Cover

Graphic: Illustration of cityscape overlaid with photos of buildings damaged 
by terrorist attacks.

Risk Management Series

Risk Assessment
A How-To Guide to Mitigate
Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings
Providing Protection to People and Buildings



Title Page

Risk Management Series

Risk Assessment
A How-To Guide to Mitigate
Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings
Providing Protection to People and Buildings

Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this 
publication do not necessarily reflect the views of FEMA. Additionally, neither 
FEMA or any of its employees makes any warrantee, expressed or implied, or 
assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or 
usefulness of any information, product, or process included in this publication. 
Users of information from this publication assume all liability arising from 
such use.



Forward and Acknowledgments

BACKGROUND
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) developed this Risk Assessment, A 
How-To Guide to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings, to 
provide a clear, flexible, and comprehensive methodology to prepare a risk 
assessment. The intended audience includes the building sciences community of 
architects and engineers working for private institutions, building 
owners/operators/managers, and State and local government officials working in 
the building sciences community.
 

OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE
The objective of this How-To Guide is to outline methods for identifying the 
critical assets and functions within buildings, determining the threats to those 
assets, and assessing the vulnerabilities associated with those threats. Based 
on those considerations, the methods presented in this How-To Guide provide a 
means to assess the risk to the assets and to make risk-based decisions on how 
to mitigate those risks. The scope of the methods includes reducing physical 
damage to structural and non-structural components of buildings and related 
infrastructure, and reducing resultant casualties during conventional bomb 
attacks, as well as chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) agents. This 
document is written as a How-To Guide. It presents five steps and multiple tasks 
within each step that will lead you through a process for conducting a risk 
assessment and selecting mitigation options. It discusses what information is 
required to conduct a risk assessment, how and where to obtain it, and how to 
use it to calculate a risk score against each selected threat. 

This is one of a series of publications that address security issues in high-
population, private sector buildings. This document is a companion to the 
Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings (FEMA 
426) and the Building Design for Homeland Security Training Course (FEMA E155). 
This document also leverages information contained within the Primer for Design 
of Commercial Buildings to Mitigate Terrorist Attacks (FEMA 427). 

The primary use of this risk assessment methodology is for buildings, although 
it could be adapted for other types of critical infrastructure.
The foundation of the risk assessment methodology presented in this document is 
based on the approach that was developed for the Department of Veterans Affairs 
(VA) through the National Institute for Building Sciences (NIBS). Over 150 
buildings have been successfully assessed using this technique. The risk 
assessment methodology presented in this publication has been refined by FEMA 
for this audience. 

The purpose of this How-To Guide is to provide a methodology for risk assessment 
to the building sciences community working for private institutions. It is up to 
the decision-makers to decide which types of threats they wish to protect 
against and which mitigation options are feasible and cost-effective. 

This How-To Guide views as critical that a team created to assess a particular 
building will be composed of professionals capable of evaluating different parts 
of the building. They should be senior individuals who have a breadth and depth 
of experience in the areas of civil, electrical, and mechanical engineering; 
architecture; site planning and security engineering; and how security and 
antiterrorism considerations affect site and building design. 

The information contained in this document is:
--not mandatory
--not applicable to all buildings
--not applicable when it interferes with other hazards such as fire


ORGANIZATION AND CONTENT
In order to create a safe environment, many factors must be considered. Figure 1 
depicts the risk assessment process presented in this document to help identify 
the best and most cost-effective terrorism mitigation measures for a buildings 
own unique security needs. The first step is to conduct a threat assessment 
wherein the threat or hazard is identified, defined, and quantified (Step 1). 
For terrorism, the threat is the aggressors (people or groups) that are known to 
exist and that have the capability and a history of using hostile actions, or 
that have expressed intentions for using hostile actions against potential 
targets as well as on whom there is current credible information on targeting 
activity (surveillance of potential targets) or indications of preparation for 
terrorist acts. The capabilities and histories of the aggressors include the 
tactics they have used to achieve their ends. The next step of the assessment 
process is to identify the value of a buildings assets that need to be 
protected (Step 2). 

Figure 1: Risk assessment process model. Graphic showing a flow chart.
Step 1: Threat identification and rating
Step 2: Asset Value Assessment
--perform a Cost Analysis by analyzing how mitigation options affect asset 
criticality and ultimately risk
Step 3: Vulnerability Assessment 
--perform a Benefit Analysis to analyze how mitigation options change 
vulnerability and ultimately risk
Step 4: Risk Assessment
Step 5: Consider Mitigation Options
(final step): Risk Management Decision

After conducting a asset value assessment, the next step is to conduct a 
vulnerability assessment (Step 3). A vulnerability assessment evaluates the 
potential vulnerability of the critical assets against a broad range of 
identified threats/hazards. In and of itself, the vulnerability assessment 
provides a basis for determining mitigation measures for protection of the 
critical assets. The vulnerability assessment is the bridge in the methodology 
between threat/hazard, asset value, and the resultant level of risk.

The next step of the process is the risk assessment (Step 4). The risk 
assessment analyzes the threat, asset value, and vulnerability to ascertain the 
level of risk for each critical asset against each applicable threat. Inherent 
in this is the likelihood or probability of the threat occurring and the 
consequences of the occurrence. Thus, a very high likelihood of occurrence with 
very small consequences may require simple low cost mitigation measures, but a 
very low likelihood of occurrence with very grave consequences may require more 
costly and complex mitigation measures. The risk assessment should provide a 
relative risk profile. High-risk combinations of assets against associated 
threats, with the identified vulnerability, allow prioritization of resources to 
implement mitigation measures.

The final step (Step 5) is to consider mitigation options that are directly 
associated with, and responsive to, the major risks identified during Step 4. 
From Step 5, decisions can be made as to where to minimize the risks and how to 
accomplish that over time. This is commonly referred to as Risk Management. 

A number of worksheets are utilized in this How-To Guide. They can be used to 
apply key concepts described in this document and are presented at the end of 
each Step. 

A core element of this How-To Guide is the Building Vulnerability Assessment 
Checklist included in Appendix A. The Checklist can be used to collect and 
report information related to the building infrastructure. It compiles many best 
practices based on technologies and scientific research to consider during the 
design of a new building or renovation of an existing building. It allows a 
consistent security evaluation of designs at various levels. 

A Risk Assessment Database accompanies this publication in the form of computer 
software. The purpose of this database is for a user to collect and organize 
risk scoring, building vulnerability data, and mitigation measures for multiple 
buildings. More information can be found throughout this publication and in 
Appendix B. 

The Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist and the Risk Assessment Database 
were developed for the Department of Veterans Affairs with assistance from the 
National Institute for Building Sciences.


ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Principal Authors:
Milagros Nanita Kennett, FEMA, Project Officer, Risk Management Series 
Publications    
Eric Letvin, URS, Project Manager
Michael Chipley, PBSJ
Terrance Ryan, UTD, Inc. 

Contributors: 
Lloyd Siegel, Department of Veterans Affairs
Marcelle Habibion, Department of Veterans Affairs
Kurt Knight, Department of Veterans Affairs
Eve Hinman, Hinman Consulting Engineering
Sarah Steerman, UTD, Inc.
Deb Daly, Greenhorne & OMara, Inc.
Julie Liptak, Greenhorne & OMara, Inc.
Wanda Rizer, Consultant

Project Advisory Panel:
Elizabeth Miller, National Capital Planning Commission
Doug Hall, Smithsonian Institution
Wade Belcher, General Service Administration
Michael Gressel, CDC/NIOSH
Kenneth Mead, CDC/NIOSH
Robert Chapman, NIST
Lawrence Skelly, Department of Homeland Security
Curt Betts, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
Earle Kennett, National Institute for Building Sciences
Frederick Krimgold, Virginia Tech
David Hattis, Building Technology, Inc.
Ettore Contestabile, Canadian Explosives Research Laboratory

This How-To Guide was prepared under contract to FEMA. It will be revised 
periodically, and comments and feedback to improve future editions are welcome. 
Please send comments and feedback by e-mail to riskmanagementseriespubs@dhs.gov.



Table of Contents

Foreword and Acknowledgments	i

Step 1:	Threat Identification and Rating	1-1
Task 1.1	Identifying the Threats	1-1
Task 1.2	Collecting Information	1-16
Task 1.3	Determining the Design Basis Threat	1-18
Task 1.4	Determining the Threat Rating	1-24

Step 2:	Asset Value Assessment	2-1
Task 2.1	Identifying the Layers of Defense	2-2
Task 2.2	Identifying the Critical Assets	2-6
Task 2.3	Identifying the Building Core Functions and                         
Infrastructure	 2-17
Task 2.4	Determining the Asset Value Rating	2-23

Step 3:   	Vulnerability Assessment	3-1
Task 3.1	Organizing Resources to Prepare the Assessment	3-2
Task 3.2	Evaluating the Site and Building		3-6
Task 3.3	Preparing a Vulnerability Portfolio	3-11
Task 3.4	Determining the Vulnerability Rating	3-14 

Step 4:	Risk Assessment	4-1
Task 4.1	Preparing the Risk Assessment Matrices	4-2
Task 4.2	Determining the Risk Ratings	4-7
Task 4.3	Prioritizing Observations in the Building Vulnerability Assessment 
Checklist 	4-10

Step 5:	Consider Mitigation Options	5-1
Task 5.1	Identifying Preliminary Mitigation Options	5-2
Task 5.2	Reviewing Mitigation Options	5-6
Task 5.3	Estimating Cost	5-9
Task 5.4	Mitigation, Cost, and the Layers of Defense	5-13

Appendix A	Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist

Appendix B1	Risk Management Database:  Assessor's User Guide

Appendix B2	Risk Management Database:  Database Administrator's User Guide

Appendix B3	Risk Management Database: Manager's User Guide

Appendix C	Acronyms and Abbreviations


Figures

Foreword and Acknowledgments
Figure 1  Risk assessment process model	iii

Chapter 1
Figure 1-1  Steps and tasks	1-1
Figure 1-2  Total international attacks by region, 1998-2003	1-3
Figure 1-3  Explosive environments - blast range to effect	1-4
Figure 1-4  Incident overpressure as a function of stand-off               
distance	1-6
Figure 1-5  Total facilities affected by international terrorism and weapons of 
choice, 1998-2003	1-16

Chapter 2
Figure 2-1  Steps and tasks	2-1
Figure 2-2  Layers of defense	2-3
Figure 2-3  Layers of defense in urban setting	2-5
Figure 2-4  Layers of defense when a particular building is considered a 
critical asset	2-5
Figure 2-5  Potential blast effects  200-lb car bomb	2-7
Figure 2-6  Potential blast effects  11,000-lb truck bomb	2-7
Figure 2-7  Using HAZUS-MH to identify the criticality of assets	2-8

Chapter 3
Figure 3-1  Steps and tasks	3-1
Figure 3-2  Common system vulnerabilities	3-15

Chapter 4
Figure 4-1  Steps and tasks	4-1

Chapter 5
Figure 5-1  Steps and tasks	5-1
Figure 5-2  Cost considerations	5-10
Figure 5-3  Mitigation options for the second layer of defense	5-14
Figure 5-4  Mitigation options for the third layer of defense	5-15


Tables

Chapter 1
Table 1-1  Explosive Evacuation Distance	1-5
Table 1-2  Critical Biological Agent Categories	1-11
Table 1-3  Event Profiles	1-13
Table 1-4  Criteria to Select Primary Threats	1-21
Table 1-5  Nominal Example to Select Primary Threats for a Specific Urban Multi-
story Building	1-22
Table 1-6  Threat Rating	1-25
Table 1-7A  Nominal Example of Threat Rating for an Urban Multi-story Building 
(Building Function)	1-26
Table 1-7B  Nominal Example of Threat Rating for an Urban Multi-story Building 
(Building Infrastructure)	1-26

Chapter 2
Table 2-1  Correlation of the Layers of Defense Against Threats	2-12
Table 2-2  Building Core Functions	2-18
Table 2-3  Building Core Infrastructure	2-20
Table 2-4  Levels of Protection and Recommended Security Measures	2-21
Table 2-5  Asset Value Scale	2-23
Table 2-6A  Nominal Example of Asset Value Rating for an Urban Multi-story 
Building (Building Function)	 2-24
Table 2-6B  Nominal Example of Asset Value Rating for an Urban Multi-story 
Building (Building Infrastructure)	2-24

Chapter 3
Table 3-1  Screening Phase	3-4
Table 3-2  Full On-site Evaluation	3-5
Table 3-3  Detailed Evaluation	3-5
Table 3-4  Vulnerability Rating	3-16
Table 3-5A  Nominal Example of Vulnerability Rating for a Specific Multi-story 
Building (Building Function)	3-17
Table 3-5B  Nominal Example of Vulnerability Rating for a Specific Multi-story 
Building (Building Infrastructure)	3-17

Chapter 4
Table 4-1  Critical Functions Asset Value 	4-4
Table 4-2  Critical Infrastructure Asset Value	4-4
Table 4-3  Critical Functions Threat Rating	4-5
Table 4-4  Critical Infrastructure Threat Rating	4-5
Table 4-5  Critical Functions Vulnerability Rating	4-6
Table 4-6  Critical Infrastructure Vulnerability Rating	4-7
Table 4-7  Total Risk Scale Color Code	4-8
Table 4-8  Site Functional Pre-Assessment Screening Matrix 	4-8
Table 4-9  Site Infrastructure Pre-Assessment Screening Matrix	4-9
Table 4-10  Nominal Example of Observations in the Building Vulnerability 
Assessment Checklist	4-10



Step 1: Threat Identification and Rating

Overview
The first step in the assessment process is to help you to identify threats that 
are a priority concern in your area and that may pose a risk to your assets (see 
Figure 1-1). The threat identification and rating process involves the following 
tasks: 
--Identifying the threats 
--Collecting information 
--Determining the design basis threat
--Determining the threat rating


Figure 1-1: Flowchart: Steps and tasks
Step 1: Threat Identification and Rating
Tasks:
1.1	Identifying the threats 
1.2	Collecting information
1.3 	Determining the design basis threat
1.4	Determining the threat rating
Step 2: Asset Value Assessment
Step 3: Vulnerability Assessment
Step 4: Risk Assessment
Step 5: Consider Mitigation Options

Identifying the Threats (Task 1.1)
For this document, threat is defined as any indication, circumstance, or event 
with the potential to cause loss of, or damage to an asset. Within the military 
services, the intelligence community, and law enforcement, the term threat is 
typically used to describe the design criteria for terrorism or manmade 
disasters. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and other civil 
agencies use the term hazard in several different contexts. Natural hazard 
typically refers to a natural event such as a flood, wind, or seismic disaster. 
Human-caused (or manmade) hazards are technological hazards and terrorism 
and are distinct from natural hazards primarily in that they originate from 
human activity. Technological hazards (i.e., a HazMat leak from a railcar) are 
generally assumed to be accidental and that their consequences are unintended. 
(Note that protection against technological hazards can also serve for the 
protection against terrorist attacks.) Terrorism is considered an unlawful act 
of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a 
government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of 
political or social objectives.

In this guide, only manmade terrorist threats will be used in the critical 
functions and infrastructure matrices. The importance of technological hazards 
is that they can become a threat if they are targets of malicious attacks. 

Identifying the threats can be a difficult task. Because manmade hazards are 
different from other hazards such as earthquakes, floods, and hurricanes, they 
are difficult to predict. Many years of historical and quantitative data, and 
probabilities associated with the cycle, duration, and magnitude of natural 
hazards exist. The fact that data for manmade hazards are scarce and that the 
magnitude and recurrence of terrorist attacks are almost unpredictable makes the 
determination of a particular threat for any particular site or building 
difficult and largely subjective. 

With any terrorist threats, it is important to understand who the people are 
with the intent to cause harm. The aggressors seek publicity for their cause, 
monetary gain (in some instances), or political gain through their actions. 
These actions include injuring or killing people; destroying or damaging 
facilities, property, equipment, or resources; or stealing equipment, material, 
or information. In some cases, the threat may originate from more than one 
group, with differing methods and motives.

Aggressor tactics run the gamut: moving vehicle bombs; stationary vehicle bombs; 
bombs delivered by persons (suicide bombers); exterior attacks (thrown objects 
like rocks, Molotov cocktails, hand grenades, or hand-placed bombs); attack 
weapons (rocket propelled grenades, light antitank weapons, etc.); ballistic 
attacks (small arms handled by one individual); covert entries (gaining entry by 
false credentials or circumventing security with or without weapons); mail bombs 
(delivered to individuals); supply bombs (larger bombs processed through 
shipping departments); airborne contamination (chemical, biological, or 
radiological [CBR] agents used to contaminate the air supply of a building); and 
waterborne contamination (CBR agents injected into the water supply). 

Domestic terrorism refers to activities that involve acts dangerous to human 
life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any 
state; appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; to 
influence the policy of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or 
kidnapping; and occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the 
United States.
 
International terrorism involves violent acts or acts dangerous to human life 
that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or any state, or 
that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the 
United States or any state. These acts appear to be intended to intimidate or 
coerce a civilian population; influence the policy of a government by 
intimidation or coercion; affect the conduct of a government by mass 
destruction, assassination or kidnapping; and occur primarily outside the 
territorial jurisdiction of the United States or transcend national boundaries 
in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear 
intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators 
operate or seek asylum. Totals for international terrorism in 1998-2003 are 
shown by regions in Figure 1-2.

Figure 1-2: Graph: Total international attacks by region, 1998 to 2003. Bar graph 
showing the number of attacks over the years for five categories: Africa, Asia, Eurasia, Latin America, Middle East, North America, and Western Europe. The greatest number of attacks is in the Latin America category.


Explosive Blast Weapons
Two parameters are used to define the explosive blast design threat: the weapon 
size, measured in equivalent pounds of trinitrotoluene (TNT), and the stand-off. 
The stand-off is the distance measured from the center of gravity of the charge 
to the component of interest.

Figures 1-3, 1-4, and Table 1-1 illustrate these principles. Figure 1-3 shows an 
example of a blast range-to-effect chart that indicates the distance or stand-
off to which a given size bomb will produce a given effect. Table 1-1 is a quick 
reference chart that provides recommended evacuation distances for a given 
explosive weight. Figure 1-4 provides a quick method for predicting the expected 
overpressure (expressed in pounds per square inch or psi) on a building for a 
specific explosive weight and stand-off distance. For additional information on 
overpressure and blast effects, see FEMA 426 and 427.

Figure 1-3: Graph: Explosive environments - blast range to effect. Key concerns are 
glass shards and structural collapse. Graph shows the increase in Minimum 
Stand-off (in feet) versus the Weapon Yield (in pounds of TNT), for a 
bomb in a piece of luggage, an automobile, a van, and a truck. 

Table 1-1: Explosive Evacuation Distance

Threat Description: Pipe Bomb
Explosive Mass (TNT Equivalent) (Based on the maximum amount of material that 
could reasonably fit into a container or vehicle. Variations are possible.): 5 
lbs, 2.3 kg	
Building Evacuation Distance (governed by the ability of an unreinforced 
building to withstand severe damage or collapse): 70 ft, 21 m	
Outdoor Evacuation Distance (Governed by the greater of fragment throw distance 
or glass breakage/falling glass hazard distance. These distances can be reduced 
for personnel wearing ballistic protection. Note that the pipe bomb, suicide 
belt/vest, and briefcase/suitcase bomb are assumed to have a fragmentation 
characteristic that requires greater stand-off distances than an equal amount of 
explosives in a vehicle.): 850 ft, 259 m

Threat Description: Suicide Belt
Explosive Mass: 10 lbs, 4.5 kg	
Building Evacuation Distance: 90 ft, 27 m	
Outdoor Evacuation Distance: 1,080 ft, 330 m

Threat Description: Suicide Vest
Explosive Mass: 20 lbs ,9 kg	
Building Evacuation Distance: 110 ft, 34 m	
Outdoor Evacuation Distance: 1,360 ft, 415 m

Threat Description: Briefcase/Suitcase Bomb
Explosive Mass: 50 lbs, 23 kg	
Building Evacuation Distance: 150 ft, 46 m	
Outdoor Evacuation Distance: 1,850 ft, 564 m

Threat Description: Compact Sedan
Explosive Mass: 500 lbs, 227 kg	
Building Evacuation Distance: 320 ft, 98 m
Outdoor Evacuation Distance: 1,500 ft, 457 m

Threat Description: Sedan
Explosive Mass: 1,000 lbs, 454 kg
Building Evacuation Distance: 400 ft, 122 m
Outdoor Evacuation Distance: 1,750 ft, 534 m

Threat Description: Passenger/Cargo Van
Explosive Mass: 4,000 lbs, 1,814 kg
Building Evacuation Distance: 640 ft, 195 m
Outdoor Evacuation Distance: 2,750 ft, 838 m

Threat Description: Small Moving Van/Delivery Truck
Explosive Mass: 10,000 lbs, 4,536 kg
Building Evacuation Distance: 860 ft, 263 m
Outdoor Evacuation Distance: 3,750 ft, 1,143 m

Threat Description: Moving Van/Water Truck
Explosive Mass: 30,000 lbs, 13,608 kg
Building Evacuation Distance: 1,240 ft, 375 m
Outdoor Evacuation Distance: 6,500 ft, 1,982 m

Threat Description: Semitrailer
Explosive Mass: 60,000 lbs, 27,216 kg
Building Evacuation Distance: 1,570 ft, 475 m
Outdoor Evacuation Distance: 7,000 ft, 2,134 m

Figure 1-4: Graph: Incident overpressure as a function of stand-off distance.
Graph shows the increase in Stand-Off Distance (in feet) versus Net Explosive 
Weight (in pounds of TNT), for a bomb in an automobile, a van 
and a truck.

To put the weapon size into perspective, it should be noted that thousands of 
deliberate explosions occur every year within the United States, but the vast 
majority of them have weapon yields of less than 5 pounds. The number of large-
scale vehicle weapon attacks that have used hundreds of pounds of TNT during the 
past 20 years is, by comparison, very small. In general, the largest credible 
explosive size is a function of the security measures in place. Each line of 
security may be thought of as a sieve, reducing the size of the weapon that may 
gain access. Therefore, the largest weapons are considered in totally unsecured 
public spaces (e.g., in a vehicle on the nearest public street), and the 
smallest weapons are considered in the most secured areas of the building (e.g., 
in a briefcase smuggled past the screening station). It should also be noted 
that the likely target is often not the building under consideration by the risk 
assessment, but a high-risk building that is nearby. Historically, more building 
damage has been due to collateral effects than direct attack. Based upon access 
to the agent, the degree of difficulty, and past experience, it can be stated 
that the chance of a large-scale explosive attack occurring is extremely low and 
that a smaller explosive attack is far more likely. 

From the standpoint of structural design, the vehicle bomb is the most important 
consideration and has been a favorite tactic of terrorists. Ingredients for 
homemade bombs are easily obtained on the open market, as are the techniques for 
making bombs.

Vehicle bombs are able to deliver a sufficiently large quantity of explosives to 
cause potentially devastating structural damage. Security design intended to 
limit or mitigate damage from a vehicle bomb assumes that the bomb is detonated 
at a so-called critical location. The critical location is a function of the 
site, the building layout, the security measures in place, and the position of 
the weapon. For a vehicle bomb, the critical location is taken to be at the 
closest point that a vehicle can approach, assuming that all security measures 
are in place. This may be a parking area directly beneath the occupied building, 
the loading dock, the curb directly outside the facility, or at a vehicle-access 
control gate where inspection takes place, depending on the level of protection 
incorporated into the design. 

Another explosive attack threat is the small bomb that is hand delivered. Small 
weapons can cause large damage when they are brought into vulnerable and 
unsecured areas of the building. Greater damage may be caused when the weapon is 
brought into the interior, such as the building lobby, mail room, and retail 
spaces. Recent events around the world make it clear that there is an increased 
likelihood that bombs will be delivered by persons (suicide bombers or hand 
carried bombs) who are willing to sacrifice their own lives. Hand-carried 
explosives are typically on the order of 5 to 10 pounds of TNT equivalent. 
However, larger charge weights, in the 50- to 100-pound TNT equivalent range, 
can be readily carried in rolling cases. Mail bombs are typically less than 10 
pounds of TNT equivalent. 

Sidebar: For design purposes, large-scale truck bombs typically contain 10,000 
pounds or more of TNT equivalent, depending on the size and capacity of the 
vehicle used to deliver the weapon. Vehicle bombs that utilize vans down to 
small sedans typically contain 5,000 to 100 pounds of TNT equivalent, 
respectively. A briefcase bomb is approximately 50 pounds, and a pipe bomb is 
generally in the range of 5 pounds of TNT equivalent. Suicide bombers can 
deliver belts ranging from 10 pounds (teenagers), 15 to 20 pounds (women), and 
30 to 40 pounds (men).


Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Weapons
Three parameters are used to define the CBR design basis threat: the exposure, 
the duration, and the concentration. Each of the CBR agents has different human 
effects and methods of attack.

Chemical, biological, and radiological attacks are an emerging threat and of 
great concern because of the large geographic area contaminated, numbers of 
people affected, and the high economic cost of response and recovery. The use of 
CBR weapons and the stated intent of terrorist groups to acquire and use the 
weapons increases the target set, and the weapons can affect a single building, 
an entire city, multiple counties, or even states. 

Like explosive threats, CBR threats may be delivered externally or internally to 
the building. External ground-based threats may be released at a stand-off 
distance from the building or may be delivered directly through an air intake or 
other opening. Interior threats may be delivered to accessible areas such as the 
lobby, mailroom, loading dock, or egress route. Because there may not be an 
official or obvious warning prior to a CBR event, the best defense is to be 
alert to signs of a release occurring.

Chemical. 
Chemical agents are compounds with unique chemical properties that can produce 
lethal or damaging effects in humans, animals, and plants. Chemical agents can 
exist as solids, liquids, or gases, depending on temperature and pressure. Most 
chemical agents are liquid and can be introduced into an unprotected population 
relatively easily using aerosol generators, explosive devices, breaking 
containers, or other forms of covert dissemination. Dispersed as an aerosol or 
vapor, chemical agents have their greatest potential for inflicting mass 
casualties. There are two categories of chemicals: lethal and incapacitating. 
The lethal chemicals are subdivided into industrial and warfare.

Industrial chemicals are used extensively throughout the nation on a daily 
basis. Lethal industrial chemicals are listed as Toxic Industrial Compounds 
(TICs). Of concern is the use of TICs as a weapon (e.g., derailment of a 
chlorine tanker car), especially in the urban environment.

Chemical agents can have an immediate effect (a few seconds to a few minutes) or 
a delayed effect (several hours to  several days). Although potentially lethal, 
chemical agents are difficult to deliver in lethal concentrations. Outdoors, the 
agents often dissipate rapidly. Chemical agents are also difficult to produce. 
There are six types of agents:
--Choking/lung-damaging (pulmonary) agents such as chlorine and phosgene
--Blood agents such as cyanide
--Vesicants or blister agents such as mustard
--Nerve agents such as GA (tabun), GB (sarin), GD (soman), GF (cyclohexyl 
sarin), and VX (phosphonothioic acid)
--Incapacipating agents such as BZ (3-quinulidinyle benzilate)
--Riot-control agents similar to Mace

Biological. 
Biological agents pose a serious threat because of their accessible nature and 
the rapid manner in which they spread. These agents are disseminated by the use 
of aerosols, contaminated food or water supplies, direct skin contact, or 
injection. Several biological agents can be adapted for use as weapons by 
terrorists. These agents include anthrax (sometimes found in sheep and cattle), 
tularemia (rabbit fever), cholera, the plague (sometimes found in prairie dog 
colonies), and botulism (found in improperly canned food). A biological incident 
will most likely be first recognized in the hospital emergency room, medical 
examiners office, or within the public health community long after the 
terrorist attack. The consequences of such an attack may present communities 
with an unprecedented requirement to provide mass protective treatment to 
exposed populations, mass patient care, mass fatality management, and 
environmental health cleanup procedures and plans.

Biological agents are organisms or toxins that can kill or incapacitate people, 
livestock, and crops. The three basic groups of biological agents that would 
likely be used as weapons are bacteria, viruses, and toxins. 

1. Bacteria are small free-living organisms that reproduce by simple division 
and are easy to grow. The diseases they produce often respond to treatment with 
antibiotics.

2. Viruses are organisms that require living cells in which to reproduce and are 
intimately dependent upon the body they infect. Viruses produce diseases that 
generally do not respond to antibiotics; however, antiviral drugs are sometimes 
effective. 

3. Toxins are poisonous substances found in, and extracted from, living plants, 
animals, or microorganisms; some toxins can be produced or altered by chemical 
means. Some toxins can be treated with specific antitoxins and selected drugs.

Most biological agents are difficult to grow and maintain. Many break down 
quickly when exposed to sunlight and other environmental factors, while others 
such as anthrax spores are very long lived. They can be dispersed by spraying 
them in the air, or by infecting animals or humans, as well through food and 
water contamination.

--Aerosols  
Biological agents are dispersed into the air as an aerosol that may drift for 
miles. Inhaling the agent may cause disease in people or animals. 

--Animals  
Some diseases are spread by insects and animals, such as fleas, mice, flies, and 
mosquitoes. Deliberately spreading diseases through livestock is also referred 
to as agro-terrorism.

--Food and water contamination  
Some pathogenic organisms and toxins may persist in food and water supplies. 
Most microbes can be killed, and toxins deactivated, by cooking food and boiling 
water.

Person-to-person spread of a few infectious agents is also possible. Humans have 
been the source of infection for smallpox, plague, and the Lassa viruses. In a 
2002 report, Public Health Assessment of Biological Terrorism Agents, the 
Centers for Disease Control (CDC) has classified biological agents as one of 
three priority categories for initial public health preparedness efforts: A, B, 
or C (see Table 1-2). The CDC maintains a comprehensive list of agents, 
diseases, and other threats at www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/index.asp.

Table 1-2: Critical Biological Agent Categories  Source: Public Health Assessment 
of Potential Biological Terrorism Agents (CDC, 2002)

Category A
Biological Agent: Variola major
Disease: Smallpox

Biological Agent: Bacillus anthracis
Disease: Anthrax

Biological Agent: Yersinia pestis
Disease: Plague

Biological Agent:  Clostridium botulinum (botulinum toxins)
Disease: Botulism

Biological Agent: Francisella tulaensis	
Disease: Tularemia

Biological Agent: Filoviruses and Arenaviruses (e.g., Ebola virus, Lassa virus)
	
Disease: Viral hemorrhagic fevers

Category B
Biological Agent: Coxiella burnetii
Disease: Q fever

Biological Agent: Brucella spp.	
Disease: Brucellosis

Biological Agent: Burkholderia mallei
Disease: Glanders

Biological Agent: Burkholderia pseudomallei
Disease: Meliodosis

Biological Agent: Alphaviruses
Disease: Encephalitis

Biological Agent: Rickettsia prowazekii
Disease: Typhus fever

Biological Agent: Toxins (e.g., Ricin)
Disease: Toxic syndromes

Biological Agent: Chlamydia psittaci
Disease: Psittacosis

Biological Agent: Food safety threats (e.g., Salmonella spp.)	
Disease: (no answer)

Biological Agent: Water safety threats (e.g., Vibrio cholerae)	
Disease: (no answer)

Category C
Biological Agent: Emerging threat agents (e.g., Nipah virus, hantavirus)	
Disease: (no answer)

Agents in Category A have the greatest potential for adverse public health 
impact with mass casualties, and most require broad-based public health 
preparedness efforts (e.g., improved surveillance and laboratory diagnosis and 
stockpiling of specific medications). Category A agents also have a moderate to 
high potential for large-scale dissemination or a heightened general public 
awareness that could cause mass public fear and civil disruption.

Most Category B agents also have some potential for large-scale dissemination 
with resultant illness, but generally cause less illness and death, and, 
therefore, would be expected to have lower medical and public health impacts. 
These agents also have lower general public awareness than Category A agents and 
require fewer special public health preparedness efforts. Agents in this 
category require some improvement in public health and medical awareness, 
surveillance, or laboratory diagnostic capabilities, but present limited 
additional requirements for stockpiled therapeutics beyond those identified for 
Category A agents. Biological agents that have undergone some development for 
widespread dissemination but do not otherwise meet the criteria for Category A, 
as well as several biological agents of concern for food and water safety, are 
included in this category.

Biological agents that are currently not believed to present a high bioterrorism 
risk to public health, but that could emerge as future threats (as scientific 
understanding of these agents improves) were placed in Category C. 

Nuclear and Radiological. 
Nuclear threat is the use, threatened use, or threatened detonation of a nuclear 
bomb or device. At present, there is no known instance in which any non-
governmental entity has been able to obtain or produce a nuclear weapon. The 
most likely scenario is the detonation of a large conventional explosive that 
incorporates nuclear material or detonation of an explosive proximate to nuclear 
materials in use, storage, or transit. Of concern is the increasing frequency of 
shipments of radiological materials throughout the world.

Nuclear explosions can cause deadly effects: blinding light, intense heat 
(thermal radiation), initial nuclear radiation, blast, fires started by the heat 
pulse, and secondary fires caused by the destruction. They also produce 
radioactive particles called fallout that can be carried by wind for hundreds of 
miles.

Terrorist use of a radiological dispersion device (RDD)  often called dirty 
nuke or dirty bomb  is considered far more likely than the use of a nuclear 
device. These radiological weapons are a combination of conventional explosives 
and radioactive material designed to scatter dangerous and sub-lethal amounts of 
radioactive material over a general area. Such radiological weapons appeal to 
terrorists because they require very little technical knowledge to build and 
deploy compared to that of a nuclear device. Also, these radioactive materials, 
used widely in medicine, agriculture, industry, and research, are much more 
readily available and easy to obtain compared to weapons grade uranium or 
plutonium.

Terrorist use of a nuclear device would probably be limited to a single smaller 
suitcase weapon. The strength of such a  nuclear weapon would be in the range 
of the bombs used during World War II. The nature of the effects would be the 
same as a weapon delivered by an inter-continental missile, but the area and 
severity of the effects would be significantly more limited.

There is no way of knowing how much warning time there would be before an attack 
by a terrorist using a nuclear or radiological weapon. A surprise attack remains 
a possibility. The danger of a massive strategic nuclear attack on the United 
States involving many weapons receded with the end of the Cold War; however, 
some terrorists have been supported by nations that have nuclear weapons 
programs.

Other Threats. 
Other threats discussed in this manual include armed attacks, cyber attacks, 
high-altitude electromagnetic pulse, and high power microwave. These are 
discussed briefly in Table 1-3.

Table 1-3 provides selected threats that you may consider when preparing your 
risk assessment, some of which has not been discussed previously in this How-To 
Guide.

Table 1-3: Event Profiles 
Threat: Improvised Explosive Device (Bomb)
- Stationary Vehicle
- Moving Vehicle
- Mail
- Supply
- Thrown
- Placed
- Suicide Bomber

Application Mode: Detonation of explosive device on or near target; via person, 
vehicle, or projectile. 

Duration: Instantaneous; additional secondary devices may be used, lengthening 
the duration of the threat until the attack site is determined to be clear. 	

Extent of Effects; Static/Dynamic: Extent of damage is determined by type and 
quantity of explosive. Effects generally static other than cascading 
consequences, incremental structural failure, etc. 

Mitigating and Exacerbating Conditions: Blast energy at a given stand-off is 
inversely proportional to the cube of the distance from the device; thus, each 
additional increment of stand-off provides progressively more protection. 
Exacerbating conditions include ease of access to target; lack of 
barriers/shielding; poor construction; and ease of concealment of device.


Threat: Armed Attack
- Ballistics (small arms)
- Stand-off Weapons (rocket propelled grenades, mortars)

Application Mode: Tactical assault or sniper attacks from a remote location.

Duration: Generally minutes to days.	

Extent of Effects; Static/Dynamic: Varies, based upon the perpetrators intent 
and capabilities.


Mitigating and Exacerbating Conditions: Inadequate security can allow easy 
access to target, easy concealment of weapons, and undetected initiation of an 
attack.


Threat: Chemical Agent
- Blister
- Blood
- Choking/Lung/Pulmonary
- Incapacitating
- Nerve
- Riot Control/Tear Gas
- Vomiting	

Application Mode: Liquid/aerosol contaminants can be dispersed using sprayers or 
other aerosol generators; liquids vaporizing from puddles/containers; or 
munitions.


Duration: Chemical agents may pose viable threats for hours to weeks, depending 
on the agent and the conditions in which it exists. 

Extent of Effects; Static/Dynamic: Contamination can be carried out of the 
initial target area by persons, vehicles, water, and wind. Chemicals may be 
corrosive or otherwise damaging over time if not remediated.  

Mitigating and Exacerbating Conditions: Air temperature can affect evaporation 
of aerosols. Ground temperature affects evaporation in pools of liquids. 
Humidity can enlarge aerosol particles, reducing the inhalation hazard. 
Precipitation can dilute and disperse agents, but can spread contamination. Wind 
can disperse vapors, but also cause target area to be dynamic. The micro-
meteorological effects of buildings and terrain can alter travel and duration of 
agents. Shielding in the form of sheltering in place may protect people and 
property from harmful effects for a limited time.


Threat: Biological Agent
- Anthrax
- Botulism
- Brucellosis
- Plague
- Smallpox
- Tularemia
- Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers
- Toxins (Botulinum, Ricin, Staphylococ-cal Enterotoxin B, T-2 Mycotoxins)	
Application Mode: Liquid or solid contaminants can be dispersed using 
sprayers/aerosol generators or by point or line sources such as munitions, 
covert deposits, and moving sprayers. May be directed at food or water supplies.
	
Duration: Biological agents may pose viable threats for hours to years, 
depending on the agent and the conditions in which it exists.

Extent of Effects; Static/Dynamic: Depending on the agent used and the 
effectiveness with which it is deployed, contamination can be spread via wind 
and water. Infection can be spread via human or animal vectors. 	
Mitigating and Exacerbating Conditions: Altitude of release above ground can 
affect dispersion; sunlight is destructive to many bacteria and viruses; light 
to moderate winds will disperse agents, but higher winds can break up aerosol 
clouds; and the micro-meteorological effects of buildings and terrain can 
influence aerosolization and travel of agents. 

Threat: Radiological Agent
- Alpha
- Beta
- Gamma	

Application Mode: Radioactive contaminants can be dispersed using 
sprayers/aerosol generators, or by point or line sources such as munitions, 
covert deposits, and moving sprayers. 

Duration: Contaminants may remain hazardous for seconds to years, depending on 
material used. 

Extent of Effects; Static/Dynamic: Initial effects will be localized to site of 
attack; depending on meteorological conditions, subsequent behavior of 
radioactive contaminants may be dynamic. 

Mitigating and Exacerbating Conditions: Duration of exposure, distance from 
source of radiation, and the amount of shielding between source and target 
determine exposure to radiation. 


Threat: Cyber Attacks

Application Mode: Electronic attack using one computer system against another.

Duration: Minutes to days.

Extent of Effects; Static/Dynamic: Generally no direct effects on built 
environment. 

Mitigating and Exacerbating Conditions: Inadequate security can facilitate 
access to critical computer systems, allowing them to be used to conduct 
attacks.

Threat: High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP)
	
Application Mode: An electromagnetic energy field produced in the atmosphere by 
the power and radiation of a nuclear explosion. It can overload computer 
circuitry with effects similar to, but causing damage much more swiftly than a 
lightning strike.

Duration: It can be induced hundreds to a few thousand kilometers from the 
detonation. 	

Extent of Effects; Static/Dynamic: Affects electronic systems. There is no 
effect on people. It diminishes with distance, and electronic equipment that is 
turned off is less likely to be damaged. 	

Mitigating and Exacerbating Conditions: To produce maximum effect, a nuclear 
device must explode very high in the atmosphere. Electronic equipment may be 
hardened by surrounding it with protective metallic shielding that routes 
damaging electromagnetic fields away from highly sensitive electrical 
components.


Threat: High Power Microwave (HPM) EMP

Application Mode: It is a non-nuclear radio frequency energy field. Radio 
frequency weapons can be hidden in an attach case, suitcase, van, or aircraft. 
Energy can be focused using an antenna, or emitter, to produce effects similar 
to HEMP, but only within a very limited range.	

Duration: An HPM weapon has a shorter possible range than HEMP, but it can 
induce currents large enough to melt circuitry, or it can cause equipment to 
fail minutes, days, or even weeks later. HPM weapons are smaller-scale, are 
delivered at a closer range to the intended target, and can sometimes be emitted 
for a longer duration.

Extent of Effects; Static/Dynamic: Vulnerable systems include electronic 
ignition systems, radars, communications, data processing, navigation, 
electronic triggers of explosive devices. HPM capabilities can cause a painful 
burning sensation or other injury to a person directly in the path of the 
focused power beam, or can be fatal if a person is too close to the microwave 
emitter.

Mitigating and Exacerbating Conditions: Very damaging to electronics within a 
small geographic area.  A shockwave could disrupt many computers within a 1-mile 
range. Radio frequency weapons have ranges from tens of meters to tens of 
kilometers. Unlike HEMP, however, HPM radiation is composed of shorter wave 
forms at higher-frequencies, which make it highly effective against electronic 
equipment and more difficult to harden against.

Note: Cyber attack focuses on denial of service, worms, and viruses designed to 
attack or destroy critical infrastructure related systems such as energy 
management, supervisory control and data acquisition systems, security, control 
valves, and voice over internet protocol telephones, which are critical systems 
that support multiple functions and are becoming increasingly connected to the 
internet.

It is important to indicate that commercial buildings have been the preferred 
target of recent terrorist attacks. Figure 1-5 illustrates such actions. Between 
1998 and 2003, 1,566 commercial facilities were struck by terrorists while only 
97 government, 170 diplomat facilities, and 41 military facilities were affected 
during the same period.

Figure 1-5: Graph: Total facilities affected by international terrorism and weapons of 
choice, 1998-2003  Source: Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003, US Department of 
State. Bar graph showing numbers of facilities affected by international 
terrorism in seven locations: Business, Diplomat, Government, Military, and Other. The graph shows that Business is the category most affected.


Collecting Information (Task 1.2)
When collecting information for your threat assessment, you may ask the 
following questions: What groups or organizations exist/are known? Do they have 
capability among themselves or is that capability readily obtainable locally? Do 
they have a history of terrorist acts and what are their tactics? What are the 
intentions of the aggressors against the government, commercial enterprises, 
industrial sectors, or individuals? Has it been determined that targeting 
(planning a tactic or seeking vulnerabilities) is actually occurring or being 
discussed?

For technological hazards, these same questions take a different perspective. 
Does anything that can be a hazard (or be attacked, causing collateral damage) 
exist within a given distance of the building in question? What is the 
capability of that incident to cause harm? Is there a history of this type of 
accident occurring? 

Many security and intelligence organizations are a good source of information 
and data for threat assessments. These organizations include the police 
department (whose jurisdiction includes the building or site), the local State 
police office, and the local office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI.) In many areas of the country, there are threat coordinating committees, 
including FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces, that facilitate the sharing of 
information. In addition, the CDC, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS), and the Homeland Security Offices (HSOs) at the State level are good 
sources of information. For technological hazards, it is important to gather 
information from the local fire department and hazardous materials (HazMat) 
unit, Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC), and State Emergency Response 
Commission (SERC). LEPC and SERC are local and State organizations established 
under a U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) program. They identify 
critical facilities in vulnerable zones and generate emergency management plans. 
Additionally, most fire departments understand which industries in the local 
area handle the most combustible materials and the HazMat unit understands who 
handles materials that could have a negative impact upon people and the 
environment. In many jurisdictions, the HazMat unit is part of the fire 
department.

Other good sources of information include the Department of Homeland Security 
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IA/IP) Directorate and, 
under the Director, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Terrorist Threat 
Integration Center (TTIC). The IA/IP Directorate and the TTIC  enhance 
intelligence fusion to bring together all terrorist information in one place, 
enabling Americas best intelligence analysts and investigators from multiple 
departments to work as a team to put together the pieces of the puzzle. 

Threat information is communicated through The Homeland Security Information 
Network. This communications system delivers real-time interactive connectivity 
among State and local partners and with the DHS Homeland Security Operations 
Center (HSOC) through the Joint Regional Information Exchange System (JRIES). 
Other DHS agencies participate through seats at the HSOC and their own 
operations centers, and the system will be further expanded within DHS 
operations. Each State and major urban areas Homeland Security Advisor and 
other points of contact will receive software licenses, technology, and training 
to participate in the information sharing and situational awareness that JRIES 
already brings to State and local homeland security personnel across the United 
States. Examples of other points of participation include State National Guard 
offices, Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs), and first responder and Public 
Safety departments.

The network significantly strengthens the flow of real-time threat information 
to State, local, and private sector partners at the Sensitive-but-Unclassified 
level (SBU), and provides a platform for communications through the classified 
SECRET level to State offices. The program is built upon the JRIES platform, a 
secure network and a suite of applications currently operating at the SBU level. 
Participants currently include approximately 100 organizations, including 
Federal agencies, States, municipalities, and other local government entities, 
with a significant law enforcement user base. All participating entities have a 
certified counterterrorism mission. Approximately 1,000 users currently have 
access to the system. 


Determining the Design Basis Threat (Task 1.3)
Stopping a terrorist or physical attack on a building is very difficult; any 
building or site can be breached or destroyed. Weapons, tools, and tactics can 
change faster than a building can be modified against a particular threat. 
However, the more secure the building or site and the better the building is 
designed to withstand an attack, the better the odds the building will not be 
attacked or, if attacked, it will suffer less damage. Terrorists generally 
select targets that have some value as a target, such as an iconic commercial 
property, symbolic government building, or structure likely to inflict 
significant emotional or economic damage such as a shopping mall or major 
seaport. 

The type and size of the weapons to be considered in the threat assessment are 
usually selected by the building stakeholders in collaboration with the 
Assessment Team (i.e., engineers who specialize in the design of structures to 
mitigate the effects of explosions - see Step 3 of this How-To Guide). The 
threat assessment and analysis for any building can range from a general threat 
scenario to a very detailed examination of specific groups, individuals, and 
tactics that the building may need to be designed to repel or defend against. 
For this How-To Guide, a simplified method has been selected to help the 
Assessment Team and building stakeholders to identify the primary threats to 
their buildings (see Selecting Primary Threats below and Table 1-4).

Table 1-4: Criteria to Select Primary Threats

Scenario: 9-10	
Access to Agent: Readily available
Knowledge/Expertise: Basic knowledge/open source
History of Threats Building Functions/Tenants): Local  
incident, occurred recently, caused great damage; building functions and  
tenants were primary targets
Asset Visibility/Symbolic: Existence widely known/iconic
Asset Accessibility: Open access, unrestricted parking
Site Population/Capacity: > 5,000
Collateral Damage/Distance to Building: Within 1,000-foot radius

Scenario: 6-8
Access to Agent: Easy to produce
Knowledge/Expertise: Bachelors degree or technical school/open scientific or 
technical literature
History of Threats Building Functions/Tenants): Regional/State incident, 
occurred a few years ago, caused substantial damage; building functions and 
tenants were one of the primary targets 
Asset Visibility/Symbolic: Existence locally known/landmark
Asset Accessibility: Open access, restricted parking
Site Population/Capacity: 1,001-5,000
Collateral Damage/Distance to Building: Within 1-mile radius

Scenario: 3-5
Access to Agent: Difficult to produce or acquire
Knowledge/Expertise: Advanced training/rare scientific or declassified 
literature  History of Threats Building Functions/Tenants):   National incident, 
occurred some time in the past, caused important damage; building functions and 
tenants were one of the primary targets 
Asset Visibility/Symbolic: Existence published/well-known
Asset Accessibility: Controlled access, protected entry
Site Population/Capacity: 251-1,000
Collateral Damage/Distance to Building: Within 2-mile radius

Scenario: 1-2
Access to Agent: Very difficult to produce or acquire
Knowledge/Expertise: Advanced degree or training/classified information
History of Threats Building Functions/Tenants): International incident, occurred 
many years ago, caused localized damage; building functions and tenants were not 
the  primary targets
Asset Visibility/Symbolic: Existence not well-known/no symbolic importance
Asset Accessibility: Remote location, secure perimeter, armed guards, tightly 
controlled access	
Site Population/Capacity: 1-250
Collateral Damage/Distance to Building: Within 10-mile radius


It is important to indicate that there are other sophisticated methods and 
criteria that can be used for more detailed threat analysis, including the TM5-
853 Army-Air Force Security Engineering Manual, the State of Florida HLS-CAM 
vulnerability and criticality matrix, the Department of Defense (DoD) CARVER 
process, and the FEMA 386-7 Site/Building Inherent Vulnerability Assessment 
Matrix. The determination of which method to be used should be left to the 
Assessment Team and building owners.

The methodology presented in this How-To Guide is based upon several 
methodologies, including some of the ones listed above. It provides a simple and 
straight forward approach to focus on the primary threats using selected 
criteria. These primary threats will help the Assessment Team and stakeholders 
complete the risk assessment and focus on proper mitigation measures. 


Selecting Primary Threats
Unlike natural disasters, terrorists continually evaluate, plan, and seek to 
exploit the weakest building protective design features. Therefore, it becomes 
impossible both from a technical and benefit/cost point to try to protect 
everything from every type of attack. The building stakeholders have to make a 
determination as to what the design basis threat is for their building and what 
level of protection they can afford. As the terrorist threat changes over time, 
the building stakeholders may wish to revisit this part of the risk assessment 
process.

To select your primary threats, the criteria described below have been provided. 
The selected criteria are part of Table 1-4, which is designed to help you to 
determine your potential threat. Scores from 1 to 10 (10 being the greater 
threat) are described.

--Access to Agent. 
The ease by which the source material can be acquired to carry out the attack. 
Consideration includes the local materials of HazMat inventory, farm and mining 
supplies, major chemical or manufacturing plants, university and commercial 
laboratories, and transportation centers.

--Knowledge/Expertise. 
The general level of skill and training that combines the ability to create the 
weapon (or arm an agent) and the technical knowledge of the systems to be 
attacked (heating, ventilation, and air conditioning [HVAC], nuclear, etc.). 
Knowledge and expertise can be gained by surveillance, open source research, 
specialized training, or years of practice in industry. 

--History of Threats (Building Functions/Tenants). 
What has the potential threat element done in the past, how many times, and was 
the threat local, regional, national, or international in nature? When was the 
most recent incident and where, and against what target? Are the building 
functions and tenants attractive targets for the terrorist?

--Asset Visibility/Symbolic. 
The economic, cultural, and symbolic importance of the building to society that 
may be exploited by the terrorist seeking monetary or political gain through 
their actions.

--Asset Accessibility. 
The ability of the terrorist to become well-positioned to carry out an attack at 
the critical location against the intended target. The critical location is a 
function of the site, the building layout, and the security measures in place. 

--Site Population/Capacity. 
The population demographics of the building and surrounding area.

--Collateral Damage/Distance to the Building. 
The potential of the threat to cause collateral damage or disruption to the 
building of interest. The building of interest is not considered the primary 
target.

Table 1-4 is used in conjunction with Table 1-3 to create a general Threat 
Scenario for the site or building. Table 1-5 illustrates the use of the threat 
scoring matrix for a typical multi-story commercial office building in an urban 
area with underground parking, internet enabled environmental energy management 
system, Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) telecommunications system, Internal 
Protocol/Transmission Control Protocol (IP/TCP) enabled security system using 
local area network (LAN) and wireless connectivity for closed-circuit 
televisions (CCTVs) and entry access control, and standard hard wire 
connectivity for the fire alarm system. Your potential threats will be selected 
from those reaching the highest scores.


Table 1-5: Nominal Example to Select Primary Threats for a Specific Urban Multi-
story Building

Table Description: Seven Scenario categories with varying numbers of 
subcategories. For each category and subcategory, the Criteria listed are ranked 
and totaled: 
--Access to Agent
--Knowledge/Expertise
--History of Threats (Building Functions/Tenants)
--Asset Visibility/Symbolic
--Asset Accessibility
--Site Population/Capacity
--Collateral Damage/Distance to Building
	
Note: the values for Asset Visibility/Symbolic, Asset Accessibility, and 
Site Population/Capacity are constants because a single building is being 
analyzed. 

The seven scenario categories and subcategories: 

1. Improvised Explosive Device (Bomb):
1-lb. Mail Bomb; 5-lb. Pipe Bomb; 50-lb. Satchel Bomb/Suicide Bomber; 500-lb. 
Car Bomb; 5,000-lb. Truck Bomb; 20,000-lb. Truck Bomb; and Natural Gas.
	
2. Bomb/Aircraft/Ship:
Small Aircraft; Medium Aircraft; Large Aircraft; and Ship.

3.Chemical Agent:
Choking (Chlorine, Phosgene); Blood (Hydrogen Cyanide); Blister
(Lewisite); and Nerve (Sarin).

4. Biological Agent:
Bacteria (Anthrax, Plague, Tularemia); Viruses (Hemorrehagic Fevers, Smallpox);
Toxins (Botulinum, Ricin)

5. Radiological Agent:
"Dirty Bomb"; Spent Fuel Storage; Nuclear Plant

6. Armed Attack:
RPG/LAW/Mortar; Ballistic

7. Cyber Attack:
Worm; Virus; Denial of Service

 
For the nominal example, the five primary threats that will be examined include: 
--Vehicle Bomb. 
500-lb. car bomb detonating within 15 feet of building exterior

--Chemical Agent. 
Sarin gas most toxic of the listed agents; assumed worst case

--Biological Agent. 
Recent mail attacks with Ricin; no antidote, high economic productivity loss

--Cyber Attack. 
Impact on Emergency Management Systems (EMS), VoIP telecommunications, security 
systems

The dirty bomb and armed assault are other potential threats that could be 
considered, but are left out of this analysis for simplicity.

These examples reveal subjective estimates and summed scores and provide a first 
level analysis of the primary threats that may affect your site or building. To 
complete this portion of your risk assessment, you should use Worksheet 1-1. 


Determining the Threat Rating (Task 1.4)
Having selected the primary threats for your site or building, the next step is 
to determine how the threat will affect the functions and critical 
infrastructure. The threat rating is an integral part of the risk assessment and 
is used to determine, characterize, and quantify a loss caused by an aggressor 
using a weapon or agent and tactic against the target (asset). The threat rating 
deals with the likelihood or probability of the threat occurring and the 
consequences of its occurrence.

For determining the threat rating, this How-To Guide provides a methodology 
based on consensus opinion of the building stakeholders, threat specialists, and 
engineers. (This group could be expanded as necessary to help refine the scoring 
process.) Table 1-6 provides a scale to help you with this process. The scale is 
a combination of a 7-level linguistic scale and a 10-point numerical scale (10 
being the greater threat). The key elements of this scale are the 
likelihood/credibility of a threat, potential weapons to be used during a 
terrorist attack, and information available to decision-makers. The primary 
objective is to look at the threat, the geographic distribution of functions and 
critical infrastructure, redundancy, and response and recovery to evaluate the 
impact on the organization should a primary threat attack occur. Tables 1-7A and 
1-7B display a nominal example of applying these ratings for an urban multi-
story building.


Table 1-6: Threat Rating

Threat: Very High
Scale Rating: 10
Likelihood: Very High  The likelihood of a threat, weapon, and tactic being 
used against the site or building is imminent. Internal decision-makers and/or 
external law enforcement and intelligence agencies determine the threat is 
credible.

Threat: High
Scale Rating: 8-9
Likelihood: High  The likelihood of a threat, weapon, and tactic being used 
against the site or building is expected. Internal decision-makers and/or 
external law enforcement and intelligence agencies determine the threat is 
credible.

Threat: Medium High
Scale Rating: 7
Likelihood: Medium High  The likelihood of a threat, weapon, and tactic being 
used against the site or building is probable. Internal decision-makers and/or 
external law enforcement and intelligence agencies determine the threat is 
credible.

Threat: Medium
Scale Rating: 5-6
Likelihood: Medium  The likelihood of a threat, weapon, and tactic being used 
against the site or building is possible. Internal decision-makers and/or 
external law enforcement and intelligence agencies determine the threat is 
known, but is not verified.

Threat: Medium Low
Scale Rating: 4
Likelihood: Medium Low  The likelihood of a threat, weapon, and tactic being 
used in the region is probable. Internal decision-makers and/or external law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies determine the threat is known, but is not 
likely.

Threat: Low
Scale Rating: 2-3
Likelihood: Low  The likelihood of a threat, weapon, and tactic being used in 
the region is possible. Internal decision-makers and/or external law enforcement 
and intelligence agencies determine the threat exists, but is not likely.

Threat: Very Low
Scale Rating: 1
Likelihood: Very Low  The likelihood of a threat, weapon, and tactic being used 
in the region or against the site or building is very negligible. Internal 
decision-makers and/or external law enforcement and intelligence agencies 
determine the threat is non-existent or extremely unlikely.


Worksheet 1-2 helps you organize and determine the threat rating in terms of 
building functions and infrastructure (see Task 2.3). The purpose is to produce 
a more informed opinion regarding the manmade hazards that affect your assets. 

As a starting point, use a value of 5 and assume a medium level of threat; then 
adjust the threat rating up or down based on consensus. Note that the threat 
rating is independent of the building function and infrastructure because it is 
assumed to be ubiquitous to the entire building and the same threat numeric 
value is used vertically for each function or infrastructure component (see 
Tables 1-7A and 1-7B). 


Table 1-7A: Nominal Example of Threat Rating for an Urban Multi-story Building 
(Building Function)

Table description:
Eight Building Function Categories to rate: 
Administration; Engineering; Warehousing; Data Center; Food Service; 
Security; Housekeeping; and Day Care.

Five Threat Categories for each of the building function categories: Cyber 
Attack; Vehicle Bomb; Suicide Bomber; Chemical (Sarin); and Biological (Ricin)
	

Table 1-7B: Nominal Example of Threat Rating for an Urban Multi-story Building 
(Building Infrastructure)

Table description: 
10 Building Infrastructure to rate the threats: Site; Architectural; Structural 
Systems; Envelope Systems; Utility Systems; Mechanical Systems; Plumbing 
and Gas Systems; Electrical Systems; Fire Alarm Systems; and IT/Communications 
Systems.

Five Threat Categories for each of the building infrastructure categories: Cyber 
Attack; Vehicle Bomb; Suicide Bomber; Chemical (Sarin); and Biological (Ricin).

	
Worksheet 1-1: Selection of primary threats
Worksheet 1-1 will help you to select your primary threats. Building 
stakeholders and the Assessment Team should review criteria provided in Task 1.3 
of this How-To Guide to fill out this Worksheet. After ranking each threat 
against the provided criteria (Table 1-2), the threat scores should be summed. 
The top scoring threats (select three to ten of the threats based on score 
dispersion) become the major threats that you will use for the preparation of 
your risk assessment.  

Seven criteria categories to rate the scenarios: Access to Agent; 
Knowledge/Expertise; History of Threats (Building Functions/Tenants); Asset 
Visibility/Symbolic; Asset Accessibility; Site Population/Capacity; and 
Collateral Damage/Distance to Building.

Scenarios:
--Improvised Explosive Device (Bomb): 1-lb. Mail Bomb; 5-lb. Pipe Bomb; 50-lb. 
Satchel Bomb/Suicide Bomber; 500-lb. Car Bomb; 5,000-lb. Truck Bomb; 20,000-lb. 
Truck Bomb; Natural Gas.								

--Bomb/Aircraft/Ship: Small Aircraft; Medium Aircraft; Large Aircraft; Ship.
				
--Chemical Agent: Choking (Chlorine, Phosgene); Blood (Hydrogen Cyanide); 
Blister (Lewisite); Nerve (Sarin).
								
--Biological Agent: Bacteria (Anthrax; Plague, Tularemia); Viruses 
(Hemorrehagic, Fevers, Smallpox); Toxins (Botulinum, Ricin).

--Radiological Agent: Dirty Bomb; Spent Fuel Storage; Nuclear Plant.	
							
--Armed Attack: RPG/LAW/Mortar; Ballistic.						
	
--Cyber Attack: Worm; Virus; Denial of Service.					
			

Worksheet 1-2: threat rating 
Worksheet 1-2 can be used to complete your risk assessment and will be used in 
conjunction with Worksheets 4-1 and 4-2. It can be used to discuss priority 
threats with building stakeholders and among the members of the Assessment Team. 
To fill out this table, analyze the impact of a particular threat on the 
building core functions and building infrastructure components of your building. 
Use the results of Worksheet 1-1 to assist you in this process. Building core 
functions and building infrastructure components are defined in Section 2.3 of 
this How-To Guide.

Threat Rating:
Very High: 10
High: 8-9
Medium High: 7
Medium: 5-6
Medium Low: 4
Low: 2-3
Very Low: 1


Assign a Threat Rating (one column for each threat) for each building function 
and infrastructure:

--Function
Administration
Engineering
Warehousing
Data Center
Food Service
Security
Housekeeping
Day Care
Other

--Infrastructure
Site
Architectural
Structural Systems
Envelope Systems
Utility Systems
Mechanical Systems
Plumbing and Gas Systems
Electrical Systems
Fire Alarm Systems
IT/Communications Systems



Step 2: Asset Value Assessment

Overview
The second step in the assessment process is to identify the assets of your 
area, site, and building that may be affected by a threat (see Figure 2-1). 
Asset value can be defined as a degree of debilitating impact that would be 
caused by the incapacity or destruction of an asset. An asset refers to a 
resource of value requiring protection. It can be tangible (i.e., buildings, 
facilities, equipment activities, operations, and information) or intangible 
(i.e., processes or a companys information and reputation).

The asset value assessment process involves the following tasks: 
--Identifying the layers of defense
--Identifying the critical assets
--Identifying the building core functions and infrastructure
--Determining the asset value rating

Figure 2-1: Steps and tasks
Step 2: Asset Value Assessment
TASKS:
2.1	Identifying the layers of defense
2.2	Identifying the critical assets
2.3	Identifying the building core functions and infrastructure
2.4	Determining the asset value rating


In this How-To Guide, the identification of the assets is done within the 
concept of layers of defense. The objective of layers of defense is to create a 
succeeding number of security layers more difficult to penetrate, provide 
additional warning and response time, and allow building occupants to move into 
defensive positions or designated safe haven protection. This approach will be 
especially helpful for identifying your mitigation options after you conclude 
your risk assessment.

To identify and prioritize a buildings critical assets is a vital step in the 
process to improve its level of protection prior to a terrorist attack. 
Recognizing that people are a buildings most critical asset, the process 
described throughout this step will help you to identify and prioritize those 
assets where people are most at risk and require protection.


Identifying the Layers of Defense (Task 2.1)
The layers of defense is a traditional approach in security engineering and use 
concentric circles extending out from an area or site to the building or asset 
that requires protection. They can be seen as demarcation points for different 
security strategies. Identifying the layers of defense early in the assessment 
process will help you to understand better the assets that require protection 
and determine your mitigation options. Figure 2-2 shows the layers of defense 
described below. 

Figure 2-2: Layers of defense.
Graphic showing an overhead view of a building's layout and the general 
parameters of the first (outermost), second, and third (inner most) layers of 
defense.

First Layer of Defense. 
This involves understanding the characteristics of the surrounding area, 
including construction type, occupancies, and the nature and intensity of 
adjacent activities. It is specifically concerned with buildings, installations, 
and infrastructure outside the site perimeter. For urban areas, it also includes 
the curb lane and surrounding streets.

Second Layer of Defense. 
This refers to the space that exists between the site perimeter and the assets 
requiring protection. It involves the placement of buildings and forms in a 
particular site and understanding which natural or physical resources can 
provide protection. It entails the design of access points, parking, roadways, 
pedestrian walkways, natural barriers, security lighting, and signage. For urban 
areas, it refers specifically to the building yard.

Third Layer of Defense. 
This deals with the protection of the asset itself. It proposes to harden the 
structures and systems, incorporate effective HVAC systems and surveillance 
equipment, and wisely design and locate utilities and mechanical systems. Note 
that, of all blast mitigation measures, distance is the most effective measure 
because other measures vary in effectiveness and can be more costly. However, 
often it is not possible to provide adequate stand-off distance. For example, 
sidewalks in many urban areas may be less than 10 meters (33 feet), while 
appropriate stand-off may require a minimum of 25 meters (82 feet). 

Designers should consider providing adequate stand-off distance when possible. 
In this case, the hardening of the building is a second choice. 


Urban versus Rural
The layers of defense are not predetermined and they may vary from site to site 
and from building to building. If a particular building requiring protection is 
part of a campus or located in a rural, semi-rural, or urban area, a similar 
analysis may be applicable for all cases when determining the importance of the 
asset. However, the security elements necessary to protect the building can be 
entirely different, depending on its location. The approach suggests 
establishing different demarcation points in order to identify sound security 
strategies. The layers of defense concept proposes that each designer study a 
particular site and determine critical assets that need to be protected and how 
protection should take place.
 
Figure 2-3 depicts the security elements that may be considered in an urban 
setting. It shows how the second layer of defense becomes extremely important to 
protect a building in an urban area. Note that the elements described below may 
require a different method of protection for a campus or a rural site. 

Figure 2-3: Layers of defense in a urban setting.
Graphic showing the layers of defense on the street level, from the building (third 
layer) through the building yard (second layer) to the sidewalk, curb lane, and street 
(first layer).

Major layers for an urban setting include:
--Curb Lane (First Layer of Defense). 
This area refers to the lane of the street closest to the sidewalk. Typically it 
is used for curbside parking, passenger drop-off, loading, and service vehicles. 
Curbside parking should not be removed unless additional stand-off distance is 
absolutely required for high-target buildings. When required, sidewalks can be 
widened to incorporate the area devoted to the curb lane. 
 
--Sidewalk (First Layer of Defense). 
This area serves as the common space for pedestrian interaction, moment, and 
activity. If possible, sidewalks should be left open and accessible to 
pedestrians and security elements should not interfere with the circulation. The 
streetscape could include hardened versions of parking meters, streetlights, 
benches, planters, and trash receptacles. The use of retractable bollards is a 
great solution when the width of the street does not allow the placement of 
security elements.

--Building Yard (Second Layer of Defense). 
This area refers to the exterior space between the building and the sidewalk. It 
consists of a grassy area adjacent to the building flush with the sidewalk or a 
planted bed raised above the level of the sidewalk. It also includes pedestrian 
entries and loading docks. For the building yard, security components should 
complement the building architecture and landscaping. Security elements should 
be located near the outer edge of the yard. A planter or raised plinth wall 
provides a good security barrier in this layer.

Figure 2-4 shows the layers of defense in a campus or rural/semi-rural setting 
that may be required for a campus when a particular building is considered a 
critical asset. Protection entails considering access points, parking, roadways, 
pedestrian walkways, natural and physical barriers, security lighting, and 
signage. Similar situations can be encountered in a campus setting or in a rural 
or semi-rural area. 


Figure 2-4: Layers of defense when a particular building is considered a 
critical asset. 
Graphic showing a drawing plan noting the layers of defense from an overhead view.


Identifying the Critical Assets (Task 2.2)
This task involves identifying critical assets within the layers of defense 
described in Task 2.1. The purpose is to help you determine those assets 
essential to the minimum operation of your building, and to ensure the health 
and safety of the building and its occupants. Table 2-1 is a starting point for 
this exercise. Appendix A of this How-To Guide -- the Building Vulnerability 
Assessment Checklist -- provides detailed information regarding the 
vulnerability of your assets. 
 
Table 2-1. Correlation of the Layers of Defense Against Threats. 
Table description: Six threat types marked based on debilitating conditions for 
each of the three layers of defense. The six threat types are Cyber Attack; 
Vehicle Bomb; Suicide Bomber; Chemical; Biological; and Other.

Identifying Critical Assets for the First Layer of Defense. 
One of the first steps when identifying your critical assets is to understand 
your surrounding areas and how construction types, occupancies, functions, and 
activities adjacent to your asset can pose a threat or serve to protect your 
asset. It is essential to understand the interdependencies and distance that 
separate your building and off-site facilities. Off-site facilities can include:
--Landmarks and iconic buildings
--Law enforcement, fire departments, and hospital buildings
--Federal facilities
--Embassies
--Key commercial properties
--HazMat storage areas and chemical manufacturing plants
--Transportation (roads, avenues of approach, bridges, railroads, tunnels, 
airports, and ports)
--Telecommunications and utility services

To assess your assets, you may want to consider different scenarios. For 
example, a car bomb may be able to carry 200 pounds of TNT and a truck bomb may 
be able to carry 11,000 pounds of TNT. If it is possible that these bombs could 
be placed proximate to your building, you may want to determine potential 
damages that they could cause, as well as protective actions for your building. 
To assess potential damage, the use of Geographic Information Systems (GISs) can 
be an invaluable resource. Figures 2-5 and 2-6 depict this process. There are 
several powerful GIS systems available that can help you to determine your 
critical asset within the first layer of defense. For this How-To Guide, we 
suggest the use of HAZUS-MH, described in Figure 2-7. Note that the use of GIS 
is not required to prepare assessment studies; it is only a tool to facilitate 
the process.

Figure 2-5. Potential blast effects of a 200 pound car bomb. 
Graphic showing an aerial view of a building, the location of the car bomb, 
and the potential reach of the blast.

Figure 2-6. Potential blast effects of a 11,000 pound truck bomb. 
Graphic showing an aerial view of a building, the location of the truck bomb, 
and the potential reach of the blast.

Figure 2-7. Using HAZUS-MH to identify the criticality of assets.
Text-based figure with small computer screen shots to illustrate 
points made.

HAZUS-MH is GIS based software developed to estimate losses from earthquakes, 
floods, and hurricane winds.

HAZUS-MH takes into account various impacts of a hazard event such as:
 Physical damage: damage to residential and commercial buildings, schools, 
critical facilities, and infrastructure
 Economic loss: lost jobs, business interruptions, and repair and 
reconstruction costs
 Social impacts: impacts to people, including requirements for shelters and 
medical aid

HAZUS-MH includes the largest compilation of geo-reference data made available 
by the Federal Government at no cost. The HAZUS-MH provided inventory data are 
gathered from the nationally available data sources and include the following: 
 
General Building Stock includes residential, commercial, and industrial building 
types. HAZUS-MH groups the general building stock into 39 specific model 
building types and 33 specific occupancy classes.  

Essential Facilities include hospitals and other medical facilities, police and 
fire stations, EOCs, and schools that are often used as shelters.  

Hazardous Material Facilities include storage facilities for industrial or 
hazardous materials such as corrosives, explosives, flammable materials, 
radioactive materials, and toxins.

High Potential Loss Facilities include nuclear power plants, dams, levees, and 
military installations.

Transportation Lifeline Systems include the following types of infrastructure 
inventory data: 
 Airways  airport facilities, airport runways, heliport facilities, and 
heliport landing pads
 Highways  bridges, tunnels, and road segments
 Railways  tracks, tunnels, bridges, and facilities (railyards and depots)
 Waterways  ports (locks, seaports, harbors, dry docks, and piers) and ferries
 Bus Stations

Utility Lifeline Systems include potable water, wastewater, oil, natural gas, 
electric power, and communications systems. 
 
Demographics include people assets of the inventory data regarding total 
population; age, gender, and race distribution; income distribution; number of 
owners and renters; building age; and other data obtained from the U.S. Census 
Bureau and Dun & Bradstreet.  The demographic data are aggregated at the Census 
block or Census tract level.

The database sets in HAZUS-MH are easily converted into visual charts, maps, and 
graphics for a given site or building.

Training is necessary to run HAZUS-MH and other GIS software. In case of HAZUS-
MH, the user must be familiarized with Windows-based environments, GIS software 
(ArcGIS 8.3), and data manipulation.

HAZUS-MH is a non-proprietary software that can be ordered at no charge at 
http://www.fema.gov/hazus


Identifying Critical Assets for the Second Layer of Defense. To identify your 
critical assets, you need to understand how important they are in terms of 
protecting people and key operations. Table 2-1 provides a nominal example of 
the components that may be of concern when establishing your critical asset. The 
elements across the top include the different threats that you may have 
identified. The column to the left provides a list of concerns related to your 
site. This process can be further expanded by consulting the Building 
Vulnerability Assessment Checklist in Appendix A. When determining your asset 
value, you may ask the following questions:
--Are perimeter fences or other types of barrier controls in place? 
--What are the access points to the site or building? 
--Is there vehicle and pedestrian access control at the perimeter of the site?
--Does site circulation prevent high-speed approaches by vehicles?
--Is there a minimum setback distance between the building and parked vehicles?
--In dense, urban areas, does curb lane parking allow uncontrolled vehicles to 
park unacceptably close to a building in public rights-of-way?  
--What are the existing types of vehicle anti-ram devices for the site or 
building?
--Do existing landscape measures/features (walls, fountains, berms, etc.) 
deflect or dissipate the blast pressure?
--Are these devices at the property boundary or at the building?

Identifying Critical Assets for the Third Layer of Defense. When estimating your 
critical assets within the third layer of defense, you need to consider the 
structural and non-structural soundness of your building, as well as the 
possibility of mechanical, plumbing, and electrical systems continuing 
operations after an attack. Given the evolving nature of the terrorist threat, 
it is hard to estimate the value of your assets. For example, due to the 
catastrophic consequences of progressive collapse, evaluating the structural 
components of your building can become a high priority. Windows that are the 
weakest part of a building can become a crucial issue. Other important elements 
for blast design may include hardening of mechanical and electrical systems and 
creating appropriate redundancies. The location of air-intakes and limiting the 
access of the public to main systems can become critical for reducing potential 
damage from terrorist attacks. The upgrade of HVAC systems and the adoptions of 
efficient filtering systems can become a key consideration when establishing 
critical assets. 

Table 2-1 is provided to assist you in assessing your critical assets. As 
previously stated, you may also want to consult the Building Vulnerability 
Assessment Checklist provided in Appendix A to further analyze your concerns. 
When determining your critical assets for the third layer of defense, you may 
ask the following questions:
--What is the designed or estimated protection level of the exterior walls 
against the postulated explosive threat?
--Is the window system design on the exterior faade balanced to mitigate the 
hazardous effects of flying glazing following an explosive event? (glazing, 
frames, anchorage to supporting walls, etc.)
--Do non-window openings, such as mechanical vents and exposed plenums, provide 
the same level of protection required for the exterior wall?
--Is the incoming water supply in a secure location? Is there a secure alternate 
drinking water supply?
-Are the incoming air intakes in a secure location? 
--How much fuel is stored on the site or at the building and how long can this 
quantity support critical operations? How is it stored? How is it secured?
--Is roof access limited to authorized personnel by means of locking mechanisms?
--What are the types and level of air filtration? 
--Are there provisions for air monitors or sensors for CBR agents?


Identifying the Building Core Functions and Infrastructure (Task 2.3)
The identification of the building core functions and infrastructure is one of 
the key elements of the assessment. These functions are the basis for the 
analysis described in this How-To Guide. The functions and infrastructure 
analyses identify the geographic distribution within the building and 
interdependencies between critical assets. Ideally, the functions should have 
geographic dispersion as well as a pre-determined recovery site or alternate 
work location. Similarly, critical infrastructure should have geographic 
dispersion and backup. For example, a bomb or CBR attack entering through the 
loading dock could impact the telecommunications, data, uninterruptible power 
supply (UPS), generator, and other key infrastructure systems. The core 
functions and infrastructure are described below.


Identifying Building Core Functions
The first activity is to determine the core functions and processes necessary 
for the building to continue to operate or provide services after an attack. The 
reason for identifying core functions/processes is to focus the Assessment Team 
on what a building does, how it does it, and how various threats can affect the 
building. This provides more discussion and results in a better understanding of 
asset value. Factors that should be considered include:
--What are the buildings primary services or outputs?
--What critical activities take place at the building?
--Who are the buildings occupants and visitors?
--What inputs from external organizations are required for a buildings success?

A number of core functions have been selected for this How-To Guide and are 
included in Table 2-2.

Table 2-2. Building Core Functions
Administration
Engineering
Warehousing
Data Center
Food Service
Security
Housekeeping
Day Care


Identifying Building Core Infrastructure
After the core functions and processes are identified, an evaluation of building 
infrastructure should follow. To help identify and value rank infrastructure, 
the following should be considered, keeping in mind that the most vital asset 
for every building is its people:
--Identify how many people may be injured or killed during a terrorist attack 
that directly affects the infrastructure.
--Identify what happens to occupants if a specific asset is lost or degraded. 
(Can primary services continue?)
--Determine the impact on other organizational assets if the component is lost 
or can not function.
--Determine if critical or sensitive information is stored or handled at the 
building.
--Determine if backups exist for the buildings assets.
--Determine the availability of replacements.
--Determine the potential for injuries or deaths from any catastrophic event at 
the buildings assets.
--Identify any critical building personnel whose loss would degrade or seriously 
complicate the safety of building occupants during an emergency. 
--Determine if the buildings assets can be replaced and identify replacement 
costs if the building is lost.
--Identify the locations of key equipment and the impact if it is lost during a 
terrorist attack.
--Determine the locations of personnel work areas and systems.
--Identify the locations of any personnel operating outside a buildings 
controlled areas.
--Determine, in detail, the physical locations of critical support 
architectures:
	 Communications and information technology (i.e., the flow of 	critical 
information)
	 Utilities (e.g., facility power, water, air conditioning, etc.)
	 Lines of communication that provide access to external resources 
	and provide movement of people (e.g., road, rail, air 
	transportation)
--Determine the location, availability, and readiness condition of emergency 
response assets, and the state of training of building staff in their use.

A number of core infrastructures have been selected for this How-To Guide. Table 
2-3 includes the selected examples.

Table 2-3. Building Core Infrastructure
Site
Architectural
Structural Systems
Envelope Systems
Utility Systems
Mechanical Systems
Plumbing and Gas Systems
Electrical Systems
Fire Alarm Systems
IT/Communications Systems


Levels of Protection
The selection of the level of protection is building-dependent. The General 
Services Administration (GSA) and DoD have developed standards and 
recommendations that can be applicable to buildings leased by or used to support 
Federal Government agencies. These standards and recommendations are not 
required for non-Federal buildings; however, building owners can evaluate and 
select those standards that meet their specific needs and criteria.

A primary concern is the protection of buildings from explosive blast and CBR 
attacks. To protect against blast, the level of protection is dependent upon the 
type of construction and the blast pressures (stand-off distance). The amount of 
explosive and the resulting blast dictate the level of protection required to 
prevent a building from collapsing or minimizing injuries and deaths. Levels of 
protection can be found in GSA PBS-P100, Facilities Standards for the Public 
Buildings Service, November 2000, Section 8.6 and USAF Installation Force 
Protection Guide and DoD UFC-010-01. 

The DoD prescribes minimum stand-off distances based on the required level of 
protection. Where minimum stand-off distances are met, conventional construction 
techniques can be used with some modifications. In cases where the minimum 
stand-off cannot be achieved, the building must be hardened to achieve the 
required level of protection. The DHS and Interagency Security Committee (ISC) 
Security Criteria (GSA was formerly responsible for this Interagency Committee) 
do not require or mandate specific stand-off distances. Rather, they provide 
protection performance criteria. In order to economically meet these performance 
standards, they present recommended stand-off distances for vehicles that are 
parked on adjacent properties and for vehicles that are parked on the building 
site (see GSA Security Criteria, Draft Revision, October 8, 1997, and ISC 
Security Design Criteria for New Federal Office Buildings and Major 
Modernization Projects, May 28, 2001). Table 2-4 presents the levels of 
protection and the recommended security measures.


Table 2-4: Levels of Protection and Recommended Security Measures
(Source: U.S. Department of Justice, Vulnerability Assessment of Federal 
Facilities, June 28, 1995)

Table Column Descriptions: 
1. Level (Assignment of levels to be based on an on-site risk  
assessment/evaluation) 
2. Typical Location
3. Examples of Tenant Agencies (Examples of typical, but not limited to, tenant 
agencies for this level facility)
4. Security Measures (based on evaluation) 
--Level: I
--Typical Location: 10 Employees (Federal); 2,500 Square Feet; Low Volume Public 
Contact; and Small Store Front Type Operation.
--Examples of Tenant Agencies: Local Office; District Office; Visitor Center; 
USDA Office; Ranger Station; Commercial Facilities; Industrial/Manufacturing; 
and Health Care.
--Security Measure: High Security Locks; Intercom; Peep Hole (Wide View); 
Lighting with Emergency Backup Power; Controlled Utility Access; and Annual 
Employee Security Training.

--Level: II
--Typical Location: 11 - 150 Employees (Federal); 2,500 - 80,000 Square Feet; 
Moderate Volume Public Contact; and Routine Operations Similar to Private Sector 
and/or Facility Shared with Private Sector.
--Examples of Tenant Agencies: Public Officials; Park Headquarters; 
Regional/State Offices; Commercial Facilities; Industrial; Manufacturing; and 
Health Care. 
Security Measure: Entry Control Package with Closed Circuit Television (CCTV); 
Visitor Control/Screening; Shipping/Receiving Procedures; Guard/Patrol 
Assessment; Intrusion Detection with Central Monitoring; CCTV Surveillance (Pan-
Tilt, Zoom System); and Duress Alarm with Central Monitoring.
 
--Level: III
--Typical Location: 151 - 450 Employees (Federal); Multi-Story Facility; 80,000 
- 150,000 Square Feet; Moderate/High Volume Public Contact; and Agency Mix of 
Law Enforcement Operations, Court Functions, and Government Records.
--Examples of Tenant Agencies: Inspectors General; Criminal Investigations; 
Regional/State Offices; GSA Field Offices; Local Schools; Commercial Facilities; 
Industrial; Manufacturing; and Health Care. 
--Security Measures: Guard Patrol on Site; Visitor Control/Screening; 
Shipping/Receiving Procedures; Intrusion Detection with Central Monitoring; 
CCTV Surveillance (Pan-Tilt, Zoom System); and Duress Alarm with Central 
Monitoring.

--Level: IV
--Typical Location: more than 450 Employees (Federal); Multi-Story Facility; 
greater than 150,000 Square Feet; High Volume Public Contact; High-Risk Law 
Enforcement/Intelligence Agencies; and District Court. 
--Examples of Tenant Agencies: Significant Buildings and Some Headquarters; 
Federal Law Enforcement Agencies; Local Schools, Universities
Commercial Facilities; and Health Care.
--Security Measures: Extend Perimeter (Concrete/Steel Barriers); 24-Hour Guard 
Patrol; Adjacent Parking Control; Backup Power System; and Hardened Parking 
Barriers.

--Level: V
--Typical Location: Level IV Profile and Agency/Mission Critical to National 
Security
--Example of Tenant Agency: Principal Department Headquarters
--Security 
Measure: Agency-Specific


Establishing the levels of protection for CBR agents is more difficult to 
quantify because there are almost infinite agents and delivery modes that can be 
used and a CBR attack affects multiple systems. Protection against CBR attacks 
is focused on preventing agents from entering a building and using the building 
envelope and HVAC system to respond to an attack to isolate or contain an agent 
to as small a footprint as possible. 

For more information on explosive blast and CBR, you may consult DoD and GSA 
standards; the Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist in Appendix A; FEMA 
426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings; 
FEMA 427, Primer for Design of Commercial Buildings to Mitigate Terrorist 
Attacks; and the CDC guides for protection against CBR attack and filtration.


Determining the Asset Value Rating (Task 2.4)
After building core functions and building infrastructure are analyzed, a value 
should be assigned. Table 2-5 provides a scale for selecting  your asset value. 
The scale is a combination of a 7-level linguistic scale and a 10-point 
numerical scale (10 being the greater threat). To determine a value, you should 
keep in mind that asset value can be defined as the degree of debilitating 
impact that would be caused by the incapacity or destruction of the buildings 
assets. To determine a vulnerability rating, you should consider the 
consequences of the loss or damage of the buildings assets (e.g., loss of life, 
injuries, or total loss of primary services, core processes and functions). The 
key asset for every building is its people (e.g., employees, visitors, etc.) and 
they will always be assigned the highest asset value. Tables 2-6A and 2-6B 
display a nominal example applying these ratings for an urban multi-story 
building.

Table 2-5: Asset Value Scale
Asset Value: Very High
Score: 10
Description: Very High  Loss or damage of the buildings assets would have 
exceptionally grave consequences, such as extensive loss of life, widespread 
severe injuries, or total loss of primary services, core processes, and 
functions.

Asset Value: High
Score: 8-9
Description: High  Loss or damage of the buildings assets would have grave 
consequences, such as loss of life, severe injuries, loss of primary services, 
or major loss of core processes and functions for an extended period of time.

Asset Value: Medium High
Score: 7
Description: Medium High  Loss or damage of the buildings assets would have 
serious consequences, such as serious injuries or impairment of core processes 
and functions for an extended period of time.

Asset Value: Medium
Score: 5-6
Description: Medium  Loss or damage of the buildings assets would have 
moderate to serious consequences, such as injuries or impairment of core 
functions and processes.

Asset Value: Medium Low
Score: 4
Description: Medium Low  Loss or damage of the buildings assets would have 
moderate consequences, such as minor injuries or minor impairment of core 
functions and processes.

Asset Value: Low
Score: 2-3
Description: Low  Loss or damage of the buildings assets would have minor 
consequences or impact, such as a slight impact on core functions and processes 
for a short period of time.

Asset Value: Very Low
Score: 1
Description: Very Low  Loss or damage of the buildings assets would have 
negligible consequences or impact.


Table 2-6A: Nominal Example of Asset Value Rating for an Urban Multi-story 
Building (Building Function)

--Five terror threats (Cyber Attack; Vehicle Bomb; Suicide Bomber; Chemical 
(Sarin); and Biological (Ricin)) ranked for the following building functions: 
Administration	
Engineering	
Warehousing	
Data Center	
Food Service	
Security	
Housekeeping	
Day Care	


Table 2-6B: Nominal Example of Asset Value Rating for an Urban Multi-story 
Building (Building Infrastructure)

--Five terror threats (Infrastructure; Cyber Attack; Vehicle Bomb; Suicide 
Bomber; Chemical; and Biological) ranked for the following building 
infrastructure: 
Site	
Architectural	
Structural Systems	
Envelope Systems	
Utility Systems	
Mechanical Systems	
Plumbing and Gas Systems	
Electrical Systems	
Fire Alarm Systems	
IT/Communications Systems


The following additional references for blast are recommended:
U.S. Air Force, 1989, ESL-TR-87-57, Protective Construction Design Manual, 
Contact Airbus Technologies Division (AFRL/MLQ) at Tyndall Air Force Base, 
Florida, via e-mail to techinfo@afrl.af.mil. [Superseded by Army Technical 
Manual TM 5-855-1 (Air Force Pamphlet AFPAM 32-1147(I), Navy Manual NAVFAC P-
1080, DSWA Manual DAHSCWEMAN-97), December 1997]

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1990, TM 5-1300, Structures to Resist Accidental 
Explosions, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Washington, D.C., (also Navy NAVFAC 
(Naval Facilities) P-397, Air Force Regulation 88-2); Contact David Hyde, U.S. 
Army Engineer Research and Development Center, 3909 Halls Ferry Road, Vicksburg, 
Mississippi 39180 or via e-mail to hyded@ex1.wes.army.mil

U.S. Department of Energy, 1992, DOE/TIC 11268, A Manual for the Prediction of 
Blast and Fragment Loadings on Structures, Southwest Research Institute, 
Albuquerque, New Mexico.

Technical Support Working Group, Terrorist Bomb Threat Stand-Off Card with 
Explanation of Use, Technical Support Working Group, Washington, D.C. 
http://www.tswg.gov/tswg/prods_pubs/newBTSCPress.htm

U.S. Department of the Treasury/Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, 1999, 
Vehicle Bomb Explosion Hazard And Evacuation Distance Tables, Department of the 
Treasury, Washington, D.C. (Request in writing, address information available at 
http://www.atf.treas.gov/pub/fire-explo_pub/i54001.htm)

Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1999, Terrorism in the United States.

Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Counterterrorism 
Division, Washington, DC. http://www.fbi.gov/publications/terror/terror99.pdf

The U.S. Department of State, 2002, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001.
Biggs, John M. Introduction to Structural Dynamics. McGraw-Hill. 1964.
The Institute of Structural Engineers. The Structural Engineers Response to 
Explosive Damage. SETO, Ltd., 11 Upper Belgrave Street, London SW1X8BH. 1995.

Mays, G.S. and Smith, P.D. Blast Effects on Buildings: Design of Buildings to 
Optimize Resistance to Blast Loading. Thomas Telford Publications, 1 Heron Quay, 
London E14 4JD. 1995.

National Research Council. Protecting Buildings from Bomb Damage. National 
Academy Press. 1995. 


WORKSHEET 2-1: ASSET VALUE 
Worksheet 2-1 can be used to complete your risk assessment and will be used in 
conjunction with Worksheets 4-1 and 4-2. It can be used to discuss asset value 
with building stakeholders and among the members of the Assessment Team. Asset 
value refers to a resource of value requiring protection. A scale (asset value) 
can be used to signify the protection that a particular asset merits. To fill 
out this table, analyze the impact of a particular threat to your site and/or 
building. Analyze core functions and building infrastructure components as 
indicated in Task 2.3. 

--Asset Value
Very High: 10
High: 8-9
Medium High: 7
Medium: 5-6
Medium Low: 4
Low: 2-3
Very Low: 1


--Function:
Administration
Engineering
Warehousing
Data Center
Food Service
Security
Housekeeping
Day Care
Other
Other

--Infrastructure:
Site
Architectural
Structural Systems
Envelope Systems
Utility Systems
Mechanical Systems
Plumbing and Gas Systems
Electrical Systems
Fire Alarm Systems
IT/Communications Systems



Step 3: Vulnerability Assessment

Overview
The third step in the assessment process is to prepare a vulnerability 
assessment of your assets that can be affected by a threat (see Figure 3-1). For 
this document, vulnerability is defined as any weakness that can be exploited by 
an aggressor to make an asset susceptible to hazard damage. A vulnerability 
assessment is an indepth analysis of the building functions, systems, and site 
characteristics to identify building weaknesses and lack of redundancy, and 
determine mitigations or corrective actions that can be designed or implemented 
to reduce the vulnerabilities. During this step, you will begin the analysis of 
your assets based on: a) the identified threat; b) the criticality of your 
assets: and c) the level of protection you may have chosen (i.e., your 
willingness or unwillingness to accept risk).  

The vulnerability assessment process involves the following tasks:
--Organizing resources to prepare the assessment
--Evaluating the site and building
--Preparing a vulnerability portfolio
--Determining the vulnerability rating

Figure 3-1: Steps and tasks
Step 3:  Vulnerability Assessment
TASKS:
3.1.  Organizing resources to prepare the assessment
3.2.  Evaluating the site and building
3.3.  Preparing a vulnerability portfolio
3.4.  Determining the vulnerability rating


Organizing Resources to Prepare the Assessment (Task 3.1)
An important task during Step 3 is organizing your resources to prepare the 
assessment. This involves determining the level of the assessment you wish to 
perform and the skills of the team necessary to conduct the assessment. 


Selecting the Assessment Team
The selection of the Assessment Team is probably the most critical task in the 
threat assessment process. An assessment has been found to be most effective 
when the Team is composed of senior individuals who have a breadth and depth of 
experience and understand other disciplines and system interdependencies. The 
Assessment Team leader will work with the building owner and stakeholders to:
--Determine the threat rating (Step 1)
--Determine the asset value and level of protection (Step 2)

The Assessment Team will coordinate the preparation of an assessment schedule, 
assessment agenda, and on-site visit assessments with the building stakeholders. 
It is important to emphasize that the Assessment Team should be composed of 
professionals capable of evaluating different parts of the buildings and 
familiar with engineering, architecture and site planning. Other members of the 
team may include law-enforcement agents, first responders, and building owners 
and managers.


Determining the Level of the Assessment 
The level of the assessment for a given building is dependent upon a number of 
factors such as type of building, location, type of construction, number of 
occupants, economic life, and other owner specific concerns and available 
economic resources. The levels of the assessment provided in this How-To Guide 
are similar to the FEMA 310 process and provide increasing tiers of assessments. 
The underlying purpose is to provide a variable scale to meet benefit/cost 
considerations for a given building that meets the intent and requirements of 
available antiterrorism guidelines such as the DoD Minimum Antiterrorism 
Standards and the GSA Interagency Security Criteria.

Tier 1.
A Tier 1 assessment is a screening phase that identifies the primary 
vulnerabilities and mitigation options, and is a 70 percent assessment (see 
Table 3-1). A Tier 1 assessment can typically be conducted by one or two 
experienced assessment professionals in approximately 2 days with the building 
owner and key staff; it involves a quick look at the site perimeter, building, 
core functions, infrastructure, drawings, and plans. A Tier 1 assessment will 
likely be sufficient for the majority of commercial buildings and other non-
critical facilities and infrastructure. 

Tier 2.
A Tier 2 assessment is a full on-site evaluation by assessment specialists that 
provides a robust evaluation of system interdependencies, vulnerabilities, and 
mitigation options; it is a 90 percent assessment solution (see Table 3-2). A 
Tier 2 assessment typically requires three to five assessment specialists, can 
be completed in 3 to 5 days, and requires significant key building staff 
participation (e.g., providing access to all site and building areas, systems, 
and infrastructure) and an indepth review of building design documents, 
drawings, and plans. A Tier 2 assessment is likely to be sufficient for most 
high-risk buildings such as iconic commercial buildings, government facilities, 
schools, hospitals, and other designated high value infrastructure assets. 

Tier 3.
A Tier 3 assessment is a detailed evaluation of the building using blast and 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) models to determine building response, 
survivability, and recovery, and the development of mitigation options. A Tier 3 
assessment (see Table 3-3) typically involves engineering and scientific experts 
and requires detailed design information, including drawings and other building 
information. Modeling and analysis can often take several days or weeks and is 
typically performed for high value and critical infrastructure assets. The 
Assessment Team is not defined for this tier; however, it could be composed of 8 
to 12 people.

Table 3-1:  Tier 1 - Screening Phase
Task: Information Gathering and Review	
Building Type: Standard commercial office building
Team Composition: 1 Site and Architectural, and 1 Security Systems and 
Operations
Duration: 1 day
Activity: Review technical area and general site analysis

Task: On-site Evaluation
Building Type: Standard commercial office building
Team Composition: 1 Site and Architectural, and 1 Security Systems and 
Operations
Duration: 1 day per assessor	
Activity: 
--Complete the Critical Function and Critical Infrastructure matrices; perform a 
limited technical review using the Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist; 
input site, vulnerability, and mitigation information into the database; write 
reports
--Prepare a verbal or PowerPoint presentation with key findings to review with 
building owners and stakeholders major findings  
--Receive input on the assessment process

Task: Develop Mitigation Options
Building Type: Standard commercial office building
Team Composition: 1 Site and Architectural, and 1 Security Systems and 
Operations
Duration: Typically 1 to 3 days per assessor	
Activity: 
--Prepare a Preliminary Report, including findings and feedback from 
stakeholders. This report should include concept and cost mitigation options.
--Prepare a written Final Report that lists the vulnerabilities, observations, 
and mitigation options.  Very rough order of magnitude cost estimates may be 
developed using standard unit costs for blast, CBR, and physical security 
infrastructure and equipment.
--Prepare a Vulnerability Portfolio with recommendations for incorporation into 
Emergency Operations, Disaster Recovery, and other plans or procedures


Table 3-2:  Tier 2 - Full On-site Evaluation
Task: Information Gathering and Review
Building Type: High-risk or iconic buildings; Commercial buildings, government 
facilities, schools, and hospitals; and Designated high asset value 
infrastructure
Team Composition: 1 Site and Architectural (recommended as Team leader) ; 1 
Structural and Building Envelope; 1 Mechanical, Electrical, and Power Systems 
and Site Utilities; 1 Landscape Architect; 1 IT and Telecommunications; and 1 
Security Systems and Operations.
Duration: 1 day per assessor
Activity: Review technical area and general site analysis collected during the 
Tier 1 assessment

Task: On-Site Evaluation
Building Type: High-risk or iconic buildings; Commercial buildings, government 
facilities, schools, and hospitals; and  Designated high asset value 
infrastructure
Team Composition: 1 Site and Architectural (recommended as Team leader) ; 1 
Structural and Building Envelope; 1 Mechanical, Electrical, and Power Systems 
and Site Utilities; 1 Landscape Architect; 1 IT and Telecommunications; and 1 
Security Systems and Operations.
Duration: 2 to 4 days per assessor
Activity: 
--Complete the Critical Function and Critical Infrastructure matrices; perform a 
limited technical review using the Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist; 
input site, vulnerability, and mitigation information into the database; write 
reports
--Prepare a verbal or PowerPoint presentation with key findings to review with 
building owners and stakeholders major findings  
--Receive input on the assessment process

Task: Develop Mitigation Options
Building Type: High-risk or iconic buildings; Commercial buildings, government 
facilities, schools, and hospitals; and Designated high asset value 
infrastructure
Team Composition: 1 Site and Architectural (recommended as Team leader); 1 
Structural and Building Envelope; 1 Mechanical, Electrical, and Power Systems 
and Site Utilities; 1 Landscape Architect; 1 IT and Telecommunications; and 1 
Security Systems and Operations.
Duration: 1 to 3 days per assessor
Activity: 
--Prepare a Preliminary Report, including findings and feedback from 
stakeholders. This report should include concept and cost mitigation options.
--Prepare a written Final Report that lists the vulnerabilities, observations, 
and mitigation options.  Very rough order of magnitude cost estimates may be 
developed using standard unit costs for blast, CBR, and physical security 
infrastructure and equipment.
--Prepare a Vulnerability Portfolio with recommendations for incorporation into 
Emergency Operations, Disaster Recovery, and other plans or procedures


Table 3-3:  Tier 3 - Detailed Evaluation
Building Type: High value and critical infrastructure assets
Team Composition: 1 Site and Architectural - Team leader; 1 Structural and 
Building Envelope; 1 Mechanical, Electrical, and Power Systems and Site 
Utilities; 1 IT and Telecommunications Modeler; 1 Security Systems and 
Operations; 1 Explosive Blast Modeler; 1 CBR Modeler; 1 Cost Engineer; and 
1 Landscape Architect.
Activity: 
--A typical Tier 3 Assessment Team will use the results of the Tier 2 assessment 
and involve modeling and analysis of the building and related systems using 
advanced blast and WMD models and applications. Blast analysis will include 
structural progressive collapse, glazing, and effects of building hardening. CBR 
analysis should evaluate the effects of the agents released externally and 
internally to provide the dispersion, duration, and exposure of the building 
systems and occupants. The IT and Telecommunications Modeler should evaluate 
effects on all IT systems assuming cascading equipment failure and long-term 
access denial to critical equipment, data, and on-site administrative 
capability. 
--The Tier 3 assessment will provide detailed building response, survivability, 
and recovery information used to develop enhanced and accurate costing of 
mitigation options.


Evaluating the Site and Building (Task 3.2)
Understanding the type, nature, and geographic range of threats (Step 1) that 
can occur at your site or building, as well as the associated exposure of your 
assets (Step 2) is essential to conducting a vulnerability analysis. Each 
building, even if on the same campus or the same general area, can have 
different priority threats and hazards. A well-prepared risk manager must be 
aware of the types of threat and hazard events that can occur, the areas and 
resources most at risk, and the potential costs and losses that could accompany 
a threat or hazard event. 

To prepare an effective assessment, the following activities should take place:  
1.  Pre-Meeting and Preparation of a Schedule and Tentative Agenda. Before 
conducting the on-site building evaluation, a coordination meeting should take 
place. During this meeting, the type of assessment to be conducted, personnel 
availability, schedules, and outputs should be discussed in detail. In addition, 
firm timetables and an agenda for on-site visits should be discussed. The agenda 
schedule should include the sites to be evaluated and special areas to be 
protected. Worksheets 3-1 and 3-2 have been developed to aid in this process.

2.  On-Site Meeting(s). For each assessment, a preparation meeting will take 
place with key stakeholders. Upon arrival at the site or building, the Team 
should have an introduction meeting with key staff, review the available 
information, and review the vulnerability portfolio (Task 3.3). 
As a minimum, recommended building personnel attendees should include:
--Site or building owner
--Chief of engineering
--Chief of security
--Chief of IT
--Emergency manager

Other attendees may include:
--Union or employee representatives
--Local law enforcement, fire, and EMS representatives
--State or county representatives
--Local utility, telecommunications, and services (waste, security services, 
etc.)
--Administration, food services, laboratory, and other critical function 
representatives

For the assessment to be successful, building stakeholders should participate as 
key members, providing on-site access to all buildings and areas. In addition, 
they should participate in interviews, and provide comments on current strengths 
and weakness of plans and procedures, including facility access, personnel 
movement, operations and maintenance, and security alerts. 

3.  Windshield Tour(s). After the introduction meeting, the Assessment Team and 
stakeholders should conduct a windshield tour or walk-around of the key 
facilities. The Assessment Team may find areas that require special attention 
and feel the need to make adjustments to the assessment agenda (Worksheet 3-2).

4.  Assessment Background Information. After the on-site tour, the Assessment 
Team and stakeholders are ready to conduct the on-site assessment. Completing 
the matrices provided in this How-To Guide for conducting the threat assessment 
will take approximately 4 to 8 hours, using an interview and consensus approach 
around a table. During these discussions, the Team should prepare worksheets 
provided in Steps 1 and 2. 
They will determine:
--Threats that are a priority concern for your site, building, and related 
	infrastructure (Worksheets 1-1 and 1-2)
--The assets of  your area, building or site that can be affected by a threat 
(Worksheet 2-1)

5.  Review Key Documents. The Assessment Team will review or evaluate a number 
of plans, procedures, and policies. The list below provides some of the 
documents that need to be reviewed by the Team before conducting the assessment. 
How to gather this information is described in Steps 1 and 2.
--Prior vulnerability assessment data
--Emergency response and disaster recovery plans
--Security master plan (including detection/delay/assess)
--Security inspection results
--HazMat plans
--Policy and legal requirements
--Federal, State, and local law enforcement threat assessments
--Site plans of utility and communications systems
--Floor plans for all facilities identified as important (including those listed 
above)
--Floor plans and locations of modified and abandoned facilities
--Structural drawings of key facilities
--New project drawings for fences, security, and buildings
--Security system drawings
--Historical reports
--Local zoning ordinances
--Comprehensive plans
--Development plans
--Information on the facility systems operations capability 
--Information on agreements with the surrounding community and Federal agencies 
--Information on incidents within the building (i.e., misconduct information)
--Population statistics
--Manpower surveys
--Other documents determined by the Team to be important

6.  Review Emergency Procedures. The Assessment Team and building stakeholders 
should review the security master plan, and the engineering operations and 
maintenance, emergency operations, and disaster recovery plans to  understand 
the critical assets of the building and establish a baseline organization 
response and recovery capability in case of an attack or event. The impact of 
many vulnerabilities can be reduced or eliminated by simple changes in plans, 
policies, and procedures. As part of the screening phase review, the following 
areas should be considered:
--Emergency notification procedures
--Emergency evacuation procedures
--First responder access and routing
--Shelter-in-place procedures
--Designated shelter capacities and travel routes
--Off-site rally point and roll call
--Emergency engineering systems shutdown (HVAC, electrical, information 
technology (IT)/telecommunications)
--Portable protective equipment (indoor air filters, sampling kits, first aid)
--Personal protective equipment (PPE)
--Exercise of plans 

7.  Prepare the Assessment. Preparing the assessment can be as simple as a quick 
review and analysis of existing documents and a short walk around the site, or a 
more detailed in-depth review and analysis of the documents, plans, and other 
information and a thorough walk-through of the building, including utility 
spaces, basements, crawl spaces, attics, and vault (see Tables 3-1, 3-2, and 3-
3). The following are recommended when conducting the different types of 
assessments.  

For Tier 1 Screening Evaluation, the analysis should include, at a minimum: 
--Perimeter identification
--Vehicle and pedestrian entry access control points
--Security operations function
--EOC (or function)
--Primary point of entry of utilities and telecommunications
--Critical functions
--Critical infrastructure
--Key staff
--Off-site rally point and other Emergency Management procedures (PPE, mass 
notification, etc.)

For Tier 2 On-Site Evaluation, the analysis should include, at a minimum:
--Tier 1 information
--Detailed inspection and route tracing of primary utilities and 
telecommunications 
--Detailed review of HVAC system and operating parameters
--Detailed review of electric power and generator capacity (life safety, data 
centers, communications, etc.)
--Detailed review of structural and envelope system (column-beam connections, 
materials, clips, glazing)
--Detailed review of Security Master Plan, Emergency Management Plan, other 
related plans and Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) (Continuity of Operations 
[COOP], Continuity of Government [COG], Certified Emergency Management Plan 
[CEMP], etc.)

For Tier 3, Detailed Evaluation, the analysis should include, at a minimum:
--Tier 2 information
--Systems interdependencies on-site and off-site (utility vaults, communications 
central office trunks, transportation nodes, logistics, etc.)
--Advanced blast and CBR modeling of building and systems (structural damage, 
interior and exterior plume dispersion, safe haven areas)
--Advanced evacuation planning and routing to include test of mass notification 
system, training, and exercises
--Advanced disaster response and recovery planning in conjunction with neighbors 
and local government

8.  Data Gap Analysis. The Assessment Team may feel that the data gathered for 
on-site assessment are not enough. The Team should assess the following 
information:
--Do we know where the greatest damages may occur in the threat/hazard areas?
--Do we know whether critical facilities will be operational after a 
threat/hazard event?
--Are there enough data to determine which assets are subject to the greatest 
potential damages?
--Are there enough data to determine whether significant elements of the 
community are vulnerable to potential threats?
--Are there enough data to determine whether certain areas of historic, 
environmental, political, or cultural significance are vulnerable to potential 
threats?
--Is there concern about a particular threat because of its severity, frequency, 
or likelihood of occurrence?
--Are additional data needed to justify the expenditure of community or state 
funds for mitigation initiatives?

If the Team decides that more data will be beneficial to conduct the assessment, 
a determination should be made as to what type of data are needed and what 
resources are available for collecting new data. If stakeholders and the Team 
agree on collecting new data, the Team needs to prioritize areas for additional 
data collection.

 
Preparing a Vulnerability Portfolio (Task 3.3)
To carry out the assessment, the Team should have a vulnerability portfolio 
available. This portfolio should include the following:
--Assessment agenda (Worksheet 3-2)
--Assessment background information (to be collected by Assessment Team and 
building owners)
--Threats rating (Worksheets 1-1 and 1-2)
--Asset value ranking worksheet (Worksheet 2-1)
--Key documents (plans, procedures, and policies, see Task 3.2) 
--Emergency procedures (baseline organization response and recovery capability 
in case of an attack or event, see Task 3.2)	
--Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist (Appendix A)
--Risk assessment matrices (Worksheets 4-1 and 4-2, described in Step 4)
--Prioritization of observations in the checklist (Worksheet 4-3)
--Risk Assessment Database (if assessment is going to be automated  see 
Appendix B)

The Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist, the Pre-Assessment Screening 
Matrix, and the Risk Assessment Database are explained below. 


Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist. 
Appendix A includes the Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist, which 
compiles many best practices based on technologies and scientific research to 
consider during the design of a new building or renovation of an existing 
building. It allows a consistent security evaluation of designs at various 
levels. The Checklist is a key tool in the preparation of the threat assessment 
and a fundamental element of your vulnerability portfolio. When performing a 
walk-through of the facility to be assessed, the Team should use the Checklist 
as a screening tool for preparing the vulnerability assessment and make 
observations when reviewing the questions included in the Checklist.

The Checklist is organized into 13 sections. To conduct a vulnerability 
assessment of a building or preliminary design, each section of the Checklist 
should be assigned to an engineer, architect, or subject matter expert who is 
knowledgeable and qualified to perform an assessment of the assigned area. Each 
assessor should consider the questions and guidance provided to help identify 
vulnerabilities and document results in the observations column. The 
observations made during this Step will be prioritized during Step 4. The 
observations in the Checklist should be supplemented with photographs, if 
possible. 

Risk Assessment Database. 
To support the building assessment process, a simple and easy to use Risk 
Assessment Database application is provided with this manual (see Appendix B). 
This database was originally developed for the Department of Veterans Affairs 
(VA) through the National Institute of Building Sciences (NIBS). It has already 
been used in the assessment of  over 100 hospitals, office buildings, data 
centers, and other facilities across the United States. FEMA modified this 
database in order to make it easy-to-use for commercial buildings. The database 
is a stand-alone application that has functions, folders to import and display 
digital photos, emergency plans, digital floor plans, and certain HAZUS-MH 
products. Information retrieved from HAZUS-MH and existing commercial off the 
shelf (COTS) software such as Facility Condition Assessment, Work Order, Real 
Estate, and Space and Planning applications can be used in conjunction with the 
database for the assessment. Site, Team, and other general information is 
collected and inputted using screens. This database contains the basic 
information included in the Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist. The 
Risk Assessment Database is an integral part of this How-To Guide. 

Using the Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist and the Risk Assessment 
Database. 
For all types of evaluations (Tiers 1, 2, and 3) the Building Vulnerability 
Assessment Checklist and the Risk Assessment Database can be used to collect and 
report information related to the building infrastructure. In practice, many 
assessment Team members will find it easier to use a paper copy of the checklist 
while walking the site and enter their field observations when back in the 
office. The newer tablet personal computers (PCs) can be used for direct data 
entry. Typically, each assessment Team member will be responsible for completing 
several sections of the checklist; the amount and detail of information that can 
be acquired and inputted into the checklist will depend upon the on-site time 
available and the amount of information that is readily available versus 
difficult to find. For example, ideally, a full set of computer-aided design 
(CAD) drawings would be used to evaluate the site, architectural elements, 
structural features, mechanical and electrical systems, and security systems. 
However, if CAD drawings are not available, often the Disaster Management 
Office, Safety Officer, or building engineer will have 8 x 11 inch site and 
floor plans that can be used in hard copy, scanned, and then color coded using 
simple Photoshop applications. If no plans are available, a picture of the fire 
evacuation plan on each floor should be taken. 

At the end of the day, after each assessment Team member has inputted his or her 
observations into the database, the Team should meet to review the observations 
and develop the vulnerability and mitigations list. The vulnerabilities can be 
grouped by campus, site, or individual building and each vulnerability can be 
given a priority; a vulnerability can have multiple mitigation options and each 
option should have a Rough Order of Magnitude Cost.

By reviewing the Critical Functions and Critical Infrastructure matrices and the 
color coded site and floor plans, the assessment Team can identify those 
functions and infrastructure that are collocated or are a single-point 
vulnerability (see Task 3.4) where multiple assets are susceptible to an event. 
A key risk reduction strategy is to build redundancy into the system by 
providing alternate means of service and places to connect temporary supplies 
for utilities and telecommunications, disperse or have alternate sites for key 
staff and functions, and have multiple means of communication for shelter-in-
place and evacuation decisions.


Determining the Vulnerability Rating (Task 3.4)
This task involves determining a vulnerability rating that reflects the weakness 
of functions, systems, and sites in regard to a particular threat. Weakness 
includes the lack of redundancies that will make the building system operational 
after an attack. 

Redundancy Factor
A terrorist selects the weapon and tactic that will cause harm to people, 
destroy the infrastructure, or functionally defeat the target. The function and 
infrastructure vulnerability analysis will identify the geographic distribution 
within the building and interdependencies between critical assets. Ideally, the 
functions should have geographic dispersion as well as a recovery site or 
alternate work location. However, some critical functions and infrastructure do 
not have a backup, or will be determined to be collocated and create what are 
called single-point vulnerabilities. Identification and protection of these 
single-point vulnerabilities is a key aspect of the assessment process. Concerns 
related to common system vulnerabilities are:
--No redundancy
--Redundant systems feed into single critical node
--Critical components of redundant systems collocated
--Inadequate capacity or endurance in post-attack environment

Identification and protection of these single-point vulnerabilities will help 
you to determine a more accurate vulnerability rating for your assessment. 
Figure 3-2 shows common system vulnerabilities.

Figure 3-2: Common system vulnerabilities
Graphic showing four different flow charts for common system vulnerabilities: no 
redundancy; redundant systems feed into single critical node; critical 
components of redundant systems collocated; and inadequate capacity or endurance 
in post-attack environment.


Scale for Vulnerability Rating
For this How-To Guide, the following scale for vulnerability has been selected. 
Table 3-4 provides a scale for selecting your vulnerability rating. The scale is 
a combination of a 7-level linguistic scale and a 10-point numerical scale (10 
being the greater threat). The key elements of this scale are the weaknesses of 
your building and easiness and/or difficulties that the aggressors may face when 
wishing to generate damage to your building. Also, the loss of operations in 
case of an attack and the lack of redundancies are considered. Tables 3-5A and 
3-5B display a nominal example applying these ratings for an urban multi-story 
building.

Table 3-4: Vulnerability Rating
Criteria: Very High
Score: 10
Description: Very High  One or more major weaknesses have been identified that 
make the asset extremely susceptible to an aggressor or hazard. The building 
lacks redundancies/physical protection and the entire building would be only 
functional again after a very long period of time after the attack.

Criteria: High
Score: 8-9
Description: High  One or more major weaknesses have been identified that make 
the asset highly susceptible to an aggressor or hazard. The building has poor 
redundancies/physical protection and most parts of the building would be only 
functional again after a long period of time after the attack.

Criteria: Medium High
Score: 7
Description: Medium High  An important weakness has been identified that makes 
the asset very susceptible to an aggressor or hazard. The building has 
inadequate redundancies/physical protection and most critical functions would be 
only operational again after a long period of time after the attack.  

Criteria: Medium
Score: 5-6
Description: Medium  A weakness has been identified that makes the asset fairly 
susceptible to an aggressor or hazard. The building has insufficient 
redundancies/physical protection and most part of the building would be only 
functional again after a considerable period of time after the attack. 

Criteria: Medium Low
Score: 4
Description: Medium Low  A weakness has been identified that makes the asset 
somewhat susceptible to an aggressor or hazard. The building has incorporated a 
fair level of redundancies/physical protection and most critical functions would 
be only operational again after a considerable period of time after the attack.

Criteria: Low
Score: 2-3
Description: Low  A minor weakness has been identified that slightly increases 
the susceptibility of the asset to an aggressor or hazard. The building has 
incorporated a good level of redundancies/physical protection and the building 
would be operational within a short period of time after an attack.

Criteria: Very Low
Score: 1
Description: Very Low  No weaknesses exist. The building has incorporated 
excellent redundancies/physical protection and the building would be operational 
immediately after an attack.


Table 3-5A: Nominal Example of Vulnerability Rating for a Specific Multi-story 
Building (Building Function)

Five terrorist threats (Cyber Attack; Vehicle Bomb; Suicide Bomber; Chemical 
(Sarin); and Biological (Ricin)) are ranked for each of the following building 
functions:
Administration	
Engineering	
Warehousing	
Data Center	
Food Service	
Security	
Housekeeping	
Day Care


Table 3-5B: Nominal Example of Vulnerability Rating for a Specific Multi-story 
Building (Building Infrastructure)

Five terrorist threats (Cyber Attack; Vehicle Bomb; Suicide Bomber; Chemical 
(Sarin); and Biological (Ricin)) are ranked for each of the following building 
infrastructures:
Site	
Architectural	
Structural Systems
Envelope Systems
Utility Systems	
Mechanical Systems
Plumbing and Gas Systems
Electrical Systems
Fire Alarm Systems
IT/Communications Systems

Worksheet 3-1: Nominal Assessment Schedule
Worksheet 3-1 provides an example of a nominal assessment schedule for two 
buildings owned by the same stakeholder. It reflects a multi-day assessment with 
a variable number of Team members.  The bottom of the table includes space to 
write key contact information. Remember that a Team can be contacted to perform 
assessments for multiple buildings.

Worksheet description: for each building location, the team members are noted 
along with their dates of first, second, and third on-site visit and any 
comments. Also on the worksheet is each member's contact information (name, 
phone, email, and comments).


Worksheet 3-2: Assessment Agenda
Worksheet 3-2 will help you to prepare your assessment agenda. Using the 
Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist, the Team should propose the areas 
that need to be analyzed during the on-site visits. The proposed list will be 
discussed with building owners and facility managers and will be finalized by 
the Assessment Team.

Worksheet description: 
Three columns: infrastructure, site and components to be assessed, and the 
members. 
The infrastructure column lists the following: Site; Architectural; Structural 
Systems; Envelope Systems; Utility Systems; Mechanical Systems; 
Plumbing and Gas Systems; Electrical Systems; Fire Alarm Systems; and 
IT/Communications Systems.


Worksheet 3-3: Vulnerability Rating
Worksheet 3-1 can be used to complete your risk assessment and will be used in 
conjunction with Worksheets 4-1 and 4-2. It can be used to discuss the 
vulnerability rating with building stakeholders and among the members of the 
Assessment Team. Vulnerability rating refers to a numerical value that can be 
assigned to building weaknesses and lack of redundancy.

To fill out Worksheet 3-1, analyze the impact of a particular threat to your 
site and/or building. Analyze core functions and building infrastructure 
components as indicated in Task 2.2 of Step 2. Analyze your assets based on: a) 
the identified threat; b) the criticality of your assets: and c) a level of 
protection you may have chosen (i.e., your willingness or unwillingness to 
accept risk). When assigning a vulnerability rating, consider redundancy factors 
included in Task 3.4. This may increase your vulnerability rating for functions 
and infrastructure.

Vulnerability Rating
Very High: 10
High: 8-9
Medium High: 7
Medium: 5-6
Medium Low: 4
Low: 2-3
Very Low: 1

--Function:
Administration
Engineering
Warehousing
Data Center
Food Service
Security
Housekeeping
Day Care
Other
Other

--Infrastructure:
Site
Architectural
Structural Systems
Envelope Systems
Utility Systems
Mechanical Systems
Plumbing and Gas Systems
Electrical Systems
Fire Alarm Systems
IT/Communications Systems



Step 4: Risk Assessment

Overview
The fourth step in the assessment process is to prepare a risk assessment for 
your site and building (see Figure 4-1). The risk assessment analyzes the 
threat, asset value, and vulnerability to ascertain the level of risk for each 
critical asset against each applicable threat. Inherent in this is the 
likelihood of the threat occurring and the consequences of the occurrence. 

The risk assessment process involves the following tasks: 
--Preparing the risk assessment matrices
--Determining the risk ratings
--Prioritizing observations in the Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist

Figure 4-1: Steps and tasks
Step 4: Risk Assessment
TASKS:
4.1.	Preparing the risk assessment matrices
4.2. 	Determining the risk ratings
4.3  	Prioritizing observations in the Building Vulnerability Assessment 
Checklist


There are a number of methods and means to conduct a building risk assessment, 
and the steps can be accomplished in different sequences. However, they all have 
one common objective, which is to apply a quantitative assessment process that 
identifies those assets at highest risk and evaluate mitigation measures that 
can reduce that risk. The process selected for this How-To Guide is described 
below.

 
Preparing the Risk Assessment Matrices (Task 4.1)
In order to estimate potential losses, a series of matrices have been prepared. 
The inputs for these matrices are based on the analysis performed during Steps 
1, 2, and 3.

To estimate risk, a number of factors need to be taken into consideration. The 
first one is to identify and rate the threats that could cause harm to a 
building and its inhabitants. Next, the value of assets and people that need to 
be protected will be identified. After threats and assets are identified, a 
vulnerability rating that identifies weaknesses that might be exploited by a 
terrorist or aggressor is determined. Risk can be computed using the results of 
the threat rating, asset value, and vulnerability rating.

Tables 4-1 to 4-10 can be used as a pre-assessment screening tool by the Team 
while conducting the on-site meetings with key staff members (e.g., building 
owners, security, site management, key function representatives, etc.). The 
tables should be completed by consensus judgment of the building stakeholders 
and Assessment Team members.  The risk assessment matrices can provide both a 
quantitative score and color code to objectively and visually determine the 
functions and systems that have been determined to be at risk.

During Steps 1 and 2, you should have identified your threat rating (Worksheet 
1-2), asset value (Worksheet 2-1), and vulnerability rating (Worksheet 3-3). At 
this point, you should transfer these values to Worksheets 4-1 and 4-2.  

In the risk assessment matrices, the threats are listed across the top, and the 
functions and infrastructure are listed down the side to create threat-pairs. In 
general, there are two approaches to complete Worksheets 4-1 and 4-2. One 
approach is to start with all cell elements set to zero and discuss each element 
in detail to arrive at a consensus number. Another approach is to start with all 
cell elements equal to a numeric value (e.g., 5) and then adjust cell values 
up or down. With either approach, the first few rows and columns will take the 
longest time to reach consensus values, but, as the group becomes familiar with 
the ratings and scales, the process converges quickly. It should take 
approximately 3 to 4 hours to complete the matrices and, during that time, many 
of the building vulnerabilities will be verbally identified and collaborated 
with the vulnerability portfolio and earlier building site tour.

Identifying and Determining the Threat Rating. 
Step 1 will help you to identify and come to a consensus in terms of the threat 
rating. After each threat/hazard has been identified and defined, the threat 
level for each threat/hazard shall be determined. The threat rating is a 
subjective judgment of a terrorist threat based on existence, capability, 
history, intentions, and targeting. The threat rating is a snapshot in time, and 
can be influenced by many factors, but the given threat value will typically be 
the same for each function (going down the columns). Organizations that are 
dispersed in a campus environment may have variations in ratings. For threat 
rating, a scale from 1-10 was assigned: 10 is considered very high; 8-9 is high; 
7 is medium high; 5-6 is medium; 4 is medium low; 2-3 is low; and 1 is very low. 

Rating the Asset Value. 
Step 2 will help you to determine the asset value rating for your site and/or 
building. After a buildings assets requiring protection have been identified, 
they should be assigned a value. The asset value is the degree of debilitating 
impact that would be caused by the incapacity or destruction of the buildings 
assets. There are a number of methods and means to conduct a building risk 
assessment, and the steps can be accomplished in different sequences, but the 
objective is to apply a quantitative assessment process that identifies those 
assets at highest risk and evaluate mitigation measures that can reduce that 
risk. For an asset value rating, a scale from 1-10 was assigned: 10 is 
considered very high; 8-9 is high; 7 is medium high; 5-6 is medium; 4 is medium 
low; 2-3 is low; and 1 is very low. 
 
Assessing the Vulnerability. 
Step 3 will help you to determine the vulnerability rating for your site and/or 
building. After your threat rating and asset value rating have been identified, 
the vulnerability rating should be determined.  Vulnerability rating requires 
identifying and rating the vulnerability of each asset-threat pair. An indepth 
vulnerability assessment of a building evaluates specific design and 
architectural features, and identifies all vulnerabilities of the building 
functions and building systems. In the vulnerability rating scale of 1 to 10, 1 
means very low or no weaknesses exist, and 10 means one or more major 
weaknesses exist to make an asset extremely susceptible to an aggressor. 

Critical Functions Asset Value. 
Table 4-1 depicts a portion of the site critical functions matrix. It lists the 
functions down the left side and threats across the top. The asset value rating 
is entered into the site critical functions matrix and begins the process of 
quantifying the risk elements. In general, the asset value for a given function 
is the same for all threats and the matrix helps to identify the primary 
functions in a quantitative form. The functions matrix is people oriented and 
subjective, and provides a guide to vulnerabilities and risks. The asset value 
under the engineering and administration functions is highlighted. For 
administration, a medium asset value (5) was assigned for all threats. For 
engineering, a high asset rating (8) was determined for all threats.

Table 4-1: Critical Functions Asset Value
Five terrorist attack types (Cyber Attack; Vehicle Bomb; Suicide Bomber; 
Chemical (Sarin); and Biological (Ricin)) are assigned critical asset values for 
each of the following building functions: 
--Administration: Asset Value, Threat Rating, and Vulnerability Rating.
Engineering: Asset Value, Threat Rating, and Vulnerability Rating.		
			

Critical Infrastructure Asset Value. 
Table 4-2 depicts a portion of the site critical infrastructure matrix. It lists 
infrastructure down the left side and threats across the top. In general, the 
asset value for a given infrastructure asset is the same for all threats and is 
usually the economic cost of replacement. The value can be changed to reflect 
intangibles such as duration of loss, loss of production capability, etc. The 
asset value rating under the site and structural systems is highlighted. A 
medium low asset value rating (4) was assigned for the site infrastructure 
threat pairs. A high asset value rating (8) was assigned for the structural 
system threat pairs.

Table 4-2: Critical Infrastructure Asset Value
Five terrorist attack types (Cyber Attack; Vehicle Bomb; Suicide Bomber; 
Chemical (Sarin); and Biological (Ricin)) are assigned critical asset 
values for each of the following building infrastructures:
--Site: Asset Value, Threat Rating, and Vulnerability Rating.
Structural Systems: Asset Value, Threat Rating, and Vulnerability Rating.	
				

Critical Functions Threat Rating. 
The threat rating under the site and structural systems is highlighted in Table 
4-3. A high threat rating (8) was assigned for a cyber attack based on known 
groups releasing worms and viruses; a medium low threat rating (4) was assigned 
for a vehicle bomb; a medium threat rating (5) was assigned for a suicide bomber 
based on current intelligence on known groups and quantity of explosives 
available; and a low threat rating (2) was assigned for both Sarin and Ricin 
attacks based on current intelligence of prior targets and predicted use against 
future targets (assuming that the building is not the primary target, but may 
experience collateral damage effects).

Table 4-3: Critical Functions Threat Rating
Five terrorist attack types (Cyber Attack; Vehicle Bomb; Suicide Bomber; 
Chemical (Sarin); and Biological (Ricin)) are assigned critical asset 
values for each of the following building functions: 
--Administration: Asset Value, Threat Rating, and Vulnerability Rating.
Engineering: Asset Value, Threat Rating, and Vulnerability Rating.		
			

Critical Infrastructure Threat Rating. The threat rating under the site and 
structural systems is highlighted in Table 4-4. A high threat rating (8) was 
assigned for a cyber attack based on known groups releasing worms and viruses; a 
medium low threat rating (4) was assigned for a vehicle bomb; a medium threat 
rating (5) was assigned for a suicide bomber based on current intelligence on 
known groups and quantity of explosives available; and a low threat rating (2) 
was assigned for both Sarin and Ricin attacks based on current intelligence of 
prior targets and predicted use against future targets (assuming that the 
building is not the primary target, but may experience collateral damage 
effects).

Table 4-4: Critical Infrastructure Threat Rating
Five terrorist attack types (Cyber Attack; Vehicle Bomb; Suicide Bomber; 
Chemical (Sarin); and Biological (Ricin)) are assigned critical asset 
values for each of the following building infrastructures:
--Site: Asset Value, Threat Rating, and Vulnerability Rating.
Structural Systems: Asset Value, Threat Rating, and Vulnerability Rating.	
			

Critical Functions Vulnerability Rating. 
In Table 4-5, for administration, a medium high vulnerability rating (7) was 
determined for a cyber attack; a medium high vulnerability rating (7) was 
determined for a vehicle bomb; a high vulnerability rating (9) was assigned for 
a suicide bomber, and for Sarin and Ricin attacks because administration is 
located at the lobby entrance. For engineering, a medium vulnerability rating 
(7) was determined for a cyber attack; a medium low vulnerability rating (4) was 
determined for a vehicle bomb; a medium vulnerability rating (5) was determined 
for a suicide bomber; and a medium vulnerability rating (6) was determined for a 
Sarin or Ricin attack.

Table 4-5: Critical Functions Vulnerability Rating
Five terrorist attack types (Cyber Attack; Vehicle Bomb; Suicide Bomber; 
Chemical (Sarin); and Biological (Ricin)) are assigned critical asset 
values for each of the following building functions:
--Administration: Asset Value, Threat Rating, and Vulnerability Rating.
Engineering: Asset Value, Threat Rating, and Vulnerability Rating.


Critical Infrastructure Vulnerability Rating. 
In Table 4-6, a low vulnerability rating (1) was determined for a cyber attack 
because there are no internet devices; a medium high vulnerability rating (7) 
was determined for a vehicle bomb; a low vulnerability rating (3) was determined 
for a suicide bomber; a low vulnerability rating (2) for Sarin and Ricin attacks 
because there would be little damage impact on the site. For structural systems, 
a low vulnerability rating (1) was determined for a cyber attack; a high 
vulnerability rating (10) was determined for a vehicle bomb due to progressive 
collapse concerns; a medium vulnerability rating (6) was determined for a 
suicide bomber who could place a device next to a primary support and load 
bearing column; and a low vulnerability rating (1) was determined for a Sarin or 
Ricin attack because there would be little or no damage. 

Table 4-6: Critical Infrastructure Vulnerability Rating
Five terrorist attack types (Cyber Attack; Vehicle Bomb; Suicide Bomber; 
Chemical (Sarin); and Biological (Ricin)) are assigned critical asset 
values for each of the following building infrastructures:
--Administration: Asset Value, Threat Rating, and Vulnerability Rating.
Engineering: Asset Value, Threat Rating, and Vulnerability Rating.


Determining the Risk Ratings (Task 4.2)
Risk is the potential for a loss or damage to an asset. It is measured based 
upon the value of the asset in relation to the threats and vulnerabilities 
associated with it. Risk is based on the likelihood or probability of the hazard 
occurring and the consequences of the occurrence. A risk assessment analyzes the 
threat (probability of occurrence), asset value (consequences of the 
occurrence), and vulnerabilities  to ascertain the level of risk for each asset 
against each applicable threat/hazard. The risk assessment provides engineers 
and architects with a relative risk profile that defines which assets are at the 
greatest risk against specific threats. 

There are numerous methodologies and technologies for conducting a risk 
assessment. For this How-To Guide, the approach is to assemble the results of 
the threat assessment, asset value assessment, and vulnerability assessment, and 
determine a numeric value of risk for each asset and threat/hazard pair in 
accordance with the following formula:

Risk = Asset Value x Threat Rating x Vulnerability Rating

To prepare the risk estimation matrices three factors or elements of risk are 
considered for each function or system against each threat previously 
identified. Multiplying the values assigned to each of the three factors 
provides quantification of total risk. The total risk for each function or 
system against each threat is assigned a color code. The results of the risk 
assessment should be used to help prioritize which mitigation measures should be 
adopted, given limited resources, in order to achieve a desired level of 
protection. To determine your risk rating, you may use Table 4-7, which includes 
information on observations in the Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist 
(Appendix A) on the total risk scale and color codes. A site functional pre-
screening matrix is shown in Table 4-8 and a site infrastructure pre-screening 
matrix is shown in Table 4-9.  Worksheets 4-1 and 4-2 will assist you in 
preparing and organizing the information for your risk assessment. 

Table 4-7: Total Risk Scale Color Code
Risk Factors Totals:
Low Risk: 1 to 60
Medium Risk: 61 to 175
High Risk: greater than or equal to 176

Table 4-8: Site Functional Pre-Assessment Screening Matrix
Table description for 4-8: Calculated risk factors for building functions based 
on the equation of Risk equals Asset Value multiplied by Threat Rating 
multiplied by Vulnerability Rating.


Table 4-9: Site Infrastructure Pre-Assessment Screening Matrix 
Table description for 4-8: Calculated risk factors for building infrastructures 
based on the equation of Risk equals Asset Value multiplied by Threat Rating 
multiplied by Vulnerability Rating.


Prioritizing Observations in the Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist 
(Task 4.3)
The  Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist relates to building core 
infrastructure. During Task 3.3, the Assessment Team performed an on-site 
assessment and filled out observations in the Building Vulnerability Assessment 
Checklist. (Table 4-10 provides a nominal example.) As mentioned before, the 
Checklist is a key tool in the preparation of the vulnerability assessment. It 
is used to guide the assessors performing the assessment of the facility. The 
vulnerabilities of the facility are selected from the observations provided for 
each vulnerability question. These vulnerabilities are then prioritized to 
determine the most effective mitigation measures. Prioritization is based on the 
greatest vulnerabilities that can be exploited by the aggressors and largest 
risks in terms of loss of lives, building damage, and loss of operation. Task 
4.3 is the final task of the risk assessment. It allows the assessors to rank 
their observed facility vulnerabilities and proposed remedial actions. Worksheet 
4-3 will help you to perform this task. For more information on how to use the 
Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist, see Step 3 and Appendix A. 


Table 4-10: Nominal Example of Observations in the Building Vulnerability 
Assessment Checklist

Section: 1.  Site
Vulnerability Question: Is a perimeter fence or other types of barrier controls 
in place?	
Guidance: The intent is to channel pedestrian traffic onto a site with multiple 
buildings through known access control points. For a single building, the intent 
is to have a single visitor entrance.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 	
Observations: The main gate entrance remains wide open for vehicle and 
pedestrian intruders. There are missing street signs throughout the facility. It 
is difficult to channel staff and visitors to control access points. There is 
only one security vehicles to serve the entire campus; at least two more are 
required.

Section: 2.  Architectural
Subsection: 2.27
Vulnerability Questions: Is interior glazing near high-risk areas minimized?
Is interior glazing in other areas shatter-resistant?	
Guidance: Interior glazing should be minimized where a threat exists and should 
be avoided in enclosures of critical functions next to high-risk areas.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100	
Observations: In the main facade, windows are not blast-resistant and the glass 
is not properly anchored to the frame. In case of a blast event, it is 
anticipated that the glass will break and will not remain in the frame. This 
could cause extensive injuries in case of an explosive event.  

Section: 8.  Utility Systems
Subsection: 8.6	
Vulnerability Questions: 
Does emergency backup power exist for all areas within the building or for 
critical areas only?
How is the emergency power distributed?
Is the emergency power system independent from the normal electrical service, 
particularly in critical areas?
Guidance: There should be no single critical node that allows both the normal 
electrical service and the emergency backup power to be affected by a single 
incident. Automatic transfer switches and interconnecting switchgear are the 
initial concerns.
Emergency and normal electrical equipment should be installed separately, at 
different locations, and as far apart as possible.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100	
Observations: There are single-point vulnerabilities to the steam and 
electricity lines. Any damage to the steam or electric lines would result in 
loss of utilities.  

Worksheet 4-1: Site Functional Pre-Assessment Matrix
Worksheet 4-1 can be used to complete your risk assessment by determining the 
functions at a higher risk. To fill out this matrix, use the scales and color 
codes, provided in Steps 4.1 and 4.2.

Worksheet table description: Five categories to rank the Asset Value, Threat 
Rating, and the Vulnerability Rating for the Cyber Attack, Vehicle Bomb, 
Suicide Bomber, Chemical, and Biological attack, in building functions and 
infrastructures for the overall purpose of calculating risk.


Worksheet 4-2: Site Infrastructure Systems Pre-Assessment Matrix
Worksheet 4-2 can be used to complete your risk assessment by determining
the infrastructure at a higher risk.

Worksheet table description: Five categories to rank the Asset Value, Threat 
Rating, and the Vulnerability Rating for the Cyber Attack, Vehicle Bomb, 
Suicide Bomber, Chemical, and Biological attack, in infrastructures for the overall 
purpose of calculating risk.


Worksheet 4-3: Prioritization of Observations in the Checklist
The observations you made in the Building Vulnerability Checklist (Appendix A) 
during Step 3 should now be used to review the vulnerability ratings in 
Worksheets 4-1 and 4-2, and then the risk ratings for the associated Threat-
Asset Pairs in those worksheets. The observations that you use to confirm or 
adjust the vulnerability ratings are your selected vulnerabilities that 
Worksheet 4-3 can help you prioritize. The top portion of Worksheet 4-3 should 
have the selected observations/vulnerabilities listed in the Cross Reference 
Column. Using the updated results of Worksheets 4-1 and 4-2, indicate all high 
risk (red) Functions and Infrastructure column-row intersections that the 
vulnerability in the Cross Reference Column impacts. As previously stated, 
prioritization is based on the greatest vulnerabilities that can be exploited by 
the aggressors and largest risks in terms of loss of lives, building damage, and 
loss of operation. The bottom portion of Worksheet 4-3 should contain your 
selected observations/vulnerabilities that meet this statement in rank order  
highest to lowest. For example, Ranked Observation 1 would have the highest 
vulnerability rating matched with the highest risk rating and impacting the 
greatest number of Functions and Infrastructure. This table can be expanded to 
include more observations, as needed. In the Risk Assessment Database, 
vulnerabilities can be given a priority of 1 to 5 as defined by the Manager 
prior to the assessment. For example, the priority could be based upon the speed 
in which the vulnerability should be mitigated, or needed level of risk 
reduction sought, or ability to be exploited by the aggressor, etc. 

Worksheet table description: table used for ranking the risks of the building 
functions and infrastructures for each observation made. 



Step 5: Consider Mitigation Options

Overview
The fifth step in this How-To Guide is to identify and evaluate various 
mitigation options that are directly associated with, and responsive to, the 
major risks identified during Step 4 (see Figure 5-1). After the risk assessment 
process is completed, the stakeholders are frequently left with several areas 
where assets require mitigation measures and are limited by factors discussed in 
this step. Thus, decisions need to be made to focus the available resources on 
the most practical mitigation options. 

The consider mitigation options process involves the followings tasks:
--Identifying preliminary mitigation options
--Reviewing mitigation options
--Estimating cost
--Reviewing mitigation options, cost, and the layers of defense

Figure 5-1: Steps and tasks
Step 5: Consider Mitigation Options
TASKS:
1.	Identifying preliminary mitigation options
2.	Reviewing mitigation options
3.	Estimating cost
4.	Reviewing mitigation, cost, and the layers of defense


Step 5 emphasizes mitigation measures that can reduce the destructive effects 
against buildings in case of a terrorist attack. During this step, you will 
examine the mitigation options from the point of view of their effectiveness, 
acceptability, and feasibility with respect to prevailing implementation 
conditions. The proposed procedure for examining the mitigation options is not 
meant to replace full and thorough analysis of the technical assessment; it is 
meant to help you narrow down your options and focus your attention on those 
measures that have the greatest chance of effective implementation. 

Worksheets 4-3, 5-1, and 5-2 and the Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist 
(Appendix A) should be used for the preparation of your mitigation options.

In order to identify, select, and implement the most appropriate mitigation 
measures, general mitigation goals and objectives, and the merits of each 
potential mitigation measure should be examined. The building owner may take the 
final decision regarding which mitigation measures should be implemented. 
However, engineers, architects, landscape architects, and other technical people 
should be involved in this process to ensure that the results of the risk 
assessment are met with sound mitigation measures that will increase the 
capability of the building to resist potential terrorist attacks. 

To select, evaluate, and prioritize potential mitigation options, this How-To 
Guide has selected criteria that help to answer the following questions:
--Which mitigation measures are most appropriate for the types of risks faced by 
your assets?
--Are resources and capabilities sufficient to implement these measures and what 
additional resources might be needed?
--What impacts will the implementation of these measures have in areas 
surrounding your building(s) or in your community?


Identifying Preliminary Mitigation Options (Task 5.1)
After the Assessment Team and building stakeholders know which assets are at 
greatest risk (see Step 4), they can then identify mitigation measures to reduce 
this risk. Because it is not possible to completely eliminate risk and every 
project has resource limitations, you must carefully analyze your mitigation 
options. Worksheet 5-1 and the remaining sections of Task 5.1 will help you to 
identify your preliminary mitigation options.  


Prioritized Observations from the Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist
The Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist (Appendix A) is the main source 
for identifying mitigation options. To identify your mitigation options you 
should start with the observations made in the Checklist when conducting the on-
site assessment (see Task 3.2), but use your expertise and experience during the 
assessment to determine any vulnerabilities or mitigation options that may not 
be covered in the standard process. Then prioritize these observations as 
vulnerabilities (see Task 4.3). The remaining part of this task will help you to 
create a feasible framework for the identified observations. 


Regulatory Measures, Rehabilitation of Existing Structures, and Protective and 
Control Structures Parameters
Mitigation measures can be viewed from many different perspectives. In this How-
To Guide, the emphasis is on addressing building infrastructure and core 
building functions. The purpose is to identify sound mitigation measures 
directed at reducing the effects of potential terrorist attacks on the built 
environment. For this task, three broad categories have been identified: 
--Regulatory measures
--Repair and strengthening of existing structures
--Protective and control measures

Regulatory Measures. 
Regulatory measures include legal and other regulatory instruments that 
governments use to prevent, reduce, or prepare for the losses associated with 
manmade hazard events that affect commercial buildings, which are the central 
topic of this How-To Guide. Examples include:
--Legislation that organizes and distributes responsibilities to protect a 
community from manmade threats
--Regulations that reduce the financial and social impact of manmade hazards 
through measures, such as insurance
--New or updated design and construction codes
--New or modified land use and zoning regulations
--Incentives that provide inducements for implementing mitigation measures 

In most cases, regulatory measures should be considered before implementing 
other measures because  regulatory measures provide the framework for decision-
making, organizing, and financing of mitigation actions.

Repair and Strengthening of Existing Structures. 
As its name implies, repair and strengthening deals with structural and non-
structural modifications of existing buildings and infrastructure facilities. 
Although new construction can include protective measures to reduce the 
potential impact against terrorist attacks, existing buildings may be at risk 
because they were constructed without the appropriate safety measures to 
withstand potential terrorist attacks. Thus, improving the safety and structural 
integrity of existing buildings and infrastructure facilities is often the best 
way to reduce the impact of manmade events on such structures. When a manmade 
hazard occurs, it can directly damage a target building or indirectly cause 
secondary effects in adjacent buildings. The level of damage is impacted by each 
structures quality of design and construction. Poorly engineered and 
constructed buildings are usually not able to resist the forces generated by a 
blast event or serve as safe havens in case of CBR attacks.

Protective and Control Measures. 
Unlike other mitigation measures that improve the resistance of buildings and 
infrastructure to disasters, protective and control measures focus on protecting 
structures by deflecting the destructive forces from vulnerable structures and 
people. Ideally, a potential terrorist attack is prevented or pre-empted through 
intelligence measures. If the attack does occur, physical security measures 
combine with operational forces (e.g., surveillance, guards, and sensors) to 
provide layers of defense that delay and/or thwart the attack (for more 
information, see Task 2.1). Deception may be used to make the facility appear to 
be a more protected or lower-risk facility than it actually is, thereby making 
it a less attractive target. Deception can also be used to misdirect the 
attacker to a portion of the facility that is non-critical. As a last resort, 
structural hardening is provided to save lives and facilitate evacuation and 
rescue by preventing building collapse and limiting flying debris. 
Because of the interrelationship between physical and operational security 
measures, it is imperative for the owner and security professional to define, 
early in the design process, what extent of operational security is planned for 
various threat levels. If properly implemented, physical security measures will 
contribute toward the goals listed below in prioritized order.

--Preventing an attack. 
By making it more difficult to implement some of  the more obvious attack 
scenarios (such as a parked car in the street) or making the target appear to be 
of low value in terms of the amount of sensation that would be generated if it 
were attacked, the would-be attacker may become discouraged from targeting the 
building. On the other hand, it may not be advantageous to make the facility too 
obviously protected or not protected, because this may provide an incentive to 
attack the building. 

--Delaying the attack. 
If an attack is initiated, properly designed landscape or architectural features 
can delay its execution by making it more difficult for the attacker to reach 
the intended target. This will give the security forces and authorities time to 
mobilize and possibly stop the attack before it is executed. This is done by 
creating a buffer zone between the publicly accessible areas and the vital areas 
of the facility by means of an obstacle course, a serpentine path, or a division 
of functions within the facility. Alternatively, through effective design, the 
attacker could be enticed to a non-critical part of the facility, thereby 
delaying the attack. 

--Mitigating the effects of the attack. 
If these precautions are implemented and the attack still takes place, 
structural protection efforts will serve to control the extent and consequences 
of damage. In the context of the overall security provided to the building, 
structural protection is a last resort that only becomes effective after all 
other efforts to stop the attack have failed. In the event of an attack, the 
benefits of enhancements to life-safety systems may be realized in lives saved. 

Sidebar: 
The goal of the assessment process is to achieve the level of protection sought 
through implementation of mitigation measures in the building design. These 
measures may reduce risk by deterring, detecting, denying, or devaluing the 
potential threat element prior to or during execution of an enemy attack. The 
Department of Homeland Security uses the following methodology to achieve this 
purpose.

Deter: 
The process of making the target inaccessible or difficult to defeat with the 
weapon or tactic selected. It is usually accomplished at the site perimeter 
using highly visible electronic security systems, fencing, barriers, lighting, 
and security personnel and in the building by securing access with locks and 
electronic monitoring devices.

Detect: 
The process of using intelligence sharing and security services response to 
monitor and identify the threat before it penetrates the site perimeter or 
building access points.

Deny: 
The process of minimizing or delaying the degree of site or building 
infrastructure damage or loss of life or protecting assets by designing or using 
infrastructure and equipment designed to withstand blast and chemical, 
biological, or radiological effects.

Devalue:  
The process of making the site or building of little to no value or consequence, 
from the terrorists perspective, such that an attack on the facility would not 
yield their desired result.


Reviewing Mitigation Options (Task 5.2)
At this point, you should have identified a preliminary list of mitigation 
options. These options should have been grouped under the regulatory, 
rehabilitation, and protective and control framework for blast and CBR. The 
remaining sections of Task 5.2 provide a set of criteria to help you to narrow 
down the mitigation options identified during Task 5.1. Worksheet 5-2 will help 
you to analyze further your mitigation options in order to select those that are 
more feasible to be implemented. The selected criteria include the following: 

Available Political Support
Political support involves examining the proposed mitigation options by seeking 
the opinions of local and State elected officials, as well as the community as a 
whole. Most communities have learned that success of mitigation efforts hinges 
on political- and community-wide support. Building an effective political 
constituency for implementation of mitigation measures in most cases requires 
time and patience. However, some mitigation options will garner such support 
more easily than others.

Community Acceptance
Community acceptance cannot be viewed separately from the need for political 
support for the proposed mitigation options. Both are necessary preconditions 
for their successful implementation. In many cases, community-wide campaigns are 
necessary to explain the risks, the reasons for, and the expected benefits from 
the proposed measures. 

Cost 
Although the implementation of mitigation measures hinges on political 
commitment and technical capacity, it also depends heavily on the costs 
involved. After identifying your mitigation measures in Task 5.1, you will have 
some idea of the cost involved and opportunities for implementation. 
 
Benefit 
When implementing a mitigation measure, it is important to consider that the 
benefit of implementing the option outweighs the cost. After identifying your 
mitigation measures in Task 5.1, you will have some idea of the benefits that 
may result from implementing your mitigation measures.
 
Available Financial Resources
As you begin Task 5.2, it is important to have some knowledge of the available 
resources for implementing mitigation options. The Team should discuss this 
issue with the site and building owners because the amount of financial 
resources may define the type of mitigation options to be adopted. The Team 
should also discuss any Federal and State programs available for financing 
large-scale mitigation measures.

Legal Authority
Without the appropriate legal authority, a mitigation action cannot lawfully be 
undertaken. You will need to determine whether the building owner has the legal 
authority to implement the selected mitigation options or whether it is 
necessary to wait for new laws or regulations. For example, creating stand-off 
distances in urban areas can be against zoning ordinances and building set-back 
requirements.

Adversely Affected Population
While implementing your mitigation measures to solve problems related to blast 
and CBR resistance, you may want to consider that some segments of the 
population may be adversely affected. For example, the construction of barriers 
and bollards can inhibit the number of tourists visiting a particular city and 
might affect the community and the hospitality sector.

Adverse Effects on the Already Built Environment
Some mitigation measures may have a negative effect on the already built 
environment. When selecting mitigation measures, the following should be 
strictly scrutinized:
--Effects on traffic/vehicular mobility
--Effects on pedestrian mobility
--Effects on ingress and egress to the building
--Effects on other building operations
--Effects on aesthetics
--Potential interference with first responders

Impact on the Environment
When considering mitigation options, it is important to consider whether the 
recommended mitigation options will have a negative effect on environmental 
assets such as threatened and endangered species, wetlands, and other protected 
natural resources.

Technical Capacity
Some mitigation measures require highly skilled and specialized engineering 
expertise for implementation. Although experts can be hired on a short-term 
basis, the technical complexity of some mitigation solutions may require the 
expertise for long-term maintenance. It is therefore necessary to examine the 
technical capacities of all stakeholders and identify key technical expertise 
needed for each proposed mitigation option. If adequate technical capabilities 
are available for proposed mitigation measures, you should rank them higher on 
your priority list.

Funding for Maintenance and Operations
When considering the implementation of your mitigation options, you should be 
sure that funding is available for maintenance and operations.

Ease and Speed of Implementation
Different mitigation measures require different kinds of authority for their 
implementation. The Team must identify public authorities and responsible 
agencies for implementing mitigation measures and must examine their rules and 
regulations. The Team must identify all legislative problem areas and 
institutional obstacles as well as the incentives that can facilitate mitigation 
and implementation. The Team will have to balance the desirability of the 
mitigation measure against the communitys rules and regulations in order to 
decide which takes precedence. 

Timeframe and Urgency
Some mitigation measures require immediate implementation due to their nature 
(i.e., repetitive security breaches), political desire (i.e., platform project), 
or social perception (i.e., recent damage and disaster) of the risk.  These 
perceptions can be the drivers to determining the timeframe for implementation 
of your mitigation options.

Short-term Solutions/Benefits
When considering your mitigation options, you may want to evaluate your short-
term solutions (i.e., mitigation options that will solve a particular problem 
temporarily, but may require additional funding in the future for follow-on 
projects). A short-term solution can be quickly accomplished and can demonstrate 
immediate progress in satisfying your community needs. 

Long-term Solutions/Benefits
When considering your mitigation options, you may want to evaluate your long-
term solutions (i.e., mitigation options that cannot be funded immediately, but 
will solve the problem permanently in the future when funds are available). A 
long-term solution can be more cost-effective in the long run that a short-term 
one.  

Estimating Cost (Task 5.3)
The initial construction cost of protection has two components: fixed and 
variable. Fixed costs include such items as security hardware and space 
requirements. These costs do not depend on the level of an attack (i.e., it 
costs the same to keep a truck away from a building regardless of whether the 
truck contains 500 or 5,000 pounds of TNT). Blast protection, on the other hand, 
is a variable cost. It depends on the threat level, which is a function of the 
explosive charge weight and the stand-off distance. Building designers have no 
control over the amount of explosives used, but are able to change the level of 
protection by defining an appropriate stand-off distance, adopting hardening 
measures for their buildings, and providing sacrificial spaces that can be 
affected by terrorist attacks, but, at the same time, can protect people and 
critical building functions and infrastructure.  

The optimal stand-off distance is determined by defining the total cost of 
protection as the sum of the cost of protection (construction cost) and the cost 
of stand-off (land cost). These two costs are considered as a function of the 
stand-off for a given explosive charge weight. The cost of protection is assumed 
to be proportional to the peak reflected pressure at the building envelope while 
the cost of land is proportional to the square of the stand-off distance. The 
optimal level of protection is the one that minimizes the sum of these costs. 

If additional land is not available to move the secured perimeter farther from 
the building, the required floor area of the building can be distributed among 
additional floors. As the number of floors is increased, the footprint 
decreases, providing an increased stand-off distance. By balancing the 
increasing cost of the structure (due to the added floors) and the corresponding 
decrease in protection cost (due to added stand-off), it is possible to find the 
optimal number of floors to minimize the cost of protection. 

These methods for establishing the best stand-off distance are generally used 
for the maximum credible explosive charge. If the cost of protection for this 
charge weight is not within the budgetary constraints, the design charge weight 
must be modified. A study can be conducted to determine the largest explosive 
yield and corresponding level of protection that can be incorporated into the 
building, given the available budget. 

Although it is difficult to assign costs to different upgrade measures because 
they vary, based on the site-specific design, some generalizations can be made 
(see Figure 5-2). Below is a list of enhancements arranged in order from least 
expensive to most expensive:
--Hardening of unsecured areas
--Measures to prevent progressive collapse 
--Exterior window and wall enhancements


Figure 5-2: Cost considerations
Graph showing the incremental cost of protection (in dollars) versus both the 
stand-off (in feet) and in Risk.


Life-Cycle Costs
Life-cycle costs need to be considered as well. For example, if it is decided 
that two guarded entrances will be provided, one for visitors and one for 
employees, they may cost more during the life of the building than a single well 
designed entrance serving everyone. Also, maintenance costs may need to be 
considered. For instance, the initial costs for a CBR detection system may be 
modest, but the maintenance costs are high. Finally, if the rentable square 
footage is reduced as a result of incorporating robustness into the building, 
this may have a large impact on the life-cycle costs.

Sidebar: NIST Publications
For more information on life-cycle cost, see: NISTIR 7025, Applications of Life-
Cycle Cost Analysis to Homeland Security Issues in Constructed Facilities: A 
Case Study, and NISTIR 7073, Cost-Effective Responses to Terrorist Risks in 
Constructed Facilities.

For more information on setting priorities, see: NIST GCR 04-865, Best Practices 
for Project Security, and NIST GCR 04-871, Risk Analysis for Extreme Events: 
Economic Incentives for Reducing Future Losses.

Electronic copies of these reports are available at 
www.bfrl.nist.gov/oae/oae.html.


Setting Priorities 
If the costs associated with mitigating manmade hazards are too high there are 
three approaches available that can be used to combination: (1) reduce the 
design threat, (2) reduce the level of protection, or (3) accept the risk. In 
some cases, the owner may decide to prioritize enhancements, based on their 
effectiveness in saving lives and reducing injuries. For instance, measures 
against progressive collapse are perhaps the most effective actions that can be 
implemented to save lives and should be considered above any other upgrades. 
Laminated glass is perhaps the single most effective measure to reduce extensive 
non-fatal injuries. If the cost is still considered too great, and the risk is 
high because of the location or the high-profile nature of the building, then 
the best option may be to consider building an unobtrusive facility in a lower-
risk area instead. In some cases (e.g., financial institutions with trading 
floors), business interruption costs are so high they outweigh all other 
concerns. In such a case, the most cost-effective solution may be to provide a 
redundant facility. 

Early consideration of manmade hazards will significantly reduce the overall 
cost of protection and increase the inherent protection level provided to the 
building. If protection measures are considered as an afterthought or not 
considered until the design is nearly complete, the cost is likely to be 
greater, because more areas will need to be structurally hardened. An awareness 
of the threat of manmade hazards from the beginning of a project also helps the 
Team to determine early in the process what the priorities are for the facility. 
For instance, if extensive teak paneling of interior areas visible from the 
exterior is desired by the architect for the architectural expression of the 
building, but the cost exceeds that of protective measures, then a decision 
needs to be made regarding the priorities of the project. Including protective 
measures as part of the discussion regarding trade-offs early in the design 
process often helps to clarify such issues. 

Applicability of Benefit/Cost to Terrorist Threats
When prioritizing hazard mitigation alternatives, a benefit/cost analysis is 
generally conducted for each proposed action. A benefit/cost analysis involves 
calculating the costs of the mitigation measure and weighing them against the 
intended benefits, frequently expressed as losses avoided. However, applying 
benefit/cost analysis to terrorist threats can be challenging due to the 
following three main factors (for more information on this subject, see FEMA 
386-7, Integrating Human-Caused Hazards Into Mitigation Planning):

The probability of an attack or frequency is not known. 
The frequency factor is much more complex in the case of manmade hazards than 
for natural hazards. Although it is possible to estimate how often many natural 
disasters will occur (i.e., a structure located in the 100-year floodplain is 
considered to have a 1 percent chance of being flooded in any given year), it is 
very difficult to quantify the likelihood of a terrorist attack or technological 
disaster. Quantitative methods to estimate these probabilities are being 
developed, but have not yet been refined to the point where they can be used to 
determine incident probability on a facility-by-facility basis. The Assessment 
Team may use a qualitative approach based on threat and vulnerability 
considerations to estimate the relative likelihood of an attack or accident 
rather than the precise frequency. Such an approach is necessarily subjective, 
but can be combined with quantitative estimates of cost-effectiveness (the cost 
of an action compared to the value of the lives and property it saves in a 
worst-case scenario) to help illustrate the overall risk reduction achieved by a 
particular mitigation action. 

The deterrence rate may not be known. 
The deterrence or preventive value of a measure cannot be calculated if  the 
number of incidents it averts is not known. Deterrence in the case of terrorism 
may also have a secondary impact in that, after a potential target is hardened, 
a terrorist may turn to a less protected facility, changing the likelihood of an 
attack for both targets. 

The lifespan of the action may be difficult to quantify. 
The lifespan of a mitigation action presents another problem when carrying out a 
benefit/cost analysis for terrorism and technological hazards. Future benefits 
are generally calculated for a natural hazard mitigation action in part by 
estimating the number of times the action will perform successfully over the 
course of its useful life. However, some protective actions may be damaged or 
destroyed in a single manmade attack or accident. For example, blast-resistant 
window film may have performed to 100 percent effectiveness by preventing 
injuries from flying glass, but it may still need replacement after one use. 
Other actions, such as a building setback, cannot be destroyed or used up 
per se. This is in contrast to many natural hazard mitigation actions, where the 
effectiveness and life span of a structural retrofit or land use policy are 
easily understood and their value over time is quantifiable.


Improving the Accuracy of your Cost Estimates
To improve the accuracy of your cost estimates, consult the Building 
Vulnerability Assessment Checklist in Appendix A. The Checklist follows the 
Construction Specifications Institute (CSI) format and cost estimates for 
infrastructure and equipment can be developed using industry standard 
applications and processes. Costing of mitigation options of physical security 
systems, blast-resistant materials and fixtures, and CBR protective sensors and 
devices is an emerging practice. A companion text to Appendix A is the RS Means 
Building Security; Strategies and Costs, which provides both a manual and an 
electronic costing approach.

Risk Assessment Database
The Risk Assessment Database provides a simple cost field for each mitigation 
option and cost summary reporting capability. Appendix B provides an extensive 
explanation on the subject.

  
Mitigation, Cost, and the Layers of Defense (Task 5.4)
A general spectrum of site mitigation measures ranging from the least 
protection, cost, and effort to the greatest protection, cost, and effort are 
provided in Figures 5-3 and 5-4. These mitigation measures have been arranged by 
layers of defense (second and third layers), following the principle that the 
layers of defense create a succeeding number of security layers more difficult 
to penetrate. The underlying purpose of this task is to provide you with 
examples of mitigation measures for each layer and give you a broad idea on the 
potential correlation between protection and cost.


Figure 5-3: Mitigation options for the second layer of defense.
Figure description: list of mitigation options ranked from less protection, less 
cost, and less effort to greater protection, greater cost, and greater effort.

 Place trash receptacles as far away from the building as possible.
 Remove any dense vegetation that may screen covert activity.
 Use thorn-bearing plant materials to create natural barriers.  
 Identify all critical resources in the area (fire and police stations, 
hospitals, etc.).
 Identify all potentially hazardous facilities in the area (nuclear plants, 
chemical labs, etc.). 
 Use temporary passive barriers to eliminate straight-line vehicular access to 
high-risk buildings.
 Use vehicles as temporary physical barriers during elevated threat conditions.
 Make proper use of signs for traffic control, building entry control, etc. 
Minimize signs identifying high-risk areas. 
 Introduce traffic calming techniques, including raised crosswalks, speed humps 
and speed tables, pavement treatments, bulbouts, and traffic circles. 
 Identify, secure, and control access to all utility services to the building. 
 Limit and control access to all crawl spaces, utility tunnels, and other means 
of under building access to prevent the planting of explosives.
 Utilize Geographic Information Systems (GIS) to assess adjacent land use.
 Provide open space inside the fence along the perimeter.
 Locate fuel storage tanks at least 100 feet from all buildings. 
 Block sight lines through building orientation, landscaping, screening, and 
landforms.
 Use temporary and procedural measures to restrict parking and increase stand-
off. 
 Locate and consolidate high-risk land uses in the interior of the site. 
 Select and design barriers based on threat levels. 
 Maintain as much stand-off distance as possible from potential vehicle bombs. 
 Separate redundant utility systems. 
 Conduct periodic water testing to detect waterborne contaminants. 
 Enclose the perimeter of the site. Create a single controlled entrance for 
vehicles (entry control point). 
 Establish law enforcement or security force presence.
 Install quick connects for portable utility backup systems.
 Install security lighting. 
 Install closed circuit television cameras.
 Mount all equipment to resist forces in any direction. 
 Include security and protection measures in the calculation of land area 
requirements.
 Design and construct parking to provide adequate stand-off for vehicle bombs.
 Position buildings to permit occupants and security personnel to monitor the 
site.
 Do not site the building adjacent to potential threats or hazards.
 Locate critical building components away from the main entrance, vehicle 
circulation, parking, or maintenance area. Harden as appropriate.
 Provide a site-wide public address system and emergency call boxes at readily 
identified locations.
 Prohibit parking beneath or within a building. 
 Design and construct access points at an angle to oncoming streets.
 Designate entry points for commercial and delivery vehicles away from high-
risk areas.
 In urban areas with minimum stand-off, push the perimeter out to the edge of 
the sidewalk by means of bollards, planters, and other obstacles.  In extreme 
cases, push the line farther outward by restricting or eliminating parking along 
the curb, eliminating loading zones, or through street closings. For this 
measure, you need to work with your local officials.
 Provide intrusion detection sensors for all utility services to the building.
 Provide redundant utility systems to support security, life safety, and rescue 
functions.
 Conceal and/or harden incoming utility systems. 


Figure 5-4: Mitigation options for the third layer of defense.
Figure description: list of mitigation options list of mitigation options ranked 
from less protection, less cost, and less effort to greater protection, greater 
cost, and greater effort.

 Install active vehicle crash barriers. Ensure that exterior doors into 
inhabited areas open outward. Ensure emergency exit doors only facilitate 
exiting.
 Secure roof access hatches from the interior. Prevent public access to 
building roofs.
 Restrict access to building operation systems.
 Conduct periodic training of HVAC operations and maintenance staff.
 Evaluate HVAC control options. 
 Install empty conduits for future security control equipment during initial 
construction or major renovation.
 Do not mount plumbing, electrical fixtures, or utility lines on the inside of 
exterior walls.
 Minimize interior glazing near high-risk areas.
 Establish emergency plans, policies, and procedures.
 Establish written plans for evacuation and sheltering in place.
 Illuminate building access points.
 Restrict access to building information.
 Secure HVAC intakes and mechanical rooms.
 Limit the number of doors used for normal entry/egress.
 Lock all utility access openings.
 Provide emergency power for emergency lighting in restrooms, egress routes, 
and any meeting room without windows.
 Install an internal public address system.
 Stagger interior doors and offset interior and exterior doors.
 Eliminate hiding places.
 Install a second and separate telephone service.
 Install radio telemetry distributed antennas throughout the facility.
 Use a badge identification system for building access.
 Install a CCTV surveillance system.
 Install an electronic security alarm system.
 Install rapid response and isolation features into HVAC systems.
 Use interior barriers to differentiate levels of security.
 Locate utility systems away from likely areas of potential attack.
 Install call buttons at key public contact areas.
 Install emergency and normal electric equipment at different locations.
 Avoid exposed structural elements.
 Reinforce foyer walls.
 Use architectural features to deny contact with exposed primary vertical load 
members.
 Isolate lobbies, mailrooms, loading docks, and storage areas.
 Locate stairwells remotely. Do not discharge stairs into lobbies, parking, or 
loading areas.
 Elevate HVAC fresh-air intakes.
 Create shelter-in-place rooms or areas.
 Separate HVAC zones. Eliminate leaks and increase building air tightness.
 Install blast-resistant doors or steel doors with steel frames. 
 Physically separate unsecured areas from the main building.
 Install HVAC exhausting and purging systems.
 Connect interior non-load bearing walls to structure with non-rigid 
connections.
 Use structural design techniques to resist progressive collapse.
 Treat exterior shear walls as primary structures.
 Orient glazing perpendicular to the primary faade facing uncontrolled vehicle 
approaches.
 Use reinforced concrete wall systems in lieu of masonry or curtain walls.
 Ensure active fire system is protected from single-point failure in case of a 
blast event.
 Install a Backup Control Center (BCC).
 Avoid eaves and overhangs or harden to withstand blast effects.
 Establish ground floor elevation 4 feet above grade.
 Avoid re-entrant corners on the building exterior.

Worksheet 5-1. Preliminary Mitigation Options
Worksheet 5-1 will help to identify your preliminary mitigation options.

After you have prioritized your observations/vulnerabilities (Task 4.3), proceed 
to rank them for impact during blast and CBR events. Using the first part of the 
Worksheet (Prioritized Observations) indicate if these observations merit a 
regulatory, rehabilitation, and/or protective measure and if they directed at 
blast or CBR.

Using the second (Preliminary Mitigation Options for Blast) and third 
(Preliminary Mitigation Options for CBR) parts of the Worksheet, determine 
mitigation options that address the main concerns included in your observations 
and provided parameters.


Worksheet 5-2: Preliminary Mitigation Options
Worksheet 5-2 will help you to identify a short list of mitigation options. 
Bring forward preliminary mitigation options from Worksheet 5-1 and review them 
against the list of criteria provided in the upper part of the worksheet. The 
selected criteria are described in Task 5.2. Mark with a plus + or a minus - 
as to whether your preliminary mitigation options have positive or negative 
impact. The lower portion of the worksheet is reserved for writing a short list 
of options as a result of the former exercise.

Worksheet table description: table used for ranking the risks of the building 
functions and infrastructures for each mitigation option. 



Appendix A: Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist

The Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist is based on the checklist 
developed by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and is part of FEMA 426, 
Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings. This 
Checklist will help you to prepare your Threat Assessment because it allows a 
consistent security evaluation of designs at various levels. The Checklist can 
be used as a screening tool for preliminary design vulnerability assessment and 
supports the preparation of all steps in this How-To Guide.  

The Checklist is organized into 13 sections: 1) site, 2) architectural, 3 ) 
structural systems, 4) building envelope, 5) utility systems, 6) mechanical 
systems, 7) plumbing and gas systems, 8) electrical systems, 9) fire alarm 
systems, 10) communications and information technology (IT) systems, 11) 
equipment operations and maintenance, 12) security systems, and 13) security 
master plan. To conduct a vulnerability assessment of a building or preliminary 
design, each section of the Checklist should be assigned to an engineer, 
architect, or subject matter expert who is knowledgeable and qualified to 
perform an assessment of the assigned area. Each assessor should consider the 
questions and guidance provided to help identify vulnerabilities and document 
results in the observations column. If assessing an existing building, 
vulnerabilities can also be documented with photographs, if possible. The 
results of the 13 assessments should be integrated into a master vulnerability 
assessment and provide a basis for determining vulnerability ratings during the 
assessment process. 

Section 1: Site
Subsection: 1.1
Vulnerability Questions: What major structures surround the facility (site or 
building(s))?
--What critical infrastructure, government, military, or recreation facilities 
are in the local area that impact transportation, utilities, and collateral 
damage (attack at this facility impacting the other major structures or attack 
on the major structures impacting this facility)?
--What are the adjacent land uses immediately outside the perimeter of this 
facility (site or building(s))?
--Do future development plans change these land uses outside the facility (site 
or building (s)) perimeter? 
 [Although this question bridges threat and vulnerability, the threat is the 
manmade hazard that can occur (likelihood and impact) and the vulnerability is 
the proximity of the hazard to the building(s) being assessed. Thus, a chemical 
plant release may be a threat/hazard, but vulnerability changes if the plant is 
1 mile upwind for the prevailing winds versus 10 miles away and downwind. 
Similarly, a terrorist attack upon an adjacent building may impact the 
building(s) being assessed. The Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City was not 
the only building to have severe damage caused by the explosion of the Ryder 
rental truck bomb.]
Guidance:
Critical infrastructure to consider includes:
--Telecommunications infrastructure:
Facilities for broadcast TV, cable TV; cellular networks; newspaper offices, 
production, and distribution; radio stations; satellite base stations; telephone 
trunking and switching stations, including critical cable routes and major 
rights-of-way

--Electric power systems:
Power plants, especially nuclear facilities; transmission and distribution 
system components; fuel distribution, delivery, and storage

--Gas and oil facilities:
Hazardous material facilities, oil/gas pipelines, and storage facilities

--Banking and finance institutions:
Financial institutions (banks, credit unions) and the business district; note 
schedule business/financial district may follow; armored car services

--Transportation networks:
Airports: carriers, flight paths, and airport layout; location of air traffic 
control towers, runways, passenger terminals, and parking areas
Bus Stations; Pipelines: oil; gas; Trains/Subways: rails and lines, 
railheads/rail yards, interchanges, tunnels, and cargo/passenger terminals; note 
hazardous material transported; Traffic: interstate 
highways/roads/tunnels/bridges carrying large volumes; points of congestion; 
note time of day and day of week; Trucking: hazardous materials cargo 
loading/unloading facilities; truck terminals, weigh stations, and rest areas; 
Waterways: dams; levees; berths and ports for cruise ships, ferries, roll-
on/roll-off cargo vessels, and container ships; international (foreign) flagged 
vessels (and cargo)

--Water supply systems:
Pipelines and process/treatment facilities, dams for water collection; 
wastewater treatment 

--Government services:
Federal/state/local government offices  post offices, law enforcement stations, 
fire/rescue, town/city hall, local mayors/governors residences, judicial 
offices and courts, military installations (include type-Active, Reserves, 
National Guard)

--Emergency services:
Backup facilities, communications centers, Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs), 
fire/Emergency Medical Service (EMS) facilities, Emergency Medical Center 
(EMCs), law enforcement facilities

The following are not critical infrastructure, but have potential collateral 
damage to consider: 

--Agricultural facilities: chemical distribution, storage, and application 
sites; crop spraying services; farms and ranches; food processing, storage, and 
distribution facilities

--Commercial/manufacturing/industrial facilities: apartment buildings; 
business/corporate centers; chemical plants (especially those with Section 302 
Extremely Hazardous Substances); factories; fuel production, distribution, and 
storage facilities; hotels and convention centers; industrial plants; raw 
material production, distribution, and storage facilities; research facilities 
and laboratories; shipping, warehousing, transfer, and logistical centers

--Events and attractions: festivals and celebrations; open-air markets; parades; 
rallies, demonstrations, and marches; religious services; scenic tours; theme 
parks

--Health care system components: family planning clinics; health department 
offices; hospitals; radiological material and medical waste transportation, 
storage, and disposal; research facilities and laboratories, walk-in clinics

--Political or symbolically significant sites: embassies, consulates, landmarks, 
monuments, political party and special interest groups offices, religious sites

--Public/private institutions: academic institutions, cultural centers, 
libraries, museums, research facilities and laboratories, schools

--Recreation facilities: auditoriums, casinos, concert halls and pavilions, 
parks, restaurants and clubs (frequented by potential target populations), 
sports arenas, stadiums, theaters, malls, and special interest group facilities; 
note congestion dates and times for shopping centers

References: FEMA 386-7, FEMA SLG 101, DOJ NCJ181200


Subsection 1.2
Vulnerability Question: Does the terrain place the building in a depression or 
low area?
Guidance:
--Depressions or low areas can trap heavy vapors, inhibit natural 
decontamination by prevailing winds, and reduce the effectiveness of in-place 
sheltering. Reference: USAF Installation Force Protection Guide

Subsection 1.3
Vulnerability Question: In dense, urban areas, does curb lane parking allow 
uncontrolled vehicles to park unacceptably close to a building in public rights-
of-way?
Guidance:
--Where distance from the building to the nearest curb provides insufficient 
setback, restrict parking in the curb lane. For typical city streets, this may 
require negotiating to close the curb lane. Setback is common terminology for 
the distance between a building and its associated roadway or parking. It is 
analogous to stand-off between a vehicle bomb and the building. The benefit per 
foot of increased stand-off between a potential vehicle bomb and a building is 
very high when close to a building and decreases rapidly as the distance 
increases. Note that the July 1, 1994, Americans with Disabilities Act Standards 
for Accessible Design states that required handicapped parking shall be located 
on the shortest accessible route of travel from adjacent parking to an 
accessible entrance.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

Subsection 1.4 
Vulnerability Question: Is a perimeter fence or other types of barrier controls 
in place?	
Guidance:
--The intent is to channel pedestrian traffic onto a site with multiple 
buildings through known access control points. For a single building, the intent 
is to have a single visitor entrance. Reference: GSA PBS-P100 

Subsection 1.5
Vulnerability Question: What are the site access points to the site or building?
Guidance:
--The goal is to have at least two access points  one for passenger vehicles 
and one for delivery trucks due to the different procedures needed for each. 
Having two access points also helps if one of the access points becomes 
unusable, then traffic can be routed through the other access point. Reference: 
USAF Installation Force Protection Guide

Subsection 1.6
Vulnerability Question: Is vehicle traffic separated from pedestrian traffic on 
the site?	
Guidance:
--Pedestrian access should not be endangered by car traffic. Pedestrian access, 
especially from public transportation, should not cross vehicle traffic if 
possible. References: GSA PBS-P100 and FEMA 386-7

Subsection 1.7
Vulnerability Question: Is there vehicle and pedestrian access control at the 
perimeter of the site?	
Guidance: 
--Vehicle and pedestrian access control and inspection should occur as far from 
facilities as possible (preferably at the site perimeter) with the ability to 
regulate the flow of people and vehicles one at a time.
--Control on-site parking with identification checks, security personnel, and 
access control systems. Reference: FEMA 386-7 

Subsection 1.8
Vulnerability Questions:
--Is there space for inspection at the curb line or outside the protected 
perimeter?
--What is the minimum distance from the inspection location to the building?	
Guidance:
--Design features for the vehicular inspection point include: vehicle arrest 
devices that prevent vehicles from leaving the vehicular inspection area and 
prevent tailgating.
--If screening space cannot be provided, consider other design features such as: 
hardening and alternative location for vehicle search/inspection.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100   

Subsection 1.9
Vulnerability Question: Is there any potential access to the site or building 
through utility paths or water runoff?	
Guidance:
--Eliminate potential site access through utility tunnels, corridors, manholes, 
stormwater runoff culverts, etc. Ensure covers to these access points are 
secured. Reference: USAF Installation Force Protection Guide

Subsection 1.10
Vulnerability Questions: 
--What are the existing types of vehicle anti-ram devices for the site or 
building?
--Are these devices at the property boundary or at the building?
Guidance:
--Passive barriers include bollards, walls, hardened fences (steel cable 
interlaced), trenches, ponds/basins, concrete planters, street furniture, 
plantings, trees, sculptures, and fountains. Active barriers include pop-up 
bollards, swing arm gates, and rotating plates and drums, etc.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

Subsection 1.11
Vulnerability Question: What is the anti-ram buffer zone stand-off distance from 
the building to unscreened vehicles or parking?	
Guidance:
--If the recommended distance for the postulated threat is not available, 
consider reducing the stand-off required through structural hardening or 
manufacturing additional stand-off through barriers and parking restrictions. 
Also, consider relocation of vulnerable functions within the building, or to a 
more hazard-resistant building. More stand-off should be used for unscreened 
vehicles than for screened vehicles that have been searched. Reference: GSA PBS-
P100

Subsection 1.12	
Vulnerability Questions: 
--Are perimeter barriers capable of stopping vehicles?
--Will the vehicle barriers at the perimeter and building maintain access for 
emergency responders, including large fire apparatus?	
Guidance:
--Anti-ram protection may be provided by adequately designed: bollards, street 
furniture, sculpture, landscaping, walls, and fences. The anti-ram protection 
must be able to stop the threat vehicle size (weight) at the speed attainable by 
that vehicle at impact. If the anti-ram protection cannot absorb the desired 
kinetic energy, consider adding speed controls (serpentines or speed bumps) to 
limit the speed at impact. If the resultant speed is still too great, the anti-
ram protection should be improved.
References: Military Handbook 1013/14 and GSA PBS P-100

Subsection 1.13	
Vulnerability Question: Does site circulation prevent high-speed approaches by 
vehicles?
Guidance: The intent is to use site circulation to minimize vehicle speeds and 
eliminate direct approaches to structures. Reference: GSA PBS-P100

Subsection 1.14	
Vulnerability Question: Are there offsetting vehicle entrances from the 
direction of a vehicles approach to force a reduction of speed?	
Guidance: Single or double 90-degree turns effectively reduce vehicle approach 
speed. Reference: GSA PBS-P100

Subsection 1.15	
Vulnerability Question: Is there a minimum setback distance between the building 
and parked vehicles?
Guidance: Adjacent public parking should be directed to more distant or better-
protected areas, segregated from employee parking and away from the building. 
Some publications use the term setback in lieu of the term stand-off. Reference: 
GSA PBS-P100

Subsection 1.16	
Vulnerability Question: Does adjacent surface parking on site maintain a minimum 
stand-off distance?	
Guidance: The specific stand-off distance needed is based upon the design basis 
threat bomb size and the building construction. For initial screening, consider 
using 25 meters (82 feet) as a minimum, with more distance needed for 
unreinforced masonry or wooden walls. Reference: GSA PBS-P100

Subsection 1.17
Vulnerability Question: Do standalone, aboveground parking garages provide 
adequate visibility across as well as into and out of the parking garage?
Guidance: 
--Pedestrian paths should be planned to concentrate activity to the extent 
possible.
--Limiting vehicular entry/exits to a minimum number of locations is beneficial.
--Stair tower and elevator lobby design should be as open as code permits. Stair 
and/or elevator waiting areas should be as open to the exterior and/or the 
parking areas as possible and well lighted. Impact-resistant, laminated glass 
for stair towers and elevators is a way to provide visual openness.
--Potential hiding places below stairs should be closed off; nooks and crannies 
should be avoided, and dead-end parking areas should be eliminated. Reference: 
GSA PBS-P100

Subsection 1.18
Vulnerability Question: Are garage or service area entrances for employee-
permitted vehicles protected by suitable anti-ram devices?
Coordinate this protection with other anti-ram devices, such as on the perimeter 
or property boundary to avoid duplication of arresting capability.
Guidance: 
--Control internal building parking, underground parking garages, and access to 
service areas and loading docks in this manner with proper access control, or 
eliminate the parking altogether.
--The anti-ram device must be capable of arresting a vehicle of the designated 
threat size at the speed attainable at the location.

Subsection 1.19
Vulnerability Question: Do site landscaping and street furniture provide hiding 
places?
Guidance: 
--Minimize concealment opportunities by keeping landscape plantings (hedges, 
shrubbery, and large plants with heavy ground cover) and street furniture (bus 
shelters, benches, trash receptacles, mailboxes, newspaper vending machines) 
away from the building to permit observation of intruders and prevent hiding of 
packages.
--If mail or express boxes are used, the size of the openings should be 
restricted to prohibit the insertion of packages. Reference: GSA PBS-P100

Subsection 1.20
Vulnerability Question: Is the site lighting adequate from a security 
perspective in roadway access and parking areas?
Guidance: Security protection can be successfully addressed through adequate 
lighting. The type and design of lighting, including illumination levels, is 
critical. Illuminating Engineering Society of North America (IESNA) guidelines 
can be used. The site lighting should be coordinated with the CCTV system. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

Subsection 1.21
Vulnerability Question: Are line-of-sight perspectives from outside the secured 
boundary to the building and on the property along pedestrian and vehicle routes 
integrated with landscaping and green space?
Guidance: 
--The goal is to prevent the observation of critical assets by persons outside 
the secure boundary of the site. For individual buildings in an urban 
environment, this could mean appropriate window treatments or no windows for 
portions of the building.
--Once on the site, the concern is to ensure observation by a general workforce 
aware of any pedestrians or vehicles outside normal circulation routes or 
attempting to approach the building unobserved.
Reference: USAF Installation Force Protection Guide

Subsection 1.22
Vulnerability Question: Do signs provide control of vehicles and people?
Guidance: The signage should be simple and have the necessary level of clarity. 
However, signs that identify sensitive areas should generally not be provided. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

Subsection 1.23
Vulnerability Question: Are all existing fire hydrants on the site accessible?
Guidance: Just as vehicle access points to the site must be able to transit 
emergency vehicles, so too must the emergency vehicles have access to the 
buildings and, in the case of fire trucks, the fire hydrants. Thus, security 
considerations must accommodate emergency response requirements.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100


Section 2: Architectural

Subsection 2.1
Vulnerability Question: Does the site and architectural design incorporate 
strategies from a Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) 
perspective?
Guidance: The focus of CPTED is on creating defensible space by employing:
1. Natural access controls:
 Design streets, sidewalks, and building entrances to clearly indicate public 
routes and direct people away from private/restricted areas
 Discourage access to private areas with structural elements and limit access 
(no cut-through streets)
 Loading zones should be separate from public parking

2. Natural surveillance:
 Design that maximizes visibility of people, parking areas, and building 
entrances; doors and windows that look out on to streets and parking areas
 Shrubbery under 2 feet in height for visibility
 Lower branches of existing trees kept at least 10 feet off the ground
 Pedestrian-friendly sidewalks and streets to control pedestrian and vehicle 
circulation
 Adequate nighttime lighting, especially at exterior doorways

3. Territorial reinforcement:
 Design that defines property lines
 Design that distinguishes private/restricted spaces from public spaces using 
separation, landscape plantings; pavement designs (pathway and roadway 
placement); gateway treatments at lobbies, corridors, and door placement; walls, 
barriers, signage, lighting, and CPTED fences
 Traffic-calming devices for vehicle speed control

4. Target hardening:
 Prohibit entry or access: window locks, deadbolts for doors, interior door 
hinges
 Access control (building and employee/visitor parking) and intrusion detection 
systems

5. Closed circuit television cameras:
 Prevent crime and influence positive behavior, while enhancing the intended 
uses of space. In other words, design that eliminates or reduces criminal 
behavior and at the same time encourages people to keep an eye out for each 
other. References: GSA PBS-P100 and FEMA 386-7

Subsection 2.2
Vulnerability Question: Is it a mixed-tenant building?
Separate high-risk tenants from low-risk tenants and from publicly accessible 
areas. Mixed uses may be accommodated through such means as separating 
entryways, controlling access, and hardening shared partitions, as well as 
through special security operational countermeasures.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

Subsection 2.3
Vulnerability Question: Are pedestrian paths planned to concentrate activity to 
aid in detection?
Guidance: Site planning and landscape design can provide natural surveillance by 
concentrating pedestrian activity, limiting entrances/exits, and eliminating 
concealment opportunities. Also, prevent pedestrian access to parking areas 
other than via established entrances. Reference: GSA PBS-P100

Subsection 2.4
Vulnerability Question: Are there trash receptacles and mailboxes in close 
proximity to the building that can be used to hide explosive devices?
Guidance: The size of the trash receptacles and mailbox openings should be 
restricted to prohibit insertion of packages. Street furniture, such as 
newspaper vending machines, should be kept sufficient distance (10 meters or 33 
feet) from the building, or brought inside to a secure area.
References: USAF Installation Force Protection Guide and DoD UCF 4-010-01

Subsection 2.5
Vulnerability Question: Do entrances avoid significant queuing?
Guidance: If queuing will occur within the building footprint, the area should 
be enclosed in blast-resistant construction. If queuing is expected outside the 
building, a rain cover should be provided. For manpower and equipment 
requirements, collocate or combine staff and visitor entrances.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

Subsection 2.6
Vulnerability Question: 
--Does security screening cover all public and private areas?
--Are public and private activities separated?
--Are public toilets, service spaces, or access to stairs or elevators located 
in any non-secure areas, including the queuing area before screening at the 
public entrance?
Guidance: Retail activities should be prohibited in non-secured areas. However, 
the Public Building Cooperative Use Act of 1976 encourages retail and mixed uses 
to create open and inviting buildings. Consider separating entryways, 
controlling access, hardening shared partitions, and special security 
operational countermeasures. References: GSA PBS-P100 and FEMA 386-7

Subsection 2.7
Vulnerability Question: Is access control provided through main entrance points 
for employees and visitors? (lobby receptionist, sign-in, staff escorts, issue 
of visitor badges, checking forms of personal identification, electronic access 
control systems)
Guidance: Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities

Subsection 2.8
Vulnerability Question: Is access to private and public space or restricted area 
space clearly defined through the design of the space, signage, use of 
electronic security devices, etc.?
Guidance: Finishes and signage should be designed for visual simplicity.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs 
Facilities

Subsection 2.9
Vulnerability Question: Is access to elevators distinguished as to those that 
are designated only for employees and visitors?
Guidance: Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities

Subsection 2.10
Vulnerability Question: Do public and employee entrances include space for 
possible future installation of access control and screening equipment?
Guidance: These include walk-through metal detectors and x-ray devices, 
identification check, electronic access card, search stations, and turnstiles. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

Subsection 2.11
Vulnerability Question: Do foyers have reinforced concrete walls and offset 
interior and exterior doors from each other?
Guidance: Consider for exterior entrances to the building or to access critical 
areas within the building if explosive blast hazard must be mitigated. 
Reference: U.S. Army TM 5-853

Subsection 2.12
Vulnerability Question: Do doors and walls along the line of security screening 
meet requirements of UL752 Standard for Safety: Bullet-Resisting Equipment?
Guidance: If the postulated threat in designing entrance access control includes 
rifles, pistols, or shotguns, then the screening area should have bullet-
resistance to protect security personnel and uninvolved bystanders. Glass, if 
present, should also be bullet-resistant. Reference: GSA PBS-P100

Subsection 2.13
Vulnerability Question: Do circulation routes have unobstructed views of people 
approaching controlled access points?
Guidance: This applies to building entrances and to critical areas within the 
building. References: USAF Installation Force Protection Guide and DoD UFC 4-
010-01

Subsection 2.14
Vulnerability Question: Is roof access limited to authorized personnel by means 
of locking mechanisms?
Guidance: References: GSA PBS-P100 and CDC/NIOSH, Pub 2002-139

Subsection 2.15
Vulnerability Question: 
--Are critical assets (people, activities, building systems and components) 
located close to any main entrance, vehicle circulation, parking, maintenance 
area, loading dock, or interior parking?
--Are the critical building systems and components hardened?
Guidance: 
--Critical building components include: Emergency generator including fuel 
systems, day tank, fire sprinkler, and water supply; Normal fuel storage; Main 
switchgear; Telephone distribution and main switchgear; Fire pumps; Building 
control centers; Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) systems controlling critical 
functions; Main refrigeration and ventilation systems if critical to building 
operation; Elevator machinery and controls; Shafts for stairs, elevators, and 
utilities; Critical distribution feeders for emergency power. Evacuation and 
rescue require emergency systems to remain operational during a disaster and 
they should be located away from potential attack locations. Primary and backup 
systems should be separated to reduce the risk of both being impacted by a 
single incident if collocated. Utility systems should be located at least 50 
feet from loading docks, front entrances, and parking areas.
--One way to harden critical building systems and components is to enclose them 
within hardened walls, floors, and ceilings. Do not place them near high-risk 
areas where they can receive collateral damage. Reference: GSA PBS-P100

Subsection 2.16
Vulnerability Question: Are high-value or critical assets located as far into 
the interior of the building as possible and separated from the public areas of 
the building?
Guidance: Critical assets, such as people and activities, are more vulnerable to 
hazards when on an exterior building wall or adjacent to uncontrolled public 
areas inside the building. Reference: GSA PBS-P100

Subsection 2.17
Vulnerability Question: Is high visitor activity away from critical assets?
Guidance: High-risk activities should also be separated from low-risk 
activities. Also, visitor activities should be separated from daily activities. 
Reference: USAF Installation Force Protection Guide

Subsection 2.18
Vulnerability Question:
--Are critical assets located in spaces that are occupied 24 hours per day?
--Are assets located in areas where they are visible to more than one person?
Guidance: Reference: USAF Installation Force Protection Guide

Subsection 2.19
Vulnerability Question: Are loading docks and receiving and shipping areas 
separated in any direction from utility rooms, utility mains, and service 
entrances, including electrical, telephone/data, fire detection/alarm systems, 
fire suppression water mains, cooling and heating mains, etc.?
Guidance: Loading docks should be designed to keep vehicles from driving into or 
parking under the building. If loading docks are in close proximity to critical 
equipment, consider hardening the equipment and service against explosive blast. 
Consider a 50-foot separation distance in all directions.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

Subsection 2.20
Vulnerability Question: 
--Are mailrooms located away from building main entrances, areas containing 
critical services, utilities, distribution systems, and important assets?
--Is the mailroom located near the loading dock?
Guidance: 
--The mailroom should be located at the perimeter of the building with an 
outside wall or window designed for pressure relief.
--By separating the mailroom and the loading dock, the collateral damage of an 
incident at one has less impact upon the other. However, this may be the 
preferred mailroom location.
--Off-site screening stations or a separate delivery processing building on site 
may be cost-effective, particularly if several buildings may share one mailroom. 
A separate delivery processing building reduces risk and simplifies protection 
measures. Reference: GSA PBS-P100

Subsection 2.21
Vulnerability Question: Does the mailroom have adequate space available for 
equipment to examine incoming packages and for an explosive disposal container?
Guidance: Screening of all deliveries to the building, including U.S. mail, 
commercial package delivery services, delivery of office supplies, etc.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

Subsection 2.22
Vulnerability Question: Are areas of refuge identified, with special 
consideration given to egress?
Guidance: Areas of refuge can be safe havens, shelters, or protected spaces for 
use during specified hazards. Reference: FEMA 386-7

Subsection 2.23
Vulnerability Question: Are stairwells required for emergency egress located as 
remotely as possible from high-risk areas where blast events might occur?
Are stairways maintained with positive pressure or are there other smoke control 
systems?
Guidance: Consider designing stairs so that they discharge into areas other than 
lobbies, parking, or loading docks. Maintaining positive pressure from a clean 
source of air (may require special filtering) aids in egress by keeping smoke, 
heat, toxic fumes, etc,. out of the stairway. Pressurize exit stairways in 
accordance with the National Model Building Code. References: GSA PBS-P100 and 
CDC/NIOSH, Pub 2002-139

Subsection 2.24
Vulnerability Question: Are enclosures for emergency egress hardened to limit 
the extent of debris that might otherwise impede safe passage and reduce the 
flow of evacuees?
Guidance: Egress pathways should be hardened and discharge into safe areas.
Reference: FEMA 386-7

Subsection 2.25
Vulnerability Question: Do interior barriers differentiate level of security 
within a building?
Guidance: Reference: USAF Installation Force Protection Guide 

Subsection 2.26
Vulnerability Question: Are emergency systems located away from high-risk areas?
Guidance: The intent is to keep the emergency systems out of harms way, such 
that one incident does not take out all capability  both the regular systems 
and their backups. Reference: FEMA 386-7

Subsection 2.27
Vulnerability Question: 
--Is interior glazing near high-risk areas minimized?
--Is interior glazing in other areas shatter-resistant?
Guidance: Interior glazing should be minimized where a threat exists and should 
be avoided in enclosures of critical functions next to high-risk areas. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

Subsection 2.28
Vulnerability Question: Are ceiling and lighting systems designed to remain in 
place during hazard events?
Guidance: 
--When an explosive blast shatters a window, the blast wave enters the interior 
space, putting structural and non-structural building components under loads not 
considered in standard building codes. It has been shown that connection 
criteria for these systems in high seismic activity areas resulted in much less 
falling debris that could injure building occupants.
--Mount all overhead utilities and other fixtures weighing 14 kilograms (31 
pounds) or more to minimize the likelihood that they will fall and injure 
building occupants. Design all equipment mountings to resist forces of 0.5 times 
the equipment weight in any direction and 1.5 times the equipment weight in the 
downward direction. This standard does not preclude the need to design equipment 
mountings for forces required by other criteria, such as seismic standards. 
Reference: DoD UCF 4-101-01


Section 3: Structural Systems

Subsection 3.1
Vulnerability Question: 
--What type of construction?
--What type of concrete and reinforcing steel?
--What type of steel?
--What type of foundation?
Guidance: The type of construction provides an indication of the robustness to 
abnormal loading and load reversals. A reinforced concrete moment-resisting 
frame provides greater ductility and redundancy than a flat-slab or flat-plate 
construction. The ductility of steel frame with metal deck depends on the 
connection details and pre-tensioned or post-tensioned construction provides 
little capacity for abnormal loading patterns and load reversals. The resistance 
of load-bearing wall structures varies to a great extent, depending on whether 
the walls are reinforced or un-reinforced. A rapid screening process developed 
by FEMA for assessing structural hazards identifies the following types of 
construction with a structural score ranging from 1.0 to 8.5. A higher score 
indicates a greater capacity to sustain load reversals.

Wood buildings of all types - 4.5 to 8.5
Steel moment-resisting frames - 3.5 to 4.5
Braced steel frames - 2.5 to 3.0
Light metal buildings - 5.5 to 6.5
Steel frames with cast-in-place concrete
shear walls - 3.5 to 4.5
Steel frames with unreinforced masonry
infill walls - 1.5 to 3.0
Concrete moment-resisting frames - 2.0 to 4.0
Concrete shear wall buildings - 3.0 to 4.0
Concrete frames with unreinforced masonry
infill walls - 1.5 to 3.0
Tilt-up buildings - 2.0 to 3.5
Precast concrete frame buildings - 1.5 to 2.5
Reinforced masonry - 3.0 to 4.0
Unreinforced masonry - 1.0 to 2.5
References: FEMA 154 and Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities

Subsection 3.2
Vulnerability Question: 
--Do the reinforced concrete structures contain symmetric steel reinforcement 
(positive and negative faces) in all floor slabs, roof slabs, walls, beams, and 
girders that may be subjected to rebound, uplift, and suction pressures?
--Do the lap splices fully develop the capacity of the reinforcement?
--Are lap splices and other discontinuities staggered?
--Do the connections possess ductile details?
--Is special shear reinforcement, including ties and stirrups, available to 
allow large post-elastic behavior?
Guidance: Reference: GSA PBS-P100

Subsection 3.3
Vulnerability Question: 
--Are the steel frame connections moment connections?
--Is the column spacing minimized so that reasonably sized members will resist 
the design loads and increase the redundancy of the system?
--What are the floor-to-floor heights?
Guidance: A practical upper level for column spacing is generally 30 feet. 
Unless there is an overriding architectural requirement, a practical limit for 
floor-to-floor heights is generally less than or equal to 16 feet.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

Subsection 3.4
Vulnerability Question: Are critical elements vulnerable to failure?
Guidance: 
--The priority for upgrades should be based on the relative importance of 
structural or non-structural elements that are essential to mitigating the 
extent of collapse and minimizing injury and damage.
--Primary Structural Elements provide the essential parts of the buildings 
resistance to catastrophic blast loads and progressive collapse. These include 
columns, girders, roof beams, and the main lateral resistance system.
--Secondary Structural Elements consist of all other load-bearing members, such 
as floor beams, slabs, etc.
--Primary Non-Structural Elements consist of elements (including their 
attachments) that are essential for life safety systems or elements that can 
cause substantial injury if failure occurs, including ceilings or heavy 
suspended mechanical units.
--Secondary Non-Structural Elements consist of all elements not covered in 
primary non-structural elements, such as partitions, furniture, and light 
fixtures. Reference: GSA PBS-P100

Subsection 3.5
Vulnerability Question: 
--Will the structure suffer an unacceptable level of damage resulting from the 
postulated threat (blast loading or weapon impact)?
--Do architectural or structural features provide a minimum 6-inch stand-off to 
the internal columns (primary vertical load carrying members)?
--Are the columns in the unscreened internal spaces designed for an unbraced 
length equal to two floors, or three floors where there are two levels of 
parking?
Guidance: 
The extent of damage to the structure and exterior wall systems from the bomb 
threat may be related to a protection level. The following is for new buildings:

Level of Protection Below Antiterrorism Standards  Severe damage. Frame 
collapse/massive destruction. Little left standing. Doors and windows fail and 
result in lethal hazards. Majority of personnel suffer fatalities.

Very Low Level Protection  Heavy damage. Onset of structural collapse. Major 
deformation of primary and secondary structural members, but progressive 
collapse is unlikely. Collapse of non-structural elements. Glazing will break 
and is likely to be propelled into the building, resulting in serious glazing 
fragment injuries, but fragments will be reduced. Doors may be propelled into 
rooms, presenting serious hazards. Majority of personnel suffer serious 
injuries. There are likely to be a limited number (10 percent to 25 percent) of 
fatalities.

Low Level of Protection  Moderate damage, unrepairable. Major deformation of 
non-structural elements and secondary structural members and minor deformation 
of primary structural members, but progressive collapse is unlikely. Glazing 
will break, but fall within 1 meter of the wall or otherwise not present a 
significant fragment hazard. Doors may fail, but they will rebound out of their 
frames, presenting minimal hazards. Majority of personnel suffer significant 
injuries. There may be a few (<10 percent) fatalities.

Medium Level Protection  Minor damage, repairable. Minor deformations of non-
structural elements and secondary structural members and no permanent 
deformation in primary structural members. Glazing will break, but will remain 
in the window frame. Doors will stay in frames, but will not be reusable. Some 
minor injuries, but fatalities are unlikely.

High Level Protection  Minimal damage, repairable. No permanent deformation of 
primary and secondary structural members or non-structural elements. Glazing 
will not break. Doors will be reusable. Only superficial injuries are likely. 
Reference: DoD UFC 4-010-01

Subsection 3.6
Vulnerability Question: 
--Is the structure vulnerable to progressive collapse?
--Is the building capable of sustaining the removal of a column for one floor 
above grade at the building perimeter without progressive collapse?
--In the event of an internal explosion in an uncontrolled public ground floor 
area, does the design prevent progressive collapse due to the loss of one 
primary column?
Guidance: Design to mitigate progressive collapse is an independent analysis to 
determine a systems ability to resist structural collapse upon the loss of a 
major structural element or the systems ability to resist the loss of a major 
structural element. Design to mitigate progressive collapse may be based on the 
methods outlined in ASCE 7-98 (now 7-02). Designers may apply static and/or 
dynamic methods of analysis to meet this requirement and ultimate load 
capacities may be assumed in the analyses. Combine structural upgrades for 
retrofits to existing buildings, such as seismic and progressive collapse, into 
a single project due to the economic synergies and other cross benefits. 
Existing facilities may be retrofitted to withstand the design level threat or 
to accept the loss of a column for one floor above grade at the building 
perimeter without progressive collapse. Note that collapse of floors or roof 
must not be permitted. Reference: GSA PBS-P100

Subsection 3.7
Vulnerability Question: Are there adequate redundant load paths in the 
structure?
Guidance: Special consideration should be given to materials that have inherent 
ductility and that are better able to respond to load reversals, such as cast in 
place reinforced concrete, reinforced masonry, and steel construction. Careful 
detailing is required for material such as pre-stressed concrete, pre-cast 
concrete, and masonry to adequately respond to the design loads. Primary 
vertical load carrying members should be protected where parking is inside a 
facility and the building superstructure is supported by the parking structure. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

Subsection 3.8
Vulnerability Question: Are there transfer girders supported by columns within 
unscreened public spaces or at the exterior of the building?
Guidance: Transfer girders allow discontinuities in columns between the roof and 
foundation. This design has inherent difficulty in transferring load to 
redundant paths upon loss of a column or the girder. Transfer beams and girders 
that, if lost, may cause progressive collapse are highly discouraged. Reference: 
GSA PBS-P100

Subsection 3.9
Vulnerability Question: What is the grouting and reinforcement of masonry (brick 
and/or concrete masonry unit (CMU)) exterior walls?
Guidance: Avoid unreinforced masonry exterior walls. Reinforcement can run the 
range of light to heavy, depending upon the stand-off distance available and 
postulated design threat. Reference: GSA PBS-P100 recommends fully grouted and 
reinforced CMU construction where CMU is selected. Reference: DoD Minimum 
Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings states Unreinforced masonry walls are 
prohibited for the exterior walls of new buildings. A minimum of 0.05 percent 
vertical reinforcement with a maximum spacing of 1200 mm (48 in) will be 
provided. For existing buildings, implement mitigating measures to provide an 
equivalent level of protection. [This is light reinforcement and based upon the 
recommended stand-off distance for the situation.]

Subsection 3.10
Vulnerability Question: Will the loading dock design limit damage to adjacent 
areas and vent explosive force to the exterior of the building?
Guidance: Design the floor of the loading dock for blast resistance if the area 
below is occupied or contains critical utilities. Reference: GSA PBS-P100

Subsection 3.11
Vulnerability Question: Are mailrooms, where packages are received and opened 
for inspection, and unscreened retail spaces designed to mitigate the effects of 
a blast on primary vertical or lateral bracing members?
Guidance: Where mailrooms and unscreened retail spaces are located in occupied 
areas or adjacent to critical utilities, walls, ceilings, and floors, they 
should be blast- and fragment- resistant. Methods to facilitate the venting of 
explosive forces and gases from the interior spaces to the outside of the 
structure may include blow-out panels and window system designs that provide 
protection from blast pressure applied to the outside, but that readily fail and 
vent if exposed to blast pressure on the inside.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100


Section 4: Building Envelope

Subsection 4.1
Vulnerability Question: What is the designed or estimated protection level of 
the exterior walls against the postulated explosive threat?
Guidance: The performance of the faade varies to a great extent on the 
materials. Different construction includes brick or stone with block backup, 
steel stud walls, precast panels, or curtain wall with glass, stone, or metal 
panel elements. Shear walls that are essential to the lateral and vertical load 
bearing system and that also function as exterior walls should be considered 
primary structures and should resist the actual blast loads predicted from the 
threats specified. Where exterior walls are not designed for the full design 
loads, special consideration should be given to construction types that reduce 
the potential for injury. Reference: GSA PBS-P100

Subsection 4.2
Vulnerability Question: 
--Is there less than a 40 percent fenestration opening per structural bay?
--Is the window system design on the exterior faade balanced to mitigate the 
hazardous effects of flying glazing following an explosive event? (glazing, 
frames, anchorage to supporting walls, etc.)
--Do the glazing systems with a -inch (-inch is better) bite contain an 
application of structural silicone?
--Is the glazing laminated or is it protected with an anti-shatter (fragment 
retention) film?
--If an anti-shatter film is used, is it a minimum of a 7-mil thick film, or 
specially manufactured 4-mil thick film?
Guidance: The performance of the glass will similarly depend on the materials. 
Glazing may be single pane or double pane, monolithic or laminated, annealed, 
heat strengthened or fully tempered.
The percent fenestration is a balance between protection level, cost, the 
architectural look of the building within its surroundings, and building codes. 
One goal is to keep fenestration to below 40 percent of the building envelope 
vertical surface area, but the process must balance differing requirements. A 
blast engineer may prefer no windows; an architect may favor window curtain 
walls; building codes require so much fenestration per square footage of floor 
area; fire codes require a prescribed window opening area if the window is a 
designated escape route; and the building owner has cost concerns. Ideally, an 
owner would want 100 percent of the glazed area to provide the design protection 
level against the postulated explosive threat (design basis threat weapon size 
at the expected stand-off distance). However, economics and geometry may allow 
80 percent to 90 percent due to the statistical differences in the manufacturing 
process for glass or the angle of incidence of the blast wave upon upper story 
windows (4th floor and higher). Reference: GSA PBS-P100

Subsection 4.3
Vulnerability Question: 
--Do the walls, anchorage, and window framing fully develop the capacity of the 
glazing material selected?
--Are the walls capable of withstanding the dynamic reactions from the windows?
--Will the anchorage remain attached to the walls of the building during an 
explosive event without failure?
--Is the faade connected to backup block or to the structural frame?
--Are non-bearing masonry walls reinforced?
Guidance: Government produced and sponsored computer programs coupled with test 
data and recognized dynamic structural analysis techniques may be used to 
determine whether the glazing either survives the specified threats or the post 
damage performance of the glazing protects the occupants. A breakage probability 
no higher than 750 breaks per 1,000 may be used when calculating loads to frames 
and anchorage.
The intent is to ensure the building envelope provides relatively equal 
protection against the postulated explosive threat for the walls and window 
systems for the safety of the occupants, especially in rooms with exterior 
walls. Reference: GSA PBS-P100

Subsection 4.4
Vulnerability Question: 
--Does the building contain ballistic glazing?
--Does the ballistic glazing meet the requirements of UL 752 Bullet-Resistant 
Glazing?
--Does the building contain security-glazing?
--Does the security-glazing meet the requirements of ASTM F1233 or UL 972, 
Burglary Resistant Glazing Material?
--Do the window assemblies containing forced entry resistant glazing (excluding 
the glazing) meet the requirements of ASTM F 588?
Guidance: Glass-clad polycarbonate or laminated polycarbonate are two types of 
acceptable glazing material. If windows are upgraded to bullet-resistant, 
burglar-resistant, or forced entry-resistant, ensure that doors, ceilings, and 
floors, as applicable, can resist the same for the areas of concern.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

Subsection 4.5
Vulnerability Question: Do non-window openings, such as mechanical vents and 
exposed plenums, provide the same level of protection required for the exterior 
wall?
Guidance: n-filling of blast over-pressures must be considered through non-
window openings such that structural members and all mechanical system mountings 
and attachments should resist these interior fill pressures.
These non-window openings should also be as secure as the rest of the building 
envelope against forced entry. Reference: GSA PBS-P100


Section 5: Utility Systems

Subsection 5.1
Vulnerability Question:
--What is the source of domestic water? (utility, municipal, wells, lake, river, 
storage tank)
--Is there a secure alternate drinking water supply?
Guidance: Domestic water is critical for continued building operation. Although 
bottled water can satisfy requirements for drinking water and minimal 
sanitation, domestic water meets many other needs  flushing toilets, building 
heating and cooling system operation, cooling of emergency generators, 
humidification, etc. Reference: FEMA 386-7

Subsection 5.2
Vulnerability Question: Are there multiple entry points for the water supply?
Guidance: If the building or site has only one source of water entering at one 
location, the entry point should be secure. Reference: GSA PBS-P100

Subsection 5.3
Vulnerability Question: Is the incoming water supply in a secure location?
Guidance: Ensure that only authorized personnel have access to the water supply 
and its components. Reference: FEMA 386-7

Subsection 5.4
Vulnerability Question:
--Does the building or site have storage capacity for domestic water?
--How many gallons of storage capacity are available and how long will it allow 
operations to continue?
Guidance: Operational facilities will require reliance on adequate domestic 
water supply. Storage capacity can meet short-term needs and use water trucks to 
replenish for extended outages. Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the 
Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities.

Subsection 5.5
Vulnerability Question:
--What is the source of water for the fire suppression system?
(local utility company lines, storage tanks with utility company backup, lake, 
or river)
--Are there alternate water supplies for fire suppression?
Guidance: The fire suppression system water may be supplied from the domestic 
water or it may have a separate source, separate storage, or nonpotable 
alternate sources. For a site with multiple buildings, the concern is that the 
supply should be adequate to fight the worst case situation according to the 
fire codes. Recent major construction may change that requirement. Reference: 
FEMA 386-7

Subsection 5.6
Vulnerability Question: Is the fire suppression system adequate, code-compliant, 
and protected (secure location)?
Guidance: Standpipes, water supply control valves, and other system components 
should be secure or supervised. Reference: FEMA 386-7

Subsection 5.7
Vulnerability Question: 
--Do the sprinkler/standpipe interior controls (risers) have fire- and blast-
resistant separation?
--Are the sprinkler and standpipe connections adequate and redundant?
--Are there fire hydrant and water supply connections near the 
sprinkler/standpipe connections?
Guidance: The incoming fire protection water line should be encased, buried, or 
located 50 feet from high-risk areas. The interior mains should be looped and 
sectionalized. Reference: GSA PBS-P100

Subsection 5.8
Vulnerability Question: 
--Are there redundant fire water pumps (e.g., one electric, one diesel)?
--Are the pumps located apart from each other?
Guidance: Collocating fire water pumps puts them at risk for a single incident 
to disable the fire suppression system. References: GSA PBS-P100 and FEMA 386-7

Subsection 5.9
Vulnerability Question: 
--Are sewer systems accessible?
--Are they protected or secured?
Guidance: Sanitary and stormwater sewers should be protected from unauthorized 
access. The main concerns are backup or flooding into the building, causing a 
health risk, shorting out electrical equipment, and loss of building use. 
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs 
Facilities

Subsection 5.10
Vulnerability Question: What fuel supplies do the building rely upon for 
critical operation?
Guidance: Typically, natural gas, propane, or fuel oil are required for 
continued operation. Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department 
of Veterans Affairs Facilities

Subsection 5.11
Vulnerability Question: 
--How much fuel is stored on the site or at the building and how long can this 
quantity support critical operations?
--How is it stored?
--How is it secured?
Guidance: Fuel storage protection is essential for continued operation. Main 
fuel storage should be located away from loading docks, entrances, and parking. 
Access should be restricted and protected (e.g., locks on caps and seals). 
References: GSA PBS-P100 and Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities

Subsection 5.12
Vulnerability Question: 
--Where is the fuel supply obtained?
--How is it delivered?
Guidance: The supply of fuel is dependent on the reliability of the supplier. 
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs 
Facilities

Subsection 5.13
Vulnerability Question:
--Are there alternate sources of fuel?
--Can alternate fuels be used?
Guidance: Critical functions may be served by alternate methods if normal fuel 
supply is interrupted. Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the 
Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

Subsection 5.14
Vulnerability Question: What is the normal source of electrical service for the 
site or building?
Guidance: Utilities are the general source unless co-generation or a private 
energy provider is available. Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the 
Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

Subsection 5.15
Vulnerability Question: 
--Is there a redundant electrical service source?
--Can the site or buildings be fed from more than one utility substation?
Guidance: The utility may have only one source of power from a single 
substation. There may be only single feeders from the main substation.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs 
Facilities

Subsection 5.16
Vulnerability Question: How many service entry points does the site or building 
have for electricity?
Guidance: Electrical supply at one location creates a vulnerable situation unless 
an alternate source is available. Ensure disconnecting requirements according to 
NFPA 70 (National Fire Protection Association, National Electric Code) are met 
for multiple service entrances. Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the 
Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

Subsection 5.17
Vulnerability Question: Is the incoming electric service to the building secure?
Guidance: Typically, the service entrance is a locked room, inaccessible to the 
public. Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities

Subsection 5.18
Vulnerability Question: 
--What provisions for emergency power exist? 
--What systems receive emergency power and have capacity requirements been 
tested?
--Is the emergency power collocated with the commercial electric service?
--Is there an exterior connection for emergency power?
Guidance: Besides installed generators to supply emergency power, portable 
generators or rental generators available under emergency contract can be 
quickly connected to a building with an exterior quick disconnect already 
installed. Testing under actual loading and operational conditions ensures the 
critical systems requiring emergency power receive it with a high assurance of 
reliability. Reference: GSA PBS-P100

Subsection 5.19
Vulnerability Question: By what means do the main telephone and data 
communications interface the site or building?
Guidance: Typically, communication ducts or other conduits are available. 
Overhead service is more identifiable and vulnerable. Reference: Physical 
Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

Subsection 5.20
Vulnerability Question: Are there multiple or redundant locations for the 
telephone and communications service?
Guidance: Secure locations of communications wiring entry to the site or 
building are required. Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the 
Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

Subsection 5.21
Vulnerability Question:
--Does the fire alarm system require communication with external sources?
--By what method is the alarm signal sent to the responding agency: telephone, 
radio, etc.?
--Is there an intermediary alarm monitoring center?
Guidance: Typically, the local fire department responds to an alarm that sounds 
at the station or is transmitted over phone lines by an auto dialer.
An intermediary control center for fire, security, and/or building system alarms 
may receive the initial notification at an on-site or off-site location. This 
center may then determine the necessary response and inform the responding 
agency. Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities

Subsection 5.22
Vulnerability Question: Are utility lifelines aboveground, underground, or 
direct buried?
Guidance: Utility lifelines (water, power, communications, etc.) can be 
protected by concealing, burying, or encasing. References: GSA PBS-P100 and FEMA 
386-7


Section 6: Mechanical Systems (HVAC and CBR)

Subsection 6.1
Vulnerability Question: 
--Where are the air intakes and exhaust louvers for the building? (low, high, or 
midpoint of the building structure)
--Are the intakes and exhausts accessible to the public?
Guidance: Air intakes should be located on the roof or as high as possible. 
Otherwise secure within CPTED-compliant fencing or enclosure. The fencing or 
enclosure should have a sloped roof to prevent the throwing of anything into the 
enclosure near the intakes. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 states that air intakes should be on the fourth floor or 
higher and, on buildings with three floors or less, they should be on the roof 
or as high as practical. Locating intakes high on a wall is preferred over a 
roof location. 
Reference: DoD UFC 4-010-01 states that, for all new inhabited buildings covered 
by this document, all air intakes should be located at least 3 meters (10 feet) 
above the ground.
Reference: CDC/NIOSH, Pub 2002-139 states: An extension height of 12 feet (3.7 
m) will place the intake out of reach of individuals without some assistance. 
Also, the entrance to the intake should be covered with a sloped metal mesh to 
reduce the threat of objects being tossed into the intake. A minimum slope of 
45 is generally adequate. Extension height should be increased where existing 
platforms or building features (i.e., loading docks, retaining walls) might 
provide access to the outdoor air intakes.
Reference: LBNL PUB-51959: Exhausts are also a concern during an outdoor 
release, especially if exhaust fans are not in continuous operation, due to wind 
effects and chimney effects (air movement due to differential temperature).

Subsection 6.2
Vulnerability Question: 
--Is roof access limited to authorized personnel by means of locking mechanisms?
--Is access to mechanical areas similarly controlled?
Guidance: Roofs are like entrances to the building and are like mechanical rooms 
when HVAC is installed. Adjacent structures or landscaping should not allow 
access to the roof. References: GSA PBS-P100, CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139, and LBNL 
Pub 51959

Subsection 6.3
Vulnerability Question: Are there multiple air intake locations?
Guidance: Single air intakes may feed several air handling units. Indicate if 
the air intakes are localized or separated. Installing low-leakage dampers is 
one way to provide the system separation when necessary. Reference: Physical 
Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

Subsection 6.4
Vulnerability Question: 
--What are the types of air filtration? 
--Include the efficiency and number of filter modules for each of the main air 
handling systems?
--Is there any collective protection for chemical, biological, and radiological 
contamination designed into the building?
Guidance: MERV  Minimum Efficiency Reporting Value; HEPA  High Efficiency 
Particulate Air; Activated charcoal for gases; Ultraviolet C for biologicals; 
Consider mix of approaches for optimum protection and cost-effectiveness. 
Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139

Subsection 6.5
Vulnerability Question: Is there space for larger filter assemblies on critical 
air handling systems?
Guidance: Air handling units serving critical functions during continued 
operation may be retrofitted to provide enhanced protection during emergencies. 
However, upgraded filtration may have negative effects upon the overall air 
handling system operation, such as increased pressure drop.
Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139

Subsection 6.6
Vulnerability Question: Are there provisions for air monitors or sensors for 
chemical or biological agents?
Guidance: Duct mounted sensors are usually found in limited cases in laboratory 
areas. Sensors generally have a limited spectrum of high reliability and are 
costly. Many different technologies are undergoing research to provide 
capability. Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139

Subsection 6.7
Vulnerability Question: By what method are air intakes and exhausts closed when 
not operational?
Guidance: Motorized (low-leakage, fast-acting) dampers are the preferred method 
for closure with fail-safe to the closed position so as to support in-place 
sheltering. References: CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139 and LBNL Pub 51959

Subsection 6.8
Vulnerability Question: 
--How are air handling systems zoned?
--What areas and functions do each of the primary air handling systems serve?
Guidance: Understanding the critical areas of the building that must continue 
functioning focuses security and hazard mitigation measures.
Applying HVAC zones that isolate lobbies, mailrooms, loading docks, and other 
entry and storage areas from the rest of the building HVAC zones and maintaining 
negative pressure within these areas will contain CBR releases. Identify common 
return systems that service more than one zone, effectively making a large 
single zone. Conversely, emergency egress routes should receive positive 
pressurization to ensure contamination does not hinder egress. Consider 
filtering of the pressurization air. References: CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139 and LBNL 
Pub 51959

Subsection 6.9
Vulnerability Question: Are there large central air handling units or are there 
multiple units serving separate zones?
Guidance: Independent units can continue to operate if damage occurs to limited 
areas of the building. Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the 
Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

Subsection: 6.10
Vulnerability Question: 
--Are there any redundancies in the air handling system?
--Can critical areas be served from other units if a major system is disabled?
Guidance: Redundancy reduces the security measures required compared to a non-
redundant situation. Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department 
of Veterans Affairs Facilities

Subsection 6.11
Vulnerability Question: 
--Is the air supply to critical areas compartmentalized?
--Similarly, are the critical areas or the building as a whole, considered tight 
with little or no leakage?
Guidance: During chemical, biological, and radiological situations, the intent 
is to either keep the contamination localized in the critical area or prevent 
its entry into other critical, non-critical, or public areas. Systems can be 
cross-connected through building openings (doorways, ceilings, partial wall), 
ductwork leakage, or pressure differences in air handling system. In standard 
practice, there is almost always some air carried between ventilation zones by 
pressure imbalances, due to elevator piston action, chimney effect, and wind 
effects. Smoke testing of the air supply to critical areas may be necessary. 
Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139 and LBNL Pub 51959

Subsection 6.12
Vulnerability Question:
--Are supply, return, and exhaust air systems for critical areas secure?
--Are all supply and return ducts completely connected to their grilles and 
registers and secure?
--Is the return air not ducted?
Guidance: The air systems to critical areas should be inaccessible to the 
public, especially if the ductwork runs through the public areas of the 
building. It is also more secure to have a ducted air handling system versus 
sharing hallways and plenums above drop ceilings for return air. Non-ducted 
systems provide greater opportunity for introducing contaminants. Reference: 
CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139 and LBNL Pub 51959

Subsection 6.13
Vulnerability Question:
--What is the method of temperature and humidity control?
--Is it localized or centralized?
Guidance: Central systems can range from monitoring only to full control. Local 
control may be available to override central operation. Of greatest concern are 
systems needed before, during, and after an incident that may be unavailable due 
to temperature and humidity exceeding operational limits (e.g., main telephone 
switch room). Reference: DOC CIAO Vulnerability Assessment Framework 1.1

Subsection 6.14
Vulnerability Question: 
--Where are the building automation control centers and cabinets located?
--Are they in secure areas?
--How is the control wiring routed?
Guidance: Access to any component of the building automation and control system 
could compromise the functioning of the system, increasing vulnerability to a 
hazard or precluding their proper operation during a hazard incident. The HVAC 
and exhaust system controls should be in a secure area that allows rapid 
shutdown or other activation based upon location and type of attack. References: 
FEMA 386-7, DOC CIAO Vulnerability Assessment Framework 1.1 and LBNL Pub 51959

Subsection 6.15
Vulnerability Question: Does the control of air handling systems support plans 
for sheltering in place or other protective approach?
Guidance: The micro-meteorological effects of buildings and terrain can alter 
travel and duration of chemical agents and hazardous material releases. 
Shielding in the form of sheltering in place can protect people and property 
from harmful effects. To support in-place sheltering, the air handling systems 
require the ability for authorized personnel to rapidly turn off all systems. 
However, if the system is properly filtered, then keeping the system operating 
will provide protection as long as the air handling system does not distribute 
an internal release to other portions of the building. Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub 
2002-139

Subsection 6.16
Vulnerability Question: 
--Are there any smoke evacuation systems installed?
--Does it have purge capability?
Guidance: For an internal blast, a smoke removal system may be essential, 
particularly in large, open spaces. The equipment should be located away from 
high-risk areas, the system controls and wiring should be protected, and it 
should be connected to emergency power. This exhaust capability can be built 
into areas with significant risk on internal events, such as lobbies, loading 
docks, and mailrooms. Consider filtering of the exhaust to capture CBR 
contaminants. References: GSA PBS-P100, CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139, and LBNL Pub 
51959

Subsection 6.17
Vulnerability Question: Where is roof-mounted equipment located on the roof? 
(near perimeter, at center of roof)
Guidance: Roof-mounted equipment should be kept away from the building 
perimeter. Reference: U.S. Army TM 5-853

Subsection 6.18
Vulnerability Question: 
--Are fire dampers installed at all fire barriers?
--Are all dampers functional and seal well when closed?
Guidance: All dampers (fire, smoke, outdoor air, return air, bypass) must be 
functional for proper protection within the building during an incident.
Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139

Subsection 6.19
Vulnerability Question: Do fire walls and fire doors maintain their integrity?
Guidance: The tightness of the building (both exterior, by weatherization to 
seal cracks around doors and windows, and internal, by zone ducting, fire walls, 
fire stops, and fire doors) provides energy conservation benefits and functional 
benefits during a CBR incident. Reference: LBNL Pub 51959

Subsection 6.20
Vulnerability Question: Do elevators have recall capability and elevator 
emergency message capability?
Guidance: Although a life-safety code and fire response requirement, the control 
of elevators also has benefit during a CBR incident. The elevators generate a 
piston effect, causing pressure differentials in the elevator shaft and 
associated floors that can force contamination to flow up or down.
Reference: LBNL Pub 51959

Subsection 6.21
Vulnerability Question: Is access to building information restricted?
Guidance: Information on building operations, schematics, procedures, plans, and 
specifications should be strictly controlled and available only to authorized 
personnel. References: CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139 and LBNL Pub 51959

Subsection 6.22
Vulnerability Question: Does the HVAC maintenance staff have the proper 
training, procedures, and preventive maintenance schedule to ensure CBR 
equipment is functional?
Guidance: Functional equipment must interface with operational procedures in an 
emergency plan to ensure the equipment is properly operated to provide the 
protection desired. The HVAC system can be operated in different ways, depending 
upon an external or internal release and where in the building an internal 
release occurs. Thus maintenance and security staff must have the training to 
properly operate the HVAC system under different circumstances, even if the 
procedure is to turn off all air movement equipment. Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub 
2002-139 and LBNL Pub 51959


Section 7: Plumbing and Gas Systems

Subsection 7.1
Vulnerability Question: What is the method of water distribution?
Guidance: Central shaft locations for piping are more vulnerable than multiple 
riser locations. Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities

Subsection 7.2
Vulnerability Question: What is the method of gas distribution? (heating, 
cooking, medical, process)
Guidance: Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities

Subsection 7.3
Vulnerability Question: Is there redundancy to the main piping distribution?
Guidance: Looping of piping and use of section valves provide redundancies in 
the event sections of the system are damaged. Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

Subsection 7.4
Vulnerability Question:
--What is the method of heating domestic water?
--What fuel(s) is used?
Guidance: Single source of hot water with one fuel source is more vulnerable 
than multiple sources and multiple fuel types. Domestic hot water availability 
is an operational concern for many building occupancies.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs 
Facilities

Subsection 7.5
Vulnerability Question: 
--Where are gas storage tanks located? (heating, cooking, medical, process)
--How are they piped to the distribution system? (above or below ground)
Guidance: The concern is that the tanks and piping could be vulnerable to a 
moving vehicle or a bomb blast either directly or by collateral damage due to 
proximity to a higher-risk area. Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the 
Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

Subsection 7.6
Vulnerability Question: Are there reserve supplies of critical gases?
Guidance: Localized gas cylinders could be available in the event of damage to 
the central tank system. Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the 
Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities


Section 8: Electrical Systems

Subsection 8.1
Vulnerability Question: 
--Are there any transformers or switchgears located outside the building or 
accessible from the building exterior?
--Are they vulnerable to public access?
--Are they secured?
Guidance: Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities

Subsection 8.2
Vulnerability Question: What is the extent of the external building lighting in 
utility and service areas and at normal entryways used by the building 
occupants?
Guidance: Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities

Subsection 8.3
Vulnerability Question: How are the electrical rooms secured and where are they 
located relative to other higher-risk areas, starting with the main electrical 
distribution room at the service entrance?
Guidance: Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities

Subsection 8.4
Vulnerability Question: 
--Are critical electrical systems collocated with other building systems?
--Are critical electrical systems located in areas outside of secured electrical 
areas?
--Is security system wiring located separately from electrical and other service 
systems?
Guidance: Collocation concerns include rooms, ceilings, raceways, conduits, 
panels, and risers. Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department 
of Veterans Affairs Facilities

Subsection 8.5
Vulnerability Question: How are electrical distribution panels serving branch 
circuits secured or are they in secure locations?
Guidance: Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities

Subsection 8.6
Vulnerability Question: 
--Does emergency backup power exist for all areas within the building or for 
critical areas only?
--How is the emergency power distributed?
--Is the emergency power system independent from the normal electrical service, 
particularly in critical areas?
Guidance: There should be no single critical node that allows both the normal 
electrical service and the emergency backup power to be affected by a single 
incident. Automatic transfer switches and interconnecting switchgear are the 
initial concerns. Emergency and normal electrical equipment should be installed 
separately, at different locations, and as far apart as possible. Reference: GSA 
PBS-P100

Subsection 8.7
Vulnerability Question: 
--How is the primary electrical system wiring distributed?
--Is it collocated with other major utilities?
--Is there redundancy of distribution to critical areas?
Guidance: Central utility shafts may be subject to damage, especially if there 
is only one for the building. Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the 
Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities


Section 9: Fire Alarm Systems

Subsection 9.1
Vulnerability Question: 
--Is the building fire alarm system centralized or localized?
--How are alarms made known, both locally and centrally?
--Are critical documents and control systems located in a secure yet accessible 
location?
Guidance: Fire alarm systems must first warn building occupants to evacuate for 
life safety. Then they must inform the responding agency to dispatch fire 
equipment and personnel. Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the 
Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

Subsection 9.2
Vulnerability Question: 
--Where are the fire alarm panels located?
--Do they allow access to unauthorized personnel?
Guidance: Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities

Subsection 9.3
Vulnerability Question: Is the fire alarm system standalone or integrated with 
other functions such as security and environmental or building management 
systems? What is the interface?
Guidance: Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities

Subsection 9.4
Vulnerability Question: Do key fire alarm system components have fire- and 
blast-resistant separation?
Guidance: This is especially necessary for the fire command center or fire alarm 
control center. The concern is to similarly protect critical components as 
described in Items 2.19, 5.7, and 10.3.

Subsection 9.5
Vulnerability Question: Is there redundant off-premises fire alarm reporting?
Guidance: Fire alarms can ring at a fire station, at an intermediary alarm 
monitoring center, or autodial someone else. See Items 5.21 and 10.5.


Section 10: Communications and IT Systems

Subsection 10.1
Vulnerability Question: 
--Where is the main telephone distribution room and where is it in relation to 
higher-risk areas?
--Is the main telephone distribution room secure?
Guidance: One can expect to find voice, data, signal, and alarm systems to be 
routed through the main telephone distribution room. Reference: FEMA 386-7

Subsection 10.2
Vulnerability Question:  
--Does the telephone system have an uninterruptible power supply (UPS)?
--What is its type, power rating, and operational duration under load, and 
location? (battery, on-line, filtered)
Guidance: Many telephone systems are now computerized and need a UPS to ensure 
reliability during power fluctuations. The UPS is also needed to await any 
emergency power coming on line or allow orderly shutdown.
Reference: DOC CIAO Vulnerability Assessment Framework 1.1

Subsection 10.3
Vulnerability Question: 
--Where are communication systems wiring closets located? (voice, data, signal, 
alarm)
--Are they collocated with other utilities?
--Are they in secure areas?
Guidance: Concern is to have separation distance from other utilities and 
higher-risk areas to avoid collateral damage. Security approaches on the closets 
include door alarms, closed circuit television, swipe cards, or other logging 
notifications to ensure only authorized personnel have access to these closets. 
Reference: FEMA 386-7

Subsection 10.4
Vulnerability Question: How is the communications system wiring distributed? 
(secure chases and risers, accessible public areas)
Guidance: The intent is to prevent tampering with the systems. Reference: 
Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

Subsection 10.5
Vulnerability Question: Are there redundant communications systems available?
Guidance: Critical areas should be supplied with multiple or redundant means of 
communications. Power outage phones can provide redundancy as they connect 
directly to the local commercial telephone switch off site and not through the 
building telephone switch in the main telephone distribution room. A base radio 
communication system with antenna can be installed in stairwells, and portable 
sets distributed to floors. References: GSA PBS-P100 and FEMA 386-7

Subsection 10.6
Vulnerability Question: 
--Where are the main distribution facility, data centers, routers, firewalls, 
and servers located and are they secure?
--Where are the secondary and/or intermediate distribution facilities and are 
they secure?
Guidance: Concern is collateral damage from manmade hazards and redundancy of 
critical functions. Reference: DOC CIAO Vulnerability Assessment Framework 1.1

Subsection 10.7
Vulnerability Question: What type and where are the Wide Area Network (WAN) 
connections?
Guidance: Critical facilities should have two Minimum-Points-of-Presence (MPOPs) 
where the telephone companys outside cable terminates inside the building. It 
is functionally a service entrance connection that demarcates where the 
telephone companys property stops and the building owners property begins. The 
MPOPs should not be collocated and they should connect to different telephone 
company central offices so that the loss of one cable or central office does not 
reduce capability. Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities

Subsection 10.8
Vulnerability Question: 
--What are the type, power rating, and location of the uninterruptible power 
supply? (battery, on-line, filtered)
--Are the UPS also connected to emergency power?
Guidance: Consider that UPS should be found at all computerized points from the 
main distribution facility to individual data closets and at critical personal 
computers/terminals. Critical LAN sections should also be on backup power. 
Reference: DOC CIAO Vulnerability Assessment Framework 1.1

Subsection 10.9
Vulnerability Question: What type of Local Area Network (LAN) cabling and 
physical topology is used? (Category (Cat) 5, Gigabit Ethernet, Ethernet, Token 
Ring)
Guidance: The physical topology of a network is the way in which the cables and 
computers are connected to each other. The main types of physical topologies 
are:
--Bus (single radial where any damage on the bus affects the whole system, but 
especially all portions downstream)
--Star (several computes are connected to a hub and many hubs can be in the 
network  the hubs can be critical nodes, but the other hubs continue to 
function if one fails)
--Ring (a bus with a continuous connection - least used, but can tolerate some 
damage because if the ring fails at a single point it can be rerouted much like 
a looped electric or water system)
The configuration and the availability of surplus cable or spare capacity on 
individual cables can reduce vulnerability to hazard incidents.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs 
Facilities

Subsection 10.10
Vulnerability Question: For installed radio/wireless systems, what are their 
types and where are they located? (radio frequency (RF), high frequency (HF), 
very high frequency (VHF), medium wave (MW))
Guidance: Depending upon the function of the wireless system, it could be 
susceptible to accidental or intended jamming or collateral damage.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs 
Facilities

Subsection 10.11
Vulnerability Question: Do the Information Technology (IT - computer) systems 
meet requirements of confidentiality, integrity, and availability?
Guidance: Ensure access to terminals and equipment for authorized personnel only 
and ensure system up-time to meet operational needs. Reference: DOC CIAO 
Vulnerability Assessment Framework 1.1

Subsection 10.12
Vulnerability Question:  Where is the disaster recovery/mirroring site?
Guidance: A site with suitable equipment that allows continuation of operations 
or that mirrors (operates in parallel to) the existing operation is beneficial 
if equipment is lost during a natural or manmade disaster. The need is based 
upon the criticality of the operation and how quickly replacement equipment can 
be put in place and operated. Reference: DOC CIAO Vulnerability Assessment 
Framework 1.1

Subsection 10.13
Vulnerability Question: 
--Where is the backup tape/file storage site and what is the type of safe 
environment? (safe, vault, underground)
--Is there redundant refrigeration in the site?
Guidance: If equipment is lost, data are most likely lost, too. Backups are 
needed to continue operations at the disaster recovery site or when equipment 
can be delivered and installed. Reference: DOC CIAO Vulnerability Assessment 
Framework 1.1

Subsection 10.14
Vulnerability Question: Are there any satellite communications (SATCOM) links? 
(location, power, UPS, emergency power, spare capacity/capability)
Guidance: SATCOM links can serve as redundant communications for voice and data 
if configured to support required capability after a hazard incident.
Reference: DOC CIAO Vulnerability Assessment Framework 1.1

Subsection 10.15
Vulnerability Question: 
--Is there a mass notification system that reaches all building occupants? 
(public address, pager, cell phone, computer override, etc.)
--Will one or more of these systems be operational under hazard conditions?
(UPS, emergency power)
Guidance: Depending upon building size, a mass notification system will provide 
warning and alert information, along with actions to take before and after an 
incident if there is redundancy and power. Reference: DoD UFC 4-010-01

Subsection 10.16
Vulnerability Question: 
--Do control centers and their designated alternate locations have equivalent or 
reduced capability for voice, data, mass notification, etc.? (emergency 
operations, security, fire alarms, building automation)
--Do the alternate locations also have access to backup systems, including 
emergency power?
Guidance: Reference: GSA PBS-P100


Section 11: Equipment Operations and Maintenance

Subsection 11.1
Vulnerability Question: 
--Are there composite drawings indicating location and capacities of major 
systems and are they current? (electrical, mechanical, and fire protection; and 
date of last update)
--Do updated operations and maintenance (O&M) manuals exist?
Guidance: Within critical infrastructure protection at the building level, the 
current configuration and capacity of all critical systems must be understood to 
ensure they meet emergency needs. Manuals must also be current to ensure 
operations and maintenance keeps these systems properly functioning. The system 
must function during an emergency unless directly affected by the hazard 
incident. Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities

Subsection 11.2
Vulnerability Question: 
--Have critical air systems been rebalanced?
--If so, when and how often?
Guidance; Although the system may function, it must be tested periodically to 
ensure it is performing as designed. Balancing is also critical after initial 
construction to set equipment to proper performance per the design.
Rebalancing may only occur during renovation. Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139

Subsection 11.3
Vulnerability Question: Is air pressurization monitored regularly?
Guidance: Some areas require positive or negative pressure to function properly. 
Pressurization is critical in a hazardous environment or emergency situation. 
Measuring pressure drop across filters is an indication when filters should be 
changed, but also may indicate that low pressures are developing downstream and 
could result in loss of expected protection.
Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139

Subsection 11.4
Vulnerability Question: Does the building have a policy or procedure for 
periodic recommissioning of major Mechanical/Electrical/Plumbing (M/E/P) 
systems?
Guidance: Recommissioning involves testing and balancing of systems to ascertain 
their capability to perform as described. Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

Subsection 11.5
Vulnerability Question: Is there an adequate O&M program, including training of 
facilities management staff?
Guidance: If O&M of critical systems is done with in-house personnel, management 
must know what needs to be done and the workforce must have the necessary 
training to ensure systems reliability. Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139

Subsection 11.6
Vulnerability Question: What maintenance and service agreements exist for M/E/P 
systems?
Guidance; When an in-house facility maintenance work force does not exist or 
does not have the capability to perform the work, maintenance and service 
contracts are the alternative to ensure critical systems will work under all 
conditions. The facility management staff requires the same knowledge to oversee 
these contracts as if the work was being done by in-house personnel.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs 
Facilities

Subsection 11.7
Vulnerability Question: Are backup power systems periodically tested under load?
Guidance: Loading should be at or above maximum connected load to ensure 
available capacity and automatic sensors should be tested at least once per 
year. Periodically (once a year as a minimum) check the duration of capacity of 
backup systems by running them for the expected emergency duration or estimating 
operational duration through fuel consumption, water consumption, or voltage 
loss. Reference: FEMA 386-7

Subsection 11.8
Vulnerability Question: Is stairway and exit sign lighting operational?
Guidance: The maintenance program for stairway and exit sign lighting (all 
egress lighting) should ensure functioning under normal and emergency power 
conditions. Expect building codes to be updated as emergency egress lighting is 
moved from upper walls and over doorways to floor level as heat and smoke drive 
occupants to crawl along the floor to get out of the building. Signs and lights 
mounted high have limited or no benefit when obscured. Reference: FEMA 386-7


Section 12: Security Systems: Perimeter Systems

Subsection 12.1
Vulnerability Question: 
--Are black/white or color CCTV (closed circuit television) cameras used?
--Are they monitored and recorded 24 hours/7 days a week? By whom?
--Are they analog or digital by design?
--What are the number of fixed, wireless, and pan-tilt-zoom cameras used?
--Who are the manufacturers of the CCTV cameras?
--What is the age of the CCTV cameras in use?
Guidance: Security technology is frequently considered to complement or 
supplement security personnel forces and to provide a wider area of coverage. 
Typically, these physical security elements provide the first line of defense in 
deterring, detecting, and responding to threats and reducing vulnerabilities. 
They must be viewed as an integral component of the overall security program. 
Their design, engineering, installation, operation, and management must be able 
to meet daily security challenges from a cost-effective and efficiency 
perspective. During and after an incident, the system, or its backups, should be 
functional per the planned design.
Consider color CCTV cameras to view and record activity at the perimeter of the 
building, particularly at primary entrances and exits. A mix of monochrome 
cameras should be considered for areas that lack adequate illumination for color 
cameras. Reference: GSA PBS P-100

Subsection 12.2
Vulnerability Question:
--Are the cameras programmed to respond automatically to perimeter building 
alarm events?
--Do they have built-in video motion capabilities?
Guidance: The efficiency of monitoring multiple screens decreases as the number 
of  screens increases. Tying the alarm system or motion sensors to a CCTV camera 
and a monitoring screen improves the man-machine interface by drawing attention 
to a specific screen and its associated camera. Adjustment may be required after 
installation due to initial false alarms, usually caused by wind or small 
animals. Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities

Subsection 12.3
Vulnerability Question: What type of camera housings are used and are they 
environmental in design to protect against exposure to heat and cold weather 
elements?
Guidance: Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities

Subsection 12.4
Vulnerability Question: Are panic/duress alarm buttons or sensors used, where 
are they located, and are they hardwired or portable?
Guidance: Call buttons should be provided at key public contact areas and as 
needed in offices of managers and directors, in garages and parking lots, and 
other high-risk locations by assessment. Reference: GSA PBS P-100

Subsection 12.5
Vulnerability Question: Are intercom call boxes used in parking areas or along 
the building  perimeter?
Guidance: See Item 12.4.

Subsection 12.6
Vulnerability Question: What is the transmission media used to transmit camera 
video signals: fiber, wire line, telephone wire, coaxial, wireless?
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs 
Facilities

Subsection 12.7
Vulnerability Question: Who monitors the CCTV system?
Guidance: Reference: DOC CIAO Vulnerability Assessment Framework 1.1

Subsection 12.8
Vulnerability Question: 
--What is the quality of video images both during the day and hours of darkness?
--Are infrared camera illuminators used?
Guidance: Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities

Subsection 12.9
Vulnerability Question: Are the perimeter cameras supported by an 
uninterruptible power supply, battery, or building emergency power?
Guidance: Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities

Subsection 12.10
Vulnerability Question: What type of exterior Intrusion Detection System (IDS) 
sensors are used? (electromagnetic; fiber optic; active infrared; bistatic 
microwave; seismic; photoelectric; ground; fence; glass break (vibration/shock); 
single, double, and roll-up door magnetic contacts or switches)
Guidance: Consider balanced magnetic contact switch sets for all exterior doors, 
including overhead/roll-up doors, and review roof intrusion detection. Consider 
glass break sensors for windows up to scalable heights.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

Subsection 12.11
Vulnerability Question: Is a global positioning system (GPS) used to monitor 
vehicles and asset movements?
Guidance: Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities


Security Systems: Interior Security

Subsection 12.12
Vulnerability Question: 
--Are black/white or color CCTV cameras used?
--Are they monitored and recorded 24 hours/7 days a week? By whom?
--Are they analog or digital by design?
--What are the number of fixed, wireless, and pan-tilt-zoom cameras used?
--Who are the manufacturers of the CCTV cameras?
--What is the age of the CCTV cameras in use?
Guidance: See Item 12.1. Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the 
Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

Subsection 12.13
Vulnerability Question: 
--Are the cameras programmed to respond automatically to interior building alarm 
events?
--Do they have built-in video motion capabilities?
Guidance: The efficiency of monitoring multiple screens decreases as the number 
of screens increases. Tying the alarm system or motion sensors to a CCTV camera 
and a monitoring screen improves the man-machine interface by drawing attention 
to a specific screen and its associated camera. Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

Subsection 12.14
Vulnerability Question: What type of camera housings are used and are they 
designed to protect against exposure or tampering?
Guidance: Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities

Subsection 12.15
Vulnerability Question: Do the camera lenses used have the proper 
specifications, especially distance viewing and clarity?
Guidance: Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities

Subsection 12.16
Vulnerability Question: What is the transmission media used to transmit camera 
video signals: fiber, wire line, telephone wire, coaxial, wireless?
Guidance: Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities

Subsection 12.17
Vulnerability Question: Are the interior camera video images of good visual and 
recording quality?
Guidance: Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities

Subsection 12.18
Vulnerability Question: Are the interior cameras supported by an uninterruptible 
power supply source, battery, or building emergency power?
Guidance: Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities

Subsection 12.19
Vulnerability Question: What are the first costs and maintenance costs 
associated with the interior cameras?
Guidance: Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities

Subsection 12.20
Vulnerability Question: 
--What type of security access control system is used?
--Are the devices used for physical security also used (integrated) with 
security computer networks (e.g., in place of or in combination with user ID and 
system passwords)?
Guidance: Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities

Subsection 12.21
Vulnerability Question: What type of access control transmission media is used 
to transmit access control system signals (same as defined for CCTV cameras)?
Guidance: Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities

Subsection 12.22
Vulnerability Question: What is the backup power supply source for the access 
control systems? (battery, uninterruptible power supply)
Guidance: Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities

Subsection 12.23
Vulnerability Question: 
--What access control system equipment is used?
--How old are the systems and what are the related first and maintenance service 
costs?
Guidance: Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities

Subsection 12.24
Vulnerability Question: 
--Are panic/duress alarm sensors used?
--Where are they located?
--Are they hardwired or portable?
Guidance: Call buttons should be provided at key public contact areas and as 
needed in offices of managers and directors, in garages and parking lots, and 
other high-risk locations by assessment. Reference: GSA PBS P-100

Subsection 12.25
Vulnerability Question: Are intercom call-boxes or a building intercom system 
used throughout the building?
Guidance: See Item 12.24.

Subsection 12.26
Vulnerability Question: 
--Are magnetometers (metal detectors) and x-ray equipment used?
--At what locations within the building?
Guidance: Reference: DOC CIAO Vulnerability Assessment Framework 1.1

Subsection 12.27
Vulnerability Question: What type of interior IDS sensors are used: 
electromagnetic; fiber optic; active infrared-motion detector; photoelectric; 
glass break (vibration/shock); single, double, and roll-up door magnetic 
contacts or switches?
Guidance: Consider magnetic reed switches for interior doors and openings.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

Subsection 12.28
Vulnerability Question: Are mechanical, electrical, gas, power supply, 
radiological material storage, voice/data telecommunication system nodes, 
security system panels, elevator and critical system panels, and other sensitive 
rooms continuously locked, under electronic security, CCTV camera, and intrusion 
alarm systems surveillance?
Guidance: Reference: DOC CIAO Vulnerability Assessment Framework 1.1

Subsection 12.29
Vulnerability Question: 
--What types of locking hardware are used throughout the building?
--Are manual and electromagnetic cipher, keypad, pushbutton, panic bar, door 
strikes, and related hardware and software used?
Guidance: As a minimum, electric utility closets, mechanical rooms, and 
telephone closets should be secured. The mailroom should also be secured, 
allowing only authorized personnel into the area where mail is screened and 
sorted. Separate the public access area from the screening area for the 
postulated mailroom threats. All security locking arrangements on doors used for 
egress must comply with NFPA 101, Life Safety Code. Reference: GSA PBS-P100

Subsection 12.30
Vulnerability Question: Are any potentially hazardous chemicals, combustible, or 
toxic materials stored on site in non-secure and non-monitored areas?
Guidance: The storage, use, and handling locations should also be kept away from 
other activities. The concern is that an intruder need not bring the material 
into the building if it is already there and accessible.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs 
Facilities

Subsection 12.31
Vulnerability Question: What security controls are in place to handle the 
processing of mail and protect against potential biological, explosive, or other 
threatening exposures?
Guidance: Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities

Subsection 12.32
Vulnerability Question: 
--Is there a designated security control room and console in place to monitor 
security, fire alarm, and other building systems?
--Is there a backup control center designated and equipped?
--Is there off-site 24-hour monitoring of intrusion detection systems?
Guidance: Monitoring can be done at an off-site facility, at an on-site 
monitoring center during normal duty hours, or at a 24-hour on-site monitoring 
center. Reference: GSA PBS-P100

Subsection 12.33
Vulnerability Question: 
--Is the security console and control room adequate in size and does it provide 
room for expansion?
--Does it have adequate environment controls (e.g., a/c, lighting, heating, air 
circulation, backup power)?
--Is it ergonomically designed?
Guidance: Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities

Subsection 12.34
Vulnerability Question: Is the location of the security room in a secure area 
with limited, controlled, and restricted access controls in place?
Guidance: Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities

Subsection 12.35
Vulnerability Question: 
--What are the means by which facility and security personnel can communicate 
with one another (e.g., portable radio, pager, cell phone, personal data 
assistants (PDAs))?
--What problems have been experienced with these and other electronic security 
systems?
Guidance: Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities

Subsection 12.36
Vulnerability Question: Is there a computerized security incident reporting 
system used to prepare reports and track security incident trends and patterns?
Guidance: Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities

Subsection 12.37
Vulnerability Question: Does the current security force have access to a 
computerized guard tour system?
Guidance: This system allows for the systematic performance of guard patrols 
with validation indicators built in. The system notes stations/locations checked 
or missed, dates and times of such patrols, and who conducted them on what 
shifts. Management reports can be produced for recordkeeping and manpower 
analysis purposes.
Guidance: Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities

Subsection 12.38
Vulnerability Question: 
--Are vaults or safes in the building?
--Where are they located?
Guidance: Basic structural design requires an understanding of where heavy 
concentrations of floor loading may occur so as to strengthen the floor and 
structural framing to handle this downward load. Security design also needs this 
information to analyze how this concentrated load affects upward and downward 
loadings under blast conditions and its impact upon progressive collapse. 
Location is important because safes can be moved by blast so that they should be 
located away from people and away from exterior windows.
Vaults, on the other hand, require construction above the building requirements 
with thick masonry walls and steel reinforcement. A vault can provide protection 
in many instances due to its robust construction.
Safes and vaults may also require security sensors and equipment, depending upon 
the level of protection and defensive layers needed. Reference: U.S. Army TM 5-
85


Security Systems: Security System Documents

Subsection 12.39
Vulnerability Question: Have security system as-built drawings been generated 
and are they ready for review?
Guidance: Drawings are critical to the consideration and operation of security 
technologies, including its overall design and engineering processes. These 
historical reference documents outline system specifications and layout security 
devices used, as well as their application, location, and connectivity. They are 
a critical resource tool for troubleshooting system problems, and replacing and 
adding other security system hardware and software products. Such documents are 
an integral component to new and retrofit construction projects. Reference: 
Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

Subsection 12.40
Vulnerability Question: Have security system design and drawing standards been 
developed?
Guidance: Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities

Subsection 12.41
Vulnerability Question: Are security equipment selection criteria defined?
Guidance: Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities

Subsection 12.42
Vulnerability Question: What contingency plans have been developed or are in 
place to deal with security control center redundancy and backup operations?
Guidance: Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities

Subsection 12.43
Vulnerability Question: Have security system construction specification 
documents been prepared and standardized?
Guidance: Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities

Subsection 12.44
Vulnerability Question: Do all security system documents include current as-
built drawings?
Guidance: Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities

Subsection 12.45
Vulnerability Question: Have qualifications been determined for security 
consultants, system designers/engineers, installation vendors, and contractors?
Guidance: Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities

Subsection 12.46
Vulnerability Question: 
--Are security systems decentralized, centralized, or integrated?
--Do they operate over an existing IT network or are they a standalone method of 
operation?
Guidance: Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities

Subsection 12.47
Vulnerability Question: What security systems manuals are available?
Guidance: Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities

Subsection 12.48
Vulnerability Question: What maintenance or service agreements exist for 
security systems?
Guidance: Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities


Section 13: Security Master Plan

Subsection 13.1
Vulnerability Question: 
--Does a written security plan exist for this site or building?
--When was the initial security plan written and last revised?
--Who is responsible for preparing and reviewing the security plan?
Guidance: The development and implementation of a security master plan provides 
a roadmap that outlines the strategic direction and vision, operational, 
managerial, and technological mission, goals, and objectives of the 
organizations security program. Reference: DOC CIAO Vulnerability Assessment 
Framework 1.1

Subsection 13.2
Vulnerability Question: Has the security plan been communicated and disseminated 
to key management personnel and departments?
Guidance: The security plan should be part of the building design so that the 
construction or renovation of the structure integrates with the security 
procedures to be used during daily operations. Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

Subsection 13.3
Vulnerability Question: Has the security plan been benchmarked or compared 
against related organizations and operational entities?
Guidance: Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities

Subsection 13.4
Vulnerability Question: Has the security plan ever been tested and evaluated 
from a benefit/cost and operational efficiency and effectiveness perspective?
Guidance: Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities

Subsection 13.5
Vulnerability Question: Does the security plan define mission, vision, and 
short- and long- term security program goals and objectives?
Guidance: Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities

Subsection 13.6
Vulnerability Question: Are threats/hazards, vulnerabilities, and risks 
adequately defined and security countermeasures addressed and prioritized 
relevant to their criticality and probability of occurrence? Guidance: 
Reference: DOC CIAO Vulnerability Assessment Framework 1.1

Subsection 13.7
Vulnerability Question: Has a security implementation schedule been established 
to address recommended security solutions?
Guidance: Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities

Subsection 13.8
Vulnerability Question: Have security operating and capital budgets been 
addressed, approved, and established to support the plan?
Guidance: Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities

Subsection 13.9
Vulnerability Question: What regulatory or industry guidelines/standards were 
followed in the preparation of the security plan?
Guidance: Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities

Subsection 13.10
Vulnerability Question: Does the security plan address existing security 
conditions from an administrative, operational, managerial, and technical 
security systems perspective?
Guidance: Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities

Subsection 13.11
Vulnerability Question: Does the security plan address the protection of people, 
property, assets, and information?
Guidance: Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities

Subsection 13.12
Vulnerability Question: Does the security plan address the following major 
components: access control, surveillance, response, building hardening, and 
protection against CBR and cyber-network attacks?
Guidance: Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities

Subsection 13.13
Vulnerability Question: Has the level of risk been identified and communicated 
in the security plan through the performance of a physical security assessment?
Guidance: Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities

Subsection 13.14
Vulnerability Question: 
--When was the last security assessment performed?
--Who performed the security risk assessment?
Guidance: Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities

Subsection 13.15
Vulnerability Question: 
--Are the following areas of security analysis addressed in the security master 
plan?

Asset Analysis: Does the security plan identify and prioritize the assets to be 
protected in accordance to their location, control, current value, and 
replacement value?

Threat Analysis: Does the security plan address potential threats; causes of 
potential harm in the form of death, injury, destruction, disclosure, 
interruption of operations, or denial of services?
(possible criminal acts [documented and review of police/security incident 
reports] associated with forced entry, bombs, ballistic assault, biochemical and 
related terrorist tactics, attacks against utility systems infrastructure and 
buildings)

Vulnerability Analysis: Does the security plan address other areas associated 
with the site or building and its operations that can be taken advantage of to 
carry out a threat?(architectural design and construction of new and existing 
buildings, technological support systems [e.g., heating, air conditioning, 
power, lighting and security systems, etc.] and operational procedures, 
policies, and controls)

Risk Analysis: Does the security plan address the findings from the asset, 
threat/hazard, and vulnerability analyses in order to develop, recommend, and 
consider implementation of appropriate security countermeasures?

Guidance: This process is the input to the building design and what mitigation 
measures will be included in the facility project to reduce risk and increase 
safety of the building and people. Reference: USA TM 5-853, Security Engineering



*Sources:
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention/National Institute for Occupational 
Safety and Health (CDC/NIOSH)
Publication No. 2002-139, Guidance for Protecting Building Environments from 
Airborne Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Attacks, May 2002

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
FEMA 154, Rapid Visual Screening of Buildings for Seismic Hazards: A Handbook, 
1988 (also, Applied Technology Council (ATC-21) by same name)
FEMA 386-7, Integrating Human-Caused Hazards Into Mitigation Planning, September 
2002
SLG 101, Guide for All-Hazard Emergency Operations Planning, Chapter 6, 
Attachment G, Terrorism, April 2001

General Services Administration (GSA)
PBS  P100, Facilities Standards for Public Buildings Service,
November 2002

Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL)
LBNL PUB-51959, Protecting Buildings from a Biological or Chemical Attack: 
Actions to Take Before or During a Release,
January 10, 2003

U.S. Air Force (USAF)
Installation Force Protection Guide, 1997

U.S. Army (USA)
Technical Manuals (TM) 5-853-1/-2/-3/-4, Security Engineering, May 12, 1994

U.S. Department of Commerce, Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (DOC CIAO)
Vulnerability Assessment Framework 1.1, October 1998

U.S. Department of Defense (DoD)
Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC), UFC 4-010-01, DoD Minimum Antiterrorism 
Standards for Buildings, July 31, 2002

U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ)
National Criminal Justice (NCJ) NCJ181200, Fiscal Year 1999 State Domestic 
Preparedness Equipment Program, Assessment and Strategy Development Tool Kit, 
May 15, 2000

U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)
Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities, 
Recommendations of the National Institute of Building Sciences Task Group to the 
Department of Veterans Affairs, 6 September 2002



Appendix B1: Risk Assessment Database

Assessors User Guide (National Institute of Building Sciences 2004)

Introduction		B1-3
Before the Assessment: Getting Ready to Use the Assessors Version of the Risk 
Assessment Database 		B1-4
Main Menu	 	B1-5
Assessment Team		B1-6
Points of Contact		B1-7
GIS Portfolio		B1-8
Miscellaneous Files			B1-9
Critical Functions Matrix	B1-10
Critical Functions Rollup	B1-11
Critical Infrastructure Matrix	B1-12
Critical Infrastructure Rollup	B1-13
Observations and Recommendations/Remediations for the Vulnerability Assessment
Checklist Sections		B1-14
Select File		B1-15
Importing Data from Other Databases 	B1-16
Importing Observation and Recommendation/Remediation Data	B1-16
	Observation Details from the REMOTE Database	B1-17
Importing Vulnerability and Recommendation/Remediation Data	B1-18 
	Assessment Vulnerabilities from the REMOTE Database	B1-19
Assessment Main Page	B1-20
Executive Summary		B1-20
Vulnerabilities		B1-21
	Remediations		B1-22
After the Assessment: Giving Data to the Database Administrator	B1-23 


Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this 
publication and application do not necessarily reflect the views of FEMA. 
Additionally, neither FEMA or any of its employees makes any warrantee, 
expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the 
accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, product, or process 
included in this publication and application. Users of information from this 
publication and application assume all liability arising from such use.


Introduction
To support the building assessment process, this easy to use Risk Assessment 
Database application is provided with FEMA 452, Risk Assessment: A How-To Guide 
to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings. The Risk Assessment 
Database is a standalone application that is both a collection tool and a 
management tool. Assessors can use the tool to assist in the systematic 
collection, storage, and reporting of assessment data.  It has functions, 
folders, and displays to import and display threat matrices, digital photos, 
cost data, emergency plans, and certain Geographic Information System (GIS) 
products as part of the record of assessment. Managers can use the application 
to store, search, and analyze data collected from multiple assessments. 

The Risk Assessment Database is initially installed on a desktop computer at an 
organizations headquarters. This database, referred to in this User Guide as 
the Managers Database, becomes the main access and storage point for future 
assessment data. When an organization wants to conduct an assessment of a site 
or series of sites, a database administrator uses the application to produce a 
small temporary database, called the Assessors Database, on a CD. Into this 
Assessors Database are placed references, site plans, GIS portfolios, and other 
site-specific data that are known about the assessment site or are developed 
during the pre-assessment phase. This Assessors Database is given to the 
Assessment Team and is loaded on one or more of their assessment computers 
(usually laptop computers). The Assessment Team then conducts their assessment 
and records information in the Assessors Database. At the end of the 
assessment, the Assessment Team combines their data into one database and passes 
the files back to the database administrator. The administrator then loads the 
data into the Managers Database for printing and analysis. 

After initially installing the application, access to that Risk Assessment 
Database becomes restricted to only those designated users who have been 
assigned permission to access to the database by their administrator. Also, data 
can be viewed by all authorized users of the database, but changes to the data 
can only be made by those granted permission. All access permission questions 
should be directed to the database administrator of your organization. 

The following are the hardware and software requirements for the Risk --
Assessment Database:
--Pentium 4 or equivalent processor 
--Windows XP 
--MS Access 2002
--256 MB of RAM recommended for all components


BEFORE THE ASSESSMENT: Getting Ready to Use the Assessors Version of the Risk 
Assessment Database

From your database administrator, the user should receive a folder named 
FEMA_452dB_Assessor containing the database application (3 files), assessment 
site(s) folder(s), which contain the folders Emergency_Plans, GIS_Portfolio, Photos,
Site_Plans_and_Floorplans, and Strategic_Site_Plan, and an application shortcut with 
the (graphic of linked database shortcut)  icon or (graphic of Microsoft Access's Key) 
icon.
--The FEMA_452dB_Assessor folder must be copied to the C:\ drive; the database 
application is dependent on the folder being downloaded to this location on the 
computer.
--The application shortcut should be copied to the desktop.
--When the user double clicks the application shortcut, the user receives a 
logon prompt:
--The user should log on using the user name and password provided by the 
database administrator.
--After logging in, the user will get the Main Menu for Assessors.


MAIN MENU
Graphic showing a computer screenshot of a main menu, noting the different areas 
with numbers that correspond to the descriptions below.

1. This is a drop down list of assessment sites. An assessment site must be 
selected before any of the other buttons can be used. 
2. The Site Information button opens the Site Information report. This is not 
filled out by the on-site Assessor; it is usually completed during the 
assessment preparation period. If not pre-loaded, information can be collected 
and turned in to the Manager for inclusion after the on-site visit.
3. The Strategic Site Plan button opens the Strategic Site Plan in Microsoft 
Excel, if it is available. This is not filled out by the on-site Assessor; it  
is usually completed during the assessment preparation period.  If not pre-
loaded, information can be collected and turned in to the Manager for inclusion 
after the on-site visit.
4. The Site Assessment Team button opens the Assessment Main Page to the tab 
with information for the team that performed the assessment (Assessment Team). 
5. The Site Points of Contact button opens the Assessment Main Page to the tab 
with the contact information for the assessment site points of contact (Points 
of Contact). 
6. The Critical Function Matrix button opens the Critical Functions Matrix form, 
and the Critical Infrastructures Matrix button opens the Critical 
Infrastructures Matrix form.
7. The Vulnerability Assessment Checklist buttons open a form that allows the 
user to input observations, recommendations/remediations, and vulnerability 
categorizations to the database for each checklist section. (Observations and 
Recommendations/Remediations for Vulnerability Assessment Checklist Questions).
8. The Site Executive Summary button opens the Assessment Main Page to the tab 
with the Executive Summary.
9. The Site Vulnerabilities button opens the Assessment Main Page to the tab 
with the Vulnerabilities for that assessment.
10. The Import Checklist button opens the Select File screen, which allows the 
main user to connect to another users data for import.


Assessment Team
(Graphic showing a computer screenshot of the Assessment Main Page with numbers 
corresponding to the descriptions below.)

This form allows the user to enter information about Assessment Team members.
1. The black triangle indicates the record that is selected.
2. The Add New Team Member button allows for the creation of a new Assessment 
Team member for the assessment site designated in the upper left portion of this 
form. 


Points of Contact
(Graphic showing a computer screenshot of the Assessment Main Page with numbers 
corresponding to the descriptions below for adding points of contacts.)

This form allows the user to enter information about points of contact (POC) at 
the assessment site.
1. The black triangle indicates the record that is selected. 
2. The Add New POC button allows for the creation of a new contact for the 
assessment site designated in the upper left portion of this form. 
3. The Delete POC button allows the removal of the selected contact from the 
database.
4. The Add New POC and Duplicate button allows the creation of a new contact and 
duplicates the information in light blue in order to minimize data entry 
efforts.


GIS Portfolio
(Graphic showing a computer screenshot of the Assessment Main Page with numbers 
corresponding to the descriptions below for loading GIS images.)

This form enables the user to see GIS images associated with the assessment site 
if developed during the pre-assessment period. These images are not entered by 
the on-site Assessor; the form is usually completed during the assessment 
preparation period. If not pre-loaded, information can be collected and turned 
in to the Manager for inclusion after the on-site visit.
1. The Load GIS button loads GIS images to the designated frames.
2. The 2 arrow button allows for navigation through pages of 5 GIS images, 
either to the previous 5 images or to the next 5 images.
3. Clicking on any of the GIS images will open the image in the Photo Zoom 
window, which displays the image larger, and the image can be printed 
individually in this window.


Miscellaneous Files
(Graphic showing a computer screenshot of the Assessment Main Page with numbers 
corresponding to the descriptions below for adding miscellaneous files.)

This form enables the user to see if files related to the assessment are 
available to view. (If developed during the pre-assessment period.) These images 
are not entered by the on-site Assessor; they are usually completed during the 
assessment preparation period. If not pre-loaded, information can be collected 
and turned in to the Manager for inclusion after the on-site visit.

The form displays a list of the files available and allows the user to open and 
view the files.
1. The black triangle indicates the record that is selected.
2. Double-clicking any of the file names will open the associated file (examples 
of possible files to pre-load for the assessors include references, a GIS 
portfolio in PDF format, and/or past assessment reports). 
3. The File Description field allows for descriptions to be typed in about each 
of the file names in the record.


CRITICAL FUNCTIONS MATRIX
(Graphic showing a computer screenshot of the matrix with numbers corresponding 
to the descriptions below showing the record numbers and results.)

This form records and numerically displays the results of analysis performed 
during the assessment. The matrix lists Critical Functions down the left side 
and threats across the top to create Threat-pairs. For each Threat-pair, a 
numeric value, on a 1-10 scale, is recorded for a threat rating, an asset value 
rating, and a vulnerability rating. The methodology for determining the ratings 
is found in FEMA 452. 
1. The black triangle indicates the record that is selected.
2. The Rollup button opens a window that summarizes all of the risk columns into 
one easy to read form called Critical Functions Rollup.
3. These fields are where values (1-10) are typed in for each of the Threat-
pairs. The Risk Column is automatically generated and color coded. 


Critical Functions Rollup 
(Graphic showing a computer screenshot of the rollup with number corresponding 
to the descriptions below showing risk value.)

This form displays a summary of the final numeric risk value of each Threat-pair 
in the Critical Functions Matrix.
1. The black triangle indicates the record that is selected.


CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE MATRIX
(Graphic showing a computer screenshot of the matrix with numbers corresponding 
to the descriptions below.)

This form records and numerically displays the results of analysis performed 
during the assessment. The matrix lists Critical Infrastructure down the left 
side and threats across the top to create Threat-pairs. For each Threat-pair, a 
numeric value, on a 1-10 scale, is recorded for a threat rating, an asset value 
rating, and a vulnerability rating. The methodology for determining the ratings 
is found in FEMA 452. 
1. The black triangle indicates the record that is selected.
2. The Rollup button opens a window that summarizes all of the risk columns into 
one easy to read called Critical Infrastructure Rollup.
3. These fields are where values (1-10) are typed in for each of the threats to 
a critical infrastructure.


Critical Infrastructure Rollup
(Graphic showing a computer screenshot of the rollup with number corresponding 
to the descriptions below on the purpose of the rollup form.)

This form is used to view the risk of threats for the specified critical 
infrastructure.
1. The black triangle indicates the record that is selected.


OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS/REMEDIATIONS FOR THE 
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT CHECKLIST SECTIONS
(Graphic showing a computer screenshot of the checklist with numbers corresponding 
to the descriptions below.)

This form allows the user to enter observations and recommendations/remediations 
for each of the vulnerability assessment checklist questions.
1. The black triangle indicates the record that is selected.
2. These fields are where observations and recommendations/remediations are 
entered by the user.
3. This checkbox is selected if the observation is a vulnerability; the 
observations and recommendations/remediations are copied to the Vulnerabilities 
page. 


SELECT FILE
(Graphic showing a computer screenshot of the Select File box with numbers 
corresponding to the descriptions below.)
 
If assessment data are collected and recorded on more than one computer, this 
form allows the main user to connect to another users database, and import 
the other users data. Note: the threat matrices cannot be imported, so it is 
important for the main user to have the threat matrices data in their 
database. 
1. The Browse button allows the user to search for and select another database 
to connect to. (Note: The database to connect to will have Data in its name, 
not Application.)
2. The Import button allows the user to connect the database selected in 1.

Once a connection is made, this window will pop up.(Graphic of computer screenshot 
regarding connection mode) Simply click the OK button to make the data available 
for viewing or copying.


IMPORTING DATA FROM OTHER DATABASES
After a database connection has been made (see Select File), the user can start 
importing another users data.


Importing Observation and Recommendation/Remediation Data
Once connected to another database, the Main Menu screen will appear the same. 
Clicking on any of the Vulnerability Assessment Checklist buttons will supply 
this window with a new Open Remote Data button added to the screen.
1. The Open Remote Data button will make the additional data available and open 
the Observation Details from REMOTE Database screen.


Observation Details from the REMOTE Database
(Graphic showing a computer screenshot with numbers corresponding to the descriptions 
below.)

This form displays the remote data and allows the Main User to choose which data 
to import. 
1. This checkbox allows the user to select individual records to be imported.
2. The Select All button selects all of the records. 
3. These checkboxes are options for copying another users data. The Copy and 
OVERWRITE checkbox will overwrite the data in the users database; the Copy and 
APPEND checkbox will add the other users data to the data existing in the 
users database.
4. The Update Local Copy button is the final step and copies the data into the 
main users database


Importing Vulnerability and Recommendation/Remediation Data
Once connected to another database, the Main Menu screen will appear the same. 
Clicking on the Site Vulnerabilities button will supply this window with a new 
Open Remote Data button added to the screen.
1.  The Open Remote Data button will make the additional data available and open 
the Observation Details from REMOTE Database screen.


Assessment Vulnerabilities from the REMOTE Database
(Graphic showing computer screenshot with numbers corresponding to the descriptions 
below.)

This form displays the remote data and allows the main user to choose which data 
to import.
1. This checkbox allows the user to select individual records to be imported.
2. The Select All button selects all the records. 
3. The Update Local Copy button is the final step and copies the data into the 
main users database.


ASSESSMENT MAIN PAGE
Executive Summary
(Graphic showing computer screenshot with numbers corresponding to the descriptions 
below.)

This form allows the user to enter an Executive Summary for the assessment site 
report. 
1. The first tab is the Executive Summary input form for the site selected in 
the drop down list on the Main Menu. 
2. This information is the first three paragraphs of the final assessment report 
and usually contains broad over arching information. Individual details are 
usually listed later in the vulnerability section of the report. 
3. The page also allows users to navigate to other forms in the database without 
having to return to the main screen as follows:


Vulnerabilities
(Graphic showing computer screenshot with numbers corresponding to the descriptions 
below.)

This form allows the user to enter additional information on the vulnerabilities 
and recommendations/remediations observed while performing the assessment. The 
form is linked to the Observations and Recommendation/Remediation form. 
Observations that were previously identified and checked as a vulnerability 
are automatically loaded into this form. These vulnerabilities should now be 
furthered analyzed and assigned a priority, a location, and a remediation cost 
estimate. (Note: Priority and Building Number are required.) 
1. The black triangle indicates the record that is selected.
2. The Project Status/Cost button opens the Remediations form.


Remediations
(Graphic showing computer screenshot with numbers corresponding to the descriptions 
below.)

This form allows the user to enter any remediation information related to an 
observed vulnerability, including date, cost, and comments.
1. The black triangle indicates the record that is selected.
2. This date field can be filled in by the user to keep the remediation cost 
records up to date.
3. Enter the cost for the remediation into this field to keep the remediation 
records up to date.
4. Enter any comments for the remediation in this field.


AFTER THE ASSESSMENT: GIVING DATA TO THE DATABASE ADMINISTRATOR
All of the assessment data should be in one database, the main users.
1. Once the database is complete, make sure all of the files are in the proper 
folder locations for each of the assessment site folders in the 
FEMA_452dB_Assessor folder. (Photos in the Photos folder, digital floor plans 
(such as CADD) in the Site_and_Floorplans folder, and emergency management plans 
in the Emergency_Plans folder.)
2. Provide the database administrator with a database file containing the word 
Data, the Photos folder, the Site_and_Floorplans folder, and the 
Emergency_Plans folder.



Appendix B2: Risk Assessment Database: Database Administrator's User Guide


Microsoft Access Experience	B2-3
Before Using the Database	B2-3 
Database Specifics		B2-3
Files to be Integrated into the Database  Assessment Supporting Materials	
	B2-4
Beginning to Use the Database	B2-5
Security		B2-6
Administrative Functions	B2-7
Load Miscellaneous Files	B2-8
Assessment Locations	B2-9
Loading Photos and GIS Images	B2-10
Assessors Database	B2-12
Creating an Assessor Database	B2-12
Preparation: Assessment Supporting Information	B2-12
Working in the Front End	B2-13
Working in the Back End	B2-14
Providing an Assessor with the Database Application	B2-15
Importing the Assessor Data into the Main Database	B2-15
Linked Table Manager	B2-16

Copyright National Institute Of Building Sciences 2004

Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this 
publication and application do not necessarily reflect the views of FEMA. 
Additionally, neither FEMA or any of its employees makes any warrantee, 
expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the 
accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, product, or process 
included in this publication and application. Users of information from this 
publication and application assume all liability arising from such use.


MICROSOFT ACCESS EXPERIENCE
It is highly recommended that the database administrator is an intermediate to 
advanced Microsoft Access user. 

For up to date information about Microsoft Access, the software webpage is: 
http://office.microsoft.com/en-us/FX010857911033.aspx.


Before Using The Database 

Database Specifics
The database application is composed of various files, including a Microsoft 
Access front end database (FEMA452_Application_v1.mde), a back end database 
(FEMA452_Data.mde), a workgroup file (FEMA452wg.mdw), a shortcut to the database 
(FEMA 452 Database), a shortcut to the back end of the database (Master Data), a 
Microsoft Word Document (FEMA452dB_UserGuide.doc), and a Microsoft Excel 
Spreadsheet (ThreatMatrix.xls) for the Master Database. An assessor database 
front end and front end shortcut are provided (FEMA452db_App_Assessor_v1.mde and 
FEMA 452 Assessor Database, respectively). Also, a short cut to the workgroup 
file (Workgroup), to change passwords and add users is provided.

The following are the hardware and software requirements for the Risk Assessment 
Database:
--Pentium 4 or equivalent processor 
--Windows XP 
--MS Access 2002
--256 MB of RAM recommended for all components

The database application files are set to run on the C: drive, in the FEMA_452dB 
folder. Similarly, the assessor database is set to run on the C: drive, in the 
FEMA_45dB_Assessor folder. The database applications have a specific file 
structure that has to be adhered to for the database to function properly, 
regardless of location on the computer. 

Graphic showing folder and file locations. 

Note: AssessmentSite1 and AssessmentSite2 are just example folders, and these 
will be replaced by assessment site folders created by the database 
administrator.

Files to be Integrated into the Database  Assessment Supporting Materials
Assessment support materials that can be integrated into this database include:
--Emergency plans,
--GIS materials  an Adobe PDF format portfolio, high and low resolution images 
(both high and low resolution images MUST have the same name, but with the low 
resolution image ending in _lr),
--Photos,
--Site plans and floor plans (CAD, Image), and
--Strategic site plan (Microsoft Excel spreadsheet).

All of these materials MUST be placed in the correct folders for the database 
application to be able to utilize them properly. See the following table for 
supporting material placement:

Table description:
Table with two columns: Supporting Material and Folder. Support Material 
contains materials entitled Emergency plans - any format; GIS materials - PDF; 
GIS materials - high resolution JPEGS; GIS materials - low resolution JPEGS; 
site plan and floor plans (CAD, Image) - any format; and strategic site plan - 
Microsoft Excel spreadsheet.
The Folder contains materials entitled Emergency_Plans; GIS_Portfolio; 
High_Res; Low_Res; Photos; Site_Plan_and_Floorplans; and Strategic_Site_Plan.

All of these folders need to be utilized in the created Assessment Site folder, 
which is named while creating a new assessment location.


BEGINNING TO USE THE DATABASE
During Installation, a shortcut was placed on the desktop, FEMA 452 Database. 
Double click the shortcut, and log on with the username Administrator, with 
password administrator. 

The Main Menu will open:
Graphic showing a screenshot of the Main Menu.


Security
Three user groups have been created, Admins, Full Data Users, and Read Only 
Users. Be sure to assign Administrator a different password after initial 
logon.

Admins has full access to the database. The Administrative Functions button will 
only be visible for users in the Administrator group. Two users have been 
created in this group, Administrator and Assessor. Both have initial passwords 
of Administrator and Assessor, respectively.

Full Data Users can view and update data. The created user Editor has an 
initial password of Editor.

Reader can only view data. The created user Reader has an initial password of 
Reader.

Add users as necessary using the Workgroup short cut provided.


ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS
From the Main Menu, click the Administrative Functions button, and the 
Administrative Functions Menu will open:
Graphic showing a screenshot of the Administrative Functions Menu.


Load Miscellaneous Files
This form allows the administrator to load files, including the GIS Portfolio 
PDF, emergency plans, and site plans/floor plans, so database users can access 
these files. These files must be in the correct location. See Assessment 
Supporting Materials.

Graphic showing computer screenshot of Load Miscellaneous Files box.

Assessment Locations
This form is where the database administrator can add new assessment locations 
and add questions and matrices to each of the assessment locations.

Graphic showing screenshot of List of Sites box.

1. The New Assessment Location button opens a form for the input of a new 
assessment location.
2. The New Assessment for: (Organization Name) button opens a form Assessment 
Information:
Graphic showing screenshot of the Assessment Information box, with blanks to enter 
such information as Site ID, location, and date.

This form must be completed to create a new assessment. It is important to enter 
all of the information on this form correctly, as the database application uses 
the fields Assessment Folder Name and Strategic Site Plan File Name as 
pointers, to access Assessment Supporting Information. 


LOADING PHOTOS AND GIS IMAGES
The Administrator Group is the only group that has the permissions required to 
load photos and GIS images. To load the photos and GIS images into the database 
application:
1. Go to the Main Menu, and click on the Assessments button, which will open the 
List of Assessments page:

Graphic showing computer screenshot of List of Assessments box.

2. Click on either the Photos or the GIS Portfolio button (both circled in 
previous image), both of which will open the Assessment Main Page:

Graphic showing computer screenshot of Assessment Main Page.

3. Click on the Photo Spreadsheet or the GIS Portfolio Spreadsheet button (both 
circled in previous image), both of which will open a new form:

Photo Spreadsheet or the GIS Portfolio Spreadsheet.

Graphic showing computer screenshot of Photo Spreadsheet and GIS Portfolio 
Spreadsheet boxes.

4. Add photos and/or GIS images by clicking either the Add Photos button or the 
Add GIS Images button.


ASSESSORS DATABASE
The CD includes a folder containing the assessor front end database 
(FEMA_452db_App_Assessor_v1.mde). To make this application function, the 
administrator will have to provide the assessor with a backend database, 
FEMA452dB_Data.mde and Assessment Supporting Information.

Creating an Assessor Database
An assessor database can be created following these steps:
Preparation: Assessment Supporting Information
1. Create an assessment site folder (it can be named anything as long as it is 
referenced properly when completing Assessment Information in step 4), and 
populate all of the  Assessment Supporting Information folders with desired 
files. Be sure to keep the following file structure: (computer screenshot of file and 
folder location and organization.)
2. Copy and paste all of the assessment site folders to the 
C:\FEMA_452dB_Assessor folder.

Working in the Front End
1. Open the FEMA452dB_application_v1.mde, logging on as an Administrator.
2. Create a logon account for the assessor (if one is not created already).
3. Create (an) assessment location(s) using the New Assessment Location function 
on the Assessment Locations form.
4. Create (a) new assessment(s) using the New Assessment for: (Organization just 
created) button function on the Assessment Locations form.
5. Load any miscellaneous files that may support the assessment.
6. Load any photos or GIS images that may have been taken or created for the 
assessment.  
7. A default photo for the assessment, which will appear on the Assessments Main 
Page in the assessors database, may be selected using the drop down menu 
located on the Assessment Main Page:

Graphic showing computer screenshot of Assessment Main Page.

8. Close the database.

Working in the Back End
Only step 1 is necessary if this is the first assessment to go to the field, 
there is only one assessment, or if there is only one group of assessments
1. Copy the FEMA452dB_Data.mde and FEMA452wg.mdw file, and paste it in the 
C:\FEMA_452dB_Assessor folder.

The purpose of the following steps is to safeguard any sensitive material that 
may have been collected on previous assessments. After completing these steps, 
assessors will only be able to access information provided to them.
2. Open the FEMA452dB_Data.mde file by double clicking on the Assessor Data 
shortcut and logging on as the administrator, to open the Administrative 
Functions Menu:

Graphic showing computer screenshot of Administrative Functions Menu.

3. Click the Create Field Database button to open the Assessments to Send to the 
Field form:
4. For any sites you want to send to the field, click the corresponding boxes 
for the site in the Send To Field column.

Graphic showing computer screenshot of frmAssessmentsToSendToTheField box.

5. Click the Create button. (This is a destructive process  all of the 
assessment locations that are not marked will be completely deleted from the 
database.)
6. Compact and repair the database (Tools ? Database Utilities ?  Compact and 
Repair Database).
7. Close the database.

Providing an Assessor with the Database Application
The assessor needs the FEMA_452dB_Assessor folder in its entirety (database 
front-end, database back-end, workgroup file, assessment supporting materials) 
and the FEMA 452 Assessor Database shortcut. Be sure to provide the assessor 
with their logon name and password (without any security changes, this will be 
Editor and Editor, respectively.

Burn this folder and files to a CD, put it on a USB drive, or post them on a ftp 
site to which the assessor has access.

Importing the Assessor Data into the Main Database
1. Open the FEMA452dB_Data.mde file using the Assessor Data shortcut and 
Administrator logon.
2. Link the following back-end tables to the FEMA452_Data.mde database the 
assessor provided using the Linked Table Manager.
tblAssessmentPeople1, 
tblAssessmentVulnerabilities1, 
tblBuildings1, 
tblCFMatrix1, 
tblCIMatrix1, 
tblExecutiveSummary1, 
tblObservations1, and 
tblPeople1. 
3. Compact and repair database (Tools  Database Utilities? Compact and Repair 
Database).
4. From the Administrative Main Menu, click the Import Data From Field button to 
get the Import Assessments form:

Graphic showing computer screenshot of Import Assessments box.

5. Make sure the record you want to import from the assessors database is 
selected in both the Master Database and the Remote Database.
6. Click the Import Assessment ID (#) (from red to blue) button and click OK for 
all options for all assessment location data you want to import. 
7. Compact and repair database (Tools ? Database Utilities ? Compact and 
Repair Database).
8. Close the database.

LINKED TABLE MANAGER
The Linked Table Manager is utilized to link the back end database to an 
assessor database when importing data from the field. 

The Linked Table Manager is accessed on the toolbar:

Graphic showing computer screenshot of Linked Table Manager selection on toolbar.



Appendix B3: Risk Assessment Database: Manager's User Guide

Introduction		B3-3
Before Using the Database: Access to the Managers Version of the Risk 
Assessment          Database		B3-4
Main Menu		B3-5
List of Assessments	B3-6
Assessment Main Page	B3-8
Executive Summary		B3-8
Vulnerabilities		B3-9
	Remediations		B3-10
Points of Contact		B3-11
Assessment Team		 B3-12 
Photos		B3-13 
GIS Portfolio		B3-14
Miscellaneous Files		B3-15
Assessment Checklists	B3-16
Critical Functions Matrix	B3-17 
Critical Functions Rollup	B3-18
Critical Infrastructure Matrix	B3-19
Critical Infrastructure Rollup	B3-20
Site Assessments Reports Menu	B3-21
Keyword Search Reports Menu	B3-22
Observations and Recommendations/Remediations for Assessment Checklist	
	B3-23
Vulnerabilities and Recommendations/Remediations	B3-24
Assessment Checklist Question Details	B3-25
All Observations and Recommendations/Remediations for This Question 	
	B3-26
Printing Reports and Accompanying Materials	B3-27
Printing Assessment Sections Completed by Assessors	B3-27
Printing Photos, GIS Portfolio, Floor Plans, Emergency Plans, and Other   
Related Documents		B3-29
	Printing Photos		B3-29
	Printing GIS Portfolio, Floor Plans, Emergency Plans, and Related                 
Documents		B3-31

Copyright National Institute Of Building Sciences 2004


Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this 
publication and application do not necessarily reflect the views of FEMA. 
Additionally, neither FEMA or any of its employees makes any warrantee, 
expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the 
accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, product, or process 
included in this publication and application. Users of information from this 
publication and application assume all liability arising from such use.


Introduction
To support the building assessment process, this easy to use Risk Assessment 
Database application is provided with FEMA 452, Risk Assessment: A How-To Guide 
to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings. The Risk Assessment 
Database is a standalone application that is both a collection tool and a 
management tool. Assessors can use the tool to assist in the systematic 
collection, storage, and reporting of assessment data. It has functions, 
folders, and displays to import and display threat matrices, digital photos, 
cost data, emergency plans, and certain Geographic Information System (GIS) 
products as part of the record of assessment. Managers can use the application 
to store, search, and analyze data collected from multiple assessments. 

The Risk Assessment Database is initially installed on a desktop computer at an 
organizations headquarters. This database, referred to in this User Guide as 
the Manager Database, becomes the main access and storage point for future 
assessment data. When an organization wants to conduct an assessment of a site 
or series of sites, a database administrator uses the application to produce a 
small temporary database, called the Assessors Database, on a CD. Into this 
Assessors Database are placed references, site plans, GIS portfolios, and other 
site-specific data that are known about the assessment site or are developed 
during the pre-assessment phase. This Assessors Database is given to the 
assessment team and is loaded on one or more of their assessment computers 
(usually laptop computers). The Assessment Team then conducts their assessment 
and records information in the Assessors Database. At the end of the 
assessment, the Assessment Team combines their data into one database and passes 
the files back to the database administrator. The administrator then loads the 
data into the Managers Database for printing and analysis. 

After initially installing the application, access to that Risk Assessment 
Database becomes restricted to only those designated users who have been 
assigned permission to access to the database by their administrator. Also, data 
can be viewed by all authorized users of the database, but changes to the data 
can only be made by those granted permission. All access permission questions 
should be directed to the database administrator of your organization. 

The following are the hardware and software requirements for the Risk Assessment 
Database:
--Pentium 4 or equivalent processor 
--Windows XP 
--MS Access 2002
--256 MB of RAM recommended for all components


BEFORE USING THE DATABASE: Access To The Managers Version Of The Risk Assessment 
Database
From your database administrator, the user should receive an application 
shortcut with the icon (graphic of the Microsoft Access icon of a key).
--The application shortcut should be copied to the desktop. When the user double 
clicks the application shortcut, the user receives a logon screen

Graphic showing computer screenshot of Logon screen.

The user should log on using the user name and password provided by the database 
administrator.
--After logging on, the user will get the Main Menu.

Main Menu

Graphic showing computer screenshot of Main Menu.

On startup, the Risk Assessment Database Main Menu displays two areas to 
navigate within the program. Select the Assessments button to view the risk 
assessment related information.
1. The Assessment button opens the List of Assessments form and all 
functionality included.
2. The Vulnerability Assessment Checklist button opens the Assessment Checklist 
Question Details form and all the functionality included.

List of Assessments

Graphic showing a computer screenshot of a Main Menu, noting the different areas 
with numbers that correspond to the descriptions below.

1. Assessment Location field allows for manual entry of full or partial station 
name for search.
2. Assessment Type field is a drop down menu to search for assessment type: Tier 
1, 2, or 3.
3. Search button performs search based on criteria entered into the fields 
described above.
4. Clear (show all records) button will allow all sites to be seen again.
5. These buttons (Executive Summary, Vulnerabilities, Points of Contact, 
Assessment Team, Photos, GIS Portfolio, and Miscellaneous Files) open the 
Assessment Main Page. 
6. The Assessment Checklist button opens the Assessment Checklist form.
7. The Critical Function button opens the Critical Functions Matrix form.
8. The Critical Infrastructure button opens the Critical Infrastructure Matrix 
form.
9. The Strategic Site Plan button opens the Strategic Site Plan in Microsoft 
Excel. 
10. The Site Reports button opens the Site Assessments Report page.
11. The Other Reports button opens the Keyword Search Reports Menu.
12. The Help button opens a window telling the user to press F1 for help.  By 
pressing F1, this User Guide will open on your computer.
13. The Close button simply closes the List of Assessments page and returns to 
the Main Menu.
14. The black triangle indicates the record that is selected.


Assessment Main Page

Executive Summary

Graphic showing a computer screenshot of the Assessment Main Page, noting the 
different areas with numbers that correspond to the descriptions below.

This form allows the user to enter an Executive Summary for the assessment site 
report.
1. For the station selected in the List of Assessments form, this tab will show 
the Executive Summary entered by the Assessment Team. 
2. For the station selected in the List of Assessments form, this tab will show 
the various Vulnerabilities for facilities at the designated site for that 
particular assessment.  
3. For the station selected in the List of Assessments form, this tab will show 
the contact Information for the site points of contact (Points of Contact).  
4. For the station selected in the List of Assessments form, this tab will show 
the contact information for the team that performed the assessment (Assessment 
Team). 
5. For the station selected in the List of Assessments form, this tab will show 
the Photos collected during the assessment (Photos). 
6. For the station selected in the List of Assessments form, this tab will show 
the GIS Portfolio for the assessment site (GIS Portfolio). 
7. For the station selected in the List of Assessments form, this tab will show 
any other files that may be associated with the assessment site (Miscellaneous 
Files). 

Vulnerabilities

Graphic showing a computer screenshot of the Assessment Main Page, noting the 
different areas with numbers that correspond to the descriptions below.

This form allows the user to view vulnerabilities and 
recommendations/remediations observed while performing the assessment. Note: 
Priority and Building Number are required. 
1. The black triangle indicates the record that is selected.
2. The Vulnerability Status/Cost button opens the Remediations form and allows 
you to record cost data associated with the remediation of the selected 
vulnerability.

Remediations

Graphic showing a computer screenshot of Remediations page, noting the different 
areas with numbers that correspond to the descriptions below.

This form allows the user to record cost data associated with the remediation of 
the selected vulnerability. The total cost of entries is reflected in other 
forms containing cost references. 
1. The black triangle indicates the record that is selected.
2. This field can be filled in by the user to track entries.
3. Enter the cost for the remediation into this field to keep the remediation 
records up to date.
4. Enter any comments for the remediation in this field.

Points of Contact

Graphic showing a computer screenshot of the Assessment Main Page, noting the 
different areas with numbers that correspond to the descriptions below.

This form allows the user to view information about points of contact at the 
assessment site.
1. The black triangle indicates the record that is selected. 
2. The Add New POC button allows for the creation of a new contact for the 
assessment site designated in the upper left portion of this form. 
3. The Delete POC: (CONTACT NAME) button allows the removal of the selected 
contact from the database.
4. The Add New POC and Duplicate button allows the creation of a new contact and 
duplicates the information in light blue in order to minimize data entry 
efforts.

Assessment Team

Graphic showing a computer screenshot of the Assessment Main Page, noting the 
different areas with numbers that correspond to the descriptions below.

This form allows the user to view information about Assessment Team members.
1. The black triangle indicates the record that is selected.
2. The Add New Team Member button allows for the creation of a new Assessment 
Team member for the assessment site designated in the upper left portion of this 
form. 

Photos

Graphic showing a computer screenshot of the Assessment Main Page, noting the 
different areas with numbers that correspond to the descriptions below.

The user is able to see the photos associated with the assessment site on this 
form.
1. The Load Photos button loads photos into the designated frames.
2. The 2 arrow buttons allow for navigation through pages of 5 photos, either to 
the previous 5 photos or to the next 5 photos.
3. Clicking on any of the photos will open the photo in the Photo Zoom window, 
which displays the photo larger, and photos can be printed individually in this 
window.

Graphic showing a computer screenshot of the Photo Zoom page.

GIS Portfolio

Graphic showing a computer screenshot of the Assessment Main Page, noting the 
different areas with numbers that correspond to the descriptions below.

The user is able to see all GIS images associated with the assessment site on 
this form.
1. The Load GIS button loads GIS images to the designated frames.
2. The 2 arrow buttons allow for navigation through pages of 5 GIS images, 
either to the previous 5 images or to the next 5 images.
3. Clicking on any of the GIS images will open the image in the Photo Zoom 
window, which displays the image larger, and images can be printed individually 
in this window.

Miscellaneous Files

Graphic showing a computer screenshot of the Assessment Main Page, noting the 
different areas with numbers that correspond to the descriptions below.

This form enables the user to see files related to the assessment that are 
available to view. The user can also open these files from this form. 
1. The black triangle indicates the record that is selected.
2. Double-clicking in any of the filenames will open the associated file. 
(Examples of possible files to pre-load for the assessors include references, a 
GIS portfolio in PDF format, and/or past assessment reports.) 
3. The File Description field allows for descriptions to be typed in about each 
of the file names in the record. 

Assessment Checklists

Graphic showing a computer screenshot of the Assessment Checklists page, noting 
the different areas with numbers that correspond to the descriptions below.

This form shows an abbreviated entry for each of the questions under the 
category selected in the row of tabs under the assessment information section at 
the top of this form.
1. The black triangle indicates the record that is selected.
2. The View All Site Observations button allows the user to view all of the 
assessment checklist data (observations and recommendations/remediations) for 
the selected section tab.
3. The View All Site Vulnerability Assessment Questions button allows the user 
to view all of the assessment checklist questions for the selected section tab.
4. These tabs represent a section in the assessment checklist. The user can 
select any of the tabs and have access to the assessment data in that section.

Critical Functions Matrix

Graphic showing a computer screenshot of the Critical Functions Matrix page, noting 
the different areas with numbers that correspond to the descriptions below.

This form records and numerically displays the results of analysis performed 
during the assessment. The matrix lists Critical Functions down the left side 
and threats across the top to create Threat-pairs. For each Threat-pair, a 
numeric value, on a 1-10 scale, is recorded for a threat rating, an asset value 
rating, and a vulnerability rating. The methodology for determining the ratings 
is found in FEMA 452. 
1. The black triangle indicates the record that is selected.
2. The Rollup button opens a window that summarizes all of the risk columns into 
one easy to read form called Critical Functions Rollup.

Critical Functions Rollup

Graphic showing a computer screenshot of the Critical Functions Rollup page, noting 
the different areas with numbers that correspond to the descriptions below.

This form displays a summary of the final numeric risk value of each Threat-pair 
in the Critical Functions Matrix.
1. The black triangle indicates the record that is selected.

Critical Infrastructure Matrix

Graphic showing a computer screenshot of the Critical Infrastructure Matrix page, noting 
the different areas with numbers that correspond to the descriptions below.

This form records and numerically displays the results of analysis performed 
during the assessment. The matrix lists Critical Infrastructure down the left 
side and threats across the top to create Threat-pairs. For each Threat-pair, a 
numeric value, on a 1-10 scale, is recorded for a threat rating, an asset value 
rating, and a vulnerability rating. The methodology for determining the ratings 
is found in FEMA 452. 
1. The black triangle indicates the record that is selected.
2. The Rollup button opens a window that summarizes all of the risk columns into 
one easy to read form called Critical Infrastructure Rollup.

Critical Infrastructure Rollup

Graphic showing a computer screenshot of the Critical Infrastructure Rollup page, noting 
the different areas with numbers that correspond to the descriptions below.

This form displays a summary of the final numeric risk value of each Threat-pair 
in the Critical Infrastructure Matrix.
1. The black triangle indicates the record that is selected.

Site Assessment Reports Menu

Graphic showing a computer screenshot of the Site Assessment Reports Menu, noting 
the different areas with numbers that correspond to the descriptions below.

This menu is displayed when selecting the Site Reports button on the List of 
Assessments main form. From this location, the user can print any of the 
automated reports for the assessment specified at the top of the menu (the 
selected record on the List of Assessments for when the Site Reports button was 
depressed).
1. The Summary Sheet button produces the Site Summary Sheet report.
2. The Executive Summary button produces the Executive Summary report.
3. The Site Assessment Team button produces the report listing the information 
for the individual assessors responsible for that particular assessment.
4. The Vulnerabilities button opens the produces the Vulnerabilities and 
Recommendations/Remediations report.
5. The Threat Matrix button will perform an automated process that opens an 
Microsoft document and then populates the information for both the Critical 
Functions Matrix and the Critical Infrastructure Matrix.
6. The Site Points of Contact button produces the Site Point of Contacts report.
7. The Observations and Comments button creates the Assessment Observations and 
Comments report.

Keyword Search Reports Menu

Graphic showing a computer screenshot of the Search Reports Menu, noting the different 
areas with numbers that correspond to the descriptions below.

This menu appears after the user selects the Other Reports button at the bottom 
of the List of Assessments form.
1. The Search Observations and Recommendations/Remediations button opens the 
Observations and Recommendations/Remediations for Assessment Checklist form.
2. The Search Vulnerabilities and Recommendations/Remediations button opens the 
Vulnerabilities and Recommendations/Remediations form.
Note: these reports search the entire database and are not limited to the 
assessment the user is currently viewing.

Observations and Recommendations/Remediations for the Assessment Checklist

Graphic showing a computer screenshot of the Observations and Recommendations/
Remediations for Assessment Checklist page, noting the different areas with numbers 
that correspond to the descriptions below.

This form is used to search all the observations and 
recommendations/remediations for all the assessment sites.
1. The black triangle indicates the record that is selected.
2. The fields in the green box allow the user to search for and display only the 
observations and recommendations/remediations of interest. 
3. The Search button performs search based on criteria entered into the fields 
described above.
4. The Clear (show all records) button will allow all sites to be seen again.
5. The Print View, Sort by Site button will create a report of the search 
results sorted by site name.
6. The Print View, Sort by Checklist # button will create a report of the search 
results sorted by the question number.

Vulnerabilities and Recommendations/Remediations

Graphic showing a computer screenshot of the Vulnerabilites and Recommendations/
Remediations page, noting the different areas with numbers that correspond to the 
descriptions below.

This form is used to search all the vulnerabilities and 
recommendations/remediations for all the assessment sites.
1. The black triangle indicates the record that is selected.
2. The fields in the green query box allow the user to search for and display 
only the vulnerabilities and recommendations/remediations of interest.
3. The Search button performs search based on criteria entered into the fields 
described above.
4. The Clear (show all records) button will allow all sites to be seen again.
5. The Print View Vulnerabilities button will create a report of the Search 
results.

Assessment Checklist Question Details

Graphic showing a computer screenshot of the Assessment Checklist Question Details 
page, noting the different areas with numbers that correspond to the descriptions below.

This form shows all of the vulnerability assessment checklist questions in the 
database.
1. The black triangle indicates the record that is selected.
2. The green query bar allows the user quick access to the assessment questions 
by utilizing a drop down menu to select the question numbers or section header. 
There are also manually entered search forms for Question or Guidance by 
searching for keywords entered.
3. The Search button performs search based on criteria entered into the fields 
described above.
4. The Clear (show all records) button will allow all sites to be seen again.
5. The View Questions/Observations button opens the All Observations and 
Comments for This Question for the selected question. 

All Observations and Recommendations/Remediations for This Question

Graphic showing a computer screenshot of the All Observations and Recommendations/
Remediations for this question page, noting the different areas with numbers that 
correspond to the descriptions below.

This form provides the user with all database entries for the question selected 
in the Assessment Checklist Question Details form when the View 
Questions/Observations button was selected. It displays the questions, guidance, 
and comments at the top of the form. The bottom of the form displays all 
information entered for that specific question number.
1. The black triangle indicates the record that is selected.
2. The View Observations button creates a report of all entries in the database 
for the designated question.
3. Double clicking on the View Observations or Recommendation/Remediation fields 
will open a form that allows the user to change the assessment data for the 
record.

Printing Reports and Accompanying Materials
Printing Assessment Sections Completed by Assessors
1. Open the database, and click on the Assessments button.

Graphic showing a computer screenshot of the Main Menu, noting the location of the 
Assessments button.

2. The List of Assessments window will open. Place the arrow on the left next to 
the desired assessment site. Click on the Site Reports button.

Graphic showing a computer screenshot of the List of Assessments Page, noting the 
location of the selection arrow.

3. The Site Assessment Reports Menu window will appear for the selected 
assessment site.

Graphic showing a computer screenshot of the Site Assessment Reports Menu.

a. Clicking on the Summary Sheet, Executive Summary, Site Assessment Team, 
Vulnerabilities, Threat Matrix, Site Points of Contact, or Observations and 
Comments button will produce an onscreen report, which can then be printed for a 
hard copy of that section. 
b. The sections that are normally used in an assessment report are the Executive 
Summary, Site Assessment Team, Vulnerabilities, Threat Matrix, and Site Points 
of Contact. 
c. The Threat Matrix button will produce a formatted Microsoft Excel Book with 
values. 
d. To print both matrices (Functions and Infrastructure), go to File and then 
Print (in Excel), and be sure to select Entire workbook before clicking OK.

Graphic showing a computer screenshot of the Printer dialog box, noting the location 
of the "Entire workbook" selection.

4. Print desired sections.
5. Close the Site Assessment Reports Menu to return to the List of Assessments 
window. 

Printing Photos, GIS Portfolio, Floor Plans, Emergency Plans, and Other Related 
Documents
Printing Photos
1. On the List of Assessments window, click the Photos button.

Graphic showing a computer screenshot of the List of Assessments page, noting the 
location of the Photos selection.

2. The Assessment Main Page window will open, and the Photos tab will be open. 
Click Load Photos to display the photos.

Graphic showing a computer screenshot of the Assessment Main Page.

3. To open a photo for printing, double click on the thumbnail for the desired 
photo, and a Photo Zoom window will open:

Graphic showing a computer screenshot of the Photo Zoom page.

4. Close the Photo Zoom window and the Assessment Main Page window to return to 
the List of Assessments window. 

Printing GIS Portfolio, Floor Plans, Emergency Plans, and Related Documents
1. On the List of Assessments window, click the Miscellaneous Files button.

Graphic showing a computer screenshot of the Assessment Main Page, noting the location
of the Miscellaneous Files button.

2. The Assessment Main Page window will open, and the Miscellaneous Files tab 
with those files loaded in the assessment will be displayed. This may be blank 
if no files were collected. For the User Guide we have listed 4 file examples:

Graphic showing a computer screenshot of the Assessment Main Page, showing the four
examples.

3. To open the desired files, double click the File Name of the desired file.

Graphic showing a computer screenshot of the Assessment Main Page, noting the location
of the file name.

Note: The desired files are designated by Folder Type. GIS Portfolios, Floor 
Plans, Emergency Plans, and the other reports will each have a designated Folder 
Type. Also, each file will open with a program external to the database. It is 
necessary that the program be installed on the computer to open the desired 
file. 
The GIS Portfolio, if part of the assessment, will have a Folder Type of GIS 
Portfolio Full PDF. The file will open with Adobe Acrobat. (Download at: 
http://www.adobe.com/products/acrobat/readstep2.html)
The Floor Plans will have a Folder Type of Site Plan/Floor Plan. These files 
will generally open with any AutoCAD viewer/reader (DWG), such as Volo View. 
The Emergency Plans will have a Folder Type of Emergency Plan. These files will 
generally open with Microsoft Word. 
4. Print each file from the program it opens in.   



Appendix C: Acronyms and Abbreviations

B
BCC	Backup Control Center

C
CAD	computer-aided design
CBR	chemical, biological, or radiological
CCTV	closed-circuit television
CDC	Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
CEMP	Certified Emergency Management Plan
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
COG	Continuity of Government
COOP	Continuity of Operations
COTS	Commercial off the Shelf
CSI	Construction Specifications Institute 

D
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DoD	Department of Defense

E
EMS	Emergency Management Services
EOC	Emergency Operations Center 
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency

F
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency

G
GIS	Geographic Information System
GSA	General Services Administration

H
HazMat	hazardous material
HEMP	High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse
HPM	High Power Microwave
HSO	Homeland Security Office
HSOC	Homeland Security Operations Center
HVAC	heating, ventilation, and air conditioning

I
IA/IP	Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
IP/TCP	Internet Protocol/Transmission Control Protocol
ISC	Interagency Security Committee
IT	information technology

J
JRIES	Joint Regional Information Exchange System

L
LAN	local area network
LEPC	Local Emergency Planning Committee

M
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding

N
NAVFAC	Naval Facilities Engineering Command
NIBS	National Institute of Building Sciences
NIOSH	National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology

P
PC	personal computer
PPE	personal protective equipment
psi	pounds per square inch
RDD	radiological dispersal device

S
SBU	Sensitive-but-Unclassified
SERC	State Emergency Response Commission

T
TIC	Toxic Industrial Compound
TNT	trinitrotoluene
TTIC	Terrorist Threat Integration Center

U
UPS	uninterruptible power supply
USDA	U.S. Department of Agriculture

V
VA	Department of Veterans Affairs  
VoIP	Voice over Internet Protocol

W
WAN	wide area network
WMD	weapons of mass destruction