Problem-Oriented Drug Enforcement: A community-based approach for effective policing.

MENU TITLE: Problem-Oriented Drug Enforcement
Series: BJA
Published: October 1993
106 pages
236,381 bytes

Bureau of Justice Assistance

Problem-Oriented Drug Enforcement
A community-based approach for effective policing
Monograph
October 1993

------------------------------

Acknowledgments

The Bureau of Justice Assistance wishes to thank
the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) for its
help and guidance in compiling this document, in
particular Deborah Lamm Weisel in North Carolina,
Karen Allen in Oklahoma, Sandra Huguley Stone in
Georgia, Joseph Perez in Florida, John Meeks in
Pennsylvania, and Nancy McPherson in California.

------------------------------

Table of Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

INTRODUCTION 

PART I: IMPLEMENTING PROBLEM-ORIENTED DRUG
ENFORCEMENT

 PROBLEM SOLVING AS A PROCESS
 IMPLEMENTATION OF PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING 
 CRITICAL ELEMENTS OF IMPLEMENTING PROBLEM-ORIENTED 
  POLICING

PART II: CASE STUDIES IN PROBLEM-SOLVING DRUG
ENFORCEMENT

 SOLUTIONS BEYOND ARRESTS
 SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA, CASE STUDIES
  A Drug Problem at 1234 Maple Avenue 
  Drugs and Guns at 5678 Maple Avenue 
  Drugs and Gangs in a Private House
  Repeat Calls at First and Third Avenues 
  A Drug Market at 10th and Ivy 
 TAMPA, FLORIDA, CASE STUDY
  College Hill Homes 
 ATLANTA, GEORGIA, CASE STUDIES 
  Ridding Public Housing of Organized Drug Gangs 
  Lighting, Clotheslines, Cops, and Crack Dealers 
  Cleaning Up Public Housing 
  Abandoned Cars
  Corner of Fair and Elm Streets
 TULSA, OKLAHOMA, CASE STUDIES 
  Drug Trafficking Among Juveniles in Low-Income   
   Public Housing
  Drug Dealing in the Seminole Hills Public Housing 
   Complex
  Normandy Apartments: A Strategy for Deterring    
   Drug Trafficking
 PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA, CASE STUDIES
  Cleaning Up Queen Village
  The "Pipe House" at 940 Dove Street
  Thefts From Vehicles in Queen Village
  Narcotics Anonymous in Queen Village

SOURCES FOR FURTHER INFORMATION 
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 
GLOSSARY 
REPORTING FORMS USED IN THE SAN DIEGO PROGRAM 

-------------------------------

Executive Summary

Problem-oriented policing is a process for
approaching persistent community problems that
require a police response. Traditional policing
expects almost instant identification of problems,
with little analysis and immediate response. 

On a call for service at a notorious drug trouble
spot, a traditional police officer might make an
immediate arrest with little effort to measure
long-term results. On a similar call, a
problem-oriented officer might also make the same
short-term response, but include an effort to
determine why the scene was an almost constant
trouble spot. 

This officer might determine that poor lighting
encouraged drug activity on the corner. Getting the
lighting upgraded might accomplish more lasting
results. 

After early reports of success with this new
approach to policing, the Bureau of Justice
Assistance funded a five-city demonstration project
in which problem-solving strategies were brought to
bear on the Nation's drug-control problem. Part I
of this monograph reveals that researchers who
served BJA in that effort discovered that those
agencies in which change came most easily had some
person or persons, ranging in rank from police
chief to patrol officer, who became strong symbols
of commitment to the methods and who promoted
problem-oriented solutions by widely sharing
examples of successes with other police officers
and managers.

Flexibility and Persuasion

In those police agencies that made change look
easy, the lead staff were persuaders rather than
dictators. They urged (and their colleagues
willingly accepted) an experimental approach to
each new challenge. The initiative appeared
inclusionary rather than elitist.

In cities where implementation went smoothly, early
participants met routinely in both formal and
informal settings to explore alternative
approaches, share encouragement, and demonstrate
mutual concern.

Effective spokespersons to promote the change will
persistently emphasize its potential and devise
strategies to surmount any roadblocks that develop.
Personnel at all levels throughout the department
should read about successes that problem-solving
methods have enjoyed elsewhere; if possible, they
should visit sites where implementation has already
succeeded or be visited by officers from those
other agencies. Attending national and regional
meetings and conferences adds breadth to the local
body of knowledge.

A concise and powerful statement of mission,
frequently reiterated, can keep the agency's
attention focused on its problem-oriented
objectives.

Organizational Structure

Too-frequent changes in shift or beat can damage
the officer-community cohesion so important to
problem-oriented policing. If shifts and beats
never change, however, officers may become so
familiar with their communities they have
difficulty retaining neutrality. A police agency
should carefully consider how its organizational
structure affects problem-solving approaches.

Closely related is the question of how much freedom
and responsibility individual officers are to have
in their relations with other municipal and private
agencies. Developing a collaborative relationship
with the community requires creativity and
firmness.

In developing an implementation plan, a police
agency must determine whether it wishes
problem-solving to originate in a special unit or
to implement it departmentwide. This decision is
closely linked with another, that of identifying
the target area. Whether that area is to be a
geographic unit such as a precinct, a type of
neighborhood such as public housing communities, or
citywide will depend on the individual city and its
particular problems.

Introducing the Strategy

The implementation team must determine how
problem-solving efforts will be documented, how
rewarded, how supervised, and how they will be
coordinated across various levels of the department
organization. 

A Realistic Timeline

Only after all these decisions are taken can a time
be set for the problem-solving effort to begin. If
an agency plans a departmentwide implementation, a
several-year period may be required to set up such
detail-oriented tasks as analysis and evaluation.
Other agencies could set up special units and begin
problem-solving operations quickly.

Every element of problem-solving policing, however,
depends on reliable data about substantive
problems. Sources will include community-based
information such as hospital and census data,
public housing statistics, and school dropout and
truancy reports, as well as police data. Crime
analysis units will be one of the first places for
individual officers to start looking. 

A creative marketing plan will be needed to win and
keep the support of community leaders for the
problem-oriented initiative. One way to market
success stories is through vivid and true case
studies. Let successes speak for themselves; they
do not require exaggeration. Officers who were
skeptical at first but have been won over to the
new concepts are among the most effective
marketers. 

Even when problem-oriented policing is established
and accepted in a police department, a training
program is necessary to keep it successful. In
every training session, someone is bound to bring
up barriers to the success of such an initiative.
Then the implementation team can work with them to
identify methods for overcoming the difficulties. 

The final goal--institutionalization of
problem-oriented policing--is realized as it
increasingly becomes an accepted response to
community problems.

Part II of the monograph shows the problem-oriented
approach in action, exemplifying the "SARA" model--
scanning, analysis, response, and assessment--in
case studies of drug-fighting efforts as recounted
by the police officers who participated in them. 

Introducing five San Diego cases is the story of
the bankrupt apartment house that became a center
for drug activity because the deceased owner's
brother ran a gambling hall in one of the few units
he didn't permit to remain vacant for use by drug
dealers. Neighbors, the estate, and police all
welcomed the changes resulting when a new
management took over. In a Tampa case, traffic
diversion and neighborhood cleanup helped residents
themselves throttle drug sales in a low-cost
housing area that was nearing notoriety.

Atlanta contributes other stories of how public
housing developments were reclaimed from growing
drug gang control. In Tulsa, imaginative police
officers used agricultural activities and a 4-H
Club to help lure urban youth away from a
drug-riddled existence. Philadelphia cases center
on a drug-plagued neighborhood that was
nevertheless undergoing expensive "gentrification"
and "urban pioneering."

A selected bibliography, a glossary, and an
appendix of problem-oriented policing report forms
used by the San Diego Police Department complete
the volume.

------------------------------

Introduction

Early successes of "problem-oriented policing"
began gaining wide publicity in 1986. In the Spring
of 1987, the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA)
provided funding for early work on the innovative
idea of applying problem-oriented policing
strategies to the Nation's drug-related problems.
This demonstration project sought to refine the
concept of problem-oriented policing and determine
how effective police officers could be in tackling
the underlying conditions linked to drug problems.

From this monograph the reader will learn that,
within 3 years, the effort met with broad success
and helped practitioners refine the concept of
problem-oriented policing. More important, the
demonstration project showed that officers, by
carefully identifying and analyzing neighborhood
crime problems, could make strides in restoring a
better quality of life to neighborhoods beleaguered
by drug activity and related crime problems.
Readers who find the present volume useful may wish
also to obtain a related BJA monograph, A Police
Guide to Surveying Citizens and Their Environment.

The demonstration project took place in five
cities: San Diego, California; Tampa, Florida;
Atlanta, Georgia; Tulsa, Oklahoma; and
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Police managers in each
of these cities targeted a portion of their cities
for the elimination of drug-related problems. Four
of the five cities selected areas dominated by
public housing; San Diego, however, selected a
large geographic area with a great deal of
low-income housing. Each of the targeted sites
shared high levels of criminal activity ranging
from property crime to violent crime, high levels
of fear of crime among residents, prevalent retail
drug markets, and poor environmental conditions
that indicated community disorder. Only one of the
targeted areas had an active residents'
organization, and that group was characterized by
internal strife and disagreement about its purpose.
Police activity in the target sites had
traditionally consisted of emergency responses to
calls for service, without additional patrols or
other police services.

By working with representatives from the sites,
police developed an implementation plan to put the
problem-oriented policing initiative into practice.
One of the earliest efforts involved training the
officers who would be engaged in targeting the
problem areas. BJA provided each of the five cities
with training and onsite technical assistance. The
results from the technical assistance provided the
newly trained officers included identification and
analysis of specific neighborhood problems,
development of mechanisms for tracking officers'
problem-solving efforts, and determining a means of
evaluating the effectiveness of the
problem-oriented police officers' responses.

Perhaps the most important component of this
process was the identification and analysis of
problems. Officers were intimately familiar with
the neighborhood problems in their assigned areas,
but tended to use general and vague language to
describe the problems. The training program guided
the officers to define drug problems more
specifically. After thinking more carefully, the
officer would be able to articulate that the drug
problem centered around a certain corner or among a
few apartments and describe what types of drugs
were sold, during what specific hours of the day,
and by whom. It became apparent that officers had a
wealth of untapped information about the specific
nature of the drug problem on their beat. 

The problem-oriented policing concept convinced
officers of the need to gather even more
information. For example, officers were encouraged
to determine the identities and origins of the
buyers and sellers of the drugs. Officers also
tried to ascertain what physical and environmental
characteristics made certain areas more appealing
as open-air drug markets. They also tried to
determine the relationship between drug activity,
crime rates, and public housing occupancy rates.
The purpose of this structured inquiry was to
uncover information that would provide clues to
developing a solution uniquely tailored to the
individual problem. Some officers met with
remarkable success in this effort.

The structured inquiry also led both researchers
and police practitioners to refine the definition
of a "drug problem" in a troubled community. In
neighborhoods characterized by drug activity, it
became clear that both officers and residents
perceived virtually all crime problems as related
to the sale and use of illegal drugs. This finding
was an important breakthrough because it gave
officers the latitude to address substantive
problems ranging from car theft and domestic
violence to juvenile delinquency and vandalized and
littered properties within a drug-related context.
Thus, officers understood drug sales and drug use
as symptoms of a host of other problems rather than
problems in themselves. Indeed, the existence of
drug problems enabled officers to more easily
identify deep-seated community problems. Once
officers were able to analyze the components of the
drug problem, they often realized that criminal
justice sanctions were not necessarily the most
appropriate mode of intervention. The various
manifestations of drug problems often needed more
innovative police responses than arrest and
required the police to break the traditional cycle
of responding to calls for service and arresting
suspects.

Three years of work on this project have yielded
several important conclusions:

o Line officers can develop close involvement with
the public to actively address the needs of
citizens.

o Police can tap diverse public and private
resources in a cooperative effort to address common
problems.

o Police can develop and implement innovative
responses to long-standing problems in the
community. 

o Police can be more effective in dealing with drug
problems by addressing the underlying conditions
associated with drug activity.

It is important to note, however, that some police
agencies had greater success in applying the
concept than others. A number of organizational
issues may have affected the level of successful
implementation, and a continuing effort was made to
identify which specific organizational
characteristics helped or hindered these efforts.
This monograph, therefore, is derived from the
experience of monitoring and evaluating a variety
of implementation strategies over a period of time.

Part I of this monograph provides guidelines to
police managers who are trying to implement,
expand, or refine their department's approach to
problem-oriented policing. It is not prescriptive,
but it does identify key elements that may serve as
an implementation checklist.

Part II, the case studies, shares actual
experiences in the problem-oriented approach to
drug enforcement. In each case, the studies were
written with the assistance of the officers who
implemented the approach. Street addresses have
been altered, and names of individuals appear as
initials. 

------------------------------

Part I: Implementing Problem-Oriented Drug
Enforcement

Problem Solving as a Process

At the most basic level, problem-oriented policing
is a process for approaching persistent community
problems that need a police response. The process
involves several components: 

o Careful identification of specific problems. 

o Analysis of the problem through the collection of
information and the formulation of several
responses.

o Development and implementation of a customized
solution to the problem.

o Evaluation of the impact of the solution on the
problem.

Each problem-solving model encompasses these four
stages, although several different versions of this
process are used by different police agencies.

Two of these stages can pose difficulty for line
officers. Police are accustomed to readily
identifying community problems; their usual
reaction is to respond immediately. Police also
usually conduct little analysis and rarely measure
results. For example, when a traditional police
officer responds to a call reporting drug activity
at a notoriously troublesome location, he or she
might make a misdemeanor arrest for drug dealing
upon arrival. Thus, in this non-problem-solving
model, the officer identifies the problem and
responds quickly, almost instinctively.

A problem-oriented police officer might become
aware of the problem in the same manner--through a
call for service. Upon arrival, the officer might
also have a similar short-term response--a drug
arrest. The problem-solving officer, however, would
most likely look at the situation more analytically
and try to determine why the area was the scene of
almost constant drug activity. He or she might
review the calls for service to the location or
analyze the patterns of arrest to identify the
demographic and temporal characteristics of
arrests, asking, "Are the arrestees youth who are
truant from school?" "Are the arrests occurring
predominantly during the day, at dusk, or late at
night?" The officer might even interview arrestees
in an effort to determine why the site was selected
for drug-related activity. If the problem impacts
on a residential neighborhood, a business
community, or other area of citizen interest, the
officer might talk with residents, small-business
owners, or other key individuals to gain insight
into their perspectives.

The officer might also try to analyze the
environmental attributes of the location to
identify conditions that may be linked with the
drug activity (see the companion volume, A Police
Guide to Surveying Citizens and Their Environment),
asking, "Is lighting inadequate?" "Are grounds
littered and buildings vandalized?" "Are vacant
apartments available to foster drug activity?" "Do
abandoned automobiles provide convenient drug
stashes?" Analysis of this sort provides a clearer
picture of the precise nature of the particular
drug problem. 

The results of this inquiry do not suggest that the
officer has sole responsibility for solving the
problem. The analysis is conducted to illuminate
what factors can be addressed to help alleviate the
problem. Only after completing careful analysis can
an officer determine what resources are needed or
how they can be tapped. For example, if lighting on
a certain corner is inadequate, the officer may be
able to marshal the resources to have lights
repaired or wattage upgraded. Thus, although the
officer does not actually do the work, he or she
must ensure that the response is implemented. Once
the response is applied, the officer should
continue to monitor the situation to see if the
response makes an impact on the problem.

In the course of addressing drug-related problems
in this project, officers refined the basic
concepts of problem-oriented policing. These
concepts include the following:

o A problem is something that concerns or causes
harm to citizens, not just the police. Issues that
concern only police officers are important but they
are not community problems.

o A problem demands a different level of police
effort than does a crime, a case, a call, or an
incident. A problem is a group or pattern of
crimes, cases, calls, or incidents.

o Problems must be described precisely and
accurately and broken down into their specific
elements. Problems often are not what they first
appear to be.

o Problems must be understood in terms of the
various interests at stake. Individuals and groups
of people are affected in different ways by a
problem and have different solutions. Police must
be aware of these competing interests.

o The analysis of problems must be thorough,
although it need not be complicated. Problems must
be routinely and systematically analyzed before a
response is implemented.

o Police must understand the way in which the
problem is currently being handled and recognize
the limits of its effectiveness before developing
an effective new response.

o All possible responses to a problem should be
considered to avoid overlooking an innovative or
potentially effective response. Responses to
problems should logically follow what is learned
during the analysis stage. Solutions should neither
be limited to nor rule out the use of arrest.

o Responding to a problem means more than providing
a quick fix; it means dealing with the underlying
conditions that create the problem.

o The department must systematically determine what
does and does not work by evaluating the
effectiveness of new responses so these results can
be shared with other police officers.

o Police officers must have the freedom to make or
participate in important decisions about problem
response. At the same time, officers must be held
accountable for their decisionmaking.

This list of reminders is useful for officers who
have learned through years of traditional police
training and experience to respond quickly to a
call for service, handle it fast, and get back into
service. Gradually, they will get used to the idea.
For example, some officers working on problems
identified in their communities for this project
developed their own language to describe their
activities, referring to their "POP"
(problem-oriented policing) project. Other officers
would say they were "problem solving" or "popping"
when they were addressing a problem on their beat.
In this way, officers began to take ownership of
identified community problems.

Over time, it became clear that officers could
accomplish the four objectives of the demonstration
project:

o To increase the effectiveness of police in
battling local drug problems by addressing the
underlying community problems that spawn them.

o To increase the reliance on the knowledge and
creative approaches of line officers to analyze
problems and develop solutions. 

o To encourage police to tap diverse public and
private resources in a cooperative effort to solve
community problems.

o To develop a closer involvement with citizens and
let them see that police address the needs of the
public. 

These broad objectives guided the implementation
effort of the problem-oriented approach to drug
enforcement.

------------------------------

Implementation of 
Problem-Oriented Policing

Many organizations resist change. This resistance
is particularly common among hierarchically
structured organizations whose operations are
guided by a proliferation of rules and procedures.
These characteristics describe many American police
agencies.

Conversely, organizations more receptive to change
are often somewhat decentralized, with employees
accountable at all levels of the organization.
Organizations that can accommodate change smoothly
typically have a more participative management
style (versus an autocratic, horizontal
organization) and open and frequent communication
patterns (Kanter, 1983).

Indeed, these latter characteristics are typical
where police agencies are exploring new options for
responding to community problems by embracing
change, such as adopting problem-oriented policing
strategies. If street-level police can improve
effectiveness by developing more proactive,
collaborative responses to persistent problems,
police organizations must in turn be flexible and
cooperative to support these efforts.

After nearly a decade of working with police
agencies to implement new approaches to police
work, researchers have discovered that some
organizational characteristics appear to be linked
with organizational capacity to integrate and
institutionalize change. During the course of
implementing problem-oriented policing, BJA
grantees dealt with major leadership transitions;
major crises within the community requiring vast
and immediate police resources, some for extended
periods of time; rotations, promotions, and
retirement of key staff; and major staff
reductions. Any of these changes had the potential
to derail the implementation effort. In some
agencies, these events blocked or slowed
implementation efforts; in other agencies, the same
types of events created only a momentary pause or
no discernible impediment to implementation. It
became clear that where certain organizational
characteristics existed in police agencies,
successful implementation of problem-oriented
policing was more likely; in their absence,
successful implementation was more vulnerable to
setbacks and may have required alternative
implementation strategies.

In agencies with greater success in the
implementation of problem-oriented policing, one
important milestone was achieved early in the
effort: the meaningful support of some key
individual or individuals. These "lead staff"
varied widely from one agency to another, ranging
in rank from police chief to division commander to
patrol officer. These individuals provided a strong
symbol of commitment to the implementation effort,
and their activities included both marketing and
insulating components. Marketing activities
included promoting problem-oriented policing by
sharing examples of successes with other police
officers and managers. Insulating activities
included dedicating adequate resources to
problem-solving efforts to ensure successes. In the
early days of implementation, both of these
functions were vital.

The agencies in which officers engaged in problem
solving most quickly and fully were characterized
by a number of different organizational or
managerial attributes detailed below.

Experimentation. The police agencies and lead staff
in successful implementation efforts were
experimental. They were not averse to or troubled
by the idea of "making it up as we go along" or
refining concepts over time. This open-ended,
flexible structure was an advantage rather than a
disadvantage. Commonly, these agencies would try
one approach to implementation; if it did not work
well, they would develop another and not dwell on
past failures. The more resistant organizations
tended to search for rules and procedures to follow
rather than ideas to explore.

Persuasion. Lead staff were persuaders rather than
dictators. These staff members were typically
energetic and encouraged officers rather than
ordering them to perform certain functions. They
recognized that change is not easily forced on
officers by top-down dictate.

Communication. Good communication also
characterized the more successful agencies.
Communication was very open within successful
organizations and included varied communication
media. Newsletters, staff meetings, and memoranda
disseminated information about implementation
activities and early successes to all members of
the agency, resulting in more staff wanting to
learn about the initiative and become involved.
Effective communication helped portray the
initiative as inclusionary rather than elitist.

Collaboration. Networking and collaboration, both
within and outside the organization, were also
typical of the more successful agencies. Tapping
internal and external resources was one method of
involving more people in the problem-solving
process. The technique sold the concept to a larger
audience, including the affected community and the
city population. Efforts to reach outside the
organization were more successful when the agency
had strong leadership and direct input. Networking
efforts were less successful when external
organizations brought their own personal agendas to
the initiative.

Nurturance. Successful agencies were willing to
nurture the initial efforts of officers by
providing some degree of insulation from the
volatile nature of police work. Early participants
in the initiative were given some latitude in terms
of addressing problems and accessing resources,
including exemption from the demands of the 911
system. This insulation, however, was limited even
in the most successful implementation efforts.
Agencies that insulated problem-solving efforts
entirely from other demands created a new set of
problems that hampered institutionalization without
furthering the cause.

Participation. Successful implementation appeared
easier in more participative organizations. In the
more successful agencies, officers, supervisors,
and command staff met routinely in both informal
and formal settings to discuss problem-solving
efforts, explore alternative approaches, and
troubleshoot organizational roadblocks. Supervisors
took an active interest in the problems officers
identified and offered assistance as necessary.

Commitment. The most successful implementation
efforts featured an articulated and demonstrated
commitment to the concept of problem-oriented
policing. This commitment included a sufficient
dedication of resources to ensure that the crisis
orientation of police work would not derail the
overall implementation effort. The support ranged
from public statements about the department's
commitment to problem-oriented policing to
top-level inquiries about an officer's or a
division's problem-solving activities. 

Thus, seven organizational and managerial
attributes were linked with easier implementation.
These characteristics are:

o Experimentation.

o Persuasion.

o Communication.

o Collaboration.

o Nurturance.

o Participation.

o Commitment.

Some of these organizational characteristics may
reflect the organizational culture or leadership
dynamics that exist in a police agency or in a
discrete part of an agency. However, it is
important to note that these characteristics are
not requisites for the successful implementation of
problem-oriented policing. Rather, they should be
viewed as merely descriptive of successful
implementation efforts. Other agencies and
individuals have different characteristics that may
be equally useful in successful implementation
efforts. Any of these characteristics are a dynamic
for overcoming the organizational challenge of
resistance to change.

This section has described organizational
characteristics of the effective implementation of
problem-oriented policing within the context of an
agency's resistance to change. Note that resistance
is a natural response to implementing any new idea;
the more far reaching the concept, the greater the
potential resistance.

This resistance to problem-oriented policing
results because it is a new concept to many police
officers who have much of their careers invested in
more traditional approaches to police work.
Problem-oriented policing is also a concept or an
approach, with a variety of possible manners of
programmatic institutionalization; therefore, there
is no single set of programmatic steps or
directives for officers or supervisors to follow.
This absence of a defined structure can be somewhat
threatening because employees are unclear about
what behaviors are expected. Problem-oriented
policing is also antithetical to the training most
police officers undergo, which promotes the ideas
that fast response, random patrol, getting back
into service quickly, and making arrests likely to
result in convictions are the ultimate goals of
policing.

Given these realities, organizational resistance to
problem-oriented policing should be understood as
part of the implementation process, identified, and
addressed. Resistance, however, should not be
considered a barrier to implementation. Indeed,
certain key elements of implementing
problem-oriented policing are developed
specifically to address the potential for
resistance. The next section of this monograph
discusses the key elements to address during the
implementation stage of a problem-solving
initiative. 

------------------------------

Critical Elements of Implementing Problem-Oriented
Policing

This section outlines the elements of the
problem-oriented policing approach that police
agencies should consider in the early stages of
implementation. These elements are not mutually
exclusive; some elements overlap. Nor are the
elements presented in rigid chronological order;
most of these elements should be addressed
concurrently within the agency. A department might,
for example, develop a Gantt chart to allocate time
periods and target dates for planning the
overlapping components of the implementation
effort. Use weeks or months as time increments,
based on the needs of the police agency.

This type of complex planning structure is
necessary to implement problem-oriented policing
because every police agency is different. Rather
than forcing the agency to conform to a
programmatic concept of problem-oriented policing,
it is important to develop a specific
implementation plan that accommodates the needs of
the individual agency. The critical elements are
designed to assist in this effort and serve as a
guideline for discussing critical implementation
issues. The critical elements are:

o Identify a spokesperson for change.

o Research the concept.

o Develop a mission statement.

o Review the current organizational structure.

o Develop a method of collaboration.

o Develop an implementation procedure.

o Identify the target area.

o Determine how to introduce the strategy.

o Decide when the problem-solving effort will
begin.

o Develop data collection resources.

o Develop a marketing plan.

o Develop and carry out training.

o Identify barriers to implementation.

o Institutionalize problem-oriented policing.

Promoting the concept. "Any new strategy, no matter
how brilliant or responsive, no matter how much
agreement the formulators have about it, will stand
a good chance of not being implemented fully--or
sometimes not at all--without someone with power
pushing it" (Kanter, 1983). This statement reflects
the experiences many police agencies have had with
implementing problem-oriented policing. The first
step in implementation, therefore, is to recognize
a person or group of people who can create change
in the organization.

All new strategies need someone to serve as their
advocate and nurture their acceptance within the
organization. This spokesperson is needed whether
the organizational environment is a private
business organization or a public police agency. In
police departments, the spokesperson for change
will often be the chief of police. Such a
spokesperson can also come from elsewhere within
the organization or even from outside the police
agency in the person of the mayor or county
commissioner. The advocate's role can also be
entrusted to a group of individuals, such as a team
of officers charged with the mission of
implementing the strategy. 

The role of these spokespersons is to persistently
encourage and reinforce the adoption of the
problem-oriented policing strategy. Some methods of
persistence include consistently emphasizing the
problem-solving concept and promoting it in person
with those in the power structure. The spokesperson
exhibits and verbalizes the commitment of the
organization to the initiative, making intentions
clear through signals to all members of the
organization, such as praising commendable efforts.
The spokesperson also monitors the implementation
process, which might include visiting officers and
supervisors engaged in problem solving and asking
probing questions.

The spokesperson can also help by identifying
roadblocks to or difficulties in implementing the
problem-oriented policing concept, devising
strategies to attack the problems, and guiding
efforts to overcome them.

Research the concept. Members of the police agency,
including those in leadership positions, will have
widely varied levels of knowledge about
problem-oriented policing. Before an agency begins
developing an implementation procedure, it is
important that decisionmakers have a minimum level
of exposure to the theoretical and applied concepts
of the problem-solving approach.

A variety of approaches will enable police managers
to become exposed to the ideas and to develop a
basic foundation of knowledge about
problem-oriented policing to use as a framework for
making implementation decisions. Reading about the
characteristics of the approach and the theoretical
base that led to the development of the concept
provides a solid base. This document contains a
selected bibliography that provides an excellent
list of resources for those interested in adopting
this approach.

Another option to expand the agency's knowledge
about problem-oriented policing is to make site
visits to other agencies currently using
problem-solving strategies. A list of some agencies
using this approach is included at the end of this
document. It is important to note that every police
agency adapts the concept to its unique
organizational circumstances, so problem-oriented
policing may look quite different from one city to
the next. It may also be called by a different
name. The basic foundations, however, will be
similar and will incorporate the problem-solving
model described in this monograph. Agencies or
individuals may call their efforts problem-oriented
approaches, but there are varied levels of
sophistication in using the strategy. Site visits
should therefore include both information gathering
and critical assessment of the agency's relative
implementation success. Visits should not be viewed
simply as an opportunity to replicate a program or
model an approach after an existing initiative.

If time or budget constraints make visiting an
implementation site difficult, consider bringing
experts on problem solving onsite to share ideas
and information about issues related to
implementation. Experts with valuable experience
can brief key police managers and facilitate a
discussion of issues that concern the agency. These
experts may be officers or administrators from
other departments or trainers from nonprofit
groups. Like the site visits, problem-oriented
policing expertise should be viewed critically.
Advice should be given within the context of
helping an agency develop its implementation plan
according to its own unique organizational culture.
Experts should share their experiences derived from
challenges and successes with other agencies.
Within this context, the shared expertise can
contribute significantly to the dialog about
implementation issues. 

Attending national and regional meetings and
conferences about problem-oriented policing is
another way to develop and refine the agency's
knowledge about the subject. Because of the growing
interest in the problem-oriented strategy as a
response to persistent problems--particularly those
related to drugs--many groups and organizations are
sponsoring workshops and meetings to discuss key
issues related to problem-oriented policing.
Attending these meetings provides an opportunity to
listen to new ideas, explore challenges to the
concept, and ask specific questions. 

Learning about problem-oriented policing should not
be restricted only to top command staff. Others
throughout the department will be interested in
learning about this concept, although they may not
have previous exposure to the ideas. Encouraging
informal learning throughout the department and
making more staff familiar with the ideas will
smooth implementation later. 

In summary, there are four primary ways to become
more familiar with problem-oriented policing: 

o Research the theoretical and applied concepts.

o Make site visits.

o Bring in experts.

o Attend meetings and conferences. 

Any combination of these activities can help agency
staff become more knowledgeable about, and more
comfortable with, problem-oriented policing.

Develop a mission statement. When police agencies
adopt new programs or strategies, employees
commonly want to know, "Why are we doing this?"
This question is a valid one and points to the need
for developing a mission statement that embodies
statements of operating principles and long-term
objectives to provide a structure for implementing
problem-oriented policing.

The term "mission statement" can be used
alternatively with other terms, such as
"departmental philosophy," "statement of operating
principles," and "governing principles." The
primary objective is to articulate the basic values
and goals inherent in the new policing approach.
The statement should also include a formal
definition of problem-oriented policing
specifically linking the approach to broader
organizational value statements. 

A department's mission statement is commonly a
reflection of the agency's chief of police.
Goldstein argues that good leaders "must have a set
of values--a commitment, goals and governing
principles." He cites others who suggest that a
chief "must build a sense of purpose into the
structure of the enterprise" (Goldstein, 1990:153).
Thus, in agencies with strong leadership, the
mission statement may primarily articulate the
vision and policies/principles of the chief or top
command staff. Other agencies have organized core
teams or management teams to develop organizational
mission statements in a participatory management
style. In addition, some agencies have used mission
statements to develop slogans or symbols that
incorporate the objectives. The precise nature of
this articulated set of policies/principles varies;
the existence, pervasiveness, and reinforcement of
those policies/principles are more important than
their form. 

The mission statement has significant value in
implementing problem-oriented policing. As a form
of internal communication, it can be a vehicle for
establishing the foundation for problem-oriented
policing. The statement can also articulate what
will and will not happen during implementation,
address benefits that may accrue to the careers of
employees, and specify how results will be
measured. In this form, the statement is a vehicle
for managing the expectations of employees by
closing the gap between their imaginations and
reality. If employees are given realistic
information, they can use this to judge and set
their own goals accordingly, overcoming some of the
fear associated with implementing change in the
organization.

In the demonstration of problem-oriented approaches
to drug enforcement, mission statements were not
formalized but were represented by written project
goals and objectives, including statements
highlighting the principles of problem solving. In
other cities, including Madison, Wisconsin, a
mission statement designed by a departmental team
helped employees discuss, sort through, and
identify common views (Couper and Lobitz, 1991).

The mission statement can serve a variety of
purposes in the organization committed to
implementing problem-oriented policing. However, it
must be constantly reiterated and reinforced by
actions taken by the agency, from hiring and
promotions to communications with the public. In
this way, the approach becomes part of the way the
police agency conducts business.

Review the current organizational structure.
Although the organization of police agencies is
similar in many ways, some striking organizational
and operational variations can be found from one
agency to the next. Some of these organizational
characteristics have an impact on the way
problem-oriented policing should be implemented.
Police agencies should carefully review the
organizational structure to determine
organizational compatibility with problem-oriented
approaches.

One agency variable that impacts problem-oriented
policing implementation is shift rotation. Agencies
with fixed shift arrangements have generally been
more successful with implementation efforts.
Problems frequently vary based on the time of day.
The visible population changes from one shift to
another; therefore, police have more difficulty
establishing relationships with the community when
they are staffed on a rotating shift basis.
Agencies with rotating shifts that wish to
implement problem-oriented policing will have to
make a serious effort to ensure communication among
officers who rotate shifts together. This kind of
communication system might enable officers to work
on problems more effectively.

Beat rotation is another important organization
issue. It is easier for officers to identify and
analyze persistent problems when they are familiar
with the community. When officers are unfamiliar
with an area, they must invest the time to gather
additional information about community-specific
problems. Of course, a disadvantage to fixed shifts
and fixed beats is the danger that police may
become too familiar with the communities they serve
and have difficulty maintaining neutrality.

Another issue linked with implementing
problem-oriented policing is the level of
centralization. Some highly centralized agencies
have had difficulty implementing problem-oriented
policing, citing as obstacles the rigidity of the
chain-of-command structure, centralized
policymaking, and unrealistic managerial
expectations. Centralization of some police
functions, however, can benefit officers engaged in
problem solving. For example, a centralized,
accessible crime analysis unit can quickly provide
officers with important, reliable data. Conversely,
centralized narcotics squads may prevent officers
from responding to the neighborhood drug problems
they detect.

The relative flexibility of management style also
impacts the success of implementation.
Organizations that have more participatory
management implement problem-oriented policing
strategies more easily. For example, a police
agency that has the ability to manage loose or
unstructured initiatives without the traditional
hierarchical rigidity will not be frustrated by the
challenges of implementation. Flexibility must not
only describe the style of current managers but
also characterize the organizational culture of a
police agency.

The type of performance indicators used and the
degree of reliance on those indicators as a true
measure of officer performance also have
significant implications for problem-oriented
policing. Implementation will be more problematic
in agencies where officers and supervisors are
routinely monitored for indicators such as the
number of calls handled, arrests made, or tickets
written. Some agencies are able to both monitor
traditional performance indicators and encourage
officers to solve problems, but this approach sends
mixed signals to officers. Agencies that include
more subjective measures to evaluate officers' work
may have less difficulty implementing
problem-oriented policing.

Closely related to the issue of performance
evaluation is the agency's definition of the role
of the supervisor. When the supervisor's role is
narrowly defined as ensuring that officers meet
quantifiable performance standards, he or she may
have difficulty accepting the more challenging
demands of supervising officers engaged in problem
solving. For example, supervisors who implement
problem-oriented policing are commonly described as
"running interference," shielding officers from
peer pressure, freeing up time to allow officers to
handle problems, permitting officers to work
flexible hours to achieve their objectives,
conferring with officers on analysis of problems,
encouraging officers, and serving as an advocate
for officers up the chain of command. These roles
are inherently more difficult than the somewhat
routinized scrutiny with which traditional
supervisors normally review the work of their
officers.

The term "organizational culture" refers to the set
of expectations and norms that guide employee
behavior. The culture of a police agency can have a
major impact on its ability to change by reflecting
employees' willingness to try new ways of doing
business. Organizational culture is largely based
on the historical experiences of employees in the
agency, reflecting organizational structure,
leadership, and methods of handling change in the
past. The police culture is transmitted in a
variety of ways. New employees are acculturated
informally through stories and legends and formally
through orientation sessions, employee handbooks,
and other means. The culture of the police
organization represents the shared norms and values
about appropriate actions within the agency. It is
imperative to carefully evaluate the organizational
culture and realistically assess its impact on
implementation before proceeding. 

Officer workload and staffing should be reviewed
within shifts and among key officers. This review
is critical because resistance to implementation
consistently comes from those claiming that
officers do not have enough time to engage in
problem solving. In other words, those opposed to
implementation assert that officers have to run
from one call to the next. Prior to implementation,
workloads should be reviewed carefully to determine
if some officers' time is restricted. Police
managers can make this determination by reviewing
officers' patrol logs or assessing the uncommitted
time of a shift's most productive officer (using
the agency's standard performance indicators or
some other method). If the workload is so heavy
that officers have no uncommitted time, the timing
of implementation may need to be reconsidered with
the availability of additional resources. If
officers do have periods of free time, however,
this information is valuable in overcoming initial
resistance to problem-oriented policing and
avoiding roadblocks.

Develop a method of collaboration. A basic tenet of
problem-oriented policing is relying on line
officers to tap the wide variety of resources, both
within and outside the police department, that may
be necessary to resolve an identified problem.
Tapping external resources may range from making a
referral for a service to enlisting the assistance
of another agency in a cooperative manner. If
police have identified a service gap in the
community, the collaboration required may be
significant.

Identifying available and appropriate resources is
a first step toward improving the cooperative
relationship among police, other public and private
agencies, and the community. Some problem-oriented
police departments have developed resource books
listing agencies, contact persons, and brief
synopses of the services offered by the agencies;
criteria for participation; or costs of services.
Other police departments routinely invite outside
agencies to make presentations to police staff,
informing officers about services and offering tips
on how to access services. These same meetings
offer an opportunity for officers to inform
agencies about the problem-solving approach and
facilitate the agency's involvement in
problem-oriented policing. 

Before encouraging collaborative relations, the
police department may need to review its own
policies and standard practices for handling
outside contacts and interaction. In some police
agencies, line officers have authority to make
routine, direct contact with other public and
private agencies to collect information and develop
responses to identified problems. The officers'
supervisors will usually have knowledge of this
contact. In most cases, the supervisor will not
become involved in the interagency interaction
unless the officer needs his or her leverage or
assistance.

In other police agencies, direct contact between
officers and other agencies is discouraged, either
by the police agency or certain public agencies.
Under these circumstances, supervisors may need to
serve as the liaison with other government agencies
or ask a commanding officer to make the contact. 

The variation in the type of collaboration depends
on the police agency and the political structure of
the city or county. If political leaders such as
mayors or council members are knowledgeable and
have supported the concept of problem-oriented
policing, other public agencies may be more
receptive to contacts from police officers and
participate in collaborative efforts. Indeed,
several cities have routinely used advisory or
management groups whose members include
representatives from the community, public and
private agencies, and government to assist with
developing and implementing problem-oriented
policing. Police leaders in other cities have
conducted regular briefings at city council
meetings and for other departmental heads to
facilitate cooperation and collaboration.

Collaboration with private agencies may be more or
less difficult than with public agencies. Again,
the police agency implementing problem-oriented
policing should review procedures for making
organizational contacts and consider whether
procedures will assist or deter officers in their
problem-solving efforts.

Collaboration with the community is an equally
important issue. Many police agencies now routinely
encourage officers to interact with the public.
Developing a collaborative relationship with the
community, however, requires creativity and
firmness. The word "collaboration" implies
obtaining assistance from the public; managing this
assistance may require officers to work closely
with members of the community, at least initially.
Therefore, officers will need to refine their
interpersonal skills, communicate expectations
clearly and directly, and provide regular feedback
to members of the community. Supervisors may want
to develop a method for monitoring and assisting
officers in handling collaborative relations with
the community.

Collaboration is an important part of
problem-solving efforts. Because officers will need
to collaborate with others on a regular basis, the
agency should develop guidelines for improving
cooperation and monitoring progress.

Develop an implementation procedure. Two groups of
individuals will be involved in the early stages of
implementing problem-oriented policing: the group
guiding the implementation and the individuals
doing the work. These groups may be distinct or may
overlap significantly. The agency must clearly
assign roles and responsibilities to those who will
be held accountable for the implementation.

Police agencies have successfully used management
or implementation teams to guide the implementation
of problem-oriented policing. These teams have
variously consisted of command staff, cross-rank
groups with members ranging from officers to the
chief, groups including key individuals from the
community such as political leaders or agency
heads, and working groups of officers and
supervisors engaged in addressing community
problems.

These management or implementation teams can serve
a variety of purposes, such as: 

o Promoting the problem-oriented policing concept. 

o Insulating the group implementing the concept
from competing demands. 

o Reviewing the progress of the officers working on
problems.

o Offering feedback, ideas, and encouragement.

o Facilitating the collection of data and contacts
with other public and private agencies. 

The group should be charged with developing an
implementation plan identifying goals and including
a timetable for the implementation schedule.

The other component of this element is deciding who
will do the work. Many police agencies have started
implementation by working with a core group of
officers trained in problem-solving techniques and
freed of their regular workload. Some agencies have
tapped broader segments of the agency's staff
resources. Other variations include elements of
both of these options.

There are two primary choices for implementation:
employing a special unit or instituting a
departmentwide approach. Each of these choices has
its own merits and drawbacks that vary depending on
the characteristics of the police organization.
Agencies should consider both the advantages and
disadvantages of each option prior to
implementation.

If the agency's long-term objective is to have a
special unit engage in problem-oriented policing,
the task at hand is to create the unit, either by
assigning officers or recruiting volunteers.
Similarly, an agency with a long-term goal of
implementing problem-oriented policing throughout
the department can create a special unit, but plan
for the expansion of the problem-solving effort
into departmentwide practice.

Special units can be self-selected core groups
varying in size from as few as three or four to as
many officers as are manageable. The group normally
consists of officers open to the new strategy. 

The work of this core group should be isolated from
the potentially negative reactions of the agency so
that it can produce visible results in a relatively
short timeframe. However, a disadvantage to having
a self-selected core group implement the approach
is that the rest of the agency may be stripped of
individuals supportive of change. Without the
benefit of having these individuals in the
mainstream of the department, the rest of the
agency may become more rigidly resistant. Tensions
may develop between the core group and the rest of
the agency, especially if the existence of the
group causes an increased workload for the rest of
the staff.

Assigning a special unit to participate in the
initiative can mitigate criticism that the unit
consists of only the agency's best officers. This
approach is likely to include some reluctant
participants. If the agency can overcome the
initial skepticism of these reluctant participants,
the officers can become highly credible advocates
of problem-solving efforts. 

A departmentwide or divisionwide introduction to
problem-oriented policing is a more ambitious
undertaking than the special-unit approach. This
type of implementation effort should be scheduled
over a longer period of time because it requires
greater resources up front (such as training all
members of the police agency) and a more
comprehensive implementation plan.

Agencies can employ any of these described
approaches to implementation or use a combination
of strategies. For example, a department could
launch a special unit with the intention of
expanding it into a departmentwide policy, make a
concerted effort to integrate the special unit's
work with that of the other officers, rotate line
officers through the special unit, and rotate unit
officers out of the unit to spread word of its
successes.

Identify the targeted area. Given physical
limitations, implementation of problem-oriented
policing more commonly occurs in stages rather than
instantaneously. Most agencies seem to prefer this
developmental process, seeing it as an opportunity
to refine and monitor the agency's progress.

Determining the initial scope of the
problem-solving initiative is the first step in
this planning process. Three primary choices are
available:

o In a specific geographic area, such as a precinct
or division.

o In targeted neighborhoods, such as high-crime
areas, business districts, or public housing
communities.

o Throughout the city's precincts and
neighborhoods.

Each of these territorial options has benefits in
the early stages of a problem-oriented policing
initiative. For example, implementation in a
specific geographic area, such as one defined by a
police reporting area, provides the following
benefits:

o Officers trained in problem-solving methods work
in the area on a daily basis. 

o Communication can be achieved efficiently.

o Outcomes for a reporting area can be monitored
more easily than for larger implementation areas. 

o Human resources can be used more flexibly when
work is occurring in a single police district or
area.

The primary benefit of targeting specific
neighborhoods--particularly those that may share a
common problem--is that officers have an
opportunity to capture impact data more directly
and make comparisons to similar problem areas where
problem-solving approaches are not used. Working on
several target neighborhoods also gives officers an
opportunity to compare and contrast gathered
information, brainstorm about alternative
responses, and build enthusiasm for handling the
problem areas.

Finally, implementing problem-oriented policing in
a citywide initiative gets the entire agency
involved in the effort early in the process. If
officers are well trained, their problem-solving
efforts will not be diluted by a citywide strategy.
On the contrary, their efforts have the potential
to be both numerous and diverse. The difficulty in
managing a citywide implementation effort is likely
to vary depending on the size of the agency and the
severity of the problems in the city.

Determine how to introduce the strategy. One of the
most important elements of implementing
problem-oriented policing is having a clear
understanding of how things are going to happen in
the agency--a kind of battle plan. Thinking through
the process and developing a clear vision of how
different elements will work together gives those
overseeing the concept a way to answer frequently
asked questions.

Most of these questions deal with how the
implementation will occur. Commonly asked questions
include:

o Why are we doing this? 

o How will progress be monitored? 

o How will the work of officers be rewarded? 

o How will officers be supervised? 

o What will supervisors do? 

o How will the effort be coordinated? 

o How will time be made available? 

o How much paperwork will there be?

It is important to recognize that answers to many
of these questions will not be available in the
early stages of the initiative. In fact, this lack
of answers is evidence of the flexibility of the
problem-solving approach. Rather than developing
forms and procedures without practical experience,
those guiding the implementation should anticipate
getting feedback on the needs of officers actively
engaged in the initiative. However, this
developmental approach, with its absence of a rigid
structure, may be alarming to those officers
accustomed to working within a bureaucracy. To
overcome some of the officers' apprehension about
the new process, the implementation team should
alert officers to the issues under consideration,
describe how the officers' feedback will be
incorporated into the development of reporting
forms, and provide a general timetable for the
field-testing and refinement of the various
strategies. 

Major issues that should be considered and
discussed (although not necessarily resolved) early
in the implementation process include:

o Documentation.

o Reward structure.

o Supervision.

o Coordination.

Documentation of problem-solving efforts is
essential, but it should be streamlined to prevent
imposing an excessive amount of paperwork on
officers. In the early days of implementation, good
recordkeeping will ensure that the implementation
team can modify the initiative as it develops,
troubleshooting any difficulties that may arise.

At a minimum, recordkeeping should keep track of
the specific problem an officer is working on (by
geographic area or type), the type and kind of
resources tapped for information in the analysis
stage (including names, dates, and a summary report
of contact), community contacts, and other
activities conducted during analysis. Recordkeeping
can be as simple as a summary sheet listing
progress to date with informal attachments of
various correspondence, notes from telephone calls,
information sheets, and other supporting materials
used in the problem-solving effort. (Several
samples of problem-oriented reporting and tracking
forms are included as attachments to this
monograph.) It is also extremely helpful to write
up the work in a narrative form so that it can be
used in an agency newsletter or departmental
memorandum on accomplished work. These narratives
or stories become examples of successful
problem-solving efforts and help spread the word
throughout the agency.

The agency's current reward structure or
performance evaluation system is likely to be
inconsistent with the performance objectives
suggested in a problem-oriented policing
initiative. This is an important issue for agencies
with quantitative evaluations that document, for
example, the number of calls handled or arrests
made during a certain period of time. Officers will
want assurance that time spent on problem-solving
activities will not adversely affect their
evaluations, and that the department will recognize
and reward their initiative in addressing problems.
Although many officers find intrinsic value in
solving community problems, a more formal reward
structure is also necessary.

It is unlikely that the evaluation system for the
entire agency can be modified in the early stages
of implementation. Officers who engage in problem
solving should be assured that their work will be
recorded in the subjective portions of their
evaluations and will be considered in any
promotional examinations. They should also be kept
informed about progress made in refining the
performance evaluation system. 

Supervision and how it occurs is another important
issue in implementation. Both officers and
supervisors need to have a basic idea about how
supervision will occur. In the more successful
implementation initiatives, supervisors played a
critical role. First-line supervisors served as
"coaches" to officers, working with them on
individual problems and suggesting alternative
resources or approaches. 

Supervisors also help officers to manage their
available time to handle problems. Sometimes they
are able to authorize "flex time" that allows
officers to alter their work hours as necessary and
balance their demands between calls for service and
solving problems. Supervisors can also intervene on
behalf of officers when necessary, routing problems
up the chain of command and facilitating contacts
within the police department or with other
agencies. The supervisor's tasks are crucial to
officers' success in solving problems.

Coordination of problem solving requires planners
to work out a method of assuring that information
is effectively communicated within the
organization. Implementation of problem-oriented
policing should include a review of the
department's organizational chart to involve each
level of agency personnel in the coordination
effort in a thoughtful and substantive manner.

Early in the implementation process, the department
should designate an individual or group of
individuals to coordinate the implementation
effort. Among the questions this individual or
group should address are: 

o How do we get started?

o How will officers identify problems? 

o Where shall we begin? 

By reviewing each of the critical elements in this
monograph, the team or individual will be on track
toward implementing problem-oriented policing. 

Decide when the problem-solving effort will begin.
Implementing problem-oriented policing is an
ambitious effort that will not be accomplished
quickly. The agency's implementation team should
carefully review the critical elements for
implementation and develop a calendar schedule or
timeline with realistic predictions for target
dates and objectives. Using a Gantt chart is an
effective way to plot implementation stages and
requirements. 

Be certain to allow sufficient time for planning,
training, application, and monitoring of progress.
Although the basic concept of problem-oriented
policing is simple, the nuances are subtle. These
subtleties and the detail-oriented nature of
problem solving--particularly in the analysis and
evaluation stages--are components that should not
be overlooked. Over time, officers develop their
own expertise in using the problem-solving model.
There is some risk, however, that too much
attention paid to the mechanics of problem-solving
will deteriorate its effectiveness. Supervisors
should continue to work with officers and monitor
their actions to guard against this possibility.

A realistic timeline for implementation may be a
several-year period if an agency plans a
departmentwide implementation. Conversely, agencies
can set up special units and begin problem-solving
operations fairly quickly. 

Develop data collection resources. Every 
component of the problem-solving model--problem
identification, analysis, response, and       
assessment--depends on reliable data or information
about substantive problems. Quality data can help
officers identify the problems that need to be
addressed. These sources typically include police
data or community-based information. Various other
sources of information are vital to problem
analysis, including hospital data, public housing
statistics, school dropout and truancy information,
and census data. The more rigorous the inquiry
about the nature of the problem, the more sources
of information the police officer 
will use.

Data sources are also important in developing
responses to problems. To implement responses,
officers must be aware of the strategies employed
by other public or private agencies to address the
problem. For example, they would need to know that
the local social service agency was providing
resources to deal with a particular problem, or
that a new treatment facility for drug problems was
opening in the problem area.

In evaluating responses, officers must also be able
to access data to ensure that their response
achieved the desired result. They may want to track
participation in local recreation programs and
evaluate their impact on truancy or juvenile
delinquency or monitor light bulbs replaced in
street lamps to assess the impact on levels of
resident fear.

To access such diverse data sources, officers must
be aware of the range of data sources available and
know how to use the information. Crime analysis
units of police agencies should be one of the first
places for officers to start. 

The ability of some police agencies to link line
officers with crime analysis information is
somewhat dependent on the sophistication and
location of the crime analysis unit. Some agencies
have crime analysts close to the ranks; others have
more sophisticated, but more centralized, units.
Officers need to know:

o What data are available from the crime analysis
unit and in what form.

o How they can tap this information.

o Time parameters for information requests.

o Method for making data requests. 

Officers also need to know how to read and
interpret computer reports or have access to
personnel who do. Orientation sessions on using the
crime analysis unit or printed tips on how to do so
will be helpful.

Police will also need to access data from other
sources within the police agency, particularly if
specialized units handle specific problems. Some
agencies have specialists ranging from officers who
handle abandoned automobiles to those who focus on
domestic abuse. Problem-solving officers need to
know what information these specialists have and
how they can obtain it.

Accessing data sources outside the police agency
may require a little more ingenuity. In some police
agencies, implementation coordinators have surveyed
the community to identify agencies and
organizations that police may need to access. These
agencies include community groups, treatment
facilities, social service agencies, public housing
agencies, and others. Officers can be kept informed
about these data resources via inservice
programming, information sessions during rollcall,
or newsletters and memoranda. Agencies can also
develop a resource book for officers or hold
orientation sessions to introduce officers to
agency representatives and services.

It may also be useful for officers to become
familiar with other police agencies' responses to
problems similar to the ones they are
investigating. Agencies may wish to contact other
police departments and facilitate interaction to
share information about problem-solving efforts.

Develop a marketing plan. Winning the support of
the critical individuals involved in the
problem-oriented policing initiative is an
important element in implementing the concept and
moving toward institutionalization. Key individuals
vary for each agency but can include both those
within the police department (line officers,
first-line supervisors, mid-level managers, and
command staff) and those external to the police
agency (the community as a whole, community groups,
the media, and local politicians or government
officials such as a city manager or mayor).

One way to persuade key persons to buy into the
initiative is to develop a creative marketing plan.
To win the support of the upper ranks, one
successful implementing agency employed the help of
the media. Officers and area command staff were
proponents of the approach, so the implementation
coordinator facilitated news coverage of their
innovative problem-solving efforts. The coordinator
also let other agencies across the country know
about the agency's work in problem-oriented
policing. Subsequently, the local media, the
national media, and other police agencies began
requesting information from the department. The
high-profile coverage alerted the upper ranks to
the importance and merit of the officers' work. The
following is a list of other tips for a successful
marketing strategy:

o Tell true stories. One way to market
problem-oriented policing is through the use of
case studies, or stories about successful
problem-solving efforts. These stories provide
vivid examples of problem-oriented policing. They
also serve to overcome resistance because they
illustrate that anyone can address problems, stress
the importance of addressing modest (versus
overwhelming) problems, and interest other members
of the police agency. 

o Avoid overselling. It is important not to
oversell problem-oriented policing. Do not promise
that such a strategy will solve the city's drug
problems or vow that the agency will change in a
finite period of time. Instead, convey that
officers plan to tackle persistent neighborhood
problems and that problem-oriented policing is a
long-term approach to refining the way police do
business. Problem-solving activities require
careful and thoughtful approaches and a realistic
view of the timeframes necessary for achieving
lasting objectives.

o Be clear on the concept. The media and public
officials frequently confuse problem-oriented
policing with community-based policing. Keep the
concept simple and reiterate key points.
Problem-oriented policing addresses the underlying
conditions that cause the problems that trouble the
community. 

o Identify some good marketers. Some agencies find
that officers or supervisors who were initially
resistant to the concept of problem-oriented
policing make great salespersons once they are sold
on the concept. The testimonials of these officers
sometimes have more credibility with their fellow
officers than do officers who jumped on the
bandwagon early on in the process. A street-smart,
traditional supervisor who has good rapport with
the troops would be the perfect advocate.

o Maintain good communication. Let people within
and outside the agency know what implementation
tasks are occurring and when; accurate information
can overcome resistance to an unknown new concept.
In particular, members of the community should be
kept well informed so that they have realistic
expectations about police service. This information
also enables the public to bring problems to the
agency's attention and assist in their resolution.

o Track progress. The marketing plan should be
dynamic and fluid, continually reevaluating
difficulties as they arise and plotting strategies
to address those difficulties. Do not lock the
agency into a plan if it does not seem to be
achieving the desired result.

Develop and carry out training. It is unrealistic
to expect officers to engage in problem-solving
activities unless they have been fully trained in
the concept. Therefore, a training program should
be developed and carried out fairly early in the
implementation effort. The implementation plan
should include a methodology for training
specifying who gets trained first and how.

Determining who and when to train are issues that
police managers should address early on in the
planning stages. Eventually, everyone--from line
officers and supervisors to command staff--should
receive problem-oriented police training; even
support staff and communications staff should be
trained in the concept. All members should become
familiar with the approach and understand their
roles and responsibilities in implementation
performance. 

Several different training approaches are
available. Agencies can contract out for training
sessions delivered at the agency. The most
effective training curriculums for problem-oriented
policing provide officers with background on police
methodology, an overview of research leading to a
problem orientation, and a discussion of the
problem-solving model and its components. The
training relies heavily on the case study method
commonly used in professional business schools.
This case study approach gives officers hands-on
practice in addressing problems. Training should
also include a description of the implementation
plan so that employees are clear about 
their roles.

The next issue is how to maintain and continue
training after the initial sessions in the agency.
Some agencies have been successful in training
officers to be trainers themselves, either using
them for inservice training or conducting special
training sessions on problem-oriented policing.
Other agencies have incorporated problem-oriented
policing into their training of new recruits at
police academies.

Training need not stop with the police agency. Some
agencies have held orientation or minitraining
sessions with city officials and community leaders.
These sessions can also serve as part of the
marketing element of the implementation plan.

Identify barriers to implementation. In every
training session, some officers are quick to point
out why the problem-solving approach will not work
in their agency. Lack of adequate time is often
cited as a barrier to implementation. The following
reasons are also on the list of commonly
encountered barriers:

o Difficulty getting middle management to buy into
the program and provide support and encouragement
to officers.

o Concern that rewards are not truly tied to
performance.

o Previous experience with new programs indicates
they are short lived. 

o Negative attitudes of first-line supervisors. 

o Concern about receiving proper training for the
entire agency. 

o Doubts that efforts can be coordinated within the
department.

o Concern that politicians and other government
agencies will not be fully aware or supportive of
the concept. 

o Belief that the volume of calls for service will
prohibit use of the approach.

o Cynicism on the part of traditional officers. 

o Resistance to change from veteran officers.

These identified barriers represent the impressions
of individuals in different agencies; not all
barriers arise in every agency. Indeed, upon closer
inspection of the agency, some of the barriers may
simply be found not to exist. However, giving
agency members an opportunity to identify barriers
and verbalize their concerns is a useful way to
identify potential problems and lays the groundwork
for developing a participative approach to
implementing problem-oriented policing.

Even individuals quick to identify barriers are
able to point out the benefits of becoming a
problem-oriented police agency, such as increased
job satisfaction, more effective use of police
time, better morale, decreased workload (in the
long term), resolution of long-standing problems,
and better service to the community.

Once barriers to implementation are identified by
those engaged in addressing problems, the
implementation team can work with officers to
develop a method for addressing the difficulties.
This process gets line officers engaged in a
participative way in solving implementation
problems--practical experience for addressing
substantive problems in communities.

Institutionalize problem-oriented policing. If
problem-oriented policing is to outlive the tenure
of the current chief and current political
administration, it must become institutionalized or
fully integrated into the organizational culture of
the agency. Any introduction of a new approach or
change in practice may be followed by a regression
to the old pattern of doing business unless the
structure of the police agency, including its
policies and procedures, has been fully revamped to
support the new approach.

Organizational theorists suggest that
institutionalization occurs when the structures
surrounding a new concept change to support it. The
new idea thus becomes a legitimized part of an
ongoing practice supported by the organizational
values and other parts of the system. To ensure
that problem-oriented policing continues, the
concept must be linked to the rest of the
department through recruiting, training, reward
structures, and consistent reinforcement messages
from top command staff. New recruits, for example,
should be assessed for their analytical or
interpersonal skills. Academy and inservice
training should include methods of analyzing
problems, including tips for reading computer
printouts or ideas for working with other agencies
and cities. Reward structures should ensure that
performance appraisals reflect the quality of an
officer's problem-solving work. Communication about
problem-solving activities should contain
reinforcing messages, new ideas for applications of
problem solving, and affirmation of completed work.
An effort to institutionalize problem-oriented
policing should also include a method of routine
monitoring for the process so refinements can be
made over time.

These types of support structures within the police
department will ensure that problem-oriented
policing is not viewed as experimental or as an
isolated effort, but rather becomes part of the
established organizational culture. One caution is
to avoid overloading the department with other
major organizational changes while problem-oriented
policing is implemented or institutionalized.
Although its concepts are simple, its
implementation is quite detailed. Many officers and
supervisors need practice and encouragement in
using the approach before it becomes a natural
response to community problems. Indeed, with
practice and support, officers can use varied
problem-solving approaches, such as organizing
teams of officers, working across shifts, or using
more officers to work on persistent problems.
Providing some level of insulation to these
officers by avoiding other major organizational
changes as they become more familiar with
problem-oriented policing may assist the
institutionalization process.

A good way to track the institutionalization of
problem-oriented policing is to conduct surveys of
officers' attitudes both to determine their level
of familiarity with the concept and to assist in
evaluating their level of satisfaction with their
work. One major benefit to problem-oriented
policing is its intrinsic rewards to officers,
including greater control over their work, more
autonomy and responsibility, and increased levels
of participation in police agency decision-making.
Each of these factors is associated with improved
job satisfaction.

The long-term costs and benefits of operating as a
police agency with a problem-solving orientation to
community issues have not been assessed. There are
costs associated with adopting this approach--costs
of training, planning, resources, and time. The
return on the investment, however, is large:
increased job satisfaction throughout the ranks,
increased community satisfaction with police
service, elimination of persistent community
problems, prevention of problems that might have
developed, and adoption of a more rational and
effective way of conducting the business of
policing. 

------------------------------

Part II: Case Studies in Problem-Solving Drug
Enforcement

Solutions Beyond Arrests

The enduring nature of the drug problem in U.S.
cities in the 1980's caused professionals to
question the efficacy of their drug-fighting
methods. As the following case studies documented,
while officers often initially increased the number
of their arrests, they found that arrests alone did
not solve the problems. The studies further
documented how officers innovatively used the
problem-oriented approach to address the illegal
drug problem. Some efforts were more ambitious than
others--tackling drug dealing in a large multiunit
public housing complex versus handling a situation
of two family members selling drugs out of a
single-family home. Although the studies did not
document all problems faced by officers in the five
cities, they did paint a vivid picture of the
problems addressed.

The case studies also portrayed varying degrees of
compliance with the problem-solving process.
Developed in Newport News, Virginia, as a guide for
officers, the problem-solving process is also known
as the SARA model after its four steps--scanning,
analysis, response, and assessment. While SARA
should not be construed as the only method of
problem solving, its sequential steps can remind
officers of a logical progression to follow in
tailoring their approach to fighting crime. The
model also provides a benchmark for evaluating the
quality of problem-solving efforts. 

All problem-solving efforts require analysis and
assessment. The level of analysis may vary
depending on a problem's complexity. While analysis
can entail sophisticated data compilation and
interpretation or only routine deduction, it must
be used to reduce a problem to its basic
components. Problem-solving initiatives also
require some measure of assessment to determine the
value of the effort.

While less attention may have been shown to the
analysis and assessment components of the
problem-solving approach in these case studies, it
is understandable when considering that this
approach presented police with an entirely
different avenue for addressing community issues.

Some case studies exemplified certain aspects of
the problem-solving model. For example, Officer
A.'s efforts in Philadelphia to control thefts from
parked cars showed thoughtful and detailed
analysis. The Atlanta Police Department's efforts
to eliminate problems presented by low-strung
clotheslines as impediments to officers' pursuits
of drug dealers in public housing communities
illustrated a successful attempt to tackle a modest
problem by gaining the housing authority's
cooperation. Officer A.'s decision to wait outside
the convenience store from which her department had
received numerous repeat calls enabled her to
create a response specifically tailored to the
problem that she subsequently uncovered.

Officers will become more comfortable with aspects
of analysis and assessment as they continue to use
problem-solving methods. Nevertheless, these case
studies represented a significant departure from
incident-driven policing that has so limited police
effectiveness in the past.

Although these studies supplemented other reports
describing this project, they also stand alone.
They offer valuable information to professionals
and to students of the problem-oriented approach.
They can be used as a training tool to illustrate
how theoretical concepts can be converted into
practical approaches and thereby used to attack
common and enduring problems facing police. Once
versed in the subtleties of the problem-solving
model, officers will be able to critically evaluate
the methods used by officers in these case studies
and use that information to develop more enduring
strategies for tackling the problems of illegal
drugs and related crime.

San Diego, California, Case Studies

A Drug Problem at 1234 Maple Avenue

Scanning. The building located at 1234 Maple Avenue
was a three-story commercial-residential structure
that sat on one of the busiest streets in southeast
San Diego. Each floor housed five small,
self-contained apartments. Operated under a
transient motel-type license, apartments were
rented by the night or for several weeks at a time.
Of 15 apartments, 10 were vacant in 1988. The
apartments contained no cooking facilities, and
each floor's residents shared a communal bathroom
and shower. The ground floor had an illegal
gambling room on its west side and a Mexican
fast-food restaurant on its east side.

During the summer of 1988, the San Diego Police
Department began receiving increased complaints
about drug use and sales in and near 1234 Maple
Avenue. According to reports, drugs, mostly crack
cocaine, were being sold in the hallways, in vacant
apartments, and in front of the building. Buyers
would usually stay in the area, which generated
complaints from local residents and business owners
who feared for their property and personal safety.
Consequently, police focused their attention on
this area. 

In September 1988, eight members of the Walking
Enforcement Campaign Against Narcotics (WECAN)
detail began working the area on Maple Avenue.
Between September and late November 1988, WECAN
officers made 134 narcotics-related arrests on the
block, including charges of possession of crack
cocaine and drug paraphernalia and of being under
the influence of an illicit substance.

After several months of selective enforcement, it
became evident that the large volume of arrests had
done little to reduce the presence of drugs at the
site. Users continued to congregate by the
building, provoking complaints from area residents
and business owners. Furthermore, signs of drug use
were still evident inside the building, with vacant
apartments containing used drug paraphernalia. To
combat this problem, WECAN officers decided to try
problem-oriented policing techniques.

Analysis. Officer W. assumed the lead role in the
WECAN detail. Through street interrogations of
suspects and witnesses, he learned that most of the
drug users and dealers did not reside at 1234
Maple, but were attracted to that location by the
availability of drugs and the presence of other
illegal activities, such as gambling. In addition,
because two-thirds of the building's apartments
were vacant, buyers had a convenient location in
which to use their drugs.

In November 1988, Officer W. learned through a
computer check that the building's owner had been
murdered 2 years earlier. From gas and electric
company billing statements, he discovered the
whereabouts of the owner's sister, Ms. C. When he
contacted Ms. C. by telephone on December 16, 1988,
she was uncooperative and referred Officer W. to
the attorney handling her brother's estate.

Officer W. learned from the attorney that the
property, as well as the rest of the estate, was in
bankruptcy; no money was available for repairs and
the building was for sale. He also learned that an
onsite manager, Mr. B., was responsible for
maintaining the building, although efforts to
contact him proved unsuccessful.

On December 23, 1988, Officer W. arranged for the
fire marshal and the housing inspector to conduct a
formal investigation of the property, which
determined that major renovations were needed to
bring the building into compliance with city codes.
Further attempts to contact Mr. B. failed; however,
1 month later, Officer W. discovered that Mr. B.
had been arrested at the property for selling 2
ounces of cocaine to an undercover Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA) operative.

Officer W. acted as an intermediary for
communications among the estate, the lawyers, the
housing and fire inspectors, and the police
department, ensuring that all parties were informed
of related activities. The Great American Bank
contacted Officer W. and announced that it was
foreclosing on the building, which was in default
of a $400,000 loan. 

Response. The principal problems at 1234 Maple, as
far as WECAN and the community were concerned, were
the dealing and use of narcotics occurring in and
around the property. Beyond that, the gambling
operation, found to be operated by Mr. B., the
building manager, also presented a problem because
it was a major stimulant to the drug activity. The
officers suspected that the property was being used
by a major drug trafficking ring in which Mr. B.
was involved. To solve the problem of open-air drug
dealing, it was necessary that the overall
environment become less attractive to drug dealers.

WECAN's options were limited. The estate had no
money to repair the property. Secondly, the onsite
manager was an alleged major drug trafficker who
was unlikely to work with officers to keep drug
dealers and users away from the property.
Initially, therefore, the officers simply continued
to make arrests at this location. 

In contact with the vice unit, Officer W. found
that it was planning to infiltrate the gambling
ring inside the building with an undercover
officer. Officer W. later learned that a joint task
force including San Diego narcotics officers and
DEA were also investigating the property. However,
the joint investigation targeted the cocaine ring
inside the building and had little direct
relationship to the open-air dealing outside.

On April 21, 1989, Great American Bank foreclosed
on the property, naming Hallmark Management
Association as receiver for the estate. Officer W.
contacted Hallmark and learned that it was
experienced in dealing with problems similar to
those on Maple Avenue and would cooperate with
police cleanup efforts. Hallmark immediately began
serving eviction notices. It also removed the pay
telephone in front of the building that was used by
drug dealers to conduct business, and hired
full-time security guards to patrol the property.

Assessment. On August 19, 1989, Officer W. reported
that street drug dealing had ceased at 1234 Maple
Avenue, while noting that the same dealers, and
possibly the gambling operation, were operating two
blocks away in a residential area. Hallmark was
making repairs to bring the building up to code and
had agreed to further cooperate with police to
forestall further criminal activity at this
location.
 
Drugs and Guns at 5678 Maple Avenue

Scanning. Located in the southeast section of San
Diego in a residential neighborhood of mostly
apartment buildings, the privately owned
three-story complex at 5678 Maple Avenue contained
more than 75 units. The complex was divided into
four buildings with a small, grassy commons area
between the buildings. An onsite manager, employed
by the buildings' management company, was
responsible for maintenance. Shortly after the
complex opened in June 1988, serious drug using and
dealing problems became evident. 

Combating narcotics activity in this area proved
difficult for patrol officers. Once such activities
become established, a complex gains a reputation
for easy access to drugs. Ridding the complex of
the reputation is often more difficult than
actually ridding it of the drug use and sales.

Police faced many obstacles in fighting the drug
problem on Maple Avenue. Initially, they focused on
making arrests, but suspects often evaded police by
running into the apartments or by running through a
canyon on the north side, an open field on the east
side, or a row of apartments on the west side.
Police determined that drug users and dealers
congregated in and around two laundry rooms located
at the east and west ends of the complex because
officers had found small plastic bags, glass pipes,
and used matchbooks--all signs of crack cocaine
use--in these rooms. Police considered each of the
locations "an easy place to make an arrest" as
there was usually someone around who was either in
possession of drugs or under their influence.

By October 1988, gunfire and gang-related violence
had become common occurrences at the complex during
evening hours. During one 3-week period, police
records indicated nightly shootings. Police learned
through an informant and confirmed through
undercover surveillance that the complex had become
a major supply source of crack cocaine for several
area gangs.

Officers A. and W.'s beat included 5678 Maple
Avenue. Working with other officers, they applied
selective enforcement and converged on the area
with large groups of officers at random intervals,
making arrests. However, because this approach
provided only temporary relief, the officers
decided to implement problem-oriented policing.

Analysis. Officers first determined that they
needed additional information. Knowing that
apartment managers sometimes were coerced into
helping drug dealers or even volunteered to assist
traffickers in exchange for money and drugs, the
officers spoke with the apartment manager and
suggested that he adopt the security measures of
placing locks on the laundry room doors and
installing additional lighting in the center of the
complex. Two weeks later, the suggested
improvements had not been made.

The officers next evaluated their arrest and
field-interview data. From this information, which
included suspect interviews, they could identify
many dealers, gangs, and tenants collaborating with
dealers. Evidence indicated that the manager had
been dissuading residents from contacting police,
saying he would deal with the problem.

The officers then contacted the complex's
management company and requested a key to a vacant
apartment so they could observe the drug dealers in
action. Noting that some dealers carried guns, the
officers later uncovered a gun-running operation,
and in a subsequent investigation seized a large
weapons cache of mostly handguns, an Uzi machine
gun, a MAC-10 automatic pistol, and several
sawed-off shotguns.

Officers A. and W. sought search warrants for the
apartments where they had observed drug dealing.
When they informed the management company of their
findings, its representatives offered to cooperate,
agreeing to evict problem tenants and install
security doors on the laundry rooms.

Response. On the evening of December 12, 1988, with
the assistance of the Special Weapons and Tactics
(SWAT) unit, five search warrants were executed
simultaneously in the complex. Numerous guns and
large quantities of drugs and drug paraphernalia
were seized, and with the assistance of the San
Diego County Marshal, numerous eviction notices
were immediately served on the problem tenants. 

During the legal eviction process, Officers A. and
W. continued to work with the private management
company and maintain their surveillance, but drug
users and sellers continued to congregate on the
apartment grounds and in the general vicinity.
Although arrests at the complex declined during 
this period, they remained high relative to other
neighborhoods.

In January 1988, the patrol officers went for the
first time directly to the owner of the complex and
learned that he was unaware of the situation. Once
informed, he fired the apartment manager and
subsequently replaced the management company. The
new company hired security guards, improved the
apartment grounds, and initiated a new tenant
screening process. 

Assessment. At the time of this report, the complex
was virtually drug free. Residents were mostly
families with children, and the security guards
reported no drug or gang activity.

Drugs and Gangs in a Private House

I can remember back in 1971, when I was in patrol,
we would take rocks, bottles, and gunfire from that
address. We tried everything to shut that place
down. I can't believe it is still a problem. 
 --Detective, San Diego Police Department

Scanning. The house at 4321 Market Street in
southeast San Diego had been a problem for many
years. Records indicated that during the previous
two decades, occupants of the house and their
associates had been arrested on charges including
homicide, robbery, possession of illegal narcotics,
and loitering. In recent years, a police walking
patrol had applied "saturation enforcement" methods
in the area, hitting the house every week or two
and making numerous arrests for narcotics
violations. However, the arrests had little effect
on the criminal activity.

In January 1988, San Diego Police Officer H. was
killed several blocks from Market Street while
apprehending a fugitive wanted by Federal agents on
drug conspiracy charges. The suspect had fled to
4321 Market, where he was apprehended within
minutes. The incident prompted several southeast
patrol officers to initiate a strategy to end
criminal activity at that address.

The officers, D., W., and K., had worked in the
southeast area of the city for several years and
were well acquainted with the house on Market
Street. From their own experiences and from
discussions with other police officers, they
initially determined that the repeat complaint
calls for loitering around 4321 Market stemmed from
illegal narcotics activities, specifically sales of
rock cocaine, by the house's occupants and
visitors.

Analysis. Officers D., W., and K. collected
information that included the results of a
door-to-door survey of all households on the 4000
block of Market Street. The survey confirmed that
the block's drug problem emanated from 4321 Market
and further revealed that although the area
residents were willing to cooperate with officers
in ridding their neighborhood of its drug problem,
they feared retaliation from the house occupants.

The officers visited the house while off duty and
spoke with its owner, a 71-year-old disabled woman
dependent on Social Security benefits who told them
that her son, daughter, and two grandsons lived
with her. The officers knew from reviewing arrest
records and from their own experiences that dozens
of people frequented the house at all hours. The
male occupants were known to be involved in the
Lincoln Park Piru street gang, and the house had
become the center for its activities. Although the
owner told officers that she was willing to assist
the police, she refused to evict her relatives or
move out of the house. While the officers found it
difficult to believe that she was unaware of the
drug dealing and use, they did not want to accuse
her unjustly. In anticipation of having the
property condemned or cited by the zoning board,
the officers asked for and were granted the owner's
consent to take pictures of the interior and
exterior of the house. 

The officers next spoke with the owner's
granddaughter, who told them that she had tried
unsuccessfully to move her grandmother out and
board up the residence. She claimed that her
grandmother required care because she was
physically disabled, and the live-in children and
grandchildren provided that care. When officers
explained their plan to eliminate illegal drug
activity at the residence even if it meant
confiscating the property, the granddaughter said
she would again try to convince her grandmother to
move from the house.

To assess the grandmother's ability to care for
herself, the officers contacted her physician.
Although reluctant to reveal patient information,
the physician stated that as of her last visit the
owner had appeared mentally competent.

At about this time, the owner's son was arrested
for a parole violation and sent back to prison for
several months.

Continuing to gather information, the officers
conducted a computer analysis of all arrests made
in the area that revealed a highly disproportionate
number of drug arrests made in and around 4321
Market Street. Furthermore, many of the arrestees
claimed the address as their residence.

As part of their analysis, the officers requested a
printout of police radio calls to the property.
They discovered this information did not exist,
because police operating procedures do not require
keeping records of calls for service to a specific
address unless a request is made in advance.

Response. The officers were convinced that the drug
problem could be eliminated only if the drug
dealers operating in the house were removed. Two
solutions were apparent. The grandmother could
evict the live-in relatives who were causing
problems, or the officers could initiate
proceedings to seize control of the house through
the city's nuisance abatement program, which would
force the entire family to vacate. The officers
subsequently initiated abatement proceedings,
anticipating that it would persuade the grandmother
to evict.

The officers contacted San Diego's abatement task
force, which consisted of representatives of the
city attorney's office, the fire marshal, building
and code inspectors, the city manager's office, and
the police department. However, because
interactions with the task force were complex and
Officers D., W., and K. believed that officers
might be deterred by the bureaucracy, they
recommended to their supervisors that the police
department assign a liaison to the task force to
assist officers in utilizing an abatement strategy.
Detective S., experienced with abatement laws from
his work in narcotics, was assigned as the
full-time abatement task force liaison.

Shortly thereafter, Officers D., W., and K. placed
the property on the task force target list. The
house was then inspected by representatives of the
housing, fire, and zoning offices, who discovered
numerous violations and informed the owner of her
rights and responsibilities. These zoning
violations allowed the officers to secure a
judgment stipulating that the city would repair the
house if the son, grandsons, and their friends
stayed away.

The officers explained to the owner's granddaughter
that the city would claim the house if the problem
relatives did not vacate, but that if the
grandmother agreed to evict them, the officers
would help repair the house. The owner agreed to
these terms, and on August 6, 1989, the problem
relatives moved out.

On that same date, Officer D. and several other
officers from the southeastern patrol division
helped to clean up the house and make necessary
repairs. They installed a security door donated
from a local hardware store and repaired the
damaged porch and broken windows. The owner's
granddaughter agreed to move in to ensure that the
problem relatives did not return.

Assessment. The house at 4321 Market Street
remained in substandard condition. The occupants
continued to use gas burners from their stove to 
heat the house. In late 1989, the San Diego Police
Department applied to have the house condemned;
however, the owner appealed, and the issue was
scheduled to go before the courts.

In May 1990, the owner's son was arrested for
violating the court order that forbade him to enter
the residence. In December 1990, two of one
grandson's acquaintances (members of the Lincoln
Park Piru gang) pleaded guilty to a violation of
the same court order. They each received 6 months'
probation.

Police believed that the problem occupants had
moved to a new location in the area and would
continue their illegal activities. Nevertheless,
the house at 4321 Market Street would no longer
serve as a sanctuary for members of the Lincoln
Park Piru gang.

Repeat Calls at First and Third Avenues

Scanning. The intersection of First and Third 
Avenues was considered one of the busiest in
southeastern San Diego. The only gas station and
convenience store in the area occupied two corners
of the intersection. In 1988 radio calls concerning
belligerent panhandlers and drug-related activity
at this corner increased dramatically. 

Analysis. The gas station was the site of heavy
pedestrian and vehicular traffic, and the liquor
store across the street attracted gang members and
panhandlers. Initially, patrol officers believed
that the numerous police radio calls resulted from
traffic in and around the gas station. 

Officer A., a veteran of the area, had responded to
many calls for service from the gas station, but
had seldom observed evidence of illegal activity.
Other officers responding to identical calls at the
station confirmed her observations.

A call to the crime analysis unit for a breakdown
of the area's calls for service revealed that more
than 100 radio calls had been dispatched to the gas
station location in the previous month, yet no
arrests had been made. Officer A. became suspicious
and decided to investigate more closely.

Response. While on patrol a short time later,
Officer A. responded to a radio call that reported
panhandlers harassing customers at the gas station.
When she arrived, however, the station clerk told
her the panhandlers had just left the parking lot.
The officer then drove across the street to observe
the store while writing her report.

While Officer A. observed the activity around the
gas station, a second radio call was dispatched
that again reported panhandlers harassing
customers. When she saw no panhandlers, however,
she drove across the street to speak with the
manager. She learned from their discussion that the
station's clerks were afraid of its clientele and
thought that if the police were called on a regular
basis (whether needed or not), the station's owner
might be compelled to hire full-time security
guards.

Officer A. explained that initiating false calls
was illegal and that police would not participate
in any scheme to manipulate the station's owner.
She encouraged the clerks to discuss their fears
with the owner, and she stressed that they must not
call for police assistance unless it was really
needed.

Assessment. The radio calls to the property
decreased to only a few per week. When she was in
the vicinity, Officer A. occasionally stopped by
the store to check on the clerks.

A Drug Market at 10th and Ivy

Scanning. Early in 1988, a neighborhood resident
told San Diego Patrol Officers S. and A. about drug
dealing on the southwest corner of 10th Street and
Ivy Avenue, where, upon investigation, they
discovered dozens of people selling and using
drugs. Officers had previously been unaware of any
illegal activity at that location. 

Preliminary investigation revealed that the
activity centered around three corner houses--320
and 322 South 10th Street and 1995 Ivy Avenue. The
three houses shared a common yard and patio with a
fourth residence, 1999 Ivy Avenue. With the
assistance of other officers, Officers S. and A.
applied selective enforcement to the properties,
using groups of officers at random intervals to
make arrests for drug-related activity. More than
100 arrests were made during April and May 1988.

Analysis. Officers initially believed that the
residence at 320 South 10th Street was the center
of drug activity and executed a search warrant at
that address. Although the tenant, Ms. K., age 55,
was arrested and jailed for sale of crack cocaine,
drug activity increased. Field interrogations
revealed that relatives and friends of Ms. K., as
well as transients, lived in the house and used it
to sell illegal drugs.

Response. In July 1988, Officer S. located the
owner of the properties, Mr. W., age 80, who lived
in Perris, California, about 85 miles north of San
Diego. Officer S. called Mr. W.'s house and left a
message with Mrs. W., explaining the problem and
suggesting that the owner visit the site. 

Officers S. and A. contacted the city zoning and
building inspection departments and arranged for
inspectors to view the property. A list of housing
code violations was sent to Mr. W., who drove to
San Diego the next day to meet with the officers.
Mr. W. had drawn up 30-day eviction notices for the
residents of 320 South 10th Street and 1995 Ivy
Avenue, but reported that he had been chased off
when he had tried to serve them. Three days later,
Officers S. and A. and two uniformed officers
accompanied Mr. W. back to the property.

Ms. K. moved out of 320 South 10th Street 1 week
after she was served with the eviction notice, and
the owner immediately boarded up the property. Ms.
F., the tenant at 1995 Ivy, was more reluctant to
leave. She explained that Section 8, a federally
subsidized housing program, had extended her rental
agreement for 1 week. When officers contacted the
housing commission's Section 8 office to confirm
Ms. F.'s assertion, they were informed that Section
8 could not assist in tenant evictions.

Upon learning from the county marshal's office that
he had to sue Ms. F. to get her out of the
residence and that the process could take 60 to 90
days, Mr. W. retained legal counsel. Meanwhile,
drug activity on the property increased. Officers
S. and A. discovered that Ms. K. had moved back
into the area and into a house at 322 South 10th
Street, where crimes such as burglaries and purse
snatchings began to occur. The officers considered
declaring the property a public nuisance and
seizing it, but rejected the idea because the owner
had been cooperative. 

In September 1988, Officers S. and A. and their
sergeant arranged a meeting with two supervisors
from the Section 8 division of the housing
commission and the special assistant to the city
council member who represented the Ivy area. During
the exchange of information, the officers
discovered that Section 8 program policies hold
owners, rather than the tenants, responsible for
any illegal activity that occurs on the rented
property. Tenants arrested for possession, use, or
sale of illegal substances are not in violation of
Section 8 program policies and can continue to
receive benefits. The Section 8 supervisors said
their office could assist in educating owners about
the importance of screening prospective tenants and
in monitoring the physical conditions of Section 8
housing. The officers agreed to meet again with the
housing commission when more information was
available. 

Ms. F. vacated 1995 Ivy, and the house was boarded
up. Officers S. and A. persuaded Mr. W. not to rent
the two vacant houses until they had dealt with the
residents of 322 South 10th Street, where they
discovered the lessee had moved out and left her
boyfriend, Mr. L., who had a history of arrests,
occupying the premises.

Officer S. contacted the county marshal's office to
determine Mr. L.'s legal status. He learned that
because Mr. W. had "full knowledge" that Mr. L. had
been residing on the property and he had not asked
Mr. L. to leave, the man could legally be
considered a tenant of that address and had to be
formally evicted. 

While Mr. W. filed the necessary eviction
paperwork, Officers S. and A. continued patrolling
the area and making arrests. Officer S. took copies
of Mr. L.'s arrest record to the city attorney's
office and arranged for his court dates to be
expedited. In November 1988, 5 days before his
formal eviction, Mr. L. voluntarily moved out. 

During the tenant eviction process, monthly
meetings were held between housing commission
representatives and officers from the San Diego
Police Department. The officers learned that
housing commission staff were equally frustrated
with the system because it allowed criminals to
receive subsidized housing benefits. The two
agencies resolved to work together to address this
problem. Housing commission staff drafted a letter
to the regional representative of the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development,
recommending specific changes in the laws that
govern certification of Section 8 recipients. 

Assessment. In July 1989, Officer S. reported that
new tenants had moved into the three houses at 10th
and Ivy and that no drug activity on or near the
property had been reported. He further reported
that in January 1989, the police department
received a complaint of drug activity at 744 Abby
Street, the new residence of Ms. F. Officer A. met
with the owners of that residence, who were
reluctant to evict the tenants without evidence
that they were dealing drugs. Officers S. and A.
arranged for a probation search of the residence,
which uncovered more than 3 ounces of cocaine. The
officers noted that numerous people were living in
the residence with Ms. F. Under Section 8
regulations, recipients of such benefits cannot
house other individuals. Once that information was
disclosed to the housing commission, Ms. F. was
disqualified from the Section 8 program and evicted
from her residence.

The police department and Officers S. and A.
received favorable attention and support in their
efforts to eliminate neighborhood narcotics
problems. Two articles on specific problems
addressed by Officers S. and A. appeared in the San
Diego Tribune. 

The San Diego Housing Commission instituted a
vigorous training program to inform landlords of
their responsibilities in tenant selection and in
maintaining control of their properties. The
commission also lobbied for changes in housing
legislation that would provide local offices with
greater authority to evict recipients of Section 8
benefits engaged in illegal activities. The San
Diego City Council was supportive of the
commission's efforts.

The police department has since trained commission
staff to identify drug problems in apartment
complexes and in housing units. Conversely, the
housing commission has trained officers in the
operations of the commission and its regulations.

------------------------------

Tampa, Florida, Case Study

College Hill Homes

Scanning. The College Hill Homes low-income housing
complex was home to more than 2,600 residents who
occupied approximately 650 out of 710 apartments.
The complex had long been considered a high-crime
area by the Tampa Police Department, particularly
with regard to traffic in illicit narcotics, and
the problem had worsened in recent years. During
1988, 4.1 percent of narcotics arrests citywide
were made at College Hill, which housed slightly
under 1 percent of the city's population and
occupied less than 1 percent of Tampa's geographic
area. 

The drug most frequently sold throughout the
complex was crack cocaine. Marijuana and powder
cocaine were also readily available, as was heroin.
Sales of the latter, however, were usually
conducted in only a few locations at the complex.
Other drugs, including LSD, mescaline,
amphetamines, and barbiturates, had been seized in
drug arrests at College Hill, but were less common.

The high volume of illicit drug traffic at College
Hill had been accompanied by an increased level of
violence. Half of all 1988 narcotics-related
homicides in Tampa were committed in the complex,
as were 10 percent of all non-narcotics-related
murders. The high incidence of drug use by College
Hill residents had contributed to 36 times as many
narcotics-related deaths per capita as the
remainder of the city (3.05 per thousand versus
.085 per thousand), representing more than 25
percent of all 1988 cocaine-related deaths in
Tampa. College Hill also led the city in newborns
addicted to narcotics, with 4.8 percent.

In June 1988, the Tampa Police Department concluded
that its enforcement techniques were unsuccessful
in reducing the magnitude of the drug trade, and a
new strategy was needed. Therefore, a team of six
field officers, each trained in problem-oriented
policing, was assembled under the supervision of
Captain S. and Lieutenant N. The unit, composed of
Officers D., G., N., P., and Q. and Sergeant M.,
was assigned to patrol the College Hill area and
work with residents to expose the area's drug
dealers. 

A management team composed of representatives of
the mayor's office, the State's Attorney's Office,
the judiciary, the Tampa Housing Authority (THA),
and the police department was formed to assist the
field officers. The management team was designed to
help develop strategies to combat the drug problem
at College Hill and to facilitate the unit's
interaction with government agencies, when
necessary. The managers of College Hill and the
Ponce de Leon Apartments, which were adjacent to
the target complex, also served on the management
team.

To implement the project at College Hill, the
police department and the management team set four
goals:

o To gain support from the community to combat the
sale of illicit narcotics.

o To educate and motivate the community to attack
the problems of illicit narcotics and crime in
their neighborhood.

o To reduce the fear of violence associated with
the sale and use of illicit narcotics.

o To return control of the community to its
law-abiding citizens.

Analysis. The first phase of the project involved
collecting data on the nature and scope of the drug
problem. Accordingly, the officers conducted a
71-question resident survey during July and August
1988 that pertained to the environmental and crime
problems in College Hill (see companion volume for
details of community and environmental surveys). A
modified random sample designed for the survey
selected every fourth address to participate, with
only adult, permanent residents being eligible.

Survey results confirmed police suspicions that
fear of victimization plagued the residents, with
88 percent reporting staying in at night to protect
themselves, and 70 percent noting that they avoided
certain areas altogether. Officers also learned
that 92.7 percent of those surveyed believed drug
dealing to be the community's most serious problem,
and 88 percent were concerned about their children
becoming involved in drugs. Few respondents (25.8
percent), however, had called police within the
previous year to report any type of illegal
activity. Fewer still (19.2 percent) had done so
within the previous month. Officers who conducted
the survey determined that the tenants lacked a
positive sense of community, which diminished their
willingness to work with police in fighting drugs
in the complex.

The officers next looked at the police department's
arrest statistics and learned that 52 percent of
those arrested on narcotics charges at College Hill
resided outside the complex, although nearly half
lived within 10 blocks.

Officers also collected information as they
patrolled the area, either on foot or bicycle. They
quickly identified many of the persons selling
drugs in the complex and began calling them by
name. The various dealers were particularly well
entrenched, many having obtained apartments in the
complex to use as illegal workstations. In such
cases, they either paid the leaseholders for use of
the apartments to store or sell drugs or coerced
them with threats of violence. The most frequent
victims of these tactics were black, female
heads-of-household. As this group constituted more
than 90 percent of the heads-of-households at
College Hill, dealers had a large field from which
to choose. Dealers usually formed a network of
apartments in a particular location, which always
included several possible escape routes. 

In addition to the high incidence of drug-related
activity in College Hill, officers were struck by
its dilapidated appearance. Sidewalks were lined
with trash and debris, as were the courtyards and
the playground. The trash dumpsters always
overflowed with garbage before the city collectors
could empty them. In addition, a large adjacent
area of vacant land was a dumping ground, littered
with broken bottles, old carpet, and automotive
parts. Team members believed that these conditions
contributed to the poor sense of community among
the residents. 

The officers also observed that the drug trade
generated a tremendous amount of vehicular traffic
in the community. Many individuals entering the
complex by car drove at excessive speeds, making
the streets unsafe for the numerous children who
played in them or nearby. The officers believed
this traffic also contributed to residents' fears
about drug traffickers, as strangers were always
entering and leaving the area.

Still another problem noted by the patrol officers
was the inadequate street lighting. Many areas in
the complex that were in total darkness after
sundown were havens for criminal activity,
particularly drug dealing. While the number of
street lamps was adequate, bulbs were missing and
not quickly replaced. In some cases, bulbs were
shot out.

Response. Given the nature and extent of the
problem at College Hill, it was obvious to the
field unit that any response had to involve
increased enforcement. Drug dealers operated with
impunity throughout the complex, and the officers
wanted to demonstrate to the residents that the
dealers were not untouchable.

Accordingly, members of the management team met
with representatives from the vice control and
selective enforcement bureaus, all agreeing that
those two units would be available for special
requests from the College Hill patrol. Joint
operations such as buy-busts and reverse stings
resulted, which pressured dealers to leave the
area. The patrol officers, in turn, worked with
College Hill's management to evict problem tenants
they determined were connected to the drug trade.

The team determined that increased police presence
was also an important part of the project. After
the patrol officers had noticed no police cruisers
patrolling during the several months they had spent
in the complex, they notified the management team,
which arranged for a regular patrol by the "X-Ray
Squad," one of several vehicular patrol squads in
the area. In addition to these patrols, foot or
bicycle patrol officers were in the complex daily,
working to identify problem areas and tenants and
trying to forge positive relationships with the
law-abiding residents.

In December 1988, after several months in the
complex, the problem-oriented policing officers
focused on the street lighting situation. Officer
Q., assisted by Officers G., D., and N. and a
representative of the Tampa Electric Company,
conducted a survey of the lighting conditions.
Locations of each street light and pole in the area
were plotted on a map, and each light pole was
recorded by its specific pole number and location.
The lighting survey determined that the wattage
(100) of all existing lights was inadequate. 

Once the survey was completed, Officer Q. contacted
an electric company representative. During their
discussions, Officer Q. discovered that, while the
electric company owned and operated all city street
lights, the housing authority paid for their use in
its low-income housing developments. Officer Q.
immediately contacted THA representatives and
included them in the discussions. Working together,
they formed a proposal to upgrade light fixtures to
400 watts and to install an additional 50 light
poles in the complex. On March 15, 1989, the
proposal was approved by the city council and the
new and improved fixtures were quickly put in
place. Officer Q. made an informal agreement with
the electric company that all inoperative lights
would be replaced within 48 hours of notification
by police.

The officers next turned their attention to the
vehicular traffic in the complex. They observed
that most of the drivers were white, drove
expensive cars, and usually stayed for only a short
period of time. 

Officers Q. and N. suggested to the management team
that traffic diverters, or speed bumps, be
installed throughout the community to reduce the
heavy vehicular traffic and, after consideration,
the team approved this suggestion on March 22,
1989.

Officers Q. and N. then contacted the public works
division of the city's department of transportation
and arranged for the issuance of a work order. The
public works supervisor initially seemed reluctant
to install the speed bumps but was convinced with
the help of the mayor's office. As a result, the
work was completed within 2 weeks.

In January 1989, the officers addressed the parking
problem at College Hill. Cars were parked on the
grass and against traffic and were driven on
sidewalks and lawns; others were disabled or
abandoned and served as drug caches for local
dealers. The officers suspected that many of the
vehicles were owned by nonresidents who may have
gone to the complex to buy drugs. In an effort to
limit parking to residents and their guests,
Officers N. and P. implemented a parking decal
program.

Each person who could show legal residence in
College Hill and could produce identification and a
valid Florida vehicle registration was given a
decal for his or her vehicle. A housing authority
employee installed the decals on each vehicle's
inside rear windshield. Each apartment was entitled
to two decals. 

Nonresidents were entitled to a renewable 3-day
visitor's permit once they disclosed names and
addresses of residents being visited and provided
vehicle information. Four-hour visitor parking was
also available.

Following installation, parking decals and
visitor's permits remained the property of THA. If
a decal or permit was lost or stolen, the owner was
required to file a report, or if a registered
vehicle was sold, to remove the decal. Any person
found in possession of a missing or stolen decal
was to be prosecuted under Florida theft statutes.
Additionally, vehicles found parked without proper
decals or permits, or found parked in a visitor's
space for more than 4 hours, were subject to
impoundment by the city at the owner's expense.

The next step in implementing the parking program
was to improve the parking facilities and designate
the parking areas. The signs and markings division
of the department of transportation was contacted
by Officer P. to assist the College Hill officers
in painting stripes to designate the various
parking categories within the parking area. City
workers also installed "Handicapped Only" and "No
Parking" signs. Officer N. also arranged for each
space to be labeled either "Permit Only" or
"Visitors Only." 

Fliers informing residents of the new parking
regulations were distributed to each apartment and
were posted at the management office. No resident
complaints or grievances were received. After the
program went into effect in mid-April,
approximately 150 resident decals were issued.
Because there were 650 rented apartments, it
appeared that most of the complex tenants did not
own cars.

Shortly after the parking program was implemented,
College Hill patrol officers scheduled a
neighborhood cleanup day. The event, planned and
coordinated by Officers P. and N., was intended to
boost community involvement, enhance resident
self-esteem and cooperation, and improve the
physical appearance of the complex. The cleanup was
held April 29, 1989. 

Officers P. and N. contacted numerous
organizations, both public and private, to solicit
donations and participation in the cleanup. Several
local businesses agreed to donate food and
beverages. Others donated such items as records,
radios, and sports equipment that were given away
as prizes. The executive director of THA and the
manager of College Hill, who provided rakes,
brooms, shovels, hedge trimmers, and a tractor and
assisted officers in the selection of cleanup
areas, both volunteered to participate. WTMP, a
local radio station, provided a mobile disk jockey
who played music throughout the day's activities
and gave away donated prizes. The event received
favorable coverage from local press and radio
stations, but more importantly, judging 
from the high turnout, the residents appeared to
enjoy the event.

Several areas in the complex were targeted for
cleanup. The playground and basketball courts were
cleared to improve recreational opportunities for
youth in the complex. The nursery building and most
common areas were cleaned, and litter in the large
vacant field adjacent to the complex was picked up
and the field secured.

The vacant field was the subject of a subsequent
College Hill team project. Following the
neighborhood cleanup, Officer Q. contacted
representatives of the housing authority and
arranged for THA maintenance staff to mow the
field. Officer Q. next obtained used telephone
poles from the electric company. He borrowed a
garage wrecker and a generator from the city to
place the poles, which were arranged to divide the
property into two sections. The first section was
for additional resident parking, and the second
served as a recreational area. The patrol officers
also solicited contributions from local businesses
to purchase and install a set of football goal
posts and a baseball backboard.

Assessment. After 1 year, patrol officers reported
significant accomplishments at College Hill. While
drug dealing continued, it was less visible than in
the past. The vice unit also continued to conduct
undercover operations in the complex.

The street light project was successful.
Ninety-four percent of residents questioned in a
followup survey reported being either "satisfied"
or "very satisfied" with the brighter lights and
the frequency of replacement for inoperative
lights. The remaining 6 percent who reported being
"unhappy" complained that the lights were too
bright, and they had difficulty sleeping. At this
reporting, only a few street lights had become
inoperable, and, in each case, it was the direct
result of someone's shooting out the lights, which
were replaced immediately.

Traffic in the complex slowed dramatically with the
introduction of traffic diverters. Speed reduction
made the area safer for residents, particularly
children, and allowed officers to record license
plate numbers of frequent visitors. By checking
plate numbers, they could verify whether the
drivers were local residents and whether they had
criminal records. Such information might be useful
for future operations in the complex. Officers
reported that the height of the speed bumps
deterred some visitors from entering the complex.
Results from the followup survey indicated that 87
percent of the tenants were satisfied with the
diverters.

The parking strategy was also favorably received,
although problems developed. While 99 percent of
residents surveyed believed the program was a good
idea, 39 percent indicated a need for improvement.
Tenants suggested that police be more vigorous in
their parking enforcement, and others requested
that the 3-day period for visitor's permits be
lengthened. Nevertheless, the system was helpful to
police in distinguishing between resident and
nonresident vehicles and in ridding the
neighborhood of abandoned cars. The patrol officers
addressed specific complaints of residents.

Perhaps the most successful police department
action was the neighborhood cleanup, which officers
described as the turning point in their
relationship with tenants. Following the cleanup,
neighborhood children began following patrol
officers through the complex, offering
encouragement, and seemingly looking upon them as a
positive force in the community. Residents became
more willing to approach officers to relay
information about criminal activity. When drug
dealers were arrested, witnesses applauded police
instead of berating them, which had occurred in the
past. The atmosphere changed from one of distrust
to one of increased cooperation, and police
believed a community spirit was developing among
the residents.

Although not all the project's goals were met,
great strides occurred. Officers described their
relationship with residents as much improved, but
said that organized community support had not yet
developed. Tenants were working more diligently to
halt the influx of drugs into their community, and
they were increasingly willing to inform police of
illegal activities they witnessed. Residents,
always aware of the problems of the drug trade,
were more knowledgeable about how they could fight
it. Fear remained a serious impediment to change,
but better lighting, heightened 
police presence, and a reduction in blatant street
dealing had a positive effect. Residents were less
reluctant to leave their homes at night and tended
to avoid only the few remaining problem areas.
Violence, while still high relative to most parts
of the city, was greatly reduced. The journey
toward the goal of ridding College Hill of drugs
and drug dealers had begun.

------------------------------

Atlanta, Georgia, Case Studies

Ridding Public Housing of Organized Drug Gangs 

Scanning. John Hope Homes and University Homes are
two large Atlanta public housing complexes adjacent
to one another and to the Clark-Atlanta University
Center that essentially comprise one community of
more than 1,200 units and housed about 2,100
residents. In the spring of 1988, the Atlanta
Police Department, the Atlanta Housing Authority,
and the residents identified the community as a
problem site for drug trafficking, as street gangs
were selling drugs in and around the housing units.

In the latter part of 1987 and early 1988, the
community experienced a sudden surge in crime.
According to patrol officers assigned to the area,
the greatest increases were attributable to drug
trafficking, specifically sales of crack cocaine.
Drug-related violence also increased, including
reports of gunfire.

Police believed that most of these incidents
resulted from turf battles between rival drug
gangs. While shootings had usually ceased by the
time police arrived, spent shell casings collected
by officers at the scene indicated that
semiautomatic and automatic weapons were being
used. Questioning of residents and suspects helped
police identify three groups involved--locals
operating independently, locals operating as a gang
known as the Terry White Boys, and a third group
known as the Miami Boys. 

The Miami Boys were quickly identified as the most
dangerous of the three groups because, unlike
neighborhood-based gangs, the Miami Boys' operation
appeared similar to that of organized crime. 
They ran a citywide criminal enterprise composed 
of several different factions, which operated
essentially independent of one another but were
loosely linked and known to cooperate on occasion.
Seven factions of the gang were identified as
operating in the Atlanta area. 

Intelligence data provided by Atlanta narcotics
officers revealed that each faction was organized
in a hierarchical, military fashion. A captain
served as the liaison between each faction and the
supply source, which was presumed to be in south
Florida. Two lieutenants were responsible for the
distribution of drugs and collection of monies.
Each lieutenant controlled two sergeants, who in
turn controlled street workers who fell into one of
four categories--lookouts, couriers, enforcers, or
dealers. Length of time in the organization
appeared to determine member assignments. Members
were recruited from neighborhoods in southern
Florida and relocated to Atlanta.

The Miami Boys were considered particularly
violent--weapons of choice were the Ingram MAC 11
machine pistol and the Intratec automatic rifle.
Within a short time, they had come to dominate the
drug market at John Hope and University Homes.
Their success was achieved by intimidation of
competitive drug dealers, including murder if
necessary. Murders were usually carried out by
members of one of the factions not operating out of
the John Hope and University Homes complexes.
Because the shooters did not originate from the
neighborhood, they were almost impossible to
identify.

Analysis. Officer T., assigned to the neighborhood
evening watch, began gathering information on the
Miami Boys. He talked with area residents;
questioned arrestees and suspected dealers; and
conducted surveillance by hiding in bushes, trees,
or vacant apartments and videotaping his suspects.
Officer T. discovered that the gang openly
displayed firearms (including machine guns) to
intimidate residents and other rival narcotics
dealers while they conducted sales of crack
cocaine, which occurred virtually 24 hours a day in
12-hour shifts. Gang members gained access to
apartments to sell and stash their wares through
several methods--by supplying users living in the
buildings with cocaine, through romantic liaisons
with tenants, and by force. Higher level gang
members even paid residents to let the group store
large amounts of cocaine in their apartments. 

Because the gang was a tightly knit group, it was
difficult to gather information about its inner
workings, particularly with regard to higher
ranking members. In addition, the gang appeared to
control area residents, who became visibly nervous
when officers approached them. Residents were
threatened and often too frightened to even come
out of their apartments because they feared gang
retaliation. As a result, they rarely provided any
information about the gang.

Response. In April 1988, in response to increased
street-level drug dealing and associated violence,
the Atlanta commissioner of public safety
established a new street-level strike force, the
Red Dog Squad. Officer T. was assigned to the
squad, where he continued to work on the Miami
Boys' case. Based on his analysis of the gang's
operations, he devised a two-part plan to break
them up. The first part of his plan called for
gathering information. Officer T. and the Red Dog
Squad wanted to determine who was controlling the
Miami Boys' operation at the complex. Because they
hoped this information could be secured from the
gang's underlings and from those residents whose
apartments the gang used, they decided to make
strategic arrests of gang members and collaborating
tenants. The plan's second phase involved seizing
control of the community from the drug dealers
through numerous arrests. By disrupting the drug
dealing and ridding the complex of some of the
dealers, he hoped to send a message to the gang
that they did not own the community. Even more
importantly, visible police presence in the area
would show residents that the Miami Boys were not
as fearsome as they appeared.

Officer T. and his partner, Officer A., conducted
military-type reconnaissance missions in the
community. At times they would lie in the bushes
for hours, waiting for an opportunity to move into
an abandoned apartment to conduct direct
surveillance of the group. When it rained, they
would take advantage of the weather to move
undetected around the area and position themselves
to observe the dealer's operation and literally
"appear from nowhere" to make surprise arrests of
group members. These tactics accounted for some
attrition among group members and psychologically
demoralized gang members because they were
unaccustomed to losing members through arrest. 

Arrests and seizures also resulted from undercover
buys, informant buys, and search warrants. Most of
the low-level dealers arrested could not make bail
and consequently remained off the street. Others
returned to Florida as part of a plea agreement.
Officer T.'s tactics were depleting the Miami Boys'
Florida-born labor pool.

In October 1988, a male known initially as "Gap"
and later identified as G.P. was arrested for
narcotics violations. Originally thought to be a
low-level dealer, interrogations of Miami Boys and
local suspects revealed that G.P. was in fact the
leader of the Miami Boys faction at John Hope and
University Homes and had been acting as a seller
only because of the arrests of his street workers.
Officer T. also learned through a Florida records
check that G.P. had been released from prison only
recently.

The apartment in John Hope Homes in which G.P.
stored his crack cocaine shipments was identified
through surveillance and intelligence information.
G.P. paid the resident $75 per day for use of the
apartment. After a search warrant was issued,
police seized a large amount of money and more than
2 ounces of narcotics. Faced with a long jail
sentence, the tenant provided information that not
only confirmed that G.P. was an upper-level member
of the Miami Boys, but also enabled prosecutors to
obtain a grand jury indictment against him for
trafficking in cocaine.

Out on bond, G.P. and the few persons left in his
operation moved their business from John Hope Homes
into two other apartment complexes in northwest
Atlanta. However, G.P. was followed by police and
later arrested on the indictment warrant while he
was transporting 15 bags of crack cocaine.

Assessment. Due to successful enforcement
activities, the Miami Boys gang in John Hope and
University Homes was completely shut down.
Residents, housing authority staff, and police
officers noted a subsequent decline in street-level
drug dealing at the complex. 

Resident fear was also substantially reduced.
Tenants began to walk through the complex at night
and children began to play in the playgrounds
during the day, unheard of occurrences when the
Miami Boys were in charge.

During the latter part of the Miami Boys'
crackdown, residents began to demonstrate visible
support for the police. For example, during police
raids, residents came outside and praised the
officers and offered words of encouragement. They
also began providing information about the drug
situation in their area, which surfaced initially
in the form of whispers and confidential telephone
calls. Eventually, as trust grew, residents began
to openly volunteer information and gave their
names freely.

Partially because area residents began to
understand their role in ridding the area of drug
dealers, no other Miami Boys factions or other
organized drug gangs were able to establish a
foothold. Detective T. and his partner, Detective
P., continued to monitor the situation at the
complex.

Lighting, Clotheslines, Cops, and Crack Dealers

Scanning. John Hope Homes and University Homes, two
densely populated Atlanta public housing complexes,
were hot spots for crack cocaine dealing. The
two-story brick buildings, some in rows and others
forming a square around an interior courtyard,
created large areas of interior space that were
inaccessible by car and unobservable by police.
Such areas constituted prime locations for the drug
dealing that proliferated in and around these two
complexes. 

Analysis. Several factors made it difficult for
police officers to apprehend the dealers. Lookouts
along the sidewalks and the stairways leading into
the courtyards and spaces between the buildings
alerted the dealers when police were coming, giving
them enough lead time to disappear between
buildings, around corners, and into apartments
before police could make arrests. Dealers often
shot out street lights in and around the spots
where they conducted business to prevent police
observation of their activities. In addition,
clotheslines were improperly strung at neck and
shin height to trip pursuing officers.

Police and housing authority officials met to
discuss strategies to combat drug dealing in the
area. The lighting problem was raised, and Mr.
R.P., security director for the Atlanta Housing
Authority (AHA), informed the group that lighting
fell primarily under the purview of the Georgia
Power Authority. Ms. C.D., property manager for the
community, was responsible for reporting
inoperative lights to the power authority, which
was then responsible for repairs. Mr. P. said that
Georgia Power had always replaced damaged light
fixtures within a few days of receiving
notification.

Police and housing authority officials agreed to
cooperate in determining which lights were
inoperative and having them quickly replaced. Dr.
A.P., director of planning and evaluation in the
public safety department, was present at the
meeting and agreed to contact representatives of
the power authority to ensure their continued
cooperation.

Response. In March 1988, Police Officers D. and T.,
the two morning watch officers assigned to the
area, conducted a survey of the lights with the
help of the housing authority staff. They reported
the information to Ms. D., who reported it to
Georgia Power. There was some initial delay in
replacing the lights because Georgia Power
requested that the officers provide pole numbers.
During a second survey, the officers discovered
that many of the numbers had been removed. When
Georgia Power was informed of this situation, it
assisted AHA in identifying the poles, then
replaced the lights. 

Dr. P. spoke with Mr. D., vice president for
corporate affairs for Georgia Power, and discussed
the police department's efforts to combat drugs at
John Hope and University Homes. Mr. D. assured her
that Georgia Power was supportive and would
cooperate fully with police, and he offered to
intervene if any problems were encountered in
having the lights replaced. That offer was relayed
to the housing authority staff, who reported no
problems.

In July 1988, Officers D. and T. conducted another
survey of the lights, relaying the information
through Ms. D. to Georgia Power, which quickly
replaced the inoperative lights. Police supervisors
were satisfied that this system was workable, and
they intended to continue with it.

Although replacement efforts were successful,
officers found that many of the repaired lights
were quickly shot out. While the problem had not
yet been resolved at the time of this report,
officers hoped that if they continued working with
the housing authority to regularly survey the
lighting situation and to replace damaged fixtures,
the vandals would grow discouraged and cease
damaging the fixtures. 

As for the clotheslines problem, officers
discovered that neither complex was equipped with
dryers. Clotheslines were required to be strung
parallel to the buildings at a height that allowed
average-sized adults to pass beneath them. To
disrupt police chases, some tenants or drug dealers
restrung the clotheslines at neck height or at shin
level to increase the officers' likelihood of
tripping.

When brought to the attention of AHA,
representatives stated that maintenance staff were
responsible for the clotheslines. Lt. R., daywatch
supervisor for the area, arranged for Officers H.
and P. to survey the clotheslines in the complex
with the help of maintenance staff. Improperly
strung lines were subsequently either removed or
restrung. The police department and AHA informally
agreed that maintenance staff would be assigned to
check for improperly strung clotheslines. 

Assessment. The system appeared to be working,
since officers no longer complained about problems
with the clotheslines.

Cleaning Up Public Housing

Scanning. John Hope Homes and University Homes,
both public housing communities in Atlanta, were
situated across the street from one another. The
two projects were densely populated and hosted a
large amount of pedestrian and vehicular traffic.
According to patrolling officers from the Atlanta
Police Department, the area was poorly maintained,
with an unusually large amount of garbage. 

Analysis. Litter presented a problem for several
reasons. Not only was it unsightly, but it included
broken glass, discarded hypodermic needles, and
broken objects with sharp edges--all constituting a
health and safety hazard. In addition, children
were unable to use the playgrounds safely. Drug
dealers also used the garbage as camouflage, hiding
their drugs in brown paper bags among the debris. 

Although cleanup was required, police and housing
authority officials believed the litter indicated a
larger problem because workers had cleaned up
litter in the past, only to have it quickly
reappear. The larger problem was the tenants' lack
of pride, and until they began to care about
maintaining their community, efforts to improve its
appearance would remain temporary. Consequently,
police and housing officials decided to involve
residents in efforts to clean up the area.

Response. Lt. R., the dayshift supervisor for the
police zone, and Ms. D., the housing authority
property manager, decided to host a neighborhood
cleanup day. This idea had been discussed
previously at tenant association meetings and
interagency council meetings, but no definite plans
had been formulated. Lt. R. and Ms. D. set the date
for the cleanup for May 20, 1989, beginning at 9
a.m. 

The plan called for participants to spend about 4
hours collecting garbage and making small
improvements to the area's appearance prior to a
community cookout. Ms. M., tenant association
president, supported this plan and agreed to help
organize the cleanup activities and solicit
donations for food. The plan was announced at the
interagency council meeting on April 26, 1989, and
attending agencies relayed the message to their
staffs. The parks and recreation department offered
to bring a tent and sound system; maintenance staff
would provide tools and garbage bags for the
volunteers; and the police bureau would provide
security. The public works department agreed to
supply a sanitation truck to haul away the
collected trash. The parks, recreation, and
cultural affairs department would assist in
cleaning the playgrounds and repairing damaged
equipment. 

Planning and coordination continued through the
first 3 weeks of May, with Ms. D. and Lt. R.
communicating regularly. Ms. M. mailed written
invitations to the two mayoral candidates, the
area's city council representatives, and the State
representatives and senator from the district. She
also established a committee of tenants to collect
donations of food and drink. Ms. H., director of
public affairs for the Atlanta Housing Authority
(AHA), arranged for media coverage. Lt. R. and Ms.
D. distributed fliers to tenants in both complexes.
In addition, six police officers were recruited to
provide security on that day.

On the morning of May 20, several tenants and their
children gathered at the designated area where
maintenance staff would distribute supplies and
tools. Suddenly, a black cloud appeared and a heavy
rain began to pour. Most adults soon became
discouraged by the rain and left, but the children
stayed. When the rain eased up, the officers and
the remaining adults accompanied the children to
various areas in the complex and began to collect
trash. 

About 20 trash bags were filled, significantly
improving the appearance of parts of the complex.
After about an hour and a half, the children began
to tire, and the participants enjoyed a lunch of
hamburgers and hot dogs. Neither the public
officials nor the media had appeared, presumably
because of the rain. The playground repair staff
did not appear, and the housing authority canceled
the sanitation truck because the small amount of
trash collected did not require an entire truck.
However, the parks and recreation staff did set up
their tent and sound system after the rain had
stopped.

Assessment. Although participants were disappointed
by the weather after all the work put into
planning, organizing, and conducting the cleanup,
the day was successful in that the appearance of
much of the complex was improved by the pickup of
trash. Moreover, the cooperation among police, the
housing authority, and participating tenants set
the groundwork for future interactions.

After the day's activities were reported to the
interagency council at its May meeting, the council
chair and the tenant association president
discussed the possible scheduling of another
cleanup day in the near future. 

Abandoned Cars

Scanning. The target area for Atlanta's
problem-oriented policing project included two
adjacent public housing developments, the Atlanta
University complex, a few small businesses, and
several residential properties. One problem
identified by project team members was the large
number of abandoned cars on local streets and in
the area's parking lots.

The patrol officers who worked with Atlanta Housing
Authority (AHA) staff identified the abandoned cars
as a persistent problem. In fact, a computer check
revealed that, with the exception of drug activity,
abandoned cars generated more calls for service
than anything else. The cars created a problem for
several reasons. They were an eyesore, and became
more so the longer they sat and decayed; they were
a danger to children, who tended to play around
them; they were breeding grounds for rodents and
other pests; and they served as shelters and hiding
places for vagrants and drug addicts and as a
convenient place to stash illegal drugs and
weapons.

Analysis. Two patrol officers working on the
abandoned cars problem faced two obstacles to the
cars' speedy removal. First, while ticketing and
removing vehicles parked on city streets presented
no problem, ticketing on housing authority property
might create legal difficulties. Streets and
parking lots within the community were owned by
AHA, with police having only limited jurisdiction.
Any effort to address the problem would have
consequently required a coordinated effort between
the police department and the housing authority.
The second obstacle to speedy removal was that
adequate warning had to be given to the car owners
prior to removal because some of the cars might
have been stolen rather than abandoned, thus
requiring a license check. Working with housing
authority representatives, the officers set out to
create a system that would speed up removal of
these cars.

Response. In January 1989, an aggressive campaign
to deal with abandoned cars was initiated. Routine
checks of the streets and lots within the housing
community were conducted by housing authority
staff. If a car was observed to be in the same
place for several days, was inoperable, or was
reported to management as abandoned by a tenant, a
dated tag was affixed to the vehicle. The tag
instructed the owner that the car would be
impounded if it was not moved within 2 to 4 days;
the time period allowed for removal depended on the
condition of the car. If the vehicle had not been
moved after the specified time period, a private
towing service was called to impound the car. A
police officer also ran a license check to
determine whether the car had been stolen, and if
so, it was towed to the city lot.

As for streets outside the housing complex, they
were routinely checked by officers on all three
shifts. Using the same identification methods as
housing authority staff (observation, citizen
complaints, and condition of the car), officers
worked to identify the abandoned vehicles in their
patrol area. Upon identification, a license check
was conducted, and if the car had been reported
stolen, it was towed immediately. Otherwise, a
dated sticker was attached to the car window giving
the owner a 5-day deadline to move the vehicle
before it would be impounded. If the car was not
moved by then, the vehicle was towed to the city
lot.

Reclaiming an impounded vehicle could be costly for
the owner. As of August 1989, the charge for towing
was $45, plus a $5 per day storage fee. Extra costs
were assessed if special equipment was required to
remove the car. If the car was not claimed within
30 days, it could then be sold.

Assessment. Within a short period of time, 87
abandoned cars were removed from the target area.
According to patrolling officers, the area improved
visually. In the 4 months following the program's
inception, dispatchers reported no citizen
complaint calls regarding abandoned cars. Although
abandoned cars in the area were likely to be a
continuing problem for police, officers and housing
authority representatives continued to use the
system.

Corner of Fair and Elm Streets

Scanning. The liquor store on the corner of Fair
and Elm Streets posed a problem for Atlanta police
officers for many years. A hangout for inebriates
and vagrants, the corner was the site of repeat
disturbance calls. Patrons bought liquor, consumed
it outside the store, and harassed passersby. They
also waved down cars to talk to friends,
acquaintances, and even complete strangers,
resulting in traffic-flow problems at this busy
intersection. The corner crowd grew larger in the
evening, and drinkers often became rowdy and noisy,
and frequently started fights. In recent years, the
problem had become more serious as drug dealers
began conducting their business on the corner.

A row of abandoned buildings perpendicular to the
liquor store created an additional problem for
police. The buildings, which had deteriorated and
were strewn with garbage, were an eyesore to the
community and structurally unsafe. Drug dealers
often hid their drug stash amid the rubble and
debris, drug users used the buildings for a place
to get high, and women addicts often traded sex for
drugs there. 

Analysis. In the past, police officers assigned to
patrol the area attended to these problems as time
permitted. Unfortunately, only one officer was
assigned to this beat, and the corner of Fair and
Elm was only a small part of the total beat area.
The Fair and Elm beat, plus two other beats,
comprised a sector. The three beat officers
assigned to this sector, along with one "umbrella
car," handled all the sector's calls. This
particular sector was responsible for 40 to 50
percent of the calls for service within the general
service area. The remaining calls for service were
spread among 10 other beats (2 other sectors),
leaving officers insufficient time to focus on the
problems existing at the corner of Fair and Elm. 

Whenever possible, the officers patrolled the area
around the liquor store, dispersing the crowd and
sometimes making arrests. However, once the
officer(s) departed, the crowd generally returned.

The area surrounding Fair and Elm was densely
populated. Fair Street bisected a large public
housing project, University Homes. Another housing
development, John Hope Homes, was a few blocks
south. Together the projects contained more than
1,200 apartments, housing approximately 2,100
people. In January 1989, the Atlanta Police
Department, working in conjunction with the Atlanta
Housing Authority (AHA), opened a miniprecinct in
the University Homes complex to better address the
area's increasing drug problems. The miniprecinct,
staffed by one officer from 10 a.m. to 6 p.m.,
Monday through Friday, was located in a building
across the street from the liquor store at Fair and
Elm. The first task assigned to the miniprecinct's
Officer E. was to address the problems on that
corner.

Response. Officer E. visited the corner at
different times throughout the day, dispersing
loiterers and, when appropriate, making arrests.
Charges ranged from disorderly conduct to
possession of a controlled substance. Officer E.
had a perfect view of the corner from the
miniprecinct's front door. When someone was
drinking in front of the store, harassing
passersby, or otherwise causing a disturbance,
Officer E. walked over and handled the situation.
He also monitored the store's liquor sales, and on
one occasion arrested the owner for selling alcohol
to a minor. When Officer E. was absent, other beat
officers increased their visibility in the area.

Officer P. was assigned the task of resolving the
problem of the abandoned buildings. He first
determined who owned the abandoned properties. He
found a faded notice attached to one of the
buildings citing it as uninhabitable and giving the
owner 30 days to bring it up to city code. The
notice, dated November 30, 1988, included a
telephone number of the city office that issued it.
When Officer P. called to inquire about the
property, he was told that a hearing on its
disposition had already been held, and that the
buildings were on the city's demolition list. The
buildings would come down once the city
renegotiated its demolition contract. 

While Officer P. continued to address this problem,
a deacon from the Providence Missionary Baptist
Church contacted him. The church was located in the
middle of the two housing complexes, and the
deacon, Mr. W., wanted to purchase the abandoned
property and develop it into an attractive
commercial plaza to serve area residents. Officer
P. gave Mr. W. the name and address of the owner.

Assessment. Within 4 months, the situation on the
corner of Fair and Elm improved. Area residents,
housing authority staff, and police officers stated
that the corner was cleaner than it had been in
years. Although vagrants and drug dealers still
frequented the area, they seldom remained for long
during the afternoons and were no longer causing
regular disturbances. Problems persisted somewhat
at night, but were less troublesome than before
police efforts began. The police department planned
to extend the ministation's office hours to include
evenings. Officer E. planned to continue to monitor
liquor sales, and if the owner continued to violate
the law, his license would be revoked.

Positive change came relatively quickly to a corner
that had long been a source of complaints.
Residents and housing authority staff were pleased
with the progress, and expressed their thanks to
the police. The police were also pleased with the
support they received from the residents and 
housing authority staff, and planned to continue
their efforts at this location.

------------------------------

Tulsa, Oklahoma, Case Studies

Drug Trafficking Among Juveniles in Low-Income
Public Housing

Scanning. Throughout the 1980's, North Tulsa
experienced consistently higher crime rates than
the rest of the city. Tulsa Police Department (TPD)
statistics for the first three quarters of 1988
revealed that 48 percent of the city's crimes of
violence (homicide, rape, robbery, assault, and
weapons violations) occurred in the city's northern
section. Drug arrests were greater there than in
the southern and eastern sections.

North Tulsa had long been regarded as a depressed,
low-income area, with virtually no social services
or industrial activity. In 1969, the Tulsa Housing
Authority (THA) was established, supporting the
city's low-income public housing. During that same
period, additional low-income apartment complexes,
several of which were located in North Tulsa, were
built by the Federal Government through the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).
At the time, these affordable units were considered
an ideal accommodation for the needs of the poorer
residents. Unfortunately, home values fell in areas
near the complexes and crime rates soared, with
drug trafficking becoming a problem.

In June 1988, a special management team of Tulsa
police officials conducted a study of North Tulsa's
drug problem and decided that to reduce the illegal
drug activity, the police department should focus
its efforts on five of the area's public housing
complexes--Morning Star, Vernon Manor, Seminole
Hills, Comanche Park, and Osage Hills--that were
chosen based on their high crime rates and the
blatant street dealing reported by area police
officers.

Analysis. A resident survey, conducted by patrol
officers in each of the public housing complexes
(see A Police Guide to Surveying Citizens and Their
Environment), revealed that 86 percent of the
occupants lived in households headed by single
females. Although 54 percent of heads-of-households
had graduated from high school, only 11 percent
worked full time. More than half of the residents
were living below the poverty line, and roughly 90
percent received some form of government assistance
in addition to subsidized housing. When asked what
they considered to be the biggest problem in the
complexes, 60 percent responded "drugs."

Police officials also collected drug-related data
from various city agencies, as well as drug arrest
information from police records that revealed a
sevenfold increase in male juvenile arrests for
drug violations between 1978 and 1988. Officers
working in North Tulsa confirmed these figures,
noting their observations of an increasing number
of juveniles involved in criminal activity,
especially drug trafficking. In 1978, blacks, who
accounted for 11.6 percent of the city's
population, represented approximately 15 percent of
Tulsa's drug violators. By 1988, that figure had
climbed to 43 percent.

Officers assigned to the target area noticed large
groups of school-age youth in the housing complexes
who appeared to be selling drugs during school
hours. These observations led police to compare the
dropout and suspension rate in North Tulsa schools
to those in other areas of the city. The city's
northernmost high school, McClain, serving most of
the high school-age youth in the five complexes,
had the highest suspension (4.4 percent) and
dropout rates (10 percent) of any school in the
city. McClain also reported the highest number of
pregnant teenagers in the school system.

The officers suspected that few of the juveniles
observed in the complexes had legitimate jobs. It
seemed that most of them came from underprivileged
backgrounds and appeared to be attracted to drug
dealing by the easy money, as well as the material
possessions the money could buy. "Why should I work
for minimum wage at McDonald's," asked one youth
interviewed on a local television program, "when I
can make $400 to $1,400 a day selling dope?"

In October 1988, the TPD requested 10 volunteer
officers to address the underlying conditions that
spawned drug trafficking in the 5 target complexes.
The officers were told to investigate the drug
problem using the problem-oriented policing
approach (see Part I of this volume for detailed
discussion of the approach). They were supplied
with data compiled in the drug-problem inventory
and advised to use their own observations to help
accomplish their assigned tasks. 

Supervisors at Uniform Division North arranged
volunteers into two-officer foot teams assigned to
the complexes on 8-hour tours. The teams were
expected to visit and establish a rapport with
residents to assure them that police were present
to ensure their safety.

Within a month, officers verified juvenile
involvement in drug trafficking. As officers
approached drug hangouts within the complexes,
young lookouts (aged 12 to 16) would call out,
"Rollers!" to alert the dealers to discard their
drugs and disperse. On those occasions when
officers surprised the dealers, a foot chase
usually ensued and frequently resulted in an
arrest. However, when arrests were made, the youth
often reappeared in the complex the next day.

The officers found that the Oklahoma State juvenile
system presented a problem for them when dealing
with youth engaged in drug trafficking. The State
legislature had forbidden the institutionalization
of juveniles except in the most serious cases, and
as a result, three State incarceration facilities
were closed. The Lloyd E. Rader Diagnostic Center
in Sand Springs housed only the most serious
juvenile offenders. The facility held only 25
youth, with the remaining offenders put on
probation and returned to their parents. Even drug
trafficking resulted in only 1 or 2 days in a youth
detention center. Because they frequently
rearrested many of the same juveniles, police
believed that the lack of incarceration facilities
and the obstacles to incarceration minimized the
effect of deterrence on juvenile offenders.

The five target housing complexes were located
within a 2-mile radius of one another, and each had
a high concentration of young people. Only one city
park and one recreation facility were available in
the area, and the few programs offered by the
recreation facility were poorly attended. The foot
patrol officers believed that the paucity of
recreational activities contributed to youth
involvement in drug trafficking. Therefore, they
developed a strategy to provide programs to deter
youth from selling or using drugs.

Response. Officers S. and N., assigned to the foot
patrol at the Morning Star Apartments, believed
that the youth needed programs that would improve
their self-esteem, teach them values, and impart
decision-making skills. Eighty-six percent of the
boys came from homes without fathers. To provide
positive role models for the young men, the
officers started a Boy Scout troop in the complex
for boys between 11 and 17 years of age. Officer
N., a qualified Boy Scout leader, and Officer S.
began meeting with the boys on Saturdays in a
vacant apartment provided by Morning Star's
management.

Officers J. and E. also organized a Boy Scout troop
in Comanche Park. In addition, they started a group
called SHARE (Stand, Help, and Rid Evil), which
worked to raise money for needy residents and
police-sponsored youth activities. As a SHARE
representative, Officer J. spoke at civic group
meetings and local churches throughout the city to
solicit donations and increase awareness of the
needs of young people on the city's north side.
Those receiving help from SHARE agreed to
participate in programs geared to improving life
and job skills. Volunteers came from the churches
and the civic groups where Officer J. spoke.

Officers B. and F., foot patrol officers at Vernon
Manor, developed plans for unemployed young people.
Officer B. organized one such group called "The
Young Ladies Awareness Group" that hosted weekly
guest speakers invited to come and teach different
job-related skills. Programs instructed young women
in how to dress for job interviews and employment,
with role-playing officers demonstrating proper
conduct during interviews. The women were also
instructed in resume writing and makeup, hair care,
and personal hygiene. The program included several
of the other housing complexes to reach as many
women as possible.

Officer F. worked with a government program called
the Private Industry Training Council (PITC) that
sponsored sessions on goal setting and self-esteem
building to prepare young people to enter job
training programs, also offered by PITC. Officer F.
helped area youth apply for birth certificates,
which were required to enter the PITC program, and
he arranged for volunteers from the Oklahoma
Highway Patrol and a local school to help teach
driver's education. Officers even provided funds
for some young people who were unable to pay the
fees to obtain birth certificates or driver's
licenses.

Officers F. and B. also tried to explain the value
of an education and persuade youth in their complex
to return to school. Unfortunately, too often
parents appeared unconcerned when their children
were missing classes.

The foot patrol officers became involved in a day
camp project conducted at the "Ranch," a 20-acre
north side property confiscated by police from a
convicted drug dealer. The project, jointly
developed by the police department, the school
system, and the urban 4-H Club, used the property
as a day camp for disadvantaged youth recruited
from the target projects. Tulsa's mayor and chief
of police came to the Ranch to meet with the youth,
as did psychologists, teachers, ministers, and
celebrities, including sports celebrities. Guests
tried to convey the value of productive and
drug-free lives, among other ethical values.

Officer M. initiated an agricultural project,
giving 10 youth from the complexes, aged 11 to 16,
individual garden plots in which to plant,
cultivate, and harvest vegetables. Three times
weekly, Officer M. and community volunteers met
with the youth to listen, encourage, and provide a
positive influence. The highlight of the program
was an overnight campout at the Ranch in the summer
of 1989.

Officers in the target area handed out fliers about
the mayor's summer jobs program and PITC's job
fair. The officers wanted to learn more about
alternative school programs available in the city,
such as the Student Training and Reentry (STAR)
program and Job Corps, and invited program
representatives to attend their squad meetings.
Officers encouraged youth to enter these programs,
to finish their education, and to learn job skills.

Master Patrol Officer M., the leader of the Police
Explorer Scouts, planned for the Explorers to start
the first U.S. Drug Abuse Resistance Education
(DARE) Program ever offered to youth in public
housing. Sergeant M., head of the DARE Program in
Tulsa, assisted with this project.

Uniform Division North also planned to develop a
course of action to work with McClain High School
to combat its dropout and suspension problems. A
program called "Adopt a School" would involve
police officers patrolling the schools during
classes in its later phases--not to make arrests,
but to establish rapport with the students. The
program was intended to improve student perceptions
of the police and reduce the likelihood of student
involvement in illegal activities.

Major R., a member of the police department, met
with the editor of the Oklahoma Eagle in late May
1989 to discuss the needs of young people living in
North Tulsa. Plans included getting the city's
north side business owners to unite for the cause
of youth to help deter them from drug involvement.
Major R. also secured funding to send 60 young
people from the Morning Star Apartments to a summer
day camp at the north side Young Women's Christian
Association (YWCA).

Assessment. The police noted a decline in street
sales of illegal drugs in the five target
complexes. Youth reacted positively to the
officers' efforts to help them, and the programs
seemed to deter them from drug involvement. The
police department continued to address the problems
of poor youth in North Tulsa. Foot patrol officers
met with the Task Force for Drug Free Public
Housing to inform the different city, county, and
statewide officials of the needs of youth in public
housing. Other social service agencies began
working with the police department, establishing
satellite offices on the north side of the city,
scheduling programs, and requesting police support
in their efforts.

Drug Dealing in the Seminole Hills Public Housing
Complex

Scanning. The Tulsa Housing Authority (THA) was
established in 1969 to provide low-cost,
government-subsidized housing in Tulsa, Oklahoma.
The Seminole Hills Apartments, built in 1969, was
the first of 20 THA housing complexes constructed
in Tulsa. Seminole Hills I and the Seminole Hills
II Annex, two blocks away, contained approximately
145 units, mostly garden apartments.

Since the mid-1980's, reported crime within the
complex increased significantly. Police statistics
for the first three quarters of 1988 revealed that
48 percent of all violent crimes (homicide, rape,
robbery, assault, weapons violations, disorderly
conduct, and miscellaneous threats) reported in
Tulsa occurred in the northern section of the city.
In that same year, the complex had the highest
crime rate of all subsidized housing in the area,
making it one of the city's most crime-ridden
areas. In the first 10 months of 1988, the
following crimes were reported at Seminole Hills
Apartments: 3 homicides, 35 felony assaults, 18
robberies, 32 burglaries, 43 drug violations, 114
auto thefts, 5 misdemeanor assaults, and 15
larcenies.

Until the mid- to late 1980's, occupancy at
Seminole Hills had averaged nearly 100 percent. By
1988 the occupancy rate fell to 65 percent. 

The management at Seminole Hills and the Tulsa
Police Department (TPD) believed that the complex's
high crime rate was related to an increase in drug
trafficking. Consequently, in October 1988, the TPD
assigned two uniformed police officers to a foot
patrol in the complex. Officers C. and V.
volunteered for the assignment under the
supervision of Corporal L.

Previous efforts to combat crime in and around
Seminole Hills had been unsuccessful. When officers
had made arrests, crowds had gathered, shouting at
and antagonizing the officers, sometimes throwing
rocks and bottles and occasionally damaging police
vehicles. Foot patrol officers were assigned to a
neighboring complex in 1987, but the assignment was
discontinued after 3 months due to concerns for the
officers' safety.

Analysis. The foot patrol's first task was to
better understand the drug problem in Seminole
Hills. Officers C. and V. knew that undercover
narcotics officers and informers could easily buy
drugs in the complex. Visible signs of the drug
trade were everywhere. For example, groups of
loiterers in the area ran at the sight of uniformed
police officers and discarded small packages of
drugs, usually crack cocaine, as they ran. The
officers' task was to uncover why drug trafficking
had become so prevalent at Seminole and determine
how to reduce the problem.

The officers conducted a resident survey and
learned that while only 19 percent of the tenants
owned their own vehicles, a constant flow of
traffic was present at the complex and the parking
lots were usually full. Sixty-one percent of the
tenants believed that the drug dealers were not
residents but used the complex to conduct business.
A computer analysis of arrest records confirmed
these suspicions--70 percent of those arrested at
Seminole did not reside there. The dealers were
using vacant units, apartments of friends, and
streets in the complex to sell drugs. 

The officers further noted that the pay phones
located in the courtyards of Seminole II usually
had crowds waiting to make or receive calls.
Undercover surveillance confirmed officers'
suspicions that many of these people were using the
phones to buy and sell drugs.

Officers C. and V. were convinced that many
residents were afraid to use the pay phones,
especially to report on drug deals they had
observed. They were also afraid to walk about the
complex freely, particularly at night. Most
importantly, they were afraid to cooperate with
police.

The officers set a long-term goal of eliminating
drug trafficking at Seminole Hills. To do this,
they needed to identify both resident and
nonresident dealers and the tenants who assisted
the dealers by allowing them to use their
apartments. They also needed to devise a means to
permanently remove these persons from the complex.
Both steps required cooperation from the manager
and the tenants.

Response. The officers met with the Seminole Tenant
Association and informed them of their plans.
Although the tenants seemed reluctant to help,
their willingness increased when they learned the
officers would be a permanent addition to the
complex. Residents became more active in
identifying dealers and, within a few months, they
frequently reported illegal drug activity.

The two officers assigned to Seminole Hills were in
the complex daily, speaking with tenants and
soliciting their help, and arresting violators when
necessary. They knocked on doors and helped tenants
with personal problems by referring them to social
service agencies, medical care units, and job
training facilities. Eventually, residents would
identify apartments where drugs were being sold.

Seminole Hills management provided a vacant
apartment for officer drug-surveillance activities.
Information gathered was delivered to narcotics
unit investigators, who assisted in obtaining and
serving warrants. 

Management worked with Officers C. and V. to evict
people arrested on drug charges. If just one family
member or a guest was involved in drug dealing, the
entire family was evicted. The officers believed
this policy would send a strong signal to people
who were aware of family members selling drugs. To
enhance the likelihood of evictions being upheld by
the courts, the officers received
courtroom-testimony training by the city
prosecutor.

The officers also received training from the Tulsa
Regional Automated Computer Information System
(TRACIS) on how to collect data, which also helped
them collect information on drug suspects. Using
TRACIS, officers could quickly check for criminal
histories or outstanding warrants and also
crosscheck for known aliases of people involved in
the drug trade at Seminole Hills. 

Additionally, Officers C. and V. were trained to
use the Scott Reagent Modified G Test to field test
seized drugs, specifically crack cocaine. The test
had to be performed before a suspect's preliminary
hearing; however, the department's drug lab was
frequently too backlogged to perform the test for
each drug arrest. Field officers speeded up the
process of obtaining a criminal indictment and
relieved some of the pressure on the department's
drug lab by performing these tests themselves.

Through an agreement between THA and the phone
company, the officers had the pay phones removed
from the Seminole Hills II annex to eliminate their
use by crowds gathered to sell drugs. Officers
requested management to post "No Trespassing" signs
on the premises. Once the signs were in place, the
foot patrol officers and other district officers
could write citations to people who appeared to
have no relationship with the residents but had
come possibly only to sell or buy drugs. The
management again cooperated with the police by
accompanying officers to court to testify against
trespassers.

Dealers quickly determined the officers' shift
schedule and refrained from dealing when the
officers were on patrol. Drug activity slowed down
before the 2:30 p.m. shift began and resumed when
the officers went off duty at 10:30 p.m. Officers
C. and V. asked for permission to vary their hours
so they could keep the dealers offguard.

During their first 30 weeks in the complex, the
officers made 178 arrests, 95 for misdemeanors and
83 for felonies (75 percent of which were for drug
violations). In addition, they served 70 search
warrants; assisted in 30 evictions; and issued 89
tickets for loitering, trespassing, and interfering
with police operations. Along with increased
enforcement, Officers C. and V. helped plan three
parties for children in the complex. At Christmas,
65 children were given toys; on Valentine's Day,
the officers helped bring in a church group to
speak with Seminole's young people; and for Easter,
they helped organize an egg hunt.

Assessment. The officers believed that residents'
fear was alleviated. For example, when the foot
patrol project began, residents were reluctant to
talk openly with police for fear that the dealers
would retaliate. Officers C. and V. reported that
people now approached them not only to visit, but
to report any new drug activity.

The district officers who patrolled the Seminole
Hills area reported that drug activity had markedly
decreased. The street crimes unit noted that
informants sent in to buy drugs now returned
empty-handed. One officer remarked that the
apartments seemed like a "dust bowl" because there
was so little drug activity. A computer analysis
conducted in May 1989 that compared violent crime
activity in the first 6 months of the city's foot
patrol with activity during the prior 6 months
confirmed a 73-percent decrease in reported violent
crime at Seminole Hills.

Though most of the area supervisors expected the
activity to resume, Seminole remained quiet. The
occupancy rate, which dropped considerably in the
first months of the project due to evictions, was
up to 90 percent by July 1989. The district
officers, the street crimes unit, the foot patrol
officers, and the management had made a concerted
effort to eliminate drugs and crimes of violence at
the Seminole Hills Apartments. As a result, the
complex went from having the highest to the lowest
crime rate of all area housing complexes.

Normandy Apartments: A Strategy for Deterring Drug
Trafficking

Scanning. The Normandy Apartments were located 5
miles east and 4 miles south of the central
business district in Tulsa, Oklahoma. They were
garden apartments that had been privately developed
in 1968 using a below-market interest rate loan.
The Tulsa Department of Housing and Urban
Development had control over Normandy Apartments
and set the rental rates for the 212 units.

The complex was located amid mostly middle-income
homes and low- to middle-income apartments.
Interstate Highway 44 was adjacent to the
apartments on the east and several large and small
businesses bordered the complex along the service
road. Two major shopping centers were located
within five blocks of the apartments.

The apartments, upon first glance, appeared to
police to be in relatively good repair, and the
manager reported occupancy at 90 percent. However,
the condition of the complex had actually
deteriorated--the playground was empty, completely
bereft of swings and other recreational equipment;
the basketball hoops sported no nets; the grounds
were littered with trash and broken glass; disabled
vehicles filled the parking spaces in front of the
buildings; and the brick planters flanking each
apartment doorway were empty, even in the spring
and summer. 

Tulsa police officers from the Ida squad of Uniform
Division Southwest were familiar with Normandy
because they responded daily to its numerous calls
for service. Police had long considered the
apartments a haven for local criminals--during
chases, suspects frequently fled into the
apartments to escape police. Officers rarely
patrolled inside the complex, generally entering it
only in response to specific calls for service. 

In late 1988, due to successful efforts to shut
down drug trafficking in low-income North Tulsa
apartment complexes, police anticipated the
displacement of drug dealers into housing complexes
in the city's southern section. Officer S. was
familiar with the problems at Normandy and aware of
the increased police enforcement in public housing
on the city's north side. He suspected that the
Normandy apartments would experience an influx of
drug dealers and other criminals moving south to
evade the north side crackdown. Officer S. hoped to
prevent this eventuality. 

Officer S. had recently learned about
problem-oriented policing (see Part I of this
volume) and wanted to try this approach at
Normandy. He explained his idea to his supervisors,
both of whom shared his apprehension that drug
dealing might be displaced southward. They granted
Officer S. permission to use a problem-oriented
approach at Normandy, and he began patrolling the
apartments on foot in January 1989.

Analysis. With assistance from one of his
supervisors, Officer S. designed an instrument to
survey residents in the complex. He and two other
officers surveyed door-to-door and received
responses from 70 of the 192 occupied apartments.
While conducting the tenant survey, the officers
explained their intention to build a strong and
secure environment at Normandy.

The survey revealed that, although 70 percent of
the residents had graduated from high school, only
40 percent were employed full time, with nearly
half living below the poverty line. The survey also
indicated that no more than half of those
interviewed had lived in the complex for more than
a year.

Officer S. next obtained a computer printout of
crimes reported in the Normandy area, mostly
larceny, auto theft, and burglary. He learned that
nearly 50 percent of the residents had been crime
victims in the past year. The printout also
revealed that many of the large and small
businesses surrounding the complex were frequent
targets of vandalism, auto theft, burglary, and
shoplifting. When arrests had been made, suspects
were often found to live in the Normandy
Apartments.

Officer S. developed a three-pronged strategy to
stave off increased drug-related crime. First, he
hoped to eliminate many of the existing crime
problems through high-profile enforcement. Second,
he wanted to establish rapport with the tenants and
organize them into a community actively involved in
keeping its complex safe and crime free. Third, he
wanted to enlist the aid of local businesses in
working on problems in the community.

Response. The complex manager provided Officer S.
with a vacant apartment that he used to write
police reports and maintain a visible police
presence. The manager also identified 5 residents
with leadership potential and 15 problem tenants
she suspected of involvement in criminal activities
such as drug dealing. Officer S. described the
manager as "streetwise," and he believed that her
information was accurate. Running record checks on
the 15 problem tenants and finding that 3 had
outstanding warrants, he promptly served the
warrants with the help of other police officers.

The officers believed that one tenant who had been
served with an outstanding warrant could assist
Officer S. in his efforts to help the community.
When Officer S. explained his intention to this
woman to rid Normandy of drugs and build a strong
community there, she offered to help and soon
became a source of intelligence for the police,
sharing information on those tenants who received a
large number of daily visitors. In addition, as a
result of a court-ordered community service work
program, she began volunteer work at the local
Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA).
Subsequent to working off her fines, she was hired
as a full-time YWCA employee.

Officer S. turned his attention to the remaining 12
problem tenants identified by the manager. Through
surveillance, he determined that 1 of the 12, a
local high school student living at the complex,
was indeed selling drugs, Officer S. sent an
informant to make a drug buy from the suspect's
apartment. After the buy, he obtained an arrest
warrant and a search warrant. When he and the other
officers executed the warrants, only the suspect's
uncle was at home. They arrested the uncle on a
possession charge and told witnesses to spread the
word that people selling drugs would not be
tolerated. The next day, Officer S. encountered the
young dealer in the complex. "Who told you I was
selling drugs?" the boy asked. "Everybody knows,"
the officer replied, adding, "If you don't stop,
you'll be arrested, too." The boy heeded the
officer's warning, and no further drug sales were
reported from that apartment. Officer S. believed
the boy was selling drugs only to make extra money,
and when confronted by the officer, he became
scared and stopped dealing.

Officer S. next met with one of the residents
identified by the complex manager as having
leadership potential. The man was a truck driver
and part-time minister who taught Sunday school to
young people in the complex. The man agreed to work
with Officer S. to establish a community
organization at Normandy. The resident explained to
his friends in the complex and to his Sunday school
students that the police were trying to help the
residents, and he solicited their cooperation.

Officers began to patrol Normandy regularly,
visiting with residents and explaining that with
the community's help, they could rid the complex of
drug dealers. Residents came to appreciate the
police presence and helped patrol officers identify
criminal activity. On one occasion, when a robbery
suspect entered the complex, witnesses pointed out
where the suspect had gone and even offered words
of encouragement as officers escorted their
prisoner to the patrol car.

Officer S. met with area businesses to gain their
support and involve them in his efforts. He
approached the executive director of a local
fraternal order whose building had experienced
break-ins. The executive director agreed to allow
the newly formed Normandy Resident Association to
use the building to conduct its meetings. Officer
S. convinced a furniture store just north of the
Normandy complex to donate backboards for the
basketball courts. He also encouraged two nearby
convenience stores to donate 20 swing sets to the
Normandy playground.

In late March, Officers S. and V. held the first
resident association meeting in the Scottish Rite
auditorium. Seventy-five residents attended.
Officer V. distributed teddy bears, donated by a
local restaurant, to children as an incentive for
their parents to attend. Area movie theaters
donated 30 free tickets, and a drawing was held to
give away stuffed Easter bunnies. Officer S.'s area
commander welcomed the residents to the meeting and
offered the support of the police department in the
effort to make Normandy a safe community. A
representative of the Citizen's Crime Commission
gave a presentation on safety tips. Officer S. also
invited a case worker from the Private Industries
Training Council (PITC) to speak to the residents,
40 percent of whom were unemployed, about job
training and placement programs.

Officer S. next focused on providing recreational
opportunities for youth living in the complex. He
held a contest in which copies of the Bill of
Rights and the Constitution, supplied by the Police
Sertoma Club, were distributed to older youth who
were challenged to write an essay on "What These
Documents Mean to Me" and to younger children who
were asked to draw a picture of "What Freedom in
America Means to Me." Contest prizes were donated
from area businesses and organizations. One store
donated a $25 gift certificate. Two sporting goods
stores donated basketballs. The general manager of
a minor league baseball team donated 80
complimentary tickets to bring the children of the
Normandy Apartments to a June baseball game. A
local women's club dedicated to assisting
low-income apartment residents donated games and
puzzles, and one member also offered to buy flowers
for the complex and to help residents plant them. 

Assessment. Officer S.'s efforts did not solve all
of Normandy's crime problems, but he was convinced
that significant improvements were made. Tenants
improved the physical appearance of the complex,
and most of the disabled vehicles were towed or
moved by their owners. 

Crime in the area decreased considerably. An
analysis of incident reports, comparing the first 3
months of 1988 with the same period in 1989, showed
a 129-percent decrease in criminal activity. Crime
statistics revealed a 50-percent reduction in two
particular crimes--"beer runs" (a slang for
shoplifting beer) and gasoline pump drive-off
thefts at two nearby convenience stores. The owner
of the Toyota dealership adjacent to the complex
told Officer S. that since the improvement program
began, vandalism and break-ins at his business had
ceased. In addition, a letter received on May 24,
1989, from the owner of a local insurance company
stated that vandalism, break-ins, and other
criminal activities had decreased in his shopping
center in the previous 2 months. Officer S.
believed the reduction in criminal activity was due
largely to improvements made in the complex.

------------------------------------

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Case Studies

Cleaning Up Queen Village

Scanning. The police officers involved in this
project, along with concerned residents of Queen
Village, agreed that crime and drug trafficking
were high-priority problems in the neighborhood.
They also agreed that the neighborhood's physical
condition and appearance had an impact upon such
problems as crime, drug trafficking, and fear in
the community. Neighborhood residents and
patrolling officers believed that improving the
physical environment could reduce crime in Queen
Village. 

Analysis. Using an environmental survey (see A
Police Guide to Surveying Citizens and Their 
Environment), patrol officers assigned to the 3d
Police District ministation conducted a physical
assessment of the neighborhood. The survey assisted
officers in identifying and collecting descriptive
information on the physical environment, such as
environmental problems, sometimes described as
"quality of life" concerns. These problems included
litter, graffiti, unkempt lots, abandoned or
dilapidated buildings, and abandoned vehicles.
Through the surveys officers identified 20
abandoned vehicles, 20 abandoned or dilapidated
buildings, 7 blocks with serious litter problems,
11 blocks with serious graffiti problems, and 5
littered vacant lots. Officers also noted that six
blocks had poor overhead street lighting because
lights were either broken or concealed by overgrown
trees. 

Although patrol officers in Philadelphia routinely
conducted similar environmental surveys (known
within the department as "Sunday surveys" because
they were conducted on Sundays when calls for
service were less frequent), they rarely addressed
the problems themselves. Traditionally, patrol
officers documented the problems and forwarded the
information through the chain of command to the
responsible individual or outside agency. However,
this practice had proven to be neither efficient
nor effective at solving many of the neighborhood
problems. Patrol officers rarely used the surveys
as a data source or tool for identifying,
analyzing, or explaining other neighborhood
problems such as drug hot spots, crime-prone areas,
disturbance locations, and fear among neighborhood
residents.

Response. Patrol Officer B., an 8-year veteran of
the department assigned to the 3rd Police District
ministation in Queen Village, was placed in charge
of addressing many of the problems identified by
the environmental survey. Officer B. began working
on removing abandoned vehicles, securing and
demolishing abandoned or dilapidated buildings, and
cleaning up vacant lots. 

Officer B.'s first task was to remove abandoned
vehicles from the neighborhood, which he believed
created a problem for several reasons: they
detracted from the neighborhood's overall
appearance; they tended to collect litter, trash,
and other junk; they attracted rodents and other
animals; they took up valuable parking space; they
provided drug dealers with a place to hide their
drugs; they were a safety hazard for children; they
were considered a nuisance by residents; and they
conveyed a lack of community concern, pride, and
control over the neighborhood.

To initiate the process to remove these vehicles,
Officer B. recorded their identification numbers
and locations and reported them to the abandoned
automobile officer of the 3rd Police District, who
examined the vehicles and identified the owners
through the State's Bureau of Motor Vehicles. He
then notified the owners by certified mail that the
vehicles had to be removed or repaired within 30
days from the date of the notice. If a vehicle was
considered a safety hazard, it could be removed
before the 30-day deadline. If the vehicle went
unclaimed, the officer placed a work order
requesting its removal by one of several private
salvage companies contracted by the city. He then
sent the owner a summary ticket (via certified
mail) for abandoning the vehicle; the ticket amount
covered the city's related expenses. 

Between December 1988 and April 1989, Officer B.
and another officer identified and removed 32
abandoned vehicles from Queen Village. Although the
removal process often took up to 60 days, it was
expedited when the officers made followup calls to
the vehicles' owners and to the salvage companies.

Officer B. also addressed the problem of abandoned
and dilapidated housing at Queen Village. One such
house was located in the middle of a litter-strewn,
drug-infested, and crime-ridden block, where large
crowds gathered almost daily to hang out, drink
alcohol, and buy drugs. 

The house had become so dilapidated that it
presented a safety hazard to passersby and to
playing children. The front door had fallen from
its hinges, bricks were falling onto the sidewalk,
and the inside floors and walls had collapsed.
Officer B. often observed children running from the
house as he drove by in his patrol car. He also
noticed evidence of drug use inside the house, such
as burned bottle caps, broken glass vials, and
marijuana cigarette butts. 

On January 13, 1989, Officer B. reported the
problem to the city's licenses and inspection (L&I)
department, which inspects buildings and enforces
building code violations in Philadelphia. L&I
concluded that ordinary measures such as sealing
the building with tin or bricks could not make it
secure and that demolition was the only safe
course. L&I first attempted to notify the
building's owner because owners were generally
given 30 days to respond before action was taken
against a property. However, the owner could not be
located, and L&I's subsequent records check showed
that the owner owed nearly $3,000 in real estate
taxes dating back to 1981.

Because the house had to be demolished, L&I
referred the situation to the city's contractual
services department, which hired wrecking
companies. As a followup measure, Officer B.
contacted the director of contractual services, who
informed Officer B. that his department was
required to seek bids from several wrecking
companies before a building could be demolished. On
March 15, 1989, the department accepted a bid, and
by March 20, the wrecking company had begun work.
Within 1 week, the building was demolished and the
lot cleaned of most of the debris. 

Officer B. also asked L&I to investigate a vacant 
litter-strewn lot located on the same block as the
abandoned building because the lot was an eyesore
and a nuisance to the community. L&I examined the
lot in January 1989 and agreed that it needed to be
cleaned. When L&I's records check revealed that the
lot was owned by the city, it referred the problem
to the city's "clean and seal department." In
March, Officer B. followed up by contacting that
department's director, who informed him that,
because the lot posed no immediate danger to the
community, the city's schedule might not allow it
to be cleaned for up to 8 to 9 months. Officer B.
eventually asked area residents to participate in
the cleanup. 

Assessment. Although no formal survey or evaluation
was conducted, Officer B. reported that residents
were pleased with the physical improvements in
their neighborhood. He continued to monitor
environmental problems in Queen Village. 

The "Pipe House" at 940 Dove Street

Scanning. Located within Queen Village, the 900
block of Dove Street was a residential street with
22 homes. The street was one of the most recent
blocks in the neighborhood to undergo
gentrification. Many of its 18th-century homes were
purchased and renovated either by developers or
young married professionals, and subsequently sold
for up to $400,000.

Analysis. Homes on Dove Street were either occupied
or undergoing renovation, with the exception of 940
Dove, which was vacant. Unsecured, the house became
a crack den or "pipe house." Between January and
March 1989, the police department received
thirty-seven 911 complaints from area residents
about sanitation problems, abandoned vehicles,
narcotics use, and disturbingly loud noises during
the night. Residents expressed concern that the
crack smoking might be a fire hazard and they
feared for their personal safety. Many reported
that they were afraid to leave their homes because
of the drug users at 940 Dove. Area businesses
suffered from the reputation of the pipe house as
well. One restaurant, located on the corner of Dove
Street, experienced a sharp decline in patronage,
which the owner attributed to residents being
afraid to leave their homes and dine at his
restaurant.

Response. Sergeant C. of the 3rd Police District
investigated the problem in February 1989. He
immediately arrested two area drug dealers, but
this had little impact on the problem. Sergeant C.
soon turned his attention to the vacant house and
discovered that its owner had recently died and
left the house to family members. Further inquiries
revealed that the decedent's daughter was anxious
to cooperate with police to solve the pipe house
problem. She had been trying to sell the house, but
two local real estate firms had dropped their
listings because their agents were afraid to go
onto the property to show the house to prospective
buyers.

The daughter agreed to have the property secured,
although she had done this twice before. With
Sergeant C. present for protection, a construction
crew secured the vacant house. The officer, along
with block residents, contacted a realtor. Sergeant
C. provided increased patrolling to the area, and 
area residents vigilantly monitored the boarded-up
property.

Assessment. The house was listed for sale by a
realtor, and its sales potential greatly increased.
Dove Street residents were no longer afraid to
leave their homes, and many said that the quality
of life on their street had dramatically improved.

Thefts From Vehicles in Queen Village

Scanning. Thefts from vehicles increased
substantially in Queen Village during the past few
years. In 1988, 142 thefts from vehicles were
reported, comprising 35 percent of all serious
Uniform Crime Reports (Part I) crimes in the
neighborhood. From January through May 1989, the
number increased to 116, representing an 87-percent
increase from the same period in 1988. The average
dollar loss from property stolen during a theft was
$613, and by the end of 1989, the yearly figure
exceeded $240,000, exclusive of damage done to the
vehicles.

Analysis. Officer A., assigned to the area, was
responsible for addressing the problem of thefts
from automobiles. Officer A. initially plotted
crime patterns by the time of day, day of week,
week of month, and location. She interviewed
car-theft victims to gather additional information
about method of entry, type of property stolen,
security measures taken, and reasons for parking in
a particular location. She then accumulated
information on likely offenders and interviewed a
local repeat offender. 

From her analysis, Officer A. learned that most
thefts from vehicles were committed on Monday
nights. However, a sizable number were committed on
other days and at times other than night. She
noticed that many thefts were committed during the
third week of each month and believed this could be
either a coincidence or a result of available money
running low by the middle of the month. She found
that the location of thefts varied from day to day,
week to week, and month to month. However, over
time, all areas in the neighborhood experienced
thefts from vehicles. 

Response. Officer A. thought that offenders might
be targeting certain vehicles. She looked for
patterns by vehicle type, vehicle characteristics,
method of entry, and type of property stolen. She
found that vehicle type varied widely. As for
victims, there appeared to be no connection among
the age, race, or sex of the owner. Of the 116
thefts from vehicles, all but 40 involved local
neighborhood residents. Those 40 victims were
either visiting family or friends or shopping in
neighborhood stores. None of the victims worked in
the area. 

The Queen Village neighborhood experienced a
tremendous amount of daily traffic from its 7,200
residents and several thousand daily visitors. Most
vehicles were parked on the street, with few parked
in private driveways or garages.

Although many victims interviewed by Officer A.
reported having left their property in plain view,
most wanted additional police protection. Few
vehicles had security alarms. The type of property
stolen varied, with mostly clothing stolen during
the winter and mostly tools stolen during warmer
months, when neighborhood construction was
underway. Other stolen property included radios,
stereos, auto parts, cameras, briefcases, and small
change. 

Method of entry was most commonly through breaking
a window, generally the sidewalk-side car window.
Break-in tools were never recovered from the scene.

It appeared that most thefts from vehicles were
merely crimes of opportunity, with few patterns or
clues to suggest a likely time, area, or target
where officers could direct their attention. 

Officer A. discussed the problem with her
supervisor, who suggested that she interview an
offender. With her supervisor's support and the
approval of her captain, she interviewed a
long-time neighborhood offender who had been
arrested three times in April of that year for
thefts from vehicles. The offender was a
37-year-old male resident of a large neighborhood
public housing complex, Southwark Plaza, where he
lived with his mother and siblings.

With a promise of immunity, the offender agreed to
discuss his methods for committing thefts from
vehicles. He also shared with Officer A. his
reasons for committing the crimes--stealing from
vehicles was the only way to support his
$1,500-a-week crack cocaine habit. Approximately 4
years prior to his addiction, he had held a steady,
well-paying job with the city's sanitation
department. In 1987, after 10 years of service, he
was fired because his crack addiction caused him to
miss too much work. His criminal record showed that
he had been arrested on 13 occasions since 1970 for
various types of property offenses and drug
charges. 

The offender revealed his typical procedure for
breaking into cars. He would walk around the
neighborhood almost daily looking for possible
targets. One reason he preferred committing thefts
from vehicles over other types of crimes, such as
burglary or robbery, was that he knew in advance
what he would be getting for his efforts--most of
what he stole was visible through the car's window.
He used a screwdriver as a lever to break the
window because it created little sound. Within
seconds, he could complete a theft and be on his
way. He would not commit more than one theft at a
time; rather, he would make only one "hit" and then
run. He routinely committed between 15 and 20 such
thefts per week. The time of day, day of week, week
of the month, location, type of car, and type of
property did not matter much to him. When
questioned about deterrents, he confessed that
nothing really mattered except witnesses--he would
not commit a theft if someone was outside watching.

The offender disposed of the property in several
ways. He would sell it on the street for 50 percent
of its value to someone looking for a good buy,
generally neighborhood residents, some of whom
became regular customers. Or, if he was unable to
sell the stolen property on the street, he went to
drug dealers, whom he considered a last resort
because they gave him only 10 percent of the
merchandise value. The dealers would then either
resell the stolen property or keep it. 

The offender told Officer A. that he would stop
committing thefts only if he kicked his addiction.

Assessment. Officer A. developed responses to the
problem of thefts from vehicles in Queen Village,
some of which included targeting repeat offenders
for probation and parole violations; conditional
release into a drug treatment program; community
crime prevention workshops; a media campaign; and a
coordinated patrol between the police and the
neighborhood "townwatch."

Narcotics Anonymous in Queen Village

Scanning. In the late 1980's, Queen Village
experienced a serious increase in crime and
disorder when drugs infested the neighborhood. In
1988, 407 serious Uniform Crime Reports (Part I)
crimes were committed there--56 serious crimes per
1,000 residents. Twelve of every 100 households
were victimized by the perpetration of at least one
serious crime. Although it was impossible to
determine how many of these crimes were
drug-related, data from the National Institute of
Justice Drug Use Forecasting study showed that 70
percent of the offenders arrested for a serious
crime in Philadelphia tested positive for cocaine
use. 

Analysis. As part of the police department's
problem-oriented policing project in Queen Village,
Officer P. saw an opportunity to use a novel
approach to address neighborhood crime and drug
abuse problems. Because he believed drug treatment
programs could be used to help reduce crime as well
as other drug-related problems in the neighborhood,
Officer P. conducted research and learned that few
such programs were available to residents in Queen
Village. One nearby treatment center, a 66-bed
private facility, provided treatment for mental
health, drug, and alcohol abuse problems. The only
other neighborhood drug treatment facility was a
20-bed unit in a nearby hospital. Like many
treatment programs, these two facilities were
expensive and had long waiting lists and,
consequently, were not accessible to many area
residents. 

Officer P. defined the problem in the community as
the prevalence of drug abuse and the lack of drug
treatment programs. He decided to lobby for an
accessible drug treatment program tailored to this
particular community's needs. In November 1988,
with support and encouragement from his supervisor,
Officer P. outlined a strategy. To better
understand community-based drug treatment programs,
he spoke with an Alcoholics Anonymous (AA)
counselor who supplied him with books and pamphlets
describing AA and other community-based programs. 

Officer P. also researched within the police
department to discover what community-based drug 
treatment programs were available. Although none
were available, officers in the Employee Assistance
Program (EAP) helped him define criteria for a
successful program: based upon a successful 
program model; easily accessible and open to all
neighborhood residents; requiring only modest funds
for startup costs; and self-supporting. It also
needed to provide a positive and lasting effect on
the community. Narcotics Anonymous (NA) seemed to
fit these criteria. 

Response. Officer P.'s next task was to enlist NA's
support. He called a number listed in the local
service directory, which turned out to be a
hotline. The hotline operator was unable to direct
him to an NA representative, nor was he able to
find a local address. 

Contacting EAP for assistance, he subsequently
reached a local NA counselor who was interested in
his idea and agreed to start a community NA program
if Officer P. arranged for the meeting place. In 
December 1988, in response to Officer P.'s request,
Southwark Plaza's housing authority manager
provided a room adjacent to the 3d Police
District's ministation. 

The first NA meeting was held on January 7, 1989.
Fifteen people attended, which was reasonable since
the meeting was advertised only by word of mouth.
Three attendees were Southwark Plaza residents and
12 were from the surrounding neighborhood. Meetings
were held each Saturday night, and within the first
month, attendance grew to 25. After 5 months,
attendance had grown to 53 regular members. Members
offered to pay the Philadelphia Housing Authority
for use of the meeting room. 

Although Officer P. was not responsible for
overseeing the program, he monitored its progress
each week. At this reporting it was too early to
say whether the program had reduced the community's
crime and other drug-related problems, but it had a
positive impact on the lives of the 53 neighborhood
residents who attended its meetings. Officer P.
planned to establish an AA program in the
neighborhood after he had located a willing
counselor and secured an available meeting room.

Assessment. Although Officer P.'s personal
satisfaction was sufficient reward, his captain and
the community believed that his accomplishments
merited an additional acknowledgment. On May 25,
1989, he was named Law Enforcement Officer of the
Year by the Philadelphia Optimist Club.

------------------------------

Sources for Further Information

For more information on the BJA Problem-Oriented
Approach to Drug Enforcement Program contact:

Law Enforcement Branch
Discretionary Grant Program Division
Bureau of Justice Assistance
633 Indiana Avenue, NW.
Washington, D.C. 20531
202-514-5947

Many of the agencies that participated in the BJA
Problem-Oriented Approach to Drug Enforcement
project are accessible for questions and site
visits from other police department officials. In
particular, the San Diego Police Department has
demonstrated its willingness to assist other
agencies. For more information, contact:

Neighborhood Policing Programs
1401 Broadway, M/S 776
San Diego, CA 92101
619-531-2158

Other agencies that have experimented with
problem-oriented policing and have frequently
accommodated visits and questions include the
police departments in the following cities:

o Baltimore County, Maryland.

o Jacksonville, Florida.

o Newport News, Virginia.

o New York City, New York.

o Oxnard, California.

o Santa Barbara, California

o Santa Ana, California.

o Savannah, Georgia.

o Reno, Nevada.

o Madison, Wisconsin.

Many of the publications cited in the selected
bibliography as well as other information on
problem- and community-oriented policing are
available through the Bureau of Justice Assistance
Clearinghouse. Contact:

BJA Clearinghouse
Box 6000
Rockville, MD 20850 
Telephone: 800-688-4252
FAX: 301-251-5212


-----------------------------

Selected Bibliography

Alpert, Geoffrey P., and Roger G. Dunham (1989).
"Community Policing," in Roger G. Dunham and
Geoffrey P. Alpert, eds., Critical Issues in
Policing: Contemporary Readings. Prospect Heights,
IL: Waveland Press.

Bayley, David H. (1988). "Community Policing: A
Report From the Devil's Advocate," in Jack R.
Greene and Stephen D. Mastrofsky, eds., Community
Policing: Rhetoric or Reality. New York: Praeger.

Brown, Lee P. (1989). Community Policing: A
Practical Guide for Police Officials, Perspectives
in Policing No. 12. Washington, D.C.: National
Institute of Justice.

Cordner, Gary W. (1985). The Baltimore County
Citizen-Oriented Police Enforcement (COPE) Project:
Final Evaluation, final report to the Florence V.
Burden Foundation. Baltimore: Criminal Justice
Department, University of Baltimore.

------ (1988). "A Problem-Oriented Approach to
Community-Oriented Policing," in Jack R. Greene and
Stephen D. Mastrofsky, eds., Community Policing:
Rhetoric or Reality. New York: Praeger.

Couper, David C., and Sabine H. Lobitz (1991).
Quality Policing: The Madison Experience.
Washington, D.C.: Police Executive Research Forum.

Eck, John E., and William Spelman (1987). Problem
Solving: Problem-Oriented Policing in Newport News.
Washington, D.C.: Police Executive Research Forum.

------ (1987). "Who Ya Gonna Call? The Police as
Problem-Busters," Crime and Delinquency, 33:31-52.

Goldstein, Herman (1979). "Improving Policing: A
Problem-Oriented Approach," Crime and Delinquency,
25:236-258.

------ (1977). Policing a Free Society. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Ballinger.

------ (1990). Problem-Oriented Policing. New York,
NY: McGraw Hill.

------ (1987). "Toward Community-Oriented Policing:
Potential, Basic Requirements, and Threshold
Questions," Crime and Delinquency, 33:6-30.

Hartmann, Francis X., Lee P. Brown, and Darrel
Stephens (1988). "Community Policing: Would You
Know It If You Saw It?" Community Policing Series
No. 16. East Lansing, MI: National Neighborhood
Foot Patrol Center, Michigan State University.

Kanter, Rosabeth Moss (1983). The Change Masters.
New York: Simon and Schuster.

Kelling, George L., and Mark H. Moore (1988). "The
Evolving Strategy of Policing." Perspectives in
Policing No. 4. Washington, D.C.: National
Institute of Justice.

Larson, Richard C. (1990). "Rapid Response and
Community Policing: Are They Really in Conflict?"
Community Policing Series No. 20. East Lansing, MI:
National Center for Community Policing, Michigan
State University.

Manning, Peter K. (1988). "Community Policing As a
Drama of Control," in Jack R. Greene and Stephen D.
Mastrofsky, eds., Community Policing: Rhetoric or
Reality. New York: Praeger.

McElroy, Jerome E., Colleen A. Cosgrove, and Susan
Sadd (1989). "An Examination of the Community
Patrol Officer Program (CPOP) in New York City,"
unpublished report. New York: Vera Institute of
Justice.

Mitchell, William P. (1990). "Problem-Oriented
Policing and Drug Enforcement in Newport News,"
Public Management, 72:6(13-16).

Moore, Mark H., and George L. Kelling (1983). "To
Serve and Protect: Learning from Police History,"
The Public Interest, 70 (Winter).

New York City Police Department (1988). Community
Patrol Officer Program: Problem-Solving Guide. New
York: New York Police Department.

Parker, Patricia A. (1990). "POP vs. Drugs,"
Police. May (34-37).

Pate, Antony M. (1989). "Community-Oriented
Policing in Baltimore," in Dennis J. Kenney, ed.,
Police and Policing: Contemporary Issues. New York:
Praeger.

Pate, Antony M., Mary Ann Wycoff, Wesley G. Skogan,
and Lawrence W. Sherman (1986). Reducing Fear of
Crime in Houston and Newark: A Summary Report.
Washington, D.C.: Police Foundation.

Police Executive Research Forum (1989). Taking A
Problem-Oriented Approach to Drugs: An Interim
Report. Washington, D.C.: Police Executive Research
Forum.

Reiss, Albert J., Jr. (1985). "Shaping and Serving
the Community: The Role of the Police Chief
Executive," in William A. Geller, ed., Police
Leadership in America: Crisis and Opportunity. New
York, NY: Praeger.

Reiss, Albert J., Jr., and Michael Tonry, eds.
(1986). Communities and Crime, Crime and Justice
Volume 8. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Sherman, Lawrence W. (1986). "Policing Communities:
What Works?" in Albert Reiss, Jr., and Michael
Tonry, eds., Communities and Crime, Crime and
Justice Volume 8. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.

------ (1989). "Repeat Calls for Service: Policing
the `Hot Spots,'" in Dennis Jay Kenney, ed., Police
and Policing: Contemporary Issues. New York:
Praeger.

Skogan, Wesley G. (1990). Disorder and Decline:
Crime and the Spiral of Decay in American
Neighborhoods. New York: Free Press.

Skolnick, H. Jerome, and David H. Bayley (1988).
Community Policing: Issues and Practices Around the
World. Washington, D.C.: National Institute of
Justice.

Spelman, William, and John E. Eck (1989). "The
Police and Delivery of Local Government Services: A
Problem-Oriented Approach," in James J. Fyfe, ed.,
Police Practice in the '90s: Key Management Issues.
Washington, D.C.: International City Management
Association.

------ (1989). "Sitting Ducks, Ravenous Wolves, and
Helping Hands: New Approaches to Urban Policing."
Public Affairs Comment. Austin, TX: Lyndon Johnson
School of Public Affairs, The University of Texas
at Austin.

Spergel, Irving (1969). Community Problem-Solving.
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Trojanowicz, Robert C., and Joanne Belknap (1986).
Community Policing Training Issues. Community
Policing Series No. 9. East Lansing, MI: National
Neighborhood Foot Patrol Center, Michigan State
University.

Trojanowicz, Robert C., and Bonnie Bucqueroux
(1989). Community Policing: A Contemporary
Perspective. Cincinnati, OH: Anderson.

Walker, Samuel (1984). "`Broken Windows' and
Fractured History: The Use and Misuse of History in
Recent Police Patrol Analysis," Justice Quarterly.
1:1 (75-90).

Wycoff, Mary Ann (1988). "The Benefits of Community
Policing: Evidence and Conjecture," in Jack R.
Greene and Stephen D. Mastrofsky, eds., Community
Policing: Rhetoric or Reality. New York: Praeger.

------------------------------

Glossary

beat: the neighborhood, community, or general area
that is the regular responsibility of a police
officer or officers. An area consistently traveled
by a police officer, resulting in his or her
familiarity with the location and its residents.

beat rotation: periodically reassigning police
officers to work in different beats. 

buy bust: a purchase of illegal drugs by an
undercover officer with the subsequent arrest of
the seller.

command staff: top-level police administrators with
decisionmaking and policymaking power.

crime analysis unit: division of a police agency
that compiles, stores, and interprets valuable
crime-related data that officers can obtain and
use. 

environmental conditions: symptoms of disorder and
decay in a community or neighborhood that can breed
criminal activity, such as poor street lighting;
vandalism and graffiti; litter; vacant, abandoned,
or condemned buildings; and broken-down or
abandoned automobiles.

Gantt chart: visual depiction of overlapping
components and target dates.

informant buy: similar to buy bust, the purchase of
illegal drugs by a cooperative individual or police
informant, who is not a police officer but who is
helping the police make the arrest of a seller
subsequent to the purchase of drugs.

institutionalization: process of making a concept
or initiative part of the established structure and
daily routine and legitimizing the new approach as
part of the organizational culture.

lead staff: individual or group that spearheads the
new problem-oriented policing initiative for a
police agency by offering meaningful support and
encouragement. 

marketing: developing the potential or projected
market for products, services, or information
within a given environment. 

mission statement: closely related to "departmental
philosophy," "statement of operating procedures,"
and "governing principles," providing a technical
expression of specific objectives. The mission
statement is often couched within a police
department credo that articulates its basic values
and goals. In a problem-oriented policing
initiative, the mission statement should include a
formal definition of the approach linking it to
larger departmental values.

open-air drug markets: outdoor places where drug
dealers and users consistently gather to conduct
their illegal transactions. Often these sites are
attractive to this criminal element because of a
combination of environmental conditions and include
parking lots, alleys, and streetcorners, thus
facilitating sales to drive-by customers.

organizational culture: the set of expectations and
norms that guide employee behavior. In a police
agency, the common perceptions and beliefs about
policing based on past experience.

Part I crimes: crimes of murder, rape, robbery,
burglary, arson, aggravated assault, or larceny as
classified in the FBI-managed Uniform Crime
Reporting (UCR) system.

participative management: decentralized style of
management that emphasizes accountability at all
levels and open communication. May be characterized
by a horizontal structure contrasting with the
rigid vertical hierarchies typical of more
centralized organizations. 

problem-oriented policing: the process of
approaching persistent community problems that need
police response with detailed research into the
underlying causes and formulation of unconventional
police responses, often drawing on a variety of
police agency, private-sector, and community
resources.

public housing: conventional low-income rental
housing for poor families and elderly. Rental
payments are based on ability to pay and are
subsidized by the U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development.

reverse sting: a situation in which undercover
police officers pose as drug dealers and arrest the
drug buyers upon completion of the transactions.

shift rotation: periodically reassigning police
officers to work different shifts. 

traditional police approach: often characterized by
a focus on random preventive patrol and rapid
response to calls for service, with arrests of
suspects used as the primary measure of success.
Contrasts with problem-oriented policing, which
involves proactive efforts to identify recurring
problems, evaluate those problems, and develop
alternative responses, including but not limited to
arrests.

truant: youth who cuts classes or skips school
altogether, possibly to engage in further
delinquent activity.

undercover buy: purchase of illegal drugs by an
undercover police officer as part of an effort to
arrest a dealer or build a case for a subsequent
arrest.