Shock-Responsive Social Protection Systems Toolkit

Appraising the use of social protection in addressing large-scale shocks

Clare O'Brien, Rebecca Holmes and Zoë Scott, with Valentina Barca

January 2018 About the project

The Shock-Responsive Social Protection Systems study is a research programme (2015 to 2018) led by Oxford Policy Management (OPM), in consortium with the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), the Cash Learning Partnership (CaLP) and INASP. Its aim is to strengthen the evidence base as to when and how social protection systems can better respond to shocks in low-income countries and fragile and conflict-affected states, thus minimising negative shock impacts and reducing the need for separate humanitarian responses.

The research is funded by UK Aid from the UK government, as part of the Department for International Development's (DFID's) Humanitarian Innovation and Evidence Programme (HIEP), an initiative to improve the quality, quantity and use of evidence in humanitarian programming.

Six case studies form the core of the analysis of the features of a social protection system that facilitate its use to respond to shocks, and of the ways in which social protection, humanitarian assistance and disaster risk management systems can best work together for a more effective response. The three in-depth case studies—of Mozambique, Mali and Pakistan—explore the issue across a wide range of shocks, and reviewing a number of social protection interventions. Two light-touch case studies, of the Philippines and Lesotho, focus on a single shock. Finally, a light study of the Sahel region reviews regionwide mechanisms for responding to food security crises.

About this toolkit

Drawing on both the research methods used in the six case studies, and on their findings, this toolkit brings together information on key concepts, diagnostic tools and guidance for determining whether shock-responsive social protection is appropriate in a given context, and the factors that might influence its effectiveness. It is aimed at social protection, humanitarian and disaster risk management professionals who are interested in pursuing better responses to emergencies, including in fragile and conflict-affected settings. This toolkit will help readers to:

- Understand what is meant by 'shock-responsive social protection' and other key terms
- Assess the feasibility of different options for shock-responsive social protection in your context
- Take steps to strengthen the systems underlying shock-responsive social protection
- Learn from other countries' experience with shock-responsive social protection
- Access other useful resources.

Suggested citation: O'Brien, C., Holmes R. and Scott, Z., with Barca, V. (2018) 'Shock-Responsive Social Protection Systems Toolkit—Appraising the use of social protection in addressing large-scale shocks', Oxford Policy Management, Oxford, UK. Acknowledgements

We warmly appreciate the time and insights shared by all our respondents—from national and local governments, as well as numerous multilateral and bilateral development partners, NGOs, private sector organisations and research firms—not only in the case studies but also during numerous workshops and consultations meetings over the research period. DFID—and in particular the project lead, Heather Kindness—has provided valuable guidance throughout. The research design and its outputs have benefited from peer review from an independent Research Advisory Group, for whose advice we are most grateful.

The team for the overall project, whose contributions form the foundation both of this report and of all other outputs of the research, is: Sarah Bailey, Valentina Barca, Simon Brook, Joanna Buckley, Francesca Bastagli, Cécile Cherrier, Nathalie Cissokho, Jenny Congrave, Lourdes Fidalgo, Rebecca Holmes, Andrew Kardan, Naffet Keïta, Simon Levine, Tanya Lone, Emmanuel Luna, Marta Marzi, Malefetsane Masasa, Clare O'Brien, Muhammed Usman Qazi, Faisal Rashid, Clara Richards, Zoë Scott, Kay Sharp, Gabrielle Smith, Rebecca Vo, and Carol Watson.

We extend our thanks to Heather Kindness, Lara Karat, Simon Narbeth and Nicola Ranger for their comments and inputs to this toolkit.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the UK government's official policies.

# Contents

List of figures, tables and boxes\
Abbreviations\
Overview

**SECTION A**\
**HOW TO USE THIS TOOLKIT**\
A1 Why this toolkit?\
A2 Learning objectives\
A3 What's in the toolkit?

**SECTION B**\
**LEARNING**\
B1 Key definitions\
B2 What is ‘shock-responsive social protection’?\
B3 Options for using social protection to respond to shocks\
B4 When might shock-responsive social protection be appropriate?

**SECTION C**\
**DIAGNOSIS**\
C1 Questions: Shocks and crises\
C2 Questions: Poverty and vulnerability\
C3 Questions: The institutional environment\
C4 Questions: The potential contribution of specific programmes\
C5 Questions: The potential contribution of specific delivery systems\
C6 Questions: The financial / budgetary context\
C7 How to interpret your diagnosis

**SECTION D**\
**FACTORS GUIDING A RESPONSE**\
D1 Finance\
D2 Targeting\
D3 Data management\
D4 Transfer values\
D5 Payment / distribution modality\
D6 Coordination\
D7 Communication\
D8 M&E

**SECTION E**\
**EXPERIENCE**

**SECTION F**\
**OTHER RESOURCES**

**SECTION G**\
**GLOSSARY** List of figures, tables and boxes

Figure 1 Our typology of social protection ................................................................. 5 Figure 2 Typology of options for shock-responsive adaptation .................................. 8 Figure 3 Options for reaching households through social protection databases .......... 33 Figure 4 Analytical frameworks for DRM and social protection ................................. 43

Table 1 Summary of typology of options for shock-responsive adaptation .................. 11 Table 2 Analytical frameworks for evaluating and assessing value for money of an emergency response: OECD and DFID ................................................................. 14 Table 3 Questions to map design and implementation features of current social protection programmes ................................................................. 22 Table 4 Options for using a beneficiary database in a shock ........................................ 34 Table 5 Options for using data on non-beneficiaries in a shock .................................... 34 Table 6 Five dimensions by which to assess if a social protection\* database is useful .... 36 Table 7 Considerations in ensuring accessibility, robustness, integration and cost-efficiency of the distribution mechanism ................................................................. 40 Table 8 Opportunities for collaboration between DRM and social protection ............... 46 Table 9 Types of indicator ............................................................................................. 49 Table 10 Example of topics that might be covered by shock-responsive social protection indicators ........................................................................................................ 50 Table 11 Main outputs of the global study ..................................................................... 60 Table 12 Other outputs from the Global Study .............................................................. 61 Table 13 Global study webinars .................................................................................... 62 Table 14 Outputs from OPM and WFP’s regional study on shock responsive social protection in Latin America and the Caribbean ................................................................. 62 Table 15 Other resources and toolkits ........................................................................... 63

Box 1 Example: Adapting the payment modality after a typhoon in the Philippines ....... 42 Box 2 Considerations when selecting social protection indicators ............................... 51

## Abbreviations

| Abbreviation | Description | |--------------|-------------| | ARC | Africa Risk capacity | | ATM | Automatic Teller Machine | | CaLP | Cash Learning Partnership | | Cat DDO | Catastrophe Deferred Drawdown Options (World Bank) | | CCT | Conditional Cash Transfer | | CGP | Child Grant Programme, Lesotho | | CRS | Cristian Relief Services | | DFID | Department for International Development | | DRM | disaster risk management | | DSWD | Department for Social Welfare and Development, Philippines | | ECHO | European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations | | FAO | Food and Agriculture Organisation | | HSNP | Hunger safety Net Programme, Kenya | | ISPA | Interagency Social Protection Assessment | | M&E | Monitoring and evaluation | | NADRA | National Database and Registration Authority, Pakistan | | NGO | Non Governmental Organisation | | NISSA | National Information System for Social Assistance, Lesotho | | NSER | National Socio Economic Registry, Pakistan | | OECD | Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development | | ODI | Overseas Development Institute | | OPM | Oxford Policy Management | | PMT | Proxy means Test | | PSNP | Productive Safety Net Programme, Ethiopia | | PSSB | Basic Social Subsidy Programme, Mozambique | | RFP | Risk Financing Mechanism | | WFP | World Food Programme |

# Shock Responsive Social Protection: Toolkit Overview

## Section A: How to use this toolkit?

- **A1** Why this toolkit?
- **A2** Learning objectives
- **A3** What’s in the toolkit

## Section B: Learning

- **B1** Key definitions
- **B2** What is ‘shock-responsive social protection’?
- **B3** Options for using social protection to respond to shocks
- **B4** When might shock-responsive social protection be appropriate?

## Section C: Diagnosis

- **C1** Questions: Shocks and crises
- **C2** Questions: Poverty and vulnerability
- **C3** Questions: The institutional environment
- **C4** Questions: The potential contribution of specific programmes
- **C5** Questions: The potential contribution of specific delivery systems
- **C6** Questions: The financial / budgetary context
- **C7** How to interpret your diagnosis

## Section D: Factors guiding a response

- **D1** Finance
- **D2** Targeting
- **D3** Data management
- **D4** Transfer values
- **D5** Payment / distribution modality
- **D6** Coordination
- **D7** Communication
- **D8** Monitoring and Evaluation

## Section E: Country experience

- **E1** Design tweaks
- **E2** Piggybacking
- **E3** Vertical expansion
- **E4** Horizontal expansion
- **E5** Alignment

## Section F: Other resources

- **F1** Global study on shock responsive social protection (DFID)
- **F2** Latin America and Caribbean regional study (WFP)
- **F3** Other resources and toolkits

## Section G: Glossary

- **E4** Horizontal expansion
- **E5** Alignment

______________________________________________________________________

In partnership with: SECTION A HOW TO USE THIS TOOLKIT

This section covers:

- Why we have developed this toolkit
- Who it is aimed at, and what you can expect to get out of it
- The different sections of the toolkit, and how to navigate it

A1 Why this toolkit?

Large-scale shocks are becoming more numerous, frequent and long-term. Disaster risk management (DRM) and humanitarian practitioners commonly play a vital role already in addressing them. Can social protection programmes and systems also contribute to responding to shocks, either before or after the crisis arises? This toolkit provides guidance on how to think through the issues.

Globally, the frequency, size and duration of disasters and crises—be they the consequence of natural phenomena or economic or political shocks—are on the rise. The cost of responding to these disasters has been increasing, too. Many shocks are predictable and protracted, and often slow-onset. Governments are already likely to have a mandate to address such shocks: the field of disaster risk management (DRM) is intended both to reduce the likelihood of these adverse events and to present a way for them to be addressed if they arise.

While national governments bear the main responsibility for mitigating the risk of shocks and responding to them, the international humanitarian community may provide assistance if the scale of the crisis is beyond the capacity of the government to deal with it, or where the government is not in a position to respond. However, the demands placed on both governments and the international humanitarian community to provide assistance continue to grow. The value of international humanitarian assistance keeps hitting record highs—the last three years have each seen the highest ever levels of assistance provided—yet the gap compared with what is needed continues to widen. Often humanitarian assistance is being provided to the same country, for the same crisis, for years at a time.

Governments and international agencies alike are therefore committed to finding a way forward that responds more efficiently and effectively to shocks. They aim to 'use existing resources and capabilities better to shrink humanitarian needs over the long term', in the words of the Grand Bargain made by the humanitarian and development communities at the World Humanitarian Summit (‘Grand Bargain’, 2016). This may include doing more before a crisis (preparedness) and in the early stage of a crisis, rather than reactively.

Many actors are now asking whether and how long-term social protection systems can play a greater role, since these are already intended to meet the needs of the poorest households, to build resilience and to respond to crises.

This toolkit responds to the demand from policymakers and programme implementers for practical guidance that can clarify key concepts, suggest approaches for assessing the suitability of shock-responsive social protection and highlight major issues for consideration in its implementation. A2 Learning objectives

This toolkit is for policymakers and programme implementers, both government and non-government, working in DRM, humanitarian assistance or social protection. Its purpose is to provoke ideas that will equip you to better understand whether and how your activities might contribute to improved outcomes for households faced with large-scale crises. It is also intended to enable you to interact with people working in related sectors, on the basis of a common understanding of shock-responsive social protection.

This toolkit is aimed at DRM, humanitarian and social protection professionals who are interested in pursuing better responses to emergencies, including in fragile and conflict-affected settings. This includes people working for governments, their development and humanitarian partners, and NGOs.

Drawing on both the research methods used in the six case studies, and on case study and literature review findings, this toolkit brings together information on key concepts, diagnostic tools and guidance for determining whether shock-responsive social protection is appropriate in a given context, and the factors that might influence its effectiveness. This toolkit will help you to:

- Understand what is meant by ‘shock-responsive social protection’ and other key terms
- Assess the feasibility of different options for shock-responsive social protection in your context
- Take steps to strengthen the systems underlying shock-responsive social protection
- Learn from other countries’ experience with shock-responsive social protection
- Access other useful resources.

Note that this toolkit does not—and cannot—provide you with a simplistic flowchart that says, ‘If you are in context A, then you should do X, Y and Z to adjust your social protection programme’. We wish that it could! Each context is, of course, highly specific. As with any other policy the options you choose will depend on the nature of the crisis and the number and characteristics of people affected, as well as on political will, budgetary constraints, relationships between agencies, the set of alternative possibilities and many other factors. The relative maturity of the DRM and social protection sectors also plays a big part. Our aim is therefore rather to guide you to ask the right questions and think through potential risks and challenges of different courses of option, to enable you to be confident in your subjective decision of how to act and the trade-offs. A3 What's in the toolkit?

This toolkit contains guidance for both retrospective analysis and forward planning of systems and interventions that address large-scale shocks, as well as an explanation of key concepts and terms.

The toolkit is structured as follows:

| Section | Name | Contents | |---------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------| | A | How to use this toolkit | Overview of rationale, learning objectives and structure | | B | Learning | The main conceptual frameworks: | | | | - What is shock-responsive social protection | | | | - What forms might it take | | | | - How might you determine whether it is 'better' than an alternative approach | | C | Diagnosis | Recommended questions to help you assess the suitability of shock- | | | | responsive social protection in your context. Identifies the current | | | | situation. Questions on shocks and crises; poverty and vulnerability; | | | | the institutional environment (roles, responsibilities, policies, | | | | partnerships etc.); the contribution of DRM, humanitarian and social | | | | protection programmes / delivery systems; and financing. | | | | Also some thoughts on how to interpret the information once you have | | | | gathered it | | D | Factors guiding a response | A more forward-looking section on things to consider if you are intending | | | | to design and implement a 'shock-responsive' element in your social | | | | protection programme or system. Covers topics such as targeting, | | | | coordination, data management | | E | Experience | References to recent examples and case studies worldwide | | F | Other resources | Links to further project materials, other toolkits, guidance notes and | | | | studies | | G | Glossary | Glossary of key terms |

Read section B at any time, alongside the related resources listed in section F, to familiarise yourself with the topic of shock-responsive social protection. Use section C to guide you when you want to analyse the context in which you are operating. There is no need to wait until a crisis before using these questions, as many of them can and should be answered even in the absence of a shock, as part of a preparedness exercise. Use section D if you are actively thinking about introducing a shock-responsive social protection element and need a reference to the key issues for design and implementation. Use sections E and F for inspiration!

Terms that are explained in the glossary are hyperlinked to the glossary text in their first use from section B onwards. SECTION B LEARNING

This section introduces you to the main concepts of shock-responsive social protection. By the end of this section you will understand:

- The definition we are using for Social Protection, Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Risk Management
- What we mean by 'shock-responsive social protection'
- Options for making social protection programmes and systems more responsive to shocks
- A framework for deciding whether shock-responsive social protection is appropriate in a given context

WHY IS THIS SECTION IMPORTANT?

Even a term such as 'social protection', and certainly 'shock-responsive social protection', is interpreted differently by different actors. Countries may have their own definition of social protection, perhaps in a national social protection policy or strategy. This section therefore sets out a common framework of terms and principles to facilitate engagement on the topic across sectors. B1 Key definitions

What counts as social protection?

Social protection can be defined as the set of public actions that address both the deprivation and vulnerabilities of the poorest, and the need of the currently non-poor for security in the face of shocks. This ‘public’ response may be governmental or non-governmental (Norton et al., 2001). It has also been broadly defined as policies and actions which enhance the capacity of poor and vulnerable people to escape from poverty and better manage risks and shocks.

Social protection encompasses a wide range of instruments, with varying objectives and financing mechanisms (Figure 1). We make a distinction between those that are ‘non-contributory’ (where the beneficiary does not have to pay directly into a scheme in order to receive something back) and those that are ‘contributory’ (where only those who pay into the scheme, or on whose behalf a payment is made, can receive something back).

Figure 1 Our typology of social protection

Source: OPM (2017). Notes: (1) ‘Non-contributory’ schemes are defined by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) as those that, ‘normally require no direct [financial] contribution from beneficiaries or their employers as a condition of entitlement to receive benefits’ (ILO, 2017). Public works programmes are usually counted as ‘non-contributory’ even though the recipient contributes labour. (2) Social transfers may be conditional or unconditional. A conditional transfer requires the recipient to meet certain behaviours (such as ensuring school attendance) to receive the benefit.

Beyond this, interventions can be classified broadly as ‘social assistance’, ‘social care’, ‘social insurance’ and ‘labour market policies’. Our focus in this toolkit—and, indeed, among many policymakers considering shock-responsive social protection—is mainly on social assistance interventions. These include:

- Conditional and unconditional cash transfers
- Vouchers (e.g. for food, or for medicines for livestock)
- In-kind transfers (such as agricultural inputs or food, including school feeding programmes);
- Public works programmes (cash-for-work or food-for-work)
- Education- and health-specific measures (fee waivers, health insurance, etc.)
- Subsidies (e.g. on food / agricultural inputs / fuel)

Other types of social protection also play a crucial role. For example, the provision of psychosocial support by social workers, which would fall under the ‘social care’ classification, can be vital to minimise trauma after a disaster. What counts as humanitarian assistance?

Humanitarian assistance is defined as the resources used to fund actions that are designed to, 'save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity during and in the aftermath of man-made crises and natural disasters, as well as to prevent and strengthen preparedness for the occurrence of such situations' (Principles and Good Practice of Good Humanitarian Donorship, 2003).

Humanitarian assistance may take many forms. It may include reconstruction and rehabilitation (e.g. restoring infrastructure and community assets such as water supplies), emergency food or cash assistance, services such as the provision of shelter, health, nutrition and education, and measures to protect the safety of the population. Some argue that it extends also to DRM activities, early warning systems and contingency planning (Global Humanitarian Assistance, 2014). The mix depends on the particular needs of a crisis and the priorities of the actors involved. In some circumstances the UN coordinates assistance in thematic clusters in line with sectoral objectives (food security, shelter etc.). The precise boundaries of humanitarian activities and expenditures with development ones are debated and often blurred. Only a few of these relate directly to social protection. There is a clear overlap in relation to the provision of material support to households in need of assistance and to enable populations to restore their livelihoods after an emergency.

The crises to which this assistance responds may be called 'humanitarian crises', though some use that term more narrowly to refer only to crises that exceed the government's capacity to respond. In this Toolkit we consider that governments can respond to a humanitarian crisis.

What counts as Disaster Risk Management?

DRM activities are all the processes that aim to reduce the likelihood of a disaster, lessen the impact of hazards and improve people's ability to cope if a disaster occurs. DRM is defined as, 'the application of disaster risk reduction policies and strategies to prevent new disaster risk, reduce existing disaster risk and manage residual risk' (UNISDR). It is often viewed as having five focal areas: prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery. These are similar in concept to the functions of social protection of protection, prevention, promotion and transformation. The types of mechanism that are often run by DRM actors but that might be relevant to people working in social protection include:

- early warning systems, that give early alerts of potential threats such as droughts or cyclones, or even small variations in weather patterns (these alerts can be used to trigger interventions that can help avert or mitigate the threat);
- risk assessments and vulnerability assessments, that can help identify locations and populations likely to be in greatest need of assistance;
- contingency plans, that set out what will be done in different types of emergency, and that might include a role for social protection in the planned response;
- local disaster response teams that may coordinate the targeting and distribution of support to communities after a shock; and
- Disaster risk financing mechanisms that can release funds for emergency measures which might include social protection. B2 What is ‘shock-responsive social protection’?

There is no single definition of ‘shock-responsive social protection’. All social protection interventions are in some sense shock-responsive, in that they deal ex-ante or ex-post with chronic or sudden events that negatively affect households' livelihoods. However, most social protection is designed to support households experiencing shocks as a result of life cycle events such as a loss of jobs, illness or death (idiosyncratic shocks).

‘Shock-responsive social protection’ instead focuses on shocks that affect a large proportion of the population simultaneously (covariate shocks). It encompasses the adaptation of routine social protection programmes and systems to cope with changes in context and demand following large-scale shocks. This can be ex-ante by building shock-responsive systems, plans and partnerships in advance of a shock to better prepare for emergency response; or ex-post, to support households once the shock has occurred. In this way, social protection can complement and support other emergency response interventions.

See the glossary for details of related terms such as 'adaptive social protection'. B3 Options for using social protection to respond to shocks

There are five main options for adapting social protection programmes to make them better at responding to shocks (Figure 2). These are

1. **Design tweaks**: making small adjustments to the design of routine social protection interventions.
2. **Piggybacking**: using elements of an existing social protection programme or system while delivering a separate emergency response.
3. **Vertical expansion**: temporarily increasing the value or duration of benefits for existing beneficiaries.
4. **Horizontal expansion**: temporarily increasing the number of recipients in an existing social protection programme.
5. **Alignment**: aligning social protection and/or humanitarian interventions with one another.

**Figure 2** Typology of options for shock-responsive adaptation

Source: OPM.

**Definition of a 'design tweak'**

The design of social protection programmes and systems can be adjusted in a way that takes into consideration the crises that a country typically faces. These 'design tweaks' can serve one of two purposes. First, they can introduce flexibility into a social protection programme so as to maintain the provision of the regular service for its usual beneficiaries in the event of a shock. This may be particularly relevant in areas prone to rapid-onset disasters such as earthquakes or cyclones, where infrastructure may be damaged, or in areas affected by conflict where access to services may be disrupted. Examples might include developing protocols that allow people to receive a cash transfer over the counter if a usual electronic payment system is no longer functioning, or that waive conditionalities (such as school attendance) if these cannot be fulfilled as a result of the crisis. Second, changes to a programme's design can be introduced that can improve its coverage, timeliness or predictability in the event of a crisis, even without requiring the programme to flex at the moment of the shock itself. This can be explored even when shock-responsiveness is not the primary focus of the intervention. It is a variant on strengthening the core social protection system—which is in any case likely to be of some value in a large-scale crisis, given that social protection is intended to improve households' capacity to deal with the shocks they face. Definition of piggybacking

‘Piggybacking’ occurs when an emergency response, delivered by either government or its partners, uses part of an established social protection system or programme while delivering something new. Exactly which and how many elements of the overall system or programme are borrowed will vary; it could be e.g. a specific programme’s beneficiary list, its staff, a national database and/or a particular payment mechanism. This response option has three key features. First, by definition there has to be an existing programme or delivery system to piggyback on, since the idea is to take advantage of something that is already there rather than starting from scratch. Second, policymakers can piggyback on either a programme or its underlying delivery systems (that may support multiple programmes): this distinguishes it from the temporary scale-up of a specific programme (vertical or horizontal expansion—see below). Third, it can be delivered by different actors to the core system or programme, working within their own political mandates and administrative structures. Humanitarian actors can piggyback on government programmes and systems, or vice versa.

Definition of vertical expansion

Social protection programmes can be ‘vertically expanded’ following a shock: this means the benefit value or duration of the programme is temporarily increased for some or all existing recipients (top-ups) This can be done via an adjustment of transfer amounts or values, or through the introduction of extraordinary payments or transfers. It is unlikely that all programme beneficiaries would have been affected by the disaster in the same way or to the same extent, so these temporary top-ups may be further targeted within the current beneficiary group. In some cases vertical expansion of a programme may look similar to piggybacking on its beneficiary list. The difference is that, with a vertically expanded programme, the extra support is not separate but rather is an integral part of the existing intervention. It is likely to use the same implementers and delivery systems and the same name. Note that the emphasis is on scaling up a specific programme, not just borrowing an element of a delivery system.

Definition of horizontal expansion

The ‘horizontal expansion’ of a social protection programme refers to the temporary inclusion of new beneficiaries from disaster-affected communities. This could be done in three ways: extending the programme’s geographical coverage; enrolling additional beneficiaries in geographical areas already covered, who meet the programme’s usual criteria (i.e. an extraordinary enrolment campaign) or bringing in additional beneficiaries by modifying the eligibility criteria. In the successful examples that emerged during fieldwork, preparations for horizontal expansion had been factored into the design of the programme rather than being added following a disaster. The ease with which the temporary

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1 For readers who are not familiar with the term, a ‘piggyback’ is a ride on someone else’s back, as sometimes given to children. The term is used metaphorically to mean the use of something that someone else has already made or done in order to make life easier. expansion is done depends partly on whether the extra beneficiaries come from a pool of households pre-selected to be the first recipients in the event of an emergency, or whether they are identified only at the moment of the crisis.

**Definition of alignment**

'Alignment' means the development of one or more elements of a parallel humanitarian response that align as best as possible with those used in a current or possible future social protection programme or DRM system. For example, this could be an alignment of objectives, targeting method, transfer value or delivery mechanism. This is distinct from piggybacking on elements of a system as it uses a parallel infrastructure rather than the same system. Alignment may arise for two reasons. First, an existing social protection intervention may be replicated because it is not operational as needed in a crisis, e.g. because it operates in geographical areas other than the crisis-affected area, because it is not reaching all the required caseload, or because it has ceased to function as a result of the crisis itself. Second, a relevant social protection intervention may not yet exist, but it is possible to perceive what one might look like. An emergency response that is designed deliberately to align with another (actual or emerging) programme or system may facilitate future integration of the two. This has the potential for increasing impact by contributing to sustainability, and may eventually relieve pressure on the international humanitarian system if alternative funding sources are found. It may also have real-time benefits, such as alleviating concerns about receipt of varying levels or types of support among different groups.

**Opportunities and constraints of the different options**

Table 1 below sets out some of the different conditions required for each adaptation to be most effective, and highlights some of the risks and challenges to take into account. Carefully reading through the information in the table should help you to determine whether a particular type of shock-responsive adaptation is feasible and likely to be beneficial in your context.

Section E gives selected examples of countries’ experiences with implementing or thinking about these options.

### Table 1 Summary of typology of options for shock-responsive adaptation

| Type | Prerequisites | Opportunities | Design / implementation challenges | Risks | |------|---------------|---------------|-------------------------------------|-------| | **DESIGN TWEAKS to social protection programmes** | - Some social protection programme must exist

- Resources and capacity required depends on nature of the tweak
- Data needed to identify appropriate design tweak | - Approach can be considered anywhere (though what is feasible will vary)
- Opportunity to be a gentle introduction of shock-responsiveness into programmes and systems | - Different shocks may call for different tweaks—need to decide which to prioritise
- Ex-ante, so may be hard to get political buy-in
- Policymakers may face competing demands to adjust programmes to meet other agendas
- Major challenges of working in crisis and conflict contexts may not be resolvable by small adjustments to programme design | - Risk of overloading programmes with concerns unrelated to core objective
- Design tweaks to enhance shock-responsiveness may close off others that have alternative benefits | | **PIGGYBACKING on existing programmes or systems** | - No requirement for a mature single programme with robust systems, as can pick and choose which elements to use
- But need some elements of a programme or system to piggyback on | - Can select strongest components for piggybacking without inheriting weak elements or capacity constraints
- May be more politically acceptable than some alternatives as the use of a separate system may avoid diluting the ‘brand’ of a specific programme
- Potential for time-savings and improved cost-effectiveness
- Works well in situations where implementers already have a relationship with a programme | - Challenge to identify which system components to piggyback on
- Weaknesses of the underlying system may be transferred to the emergency programme (timeliness, staff capacity etc.)
- Need to secure agreement of the implementers of the core programme
- Increased coordination with multiple organisations and agencies required. | - Systems being piggybacked on risk being overwhelmed.
- If coordination is poor, multiple agencies may decide to piggyback on the same programme
- Piggybacking on programmes can lead to misunderstanding of programme objectives | | **VERTICAL EXPANSION (top-ups to existing beneficiaries)** | - Strong social protection programme with good coverage of disaster-affected areas, and of the neediest households.
- Understanding of who is affected by the shock
- Understanding of relevance of top-up support for beneficiaries
- Adequate administrative systems, able to withstand the shock | - Potential to be quick and cost-effective
- Coverage—existing social protection programme may reach a substantial proportion of the disaster-affected caseload
- Programme infrastructure already in place (provided it withstands the shock and has capacity to absorb extra workload)
- Existing relationships between partners | - Coordination with other actors implementing emergency responses
- Determining the size of the top-up (many different ways could be justified)
- Additional resource requirements
- Some features of the social protection programme may be inconvenient for the emergency component (eg. timing of payouts)
- Considerable effort on communication to explain why beneficiaries are getting even more assistance while non-beneficiaries receive nothing | - Key risk is not reaching significant % of those affected, since non-beneficiaries are not covered.
- Risk of duplicating support or missing some individuals as difficult to align with other actors providing complementary responses.
- Risk of negative impact on people’s perceptions of the generosity of the underlying programme | | Type | Prerequisites | Opportunities | Design / implementation challenges | Risks | |------|---------------|---------------|-----------------------------------|-------| | **HORIZONTAL EXPANSION** *(temporary extension of social protection programme to new beneficiaries)* | • A mature social protection programme with strong administrative and delivery systems\
  • Accurate data for the identification of new beneficiaries when the programme is expanded\
  • Sometimes, complementary system components that are only indirectly connected with the core social protection intervention may be needed (eg. teachers and buildings, for a school feeding programme). | • Potential to reach a higher percentage of those affected by the disaster than is likely through vertical expansion alone, as the worst affected areas and communities can be specifically targeted\
  • Potential for more timely response\
  • May work well in relation to means-tested social protection programmes with on-demand registration during economic shocks, where people fall temporarily within the eligibility threshold\
  • Temporary additional caseload may serve as a foundation for the eventual expansion of the core programme | • Difficult to conceive what the benefit should cover and why a non-beneficiary in crisis times should receive the same as a beneficiary gets in non-crisis times\
  • Challenge in deciding who should receive the extra benefit and how they should be selected, including trade-off between prepositioned data and data that more accurately reflects the emergency\
  • Timely inclusion of households can be problematic, especially if not pre-enrolled\
  • Additional resource requirements, including for verifying and enrolling new beneficiaries and extending delivery mechanisms.\
  • Some features of the social protection programme may be inconvenient for the emergency component (eg. timing of payouts)\
  • Considerable effort required for communication | • If programme extended to people who are not normally eligible, underlying programme’s core objectives may be diluted or obscured\
  • May create confusion amongst beneficiaries about objectives and about implementation arrangements, and perhaps undermine the programme’s ‘brand’ | | **ALIGNMENT between different programmes or systems** | • No prerequisite for strong programmes or systems, can be applied in fragile contexts with weak social protection infrastructure | • In short term can lead to efficiency savings if reduces duplication of delivery systems\
  • In longer term, opportunity for a more sustainable approach to emergency response, with greater predictability of funding, possibly leading to long-term government ownership and freeing up humanitarian actors from responding to predictable, recurrent crises.\
  • Opportunity for government to upgrade their approaches based on humanitarian innovations. | • Difficult to choose which elements to align with\
  • Will need to work with other programmes and organisations, and maintain those relationships over the long-term given that full transition likely to take many years | • While alignment between programmes may have positive impact on organisational capacity it risks having less direct impact on beneficiaries, if the support is less tailored to their needs |

Source: OPM. Note: All details are presented in sections 6–10 of the synthesis report. B4 When might shock-responsive social protection be appropriate?

Just because it is feasible to adapt a programme, this does not mean that it is necessarily advisable. To determine this, you will need to compare options with other previous and planned emergency responses. If social protection programmes are to be useful for shock response, they need to offer a solution that improves on alternatives.

The final step in assessing options for shock responsive social protection is therefore to assess whether and how the identified options will improve on alternative emergency responses in relation to:

- **Meeting needs**: does the intervention deliver an equal or greater impact than its alternatives? Is it better targeted to address needs? Does it provide a more adequate level of support? Does it provide support of a more appropriate nature?
- **Coverage**: Will it lead to more of those in need receiving assistance? Will it reduce the number of those who need support?
- **Timeliness**: Will it lead to quicker support to households? Will it contribute to early response?
- **Predictability**: Will the funding be more predictable? Will it result in more predictable assistance for households?
- **Duplication**: Will it reduce duplication of programme delivery systems and processes? Will it increase coordination between programme implementers? Will it harmonise aspects of programme delivery?
- **Sustainability**: Will it lead to strengthened organisational capacity? Will it be more embedded in government-led systems? Is it more sustainable over the long-term?

It is very unlikely that any programme adapted for shock response will be able to improve all six of these dimensions in comparison to alternative emergency response. There is likely to be a trade-off and you will need to make a subjective decision as to which is the priority and therefore which option or options are ultimately best to take forward. The decision as to what will work better against these six criteria will vary depending on which aspects of efficiency and effectiveness are believed to be the priority. This may be affected by:

- the **type of crisis** (eg. whether it is rapid- or slow-onset, which may determine the extent to which the speed of response affects household well-being);
- the **regularity and size of the crisis**, which may affect whether it should be treated as a one-off exceptional event—perhaps requiring the enactment of a contingency plan—or whether governments should plan to integrate a response to the shock into their routine activities;
- whether the intervention is taking place in a **conflict context**, and whether the government is a party to the conflict, which may have implications for the alignment with government systems.
- the **capacity of agencies**, including access to financing and infrastructure, which may influence whether the use of an existing system will overwhelm it or can be absorbed.

Beyond the six factors discussed above, others may also be relevant. Useful frameworks are the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD's) guidance for evaluating humanitarian assistance, and DFID's '4E's approach for assessing value for money. These are summarised in Table 2 below.

### Table 2 Analytical frameworks for evaluating and assessing value for money of an emergency response: OECD and DFID

| OECD humanitarian assistance evaluation criteria | | |-----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------| | **Relevance / appropriateness:** Extent to which the intervention is in line with local needs and priorities (as well as donor policy) and is tailored to local needs, increasing ownership, accountability and cost-effectiveness | | | **Connectedness:** Ensuring that activities of a short-term emergency nature are carried out in a context that takes long-term and interconnected problems into account | | | **Coherence:** Extent to which policies of different actors are complementary or contradictory—including humanitarian, development, security, trade and military policies | | | **Coverage:** The need to reach major population groups facing life-threatening risk wherever they are | | | **Efficiency:** How economically inputs are converted to outputs | | | **Effectiveness:** Extent to which an activity achieves its purpose, including timeliness and coordination | | | **Impact:** Longer-term consequences of achieving or not achieving objectives | |

| DFID value for money metrics | | |-----------------------------|-----------------------------------------------| | **Economy:** Purchase of inputs of the appropriate quality at the right price | | | **Efficiency:** How well are inputs converted into outputs (“Spending well”) | | | **Effectiveness:** How well are outputs achieving the desired outcomes and ultimately impact. Impact has three distinct elements: the direct impact on the intended beneficiaries; impact on policy design; and impact through the strengthening of organisational capacity (“Spending wisely”) | | | **Equity:** Degree to which benefits are fairly distributed (“Spending fairly”) | |

Source: [ALNAP (2006)](https://www.alnap.org) and [DFID (2011)](https://www.dfid.gov.uk). SECTION C DIAGNOSIS

This section provides you with the analytical tools to assess the context in which you work, so that you can gather information that will later help you make decisions about the suitability of shock-responsive social protection. It offers a set of guiding questions for understanding:

- The nature of shocks and crises that are present in your context
- The nature of poverty and vulnerability
- The institutional environment
- The potential contribution of specific programmes
- The potential contribution of specific delivery systems
- The financial / budgetary context
- How to interpret your diagnosis

WHY IS THIS SECTION IMPORTANT?

Shock-responsive social protection has become a 'hot topic' in development and humanitarian circles. While there are many instances when adaptations to social protection programmes can make a valuable contribution to reducing the impact of shocks and crises, there is a risk that they may be assumed to be a good idea even in contexts where their suitability has not been thoroughly investigated.

Policymakers and programme implementers should therefore carefully consider whether social protection is an appropriate mechanism to use in response to a shock, and if so, how social protection can best provide shock response. This section provides you with the analytical tools to gather the information to make that judgment. Having explored these questions it may become apparent that adapting social protection systems to provide shock-response may be appropriate, or may not be the best option for improving responses to shocks. In some contexts, a better starting point may be to consider strengthening routine social protection first.

We would emphasise that the diagnosis of the context is best done before a shock occurs. It is a crucial aspect of preparedness. The analytical tools mainly capture what exists, and help you to understand why it is this way (enabling factors and bottlenecks). At the time of a crisis this knowledge can then be complemented with a rapid appraisal of the changes in the context provoked by the crisis itself.

Working on this analysis before a shock will allow time for other preparations in readiness for the potential shock, such as developing relevant policies and regulations, setting up partnership agreements etc. It also increases awareness of options available: even in a country where the overall social protection system is relatively immature it may be possible to identify one or two programmes that can offer a significant contribution. This understanding, in turn, is likely to facilitate appropriate actions in response to the shock when it arises.

Answering these questions will require social protection, humanitarian and DRM actors, policymakers and practitioners, to work together. C1 Questions: Shocks and crises

The fact that you are considering shock-responsive social protection means there is a shock (or shocks) that occur in the context where you work, and that you feel could benefit from improvements to the way it is handled. Your first task is to understand the nature of the problem itself. Without this, you cannot determine the most appropriate response.

Be clear what type(s) of shock you are aiming to address. You may be considering building on social protection programmes to respond to a single incident or emergency, a frequently occurring or cyclical / seasonal shock, or many different types of shock. Base your analysis on past shocks to better understand what may be expected in the future.

1. What are the characteristics of the shock(s) that you are aiming to address? Think in terms of:

   - Speed of onset. This might be rapid-onset, such as an earthquake; or slow-onset, such as drought.
   - Geographical distribution. Are some geographical areas more affected by the shock?
   - Numbers and proportion of population affected. Are some groups disproportionately affected?

2. What is the frequency and duration of each type of shock? Is it a one-off, short-term shock, or does it have longer-lasting impacts into the medium term, for example an economic downturn? Is it a protracted crisis? Does it occur every year, such as an annual lean season before a harvest?

3. Is this a complex shock, with multiple dimensions (such as a drought in a conflict area)?

HELP TO FIND THE ANSWER

Besides key informant interviews or workshops to get the perceptions of multiple stakeholders, you may be able to obtain quantitative and qualitative data that is routinely collected and updated on the nature of shocks. This includes historical time-series data on previous shocks, and current risk assessments of the probability of future shocks.

Some common sources include the EM-DAT database, annual Humanitarian Response Plans, contingency plans, the Famine Early Warning Systems Network data and Reliefweb data. See also Section F.

FOR THOUGHT

The geographical location where a shock initially hits may not be the location most heavily affected by its impacts. For example, a crisis in one part of a country may lead to mass displacement of the population to other parts. Are you aiming to address the shock in its original location, in other affected areas or in both? C2 Questions: Poverty and vulnerability

Understanding a country's underlying poverty trends and the nature of vulnerability, including how these relate to vulnerability to shocks, is critically important. It can determine the extent to which the people likely to be adversely affected by a shock are also likely to be beneficiaries of one or more social protection programmes: many are intended to reduce poverty—and vulnerability to poverty—but may be aimed at the chronically poor rather than those temporarily affected by a shock.

Efforts to understand the factors that affect a household’s vulnerability to poverty—that is, the likelihood that a household will become poor (or poorer) in the future—must consider both the household’s exposure to risk and its ability to cope with that risk. An assessment of poverty and vulnerability may also give you a sense of the extent to which poverty is dynamic (with some households moving in and out of poverty while others remain in chronic poverty over generations) and vulnerabilities are linked to life-cycle circumstances.

1. What are the latest poverty figures and trends (including disaggregation by geographical area and population subgroup)?

2. What are the demographic / livelihoods characteristics of those most likely to be in, or at risk of, poverty? Think in terms of:

   - Household characteristics, e.g. household demography (such as number of children), dependency ratios, ownership of assets and access to resources, livelihood strategies households engaging in agricultural activities.
   - Individual characteristics, e.g. gender, age

3. Who do stakeholders consider to be vulnerable and in most need of assistance? This complementary qualitative assessment may be more nuanced than purely quantitative data, and perceptions may differ across social protection, humanitarian and DRM actors.

4. How does vulnerability to shocks relate to poverty? Do shocks tend to affect areas / subgroups characterised by higher poverty rates? Compare your answers to this section with those in section C1 on shocks and crises.

HELP TO FIND THE ANSWER

There is likely to be a body of knowledge on poverty and vulnerability in your country, e.g. in national household surveys, though the data may be several years old. Work together with your Statistics Agency! A good external starting point is the World Bank’s Microdata library and its Poverty and Equity data portal.

It is also worth taking multi-dimensional poverty indicators into account if available. See for example, the Multidimensional Poverty Index and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD’s) Social Institutions and Gender Index.

FOR THOUGHT

Is it possible to distinguish shock-affected from chronically poor people, and even if so, does this distinction matter?

For example, if two households have similar levels of well-being—one because it has lost income as a result of a shock, and the other because it is chronically poor—does it make sense to support one and not the other?

These types of question can have a big impact on the design of any eventual emergency response programme and on its target caseload. C3 Questions: The institutional environment

This section provides questions to understand the organisations and agencies working in DRM, social protection and humanitarian response, their relationships, interests and capacity. It also looks at the laws, regulations and policies that govern them. The mandates of the organisations, the power dynamics and political environment all affect how initiatives do or don’t happen. Pay particular attention to governance arrangements, especially the division of responsibilities between national and subnational authorities.

Mapping institutions: roles, responsibilities, laws and policies

1. Thinking about responsibility for the design, implementation and coordination of DRM / emergency response policies:

   - Who are the actors responsible? What are their different roles (on paper and in practice)?
   - What are the key national and local plans, laws, regulations and policies that govern their activities (eg. a DRM framework, a humanitarian action policy etc.)? What priorities do these signal for eg. reducing vulnerability to shocks, increasing resilience etc.?
   - To what extent do national and local governments lead on the various aspects of policy design, implementation and coordination?
   - Once in place, are laws, regulations and policies being implemented as intended? If not, what is blocking them?
   - Are there strengths and weaknesses in the current disaster preparedness and emergency response model? What are they?

2. Next consider social protection policies and ask the same questions about the actors involved, their roles, the relevant laws, regulations and policies and their implementation, and the involvement of national and local governments.

3. Does—or could—the social protection system offer a solution, institutionally, to any of the shortcomings of the current method for emergency response (such as filling capacity gaps)?

4. Is there a consistent approach to interpreting the nature of crises and how they should be addressed, between the DRM, humanitarian and social protection sectors? Is there scope for greater policy coordination?

5. Is there competition over resources and authority associated with DRM, humanitarian and social protection between line ministries? What are the power dynamics and the key points of contention?

HELP TO FIND THE ANSWER

You will find it useful to obtain and review documentation from all three sectors—DRM, social protection and humanitarian response. For example, does the DRM policy or strategy endorse the extension of social protection to new beneficiaries in a crisis?

This should be complemented with key informant interviews or qualitative research at both national and subnational level.

FOR THOUGHT

There will probably already be a system in your country for responding to disasters. Do you know how it works? This should guide your assessment of whether social protection can offer an alternative or complement.

For example, if disaster response is the remit of district-level authorities, and you are supporting a national-level social protection programme which you think might be useful in a crisis, have you thought how you would engage with the district authorities to see whether they feel it has added value? **Quick exercise: How mature are the DRM and social protection systems in your context?**

The maturity of a country's social protection and DRM systems has considerable consequences for their ability to be effective in a shock. This is not a fixed state and will change over time. However, it is useful to start by considering the maturity in the context in which you are working in order to plan approaches that are most likely to succeed.

You may feel that your country does not yet have a coherent social protection system. While it may not have a set of programmes offering seamless support to all people in need across the lifecycle, avoiding gaps and duplication, and articulated in a well-funded strategy, it will have some kind of assistance in place, even if delivered *ad-hoc* by non-state actors. You can assess this assistance to determine how useful it would be to support response to a shock, relative to alternative emergency responses.

As a rapid exercise, take a moment to consider the maturity of the social protection system in your context. The table below sets out a typology of system maturity:

| Category of maturity | Description | |----------------------|-------------| | 1 Non-existent | No state interest in developing long-term social protection, and only ad-hoc humanitarian interventions by development partners | | 2 Internationally led| No clear progress in state policy, but emerging interventions by development partners shaping up to a system with elements of harmonisation or coordination between state and its partners | | 3 State-led interest | Some state interest to expand social protection to the vulnerable, including elements such as the outline of what could become a national programme | | 4 State-led commitment| Commitment to expand social protection articulated in e.g. a strategy, with some flagship initiatives for the poor (co-)funded by the state | | 5 State-led expanding| Clear state policies and a growing set of social protection programmes | | 6 State-led mature | Well established system with high coverage of populations and needs, strong state role in delivery, capacity building and financing |

Source: OPM (2015).

You can do a similar exercise to consider the maturity of the DRM system.

You may decide that the maturity of a system is better assessed on a programme-by-programme basis rather than at a system-wide level. For example, perhaps the government is highly committed to expanding public works programmes, but not at all interested in cash transfers. Or perhaps the overarching social protection system is non-existent, but a donor is funding a sophisticated programme that is expected to be in place for the long term.

Bearing this in mind, and comparing it with other contexts, may help you decide whether a scheme that you see elsewhere might also be transferable to your own context, and what you might need to address to improve its probability of being effective. For instance, an initiative that might work well in Kenya might not be sustainable in a country with a less mature social protection system, though elements might be transferable. Mapping institutions: relationships, partnerships and coalitions

1. Thinking about political economy: what are the interests and levels of power / influence of the stakeholders—at local, national and international level—in reforming the current system for emergency response and in considering closer links with social protection? How has this affected the design and implementation of shock-responsive policies until now?

2. Is there a window of opportunity for reform, if reform is needed, such as through the presence of a sector ‘champion’ in government, the support of a particular political party, or the drafting of relevant legislation?

3. What is the degree of decentralisation in the provision and financing of, and authority over, social protection, humanitarian response and DRM? What implications does this have in practice? Is there competition and/or different levels of prioritisation of these sectors at different levels of government?

4. How, and how well, do development partners work with the government, private sector and communities on humanitarian assistance and social protection provision? How has previous support in response to shocks been perceived? Do agencies have competing visions / objectives?

5. What scale and size of private sector or community participation is involved in designing and implementing social protection and humanitarian interventions, and in contributing to policy debates about future reforms?

6. How do different stakeholders organise themselves in terms of coordination and partnerships? How well have they previously coordinated and collaborated amongst themselves in the event of shocks? C4 Questions: The potential contribution of specific programmes

An important first step in assessing the appropriateness and feasibility of shock-responsive social protection in a given context is to review the design and implementation of existing DRM and humanitarian responses. These can be compared with social protection programmes, and how they have been or might be adapted to respond to shocks, to see how well they offer an appropriate alternative or complement.

Mapping recent DRM and humanitarian response programmes

1. What DRM and humanitarian response interventions have been implemented recently to address large-scale crises? These might be by local or national government, or international actors, or both. Consider interventions that provide support to households or individuals.

2. Thinking of each of these programmes in turn, what have been their key design features? You can use the list of features presented in Table 3 below to think through these.

3. How did these recent responses perform with respect to meeting people's needs at the time? What worked well, and what are the shortcomings? Were they harmonised and coordinated? What evaluations have been conducted and what are their findings? You can use the dimensions of economy, efficiency, effectiveness and equity outlined in section B4 to make this assessment. Also use any available monitoring / evaluation reports.

Mapping social protection programmes

1. What social protection interventions are in place? These might be implemented by local or national government, or international actors, or both. Use the typology of social protection interventions in Section B1 to help compile the list. It may include:

   - social assistance (e.g. cash and in-kind transfers, public works, fee waivers, subsidies)
   - social care services (e.g. support from social workers)
   - social insurance (e.g. contributory schemes to insure against unemployment, disability etc.)

2. Thinking of each programme in turn, what are their key design and implementation features? How resilient are these to a crisis? Use the list in Table 3 to help you think through these.

HELP TO FIND THE ANSWER

If the social protection sector is well established it may have an annual sector review process coordinated across the government and its agencies, which may generate analytical reports.

Programmes are likely to have their own design documents and progress reports, and perhaps also an independent M&E process. Further resources include: the Social Assistance in Developing Countries Database, the World Bank Atlas of Social Protection, the ILO World Social Protection Report data and the Inter-Agency Social Protection Assessment tools.

FOR THOUGHT

The principle of shock-responsive social protection is to consider whether social protection programmes can improve on the emergency response provided by other mechanisms, and if so, how.

This is why it is important not just to think in isolation about the value of the social protection programmes, but to compare them with the DRM and humanitarian / emergency responses that already exist. Without this it is difficult to know whether the use of the system would represent an improvement.

### Table 3 Questions to map design and implementation features of current social protection programmes

| Design feature | Examples of questions relevant for shock-responsive social protection | |---------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------| | Objectives | What is the programme trying to achieve? | | Target group and coverage | Who is eligible for the programme and how is this decided? How often does selection of beneficiaries take place? How are they registered? How often do people leave the programme? What is the overall coverage? To what extent are those targeted by the programme likely to overlap with those who are most vulnerable to shocks? | | Nature of support | What does the programme provide (e.g. cash or in-kind transfer, livelihood support, psychosocial support)? What is the frequency and duration of support? If it is a transfer, what is the value? | | Delivery system | How is the support delivered (for example, if a cash transfer, how does money reach the beneficiary—through direct bank transfer, mobile phone payment, over the counter of a post office, manual distribution by programme staff etc.)? | | Capacity and resources | How is the programme staffed? Does it use government employees, external contractors or independent organisations? How many staff are there, how are they distributed, and what is the potential for recruiting more if needed, on a long- or short-term basis? What other resources does the programme have (e.g. local offices, vehicles), and what is the potential for increasing these resources? | | Case management | What are the mechanisms for communicating with beneficiaries and for handling updates and appeals and complaints? | | M&E | How is the programme monitored and evaluated? What are its key indicators of success? | | Links to other programmes | Does the programme already link up to other complementary initiatives, e.g. health / education / agriculture programmes? How could these be leveraged? |

Note: These questions focus on the descriptive mapping of existing social protection programmes. The discussion of what might be needed from these programme elements in order to improve responses to shocks is the focus of section D. Questions on programme financing are also relevant, and are presented in section C6 below. Similar questions could be adapted to analyse existing DRM and humanitarian programmes.

3. How are these programmes judged to have performed with respect to meeting the needs of their target population? What are the strengths and weaknesses of the programmes? What evaluations have been conducted and what are their findings?

4. What flexibility is there in the programme’s existing design and operations to increase its caseload / change the level of support to its beneficiaries / share its delivery systems with other interventions in the event of an emergency? What prospects might there be to introduce this flexibility?

5. Have any of the programmes already been used flexibly in an emergency, and if so how? Have any of them undergone adjustments in their design to make their beneficiaries better prepared for an emergency or more resilient to crises? What was the experience of this? C5 Questions: The potential contribution of specific delivery systems

The DRM, humanitarian and social protection sectors also contain elements that are not exclusive to any single programme, but that contribute to the functioning of multiple programmes or to coordinating and harmonising the sector as a whole. Examples are processes for contingency planning, early warning and market analysis, vulnerability assessments, and databases such as the 'social registries' that are becoming popular. What is the role that these might play?

Mapping systems used in DRM / humanitarian interventions

1. What are the current methods by which the organisations mandated to deliver DRM / humanitarian response carry out the following functions?

   - Risk and vulnerability assessments
   - Early warning systems
   - Contingency planning
   - Coordination of emergency response
   - Keeping track of beneficiaries reached by different interventions
   - Market assessments
   - Monitoring and evaluating the performance of an overall emergency response

2. How well do these systems and processes perform with respect to meeting people’s needs at the time? What worked well, and what are the shortcomings? Use the dimensions of economy, efficiency, effectiveness and equity outlined in section B4 to make this assessment.

Mapping systems used in social protection interventions

1. What systems and processes exist in the social protection sector that serve, or might serve, a similar function to those cited above in relation to DRM / humanitarian interventions? For example, what information systems and related databases are in place? What tools are used for contingency planning or early warning?

2. Thinking of each of these elements, to what extent do they improve on, or offer an alternative to, the systems already in place for DRM / humanitarian response? Use the dimensions of economy, efficiency, effectiveness and equity outlined in section B4 to make this assessment.

HELP TO FIND THE ANSWER

You may find that there are no single common systems for undertaking these processes in your context. Sometimes groups of NGOs may work together to try to develop a harmonised system for these processes, which may or may not be connected to the government’s own system(s).

A great resource to learn more about tools used by humanitarian actors when delivering cash transfers is CaLP’s Learning Hub, searchable Library and tools sections.

FOR THOUGHT

Humanitarian systems may be set up so as to maximise the possibility that implementers can meet the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence.

Think how this manifests itself in the current design of systems for emergency response (eg. are some systems intentionally kept separately from the government? Who leads the processes?). How would this be affected if a social protection system was used instead? C6 Questions: The financial / budgetary context

The way emergency responses are currently funded should be understood and assessed, in order to be able to make a comparison of funding through different mechanisms. An important element of whether a social protection system can be more responsive to shocks relates to how it is financed, to what extent, and the scope for allocating additional funds towards it for a response to shocks. Consider also the potential challenges of any transition from one system of funding to the other.

Thinking of the DRM, humanitarian and social protection sectors in turn, assess the following:

1. What has been the value of national and local government funding to the sector in recent years (e.g. the last three), and what are the projections for the next three years?
2. To what extent is this funding from domestic or external (international) sources? What are the different sources? How, and from whom, are externally sourced funds raised?

Looking across the sectors as a whole:

1. What are the overall prospects for the macro-economy in the years ahead?
2. How are national and local government budgets determined and allocated annually?
3. What are the prospects for increasing funding towards disaster risk reduction / preventive activities, rather than post-hoc response to disasters?
4. Is there a space for funding shock-response through other sectors, such as education, health or agriculture?
5. Does the government have a contingency fund that it can draw on in emergencies? Does it contain any funds? How is it replenished? For what can it be used, and how is it triggered?
6. Are other risk financing mechanisms being implemented or considered? How do they work?
7. What has been the size of estimated funding requirements in recent emergencies? How much was received and spent?
8. Is there a shift towards multiyear funding of humanitarian assistance? To what extent is this resolving any funding constraints?
9. Are there any implications for future sustainability of funding, if interventions that are currently deemed ‘humanitarian assistance’ were moved to a social protection programme?

HELP TO FIND THE ANSWER

Some of this information may be available in national budget documents, if public. Other relevant documentary sources may include medium-term expenditure frameworks, public expenditure reviews, IMF Article IV reports and humanitarian response plans.

Government documents do not always contain information about development partner spending, which may be either ‘on-budget’ or ‘off-budget’. You may need to collect additional information from individual agencies.

FOR THOUGHT

There is often a large discrepancy between planned and actual expenditure across these sectors. Consider how implementation constraints are likely to affect the availability of funds for a response (lengthy procurement or approval processes, lack of procedures governing the top-up of contingency funds etc.) C7 How to interpret your diagnosis

As we noted in section A2, the answers to these questions do not lead automatically through a flowchart to a prescribed solution. Here we suggest how you might handle your results, and point you to other parts of the toolkit that may help you reach your conclusion.

The primary issue to remember while asking these questions is, of course… Why are you asking them? What is the policy challenge that you are aiming to resolve? It is not enough to look at a social protection programme or system in isolation and decide whether it could be made more shock-responsive. Instead you should look at a set of alternative policy options and select the most appropriate one. This may be a move towards shock-responsive social protection, or it may not.

Here is a three-step process to help you interpret your diagnosis:

**Step 1. Understand the problem**

Reviewing your answers in relation to all three sectors, consider where the main bottlenecks lie in reducing and addressing households’ vulnerability to shocks. Are they mainly challenges of policy design, or of implementation? Is the problem mostly one of a lack of planning and preparedness—such as an absence of rigorous contingency planning or of protocols and agreements with service providers—or do policymakers clearly see the problem but lack the resources to address it? How much are these bottlenecks symptomatic of the state of maturity of the sectors (see section C3 above), and to what extent is it likely that they can be overcome in the short or medium term?

**Step 2. Assess the options**

Once you have collected information about the current DRM / humanitarian programmes and systems and their benefits and challenges, and the same for social protection, you should compare answers between the two. Does the use of a social protection system resolve some issues inherent in the current system for reducing and addressing vulnerability to shocks? What new challenges will it create? What will be lost (for example, will a social protection intervention be able to adhere to the humanitarian principles)? Is this an acceptable trade-off? Could these challenges be resolved equally well (or even better) by simply improving the DRM / humanitarian systems?

**Step 3. Consider unintended consequences**

Looking beyond the current status of the social protection programmes you have reviewed, consider also whether there are any risks in using them that may undermine the effectiveness of the underlying programme or divert it from its core objectives (e.g. by introducing new beneficiaries whose circumstances do not match those of the intended target of the core programme).

The task of assessing the options refers not just to whether it is appropriate to use social protection systems at all for shock response, but considering which programmes could best be adapted and in which ways. For this, the typology of options listed in Figure 1 will be relevant. You can assess the feasibility of tweaking the design of each, if any could move to greater alignment, if any elements would be suitable for piggybacking, and whether there is scope for vertical or horizontal expansion – or a combination, including alongside parallel (and aligned) humanitarian responses. The Table 1 in section B provides a detailed reflection on the prerequisites and the relative merits and risks of each of these options, which will play out differently according to the scenario and context. This information is based on what we know from the country case studies and literature review, yet there is still a lot to learn. For example: • If you do not have a strong social protection programme or underlying social protection system, and you do not expect it to be able to take on the delivery of interventions that are currently provided by humanitarian actors, you might wish to start by simply strengthening the routine social protection intervention; and perhaps introducing design tweaks to improve its use in a shock. For this you would need to have data that permits an understanding of priority needs to ensure effective design adjustments. You might also encourage alignment of interventions among different actors, including the government, which may help a move towards an eventual strong social protection programme.

• If you do not have a comprehensive system or a highly relevant social protection programme that reaches the right target households, but you do have strong programme systems such as good data or strong delivery mechanisms, you might consider piggybacking on elements of the system.

• If you have a programme with good coverage of the geographical areas affected by the disaster, and the beneficiaries of which closely match at least some of the affected group, and you have good data and robust administrative and delivery systems—you may wish to consider vertical expansion of the programme. A good assessment of needs is also required to understand whether it is useful for beneficiaries to receive more of what they already get.

• If you have a programme with robust, accurate data for the identification of new beneficiaries when the programme is expanded and strong administrative and delivery systems that can cope with scale-up and preparation in advance, and if the inclusion of new beneficiaries will not be detrimental to the existing programme or its beneficiaries, consider horizontal expansion. If there is no spare capacity to scale out then ‘surge capacity’ will need to be available and will require institutional coordination, for example by bringing in staff from other geographical areas or other programmes.

• Also consider adapting several programmes at once: each should be considered on its own merits, but it will be important to think about the interplay. Different types of response may be relevant at different points in time (e.g. early response versus longer-term recovery). SECTION D FACTORS GUIDING A RESPONSE

This section highlights key points you may wish to take into account in the design of any shock-responsive social protection intervention. Drawing on the main components of a social assistance programme, it covers:

- Finance—Exploring whether and how the intervention might be funded
- Targeting—Considering who the intervention is designed to reach
- Data management—The merits and challenges of using ready-made databases
- Transfer values—Determining how much support to provide
- Payment / distribution mechanisms—How the support will reach the target recipients
- Coordination—Linking all relevant actors
- Communication—Discussing the intervention with communities
- M&E—Measuring whether the intervention is having its intended effect

WHY IS THIS SECTION IMPORTANT?

Interventions that aim to support households in an emergency are generally designed on the basis of a fairly consistent set of questions about the processes and systems needed to achieve impact. While the questions remain fairly similar for all interventions, the answers will be vastly different depending on the context.

Broadly, the questions cover: Who needs assistance? What support do they need? What and how much can we provide, and how do we get it to those that need it? How will they know about it? How will we keep track of what we’re doing, whether it works, and what others are doing? In technical terms this translates into decisions about targeting, delivery mechanisms, communication, data management, M&E and so forth.

The same questions apply to the delivery of long-term social protection assistance, though again with a range of answers. This similarity in the set of processes and systems is one of the things that has led to the present debate about whether and how social protection systems can complement or substitute for other emergency response mechanisms.

The critical difference is that programme objectives, and the underlying assumptions about what is considered best practice, can vary hugely between programmes that are perceived as ‘humanitarian’ and those considered as ‘development’ interventions or part of routine service delivery. For example, in setting the value of a cash or in-kind transfer, a ‘humanitarian’ response might aim to meet the full consumption needs of a household, while a social protection response might have an objective of contributing enough to meet, say, 25% of the need.

This section therefore highlights some of the key issues to consider, and likely points of contention, in the design and delivery of the different elements of a shock-responsive social protection intervention, from the perspective of humanitarian and DRM as well as social protection implementers. A fuller examination of all these issues is provided in the synthesis report for this research. D1 Finance

Using the answers to the diagnostic questions in section C6, you should have an understanding of the fiscal space for shock-response, including the current channels through which they are disbursed, and you will be aware of whether government and external funding is likely to be available to sustain extensions or adaptations to long-term government-led social protection programmes.

The two factors that will then assist you in determining your choice of funding option are, first, your anticipation of potential funding requirements; and second, your assessment of the challenges and opportunities of the alternative sources of finance.

Anticipating potential funding requirements

Effective programming requires robust processes for anticipating the size of funding needed. Before you can secure timely and predictable financing for shock-responsive social protection, it is important to establish or strengthen systems for needs analysis and funding requirements. This might be a regular process involving government, humanitarian and development partners, such as Mali’s annual National Response Plan for Food Security. Information on likely need could be presented in a plan with funding sources agreed and detailed. The process will be different for slow- and rapid-onset crises. For both, reliable early warning data will be advantageous – this was not often the case in our case study countries.

Assessing alternative sources and channels of finance

Struggles to obtain sufficient funding to respond to emergencies, and to disburse it in a timely manner, have been one of the main impetus for consideration of shock-responsive social protection programming. If you work for a humanitarian agency that has been responding to a protracted crisis over a number of years, the fact that humanitarian funding is often guaranteed for only one year at a time may have been a source of concern. The integration of a response into a long-term social protection programme or system may look like a way of resolving the short-term funding problem. However, you must consider the following:

- Would the switch to funding a response through a social protection programme entail channelling funds through government systems? Do the requirements of the current funder (if not the government) permit this; and if not, can other funders be found, or will the government itself take on the expenditure?

- A switch to disbursement through a government budget may increase national ownership and perhaps improve the sustainability of the overall system. However, governments face considerable demands on their resources, and may meet constraints in their ability to release funds quickly. Administrative delays in releasing emergency funds can have a serious impact on the effectiveness of the response. How can any delays and/or cuts be minimised? The answer depends also on the disbursement mechanism for the specific programme that is used in the response to the crisis (eg. whether it can release payments on an ad-hoc basis or only quarterly. See also section D5 below).

- A difficulty with some funding arrangements is that the amount of money needed can vary hugely from one year to the next. Some mechanisms require unspent money to be returned at the end of a financial year, and this may also have an impact on the size of the budget proposed for subsequent years. How will this scenario be avoided? To help address these challenges, important **disaster risk financing principles** to consider, irrespective of whether emergency response is through shock-responsive social protection or other channels, are:

- Financing should be in place before the event of a crisis, so that it can be rapidly mobilised and disbursed when needed, and

- Effective disaster risk financing strategies include multiple financial instruments.

Mobilising sufficient finance to meet the level of funding required is often challenging. Layers of risk financing including budgetary instruments, contingent financing, market-based instruments, topped up by humanitarian appeals where required, will be necessary (e.g. see World Bank and Asian Development Bank, 2017). Selected options that governments can consider for rapid financing include:

- **Contingency funds**: Funds that can be called upon in an emergency must be accompanied by the clear allocation of responsibility for ensuring that they are adequately resourced and for disbursing their contents in a time-sensitive manner. In some countries, contingency funds are set up but ultimately remain empty. If used for shock-responsive social protection, such funds may require additional financing so that the essential response activities that were originally expected to be funded through these mechanisms can still go ahead.

- **Contingent credit lines**: The release of emergency credit can provide immediate liquidity to countries in the aftermath of a disaster, though this has the drawback of adding to debt. World Bank Catastrophe Deferred Drawdown Options (Cat DDOs) for example, can be accessed by pre-selected countries upon declaration of a state of emergency. Essentially, the Cat DDO serves as bridge financing while funds from other sources (e.g. aid, reconstruction loans or concessional funding) are mobilised.

- **Disaster insurance**: Insurance is one way in which governments can smooth the cost of responding to disasters and reduce reliance on emergency appeals. Insurance payouts can be linked directly to social protection programmes – for example, governments joining the African Risk Capacity (ARC) have to develop a contingency plan showing how they will use the money if they receive a payout following a drought. However, insurance mechanisms are designed to respond to exceptional events, not annual food insecurity, meaning that while they may be one part of a portfolio of funding mechanisms for use in a crisis, they cannot be the only one.

Ultimately, it is widely agreed that it is more cost-effective to spend money on averting disasters and building resilience than to wait for a crisis and then respond(^2).

**HELP TO FIND THE ANSWER**

For a more comprehensive overview of ex-ante versus ex-post disaster risk finance instruments, as well as learning more about how to estimate funding gaps, you can read the World Bank and ADB ‘Guidance Note on Conducting a Disaster Risk Finance Diagnostic’. Other useful tools include: the BOOST databases, which facilitates user-friendly access to budget data in about 40 countries as of mid-2016 and Climate Public Expenditure and Institutional Reviews (CPEIRs).

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(^2) See eg. Cabot Venton *et al.* (2012) and OPM (2016). D2 Targeting

A core principle of an effective shock-response is to be clear about who needs assistance and what support they require. This means making good use of vulnerability assessments and needs assessments. Authorities responsible for emergency response have processes for deciding where to go and whom to support. An important question, then, is whether the social protection sector can contribute an effective alternative or complement to these processes from its experience with supporting chronically poor or vulnerable households; and what the advantages and challenges might be in different contexts.

Many tools exist for conducting vulnerability assessments and needs assessments. These range from annual vulnerability assessments, conducted independently of any specific emergency, to needs assessments conducted in the immediate aftermath of a rapid-onset crisis such as an earthquake. In many of our case study countries, annual vulnerability assessments are conducted jointly by government agencies and development and humanitarian partners in relation to slow-onset food security crises, to determine the severity of food insecurity by geographical area, and to estimate roughly how many households need assistance in each area.

Besides generating information on the nature of support required, these assessments can be used to assist targeting of an emergency response. Targeting typically requires agreement on two factors: (1) The identification of priority geographical areas for support (perhaps with the exception of a generalised economic shock, where a response may be countrywide) (2) The identification of specific households or individuals for support in those areas. A wide variety of approaches are used by humanitarian and DRM actors to do this in emergency contexts, many involving some form of rapid assessment (e.g. to establish extent of ‘damage’) and community-based targeting.

Social protection programmes may be able to make a relevant contribution to reaching an agreement on these factors from two perspectives. First, they may have a useful method for identifying needy areas, households and individuals – depending on the underlying policy decisions on eligibility criteria for specific programmes. Programmes may select households through methods ranging from defining eligible categories, e.g. people of certain age groups or people with a disability (‘categorical targeting’) to consultation with communities about who they believe to be the most vulnerable (‘community-based targeting’), to collecting socio-economic data to estimate how poor the household is (poverty targeting, e.g. through means testing or ‘proxy means testing’, PMT), or a combination. Some types of programmes implicitly define their target group, based on their operations: some public works programmes use self-targeting of those willing to accept the set wage, while universal school feeding programmes target all of those who are in school. Second, they may hold useful data generated from the processes of registration (e.g. on all potentially eligible individuals/households) and subsequent enrolment (e.g. on beneficiary individuals/households) for specific programmes (see D3).

To decide whether a social protection programme can make either of these contributions, consider the following:

1. **What are the objectives of your emergency response**: what kind of needs are you trying to meet, for whom, and what impact do you wish to have? What targeting method is likely to maximise the impact achieved?

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3 For example, the IFRC ‘Cash in Emergencies’ toolkit lists about a dozen. 2. **What targeting approach is acceptable and appropriate, both politically and for communities?** It is important to be sensitive to the cultural norms of communities in relation to the sharing and distribution of assistance. Other factors that might determine the political acceptability of a targeting method include its transparency, its accountability to the recipient population, and the costs to households of participating. Conflict must also be factored in.

3. **What targeting approach is appropriate for the type of shock, and stage of the response** (initial stage versus recovery stage)? For example, for longer-term protracted crises more precision may be needed, while for short-term response a blanket approach may be more appropriate (e.g. allowing for ‘inclusion errors’).

4. **What is affordable**, in terms of the method for targeting and also the scale of support that can be accommodated?

5. **What approach will guarantee a timely response**, especially for rapid-onset disasters?

6. **What targeting method is practical** from the point of view of not overburdening the administrative capacity?

Compare the answers to these questions for standalone emergency response targeting processes, with emergency response delivered using social protection targeting mechanisms used. Also consider combinations of different approaches. By viewing these answers from the lens of what counts as an 'efficient, effective and equitable' intervention (see section B4 for the criteria—timeliness, sustainability and so forth) you can determine which is most suitable in your context.

The way that you plan to use any existing social protection programme for shock response, of course, has implications for how its targeting method has an impact on your own programme. More specifically:

- If you decide to **vertically expand** an existing social protection programme, i.e. to give top-ups to existing beneficiaries, then by definition you are relying on the same targeting method and the same list of beneficiaries as the underlying programme (though potentially only in disaster-affected geographical areas, and potentially only to a sub-set of the list of beneficiaries).

- If you decide to **horizontally expand** an existing social protection programme, i.e. extend it to new recipients, then you may be relying on elements of the same targeting method (e.g. registration data) but selecting a different list of beneficiaries. You will need to select the criteria by which you will extend the programme. This might entail, for example:

  - enrolling individuals or households who meet the current eligibility criteria, in the event that there has been under-coverage (e.g. owing to budgetary constraints); or
  - enrolling individuals or households who meet the current eligibility criteria but who live in areas not yet covered by the programme (and who might eventually be incorporated into the core programme); or
  - enrolling those who fall outside the current eligibility criteria, such as those whose incomes are above a poverty cut-off, or whose age falls outside the range for an intervention targeted categorically by age. This could include enrolling entirely new categories of beneficiaries.

- If you decide to **piggyback on an existing beneficiary list** then you will have at least some of the same beneficiaries as the underlying programme. You may use different eligibility criteria to select the subset of them for the emergency support (e.g. restricted geographical area).

- Alternatively you may **piggyback on a wider list of potential beneficiaries** (e.g. of households that were registered and stored in Social Registries but never enrolled on a programme), but may choose to have an entirely different set of eligibility criteria. See section D3 on data management for more on this. • If you propose to **align** your emergency intervention with a prospective or immature social protection intervention then you may need to choose a targeting method that is suitable for the longer term intervention even if it is not the one that you would prefer for an emergency response. Consider the risks of potential negative impact on the outcome of your programme in this scenario, if you are not reaching the households you would ideally wish to reach.

• It may also be possible to **tweak the design** of the underlying social protection programme so that the households and individuals who are supported by the core programme are more likely to be those at highest risk of vulnerability to shocks. In some cases, this will include applying ‘waivers’ to standard programme rules, such as the enforcement of conditionalities. D3 Data management

Governments and implementing agencies are increasingly exploring whether databases that have been compiled for one primary objective—such as storing data about beneficiaries of a social assistance programme—can also be used in response to a crisis. The usability of these databases is closely associated with the way that beneficiaries of the original programme have been registered and targeted. We highlight five issues that you should consider when reviewing a database to consider its value in shock response: data relevance, completeness, data currency, accessibility and accuracy.

Social protection programmes that are targeted at specific households or individuals usually store information about them on a database. Information about other people—potential future recipients, or households who have been assessed but deemed ineligible—is also collected, but not always stored and maintained. The distinction between these two types of database—beneficiary databases and databases containing information on a wider group of potential beneficiaries (known as social registries)—is crucial.

These existing databases – and their wider information systems – have the potential (subject to the challenges below) to improve the efficiency of emergency response by reducing duplication of data by multiple agencies; improving timeliness of identification of individuals for assistance (leading to timely support if acted on promptly), increasing coverage, and ensuring more predictable support for the household (provided they know the circumstances when they will receive it). Existing data could also promote better understanding of households’ vulnerability, providing inputs for better planning, and could reduce costs of data collection and management, though evidence on this is scarce. Whether or not this improves programme impact will depend on the database’s ability to identify the neediest people in any given shock, compared with alternative data collection arrangements delivering separate interventions.

We note three possibilities (Figure 3). In scenarios a. and b. we do not assume that the existing database should be used for targeting: it depends on whether they are an improvement on the alternative targeting methods used by humanitarian and DRM actors (see also below).

Figure 3 Options for reaching households through social protection databases

Source: OPM. Notes (1) The size of each oval will depend on each country’s circumstances. (2) The ‘National population’ oval represents 100% of the population. (3) To keep the figure simple, the red oval exemplifies one programme (e.g. the country’s flagship programme with highest coverage), yet most countries have several programme databases, sometimes partly overlapping. Databases of contributory programmes are not included here (by research design), but also offer potential.

a) Do disaster-affected households closely match those on the beneficiary list of a social protection programme? If they do, households may be reached through vertical expansion (top-up) of regular support or by piggybacking on the beneficiary list. Table 4 lists three key options for this.

**Table 4** Options for using a beneficiary database in a shock

| Option | Implication | |---------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | **Target all beneficiaries within the selected geographical area** | This can be pragmatic and improve timeliness in severe shocks where most households are likely to have been affected. This was used by the Department of Social Welfare and Development and WFP in the Philippines after Typhoon Haiyan. It will likely lead to inclusion and exclusion errors\* by design. | | **Target some beneficiaries** | For less severe crises, or where there is variation in impact, you may wish to take the list as a start from which household vulnerability is verified. This will likely lead to exclusion errors by design\*. | | **Target no beneficiaries** | In some cases beneficiary households have been de-prioritised on the grounds that they already receive some help (e.g. during the response to the El Niño drought in Mozambique in 2016). This may result from a lack of clear directive to agencies as to what to do with the list, leading to discretionary and inconsistent decisions (see the Mozambique case study). It will likely lead to exclusion errors by design\*. |

Source: OPM, 2018, Barca and O’Brien (2017). \*Unless complementary efforts are made to reach other affected households.

b) **Are disaster-affected households not beneficiaries of a specific programme, but their data is in a database of potential beneficiaries e.g. a social registry?** If it is, explore the feasibility of extending the programme horizontally to new beneficiaries already in the registry, or piggybacking on the registry and delivering a separate programme. Table 5 discussed options for this.

**Table 5** Options for using data on non-beneficiaries in a shock

| Option | Implication | |---------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | **Use variables in the social registry to select households** | This presupposes that households worst affected by a disaster can be identified from existing variables, e.g. their wealth ranking; their geolocation (if GPS coordinates are collected and can be overlaid with hazard vulnerability maps); or the characteristics of a household member. If the criteria, and the circumstances in which they would be used, are planned in advance, such an approach would effectively pre-identify a cohort of households for assistance, enabling immediate targeting in a disaster. Pre-enrolment (e.g. collecting operationally relevant data at registration stage) might also be possible as part of preparedness planning, and might enable a timely response in the manner of ‘no regrets’. | | **Use the records as a starting point to obtain a list of households, but do not target directly from the data** | In this event further screening would be applied post-disaster in order to identify which households have been worst affected. The use of the database as a starting point might enable a more rapid validation process than collecting all information from scratch. |

Source: OPM, 2018 and Barca and O’Brien (2017). c) Are disaster-affected households not covered by social protection\* databases? Horizontal expansion of a programme to reach these households will be harder as no information exists. Assess the usefulness of other databases (e.g. national ID) and explore potential efficiency gains of linking to the underlying information systems, infrastructure and capacity offered by existing social protection databases.

Of course, it is quite likely that the households affected by a shock fall across all of these categories. Moreover, the categories are not necessarily this clear-cut as each country runs a wide variety of social assistance programmes, each with their own approach to data management and varying levels of integration across programmes. Policymakers must decide what approach is most cost-effective given their context, including whether to use separate ways of reaching groups a, b and c, or whether to deliver a single response that reaches a, b and c at once.

However you use the data, gaps in coverage and quality mean complementary methods must be used to identify other households in need. Since no targeting mechanism is perfect, errors deriving from either design or poor implementation will lead to errors of inclusion and exclusion in social protection programmes—such that some of those enrolled are not the poorest, whilst some poor households are excluded. You will have to ensure that those excluded from a programme, or a registry, are not systematically excluded from the shock response.

What you can do in advance of a shock Implementing an effective shock response based on social protection data will require careful planning. In particular, you could develop guidelines on:

- How to better use data for planning purposes as well as targeting;
- The types of crisis these databases and different targeting systems will be used in. For example, in the Philippines, typhoons, El Niño events and earthquakes could lead to the prioritisation of different geographical areas and population groups;
- Who can engage in shock response and how those managing social registries will coordinate with social protection institutions, DRM and humanitarian actors;
- How to use the systems so as to avoid social protection beneficiaries either receiving multiple benefits from different actors, or being excluded; and
- Options for building secure (and respectful of data privacy) two-way information-sharing between social protection and humanitarian actors, to help maintain data currency and ensure timely response.

Five dimensions by which to assess if a database is useful

There are five key dimensions of social protection data (and related information systems) that enhance or limit their potential use in emergencies: Data relevance; Completeness (coverage); Data currency; Accessibility; Accuracy. Table 6 explains what you need to consider for each of these.

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4 The issues in this subsection are discussed fully in the policy brief on information systems that accompanies this report (Barca and O’Brien, 2017).

### Table 6 Five dimensions by which to assess if a social protection\* database is useful

| Dimension | What to look out for when considering their use in a crisis | |-----------|----------------------------------------------------------| | **Relevance:** does it contain the right variables? | • Are the indicators that determine eligibility of households for routine social protection programmes suited for identifying households vulnerable to disasters? Note this will vary depending on the underlying approach to targeting, partly as different programmes have different data requirements. For example universal social pension requires less information than a poverty-targeted grant, while self-targeted programmes such as public works can require even less.\
• Does the database contain any data on climatic vulnerability? Information on dietary diversity (etc) change too quickly to be of use except at the moment of collection – these will always need to be collected at the time of the shock.\
• Is data on non-beneficiaries adequately stored and maintained? If so, does it include operationally relevant information: recipient details, full address, GIS reference, contact number, bank account number, biometric data, etc? | | **Completeness:** Does it contain data on all people / households in the affected area or in need? | • What percentage of population is covered within existing databases, nationally and in affected areas? A database will be best placed to assist an emergency response if a large proportion of those in need are included. Of course, this can also be achieved via several databases.\
o Do beneficiary databases only cover a subset of the population in any given area (e.g. the ‘poor’, older people, children, etc.)? Who? Are they also targeted geographically? How?\
o Is there a social registry serving several social protection programmes? Who is excluded from it and why?\
o What other databases created for uses other than non-contributory social protection are available—including, potentially, a country’s contributory social protection databases, national ID database or its civil registry? | | **Data currency:** Is the information up to date? | • To what extent do the data reflect households’ circumstances at the required point in time? It is impossible for standard social protection data to reflect reality after a disaster, meaning some post-disaster revalidation is always required.\
• How out of date is the data and why? E.g. Data collection: mass ‘census survey’ every few years or continual on demand registration by individuals or households? Who updates the information and how are updates shared? Note: Beneficiary databases tend to be more up to date than databases containing potential beneficiaries, as beneficiary data is used and updated on an ongoing basis.\
• To what extent is household well-being affected by the shock? For example, conflict and many natural shocks may cause widespread internal displacement, split up households and significantly change their material circumstances. | | **Accessibility:** Can the information be accessed by the people who need it? | • Who are the users (e.g. national government versus decentralised government versus non-government agencies) and what protocols and authorisation levels are in place for data sharing with each of them?\
• Is data maintained and stored digitally? What type of data interface (e.g. web service) is used for sharing data?\
• What capacity and infrastructure is there in terms of (i) human resources to use the database (ii) availability of computers (iii) availability of electricity and network connection?\
• What provisions are there for data security and privacy? | | **Accuracy:** Is it free of errors? | • Is the data free of mistakes and omissions (to the extent possible)? This affects the confidence that can be placed in the data, its wider credibility and ultimately its usability. Perceived accuracy also depends on where data is housed and who has oversight over its quality. |

Source: Source: OPM, 2018 and Barca and O’Brien (2017). *In this table, the term ‘social protection’ refers to non-contributory social protection.* D4 Transfer values

Humanitarian interventions aim to ensure that those affected by crises receive assistance that meets their needs. The increasing frequency and severity of crises, and shortfalls in funding, necessitate inevitable trade-offs between scale and value—supporting all those in need with less, or providing adequate assistance to fewer people. The value of humanitarian assistance is increasingly debated as aid becomes monetised—households are increasingly likely to receive emergency relief in cash rather than being given food or other goods—and through use of multisectoral grants, which enable them to spend the cash on whatever they feel is most appropriate (which might be eg. education, health or shelter, besides food). This is highlighting the need for strong coordination and harmonisation of transfer values across the response, and an awareness of the different objectives of different schemes which can justify variations in amounts provided.

It can be challenging to harmonise transfer values between interventions delivered through national social protection programmes and systems, and those implemented separately by humanitarian actors. For example, with a focus on cash assistance:

- If you decide to vertically expand an existing social protection programme, i.e. to give top-ups to existing beneficiaries, you must decide whether either the top-up alone, or the total value including the original support should reflect what other households are being provided through separate emergency interventions.
- If you decide to horizontally expand an existing social protection programme, i.e. extend it to new recipients, then the rationale underpinning the choice of a transfer value should be clear.
- If you decide to piggyback on a component of a programme (e.g. by paying into bank accounts or adding a new benefit onto a payment card launched by a different intervention), but you deliver assistance of some other value, you need to be sure that households are absolutely clear why the value is different to what they or others might be receiving under the core intervention.

The following should be considered when setting a transfer value for emergency assistance delivered through a social assistance programme:

1. **How to maintain the value of the routine social protection transfer in the event of a shock?** This will be particularly the case for cash transfers, if there is a shock that affects prices (food, fuel, other). Tools for market analysis adopted by humanitarian actors may prove useful for this (see e.g. Table 15).

2. **What humanitarian needs form the basis of the calculation?** Agencies must first define which needs a response aims to meet: food security, other basic needs, rent, livelihoods recovery etc. Transfers in the form of food will mainly help meet food security needs (if the recipient consumes rather than sells it) whereas cash can potentially meet a range of needs. The sequencing of needs, and the value and frequency of transfers, will vary.

   Findings from the Philippines and Pakistan suggest that, in a rapid-onset disaster such as an earthquake or cyclone, it may be quicker and easier to manage a response that focuses on basic food and non-food needs that are best supported by regular, recurrent transfers that can be easily standardised—certainly in the early response phase. More specific needs could be factored in during a recovery phase, though this adds a layer of complexity to programme administration since transfer values will vary over time and between households.

3. **How will the transfer value be calculated, and what trade-offs may be needed?** If the emergency assistance is intended to fulfil humanitarian objectives for a portion of the caseload then transfer values must be based on a calculation of humanitarian needs. However, there are trade-offs. The first is between scale and value, driven by funding limitations—whether to meet some needs of many affected households, or the full needs of fewer. A further trade-off, more likely on a programme linking to national social protection, is between securing adequate value and securing political support. In Lesotho, there was some political resistance to temporarily topping up the Child Grant Programme owing to concerns about its impact on popular support for the transfer value of the core programme.

Considering transfer values as part of preparedness planning where possible is important, so that values can easily be computed post-disaster. It is also important to pay the same attention to the ability of the market to absorb additional cash assistance when delivered through a social protection programme as one would if it was a separate emergency response.

4. **How to coordinate with other humanitarian interventions?** It is recognised good practice to harmonise transfer values and agree standards for humanitarian assistance across agencies. Therefore it is important that humanitarian transfers delivered through social protection systems are aligned with those delivered through parallel interventions—or at least that the rationale for the choice of any given transfer level is clearly stated and widely shared. In both the Philippines and Lesotho, variations in transfer values between standalone humanitarian responses and the top-ups to social protection beneficiaries risked confusion and disappointment. The development of common transfer guidelines for government and aid agencies in Philippines and Lesotho subsequently supported greater harmonisation. If going through a social protection system means lowering the support people receive compared with what they would have received under a standalone response, there is a danger of compromising the appropriateness of the support.

5. **What is the scope for varying the transfer value delivered through national systems, particularly in an emergency context?** Transfer values that are more closely aligned with a household’s real needs—which vary, for example, according to the size of the household, location, or phase of the response—will be more effective. However, this adds a layer of complexity to programme administration (communication and delivery). Actors must consider whether the national systems have capacity to deal with these complexities effectively, in a timely fashion. If not, then a standard transfer value to allow delivery at scale and speed may be more useful.

These decisions will form part of a ‘response analysis’, alongside other activities such as a market assessment. D5 Payment / distribution modality

Social assistance may entail the provision of cash, vouchers or in-kind assistance to households, among other instruments. These require a delivery system for getting them to their intended beneficiaries. The system may vary from staff travelling to communities distributing physical cash or goods, to payment service providers such as post offices disbursing cash over the counter, to electronic mechanisms such as transfers by mobile phone or directly into bank accounts. Each combination of instrument (e.g. cash / voucher), disbursement device (e.g. phone, ATM), service provider (e.g. post office, bank, shop) and contracting arrangement (in-house or contracted out) has implications for its appropriateness, accessibility, robustness, degree of integration and cost, even in non-crisis times, and more so when there is disruption due to a disaster.

Think about your proposed payment / distribution modality in relation to the crisis scenarios in your context. Conflict and rapid-onset natural catastrophes can disrupt systems, damage infrastructure and displace people and businesses. A slow-onset crisis such as a drought may cause less damage to infrastructure but may affect population movements. What will happen to your existing payment modalities in those contexts, and how can you mitigate the impact? There are three key issues:

1. How can you best maintain the delivery of the routine social protection intervention in the event of a shock?
2. How can you make sure that any emergency assistance channelled through the same system neither compounds the burden on the routine intervention, nor suffers the same disruption?
3. If emergency assistance is delivered through a different system, will this create any unacceptable differences between the support offered to routine social protection and emergency beneficiaries?

The Inter-Agency Social Protection Assessment (ISPA) tool on 'What matters' in social protection payment delivery mechanisms provides a comprehensive framework for analysing these issues. Using that framework, we recommend that you consider the impact of a crisis across the three main dimensions it identifies, together with a fourth focusing on cost:

- **accessibility**: for payment beneficiaries;
- **robustness**: designing and implementing a payment mechanism that can be depended on to reliably deliver transfers on a regular basis to the correct recipient;
- **integration**: the extent to which the program is taking advantage of economies of scale by coordinating across the sector. This includes integrating the beneficiary into the financial system (financial inclusion) and, for policy makers, ensuring ease of payment across a variety of programs seeking to deliver cash transfers;
- **cost** (and cost efficiency) of delivery: direct costs of the payment mechanism and effectiveness in achieving intended outcomes.

In Table 7 and Box 1 we provide you with some questions and observations to think through.

### Table 7 Considerations in ensuring accessibility, robustness, integration and cost-efficiency of the distribution mechanism

| Element | Considerations for delivery mechanisms in a crisis context | |------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | Maintaining routine service delivery | | | Incorporating emergency response | | **Accessibility**| | | Cost of access | • Will the crisis increase distance that beneficiaries must travel to the nearest distribution point (e.g. if some distributors close down)? | | | • Does this have financial implications for the beneficiary (e.g. transport)? | | | • If the same service provider is used for emergency response (either through piggybacking on the mechanism, or through horizontal expansion of the routine programme), will this increase congestion at the service provider, e.g. through longer queues? | | | • If existing beneficiaries are given top-ups, will they incur any additional charges in accessing support (e.g. by exceeding thresholds for number of free withdrawals)? | | Appropriateness | • Is the technology appropriate in a crisis? For example, if it relies on the use of a phone network, what will happen if the network is disrupted? | | | • Is there flexibility as to when and how beneficiaries can collect their assistance, and how much they can collect? | | | • If implementers piggyback or horizontally expand on the delivery system to provide new support for households who haven't previously received it, will they be familiar with any technology? | | | • Will new beneficiaries receive training on how to access their support? | | | • Is any emergency response likely to place too much strain on the delivery mechanism, e.g. causing liquidity problems (payment providers running out of cash)? | | Rights / dignity | • Is the crisis likely to cause the exclusion of existing beneficiaries? For example, will people with disabilities still be able to reach the distribution point? What will happen if people lose their ID cards or programme cards (e.g. on account of losing their home, or displacement)? | | | • Similarly to the maintenance of routine service delivery (see left): Who might be excluded by the use of the distribution mechanism? | | | • If humanitarian assistance is delivered through a different system to the routine social protection, is this likely to cause any stigmatisation or exclusion of one group or the other? | | **Robustness** | | | Reliability | • How is the predictability of the disbursement date and frequency likely to be affected by a crisis? | | | • If vertically or horizontally expanding, or piggybacking on an existing payment modality, what is the payment frequency? Is this appropriate in a crisis context (e.g. does it require beneficiaries to wait three months for the next disbursement, and is this problematic)? | | | • Can the payment frequency be adjusted, e.g. through extra payments outside the usual schedule? What needs to be in place to do this? | | | • Electronic payment channels may have the potential to vary the frequency of transfers according to changing needs. However, they are primarily an advantage only in schemes where beneficiaries tend to store and use the money electronically; if beneficiaries prefer to withdraw it in cash then the usual requirements for liquidity still apply. | | Governance | • Are there clear procedures and policies that include contingency planning for maintenance of service delivery in a crisis? | • Are there clear procedures for introducing variations to the delivery system (e.g. through protocols with payment providers to provide support to additional beneficiaries or different payment schedules)? • Is there a risk that service providers will be distracted from the routine social protection intervention while handling the emergency? How can this be mitigated? • If more staff are required (e.g. for manual distribution of assistance), how will this be funded and obtained (surge capacity)? | | Security | • Is there an increased risk that recipients will not receive the full amount due, or greater risk of theft, in a crisis context? How can this be mitigated? • Is there flexibility in authentication arrangements (e.g. waiving of ID card requirements—see ‘Rights / dignity’)? | • Are certain payment providers more secure than others in terms of maintaining privacy of the personal data of recipients of emergency support (especially in a conflict situation)? | | Integration | | | | Financial inclusion | • If the routine programme has financial inclusion objectives, e.g. by channelling recipients' support through regular bank accounts, is this likely to have any adverse consequences in the event of a crisis? How can this be mitigated? | • Is a crisis an appropriate time to be introducing payment modalities that promote financial inclusion, or are other modalities more suitable? | | Coordination | • If the payment provider is already used by multiple programmes, are there any implications for one intervention if another intervention faces disruption? • Training or guidance for programme staff and any payment providers on recovering operations following disasters will better ensure continuity | • Does the service provider wish to be contracted for emergency as well as routine support? • Are they likely to increase the commission charged for cash transfers on account of the extra inconvenience of an increased caseload (as was the case for money transfer agents in Somalia during the 2011-12 crisis)? | | Cost-efficiency | • How will running costs be affected in a crisis situation? | • Some payment mechanisms have high set-up costs (especially electronic systems). Does the duration of the response justify their use, if they are set up specifically for the crisis? • Others typically have high running costs (e.g. manual distribution of cash). How does the duration and geographical spread of the response affect these costs? |

Source: OPM, based on ISPA Box 1 Example: Adapting the payment modality after a typhoon in the Philippines

In the Philippines, the payment of the Pantawid cash transfer to households was disrupted by Typhoon Haiyan in 2013. Adjustments were made to restore the functioning of the routine intervention. Pantawid’s delivery systems were also used to provide emergency top-ups (vertical expansion) to several thousand households. The implications for the delivery system were as follows:

| Element | Maintaining routine service delivery | Incorporating emergency response | |---------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Appropriateness | • Power outages prevented the use of e-payment channels for several weeks. Households who usually received payments electronically were allowed to collect them over the counter instead while awaiting a replacement cash card (which took up to several months, despite quick revalidation efforts)\
• Three mobile ATMs were introduced to help disburse cash card payments, although this was delayed so only partially effective | • Rather than waiting for the next bi-monthly payment, the top-ups were issued separately\
• Additional commission was agreed with payment providers to deliver the extra rounds of transfer\
• Obtaining additional physical cash was a challenge in remote areas | | Reliability | | | | Governance | • Government drafted in staff from non-affected regions to help social welfare officers conduct a rapid validation exercise, locating beneficiaries and cross-checking answers to questions against the beneficiary roster, then issuing temporary ID cards | • Cash top-ups to beneficiaries added to the workload of service providers.\
• The unexpected increase in the number of payments (monthly rather than bi-monthly transfers) strained capacity, in some cases leading to missed routine payment dates. | | Security | • Many Pantawid beneficiaries lost their ID and ATM cards\
• The Central Bank relaxed national financial regulations, such as ‘know-your-customer’ requirements, acknowledging that many households had lost their identity cards | • Overall, lack of clarity on financial reporting procedures (e.g. from government to supporting organisations) |

Source: Smith et al. (2017) D6 Coordination

In many countries, collaboration between the social protection, DRM and humanitarian sectors is limited which creates challenges for the effective implementation of shock-responsive social protection. To improve coordination, attention needs to be paid to (i) improving understanding of one another’s fields; (ii) strengthening engagement between the sectors in both policy and practice; and (iii) strengthening coordination between programmes and between delivery systems. DRM programmes and delivery systems are particularly underutilised and can offer potential for improved effectiveness in relation to shock-responsiveness.

Key areas for strengthening coordination

Although social protection, humanitarian and DRM actors are increasingly working together, coordination can be challenging. For shock-responsive social protection, the ideal scenario is that a coordinated social protection sector feeds into a disaster management platform that coordinates a response. However, in many countries this does not happen, in part because of challenges arising from the multi-sectoral nature of the sectors and differing levels of maturity.

Coordination and collaboration needs to be strengthened in three key ways:

1. Improve understanding of one another’s fields.

2. Strengthen engagement between sectors—in policy and practice.

3. Strengthen coordination between programmes and between delivery systems.

4. Improve understanding of one another’s fields

Definitions of and principles underlying ‘social protection’, ‘DRM’ and ‘humanitarian’ work are often not widely understood between the three sectors. In fact, both social protection and DRM have long been conceived of in similar cycles, revealing multiple entry-points for joint thinking and working. As shown in Figure 4 below, both sectors aim to prevent shocks, reduce negative impacts if a shock occurs, support affected households and communities, and invest in measures that lessen the impact of any future shocks.

Figure 4 Analytical frameworks for DRM and social protection

Source: Authors. Note: The DRM cycle consists of five components in relation to disasters: Prevention, Mitigation, Preparedness, Response and Recovery. A commonly used social protection framework conceives of the sector as comprising Protective, Preventive, Promotive and Transformative functions (Devereux and Sabates Wheeler, 2004). Ideas of how to improve in this area:

- Undertake targeted initiatives to train stakeholders in the basic principles of social protection, humanitarian work and DRM.
- Promote national and sub-national reflection on broader institutional links with social protection through the full DRM cycle (prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery).

2. Strengthening engagement between sectors

When thinking about how to strengthen coordination across the different sectors, you have to plan and act at different levels. Coordination is needed at the national level, between sectors, but also within and between their representatives at subnational and community levels. This coordination can either be at an institutional level (i.e. policies and governance arrangements) or an organisational level (e.g. activities).

Coordination at an institutional level

A starting point for improved institutional coordination is to improve coherence within each sector individually. The more each sector is aligned within itself, the easier cross-sector collaboration becomes. This is particularly challenging for social protection and DRM as they both have a wide-ranging scope and funding and are sometimes spread across many different ministries.

Ideas of how to improve in this area:

- Work to improve individual sectoral coherence, for example through national and sub-national strategies that other actors can align behind
- Pay attention to intersectoral policy coherence: joint policies, strategies and/or frameworks that clearly set out the synergies and overlaps between the sectors and are developed together.

Coordination at an organisational level

Organisational coordination needs to be deliberately planned and built within and across sectors. Without formal coordination, there is a risk of policy agendas and programmes overlapping with or competing with each other. The presence and effectiveness of coordination bodies for strategic oversight and information exchange differs dramatically between countries. Examples of coordination structures include:

- Forums for data collection and analysis
- Technical working groups on specific themes (e.g. shock-responsive social protection)
- Cash working groups to coordinate cash assistance in emergencies
- Disaster response groups
- Alliances for advocacy and policy coordination
- Temporary committees
- Periodic conferences

Ideas of how to improve in this area:

- Consider creating and activating some of the forums and structures listed above to facilitate information exchange and strategic coordination. More than one type is likely to be necessary, but beware of overlap and meeting fatigue. • Ensure these groups have wide membership drawn from multiple sectors, agencies and government ministries / departments. Consider rotating the chair position between organisations.

• Strengthen Cash Working Groups in contexts where cash is becoming a significant feature of both long term social protection and emergency response. This could include joint planning exercises, shared lessons on design and implementation features and joint capacity building.

3. Strengthen coordination between programmes and systems

Shock-responsive social protection will only ever be a partial solution for responding to emergencies, and so many separate emergency interventions will need to be effectively coordinated to avoid duplication. Agreement will be required on many different design and implementation details. There is an opportunity to streamline processes, for example for enrolling households, distributing support or communicating why there are differences. Section D8 also sets out the importance of coordinating M&E approaches between different programmes in a particular country, in order to measure them consistently and inform future decisions on effectiveness.

Some stakeholders engaging in shock-responsive social protection become preoccupied with avoiding duplication of specific households included in emergency and routine social protection responses. This is not really an issue and social protection programme beneficiaries should not automatically be deliberately excluded from emergency response programmes as a) the value of humanitarian assistance can be significantly higher than the value of regular social assistance transfers; b) households affected by shocks may have lost other sources of food and income, in which case they will have additional needs as a result of the shock.

In most countries, the DRM sector is not well coordinated with the social protection and humanitarian sectors. This often results in missed opportunities. The DRM sector often has numerous delivery systems and programmes that could be utilised to support the social protection and / or humanitarian sectors to improve shock-responsiveness. Some examples are included in the table below. Some relate specifically to DRM engagement with shock-responsive social protection programmes and some to social protection more broadly; collaboration between the sectors is likely to lead to a more conducive environment for shock-responsiveness.

### Table 8 Opportunities for collaboration between DRM and social protection

| Element of DRM cycle | Typical DRM programmes and systems | Opportunities for collaboration with social protection | |----------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------| | **Prevention and mitigation** | Programmes to reduce vulnerability to disasters | Given that reducing poverty and vulnerability is both an underlying driver of disaster resilience and a focus of social protection efforts, there is great potential for collaboration and mutual learning. | | | 'DRM mainstreaming' efforts | DRM mainstreaming efforts—linking in with development plans, cross-sectoral strategies, committees, forums etc. at all levels—provide an opportunity for social protection and DRM staff to work together | | | Community-based prevention programmes | 'Cash plus' programmes may contribute to disaster prevention and mitigation through the additional elements, e.g. by distributing drought-resilient seeds or training on flood-mitigating farming techniques. | | | Resettlement or adaptive livelihoods programmes | Political economy analysis would be necessary to fully understand how social protection could contribute to incentivising change and what obstacles exist | | **Preparedness** | Disaster risk financing mechanisms | Mechanisms such as contingency funds and sovereign risk insurance schemes could be linked to social protection interventions | | | DRR contingency plans | Could incorporate any expected expansion of social protection programmes following a shock. We found several examples of joint working between DRM and social protection on this | | | Early warning systems and criteria for levels of alert | These systems should trigger action before an emergency to reduce losses. Data can be used to achieve consensus on the approach and/or extent of a crisis, and trigger finance for social protection response | | | Vulnerability, risk and hazard assessments | Assessments can be used not just to design responses, but to shape the targeting of social protection programmes to make them more shock-responsive (design tweaks). | | | Public information systems | Awareness-raising mechanisms and emergency communication systems, including disaster warning alert apps on mobile phones, could explain to beneficiaries their entitlements under expanded social protection programmes | | **Response** | Provision of cash and in-kind emergency transfers | Shared modalities, programmes and systems. This was the area of greatest collaboration between the sectors across the case studies, although shared approaches did not guarantee coordination in many places | | | Post-disaster needs / damage / loss assessments | Post-disaster assessments may be useful for targeting social protection programmes, depending on the speed with which they can be conducted and the content | | **Recovery** | Reconstruction programmes ('build back better' approach) | In theory, public works programmes could be used for reconstruction activities such as rebuilding infrastructure. However, this requires technical expertise, machinery, skills and resources that are generally not present | | | Post-disaster rebuilding of livelihoods | Many ways in which these programmes could be linked to social protection, e.g. through in-kind transfers linked to livelihood development e.g. tool distribution | | **General** | DRM committees at regional, local and community levels | DRM committees may be able to play an important role in supporting planning, targeting and the implementation of social protection initiatives. | | | Institutional and organisational framework | The DRM institutional framework—laws, policies, codes etc.—could formally incorporate attention to social protection. There should be opportunities to bring social protection and DRM professionals together. |

Source: O'Brien et al. (2018). D7 Communication

Strong communication with communities is important when humanitarian assistance is delivered through national social protection programmes, and particularly when there are multiple delivery channels. Adaptations to routine social protection programmes and humanitarian assistance provided using social protection channels may not be well understood by communities which can create frustration, feelings of inequity and misinformation which can ultimately result in individuals not knowing whether they are eligible for support and can affect trust.

If social protection systems and programmes are used for shock-response, you must take considerable care to ensure the following points are communicated effectively to both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries:

1. **Decisions on targeting**: Who is included and excluded, and why. Will existing beneficiaries receive extra support?

2. **Explanations of the type and value of the support**: What it is based on, why this differs from the type and value of social protection in normal times, or other parallel humanitarian assistance, or both.

3. **Duration of support**: For how long households will receive support, if additional assistance is temporarily provided, and how the exit process will work.

4. **How to request further information, complain or query any decisions**: Grievance mechanisms are an important part of enabling two-way communication within shock-responsive social protection, particularly where personal data are used for targeting. Having an effective grievance redress system can reduce errors and improve understanding of the intervention.

Misunderstandings around these key points can have further reaching, long term and political ramifications. Any dissatisfaction with the emergency response may be directed not only towards its implementers but also towards the incumbent government, if they are not delivering. Social protection programmes are understood by citizens to be reaching particular groups of people, with particular amounts (if programme communication has been successful). Providing additional payments to beneficiaries (or to some beneficiaries), or including households who do not fit the targeting criteria, without clear explanation may create tensions or undermine public support for the long term programme.

If you are an implementer of a social protection intervention or humanitarian assistance for households, you can consider using the communication routes available via the DRM architecture when engaging in shock-response, beyond those that you regularly use. These might include, for example:

- SMS / texting, social media and mobile phone apps
- DRM city / village committees, forums and response teams
- DRM information networks
- DRM training sessions, simulations, workshops
- Traditional media—radio, emergency broadcasts D8 M&E

Good monitoring and evaluation of shock-responsive social protection can be made through the careful selection of appropriate and robust indicators, with consideration of harmonising indicators across interventions and sectors (social protection, DRM and humanitarian). This section sets out some principles for developing and selecting appropriate indicators to measure the performance of shock-responsive programmes as well as indicators to measure progress in developing shock-responsive systems.

Problems with current approaches

Monitoring frameworks suffer from similar problems:

- an over-emphasis on inputs and outputs, with less attention paid to outcomes and impact
- poor quality data
- lack of coherence or shared indicators across actors, programmes and sectors.

Most importantly, there are no established indicators that are consistently applied to measure the efficiency and effectiveness of using social protection to respond to shocks, nor standard indicators consistently applied to DRM and humanitarian response. It is therefore very difficult to compare emergency support delivered through separate humanitarian or DRM responses with support delivered through social protection programmes and systems.

Improving indicators for shock-responsive social protection

For routine monitoring, social protection programmes typically collect data on inputs and outputs (e.g. measuring the resources needed to implement the programmes, and its immediate outputs). This information tends to be the easiest to collect and measure, and more frequently available. However, it is also important to collect information on outcomes and impacts in order to ensure that the programme is meeting its agreed objectives. Programmes will benefit most from having agreed indicators across the different stages outlined in Table 9 below.

In attempting to measure the performance of social protection systems in responding to shocks, you can consider four different categories, covering measurement of processes and systems, outcomes and impacts:

1. Indicators focused on the activities and effectiveness of the routine social protection programme in building household resilience by reducing vulnerability to shocks (for example through continued protection of household income or preventing households from falling further into poverty as a result of a shock).
2. Indicators focused on measuring a routine social protection programmes' ability to withstand shocks and continue operations in the context of a crisis.
3. Indicators focused on the effects of the shock-responsive component. This might be e.g. the flexible use of social protection to enable households to secure their needs when a shock

______________________________________________________________________

5 See McCord, A., Holmes, R. and Harman, L. (2017), ‘Indicators to measure social protection performance: Implications for EC programming’, Concept Paper N° 5 Tools and Methods Series’, European Union. occurs. These indicators can be used to measure and compare emergency responses through social protection programmes and systems, and traditional emergency response.

4. Indicators focused on coordination, integration and/or harmonisation of social protection, humanitarian and DRM actors and interventions to better prepare for, respond to and facilitate recovery from shocks.

Table 9 Types of indicator

| Indicator type | Explanation | |----------------|-------------| | Input | The financial, human, material, administrative and regulatory resources used by the programme | | Process | The activities that turn inputs into outputs. For shock-responsive social protection these are likely to relate to: | | | - Developing system components/policies/legislation (e.g. registry databases, targeting mechanisms, payment systems) | | | - Planning and preparedness (e.g. contingency plans and funds in place) | | | - Creation of partnerships and coordination | | Output | The outputs delivered by a programme. For shock-responsive social protection these are likely to relate to e.g.: | | | - The number of beneficiaries receiving assistance | | | - The timeliness (speed) of the response | | Outcome | The direct benefits of the programme or short-term changes as a result of the programme. For shock-responsive social protection these are likely to relate to: | | | - Programme coverage | | | - Targeting effectiveness and equity | | | - The effectiveness and adequacy of benefits in improving beneficiaries’ circumstances | | Impact | Broad changes to wellbeing, vulnerability or resilience. This is usually assessed as part of an independent evaluation rather than as part of routine monitoring. |

Source: authors. Note that the timeframe for using different indicators will vary. E.g., input indicators can be considered at the beginning of the response whereas impact indicators will be considered once a response is underway.

Existing guidance for measuring the achievements of social protection, DRM and humanitarian response programmes may be of use here, if tailored to the context of shock-responsive social protection. These include DFID’s guidance notes on measuring value for money in social transfers, in social protection systems, in humanitarian programming and cash transfers in emergencies, and the OECD-DAC criteria for evaluating development programmes and humanitarian assistance.

Some examples of topics that might be covered by potential indicators are presented in Table 10.

### Table 10 Example of topics that might be covered by shock-responsive social protection indicators

| Indicator type | Monitoring how routine social protection copes in a shock | Monitoring the shock-responsive component | Coordination | |----------------|----------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|--------------| | **Input** | • Costs, time and human resource inputs to the routine programme\
• % of funding that is multi-year | • Costs, time and human resource inputs to the shock-responsive component\
• Contingency funding agreed and in place | • Costs, time and human resource inputs coming from other sectors / ministries\
• Integration of social protection in disaster insurance payout plans | | **Process** | • Plans completed for continuing operations in the event of a shock\
• Development of social registry | • No. of quality plans and procedures in place for shock-responsive component\
• Completion of activities related to building capacity of delivery infrastructure to absorb increased workload (e.g. no. of payment service providers able to make additional payments)\
• Key operational systems developed for accessing and using contingency funds and insurance payouts | • Links developed with early warning systems\
• Examples of data sharing on vulnerability\
• Signed memorandums of understanding and action plans in place between different actors | | **Output** | • No. of programmes operating in areas at risk of shock\
• No. of beneficiaries continuing to be supported throughout shock\
• Amount and regularity of transfers delivered throughout shock | • No. of disaster-affected people reached with additional support\
• No. of households / individuals receiving support within x days / weeks (after a specified date)\
• % of clients receiving additional support within x days | • Examples of shared systems and operations | | **Outcome** | • % of beneficiary households reporting improved livelihoods, reduced negative coping strategies, improved consumption on savings\
• Levels of self-reported food insecurity\
• Assessment of whether households are better able to meet daily needs, impact on savings | • Indicators as for recipients of routine social protection (see left), but relating to those receiving support because of the shock\
• Evidence of improvement in comparison to emergency response e.g. (% increase in coverage, cost saved, days saved, increase in transfer value etc.). | • Money saved through shared systems or economies of scale (e.g. through eliminating duplication of data collection) | | **Impact** | • Evidence of poverty reduction amongst beneficiaries, livelihood diversification, improved savings and value of household assets | • Evidence of improved dietary diversity and child nutrition amongst beneficiaries, value of household assets maintained | • Evidence that systems for improved working across sectors have been institutionalised (e.g. joint strategies developed and routinely implemented) |

Source: Authors. Note: These are not specific indicators (which would need to be specific, measurable, timebound etc.) but rather themes that might be covered. Considerations when choosing indicators

Indicators should be chosen that are context-specific and that are suitable given the existing data availability and monitoring activities. Indicators should relate to the overall objectives of the programme, or differentiate between the routine programme and the shock-responsive element. In situations where a long-term programme is being scaled up, or a system is being piggybacked on, it makes sense to integrate the systems and processes for monitoring the shock-responsive element with the M&E of the long-term programme if possible, while making sure that the two elements can be distinguished in the data.

There are numerous guidelines to support the development of measurable indicators including RACER: Relevant, Acceptable, Credible, Easy and Robust (EC, 2012); SMART: Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic and Time-limited; and CREAM: Clear, Relevant, Economic, Adequate and Monitorable (McCord et al., 2017). Some of the indicators currently used by scaled up social protection programmes are not very measurable, for example “use of adequate targeting system to identify the right beneficiaries” or a “a system for scaling up”. It is much better to specify a timeframe, number, percentage or completion of a particular milestone.

Whilst it is not possible that all programmes can use exactly the same indicators, ideally actors responding to the same shocks in a particular country would harmonise their frameworks and use comparative indicators as much as possible. If the social protection and humanitarian sectors in a country can start to use comparable indicators then it will become much easier to identify whether and how shock-responsive social protection has been able to improve on other emergency responses. Box 2 provides considerations when selecting indicators to be used for measuring the performance of shock-responsive social protection.

Box 2 Considerations when selecting social protection indicators

A checklist of key questions to be considered in relation to the type of indicators to select are:

- How many indicators are desirable for a policy or programme (taking into consideration the size of the programme)?
- What types of indicators are already used or omitted and are necessary for appraising performance (input, output, outcome, impact)?
- What is the rationale behind using the existing indicators?
- Do these indicators collect an appropriate range of preparedness and shock response outcomes and impacts?
- What indicators can be used to assess the quantity of response provided?
- What indicators can be used to measure the quality of response?
- What types of benchmarks are used to measure the quantity and quality of preparedness and shock response (both processes and provision) (e.g. objective, time-based, comparative national or international)?
- Are composite indicators used and if so are the results useful or meaningful for appraising performance?
- Do indicators create perverse monitoring incentives?
- Are targets disaggregated by, for example, sex, disability, geography?

Source: adapted from McCord et al., 2017 SECTION E EXPERIENCE

This section provides a reference to selected recent examples of cases where shock-responsive social protection has been considered and/or put into practice.

This toolkit is mainly based on research carried out in the following countries and regions, alongside a global literature review (Smith et al., 2017):

Source: OPM (2017).

We also draw on OPM’s recent case studies (of shock-responsive social protection in Latin America and the Caribbean (Ecuador, Guatemala, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Peru and El Salvador), undertaken on behalf of WFP (see project here and Section F for details).

E1 Design tweaks in practice

Example of a design tweak: Cash transfers in the Philippines following Typhoon Haiyan

Source: Smith et al. (2017)

Changes to the regulatory environment can enhance shock-responsive social protection, particularly when they are made before the shock occurs. Before Typhoon Haiyan, earlier in 2013, the Department for Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) in the Philippines had passed a resolution that if a state of calamity was declared, household conditions on cash transfer programmes would be waived for three months. This change meant that Pantawid transfers automatically became unconditional following Typhoon Haiyan, at the same time that DSWD and WFP began their discussions on delivering an emergency cash transfer through Pantawid. This made it easier to plan an unconditional top-up and vertically expand the programme. Similarly, in the wake of the typhoon, the Central Bank relaxed its national financial regulations related to ‘know-your-customer’ requirements, in acknowledgement that many households had lost their identity cards. This contributed to the conducive environment for implementing emergency cash assistance.

**Example of a design tweak: School feeding programme in Mali**

*Source: O'Brien et al. (2018)*

In Mali the government has tailored the roll-out of its school meals programme to prioritise the most food-insecure areas. The Ministry of Education's long-term objective is to provide free meals for pupils in all schools, but as it does not yet have the capacity to do so, it reaches 20% of primary schools for now (others are supported by WFP). The government has geographically targeted its programme so as to prioritise the 166 communes considered most vulnerable to food insecurity. Within the targeted zones, priority is given to schools with low enrolment and retention rates, especially of girls. Although shock-responsiveness is not the primary objective of the programme, by prioritising these areas - and by prioritising girls, whom some evidence shows to have higher vulnerability to disasters compared to boys - it is more relevant in the event of a shock.

**An opportunity for a design tweak: Mozambique’s cash transfer programme**

*Source: Kardan et al. (2017)*

In Mozambique, where the social protection programmes are relatively under-resourced and the overall system is relatively immature (although some programmes have been established for a long time), our research team identified an opportunity to tweak the design of the cash transfer programme, the Basic Social Subsidy Programme (PSSB). The PSSB routinely suffers from disbursement delays in the first quarter of each new financial year in January. Unfortunately, that also coincides with the period of greatest risk of climatic shocks such as cyclones and floods. A simple design tweak could be made to the payment plan, such as a double payment in December in place of a payment in January or February: this would ensure that households were covered at the time of increased vulnerability, and would be fiscally cost neutral if the aggregate amount paid across the year remained the same. In addition, as the programme continues its expansion in line with the objectives of the national social protection strategy, it could consider prioritising geographical areas and populations most vulnerable to particular shocks, as in the Mali school meals example above.

**A challenge in adjusting programme design: Lesotho’s socioeconomic database**

*Source: Kardan et al. (2017)*

Lesotho is reforming (overhauling rather than tweaking) its large database, known as NISSA, which records the socioeconomic characteristics of poor households in some areas. Under the reform it aims to record details of 50% of households in each location, selected by the community, rather than seeking full coverage in each area as per the earlier database. The change is intended to increase the influence of the community, improve accuracy and speed up completion of the database. However, a side effect is that the data—while possibly more accurate—may cover a smaller percentage of households in any given area than the previous one, so may be a less useful starting point for finding out about households in the event of an emergency, since many of those who were not considered poor initially will not be on it. E2 'Piggybacking' on an established system or programme in practice

Examples of piggybacking on beneficiary lists and databases: Lesotho and Mali

Source: Kardan et al. (2017); O'Brien et al. (2018)

During fieldwork, several examples of piggybacking were found to be under discussion or under implementation. Commonly, actors take advantage of databases or households lists that have already been set up by another programme, in order not to duplicate the effort: indeed, often these databases are set up with that purpose in mind (see section D7 above for more on such databases).

- In Lesotho during the El Niño-induced drought in 2016, the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and Catholic Relief Services (CRS) piggybacked on a specific programme: they used the Child Grant Programme’s beneficiary list to distribute seeds, training and vouchers.
- In Mali, the government has piggybacked on humanitarian databases to build the Registre Social Unifié, a unified social registry that is still being developed but is envisioned as a gateway for all actors working on social assistance to access information about individuals and households.

The appropriateness of this action depends on factors such as the extent to which social protection programme beneficiaries are also disaster-affected, and the data privacy arrangements in place.

An opportunity for piggybacking: Pakistan’s National Socioeconomic Registry

Source: Watson et al. (2017)

Piggybacking was identified by some stakeholders as the most feasible option for effective shock-responsive social protection in Pakistan. Agencies responding to a disaster might usefully build on elements of the delivery systems used by the national social assistance intervention, the Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP). For example, they could obtain support regarding data from the underlying social registry, the National Socio Economic Registry (NSER) and regarding registration from the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) who are responsible for the issuance of computerised national IDs. This would provide the opportunity to build upon the technical knowledge and procedures developed within BISP as an organisation, including the strong relationship with NADRA and the NSER database which, despite some limitations, still contains the strongest household data that exists in the country.

A challenge in Lesotho: to piggyback on the national social registry or not?

Source: Kardan et al. (2017)

In Lesotho, during the 2016 drought, some humanitarian agencies considered whether to select households for support by piggybacking either on the national social registry, the National Information System for Social Assistance (NISSA), which listed over 100,000 households who were thought to be chronically poor and vulnerable; or on a subset, the 27,000 households who receive transfers under the Child Grant Programme (CGP).

Some international agencies had existing relationships with the implementers of the NISSA and the CGP, which made it an accessible route through which to reach affected households. The relatively extensive coverage was also an advantage. On the other hand, the database covered households in only about half the community councils (subdistricts) in Lesotho; some areas had been picked by lottery, so were not necessarily the areas most affected by a drought; and the data had been collected several years earlier, some of it in 2010, so much of it was out of date. The data were also not visible to people outside the capital, including the district disaster management teams who coordinated the emergency response.

In the end no agency used the broader NISSA database, ie. of non-CGP households, since that data had not been used since it was collected and it did not seem the best way to identify households currently facing food insecurity. However, some agencies—such as FAO and CRS—did piggyback on the CGP beneficiary list to distribute their assistance as those households were currently in receipt of transfers so their records were more up-to-date and they could be traced (see also above).

Other social protection databases were not assessed for their suitability to be piggybacked on, so we cannot compare these benefits and drawbacks relative to other programmes.

**Example from Ecuador: response to the 2016 earthquake**

*Source: Beazley (2017)*

WFP provided support to the Government of Ecuador in response to the 2016 earthquake. WFP channelled its support through the emergency allowance Bono de Alimentación, which relied on systems, processes and infrastructure used by regular social assistance schemes.

**E3 ‘Vertical expansion' in practice: top-ups to current beneficiaries**

**Example of vertical expansion: top-ups to a cash transfer in the Philippines**

*Source: Smith et al. (2017)*

The Philippines has a major government-led national conditional cash transfer (CCT) programme, the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Programme (known as Pantawid or 4Ps). Pantawid routinely delivers cash benefits to 4.4 million poor households with children—making it the world's third largest CCT. Following Typhoon Haiyan in 2013, Pantawid was vertically expanded in two ways: WFP provided a small amount of extra cash and rice to 105,000 beneficiary households in typhoon-affected areas immediately after the disaster, and UNICEF provided a much larger top-up to about 5,800 beneficiary households with children for six months during the subsequent recovery phase, prioritising structurally vulnerable households.

We class this as vertical expansion of Pantawid—rather than WFP and UNICEF piggybacking on Pantawid's beneficiary list—because the response was fully integrated into the national programme: all the Pantawid systems were used, rather than just one or two, and the programme continued to be branded as Pantawid throughout.

**Benefits of vertically expanding a cash transfer: example of the Philippines**

*Source: Smith et al. (2017)*

In wanting to respond with cash at scale following Typhoon Haiyan, WFP could not find an NGO with the capacity to identify households and disburse cash quickly across all of the affected area, which would have required new systems and processes for communication, targeting and payment. The Pantawid programme had well established systems and extensive coverage, and many disaster-affected families were already enrolled in it. It therefore offered a rapid means to reach a large number of people with emergency cash assistance, at a speed and scale that was not possible through traditional humanitarian channels (over 105,000 households within two months, compared to 85,000 through NGOs over a longer period). As explained by a WFP official:

'The first cash we got out was through our NGO partners. But to reach the scale that we reached with cash transfers through the Pantawid partnership—there was no other way of doing this rapidly. The targeting, verification, ID, delivery instrument and multi-pathway delivery channels with pre-existing contracts all helped'.

The timeframe for launching the vertical expansion of Pantawid (one month) also compared favourably with the several months that it took WFP to establish a service agreement with a financial service provider on its separate ‘cash for assets’ programme during the recovery phase.

This ability of the CCT to disburse emergency relief quickly at scale means that for those households who were Pantawid beneficiaries, it was a more efficient channel for cash distribution than the parallel humanitarian system. The donor, WFP, reports that using existing systems also meant relatively low transaction costs compared to the alternatives through implementing partners.

**Vertical expansion of cash transfers in Latin America and the Caribbean**

*Source: Beazley, Solorzano and Sossouvi, (2016)*

In Latin America and the Caribbean, governments tend to lead and fund the response to shocks. Cash-based social assistance has been mostly used to respond to shocks, largely because of strong administrative capacity in managing cash transfer programmes. For example, in Argentina, the government gave additional benefits to beneficiaries of the child grant Asignación Universal por Hijo, and of the social pension, in response to the flooding of 2015. In Guatemala, recipients of the CCT Bono Seguro who inhabit areas that are declared by the state as suffering from an emergency situation receive an increase of up to 50% of their transfer. In Chile, a lump sum was paid to beneficiaries of the Chile Solidario programme affected by the 2010 earthquake. In other cases, school meals have also been used in emergency responses, providing additional rations of food and meals during school holidays (i.e. Haiti, Honduras and Nicaragua). Despite the low coverage of social insurance—particularly coverage of poor people—there are also some experiences in the region of expanding social insurance vertically in response to emergencies (i.e. Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic and El Salvador).

**E4 'Horizontal expansion' in practice: temporary inclusion of new beneficiaries**

**Example of horizontal expansion: the Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP) in Kenya**

*Source: O'Brien et al. (2018)*

The case of the HSNP cash transfer in northern Kenya, led by the National Drought Management Authority, is routinely cited as a prime example of a programme with a flexible component that allows for horizontal expansion in an emergency. The core programme gives cash every two months to 100,000 very poor households across the region. Every household has been registered with a bank account, into which money is paid directly. An innovation in Phase 2 of HSNP, which started in 2013, has been the registration of almost all other households in the four participating counties—nearly 300,000—and give them a bank account as well. The account of these 'Group 2' households is normally dormant—they do not receive a routine transfer—but some are eligible to receive ad-hoc payments from HSNP in a drought, depending on their wealth ranking at the time of a targeting exercise. HSNP has triggered this temporary expansion of transfers to more beneficiaries several times since a first emergency payment in early 2015.

It is worth noting that the HSNP operates in an environment where the social protection system is relatively sophisticated and well resourced (by both the government and donors), and where the routine HSNP already reaches over 25% of the population in the areas where it operates. We therefore caution against assuming this can be easily replicated in contexts with nascent social protection systems where the challenges and risks mentioned below are likely to be felt more strongly.

**Example of horizontal (and vertical) expansion: Ethiopia’s PSNP**

*Source: Gray and Asmare (2012)*(^6); *Maunder et al., (2015)*(^7)

The Productive Safety Nets Programme (PSNP), originating in 2005 to reduce reliance on annual emergency food aid appeals in chronically food insecure woredas (districts), is implemented by Ethiopia’s Ministry of Agriculture and supported by a donor coalition. In its most recent phase it has been operating a continuum of four risk management instruments: 1. First, it provides six months of regular transfers per year (cash, food or a mix) to households identified by communities as chronically food insecure. 2. The second stage comprises woreda and regional contingency budgets, 20% of the annual PSNP budget. 3. In 2009 a Risk Financing Mechanism (RFM) was introduced to mobilise additional resources in an emergency. Based on an in-principle donor commitment, it allows for up to $80 million to be mobilised for a crisis each year. The established early warning system triggers the release of funds. 4. A fourth instrument, the Humanitarian Requirements Document, is released twice a year and defines the needs of non-beneficiaries, mostly in terms of food aid, though there is a cash element for non-food requirements such as water, health and education provision.

The federal government triggered the RFM in August 2011 to address the transitory food needs of about 9.6 million people in PSNP districts, of whom two-thirds were existing PSNP clients and one-third were non-beneficiaries, who received up to three months’ support. The literature highlights that the mechanism significantly reduced the ‘typical’ humanitarian timeline for response. It took nine months from the launch of the humanitarian appeal to leverage all funding. By comparison from request to disbursement of funds the RFM took six weeks, although, though there were significant delays in the government making the initial request to draw down the RFM funds. In 2014 it was triggered again, but with some challenges in timeliness.

**Horizontal expansion of cash transfers in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC)**

*Source: Beazley, Solorzano and Sossouvi (2016)*

As a response to the global financial crisis of 2008 many countries in LAC extended the coverage of their cash transfer programmes. For example, in Colombia, Familias en Acción (Families in Action) increased its number of beneficiaries by almost 50%, from 1.8 million families (7.9 million people) in 2008 to 2.6 million families (11.6 million people) in 2009. In the Dominican Republic, the Solidaridad programme almost doubled, from 1.2 million individuals in 2007 to 2.1 million in 2008, and has remained rather constant since. In Jamaica, the number of beneficiaries of the Programme of Advancement through Health and Education (‘PATH’), established in 2002,

______________________________________________________________________

(^6) Unpublished. ‘Report of a learning review of the implementation of the risk financing mechanism of the Productive Safety Net Programme’.

(^7) Unpublished. ‘Global Evaluation of ECHO’s Cash and Voucher Programmes 2011-2014. ADE’. (working title). remained stable in 2008 and 2009, at about 355,000, but increased to 419,000 in 2010. In Peru, the number of beneficiaries of Juntos increased from 2.3 million in 2008 to 2.6 million in 2010. In Paraguay, the programme Tekopora increased coverage exponentially in 2009, from 14,000 families to over 80,000. In Ecuador, the coverage of the BDH, a Human Development Grant, increased from 1 million to 1.2 million between 2008 and 2009. In Mexico, following high food prices and riots of 2007, the Mexican government increased the Prospera budget and the number of beneficiaries was increased by 1 million. In many cases, these horizontal expansions have led to permanent (long-term) increases in social protection caseloads in the region.

**Challenges with implementing horizontal expansion: decision not to proceed in the Philippines**

*Source: Smith et al. (2017)*

In the Philippines after Typhoon Haiyan, WFP and UNICEF considered horizontal expansion of Pantawid but quickly dismissed it. It was not considered to be feasible to design and implement it quickly or effectively post-disaster. This was due, first, to the scale of the disaster, which had affected the government’s and the payment service provider’s personnel and resources; and, second, the acknowledgement that such an expansion could not be automatic but would require definition, communication and implementation of processes and procedures for identifying, enrolling and paying beneficiaries.

**Risks of horizontal expansion: perspectives from Pakistan and the Philippines**

*Source: Smith et al. (2017); Watson et al. (2017)*

Reservations were expressed by some stakeholders in Pakistan at the prospect of the horizontal expansion of BISP in the event of a major shock. Early experiences with its horizontal expansion in a specific crisis had not subsequently been pursued. Most stakeholders felt that BISP had been designed for a clear purpose and had clear associated targeting criteria. These would need to be changed in times of disaster, which risked obscuring BISP’s objectives, and also risked inappropriately raising expectations of long-term support among the temporary caseload.

Similar concerns were cited by government personnel in the Philippines, as a reason for not pursuing horizontal expansion of the Pantawid programme after Typhoon Haiyan. Again, there was concern that enrolling a caseload that did not fit the usual eligibility criteria would change Pantawid’s focus, which is very specifically to improve human development of poor families. This risked undermining the legitimacy of the long-term programme. The same issues also arose around communicating the temporary nature of the programme’s expansion, which could create problems when households were removed post-disaster.

**E5 Alignment in practice**

**Example of alignment: cash transfers in northern Mali**

*Source: O’Brien et al. (2018)*

In Mali, following the 2012 political crisis, only humanitarian and dual-mandate organisations were able to work in the north. A group of NGOs, with ECHO funding, provided one year of emergency cash support in 2014 to nearly 40,000 households under the banner of the ‘Cadre Commun’ ['Common Framework']. The support consisted of a total of CFA 100,000 (about $160) per household, split into three tranches. Meanwhile, the government had set up an unconditional poverty-targeted cash transfer programme, Jigisèmèjiri, with World Bank funding, in the south in 2012. This supported households with CFA 120,000 (about $194) a year, i.e. CFA 10,000 ($16) per month. Jigisèmèjiri had been unable to roll out in the north while the area was not fully under government control. One aim of the Cadre Commun was to provide a model for extending Jigisèmèjiri to the north.

Acknowledging that the Cadre Commun was not dealing with exceptional crisis needs, but rather with cyclical food insecurity or chronic poverty that is also an issue in the south, the transfer value 2016 was aligned with Jigisèmèjiri and disbursed with the same frequency. This has two advantages: first, when the programme finishes, households that transfer onto Jigisèmèjiri (if it is still running and enrolling new beneficiaries) will not be surprised by a sudden change in support. Second, if others in the same localities are enrolled on Jigisèmèjiri there will not be a mismatch between the benefits received.

It is worth noting that not all aspects of cash transfer delivery were deemed suitable for alignment by the NGOs. For example, the Cadre Commun used its own mixture of payment modalities (both cash and voucher) and payment service providers (microfinance institutions, mobile phone operators and local traders) depending on what they thought would work best in a given area.

**Example of alignment: the Kore Lavi programme in Haiti**

*Source: Beazley, Solorzano and Sossouvi (2016); Beazley (2017)*

As part of a consortium, CARE, Action Contre la Faim (ACF), WFP and World Vision have been supporting the Government of Haiti in establishing a replicable safety net system to reduce food insecurity and vulnerability while building resilience. The Kore Lavi programme is implemented in 24 communes and has four objectives: 1) the completion of household surveys and the establishment of a Management Information System (MIS) for targeting, monitoring and coordinating with other interventions, 2) the provision of food vouchers to around 18,000 households and their gradual inclusion in Village Savings and Loans Associations (VSLAs), 3) the provision of supplementary food rations to pregnant and lactating women, and children and 4) the institutionalisation of the program in Government and in local organisations. Given how prone Haiti is to natural disasters, Kore Lavi aims to strengthen the country’s capacity to respond to such disasters. This, together with the intention of establishing a programme that could be replicated by the government, makes it one of the few examples of an ‘alignment’ type of response in the region.

**Benefit of alignment: cash transfers and medical assistance in Mali**

*Source: O’Brien et al. (2018)*

In Mali it was realised that the assessment form for the Jigisèmèjiri cash transfer could, with a few adjustments to questions, be used to simultaneously assess eligibility for the free medical assistance programme, known as RAMED, for the poorest households. By aligning the forms and the targeting criteria, so that Jigisèmèjiri beneficiaries were automatically enrolled onto RAMED, enrolment onto RAMED greatly increased, as lack of resources for targeting had previously been one of the impediments to its take-up.

At the time of the research there were proposals to formalise a protocol of collaboration between the two interventions, harmonise the household ID code for improved monitoring, and changing the duration of eligibility for the medical assistance to three years to match the cash transfer.

This type of harmonisation is of routine programmes, but can be considered to improve the shock-responsiveness of both interventions by reducing the likely impact of a shock when it strikes. SECTION F OTHER RESOURCES

The toolkit is just one of a set of outputs produced by the Shock-Responsive Social Protection Systems global research project. Here are links to the others. You may wish to explore these to understand more about the concepts of shock-responsive social protection and their application. There are also many other guides that may be of further use to you in your analysis of the current context, or to think through options for shock-responsive social protection. We provide some examples.

F1 Global study on shock-responsive social protection (DFID)

- All written outputs of the project are available on the OPM website at http://www.opml.co.uk/projects/shock-responsive-social-protection-systems
- There is a community of practice on ‘Social Protection in Crisis Contexts’ on the socialprotection.org website created by this project and now self-sustaining. This is a space where you can post documents and ideas, and interact with other professionals working in the field. It also contains links to the many relevant documents.
- The literature review, listed below, contains references to hundreds of documents relevant to the topic of shock-responsive social protection

Six case studies, a global literature review and a synthesis report, form the core of the Shock-Responsive Social Protection Systems research project. Other outputs include policy briefs, blogs, infographics, webinars and an animated cartoon summarising key findings.

Table 11 Main outputs of the global study

| Document | Year published | Link to full report | Link to summary policy brief | |-------------------|----------------|---------------------|------------------------------| | Lesotho | 2017 | In English | Policy brief | | Mali | 2018 | In English and French| Policy brief | | Mozambique | 2017 | In English and Portuguese| Policy brief | | Pakistan | 2017 | In English | Policy brief | | Philippines | 2017 | In English | Policy brief | | Sahel | 2017 | In English and French| Policy brief | | Literature review (2nd edition) | 2017 | In English and French | NA | | Synthesis report | 2018 | In English | Policy brief |

8 This is hosted independently by the International Poverty Centre for Inclusive Growth (IPC-IG)

### Table 12 Other outputs from the Global Study

| Document | Title | Year published | Link to document | |----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|------------------| | Policy brief | Factors affecting the usefulness of existing social protection databases in disaster preparedness and response | 2017 | Policy brief | | One-pager | Conceptualising shock-responsive social protection (published as part of IPC-IG One-Pager series) | 2017 | One-pager | | Working Paper 1| Conceptualising shock-responsive social protection | 2015 | Working paper 1 | | Working Paper 2| Preparatory document for Mali case study [Document de travail 2 : Etude de cas du Mali. Document préparatoire] | 2016 | Working paper 2 | | | (French only) | | | | Working Paper 3| Shock-Responsive Social Protection in the Sahel: Community Perspectives | 2016 | In English and French | | Blog | OECD Insights: What do we know about how social protection systems can respond to needs during a crisis? | 2016 | Blog | | Blog | PLACARD: How do social protection systems respond to needs during a crisis? | 2016 | Blog | | Blog | Humanitarian Practice Network: Shock-responsive social protection in the Sahel: How to incorporate community perspectives? | 2017 | Blog | | Infographic | Original Conceptual Framework informing study | 2017 | Infographic | | Animated cartoon| Shock-Responsive Social Protection | 2017 | Video | Table 13 Global study webinars

| No. | Title | Year published | |-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------| | 1 | A framework and practical guidance on linking humanitarian cash transfers with long-term social safety nets | 2016 | | 2 | Shock-responsive social protection in practice: perspectives from Kenya and Mozambique | 2016 | | 3 | Shock-responsive social protection in practice: experiences in Pakistan and the Philippines | 2017 | | 4 | What role can social protection play in responding to humanitarian emergencies? Findings from a global study | 2018 |

F2 Regional study on shock responsive social protection in Latin America and the Caribbean (WFP)

This study was conducted by OPM during the same timeframe as the Global Study, with a focus on Latin American and Caribbean countries. Key outputs are summarised below.

Table 14 Outputs from OPM and WFP’s regional study on shock responsive social protection in Latin America and the Caribbean

| Document | Title and link | Year published | |----------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------| | Report | Theoretical framework and literature review (LAC focus) (in Spanish [here](#) and French [here](#)) | 2016 | | One-pager| Are social protection systems in Latin America and the Caribbean shock-responsive? | 2017 | | Case study| Ecuador case study (in Spanish [here](#)) | 2017 | | Case study| Guatemala case study (in Spanish [here](#)) | 2017 | | Case study| Haiti case study (in French [here](#)) | 2017 | | Case study| Dominican Republic case study (in Spanish) | 2017 | | Report | (Draft) Summary of key findings and policy recommendations (in Spanish [here](#)) | 2017 | | Factsheet| Shock-Responsive Social Protection in Latin America and the Caribbean (in Spanish [here](#)) | 2017 | | Webinar | Protección social reactiva frente a emergencias en América Latina y el Caribe: las Experiencias de Ecuador y Guatemala (in Spanish) | 2017 | | Webinar | Shock Responsive Social Protection in Latin America and the Caribbean: recent regional experiences (in English) | 2017 | | Video | Shock Responsive Social Protection in Latin America and the Caribbean | 2018 |

### F3 Other resources and toolkits

The list in Table 17 below is indicative of the resources and tools that are available on topics related to shock response, primarily developed by NGOs, INGOs and multilateral organisations involved in emergency response. It includes a list of useful websites.

#### Table 15 Other resources and toolkits

| Title and organisation | Description | Link | |------------------------|-------------|------| | **Specific focus on shock responsive social protection and related** | | | | **Shock response readiness appraisal toolkit, ODI** | This toolkit is intended to inform the development and re-orientation of national social protection strategies to enable them to better cope with future shocks, and has been prepared for an audience of national or donor stakeholders. The diagnostic approach presented in the toolkit enables an appraisal to be made of the readiness of the social protection sector to respond to shocks in low- and middle-income countries, with the aim of informing planning and resource allocation decisions and identifying priority actions to feed into national strategy development. | Here | | **Working with cash based safety nets in humanitarian contexts: Guidance note for humanitarian practitioners, CaLP** | This guidance note has been prepared from a humanitarian perspective, for humanitarian actors engaged in cash based programming. It recognises that social protection is the responsibility of national governments, but also that there is immense scope for humanitarian actors to play a role in strengthening existing, and supporting the creation of new, social protection systems where they do not exist or are underdeveloped. | Here | | **Social protection and resilience. Supporting livelihoods in protracted crises and in fragile and humanitarian contexts, FAO** | The paper discusses the role that social protection can play in saving livelihoods while also enhancing the capacity of households to respond, cope and withstand threats and crises. The paper builds on FAO Social Protection Framework (FAO, 2017) and focuses on the role of social protection systems in humanitarian contexts, with a closer look at protracted crises and a discussion on the importance of shock-sensitive and responsive systems, even in stable contexts. | Here | | **Building Resilience to Disaster and Climate Change through Social Protection** | This toolkit provides guidance on how to prepare social protection programs to respond to disasters and climate change. The snapshots of good practice experiences and practical tips for implementation are intended to guide decision makers in countries facing these risks in adapting their social protection programs to reduce negative impacts and accelerate recovery. The toolkit consists of a synthesis document and a set of online materials, comprising five Guidance Notes, five case studies, two technical notes, and a video | Here | | Title and organisation | Description | Link | |------------------------|-------------|------| | Adaptive Social Protection, Making Concepts a Reality, guidance note, IDS | This toolkit outlines the process required to incorporate climate change adaptation and/or disaster risk reduction into social protection programmes, thereby ensuring that they become examples of adaptive social protection. | Here | | Analysis tool for linking social protection with disaster risk management and climate change adaptation, UNICEF | The objective of this tool is to provide key elements for analysis to identify to what extent national Social Protection (SP) systems incorporate Disaster Risk Management (DRM) and Climate Change Adaptation (CCA) components with a specific focus on children, and existing gaps and opportunities for articulation between institutions in the field of resilient development and SP. | Here | | **Assessing social protection systems (see also Section C4)** | | | | Social Assistance in Developing Countries Database | The Social Assistance in Developing Countries Database aims to: provide a summary of the evidence available on the effectiveness of social assistance interventions in developing countries; focus on programmes seeking to combine the reduction and mitigation of poverty, with strengthening and facilitating household investments capable of preventing poverty and securing development in the longer term; select programmes for inclusion in the database on the basis of the availability of information on design features, evaluation, size, scope, or significance. | Here | | Atlas of Social Protection (ASPIRE), World Bank | This portal provides harmonized indicators which describe the country context where SPL programs operate, and show performance of social assistance, social insurance and labor markets programs based on nationally representative household survey data from 122 developing countries. | Here | | Data from ILO 2017-2019 Social Protection Report | Data underpinning the ILO 2017-2019 Social Protection Report | Here | | Inter-Agency Social Protection Assessment tools | A set of practical tools that help countries improve their social protection system by analysing its strengths and weaknesses and offering options for further action. Key existing tools include the comprehensive Core Diagnostic Instrument (CODI), a tool on payment systems, one on ID systems and one on Public Works programmes. | Here | | \`Preparedness' assessment tool for humanitarian cash transfers, UNICEF | This is a basic assessment tool for determining the feasibility, or “readiness”, of the country’s social protection system to implement preparedness and mitigation strategies supporting the use of CTP in emergencies. In addition, it helps with the feasibility or readiness of UNICEF and other actors (humanitarian implementing agencies, financial service providers) for preparing for and implementing humanitarian cash transfer programmes. | Forthcoming | | Title and organisation | Description | Link | |------------------------|-------------|------| | **Assessing risks and impacts of disasters/shocks (see also section C1)** | | | | **Multi-Hazard Disaster Risk Assessment, DFID** | Carrying out a multi-hazard risk assessment is the first step in preparing a disaster resilience country strategy. This How to Note sets out a framework for undertaking the assessment. A number of approaches and methodologies could be employed for each step, though as far as possible, the process should be light touch and make use of existing information. | Here | | **Global Risk Data Platform** | A multi-agency effort to share spatial data information on global risk from natural hazards. It is possible to visualise, download or extract data on past hazardous events, human & economical hazard exposure and risk from natural hazards. | Here | | **INFORM index** | INFORM is a national-level composite indicator (combining 53 indicators on three dimensions of risk: Hazards & Exposure, Vulnerability and Lack of Coping Capacity) that identifies countries at risk of humanitarian crisis and disaster that would overwhelm national response capacity | Here | | **The International Disaster Database (EM-DAT)** | In 1988, the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) launched the Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT). EM-DAT was created with the initial support of the World Health Organisation (WHO) and the Belgian Government. The main objective of the database is to serve the purposes of humanitarian action at national and international levels. The initiative aims to rationalise decision making for disaster preparedness, as well as provide an objective base for vulnerability assessment and priority setting. EM-DAT contains essential core data on the occurrence and effects of over 22,000 mass disasters in the world from 1900 to the present day. | Here | | **Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR)** | Disaster Risk Management Programs for Priority Countries has data on 31 countries, including risk profiles, details of government agencies working on disaster risk management, agencies active in risk mapping, key donor engagements. | Here | | **Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWSnet)** | The Famine Early Warning Systems Network is a leading provider of early warning and analysis on food insecurity. Created by USAID in 1985 to help decision-makers plan for humanitarian crises, FEWS NET provides evidence-based analysis on some 34 countries. | Here | | **Disaster Risk Index (DRI)** | The DRI enables the calculation of the average risk of death per country in large- and medium-scale disasters associated with earthquakes, tropical cyclones and floods, based on data from 1980 to 2000. It also enables the identification of a number of socio-economic and environmental variables that are correlated with risk to death and which may point to causal processes of disaster risk. In the DRI, countries are indexed for each hazard type according to their degree of physical exposure, their degree of relative vulnerability and their degree of risk. | Here | | Title and organisation | Description | Link | |------------------------|-------------|------| | World Risk Index | The index evaluates the exposure to natural hazards faced by 171 countries and assesses the inherent vulnerability in the countries towards suffering from impacts when facing these hazards | Here | | Global Climate Risk Index | The Global Climate Risk Index 2017 analyses to what extent countries have been affected by the impacts of weather-related loss events (storms, floods, heat waves etc.). The most recent data available – from 2015 and 1996–2015 – were taken into account. | Here | | Natural hazards Risks Atlas, Maplecroft | The Natural Hazards Risk Atlas, which assesses 197 countries on physical and economic exposure to 12 types of natural hazards, including flooding, storm surge, earthquakes, tsunamis, cyclones, wildfires and volcanoes, is produced annually to assist companies and insurers to identify risks to assets worldwide | Here | | Global Humanitarian Overview, OCHA | The Global Humanitarian Overview is the most comprehensive, authoritative and evidence-based assessment of world humanitarian needs. The GHO is based on detailed analysis of comprehensive data from a wide range of sources, and face-to-face interviews with hundreds of thousands of people directly affected by humanitarian crises across the globe. Our global plan facilitates effective, rapid and coordinated responses to humanitarian crises, supporting prompt life-saving action by humanitarian agencies, generously financed by governmental, private and individual donors. | Here | | ND-GAIN Country Index | The ND-GAIN Country Index summarizes a country's vulnerability to climate change and other global challenges in combination with its readiness to improve resilience. It aims to help governments, businesses and communities better prioritize investments for a more efficient response to the immediate global challenges ahead. | Here | | Guidance Note on Conducting a Disaster Risk Finance Diagnostic, ADB and World Bank | The World Bank and Asian Development Bank have worked in more than 50 countries to (i) quantify the economic and fiscal impact of disasters; (ii) take stock of existing mechanisms to finance these costs and analyze their legal and institutional underpinnings; (iii) review aspects of the insurance and capital markets that are relevant for disaster risk finance; and (iv) estimate potential funding gaps following disasters. This note provides guidance on how to conduct such a diagnostic exercise in a systematic and comprehensive manner. | Here | | SADC Regional Vulnerability Assessment and Analysis (RVAA) Programme | The RVAA system is widely acknowledged as the main system to track, report and respond to food insecurity in the Region. The Programme produces outputs at the regional and national level, including national and regional vulnerability assessments. | Here | | Title and organisation | Description | Link | |------------------------|-------------|------| | **Shock Impact Simulation Model, (SISMod)** | Developed jointly by WFP (VAM) and FAO (Global Information and Early Warning System), SISMod is an economic modelling system that serves as a food security analysis tool, used to measure the impact of shocks on food security in vulnerable countries. It brings new possibilities to allow timely quantitative assessments on the ex-ante and ex-post impact of various types of shocks (market, economic, climatic) on livelihood and food security. It identifies and profiles the vulnerable groups, and estimates to what extent they are in need. SISMod provides early estimates of the impacts of shocks before field assessments are carried out, informing the initial development of response scenarios. | Here | | **Safety Nets Alert Platform (SNAP), WFP** | The World Food Programme’s (WFP) Safety Nets Alert Platform (SNAP) is an innovative regional (Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia) food price monitoring system with state of the art analytical tools that will serve to enhance food security early warning, risk management and social protection mechanisms. SNAP supports decision-makers to take rapid action and prepare interventions in support of vulnerable populations that are based on best available evidence. | Here | | **RIMA** | A quantitative approach that enables a rigorous analysis of how households cope with shocks and stressors. Comparisons can be made between different types of households (for example, male-headed versus female-headed or urban versus rural) in a given country or area. | Here | | **Food Security Phase Classification (IPC)** | The IPC is a set of protocols (tools and procedures) to classify the severity of food insecurity and provide actionable knowledge for decision support. | Here | | **Risk Informed programming guidance, UNICEF** | This guidance provides the methodology to programme sectors, Government counterparts and other stakeholders to participate in and contribute to the design and implementation of programmes that are grounded in a deep understanding of the risk landscape. By facilitating analysis, the guidance aims to bring together partners to build consensus related to risk for children, their families, communities and systems. The guidance helps teams on the ground to understand vulnerability, capacity, exposure as well as shocks and stresses to integrate risk considerations into programming, including monitoring and evaluation. | Forthcoming |

**Vulnerability, needs and context analysis**

| Title and organisation | Description | Link | |------------------------|-------------|------| | **Participatory Vulnerability Analysis, ActionAid** | This guide is developed to assist field workers and communities to analyse people’s vulnerability, draw action plans, mobilise resources and enact appropriate policies, laws and strategies to reduce their vulnerability to disaster. Provides a framework and tools for doing this, including steps to 1) assess vulnerability, 2) assess causes, 3) assess current action/coping mechanisms. Again focus remains at community-level but there are components of district and national-level analysis. | Here | | Title and organisation | Description | Link | |------------------------|-------------|------| | Multi-Sector Initial Rapid Assessment Guidance (MIRA), IASC | The Multi-Cluster/Sector Initial Rapid Assessment (MIRA) is a joint needs assessment tool that can be used in sudden onset emergencies, including IASC System-Wide level 3 Emergency Responses (L3 Responses). It is a precursor to cluster/sectoral needs assessments and provides a process for collecting and analyzing information on affected people and their needs to inform strategic response planning. | Here | | Household Economy Approach (HEA) | The Household Economy Approach (HEA) is a unique livelihoods-based framework designed to provide a clear and accurate representation of the inside workings of household economies at different levels of a wealth continuum and in different parts of the world. At the heart of the HEA is an analysis of: 1. how people in different social and economic circumstances get the food and cash they need; 2. their assets, the opportunities open to them and the constraints they face; and 3. the options open to them at times of crisis. It involves the analysis of the connections among different groups and different areas, providing a picture of how assets are distributed within a community and who gets what from whom. | Here | | Household Livelihood Security Analysis (HLSA), CARE | HLSA is CARE’s basic framework for program analysis, design, monitoring and evaluation. HLS grows out of a food security perspective, but is based on the observation that food is only one important basic need among several, and adequate food consumption may be sacrificed for other important needs. Given that the causes of poverty are complex, HLS provides a framework to analyse and understand the web of poverty and people’s mechanisms for dealing with it. | Here | | Household Vulnerability Index (HVI), FAO | The Household Vulnerability Index (HVI) is a measure that was developed by the Food, Agriculture and Policy Analysis Network (FANRPAN) to measure vulnerability of households and communities to the impacts of diseases and shocks such as HIV and AIDS and poverty. | Here | | Guidelines for assessment in emergencies, IFRC | Guidelines that provide a framework within which an assessment can be organized. By working through the guidelines, you should be able to cover all the main issues required for a successful assessment in the context of an emergency. | Here | | Participatory Capacity and Vulnerability Analysis (PCVA): A practitioner's guide, Oxfam | PCVA “is a risk analysis process designed to help staff and partner organisations engage with communities in contexts where natural disasters are significant drivers of poverty and suffering” – with the aim of developing a risk reduction action plan and putting it in to practice. Participatory, community-level/focused assessment tools, which includes: secondary data collection; participatory community appraisal; (participatory) hazard analysis; prioritisation of risks | Here | | Title and organisation | Description | Link | |------------------------|-------------|------| | **Guidelines for Resilience Systems Analysis, OECD** | Step by step approach to resilience systems analysis, for field practitioners to: • prepare for, and facilitate, a successful multi-stakeholder resilience analysis workshop • design a roadmap to boost the resilience of communities and societies • integrate the results of the analysis into their development and humanitarian programming. | Here | | **Post-Disaster Needs Assessment and Recovery Framework (PDNA/RF)** | An approach to harmonize the assessment, analysis and prioritization of damages, losses and needs by a range of stakeholders (United Nations agencies and programmes, the World Bank, donors, non-governmental organizations) in support of the national government. PDNA is a government-led exercise, with integrated support from the United Nations, the European Commission, the World Bank and other national and international actors. A PDNA pulls together information into a single, consolidated report, information on the physical impacts of a disaster, the economic value of the damages and losses, the human impacts as experienced by the affected population, and the resulting early and long-term recovery needs and priorities. | Here | | **Food Security and Livelihoods in First Phase Emergency 48-Hours Assessment Tool, Oxfam** | The purpose of this tool is to obtain a quick understanding of the emergency food security and livelihood situation within the first few days after a rapid-onset disaster. This tool is independent of other inter-agency multi-sectoral assessments such as the MIRA and collects information only on food security and livelihoods. However, this tool can be used alongside such processes. The results of this initial assessment are aimed to inform the design of first phase responses, for the first 6 to 8 weeks after the disaster occurred. | Here | | **WFP Vulnerability Analysis Mapping One Stop Shop (VAM)** | The VAM One Stop Shop is an innovative platform which allows access to the latest food security data, publications and analytical tools. The VAM publications include baseline studies, household/ market monitoring, emergency assessments/market studies and secondary data analysis. The publications are navigable by year, assessment type and field work status, as well as by country through the world map. | Here | | **Comprehensive Food Security & Vulnerability Analysis (CFSVA), WFP** | Designed to understand and describe the profiles of food-insecure and vulnerable households, identify the root causes of hunger, and analyze the risks and emerging vulnerabilities among populations in crisis-prone countries. It also makes recommendations on the best response options (food or non-food) to reduce hunger, target the neediest and informing preparedness. | Here | | **Emergency Food Security Assessment (EFSA), WFP** | The purpose is to assess the impact of shock on the food security of households and communities within the affected area. Key outputs include: • description of the current food and nutrition security situation; • analysis of the ways in which the affected population, the government and other stakeholders are responding to the emergency; • forecast of the future evolution of food and nutrition security; • identification of response options, and recommendations for intervention or non-intervention. An EFSA may be conducted as a rapid assessment or an in-depth assessment. | Here | | Title and organisation | Description | Link | |------------------------|-------------|------| | **Vulnerability and Capacity Assessment (VCA), IFRC** | VCA is complementary to national and sub-national risk, hazard, vulnerability and capacity mapping exercises that identify communities most at risk. Vulnerability and Capacity Assessment (VCA) uses various participatory tools to gauge people’s exposure to and capacity to resist natural hazards. It is an integral part of disaster preparedness and contributes to the creation of community-based disaster preparedness programmes at the rural and urban grass-roots level. | Here | | **Climate Vulnerability and Capacity Analysis (CVCA), CARE** | The main objectives of the CVCA are to: Analyze vulnerability to climate change and adaptive capacity at the community level; Combine community knowledge and scientific data to yield greater understanding about local impacts of climate change. The CVCA process builds people’s understanding about climate risks and adaptation strategies. It provides a framework for dialogue within communities, as well as between communities and other stakeholders (e.g. local and national government agencies). | Here | | **Guidelines for resilience systems analysis, OECD** | Simple “how to” guide to analyse what is needed to boost the resilience of specific groups, specific systems, and specific programmes, to the risks people face every day. The results of this analysis are then used to design new programmes to boost resilience, or to modify ongoing plans and actions. | Here | | **CLEAR - Consolidated Livelihood Exercise for Analysing Resilience, WFP** | CLEAR is an analytical tool developed by WFP to assess and better understand the impacts of climate risks on food security. It consists in a livelihood zoning and profiling exercise carried out using a rapid livelihood assessment, aiming at identifying and describing generalizable trends and patterns in livelihoods that can then serve as a starting point for analyzing food security and vulnerability. In addition to the delineation of geographic areas based on patterns of livelihood activities, it furthers the analysis by ranking the livelihood zones according to their experiences of food security, diversity of livelihood activities and sensitivity of income to climate-related hazards. | Here | | **Integrated Context Analysis (ICA), WFP** | Part 1 of WFP’s 3-pronged approach. A collaborative and consultative programming tool that helps orient geographic prioritisation for intervention based on where different levels of recurrence of food insecurity and natural shocks have historically overlapped. It is used to inform strategic programmatic decision-making in specific geographical areas in resilience, disaster risk reduction, social protection, and preparedness actions. | Here |

**Emergency programming and planning**

| Title and organisation | Description | Link | |------------------------|-------------|------| | **Seasonal Livelihoods Programming (SLP), WFP** | Part 2 of WFP’s 3-pronged approach Consultative process that brings together communities, government, and partners to develop a shared understanding of the context and to highlight which programmes should be implemented when, for whom, and by which partners, during typical and crisis years. This dialogue aims to strengthen operational plans across multiple sectors and institutions, to inform resilience-building, productive safety nets and other relevant agendas, and to enhance partnerships and coordination. | Here | | Title and organisation | Description | Link | |------------------------|-------------|------| | Community-based Participatory Planning (CBPP), WFP | A local level participatory exercise to empower vulnerable communities and women, build a shared understanding of livelihoods, landscapes, shocks and stresses, vulnerabilities and priority needs, and to develop a multi-sectorial action plan tailored to the local context. | Here | | Emergency Preparedness and Response Package, WFP | The Package is WFP’s toolbox for enhancing emergency preparedness and response capabilities at the field level. The Package builds on the experience and expertise gathered by WFP and its partners in contingency planning, business continuity and pandemic planning. It creates linkages with other planning processes and frameworks, at both internal and inter-agency levels. | Here | | Market Analysis Framework, WFP | The Market Analysis Framework (MAF) provides an overview of various market analysis tools, including what purpose(s) they serve, how they are related, and where to find the technical details on each of them. This guidance can help you to: understand the links between market and food security analysis – prioritize market information needs for food security analysis and response planning – and select the appropriate tool according to the context, objectives and information requirements. | Here | | Emergency Market Mapping and Analysis Toolkit (EMMA) | Quick, rough-and-ready market analysis toolkit to inform practical recommendations that are suitable for the early stages of emergencies. | Here | | Cash in emergencies toolkit, ICRC | The Cash in Emergencies Toolkit has been devised by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement as a means to make tools, practical guidance and minimum standards easily accessible to staff and volunteers. The toolkit should inform and guide the implementation of CTP, to improve the quality of CTP at the different phases of the project cycle. | Here | | Cash Transfer Programming toolkit, MercyCorps | The Cash Transfer Programming (CTP) Toolkit is a basic guide to cash transfer programming in emergency response and early recovery settings. | Here | | Core Humanitarian Standard | The Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability (CHS) sets out Nine Commitments that organisations and individuals involved in humanitarian response can use to improve the quality and effectiveness of the assistance they provide. | Here | | The Sphere Handbook: Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response | The Sphere Handbook is one of the most widely recognized sets of common principles and universal minimum standards for the delivery of quality humanitarian response. | Here | | Title and organisation | Description | Link | |------------------------|-------------|------| | Good Practice Review Emergency food security interventions | This Good Practice Review explores programming practices in emergency food security. It provides an overview of conceptual issues and planning approaches, together with programming practices in interventions designed to protect the food security of disaster or crisis-affected groups. Along with a brief description of the intervention, its application, management and monitoring, each chapter includes references to topic-specific overviews, tools and case studies. | Here |

**Other useful websites and repositories on related topics**

| Title and organisation | Description | Link | |------------------------|-------------|------| | Humanitarian Response, OCHA | Purpose: to support efficient, effective, and coordinated humanitarian response through the sharing of operational information. Managed by OCHA, this website serves as a central repository for information management tools and services, enabling information exchange among humanitarian aid agencies and staff. This global site is complimented by country-specific emergency sites. | Here | | Reliefweb, OCHA | ReliefWeb is the leading humanitarian information source on global crises and disasters. It is a specialized digital service of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). | Here | | Preventionweb | PreventionWeb is a collaborative knowledge sharing platform on disaster risk reduction (DRR), managed by the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR). The site offers a range of knowledge products and services to facilitate the work of DRR professionals. | Here | | ALNAP | ALNAP is a global network of NGOs, UN agencies, members of the Red Cross/Crescent Movement, donors, academics and consultants dedicated to learning how to improve response to humanitarian crises. | Here | | The Cash Learning Partnership (CaLP) | CaLP is a global partnership of humanitarian actors engaged in policy, practice and research within cash transfer programming (CTP). Formed of a community of practice including over 150 organisations and more than 5,000 individuals in the humanitarian sector, CaLP is based on learning, knowledge sharing, networking and coordination around the appropriate and timely use of CTP in humanitarian response. | Here | | Humanitarian Practice Network (HPN) | Independent forum for policy-makers, practitioners and others working in or on the humanitarian sector to share and disseminate information, analysis and experience, and to learn from it. The only network of its kind, HPN plays a key role in examining policy developments and distilling practice. | Here | | PLACARD | PLACARD’s (PLAtform for Climate Adaptation and Risk reDuction) mission is to be the recognised platform for dialogue, knowledge exchange and collaboration between the Climate Change Adaptation (CCA) and Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) communities. | Here | | Socialprotection.org | Socialprotection.org aims to facilitate knowledge sharing and capacity building on effective social protection policies and programmes, particularly among low- and middle- income countries. | Here |

### Glossary

| Term | Definition | |-----------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Adaptive social protection | The concept that synergies can be gained if social protection, disaster risk management and climate change adaptation are considered simultaneously, in order to reduce vulnerability to the impacts of climate change and disasters. | | Alignment | The development of one or more elements of a parallel humanitarian response that aligns as best as possible with those used in a current or possible future social protection programme or DRM system. This could be, for example, an alignment of objectives, targeting method, transfer value or delivery mechanism. This is distinct from piggybacking on elements of a system as it uses a parallel infrastructure rather than the same system. (Note: The term has been used throughout this toolkit in a way that is different from ‘alignment’ in relation to aid effectiveness principles). | | Contingency planning | A management process that analyses specific potential events or emerging situations that might threaten society or the environment and establishes arrangements in advance to enable timely, effective and appropriate responses to such events and situations. Contingency planning results in organised and coordinated courses of action with clearly-identified institutional roles and resources, information processes, and operational arrangements for specific actors at times of need. Based on scenarios of possible emergency conditions or disaster events, it allows key actors to envision, anticipate and solve problems that can arise during crises. Contingency planning is an important part of overall preparedness. Contingency plans need to be regularly updated and exercised. | | Design tweak | The design of social protection programmes and systems can be adjusted in a way that takes into consideration the crises that a country typically faces. These ‘design tweaks’ can serve one of two purposes. First, they can introduce flexibility into a social protection programme so as to maintain the provision of the regular service for its usual beneficiaries in the event of a shock. Second, changes to a programme’s design can be introduced that can improve its coverage, timeliness or predictability in the event of a crisis, even without requiring the programme to flex at the moment of the shock itself. | | Disaster risk | The potential disaster losses, in lives, health status, livelihoods, assets and services, which could occur to a particular community or a society over a specified future time period. | | Disaster risk management | The systematic process of using administrative directives, organisations, and operational skills and capacities to implement strategies, policies and improved coping capacities in order to lessen the adverse impacts of hazards and the possibility of disaster. | | Disaster risk reduction | The concept and practice of reducing disaster risks through systematic efforts to analyse and manage the causal factors of disasters, including through reduced exposure to hazards, lessened vulnerability of people and property, wise management of land and the environment, and improved preparedness for adverse events. |

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9 The Glossary draws from a wide range of sources, including the Humanitarian Coalition, GIZ, WHO, Reliefweb and GSDRC websites. Shock Responsive Social Protection Research: Toolkit

Early warning system

The set of capacities needed to generate and disseminate timely and meaningful warning information to enable individuals, communities and organisations threatened by a hazard to prepare and to act appropriately and in sufficient time to reduce the possibility of harm or loss.

Emergency response

Actions taken to mitigate the impact of a dangerous incident on the public or the environment.

Horizontal expansion

Temporary inclusion of new beneficiaries from disaster-affected communities in a social protection programme.

Humanitarian assistance

Resources used to fund actions that are designed to, 'save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity during and in the aftermath of manmade crises and natural disasters, as well as to prevent and strengthen preparedness for the occurrence of such situations (Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative, 2003). Humanitarian assistance may take many forms. It may include reconstruction and rehabilitation (e.g. restoring infrastructure and community assets such as water supplies), emergency food or cash assistance, services such as the provision of shelter, health, nutrition and education, and measures to protect the safety of the population. Humanitarian assistance is often provided in line with some or all of the key 'humanitarian principles' of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence.

Humanitarian crisis

An exceptional and generalised threat to human life, health or subsistence. Crises may appear within the context of an existing lack of protection, where a series of pre-existing conditions (poverty, inequality etc) exacerbated by a natural disaster or armed conflict, are likely to aggravate destructive effects. Humanitarian assistance must be provided in accordance with the principles of:

1. Humanity – human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found, with particular attention to the most vulnerable in the population, such as children, women and older people. The dignity and rights of all victims must be respected and protected.

Humanitarian principles

2. Neutrality – Humanitarian assistance must be provided without engaging in hostilities or taking sides in controversies of a political, religious or ideological nature.
3. Impartiality – Humanitarian assistance must be provided without discriminating as to ethnic origin, gender, nationality, political opinions, race or religion. Relief of the suffering must be guided solely by needs and priority must be given to the most urgent cases of distress
4. Independence - Humanitarian action must be autonomous from the political, economic, military or other objectives that any actors may hold with regard to areas where humanitarian action is being implemented.

Mitigation

The lessening or limitation of the adverse impacts of hazards and related disasters.

Piggybacking

Use of part of an established system or programme by a new programme response (either by government or partners). One or more elements could be used, for example the beneficiary list, staff or a payment mechanism.

Preparedness

The knowledge and capacities developed by governments, professional response and recovery organisations, communities and individuals to 74

effectively anticipate, respond to, and recover from, the impacts of likely, imminent or current hazard events or conditions.

| Prevention | The outright avoidance of adverse impacts of hazards and related disasters. | |------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Protracted crisis | Protracted crises refer to situations in which a significant portion of a population is facing a heightened risk of death, disease, and breakdown of their livelihoods. These circumstances are often linked to recurrent natural disasters or conflicts. While each protracted crises is a distinct occurrence, there are several characteristics which are often present: duration or longevity (hence ‘protracted’); conflict; weak governance or public administration; unsustainable livelihood systems and poor food security outcomes; breakdown of local institutions. | | Recovery | The restoration, and improvement where appropriate, of facilities, livelihoods and living conditions of disaster-affected communities, including efforts to reduce disaster risk factors. | | Resilience | The ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions. | | Response | The provision of emergency services and public assistance during or immediately after a disaster in order to save lives, reduce health impacts, ensure public safety and meet the basic subsistence needs of the people affected. | | Risk assessment | A methodology to determine the nature and extent of risk by analysing potential hazards and evaluating existing conditions of vulnerability that together could potentially harm exposed people, property, services, livelihoods and the environment on which they depend. | | Seasonal variations | Seasonal variations refer to predictable seasonal patterns which are usually related to agricultural production, such as the harvest season or the lean season. Seasonal variations are different from shocks and stresses, although they may be strongly interconnected. Seasonal variations refer to predictable cyclical variations in weather and the impact on agricultural production. Seasonal variations often result in a food-security crisis if the affected population remain vulnerable to these changes, for example, a large number of households requiring short-term assistance on a regular basis in the lean season. | | Shock (covariate) | Covariate shocks affect large numbers of people and/or communities at once. Such shocks are often concurrent. Covariate shocks may be natural, economic or political. They include, for instance, drought, floods, typhoons and earthquakes; locust invasions; high food prices and economic downturns; political crises and armed conflict; high numbers of refugees; or outbreaks of disease such as the Ebola epidemic. Shocks vary in: | | | • **Speed of onset** (rapid vs. slow). Slow-onset shocks bring critical questions as to when a gradually worsening situation can be classified as an emergency, and at what point humanitarian agencies should step in and authorise the disbursement of funds. A social protection system designed to respond to slow-onset crises faces the same question as to when its emergency response mechanism should be triggered. Drought is the main slow-onset shock. | | | • **Predictability.** Slow-onset shocks ought always to be predictable to some degree, though it is not always possible to predict whether or not a slowly developing situation, such as rain failures, will turn into a... | Rapid-onset shocks may appear to be less predictable but there is still usually some indication where such shocks might be expected, if not always when: the existence of geological faultlines for earthquakes, for example, or regular weather patterns that commonly lead to cyclones. From this perspective one would expect that a shock-responsive social protection system should take note of this predictability and put in place activities that strengthen early warning systems and improve preparedness for a disaster.

- **Duration** (short-, medium-term or protracted). Protracted crises are often associated with conflict, which will have an effect on the ability of systems to respond.

| Shock (idiosyncratic) | Idiosyncratic shocks affect individual households or household members, for example job loss or the death of a breadwinner. | |-----------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Social assistance | Direct, regular cash or in-kind transfers to poor and vulnerable individuals or households. Transfers are non-contributory i.e. those in need are not asked to make contributions to be entitled to receive assistance. Some are targeted based on categories of vulnerability, and some are targeted broadly to low-income groups. | | Social care | Social care helps address the interaction between social and economic vulnerability, through services such as home-based care and family support services. Whilst poverty may be one of the drivers that leads people to require social care and support, income generation alone will not, in many cases, provide the solution to meeting the needs of people who are dependent on others for basic care or protection. This may include children (including orphans, street/working children, children at risk of abuse and neglect, children lacking appropriate care), the disabled of all ages and older people with limited capacities. | | Social insurance | Contributory programmes where participants make regular payments to a scheme that will cover costs related to life-course events, for example, pregnancy, unemployment or illness. Sometimes costs are matched or subsidised by the provider. Social insurance includes contributory pensions. | | Stress | Stresses are, ‘long-term trends that undermine the potential of a given system or process and increase the vulnerability of actors within it’ (DFID, 2011). Stresses can include natural resource degradation, loss of agricultural production, urbanisation, demographic changes, climate change, political instability and economic decline. Some crises are caused by longer term or recurrent problems which eventually cause a livelihood system to reach breaking point. The term ‘shock’ is often taken to refer to a single event, or a situation developing in a short period of time, and problems caused by difficulties that build up for people over many years might more properly be classified as stresses rather than shocks. However, once the breaking point is reached, or a crisis is recognised, there is a tendency to think of the problem in terms of a shock. In some cases, breaking point or crisis is reached simply because of the duration of the stress. In other cases, though, it is caused when the stress becomes a little more severe than normal, e.g. a particularly long dry season, and in such cases, the situation will almost always be thought of as a shock. | | Vertical expansion | The benefit value or the duration of a social protection programme is temporarily increased for some or all beneficiaries. | | Vulnerability | The characteristics and circumstances of a community, household, system or asset that make it susceptible to the damaging effects of a hazard. |