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 Federal  Communications  Commission  FCC  01-  130
 Before  the
 Federal  Communications  Commission
 Washington,  D.  C.  20554
 In  the  Matter  of
 Application  of  Verizon  New  England  Inc.,  Bell
 Atlantic  Communications,  Inc.  (d/  b/  a  Verizon
 Long  Distance),  NYNEX  Long  Distance
 Company  (d/  b/  a  Verizon  Enterprise  Solutions)
 And  Verizon  Global  Networks  Inc.,
 For  Authorization  to  Provide  In-  Region,
 InterLATA  Services  in  Massachusetts
 )
 )
 )
 )
 )
 )
 )
 )
 )
 CC  Docket  No.  01-  9
 MEMORANDUM  OPINION  AND  ORDER
 Adopted:  April  16,  2001  Released:  April  16,  2001
 By  the  Commission:  Chairman  Powell  and  Commissioner  Ness  issuing  separate  statements;
 Commissioner  Furchtgott-  Roth  concurring  and  issuing  a  statement;  and  Commissioner  Tristani
 dissenting  and  issuing  a  statement.
 TABLE  OF  CONTENTS
 Paragraph
 I.  INTRODUCTION  ............................................................................................................  1
 II.  BACKGROUND...............................................................................................................  4
 A.  HISTORY  OF  THIS  APPLICATION  ........................................................................................  4
 B.  EVALUATIONS  OF  MASSACHUSETTS  DEPARTMENT  AND  DEPARTMENT  OF  JUSTICE  .............  8
 III.  PROCEDURAL  AND  ANALYTICAL  FRAMEWORK...............................................  10
 IV.  PRIMARY  ISSUES  IN  DISPUTE  ..................................................................................  15
 A.  CHECKLIST  ITEM  2    UNBUNDLED  NETWORK  ELEMENTS  .................................................  16
 1.  Pricing  of  Network  Elements  ......................................................................................  16
 2.  Access  to  Operations  Support  Systems  .......................................................................  43
 3.  UNE  Combinations  ..................................................................................................  117
 B.  CHECKLIST  ITEM  4    UNBUNDLED  LOCAL  LOOPS  ..........................................................  121
 1.  Background  .............................................................................................................  121
 2.  Discussion  ................................................................................................................  124
 V.  OTHER  CHECKLIST  ITEMS.....................................................................................  182
 A.  CHECKLIST  ITEM  1    INTERCONNECTION  .......................................................................  182
 1.  Interconnection  Trunking  .........................................................................................  183
 2.  Collocation  ..............................................................................................................  194
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 Federal  Communications  Commission  FCC  01-  130
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 3.  Technically  Feasible  Points  of  Interconnection  ..........................................................  197
 4.  Pricing  of  Interconnection  ........................................................................................  198
 B.  CHECKLIST  ITEM  3    POLES,  DUCTS,  CONDUITS  AND  RIGHTS  OF  WAY  ...........................  205
 1.  Background  .............................................................................................................  205
 2.  Discussion  ................................................................................................................  206
 C.  CHECKLIST  ITEM  5    UNBUNDLED  LOCAL  TRANSPORT  ..................................................  207
 D.  CHECKLIST  ITEM  13    RECIPROCAL  COMPENSATION  .....................................................  213
 E.  CHECKLIST  ITEM  14    RESALE  ......................................................................................  217
 F.  REMAINING  CHECKLIST  ITEMS  (6-  12)  ............................................................................  222
 VI.  COMPLIANCE  WITH  SECTION  271(  C)(  1)(  A)  .........................................................  223
 A.  BACKGROUND  ..............................................................................................................  223
 B.  DISCUSSION  .................................................................................................................  224
 VII.  SECTION  272  COMPLIANCE  ................................................................................  226
 A.  BACKGROUND  ..............................................................................................................  226
 B.  DISCUSSION  .................................................................................................................  227
 1.  Unchallenged  Sections  .............................................................................................  228
 2.  Challenged  Sections  .................................................................................................  229
 VIII.  PUBLIC  INTEREST  ANALYSIS.............................................................................  232
 A.  COMPETITION  IN  LOCAL  EXCHANGE  AND  LONG  DISTANCE  MARKETS  ............................  234
 B.  ASSURANCE  OF  FUTURE  COMPLIANCE  ..........................................................................  236
 1.  Performance  Assurance  Plan  ....................................................................................  237
 2.  Key  Elements  of  the  Performance  Assurance  Plan  ....................................................  240
 C.  OTHER  ISSUES  ..............................................................................................................  249
 IX.  SECTION  271(  D)(  6)  ENFORCEMENT  AUTHORITY..............................................  250
 X.  CONCLUSION..............................................................................................................  253
 XI.  ORDERING  CLAUSES................................................................................................  254
 APPENDIX  A    LIST  OF  COMMENTERS
 APPENDIX  B    STATUTORY  REQUIREMENTS    CHECKLIST  ITEMS  6-  12
 I.  INTRODUCTION
 1.  On  January  16,  2001,  Verizon  New  England  Inc.,  Bell  Atlantic  Communications,
 Inc.  (d/  b/  a  Verizon  Long  Distance),  NYNEX  Long  Distance  Company  (d/  b/  a  Verizon  Enterprise
 Solutions),  and  Verizon  Global  Networks  Inc.  (Verizon)  filed  this  application  pursuant  to  section
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 271  of  the  Communications  Act  of  1934,  as  amended,  1  for  authority  to  provide  in-  region,
 interLATA  service  originating  in  the  state  of  Massachusetts.  2  We  grant  this  application  in  this
 Order  based  on  our  conclusion  that  Verizon  has  taken  the  statutorily  required  steps  to  open  its
 local  exchange  markets  to  competition  in  Massachusetts.
 2.  In  approving  this  application,  we  wish  to  recognize  the  hard  work  of  the
 Massachusetts  Department  of  Telecommunications  and  Energy  (Massachusetts  Department)  in
 laying  the  foundation  for  approval  of  this  application.  The  Massachusetts  Department  has
 conducted  critically  important  proceedings  concerning  Verizons  section  271  compliance  open  to
 participation  by  all  interested  parties.  The  Massachusetts  Department  and  Verizon  also  provided
 for  third-  party  testing  of  Verizons  operations  support  systems  (OSS)  offering.  In  addition,  the
 Massachusetts  Department  adopted  a  broad  range  of  performance  measures  and  standards  and  a
 Performance  Assurance  Plan  designed  to  create  a  financial  incentive  for  post-  entry  compliance
 with  section  271.  State  proceedings  such  as  these  serve  a  vitally  important  role  in  the  overall
 section  271  approval  process.
 3.  We  also  commend  Verizon  for  all  of  the  work  that  it  has  undertaken  to  open  its
 local  exchange  market  to  competition  in  Massachusetts.  For  example,  Verizon  states  that
 competitive  local  exchange  carriers  (competitive  LECs)  serve  more  than  513,000  lines  on  a
 facilities  basis  in  Massachusetts,  with  Verizon  providing  more  than  333,000  interconnection
 trunks  and  1,700  collocation  nodes  to  competitive  LECs.  Verizon  also  states  that  it  provides
 more  than  93,000  unbundled  local  loops,  including  more  than  69,000  stand-  alone  unbundled  local
 loops  and  more  than  23,000  unbundled  loops  provided  as  part  of  an  unbundled  network  element
 platform  (UNE-  P).  There  is  also  an  active  resale  market  in  Massachusetts.  Verizon  states  that  it
 provides  more  than  268,000  resold  local  exchange  lines,  including  238,000  business  lines  and
 30,000  residential  lines.  These  results  bear  out  the  fact  that  Verizon  has  made  extensive  efforts  to
 open  its  local  markets  in  compliance  with  the  requirements  of  the  Act.  3
 II.  BACKGROUND
 A.  History  of  this  Application
 4.  In  the  1996  amendments  to  the  Communications  Act,  Congress  required  that  the
 Bell  Operating  Companies  (BOCs)  demonstrate  compliance  with  certain  market  opening
 requirements  contained  in  section  271  of  the  Act  prior  to  entering  the  in-  region,  interLATA
 market.  Congress  also  provided  for  Commission  review  of  BOC  applications  to  provide  such
 1  In  1996,  Congress  amended  the  Communications  Act  of  1934  to  foster  the  development  of  local  exchange
 competition,  among  other  things.  The  Telecommunications  Act  of  1996,  Pub.  L.  No.  104-  104,  110  Stat.  56  (1996).
 We  refer  to  the  Communications  Act  of  1934,  as  amended  by  the  Telecommunications  Act  of  1996,  as  the
 Communications  Act  or  the  Act.
 2  Supplemental  Filing  of  Verizon  New  England,  CC  Docket  No.  01-  9  (filed  Jan.  16,  2001)  (Verizon
 Massachusetts  II  Application).
 3  See  id.  Attach.  A.
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 services  in  consultation  with  the  affected  state  and  the  Attorney  General.  The  Commission  has
 summarized  the  applicable  statutory  framework  in  a  number  of  prior  orders  and  need  not  repeat
 this  material  here.  4
 5.  On  May  24,  1999,  Verizon  filed  a  draft  section  271  application  with  the
 Massachusetts  Department.  5  The  Massachusetts  Department  conducted  a  sixteen-  month
 investigation  of  Verizons  compliance  with  section  271.  These  proceedings  were  open  to  full
 participation  by  all  interested  parties.  This  process  included:  a  comprehensive  third-  party  test  of
 Verizons  OSS;  numerous  technical  sessions  with  the  Departments  staff,  Verizon  and  many
 competitive  LECs;  a  series  of  public  hearings  and  oral  arguments;  and  hundreds  of  information
 requests.
 6.  In  August  of  1999,  the  Massachusetts  Department  contracted  with  KPMG
 consulting,  L.  L.  C.  to  perform  a  third-  party  test  of  Verizons  OSS  performance.  In  January  2000,
 the  Massachusetts  Department  adopted  the  performance  metrics  developed  in  the  New  York
 carrier-  to-  carrier  proceeding  as  the  metrics  to  be  used  and  replicated  by  KPMG  in  evaluating
 Verizons  performance  in  Massachusetts.  6  On  September  7,  2000,  KPMG  issued  its  final  report,
 which  found  that  Verizon  satisfied  800  of  804  test  points  relating  to  its  review  of  Verizons  OSS.  7
 7.  Verizon  filed  its  initial  application  for  section  271  authority  for  the  state  of
 Massachusetts  (the  Massachusetts  I  Application)  on  September  22,  2000,  8  but  later  chose  to
 4  See,  e.  g.,  Joint  Application  by  SBC  Communications  Inc.,  Southwestern  Bell  Tel.  Co.,  and  Southwestern  Bell
 Communications  Services,  Inc.,  d/  b/  a  Southwestern  Bell  Long  Distance  for  Provision  of  In-  Region,  InterLATA
 Services  in  Kansas  and  Oklahoma,  Memorandum  Opinion  and  Order,  FCC  01-  29,  CC  Docket  No.  00-  217,  paras.
 7-  10  (rel.  Jan.  22,  2001)  (SWBT  Kansas/  Oklahoma  Order);  Application  by  SBC  Communications  Inc.,
 Southwestern  Bell  Tel.  Co.,  and  Southwestern  Bell  Communications  Services,  Inc.  d/  b/  a  Southwestern  Bell  Long
 Distance  Pursuant  to  Section  271  of  the  Telecommunications  Act  of  1996  To  Provide  In-  Region,  InterLATA
 Services  in  Texas,  Memorandum  Opinion  and  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  18354,  18359-  61,  paras.  8-  11  (2000)  (SWBT
 Texas  Order);  Application  by  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  for  Authorization  Under  Section  271  of  the  Communications
 Act  To  Provide  In-  Region,  InterLATA  Service  in  the  State  of  New  York,  Memorandum  Opinion  and  Order,  15  FCC
 Rcd  3953,  3961-  63,  paras.  17-  20  (1999)  (Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order).
 5  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Application  App.  B,  Vol.  1a-  aa,  Tab  2  (Massachusetts  DTE,  D.  T.  E.  99-  271,
 Inquiry  by  the  Department  of  Telecommunications  and  Energy  pursuant  to  Section  271  of  the  Telecommunications
 Act  of  1996  into  the  Compliance  Filing  of  New  England  Telephone  and  Telegraph  Company  d/  b/  a  Bell  Atlantic-Massachusetts
 as  part  of  its  application  to  the  Federal  Communications  Commission  for  entry  into  the  in-  region
 interLATA  (long  distance)  telephone  market).
 6  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Application  App.  B,  Vol.  24,  Tab  282  (Massachusetts  DTE,  D.  P.  U.  99-  271,
 Evaluation  of  Bell  Atlantic-  Massachusetts  Operations  Support  Systems:  Final  Attachment  A  to  11/  19/  99  Letter
 Order  on  Final  Master  Test  Plan  (Jan.  14,  2000)).
 7  See  generally  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Application  App.  I,  Vol.  1a-  b  (KPMG  Final  Report).
 8  Application  by  Verizon  New  England  for  Authorization  to  Provide  In-  Region,  InterLATA  Services  in
 Massachusetts,  CC  Docket  No.  00-  176  (filed  Sept.  22,  2000)  (Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Application).
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 withdraw  it.  9  Verizon  filed  another  application  for  Massachusetts  (the  Massachusetts  II
 Application)  on  January  16,  2001.  10  The  Massachusetts  II  Application  incorporates  the  material
 in  the  original  application  by  reference  to  demonstrate  compliance  with  most  of  the  section  271
 requirements.  It  also  provides  additional  information  concerning  Verizons  provision  of  DSL-capable
 local  loops,  the  availability  of  loop  make-  up  information  and  line  sharing.  In  addition,
 competitive  LECs  now  have  access  to  Verizons  carrier  specific  performance  data.  11
 B.  Evaluations  of  Massachusetts  Department  and  Department  of  Justice
 8.  The  Massachusetts  Department  supports  Verizons  application  to  provide  in-region,
 interLATA  long  distance  service  originating  in  Massachusetts.  Specifically,  it  concluded
 that  Verizon  had  met  the  requirements  of  section  271,  and  urged  the  Commission  to  approve
 Verizons  in-  region,  interLATA  entry  in  both  its  October  16,  2000  evaluation  of  the
 Massachusetts  I  Application,  12  and  its  February  6,  2001  evaluation  of  the  Massachusetts  II
 Application.  13
 9.  The  Department  of  Justice  filed  its  evaluation  of  Verizons  Massachusetts  I
 Application  on  October  27,  2000.  14  It  recommended  that  the  Commission  not  approve  the
 application  until  Verizon  had  demonstrated  that  it  provides  nondiscriminatory  access  to  DSL-capable
 loops  and  established  suitable  performance  measures  with  unambiguous  benchmarks  for
 DSL-  capable  loops.  15  The  Department  of  Justice  submitted  an  evaluation  of  Verizons
 9  See  Letter  from  Michael  E.  Glover,  Senior  Vice  President  &  Deputy  General  Counsel,  Verizon,  to  Magalie
 Roman  Salas,  Secretary,  Federal  Communications  Commission,  CC  Docket  No.  00-  176  (filed  Dec.  18,  2000).
 10  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Application.
 11  The  availability  of  this  information  plays  a  critical  role  in  the  ability  of  competitive  LECs  to  participate  in  the
 section  271  application  review  process.
 12  Evaluation  of  the  Massachusetts  Department  of  Telecommunications  and  Energy,  CC  Docket  No.  00-  176
 (filed  October  16,  2000)  (Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  I  Comments).  On  November  3,  2000,  the
 Massachusetts  Department  filed  its  reply  (Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  I  Reply).
 13  Evaluation  of  the  Massachusetts  Department  of  Telecommunications  and  Energy,  CC  Docket  No.  01-  9  (filed
 February  6,  2001)  (Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  II  Comments).  On  February  28,  2001,  the
 Massachusetts  Department  filed  its  second  reply  (Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  II  Reply).
 14  Evaluation  of  the  United  States  Department  of  Justice,  CC  Docket  No.  00-  176  (filed  October  27,  2000)
 (Department  of  Justice  Massachusetts  I  Evaluation).
 15  See  Department  of  Justice  Massachusetts  I  Evaluation  at  2.  The  Department  of  Justice  found  that,  although
 Verizon  has  satisfied  this  standard  in  most  respects,  important  issues  remain  inadequately  addressed.  Id.  It  noted
 that  the  principal  issue  on  which  Verizon  had  failed  to  develop  an  adequate  record  was  its  provision  of  DSL-capable
 loops.  See  id.  The  Department  concluded  that  Verizon  had  not  yet  demonstrated  that  it  provides
 nondiscriminatory  access  to  DSL-  capable  loops,  including  line  sharing,  or  that  adequate  performance  mechanisms
 were  in  place  to  deter  backsliding.  See  id.  at  24.  The  Department  of  Justice  recommended  that  we  not  permit
 Verizon  to  offer  interLATA  services  in  Massachusetts  until  Verizon  demonstrated  that  it  has  resolved  these
 shortcomings.  See  id.  at  3.
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 Massachusetts  II  Application  on  February  21,  2001.  16  It  recognized  that  a  number  of  changes
 have  taken  place  since  it  filed  its  evaluation  of  the  Massachusetts  I  Application  and
 acknowledged  that  the  second  Verizon  application  shows  improvement  in  some  aspects  of
 Verizons  performance  in  providing  access  to  DSL  loops,  although  it  highlighted  several
 remaining  disputed  issues  related  to  the  provision  of  nondiscriminatory  access  to  DSL-  capable
 loops.  17  The  Department  of  Justice  stated  that  it  was  unable  to  resolve  those  remaining  issues
 based  on  the  record  on  file  at  the  time  of  its  evaluation.  18  As  a  result,  it  stated  that  it  could  not
 find  at  that  stage  of  the  proceeding  that  Verizon  had  adequately  demonstrated  its  ability  to
 provide  nondiscriminatory  access  to  DSL-  capable  loops.  19  Recognizing  that  its  evaluation
 reflected  only  the  evidence  in  the  record  at  the  time  of  its  evaluation,  however,  the  Department  of
 Justice  urged  the  Commission  to  consider  the  full  record  --  as  it  developed  in  reply  comments  and
 ex  parte  submissions  --  in  its  final  determination.  20
 III.  PROCEDURAL  AND  ANALYTICAL  FRAMEWORK
 10.  To  determine  whether  a  BOC  applicant  has  met  the  prerequisites  for  entry  into  the
 long  distance  market,  we  evaluate  its  compliance  with  the  competitive  checklist,  as  developed  in
 our  local  competition  rules  and  orders  in  effect  at  the  time  the  application  was  filed.  Despite  the
 comprehensiveness  of  our  rules,  there  will  inevitably  be,  in  any  section  271  proceeding,  disputes
 over  an  incumbent  LECs  precise  obligations  to  its  competitors  that  our  rules  have  not  addressed
 and  that  do  not  involve  per  se  violations  of  self-  executing  requirements  of  the  Act.  As  the
 Commission  has  explained  in  prior  orders,  the  section  271  process  simply  could  not  function  as
 Congress  intended  if  we  resolved  all  such  disputes  as  a  precondition  to  granting  a  section  271
 application.  21  In  prior  orders,  the  Commission  has  explained  the  procedural  rules  it  has  developed
 16  Evaluation  of  the  United  States  Department  of  Justice,  CC  Docket  No.  00-  176  (filed  February  21,  2001)
 (Department  of  Justice  Massachusetts  II  Evaluation).
 17  Department  of  Justice  Massachusetts  II  Evaluation  at  2-  3.  For  example,  the  Department  of  Justice  noted,
 among  other  things,  that:  (1)  Verizon  and  the  competing  carriers  modified,  and  the  Massachusetts  Department
 adopted,  the  carrier-  to-  carrier  measures  for  DSL-  capable  loop  performance  and  created  a  set  of  measures  for  line
 sharing;  (2)  Verizon  submitted  to  the  Massachusetts  Department  changes  to  its  performance  assurance  plan,
 proposing  to  add  additional  DSL-  capable  loop  and  line  sharing  measurements  and  make  DSL  a  separate  mode  of
 entry;  (3)  Verizons  separate  data  affiliate,  Verizon  Advanced  Data,  Inc.  (VADI),  became  fully  operational  in
 Massachusetts;  (4)  Verizon  agreed  to  proceed  with  the  development  and  deployment  of  a  mechanism  to  provide
 competing  carriers  with  electronic  access  to  loop  make-  up  information;  and  (5)  Verizon  conducted  re-  inspections
 of  line  sharing  related  collocation  work,  enabled  some  line  sharing  orders  to  flow  through  its  systems  without
 manual  intervention,  and  established  a  wholesale  service  center  dedicated  to  DSL-  capable  loops  and  line  sharing.
 See  id.
 18  See  Department  of  Justice  Massachusetts  II  Evaluation  at  3,  14;  see  also  id.  at  7-  14  (describing  issues  in
 dispute).
 19  See  id.  at  14.
 20  See  id.  at  15  &  n.  61.
 21  See  SWBT  Kansas/  Oklahoma  Order  at  para.  19;  see  also  American  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.  v.  FCC,  220  F.  3d  607,  631
 (D.  C.  Cir.  2000).
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 to  facilitate  the  review  process.  22  Here  we  describe  how  we  consider  the  evidence  of  compliance
 that  Verizon  has  presented  to  us  in  this  proceeding.
 11.  As  part  of  our  determination  that  a  BOC  has  satisfied  the  requirements  of  section
 271,  we  consider  whether  the  BOC  has  fully  implemented  the  competitive  checklist  in  subsection
 (c)(  2)(  B).  The  BOC  at  all  times  bears  the  burden  of  proof  of  compliance  with  section  271,  even  if
 no  party  challenges  its  compliance  with  a  particular  requirement.  In  demonstrating  its
 compliance,  a  BOC  must  show  that  it  has  a  concrete  and  specific  legal  obligation  to  furnish  the
 item  upon  request  pursuant  to  state-  approved  interconnection  agreements  that  set  forth  prices  and
 other  terms  and  conditions  for  each  checklist  item,  and  that  it  is  currently  furnishing,  or  is  ready  to
 furnish,  the  checklist  items  in  quantities  that  competitors  may  reasonably  demand  and  at  an
 acceptable  level  of  quality.  23  In  particular,  the  BOC  must  demonstrate  that  it  is  offering
 interconnection  and  access  to  network  elements  on  a  nondiscriminatory  basis.  24  Previous
 Commission  orders  addressing  section  271  applications  have  elaborated  on  this  statutory
 standard.  25  First,  for  those  functions  the  BOC  provides  to  competing  carriers  that  are  analogous
 to  the  functions  a  BOC  provides  to  itself  in  connection  with  its  own  retail  service  offerings,  the
 BOC  must  provide  access  to  competing  carriers  in  substantially  the  same  time  and  manner  as  it
 provides  to  itself.  26  For  those  functions  that  have  no  retail  analogue,  the  BOC  must  demonstrate
 that  the  access  it  provides  to  competing  carriers  would  offer  an  efficient  carrier  a  meaningful
 opportunity  to  compete.  27
 12.  In  past  orders,  the  Commission  has  found  that  the  most  probative  evidence  of
 nondiscriminatory  access  to  interconnection  and  UNEs  is  actual  commercial  usage,  and
 [  p]  erformance  measures  are  an  especially  effective  means  of  providing  us  with  evidence  of  the
 quality  and  timeliness  of  the  access  provided  by  a  BOC  to  requesting  carriers.  28  We  expect  that,
 in  its  prima  facie  case  in  the  initial  application,  a  BOC  relying  on  performance  data  will:
 22  See,  e.  g.,  SWBT  Kansas/  Oklahoma  Order  at  paras.  21-  27;  SWBT  Texas  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  18370-  73,
 paras.  34-  42;  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  3968-  71,  paras.  32-  42.
 23  See  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  3973-  74,  para.  52.
 24  See  47  U.  S.  C.    271(  c)(  2)(  B)(  i),  (ii).
 25  See  SWBT  Kansas/  Oklahoma  Order  at  paras.  28-  29;  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  3971-  72,
 paras.  44-  46.
 26  SWBT  Texas  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  18373,  para.  44;  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  3971,  para.
 44.
 27  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  3971,  para.  44;  Application  of  Ameritech  Michigan  Pursuant  to
 Section  271  of  the  Communications  Act  of  1934,  as  amended,  To  Provide  In-  Region,  InterLATA  Services  in
 Michigan,  Memorandum  Opinion  and  Order,  12  FCC  Rcd  20543,  20618-  19,  para.  141  (1997)  (Ameritech
 Michigan  Order).
 28  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  3969,  para.  53.
7
 Federal  Communications  Commission  FCC  01-  130
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 a)  provide  sufficient  performance  data  to  support  its  contention  that  the  statutory
 requirements  are  satisfied;
 b)  identify  the  facial  disparities  between  the  applicants  performance  for  itself  and
 its  performance  for  competitors;
 c)  explain  why  those  facial  disparities  are  anomalous,  caused  by  forces  beyond  the
 applicants  control  (e.  g.,  competing  carrier-  caused  errors),  or  have  no
 meaningful  adverse  impact  on  a  competing  carriers  ability  to  obtain  and  serve
 customers;  and
 d)  provide  the  underlying  data,  analysis,  and  methodologies  necessary  to  enable
 the  Commission  and  commenters  meaningfully  to  evaluate  and  contest  the
 validity  of  the  applicants  explanations  for  performance  disparities,  including,
 for  example,  carrier  specific  carrier-  to-  carrier  performance  data.
 13.  The  Massachusetts  Department  has  adopted  the  performance  metrics  and
 standards  established  by  the  New  York  Commission.  Under  this  framework,  for  functions  with
 retail  analogues,  Verizon  provides  a  figure  indicating  the  degree  of  statistical  significance  for  any
 differences  in  performance  for  competitors  as  compared  to  performance  for  its  retail  operations.
 For  functions  with  a  performance  benchmark,  Verizon  provides  data  on  its  performance,  which
 are  then  compared  to  the  benchmark.  The  Commission  has  explained  in  prior  orders  that  parity
 and  benchmark  standards  established  by  state  commissions  do  not  represent  absolute  maximum  or
 minimum  levels  of  performance  necessary  to  satisfy  the  competitive  checklist.  Rather,  where,  as
 here,  these  standards  are  developed  through  open  proceedings  with  input  from  both  the
 incumbent  and  competing  carriers,  these  standards  can  represent  informed  and  reliable  attempts  to
 objectively  approximate  whether  competing  carriers  are  being  served  by  the  incumbent  in
 substantially  the  same  time  and  manner,  or  in  a  way  that  provides  them  a  meaningful  opportunity
 to  compete.  29  Thus,  to  the  extent  there  is  no  statistically  significant  difference  between  Verizons
 provision  of  service  to  competing  carriers  and  its  own  retail  customers,  we  generally  need  not
 look  any  further.  Likewise,  if  Verizons  provision  of  service  to  competing  carriers  satisfies  the
 performance  benchmark,  our  analysis  is  usually  done.  Otherwise,  we  will  examine  the  evidence
 further  to  make  a  determination  whether  the  statutory  nondiscrimination  requirements  are  met.  30
 Thus,  we  will  examine  the  explanations  that  Verizon  and  others  provide  about  whether  these  data
 accurately  depict  the  quality  of  Verizons  performance.  We  also  may  examine  how  many  months
 a  variation  in  performance  has  existed  and  what  the  recent  trend  has  been.  We  may  find  that
 statistically  significant  differences  exist,  but  conclude  that  such  differences  have  little  or  no
 competitive  significance  in  the  marketplace.  In  such  cases,  we  may  conclude  that  the  differences
 are  not  meaningful  in  terms  of  statutory  compliance.  Ultimately,  the  determination  of  whether  a
 BOCs  performance  meets  the  statutory  requirements  necessarily  is  a  contextual  decision  based  on
 the  totality  of  the  circumstances  and  information  before  us.
 29  See  SWBT  Kansas/  Oklahoma  Order  at  para.  31;  SWBT  Texas  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  18377,  para.  55  &  n.  102.
 30  See  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  3970,  para.  59.
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 Federal  Communications  Commission  FCC  01-  130
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 14.  In  this  application,  we  examine  performance  data  as  reported  in  carrier-  to-  carrier
 reports  reflecting  service  in  the  most  recent  full  months  before  filing  (i.  e.,  from  September
 through  December  2000).  We  also  examine  Verizons  January  performance  data  in  a  few
 instances  for  the  limited  purpose  of  confirming  the  acceptable  performance  or  a  trend  of
 improvement  shown  in  earlier  months  data.  Verizon  has  asserted  that  some  of  these  data  are
 affected  by  a  workers  strike  that  took  place  in  August  2000.  We  address  the  relevance  of  the
 strike  and  Verizons  explanations  of  its  impact  on  the  data  below  in  our  discussions  of  specific
 aspects  of  Verizons  performance.
 IV.  PRIMARY  ISSUES  IN  DISPUTE
 15.  In  this  Order,  we  assess  all  aspects  of  compliance  with  section  271,  but  we  focus
 primarily  on  the  most  controversial  checklist  compliance  issues  as  the  Commission  did  in  the
 recent  SWBT  Kansas/  Oklahoma  Order.  31  First,  we  address  checklist  item  2,  which  encompasses
 access  to  unbundled  network  elements,  including  issues  related  to  OSS  and  combinations  of
 network  elements  as  well  as  pricing.  We  then  discuss  checklist  item  4,  access  to  unbundled  local
 loops.  The  remaining  checklist  requirements  are  then  discussed  briefly  because  commenting
 parties  did  not  comment  as  extensively,  or  at  all,  on  them,  and  our  own  review  of  the  record  leads
 us  to  conclude  that  Verizon  has  satisfied  these  requirements.  We  then  address  Verizons  showing
 of  compliance  with  the  requirements  of  Track  A  in  Massachusetts.  Finally,  we  discuss  issues
 concerning  compliance  with  section  272  and  the  public  interest  requirement,  and  our  section
 271(  d)(  6)  enforcement  authority.  It  is  our  hope  that  this  approach  will  serve  to  focus  attention  on
 the  section  271  requirements  commenting  parties  address  most  extensively,  while  streamlining  the
 discussion  of  the  other  less  or  noncontroversial  requirements.
 A.  Checklist  Item  2    Unbundled  Network  Elements
 1.  Pricing  of  Network  Elements
 a.  Background
 16.  Checklist  item  2  of  section  271  states  that  a  BOC  must  provide
 [  n]  ondiscriminatory  access  to  network  elements  in  accordance  with  the  requirements  of  sections
 251(  c)(  3)  and  252(  d)(  1)  of  the  Act.  32  Section  251(  c)(  3)  requires  LECs  to  provide
 nondiscriminatory  access  to  network  elements  on  an  unbundled  basis  at  any  technically  feasible
 point  on  rates,  terms,  and  conditions  that  are  just,  reasonable,  and  nondiscriminatory.  .  .  .  33
 Section  252(  d)(  1)  requires  that  a  state  commissions  determination  of  the  just  and  reasonable
 rates  for  network  elements  shall  be  based  on  the  cost  of  providing  the  network  elements,  shall  be
 nondiscriminatory,  and  may  include  a  reasonable  profit.  34  Pursuant  to  this  statutory  mandate,  the
 31  See  SWBT  Kansas/  Oklahoma  Order  at  para.  39.
 32  47  U.  S.  C.    271(  B)(  ii).
 33  Id.    251(  c)(  3).
 34  Id.    252(  d)(  1).
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 Federal  Communications  Commission  FCC  01-  130
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 Commission  has  determined  that  prices  for  unbundled  network  elements  (UNEs)  must  be  based
 on  the  total  element  long  run  incremental  cost  (TELRIC)  of  providing  those  elements.  35
 17.  Although  the  United  States  Court  of  Appeals  for  the  Eighth  Circuit  stayed  the
 Commissions  pricing  rules  in  1996,  36  the  Supreme  Court  restored  the  Commissions  pricing
 authority  on  January  25,  1999,  and  remanded  to  the  Eighth  Circuit  for  consideration  of  the  merits
 of  the  challenged  rules.  37  On  remand  from  the  Supreme  Court,  the  Eighth  Circuit  concluded  that
 while  TELRIC  is  an  acceptable  method  for  determining  costs,  certain  specific  rules  contained
 within  the  Commissions  pricing  rules  were  contrary  to  Congressional  intent.  38  The  Eighth  Circuit
 has  stayed  the  issuance  of  its  mandate  pending  review  by  the  Supreme  Court.  39  Accordingly,  the
 Commissions  rules  remain  in  effect  for  purposes  of  this  application.
 18.  The  Massachusetts  Department  established  its  prices  for  UNEs  in  an  extensive
 proceeding  beginning  when  several  carriers  requested  arbitration  of  interconnection  agreements
 with  Verizon  in  July  1996.  40  In  Phase  4  of  its  Consolidated  Arbitrations  proceeding,  the
 Massachusetts  Department  examined  cost  studies  submitted  by  Verizon  and  the  competitive  LECs
 that  purported  to  apply  the  Commissions  TELRIC  pricing  methodology.  41  The  Massachusetts
 Department  accepted,  for  the  most  part,  Verizons  submitted  cost  model  and  ordered  it  to
 determine  the  cost  of  UNEs  based  on  that  model.  42  The  interim  rates  adopted  in  the
 Massachusetts  DTE  Phase  4  Order  were  made  permanent  by  the  Massachusetts  Department  on
 March  19,  1999.  43  From  the  start  of  the  Consolidated  Arbitrations  proceeding  through  the  filing
 35  See  Local  Competition  First  Report  and  Order,  11  FCC  Rcd  at  15844-  47,  paras.  672-  78;  47  C.  F.  R.    51.501
 et  seq.  (1999);  see  also  Line  Sharing  Order,  14  FCC  Rcd  at  20973-  81,  paras.  131-  57  (concluding  that  states  should
 set  the  prices  for  line  sharing  as  a  new  network  element  in  the  same  manner  as  the  states  set  prices  for  other
 UNEs).
 36  See  Iowa  Utils.  Bd.  v.  FCC,  109  F.  3d  418  (8  th  Cir.  1996),  120  F.  3d  753,  800,  804-  06  (8  th  Cir.  1997),  affd  in
 part,  revd  in  part  sub  nom.  AT&  T  Corp.  v.  Iowa  Utils.  Bd.,  525  U.  S.  366  (1999).
 37  AT&  T  Corp.  v.  Iowa  Utils.  Bd.,  525  U.  S.  at  397.
 38  Iowa  Utils.  Bd.  v.  FCC,  219  F.  3d  744  (8  th  Cir.  2000),  cert.  granted  sub  nom.  Verizon  Communications,  Inc.  v.
 FCC,  121  S.  Ct.  877  (2001).
 39  Iowa  Utils.  Bd.  v.  FCC,  No.  96-  3321  et  al.  (8  th  Cir.,  Sept.  25,  2000).
 40  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Application  App.  H,  Vol.  27,  Tab  162,  Consolidated  Petitions  of  New  England
 Telephone  and  Telegraph  Company  d/  b/  a  NYNEX,  Teleport  Communications  Group,  Inc.,  Brooks  Fiber
 Communications,  AT&  T  Communications  of  New  England,  Inc.,  MCI  Communications  Company,  and  Sprint
 Communications  Company,  L.  P.,  Pursuant  to  Section  252(  b)  of  the  Telecommunications  Act  of  1996,  for
 Arbitration  of  Interconnection  Agreements  Between  NYNEX  and  the  Aforementioned  Companies  D.  P.  U.  96-  73/  74,
 96-  75,  96-  80/  81,  96-  83,  96-  94  Phase  4  (Dec.  4,  1996)  (Massachusetts  DTE  Phase  4  Order).
 41  See  Massachusetts  DTE  Phase  4  Order  at  6,  8-  9.
 42  See  Massachusetts  DTE  Phase  4  Order  at  12-  17,  71.
 43  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Application  App.  F,  Vol.  8,  Tab  157,  Investigation  by  the  Department  on  Its  Own
 Motion  into  the  Propriety  of  the  Resale  Tariff  of  New  England  Telephone  and  Telegraph  Company  d/  b/  a  Bell
 (continued.)
10
 Federal  Communications  Commission  FCC  01-  130
 11
 of  Verizons  section  271  applications,  commenters  have  been  challenging  Verizons  UNE  rates  in
 Massachusetts.  44  On  July  24,  2000,  the  Massachusetts  Department  approved  lower,  promotional
 residential  UNE  switching  rates  in  an  interconnection  agreement  between  Verizon  and  one  carrier,
 Z-  Tel.  45  These  promotional  rates  were  negotiated  at  the  request  of  the  Massachusetts  Department
 and  were  made  available  to  similarly  situated  carriers.  46  In  a  tariff  filing  submitted  to  and
 approved  by  the  Massachusetts  Department  on  October  13,  2000,  during  the  pendency  of
 Verizons  Massachusetts  I  Application,  Verizon  further  lowered  its  UNE  rates  for  switching,
 transport  and  switch  ports  to  rates  equivalent  to  those  that  it  currently  has  in  effect  in  New  York.  47  In  filing  these  October  13  th  rates  with  the  Massachusetts  Department,  Verizon  explained
 that  the  lower  rates  were  intended  to  eliminate  pricing  issues  particularly  regarding  local
 switching  in  its  Section  271  application  now  pending  before  the  FCC.  48
 19.  On  January  12,  2001,  the  Massachusetts  Department  opened  its  scheduled  five-year
 review  of  UNE  rates.  49  The  Massachusetts  Department  intends  to  conclude  its  investigation
 (Continued  from  previous  page)
 Atlantic-  Massachusetts,  Filed  with  the  Department  on  January  16,  1998,  to  Become  Effective  February  14,  1998,
 D.  T.  E.  98-  15  (Phases  II,  III)  at  16  (Mar.  19,  1999).
 44  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Application  App.  H,  Vol.  29,  Tab  175,  Motion  of  MCI  Telecommunications
 Corp.  for  Reconsideration  and  Clarification  of  Phase  3  and  Phase  4  Orders,  D.  P.  U.  96-  73/  74,  96-  75,  96-  80/  81,
 96-  83,  96-  94  (Dec.  31,  1996);  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Application  App.  F,  Vol.  1,  Tab  12,  Motion  by  AT&  T
 Communications  of  New  England,  Inc.,  to  Establish  Permanent  Recurring  Rates  for  Unbundled  Network  Elements,
 D.  T.  E.  98-  15  (Mar.  27,  1998);  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Application  App.  F,  Vol.  7,  Tab  126,  Initial  Brief  of  MCI
 WorldCom,  Inc.  on  the  Methodology  for  Permanent  Pricing  of  Unbundled  Network  Elements,  D.  T.  E.  98-  15  (Oct.
 14,  1998);  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Application  App.  B,  Vol.  37,  Tab  455,  Letter  from  Christopher  J.  McDonald,
 Senior  Attorney,  MCI  WorldCom,  to  Mary  L.  Cottrell,  Secretary,  Massachusetts  Department  of
 Telecommunications  and  Energy  (May  18,  2000);  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Application  App.  B,  Vol.  38,  Tab  457,
 Comments  of  the  Attorney  General  on  Bell  Atlantics  May  26,  2000  Supplemental  Filing,  D.  T.  E.  99-  271  at  17-  18
 (July  18,  2000).
 45  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Application  App.  A,  Tab  7,  Declaration  of  W.  Robert  Mudge  Attach.  A,
 Amendment  No.  2  to  the  Interconnection  Agreement  between  Bell  Atlantic-  Massachusetts  and  Z-  Tel
 Communications,  Inc.  (June  29,  2000);  see  also  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  221-  22.
 46  See  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  221-  22.
 47  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  222-  23;  Letter  from  Gordon  R.  Evans,  VP  Federal
 Regulatory,  Verizon,  to  Magalie  Roman  Salas,  Secretary,  Federal  Communications  Commission,  CC  Docket  No.
 00-  176  (Oct.  13,  2000)  (Verizon  October  13  th  UNE  Rate  Filing);  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Reply  App.,  Tab  8,
 Reply  Declaration  of  Steven  E.  Collins  Attach.  B,  Letter  from  John  L.  Conroy,  Director  Regulatory-  Massachusetts,
 Verizon,  to  Mary  Cottrell,  Secretary,  Massachusetts  Department  of  Telecommunications  and  Energy,  correcting  a
 typographical  error  in  October  13  th  filing  for  unbundled  telephone  company  reciprocal  compensation  rates  (Oct.
 18,  2000).
 48  Verizon  October  13  th  UNE  Rate  Filing  at  2.
 49  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Application  App.  B,  Vol.  3,  Tab  4,  Subtab  D,  Investigation  by  the  Department
 of  Telecommunications  and  Energy  on  its  own  Motion  into  the  Appropriate  Pricing,  Based  upon  Total  Element
 Long-  Run  Incremental  Costs,  for  Unbundled  Network  Elements  and  Combination  of  Unbundled  Network  Elements,
 and  the  Appropriate  Avoided  Cost  Discount  for  Verizon  New  England,  Inc.  d/  b/  a  Verizon  Massachusetts  Resale
 (continued.)
11
 Federal  Communications  Commission  FCC  01-  130
 12
 and  have  new  UNE  rates  in  place  by  the  end  of  this  calendar  year.  50  The  Massachusetts
 Department  asserts  that  the  UNE  rates  currently  in  effect  are  permanent,  not  interim,  despite  the
 fact  that  the  Massachusetts  Department  is  now  conducting  its  regular  review  of  UNE  rates.  51
 b.  Discussion
 20.  Based  on  the  evidence  in  the  record,  we  find  that  Verizons  charges  for  UNEs
 made  available  in  Massachusetts  to  other  telecommunications  carriers  are  just,  reasonable,  and
 nondiscriminatory  in  compliance  with  checklist  item  2.  Verizon  states  that  it  provides  UNEs  at
 TELRIC-  based  rates.  52  The  Massachusetts  Department  concludes  that  Verizon  has  satisfied  the
 requirements  of  this  checklist  item.  53  The  Commission  has  previously  held  that  it  will  not  conduct
 a  de  novo  review  of  a  states  pricing  determinations  and  will  reject  an  application  only  if  basic
 TELRIC  principles  are  violated  or  the  state  commission  makes  clear  errors  in  factual  findings  on
 matters  so  substantial  that  the  end  result  falls  outside  the  range  that  the  reasonable  application  of
 TELRIC  principles  would  produce.  54  In  reviewing  Verizons  Massachusetts  pricing,  we  find  that
 the  Massachusetts  Department  generally  followed  basic  TELRIC  principles,  though  adherence  to
 such  basic  principles,  if  other  key  inputs  or  methodologies  are  not  reasonable,  does  not  ensure
 that  the  rates  adopted  are  TELRIC-  complaint.  55
 21.  Verizons  Massachusetts  II  Application  relies  on  voluntarily-  adopted  rates  that  are
 equivalent  to  those  currently  in  place  in  New  York.  56  In  the  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  over  a
 (Continued  from  previous  page)
 Services  in  the  Commonwealth  of  Massachusetts,  D.  T.  E.  01-  20  (Jan.  12,  2001)  (Massachusetts  DTE  UNE  Rate
 Investigation  Order).
 50  See  Massachusetts  DTE  UNE  Rate  Investigation  Order  at  5.
 51  See  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  I  Reply  at  50-  52;  see  also  Massachusetts  Department
 Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  205,  216.
 52  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Application  at  40.
 53  See  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  19-  20.
 54  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  4084,  para.  244;  SWBT  Kansas/  Oklahoma  Order  at  para.  59.
 55  For  a  discussion  of  the  rates  set  by  the  Massachusetts  Department,  see  infra  Part  IX.
 56  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Application  at  37-  38;  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Reply  at  31-  32.  New  Yorks
 UNE  rates  were  not  adopted  in  whole  because  minor  adjustments  were  made  to  account  for  rate  structure
 differences.  Based  on  our  own  analysis,  we  find  that  the  rates  Verizon  adopted  on  October  13,  2000  are  equivalent
 to  those  approved  in  New  York  for  those  elements,  when  one  accounts  for  the  rate  structure  differences  (e.  g.  lower
 port  prices  and  higher  per-  minute  prices  in  Massachusetts).  Comparisons  depend  on  assumption  of  switch  usage,
 but  even  with  high  estimates  of  switch  usage,  the  Massachusetts  rates  for  ports  and  switches  are  only  2  percent
 more  than  those  in  New  York.  We  find  that  AT&  Ts  assertion  that  Verizons  voluntarily  discounted  rates  in
 Massachusetts  are  not  the  equivalent  of  corresponding  New  York  rates  is  unsubstantiated  and  without  merit,  and
 we  agree  with  the  Massachusetts  Department  that  Massachusetts  rates  are  effectively  the  same  as  the
 corresponding  rates  in  New  York.  See  AT&  T  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  8;  see  also  Letter  from  Charles  E.
 Griffin,  Government  Affairs  Director,  AT&  T,  to  Magalie  Roman  Salas,  Secretary,  Federal  Communications
 Commission,  CC  Docket  No.  01-  9  at  3-  4  (filed  March  21,  2001)  (AT&  T  March  21  Ex  Parte  Letter);  Massachusetts
 (continued.)
12
 Federal  Communications  Commission  FCC  01-  130
 13
 year  ago  in  1999,  the  Commission  found  that  these  rates  complied  with  the  requirements  of
 checklist  item  2  for  purposes  of  Verizons  section  271  application.  57  This  decision  was  affirmed
 by  the  United  States  Court  of  Appeals  for  the  District  of  Columbia  Circuit.  58  We  note,  however,
 that  these  rates  are  at  present  under  active  review  by  the  New  York  Commission.
 22.  Commenters  have  raised  several  objections  to  Verizons  October  13  th  UNE
 switching  rates.  Specifically,  commenters  claim  that  Verizon  has  not  submitted  evidence
 demonstrating  that  these  rates  are  cost-  based.  59  As  the  Commission  noted  in  the  SWBT
 Kansas/  Oklahoma  Order,  under  appropriate  circumstances,  a  BOCs  UNE  rates  will  be  entitled
 to  a  presumption  of  TELRIC  compliance  if  they  are  adopted  in  whole  from  another  state  whose
 rates  have  been  found  to  comply  with  TELRIC,  and  if  costs  are  demonstrated  to  be  at  or  above
 the  costs  in  the  state  whose  rates  were  adopted.  60  Under  this  standard,  Verizons  October  13  th
 rates  will  be  found  to  be  TELRIC-  compliant  if  Verizon  can  demonstrate  that  its  switching  costs  in
 Massachusetts  are  the  same  or  higher  than  in  New  York.  In  the  SWBT  Kansas/  Oklahoma  Order,
 the  Commission  also  determined  that  the  USF  cost  model  provides  a  reasonable  basis  for
 comparing  cost  differences  between  states.  61
 23.  We  find  that  Verizons  Massachusetts  rates  at  the  filing  of  the  application  meet  the
 TELRIC-  presumption  test  set  forth  in  the  SWBT  Kansas/  Oklahoma  Order.  An  analysis  of
 relative  switch  costs  using  our  USF  model  supports  this  conclusion.  In  the  USF  cost  model,  the
 Commission  estimated  forward-  looking  switch  costs  by  adopting  a  fixed  cost  for  host  and  stand-alone
 switches,  and  a  separate  fixed  cost  for  remote  switches.  62  The  switch  costs  in  the  USF
 model  vary  based  primarily  on  the  number  of  lines  per  switch.  The  results  of  regression  analysis
 developed  by  the  Commission  through  the  USF  model  to  estimate  switching  costs  indicate  that
 switching  costs  per  line  decrease  as  the  number  of  lines  increases  because  the  fixed  cost  of
 switching  is  spread  over  a  larger  number  of  lines.  The  results  also  indicate  that  switching  cost  per
 line  decreases  as  the  relative  number  of  remotes  in  the  network  increases  because  the  fixed  cost
 for  a  remote  switch  is  less  than  that  for  a  host  or  a  stand-  alone  switch.
 (Continued  from  previous  page)
 Department  Massachusetts  I  Reply  at  52-  53;  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  222-  23;
 Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  20-  21.
 57  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  4081,  para.  238.
 58  AT&  T  Corp.  v.  FCC,  220  F.  3d  607,  617-  18  (D.  C.  Cir.  2000).
 59  WorldCom  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  7-  9;  ASCENT  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  15;  WorldCom
 Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  12.
 60  SWBT  Kansas/  Oklahoma  Order  at  para.  82  n.  244.
 61  Id.  at  para.  84.
 62  Federal-  State  Joint  Board  on  Universal  Service,  Forward-  Looking  Mechanism  for  High  Cost  Support  for
 Non-  Rural  LECs,  CC  Docket  Nos.  96-  45,  97-  160,  Tenth  Report  and  Order,  14  FCC  Rcd  20156,  20281,  para.  296
 (1999)  (USF  Tenth  Report  and  Order).  The  Commission  also  adopted  an  additional  cost  per  line  for  remote,  host,
 and  stand-  alone  switches.  The  determination  of  host  and  remote  switches  in  the  USF  model  was  based  on  the
 Local  Exchange  Routing  Guide  (LERG).  See  id.
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 24.  Here,  evidence  indicates  that  the  number  of  lines  per  switch  is  no  greater  in
 Massachusetts  than  in  New  York,  and  it  is  reasonable  to  conclude  that  switch  costs  would  not  be
 lower  in  Massachusetts  than  in  New  York.  63  The  data  used  with  the  Commissions  model  to
 estimate  switching  costs  indicate  that  in  Massachusetts  Verizon  has  16,585  lines  per  wire  center
 and  that  in  New  York  it  has  20,865  lines  per  wire  center.  These  data  show  that  in  Massachusetts,
 Verizons  host  and  stand-  alone  switches  account  for  58  percent  of  the  total  number  of  switches
 and  its  remote  switches  account  for  the  remaining  42  percent.  The  data  also  show  that  in  New
 York,  Verizons  host  and  stand-  alone  switches  account  for  54  percent  of  the  total  number  of
 switches  and  its  remote  switches  account  for  the  remaining  46  percent.  These  data  underlie  the
 less  than  two  percent  higher  estimate  obtained  from  the  Commissions  model  of  switching  cost
 per  line  for  Massachusetts  than  for  New  York.
 25.  Our  finding  that  Verizon  may  rely  on  New  York  rates  is  also  supported  by  a
 comparison  of  Verizons  costs  to  Verizons  actual  rates.  A  weighted  average  of  Verizons
 voluntarily-  discounted  Massachusetts  rates  (switching,  transport,  and  switch  ports)  and
 corresponding  rates  in  New  York  shows  that  rates  in  Massachusetts  are  roughly  5  percent  lower
 than  those  in  New  York.  64  A  comparison  based  on  the  Commissions  USF  model  of  costs  in
 Verizons  study  areas  in  Massachusetts  and  New  York  for  these  same  elements  indicates  that  the
 costs  in  Massachusetts  are  roughly  the  same  as  the  costs  in  New  York.  65  Because  of  the  rate
 structure  differences  between  Massachusetts  and  New  York  that  recover  more  of  the  switching
 costs  through  the  flat-  rated  port  charge  in  New  York,  we  believe  this  aggregate  comparison  is
 most  appropriate.  In  comparing  each  of  the  non-  loop  elements  separately,  application  of  the  USF
 cost  model  indicates  that  costs  for  unbundled  switching  are  almost  the  same  in  Massachusetts  and
 New  York,  with  costs  in  Massachusetts  only  1  percent  higher.  Verizons  per-  minute  rates  for
 unbundled  switching  are  slightly  higher  in  Massachusetts  than  in  New  York,  but  this  is  offset  by
 its  unbundled  switch  port  rates,  which  are  lower  in  Massachusetts  than  in  New  York.  Signaling
 and  transport  costs  are  lower  in  Massachusetts  than  in  New  York,  according  to  the  model,  and
 the  Massachusetts  rates  for  these  elements  are  correspondingly  lower.
 26.  In  addition  to  our  analysis  of  the  switching  element  costs  based  on  the  USF  cost
 model,  Verizon  has  submitted  evidence  demonstrating  that  its  switching  costs  in  Massachusetts
 are  the  same  as  or  higher  than  its  switching  costs  in  New  York.  66  According  to  Verizon,  cost
 63  See  Letter  from  Keith  L.  Seat,  Senior  Counsel,  Federal  Law  and  Public  Policy,  MCI  Communications
 Corporation,  to  Magalie  Roman  Salas,  Secretary,  Federal  Communications  Commission,  CC  Docket  No.  00-  176  at
 26  (Oct.  3,  2000)  (chart  showing  cumulative  distribution  of  lines  by  wire  center  size  in  Massachusetts  and  New
 York).
 64  This  analysis  assumed  1200  originating  and  1200  terminating  local  minutes  of  use  per  line  per  month  with  25
 percent  of  the  minutes  intraswitch.  The  two  states  rates  remain  close  using  a  wide  range  of  assumptions.
 65  See  http://  www.  fcc.  gov/  ccb/  apd/  hcpm.  We  note  that  AT&  T  conducted  a  similar  analysis  with  similar  results.
 Specifically,  according  to  AT&  T,  rates  for  the  non-  loop  elements  are  approximately  7  percent  lower  in
 Massachusetts  than  in  New  York,  and  costs  for  the  non-  loop  elements  are  6  percent  lower  in  Massachusetts  than  in
 New  York.  See  AT&  T  Massachusetts  II  Comments  Attach.  4.
 66  See  Verizon  Feb.  23  UNE  Costs  Ex  Parte  Letter  at  1.  AT&  T  concurs  that  switching  costs  in  Massachusetts
 are  the  same  as  those  in  New  York.  See  AT&  T  March  21  Ex  Parte  at  2.
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 studies  based  on  the  same  assumptions  were  conducted  for  Massachusetts  and  New  York,  and
 these  studies  demonstrated  higher  costs  in  Massachusetts  than  in  New  York  for  all  switching
 elements,  including  local  switch  usage,  common  transport,  tandem  usage,  and  line  ports.  67
 27.  We  therefore  conclude  that  Verizons  switching  rates  in  Massachusetts  are  at
 present  within  the  range  that  a  reasonable  application  of  TELRIC  principles  would  produce,
 although  we  recognize  that  rates  may  need  to  evolve  over  time  to  take  into  account  updated
 information  on  cost  inputs  and  new  technologies.  The  Commission  has  previously  found
 Verizons  switching  rates  that,  at  present,  are  still  in  effect  in  New  York  to  be  within  a  range  of
 TELRIC-  based  rates.  68
 28.  We  disagree  with  AT&  Ts  assertion  that  New  York  rates  should  not  be  used  as
 the  benchmark  for  measuring  whether  Verizons  UNE  rates  are  TELRIC-  based  in  Massachusetts.
 AT&  T  would  like  the  Commission  to  use  rates  found  to  be  TELRIC-  based  in  the  SWBT  states  of
 Texas,  Kansas,  or  Oklahoma  for  comparison.  69  We  find  that  it  is  permissible  to  rely  on  the  New
 York  rates  in  this  application  because  they  meet  the  criteria  the  Commission  established  in  the
 SWBT  Kansas/  Oklahoma  Order.  In  the  SWBT  Kansas/  Oklahoma  Order,  to  determine  whether
 Oklahoma  rates  were  within  the  range  of  what  a  reasonable  application  of  what  TELRIC  would
 produce,  the  Commission  compared  SWBTs  rates  in  Oklahoma  to  its  rates  in  Texas.  The
 Commission  stated  this  was  permissible  because:  1)  they  have  a  common  BOC  and  geographic
 similarities;  2)  they  have  similar,  although  not  identical,  rate  structures  for  comparison  purposes;
 and  3)  the  Commission  had  already  found  the  rates  in  Texas  to  be  reasonable.  70  Applying  this
 standard  to  Verizons  Massachusetts  rates,  we  find  that  New  York  is  a  permissible  state  for  UNE
 rate  comparison  purposes.  The  states  are  adjoining,  they  have  similar  rate  structures,  the
 Commission  has  found  the  New  York  rates  are  within  a  zone  that  is  consistent  with  TELRIC
 based  on  current  information  in  the  record,  and  it  is  the  same  BOC  in  both  states.
 29.  We  note,  however,  that  the  New  York  Commission  is  actively  investigating  UNE
 rates  and  may  modify  those  rates  to  reflect  changed  market  conditions,  technologies,  and
 information.  If  the  New  York  Commission  adopts  modified  UNE  rates,  future  section  271
 applicants  could  no  longer  demonstrate  TELRIC  compliance  by  showing  that  their  rates  in  the
 applicant  states  are  equivalent  to  or  based  on  the  current  New  York  rates,  which  will  have  been
 superceded.
 30.  Moreover,  because  Verizon  would  have  us  rely  on  switching  rates  from  the  New
 York  proceeding,  a  decision  by  the  New  York  Commission  to  modify  these  UNE  rates  may
 67  See  Verizon  Feb.  23  UNE  Costs  Ex  Parte  Letter  at  1,  3.
 68  See  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  4084-  85,  para.  245.
 69  See  AT&  T  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  20-  21.  AT&  T  asserts  that  Verizon  resists  comparisons  to  switching
 rates  in  other  states  because  switching  rates  in  Massachusetts  and  New  York  are  substantially  higher  than  those  in
 effect  in  most  other  states.  See  id.  at  n.  25.
 70  SWBT  Kansas/  Oklahoma  Order  at  para.  82.
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 Federal  Communications  Commission  FCC  01-  130
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 undermine  Verizons  reliance  on  those  rates  in  Massachusetts  and  its  compliance  with  the
 requirements  of  section  271,  depending  on  the  New  York  Commissions  conclusions.  71  We  note
 that  the  Massachusetts  Department  has  undertaken  a  review  of  UNE  rates  in  Massachusetts  and  is
 endeavoring  to  reset  UNE  rates,  consistent  with  the  Act  and  our  rules.  We  observe  that  in  any
 context  in  which  prices  are  not  set  in  accordance  with  our  rules  and  the  Act,  we  retain  the  ability
 going  forward  to  take  appropriate  enforcement  action,  including  action  pursuant  to  section
 271(  d)(  6).  72
 31.  We  disagree  with  those  commenters  who  take  issue  with  the  current  New  York
 rates,  arguing  that  they  are  not  TELRIC-  based.  73  As  evidence,  the  commenters  point  to  the  on-going
 review  of  the  UNE  rates  being  conducted  by  the  New  York  Commission.  74  It  was
 reasonable  for  Verizon  to  rely  on  New  Yorks  current  switching  rates  because  these  rates  have
 been  found  to  be  TELRIC-  compliant  by  the  New  York  Commission  in  an  extensive  rate-  making
 proceeding,  75  and  by  this  Commission  in  the  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  76  as  affirmed  by  the
 D.  C.  Circuit,  77  and  are  at  present  still  in  effect.  It  would  be  unreasonable  to  preclude  incumbent
 LECs  from  relying  on  appropriate  rates  that  have  been  found  to  be  TELRIC-  compliant  merely
 because  these  rates  are  under  some  form  of  challenge  or  review  where  there  has  not  been  a
 determination  that  those  rates  are  not  TELRIC-  compliant.  78  As  the  D.  C.  Court  of  Appeals  stated:
 [W]  e  suspect  that  rates  may  often  need  adjustment  to  reflect  newly  discovered
 information,  like  that  about  Bell  Atlantics  future  discounts.  If  new  information
 automatically  required  rejection  of  section  271  applications,  we  cannot  imagine  how  such
 applications  could  ever  be  approved  in  this  context  of  rapid  regulatory  and  technological
 change.  79
 32.  We  also  reject  AT&  Ts  contention  that  New  York  and  Massachusetts  switching
 rates  are  significantly  higher  than  the  switching  rates  our  cost  model  generates  and,  therefore,  are
 71  See  infra  Part  IX.
 72  See  47  U.  S.  C.    271(  d)(  6).
 73  See  ASCENT  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  13-  14;  AT&  T  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  9-  11;  Sprint
 Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  9-  10.
 74  See  AT&  T  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  18;  WorldCom  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  13,  16-  18.
 75  See  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  4081-  83,  4084,  paras.  238-  40,  242.
 76  Id.  at  4083,  para.  242.
 77  AT&  T  Corp.  v.  FCC,  20  F.  3d  at  617-  18.
 78  As  discussed  above,  however,  the  ongoing  New  York  UNE  rate  proceeding  could  result  in  Verizon  falling  out
 of  section  271  compliance  in  Massachusetts.
 79  AT&  T  Corp.  v.  FCC,  20  F.  3d  at  617-  18.
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 Federal  Communications  Commission  FCC  01-  130
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 not  TELRIC-  compliant.  80  The  Commission  has  never  used  the  USF  cost  model  to  determine  rates
 for  a  particular  element,  nor  was  it  designed  to  perform  such  a  task.  The  model  was  designed  to
 determine  relative  cost  differences  among  different  states,  not  actual  costs.  That  is  the  purpose
 for  which  the  Commission  has  used  the  model  in  the  universal  service  proceeding  and  that  is  the
 purpose  for  which  the  Commission  used  it  the  SWBT  Kansas/  Oklahoma  Order  and  in  this  Order.  81
 33.  Additionally,  AT&  Ts  and  WorldComs  assertions  that  New  York  rates  should  not
 be  relied  on  because  Verizon  applied  an  incorrect  switch  discount  in  New  York  does  not  change
 our  conclusion.  The  commenters  argue  that  Verizon  applied  a  smaller  switch  discount  offered  by
 vendors  for  expanding  existing  switches  rather  than  the  larger  discounts  it  received  for  bulk
 purchases  of  new  switches,  based  on  Verizons  erroneous  assertion  that  the  larger  discounts  were
 no  longer  available.  82  Commenters  raised  this  identical  issue,  however,  during  the  course  of  the
 New  York  section  271  proceeding,  and  the  Commission  addressed  it  in  the  Bell  Atlantic  New
 York  Order.  The  Commission  found  that  the  New  York  Commission  had  substantially  reduced
 Verizons  originally-  proposed  switch  rates  and  had  appropriately  exercised  its  flexibility  to  set
 prices  within  a  range  of  TELRIC-  based  rates.  83  Although  the  New  York  Commission  had
 initiated  a  second  UNE  rate  case  in  which  it  is  reexamining  the  switch  discount  issue,  this
 Commission  held  that  the  switching  rates  were  no  less  TELRIC-  compliant  on  that  account,  84
 and  noted  the  New  York  Commissions  position  that  correcting  the  level  of  switch  discounts
 involved  complex  adjustments.  85  The  Massachusetts  Department  has  opened  a  new  investigation
 into  the  UNE  rates  where  this  issue  will  be  addressed.  In  the  meantime,  the  switching  rates  are
 equivalent  to  those  the  Commission  found  to  be  TELRIC-  compliant  in  New  York.  AT&  Ts  and
 WorldComs  attack  on  the  switching  discount  used  in  establishing  New  York  rates  was
 considered  and  rejected  in  the  New  York  section  271  proceeding.  As  noted  above,  however,  the
 80  See  AT&  T  March  21  Ex  Parte  at  3-  4.
 81  SWBT  Kansas/  Oklahoma  Order  at  para.  84  (citing  Federal-  State  Joint  Board  on  Universal  Service,  CC
 Docket  No.  96-  45,  Ninth  Report  and  Order  and  Eighteenth  Order  on  Reconsideration,  14  FCC  Rcd  20432,  20455-
 56,  paras.  41-  42  (1999)).
 82  See  WorldCom  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  13;  AT&  T  Massachusetts  I  Reply  at  23;  WorldCom
 Massachusetts  I  Reply  at  8-  9;  AT&  T  Massachusetts  I  Reply  at  28-  29;  WorldCom  Massachusetts  I  Reply  at  20;
 ASCENT  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  13-  14;  AT&  T  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  7,  9  n.  13;  Sprint
 Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  9-  10;  WorldCom  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  17;  AT&  T  Massachusetts  II  Reply
 at  7;  WorldCom  Massachusetts  II  Reply  at  5.
 83  See  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  4085,  paras.  245-  46.
 84  Id.  at  4086,  para.  247.
 85  AT&  T  incorrectly  asserts  that  the  Commission  never  concluded  in  the  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order  that
 Verizons  switching  rates  were  TELRIC-  compliant.  AT&  T  March  21  Ex  Parte  at  2  n.  1.  In  the  Bell  Atlantic
 New  York  Order,  the  Commission  concluded  that  Verizons  prices  for  switches  and  loops  offered  as  unbundled
 network  elements  are  priced  pursuant  to  a  forward-  looking,  long-  run  incremental  cost  methodology,  and  that
 Verizon  offered  a  full  suite  of  TELRIC  rates  for  its  unbundled  network  elements.  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,
 15  FCC  Rcd  at  4081,  para.  238,  4083,  para.  242.
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 Federal  Communications  Commission  FCC  01-  130
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 outcome  of  the  ongoing  New  York  UNE  rate  proceeding  could  affect  Verizons  future  section
 271  compliance  in  Massachusetts.
 34.  The  fact  that  the  New  York  Commission  adopted  a  true-  up  mechanism  for  the
 switching  rates  pending  the  outcome  of  its  UNE  cost  proceeding,  while  Massachusetts  rates  are
 not  subject  to  true-  up,  does  not  at  present  mean  that  Verizon  fails  this  checklist  item.  86  Although
 we  agree  that  implementation  of  such  a  true-  up  mechanism  pending  the  outcome  of  the
 Massachusetts  Departments  current  UNE  cost  proceeding  could  help  to  ensure  that  competitive
 LECs  pay  cost-  based  rates,  we  do  not  fail  Verizon  on  this  checklist  item  merely  because  such  a
 mechanism  is  lacking  in  Massachusetts.  The  Commission  did  not  rely  on  the  existence  of  the  true-up
 mechanism  in  finding  the  New  York  switching  rates  to  be  TELRIC-  compliant,  87  although  we
 recognize  that  in  certain  circumstances  such  measures  could  be  appropriate.
 35.  Although  questions  have  been  raised  regarding  whether  the  Massachusetts
 Department  will  adopt  TELRIC-  based  pricing  on  a  going-  forward  basis,  we  note  that
 Massachusetts  permanent  UNE  rates  were  adopted  by  the  Massachusetts  Department  shortly
 after  the  passage  of  the  1996  Act  and  our  rules  implementing  it.  88  Since  that  time,  there  has  been
 significant  guidance  on  what  constitutes  TELRIC-  based  rates  from  this  Commission,  other  state
 commissions,  and  the  courts.  States  may  benefit  from  the  experiences  of  other  states  that  have
 undertaken  extensive  pricing  analyses.  Additionally,  circumstances  have  changed  since
 Massachusetts  prices  were  originally  set  in  late  1996.  New  developments,  technologies,  and
 information,  including  information  as  to  the  kind  of  switch  discounts  that  would  be  available  if  a
 carrier  were  building  an  entire  network,  have  become  available  since  that  time.  As  always,  we
 presume  that  the  Massachusetts  Department,  like  other  state  commissions,  will  examine  these
 issues  during  the  course  of  its  ongoing  rate  case  and  set  rates  within  the  range  of  what  a
 reasonable  application  of  what  TELRIC  would  produce.
 36.  We  find  the  concerns  of  the  commenters  regarding  the  pending  UNE  cost
 proceeding  before  the  Massachusetts  Department  to  be  unwarranted.  89  As  discussed  above,  the
 86  See  AT&  T  Massachusetts  I  Reply  at  28-  30;  Massachusetts  Attorney  Generals  Massachusetts  I  Reply  at  9;
 AT&  T  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  4;  AT&  T  March  21  Ex  Parte  at  2;  Massachusetts  Attorney  Generals
 Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  3,  5-  6.
 87  See  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  4085-  86,  para.  247.  The  Commission  did  cite  favorably  the
 true-  up  mechanism  adopted  by  the  New  York  Commission  in  setting  rates  for  the  conditioning  of  xDSL-  capable
 loops,  but  these  rates  were  interim  at  the  time  of  the  section  271  filing.  See  id.  at  4091,  para.  259.  Verizons
 October  13  th  switching  rates,  like  its  New  York  switching  rates,  are  not  interim.
 88  See  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  204-  06.  As  noted  above,  commenters  have
 repeatedly  challenged  Verizons  rates  in  Massachusetts,  but  the  Massachusetts  Department  has  not  changed  UNE
 rates  since  it  set  them  in  1996.  See,  e.  g.,  WorldCom  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  34-  37;  AT&  T  Massachusetts  II
 Comments  at  10.  Additionally,  as  noted  above,  Verizon  voluntarily  adopted  New  York  switching  rates  in
 Massachusetts.
 89  See  ASCENT  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  14;  AT&  T  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  10;  Massachusetts
 Attorney  Generals  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  6  n.  12.
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 Federal  Communications  Commission  FCC  01-  130
 19
 fact  that  a  state  may  conduct  a  rate  investigation  and  change  the  rates  in  the  future  does  not  cause
 an  applicant  to  fail  the  checklist  item  at  this  time.  Indeed,  rates  may  well  evolve  over  time  to
 reflect  new  information  on  cost  inputs  and  changes  in  technology  or  market  conditions.  The
 Massachusetts  Department  has  expended  an  extraordinary  amount  of  effort  in  its  Consolidated
 Arbitrations  and  other  rate-  making  proceedings.  We  applaud  the  Massachusetts  Department  for
 the  tremendous  amount  of  work  it  has  done,  and  we  expect  that  it  will  adopt  appropriate  cost-based
 UNE  rates  in  its  current  proceeding.  The  Massachusetts  Department  has  committed  to
 conclude  its  proceeding  and  implement  new  UNE  rates  before  the  end  of  this  calendar  year.  90
 37.  Additionally,  we  find  the  Massachusetts  loop  rates  to  be  within  the  range  that  the
 reasonable  application  of  TELRIC  principles  would  produce.  Commenters  contend  that
 Verizons  UNE-  loop  rates  are  not  TELRIC-  based.  91  The  Commission  has  made  clear  that  it  will
 not  overturn  a  states  pricing  decision  in  the  context  of  a  section  271  proceeding  where  isolated
 factual  findings  might  differ  from  what  we  would  find  if  we  were  arbitrating  the  case.  Instead,  we
 will  reject  an  application  only  if  basic  TELRIC  principles  are  violated  or  the  state  commission
 makes  clear  errors  in  factual  findings  on  matters  so  substantial  that  the  end  result  falls  outside  the
 range  that  the  reasonable  application  of  TELRIC  principles  would  produce.  92
 38.  Commenters  have  raised  legitimate  concerns  regarding  some  of  the  inputs  used  by
 Massachusetts  in  calculating  its  loop  rates.  In  particular,  we  note  that  the  Massachusetts
 Department  utilized  a  cost  of  capital  of  12.16  percent.  93  This  is  higher  than  the  cost  of  capital  that
 the  Massachusetts  Department  has  used  in  setting  Verizons  local  rates  94  and  substantially  higher
 than  the  cost  of  capital  employed  by  any  of  the  other  states  in  Verizons  region.  AT&  T  questions
 whether  there  is  any  reason  to  believe  that  offering  UNEs  on  a  wholesale  basis,  where  Verizon
 faces  no  competition,  is  riskier  than  offering  retail  service,  where  it  now  has  competition.  95  We
 90  See  Massachusetts  UNE  Rate  Investigation  Order  at  5;  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  II
 Comments  at  22.
 91  See  WorldCom  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  30-  31;  AT&  T  Massachusetts  I  Reply  at  32-  33,  Attach.  B  at  2;
 WorldCom  Massachusetts  I  Reply  at  10-  13;  AT&  T  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  21-  24;  Sprint  Massachusetts  II
 Comments  at  9;  WorldCom  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  18-  19.
 92  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  4084,  para.  244.
 93  See  AT&  T  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  21-  22;  Sprint  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  10-  11;  WorldCom
 Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  19-  22.
 94  The  Massachusetts  Department  considered  whether  Verizons  rates  set  under  the  last  year  of  rate  of  return
 regulation  were  a  reasonable  starting  point  for  rates  established  under  price  cap  regulation  and  determined  that  a
 9.  63  percent  rate  of  return  was  reasonable  for  Verizon.  The  9.  63  percent  rate  of  return  reflects  an  11.  5  percent  cost
 of  equity,  a  7.  16  percent  cost  of  debt,  and  a  capital  structure  with  41  percent  and  59  percent  equity.  See  Petition  of
 New  England  Telephone  and  Telegraph  Company  d/  b/  a/  NYNEX  for  an  Alternative  Regulatory  Plan  for  the
 Companys  Massachusetts  Intrastate  Telecommunications  Services,  1995  WL  386802  (Mass.  D.  P.  U.  1995)  at  455-
 516,  528.
 95  See  AT&  T  Massachusetts  I  Reply  at  17-  18;  AT&  T  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  6-  8.  The  cost  of  capital
 used  by  the  Massachusetts  Department  to  set  UNE  rates  is  also  significantly  higher  than  the  11.  25  percent  cost  of
 capital  used  by  this  Commission,  and  is  more  heavily  weighted  towards  equity  (76  percent)  than  is  the
 (continued.)
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 question  whether  this  relatively  high  cost  of  capital  is  sufficiently  justified  by  state-  specific  factors.
 We  note,  however,  that  the  Massachusetts  Department  is  reviewing  this  input  as  part  of  its
 current  rate  case,  and,  as  discussed  below,  we  find  that  Verizons  loop  rates  fall  within  a
 reasonable  TELRIC  range.
 39.  In  addition,  commenters  have  pointed  out  that  Massachusetts  used  substantially
 lower  fill  factors  96  in  calculating  its  UNE-  loop  rates  than  this  Commission  has  used  in  its  USF  cost
 model.  97  For  copper  distribution  cable,  which  affects  loop  rates,  Verizon  used  a  fill  factor  of  40
 percent  for  metro,  urban,  and  suburban  zones.  98  In  the  SWBT  Kansas/  Oklahoma  Order,  the
 Commission  found  that  a  fill  factor  of  30  percent  for  distribution  cable  was  too  low  because  it
 assumed  that  too  large  a  percentage  of  capacity  would  be  idle  for  an  indefinite  time,  contrary  to
 TELRICs  presumption  of  an  efficient  network.  99  The  Commission  noted  that  it  adopted  fill
 factors  ranging  from  50  to  75  percent  for  the  USF  cost  model,  that  the  Kansas  Commission
 adopted  a  53  percent  distribution  cable  fill  factor,  and  that  the  New  York  Commission  adopted  a
 50  percent  distribution  cable  fill  factor.  100  We  question  whether  the  low  fill  factor  used  in
 Massachusetts  is  appropriate  without  a  state-  specific  justification.  We  note,  however,  that  the
 Massachusetts  Department  is  reviewing  this  input  as  part  of  its  current  rate  case,  and,  as  discussed
 below,  we  find  that  Verizons  rates  fall  within  a  reasonable  TELRIC  range.  101
 40.  Despite  our  concerns,  we  conclude  that  any  errors  made  by  the  Massachusetts
 Department  in  establishing  loop  rates  were  not  so  great  as  to  render  the  resulting  rates  outside  the
 range  that  a  reasonable  application  of  TELRIC  principles  would  produce.  In  reaching  this
 conclusion,  we  have  compared  the  differences  between  Verizons  Massachusetts  and  New  York
 (Continued  from  previous  page)
 Commissions  capital  structure  (55.8  percent  equity,  44.2  percent  debt).  See  WorldCom  Massachusetts  I
 Comments  at  22;  AT&  T  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  21-  22;  Sprint  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  10-  11;
 WorldCom  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  19-  22.
 96  A  fill  factor  is  the  estimate  of  the  proportion  of  a  facility  that  will  be  used.
 97  See  AT&  T  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  21-  22;  Sprint  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  10-  11;  WorldCom
 Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  19-  22.
 98  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Application  App.  H,  Vol.  31,  Tab  198,  NYNEX  Phase  2  and  Phase  4  Compliance
 Filing,  Workpapers  Part  A  at  11  (Feb.  14,  1997);  see  also  WorldCom  Massachusetts  II  Frentrup  Decl.  at  para.  21.
 99  SWBT  Kansas/  Oklahoma  Order  at  para.  80.
 100  Id.
 101  The  commenters  point  to  various  other  inputs  to  the  cost  model  used  to  calculate  the  Massachusetts  loop  rates
 that  they  assert  are  incorrect.  These  inputs  include:  1)  unrealistically  long  drop  lengths  in  urban  and  suburban
 areas;  2)  excessive  spare  conduit  capacity;  3)  unreasonably  high  pole  cost  assumptions;  4)  unreasonably  high  cost
 per  NID;  and  6)  unreasonably  high  cost  of  cables.  See  AT&  T  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  21-  22;  Sprint
 Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  10-  11;  WorldCom  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  19-  22.  We  do  not  make  any
 specific  finding  with  regard  to  these  inputs,  but  expect  that  the  Massachusetts  Department  will  address  these  inputs
 in  its  pending  UNE  rate  proceeding.
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 Federal  Communications  Commission  FCC  01-  130
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 loop  rates  with  the  relative  cost  differences  between  the  two  states  using  the  USF  cost  model.  102
 According  to  the  USF  cost  model,  average  loop  costs  in  Verizons  Massachusetts  study  area  are  8
 percent  higher  than  average  loop  costs  in  Verizons  New  York  study  area.  103  Yet  loop  rates  in
 Massachusetts  are  only  6  percent  higher  than  in  New  York.  104  The  Commission  has  already
 determined  that  the  New  York  loop  rates  are  TELRIC-  compliant.  105  Based  on  this  analysis,  we
 conclude  that  the  loop  rates  in  Massachusetts  are  also  within  the  reasonable  range  that  application
 of  TELRIC  principles  would  produce.
 41.  Finally,  we  do  not  accept  WorldComs  assertion  that  competitors  lack  a  sufficient
 profit  margin  between  Verizons  retail  and  wholesale  rates  to  allow  local  residential  competition
 over  the  UNE-  P,  which  indicates  that  the  UNE  rates  are  not  TELRIC-  based.  106  WorldCom
 asserts  that  Verizons  UNE  rates  do  not  provide  a  viable  path  to  entry  because  the  rates  do  not
 provide  a  gross  margin  of  profit  that  is  economically  viable.  107  In  the  SWBT
 Kansas/  Oklahoma  Order,  the  Commission  held  that  this  profitability  argument  is  not  part  of  the
 section  271  evaluation  of  whether  an  applicants  rates  are  TELRIC-  based.  108  The  Act  requires
 that  we  review  whether  the  rates  are  cost-  based,  not  whether  a  competitor  can  make  a  profit  by
 entering  the  market.  Conducting  a  profitability  analysis  would  require  us  to  consider  the  level  of  a
 states  retail  rates,  because  such  an  analysis  requires  a  comparison  between  the  UNE  rates  and  the
 states  retail  rates.  Retail  rate  levels,  however,  are  within  the  states  jurisdictional  authority,  not
 the  Commissions.  109  Conducting  such  an  analysis  would  further  require  a  determination  of  what
 a  sufficient  profit  margin  is.  We  are  hesitant  to  engage  in  such  a  determination.  110  Moreover,
 102  As  explained  above,  the  New  York  rates  are  an  appropriate  point  of  comparison  because  New  York  and
 Massachusetts  are  adjacent  states,  have  similar  rate  structures,  and  the  New  York  rates  have  been  found  to  be
 TELRIC-  compliant.
 103  See  http://  www.  fcc.  gov/  ccb/  apd/  hcpm.
 104  AT&  T  conducted  a  similar  analysis  with  similar  results.  Specifically,  according  to  AT&  T,  loop  costs  are
 approximately  10  percent  higher  in  Massachusetts  than  in  New  York,  while  the  Massachusetts  loop  rates  exceed
 the  New  York  loop  rates  by  only  5  percent.  See  AT&  T  Massachusetts  II  Comments  Attach.  4.
 105  See  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  4087,  para.  249.
 106  See  WorldCom  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  2,  6-  7,  14,  23;  see  also  AT&  T  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  7
 n.  11;  AT&  T  Massachusetts  I  Reply  at  33-  35,  41;  AT&  T  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  12-  14.
 107  WorldCom  Massachusetts  II  Comments  App.  B,  Joint  Declaration  of  Paul  Bobeczko  and  Vijetha  Huffman  at
 paras.  9-  10  (WorldCom  Massachusetts  II  Bobeczko/  Huffman  Decl.).
 108  SWBT  Kansas/  Oklahoma  Order  at  paras.  65,  92.
 109  See  SWBT  Kansas/  Oklahoma  Order  at  paras.  65,  92;  see  also  Local  Competition  First  Report  and  Order,  11
 FCC  Rcd  at  15922,  para.  848  (declining  to  implement  an  imputation  rule  that  would  prevent  price  squeezes
 because  doing  so  would  impose  substantial  burdens  on  states  to  rebalance  their  retail  rates).
 110  A  profitability  analysis  would  also  require  projections  of  penetration  rates  for  various  services  and  minutes  of
 use.  We  are  hesitant  to  engage  in  those  endeavors  as  well.
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 competition  currently  exists  in  Massachusetts  through  the  use  of  the  UNE-  P.  111  The  number  of
 UNE-  P  lines  in  use  in  Massachusetts  has  significantly  increased  since  Verizons  adoption  of  the
 October  13  th  rates.  112
 42.  We  do  not  accept  AT&  Ts  contention  that  its  inability  to  make  a  profit  by  entering
 the  Massachusetts  market  proves  that  it  is  not  permitted  an  efficient  entry,  which  is  contrary  to
 the  Commissions  prior  determination.  113  AT&  Ts  misinterpretation  of  the  Commissions  prior
 holding  appears  to  be  based  on  its  equating  "efficient  entry"  with  the  guarantee  of  a  profit  that
 would  induce  competitors  to  enter  the  market.  114  The  Commission,  in  a  prior  section  271  case,
 rejected  Ameritechs  section  271  application  because  it  failed  to  demonstrate  compliance  with
 non-  pricing  checklist  items.  115  The  Commission  did  not  analyze  whether  Ameritech  complied  with
 the  checklists  pricing  requirements.  It  did,  however,  set  forth  general  concerns  about  pricing
 with  the  goal  of  providing  guidance  as  to  what  showing  is  required  in  future  applications.  The
 Commission  concluded  that  a  BOC  is  not  in  compliance  with  section  271s  pricing  requirements
 unless  it  demonstrates  that  its  costs  are  based  on  forward-  looking  economic  costs.  116  The
 Commission  determined  that  new  entrants  should  make  their  decisions  whether  to  purchase
 unbundled  elements  .  .  .  based  on  the  relative  economic  costs  of  these  options,  and  that  such
 competitors  would  not  be  able  to  make  such  decisions  efficiently  unless  the  BOC  was  offering
 UNEs  based  on  forward-  looking  economic  costs.  The  Commission  equated  efficient  entry  with
 the  availability  of  UNEs  at  forward-  looking  economic  costs,  which  replicates  .  .  .  the  conditions
 of  a  competitive  market.  117  Efficient  entry  simply  means  that  competitors  seeking  entry  will
 face  the  same  sorts  of  costs  they  would  face  in  a  fully  competitive  market,  that  is,  TELRIC-  based
 UNE  rates.  The  Commissions  use  of  TELRIC  was  designed  to  prevent  "inefficient  entry"
 conditions,  a  situation  in  which  competitors  would  have  to  bear  unreasonably  higher  costs  than
 incumbents.  Contrary  to  AT&  Ts  assertion,  the  concept  of  "efficient  entry"  does  not  guarantee
 that  any  competitors  will  necessarily  enter  the  market.  Even  if  competitors  can  gain  "efficient
 entry"  to  a  market  through  the  availability  of  TELRIC-  based  UNE  rates,  they  may  still  decide  not
 to  enter  based  on  their  independent  determinations  that  they  cannot  turn  a  sufficient  profit  in  the
 111  See  Z-  Tel  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  3-  4.
 112  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Application  Attach.  B  (chart  showing  the  number  of  competitive  LEC  platforms
 at  12,000  in  September  2000,  and  at  23,000  in  November  2000).  As  of  December  2000,  approximately  35  percent
 of  the  total  UNE-  Ps  in  Massachusetts  were  used  for  residential  service.  See  Letter  from  Dee  May,  Executive
 Director  Federal  Regulatory,  Verizon,  to  Magalie  Roman  Salas,  Secretary,  Federal  Communications  Commission,
 CC  Docket  No.  01-  9  at  6  (filed  Feb.  15,  2001).
 113  AT&  T  Massachusetts  I  Reply  at  40-  41.
 114  Id.;  see  also  AT&  T  Massachusetts  II  Comments  Tab  2,  Letter  from  Richard  Rubin,  Senior  Attorney,  AT&  T  to
 Magalie  Roman  Salas,  Secretary,  Federal  Communications  Commission,  CC  Docket  No.  00-  176  at  2  (Nov.  30,
 2000).
 115  Ameritech  Michigan  Order,  12  FCC  Rcd  at  20694,  para.  281.
 116  Id.  at  20697-  98,  para.  289.
 117  Id.
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 Federal  Communications  Commission  FCC  01-  130
 23
 market.  As  long  as  UNE  rates  are  cost-  based  under  TELRIC,  however,  a  BOC  has  satisfied  its
 obligations  under  sections  251  and  252.  We  thus  find  that  AT&  T  has  misinterpreted  the
 Commissions  determinations  in  the  Ameritech  Michigan  Order  and  that  its  assertion  does  not
 cause  Verizon  to  fail  this  checklist  item.
 2.  Access  to  Operations  Support  Systems
 a.  Background
 43.  The  Commission  has  defined  OSS  as  the  various  systems,  databases,  and  personnel
 used  by  incumbent  LECs  to  provide  service  to  their  customers,  118  and  consistently  has  found  that
 nondiscriminatory  access  to  OSS  is  a  prerequisite  to  the  development  of  meaningful  local
 competition.  119  Our  discussion  of  Verizons  Operations  Support  Systems  (OSS)  begins  by
 outlining  our  general  approach  to  analyzing  the  adequacy  of  an  applicants  OSS.  Next,  we
 describe  the  analytical  roadmap  we  use  in  reviewing  the  results  of  independent  third-  party  OSS
 testing  in  the  applicants  state.  Also,  because  Verizon  contends  that  its  line  sharing  OSS  in
 Massachusetts  is  the  same  as  its  line  sharing  OSS  in  New  York,  we  also  describe  the  roadmap  we
 use  in  reviewing  the  BOCs  reliance  on  its  performance  and  OSS  in  another  state  where
 substantially  greater  volumes  of  commercial  data  exist  to  demonstrate  the  adequacy  of  its  OSS  in
 the  applicant  state.  We  then  individually  analyze  Verizons  performance  in  providing  access  to
 the  five  critical  OSS  functions:  pre-  ordering  (which  includes  access  to  loop  qualification
 information),  ordering,  provisioning,  maintenance  and  repair,  and  billing.  Finally,  we  address
 Verizons  change  management  process  and  the  technical  assistance  that  Verizon  offers  to
 competing  carriers  seeking  to  use  its  OSS.  Because  the  Commission  has  described  its  two-  step
 analysis  of  OSS  in  previous  orders,  we  do  not  repeat  that  analytical  approach  here.  120  We  instead
 proceed  to  evaluate  the  adequacy  of  Verizons  Massachusetts  OSS  consistent  with  the  analysis
 the  Commission  has  applied  previously.
 b.  Third-  Party  Testing
 44.  KPMGs  Independent  Third-  Party  Testing.  The  Massachusetts  Department
 retained  KPMG  to  conduct  an  independent,  third-  party  test  of  the  readiness  of  Verizons  OSS,
 interfaces,  documentation  and  processes.  121  KPMGs  test  was  broad  in  scope.  122  All  stages  of  the
 118  See  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  3989-  90,  para.  83;  Application  of  BellSouth  Corporation,  et
 al.,  Pursuant  to  Section  271  of  the  Communications  Act  of  1934,  as  amended,  to  Provide  In-  Region,  InterLATA
 Services  in  South  Carolina,  CC  Docket  No.  97-  208,  Memorandum  Opinion  and  Order,  13  FCC  Rcd  539,  585
 (BellSouth  South  Carolina  Order);  SWBT  Texas  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  18396-  97,  para.  92.
 119  See  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  3990,  para.  83;  Application  by  BellSouth  Corporation,  et
 al.,  Pursuant  to  Section  271  of  the  Communications  Act  of  1934,  as  Amended,  to  Provide  In-  Region,  InterLATA
 Services  in  Louisiana,  CC  Docket  No.  98-  121,  Memorandum  Opinion  and  Order,  13  FCC  Rcd  20599,  20653
 (Second  BellSouth  Louisiana  Order);  BellSouth  South  Carolina  Order,  13  FCC  Rcd  at  547-  48,  585.
 120  See,  e.  g.,  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  3991-  92,  paras.  85-  86;  SWBT  Kansas/  Oklahoma
 Order  at  paras.  104-  05.
 121  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  44;  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Application  at  9.
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 relationship  between  Verizon  and  competing  carriers  were  considered,  from  establishing  the  initial
 relationship,  to  performing  daily  operations,  to  maintaining  the  relationship.  Resale,  UNE-  loops,
 UNE-  P,  and  combinations  were  all  included  in  the  test.  In  addition,  both  the  application-  to-application
 electronic  data  interchange  (EDI)  and  the  terminal-  type  web-  based  graphical  user
 interface  (GUI)  were  tested.  123  KPMG  performed  pre-  ordering,  ordering,  provisioning,
 maintenance  and  repair,  billing,  and  relationship  management  and  infrastructure  tests  to  evaluate
 functional  capabilities  and  determine  whether  competing  carriers  receive  a  level  of  service
 comparable  to  Verizon  retail  service.  124  To  fully  test  these  systems,  orders  were  submitted  with
 known  error  conditions,  canceled,  and  supplemented.  125  To  perform  these  transaction-  driven
 tests,  KPMG  combined  efforts  with  Hewlett  Packard.  126  Documentation  was  evaluated  for
 usefulness,  correctness,  and  completeness.  127  KPMG  also  performed  stress  volume  tests  of
 Verizon  systems  and  identified  specific  bottlenecks  for  wholesale  customers.  128
 45.  In  performing  these  tests,  KPMG  adopted  a  military-  style  test  standard.  129  Thus,
 when  situations  arose  where  testing  revealed  that  a  Verizon  process,  document,  or  system  did  not
 meet  expectations,  Verizon  would  formally  respond  by  providing  a  clarification  or  describing  its
 intended  fix  for  the  problem,  and  KPMG  would  retest  the  process,  document,  or  system  as
 required.  130  Furthermore,  to  the  greatest  extent  possible,  the  KPMG  test  was  both  independent
 (Continued  from  previous  page)
 122  KPMG  indicates  that  its  Massachusetts  evaluation  was  designed  as  a  validation  of  the  shared  components  of
 the  Massachusetts  and  New  York  OSS,  as  well  as  a  full  evaluation  of  the  OSS  elements  unique  to  Massachusetts.
 See  KPMG  Final  Report  at  10.  Despite  this  characterization,  KPMGs  test  was  not  an  evaluation  of  the
 comparability  of  Verizons  Massachusetts  and  New  York  OSS,  and  was  therefore  unlike  the  Ernst  and  Young  audit
 attestation  relied  upon  by  the  Commission  in  approving  SWBTs  application  for  section  271  authorization  in
 Kansas  and  Oklahoma.  See  SWBT  Kansas/  Oklahoma  Order  at  paras.  106-  18.  Rather,  KPMGs  test  in
 Massachusetts  was  in  essence  a  full  independent  third-  party  test  of  Verizons  Massachusetts  OSS,  including
 functional  and  volume  testing  specifically  of  the  Massachusetts  OSS.  Aside  from  PricewaterhouseCoopers  line
 sharing  study  discussed  below,  Verizon  has  not  submitted  the  type  of  evidence  that  we  require  in  order  to  consider
 the  performance  of  its  OSS  in  another  state  in  evaluating  its  Massachusetts  OSS.  See  id.  For  this  reason,  except  as
 described  below  (infra  at  paras.  47-  49),  we  do  not  consider  the  performance  of  Verizons  OSS  in  other  states  in
 reaching  our  conclusions,  nor  do  we  address  commenters  criticisms  of  Verizons  OSS  in  other  states.
 123  See  KPMG  Final  Report  at  6.
 124  In  addition,  KPMG  evaluated  the  integrity  of  Verizons  internal  handling  of  raw  source  data  and  validated
 Verizons  calculation  of  results  for  a  series  of  metrics  measuring  Verizons  performance  of  pre-  ordering,  ordering,
 provisioning,  maintenance  and  repair,  billing,  network  performance  and  operator  services  functions.  See  id.  at
 631.
 125  See,  e.  g.,  id.  at  15.
 126  See  id.  at  7.
 127  See,  e.  g.,  id  at  129-  50,  315-  36,  and  403-  10.
 128  See,  e.  g.,  id.  at  44-  45  (testing  the  EDI  interface  at  150  percent  of  Verizons  normal  hourly  order  volume).
 129  See  id.  at  8-  9.
 130  See  id.
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 25
 and  blind.  131  Although  it  was  virtually  impossible  for  the  KPMG  transactions  to  be  truly  blind,
 KPMG  instituted  certain  procedures  to  ensure  that  both  KPMG  and  Hewlett  Packard  would  not
 receive  preferential  treatment.  132  For  example,  KPMG  required  that  all  documents  provided  to
 them  were  generally  available  to  all  competing  carriers.  133
 46.  The  persuasiveness  of  a  third-  party  review  depends  upon  the  conditions  and  scope
 of  the  review.  134  The  scope  and  depth  of  KPMGs  review,  and  the  conditions  surrounding  it,
 including  KPMGs  independence,  military-  style  test  philosophy,  efforts  to  place  itself  in  the
 position  of  an  actual  market  entrant,  and  efforts  to  maintain  blindness  when  possible,  lead  us  to
 treat  the  conclusions  in  the  KPMG  Final  Report  as  persuasive  evidence  of  Verizons  OSS
 readiness.
 47.  PricewaterhouseCoopers  Review.  After  filing  its  initial  application,  but  before
 refiling,  Verizon  engaged  PricewaterhouseCoopers  (  PwC)  to  review  certain  aspects  of  its
 performance  metrics  data  and  OSS  to  supplement  the  KPMG  review.  Among  other  things,  PwC:
 (1)  replicated  certain  DSL  performance  metrics  for  Massachusetts  and  certain  line  sharing  metrics
 for  Massachusetts  and  New  York  to  assess  whether  Verizon  calculates  measures  according  to  the
 prescribed  business  rules;  135  and  (2)  reviewed  the  processes,  systems,  and  procedures  used  for  line
 sharing  by  Verizon  in  Massachusetts  to  assess  whether  they  are  comparable  to  those  used  in  New
 York.  136
 48.  We  conclude  that  Verizon,  through  the  PwC  review  and  other  aspects  of  its
 application,  provides  sufficient  evidence  that  the  line  sharing  OSS  in  New  York  are  relevant  and
 should  be  considered  in  our  evaluation  of  Verizons  Massachusetts  OSS.  This  showing  thus
 enables  us  to  rely,  for  limited  purposes,  on  New  York  performance  data  as  an  indication  of
 Verizons  line  sharing  OSS  readiness  in  Massachusetts  in  addition  to  the  limited  Massachusetts
 specific  performance  evidence  in  Verizons  Massachusetts  carrier-  to-  carrier  reports.  We  find  that
 this  showing  is  adequate,  in  these  circumstances,  because  we  are  merely  considering  it  as  evidence
 to  supplement  the  limited  commercial  line  sharing  performance  available  in  Massachusetts.  We
 131  See  id.  at  9.
 132  For  example,  blindness  was  impossible  because  transactions  arrive  on  dedicated  circuits,  the  owners  of  which
 are  known  by  Verizon.  Id.
 133  Id.
 134  Ameritech  Michigan  Order,  12  FCC  Rcd  at  20659.
 135  See  infra  Part  IV.  B.  2.  a.
 136  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Application  App.  A,  Vol.  2,  Joint  Supp.  Declaration  of  Russell  J.  Sapienza  and
 Gerard  J.  Mulcahy,  Tab  2  at  3-  4,  para.  9  (Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Sapienza/  Mulcahy  Decl.).  PwC  also  assessed
 whether  Verizons  separate  data  affiliate,  Verizon  Advanced  Data,  Inc.  (  VADI)  used  the  same  interfaces  as  non-affiliates
 and  whether  Verizon  treats  VADI  transactions  the  same  as  non-  affiliate  transactions  and  reviewed  the
 accuracy  and  consistency  of  several  Verizon  studies  of  the  Massachusetts  DSL  performance  data.  Id.  We  note  in
 the  relevant  discussions  below  the  extent  to  which  we  rely  on  these  findings.
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 also  note  that  our  finding  rests  in  part  on  the  fact  that  no  party  asserts  that  the  New  York  and
 Massachusetts  line  sharing  OSS  are  different  or  that  we  should  not  consider  Verizons  New  York
 line  sharing  performance  in  this  application.  137  Indeed,  at  least  one  commenter  concedes  the
 comparability  issue.  138
 49.  The  record  indicates  that  Verizons  line  sharing  OSS  in  New  York  and
 Massachusetts  use  the  same  systems  and  offer  the  same  functionality.  139  PwCs  review  included  a
 step-  by-  step  walkthrough  of  957  OSS  transactions.  PwC  tracked  both  New  York  and
 Massachusetts  transactions  forward  from  the  competing  carrier  interfaces  to  Verizons  service
 order  processor  to  determine  if  the  process  is  the  same  in  both  states.  PwC  also  sampled  pending
 service  orders  in  the  Service  Order  Processor  and  traced  their  history  back  to  Verizons  front-  end
 systems.  PwC  supplemented  the  walkthroughs  by  examining  programming  code,  reviewing
 documentation  related  to  systems  architecture  and  process  flow,  and  interviewing  Verizon
 employees.  140  PwC  concluded,  based  upon  its  review,  that  there  are  no  significant  differences  in
 the  systems  and  processes  used  to  provide  ordering,  provisioning,  or  maintenance  and  repair  of
 line  sharing  in  New  York  and  Massachusetts.  In  addition  to  PwCs  review,  the  record  indicates
 that  Verizons  Massachusetts  OSS  for  pre-  ordering  functions  does  not  distinguish  queries  related
 to  line  sharing  from  those  for  stand  alone  xDSL-  capable  loops.  141  As  we  conclude  below,  Verizon
 has  shown  that  its  pre-  ordering  OSS  for  xDSL-  capable  loops  is  adequate.  142  Accordingly,  we
 shall  consider  Verizons  commercial  line  sharing  performance  in  New  York  as  a  supplement  to
 Verizons  limited  commercial  line  sharing  performance  in  Massachusetts.
 c.  Pre-  Ordering
 50.  Based  on  the  evidence  in  the  record,  we  conclude  that  Verizon  demonstrates  that  it
 provides  nondiscriminatory  access  to  its  OSS  pre-  ordering  functions.  Specifically,  we  find  that
 Verizon  demonstrates  that:  (i)  Verizons  pre-  ordering  systems  allow  competing  carriers  to
 successfully  build  and  use  application-  to-  application  interfaces  to  perform  pre-  ordering  functions,
 137  We  cannot  say,  however,  that  we  would  find  similar  evidence  persuasive  proof  that  OSS  from  one  state  is
 relevant  in  our  consideration  of  another  states  OSS  if  such  evidence  were  challenged  or  were  not  merely  intended
 to  supplement  actual,  though  limited,  commercial  evidence  in  the  primary  state  (as  we  have  here).
 138  See  Covad  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  20.
 139  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Sapienza/  Mulcahy  Decl.  at  6-  26,  paras.  14-  48.
 140  PwC  did  note  two  exceptions  to  its  overall  conclusion.  First,  a  Verizon  operations  center  processes  line
 sharing  orders  for  VADIs  New  York  operations  but  not  other  competitive  LECs  or  VADIs  Massachusetts
 operations.  PwC  did  find,  however,  that  the  operations  center  uses  the  same  methods  and  procedures  as  the
 operations  center  that  processes  other  line  sharing  orders.  Second,  one  code  module  in  the  New  York  Service
 Order  Processor  did  not  exist  in  the  Massachusetts  Service  Order  Processor.  Verizon  explained  that  the  code
 module  was  inactive  and  had  been  renamed  for  archiving,  and  immediately  deleted  it.
 141  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Application  App.  A,  Vol.  1,  Declaration  of  Paul  A.  Lacouture  and  Virginia  P.
 Ruesterholz  at  12,  para.  27  (Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.).
 142  See  infra  Parts  IV.  A.  2.  c(  ii)  &  IV.  B.  2.  c.
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 allow  competitors  to  integrate  pre-  ordering  and  ordering  interfaces,  provide  reasonably  prompt
 response  times,  and  are  consistently  available  in  a  manner  that  affords  competitors  a  meaningful
 opportunity  to  compete;  and  (ii)  Verizon  offers  nondiscriminatory  access  to  OSS  pre-  ordering
 functions  associated  with  determining  whether  a  loop  is  capable  of  supporting  xDSL  advanced
 technologies.
 51.  The  pre-  ordering  phase  of  OSS  generally  includes  those  activities  that  a  carrier
 undertakes  to  gather  and  verify  the  information  necessary  to  place  an  order.  143  Most  of  the  pre-ordering
 activities  undertaken  by  a  competing  carrier  to  order  resale  services  and  UNEs  from  the
 incumbent  are  analogous  to  the  activities  a  BOC  must  accomplish  to  furnish  service  to  its  own
 customers.  For  example,  in  this  proceeding  and  in  accordance  with  the  UNE  Remand  Order,  we
 require  Verizon  to  provide  competing  carriers  with  access  at  the  pre-  ordering  stage  to  the  same
 detailed  information  Verizon  makes  available  to  itself  concerning  loop  make-  up  information  so
 that  competitors  may  make  fully  informed  judgments  about  whether  to  provision  xDSL  service  to
 end  users.  144  In  prior  orders,  the  Commission  has  emphasized  that  providing  pre-  ordering
 functionality  through  an  application-  to-  application  interface  is  essential  in  enabling  carriers  to
 conduct  real-  time  processing  and  to  integrate  pre-  ordering  and  ordering  functions  in  the  same
 manner  as  the  BOC.  145
 (i)  Pre-  Ordering  Functionality,  Integration,  Response
 Times  and  Availability
 52.  Verizons  pre-  ordering  systems  allow  competing  carriers  to  successfully  build  and
 use  application-  to-  application  interfaces  to  perform  pre-  ordering  functions,  allow  competitors  to
 integrate  pre-  ordering  and  ordering  interfaces,  provide  reasonably  prompt  response  times,  and  are
 consistently  available  in  a  manner  that  affords  competitors  a  meaningful  opportunity  to  compete.
 Verizon  offers  requesting  carriers  in  Massachusetts  access  to  an  EDI  application-  to-  application
 143  See  SWBT  Texas  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  18426,  para.  148;  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  4014,
 para.  129.  In  prior  orders,  the  Commission  has  identified  the  following  five  pre-  order  functions:  (1)  customer
 service  record  (CSR)  information;  (2)  address  validation;  (3)  telephone  number  information;  (4)  due  date
 information;  (5)  services  and  feature  information.  See  id.,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  4015,  para.  132.  In  addition,  the
 Commission  determined  in  the  UNE  Remand  Order  that  the  pre-  ordering  function  includes  access  to  loop
 qualification  information.  See  Implementation  of  the  Local  Competition  Provisions  of  the  Telecommunications
 Act  of  1996,  CC  Docket  No.  96-  98,  Third  Report  and  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  3696,  3885,  para.  426  (UNE  Remand
 Order).
 144  As  the  Commission  has  explained  in  prior  orders,  because  characteristics  of  a  loop,  such  as  its  length  and  the
 presence  of  various  impediments  to  digital  transmission,  can  hinder  certain  advanced  services  technologies,
 carriers  often  seek  to  pre-  qualify  a  loop  by  accessing  basic  loop  make-  up  information  that  will  assist  carriers  in
 ascertaining  whether  the  loop,  either  with  or  without  the  removal  of  the  impediments,  can  support  a  particular
 advanced  service.  See  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  4021,  para.  140.
 145  SWBT  Texas  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  18426,  para.  148;  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  4014,
 para.  130;  Second  BellSouth  Louisiana  Order,  13  FCC  Rcd  at  20661-  67,  para.  105.
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 Federal  Communications  Commission  FCC  01-  130
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 interface.  146  We  find  that  the  EDI  interface  allows  competing  carriers  to  perform  the  same  full
 range  of  pre-  ordering  functions  for  both  resale  services  and  UNEs  that  Verizon  provides  to  itself.  147  We  note  that  no  commenter  alleges  that  Verizon  fails  or  refuses  to  offer  any  of  these
 specific  pre-  ordering  functions.  Verizon  also  demonstrates  that  competing  carriers  can
 successfully  build  and  use  application-  to-  application  interfaces.  We  base  our  conclusion  on  the
 ability  of  the  third-  party  tester  to  construct  and  extensively  test  the  EDI  interface  for  pre-  ordering
 functions.  148  KPMG  successfully  conducted  a  functional  evaluation  and  volume  and  stress  tests  of
 the  EDI  interface,  which  confirm  Verizons  ability  to  provide  the  requisite  pre-  ordering
 functionality.  149  We  also  find  that  Verizon  has  shown  that  it  allows  competing  carriers  to  integrate
 successfully  pre-  ordering  information  into  Verizons  ordering  interface  and  the  carriers  back
 office  systems.  150  As  part  of  its  functional  evaluation  of  the  EDI  interface,  KPMG  used  pre-  order
 response  information  to  populate  subsequent  service  requests.  KPMG  found  that  the  pre-  order
 and  order  field  names  and  formats  were  compatible,  allowing  carriers  to  integrate  pre-  ordering
 and  ordering  interfaces  and  integrate  pre-  ordering  information  into  their  back  office  systems.  151  In
 addition,  although  we  do  not  rely  on  Verizons  common  object  request  broker  architecture
 interface  (CORBA)  in  reaching  our  conclusion,  we  take  note  that  Verizon  provides  competing
 carriers  with  this  additional  application-  to-  application  interface  for  pre-  order  functions.  152
 53.  Verizon  demonstrates  that  it  provides  access  to  pre-  ordering  functionality  in  a
 manner  that  allows  an  efficient  competitor  a  meaningful  opportunity  to  compete.  The
 Commission  has  held  previously  that  an  interface  that  provides  responses  in  a  prompt  timeframe
 and  is  stable  and  reliable  is  necessary  for  competing  carriers  to  market  their  services  and  serve
 146  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Application  App.  A,  Vol.  2,  Declaration  of  Kathleen  McLean  and  Raymond
 Wierzbicki  at  9-  10,  para.  21  (Verizon  Massachusetts  I  McLean/  Wierzbicki  Decl.).
 147  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  McLean/  Wierzbicki  Decl.  at  para.  18.  See  also  SWBT  Texas  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd
 at  18427,  para.  149;  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  4014,  para.  130.
 148  See  infra  Part  IV.  A.  2.  h(  i).
 149  See  KPMG  Final  Report  at  15-  69  (providing  the  results  of  the  LSOG  2  EDI  functional  evaluation  and  volume
 performance  test).  Specifically,  KPMG  concluded  that  Verizons  OSS  provided  the  pre-  order  functionality
 Verizon  is  required  to  provide  (Test  POP-  1-  2-  2).  KPMG  also  concluded  that  Verizons  pre-  order  systems  provided
 clear,  accurate  and  complete  responses  and  error  messages  (POP-  1-  6-  1,  POP-  1-  6-  2).
 150  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  McLean/  Wierzbicki  Decl.  at  para.  27.
 151  See  KPMG  Final  Report  at  60  (Test  POP-  1-  7-  1).  Although  KPMG  found  an  inconsistency  in  the  manner
 Verizon  returned  one  field  of  directory  listing  information,  this  inconsistency  appears  to  have  had  minimal
 competitive  impact;  KPMG  concluded  that  the  pre-  order  response  information  returned  in  this  field  adequately
 fulfilled  order  form  input  requirements.  See  id.  Of  course,  to  the  extent  Verizon  becomes  aware  of  any
 inconsistencies  in  field  names  or  formats  that  would  impede  a  carriers  ability  to  integrate  pre-  ordering  and
 ordering  functions,  we  expect  that  Verizon  promptly  will  design  and  deploy  a  software  correction  or  provide  the
 necessary  technical  assistance  to  competing  carriers  in  the  interface  integration.  See  Bell  Atlantic  New  York
 Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  4021,  para.  139.
 152  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  McLean/  Wierzbicki  Decl.  at  para.  25.
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 Federal  Communications  Commission  FCC  01-  130
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 their  customers  as  efficiently  and  at  the  same  level  of  quality  as  Verizon  serves  its  own  customers.  153  Verizons  performance  data  demonstrate  that  Verizons  EDI  interface  has  met  or
 exceeded  the  relevant  benchmarks  for  interface  response  time  and  availability  in  each  of  the  last
 four  months,  with  only  a  few  scattered  exceptions  of  negligible  competitive  impact.  154  KPMGs
 functional  and  volume  tests  of  Verizons  LSOG  2  EDI  pre-  order  interface  provide  additional
 confirmation  of  Verizons  satisfactory  performance  with  respect  to  the  availability  and  response
 times  of  its  pre-  order  functionality.  155  We  therefore  conclude  that  Verizons  interfaces  are
 available  in  a  stable  and  consistent  manner  and  afford  an  efficient  competitor  a  meaningful
 opportunity  to  compete.
 (ii)  Access  to  Loop  Qualification  Information
 54.  Background.  As  the  Commission  required  of  SWBT  in  the  recent  SWBT
 Kansas/  Oklahoma  Order,  156  we  require  Verizon  to  demonstrate  that  it  provides  access  to  loop
 qualification  information  in  a  manner  consistent  with  the  requirements  of  the  UNE  Remand  Order.  157  In  particular,  we  require  Verizon  to  provide  access  to  loop  qualification  information  as
 part  of  the  pre-  ordering  functionality  of  OSS.  In  the  UNE  Remand  Order,  the  Commission
 153  See  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  4025,  para.  145,  and  4029,  para.  154.
 154  See  Verizon  Carrier-  to-  Carrier  Performance  Standards  and  Reports,  September  2000    December  2000.  The
 PO  1  series  of  metrics  measures  the  response  times  of  Verizons  OSS  in  performing  a  number  of  pre-  order
 transactions.  Verizons  EDI  performance  under  this  series  of  metrics  met  or  exceeded  the  applicable  benchmark  in
 all  four  months,  with  the  following  exception.  In  October  2000,  Verizons  average  response  time  to  reject  EDI  pre-order
 queries  was  0.68  seconds  longer  than  the  applicable  benchmark  (PO  1-  07).  We  do  not  deem  this  delay  in
 response  time  of  less  than  one  second  in  one  months  performance  to  be  competitively  significant.  The  PO  2  series
 of  metrics  measures  the  availability  of  Verizons  OSS  interfaces.  While  Verizon  may  not  have  met  the  benchmark
 standard  of  100  percent,  24  hour  availability  for  some  of  the  PO  2  metrics  measuring  EDI  pre-  order  interface
 availability  from  September  through  December  2000,  Verizons  performance  data  under  these  metrics  show  no
 lower  than  99.  88  percent  availability  of  its  EDI  interface  during  this  four-  month  period.  We  do  not  consider  the
 0.  12  percent  unavailability  of  Verizons  interface  to  be  competitively  significant.
 155  See  KPMG  Final  Report  at  47-  55.  Specifically,  KPMG  concluded  that  LSOG  2  EDI  pre-  order  interface
 capability  was  consistently  available  during  100  percent  of  scheduled  hours  of  operation  (Test  POP-  1-  1-  1).  KPMG
 found  that,  following  system  and  documentation  enhancements,  98  percent  of  pre-  order  transactions  submitted  as
 part  of  its  functional  test  received  responses  (POP-  1-  2-  1).  For  its  volume  test,  99.9  percent  of  pre-  order
 transactions  received  responses  (POP-  1-  3-  1).  For  pre-  order  transactions  for  which  Verizon  retail  analogue  data
 were  available,  average  response  times  for  transactions  submitted  by  KPMG  as  part  of  its  functional  evaluation  met
 the  associated  carrier-  to-  carrier  benchmarks,  with  the  exception  of  pre-  order  product  and  service  availability  (PSA)
 transactions.  However,  95  percent  of  KPMGs  total  PSA  transactions  during  its  functional  evaluation  and  99
 percent  of  such  transactions  during  its  volume  test  received  responses  within  10  seconds  (POP-  1-  4-  2,  POP-  1-  4-  3,
 POP-  1-  5-  2).  See  also  KPMG  Final  Report  at  69  (Table  1-  18)  (volume  evaluation  of  LSOG  2  EDI  pre-  order
 response  timeliness).
 156  SWBTs  section  271  application  for  Kansas  and  Oklahoma  was  the  first  such  application  reviewed  for  its
 compliance  with  the  UNE  Remand  Order  requirements  for  nondiscriminatory  access  to  loop  qualification
 information.  See  SWBT  Kansas/  Oklahoma  Order  at  paras.  121-  29.
 157  See  UNE  Remand  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  3885-  87,  paras.  427-  31.
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 required  incumbent  carriers  to  provide  competitors  with  access  to  all  of  the  same  detailed
 information  about  the  loop  available  to  themselves,  and  in  the  same  time  frame  as  any  of  their
 personnel  could  obtain  it,  so  that  a  requesting  carrier  could  make  an  independent  judgment  at  the
 pre-  ordering  stage  about  whether  a  requested  end  user  loop  is  capable  of  supporting  the  advanced
 services  equipment  the  requesting  carrier  intends  to  install.  Under  the  UNE  Remand  Order,
 Verizon  must  provide  carriers  with  the  same  underlying  information  that  it  has  in  any  of  its  own
 databases  or  internal  records.  158  The  relevant  inquiry  as  required  by  the  UNE  Remand  Order  is
 not  whether  Verizons  retail  arm  or  advanced  services  affiliate  has  access  to  such  underlying
 information  but  whether  such  information  exists  anywhere  in  Verizons  back  office  and  can  be
 accessed  by  any  of  Verizons  personnel.  159  Moreover,  Verizon  may  not  filter  or  digest  the
 underlying  information  and  may  not  provide  only  information  that  is  useful  in  the  provision  of  a
 particular  type  of  xDSL  that  Verizon  offers.  160  Verizon  must  provide  loop  qualification
 information  based,  for  example,  on  an  individual  address  or  zip  code  of  the  end  users  in  a
 particular  wire  center,  NXX  code  or  on  any  other  basis  that  Verizon  provides  such  information  to
 itself.  Verizon  must  also  provide  access  for  competing  carriers  to  the  loop  qualifying  information
 that  Verizon  can  itself  access  manually  or  electronically.  Finally,  Verizon  must  provide  access  to
 loop  qualification  information  to  competitors  within  the  same  time  frame  that  any  incumbent
 personnel  are  able  to  obtain  such  information,  including  any  personnel  in  its  advanced  services
 affiliate,  Verizon  Advanced  Data,  Inc.  (VADI).  161
 55.  Currently,  Verizon  provides  four  ways  for  competing  carriers  to  obtain  loop  make-up
 information:  (1)  mechanized  loop  qualification  based  on  information  in  its  LiveWire  database;
 (2)  access  to  loop  make-  up  information  in  its  Loop  Facility  Assignment  and  Control  System
 (LFACS)  database;  (3)  manual  loop  qualification;  and  (4)  engineering  record  requests.  As  we
 discuss  in  more  detail  below,  competitors  can  request  loop  make-  up  information  from  the  LFACS
 and  LiveWire  databases,  or  can  request  that  Verizon  perform  a  manual  search  of  its  paper  records
 to  determine  whether  a  loop  is  capable  of  supporting  advanced  technologies.  162
 158  See  id.  at  3885,  para.  427.  For  example,  to  the  extent  Verizon  personnel  may  access  any  such  information,
 Verizon  must  provide  competitors  with  information  regarding:  (1)  the  composition  of  the  loop  material,  including
 both  fiber  and  copper;  (2)  the  existence,  location  and  type  of  any  electronic  or  other  equipment  on  the  loop,
 including  but  not  limited  to,  digital  loop  carrier  or  other  remote  concentration  devices,  feeder/  distribution
 interfaces,  bridge  taps,  load  coils,  pair-  gain  devices,  disturbers  in  the  same  or  adjacent  binder  groups;  (3)  the  loop
 length,  including  the  length  and  location  of  each  type  of  transmission  media;  (4)  the  wire  gauge(  s)  of  the  loop;  and
 (5)  the  electrical  parameters  of  the  loop,  which  may  determine  the  suitability  of  the  loop  for  various  technologies.
 See  id.
 159  See  id.  at  3886,  para.  430.
 160  See  id.  at  3886,  para.  428.  For  example,  an  incumbent  LEC  may  not  provide  a  green,  yellow,  or  red
 indicator  of  whether  a  loop  qualifies  for  its  particular  xDSL  offering  in  lieu  of  underlying  loop  make-  up
 information  in  its  possession.  See  id.;  see  also  infra  at  para.  67.
 161  See  UNE  Remand  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  3885-  87,  paras.  427-  31.
 162  See  SWBT  Kansas/  Oklahoma  Order  at  para.  122.
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 56.  Verizons  mechanized  loop  qualification  database,  known  as  LiveWire,  provides
 real-  time  access  on  a  pre-  order  basis  to  the  loop  qualification  information  VADIs  retail  personnel
 use  to  qualify  an  end-  user  customers  line  for  VADIs  ADSL  service.  163  Competing  carriers  are
 able  to  access  the  LiveWire  mechanized  database  via  the  Web  GUI,  CORBA  and  EDI  interfaces.
 Verizon  states  that  LiveWire  provides  information  on  whether  a  loop  is  qualified  for  ADSL
 service,  the  length  of  the  loop  and,  if  the  loop  does  not  qualify  for  ADSL  service,  data  on  why  the
 loop  does  not  qualify  (e.  g.,  presence  of  Digital  Loop  Carrier,  T-  1  in  the  binder  group,  or  load
 coils).  164  The  information  contained  in  the  LiveWire  database  is  theoretical  or  sampled  loop
 information,  i.  e.,  information  about  a  test  sample  of  loops  in  a  given  distribution  terminal  that  is
 attributed  to  the  rest  of  the  loops  in  the  same  terminal.  165  According  to  Verizon,  as  of  July  2000,
 the  mechanized  database  included  information  about  loops  in  93  percent  of  Verizons  central
 offices  in  Massachusetts  with  collocation  arrangements  in  place,  which  covered  98  percent  of  the
 access  lines  in  Massachusetts  with  collocation.  166
 57.  Competing  carriers  are  also  able  to  use  an  interim  pre-  order  process  to  access  any
 loop  make-  up  information  stored  in  Verizons  LFACS  database.  167  The  loop  make-  up  information
 contained  in  LFACS  includes  actual,  loop-  specific  information.  168  Within  24  hours  of  a
 competitive  carrier  querying  LFACS  for  loop  make-  up  information,  Verizon  returns  all  of  the
 163  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Application  App.  A,  Vol.  1,  Declaration  of  Paul  A.  Lacouture  and  Virginia  P.
 Ruesterholz  at  para.  108  (Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.).  See  also  Verizon  Massachusetts
 I  McLean/  Wierzbicki  Decl.  at  para.  20.
 164  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  para.  108.
 165  See  Letter  from  Dolores  May,  Executive  Director  Federal  Regulatory,  Verizon,  to  Magalie  Roman  Salas,
 Secretary,  Federal  Communications  Commission,  CC  Docket  No.  00-  176  (filed  November  3,  2000)  (Verizon
 November  3  Ex  Parte  Letter).  Verizon  tested  a  minimum  of  10  pairs  per  hundred  pairs  in  a  terminal,  or  a  fraction
 of  100  pairs  if  less  than  a  100  pairs  were  in  the  terminal  tested.  See  id.
 166  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  para.  108.  As  an  alternative  to  mechanized  loop
 qualification  through  the  LiveWire  database,  Verizon  states  that  it  also  provides  competitors  with  access  to  a  server
 containing  files  indicating  the  working  telephone  numbers  in  end  offices  that  have  been  qualified  for  Verizons
 retail  ADSL  product.  Verizon  states  that  it  plans  to  add  loop  length  information  to  the  files  in  February  2001.  See
 Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  para.  33.
 167  According  to  Verizon,  LFACS  contains  loop  make-  up  information  for  about  10  percent  of  Verizons
 Massachusetts  terminal  locations.  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Reply  at  37.  Verizon  has  not  provided  specific
 information  about  the  terminals  for  which  LFACS  does  contain  information.  Thus,  to  the  extent  those  terminals
 serve  a  greater  number  of  loops  (for  example,  terminals  in  densely  populated  urban  areas),  the  10  percent  of
 terminals  for  which  Verizon  has  stated  LFACS  contains  loop  make-  up  information  could  actually  reflect  a
 significantly  higher  proportion  of  Verizons  loops  in  Massachusetts  than  10  percent.  See  Verizon  November  3  Ex
 Parte  Letter  (indicating  that  terminals  vary  greatly  in  the  number  of  loops  they  serve).
 168  LFACS  contains  loop-  specific  information  including:  segment  length  by  gauge;  bridge  tap  location;  bridge  tap
 length;  loop  composition  (e.  g.,  copper  or  fiber);  existence  of  digital  single  subscriber  carrier;  the  existence,
 spacing,  type  and  quantity  of  load  coils;  and  the  presence  of  DLC.  See  Letter  from  Dolores  May,  Executive
 Director  Federal  Regulatory,  Verizon,  to  Magalie  Roman  Salas,  Secretary,  Federal  Communications  Commission,
 CC  Docket  No.  01-  9,  Attach.  D,  at  6  (filed  February  2,  2001)  (Verizon  February  2  Ex  Parte  Letter).
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 LFACS  information  on  the  loop  in  the  remarks  field  of  the  pre-  order  interface  used  to  make  the
 query.  169  In  addition,  through  its  change  management  process,  Verizon  has  begun  implementing  a
 permanent  process  for  providing  this  information  in  real-  time  and  in  electronically  parsed  form
 through  its  LSOG  4  and  LSOG  5  pre-  order  interfaces,  with  availability  expected  by  October
 2001.  170
 58.  Verizon  also  provides  a  manual  loop  qualification  process.  According  to  Verizon,
 this  manual  process  provides  competing  carriers  with  the  same  types  of  information  ordinarily
 available  through  the  mechanized  loop  qualification  process.  171  To  conduct  a  manual  loop
 qualification,  Verizons  Loop  Qualification  Center  (LQC)  first  examines  information  from  the
 LiveWire  and  LFACS  databases,  and  performs  a  mechanized  line  test  (MLT)  on  the  loop  to  verify
 the  actual  loop  length.  172  If  this  information  is  inconclusive,  engineers  in  Verizons  Facilities
 Management  Center  examine  paper  records  to  determine  the  loop  length,  whether  or  not  the  loop
 is  qualified  and,  if  it  is  not,  the  reasons  why.  173  Unlike  loop  qualification  through  the  real  time
 LiveWire  mechanized  database,  which  is  designed  to  return  loop  qualification  information  within
 seconds  when  queried,  the  manual  qualification  process  has  a  standard  completion  interval  of
 three  business  days  between  submission  of  a  request  for  manual  loop  qualification  and  the  return
 of  the  requested  loop  information  to  the  competing  carrier.  174  Currently,  competing  carriers
 169  See  Verizon  February  2  Ex  Parte  Letter  at  3-  4.  Verizon  provides  evidence  that  it  is  consistently  meeting  its
 target  of  returning  LFACS  loop  make-  up  information  within  24  hours.  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Reply,  App.
 A,  Tab  1,  Attach.  C  (showing  100  percent  of  LFACS  queries  receiving  responses  within  24  hours  for  February
 2001).  As  described  below,  requesting  carriers  generally  receive  LFACS  loop  information  within  2  hours  of
 submitting  a  request.  See  infra  at  para.  61,  n.  183.
 170  See  Verizon  February  2  Ex  Parte  Letter  at  8.  Verizons  change  management  proposal  for  this  new  transaction
 treats  it  as  a  Type  2  or  regulatory  change.  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Application  at  14-  15.
 171  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  para.  109.  See  also  Letter  from  Dolores  May,
 Executive  Director  Federal  Regulatory,  Verizon,  to  Eric  Einhorn,  Common  Carrier  Bureau,  Federal
 Communications  Commission,  CC  Docket  No.  00-  176  at  2  (filed  October  17,  2000)  (Verizon  October  17  Ex  Parte
 Letter).
 172  The  loop  lengths  returned  by  the  MLT  in  the  manual  qualification  process  correspond  to  the  actual  metallic
 loop  lengths  of  discrete  cable  pairs  to  end  users,  as  opposed  to  the  theoretical  loop  lengths  returned  by  LiveWire.
 Loop  lengths  in  LiveWire  are  based  on  binder  group  sampling,  for  which  Verizon  has  conducted  MLT  tests  on  a
 sample  of  loops  serving  a  given  distribution  terminal.  See  Verizon  November  3  Ex  Parte  Letter.  See  also  Letter
 from  Jason  Oxman,  Senior  Government  Affairs  Counsel,  Covad  Communications  Company,  to  Magalie  Roman
 Salas,  Secretary,  Federal  Communications  Commission,  CC  Docket  No.  00-  176  at  7,  n.  11  (filed  October  26,  2000)
 (Covad  October  26  Ex  Parte  Letter).
 173  See  Verizon  October  17  Ex  Parte  Letter  at  3-  4  (describing  Verizons  manual  loop  qualification  process).  This
 paper  records  search  performed  as  part  of  the  manual  loop  qualification  process  yields  a  more  limited  set  of  loop
 information  than  the  engineering  query  discussed  below.  See  infra  n.  174  and  para.  59.
 174  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  para.  109.  See  also  Verizon  Massachusetts  I
 Application  App.  A,  Vol.  3,  Declaration  of  Elaine  M.  Guerard  and  Julie  A.  Canny  at  para.  78  (Verizon
 Massachusetts  I  Guerard/  Canny  Decl.).  If  the  manual  process  indicates  a  loop  is  qualified  for  the  requested
 service,  Verizon  provides  loop-  specific  information  about  the  length  of  the  line  based  on  MLT,  the  presence  of  load
 coils  or  bridge  tap,  and  the  presence  of  T-  1  in  the  binder  group.  If  the  loop  is  not  qualified,  Verizon  returns  a
 (continued.)
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 request  manual  loop  qualification  as  part  of  the  OSS  ordering  function  by  ordering  an  xDSL  loop
 and  indicating  in  the  Local  Service  Request  (LSR)  order  form  that  a  manual  qualification  is
 required.  Verizon  has  begun  implementing  access  to  manual  loop  qualification  as  a  pre-  order
 function.  Detailed  specifics  for  this  pre-  order  transaction  are  being  addressed  in  Verizons  change
 management  process,  with  complete  implementation  expected  in  October  2001.  175
 59.  Finally,  Verizon,  through  an  engineering  record  request,  provides  additional  types
 of  loop  make-  up  information  not  returned  through  the  mechanized  and  manual  loop  qualification
 processes.  Verizon  indicates  that  competitors  may  request  this  engineering  query  on  a  pre-  order
 basis.  176  To  conduct  this  engineering  query,  Verizons  Facilities  Management  Center  conducts  a
 search  of  loop  inventory  and  paper  records.  The  additional  information  provided  through  an
 engineering  query  includes  the  exact  locations  of  load  coils,  the  exact  locations  and  lengths  of
 bridge  taps,  as  well  as  actual  cable  gauges  and  the  length  of  each  gauge.  177  According  to  Verizon,
 this  information  is  more  detailed  than  the  information  returned  in  response  to  a  manual  loop
 qualification  request.  178  Furthermore,  the  engineering  query  provides  loop  make-  up  information
 for  loops  not  in  the  LFACS  database.  179  The  engineering  query  carries  a  standard  interval  of  72
 hours  for  performing  the  engineering  record  review.  180  These  queries  appear  to  be  seldom
 requested;  Verizon  performed  only  15  engineering  queries  in  Massachusetts  between  January  and
 June  2000,  whereas  it  performed  approximately  11,700  manual  loop  qualifications  in  the  same
 period.  181
 60.  Discussion.  Based  on  this  evidence,  we  conclude  that  Verizon  demonstrates  that
 it  offers  nondiscriminatory  access  to  OSS  pre-  ordering  functions  associated  with  determining
 (Continued  from  previous  page)
 query  notice  indicating  why  the  loop  is  not  qualified  for  the  requested  service.  See  Verizon  October  17  Ex  Parte
 Letter  at  3-  4  (describing  Verizons  manual  loop  qualification  process).
 175  See  Verizon  February  2  Ex  Parte  Letter  at  4-  8.  Verizons  change  management  proposal  for  this  new
 transaction  treats  it  as  a  Type  2  or  regulatory  change.  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Application  at  14-  15.
 176  Verizon  indicates  that,  using  a  manually  submitted  form,  competitors  may  conduct  engineering  record  requests
 on  a  pre-  order  basis.  See  Letter  from  Dee  May,  Executive  Director  Federal  Regulatory,  Verizon,  to  Magalie
 Roman  Salas,  Secretary,  Federal  Communications  Commission,  CC  Docket  No.  01-  9  (filed  March  16,  2001);  see
 also  Engineering  Query  Process  Description,  at
 http://  128.11.40.241/  east/  wholesale/  html/  pdfs/  engineering_  queryrequest.  pdf.
 177  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  para.  110.  See  also  Verizon  October  17  Ex  Parte
 Letter  at  4.
 178  See  Verizon  October  17  Ex  Parte  Letter  at  4.
 179  See  supra  n.  167.
 180  See  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  293.
 181  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Application  App.  B.,  Vol.  34a-  b,  Tab  443  at  657  (Verizon  response  to  DTE-WCOM-
 4-  11  information  request).  One  commenter  indicates  that  the  engineering  query  is  seldom  requested  due
 to  its  high  cost,  at  $123  per  query.  See  Rhythms  Massachusetts  I  Reply  App.  A,  Declaration  of  Robert  Williams  at
 para.  13  (Rhythms  Massachusetts  I  Williams  Reply  Decl.).
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 whether  a  loop  is  capable  of  supporting  xDSL  advanced  technologies.  We  reject  commenters
 various  assertions  that  Verizons  loop  make-  up  information  processes  do  not  comply  with  its
 UNE  Remand  obligations.  These  complaints  fall  into  three  categories.  First,  Covad  complains
 that  deficiencies  in  the  interim  LFACS  process  render  Verizons  loop  information  processes
 noncompliant  with  the  checklist.  Second,  Rhythms  and  Covad  complain  that  Verizons  manual
 loop  qualification  process  is  not  part  of  the  pre-  ordering  stage,  contrary  to  the  requirements  of  the
 UNE  Remand  Order.  Finally,  several  commenters  advance  various  other  complaints  that
 deficiencies  in  Verizons  loop  information  processes  warrant  a  finding  of  noncompliance.  For  the
 reasons  discussed  below,  we  reject  these  claims.
 61.  Interim  LFACS  Process.  We  conclude,  contrary  to  Covads  assertions,  that
 Verizons  offering  for  LFACS  loop  make-  up  information  complies  with  the  checklist.  Our
 conclusion  is  based  on  both  the  nature  of  Verizons  interim  process  for  access  to  LFACS
 information  coupled  with  its  work  in  the  formal  change  management  process  implementing
 enhanced  permanent  loop  qualification  processes.  182  In  addition,  we  are  encouraged  by  Verizons
 current  plans  to  develop  a  permanent  fix  for  loop  qualification  OSS  by  October  2001.  With
 respect  to  the  nature  of  the  interim  process,  we  find  that  Verizon  is  currently  providing  useful,
 detailed  information  to  competing  carriers  concerning  the  ability  of  loops  to  support  xDSL
 services  and  is  doing  so  in  reasonable  time  frames.  Specifically,  although  Verizon  states  that  it
 will  return  all  queries  for  loop  qualification  information  within  24  hours  of  receiving  a  request,  in
 actuality,  competitors  are  generally  receiving  this  information  within  2  hours.  183  Moreover,  we
 find  it  significant  that  Verizons  interim  loop  qualification  process  is  largely  automated.  For
 example,  competitors  are  able  to  submit  their  loop  information  queries  and  receive  responses  to
 these  queries  through  Verizons  electronic  pre-  order  interfaces.  184
 62.  With  respect  to  Verizons  work  in  the  change  management  process,  we  find  that
 Verizon  has  begun  actively  implementing  enhancements  to  its  loop  qualification  processes  under  a
 proposal  that  is  detailed,  well-  developed,  and  subject  to  a  prioritized  time  frame.  185  Extensive
 software  development  is  required  of  both  Verizon  and  competing  carriers  to  implement  Verizons
 change  management  proposals  for  LFACS  access.  Importantly,  we  find  that  Verizon  has  initiated
 concrete  and  irreversible  steps  to  implement  these  changes  through  its  formal  change  management
 process.  This  is  not  a  case,  for  example,  where  only  a  skeletal  plan  is  being  submitted  to  change
 management.  Verizons  proposals  provide  competitors  with  comprehensive  detail  about  the
 business  rules  and  field  format  requirements  of  its  new  loop  information  processes.
 Implementation  of  these  processes  at  a  minimum  requires  extensive  software  development  in
 182  We  note,  for  future  applications,  that  not  all  interim  processes  and  change  management  proposals  may  be
 sufficient  to  warrant  a  finding  of  checklist  compliance.
 183  See  Letter  from  Dee  May,  Executive  Director  Federal  Regulatory,  Verizon,  to  Magalie  Roman  Salas,
 Secretary,  Federal  Communications  Commission,  CC  Docket  No.  01-  9  (filed  April  3,  2001).
 184  See  Verizon  February  2  Ex  Parte  Letter  at  3.
 185  Verizon  states  that  these  system  enhancements  will  be  complete  by  October  2001.  See  Verizon  February  2  Ex
 Parte  Letter  at  8.
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 Verizons  interface  systems  (Web  GUI,  EDI  and  CORBA),  the  Request  Manager  gateway
 system,  the  underlying  systems  (LFACS,  LiveWire),  and  the  data  exchange  between  these
 systems.  186  Moreover,  we  recognize  that  change  management  is  an  appropriate  and  important
 step  in  implementing  systems  enhancements  where,  as  here,  such  enhancements  may  substantially
 impact  competing  carriers  OSS.  187  In  reaching  our  conclusion,  we  rely  on  the  nature  of
 Verizons  formal  change  management  process  in  Massachusetts,  which  provides  for  substantial
 competing  carrier  input  and  participation  and  for  oversight  by  the  Massachusetts  Department.  188
 We  also  rely  on  the  fact  that  Verizon  has  introduced  its  proposals  as  regulatory  changes,  subject
 to  the  prioritized  implementation  process  for  regulatory  requirements.  189  Finally,  we  note  that
 Verizon  has  established  October  2001  as  the  expected  completion  date  for  its  system
 enhancements.  190
 63.  Under  these  circumstances,  we  reject  Covads  claim  that  checklist  compliance  is
 not  met  until  the  completion  of  the  change  management  process.  191  To  find  such  would  perversely
 incent  competing  carriers  to  delay  implementation  of  improved  OSS  and  BOCs  to  circumvent  the
 change  management  process.  Given  these  specific  circumstances,  we  find  that  Verizons
 processes  for  access  to  LFACS  comply  with  the  checklist.  Verizon  has  an  interim  process  for
 LFACS  access  in  place,  and  is  actively  using  the  change  management  process  in  implementing  a
 proposal  that  is  detailed,  well-  developed,  subject  to  a  prioritized  time  frame  and  firm  completion
 date,  and  carries  substantial  implications  for  competitors  OSS.
 64.  We  also  reject  Covads  other  arguments  that  Verizons  LFACS  process  fails  to
 satisfy  its  UNE  Remand  obligations  for  the  following  reasons.  Covad  objects  that  competing
 186  See  Verizon  February  2  Ex  Parte  Letter  at  5.
 187  As  the  Commission  has  previously  recognized,  [  c]  ompeting  carriers  need  information  about  and
 specifications  for  an  incumbents  systems  and  interfaces  in  order  to  develop  and  modify  their  systems  and
 procedures  to  access  the  incumbents  OSS  functions.  See  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  3999,
 para.  102.  For  competing  carriers  to  successfully  interface  with  and  make  use  of  Verizons  new  loop  information
 processes,  they  will  need  to  conduct  extensive  development  with  respect  to  their  own  systems  and  interfaces.  See
 Verizon  February  2  Ex  Parte  Letter  at  5.  The  Commission  has  recognized  that  the  existence  of  an  adequate
 change  management  process  and  evidence  that  the  BOC  has  adhered  to  this  process  over  time  demonstrates  that
 the  BOC  is  adequately  assisting  competing  carriers  to  use  available  OSS  functions.  See  Bell  Atlantic  New  York
 Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  4000,  para.  102.  As  discussed  below,  we  find  Verizons  change  management  processes  in
 Massachusetts  to  be  satisfactory.  See  infra  Part  IV.  A.  2.  h.
 188  See  infra  Part  IV.  A.  2.  h(  i).
 189  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Application  at  14-  15;  see  also  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  McLean/  Wierzbicki
 Decl.,  Attach.  S  at  18,  36-  39,  71-  77  (timeline,  process  flow,  and  description  of  regulatory  change  process).
 190  We  note  that,  while  our  analysis  of  Verizons  compliance  relies  in  part  on  the  enhancements  discussed  in
 Verizons  application,  this  Order  does  not  address  whether  Verizon  was  in  compliance  with  the  requirements  of
 the  UNE  Remand  Order  prior  to  adopting  its  interim  process  for  access  to  LFACS  and  implementing  additional
 enhancements  through  its  change  management  process.
 191  See  Covad  Massachusetts  II  Reply  at  27.
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 carriers  must  wait  24  hours  to  receive  LFACS  loop  make-  up  information  under  the  interim
 process,  whereas  Verizons  personnel  are  able  to  access  this  information  electronically  in  an
 instant.  192  As  already  explained,  however,  requesting  carriers  generally  receive  LFACS
 information  through  the  interim  process  within  2  hours.  193  Covad  also  objects  that  the  interim
 process  does  not  provide  loop  information  in  electronically  parsed  form,  to  allow  for  integration
 between  pre-  ordering  and  ordering  interfaces.  194  Verizons  interim  process  does,  however,  allow
 competitors  to  submit  queries  for  and  obtain  LFACS  loop  information  through  Verizons
 electronic  pre-  order  interfaces.  195  Furthermore,  with  respect  to  both  of  these  objections  to  the
 interim  process,  our  finding  of  checklist  compliance  does  not  rely  on  Verizons  interim  processes
 alone.  Rather,  as  explained  above,  our  conclusion  rests  on  the  nature  of  Verizons  interim
 processes  for  access  to  LFACS  coupled  with  its  work  in  change  management  enhancing  this
 process.  The  permanent  process  for  LFACS  access  will  provide  the  functionality  and  features
 Covad  seeks.  196  Until  this  permanent  system  enhancement  is  in  place,  Verizon  has  provided
 competing  carriers  with  an  adequate  process  for  obtaining  LFACS  loop  information  quickly  and
 electronically.  Finally,  Covad  objects  that  Verizon  does  not  return  working  telephone  number  or
 serving  address  information  with  the  LFACS  information  it  returns,  making  it  more  difficult  for
 competitors  to  associate  the  information  with  a  particular  loop.  197  We  find,  however,  that
 requesting  carriers  are  able  to  associate  LFACS  loop  information  with  working  telephone
 numbers  or  serving  area  addresses,  contrary  to  Covads  assertions.  198
 65.  Manual  Loop  Qualification.  We  also  reject  Rhythms  and  Covads  complaints
 that  Verizon  has  so  far  failed  to  develop  a  pre-  ordering  interface  for  manual  loop  qualification.  199
 We  find  that  this  is  insufficient  to  render  Verizons  loop  information  offering  to  competitors
 noncompliant  with  the  requirements  of  the  UNE  Remand  Order.  For  the  most  part,  the
 192  See  Covad  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  33.
 193  See  supra  at  para.  61,  n.  183.
 194  See  Covad  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  33.
 195  See  Verizon  February  2  Ex  Parte  Letter  at  3.
 196  See  supra  at  paras.  60-  63;  see  also  Verizon  February  2  Ex  Parte  Letter  at  4-  5  and  Attach.  D.  Verizon  states
 that  these  system  enhancements  will  be  complete  by  October  2001,  a  schedule  to  which  we  expect  Verizon  to
 adhere.  See  Verizon  February  2  Ex  Parte  Letter  at  8.
 197  See  Covad  Massachusetts  II  Reply  at  27.
 198  Verizon  states  that,  if  a  competitive  carriers  representative  uses  the  end  users  telephone  number  to  identify
 the  loop  for  which  information  is  being  sought,  the  LFACS  loop  information  returned  will  be  associated  with  that
 telephone  number  on  that  representatives  work  list.  Verizon  also  states  that,  if  the  representative  uses  the  end
 users  address  to  identify  the  loop,  Verizon  will  include  that  address  along  with  the  LFACS  loop  make-  up
 information  returned  in  the  remarks  field  of  the  pre-  order  interface.  See  Letter  from  Dee  May,  Executive
 Director  Federal  Regulatory,  Verizon,  to  Magalie  Roman  Salas,  Secretary,  Federal  Communications  Commission,
 CC  Docket  No.  01-  9  (filed  April  4,  2001).
 199  See  Rhythms  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  33-  34;  Covad  Massachusetts  I  Reply  at  10.
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 information  returned  through  the  manual  loop  qualification  process  is  already  provided  to
 competitors  through  other  loop  qualification  processes  that  are  available  at  the  pre-  ordering  stage.  200  The  only  information  returned  through  manual  loop  qualification  not  otherwise  available
 at  the  pre-  ordering  stage  is  the  result  of  a  loop-  specific  MLT  test.  201  MLT  information  is  merely  a
 small  subset  of  the  information  returned  through  the  manual  loop  qualification  process.  We  find
 that,  given  the  totality  of  the  circumstances,  the  inability  of  competitors  to  access  this  subset  of
 information  on  a  pre-  order  basis  is  not  fatal  to  Verizons  application.  Moreover,  we  rely  on
 Verizons  work  in  the  change  management  process  to  implement  pre-  order  access  to  manual  loop
 qualification,  including  MLT  test  results,  through  its  LSOG  4  and  LSOG  5  pre-  order  interfaces.  202
 66.  Other  Arguments.  Finally,  commenters  make  various  other  claims  alleging  that
 Verizons  provision  of  loop  make-  up  information  is  discriminatory  and  violates  the  requirements
 of  the  UNE  Remand  Order,  which  we  reject  for  the  following  reasons.  For  example,  ALTS  and
 Covad  claim  that  Verizons  mechanized  loop  make-  up  information  database  --  LiveWire  --  fails  to
 meet  UNE  Remand  requirements  because  it  sometimes  contains  inaccurate  and  incomplete
 information,  hampering  competing  carriers  ability  to  order  xDSL  loops.  203  As  we  noted  above,
 the  LiveWire  database  Verizon  makes  available  to  competing  carriers  is  the  same  database  used
 by  Verizons  retail  affiliate  to  qualify  loops.  204  Thus,  any  inaccuracies  or  omissions  in  Verizons
 LiveWire  database  are  not  discriminatory,  because  they  are  provided  in  the  exact  same  form  to
 both  Verizons  affiliate  and  competing  carriers.  205
 67.  We  also  reject  Covads  assertion  that  Verizons  inclusion  of  information  in  its
 LiveWire  database  regarding  whether  a  loop  qualifies  for  VADIs  retail  ADSL  service  violates  the
 UNE  Remand  Order.  206  Covad  contends  that  Verizons  use  of  this  information  denies  competing
 200  See  supra  at  para.  58.  For  example,  competitors  currently  have  pre-  order  access  to  loop  information  stored  in
 the  LiveWire  and  LFACS  databases,  separate  and  apart  from  information  from  those  databases  returned  through
 the  manual  loop  qualification  process.  See  supra  at  paras.  56-  57.  Competitors  may  also  obtain  pre-  order  access  to
 loop  information  in  Verizons  paper  records  through  an  engineering  query.  See  supra  at  para.  59.
 201  See  supra  at  para.  58  &  n.  172.
 202  See  supra  at  para.  58.  See  also  Verizon  February  2  Ex  Parte  Letter  at  4-  5,  and  Attach.  D.
 203  See  ALTS  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  27-  28;  ALTS  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  18-  19;  Covad
 Massachusetts  II  Reply  at  27-  28.
 204  See  supra  n.  163.
 205  The  Commission  came  to  the  same  conclusion  regarding  similar  allegations  of  inaccuracies  in  SWBTs  loop
 make-  up  information  database,  which  was  also  used  both  by  retail  personnel  in  SWBTs  separate  data  affiliate  and
 competitors.  See  SWBT  Kansas/  Oklahoma  Order  at  para.  126.  We  note  that  a  change  to  LiveWire  is  currently  in
 change  management.  When  this  change  is  implemented,  LiveWire  will  indicate  when  its  does  not  contain  loop
 qualification  data  for  a  particular  service  address  or  telephone  number,  and  indicate  that  a  manual  loop
 qualification  should  be  requested.  Verizon  states  that  this  change  will  follow  the  change  management  timeline  for
 a  June  2001  release.  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Reply  Decl.  at  para.  22.
 206  See  Covad  Massachusetts  I  Reply  at  9-  10.
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 carriers  access  to  more  detailed  loop  information  and  does  not  allow  carriers  to  identify  the
 physical  attributes  of  the  loop  to  make  a  more  informed  judgment  about  the  possibility  of  offering
 service.  We  reject  this  contention  because  we  find  that  this  information  is  provided  to
 competitors  in  addition  to  the  other  loop  make-  up  information  required  by  the  UNE  Remand
 Order,  and  not  instead  of  required  information.  Verizons  designation  of  whether  or  not  a  loop
 qualifies  for  VADIs  retail  ADSL  service  is  a  summary  of  the  loop  make-  up  information  contained
 in  LiveWire  and  an  alternative  way  to  provide  help  in  determining  whether  the  loop  is  adequate
 for  providing  advanced  services.  207  It  does  not  replace  the  loop  make-  up  information  contained  in
 LiveWire  that  is  also  returned  with  each  query.  In  addition  to  the  loop  make-  up  information
 contained  in  LiveWire,  competing  carriers  can  also  access  actual  loop  make-  up  information  from
 Verizons  LFACS  database  to  the  extent  it  is  available  and,  upon  request,  Verizon  will  perform  an
 engineering  search  of  its  paper  records  to  determine  the  actual  make-  up  of  the  loop.  We  therefore
 find  that  Verizons  designation  of  whether  a  loop  qualifies  for  VADIs  retail  ADSL  service  merely
 supplements  the  other  loop  make-  up  information  Verizon  provides.
 68.  Moreover,  we  reject  ALTS  argument  that  Verizons  current  loop  qualification
 processes,  including  its  interim  process  for  allowing  competitors  access  to  LFACS,  fail  to  satisfy
 UNE  Remand  obligations  because  portions  of  these  processes  are  manual  rather  than  electronic.
 Specifically,  ALTS  asserts  that  the  only  truly  competitive  way  for  [competing  carriers]  to  receive
 [loop  information]  is  electronically.  208  The  Commission  specifically  rejected  such  an  assertion  in
 the  UNE  Remand  Order.  That  order  makes  clear  that,  to  the  extent  an  incumbent  has  not
 compiled  loop  information  for  itself,  it  is  not  required  to  conduct  a  plant  inventory  and  construct
 a  database  on  behalf  of  requesting  carriers.  Instead,  the  incumbent  is  obligated  to  provide
 requesting  competitors  with  nondiscriminatory  access  to  loop  information  within  the  same  time
 frame  whether  it  is  accessed  manually  or  electronically.  209
 69.  We  also  reject  Sprints  contention  that  Verizon  fails  to  meet  its  obligations  under
 the  UNE  Remand  Order  because  it  fails  to  provide  unfiltered  access  to  information  about  its
 digital  loop  carrier  (DLC)  facilities.  Specifically,  Sprint  contends  that  Verizon  only  offers
 information  about  DLC  on  a  line-  by-  line  basis,  rather  than  also  on  the  basis  of  zip  code  of  the
 end  users  in  a  particular  wire  center,  NXX  code,  or  on  any  other  basis  that  the  incumbent
 provides  such  information  to  itself,  as  stated  in  the  UNE  Remand  Order.  210  The  UNE  Remand
 Order,  however,  does  not  require  that  Verizon  provide  loop  information  on  the  basis  of  zip  code
 and  NXX  code  if  none  of  Verizons  personnel  are  able  to  access  loop  information  on  those  bases.
 Rather,  the  UNE  Remand  Order  sets  forth  a  standard  of  nondiscrimination,  requiring  incumbents
 to  provide  loop  information  on  any  basis  that  any  incumbent  personnel  may  obtain  that
 information.  211  Verizon  indicates  that,  through  both  its  interim  and  long-  term  LFACS  access
 207  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  para.  108.
 208  See  ALTS  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  18.
 209  See  UNE  Remand  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  3886,  para.  429.
 210  See  Sprint  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  5  (citing  UNE  Remand  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  3885,  para.  427).
 211  See  UNE  Remand  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  3885,  para.  427.
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 processes,  it  will  provide:  (1)  an  indication  that  DLC  equipment  is  present  on  the  facility  for
 which  loop  make-  up  has  been  requested;  and  (2)  the  type  of  DLC  equipment  present.  212  The
 record  does  not  contain  any  evidence  that  DLC  information  is  available  to  any  Verizon  personnel
 in  any  form  other  than  on  a  line-  by-  line  basis,  nor  is  there  information  on  the  record  that  any
 Verizon  personnel  have  access  to  DLC  information  beyond  the  information  returned  through  an
 LFACS  query.  Without  more  than  Sprints  allegations  to  the  contrary,  we  decline  to  find  that
 Verizon  fails  to  provide  competitors  with  nondiscriminatory  access  to  its  loop  information
 systems,  including  information  about  DLC  facilities.
 d.  Ordering
 70.  In  this  section,  we  address  Verizons  ability  to  provide  competing  carriers  with
 access  to  the  OSS  functions  necessary  for  placing  wholesale  orders.  We  find  that  Verizon
 demonstrates  --  with  performance  data,  the  results  of  its  third-  party  test,  and  other  evidence  --
 that  it  provides  competing  carriers  with  access  to  OSS  ordering  functions  in  a  manner  that  allows
 these  carriers  a  meaningful  opportunity  to  compete  or  in  the  same  time  and  manner  as  it  provides
 those  functions  to  its  retail  operations.  First,  in  subparts  (i)  through  (iv),  we  address  those  same
 elements  of  ordering  as  have  been  probative  in  past  section  271  orders:  213  confirmation  notices,
 rejection  notices,  flow-  through,  completion  notices,  and  jeopardy  information.  Then  in  subpart
 (v)  we  address  commenters  concerns  that  Verizons  ordering  OSS  is  susceptible  to  the  same
 problems  that  led  to  a  Consent  Decree  between  Verizon  (then  Bell  Atlantic)  and  the  Commission
 after  the  companys  section  271  application  was  approved  in  New  York.
 (i)  Order  Confirmation  Notices
 71.  Using  the  same  analysis  and  looking  to  similar  performance  measurements  as  in
 prior  orders,  we  find  that  Verizon  provides  order  confirmation  notices  in  a  manner  that  affords
 competitors  a  meaningful  opportunity  to  compete.  214  Data  indicate  that  for  orders  that  flow
 through  215  its  systems  without  manual  handling,  Verizon  consistently  exceeds  the  Massachusetts
 Departments  benchmark  of  returning  95  percent  of  confirmation  notices  within  two  hours.  216  For
 orders  that  require  some  amount  of  manual  processing  (e.  g.,  complex  orders,  orders  for  nine  or
 more  loops),  Verizon  generally  exceeds  the  Massachusetts  Departments  benchmark,  with
 212  See  Letter  from  Dee  May,  Verizon,  to  Magalie  Roman  Salas,  Secretary,  Federal  Communications
 Commission,  CC  Docket  No.  01-  9  (filed  February  26,  2001)  (Verizon  February  26  Ex  Parte  Letter).
 213  See  SWBT  Kansas/  Oklahoma  Order  at  para.  135;  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  4035,  para.
 163.
 214  See  SWBT  Texas  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  18438-  40,  paras.  171-  73;  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd
 at  4035-  37,  para.  164,  4047-  48,  para.  180.
 215  See  infra  Part  IV.  A.  2.  d(  iii)  (discussing  order  flow-  through  in  detail).
 216  For  orders  that  flow  through,  Verizon  returned  such  notices  96.  56  to  99.  89  percent  of  the  time  in  the  period
 from  September  through  December  2000.  See  OR  1-  02  (percent  on  time  local  service  request  confirmation,  flow-through).
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 scattered  exceptions  relating  to  resale  two-  wire  digital  services,  resale  special  services  of  ten  or
 more  lines,  and  UNE  DS-  1  and  DS-  3  orders.  The  disparities  for  two-  wire  digital  services  and
 resale  special  services  were  minimal.  217  Although  the  disparities  for  UNE  DS-  1  and  DS-  3  order
 confirmations  were  more  significant,  218  confirmations  for  these  orders  made  up  less  than  one
 percent  of  all  confirmations  from  September  through  December.  219  Absent  evidence  of
 discrimination  or  competitive  harm,  we  find  that  this  disparity  has  little  competitive  impact  in  light
 of  the  small  number  of  those  orders.  We  also  find  that  Verizons  confirmation  notices  accurately
 reflect  competing  carriers  orders.  220
 72.  Our  conclusion  that  Verizons  performance  is  acceptable  is  further  supported  by
 the  results  of  KPMGs  examination  of  Verizons  order  confirmation  process  and  performance.
 KPMG  found  that  Verizon  timely  returns  confirmations  for  flow-  through  orders  and  non-  flow-through
 orders  upwards  of  96  percent  of  the  time.  221  The  Massachusetts  Department  likewise
 concluded  that  Verizon  provides  timely  confirmation  notices.  222
 73.  We  reject  commenters  arguments  that  Verizon  fails  to  provide  confirmation
 notices  adequately.  ASCENT  (on  behalf  of  its  members)  and  OnSite  assert  without  support  that
 they  experience  problems  with  confirmation  timeliness  and  accuracy.  223  We  decline  to  find  that
 these  vague  assertions  overcome  Verizons  specific  evidence  showing  that  it  provides
 217  For  resale  orders  for  two-  wire  digital  services,  Verizon  returned  94.  64,  92.  30,  94.  87,  and  92.  11  percent  of
 confirmation  notices  within  72  hours  for  September  through  December  respectively.  This  performance  is  just
 under  the  benchmark  and  does  not  appear  to  be  consistently  deteriorating.  See  OR  1-  04  (percent  on  time  local
 service  request  confirmation  <  10  lines,  no  flow-  through).  For  resale  orders  for  special  services  of  ten  or  more
 lines,  Verizon  returned  confirmations  on  time  88.  88  percent  of  the  time  in  September,  increasing  through
 December  when  Verizon  returned  confirmations  on  time  100  percent  of  the  time.  See  OR  1-  06  (percent  on  time
 local  service  request  confirmation,  no  flow-  through,  electronically  submitted).
 218  For  UNE  DS-  1  and  DS-  3  orders  of  less  than  ten  lines,  Verizon  fell  well  below  the  benchmark  from  September
 through  December,  achieving  no  more  than  a  50  percent  on  time  rate.  See  OR  1-  04  (percent  on  time  local  service
 request  confirmation  <  10  lines,  no  flow-  through).  For  further  discussion  of  Verizons  performance  with  regard  to
 DS-  1s  and  DS-  3s,  see  infra  Parts  IV.  B  &  V.  C.
 219  See  total  confirmations  as  calculated  from  Verizon  September  through  December  Performance  Data.
 220  Each  month,  Verizon  examines  a  sample  of  confirmation  notices  from  manually  processed  orders  for  accuracy.
 In  every  month  from  September  through  December,  Verizon  exceeded  the  Massachusetts  Departments
 benchmark  of  95  percent  error-  free  confirmations,  with  the  exception  of  November  when  94.  05  percent  and
 December  when  92.  75  percent  of  the  sample  of  manually  processed  UNE-  L  orders  was  error-  free.  We  find  this
 disparity  to  be  isolated  and  slight.  See  OR  6-  03  (percent  accuracy).  We  do  not  address  WorldComs  complaints
 regarding  July  data  for  order  accuracy  because  more  recent  data  show  acceptable  performance.  See  WorldCom
 Massachusetts  I  Kwapniewski/  Lichtenberg  Decl.  at  para.  28.
 221  See  KPMG  Final  Report  at  50-  51  (Test  POP-  1-  4-  4  and  -1-  4-  5  (EDI)),  102  (Test  POP-  2-  4-  1  and  -2-  4-  2  (GUI)).
 222  See  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  147.
 223  See  ASCENT  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  10;  OnSite  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  8,  18;  ASCENT
 Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  20.
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 confirmation  notices  in  a  manner  that  affords  competing  carriers  a  meaningful  opportunity  to
 compete.  224
 (ii)  Order  Rejection  Notices  and  Order  Rejections
 74.  We  agree  with  the  Massachusetts  Department  that  Verizon  provides  competing
 carriers  with  order  rejection  notices  in  a  manner  that  allows  them  a  meaningful  opportunity  to
 compete.  225  Verizons  performance  data  demonstrate  that  it  returns  order  rejection  notices  in  a
 timely  manner  over  both  EDI  and  the  web  GUI.  From  September  through  December,  Verizon
 returned  rejection  notices  for  orders  that  flow  through  its  system  within  two  hours  more  than  97
 percent  of  the  time.  226  In  the  same  period,  for  orders  that  require  some  manual  processing,
 Verizon  returns  rejection  notices  within  the  number  of  hours  required  for  each  particular  service,
 with  minor  exceptions.  227  Furthermore,  KPMG  found  that  Verizon  timely  and  appropriately
 returns  rejection  messages.  228  Absent  any  clear  evidence  of  discrimination  or  competitive  harm,
 we  find  that  this  performance  demonstrates  compliance  with  our  requirements.
 75.  We  recognize,  however,  that  on  average  for  all  carriers  combined,  Verizon  rejects
 a  substantial  number  of  orders.  From  September  through  December,  Verizon  rejected
 approximately  43  to  49  percent  of  resale  orders  and  21  to  25  percent  of  UNE  orders.  229  The
 Commission  does  not,  however,  hold  a  BOC  accountable  for  rejects  that  occur  for  reasons  within
 a  competing  carriers  control.  As  in  the  SWBT  Kansas/  Oklahoma  Order,  SWBT  Texas  Order,
 and  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  230  rejections  in  this  instance  vary  widely  by  individual
 competing  carrier:  among  carriers  submitting  the  most  orders  in  May,  June,  or  July,  rejection  rates
 224  We  decline  to  address  commenters  assertions  about  data  from  before  September  2000  when  later  data  are
 available.  See,  e.  g.,  Winstar  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  22.
 225  See  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  147.
 226  See  OR  2-  02  (Percent  On  Time  LSR  Reject,  Flow-  Through).
 227  See  OR  2-  04  (Percent  On  Time  LSR  Reject  <  10  Lines);  OR  2-  06  (Percent  On  Time  LSR  Reject  >=  10  Lines).
 The  exceptions  were  isolated  and  slight.  In  September,  Verizon  returned  rejections  for  resale  POTS  and
 prequalified  complex  orders  on  time  94.  73  percent  of  the  time.  See  OR  2-  04.  Also,  Verizon  returned  rejections  for
 UNE  special  services  orders  on  time  91.  37  percent  of  the  time  in  November  and  93.  62  percent  of  the  time  in
 December.  See  OR  2-  04.  Finally,  for  UNE  orders  of  less  than  10  lines  that  were  faxed  in  (rather  than  submitted
 electronically),  Verizon  returned  rejections  on  time  in  October  79.  55  percent  of  the  time,  in  November  90.  63
 percent  of  the  time,  and  in  December  92.  31  percent  of  the  time.  See  OR  2-  08  (percent  on  time  LSR  reject  <  10
 lines).  This  performance  is  steadily  improving  and  in  recent  months  has  been  only  slightly  below  the  95  percent
 benchmark.  We  do  not  address  comments  based  on  March  through  July  data  because  more  recent  data  are
 available.  See,  e.  g.,  WorldCom  Massachusetts  I  Kwapniewski/  Lichtenberg  Decl.  at  para.  28.
 228  See  KPMG  Final  Report  at  52-  53  (Tests  POP-  1-  4-  6  &  POP-  1-  4-  7  (EDI)),  105  (Test  POP-  2-  6-  5  (GUI)).
 229  See  OR  3-  01  (Percent  Orders  Rejected).
 230  See  SWBT  Kansas/  Oklahoma  Order  at  para.  143;  SWBT  Texas  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  18442,  para.  176;  Bell
 Atlantic  New  York  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  4045,  para.  175,  4050,  para.  183.
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 varied  from  about  5  to  83  percent.  231  Because  all  competing  carriers  interface  with  the  same
 Verizon  system,  we  find,  on  this  record,  that  it  would  not  be  appropriate  to  attribute  this  wide
 range  of  results  entirely  to  Verizon.  The  Massachusetts  Department  likewise  determined  that  the
 efforts  put  forth  by  the  [competing  carriers]  in  submitting  accurate  [local  service  requests]  are
 very  strongly  tied  to  the  overall  order  reject  rates  reported  by  VZ-  MA.  232  In  light  of  this
 variation,  we  conclude  that  the  overall  reject  rates  experienced  by  competing  carriers  in  this
 instance  do  not  indicate  flaws  in  Verizons  OSS.
 76.  Two  commenters,  OnSite  and  ASCENT  (on  behalf  of  its  members),  allege  that
 they  have  problems  receiving  timely  rejection  notices.  233  Their  assertions  are  not  supported,
 however,  by  any  specific  evidence.  Absent  such  evidence,  these  assertions  are  insufficient  to
 rebut  Verizons  evidence  of  compliance  with  this  checklist  item.  We  also  disagree  with  Rhythms
 assertion  that  Verizons  rejection  performance  does  not  satisfy  our  standards  for  section  271
 approval  because  Verizon  was  rejecting  its  orders  for  defective  characters  and  has  not
 performed  a  root  cause  analysis  on  this  problem.  234  We  are  not  able  to  conclude  based  on  the
 evidence  that  Rhythms  provides  that  this  is  a  problem  with  Verizons  OSS  and  not  Rhythms.
 Finally,  ALTS  points  to  a  KPMG  observation  regarding  inappropriate  rejections  of  ISDN  resale
 orders.  235  This  observation  was  successfully  closed,  and  in  the  absence  of  further  evidence  we
 believe  the  issue  is  resolved.  236
 (iii)  Order  Flow-  Through  Rate
 77.  We  agree  with  the  Massachusetts  Department  that  Verizons  OSS  are  capable  of
 flowing  through  orders  in  a  manner  that  affords  competing  carriers  a  meaningful  opportunity  to
 compete.  237  In  recent  section  271  orders,  the  Commission  has  examined  flow-  through  rates  238
 largely  for  their  potential  to  indicate  problems  elsewhere  in  a  BOCs  OSS.  In  particular,  low
 flow-  through  rates,  combined  with  other  independent  record  evidence,  can  be  indicators  of:
 231  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  McLean/  Wierzbicki  Decl.  Attach.  I.
 232  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  113.
 233  See  ASCENT  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  10;  OnSite  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  8;  ASCENT
 Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  20.  WorldCom  points  to  commercial  data  from  March  through  June  2000;  we  do
 not  generally  address  commenters  claims  regarding  old  data  when  more  recent  data  are  available.
 234  Rhythms  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  22.
 235  See  ALTS  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  23.
 236  See  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  I  Reply  at  22.
 237  See  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  107  (finding  that  VZ-  MAs  systems  are  quite
 capable  of  allowing  [competing  carriers]  and  resellers  to  attain  high  levels  of  order  flow-  through  and  of  sustaining
 future  commercial  volumes),  147-  48.
 238  Competing  carriers  orders  flow  through  if  they  are  submitted  electronically  and  pass  through  Verizons
 ordering  OSS  into  its  back  office  systems  without  manual  intervention.
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 (1)  failure  to  provision  orders  in  a  timely  manner;  (2)  failure  to  provide  competing  carriers  with
 complete,  up-  to-  date  business  rules  and  ordering  codes;  (3)  lack  of  integration  between  pre-ordering
 and  ordering  functions;  (4)  failure  to  provide  order  status  notices  electronically;  and
 (5)  inability  to  process  competing  carriers  orders  at  reasonably  foreseeable  commercial  volumes
 in  a  nondiscriminatory  manner.  239  Flow-  through  rates,  therefore,  are  not  so  much  an  end  in
 themselves,  but  a  tool  used  to  indicate  a  wide  range  of  possible  deficiencies  in  a  BOCs  OSS  that
 may  deny  an  efficient  competitor  a  meaningful  opportunity  to  compete  in  the  local  market.  As
 discussed  elsewhere  in  this  Order,  these  specific  deficiencies  are  not  present  here.  240  As  a  result,
 we  use  flow-  through  here  not  as  a  conclusive  measure  of  nondiscriminatory  access  to  ordering
 functions,  241  but  as  one  indicium  among  many  of  the  performance  of  Verizons  OSS.
 78.  Although  Verizons  commercial  data  show  low  average  total  flow-  through  rates  --
 ranging  from  about  46  to  49  percent  for  resale  orders  and  51  to  55  percent  for  UNE  orders  from
 September  through  December  242  --  we  conclude,  as  the  Massachusetts  Department  did,  243  that
 Verizons  OSS  is  capable  of  flowing  through  competing  carriers  orders  in  substantially  the  same
 time  and  manner  as  Verizons  own  orders.  Some  competing  carriers  are  achieving  much  higher
 flow-  through  rates  than  others.  Data  regarding  resale  orders  show  that  carriers  that  placed  the
 most  orders  in  July  2000  had  total  flow-  through  rates  for  resale  orders  varying  from  0  to  90.09
 percent;  data  regarding  UNE-  P  orders  similarly  show  that  carriers  that  placed  the  most  orders  in
 July  2000  had  total  flow-  through  rates  for  such  orders  varying  from  66.10  to  70.59  percent.  244
 Because  all  competing  carriers  interface  with  the  same  Verizon  system,  we  find,  on  this  record,
 that  it  would  not  be  appropriate  to  attribute  this  wide  range  of  results  entirely  to  Verizon.  The
 Commission  has  consistently  stated  that  a  BOC  is  not  accountable  for  orders  that  fail  to  flow
 through  due  to  competing  carrier-  caused  errors.  245  Moreover,  our  conclusion  that  Verizons
 systems  are  capable  of  achieving  high  overall  levels  of  order  flow-  through  is  reinforced  by
 KPMGs  testing.  When  KPMG  submitted  test  orders,  it  achieved  a  flow-  through  rate  of  100
 percent  for  both  resale  and  UNE-  L  orders  that  are  designed  to  flow  through  Verizons  systems.  246
 239  See  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  4034,  para.  162;  Second  BellSouth  Louisiana  Order,  13
 FCC  Rcd  at  20671,  para.  108.
 240  See  infra  Part  IV.  A.  2.  e  (provisioning);  infra  Part  IV.  A.  2.  h(  i)  (documentation);  supra  Part  IV.  A.  2.  c
 (integration);  supra  Parts  IV.  A.  2.  d(  i),  IV.  A.  2.  d(  ii),  and  infra  Part  IV.  A.  2.  d(  iv)  (ordering  notifiers);  infra  para.  81
 (scalability).
 241  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  4034,  para.  161.
 242  See  OR  5-  01  (Percent  Flow-  Through  Total).
 243  See  supra  n.  237.
 244  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  McLean/  Wierzbicki  Decl.  Attach.  H.
 245  See  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  4039-  40,  para.  167,  4049,  para.  181;  Second  BellSouth
 Louisiana  Order,  13  FCC  Rcd  at  20674,  para.  111.
 246  See  KPMG  Final  Report  at  123-  24  (Tests  POP-  3-  1,  POP-  3-  2,  POP-  3-  3)  (results  after  correcting  Verizons
 documentation).  In  its  commercial  flow-  through  test,  KPMG  examined  a  sample  of  the  New  York  and
 Massachusetts  orders  of  two  competing  carriers  to  determine  the  rate  of  flow-  through  for  flow-  through  eligible
 (continued.)
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 We  expect  that  Verizons  flow-  through  rates  will  improve  over  time  as  individual  carriers  gain
 experience  with  the  OSS  and  as  Verizon  conducts  monthly  workshops  for  competing  carriers  to
 help  them  improve  their  order  submissions.  247
 79.  We  disagree  with  commenters  that  we  should  reject  Verizons  application  based
 on  its  average  flow-  through  rates  or  because  some  kinds  of  orders  are  not  designed  to  flow
 through.  248  Specifically,  WorldCom  first  argues  that  Verizons  flow-  through  rates  are  too  low.  It
 points  out  that  Verizons  Massachusetts  rates  are  below  the  rates  in  New  York  at  the  time  of
 section  271  approval  there,  and  it  argues  that  Verizon  should  be  reporting  on  achieved  flow-through,
 as  it  does  in  New  York.  WorldCom  also  disagrees  that  Verizon  should  be  permitted  to
 rely  on  UNE-  P  flow-  through  rates  to  show  that  competing  carrier  orders  can  flow  through.  249
 Second,  WorldCom  argues  that  KPMGs  test  revealed  problems  with  Verizons  flow-  through  in
 Massachusetts.  It  points  out  that  KPMGs  commercial  test  shows  a  less  than  60  percent  achieved
 flow-  through  rate  and  that  four  orders  that  flowed  through  for  Verizon  did  not  flow  through  in
 the  wholesale  environment.
 80.  As  we  explain  above,  Verizon  has  shown  that  its  OSS  is  capable  of  flowing
 competing  carrier  orders  through.  The  commercial  data,  particularly  the  individual  carrier
 reports,  demonstrate  that  some  carriers  are  capable  of  achieving  high  flow-  through  rates.
 Verizons  showing  that  some  carriers  achieve  high  UNE-  P  flow-  through  rates  is  not  its  sole
 showing  that  its  OSS  can  flow  through  orders,  but  is  incremental  evidence  that  some  carriers  are
 achieving  high  flow-  through.  We  do  not  specifically  need  Verizons  achieved  flow-  through
 figures  in  order  to  determine  that  Verizons  OSS  are  capable  of  offering  high  flow-  through.  The
 commercial  data  are  the  most  probative  evidence  that  Verizon  provides  nondiscriminatory  access
 to  its  OSS.  KPMGs  functionality  test,  which  showed  good  flow-  through,  supports  our
 (Continued  from  previous  page)
 orders  (achieved  flow-  through)  and  the  overall  rate  of  flow-  through  (total  flow-  through)  for  those  carriers  over  a
 two  week  period.  See  id.  at  116  &  n.  70.  Achieved  flow-  through  was  59  percent  and  total  flow-  through  was  35
 percent.  See  id.  at  126.  KPMG  discounted  the  results  of  this  test,  because  its  primary  assessment  methodology
 was  the  testing  of  KPMG  orders  described  in  the  text  above.  Id.  The  Massachusetts  Department  also  discounted
 the  results  of  KPMGs  commercial  test,  particularly  because  the  test  examined  orders  placed  in  New  York  as  well
 as  Massachusetts,  and  at  a  time  when  Verizon  was  addressing  order  processing  errors  in  New  York.  See
 Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  143.  Without  knowing  whether  the  two  carriers  KPMG
 selected  for  its  commercial  test  were  representative  of  competing  carriers  in  general,  and  for  the  reasons  stated  by
 the  Massachusetts  Department,  we  are  not  persuaded  that  the  results  of  KPMGs  commercial  test  show
 discrimination.
 247  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  McLean/  Wierzbicki  Decl.  at  para.  53.  We  also  note  that  the  Massachusetts
 Department  has  added  a  special  provision  on  flow-  through  to  the  Massachusetts  PAP.  See  infra  n.  257.
 248  See  ASCENT  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  11;  OnSite  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  18;  Rhythms
 Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  22-  23;  Winstar  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  16,  21;  ASCENT  Massachusetts  II
 Comments  at  21.  We  do  not  address  commenters  claims  regarding  data  from  early  2000  when  more  recent  data
 are  available.
 249  WorldCom  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  47,  52;  WorldCom  Massachusetts  I  Kwapniewski/  Lichtenberg  Decl.
 at  paras.  155-  64;  WorldCom  Massachusetts  I  Kinard  Decl.  at  para.  8;  WorldCom  Massachusetts  I  Reply  at  39;
 WorldCom  Massachusetts  I  Kwapniewski/  Lichtenberg  Reply  Decl.  at  paras.  23-  24.
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 determination.  While  its  commercial  test  does  not,  KPMG  itself  discounted  its  commercial  test,
 and  the  Massachusetts  Department  concurred  that  the  commercial  test  was  not  as  probative  as  the
 functionality  test.  Finally,  the  Massachusetts  Department  has  added  a  special  provision  on  flow-through
 to  the  Performance  Assurance  Plan  (PAP);  Verizon  must  report  there  both  achieved  and
 total  flow-  through.  250  This  addition  will  provide  a  substantial  disincentive  to  discriminate  against
 competing  carriers  with  regard  to  flow-  through.
 81.  We  also  agree  with  the  Massachusetts  Department  that  Verizon  is  timely  and
 accurately  processing  orders  that  do  not  flow  through,  251  and  that  Verizons  ordering  systems  are
 sufficiently  scalable  to  handle  reasonably  foreseeable  commercial  volumes  of  orders  in  a
 nondiscriminatory  manner.  252  Verizon  has  been  able  to  maintain  or  improve  upon  its  performance
 while  order  volumes  have  generally  increased.  253  KPMG  also  concluded  that  Verizons  systems
 are  scalable.  254
 82.  Some  commenters  have  expressed  concern  that  low  levels  of  flow-  through,  the
 commensurate  higher  levels  of  manual  processing,  or  other  inadequacies  limit  the  scalability  of
 Verizons  OSS.  255  In  particular,  the  Department  of  Justice  expressed  concern  in  its  first
 evaluation  that  Verizon  has  not  shown  its  OSS  to  be  scalable,  because  KPMGs  test  was  less
 rigorous  than  its  test  in  New  York  and  because  the  Massachusetts  PAP  had  less  deterrent  force
 than  the  New  York  plan.  256  The  Department  of  Justice  did  not  raise  this  concern  in  its
 250  See  Verizon  Jan.  30  Ex  Parte  Letter  Attach.  at  14.
 251  See  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  148;  supra  para.  71  (confirmation  timeliness  for
 non-  flow-  through  orders);  supra  para.  74  (rejection  notice  timeliness  for  non-  flow-  through  orders);  supra  para.  71
 &  n.  220  (confirmation  accuracy  for  manually  processed  orders).  From  September  through  December,  Verizon
 processed  these  orders  with  90  to  99  percent  accuracy  (with  the  exceptions  of  resale  orders  in  September,  for  which
 only  82.  74  percent  of  orders  were  manually  processed  without  error,  UNE-  P  orders  in  December,  for  which  89.  62
 percent  were  without  error,  and  UNE-  L  orders  in  December,  for  which  88.  86  percent  were  without  error).  See  OR
 6-  01  (Percent  Accuracy,  Orders);  OR  6-  02  (Percent  Accuracy,  Opportunities).  We  do  not  address  complaints  about
 data  for  months  before  September  2000  as  more  recent  data  are  available.
 252  See  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  148.
 253  The  total  number  of  PONs  increased  from  31,987  in  May  to  44,368  in  December.  See  OR  3-  01  (Percent
 Orders  Rejected,  competing  carrier  aggregate  observances).
 254  KPMG  found  in  its  Capacity  Management  Evaluation  that  Verizons  OSS  are  designed  in  a  manner  that
 would  allow  them  to  scale  to  meet  increases  in  demand.  KPMG  Final  Report  at  238  (Test  POP-  8-  1-  14).
 255  See  ALTS  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  24;  OnSite  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  18;  Winstar  Massachusetts
 I  Comments  at  17,  21,  23;  WorldCom  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  48;  WorldCom  Massachusetts  I  Reply  at  39;
 WorldCom  Massachusetts  I  Kwapniewski/  Lichtenberg  Reply  Decl.  at  para.  25.
 256  See  Department  of  Justice  Massachusetts  I  Evaluation  at  22.
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 Massachusetts  II  Application  comments,  and  we  believe  that  these  concerns  are  addressed  by  the
 more  recent  Massachusetts  PAP.  257
 (iv)  Order  Completion  Notices  and  Jeopardy  Information
 83.  We  conclude  that  Verizon  provides  billing  and  provisioning  completion  notifiers
 and  jeopardy  information  in  a  manner  that  affords  competing  carriers  a  meaningful  opportunity  to
 compete.  After  provisioning  an  order  that  requires  physical  work,  Verizon  updates  its  Service
 Order  Processor  to  reflect  that  the  work  has  been  done;  if  an  order  requires  no  physical  work
 (e.  g.,  feature  changes),  the  Service  Order  Processor  is  automatically  updated  during  overnight
 processing.  The  Service  Order  Processor  then  communicates  with  the  appropriate  Verizon
 gateway  to  send  a  provisioning  completion  notice  to  the  competing  carrier.  The  Service  Order
 Processor  also  communicates  to  Verizons  billing  system  that  the  work  has  been  completed.
 Verizons  billing  records  are  updated  overnight,  and  Verizon  sends  a  billing  completion  notice  to
 the  competing  carrier  the  next  day.  258
 84.  Verizons  commercial  performance  indicates  that  it  provides  completion  notices  in
 a  nondiscriminatory  fashion.  Verizon  consistently  meets  the  benchmark  set  by  the  Massachusetts
 Department  for  timely  delivery  of  both  provisioning  completion  notices  and  billing  completion
 notices.  259  Verizon  has  begun  reporting  on  new  measures  designed  to  track  how  long  it  takes  to
 update  its  billing  systems  after  performing  the  relevant  work.  While  these  are  parity  measures,
 Verizon  has  not  yet  begun  reporting  the  data  for  its  retail  operations.  Nonetheless,  the  data
 regarding  its  wholesale  performance  generally  show  that  it  is  updating  its  billing  systems  on
 average  in  less  than  a  day.  260  The  Massachusetts  Department  also  found  that  Verizons  current
 257  See  infra  para.  88  and  Part  VIII.  B.  1.  The  Massachusetts  PAP  contains  a  special  provision  on  flow-  through:
 Verizon  must  achieve  80  percent  total  flow-  through  and  95  percent  achieved  flow-  through  for  UNE  orders.  See
 Verizon  Jan.  30  Ex  Parte  Letter  Attach.  at  14.
 258  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  McLean/  Wierzbicki  Decl.  at  paras.  75-  76.
 259  According  to  data  for  September  through  December,  Verizon  returned  provisioning  and  billing  completion
 notices  on  time  (by  noon  the  next  business  day)  97  to  100  percent  of  the  time  for  both  resale  and  UNE  orders.  See
 OR  4-  02  (completion  notice  -  percent  on  time);  OR  4-  05  (work  completion  notice  -  percent  on  time).  KPMGs  test
 results  are  inconsistent  with  the  data  reflecting  actual  commercial  usage.  KPMG  found  that  92.  9  percent  of
 provisioning  completion  notices  and  74.  7  percent  of  billing  completion  notices  were  delivered  over  EDI  by  noon
 the  next  business  day;  and  that  2.  3  percent  of  the  billing  completion  notices  and  3.  3  percent  of  the  provisioning
 completion  notices  it  expected  to  receive  never  arrived.  See  KPMG  Final  Report  at  53-  54  (Tests  POP-  1-  4-  8,  POP-1-
 4-  9).  However,  because  KPMG  did  not  evaluate  the  timeliness  of  completion  notifiers  using  the  same  business
 rules  as  set  out  by  the  carrier-  to-  carrier  working  group,  see  id.,  we  cannot  directly  compare  KPMGs  test  results
 against  the  commercial  data  Verizon  provided,  and  we  decline  to  find  noncompliance  on  the  basis  of  these  test
 results.
 260  See  OR  4-  06  (Average  duration  -  work  completion  (SOP)  to  bill  completion).  In  addition,  from  September
 through  December,  Verizon  took  more  than  one  business  day  to  update  the  billing  systems  for  13.  99,  12.  84,  15.  29,
 and  11.99  percent  of  resale  orders;  and  9.94,  8.38,  10.66,  and  5.38  percent  of  UNE  orders.  See  OR  4-  08  (percent
 SOP  to  bill  completion  >  1  business  day).  Also,  in  the  same  time  period,  Verizon  took  more  than  four  business
 days  to  update  its  billing  systems  for  only  1.  56,  1.  07,  1.  95,  and  0.  38  percent  of  resale  orders;  and  4.  06,  3.  61,  2.  35,
 and  0.23  percent  of  UNE  orders.  See  OR  4-  07  (percent  SOP  to  Bill  Completion  >=  5  business  days).
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 performance  is  satisfactory,  261  and  we  are  encouraged  by  the  Massachusetts  Departments  recent
 decision  to  add  new  measures  to  the  PAP,  which  we  discuss  below.
 85.  We  agree  with  the  Massachusetts  Department  262  that  the  order  status  and  jeopardy
 information  system  created  by  Verizon  for  wholesale  orders  is  nondiscriminatory  because  it  allows
 competing  carriers  to  access  order  status  and  jeopardy  information,  to  the  extent  that  it  is
 available,  in  substantially  the  same  time  and  manner  as  Verizons  retail  representatives  can  access
 such  information.  Verizon  makes  jeopardy  information  available  to  its  retail  representatives  and
 to  competing  carriers  in  the  manner  described  in  the  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order.  263  Verizon
 does  not  actively  provide  jeopardy  notices,  except  that  it  follows  the  same  hot  cut  procedures  it
 first  developed  and  implemented  in  New  York.  264
 86.  WorldCom  asserts  that  because  of  systems  problems  on  Verizons  side,  it  has
 been  unable  to  access  its  jeopardy  reports  for  some  days  in  December  2000  and  January  2001.  265
 Verizon  responds  that  it  investigated  and  found  a  problem  with  the  back-  office  OSS  that  formats
 the  reports;  pending  implementation  of  a  fix,  Verizon  is  formatting  the  reports  manually.  266  We
 find  that  the  reports  are  being  provided  in  a  nondiscriminatory  manner  pending  the  fix,  and  that
 any  disruption  has  not  had  a  competitive  impact.
 (v)  Ordering  Notifiers  and  the  New  York  Consent  Decree
 87.  We  disagree  with  commenters  assertions  that  there  is  a  systemic  problem  with
 ordering  notifiers  in  Massachusetts  similar  to  the  problem  that  led  to  the  Commission  issuing  a
 Consent  Decree  following  section  271  approval  in  New  York.  After  the  Commission  approved
 Bell  Atlantics  --  now  Verizons  --  entry  into  the  interLATA  service  market  in  New  York,  it
 became  clear  that  Bell  Atlantic  was  having  problems  associated  with  lost  or  mishandled  orders
 for  unbundled  network  elements  electronically  submitted  by  its  local  service  competitors  over
 EDI.  267  The  Commission  began  to  investigate  Bell  Atlantics  performance  as  a  possible  violation
 of  section  271,  and  [  e]  vidence  submitted  by  Bell  Atlantic  in  this  investigation  suggest[  ed]  that
 Bell  Atlantics  performance  in  providing  order  acknowledgements,  confirmation  and  rejection
 261  See  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  147.
 262  See  id.
 263  See  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  4051,  para.  184.
 264  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  McLean/  Wierzbicki  Decl.  at  para.  74.  Although  Verizons  implementation  of  a
 system  of  active  jeopardy  notices  likely  will  provide  additional  benefit  to  carriers,  it  is  not  relevant  to  our
 determination  here  that  its  current  system  is  nondiscriminatory.  Therefore  we  reject  WorldComs  complaint  that
 this  new  jeopardy  system  is  flawed.  See  WorldCom  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  33.
 265  WorldCom  Massachusetts  II  Lichtenberg/  Chapman  Decl.  at  para.  20.
 266  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  McLean/  Wierzbicki  Reply  Decl.  at  para.  20.
 267  Bell  Atlantic-  New  York  Authorization  Under  Section  271  of  the  Communications  Act  To  Provide  In-  Region,
 InterLATA  Service  in  the  State  of  New  York,  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  5413  Attach.  (2000)  (  Consent  Decree)
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 notices,  and  order  completion  notices  for  UNE-  P  local  service  orders  deteriorated  following  Bell
 Atlantics  entry  into  the  New  York  long  distance  market.  268  The  investigation  terminated  in  the
 Consent  Decree  between  the  Commission  and  Bell  Atlantic.  The  Consent  Decree  required  Bell
 Atlantic  to  begin  reporting  using  several  new  measures:  percent  missing  notifier  trouble  ticket
 PONs  cleared  within  three  business  days;  percent  order  confirmations/  rejects  sent  within  three
 business  days;  percent  SOP  to  bill  completion  within  three  business  days;  percent  confirmation
 timeliness  --  total  local  service  requests;  and  percent  resubmission  rejection.  269  After  the  parties
 entered  into  the  Consent  Decree,  Bell  Atlantics  performance  improved.  Therefore,  the
 Commission  terminated  the  Consent  Decree.  270
 88.  We  reject  the  assertions  of  WorldCom  and  others  271  that  there  is  a  systemic
 problem  with  notifiers  in  Massachusetts.  272  First,  WorldCom  points  to  KPMGs  findings  that
 Verizon  failed  to  return  two  to  three  percent  of  completion  notifiers.  273  There  is  no  evidence  in
 the  record,  however,  that  KPMGs  findings  involving  this  limited  number  of  notifiers  would  have
 any  competitive  impact.  Second,  WorldCom  asserts  that  KPMGs  test  revealed  problems  with
 late  billing  completion  notifiers,  and  some  billing  completion  notifiers  contained  information  not  in
 accordance  with  Verizons  business  rules.  274  We  are  unable  to  compare  KPMGs  results  against
 the  commercial  data  that  Verizon  provided,  however,  because  KPMG  did  not  explain  adequately
 how  it  measured  the  timeliness  of  completion  notifiers.  275  With  regard  to  the  contents  of  the
 billing  completion  notifiers,  KPMG  found  there  was  sufficient  information  to  permit  it  to  engage
 268  Id.  at  5418,  para.  7.
 269  Id.  at  5425-  26.
 270  See  Letter  from  David  H.  Solomon,  Chief,  Enforcement  Bureau,  Federal  Communications  Commission,  to
 Edward  D.  Young,  III,  Senior  Vice  President-  Regulatory,  Bell  Atlantic  (June  20,  2000).  Specifically,  Bell
 Atlantics  aggregate  performance  under  the  new  measurements  exceeded  95  percent  for  four  consecutive  weeks.
 See  id.
 271  See  ALTS  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  22;  ASCENT  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  10-  11;  OnSite
 Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  8-  9;  Winstar  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  22-  23;  ASCENT  Massachusetts  II
 Comments  at  20.  These  commenters  did  not  support  their  claims  with  specific  evidence.  We  do  not  address  other
 commenters  claims  about  AT&  Ts  experiences  with  Verizons  OSS  as  AT&  T  did  not  raise  these  claims  itself  in
 this  proceeding.  See,  e.  g.,  Winstar  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  22.
 272  We  generally  do  not  examine  commenters  complaints  that  rely  on  data  or  experiences  from  states  other  than
 Massachusetts.  With  specific  regard  to  New  York,  the  proper  vehicle  for  complaints  that  Verizons  performance
 has  deteriorated  is  section  271(  d)(  6),  not  opposition  to  this  application.
 273  See  WorldCom  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  42;  WorldCom  Massachusetts  I  Kwapniewski/  Lichtenberg  Decl.
 at  para.  41;  WorldCom  Massachusetts  I  Kwapniewski/  Lichtenberg  Reply  Decl.  at  para.  5.
 274  See  WorldCom  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  42-  43;  WorldCom  Massachusetts  I  Kinard  Decl.  at  para.  12;
 WorldCom  Massachusetts  I  Kwapniewski/  Lichtenberg  Decl.  at  paras.  40-  44,  54;  WorldCom  Massachusetts  I
 Kwapniewski/  Lichtenberg  Reply  Decl.  at  para.  5.
 275  See  KPMG  Final  Report  at  53-  54.
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 in  its  billing  activities.  276  Finally,  WorldCom  asserts  that  carrier-  to-  carrier  business  rules
 underlying  the  commercial  data  Verizon  provided  are  inadequate  to  reveal  problems  with  late  or
 missing  notifiers.  Specifically,  WorldCom  asserts  that  Verizon  should  have  reported  data  under
 the  measures  developed  in  the  Consent  Decree,  which  capture  how  long  it  takes  Verizon  to  send
 out  billing  completion  notifiers  after  completing  the  relevant  work.  277  In  our  discussion  of
 completion  notifiers  above,  however,  we  explain  that  Verizon  has  begun  reporting  how  long  it
 takes  an  order  to  enter  Verizons  billing  systems  after  the  relevant  provisioning  work  is
 completed.  278  Those  data  show  that  Verizon  updates  its  billing  systems  on  average  in  less  than  a
 day,  and  that  Verizon  takes  more  than  four  days  to  do  so  for  less  than  five  percent  of  orders.  279  In
 combination  with  the  data  that  show  that  Verizon  sends  out  billing  completion  notifiers  on  time
 after  updating  its  billing  systems,  280  these  data  show  that  Verizon  updates  its  billing  systems
 promptly  after  completing  orders,  and  sends  out  billing  completion  notifiers  promptly  after
 updating  its  billing  systems.
 89.  We  also  note  that  the  Massachusetts  Department  has  adopted  new  performance
 measures  in  the  Massachusetts  PAP  to  track  this  area:  percent  missing  notifier  trouble  ticket
 PONs  cleared  within  three  business  days,  percent  resubmission  rejection,  and  percent  SOP  to  bill
 completion  within  three  business  days.  281  These  measures  will  inform  carriers,  the  Massachusetts
 Department,  and  the  Commission  about  Verizons  notifier  performance  going  forward,  and  the
 special  provision  of  the  PAP  will  give  Verizon  a  substantial  disincentive  for  performance  like  that
 that  occurred  in  New  York.  282
 e.  Provisioning
 90.  We  conclude  that  Verizon  provisions  competing  carriers  orders  for  resale  and
 UNE-  P  services  in  substantially  the  same  time  and  manner  as  it  provisions  orders  for  its  own  retail
 customers.  283  Consistent  with  the  Commissions  approach  in  prior  section  271  orders,  we
 276  See  id.  at  60.
 277  See  WorldCom  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  43,  54;  WorldCom  Massachusetts  I  Kinard  Decl.  at  para.  12;
 WorldCom  Massachusetts  I  Kwapniewski/  Lichtenberg  Decl.  at  paras.  42-  43;  WorldCom  Massachusetts  I  Reply  at
 36;  WorldCom  Massachusetts  I  Kwapniewski/  Lichtenberg  Reply  Decl.  paras.  9-  10.
 278  See  supra  Part  IV.  A.  2.  d(  iv).
 279  See  supra  n.  260.
 280  See  supra  n.  259.
 281  See  Verizon  Jan.  30  Ex  Parte  Letter  Attach.  at  16-  17  &  App.  H.  These  additions  resolve  concerns  that  the
 original  PAP  lacked  such  a  provision.  See  ALTS  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  57;  Department  of  Justice
 Massachusetts  I  Evaluation  at  23  n.  77;  WorldCom  Massachusetts  I  Kinard  Decl.  at  para.  12.
 282  As  in  the  New  York  situation,  we  are  prepared  to  take  appropriate  enforcement  action  under  section  271(  d)(  6)
 if  we  find  evidence  of  a  systemic  and  widespread  failure  of  Verizon  to  deliver  ordering  notifiers  reliably  and  on
 time.  See  infra  Part  IX.
 283  We  discuss  loop  provisioning  below.  See  infra  Part  IV.  B.
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 examine  the  procedures  Verizon  follows  when  provisioning  competitors  orders,  its  performance
 with  respect  to  provisioning  timeliness  and  its  provisioning  quality.  284  Based  on  the  results  of
 KPMGs  Massachusetts  testing  and  Verizons  performance  data,  we  find  that  Verizon
 demonstrates  that  it  provides  nondiscriminatory  access  to  its  provisioning  processes.  KPMGs
 test  of  Verizons  Massachusetts  OSS  demonstrates  that  Verizon  makes  available  in  Massachusetts
 the  same  set  of  standard  intervals  and  SMARTS  clock  intervals  285  for  both  competing  carriers  and
 its  retail  personnel.  286  KPMGs  test  also  demonstrates  that,  in  its  provisioning  systems,  methods
 and  processes,  Verizon  provides  parity  between  competitors  orders  and  its  retail  orders.  287  As
 discussed  below,  Verizons  performance  data  for  resale  services  and  UNE-  P  demonstrate  that
 Verizon  provides  parity  in  provisioning  competitors  orders  as  compared  to  its  retail  orders.
 (i)  Resale  Orders
 91.  We  conclude  that  Verizon  provisions  orders  for  resale  POTS  and  specials  to
 competitors  in  substantially  the  same  time  that  it  provisions  equivalent  orders  to  itself.  288  As  in
 previous  section  271  orders,  we  review  Verizons  performance  data  to  determine  whether  it
 provisions  resale  service  at  parity  with  its  analogous  retail  services.  289  For  this  application  we
 284  See  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  4058,  para.  196.  For  provisioning  timeliness,  we  look  to
 missed  due  dates  and  average  installation  intervals  and  for  provisioning  quality,  we  look  to  service  problems
 experienced  at  the  provisioning  stage.
 285  Verizon  offers  provisioning  intervals  either  based  on  standard  product-  specific  intervals  or  based  on  its
 SMARTS  Clock  system  where  no  specific  interval  is  set,  which  assigns  available  appointment  dates  for  orders
 requiring  dispatch.  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Guerard/  Canny  Decl.  at  para.  61.  See  also  Bell  Atlantic  New
 York  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  4058,  para.  197  and  n.  629  &  631.
 286  See  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  157-  59  (citing  KPMG  Final  Report  at  58,  63,
 105,  108  (Tests  POP-  1-  6-  4,  POP-  1-  9-  4,  POP-  2-  6-  4,  POP-  2-  8-  4)).  Although  KPMG  reported  findings  of  Not
 Satisfied  for  its  test  of  Verizons  offered  due  dates  over  the  LSOG-  4  EDI  interface,  these  findings  were  associated
 with  Verizons  systems  incorrectly  giving  competitive  LECs  different  due  dates  for  ISDN  orders  than  were  given  to
 Verizons  retail  customers.  See  KPMG  Final  Report  at  63,  108  (Tests  POP-  1-  9-  4,  Tests  POP-  2-  8-  4);  see  also
 KPMG  Final  Report  at  Exception  Report  #16.  Subsequent  to  the  conclusion  of  KPMGs  testing,  the  Massachusetts
 Department  oversaw  Verizons  implementation  of  system  fixes  to  correct  these  problems,  and  continues  to  monitor
 Verizons  ISDN  performance  to  ensure  that  this  issue  has  been  resolved.  See  Massachusetts  Department
 Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  159;  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Application  App.  B,  Tab  545  at  3077-  3079  (transcript
 of  technical  session  held  August  28,  2000).
 287  See  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  159-  160  (citing  KPMG  Final  Report  at  195-
 204).  KPMG  concluded  that  Verizon  satisfied  every  test  element  in  its  evaluation  of  parity  in  Verizons
 provisioning  processes.  KPMG  found  that,  in  most  cases,  there  is  no  distinction  between  the  systems,  methods,  or
 execution  of  processes  between  wholesale  and  retail  orders.  Where  parts  of  the  retail  and  wholesale  order
 provisioning  processes  are  handled  by  different  organizations  within  Verizon,  the  same  processes  are  followed  for
 both  competitors  orders  and  Verizons  retail  orders.  See  id.
 288  Verizons  resale  specials  include  orders  for  resold  DS-  0,  DS-  1,  and  DS-  3  services.  See  Verizon
 Massachusetts  I  Guerard/  Canny  Decl.  at  para.  64.  Resale  POTS  service  is  resold  voice  telephone  service.
 289  See  SWBT  Texas  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  18452,  para.  194.
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 Federal  Communications  Commission  FCC  01-  130
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 review  performance  data  measuring  how  Verizon  performs  in  meeting  competitors  due  dates  for
 service  installation  as  a  reliable  indicator  of  whether  Verizon  is  providing  nondiscriminatory
 service.  The  data  indicate  that  Verizon  satisfied  parity  standards  for  meeting  competitors  resale
 POTS  and  specials  due  dates  from  September  through  December  2000  in  Massachusetts,  with  a
 few  limited  exceptions.  290  We  find  that  the  limited  exceptions  to  Verizons  satisfactory
 performance  are  not  competitively  significant.  291
 92.  We  also  examine  performance  data  measuring  average  completed  intervals  for
 competing  carriers  resale  orders,  but  find  that  these  data  are  not  an  accurate  indicator  of
 Verizons  performance  in  provisioning  these  orders.  As  it  did  for  its  section  271  application  in
 New  York,  Verizon  offers  unrebutted  evidence  that  the  disparity  in  the  performance  data  between
 average  completed  intervals  for  competing  carriers  resale  orders  and  Verizons  retail  orders  in
 Massachusetts  is  substantially  caused  by  several  factors  outside  of  Verizons  control.  292
 290  See  Metric  PR  4  (resale  missed  appointments).  The  performance  data  for  the  PR  4  series  of  metrics  generally
 show  no  statistically  significant  disparities  in  Verizons  performance  in  meeting  competitors  due  dates  for  resale
 POTS  provisioning.
 291  Two  PR  4  submetrics,  PR  4-  02  (average  delay  days-  total)  and  PR  4-  05  (missed  non-  dispatch  due  dates),
 indicate  some  statistically  significant  disparities  in  Verizons  performance  in  meeting  competitors  due  dates  for
 resale  POTS  provisioning  in  September  and  October  2000.  In  September  2000,  competitors  experienced  an
 average  of  9.  05  provisioning  delay  days  for  resale  POTS,  as  compared  to  4.  64  delay  days  for  Verizon  retail
 customers,  and  in  October  competitors  experienced  an  average  of  5.  84  provisioning  delay  days  for  resale  POTS,  as
 compared  to  3.64  delay  days  for  Verizon  retail  customers  (PR  4-  02).  Also,  in  September,  Verizon  missed  0.20
 percent  of  competitors  non-  dispatch  due  dates  for  resale  POTS  as  compared  to  0.  11  percent  of  non-  dispatch  due
 dates  for  its  retail  customers,  and  in  October  Verizon  missed  0.  12  percent  of  competitors  non-  dispatch  due  dates
 for  resale  POTS  as  compared  to  0.  04  percent  of  non-  dispatch  due  dates  for  its  retail  customers,  differences  of  0.  09
 and  0.08  percent  in  September  and  October  respectively  (PR  4-  05).  We  conclude  that  these  disparities  alone  do  not
 warrant  a  finding  of  noncompliance.  Our  finding  is  underscored  by  the  lack  of  statistically  significant  disparities
 in  performance  under  these  metrics  in  November  and  December  2000.  See  id.  Because  of  Verizons  satisfactory
 performance  during  this  latest  two  month  period,  we  conclude  that  Verizons  previous  performance  does  not
 warrant  a  finding  of  noncompliance.  Furthermore,  although  Verizons  performance  under  PR  4-  02  (average  delay
 days-  total)  for  resale  specials  seems  to  show  a  disparity  between  retail  and  wholesale  performance  in  December
 2000  (29.67  competitor  delay  days  versus  12.10  for  Verizon),  we  conclude  that  these  data  alone  fail  to  show  a  lack
 of  parity  in  Verizons  treatment  of  competitors  resale  specials  orders,  due  to  the  fact  that  only  three  competing
 carrier  observations  were  used  to  calculate  these  data.  See  Metric  PR  4-  02  (average  delay  days-  total  for  resale
 specials,  listing  3  competing  carrier  observations).
 292  In  the  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  the  Commission  concluded  that  the  disparity  between  average  completed
 intervals  for  competing  carriers  and  Bell  Atlantic  was  substantially  caused  by  several  factors  outside  of  Bell
 Atlantics  control,  including  competing  carriers  choosing  longer  installation  dates  without  proper  date-  coding  (the
 W-  coding  problem)  and  ordering  products  and  services  with  long  standard  intervals  (the  order  mix  problem).
 See  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  4061-  62,  para.  203.  Verizon  offers  evidence  here  demonstrating
 that,  under  the  LSOG  2  interface,  competing  carriers  can  and  do  choose  longer  than  standard  installation  dates  for
 resale  services  without  proper  date-  coding,  and  are  ordering  a  relatively  larger  share  of  products  and  services  with
 longer  standard  intervals  than  Verizon.  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Guerard/  Canny  Decl.  at  paras.  66-  77.  Based
 on  this  unrebutted  evidence,  we  conclude  that  the  disparity  in  Massachusetts  between  average  completion  intervals
 for  competing  carriers  resale  orders  and  Verizons  retail  orders  is  caused  by  factors  outside  of  Verizons  control,
 and  renders  its  performance  data  on  resale  average  completed  intervals  unreliable.  We  note  for  future  applications,
 however,  that  Verizons  LSOG  4  ordering  interface  corrects  the  problem  of  incorrect  installation  date  coding  (the
 (continued.)
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 Therefore,  consistent  with  the  Commissions  findings  in  the  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  we
 accord  little  weight  here  to  performance  data  evidencing  the  average  intervals  in  which  Verizon
 completes  resale  orders  in  Massachusetts.  293  Instead,  as  discussed  above,  we  rely  on  the
 performance  data  measuring  Verizons  performance  in  meeting  competitors  due  dates  for  resale
 service  installation.  294
 93.  Verizon  also  demonstrates  that  the  quality  of  resale  installations  provided  to
 competitors  customers  is  generally  the  same  as,  or  better  than,  similar  work  performed  for  its
 own  retail  customers.  The  data  demonstrate  that  Verizon  generally  receives  trouble  reports  from
 competitors  resale  customers  at  the  same  rate  as  from  its  own  retail  customers,  and  in  some  cases
 demonstrate  that  Verizon  receives  trouble  reports  from  competitors  customers  at  a  lower  rate.  295
 We  find  that  the  limited  exceptions  to  Verizons  parity  performance  are  not  competitively
 significant.  296
 (Continued  from  previous  page)
 W-  coding  problem).  We  therefore  expect  that,  over  time,  competing  carriers  selection  of  longer  installation
 dates  should  have  a  diminished  effect  on  the  reliability  of  performance  data  for  average  completed  intervals.  See
 Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Guerard/  Canny  Decl.  at  para.  76.
 293  See  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  4061-  66,  paras.  202-  10.
 294  See  supra  at  para.  91.
 295  See  Metric  PR  6  (installation  quality  for  resale  services).  From  September  2000  through  December  2000,
 Verizons  performance  data  under  the  PR  6  series  of  metrics  generally  show  no  statistically  significant  disparities
 in  installation  quality  for  competitors  offering  resale  services  as  compared  to  Verizons  retail  service.
 296  Three  PR  6  submetrics  measuring  installation  quality  for  resale  services  show  some  statistically  significant
 disparities  between  Verizons  provisioning  performance  for  itself  and  for  competitors  in  September  and  December
 2000.  In  September  2000,  the  percentage  of  installation  troubles  reported  within  30  days  for  2-  wire  xDSL  services
 (PR  6-  01)  was  6.90  percent  for  competing  carriers  versus  1.93  percent  for  VADI,  a  difference  of  4.97  percent;
 these  data,  however,  were  based  on  29  competing  carrier  orders.  Due  to  the  low  volume  of  competitors  orders,  a
 handful  of  trouble  reports  can  cause  seemingly  large  variations  in  the  monthly  trouble  reports.  See,  e.  g.,  Letter
 from  Dee  May,  Executive  Director  Federal  Regulatory,  Verizon,  to  Magalie  Roman  Salas,  Secretary,  Federal
 Communications  Commission,  CC  Docket  No.  01-  9  (filed  March  13,  2001)  (Verizon  March  13  Ex  Parte  Letter).
 A  4  month  average  of  Verizons  data  for  resold  2-  wire  xDSL  under  the  PR  6-  01  submetric  from  September  through
 December  2000  reduces  the  disparity  to  1.10  percent,  which  is  not  competitively  significant.  In  December  2000,
 the  percentage  of  installation  troubles  reported  within  30  days  for  2-  wire  digital  services  (not  including  xDSL
 services)  where  no  trouble  was  found  on  the  network  (PR  6-  03)  was  4.74  percent  for  competing  carriers  versus  2.06
 percent  for  VADI;  the  overall  trouble  report  rate  within  30  days  (PR  6-  01)  for  the  same  services  in  that  month,
 however,  was  much  lower  for  competing  carriers  (0.43)  than  for  VADI  (1.24).  Finally,  also  in  December  2000,  the
 percentage  of  installation  troubles  reported  within  30  days  (PR  6-  01)  for  resold  special  services  was  0.71  percent
 for  competing  carriers  versus  0.  47  for  Verizon;  the  difference  between  the  two  numbers,  however,  amounts  to  0.  24
 percent,  and  no  commenter  has  complained  about  Verizons  performance  under  this  measure.  We  conclude  that
 these  disparities  alone  are  not  competitively  significant,  and  do  not  warrant  a  finding  of  noncompliance  in
 Verizons  provision  of  resale  services  to  competitors.  Verizons  performance  under  the  PR  6  metrics  for  digital
 services,  i.  e.,  resale  xDSL,  is  also  relevant  to  our  review  of  its  compliance  with  its  resale  obligations  under
 checklist  item  14.  See  infra  Part  V.  E.
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 (ii)  UNE-  P  Orders
 94.  Based  on  a  review  of  performance  data  for  UNE-  P  service,  we  conclude  that
 Verizon  provisions  competing  carrier  orders  for  these  network  combinations  in  the  same  time  as  it
 provisions  equivalent  retail  services  and  at  the  same  level  of  quality  (i.  e.,  with  a  comparably  low
 level  of  troubles  reported  within  the  first  ten  days  after  installation).  Verizons  performance  data
 demonstrate  that,  from  September  through  December  2000  in  Massachusetts,  Verizon
 provisioned  UNE-  P  orders  in  substantially  the  same  time  that  it  provisioned  similar  orders  for
 itself.  297  Verizons  data  also  indicate  that,  over  this  time  period,  it  provisioned  UNE-  P  orders  in
 substantially  the  same  manner  (i.  e.,  quality)  as  it  provisioned  comparable  retail  orders  for  itself  in
 Massachusetts.  298  While  there  are  disparities  with  respect  to  some  measurements  of  UNE-  P
 provisioning  performance,  these  disparities  do  not  appear  to  be  competitively  significant.  299  Taken
 as  a  whole,  we  find  this  performance  to  be  acceptable.
 f.  Maintenance  and  Repair
 95.  Functionality.  We  conclude  that  Verizon  offers  maintenance  and  repair  interfaces
 and  systems  that  enable  a  requesting  carrier  to  access  all  the  same  functions  that  are  available  to
 297  See  Metrics  PR  2-  01,  PR  2-  03,  PR  2-  04,  and  PR  2-  05  (average  interval  completed  for  platform  orders),  and
 Metrics  PR  4-  04  and  PR  4-  05  (missed  appointments  for  platform  orders).
 298  Verizons  performance  data  demonstrate  that,  from  September  2000  through  December  2000,  competitors
 consistently  reported  a  lower  percentage  of  installation  troubles  within  the  first  30  days  of  installation  of  UNE-  P
 than  Verizons  retail  POTS  customers.  See  Metric  PR  6-  01  (for  POTS    Provisioning    Other).  In  a  letter,
 Verizon  explains  that  this  measure  captures  only  UNE-  P  orders.  See  Verizon  March  13  Ex  Parte  Letter.
 299  Two  provisioning  submetrics  show  some  statistically  significant  disparities  in  Verizons  provisioning
 performance  with  respect  to  UNE-  P  dispatch  (Metric  PR  4-  04)  and  UNE-  P  non-  dispatch  (Metric  PR  2-  01)  orders.
 For  the  reasons  discussed  here,  we  find  these  disparities  do  not  warrant  a  finding  of  noncompliance.  Verizon
 missed  a  higher  percentage  of  competitors  due  dates  for  UNE-  P  dispatch  orders  than  for  its  own  retail  POTS
 service  in  September  and  October  2000  (19.05  versus  8.70  percent  and  15.28  versus  7.83  percent,  respectively)
 (Metric  PR  4-  04  for  platform  dispatch  orders).  These  data,  however,  are  based  on  low  competitor  order  volumes
 (42  UNE-  P  dispatch  orders  in  September  and  72  in  October).  Due  to  the  low  volume  of  competitors  orders,  a
 handful  of  missed  due  dates  can  cause  seemingly  large  variations  in  the  monthly  trouble  reports.  See,  e.  g.,  Verizon
 March  13  Ex  Parte  Letter.  While  these  September  and  October  2000  data  respectively  show  disparities  of  10.35
 and  7.  45  percent  between  the  rate  Verizon  misses  POTS  dispatch  provisioning  due  dates  for  itself  as  compared  to
 UNE-  P  competitors,  a  4  month  average  of  Verizons  data  from  September  through  December  2000  reduces  that
 disparity  to  4.  35  percent.  Furthermore,  Verizons  November  and  December  2000  performance  data  do  not  show
 any  statistically  significant  disparities  under  this  submetric,  and  the  data  show  a  clear  downward  trend  towards
 parity  from  September  through  December.  See  Metric  PR  4-  04  (missed  due  dates  for  platform  dispatch  order).
 With  respect  to  non-  dispatch  UNE-  P  orders,  although  Verizons  October  2000  performance  data  show  a  disparity
 between  the  intervals  in  which  competitors  UNE-  P  orders  are  completed  as  compared  to  Verizons  retail  POTS
 orders  (1.77  days  vs.  1.26  days)  (Metric  PR  2-  01),  Verizons  other  average  completed  interval  measures  for  UNE-  P
 show  no  statistically  significant  disparities  in  that  month,  nor  do  any  of  its  average  completed  interval  measures  for
 UNE-  P  in  November  and  December  2000.  Furthermore,  the  performance  data  show  that  Verizon  consistently
 misses  a  lower  percentage  of  competitors  due  dates  for  UNE-  P  non-  dispatch  orders  than  for  its  own  retail  POTS
 service  (Metric  PR  4-  05).  See  Metrics  PR  2-  01,  PR  2-  03,  PR  2-  04,  and  PR  2-  05  (average  interval  completed  for
 platform  orders),  and  PR  4-  04  and  PR  4-  05  (missed  appointments  for  platform  orders).
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 Federal  Communications  Commission  FCC  01-  130
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 Verizons  retail  representatives.  Verizon  provides  competing  carriers  with  several  options  for
 requesting  maintenance  and  reporting  troubles.  Competing  carriers  may  electronically  access
 Verizons  maintenance  and  repair  functions  for  UNE-  Loop,  UNE-  P,  and  resale  through  the  GUI
 Repair  Trouble  Administration  System  (RETAS)  interface  or  the  application-  to-  application
 Electronic  Bonding  Interface  (EBI).  300  Both  the  RETAS  and  EBI  interfaces  flow  directly  into
 Verizons  back-  end  OSS  and  enable  competing  carriers  to  perform  the  same  functions,  in  the
 same  manner,  as  Verizons  retail  operations.  301  Although  the  EBI  interface  does  not  support
 every  maintenance  and  repair  function  supported  by  RETAS,  302  the  Commission  has  not  in  the
 past  required  applicants  to  provide  an  integratable,  application-  to-  application  interface  for
 maintenance  and  repair.  303  Furthermore,  Verizons  performance  data  indicate  that  its  RETAS
 maintenance  and  repair  interface  is  available  in  a  manner  that  affords  an  efficient  competitor  a
 meaningful  opportunity  to  compete.  304  KPMGs  functional  testing  of  Verizons  RETAS
 maintenance  and  repair  interface  confirms  the  satisfactory  performance  demonstrated  by
 Verizons  performance  data.  305  Based  on  the  evidence  before  us,  we  conclude  that  Verizon
 satisfies  its  obligation  of  providing  maintenance  and  repair  functionality  to  competitors  in
 substantially  the  same  manner  that  it  provides  such  functionality  to  itself.  Finally,  we  note  that  no
 300  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  McLean/  Wierzbicki  Decl.  at  paras.  82-  84.
 301  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  McLean/  Wierzbicki  Decl.  at  paras.  83-  91.  The  RETAS  interface  enables  carriers
 to  perform  the  same  maintenance  and  repair  functions  as  Verizons  retail  operations,  including:  (1)  testing  resale
 POTS  and  UNE-  P  lines,  as  well  as  special  service  lines  at  DS-  0  and  lower;  (2)  creating  trouble  tickets;  (3)
 obtaining  trouble  status;  (4)  modifying  trouble  tickets;  (5)  canceling  trouble  tickets;  (6)  requesting  trouble  report
 histories;  and  (7)  trouble  ticket  service  recovery.  Although  it  supports  all  other  maintenance  and  repair  functions
 for  UNE  loops,  the  RETAS  interface  does  not  support  testing  of  UNE  loops,  because  these  loops  are  not  connected
 to  a  Verizon  switch.  Instead,  competing  carriers  must  test  UNE  loops  through  their  own  switches.  See  id.  at  para.
 83.
 302  Verizons  EBI  interface  offers  similar  functionality  to  the  RETAS  interface,  with  the  exceptions  of:  (1)
 automatic  feature  updates  to  switches  through  Verizons  StarMem  system  for  features  ordered  by  customers  but  not
 yet  active;  and  (2)  testing  special  service  lines.  Verizon  indicates  that  it  has  implemented  EBI  in  Massachusetts  to
 support  local  services  and  local  service  circuits  consistent  with  industry  standards,  where  they  exist.  See  id.  at
 paras.  83-  84  and  Attach.  O.
 303  See  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  4069,  para.  215.
 304  See  Metrics  PO  2-  01,  PO  2-  02,  and  PO  2-  03  (OSS  availability  for  Maint.  Web  GUI  (RETAS)).  Verizons
 performance  data  show  that  its  RETAS  interface  was  generally  available  during  more  than  99.  5  percent  of
 scheduled  hours  of  availability  from  September  through  December  2000;  although  non-  prime  time  RETAS
 availability  was  99.  25  percent  in  December,  we  do  not  find  this  deviation  from  the  benchmark  to  be  competitively
 significant.
 305  KPMG  found  that  Verizon  satisfied  every  test  element  of  its  functional  evaluation  of  Verizons  maintenance
 and  repair  functions.  See  KPMG  Final  Report  at  247-  59.  KPMGs  functional  test  evaluated  RETAS  both  for  its
 conformance  with  Verizon  documentation  and  for  its  comparative  functionality  to  Verizons  retail  trouble
 administration  systems.  See  id.  at  239.  For  its  functional  evaluation  of  the  RETAS  interface,  KPMG  evaluated  the
 following  functions:  (1)  mechanized  loop  test;  (2)  switched  access  remote  test;  (3)  create  trouble  ticket;  (4)  modify
 trouble  ticket;  (5)  obtain  trouble  ticket  status;  (6)  close  trouble  ticket;  (7)  perform  service  recovery;  (8)  request
 trouble  ticket  history;  and  (9)  request  extended  trouble  ticket  history.  See  KPMG  Final  Report  at  246.
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 Federal  Communications  Commission  FCC  01-  130
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 commenter  has  provided  evidence  to  suggest  that  Verizons  systems  and  processes  are  inadequate
 in  this  area.
 96.  Interface  Response  Times,  Time  to  Restore  and  Quality  of  Work  Performed.  We
 conclude  that  Verizon  has  demonstrated  that  it  provides  nondiscriminatory  access  to  its
 maintenance  and  repair  systems  and  processes.  In  previous  section  271  applications,  the
 Commission  reviewed  performance  data  reflecting  the  timeliness  of  the  BOCs  interfaces  used  for
 maintenance  and  repair  functions,  the  timeliness  of  its  repair  work,  and  the  quality  of  the  repair
 work.  Verizons  performance  data  indicate  satisfactory  performance  in  each  of  these  areas.  The
 performance  data  show  that  Verizons  maintenance  and  repair  interfaces  and  systems  process
 trouble  inquiries  from  competing  carriers  in  substantially  the  same,  if  not  less,  time  as  Verizon
 processes  inquiries  concerning  its  own  retail  customers.  306  The  data  also  show  that  Verizon
 repairs  troubles  for  competing  LECs  customers  in  substantially  the  same  time  as  it  repairs  its  own
 retail  customers  troubles,  307  and  meets  substantially  the  same  percentage  of  repair  commitments
 for  troubles  on  competing  carriers  lines  as  it  does  for  comparable  retail  repair  commitments.  308
 Finally,  the  data  reveal  that  competing  carriers  customers  that  receive  service  via  resale  or  UNE-P
 generally  reported  the  same  rate  of  trouble  reports,  309  and  the  same  rate  of  repeat  trouble
 306  See  Metric  MR  1  (maintenance  OSS  response  times).  The  MR  1  series  of  metrics  measures  Verizons
 response  times  in  allowing  competitors  to  create  trouble  tickets,  obtain  trouble  ticket  status  reports,  modify  trouble
 tickets,  cancel  trouble  tickets,  obtain  trouble  report  histories,  and  test  POTS  lines.  From  September  through
 December  2000,  Verizon  performed  these  functions  for  competitors  within  the  benchmark  response  times,  and  in
 most  cases  provided  competitors  with  faster  service  than  it  provided  to  itself.
 307  See  Metric  MR  4  (trouble  durations  for  resale  and  UNE-  P).  The  performance  data  for  the  MR  4  series  of
 metrics  show  no  statistically  significant  disparities  in  trouble  durations  experienced  by  competitors  providing
 resold  services  or  UNE-  P  as  compared  to  Verizons  retail  services,  with  the  exception  of  one  submetric  for  resale
 special  lines  in  November  2000.  To  the  contrary,  these  data  for  the  most  part  indicate  that  Verizon  is  repairing
 troubles  for  competitors  within  shorter  time  frames  than  for  its  retail  customers.  In  November  2000,  however,
 67.  74  percent  of  resold  special  service  lines  experiencing  troubles  were  out  of  service  for  longer  than  4  hours,  as
 compared  to  55.66  percent  of  Verizons  retail  special  service  lines  (MR  4-  06  for  resale  special  service  lines).
 These  data,  however,  were  based  on  a  volume  of  82  trouble  reports  by  competitors.  Due  to  the  low  volume  of
 competitors  trouble  reports,  a  handful  of  troubles  can  cause  seemingly  large  variations  in  the  monthly  performance
 data.  See,  e.  g.,  Verizon  March  13  Ex  Parte  Letter.  We  note  that,  while  the  November  2000  resale  specials  data
 for  this  submetric  shows  a  disparity  of  12.  08  percent,  a  4  month  average  of  Verizons  data  from  September  through
 December  2000  reduces  the  disparity  under  this  submetric  to  8.22  percent  (62.26  percent  for  Verizon  versus  70.48
 percent  for  competitors).  We  are  encouraged  by  Verizons  improved  performance  under  this  measure  in  December
 2000,  which  does  not  reflect  any  statistically  significant  disparity  between  Verizons  performance  for  itself  as
 compared  to  competitors.  We  do  not  find  that  the  disparity  in  November  2000  under  this  one  submetric  warrants
 a  finding  of  checklist  noncompliance.
 308  See  Metric  MR  3  (missed  repair  appointments  for  resale  and  UNE-  P).  From  September  through  December
 2000,  Verizon  exhibited  no  statistically  significant  disparities  in  the  percentage  of  maintenance  and  repair
 appointments  it  missed  for  competitors  providing  resale  services  or  UNE-  P  as  compared  to  its  own  retail  services.
 309  See  Metric  MR  2  (trouble  report  rate  for  resale  and  UNE-  P).  In  some  instances,  the  performance  data  for  the
 MR  2  series  of  metrics  for  resale  and  UNE-  P  show  statistically  significant  disparities  in  the  rate  at  which  network
 troubles  are  reported  by  competitors  as  compared  to  Verizons  retail  customers.  These  disparities,  however,  are
 very  small.  In  September  2000,  the  trouble  report  rate  for  central  office  network  troubles  (MR  2-  03)  for
 (continued.)
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 Federal  Communications  Commission  FCC  01-  130
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 reports,  310  as  Verizons  retail  customers.  KPMGs  testing  of  Verizons  maintenance  and  repair
 performance  for  competitors  confirms  the  satisfactory  performance  evidenced  by  Verizons
 performance  data.  311  Finally,  we  note  that  no  commenter  has  provided  evidence  to  suggest  that
 Verizons  systems  and  processes  are  inadequate  in  this  area.
 g.  Billing
 97.  We  agree  with  the  Massachusetts  Department  that  Verizon  provides
 nondiscriminatory  access  to  its  billing  functions.  312  As  the  Commission  has  required  in  prior
 (Continued  from  previous  page)
 competitors  providing  UNE-  P  services  was  0.  24  percent,  as  compared  to  0.  12  percent  for  Verizons  retail
 customers,  a  difference  of  0.12  percent.  In  October  2000,  the  trouble  report  rate  for  network  troubles  (MR  2-  01)
 for  competitors  providing  resold  special  services  was  0.  38  percent,  as  compared  to  0.  28  percent  for  Verizons  retail
 customers,  a  difference  of  0.  10  percent.  In  the  same  month,  the  trouble  report  rate  for  central  office  network
 troubles  (MR  2-  03)  for  competitors  providing  UNE-  P  services  was  0.52  percent,  as  compared  to  0.09  percent  for
 Verizons  retail  customers,  a  difference  of  0.43  percent.  In  November  2000,  the  trouble  report  rate  for  central
 office  network  troubles  (MR  2-  03)  for  competitors  providing  UNE-  P  services  was  0.15  percent,  as  compared  to
 0.  08  percent  for  Verizons  retail  customers,  a  difference  of  0.  07  percent.  In  December  2000,  the  network  trouble
 report  rate  (MR  2-  01)  for  competitors  providing  resale  special  services  was  0.35  percent,  as  compared  to  0.23
 percent  for  Verizons  retail  customers,  a  difference  of  0.  12  percent.  In  the  same  month,  the  trouble  report  rate  for
 central  office  network  troubles  (MR  2-  03)  for  competitors  providing  UNE-  P  services  was  0.35  percent,  as
 compared  to  0.  08  percent  for  Verizons  retail  customers.  Because  these  disparities  are  so  small,  the  performance
 differential  does  not  appear  to  be  competitively  significant  and  does  not  warrant  a  finding  that  Verizon  fails  to
 provide  nondiscriminatory  access  to  maintenance  and  repair  OSS  functions.
 310  See  Metric  MR  5  (repeat  trouble  report  rate  for  resale  and  UNE-  P).  Verizons  performance  data  from
 September  through  December  2000  for  the  most  part  indicate  no  statistically  significant  disparities  in  the
 percentage  of  repeat  trouble  reports  made  by  competitors  providing  resale  services  or  UNE-  P  as  compared  to
 Verizons  retail  customers.  In  many  instances,  the  data  show  that  competitors  report  a  smaller  percentage  of
 repeat  troubles  for  these  services  than  Verizons  retail  customers.  In  December  2000,  however,  the  percentage  of
 repeat  troubles  within  30  days  (MR  5-  01)  reported  by  competitors  providing  resold  special  services  was  28.28
 percent,  as  compared  to  19.  72  percent  for  Verizons  retail  customers.  Due  to  the  low  volumes  of  competitor  orders
 recorded  under  this  metric,  a  handful  of  trouble  reports  can  cause  seemingly  large  variations  in  the  monthly  trouble
 reports.  See  Verizon  March  13  Ex  Parte  Letter.  We  also  note  that,  while  the  December  2000  resale  specials  data
 for  MR  5-  01  shows  a  disparity  of  8.56  percent,  the  disparity  shown  by  a  4  month  average  of  Verizons  data  from
 September  through  December  2000  is  only  1.85  percent,  which  is  not  competitively  significant.  We  do  not  find,
 based  solely  on  one  months  performance  measuring  a  low  volume  of  orders,  that  Verizon  fails  to  provide
 nondiscriminatory  access  to  maintenance  and  repair  OSS  functions.  See  Metric  MR  5-  01  (repeat  trouble  reports
 within  30  days  for  resale  specials,  listing  99  competitor  observations  in  December).
 311  KPMG  found  that  Verizon  satisfied  every  test  element  of  its  performance  (volume)  evaluation  of  Verizons
 maintenance  and  repair  functions.  See  KPMG  Final  Report  at  278-  84.  KPMGs  volume  test  evaluated  the
 performance  of  the  RETAS  interface  under  normal  load  (projected  September  and  December  2000  normal  hour
 loads),  peak  hour  load  (150  percent  of  normal  load)  and  stress  load  (240  percent  of  normal  load)  conditions,
 examining  the  performance  of  the  RETAS  interface  for  statistically  significant  degradation  under  these  conditions.
 See  KPMG  Final  Report  at  270  (Table  2-  4)  and  278-  84.  For  its  volume  testing  of  the  RETAS  interface,  KPMG
 evaluated  Verizons  ability  to  perform  all  nine  functions  tested  in  its  functional  evaluation.  See  KPMG  Final
 Report  at  261  and  supra  at  n.  305.
 312  See  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  195-  96.
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 section  271  orders,  a  BOC  must  provide  competing  carriers  with  complete  and  accurate  reports
 on  the  service  usage  of  competing  carriers  customers  in  substantially  the  same  time  and  manner
 that  it  provides  such  information  to  itself,  and  wholesale  bills  in  a  manner  that  gives  competing
 carriers  a  meaningful  opportunity  to  compete.  313  Verizon  provides  competing  carriers  with  billing
 information  through  Daily  Usage  Files  (DUFs),  which  itemize  the  daily  usage  of  competing  carrier
 customers,  and  through  carrier  bills,  which  are  monthly  invoices  incorporating  charges  for  all
 products  and  services  Verizon  provides  to  a  competing  carrier.  314  These  are  the  same  mechanisms
 that  Verizon  uses  to  provide  billing  information  to  its  retail  operations.  315
 98.  The  performance  data  demonstrate  Verizons  ability  to  provide  competing  carriers
 with  DUFs  in  substantially  the  same  time  and  manner  that  Verizon  provides  such  information  to
 itself,  and  carrier  bills  in  a  manner  that  gives  competing  carriers  a  meaningful  opportunity  to
 compete.  Verizon  met  or  came  close  to  meeting  the  Massachusetts  Departments  benchmarks  for
 timeliness  in  sending  out  DUFs  and  carrier  bills,  and  for  bill  accuracy.  316  The  exception  was  not
 competitively  significant.  KPMG  found  Verizons  billing  system  to  be  accurate  and  reliable.  317
 Although  KPMG  initially  opened  a  few  billing  related  exceptions  on  bills  for  UNE  products,  it
 closed  those  exceptions  after  Verizon  implemented  fixes,  including  changes  to  software  and
 handbooks.  We  find  that  these  fixes  resolved  KPMGs  concerns  and  that  Verizons  billing  OSS
 provide  competing  carriers  a  meaningful  opportunity  to  compete.
 99.  We  reject  WorldComs  and  Winstars  complaints  over  observations  and  exceptions
 in  the  KPMG  test  because,  as  the  Massachusetts  Department  confirmed,  they  were  successfully
 closed  after  retesting  or  evaluation  and  confirmation  of  Verizons  explanations.  318  ASCENT
 313  See  SWBT  Kansas/  Oklahoma  Order  at  para.  163.
 314  See  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  4075,  para.  226.
 315  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Application  at  52;  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  McLean/  Wierzbicki  Decl.  at  para.
 92.
 316  The  Massachusetts  Department  has  established  a  benchmark  of  sending  out  95  percent  of  DUFs  in  four
 business  days,  and  98  percent  of  carrier  bills  in  ten  business  days.  In  September  through  December,  Verizon
 consistently  met  the  benchmark  for  timeliness  in  sending  out  DUFs,  see  BI  1-  02  (percent  DUF  in  4  business  days)
 and  achieved  billing  accuracy  close  to  or  surpassing  parity,  see  BI  3-  01  (percent  Billing  Adjustments-  Dollars
 Adjusted);  BI  3-  02  (Percent  Billing  Adjustments-  Number  of  Adjustments).  Verizon  also  met  the  benchmark  for
 timeliness  in  sending  out  wholesale  bills  except  in  November,  when  Verizon  sent  out  only  94  percent  of  carrier
 bills  on  time.  By  December  that  figure  was  back  up  to  100  percent.  See  BI  2-  01  (Timeliness  of  Carrier  Bill).
 317  See  KPMG  Final  Report  at  450-  82  (Tests  BLG-  5  and  -6).  We  also  find  that  Verizons  billing  OSS  is
 sufficiently  scalable  to  accommodate  reasonably  foreseeable  commercial  demand.  We  base  this  finding  on
 Verizons  continued  good  performance  in  the  face  of  higher  order  volumes,  see  supra  n.  253,  and  on  KPMGs
 conclusion  that  Verizons  billing  systems  are  designed  in  a  manner  that  would  allow  them  to  scale  to  meet
 increases  in  demand,  KPMG  Final  Report  at  494  (Test  BLG-  7-  1-  14).
 318  See  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  I  Reply  at  43;  WorldCom  Massachusetts  I
 Kwapniewski/  Lichtenberg  Decl.  at  paras.  172-  73;  Winstar  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  26;  Verizon
 Massachusetts  I  Application  App.  I,  Tab  2  at  Exceptions  6,  11.  We  do  not  generally  address  carriers  claims
 (continued.)
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 argues  that  its  members  frequently  complain  about  inaccuracy  of  billing  data  from  Verizon,
 overuse  of  paper  bills,  problems  with  electronic  bill  transmission,  and  problems  getting  Verizon  to
 credit  competing  carrier  payments  and  resolving  billing  disputes.  319  Absent  support,  however,
 these  concerns  do  not  overcome  the  showing  that  Verizon  has  made  through  its  performance  data
 and  the  KPMG  analysis  that  its  billing  systems  are  accurate  and  prompt,  providing  competing
 carriers  a  meaningful  opportunity  to  compete.
 100.  Line  Loss  Reports.  We  reject  commenters  claims  that  Verizon  fails  to  provide
 timely  or  accurate  line  loss  reports,  which  signal  competing  carriers  that  a  customer  has
 migrated  to  another  LEC.  320  Competing  carriers  require  line  loss  notifications  in  order  to  know
 that  a  customer  has  in  fact  migrated  and  should  no  longer  be  billed  for  service.  321  Commenters
 have  not  provided  evidence  of  a  systemic  problem:  ASCENT  does  not  provide  details  about  its
 members  problems  with  line  loss  notifications,  and  WorldCom  describes  problems  occurring
 outside  of  Massachusetts.  Therefore,  we  reject  their  assertions.
 101.  Suspension  for  Non  Payment.  We  decline  to  address  WorldComs  complaint  that
 Verizon  is  disconnecting  (SNPing  or  snipping)  WorldCom  customers  for  nonpayment  of  charges
 that  accrued  while  the  customers  were  still  Verizon  customers.  322  WorldCom  provides  evidence
 of  snipped  customers  in  states  other  than  Massachusetts.  For  the  reasons  explained  above,  323  we
 do  not  address  complaints  arising  outside  of  Massachusetts.
 h.  Change  Management  and  Technical  Assistance
 102.  We  conclude  that  Verizon  has  shown  that  it    has  deployed  the  necessary  systems
 and  personnel  to  provide  sufficient  access  to  each  of  the  necessary  OSS  functions  and  .  .  .  is
 adequately  assisting  competing  carriers  to  understand  how  to  implement  and  use  all  of  the  OSS
 functions  available  to  them.    324  Specifically,  Verizon  has  shown  that  it  has  an  adequate  change
 management  process  in  place  in  Massachusetts;  has  adhered  to  that  change  management  process
 over  time;  and  provides  adequate  technical  assistance,  training,  documentation,  and  help  desk
 (Continued  from  previous  page)
 arising  out  of  their  experiences  with  Verizons  OSS  in  other  states,  or  claims  about  other  carriers  experiences
 when  those  carriers  did  not  raise  those  claims  themselves  in  this  proceeding.
 319  See  ASCENT  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  11;  ASCENT  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  21.
 320  See  id.;  WorldCom  Massachusetts  I  Kwapniewski/  Lichtenberg  Decl.  at  paras.  147-  51;  WorldCom
 Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  31;  WorldCom  Massachusetts  II  Lichtenberg/  Chapman  Decl.  at  para.  16.
 321  See  SWBT  Texas  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  18452,  para.  193  (noting  importance  of  loss  notification).
 322  See  WorldCom  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  41  n.  67;  WorldCom  Massachusetts  I  Kwapniewski/  Lichtenberg
 Decl.  at  paras.  152-  53.
 323  See  supra  Part  IV.  A.  2.  b.
 324  See  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  3999,  para.  102  (quoting  Ameritech  Michigan  Order,  12
 FCC  Rcd  at  20616,  para.  136).
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 support  to  competing  carriers.  325  We  concur  with  the  Massachusetts  Department  that  Verizon
 has  satisfied  its  requirements  in  the  offering  of  nondiscriminatory  access  to  its  OSS  functions
 with  respect  to  Change  Management  and  Technical  Assistance.  326
 (i)  Change  Management  Process
 103.  In  evaluating  whether  a  BOCs  change  management  process  affords  an  efficient
 competitor  a  meaningful  opportunity  to  compete,  we  first  assess  whether  the  change  management
 plan  as  stated  is  adequate.  To  make  that  assessment,  we  examine  whether  the  evidence
 demonstrates:  (1)  that  information  relating  to  the  change  management  process  is  clearly  organized
 and  readily  accessible  to  competing  carriers;  (2)  that  competing  carriers  had  substantial  input  in
 the  design  and  continued  operation  of  the  change  management  process;  (3)  that  the  change
 management  plan  defines  a  procedure  for  the  timely  resolution  of  change  management  disputes;
 (4)  the  availability  of  an  adequate  testing  environment;  and  (5)  the  efficacy  of  the  documentation
 the  BOC  makes  available  for  the  purpose  of  building  an  electronic  gateway.  We  also  evaluate
 whether  the  BOC  has  demonstrated  a  pattern  of  compliance  with  its  change  management  process.  327
 104.  Change  Management  Plan.  We  concur  with  the  Massachusetts  Department  that
 Verizons  defined  Change  Management  process  is  sufficient  to  meet  the  needs  of  [competing
 carriers].  328  The  plan  is  memorialized  in  Verizons  Telecom  Industry  Services  Change
 Management  Process  (Change  Agreement).  329  The  Change  Agreement  is  clearly  organized,
 divided  into  sections  that  describe  the  processes  for  different  types  of  changes,  such  as  those
 initiated  by  Verizon,  those  initiated  by  competing  carriers,  those  required  by  regulators,  and
 emergency  changes.  The  Change  Agreement  includes  flow  charts  that  describe  the  change
 process  from  conceptualization  of  a  change  to  implementation,  specifies  time  frames  for  Verizons
 provision  of  specifications  to  competing  carriers  for  each  type  of  change,  and  specifies  time
 frames  for  competing  carrier  comment  on  those  specifications.  The  Change  Agreement  is
 available  to  competing  carriers  at  Verizons  website.
 105.  We  agree  with  the  Massachusetts  Department  that  Verizon  has  adhered  to  its
 Change  Management  process  over  time.  330  Verizon  has  implemented  performance  metrics  to
 325  The  change  management  process  refers  to  the  methods  and  procedures  that  the  BOC  employs  to
 communicate  with  competing  carriers  regarding  the  performance  of,  and  changes  in,  the  BOCs  OSS.  See  SWBT
 Texas  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  18403-  04,  para.  107  (describing  importance  of  change  management).
 326  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  78.  We  are  encouraged  by  the  Massachusetts
 Departments  decision  to  adopt  a  Change  Control  Assurance  Plan,  which  will  encourage  strong  performance  going
 forward.  See  infra  Part  VIII.  B.  1.
 327  See  SWBT  Texas  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  18404,  para.  108.
 328  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  78.
 329  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  McLean/  Wierzbicki  Decl.  Attach.  S.
 330  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  78.
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 measure  whether  it  provides  change  management  notices  to  competing  carriers  in  compliance  with
 the  Change  Agreement.  The  performance  data  show  that  Verizon  consistently  issues  its  notices
 according  to  the  schedule  set  forth  in  the  Change  Agreement.  331  We  therefore  find  that  Verizon
 carries  out  the  activities  set  forth  in  the  Change  Agreement  in  a  reasonable  and  timely  manner.
 106.  WorldCom  asserts  that  Verizon  has  failed  to  comply  with  the  Change  Agreement
 with  regard  to  the  rollout  of  a  new  billing  OSS,  expressTRAK.  Specifically,  WorldCom  asserts
 that  Verizon  has  begun  implementation  of  expressTRAK  in  some  states  but  has  not  provided  a
 detailed  rollout  schedule  or  specifications.  332  Verizon  responds  it  is  not  rolling  out  expressTRAK
 in  Massachusetts  before  the  end  of  2001,  and  that  expressTRAK  is  a  back-  office  OSS  and  is
 therefore  not  subject  to  the  same  business  rule  and  specification  requirements  as  interface
 software  releases.  333  Based  on  Verizons  explanation  of  its  timing,  we  conclude  that  Verizon  is
 not  rolling  out  expressTRAK  in  Massachusetts  in  violation  of  the  Change  Agreement.  ALTS
 points  to  a  KPMG  observation  regarding  timing  and  completeness  of  change  management  notices.  334  As  discussed  above,  current  data,  however,  show  good  performance  with  regard  to  the
 timing  of  notices,  and  we  do  not  believe  absent  further  evidence  that  KPMGs  finding  with  regard
 to  completeness  of  change  management  notices  has  a  competitive  impact.  In  general,  we  note
 that  the  Massachusetts  Department  found  that  each  of  the  Observations  raised  by  KPMG  was
 satisfactorily  resolved  prior  to  the  conclusion  of  the  test.  335
 107.  Competing  Carrier  Input  and  Participation.  Competing  carriers  had  substantial
 input  in  the  design  of  the  Change  Agreement  336  and  continue  to  participate  meaningfully  in  its
 operation;  we  agree  with  the  Massachusetts  Department  that  [  competing  carriers]  have
 substantial  input  in  [the  change  management]  process.  337  Competing  carriers  participate  in
 monthly  change  management  meetings  with  Verizon,  at  which  all  parties  discuss  new  change
 requests  and  vote  on  priorities.  Competing  carriers  also  initiate  change  proposals,  comment  on
 change  proposals,  participate  in  the  development  of  the  change  schedule,  and  test  new  software
 before  it  is  finalized.  338  We  note  that  Verizon  employs  versioning,  meaning  that  it  maintains  a
 331  From  September  through  December,  Verizon  sent  all  notices  on  time.  See  PO  4-  01  (Percent  Notices  Sent  On
 Time).
 332  See  WorldCom  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  46;  WorldCom  Massachusetts  I  Kwapniewski/  Lichtenberg  Decl.
 at  paras.  102-  15;  WorldCom  Massachusetts  I  Reply  at  38;  WorldCom  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  30;
 WorldCom  Massachusetts  II  Lichtenberg/  Chapman  Decl.  at  para.  15.
 333  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Reply  at  48;  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  McLean/  Wierzbicki  Reply  Decl.  at  para.
 37;  cf.  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  McLean/  Wierzbicki  Decl.  Attach.  S  at  6-  7  (defining  types  of  change[  s]  affecting
 interfaces  between  the  [competing  carriers]  and  Bell  Atlantics  operational  support  systems).
 334  See  ALTS  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  24.
 335  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  I  Reply  at  22.
 336  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  McLean/  Wierzbicki  Decl.  at  para.  101.
 337  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  78.
 338  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  McLean/  Wierzbicki  Decl.  at  paras.  101-  05.
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 prior  version  of  a  software  release  for  some  time  after  implementing  a  new  version,  so  that
 competing  carriers  need  not  switch  to  the  newer  version  immediately.  339  The  Commission  has
 previously  found  versioning  very  useful  to  a  BOCs  demonstration  that  its  change  management
 process  affords  competing  carriers  a  meaningful  opportunity  to  compete,  because  it  ensur[  es]
 that  system  changes  and  enhancements  do  not  adversely  affect  a  carriers  ability  to  access  the
 BOCs  OSS.  340
 108.  Separate  Dispute  Resolution  Forum.  The  record  also  reflects  that  Verizon
 provides  a  separate  dispute  resolution  forum  for  change  management  issues:  Competing  carriers
 may  escalate  change  management  problems  to  Verizons  Change  Management  Director,  and,  if
 needed,  to  a  Verizon  Vice  President.  They  may  also  bring  disputes  to  the  attention  of  the
 Massachusetts  Department.  341  The  Massachusetts  Department  noted  that  competing  carriers
 invoked  the  change  management  dispute  resolution  forum  successfully  to  defer  the  retirement  of
 the  Phase  II  GUI.  342
 109.  Testing  Environment.  We  find  that  Verizons  change  management  process
 provides  for  an  adequate  testing  environment.  In  past  section  271  orders,  the  Commission  has
 found  it  useful  to  determine  whether  the  record  demonstrates  that  the  BOCs  testing  environment
 is  stable,  343  adequately  mirrors  the  production  environment,  affords  competing  carriers  an
 opportunity  to  develop  test  decks  of  representative  pre-  ordering  and  ordering  transactions,  and
 offers  the  extended  testing  period  that  competing  carriers  need  for  EDI  implementation  and  new
 release  testing.  344  We  analyze  these  factors  and  determine  that  Verizons  test  environment  affords
 competing  carriers  adequate  testing  opportunities.
 110.  Verizon  has  established  the  CLEC  Test  Environment,  or  CTE,  which  is  a
 testing  environment  that  is  physically  separate  from  but  matches  the  actual  production
 environment.  In  the  CTE,  competing  carriers  can  test  their  own  software  to  be  sure  it  is
 compatible  with  Verizons  OSS,  and  they  can  test  new  Verizon  software  releases.  345  First,  we
 find  that  Verizons  provision  of  the  CTE  satisfies  its  requirement  to  provide  a  stable  testing
 environment.  Verizons  CLEC  Handbook  specifies  that  Bell  Atlantic  will  not  make  any
 339  See  id.  at  para.  104.
 340  SWBT  Texas  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  18408,  para.  115.
 341  See  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  53.
 342  See  id.
 343  A  stable  testing  environment  is  one  in  which  the  BOC  makes  no  changes  to  the  proposed  release  during  the
 test  period.  See  SWBT  Texas  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  18419,  para.  132  &  n.  350  (explaining  importance  of  stable
 testing  environment).
 344  See  id.,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  18420,  para.  134.
 345  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  McLean/  Wierzbicki  Decl.  at  para.  108.
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 changes  to  the  CLEC  Test  Environment  while  [competing  carriers]  are  testing  the  new  release.  346
 KPMG  found  improvement  in  the  stability  of  the  CTE  in  the  June  2000  release  as  compared  with
 the  February  2000  release.  347  Moreover,  the  CLEC  Handbook  calls  for  Verizon  to  complete  its
 internal  testing  before  competing  carrier  testing  begins.  348  Second,  we  find  that  the  test
 environment  adequately  mirrors  production.  349  Third,  the  Change  Agreement  time  frames  before
 and  during  testing  are  long  enough  to  permit  competing  carriers  to  develop  their  own  test  decks;
 Verizon  provides  dedicated  test  coordinators  to  help  competing  carriers  develop,  execute,  and
 evaluate  their  test  decks;  350  and  Verizon  makes  its  own  test  deck  available  on  its  website.  351
 Finally,  Verizon  offers  sufficiently  long  testing  periods  to  permit  adequate  testing.  352
 111.  We  disagree  with  commenters  assertions  that  Verizon  fails  to  provide  an
 adequately  stable  testing  environment.  WorldCom  points  to  KPMGs  analysis  and  argues  that
 Verizons  poor  documentation  and  coding  errors  require  Verizon  and  competing  carriers  to  make
 changes  to  their  interfaces  during  testing,  which  changes  make  the  testing  environment  unstable.  353
 We  note  that  KPMG  found  improvement,  however,  in  the  stability  of  Verizons  testing
 environment;  moreover,  the  Massachusetts  Department  notes  that  KPMG  was  able  to  complete
 its  interface  testing  during  the  established  new  release  test  period.  354  We  also  note  that  KPMG
 closed  its  exception  regarding  problems  with  Verizons  test  deck  after  successful  retesting.  355  We
 believe  in  the  absence  of  further  evidence  to  the  contrary  that  Verizons  testing  environment  is
 adequately  stable.
 112.  Documentation.  The  record  supports  our  finding  and  the  Massachusetts
 Departments  finding  that  Verizon  makes  available  sufficiently  detailed  interface  design
 specifications  and  documentation  to  enable  competing  carriers  to  modify  or  design  their  systems
 346  See  id.  Attach.  T  at  3  (CLEC  Handbook).  The  CLEC  Handbook  is  available  in  its  entirety  on  Verizons
 website  at  http://  www.  bell-  atl.  com/  wholesale/  html/  customer_  doc.  htm.
 347  See  KPMG  Final  Report  at  532  (Test  RMI-  2-  9);  see  also  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Application  App.  I  Tab  2  at
 Exception  7  (KPMG  report  on  disposition  of  exception  regarding  CTE  stability).
 348  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  McLean/  Wierzbicki  Decl.  Attach.  T  at  1-  2.
 349  See  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  54.
 350  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  McLean/  Wierzbicki  Decl.  at  para.  110.
 351  See  id.  at  para.  109.  KPMG  noted  that  Verizons  test  deck  for  its  February  2000  software  release  had  quality
 problems,  but  that  the  June  2000  release  showed  improvement.  See  KPMG  Final  Report  at  527  (Test  RMI-  2-  2).
 352  See  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  54.
 353  See  WorldCom  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  45;  WorldCom  Massachusetts  I  Kwapniewski/  Lichtenberg  Decl.
 at  paras.  85,  89;  WorldCom  Massachusetts  I  Kwapniewski/  Lichtenberg  Reply  Decl.  at  para.  15.  We  do  not  address
 WorldComs  complaints  arising  out  if  its  testing  experiences  in  states  other  than  Massachusetts.
 354  See  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  I  Reply  at  28.
 355  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Application  App.  I,  Tab  2  at  Exception  7.
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 in  a  manner  that  enables  them  to  communicate  with  Verizons  systems  and  any  relevant  interfaces.  356  Verizon  publishes  an  Electronic  Interface  Guide  as  part  of  its  CLEC  Handbook
 series,  and  it  provides  technical  documentation  to  enable  competing  carriers  to  program  their  own
 systems  to  communicate  with  Verizons  OSS.  357  The  adequacy  of  Verizons  documentation  is
 demonstrated  most  forcefully  by  the  fact  that  several  competing  carriers  have  constructed  and  are
 using  EDI  interfaces  in  a  commercial  environment.  The  fact  that  several  of  these  carriers  are
 placing  commercial  volumes  of  orders  via  EDI  with  relatively  few  rejects  significantly  undermines
 the  assertion  that  poor  documentation  prevents  competing  carriers  from  successfully
 implementing  EDI.  358  Furthermore,  KPMG/  Hewlett  Packard  also  successfully  used  Verizons
 documentation  to  build  an  EDI  interface.  359  KPMGs  evaluation  of  documentation  issued  in
 anticipation  of  the  June  2000  release  revealed  some  errors  and  inconsistencies,  which  Verizon
 corrected  over  the  summer.  360  KPMG  overall  found  that  the  documentation  was  satisfactory.  361
 Based  on  all  these  facts,  we  determine  that  the  EDI  implementation  and  design  specifications  that
 Verizon  makes  available  afford  an  efficient  competitor  a  meaningful  opportunity  to  compete.
 113.  In  their  comments,  WorldCom  and  ALTS  repeat  KPMGs  findings  with  regard  to
 errors  in  Verizons  documentation.  WorldCom  notes  that  the  errors  were  corrected,  but  points
 out  that  the  poor  quality  of  Verizons  documentation  when  it  is  first  released  imposes  significant
 costs  on  [competing  carriers].  362  WorldCom  further  states  that  when  Verizon  issues  corrections
 to  its  documentation,  those  corrections  often  contain  errors  as  well,  and  that  Verizon  takes  too
 long  to  issue  documentation.  363  ASCENT  also  commented  that  its  members  report  persistent
 flaws  in  documentation,  and  noted  that  KPMG  failed  to  perform  a  root  cause  analysis.  364  We
 356  See  SWBT  Texas  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  18411,  para.  119;  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  I
 Comments  at  78.
 357  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  McLean/  Wierzbicki  Decl.  at  paras.  113-  14.  Examples  of  Verizons  technical
 documentation  include  a  Pre-  Order  EDI  Guide,  a  Pre-  Order  CORBA  Guide,  the  Combined  Pre-  Order
 Documentation  (EDI  User  Guide  with  Business  Rules),  the  Order  EDI  Guide,  and  Specifications  for  Access  Service
 Request.  See  id.
 358  See  Verizon  Nov.  15  Ex  Parte  Letter  Attach.  (showing  reject  rates  by  individual  carrier).  As  of  September
 2000,  fifteen  competing  carriers  were  using  EDI  and  seven  more  were  in  the  process  of  being  certified.  See
 Verizon  Massachusetts  I  McLean/  Wierzbicki  Decl.  at  para.  40.
 359  See  KPMG  Final  Report  at  8.
 360  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  McLean/  Wierzbicki  Decl.  at  para.  119.
 361  See  KPMG  Final  Report  at  147-  50  (Tests  POP-  4-  17  to  -4-  24).
 362  WorldCom  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  45;  see  WorldCom  Massachusetts  I  Kwapniewski/  Lichtenberg  Decl.
 at  paras.  73-  93;  ALTS  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  23;  WorldCom  Massachusetts  I  Reply  at  37;  WorldCom
 Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  30;  WorldCom  Massachusetts  II  Lichtenberg/  Chapman  Decl.  at  para.  13.  We  do
 not  address  WorldComs  claims  arising  from  data  or  experiences  in  states  other  than  Massachusetts.
 363  See  WorldCom  Massachusetts  I  Kwapniewski/  Lichtenberg  Decl.  at  paras.  95-  99.
 364  ASCENT  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  10;  ASCENT  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  20.
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 recognize  that  it  would  be  better  if  Verizons  documentation  were  100  percent  correct  from  the
 beginning.  However,  we  believe  that  Verizons  actions  to  correct  documentation  once  errors  are
 brought  to  its  attention  are  further  evidence  that  the  change  management  process  is  effective  and
 that  competing  carriers  have  meaningful  participation  in  it.  365  Furthermore,  we  do  not  believe  that
 the  relatively  small  number  of  errors  366  in  this  large  amount  of  documentation  poses  a  barrier  to
 competing  carriers  ability  to  use  Verizons  OSS.
 (ii)  Training,  Technical  Assistance,  and  Help  Desk  Support
 114.  We  conclude  that  Verizon  demonstrates  that  it  provides  the  technical  assistance
 and  help  desk  support  necessary  to  give  competing  carriers  nondiscriminatory  access  to  its  OSS.
 Verizon  publishes  on  its  website  many  documents  to  assist  competing  carriers  in  using  its  OSS,
 including  a  three  volume  handbook  series  for  resellers,  a  three  volume  handbook  series  for
 purchasers  of  UNEs,  technical  documentation  to  enable  competing  carriers  to  program  their
 systems  to  communicate  with  Verizons  systems,  business  rules  and  EDI  and  CORBA
 specifications,  and  several  other  guides  on  a  variety  of  topics.  Verizon  also  provides  training  for
 resellers  and  for  purchasers  of  UNEs  in  a  hands  on  classroom.  Verizon  will  provide  training  at
 competing  carriers  premises  on  request  as  scheduling  permits.  Finally,  Verizons  help  desk,
 known  now  as  the  Wholesale  Customer  Care  Center  (WCCC),  provides  a  single  point  of  contact
 for  all  competing  carrier  reports  of  system  issues.  367  We  find  that,  on  the  whole,  Verizon  provides
 technical  assistance  and  help  desk  support  adequate  to  permit  competitors  to  use  Verizons  OSS
 effectively.  The  Massachusetts  Department  likewise  found  that  Verizon  provides  [competing
 carriers]  with  a  significant  level  of  technical  assistance  and  help  desk  support  through  its  training
 programs,  published  documentation,  and  the  WCCC.  368
 115.  We  reject  commenters  assertions  that  Verizons  help  desk  is  inadequate.
 ASCENT,  Rhythms,  and  WorldCom  argue  that  WCCC  staff  is  not  knowledgeable  and  does  not
 follow  through  on  problems  promptly.  369  In  support  of  its  argument,  WorldCom  points  to
 KPMGs  findings  that  the  help  desk  sometimes  takes  several  days  to  respond  to  even  critical
 365  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  McLean/  Wierzbicki  Decl.  at  para.  118.
 366  Verizon  states  that  the  documentation  for  its  June  and  October  software  releases  had  error  rates  of  0.  4  percent
 and  0.13  percent,  respectively.  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Reply  at  48;  Verizon  Massachusetts  II
 McLean/  Wierzbicki  Reply  Decl.  at  para.  29.
 367  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  McLean/  Wierzbicki  Decl.  at  paras.  113-  15,  120-  22,  125.
 368  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  78.
 369  See  ASCENT  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  8-  9;  Rhythms  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  24-  25;  WorldCom
 Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  43-  44,  46;  WorldCom  Massachusetts  I  Kwapniewski/  Lichtenberg  Decl.  at  paras.
 116-  28;  ASCENT  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  19.  We  do  not  address  WorldComs  complaints  regarding  help
 desk  problems  it  has  experienced  in  other  states.  See  WorldCom  Massachusetts  I  Kwapniewski/  Lichtenberg  Decl.
 at  paras.  116-  26.
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 issues.  370  And  OnSite  believes  that  frequent  personnel  changes  at  Verizons  help  desk  cause
 poorer  service.  371  Except  for  pointing  to  KPMGs  findings,  the  commenters  do  not  provide  any
 evidence  of  a  problem  with  Verizons  help  desk.  KPMGs  findings  do  not  compel  the  conclusion
 that  the  commenters  suggest.  KPMG  tested  Verizons  former  help  desk,  the  Bell  Atlantic  System
 Support  (BASS)  Help  Desk.  372  Verizon  has  since  consolidated  its  help  desk  functions  in  the  new
 WCCC;  373  therefore,  KPMGs  findings  carry  less  weight  than  they  otherwise  would.  While
 KPMG  did  find  that  38  percent  of  critical  trouble  tickets  and  38  percent  of  all  trouble  tickets  took
 longer  than  one  day  to  close,  it  also  found  that  some  delays  were  caused  by  competing  carriers
 not  closing  trouble  tickets  after  the  issue  is  actually  resolved  or  by  problems  traced  back  to
 competing  carriers  OSS.  374  Verizon  notes  that  KPMGs  test  evaluated  data  through  April  2000,
 and  that  after  April  2000  its  time  to  resolve  trouble  tickets  improved:  the  number  of  tickets  open
 for  two  days  or  more  dropped  from  38  to  18  percent.  375  We  conclude  that  the  bulk  of  the
 evidence  shows  that  Verizons  help  desk  provides  competing  carriers  with  the  technical  assistance
 necessary  for  a  meaningful  opportunity  to  compete.
 116.  We  also  reject  commenters  suggestions  for  enhancements.  WorldCom  says  that
 Verizon  should  report  on  the  timeliness  of  resolving  trouble  tickets  and  otherwise  track  its  own
 help  desk  performance.  376  Covad  and  Rhythms  argue  that  Verizon  should  expand  the  hours  of  the
 TISOC.  377  While  these  suggestions  for  improvement  may  have  merit,  they  do  not  affect  our
 conclusion  that  Verizon  currently  provides  technical  assistance  adequate  to  permit  competing
 carriers  a  meaningful  opportunity  to  compete.
 3.  UNE  Combinations
 117.  In  this  section,  we  conclude  that  Verizon  provides  nondiscriminatory  access  to
 combinations  of  UNEs.  378  The  record  indicates  first  that  Verizon  provides  access  to  UNE
 370  See  KPMG  Final  Report  at  609;  WorldCom  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  44;  WorldCom  Massachusetts  I
 Kwapniewski/  Lichtenberg  Decl.  at  para.  118;  WorldCom  Massachusetts  I  Reply  at  37.
 371  See  OnSite  Massachusetts  I  Comments  Kriss  Stmt.  at  7.
 372  See  KPMG  Final  Report  at  605.
 373  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  McLean/  Wierzbicki  Reply  Decl.  at  para.  41.
 374  See  KPMG  Final  Report  at  609.
 375  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  McLean/  Wierzbicki  Reply  Decl.  at  para.  41.
 376  See  WorldCom  Massachusetts  I  Kwapniewski/  Lichtenberg  Decl.  at  para.  55.
 377  See  Rhythms  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  23;  Covad  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  48;  Rhythms
 Massachusetts  I  Reply  at  9.
 378  In  order  to  comply  with  the  requirements  of  checklist  item  2,  a  BOC  must  show  that  it  is  offering
 [  n]  ondiscriminatory  access  to  network  elements  in  accordance  with  the  requirements  of  section[]  251(  c)(  3).  47
 U.  S.  C.    271(  c)(  2)(  B)(  ii).  Section  251(  c)(  3)  requires  an  incumbent  LEC  to  provide,  to  any  requesting
 telecommunications  carrier  .  .  .  nondiscriminatory  access  to  network  elements  on  an  unbundled  basis  at  any
 (continued.)
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 combinations,  and  second  that  it  provides  access  to  UNEs  in  a  manner  that  allows  requesting
 carriers  to  combine  those  elements.  379  We  base  our  conclusion  on  evidence  of  actual  commercial
 usage,  and  also  on  Verizons  legal  obligation  to  provide  such  access  as  established  in  its
 Massachusetts  tariff  and  interconnection  agreements.
 118.  First,  the  record  indicates  that  Verizon  has  an  obligation  to  provide  access  to  UNE
 combinations  in  compliance  with  our  UNE  rules.  380  Verizon  has  a  legal  obligation,  under  its  tariff,
 interconnection  agreements,  and  our  rules  to  provide  access  to  UNE  combinations,  including  the
 loop-  switch  port  platform  combination  (UNE-  P)  and  the  loop-  transport  facilities  combination
 (Enhanced  Extended  Link,  or  EEL).  381  Verizon  also  makes  available  a  switch  sub-  platform,
 which  is  local  switching  combined  with  other  shared  elements  such  as  shared  transport,  shared
 tandem  switching,  operator  services,  directory  assistance,  and  SS7  signaling.  382  The  evidence  of  (Continued  from  previous  page)
 technically  feasible  point  on  rates,  terms,  and  conditions  that  are  just,  reasonable,  and  nondiscriminatory.  Id.
   251(  c)(  3).  Section  251(  c)(  3)  of  the  Act  also  requires  incumbent  LECs  to  provide  UNEs  in  a  manner  that  allows
 requesting  carriers  to  combine  such  elements  in  order  to  provide  a  telecommunications  service.
 379  In  previous  section  271  orders,  the  Commission  has  emphasized  that  the  ability  of  requesting  carriers  to  use
 UNEs,  as  well  as  combinations  of  UNEs,  is  integral  to  achieving  Congress  objective  of  promoting  competition  in
 local  telecommunications  markets.  See  SWBT  Kansas/  Oklahoma  Order  at  para.  171  n.  487;  Bell  Atlantic  New  York
 Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  4077-  78,  para.  230.
 380  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Application  at  33;  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  paras.
 180-  84;  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  199.
 381  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Application  at  33;  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  paras.
 181,  184;  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Application  App.  B,  Vol.  2,  Tab  3C  (D.  T.  E.  Tariff  No.  17,  Part  B,  
 13.1.1.A,  15.1.1.A)  (D.  T.  E.  Tariff  No.  17);  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Application  App.  J,  Vol.  3,  Tab  12,  Part  II
   3.1  (Agreement  between  New  England  Telephone  and  Telegraph  Company  d/  b/  a  BA  and  AT&  T  Communications
 of  New  England,  Inc.  (Apr.  13,  1998));  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Application  App.  J,  vol.  7,  Tab  22,  Attach.  III
 (Interconnection  Agreement  by  and  between  New  England  Telephone  and  Telegraph  Company  d/  b/  a  Bell  Atlantic
 -  Massachusetts  and  MCImetro  Access  Transmission  Services,  Inc.  (Sept.  29,  1998)).  The  Commission  has  an
 ongoing  proceeding  regarding  the  requirements  for  requesting  carriers  to  use  EELs  to  provide  exchange  access
 service.  See  Implementation  of  the  Local  Competition  Provisions  of  the  Telecommunications  Act  of  1996,  CC
 Docket  No.  96-  98,  Third  Report  and  Order  and  Fourth  Further  Notice  of  Proposed  Rulemaking,  15  FCC  Rcd  3696,
 3913-  15,  paras.  489,  492-  96  (1999);  Supplemental  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  1760,  1761,  para.  4  (1999);  Supplemental
 Order  Clarification,  15  FCC  Rcd  9587,  9592,  para.  8  (2000)  (Supplemental  Order  Clarification).  At  present,  the
 Commission  conditions  the  use  of  EELs  for  exchange  access  to  those  carriers  that  provide  a  significant  amount
 of  local  exchange  service  to  a  particular  user.  Id.  Verizon  is  legally  obligated  to  convert  special  access
 arrangements  to  EELs  if  a  competing  carrier  certifies  that  it  provides  a  significant  amount  of  local  exchange
 service  to  the  particular  end  user  in  accordance  with  the  Supplemental  Order  Clarification.  Verizon  Massachusetts
 I  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  para.  184;  D.  T.  E.  Tariff  No.  17,  Part  B,    13.1.1.D;  see  also  SWBT
 Kansas/  Oklahoma  Order  at  paras.  175-  76.  We  find  based  on  the  evidence  in  the  record  that  Verizon  is  in
 compliance  with  Commission  orders  on  the  subject.
 382  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Application  at  33;  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  para.
 183;  D.  T.  E.  Tariff  No.  17,  Part  B,    14.1.1.B.;  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Application  App.  J,  Vol.  3,  Tab  12,  Part  II
   3.1  (Agreement  between  New  England  Telephone  and  Telegraph  Company  d/  b/  a  BA  and  AT&  T  Communications
 of  New  England,  Inc  (Apr.  13,  1998));  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Application  App.  J,  vol.  7,  Tab  22,  Attach.  III
 (Interconnection  Agreement  by  and  between  New  England  Telephone  and  Telegraph  Company  d/  b/  a  Bell  Atlantic
 -  Massachusetts  and  MCImetro  Access  Transmission  Services,  Inc.  (Sept.  28,  1998)).
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 Federal  Communications  Commission  FCC  01-  130
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 actual  commercial  usage  demonstrates  that  Verizon  is  currently  providing  access  at  acceptable
 levels  of  quantity  and  quality.  Verizon  has  provisioned  23,000  UNE-  P  orders  as  of  January  2001.  383  The  Massachusetts  Department  determined  that  Verizon  provides  access  to  UNE
 combinations  in  compliance  with  our  UNE  rules  and  the  Massachusetts  Departments  own
 requirements.  384  No  commenter  has  raised  an  issue  with  regard  to  Verizons  provision  of
 combinations.
 119.  The  record  also  indicates  that  Verizon  provides  access  to  UNEs  in  a  manner  that
 allows  competing  carriers  to  combine  such  elements  for  themselves.  385  Verizon  provides  a  variety
 of  methods  that  allow  competing  carriers  to  combine  UNEs.  In  addition  to  standard  physical  and
 virtual  collocation  arrangements,  Verizon  provides  alternative  collocation  arrangements  such  as
 smaller  physical  collocation  cages  and  cageless  collocation  arrangements,  any  of  which  may  be
 used  by  competing  carriers  to  combine  UNEs.  386  Where  space  for  collocation  is  not  available,
 Verizon  also  permits  competing  carriers  to  collocate  their  equipment  in  adjacent  controlled
 environmental  vaults.  387  The  record  also  indicates  that  Verizon  satisfies  its  obligation  to  make
 noncollocation  options  available  for  the  combination  of  unbundled  network  elements.  Under  the
 Commissions  rules,  Verizon  must  provide  .  .  .  any  technically  feasible  method  of  obtaining  .  .  .
 access  to  unbundled  network  elements[,  which  is]  not  limited  to  .  .  .  physical  collocation  and
 virtual  collocation.  388  In  at  least  one  interconnection  agreement,  Verizon  offers  any  technically
 feasible  method  to  access  unbundled  [n]  etwork  [e]  lements.  389  Although  Verizon  has  not
 provided  evidence  of  a  standardized  offering  for  noncollocation  methods  of  combining  UNEs,  390
 383  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Application  Attach.  A.  This  is  nearly  twice  as  many  UNE-  Ps  as  were
 provisioned  at  the  time  of  Verizons  first  Massachusetts  section  271  application  in  September  2000.  See  Verizon
 Massachusetts  I  Application  Attach.  A,  Tab  1  (approximately  12,000  UNE-  Ps).
 384  See  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  199.
 385  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Application  at  33-  34;  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at
 paras.  176-  79.
 386  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  paras.  31-  62,  177-  78;  see  also  infra  Part  V.  A.  2
 (discussing  the  terms  and  conditions  for  access  to  UNEs  through  physical  and  virtual  collocation  arrangements).
 387  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  para.  55;  infra  Part  V.  A.  2.
 388  47  C.  F.  R.    51.321(  a),  (b);  Second  BellSouth  Louisiana  Order,  13  FCC  Rcd  at  20706,  para.  170;  see  also
 Local  Competition  First  Report  and  Order,  11  FCC  Rcd  at  15780-  81,  para.  553.
 389  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Application  App.  J,  vol.  7,  Tab  22,  Attach.  III,  at  2  (Interconnection  Agreement  by
 and  between  New  England  Telephone  and  Telegraph  Company  d/  b/  a  Bell  Atlantic  -  Massachusetts  and  MCImetro
 Access  Transmission  Services,  Inc.);  see  also  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  para.  180
 (Verizon  provides  all  technically  feasible  methods  for  [competing  carriers]  to  combine  individual  network
 elements.).
 390  While  it  provided  assembly  rooms  and  assembly  points  in  New  York  for  this  purpose,  it  states  that  [  o]  nly  one
 [competing  carrier]  made  any  use  of  this  offering  in  New  York,  and  that  use  .  .  .  has  been  discontinued.  Verizon
 Massachusetts  I  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  para.  179.
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 this  commitment  in  an  interconnection  agreement  satisfies  the  obligation  to  make  available
 noncollocation  options  for  competing  carriers  wanting  to  combine  UNEs.
 120.  We  reject  as  irrelevant  Sprints  argument  that  volumes  of  UNE  combinations  in
 Massachusetts  will  not  continue  to  increase.  391  Sprint  points  to  a  statement  Verizon  made  that  it
 might  reconsider  its  provision  of  UNE  combinations  if  its  legal  obligation  to  do  so  changes.  392
 This  argument  does  not  suggest  that  Verizon  is  not  in  compliance  with  current  UNE
 requirements,  and  therefore  is  not  relevant  to  our  inquiry.
 B.  Checklist  Item  4    Unbundled  Local  Loops
 1.  Background
 121.  Section  271(  c)(  2)(  B)(  iv)  of  the  Act,  item  4  of  the  competitive  checklist,  requires
 that  a  BOC  provide  [  l]  ocal  loop  transmission  from  the  central  office  to  the  customers  premises,
 unbundled  from  local  switching  or  other  services.  393  A  BOC  has  an  obligation  to  provision
 different  types  of  loops,  including  two-  wire  and  four-  wire  analog  voice-  grade  loops,  and  two-wire
 and  four-  wire  loops  that  are  conditioned  to  transmit  the  digital  signals  needed  to  provide
 service  such  as  ISDN,  ADSL,  HDSL,  and  DS1-  level  signals.  394
 122.  In  evaluating  Verizons  overall  performance  in  providing  unbundled  local  loops  in
 Massachusetts,  we  examine  Verizons  performance  in  the  aggregate  (i.  e.,  by  all  loop  types)  as
 well  as  its  performance  for  specific  loop  types  (i.  e.,  by  voice  grade,  xDSL-  capable,  line-  shared
 and  DS-  1  types).  395  In  doing  so,  we  are  looking  for  patterns  of  systemic  performance  disparities
 391  See  Sprint  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  26-  28.
 392  Sprint  points  to  a  statement  Verizon  made  in  the  course  of  an  interconnection  proceeding,  to  the  effect  that
 Verizon  will  voluntarily  provide  [UNE-  P]  even  where  the  loop  and  local  switching  elements  comprising  the  UNE-P
 do  not  already  exist  in  combined  form  for  a  specific  customer  in  its  network,  but  that  it  reserves  the  right  to
 review  this  voluntary  commitment  based  on  judicial  action  by  the  Eighth  Circuit  Court  of  Appeals  concerning  [47
 C.  F.  R.  ]  51.315(  c)-(  f).  Id.  at  27  (quoting  Consolidated  Petitions  for  Arbitration  of  Interconnection  Agreements,
 DTE/  DPU  Dkt.  Nos.  96-  73/  74,  96-  75,  96-  80/  81,  96-  83,  96-  94,  Phase  4-  P  Order  at  6  (Jan.  10,  2000)
 <http://  www.  state.  ma.  us/  dpu/  telecom/  96-  73/  UneProvi.  htm>)  (emphasis  omitted).
 393  47  U.  S.  C.    271(  c)(  2)(  B)(  iv).  The  Commission  has  defined  the  loop  as  a  transmission  facility  between  a
 distribution  frame,  or  its  equivalent,  in  an  incumbent  LEC  central  office,  and  the  demarcation  point  at  the
 customer  premises.  See  Local  Competition  First  Report  and  Order,  11  FCC  Rcd  at  15691,  para.  380;  UNE
 Remand  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  3772-  73,  paras.  166-  167,  n.  301  (retaining  definition  of  the  local  loop  from  the
 Local  Competition  First  Report  and  Order,  but  replacing  the  phrase  network  interconnection  device  with
 demarcation  point,  and  making  explicit  that  dark  fiber  and  loop  conditioning  are  among  the  features,  functions
 and  capabilities  of  the  loop).
 394  Local  Competition  First  Report  and  Order,  11  FCC  Rcd  at  15691,  para.  380;  UNE  Remand  Order,  15  FCC
 Rcd  at  3772-  73,  paras.  166-  67.
 395  Competing  carriers  in  Massachusetts  rely  principally  on  three  types  of  unbundled  stand-  alone  loops  that
 support  high-  speed  services:  the  xDSL  loop,  the  Digital  loop  and  the  high-  capacity  or  DS-  1  loop.  The
 Massachusetts  Department  has  adopted  the  New  York  Commissions  separate  loop-  type  performance  measurement
 (continued.)
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 that  have  resulted  in  competitive  harm  or  otherwise  denied  competing  carriers  a  meaningful
 opportunity  to  compete.  396  As  the  Commission  has  noted  in  previous  section  271  orders,  we
 examine  the  data  for  all  the  various  loop  performance  measurements,  as  well  as  the  factors
 surrounding  the  development  of  these  measures.  Verizon  demonstrates  that  for  xDSL  loops,  it  is
 performing  at  acceptable  levels  for  all  of  the  measures  the  Commission  has  considered  in  previous
 section  271  orders.  Isolated  cases  of  performance  disparity,  especially  when  the  margin  of
 disparity  or  the  number  of  instances  measured  is  small,  will  generally  not  result  in  findings  of
 checklist  noncompliance.  Finally,  we  evaluate  the  information  Verizon  provided  describing  its
 processes  for  installing  and  maintaining  loops,  the  capabilities  of  its  workforce,  and  employee
 training  to  show  that  it  provisions  and  maintains  unbundled  loops.
 123.  We  focus  our  analysis  in  this  section  on  the  issues  in  controversy  under  this
 checklist  item,  beginning  with  the  pre-  ordering,  ordering,  provisioning  and  maintenance  and  repair
 of  stand-  alone  xDSL-  capable  loops.  We  also  address  voice-  grade  loops  provisioned  as  new  loops
 and  hot  cut  loops  as  well  as  Verizons  subloop  unbundling  offering.  Finally,  we  address  line
 sharing  and  line  splitting  at  the  end  of  this  discussion.
 2.  Discussion
 124.  Based  on  the  record  before  us,  we  conclude  that  Verizon  has  adequately
 demonstrated  that  it  provides  unbundled  local  loops  as  required  by  section  271  and  our  rules.
 First,  as  described  above,  we  find  that  Verizon  provides  access  to  loop  make-  up  information  in
 compliance  with  the  UNE  Remand  Order.  Second,  we  find  that  Verizon  provides
 nondiscriminatory  access  to  stand  alone  xDSL-  capable  loops  and  high-  capacity  loops.  Third,  we
 find  that  Verizon  provides  voice  grade  loops,  both  as  new  loops  and  through  hot-  cut  conversions,
 in  a  nondiscriminatory  manner.  Finally,  we  find  that  Verizon  has  demonstrated  that  it  has  a  line-sharing
 and  line-  splitting  provisioning  process  that  affords  competitors  nondiscriminatory  access
 to  these  facilities.  In  so  doing,  we  acknowledge  that  the  Massachusetts  Department  also
 concludes  that  Verizon  complies  with  this  checklist  item.  397
 (Continued  from  previous  page)
 categories  for  xDSL  loops  (including,  but  not  limited  to,  loops  provisioned  for  ADSL,  HDSL,  and  SDSL  services);
 Digital  loops,  which  are  used  by  competing  carriers  to  provide  xDSL,  IDSL  or  ISDN-  like  services  and  high-capacity
 or  DS-  1  loops.  Commenters  in  this  proceeding  do  not  specifically  criticize  Verizons  performance  with
 regard  to  Digital  loops  which  are  a  decreasing  proportion  of  all  xDSL-  capable  loops  requested  by  competing  LECs.
 For  example,  in  November  of  2000,  the  measure  of  missed  installation  appointments,  PR  4-  04,  captured  1292
 xDSL  loops  compared  to  276  Digital  loops.  The  carrier-  to-  carrier  reports  also  suggest  that  Verizons  performance
 for  xDSL  loops  is  similar  to  its  performance  for  Digital  loops.  We  analyze  high-  capacity  or  DS-  1  loops  separately
 at  the  end  of  this  section.
 396  See  Updated  Filling  Requirements  for  Bell  Operating  Company  Applications  Under  Section  271  of  the
 Communications  Act,  Public  Notice,  DA  01-  734,  (rel.  March  23,  2001)  at  6  (encouraging  BOC-  applicants  to
 explain  why  factual  anomalies  may  have  no  meaningful  adverse  impact  on  a  competing  carriers  ability  to  obtain
 and  serve  customers).
 397  See  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  24.
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 125.  When  all  types  of  loops  are  considered,  Verizon  shows  that  it  performs  at  an
 acceptable  level,  generally  meeting  the  parity  standards  in  the  four  month  period  leading  up  to  its
 application.  Verizon  demonstrates  that  it  has  put  in  place  a  process  to  deliver  xDSL-  capable
 loops  in  a  timely  manner  and  at  acceptable  levels  of  quality  to  allow  competitors  to  meet  the
 significant  demand  for  high-  speed  services  in  Massachusetts.  Furthermore,  Verizon  demonstrates
 that  it  has  adapted  its  provisioning  methods  and  procedures  to  accommodate  competitive  carrier
 requests  for  line-  shared  loops    loops  that  are  recognized  as  an  important  element  in  providing
 high-  speed  service  to  residential  subscribers.  One  commenter,  Rhythms,  initially  opposed
 Verizons  application  on  the  basis  of  its  xDSL  loop  performance,  but  now  states  that  Verizon  has
 taken  steps  to  resolve  its  difficulties  and  has  withdrawn  its  opposition.  398  We  find  that  Verizons
 overall  performance  meets  the  checklist  requirements,  even  though  some  performance
 measurements  indicate  isolated  and  marginal  problems.  As  explained  below,  we  believe  that  the
 marginal  disparities  in  some  measurements  are  not  competitively  significant  and  do  not  show  signs
 of  systemic  discrimination.
 126.  As  described  above,  the  New  York  Commission  developed  Verizons  performance
 measurements,  business  rules  and  standards  in  a  collaborative  state  proceeding  with  input  from
 competing  carriers.  399  The  Massachusetts  Department  has  adopted  these  performance  measures,
 business  rules  and  standards.  When  possible,  the  New  York  Commission  elected  to  compare
 Verizons  service  to  competing  carriers  using  unbundled  loops  directly  to  the  level  of  service
 provided  to  Verizons  retail  operations.  400  Where,  however,  the  New  York  Commission
 determined  that  no  comparable  retail  function  exists,  the  level  of  service  Verizon  provided  to
 competing  carriers  in  Massachusetts  is  tested  against  benchmarks  developed  in  New  York.  401
 Because  the  New  York  Commission  adopted  the  performance  measures  through  an  open  and
 collaborative  process,  and  no  commenter  specifically  criticizes  the  New  York  Commissions
 process,  we  defer  to  the  reasonable  standards  it  set  for  these  measurements  as  a  basis  for
 analyzing  Verizons  Massachusetts  application.  402
 398  See  Letter  from  Kimberly  Scardino,  Assistant  General  Counsel,  Rhythms,  to  Magalie  Roman  Salas,  Secretary,
 Federal  Communications  Commission,  CC  Docket  No.  01-  9  (filed  March  14,  2001).
 399  See  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  7.
 400  Where  the  New  York  Commission  determined  that  a  retail  analogue  is  appropriate  and  the  Massachusetts
 Department  uses  this  analogue  in  its  evaluation,  we  examine  Verizons  Massachusetts  performance  by  determining
 whether  it  provides  unbundled  local  loops  to  competing  carriers  in  substantially  the  same  time  and  manner  as  it
 does  to  its  retail  customers.  See  Second  BellSouth  Louisiana  Order,  13  FCC  Rcd  at  20655,  para.  87;  see  also  Bell
 Atlantic  New  York  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  4098,  para.  279.
 401  In  these  instances,  we  examine  Verizons  service  to  competing  carriers  in  terms  of  whether  its  performance
 affords  competitors  a  meaningful  opportunity  to  compete.  See  generally  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  15  FCC
 Rcd  at  4098,  para.  279.
 402  See  Petition  of  New  York  Telephone  Company  for  Approval  of  its  Statement  of  Generally  Available  Terms  and
 Conditions  Pursuant  to  Section  252  of  the  Telecommunications  Act  of  1996  and  Draft  Filing  of  Petition  for
 InterLATA  Entry  Pursuant  to  Section  271  of  the  Telecommunications  Act  of  1996,  Order  Amending  Performance
 (continued.)
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 a.  Overview  of  Performance  Data
 127.  In  our  analysis  we  rely  primarily  on  Massachusetts  performance  data  collected  and
 submitted  by  Verizon  under  the  state-  adopted  carrier-  to-  carrier  standards.  Where  the  data
 displays  facial  disparities  in  performance  between  the  manner  in  which  Verizon  provisions  loops
 for  itself  vis-  -  vis  its  competitors,  Verizon  proposes  explanations  for  statistical  disparities  and
 offers  studies  that  recalculate  measures  according  to  various  exclusions  which  are  discussed
 below.  In  such  instances,  we  look  to  the  availability  of  data  reconciled  under  the  auspices  of  the
 Massachusetts  Department  and  specific  evidence  presented  by  commenters  to  determine  the
 appropriate  weight  to  accord  the  challenged  data.  In  evaluating  the  probity  of  Verizons
 explanations  and  studies,  we  consider  among  other  things,  whether  third  parties  had  access  to  the
 underlying  data  and  whether  the  challenged  data  were  reconciled  by  the  Massachusetts
 Department.
 128.  Although  KPMG  conducted  a  review  of  other  Verizon  performance  metrics  in
 Massachusetts,  it  did  not  separately  evaluate  the  xDSL  metrics  because  they  were  implemented  by
 Verizon  after  the  initial  testing  period.  403  In  its  supplemental  filing,  however,  Verizon  describes  its
 engagement  of  PwC  to  validate  its  DSL  and  line  sharing  measures  and  notes  that  PwC
 performed  its  work  under  the  same  standards  as  KPMG  did  during  its  third  party  OSS  testing.  404
 PwC  replicated  a  total  of  159  measures  and  matched  Verizons  calculations  for  136  of  159
 measures.  Verizon  asserts  that  for  the  remaining  23,  the  number  of  observations  were  identical
 and  the  reported  performance  was  within  one  percent  of  the  results  replicated  by  PwC.  405  In
 addition  to  replicating  the  carrier-  to-  carrier  data,  PwC  examined  the  additional  special  studies
 Verizon  performed  with  respect  to  certain  DSL  measures.  406
 129.  Several  commenters  challenge  the  validity  of  Verizons  adjustment  to  official
 carrier-  to-  carrier  performance  data.  407  Where  commenters  challenge  the  comprehensiveness  of  a
 (Continued  from  previous  page)
 Assurance  Plan,  Case  97-  C-  0271  (NY  PSC  Mar.  9,  2000);  see  also  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at
 3974-  76,  paras.  54-  60.
 403  See  Department  of  Justice  Massachusetts  I  Evaluation  at  15;  Rhythms  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  29-  30
 (quoting  KPMG  Technical  Session  Tr.  5185-  89).  As  part  of  its  more  general  process  evaluation,  Covad  suggests
 that  KPMG  observed  the  installation  of  45  xDSL  loops.  See  Covad  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  35.
 404  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Ruesterholz/  Lacouture  Decl.  at  para.  20;  see  also  supra  at  para.  47.
 405  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Ruesterholz/  Lacouture  Decl.  at  para.  20.
 406  PwC  used  the  carrier-  to-  carrier  guidelines  and  Verizons  raw  data  to  replicate  Verizons  DSL  performance
 results  in  Massachusetts  for  October.  PwC  undertook  a  similar  process  with  Verizons  October  line  sharing
 performance  results  for  New  York  and  Massachusetts  based  on  the  January  16  th  corrected  guidelines  filed  with  the
 New  York  Commission  in  compliance  with  its  December  15  order  approving  the  new  carrier-  to-  carrier  working
 group  consensus.
 407  See  Rhythms  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  7;  Covad  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  7-  8;  Rhythms
 Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  29;  Covad  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  13;  ALTS  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at
 32;  NAS  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  5.
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 third-  party  evaluation  of  underlying  data  or  a  BOC-  applicants  adjustment  to  carrier-  to-  carrier
 measures,  carrier-  specific  carrier-  to-  carrier  data  become  an  important  tool  for  the  Commission  to
 evaluate  a  BOCs  compliance  with  section  271.  Carrier-  specific  data  underlying  the  carrier-  to-carrier
 reports  are  important  to  this  Commissions  section  271  process  because  they  allow
 competing  carriers  to  compare  carrier-  to-  carrier  results  or  BOC-  applicants  explanations  to  their
 own  experiences  and  thus  provide  us  with  as  complete  a  record  as  possible  on  which  to  make  our
 decision.  408  Likewise,  where  there  is  no  comprehensive  third-  party  evaluation  of  particular
 metrics,  we  strongly  suggest  that  state  commissions  and  applicants  enable  all  parties  to  have
 access  to  the  data  used  to  calculate  special  studies  of  the  BOCs  performance.  We  find  evidence
 that  has  been  scrutinized  in  this  manner  is  most  persuasive.  Accordingly,  BOC-  applicants  may
 facilitate  the  development  of  a  full  record  upon  which  they  may  rely  to  demonstrate  compliance
 with  section  271.  409  In  this  case,  Verizon  has  provided  carrier-  specific  data  underlying  carrier-  to-carrier
 measures  and  the  underlying  data  used  to  generate  reformulated  measures  of  performance.  410  We  discuss  competitor  challenges  to  Verizons  performance  based  on  carrier-specific
 data  where  relevant  below.
 b.  xDSL-  Capable  Loops
 130.  We  find  that  Verizon  demonstrates  that  it  is  providing  xDSL-  capable  loops  in
 accordance  with  the  requirements  of  checklist  item  4.  In  analyzing  Verizons  showing,  we  rely
 primarily  on  the  performance  measures  and  performance  data  described  in  prior  section  271
 orders.  We  review  Verizons  xDSL-  capable  loop  order  processing  timeliness,  the  timeliness  of
 Verizons  xDSL-  capable  loop  installation  and  percentage  of  Verizon-  caused  missed  installation
 appointments,  the  quality  of  the  xDSL-  capable  loops  Verizon  installs,  and  the  timeliness  and
 quality  of  the  maintenance  and  repair  functions  Verizon  provides  to  competing  carrier  xDSL-capable
 loops.  We  note,  however,  that  we  do  not  rely  on  data  reflecting  Verizons  provision  of
 xDSL  loops  to  its  separate  affiliate  to  reach  our  conclusions  because  Verizon  demonstrates
 408  During  the  Massachusetts  I  application,  Verizon  began  the  process  of  submitting  carrier-  specific  data  to  the
 Commission.
 409  In  addition,  we  note  that  carrier-  specific  data  aided  the  Massachusetts  Department  in  concluding  that  Verizon
 provides  nondiscriminatory  access  to  hot  cut  loops.  See  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at
 290.  The  availability  of  carrier-  specific  data  was  an  important  factor  in  the  Commissions  prior  section  271
 approvals.  In  New  York,  the  Commission  relied  upon  carrier-  specific  data  to  find  that  Bell  Atlantic  provided
 nondiscriminatory  access  to  OSS.  See  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  paras.  166,  175,  181.
 410  Verizon  states  that  it  has  provided  carrier-  specific  reports  beginning  in  May  2000  to  competitors  operating  in
 Massachusetts  that  have  requested  them.  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  para.  17.
 Verizon  has  included  carrier-  specific  reports  for  September,  October  and  November  2000  in  its  application.  See
 Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  App.  C.  Going  forward  Verizon  has  represented  that  it  will
 provide  carrier-  specific  reports  to  those  competitors  that  have  requested  them  by  the  25  th  day  of  the  following
 month.  Further,  Verizon  is  in  the  process  of  establishing  a  secure  Website  through  which  competitors  will  be  able
 to  obtain  the  aggregate  performance  results  and  their  own  individual  reports  and  their  Performance  Plan  reports,
 along  with  the  underlying  data  in  the  first  half  of  2001.  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.
 at  para.  17.
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 checklist  compliance  with  an  evidentiary  showing  of  performance  to  its  wholesale  xDSL
 customers.  411
 131.  Verizon  has  a  concrete  and  specific  legal  obligation  to  provide  unbundled  xDSL-capable
 loops  to  competing  carriers.  412  Verizon  makes  available  unbundled  xDSL-  capable  loops
 (including  all  technically  feasible  features,  functions  and  capabilities)  in  Massachusetts  through
 interconnection  agreements  and  pursuant  to  tariffs  approved  by  the  Massachusetts  Department.  413
 (i)  Order  Processing  Timeliness
 132.  To  determine  whether  Verizon  is  processing  orders  in  a  timely  fashion,  we
 examine  whether  it  provides  competitors  with  nondiscriminatory  access  to  loop  information  in  a
 timely  manner  and  whether  it  returns  timely  firm  order  confirmations  (FOCs)  to  competitors.  414
 133.  Timely  Access  to  Loop  Information.  As  described  above,  we  find  that  Verizon  has
 demonstrated  that  its  pre-  ordering  OSS  provides  competitors  with  access  to  the  same  underlying
 loop  information  available  to  Verizons  retail  and  back  office  personnel.  415  We  also  find  that
 Verizon  appears  to  be  providing  that  information  within  the  required  time  frames.
 134.  Verizons  performance  data  reflect  that  it  provides  responses  to  competing  carrier
 requests  for  loop  information  in  substantially  the  same  time  and  manner  as  for  itself.  416  The
 carrier-  to-  carrier  reports  contain  four  pre-  ordering  metrics  that  measure  Verizons  performance  in
 providing  competitors  with  pre-  order  access  to  loop  information.  417  Under  two  of  these  metrics,
 Verizon  provides  performance  data  for  September  through  December  2000  showing  that  Verizon
 is  providing  timely  responses  to  competitors  pre-  order  mechanized  loop  database  queries
 411  Verizons  separate  affiliate  has  not  been  purchasing  the  same  inputs  to  provide  advanced  services  as
 unaffiliated  competing  carriers.  Specifically,  Verizons  separate  affiliate  purchases  line  sharing  to  provide  ADSL
 service  while  competing  carriers  in  Massachusetts  continue  to  purchase  stand  alone,  xDSL-  capable  loops  and  have
 only  recently  begun  purchasing  line  sharing.  As  a  result,  Verizons  advanced  services  separate  affiliate  is  not
 useful  in  making  a  presumption  of  nondiscriminatory  performance.
 412  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  paras.  63,  114.
 413  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  Exh.  B  (citing  D.  T.  E.  Tariff  No.  17,  Part  B,
 Section  5).
 414  See  SWBT  Texas  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  18499-  18501,  paras.  286-  90.
 415  See  supra  Part  V.  A.  2.  c(  ii).
 416  See  PO-  1-  06  (Facility  Availability,  Loop  Qualification,  EDI  and  CORBA).
 417  The  first  two  metrics  are  PO-  1-  06  Facility  Availability  (Loop  Qualification)    EDI  and  PO-  1-  06  Facility
 Availability  (Loop  Qualification)    CORBA,  both  of  which  measure  the  timeliness  of  Verizons  responses  to
 mechanized  loop  database  queries.  The  second  two  metrics  are  PO-  8-  01  Average  Response  Time    Manual  Loop
 Qualification  and  PO-  8-  02  Average  Response  Time    Engineering  Record  Request,  which  measure  the
 timeliness  of  Verizons  responses  to  manual  loop  qualification  and  engineering  record  requests.  See  Verizon
 Massachusetts  I  Guerard/  Canny  Decl.  Tab  B  at  9,  18.
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 submitted  via  Verizons  EDI  and  CORBA  interfaces.  418  Verizon,  however,  has  not  reported
 carrier-  to-  carrier  performance  data  measuring  its  average  response  times  in  conducting  pre-  order
 manual  loop  qualifications  and  engineering  record  requests.  419  Instead,  Verizon  provides  data  for
 manual  loop  qualifications  conducted  from  September  through  November  2000  under  Verizons
 existing  process  through  its  ordering  OSS,  showing  that  between  97  percent  and  99  percent  of
 manual  loop  qualifications  were  completed  within  48  hours.  420  Although  these  data  have  not  been
 submitted  under  the  auspices  of  the  Massachusetts  carrier-  to-  carrier  reports  prepared  in
 accordance  with  business  rules  developed  collaboratively  by  Verizon  and  competitive  carriers,  we
 accept  them  here  because  they  have  not  been  challenged.  421  Finally,  Verizon  provides  evidence
 that  it  is  consistently  meeting  its  target  of  returning  loop  make-  up  information  to  competitors
 within  24  hours  under  its  interim  LFACS  process.  422  Verizon  also  states  that  competitors
 generally  receive  this  information  within  2  hours.  423
 135.  Timely  Return  of  Firm  Order  Confirmations.  We  conclude  that  Verizons
 reported  performance  metrics  indicate  that  it  consistently  provides  timely  confirmation  notices  to
 competing  LECs  in  Massachusetts  for  xDSL  unbundled  loop  orders.  424  We  encourage  Verizon  to
 418  See  PO-  1-  06  for  EDI.  The  performance  data  for  these  months  show  that  Verizon  consistently  responds  faster
 to  queries  for  loop  qualification  information  from  the  mechanized  LiveWire  database  placed  from  competitors
 application-  to-  application  interfaces  than  to  similar  queries  placed  from  VADIs  retail  pre-  ordering  interfaces.
 From  October  through  December  2000,  competitors  received  mechanized  loop  qualification  responses  on  average
 within  3.  11,  2.  92,  and  3.  02  seconds  respectively,  as  compared  to  4.  72,  17.  26,  11.  85  seconds  for  VADIs  retail
 personnel.
 419  In  its  reply  comments,  Verizon  explains  that  it  has  not  reported  data  for  the  PO-  8-  01  and  PO-  8-  02  metrics
 measuring  the  timeliness  of  its  responses  to  pre-  order  manual  loop  qualification  and  engineering  record  requests,
 because  there  are  currently  no  electronic  pre-  ordering  OSS  functions  for  manual  loop  qualification  and  engineering
 record  requests.  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Guerard/  Canny  Reply  Decl.  at  13.
 420  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  Tab  J.  As  discussed  below,  Verizons  performance
 data  also  show  that  it  returns  to  competitors  ordering  xDSL  loops  timely  firm  order  confirmations  and  rejects,
 which  under  Verizons  current  manual  loop  qualification  process  contain  the  results  of  manual  loop  qualifications.
 See  id.  at  Tab  K  and  Tab  L  (summarizing  Verizons  performance  data  for  September  through  November  2000  for
 DSL  order  confirmation  and  reject  timeliness);  see  also  infra  at  para.  135.
 421  We  note  that  Verizon  has  been  ordered  to  begin  reporting  on  these  two  pre-  ordering  metrics,  in  accordance
 with  the  guidelines  adopted  in  the  carrier-  to-  carrier  working  group.  As  stated  above,  the  availability  of  carrier-  to-carrier
 reports  permits  competitors  to  fully  analyze  Verizons  performance  and  evaluate  it  against  the  performance
 data  they  have  collected  themselves.
 422  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Reply,  App.  A,  Tab  1,  Attach.  C  (showing  100  percent  of  LFACS  queries
 receiving  responses  within  24  hours  for  February  2001).
 423  See  Letter  from  Dee  May,  Executive  Director  Federal  Regulatory,  Verizon,  to  Magalie  Roman  Salas,
 Secretary,  Federal  Communications  Commission,  CC  Docket  No.  01-  9  (filed  April  3,  2001).
 424  As  the  Massachusetts  Department  concluded,  although  [Verizon]  includes  xDSL  orders  with  other  loop
 orders  in  the  denominator  of  the  relevant  metric,  based  upon  our  review  of  [Verizons]  performance  data,  it
 appears  that  [Verizon]  returns  [xDSL  confirmation  notices]  within  the  stated  interval  almost  all  of  the  time.
 Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  298.  For  example,  from  September  through  December
 (continued.)
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 work  in  the  collaborative  process  to  adopt  disaggregated  performance  metrics  for  xDSL  and
 digital  loops,  whether  pre-  qualified  or  manually  qualified.  425  As  the  Commission  explained  in  the
 Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  the  need  for  unambiguous  [xDSL]  performance  standards  and
 measures  has  been  reinforced  by  the  disputes  in  [that]  record  regarding  .  .  .  what  performance  is
 being  measured.  426
 (ii)  Provisioning  Timeliness
 136.  We  find  that  Verizon  demonstrates  that  it  provisions  xDSL-  capable  loops  for
 competing  carriers  in  substantially  the  same  time  and  manner  that  it  installs  xDSL-  capable  loops
 for  its  own  retail  operations.  In  analyzing  Verizons  provisioning  performance  for  checklist
 compliance,  we  continue  to  rely  primarily  upon  the  performance  measurements  identified  in  the
 Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order  and  SWBT  Texas  Order,  i.  e.,  missed  installation  appointments  and
 average  completion  intervals.  427
 (Continued  from  previous  page)
 2000,  respectively,  for  Loop/  Pre-  qualified  Complex/  LNP  orders,  Verizon  timely  returned  99.68,  99.82,  99.48,
 and  99.  79  percent  of  confirmation  notices  for  flow-  through  orders  within  2  hours;  97.  35,  97.  35,  97.  27,  and  97.  88
 percent  of  confirmation  notices  for  orders  of  less  than  10  lines  within  24  hours;  and  96.90,  99.73,  100.00,  and
 99.  74  percent  of  confirmation  notices  for  orders  equal  to  or  more  than  10  lines  within  72  hours.  Verizon  likewise
 exceeded  the  95  percent  benchmark  for  timely  return  of  reject  notices  during  this  period.  See  OR-  1-  02,  OR-  1-  04,
 OR-  1-  06,  OR-  2-  02,  OR-  2-  04,  OR-  2-  06.  Pre-  qualified  Complex  orders  encompass  orders  for  pre-  qualified  xDSL-capable
 loops,  and  include  specifically  orders  for  pre-  qualified  2-  wire  xDSL  and  2-  wire  digital  loops.  See  Verizon
 Massachusetts  I  Guerard/  Canny  Decl.  Attach.  B  at  100.  Verizon  also  appears  to  have  exceeded  the  95  percent
 benchmark  for  timely  return  of  confirmation  and  reject  notices  with  respect  to  manually  qualified,  2-  wire  xDSL
 loop  orders.  For  example,  from  September  through  December  2000,  respectively,  for  2  Wire  xDSL  Service
 orders,  Verizon  timely  returned  98.  75,  98.  67,  99.  25,  and  96.  77  percent  of  confirmation  notices,  and  98.  80,  98.  92,
 99.38,  97.75  percent  of  reject  notices,  for  orders  of  less  than  10  lines  within  72  hours.  See  OR-  1-  04  and  OR-  2-  04.
 425  In  Texas,  for  example,  SBC  disaggregated  its  order  confirmation  timeliness  performance  data  into  separate
 categories  for  stand-  alone  loops,  loops  ordered  with  a  ported  number,  digital  loops,  and  xDSL  loops.  See  id.  at
 paras.  172,  288.  SBCs  disaggregated  data  arose  from  a  Texas  Commission  proceeding  and  involved  joint  efforts
 by  SBC,  interested  competitive  LECs,  and  the  Texas  Commission.  See  id.  at  paras.  286-  90.  In  Massachusetts,
 beginning  with  its  August  2000  carrier-  to-  carrier  metrics,  Verizon  has  disaggregated  manually-  qualified,  2-  wire
 xDSL  loop  ordering  performance  measures  from  manually  qualified,  2-  wire  digital  loop  ordering  performance
 measures.  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Guerard/  Canny  Reply  Decl.  Attach.  D  at  7,  22  (metrics  OR-  1-  03-  06  and
 OR-  2-  03-  06).  Furthermore,  one  of  the  consensus  items  from  the  New  York  carrier-  to-  carrier  working  group,
 whose  results  are  likewise  to  be  implemented  in  Massachusetts  shortly,  see,  e.  g.,  Verizon  Guerard/  Canny  Decl.  at
 para.  15,  calls  for  Verizon  to  disaggregate  further  its  2-  wire  xDSL  services  ordering  metrics  into  separate  measures
 pertaining  to  2-  wire  xDSL  loops  and  DSL  line  sharing.  See  Verizon  Guerard/  Canny  Decl.  Attach.  A  at  2,  7-  8
 (discussing  further  disaggregation  to  line  sharing  order  confirmation  and  reject  timeliness  metrics,  specifically  OR-1-
 03-  06  and  OR-  2-  03-  06).  Such  disaggregation  likewise  should  apply  to  performance  data  on  reject  notice
 timeliness,  as  captured  in  the  OR-  2  metrics.
 426  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  4123,  para.  334.
 427  The  New  York  Commission  and  Massachusetts  Department  established  Verizons  provisioning  of  2-  Wire
 xDSL  services  as  the  appropriate  retail  analogue  for  competing  carrier  xDSL  loops  in  the  performance
 measurement  for  missed  installation  appointments.  Verizon  notes,  however,  that,  for  purposes  of  one  xDSL
 measure,  the  Percent  Completed  in  6  Days  measure,  PR  3-  10,  the  retail  analogue  has  been  changed  to  Verizons
 installation  of  POTS  second  lines.  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  para.  94.
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 137.  Percent  Missed  Installation  Appointments.  Recent  performance  data  show  that
 Verizons  missed  appointment  measure  demonstrates  parity  performance  for  competitive  LECs.  428
 Although  past  performance  indicates  some  statistically  significant  disparities,  the  trend  in
 Massachusetts  has  improved  significantly  and,  in  the  months  of  September,  October,  November
 and  December,  Verizons  performance  moved  to  within  approximately  two  percentage  points  of
 Verizons  retail  missed  appointment  rate.  429  Thus,  the  record  shows  that  whatever  performance
 disparities  may  have  existed  in  the  past,  they  have  been  narrowed  to  a  small  margin.  430
 138.  We  find  no  basis  in  the  record  to  support  NAS  contention  that  Verizon  grants
 preferential  installation  appointments  to  its  retail  affiliate.  431  Verizon  states  that  it  offers
 428  This  performance  metric  is  disaggregated  to  divide  Verizons  missed  installation  appointments  between  those
 requiring  dispatch  of  a  technician  and  those  not  requiring  dispatch.  A  dispatch  typically  involves  sending  a
 Verizon  technician  in  to  a  Verizon  central  office  to  provision  a  particular  UNE  or  out  into  the  field  to  work  in
 the  outside  plant.  To  date,  competing  carriers  generally  request  stand-  alone  xDSL-  capable  loops  and  thus  request
 dispatch  xDSL  loops  which  require  a  Verizon  technician  to  perform  field  work  to  provision  an  xDSL-  capable
 loop.  Verizons  retail  xDSL  provisioning  is  overwhelmingly  no-  dispatch  because  its  ADSL  services  are  provided
 through  line  sharing  arrangements.  Since  filing  its  original  application,  Verizon  has  amended  its  carrier-  to-  carrier
 performance  reports  to  include  both  dispatch  and  no-  dispatch  information  in  the  missed  appointments  measure.
 During  the  initial  phase  of  this  proceeding,  Verizon  was  unable  to  resolve  the  discrepancy  between  the  average
 completion  interval  and  percent  missed  appointments  measures  for  competing  carrier  no  dispatch  orders.  On
 December  3,  2000,  Verizon  offered  an  explanation  for  this  discrepancy.  Verizon  discovered  that  performance  for
 all  unbundled  xDSL  loops  was  aggregated  in  the  reported  results  for  PR  4-  04,  whether  or  not  the  orders  required  a
 dispatch.  See  Letter  from  Dee  May,  Executive  Director  Federal  Regulatory,  Verizon  to  Eric  Einhorn,  Policy  and
 Program  Planning  Division,  Common  Carrier  Bureau,  Federal  Communications  Commission,  CC  Docket  No.  00-176
 (filed  Dec.  3,  2000).  Since  then,  Verizon  has  reported  both  dispatch  and  no-  dispatch  volumes  in  the  percent
 missed  appointment  measure  for  the  months  of  September,  October,  November  and  December.  Accordingly,  the
 Commission  can  now  rely  upon  competing  carrier  carrier-  to-  carrier  data  when  examining  the  percent  missed
 appointments  metrics  to  obtain  a  more  accurate  dispatch-  to-  dispatch  comparison  and  therefore  a  more  reliable
 picture  of  Verizons  performance.
 429  The  four  month  average  (September    December)  for  competing  carrier  missed  appointment  rates,  for  dispatch
 services  was  6.  4  percent  compared  to  4.  6  percent  for  Verizon.  Indeed,  in  November,  Verizon  provided  better
 service  to  competitors  than  its  retail  affiliate.  In  the  months  of  October,  November  and  December,  the  missed
 appointment  rate  for  dispatch  xDSL  services  for  competitors  was  3.  67,  2.  40  and  4.  19  percent  and  the  retail  rate
 was  3.  18,  4.  21  and  2.  13  percent,  respectively.  Verizons  performance  in  September  showed  some  disparities,
 which  Verizon  attributes  to  the  lingering  effect  of  a  strike  it  experienced  in  August.  For  September,  Verizon
 missed  12.  75  percent  of  its  dispatch  installation  appointments  for  competitors  compared  to  7.  13  percent  for  itself.
 See  PR  4-  04  (Provisioning  ,  Two  Wire  xDSL  Services,  percent  Missed  Appointment,  Verizon,  Dispatch).  Verizon
 responds  that  its  September  results  were  adversely  affected  by  the  work  stoppage,  because  orders  missed  in  August
 but  completed  in  September  were  recorded  as  missed  appointments  in  the  September  performance  reports.  Verizon
 performed  a  study  which  excludes  orders  not  originally  due  during  the  strike,  which  shows  that  the  adjusted  missed
 appointment  rate  of  3.  79  percent  for  September  is  comparable  to  its  October  and  November  results.  See  Verizon
 Massachusetts  II  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  para.  72  and  Attach.  V.
 430  While  the  Department  of  Justice  takes  issue  with  isolated  xDSL  performance  measures  and  the  manner  in
 which  those  measures  report  Verizons  wholesale  performance,  it  does  not  specifically  criticize  the  percent  missed
 appointments  measure  for  stand-  alone  xDSL  loops.  See  generally  Department  of  Justice  Massachusetts  I
 Evaluation  at  8.
 431  See  NAS  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  5;  but  see  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  I  Reply  at  86.
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 Federal  Communications  Commission  FCC  01-  130
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 nondiscriminatory  access  to  shorter  appointment  windows  for  competitive  LECs  and  Verizon
 alike.  432  Given  Verizons  representation  that  it  offers  identical  installation  appointment  windows
 to  customers  of  both  competitors  and  its  retail  affiliate  that  have  extenuating  circumstances,  we
 emphasize  that  Verizon  is  required  to  apply  this  policy  consistently.  433
 139.  Average  Completion  Interval.  We  find  that  Verizons  average  completion  interval
 data  for  the  period  September  through  December  show  nondiscriminatory  treatment.  During  this
 period,  the  average  completion  interval  for  orders  requiring  a  dispatch,  which  captures  the  vast
 majority  of  competing  carrier  orders,  indicates  a  trend  of  improving  performance  and  shows  that
 retail  performance  is,  on  average,  within  approximately  one-  half  a  day  of  Verizons  retail  affiliate
 and  approximately  one  and  one-  half  days  longer  than  the  standard  six-  day  interval  established  by
 the  Massachusetts  Department.  434  The  average  completion  interval  for  Verizon  retail  during  the
 period  September  through  December  is  also  approximately  one  day  longer  than  the  standard
 interval.  435  Verizon  argues  that  these  results  show  nondiscriminatory  treatment  and  any  average
 completion  interval  disparities  that  remain  should  be  discounted  because  these  results  are  skewed
 by  competing  carrier  behavior.  Specifically,  Verizon  asserts  that  orders  which  were  not
 prequalified  (which  have  a  9-  day  interval)  and  orders  which  request  installation  dates  outside  of
 the  standard  interval  skew  the  carrier-  to-  carrier  results.  436
 432  Verizon  states  that  if  a  retail  customer  has  extenuating  circumstances  and  requests  a  shorter  installation
 appointment  window,  Verizon  will  schedule  either  a  morning  or  afternoon  appointment  window.  Verizon  will  also
 schedule  a  morning  or  afternoon  appointment  for  a  competing  LEC  customer  with  extenuating  circumstances.
 Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Reply  Decl.  at  para.  38.
 433  Failure  to  provide  nondiscriminatory  access  to  installation  appointments  at  identical  windows  could  subject
 Verizon  to  a  targeted  enforcement  action  or  carrier-  initiated  complaint.  See  infra  Part  IX.
 434  The  4  month  (September    December)  average  for  competing  carrier  dispatch  orders  was  7.  3  days  compared  to
 6.  94  days  for  Verizon.  In  the  months  of  September,  October,  November  and  December  Verizon  completed  no-dispatch
 competing  carrier  orders  in  9.7,  7.75,  7.3  and  6.7  days  compared  to  11.4,  7.63,  5.2  and  6.3  days  for
 Verizon.  See  PR  2-  02  (Provisioning  ,  Two  Wire  xDSL  Services,  Average  Interval  Completed,  Total  Dispatch).
 While  the  September  results  for  this  measure  appear  to  be  affected  by  the  strike,  Verizon  states  that  during  the
 period  September  through  November  2000,  the  average  completion  interval  to  provision  DSL  loops  for  competitors
 where  a  dispatch  was  required  averaged  8.  32  days,  while  Verizons  retail  ADSL  orders  that  likewise  required  a
 dispatch  were  provisioned  within  an  average  of  8.  48  days.  Verizon  avers  that  consistent  with  the  relevant  business
 rules,  this  measure  reports  the  time  from  Verizons  receipt  of  a  valid  service  order  to  actual  work  completion,  and
 uses  the  same  measurement  points  for  both  retail  and  wholesale  orders.  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II
 Guerard/  Canny  Decl.  Attach.  B,  at  para.  42;  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  para.  75.
 435  See  PR  2-  02  (Provisioning,  Two  Wire  xDSL  Services,  Average  Interval  Completed,  Total  Dispatch).
 436  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  para.  75.  In  its  original  application,  Verizon
 argued  that  its  recalculated  results  -  which  exclude  manually  qualified  loops  -  for  average  completion  interval  also
 show  parity.  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Guerard/  Canny  Decl.  at  para.  79  and  Attach.  K.  Approximately  half  of
 the  orders,  according  to  Verizon,  were  pre-  qualified,  while  the  remainder  required  manual  loop  qualification.  The
 results  of  this  study  show  that  [  t]  he  average  interval  completed  for  pre-  qualified  xDSL  loops  was  6.  46  days
 compared  to  6.  69  days  for  retail  in  June  and  5.  40  days  compared  to  5.  93  days  for  retail  in  July.  See  Verizon
 Massachusetts  I  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  para.  101.  Covad  responded  to  Verizons  study  questioning  its
 methodology  and  results.  See  Letter  from  Jason  Oxman,  Senior  Governmental  Affairs  Counsel  to  Magalie  Roman
 (continued.)
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 Federal  Communications  Commission  FCC  01-  130
 78
 140.  Although  we  recognize  that  the  average  completion  interval  as  reported  by  the
 carrier-  to-  carrier  measure  slightly  exceeds  the  standard  interval  adopted  by  the  Massachusetts
 Department,  we  note  that  Verizons  performance  has  improved  over  the  period  September
 through  December  while  the  number  of  competitor  orders  has  remained  consistent.  437  This
 improving  trend  and  the  competitively  insignificant  disparity  between  competitor  and  Verizon
 completion  intervals  persuades  us  that  Verizons  technicians  have  gained  sufficient  expertise  and
 operational  readiness  to  adjust  to  the  growth  of  competition  in  Massachusetts.  438  To  evaluate
 Verizons  provisioning  timeliness,  we  look  to  the  totality  of  the  evidence  presented  to  us.  It  is
 based  on  this  totality  and  specifically,  the  measures  the  Commission  has  relied  upon  in  the  past,
 that  we  conclude  that  Verizons  provisioning  timeliness  performance  offers  competitors  a
 meaningful  opportunity  to  compete.
 141.  Although  Verizon  and  some  commenters  urge  us  to  rely  on  other  measures,  we
 need  not  do  so  in  this  case  because  Verizon  has  demonstrated  compliance  with  this  aspect  of  our
 loops  analysis  on  the  basis  of  the  measures  the  Commission  has  relied  upon  in  previous  section
 271  orders.  We  decline  to  rely  upon  the  percent  on-  time  measure  supplied  by  Verizon  439  or
 percent  completed  within  6  days  measures  supplied  by  competitors,  440  because  we  do  not  have
 (Continued  from  previous  page)
 Salas,  Secretary,  Federal  Communications  Commission,  CC  Docket  No.  00-  176  (filed  November  7,  2000)  (Covad
 Nov.  7  Ex  Parte  Letter).
 437  Competitor  order  volumes  captured  in  the  average  completion  interval,  PR  2-  01/  2-  02  peaked  in  October  2000
 with  934  orders  and  have  remained  well-  above  600  orders  per  month  for  the  last  four  months.  See  PR  2-  01/  2-  02
 (Provisioning,  2-  Wire  xDSL  Services,  Average  Interval  Completed,  Total  Dispatch,  Total  No-  Dispatch).  Rhythms
 argues  that  Verizons  contention  that  VADI  also  receives  service  outside  the  standard  interval  is  no  response  to
 Verizons  late  wholesale  performance  for  unaffiliated  competitive  LECs.  Rhythms  states  that  it  makes  no
 difference  to  Rhythms  that  it  received  parity  with  Verizons  retail  service  when  parity  means  that  Rhythms
 received  its  loops  two  days  later  than  the  standard  interval,  an  interval  Rhythms  notes  is  already  an  unnecessarily
 long  period  of  time.  See  Rhythms  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  11-  12  and  Williams  Supplemental  Declaration  at
 para.  21.  CIX  argues  that  the  Massachusetts  Departments  six-  day  interval  was  defined  through  a  long  and
 thorough  regulatory  process  and  Verizon  should  be  accountable  for  failing  to  meet  that  interval  for  competitive
 LEC  orders.  CIX  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  22.
 438  The  Department  of  Justice  recognizes  that  Verizons  on-  time  performance  is  improving  but  notes  that  it  falls
 short  of  the  95  percent  on-  time  benchmark.  Department  of  Justice  Massachusetts  II  Evaluation  at  9.
 439  Verizon  supplements  its  affirmative  showing  by  arguing  that  it  provides  xDSL  loops  when  competing  carriers
 request  them  and  asks  us  to  consider,  in  addition  to  the  average  completion  interval,  Verizons  performance  under
 a  different  metric  which  measures  percent  on-  time  installation.  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II
 Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  para.  66.  Verizon  claims  that  when  facility  misses  are  included  in  the  results,
 Verizons  performance,  when  adjusted  to  remove  the  impact  of  the  strike,  is  approximately  85  percent  on-  time  in
 October  and  in  November  it  is  approximately  90  percent  on-  time.  Verizons  removal  of  strike-  affected  orders  from
 these  measures  for  September  and  October  2000  improves  Verizons  reported  performance  somewhat  (from  75.7  to
 86.6  percent).  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  para.  69  and  Attach.  S.  Verizons
 final  data  presentation  of  the  revised  on-  time  measure,  which  excludes  orders  for  which  Verizon  cannot  provide  a
 loop  and  adjusts  for  strike-  affected  orders,  shows  on-  time  performance  that  exceeds  the  95  percent  standard  in
 November  2000.  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  para.  66  and  Attach.  R.
 440  Competing  carriers  contest  Verizons  claim  that  it  provides  xDSL-  capable  loops  on  time  and  point  to  yet
 another  measure  of  on-  time  performance,  the  percentage  of  xDSL  loops  completed  within  the  standard  interval  of  6
 (continued.)
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 Federal  Communications  Commission  FCC  01-  130
 79
 enough  data  or  experience  with  them  for  determining  a  BOCs  compliance  with  section  271.  441
 Moreover,  commenters  have  offered  no  persuasive  reason  to  depart  from  Commission  practice  of
 placing  primary  reliance  upon  the  percent  missed  appointment  or  the  average  completion  interval
 measures.  Accordingly,  we  view  the  on-  time  measures  cited  by  Verizon  and  the  percent
 completed  within  6  days  measure  cited  by  competitors  as  additional  diagnostic  data  to  evaluate
 Verizons  contention  that  it  provides  xDSL-  capable  loops  in  a  timely  manner.  442  We  find  that
 these  measures  support  rather  than  refute  the  measures  the  Commission  relied  upon  in  the  past
 and  confirm  our  view  that  the  missed  appointment  and  average  completion  interval  measures
 provide  an  accurate  description  of  Verizons  performance  for  competitors.
 (iii)  Provisioning  Quality
 142.  We  conclude  that  Verizon  provides  xDSL  loops  to  competing  carriers  at  a  level  of
 loop  installation  quality  that  meets  the  requirements  of  checklist  item  4.  In  analyzing  installation  (Continued  from  previous  page)
 days.  See  PR  3-  10  (Provisioning,  2-  Wire  xDSL  Services,  percent  Completed  in  6  Days).  In  September,  October,
 November  and  December  Verizon  completed  62.  1,  64.  6,  63.  4  and  72.  9  percent  of  competing  carrier  xDSL  loops
 within  6  days.  In  the  same  months,  Verizon  completed  65.5,  82.3,  87.8,  and  87.2  percent  of  xDSL  loops  within  6
 days  for  itself.  See  Rhythms  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  28;  Department  of  Justice  Massachusetts  II  Evaluation
 at  9  n.  2;  CIX  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  22.  USIAPA  argues  that  the  real  provisioning  interval  is,  on  average,
 25  days  between  the  first  FOC  and  actual  installation  because  some  24  percent  of  orders  in  Massachusetts  receive
 sliding  FOCs.  See  USISPA  Massachusetts  II  Reply  at  8.  During  Verizons  original  proceeding,  Verizon  and
 competing  carriers  reached  consensus  to  eliminate  the  retail  analogue  and  instead  set  a  95  percent  benchmark
 standard  for  the  percent  completed  within  6  days  measure.  Consensus  was  also  reached  to  exclude  orders  that  were
 not  pre-  qualified,  orders  requesting  intervals  outside  of  the  standard  interval  and  orders  missed  for  lack  of
 facilities.  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Reply.  Decl.  at  paras.  77-  80.  Verizon  engaged  a
 consultant,  Lexecon,  to  recalculate  the  reported  results  for  this  measure  consistent  with  the  exclusions  discussed
 above  and  to  adjust  this  measure  for  orders  affected  by  the  strike.  When  Verizons  performance  for  this  measure  is
 calculated  in  accordance  with  the  new  business  rules,  Verizon  argues  it  provides  84  percent  of  xDSL  loops  between
 September  and  November  with  six  days.  This  study  shows  that  during  the  September  through  November  period,
 95  percent  of  the  competitor  orders  not  completed  within  the  standard  six  day  installation  interval  are  completed
 within  7  days.  The  Lexecon  study  shows  that  under  the  revised  PR  3-  10  measure,  in  September,  89.12  percent  of
 competitive  LEC  orders  were  completed  within  6  days;  80.  00  percent  were  completed  within  6  days  in  October  and
 82.  24  percent  were  completed  within  6  days  in  November.  Reply  Appendix,  Tab  4,  Joint  Reply  Declaration  of
 Robert  H.  Gertner  and  Gustavo  E.  Bamberger.  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  para.
 82.  Competitors  respond  that  even  Verizons  recalculated  results  show  that  that  a  substantial  number  of  orders  are
 completed  outside  the  standard  interval.  Rhythms  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  11-  12;  CIX  Massachusetts  II
 Comments  at  22.
 441  Furthermore,  by  some  estimates,  83.  77  percent  of  all  DSL  orders  are  excluded  from  the  percent  completed
 within  6  days  measure.  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  para.  84.  We  note  that  the
 Commission  has  not  previously  relied  upon  either  the  on-  time  measure  cited  by  Verizon  nor  the  percent  completed
 within  6  days  metric  cited  by  competing  carriers.  Data  supporting  the  6-  day  measure  became  available  for  the  first
 time  in  July  2000  and  data  supporting  the  on-  time  measure  became  available  in  June.  The  Massachusetts
 Department  did  not  initially  evaluate  the  percent  completed  on  time  measure  relied  upon  by  Verizon  and  also  did
 not  evaluate  the  percent  completed  with  6  day  measure  cited  by  competing  carriers.
 442  For  example,  when  the  percent  completed  within  6  days  results  are  examined  in  conjunction  with  the  average
 completion  interval,  it  is  not  surprising  that  approximately  80  percent  of  orders  are  completed  within  six  days
 because  the  average  completion  interval  is  slightly  more  than  6  days.
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 quality  we  continue  to  rely  primarily  upon  the  measure  identified  in  the  Bell  Atlantic  New  York
 Order  and  SWBT  Texas  Order    percent  installation  troubles  within  30  days.  443  Assessing  the
 quality  of  loop  installation  is  important  because  advanced  services  customers  that  experience
 substantial  troubles  in  the  period  following  installation  of  an  xDSL-  capable  loop  are  unlikely  to
 remain  with  a  competing  carrier.  444
 143.  As  an  initial  matter,  we  reject  Verizons  request  that  we  depart  from  relying  upon
 certain  metrics  the  Commission  has  relied  upon  in  the  past.  We  conclude  that  Verizons  use  of
 the  total  DSL  trouble  report  rate  as  a  substitute  for  the  percent  trouble  within  30  days  does  not
 measure  the  quality  of  Verizons  installation  performance.  445  In  fact,  it  is  not  even  classified  in  the
 carrier-  to-  carrier  reports  or  the  Commissions  past  orders  as  a  provisioning  metric,  but  rather,  as
 a  measure  of  maintenance  and  repair  activities.  Verizon  has  not  persuaded  us  that  the  metric  for
 trouble  reports  within  30  days  of  installation  is  any  less  probative  of  installation  quality  in  the
 factual  context  of  this  application  than  it  was  in  the  previous  applications  wherein  the  Commission
 relied  on  this  metric.  Specifically,  we  find  that  the  percent  troubles  within  30  days  measure  is
 more  probative  of  installation  quality  than  the  total  trouble  report  rate  which  measures  all  xDSL-lines
 in  service  throughout  Verizons  network,  not  lines  recently  installed.  446
 144.  During  this  proceeding,  the  New  York  Commission  and  the  Massachusetts
 Department  accepted  a  consensus  revision  to  the  trouble  report  within  30  days  measure  to  control
 for  certain  carrier  business  practices.  447  Under  the  new  consensus  measure,  the  metric  will  include
 only  trouble  reports  that  are  submitted  within  30  days  of  installation  by  competitors  that
 participate  in  acceptance  testing.  448  The  revised  definition  reflects  the  fact  that  properly
 443  The  Commission  stated  in  the  SWBT  Texas  Order,  that  we  consider  trouble  reports  within  30  days  as
 indicative  of  the  quality  of  network  components  supplied  by  the  incumbent  LEC.  SWBT  Texas  Order,  15  FCC
 Rcd  at  18504-  05,  para.  299.
 444  SWBT  Texas  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  18504-  05,  para.  299.
 445  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Reply  Decl.  at  para.  86.
 446  See  Letter  from  Dee  May,  Executive  Director  Federal  Regulatory,  Verizon,  to  Magalie  Roman  Salas,
 Secretary,  Federal  Communications  Commission,  CC  Docket  No.  00-  176  (filed  Nov.  14,  2000);  see  also  Letter
 from  Edward  D.  Young,  III,  Verizon,  to  William  E.  Kennard,  Chairman,  Federal  Communications  Commission,
 CC  Docket  No.  00-  176  (filed  Dec.  1,  2000).
 447  The  New  York  Commission  adjusted  the  retail  analogue  to  compare  Verizons  performance  for  competitors
 with  Verizons  own  retail  POTS  service  rather  than  its  DSL  service  because  Verizons  DSL  service  is  almost
 always  provided  over  a  loop  that  is  already  working  and  delivering  dial  tone,  whereas  retail  POTS  will  involve
 providing  service  over  a  loop  that  is  not  already  working.  Thus,  because  stand-  alone  loops  better  approximate  the
 manner  in  which  Verizon  provisions  stand  alone  xDSL-  capable  loops  to  competitors,  it  was  selected  as  the
 appropriate  retail  analogue.
 448  Acceptance  testing  is  a  joint  project  whereby  after  installation,  Verizon  contacts  competitors  so  the  loop  can  be
 tested  for  improper  voltages,  or  other  impediments  to  xDSL  service,  such  as  ringers  and  load  coils.  Under
 established  acceptance  testing  procedures,  Verizon  shorts  a  loop  enabling  competitors  to  verify  continuity  length
 and  to  ensure  that  the  loop  meets  a  competitors  requirements.  Competitors  then  provide  to  Verizon  a
 confirmation  indicating  a  loop  is  in  working  order,  or,  in  the  alternative,  reject  the  loop  as  non-  working.
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 conducted  acceptance  testing  could  identify  some  installation  quality  problems  that  could  be
 resolved  at  the  time  the  competitive  LEC  and  Verizon  conduct  the  acceptance  test.  When
 Verizon  presents  data  that  control  for  the  exclusions  adopted  by  the  consensus  revision,  the
 performance  dissimilarities  are  reduced  or  eliminated  entirely.  449  Competitive  LECs  question
 whether  Verizon  may  appropriately  exclude  some  of  these  trouble  reports  and  have  used  carrier-specific
 data  supplied  by  Verizon  to  argue  that  Verizon  does  not  provide  loops  at  an  acceptable
 level  of  quality.  450
 145.  We  agree  with  the  Department  of  Justice  that  Verizons  adjustments  to  the  data
 are  justified  if  an  inference  could  reliably  be  made  when  the  type  of  trouble  reported:  (1)  could  not
 occur  post-  acceptance,  but  rather  must  have  existed  at  acceptance;  and  (2)  would  consistently  be
 449  Verizon  engaged  Lexecon  to  recompute  the  I-  code  rate  (trouble  reports  within  30  days)  presented  in  the
 official  carrier-  to-  carrier  data,  for  September  through  November  2000  using  the  new  consensus  method.  Lexecon
 found  that  the  performance  disparity  between  competitive  LEC  and  retail  I-  code  rate  was  eliminated  in  September
 and  substantially  reduced    by  51  percent  in  October  (from  8.  2  to  4.  34  percentage  points);  and  by  74  percent  in
 November  (from  4.  96  to  1.  29  percentage  points).  Verizon  contends  that  the  weighted  average  I-  code  rate  under
 the  new  consensus  rules  for  September  through  November  2000  was  4.78  for  [competing  carriers]  and  3.3  for
 Verizons  retail  customers.  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  para.  94.  Verizon  goes  on  to
 adjust  its  performance  results  to  include  troubles  that  could  have  been  discovered  by  a  properly  conducted
 acceptance  test.  Under  this  adjustment  the  competitive  LEC  I-  code  rate  was  3.12  percent  in  September  2000;  6.08
 percent  for  October  2000,  and  4.19  percent  for  November  2000.  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II
 Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  para.  95  Attach.  Z.  The  weighted  average  for  this  period  is  4.  28  percent  for
 competitive  LECs  and  3.  30  percent  for  Verizon  retail.  Id.  Verizon  performs  a  third  level  of  analysis:  after
 quantifying  the  I-  code  rate  under  the  revised  measure  recently  approved  by  the  New  York  Commission,  and  then
 excluding  those  I-  codes  that  could  have  been  discovered  by  a  properly  conducted  acceptance  test,  Verizon  shows
 that  the  gap  between  competitive  LECs  and  retail  I-  code  rate  in  September  and  November  2000  is  eliminated  and
 reduced  to  less  than  one  percent  in  October  2000.  The  adjusted  rate  is  1.43  percent  for  September  2000,  4.04
 percent  for  October  2000  and  1.94  percent  for  November  2000  compared  to  the  weighted  average  during  this
 period  of  2.  36  percent  for  competitive  LECs  and  3.  30  percent  for  Verizon.  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II
 Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  para.  96  and  Attach.  AA.
 450  See  Rhythms  Massachusetts  II  Williams  Decl.  para.  26;  Covad  Clancy  Decl.  para.  10-  23;  see  also  USISPA
 Massachusetts  II  Reply  at  8.  The  Department  of  Justice  questions  the  validity  of  the  performance  data  and
 contends  that  Verizons  exclusion  methodology  infers  improper  acceptance  testing  from  the  nature  of  the  trouble
 reported.  See  Department  of  Justice  Massachusetts  II  Evaluation  at  10  n.  39.  The  Massachusetts  Department
 discounts  this  measure  entirely  and  questions  whether  the  measure  accurately  captures  Verizons  ability  to
 provision  quality  loops.  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  II  Evaluation  at  30.  We  agree  with  the
 Department  of  Justice  that  the  calculation  of  the  revised  measure  appears  to  be  flawed.  While  trouble  reports  from
 carriers  that  do  not  conduct  acceptance  tests  are  excluded  from  the  numerator  of  this  measure,  orders  from  such
 carriers  are  not  excluded  from  the  denominator.  The  result  is  to  inappropriately  skew  the  trouble  report  rate.
 When  these  orders  are  excluded  from  the  denominator,  the  reported  trouble  rate  is  higher  for  October  and
 November  2000  under  the  revised  measure  than  as  reported  under  the  original  carrier-  to-  carrier  measure.  The
 Department  of  Justice  has  recalculated  PR  6-  01  to  control  for  this  anomaly.  Pursuant  to  this  recalculation,  for  the
 period  September  to  November,  competitive  LECs  experienced  6.  99  percent  troubles  within  30  days.  See
 Department  of  Justice  Evaluation  at  10-  11,  Exh.  1.
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 detected  by  the  joint  testing  methods  employed.  451  The  issue  of  whether  competing  carriers  can
 consistently  detect  loop  quality  problems  is  disputed  by  Covad,  Rhythms  and  NAS.  452  Covad
 argues  that  carrier-  specific  data  show  that  it  experiences  installation  quality  troubles  which  are
 over  four  times  higher  for  its  orders  compared  to  Verizon  retail.  453  Verizon  responds  that  when
 an  adjustment  is  made  for  Covads  failure  to  properly  conduct  acceptance  testing  its  I-  code  rate
 falls  to  below  retail.  454  Verizon  forwards  similar  carrier-  specific  responses  to  Rhythms  and  NAS.  455
 146.  We  find  that  Verizon  is  making  loops  available  at  substantially  the  same  level  of
 quality  as  Verizon  provides  to  itself.  In  reaching  this  conclusion  we  rely  upon  data  that  are
 adjusted  to  comply  with  the  recently-  adopted  consensus  revision  to  the  troubles  with  30  days
 451  See  Department  of  Justice  Massachusetts  II  Evaluation  at  11  n.  39.  Verizon  responds  that  while  it  is  possible
 for  a  DSL  loop  to  break  after  the  loop  is  installed,  that  is  a  rare  occurrence.  Verizon  Massachusetts  II
 Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  para.  100.
 452  See  Covad  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  11;  NAS  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  11;  Rhythms  Massachusetts
 II  Comments  at  18.
 453  In  its  comments,  Covad  reviewed  8  trouble  tickets  in  the  month  of  November  to  refute  Verizons  argument
 that  Covad  knowingly  accepted  non-  working  loops.  Covad  contends  that  these  loops  were  accepted  because:  (1)
 the  Verizon  technician  was  not  at  the  NID  when  the  test  was  performed;  (2)  Verizon  failed  to  provision  the  loop  to
 the  appropriate  NID;  or  (3)  the  loops  became  non-  working  after  Covad  accepted  it.  See  Covad  Massachusetts  II
 Reply  at  9.  On  reply  Covad  surveyed  its  acceptance  testing  logs  for  all  of  the  I-  codes  reported  in  November.  This
 survey  showed  that  of  the  25  I-  codes  which  Verizon  excluded  from  its  adjusted  performance  measure,  none  of  the
 installation  quality  troubles  could  have  been  discovered  at  the  time  of  acceptance  and  all  of  these  installation
 quality  troubles  were  properly  addressed  as  maintenance  and  repair  issues.  Covad  argues  that  in  many  cases  its
 records  show  that  loops  were  much  shorter  at  the  time  of  acceptance  testing  than  when  repaired  by  Verizon,
 demonstrating  that  Verizon  did  not  test  the  full  loop  length  during  acceptance  testing.  See  Covad  Massachusetts  II
 Reply  at  10.  Verizon  responds  to  Covads  initial  survey  of  I-  codes  by  showing  that  in  two  cases,  Covads  test
 equipment  was  not  available  to  perform  an  acceptance  test  and  in  two  other  instances,  Covads  acceptance  test
 failed  to  identify  the  presence  of  a  load  coil  and  half  ringer.  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz
 Reply  Decl.  at  para.  91.  In  three  other  instances,  Verizon  states  that  Covad  tested  and  accepted  a  loop  that  Verizon
 identified  as  defective;  Covads  technician  went  to  the  wrong  demarcation  point  and  finally,  Covad  could  not  locate
 the  acceptance  testing  data  on  the  loop  in  question  in  its  database.  See  id.
 454  When  Verizon  controls  for  installation  quality  issues  that  could  have  been  discovered  during  acceptance
 testing  Covads  rate  is  at  parity  for  the  period  September  through  November.  Id.  at  para.  83.
 455  Rhythms  claims  that  it  reviewed  the  list  of  I-  codes  excluded  by  Verizon  for  acceptance  testing  reasons  and
 states  that  its  records  did  not  match  Verizons.  Rhythms  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  18.  Verizon  states  that
 Rhythms  did  not  provide  any  information  for  a  number  of  the  Rhythms  I-  codes  excluded  by  Verizon.  Verizon
 shows  that  some  of  the  I-  codes  contested  by  Rhythms  were  not  excluded  by  Verizon,  therefore  no  downward
 adjustment  to  the  competitive  LEC  I-  code  rate  was  taken.  Finally,  of  the  remaining  I-  codes  submitted  by  Rhythms,
 Verizons  records  show  that  these  loops  had  ringers  on  the  lines  and  should  have  been  discovered  during
 acceptance  testing;  these  records  contain  inconclusive  information  or  contained  no  relevant  data  or  finally,  the  I-code
 was  not  related  to  Rhythms  failure  to  properly  perform  acceptance  testing.  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II
 Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Reply  Decl.  at  para.  94.  Verizon  performed  a  similar  analysis  for  NAS  adjusting  its  I-  code
 rate  to  below  retail  in  the  period  September  through  November.  See  id.  at  paras.  84-  85.
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 measure.  456  During  the  period  September  through  November  2000,  competitive  LECs
 experienced  installation  quality  troubles  at  a  rate  of  7.0  percent  compared  to  2.3  percent  for
 Verizon  retail.  457  Thus,  the  adjusted  data  narrow  the  facial  disparity  between  Verizons
 performance  to  its  competitors  compared  to  itself.  Moreover,  we  also  note  that  recent
 performance  shows  that  Verizon  has  improved  its  ability  to  provide  competitors  with  xDSL-capable
 loops  at  acceptable  levels  of  quality.  458  We  find,  therefore,  that  the  adjusted  data  coupled
 with  the  improving  trend  in  Verizons  performance  are  sufficient  for  us  to  conclude  that  Verizon
 is  installing  loops  in  a  nondiscriminatory  manner.
 147.  We  are  unable  to  quantify  exactly  the  effect  of  Verizon  and  competitor
 adjustments  to  the  data  because  of  limited  factual  disputes.  459  We  note  however,  that  the
 Massachusetts  Department  has  conducted  a  comprehensive  and  detailed  factual  reconciliation  of
 I-  codes  for  the  month  of  November  2000  with  the  participation  of  Covad  and  Verizon.  460  This
 inquiry  has  yielded  several  process  improvements  that  are  designed  to  improve  Verizons
 installation  quality  results.  461  We  welcome  the  Massachusetts  Departments  participation  in
 456  We  also  agree  with  the  Department  of  Justice  that  Verizons  practice  of  excluding  trouble  reports  from  carriers
 that  do  not  conduct  acceptance  testing  from  the  numerator  but  not  the  denominator  is  inappropriate  and  will  result
 in  inappropriately  low  trouble  report  rates.  See  Department  of  Justice  Evaluation  at  10.  In  this  circumstance,
 where  the  carriers  have  agreed  to  revise  a  measure  going  forward,  we  believe  it  is  reasonable  to  include  the  results
 of  the  revised  measure  to  adjust  Verizons  performance  as  officially  reported.
 457  See  Department  of  Justice  Massachusetts  II  Evaluation  at  10,  Attach.  1.
 458  The  individual  results  for  competitive  LECs  performing  acceptance  testing  for  September,  October  and
 November  were  4.13  percent,  11.18  and  8.22  percent  compared  to  1.93  percent,  2.09  percent  and  2.81  percent  for
 Verizon  retail  over  the  same  period.  See  id.  The  unrevised  carrier-  to-  carrier  data  confirm  this  positive  trend.
 Even  as  volumes  have  remained  substantial,  the  percent  trouble  within  30  days  measure  as  originally  reported
 moved  from  a  high  in  October  2000  of  11.1  percent  to  7.8  percent  in  November  and  5.8  percent  in  December,
 reducing  the  disparity  to  approximately  3  percent  in  the  most  recent  month  we  consider.  In  September,  competitive
 LEC  trouble  reports  within  30  days  were  5.  4  percent.  The  comparable  numbers  for  Verizon  retail  were  1.  93,  2.  09,
 2.  81  and  2.  79  percent  in  September,  October,  November  and  December  respectively.  See  PR  6-  01  (Provisioning,
 2-  Wire  xDSL  Services,  percent  Installation  Troubles  Reported  Within  30  Days).  The  four  month  (September  
 December)  average  for  competitive  LEC  trouble  reports  within  30  days,  according  to  the  unrevised  carrier-  to-carrier
 reports  filed  with  the  application,  was  7.  3  percent  compared  to  2.  4  percent  for  Verizon.
 459  We  note  that  Verizons  adjustment  to  the  data  lower  the  I-  code  rate  to  less  than  7  percent  and  competitive  LEC
 challenges  to  Verizons  adjustment  raise  the  I-  code  rate;  but  in  no  case  do  competitor  challenges  to  Verizons
 adjustment  raise  the  I-  code  rate  above  the  7  percent  level  presented  by  the  revised  carrier-  to-  carrier  measure  as
 calculated  by  the  Department  of  Justice.  See  Letter  from  Paul  Afonso,  General  Counsel,  Massachusetts
 Department  of  Telecommunications  and  Energy  to  Magalie  Roman  Salas,  Secretary,  Federal  Communications
 Commission,  CC  Docket  No.  01-  9  (filed  March  21,  2001)  (Massachusetts  Department  Reconciliation  Letter).
 460  On  March  15  2001,  at  the  request  of  the  Commissions  staff,  the  Massachusetts  Department,  together  with
 Covad  and  Verizon,  undertook  a  review  of  the  disputed  Covad  orders.  After  conducting  its  review,  the
 Massachusetts  Department  submitted  a  list  of  process  improvements  developed  by  Verizon  and  Covad  during  this
 review.
 461  Under  the  auspices  of  the  Massachusetts  Department,  Covad  and  Verizon  have  agreed  to  several  modifications
 or  additions  to  the  existing  acceptance  testing  process.  Verizon  has  agreed  to  implement  a  process  requirement
 (continued.)
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 addressing  Verizons  acceptance  testing  process  and  are  encouraged  by  the  improvements  to  this
 process.  462  We  encourage  carriers  to  bring  issues  such  as  these  to  the  attention  of  state
 commissions  so  that  factual  disputes  can  be  resolved  before  a  BOC  applicant  files  a  section  271
 application  with  this  Commission.
 148.  We  find  that  recent  carrier-  to-  carrier  installation  quality  measures  show  that
 Verizon  has  improved  significantly  its  ability  to  provide  competitors  with  xDSL-  capable  loops  at
 acceptable  levels  of  quality.  463  Moreover,  we  find  that  Verizons  remedial  efforts  to  improve  the
 stand-  alone  xDSL  loop  provisioning  and  acceptance  testing  process,  in  addition  to  those  agreed
 to  in  the  context  of  the  Massachusetts  Departments  reconciliation  proceeding,  are  likely  to
 reduce  competitive  LEC  installation  quality  impairments  in  the  future.  Starting  in  January  2001,
 Verizon  will  tag  DSL  loops  at  both  the  NID  and  the  cross-  connection  box  with  special  services
 markers  to  indicate  to  Verizon  technicians  that  the  loop  is  in  use  for  data  services  and  should  not
 be  used  to  serve  another  customer.  464  Verizon  is  also  engaged  in  on-  site  visits  to  competitive
 LEC  testing  centers  to  discover  ways  to  improve  the  acceptance  testing  process.  465  Verizon  has
 committed  to  providing  competitive  LECs  with  detailed  information  on  their  I-  codes  to  diagnose
 acceptance  testing  issues  and  reconcile  data.  466  Verizon  has  also  agreed  to  a  trial  of  sync  testing
 to  enable  Verizon  technicians,  at  the  time  of  testing,  to  determine  whether  the  competitive  LEC
 (Continued  from  previous  page)
 that  its  technicians  will  cut  down  xDSL  loops  at  the  NID  before  the  final  cooperative  test  is  performed.
 Additionally,  Covad  has  agreed  to  insert  into  its  acceptance  testing  script  a  question  to  determine  whether  the
 Verizon  technician  is  testing  through  the  network  interface  device.  Second,  to  reduce  technician  confusion  about
 where  in  Verizons  outside  plant  the  cooperative  test  was  performed,  the  carriers  have  agreed  to  enhance  the
 demarcation  point  information  procedures  by  establishing  a  three-  fold  process  whereby  the  Covad  technician  can:
 (1)  verify  before  dispatch,  that  the  loop  was  located  and  tagged  by  the  Verizon  technician  during  cooperative
 testing;  (2)  access  Verizons  demarcation  information  electronically  before  dispatching  to  the  filed;  and  (3)  call
 Verizon  from  the  field  if  the  technician  cannot  locate  the  demarcation  point.  Third,  Verizon  has  committed  to
 make  it  clear  to  its  technicians  that  they  should  remove  all  half  ringers  on  stand-  alone  xDSL  loops.  Fourth,  Covad
 and  Verizon  have  agreed  to  implement  a  process  for  obtaining  a  final  acceptance  test  when  an  earlier  acceptance
 test  has  failed  and  to  educate  their  technicians  about  interim  loop  testing  versus  final  acceptance  testing.  See
 Massachusetts  Department  Reconciliation  Letter  at  8.
 462  We  note  that  the  Department  of  Justice  did  not  have  the  benefit  of  the  Massachusetts  Departments
 reconciliation  of  Verizons  I-  codes.  See  Department  of  Justice  Massachusetts  II  Evaluation  at  15  n.  61  (noting  that
 the  Department  of  Justices  evaluation  is  necessarily  based  solely  on  the  evidence  in  Verizons  application  and
 stating  that  [  r]  eply  comments  and  ex  parte  submissions  undoubtedly  will  provide  additional  evidence  concerning
 the  questions  that  have  been  raised  about  Verizons  pre-  application  DSL  performance.).
 463  We  therefore  rely  upon  the  Massachusetts  Departments  conclusion  that  the  information  contained  in  VZ-MAs
 supplemental  application  only  affirms  our  earlier  conclusion  that  VZ-  MA  provides  [competing  carriers]  an
 installation  quality  sufficient  to  afford  them  a  meaningful  opportunity  to  compete.  Massachusetts  Department
 Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  29-  30;  see  also  SWBT  Kansas/  Oklahoma  Order  at  para.  191  (finding  that  SWBT
 generally  met  6  percent  installation  quality  benchmark  and  noting  improved  performance  trend).
 464  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl  at  para.  110.
 465  See  id.  at  para.  110.
 466  See  id.  at  para.  109.
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 can  synchronize  its  DSLAM  with  customer  premises  modems.  467  Finally,  Verizon  is  working  with
 a  competitive  LEC  to  make  access  to  its  testing  equipment  available  to  Verizon  through  a  voice
 response  unit.  468  We  emphasize  that  Verizons  installation  quality  performance  is  minimally
 acceptable  --  even  under  our  flexible  approach  of  reviewing  Verizons  performance  in  light  of  the
 totality  of  the  circumstances.  469
 (iv)  Maintenance  and  Repair
 149.  We  agree  with  the  Massachusetts  Department  that  Verizon  demonstrates  that  it
 provides  maintenance  and  repair  functions  for  competing  carrier  xDSL-  capable  loops  in  a  manner
 sufficient  to  meet  the  requirements  of  checklist  item  4.  470  In  analyzing  Verizons  maintenance  and
 repair  functions  we  continue  to  rely  primarily  upon  the  mean  time  to  repair  and  repeat  trouble  rate
 measures  identified  in  the  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  and  SWBT  Texas  Orders.
 150.  Mean  Time  to  Repair.  Like  the  Massachusetts  Department,  we  find  that  Verizon
 offers  nondiscriminatory  access  to  maintenance  and  repair  functions.  During  the  period  from
 September  through  December,  the  mean  time  to  repair  competing  carrier  troubles  on  xDSL  loops
 was  29.4  hours  while  the  comparable  number  for  Verizon  was  21.59  hours,  an  approximately  8
 hour  difference.  Although  this  disparity  is  statistically  significant,  we  note  that,  in  December,
 Verizon  repaired  competitive  LEC  lines  in  19.  1  hours  compared  to  17.  8  hours  for  its  retail
 affiliate,  bringing  Verizon  into  near  facial  parity  with  its  retail  operation.  471  Accordingly,  the  most
 recent  month  we  consider  indicates  that  Verizon  has  virtually  eliminated  this  performance
 467  See  id.  at  para.  118.
 468  See  id.  at  para.  109.
 469  Any  future  evidence  of  significant  and  sustained  deterioration  may  result  in  a  targeted  enforcement  action  or
 carrier-  initiated  complaint  under  the  Act.  See  also  infra  Part  IX.
 470  See  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  31.
 471  Verizons  missed  repair  appointment  performance  is  likewise  at  parity.  During  September  through  November
 2000,  Verizon  met  approximately  85  percent  of  repair  appointments  for  competitive  LECs  compared  to
 approximately  86  percent  for  retail.  MR  3-  01  (Maintenance  and  Repair,  2-  wire  xDSL  Services,  percent  Missed
 Repair  Appointment    Loop);  see  also  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  Attach.  EE.  Verizon
 concludes  that  during  September  through  November  2000,  nearly  58  percent  of  troubles  reported  within  30  days  of
 the  installation  of  a  DSL  loop  were  closed  with  no  trouble  found.  See  id.  at  para.  105  and  Attach.  BB.  This
 number  is  consistent  with  Verizons  analysis  for  the  period  May  through  July.  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I
 Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  para.  78,  104  &  Attach.  I  (discussing  the  effect  of  failure  to  isolate  troubles  on  UNE
 POTS  repair  metrics).
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 disparity.  472  We  do  not  find,  therefore,  any  systematic  discrimination  in  Verizons  maintenance
 and  repair  functions  offered  to  competitors.  473
 151.  Verizon  contends  that  the  data  reflecting  the  measurement  of  mean  time  to  repair
 for  xDSL  loops  provide  a  misleading  indication  of  its  performance  and  thus  the  Commission
 should  look  behind  the  measures  for  additional  evidence  of  nondiscrimination.  Verizon  claims
 that  it  is  much  more  likely  to  be  unable  to  access  competing  carriers  customers  premises  to  repair
 xDSL  loops  than  access  to  the  premises  of  its  own  retail  customers  474  and  that  competing  carriers
 are  less  willing  to  schedule  weekend  appointments  than  are  Verizons  retail  customers.  475  Both  of
 these  factors,  Verizon  claims,  lengthens  the  time  needed  to  repair  competing  carrier  xDSL  loops.
 Covad  and  Rhythms  specifically  deny  that  they  avoid  weekend  repair  appointments  and  otherwise
 criticize  Verizons  maintenance  and  repair  functions.  476
 472  Indeed,  we  take  additional  comfort  in  Verizons  January  performance  which  indicates  that  this  trend  has
 continued.  In  fact,  Verizon  performs  better  for  competitive  LECs  than  for  itself  in  January.  The  January  mean
 time  to  repair  competitive  LEC  xDSL  loops  was  20.  82  hrs  compared  to  23.  80  hrs.  for  Verizon.  See  MR  4-  02
 (Maintenance,  2-  Wire  xDSL  Services,  Mean  Time  to  Repair    Loop  Trouble).
 473  Should  Verizons  future  performance  reverse  this  positive  trend,  Verizon  risks  a  targeted  enforcement  action
 or  carrier-  initiated  complaint  under  the  Act.  See  infra  Part  IX.
 474  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Application  at  25;  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl  at  para.
 106.  During  April,  May,  June  and  July  2000,  Verizon  claims  that  competing  carriers  provided  only  limited
 access  to  end  users  for  58.9  percent  of  competing  carrier  Complex  loop  repair  requests,  compared  to  3.4  percent
 on  Verizons  Complex  loop  retail  repair  requests.  Id.  at  para.  106  &  Attach.  N.
 475  Verizon  contends  that  a  relatively  small  disparity  in  the  mean  time  to  repair  measure  exists  during  September,
 October  and  November  and  that  there  is  some  variation  among  competitive  LECs  regarding  the  rate  at  which  they
 accept  weekend  repair  appointments.  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  para.  119
 Attach.  GG.  Verizon  performed  an  analysis  of  the  weekend  repair  appointment  exclusion  and  concluded  that  the
 rejection  of  weekend  repair  appointments  added  approximately  4.  35  hours  to  the  average  repair  interval  for
 competitive  LEC  loops,  reducing  the  9  hour  difference  to  approximately  4-  5  hours  of  disparity,  an  amount  Verizon
 contends,  that  is  not  competitively  significant;  See  also  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at
 para  119  Attach.  GG.  See  also  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  73-  74  &  Attach.  G
 (discussing  the  effect  of  not  accepting  weekend  repair  appointments  on  the  UNE  POTS  repair  metrics.)
 476  See  Rhythms  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  31-  32;  See  Letter  from  Dhruv  Khana,  Executive  Vice  President
 and  General  Counsel,  Covad  to  Magalie  Roman  Salas,  Secretary,  Federal  Communications  Commission,  CC
 Docket  No.  00-  176,  at  8  (filed  Dec.  5,  2000);  see  also  Covad  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  20-  22  (stating  that
 Verizon  adds  to  the  no  access  problem  by  assigning  all  day  appointment  windows);  Network  Access  Solutions
 Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  3-  4  (same).  Rhythms  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  32.  Covad  specifically  notes
 that  an  apparent  increase  in  competing  carrier  no  access  situations  is  explained  by  the  fact  that  Verizons
 schedules  retail  repair  appointments  in  smaller  windows  than  for  competing  carriers.  The  Massachusetts
 Department  was  unable  to  comment  on  Covads  alleged  unsuccessful  attempt  to  shorten  repair  windows  offered  by
 Verizon  to  competing  carriers.  See  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  I  Reply  at  86.  On  reply,  Verizon
 states  that  it  will  grant  morning  or  afternoon  appointments  for  retail  customers  if  they  have  extenuating
 circumstances  and  it  will  do  the  same  for  competing  carriers.  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz
 Reply  Decl.  at  33  (emphasis  added).
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 152.  We  exercise  our  discretion  to  afford  Verizons  adjusted  mean  time  to  repair  data
 little  weight.  477  Because  the  official  carrier-  to-  carrier  data  provide  sufficient  evidence  for  the
 Commission  to  conclude  that  Verizon  provides  nondiscriminatory  access  to  maintenance  and
 repair  functions,  we  need  not  resolve  the  factual  dispute  presented  by  commenters  regarding
 refused  weekend  repair  appointments.  We  recognize  and  encourage  BOCs  to  conduct  root  cause
 analysis  of  their  performance  and  will  appropriately  credit  explanations  of  disparities  in  the
 performance  measures.  We  believe,  however,  that  such  explanations  are  best  used  to  improve
 processes  and  carrier-  to-  carrier  reporting  and  that  they  are  most  useful  when  surfaced  in  state
 proceedings.  We  note  that  the  development  of  performance  measures  is  an  iterative  process  and
 we  encourage  competitive  LECs  and  Verizon  to  continue  to  specifically  improve  the  mean  time  to
 repair  measure  to  provide  a  more  accurate  indicator  of  performance.  478
 153.  Repeat  Trouble  Rate.  We  conclude  that  Verizon  provides  competitors  with
 maintenance  and  repair  services  at  an  acceptable  level  of  quality.  Verizons  repeat  trouble  report
 data  show  that  competing  carriers  infrequently  experience  problems  after  a  repair  visit  for  a
 trouble  on  DSL  loops.  This  measure  shows  that  competing  carriers  experience  fewer  repeat
 troubles  than  Verizons  retail  affiliate.  479  For  the  period  September  through  December,  competing
 carriers  experienced  16.3  percent  repeat  trouble  report  rates  compared  to  21.5  percent  for
 Verizon.  480  Thus,  during  the  four  recent  months  we  consider,  Verizon  provides  better  service  to
 competitors  in  this  area  than  it  does  for  its  retail  affiliate.  481
 477  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  para  119  Attach.  GG.
 478  The  Department  of  Justice  notes  that  the  mean  time  to  repair  measure  is  likely  to  be  disputed  in  the  future  and,
 if  the  measure  is  left  unrevised,  it  may  create  an  analysis  that  is  biased  toward  finding  parity.  Excluding
 observations  involving  competitive  LEC  refusals  of  weekend  appointments  makes  Verizons  performance  for
 competitive  LECs  look  stronger,  moving  the  apparent  balance  toward  parity.  Excluding  observations  involving
 refused  weekday  appointments    an  adjustment  Verizon  did  not  make    could  make  Verizons  performance  as  to
 its  retail  unit  or  separate  affiliate  look  better,  moving  the  apparent  balance  away  from  parity.  Department  of
 Justice  Massachusetts  II  Evaluation  at  12.
 479  The  Percent  Repeat  Trouble  Reports  metric,  MR  5-  01  shows  that  the  4-  month  (September    December)
 average  for  competing  carriers  is  16.  3  percent  and  21.  5  percent  for  Verizon.  For  the  months  of  September,
 October,  November  and  December,  competing  carrier  repeat  trouble  rates  were  19.  3,  15.  4,  16.  1  and  13.  4  percent.
 For  the  same  months,  Verizon  repeat  trouble  rate  was  22.7,  20.3,  22.6  and  16.5  percent.  See  MR  5-  01
 (Maintenance,  2-  Wire  DSL  Services,  percent  Repeat  Trouble  Reports  within  30  Days).
 480  See  id.
 481  The  average  repeat  trouble  report  rate  for  the  period  September  through  December  is  16.  3  for  competing  LECs
 compared  to  21.  5  for  Verizon  retail.  See  MR  5-  01  (Maintenance,  2-  Wire  DSL  Services,  percent  Repeat  Trouble
 Reports  within  30  Days).  We  take  additional  comfort  in  Verizons  network  trouble  report  rates  for  DSL  loops  in
 Massachusetts.  These  results  further  support  our  conclusion  that  Verizon  provides  competing  carriers  with
 maintenance  and  repair  service  in  substantially  the  same  time  and  manner  as  Verizons  own  retail  operations.
 Competing  carriers  experienced  a  trouble  report  rate  of  1.  9  percent  for  the  months  of  September  through  December
 2000  while  Verizon  experienced  trouble  report  rates  at  a  comparable  1.3  percent  rate.  See  MR  2-  02/  2-  03
 (Maintenance,  2-  Wire  xDSL  Services,  Network  Trouble  Report  Rate,  Loop;  Network  Trouble  Report  Rate,  Central
 Office).
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 c.  Subloops
 154.  We  find  that  Verizon  provides  nondiscriminatory  access  to  subloops  consistent
 with  the  requirements  of  section  271  and  the  UNE  Remand  Order.  482  The  Commissions  UNE
 Remand  Order  requires  incumbent  LECs  to  provide  competitors  access  to  subloop  elements  at
 any  technically  feasible  point  to  ensure  that  requesting  carriers  [have]  maximum  flexibility  to
 interconnect  their  own  facilities  with  those  of  the  incumbent  LEC.  483  Competitors  take  issue
 with  Verizons  subloop  offering  claiming  that  Verizon  limits  subloops  to  metallic  distribution
 pairs/  facilities;  restricts  competitor  subloop  access  to  interconnection  at  the  feeder  distribution
 interface  (FDI);  and  refuses  to  allow  competitors  to  collocate  equipment  inside  remote  terminals
 for  purposes  of  accessing  subloops.  484
 155.  We  find  that,  consistent  with  our  rules,  Verizon  allows  collocation  inside  remote
 terminals  on  a  space-  available  basis.  485  Where  space  is  unavailable,  competitive  LECs  may  deploy
 an  adjacent  cabinet  to  access  subloops  through  an  interconnecting  cable.  486  Furthermore,  Verizon
 does  not  limit  competitive  LEC  access  to  subloops  to  only  metallic  distribution  facilities.  Rather,
 Verizon  allows  requesting  carrier  to  obtain  access  to  subloop  facilities  regardless  of  the
 transmission  medium.  487  Finally,  Verizon  has  demonstrated  that  competitive  LECs  may  gain
 access  to  subloops  at  technically  feasible  points  of  interconnection  other  than  the  FDI.  488  For
 these  reasons,  we  cannot  agree  with  the  commenters  claims  that  Verizon  limits  access  to  subloop
 unbundled  network  elements  in  violation  of  the  requirements  of  section  271.
 d.  High  Capacity  Loop  Performance
 156.  We  find  that  Verizons  performance  for  high  capacity  loops  does  not  result  in  a
 finding  of  noncompliance  with  checklist  item  four.  We  look  to  the  totality  of  the  circumstances  in
 482  Although  nondiscriminatory  access  to  subloops  technically  falls  under  checklist  item  2,  we  treat  subloops  in
 this  section  because  it  is  logically  related  to  the  provision  of  unbundled  loops.
 483  UNE  Remand  Order  at  para.  206.  The  Commission  held  that  technically  feasible  points  of  interconnection
 near  a  customer  premises  could  include  poles  or  pedestals,  the  NID  or  the  minimum  point  of  entry  (MPOE),  the
 feeder  distribution  interface  (FDI)  or  a  remote  terminal  or  environmentally  controlled  vault.  Id.
 484  Rhythms  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  12;  ALTS  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  16-  17;  Covad  Massachusetts  I
 Comments  at  25-  28.
 485  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Reply  Decl.  at  para.  44.
 486  Id.
 487  Verizon  offers  feeder  subloops  over  DS1  or  DS3  transmission  paths  which  may  be  either  fiber  or  copper
 depending  upon  facilities  availability.  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Reply  Decl.  at  para.
 137.  Id.  at  Attach.  P  (stating  that  a  Feeder  Sub-  Loop  means  a  DS1-  DS3  transmission  path  over  a  feeder  facility  in
 Verizons  network).
 488  Verizon  specifically  identifies  the  NID  and  the  MPOE  as  possible  alternative  points  for  competing  LECs  to
 obtain  access  to  subloops.  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Reply  Decl.  at  para.  138.
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 evaluating  Verizons  performance  in  providing  loops  in  accordance  with  the  checklist
 requirements.  489  During  the  period  September  through  November,  although  volumes  are  low,
 carrier-  to-  carrier  data  show  that  Verizon  misses  a  comparable  number  of  installation  appointments
 for  competitors  and  retail  alike.  490  Verizons  performance  data  for  its  maintenance  and  repair
 functions  for  high  capacity  loops  show  parity.  491  Like  other  types  of  loops  we  consider,  Verizon
 states  that  competing  carrier  behavior  skews  its  high  capacity  loop  performance.  492  We  recognize
 that  Verizons  performance  on  other  measures  with  respect  to  provisioning  high  capacity  loops
 has  been  poor  in  Massachusetts.  493  High  capacity  loops  in  Massachusetts  represent  only
 approximately  0.  8  percent  of  all  unbundled  loops  provisioned  to  competitors.  494  Verizon
 performs  at  an  acceptable  level  for  most  types  of  unbundled  local  loops.  Given  the  low  volumes
 489  In  so  doing,  we  do  not  consider  Verizons  special  access  services  performance.  OnSite  Access  specifically
 criticizes  Verizons  performance  in  provisioning  high  capacity  loops  in  New  York  and  Massachusetts.  See  also
 On  Site  Access  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  20-  21  (citing  Leonard  Kriss  Decl.  at  2-  6).  CompTel  lodges  a  related
 complaint  alleging  that  Verizon  has  not  demonstrated  that  it  can  comply  with  the  competitive  checklist  at  the  same
 time  it  meets  its  obligation  to  provision  access  services  and  operate  its  long  distance  affiliate  consistent  with  section
 272s  nondiscrimination  requirements.  See  CompTel  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  1-  3.  Criticisms  of  Verizons
 provisioning  of  special  access  service  are  not  relevant  to  compliance  with  checklist  item  four.  As  we  held  in  the
 SWBT  Texas  and  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Orders,  we  do  not  consider  the  provision  of  special  access  services
 pursuant  to  tariffs  for  purposes  of  determining  checklist  compliance.  SWBT  Texas  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  18504,
 para.  335;  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  4126-  27,  para.  340.  Checklist  item  4  does  not  address
 itself  to  retail  services  Verizon  provides  to  competitors  such  as  special  access  services.
 490  See  PR  4-  01  (UNE  POTS/  Special  Services,  percent  Missed  Appointments    Verizon    Total).  In  September
 and  October,  Verizon  did  not  miss  any  installation  appointments  for  high-  capacity  loops  and  missed  18.  39  percent
 of  its  installation  appointments  in  November.  In  November,  the  number  of  observations  in  this  metric  is  310
 competitive  LEC  installations.  However,  this  measure  aggregates  EEL  and  interoffice  facilities  installations.  The
 comparable  numbers  over  the  same  period  for  Verizon  retail  were  2.  78,  1.  90  and  1.  43  percent.  See  id.
 491  For  the  period  September  through  January,  the  Mean  Time  to  Repair  measure  shows  that  Verizon  troubles  are
 resolved  in  8.  38  hours  compared  to  8.  40  hours  for  competitive  LECs  during  the  same  period.  See  MR  4-  01
 (Maintenance,  UNE  POTS,  Special  Services,  Mean  Time  to  Repair,  Total).
 492  Verizon  examined  a  sample  of  the  January  orders  that  were  included  in  the  Average  Interval  Offered  measure
 (PR  1-  07)  and  discovered  that  the  vast  majority  of  the  orders  should  have  been  X  coded  because  the  competitive
 LEC  asked  for  an  interval  longer  than  the  standard  interval.  Because  the  orders  were  incorrectly  W  coded,
 Verizon  states  that  they  were  included  in  the  results  and  skewed  the  reported  results.  See  Letter  from  Dee  May,
 Executive  Director  Federal  Regulatory,  Verizon  to  Magalie  Roman  Salas,  Secretary,  Federal  Communications
 Commission,  CC  Docket  No.  01-  09  (filed  February  28,  2001)  (Verizon  Feb.  28  Ex  Parte  Letter).
 493  See  e.  g.,  PR  2-  07  (Special  Services    Provisioning,  Av.  Interval  Completed    DS-  1);  PR  6-  01  (Special  Services
   Provisioning,  percent  Installation  Troubles  reported  within  30  Days).
 494  Verizon  states  that  during  the  period  September  through  January,  observations  for  PR  2-  07  totaled  176  loops.
 Verizon  notes  that  the  high-  capacity  loop  volumes  the  Commission  considered  in  the  SWBT  Kansas/  Oklahoma
 Order  was  even  higher  over  the  four  month  period  the  Commission  considered  in  that  proceeding.  See  Verizon
 Feb.  28  Ex  Parte  Letter.  Letter  from  Dee  May,  Executive  Director  Federal  Regulatory,  Verizon  to  Magalie  Roman
 Salas,  Secretary,  Federal  Communications  Commission,  CC  Docket  No.  01-  09  (filed  February  28,  2001).  In  the
 period  July  through  October,  SWBT  received  210  orders  for  DS-  1  loops  in  Oklahoma.  SWBT  Kansas/  Oklahoma
 Order  at  para.  213  n.  616.
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 of  orders  for  high  capacity  loops  in  Massachusetts  we  cannot  find  that  Verizons  performance  for
 high  capacity  loops  results  in  a  finding  of  noncompliance  for  all  loop  types.  495
 e.  Voice  Grade  Loops
 157.  We  agree  with  the  Massachusetts  Department  that  Verizon  demonstrates  that  it
 provides  voice  grade  unbundled  loops  in  a  nondiscriminatory  manner.  496  This  category  includes
 hot  cut  loops  and  new  stand-  alone  loops.  We  discuss  each  of  these  categories  separately  below.
 (i)  Hot  Cut  Loop  Provisioning
 158.  Hot  Cut  Process.  Verizons  hot  cut  process  is  designed  to  move  a  loop  that  is  in
 service  from  Verizons  switch  to  a  competitors  switch.  Competitors  can  request  that  Verizon
 complete  the  hot  cut  within  a  specific  appointment  window  and  Verizon  has  committed  to
 ensuring  that  the  customer  will  not  be  out  of  service  for  more  than  five  minutes  during  the  hot
 cut.  497  Verizons  hot  cut  process  includes  a  number  of  steps  that  Verizon  and  competitors  must
 take  during  the  days  preceding  the  hot  cut.  These  steps  include  pre-  wiring  a  cross-  connection
 from  the  competitors  collocation  arrangement  to  Verizons  main  distribution  frame  prior  to  the
 committed  date  and  time  of  the  hot  cut,  setting  the  appropriate  Local  Number  Portability  triggers
 and  confirming  with  the  competitor  that  the  loop  is  to  be  cut  over  to  a  competitors  switch.  498
 159.  Hot  Cut  Timeliness  and  Quality.  We  find  that  Verizon  demonstrates  that  it
 provides  hot  cuts  in  Massachusetts  in  accordance  with  checklist  item  4  because  it  provides  hot
 cuts  in  a  timely  manner,  at  an  acceptable  level  of  quality,  with  minimal  service  disruption,  and  with
 a  minimum  number  of  troubles  following  installation.  499  Verizon  reports  data  on  the  percentage  of
 hot  cut  orders  completed  within  the  cut-  over  window  specified  by  the  requesting  competing
 carriers  on  an  LSR.
 160.  In  the  instant  application,  Verizon  demonstrates  that  its  hot  cut  performance  has
 returned  to  acceptable  pre-  strike  levels  which  afford  a  competitor  a  meaningful  opportunity  to
 495  Although  we  recognize  specific  performance  problems  for  high  capacity  loops,  we  do  not  find  that  these
 disparities  in  and  of  themselves  are  enough  to  render  a  finding  of  checklist  noncompliance  because  of  the  small
 numbers  of  DS-  1  loops  requested  by  competing  carriers.  We  stress,  however,  that  we  will  be  actively  monitoring
 Verizons  performance  in  this  area  and  we  will  take  swift  and  appropriate  enforcement  action  in  the  event  that
 Verizons  provisioning  performance  for  high  capacity  loops  deteriorates.  See  infra  Part  IX.
 496  See  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  279.
 497  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  para.  81.
 498  Id.  at  Attach.  J.
 499  We  evaluate  the  PR  9-  01  (Provisioning,  POTS,  percent  On-  Time  Performance    Hot  Cut);  PR  6-  02
 (Provisioning,  POTS,  percent  Installation  Troubles  reported  within  7  Days    Hot  Cut  Loop)  measures  in
 Massachusetts.
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 compete.  500  During  October  and  November  2000,  Verizon  completed  on  average  96  percent  of
 hot  cut  orders  on  time.  During  the  same  time  period,  less  than  0.8  of  the  hot  cut  lines  experienced
 installation  troubles  within  7  days.  501  The  Massachusetts  Department  engaged  in  a  reconciliation
 of  various  Verizon  self-  reported  hot  cut  performance  measurement  data  in  the  context  of  the  state
 section  271  proceeding.  502  Relying  upon  the  results  of  its  carrier-  specific  data  reconciliation,  the
 Massachusetts  Department  concluded  that  there  is  no  need  for  further  data  reconciliation  and
 concluded  that  Verizon  provides  sufficient  on-  time  hot  cut  performance  to  meet  the  requirements
 of  checklist  item  4.  503  Because  the  Massachusetts  Department  performed  a  searching  and  specific
 data  reconciliation  of  Verizons  hot  cut  performance,  we  accord  its  resolution  of  this  issue
 substantial  weight.  We  note  that  no  commenter  challenges  Verizons  hot-  cut  conversion
 performance  in  this  phase  of  the  proceeding.  We  thus  conclude  that  the  record  demonstrates  that
 the  hot  cut  performance  Verizon  makes  available  to  competing  carriers  in  Massachusetts
 minimizes  service  disruptions  and  affords  a  competitor  a  meaningful  opportunity  to  compete.
 (ii)  New  Stand-  Alone  Loop  Provisioning
 161.  We  agree  with  the  Massachusetts  Department  that  Verizon  demonstrates  that  it
 provisions  new  unbundled  stand-  alone  voice  grade  loops  in  accordance  with  the  requirements  of
 checklist  item  4.  504  When  Verizon  does  not  presently  service  the  customer  on  the  line  in  question,
 a  hot  cut  loop  is  not  required.  In  such  instances,  a  competing  carrier  obtains  a  new  stand-  alone
 loop  from  Verizon  which  dispatches  a  technician  to  the  customers  premises  to  complete  the
 installation.  We  find  that  Verizon  demonstrates  that  it  provisions  and  maintains  new  stand-  alone
 voice  grade  loops  for  competing  carriers  in  substantially  the  same  time  and  manner  that  it  installs
 new  voice  grade  loops  for  its  own  retail  operations.
 162.  Provisioning  Timeliness  and  Quality,  Maintenance  and  Repair.  Verizon
 demonstrates  that  it  delivers  new  voice  grade  loops  in  a  timely  manner  and  at  acceptable  levels  of
 500  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Guerard/  Canny  Decl.  at  Attach.  E;  PR  9-  01  (Provisioning  POTS,  percent  On
 Time  Performance    Hot  Cuts).  For  May,  PR  9-  01  showed  98.45  percent  on  time  performance,  for  June,  PR  9-  01
 showed  99.63  percent  on  time  performance  and  for  July,  PR  9-  01  showed  99.19  percent  on  time  performance.
 KPMG  reviewed  Verizons  hot  cut  performance  between  October  1999  and  January  2000  and  found  that  98
 percent  of  hot  cuts  were  completed  on-  time.  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  para.  83
 (citing  KPMG  Report  at  198-  99  (POP-  6-  2-  6).  The  Massachusetts  Department  characterizes  Verizons  hot  cut
 timeliness  performance  as  excellent  and  notes  that  unlike  Verizons  performance  in  New  York  prior  to  filing  its
 application  with  this  Commission,  Verizon  bettered  the  95  percent  on  time  benchmark  in  Massachusetts  every
 month  from  January  through  July  2000.  See  Massachusetts  Department  Comments  at  284-  85.
 501  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  para.  5.
 502  In  response  to  criticism  from  one  carrier,  AT&  T,  regarding  the  accuracy  of  Verizons  hot  cut  data,  the
 Massachusetts  Department  engaged  in  a  reconciliation  of  various  Verizon  self-  reported  hot  cut  performance
 measurement  data  in  the  context  of  the  state  section  271  proceeding.  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  I
 Comments  at  288.  AT&  T  does  not  criticize  Verizons  hot  cut  performance  in  this  proceeding.
 503  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  288.
 504  See  id.  at  256.
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 quality.  Verizon  also  demonstrates  that  it  provides  maintenance  and  repair  functions  for  such
 loops  in  a  nondiscriminatory  manner.  No  party  specifically  criticizes  Verizons  new,  stand-  alone
 loop  provisioning  performance.  As  in  previous  section  271  orders,  in  reviewing  Verizons
 performance  we  examine  the  average  completion  interval,  missed  installation  appointments,
 trouble  reports  within  7  days  and  mean  time  to  repair  measures.  Specifically,  Verizons
 performance  results  for  the  months  of  September,  October,  November  and  December  2000  also
 demonstrate  parity  for  the  average  completion  interval  for  new  loop  orders  of  1-  5  lines  measure.  505  During  the  same  period,  Verizons  missed  installation  appointment  rate  for  new  voice
 loops  also  demonstrated  parity.  506  Furthermore,  Verizon  appears  to  be  providing  new  voice  grade
 loops  to  competitors  at  an  acceptable  level  of  quality.  Based  on  the  trouble  report  within  7  days
 measure,  Verizon  provided  installation  at  the  same  level  of  quality  for  competitive  LECs
 compared  to  retail  during  the  months  of  September,  October,  November  and  December  2000.  507
 Verizons  mean  time  to  repair  measures  show  that  it  is  providing  maintenance  and  repair  functions
 for  new  loops  to  competitors  in  a  nondiscriminatory  manner.  508
 f.  Line  Sharing
 (i)  Background
 163.  On  December  9,  1999  the  Commission  released  the  Line  Sharing  Order  that,
 among  other  things,  defined  the  high-  frequency  portion  of  local  loops  as  a  UNE  that  must  be
 provided  to  requesting  carriers  on  a  nondiscriminatory  basis  pursuant  to  section  251(  c)(  3)  of  the
 Act  and,  thus,  checklist  items  2  and  4  of  section  271.  509  In  the  Line  Sharing  Order  the
 505  In  September,  Verizon  completed  POTS  loop  orders  of  1-  5  lines  in  8.82  for  Verizon  retail  and  8.53  for
 competitors.  The  comparable  numbers  for  October  were  5.  81  for  Verizon  retail  affiliate  and  9.  22  and  5.  45  for
 Verizon  retail  and  4.  86  for  competitors  in  December.  See  PR  2-  03  (Provisioning,  Average  Completed  Interval,
 Dispatch  1-  5  lines    Loop).
 506  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  Attach.  A.  The  September  to  November  missed
 appointment  rate,  PR  4-  04,  is  8.13  percent  for  Verizon  and  7.09  percent  for  [competing  carriers].  The  December
 rate  was  6.96  for  Verizon  and  10.31  for  competing  LECs.  See  PR  4-  04  (Provisioning,  POTS,  percent  Missed
 Appointments,  Verizon,  Dispatch,  Loop    New).
 507  The  percentage  of  installation  troubles  reported  on  voice  grade  loops  for  competitors  were  1.  13  percent  in
 September,  .98  percent  in  October,  .80  percent  in  November  and  .74  in  December.  The  comparable  numbers  for
 Verizon  were  2.  39  in  September,  1.  87  in  October,  1.  77  in  November  and  1.  60  in  December.  See  PR  6-  02
 (Provisioning,  POTS,  percent  Installation  Troubles  reported  within  7  Days    Loop).
 508  Results  for  the  mean  time  to  repair  measure,  Mean  Time  to  Repair    Total,  in  the  months  of  September,
 October,  November  and  December  show  parity.  Competitor  troubles  were  repaired  in  19.  77  hours  in  September,
 18.  52  hours  in  October,  19.  00  hours  in  November  and  15.  38  hrs  in  December.  Verizons  troubles  were  repaired  in
 21.  63  hours  in  September,  17.  68  hours  in  October,  17.  95  hours  in  November  and  16.  98  hrs  in  December.  See  MR
 4-  01  (Maintenance,  POTS  Loop,  Mean  Time  to  Repair    Total).
 509  See  Deployment  of  Wireline  Services  Offering  Advanced  Telecommunications  Capabilities  and
 Implementation  of  the  Local  Competition  Provisions  of  the  Telecommunications  Act  of1996,  Third  Report  and
 Order,  CC  Docket  No.  98-  147,  Fourth  Report  and  Order,  CC  Docket  No.  96-  98,  14  FCC  Rcd  20912  (1999)  (Line
 Sharing  Order)  (pet.  for  rehearing  pending  sub  nom.  USTA  v.  FCC,  DC  Cir.  No.  00-  102  (filed  Jan  18,  2000)).
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 Commission  acknowledged  that  it  could  take  as  long  as  180  days  from  the  release  date  for
 incumbent  LECs  to  develop  and  deploy  the  modifications  necessary  to  implement  this  new
 requirement.  This  180  day  period  concluded  on  June  6,  2000,  approximately  six  months  before
 Verizon  filed  its  Massachusetts  II  application.  In  the  SWBT  Kansas/  Oklahoma  Order,  the
 Commission  provided  BOC-  applicants  guidance  concerning  the  required  section  271  line  sharing
 showing  necessary  to  meet  a  BOCs  burden  of  proof.  Specifically,  the  Commission  stated  that  a
 successful  BOC-  applicant  should  provide  evidence  that  its  central  offices  are  operationally  ready
 to  handle  commercial  volumes  of  line  sharing  and  that  it  provides  competing  carriers  with
 nondiscriminatory  access  to  the  pre-  ordering  and  ordering  OSS  functions  associated  with  the
 provision  of  line  shared  loops,  including  access  to  loop  qualification  information  and  databases.  510  The  Commission  also  held  that  to  the  extent  that  a  BOC  applicant  relies  upon
 commercial  data  from  another  state  to  establish  that  it  is  providing  nondiscriminatory  access  to
 line  shared  loops  in  a  state  where  it  requests  section  271  authority,  it  should  provide  evidence  that
 the  OSS  and  provisioning  processes  are  identical.  511  Verizon  must  demonstrate,  therefore,  that  it
 provides  nondiscriminatory  access  to  the  unbundled  high-  frequency  portion  of  the  loop  to  gain
 section  271  approval  in  Massachusetts.
 164.  Verizon  proposes  to  demonstrate  compliance  with  its  line  sharing  obligation  with
 evidence  that  it  has  signed  nine  interconnection  agreements  in  Massachusetts  with  line  sharing
 provisions.  Verizon  also  notes  that  the  Massachusetts  Department  recently  approved  its  line
 sharing  tariffs,  with  only  minor  amendments.  512  It  further  states  that  it  is  able  to  handle
 considerable  volumes  of  line  sharing  orders  by  utilizing  its  successful  New  York  provisioning
 methods  and  procedures  in  Massachusetts.  513  Finally,  through  the  New  York  DSL  collaborative,
 510  SWBT  Kansas/  Oklahoma  Order  at  para.  215.
 511  SWBT  Kansas/  Oklahoma  Order  at  para.  215.  The  Commission  further  stated  that  to  the  extent  its  OSS
 provisioning  processes  are  not  identical,  a  BOC  applicant  bears  the  burden  of  showing  that  whatever  differences
 are  present  are  not  material.  Id.
 512  Verizon  offers  competing  carriers  two  arrangements  for  line  sharing  pursuant  to  its  interconnection
 agreements  and  line  sharing  tariff.  The  first  arrangement  provides  a  competing  carrier  with  the  ability  to  install,
 own  and  maintain  the  splitter  in  the  competing  carriers  own  collocation  arrangement.  In  the  second  arrangement,
 a  competitive  LEC-  owned  splitter  is  located  in  Verizons  central  office  space  and  is  maintained  by  Verizon.  See
 Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Ruesterholz/  Lacouture  Decl.  at  para.  118.  As  part  of  its  Phase  III  proceeding,  the
 Massachusetts  Department  has  directed  Verizon  to  implement  OSS  enhancements  to  support  line  sharing  by  April
 1,  2001.  The  Massachusetts  Department,  however,  found  that  the  fact  that  line  sharing  orders  currently  require
 manual  processing  does  not  prevent  it  from  finding  that  Verizon  satisfies  its  nondiscrimination  obligation.  See
 Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  328.  Covad  contests  Verizons  showing  that  it  offers  line
 sharing  capability  over  fiber-  fed  loops.  Covad  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  35.  Verizon  responds  that  it  satisfies
 the  Commissions  requirements  through  remote  terminal  collocation  and  unbundled  subloop  offerings.  See
 Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Reply  Decl.  at  paras.  160-  65.  We  note  that  the  issue  of  line
 sharing  over  fiber-  fed  loops  is  the  subject  of  a  Further  Notice  of  Proposed  Rulemaking  at  the  Commission.  See
 Line  Sharing  Reconsideration  Order  at  para.  12;  see  also  accompanying,  Third  Further  Notice  of  Proposed
 Rulemaking  in  CC  Docket  No.  98-  147,  Sixth  Further  Notice  of  Proposed  Rulemaking  in  CC  Docket  No.  96-  98.
 513  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Ruesterholz/  Lacouture  Decl.  at  para.  114.  In  its  initial  application  Verizon  stated
 that  it  has  provisioned  over  7,000  line  sharing  orders  in  New  York,  the  majority  of  which  were  for  its  own  data
 affiliate.  See  id.  Verizons  Massachusetts  II  application  shows  that  Verizon  has  processed  roughly  10  times  the
 (continued.)
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 it  has  worked  with  competing  carriers  to  identify  and  resolve  various  technical  and  operational
 issues  associated  with  line  sharing  in  Massachusetts.  514  Competing  carriers  contest  Verizons
 operational  readiness  to  offer  line  sharing  and  Verizons  ability  to  offer  line  sharing  on  a
 nondiscriminatory  basis.  515
 (ii)  Discussion
 165.  We  find  that  Verizon  demonstrates  that  it  provides  nondiscriminatory  access  to  the
 high-  frequency  portion  of  the  loop.  Specifically,  the  most  probative  evidence  that  Verizon
 submits  to  support  this  point  is  actual  commercial  usage.  516  The  Commission  stated  in  the  SWBT
 Kansas/  Oklahoma  Order  that  a  successful  BOC  applicant  could  provide  evidence  of  BOC-caused
 missed  installation  due  dates,  average  installation  intervals,  trouble  reports  within  30  days
 of  installation,  mean  time  to  repair,  trouble  report  rates  and  repeat  trouble  report  rates.  517  Our
 approach  in  this  case  is  to  rely  primarily  on  the  limited  commercial  data  Verizon  has  submitted
 from  its  Massachusetts  operations.  Because  line  sharing  volumes  in  Massachusetts  have  escalated
 only  recently,  however,  we  look  to  Verizons  line  sharing  performance  in  New  York  as  well,  (Continued  from  previous  page)
 number  of  line  sharing  orders  for  its  retail  affiliate  compared  to  line  sharing  orders  processed  for  unaffiliated
 competing  LECs.
 514  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Ruesterholz/  Lacouture  Decl.  at  para.  115.  For  example,  Verizon  asked  competing
 carriers  to  identify  their  priority  wire  centers  throughout  Massachusetts  by  March  13,  2000  so  that  Verizon  could
 prioritize  the  central  office  wiring  work  necessary  to  accommodate  line  sharing  requests.  Id.  at  127.
 515  See  Covad  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  7-  8;  Rhythms  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  6;  CIX  Massachusetts
 II  Comments  at  7;  USISPA  Massachusetts  II  Reply  at  9;  AT&  T  Massachusetts  II  Reply  at  25;  Covad  Massachusetts
 I  Comments  at  28;  WorldCom  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  62;  Rhythms  Massachusetts  I  Reply  at  18;  ALTS
 Massachusetts  I  Reply  at  36.  On  March  14,  2001,  Verizon  filed  an  ex  parte  letter  in  this  proceeding  stating  that
 Verizon  has  taken  steps  to  address  the  outstanding  issues  between  Rhythms  and  Verizon  and  accordingly,
 Rhythms  no  longer  opposes  Verizons  Application  for  section  271  authority  in  Massachusetts.  Letter  from
 Kimberly  A.  Scardino,  Assistant  General  Counsel,  Rhythms  to  Magalie  Roman  Salas,  Secretary,  Federal
 Communications  Commission,  CC  Docket  No.  01-  9  (filed  March  14,  2001).  Rhythms  had  argued  that  where
 Verizon  completed  pre-  wiring  collocation  work,  in  some  instances  it  was  wired  incorrectly  or  the  cable  and  pair
 assignment  were  not  entered  into  Verizons  inventory  system.  See  Rhythms  Massachusetts  II  Comments,  Williams
 Decl.  at  para.  39.  Covad  claims  that  Verizon  cannot  provision  a  single  line  shared  order  in  a  central  office  while
 at  the  same  time  Verizon  was  shutting  off  line-  sharing  ready  central  offices  for  its  own  retail  service  because  orders
 are  flowing  through  beyond  capacity.  Letter  from  Jason  D.  Oxman,  Senior  Government  Affairs  Counsel,  Covad  to
 Magalie  Roman  Salas,  Secretary,  Federal  Communications  Commission,  CC  Docket  No.  00-  176  at  1  (filed  Feb.
 21,  2000);  see  also  Letter  from  Jason  D.  Oxman,  Senior  Government  Affairs  Counsel,  Covad  to  Magalie  Roman
 Salas,  Secretary,  Federal  Communications  Commission,  CC  Docket  No.  00-  176  at  1  (filed  Nov.  28,  2000)  (arguing
 that  walkthroughs  of  Verizon  central  offices  showed  incomplete  splitter  installations  as  of  the  week  of  November
 20,  2000).  Verizon  responds  that  Covad  and  Rhythms  are  the  only  competing  carriers  that  submitted  their  line
 sharing  plans  to  Verizons  project  management  plan  and  that  installation  of  splitters  was  performed  on  a  timely
 basis.  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  paras.  112-  13.  The  Massachusetts  Department
 found  that  whatever  delays  resulted  from  splitter  installation  were  attributable  to  competing  carriers,  specifically
 Covad.  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  327.
 516  See  supra  Part  II.  A.
 517  See  SWBT  Kansas/  Oklahoma  Order  at  para.  215.
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 where  line  sharing  volumes  are  larger  for  additional  evidence  that  Verizon  is  providing
 nondiscriminatory  access  to  line  sharing.  518  As  discussed  above,  we  conclude  that  Verizons  line
 sharing  OSS  in  New  York  and  Massachusetts  uses  the  same  systems  and  offers  the  same
 functionality.  519  Accordingly,  we  shall  consider  Verizons  commercial  line  sharing  performance  in
 New  York  as  a  supplement  to  Verizons  limited  commercial  line  sharing  performance  in
 Massachusetts.
 166.  Operational  Readiness.  Competitive  LECs  take  issue  with  Verizons  ability  to
 wire  adequately  central  offices  to  offer  line  sharing.  520  Covad  specifically  contests  Verizons
 representation  that  it  was  operationally  ready  to  provision  line  sharing  for  all  splitter  collocation
 arrangements  in  place  as  of  December  1,  2000.  521  In  response,  Verizon  states  that  it  recognized
 518  From  September  2000  through  January  2001,  Verizon  has  provided  a  total  of  approximately  51,000  line
 shared  loops  in  Massachusetts  including  those  for  VADI.  During  December  and  January,  Verizon  completed
 nearly  500  line  shared  loops  for  competitors  in  Massachusetts.  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II
 Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Reply  Decl.  at  para.  103.  In  New  York,  Verizon  has  processed  110,000  line  shared  orders
 including  those  provided  to  VADI.  See  id  at  para.  28.
 519  See  supra  Part  IV.  A.  2.  b.  The  Massachusetts  Department  concluded  that  the  systems  and  processes  in
 Massachusetts  are  comparable  to,  indeed  the  very  same  as,  those  found  in  New  York.  Massachusetts  Department
 Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  35;  see  also  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Sapienza/  Mulcahy  Decl.  App.  A,  Attach.  B.
 PwC  also  investigated  whether  VADI  has  the  same  interface  options  as  unaffiliated  competitive  LECs  and  whether
 Verizon  treats  transactions  it  receives  from  VADI  the  same  as  transactions  it  receives  from  unaffiliated  competitive
 LECs.  PwC  confirmed  that  VADI  offers  DSL  service  using  line  sharing  purchased  from  Verizon  using  the  same
 interfaces  that  are  available  to  other  unaffiliated  competitive  LECs.  VADI  generally  uses  CORBA  for  pre-ordering,
 EDI  for  ordering  and  the  Web  GUI  for  maintenance  and  repair.  In  addition,  PwC  confirmed  that  once
 Verizon  receives  the  orders  over  the  interface,  it  provisions  a  VADI  order  using  the  same  systems  and  processes  as
 it  uses  to  provision  an  order  for  any  other  competitive  LEC.  Likewise,  PwC  reports  that  VADIs  maintenance  and
 repair  requests  are  handled  by  Verizon  in  the  same  manner  as  a  request  from  an  unaffiliated  competitive  LEC.  See
 Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl  at  para.  143.  Verizon  does,  however,  reveal  that  a  small
 percentage  of  VADIs  New  York  line  sharing  orders  are  distributed  by  a  team  leader  in  the  Boston  xDSL/  Line
 Sharing  Center  to  a  group  of  approximately  35  temporary  service  order  representatives  located  in  New  York.
 Verizon  contends  that  it  retained  these  temporary  representatives  to  clear  a  backlog  of  retail  DSL  orders  in  New
 York  that  existed  before  VADI  was  operational.  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Supp.  Decl.  at
 para.  154.  This  slight  difference  in  OSS  functionality  does  not  alter  our  conclusion  that  the  OSS  in  New  York  and
 Massachusetts  are  identical  for  purposes  of  the  Commissions  consideration  of  New  York  line  sharing  commercial
 data.
 520  See  Covad  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  6;  Rhythms  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  8.  Rhythms  contends
 that  Verizons  explanation  of  defective  splitter  installation  could  not  apply  to  it  because  Rhythms  has  elected  to
 place  splitter  in  Rhythms  collocation  spaces  and  the  only  remaining  central  office  wiring  work  to  be  done  is  the  re-termination
 of  existing  200  cable  and  pair,  a  process  that  Rhythms  claims  is  simple  and  accomplished  quickly.
 Rhythms  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  8.
 521  Covad  argues  that  it  requested  that  55  central  offices  in  Massachusetts  offer  line  sharing  capability.  As  of
 February  21,  2000,  Covad  has  successfully  provisioned  line  sharing  in  44  of  those  55  offices  and  it  has  provided
 the  CLLI  codes  for  those  offices  where  Covad  has  pending  orders.  See  Covad  Massachusetts  II  Reply  at  19;  see
 also  Rhythms  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  8.  Verizon  responds  that  only  two  of  the  offices  Covad  initially
 complained  of  are  in  Massachusetts  and  of  these  two,  it  has  provisioned  Covad  orders  in  a  number  of  the  central
 offices  which  are  relevant  to  this  application.  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Reply  Decl.  at
 para.  131.  As  to  the  status  of  contested  offices  in  New  York,  Verizon  responds  that  Covads  claim  that  its  Failed
 (continued.)
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 central  office  wiring  problems  that  delayed  the  readiness  of  certain  offices  and  committed  to
 reinspections  of  all  line-  sharing  related  central  office  work  beginning  in  December  2000.  522  The
 Department  of  Justice  recognizes  that  Verizon  is  making  efforts  to  resolve  its  line  sharing
 implementation  difficulties  and  the  Massachusetts  Department  urges  us  to  find  that  Verizon
 provides  nondiscriminatory  access  to  the  high  frequency  portion  of  the  loop.  523
 167.  Verizon  has  now  completed  all  the  quality  inspections  and  has  taken  the  necessary
 corrective  action  for  all  of  the  line  sharing-  related  collocation  arrangements  that  were  in  place  as
 of  December  1,  2000  .  .  .  in  both  Massachusetts  and  New  York.  524  Verizon  has  also  agreed  to
 implement  the  elements  of  its  quality  inspection  process  into  the  normal  collocation  inspection
 process  and  thus,  new  line  sharing-  related  collocation  arrangements  will  be  subject  to  this
 inspection  process  as  well.  525  It  therefore  appears  that  Verizon  instituted  its  quality  inspection
 process  and  completed  any  necessary  corrective  action  as  it  became  aware  of  central  office  wiring
 issues  described  by  competitive  LECs.  526
 (Continued  from  previous  page)
 Dispatch  Report  shows  discrimination  is  misplaced  because  joint  investigations  at  these  central  offices  show  that
 the  orders  have  failed  due  to  operational  and  other  problems  on  Covads  part.  Id.  at  133-  35.  Covad  concedes  that
 for  some  of  its  collocation  arrangements,  it  is  possible  that  Covad  has  not  yet  installed  DSLAM  cards  in  a
 particular  office  to  support  line  sharing  capability  to  conserve  scarce  resources  but  nonetheless  argues  that
 regardless  of  whether  such  equipment  is  installed,  Verizon  has  an  obligation  to  ensure  that  the  office  is  line-sharing
 ready.  Covad  Massachusetts  II  Reply  at  20  n.  35.  Verizon  offers  a  similar  response  to  Rhythms
 allegations  that  several  Massachusetts  central  offices  are  not  line  sharing  ready.  Verizon  contends  that  the  central
 offices  in  question  have  been  re-  examined  and  it  has  not  found  any  wiring  problems.  Verizon  further  responds  that
 its  records  show  that  of  the  LSRs  submitted  by  Rhythms  only  a  small  proportion  of  the  central  offices  in
 Massachusetts  are  at  issue.  Of  these  offices,  Verizon  claims  that  it  has  completed  line  sharing  orders  for  Rhythms
 in  nearly  all  of  the  central  offices  at  issue  in  Massachusetts.  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz
 Reply  Decl.  at  paras.  143-  145.
 522  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  para.  138.
 523  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  36-  38;  Department  of  Justice  Massachusetts  II
 Evaluation  at  14.
 524  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Reply  Decl.  at  para  126;  see  also  Letter  from  Dee  May,
 Executive  Director  Federal  Regulatory,  Verizon,  to  Magalie  Roman  Salas,  Secretary,  Federal  Communications
 Commission,  CC  Docket  No.  01-  9  (filed  February  23,  2001).  Covad  represents  that  it  submitted  every  single  one
 of  its  linesharing  collocation  applications  in  Massachusetts  in  April  2000.  Covad  Massachusetts  II  Reply  at  22.
 525  See  Letter  from  Dee  May,  Executive  Director  Federal  Regulatory,  Verizon  to  Magalie  Roman  Salas,  Secretary,
 Federal  Communications  Commission,  CC  Docket  No.  01-  9  (filed  February  22,  2001).  Rhythms  argues  that
 Verizon  did  not  institute  its  quality  inspection  audit  process  soon  enough.  See  Rhythms  Massachusetts  II
 Comments  at  8.  Verizon  responds  that  its  implemented  the  inspection  process  as  soon  as  it  became  aware  of  the
 start-  up  issues.  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Reply  Decl.  at  para.  37.
 526  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz.  Reply  Decl.  at  para.  137.  Verizon  has  continued  to
 address  these  issues,  particularly  with  Covad.  Recent  reports  suggest  that  Verizon  has  largely,  if  not  completely,
 resolved  central  office  wiring  issues  that  have  affected  the  deployment  of  line-  shared  services  by  competing
 carriers.  See  Letter  from  Jason  Oxman,  Senior  Counsel,  Covad  to  Magalie  Roman  Salas,  Secretary,  Federal
 Communications  Commission,  CC  Docket  No.  01-  9,  (filed  April  6,  2001)  (stating  that  Covad  verified,  in
 (continued.)
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 168.  Line  Sharing  Performance  Data.  Verizon  has  supplied  a  limited  amount  of
 Massachusetts  commercial  data  for  the  period  September  through  November  2000  in  support  of
 its  line  sharing  showing.  527  To  show  that  the  data  are  reliable,  Verizon  engaged  PwC  to  replicate
 its  carrier-  to-  carrier  results  and  34  line  sharing  measures  for  the  period  September  through
 November,  the  results  of  which,  according  to  PwC,  largely  confirm  the  results  presented  by
 Verizon.  528  We  recognize  the  Department  of  Justices  concerns  that  some  of  the  line  sharing
 completion  interval  data  may  be  inaccurate.  529  Like  the  Massachusetts  Department,  however,  we
 conclude  that  the  data  adequately  show  that  Verizon  has  met  its  line  sharing  obligation.  530  The
 New  York  Commission  only  recently  directed  Verizon  to  capture  its  xDSL  performance  in
 disaggregated  line  sharing  measures.  In  this  case,  we  decline  to  hold  isolated  inaccuracies  against
 Verizon  where  the  method  of  reporting  and  collecting  data  is  new  and  the  underlying  cause  of  the
 distortion  has  been  addressed  by  Verizon.  531  In  this  context,  we  believe  it  is  appropriate  to  credit
 Verizons  submission  of  Massachusetts  commercial  line  sharing  data,  supplemented  by  data  from
 New  York,  when  making  our  determination  that  Verizon  provides  nondiscriminatory  access  to  the
 high-  frequency  portion  of  the  loop.  Specifically,  we  are  convinced  that  the  flawed  timeliness
 measures  provide  evidence  of  the  time  it  takes  Verizon  to  provision  line  shared  loops.
 (Continued  from  previous  page)
 Massachusetts,  that  Verizon  honored  its  commitment  to  clear  all  infrastructure  related  troubles,  throughout  the
 former  Bell  Atlantic  footprint,  by  February  15,  2001).
 527  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Sapienza/  Mulcahy  Decl.  at  para.  13.
 528  See  id.  (finding  that  for  the  majority  of  the  line  sharing  measurements,  PwCs  numbers  matched  Verizons
 and  that  for  the  remaining  measurements,  the  number  of  observations  was  consistent  and  Verizons  reported
 performance  was  within  one  percent).
 529  While  PwC  confirmed  that  Verizon  accurately  calculated  the  missed  appointment  rates  under  the  terms  of  the
 new  consensus  measurements,  the  reported  results  may  overstate  Verizons  performance.  Verizons  technicians
 may  have  marked  some  competitive  LEC  orders  as  completed  after  they  had  tested  the  line  and  received  a  working
 dialtone,  even  though  the  splitter  to  enable  DSL  serve  on  that  line  may  not  initially  have  been  installed  correctly.
 Verizon  however  has  committed  to  adopt  additional  testing  procedures  to  ensure  that  line  sharing  orders  are  not
 marked  completed  unless  working  splitters  are  in  place.  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Application  at  30  n.  25.  The
 Department  of  Justice  states  that  this  problem  affected  those  performance  measures  calculated  using  the
 provisioning  completion  date:  PR-  2  (average  interval  completed);  PR  3-  10  (percent  completed  within  x  days);  and
 PR-  4  (missed  appointments).  Department  of  Justice  Massachusetts  II  Evaluation  at  13  n.  54.  Competing  carriers
 also  contest  Verizons  line  sharing  showing  and  argue  that  the  current  record  is  insufficient  to  support  a  finding  of
 nondiscrimination.  See  Covad  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  8;  Rhythms  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  6;  CIX
 Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  24.
 530  The  Massachusetts  Department  notes  that  Verizon  states  that  for  the  percent  missed  appointments    dispatch
 measure,  PR  4-  05,  Verizon  may  not  have  included  those  instances  where  Verizons  technician  performed  the
 central  office  work  typically  required  for  xDSL  loops  but  failed  to  confirm  that  a  splitter  .  .  .  was  functioning  on  the
 line.  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  37.  The  Massachusetts  Department  found  that
 Verizons  manual  processing  of  line  sharing  orders  will  be  short-  lived  and,  even  absent  complete  line  sharing
 order  flow-  through  Verizon  can  meet  foreseeable  demand  for  line  sharing.  Massachusetts  Department
 Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  327.
 531  Verizon  now  performs  a  splitter  signature  test  which  is  used  to  determine  whether  the  splitter,  which  is
 necessary  for  line  sharing,  is  functioning  on  the  line.  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Reply  at  23.
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 169.  Provisioning  Timeliness.  Overall,  Verizon  adequately  demonstrates  that  it
 provisions  line  sharing  to  competitors  in  substantially  the  same  time  as  it  does  for  itself.  We  note
 at  the  outset  that  we  give  no  decisional  weight  to  Verizons  missed  appointment  data  for  line
 sharing  in  New  York  and  Massachusetts.  Although  the  data  on  their  face  show  that  Verizon
 meets  the  parity  standard  532  we  agree  with  the  Department  of  Justice,  the  Massachusetts
 Department  and  even  Verizon  itself,  that  the  measure  may  be  flawed.  533  Specifically,  Verizon
 states  that  this  measure  may  not  have  captured  those  instances  where  a  Verizon  technician
 performed  the  central  office  work  typically  required  for  xDSL  loops  but  failed  to  confirm  that  a
 splitter  was  functioning  on  the  line.  534  Parties  criticizing  the  completion  measures  appear  to  argue
 that  because  a  Verizon  technician  did  not  test  for  a  functioning  splitter,  the  quality    rather  than
 the  timeliness    of  Verizons  installation  work  is  unacceptable.  535  While  we  recognize  that
 performing  the  additional  work  required  to  test  whether  a  splitter  was  functioning  on  the  line
 could  have  an  impact  on  the  completion  measures,  we  find  that  the  data  provided  by  Verizon  are
 probative  of  the  time  it  takes  Verizons  technicians  to  install  line-  shared  service.  536  We  are
 therefore  not  prepared  to  dismiss  all  of  the  evidence  of  commercial  usage  as  USISPA  suggests
 because  the  inaccuracies  appear  to  be  limited  to  the  completion  measures  and  are  not  so  pervasive
 as  to  render  Verizons  line  sharing  data  completely  untrustworthy.  537  Furthermore,  as  Verizon
 became  aware  of  this  problem,  it  addressed  this  data  integrity  issue  by  properly  instructing  its
 installation  personnel  to  code  orders  as  complete  after  properly  functioning  splitters  are  working
 on  a  given  line,  implementing  its  quality  inspections  for  line  sharing-  related  collocation  work  and
 performing  a  splitter  signature  test  to  ensure  that  the  quality  of  its  installation  work  was
 532  In  September,  October,  and  November  in  Massachusetts,  Verizon  did  not  miss  any  competitive  LEC  line
 sharing  appointments.  In  December,  Verizon  missed  approximately  one  percent  of  competitive  LEC
 appointments.  Verizon  has  supplied  provisioning  information  for  its  separate  data  affiliate,  VADI,  only  for  the
 month  of  November.  In  November,  these  results  demonstrate  parity.  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II
 Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  Attach.  JJ.
 533  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Application  at  30  n.  25.  The  Massachusetts  Department  believes  that  the  measure  is
 sufficiently  flawed  to  merit  exclusion  of  this  information  as  evidence  that  Verizon  is  providing  nondiscriminatory
 access  to  line  sharing.  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  37.  The  Department  of  Justice
 agrees  and  characterizes  the  measure  as  substantially  undermined  by  the  inaccuracies  captured  in  the  measure.
 Id.  at  13.
 534  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Brief  at  30  n.  25.  Without  such  testing,  even  though  technicians  have  confirmed
 dial-  tone  to  and  from  the  splitter,  Verizon  is  unable  to  confirm  that  a  splitter  is  properly  functioning  on  a  line.
 535  See  Covad  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  8;  see  also  Department  of  Justice  Massachusetts  II  Evaluation  at  13.
 536  Even  with  the  miscoding,  the  measures  describe  accurately  the  amount  of  time  Verizon  technicians  required  to
 install  line-  shared  service  without  the  added  task  of  performing  a  splitter  signature  test.  Because  failure  to  install  a
 functioning  splitter  on  a  line  could  prevent  line-  shared  service,  the  lack  of  a  splitter  test  suggests  that  the  quality  of
 the  work,  rather  than  its  timeliness,  was  affected.
 537  We  disagree  with  USISPA  that  the  line  sharing  measurements  simply  do  not  exist.  USISPA  Massachusetts
 II  Reply  at  6.
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 acceptable.  Indeed,  the  record  shows  that  during  the  period  of  time  not  affected  by  the  distortion,
 Verizons  timeliness  performance  demonstrates  parity.  538
 170.  The  average  completion  interval  data  for  line  sharing  show  parity.  539  While
 Verizon  has  supplied  no  retail  information  as  a  basis  for  comparison  during  the  months  of
 September  and  October  for  Massachusetts  data,  the  average  completion  interval  measure  in
 November  shows  that  Verizon  required  slightly  more  than  six  days  to  provision  line-  shared  loops
 to  competitors  compared  to  over  seven  days  for  itself.  540  In  New  York,  for  the  months  of
 September  and  November,  performance  for  competitive  LECs  is  superior  to  that  provided  to
 VADI.  541  Although  these  data  show  that  Verizon  is  performing  at  parity  we  note  that  Verizons
 performance  is  generally  above  the  5-  day  interval  established  by  the  Massachusetts  Department
 even  as  the  current  interval  is  scheduled  to  be  reduced  to  four  days  in  the  near  future.  542  It  is
 538  Verizon  remedied  this  miscoding  problem  by  December  15,  2000.  In  Massachusetts,  the  missed  appointment
 measure  in  January  shows  that  Verizon  missed  only  one  percent  of  competitive  LEC  line  sharing  installation
 appointments.  Verizon  argues  that  the  January  results  show  that  the  impact  on  the  performance  measures  caused
 by  the  lack  of  the  splitter  signature  test  was  minimal.  Letter  from  Dee  May,  Executive  Director  Federal
 Regulatory,  Verizon  to  Magalie  Roman  Salas,  Secretary,  Federal  Communications  Commission,  CC  Docket  No.
 01-  9  (filed  March  19,  2001).  The  December  results  also  show  that  Verizon  misses  less  than  one  percent  of
 installation  appointments  for  competing  carrier  line  sharing  orders.  See  id.
 539  We  acknowledge  that  the  failure  of  Verizons  technicians  to  test  whether  a  splitter  was  functioning  on  the  line
 may  also  have  affected  the  average  completion  interval.  As  discussed  above,  Verizon  has  addressed  this  data
 integrity  issue  going  forward  and  has  instituted  a  quality  inspection  program  to  ensure  that  competitive  LECs
 receive  acceptable  installation  quality  performance.
 540  The  Massachusetts  average  completion  interval  in  November  was  6.  37  days  for  competitive  LECs  compared  to
 7.  53  days  for  VADI.  In  September,  Verizon  completed  competitive  LEC  line  sharing  orders  in  6.  47  days  and  6.  29
 days  in  October.  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  para.  159  &  Attach.  NN.  Verizon
 has  also  presented  data  for  another  interval  measure,  the  percent  completed  within  6  days  measure.  In  New  York,
 from  September  through  November,  Verizon  completed  74.  87  percent  of  competitive  LEC  orders  and  71.  60
 percent  of  VADI  orders  within  six  days,  where  a  six  day  interval  was  requested.  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II
 Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  para.  159  &  Attach.  OO.  Verizon  contends  that  a  majority  of  the  competitive  LEC
 orders  not  completed  within  six  days  are  completed  within  seven  days.  In  Massachusetts,  over  93  percent  of  the
 competitive  LEC  line  sharing  orders  in  the  period  September  through  November  were  completed  within  seven
 days.  See  id.
 541  For  the  months  of  September,  October  and  November,  the  average  completion  interval  for  competitive  LECs  in
 New  York  was  5.  59,  6.  4,  and  6.  42  days  compared  to  9.  15,  6.  2,  6.  02  days  for  VADI.  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II
 Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  159,  Attach.  MM.
 542  Verizon  has  introduced  flow  through  capability  for  line-  shared  ADSL  orders  and  will  accomplish  line  sharing
 provisioning  for  most  orders  without  the  time  necessary  to  dispatch  a  technician  to  install  service.  Given  the  fact
 that  line  sharing  provisioning  is  largely  accomplished  without  manual  intervention,  the  Massachusetts  Department
 ordered  Verizon  to  reduce  its  line  sharing  interval  from  6  days  to  five  days  effective  November  27,  2000.
 Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  36  n.  110;  see  also  CIX  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  25.
 Verizon  states  that  its  5-  day  interval  tariff  for  line  sharing  orders  of  1-  9  lines  went  into  effect  on  November  27,
 2000  and  Verizon  is  now  complying  with  the  new  interval.  See  D.  T.  E.  Tariff  No.  17,  Part  A,  Section  3.  2.  10.
 Additionally,  Verizon  has  committed  to  file,  as  required  by  the  Massachusetts  Department,  a  tariff  reducing  the
 provisioning  interval  by  an  additional  business  day  after  the  April  1  st  deadline  for  fully  implementing  certain  OSS
 upgrades.  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  para.  164.
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 encouraging  that  Verizon  is  moving  toward  meeting  this  state-  approved  provisioning  interval
 while  it  gains  additional  experience  provisioning  commercial  volumes  of  line  shared  orders.
 171.  Installation  Quality  &  Maintenance  and  Repair.  Based  on  the  commercial  data
 presented  in  Massachusetts,  Verizon  appears  to  be  providing  line  shared  loops  at  acceptable  levels
 of  quality.  Although  VADI  did  not  submit  any  trouble  reports  within  thirty  days  of  installation  in
 the  month  of  November,  the  competitive  LEC  rate  was  1  percent  and  in  September  and  October
 2000,  competitive  LECs  did  not  report  any  troubles  on  line-  shared  loops  captured  by  the
 measures.  543  In  New  York,  from  September  through  November,  the  weighted  average  of
 installation  troubles  for  competitive  LECs  was  1.70  percent  compared  to  less  than  one  percent  for
 VADI.  544
 172.  With  respect  to  maintenance  and  repair,  Verizon  repairs  loops  for  competitors  in
 less  time  than  it  takes  to  repair  retail  line-  shared  loops.  In  November,  the  only  month  for  which
 Verizon  provided  such  data  in  Massachusetts,  Verizon  repaired  competing  carrier  line-  shared
 loops  in  just  over  three  hours.  545  Verizon  represents  that  it  took  significantly  longer  to  repair
 loops  for  VADI    over  25  hours.  546  In  New  York,  Verizon  shows  that  the  mean  time  to  repair  is
 comparable  to  stand-  alone  xDSL  loop  repair  times  and  offers  competitors  nondiscriminatory
 access  to  maintenance  and  repair  functions.  547  Verizon  also  shows  that  its  repair  services  are
 performed  at  acceptable  levels  of  quality.  548  Thus  we  find  that  the  data  suggest  that  Verizon  is
 543  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  36.  We  are  mindful  that,  because  Verizon  has
 committed  to  resolving  line  sharing  troubles  through  a  coordinated  process,  it  addresses  some  number  of  line
 sharing  troubles  without  the  receipt  of  a  trouble  ticket  and  concedes  that  the  small  number  of  maintenance  and
 repair  requests  reported  is  likely  attributable  to  that  interim  process.  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II
 Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Supp.  Decl.  at  para.  156.
 544  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  para.  166  &  Attach.  SS.  Covad  argues  that
 Verizons  line  sharing  I-  code  data  are  skewed  because  Verizon  classifies  troubles  associated  with  splitter  wiring  as
 CPE  troubles  which  show  up  in  the  performance  measure  as  competitive  LEC-  caused  troubles.  Covad
 Massachusetts  II  Reply  at  15.  Verizon  responds  that  Covad  mistakenly  assumes  that  Verizons  trouble  designation
 codes  are  designed  to  assign  blame  for  a  trouble  ticket  to  Verizon  or  a  competitive  LEC.  See  Verizon
 Massachusetts  II  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Reply  Decl.  at  para.  119.  The  codes  at  issue  are  designed  to  indicate
 whether  the  trouble  is  caused  by  an  item  in  the  Verizon  or  competitive  LEC  network.  Because  splitters  are  not  part
 of  Verizons  network  Verizon  codes  splitter  troubles  accordingly.
 545  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  para.  71.
 546  Id.
 547  During  September  through  November,  the  mean  time  to  repair  for  competitive  LECs  was  16  hours  compared
 to  slightly  longer  than  10  hours  for  VADI.  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  para.  172.  In
 New  York,  from  September  through  November,  Verizon  met  more  than  92  percent  of  the  repair  appointments  that
 did  not  require  a  dispatch  for  both  VADI  and  competitors.  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.
 at  para.  170  &  Attach.  TT.
 548  Verizon  also  provided  the  percentage  of  repeat  trouble  reports  for  both  competitors  and  VADI.  These  data
 demonstrate  that  Verizon  provides  superior  service  to  competitors  compared  to  itself.  See  MR  5-  01  (Line  Sharing,
 percent  Repeat  Troubles  w/  30  Days).
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 providing  line-  shared  loops  at  an  acceptable  level  of  quality  and  repairing  these  facilities  in  a
 nondiscriminatory  manner.
 173.  Although  we  have  some  concerns  with  the  accuracy  of  Verizons  performance
 results  and  the  limited  volume  of  competitive  LEC  orders  captured  by  the  measures,  we  base  our
 decision  on  measures  not  affected  by  such  inaccuracies,  the  replication  of  other  measures  by  PwC
 and  Verizons  efforts  in  addressing  the  central  office  wiring  issues  that  have  impaired  the  ability  of
 competitive  LECs  to  submit  commercial  volumes  of  line  sharing  orders.  Recent  efforts  by
 Verizon  have  substantially,  if  not  completely,  addressed  the  initial  central  office  wiring
 implementation  issues  experienced  by  competitive  LECs  in  Massachusetts.  549  Furthermore,  we
 also  note  that  Verizon  has  designed  a  process  to  address  line  sharing  implementation  difficulties
 going  forward.  550
 g.  Line  Splitting
 (i)  Background
 174.  In  the  Line  Sharing  Order  on  Reconsideration,  the  Commission  made  clear  that
 line  splitting  is  an  existing  legal  obligation  and  that  incumbent  LECs  must  allow  competitors  to
 order  line  splitting  immediately,  whether  or  not  a  fully  electronic  interface  is  in  place.  551  The
 Commission  further  stated  that  we  expect  Bell  Operating  Companies  to  demonstrate,  in  the
 context  of  section  271  applications,  that  they  permit  line  splitting,  by  providing  access  to  network
 elements  necessary  for  competing  carriers  to  provide  line-  split  services.  552  We  discuss  below  the
 steps  Verizon  has  taken  to  offer  line  splitting  capabilities  consistent  with  the  Line  Sharing  Order
 on  Reconsideration.  553
 549  See  Letter  from  Kimberly  A.  Scardino,  Rhythms  to  Magalie  Roman  Salas,  Secretary,  Federal  Communications
 Commission,  CC  Docket  No.  01-  09  (filed  March  2,  2001).
 550  Verizon  has  designated  a  single  point  of  contact  for  each  competitive  LEC  to  address  line  sharing  ordering  or
 provisioning  processes  regardless  of  whether  they  arise  in  Verizons  TISOC,  CLPC  or  RCMC.  Verizon  is
 participating  in  the  Commissions  Line  Sharing  Summit  and  is  engaged  in  a  dialogue  with  competitive  LECs  to
 further  improve  the  line  sharing  process.  Verizon  has  also  introduced  flow  through  capability  on  line  sharing
 orders  for  connections  requiring  less  than  three  lines.  Verizon  has  also  accompanied  Covad  on  site  visits  of  several
 Massachusetts  central  offices  to  address  what  it  terms  are  several  minor  collocation-  related  issues.  See  Verizon
 Massachusetts  II  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  para.  139.
 551  Third  Report  and  Order  and  Order  on  Reconsideration,  CC  Docket  No.  98-  147;  Fourth  Report  and  Order  on
 Reconsideration,  CC  Docket  No.  96-  98;  Third  Further  Notice  of  Proposed  Rulemaking;  CC  Docket  No.  98-  147;
 Sixth  Further  Notice  of  Proposed  Rulemaking;  CC  Docket  No.  96-  98  (rel.  Jan.  19,  2001)  at  para.  20  n.  36.
 552  Id.
 553  The  Massachusetts  Department  recognizes  that  Verizon  is  required  to  offer  line  splitting  but  requests  that  the
 Commission  take  into  account  the  recent  nature  of  both  its  and  the  Departments  clarifying  Orders  on  line
 splitting  when  reviewing  Verizons  section  271  application.  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  II
 Comments  at  41.
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 175.  Verizon  states  that  it  currently  offers  the  unbundled  network  elements  that  would
 allow  line-  split  services.  554  On  February  14,  2001,  Verizon  issued  a  statement  of  policy  to
 accommodate  line  splitting.  555  Additionally,  Verizon  has  incorporated  line  splitting  contract
 language  reflecting  this  policy  into  its  Model  Interconnection  Agreement  which  it  will  make
 immediately  available  to  any  carrier  who  wishes  to  offer  line-  split  services.  556  Verizon  has  also
 demonstrated  that  it  offers  competitors  nondiscriminatory  access  to  the  individual  network
 elements  necessary  to  provide  line-  split  services  and  that  nothing  prevent  competitors  from
 offering  voice  and  data  services  over  a  single  unbundled  loop.  557  Several  competitors  contest  the
 adequacy  of  this  language  and  argue  that  Verizon  is  currently  not  in  compliance  with  the
 Commissions  line  sharing  and  line  splitting  requirements.  558  These  carriers  further  contend  that
 Verizon  has  engaged  in  a  pattern  of  recalcitrant  behavior  with  regard  to  implementing  line  sharing
 and  line  splitting  requirements  and  the  Commission  should  not  credit  its  promises  of  future
 compliance.  559
 (ii)  Discussion
 176.  Verizon  demonstrates  that  it  makes  it  possible  for  competing  carriers  to  provide
 voice  and  data  service  over  a  single  loop    i.  e.,  to  engage  in  line  splitting.  560  Specifically,
 Verizon  demonstrates  that  it  has  concrete  and  specific  legal  obligation  to  provide  line  splitting
 554  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Reply  Decl.  at  149.
 555  Verizon  issued  its  statement  of  policy  on  February  14,  2001,  approximately  three  weeks  after  this  Commission
 issued  the  Line  Sharing  Reconsideration  Order.  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Reply.  Decl.
 at  154.  AT&  T  argues  that  Verizon  must  at  least  demonstrate  it  has  a  nondiscriminatory  process  in  place  to  support
 line-  split  services.  AT&  T  Massachusetts  II  Reply  at  24;  see  also  USISPA  Massachusetts  II  Reply  at  5;  CompTel
 Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  3-  5.
 556  In  its  line  splitting  amendment,  Verizon  commits  to  offer  line  splitting  consistent  with  the  Commissions  Line
 Sharing  Reconsideration  Order  by  utilizing  Verizons  OSS  to  order  the  unbundled  network  elements  necessary  to
 provide  line-  split  services.  With  regard  to  migrations  of  UNE-  P  customers  to  line  splitting,  Verizon  commits  to
 follow  the  implementation  schedules,  terms,  conditions  and  guidelines  established  in  the  ongoing  DSL
 collaborative  at  the  New  York  Public  Service  Commission.  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Reply
 Decl.  at  154,  Attach.  Q.
 557  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Reply  Decl.  at  para.  149-  58.  Verizon  further  argues  that
 the  Commission  has  already  held  that  Verizon  can  provide  unbundled  network  elements  in  combination,  and  line
 splitting  can  be  achieved  through  the  combination  of  unbundled  network  elements.  See  id.  at  para.  158.
 558  See  AT&  T  Massachusetts  II  Reply  24;  WorldCom  Massachusetts  II  Reply  at  12-  13;  Covad  Massachusetts  II
 Reply  at  5-  6.
 559  AT&  T  Massachusetts  II  Reply  24;  WorldCom  Massachusetts  II  Reply  at  12-  13;  Covad  Massachusetts  II  Reply
 at  5-  6.
 560  Line  Sharing  Reconsideration  Order  at  para.  14-  25;  SWBT  Texas  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  18515-  17,  paras.  323-
 329  (describing  line  splitting);  47  C.  F.  R.    51.703(  c)  (requiring  that  incumbent  LECs  provide  competing  carriers
 with  access  to  unbundled  loops  in  a  manner  that  allows  competing  carriers  to  provide  any  telecommunications
 service  that  can  be  offered  by  means  of  that  network  element).
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 through  rates,  terms  and  conditions  in  interconnection  agreements.  As  a  result,  a  competing
 carrier  may,  for  instance,  provide  voice  service  using  UNE-  P  and,  either  alone  or  in  conjunction
 with  another  carrier,  provide  xDSL  service  on  that  same  line.
 177.  Our  recent  Line  Sharing  Reconsideration  Order  is  clear:  Verizon  must  permit
 competing  LECs  to  offer  both  voice  and  data  services  over  a  single  unbundled  loop  in  a  line
 splitting  configuration.  561  The  Commission  also  stated  that  incumbents  must  make  necessary
 network  modifications  including  access  to  OSS  necessary  for  the  pre-  ordering,  ordering,
 provisioning,  maintenance  and  repair  and  billing  for  loops  used  in  line  splitting  arrangements.  562
 As  carriers  identify  operational  issues  associated  with  line  splitting,  the  Commission  recognized
 that  state  collaboratives  and  change  management  processes  could  be  used  by  incumbent  LECs
 and  competing  carriers  to  work  together  to  develop  processes  and  systems  to  support  competing
 carrier  ordering  and  provisioning  of  unbundled  loops  and  switching  necessary  for  line  splitting.  563
 178.  We  disagree  with  WorldComs  contention  that  Verizons  line-  splitting
 interconnection  agreement  language  limits  line  splitting  to  carriers  who  are  collocated  in  Verizon
 central  offices  or  that  Verizon  is  taking  the  position  that  the  UNE-  P  providers  may  not  line  split
 unless  they  are  collocated.  564  Verizons  contract  language,  which  includes  a  reference  to
 collocator  to  collocator  connections,  does  not  require  UNE-  P  providers  to  be  collocated  in
 Verizon  central  offices  to  offer  line  split  services.  565  Rather,  UNE-  P  providers  need  not  obtain
 collocation  in  Verizon  central  offices  to  offer  the  voice  component  of  line-  split  services.
 179.  Verizons  interconnection  agreement  amendment  is  also  consistent  with  our  Line
 Sharing  Reconsideration  Order,  which  requires  that  incumbent  LECs  minimize  service
 disruptions  to  existing  voice  customers  undergoing  a  transition  to  line-  splitting.  566  For  example,
 where  competitive  LECs  provide  data  service  to  existing  end  user  customers  and  Verizon
 561  Line  Sharing  Reconsideration  Order  at  para.  18.
 562  Id.  at  paras.  18-  20.
 563  Id.  at  para.  21.
 564  See  WorldCom  Massachusetts  II  Reply  at  13.
 565  See  Letter  from  Dee  May,  Executive  Director  Federal  Regulatory,  Verizon,  to  Magalie  Roman  Salas,
 Secretary,  Federal  Communications  Commission,  CC  Docket  No.  01-  9  (filed  March  23,  2001)  (clarifying  that
 voice  providers  in  line  splitting  arrangements  are  not  required  to  be  collocated).  We  note  that  where  a  competitive
 LEC  purchases  an  unbundled  xDSL-  capable  loop  terminated  to  its  collocation  arrangement  to  provide  data  service,
 it  may  partner  with  another  competitive  LEC  to  provide  voice  service.  In  this  situation,  the  data  provider  may
 require  a  connection  to  the  voice  providers  collocation  arrangement.
 566  Verizons  line  splitting  amendment  refers  to  existing  supporting  OSS  to  order  and  combine  unbundled
 network  elements  necessary  for  line-  split  services.  Line  Sharing  Reconsideration  Order  at  para.  22.  WorldCom
 likewise  asserts  that  Verizons  contract  language  suggests  that  it  intends  to  charge  a  series  of  non-  recurring
 charges  associated  with  each  unbundled  network  element  to  its  line-  splitting  customers  that  it  does  not  charge  to  its
 UNE-  P  customers.  See  WorldCom  Massachusetts  II  Reply  at  13.
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 provides  voice  service  to  that  customer  there  is  no  need  to  rearrange  network  facilities  to
 provide  line-  split  services.  567  Because  no  central  office  wiring  changes  are  necessary  in  such  a
 conversion  from  line  sharing  to  line  splitting,  Verizon  is  required  under  our  Line  Sharing
 Reconsideration  Order  to  develop  a  streamlined  ordering  processes  for  formerly  line  sharing
 competitive  LECs  to  enable  migrations  between  line  sharing  and  line  splitting  that  avoid  voice  and
 data  service  disruption  and  make  use  of  the  existing  xDSL-  capable  loop.  568  Such  a  transition  from
 line  sharing  to  line  splitting  should  occur  subject  only  to  charges  consistent  with  the  Commissions
 cost  methodology  as  articulated  in  the  Local  Competition  First  Report  and  Order.  569
 180.  We  disagree  with  WorldComs  claim  that  Verizons  OSS  does  not  comply  with
 our  Line  Sharing  Reconsideration  Order  in  other  respects.  570  The  Line  Sharing  Reconsideration
 Order  does  not  require  Verizon  to  have  implemented  an  electronic  OSS  functionality  to  permit
 line  splitting.  Rather,  the  Commissions  Line  Sharing  Reconsideration  Order  recognizes  that  a
 state-  sponsored  xDSL  collaboratives  is  the  appropriate  place  for  Verizon  to  evaluate  how  best  to
 develop  this  functionality.  571  For  example,  Verizon  has  represented  that  it  is  actively  working  on
 developing  the  OSS  upgrades  necessary  to  provide  for  electronic  ordering  of  line-  split  services  in
 the  context  of  the  New  York  Commissions  xDSL  collaborative.  572  We  recognize  that  Verizon
 has  not,  to  date,  implemented  the  OSS  upgrades  necessary  to  electronically  process  line-  splitting
 orders  in  a  manner  that  is  minimally  disruptive  to  existing  voice  customers;  but  that  such
 functionality  may  require  significant  software  upgrades  and  testing.  It  is  undisputed  that  the
 567  In  the  Line  Sharing  Reconsideration  Order,  the  Commission  held  that  no  central  office  wiring  changes  are
 necessary  in  a  conversion  from  line  sharing  to  line  splitting.  Line  Sharing  Reconsideration  Order  at  para.  22.
 Verizon  suggests  that  when  competitive  LEC  serve  customers  with  existing  voice  service,  they  may  order  new
 unbundled  xDSL-  capable  loops  and  UNE-  P  arrangements  and  then  issue  a  disconnect  of  the  existing  voice  service
 to  provide  line  split  services.  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Reply  Decl.  at  para.  157.
 Disconnecting  a  customers  currently-  established  voice  service  to  enable  the  transition  from  line  sharing  to  line
 splitting  would  require  some  disruption  of  dial  tone  and  may  require  a  change  in  the  voice  customers  telephone
 number,  a  result  that  is  inconsistent  with  our  Line  Sharing  Reconsideration  Order.  See  Line  Sharing
 Reconsideration  Order  at  para.  22.
 568  Line  Sharing  Reconsideration  Order  at  para.  22.
 569  See  Local  Competition  First  Report  and  Order,  11  FCC  Rcd  at  15814-  84,  paras.  625-  771.  For  example,  we
 would  expect  Verizon  to  demonstrate  why  non-  recurring  charges  in  addition  to  those  assessed  when  a  competitive
 LEC  orders  a  UNE-  P  arrangement  are  necessary.  We  cannot  agree  with  Verizon  when  it  states  that  if  Covad
 wants  to  engage  in  a  line  splitting  arrangement  with  a  voice  [competing  carrier],  it  may  do  so  by  working  with  the
 voice  [competing  carrier]  to  order  the  individual  network  elements  if  such  a  process  would  impose  unnecessary
 charges  that  are  not  cost-  based  or  would  otherwise  require  disruption  of  an  end  users  voice  service  in  the  context
 of  a  migration  from  line  sharing  to  line  splitting.  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Reply  Decl.  at
 para.  159.
 570  WorldCom  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  27.
 571  Line  Sharing  Reconsideration  Order  at  para.  22  n.  41  (  We  also  encourage  participants  in  state  collaboratives
 and  change  management  processes  to  develop  specific  ordering  procedures  associated  with  a  variety  of  line
 splitting  scenarios.)
 572  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Reply  Decl.  at  para.  157.
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 parties  in  the  New  York  DSL  collaborative  commenced  discussion  of  line  splitting  over  a  year
 ago;  that  in  April  2000  Verizon  formally  posed  numerous  questions  to  competitors  concerning
 their  business  rules  for  line  splitting;  and  that  in  August  2000,  competitive  LECs  submitted  their
 initial  detailed  business  rules  to  Verizon.  573  Thus  it  appears  that  Verizon  has  the  necessary
 information  to  implement  the  necessary  OSS  upgrades.  Verizon  has  been  able  to  provide  its
 customers  line-  shared  DSL  service  for  approximately  two  years.  Our  Line  Sharing
 Reconsideration  Order  is  fulfilled  by  Verizons  adoption  of  an  implementation  schedule  for  line
 splitting  as  directed  by  the  New  York  Commission  that  will  afford  competitors  the  same
 opportunities.
 181.  We  note  that  in  response  to  WorldComs  concerns,  Verizon  has  agreed  upon  an
 implementation  schedule  to  offer  line  splitting-  specific  OSS  capabilities  under  the  supervision  of
 the  New  York  Commission.  574  In  June  of  this  year  we  expect  that  Verizon  will  conduct  a
 preliminary  OSS  implementation  in  New  York  using  new  OSS  functionality  to  add  data  service  to
 an  existing  UNE-  P  customer.  In  October,  Verizon  has  committed  to  implement,  in  the  Verizon
 East  territory  including  Massachusetts,  the  new  OSS  capability  necessary  to  support  migrations
 from  line  sharing  to  line  splitting  arrangements  consistent  with  the  business  processes  defined  in
 the  New  York  DSL  collaborative.  575  Consistent  with  their  plans  and  with  the  guidance  of  the
 New  York  DSL  collaborative,  Verizon  plans  to  offer  OSS  capability  necessary  to  support  UNE-  P
 migrations  to  line  splitting  by  October  2001.
 V.  OTHER  CHECKLIST  ITEMS
 A.  Checklist  Item  1    Interconnection
 182.  We  conclude,  as  described  below,  that  Verizon  demonstrates  that  it  provides
 equal-  in-  quality  interconnection  on  terms  and  conditions  that  are  just,  reasonable,  and
 nondiscriminatory  in  accordance  with  the  requirements  of  sections  251(  c)(  2)  and  as  specified  in
 section  271  and  applied  in  the  Commissions  prior  orders.  576  We  further  find  that  Verizon  proves
 that  it  designs  its  interconnection  facilities  to  meet    the  same  technical  criteria  and  service
 standards  that  are  used  for  the  interoffice  trunks  within  [its  own]  network.  577  We  also  find  that
 Verizon  makes  interconnection  available  at  any  technically  feasible  point,  including  the  option  to
 interconnect  at  only  one  technically  feasible  point  within  a  LATA,  578  and  that  it  is  providing
 573  See  New  York  PSC,  Order  Granting  Clarification,  Granting  Reconsideration  in  Part  and  Denying
 Reconsideration  in  Part  and  Adopting  Schedule,  Case  00-  C-  0127  (Issued  and  Effective  January  29,  2001).
 574  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Reply  at  30.
 575  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Reply  Decl.  at  paras.  157.
 576  See  SWBT  Texas  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  18379-  81,  paras.  61-  64;  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at
 3977-  86,  paras.  63-  76.
 577  SWBT  Texas  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  18380,  para.  62  (quoting  Local  Competition  First  Report  and  Order,  11
 FCC  Rcd  at  15613-  15,  paras.  221-  25).
 578  See  SWBT  Texas  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  18390,  para.  78.
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 collocation  in  Massachusetts  in  accordance  with  the  Commissions  rules.  579  We  note  that  the
 Massachusetts  Department  found  that  Verizon  has  satisfied  all  aspects  of  this  checklist  item.  580
 1.  Interconnection  Trunking
 183.  Based  on  our  review  of  the  record,  we  are  persuaded  that  Verizon  provides
 competing  carriers  with  interconnection  trunking  in  Massachusetts  that  is  equal  in  quality  to  the
 interconnection  Verizon  provides  to  its  own  retail  operations,  and  on  terms  and  conditions  that
 are  just,  reasonable,  and  nondiscriminatory.  581  Verizon  makes  interconnection  available  in
 Massachusetts  through  interconnection  agreements  and  through  its  state  approved  wholesale
 tariff.  582  Verizon  receives  orders  for  interconnection  trunks  through  the  Access  Service  Request
 (ASR)  process,  and  accepts  ASRs  through  an  electronic  application-  to-  application  interface,  its
 GUI  and  manual  orders.  583  Verizon  provides  affidavit  evidence  to  demonstrate  compliance  with
 checklist  item  1  in  Massachusetts,  as  well  as  performance  data  to  measure  the  quality  of
 interconnection  service  provided  to  competing  carriers.  584  Several  commenting  parties  raise
 concerns  about  interconnection  trunking,  and  we  address  these  issues  below.
 184.  Interconnection  Quality.  We  conclude  that  Verizon  provides  interconnection
 trunking  to  competitive  LECs  that  is  equal  in  quality  to  the  interconnection  Verizon  provides  to
 its  own  retail  operations.  Although  the  performance  metric  that  we  analyze  to  evaluate
 579  See  generally  Deployment  of  Wireline  Services  Offering  Advanced  Telecommunications  Capability,  Order  on
 Reconsideration  and  Second  Further  Notice  of  Proposed  Rulemaking  in  CC  Docket  No.  98-  147  and  Fifth  Further
 Notice  of  Proposed  Rulemaking  in  CC  Docket  No.  96-  98,  15  FCC  Rcd  17806  (2000),  recon.  pending  (Collocation
 Reconsideration  Order).
 580  See  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  19-  41;  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts
 II  Comments  at  1.
 581  In  the  Local  Competition  First  Report  and  Order,  the  Commission  identified  trunk  group  blockage  and
 transmission  standards  as  indicators  of  an  incumbent  LECs  technical  criteria  and  service  standards.  See  Local
 Competition  First  Report  and  Order,  11  FCC  Rcd  at  15614-  15,  paras.  224-  25.  In  prior  section  271  applications,
 the  Commission  concluded  that  disparities  in  trunk  group  blockage  may  indicate  a  failure  to  provide
 interconnection  to  competing  carriers  equal  in  quality  to  the  interconnection  the  BOC  provided  to  its  own  retail
 operations.  See  SWBT  Texas  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  18380,  para.  62.
 582  See  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  20;  D.  T.  E.  Tariff  No.  17.
 583  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  para.  8;  see  also  Verizon  Massachusetts  II
 Application  App.  B,  Vol.  1,  Tab  1A  at  18;  CLEC  Handbook,  VOL.  III,    4.2.3.2.
 584  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  paras.  37-  38,  187;  Verizon  Massachusetts  II
 Application  App.  B,  Vol.  1,  Tab  2.  Verizon  has  implemented  a  number  of  performance  measures  relating  to
 interconnection,  including  measures  that  compare  blockage  on  Verizon  common  trunk  groups  with  blockage  on
 dedicated  trunk  groups  serving  competitive  LECs  (NP  1-  01);  measures  that  capture  missed  appointments  for  trunk
 installations  (PR  4-  01);  and  measures  that  provide  data  on  average  installation  intervals  (PR  2-  09),  and  percent
 troubles  within  30  days  of  installation  (PR  6-  01).
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 Federal  Communications  Commission  FCC  01-  130
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 interconnection  quality,  Percent  Final  Trunk  Group  Blockage,  585  demonstrates  facial  disparity
 between  Verizons  performance  for  competitive  LECs  as  compared  to  its  own  retail  operations,  586
 we  find,  based  on  the  totality  of  the  circumstances,  that  such  a  disparity  is  not  competitively
 significant.  587
 185.  We  reach  this  conclusion  based  on  the  following  factors.  First,  the  extent  of  call
 blocking  for  all  trunks,  including  competitive  LEC  trunks,  is  low  in  absolute  terms.  The  blocking
 standard  employed  by  the  carrier-  to-  carrier  guidelines  permits  only  one  out  of  two  hundred  calls
 to  be  blocked  during  the  busy  hour,  and  the  percentage  of  competitive  LEC  trunk  groups
 exceeding  this  blocking  standard  is  small.  Specifically,  in  the  aggregate,  less  than  two  percent  588
 of  competitive  LEC  trunk  groups  exceeded  the  blocking  standard  due  to  insufficient  trunking
 from  September  through  December  2000.  Stated  another  way,  Verizon  met  the  trunk  blocking
 standard  approximately  98  percent  of  the  time  during  these  four  months.  Moreover,  the
 difference  between  the  percentage  of  competitive  LEC  trunk  groups  and  the  percentage  of
 Verizon  trunk  groups  exceeding  the  blocking  standard  is  also  small,  with  a  difference  of  only  1.64
 percentage  points  between  the  competitive  LEC  and  Verizon  four-  month  averages  for  September
 through  December  2000.  589  Second,  as  discussed  below,  other  data  used  to  evaluate  Verizons
 585  The  metric  NP  1-  01,  Percent  Final  Trunk  Group  Blockage,  compares  the  proportion  of  dedicated  final  trunk
 groups  carrying  traffic  from  the  Verizon  access  tandem  to  a  competitive  LEC  that  exceed  the  blocking  design
 threshold  (generally  B.  005)  with  the  proportion  of  Verizon  common  final  trunk  groups  carrying  Verizon  local
 traffic  between  offices  that  exceed  this  blocking  threshold.  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Sapienza/  Mulcahy  Decl.
 Attach.  A.
 586  See  NP  1-  01  (Percent  Final  Trunk  Groups  Exceeding  Blocking  Standard).  The  percent  of  competitive  LEC
 trunk  groups  exceeding  the  blocking  standard  was  1.  43  percent,  2.  14  percent,  4.  21  percent  (2.  11  percent  with
 adjustment),  and  2.  06  percent  for  September  through  December,  respectively.  See  infra  n.  588.  The  portion  of
 Verizon  trunk  groups  exceeding  the  standard  was  0.  30  percent,  0.  30  percent,  0.  00  percent,  and  0.  60  percent  for
 these  months,  respectively.
 587  This  review  standard  is  consistent  with  the  Commissions  approach  in  previous  section  271  orders.  See,  e.  g.,
 Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  3976,  paras.  59-  60  (  Finally,  in  some  instances,  we  may  find  that
 statistically  significant  differences  in  measured  performance  may  exist,  but  that  such  differences  have  little  or  no
 competitive  significance  in  the  marketplace.  As  such,  we  may  deem  such  differences  non-  cognizable  under  the
 statutory  standard.).
 588  This  calculation  includes  an  adjusted  figure  of  2.  11  percent  for  November.  The  percentage  of  competitive
 LEC  trunk  groups  exceeding  the  blocking  standard  rose  in  November  to  4.  21  percent.  Verizon  has  explained  that
 this  spike  in  the  rate  was  due  to  a  brief  equipment  failure  that  affected  six  of  the  twelve  competitive  LEC  final
 trunk  groups  that  exceeded  the  design  threshold  in  November.  Excluding  those  trunk  groups,  only  six  competitive
 LEC  trunk  groups  exceeded  the  design  threshold  because  of  insufficient  trunking,  or  2.  11  percent.  See  Letter  from
 Dee  May,  Executive  Director  Federal  Regulatory,  Verizon,  to  Magalie  Roman  Salas,  Secretary,  Federal
 Communications  Commission,  CC  Docket  No.  01-  9  at  1  (filed  March  27,  2001)  (Verizon  March  27  Ex  Parte
 Letter).
 589  This  difference  was  calculated  using  the  adjusted  figure  for  November  discussed  supra  n.  588.  The  proportion
 of  final  trunk  groups  that  were  blocked  due  to  insufficient  trunking  for  the  period  September  through  December
 was  1.  94  percent  for  dedicated  competitive  LEC  interconnection  trunk  groups  and  0.  30  percent  for  Verizon
 common  final  trunk  groups.
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 Federal  Communications  Commission  FCC  01-  130
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 interconnection  trunking  performance  demonstrate,  on  their  face,  that  Verizon  is  providing
 interconnection  in  a  manner  that  complies  with  this  checklist  item.  590  Finally  we  note  that  no
 commenter  has  complained  about  trunk  blockage  in  this  proceeding.  591  If  the  rate  of  competitive
 LEC  trunks  exceeding  the  blocking  standard  were  competitively  significant,  we  would  expect  the
 commenting  parties  to  address  this  issue,  particularly  when  competitive  LECs  have  been  provided
 with  carrier-  specific  data  showing  their  individual  rates  for  trunk  groups  exceeding  the  blocking
 standard.
 186.  Interconnection  Timeliness.  Other  aspects  of  Verizons  performance  data  further
 indicate  it  is  providing  nondiscriminatory  interconnection  trunking  in  Massachusetts.  In  previous
 section  271  applications,  the  Commission  has  evaluated  missed  installation  appointments  and
 average  installation  intervals  to  gauge  trunk  provisioning  timeliness.  592  Verizon  demonstrates
 satisfactory  performance  in  both  of  these  areas  in  Massachusetts.  Verizons  performance  data
 concerning  the  percentage  of  missed  installation  appointments  for  provisioning  of  interconnection
 trunks  show  that,  in  recent  months,  Verizons  provisioning  performance  for  competitors  in
 Massachusetts  was  as  good  as  that  provided  to  interexchange  carriers.  In  Massachusetts,  from
 September  to  December  2000  in  the  aggregate,  Verizon-  caused  missed  trunk  installations
 averaged  4.44  percent  for  competitive  LECs,  and  4.43  percent  for  interexchange  carriers.  593
 These  figures  indicate  that,  in  general,  Verizon  provided  parity  or  better  performance  for
 competitive  LECs  in  Massachusetts  for  trunk  installations.
 187.  Average  Installation  Intervals.  Verizons  performance  data  measuring  the  average
 time  for  installation  of  interconnection  trunks  in  Massachusetts  also  show  that  Verizons
 installation  performance  for  competitors  was  as  good  as  or  better  than  that  provided  to
 interexchange  carriers.  For  example,  Verizons  performance  data  show  that  the  average  time  to
 install  interconnection  trunks  for  competitive  LECs  for  the  months  of  September  through
 December  2000  was  27  days,  and  49  days  for  interexchange  carriers.  594
 590  See  infra  paras.  186-  192.
 591  RNK  briefly  notes  that  it  has  experienced  inward  trunk  blockage,  but  supports  Verizons  application  for
 section  271  authorization  in  Massachusetts.  See  RNK  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  2-  3.
 592  Pursuant  to  the  metrics  approved  by  the  Massachusetts  Department,  Verizons  interconnection  trunking
 performance  for  competitive  LECs  is  measured  against  its  performance  for  interexchange  carriers  (except  for  trunk
 blockage,  which  is  measured  against  Verizon  common  final  trunks).  See,  e.  g.,  Verizon  Massachusetts  II
 Application  App.  B,  Vol.  1,  Tab  B,  at  53,  82.
 593  These  four-  month  averages  are  weighted  to  reflect  the  number  of  trunk  installation  appointments  each  month.
 Verizons  rates  of  missed  trunk  installation  appointments  for  competitive  LECs  in  Massachusetts  were  9.  3  percent
 ,  6.  0  percent,  2.  3  percent,  and  0.  0  percent  for  the  months  of  September  through  December,  respectively.  Verizons
 rates  of  missed  trunk  installation  appointments  for  interexchange  carriers  were  12.  0  percent,  7.  0  percent,  2.  9
 percent,  and  0.  0  percent  respectively  for  the  same  four  months.  See  PR  4-  01  (Percent  Missed  Appointments  
 Trunks).
 594  See  PR  2-  09  (Average  Completed  Interval    Trunks).  The  average  completed  installation  interval  for  trunks
 for  competitive  LECs  for  September  was  27  days.  There  were  no  orders  shown  for  this  measure  for  competitive
 (continued.)
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 Federal  Communications  Commission  FCC  01-  130
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 188.  Issues  Raised  by  Commenting  Parties.  CompTel,  on  behalf  of  ICG,  and  Winstar
 raise  issues  concerning  Verizons  interconnection  trunking  performance.  In  particular,  they  have
 raised  provisioning  timeliness  as  an  issue.  Winstar  also  raises  issues  concerning  service  outages
 on  interconnection  trunks,  and  argues  that  the  current  performance  data  do  not  accurately  reflect
 Verizons  performance.
 189.  Winstar  alleges  that  Verizon  caused  ordering  and  provisioning  delays  and  provided
 untimely  or  otherwise  inadequate  FOCs  for  interconnection  trunks.  We  do  not  find  these
 allegations  persuasive.  As  an  initial  matter,  we  note  that  a  number  of  the  provisioning  delays  cited
 by  Winstar  appear  to  have  occurred  in  the  first  half  of  2000  or  earlier.  595  Accordingly,  those
 contentions  have  little  bearing  on  Verizons  performance  in  recent  months  and  its  current
 checklist  compliance.  Moreover,  we  find  that  those  allegations,  as  well  as  Winstars  claims
 relating  to  more  recent  performance,  596  are  not  supported  by  affidavit.  Given  the  fact  that
 Verizons  responses  to  these  issues  are  supported  by  affidavit  and  are  much  more  factually
 detailed,  we  find  that  Verizon  satisfactorily  refutes  Winstars  claims.  597  Winstar  also  cites  to  the
 provisioning  delays  raised  by  other  carriers  as  evidence  of  endemic  provisioning  problems.
 Except  for  ICGs  claims,  as  discussed  below,  other  carriers  claims  were  only  raised  before  the
 Massachusetts  Department  and  not  in  this  proceeding,  and  have  now  been  resolved.  598
 190.  ICGs  allegations  599  concerning  delays  in  trunk  provisioning  likewise  do  not
 warrant  a  finding  of  noncompliance  with  checklist  item  1.  Verizon  states  that  the  trunks
 requested  by  ICG  carry  traffic  from  Verizon  to  ICG  and  that  the  number  of  trunks  requested  was
 not  justified  by  existing  or  reasonably  anticipated  traffic,  600  and  that  the  existing  trunks  were
 (Continued  from  previous  page)
 LECs  for  October  through  December.  The  average  monthly  installation  intervals  for  interexchange  carriers  for
 September  through  December  were  approximately  54,  40,  21,  and  66  days,  respectively.
 595  See  Winstar  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  4.
 596  For  example,  Winstar  raises  issues  concerning  the  provision  of  64  Kbps  Clear  Channel  interconnection  trunks
 and  two-  way  trunks.
 597  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Reply  Decl.  at  paras.  12-  13,  23;  Verizon  Massachusetts  I
 Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Reply  Decl.  at  paras.  25-  29;  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Reply  Decl.  at
 paras.  177,  180,  183-  85.
 598  Winstar  also  cites  claims  of  trunk  provisioning  delays  made  by  AT&  T,  NECLEC  and  RNK  in  the  proceedings
 before  the  Massachusetts  Department.  AT&  T  has  not  raised  these  claims  in  its  filings  before  the  Commission  in
 either  the  Massachusetts  I  or  II  Applications.  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Reply  Decl.  at
 para.  24.  NECLEC  and  RNK  both  stated  that  they  had  experienced  provisioning  problems,  but  concluded  that
 Verizon  was  making  improvements  and  filed  in  support  of  the  Massachusetts  I  Application.  See  NECLEC
 Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  2;  RNK  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  2-  3.
 599  See  CompTel  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  15-  18  and  Attach.  (Washington  Affidavit).
 600  Verizon  states  that  ICG  forecasted  that  Verizon  should  provision  over  24,000  trunks  to  deliver  traffic  from
 Verizon  to  ICG  (the  equivalent  of  120  trunks  from  Verizon  to  ICG  for  every  one  trunk  from  ICG  to  Verizon).
 Verizon  further  states  that  the  number  of  trunks  ICG  requested  amounts  to  nearly  8  percent  of  all  the  local
 interconnection  trunks  Verizon  installed  during  the  last  four  and  a  half  years  to  serve  all  competitive  LECs,  and  is
 (continued.)
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 Federal  Communications  Commission  FCC  01-  130
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 under-  utilized,  with  only  a  33  percent  overall  utilization  level.  601  We  find  the  detailed  information
 Verizon  provided  to  support  its  explanation  persuasive.  Verizon  states  that  the  delays  in  the
 provisioning  of  entrance  facilities  cited  by  ICG  were  actually  caused  by  ICG.  602  ICG  provided  no
 response  to  Verizons  explanations.  In  any  event,  to  the  extent  that  there  may  have  been  delays  in
 the  provisioning  of  interconnection  trunks  to  ICG,  this  appears  to  have  been  an  isolated  situation
 rather  than  evidence  of  a  widespread  problem.  603
 191.  Nor  do  Winstars  claims  of  service  outages  on  interconnection  trunks  or
 maintenance  and  repair  problems  persuade  us  that  Verizon  is  not  currently  in  compliance  with
 checklist  item  1.  The  outage  primarily  relied  on  by  Winstar  in  support  of  these  contentions
 occurred  in  September  1999.  Thus,  it  is  not  relevant  to  Verizons  recent  or  current  performance
 for  purposes  of  the  instant  proceeding.  The  other  outages  referred  to  by  Winstar  do  not  involve
 interconnection  trunking  provided  by  Verizon  in  Massachusetts.  604  We  also  note  that  none  of  the
 other  commenting  parties  raise  concerns  relating  to  service  outages.
 192.  Winstar  also  alleges  that  Verizon  engages  in  practices  designed  to  distort  the
 performance  data  and  conceal  its  poor  provisioning  and  maintenance  and  repair  of  interconnection
 trunking.  605  These  claims  by  Winstar  are  not  supported  by  affidavits,  and,  based  on  the  current
 record,  we  are  unable  to  determine  the  extent  to  which  Winstars  claims  are  true.  606  We  also  note
 that  no  other  carrier  raises  similar  claims  in  this  proceeding.  We  emphasize  that,  as  an  initial
 matter,  competitive  LECs  should  raise  issues  such  as  this  concerning  the  performance  metrics  in
 the  relevant  state  proceedings  where  they  can  be  investigated  and  properly  addressed.  Further,  in
 the  future,  if  competitive  LECs  allege  that  poor  performance  is  not  being  captured  by  the  state-approved
 performance  measures,  then  competitive  LECs  should  provide  evidence,  such  as  reliable
 performance  data,  along  with  a  showing  of  why  the  BOC  is  responsible  for  the  performance.  607
 (Continued  from  previous  page)
 more  trunks  than  Verizon  typically  installs  for  all  competitive  LECs  in  a  two-  month  period.  See  Verizon
 Massachusetts  I  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Reply  Decl.  at  paras.  27-  31.
 601  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  paras.  36-  45.
 602  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Reply  Decl.  at  paras.  42-  44.
 603  The  record  does  not  contain  persuasive  evidence  of  significant  ongoing  trunk  provisioning  delays.  An  isolated
 example  of  poor  performance  by  a  BOC,  absent  special  circumstances,  does  not  warrant  denial  of  a  section  271
 application  if  the  performance  data  do  not  indicate  a  broader  problem.  See,  e.  g.,  SWBT  Kansas/  Oklahoma  Order
 at  para.  138.
 604  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Reply  Decl.  at  paras.  174-  75.
 605  See  Winstar  Massachusetts  II  Reply  at  4-  13.
 606  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  para.  22;  Verizon  Massachusetts  I
 Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Reply  Decl.  at  para.  33.
 607  See  SWBT  Texas  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  18383-  84,  para.  69.
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 Federal  Communications  Commission  FCC  01-  130
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 193.  Finally,  we  reject  the  contentions  of  Winstar,  CompTel  and  Global  Crossing
 involving  the  provision  of  interexchange  access  services.  The  Commission  has  held  in  prior
 orders  that  checklist  compliance  is  not  intended  to  encompass  the  provision  of  these  services.  608
 2.  Collocation
 194.  Verizon  demonstrates  that  its  collocation  offerings  in  Massachusetts  satisfy  the
 requirements  of  sections  251  and  271  of  the  Act.  Verizon  provides  physical  and  virtual
 collocation  through  state-  approved  tariffs.  Verizons  Massachusetts  physical  and  virtual
 collocation  tariffs  are  virtually  identical  to  the  New  York  physical  and  virtual  collocation  tariffs,
 which  the  Commission  found  to  satisfy  checklist  item  1  in  the  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order.  609  In
 its  application,  Verizon  states  that  shared,  cageless,  and  adjacent  collocation  options  are  available
 in  Massachusetts,  and  that  it  has  taken  other  steps  necessary  to  implement  the  collocation
 requirements  contained  in  the  Advanced  Services  First  Report  and  Order  and  the  Collocation
 Reconsideration  Order.  610
 195.  Verizons  collocation  performance  data  generally  indicate  that  Verizon  processed
 collocation  requests  and  provisioned  collocation  arrangements  in  accordance  with  the  time  frames
 established  by  the  Massachusetts  Department.  611  Verizons  performance  data  show  100  percent
 on-  time  responses  to  requests  for  physical  and  virtual  collocation  for  the  period  September
 through  December  2000.  612  Although  Verizons  performance  data  for  average  on-  time
 completion  for  both  new  and  augmented  orders  of  physical  collocation  demonstrate  some  facial
 disparities,  when  adjusted  for  the  time  lost  during  the  August  strike,  Verizons  performance  is  at
 608  See  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  4126-  27,  para.  340;  SWBT  Texas  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at
 18520,  para.  335.  The  provisioning  of  special  access  services  is  not  relevant  for  the  purposes  of  determining
 section  271  checklist  compliance.  Therefore,  although  Winstar,  Global  Crossing,  and  CompTel  filed  comments
 alleging  Verizons  inadequate  performance  in  providing  special  access,  this  is  not  a  factor  in  determining
 Verizons  compliance  with  checklist  item  1.  See  Winstar  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  12;  Global  Crossing
 Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  2-  5;  CompTel  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  2-  3.
 609  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Application  at  12,  14.  Verizon  states  that  it  has  provided  1,700  collocation
 arrangements  in  central  offices  that  serve  96  percent  of  Verizons  business  access  lines  and  94.  5  percent  of  its
 residential  lines  in  Massachusetts.  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  para.  34;  Verizon
 Massachusetts  II  Reply  at  44.
 610  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Application  at  14,  n.  16;  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Reply  at  31-  32;  Deployment  of
 Wireline  Services  Offering  Advanced  Telecommunications  Capability,  CC  Docket  No.  98-  147,  First  Report  and
 Order  and  Further  Notice  of  Proposed  Rulemaking,  14  FCC  Rcd  4761  (1999)  (Advanced  Services  First  Report  and
 Order),  affd  in  part  and  remanded  in  part  sub  nom.  GTE  Service  Corp.  v.  FCC,  205  F.  3d  416  (D.  C.  Cir.  2000),
 on  recon.,  Collocation  Reconsideration  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  17806.
 611  The  timeframe  is  generally  76  business  days.  This  time  period  can  be  extended  up  to  15  days  in  the  case  of
 complex  orders.  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  para.  37.
 612  See  NP  2-  01;  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Reply  Decl.  Attach.  A.
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 Federal  Communications  Commission  FCC  01-  130
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 or  near  the  established  benchmarks.  613  We  conclude  that  this  overall  level  of  on-  time  performance
 for  completion  of  physical  collocation  arrangements  satisfies  Verizons  section  271  obligations
 and  allows  an  efficient  competitor  a  meaningful  opportunity  to  compete.
 196.  Contrary  to  the  assertions  made  by  ALTS,  614  we  conclude  that  Verizon  has
 demonstrated  that  it  has  a  concrete  and  specific  legal  obligation  to  provide  remote  terminal
 collocation  consistent  with  the  UNE  Remand  Order.  615  We  are  also  not  persuaded  by  Rhythms
 and  ALTS  contentions  616  that  Verizon  attempts  to  limit  the  Remote  Terminal  Equipment
 Enclosures  (RTEEs)  at  which  it  will  provide  remote  terminal  collocation  through  its  definition  of
 RTEEs.  617  In  particular,  we  accept  Verizons  explanation  that  the  definition  of  RTEEs  is  intended
 to  expand  the  remote  locations  encompassed  by  the  definition,  not  limit  them.  618  We  also
 conclude  that  Verizon  is  not  required  to  permit  in-  place  conversion  of  virtual  to  physical
 613  We  find  that  the  adjustments  made  by  Verizon  to  account  for  the  August  strike  are  reasonable,  and  that  the
 adjusted  data  present  a  more  accurate  picture  of  Verizons  performance  in  this  area.  The  data  were  adjusted  by
 extending  the  due  dates  for  collocation  arrangements  by  fifteen  business  days  to  offset  the  time  lost  during  the
 strike.  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  para.  182.  The  adjustment  here  is  very
 simple  and  does  not  involve  complex  statistical  adjustments  that  are  difficult  to  verify  and  analyze.
 In  the  case  of  new  orders  for  physical  collocation,  the  strike-  adjusted  data  show  an  average  95.  18  percent  on-time
 completion  rate  for  new  physical  collocation  requests  for  the  period  September  to  November  2000.  See
 Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  Attach.  UU  at  3.  The  strike-  adjusted  data  also  show  an
 average  rate  of  90.  64  percent  on-  time  completions  for  physical  collocation  augmentations  for  the  period  September
 to  November  2000.  See  id.  Strike-  adjusted  data  for  December  show  an  on-  time  completion  rate  of  100  percent  for
 new  physical  collocation  arrangements  and  an  on-  time  completion  rate  of  98.  7  percent  for  augmentations.  See
 Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  71.  The  data  for  January  2001  show  a  return  to  pre-  strike
 performance,  with  Verizon  completing  95  percent  of  new  physical  collocation  arrangements  on  time  and  95.  52
 percent  of  augments  on  time,  without  any  adjustment.  See  id.  at  para.  187.
 614  See  ALTS  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  16-  17.
 615  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Reply  at  31-  32;  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  16.
 616  See  Rhythms  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  12;  ALTS  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  16-  17.
 617  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Application  at  14-  15  n.  16.
 618  Verizon  specifically  states  that  Rhythms  concern  that  the  CRTEE  tariff  precludes  [competing  LECs]  from
 collocating  in  manholes  or  other  non-  building  structures  reflects  a  misinterpretation  of  the  tariff.  Verizon
 Massachusetts  I  Reply  at  32  n.  43.  Verizons  remote  collocation  tariff  states  that  a  CRTEE  provides  an
 arrangement  in  which  [competing  LEC]  equipment  can  be  placed  in  Telephone  Company  remote  terminal
 equipment  enclosures  (RTEEs).  D.  T.  E.  Tariff  No.  17,  Part  E,  Section  11.  1.  1.  A.  1.  1.  A.  The  language  complained
 of  by  Rhythms  merely  expands  the  scope  of  the  offering  to  additional  enclosures  not  owned  by  Verizon.  As
 Verizon  states,  [  a]  lthough  the  tariff  indicates  that  remote  equipment  enclosures  include  enclosures  that  are  in
 buildings  not  owned  by  Verizon,  it  does  not  limit  remote  collocation  to  only  such  in-  building  structures.
 Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Reply  at  32  n.  43  (emphasis  in  original).  Moreover,  Verizon  states  that  [competing]
 LECs  are  free  to  remotely  collocate  in  non-  building  structures  as  well  where  space  is  available.  Id.;  Verizon
 Massachusetts  II  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  para.  139.
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 collocation  in  Massachusetts  for  purposes  of  section  271  619  despite  the  contentions  of  Rhythms
 and  ALTS.  620  Nor  do  we  believe  that  the  concern  raised  by  ALTS  about  the  ability  of  competitive
 LECs  to  obtain  POTS  lines  in  their  collocation  cages  raises  issues  of  section  271  compliance.  621
 3.  Technically  Feasible  Points  of  Interconnection
 197.  We  conclude  that  Verizon  provides  interconnection  at  all  technically  feasible
 points,  including  a  single  point  of  interconnection,  622  and  therefore  demonstrates  compliance  with
 the  checklist  item.  Verizon  demonstrates  that  it  has  state-  approved  interconnection  agreements
 that  set  forth  readily  available  points  of  interconnection,  and  provide  a  process  for  competitive
 LECs  to  request  interconnection  at  additional,  technically  feasible  points.  623  Verizon  further
 shows  that,  for  purposes  of  interconnection  to  exchange  local  traffic,  a  competitive  LEC  may
 choose  a  single,  technically  feasible  point  of  interconnection  within  a  LATA.  624  In  addition,  the
 Verizon  revised  Massachusetts  Collocation  Tariff  complies  with  Commission  rules  by  allowing
 competing  carriers  to  choose  a  single  technically  feasible  point.  625
 4.  Pricing  of  Interconnection
 198.  Checklist  item  1  requires  a  BOC  to  provide  interconnection  in  accordance  with
 the  requirements  of  sections  251(  c)(  2)  and  252(  d)(  1).  626  Section  251(  c)(  2)  requires  incumbent
 619  Neither  the  Commissions  collocation  rules  nor  the  requirements  adopted  by  Massachusetts  require  in-  place
 conversion  from  virtual  to  physical  collocation.  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Reply  at  30-  31.
 620  See  Rhythms  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  15-  18;  ALTS  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  14-  16.
 621  See  ALTS  Massachusetts  I  Comments  Attach.  (Landers  Decl.)  at  7  (stating  that  competitive  LECs  may  want
 POTS  lines  in  their  collocation  space  to  facilitate  communications  by  their  technicians  since  Verizon  bars  the  use
 of  mobile  telephones  in  these  areas).
 622  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Application  at  12;  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  paras.
 8,  258  (describing  available  points  of  access  to  each  of  Verizons  standard  methods  of  interconnection).
 623  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Application,  App.  J,  Tab  22,  Attach.  IV  at  IV-  2  (Interconnection  Agreement
 Dated  as  of  September  28,  1998  by  and  between  New  England  Telephone  and  Telegraph  Company  d/  b/  a  Bell
 Atlantic-  Massachusetts  and  MCImetro).  The  agreement  defines  technically  feasible  point  as  described  in  the
 FCC  Rules  and  regulation.  Id.  Part  B  at  B-  13.  It  also  states  that  [Verizon]  will  interconnect  with  MCIm  at  any
 technically  feasible  point.  Id.  Attach.  IV  at  IV-  2.
 624  Any  competing  LEC  may  request  the  same  terms  and  conditions  as  those  contained  in  existing  interconnection
 agreements  which  allow  interconnection  at  only  one  technically  feasible  point  within  a  LATA.  For  example,
 Qwest  based  its  interconnection  agreement  of  March  19,  1999  on  MCIMetros  agreement  with  Verizon.  See
 Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Application,  App.  J,  Tab  37  (Interconnection  Agreement  Dated  as  of  March  19,  1999  by
 and  between  New  England  Telephone  and  Telegraph  Company  d/  b/  a  Bell  Atlantic-  Massachusetts  and  Qwest
 Communications  Company).
 625  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  para.  139.
 626  47  U.  S.  C.    271(  c)(  2)(  B)(  i).
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 LECs  to  provide  interconnection  at  any  technically  feasible  point  within  the  carriers  network  .  .  .
 on  rates,  terms,  and  conditions  that  are  just,  reasonable,  and  nondiscriminatory.  627  Section
 252(  d)(  1)  requires  state  determinations  regarding  the  rates,  terms,  and  conditions  of
 interconnection  to  be  based  on  cost  and  to  be  nondiscriminatory,  and  allows  the  rates  to  include  a
 reasonable  profit.  628  The  Commissions  pricing  rules  require,  among  other  things,  that  in  order  to
 comply  with  its  collocation  obligations,  an  incumbent  LEC  provide  collocation  based  on  TELRIC.  629
 199.  Based  on  the  evidence  in  the  record,  we  find  that  Verizon  offers  interconnection  in
 Massachusetts  to  other  telecommunications  carriers  at  just,  reasonable,  and  nondiscriminatory
 rates,  in  compliance  with  checklist  item  1.  The  Massachusetts  Department  concludes  that
 Verizon  currently  provides  collocation  under  approved  interconnection  agreements  and  tariffs,
 consistent  with  Commission  and  Massachusetts  Department  orders.  630
 200.  We  find  that  the  collocation  pricing  issues  raised  by  commenters  that  are  currently
 before  the  Massachusetts  Department  do  not  cause  Verizon  to  fail  this  checklist  item.  First,
 commenters  contend  that  Verizon  improperly  charges  for  the  number  of  amps  fused,  rather  than
 the  number  of  drained  amps  actually  requested  and  used  by  competitive  LECs.  631  Prior  to  refiling
 its  Massachusetts  II  Application  with  the  Commission,  Verizon  amended  its  tariff  to  apply
 collocation  power  charges  on  a  per-  load  amp  requested  basis,  rather  than  on  a  per-  fused  amp
 basis.  632  AT&  T  and  Covad  filed  a  petition  with  the  Massachusetts  Department  requesting  an
 investigation  of  this  tariff  revision.  633  When  the  Massachusetts  Department  declined  to  investigate
 the  tariff  revision,  the  parties  filed  a  reconsideration  motion,  asserting  that  Verizon  is  improperly
 627  Id.    251(  c)(  2).
 628  Id.    252(  d)(  1).
 629  See  47  C.  F.  R.    51.501-  07,  51.509(  g);  Local  Competition  First  Report  and  Order,  11  FCC  Rcd  at  15812-  16,
 15844-  61,  15874-  76,  15912,  paras.  618-  29,  674-  712,  743-  51,  826.
 630  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  35-  37.
 631  See  ALTS  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  14,  18-  20;  Covad  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  44-  47;  Rhythms
 Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  18-  20;  Rhythms  Massachusetts  I  Reply  at  8-  9;  ALTS  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at
 6,  11-  14;  Covad  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  36-  39.
 632  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Application  App.  B,  Vol.  3,  Tab  3,  Subtab  M,  Letter  from  Robert  Mudge,
 President-  Massachusetts,  Verizon,  to  Department  of  Telecommunications  &  Energy  (Jan.  12,  2001)  (Verizon
 January  12  th  Tariff  Revision).
 633  See  Letter  from  Charles  E.  Griffin,  Government  Affairs  Director,  AT&  T,  to  Magalie  Roman  Salas,  Secretary,
 Federal  Communications  Commission,  CC  Docket  No.  01-  9  (filed  March  29,  2001)  (AT&  T  March  29  Collocation
 Ex  Parte  Letter)  at  Attach.  2  (Petition  of  AT&  T  Communications  of  New  England,  Inc.  and  Covad
 Communications  Company  to  Investigate  Certain  Provisions  of  January  12,  2001  Tariff  Filing  and  Suspend  and
 Investigate  Certain  Other  Provisions,  DTE  98-  57  (Feb.  1,  2001))  (AT&  T/  Covad  Tariff  Suspension  Request  Ex
 Parte).
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 charging  them  on  a  per-  fused  amp  basis.  634  In  its  response  to  the  Massachusetts  Department,
 Verizon  responds  that  its  tariff  revision  addresses  these  parties  concerns  by  charging  them  on  a
 per-  load  amp  basis  and  that  such  tariff  revision  will  lead  to  a  decrease  in  power  charges.  635
 201.  Second,  commenters  assert  that  Verizon  is  improperly  charging  competitive  LECs
 for  collocation  power  by  assessing  an  additional  power  charge  for  each  redundant  feed  requested
 by  the  competitive  LEC.  636  According  to  these  commenters,  a  redundant  feed  runs  only  between
 the  power  distribution  bay  and  the  competitive  LECs  collocation  point.  They  assert  that  Verizon
 is  charging  an  additional  power  charge  that  recovers  the  cost  of  every  piece  of  equipment  in  the
 collocation  power  configuration,  regardless  of  whether  or  not  it  is  utilized  for  the  redundant  feed.  637  ALTS  contends  that  most  competitive  LECs  configure  their  equipment  to  use  either  the
 A  or  B  feed  as  the  power  source,  but  not  both.  Verizon  should  not  charge  the  full  amount  for
 power  for  both  the  main  and  redundant  feeds  because  the  backup  feed  is  only  used  when  the
 original  feed  fails.  638  According  to  the  commenters,  competitive  LECs  would  use  only  the  amount
 of  amps  requested  to  operate  their  equipment,  and  not  double  that  amount  simply  because  they
 have  back-  up  feeds.  AT&  T  and  Covad  also  raise  this  issue  in  their  tariff  investigation
 reconsideration  motion  before  the  Massachusetts  Department.  639
 202.  Verizon  responds  that  it  provides  competitive  LECs  with  a  means  of  purchasing
 only  the  power  they  want.  Verizon  disputes  ALTS  assertion  that  most  competitive  LECs
 configure  their  equipment  to  use  either  the  A  or  B  feed,  but  not  both.  640  Verizon  contends  that
 most  competitive  LECs  have  collocation  equipment  that  is  designed  to  draw  power  from  two
 feeds  simultaneously.  641  To  support  this  statement,  Verizon  asserts  that  it  surveyed  over  1,000
 power  feeds  at  collocation  arrangements  in  Massachusetts  and  found  that  over  97  percent  of  them
 634  See  AT&  T  March  29  Collocation  Ex  Parte  Letter  at  Attach.  4  (Motion  of  AT&  T  Communications  of  New
 England,  Inc.  and  Covad  Communications  Company  for  Reconsideration  and  for  Extension  of  the  Judicial  Appeal
 Period,  DTE  98-  57  (March  7,  2001))  (AT&  T/  Covad  Tariff  Reconsideration  Motion  Ex  Parte).
 635  See  Letter  from  Dee  May,  Executive  Director,  Federal  Regulatory,  Verizon,  to  Magalie  Roman  Salas,
 Secretary,  Federal  Communications  Commission,  CC  Docket  No.  01-  9  (filed  March  28,  2001)  (Verizon  March  28
 Collocation  Ex  Parte  Letter)  at  Attach.  1  (Opposition  of  Verizon  Massachusetts,  DTE  98-  57  (March  15,  2001))
 (Verizon  Tariff  Opposition  Ex  Parte).
 636  See  ALTS  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  14,  18-  19;  Covad  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  44-  47;  Rhythms
 Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  19;  Rhythms  Massachusetts  I  Reply  at  8-  9;  ALTS  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  11-
 13;  Covad  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  36-  37.
 637  See  Covad  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  46-  47.
 638  See  ALTS  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  12.
 639  AT&  T/  Covad  Tariff  Reconsideration  Motion  Ex  Parte  at  7.
 640  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Reply  at  45;  see  also  Verizon  March  28  Collocation  Ex  Parte  Letter  at  Attach.  2,
 Answer  of  Verizon  Massachusetts,  DTE  98-  57  at  8-  11  (March  15,  2001)  (Verizon  Tariff  Reconsideration  Answer
 Ex  Parte).
 641  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Reply  at  45.
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 were  drawing  power  on  both  feeds.  642  Verizon  also  asserts  that  it  does  not  require  competitive
 LECs  to  take  a  second  backup  feed,  nor  does  it  specify  the  load  that  a  competitive  LEC  must
 place  on  a  given  feed.  643  If,  for  instance,  a  competitive  LEC  has  a  piece  of  equipment  that  draws
 40  amps  and  wants  to  order  and  pay  for  only  40  amps  of  power,  Verizon  asserts  that  it  can  order
 two  power  feeds  with  20  load  amps  on  each  feed.  644
 203.  These  disputes  are  currently  before  the  Massachusetts  Department.  As  we  noted
 in  the  SWBT  Texas  Order,  the  Act  authorizes  the  state  commissions  to  resolve  specific  carrier-  to-carrier
 disputes  arising  under  the  local  competition  provisions,  and  it  authorizes  the  federal  district
 courts  to  ensure  that  the  results  of  the  state  arbitration  process  are  consistent  with  federal  law.  645
 Although  we  have  an  independent  obligation  to  ensure  compliance  with  the  checklist,  section  271
 does  not  compel  us  to  preempt  the  orderly  disposition  of  intercarrier  disputes  by  the  state
 commissions,  particularly  now  that  the  Supreme  Court  has  restored  our  pricing  jurisdiction  and
 has  thereby  directed  the  state  commissions  to  follow  our  pricing  rules  in  their  disposition  of  those
 disputes.  Here,  we  have  confidence  in  the  Massachusetts  Departments  ability  to  resolve  these
 matters  consistent  with  our  rules.  Verizon  amended  its  collocation  tariff  in  January  12,  2001  to
 address  the  concerns  of  the  parties,  and  parties  have  presented  no  evidence  that  Verizon  is  not
 fully  cooperating  with  the  efforts  of  the  Massachusetts  Department  to  resolve  these  issues.  We
 note  that  progress  is  being  made  in  this  regard.  646  We  therefore  find  that  these  disputes  do  not
 cause  Verizon  to  fail  this  checklist  item.
 204.  We  are  not  persuaded  by  ALTS  assertion  that  Verizon  charges  more  for  power  in
 its  Massachusetts  tariff  for  cageless  collocation  than  it  charges  for  power  in  its  federal  tariff,  in
 which  there  is  no  cageless  collocation  offering.  647  According  to  ALTS,  there  is  no  cost
 justification  for  the  difference  in  collocation  power  charges.  648  Verizon  claims  that  its  federal
 power  rate  is  based  on  outdated  information  from  1991  and  greatly  understates  its  power  costs.
 Differences  between  the  federal  tariff  and  the  state  tariff  are  not  enough,  by  themselves,  to
 support  a  finding  that  the  state  tariff  is  unlawful.  The  power  rates  in  the  Massachusetts  tariff  are
 642  See  id.
 643  See  id.;  see  also  Verizon  Tariff  Reconsideration  Answer  Ex  Parte  at  8-  12.
 644  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Reply  at  45.
 645  See  SWBT  Texas  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  18541,  para.  383;  see  also  47  U.  S.  C.    252(  c),  (e)(  6);  AT&  T  Corp.  v.
 Iowa  Utils.  Bd.,  525  U.  S.  366  (1999).
 646  See  Letter  from  Kenneth  Rust,  Director,  Federal  Regulatory,  Verizon,  to  Magalie  Roman  Salas,  Secretary,
 Federal  Comminations  Commission,  CC  Docket  No.  01-  09  at  1-  2  (filed  April  3,  2001)  (Verizon  April  3
 Collocation  Ex  Parte  Letter)  (Verizon  letter  informing  competitive  LECs  of  new  methods  for  billing  power  in
 collocation  arrangements  in  New  York  and  Massachusetts.  Verizon  now  bills  competitive  LECs  for  collocation
 power  on  the  basis  of  the  total  number  of  load  amps  requested,  on  a  per-  load-  amp  basis,  and  permits  competitive
 LECs  to  request  a  fuse  size  of  up  to  2.  5  times  the  load  amp  requested.).
 647  See  ALTS  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  14.
 648  See  id.
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 based  on  more  recent  cost  studies  and  have  been  approved  by  the  Massachusetts  Department,  and
 we  find  no  basis  for  rejecting  them.  649
 B.  Checklist  Item  3    Poles,  Ducts,  Conduits  and  Rights  of  Way
 1.  Background
 205.  Section  271(  c)(  2)(  B)(  iii)  requires  BOCs  to  provide  [  n]  ondiscriminatory  access  to
 the  poles,  ducts,  conduits,  and  rights-  of-  way  owned  or  controlled  by  the  [BOC]  at  just  and
 reasonable  rates  in  accordance  with  the  requirements  of  section  224.  650  Section  224(  b)(  1)  states
 that  the  Commission  shall  regulate  the  rates,  terms,  and  conditions  governing  pole  attachments  to
 ensure  that  they  are  just  and  reasonable.  651  Notwithstanding  this  general  grant  of  authority,
 section  224(  c)(  1)  states  that  where  such  matters  are  regulated  by  a  state  nothing  in  the  section
 shall  be  construed  to  apply  to,  or  to  give  the  Commission  jurisdiction  with  respect  to  the  rates,
 terms,  and  conditions,  or  access  to  poles,  ducts,  conduits  and  rights-  of-  way.  652  Massachusetts  has
 certified  to  this  Commission  that  it  regulates  the  rates,  terms,  and  conditions  for  pole  attachments
 in  that  state.  653
 2.  Discussion
 206.  Based  on  the  evidence  in  the  record,  we  conclude,  as  the  Massachusetts
 Department  does,  654  that  Verizon  demonstrates  that  it  provides  nondiscriminatory  access  to  its
 649  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Reply  at  45;  see  also  ALTS  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  Ex.  B.
 650  47  U.  S.  C.    271(  c)(  2)(  B)(  iii).  As  originally  enacted,  section  224  was  intended  to  address  obstacles  that  cable
 operators  encountered  in  obtaining  access  to  poles,  ducts,  conduits,  or  rights-  of-  way  owned  or  controlled  by
 utilities.  The  1996  Act  amended  section  224  in  several  important  respects  to  ensure  that  telecommunications
 carriers  as  well  as  cable  operators  have  access  to  poles,  ducts,  conduits,  or  rights-  of-  way  owned  or  controlled  by
 utility  companies,  including  LECs.  See  Second  BellSouth  Louisiana  Order,  13  FCC  Rcd  at  20706,  para.  171
 n.  574.
 651  47  U.  S.  C.    224(  b)(  1).
 652  47  U.  S.  C.    224(  c)(  1).  The  1996  Act  extended  the  Commissions  authority  to  include  not  just  rates,  terms,
 and  conditions,  but  also  the  authority  to  regulate  nondiscriminatory  access  to  poles,  ducts,  conduits,  and  rights-  of-way.
 See  Local  Competition  First  Report  and  Order,  11  FCC  Rcd  at  16104,  para.  1232;  47  U.  S.  C.    224(  f).
 Absent  state  regulation  of  terms  and  conditions  of  nondiscriminatory  attachment  access,  the  Commission  retains
 jurisdiction.  See  Local  Competition  First  Report  and  Order,  11  FCC  Rcd  at  16104,  para.  1232;  47  U.  S.  C.  
 224(  c)(  1);  see  also  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  4093,  para.  264.
 653  See  States  That  Have  Certified  That  They  Regulate  Pole  Attachments,  Public  Notice,  7  FCC  Rcd  1498  (1992);
 Implementation  of  the  Local  Competition  Provisions  in  the  Telecommunications  Act  of  1996,  CC  Docket  No.  96-
 98;  Interconnection  between  Local  Exchange  Carriers  and  Commercial  Mobile  Radio  Service  Providers,  CC
 Docket  No.  95-  185,  Order  on  Reconsideration,  14  FCC  Rcd  at  18089,  para.  115  (1999)  (stating  that  [  o]  ur  rule
 does  not  require  .  .  .  [previously  certified]  .  .  .  states  to  formally  re-  certify  in  order  to  assert  their  jurisdiction  over
 access);  47  U.  S.  C.    224(  c).
 654  See  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  223-  49;  Massachusetts  Department
 Massachusetts  I  Reply  at  54-  61.
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 poles,  ducts,  conduits,  and  rights-  of-  way  at  just  and  reasonable  rates  in  accordance  with  section
 271(  c)(  2)(  B)(  iii).  655  We  reject  commenters  requests  to  find  that  Verizons  pole  attachment
 policies  and  practices  in  Massachusetts  are  discriminatory.  656  As  we  explain  above,  the
 Massachusetts  Department  is  certified  by  this  Commission  to  regulate  pole  attachments  in  that
 state.  The  Massachusetts  Department  has  established  a  process  for  complaints  of  discriminatory
 access  to  poles.  657  Therefore,  any  claim  regarding  discriminatory  access  to  poles  is  a  matter  for
 the  Massachusetts  Department  to  consider.  658  The  record  does  not  indicate  that  anyone,  including
 any  of  the  commenters,  has  filed  a  discriminatory  access  complaint  with  the  Massachusetts
 Department.  659
 C.  Checklist  Item  5    Unbundled  Local  Transport
 207.  Section  271(  c)(  2)(  B)(  v)  of  the  competitive  checklist  requires  a  BOC  to  provide
 [  l]  ocal  transport  from  the  trunk  side  of  a  wireline  local  exchange  carrier  switch  unbundled  from
 switching  or  other  services.  660  The  Commission  has  required  that  BOCs  provide  both  dedicated
 and  shared  transport  to  requesting  carriers.  661  Dedicated  transport  consists  of  BOC  transmission
 facilities  dedicated  to  a  particular  customer  or  carrier  that  provide  telecommunications  between
 wire  centers  owned  by  BOCs  or  requesting  telecommunications  carriers,  or  between  switches
 owned  by  BOCs  or  requesting  telecommunications  carriers.  662  Shared  transport  consists  of
 transmission  facilities  shared  by  more  than  one  carrier,  including  the  BOC,  between  end  office
 655  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Application  at  34-  35;  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  paras.
 187-  202;  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Reply  Decl.  at  paras.  151-  66;  Verizon  Massachusetts  II
 Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Reply  Decl.  at  paras.  201-  03.
 656  See  RCN  Massachusetts  I  Comments;  RCN  Massachusetts  I  Reply;  RCN  Massachusetts  I  Supplementary
 Reply;  RCN  Massachusetts  II  Comments;  Fiber  Technologies  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  5;  Fiber  Technologies
 Massachusetts  I  Reply  at  7;  ALTS  Massachusetts  I  Comments  43-  48;  Massachusetts  Attorney  General
 Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  6-  7.
 657  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  224-  25.
 658  See  47  U.  S.  C.    224(  c);  see  also  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Reply  at  39-  40.
 659  See  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  224.  Although  we  recognize  that  commenters
 raised  these  claims  in  the  section  271  proceeding  before  the  Massachusetts  Department,  the  record  does  not
 indicate  that  such  claims  were  also  raised  through  the  complaint  and  enforcement  process  established  by  the
 Massachusetts  Department.  The  Massachusetts  Department  concluded  that,  based  upon  the  evidence  presented  in
 its  section  271  proceeding,  Verizon  is  providing  nondiscriminatory  access  to  its  poles.  See  Massachusetts
 Department  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  249.  The  Department  further  noted,  however,  that  its  rules  permit  any
 party  to  raise  claims  of  discriminatory  treatment  and  that  its  findings  in  the  context  of  the  section  271  proceeding
 shall  in  no  way  be  considered  precedential  in  any  proceedings  under  its  rules.  Id.
 660  47  U.  S.  C.    271(  c)(  2)(  B)(  v).
 661  See  Second  BellSouth  Louisiana  Order,  13  FCC  Rcd  at  20719,  para.  201.
 662  See,  e.  g.,  id.;  SWBT  Texas  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  18518,  para.  331  n.  920.
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 switches,  between  end  office  switches  and  tandem  switches,  and  between  tandem  switches,  in  the
 BOCs  network.  663
 208.  We  conclude,  based  upon  the  evidence  in  the  record,  that  Verizon  demonstrates
 that  it  provides  both  shared  and  dedicated  transport  in  compliance  with  the  requirements  of
 checklist  item  5.  664  The  Massachusetts  Department  also  finds  that  Verizon  is  in  compliance  with
 this  checklist  item.  665
 209.  In  prior  orders  the  Commission  has  reviewed  the  missed  appointment  rates  for  the
 provision  of  interoffice  facilities  to  competitive  LECs  to  determine  compliance  with  checklist  item
 5.  666  On  first  examination,  the  carrier-  to-  carrier  missed  appointment  rate  performance  appears  to
 depict  a  significant  difference  in  the  provision  of  interoffice  facilities  for  competitive  LECs
 compared  to  the  retail  analogue  described  in  the  carrier-  to-  carrier  guidelines  in  place  prior  to
 January  2001.  667  We  place  little  weight  on  this  performance  disparity,  however,  given  the  revised
 retail  analogue  developed  by  the  carrier-  to-  carrier  working  group  and  adopted  by  the  New  York
 Commission  and  Massachusetts  Department  in  December  2000,  which  paints  a  more  accurate
 picture  of  Verizons  transport  provisioning  performance.  As  explained  below,  when  Verizons
 provision  of  unbundled  transport  is  compared  to  the  revised  retail  analogue,  its  performance  is
 better  for  competing  LECs  than  it  is  for  its  own  retail  customers.
 210.  Under  the  carrier-  to-  carrier  guidelines  in  place  prior  to  January  2001  for  the
 missed  appointments  metric,  the  provisioning  of  competitive  LEC  interoffice  facility  transport  was
 compared  to  Verizons  provisioning  of  retail  special  services.  668  According  to  Verizon,  retail
 663  See,  e.  g.,  Second  BellSouth  Louisiana  Order,  13  FCC  Rcd  at  20719-  20,  para.  201  nn.  650  &  652.
 664  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Application  at  30;  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  paras.
 159-  66  &  App.  B;  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Reply  at  38.
 665  See  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  338-  39.
 666  See  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  4126,  para.  339;  SWBT  Texas  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  1851,
 para.  333.
 667  Using  the  carrier-  to-  carrier  numbers  provided  with  the  application,  the  four  month  (September  through
 December  2000)  average  for  competitive  LECs  was  12.1  percent,  compared  to  2.1  percent  for  Verizons  retail
 special  services  provisioning.  See  PR-  4-  01  (Provisioning  of  POTS/  Special  Services  -  Missed  Appointments).
 Specifically,  the  competitive  LEC  missed  appointment  rates  for  September  through  December  2000  were  10.71
 percent,  2.  76  percent,  15.  21  percent,  and  21.  25  percent,  respectively.  Verizons  performance  for  its  own  retail
 special  services  for  the  same  period  was  2.  78  percent,  1.  90  percent,  1.  43  percent,  and  2.  04  percent,  respectively.
 668  Letter  from  Dolores  A.  May,  Executive  Director  Federal  Regulatory,  Verizon,  to  Magalie  Roman  Salas,
 Secretary,  Federal  Communications  Commission  (March  29,  2001)  (Verizon  March  29  Ex  Parte  Letter)  at  1;
 Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Guerard/  Canny  Decl.  Attach.  B  at  49.  Special  services  are  services  that  require
 engineering  design  intervention.  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Guerard/  Canny  Decl.  Attach.  B  at  101.  These  include
 such  services  as  primary  rate  ISDN,  4  wire  xDSL  services,  digital  services,  private  line  or  foreign  served  services,
 as  well  as  high  capacity  services  such  as  DS-  1  and  DS-  3  circuits.  See  id.
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 special  services  are  predominately  at  the  voice  grade  level.  669  The  carrier-  to-  carrier  working
 group  670  agreed  to  change  the  guidelines  as  of  January  2001,  however,  to  reflect  a  revised  retail
 analogue  for  this  performance  measure  using  provisioning  of  retail  DS-  3s  instead  of  retail  special
 services  because  the  unbundled  interoffice  facilities  Verizon  provides  to  competitive  LECs  are
 predominately  at  the  DS-  3  level,  rather  than  the  voice  grade  level.  671  We  find  that  the  revised
 retail  analogue  appears  to  be  more  appropriate  and  represents  a  better  indicator  of  whether
 Verizon  is  providing  the  same  quality  of  service  to  competitive  LECs  as  to  its  own  customers  for
 transport  than  the  comparison  in  place  prior  to  January  2001.  673  We  further  find  that  the  missed
 appointment  data,  using  the  revised  carrier-  to-  carrier  retail  analogue,  provides  sufficient  evidence
 that  Verizon  is  providing  unbundled  transport  to  competitive  LECs  in  a  nondiscriminatory
 manner.  674
 211.  We  reject  OnSites  assertion  that  Verizon  has  repeatedly  failed  to  provide
 transport  circuits  in  violation  of  checklist  item  5  675  because  the  record  indicates  OnSite  orders  the
 669  Id.
 670  The  carrier-  to-  carrier  working  group  is  an  industry  group,  comprised  of  Verizon  and  all  interested  competitive
 LECs,  that  addresses  the  performance  measures  that  should  apply  to  the  provision  of  service  to  competitive  LECs
 and  the  appropriate  performance  standards  associated  with  those  measures.  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I
 Application  Guerard/  Canny  Decl.  at  5.
 671  See  id.;  see  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Application  App.  B,  Tab  1B,  at  53  (reflecting  new  retail  analogue).
 673  Using  the  revised  DS-  3  retail  analogue,  Verizon  missed  about  63  percent,  25  percent,  43  percent,  and  40
 percent  of  its  retail  DS-  3  appointments  in  September  through  December,  respectively.  See  id.  at  2.  Because  the
 number  of  orders  for  each  of  these  months  are  relatively  small  --  ranging  between  10  and  27  orders  per  month  --
 we  rely  on  an  average  of  those  four  months  in  reaching  our  finding.  The  average  rate  over  the  four-  month  period
 was  47.  62  percent.  This  compares  favorably  with  the  four  month  average  of  the  missed  appointment  rate  for
 provisioning  unbundled  transport  to  competitive  LECs,  which  was  12.  13  percent.
 674  Although  the  carrier-  to-  carrier  collaborative  chose  DS-  3s  as  the  retail  analogue,  it  might  have  chosen  to
 combine  the  missed  appointment  rate  for  DS-  1s  and  DS-  3s  because  both  are  used  by  competitive  LECs  for
 transport.  Using  both  DS-  1s  and  DS-  3s,  Verizon  missed  appointments  for  its  retail  customers  about  12.  33  percent
 on  average  for  September  through  December,  which  compares  favorably  with  the  average  missed  appointment  rate
 for  providing  competitive  LECs  with  unbundled  local  transport  for  the  same  period:  12.  13  percent.  See  Verizon
 March  29  Ex  Parte  Letter  at  2.  This  analysis  gives  us  additional  confidence  in  our  conclusion.
 675  See  OnSite  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  20-  21  &  Kriss  Decl.  at  2-  6;  see  also  Global  Crossing  Massachusetts
 II  Comments  at  3-  5  (complaining  of  poor  special  access  provisioning);  CompTel  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  3
 (same).  We  discuss  the  Commissions  oversight  of  the  provision  of  special  access  in  our  discussion  of  section  272
 below.  See  infra  Part  VII.  B.  2.
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 those  circuits  out  of  Verizons  special  access  tariff.  676  The  Commission  previously  determined  in
 the  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order  that  checklist  compliance  is  not  intended  to  encompass
 provision  of  tariffed  interstate  services  simply  because  these  services  use  some  of  the  same
 physical  facilities  as  a  checklist  item.  677  We  note,  however,  that  to  the  extent  parties  are
 experiencing  delays  in  the  provisioning  of  special  access  services  ordered  from  Verizons  federal
 tariffs,  these  issues  are  appropriately  addressed  in  the  Commissions  section  208  complaint
 process.
 212.  We  also  disagree  with  Digital  Broadbands  assertions  that  Verizon  has  failed  to
 satisfy  checklist  item  5.  Through  comments  filed  by  ALTS,  Digital  Broadband  states  that  it  has
 experienced  difficulties  with  ordering  and  provisioning  DS-  3s  during  April  through  September
 2000.  Specifically,  Digital  Broadband  complains  about  orders  not  completed  by  the  committed
 due  date,  repeated  postponements  of  the  committed  due  dates  and  newly  installed  circuits  that  do
 not  function  properly.  678  Even  though  Digital  Broadband  may  have  experienced  some  problems
 during  that  time  period,  performance  data  from  that  period  have  little  bearing  on  Verizons
 performance  in  recent  months  and,  consequently,  its  current  checklist  compliance.  Moreover,  no
 commenter  complains  of  recent  problems  with  ordering  or  provisioning  of  unbundled  transport.
 D.  Checklist  Item  13    Reciprocal  Compensation
 213.  Section  271(  c)(  2)(  B)(  xiii)  of  the  Act  requires  that  a  BOC  enter  into  [  r]  eciprocal
 compensation  arrangements  in  accordance  with  the  requirements  of  section  252(  d)(  2).  679  In  turn,
 pursuant  to  section  252(  d)(  2)(  A),  a  state  commission  shall  not  consider  the  terms  and  conditions
 for  reciprocal  compensation  to  be  just  and  reasonable  unless  (i)  such  terms  and  conditions  provide
 for  the  mutual  and  reciprocal  recovery  by  each  carrier  of  costs  associated  with  the  transport  and
 termination  on  each  carrier's  network  facilities  of  calls  that  originate  on  the  network  facilities  of
 the  other  carrier;  and  (ii)  such  terms  and  conditions  determine  such  costs  on  the  basis  of  a
 reasonable  approximation  of  the  additional  costs  of  terminating  such  calls.  680
 214.  Based  on  the  evidence  in  the  record,  we  conclude  that  Verizon  demonstrates  that  it
 has  entered  into  reciprocal  compensation  arrangements  in  accordance  with  the  requirements  of
 section  252(  d)(  2),  and  thus  satisfies  the  requirements  of  checklist  item  13.  Verizon  demonstrates
 that  it:  (1)  has  in  place  reciprocal  compensation  arrangements  in  accordance  with  section
 676  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Reply  at  54.
 677  See  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  4126-  27,  para.  340.
 678  See  ALTS  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  29  &  Landers  Decl.  at  para.  12;  see  also  Digital  Broadband
 Massachusetts  I  Reply  at  8-  10.  Digital  Broadband  also  complains  about  orders  that  were  incorrectly  recorded  as
 ticketed  as  customer  not  ready.
 679  47  U.  S.  C.    271(  c)(  2)(  B)(  xiii).
 680  Id.    252(  d)(  2)(  A).
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 252(  d)(  2),  681  and  (2)  is  making  all  required  payments  in  a  timely  fashion.  682  The  Massachusetts
 Department  has  concluded  that  Verizon  complies  with  the  reciprocal  compensation  requirements
 in  checklist  item  13.  683
 215.  Several  commenters  allege  that  Verizon  is  failing  to  pay  reciprocal  compensation
 for  ISP-  bound  traffic.  684  We  find  that  the  issues  raised  by  the  commenters  do  not  evidence
 Verizons  failure  to  satisfy  checklist  item  13.  Under  a  prior  Commission  order,  ISP-  bound  traffic
 is  not  subject  to  the  reciprocal  compensation  provisions  of  section  251(  b)(  5)  and  252(  d)(  2);  685
 therefore,  as  the  Commission  stated  in  the  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  whether  a  carrier  pays
 such  compensation  is  irrelevant  to  checklist  item  13.  686  The  United  States  Court  of  Appeals  for
 the  District  of  Columbia  Circuit  vacated  and  remanded  the  Commissions  order,  and  the
 Commission  is  now  reconsidering  the  matter.  687  Given  that  the  Commission  has  not  yet
 determined  the  status  of  ISP-  bound  traffic,  refusal  to  pay  reciprocal  compensation  for  ISP-  bound
 traffic  does  not  violate  checklist  item  13s  requirements  at  this  time.  As  we  have  stated,  [  i]  n  the
 absence  of  a  Commission  rule  on  reciprocal  compensation,  parties  may  voluntarily  include  this
 traffic  within  the  scope  of  their  interconnection  agreements  .  .  .  [and]  they  are  bound  by  those
 agreements,  as  interpreted  and  enforced  by  the  state  commissions.  688  At  this  time,  therefore,
 provided  that  a  carrier  follows  states  interpretations  and  requirements  promulgated  under  their
 interpretation  of  interconnection  agreements,  including  states  requirements  concerning  ISP-bound
 traffic,  such  carrier  has  satisfied  checklist  item  13.
 216.  The  Massachusetts  Department  has  created  a  rebuttable  presumption  that  the
 minutes  of  traffic  to  a  competitive  LEC  will  be  presumed  local  (i.  e.,  non-  ISP)  and  subject  to
 reciprocal  compensation  up  to  an  amount  that  is  twice  the  amount  of  traffic  from  the  competitive
 681  Verizon  provides  reciprocal  compensation  to  competing  carriers  for  the  termination  of  local  calls  from
 Verizon  customers  under  approved  interconnection  agreements  and  tariffs.  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I
 Application  at  41;  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  para.  292.
 682  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Application  at  41;  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  paras.
 293-  94.
 683  See  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  390.
 684  See  Sprint  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  23-  26;  WorldCom  Massachusetts  I  Reply  at  41-  44;  Conversent
 Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  1-  6;  Global  NAPS  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  3-  9.
 685  See  Implementation  of  the  Local  Competition  Provisions  in  the  Telecommunications  Act  of  1996:  Inter-Carrier
 Compensation  for  ISP-  Bound  Traffic,  Declaratory  Ruling  in  CC  Docket  No.  96-  98  and  Notice  of  Proposed
 Rulemaking  in  CC  Docket  No.  96-  98,  14  FCC  Rcd  3689  at  3706,  para.  26  n.  87  (1999)  (Reciprocal  Compensation
 Declaratory  Ruling),  revd  and  remanded  sub  nom.  Bell  Atlantic  Tel.  Cos.  v.  FCC,  206  F.  3d  1  (D.  C.  Cir.  2000).
 686  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  4142,  para.  377.
 687  See  Bell  Atlantic  Tel.  Cos.  v.  FCC,  206  F.  3d  1  (D.  C.  Cir.  2000);  Comment  Sought  on  Remand  of  the
 Commissions  Reciprocal  Compensation  Declaratory  Ruling  by  the  U.  S.  Court  of  Appeals  for  the  D.  C.  Circuit,  CC
 Docket  Nos.  96-  98,  99-  68,  Public  Notice,  15  FCC  Rcd  11311  (2000).
 688  Reciprocal  Compensation  Declaratory  Ruling,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  3703,  para.  22.
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 LEC  to  Verizon.  689  Verizon  states  that  it  will  make  reciprocal  compensation  payments  in  excess
 of  the  2:  1  ratio  if  a  competitive  LEC  provides  evidence  that  its  local  traffic  exceeds  this  ratio,
 and  as  of  July  2000,  one  competitive  LEC  had  made  such  a  showing  and  was  receiving  reciprocal
 compensation  payments  in  excess  of  the  2:  1  ratio.  690  The  Massachusetts  Department  has  verified
 that  Verizon  is  providing  reciprocal  compensation  under  the  obligations  in  its  Department-approved
 interconnection  agreements  and  tariffs,  as  well  as  relevant  Department  Orders.  691
 Therefore,  we  find  that  Verizon  is  in  compliance  with  checklist  item  13.
 E.  Checklist  Item  14    Resale
 217.  Section  271(  c)(  2)(  B)(  xiv)  of  the  Act  requires  a  BOC  to  make  telecommunications
 services  .  .  .  available  for  resale  in  accordance  with  the  requirements  of  sections  251(  c)(  4)  and
 252(  d)(  3).  692  Based  on  the  evidence  in  the  record,  we  conclude  that  Verizon  demonstrates  that  it
 makes  telecommunications  services  available  in  Massachusetts  for  resale  in  accordance  with
 sections  251(  c)(  4)  and  252(  d)(  3),  and  thus  satisfies  the  requirements  of  checklist  item  14.
 Verizon  states  that  it  is  in  compliance  with  the  requirements  of  this  checklist  item,  693  and  the
 Massachusetts  Department  agrees.  694  Verizon  says  that  it  commits  in  its  interconnection
 agreements  and  tariffs  to  making  its  retail  services  available  to  competing  carriers  at  wholesale
 rates.  695  In  its  Consolidated  Arbitrations  proceeding,  conducted  after  the  1996  Act  was
 implemented,  the  Massachusetts  Department  used  an  avoided-  cost  calculation  method  consistent
 with  the  Commissions  pricing  rules  to  establish  interim  resale  discount  rates  of  24.  99  percent  for
 lines  with  Verizons  operator  services  and  directory  assistance,  and  29.47  percent  for  lines
 without  these  features.  696  These  interim  rates  were  adopted  as  permanent  rates  by  the
 689  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Application  App.  G,  Vol.  5,  Tab  108,  Complaint  of  MCI  WorldCom,  Inc.  Against
 New  England  Telephone  and  Telegraph  Company  d/  b/  a  Bell  Atlantic-  Massachusetts  for  Breach  of  Interconnection
 Terms  Entered  into  Under  Sections  251  and  252  of  the  Telecommunications  Act  of  1996,  DTE  97-  116-  C  at  19-  31
 (May  19,  1999).
 690  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  para.  294.
 691  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  390.
 692  47  U.  S.  C.    271(  c)(  2)(  B)(  xiv).
 693  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Application  at  41-  43;  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at
 paras.  295-  308.
 694  See  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  396-  97.
 695  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  paras.  295-  96.
 696  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  para.  295;  Consolidated  Petitions  of  New  England
 Telephone  and  Telegraph  Company  d/  b/  a  NYNEX,  Teleport  Communications  Group,  Inc.,  Brooks  Fiber
 Communications,  AT&  T  Communications  of  New  England,  Inc.,  MCI  Communications  Company,  and  Sprint
 Communications  Company,  L.  P.,  Pursuant  to  Section  252(  b)  of  the  Telecommunications  Act  of  1996,  for
 Arbitration  of  Interconnection  Agreements  Between  NYNEX  and  the  Aforementioned  Companies,  D.  P.  U.  96-  73/  74,
 96-  75,  96-  80/  81,  96-  83,  96-  94  --  Phase  2  (Dec.  2,  1996)  (Massachusetts  DTE  Phase  2  Order);  Massachusetts
 Department  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  393.  We  note  that  the  United  States  Court  of  Appeals  for  the  Eighth
 (continued.)
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 Federal  Communications  Commission  FCC  01-  130
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 Massachusetts  Department  in  1999.  697  Verizon  applies  the  wholesale  discount  to  customer
 specific  arrangements  (CSAs),  grandfathered  services,  and  promotional  offerings  in  effect  more
 than  90  days.  For  promotional  offerings  of  90  days  or  less,  competing  carriers  may  elect  to  have
 Verizon  apply  the  wholesale  discount  to  the  retail  price  of  telecommunications  services  offered  in
 the  promotional  offering,  or  to  pay  the  promotional  offering  rate.  698  Competing  carriers  may
 purchase  at  the  wholesale  discount  CSAs  to  resell  to  new  customers.  699  Verizon  permits
 competing  carriers  that  resell  CSAs  to  meet  minimum  volume  requirements  by  aggregating  the
 traffic  of  multiple  end-  user  customers,  provided  that  those  customers  are  similarly  situated  to  the
 customer(  s)  of  Verizons  original  contract.  700
 218.  Verizon  also  states  that  it  makes  its  retail  telecommunications  services  available  for
 resale  without  unreasonable  or  discriminatory  conditions  or  limitations.  701  The  Massachusetts
 Department  agrees.  702  According  to  Verizon,  it  provides  for  resale  all  of  the  telecommunications
 services  that  it  provides  at  retail  to  subscribers  that  are  not  telecommunications  carriers.  703
 Verizon  demonstrates  that  it  provides  its  retail  telecommunications  services  for  resale  in  a
 nondiscriminatory  and  timely  manner.  704
 219.  We  reject  commenters  contentions  that  Verizon  fails  this  checklist  item  because
 its  separate  advanced  services  affiliate  was  not  providing  DSL  and  other  advanced  services  at
 (Continued  from  previous  page)
 Circuit  issued  an  order  vacating  and  remanding  the  Commissions  pricing  rule  regarding  the  determination  of
 avoided  retail  costs.  Iowa  Utils.  Bd.  v.  FCC,  219  F.  3d  744  (8  th  Cir.  2000).
 697  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Application  App.  F,  Vol.  8,  Tab  157,  Investigation  by  the  Department  on  Its  Own
 Motion  Into  the  Propriety  of  the  Resale  Tariff  of  New  England  Telephone  and  Telegraph  Company  d/  b/  a  Bell
 Atlantic-  Massachusetts,  Filed  with  the  Department  on  January  16,  1998,  to  Become  Effective  February  14,  1998,
 DTE  98-  15  (Phases  II  and  III)  at  11-  17  (Mar.  19,  1999).  The  Massachusetts  Department  recently  initiated  an
 investigation  to  review  the  avoided  cost  discount  for  Verizons  resale  services.  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II
 Application  App.  B,  Tab  4,  Subtab  D,  Investigation  by  the  Department  of  Telecommunications  and  Energy  on  its
 own  Motion  into  the  Appropriate  Pricing,  Based  upon  Total  Element  Long-  Run  Incremental  Costs,  for  Unbundled
 Network  Elements  and  Combination  of  Unbundled  Network  Elements,  and  the  Appropriate  Avoided  Cost  Discount
 for  Verizon  New  England,  Inc.  d/  b/  a  Verizon  Massachusetts  Resale  Services  in  the  Commonwealth  of
 Massachusetts,  DTE  01-  20  (Jan.  12,  2001).
 698  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  para.  298.  Pursuant  to  Commission  rules,
 incumbent  LECs  do  not  need  to  offer  for  resale  short-  term  promotions  of  90  days  or  less,  as  long  as  such  short-  term
 promotions  are  not  used  to  evade  the  wholesale  rate  obligation.  See  47  C.  F.  R.    51.613(  a)(  2)(  ii).
 699  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  para.  298.
 700  See  id.  at  para.  299.
 701  See  id.  at  para.  296.
 702  See  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  396-  97.
 703  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Application  at  41;  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  para.
 295.
 704  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  paras.  304-  08.
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 Federal  Communications  Commission  FCC  01-  130
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 resale  discounts  in  accordance  with  the  ASCENT  v.  FCC  decision.  705  The  mandate  in  that
 decision  had  not  issued  when  Verizon  filed  the  instant  application.  706  Accordingly,  we  find  the
 ASCENT  decision  is  not  relevant  to  our  analysis  of  checklist  compliance  in  the  context  of  this
 proceeding.  707
 220.  We  find  unpersuasive  Allegiances  claim  that  the  Commission  should  adopt  a
 fresh  look  policy.  708  Allegiance  asserts  that  the  Commission  should  allow  customers  in  long-term
 contracts  with  Verizon  for  local  exchange  and  intraLATA  service  to  switch  to  competing
 telecommunications  carriers  before  the  expiration  of  their  Verizon  contracts  without  incurring
 termination  penalties.  We  note  that  a  similar  issue  has  been  raised  by  KMC  Telecom  in  a  Petition
 for  Declaratory  Ruling,  which  is  currently  pending.  709  We  find,  as  we  did  in  prior  orders,  that  this
 issue  is  best  addressed  in  the  context  of  that  pending  petition,  and  we  decline  to  resolve  the  issue
 here.  710
 221.  Based  on  evidence  in  the  record,  we  also  find  that  Verizon  satisfies  the
 provisioning  requirements  of  checklist  item  14.  As  discussed  above,  Verizon  is  provisioning
 competitive  LECs  orders  for  resale  in  substantially  the  same  time  and  manner  as  for  its  retail
 customers.  711
 F.  Remaining  Checklist  Items  (6-  12)
 705  See  ASCENT  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  3;  AT&  T  Massachusetts  II  Reply  at  21  (citing  Association  of
 Communications  Enterprises  v.  FCC,  Case  No.  99-  1441,  slip  op.  (D.  C.  Cir.  Jan  9,  2001)  (hereafter  ASCENT).
 This  decision  overturned  the  Commissions  determination  in  the  SBC/  Ameritech  Order  that,  because  the  separate
 advanced  services  affiliate  was  not  a  successor  or  assign  of  the  BOC,  the  separate  advanced  services  affiliate  could
 avoid  the  resale  obligations  of  251(  c)(  4).  Because  the  Commission  incorporated  by  reference  the  successor  or
 assign  analysis  of  the  SBC/  Ameritech  Order  into  the  Bell  Atlantic/  GTE  Order,  the  D.  C.  Circuits  decision  also
 impacts  the  Commissions  conclusion  in  the  Bell  Atlantic/  GTE  Order.
 706  The  D.  C.  Circuit  issued  the  mandate  in  ASCENT  on  March  6,  2001.
 707  Verizon  should  not  be  faulted  for  its  efforts  to  comply  with  a  Commission  order  in  effect  at  the  time  of  the
 application,  even  though  portions  of  that  order  were  subsequently  vacated.  See  SWBT  Kansas/  Oklahoma  Order  at
 para.  253.  As  the  D.  C.  Circuit  affirmed,  compliance  with  Commission  orders  cannot  serve  as  a  basis  for  rejecting
 an  application.  AT&  T  v.  FCC,  220  F.  3d  at  630.
 708  Allegiance  Massachusetts  I  Reply  at  7-  8.
 709  See  In  re  Establishment  of  Rules  to  Prohibit  the  Imposition  of  Unjust,  Onerous  Termination  Penalties  on
 Customers  Choosing  to  Partake  of  the  Benefits  of  Local  Exchange  Telecommunications  Competition,  Petition  for
 Declaratory  Ruling,  CC  Docket  No.  99-  142  (Apr.  26,  1999)  (requesting  that  the  Commission  declare  unlawful
 termination  penalties  imposed  by  incumbent  LECs,  prohibit  enforcement  of  incumbent  LEC  termination  penalties,
 and  require  the  removal  of  incumbent  LEC  termination  penalties  from  state  tariffs  until  more  competition
 develops).
 710  See  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  4148,  para.  391;  SWBT  Texas  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  18547-
 48,  para.  391;  SWBT  Kansas/  Oklahoma  Order  at  para.  253.
 711  See  supra  Part  IV(  A)(  2).
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 Federal  Communications  Commission  FCC  01-  130
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 222.  An  applicant  under  section  271  must  demonstrate  that  it  complies  with  checklist
 item  6  (unbundled  local  switching),  712  item  7  (911/  E911  access  and  directory  assistance/  operator
 services),  713  item  8  (white  page  directory  listings),  714  item  9  (numbering  administration),  715  item  10
 (databases  and  associated  signaling),  716  item  11  (number  portability),  717  and  item  12  (local  dialing
 parity).  718  Based  on  the  evidence  in  the  record,  and  in  accordance  with  Commission  rules  and
 orders  concerning  compliance  with  section  271  of  the  Act,  we  conclude  that  Verizon
 demonstrates  that  it  is  in  compliance  with  checklist  items  6,  7,  8,  9,  10,  11  and  12  in
 Massachusetts.  719  The  Massachusetts  Department  also  concludes  that  Verizon  complies  with  the
 requirement  of  each  of  these  checklist  items.  720  Moreover,  no  commenter  raised  allegations
 challenging  Verizons  compliance  with  these  checklist  items.
 VI.  COMPLIANCE  WITH  SECTION  271(  C)(  1)(  A)
 A.  Background
 223.  In  order  for  the  Commission  to  approve  a  BOCs  application  to  provide  in-  region,
 interLATA  services,  a  BOC  must  first  demonstrate  that  it  satisfies  the  requirements  of  either
 section  271(  c)(  1)(  A)  (Track  A)  or  271(  c)(  1)(  B)  (Track  B).  721  To  qualify  for  Track  A,  a  BOC
 must  have  interconnection  agreements  with  one  or  more  competing  providers  of  telephone
 712  47  U.  S.  C.    271(  c)(  2)(  B)(  vi).  We  discuss  the  statutory  requirements  of  checklist  items  6-  12  in  Appendix  B  to
 this  Order.
 713  Id.    271(  c)(  2)(  B)(  vii).
 714  Id.    271(  c)(  2)(  B)(  viii).
 715  Id.    271(  c)(  2)(  B)(  ix).  ALTS  and  Sprint  allege  that  Verizon  mismanaged  its  responsibility  when  it  was  the
 local  numbering  administrator.  See  ALTS  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  52;  Sprint  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at
 11.  Because  Verizon  is  no  longer  the  administrator,  however,  these  parties  do  not  claim  that  Verizon  has  failed  to
 satisfy  checklist  item  9.  Rather,  they  raise  this  issue  as  a  public  interest  concern.  Accordingly,  we  discuss  these
 claims  in  the  Public  Interest  section  below.  See  infra  Part  VIII.  C.
 716  47  U.  S.  C.    271(  c)(  2)(  B)(  x).
 717  Id.    271(  c)(  2)(  B)(  xi).
 718  Id.    271(  c)(  2)(  B)(  xii).
 719  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Application  at  30-  31  (checklist  item  6),  35-  37  (checklist  item  7),  37-  38  (checklist
 item  8),  38  (checklist  item  9),  38-  39  (checklist  item  10),  and  40  (checklist  items  11  and  12);  Verizon
 Massachusetts  I  Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  paras.  145-  58  (checklist  item  6),  203-  34  (checklist  item  7),  235-  51
 (checklist  item  8),  252-  56  (checklist  item  9),  257-  82  (checklist  item  10),  283-  86  (checklist  item  11),  and  287-  91
 (checklist  item  12);  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Reply  at  42  (checklist  item  9).
 720  See  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  340-  48  (checklist  item  6),  348-  57  (checklist  item
 7),  357-  63  (checklist  item  8),  363-  66  (checklist  item  9),  366-  71  (checklist  item  10),  371-  81  (checklist  item  11),  and
 381-  84  (checklist  item  12).
 721  See  47  U.  S.  C.    271(  d)(  3)(  A).
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 exchange  service  .  .  .  to  residential  and  business  subscribers.  722  The  Act  states  that  such
 telephone  service  may  be  offered  .  .  .  either  exclusively  over  [the  competitors]  own  telephone
 exchange  service  facilities  or  predominantly  over  [the  competitors]  own  telephone  exchange
 facilities  in  combination  with  the  resale  of  the  telecommunications  services  of  another  carrier.  723
 The  Commission  concluded  in  the  Ameritech  Michigan  Order  that  section  271(  c)(  1)(  A)  is
 satisfied  if  one  or  more  competing  providers  collectively  serve  residential  and  business
 subscribers.  724
 B.  Discussion
 224.  We  conclude,  as  did  the  Massachusetts  Department,  that  Verizon  demonstrates
 that  it  satisfies  the  requirements  of  Track  A  based  on  the  interconnection  agreements  it  has
 implemented  with  competing  carriers  in  Massachusetts.  725  The  Massachusetts  Department  has
 approved  a  substantial  number  of  binding  interconnection  agreements  between  Verizon  and
 competing  providers  of  telephone  exchange  service.  726  The  record  demonstrates  that  the  three
 largest  competing  carriers  in  Massachusetts  --  AT&  T,  WorldCom,  and  RCN  --  collectively
 provide  telephone  exchange  service  predominantly  over  their  own  facilities  to  residential  and
 business  subscribers.  727  Verizon  also  asserts  that  six  other  competitive  LECs  provide  business
 and/  or  residential  service  through  some  mix  of  their  own  facilities,  UNEs,  UNE-  P,  and  resale.  728
 225.  Although  AT&  T  and  WorldCom  have  challenged  some  of  Verizons  estimates  of
 the  number  of  residential  customers  served  over  competitors  own  facilities,  those  carriers  have
 not  challenged  Verizons  claim  that  a  sufficient  number  of  residential  customers  are  being  served
 by  competing  LECs  using  their  own  facilities  to  demonstrate  that  there  is  an  actual  commercial
 722  Id.
 723  Id.
 724  See  Ameritech  Michigan  Order,  12  FCC  Rcd  at  20589,  para.  85;  see  also  Second  BellSouth  Louisiana  Order,
 13  FCC  Rcd  at  20633-  35,  paras.  46-  48.
 725  See  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  18;  see  also  Department  of  Justice
 Massachusetts  I  Evaluation  at  3-  5  (describing  level  of  residential  and  business  telephone  exchange  service
 competition  in  Massachusetts).
 726  See  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  17-  18.  The  Massachusetts  Department  has
 approved,  pursuant  to  section  252  of  the  Act,  more  than  70  interconnection  agreements  between  Verizon  and
 various  competing  carriers.  See  id.  at  17;  see  also  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Taylor  Decl.  Attach.  A  at  paras.  16-  36.
 727  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Application  at  5;  see  also  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  I  Comments
 at  17-  18.
 728  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Taylor  Decl.  Attach.  A  at  paras.  16-  36.  The  six  competitive  LECs  are:
 Allegiance,  Network  Plus  Corp.,  ChoiceOne  Communications,  Global  Crossing,  PaeTec  Communications  and
 NEXTLINK.  See  also  the  updated  totals  in  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Application  Attach.  B.
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 alternative  to  Verizon  in  Massachusetts  for  purposes  of  a  Track  A  showing.  729  Specifically,  both
 AT&  T  and  WorldCom  complain  that  Verizons  method  of  estimation  overstates  the  current  level
 of  residential  telephony  competition  in  Massachusetts.  730  Even  if  we  credited  such  claims,
 however,  Verizon  has  shown  that  facilities-  based  competing  carriers  serve  more  than  a  de  minimis
 number  of  residential  customers  in  Massachusetts.  AT&  T  and  WorldCom  do  not  challenge  this
 claim.  731  Moreover,  no  carrier  has  challenged  Verizons  evidence  with  regard  to  the  level  of
 facilities-  based  business  competition.  Accordingly,  we  conclude  that  Verizon  has  met  the
 requirements  for  a  Track  A  showing.
 VII.  SECTION  272  COMPLIANCE
 A.  Background
 226.  Section  271(  d)(  3)(  B)  requires  that  the  Commission  shall  not  approve  a  BOCs
 application  to  provide  interLATA  services  unless  the  BOC  demonstrates  that  the  requested
 authorization  will  be  carried  out  in  accordance  with  the  requirements  of  section  272.  732  The
 Commission  set  standards  for  compliance  with  section  272  in  the  Accounting  Safeguards  Order
 and  the  Non-  Accounting  Safeguards  Order.  733  Together,  these  safeguards  discourage  and
 facilitate  the  detection  of  improper  cost  allocation  and  cross-  subsidization  between  the  BOC  and
 its  section  272  affiliate.  734  In  addition,  these  safeguards  ensure  that  BOCs  do  not  discriminate  in
 favor  of  their  section  272  affiliates.  735  As  the  Commission  stated  in  prior  section  271  orders,
 729  Application  by  SBC  Communications  Inc.,  Pursuant  to  Section  271  of  the  Communications  Act  of  1934,  as
 amended,  To  Provide  In-  Region,  InterLATA  Services  in  Oklahoma,  12  FCC  Rcd  8685,  8695,  para.  14  (construing
 section  271(  c)(  1)(  A)  as  requiring  that  there  must  be  an  actual  commercial  alternative  to  the  BOC  in  order  to
 satisfy  Track  A).  The  D.  C.  Circuit  affirmed  this  reading  of  Track  A.  See  SBC  Communications  v.  FCC,  138
 F.  3d  410,  416-  17  (D.  C.  Cir.  1998).
 730  See  WorldCom  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  70-  72;  AT&  T  Massachusetts  I  Reply  at  8.
 731  AT&  T  and  WorldCom  do  assert,  however,  that  approving  this  application  at  the  current  level  of  residential
 competition  in  Massachusetts  would  be  contrary  to  the  public  interest.  See  infra  Part  VIII.  A.
 732  47  U.  S.  C.    271(  d)(  3)(  B).
 733  See  Implementation  of  the  Accounting  Safeguards  Under  the  Telecommunications  Act  of  1996,  CC  Docket  No.
 96-  150,  Report  and  Order,  11  FCC  Rcd  17539  (1996)  (Accounting  Safeguards  Order),  Second  Order  On
 Reconsideration,  FCC  00-  9  (rel.  Jan.  18,  2000);  Implementation  of  the  Non-  Accounting  Safeguards  of  Sections
 271  and  272  of  the  Communications  Act  of  1934,  as  amended,  CC  Docket  No.  96-  149,  First  Report  and  Order  and
 Further  Notice  of  Proposed  Rulemaking,  11  FCC  Rcd  21905  (1996)  (Non-  Accounting  Safeguards  Order);  First
 Order  on  Reconsideration,  12  FCC  Rcd  2297  (1997),  Second  Order  on  Reconsideration,  12  FCC  Rcd  8653  (1997),
 affd  sub  nom.  Bell  Atlantic  Tel.  Cos.  v.  FCC,  131  F.  3d  1044  (D.  C.  Cir.  1997),  Third  Order  on  Reconsideration,
 FCC  99-  242  (rel.  Oct.  4,  1999).
 734  See  Non-  Accounting  Safeguards  Order,  11  FCC  Rcd  at  21914;  Accounting  Safeguards  Order,  11  FCC  Rcd  at
 17550;  Ameritech  Michigan  Order,  12  FCC  Rcd  at  20725.
 735  See  Non-  Accounting  Safeguards  Order,  11  FCC  Rcd  at  21914,  paras.  15-  16;  Ameritech  Michigan  Order,  12
 FCC  Rcd  at  20725,  para.  346.
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 129
 compliance  with  section  272  is  of  crucial  importance  because  the  structural,  transactional,  and
 nondiscrimination  safeguards  of  section  272  seek  to  ensure  that  BOCs  compete  on  a  level  playing
 field.  736
 B.  Discussion
 227.  Based  on  the  record,  we  conclude  that  Verizon  has  demonstrated  that  it  complies
 with  the  requirements  of  section  272.  Significantly,  Verizon  provides  evidence  that  it  maintains
 the  same  structural  separation  and  nondiscrimination  safeguards  in  Massachusetts  as  it  does  in
 New  York,  a  state  in  which  Verizon  has  already  received  section  271  authority.  737  With  the
 exception  of  Verizons  provisioning  of  special  access  services,  no  party  challenges  Verizons
 section  272  showing.  We  address  each  section  272  requirement  below.
 1.  Unchallenged  Sections
 228.  We  find,  based  on  the  evidence  in  the  record,  that  Verizons  Massachusetts  section
 272  structure  and  compliance  controls  are  the  same  as  those  the  Commission  reviewed  for  New
 York.  738  Specifically,  we  conclude  that  Verizon  demonstrates  it  will  operate  in  accordance  with
 the  following  elements  of  section  272:  1)  section  272(  a),  which  requires  the  BOC  and  its  local
 exchange  carrier  affiliates  that  are  subject  to  section  251(  c)  to  provide  certain  competitive
 services  through  structurally  separate  affiliates;  2)  section  272(  b),  which  requires  the  BOC  to
 demonstrate  that  its  section  272  affiliates  will  operate  independently,  maintain  separate  books,
 records,  and  accounts,  maintain  separate  officers,  directors  and  employees,  comply  with  certain
 credit  requirements,  and  comply  with  the  Commissions  arms  length  and  public  disclosure
 requirements;  3)  section  272(  c),  which  requires  the  BOC  to  account  for  all  transactions  with
 section  272  affiliates  in  accordance  with  the  accounting  principles  designated  or  approved  by  the
 Commission  and  prohibits  discrimination  in  favor  of  the  section  272  affiliates  in  the  provision  or
 procurement  of  goods,  services,  facilities,  and  information,  or  in  the  establishment  of  standards;
 4)  section  272(  d),  which  requires  an  independent  audit  of  the  BOCs  compliance  with  section  272
 736  Ameritech  Michigan  Order,  12  FCC  Rcd  at  20725;  see  SWBT  Texas  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  18549,  para.  395.
 737  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Application  at  55-  56;  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  4153,  para.
 403.
 738  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Application  at  55-  59;  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Application  App.  A,  Vol.  4,
 Declaration  of  Susan  C.  Browning  at  para.  9  (Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Browning  Decl.)  (Massachusetts  structural
 and  transactional  safeguards  are  the  same  as  those  that  the  Commission  approved  in  granting  Verizon  section  271
 authority  for  New  York.);  see  also  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  4154-  58,  paras.  406-  14.  In
 addition,  Verizon  proffers  unchallenged  evidence  that  the  same  section  272  internal  controls  the  Commission
 reviewed  for  New  York  are  in  place  in  Massachusetts.  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Application  at  55-  58;  Verizon
 Massachusetts  I  Browning  Decl.  at  paras.  7,  10(  b),  10(  c),  11,  12(  a),  12(  b),  12(  c),  13,  14,  22-  26,  29  &  Attachs.  B,
 D,  F,  G,  H,  K,  J,  M,  P,  Z.
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 after  receiving  interLATA  authorization;  and  5)  section  272(  g),  which  requires  that  the  BOC
 comply  with  that  sections  joint  marketing  provisions  and  affiliate  services  requirements.  739
 2.  Challenged  Sections
 229.  Section  272(  e)    Fulfillment  of  Certain  Requests.  Based  on  the  evidence  in  the
 record,  we  conclude  that  Verizon  will  comply  with  section  272(  e).  740  Specifically,  section  272(  e)
 requires  the  BOC  to  fulfill  requests  for,  among  other  things,  telephone  exchange  and  exchange
 access  services  from  unaffiliated  entities  within  the  same  time  period  the  BOC  fulfills  such
 requests  for  its  own  retail  operations.  741  In  addition,  section  272(  e)  also  provides  that  a  BOC
 shall  not  provide  any  facilities,  services,  or  information  concerning  its  provision  of  exchange
 access  to  the  [section  272  affiliate]  unless  such  facilities,  services  or  information  are  made
 available  to  other  providers  of  interLATA  services  in  that  market  on  the  same  terms  and
 conditions.  742  Finally,  section  272(  e)  places  certain  accounting  and  nondiscrimination
 requirements  on  BOCs  with  respect  to  exchange  access  and  facilities  or  services  provided  to  their
 section  272  affiliates.  743
 230.  Several  parties  complain  that  the  quality  of  Verizons  provisioning  of  special
 access  services  is  poor.  744  These  comments  do  not  undermine  our  finding  that  Verizon  complies
 with  section  272.  As  the  Commission  stated  in  the  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order  and  the  SWBT
 Texas  Order,  we  do  not  consider  the  provision  of  special  access  services  pursuant  to  a  tariff  for
 purposes  of  Verizons  section  272  showing.  745  In  addition,  our  section  272  analysis  does  not
 focus  on  Verizons  provisioning  of  special  access  services  because  Verizon  does  not  currently
 have  an  operational  section  272  affiliate  in  Massachusetts.  Consequently,  we  do  not,  nor  could
 739  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Application  at  paras.  55-  58;  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Browning  Decl.  at  paras.  7,
 10(  b),  10(  c),  11,  12(  a),  12(  b),  12(  c),  13,  14,  22-  26,  29  &  Attach.  B,  D,  F,  G,  H,  K,  J,  M,  P,  Z;  see  also  Bell  Atlantic
 New  York  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  4154-  58,  paras.  406-  14.
 740  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Application  at  57-  58;  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Browning  Decl.  at  paras.  18-  21  &
 Attachs.  O,  P.  Verizon  demonstrates  that  it  will  provide  accurate  data  regarding  actual  service  intervals  so  that
 unaffiliated  parties  can  evaluate  the  performance  Verizon  provides  itself  and  its  affiliates  and  compare  such
 performance  to  the  service  quality  Verizon  provides  to  competing  carriers.  See  also  Verizon  Massachusetts  I
 Lacouture/  Ruesterholz  Decl.  at  para.  23.
 741  47  U.  S.  C.    272(  e)(  1);  Non-  Accounting  Safeguards  Order,  11  FCC  Rcd  at  22018-  22,  paras.  239-  45;  Second
 BellSouth  Louisiana  Order,  13  FCC  Rcd  at  20800-  01,  paras.  348-  50;  see  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Application  at
 57-  58;  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Browning  Decl.  at  para.  18.
 742  47  U.  S.  C.    272(  e)(  2).
 743  See  id.    272(  e)(  3),  (e)(  4);  Second  BellSouth  Louisiana  Order,  13  FCC  Rcd  at  20802-  03,  paras.  353-  55;  see
 Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Application  at  57-  58;  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Browning  Decl.  at  para.  18.
 744  See,  e.  g.,  CompTel  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  9-  15;  AT&  T  Massachusetts  II  Reply  at  28-  33.
 745  See  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  4126-  27,  para.  340;  SWBT  Texas  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at
 18520,  para.  335;  see  also  Second  BellSouth  Louisiana  Order,  13  FCC  Rcd  at  20800-  01.
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 we,  inquire  whether  Verizon  provides  competitors  special  access  on  a  nondiscriminatory  basis,  as
 compared  to  Verizons  section  272  affiliates.  Our  review,  instead,  focuses  upon  whether,  after  it
 receives  section  271  authority,  Verizon  will  maintain  records  tracking  the  quality  of  service  to  its
 section  272  affiliate  for  telephone  exchange  and  exchange  access  services.  746  While  the
 Commission  has  not  prescribed  a  reporting  format,  Verizon  will  provide  exchange  access  service
 quality  as  described  in  its  application.  747  Because  Verizons  special  access  performance  will  be
 included  in  these  reports,  748  we  expect  that  any  such  discrimination  will  be  detectable.
 231.  Finally,  we  note  that  Verizon  reports  to  the  Commission  its  special  access
 performance  pursuant  to  the  Bell  Atlantic/  GTE  Merger  Conditions  749  and,  to  the  extent  that
 parties  are  experiencing  problems  in  the  provisioning  of  special  access  services  ordered  from
 Verizons  federal  tariffs,  we  note  that  these  issues  are  appropriately  addressed  in  the
 Commissions  section  208  complaint  process.
 VIII.  PUBLIC  INTEREST  ANALYSIS
 232.  Separate  from  determining  whether  a  BOC  satisfies  the  competitive  checklist  and
 will  comply  with  section  272,  Congress  directed  the  Commission  to  assess  whether  the  requested
 authorization  would  be  consistent  with  the  public  interest,  convenience,  and  necessity.  750  We
 conclude  that  approval  of  this  application  is  consistent  with  the  public  interest.
 233.  We  view  the  public  interest  requirement  as  an  opportunity  to  review  the
 circumstances  presented  by  the  application  to  ensure  that  no  other  relevant  factors  exist  that
 would  frustrate  the  congressional  intent  that  markets  be  open,  as  required  by  the  competitive
 checklist,  and  that  entry  will  therefore  serve  the  public  interest  as  Congress  expected.  Among
 other  things,  we  may  review  the  local  and  long  distance  markets  to  ensure  that  there  are  not
 unusual  circumstances  that  would  make  entry  contrary  to  the  public  interest  under  the  particular
 circumstances  of  this  application.  751  Another  factor  that  could  be  relevant  to  our  analysis  is
 746  See  Non-  Accounting  Safeguards  Order,  11  FCC  Rcd  at  22018-  22,  paras.  239-  45.
 747  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Browning  Decl.  at  para.  18  &  Attach.  Q  (providing  performance  metrics
 reporting  format  and  business  rules).
 748  See,  e.  g.,  Deployment  of  Wireline  Services  Offering  Advanced  Telecommunications  Capability,  CC  Docket
 No.  98-  147,  Order  on  Remand,  15  FCC  Rcd  385,  406,  para.  45  (1999)  (stating  that  special  access  services  are
 included  within  the  broader  category  of  exchange  access  services).
 749  See  Applications  of  GTE  Corporation,  Transferor,  and  Bell  Atlantic  Corporation,  Transferee,  For  Consent  to
 Transfer  Control  of  Domestic  and  International  Sections  214  and  310  Authorizations  and  Application  to  Transfer
 Control  of  a  Submarine  Cable  Landing  License,  CC  Docket  No.  98-  184,  Memorandum  Opinion  and  Order,  15
 FCC  Rcd  14032,  App.  D,  at  para.  53  (2000).
 750  See  47  U.  S.  C.    271(  d)(  3)(  C).
 751  See  Second  BellSouth  Louisiana  Order,  13  FCC  Rcd  at  20805-  06,  para.  360  (the  public  interest  analysis  may
 include  consideration  of  whether  approval  .  .  .  will  foster  competition  in  all  relevant  telecommunications
 markets).
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 whether  we  have  sufficient  assurance  that  markets  will  remain  open  after  grant  of  the  application.
 While  no  one  factor  is  dispositive  in  this  analysis,  our  overriding  goal  is  to  ensure  that  nothing
 undermines  our  conclusion,  based  on  our  analysis  of  checklist  compliance,  that  this  market  is  open
 to  competition.
 A.  Competition  in  Local  Exchange  and  Long  Distance  Markets
 234.  As  set  forth  below,  we  conclude  that  approval  of  this  application  is  consistent  with
 promoting  competition  in  the  local  and  long  distance  telecommunications  markets  in
 Massachusetts.  Consistent  with  our  extensive  review  of  the  competitive  checklist,  which
 embodies  the  critical  elements  of  market  entry  under  the  Act,  we  find  that  barriers  to  competitive
 entry  in  the  local  markets  have  been  removed  and  the  local  exchange  markets  today  are  open  to
 competition.  We  further  find  that  the  record  confirms  our  view,  as  noted  in  prior  section  271
 orders,  that  BOC  entry  into  the  long  distance  market  will  benefit  consumers  and  competition  if  the
 relevant  local  exchange  market  is  open  to  competition  consistent  with  the  competitive  checklist.  752
 235.  Several  commenters  argue  that  the  public  interest  would  be  disserved  by  granting
 Verizons  application  because  the  local  market  in  Massachusetts  has  not  yet  truly  been  opened  to
 competition.  753  We  disagree.  Commenters  cite  an  array  of  evidence  which,  they  argue,
 demonstrates  that  the  local  telecommunications  market  is  not  open  and  that  competition  has  not
 sufficiently  taken  hold  in  Massachusetts.  For  example,  several  commenters  suggest  that  the  state
 of  competition  for  residential  services  in  Massachusetts  indicates  that  this  market  is  not  yet  truly
 open.  754  Given  an  affirmative  showing  that  a  market  is  open  and  the  competitive  checklist  has
 been  satisfied,  low  customer  volumes  in  and  of  themselves  do  not  undermine  that  showing.
 Factors  beyond  a  BOC's  control,  such  as  individual  competitive  LEC  entry  strategies,  might
 explain  a  low  residential  customer  base.  We  note  that  Congress  specifically  declined  to  adopt  a
 market  share  or  other  similar  test  for  BOC  entry  into  long  distance,  and  we  have  no  intention  of
 establishing  one  here.  755
 B.  Assurance  of  Future  Compliance
 236.  Verizons  Performance  Assurance  Plan  (or  PAP)  for  Massachusetts  provides
 additional  assurance  that  the  local  market  will  remain  open  after  Verizon  receives  section  271
 authorization.  The  Commission  previously  has  explained  that  one  factor  it  may  consider  as  part
 of  its  public  interest  analysis  is  whether  a  BOC  would  continue  to  satisfy  the  requirements  of
 752  See  SWBT  Texas  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  18558-  59,  para.  419.
 753  See,  e.  g.,  Sprint  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  68;  AT&  T  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  24-  29.
 754  See,  e.  g.,  WorldCom  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  65-  73;  AT&  T  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  24.  The
 commenters  generally  attribute  the  lack  of  competition  to  Verizons  UNE  pricing.  As  noted  above,  however,
 Verizon  has  made  a  sufficient  showing  on  this  issue.  See  supra  Part  VI.  A.  1.
 755  See  Ameritech  Michigan  Order,  12  FCC  Rcd  at  20585,  para.  77.
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 section  271  after  entering  the  long  distance  market.  756  Although  the  Commission  strongly
 encourages  state  performance  monitoring  and  post-  entry  enforcement,  it  has  never  required  BOC
 applicants  to  demonstrate  that  they  are  subject  to  such  mechanisms  as  a  condition  of  section  271
 approval.  757  The  Commission  has  stated  that  the  fact  that  a  BOC  will  be  subject  to  performance
 monitoring  and  enforcement  mechanisms  would  constitute  probative  evidence  that  the  BOC  will
 continue  to  meet  its  section  271  obligations  and  that  its  entry  would  be  consistent  with  the  public
 interest.  758  Indeed,  performance  monitoring  and  enforcement  mechanisms  administered  by  state
 commissions  can  be  critical  complements  to  this  Commissions  section  271(  d)(  6)  authority  given
 the  state  commissions  historical  role  in  regulating  local  exchange  services.  We  note  that  in  all  the
 applications  that  have  been  granted  to  date,  each  contained  an  enforcement  plan  to  protect  against
 backsliding  after  entry  into  the  long-  distance  market.  759
 1.  Performance  Assurance  Plan
 237.  The  Massachusetts  Department  has  ordered  Verizon  to  report  performance  data,
 on  a  monthly  basis,  using  a  wide  range  of  performance  measurements  or  metrics.  760  These
 measurements  were  developed  through  the  Carrier-  to-  Carrier  Service  Quality  proceeding
 before  the  New  York  Commission.  761  The  measurements  track  Verizons  performance  on
 functions  essential  to  an  open,  competitive  local  market:  pre-  ordering,  ordering,  provisioning,
 maintenance  and  repair,  network  performance  (interconnection  trunks),  collocation,  billing  and
 756  See,  e.  g.,  Second  BellSouth  Louisiana  Order,  13  FCC  Rcd  at  20806,  paras.  363-  64;  see  Ameritech  Michigan
 Order,  12  FCC  Rcd  at  20747,  para.  390.
 757  These  mechanisms  are  generally  administered  by  state  commissions  and  derive  from  authority  the  states  have
 under  state  law  or  under  the  federal  Act.  As  such,  these  mechanisms  can  serve  as  critical  complements  to  the
 Commissions  authority  to  preserve  checklist  compliance  pursuant  to  section  271(  d)(  6).  Moreover,  in  this
 instance,  we  find  that  the  collaborative  process  by  which  these  mechanisms  were  developed  in  New  York  and
 adapted  in  Massachusetts  has  itself  helped  to  bring  Verizon  into  checklist  compliance.
 758  See  SWBT  Kansas/  Oklahoma  Order  at  para.  269.
 759  See,  e.  g.,  id.  at  paras.  270-  80.
 760  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Guerard/  Canny  Decl.  at  para.  16;  Massachusetts  Department  of
 Telecommunications  and  Energy,  Evaluation  of  Bell  Atlantic-  Massachusetts  Operation  Support  Systems:  Final
 Attachment  A  to  11/  19/  99  Letter  Order  on  Final  Master  Test  Plan,  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Application  App.  B,
 Vol.  24,  Tab  282  (adopting  in  Massachusetts  the  carrier-  to-  carrier  guidelines  established  by  the  New  York
 Commission);  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Application  App.  B,  Vol.  1,  Subtabs  A  &  B  (current  carrier-  to-  carrier
 guidelines).
 761  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Guerard/  Canny  Decl.  at  paras.  13-  16.  Verizon  must  notify  the  Massachusetts
 Department  of  changes  to  the  New  York  PAP.  Verizon  must  file  the  notification  within  10  days  of  the  New  York
 Commissions  order.  The  Massachusetts  Department  will  then  decide  whether  the  changes  should  be  made  to  the
 Massachusetts  PAP.  See  Massachusetts  Department  of  Telecommunications  and  Energy,  Order  on  Motions  for
 Clarification  and  Reconsideration  of  Performance  Assurance  Plan,  D.  T.  E.  99-  271,  Verizon  Massachusetts  II
 Application  App.  B,  Vol.  3,  Tab  4,  Subtab  B  at  14  (Massachusetts  DTE  November  21  st  Order).
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 operator  services.  Associated  with  most  of  these  measurements  are  standards  --  either
 benchmarks  or  retail  analogues  --  also  developed  through  the  carrier-  to-  carrier  proceeding.  762
 238.  The  Massachusetts  Department  also  required  Verizon  to  submit  a  comprehensive
 performance  enforcement  mechanism,  which  would  become  effective  upon  Verizon  receiving
 authority  to  provide  interLATA  services  under  section  271.  763  The  PAP  is  modeled  on  the  New
 York  plan  the  Commission  reviewed  in  the  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order.  The  PAP  establishes
 an  automatic  process  under  which  affected  competitors  receive  bill  credits  if  Verizon  fails  to
 satisfy  pre-  determined  performance  standards  on  a  sub-  set  of  the  carrier-  to-  carrier  reporting
 metrics.  764
 239.  The  PAP  has  undergone  several  changes  since  Verizons  first  Massachusetts  filing.
 After  that  filing,  the  Massachusetts  Department  responded  to  competitive  LECs  complaints  by
 ordering  Verizon,  inter  alia,  to  increase  the  amount  of  bill  credits  available  for  payment  and  to
 add  DSL  and  Line  Sharing  metrics.  765
 2.  Key  Elements  of  the  Performance  Assurance  Plan
 240.  The  PAP  in  Massachusetts  provides  incentives  to  foster  post-  entry  checklist
 compliance.  Plans  may  vary  in  their  strengths  and  weaknesses,  and  there  is  no  one  way  to
 demonstrate  assurance.  766  In  the  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  the  Commission  predicted  that
 the  enforcement  mechanisms  developed  in  New  York  would  be  effective  in  practice.  767  The
 carrier-  to-  carrier  guidelines  were  developed  through  a  collaborative  process  involving  the  New
 York  Commission,  Verizon,  and  competitive  LECs.  The  collaborative  efforts  yielded  workable
 762  Wherever  possible,  the  carrier-  to-  carrier  guidelines  establish  parity  standards  (a  performance  level  which  is
 the  same  for  competitors  as  it  is  for  Verizons  retail  operations).  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Guerard/  Canny
 Decl.  at  para.  20.  For  wholesale  functions  that  do  not  have  retail  analogues,  the  carrier-  to-  carrier  guidelines
 establish  absolute  standards,  usually  a  fixed  percentage  or  a  fixed  period  of  time.  See  id.
 763  See  Letter  from  Dee  May,  Executive  Director    Federal  Regulatory,  Verizon,  to  Magalie  Roman  Salas,
 Secretary,  FCC  (Feb.  3,  2001)  (Verizon  January  30  th  PAP).  This  PAP  was  adopted  by  the  Massachusetts
 Department  on  February  23,  2001.  See  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  II  Reply  App.  C.
 764  The  procedures  and  requirements  of  the  PAP  are  described  generally  in  Verizons  application,  submissions
 made  to  the  Massachusetts  Department,  and  the  Massachusetts  Departments  orders.  See,  e.  g.,  Verizon  January
 30  th  PAP.
 765  See  Massachusetts  DTE  November  21  st  Order;  Verizon  January  30  th  PAP.
 766  See  Ameritech  Michigan  Order,  12  FCC  Rcd  at  20741-  51,  para.  393.
 767  See  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  4166-  67,  para.  433.  This  prediction  was  based  on  five
 characteristics:  potential  liability  that  provides  a  meaningful  and  significant  incentive  to  comply  with  the
 designated  performance  standards;  clearly-  articulated,  pre-  determined  measures  and  standards,  which  encompass  a
 comprehensive  range  of  carrier-  to-  carrier  performance;  a  reasonable  structure  that  is  designed  to  detect  and
 sanction  poor  performance  when  it  occurs;  a  self-  executing  mechanism  that  does  not  leave  the  door  open
 unreasonably  to  litigation  and  appeal;  and  reasonable  assurances  that  the  reported  data  are  accurate.  See  id.  at
 433.
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 measures  to  sufficiently  capture  Verizons  wholesale  performance.  768  As  explained  below,  the
 Massachusetts  Department  established  a  PAP  that  discourages  anti-  competitive  behavior  by
 setting  the  damages  and  penalties  at  a  level  above  the  simple  cost  of  doing  business.
 241.  Total  Liability  At  Risk.  The  Massachusetts  PAP  places  a  total  of  $155  million  in
 potential  bill  credits  placed  at  risk,  on  an  annual  basis,  under  all  components  of  the  PAP.  769  The
 PAP  adopted  by  the  Massachusetts  Department  does  not  represent  the  only  means  of  ensuring
 that  Verizon  continues  to  provide  nondiscriminatory  service  to  competing  carriers.  In  addition  to
 the  $155  million  at  stake  under  this  plan,  Verizon  faces  other  consequences  if  it  fails  to  sustain  a
 high  level  of  service  to  competing  carriers,  including:  federal  enforcement  action  pursuant  to
 section  271(  d)(  6)  and  remedies  associated  with  antitrust  and  other  legal  actions.  770
 242.  We  reject  commenters  assertions  that  the  PAP  limitations  on  the  damages
 available  to  competitive  LECs  to  the  higher  of  PAP  bill  credits  or  damages  under  their  individual
 interconnection  agreements  dilutes  the  PAPs  value  as  an  anti-  backsliding  safeguard.  771  We  also
 note  that  in  previous  section  271  orders  the  Commission  has  seen  public  interest  benefits  in
 liquidated  contract  damages  to  supplement  enforcement  plan  damages.  772  The  Massachusetts
 Department  concludes,  however,  that  the  interconnection  agreements  here  provide  damages  more
 like  a  comprehensive  PAP  than  the  limited  contract  damages  available  to  competitive  LECs  in
 New  York.  773  In  addition,  the  Massachusetts  Department  has  found  that  requiring  Verizon  to  pay
 768  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Application  App.  B,  Vol.  1,  Tab  1,  Subtabs  A  and  B  (current  carrier-  to-  carrier
 guidelines).
 769  See  Verizon  January  30  th  PAP  at  4.  We  reach  this  number  by  adding  the  following  components:  $39.68
 million  (Mode  of  Entry  (MOE));  $39.68  million  (MOE  doubling  provisions);  $42.85  million  (Critical  Measures);
 $27.51  million  (Special  Provisions);  and  $5.28  million  (Change  Control  Assurance  Plan).  See  id.  In  the  Bell
 Atlantic  New  York,  SWBT  Texas,  and  SWBT  Kansas/  Oklahoma  Orders  the  Commission  reviewed  plans  that
 subjected  36  percent  of  the  applicants  Net  Return  to  liability  for  sub-  par  service  quality.  See  Bell  Atlantic  New
 York  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  4168,  para.  436  n.  1332;  SWBT  Texas  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  18561,  para.  424  n.  1235;
 SWBT  Kansas/  Oklahoma  Order  at  para.  274  n.  837.  The  $155  million  at  risk  here  represents  39  percent  of
 Verizons  Net  Return.  See  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  II  Reply  App.  C.
 770  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Application  at  74.  See  also  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  4165,
 para.  430  (stating  that  the  BOC  risks  liability  through  antitrust  and  other  private  causes  of  action  if  it  performs  in
 an  unlawfully  discriminatory  manner)  (footnote  omitted);  SWBT  Texas  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  18560,  para.  421
 (same).
 771  See,  e.  g.,  ALTS  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  iii,  58;  WorldCom  Massachusetts  I  Kinard  Decl.  at  paras.  32-33;
 WorldCom  Massachusetts  I  Reply  at  33.
 772  See,  e.  g.,  SWBT  Texas  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  18562,  para.  424;  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at
 4168,  para.  435.
 773  See  Massachusetts  DTE  November  21  st  Order  at  12-  13;  Massachusetts  Department  Massachusetts  II  Reply  at
 Attach.  C;  see  also  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Reply  at  56;  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Guerard/  Canny  Joint  Reply
 Decl.  at  para.  35.
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 cumulative  damages  would  result  in  double  counting.  774  Finally,  the  Massachusetts  Department
 can  increase  the  amount  of  bill  credits  available  to  competitive  LECs  under  the  PAP  should  it
 decide  that  the  current  amount  is  inadequate  to  compensate  competitive  LECs  and  penalize
 Verizon.  775  Given  this,  the  PAP,  with  the  Massachusetts  Departments  ongoing  oversight,  will
 deter  backsliding  and  serve  the  public  interest.
 243.  Performance  Measurements  and  Standards.  Each  performance  metric  developed
 through  the  carrier-  to-  carrier  proceeding  has  a  clearly-  articulated  definition,  or  business  rule,
 which  sets  forth  the  manner  in  which  the  data  are  to  be  collected  by  Verizon,  lists  any  relevant
 exclusions,  and  states  the  applicable  performance  standards.  776  The  clarity  provided  by  these
 business  rules  will  help  to  ensure  that  the  reporting  mechanism  provides  a  benchmark  against
 which  new  entrants  and  regulators  can  measure  performance  over  time  to  detect  and  correct  any
 degradation  of  service  rendered  to  new  entrants.  777
 244.  We  note  that  commenters  in  the  first  Massachusetts  application  complained  that
 the  PAP  lacked  sufficient  DSL  and  Line  Sharing  measurements  to  deter  backsliding  in  these
 important  areas.  778  Since  that  filing,  these  concerns  have  been  addressed.  Specifically,  Verizon
 has  added  DSL  as  its  own  Mode  of  Entry  category  and  added  DSL  metrics  to  the  Critical
 Measures.  779  Verizon  also  imported  EDI  notifier  metrics  from  the  New  York  PAP  to  the
 Massachusetts  plan  (including  additional  damages).  780  Although  commenters  raise  a  handful  of
 774  See  Massachusetts  Department  of  Telecommunications  and  Energy,  Order  Adopting  Performance  Assurance
 Plan,  D.  T.  E.  99-  271,  Verizon  Massachusetts  I  Application  App.  B,  Vol.  47,  Tab  559  at  29-  30  (Massachusetts  DTE
 September  5  th  Order);  Massachusetts  DTE  November  21  st  Order  at  12-  13  (  the  contract  liability  [for  Verizon]  in
 Massachusetts  is  significantly  greater  than  [Verizons]  contract  liability  in  New  York).
 775  See,  e.  g.,  Massachusetts  DTE  November  21  st  Order  at  6  (ordering  Verizon  to  increase  the  amount  of  total  bill
 credits  available  under  the  PAP  to  account  for  the  addition  of  DSL  and  Line  Sharing  metrics).
 776  See  Verizon  Massachusetts  II  Application  App.  B,  Vol.  1,  Tab  1,  Subtabs  A  &  B  (current  carrier-  to-  carrier
 guidelines).
 777  SWBT  Kansas/  Oklahoma  Order  at  para.  275.
 778  See,  e.  g.,  ALTS  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  iv,  6,  49-  51;  Covad  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  47-  48;
 Massachusetts  I  Department  of  Justice  Evaluation  at  16  n.  58.
 779  See  Verizon  January  30  th  PAP  at  12-  14.  MOE  categories  comprise  an  element  of  the  PAP  designed  to  gauge
 Verizons  performance  in  broad  areas  of  competitive  LEC  entry,  e.  g.,  UNE,  and  resale.  See  Verizon
 Massachusetts  I  Guerard/  Canny  Decl.  at  58-  59.  MOE  categories  contain  a  variety  of  metrics  related  to  that  mode
 of  entry  and  associated  bill  credits  that  are  paid  to  all  competitive  LECs  using  that  mode.  The  Critical
 Measurements,  on  the  other  hand,  consist  of  12  groups  of  metrics  that  represent  key  aspects  of  service,  e.  g.,
 performance  of  OSS  interfaces  and  hot  cut  completions.  See  Verizon  January  30  th  PAP  App.  B.  If  Verizon  misses
 the  relevant  performance  standard  for  any  of  the  12  groups,  it  must  provide  bill  credits  the  competitive  LECs  who
 received  sub-  standard  performance.  See  id.  at  12-  13.
 780  See  Verizon  January  30  th  PAP  at  App.  H,  4-  7.
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 additional  concerns  about  specific  metrics  in  the  PAP,  781  none  of  these  arguments  demonstrate
 that  the  PAP  is  contrary  to  the  public  interest  or  insufficient  to  prevent  backsliding  in  light  of  the
 substantial  progress  Verizon  and  the  Massachusetts  Department  have  made  strengthening  the  plan
 since  the  first  application.
 245.  Structural  Elements  of  the  PAP.  The  structural  elements  of  the  PAP  are  designed
 to  detect  and  sanction  poor  performance  when  it  occurs.  The  PAP  sets  forth,  in  great  detail,  the
 processes  by  which  Verizons  performance  is  measured  and  evaluated,  the  method  for
 determining  compliance  and  noncompliance  with  respect  to  individual  metrics,  and  the  manner  in
 which  noncompliance  with  individual  metrics  will  translate  into  bill  credits.  782
 246.  Self-  executing  mechanism.  The  PAPs  performance  monitoring  and  enforcement
 mechanisms  are  reasonably  self-  executing  and  comparable  to  those  the  Commission  reviewed  in
 the  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  the  SWBT  Texas  Order,  and  the  SWBT  Kansas/  Oklahoma
 Order.  783  We  reject  commenters  claims  that  the  PAPs  waiver  provisions  allow  Verizon  to
 escape  liability  too  easily.  784  In  this  case,  Verizon  may  ask  for  a  waiver  for  unusual  competitive
 LEC  behavior.  785  When  it  seeks  a  waiver,  Verizon  must  provide  detailed  documentation  as  to
 why  competitive  LEC  behavior  necessitates  the  waiver.  Verizon,  moreover,  must  prove  its  case
 with  clear  and  convincing  evidence  and  provide  competitive  LECs  an  opportunity  to  respond  to
 Verizons  petition.  We  disagree  with  commenters,  therefore,  that  the  absence  of  a  deadline  to  act
 on  waivers  detracts  from  the  effectiveness  of  the  PAP  or  undermines  its  public  interest  value.
 247.  Data  Validation  and  Audit  Procedures.  The  PAP  includes  review  and  monitoring
 mechanisms  that  assure  the  data  will  be  reported  in  a  consistent  and  reliable  manner.  The
 Massachusetts  Department  has  ordered  Verizon  to  obtain  an  independent  audit  of  Verizons  data
 and  reporting  on  an  annual  basis.  786  The  Massachusetts  Department  will  select  the  auditor  and  the
 781  See,  e.  g.,  ALTS  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  57  (criticizing  plan  for  not  including  resale  flow-  through
 metrics);  WorldCom  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  54  (stating  that  trunking  metrics  are  flawed  in  definition  and
 weight);  WorldCom  Massachusetts  I  Kinard  Decl.  at  17  (stating  that  answering  time  metrics  are  not  useful);
 WorldCom  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  54  (stating  that  Average  Interval  Offered  and  Completed  metrics  should
 be  further  disaggregated);  WorldCom  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  54  (Trouble  Duration  should  be  further
 disaggregated).
 782  See  generally  Verizon  January  30  th  PAP.
 783  See  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  4171,  para.  441;  SWBT  Texas  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  18563-
 64,  para.  427;  SWBT  Kansas/  Oklahoma  Order  at  para.  277.
 784  See,  e.  g.,  ALTS  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  57  (waiver  standard  for  competitive  LEC  behavior  is  too
 broad);  WorldCom  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  56  (no  deadline  for  Massachusetts  Department  to  act  on  waiver
 petition  and  PAP  not  explicit  that  Verizon  will  provide  bill  credits  during  pendency  of  waiver).
 785  Verizon  January  30  th  PAP  at  22.
 786  See  Verizon  January  30  th  PAP  at  25.  The  first  audit  will  begin  six  months  after  Verizon  enters  the  long-distance
 market  in  Massachusetts.  See  id.
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 audit  will  be  subject  to  the  Massachusetts  Departments  review.  787  The  Massachusetts
 Department  will  also  conduct  an  annual  review  to  determine  whether  changes  should  be  made  to
 improve  the  PAP.  788
 248.  Accounting  Requirements.  Consistent  with  our  accounting  rules  with  respect  to
 antitrust  damages  and  certain  other  penalties  paid  by  carriers,  789  Verizon  should  not  reflect  any
 portion  of  market  adjustments  as  expenses  under  the  revenue  requirement  for  interstate  services
 of  the  Verizon  incumbent  LEC.  Such  accounting  treatment  ensures  that  ratepayers  do  not  bear,
 in  the  form  of  increased  rates,  the  cost  of  market  adjustments  under  the  enforcement  plan  in  the
 event  Verizon  fails  to  provide  adequate  service  quality  to  competitive  LECs.  790
 C.  Other  Issues
 249.  ALTS  and  Sprint  allege  that  Verizon  mismanaged  its  responsibility  when  it  was  the
 local  numbering  administrator  and,  therefore,  granting  the  application  would  be  in  violation  of  the
 public  interest.  791  These  allegations  do  not  convince  us  that  a  grant  of  this  application  would  be
 inconsistent  with  the  public  interest.  Specifically,  even  assuming  these  allegations  are  true,  they
 do  not  undermine  our  confidence  that  Verizons  local  market  is  open  to  competition  and  will
 remain  so  after  it  receives  interLATA  authority.  792
 IX.  SECTION  271(  D)(  6)  ENFORCEMENT  AUTHORITY
 250.  Section  271(  d)(  6)  of  the  Act  requires  Verizon  to  continue  to  satisfy  the
 conditions  required  for  .  .  .  approval  of  its  section  271  application  after  the  Commission
 787  See  id.
 788  Verizon  January  30  th  PAP  at  24.
 789  See  Accounting  for  Judgments  and  Other  Costs  Associated  with  Litigation,  CC  Docket  No.  93-  240,  Report  and
 Order,  12  FCC  Rcd  5112  (1997);  47  C.  F.  R.    32.7370(  d).  As  a  general  matter,  a  carriers  operating  expenses
 recovered  through  its  rates  must  be  legitimate  costs  of  providing  adequate  service  to  ratepayers.  See,  e.  g.,  West
 Ohio  Gas  Co.  v.  PUC,  294  U.  S.  63,  74  (1935);  Mountain  States  Tel.  and  Tel.  Co.  v.  FCC,  939  F.  2d  1035,  1044
 (D.  C.  Cir.  1991).
 790  See  SWBT  Kansas/  Oklahoma  Order  at  para.  280.  Although  the  PAP  does  not  explicitly  prohibit  Verizon  from
 including  performance-  related  damages  in  its  state  price  cap  calculation,  the  Massachusetts  Department  states  that
 it  will  monitor  Verizons  accounting  of  such  damages.  See  Massachusetts  DTE  September  5  th  Order  at  34.
 791  See  ALTS  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  52;  Sprint  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  11  (stating  that  Verizon
 inadequately  forecasted  the  need  for  area  codes  and  did  not  optimize  the  use  of  numbering  resources).  Verizon  is
 no  longer  the  numbering  administrator.  See  In  the  Matter  of  Request  of  Lockheed  Martin  Corporation  and
 Warburg,  Pincus  &  Co.  for  Review  of  the  Transfer  of  the  Lockheed  Martin  Communications  Industry  Services
 Business,  CC  Docket  No.  92-  237,  Order,  14  FCC  Rcd  19792  (1999).
 792  We  emphasize  that  grant  of  this  application  does  not  reflect  any  conclusion  that  Verizons  conduct  in  the
 individual  instances  cited  by  commenters  is  nondiscriminatory  and  complies  with  the  companys  obligations  under
 the  Communications  Act.
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 approves  its  application.  793  As  the  Commission  has  already  described  the  post-  approval
 enforcement  framework  and  its  various  section  271(  d)(  6)  enforcement  powers  in  detail  in  prior
 orders,  it  is  unnecessary  to  do  so  again  in  this  Order.  794  Working  in  concert  with  the
 Massachusetts  Department,  we  intend  to  monitor  closely  Verizons  post-  approval  compliance  for
 Massachusetts  to  ensure  that  Verizon  does  not  cease[  ]  to  meet  any  of  the  conditions  required
 for  [section  271]  approval.  795  We  stand  ready  to  exercise  our  various  statutory  enforcement
 powers  quickly  and  decisively  in  appropriate  circumstances  to  ensure  that  the  local  market
 remains  open  in  Massachusetts.  For  example,  we  expect  that  Verizons  proposed  new  processes
 for  LFACS  access  and  pre-  order  manual  loop  qualifications  will  enhance  competitors  ability  to
 access  loop  make-  up  information  in  a  nondiscriminatory  fashion.  As  stated  above,  we  note  that
 Verizon  has  established  October  2001  as  the  expected  completion  date  for  its  system
 enhancements.  We  stress  that  we  are  prepared  to  use  our  authority  under  section  271(  d)(  6)  if
 evidence  surfaces  at  a  later  date  that  Verizons  OSS  have  fallen  out  of  compliance  with  the
 requirements  of  the  UNE  Remand  Order.
 251.  The  Commission  has  a  responsibility  to  not  only  ensure  that  Verizon  is  in
 compliance  with  section  271  today,  but  also  that  it  remains  in  compliance  in  the  future.  The
 Commission  will  not  hesitate  to  use  its  enforcement  authority  after  section  271  authority  has  been
 granted.  In  this  regard,  the  Commission  will  pay  particular  attention  to  section  271  checklist
 items  where  Verizons  performance  was  most  marginal.  For  example,  like  many  commenters  in
 this  proceeding  796  and  the  Department  of  Justice,  797  we  have  serious  concerns  that  repetition  of
 some  of  the  assumptions  incorporated  into  the  original  Massachusetts  Department-  approved  UNE
 switching  rates  may  result  in  rates  outside  the  range  that  the  reasonable  application  of  TELRIC
 principles  would  produce.  We  note  that  these  original  rates  were  significantly  higher  than  those
 of  any  other  state  of  comparable  population  and  teledensity,  798  and  there  does  not  appear  to  have
 793  47  U.  S.  C.    271(  d)(  6).
 794  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  4174-  77,  paras.  446-  53;  SWBT  Texas  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at
 18567-  68,  paras.  434-  36;  SWBT  Kansas/  Oklahoma  Order  at  paras.  283-  85.
 795  47  U.  S.  C.    271(  d)(  6)(  A).
 796  See  ASCENT  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  3-  6;  AT&  T  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  2-  4;  CompTel
 Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  8-  9;  Massachusetts  Attorney  Generals  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  3-  8;  RNK
 Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  2-  3;  WorldCom  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  9-  25,  28-  33;  AT&  T  Massachusetts  I
 Reply  at  8-  23;  Massachusetts  Attorney  Generals  Massachusetts  I  Reply  at  7;  WorldCom  Massachusetts  I  Reply  at
 5-  10.  WorldCom  and  AT&  T  questioned  specific  inputs  used  in  the  cost  studies  to  set  UNE  rates  in  Massachusetts,
 including  whether  Verizon  misrepresented  the  discount  it  receives  from  vendors  for  new  switches,  and  whether  an
 inflated  cost  of  capital  was  used.  See  WorldCom  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  12-  25;  WorldCom  Massachusetts
 II  Comments  at  15-  18;  WorldCom  Massachusetts  II  Frentrup  Decl.  at  paras.  2-  28;  AT&  T  Massachusetts  I  Reply  at
 12-  24;  AT&  T  Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  6-  11.
 797  In  its  evaluation  of  Verizons  Massachusetts  I  Application,  the  Department  of  Justice  expressed  concern  over
 UNE  prices,  saying  that  there  are  reasons  to  suspect  that  in  some  cases  [certain  UNE]  prices  have  not  been  based
 on  the  relevant  costs  of  the  network  elements.  Department  of  Justice  Massachusetts  I  Evaluation  at  19.
 798  Based  on  WorldComs  usage  assumptions,  Verizons  original  rate  in  Massachusetts  for  the  per-  line,  per-month
 cost  for  switching  (excluding  the  line  port  cost),  transport,  and  signaling,  was  $21.68.  By  comparison,
 (continued.)
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 been  any  justification  for  such  significant  differences  based  on  Massachusetts-  specific
 technological,  environmental,  regulatory,  and  economic  conditions.  The  original  cost  study  used
 to  set  those  rates  has  a  number  of  potential  flaws  that,  if  repeated  without  justification,  could
 result  in  UNE  rates  that  warrant  enforcement  action.  These  include  the  size  of  switch  discounts
 that  it  assumed  would  be  available  from  vendors,  the  use  of  an  installation  factor  (the  cost  to
 install  a  switch)  that  was  based  on  installation  costs  relative  to  discounted  switches  but  applied  to
 undiscounted  switches,  a  cost  of  capital  in  excess  of  the  authorized  rate  of  return  in
 Massachusetts  and  higher  than  any  other  state  in  Verizons  territory  with  nothing  on  the  record  to
 justify  a  Massachusetts-  specific  difference,  and  an  inappropriate  busy  hour  conversion  factor.  799
 Because  states  have  considerable  flexibility  in  setting  UNE  rates,  certain  flaws  in  a  cost  study,  by
 themselves,  may  not  result  in  rates  that  are  outside  the  reasonable  range  that  a  correct  application
 of  our  TELRIC  rules  would  produce.  Collectively,  however,  the  number  of  possible  flaws  in  the
 original  cost  study,  if  repeated  without  adequate  state-  specific  justification,  may  well  result  in
 prices  outside  the  reasonable  range  of  what  TELRIC  would  produce.  The  Massachusetts
 Department  is  currently  examining  all  UNE  prices  in  its  five-  year  UNE  rate  review.  We  presume,
 as  we  do  with  all  state  commissions,  that  the  Massachusetts  Department  will  set  UNE  rates  within
 the  range  of  what  a  reasonable  application  of  what  TELRIC  would  produce.  We  observe  that  in
 any  context  in  which  prices  are  not  set  in  accordance  with  our  rules  and  the  Act,  we  retain  the
 ability  to  take  appropriate  enforcement  action,  including  action  pursuant  to  section  271(  d)(  6),  and
 will  not  hesitate  to  do  so.  800
 252.  Consistent  with  prior  section  271  orders,  we  require  Verizon  to  report  to  the
 Commission  all  Massachusetts  carrier-  to-  carrier  performance  metrics  results  and  Performance
 Assurance  Plan  monthly  reports  beginning  with  the  first  full  month  after  the  effective  date  of  this
 Order,  and  for  each  month  thereafter  for  one  year  unless  extended  by  the  Commission  or  Chief  of
 the  Enforcement  Bureau.  These  results  and  reports  will  allow  us  to  review,  on  an  on-  going  basis,
 Verizons  performance  to  ensure  continued  compliance  with  the  statutory  requirements.  We  are
 confident  that  cooperative  state  and  federal  oversight  and  enforcement  can  address  any
 (Continued  from  previous  page)
 Verizon's  state-  approved  rates  in  New  York  and  Pennsylvania  and  state-  approved  rates  in  Texas,  Kansas,
 Oklahoma,  and  Michigan  are  $10.60  in  New  York,  $5.02  in  Pennsylvania,  $4.17  in  Texas,  $4.23  in  Kansas,  $5.47
 in  Oklahoma,  and  $1.  97  in  Michigan.  Verizons  original  Massachusetts  rates  thus  exceeded  the  rates  for  these
 elements  by  105  percent  in  New  York,  332  percent  in  Pennsylvania,  420  percent  in  Texas,  413  percent  in  Kansas,
 296  percent  in  Oklahoma,  and  1,001  percent  in  Michigan.  See  Letter  from  Keith  L.  Seat,  Senior  Counsel,  Federal
 Law  and  Public  Policy,  WorldCom,  to  Magalie  Roman  Salas,  Secretary,  Federal  Communications  Commission,  CC
 Docket  No.  01-  9  at  13  (Jan.  31,  2001)  (WorldCom  Jan.  31  UNE  Pricing  Ex  Parte  Letter);  see  also  WorldCom
 Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  27-  28,  App.  A,  Joint  Declaration  of  Patricia  Proferes,  John  Nolan,  Paul  Bobeczko,
 and  Thomas  Graham  at  paras.  27-  29  and  Attach.  2.
 799  See  WorldCom  Massachusetts  I  Comments  at  12-  25;  AT&  T  Massachusetts  I  Reply  at  12-  23;  AT&  T
 Massachusetts  II  Comments  at  9-  11;  AT&  T  Massachusetts  II  Reply  at  4-  5;  WorldCom  Massachusetts  II  Frentrup
 Decl.  at  3-  15.
 800  See  47  U.  S.  C.    271(  d)(  6).
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 backsliding  that  may  arise  with  respect  to  Verizons  entry  into  the  Massachusetts  long  distance
 market.  801
 X.  CONCLUSION
 253.  For  the  reasons  discussed  above,  we  grant  Verizons  application  for  authorization
 under  section  271  of  the  Act  to  provide  in-  region,  interLATA  services  in  the  state  of
 Massachusetts.
 XI.  ORDERING  CLAUSES
 254.  Accordingly,  IT  IS  ORDERED  that,  pursuant  to  sections  4(  i),  4(  j),  and  271  of  the
 Communications  Act  of  1934,  as  amended,  47  U.  S.  C.    154(  i),  154(  j)  and  271,  Verizons
 application  to  provide  in-  region,  interLATA  service  in  the  state  of  Massachusetts,  filed  on  January
 16,  2001,  IS  GRANTED.
 801  See,  e.  g.,  Bell  Atlantic-  New  York,  Authorization  Under  Section  271  of  the  Communications  Act  to  Provide  In-Region,
 InterLATA  Service  in  the  State  of  New  York,  File  No.  EB-  00-  IH-  0085,  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  5413  (2000)
 (adopting  consent  decree  between  Commission  and  Bell  Atlantic  that  included  provisions  for  Bell  Atlantic  to  make
 a  voluntary  payment  of  $3,000,000  to  the  United  States  Treasury,  additional  payments  if  Bell  Atlantic  failed  to
 meet  specified  performance  standards,  and  weekly  reporting  requirements  to  gauge  Bell  Atlantics  performance  in
 correcting  the  problems  associated  with  its  electronic  ordering  systems).
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 Federal  Communications  Commission  FCC  01-  130
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 255.  IT  IS  FURTHER  ORDERED  that  this  Order  SHALL  BECOME  EFFECTIVE
 April  26,  2001.
 FEDERAL  COMMUNICATIONS  COMMISSION
 Magalie  Roman  Salas,
 Secretary
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 APPENDIX  A
 List  of  Commenters
 Verizon  New  England  Inc.,  et  al.,  Section  271  Application  to
 Provide  In-  Region  InterLATA  Services  in  Massachusetts
 CC  Docket  No.  01-  9
 Comments
 Commenters:
 A.  R.  C.  Networks,  Inc.
 Association  for  Local  Telecommunications  Services  (ALTS);  XO  Communications,  Inc.,  &  Focal
 Communications  Corporation  (filing  jointly)
 Association  of  Communications  Enterprises
 AT&  T  Corp.
 Commercial  Internet  Exchange  Association
 Competitive  Telecommunications  Association  (CompTel)
 Conversent  Communications  of  Massachusetts,  L.  L.  C.
 Covad  Communications  Company
 Fiber  Technologies
 Global  Crossing  North  America,  Inc.
 Global  NAPS,  Inc.
 Massachusetts  Attorney  General
 Massachusetts  Coalition  for  Competitive  Phone  Service
 Network  Access  Solutions
 New  England  Public  Communications  Council,  Inc.
 NOBLE  (North  of  Boston  Library  Exchange,  Inc.)
 RCN  BecoCom,  L.  L.  C.
 Rhythms  Netconnections  Inc.
 Sprint  Communications  Company  L.  P.
 Telecommunications  Advocacy  Project
 Winstar  Communications,  Inc.
 WorldCom,  Inc.
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 2
 Verizon  New  England  Inc.,  et  al.,  Section  271  Application  to
 Provide  In-  Region  InterLATA  Services  in  Massachusetts
 CC  Docket  No.  01-  9
 Reply  Comments
 Commenters:
 AT&  T  Corp.
 Commercial  Internet  Exchange  Association
 Competition  Policy  Institute
 Covad  Communications  Company
 Massachusetts  Attorney  Generals  Office
 Massachusetts  Department  of  Telecommunications  &  Energy
 Network  Access  Solutions
 United  States  Internet  Provider  Alliance
 Verizon  New  England
 Winstar  Communications,  Inc.
 WorldCom,  Inc.
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 3
 Verizon  New  England  Inc.,  et  al.,  Section  271  Application  to
 Provide  In-  Region  InterLATA  Services  in  Massachusetts
 CC  Docket  No.  00-  176
 Comments
 Commenters:
 Affiliated  Chambers  of  Commerce  of  Greater  Springfield,  Inc.
 Alliance  for  Education
 Alliance  for  Public  Technology
 Arts  Boston
 Association  of  Communications  Enterprises
 Association  for  Local  Telecommunications  Services  (ALTS)
 AT  &  T  Corp.
 BCNC  (Business  in  Partnership  with  the  Community)
 Blackstone  valley  Vocational  Regional  School  District
 Boston  Partners  in  Education
 Boston  Private  Industry  Council
 Boston  Public  Schools
 Bristol  Workforce  Investment  Board
 Cape  and  Islands  United  Way
 Cape  Cod  Technology  Council,  Inc.
 Century  21
 Chinatown  Business  Association
 Chemetal
 City  of  Boston,  MA,  Office  of  the  Mayor
 City  of  Brockton,  MA,  Office  of  the  Mayor
 City  of  Chelsea,  MA
 City  of  Fall  River,  MA
 City  of  Haverhill,  Haverhill,  MA
 City  of  Marlborough,  MA,  Office  of  the  Mayor
 City  of  Melrose,  MA,  Office  of  the  Mayor
 City  of  New  Bedford,  Office  of  the  Mayor
 City  of  Taunton,  MA,  Office  of  the  Mayor
 City  of  Taunton,  MA,  Mayors  Office  of  Economic  Development
 Communica
 Competitive  Telecommunications  Association
 CONQUEST,  Inc.
 Consulado  General  de  la  Republica  Dominicana
 Covad
 Diane  Davis  Associates
 Florence  Paint  &  Decorating  Center,  Inc.
 Frank  M.  Hynes,  State  Representative
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 4
 Greater  New  Bedford  Workforce  investment  Board,  Inc.
 Haddad  Electronic  Supply  Inc.
 Hispanic-  American  Chamber  of  Commerce
 Immigrant  Learning  Center
 Just  a  Start  Corporation
 Keep  America  Connected,  et  al.
 League  of  Latin  American  Citizens
 Lynn  Area  Chamber  of  Commerce
 Martin  L.  King,  Jr.  Business  Empowerment  Center
 Massachusetts  Attorney  General
 Massachusetts  House  of  Representatives
 Massachusetts  Department  of  Telecommunications  &  Energy
 Massachusetts  Rural  Development  Council,  Inc.
 MATP  Center  (Massachusetts  Assistive  Technology  Partnership  Center)
 Mentor
 Merrimack  Valley  Economic  Development  Council,  Inc.
 MetroWest  Chamber  of  Commerce
 National  Association  for  the  Advancement  of  Colored  People,  Washington  Bureau
 National  Association  of  Partners  in  Education
 National  Black  Chamber  of  Commerce,  et  al.
 National  Congress  for  Puerto  Rican  Rights
 NECLEC,  LLC
 Network  Access  Solutions  Corporation
 New  Networks  Institute
 Northern  Essex  Community  College
 Onsite  Access  Local,  L.  L.  C.
 Organizations  Concerned  About  Rural  Education  (OCRE)
 Plymouth  Area  Chamber  of  Commerce
 Puerto  Rican  Cultural  Center
 Puerto  Rico  Federal  Affairs  Administration
 Public  Schools  of  Springfield,  MA
 Rainbow  Push  Coalition
 RCN  BecoCom,  L.  L.  C.
 RNK  Inc.  d/  b/  a  RNK  Telecom
 Regional  Employment  Board  of  Hampden  County,  Inc.
 Rhythms  Netconnections  Inc.
 Saunders  Hotel  Group
 Shepley  Wood  Products,  Inc.
 Southern  Essex  Workforce  Investment  Board
 Springfield  Bilingual  Veterans  Outreach  Center
 Sprint  Communications  Company  L.  P.
 Stanton  Insurance  Agency,  Inc.
 Stik-  II  Products
 Telecommunications  Insight  Group
 Telecommunications  Research  and  Action  Center  (TRAC)
 The  October  Company,  Inc.
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 5
 The  Lowell  Plan
 Thomas  J.  OBrien,  State  Representative
 Town  of  Braintree,  MA
 Town  of  Burlington,  MA
 Town  of  Cohasset,  MA
 Town  of  Randolph,  MA
 Town  of  Scituate,  MA
 United  Seniors  Health  Cooperative
 University  of  Massachusetts,  Boston
 Urban  League  of  Eastern  Massachusetts  Inc.
 Vinny  deMacedo,  State  Representative
 Waltham  West  Suburban  Chamber  of  Commerce
 Wellesley  Chamber  of  Commerce,  Inc.
 Winstar  Communications,  Inc.
 Worcester  Area  Chamber  of  Commerce
 WorldCom,  Inc.
 World  Institute  on  Disability,  et  al.
 Z-  Tel  Communications,  Inc.
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 6
 Verizon  New  England  Inc.,  et  al.,  Section  271  Application  to
 Provide  In-  Region  InterLATA  Services  in  Massachusetts
 CC  Docket  No.  00-  176
 Reply  Comments
 Commenters:
 Alliance  for  Public  Technology
 Allegiance  Telecom  of  Massachusetts,  Inc.
 AT&  T  Corp.
 Covad
 Digital  Broadband  Communications,  Inc.
 Fiber  Technologies,  Inc.
 Keep  America  Connected,  et  al.
 Massachusetts  Attorney  General
 Massachusetts  Department  of  Telecommunications  &  Energy
 National  Consumers  League
 RCN  BecoCom
 Rhythms  NetConnections  Inc.
 Telecommunications  Research  &  Action  Center  (TRAC)
 Verizon
 Winstar  Communications,  Inc.
 WorldCom,  Inc.
148
 Federal  Communications  Commission  FCC  01-  130
 Appendix  B
 Statutory  Requirements    Checklist  Items  6-  12
 1.  Checklist  Item  6    Unbundled  Local  Switching.  Section  271(  c)(  2)(  B)(  ix)  requires
 BOCs  to  provide  [  l]  ocal  switching  unbundled  from  transport,  local  loop  transmission,  or  other
 services.  1  To  satisfy  its  obligations  under  this  subsection,  an  applicant  must  demonstrate
 compliance  with  the  Commission  rules  effective  as  of  the  date  of  the  application  relating  to
 unbundled  local  switching,  must  of  which  are  set  forth  in  detail  in  our  prior  section  271  orders.  2
 The  Commission  revised  these  rules  in  the  UNE  Remand  Order,  which  was  released  on
 November  5,  1999.  That  order  generally  retained  the  unbundling  obligations  for  local  switching
 while  narrowing  the  scope  of  obligation  for  certain  geographic  areas.  3  In  the  UNE  Remand
 Order,  the  Commission  required  that  incumbent  LECs  need  not  provide  access  on  an  unbundled
 basis  to  packet  switching  except  in  certain  limited  situations.  4
 2.  Checklist  Item  7    911/  E911  Access  and  Directory  Assistance/  Operator  Services.
 Section  271(  c)(  2)(  B)(  vii)  of  the  Act  requires  a  BOC  to  provide  [  n]  ondiscriminatory  access  to  
 (I)  911  and  E911  services.  5  In  the  Ameritech  Michigan  Order,  the  Commission  found  that
 section  271  requires  a  BOC  to  provide  competitors  access  to  its  911  and  E911  services  in  the
 same  manner  that  a  BOC  obtains  such  access,  i.  e.,  at  parity.  6  Specifically,  the  Commission  found
 that  a  BOC  must  maintain  the  911  database  entries  for  competing  LECs  with  the  same  accuracy
 and  reliability  that  it  maintains  the  database  entries  for  its  own  customers.  7  For  facilities-  based
 carriers,  the  BOC  must  provide  unbundled  access  to  [its]  911  database  and  911  interconnection,
 including  the  provision  of  dedicated  trunks  from  the  requesting  carriers  switching  facilities  to  the
 911  control  office  at  parity  with  what  [the  BOC]  provides  to  itself.  8  Section
 271(  c)(  2)(  B)(  vii)(  II)  and  section  271(  c)(  2)(  B)(  vii)(  III)  require  a  BOC  to  provide
 1  47  U.  S.  C.    271(  c)(  2)(  B)(  vi);  see  also  SWBT  Texas  order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  18520,  para.  336;  Second  BellSouth
 Louisiana  Order,  13  FCC  Rcd  at  20722.
 2  See  SWBT  Texas  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  18520-  22,  paras.  336-  38;  Second  BellSouth  Louisiana  Order,  13  FCC
 Rcd  at  20772,  para.  207.
 3  UNE  Remand  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  3822-  32,  paras.  276-  99  (limiting  an  incumbent  LECs  general  duty  to
 unbundle  circuit  switching  when  a  requesting  telecommunications  carrier  serves  end  users  in  the  top  50  MSAs,  in
 Density  Zone,  with  four  or  more  voice  grade  lines,  provided  that  such  LEC  provides  access  to  EELs)
 4  UNE  Remand  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  3838-  3919.
 5  47  U.  S.  C.    271(  c)(  2)(  B)(  vii).
 6  Ameritech  Michigan  Order,  12  FCC  Rcd  at  20679,  para.  256.
 7  Id.
 8  Id.
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 Federal  Communications  Commission  FCC  01-  130
 2
 nondiscriminatory  access  to  directory  assistance  services  to  allow  the  other  carriers  customers
 to  obtain  telephone  numbers  and  operator  call  completion  services,  respectively.  9  Section
 251(  b)(  3)  of  the  Act  imposes  on  each  LEC  the  duty  to  permit  all  [competing  providers  of
 telephone  exchange  service  and  telephone  toll  service]  to  have  nondiscriminatory  access  to  .  .  .
 operator  services,  directory  assistance,  and  directory  listing,  with  no  unreasonable  dialing  delays.  10  The  Commission  concluded  in  the  Second  BellSouth  Louisiana  Order  that  a  BOC  must
 be  in  compliance  with  the  regulations  implementing  section  251(  b)(  3)  to  satisfy  the  requirements
 of  sections  271(  c)(  2)(  B)(  vii)(  II)  and  271(  c)(  2)(  B)(  vii)(  III).  11  In  the  Local  Competition  Second
 Report  and  Order,  the  Commission  held  that  the  phrase  nondiscriminatory  access  to  directory
 assistance  and  directory  listings  means  that  the  customers  of  all  telecommunications  service
 providers  should  be  able  to  access  each  LECs  directory  assistance  service  and  obtain  a  directory
 listing  on  a  nondiscriminatory  basis,  notwithstanding:  (1)  the  identity  of  a  requesting  customers
 local  telephone  service  provider;  or  (2)  the  identity  of  the  telephone  service  provider  for  a
 customer  whose  directory  listing  is  requested.  12  The  Commission  concluded  that
 9  47  U.  S.  C.    271(  c)(  2)(  B)(  vii)(  II),  (III).
 10  47  U.  S.  C.    251(  b)(  3).  The  Commission  implemented  section  251(  b)(  3)  in  the  Local  Competition  Second
 Report  and  Order.  47  C.  F.  R.    51.217;  In  re  Implementation  of  the  Local  Competition  Provisions  of  the
 Telecommunications  Act  of  1996,  Second  Report  and  Order  and  Memorandum  Opinion  and  Order,  11  FCC  Rcd
 19392  (1996)  (Local  Competition  Second  Report  and  Order)  vacated  in  part,  People  of  the  State  of  California  v.
 FCC,  124  F.  3d  934  (8th  Cir.  1997),  overruled  in  part,  AT&  T  Corp.  v.  Iowa  Utils.  Bd.,  119  S.  Ct.  721  (1999);  see
 also  Implementation  of  the  Telecommunications  Act  of  1996:  Provision  of  Directory  Listings  Information  under
 the  Telecommunications  Act  of  1934,  Notice  of  Proposed  Rulemaking,  14  FCC  Rcd  15550  (1999)  (Directory
 Listings  Information  NPRM).
 11  While  both  sections  251(  b)(  3)  and  271(  c)(  2)(  B)(  vii)(  II)  refer  to  nondiscriminatory  access  to  directory
 assistance,  section  251(  b)(  3)  refers  to  nondiscriminatory  access  to  operator  services,  while  section
 271(  c)(  2)(  B)(  vii)(  III)  refers  to  nondiscriminatory  access  to  operator  call  completion  services.  47  U.  S.  C.  
 251(  b)(  3),  271(  c)(  2)(  B)(  vii)(  III).  The  term  operator  call  completion  services  is  not  defined  in  the  Act,  nor  has
 the  Commission  previously  defined  the  term.  However,  for  section  251(  b)(  3)  purposes,  the  term  operator
 services  was  defined  as  meaning  any  automatic  or  live  assistance  to  a  consumer  to  arrange  for  billing  or
 completion,  or  both,  of  a  telephone  call.  Local  Competition  Second  Report  and  Order,  11  FCC  Rcd  at  19448,
 para.  110.  In  the  same  order  the  Commission  concluded  that  busy  line  verification,  emergency  interrupt,  and
 operator-  assisted  directory  assistance  are  forms  of  operator  services,  because  they  assist  customers  in  arranging
 for  the  billing  or  completion  (or  both)  of  a  telephone  call.  Id.  at  19449,  para.  111.  All  of  these  services  may  be
 needed  or  used  to  place  a  call.  For  example,  if  a  customer  tries  to  direct  dial  a  telephone  number  and  constantly
 receives  a  busy  signal,  the  customer  may  contact  the  operator  to  attempt  to  complete  the  call.  Since  billing  is  a
 necessary  part  of  call  completion,  and  busy  line  verification,  emergency  interrupt,  and  operator-  assisted  directory
 assistance  can  all  be  used  when  an  operator  completes  a  call,  the  Commission  concluded  in  the  Second  BellSouth
 Louisiana  Order  that  for  checklist  compliance  purposes,  operator  call  completion  services  is  a  subset  of  or
 equivalent  to  operator  service.  Second  BellSouth  Louisiana  Order,  13  FCC  Rcd  at  20740,  n.  763.  As  a  result,  we
 use  the  nondiscriminatory  standards  established  for  operator  services  to  determine  whether  nondiscriminatory
 access  is  provided.
 12  47  C.  F.  R.    51.217(  c)(  3);  Local  Competition  Second  Report  and  Order,  11  FCC  Rcd  at  19456-  58,  paras.  130-
 35.  The  Local  Competition  Second  Report  and  Orders  interpretation  of  section  251(  b)(  3)  is  limited  to  access  to
 each  LECs  directory  assistance  service.  Id.  at  19456,  para.  135.  However,  section  271(  c)(  2)(  B)(  vii)  is  not
 (continued.)
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 Federal  Communications  Commission  FCC  01-  130
 3
 nondiscriminatory  access  to  the  dialing  patterns  of  4-  1-  1  and  5-  5-  5-  1-  2-  1-  2  to  access  directory
 assistance  were  technically  feasible,  and  would  continue.  13  The  Commission  specifically  held  that
 the  phrase  "nondiscriminatory  access  to  operator  services"  means  that  .  .  .  a  telephone  service
 customer,  regardless  of  the  identity  of  his  or  her  local  telephone  service  provider,  must  be  able  to
 connect  to  a  local  operator  by  dialing  0,    or  0  plus  the  desired  telephone  number.  14
 3.  Competing  carriers  may  provide  operator  services  and  directory  assistance  by
 either  reselling  the  BOCs  services  or  by  using  their  own  personnel  and  facilities  to  provide  these
 services.  Our  rules  require  BOCs  to  permit  competitive  LECs  wishing  to  resell  the  BOCs
 operator  services  and  directory  assistance  to  request  the  BOC  to  brand  their  calls.  15  Competing
 carriers  wishing  to  provide  operator  services  or  directory  assistance  using  their  own  facilities  and
 personnel  must  be  able  to  obtain  directory  listings  either  by  obtaining  directory  information  on  a
 read  only  or  per  dip  basis  from  the  BOCs  directory  assistance  database,  or  by  creating  their
 own  directory  assistance  database  by  obtaining  the  subscriber  listing  information  in  the  BOCs
 database.  16  Although  the  Commission  originally  concluded  that  BOCs  must  provide  directory
 assistance  and  operator  services  on  an  unbundled  basis  pursuant  to  sections  251  and  252,  the
 Commission  removed  directory  assistance  and  operator  services  from  the  list  of  required
 unbundled  network  elements  in  the  Local  Competition  Third  Report  and  Order.  17  Checklist  item
 obligations  that  do  not  fall  within  a  BOCs  obligations  to  provide  unbundled  network  elements  are
 not  subject  to  the  requirements  of  sections  251  and  252,  including  the  requirement  that  rates  be
 (Continued  from  previous  page)
 limited  to  the  LECs  systems  but  requires  nondiscriminatory  access  to  .  .  .  directory  assistance  to  allow  the  other
 carriers  customers  to  obtain  telephone  numbers.  47  U.  S.  C.    271(  c)(  2)(  B)(  vii).  Combined  with  the
 Commissions  conclusion  that  incumbent  LECs  must  unbundle  the  facilities  and  functionalities  providing
 operator  services  and  directory  assistance  from  resold  services  and  other  unbundled  network  elements  to  the  extent
 technically  feasible,  Local  Competition  First  Report  and  Order,  11  FCC  Rcd  at  15772-  73,  paras.  535-  37,  section
 271(  c)(  2)(  B)(  vii)  s  requirement  should  be  understood  to  require  the  BOCs  to  provide  nondiscriminatory  access  to
 the  directory  assistance  service  provider  selected  by  the  customers  local  service  provider,  regardless  of  whether  the
 competitor;  provides  such  services  itself;  selects  the  BOC  to  provide  such  services;  or  chooses  a  third  party  to
 provide  such  services.  See  Directory  Listings  Information  NPRM.
 13  Local  Competition  Second  Report  and  Order,  11  FCC  Rcd  at  19464,  para.  151.
 14  Id.  at  para.  112.
 15  47  C.  F.  R.    51.217(  d);  Local  Competition  Second  Report  and  Order,  11  FCC  Rcd  at  19463,  para.  148.  For
 example,  when  customers  call  the  operator  or  calls  for  directory  assistance,  they  typically  hear  a  message,  such  as
 thank  you  for  using  XYZ  Telephone  Company.  Competing  carriers  may  use  the  BOCs  brand,  request  the  BOC
 to  brand  the  call  with  the  competitive  carriers  name  or  request  that  the  BOC  not  brand  the  call  at  all.  47  C.  F.  R.  
 51.217(  d).
 16  47  C.  F.  R.    51.217(  C)(  3)(  ii);  Local  Competition  Second  Report  and  Order,  11  FCC  Rcd  at  19460-  61,  paras.
 141-  44.
 17  UNE  Remand  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  3891-  92,  paras.  441-  42.
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 Federal  Communications  Commission  FCC  01-  130
 4
 based  on  forward-  looking  economic  costs.  18  Checklist  item  obligations  that  do  not  fall  within  a
 BOCs  UNE  obligations,  however,  still  must  be  provided  in  accordance  with  sections  201(  b)  and
 202(  a),  which  require  that  rates  and  conditions  be  just  and  reasonable,  and  not  unreasonably
 discriminatory.  19
 4.  Checklist  Item  8    White  Pages  Directory  Listing.  Section  271(  c)(  2)(  B)(  viii)  of
 the  Act  requires  a  BOC  to  provide  [  w]  hite  pages  directory  listings  for  customers  of  the  other
 carriers  telephone  exchange  service.  20  Section  251(  b)(  3)  of  the  Act  obligates  all  LECs  to  permit
 competitive  providers  of  telephone  exchange  service  and  telephone  toll  service  to  have
 nondiscriminatory  access  to  directory  listings.  21  In  the  Second  BellSouth  Louisiana  Order,  the
 Commission  found  that  a  BOC  satisfies  the  requirements  of  checklist  item  8  by  demonstrating  that
 it:  (1)  provided  nondiscriminatory  appearance  and  integration  of  white  page  directory  listings  to
 competitive  LECs  customers;  and  (2)  provided  white  page  listings  for  competitors  customers
 with  the  same  accuracy  and  reliability  that  it  provides  its  own  customers.  22
 5.  Checklist  Item  9    Numbering  Administration.  Section  271(  c)(  2)(  B)(  ix)  of  the  Act
 requires  a  BOC  to  provide  nondiscriminatory  access  to  telephone  numbers  for  assignment  to  the
 other  carriers  telephone  exchange  service  customers,  until  the  date  by  which
 telecommunications  numbering  administration,  guidelines,  plan,  or  rules  are  established.  23  The
 checklist  mandates  compliance  with  such  guidelines,  plan,  or  rules  after  they  have  been
 established.  24  A  BOC  must  demonstrate  that  it  adheres  to  industry  numbering  administration
 guidelines  and  Commission  rules.  25
 18  Local  Competition  Third  Report  and  Order  at  para.  470.  See  generally  47  U.  S.  C.    251-  52;  see  also  47
 U.  S.  C.    252(  d)(  1)(  A)(  i)  (requiring  UNE  rates  to  be  based  on  the  cost  (determined  without  reference  to  a  rate-  of-return
 or  other  rate-  based  proceeding)  of  providing  the    network  element).
 19  Local  Competition  Third  Report  and  Order  at  paras.  470-  73;  see  also  47  U.  S.  C.    201(  b),  202(  a).
 20  47  U.  S.  C.    271(  c)(  2)(  B)(  viii).
 21  47  U.  S.  C.    251(  b)(  3).  In  the  Second  BellSouth  Louisiana  Order,  the  Commission  concluded  that,  consistent
 with  the  Commissions  interpretation  of  directory  listing  as  used  in  section  251(  b)(  3),  the  term  white  pages  in
 section  271(  c)(  2)(  B)(  viii)  refers  to  the  local  alphabetical  directory  that  includes  the  residential  and  business  listings
 of  the  customers  of  the  local  exchange  providers.  Second  BellSouth  Louisiana  Order,  13  FCC  Rcd  at  20748,
 para.  255.  The  Commission  further  concluded,  the  term  directory  listing,    as  used  in  this  section,  includes,  at  a
 minimum  the  subscribers  name,  address,  telephone  number,  or  any  combination  thereof.  Id.
 22  Id.
 23  47  U.  S.  C.    271(  c)(  2)(  B)(  ix).
 24  Id.
 25  See  Second  Bell  South  Louisiana  Order,  13  FCC  Rcd  at  20752;  see  also  Numbering  Resource  Optimization,
 Report  and  Order  and  Further  Notice  of  Proposed  Rulemaking,  15  FCC  Rcd  7574  (2000);  Numbering  Resource
 (continued.)
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 Federal  Communications  Commission  FCC  01-  130
 5
 6.  Checklist  Item  10    Databases  and  Associated  Signaling.  Section  271(  c)(  2)(  B)(  x)
 of  the  Act  requires  a  BOC  to  provide  nondiscriminatory  access  to  databases  and  associated
 signaling  necessary  for  call  routing  and  completion.  26  In  the  Second  BellSouth  Louisiana  Order,
 the  Commission  required  BellSouth  to  demonstrate  that  it  provided  requesting  carriers  with
 nondiscriminatory  access  to:  (  1)  signaling  networks,  including  signaling  links  and  signaling
 transfer  points;  (2)  certain  call-  related  databases  necessary  for  call  routing  and  completion,  or  in
 the  alternative,  a  means  of  physical  access  to  the  signaling  transfer  point  linked  to  the  unbundled
 database;  and  (3)  Service  Management  Systems  (SMS).  27  The  Commission  also  required
 BellSouth  to  design,  create,  test,  and  deploy  Advanced  Intelligent  Network  (AIN)  based  services
 at  the  SMS  through  a  Service  Creation  Environment  (SCE).  28  In  the  Local  Competition  First
 Report  and  Order,  the  Commission  defined  call-  related  databases  as  databases,  other  than
 operations  support  systems,  that  are  used  in  signaling  networks  for  billing  and  collection  or  the
 transmission,  routing,  or  other  provision  of  telecommunications  service.  29  At  that  time  the
 Commission  required  incumbent  LECs  to  provide  unbundled  access  to  their  call-  related  databases,
 including  but  not  limited  to:  the  Line  Information  Database  (LIDB),  the  Toll  Free  Calling
 database,  the  Local  Number  Portability  database,  and  Advanced  Intelligent  Network  databases.  30
 In  the  UNE  Remand  Order,  the  Commission  clarified  that  the  definition  of  call-  related  databases
 includes,  but  is  not  limited  to,  the  calling  name  (CNAM)  database,  as  well  as  the  911  and  E911
 databases.  31
 7.  Checklist  Item  11    Number  Portability.  Section  271(  c)(  2)(  B)  of  the  Act  requires
 a  BOC  to  comply  with  the  number  portability  regulations  adopted  by  the  Commission  pursuant  to
 section  251.  32  Section  251(  b)(  2)  requires  all  LECs  to  provide,  to  the  extent  technically  feasible,
 number  portability  in  accordance  with  requirements  prescribed  by  the  Commission.  33  The  Act
 defines  number  portability  as  the  ability  of  users  of  telecommunications  services  to  retain,  at  the
 same  location,  existing  telecommunications  numbers  without  impairment  of  quality,  reliability,  or
 (Continued  from  previous  page)
 Optimization,  Second  Report  and  Order,  Order  on  Reconsideration  in  CC  Docket  No.  99-  200  and  Second  Further
 Notice  of  Proposed  Rulemaking  in  CC  Docket  No.  99-  200,  CC  Docket  Nos.  96-  98;  99-  200  (rel.  Dec.  29,  2000).
 26  47  U.  S.  C.    271(  c)(  2)(  B)(  x).
 27  Second  BellSouth  Louisiana  Order,  13  FCC  Rcd  at  20753,  para.  267.
 28  Id.  at  20755-  56,  para.  272.
 29  Local  Competition  First  Report  and  Order,  11  FCC  Rcd  at  15741,  n.  1126;  UNE  Remand  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd
 at  3875,  para.  403.
 30  Local  Competition  First  Report  and  Order,  11  FCC  Rcd  at  15741-  42,  para.  484.
 31  UNE  Remand  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd  at  3875,  para.  403.
 32  47  U.  S.  C.    271(  c)(  2)(  B)(  xii).
 33  Id.    251(  b)(  2).
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 Federal  Communications  Commission  FCC  01-  130
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 convenience  when  switching  from  one  telecommunications  carrier  to  another.  34  In  order  to
 prevent  the  cost  of  number  portability  from  thwarting  local  competition,  Congress  enacted  section
 251(  e)(  2),  which  requires  that  [  t]  he  cost  of  establishing  telecommunications  numbering
 administration  arrangements  and  number  portability  shall  be  borne  by  all  telecommunications
 carriers  on  a  competitively  neutral  basis  as  determined  by  the  Commission.  35  Pursuant  to  these
 statutory  provisions,  the  Commission  requires  LECs  to  offer  interim  number  portability  to  the
 extent  technically  feasible.  36  The  Commission  also  requires  LECs  to  gradually  replace  interim
 number  portability  with  permanent  number  portability.  37  The  Commission  has  established
 guidelines  for  states  to  follow  in  mandating  a  competitively  neutral  cost-  recovery  mechanism  for
 interim  number  portability,  38  and  created  a  competitively  neural  cost-  recovery  mechanism  for
 long-  term  number  portability.  39
 8.  Checklist  Item  12    Local  Dialing  Parity.  Section  271(  c)(  2)(  B)(  xii)  requires  a
 BOC  to  provide  [  n]  ondiscriminatory  access  to  such  services  or  information  as  are  necessary  to
 allow  the  requesting  carrier  to  implement  local  dialing  parity  in  accordance  with  the  requirements
 of  section  251(  b)(  3).  40  Section  251(  b)(  3)  imposes  upon  all  LECs  [  t]  he  duty  to  provide  dialing
 34  Id.    153(  30).
 35  Id.    251(  e)(  2);  see  also  Second  BellSouth  Louisiana  Order,  13  FCC  Rcd  at  20757,  para.  274;  In  the  Matter  of
 Telephone  Number  Portability,  Third  Report  and  Order,  13  FCC  Rcd  11701,  11702-  04  (1998)  (Third  Number
 Portability  Order);  In  the  Matter  of  Telephone  Number  Portability,  Fourth  Memorandum  Opinion  and  Order  on
 Reconsideration,  CC  Docket  No.  95-  116,  at  paras.  1,  6-  9  (Jun.  23,  1999)  (Fourth  Number  Portability  Order).
 36  Fourth  Number  Portability  Order  at  para.  10;  In  re  Telephone  Number  Portability,  First  Report  and  Order  and
 Further  Notice  of  Proposed  Rulemaking,  11  FCC  Rcd  8352,  8409-  12,  paras.  110-  116  (1996)  (First  Number
 Portability  Order);  see  also  47  U.  S.  C.    251(  b)(  2).
 37  See  47  C.  F.  R.    52.3(  b)-(  f);  Second  BellSouth  Louisiana  Order,  13  FCC  Rcd  at  20758,  para.  275;  First
 Number  Portability  Order,  11  FCC  Rcd  at  8355  and  8399-  8404,  paras.  3  and  91;  Third  Number  Portability  Order,
 13  FCC  Rcd  at  11708-  12,  paras.  12-  16.
 38  See  47  C.  F.  R.    52.29;  Second  BellSouth  Louisiana  Order,  13  FCC  Rcd  at  20758,  para.  275;  First  Number
 Portability  Order,  11  FCC  Rcd  at  8417-  24,  paras.  127-  140.
 39  See  47  C.  F.  R.    52.32,  52.33;  Second  BellSouth  Louisiana  Order,  13  FCC  Rcd  at  20758,  para.  275;  Third
 Number  Portability  Order,  13  FCC  Rcd  at  11706-  07,  para.  8;  Fourth  Number  Portability  Order  at  para.  9.
 40  Based  on  the  Commissions  view  that  section  251(  b)(  3)  does  not  limit  the  duty  to  provide  dialing  parity  to  any
 particular  form  of  dialing  parity  (i.  e.,  international,  interstate,  intrastate,  or  local),  the  Commission  adopted  rules
 in  August  1996  to  implement  broad  guidelines  and  minimum  nationwide  standards  for  dialing  parity.  Local
 Competition  Second  Report  and  Order,  11  FCC  Rcd  at  19407;  Interconnection  Between  Local  Exchange  Carriers
 and  Commercial  Mobile  Radio  Service  Providers,  CC  Docket  No.  95-  185,  Further  Order  On  Reconsideration,
 FCC  99-  170  (rel.  July  19,  1999).
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 7
 parity  to  competing  providers  of  telephone  exchange  service  and  telephone  toll  service  with  no
 unreasonable  dialing  delays.  41  Section  153(  15)  of  the  Act  defines  dialing  parity  as  follows:
 [A]  person  that  is  not  an  affiliate  of  a  local  exchange  carrier  is  able
 to  provide  telecommunications  services  in  such  a  manner  that
 customers  have  the  ability  to  route  automatically,  without  the  use  of
 any  access  code,  their  telecommunications  to  the
 telecommunications  services  provider  of  the  customers  designation
 .  .  .  .  42
 9.  Our  rules  implementing  section  251(  b)(  3)  provide  that  customers  of  competing
 carriers  must  be  able  to  dial  the  same  number  of  digits  the  BOCs  customers  dial  to  complete  a
 local  telephone  call.  43  Moreover,  customers  of  competing  carriers  must  not  otherwise  suffer
 inferior  quality  service,  such  as  unreasonable  dialing  delays,  compared  to  the  BOCs  customers.  44
 41  47  U.  S.  C.    251(  b)(  3).
 42  Id.  at    153(  15).
 43  47  C.  F.  R    51.205,  51.207.
 44  See  47  C.  F.  R.    51.207  (requiring  same  number  of  digits  to  be  dialed);  Local  Competition  Second  Report  and
 Order,  11  FCC  Rcd  at  19400,  19403.
155
 Federal  Communications  Commission  FCC  01-  130
 SEPARATE  STATEMENT  OF  CHAIRMAN  MICHAEL  K.  POWELL
 Re:  Application  of  Verizon  New  England  Inc.,  Bell  Atlantic  Communications,  Inc.  (d/  b/  a
 Verizon  Long  Distance),  NYNEX  Long  Distance  Company  (d/  b/  a  Verizon  Enterprise
 Solutions)  and  Verizon  Global  Networks  Inc.,  for  Authorization  to  Provide  In-  Region,
 InterLATA  Services  in  Massachusetts  (CC  Docket  No.  01-  9)
 I  write  separately  to  explain  the  bases  upon  which  I  support  this  Order,  which  approves  an
 application  by  Verizon  to  provide  in-  region,  interLATA  service  in  Massachusetts,  pursuant  to
 section  271  of  the  Telecommunications  Act  of  1996.
 There  was  a  time  when  the  Commissions  interpretation  of  section  271  was  so  fluid  that  it
 was  difficult  to  ascertain  precisely  what  was  required  of  a  Bell  Company  to  enable  it  to  attain
 approval  to  enter  the  long  distance  market.  The  Commission  was  criticized  for  hiding  the  ball
 in  that,  in  the  face  of  undeniably  weak  applications,  we  declined  to  provide  guidance  regarding
 what  we  would  find  to  be  a  persuasive  showing  of  compliance  with  the  statutory  competitive
 checklist.
 Under  the  stewardship  of  the  previous  Chairman,  however,  the  Commission  concertedly
 labored  to  provide  more  detailed  guidance,  notwithstanding  the  strict  limitations  imposed  on  our
 deliberations  by  the  90-  day  statutory  deadline  for  approving  or  rejecting  section  271  applications.
 The  fruits  of  this  effort  have  been  that,  of  the  more  than  five  years  in  which  we  have  been
 responsible  for  implementing  section  271,  we  have  adopted  all  five  approval  orders  only  in  the  last
 16  months.  This  cluster  of  recent  approvals  (which  were  supported  by  all  of  my  present
 colleagues)  is,  in  my  view,  the  result  of  simple  logic:  without  a  clear  explanation  of  what  they
 needed  to  do  to  gain  section  271  approval,  Bell  Companies  lacked  adequate  incentives  and  ability
 to  do  what  this  provision  intended,  namely,  open  local  markets  in  exchange  for  entry  into  the  in-region,
 interLATA  telecommunications  market.
 But  future  applicants  and  other  interested  parties  are  admonished  that,  even  after  more
 than  a  year  of  applying  a  standard  that  provides  section  271  applicants  the  guidance  they  need  to
 succeed,  the  Commission  will  continue  to  apply  the  same  rigor  it  always  has  to  these  questions.  It
 is  not  overstating  matters  to  point  out  that  the  legal  and  policy  questions  encompassed  by  these
 proceedings  are  extraordinarily  complex  and,  most  often,  close  questions  must  be  resolved.  As
 such,  there  still  will  be  times  when  the  Commission  receives  an  application  that  either  fails  to  meet
 the  demanding  standard  outlined  in  our  precedent,  or  fails  based  on  questions  that  surface  for  the
 first  time.
 With  respect  to  the  application  before  us,  though  it  has  some  weaknesses,  I  believe  it  is
 consistent  with  our  precedent  and  merits  approval.  The  central  concern  with  this  application  is
 the  rate  Verizon  offers  for  switching.  It  is  clearly  higher  than  those  we  have  seen  in  some  other
 states.  Our  task  under  the  checklist,  however,  is  to  ensure  that  whatever  rates  are  offered  are
 cost-  based  and  the  product  of  a  forward-  looking  methodology  (i.  e.,  TELRIC).  In  evaluating
 section  271  applications,  the  Commission  does  not  conduct  completely  independent  rate
156
 Federal  Communications  Commission  FCC  01-  130
 2
 proceedings.  Thus,  we  are  left  to  examine  whether  a  state  commission  demonstrates  intent  and
 some  ability  to  use  the  appropriate  methodology,  and  whether  the  rates  ultimately  relied  on  in  the
 application  are  within  the  range  that  a  reasonable  application  of  TELRIC  principles  would
 produce.
 Here,  Verizon  relies  on  a  switching  rate  lower  than  that  set  by  the  Massachusetts
 Department,  recognizing  the  Commissions  concern  that  the  state-  set  rate  might  not  be
 appropriately  cost-  based.  Verizon  chose  simply  to  offer  a  switching  rate  similar  to  that  we
 approved  in  New  York.  In  the  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  Order,  we  found  this  rate  to  be  consistent
 with  the  cost-  based  methods  we  require.  Given  that,  I  believe  we  are  constrained  to  approve  the
 rate  unless  we  find  it  unquestionably  clear  that  the  rate  is  not  built  on  the  proper  TELRIC
 foundation.  In  contrast,  opponents  of  this  application  argue  that  we  should  not  rely  on  the  New
 York  rate,  because  the  New  York  Commission  is  on  the  verge  of  revising  it,  having  found  an
 arguable  input  error  in  its  previous  methodology.  It  is  alleged  that  this  revision  will  result  in  a
 substantially  lower  rate  and  thus  we  should  not  endorse  the  current  rate  for  Massachusetts.
 This  is  not  an  idle  concern,  for  we  recognize  the  importance  of  cost-  based  rates  to  new
 entrants  hoping  to  enter  the  incumbents  local  market.  I  must  conclude,  however,  that  we  cannot
 properly  reject  an  application  from  one  state  that  is  consistent  with  precedent,  on  the  basis  of
 speculation  regarding  the  outcome  of  another  states  future  rate  proceeding.  We  cannot  know
 with  sufficient  certainty  what  will  be  the  full  impact  on  the  rates  of  that  future  proceeding,  even  if
 it  is  generally  accepted  that  the  rate  is  likely  to  be  lower.  Nor  can  we,  on  this  record  and  within
 the  constraints  of  this  90-  day  proceeding,  conduct  our  own  de  novo  evaluation  of  these  switching
 rates,  so  as  to  revise  our  prior  decision.  Moreover,  I  cannot  agree  that  we  should,  as  a  prior
 condition  of  approving  this  application,  compel  Verizon  (through  formal  or  informal  means)  to
 mirror  its  Massachusetts  rates  with  any  revisions  that  occur  in  New  York.  Taking  such  action
 now,  as  a  condition  of  approval,  would  impermissibly  subject  the  Massachusetts  Department  to
 the  regulatory  actions  of  another  state  and  might  well  interfere  with  the  Departments  ongoing
 ratemaking  proceedings.
 That  said,  approval  today  does  not  forever  insulate  the  switching  rate  Verizon  has
 successfully  proferred  in  this  application.  If  New  York  in  fact  revises  its  rates  downward  after
 concluding  that  its  prior  determinations  were  not  soundly  cost-  based,  neither  Verizon  nor  anyone
 else  could  properly  rely  in  future  applications  on  the  rates  we  approved  in  the  Bell  Atlantic  New
 York  Order  without  new  substantiation.  Furthermore,  depending  on  the  scope  of  the  New  York
 Commissions  upcoming  decision  on  rates,  this  Commission  might  determine  that  Verizon  has
 subsequently  ceased  to  meet  [one]  of  the  conditions  required  for  [section  271]  approval,
 thereby  empowering  us  to  take  remedial  action  under  section  271(  d)(  6).  Thus,  there  may  be
 situations  after  the  New  York  Commission  rules  in  which  I  would  support  taking  action  that
 would  have  the  practical  effect  of  requiring  Verizon  to  find  a  new  cost-  based  rate  for  switching
 for  a  few  months  until  the  Massachusetts  Department  resets  its  rates.  I  have  full  confidence  that
 the  Massachusetts  Department  will  take  account  of  New  Yorks  experience,  as  well  as  carefully
 ensure  that  any  rates  it  chooses  are  based  on  sound  TELRIC  methodology,  as  described  in  this
 and  prior  Commission  orders.
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 Federal  Communications  Commission  FCC  01-  130
 3
 For  these  reasons  and  with  these  caveats,  I  support  adoption  of  this  section  271
 application.  I  wish  to  thank,  in  particular,  the  Massachusetts  Department,  the  Department  of
 Justice  and  our  tireless  Common  Carrier  Bureau  staff  for  their  exemplary  skill,  drive  and  stamina
 in  bringing  this  Order  to  fruition.
158
 Federal  Communications  Commission  FCC  01-  130
 SEPARATE  STATEMENT  OF
 COMMISSIONER  SUSAN  NESS
 Re:  Application  of  Verizon  New  England  Inc.,  Bell  Atlantic  Communications,  Inc.  (d/  b/  a
 Verizon  Long  Distance),  NYNEX  Long  Distance  Company  (d/  b/  a  Verizon  Enterprise
 Solutions)  and  Verizon  Global  Networks  Inc.,  for  Authorization  to  Provide  In-  Region,
 InterLATA  Services  in  Massachusetts  (CC  Docket  No.  01-  9)
 Notwithstanding  serious  reservations  about  Verizon  New  Englands  pricing  of  unbundled
 network  elements,  I  vote  to  approve  this  application  to  provide  long-  distance  services  in
 Massachusetts.  On  balance,  I  believe  that  Massachusetts  consumers  will  benefit  from  heightened
 competition  in  both  the  long  distance  and  local  markets.  Although  I  vote  for  this  order  with  some
 trepidation,  I  am  optimistic  that  this  Commission  and  the  Massachusetts  Department  of
 Telecommunications  and  Energy  (DTE)  will  maintain  vigilance  to  ensure  that  the  market-  opening
 requirements  mandated  by  Congress  continue  to  be  met.
 Enduring  competition  in  the  local  market  will  only  take  root  and  thrive  if  we  and  our  state
 colleagues  rigorously  pursue  cost-  based  pricing.  Indeed,  pricing  is  at  the  very  core  of  the
 statutory  framework  Congress  constructed  to  eliminate  economic  barriers  to  entry  in  all
 telecommunications  markets.  The  use  of  a  forward-  looking  methodology  --  with  a  reasonable
 risk-  adjusted  return  to  incumbents  --  promotes  fair  and  efficient  competition.
 Since  the  earliest  271  applications,  the  Commission  has  made  clear  that  we  must  make  an
 independent  determination  that  the  rates  are  based  on  forward-  looking  costs  --  a  statutory
 responsibility  that  the  Commission  diligently  undertook  in  the  recent  SWBT  Kansas/  Oklahoma
 Order.  1  Todays  decision  squarely  reaffirms  this  obligation.
 Our  independent  evaluation  shows  that  the  original  switching  rates  adopted  by  the
 Massachusetts  DTE  were  substantially  higher  than  other  states  and  not  within  a  range  of  prices
 that  would  be  consistent  with  forward-  looking  principles.  With  average  consumer  usage,  the  per
 month  costs  for  switching,  transport,  and  signaling  would  have  been  $21.68  in  Massachusetts  
 more  than  double  the  rate  in  New  York  and  more  than  300  percent  above  the  rates  in  numerous
 other  states  in  Verizons  territory  and  across  the  country.  I  would  not  have  approved  an
 application  that  was  based  upon  such  rates  absent  compelling  evidence  that  switching  costs  in
 Massachusetts  should  differ  so  extraordinarily  from  those  in  other  states.
 The  order  permits  Verizon  to  rely  on  current  switching  rates  from  New  York  --  a
 neighboring  state  with  similar  cost  characteristics  --  to  prove  compliance  with  the  statutory
 requirements.  I  have  significant  misgivings  about  this  approach.  The  rates  adopted  in  New  York
 are  several  years  old  and  are  under  active  review  by  the  New  York  Commission  with  a  true-  up
 1  See,  e.  g.,  Ameritech  Michigan  Order,  12  FCC  Rcd  20543,  20694-  701;  SWBT  Kansas/  Oklahoma  Order  at  paras.
 47-  102.
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 Federal  Communications  Commission  FCC  01-  130
 2
 after  it  completes  its  review.  As  noted  above,  since  our  approval  of  Verizons  New  York
 application,  other  states  have  adopted  switching  rates  that  are  significantly  lower  than  those  in
 New  York.  Reluctantly,  I  am  compelled  to  support  the  decision  to  grant  this  application  because
 the  rates  that  were  approved  by  the  New  York  Commission  --  and  evaluated  by  this  Commission  --
 are  presently  in  effect  and  there  is  insufficient  evidence  in  the  record  at  this  time  to  determine
 that  those  rates  are  inconsistent  with  forward-  looking  principles.
 Todays  order  correctly  recognizes,  however,  that  rates  will  evolve  over  time  to  reflect
 changed  market  conditions,  new  technologies,  and  updated  information  on  cost  inputs.  Parties
 should  be  forewarned  that  they  should  not  rely  on  outdated  rates  in  future  applications.
 Moreover,  depending  on  the  New  York  Commissions  decision,  Verizons  reliance  on  the  present
 rates  to  demonstrate  continuing  compliance  in  Massachusetts  may  be  undermined.  If  the  New
 York  Commission  orders  lower  rates  after  determining  that  the  present  rates  are  not  cost-  based
 and  Verizon  does  not  revise  its  rates  in  Massachusetts,  the  FCC  should  use  its  section  271(  d)(  6)
 authority  to  suspend  or  revoke  Verizons  long-  distance  authorization  in  Massachusetts  until  the
 DTE  completes  its  cost  proceeding.
 I  am  also  troubled  by  the  cost  inputs  used  to  set  the  loop  rates  in  Massachusetts.  In
 particular,  the  fill  factor  used  is  exceptionally  low.  In  addition,  the  designated  cost  of  capital
 exceeds  the  figure  used  to  set  retail  rates  in  Massachusetts  and  is  substantially  higher  than  the
 percentages  used  in  the  other  Verizon  states.  I  have  every  confidence  that  the  Massachusetts
 DTE  will  address  any  flaws  in  the  inputs  through  its  pending  cost  proceeding.
 As  we  have  consistently  noted,  opening  a  local  market  to  competition  does  not  end  with
 the  grant  of  a  271  application.  Indeed,  the  Commission  and  state  commissions  must  be  even  more
 vigilant  in  ensuring  that  incumbents  live  up  to  their  statutory  obligations  once  long-  distance
 authorization  is  granted.
 This  application  demonstrates  the  importance  of  each  state  commission  undertaking  an
 evaluation  of  forward-  looking  costs  as  it  establishes  rates  within  its  borders.  It  also  demonstrates
 that,  although  a  forward-  looking  methodology  provides  latitude  in  setting  rates,  pricing  decisions
 in  other  states  can  serve  as  a  benchmark  by  which  a  state  commission  can  evaluate  the
 appropriateness  of  its  rates.  I  encourage  state  commissions  to  undertake  a  pro-  active  dialogue  on
 pricing  with  each  other  and  with  this  Commission  so  that  the  benefits  of  effective  competition
 reach  consumers  throughout  the  entire  country  as  quickly  as  possible.
 After  this  fifth  grant  of  an  application  to  provide  long-  distance  services,  there  should  no
 longer  be  any  question  about  getting  to  yes;  rather  the  focus  must  be  on  getting  it  right.
160
 Federal  Communications  Commission  FCC  01-  130
 CONCURRING  STATEMENT  OF
 COMMISSIONER  HAROLD  FURCHTGOTT-  ROTH
 Re:  Application  of  Verizon  New  England  Inc.,  Bell  Atlantic  Communications,  Inc.  (d/  b/  a
 Verizon  Long  Distance),  NYNEX  Long  Distance  Company  (d/  b/  a  Verizon  Enterprise
 Solutions)  and  Verizon  Global  Networks  Inc.,  for  Authorization  to  Provide  In-  Region,
 InterLATA  Services  in  Massachusetts  (CC  Docket  No.  01-  9)
 I  support  todays  decision  to  grant  Verizon  Section  271  authority  in  Massachusetts.
 While  I  continue  to  have  doubts  about  the  Commissions  overall  approach  to  these  proceedings,  I
 believe  todays  approval  is  a  first  step  towards  a  more  statutorily-  constrained  approach  to  Section
 271  applications.
 There  are  a  number  of  hopeful  signs  in  todays  Order.  First,  the  Commission  has  resisted
 the  temptation  to  condition  its  approval  on  some  future  event  or  approve  entry  based  on  some
 new  information  submitted  after  the  filing  date.  1  The  only  relevant  consideration  should  be  a
 carriers  section  271  performance  at  the  time  the  application  is  filed.  Section  271  is  intended  to  be
 a  snapshot  of  what  actually  prevailed  in  the  market  90  days  ago  not  a  crystal-  ball-  gazing
 speculation  about  a  parade  of  horribles  that  may    or  may  not    happen  in  the  future.  When
 speculation  prevails,  11  th  hour  dealmaking  is  not  far  behind.
 Second,  todays  decision  is  less  intrusive  into  the  province  of  state  commissions.  I  have
 long  advocated  a  more  deferential  approach  to  state  commission  decisions,  on  compliance  with
 the  checklist  generally  and  particularly  on  pricing  issues.  Todays  order  moves  productively  in
 that  direction.  Similarly  the  Commission  has  refrained  from  the  detailed  second-  guessing  of  state
 commission  determinations  that  once  typified  these  orders.
 Finally,  todays  order  more  clearly  limits  our  consideration  to  those  items  actually  in  the
 statutory  checklist.  Prior  decisions  seemed  at  least  implicitly  to  expand  that  checklist    by
 encouraging  and  expecting  companies  and  commissions  to  take  additional  steps  that  reflected
 the  policy  priorities  of  the  erstwhile  majority.  That  practice  has  now  been  largely  eliminated.
 Although  these  are  all  positive  trends,  I  hope  that  future  commissions  will  continue  down  this
 road.
 Nonetheless  some  aspects  of  todays  Order  are  not  consistent  with  my  overall  view  of  the
 FCCs  role.  As  I  have  stated  in  prior  Section  271  decisions,  I  believe  that  Section  271  primarily
 requires  the  Commission  to  determine  whether  a  Bell  operating  company  has  fulfilled  its
 obligations  under  Sections  251  and  252,  and  these  are  specified  in  the  interconnection  agreements
 into  which  it  has  entered.  2  In  this  regard,  an  essential  element  in  my  review  is  whether  any
 1  Unfortunately  the  Kansas  and  Oklahoma  Order  suffered  from  both  of  these  deficiencies.
 2  See  Concurring  Statement  of  Commissioner  Harold  W.  Furchtgott-  Roth,  In  the  Matter  of  Application  by
 Verizon  Under  Section  271  of  the  Telecommunications  Act  of  1996  To  Provide  In-  Region,  InterLATA  Services  in
 (continued.)
161
 Federal  Communications  Commission  FCC  01-  130
 2
 complaints  have  been  filed  at  the  FCC  or  with  the  relevant  state  commission  alleging  non-compliance
 with  section  251  generally  and  section  252  agreements  in  particular.  In  the  absence  of
 such  complaints,  I  take  a  highly  skeptical  view  of  allegations  that  are  aired  for  the  first  time  in  the
 Section  271  application  process.  Section  271  does  not  create  an  opportunity  to  circumvent  the
 statutory  dispute  resolution  process  created  by  Sections  251  and  252.  Although  todays  order
 does  emphasize  the  utility  of  complaint  processes  and  the  role  of  the  states,  it  nonetheless  indulges
 new  and  novel  concerns  unreviewed  elsewhere  in  far  more  detail  than  I  would  have.
 I  also  wish  to  emphasize  that  the  FCCs  job  does  not  end  with  approval  of  Verizons
 application.  Section  271  (d)(  6)  sets  forth  a  clear  role  for  the  Commission  to  ensure  that  Bell
 operating  companies  continue  to  meet  the  statutory  checklist.  I  share  Chairman  Powells
 commitment  to  swift  and  sure  enforcement  action  when  licensees  violate  our  rules.  Thus  we  will
 closely  monitor  the  situation  in  Massachusetts  in  order  to  be  certain  that  Verizon  remains  in  full
 compliance  with  Section  271.
 (Continued  from  previous  page)
 New  York,  15  FCC  Rcd  3953  (1999)  Concurring  Statement  of  Commissioner  Harold  W.  Furchtgott-  Roth,  In  the
 Matter  of  Application  by  SBC  Communications  Inc.,  Southwestern  Bell  Telephone  Company,  and  Southwestern
 Bell  Communications  Services,  Inc.  d/  b/  a  Southwestern  Bell  Long  Distance  Pursuant  to  Section  271  of  the
 Telecommunications  Act  of  1996  To  Provide  In-  Region,  InterLATA  Services  in  Texas,  15  FCC  Rcd  18354  (2000);
 see  also  Concurring  Statement  of  Commissioner  Harold  W.  Furchtgott-  Roth,  In  the  Matter  of  Application  by  SBC
 Communications  Inc.,  Southwestern  Bell  Telephone  Company,  and  Southwestern  Bell  Communications  Services,
 Inc.  d/  b/  a  Southwestern  Bell  Long  Distance  Pursuant  to  Section  271  of  the  Telecommunications  Act  of  1996  To
 Provide  In-  Region,  InterLATA  Services  in  Kansas  and  Oklahoma,  CC  Docket  00-  217  (Jan.  22,  2001).
162
 Federal  Communications  Commission  FCC  01-  130
 DISSENTING  STATEMENT  OF  COMMISSIONER  GLORIA  TRISTANI
 Re:  Application  of  Verizon  New  England  Inc.,  Bell  Atlantic  Communications,  Inc.  (d/  b/  a
 Verizon  Long  Distance),  NYNEX  Long  Distance  Company  (d/  b/  a  Verizon  Enterprise
 Solutions)  and  Verizon  Global  Networks  Inc.,  for  Authorization  to  Provide  In-  Region,
 InterLATA  Services  in  Massachusetts  (CC  Docket  No.  01-  9)
 With  the  stakes  so  high,  the  Commission  cannot  afford  to  let  Verizon  into  the
 Massachusetts  long  distance  market  before  the  company  has  fully  demonstrated  compliance  with
 the  market  opening  requirements  of  section  271.  The  availability  of  unbundled  network  elements
 (UNEs)  at  cost-  based  rates  is  an  essential  ingredient  of  a  primary  strategy  for  entering  the
 residential  market  in  Massachusetts.  Accordingly,  I  must  dissent,  because  the  Commission  should
 not  permit  Verizon  to  enter  the  in-  state  long  distance  market  without  more  rigorous  support  for
 its  unbundled  switching  rates  in  Massachusetts.
 Based  on  the  evidence  in  the  record,  I  cannot  conclude  that  Verizon  has  demonstrated  that
 its  switching  rates  are  based  on  the  forward-  looking,  total  element  long  run  incremental  cost
 (TELRIC)  of  providing  that  network  element.  Prior  to  filing  its  second  271  application  for
 Massachusetts,  Verizon  elected  not  to  rely  on  the  unbundled  switching  rates  set  by  the
 Massachusetts  Department  of  Telecommunications  and  Energy  (Massachusetts  Department).
 Instead  Verizon  chose  to  rely  on  voluntarily-  adopted  rates  equivalent  to  those  currently  in  effect
 in  New  York,  without  providing  any  further  evidence  that  those  rates  are  TELRIC  compliant  for
 Massachusetts.
 By  allowing  Verizon  simply  to  mirror  rate  levels  set  four  years  ago  in  another  state  and
 subject  to  imminent  revision,  the  Commission  has  undermined  the  rigor  of  its  271  process.  Indeed
 the  majority  has  sent  a  signal  that  it  will  allow  reliance  on  previously  approved  rates,  irrespective
 of  the  amount  of  time  passed  or  pricing  information  gathered  since  those  rates  were  last  before  us.
 In  a  declining  cost  industry  characterized  by  rapid  technological  innovation,  such  an  approach  is
 inconsistent  with  our  statutory  mandate.  Nor  can  the  majoritys  threats  of  future  enforcement
 action  --  particularly  with  regard  to  section  271  checklist  items  where  Verizons  performance
 was  most  marginal,  such  as  the  pricing  of  unbundled  elements  1  --  substitute  for  a  requirement
 that  Verizon  demonstrate  full  checklist  compliance  before  winning  long  distance  authority.
 The  record  that  supported  Verizons  New  York  271  application  in  1999,  based  on  a
 pricing  docket  completed  in  1997,  is  not  adequate  to  support  Verizons  case  in  Massachusetts
 today.  The  New  York  Public  Service  Commission  (NYPSC)  is  expected  to  revise  the  New  York
 rates  this  summer,  after  it  completes  its  review  of  additional  information  regarding  the  cost  of
 unbundled  switching.  The  NYPSC  adopted  the  current  rates  at  a  time  when  there  was
 comparatively  little  experience  with  TELRIC  pricing.  Since  the  New  York  application  was
 adopted,  however,  the  Commission  has  acquired  additional  information  about  the  pricing  of
 1  Order  at    251.
163
 Federal  Communications  Commission  FCC  01-  130
 2
 switching  in  particular.  The  applications  that  the  Commission  has  approved  since  that  time
 reflected  rates  for  the  per-  line,  per-  month  cost  for  switching,  transport,  and  signaling  that  --  based
 on  WorldComs  usage  assumptions  --  are  roughly  half  of  New  Yorks  rates.  2  Such  rate  disparities
 suggest  there  is  a  good  chance  that  the  NYPSC  may  revise  its  rates  significantly.  At  a  minimum,
 such  comparisons  support  the  need  for  additional  information  to  ensure  that  the  Massachusetts
 switching  rate  is  within  the  range  that  reasonable  application  of  TELRIC  principles  would
 produce.
 In  any  case,  Verizon  did  not  adopt  the  New  York  rates  for  unbundled  switching  in  their
 entirety.  The  New  York  rates,  unlike  the  fixed  rates  on  which  Verizon  relies,  are  subject  to  true-up
 and  potential  refund.  Moreover,  although  the  NYPSC  is  expected  to  complete  its  pricing
 proceeding  shortly,  Verizon  did  not  commit  to  adopt  the  resulting  rates,  which  will  be  based  on
 more  complete  and  updated  cost  information.
 Finally,  when  we  approved  Verizons  New  York  271  application,  we  placed  great  weight
 on  the  New  York  Commissions  active  review  and  modification  of  Bell  Atlantics  proposed
 unbundled  network  element  prices,  its  commitment  to  TELRIC-  based  rates,  and  its  detailed
 supporting  comments  concerning  its  extensive,  multi-  phased  network  elements  rate  case.  3  We
 do  not  have  the  same  record  in  Massachusetts.  As  the  majority  describes,  significant  errors
 appear  to  have  been  made  in  establishing  the  original  UNE  switching  rates  in  Massachusetts.  Like
 the  majority,  I  expect  that  the  Massachusetts  Department  will  examine  these  issues  during  the
 course  of  its  on-  going  rate  case  and  set  rates  within  the  range  that  a  reasonable  application  of
 TELRIC  principles  would  produce.  But,  based  on  the  record  currently  before  me,  I  cannot
 conclude  that  the  unbundled  switching  rates  on  which  Verizon  relies  are  within  that  range  and
 accordingly  must  dissent.
 2  Id.  at  n.  798.
 3  Application  by  Bell  Atlantic  New  York  for  Authorization  Under  Section  271  of  the  Communications  Act  to
 Provide  In-  region,  InterLATA  Service  in  the  State  of  New  York,  Memorandum  Opinion  and  Order,  15  FCC  Rcd
 3953,  4081-  4082  (1999).
164