1. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

1.1 Research Objectives

1.1.1 As part of their aims to drive for a safer, high performing and efficient railway, ORR, wishes to build an understanding of what, in practice, motivates people and organisations to improve rail performance. The research objectives are to:

- Identify the mechanisms which exist to influence people and organisations’ decisions related to train performance;
- Understand the motivations for improving train performance, including the importance and influence of extrinsic and intrinsic incentives (both financial and non-financial), and how they interact;
- Understand the consequences of industry mechanisms in relation to performance outcomes, including any impacts on collaboration between different individuals and organisations in the event of performance related incidents; and
- Ascertain how incentives and behaviour vary within and between different organisations.

1.2 Research Context

1.2.1 ORR commissioned SYSTRA to undertake a review into rail performance incentives, to include both formal incentive mechanisms (extrinsic influencers) and other behavioural motivators (intrinsic motivators). The research study was designed in three parts:

- Wave 1 interviews: in-depth interviews with industry representatives, identifying key influencing factors on behaviours affecting rail performance;
- Online survey: quantitative and qualitative insights from a larger number of respondents across the industry; and
- Wave 2 interviews: in-depth interviews with industry representatives, refining and challenging the themes emerging from the Wave 1 interviews.

1.2.2 Wave 1 interviews took place in February and early March 2020.

1.2.3 Due to the global Covid-19 pandemic, as of 23rd March 2020, government suspended rail franchise agreements for at least six months. All revenue and costs risks have been transferred to government, whilst operators continue with day-to-day services for a management fee. A reduced rail service is being run, and demand substantially reduced.

1.2.4 Due to the impact of Covid-19 on the rail industry, further primary data collection was temporarily put on hold. Wave 2 interviews and the online survey subsequently took place in June and July 2020, after consultation with the industry to ensure this would not place an unnecessary burden on respondents. 1.3 **Approach**

1.3.1 ORR provided SYSTRA with an initial list of rail industry contacts covering the following key stakeholder groups, and this was supplemented with SYSTRA’s own industry contacts:

- Train Operating Companies (TOCs) and Owning Groups;
- Freight Operating Companies (FOCs);
- Infrastructure Managers (primarily Network Rail);
- Central government and local government; and
- Trade associations, representative bodies and consumer groups.

1.3.2 Representatives were identified in each group either for interview themselves, or to facilitate interviews with appropriate respondents to ensure a structured coverage of role, background and experience within the target groups.

1.3.3 A range of strategic and operational representatives were targeted, as were different TOC types (comprising regional, long distance, London/South East, and Open Access) to ensure a range of viewpoints were captured.

1.4 **Qualitative Research**

1.4.1 Interviews were undertaken through a mixture of face-to-face (in February and early March) and remote methods by core members of the SYSTRA research team (and report authors). A discussion guide was used to ensure key topic were covered, whilst allowing the respondent freedom to introduce any other topics they considered relevant to rail performance.

1.4.2 Many techniques were used to encourage open and transparent answers and reduce the potential for biased responses. The independent nature of the research was emphasised, with great weight placed upon respondent anonymity.

1.4.3 The structure of the discussion guide used was as follows:

- Explanation of research purpose and interview session;
- Background information, including job role and responsibilities;
- Individual and organisational influencers on decision making with regards to performance;
- Views on mechanisms intended to positively influence performance related decision making;
- Responses to delay scenarios; and
- Perspectives on influencing factors for other organisational types.

1.4.4 Changes were made between the first and second wave of interviews to incorporated questions on how Covid-19 has impacted the industry, and specific prompts were added on emerging findings.

1.4.5 With consent, discussions were voice-recorded, and a write-up of the interview produced. Verbatim quotes have been provided throughout this report, alongside stakeholder group identifiers.

1.4.6 As with all qualitative research, it should be noted that: While the views of a range of rail industry representatives are reflected in the research, the sample selected for this study is not statistically representative; and

The views and opinions reported are based on statements made by participants, and are not necessarily factually correct.

1.4.7 If differences between different participant types are not highlighted, it can be assumed that the views expressed did not vary significantly by these characteristics.

1.4.8 In total, over 50 industry representatives were consulted with across 38 interviews. A summary of the interview breakdown by stakeholder type is:

| STAKEHOLDER TYPE | NUMBER OF INTERVIEWS | |-------------------------------------------------------|----------------------| | TOC Owning Group and TOCs | 20 | | Track and infrastructure | 6 | | FOCs | 5 | | Government and local government | 4 | | Trade associations, consumer groups and representative bodies | 3 |

1.4.9 It should be noted that the majority of interviews were completed with TOCs and Owning Groups. Whilst the first wave of interviews was more evenly split between TOCs and Infrastructure Managers, it proved difficult to secure these interviews in the second wave of interviews.

1.5 Quantitative Research

1.5.1 An online survey was distributed to stakeholders and those unable to take part in interviews, with requests for the survey to be distributed more widely amongst teams.

1.5.2 The survey included a mix of open and closed questions. Responses to the open questions have been thematically analysed with the interview findings. Due to the small number of responses, closed questions have been reported as totals, as appropriate throughout the report. Full data tables are available in Appendix C.

1.5.3 The structure of the survey questions was as follows:

- About your role and organisation;
- Performance decision making;
- Incentive mechanisms;
- Impact of Covid-19 on performance. 1.5.4 In total, 32 survey responses were received:

| STAKEHOLDER TYPE | NUMBER OF RESPONSES | |-------------------------------------------------------|---------------------| | TOC Owning Group and TOCs | 23 | | Track and infrastructure | 1 | | FOCs | 4 | | Government and local government | 3 | | Trade associations, consumer groups and representative bodies | 1 |

1.5.5 It should be noted that 7 responses were received prior to the temporary pause of the research, after which questions were added on the impacts of Covid-19, therefore some question response sizes vary.

1.6 Analysis and Reporting

1.6.1 Qualitative data has been analysed thematically, whereby the core messages were highlighted and extrapolated. An assimilation process was then undertaken across all the written-up interview scripts, so that similar themes are clustered together, which were then analysed to provide main findings. Where possible, the consensus view and alternatives have been reported, with the corresponding underlying rationale, for each issue and sub-issue. The verbatim quotes used throughout the report demonstrate the points being made by stakeholders.

1.6.2 Responses to the closed survey questions were tabulated in Excel. Responses to each question were examined by stakeholder type and type of decision maker (strategic decision-maker/manager, decision-maker at senior operational level or frequent frontline decision-maker), however, due to the small sample size no conclusions can be drawn from this. Responses to open-ended questions from the survey were analysed thematically, as per the interview write-ups.

1.6.3 After the first wave of interviews an interim report was produced and this final report builds upon that document. Appendix B

2. RESPONSE TO DELAY SCENARIOS

Introduction

2.1.1 As part of discussions with stakeholders, a series of operational scenarios were presented to participants, each in turn. The following section outlines:

- How stakeholders at TOCs, FOCs and Network Rail think their organisation responds, operationally, to such scenarios; and
- How these stakeholders think organisations other than their own responds to such scenarios.

2.1.2 Each of the scenarios were designed with ORR.

Scenario A

2.1.3 Scenario A was designed to reflect a sub-threshold delay incident and was given as follows:

**Scenario A**

A train service has started regularly presenting around 5 minutes late at a small, intermediate station, where it has previously been presenting on-time. However, recovery time in its schedule means that its ‘on-time’ arrival (within 3 minutes) performance at the final destination has not changed.

**TOC/FOC response and perceived response**

2.1.4 TOCs and FOCs suggest that they would consider this to be a significant issue and would seek to identify the root-cause and possible mitigations, such as a regulation statement. The concern, amongst some strategic decision-makers, was not just for their own service but also if it is causing knock-on problems to other services. They would expect the solution, ultimately, to lie with Network Rail whom, they think, should be equally concerned (but, they believe, are not). For operational representatives, concern was shown for the impacts Scenario A would have on the passenger, especially those wanting to connect with other services on route.

2.1.5 FOCs noted the Schedule 8 impacts resulting from this scenario, and one suggested that they would seek to return to planned service as quickly as possible in order to reduce Schedule 8 penalties.

“This is an interesting one. It’s really important because of the system impact. The fact that my train recovers itself by the time it gets to its destination is next to irrelevant – because if I’m 5 minutes out it may be somewhere where I’m having a lot of impact … ricocheting impacts all over. … You’ve got a lovely example of that at York which is a massive reactionary delay hotspot – something like 90% of the delay is reactionary, telling you something about timetables and the configuration of the network at that location.” (TOC)

“You need to understand the root cause – what is happening that is making the train 5 minutes late? Within my team we have a TRUST delay attributer, so that is a Level 1 attribution of train delay. I would expect that person to understand that trend – there could be a host of reasons: temporary speed restriction as the track’s not good, restrictive signals, train acceleration curves aren’t right, .... Once you’ve got that root cause, you can then think about how you would implement change to mitigate that issue.” (TOC)

“We would try and identify the root cause of the delay and we might look at train planning issues or allowances. That can quite often happen - we can be delayed in the journey and make up the recovery time. That may have delayed others and we still end up in the penalties. One of our services was being 3 minutes late regularly... as a result of that train being slightly ahead of an approaching [name of TOC] service, we were causing secondary delay to services. It’s a domino effect and although a passenger operator might pass PPM [in this instance], from a freight perspective, if we see a lateness sign against us, we run a risk of being penalised - there is no financial benefit of arriving on time... there is a financial benefit of not being late at any point.” (FOC)

2.1.6 In contrast to how TOCs said they would respond, some Network Rail representatives suggest that TOCs do not investigate the root cause of sub-threshold delays, as they have no incentive – except where they cause large reactionary incidents. Sub-threshold delays, such as the one in the scenario, are typically paid for mostly by Network Rail for Schedule 8, so TOCs are financially compensated despite such delays being more likely to be the fault of the TOC (as perceived by some at Network Rail).

2.1.7 However, others in Network Rail (those working more closely with TOCs) suggested that TOCs would seek to identify the root cause of sub-threshold delays, referencing joint meetings between Performance Improvement Boards and Network Rail to discuss cause and mitigations.

“They would do the same, look at it as well. Hopefully there will be some joint meetings between the TOC and Network Rail on the route, Performance Improvement Boards. There might be some shared options [to mitigate the poor performance].” (Infrastructure Manager)

Network Rail response and perceived response

2.1.8 At a strategic level, one NR representative suggested that they would investigate.

“The performance team for the route or region will do the analytical work to diagnose why that performance level is happening... and a debate on how we best go about managing that if it’s a Network Rail ownership... it might be something on the timetable, it might be something on the asset management side.” (Infrastructure Manager) 2.1.9 However, others at a strategic level at Network Rail, and at an operational level, suggested that there are barriers to action which mean action is not considered worthwhile. The main reasons for this is that:

- The cost of investigation was more than the payments that would be attributed to third parties (i.e. TOCs);
- There are a large number of these instances;
- They do not have the data easily available to attribute the delay;
- It would more than double the work of the delay attributers; and
- The perception that the way that systems record delays means that some of these ‘delays’ might not actually be delays.

2.1.10 Anecdotally, it was assumed by some Network Rail participants that TOCs are the cause of most of these ‘small’ delays – probably caused by a few minutes’ train dwell time or a boarding issue at a station.

“Within our collective team, I would like someone to be aware that that [the situation] was an issue bubbling away … get an understanding of what’s caused the change and what actions we can take to resolve it.” (Infrastructure Manager)

“It’s an interesting one… when they fall into the sub-threshold category, it’s not investigated and it’s not attributed. There are lots of reasons why that is… For Schedule 8, Network Rail would pick up that bill because it’s unattributed – something like 80% Network Rail’s payment, despite not knowing what the cause is… Logically, if they are genuine delays and not errors in the way the system captures the delay, they’re probably more likely to be due to TOC incidents because a Network Rail delay is likely to cause a lot of delay. A signalling fault is not going to cause a 3-minute delay, it’s going to cause a 20-minute delay, if you’re lucky.” (Infrastructure Manager)

2.1.11 TOCs’ views of Network Rail’s likely response varied – according to level in which they work with Network Rail. Front-line TOC staff assumed that Network Rail would investigate the cause and seek to resolve the issue.

2.1.12 The strategic-level TOC view, on the other hand, believes that Network Rail does not typically review these situations nor seek a resolution - but that they should do. TOCs consider this to be part of Network Rail’s remit; and that funding/resource (to investigate and make the required improvements) should not be a problem.

“I suppose that Network Rail would have a symmetrical process with a Level 1 delay attributer who would accept, or reject, the delay. They would then interrogate the data and look to find the solution. If it was an infrastructure problem then I would expect them to fix it. If it was a train operator borne delay then we would fix it and Network Rail should be holding us to account, or altering the [train]plan consequentially. … There’s often disputes [with Network Rail] and, worse than that, there is a pool of delays where they don’t interrogate the data – they [Network Rail] put them in their ‘too-hard-to-solve’ box or ‘not-worth-solving’ box.” (TOC)

“I have a radical, wild idea - let’s have a network system operator whose job it is to manage the network in real-time, and responsible for producing a set of resilient and recoverable timetables. Let’s have that body holding the ring at regional, and route, performance boards. Let’s just call it Network Rail – that’s their job; it’s exactly what they’re supposed to be doing!... Network Rail channel all of, let’s call it income, from all of the perpetrators, out to the affected parties. They are sitting there with the largest financial flow of Schedule 8, as reactionary delay increases on the network – what do they do with that? If they managed that, improving it... Why doesn’t that happen? what is going wrong inside Network Rail that they don’t see that as one of their core functions?” (TOC)

Scenario B

2.1.13 Scenario B was designed to reflect a reactionary delay and was given as follows:

Scenario B

A train service on a particular route is improving its performance, as the results of a major investment in asset performance improvement are realised. The scheme has worked better than expected, and primary delays are falling fast, however delay per incident (DPI) is increasing, indicating an increase in reactionary delay for each incident that occurs. The amount of delay in total is falling.

TOC / FOC response and perceived response

2.1.14 For one TOC, viewed from a more strategic perspective, this scenario was seen as not likely to result in any action.

“That’s the sort of debate that performance managers might have when they’re feeling bored. You can fail as often as you like as long as nobody notices... We’ve got to think about the outcome for passengers, the outcome for the network as a whole.” (TOC)

2.1.15 Other TOC representatives suggested that they would look to identify the root cause of a reactionary delay, with some expecting this scenario to be as a result of a faulty timetable or service recovery plan. As a result, TOCs suggested that they would monitor the impacts and deliver a recovery plan which would limit the delays to their customers. One TOC suggested that this plan could include a change in train prioritisation by Network Rail. FOCs also indicated that they would investigate in order to reduce the impacts of their trains being sent on a diversion, and minimise the risk of any Schedule 8 payments. In response to Scenario B, operational representatives at one FOC suggested that they would look to operate on better and faster paths which have higher utilisation and better use of resources.

“An increase in reactionary delays suggests that people’s contingencies aren’t as well thought through as they should be. We would see that [reactionary delay] immediately and look at the root cause... You make sure that your train runs on time.” (TOC Owning Group)

“We would discuss the decisions being made by Network Rail, and we would discuss the decisions made by [TOC]. We would see if the decisions made were optimal, or sub-optimal and would use that to improve our service recovery score next time.” (TOC) Network Rail response and perceived response

2.1.16 Some in Network Rail suggested that they would seek to identify the root cause of reactionary delays so that mitigations could be put in place, including changes in resource planning and timetabling.

“If delay per incident has gone up then you’d want to understand why that is. If it’s down to an operational issue - resources are stretched... it could be down to the timetable - you’d identify a mitigation plan.” (Infrastructure Manager)

2.1.17 Others in Network Rail linked this investigation to Schedule 8 penalties, noting that the actual costs of reactionary delays are borne by Network Rail under Schedule 8, even if the delay is not a Network Rail fault.

“Reactionary delay would be Network Rail. I imagine we would want to know why that was happening and want to do some form of investigation into that... it goes back to if it was anything other than the network causing that delay to get worse, there isn’t much we can do about it.” (Infrastructure Manager)

“It sounds like, overall, it’s a positive and an objective has been achieved, but I think we’d have a look to see if there was anything we could do to tackle the reactionary delay.” (Infrastructure Manager)

2.1.18 There was recognition that sometimes the data does not enable the root cause to be determined. Typical aspects that Network Rail would want to understand, but not currently always able to, are: how the reactionary delay is propagating; does it happen at certain times of day only; does it happen with certain types of train; can you see a trend of delay through the day; etc.

2.1.19 A third reason why Network Rail would be likely to review is to evaluate the impact of their investment.

“I’d imagine we’d want to investigate that – in terms of if you’ve done an investment you’d want to see how it’s gone after, wouldn’t you?” (Infrastructure Manager)

2.1.20 At an operational level, TOC representatives expected that Network Rail would (naturally) seek to understand the cause of the reactionary delay and a resolution.

“I don’t see Network Rail being our adversary in this [scenario]. I don’t think their thinking is any different to ours.” (TOC) Scenario C

2.1.21 Scenario C was designed to reflect an unplanned situation creating significant disruption, delay and cancellations, and was given as follows:

Scenario C

The train service you are responsible for has been disrupted by the closure of a key section of track for an unknown period, due to a major flooding incident leading to washout.

TOC / FOC response and perceived response

2.1.22 The TOCs response to this scenario focuses entirely on the passengers’ experience, and how best to minimise the adverse impacts on them (which are likely to be significant); and concentrate efforts on trying to get their train services back to normality as soon as possible.

2.1.23 How TOCs would minimise the adverse passenger impacts would depend on the precise circumstances and options for re-routing services, running an emergency service or having to stop services altogether (and operating a rail replacement bus service). These actions would always seek to prioritise keeping passengers moving.

“You’ve got to do what’s right for the passenger... Thinking about reputation. Thinking about the impact on real people that you want to see coming back whenever it’s fixed.” (TOC)

“There’s two or three things need addressing. There’s the immediate need that we’ve got trains running currently – what are we going to do with them? There’s the secondary problem that Network Rail’s going to need the railway to fix it so what is our train plan going to be during this period; and how long that period is going to be? And then there’s the tertiary problem is when things are back up and running, how’s this going to impact on our railway – are we going to have a temporary speed restriction? Will there need to be some proofing trains?” (TOC)

“What we do to try and stay on top of that is that we will send a train out, and it goes out relatively slow to see if everything with the infrastructure is going fine - and then your trains can run from that. Or you’ve got to go with your diverting arrangements, or you’re in a rail replacement situation. The most important thing is to get your customers moving!” (TOC Owning Group)

2.1.24 FOCs felt they would monitor flood levels and run services on the route, as soon as it was safe to do so, or a diversion, if resources would allow, even if the journey was forced to run slower than usual. The motivation for this is keeping their customers happy and protecting commercial outcomes. One FOC suggested that if some of their services had to be cancelled as a result of flooding, they would prioritise some customers over others, such as those requiring goods within a specific amount of time. FOCs suggested that TOCs would not be as quick to respond and would likely have days’ worth of delays for their passengers.

“I would monitor flood levels, organise alternative resource, to ensure that the second the route was ready to run, our train would run to for the destination for the customer... could the train have been diverted I would have diverted them... There was Storm Ciara and virtually everything was ground to a halt... that weekend it was highly likely that [FOC] were the only operator to run services for their customer. They won’t have run in a timely manner but we did run the train... our customers are with us because we don’t stop... many of our customers are supermarket chains, it’s next day delivery stuff, if it doesn’t arrive the supermarket shops are shut... it’s customer satisfaction.” (FOC)

2.1.25 In contrast to the above, Infrastructure Managers and Consumer/Trade Associations suggested that the TOCs, and Infrastructure Managers, could wait for one another to implement storm mitigations, such as temporary speed restrictions - in order to reduce the possibility of having to pay penalties.

“We’ve had issues on our network that are like a Mexican stand-off where whoever blinks first will sort the delay out so nobody blinks and then it gets worse... Imagine there is a big storm... whoever puts the speed restrictions on first... they would have effectively taken the hit on the problem.” (Infrastructure Manager)

Network Rail response and perceived response

2.1.26 Strategic level stakeholders in Network Rail suggested that they would investigate in order to make timely announcements about the closure of parts of the railway, and take actions designed to minimise their Schedule 8 and 4 compensation payments.

“If it’s going be shut for an unknown length of time. If Network Rail can announce that by 10pm, the night before getting it into the timetable for the next day, we have to pay Schedule 4 compensation rather than Schedule 8, which is slightly less – reflecting the fact that passengers have been given the opportunity to become aware of the incident. ... it’s an interesting one because there’s probably no revenue loss so, therefore, there probably shouldn’t really be any compensation paid for that.” (Infrastructure Manager)

“I could be involved in the command Structure to try to restore normality ... and trying to put together an emergency plan working with colleague and the train operator ... to try to rectify the situation, and some of the communications around this.” (Infrastructure Manager)

“If a section of track has been flooded, particularly if it is a mainline, it would get high attention. We would do a contingency timetable for that and I would be aware from general conversations in the Network Rail senior leadership meetings if it was an issue. It would be one that the regional team in the Network Rail region would be almost certainly responsible for, for delivery of the recovery plan... and they’d want to work collaboratively with the train operators as well.” (Infrastructure Manager)

2.1.27 TOCs would expect Network Rail to try and fix underlying issues related to flooding in order to enhance network resilience; this could include engineering works for landslips on cuttings and embankments. TOCs would therefore expect Network Rail to require a track possession and would need to know the details of this in order to develop a temporary train plan around the engineering.

### 3. DATA TABLES

#### 3.1 Respondent Profile

| Which of the following best describes the organisation you work within? | Frequency | |---------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | TOC | 23 | | FOC | 4 | | Government/Regulator | 3 | | Infrastructure Manager | 1 | | Representative Group/Advocate | 1 | | Base | 32 |

| Which best describes the type of TOC you work for? | Frequency | |---------------------------------------------------|-----------| | Long distance | 13 | | Regional | 7 | | London/South East | 3 | | Base | 23 |

| How would you best describe your role relating to decisions on train performance within your organisation? | Frequency | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| | Decision-maker at senior operational level | 7 | | Frequent front-line decision-maker | 6 | | Strategic decision-maker/manager | 5 | | Other | 14 | | Base | 32 |

| How many years have you worked in the rail sector? | Frequency | |---------------------------------------------------|-----------| | 1 to 10 years | 10 | | 11 to 20 years | 8 | | 21 to 30 years | 7 | | 31 to 40 years | 5 | | Base | 30 |

### 3.2 Performance Decision Making

Thinking about your experience before the Covid-19 impacts, on a scale from zero to 10, how much do each of the following factors influence your decisions affecting train performance?

| Factor | Mean | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Taking pride in your work/‘doing the right thing’ | 9.2 | | Wanting your organisation to succeed | 8.7 | | Minimising negative impacts on passengers | 7.6 | | Your organisation’s targets | 7.5 | | Your company’s protocol/policies/guidelines defining your response | 7.5 | | The financial implications on your organisation in the short or longer term | 6.9 | | Your personal performance target(s) | 6.5 | | Negative media coverage/public perception | 6.3 | | Wanting to improve your reputation within your organisation | 6.3 | | Your performance-related pay/bonus scheme | 3.1 | | Base | 28 |

### 3.3 Incentives

Thinking about your experience before the Covid-19 impacts, please consider the following mechanisms/processes. For each in turn, does it have a positive, negative, or negligible effect on overall train performance across the network? Please think about the overall effect on the majority of passengers.

| Mechanism | Positive Outcome | Negligible Outcome | Negative Outcome | Don’t know | |---------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------|--------------------|------------------|------------| | Schedule 4 (or equivalent) - contractual performance regime relating to unplanned disruption | 11 | 14 | 3 | 4 | | Introduction of changes to timetable (excluding temporary changes) | 10 | 10 | 10 | 2 | | Schedule 8 (or concession service equivalents) - contractual performance regime relating to planned disruption | 9 | 14 | 5 | 4 | | Knock-on impacts of short-term disruptions caused by infrastructure improvements | 8 | 9 | 13 | 2 | | ORR’s monitoring and enforcement on Network Rail | 6 | 20 | 0 | 6 | | TOC performance league tables | 6 | 19 | 1 | 6 | | Obligations in Franchise Agreement or similar contractual relationship with funding body | 6 | 10 | 3 | 5 |

*The following options were only available in the version of the survey issued before the Covid-19 impact, base=7*

| Option | Positive Outcome | Negligible Outcome | Negative Outcome | Don’t know | |------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------|--------------------|------------------|------------| | Network Rail performance metrics (PPM, on-time, cancellations), as agreed with ORR and varying by operator | 4 | 2 | 0 | 1 | | Train service specifications (levels of service, performance etc.) defined in the franchise bidding process | 1 | 1 | 3 | 2 | | DfT/government’s monitoring and enforcement of performance targets on franchised TOCs | 0 | 4 | 2 | 1 |

### Which of the following interventions has the greatest positive influence on train performance?

| Intervention | Rank 1 | Rank 2 | Rank 3 | |------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|--------|--------| | Network Rail performance metrics (PPM, on-time, cancellations), as agreed with ORR and varying by operator | 10 | 8 | 7 | | Schedule 8 (or concession service equivalent) - contractual performance regime relating to unplanned disruption | 8 | 2 | 3 | | Introduction of changes to timetable (excluding temporary changes) | 4 | 4 | 7 | | Obligations in Franchise Agreement or similar contractual relationship with funding body | 3 | 5 | 3 | | ORR’s monitoring and enforcement on Network Rail | 3 | 3 | 2 | | DfT/government’s monitoring and enforcement of performance targets on franchised TOCs | 1 | 0 | 1 | | Knock-on impacts of short-term disruptions caused by infrastructure improvements | 1 | 2 | 5 | | Schedule 4 (or equivalents) - contractual performance regime relating to planned disruption | 1 | 1 | 4 | | TOC performance league tables | 1 | 5 | 0 | | Train service specifications (levels of service, performance etc.) defined in the franchise bidding process | 0 | 2 | 0 |

### If you were to change one intervention to make it have a more positive impact on train performance, which intervention would it be?

| Intervention | Rank | |------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| | Train service specifications (levels of service, performance etc.) defined in the franchise bidding process | 12 | | Introduction of changes to timetable (excluding temporary changes) | 8 | | ORR’s monitoring and enforcement on Network Rail | 5 | | Schedule 8 (or concession service equivalent) | 3 | | DfT/government’s monitoring and enforcement of performance targets on franchised TOCs | 1 | | Knock-on impacts of short-term disruptions caused by infrastructure improvements | 1 | | Network Rail performance metrics (PPM, on-time, cancellations), as agreed with ORR and varying by operator | 1 | | Schedule 4 | 1 | | Base | 32 |

### 3.4 Response to Covid-19

Thinking about the current industry set-up as it responds to the Covid-19 impacts, which of the following factors are leading to improved performance?

| Factor | Rank 1 | Rank 2 | Rank 3 | |-----------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|--------|--------| | Fewer trains on the network | 19 | 3 | 2 | | Achievable timetables | 4 | 11 | 1 | | Prioritise the movement of TOC’s own passengers during the disruption period, even if fewer PPM targets are met | 3 | 5 | | | Reduced passenger numbers | 2 | 3 | 5 | | Sufficient dwell times in relation to passenger numbers | 0 | 3 | 7 | | Delivery of infrastructure improvements during lockdown | 0 | 2 | 1 | | Favourable weather | 0 | 1 | 3 | | Stronger overall industry leadership/coordination | 0 | 1 | 2 | | Increased collaboration/communication across the industry | 0 | 1 | 0 | | Less target-driven work environment | 0 | 0 | 3 | | Other | 0 | 0 | 1 | | **Base** | 32 | 32 | 25 | SYSTRA provides research and advice on transport, to central, regional and local government, agencies, developers, operators and financiers.

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Reading Soane Point, 6-8 Market Place, Reading, Berkshire, RG1 2EG T: +44 (0)118 206 0220

Woking Dukes Court, Duke Street Woking, Surrey GU21 5BH United Kingdom T: +44 (0)1483 357705

Other locations:

France: Bordeaux, Lille, Lyon, Marseille, Paris

Northern Europe: Astana, Copenhagen, Kiev, London, Moscow, Riga, Wroclaw

Southern Europe & Mediterranean: Algiers, Baku, Bucharest, Madrid, Rabat, Rome, Sofia, Tunis

Middle East: Cairo, Dubai, Riyadh

Asia Pacific: Bangkok, Beijing, Brisbane, Delhi, Hanoi, Hong Kong, Manila, Seoul, Shanghai, Singapore, Shenzhen, Taipei

Africa: Abidjan, Douala, Johannesburg, Kinshasa, Libreville, Nairobi

Latin America: Lima, Mexico, Rio de Janeiro, Santiago, São Paulo

North America: Little Falls, Los Angeles, Montreal, New-York, Philadelphia, Washington