartments inresponsetoaninternationalemergency.ArrangementsbyDFIDare*ad hoc*and departmentsarecalledinasandwhenDFIDconsidersthereisaneedforwidersupport. Theinformalityofthisarrangementmeansthattherightpeoplearenotalways availableatshortnoticetoattendmeetings.Morejuniorstaffmayrepresenttheir departmentthanisideal.Thesepeoplemaynotbeofsufficientsenioritytotake decisions,andcontinuityofstaffwhoattendmeetingsisnotmaintained.Thiscanlead toalackofeffectivecommunicationbetweendifferentdepartmentsandafailureto achieveresults.ForexampletheMODchainofcommandrequiressomeoneoftheright ranktoapprovetheuseofanaircraftforreliefsupplies.Iftherightpersonisnotatthe meetingwhenitisrequested,thedecisioncannotbetakenandtimeislost.DFIDmay lookelsewherefortransport.

Thereviewunderstandsthatothergovernmentdepartmentsarekeentoprovide supportinemergenciesandconsidertheyhavemoretocontributethanDFIDisaware of.Thisisparticularlythecaseifotherdepartmentsaregivenenoughtimetoplanand preparetheirresponse.Incaseswheremoreformalcoordinationarrangementshave beenmade,crossgovernmentactionhasbeenmoreeffective.Forexampletheresponse toCycloneNargisinBurma,2008includedthecreationofacross-Whitehallteamfor planningjointresponseoptions.Theresultwasaneffectivebodymadeupofpeopleof therightsenioritywhowereabletomakedecisionsandactrapidly.

TheNationalSecurityCouncilisthenewmechanismunderwhichcross-government departmentsareconvenedundertheauthorityofthePrimeMinister.Asimilarbody thatcoulddrawtogethergovernmentdepartmentsundertheauthorityofthePrime Minister,chairedbyDFIDandconstitutedunderstricthumanitarianprincipleswould providethenecessarycoordination.Awayshouldbefoundthroughtheexisting NationalSecurityCouncilmechanismtoconveneastandingcommitteeon humanitarianemergencyresponsetodothis.

28
Change the funding model to achieve greater preparedness, pre-crisis arrangements, capacity, performance and coherence by:
•Increasingpredictablemulti-yearfundinglinkedtoperformancetomajorUNagencies,
theRedCrossMovementandNGOs.
•Increasinglong-termsupporttointernational(theCERF)andcountrylevelpooled
fundsandtoglobal,regionalandcountrylevelNGOconsortia,suchastheCBHA
andWAHRF.
29
Design fast and flexible funding models for emergency responses:
•ProvidefastmobilisationfundingintheCriticalPeriodbasedonpre-qualification
ratherthanspeculativeproposals.Usetheprocesstoreducebureaucracyinthis
CriticalPeriod.
•Ensurerecoveryandlivelihoodsfundingisconsideredduringandimmediatelyafter
theCriticalPeriod,ratherthanlaterashastraditionallybeenthecase.
•Ensurethereisflexibilityoffundingasfastmovingsituationschange,perhapsby
providingitinstages.

| 30                                                                                | Useallnewfundingmodelstoenforcestandardsandlinkfundingtoperformance         |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| throughclearimpactassessmentsandreporting.Carryoutindependentperiodic             |                                                                             |
| programmeauditsandafteractionreviewstoinformfuturefundingdecisions.               |                                                                             |
| 31                                                                                |                                                                             |
| Develop and deploy niche capabilities in a more focused way where they add value: |                                                                             |
| •OnlyusesearchandrescueinsituationswheretheUKcangenuinelyaddvalue.                |                                                                             |
| •Incorporatesurgicalteamsintofirstphasedeploymentsespeciallyafterearthquakes.     |                                                                             |
| •Investigatenewformsofnichecapabilitiesthatcanrespondtonewtypesofthreats          |                                                                             |
| suchasnuclear,biologicalandchemical.                                              |                                                                             |
| 32                                                                                | ContinueandexpandthesurgeofUKcontractedpersonnelintotheinternationalsystem. |
| 33                                                                                |                                                                             |
| Conveneandleadastandingcross-governmentemergencymechanismformega                  |                                                                             |
| emergencies,usingtheauthorityoftheNationalSecurityCouncil.                        |                                                                             |

## 5.3 Changing The Structure, Shifting Resources

HumanitarianemergencyresponsehashistoricallybeenundersupportedwithinDFID.

ThehumanitariancadrewasonlyrecentlyformedandisthesmallestofDFID'stechnical networksbyamargin.Itcurrentlystandsat12peopleglobally,despitehumanitarian spendingconstituting8%ofoverseasdevelopmentaid(ODA)annually.TheConflict, HumanitarianandSecurityTeam(CHASE)managesallhumanitarianissues,including response.Astheconflictportfolioofworkincreases,themanagerialloadhasbecome increasinglyuntenable.Despitealargeresearchbudget,DFIDdoesnotsupport significanthumanitarianresearch. Theemergency(rapid)responsecapabilityhasbeenoutsourcedonathreeyearrolling contractualbasis.Thecontractcurrentlyprovidesfor27staffsharedwiththe StabilisationUnit.Therearesixdedicatedhumanitarianstaffonthecontract.Italso paysforasignificantlogisticalstandingcapacity–cars,communications,specialist deploymentequipmentandsoon.ThiscapabilityiscalledtheOperationsTeam(OT) andisco-locatedwithCHASE,withOTstaffintegratedintotheDFIDmainoffice.Whilst theinternationalreputationoftheOTisextremelyhigh(andmuchenvied),inrecent yearscorporateworkhasbeenincreasinglyundertakenbytheteamasaresultoflackof capacitywithinDFID. ThelackofcapacitywithinbothCHASEandOThasmeantclear,strategicdirectionhas beenmissing,astheworkhasbeenalmostconstant'fire-fighting'.Theimpactof successivelarge-scaleemergencieshasbeentostretchresourcesstillfurther.Thislackof strategyisnotconfinedtoCHASE.HumanitarianactionisspreadacrossDFIDina largelyunconnectedand*ad hoc*fashion,andthereisnoseniorchampion.Untilrecently therewasaseparateAfricaConflictandHumanitarianUnit(ACHU)withinAfrica division.ACHUoversawanAfricaemergencyreservefundandhadnoformal connectionwithCHASE.Countryofficescanchoosewhethertohavehumanitarian advisors,eveninhigh-risksituations(Pakistanhadaconflictadvisorwithresponsibility forhumanitarianbutnoexperienceinthisarea).

Thedisparateandneglectedstructuredoesnotonlyhaveaneffectonoverallstrategy, ithasledtoaschismbetweenthepolicyfunctionandtheresponsemechanisms.The smallteamofhumanitarianpolicyadvisorscentrallyholdlongtermfunding relationshipswithbigagencieslikeUNICEFandUNHCR,butitistheOTstaffthatsee howtheseagenciesperforminsuccessiveemergencies.Thishasledtomixedmessages andlostopportunities. PartnersremainhighlypositiveaboutDFIDandvalueboththequalityofthepersonnel anditsabilitytoreactquicklyandflexibly.ThereisdemandforDFIDtobepresentin large-scaleemergenciesasitsabilitytoinfluencetheoverallstrategyismuchvalued.

Thereisalsodemandforacontinuedcapacitytodeploybothpeopleandgoodsintothe internationalsystematshortnotice.

Inparalleltothisreview,DFIDalsoundertookabilateralaidreview(BAR)thatasked countryofficestopredicttheirexpenditureforthenextfewyears.Inthisexercise humanitarianspendwasforecasttofall,orrathercountryofficesdidnotmakeabidfor humanitarianresourcestorise.Thismightreflectanaturaloptimism–thatthingswill getbetterorthatdevelopmentgainswillmeantheimpactofhumanitarianemergencies willbediminished.However,itisoutofstepwithmostforecastsofneedandmayalso reflectadesire'nottobeinvolved';anideathatDFID'scorebusinessisdevelopmentand thathumanitarianemergenciesareanunwelcomedistraction.Itmayalsoreflectan assumptionbycountryofficesthatCHASEwillrespondifthereisanemergencyandthe resourceswillbemadeavailablecentrally. Tosomeextentthisassumptioniscorrect.Thisreviewconcludesthatfor overwhelminglylargeemergencies,'megaemergencies',responseshouldbeledfrom London.Theintenseinterestfromacrossgovernmentandfromthepublicmeansthatit isnecessaryforLondontoleadonstrategy.Wherethereisacountryofficetheyshould leadondelivery,althoughDFIDshouldalsooperatea'stepaside'policysimilartothat beingadvocatedwiththeUN,wherebyitensuresthatdeliveryisledwiththerequisite levelofexperience.Formediumandsmall-scaledisastersthecountryofficesarewell placedtolead,perhapswithsometechnicalorlogisticalsupportfromCHASE. ItalsomeansthatDFIDneedstomakebettersenseofitsinternalstructureandstrategy –reflectingtheimportanceofitshumanitarianworkinstructure,capacityandresources aswellasinrhetoric.IfbuildingresilienceistobecomeacorepartofDFID'sworkasthis reviewsuggests,thenbothseniormanagementandthecountryofficeswillneedto reflectthisinthewaytheyworkandplan.Iftheperformanceoftheinternational systemistrulytobeimprovedthenDFIDwillneedtomakebetteruseof(andincrease)
itshumanitarianstaffanditsoperationsteam,andwillneedtoexpandthiscapability.If DFIDisgoingtopromoteinnovation,buildnewpartnershipsandenablenewnetworks ofhumanitarianpolicyandpractice,thenitwillneedtobebetterintegrateditself,using itspolicydivisiontopromoteresearchandevidence,itscountryofficestoworkwith governmentsandUKmissionstoworkwithothernations.

Managing the response Humanitarianemergenciesarechaoticandfastmoving.Theyneedexperienced managerswithclearauthoritytobeincharge.

DFIDhasasystemof'responsemanagement'butitisdiluted.Thisisduetothe separationofthecontractedoutOperationsTeamfromthemanagementofCHASE.

Partlyalsoitisbecausethisskillhasnotbeenprioritised.Thenewsystemmusthave experiencedresponsemanagerswithdelegatedauthority. Aneffectiveresponserequiresclearlinesofauthorityandresponsibility,andaclear strategy.Theproductionofawiderangingstrategyincludingfunding,lobbying,cross- Whitehallworkandanydirectassistance,shouldbeapriorityfortheresponse management.Theownershipoftheresponsestrategyshouldbeatasufficientlysenior level.InamegaemergencythiswouldbeatDirectororDirectorGenerallevel.

AcomparativeadvantagethatDFIDhaslongenjoyedisthequalityofitsadvisorycadre. ThereisaneedforDFIDhumanitarianadvisorstobedeployedtoemergencies.Theycan helpshapetheresponse,andsafeguardUKtaxpayerinvestments.Theycanalsoprovide valuableanalysisandinsighttoLondon.Thisisnottruejustinmega-emergenciesbut alsoinemergingcrisesandconflict.

Managing risk Humanitarianemergenciesarehigh-riskenvironments.Theyarechaoticanduncertain anddecision-makinghastoberapid.Thereismorechanceofgettingthingswrong. Theremustbeagreatertoleranceforriskinsuchsituation.

Butthereareoftengreaterriskswithdoingnothing,orrespondingtooslowly. Humanitarianemergenciesarehighriskbecausetheyinvolvelifeordeathsituations. Slowdecision-making,ornotreacting,canleadtolossofbothlivesandopportunities.

Politicallythereislessriskinamessyresponse,oranaccusationofwaste,thanbeing accusedoflettingpeopledie. Theconsequencesofthisarethatproceduresneedtobestreamlinedforhumanitarian emergencies,anddecision-makingneedstobedelegated.Empoweringthosewiththe informationtomakeadecision,andtoimplementitfastisessential.Historicallythishas beenacknowledgedwithinDFIDandprocedureshavebeenmodified.Thistradition needstocontinue.

Thisreviewsetsoutseveralmeasuresforimprovingaccountabilityintheinternational humanitariansystem.Connectedtothisistherequirementforagenciestodemonstrate results,andprovetheyaregoodvalueformoney.Butthiscannotcomeattheexpense ofrapidresponseorifDFIDhumanitarianstafffeelafraidtomakedecisions.

34
Ensure that the structure, funding and human resources for humanitarian work reflects its move to being a central part of DFID work, not least by having a Director General champion this work. Amongst others, this will require:
•RebalanceresourceswithinDFIDtomeetthechallengesofrisinghumanitarianneed.
•Expandthehumanitariancadre,bothinLondonandinthefield.
•Ensuringeveryresponsetorapidonsethumanitarianneedisledbyanexperienced
responsemanager,withsufficientdelegatedauthoritytoensureswiftaction.
•Leadlarge-scaleresponsesfromLondon,managedbyCHASE.
35
Redefinetheobjectivesforthecontractedresponseteamsothatitissolelydedicatedto
supportingrapidresponseandpre-crisisarrangements.

## 5.4 Driving Results And Value For Money

Thehumanitariansectorhastraditionallybeenreluctanttocollect,systematiseand shareevidenceonwhatworks,whatdoesnotandwhy.Therehasbeenalackofdemand forthiskindofinformation,andsometimesaninabilitytofindanswers.Thereasonsare laidoutintheImpactsectionabove. Fundingdecisionsarenotroutinelybasedonevidence.Andwhenfundingdecisionsare basedonevidenceofresults,itisoutputsratherthanimpactthatarebeingconsidered. Withoutgreaterclarityonresults(bothonwhatistheevidenceandwhatisthe humanitarianobjective),itisnoteasytodeterminethevalueformoneyofhumanitarian actions.Andithasrarelybeentried.

Valueformoneyisabouttheoptimaluseofresourcestoachievetheintended outcomes.Itisabouttheoptimumcombinationofcostsandqualityofthegoodsand servicestomeettheneedsofbeneficiaries.AsinallotherareasofHMGspending,itis notjustaboutthelowestcost. Inahumanitarianresponse,togetvalueformoney,speedisoftheessence.Thereisno valueinaresponsethatcomestoolate.Liveswillbelost.Therisksoflateornoninterventionneedtobeconsidered.Therefore,timelinessorspeedneedstobeadded intotheequationonvalueformoney.

ThefigurebelowfromtheNationalAuditOfficeshowstheresultschainthroughitsdark bluearrows.Andthecostsattachedtotheresultsthroughitslightbluesquares.Value formoneyanalysishastoincludethiswholechain.

Duringaresponse,therelativeimportanceofthethreekeycomponents,cost,quality andspeed,hastochangeifthehumanitarianimperativeofsavinglivesistheprinciple. IntheCriticalPeriod,itisspeedthatshouldcountthemost,because,inthisphasespeed saveslives.Costandqualitythenincreaseinimportancewithtime.

SinceJanuary2011,allproposalsforDFIDfundingmustbeaccompaniedbyaBusiness Case,whichsetsouttheneed,justificationandaffordabilityofanintervention.35Ithas notbeendevisedthoughforcompletingwithinhoursofadisasterhittingwhen informationisscarceandpeoplearedying.AsDFID'scomparativeadvantageisfast response,partnerslooktoDFIDimmediatelyforfunding. Whilethereviewrecommendsmoreworkonevidenceofwhatworksandwhatdoesnot andcost-effectivenessinhumanitarianaction,thisworkislessrelevantintheCritical Period.However,post-actionreviewsandevaluationscanhelpgreatlytoinformfuture decisionmakingaboutdeliverypartnersandmechanismseveninthecriticalperiod, throughprequalificationofpartners(seeChangingthefundingmodelinsection5.2).

Valueformoneyinaresponsecanbestbeachievedthroughafocusonachievingresults withallresources.Beitfromotherdonors,domesticresourcesortheprivatesector. DFID'sresourcesinaneffectivesystemcanachievemuchgreatervalueformoneythan inanineffectivesystem.DFID'simportantroleinmakingthesystemmoreeffective,as laidoutthroughoutthisreport,isthereforelikelytohavethegreatestimpactonvalue formoney. InnovationisanotherareawhereDFIDinvestmentcouldreapsubstantialgainsinvalue formoneyinthefuture.DFID'sinvestmentinCommunity-BasedTherapeuticcare(CTC) isagoodexamplewhichhasmadethetreatmentofmalnourishedpeopleinmajor emergenciesmorecost-effectivethantraditionaltherapies.Witharelativelyhighfixed initialcost,CTCcantreatseveralthousandmalnourishedpeoplewithlittlemorethan theextracostsoffoodandmedicine.Othersubstantialcoststothecommunity(suchas travelcostsandopportunitycostsofbeinginfull-timecare)havealsoreducedsignificantly.

Itshouldnotbeforgottenthatbuildingresilienceisoftenthebestmeansofproviding valueformoney.Itisestimatedthat£1inpreventionsaves£4inresponse(seesection
4.2).AstheIFRCAnnualreport2008says:'thereisnoeconomicsenseinspending moneyonemergencyresponsealone.Yearsofinvestmentcandisappearinminutesif riskreductionandpreventionareignored.'36ThisiswhyDFID'sapproachtohumanitarian workneedstohavepreventionatitscore.

Outcomes and effectiveness Thesectiononimpactsetsouttheimportanceofbeingcleareraboutdesiredoutcomes andimpactandmeasuringthem.ButassessingtheoutcomesofDFID'sfundingand influencingisfarmorecomplexthanmeasuringoutputs.Andquantitativeassessments areastepmoredifficultthanqualitativeones.

JudgingfromthequalitativeassessmentsmadeinevaluationsofDFID'sresponseefforts, DFIDoftengetsitright.Fundingisfast,flexible,goestothesectorswheretheneedis greatestandenablesotherpartsofthesystemtobecomemoreeffective.Thisshould leadtobetteroutcomesfortheaffectedpopulation.Howexactlyitdoesthat,atwhat costandwhatwouldhappenwithoutDFID'ssupporthoweverisoftennotclear.Cost andbenefitsarerarelyquantified. DFIDismakingeffortsonvariousfrontstorectifythis.Internally,DFIDPakistan,for example,hasstartedpilotinganapproachtobetteroutcomeassessmentandunitcost analysis.DFIDKenyaandSomaliaarebuildingupadatabaseofhumanitarianindicators andcosts.Externally,DFIDhassetuptheIndependentCommissionforAidImpact,a bodythatwillevaluateDFID'swork,includingindisasterresponse,withafocusin impact.Thereviewwelcomesthisinitiative.

Outputs and efficiency Outputsarethefirstresultsinthechain.Anyprojectorprogrammehastobeableto showwhattheintendedoutputsareandlaterwhattherealoutputswere.Thereare however,twoproblemswithreportingoutputresults.First,outputscanonlybeproxies forimpactandcangetitwrong.Second,outputs,ascurrentlyreportedinproject documents,cannoteasilybecomparedoraggregated.Henceitisdifficulttojudgethe efficiencyofimplementingpartnersandDFID'sfunding.

ThefollowingareexamplesofoutputsfromthePakistanfloodsresponse:

•Wheatandvegetableseeds,fertiliser,animalstockfeed,andveterinaryservicestomore
than115,000ruralfamiliestoavoidfurtherlossofanimalsanddependencyonfoodaid
forthenextyearormore.
•Toiletsandsanitationforalmost500,000people.
Thenumberssoundimpressive,buttheydonotsayiftheseedsandfertiliserscamein
timefortheplantingseason.Ifthetimingwaswrong,theimpactwouldnothavebeen
thedesiredoneofrecovery.Theyalsodonotshowifthetoiletswereplacedandlitin
suchawayastobegendersensitive.Qualityandspeed–twokeyparametersof
humanitarianeffectiveness–cannotbeassessedbyoutputmeasurement.Thereisa
dangerbyfocusingononeareaoftheresultschainofhittingthetargetbutmissing
thepoint.
Comparisonsbetweencostsofoutputsandhencethecostefficiencyofimplementing partners,arecurrentlyclosetoimpossible.

•Outputsarenotstandardised(evenwithinsectors)withtheresultthatcomparingis
oftenlikeappleswithpears.
•Somebenefitsaredifficulttomeasure,e.g.inprotectionanddifferentinterventions
havedifferentbenefits–theydonotalladdressthesameneed,e.g.cash-for-work
versuspsychosocialsupport.
•Theinformationcurrentlyreceivedfromimplementingpartnerscangivearough
indicationofwhatthingscost.Itcannotgivemuchmorethough.
•Anycomparisonsofcostswouldbemisleadingwithoutknowingtheexact
circumstancesoftheactions,includingtargetingofdifferentpopulationgroups,levelof
securityrisk,ortiming.
Onlywhenoutputsarethesame,isitpossibletocarryoutananalysistoseewhich interventionisthemostcost-efficient.

Inputs and economy Inputsareeasytoidentifyandquantify.Allbudgetsofimplementingpartnersshow whatinputsareusedatwhatcost.Inputsrangefrommaterialsandlogistics,personnel andpersonnelsupport(includingsecurityforpersonnel)toindirectsupportcosts
(theoverheads).

Comparingunitcostsofinputsbetweenimplementingpartnersoracrossemergenciesis relativelyeasy.Butthecomparisonsdonotmakesenseifthecontextisnottakeninto accountasexplainedintheoutputsection.Aprojectinacomplexemergencywith securityimplicationswillhavegreatersecuritycoststopersonnelattachedthananother oneinanaturaldisasterzone.Aprojecttargetingdifficulttoreachpopulationswillhave veryjustifiablygreaterlogisticscoststhanaprojectinanurbaneasy-to-reach environment. LookingthroughbudgetsofDFIDimplementingpartners,itisobviousthatcostscan differsignificantly,notalwaysforjustifiablereasons.AnagencyinthePakistanflood responseforexamplewantedtochargeDFID£1millionmoreforthesamenon-food itemsdeliveredtothesameplacebutwithaonemonthtimedelaythanifDFIDhad procuredtheitemsitself.Withthis£1million,shelterforanadditional10,000families couldhavebeenpurchasedanddeliveredamonthearlier.

The global supply chain Aslogisticscanaccountforasmuchas80%37oftheeffortofhumanitarian organisationsduringareliefoperation,theglobalsupplychainwarrantsspecial consideration. IfDFIDwantstoimproveitsabilitytorespondattherighttimefortherightpriceand withtheappropriatequality,supplychainmanagementneedstoberecognisedasan integralpartofpreparednessandresponse.

End-to-endsupplychainmanagementinahumanitarianresponseincludesprocurement, stockpilemanagement,qualityandcostcontrol,managingproductioncapacity, internationalmovement,coordinationwithotheragenciesanddeliverytothe beneficiaries. ManyINGOshavelosttheirsupplychainmanagementcapabilitiesthroughthechange intheirfocusfromdirectdeliverytoadvocacyoverthelastdecade.Thiscapabilityloss onthedevelopmentsideofoperationshastranslateddirectlyintoalossonthe humanitarianresponseside.EvaluationsofNGOresponseshaveshownthatmistakes areroutinelymadealongthesupplychain.

UNagenciesontheotherhandhavesignificantprocurementandlogisticsdepartments buttheyareconstrainedbyantiquatedprocurementrules,differentdonorrequirements andUNbureaucracy.

Keyconcernsthatimpactnegativelyontheaffectedpopulationare:

•Qualityofnon-fooditemsbeingsubstandard.Itisestimatedthat70%ofthemillion
plussheetsprovidedtoHaitiaftertheearthquakeneededreplacingafter9months.
Atacost(withoutfreight)ofaround£10asheetthatmeans£7millionwasspenton commodities,whichhaveatbestlasted9months.
•Reliefitemsarenotalwayswhatthebeneficiariesmostneedorarrivetoolate.After
CycloneNargisinBurma,womengotintodebtbecausetheypurchasedreliefitemslong
beforetheinternationalresponsereachedthem.Blanketsprovidedintheaftermathof
theSamanganearthquakeinAfghanistanweretoothinfortheclimate.
•Lackofpreparednesscanleadtomultiplesoftransportcostsnecessary(especiallyair
versusseatransport).
•Becauseoflimitedsupplysidecapacityinanemergency,pricesgoupandquality
decreases.Thiscanbeovercomebybuildingupthesupplierbaseinadvanceand
collaboratingonqualitystandardsandspecifications,
Whilstdecreasingtheseinefficienciesshouldbeseenasaprioritynow,DFIDhasto recognisethattheglobalsupplychainislikelytochangesoonerorlater.Ifforexample cashresponsesbecomeagame-changerinhumanitarianresponse,thiswillhave importantimplications.Internationalprocurementandtransportwilldecrease.Afocus onmorelocalprocurement,asincreasinglydonebyWFP,willalsochangethenatureof thetraditionalsupplychain.

36
Build up a library of results, costs of inputs, outputs and outcomes from different countries and regions and different types of disasters in order to be able to carry out effective unit cost analysis and enable fast evidence based decision-making. Share this where appropriate with other donors.
37
EncouragetheIndependentCommissionforAidImpacttoexaminearangeof humanitariancasesandresiliencebuildingwork.
38
Carryoutanin-depthstudyonhowDFID'sfundingimpactsonthehumanitariansupply
chainrecognisingthatthesupplychainisamajorcostdriverinsudden-onsetresponses.
Basedonthefindings,workwithotherdonors,theprivatesectorandimplementing
partnerstoalignsupplychainpractices.

## 5.5 Getting The Message Across

ThereisstrongpublicsupportfortheUKresponsetodisastersandemergenciesin developingcountries38.ButhistoricallyDFIDhasnotusedtheseopportunitiestotalk aboutitswork.Withanaidbudgetunderattackfromsomequartersandquestions aboutfailureinHaiti,DFIDneedstogetbetteratcommunicatingthegenerallyexcellent workitdoes. Thecommunicationsenvironmentischanging.CommunitiesintheUKareoften independentlylinkedtoaffectedpopulations,throughdiasporas,faithbasedgroupsand partnerships.Itisnolongerpossible,ordesirabletoadoptabroadcastapproachto communicationswork.Domesticmediacoverageisincreasinglyhostiletothe government'sringfencedaidbudget,andtherearegreaterexpectationsaroundthe speedandavailabilityofaccurateinformationaboutDFID'swork.

HumanitariandisastersnaturallyattracthighlevelsofmediaattentionintheUK,and thepublicarereadytobeengaged.TherelationshipbetweenthemediaandNGOsisa complexone.ThemediaoftenreliesonNGOsforaccessandinformationatthesame timeasseeingitsroletoholdthemtoaccount.IfanNGOhelpsajournalistreacha communitythatisreceivingsupportduringaresponse,thejournalistislikelytogo furthertofindacommunitythathasbeenoverlookedtopresentthestoryofaidnot gettingtothosewhoneedit39.

UsingitsrelativeindependencefromthisrelationshipDFIDcanmakegeneralcomments onthecontextandnatureofthedisasterandtheplannedresponse.Itisabletorefer neutrallytotheworkofothers,tosecureauniquepositionincommunicatingtotheUK
public.Butthispositioncanonlybeexploitedifitcanofferanauthoritativevoiceonthe groundfromtheoutsetofaresponse. Thereisalsoaneedtoemployalongertermstrategicapproachtohelpshareabetter understandingabouthowanemergencyresponseworks–andwhyitisimportant.

Thisneedsastrongandconsistentnarrativetoenablethepublictounderstandthat differentdisastersandemergenciesneedadifferentresponsefromtheUK–including explanationofhumanitarianpolicy,howtheinternationalcommunityisrespondingand therangeofresponsestomeetneeds.Intimethiswillhelpchallengetheperception thataid,developmentandhumanitarianresponseisoneandthesame. TheUKAidTransparencyGuaranteewillputallnewspendingon-line.Thiswillmake detailedinformationofeachemergencyresponseavailable.Aproactiveandstrategic approachtopubliccommunicationswork(mediaandnon-media)willbeneededtoput thisinformationincontext. Foranemergencyresponse,strategy,plansandexpectedresultsneedtobereadily available.EarlystatementsonUK'splansandobjectivestoresponseshouldbeposted on-lineassoonaspossible.Thesecanbedevelopedastheresponseprogressesand shouldcomplementmediaannouncementsonfundingallocations. Butwhereconcernsabouteffectivenessandcorruptionaregenerallyhighthereview publicsurveyshowedsupportforDFID'sresponsedidn'tcarrythesamelevelsof concernaboutwasteandcorruptionthathavebeenreflectedinothersurveys40.Italso showedthatthepublicfeelpleasedwhentheyhearabouttheUKgovernment's response41alongwithadesiretoknowmore42.Andmorerecentresearchcommissioned byPlanUKreportedthat90%ofrespondentsrecalledrecentdisastersinHaitior Pakistan,and36%werepromptedtodonate43.ThispresentsDFIDwithaclear opportunitytobringitsworktotheattentionofanalreadyengagedpublic–oneofits bestchancestoreachabroadUKpublicisthroughcommunicationsarounditsresponse torapidonsetdisasters.

Governmentrestrictionsonspendingmeansthatalongsidetraditionalbroadcastand printmediaactivity,communicationsthroughDFID'sownwebsiteandonlinepresenceis vitaltothesuccessofitscommunicationstrategy.Thisworkhasbeendevelopingwell: e-bulletins,blogs,tweets,YouTube,FacebookandFlickrpagespresentDFID'sworktoan engagedpublic.CommunicationsactivityaroundtheUK'sresponsetomeet humanitarianneedsinGazafollowingOperationCastLead,andtheon-lineFlood MonitorshowingclearlywhereandhowUKAidishelpingpeopleaffectedbythefloods inPakistan44,hasshownDFID'scommunicationsworkaroundanemergencyresponseat itsbest. Thoseaffectedbydisasterareincreasinglyabletoprovideinformationandcontributeto assessmentofneedaswellascallingdonorsandtheinternationalcommunitydirectly toaccountviaonlinechannelsmeansevengreaterneedforcontinuedbuildingofits onlineprocess.

## Recommendations Dfid Should: 39 Prioritise Communications As A Key Factor In The Uk'S Emergency Response, And Resource It Accordingly.

•Embedcommunicationsatthepolicyandoperationslevelfromthebeginningof
aresponse.
•MakeDFID'shumanitarianandemergencyresponseworkpermanentlymore
visiblethroughDFID'swebsite–inadditiontofeaturesonspecificresponses. Communicationsstaff,and/ortheteamleadertrainedincommunicationsshouldbe supportedtospeakpubliclyonDFID'sbehalf.
•Makebetteruseoffaithbasedanddiasporapartners.
•Workmorecloselywithfundedpartnersoncommunications–toagreeaconsistent
narrativeandsharechannels.Theserelationshipsneedtobedevelopedinadvanceof
anemergencyresponse.
40
Request the International Development Select Committee to scrutinise progress on the implementation of these findings one year on from the launch of this report.

## 6. Recommendations Anticipation

1
Assemble and regularly update a global risk register for DFID using information gained from its country teams and international organisations.
2
MakebetteruseoftheDFIDChiefScientisttosupportUKscienceinanticipatingcrises.
3
Makethisavailableasacontributiontopre-crisisarrangementsacrossthesystem.

## Resilience

4
Ensure that building resilience is part of the core DFID programme in at risk 
countries, integrating the threat from climate change and other potential hazards 
into disaster risk reduction. Country offices should undertake contingency planning.
5
Promote national response capacities of both governments and civil society in at risk countries including: 
- Thedevelopmentofnationalresiliencestrategies. - Theestablishmentofdirectfundingmechanisms. - Regionalresponsemechanismswheretheyaddvalue. - ThroughcivilsocietyorganisationssuchasRedCrossandCrescentSocieties. - Nationalandlocalprivatesectorcompanies,whichareableatthecountrylevelto
supportentrepreneurial,andmarketsolutions,whichwillincreaseinresilienceand improvedisasterresponse.

## Leadership

6
Build coalitions to drive forward humanitarian reform based on improving 
leadership, including;
- Rapiddeploymentofexperiencedleadershipteamsinbigcrises.Thisshouldincludea
'stepaside'systemtoensurethebestleadershipisinplaceatboththestrategicand operationallevel.
- EncouragetheconveningofaUNHighLevelPaneltolookatwaysofimprovingthe
internationalhumanitariansystemtofacefuturechallenges.
- WorkcloselywithUKmissionstobuildcoalitionsforreformoftheinternational
system,includingmorecoherentuseofUNexecutiveboardpositions.
- WorkwiththeUNtocreateanewcadreofhumanitarianleadersandthetalent
managementsystemsandtermsandconditionstosustainthis.
- WorkwithotherdonorsandtheUNtoresolvesomeofthedeficienciesin
management,prioritisationandplanning.Thismustincludetherightsupportstaff availableforrapiddeployment.
- WorkwithotherdonorsandtheUNtostrengthenandprovidebetterleadershipof
theclustersystem.
7
DFIDshouldmakeasustainedefforttoimproveskillsinthehumanitariansector.This
shouldinclude;
- Worktocreateasetofstandardsforhumanitarianleadership. - TrainingwithinDFID,aidagenciesandgovernmentsandcivilsocietyindisasterprone
countries.
- Ensuringpre-qualifiedpartnersdemonstrateadequateinvestmentinskills
development

## Innovation

8
Nurture innovation and its application in dealing with and preparing for humanitarian emergencies, including through partnership with operational agencies, private sector, technological innovators and science and research communities.
9
Appoint a Humanitarian Senior Research Fellow, reporting to the Chief Scientific Officer with a dedicated budget tasked with developing evidence and innovation.
10
Investinthreekeytechnologies;mobiletechnologies,satellitesanddatamanagement anddisplay.
11
Supportexplorationofemergingandcutting-edgetechnologiessuchasnanotechnology, andnewcomputermodellingapproaches.
12
Workwithpartnerstoensurecashbasedresponsesaregivenfullconsiderationand whereappropriatebecomemuchmorewidelyadopted.

## Accountability

13
Promote and support mechanisms to give recipients of aid a greater voice.
14
Promote the development of robust impact assessments. 
15
Workwithotherstocreateanover-archingsetofstandardstoassessbeneficiary accountability.
16
Encouragethespreadofbestpracticeinthisarea.
17
Givegreateremphasistobeneficiaryaccountabilityfactorswhenmakingfunding decisions.

## Partnership

18
Reach out to create new partnerships with new donor partners (in particular China, India, Brazil and the Gulf States).
19
Maintain its default position that humanitarian response is multilateral. In particular it should:
- EngagemoreeffectivelywithECHOonapolicylevel,andexplorethepossibilityof
co-financing.
- WorkwithotherstosupporttheUNEmergencyReliefCoordinatorinthereformof
OCHAandthesystemmorewidely.
20
WorkwithpartnerstopromotedonorcoordinationandrevitalisetheGood
HumanitarianDonor-shipgroup.
21
EnsurethatthenewPrivateSectorDepartmentgivesfullconsiderationtothoseareas whereprivatesectorexpertisecanimprovehumanitarianresponseeffectiveness, includingatthecountrylevel.
22
UsemilitaryassetsinsituationswheretheyareconsistentwithOsloguidelinesandoffer capacityotherscannot,orprovidebettervalueformoneythancommercialalternatives.
23
WorkwithNGOstopromotetheconceptofaccreditationorcertification.

## Humanitarian Space

24
Re-assert the premise that humanitarian action should be based on need, reaffirming the key principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality in the new DFID humanitarian policy.
25
Ensurefundingismadeavailableforsecurityandriskmanagementforhumanitarian workers.

## Changing The Policy

26
Incorporate resilience into its development policy and programmes.
27
Develop a new humanitarian policy setting out why the UK responds, where, when 
and how.Thepolicyshouldbuildonthereviewthemesofanticipation,resilience,
leadership,innovation,accountability,partnershipandhumanitarianspace.

## Delivering Differently

28
Change the funding model to achieve greater preparedness, pre-crisis arrangements, capacity, performance and coherence by:
- Increasingpredictablemulti-yearfundinglinkedtoperformancetomajorUNagencies,
theRedCrossMovementandNGOs.
- Increasinglong-termsupporttointernational(theCERF)andcountrylevelpooled
fundsandtoglobal,regionalandcountrylevelNGOconsortia,suchastheCBHAand WAHRF.
29
Design fast and flexible funding models for emergency responses:
- ProvidefastmobilisationfundingintheCriticalPeriodbasedonpre-qualification
ratherthanspeculativeproposals.Usetheprocesstoreducebureaucracyinthis CriticalPeriod.

- Ensurerecoveryandlivelihoodsfundingisconsideredduringandimmediatelyafter
theCriticalPeriod,ratherthanlaterashastraditionallybeenthecase.
- Ensurethereisflexibilityoffundingasfastmovingsituationschange,perhapsby
providingitinstages.

| 30                                                                           | Useallnewfundingmodelstoenforcestandardsandlinkfundingtoperformance   |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| throughclearimpactassessmentsandreporting.Carryoutindependentperiodic        |                                                                       |
| programmeauditsandafteractionreviewstoinformfuturefundingdecisions.          |                                                                       |
| 31                                                                           |                                                                       |
| Develop and deploy niche capabilities in a more focused way concentrating on |                                                                       |
| those areas where DFID or the UK are able to add value:                      |                                                                       |
| -                                                                            |                                                                       |
| OnlyusesearchandrescueinsituationswheretheUKcangenuinelyaddvalue.            |                                                                       |
| -                                                                            |                                                                       |
| Incorporatesurgicalteamsintofirstphasedeploymentsespeciallyafterearthquakes. |                                                                       |
| -                                                                            |                                                                       |
| Investigatenewformsofnichecapabilitiesthatcanrespondtonewtypesofthreats      |                                                                       |
| suchasnuclear,biologicalandchemical.                                         |                                                                       |
| 32                                                                           | ContinueandexpandthesurgeofUKcontractedpersonnelintotheinternational  |
| system.                                                                      |                                                                       |
| 33                                                                           | Conveneandleadastandingcross-governmentemergencymechanismformega      |
| emergencies,usingtheauthorityoftheNationalSecurityCouncil.                   |                                                                       |

## Changing The Structure, Shifting Resources

34
Ensure that the structure, funding and human resources for humanitarian work reflects its importance as a central part of DFID work, not least by having a Director General champion this work. Amongst others, this will require
- RebalanceresourceswithinDFIDtomeetthechallengesofrisinghumanitarianneed. - Expandthehumanitariancadre,bothinLondonandinthefield. - Ensuringeveryresponsetorapidonsethumanitarianneedisledbyanexperienced
responsemanager,withsufficientdelegatedauthoritytoensureswiftaction.
- Leadlarge-scaleresponsesfromLondon,managedbyCHASE.
35
Redefinetheobjectivesforthecontractedresponseteamsothatitissolelydedicatedto
supportingrapidresponseandpre-crisisarrangements.

## Driving Results And Value For Money

36
Build up a library of results, costs of inputs, outputs and outcomes from different countries and regions and different types of disasters in order to be able to carry out effective unit cost analysis and enable fast evidence based decision-making. Share this where appropriate with other donors.
37
EncouragetheIndependentCommissionforAidImpacttoexaminearangeof humanitariancasesandresiliencebuildingwork.
38
Carryoutanin-depthstudyonhowDFID'sfundingimpactsonthehumanitariansupply chainrecognisingthatthesupplychainisamajorcostdriverinsudden-onsetresponses. Workwithotherdonors,theprivatesectorandimplementingpartnerstoalignsupply chainpractices.

## Getting The Message Out

39
Prioritise communications as a key factor in the UK's emergency response, and resource it accordingly.
- Embedcommunicationsatthepolicyandoperationslevelfromthebeginningofa
response.
- MakeDFID'shumanitarianandemergencyresponseworkpermanentlymore
visiblethroughDFID'swebsite–inadditiontofeaturesonspecificresponses. Communicationsstaff,and/ortheteamleadertrainedincommunicationsshouldbe supportedtospeakpubliclyonDFID'sbehalf.
- Makebetteruseoffaithbasedanddiasporapartners.
- Workmorecloselywithfundedpartnersoncommunications–toagreeaconsistent
narrativeandsharechannels.Theserelationshipsneedtobedevelopedinadvanceof anemergencyresponse.
40
Request the International Development Select Committee to scrutinise progress on the implementation of these findings one year on from the launch of this report.

PublishedbytheHumanitarianEmergencyResponseReview March2011 Chair:Lord(Paddy)Ashdown Director:RossMountain SeniorAdvisoryBoardMembers:AndyBearpark;BarneyMayhew;CarolynMiller;
DavidBryer;ElisabethRasmusson;GilbertGreenall;GordonConway;JodaSilva;
MarkBowden;NiciDahrendorf;RandolphKent;SimonMaxwell;SteffenStenberg; SueWardell;YaseminAysan. HumanitarianReviewTeamSecretariat:MelindaSimmons;LewisSida;RachelKessler;
SophiePongracz;LouisaBrewin;DavidPratt;MalcolmRidout;RosTendler. Thisreportisavailableonline:www.dfid.gov.uk/emergency-response-review