Screening Analysis of Criticality Features, Events, and Processes for License Application Rev 01, ICN 00

ANL-EBS-NU-000008

October 2004 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report documents the screening analysis of postclosure criticality features, events, and 
processes. It addresses the probability of criticality events resulting from degradation processes 
as well as disruptive events (i.e., seismic, rock fall, and igneous). Probability evaluations are 
performed utilizing the configuration generator described in Configuration Generator Model1, a 
component of the methodology from Disposal Criticality Analysis Methodology Topical Report2. 
The total probability per package of criticality is compared against the regulatory probability 
criterion for inclusion of events established in 10 CFR 63.114(d)3 (consider only events that have 
at least one chance in 10,000 of occurring over 10,000 years). The total probability of criticality 
accounts for the evaluation of identified potential critical configurations of all baselined 
commercial and U.S. Department of Energy spent nuclear fuel waste form and waste package 
combinations, both internal and external to the waste packages. 
This criticality screening analysis utilizes available information for the 21Pressurized Water 
Reactor Absorber Plate, 12Pressurized Water Reactor Absorber Plate, 44Boiling Water 
Reactor Absorber Plate, 24Boiling Water Reactor Absorber Plate, and the 5-Defense High-
Level Radioactive Waste/U.S. Department of Energy Short waste package types. Where 
defensible, assumptions have been made for the evaluation of the following waste package types 
in order to perform a complete criticality screening analysis: 21Pressurized Water Reactor 
Control Rod, 5Defense High-Level Radioactive Waste/U.S. Department of Energy Long, and 
2Multi-Canister Overpack/2Defense High-Level Radioactive Waste package types. 
The inputs used to establish probabilities for this analysis report are based on information and 
data generated for the Total System Performance Assessment for the License Application, where 
available. 
This analysis report determines whether criticality is to be included or excluded from the Total 
System Performance Assessment for the License Application. The updated criticality features, 
events, and processes screening analysis contained herein are prepared in accordance with the 
guidance specified in The Development of the Total System Performance Assessment-License 
Application Features, Events, and Processes4. 
1 
BSC (Bechtel SAIC Company) 2004 [DIRS 168552]. Configuration Generator Model. CAL-DS0-NU-000002 
REV 00A. Las Vegas, Nevada: Bechtel SAIC Company. ACC: TBD. 
2 
YMP (Yucca Mountain Site Characterization Project) 2003 [DIRS 165505]. Disposal Criticality Analysis 
Methodology Topical Report. YMP/TR-004Q, Rev. 02. Las Vegas, Nevada: Yucca Mountain Site 
Characterization Office. ACC: DOC.20031110.0005. 
3 
10 CFR 63 [DIRS 156605]. Energy: Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Wastes in a Geologic Repository at 
Yucca Mountain, Nevada. Readily available. 
4 BSC (Bechtel SAIC Company) 2004 [DIRS 168706]. The Development of the Total System Performance 
Assessment-License Application Features, Events, and Processes. TDR-WIS-MD-000003 REV 01. Las Vegas, 
Nevada: Bechtel SAIC Company. ACC: TBD. 

The total probability per package of criticality resulting from the criticality features, events, and 
processes analyses documented in this report has a calculated value below the regulatory 
probability criterion. Therefore, it is recommended that criticality be excluded from the Total 
System Performance Assessment for the License Application evaluation. 

1. PURPOSE
The purpose of this analysis report is to evaluate and document the inclusion or exclusion of the 
criticality features, events, and processes (FEPs) with respect to modeling used to support the 
Total System Performance Assessment for License Application (TSPA-LA). A screening 
decision, either Included or Excluded, is given for each FEP along with the technical basis for 
screening decisions. This information is required by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 
in 10 CFR 63.114 (d, e, and f) [DIRS 156605]. 
The criticality FEPs screening analysis calculates the probability per package (Table 6.7-1) of 
criticality resulting from degradation processes (in-package and external) as well as disruptive 
events (i.e., seismic, rock fall, and igneous). Probability evaluations are performed utilizing the 
configuration generator described in Configuration Generator Model (BSC 2004 [DIRS 
168552]), a component of the methodology from Disposal Criticality Analysis Methodology 
Topical Report (YMP 2003 [DIRS 165505]). The calculated probabilities for the individual 
criticality FEPs analyses are summed to obtain a total probability per package of criticality, 
which is then compared to the regulatory probability criterion for inclusion of events (10 CFR 
63.114(d) [DIRS 156605]) for determination of criticalitys inclusion in, or exclusion from, 
evaluation in the TSPA-LA. This comparison is the basis of the screening recommendation for 
the criticality FEPs. This revision addresses the LA FEP List (DTN: MO0407SEPFEPLA.000 
DIRS [170760]). The analyses in the document do not apply to naval spent nuclear fuel. In 
Section 2.2.1.4.2 of its classified Technical Support Document for the License Application, the 
NNPP provides its screening analysis and calculation of the probability per package of criticality 
for naval spent nuclear fuel in the repository. 
1.1 PLANNING AND DOCUMENTATION 
Documentation requirements for this analysis report are described in the technical work plan 
(TWP) entitled Technical Work Plan for: Criticality Department Work Packages ACRM01 and 
NSN002 (BSC 2004 [DIRS 166964]). Any changes in the assigned criticality FEP list for 
TSPA-LA that resulted from the planned work scope are further described in Section 6.1. 
All of the NUREG-1804 acceptance criteria specified in Technical Work Plan for: Criticality 
Department Work Packages ACRM01 and NSN002 (BSC 2004 [DIRS 166964], Table 4) have 
not been addressed as many of these criteria were determined not to be relevant to this document. 
The acceptance criteria that have been determined to be relevant are presented in Table 4.2-2. 
The acceptance criteria deemed to be not relevant to this document (model and design criteria) 
are listed in Table 1.1-1. Additionally, the results of this analysis are utilized in the resolution of 
Key Technical Issue (KTI) Agreements CLST (Container Lifetime and Source Term) 5.03, 5.05, 
5.06, and 5.07. 

1.2 SCOPE 
The scope of this report is to describe, evaluate, and document screening decisions and technical 
bases for the criticality FEPs for TSPA-LA. For FEPs that are included in the TSPA-LA, this 
analysis provides a TSPA-LA disposition, which is a consolidated summary of how the FEP has 
been included and addressed in the TSPA-LA model, based on the various supporting technical 
analysis reports and model reports (collectively, AMRs) that describe the inclusion of the FEP. 
It also provides a list, or reference roadmap, of the specific supporting technical AMRs that 
provide more detailed discussions of the FEP. For FEPs that are excluded from the TSPA-LA, 
this analysis report provides a screening argument, which identifies the basis for the screening 
decision (i.e., low probability, low consequence, or by regulation) and discusses the technical 
Table 1.1-1. Non-Relevant Yucca Mountain Review Plan Acceptance Criteria 
YMRP Section Acceptance Criterion 
System Description and Demonstration of Multiple 
Barriers: 
Areas of Review 
(NRC 2003 [DIRS 163274], Section 2.2.1.1.3) 
Acceptance Criterion 3: 
Technical Basis for Barrier Capability is Adequately 
Presented. 
Scenario Analysis and Event Probability: 
Identification of Events with Probability Greater than 10-8 
per Year 
(NRC 2003 [DIRS 163274], Section 2.2.1.2.2.3) 
Acceptance Criterion 3: 
Probability Model Support is Adequate. 
Acceptance Criterion 4: 
Probability Model Parameters Have Been Adequately 
Established. 
Model Abstraction 
Degradation of Engineered Barriers 
(NRC 2003 [DIRS 163274], Section 2.2.1.3.1.3) 
Acceptance Criterion 1: 
System Description and Model Integration Are Adequate. 
Model Abstraction 
Mechanical Disruption of Engineered Barriers 
(NRC 2003 [DIRS 163274], Section 2.2.1.3.2.3) 
Acceptance Criterion 1: 
System Description and Model Integration Are Adequate. 
Model Abstraction 
Mechanical Disruption of Engineered Barriers 
(NRC 2003 [DIRS 163274], Section 2.2.1.3.3.3) 
Acceptance Criterion 1: 
System Description and Model Integration Are Adequate. 
Acceptance Criterion 3: 
Data Uncertainty is Characterized and Propagated 
Through the Model Abstraction. 
Model Abstraction 
Radionuclide Release Rates and Solubility Limits 
(NRC 2003 [DIRS 163274], Section 2.2.1.3.4.3) 
Acceptance Criterion 1: 
System Description and Model Integration Are Adequate. 
Acceptance Criterion 3: 
Data Uncertainty is Characterized and Propagated 
Through the Model Abstraction. 
Model Abstraction 
Radionuclide Transport in the Unsaturated Zone 
(NRC 2003 [DIRS 163274], Section 2.2.1.3.7.3) 
Acceptance Criterion 3: 
Data Uncertainty is Characterized and Propagated 
Through the Model Abstraction 
Model Abstraction 
Radionuclide Transport in the Saturated Zone 
(NRC 2003 [DIRS 163274], Section 2.2.1.3.9.3) 
Acceptance Criterion 3: 
Data Uncertainty is Characterized and Propagated 
Through the Model Abstraction 
Acceptance Criteria 
(NRC 2003 [DIRS 163274], Section 2.5.1.3) 
Acceptance Criterion 3: 
The Activities Related to Design Control are Acceptable 
Provided that:  

basis that supports that decision. It also provides appropriate references to project and non-
project information that supports the exclusion. 
In cases where a FEP covers multiple technical areas and is shared with other FEP analysis 
reports, this analysis report provides only a partial technical basis for the screening decision as it 
relates to criticality concerns. The full technical basis for these shared FEPs is addressed, 
collectively, by all of the sharing FEP analysis reports. This information is provided in 
Section 6.8 and subsequent sections and subsections 
An overview of the YMP FEP analysis and scenario development process is available in The 
Development of the TSPA-LA Features, Events, and Processes (BSC 2004, Sections 2.4, 3, and 4 
[DIRS 168706]), describing the TSPA-LA FEP identification and screening process that led to 
the development of the LA FEP List documented in DTN: MO04075SEPFEPLA.000 ([DIRS 
170760]). Changes in the FEP list, FEP names, and FEP descriptions can also be traced through 
that report. The criticality FEPs addressed in this report form a subset of the revised LA FEP 
List. These FEPs are listed in Table 1.2-1, including the designation of shared FEPs. 
Direct inputs supporting the screening decisions are listed in Section 4. Indirect inputs 
supporting the screening decisions are listed in Section 6.1. The individual FEP discussions 
providing identification (FEP number, name, and description) and screening (screening decision, 
screening argument or TSPA disposition) information are in Section 6.8. 
Table 1.2-1. Criticality FEPs List to be Utilized in Criticality Screening Analysis 
FEP 
Number FEP Name FEP Description 
Base Case FEPs 
2.1.14.15.0A 
In-package 
criticality 
(intact 
configuration) 
The waste package internal structures and the waste form remain intact. If 
there is a breach (or are breaches) in the waste package which allows water to 
either accumulate or flow-through the waste package then criticality could 
occur in situ. In-package criticality resulting from disruptive events is 
addressed in separate FEPs. 
2.1.14.16.0A 
In-package 
criticality 
(degraded 
configurations) 
The waste package internal structures and the waste form may degrade. If a 
critical configuration (sufficient fissile material and neutron moderator, lack of 
neutron absorbers) develops, criticality could occur in situ. Potential in situ 
critical configurations are defined in Figures 3.2a and 3.2b of Disposal 
Criticality Analysis Methodology Topical Report (YMP 2003 [DIRS 165505]). 
In-package criticality resulting from disruptive events is addressed in separate 
FEPs. 
2.1.14.17.0A Near-field 
criticality 
Near-field criticality could occur if fissile material-bearing solution from the 
waste package is transported into the drift and the fissile material is 
precipitated into a critical configuration. Potential near-field critical 
configurations are defined in Figure 3.3a of Disposal Criticality Analysis 
Methodology Topical Report (YMP 2003 [DIRS 165505]). In-package criticality 
resulting from disruptive events is addressed in separate FEPs. 
2.2.14.09.0A Far-field 
criticality 
Far-field criticality could occur if fissile material-bearing solution from the waste 
package is transported beyond the drift and the fissile material is precipitated 
into a critical configuration. Potential far-field critical configurations are defined 
in Figure 3.3b of Disposal Criticality Analysis Methodology Topical Report 
(YMP 2003 [DIRS 165505]). In-package criticality resulting from disruptive 
events is addressed in separate FEPs. 

Table 1.2-1. Criticality FEPs List to be Utilized in Criticality Screening Analysis (Continued) 
FEP 
Number FEP Name FEP Description 
Seismic Disruptive Event FEPs 
2.1.14.18.0A 
In-package 
criticality 
resulting from 
a seismic 
event (intact 
configuration) 
The waste package internal structures and the waste form remain intact either 
during or after a seismic disruptive event. If there is a breach (or are 
breaches) in the waste package which allows water to either accumulate or 
flow-through the waste package then criticality could occur in situ. 
2.1.14.19.0A 
In-package 
criticality 
resulting from 
a seismic 
event 
(degraded 
configurations) 
Either during, or as a result of, a seismic disruptive event, the waste package 
internal structures and the waste form may degrade. If a critical configuration 
develops, criticality could occur in situ. Potential in situ critical configurations 
are defined in Figures 3.2a and 3.2b of Disposal Criticality Analysis 
Methodology Topical Report (YMP 2003 [DIRS 165505]). 
2.1.14.20.0A 
Near-field 
criticality 
resulting from 
a seismic 
event 
Either during, or as a result of, a seismic disruptive event, near-field criticality 
could occur if fissile material-bearing solution from the waste package is 
transported into the drift and the fissile material is precipitated into a critical 
configuration. Potential near-field critical configurations are defined in 
Figure 3.3a of Disposal Criticality Analysis Methodology Topical Report (YMP 
2003 [DIRS 165505]). 
2.2.14.10.0A 
Far-field 
criticality 
resulting from 
a seismic 
event 
Either during, or as a result of, a seismic disruptive event, far-field criticality 
could occur if fissile material-bearing solution from the waste package is 
transported beyond the drift and the fissile material is precipitated into a critical 
configuration. Potential far-field critical configurations are defined in 
Figure 3.3b of Disposal Criticality Analysis Methodology Topical Report (YMP 
2003 [DIRS 165505]). 
Rock Fall Disruptive Event FEPs 
2.1.14.21.0A 
In-package 
criticality 
resulting from 
rock fall (intact 
configuration) 
The waste package internal structures and the waste form remain intact either 
during or after a rock fall event. If there is a breach (or are breaches) in the 
waste package which allows water to either accumulate or flow-through the 
waste package then criticality could occur in situ. 
2.1.14.14.0A 
2.1.14.22.0A 
In-package 
criticality 
resulting from 
rock fall 
(degraded 
configurations) 
Either during, or as a result of, a rock fall event, the waste package internal 
structures and the waste form may degrade. If a critical configuration 
develops, criticality could occur in situ. Potential in situ critical configurations 
are defined in Figures 3.2a and 3.2b of Disposal Criticality Analysis 
Methodology Topical Report (YMP 2003 [DIRS 165505]). 
2.1.14.23.0A 
Near-field 
criticality 
resulting from 
rock fall 
Either during, or as a result of, a rock fall event, near-field criticality could 
occur if fissile material-bearing solution from the waste package is transported 
into the drift and the fissile material is precipitated into a critical configuration. 
Potential near-field critical configurations are defined in Figure 3.3a of Disposal 
Criticality Analysis Methodology Topical Report (YMP 2003 [DIRS 165505]). 
2.2.14.11.0A 
Far-field 
criticality 
resulting from 
rock fall 
Either during, or as a result of, a rock fall event, far-field criticality could occur if 
fissile material-bearing solution from the waste package is transported beyond 
the drift and the fissile material is precipitated into a critical configuration. 
Potential far-field critical configurations are defined in Figure 3.3b of Disposal 
Criticality Analysis Methodology Topical Report (YMP 2003 [DIRS 165505]). 

Source: DTN: MO0407SEPFEPLA.000 ([DIRS 170760]) 
1.3 SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS LIMITATIONS AND USE 
The intended use of this analysis report is to provide FEP screening information for a project 
specific FEP database, and to promote traceability and transparency for both included and 
excluded criticality FEPs. This analysis report is intended for use as the source documentation 
for inclusion or exclusion of criticality FEPs within or from the TSPA-LA model. The following 
limitations apply to this analysis report: 
 
Because this analysis report cites other AMRs and controlled documents as direct input, 
the limitations of this analysis report inherently include any limitations or constraints 
described in the cited AMRs or controlled documents. 
 
For screening purposes, this analysis report generally uses mean values of probabilities, 
mean amplitude of events, or mean value of consequences (e.g., mean time to waste 
package degradation) as a basis for reaching an include/exclude decision. Mean values 
are determined based on the range of possible values. 
 
The results of the FEP screening presented herein are specific to the repository design 
and processes for YMP available at the time of the TSPA-LA. Changes in direct inputs 
listed in Section 4.1, in baseline conditions used for this evaluation, or in other 
subsurface conditions, will need to be evaluated to determine whether the changes are 
Table 1.2-1. Criticality FEPs List to be Utilized in Criticality Screening Analysis (Continued) 
FEP 
Number FEP Name FEP Description 
Igneous Disruptive Event FEPs 
2.1.14.24.0A 
In-package 
criticality 
resulting from 
an igneous 
event (intact 
configuration) 
The waste package internal structures and the waste form remain intact either 
during or after an igneous disruptive event. If there is a breach (or are 
breaches) in the waste package which allows water to either accumulate or 
flow-through the waste package then criticality could occur in situ. 
2.1.14.25.0A 
In-package 
criticality 
resulting from 
an igneous 
event 
(degraded 
configurations) 
Either during, or as a result of, an igneous disruptive event, the waste package 
internal structures and the waste form may degrade. If a critical configuration 
develops, criticality could occur in situ. Potential in situ critical configurations 
are defined in Figures 3.2a and 3.2b of Disposal Criticality Analysis 
Methodology Topical Report (YMP 2003 [DIRS 165505]). 
2.1.14.26.0A 
Near-field 
criticality 
resulting from 
an igneous 
event 
Either during, or as a result of, an igneous disruptive event, near-field criticality 
could occur if fissile material-bearing solution from the waste package is 
transported into the drift and the fissile material is precipitated into a critical 
configuration. Potential near-field critical configurations are defined in 
Figure 3.3a of Disposal Criticality Analysis Methodology Topical Report 
(YMP 2003 [DIRS 165505]). 
2.2.14.12.0A 
Far-field 
criticality 
resulting from 
an igneous 
event 
Either during, or as a result of, an igneous disruptive event, far-field criticality 
could occur if fissile material-bearing solution from the waste package is 
transported beyond the drift and the fissile material is precipitated into a critical 
configuration. Potential far-field critical configurations are defined in 
Figure 3.3b of Disposal Criticality Analysis Methodology Topical Report 
(YMP 2003 [DIRS 165505]). 

within the limits stated in the FEP evaluations. Engineering and design changes are 
subject to evaluation to determine whether there are any adverse impacts to safety, as 
codified at 10 CFR 63.73 and in Subparts F and G ([DIRS 156605]). (See also the 
requirements at 10 CFR 63.44 ([DIRS 156605]). 
 
Only specific information and data for the 21Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) 
Absorber Plate, 12PWR Absorber Plate, 44Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) Absorber 
Plate, 24BWR Absorber Plate, and 5Defense High-Level Radioactive Waste 
(DHLW)/U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Short waste package types are utilized. 
Assumptions (which require confirmation) are utilized to extend the probability 
evaluation to the 21PWR Control Rod, 5DHLW/DOE Long and 2Multi-Canister 
Overpack (MCO)/2DHLW waste package types. 
 
The inputs used to establish probabilities for this analysis are based on information and 
data for the TSPA-LA, where available. Assumptions requiring confirmation and/or 
verification are utilized when TSPA-LA specific information is not available. 
1.4 IMPLEMENTATION OF DISPOSAL CRITICALITY ANALYSIS 
METHODOLOGY 
The criticality FEPs screening analysis implements the disposal criticality analysis methodology 
as outlined in Disposal Criticality Analysis Methodology Topical Report (YMP 2003 [DIRS 
165505]). An overview of the disposal criticality analysis methodology is presented in 
Figure 1-1. The criticality FEPs screening analysis uses the configuration generator (BSC 2004 
[DIRS 168552]) to provide a systematic process to develop and evaluate the potential criticality 
scenarios of each waste package/waste form combination. The development of potential 
criticality scenarios is based on the standard configuration classes of the Master Scenario List 
(Box 1 of Figure 1-1) (YMP 2003 [DIRS 165505], Section 3.3). These criticality scenarios have 
been identified as having the most likely potential to increase the reactivity of an in-package or 
external system. 
The configuration generator uses an event tree methodology to develop and define end states that 
represent the configuration classes derived from criticality scenarios. As is documented in this 
analysis, the characteristics of the waste form, waste package, drip shield and repository (Boxes 
2, 3, and 4), as well as the geochemical performance characteristics (Box 5), are used to develop 
the configuration generator inputs used in the development and quantification of the 
configuration classes applicable to each waste package/waste form combination (Boxes 6 and 7). 
A configuration class is considered to have potential for criticality if the probability of 
configuration class formation is above the probability screening criterion (Box 8). This criterion 
is used to screen from further consideration configuration classes that contribute insignificantly 
to the total probability of a criticality occurring in the repository during the period of regulatory 
concern. For this analysis, a value of 10-15 is set as the probability screening criterion as utilized 
for SAPHIRE sequence evalutions. This value is the lowest limit that can maintain any 
significant digits with double precision arithmetic on PC hardware. Configuration classes with 
probabilities below this cutoff threshold have a negligible contribution to the total probability per 
package of criticality and are discarded. The reactivity of configuration classes with 
probabilities above the cutoff threshold are assessed (Box 9). If the reactivity of the 

configuration class satisfies the criticality acceptance criterion, i.e., its keff range does not exceed 
the critical limit (Box 10), then this configuration class does not have any criticality potential and 
is discarded. The probability of criticality (Box 11), derived from the probability values of the 
range of configuration class parameters, is evaluated only for configuration classes that exceed 
the criticality potential criterion, i.e., have a keff range exceeding the critical limit for the waste 
form. 
After establishing the inputs for waste package/waste form combinations, the configuration 
generator has the capability of processing all waste package/waste form combinations 
individually or as a group (Boxes 7 through 15). The analysis results are not impacted by the 
processing method. Once all waste package/waste form combinations are evaluated, the 
probabilities from the individual waste package/waste form configuration classes are summed to 
obtain the total probability per package of criticality for the regulatory period (Box 16). The 
total probability of criticality is then compared to the design probability criterion of one chance 
of occurring during the regulatory period (Box 17). If the total probability of criticality is equal 
to or exceeds the design probability criterion, then a redesign of the waste package or other 
components is necessary (Box 23) to reduce the total probability of criticality and meet the 
design probability criterion. 
If the total probability per package of criticality is less than the design probability criterion, the 
total probability is then compared to the regulatory probability criterion for inclusion of events 
established in 10 CFR 60.114(d) [DIRS 156605] as one chance in 10,000 of occurring during the 
10,000-year regulatory period (Box 18). If the total probability per package is less than the 
regulatory probability criterion, then the repository design is acceptable (Box 22). The criticality 
evaluations are then complete and criticality excluded from further evaluation in the TSPA. 
Otherwise, it is necessary to perform criticality consequence evaluations (Box 19) for the 
development of additional radionuclide source terms for inclusion in the TSPA (Box 20). 

Figure 1-1. Overview of Approach to the Disposal Criticality Analysis Methodology 

2. QUALITY ASSURANCE
Technical Work Plan for: Criticality Department Work Packages ACRM01 and NSN002 (BSC 
2004 [DIRS 166964], Section 8) determined that the development of this analysis report and the 
associated activities are subject to Quality Assurance Requirements and Description (DOE 2004 
[DIRS 171539]). This report contributes to the analysis and modeling used to support 
performance assessment. This analysis report investigates the performance of the following 
natural and engineered barriers that are important to waste isolation: 
 
Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Cladding 
 
DOE and Commercial Waste Packages 
 
Emplacement Drift Invert 
 
Drip Shield 
 
Saturated Zone (between the repository and the accessible environment) 
 
Surface Topography, Soils and Bedrock 
 
Unsaturated Zone above the Repository 
 
Unsaturated Zone below the Repository 
 
Waste Form. 
Although these barriers are categorized as Safety Category in Q-List (BSC 2004 [DIRS 
171190]), the evaluations and conclusions do not directly impact the features important to safety, 
defined in AP-2.22Q, Classification Analyses and Maintenance of the Q-List. The methods used 
to control the electronic management of data as required by AP-SV.1Q, Control of the Electronic 
Management of Information, are identified in Technical Work Plan for: Criticality Department 
Work Packages ACRM01 and NSN002 (BSC 2004 [DIRS 166964], Section 8). 
Also, in accordance with Technical Work Plan for: Criticality Department Work Packages 
ACRM01 and NSN002 (BSC 2004 [DIRS 166964], Table 1), development of this analysis was 
controlled by AP-SIII.9Q, Scientific Analyses. 

INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

3. USE OF SOFTWARE 
3.1 QUALIFIED AND BASELINE SOFTWARE 
3.1.1 SAPHIRE 
 
Title: SAPHIRE 
 
Version/Revision number: 7.18 
 
Software Tracking Number (STN): 10325-7.18-00 
 
Status/Operating System: Microsoft Windows 2000 Professional 
 
Computer Type: DELL Latitude C640 Laptop PC
Computer processing unit number: CRWMS M&O Tag number 501215
 
Computer Type: DELL OptiPlex GX260 PC
Computer processing unit number: CRWMS M&O Tag number 152369
The software code SAPHIRE V.7.18 (BSC 2002 [DIRS 160873]) was used to develop and 
quantify event trees and fault trees in this analysis. SAPHIRE (Systems Analysis Programs for 
Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations) is a state-of-the-art probabilistic risk analysis 
software program that utilizes an integrated event tree/fault tree methodology to develop and 
analyze the logical interactions that may occur between systems and components to determine 
the probability or frequency of an events occurrence. 
SAPHIRE is qualified software that was obtained from Software Configuration Management. It 
is appropriate for use in the present analysis, and is used only within its range of validation, in 
accordance with LP-SI.11Q-BSC, Software Management. No limitations have been identified 
for the output of these analyses resulting from the use of this software. 
The event trees, fault trees, and logic rules developed for the SAPHIRE calculations are 
documented in Appendix B. All of the electronic files necessary for the performance of the 
SAPHIRE calculation are found in Appendix G (a CD-ROM). The input files in Appendix B 
allow an independent reproduction of the calculations. 
3.2 COMMERCIAL OFF-THE-SHELF SOFTWARE 
The following commercial off-the-shelf software programs were utilized in the criticality FEPS 
screening analysis for the development of the analysis results and conclusions. 
3.2.1 EXCEL 
 
Title: Excel 
 
Version/Revision number: Microsoft Excel 97 SR-2 
 
Status/Operating System: Microsoft Windows 2000 Professional 
 
Computer Type: Latitude C640 Laptop PC
Computer processing unit number: CRWMS M&O Tag number 501215
Microsoft Excel for Windows, Version 97 SR-2, is used in this analysis to manipulate the inputs 
using standard mathematical expressions and operations. It is also used to tabulate and chart 

results. The user-defined formulas, inputs, and results are documented in sufficient detail to 
allow an independent repetition of computations. Thus, Microsoft Excel is used only as a 
worksheet and not as a software routine. Microsoft Excel 97 SR-2 is controlled under the 
Software Configuration Management, but is not required to be qualified as specified in 
Sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.6 of LP-SI.11Q-BSC, Software Management. 
Electronic files of the Excel calculations used in this analysis are found in Appendix G (a CDROM). 
The input files in Appendix G allow an independent reproduction of the calculations. 
3.2.2 MATHCAD 
 
Title: Mathcad 
 
Version/Revision number: Mathsoft Engineering and Education, Inc. Mathcad 2001i 
Professional 
 
Status/Operating System: Microsoft Windows 2000 Professional 
 
Computer Type: DELL OptiPlex GX260 PC 
 
Computer processing unit number: CRWMS M&O Tag number 152369 
Mathcad for Windows 2000, Version 2001i Professional, is a problem-solving environment 
used in calculations and analyses. It is also used to tabulate and chart results. The user-defined 
expressions, inputs, and results are documented in sufficient detail to allow an independent 
repetition of computations. Thus, Mathcad is used as a worksheet and not as a software routine. 
Mathcad is controlled under the Software Configuration Management, but is not required to be 
qualified as specified in Sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.6 of LP-SI.11Q-BSC. 
Input and output files for the various Mathcad calculations are documented in Appendices C 
and D. The electronic files of these calculations are found in Appendix G (a CD-ROM). The 
input files in Appendix G allow an independent reproduction of the calculations. 

4. INPUTS
AP-3.15Q, Managing Technical Product Inputs, categorizes technical product input usage as 
either direct input or indirect input. Direct input is used to develop the results or conclusions in a 
technical product. Indirect input is used to provide additional information that is not used in the 
development of results or conclusions. Direct inputs are addressed in this Section. Indirect 
inputs are addressed in Section 6.1.3. 
Section 4.1 identifies all direct inputs used in this report. The direct inputs were obtained from 
controlled source documents and other appropriate sources in accordance with the controlling 
procedure AP-3.15Q, Managing Technical Product Inputs. Section 4.2 identifies the FEP 
screening criteria described in 10 CFR Part 63 [DIRS 156605] along with the regulatory derived 
FEP screening criteria. Section 4.3 identifies codes and standards applicable to the criticality 
FEPs screening analysis. 
4.1 DIRECT INPUTS 
The following sections present the direct inputs used to perform the criticality FEPs screening 
analysis. Use of these data is justified as they are extracted from qualified project sources and 
their application is compatible with their developed purpose and limitations. 
4.1.1 Configuration Generator Event Trees 
This report utilizes event tree structures from the Configuration Generator Model (BSC 2004 
[DIRS 168552]) to perform probability evaluations to support the criticality FEPs screening 
analysis. The qualified data necessary to develop the event tree probability values are presented 
throughout Section 4.1. The probability values are developed and evaluated in Sections 6.3 
through 6.6. Documentation of the event tree structures used in the criticality FEPs screening 
analysis is provided in Section 6.2 and Appendix B. 
4.1.2 Seepage Rate Information 
The seepage rate is determined from the inputs discussed in the Abstraction of Drift Seepage 
(BSC 2004 [DIRS 169131], Section 6.7.1.1, [TBV-6630]). The seepage flux is a function of 
three parameters: capillary strength (1/a), permeability (k), and adjusted percolation flux (qperc,ff). 
The values for each of these parameters will be discussed. 
Capillary strength (1/a) is developed into two separate distributions, one to account for spatial 
variability and the second to account for uncertainty (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169131], Section 6.7.1.1, 
[TBV-6630]). The spatial variability follows a uniform distribution with a mean of 591 Pa, a 
lower bound of 402 Pa, and an upper bound of 780 Pa. The uncertainty [.(1/a)] is represented 
by a triangular distribution with a mean of 0.0 Pa, a lower bound of -105 Pa, and an upper bound 
of 105 Pa. These distributions are applicable for all geologic repository zones. 
Permeability (k) is developed into two separate distributions, one to account for spatial 
variability and the other to account for uncertainty. The spatial variability for permeability was 
statistically analyzed using log-transformed data and found to follow a lognormal distribution (in 

log 10) (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169131], Section 6.7.1.1, [TBV-6630]). The uncertainty (.k) follows 
a triangular distribution. Depending on the geologic repository zone, there are different values 
for the lognormal distribution and the triangular distribution (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169131], 
Section 6.7.1.1, [TBV-6630]). 
Lithophysal zone: 
Lognormal distribution mean is -11.5 and standard deviation is 0.47 (in log 10). 
Triangular distribution mean is 0.0, lower bound is -0.92, and upper bound is 0.92. 
Nonlithophysal zone: 
Lognormal distribution mean is -12.2 and standard deviation is 0.34 (in log 10). 
Triangular distribution mean is 0.0, lower bound is -0.68, and upper bound is 0.68. 
The percolation flux for the glacial transition climate used in this analysis is from 
DTN: LB0310AMRU0120.002 [DIRS 166116] and is based on the percolation in the repository 
area only (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169131], Figure 6.6-10, [TBV-6630]). The percolation flux for the 
glacial transition climate is described using three different scenarios (i.e., lower bound, mean, 
and upper-bound), which are used in this analysis. The probability associated with the three 
different percolation flux scenarios are 0.24, 0.41, and 0.35 for the lower bound, mean, and upper 
bound, respectively (BSC 2003 [DIRS 165991], Section 7, Table 7-1). These probabilities are 
based on the glacial transition climate excluding the contingency area. 
The seepage rate at the drift is then determined from lookup tables based on the three key 
parameters discussed above. The seepage rates are obtained through interpolation given a 
capillary strength (1/a), permeability (k), and adjusted percolation flux (qperc,ff). The seepage 
rates are from DTN: LB0304SMDCREV2.002 [DIRS 163687] for nondegraded drifts and 
DTN: LB0307SEEPDRCL.002 [DIRS 164337] for degraded drifts. The seepage rates are 
adjusted to account for uncertainty. The uncertainty is a factor that follows a uniform 
distribution having a mean of 0.0 with lower- and upper bound values of ( m 3 ), respectively. 
4.1.3 Mean Annual Seismic Exceedance Frequency Range and Time of Seismic Event 
The range of mean annual seismic exceedance frequencies is obtained from 
DTN: MO0409SPACALSS.005, [DIRS 171833], [TBV-6787], which follows a log-uniform 
distribution. The mean annual seismic exceedance frequency of concern to the criticality FEPs 
analysis ranges from 10-8 to 10-4 per year. The time of occurrence of a seismic event ranges from 
repository closure through the regulatory period. This range is uniformly distributed from 1 year 
to 10,000 years (DTN: MO0409SPACALSS.005, [DIRS 171833], [TBV-6787]). 

4.1.4 
Reserved for Future Use 
4.1.5 
Reserved for Future Use 
4.1.6 
Reserved for Future Use 
4.1.7 
Waste Package and Drip Shield Fabrication Error Probabilities 
Waste package and drip shield fabrication and closure process error probabilities have been 
obtained from Analysis of Mechanisms for Early Waste Package/Drip Shield Failure (BSC 2004 
[DIRS 170024], Table 22). The waste package and drip shield fabrication and closure process 
error probabilities used in this analysis are presented in Table 4.1-1. 
Source: Analysis of Mechanisms for Early Waste Package/Drip Shield Fairlure (BSC 2004 [DIRS 170024],
Table 22)
NOTES: Itemized drip shield fabrication defects have non-zero rate and probability values assigned but such 
defects have no consequences with respect to criticality. No advective flow onto waste packages results 
from such defects (Section 6.3.3.1.3). 
It should be noted that one of the recommendations for modeling waste package damage due to 
improper heat treatment (grouped with improper laser peening and waste package damaged by 
mishandling) is to consider the entire waste package surface to be affected (BSC 2004 [DIRS 
170024], Section 6.4.8). 
Defect probabilities as given in Table 4.1-1 have been translated in failure probabilities through 
degradation analyses in WAPDEG Analysis of Waste Package and Drip Shield Degradation 
(BSC 2004 [DIRS 169996]). This analysis calculated a probability of 0.17 of having at least one 
early waste package failure (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169996], Section 6.4.12). 
4.1.8 Emplacement Drift Information 
Emplacement drift information is required to properly assign seepage information to the two 
geologic zones  lithophysal and nonlithophysal. The lithophysal and nonlithophysal fractional 
Table 4.1-1. Defect Types to Consider for Waste Package and Drip Shield Performance 
Waste Package Defect Type Evaluation of Probability per Waste Package 
Weld flaws See Table 11 through Table 13 of Analysis of Mechanisms for Early 
Waste Package/Drip Shield Failure (BSC 2004 [DIRS 170024]) 
Improper heat treatment grouped wimproper laser peening and waste 
package damaged by mishandling 
ith 
Lognormal distribution: 
Median = 7.2  10-6 per waste package 
Mean = 2.8  10-5 per waste package 
error factor = 15 
upper truncation value = 7.44213  10-3 per waste package 
Drip Shield Defect Type Main Characteristics 
Weld flaws Mean number of flaws: 4.1 per drip shield 
Mean size of flaw: 1.3 mm 
Base metal flaws See Table 18 of Analysis of Mechanisms for Early Waste Package/Drip 
Shield Failure (BSC 2004 [DIRS 170024]) 
Improper heat treatment Mean probability: 1.3  10-5 per drip shield 
Damage by mishandling Mean probability: 4.8  10-7 per drip shield 

areas are calculated by dividing the emplacement drift area of both geological zones by the total 
drift area. The drift emplacement area by geological unit is found in Table 8 of D&E / PA/C IED 
Subsurface Facilities (BSC 2004 [DIRS 168370]). This information is summarized in 
Table 4.1-2. 
Source: D&E / PA/C IED Subsurface Facilities (BSC 2004 [DIRS 168370], Table 8) 
4.1.9 Waste Package Population 
Table 4.1-3 presents the percent breakdown of waste package by type for the 70,000 MTHM 
limit established for disposal in the MGR. This information is obtained from Configuration 
Generator Model (BSC 2004 [DIRS 168552], Table 6-2, [TBV-6629]). It forms the basis for the 
assignment of the basic event values for the waste form and waste package type fractions of 
event tree WP_TYPE (Appendix B). 
4.1.10 Drip Shield Emplacement Error 
Drip shield emplacement errors have been obtained from Analysis of Mechanisms for Early 
Waste Package/Drip Shield Failure (BSC 2004 [DIRS 170024], Sections 6.3.7). The sequence 
of events and their products follow a log-normal distribution. The calculation shows that, 
although an improperly placed drip shield in the repository to be a probable event, it does not 
result in an advective flow path through the drip shield and onto the waste package (BSC 2004 
[DIRS 170024], Section 6.4.7). The emplacement error probabilities used in this analysis are 
presented in Table 4.1-4. 
Table 4.1-2. Drift Emplacement Area by Geological Unit 
Geological Unit Drift Emplacement Area 
(square meters) Reference 
Tptpul (lithophysal) 224,398 BSC 2004 [DIRS 168370], Table 8 
Tptpmn (nonlithophysal) 616,003 BSC 2004 [DIRS 168370], Table 8 
Tptpll (lithophysal) 4,013,268 BSC 2004 [DIRS 168370], Table 8 
Tptpln (nonlithophysal) 129,483 BSC 2004 [DIRS 168370], Table 8 
Total Lithophysal 4,237,666 sum of rows 1 and 3 
Total Nonlithophysal 745,486 sum of rows 2 and 4 
TOTAL 4,983,152 sum of rows 5 and 6 

Source: a Configuration Generator Model (BSC 2004 [DIRS 168552, Table 6-2, [TBV-6629]) 
b Reserved for future use 
NOTES: c 21-PWR AP  21-PWR Absorber Plate waste package type 
d 
21-PWR CR  21-PWR Control Rod waste package type 
e 
12-PWR AP  12-PWR Absorber Plate waste package type 
f 
44-BWR AP  44-BWR Absorber Plate waste package type 
g 
24-BWR AP  24-BWR Absorber Plate waste package type 
h 
DOE1  Mixed Oxide (MOX) DOE SNF; representative fuel type  Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) 
I 
DOE2  Uranium-Zirconium Hydride (UzrH) DOE SNF; representative fuel type  TRIGA
j DOE3  Uranium Metal (U-Metal) DOE SNF; representative fuel type  N Reactor
k 
DOE4  High-Enriched Uranium Oxide (HEU Oxide) DOE SNF; representative fuel type  Shippingport PWR 
m DOE5  Uranium/Thorium Oxide (U/Th Oxide) DOE SNF; representative fuel type  Shippingport LWBR 
n 
DOE6  Uranium/Thorium Carbide (U/Th Carbide) DOE SNF; representative fuel type  Fort St. Vrain 
o 
DOE7  Aluminum Based DOE SNF; representative fuel type  Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) 
p 
DOE8  Uranium-Zirconium/Uranium-Molybdenum (U-Zr/U-Mo) Alloy DOE SNF; representative fuel type  
Enrico Fermi 
q 
DOE9  Low-Enriched Uranium Oxide (LEU Oxide) DOE SNF; representative fuel type  Three Mile Island II 
(TMI II) 
r 
NNPP  Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program 
s 
5-DHLW/DOE Short waste package type 
t 
5-DHLW/DOE Long waste package type 
u 
2-MCO/2-DHLW waste package type 
Table 4.1-3. Breakdown of 70,000 MTHM Emplacement Inventory by Waste Package Type 
Waste 
Package 
Number 
Waste Package 
Type 
Number of 
Waste 
Packages a 
Fraction of 
Total 
Inventory 
Number of 
Waste 
Packages 
Fraction of 
Total 
Inventory 
Number of 
Waste 
Packages 
Fraction of Total 
Inventory 
1 21-PWR AP c 4,299 0.3821 
4,557 0.4051 
7,472 0.66418 
2 21-PWR CR d 95 0.0084 
3 12-PWR AP e 163 0.0145 
4 44-BWR AP f 2,831 0.2516 
2,915 0.2591 
5 24-BWR AP g 84 0.0075 
6 DOE1-S h,s 5 0.0004 
66 0.0059 
3,478 0.30916 
7 DOE1-L h,t 61 0.0054 
8 DOE2-S i,s 165 0.0147 165 0.0147 
9 DOE3-S j,s 16 0.0014 
240 0.0213 10 DOE3-L j,t 4 0.0004 
11 DOE3-MCO j,u 220 0.0196 
12 DOE4-S k,s 655 0.0582 
697 6.0020 
13 DOE4-L k,t 42 0.0037 
14 DOE5-S m,s 20 0.0018 
93 0.0083 
15 DOE5-L m,t 73 0.0065 
16 DOE6-L n,t 605 0.0538 605 0.538 
17 DOE7-S o,s 1,226 0.1090 
1,227 0.1091 
18 DOE7-L o,t 1 0.0001 
19 DOE8-S p,s 14 0.0012 
33 0.0029 
20 DOE8-L p,t 19 0.0017 
21 DOE9-S q,s 8 0.0007 
352 0.0313 
22 DOE9-L q,t 344 0.0306 
23 NNPP-S r,s 144 0.0128 
300 0.0267 300 0.02667 
24 NNPP-L r,t 156 0.0139 
Totals 11,250 1.0000 11,250 1.0000 11,250 1.00000 

Source: Analysis of Mechanisms for Early Waste Package/Drip Shield Failure (BSC 2004 
[DIRS 170024], Section 6.3.7) 
4.1.11 Probability of Igneous Events 
Eruptive and intrusive igneous events occur with a probability distribution characterized by a 
mean frequency of 1.710-8/yr as stated in Characterize Framework for Igneous Activity at 
Yucca Mountain, Nevada (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169989], Table 7-1, [TBV-6652]). Given an 
igneous intrusion into the repository, the conditional probability that one or more eruptive 
centers will form within the repository boundary is estimated as 0.78 (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169989], 
Table 7-1, [TBV-6652]), or a frequency of 1.310-8 per year. The number of eruptive centers of 
intersecting the repository ranges from zero to 13 with one being the most probable number 
(BSC 2004 [DIRS 169989], Table 6-11, [TBV-6652]). 
The number of waste packages damaged by a system of eruptive conduits is treated as a joint 
probability, dependent on both the number of conduits and the diameter of the conduits in 
Number of Waste Packages Hit by Igneous Intrusion (BSC 2004 [DIRS 170001], Section 6.4, 
[TBV-6691]). This analysis concludes that the median number of waste packages hit by 
conduits is approximately six (BSC 2004 [DIRS 170001], Section 7.2, [TBV-6691]). The 
median number of waste packages damaged is 1612 (BSC 2004 [DIRS 170001], Table 5, [TBV6691]). 
4.1.12 Longevity of Invert Material 
A majority of the drift and invert non-tuff structures are either carbon or alloy steel (BSC 2004 
[DIRS 169776]) that have a high corrosion rate. Corrosion tests in humid-air environments 
indicated that the longevity of these materials could be on the order of 300 years (BSC 2001 
[DIRS 155667], Section 7.2), depending upon the thickness of the corrosion-allowance material. 
The actual longevity of the invert material is assumed to be 1000 years (Assumption 5.2.5) since 
not filling voids in the invert with corrosion products is conservative. 
Table 4.1-4. Probability of Drip Shield Emplacement Error 
Event Event Probability 
Failure to properly interlock adjacent drip shields 
Mean = 3.75 10-3 
Median = 3.0 10-3 
Error factor = 3 
Operator fails to detect gap between two 
improperly placed drip shields 
Mean = 2.50  10-3 
Median = 2.0 10-3 
Error factor = 3 
Mean = 9.3  10-6 
Median = 6.0 10-6 
Combined probability per drip shield Error factor = 4.7 
5th percentile = 1.3  10-6 
95th percentile = 12.8  10-5 

4.1.13 Probabilities for Waste Package/Waste Form Handling Errors 
A waste paeckag selection error during loading operations can occur where a 21PWR Control 
Rod waste package is utilized in place of a 21PWR Absorber Plate waste package since both 
waste package types are identical in size and configuration. The only difference between them is 
that the basket assembly of the 21PWR Control Rod waste package does not contain any 
neutron absorber material. Misloading errors can occur by incorrectly placing waste form into a 
waste package (or DOE standardized SNF canister) not designed for that waste form during the 
preclosure loading process. The probability values assigned to these errors are listed in 
Table 4.1-5. 
Source: Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuels Waste Package Misload Analysis (BSC 2003 [DIRS 
166316]): 
abTable 11, Sequences 13C and 24C 
Table 41 
c 
dTable 11, Sequences 18C, 20C, 29C, and 31C 
Table 41 
e Section 7 
4.1.14 Probability for Selection of Improper Material 
The possibility exists that the manufacturer could inadvertently select a material that does not 
have any neutron absorbing properties during the manufacturing of the neutron absorber material 
for the waste form container (either a waste package or a DOE standardized SNF canister). 
Analysis of similar type events has been performed for weld and base metal materials in Analysis 
of Mechanisms of Early Waste Package/Drip Shield Failure (BSC 2003 [DIRS 170024], 
Section 6.2.3). The results of this evaluation were that that use of improper materials followed a 
log-normal distribution with a median probability of 3.510-5 and an error factor of 2.3. 
4.1.15 Probability of Human Error 
Human factor errors have been estimated in Handbook of Human Reliability Analysis with 
Emphasis on Nuclear Power Plant Applications Final Report (Swain and Guttmann 1983 
[DIRS 139383]). The relevant ones for this FEP screening process are as follows: (1) selection 
of the wrong basket material, (2) mislabeling of the waste package prior to shipping, (3) failure 
to correctly perform field measurements of material composition prior to the loading of the waste 
form, (4) failure to insert the neutron absorber materials for either commercial PWR SNF or 
Table 4.1-5. Probability of Waste Package Handling Errors 
Waste Package Type Event Event Probability 
21-PWR Absorber Plate Waste Package 
21-PWR Control Rod Waste Packagea 
Improper Waste 
Package Selection 1.394 10-6 
21-PWR Absorber Plate Waste Packageb Misload 1.18  10-5 
21-PWR Control Rod Waste Packagec Misload 4.374 10-8 
44-BWR Absorber Plate Waste Packaged Misload 1.73  10-5 
12-PWR Absorber Plate Waste Packagee Misload 0.0 
24-BWR Absorber Plate Waste Packagee Misload 0.0 

DOE standardized SNF canisters, (5) failure to identify missing neutron absorber materials as the 
waste form is loaded and the container sealed, and (6) failure to identify misloaded DOE 
standardized SNF canisters prior to sealing the canisters. The probabilities associated with these 
errors are given in Table 4.1-6. 
Source: Handbook of Human Reliability Analysis with Emphasis on Nuclear Power Plant Applications Final 
Report (Swain and Guttmann 1983 [DIRS 139383]): 
a Table 20-12, Item 2 
b Table 20-10, Item 9 
c Table 20-10, Item 2 
d Table 20-7, Item 4 
4.2 CRITERIA 
This section addresses the criteria relevant to the FEP screening process. These criteria stem from 
the applicable regulations of 10 CFR Part 63 [DIRS 156605], as identified in the Project 
Requirements Document (PRD) (Canori and Leitner 2003 [DIRS 166275]). These criteria are 
expanded upon and expressed as specific NRC acceptance criteria in Yucca Mountain Review Plan, 
Final Report (NRC 2003, [DIRS 163274], Sections 2.2.1.2.1.3 and 2.2.1.2.2.3). 
4.2.1 Projects Requirements Document 
The Project Requirements Document (Canori and Leitner 2003 [DIRS 166275]) documents and 
categorizes the regulatory requirements and other project requirements and provides a crosswalk to 
the various YMP organizations that are responsible for ensuring that the criteria have been addressed 
in the License Application. The regulatory requirements include criteria relevant to performance 
assessment activities, in general, and to FEP-related activities as they pertain to performance 
assessment, in particular. Table 4.2-1 provides a listing of the requirements from Project 
Requirements Document (Canori and Leitner 2003 [DIRS 166275]) that are applicable to the 
criticality FEPs screening analysis and how this document addresses these requirements. 
Table 4.1-6. Probability of Occurrence for Human Factor Errors 
Potential Error Description Error Category Probability/Error Factor 
Select the wrong basket material Select wrong control identified by 
labels onlya 
Median = 3.0  10-3 
Error Factor = 3.0 
Mislabel the waste package prior to 
shipping 
Error in reading and recording 
quantitative informationb 
Median = 1.0  10-3 
Error Factor = 3.0 
Incorrectly perform field 
measurements of waste form Failure to correctly read digital Median = 1.0  10-3 
composition prior to the loading readoutc Error Factor = 3.0 
container 
Failure to insert the neutron absorber 
materials as required 
Failure to correctly follow procedure 
without a checkoff list or long list used 
incorrectlyd 
Median = 1.0  10-2 
Error Factor = 3.0 
Failure to identify missing neutron 
absorber materials as the waste form 
is loaded and the container sealed 
Failure to correctly read digital 
readoutc 
Median = 1.0  10-3 
Error Factor = 3.0 
Failure to identify misloaded DOE 
standardized SNF canisters prior to 
sealing 
Failure to correctly read digital 
readoutc 
Median = 1.0  10-3 
Error Factor = 3.0 

4.2.2 Yucca Mountain Review Plan (YMRP) 
The bases for the NRC review of the License Application and its acceptance are described in Yucca 
Mountain Review Plan, Final Report (NRC 2003 [DIRS 163274]). The FEP-related acceptance 
criteria and how this document addresses these criteria are presented in Table 4.2-2. The acceptance 
criteria for FEP screening echo the regulatory screening criteria of low probability and low 
consequence, but also allow for exclusion of a FEP if the process is specifically excluded by the 
regulations (refer to Section 4.2.3). 

ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01 4-10 October 2004 
Table 4.2-1. Applicable Project Requirements 
Requirement 
Number and Title Requirement Text Rationale for Requirement How Requirement Addressed 
Regulation 10 CFR 63.114 [DIRS 156605] specifies technical 
requirements to be used in a performance assessment to 
demonstrate compliance to 10 CFR 63.113 [DIRS 156605]. It 
includes requirements for calculations, including data related to site 
PRD-002/T-015a 
For complete requirement 
geology, hydrology, and geochemistry; the need to account for 
uncertainties and variabilities in model parameters; the need to This report provides the technical bases for 
Requirements for text, refer to 10 CFR 63.114 consider alternative conceptual models; and technical bases for excluding criticality FEPs. The technical 
Performance [DIRS 156605] inclusion or exclusion of specific features, events, and processes basis is provided in Section 6.8. 
Assessment (FEPs); deterioration or degradation processes of engineered 
barriers; and all the models used in the performance assessment. 
The Performance Assessment organization is responsible for 
developing and using TSPA calculations, methods, models, and 
processes that comply with the requirements of this section. 
PRD-002/T-034b 
Limits on 
Performance 
Assessments 
For complete requirement 
text, refer to 10 CFR 63.342 
[DIRS 156605] 
This section states that the license applicant's performance 
assessments should not include very unlikely FEPs, defined as 
those that are estimated to have less than one chance in 10,000 of 
occurring within 10,000 years of disposal. Furthermore, this section 
states that the performance assessments need not evaluate the 
impacts of sequences of FEPs with a higher chance of occurrence if 
the results of the earlier performance assessments would not be 
changed significantly. The Performance Assessment organization is 
responsible for incorporating these limits on performance 
assessments into its analytical models, methods, and activities. 
This report provides the screening so as to 
not include very unlikely FEPs, defined as 
those that are estimated to have less than 
one chance in 10,000 of occurring within 
10,000 years after closure, in the 
performance assessments. The screening is 
provided in Section 6.8. 
PRD-013/T-016c 
DOE SNF Canister 
Criticality Potential 
Postclosure 
The methodology defined in 
the Disposal Criticality 
Analysis Methodology 
Topical Report (YMP 2003 
[DIRS 165505]) shall be 
used to demonstrate 
acceptable criticality control 
for canisters and the waste 
packages in which they are 
disposed. 
This requirement specifies the method by which acceptable criticality 
control is demonstrated for the [DOE standardized SNF] canisters 
and the waste packages for postclosure. 
This report documents the partial 
implementation of the methodology from 
Disposal Criticality Analysis Methodology 
Topical Report (YMP 2003 [DIRS 165505]). 
The complete methodology is not used 
because the partial application excludes 
criticality. The implementation is provided in 
Sections 6.2 through 6.7 

Source: Canori and Leitner 2003 [DIRS 166275] 
a
NOTES: Requirement basis is 10 CFR 63.114 and 63.113 [DIRS 156605] and YMP-RD 3.3.4.19 (YMP 2001 [DIRS 156713]) 
b 
Requirement basis is 10 CFR 63.342 [DIRS 156605] 
c 
Requirement basis is WASRD 4.3.12.B (DOE 2002 [DIRS 158873]) 
d 
Requirement basis is WASRD 4.4.13.B (DOE 2002 [DIRS 158873]) 
e 
Requirement basis is WASRD 4.5.13.B (DOE 2002 [DIRS 158873]) 
f 
Although Requirement Text references the NNPP addendum (Mowbray 1999 [DIRS 149585]), this document is to be superceded by 
NNPPs Technical Support Document for the License Application (McKenzie 2004 [DIRS 170742]) 
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01 4-11 October 2004 
Table 4.2-1. Applicable Project Requirements (Continued) 
The methodology defined in 
the NNPP addendum 
PRD-013/T-023d 
Naval SNF 
Canister Criticality 
Potential 
Postclosure 
(Mowbray 1999 [DIRS 
149585]) to the Disposal 
Criticality Analysis 
Methodology Topical 
Report (YMP 2003 [DIRS 
165505]) shall be used to 
demonstrate acceptable 
criticality control for 
canisters and the waste 
The methodology in the NNPP addendum demonstrates the method 
by which acceptable postclosure criticality control is demonstrated 
for the waste packages with NNPP canisters. NNPP is directly 
responsible for completing the postclosure in-package criticality 
analysis of naval SNF waste packages and supplying the results to 
DOE. NNPP will also provide the results of the fissile material loss 
from waste packages source term calculations to the DOE for any 
out-of-package criticality analyses that may be needed. 
The methodology in the NNPP Technical 
Support Document for the License 
Application (Mckenzie 2004 [DIRS 
170742]) applies to naval SNF in lieu of the 
methodology provided in this report. 
packages in which they are 
disposed.f 
PRD-013/T-038e 
Disposable 
Commercial- Origin 
DOE SNF Canister 
Criticality Potential 
Postclosure 
The methodology defined in 
the Disposal Criticality 
Analysis Methodology 
Topical Report (YMP 2003 
[DIRS 165505]) shall be 
used to demonstrate 
acceptable criticality control 
for canisters and the waste 
packages in which they are 
disposed. 
The methodology in the Topical Report demonstrates the method by 
which acceptable postclosure criticality control is demonstrated for 
canisters and waste packages in a repository. 
This report documents the partial 
implementation of the methodology from 
Disposal Criticality Analysis Methodology 
Topical Report (YMP 2003 [DIRS 165505]). 
The complete methodology is not used 
because the partial application excludes 
criticality. The implementation is provided in 
Sections 6.2 through 6.7 

ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01 4-12 October 2004 
Table 4.2-2. Relevant Yucca Mountain Review Plan Acceptance Criteria 
YMRP Section Acceptance Criterion Description How Addressed in this Analysis Report 
Acceptance Criterion 1: 
The Identification of a List 
of Features, Events, and 
Processes Is Adequate. 
(1) The Safety Analysis Report contains a complete list of features, 
events and processes, related to the geologic setting or the 
degradation, deterioration, or alteration of engineered barriers 
(including those processes that would affect the performance of 
natural barriers) that have the potential to influence repository 
performance. The list is consistent with the site characterization 
data. Moreover, the comprehensive features, events, and 
processes list includes, but is not limited to, potentially disruptive 
events related to igneous activity (extrusive and intrusive); seismic 
shaking (high-frequency-low-magnitude, and rare large-magnitude 
events); tectonic evolution (slip on existing faults and formation of 
new faults); climatic change (change to pluvial conditions); and 
criticality. 
(1) The list of criticality FEPs and FEP 
descriptions are provided in Section 1.2. 
See Section 6.1.1 of this analysis report 
for a description and origin of the 
criticality FEP list and descriptions. 
This analysis report does not address 
climatic change. 
Scenario 
Analysis and 
Event 
Probability: 
(1) The U.S. Department of Energy has identified all features, events, 
and processes related to either the geologic setting or to the 
degradation, deterioration, or alteration of engineered barriers 
(including those processes that would affect the performance of 
natural barriers) that have been excluded 
(1) See Table 7.2-1 for a list of excluded 
criticality FEPs. 
(2) The U.S. Department of Energy has provided justification for those 
Scenario Analysis 
(NRC 2003 [DIRS 
163274], Section 
2.2.1.2.1.3) Acceptance Criterion 2: 
features, events, and processes that have been excluded. An 
acceptable justification for excluding features, events, and 
processes is that either the feature, event, and process is 
specifically excluded by regulation; probability of the feature, 
event, and process (generally an event) falls below the regulatory 
criterion; or omission of the feature, event, and process does not 
(2) See the method and approach 
discussion provided in Section 6.1.2 
and the individual justification (by 
regulation, low probability, low 
consequence) for excluding FEPs. The 
Screening of the List of 
Features, Events, and 
Processes Is Appropriate. 
significantly change the magnitude and time of the resulting 
radiological exposures to the reasonably maximally exposed 
individual, or radionuclide releases to the accessible environment; 
and 
justification is also included in 
Table 7.2-1. 
(3) The U.S. Department of Energy has provided an adequate 
technical basis for each feature, event, and process, excluded 
from the performance assessment, to support the conclusion that 
either the feature, event, or process is specifically excluded by 
regulation; the probability of the feature, event, and process falls 
below the regulatory criterion; or omission of the feature, event, 
and process does not significantly change the magnitude and time 
of the resulting radiological exposures to the reasonably 
maximally exposed individual, or radionuclide releases to the 
(3) See Section 6.8 for discussion of the 
individual FEP screening arguments 
and supporting technical bases. 
accessible environment. 

ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01 4-13 October 2004 
Table 4.2-2. Relevant Yucca Mountain Review Plan Acceptance Criteria (Continued) 
YMRP Section Acceptance Criterion Description How Addressed in this Analysis Report 
Acceptance Criterion 1: 
(1) Events or event classes are defined without ambiguity and 
used consistently in probability models, such that probabilities 
for each event or event class are estimated separately; and. 
(1) See the FEP description provided for each 
FEP in Section 6.8. 
Events Are Adequately 
Defined. 
(2) Probabilities of intrusive and extrusive igneous events are 
calculated separately. Definitions of faulting and earthquakes 
are derived from the historical record, paleoseismic studies, 
or geological analyses. Criticality events are calculated 
separately by location. 
(2) Probabilities associated with seismic and 
igneous disruptive events are taken into 
account in the criticality FEPs analyses of 
Sections 6.4 and 6.6, respectively. 
Scenario 
Analysis and 
Event 
Probability: 
Acceptance Criterion 2: 
Probability Estimates for 
Future Events Are 
Supported by Appropriate 
Technical Bases. 
(1) Probabilities for future natural events have considered past 
patterns of the natural events in the Yucca Mountain region, 
considering the likely future conditions and interactions of the 
natural and engineered repository system. These probability 
estimates have specifically included igneous events, faulting 
and seismic events, and criticality events. 
(1) Probabilities associated with seismic and 
igneous disruptive events (including faulting) 
are taken into account in the criticality FEPs 
analyses of Sections 6.4 and 6.6, 
respectively. 
Identification of 
Events with 
Probability 
Greater than 10-8 
per Year 
(NRC 2003 [DIRS 
163274], Section 
2.2.1.2.2.3) Acceptance Criterion 5: 
Uncertainty in Event 
Probability Is Adequately 
Evaluated 
(1) Probability values appropriately reflect uncertainties. 
Specifically: 
(a) The U.S. Department of Energy provides a technical 
basis for probability values used, and the values account 
for the uncertainty in the probability estimates; and 
(a) The uncertainty for reported probability values 
adequately reflects the influence of parameter 
uncertainty on the range of model results (i.e., precision) 
and the model uncertainty, as it affects the timing and 
magnitude of past events (i.e., accuracy). 
(1) The report addresses uncertainty in 
probability values by accounting for 
uncertainty in the model outputs used to 
develop the probability values. The 
uncertainty in model outputs used to develop 
probabilities is discussed in Section 6.4. 
Specifically: 
(a) The report provides a technical basis 
for probability values used (Sections 
6.3 through 6.6 and Appendix C), and 
the values account for the uncertainty 
in the probability estimates 
(b) The uncertainties are not reported 
separately for probability values. The 
probability values are based on results 
that incorporate the parameter 
uncertainty from the model results and 
model uncertainty. 

4.2.3 FEPs Screening Criteria 
The criteria for determining low probability, low consequence, or by regulation exclusions are 
described below. 
4.2.3.1 Low Probability 
The low-probability criterion is stated in 10 CFR 63.114(d) [DIRS 156605]: 
Consider only events that have at least one chance in 10,000 of occurring over 
10,000 years. 
and supported by 10 CFR 63.342 [DIRS 156605]: 
The Department of Energys (DOE) performance assessments shall not include 
consideration of very unlikely features, events, or processes, i.e., those that are 
estimated to have less than one chance in 10,000 of occurring within 10,000 years 
of disposal. 
10
As noted in Assumption 5.1.18, the low-probability criterion for very unlikely events 
corresponds to an annual exceedance probability of 10-8 over the 10,000-year regulatory period 
for naturally occurring, time-independent FEPs. For time-dependent FEPs, such as criticality, 
the regulation [10 CFR 63.114(d)] is also expressed as a total probability criterion equivalent to 
-4 for the 10,000-year regulatory period. 
4.2.3.2 Low Consequence 
The low consequence criterion is stated in 10 CFR 63.114 (e and f) [DIRS 156605]: 
(e) 
Provide the technical basis for either inclusion or exclusion of specific 
features, events, and processes in the performance assessment. Specific 
features, events, and processes must be evaluated in detail if the 
magnitude and time of the resulting radiological exposures to the 
reasonably maximally exposed individual, or radionuclide releases to the 
accessible environment, would be significantly changed by their omission. 
(f) 
Provide the technical basis for either inclusion or exclusion of 
degradation, deterioration, or alteration processes of engineered barriers in 
the performance assessment, including those processes that would 
adversely affect the performance of natural barriers. Degradation, 
deterioration, or alteration processes of engineered barriers must be 
evaluated in detail if the magnitude and time of the resulting radiological 
exposures to the reasonably maximally exposed individual, or 
radionuclide releases to the accessible environment, would be significantly 
changed by their omission. 

and supported by 10 CFR 63.342 [DIRS 156605]: 
DOEs performance assessments need not evaluate the impacts resulting from any 
features, events, and processes or sequences of events and processes with a higher 
chance of occurrence if the results of the performance assessments would not be 
changed significantly. 
Some FEPs have a beneficial effect on the TSPA, as opposed to an adverse effect. As identified 
in 10 CFR 63.102(j) [DIRS 156605], the concept of a performance assessment includes that: 
The features, events, and processes considered in the performance assessment 
should represent a wide range of both beneficial and potentially adverse effects on 
performance (e.g., beneficial effects of radionuclide sorption; potentially adverse 
effects of fracture flow or a criticality event). Those features, events, and 
processes expected to materially affect compliance with 10 CFR 63.113(b) [DIRS 
156605] or be potentially adverse to performance are included, while events 
(event classes or scenario classes) that are very unlikely (less than one chance in 
10,000 over 10,000 years) can be excluded from the analysis.  
The Yucca Mountain Review Plan, Final Report (NRC 2003 [DIRS 163274], Section 2.2.1), 
states that: 
In many regulatory applications, a conservative approach can be used to decrease 
the need to collect additional information or to justify a simplified modeling 
approach. Conservative estimates for the dose to the reasonably maximally 
exposed individual may be used to demonstrate that the proposed repository 
meets U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations and provides adequate 
protection of public health and safety. The total system performance 
assessment is a complex analysis with many parameters, and the U.S. Department 
of Energy may use conservative assumptions to simplify its approaches and data 
collection needs. However, a technical basis  must be provided. 
On the basis of these statements, those FEPs that are demonstrated to have only beneficial effects 
on the radiological exposures to the reasonably maximally exposed individual, or radionuclide 
releases to the accessible environment, can be excluded on the basis of low consequence because 
they have no adverse effects on performance. 
4.2.3.3 Regulation 
Yucca Mountain Review Plan, Final Report (NRC 2003 [DIRS 163274], Section 2.2.1.2.1.3, 
Acceptance Criterion 2) allows for exclusion of a FEP if the process is specifically excluded by 
the regulations. To wit: 
The DOE has provided justification for those FEPs that have been excluded. An 
acceptable justification for excluding FEPs is that either the FEP is specifically 
excluded by regulation; probability of the FEP (generally an event) falls below the 
regulatory criterion; or omission of the feature, and process does not significantly 
change the magnitude and time of the resulting radiological exposures to the 

reasonably maximally exposed individual, or radionuclide releases to the 
accessible environment. 
4.3 CODES AND STANDARDS 
The following codes have been cited in this analysis: 
 10 CFR Part 63 [DIRS 156605]. Energy: Disposal of High-Level Radioactive 
Wastes in a Geologic Repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. 
The following standards are applicable to criticality FEPs screening evaluations: 
 ASTM B 932-04. 2004 [DIRS 168403]. Standard Specification for Low-Carbon 
Nickel-Chromium-Molybdenum-Gadolinium Alloy Plate, Sheet, and Strip. 
The following standard, ASTM B 932-04, is used in addition to the those identified in Technical 
Work Plan for: Criticality Department Work Packages ACRM01 and NSN002 (BSC 2004 [DIRS 
166964] because of the TMRB-2004-009 (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169959]) baseline change after 
issuance of BSC 2004 [DIRS 166964]. 

5. ASSUMPTIONS 
5.1 GENERAL CRITICALITY FEPS ANALYSIS ASSUMPTIONS 
The following general assumptions are used in the development of inputs for the criticality FEPs 
screening analysis. 
5.1.1 Waste Package Localized Corrosion Failures 
Assumption: It is assumed that 10 percent of the waste packages fail due to localized corrosion 
processes. 
Rationale: Drip shield failure is defined as drip shield damage, which results in an advective 
flow path through the drip shield and onto the waste package outer barrier. Waste package 
failure is defined as any breach of a waste package, regardless of the mechanism, that can result 
in either a diffusive or advective flow path through the waste package outer barrier. 
The chemistry required to induce localized corrosion, low pH combined with high chloride 
concentrations, is unlikely to exist in large quantities in the repository. These chemistries can 
exist on the waste package by direct seepage onto the waste package or by the presence of dust 
with soluble salts on the waste package, which can cause water condensation. For direct seepage 
onto the waste package, there must be drip shield separation, which only occurs from fault 
displacement during a seismic event. The nominal seepage and dust chemistries are not severe 
enough to cause localized corrosion, as shown in Figures 6.13-4 through 6.13-12 for seepage and 
Figures 6.13-20 through 6.13-23 for dust in Engineered Barriers System: Physical and Chemical 
Environment Model (BSC 2004 [DIRS 170905]). Engineered Barriers System: Physical and 
Chemical Environment Model (BSC 2004 [DIRS 170905], Table 6.13-1) indicates that bin 1 and 
2, the most extreme bins, will not seep into the repository, and bin 3, which has the next most 
extreme chemistry, has less than a 1% probability of occurring. The remaining situation that 
could cause localized corrosion is if the chloride and nitrate from seepage waters were to 
separate as the seepage runs down the outside of the waste package. For such separation to 
occur, the relative humidity (RH) must be below 77% (BSC 2004 [DIRS 170905], Section 
6.11.2). However, once the drift wall has cooled to 100C such that water can seep into the drift, 
the RH surrounding the vast majority of the waste packages is well above 77% as shown in 
Multiscale Thermohydrologic Model (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169565], Section 6.3.13). Therefore, 
though the choice of 10% of the waste packages is somewhat arbitrary, it is likely that the vast 
majority of waste packages will not fail due to localized corrosion. 
Confirmation Status: The actual number of failed waste package outer barriers from localized 
corrosion must be determined from TSPA-LA analyses. Confirmation of this assumption will be 
accomplished through completion and verification of the TSPA-LA analyses that calculate the 
localized corrosion effects on the waste package outer barrier system. 
Use in the Analysis: This assumption is used in Sections 6.3.3.1.3, 6.3.3.1.5, 6.3.3.1.10, 
6.4.1.1.1, 6.4.2.1.10, 6.8.2, 6.8.3, 6.8.4, 6.8.10, and 7.3.2. 

5.1.2 Loading Curves for Commercial SNF Waste Packages 
Assumption: It is assumed that loading curve evaluations for the 21PWR Control Rod, 
12-PWR Absorber Plate, and 24BWR Absorber Plate waste package design variants will 
demonstrate results similar to those obtained for the 21PWR Absorber Plate and 44BWR 
Absorber Plate design variants. 
Rationale: A basic waste package design is used for all commercial waste forms anticipated for 
disposal in the repository, but has a number of variants to accommodate particular waste forms 
(BSC 2004 [DIRS 169472]). The three referenced waste package types are designed to prevent 
criticality for intact and degraded in-package conditions. 
Confirmation Status: This assumption requires confirmation to be provided through completion 
of waste form loading curve evaluations. Demonstration of the no-criticality potential for the 
waste package design variations is through the performance of the loading curve evaluations. 
Use in the Analysis: This assumption is used in Section 6.2. 
5.1.3 Design of Control Rods for the 21PWR Control Rod Waste Package 
Assumption: It is assumed that the 21PWR Control Rod waste package will use zirconium clad, 
boron carbide (B4C) control rods for reactivity control as described in Determination of Waste 
Package Design Configurations (CRWMS M&O 1997 [DIRS 100224], Section 7.3.2). 
Rationale: The control rod design is similar to the referenced zirconium clad B4C rods that 
exhibit low corrosion rates and adequate control characteristics. 
Confirmation Status: This assumption requires confirmation to be provided through completion 
of waste package design. 
Use in the Analysis: This assumption is used in Sections 5.1.6, 6.3.3.1.8, and 7.3.1. 
5.1.4 Probability of Human Error in Waste Package Fabrication 
Assumption: It is assumed that the use of generic human reliability analysis values for 
evaluating fabrication errors, e.g., neutron absorber misloads, generate more limiting (i.e., higher 
probability of failure) results than are expected during actual waste package fabrication. 
Rationale: Generic human reliability analyses, of necessity, include sample distributions in their 
studies of the performance of basic operations that are drawn from a general population. Thus, 
the samples likely include a number of individuals with little or no training on the particular 
processes or operations. Fabrication processes for QA or any other type of manufacturing 
control require training on the processes. Thus, in general, the rate of operational errors for such 
specialized processes are likely to be lower than rates from operations performed by generic 
populations. 
Confirmation Status: This assumption requires confirmation to be provided from fabrication and 
operational training requirements. 

Use in the Analysis: This assumption is used in Section 6.3.3.1.8. 
5.1.5 Receipt of Fabricated Waste Package Components 
Assumption: It is assumed that hardware suppliers may obtain contracts to manufacture both the 
21PWR Absorber Plate and 21PWR Control Rod waste packages. It is further assumed that 
these waste packages will contain the basket assembly within the waste package when received 
at the repository. 
Rationale: Because procurement requirements may not allow segregation of bidders by waste 
package type, it is possible that a manufacturer could fabricate both 21-PWR Absorber plate and 
21-PWR Control rod waste packages. Likewise, in such cases, cost as well as shipping logistics 
would likely be minimized by assembling the internal structures of these waste packages prior to 
shipping. With the same manufacturer fabricating both waste packages, potential misload 
situations can develop through human error and non-recovery processes during the 
manufacturing process. 
Confirmation Status: This assumption requires confirmation to be obtained from procurement 
activities. 
Use in the Analysis: This assumption is used in Section 6.3.3.1.8. 
5.1.6 Degradation of Neutron Absorber Material in the 21PWR Control Rod Waste 
Package 
Assumption: It is assumed that the neutron absorber material in the 21PWR Control Rod waste 
package will not degrade during the regulatory period. 
Rationale: The 21PWR Control Rod waste package is designed for PWR commercial SNF that 
does not meet the loading curve criteria for placement in the 21PWR Absorber Plate waste 
package. The 21PWR Control Rod waste package uses zirconium clad, boron carbide (B4C) 
control rods for reactivity control (CRWMS M&O 1997 [DIRS 100224], Section 7.3.2) 
(Assumption 5.1.3). These control rods are to be inserted into each assembly guide tube location 
prior to waste package loading. The zirconium cladding of the control rods is the same as the 
Zircaloy used for the manufacturing of fuel rod cladding. Under normal conditions, Zircaloyclad 
fuel rods remain intact beyond the regulatory period because Zircaloy cladding is highly 
resistant to corrosion (Hillner, et al. 1998 [DIRS 100455], Abstract). Because the zirconium 
cladding of the control rods is unirradiated and is thicker than the fuel rod cladding, its durability 
and corrosion resistance is expected to be even greater than that of the Zircaloy cladding of the 
fuel rods. In addition, because the zirconium control rod cladding is expected to be thicker than 
fuel pin cladding and the controls are protected by the fuel assembly guide tubes, it is unlikely 
that the control rod cladding is damaged during seismic events. Therefore, it is assumed that the 
neutron absorber materials of the 21PWR Control Rod waste package cannot be flushed from 
the waste package during the regulatory period. 
Confirmation Status: This assumption requires confirmation from analyses that include the 
21-PWR Control Rod waste package. 

Use in the Analysis: This assumption is used in Section 5.1.10 and 7.3.1. 
5.1.7 Waste Form Misload Criticality Potential 
Assumption: It is assumed that the waste package configuration resulting from a waste form 
misload has a criticality potential. The criticality potential of DOE SNF misloads is assumed to 
be 1.00. The criticality potential of commercial SNF misloads is based on the evaluations of the 
possible waste package misload scenarios. 
Rationale: The resulting increase in fissile material that results from the misload of a waste form 
will increase the reactivity of a waste package system. The resulting increase in reactivity will 
increase the potential for criticality of the resulting configuration. Two waste form/waste 
package types have been identified as having the potential for misload  the 21-PWR Absorber 
Plate (BSC 2004 [DIRS 171414]) and the 5-DHLW/DOE Long with MOX DOE SNF (CRWMS 
M&O 1999 [DIRS 125206]). 
Confirmation Status: This assumption requires confirmation to be obtained by completion of 
evaluations of misload potential. 
Use in the Analysis: This assumption is used in Sections 6.4.2.2.10 and 6.4.2.3.6. 
5.1.8 Waste Package Quality Control Inspection 
Assumption: It is assumed that quality control inspections will be performed on fabricated 
components as they arrive at the repository site. These inspections are assumed to include 
examinations, e.g., X-ray spectroscopy, that have the capability for performing quick field 
measurements of material composition. 
Rationale: Although the waste package fabrication processes will be under a quality control 
procedure, there is still the possibility of failures to perform the operations correctly. The quality 
control inspection at the point of receipt will help minimize the probability of incorrect material 
and component usage. 
Confirmation Status: This assumption requires confirmation that will be done when the 
operational procedures are finalized. 
Use in the Analysis: This assumption is used in Section 6.3.3.1.8. 
5.1.9 Corrosion Rate of Neutron Absorbing Material 
Assumption: It is assumed that the corrosion rates for the neutron absorbing material, Ni-Gd 
alloy (UNS N06464) (ASTM B 932-04 2004 [DIRS 168403]) are similar to Ni-Cr alloy (UNS 
N06455). 
Rationale: The composition of the principal constituents of the Ni-Gd alloy (ASTM B 
932-04 2004 [DIRS 168403], Table 1) is similar to that of Ni-Cr alloy (UNS N06455). Thus, the 
general corrosion characteristics are expected to be similar. The major difference is the possible 
behavior of the gadolinium (Gd). Short term tests (~1 year) indicate that gadolinium degrades 

preferentially if present in the alloy as a connected matrix (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169959]). 
However, fabrication specifications (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169959]) require the gadolinium to be in 
a non-connected matrix to prevent such preferential degradation. 
Confirmation Status: This assumption requires confirmation to be obtained from testing and 
fabrication specifications. 
Use in the Analysis: This assumption is used in Sections 6.3, 6.4.2.2.3, 6.4.2.2.5, 6.4.2.2.6, 
6.4.2.3.4, 6.4.2.4.1, 6.8.2 and 6.8.3. 
5.1.10 Loading of Control Rods in Assemblies for the 21PWR Control Rod Waste 
Package 
Assumption: It is assumed that B4C control rods (Assumption 5.1.3) are included in all 
assemblies identified for loading into the 21PWR Control Rod waste package. 
Rationale: PWR assemblies that do not meet the reactivity criteria for loading into the 21PWR 
Absorber Plate waste package are designated for loading into the 21PWR Control Rod waste 
package. Placement of control rods in all assemblies is potentially a requirement since the 
criticality potential of this waste package/waste form has not been determined. 
Confirmation Status: This assumption requires confirmation to be obtained from analyses of the 
21PWR Control Rod waste package. 
Use in the Analysis: This assumption is used in Section 6.3.3.1.8. 
5.1.11 
RESERVED FOR FUTURE USE 
5.1.12 
No Drip Shield or Waste Package Failures from Generalized Corrosion or Stress 
Corrosion Cracks within Regulatory Period 
Assumption: It is assumed that there will be no failures due to generalized corrosion or stress 
corrosion cracks of either the drip shield or waste package outer barrier material that could allow 
advective flow during the 10,000-year period of regulatory concern. 
Rationale: For general corrosion, from General Corrosion and Localized Corrosion of the 
Waste Package Outer Barrier (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169984], Section 8.1), a bounding analysis 
clearly demonstrates that the waste package performance in the repository is not limited by 
general corrosion. For stress corrosion cracks, a bounding analysis (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169985], 
Section 8.3), shows that the final closure lid weld stress mitigated layer is deep enough to extend 
the lifetime of the waste package well beyond 10,000 years. (See definition of drip shield and 
waste package failure in Section 5.1.1) 
Confirmation Status: Confirmation of this assumption is required and will be obtained through 
the completion and verification of the TSPA-LA model that calculates the effects of general 
corrosion and stress corrosion cracking of the drip shield and waste package outer barrier. 

Use in the Analysis: This assumption is used in Sections 6.3.3.1.3, 6.3.3.1.5, 6.4.2.1.3, 6.4.2.1.5, 
and 7.3.2. 
5.1.13 Misload Probability for DOE SNF Waste Forms 
Assumption: It is assumed that the misload probability for DOE SNF waste forms in the DOE 
standardized SNF canister will not exceed the probability calculated for commercial SNF waste 
package types. 
Rationale: The probability of a waste form misload is proportional, among other things, to the 
number of units placed into a waste package. The maximum misload probability assigned to 
commercial SNF waste package types is 1.1810-5 for the 21PWR Absorber Plate waste 
package (Table 4.1-9). Thus, the misload probability for the MOX DOE SNF (the only DOE 
waste form with misload potential) waste form in the DOE standardized SNF canister is set at 
1.1810-5. This assumption is conservative. 
Confirmation Status: This assumption does not require confirmation. 
Use in the Analysis: This assumption is used in Section 6.3.3.1.9. 
5.1.14 
RESERVED FOR FUTURE USE 
5.1.15 
Waste Package Verification Inspection 
Assumption: It is assumed that a separate independent verification inspection will be performed 
prior to waste package loading to confirm that the correct waste package configuration type is 
selected for loading. 
Rationale: Independent verification inspections are common practice for nuclear quality 
assurance operational procedures. 
Confirmation Status: This assumption requires confirmation to be obtained when operational 
procedures are finalized. 
Use in the Analysis: This assumption is used in Section 6.3.3.1.8. 
5.1.16 Neutron Absorber Material Misload Criticality Potential 
Assumption: Waste package configurations with neutron absorber material misloads are assumed 
to have a probability of 1.0 of having criticality potential. 
Rationale: It is conservative to assume that waste package configurations with neutron absorber 
material misloads have criticality potential with a probability of 1.0. 
Confirmation Status: This assumption does not require confirmation. 
Use in the Analysis: This assumption is used in Sections 6.4.2.2.10, 6.4.2.3.6, and 6.6.2.4.7. 

5.1.17 
RESERVED FOR FUTURE USE 
5.1.18 
Low Probability Screening Criterion 
Assumption: For naturally occurring, time-independent FEPs, it is assumed that regulations 
expressed as a probability criterion can be expressed as an annual-exceedance probability, which 
is defined as the probability that a specified value (such as for ground motions or fault 
displacement) will be exceeded during one year. More specifically, the stated probability 
screening criterion of one chance in 10,000 in 10,000 years (10-4/104 yr) criterion is assumed 
equivalent to a 10-8 annual-exceedance probability over the 10,000-year regulatory period. 
Rationale: The definition of annual exceedance probability is taken from Characterize 
Framework for Seismicity and Structural Deformation at Yucca Mountain, Nevada (BSC 2004 
[DIRS 168030], Glossary). The assumption of equivalence of annual-exceedance probability is 
appropriate if the possibility of an event is equal for any given year. This satisfies the definition 
of a Poisson distribution as a mathematical model of the number of outcomes obtained in a 
suitable interval of time and space, that has its mean equal to its variance (Merriam-Webster 
1993 [DIRS 100468], p. 899). This is inferred to mean that naturally occurring, infrequent, and 
independent events, can be represented as stochastic processes in which distinct events occur in 
such a way that the number of events occurring in a given period of time depends only on the 
length of the time period. The use of this assumption is justified in Characterize Framework for 
Seismicity and Structural Deformation at Yucca Mountain, Nevada (BSC 2004 [DIRS 168030], 
Section 6.4.2), which indicates that assuming that the behavior of the earth is generally 
Poissonian or random is the underlying assumption in all probabilistic hazard analyses. 
Although there may be cases where sufficient data and information exist to depart from this 
assumption, the Poissonian model is generally an effective representation of nature and 
represents a compromise between the complexity of natural processes, availability of 
information, and the sensitivity of results of engineering relevance. Consequently, for geologic 
processes that occur over long time spans, assuming annual equivalence over a 10,000-year 
period (a relatively short time span for geologic-related events) is reasonable and consistent with 
the basis of probabilistic hazard analyses. Therefore, no further confirmation is required. 
For time-dependent events, such as criticality, an annual exceedance probability criterion is 
unrealistic as the initiating events required to cause a criticality event are equally likely to occur 
in year one as in year ten thousand. For a criticality initiating event occurring in year 10,000, an 
annual probability value of zero would be calculated for the first 9999 years and an annual 
probability of one calculated for the year 10,000. This would violate the annual exceedance 
probability criterion of 10-8 in year 10,000. 
Therefore, for time-dependent FEPs, the use of a total probability criterion, not to be exceeded 
over the entire regulatory period, is more applicable. The total probability criterion is 10-4 for the 
10,000-year regulatory period. 
Confirmation Status: This assumption does not require confirmation. 
Use in the Analysis: This assumption is used in Section 4.2.3.1. 

5.2 SEISMIC CRITICALITY FEPS ANALYSIS ASSUMPTIONS 
The following assumptions are used in the development of inputs for the criticality FEPs 
screening analysis of the seismic disruptive event. 
5.2.1 
RESERVED FOR FUTURE USE 
5.2.2 
RESERVED FOR FUTURE USE 
5.2.3 
RESERVED FOR FUTURE USE 
5.2.4 
Condensation Flux From Drip Shields 
Assumption: It is assumed that any condensation flux within the drip shield region is a negligible 
contributor to waste package flooding. 
Rationale: In the absence of seepage, the only sources of water are condensation and 
atmospheric humidity. Multiscale Thermohydrologic Model (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169565], 
Sections 5.6 and 6.3.3) indicates that, because of the fracture density, drainage from the drift is 
not significantly impeded, inferring that pooling in the invert thus cannot occur. 
Condensation on the underside of the drip shield may occur, as discussed in In-Drift Convection 
and Condensation Model (BSC 2004 [DIRS 164327], Section 8.3). However, from the geometry 
of the drip shield/waste package system, only a small fraction (on the order of 10%) of 
condensate liquid present on the underside of the drip shield can drip onto the waste packages 
since the source must originate near the drip shield crown to affect the waste packages. 
Furthermore, source locations of condensation do not correlate with failure locations on the 
waste package outer barrier. Therefore, condensation represents a minor contributor to any 
liquid that might drip into breached waste packages, relative to seepage flux. This conclusion is 
also consistent with Engineered Barrier System Features, Events, and Processes (BSC 2004 
[DIRS 169898], Section 6.2.41) which states that condensate waters present on the underside of 
the drip shield have a small potential to drip onto exposed waste packages. 
Where seepage or condensation does occur, the flux into a failed waste package is only of 
concern for those waste packages that have potential for criticality, a majority of which are 
CSNF waste packages. These latter waste packages also have the largest decay heat sources to 
support evaporation, increasing the seepage flux required to flood these waste packages. This 
minimizes the contribution of very low seepage rates to the overall criticality potential. 
Confirmation Status: This assumption requires confirmation to be obtained by completion of 
analysis. 
Use in the Analysis: This assumption is used in Sections 6.3.3.1.4 and 6.4.2.1.4. 
5.2.5 Drift Material Degradation 
Assumption: It is assumed that the drift material, e.g., grids, rails, etc., are degraded by 1000 
years. 

Rationale: A majority of the drift and invert non-tuff structures are either carbon or alloy steel 
that have a high corrosion rate. Corrosion tests in humid-air environments indicated that the 
longevity of these materials could be on the order of 300 years (BSC 2001 [DIRS 155667], 
Section 7.2). Using 1000 years for the longevity of carbon steel is conservative as it allows for a 
longer period before voids in the invert are filled with corrosion products that will prevent 
significant accumulation of released fissile materials from breached waste packages. 
Confirmation Status: This assumption does not require further confirmation. 
Use in the Analysis: This assumption is used in Sections 6.4.2.8.4 and 6.6.2.8.4. 
5.2.6 
RESERVED FOR FUTURE USE 
5.2.7 
Probability of Waste Package Failures Forming a Bathtub 
Assumption: It is assumed that all waste package failure conditions associated with localized 
corrosion mechanisms allowing for advective flow will result in the formation of a bathtub 
configuration. 
Rationale: There are two waste package failure modes that allow for advective flow - bathtub 
and flow-through (see Section 6.1.1 for description of configurations). The flow-through mode 
results in an under-moderated configuration that has a small possibility of in-package criticality, 
but increases the potential for external criticality by providing a more direct pathway for the 
transport of fissile material to the near-field and far-field environments. A bathtub mode will 
result in a higher likelihood of in-package critical configuration formation due to its higher 
neutron moderation capability. Information is currently not available for the determination of the 
formation and duration of bathtub and flow-through configurations during the regulatory period. 
Although waste package damage initiated by seismic events is expected to occur over the entire 
surface of the waste package, it is conservative to assume that the damage on other than the top 
surface remains in a diffusive mode or becomes plugged with corrosion products, effectively 
limiting the waste package failure to a bathtub mode. 
Eventually, however, the bathtub configuration will transition to a flow-through configuration as 
the bottom surface fails due to corrosion mechanisms. The formation of a flow-through 
configuration limits the duration of the bathtub configuration and, thus, limits the potential for 
internal criticality. However, formation of the flow-through configuration increases the potential 
for external criticality by providing a more direct path for the transport of fissile material to the 
near-field and far-field environments. 
Confirmation Status: This assumption does not require confirmation since assuming that damage 
to waste packages from seismic events results in bathtub configurations is a conservative 
approach. Waste package failures from seismic activity are only predicted for fault displacement 
events that are expected to damage both top and bottom surfaces of the waste package, in which 
event, bathtub configurations would be precluded. 
Use in the Analysis: This assumption is used in Sections 6.4.2.1.6, 6.4.2.1.7, and 6.4.2.2.8. 

5.3 ROCK FALL CRITICALITY FEPS ANALYSIS ASSUMPTIONS 
No assumptions are required to evaluate the rock fall disruptive event criticality FEPs. 
5.4 IGNEOUS CRITICALITY FEPS ANALYSIS ASSUMPTIONS 
The following assumptions are used in the development of inputs for the criticality FEPs 
screening analysis of the igneous disruptive event. 
5.4.1 
RESERVED FOR FUTURE USE 
5.4.2 
RESERVED FOR FUTURE USE 
5.4.3 
RESERVED FOR FUTURE USE 
5.4.4 
RESERVED FOR FUTURE USE 
5.4.5 
Characterization of Igneous Events 
Assumption: It is assumed that any eruptive igneous event that intersects the repository has both 
effusive and pyroclastic phases lasting throughout the duration of the event erupting volcanic 
tephra in a range of sizes from large clasts to very fine grained material. 
Rationale: Volcanic activity typically consists of gas and effusive Strombolian and violent 
Strombolian phases. Strombolian activity is characterized by short-duration bursts that throw 
relatively coarse fragments of melt out of the vent on ballistic trajectories, where most of the 
fragments are deposited immediately around the vent with only a small fraction of finer particles 
rising higher and being dispersed by wind to form minor fallout sheets (BSC 2004 [DIRS 
169980], Section 6.3.3.6.1). In contrast, the most violent type of Strombolian activity is 
characterized by vertical eruption of a high-speed jet of a gas-clast mixture and fragments or 
clasts tend to be finer gained. The near-vent ballistic component is small and tephra dispersal in 
a wind-blown convective plume dominates, according to the conceptual model (Jarzemba, et al. 
1997 [DIRS 100987], p. 2-1) used for ASHPLUME (BSC 2004 [DIRS 170026], Section 6.5). 
This assumption maximizes the dispersal for contaminants for Strombolian activity. This 
assumption is part of the assumptions incorporated in the ASHPLUME model of igneous events 
(BSC 2004 [DIRS 170026], Section 5.1.1). 
Confirmation Status: This assumption does not require further confirmation. 
Use in the Analysis: This assumption is used in Section 6.6. 
5.4.6 Interaction of Eruptive Igneous Events with Waste Packages 
Assumption: It is assumed that the waste packages adjacent to an eruptive conduit will remain in 
place in the magma-filled drift and will not be captured by the ascending magma in the eruption 
conduit (BSC 2004 [DIRS 170001] Section 5.3). This assumption applies only to non-vitrified 
waste. 

Rationale: The waste packages are expected to deform rather than disintegrate in the presence of 
magma (BSC 2004 [DIRS 170028], Section 6.4.8.1). The waste packages have a greater density 
than the magma {waste package mean density is in the range of 2940-4280 kg/m3 (BSC 2004 
[DIRS 169472], Table 1) whereas molten magma has a density ranging from 2474 to 2663 kg/m3 
(BSC 2004 [DIRS 169980], Table 6-4)}. It is thus reasonable to assume that the waste packages 
that are adjacent to the conduit will most likely remain in place in the magma-filled drift and will 
not be captured by the ascending magma in the eruption conduit as a result of drain back or melt 
(BSC 2004 [DIRS 170028], Section 6.4.8.2). 
Confirmation Status: This assumption does not require further confirmation. 
Use in the Analysis: This assumption is used in Section 6.6. 
5.4.7 Magmatic Intrusion into Impacted Waste Packages 
Assumption: It is assumed that intrusive magma flowing around a waste package will not 
significantly flood or flush through the waste package. 
Rationale: Intact waste packages are not expected to rupture from internal pressure due to 
heating from the magma (CRWMS M&O 1999 [DIRS 121300]). Rather, they are expected to 
deform and slump downward (BSC 2004 [DIRS 170028], Section 6.4.8.1). It is expected that 
the width of any crack opening on the outer surface will be on the order of several millimeters, 
but could possibly range from 0.1 mm to 10 mm wide, extending a meter or more in length, and 
penetrate the waste package outer barrier (BSC 2004 [DIRS 170028], Section 6.4.8.1). 
Even if magma were to penetrate a waste package, the magma outside of the waste package is 
expected to stagnate once the drift has filled {on the order of 1000 seconds (BSC 2004 [DIRS 
170028, Section 6.4.7.5)} so that there are not likely to be driving forces that would result in 
flow through a waste package. Thus it can be concluded that, in the absence of a major failure of 
a waste package, significant amounts of magma will not flow through the waste package, and 
that the waste form will remain in place (BSC 2004 [DIRS 170028], Section 6.4.8.1). 
Confirmation Status: This assumption does not require further confirmation. 
Use in the Analysis: This assumption is used in Sections 6.6.2.2.3 and 6.6.2.4.4. 
5.4.8 
RESERVED FOR FUTURE USE 
5.4.9 
RESERVED FOR FUTURE USE 
5.4.10 Waste Form Pulverized 
Assumption: In a violent Strombolian eruption, the waste packages within the conduit are 
assumed to be destroyed and the waste form pulverized (BSC 2004 [DIRS 170026], 
Section 5.2.4). 

Rationale: Waste interaction has been evaluated in two stages. The first addresses the 
performance of the waste package in an igneous event and the second addresses the assumptions 
for waste materials fragmentation when exposed during an igneous event. 
Dike/Drift Interactions (BSC 2004 [DIRS 170028], Section 6.4.9) evaluated the impact of 
magma on the waste package. Because of the limited data available, the report stated that: it 
would be proper to adopt the conservative position that all waste packages and associated drip 
shields that come in contact with basalt magma immediately and totally fail. 
The rationale for estimating the waste-particle size is given in Atmospheric Dispersal and 
Deposition of Tephra from a Potential Volcanic Eruption at Yucca Mountain, Nevada (BSC 
2004 [DIRS 170026], Section 5.2.4). Experimental evidence is lacking for processes capable of 
fragmenting spent nuclear fuel in a volcanic eruption.  From the foregoing, and in the 
absence of data that more specifically represents interaction of magma with spent fuel, the 
Ashplume [sic] model assumes that fuel in the affected waste packages is available for 
entrainment in the ash plume as finely-divided particles with diameters in the range of 1 to 500 
micrometers, with a mean of 20 micrometers. 
Confirmation Status: This assumption does not require further confirmation. 
Use in the Analysis: This assumption is used in Section 6.6.2.2.1. 
5.4.11 
RESERVED FOR FUTURE USE 
5.4.12 
Post-Igneous Near-field Fissile Material Accumulation 
Assumption: It is assumed that after an igneous event, seepage water is expected to be 
reestablished and flow through repository contacting the basalt, and undergo chemical 
interactions with the basalt (BSC 2004 [DIRS 170028], Section 6.8). No known mechanism 
exists for fissile material accumulation in this process. 
Rationale: The chemistry of water seeping into the magma-filled drifts after cool down to less 
than boiling conditions is considered to be unaltered but could be affected by basalt-water as the 
seepage of water passes the magma in the drift (BSC 2004 [DIRS 170028], Section 6.8). As 
water moves from the tuff into the cooled basalt, the environment is likely to become more 
reducing. The impact of this on the waste form is unknown. As given in Assumption 5.5.3, 
there are no mechanisms in the external fields that can cause appreciable precipitation of fissile 
material. Thus, the post-igneous environment is not considered to support appreciable 
precipitation of fissile material. 
In the presence of magma, chemical interactions between waste forms and the magma, and the 
waste forms and the metal of the waste canisters or assemblies and cladding could occur. 
Because the extent of development of mineral phases is unknown, the waste is considered 
chemically unchanged. If the waste were to react with the magma and cladding, the resulting 
phases would be less soluble than unaltered waste. 
Confirmation Status: This assumption does not require further confirmation. 

Use in the Analysis: This assumption is used in Sections 6.6.2.6.2, 6.6.2.6.3, 6.6.2.6.4, 6.6.4, 
and 6.8.15. 
5.5 EXTERNAL CRITICALITY FEPS ANALYSIS ASSUMPTIONS 
The following fissile material accumulation assumptions are used in the development of inputs 
for the in the external (near-field and far-field) criticality FEPs screening analyses for the seismic 
and igneous disruptive events. 
5.5.1 Franklin Lake Accumulation 
Assumption: It is assumed that, over the period of regulatory concern, insufficient fissile 
material could be transported and accumulated in the organic-rich zones of the Franklin Lake 
region to result in a potentially critical configuration. 
Rationale: This is a reasonable assumption based on the following evaluation of: (1) transport 
distance from Yucca Mountain to Franklin Lake; and (2) groundwater dilution along the flow 
path. 
Czarnecki (1997 [DIRS 158810]) shows the potentiometric surface in the Amargosa Desert that 
indicates a continuous flow system in the Alluvial Aquifer from Fortymile Wash near the Yucca 
Mountain accessible environment to the discharge area at Franklin Lake. Using the flow field of 
Czarnecki (1997 [DIRS 158810]) there is a flow path from the Yucca Mountain repository to 
Franklin Lake Playa. Such a flow path would pass through the alluvium of the Amargosa Desert 
for about 45 km from a point near the boundary of the Yucca Mountain accessible environment 
to Franklin Lake Playa. Using the groundwater specific discharge in the alluvium at the 
accessible environment which ranges from 1.2 to 9.4 m/yr and the range of effective porosity of 
0.0 
to 0.35 (BSC 2004 [DIRS 170042], Section 6.5.2), the range in groundwater velocity is 4.3 to 
1.8 
 102 m/yr. The corresponding travel time for 45 km ranges from 3.8  102 to 1.0  104 
years. Of the radionuclides that potentially could migrate along the flow path, consider the 
potential for uranium and plutonium with mean values of sorption coefficients of 4.6 and 100 
ml/g, respectively (DTN: LA0310AM831341.002, [DIRS 165891]). Their retardation 
coefficients (using bulk density of 1.9 g/ml and total porosity of 0.3) range from a low of 30 for 
uranium to a high of 6.3  102 for plutonium. Their travel times range from 1.1  104 to 6.6  
106 years, which exceed the 10,000-year compliance period. 
A large amount of dilution would also be expected to occur over that 45 km flow path. Using 
equation 9.7 of Freeze and Cherry (1979, p 395) with a longitudinal dispersivity of 100 m and 
transverse dispersivities defined in the saturated zone (SZ) site-scale transport model abstraction 
(BSC 2004 [DIRS 170042]), the concentrations are estimated to decrease by more than 8 orders 
of magnitude along the flow path. 
Confirmation Status: This assumption does not require confirmation. 
Use in the Analysis: This assumption is used in Sections 5.5.2, 6.4.2.12.8, 6.4.2.12.9, 6.6.2.11.8, 
6.6.2.11.9, 6.6.4, 6.8.4, 6.8.8, 6.8.12, and 6.8.16. 

5.5.2 TSbv Accumulation 
Assumption: It is assumed that there are no known fissile material accumulation mechanisms in 
the altered TSbv (Topopah Spring basal vitrophyre). 
Rationale: This is a subcase of Assumption 5.5.3. 
Confirmation Status: This assumption requires confirmation that will be obtained upon 
completion of analyses. 
Use in the Analysis: This assumption is used in Sections 6.4.2.10.7, 6.4.2.11.3, 6.4.2.11.6, 
6.6.2.9.7, 6.6.2.10.3, 6.6.2.10.6, 6.6.4, 6.8.4, 6.8.8, 6.8.12, and 6.8.16. 
5.5.3 Precipitation of Fissile Material in the Unsaturated and Saturated Zones 
Assumption: It is assumed that there are no mechanisms in either the unsaturated or saturated 
zones below the repository that would cause an appreciable precipitation and/or accumulation of 
fissile material. 
Rationale: 
Precipitation of Fissile Material in the Unsaturated Zone - The effects of solubility on 
potential precipitation of uranium and plutonium in the unsaturated zone (UZ) were evaluated 
using the ranges of temperature, pH, and pCO2 [log (partial pressure by volume)] expected 
during the performance period. 
The effects of temperature are discussed in Dissolved Concentration Limits of Radioactive 
Elements (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169425], Section 6.3.3.3) where it is stated that uranium and 
plutonium are expected to have solubilities that increase with decreasing temperature. Hence, 
radionuclides moving from the repository to cooler environments will tend to keep the 
radionuclides in solution. 
Another factor that will tend to keep these elements in solution is that as the radionuclides move 
away from the repository, they will mix in water of lower elemental concentrations leading to a 
dilution effect. 
Figures 6.4-16 and 6.4-17 of Mountain-Scale Coupled Processes (TH/THC/THM) (BSC 2004 
[DIRS 169866]) show the expected variations in pCO2 and pH, respectively between the 
repository and the water table. Generally speaking, pCO2 ranges from a minimum of 3 near the 
repository to a maximum value of 4.5. The variations in pH are found to be from about 8 near 
the repository to a minimum values of 7. 
For plutonium, the solubility variations going from a pH of 8 and a pCO2 of 3 at the repository to 
a pH of 7 and pCO2 of 4.5 gives the following: 
Repository (mg/L) UZ (mg/L) 
uranium: 40 1 (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169425], Table 6.7-3) 
plutonium: 0.006 0.004 (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169425], Table 6.5-3) 

As can be seen, plutonium solubility is almost flat spanning the full range of pH and pCO2 
conditions, so the effects of temperature and dilution are expected to keep plutonium in solution 
during transport through the UZ. However, the effects of pH and pCO2 on uranium are much 
larger, showing a reduction in solubility of a factor of 40, which could lead to precipitation of 
uranium. If uranium precipitation should occur, the mass density of uranium in a precipitate 
zone may approach 7000 g/L, based on a maximum porosity of 0.35 (BSC 2004 [DIRS 170041], 
Table 6-3) and a density of solid uranium of 19 g/mL 
Precipitation of Fissile Material in the Saturated Zone - Geochemical contrasts in Eh 
(equilibrium redox potential in volts) in the SZ have the potential for causing precipitation of 
uranium or plutonium. However, observations in groundwater wells in the Yucca Mountain area 
indicate that precipitation and accumulation of fissile material in the SZ would not be significant. 
If significant precipitation of redox sensitive species (such as natural uranium) had occurred in 
the groundwater system in the past, this would indicate the potential for such accumulation of 
contaminants from the repository in the future. Specifically, accumulations of natural uranium in 
the past in the SZ would be observed as anomalies in gamma geophysical borehole logs. No 
gamma log anomalies indicative of significant natural uranium accumulation have been observed 
in well logs along the inferred flow path from the repository out to the boundary of the accessible 
environment (including gamma logs from Nye Co. Early Warning Drilling Program wells 
EWDP-10P, 10S, 22PA, 22S, 19D, and 19P). Significantly high gamma log readings have been 
observed in Nye Co. wells EWDP-3D and 3S; however, this well is not along the flow path from 
Yucca Mountain. 
Confirmation Status: This assumption requires confirmation that will be obtained upon 
completion of analyses. 
Use in the Analysis: This assumption is used in Sections 5.4.12, 6.4.2.10.4, 6.4.2.12.2, 
6.4.2.12.4, 6.6.2.9.4, 6.6.2.11.2, 6.6.2.11.4, 6.6.4, 6.8.4, 6.8.8, 6.8.12, and 6.8.16. 
5.5.4 Sorption of Fissile Material on Clays and Zeolites in the Unsaturated Zone 
Assumption: It is assumed that the known quantities of clays and zeolites in the unsaturated zone 
are insufficient to result in appreciable sorption and accumulation of fissile materials. 
Rationale: This is a subcase of Assumptions 5.5.3 and 5.5.5. 
Confirmation Status: This assumption requires confirmation that will be obtained upon 
completion of analyses. 
Use in the Analysis: This assumption is used in Sections 6.4.2.10.6, 6.4.2.11.5, 6.6.2.9.6, 
6.6.2.10.5, 6.6.4, 6.8.4, 6.8.8, 6.8.12, and 6.8.16. 
5.5.5 Accumulation of Fissile Material in Organic-Rich Reducing Zones 
Assumption: It is assumed that any fissile material transported to organic-rich reducing zones in 
the saturated zone is precipitated and accumulates in these zones. 

Rationale: It is reasonable to assume that significant accumulation of fissile material could occur 
in the SZ if organic-rich reducing zones are present. However, there are no observations of 
organic-rich zones in the SZ along the flow path from the repository (at least out to the boundary 
of the accessible environment). In addition, any such organic-rich zones in the SZ would have 
accumulated natural uranium from the groundwater system in the geologic past and would be 
identified in gamma geophysical borehole logs, as described above in Section 5.5.3. 
Confirmation Status: This assumption does not require confirmation. 
Use in the Analysis: This assumption is used in Sections 5.5.4, 6.4.2.12.5, 6.4.2.12.6, 6.6.2.11.5, 
6.6.2.11.6, 6.6.4, 6.8.4, 6.8.8, 6.8.12, and 6.8.16. 

6. SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS DISCUSSION
The following sections discuss the criticality FEPs analyses. Section 6.1 discusses the methods 
and approach used for the FEPs screening. Section 6.2 discusses the SAPHIRE analysis used to 
establish the technical basis for the criticality FEPs screening. The SAPHIRE analysis 
(summarized in Section 6.2) used to organize the processes and event scenarios and to combine 
associated probabilities for the criticality FEPs screening analysis was developed specifically for 
this purpose in Configuration Generator Model (BSC 2004 [DIRS 168552]) and is consistent 
with the TSPA approach to satisfy the regulatory probability criterion and performance 
objectives. Additionally, these analyses are also appropriate because they address the NRCs 
acceptance criteria in Yucca Mountain Review Plan (NRC 2003 [DIRS 163274]) as previously 
discussed in Section 4.2, which are applicable to the FEPs discussions provided in Sections 6.3 
through 6.8 of this analysis report. Section 6.3 provides the details and results of the base case 
criticality FEPs screening analysis. Section 6.4 provides the details and results of the seismic 
disruptive event criticality FEPs screening analysis. Section 6.5 provides the details and results 
of the rock fall disruptive event criticality FEPs screening analysis. Section 6.6 provides the 
details and results of the igneous disruptive event criticality FEPs screening analysis. Section 6.7 
summarizes the results of Sections 6.3 through 6.6 and Section 6.8 provides the screening 
discussions for the criticality FEPs. 
6.1 METHODS AND APPROACH 
The identification and screening of a comprehensive list of FEPs potentially relevant to the 
postclosure performance of the Yucca Mountain repository is an ongoing, iterative process based 
on site-specific information, design, and regulations. FEP analysis uses the following 
definitions, as taken from NRC (2003, Glossary [DIRS 163274]): 
feature  An object, structure, or condition that has a potential to affect disposal system
performance.
event  A natural or human-caused phenomenon that has a potential to affect disposal
system performance and that occurs during an interval that is short compared to
the period of performance.
process  A natural or human-caused phenomenon that has a potential to affect disposal 
system performance and that operates during all or a significant part of the period 
of performance. 
FEP analysis for TSPA-LA is described in BSC (2004 [DIRS 168706]). It is summarized in the 
following subsections. 
6.1.1 Feature Events and Processes Identification 
The first step of FEP analysis is FEP identification and classification, which addresses 
Acceptance Criterion 1 of the Yucca Mountain Review Plan, Final Report (NRC 2003 [DIRS 
163274], Section 2.2.1.2.1.3). The TSPA-LA FEP identification and classification process is 
described in BSC (2004 [DIRS 168706], Section 3). It produced a version of the LA FEP List 
(DTN: MO0407SEPFEPLA.000 DIRS [170760]), used in this criticality FEP analysis. Aside 

from editorial corrections to FEP descriptions, any changes to the FEP list from the information 
shown in DTN: MO0407SEPFEPLA.000 ([DIRS 170760]) is discussed below. 
Table 6.1-1 presents the list of 16 criticality FEPs for TSPA-LA from Table 1.2-1. The Inpackage 
criticality (degraded configurations) FEPs encompass the configuration classes 
identified in Figures 3-2a and 3-2b of Disposal Criticality Analysis Methodology Topical Report 
(YMP 2003 [DIRS 165505]). Figure 3-2a defines in-package bathtub configuration classes (hole 
at top of waste package and waste package flooded). Figure 3-2b defines in-package flow-
through configuration classes (hole at top and bottom of waste package and water flowing 
through and over waste package internals and waste form). 
The Near-field criticality FEPs encompass the degraded configuration classes identified in 
Figure 3-3a of Disposal Criticality Analysis Methodology Topical Report (YMP 2003 [DIRS 
165505]) and the Far-field criticality FEPs encompass the configuration classes of Figure 3-3b. 
The near-field environment is defined as external to the waste package and inside the drift wall 
(including any drift liner and the invert). The far-field environment is defined as the area beyond 
the drift wall (i.e., in the host rock of the repository). 
Table 6.1-1. Criticality FEPs List to be Utilized in Criticality Screening Analysis 
FEP 
Number FEP Name FEP Description 
Base Case FEPs 
2.1.14.15.0A 
In-package 
criticality 
(intact 
configuration) 
The waste package internal structures and the waste form remain intact. If 
there is a breach (or are breaches) in the waste package which allows water to 
either accumulate or flow-through the waste package then criticality could 
occur in situ. In-package criticality resulting from disruptive events is 
addressed in separate FEPs. 
2.1.14.16.0A 
In-package 
criticality 
(degraded 
configurations) 
The waste package internal structures and the waste form may degrade. If a 
critical configuration (sufficient fissile material and neutron moderator, lack of 
neutron absorbers) develops, criticality could occur in situ. Potential in situ 
critical configurations are defined in Figures 3.2a and 3.2b of Disposal 
Criticality Analysis Methodology Topical Report (YMP 2003 [DIRS 165505]). 
In-package criticality resulting from disruptive events is addressed in separate 
FEPs. 
2.1.14.17.0A Near-field 
criticality 
Near-field criticality could occur if fissile material-bearing solution from the 
waste package is transported into the drift and the fissile material is 
precipitated into a critical configuration. Potential near-field critical 
configurations are defined in Figure 3.3a of Disposal Criticality Analysis 
Methodology Topical Report (YMP 2003 [DIRS 165505]). In-package criticality 
resulting from disruptive events is addressed in separate FEPs. 
2.2.14.09.0A Far-field 
criticality 
Far-field criticality could occur if fissile material-bearing solution from the waste 
package is transported beyond the drift and the fissile material is precipitated 
into a critical configuration. Potential far-field critical configurations are defined 
in Figure 3.3b of Disposal Criticality Analysis Methodology Topical Report 
(YMP 2003 [DIRS 165505]). In-package criticality resulting from disruptive 
events is addressed in separate FEPs. 
Seismic Disruptive Event FEPs 
2.1.14.18.0A 
In-package 
criticality 
resulting from 
a seismic 
event (intact 
configuration) 
The waste package internal structures and the waste form remain intact either 
during or after a seismic disruptive event. If there is a breach (or are 
breaches) in the waste package which allows water to either accumulate or 
flow-through the waste package then criticality could occur in situ. 

Table 6.1-1. Criticality FEPs List to be Utilized in Criticality Screening Analysis (Continued) 
FEP 
Number FEP Name FEP Description 
2.1.14.19.0A 
In-package 
criticality 
resulting from 
a seismic 
event 
(degraded 
configurations) 
Either during, or as a result of, a seismic disruptive event, the waste package 
internal structures and the waste form may degrade. If a critical configuration 
develops, criticality could occur in situ. Potential in situ critical configurations 
are defined in Figures 3.2a and 3.2b of Disposal Criticality Analysis 
Methodology Topical Report (YMP 2003 [DIRS 165505]). 
2.1.14.20.0A 
Near-field 
criticality 
resulting from 
a seismic 
event 
Either during, or as a result of, a seismic disruptive event, near-field criticality 
could occur if fissile material-bearing solution from the waste package is 
transported into the drift and the fissile material is precipitated into a critical 
configuration. Potential near-field critical configurations are defined in Figure 
3.3a of Disposal Criticality Analysis Methodology Topical Report (YMP 2003 
[DIRS 165505]). 
2.2.14.10.0A 
Far-field 
criticality 
resulting from 
a seismic 
event 
Either during, or as a result of, a seismic disruptive event, far-field criticality 
could occur if fissile material-bearing solution from the waste package is 
transported beyond the drift and the fissile material is precipitated into a critical 
configuration. Potential far-field critical configurations are defined in Figure 
3.3b of Disposal Criticality Analysis Methodology Topical Report (YMP 2003 
[DIRS 165505]). 
Rock Fall Disruptive Event FEPs 
2.1.14.21.0A 
In-package 
criticality 
resulting from 
rock fall (intact 
configuration) 
The waste package internal structures and the waste form remain intact either 
during or after a rock fall event. If there is a breach (or are breaches) in the 
waste package which allows water to either accumulate or flow-through the 
waste package then criticality could occur in situ. 
2.1.14.14.0A 
2.1.14.22.0A 
In-package 
criticality 
resulting from 
rock fall 
(degraded 
configurations) 
Either during, or as a result of, a rock fall event, the waste package internal 
structures and the waste form may degrade. If a critical configuration 
develops, criticality could occur in situ. Potential in situ critical configurations 
are defined in Figures 3.2a and 3.2b of Disposal Criticality Analysis 
Methodology Topical Report (YMP 2003 [DIRS 165505]). 
2.1.14.23.0A 
Near-field 
criticality 
resulting from 
rock fall 
Either during, or as a result of, a rock fall event, near-field criticality could 
occur if fissile material-bearing solution from the waste package is transported 
into the drift and the fissile material is precipitated into a critical configuration. 
Potential near-field critical configurations are defined in Figure 3.3a of Disposal 
Criticality Analysis Methodology Topical Report (YMP 2003 [DIRS 165505]). 
2.2.14.11.0A 
Far-field 
criticality 
resulting from 
rock fall 
Either during, or as a result of, a rock fall event, far-field criticality could occur if 
fissile material-bearing solution from the waste package is transported beyond 
the drift and the fissile material is precipitated into a critical configuration. 
Potential far-field critical configurations are defined in Figure 3.3b of Disposal 
Criticality Analysis Methodology Topical Report (YMP 2003 [DIRS 165505]). 
Igneous Disruptive Event FEPs 
2.1.14.24.0A 
In-package 
criticality 
resulting from 
an igneous 
event (intact 
configuration) 
The waste package internal structures and the waste form remain intact either 
during or after an igneous disruptive event. If there is a breach (or are 
breaches) in the waste package which allows water to either accumulate or 
flow-through the waste package then criticality could occur in situ. 

Source: Table 1.2-1 
6.1.2 Feature, Event, and Process Screening Process 
The second step of FEP analysis is FEP screening, which addresses Acceptance Criterion 2 of 
the Yucca Mountain Review Plan, Final Report (NRC 2003 [DIRS 163274], Section 2.2.1.2.1.3). 
The TSPA-LA FEP screening process is described in BSC (2004 [DIRS 168706], Section 4). 
For FEP screening, each FEP is screened against the specified exclusion criteria (refer to 
Section 4.2.3), summarized in the three following FEP screening statements: 
1) FEPs having less than one chance in 10,000 of occurring over 10,000 years 
may be excluded (screened out) from the TSPA on the basis of low 
probability (as per 10 CFR 63.114(d) [DIRS 156605]). 
2) FEPs whose omission would not significantly change the magnitude and 
time of the resulting radiological exposures to the RMEI, or radionuclide 
releases to the accessible environment, may be excluded (screened out) from 
the TSPA on the basis of low consequence (as per 10 CFR 63.114 (e and f) 
([DIRS 156605])). 
3) FEPs that are inconsistent with the characteristics, concepts, and definitions 
specified in 10 CFR Part 63 ([DIRS 156605]) may be excluded (screened 
out) from the TSPA by regulation. 
A FEP need only satisfy one of the exclusion screening criteria to be excluded from TSPA. A 
FEP that does not satisfy any of the exclusion screening criteria must be included (screened in) in 
the TSPA-LA model. 
Table 6.1-1. Criticality FEPs List to be Utilized in Criticality Screening Analysis (Continued) 
FEP 
Number FEP Name FEP Description 
2.1.14.25.0A 
In-package 
criticality 
resulting from 
an igneous 
event 
(degraded 
configurations) 
Either during, or as a result of, an igneous disruptive event, the waste package 
internal structures and the waste form may degrade. If a critical configuration 
develops, criticality could occur in situ. Potential in situ critical configurations 
are defined in Figures 3.2a and 3.2b of Disposal Criticality Analysis 
Methodology Topical Report (YMP 2003 [DIRS 165505]). 
2.1.14.26.0A 
Near-field 
criticality 
resulting from 
an igneous 
event 
Either during or as a result of an igneous disruptive event, near-field criticality 
could occur if fissile material-bearing solution from the waste package is 
transported into the drift and the fissile material is precipitated into a critical 
configuration. Potential near-field critical configurations are defined in Figure 
3.3a of Disposal Criticality Analysis Methodology Topical Report (YMP 2003 
[DIRS 165505]). 
2.2.14.12.0A 
Far-field 
criticality 
resulting from 
an igneous 
event 
Either during, or as a result of, an igneous disruptive event, far-field criticality 
could occur if fissile material-bearing solution from the waste package is 
transported beyond the drift and the fissile material is precipitated into a critical 
configuration. Potential far-field critical configurations are defined in Figure 
3.3b of Disposal Criticality Analysis Methodology Topical Report (YMP 2003 
[DIRS 165505]). 

This analysis report documents the screening decisions for the criticality FEPs. In cases where a 
FEP covers multiple technical areas and is shared with other FEP AMRs, this analysis report 
provides only a partial technical basis for the screening decision as it relates to criticality issues. 
The full technical basis for these shared FEPs is addressed, collectively, by all of the sharing FEP 
analysis reports. 
Documentation of the screening for each FEP is provided in Section 6.8. The following 
standardized format is used. 
Section 6.2.x FEP Name (FEP Number) 
FEP Description: This field describes the nature and scope of the FEP under 
consideration. 
Screening Decision: Identifies the screening decision as one of: 
-Included
-
Excluded  Low Probability
-
Excluded  Low Consequence
-
Excluded  By Regulation
In a few cases, a FEP may be excluded by a combination of two criteria (e.g., Low 
Probability and Low Consequence). 
Screening Argument: This field is used only for excluded FEPs. It provides the 
discussion for why a FEP has been excluded from TSPA-LA. 
TSPA Disposition: This field is used only for included FEPs. It provides the 
consolidated discussion of how a FEP has been included in TSPA-LA, making reference 
to more detailed documentation in other supporting technical AMRs, as applicable. For 
excluded FEPs, it is indicated as Not Applicable. 
Supporting Reports: This field is only used for included FEPs. It provides the list of 
supporting technical AMRs that identified the FEP as an included FEP and contain 
information relevant to the implementation of the FEP within the TSPA-LA model. This 
list of supporting technical AMRs provides traceability of the FEP through the document 
hierarchy. For excluded FEPs, it is indicated as Not Applicable. 
6.1.3 Supporting AMRs and Inputs 
Indirect inputs used for the criticality FEPs screening analyses are cited within each FEP 
discussion and use of these inputs has been documented per YMP procedural requirements. 
Where possible, the indirect inputs used in this analysis report to support the screening decisions 
were obtained from controlled source documents and references using the appropriate document 
identifiers or records system accession numbers. Sources of such inputs include, but are not 
limited to, analyses, models, technical reports, and other YMP documents and databases. As 
needed, indirect inputs were obtained from literature searches of peer-reviewed journals, other 
widely recognized scientific periodicals, results of review of YMP documents by external 

organizations, and other appropriate sources such as technical handbooks and textbooks. A 
listing of the indirect input used to support the criticality FEPs screening decisions are provided 
in Table 6.1-2. 
Table 6.1-2. Indirect Inputs Used in the Criticality FEPs Screening Analyses 
Reference Description Reference 
Sections Used Section Used in Input Description 
Evaluation of Codisposal Viability for MOX 
(FFTF) DOE-Owned Fuel (CRWMS M&O 
1999 [DIRS 125206]) 
Entire 
Table 6.2-1 
Sections 5.1.7, 6.8.1 
and 6.8.2 
Reference to FFTF fuel 
criticality analyses 
Evaluation of Codisposal Viability for UZrH 
(TRIGA) DOE-Owned Fuel (CRWMS M&O 
2000 [DIRS 147650]) 
Entire 
Table 6.2-1 
Sections 6.8.1 and 
6.8.2 
Reference to TRIGA fuel 
criticality analyses 
Evaluation of Codisposal Viability for HEU Table 6.2-1 Reference to 
Oxide (Shippingport PWR) DOE-Owned Fuel Entire Sections 6.8.1 and Shippingport PWR fuel 
(CRWMS M&O 2000 [DIRS 147651]) 6.8.2 criticality analyses 
Evaluation of Codisposal Viability for U-Zr/U-
Mo Alloy (Enrico Fermi) DOE-Owned Fuel 
(CRWMS M&O 2000 [DIRS 151742]) 
Entire 
Table 6.2-1 
Sections 6.8.1 and 
6.8.2 
Reference to Enrico 
Fermi fuel criticality 
analyses 
Evaluation of Codisposal Viability for Th/U 
Oxide (Shippingport LWBR) DOE-Owned Fuel 
(CRWMS M&O 2000 [DIRS 151743]) 
Entire 
Table 6.2-1 
Sections 6.8.1 and 
6.8.2 
Reference to 
Shippingport LWBR fuel 
criticality analyses 
Evaluation of Codisposal Viability for U-Metal 
(N Reactor) DOE-Owned Fuel (CRWMS M&O 
2001 [DIRS 154194]) 
Entire 
Table 6.2-1 
Sections 6.8.1 and 
6.8.2 
Reference to N Reactor 
fuel criticality analyses 
Evaluation of Codisposal Viability for Melt and 
Dilute DOE-Owned Fuel (BSC 2001 [DIRS 
157733]) 
Entire 
Table 6.2-1 
Sections 6.8.1 and 
6.8.2 
Reference to aluminum 
based fuel criticality 
analyses 
Evaluation of Codisposal Viability for Th/U 
Carbide (Fort Saint Vrain HTGR) DOE-Owned 
Fuel (BSC 2001 [DIRS 157734]) 
Entire 
Table 6.2-1 
Sections 6.8.1 and 
6.8.2 
Reference to Fort St. 
Vrain fuel criticality 
analyses 
Intact and Degraded Mode Criticality 
Calculations for the Codisposal of TMI-2 
Spent Nuclear Fuel in a Waste Package (BSC 
2004 [DIRS 168935]). 
Entire 
Table 6.2-1 
Sections 6.8.1 and 
6.8.2 
Reference to TMI-2 fuel 
criticality analyses 
21-PWR Waste Package with Absorber Plates 
Loading Curve Evaluation (BSC 2004 [DIRS 
171414]) 
Entire 
Sections 5.1.7, 6.2, 
6.3.3.1.8, 6.3.3.1.10, 
6.4.2.1.10, 6.4.2.2.10, 
6.4.2.3.6, 6.8.1, and 
6.8.2 
Reference to 21-PWR 
fuel assembly loading 
curve analyses 
44 BWR Waste Package Loading Curve 
Evaluation (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169963]) Entire 
Sections 6.2, 
6.3.3.1.10, 6.4.2.1.10, 
6.4.2.2.10, 6.4.2.3.6, 
6.8.1, and 6.8.2 
Reference to 44-BWR 
fuel assembly loading 
curve analyses 

Table 6.1-2. Indirect Inputs Used in the Criticality FEPs Screening Analyses (Continued) 
Reference Description Reference 
Sections Used Section Used in Input Description 
Section 3.3 Section 6.2 Master Scenario List 
Disposal Criticality Analysis Methodology 
Topical Report (YMP 2003 [DIRS 165505]) 
Sections 3.7.1.1 
and 3.7.2 Section 6.3 Silica moderator 
Figures 3-2a 
through 3-3b 
Tables 6.1-1, 6.3-1, 
6.4-1, 6.5-1, and 6.6-1 
Sections1.2, 6.1.1, 
8.2, 8.3, 8.6, 8.8 8.10, 
8.11, 8.12, 8.14, 8.15, 
and 8.16 
Reference to 
degraded 
configurations 
Criticality Model Report (BSC 2004 [DIRS 
Section 6.3.1 Sections 6.2, 6.3, 
6.8.1, and 6.8.2 
Definition of critical 
limit 
168553]) 
Entire Section 6.2 Reference to criticality 
model 
WAPDEG Analysis of Waste Package and 
Drip Shield Degradation (BSC 2004 [DIRS 
169996]) 
Sections 6.3.5 
and 6.5.2; 
Figures 22, 23, 
24 and 26 
Sections 6.3.3.1.3, 
6.3.3.1.5, and 
6.3.3.2.2 
General corrosion 
failure of the waste 
package and drip 
shield and stress 
corrosion cracking 
failure of the waste 
package 
Section 5.4.2 Section 6.6.2.4.2 Fracture density in 
basalt 
Dike/Drift Interactions (BSC 2004 [ DIRS 
170028]) 
Sections 6.4.7.5, 
6.4.8.1, 6.4.8.2, 
6.7.1.2, 6.4.8.3 
Sections 5.4.6, 5.4.7, 
6.6, 6.6.2.3.1, 
6.6.2.3.2; Table 6.1-2 
Waste package 
failure; Tensile 
strength of the waste 
package and internal 
components; Magma 
temperature; 
Formation of Zr-Fe 
and Zr-Ni liquid 
eutectics; Mixed 
phases of waste and 
magma 
Sections 6.4.9, 
6.6, 6.6.1, 6.6.5, 
6.6.6, 6.7, 
6.7.1.2, 6.8, 
8.2.3, Appendix 
D 
Sections 5.4.10, 
6.6.1, 6.6.2.3.2, 
6.8.13, 6.8.14; Table 
6.1-2 
Igneous impacts on 
waste packages in 
Zone 1 and Zone 2; 
possible impacts from 
thermal and volatile 
gases 
Section 6.4.7.5 Sections 6.6, 
6.6.2.7.1; Table 6.1-2 
Magma flows into 
drifts 
Section 6.4.7.5 
Sections 5.4.7, 6.6, 
6.6.2.7.1, 6.6.2.8.2, 
6.6.2.8.5, 6.6.2.8.6 
Magma levels in drift 
and time to fill drifts 
Characterize Eruptive Processes at Yucca 
Mountain (BSC 2004 [ DIRS 169980]) 
Sections 6.3.1.1, 
6.3.2.2 Section 6.6 
Roughly cylindrical 
conduit eruptions; 
water content of 
magma 

6.1.4 Qualification of Unqualified Direct Inputs 
Direct Inputs are listed in Section 4.1 and any unqualified data are identified by TBV number 
that documents their qualification. 
6.1.5 Assumptions and Simplifications 
For included FEPs, the TSPA Dispositions may include statements regarding assumptions made 
to implement the FEP within the TSPA-LA model. Such statements are descriptive of the 
manner in which the FEP has been included and are not used as the basis of the screening 
decision to include the FEP with the TSPA-LA model. Assumptions utilized in the criticality 
FEPs screening analysis are provided in Section 5. 
Table 6.1-2. Indirect Inputs Used in the Criticality FEPs Screening Analyses (Continued) 
Reference Description Reference 
Sections Used Section Used in Input Description 
Section 6.5 Section 5.4.5 
Reference to 
conceptual model for 
ASHPLUME 
Section 5.2.4 Sections 5.4.10, 6.6, 
6.6.2.2.1, and 6.8.14 
Sections 5.4.10, 6.6, 
6.6.2.2.1, and 6.8.14 
Atmospheric Dispersal and Deposition of 
Tephra from a Potential Volcanic Eruption at 
Yucca Mountain (BSC 2004 [ DIRS 170026]) 
Section 5.1.1 Sections 5.4.5 and 6.6 Description of igneous 
event 
Sections 6.6 and 
6.7 Section 6.6.1 Mobility of volcanic 
gases between drifts 
Figures 1-1 and 
7-3 Section 6.6.2.2.3 Dispersal area for 
eruption 
entire Sections 6.1.3, 6.3.2 , 
and 6.4.3 
minimum critical mass 
in invert 
Critical Mass Search Calculation in the Invert 
(BSC 2004 [ DIRS 170060]) Entire Section 6.8.7 Supporting 
documentation 
entire 
Sections 6.4.2.6.5, 
6.4.2.7.3, and 
6.4.2.8.7 
calculated k-eff below 
the critical limit 
Criticality Potential of Waste Packages Affected 
by Igneous Intrusion. (BSC 2004 [DIRS 
171690]) Entire Section 6.6.3 
Criticality potential of 
waste packages 
affectied by igneous 
intrusion 
Configuration Generator Model 
Entire 
Executive Summary; 
Sections 1, 1.4, 4.1.1, 
6, 6.2; Appendix B 
Reference to 
Configuration 
Generator Model, 
configuration classes, 
and WP event trees 
(BSC 2004 [ DIRS 168552]) 
Attachment I 
Section 6.2, Figures 
6.2-1 thru 6.2-5 and 
B-1 thru B-27 

Because of the individual FEPs are specific in nature, any discussion of applicable mathematical 
formulations, equations, algorithms, numerical methods, or idealizations or simplifications are 
provided within the individual FEP discussions in Section 6.2. 
6.1.6 Intended Use and Limitations 
The intended use of this analysis report is to provide FEP screening information for a project-
specific FEP database, and to promote traceability and transparency regarding FEP screening. 
This analysis report is intended to be used as the source documentation for the FEP database 
described in BSC (2004, [DIRS 168706]). For included FEPs, this document summarizes and 
consolidates the method of implementation of the FEP in TSPA-LA in the form of TSPA 
Disposition statements, based on more detailed implementation information in the listed 
supporting technical AMRs. For excluded FEPs, this document provides the technical basis for 
exclusion in the form of Screening Arguments. 
Inherent in this evaluation approach is the limitation that the repository is constructed, operated, 
and closed according to the design used as the basis for the FEP screening and in accordance 
with NRC license requirements. This is inherent in performance evaluation of any engineering 
project, and design verification and performance confirmation are required as part of the 
construction and operation processes. The results of the FEP screening presented herein are 
specific to the repository design evaluated in this analysis report for TSPA-LA. 
Any changes in direct inputs listed in Section 4.1, in baseline conditions used for this evaluation, 
or in other subsurface conditions, will need to be evaluated to determine if the changes are within 
the limits stated in the FEP evaluations. Engineering and design changes are subject to 
evaluation to determine if there are any adverse manner impacts to safety as codified at 
10 CFR 63.73 and in Subparts F and G ([DIRS 156605]). See also the requirements in 
10 CFR 63.44 ([DIRS 156605]). 
6.2 CRITICALITY FEPS SCREENING ANALYSIS 
The criticality FEPs screening analysis utilizes the event tree process developed in Configuration 
Generator Model (BSC 2004 [DIRS 168552]) for the evaluation of the overall probability of 
criticality. The configuration generator identifies the possible pathways required for the 
development of waste package internal and external configuration classes, evaluates the 
probability of occurrence for the configuration classes, and provides the configuration class 
associated parameter ranges to determine the criticality potential of each configuration class. 
The configuration classes represented by the event tree process of the Configuration Generator 
Model (BSC 2004 [DIRS 168552], Attachment I) are defined by the Master Scenario List in 
Disposal Criticality Analysis Methodology Topical Report (YMP 2003 [DIRS 165505], 
Section 3.3). These configuration classes represent flooded, i.e., bathtub, and flow-through 
waste package configurations, near-field and far-field configurations external to the waste 
package, and igneous configurations. The event trees of the configuration generator represent 
the events and processes, both internal and external to the waste package, which are necessary to 
achieve the configuration classes. 

The configuration generator event tree starts with the different waste forms expected to be stored 
in the monitored geologic repository. The sequences for the various waste forms then transfer, 
respectively, to their specific configuration generating event trees. These event trees identify the 
specific waste form along with the degradation processes listed in sequential order, in order to 
provide the start to finish sequences for the degradation process. The top events on the event tree 
are the specific processes required for degradation. Branching under the top events (degradation 
processes) provides a traceable sequence to each configuration class. The different configuration 
classes are noted on the configuration generator event tree with their respective end states. Note 
that to reach a specific end state, the degradation-related processes in that sequence must occur. 
The various end states of a configuration class are evaluated for their potential for criticality 
without necessarily quantifying the probability of achieving such a state. End states of a 
configuration class are marked as having potential for criticality if their essential parameters 
have values in the range that can support criticality. The sequences to those particular end states 
are then backtracked to assess the probabilities that the parameters can actually have the requisite 
values. Summing these probabilities is the method for estimating the probability of occurrence 
of a configuration class. The probability of criticality is set to zero for all end states of 
configuration classes that are not marked as having potential for criticality. 
The waste package/waste form must degrade in some manner to achieve a potentially critical 
configuration. This is because intact, fully flooded waste package conditions are precluded from 
achieving criticality by design to satisfy a preclosure operations requirement that the repository 
provide means to ensure criticality control during SNF/HLW handling operations, including 
waste package loading (Curry 2004 [DIRS 170557], Requirement 1.1.6-4). If this requirement is 
satisfied, in situ criticality in an intact configuration (criticality FEPs 2.1.14.15.0A, 2.1.14.18.0A, 
2.1.14.21.0A, or 2.1.14.24.0A) cannot occur. 
It has been previously demonstrated through loading curve analyses for the 21PWR Absorber 
Plate and the 44BWR Absorber Plate waste package types that an intact, fully flooded waste 
package configuration cannot achieve criticality (BSC 2004 [DIRS 171414] and BSC 2004 
[DIRS 169963], respectively). To satisfy Requirement 1.1.6-4 (Curry 2004 [DIRS 170557]), 
similar analyses must be performed for the remaining commercial SNF waste package types. 
Analyses have also been previously performed for all nine of the representative DOE SNF waste 
forms that demonstrate subcriticality of these waste package types for intact, fully flooded 
conditions. The references for these analyses are listed in Table 6.2-1. Future loading curve 
evaluations of the remaining three commercial SNF waste package types are expected to 
demonstrate similar results (Assumption 5.1.2). 
The final logical evaluation point is to assess the criticality probability for each configuration 
class. Using the criticality model (BSC 2004 [DIRS 168553]) and the configuration class 
characteristics defined by the configuration generator evaluations, detailed criticality analyses 
are performed to determine the effective neutron multiplication factor (keff) for the range of 
parameters associated with each configuration class. If the calculated keff is below a prescribed 
critical limit (BSC 2004 [DIRS 168553], Section 6.3.1) for the entire range of parameters, the 
configuration class has no criticality potential. If the calculated keff is above a prescribed critical 
limit for some or all of the range of parameters, then the probability of achieving these parameter 

ranges is assessed. The probability of achieving these parameter ranges is the configuration 
classs criticality probability. 
The remainder of this section summarizes select event trees of the configuration generator used 
in the criticality FEPs screening analysis. The configuration generator consists of 48 event trees 
that represent the events and processes necessary for the formation of the configuration classes of 
the Master Scenario List (YMP 2003 [DIRS 165505], Section 3.3). A listing of these trees and a 
cross reference of their use in the criticality FEPs screening analysis is provided in Table 6.2-2. 
The event trees used in the criticality FEPs screening analysis are contained in the SAPHIRE file 
of Appendix G (a read-only CDROM). 
Table 6.2-1. DOE SNF Intact Configuration Criticality Analysis References 
DOE SNF Waste Form Group 
DOE SNF Representative 
Waste Form 
Intact Configuration Criticality 
Analysis Reference 
Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) CRWMS M&O 1999 [DIRS 125206] 
Uranium-Zirconium Hydride (U-Zr Hx) Training, Research, Isotopes, 
General Atomics (TRIGA) CRWMS M&O 2000 [DIRS 147650] 
Uranium (U) Metal N Reactor CRWMS M&O 2001 [DIRS 154194] 
High-Enriched Uranium (HEU) Oxide Shippingport PWR CRWMS M&O 2000 [DIRS 147651] 
Uranium/Thorium (U/Th) Oxide Shippingport LWBR CRWMS M&O 2000 [DIRS 151743] 
Uranium/Thorium (U/Th) Carbide Fort St. Vrain BSC 2001 [DIRS 157734] 
Aluminum Based Melt and Dilute BSC 2001 [DIRS 157733] 
Uranium-Zirconium/Uranium-
Molybdenum (U-Zr/U-Mo) Alloy Enrico Fermi CRWMS M&O 2000 [DIRS 151742] 
Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) Oxide Three Mile Island II BSC 2004 [DIRS 168935] 
Table 6.2-2. Listing of Configuration Generation Model Event Trees 
Event Tree Name Description Use in Criticality FEPs 
Screening Analysis 
WP-WF Event tree for determination of waste package type 
fractions 
Yes, for informational purposes 
only 
WP01-21-PWR-AP Initiating event tree for 21-PWR Absorber Plate waste 
package type Yes, for all cases 
WP02-21-PWR-CR Initiating event tree for 21-PWR Control Rod waste 
package type Yes, for all cases 
WP03-12-PWR-AP Initiating event tree for 12-PWR Absorber Plate waste 
package type Yes, for all cases 
WP04-24-BWR-AP Initiating event tree for 24-BWR Absorber Plate waste 
package type Yes, for all cases 
WP05-44-BWR-AP Initiating event tree for 44-BWR Absorber Plate waste 
package type Yes, for all cases 
WP06-DOE1-SHORT Initiating event tree for MOX DOE SNF in 
5-DHLW/DOE Short waste package type Yes, for all cases 
WP07-DOE1-LONG Initiating event tree for MOX DOE SNF in 
5-DHLW/DOE Long waste package type Yes, for all cases 
WP08-DOE2-SHORT Initiating event tree for U-Zr Hx DOE SNF in 
5-DHLW/DOE Short waste package type Yes, for all cases 
WP09-DOE2-SHORT Initiating event tree for U-Metal DOE SNF in 
5-DHLW/DOE Short waste package type Yes, for all cases 

WP10-DOE2-LONG Initiating event tree for U-Metal DOE SNF in 
5-DHLW/DOE Long waste package type Yes, for all cases 
WP011-DOE3-MCO Initiating event tree for U-Metal DOE SNF in 
2-MCO/2-DHLW waste package type Yes, for all cases 
WP12-DOE4-SHORT Initiating event tree for HEU Oxide DOE SNF in 
5-DHLW/DOE Short waste package type Yes, for all cases 
WP13-DOE4-LONG Initiating event tree for HEU Oxide DOE SNF in 
5-DHLW/DOE Long waste package type Yes, for all cases 
WP14-DOE5-SHORT Initiating event tree for U/Th Oxide DOE SNF in 
5-DHLW/DOE Short waste package type Yes, for all cases 
WP15-DOE5-LONG Initiating event tree for U/Th Oxide DOE SNF in 
5-DHLW/DOE Long waste package type Yes, for all cases 
WP16-DOE6-SHORT Initiating event tree for U/Th Carbide DOE SNF in 
5-DHLW/DOE Short waste package type Yes, for all cases 
WP17-DOE7-SHORT Initiating event tree for Aluminum Based DOE SNF in 
5-DHLW/DOE Short waste package type Yes, for all cases 
WP18-DOE7-LONG Initiating event tree for Aluminum Based DOE SNF in 
5-DHLW/DOE Long waste package type Yes, for all cases 
Table 6.2-2 Listing of Configuration Generation Model Event Trees (Continued) 
Event Tree Name Description Use in Criticality FEPs 
Screening Analysis 
WP19-DOE8-SHORT Initiating event tree for U-Zr/U-Mo Alloy DOE SNF in 
5-DHLW/DOE Short waste package type Yes, for all cases 
WP20-DOE8-LONG Initiating event tree for U-Zr/U-Mo Alloy DOE SNF in 
5-DHLW/DOE Long waste package type Yes, for all cases 
WP21-DOE9-SHORT Initiating event tree for LEU Oxide DOE SNF in 
5-DHLW/DOE Short waste package type Yes, for all cases 
WP22-DOE9-LONG Initiating event tree for LEU Oxide DOE SNF in 
5-DHLW/DOE Long waste package type Yes, for all cases 
YMP-INIT-EVENTS Event tree for directing Master Scenario List evaluation 
for base case and disruptive events Yes, for all cases 
MSL-ET Event tree for determining bathtub or flow-through 
waste package configuration 
Yes, for base, seismic, and rock 
fall cases 
MSL-ET2 Continuation of event tree for determining bathtub or 
flow-through waste package configuration 
Yes, for base, seismic, and rock 
fall cases 
CONFIG-BATH Event tree for initiating evaluation of waste package 
bathtub configurations IP-1, IP-2, and IP-3 Yes, for seismic case 
CONFIG-NOBATH Event tree for initiating evaluation of waste package 
flow-through configuration classes IP-4, IP-5, and IP-6 Not used in this analysis 
CONFIG-IP2-D Event tree for evaluating configuration class IP-2 Not used in this analysis 
CONFIG-IP3 Event tree for evaluating configuration class IP-3 Not used in this analysis 
CONFIG-IP3-G Continuation of event tree for evaluating configuration 
class IP-3 Not used in this analysis 

Source: Configuration Generator Model. CAL-DS0-NU-000002 REV 00A (BSC 2004 [DIRS 168552]) 
It is beyond the scope of this analysis to provide the details of each of these event trees. Only 
those event trees involved in initiating the criticality FEPs evaluation are discussed in this 
section. Detailed descriptions of the remaining trees and their inputs are presented in 
Configuration Generator Model (BSC 2004 [DIRS 168552]). Event descriptions and 
justification of the input values for the event trees that are utilized in the criticality FEPs 
screening analysis are provided in subsequent sections. 
The first event tree from the configuration generator defines the fractional breakdown of the 
waste forms and waste package types proposed for disposal in the repository. This event tree, 
Table 6.2-2 Listing of Configuration Generation Model Event Trees (Continued) 
Event Tree Name Description Use in Criticality FEPs 
Screening Analysis 
CONFIG-IP4-A Event tree for evaluating configuration class IP-4 Yes, for seismic case 
CONFIG-IP5 Event tree for evaluating configuration class IP-5 Not used in this analysis 
CONFIG-IP-6C Event tree for evaluating configuration class IP-6 Not used in this analysis 
CONFIG-NF-F Event tree for initiating the evaluation of near-field 
configuration classes Yes, for all cases 
CONFIG-NF1 Event tree for evaluating configuration class NF-1 Yes, for all cases 
CONFIG-NF2 Event tree for evaluating configuration class NF-2 Yes, for all cases 
CONFIG-NF3 Event tree for evaluating configuration class NF-3 Yes, for all cases 
CONFIG-NF4 Event tree for evaluating configuration classes NF-4 
and NF-DD 
Yes, for base, seismic, and rock 
fall cases 
CONFIG-NF4-E Continuation of tree for evaluating configuration class 
NF-4 TP E Not used in this analysis 
CONFIG-NF5-I Event tree for evaluating configuration class NF-5 TP I Not used in this analysis 
CONFIG-FF-J Event tree for evaluating configuration class FF-1 Yes, for seismic and igneous 
cases 
CONFIG-FF-K Event tree for evaluating configuration class FF-2 Yes, for seismic and igneous 
cases 
CONFIG-FF3 Event tree for evaluating configuration class FF-3 Yes, for seismic and igneous 
cases 
IGNEOUS Event tree for initiating evaluation of igneous 
configuration class Yes, for igneous case 
IG-ERUPTIVE Event tree for evaluating igneous eruptive scenarios  
configuration classes IGE-1, IGE-2, and IGE-3 Yes, for igneous case 
IG-INTRUSIVE Event tree for evaluating igneous intrusion scenarios  
configuration classes  IGI-4, IGI-5, and IGI-6 Yes, for igneous case 
IG-INTRUSIVE2 
Continuation of evaluation of igneous intrusion 
scenarios  configuration classes  IGI-1, IGI-2, and 
IGI-3 
Yes, for igneous case 

presented in Figure 6.2-1, is a stand-alone tree (i.e., none of its end states transfer to a sub-event 
tree). 
Its purpose is to graphically identify the fraction of total waste package inventory for each 
waste form and waste package type, including naval waste package types. The inventory 
fractions presented on this event tree are based on the information provided in Table 4.1-3. 
1
21-PWR Absorber Plate (38.21% of inventory)
PWR (40.51% of inventory)
2
21-PWR ControlRod (0.84% of inventory)
Com mercial SNF (66.42% of inventory)
12-PWR Absorber Plate (1.45% of inventory) 3
44-BWR Absorber Plate (25.16% of inventory)
BWR (25.91% of total inventory)
4 
5
DOE Short (0.04% of inventory)
Mixed O xide (0.59% of inventory)
6 
(1.47% 
of inventory) DOE Short (1.47% of inventory)
8
9
DOE Short (0.14% of inventory)
Uranium M etal (2.13% of inventory) 
10
DOE Long (0.04% of inventory)
DOE MCO (1.96% of inventory)
11
High-E nriched Uranium Ox ide DOE Short (5.82% of inventory)
(6.20% of inventory)
12 
13
DO E SNF (30.91% of inventory) Uranium/T horium O xide DOE Short (0.18% of inventory)
(0.83% of inventory)
14 
DOE Long (0.65% of inventory) 
15
Uranium /T horium Carbide 
(5.38% 
ofinventory) DOE Long (5.38% of inventory)
DOE Short (10.90% of inventory)
16
Aluminum Based (10.91% of inventory)
17 
18
DOE Long (0.01% of inventory)
DOE Short (0.12% of inventory)
Uranium-Zirconium/Uranium-Molybdenum
19 
(0.29% 
of inventory) 
20
DOE Long (0.17% of inventory)
DOE Short (0.07% of inventory)
Low-Enriched Urani um O xide
21 
(3.13% 
of inventory) 
22
DOE Long (3.06% of inventory)
Naval Short (1.28% of inventory)
Naval SNF (2.67% of inventory)
23 
24-BWR Absorber Plate (0.75% of inventory) 
DOE Long (0.54% of inventory) 
7
Uranium-Zirconium Hydride 
DOE Long (0.37% of inventory) 
W aste Package Fraction 
24
Naval Long (1.39% ofinventory)
Source: BSC 2004 [DIRS 168552], Attachment I
WPWP 
ion 
#-TYPE 
Waste Package Type 
Percentages 
WF-TYPE-PERC 
Waste Form 
Type Pe rcentages 
WF-SOURCE 
Waste Form Source 
Percentages 
Waste Package 
FractEND -STA TE Fre quencyWP-21-PWR-AP 3.822E-00 1WP-21-PWR-CR 8.426E-003WP-12-PWR-AP 1.450E-00 2WP-44-BWR-AP 2.516E-00 1WP-24-BWR-AP 7.462E-00 3WP-DOE-1-S HORT 4.453E-00 4WP-DOE-1-LONG 5.430E-00 3WP-DOE-2-S HORT 1.466E-00 2WP-DOE-3-S HORT 1.423E-00 3 
WP-DOE-3-LONG 3.563E-004 
WP-DOE-3-MCO 1.956E-002 
WP-DOE-4-S HORT 5.823E-002 
WP-DOE-4-LONG 3.736E-003 
WP-DOE-5-S HORT 1.776E-003 
WP-DOE-5-LONG 6.480E-003 
WP-DOE-6-LONG 5.380E-002 
WP-DOE-7-S HORT 1.090E-001 
WP-DOE-7-LONG 8.727E-005 
WP-DOE-8-S HORT 1.246E-003 
WP-DOE-8-LONG 1.691E-003 
WP-DOE-9-S HORT 7.103E-004 
WP-DOE-9-LONG 3.058E-002 
WP-NAVA L-SHORT 1.282E-002 
WP-NAVA L-LONG 1.388 E-00 2 
Figure 6.2-1. Fraction of Waste Form and Waste Package Types Proposed for Disposal at the 
Repository 
Although the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program (NNPP) is responsible for assessing the 
criticality potential of the naval waste package types in their Technical Support Document for the 
License Application (McKenzie 2004 [DIRS 170742]), these waste package types are presented 
on this event tree for completeness. 
The 22 commercial and DOE SNF waste package types listed in Figure 6.2-1 are utilized as the 
initiating event in 22 separate event trees. The sole purpose of these event trees is to transfer to 
the event tree that initiates the evaluation of the four criticality FEPs cases. An example of the 
Waste Package Type event tree representing the 21-PWR Absorber Plate waste package is 
presented in Figure 6.2-2. The automatic transfer of this event tree is indicated by the T after 
the event tree sequence number in the # column. The YMP-INIT-EVENTS end state name 
in the END-STATE column indicates the name of the event tree to which the transfer occurs. 

itiil# 
1 TPASS 
PASS THROUGH 
WP01-21-PWR-AP 
Inatng Event of 
21-PWR Absorber Pate 
Waste Package Type 
END-STATE 
YMP-INIT -EVENTS 
Source: BSC 2004 [DIRS 168552], Attachment I. 
Figure 6.2-2. Example of Waste Package Type Event Tree 
The YMP-INIT-EVENTS event tree is presented in Figure 6.2-3. This event tree directs the 
evaluation of the four criticality FEPs cases  (1) Base Case, (2) Seismic Disruptive Event, 
(3) Rock Fall Disruptive Event, and (4) Igneous Disruptive Event. These cases are respectively 
represented by the four branches of the first top event  INIT-EVENT. The probabilities of 
occurrence assigned to the top event branches representing these four criticality FEPs cases are 
as follows: 

iDriiiiiD il 
itii#DRIFT-ZONE 
Geolo gcal Zone 
of Emplacemen t 
ft s 
SEI S-DAMAGE 
Se smc Event 
Damage Type 
SEIS-RANGE 
Se smic Frequences 
Br oken into D ecade 
R anges 
INIT-EVENT 
f feren t PotentiaIn ating Events 
YMP-INIT-EVENTS 
Incom ng Waste 
Package Type 
Ide ntifier 
END-STATE 
MSL-ET 
MSL-ET 
MSL-ET 
MSL-ET 
MSL-ET 
MSL-ET 
MSL-ET 
MSL-ET 
MSL-ET 
MSL-ET 
MSL-ET 
MSL-ET 
MSL-ET 
MSL-ET 
MSL-ET 
MSL-ET 
MSL-ET 
MSL-ET 
IGNEOUS 
IGNEOUS 
Base Case Nonlithophysal 
1T
Lithophysal 
2T
Gr ound Motion Nonlithophysal 
3TSeismic Frequency 
1E-8 to 2E-8 Lithophysal 
4T
Nonlithophysal 
5T
Faulting 
Lithophysal 6T
Gr ound Motion Nonlithophysal 
7TSeismic Frequency 
2E-8 to 6E-8 Lithophysal 
8T
Nonlithophysal 
9TSeismic Disruptive Event Faulting 
Lithophysal
WP Type 
10 T
Gr ound Motion Nonlithophysal 
11 TSeismic Frequency 
6E-8 to 2E-7 Lithophysal 12 T
Nonlithophysal 
13 T
Faulting 
Lithophysal 
14 T
Seismic Frequency 
2E-7 to 1E-4 Nonlithophysal 
15 T
Lithophysal 
16 T
Rock Fall Disruptive Event Nonlithophysal 
17 T
Lithophysal 
18 T
Igneous Disruptive Event Nonlithophysal 
19 T
Lithophysal 
20 T
Source: BSC 2004 [DIRS 168552], Attachment I.
Figure 6.2-3. Event Tree for Processing Criticality FEPs Cases
BASE-CASE = 0.000E-000 (complement of 1.00) 
SEISMIC-EVENT = 1.000E-000 
ROCKFALL-EVENT = 0.000E-000 
IGNEOUS-EVENT = 1.700E-004 
The probability of BASE-CASE branch of this top event has been assigned a probability of 0.0 
because the value of an upper branch, or failure branch, is interpreted by SAPHIRE as the 
complement of its assigned value (i.e., one minus the assigned value). Since the base case 
criticality FEPs are always to be evaluated, a zero value is assigned to this branch (i.e., 0=11). 
The evaluation of the base case criticality FEPs is presented in Section 6.3. 
The seismic disruptive event branch, or second branch, of top event INIT-EVENT, is also 
assigned a probability of 1.0 (i.e., always evaluated). This was done so as not to modify the 
seismic sub-event probabilities of top events SEIS-RANGE and SEIS-DAMAGE. As indicated 
by the top event SEIS-RANGE, the seismic disruptive event has been divided into four sub-
events, each representing a seismic frequency range. Top event SEIS-DAMAGE further 

subdivides the top three seismic frequency ranges based on whether the seismic induced damage 
results from ground motion or faulting. 
Seismic consequences have been evaluated for annual exceedance frequencies ranging from 10-4 
to 10-8 per year (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169183], Section 6.4.2). The determination of the subdivision 
of the seismic case analysis represented by top event SEIS-RANGE is based on the seismic 
faulting events impact on the waste package. For seismic event annual exceedance frequencies 
greater than 210-7 per year (i.e., less severe earthquakes), no waste package damage occurs due 
to faulting (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169183], Section 6.7.5). For seismic event annual exceedance 
frequencies less than 210-7 per year (i.e., more severe earthquakes) waste package failure is 
initiated. Six waste packages are predicted to fail for seismic faulting events at the 610-8 to 
210-7 per year annual exceedance frequency range. A maximum of 56 waste package failures 
are predicted to occur for seismic faulting events at the 110-8 to 210-8 per year annual 
exceedance frequency range (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169183], Section 6.7.5). Seismic event annual 
exceedance frequencies from 110-8 to 210-8 per year are represented by the upper branch of 
top event SEIS-RANGE. The second branch represents the annual exceedance frequency range 
of 210-8 to 610-8 per year, the third branch represents 610-8 to 210-7 per year, and the lower 
branch represent 210-7 to 110-4 per year annual exceedance frequencies. These basic events 
assigned to these branches are SEIS-1E-8TO2E-8, SEIS-2E-8TO6E-8, SEIS-6E-8TO2E-7, and 
SEIS-2E-7TO1E-4, respectively. The probabilities of these basic events are determined using 
Equation 6.2-1 and the information provided in Table 6.2-3: 
Probability = [(1-e-...t)] (Eq. 6.2-1) 
where: .. is the difference in the seismic annual exceedance frequencies of interest 
(.2 -. 1) 
.t is the difference in the time periods of interest (t1  t2) 
Table 6.2-3. Calculation of Seismic Basic Event Probabilities 
Seismic Basic Event .1 
(events/year) 
. 2 
(events/year) 
t1 
(years) 
t2 
(years) Probability 
SEIS-1E-8TO2E-8 1.0E-8 2.0E-8 10,000 0 1.000E-4 
SEIS-2E-8TO6E-8 2.0E-8 6.0E-8 10,000 0 4.000E-4 
SEIS-6E-8TO2E-7 6.0E-8 2.0E-7 10,000 0 1.400E-3 
SEIS-2E-7TO1E-4 2.0E-7 1.0E-4 10,000 0 6.314E-1 
The top three branches of top event SEIS-RANGE are further subdivided to account for the 
waste package failure dependency on seismic induced ground motions and faulting. The lower 
branch of top event SEIS-RANGE is not subdivided because seismic faulting is not predicted to 
result in any waste package failures for this annual exceedance frequency range. The event 
SEIS-GROUND defines the upper branch of the SEIS-DAMAGE top event and is used to 
evaluate the potential of waste package failure due to seismic induced ground motions. The 
event SEIS-FAULT represents the lower branch of the SEIS-DAMAGE top event and is used to 
evaluate the potential of waste package failure due to seismic induced faulting. To activate 

evaluation of both branches of this top event, event /SEIS-GROUND is assigned a value of 0.0 
(complement of 1.0) for all seismic ranges. The event SEIS-FAULT is assigned a value of 1.0 
for seismic ranges represented by the first and second branches of SEIS-RANGE for all 
commercial SNF waste package types (21PWR Absorber Plate, 21PWR Control Rod, 
12-PWR Absorber Plate, 44BWR Absorber Plate, and 24BWR Absorber Plate waste package 
types). For the DOE SNF waste package types (5DHLW/DOE Short, 5DHLW/DOE Long, 
and 2MCO/2DHLW waste package types), SEIS-FAULT is assigned a value of 1.0 for 
seismic ranges represented by the upper and first, second, and third branches of SEIS-RANGE. 
The evaluation of the seismic disruptive event is presented in Section 6.4. 
The rock fall disruptive event is represented by the third branch of top event INIT-EVENT. The 
basic event for this criticality FEPs case is ROCKFALL-EVENT. This event has been assigned 
a value of 0.0 because, as is discussed in Section 6.5, rock fall does not result in any new 
potentially critical scenarios beyond those already defined for the base case. Rock fall is the 
result of natural drift degradation phenomena and is expected to occur throughout the postclosure 
period without any predictable frequency. The rock fall disruptive event is differentiated from 
rock fall that may occur during a seismic disruptive event. Damage resulting from seismic 
induced rock fall is accounted for in the Section 6.4. 
The igneous disruptive event case is represented by the fourth branch of the INIT-EVENT top 
event. Its basic event is IGNEOUS-EVENT. The igneous disruptive event has a probability of 
occurrence of 1.710-4 over the 10,000-year regulatory period. Determination of this probability 
is performed using the following equation: 
Probability = [(1-e-.t)] (Eq. 6.2-2) 
where 
. = intersection frequency (mean) of volcanic event with repository 1.710-8/yr (BSC 
2004 [DIRS 169989], Table 7-1) 
t = 10,000 years 
The evaluation of the igneous disruptive event is presented in Section 6.6. 
The DRIFT top event of the YMP-INIT-EVENTS event tree is used to split the criticality FEP 
evaluations between the two geological zones of the drifts  lithophysal and nonlithophysal. 
Based on the drift area information presented in Table 4.1-2, of the 4,983,152 m2 of total 
emplacement drift area, 745,486 m2 is in the nonlithophysal geological zone. This results in a 
top event split fraction of 0.15 for nonlithophysal (745,486/4,983,152) and 0.85 for lithophysal. 
These values are applied to the event tree evaluation by assigning the value of 0.85 to 
DRIFTZONE. 
The upper branch of DRIFT-ZONE (i.e., /DRIFT-ZONE) is assigned the 
complement value (i.e., 1 - 0.85 = 0.15). As is discussed in Section 6.3 (base case criticality 
FEPs), Section 6.4 (seismic disruptive event criticality FEPs), Section 6.5 (rock fall disruptive 
event criticality FEPs), and Section 6.6 (igneous disruptive event criticality FEPs), it is important 
to distinguish between the two geological units to account for their different impacts on seepage, 
drip shield damage, and waste package damage. 

The sequences of the YMP-INIT-EVENTS event tree of Figure 6.2-3 automatically transfer to 
another event tree. An event tree transfer is indicated by the T after the sequence numbers in 
the # column. The MSL-ET end state name in the END-STATE column for the first ten 
sequences indicates the name of the event tree to which the transfer occurs. The MSL-ET 
event tree (shown in Figure 6.2-4) performs the probability evaluation for availability of seepage, 
drip shield and waste package failure, availability of condensation, seepage accumulation in the 
waste package (i.e., formation of a bathtub or flow-through configuration), and neutron absorber 
material misload. 
A transfer to the IGNEOUS event tree is indicated for the end states of the remaining two 
sequences. The IGNEOUS event tree directs the probability evaluation of potentially critical 
configurations during an igneous event. 
IiMS -Iiidrilto iMS -IInfiliio 
(ial 
i) 
#MSC-
1B 
Condensaton 
water reaches 
waste package 
C-2 
Drip Sheld Failure 
Allowng Water to drip 
on Waste Package 
MS-NF-T 
Water that reaches 
ft fows directly 
nvert 
C-1A 
tration water 
reaches drft 
MSL-ET 
Master ScenarListpotentcritcal scenariosEND-STATEMSL-ET2MSL-ET2MSL-ET2MSL-ET2MSL-ET2MSL-ET2CO NF IG -NF4MSL-ET2MSL-ET2 
MSL-ET2 
MSL-ET2 
CO NF IG -NF4 
MSL-ET2 
MSL-ET2 
MSL-ET2 
MSL-ET2 
CO NF IG -NF4 
NO 
1T
NO 
YE S 
2T 
NO 
3T
NO 
YE S 
4T 
YES NO 
(lower bound
NO 
infiltration) 
5T
YES 
YE S 
6T 
YE S (NF-4 TRANSFER) 
7T 
NO
Master Scenario List 
8T
NO 
YE S 
9T
NO 
NO 
YES 
10 T
YES
(mean infilt ration) 
YE S 
11 TYE S (NF-4 TRANSFER) 
12 T
NO 
13 T
NO 
YE S 
14 T
YES NO
(upper bound
NO 
infiltration) 
15 T
YES 
YE S 
16 TYE S (NF-4 TRANSFER) 
17 T
Source: BSC 2004 [DIRS 168552], Attachment I. 
Figure 6.2-4. Master Scenario List Event Tree  MSL-ET 
As presented in the MSL-ET event tree and its continuation event tree MSL-ET2 of 
Figures 6.2-4 and 6.2-5, nine top events are used to define the events and processes necessary for 
the formation of a waste package bathtub or flow-through configuration. The purpose of the first 
top event, MS-IC-1A, is to evaluate the probability of infiltration water or seepage reaching the 

drift. This top event is separated into four branches. The first branch represents the no seepage 
case. The second through fourth branches represent lower bound, mean, and upper bound 
seepage rates, respectively. The quantification of the branch probabilities is provided in 
Sections 6.3 through 6.6. 
If seepage is predicted to occur (i.e., any one of the three bottom branches of the MS-IC-1A top 
event), then top event MS-NF-T is queried. The purpose of this top event is to account for the 
availability of water in the drift invert, or near-field. Water in the invert provides a transport 
mechanism of fissile material to the far-field in the event of waste package breach and its release 
of the waste form. Water in the invert may also provide a reducing environment that causes the 
deposition and accumulation of fissile material in the near-field. The upper branch, of this top 
event accounts for the availability of water to enter a failed waste package. The lower branch, 
accounts for seepage water in the invert. The lower branch transfers directly to the near-field 
event tree CONFIG-NF4 for further evaluation. Both branches of this top event are evaluated 
in order to assess the criticality potential of these scenarios. Therefore, /MS-NF-T is assigned a 
value of 0.00 (i.e., the complement of 1.00) and MS-NF-T is assigned a value of 1.00. 
lil ofload 
iisload 
4 
ills 
iMS-
f#CR IT-PO T-WF 
Criticaty 
PotentiaWaste F orm 
WF-MISLO AD 
Waste Form 
MisNA-M ISLOAD 
Neutr on 
Absorber 
Mater al MMS-IC-
Liquid FWaste Package 
MS-IC-3B 
Bathtub 
Confguration 
For ms 
IC -3A 
Was te Pac kage 
Penetration 
MSL-ET 2 
Transferrom 
MSL-E T 
END -ST ATE 
@ EN D-ANALYSIS 
@ EN D-ANALYSIS 
CON FIG-D RY 
@ EN D-ANALYSIS 
CON FIG-D RY 
@ EN D-ANALYSIS 
CON FIG-D RY 
@ EN D-ANALYSIS 
CON FIG-D RYCON FIG-N OBATHCON FIG-N OBATHCON FIG-BAT HCON FIG-BAT HCON FIG-BAT HCON FIG-BAT HCON FIG-BAT HCON FIG-BAT HCON FIG-BAT HCON FIG-BAT H 
NO 
1 
NO POTENTIAL 
2 
NO YES POTENTIAL 
3 
NO NO POTENTIAL 
4 
YES 
YES POTENTIAL 
YES (diffusive) 
5 
NO POTENTIAL 
6 
NO YES POTENTIAL 
7 
YES NO POTENTIAL 
8 
YES YES POTENTIAL 
9 
Flow-Through NO 
10 T 
Configuration 
YES 
11 T 
NO 
12 T 
YES (advective) NO 
YES 
13 T 
YES 
(lower bound 
infiltration) NO 14 T 
YES 
Bathtub 
15 T 
Configuration 
YES 
(mean infiltr ation) NO 
16 T 
YES 
17 T 
YES 
(upper bound NOinfiltration) 18 T 
YES 
19 T 
Source: BSC 2004 [DIRS 168552], Attachment I.
Figure 6.2-5. Continuation of Master Scenario List Event Tree  MSL-ET2

Top event MS-IC-2 evaluates the probability that, given seepage in the drift, the drip shield is 
failed in such a manner to allow water to pass through to the waste package. Regardless of 
whether the drip shield is failed (i.e., branching goes down) or not (i.e., branching goes up), top 
event MS-IC-1B is queried. If the drip shield is failed, the query of top event MS-IC-1B is 
performed to determine if, in addition to seepage, condensation water flux is available to enter a 
waste package. If the drip shield is not failed, the query of the condensation top event is 
performed to determine if any water flux is available to enter a waste package. 
Other than the sequences of the lower branch of top event MS-NF-T, which transfer to the 
CONFIG-NF4 event tree, all remaining sequences of the MSL-ET event tree transfer to its 
continuation event tree, MSL-ET2. 
There are six top events in the MSL-ET2 event tree to complete the master scenario list 
initiation. The first top event to be queried is MS-IC-3A. Top event MS-IC-3A evaluates the 
probability of a waste package failure. The branching of this top event allows for breaches that 
permit both advective and diffusive flow paths into the waste package as well as no waste 
package failures. The middle branch of this top event represents a diffusive failure of the waste 
package. The bottom branch of this top event represents a waste package failure that allows 
advective flow of water to enter and support the generation of a potentially critical configuration. 
If the waste package is not failed (i.e., branching goes up), then the analysis is terminated. 
Termination of sequence evaluation is indicated by the @END-ANALYSIS end state name (the 
@ symbol prefixing an end state name indicates to SAPHIRE to stop processing). 
Top event MS-IC-3B evaluates the probability that, given an advective flow path into the waste 
package (bottom branch of top event MS-IC-3A), either a flow-through or a bathtub 
configuration is formed. A flow-through configuration results from a failure of both the top and 
bottom of the waste package, allowing the water to flow in through the top of the waste package 
and out through the bottom. This configuration is represented by the upper branch of this top 
event. A bathtub configuration is formed when only a top failure of the waste package occurs. 
The bathtub waste package configuration is represented by the bottom branch of this top event. 
If a flow-through waste package configuration is formed, the next top event queried is 
NA-MISLOAD. If a bathtub waste package configuration is formed, then top event MS-IC-4 is 
queried. 
Top event MS-IC-4 evaluates the probability that, given its availability to enter a failed waste 
package, water accumulates in and fills the waste package creating a potentially critical 
configuration. The probability value for water accumulation and waste package filling is 
dependent on the seepage scenario of top event MS-IC-1A of event tree MSL-ET. Therefore, 
separate branches are provided in top event MS-IC-4 that reflect the branching of MS-IC-1A for 
the lower-bound, mean, and upper-bound seepage scenarios. The second through fourth 
branches from the top of this top event respectively represents these seepage scenarios. The 
upper branch of this top event represents the probability that water does not accumulate in 
sufficient quantity to fill the waste package. 
The accumulation and retention of water in the waste package is referred to as a bathtub 
configuration and is represented on the event tree as a downward branch for top event MS-IC-
3B. It is also possible for water to enter the waste package, but does not accumulate due to a 

breach in the waste package bottom. This condition is referred to as a flow-through 
configuration and is represented on the event tree as an upward branch for top event MS-IC-3B. 
Potentially critical configurations could result from either condition through the degradation of 
the waste package internals and the separation or removal of neutron absorber and/or fissile 
materials. 
Another possible configuration is one in which a breach in the top and bottom of the waste 
package exists, but that the bottom hole is much smaller than the top hole so more water could 
enter the waste package through the top than could exit through the bottom. This configuration 
is not explicitly considered in this analysis because such a bottom breach would have to be a 
diffusive type that would make this waste package configuration a subset of the bathtub 
configuration. Otherwise, it would be a flow-through configuration. 
The next top event evaluated for the MSL-ET2 event tree is NA-MISLOAD. This top event is 
queried for either waste package diffusive or advective (both bathtub and flow-through 
configurations) flow path failure branches of all the branches of the MS-IC-3A and MS-IC-3B 
top events. The NA-MISLOAD top event evaluates the probability that neutron absorber 
material is not loaded as designed into the waste package or waste form. Evaluation of neutron 
absorber material misload is an important consideration for the determination of a 
configurations criticality potential. Dependent on the top event MS-IC-4 branching, both 
misload and no misload branches transfer to the appropriate CONFIG-BATH and 
CONFIG-NOBATH event trees for further criticality potential evaluation. 
If the NA-MISLOAD top event is queried following a diffusive failure of the waste package 
(middle branch of top event MS-IC-3A), then the processing of these sequences proceeds to the 
evaluation of top events WF-MISLOAD and CRIT-POT-WF. The WF-MISLOAD misload top 
event queries the potential for misloading the waste packages waste form and top event 
CRIT-POT-WF evaluates the criticality potential of the resulting configuration. The upper 
branch of the CRIT-POT-WF top event indicates that this configuration does not have any 
criticality potential and processing of this sequence is terminated. The lower branch of this top 
event indicates that the configuration has a criticality potential and the probability associated 
with that potential is assigned to end state CONFIG-DRY. 
As stated previously, the above section provides an overview of only the initial event trees from 
the configuration generator. Forty-eight event trees comprise the configuration generator, of 
which 26 have been discussed (22 of these represent the waste form/waste package type 
configuration, of which only one representative event tree has been discussed). Detailed 
discussion for the remaining 22 event trees of the configuration generator are presented in 
Configuration Generator Model (BSC 2004 [DIRS 168552]). 
Evaluation of the configuration generator by the SAPHIRE software code allows for the 
truncation of sequences based on their in-process probability value. If the probability of a 
sequence falls below the truncation or cutoff value, continued processing of this sequence is 
halted and a value of zero assigned. This cutoff threshold is equivalent to the probability 
screening criterion discussed in the Disposal Criticality Analysis Methodology Topical Report 
(BSC 2003 [DIRS 165505], Section 3.2.1) and is used to screen from further consideration 
configuration classes that contribute insignificantly to the total probability of a criticality 

occurring in the repository during the period of regulatory concern. A value of 10-15 is utilized as 
the probability screening criterion for SAPHIRE sequence evaluation. This value has been 
utilized based on the limitation of personal computers for the number of significant digits that 
can be tracked with double precision. 
6.3 ANALYSIS OF BASE CASE CRITICALITY FEPS 
This screening analysis of the base case postclosure criticality FEPs evaluates the probability that 
water is able to enter a waste package to degrade the waste package internals and waste form and 
create a potentially critical configuration during the regulatory period (10,000 years after 
repository closure). The probability of potentially critical configurations is considered for both 
internal and external waste package scenarios. 
For a criticality event to occur, the proper combination of materials (neutron moderators, neutron 
absorbers, fissile materials, or isotopes) and geometric configuration must exist. A critical 
system for the geological repository is defined as one having an effective neutron multiplication 
factor (keff) larger than the critical limit. The critical limit is the value of keff at which a system 
(configuration of fissile material) is considered critical as characterized by statistical tolerance 
limits (BSC 2004 [DIRS 168553], Section 6.3.1). 
All postclosure criticality FEPs, internal and external, require water infiltration to degrade the 
waste package internals and waste form. Neutron absorber material loss and a flooded waste 
package condition for neutron moderation is the most likely scenario that could result in a 
potentially critical configuration in any of the in situ criticality FEPs. Seepage flow-through and 
humid air conditions internal to the waste package may also degrade waste package internal 
components and waste forms. However, based on its corrosion rate (Assumption 5.1.9), 
sufficient neutron absorber material loss (Assumption 5.1.9) and adequate neutron moderation 
are unlikely under these conditions and the generation of an internal criticality configuration is 
improbable. External criticality FEPs (near-field and far-field) also require the separation of 
neutron absorber materials from the waste form and, additionally, the transport of fissile material 
from the waste package and its re-accumulation in the drift invert or beyond. 
Water, silica, and carbon are the only potential moderating materials for internal and external 
configurations. Water, the most effective neutron-moderating material, can enter the waste 
package as percolation flow or be present in the pores of the rock. Silica is present in 
appreciable quantities in the high-level radioactive waste glass canisters and in the rock. Silica 
can also be introduced into the waste package through precipitation from the percolation flow. 
Carbon is present in only limited amounts in less than 20 percent of the DOE SNF waste package 
types (DOE 2004 [DIRS 170071]) and, therefore, has a limited impact on the potential for 
criticality. The loading of the DOE-standardized SNF canisters, the design of the basket 
structure inside the canisters, and the addition of neutron absorber materials take into account the 
presence and effect of degraded glass in DOE SNF codisposal waste packages. Silica from the 
degradation of high-level radioactive waste glass, therefore, has no impact on the potential for 
criticality in DOE SNF waste packages. Silica is a much less effective moderator than water and 
its introduction into commercial SNF waste packages from seepage infiltration will displace 
water and effectively reduce the reactivity of the system, thus reducing the potential for 
criticality. Additionally, silica can act as a neutron reflector. However, inside the waste package 

its reflector effects, which increase reactivity, are secondary to its water displacement effects, 
which decrease reactivity (YMP 2003 [DIRS 165505], Section 3.7.2). Current evaluations from 
Total Dust Settling on Naval Long Waste Packages in 100 Years (BSC 2004 [DIRS 171462], 
Table 4) indicate only a limited quantity of tuff (up to 20 kg) is available to enter a failed waste 
package. 
In addition, criticality without water infiltration is unlikely for the repository since the critical 
mass for unmoderated or silica moderated systems exceeds the fissionable content of a waste 
package (YMP 2003 [DIRS 165505], Section 3.7.1.1). This also results from satisfying a 
preclosure operations requirement that the MGR provide means to ensure criticality control 
during SNF/HLW handling operations, including waste package loading (Curry 2004 [DIRS 
170557], Requirement 1.1.6-4). 
Some of the DOE SNF waste forms have highly enriched fuel or a waste form that could 
potentially support unmoderated (fast) criticality if (1) the fissile material is concentrated beyond 
its design concentration in the waste form, and (2) the neutron absorber materials are removed. 
Concentration of the fissile material beyond its design concentration could result from either the 
degradation of the waste form resulting from water infiltration or a disruptive event. However, 
removal of the neutron absorber materials from a DOE SNF waste package would require a 
breach of the waste package and a removal mechanism. The most likely neutron absorber 
material removal mechanism is through water infiltration resulting in degradation of the waste 
package internal components, dissolving of the neutron absorber material in the water, and 
flushing of the material from the waste package. 
6.3.1 Internal (In Situ) Criticality 
Water entering a failed waste package may occur from two primary pathways: (1) water dripping 
from the drift crown, and (2) water dripping from the underside of the drip shield due to 
evaporation and condensation. The first pathway can occur if the drip shield fails to divert 
dripping water from the drift crown into a failed waste package. The second pathway can occur 
if water vapor condenses on the underside of the drip shield and falls onto and enters a failed 
waste package. The probability that these conditions exist for the base case criticality FEPs is 
discussed in Section 6.3.3. The list of base case internal (in situ) criticality FEPs to be evaluated 
is presented in Table 6.3-1. 
The intact, fully flooded configuration of FEPs 2.1.14.15.0A, 2.1.14.18.0A, 2.1.14.21.0A, and 
2.1.14.24.0A is discussed in Section 6.2. Criticality is precluded by design for this 
configuration. 

Table 6.3-1. Base Case Configurations: Internal (In Situ) Criticality FEPs 
FEP Number FEP Name FEP Description 
2.1.14.15.0A In-package criticality 
(intact configuration) 
The waste package internal structures and the waste form remain 
intact. If there is a breach (or are breaches) in the waste package 
which allows water to either accumulate or flow-through the waste 
package then criticality could occur in situ. In-package criticality 
resulting from disruptive events is addressed in separate FEPs. 
The waste package internal structures and the waste form may 
degrade. If a critical configuration (sufficient fissile material and 
In-package criticality neutron moderator, lack of neutron absorbers) develops, criticality 
2.1.14.16.0A (degraded 
configurations) 
could occur in situ. Potential in situ critical configurations are defined 
in Figures 3.2a and 3.2b of Disposal Criticality Analysis Methodology 
Topical Report (YMP 2003 [DIRS 165505]). In-package criticality 
resulting from disruptive events is addressed in separate FEPs. 
Source: Table 6.1-1 
6.3.2 External (Near-Field and Far-Field) Criticality 
The probability of external criticality is less than the probability of water entering a waste 
package. If the probability of water entering a waste package (in either a bathtub or flow-
through configuration) during the regulatory period is calculated to be below the regulatory 
probability criterion for inclusion of events (at least one chance in 10,000 of occurring over 
10,000 years (10 CFR 63.114(d) DIRS [156605]), then the probability of an external criticality 
would be even lower. This is because, in addition to the events evaluated to calculate the 
probability of water entering a waste package, the probability of the following events must be 
considered: 
 
Degrading the waste form during the regulatory period 
 
Separating the fissile materials from the degraded waste form 
 
Removing the fissile materials from the waste package 
 
Accumulating sufficient fissile materials into a potentially critical configuration in the 
near-field or far-field environments 
 
Having sufficient neutron moderator available. 
The minimum critical mass required to be accumulated in the invert has been calculated for a 
range of 235U enrichments in Critical Mass Search Calculation in the Invert (BSC 2004 [DIRS 
170060]). The critical mass results from this calculation are summarized in Table 6.3-2. Critical 
Mass Search Calculation in the Invert (BSC 2004 [DIRS 170060]) calculates that less than 11 kg 
of uranium will accumulate in the invert under a waste package. Based on the values presented 
in Table 6.3-2, 11 kg of uranium in the invert will not have criticality potential. 

Table 6.3-2. Minimum 235U Critical Mass 
Invert Void 
Fraction 
Waste Form 235U Enrichment 
(weight percent) 
(percent) 5 15 25 50 75 100 
27 N/A 20.85 kg 19.39 kg 17.63 kg 16.63 kg 16.23 kg 
39 29.00 kg 29.19 kg 27.28 kg 25.50 kg 23.00 kg 21.83 kg 
Source: BSC 2004 [DIRS 170060] 
NOTE: N/A  not applicable; insufficient fissile material to result in a critical mass 
The base case external criticality FEPs are presented in Table 6.3-3. The external FEPs define 
criticality configurations that begin with source terms resulting from the transport of fissile 
materials from the waste package in a form (either as solutes, colloids, or slurry of fine 
particulate) that can be transported into the drift invert (near-field) and beyond (far-field). 
Table 6.3-3. Base Case Configurations: External (Near-Field and Far-Field) Criticality FEPs 
FEP Number FEP Name FEP Description 
Near-field criticality could occur if fissile material-bearing solution 
from the waste package is transported into the drift and the fissile 
2.1.14.17.0A Near-field criticality 
material is precipitated into a critical configuration. Potential near-
field critical configurations are defined in Figure 3.3a of Disposal 
Criticality Analysis Methodology Topical Report (YMP 2003 [DIRS 
165505]). In-package criticality resulting from disruptive events is 
addressed in separate FEPs. 
Far-field criticality could occur if fissile material-bearing solution from 
the waste package is transported beyond the drift and the fissile 
2.2.14.09.0A Far-field criticality 
material is precipitated into a critical configuration. Potential far-field 
critical configurations are defined in Figure 3.3b of Disposal Criticality 
Analysis Methodology Topical Report (YMP 2003 [DIRS 165505]). 
In-package criticality resulting from disruptive events is addressed in 
separate FEPs. 
Source: Table 6.1-1 
6.3.3 SAPHIRE Event Probabilities for Base Case Analyses 
Assignments of the event probabilities for the base case SAPHIRE criticality FEPs evaluation 
are presented in the following sections. The events presented in these sections are used to 
quantify the master scenario list and a near-field configuration event tree for Appendix B, 
Figures B-4, B-5, and B-18. 
6.3.3.1 Quantification of Event Trees MSL-ET and MSL-ET2 
Six events and processes are required to define the formation of a waste package bathtub or flow-
through configuration. These events are listed as top events of the MSL-ET event tree 
(Appendix B, Figure B-4) and its continuation event tree MSL-ET2 (Appendix B, Figure B-5). 

These events are: 
(1) 
The probability that seepage flux is available to enter a waste package (top event 
MS-IC-1A) 
(2) 
The probability of drip shield failure (top event MS-IC-2) 
(3) 
The probability that condensation flux is available to enter a waste package (top event 
MS-IC-1B) 
(4) 
The probability of waste package failure (top event MS-IC-3A) 
(5) 
The probability that the waste package failure will allow for the formation of a bathtub 
configuration (top event MS-IC-3B) 
For bathtub configurations only: 
(6) 
The probability of sufficient seepage to fill and overflow the waste package during the 
regulatory period (top event MS-IC-4). 
In addition, event trees MSL-ET and MSL-ET2 contain four other top events necessary to 
define the internal and external configuration classes. The first of these is top event MS-NF-T 
that defines whether seepage that reaches the drift flows directly to the invert and is available to 
influence the formation of near-field configuration classes. The second top event, 
NA-MISLOAD, helps define the internal waste package conditions by querying whether the 
waste packages or waste forms neutron absorber material was misloaded. The third top event, 
WF-MISLOAD, defines the probability that a waste form has been misloaded into a waste 
package. Finally, the fourth top event determines the criticality potential for failed waste 
packages under dry diffusion conditions. 
The following subsections provide justification for the probabilities assigned to the events used 
in the quantification of event trees MSL-ET and MSL-ET2 for the base case criticality FEPs 
analysis. Of the 10 top events of these two event trees, only eight are necessary for the 
quantification of the base case criticality FEPs. Table 6.3-4 summarizes the event probability 
assignments discussed below. 

Table 6.3-4. Event Probability Assignment for the MSL-ET and MSL-ET2 Event Trees for Base Case 
Criticality FEPs SAPHIRE Analyses 
SAPHIRE Assigned 
Event Valuea 
Event Name and Description 
Probability 
Value 
(per waste package for 
all waste package types) Justification 
Availability of Seepage 
For the lithophysal zone: 
/MS-IC-1A-NOM-NWL (no seepage scenario) a 7.605E-1 2.395E-1 
MS-IC-1A-NOM-LL (lower-bound seepage scenario) 1.104E-2 1.104E-2 
MS-IC-1A-NOM-ML (mean seepage scenario) 1.007E-1 1.007E-1 
MS-IC-1A-NOM-UL (upper-bound seepage scenario) 1.278E-1 1.278E-1 
Section 
6.3.3.1.1 
For the nonlithophysal zone: 
/MS-IC-1A-NOM-NWNL (no seepage scenario) 5.170E-1 4.830E-1 
MS-IC-1A-NOM-LNL (lower-bound seepage scenario) 3.518E-2 3.518E-2 
MS-IC-1A-NOM-MNL (mean seepage scenario) 2.127E-1 2.127E-1 
MS-IC-1A-NOM-UNL (upper-bound seepage scenario) 2.351E-1 2.351E-1 
(MS-IC-1A top event) 
Flow of Seepage to the Near-Field Environment 
/MS-NF-T (water available to enter failed WP) 
MS-NF-T (water available directly to drift) 
True a 
True 
0.00 
1.00 Section 
6.3.3.1.2 
(MS-NF-T top event) 
Probability that drip shield fails within 10,000 years. 
/MS-IC-2 (no drip shield failure) 
MS-IC-2 (drip shield failure) 
True a 
False 
0.00 
0.00 Section 
6.3.3.1.3 
(MS-IC-2 top event) 
Availability of Condensation 
/MS-IC-1B (no condensation flux) 
MS-IC-1B (condensation flux) 
True a 
False 
0.00 
0.00 Section 
6.3.3.1.4 
(MS-IC-1B top event) 
Probability of waste package failure within 10,000 
years. 
/MS-IC-3A (no failure) 8.99972E-1 1.00028E-1 
MS-IC-3A[1] (diffusive flow path) 
MS-IC-3A[2] (advective flow path) 
1.00028E-1 
False 
1.00028E-1 
0.00 
Section 
6.3.3.1.5 
(MS-IC-3A top event) 

Table 6.3-4. Event Probability Assignment for the MSL-ET and MSL-ET2 Event Trees for Base Case 
Criticality FEPs SAPHIRE Analyses 
SAPHIRE Assigned 
Event Valuea 
Event Name and Description 
Probability 
Value 
(per waste package for 
all waste package types) Justification 
Probability of Neutron Absorber Material Misload in the 
Waste Package or Waste Form (MS-IC-3B top event) 
For the 21-PWR Control Rod waste package type 
/NA-MISLOAD ~1 3.758E-9 
NA-MISLOAD 3.758E-9 3.758E-9 
For the 21-PWR Absorber Plate waste package type 
/NA-MISLOAD ~1 4.576E-8 
NA-MISLOAD 4.576E-8 4.576E-8 
For the 12-PWR Absorber Plate waste package type 
/NA-MISLOAD ~1 6.217E-11 
NA-MISLOAD 6.217E-11 6.217E-11 
For the 44-BWR Absorber Plate waste package type 
/NA-MISLOAD ~1 6.217E-11 
NA-MISLOAD 6.217E-11 6.217E-11 
For the 24-BWR Absorber Plate waste package type 
/NA-MISLOAD 
NA-MISLOAD 
~1 
6.217E-11 
6.217E-11 
6.217E-11 
Section 
6.3.3.1.8 
For DOE SNF Group 1 waste package types with 
neutron absorber materials in the canister basket b 
/NA-MISLOAD ~1 6.217E-11 
NA-MISLOAD 6.217E-11 6.217E-11 
For DOE SNF Group 2 waste package types with 
neutron absorber materials in filler c 
/NA-MISLOAD ~1 3.906E-8 
NA-MISLOAD 3.906E-8 3.906E-8 
For DOE SNF Group 3 waste package types with neutron 
absorber materials in canister basket and filler d 
/NA-MISLOAD ~1 3.912E-8 
NA-MISLOAD 3.912E-8 3.912E-8 
For DOE SNF waste package types without neutron 
absorber materials e 
/NA-MISLOAD (no misload) True a 0.00 
NA-MISLOAD (misload) False 0.00 

Table 6.3-4. Event Probability Assignment for the MSL-ET and MSL-ET2 Event Trees for Base Case 
Criticality FEPs SAPHIRE Analyses 
SAPHIRE Assigned 
Event Valuea 
Event Name and Description 
Probability 
Value 
(per waste package for 
all waste package types) Justification 
Probability of Waste Form Misload (WF-MISLOAD top 
event) 
For the 21-PWR Absorber Plate waste package 
/WF-MISLOAD ~1 1.18E-5 
WF-MISLOAD 1.18E-5 1.18E-5 
For the 21-PWR Control Rod waste package 
/WF-MISLOAD True a 0.00 
WF-MISLOAD False 0.00 
For the 12-PWR Absorber Plate waste package 
/WF-MISLOAD (no misload) True a 0.00 
WF-MISLOAD (misload) False 0.00 
For the 44-BWR Absorber Plate waste package 
/WF-MISLOAD (no misload) 
True a 
False 
0.00 
0.00 Section 
6.3.3.1.9 
WF-MISLOAD (misload) 
For the 24-BWR Absorber Plate waste package 
/WF-MISLOAD (no misload) True a 0.00 
WF-MISLOAD (misload) False 0.00 
For DOE waste package types with misload potential f 
/WF-MISLOAD ~1 1.475E-8 
WF-MISLOAD 1.475E-8 1.475E-8 
For DOE waste package types without misload 
potential g 
/WF-MISLOAD (no misload) True a 0.00 
WF-MISLOAD (misload) False 0.00 
Criticality potential of waste package dry diffusion 
configuration 
/CRIT-POT-WF (no criticality potential) 
CRIT-POT-WF (criticality potential) 
True a 
False 
0.00 
0.00 
Section 
6.3.3.1.10 
(CRIT-POT-WF top event) 
NOTES: a For event names prefixed by a slash /, the actual event probability used in processing the SAPHIRE 
logic model is the complement (i.e., 1-value) of the assigned value. True states that a branch is 
evaluated, False states that it is not evaluated. Example: Using neutron absorber material for waste 
forms with no criticality potential is not considered a misload since the criticality potential is not increased. 
b 
Aluminum Based, MOX, and U-Zr Hx DOE SNF waste forms with neutron absorber materials in the 
canister basket assembly 
c 
U/Th Oxide DOE SNF waste form with neutron absorber material in the canister filler materials 
d 
U-Zr/U-Mo Alloy DOE SNF waste form with neutron absorber material in the canister basket and filler 
materials 
e 
HEU Oxide, LEU Oxide, U-Metal, and U/Th Carbide DOE SNF waste forms without neutron absorber 
materials 
f 
MOX DOE SNF waste form with misload potential 
g 
Aluminum Based, HEU Oxide, LEU Oxide, U-Metal, U/Th Carbide, U/Th Oxide, and U-Zr Hx, and U-Zr/U-
Mo Alloy DOE SNF waste forms without misload potential 

6.3.3.1.1 Top Event MSIC1A 
The amount of seepage reaching the drift is an important factor in waste package degradation 
and criticality potential. Two parameters characterize the seepage into the emplacement drifts  
the seepage fraction (location within the drifts that see seepage) and the seepage rate (the volume 
of water entering the drift on an annual basis). The purpose of top event MS-IC-1A is to 
represent the possibility that seepage is available in a drift to enter a breached waste package. 
The upper branch of this top event indicates that seepage does not occur and the bottom three 
branches indicates that seepage does occur: branch 1  lower-bound seepage scenario, branch 2  
mean seepage scenario and branch 3  upper-bound seepage scenario. The probability of 
attaining seepage for the lower-bound, mean, and upper-bound seepage scenarios is based on 
Analysis of Infiltration Uncertainty (BSC 2003 [DIRS 165991], Table 7-1) and seepage fraction 
calculated in Appendix C, Sections C.1 and C.2. 
The seepage fraction (i.e., the fraction of waste packages that see seepage) and seepage rate 
distributions for the lower-bound, mean, and upper-bound climate scenario is based on the 
glacial transition climate that is expected to last from roughly 2000 to 10,000 years after 
repository closure (BSC 2004 [DIRS 170002], Section 6.6.1). (Climate projections for the first 
2000 years have been identified as modern interglacial and monsoonal with lower projected 
seepage rates.) The Latin Hypercube Sampling process performed in Appendix C, Sections C.1 
and C.2 was performed for 20,000 realizations to obtain the seepage fraction used to quantify the 
seepage scenario branch probabilities. The results of the sampling process are documented in 
Appendix C, Sections C.1 and C.2 for the lithophysal and nonlithophysal geological zones, 
respectively. 
Because of differences in the drift after a seismic event for the lithophysal and nonlithophysal 
geologic zone, it was necessary to perform separate Latin Hypercube samplings for each zone. 
The results reported in Appendix C, Sections C.1 and C.2 are the drift fractional probability of 
seepage given the specified seepage scenario (i.e., lower-bound, mean, or upper-bound). The 
probability of the individual seepage scenarios is specified in Analysis of Infiltration Uncertainty 
(BSC 2003 [DIRS 165991], Table 7-1). The seepage scenario probability is calculated by taking 
the seepage fraction for each scenario (i.e., lower-bound, mean, and upper-bound) and 
multiplying it to the probability of being in that seepage scenario. This calculation has been 
performed in the EXCEL spreadsheet Probability of Seepage (Appendix G). The appropriate 
seepage probability is then substituted into the SAPHIRE analysis based on the sequence 
branching of top event DRIFT-ZONE of the YMP-INIT-EVENT event tree. The results of 
this calculation are assigned as follows: 
Lithophysal Zone Base Case Seepage Probabilities 
/MS-IC-1A-NOM-NWL = 2.395E-1 (no seepage probability  SAPHIRE takes the 
complement of this value) 
MS-IC-1A-NOM-LL = 1.104E-2 (lower-bound seepage scenario probability) 
MS-IC-1A-NOM-ML = 1.007E-1 (mean seepage scenario probability) 
MS-IC-1A-NOM-UL = 1.278E-1 (upper-bound seepage scenario probability) 

Nonlithophysal Zone Base Case Seepage Probabilities 
/MS-IC-1A-NOM-NWNL = 4.830E-1 (no seepage probability  SAPHIRE takes the 
complement of this value) 
MS-IC-1A-NOM-LNL = 3.518E-2 (lower-bound seepage scenario probability) 
MS-IC-1A-NOM-MNL = 2.127E-1 (mean seepage scenario probability) 
MS-IC-1A-NOM-UNL = 2.351E-1 (upper-bound seepage scenario probability) 
6.3.3.1.2 Top Event MSNF-T 
The branching of top event MS-NF-T represents the availability of seepage to flow directly into 
the invert. The upper branch indicates that seepage does not flow into the invert and the lower 
branch indicates that it is available. If seepage is available to flow directly into the invert, the 
sequence transfers to the CONFIG-NF4 event tree for the evaluation of near-field 
configuration class NF-4. Seepage flow directly to the invert can follow either of two pathways, 
i.e., dripping from the drift crown onto the drip shield or down the drift wall. Because both 
pathways are likely to occur simultaneously, both branches of this top event are processed to 
ensure the evaluation of all configuration classes. In order to process both branches of this top 
event, /MSNFT is assigned a value of 0.00 (i.e., the complement of 1.00, True) and MSNFT 
is assigned a value of 1.00 (True). 
6.3.3.1.3 Top Event MSIC2 
The probability of water passing through the drip shield to a failed waste package is an important 
factor in waste package degradation and criticality. This event is associated with top event MS 
IC2 of the MSLET event tree (Figure B-4). The upper branch represents no drip shield 
failure and the lower branch represents that the drip shield has failed. 
Water pathways through the drip shield can be created by corrosion (Assumption 5.1.1) and 
emplacement errors. Drip shield failures can be categorized as being caused by either time-
dependent or time-independent mechanisms. Corrosion failure mechanisms are time-dependent 
and may be active or inactive during the performance evaluation period. 
Time-independent drip shield failure mechanisms are defined as those failure mechanisms that 
can occur randomly from the time of initial emplacement. Drip shield emplacement errors, rock 
fall, or seismic events are types of time-independent failure mechanisms that can potentially 
result in immediate creation of an advective pathway through the drip shield. In certain cases, 
such as fabrication errors, the failure mechanism is an initiator that exacerbates corrosion (a 
time-dependent mechanism). 
The drip shield failure mechanisms are discussed in the remainder of this section. The intent of 
these discussions is to justify the probability values of top event MSIC2 for the evaluation of 
the base case criticality FEPs. Drip shield failure is defined as those drip shield damage 
mechanisms that can result in an advective flow path through the drip shield and onto the waste 
package surface. Drip shield failure could be the result of a crack in the drip shield surface or 
from the catastrophic failure of the complete drip shield. As is discussed, not all drip shield 
damage results in the failure of the drip shields primary function. 

Based on the discussions provided below, for the base case criticality FEPs conditions there are 
no known failure mechanisms of the drip shield. Therefore, only the upper branch of top event 
MS-IC-2 is activated and /MS-IC-2 is assigned a value of 0.0 (True) and MS-IC-2 is assigned a 
value of 0.0 (False). 
General Corrosion Failure of the Drip Shield 
This is a time-dependent drip shield failure mechanism. As stated in WAPDEG Analysis of 
Waste Package and Drip Shield Degradation (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169996], Section 6.5.2 and 
Figure 23), the earliest failure of the drip shield due to general corrosion does not occur until 
after 10,000 years (approximately 47,500 years). 
It is assumed that TSPA-LA will show there are no general corrosion failures of the drip shield 
before 10,000 years (Assumption 5.1.12) and, therefore, the probability of drip shield failure due 
to general corrosion during the regulatory period is zero. The probability of occurrence of this 
drip shield failure mechanism is negligible. 
Localized Corrosion Failure of the Drip Shield 
This is a time-dependent drip shield failure mechanism. As stated in General Corrosion and 
Localized Corrosion of the Drip Shield (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169845], Section 6.6.3.1), Localized 
corrosion of Ti Grade 7 would not initiate in a repository-relevant environment Therefore, 
the probability of occurrence for this drip shield failure mechanism is negligible. 
Stress Corrosion Cracking Failure of the Drip Shield 
This is a time-dependent drip shield failure mechanism. As discussed in this section, drip shield 
fabrication errors can result in the formation of stress corrosion cracks. Stress Corrosion 
Cracking of the Drip Shield, the Waste Package Outer Barrier, and the Stainless Steel Structural 
Material (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169985], Section 6.3.7) states that stress corrosion cracks are 
expected to fill with corrosion products or be plugged with precipitates such as carbonate. Stress 
corrosion cracks are expected to be sealed within a few hundred years if water flows through the 
cracks at the expected very low film flow rate. If the cracks are bridged by water, the sealing 
process may take several thousand years, but no flow occurs. Because of the high density of the 
crack plugging materials and the lack of a pressure gradient to drive water through the crack, the 
probability of flow through the plugged crack approaches zero. 
Given the very low flow rates through a stress corrosion crack in the drip shield for, at most, a 
few hundred years, it is concluded that stress corrosion cracking does not prevent the drip shield 
from fulfilling its primary role to keep water from contacting the waste packages. The 
probability of occurrence for this drip shield failure mechanism is negligible. 
Hydrogen Detonation Failure of the Drip Shield 
This is a time-dependent drip shield failure mechanism. It has been conjectured that explosive 
gas mixtures, such as hydrogen, could accumulate within the waste package or under the drip 
shield Engineered Barrier System Features, Events, and Processes (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169898], 
Section 6.2.76). This mechanism has been excluded from the TSPA-LA and likewise will not 

contribute to the criticality potential of internal configuration classes. Therefore, the probability 
of occurrence for this drip shield failure mechanism is negligible. 
Emplacement Error Failure of the Drip Shield 
This is a time-independent drip shield failure mechanism. The probability of a drip shield 
emplacement error is calculated in Analysis of Mechanisms for Early Waste Package/Drip Shield 
Failure, (BSC 2004 [DIRS 170024], Section 6.3.7) as having a median value of 6.010-6 per 
drip shield with an error factor of 4.7. The 5 percentile, the 95 percentile, and the mean values 
are calculated to be 1.310-6, 2.810-5, and 9.310-6, respectively. 
However, Analysis of Mechanisms for Early Waste Package/Drip Shield Failure (BSC 2004 
[DIRS 170024], Section 6.4.7) goes on to state that it is not credible that a drip shield 
emplacement error will result in a nondetected gap exceeding the length of the drip shield 
connecting plates. Because any gap between two adjacent drip shields improperly interlocked is 
expected to be small, water from the drift is not expected to fall directly onto an underlying 
waste package. The drip shield interlock geometry will most likely cause water to first hit the 
lower drip shields connecting plate and thus divert the seepage from the waste package surface. 
Therefore, although a drip shield emplacement error is considered possible, the drip shield 
failure area due to such an emplacement error is zero. Because the primary function of the drip 
shield (to prevent advective flow onto the waste package) is not compromised, the probability of 
occurrence for this drip shield failure mechanism is negligible. 
Fabrication Error Failure of the Drip Shield 
This is a time-independent drip shield failure mechanism. Four drip shield fabrication errors are 
identified in Analysis of Mechanisms for Early Waste Package/Drip Shield Failure, (BSC 2004 
[DIRS 170024], Table 20) as having the potential to increase the susceptibility of the drip shield 
to stress corrosion cracking or localized corrosion. These fabrication errors are weld flaws, base 
metal flaws, improper heat treatment, and damage by mishandling. 
However, General Corrosion and Localized Corrosion of the Drip Shield (BSC 2004 
[DIRS 169845], Section 6.6.3.1) states that Localized corrosion of Ti Grade 7 would not initiate 
in a repository-relevant environment. In addition, Stress Corrosion Cracking of the Drip 
Shield, the Waste Package Outer Barrier, and the Stainless Steel Structural Material (BSC 2004 
[DIRS 169985], Section 6.3.7) states that stress corrosion cracks are expected to fill with 
corrosion products or be plugged with precipitates such as carbonate. Stress corrosion cracks are 
expected to be sealed within a few hundred years if water flows through the cracks at the 
expected very low film flow rate. If the cracks are bridged by water, the sealing process may 
take several thousand years, but no flow occurs. Because of the high density of the crack 
plugging materials and the lack of a pressure gradient to drive water through the crack, the 
probability of flow through the plugged crack approaches zero. 
Since neither localized corrosion or stress corrosion cracking will result in an advective flow area 
through the drip shield, the drip shield failure area associated with drip shield fabrication errors 
as initiators is zero. Therefore, because the primary function of the drip shield is not 
compromised, the probability of occurrence for this drip shield failure mechanism is negligible. 

Thermal Expansion Failure of the Drip Shield 
This is a time-independent drip shield failure mechanism. As stated in EBS Radionuclide 
Transport Abstraction (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169868], Section 6.3.2.3), Thermal and mechanical 
response of the drip shield may produce gaps between adjacent sections of drip shield. These 
breaching mechanism have been screened out . Therefore, the probability of occurrence for 
this drip shield failure mechanism is negligible. 
Seismic Failure of the Drip Shield 
This is a time-independent drip shield failure mechanism. Seismic failures of the drip shield are 
not considered during the base case criticality FEPs analysis. This failure mechanism is only 
considered during the evaluation of the seismic disruptive event criticality FEPs analysis 
(Section 6.4). 
Rock Fall Failure of the Drip Shield 
This is a time-independent drip shield failure mechanism. Rock fall failures of the drip shield 
are not considered during the base case criticality FEPs analysis. This failure mechanism is only 
considered during the evaluation of the rock fall disruptive event criticality FEPs (Section 6.5). 
It should be noted that rock fall damage to the drip shield due to a seismic event is accounted for 
in the BE-DS-SEISMIC1 basic event during the seismic initiating event evaluation presented in 
Section 6.4. 
Igneous Failure of the Drip Shield 
This is a time-dependent drip shield failure mechanism. Igneous failures of the drip shield are 
not considered during the base case criticality FEPs analysis. This failure mechanism is only 
considered during the evaluation of the igneous disruptive event criticality FEPs (Section 6.6). 
6.3.3.1.4 Top Event MSIC1B 
The availability of condensation water to enter a failed waste package is an important factor in 
waste package degradation and criticality and is associated with top event MS-IC-1B of the 
MSL-ET event tree (Appendix B, Figure B-5). The upper branch of this top event represents 
the availability of, at most, only insignificant quantities of condensation to enter a failed waste 
package. The lower branch represents that significant condensation is available to enter a failed 
waste package. 
Based on the information contained in In-Drift Natural Convection and Condensation (BSC 
2004 [DIRS 164327], Section 8.3), condensation can occur on the underside of the drip shield. 
However, it is assumed that any condensation flux from the underside of the drip shield has little 
potential for dripping onto the exposed waste package (Assumption 5.2.4). Therefore, 
condensation flux is not predicted to impact the criticality potential of a waste package and 
events /MS-IC-1B and MS-IC-1B will each be assigned a value of 0.00. 

6.3.3.1.5 Top Event MSIC3A 
The ability for water to enter a waste package is an important factor in waste package 
degradation and criticality and is associated with top event MSIC3A of the MSLET2 event 
tree (Appendix B, Figure B-5). Water pathways into the waste package can be created by 
corrosion and/or failures caused by the waste package response to events such as seismic activity 
and fabrication errors. Waste package failures can be categorized as being caused by either time-
dependent or time-independent mechanisms. Corrosion failure mechanisms are time-dependent 
and may be active or inactive during the performance evaluation period. 
Time-independent waste package failure mechanisms are defined as those failure mechanisms 
that can occur randomly from the time of initial emplacement. A seismic event is a type of time-
independent failure mechanism that can potentially result in immediate creation of an advective 
pathway into the waste package. In certain cases, such as fabrication errors, the failure 
mechanism is an initiator that exacerbates corrosion (a time-dependent mechanism). 
The waste package failure mechanisms are discussed in the remainder of this section. The intent 
of these discussions is to justify the probability values of top event MS-IC-3A used for the 
evaluation of the base case criticality FEPs. Waste package failure is defined as any breach of a 
waste package, regardless of the mechanism, that can result in either a diffusive or advective 
flow path through the waste package outer barrier. The upper branch of this top event represents 
the probability of no waste package failures. The second and third branches respectively 
represent the probability of a diffusive or advective waste package failure. Waste package 
failure could be the result of a crack in the waste package surface or from the catastrophic failure 
of the complete waste package. As is discussed, not all waste package damage mechanisms 
result in an advective failure of the waste package. 
Based on the discussions provided below, for the base case criticality FEPs conditions, the 
probability of occurrence of a diffusive waste package failure is calculated to be 0.100028 (sum 
of localized corrosion [0.1 from Localized Corrosion Failure of the Waste Package header] and 
fabrication [2.810-5 from Fabrication Induced Failure of the Waste Package header] failure 
mechanisms from fabrication induced failure of the waste package). The probability of 
occurrence of an advective waste package failure is negligible. The probability of no waste 
package failures is calculated to be 0.899972 (i.e., one minus the probability of diffusive and 
advective waste package failures). Therefore, /MS-IC-3A is assigned a value of 0.100028 
(complement of 0.899972), MS-IC-3A[1] is also assigned a value of 0.100028, and MS-IC-
3A[2] is assigned a value of 0.00. 
General Corrosion Failure of the Waste Package 
This is a time-dependent waste package failure mechanism. As stated in WAPDEG Analysis of 
Waste Package and Drip Shield Degradation (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169996], Section 6.5.2 and 
Figure 22), the earliest patch failure of the waste package due to general corrosion does not occur 
until after 10,000 years (approximately 120,000 years). It is assumed that this information will 
be confirmed by TSPA-LA (Assumption 5.1.12). 

It is assumed that TSPA-LA will show that there are no general corrosion failures of the waste 
package before 10,000 years (Assumption 5.1.12) and, therefore, the probability of waste 
package failure due to general corrosion during the regulatory period is zero. Therefore, the 
probability of occurrence of this waste package failure mechanism is negligible. 
Localized Corrosion Failure of the Waste Package 
This is a time-dependent waste package failure mechanism. It is assumed that localized 
corrosion could conceivably occur in 10 percent of the waste packages (Assumption 5.1.1). 
When certain environmental conditions exist in the presence of certain dust assemblages, 
deliquescence induced localized corrosion could conceivably result in an advective flow path 
into the waste package. The area impacted by this corrosion mechanism is at the top of the waste 
package, where the majority of dust particles with soluble salts are predicted to accumulate. 
However, because the drip shield is not failed to allow drift seepage to flow into the waste 
package (Section 6.3.3.1.1) and condensation under the drip shield (Section 6.3.3.1.4) would 
have only a small potential to drip onto a breached waste package, the release mechanism is 
controlled by diffusion. Therefore, the probability of this waste package failure mechanism is 
conservatively set to 0.10. 
Stress Corrosion Cracking Failure of the Waste Package 
This is a time-dependent waste package failure mechanism. Stress corrosion cracking of the 
waste package will result in a diffusive failure of the waste package (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169996], 
Section 6.3.5). As stated in WAPDEG Analysis of Waste Package and Drip Shield Degradation 
(BSC 2004 [DIRS 169996], Section 6.5.2 and Figure 24), the earliest crack failure of the waste 
package due to stress corrosion cracking does not occur until after 10,000 years (approximately 
120,000 years). It is assumed that this information will be confirmed by TSPA-LA (Assumption 
5.1.12). 
It is assumed that TSPA-LA will show that there are no stress corrosion cracking failures of the 
waste package before 10,000 years (Assumption 5.1.12) and, therefore, the probability of waste 
package failure due to stress corrosion cracking during the regulatory period is zero. Thus, the 
probability of occurrence of this waste package failure mechanism is negligible. 
Hydrogen Detonation Failure of the Waste Package 
This is a time-dependent waste package failure mechanism. It has been conjectured that 
explosive gas mixtures, such as hydrogen, could accumulate within the waste package or under 
the drip shield Engineered Barrier System Features, Events, and Processes (BSC 2004 [DIRS 
169898], Section 6.2.76). This mechanism has been excluded from the TSPA-LA and likewise 
will not contribute to the criticality potential of internal configuration classes. Therefore, the 
probability of occurrence for this waste package failure mechanism is negligible. 
Fabrication Induced Failure of the Waste Package 
This is a time-independent waste package failure mechanism. Four waste package fabrication 
errors are identified in Analysis of Mechanisms for Early Waste Package/Drip Shield Failure, 
(BSC 2004 [DIRS 170024], Table 20) as having the potential to increase the susceptibility of the 

waste package to stress corrosion cracking. These fabrication errors are weld flaws, improper 
heat treatment, improper laser peening, and damage by mishandling. Stress corrosion cracking 
of the waste package will result in a diffusive failure of the waste package (BSC 2004 [DIRS 
169996], Section 6.3.5). Other fabrication errors, e.g., assembly errors, have been screened out 
since improper components will either not fit into the waste package or the waste form cannot be 
loaded. 
After ultrasonic testing inspection, the mean probability of the occurrence of one or more weld 
flaws in the upper and middle closure lids is 0.18 and 0.20, respectively (BSC 2004 [DIRS 
170024], Table 13). For the waste package seam weld, the mean probability increases to 0.46 
(BSC 2004 [DIRS 170024], Table 13). The residual stresses/stress intensity factors resulting 
from weld flaws may induce stress corrosion cracking. However, as noted above in this section, 
the earliest crack failure of the waste package due to stress corrosion cracking is not predicted to 
occur until after 10,000 years (approximately 120,000 years) (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169996], 
Section 6.5.2, Figure 24). It is assumed that this information will be confirmed by TSPA-LA 
(Assumption 5.1.12). 
The probability of improper heat treatment has been combined with the probabilities of improper 
laser peening and damage by mishandling. From the information presented in Table 4.1-1, this 
event has been calculated to have a median value of 7.2  10-6 per waste package with an error 
factor of 15 and a mean value of 2.8  10-5 per waste package (BSC 2004 [DIRS 170024], 
Table 22). The probability of having at least one waste package early failure in the repository 
due to fabrication errors has been calculated to be 0.17 (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169996], Section 
6.4.12). Recommendations from Analysis of Mechanisms for Early Waste Package/Drip Shield 
Failure (BSC 2004 [DIRS 170024], Section 6.4.8) state that the entire waste package surface 
should be considered affected by an improper heat treatment. 
Based on the information above, the probability of occurrence for waste package early failure is 
2.8  10-5. 
Seismic Failure of the Waste Package 
This is a time-independent waste package failure mechanism. Seismic failures of the waste 
package are not considered during the base case criticality FEPs analysis. This failure 
mechanism is only considered during the evaluation of the seismic disruptive event criticality 
FEPs (Section 6.4). 
Rock Fall Failure of the Waste Package 
Rock fall failures of the waste package during the base case criticality FEPs analysis are not 
considered credible since no drip shield failures occur from rock fall. 
Igneous Failure of the Waste Package 
This is a time-dependent waste package failure mechanism. Igneous failures of the waste 
package are not considered during the base case criticality FEPs analysis. This failure 

mechanism is only considered during the evaluation of the igneous disruptive event criticality 
FEPs (Section 6.6). 
6.3.3.1.6 Top Event MSIC3B 
This top event is not accessed during the base case criticality FEPs analysis. 
6.3.3.1.7 Top Event MS-IC-4 
This top event is not accessed during the base case criticality FEPs analysis. 
6.3.3.1.8 Top Event NAMISLOAD 
The presence of neutron absorber materials in a waste package is important to criticality control 
during the regulatory period for the majority of the waste forms proposed for disposal in the 
repository. Misload of the neutron absorber materials is associated with top event NA 
MISLOAD of the MSLET2 event tree (Figure B-5). The upper branch of this top event 
indicates that there is no neutron absorber material misload and the lower branch indicates that 
there is a misload. 
Neutron absorber material misload can occur as the result of several mechanisms during the 
waste package fabrication and loading processes. These processes include the use of wrong 
materials, failure to load the neutron absorber materials into the waste package or waste form, 
and selection of the wrong waste package type. The probabilities necessary to quantify the NA 
MISLOAD top event for each of the waste package/waste form types are summarized in 
Table 6.3-5. The justification for their value assignment is discussed in the remainder of this 
section. 
Assessment of the neutron absorber material misload event only accounts for the potential to 
load none or less than the designed mass of neutron absorber material. No penalty is assigned 
for loading additional neutron absorber materials into a waste package or waste form. 
Because the manufacturing, fabrication, and waste form loading processes have not yet been 
established for the waste package and its related components, the following probabilities are 
based on generic human reliability analysis values for the performance of basic operations. As 
the manufacturing processes, fabrication process, and surface facility operational procedures are 
developed, more detailed evaluation of the probability of neutron absorber material misload can 
be performed. It is assumed that the use of generic human reliability analysis values generate 
more limiting (i.e., higher probability of failure) results (Assumption 5.1.4). 
Based on the information provided below, the probabilities listed in Table 6.3-5 are assigned to 
the various waste package/waste form types for both /NA-MISLOAD and NA-MISLOAD. 

Table 6.3-5. Neutron Absorber Material Misload Probabilities 
Waste Package / Waste Form Type Event Probability 
21-PWR Control Rod Waste Package 4.576E-8 
21-PWR Absorber Plate Waste Package 7.875E-9 
12-PWR Absorber Plate Waste Package 6.217E-11 
44-BWR Absorber Plate Waste Package 6.217E-11 
24-BWR Absorber Plate Waste Package 6.217E-11 
DOE SNF canister baskets with neutron absorber materials a 6.217E-11 
DOE SNF canisters with neutron absorber filler materials b 3.906E-8 
DOE SNF canisters with neutron absorber filler materialsbaskets with neutron absorber materials c 
and 3.912E-8 
DOE SNF canisters without neutron absorber materials d 0.0 e 
Source: Tables 6.3-6, 6.3-7, and 6.3-8 
NOTES: a Aluminum Based, MOX, and U-Zr Hx DOE SNF waste forms 
b 
U/Th Oxide DOE SNF waste form 
c 
U-Zr/U-Mo DOE SNF waste form 
d 
HEU Oxide, LEU Oxide, U-Metal, and U/Th Carbide DOE SNF waste forms. 
e 
No misload potential results in zero probability of misload. 
Material Selection Errors 
During the manufacturing of the neutron absorber material to be included in the fabrication of 
the waste form container (either a waste package or a DOE standardized SNF canister) it is 
possible that the manufacturer could inadvertently select a material that does not have any 
neutron absorbing properties. Although no specific analysis of neutron absorber material 
selection error has been performed, improper material selection evaluations have been performed 
for weld and base metal materials in Analysis of Mechanisms of Early Waste Package/Drip 
Shield Failure (BSC 2003 [DIRS 170024], Section 6.2.3). The results of this evaluation yield a 
median probability of 3.510-5 and an error factor of 2.3. From this information, a mean 
probability of 3.97910-5 is calculated using Equation 6.3-1. Therefore, the probability of 
occurrence for this event is assigned a value of 3.97910-5. 
=

50
th

...
exp 
1
2

..
. 
s
2 
(Eq. 6.3-1) 
where 
 = mean human error probability 
50th = median human error probability 
s
=
...
ln(EF ) 
645.1
...
(Modarres 1993 [DIRS 104667], p. 266) 
EF = error factor 
During the assembly of the commercial SNF waste package, it is possible that the assembler 
could inadvertently select a waste package basket assembly that does not have neutron absorber 
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01 6-40 October 2004 

materials. This selection error is only possible for the 21PWR Absorber Plate and the 21PWR 
Control Rod waste package types. Basket selection errors for other commercial SNF waste 
packages are not possible because of the dimensional differences of the basket assemblies. The 
21PWR Absorber Plate and 21PWR Control Rod waste package basket assemblies are 
identical in dimensions, but differ in material. The 21PWR Absorber Plate waste package 
basket assembly is manufactured from a nickel-gadolinium alloy and the 21PWR Control Rod 
waste package basket assembly is manufactured from stainless steel. 
It is assumed (Assumption 5.1.5) that because the 21PWR Absorber Plate waste package and 
the 21PWR Control Rod waste package are dimensionally identical, they may be fabricated by 
the same manufacturer(s). It is further assumed that the commercial SNF waste packages are 
delivered at the repository with the basket assembly already contained within the waste package. 
When the manufacturer assembles the basket assemblies, it is possible that the 21PWR Control 
Rod waste package basket assembly could be selected and inserted into a 21PWR Absorber 
Plate waste package or that the waste package could be mislabeled prior to shipping. 
The selection of the wrong basket material can be approximated by the probability of an operator 
selecting a wrong control from a panel of similar looking controls. This event has a median 
probability of 3.010-3 and an error factor of 3 (Swain and Guttman 1983 [DIRS 139383], Item 2 
of Table 20-12). From this information, a mean probability of 3.7510-3 is calculated using 
Equation 6.3-1. Therefore, the probability of occurrence for this event is assigned a value of 
3.75010-3 per waste package. 
The mislabeling of the waste package prior to shipping can be approximated by the probability 
of an error of commission in reading and recording quantitative information. This event has a 
median probability of 1.010-3 and an error factor of 3 (Swain and Guttman 1983 
[DIRS 139383], Item 9 of Table 20-10). From this information, a mean probability of 1.2510-3 
is calculated using Equation 6.3-1. Therefore, the probability of occurrence for this event is 
assigned a value of 1.25010-3 per waste package. 
It is possible to recover from the above selection and labeling errors. The possibility of using 
improper materials has been virtually eliminated with the evolution of new instrumentation, such 
as portable X-ray spectroscopy equipment, to perform quick field measurements of material 
composition. It is assumed that such a quality control inspection will be performed on the waste 
packages and canisters upon receipt of the waste package at the repository or the DOE 
standardized SNF canister at the DOE SNF loading facility (Assumption 5.1.8). It is also 
assumed that a separate independent verification inspection will be performed just prior to the 
loading of the waste form (Assumption 5.1.15). However, there is still the possibility that there 
is a failure to perform these operations correctly. The human error probability (HEP) can be 
approximated by the (lognormal) probability of improperly checking a digital display, which has 
a median of 1.010-3 and an error factor of 3 (Swain and Guttman 1983 [DIRS 139383], Item 2 
of Table 20-10). From this information, a mean probability of 1.2510-3 is calculated using 
Equation 6.3-1. Therefore, the probability of non-recovery is assigned a value of 1.25010-3 per 
waste package for each of these tests. 
The probability of this event can be calculated for each waste package / waste form type using 
Equation 6.3-2: 

Prmse = (Prwm + Prse + Prml)(Prnrec-receipt)(Prnrec-load) (Eq. 6.3-2) 
where 
Prmse = probability of material selection error 
Prwm = probability of wrong materials 
Prse = probability of basket material selection error 
Prml = probability of mislabeling the waste package 
Prnrec-receipt = probability of non-recovery at receipt 
Prnrec-load = probability of non-recovery at loading 
The values assigned to each of these probabilities and the calculated result for each waste form / 
waste package type is calculated as follows in Table 6.3-6: 
Table 6.3-6. Waste Package Neutron Absorber Material Selection Error Probabilities 
Event Probability 
Waste Package / Waste Form Type 
Prwm Prse Prml 
Prnrec-Prnrec-Prmse 
receipt load 
21-PWR Control Rod Waste Package 3.979E-5 0.0 c 1.250E-3 1.250E-3 1.250E-3 2.015E-9 
21-PWR Absorber Plate Waste Package 3.979E-5 3.750E-3 1.250E-3 1.250E-3 1.250E-3 7.875E-9 
12-PWR Absorber Plate Waste Package 3.979E-5 0.0 c 0.0 c 1.250E-3 1.250E-3 6.217E-11 
44-BWR Absorber Plate Waste Package 3.979E-5 0.0 c 0.0 c 1.250E-3 1.250E-3 6.217E-11 
24-BWR Absorber Plate Waste Package 3.979E-5 0.0 c 0.0 c 1.250E-3 1.250E-3 6.217E-11 
DOE standardized SNF canister baskets 
with neutron absorber materials a 3.979E-5 0.0 c 0.0 c 1.250E-3 1.250E-3 6.217E-11 
DOE standardized SNF canister baskets 
without neutron absorber materials b 0.0 c 0.0 c 0.0 c 0.0 c 0.0 c 0.0 
a
NOTES DOE standardized SNF canister baskets for Aluminum Based, U-Zr/U-Mo Alloy, and U-Zr Hx DOE SNF 
waste forms 
b 
DOE standardized SNF canisters for, HEU Oxide, LEU Oxide, U-Metal, U/Th Carbide, and U/Th Oxide 
DOE SNF waste forms 
c 
Probability is zero since error is not applicable to this waste package type or has no consequences. 
Waste Form Neutron Absorber Material Loading Error 
For select commercial PWR SNF, the neutron absorber material is integral to the waste form. 
Control rods of neutron absorbing B4C (Assumption 5.1.3) are inserted and locked into the guide 
tubes of PWR fuel assemblies designated for the 21-PWR Control Rod waste package type. The 
neutron absorber material for DOE SNF waste forms is poured into the DOE standardized SNF 
canister in the form of shot at the time of waste form loading. The DOE SNF waste forms that 
require neutron absorber materials are U/Th Oxide and U-Zr/U-Mo Alloy. The probability of 
neutron absorber misload errors is set to 0.00 for waste forms not requiring absorber material to 
be loaded with the waste form. 
During the loading of commercial PWR SNF assemblies, the burnup and initial enrichment of 
each assembly is compared to the 21PWR Absorber Plate loading curve (BSC 2004 
[DIRS 171414]). Based on this comparison, the assembly is either acceptable to load into a 21 

PWR Absorber Plate waste package or is designated for inclusion in the 21PWR Control Rod 
waste package type. If the assembly is slated for the 21PWR Control Rod waste package type, 
a control rod assembly is inserted into the fuel assemblys guide tubes. Failure to insert the 
control rod assembly could result in the loading of the assembly into the 21-PWR Control Rod 
waste package without adequate reactivity control. It should be noted that loading a waste form 
into the wrong waste package type (such as putting an assembly intended for a 21PWR Control 
Rod waste package into a 21PWR Absorber Plate waste package) is covered by the WF 
MISLOAD top event. 
Failure to insert the neutron absorber materials can occur due to one of two mechanisms  
(1) failure to properly identify the waste form or, after properly identifying the waste form, (2) 
failure to insert the neutron absorber material. Both failure mechanisms are equivalent to 
incorrectly using a procedure with check-off provisions. For long list procedures (more than 
10 items), the median probability is listed as 1.010-2 with an error factor of 3 (Swain and 
Guttman 1983 [DIRS 139383], Item 4 of Table 20-7). From this information, a mean probability 
of 1.2510-2 is calculated using Equation 6.3-1. Therefore, the probability of occurrence is each 
assigned a value of 1.25010-2 per loading. 
Recovery of a neutron absorber material misload for a waste form is likely. This is because the 
absence of the neutron absorber material is visibly recognizable during the loading processes. 
Although the missing neutron absorber materials are readily visible, there is always the 
possibility that its omission is missed as the waste form is loaded and the container sealed. The 
probability of non-recovery can be approximated by the probability of improperly checking a 
digital display, which has a median probability of 1.010-3 and an error factor of 3 (Swain and 
Guttman 1983 [DIRS 139383], Item 2 of Table 20-10). From this information, a mean 
probability of 1.2510-3 is calculated using Equation 6.3-1. Therefore, this probability of non-
recovery is assigned a value of 1.25010-3 per loading. 
An additional recovery action for DOE standardized SNF canisters is the weighing of the 
canisters prior to shipping. If the weight of the canister is less than the expected weight within 
tolerances, then the neutron absorber material may not have been added at loading and the error 
recovered. Although the weight of the canister is readily verified, there is always the possibility 
that the weight is misread or the action not performed. The probability of non-recovery can be 
approximated to be the same as the visual inspection. Therefore, this probability of non-recovery 
is assigned a value of 1.25010-3 per DOE standardized SNF canister. 
The analysis of commercial SNF misload probabilities performed in Commercial Spent Nuclear 
Fuels Waste Package Misload Analysis (BSC 2003 [DIRS 166316]) indicates that if a 21-PWR 
Control Rod waste package is mistakenly selected when a 21-PWR Absorber Plate waste 
package is required, there is a 4.37410-8 probability that no control rods or other neutron 
absorber materials will be inserted into any of the PWR assemblies loaded into the waste 
package (BSC 2003 [DIRS 166316], Table 11, Sequences 18C, 20C, 29C, and 31C). This 
probability includes recovery actions. 

The probability of this event can be calculated for each waste package/waste form type using 
Equation 6.3-3: 
Prwfle = (Prwfid + Prwfl)(Prnrec-visual)(Prnrec-weigh) (Eq. 6.3-3) 
where 
Prwfle = probability of waste form loading error 
Prwfid = probability of waste form identification error 
Prwfl = probability of failure to load neutron absorber material into the waste form 
Prnrec-visual = probability of non-recovery due to visual inspection 
Prnrec-weigh = probability of non-recovery due to weighing (DOE SNF only) 
The values assigned to each of these probabilities and the calculated result for each waste 
form/waste package type or DOE standardized SNF canister is listed as follows in Table 6.3-7: 
Table 6.3-7. Waste Form Neutron Absorber Material Loading Error Probabilities 
Waste Package / Waste Form Type 
Prwfid Prwfl 
Event Probability 
Prnrec-visual Prnrec-weigh Prwfle 
21-PWR Control Rod Waste Package N/A a N/A a N/A a N/A a 4.37410-8 
21-PWR Absorber Plate Waste Package 0.0 d 0.0 d 0.0 d 0.0 d 0.0 
12-PWR Absorber Plate Waste Package 0.0 d 0.0 d 0.0 d 0.0 d 0.0 
44-BWR Absorber Plate Waste Package 0.0 d 0.0 d 0.0 d 0.0 d 0.0 
24-BWR Absorber Plate Waste Package 0.0 d 0.0 d 0.0 d 0.0 d 0.0 
DOE SNF waste forms with filler materials b 1.250E-2 1.250E-2 1.250E-3 1.250E-3 3.906E-8 
DOE SNF waste forms without filler materials c 0.0 d 0.0 d 0.0 d 0.0 d 0.0 
NOTES: a N/A means that the total probability was not derived from Equation 6.3-3. 
b 
U/Th Oxide and U-Zr/U-Mo Alloy DOE SNF waste forms 
c 
Aluminum Based, HEU Oxide, LEU Oxide, MOX, U-Metal, U/Th Carbide, and U-Zr Hx DOE SNF waste 
forms 
d 
Probability is zero since error is not applicable to this waste package type or has no consequences. 
Waste Package Selection Error 
A waste package selection error during waste package loading operations can occur if either (1) 
the operator inadvertently requests and receives the wrong waste package type or (2) the operator 
requests the correct waste package type, but the wrong waste package type is selected and 
delivered. This error is based on the assumption that, at any given time, an inventory of all waste 
package types is available at the repository. Recovery of a waste package selection error is 
guaranteed in almost all cases because of the different waste package sizes and internal 
configurations. The only selection error where recovery may not be possible, or where there are 
negative consequences, is when a 21PWR Control Rod waste package is utilized in place of a 
21PWR Absorber Plate waste package. All other waste package selection error probabilities 
are given a 0.0 value since there are no negative consequences. This selection error is credible 
because both waste package types are identical in size and configuration. The only difference is 
that the basket assembly of the 21PWR Control Rod waste package does not contain any 
neutron absorber material. The evaluation of this event in Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel 

Waste Package Misload Analysis (BSC 2003 [DIRS 166316], Section 6.2.1), indicates that 
probability of occurrence for this event, including recovery, is 1.39410-6 (BSC 2003 [DIRS 
166316], Table 11, Sequences 13C and 24C). Therefore, the probability of occurrence for this 
event is 1.39410-6 per 21PWR Absorber Plate waste package. This probability value includes 
the recovery action for an independent checker to detect discrepancies between the operators 
actions and the procedure. However, if a field measurement to determine the basket composition 
is performed just prior to waste package loading, an additional reduction in probability of 
misload can be achieved. As documented in the Material Selection Errors discussion above, 
the mean probability of non-recovery for this action is 1.25010-3. Accounting for this 
additional recovery action results in a probability of 1.74310-9. 
Based on the discussion above, the probability of waste package selection error assigned to each 
waste form/waste package type is presented in Table 6.3-8. 
Table 6.3-8. Waste Package Selection Error Probabilities 
Waste Package / Waste Form Type Event Probability 
21-PWR Control Rod Waste Package 0.0 a 
21-PWR Absorber Plate Waste Package 1.743E-9 
12-PWR Absorber Plate Waste Package 0.0 a 
44-BWR Absorber Plate Waste Package 0.0 a 
24-BWR Absorber Plate Waste Package 0.0 a 
All DOE SNF waste packages 0.0 a 
a
Note: Probability is zero since error is not applicable to this waste 
package type or has no consequences. 
6.3.3.1.9 Top Event WFMISLOAD 
The WFMISLOAD top event represent the probability that a waste form was incorrectly placed 
into a waste package or DOE standardized SNF canister during the preclosure loading process. 
The lower branch of this top event indicates the occurrence of a waste form misload and the 
upper branch indicates that no misload occurred. 
An analysis of commercial SNF misload probabilities was performed in Commercial Spent 
Nuclear Fuels Waste Package Misload Analysis (BSC 2003 [DIRS 166316]). Results from this 
analysis reports the probability of misloading an SNF assembly into a 21PWR Absorber Plate 
Waste Package as 1.1810-5 (BSC 2003 [DIRS 166316], Table 41). For the 44BWR Absorber 
Plate (BSC 2003 [DIRS 166316], Table 41) waste package type, the probability is reported as 
1.7310-5. According to Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuels Waste Package Misload Analysis 
(BSC 2003 [DIRS 166316], Section 7), the probability of assembly misload for the 21PWR 
Control Rod, 12PWR Absorber Plate and 24BWR Absorber Plate waste package types is 
negligible. 
The only DOE SNF waste form that has any misload potential is MOX. It is assumed that the 
misload probability for the MOX waste form will not exceed the highest misload probability 
calculated for commercial SNF waste package types (i.e., 1.1810-5 for the 21PWR Absorber 
Plate waste package) (Assumption 5.1.13). The MOX misload potential is the loading of six 

assemblies into the DOE standardized SNF canisters with a loading restriction of five 
assemblies. Such a misload is possible because there are six cell locations available within the 
DOE standardized SNF canister for this waste form. 
An additional reduction of the MOX misload probability can be achieved by accounting for a 
visual inspection of the loaded canister to verify that one location within the canister is empty. 
Although the loaded and empty canister cell locations should be readily identifiable, there is 
always the possibility that the presence of an extra assembly is overlooked and the container 
sealed. The probability of non-recovery for this scenario can be approximated by the probability 
of improperly checking a digital display, which has a median probability of 1.010-3 and an error 
factor of 3 (Swain and Guttman 1983 [DIRS 139383], Item 2 of Table 20-10). From this 
information, a mean probability of 1.2510-3 is calculated using Equation 6.3-1. Therefore, this 
probability of nonrecovery is assigned a value of 1.25010-3 per MOX DOE standardized SNF 
canister. Combining this secondary recovery action with the 1.1810-5 misload probability 
results in a calculated probability of misload for the MOX DOE SNF waste form of 1.47510-8 
(probability of misload times the probability of nonrecovery). 
Based on the information provided above, the probabilities listed in Table 6.3-9 are assigned to 
the various waste package/waste form types for both /WFMISLOAD and WFMISLOAD. 
Table 6.3-9. Waste Form Misload Probabilities 
Waste Package / Waste Form Type Event Probability 
21-PWR Control Rod Waste Package 0.0 
21-PWR Absorber Plate Waste Package 1.18E-5 
12-PWR Absorber Plate Waste Package 0.0 
44-BWR Absorber Plate Waste Package 0.0 
24-BWR Absorber Plate Waste Package 0.0 
DOE SNF waste forms with misload potential a 1.475E-8 
DOE SNF waste forms without misload potential b 0.0 
NOTES: a MOX DOE SNF waste form 
b 
Aluminum Based, HEU Oxide, LEU Oxide, U-Metal, U/Th Carbide, U/Th Oxide, U-Zr Hx, and U-Zr/U-
Mo Alloy DOE SNF waste forms 
6.3.3.1.10 Top Event CRIT-POT-WF 
The branching of top event CRIT-POT-WF represents the criticality potential of a waste package 
with a diffusive failure. The upper branch indicates that this configuration does not have any 
criticality potential and the lower branch indicates that it does. 
Ten percent of the waste package inventory is assumed to fail from localized corrosion that is 
initiated after repository closure due to seepage and/or dust associated chemistries (Assumption 
5.1.1). No water accumulation in the waste package occurs because of the lack of seepage or 
condensation flow into the failed waste packages due to no drip shield failures in the base case. 
In addition, for the base case the waste forms are predicted to remain intact. For each of the 
waste forms evaluated in the base case criticality FEPs analysis, criticality evaluations have 

shown that without water for neutron moderation, criticality cannot occur (refer to DOE SNF 
references in Table 6.2-1 and commercial SNF references BSC 2004 [DIRS 171414] and BSC 
2004 [DIRS 169963]). This is true even if a waste form or neutron absorber material misload 
occurs. Therefore, for all base case criticality FEPs conditions, only the upper branch of this top 
event is activated and /CRIT-POT-WF is assigned a value of 0.00 (True) and CRIT-POT-WF is 
assigned a value of 0.00 (False). 
6.3.3.2 Quantification of Event Tree CONFIG-NF4 
The following subsections provide justification for the probabilities assigned to the events used 
in the quantification of the near-field event tree CONFIG-NF4 (Figure B-18 of Appendix B). 
This event tree initiates the evaluation of the near-field configuration class NF-4. This event tree 
consists of four top events, of which only one is required for the evaluation of base case 
criticality FEPs. Table 6.3-10 summarizes the event probability assignments discussed below. 
Near-field configurations that involve fissile material from one waste package affecting the 
criticality potential of adjacent waste packages have been screened out based upon the neutronic 
isolation of the waste packages. The neutronic isolation is a result of the exclusion of effective 
reflectors around the waste packages, i.e., no external pooling expected, and the low probability 
of near-field criticality (Table 6.3-12). 
Table 6.3-10. Event Probability Assignment for the CONFIG-NF4 Event Tree for the Base Case 
Criticality FEPs SAPHIRE Analysis 
Event Name and Description 
Probability 
Value 
SAPHIRE Assigned 
Event Valuea 
(per waste package) Justification 
Water ponds on drift floor due to sealing and/or damming 
/MS-NF-2 (seepage does not pond on drift floor) True a 0.00 
MS-NF-2 (seepage does pond on drift floor) False 0.00 Section 6.3.3.2.1 
(MS-NF-2 top event) 
Dry transport of fissile material from the waste package 
transfers to the surface of the invert 
/MS-NF-DD (no accumulation of fissile material on True a 0.00 
invert) Section 6.3.3.2.2 
MS-NF-DD (accumulation of fissile material on invert) False 0.00 
(MS-NF-DD top event) 
a
NOTE: For events prefixed by a slash / the actual event probability used in processing the SAPHIRE logic 
model is the complement (i.e., 1  value) of the assigned value
6.3.3.2.1 Top Event MS-NF-2 
The branching of top event MS-NF-2 determines whether seepage water ponds on the drift floor 
due to sealing or damming. The upper branch of this top event indicates that ponding does not 
occur and the bottom branch indicates that it does. As stated in Engineered Barrier System 
Features, Events, and Processes (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169898], Section 6.2.40), ponding in the 

invert has been excluded. Therefore, /MS-NF-2 is assigned a value of 0.00 (True) and MS-NF-2 
is assigned a value of 0.00 (False). 
6.3.3.2.2 Top Event MS-NF-DD 
The branching of top event MS-NF-DD determines whether fissile material can accumulate on 
the invert surface due to dry transport mechanisms from a failed waste package that does not 
experience advective flow. The upper branch of this top event indicates that fissile material does 
not accumulate on the invert surface, and the bottom branch indicates that it does. EBS 
Radionuclide Transport Abstraction (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169868], Executive Summary and 
Section 8.1) states that diffusive transport is the sole means of transport in a no-seep envirnment 
(no drip shield separation) for fissile material that to leave a failed waste package. The quantity 
of this material is shown below to be insufficient for achieving a critical mass. Therefore, /MS-
NF-DD is assigned a value of 0.00 (True) and MS-NF-DD is assigned a value of 0.00 (False). 
The following calculation shows that the amount of uranium released by diffusive transport from 
a waste packaged breached by stress corrosion cracks over a 10,000-year period is insufficient to 
achieve a critical mass. 
In a no-seep environment where there is no flow of liquid water, uranium can diffuse from the 
breached waste package through porous corrosion products that fill the stress corrosion products. 
Dissolution of uranium and subsequent diffusion occur in a thin film of water that is adsorbed 
onto and partially saturates the corrosion products. The diffusive flux of dissolved uranium from 
a waste package, q (kg U/s), is given by Ficks first law of diffusion (Bird et. al. 1960 
[DIRS 103524], p. 503): 
. C . C 
q - = DA 
. x 
-  DA 
. x 
, (Eq. 6.3-4) 
where A is the cross sectional diffusive area of the stress corrosion cracks (m2), D is the diffusion 
coefficient for uranium (m2/s), .C is the concentration gradient of uranium (kg U/m3), and . xis the diffusive path length (m). 
The mass of uranium released by diffusion through stress corrosion cracks, m (kg U), over a 
period of time, .t (yr), is given by: 
. C 
m =q. t = DA. t . (Eq. 6.3-5)
. x 
The earliest crack failure of the waste package due to stress corrosion cracking is not predicted to 
occur until after 10,000 years (approximately 120,000 years) (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169996], Figure 
24). Thus, considering stress-corrosion cracking prior to 500,000 years is a conservative 
approach. The cross-sectional area of a single stress corrosion crack is estimated to be 
6
7.7  10- m2 (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169868], Section 6.3.3.1.2.1). At the 95th percentile confidence 
interval, the average number of crack penetrations per failed CSNF waste package ranges from 
zero to about 30 for times between 200,000 and 500,000 years (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169996], 

Figure 26). Using 30 stress corrosion cracks per waste package, the total cross-sectional 
diffusive area of stress corrosion crack openings in a failed waste package is A = 2.31  10-4 m. 
The diffusion coefficient for uranium in porous corrosion products is given by an empirical 
function of porosity and saturation, Archies law (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169868], Section 
6.5.1.2.1.4.2): 
3.1 2 
, D0 (Eq. 6.3-6)
D =f S CP we 
where D0 is the self-diffusion coefficient of water (2.299  10-5 cm2/s), used as a bounding 
value for diffusivity in bulk liquid water for all radionuclides (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169868], 
Section 6.3.4.1). 
It is assumed that the porous corrosion products that fill the stress corrosion cracks have a 
porosity of f= 4.0 (fraction) (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169868], Section 6.5.1.2.1.3.2). 
The corrosion products are partially saturated with water. The effective water saturation of 
corrosion products, SCP we (fraction), depends on the relative humidity, RH (fraction), of the air 
,
in the immediate vicinity of the stress corrosion cracks and on the specific surface area of 
corrosion products, sCP (m2/kg) (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169868], Section 6.5.1.2.1.4.2): 
- 1/ 45.2 
S 
CP we = 312.1  10- 6 sCP (- ln RH ) . (Eq. 6.3-7)
, 
The specific surface area of corrosion products is uncertain, ranging from 1000.0 to 
22,000 m2/kg (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169868], Section 6.5.1.2.1.3.1). Diffusive releases will be 
maximized when the specific surface area of corrosion products is sCP = 22 ,000 m2/kg. 
Diffusive releases will also be maximized when the concentration gradient of uranium, . C, is 
maximized. According to Table 8-2 of In-Package Chemistry Abstraction (BSC 2004 
[DIRS 167621]), the pH inside a failed CSNF waste package will lie in the range 4.5 to 7.0 
during the period from 600 to 20,000 years if the temperature is between 25  C and 100  C. For 
this range of pH, the solubility limit of uranium inside a CSNF waste package breached under 
nominal conditions or by seismic activity is 2.33 (log10 U (mg/L)) (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169425], 
Section 8.1). This is a concentration inside the package of 214 mg/L. The maximum 
concentration gradient will occur when the concentration outside the package is zero, giving 
. C = 214 mg/L or .214 kg/m3. 
The diffusive path length from a source of dissolved uranium inside a waste package to the 
exterior of the waste package is uncertain, ranging from 0.02 to 0.859 m (parameter 
Diff_Path_Length_CP_CSNF, BSC 2004 [DIRS 169868], Table 8.2-5). Diffusive releases will 
be maximized when the diffusive path length is at its minimum, . x = 02.0 m. This is the 
thickness of the waste package outer corrosion barrier, so it is also the diffusive path length 
through stress corrosion cracks alone; any additional path length inside the waste package from a 
uranium source to a stress corrosion crack in the outer corrosion barrier is neglected. 

Using the parameter values above that maximize the diffusive release, the mass of uranium 
released by diffusion through stress corrosion cracks over a period of time, .t (yr), is then given 
as a function of RH as: 
m = tq.= tDA. 
x 
C 
. 
. 
1072.1 23.1 12 sCP= -f (-ln )45.2 /2RH - 
0 tA D . 
x 
C 
. 
. 
(Eq. 6.3-8) 
= (1054.4 8 - - ln ) . 45.2 /2 tRH .- 
Over a time period of .t= 10,000 years, the mass of uranium released by diffusion through 
stress corrosion cracks for a range of relative humidities is shown in Table 6.3-11. 
Table 6.3-11. Diffusive Release of Uranium over 10,000 Years 
Diffusive Releases of 
RH Uranium Over 104 Years 
(kg U) 
0.9 2.9 10-3 
0.99 1.9 10-2 
0.999 1.3 10-1 
0.9999 8.4 10-1 
These results show that the mass of uranium released from a waste package through stress 
corrosion cracks over a 10,000-year period is insufficient to achieve a critical mass (Table 6.3-2). 
6.3.4 Base Case Criticality FEPs Analysis Results 
The probability of criticality per waste package for the base case criticality FEPs are shown in 
Table 6.3-12. These probability results have been generated to address the criticality FEPs of 
Tables 6.3-1 and 6.3-3 and are summarized from the SAPHIRE analysis results presented in 
Appendix B, Section B.23. Because there is no mechanism to breach the drip shield for these 
base case criticality FEPs during the regulatory period, there is no probability for advective flow 
to enter a failed waste package and generate a potentially critical configuration. Therefore, the 
probability of criticality for the base case criticality FEPs analysis is negligible. 

Table 6.3-12. Per Waste Package Criticality Probabilities from SAPHIRE Analysis of Base Case 
Criticality FEPs 
Waste Package Type 
Number of 
Waste 
Packagesa 
Per Waste Package Probability of Criticalityb 
Intact 
In-Package 
Degraded 
In-Package Near-Field Far-Field 
21-PWR Absorber Plate 4299 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
21-PWR Control Rod 95 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
12-PWR Absorber Plate 163 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
24-BWR Absorber Plate 84 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
44-BWR Absorber Plate 2831 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF Short w/ MOX 5 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF Long w/ MOX 61 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF Short w/ U-Zr Hx 165 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF Short w/ U-Metal 16 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF Long w/ U-Metal 4 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF MCO w/ U-Metal 220 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF Short w/ HEU Oxide 655 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF Long w/ HEU Oxide 42 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF Short w/ U/Th Oxide 20 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF Long w/ U/Th Oxide 73 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF Long w/ U/Th Carbide 605 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF Short w/ Aluminum Based 1226 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF Long w/ Aluminum Based 1 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF Short w/ U-Zr/U-Mo Alloy 14 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF Long w/ U-Zr/U-Mo Alloy 19 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF Short w/ LEU Oxide 8 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF Long w/ LEU Oxide 344 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
a
Source: Values from Table 4.1-3 
b 
SAPHIRE V. 7.18 (BSC 2002 [DIRS 160873]) analysis results (Appendix B, Section B.24) and 
Microsoft EXCEL spreadsheet endstate.xls. (Probability values below the screening criterion are set 
to 0.0.) 
6.4 ANALYSIS OF SEISMIC DISRUPTIVE EVENT CRITICALITY FEPS 
Vibratory ground motion and rock fall induced by a seismic event have been conjectured as 
initiating events that could cause drip shield failure through separation and/or corrosion leading 
to subsequent waste package failure. Such failures may allow the influx of seepage (either 
advective or diffusive) into the waste package, which, in turn, has the potential to cause a 
criticality. Although these failure mechanisms have been determined not to affect the criticality 
potential of the repository through analyses showing no drip shield separation due to seismic 
events (BSC 2004 [DIRS 170295], Section 6.5.4) and no corrosion related mechanisms for drip 

shield failure resulting in advective flow paths (Section 6.3.4), discussion of these processes are 
included in this section for purposes of completeness. The probabilities associated with the 
events are set to 0.0 since there is no mechanism for them to occur and thus no contribution to 
the criticality potential for the repository. 
A seismic event can, however, induce fault displacement that can potentially lead to drip shield 
and waste package failure for those structures intersecting the fault, which can then potentially 
allow advective or diffusive flow into the waste package and lead to conditions conducive to 
criticality. Additionally, new fractures that intersect the drift segments and the collapsing of the 
drift due to a seismic event will have an affect on the seepage as to both location and rate. 
However, these changes in seepage have no impact on the repositorys potential for criticality 
without drip shield failure resulting from fault displacement. Thus, fault displacement (Section 
6.4.4.1) is the only seismic disruptive event affecting the criticality potential of the repository. 
Table 6.4-1 presents the seismic disruptive event criticality FEPs 2.1.14.18.0A, 2.1.14.19.0A, 
2.1.14.20.0A, and 2.2.14.10.0A, which may initiate a sequence of events that can lead to a 
potential critical event. The direct and indirect effects of seismic activities on in-package 
criticality, near-field criticality, and far-field criticality are analyzed in this section. 
Table 6.4-1. Seismic Disruptive Event Criticality FEPs 
FEP Number FEP Title FEP Description 
2.1.14.18.0A 
In-package 
criticality resulting 
from a seismic 
event (intact 
configuration) 
The waste package internal structures and the waste form remain intact 
either during or after a seismic disruptive event. If there is a breach (or are 
breaches) in the waste package which allows water to either accumulate or 
flow-through the waste package then criticality could occur in situ. 
2.1.14.19.0A 
In-package 
criticality resulting 
from a seismic 
event (degraded 
configurations) 
Either during or as a result of, a seismic disruptive event, the waste 
package internal structures and the waste form may degrade. If a critical 
configuration develops, criticality could occur in situ. Potential in situ 
critical configurations are defined in Figures 3.2a and 3.2b of Disposal 
Criticality Analysis Methodology Topical Report (YMP 2003 [DIRS 
165505]). 
2.1.14.20.0A 
Near-field 
criticality resulting 
from a seismic 
event 
Either during or as a result of, a seismic disruptive event, near-field 
criticality could occur if fissile material-bearing solution from the waste 
package is transported into the drift and the fissile material is precipitated 
into a critical configuration. Potential near-field critical configurations are 
defined in Figure 3.3a of Disposal Criticality Analysis Methodology Topical 
Report (YMP 2003 [DIRS 165505]). 
2.2.14.10.0A 
Far-field criticality 
resulting from a 
seismic event 
Either during or as a result of, a seismic disruptive event, far-field criticality 
could occur if fissile material-bearing solution from the waste package is 
transported beyond the drift and the fissile material is precipitated into a 
critical configuration. Potential far-field critical configurations are defined in 
Figure 3.3b of Disposal Criticality Analysis Methodology Topical Report 
(YMP 2003 [DIRS 165505]). 
Source: Table 6.1-1 
Uncertainty is included in the seismic evaluation of potential in-package criticality, because of its 
importance to any analysis. Uncertainty is included throughout the evaluation by the 
development of probability distributions sampled via a Latin Hypercube Sampling method. The 
principle of Latin Hypercube Sampling is provided by Modarres (1993 [DIRS 104667], p. 244). 
The developed probability distributions represent the epistemic uncertainty for the parameters of 
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01 6-52 October 2004 

interest. An example is the damaged area (i.e., separation) of drip shield, which is dependent 
upon the seismic event PGV. The analysis develops a probability distribution representing the 
epistemic uncertainty about the damaged area of the drip shield (i.e., separation) and then 
samples this distribution to obtain the damaged area (i.e., separation) based on the seismic event. 
The developed Latin Hypercube Sampling method evaluates the epistemic uncertainty of all 
input parameters either developed within the evaluation or based on other reports. An example 
of an external parameter with its epistemic uncertainty accounted for in the Latin Hypercube 
Sampling method would be the seepage rate. 
Seismic Peak Ground Velocity 
The horizontal peak ground velocity (PGV) is related to the mean annual seismic exceedance 
frequency. This relationship was developed in Seismic Consequence Abstraction (BSC 2004 
[DIRS 169183], Section 6.4). The relationship between the PGV values and the mean annual 
seismic exceedance frequency was developed by scaling the PGV values at the monitored 
geologic repository (MGR) surface down to the drift. Based on this relationship scaled to the 
drift, the PGV values and their related mean annual seismic exceedance frequencies are listed in 
Table 6.4-2 (DTN: MO0409SPACALSS.005 [DIRS 171833], Table 1). 
Table 6.4-2. Mean Annual Exceedance Frequency and Corresponding Peak Ground Velocity 
Mean Annual Exceedance Peak Ground Velocity 
Frequency (1/yr) (m/s) 
6.26  10-4 0.159 
2.78  10-4 0.239 
9.30  10-5 0.398 
1.84  10-5 0.796 
3.07  10-6 1.59 
2.28  10-7 3.98 
8.15  10-8 5.57 
2.60  10-8 7.96 
6.56  10-9 11.9 
Source: DTN: MO0409SPACALSS.005 [DIRS 171833], Table 1 
Drip Shield Failure from Seismic Event 
Damage to the drip shield via drip shield separation, which has the potential to allow advective 
flow to reach the waste package, can occur due to vibratory ground motion. The percent 
damaged area (i.e., separation) of the drip shield from a seismic event follows a uniform 
distribution. The lower-bound of the uniform distribution for the percent damaged area is based 
on linear interpolation below a PGV value of 5.35 m/s and linear extrapolation for PGV values 
above 5.35 m/s. The lower-bound tabular values are shown in Table 6.4-3 
(DTN: MO0409SPACALSS.005 [DIRS 171833], Table 1). 

Table 6.4-3. Lower-Bound Percent Damaged Area of Drip Shield Due to Seismic Event 
PGV Value 
(m/s) 
Damaged Area to Drip Shield 
(percent) 
0.00 0.0 
2.44 0.0 
5.35 10.0 
Source: DTN: MO0409SPACALSS.005 [DIRS 171833], 
Table 1 
The upper-bound of the uniform distribution is also correlated to the PGV value. Table 6.4-4 
provides the upper-bound percent damaged area of the drip shield based on PGV value. The 
upper-bound value can be interpolated for PGV values not directly listed. The tabulated values 
(DTN: MO0409SPACALSS.005 [DIRS 171833], Table 1) are listed in Table 6.4-4. 
Table 6.4-4. Upper-Bound Percent Damaged Area of Drip Shield Due to Seismic Event 
PGV Value Damaged Area to Drip Shield 
(m/s) (percent) 
0.00 0.00 
2.44 0.00 
5.35 50.0 
20.0 50.0 
Source: DTN: MO0409SPACALSS.005 [DIRS 171833], 
Table 1 
Waste Package Failure 
Waste package failure is defined as any breach of a waste package, regardless of the mechanism, 
that can result in either a diffusive or advective flow path through the waste package outer 
barrier. A waste package failure that creates a diffusive flow path can occur due to vibratory 
ground motion. The percent damaged area of the waste package from a seismic event follows a 
uniform distribution. The calculated percent damaged area of a waste package follows a uniform 
distribution (DTN: MO0409SPACALSS.005 [DIRS 171833], Table 1) ranging from a minimum 
of 0.0 to an upper-bound that is correlated to the PGV value by 
0.436  PGV  0.305 PGV > 0.7 
Upper Bound = (Eq. 6.4-1) 
0.0 PGV = 0.7. 
6.4.1 Seismic Ground Motion Effects on In-Package Criticality Evaluations 
A seismic event has the potential to lead to a critical event by causing damage to the drip shield 
and waste package, which can create an advective or diffusive flow to penetrate the damaged 
waste package. Water penetrating a damaged waste package can lead to a potential criticality via 
moderation or degradation of the waste form into a more critical composition. This section uses 
the information from Seismic Consequence Abstraction (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169183]) and 

Abstraction of Drift Seepage (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169131]) in the probability evaluation of 
sufficient seepage filling a damaged waste package, which then has the potential of becoming 
critical. 
6.4.1.1 Seismic Effects in the Lithophysal Zone 
A seismic event can affect the drip shield, waste package, and cladding from vibratory ground 
motion. Rock fall induced by the seismic event can cause stress cracks on the drip shield, but 
will not cause any damage to the waste package. A seismic event can also affect the seepage of 
water into the drift due to new fractures or the collapsing of the drift. Seepage is an important 
factor that can lead to a waste package criticality. Seepage can lead to localized corrosion on the 
outer barrier of the waste package and possible penetration of the barrier, which allows the 
seepage water to enter and fill the waste package. Seepage is an important aspect to criticality 
because of its moderation potential. In order for seepage to penetrate the waste package and 
potentially lead to a criticality, multiple barriers must be breached. A seismic event can initiate 
breach of these barriers, which is the drip shield separation that can lead to waste package outer 
barrier breach via localized corrosion. Breaching (i.e., separation) of a drip shield followed by 
waste package damage from localized corrosion are analyzed below. In addition, the 
development and use of seepage rate distributions filling a damaged waste package is analyzed. 
The analysis is divided into two separate repository geological zones, lithophysal and 
nonlithophysal. Each zone requires separate evaluations because of the effect a seismic event 
has on the seepage rates due to drift fracturing or collapse. The lithophysal zone represents 
approximately 85 percent of the total repository drift area (refer to Section 6.2). 
The methodology for evaluating damage to the drip shield and waste package is the same for 
both repository drift zones. Therefore, drip shield and waste package damage assessment 
process is independent of location within the repository. 
6.4.1.1.1 Drip Shield and Waste Package Damage 
Drifts in the lithophysal zone are expected to collapse during a seismic event and the void area 
between the drip shield and the drift area to become filled. The collapse of the drift in this zone 
does not damage the drip shield because the rock type is low in compressive strength and is 
permeated with void spaces (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169183], Section 6.6.2). This weak rock is 
expected to collapse into small fragments under the load imposed by the vibratory ground 
motion. Any failure to the drip shield in this zone is expected to occur only from the vibratory 
ground motions that cause the drip shields to separate, allowing an advective flowpath for 
seepage into the waste package. 
To account for drip shield damage, Seismic Consequence Abstraction (BSC 2004 [DIRS 
169183], Section 6.6.3) developed an abstraction, which is followed to calculate the drip shield 
percent damaged area (i.e., separation). To account for the drip shield damage, a Mathcad 
spreadsheet was developed (Appendix D) to use the seismic inputs listed above in subsections 
(Drip Shield Failure from Seismic Event) and (Waste Package Failure). This Mathcad 
spreadsheet also accounts for the uncertainty in the drip shield percent damaged area (i.e., 
separation) by performing a Latin Hypercube Sampling process. 

The process to calculate the drip shield percent damaged area (i.e., separation) is outlined in 
Seismic Consequence Abstraction (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169183], Section 6.9.2) and 
DTN: MO0409SPACALSS.005 [DIRS 171833]. The process discusses sampling the mean 
annual exceedance frequency of a seismic event to obtain a PGV value. The mean annual 
seismic exceedance frequency follows a log-uniform distribution between 10-8 to 10-6 per year. 
Although Seismic Consequence Abstraction (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169183], Section 6.9.2) addresses 
seismic annual exceedance frequencies between 10-8 to 10-4 per year, only annual exceedance 
frequencies less than 10-6 per year (corresponding to a PGV value of 2.44 m/s) will result in drip 
shield damage (i.e., separation) (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169183], Section 6.9.2). 
The sampled mean annual seismic exceedance frequency is used to obtain the corresponding 
PGV value from log-linear interpolation of the lookup table (refer to Table 6.4-2). The 
interpolated PGV value is used to determine the upper and lower-bounds of the uniform 
distribution representing the drip shield percent damaged area (i.e., separation). However, the 
information provided in Seismic Consequence Abstraction (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169183], 
Section 6.4.4) limits, or caps, the maximum PGV values at 5.0 m/s, thereby limiting the 
predicted damage area for the drip shield. However, drip shield damage area (i.e., separation) is 
maximized at 50 percent for seismic annual exceedance frequencies of 10-7 per year. At these 
frequencies and lower the drip shields are predicted to relocate and completely overlap one 
another (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169183], Section 6.5.6). 
The upper-bound percent damaged area is interpolated from Table 6.4-4 based on the sampled 
PGV value. This interpolated upper-bound value is input into the uniform distribution that 
represents the drip shield percent damaged area (i.e., separation). The lower-bound of the 
uniform distribution is also determined by interpolation. The lower-bound percent damaged area 
uses the lookup table shown in Table 6.4-3. The lower-bound percent damaged area is based on 
the same sampled PGV value. Once the lower and upper-bounds of the uniform distribution are 
obtained, this distribution is then sampled to calculate the drip shield percent damaged area (i.e., 
separation) for that particular seismic event. This percent damaged area value is stored within 
the Mathcad spreadsheet. 
The process then repeats with a newly sampled mean seismic exceedance frequency. This newly 
sampled mean seismic exceedance frequency leads to a new drip shield percent damaged area 
(i.e., separation) based on that seismic event. This process is performed for 30,000 realizations. 
The mean fraction of drip shield damaged area (i.e., percent damage divided by 100) from the 
sampled vibratory ground motions is calculated to be 4.56810-2 and the 5 and 95 percentile are 
0.0 and 1.81110-1, respectively (refer to Appendix D, pp. D-3 and D-4). 
The waste package may also be damaged due to vibratory ground motion in the lithophysal zone. 
The damage to the waste package is not calculated in this analysis because all seismic induced 
waste package damage is stress corrosion cracks. These cracks will only allow diffusive flow to 
enter the waste package, which is an insufficient amount of water for moderation. Therefore, 
seismic induced waste package damage will not be calculated and carried further in the analysis. 
Advective flow paths into the waste package may be created following a seismic event if the 
corresponding drip shield damage (i.e., separation) allows the infiltration of seepage to reach the 
waste package. Even if the waste package does not see seepage, localized corrosion can still 

occur and is assumed to attack up to 10 percent of the total population of waste packages 
(Assumption 5.1.1) creating an advective flow path into these waste packages. Otherwise, waste 
package damage will only create a diffusive flow path. 
6.4.1.1.2 Seepage Rate Probability Distribution for Lithophysal 
The process used to determine the seepage rate distributions, which is used to calculate the 
seepage probability, follows the process steps discussed in Abstraction of Drift Seepage (BSC 
2004 [DIRS 169131], Section 6.7.1.1). The determination of the seepage rate distributions is 
discussed below and presented in Appendix C, Section C.3. 
In order to determine seepage rate distributions, a Latin Hypercube Sampling process was 
developed to handle the spatial variability and uncertainty of the seepage parameters. The 
routine sampled each seepage parameter for 20,000 realizations to ensure sufficient coverage of 
the parameter range. There are three key parameters, which are sampled in order to determine 
the seepage rate distributions. 
The first parameter, capillary strength (1/a), is determined to have a spatial variability that is 
uniformly distributed with a range between 402 Pa to 780 Pa, and a mean of 591 Pa. The 
uncertainty about the capillary strength, .(1/a), follows a triangular distribution with a lower-
bound of -105 Pa, upper-bound of +105 Pa, and a mean of 0.0 (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169131], 
Section 6.7.1.1). These distributions are identical for all geological zones. The Latin Hypercube 
Sampling process samples a capillary strength value from the spatial variability and adds it to the 
sampled capillary strength value from the uncertainty distribution. This calculated capillary 
strength is used in the interpolation process along with the other sampled key parameters to 
determine the seepage rate. This sampling process is performed for 20,000 realizations. 
The next key parameter for the lithophysal zone, permeability (k), is determined to have a spatial 
variability distribution that is lognormal with a mean of -11.5 (in log 10) and a standard 
deviation of 0.47 (in log 10). The mean and standard deviation of permeability was determined 
from statistical analysis on the log-transformed data. The permeability uncertainty (.k) follows 
a triangular distribution with a lower-bound of -0.92, upper-bound +0.92, and a mean of 0.0 
(BSC 2004 [DIRS 169131], Section 6.7.1.1). These distributions are for the lithophysal zone 
only. The Latin Hypercube Sampling process samples a permeability value from the spatial 
variability and adds it to the sampled permeability value from the uncertainty distribution. This 
calculated permeability is used in the interpolation process along with the other sampled key 
parameters to determine the seepage rate. This sampling process is performed for 
20,000 realizations. 
Percolation flux is sampled from the percolation flux information that represents the repository 
area (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169131], Figure 6.6-10). The sampling process uses the glacial transition 
climate percolation flux information, which occurs 2000 years after repository closure and lasts 
through the regulatory period of 10,000 years (BSC 2004 [DIRS 170002], Section 6.6.1). The 
percolation flux uncertainty is expressed by three different scenarios (lower-bound, mean, and 
upper-bound). Since there are three different scenarios that are used to represent the uncertainty, 
three different final seepage rate distributions are obtained (one for each scenario). 

The percolation flux is adjusted to account for intermediate-scale heterogeneity by using flow 
focusing factors (Equation 6.4-2) (DTN: LB0104AMRU0185.012 [DIRS 163906]). The flow 
focusing factors are obtained by sampling the cumulative distribution function (Equation 6.4-2). 
The sampled flow focusing factor is then multiplied to the sampled percolation flux. 
Equation 6.4-2 is the cumulative distribution function for the flow focusing factors where the 
variable x represents the flow-focusing factor. 
ff - = 3137.0 x 4 + 4998.5 x3 - 66.35 x 2 + 3.102 x - 434.11 (Eq. 6.4-2) 
The seepage rate for each of the uncertainty scenarios (i.e., lower-bound, mean, and upper-
bound) is determined via the developed sampling routine (refer to Appendix C, Section C.3). 
The sampling routine samples a value from the three key parameters (i.e., capillary strength, 
permeability, and adjusted percolation flux), that are used to interpolate the mean seepage rate 
and seepage rate standard deviation. The mean seepage rate and seepage rate standard deviation 
are from the lookup table for the degraded drift (DTN: LB0307SEEPDRCL.002 [DIRS 
164337]). Prior to using the standard deviation, it is adjusted to account for uncertainty by 
creating a uniform distribution with a lower-bound of -3 times the sampled standard 
deviation and an upper-bound of +3 times the sampled standard deviation. The uniform 
distribution to account for uncertainty is sampled and added to the interpolated mean seepage 
rate. This process is performed for 20,000 realizations (refer to Appendix C, Section C.3). 
The resulting seepage rate values are adjusted prior to being used to determine the seepage flux 
probability by (1) setting seepage rates less than 0.1 kg/yr per waste package to zero (since these 
small values are the result of interpolation (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169131], Section 6.7.1.1), and (2) 
capping calculated seepage rates at 100 percent. 
Seepage rates are then filtered in order to develop a distribution that represents the seepage rate 
values by discarding all seepage rates with a zero value. The remaining nonzero seepage rates 
are then used to develop a Weibull distribution for each of the scenarios (i.e., lower-bound, 
mean, and upper-bound) to represent the seepage rate at the drift (refer to Appendix C, 
Section C.3). These Weibull distributions are used to calculate the probability of having 
sufficient seepage to fill and overflow a damaged waste package (refer to Appendix D). In 
addition, to calculate the fraction of waste package locations with seepage, the number of 
nonzero seepage rates is divided by the total number of realizations (i.e., seepage fraction). The 
Weibull parameters, scale and shape (a and  , respectively), and seepage fraction for each 
scenario are listed in Table 6.4-5. 

Table 6.4-5. Weibull Parameters and Seepage Fraction (Lithophysal Zone) 
Weibull Parameters Value Seepage Fraction 
Lower-Bound Seepage Scenario (Drift Collapse) 
a (scale) 9.303E+00 (liters/year) 
1.926E-01 
 (shape) 4.95E-01 
Mean Seepage Scenario (Drift Collapse) 
a (scale) 1.455E+02 (liters/year) 
5.149E-01 
 (shape) 4.561E-01 
Upper-Bound Seepage Scenario (Drift Collapse) 
a (scale) 3.81E+02 (liters/year) 
6.408E-01 
 (shape) 4.858E-01 
Source: Appendix C, p. C-45 
6.4.1.2 Seismic Effects in the Nonlithophysal Zone 
The nonlithophysal zone is analyzed separately because of the difference in seepage rates due to 
the drift fracturing instead of collapsing as it does in the lithophysal zone. Damage to the drip 
shield and waste package remains the same for the nonlithophysal zone as discussed in 
Section 6.4.1.1. However, drip shields can be impacted by rock blocks being ejected from the 
drift due to a seismic event. This damage is discussed below. 
6.4.1.2.1 Drip Shield and Waste Package Damage 
Seismic induced rock fall has been determined in Seismic Consequence Abstraction (BSC 2004 
[DIRS 169183], Sections 6.6.2) and determined that stress corrosion cracks were created on the 
drip shield. However, these stress corrosion cracks are small and tight, which makes advective 
flow passing through these cracks negligible (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169183], Sections 6.5.4). 
Seismic induced rock fall does not to result in waste package failure as discussed in Seismic 
Consequence Abstraction (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169183], Sections 6.6.3). The rock blocks can not 
reach the waste packages since the drip shields remain relatively intact. 
Vibratory ground motion damage to the drip shield and waste package is the same in the 
nonlithophysal zone as in the lithophysal zone. The effects of this damage mechanism are 
presented in Section 6.4.1.1.1. Therefore, no additional discussion of this damage mechanism is 
necessary. 
6.4.1.2.2 Seepage Rate Probability Distribution for Nonlithophysal 
The process used to determine the seepage rate distribution for the nonlithophysal zone, which is 
used to calculate the seepage probability, follows the process steps discussed in Abstraction of 
Drift Seepage (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169131], Section 6.7.1.1) and Section 6.4.1.1.2. The only 
differences are the permeability, k, and the look-up table for seepage rate, and the seepage rate 
standard deviation. 
Capillary strength (1/a) is the same for the nonlithophysal zone as it is for the lithophysal zone. 

The nonlithophysal zone permeability (k) is determined to have a spatial variability distribution 
that is lognormal with a mean of -12.2 (in log 10) and a standard deviation of 0.34 (in log 10). 
The mean and standard deviation of permeability were determined from statistical analysis on 
the log-transformed data. The permeability uncertainty (.k) follows a triangular distribution 
with a lower-bound of -0.68, upper-bound +0.68, and a mean of 0.0 (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169131], 
Section 6.7.1.1). These distributions are for the nonlithophysal zone only. 
The percolation flux representing the repository area (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169131], Figure 6.6-10) 
is the same for the nonlithophysal as for the lithophysal. The percolation flux uncertainty is 
expressed by three different scenarios for the spatial flux distributions (lower-bound, mean, and 
upper-bound). Since three different scenarios are used to represent the uncertainty, three seepage 
rate distributions (one for each scenario) are obtained for the nonlithophysal zone. 
The percolation flux is adjusted for intermediate-scale heterogeneity by using flow-focusing 
factors (Equation 6.4-2), which are sampled and multiplied by the sampled percolation flux. 
However, for the nonlithophysal zone, the interpolated seepage rate is increased by 20 percent to 
account for rock bolts and drift degradation (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169131], Section 6.7.1.2). 
The seepage rate at the drift for each of the uncertainty scenarios (i.e., lower-bound, mean, and 
upper-bound) is determined using the same sampling process discussed in Section 6.4.1.1.2. The 
sampled value from the three key parameters (i.e., capillary strength, permeability, adjusted 
percolation flux) is used to interpolate the mean seepage rate and seepage rate standard deviation 
using the lookup table for the non-degraded drift (DTN: LB0304SMDCREV2.002 
[DIRS 163687]). The standard deviation is adjusted to account for uncertainty by creating a 
uniform distribution with a lower-bound of -3 times the sampled standard deviation and an 
upper-bound of + 3 times the sampled standard deviation. The uniform distribution to account 
for uncertainty is sampled and then added to the interpolated mean seepage rate. This process is 
performed for 20,000 realizations (refer to Appendix C, Section C.4). 
The resulting seepage rate values are adjusted prior to being used to determine the seepage rate 
probability by (1) setting seepage rates less than 0.1 kg/yr per package to zero (since these small 
values are the result of interpolation (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169131], Section 6.7.1.1)), and (2) 
capping calculated seepage rates at 100 percent. 
Seepage rates are then filtered in order to develop a distribution that represents the seepage rate 
values by discarding all seepage rates with a zero value. The remaining nonzero seepage rates 
are then used to develop a Weibull distribution for each of the scenarios (i.e., lower-bound, 
mean, and upper-bound) to represent the seepage rate at the drift (refer to Appendix C, 
Section C.2). These Weibull distributions are used to calculate the probability of having 
sufficient seepage to fill and overflow a damaged waste package (refer to Appendix D). In 
addition, to calculate the fraction of waste package locations that see seepage, the number of 
nonzero seepage rates is divided by the total number of realizations (i.e., seepage fraction). The 
Weibull parameters, scale and shape (a and , respectively), and seepage fraction for each 
scenario are listed in Table 6.4-6. 

Table 6.4-6. Weibull Parameters and Seepage Fraction (Nonlithophysal Zone) 
Weibull Parameters Values Seepage Fraction 
Lower-Bound Seepage Scenario (Drift Collapse) 
a (scale) 5.099E+00 (liters/year) 
1.542E-01 
 (shape) 5.135E-01 
Mean Seepage Scenario (Drift Collapse) 
a (scale) 8.414E+01 (liters/year) 
5.234E-01 
 (shape) 4.619E-01 
Upper-Bound Seepage Scenario (Drift Collapse) 
a (scale) 2.232E+02 (liters/year) 
6.716E-01 
 (shape) 4.932E-01 
Source: Appendix C, p. C-60 
6.4.2 SAPHIRE Event Probability Assignment for Seismic Scenarios 
Based on the calculations in the above sections, the following basic events are modified from the 
base case criticality FEPs SAPHIRE analysis of the seismic disruptive event evaluations. 
Assignment of the event probabilities for the seismic SAPHIRE criticality FEPs evaluation is 
presented in the following sections. The events presented in these sections are used to quantify: 
 
The master scenario list event trees MSL-ET and MSL-ET2 (Figures B-4 and B-5 of 
Appendix B, respectively) 
 
The waste package internal configuration event trees CONFIG-BATH and CONFIG-IP4-
A (Figures B-6 and B-11 of Appendix B, respectively) 
 
The near-field configuration event trees CONFIG-NF-F, CONFIG-NF1, CONFIGNF2, 
CONFIG-NF3, and CONFIG-NF4 (Figures B-14, B-15, B-16, B-17, and B-18 of 
Appendix B, respectively) 
 
The far-field configuration event trees CONFIG-FF-J, CONFIG-FF-K, and CONFIGFF3 
(Figures B-21, B-22, and B-23 of Appendix B, respectively). 
Justification for the probability values assigned to these events is, in part, based on the 
information presented in the previous discussions. 
6.4.2.1 Quantification of Event Trees MSL-ET and MSL-ET2 
The quantification of nine events and processes are required to define the formation of a waste 
package bathtub or flow-through configuration. These events are listed as top events of the 
MSL-ET event tree (Figure B-4, Appendix B) and its continuation event tree MSL-ET2 
(Figure B-5, Appendix B). The following subsections provide justification for the probabilities 
assigned to the events used in the quantification of event trees MSL-ET and MSL-ET2 for 
the seismic criticality FEPs evaluations. Table 6.4-7 summarizes the event probability 
assignments discussed below. 

Table 6.4-7. Event Probability Assignment for the MSL-ET and MSL-ET2 Event Trees for the Seismic 
Disruptive Event Criticality FEPs SAPHIRE Analysis 
SAPHIRE Assigned 
Event Valuea 
Event Name and Description 
Probability 
Values 
(per waste package 
for all waste 
package types) Justification 
Availability of Seepage 
For the lithophysal zone: 
/MS-IC-1A-SEIS-NWL (no seepage scenario) 5.184E-1 4.816E-1 
MS-IC-1A-SEIS-LL (lower-bound seepage scenario) 4.622E-2 4.622E-2 
MS-IC-1A-SEIS-ML (mean seepage scenario) 2.111E-1 2.111E-1 
MS-IC-1A-SEIS-UL (upper-bound seepage scenario) 2.243E-1 2.243E-1 
Section 
6.4.2.1.1 
For the nonlithophysal zone: 
/MS-IC-1A-SEIS-NWNL (no seepage scenario) 5.133E-1 4.867E-1 
MS-IC-1A-SEIS-LNL (lower-bound seepage scenario) 3.701E-2 3.701E-2 
MS-IC-1A-SEIS-MNL (mean seepage scenario) 2.146E-1 2.146E-1 
MS-IC-1A-SEIS-UNL (upper-bound seepage scenario) 2.351E-1 2.351E-1 
(MS-IC-1A top event) 
Availability of Seepage in the Near-Field Environment 
/MS-NF-T (water available to enter failed WP) 
MS-NF-T ((water available directly to drift)) 
True a 
True 
0.00 
1.00 Section 
6.4.2.1.2 
(MS-NF-T top event) 
Probability that drip shield failure within 10,000 years. 
For seismic ground motion scenarios 
/MS-IC-2 True a 0.0 
MS-IC-2 False 0.0 
Section 
6.4.2.1.3 
For seismic faulting scenarios 
/MS-IC-2 False a 1.00 
MS-IC-2 True 1.00 
(MS-IC-2 top event) 
Availability of Condensation underneath the drip shield 
/MS-IC-1B 
MS-IC-1B 
True a 
False 
0.00 
0.00 Section 
6.4.2.1.4 
(MS-IC-1B top event) 

Table 6.4-7. Event Probability Assignment for the MSL-ET and MSL-ET2 Event Trees for the 
Seismic Disruptive Event Criticality FEPs SAPHIRE Analysis (Continued) 
SAPHIRE Assigned 
Event Valuea 
Event Name and Description 
Probability 
Values 
(per waste package 
for all waste 
package types) Justification 
Probability of waste package fails within 10,000 years. 
For no seepage or no drip shield failure scenarios: 
/MS-IC-3A (no failure) False a 1.00 
MS-IC-3A[1] (diffusive flow path) True 1.00 
MS-IC-3A[2] (advective flow path) False 0.0 
Section 
For seepage and drip shield failure scenarios before 2000 6.4.2.1.5 
years 
/MS-IC-3A (no failure) False a 1.00 
MS-IC-3A[1] (diffusive flow path) False 0.00 
MS-IC-3A[2] (advective flow path) True 1.00 
(MS-IC-3A top event) 
Probability of formation of waste package bathtub 
configuration 
/MS-IC-3B False a 1.00 Section 
MS-IC-3B True 1.00 6.4.2.1.6 
(MS-IC-3B top event) 

Table 6.4-7. Event Probability Assignment for the MSL-ET and MSL-ET2 Event Trees for the 
Seismic Disruptive Event Criticality FEPs SAPHIRE Analysis (Continued) 
SAPHIRE Assigned 
Event Valuea 
Event Name and Description 
Probability 
Values 
(per waste package 
for all waste 
package types) Justification 
Probability of filling and overflowing the waste package 
given a bathtub configuration b 
Lower-bound seepage scenario for a 21-PWR Absorber 
Plate waste package type in the lithophysal zone: 
/MS-IC-4 (not filled scenario) 8.229E-1 1.771E-1 
MS-IC-4[1] (lower-bound seepage scenario) 1.771E-1 1.771E-1 
MS-IC-4[2] (mean seepage scenario) False 0.00 
MS-IC-4[3] (upper-bound seepage scenario) False 0.00 
Lower-bound seepage scenario for a 21-PWR Absorber 
Plate waste package type in the nonlithophysal zone: 
/MS-IC-4 (not filled scenario) 8.419E-1 1.581E-1 
MS-IC-4[1] (lower-bound seepage scenario) 1.581E-1 1.581E-1 
MS-IC-4[2] (mean seepage scenario) False 0.00 
MS-IC-4[3] (upper-bound seepage scenario) False 0.00 
Mean seepage scenario for a 21-PWR Absorber Plate 
waste package type in the lithophysal zone: 
/MS-IC-4 (not filled scenario) 7.686E-1 2.314E-1 
MS-IC-4[1] (lower-bound seepage scenario) False 0.00 
MS-IC-4[2] (mean seepage scenario) 2.314E-1 2.314E-1 
MS-IC-4[3] (upper-bound seepage scenario) False 0.00 Section 
6.4.2.1.7 
Mean seepage scenario for a 21-PWR Absorber Plate 
waste package type in the nonlithophysal zone: 
/MS-IC-4 (not filled scenario) 7.758E-1 2.242E-1 
MS-IC-4[1] (lower-bound seepage scenario) False 0.00 
MS-IC-4[2] (mean seepage scenario) 2.242E-1 2.242E-1 
MS-IC-4[3] (upper-bound seepage scenario) False 0.00 
Upper-bound seepage scenario for a 21-PWR Absorber 
Plate waste package type in the lithophysal zone: 
/MS-IC-4 (not filled scenario) 2.447E-1 2.447E-1 
MS-IC-4[1] (lower-bound seepage scenario) False 0.00 
MS-IC-4[2] (mean seepage scenario) False 0.00 
MS-IC-4[3] (upper-bound seepage scenario) 2.447E-1 2.447E-1 
Upper-bound seepage scenario for a 21-PWR Absorber 
Plate waste package type in the nonlithophysal zone: 
/MS-IC-4 (not filled scenario) 2.404E-1 2.404E-1 
MS-IC-4[1] (lower-bound seepage scenario) False 0.00 
MS-IC-4[2] (mean seepage scenario) False 0.00 
MS-IC-4[3] (upper-bound seepage scenario) 2.404E-1 2.404E-1 
(MS-IC-1A top event) 

Table 6.4-7. Event Probability Assignment for the MSL-ET and MSL-ET2 Event Trees for the 
Seismic Disruptive Event Criticality FEPs SAPHIRE Analysis (Continued) 
SAPHIRE Assigned 
Event Valuea 
Event Name and Description 
Probability 
Values 
(per waste package 
for all waste 
package types) Justification 
Probability of neutron absorber material misload in the 
waste package or waste form 
For the 21-PWR Control Rod waste package type 
/NA-MISLOAD ~1 3.758E-9 
NA-MISLOAD 3.758E-9 3.758E-9 
For the 21-PWR Absorber Plate waste package type 
/NA-MISLOAD ~1 4.576E-8 
NA-MISLOAD 4.576E-8 4.576E-8 
For the 12-PWR Absorber Plate waste package type 
/NA-MISLOAD ~1 6.217E-11 
NA-MISLOAD 6.217E-11 6.217E-11 
For the 44-BWR Absorber Plate waste package type 
/NA-MISLOAD ~1 6.217E-11 
NA-MISLOAD 6.217E-11 6.217E-11 
For the 24-BWR Absorber Plate waste package type 
/NA-MISLOAD 
NA-MISLOAD 
~1 
6.217E-11 
6.217E-11 
6.217E-11 Section 
6.4.2.1.8 
For DOE SNF Group 1 waste package types with neutron 
absorber materials in the canister basket c 
/NA-MISLOAD ~1 6.217E-11 
NA-MISLOAD 6.217E-11 6.217E-11 
For DOE SNF Group 2 waste package types with neutron 
absorber materials in filler d 
/NA-MISLOAD ~1 3.906E-8 
NA-MISLOAD 3.906E-8 3.906E-8 
For DOE SNF Group 3 waste package types with neutron 
absorber materials in canister basket and filler e 
/NA-MISLOAD ~1 3.912E-8 
NA-MISLOAD 3.912E-8 3.912E-8 
For DOE SNF waste package types without neutron 
absorber materials f 
/NA-MISLOAD True a 0.00 
NA-MISLOAD False 0.00 
(MS-IC-3B top event) 

Table 6.4-7. Event Probability Assignment for the MSL-ET and MSL-ET2 Event Trees for the 
Seismic Disruptive Event Criticality FEPs SAPHIRE Analysis (Continued) 
SAPHIRE Assigned 
Event Valuea 
Event Name and Description 
Probability 
Values 
(per waste package 
for all waste 
package types) Justification 
Probability of waste package misload: 
For the 21-PWR Absorber Plate waste package 
/WF-MISLOAD ~1 1.18E-5 
WF-MISLOAD 1.18E-5 1.18E-5 
For the 21-PWR Control Rod waste package 
/WF-MISLOAD True a 0.00 
WF-MISLOAD False 0.00 
For the 12-PWR Absorber Plate waste package 
/WF-MISLOAD True a 0.00 
WF-MISLOAD False 0.00 
For the 44-BWR Absorber Plate waste package 
/WF-MISLOAD True a 0.00 Section 
6.4.2.1.9 
WF-MISLOAD False 0.00 
For the 24-BWR Absorber Plate waste package 
/WF-MISLOAD True a 0.00 
WF-MISLOAD False 0.00 
For DOE waste package types with misload potential g 
/WF-MISLOAD ~1 1.475E-5 
WF-MISLOAD 1.475E-5 1.475E-5 
For DOE waste package types without misload potentialh 
/WF-MISLOAD True a 0.00 
WF-MISLOAD False 0.00 
(WF-MISLOAD top event) 

Table 6.4-7. Event Probability Assignment for the MSL-ET and MSL-ET2 Event Trees for the 
Seismic Disruptive Event Criticality FEPs SAPHIRE Analysis (Continued) 
SAPHIRE Assigned 
Event Valuea 
Event Name and Description 
Probability 
Values 
(per waste package 
for all waste 
package types) Justification 
Criticality potential of waste package dry diffusion 
configuration 
/CRIT-POT-WF True a 0.00 Section 
CRIT-POT-WF False 0.00 6.4.2.1.10 
(CRIT-POT-WF top event) 
NOTES: a For event names prefixed by a slash /, the actual event probability used in processing the SAPHIRE
logic model is the complement (i.e., 1-value) of the assigned value.
b 
Only an example of this top events probability assignment for one waste package type under seismic 
induced localized corrosion conditions is provided here. A complete list of this events probabilities for 
all waste package types, corrosion scenarios, and seepage scenarios are found in Tables 6.4-5 and 
6.4-6. 
c 
Aluminum Based, MOX, and U-Zr Hx DOE SNF waste forms with neutron absorber materials in the 
canister basket assembly 
d 
U/Th Oxide DOE SNF waste form with neutron absorber material in the canister filler materials 
e 
U-Zr/U-Mo Alloy DOE SNF waste form with neutron absorber material in the canister basket and filler 
materials 
f 
HEU Oxide, LEU Oxide, U-Metal, and U/Th Carbide DOE SNF waste forms without neutron absorber 
materials 
g 
MOX DOE SNF waste form with misload potential 
h 
Aluminum Based, HEU Oxide, LEU Oxide, U-Metal, U/Th Carbide, U/Th Oxide, and U-Zr Hx, and U-
Zr/U-Mo Alloy DOE SNF waste forms without misload potential 
6.4.2.1.1 Top Event MS-IC-1A 
The amount of seepage reaching the drift is an important factor in waste package degradation 
and criticality potential. Two parameters characterize the seepage into the emplacement drifts  
the seepage fraction (location within the drifts that see seepage) and the seepage rate (the volume 
of water entering the drift on an annual basis). The purpose of top event MS-IC-1A is to 
represent the possibility that seepage is available in a drift to enter a breached waste package. 
The upper branch of this top event indicates that seepage does not occur and the bottom three 
branches indicates that seepage does occur: branch 1  lower-bound seepage scenario, branch 2 mean 
seepage scenario and branch 3  upper-bound seepage scenario. The probability of 
attaining seepage for the lower-bound, mean, and upper-bound seepage scenarios is based on 
Analysis of Infiltration Uncertainty (BSC 2003 [DIRS 165991], Table 7-1) and seepage fraction 
calculated in Sections 6.4.1.1.2 and 6.4.1.2.2. 
The seepage fraction (i.e., the fraction of waste packages that see seepage) and seepage rate 
distributions for the lower-bound, mean, and upper-bound climate scenario is based on the 
glacial transition climate. The glacial transition is expected to last from roughly 2000 to 
10,000 years after repository closure (BSC 2004 [DIRS 170002], Section 6.6.1). The Latin 
Hypercube Sampling process discussed in Sections 6.4.1.1.2 and 6.4.1.2.2 was performed for 
20,000 realizations to obtain the seepage fraction used to quantify the seepage scenario branch 

probabilities. The results of the sampling process are documented in Appendix C, Sections C.3 
and C.4 for the lithophysal and nonlithophysal geological zones, respectively. 
Because of differences in the drift after a seismic event for the lithophysal and nonlithophysal 
geologic zone, it was necessary to perform separate Latin Hypercube samplings for each zone. 
The results reported in Tables 6.4-2 and 6.4-3 are the drift fractional probability of seepage given 
the specified seepage scenario (i.e., lower-bound, mean, or upper-bound). The probability of the 
individual seepage scenarios is specified in Table 7-1 of Analysis of Infiltration Uncertainty 
(BSC 2003 [DIRS 165991]). The seepage scenario probability is calculated by taking the 
seepage fraction for each scenario (i.e., lower-bound, mean, and upper-bound) and multiplying it 
to the probability of being in that seepage scenario. This calculation has been performed in the 
EXCEL spreadsheet Probability of Seepage (Appendix G). The appropriate seepage 
probability is then substituted into the SAPHIRE analysis based on the sequence branching of 
top event DRIFT-ZONE of the YMP-INIT-EVENT event tree. The results of this calculation 
are assigned as follows: 
Lithophysal Zone Seismic Disruptive Event Seepage Probabilities 
/MS-IC-1A-SEIS-NWL = 4.816E-1 (no seepage probability  SAPHIRE takes the 
complement of this value) 
MS-IC-1A-SEIS-LL = 4.622E-2 (lower-bound seepage scenario probability) 
MS-IC-1A-SEIS-ML = 2.111E-1 (mean seepage scenario probability) 
MS-IC-1A-SEIS-UL = 2.243E-1 (upper-bound seepage scenario probability) 
Nonlithophysal Zone Seismic Disruptive Event Seepage Probabilities 
/MS-IC-1A-SEIS-NWNL = 4.867E-1 (no seepage probability  SAPHIRE takes the 
complement of this value) 
MS-IC-1A-SEIS-LNL = 3.701E-2 (lower-bound seepage scenario probability) 
MS-IC-1A-SEIS-MNL = 2.146E-1 (mean seepage scenario probability) 
MS-IC-1A-SEIS-UNL = 2.351E-1 (upper-bound seepage scenario probability) 
6.4.2.1.2 Top Event MS-NF-T 
The branching of top event MS-NF-T represents the availability of seepage to flow directly into 
the invert. The upper branch indicates that seepage does not flow into the invert and the lower 
branch indicates that it is available. If seepage is available to flow directly into the invert, the 
sequence transfers to the CONFIG-NF4 event tree for the evaluation of near-field 
configuration class NF-4. Because both pathways are likely to occur simultaneously, both 
branches of this top event are processed to ensure the evaluation of all configuration classes. In 
order to process both branches of this top event, /MS-NF-T is assigned a value of 0.00 (i.e., the 
complement of 1.00) and MS-NF-T is assigned a value of 1.00. 
6.4.2.1.3 Top Event MS-IC-2 
The probability of water passing through the drip shield in order to reach the waste package is an 
important factor in waste package degradation and criticality. Water pathways through the drip 
shield can be created by stress corrosion cracks and/or gaps caused by the drip shield response to 

seismic events. This event is associated with top event MS-IC-2 of the MSL-ET event tree 
(Figure B-4, Appendix B). The upper branch represents no drip shield failure and the lower 
branch represents that the drip shield has failed. 
The intent of this discussion is to justify the probability value of top event MSIC2 for the 
evaluation of the seismic criticality FEPs. Drip shield failure is defined as drip shield damage, 
which results in an advective flow path through the drip shield and onto the waste package outer 
barrier. 
Based on the discussions provided below, for the seismic criticality FEPs conditions, the drip 
shield becomes damaged and allows advective flow to reach the waste package outer barrier. 
Therefore, /MS-IC-2 and MS-IC-2 are each assigned a value of 1.00. 
Seismic Failure of the Drip Shield 
This time independent drip shield failure mechanism can cause an advective flow through the 
drip shield. However, seismic failures of the drip shield are not predicted to occur due to seismic 
ground motion (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169183], Section 6.5.4.3). For seismic faulting events, drip 
shields on the fault are damaged to the point where they are completely ineffective (i.e., 100 
percent failure) (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169183], Section 6.7.5). 
Therefore, for seismic ground motion scenarios, the probability of occurrence for drip shield 
failure is negligible. For seismic faulting scenarios, drip shield failure probability is 1.0. 
6.4.2.1.4 Top Event MS-IC-1B 
The availability of condensation water to enter a failed waste package is an important factor in 
waste package degradation and criticality and is associated with top event MS-IC-1B of the 
MSL-ET event tree (Appendix B, Figure B-5). The upper branch of this top event represents 
the availability of, at most, only insignificant quantities of condensation to enter a failed waste 
package. The lower branch represents that significant condensation is available to enter a failed 
waste package. 
Based on the information contained in In-Drift Natural Convection and Condensation (BSC 
2004 [DIRS 164327], Section 8.3), condensation can occur on the underside of the drip shield. 
However, it is assumed that any condensation flux from the underside of the drip shield has little 
potential for dripping onto the exposed waste package (Assumption 5.2.4). Therefore, 
condensation flux is not predicted to impact the criticality potential of a waste package and 
events /MS-IC-1B and MS-IC-1B will each be assigned a value of 0.00. 
6.4.2.1.5 Top Event MS-IC-3A 
The ability for water to enter a waste package is an important factor in waste package 
degradation and criticality and is associated with top event MS-IC-3A of the MSL-ET2 event 
tree (Appendix B, Figure B-5). Water pathways into the waste package can be created by 
corrosion and/or failures caused by the waste package response to seismic events. The intent of 
this discussion is to justify the probability value of top event MS-IC-3A used for the evaluation 
of the seismic criticality FEPs. Waste package failure is defined as waste package damage, 

which results in either a diffusive or advective flow path into the waste package. The upper 
branch of this top event represents the probability of no waste package failures. The second and 
third branches respectively represent the probability of a diffusive or advective waste package 
failure. 
The ground motion of seismic events with annual exceedance frequencies less than 10-4 (PGV of 
0.384 m/s) per year will result in damage to all of the waste packages. However, without an 
advective flow path into the waste package failure locations (i.e., no seepage or drip shield 
failure), the damage to the waste package is considered diffusive. For these conditions, /MS-IC-
3A is assigned a value of 1.00 (complement of 0.00), MS-IC-3A[1] is assigned a value of 1.00, 
and MS-IC-3A[2] is assigned a value of 0.00. 
Dependent on the waste package type, waste packages located on faults during a seismic event 
with annual exceedance frequencies less than 210-7 per year (BSC [DIRS 169183], 
Section 6.7.5) will result in damage to all of the waste packages. Because the drip shields are 
also failed at these fault locations, an advective flow path into the failed waste packages will be 
formed if seepage is present. For these conditions, /MS-IC-3A is assigned a value of 1.00 
(complement of 0.00), MS-IC-3A[1] is assigned a value of 0.00, and MS-IC-3A[2] is assigned a 
value of 1.00. 
6.4.2.1.6 Top Event MS-IC-3B 
The branching of top event MS-IC-3B represents the probability that waste package failure will 
result in the formation of a bathtub or flow-through configuration. The upper branch indicates 
the formation of a flow-through waste package configuration and the lower branch indicates that 
a bathtub configuration is formed. As discussed in Section 6.4.2.1.5, two post-seismic 
conditions could result in the formation of an advective flow path into the waste package. For all 
seismic events, it is assumed (Assumption 5.2.7) that all waste package failure conditions 
resulting in advective flow will result in the formation of a bathtub condition. Since a bathtub 
condition is believed to result in a higher likelihood of a critical configuration, this assumption is 
considered limiting. Although waste package damage initiated by seismic events is expected to 
occur over the entire surface of the waste package, it is assumed that the damage on the bottom 
surface remains in a diffuse mode or becomes plugged with corrosion products for the remainder 
of the regulatory period (Assumption 5.2.7). Therefore, /MS-IC-3B and MS-IC-3B are each 
assigned a value of 1.00. 
6.4.2.1.7 Top Event MS-IC-4 
The availability of sufficient water to fill and overflow a waste package in a bathtub 
configuration is associated with top event MS-IC-4 of the MSL-ET2 event tree (Appendix B, 
Figure B-5). The upper branch of this top event represents that there is insufficient seepage to 
fill and overflow a failed waste package during the regulatory period. The second, third, and 
fourth branches represent the probability of sufficient seepage to fill and overflow a failed waste 
package for the lower-bound, mean, and upper-bound seepage scenarios, respectively. The 
probability of occurrence for this top event is calculated using information on the various 
seepage scenarios from Abstraction of Drift Seepage (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169131]) and the failure 
mechanisms for the drip shield and waste package given a seismic event. It is assumed that 

localized corrosion induced waste package failures will always result in the formation of a 
bathtub configuration (Assumption 5.2.7). 
The probability of attaining sufficient seepage for these seepage scenarios is calculated in 
Appendix D using a Latin Hypercube Sampling process with 50,000 realizations. The evaluation 
for the determination of the probabilities is further dependent on: 
 
the seismic events time of occurrence, which provides the time remaining to fill the waste 
package (i.e., 10,000 years minus time of occurrence). 
 
the waste package free volume to be filled (liters  waste package type dependent). 
 
whether the waste package is located in the lithophysal or nonlithophysal geologic zone. 
Table 6.4-8 summarizes the results for this sampling process for the seismic faulting induced 
waste package failures. 
Table 6.4-8. Probability of Overfilling Waste Package After a Seismic Faulting Event 
Waste Package Type 
Geologic 
Zone 
Probability of Waste Package Overfilling 
Lower-Bound 
Seepage Scenario 
Mean Seepage 
Scenario 
Upper-Bound 
Seepage Scenario 
21-PWR Absorber Plate 
Lithophysal 1.771E-1 2.314E-1 2.447E-1 
Nonlithophysal 1.581E-1 2.242E-1 2.404E-1 
21-PWR Control Rod 
Lithophysal 1.771E-1 2.314E-1 2.447E-1 
Nonlithophysal 1.581E-1 2.242E-1 2.404E-1 
12-PWR Absorber Plate 
Lithophysal 1.129E-1 1.415E-1 1.486E-1 
Nonlithophysal 1.027E-1 1.378E-1 1.464E-1 
44-BWR Absorber Plate 
Lithophysal 1.760E-1 2.310E-1 2.445E-1 
Nonlithophysal 1.568E-1 2.237E-1 2.401E-1 
24-BWR Absorber Plate 
Lithophysal 1.162E-1 1.428E-1 1.494E-1 
Nonlithophysal 1.066E-1 1.394E-1 1.474E-1 
DOE SNF Short 
Lithophysal 6.816E-1 8.830E-1 9.325E-1 
Nonlithophysal 6.108E-1 8.565E-1 9.167E-1 
DOE SNF Long 
Lithophysal 6.364E-1 8.644E-1 9.205E-1 
Nonlithophysal 5.579E-1 8.339E-1 9.019E-1 
DOE SNF MCO 
Lithophysal 3.225E-1 4.181E-1 4.416E-1 
Nonlithophysal 2.890E-1 4.055E-1 4.341E-1 
Source: Appendix D, pp. D-6 and D-9 
6.4.2.1.8 Top Event NA-MISLOAD 
The presence of neutron absorber materials in a waste package is important to criticality control 
during the regulatory period for the majority of the waste forms proposed for disposal in the 
repository. Misload of the neutron absorber materials is associated with top event NAMISLOAD 
of the MSL-ET2 event tree (Appendix B, Figure B-5). The lower branch of this 
top event indicates the occurrence of a misload of neutron absorber materials in the waste 
package or waste form and the upper branch indicates that no misload occurred. 

Neutron absorber material misload can occur as the result of several mechanisms during the 
waste package fabrication and loading processes. These processes include the use of wrong 
materials, failure to load the neutron absorber materials into the waste package or waste form, 
and selection of the wrong waste package type. The probabilities necessary to quantify the NA 
MISLOAD top event for each of the waste package/waste form types are the same as those 
presented in Section 6.3.3.1.8. 
Assessment of the neutron absorber material misload event only accounts for the potential to not 
load any neutron absorber material or to load less than the designed mass. No penalty is 
assigned for loading additional neutron absorber materials into a waste package or waste form. 
6.4.2.1.9 Top Event WF-MISLOAD 
The WF-MISLOAD top event represent the probability that a waste form was incorrectly placed 
into a waste package or DOE standardized SNF canister during the preclosure loading process. 
The lower branch of this top event indicates the occurrence of a waste form misload and the 
upper branch indicates that no misload occurred. 
An analysis of commercial SNF misload probabilities was performed in Commercial Spent 
Nuclear Fuels Waste Package Misload Analysis (BSC 2003 [DIRS 166316]). The probabilities 
necessary to quantify the WFMISLOAD top event for each of the waste package/waste form 
types are the same as those presented in Section 6.3.3.1.9. 
6.4.2.1.10 Top Event CRIT-POT-WF 
The branching of top event CRIT-POT-WF represents the criticality potential of a waste package 
with a diffusive failure. The upper branch indicates that this configuration does not have any 
criticality potential and the lower branch indicates that it does. 
As a result of seismic events with annual exceedance frequencies less than 10-4 per year (PGV of 
0.384 m/s), all waste packages are damaged. This damage is initially diffusive, resulting from 
stress corrosion cracking. However, 10 percent of the waste package inventory are assumed to 
have waste package failures resulting from localized corrosion initiated soon after repository 
closure (Assumption 5.1.1). For those waste packages that are located in no-seepage areas of the 
repository or for which the drip shield is not failed, the waste packages remain in a dry, diffusive 
failure mode. In addition, for the seismic disruptive event, the waste form has been breached by 
the seismic event (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169183], Section 6.5.7.3) and converted (degraded) into a 
more reactive configuration. 
For each of the waste forms evaluated, criticality evaluations have shown that without water for 
neutron moderation, criticality cannot occur (refer to DOE SNF references in Table 6.2-1 and 
commercial SNF references BSC 2004 [DIRS 171414] and BSC 2004 [DIRS 169963]). This is 
true even if a waste form or neutron absorber material misload occurs. Therefore, for waste 
packages with a diffusive failure, only the upper branch of this top event is activated and /CRIT-
POT-WF and CRIT-POT-WF are each assigned a value of 0.00. 

6.4.2.2 Quantification of Event Tree CONFIGBATH 
The following subsections provide justification for the probabilities assigned to the events used 
in the quantification of the event tree CONFIGBATH (Figure B-6 of Appendix B). This 
event tree initiates the evaluation of the internal waste package configuration classes IP-1, IP-2, 
and IP-3. This event tree consists of 11 top events, all of which are required for the evaluation of 
this waste package internal configuration class for the seismic disruptive event. Table 6.4-9 
summarizes the event probability assignments discussed below. 
Table 6.4-9. Event Probability Assignment for the CONFIGBATH Event Tree for the Seismic 
Disruptive Event Criticality FEPs SAPHIRE Analyses 
Event Name and Description 
Probability 
Value 
SAPHIRE Assigned 
Event Valuea 
(per waste package) Justification 
Initiate evaluation of waste package internal 
configuration class IP-1 
/CONFIG-SCEN False a 1.00 
CONFIG-SCEN[1] (configuration class IP-1) True 1.00 
CONFIG-SCEN[2] (transfer to CONFIG-IP2-D 
event tree) 
True 1.00 Section 6.4.2.2.1 
CONFIG-SCEN[3] (transfer to CONFIG-IP3 event True 1.00 
tree) 
(CONFIG-SCEN top event) 
Waste package internal structures degrade slower 
than waste form (configuration class IP-1) 
/MS-IC-6 False a 1.00 
MS-IC-6[1] (configuration class IP-1A) True 1.00 
MS-IC-6[2] (configuration class IP-1B) True 1.00 Section 6.4.2.2.2 
MS-IC-6[3] (transfer to CONFIG-IP2-D event tree) True 1.00 
MS-IC-6[4] (transfer to CONFIG-IP4-A event tree) True 1.00 
(MS-IC-6 top event) 
Waste package internal structures degrade at 
same rate as waste form 
/MS-IC-7 
MS-IC-7 
True a 
False 
0.00 
0.00 Section 6.4.2.2.3 
(MS-IC-7 top event) 
Waste package internal structures degrade faster 
than waste form 
/MS-IC-8 
MS-IC-8 
True a 
False 
0.00 
0.00 Section 6.4.2.2.4 
(MS-IC-8 top event) 

Table 6.4-9. Event Probability Assignment for the CONFIGBATH Event Tree for the Seismic 
Disruptive Event Criticality FEPs SAPHIRE Analyses 
Event Name and Description 
Probability 
Value 
SAPHIRE Assigned 
Event Valuea 
(per waste package) Justification 
Waste form degrades in place 
(configuration class IP-1A) 
/MS-IC-9 
MS-IC-9 
(MS-IC-9 top event) 
False a 
True 
1.00 
1.00 Section 6.4.2.2.5 
Waste package internal structures degrade 
(transfer to CONFIG-IP2-D event tree) 
/MS-IC-10 
MS-IC-10 
(MS-IC-10 top event) 
True a 
False 
0.00 
0.00 Section 6.4.2.2.6 
Degraded waste form is mobilized, separating 
fissile material from neutron absorber material 
(configuration class IP-1B) 
For all waste form evaluation sequences with 
waste package overfill (either MS-IC-4[1] or MS-
IC-4[2] activated). 
/MS-IC-11 
MS-IC-11[1] (configuration class IP-1B) 
MS-IC-11[2] (transfer to CONFIG NF-F) 
For all waste form evaluation sequences with no 
waste package overfill (/MS-IC-4 activated). 
/MS-IC-11 
MS-IC-11[1] (configuration class IP-1B) 
MS-IC-11[2] (transfer to CONFIG NF-F) 
(MS-IC-11 top event) 
False a 
True 
True 
False a 
True 
False 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
0.00 
Section 6.4.2.2.7 
Waste package bottom fails, draining liquid 
(transfer to CONFIG-IP4-A) 
/MS-IC-12 
MS-IC-12 
(MS-IC-12 top event) 
False a 
True 
1.00 
1.00 Section 6.4.2.2.8 

Table 6.4-9. Event Probability Assignment for the CONFIGBATH Event Tree for the Seismic 
Disruptive Event Criticality FEPs SAPHIRE Analyses 
Event Name and Description 
Probability 
Value 
SAPHIRE Assigned 
Event Valuea 
(per waste package) Justification 
Probability of waste package misload: 
For the 21-PWR Absorber Plate waste package 
/WF-MISLOAD 
WF-MISLOAD 
For the 21-PWR Control Rod waste package 
/WF-MISLOAD 
WF-MISLOAD 
For the 12-PWR Absorber Plate waste package 
/WF-MISLOAD 
WF-MISLOAD 
For the 44-BWR Absorber Plate waste package 
/WF-MISLOAD 
WF-MISLOAD 
For the 24-BWR Absorber Plate waste package 
/WF-MISLOAD 
WF-MISLOAD 
For DOE waste package types with misload 
potential b 
/WF-MISLOAD 
WF-MISLOAD 
For DOE waste package types without misload 
potential c 
/WF-MISLOAD 
WF-MISLOAD 
(WF-MISLOAD top event) 
~1 
1.18E-5 
True a 
False 
True a 
False 
True a 
False 
True a 
False 
~1 
1.475E-5 
True a 
False 
1.18E-5 
1.18E-5 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
1.475E-5 
1.475E-5 
0.00 
0.00 
Section 6.4.2.2.9 

Table 6.4-9. Event Probability Assignment for the CONFIGBATH Event Tree for the Seismic 
Disruptive Event Criticality FEPs SAPHIRE Analyses 
Event Name and Description 
Probability 
Value 
SAPHIRE Assigned 
Event Valuea 
(per waste package) Justification 
Criticality potential of waste package advective 
flow configuration 
For all non- misload scenarios (neutron absorber 
material or waste form) 
/CRIT-POT-WF 
CRIT-POT-WF 
For neutron absorber material or DOE SNF 
misload scenarios 
/CRIT-POT-WF 
CRIT-POT-WF 
For commercial SNF misload scenarios 
/CRIT-POT-WF 
CRIT-POT-WF 
(CRIT-POT-WF top event) 
True a 
False 
False a 
True 
~1 
2.480E-5 
0.00 
0.00 
1.00 
1.00 
2.480E-5 d 
2.480E-5 
Section 6.4.2.2.10 
NOTES: a For event names prefixed by a slash / the actual event probability used in processing the SAPHIRE 
logic model is the complement (i.e., 1  value) of the assigned value
b 
MOX DOE SNF waste form with misload potential 
c 
Aluminum Based, HEU Oxide, LEU Oxide, U-Metal, U/Th Carbide, U/Th Oxide, and U-Zr Hx, and U-
Zr/U-Mo Alloy DOE SNF waste forms without misload potential 
d 
Conservative value, i.e., probability of criticality from a misload in a 21-PWR Absorber Plate waste 
package is calculated as 7.80E-6 in Probability of Assembly Compensation for a Misloaded Waste 
Package (BSC 2004 [DIRS 171622], Section 6). 
6.4.2.2.1 Top Event CONFIG-SCEN 
The branching of top event CONFIG-SCEN is used to configure the in-package, bathtub 
configuration classes IP-1, IP-2, and IP-3 for evaluation. The upper branch is not utilized in 
these analyses and is included only as a modeling convenience. The three in-package, bathtub 
configuration classes are represented by the second through fourth branches from the top of this 
top event. These three branches direct the evaluation of configuration subclass IP-1, IP-2, and 
IP-3, respectively. The processing of the bottom three branches of this top event are initiated by 
assigning CONFIG-SCEN[1], CONFIG-SCEN[2], and CONFIG-SCEN[3] a value of 1.00. 
6.4.2.2.2 Top Event MS-IC-6 
The branching of top event MS-IC-6 initiates the evaluation of in-package configuration class 
IP-1 defined as the scenario in which the waste package internal structures degrade at a slower 
rate than the waste form. This top event has five branches that are accessed by the second 
branch of top event CONFIG-SCEN. The upper branch indicates that waste package internal 
structures do not degrade slower than the waste form and the lower four branches indicate that 
they do. 

For the seismic evaluations, the waste package internals degrade slower than the waste form. 
The reason this occurs is due to the magnitude of seismic events evaluated. All seismic events 
with a mean annual exceedance frequency less than 10-4 per year starts to cause waste 
package/waste form damage. Once the waste form has been damaged, it is available for 
degradation. Therefore, all seismic events will have the waste form degrading faster than the 
waste package internal structures. 
The branching under this top event is used to create the formation of the configuration subclasses 
of IP-1 and any transformations that can occur. The second and third branches of this top event 
create the formation of configuration subclasses IP-1A and IP-1B. These configuration 
subclasses are created due to the fact the waste form has been damaged from the seismic event 
and is therefore, available for degradation at a rate faster than the waste package internals. 
The fourth branch evaluates whether configuration class IP-1 transforms into configuration class 
IP-2. This transformation can take place if the degradation of the waste package internals catch 
up to the degradation of the waste form. The fifth branch evaluates whether configuration class 
IP-1 transforms into configuration class IP-4. This transformation requires the bottom of the 
waste package to breach and create a flow through system. For this evaluation, all four of these 
branches are evaluated. Therefore, /MS-IC-6, MS-IC-6[1], MS-IC-6[2], and MS-IC-6[3] are 
each assigned a value of 1.00. 
6.4.2.2.3 Top Event MS-IC-7 
The branching of top event MS-IC-7 represents the in-package scenario of the waste package 
internal structures degrading at the same rate as the waste form and the subsequent transfer of the 
SAPHIRE evaluation to event tree CONFIG-IP2-D. This top event is queried by the third 
branch of top event CONFIG-SCEN. The upper branch indicates that the waste package internal 
structures do not degrade at the same rate as the waste form and the lower branch indicates that 
they do. 
All waste forms are breached subsequent to a seismic event (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169183], 
Section 6.5.7.3). Once breached, the degradation of the waste forms is expected to occur at 
much more rapid rate than the oxidation of the waste package internal structures. Although some 
waste package internal components will degrade quickly (such as the carbon steel assembly 
tubes of the commercial SNF waste package types), other components such as the Ni-Gd alloy 
basket assemblies are predicted to degrade slowly and will remain intact throughout the 
regulatory period (refer to Sections 4.1.12 and 5.1.9). Therefore, it is unlikely that the waste 
package internal structure could degrade at the same rate as the waste form. Based on this 
information, /MSIC7 and MSIC7 are each assigned a value of 0.00. 
6.4.2.2.4 Top Event MS-IC-8 
The branching of top event MS-IC-8 represents the in-package scenario of the waste package 
internal structures degrading faster than the waste form and the subsequent transfer of the 
SAPHIRE evaluation to event tree CONFIG-IP3. This top event is queried by the fourth 
branch of top event CONFIG-SCEN. The upper branch indicates that the waste package internal 

structures do not degrade faster than the waste form and the lower branch indicates that they do 
degrade faster. 
All waste forms are breached subsequent to a seismic event (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169183], Section 
6.5.7.3). Once breached, the degradation of the waste forms is expected to occur at much more 
rapid rate than the oxidation of the waste package internal structures. Although some waste 
package internal components will degrade quickly (such as the carbon steel assembly tubes of 
the commercial SNF waste package types), other components such as the Ni-Gd alloy basket 
assemblies are predicted to degrade slowly and will remain intact throughout the regulatory 
period (refer to Sections 4.1.12 and 5.1.9). Therefore, it is unlikely that the waste package 
internal structure could degrade faster than the waste form and /MS-IC-8 and MS-IC-8 are each 
assigned a value of 0.00. 
6.4.2.2.5 Top Event MS-IC-9 
The branching of top event MS-IC-9 represents the waste form degrading in-place for the 
evaluation of configuration subclass IP-1A. This top event is queried by the second branch of 
top event MS-IC-6. The upper branch indicates that the waste form does not degrade in-place 
and the lower branch indicates that it does. In order to evaluate configuration subclass IP-1A, 
only the bottom branch of this top event is activated. Therefore, /MS-IC-9 and MS-IC-9 are each 
assigned a value of 1.00. 
6.4.2.2.6 Top Event MS-IC-10 
The branching of top event MS-IC-10 evaluates whether waste package internal structures 
degrade at some point during the regulatory period thereby transforming configuration class IP-1 
into IP-2. This top event is queried by the third branch of top event MSIC6. The upper 
branch indicates that the waste package internal components do not degrade and the lower 
branch indicates that they do. 
Although some waste package internal components will degrade quickly (such as the carbon 
steel assembly tubes of the commercial SNF waste package types), other components such as the 
Ni-Gd alloy basket assemblies are predicted to degrade slowly and will remain intact throughout 
the regulatory period (refer to Sections 4.1.12 and 5.1.9). Therefore, only the upper branch of 
this top event is activated and /MS-IC-10 and MS-IC-10 are each assigned a value of 0.00. 
6.4.2.2.7 Top Event MS-IC-11 
The branching of top event MS-IC-11 represents the mobilization of the degraded waste form 
and its separation from any intact neutron absorber material. The upper branch indicates that the 
degraded waste form is not separated from any intact neutron absorber materials and the lower 
two branches indicate that it does. The second branch of this top event evaluates configuration 
subclass IP-1B. The third, or bottom, branch of this top event represents the flushing of the 
mobilized waste form into the near-field environment via this sequences immediate transfer to 
the CONFIG-NF-F event tree. 

The second branch of this top event is activated for all waste form/waste package types 
regardless of whether the waste form initially contained neutron absorber material or not. 
Therefore, /MS-IC-11 and MS-IC-11[1] are each assigned a value of 1.00. 
The third branch of this top event is only activated if the waste package is in an overfill condition 
as indicated by the second through fourth branches of the MS-IC-4 top event of event tree 
MSL-ET2. For these branches of the MS-IC-4 top event, MS-IC-11[2] is assigned a value of 
1.00. 
For sequences activated through the first branch of the MS-IC-4 top event, MS-IC-11[2] is 
assigned a value of 0.00 since, for this branch of the MS-IC-4 top event, no waste package 
overflow is available to transport the fissile material of the degraded waste form into the near-
field environment. 
6.4.2.2.8 Top Event MS-IC-12 
The branching of top event MS-IC-12 evaluates whether waste package bottom fails at some 
point during the regulatory period thereby transforming configuration class IP-1 into IP-4. This 
top event is queried by the fourth branch of top event MS-IC-6. The upper branch indicates that 
the waste package bottom does not fail and the lower branch indicates that they do. 
Although no information currently exists to determine probability of a waste package bottom 
failure occurring during the regulatory period, it is more limiting to assume that it does occur 
(Assumption 5.2.7). Therefore, only the lower branch of this top event is activated and 
/MS-IC-12 and MS-IC-12 are each assigned a value of 1.00. 
6.4.2.2.9 Top Event WF-MISLOAD 
The WF-MISLOAD top event represents the probability that a waste form was incorrectly placed 
into a waste package or DOE standardized SNF canister during the preclosure loading process. 
The lower branch of this top event indicates the occurrence of a waste form misload and the 
upper branch indicates that no misload occurred. 
An analysis of commercial SNF misload probabilities was performed in Commercial Spent 
Nuclear Fuels Waste Package Misload Analysis (BSC 2003 [DIRS 166316]). The probabilities 
necessary to quantify the WFMISLOAD top event for each of the waste package/waste form 
types are the same as those presented in Section 6.3.3.1.9. 
6.4.2.2.10 Top Event CRIT-POT-WF 
The branching of top event CRIT-POT-WF represents the criticality potential of in-package 
configuration subclasses IP-1A and IP-1B. For a seismic disruptive event, the waste form has 
been breached by the seismic event (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169183], Section 6.5.7.3) and converted 
(degraded) into a more reactive configuration. The upper branch indicates that this configuration 
does not have any criticality potential and the lower branch indicates that it does. 
For the waste packages that are not misloaded, criticality analyses for in-package configuration 
subclasses IP-1A and IP-1B have shown that the calculated keff of these configurations is below 

the critical limit (refer to DOE SNF references in Table 6.2-1 and commercial SNF references 
(BSC 2004 [DIRS 171414] and BSC 2004 [DIRS 169963]). Therefore, only the upper branch of 
this top event is activated and /CRIT-POT-WF and CRIT-POT-WF are each assigned a value of 
0.00. 
For all waste package types that have neutron absorber material misloads, the resulting scenario 
is assumed to have criticality potential (Assumption 5.1.16). Therefore, only the lower branch of 
this top event is activated and /CRIT-POT-WF and CRIT-POT-WF are each assigned a value of 
1.00. 
For commercial SNF misloads, the resulting scenario is assumed to have criticality potential 
(Assumption 5.1.7). Based on the commercial SNF misload scenarios, an evaluation was 
conducted to calculate the probability of misloading a fuel assembly with sufficient reactivity to 
create a potential critical configuration. The evaluation of commercial SNF misload scenarios 
resulted in a mean probability of 2.48010-5 {Table 6.4-9, conservative preliminary value (BSC 
2004 [DIRS 171622], Section 6)}. This evaluation was based on the fact that the resulting 
misloaded fuel assembly would create a potential critical configuration (BSC 2004 [DIRS 
171622]). Therefore, for commercial SNF misload scenarios, /CRIT-POT-WF and CRIT-POT-
WF are each assigned a value of 2.48010-5. 
For the misload of DOE SNF, the resulting scenario is evaluated as having criticality potential 
(Assumption 5.1.7). Therefore, only the lower branch of this top event is activated and /CRIT-
POT-WF and CRIT-POT-WF are each assigned a value of 1.00. 
6.4.2.3 Quantification of Event Tree CONFIG-IP4-A 
The following subsections provide justification for the probabilities assigned to the events used 
in the quantification of the in-package configuration event tree CONFIG-IP4-A (Figure B-11 
of Appendix B). This event tree initiates the evaluation of the internal waste package 
configuration subclasses IP-4A and IP-4B. This event tree consists of six top events, all of 
which are required for the evaluation of this waste package internal configuration class for the 
seismic disruptive event. Table 6.4-10 summarizes the event probability assignments discussed 
below. 

Table 6.4-10. Event Probability Assignment for the CONFIG-IP4-A Event Tree for the Seismic Disrupt 
Event Criticality FEPs SAPHIRE Analysis 
Event Name and Description 
Probability 
Value 
SAPHIRE Assigned 
Event Value a 
(per waste package) Justification 
Initiate evaluation of waste package internal 
configuration class IP-4 
/CONFIG-SCENFalse a 1.00 
CONFIG-SCEN[1] (configuration subclass IP-4A)True 1.00 
CONFIG-SCEN[2] (configuration subclass IP-4B)True 1.00 Section 6.4.2.3.1 
CONFIG-SCEN[3] (transfer to CONFIG-IP5-B True 1.00 
event tree) 
(CONFIG-SCEN top event) 
Waste form degradation products hydrate in initial 
location (configuration subclass IP-4A) 
/MS-IC-32 
MS-IC-32 
False a 
True 
1.00 
1.00 Section 6.4.2.3.2 
(MS-IC-32 top event) 
Waste package internal structures degrade at same 
rate as waste form 
/MS-IC-33 
MS-IC-33 
False a 
True 
1.00 
1.00 Section 6.4.2.3.3 
(MS-IC-33 top event) 
Degraded waste form is mobilized and hydrating, 
separating from neutron absorber materials 
/MS-IC-34False a 1.00 
MS-IC-34[1]False 0.00 Section 6.4.2.3.4 
MS-IC-34[2] True 1.00 
(MS-IC-34 top event) 

Table 6.4-10. Event Probability Assignment for the CONFIG-IP4-A Event Tree for the Seismic Disrupt 
Event Criticality FEPs SAPHIRE Analysis (Continued) 
Event Name and Description 
Probability 
Value 
SAPHIRE Assigned 
Event Value a 
(per waste package) Justification 
Probability of waste package misload: 
For the 21-PWR Control Rod waste package 
/WF-MISLOAD~1 1.18E-5 
WF-MISLOAD 1.18E-5 1.18E-5 
For the 21-PWR Absorber Plate waste package 
/WF-MISLOADTrue a 0.00 
WF-MISLOAD False 0.00 
For the 12-PWR Absorber Plate waste package 
/WF-MISLOADTrue a 0.00 
WF-MISLOAD False 0.00 
For the 44-BWR Absorber Plate waste package 
/WF-MISLOADTrue a 0.00 
WF-MISLOAD False 0.00 Section 6.4.2.3.5 
For the 24-BWR Absorber Plate waste package 
/WF-MISLOADTrue a 0.00 
WF-MISLOAD False 0.00 
For DOE waste package types with misload 
potential b 
/WF-MISLOAD~1 1.475E-8 
WF-MISLOAD 1.475E-8 1.475E-8 
For DOE waste package types without misload 
potential c 
/WF-MISLOADTrue a 0.00 
WF-MISLOAD False 0.00 
(WF-MISLOAD top event) 

Table 6.4-10. Event Probability Assignment for the CONFIG-IP4-A Event Tree for the Seismic Disrupt 
Event Criticality FEPs SAPHIRE Analysis (Continued) 
Event Name and Description 
Probability 
Value 
SAPHIRE Assigned 
Event Value a 
(per waste package) Justification 
Criticality potential of in-package configuration class 
IP-4 
For all no waste form misload scenarios 
/CRIT-POT-WFTrue a 0.00 
CRIT-POT-WF False 0.00 
For neutron absorber material and DOE SNF 
misload scenarios Section 6.4.2.3.6 
/CRIT-POT-WFFalse a 1.00 
CRIT-POT-WF True 1.00 
For commercial SNF misload scenarios 
/CRIT-POT-WF~1 2.480E-5 d 
CRIT-POT-WF 2.480E-5 2.480E-5 
(CRIT-POT-WF top event) 
NOTES: a For event names prefixed by a slash / the actual event probability used in processing the SAPHIRE 
logic model is the complement (i.e., 1  value) of the assigned value
b 
MOX DOE SNF waste form with misload potential 
c 
Aluminum Based, HEU Oxide, LEU Oxide, U-Metal, U/Th Carbide, U/Th Oxide, and U-Zr Hx, and U-
Zr/U-Mo Alloy DOE SNF waste forms without misload potential 
d 
Conservative value, i.e., probability of criticality from a misload in a 21-PWR Absorber Plate waste 
package is calculated as 7.80E-6 in Probability of Assembly Compensation for a Misloaded Waste 
Package (BSC 2004 [DIRS 171622], Section 6). 
6.4.2.3.1 Top Event CONFIG-SCEN 
The branching of top event CONFIG-SCEN is used to configure the in-package, flow-through 
configuration subclasses IP-4A and IP-4B. The upper branch is not utilized in these analyses and 
is included only for modeling convenience. The three in-package, flow-through configuration 
subclasses are represented by the second and third branches from the top of this top event. These 
two branches direct the evaluation of configuration subclass IP-4A and IP-4B, respectively. The 
bottom, or fourth, branch initiates a transfer to the processing of configuration class IP-5. The 
processing of the bottom three branches of this top event are activated by assigning CONFIG-
SCEN[1], CONFIG-SCEN[2], and CONFIG-SCEN[3] a value of 1.00. 
6.4.2.3.2 Top Event MS-IC-32 
The branching of top event MS-IC-32 initiates the evaluation of in-package configuration 
subclass IP-4A defined as the scenario in which the waste form degradation products hydrate in 
their initial location. This top event is queried by the second branch of top event CONFIGSCEN. 
The upper branch indicates that waste form degradation products do not hydrate in their 
initial location and the lower branch indicates that they do. To initiate the evaluation of 

configuration subclass IP-4A, only the bottom branch of this top event is activated and /MSIC 
32 and MSIC32 are each assigned a value of 1.00. 
6.4.2.3.3 Top Event MS-IC-33 
The branching of top event MS-IC-33 represents the degradation of the waste package internal 
structures. This top event is queried by the third branch of top event CONFIG-SCEN. The 
upper branch indicates that the waste package internal structures do not degrade and the lower 
branch indicates that they do. Activation of the lower branch of this top event initiates a transfer 
to the CONFIG-IP5-B event tree. 
Certain waste package internal components will degrade at a faster rate than others, such as the 
carbon steel fuel tubes of the commercial waste package types. Because it is likely that some of 
the waste package internal structure would degrade during the regulatory period given a waste 
package breach, /MS-IC-33 and MS-IC-33 are each assigned a value of 1.00. 
6.4.2.3.4 Top Event MS-IC-34 
The branching of top event MS-IC-34 represents the mobilization and hydration of the degraded 
waste form and its separation from the neutron absorber materials of the waste package. This top 
event is queried by the third branch of top event CONFIG-SCEN. The upper branch of this top 
event indicates that the waste form is not mobilized and separated from the neutron absorber 
materials and the bottom two branches indicate that it is. The second branch represents the waste 
form mobilization and separation internal to the waste package to initiate the evaluation of 
configuration subclass IP-4B. The bottom, or third, branch represent the transport of the 
mobilized waste form to the near-field environment as indicated by the transfer to the CONFIG-
NF-F event tree. 
Because the Ni-Gd neutron absorber materials have a low degradation rate (Assumption 5.1.9), 
the mobilization of the waste form in a waste package flow through condition will result in the 
flushing of the waste form from the waste package into the near-field. Retention and 
accumulation of the waste form on the bottom of the waste package is unlikely. Therefore, only 
the bottom branch of this top event is activated and /MS-IC-34 and MS-IC-34[2] are each 
assigned a value of 1.00 and MS-IC-34[1] is assigned a value of 0.00. 
6.4.2.3.5 Top Event WF-MISLOAD 
The WF-MISLOAD top event represents the probability that a waste form was incorrectly placed 
into a waste package or DOE standardized SNF canister during the preclosure loading process. 
The lower branch of this top event indicates the occurrence of a waste form misload and the 
upper branch indicates that no misload occurred. 
An analysis of commercial SNF misload probabilities was performed in Commercial Spent 
Nuclear Fuels Waste Package Misload Analysis (BSC 2003 [DIRS 166316]). The probabilities 
necessary to quantify the WFMISLOAD top event for each of the waste package/waste form 
types are the same as those presented in Section 6.3.3.1.9. 

6.4.2.3.6 Top Event CRIT-POT-WF 
The branching of top event CRIT-POT-WF represents the criticality potential of in-package 
configuration subclasses IP-1A and IP-1B. For a seismic disruptive event, the waste form has 
been breached by the seismic event (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169183], Section 6.5.7.3) and converted 
(degraded) into a more reactive configuration. The upper branch indicates that this configuration 
does not have any criticality potential and the lower branch indicates that it does. 
For the waste packages that are not misloaded, criticality analyses for in-package configuration 
subclasses IP-1A and IP-1B have shown that the calculated keff of these configurations is below 
the critical limit (refer to DOE SNF references in Table 6.2-1 and commercial SNF references 
(BSC 2004 [DIRS 171414] and BSC 2004 [DIRS 169963]). Therefore, only the upper branch of 
this top event is activated and /CRIT-POT-WF and CRIT-POT-WF are each assigned a value of 
0.00. 
For all waste package types that have neutron absorber material misloads, the resulting scenario 
is assumed to have criticality potential (Assumption 5.1.16). Therefore, only the lower branch of 
this top event is activated and /CRIT-POT-WF and CRIT-POT-WF are each assigned a value of 
1.00. 
For commercial SNF misloads, the resulting scenario is assumed to have criticality potential 
(Assumption 5.1.7). Based on the commercial SNF misload scenarios, an evaluation was 
conducted to calculate the probability of misloading a fuel assembly with sufficient reactivity to 
create a potential critical configuration. The evaluation of commercial SNF misload scenarios 
calculated a mean probability of 2.48010-5 {Table 6.4-10, conservative preliminary value (BSC 
2004 [DIRS 171622], Section 6)}. This evaluation was based on the fact that the resulting 
misloaded fuel assembly would create a potential critical configuration (BSC 2004 [DIRS 
171622]). Therefore, for commercial SNF misload scenarios, /CRIT-POT-WF and CRIT-POT-
WF are each assigned a value of 2.48010-5. 
For the misload of DOE SNF, the resulting scenario is evaluated as having criticality potential 
(Assumption 5.1.7). Therefore, only the lower branch of this top event is activated and /CRIT-
POT-WF and CRIT-POT-WF are each assigned a value of 1.00. 
6.4.2.4 Quantification of Event Tree CONFIG-IP5-B 
The following subsections provide justification for the probabilities assigned to the events used 
in the quantification of the in-package configuration event tree CONFIG-IP5-B (Figure B-12 
of Appendix B). This event tree initiates the evaluation of the internal waste package 
configuration class IP-5. This event tree consists of four top events, of which only one is 
required for the evaluation of this waste package internal configuration class for the seismic 
disruptive event. Table 6.4-11 summarizes the event probability assignments discussed below. 

Table 6.4-11. Event Probability Assignment for the CONFIG-IP5-B Event Tree for the Seismic Disrupt 
Event Criticality FEPs SAPHIRE Analysis 
Event Name and Description 
Probability 
Value 
SAPHIRE Assigned 
Event Value a 
(per waste package) 
Justification 
Hydrated waste form and waste package 
degraded internal components collect at bottom of 
the waste package 
/MS-IC-35False a 1.00 
MS-IC-35[1] (configuration subclass IP-5A)False 0.00 Section 6.4.2.4.1 
MS-IC-35[2] (transfer to CONFIG-NF-F event True 1.00 
tree) 
(MS-IC-35 top event) 
a
NOTE: For events prefixed by a slash / the actual event probability used in processing the SAPHIRE logic 
model is the complement (i.e., 1  value) of the assigned value
6.4.2.4.1 Top Event MS-IC-35 
The branching of top event MS-IC-35 represents the accumulation of the hydrated waste form 
and waste package degraded internal components at the bottom of the waste package. The upper 
branch of this top event indicates that the waste form and degraded components do not collect on 
the bottom of the waste package and the bottom two branches indicate that it does. The second 
branch initiates the evaluation of configuration subclass IP-5B. The bottom, or third, branch 
represent the transport of the hydrated waste form and degraded internal components to the near-
field environment as indicated by the transfer to the CONFIG-NF-F event tree. 
Because the Ni-Gd neutron absorber materials of the waste package and canister baskets have a 
low degradation rate (Assumption 5.1.9), these components will remain relatively intact for the 
duration of the regulatory period. Any degradation products generated from other internal 
components will most likely remain within the basket cells. The hydration and mobilization of 
the waste form in a flow-through condition will result in the transport of the waste form from the 
waste package into the near-field. Retention and accumulation of the waste form on the bottom 
of the waste package is unlikely. Therefore, only the bottom branch of this top event is activated 
and /MS-IC-35 and MS-IC-35[2] are each assigned a value of 1.00 and MS-IC-35[1] is assigned 
a value of 0.00. 
6.4.2.5 Quantification of Event Tree CONFIG-NF-F 
The following subsections provide justification for the probabilities assigned to the events used 
in the quantification of the near-field event tree CONFIG-NF-F (Figure B-14 of Appendix B). 
This event tree initiates the evaluation of the near-field configurations for the formation of 
potentially critical configurations. This event tree consists of four top events, all of which are 
required for the evaluation of near-field configurations. Table 6.4-12 summarizes the event 
probability assignments discussed below. 

Table 6.4-12. Event Probability Assignment for the CONFIG-NF-F Event Tree for the Seismic 
Disruptive Event Criticality FEPs SAPHIRE Analysis 
Event Name and Description Probability 
Value 
SAPHIRE Assigned 
Event Value a 
(per waste package) 
Justification 
Near-field configuration class 
/CONFIG-SCEN False a 1.00 
CONFIG-SCEN[1] True 1.00 
CONFIG-SCEN[2] True 1.00 Section 6.4.2.5.1 
CONFIG-SCEN[3] True 1.00 
(CONFIG-SCEN top event) 
Initiate processing of near-field configuration class 
NF-1 
/MS-NF-6 
MS-NF-6 
False a 
True 
1.00 
1.00 Section 6.4.2.5.2 
(MS-NF-6 top event) 
Initiate processing of near -field configuration class 
NF-2 if waste package bottom failure 
/MS-NF-7 False a 1.00 
MS-NF-7 True 1.00 
Otherwise, no processing of configuration class Section 6.4.2.5.3 
NF-2 
/MS-NF-7 True a 0.00 
MS-NF-7 False 0.00 
(MS-NF-7 top event) 
Initiate processing of near -field configuration class 
NF-3 
/MS-NF-8 
MS-NF-8 
False a 
True 
1.00 
1.00 Section 6.4.2.5.4 
(MS-NF-8 top event) 
a
NOTE: For event names prefixed by a slash / the actual event probability used in processing the SAPHIRE logic 
model is the complement (i.e., 1  value) of the assigned value 
6.4.2.5.1 Top Event CONFIG-SCEN 
The branching of top event CONFIG-SCEN establishes the evaluation of three of the five near-
field configuration classes  NF-1, NF-2, and NF-3. These configuration classes are represented 
by the second, third and fourth branches from the top of this top event. The top branch is not 
utilized in these analyses and is included as a modeling convenience. The processing of all three 
configuration class branches of this top event are initiated by assigning CONFIG-SCEN[1], 
CONFIG-SCEN[2], and CONFIG-SCEN[3] a value of 1.00. 

6.4.2.5.2 Top Event MS-NF-6 
The branching of top event MS-NF-6 directs the evaluation of near-field configuration class 
NF-1. The upper branch of this top event indicates that this configuration class is not to be 
evaluated and the lower branch indicates that this configuration class is evaluated. Selection of 
the lower branch results in a transfer to the CONFIG-NF1 event tree. This near-field 
configuration class represents the transport of fissile material bearing solutes from the waste 
package to the near-field environment. The NF-1 configuration class is to be evaluated for either 
a waste package overflow or bottom breach scenario, therefore, /MS-NF-6 and MS-NF-6 are 
each assigned a value of 1.00. 
6.4.2.5.3 Top Event MS-NF-7 
The branching of top event MS-NF-7 directs the evaluation of near-field configuration class 
NF-2. The upper branch of this top event indicates that this configuration class is not to be 
evaluated and the lower branch indicates that this configuration class is evaluated. Selection of 
the lower branch results in a transfer to the CONFIG-NF2 event tree. Configuration class NF-2 
represents the transport of fissile material bearing slurry effluent from the waste package into the 
near-field environment. A slurry effluent can only result from a bottom breach of the waste 
package. Therefore, when the bottom branch of top event MS-IC-12 of the CONFIG-BATH 
event tree is activated (refer to Section 6.4.2.2.8), /MS-NF-7 and MS-NF-7 are each assigned a 
value of 1.00. Otherwise, /MS-NF-7 and MS-NF-7 are each assigned a value of 0.00. 
6.4.2.5.4 Top Event MS-NF-8 
The branching of top event MS-NF-8 directs the evaluation of near-field configuration class 
NF-3. The upper branch of this top event indicates that this configuration class is not to be 
evaluated and the lower branch indicates that this configuration class is evaluated. Selection of 
the lower branch results in a transfer to the CONFIG-NF3 event tree. This near-field 
configuration class represents the transport of fissile material bearing colloids from the waste 
package to the near-field environment. The NF-3 configuration class is to be evaluated either for 
a waste package overflow or bottom breach scenario. Therefore, /MS-NF-8 and MS-NF-8 are 
each assigned a value of 1.00. 
6.4.2.6 Quantification of Event Tree CONFIG-NF1 
The following subsections provide justification for the probabilities assigned to the events used 
in the quantification of the near-field event tree CONFIG-NF1 (Figure B-15 of Appendix B). 
This event tree initiates the evaluation of the near-field configuration class NF-1 representing the 
near-field accumulation of fissile materials into potentially critical configurations resulting from 
solution effluent discharges from the waste package. This event tree consists of five top events, 
four of which are required for the evaluation of this near-field configuration class. Table 6.4-13 
summarizes the event probability assignments discussed below. 

Table 6.4-13. Event Probability Assignment for the CONFIG-NF1 Event Tree for the Seismic Disruptive 
Event Criticality FEPs SAPHIRE Analysis 
Event Name and Description 
Probability 
Value 
SAPHIRE Assigned 
Event Value a 
(per waste package) Justification 
Transport of solution effluent from waste package 
into invert for the formation of near-field 
configuration class NF-1 subclasses 
/MS-NF-9 False a 1.00 
MS-NF-9[1] (configuration class NF-1A) 
MS-NF-9[2] (configuration class NF-1B) 
True 
True 
1.00 
1.00 Section 6.4.2.6.1 
MS-NF-9[3] (configuration class NF-1C) True 1.00 
MS-NF-9[4] (transfer to far-field) True 1.00 
(MS-NF-9 top event) 
Initiate processing of near-field configuration class 
NF-1A 
/MS-NF-10 
MS-NF-10 
False a 
True 
1.00 
1.00 Section 6.4.2.6.2 
(MS-NF-10 top event) 
Initiate processing of near-field configuration class 
NF-1B 
/MS-NF-11 
MS-NF-11 
False a 
True 
1.00 
1.00 Section 6.4.2.6.3 
(MS-NF-11 top event) 
Initiate processing of near-field configuration class 
NF-1C 
/MS-NF-12 
MS-NF-12 
False a 
True 
1.00 
1.00 Section 6.4.2.6.4 
(MS-NF-12 top event) 
Criticality potential of NF-1A, NF-1B and NF-1C 
/CRIT-POT-WF True a 0.00 
CRIT-POT-WF False 0.00 Section 6.4.2.6.5 
(CRIT-POT-WF top event) 
a
NOTE: For event names prefixed by a slash / the actual event probability used in processing the SAPHIRE logic 
model is the complement (i.e., 1  value) of the assigned value 
6.4.2.6.1 Top Event MS-NF-9 
The branching of top event MS-NF-9 directs the evaluation of the three configuration subclasses 
of configuration class NF-1  NF-1A, NF-1B, and NF-1C. These configuration classes are 
represented by the second, third and fourth branches from the top of this top event. The upper 
branch is not utilized in these analyses and is included for modeling convenience. The lower 
branch of this top event represents the transport of fissile material from the near-field to the far-
field. This branch immediately transfers to the CONFIG-FF-J event tree for far-field evaluation. 

The processing of all three configuration subclass branches and the far-field transfer of this top 
event are initiated by assigning MS-NF-9[1], MS-NF-9[2], MS-NF-9[3], and MS-NF-9[4] a 
value of 1.00. To prevent further evaluation of the top branch of this top event, /MS-NF-9 is also 
assigned a value of 1.00 (the complement of 0.00). 
6.4.2.6.2 Top Event MS-NF-10 
The branching of top event MS-NF-10 directs the evaluation of near-field configuration class 
NF-1A. The upper branch of this top event indicates that fissile materials are not sorbed into the 
invert materials and the lower branch indicates that fissile materials are sorbed in the invert 
materials. The criticality potential of near-field configuration class NF-1A is evaluated for the 
seismic disruptive event. Therefore, /MS-NF-10 and MS-NF-10 are each assigned a value of 
1.00. 
6.4.2.6.3 Top Event MS-NF-11 
The branching of top event MS-NF-11 directs the evaluation of near-field configuration class 
NF-1B. The upper branch of this top event indicates that fissile materials do not precipitate in 
the invert and the lower branch indicates that fissile materials do precipitate in the invert. The 
criticality potential of near-field configuration class NF-1B is evaluated for the seismic 
disruptive event. Therefore, /MS-NF-11 and MS-NF-11 are each assigned a value of 1.00. 
6.4.2.6.4 Top Event MS-NF-12 
The branching of top event MS-NF-12 directs the evaluation of near-field configuration class 
NF-1C. The upper branch of this top event indicates that fissile materials are not transported 
from one or more waste packages and deposited at an invert low point. The lower branch 
indicates that fissile materials are transported and deposited at an invert low point. The 
criticality potential of near-field configuration class NF-1C is evaluated for the seismic 
disruptive event. Therefore, /MS-NF-12 and MS-NF-12 are each assigned a value of 1.00. 
6.4.2.6.5 Top Event CRIT-POT-WF 
The branching of top event CRIT-POT-WF represents the criticality potential of a waste package 
with an advective failure. The cladding of a waste form in such a waste package is assumed to 
have breached and the waste form converted (degraded) into a more reactive configuration that 
has been flushed from the breached waste package. The upper branch indicates that this 
configuration does not have any criticality potential and the lower branch indicates that it does. 
This top event is queried for this event tree only for waste package advective failure conditions. 
The criticality analyses of near-field configuration classes NF-1A, NF-1B and NF-1C have 
shown that the calculated keff of these configurations is below the critical limit (BSC 2004 [DIRS 
170060]). Therefore, only the upper branch of this top event is activated and /CRIT-POT-WF 
and CRIT-POT-WF are each assigned a value of 0.00. 

6.4.2.7 Quantification of Event Tree CONFIG-NF2 
The following subsections provide justification for the probabilities assigned to the events used 
in the quantification of the near-field event tree CONFIG-NF2 (Figure B-16 of Appendix B). 
This event tree initiates the evaluation of the near-field configuration class NF-2 representing the 
near-field accumulation of fissile materials into potentially critical configurations resulting from 
slurry effluent discharging from the waste package. This event tree consists of three top events, 
of which only one is required for the evaluation of this near-field configuration class. 
Table 6.4-14 summarizes the event probability assignments discussed below. 
Table 6.4-14. Event Probability Assignment for the CONFIG-NF2 Event Tree for the Seismic Disruptive 
Event Criticality FEPs SAPHIRE Analysis 
Event Name and Description 
Probability 
Value 
SAPHIRE Assigned 
Event Valuea 
(per waste package) Justification 
Slurry effluent flows to conform to invert surface 
/MS-NF-13 
MS-NF-13 False a 1.00 Section 6.4.2.7.1 
True 1.00 
(MS-NF-13 top event) 
Neutron absorber and fissile materials separate 
/MS-NF-14 True a 0.00 
MS-NF-14 True 1.00 Section 6.4.2.7.2 
(MS-NF-14 top event) 
Criticality potential of NF-1A, NF-1B and NF-1C 
/CRIT-POT-WF True a 0.00 
CRIT-POT-WF False 0.00 Section 6.4.2.7.3 
(CRIT-POT-WF top event) 
NOTES: a For event names prefixed by a slash / the actual event probability used in processing the SAPHIRE 
logic model is the complement (i.e., 1  value) of the assigned value
6.4.2.7.1 Top Event MS-NF-13 
The branching of top event MS-NF-13 directs the evaluation of near-field configuration class 
NF-2A. The upper branch of this top event indicates that fissile material contained in the slurry 
effluent does not flow and conform to the invert surface. The lower branch indicates that the 
slurry effluent does flow to conform to the invert surface. In order to evaluate near-field 
configuration subclass NF-2A, only the lower branch of this top event is evaluated  slurry 
effluent does flow to conform to the invert surface. Therefore, /MS-NF-13 and MS-NF-13 are 
each assigned a value of 1.00. 
6.4.2.7.2 Top Event MS-NF-14 
The branching of top event MS-NF-14 evaluates whether the neutron absorber and fissile 
materials separate as the slurry effluent flows to conform to the invert surface. The upper branch 

of this top event indicates that the neutron absorber and fissile materials do not separate and the 
lower branch indicates that they do. Both branches of this top event are evaluated in order to 
assess the criticality potential of the slurry effluent with and without neutron absorber materials. 
Therefore, /MS-NF-14 is assigned a value of 0.00 (i.e., the complement of 1.00) and MS-NF-14 
is assigned a value of 1.00. 
6.4.2.7.3 Top Event CRIT-POT-WF 
The branching of top event CRIT-POT-WF represents the criticality potential of near-field 
configuration subclass NF-2A - a slurry effluent from the waste package is assumed to flow and 
conform to the invert surface with and without neutron absorber material separation. The upper 
branch indicates that this configuration does not have any criticality potential and the lower 
branch indicates that it does. The criticality analyses of near-field configuration classes has 
shown that the calculated keff of these classes is below the critical limit (BSC 2004 [DIRS 
170060]). Therefore, only the upper branch of this top event is activated and /CRIT-POT-WF 
and CRIT-POT-WF are each assigned a value of 0.00. 
6.4.2.8 Quantification of Event Tree CONFIG-NF3 
The following subsections provide justification for the probabilities assigned to the events used 
in the quantification of the near-field event tree CONFIG-NF3 (Figure B-17 of Appendix B). 
This event tree initiates the evaluation of the near-field configuration class NF-3 representing the 
near-field accumulation of fissile material bearing colloids into potentially critical 
configurations. This event tree consists of seven top events, all of which are required for the 
evaluation of this near-field configuration class. Table 6.4-15 summarizes the event probability 
assignments discussed below. 
6.4.2.8.1 Top Event CONFIG-SCEN 
The branching of top event CONFIG-SCEN establishes the evaluation of the three subclasses of 
near-field configuration class NF-3 and the transport of fissile material containing colloids from 
the near-field to the far-field environments. The upper branch is not utilized in these analyses 
and is included only as a modeling convenience. The three near-field configuration subclasses 
are represented by the second and third branches from the top of this top event. The second 
branch directs the evaluation of configuration subclass NF-3A and the third branch directs the 
evaluation of subclasses NF-3B and NF-3C. The fourth, or bottom, branch of this top event 
represents the transport of fissile material through the near-field environment to the far-field 
environment. The fourth branch immediately transfers to the CONFIG-FF-K event tree for 
far-field configuration evaluation. The processing of the bottom three branches of this top event 
are initiated by assigning CONFIG-SCEN[1], CONFIG-SCEN[2], and CONFIG-SCEN[3] a 
value of 1.00. 

Table 6.4-15. Event Probability Assignment for the CONFIG-NF3 Event Tree for the Seismic Disruptive 
Event Criticality FEPs SAPHIRE Analyses 
Event Name and Description Probability 
Value 
SAPHIRE Assigned 
Event Valuea 
(per waste package) 
Justification 
Initiate evaluation of near-field configuration class NF-3 
subclasses 
/CONFIG-SCEN False a 1.00 
CONFIG-SCEN[1] (configuration class NF-3A) True 1.00 Section 
CONFIG-SCEN[2] (configuration classes NF-3B and NF-3C) True 1.00 6.4.2.8.1 
CONFIG-SCEN[3] (transfer to far-field configuration classes) True 1.00 
(CONFIG-SCEN top event) 
Filtration and concentration of colloids on top of invert trapped 
by waste package corrosion products 
/MS-NF-15 False 1.00 Section 
MS-NF-15 (configuration class NF-3A) True 1.00 6.4.2.8.2 
(MS-NF-15 top event) 
Transport of colloids into invert 
/MS-NF-16 
MS-NF-16[1] (configuration class NF-3B and NF-3C) 
MS-FF-16[2] (transfer to far-field) 
(MS-NF-16 top event) 
Degradation of invert material 
/MS-NF-19 
MS-NF-19 
(MS-NF-19 top event) 
Hydrodynamic/chromatographic separation of fissile material 
colloids from neutron absorber materials 
/MS-NF-17 (configuration class NF-3B) 
MS-NF-17 (configuration class NF-3C) 
(MS-NF-17 top event) 
Filtration and concentration of colloids in the invert 
/MS-NF-18 
MS-NF-18 
(MS-NF-18 top event) 
Criticality potential of configuration subclass NF-3A, NF-3B, 
and NF-3C. 
/CRIT-POT-WF 
CRIT-POT-WF 
(CRIT-POT-WF top event) 
False 
True 
True 
0.10 
0.90 
True 
True 
False 
True 
True 
False 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
0.90 
0.90 
0.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Section 
6.4.2.8.3 
Section 
6.4.2.8.4 
Section 
6.4.2.8.5 
Section 
6.4.2.8.6 
Section 
6.4.2.8.7 
NOTE: a For event names prefixed by a slash / the actual event probability used in processing the SAPHIRE logic 
model is the complement (i.e., 1  value) of the assigned value 

6.4.2.8.2 Top Event MS-NF-15 
The branching of top event MS-NF-15 directs the evaluation of near-field configuration subclass 
NF-3A. The upper branch of this top event indicates that fissile material containing colloids are 
not filtered and concentrated on top of the invert, trapped by corrosion products. The lower 
branch indicates that the colloids are trapped on the invert surface. In order to evaluate near-
field configuration subclass NF-3A, only the lower branch of this top event is evaluated. 
Therefore, /MS-NF-15 and MS-NF-15 are each assigned a value of 1.00. 
6.4.2.8.3 Top Event MS-NF-16 
The branching of top event MS-NF-16 determines whether fissile material containing colloids 
are transported into the invert. Activation of the upper branch of this top event indicates that 
fissile material containing colloids are not transported into the invert. The activation of the 
second branch indicates that fissile material containing colloids are transported into the invert. 
In order to evaluate near-field configuration subclasses NF-3B and NF-3C, the second branch of 
this event is activated. The third branch is activated, which allows the fissile material colloids to 
be transported into the far-field. Therefore, /MS-NF-16 and MS-NF-16[1] and MS-NF-[2] are 
each assigned a value of 1.00. 
6.4.2.8.4 Top Event MS-NF-19 
The branching of top event MS-NF-19 directs the evaluation of near-field configuration 
subclasses NF-3B and NF-3C. The upper branch of this top event evaluates configuration 
subclass NF-3B and indicates that the invert materials have not degraded prior to the release of 
the waste form materials following a seismic event. The lower branch evaluates near-field 
configuration subclass NF-3C and indicates that the invert materials have degraded prior to the 
release of waste form materials following a seismic event. The degradation of the drift invert 
materials will likely occur within several hundred years of repository closure due to the highly 
oxidizing drift environment. If it is assumed that drift material degradation does not occur for 
1000 years (Assumption 5.2.5), the probability of fissile material being released to the invert due 
to a seismic event prior to drift degradation is calculated to be 0.10 (i.e., 1000 years to degrade 
drift divided by 10,000-year regulatory period) and the probability of fissile material release after 
drift degradation is 0.90. Therefore, /MS-NF-19 is assigned a value of 0.90 (i.e., the complement 
of 0.10) and MS-NF-19 is assigned a value of 0.90. 
6.4.2.8.5 Top Event MS-NF-17 
The branching of top event MS-NF-17 evaluates the likelihood of hydrodynamic or 
chromatographic separation of fissile material containing colloids from the neutron absorber 
materials for both near-field configuration subclasses NF-3B and NF-3C. The upper branch of 
this top event indicates that fissile material containing colloids are not separated from the neutron 
absorber materials and the lower branch indicates that they are. Although no known mechanism 
exists to separate the fissile materials from the neutron absorber materials, both branches of this 
top event are evaluated. Therefore, /MS-NF-17 is assigned a value of 0.00 (i.e., the complement 
of 1.00) and MS-NF-17 is assigned a value of 1.00. 

6.4.2.8.6 Top Event MS-NF-18 
The branching of top event MS-NF-18 represents the filtration and concentration of the fissile 
material containing colloids in the invert for both configuration subclasses NF-3B and NF-3C. 
The upper branch of this top event indicates that fissile material containing colloids are not 
filtered and concentrated in the invert and the lower branch indicates that they are. In order to 
evaluate both configuration classes, only the lower branch of this top event is activated. 
Therefore, /MS-NF-18 and MS-NF-18 are each assigned a value of 1.00. 
6.4.2.8.7 Top Event CRIT-POT-WF 
The branching of top event CRIT-POT-WF represents the criticality potential of near-field 
configuration subclasses NF-3A, NF-3B, and NF-3C  scenarios for the filtration and 
concentration of fissile material containing colloids in the near-field. The upper branch indicates 
that this configuration does not have any criticality potential and the lower branch indicates that 
it does. The criticality analyses of these near-field configuration subclasses have shown that the 
calculated keff of these subclasses is below the critical limit (BSC 2004 [DIRS 170060]). 
Therefore, only the upper branch of this top event is activated and /CRIT-POT-WF and CRIT-
POT-WF are each assigned a value of 0.00. 
6.4.2.9 Quantification of Event Tree CONFIG-NF4 
The following subsections provide justification for the probabilities assigned to the events used 
in the quantification of the near-field event tree CONFIG-NF4 (Figure B-18 of Appendix B). 
This event tree initiates the evaluation of the near-field configuration class NF-4. This event tree 
consists of four top events, of which only two are required for the evaluation of the seismic 
disruptive event criticality FEPs. Table 6.4-16 summarizes the event probability assignments 
discussed below. 
Table 6.4-16. Event Probability Assignment for the CONFIG-NF4 Event Tree for the Seismic 
Disruptive Event Criticality FEPs SAPHIRE Analyses 
Event Name and Description Probability 
Value 
SAPHIRE Assigned 
Event Valuea 
(per waste package) 
Justification 
Water ponds on drift floor due to sealing and/or Section 6.4.2.9.1 
damming 
/MS-NF-2 True a 0.00 
MS-NF-2 False 0.00 
(MS-NF-2 top event) 
Dry transport of fissile material from the waste Section 6.4.2.9.2 
package transfers to the surface of the invert 
/MS-NF-DD True a 0.00 
MS-NF-DD False 0.00 
(MS-NF-DD top event) 
NOTE: a For event names prefixed by a slash / the actual event probability used in processing the SAPHIRE logic 
model is the complement (i.e., 1  value) of the assigned value 
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01 6-95 October 2004 

6.4.2.9.1 Top Event MS-NF-2 
The branching of top event MS-NF-2 determines whether seepage water ponds on the drift floor 
due to sealing or damming. The upper branch of this top event indicates that ponding does not 
occur and the lower branch indicates that it does. As stated in Engineered Barrier System 
Features, Events, and Processes (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169898], Section 6.2.40), ponding in the 
invert has been excluded. Therefore, /MS-NF-2 and MS-NF-2 are each assigned a value of 0.00. 
6.4.2.9.2 Top Event MS-NF-DD 
The branching of top event MS-NF-DD determines whether fissile material can accumulate on 
the invert surface due to dry transport mechanisms from a failed waste package that does not 
experience advective flow. The upper branch of this top event indicates that fissile material does 
not accumulate on the invert surface and the lower branch indicates that it does. EBS 
Radionuclide Transport Abstraction (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169868], Executive Summary and 
Section 8.1) states that diffusive transport is the sole means of transport in a no-seep envirnment 
(no drip shield separation) for fissile material that to leave a failed waste package. This quantity 
is shown in Section 6.3.3.2.2 to be insignificant. Therefore, /MS-NF-DD and MS-NF-DD are 
each assigned a value of 0.00. 
6.4.2.10 Quantification of Event Tree CONFIG-FF-J 
The following subsections provide justification for the probabilities assigned to the events used 
in the quantification of the far-field event tree CONFIG-FF-J (Figure B-21 of Appendix B). 
This event tree initiates the evaluation of the far-field configuration class FF-1 representing the 
far-field accumulation of fissile material bearing solutes into potentially critical configurations. 
This event tree consists of nine top events, of which only seven are required for the evaluation of 
this far-field configuration class for the seismic disruptive event. Table 6.4-17 summarizes the 
event probability assignments discussed below. 

Table 6.4-17. Event Probability Assignment for the CONFIG-FF-J Event Tree for the Seismic Disruptive 
Event Criticality FEPs SAPHIRE Analyses 
Event Name and Description Probability 
Value 
SAPHIRE Assigned 
Event Valuea 
(per waste package) 
Justification 
Transport of fissile material solutes to far-field in Section 6.4.2.10.1 
carrier plume 
/MS-FF-1 False a 1.00 
MS-FF-1 True 1.00 
(MS-FF-1 top event) 
Separation of fissile material from neutron absorber Section 6.4.2.10.2 
initiating formation of far-field configuration class 
subclasses 
/MS-FF-2 False a 1.00 
MS-FF-2[1] (configuration subclass FF-1A) True 1.00 
MS-FF-2[2] (configuration subclasses FF-1B and FF-True 1.00 
1C) 
MS-FF-2[3] (transfer to configuration class FF-3) True 1.00 
(MS-FF-2 top event) 
Fissile material solutes are transported to the water Section 6.4.2.10.3 
table (transfer to far-field event tree CONFIG-FF3) 
/MS-FF-3 
MS-FF-3 False a 1.00 
True 1.00 
(MS-FF-3 top event) 
Precipitation of fissile material as carrier plume is Section 6.4.2.10.4 
altered by rocks (far-field configuration class FF-1A) 
/MS-FF-11 
MS-FF-11 True a 0.00 
False 0.00 
(MS-FF-11 top event) 
Transport of fissile material solutes to altered TSbv Section 6.4.2.10.5 
/MS-FF-12 
MS-FF-12[1] (configuration class FF-1B) False a 1.00 
MS-FF-12[2] (configuration class FF-1C) True 1.00 
True 1.00 
(MS-FF-12 top event) 
Sorption of fissile material on clays and zeolites in Section 6.4.2.10.6 
altered TSbv (configuration class FF-1B) 
/MS-FF-13 True a 0.00 
MS-FF-13 False 0.00 
(MS-FF-13 top event) 
Accumulation of fissile material solute in topographic Section 6.4.2.10.7 
lows above altered TSbv (configuration class FF-1C) 
/MS-FF-14 
MS-FF-14 True a 0.00 
False 0.00 
(MS-FF-14 top event) 
NOTE: a For event names prefixed by a slash / the actual event probability used in processing the SAPHIRE logic 
model is the complement (i.e., 1  value) of the assigned value 
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01 6-97 October 2004 

6.4.2.10.1 Top Event MS-FF-1 
The branching of top event MS-FF-1 initiates the evaluation of far-field configuration class FF-1 
representing the transport of fissile material containing solutes into the far-fields saturated and 
unsaturated zones. The upper branch represents that the fissile material bearing solutes are not 
transported to the far-field and the lower branch represents that they are transported to the far-
field. Only the lower branch of this top event is activated to initiate the evaluation of this far-
field configuration class. Therefore, /MS-FF-1 and MS-FF-1 are each assigned a value of 1.00. 
6.4.2.10.2 Top Event MS-FF-2 
The branching of top event MS-FF-2 determines whether the fissile materials entering the far-
field environment are separated from the neutron absorber materials of the waste package or 
waste form. The upper branch indicates that the fissile material is not separated from the neutron 
absorber materials by the far-field environment. The remaining three branches evaluate far-field 
configuration classes for the separation of the fissile materials from the neutron absorber 
materials. The second branch from the top directs the evaluation of configuration subclass FF1A 
and the third branch directs the evaluation of subclasses FF-1B and FF-1C. The fourth, or 
bottom, branch of this top event represents the transport of fissile material through the 
unsaturated zone and into the water table for the evaluation of configuration class FF-3. The 
fourth branch immediately transfers to the CONFIG-FF3 event tree. The processing of the 
bottom three branches of this top event are activated by assigning MS-FF-2[1], MS-FF-2[2], and 
MS-FF-2[3] a value of 1.00. To prevent the evaluation of the upper branch of this top event, 
/MS-FF-2 will also assigned a value of 1.00 (i.e., the complement of 0.00). 
6.4.2.10.3 Top Event MS-FF-3 
The branching of top event MS-FF-3 represents the transport of fissile materials through the 
unsaturated zone to the water table. The upper branch of this top event indicates that fissile 
material is not transported to the water table. The lower branch of this top event indicates that 
fissile materials are transported directly to the water table. In order to allow for the evaluation of 
far-field configuration class FF-3, the lower branch of this top event is selected. Therefore, /MS-
FF-3 and MS-FF-3 are each assigned a value of 1.00. 
6.4.2.10.4 Top Event MS-FF-11 
The branching of top event MS-FF-11 represents the precipitation of fissile material as the 
chemistry of the fissile material containing carrier plume is altered by the unsaturated zone host 
rock. This scenario represents far-field configuration subclass FF-1A. The upper branch of this 
top event indicates that fissile material is not precipitated and the lower branch of this top event 
indicates that it is. It is assumed there are no mechanisms that would cause any appreciable 
precipitation and accumulation of fissile material in the unsaturated zone (Assumption 5.5.3). 
Therefore, /MS-FF-11 and MS-FF-11 are each assigned a value of 0.00. 
6.4.2.10.5 Top Event MS-FF-12 
The branching of top event MS-FF-12 represents the transport of fissile material containing 
solutes to altered TSbv. The upper branch of this top event indicates that the fissile material is 

not transported to the altered TSbv. The second and third branches of this top event indicate that 
fissile materials are transported to the altered TSbv and initiate the evaluation of far-field 
configuration subclasses FF-1B and FF-1C, respectively. In order to allow for the evaluation of 
far-field configuration subclass FF-1B and FF-1C, the lower two branches of this top event are 
selected. Therefore, /MS-FF-12, MS-FF-12[1], and MS-FF-12[2] are each assigned a value of 
1.00. 
6.4.2.10.6 Top Event MS-FF-13 
The branching of top event MS-FF-13 represents formation of the far-field configuration 
subclass FF-1B, which is defined as the sorption of fissile material in clays and zeolites in the 
altered TSbv. The upper branch of this top event indicates that fissile materials are not sorbed 
and the lower branch of this top event indicates that they are. Because the known quantities of 
clays and zeolites in the unsaturated zone will not result in any appreciable sorption of fissile 
materials (Assumption 5.5.4), the upper branch of this top event is selected. Therefore, /MS-FF-
13 and MS-FF-13 are each assigned a value of 0.00. 
6.4.2.10.7 Top Event MS-FF-14 
The branching of top event MS-FF-14 represents the formation of far-field configuration 
subclass FF-1C, which is defined as the accumulation of fissile material containing solutes in 
topographical lows above altered TSbv. The upper branch of this top event indicates that fissile 
material containing solutes are not accumulated and the lower branch of this top event indicates 
that they are accumulated. Because there are no known fissile material accumulation 
mechanisms in the altered TSbv (Assumption 5.5.2), the upper branch of this top event is 
selected. Therefore, /MS-FF-14 and MS-FF-14 are each assigned a value of 0.00 
6.4.2.11 Quantification of Event Tree CONFIG-FF-K 
The following subsections provide justification for the probabilities assigned to the events used 
in the quantification of the far-field event tree CONFIG-FF-K (Figure B-22 of Appendix B). 
This event tree initiates the evaluation of the far-field configuration class FF-2 representing the 
far-field accumulation of fissile material bearing colloids into potentially critical configurations. 
This event tree consists of seven top events, of which only six are required for the evaluation of 
this far-field configuration class for the seismic disruptive event. Table 6.4-18 summarizes the 
event probability assignments discussed below. 

Table 6.4-18. Event Probability Assignment for the CONFIG-FF-K Event Tree for the Seismic Disruptive 
Event Criticality FEPs SAPHIRE Analyses 
Event Name and Description Probability 
Value 
SAPHIRE Assigned 
Event Valuea 
(per waste package) 
Justification 
Transport of fissile material colloids to Section 6.4.2.11.1 
(Topopah Spring welded hydrogeologic unit 
(TSw) in carrier plume 
/MS-FF-16 False a 1.00 
MS-FF-16 True 1.00 
(MS-FF-16 top event) 
Hydrodynamic/chromatographic separation of Section 6.4.2.11.2 
fissile material colloids from neutron absorber 
materials 
/MS-FF-17 False a 1.00 
MS-FF-17[1] (configuration class FF-2A) True 1.00 
MS-FF-17[2] (configuration classes FF-2B and True 1.00 
FF-2C) 
(MS-FF-17 top event) 
Trapping of fissile material colloids in dead-end Section 6.4.2.11.3 
fractures at boundary stress-relief zone 
(configuration class FF-2A) 
/MS-FF-18 True a 0.00 
MS-FF-18 False 0.00 
(MS-FF-18 top event) 
Transport of fissile material colloids to altered Section 6.4.2.11.4 
TSbv 
/MS-FF-19 False a 1.00 
MS-FF-19[1] (configuration class FF-2B) True 1.00 
MS-FF-19[2] (configuration class FF-2C) True 1.00 
(MS-FF-19 top event) 
Sorption of colloids on clays and zeolites in Section 6.4.2.11.5 
altered TSbv (configuration class FF-2B) 
/MS-FF-20 True a 0.00 
MS-FF-20 False 0.00 
(MS-FF-20 top event) 
Filtration of colloids in topographic lows above Section 6.4.2.11.6 
TSbv (configuration class FF-2C) 
/MS-FF-21 True a 0.00 
MS-FF-21 False 0.00 
(MS-FF-21 top event) 
a
NOTE: For event names prefixed by a slash / the actual event probability used in processing the 
SAPHIRE logic model is the complement (i.e., 1  value) of the assigned value

6.4.2.11.1 Top Event MS-FF-16 
The branching of top event MS-FF-16 initiates the evaluation of far-field configuration class 
FF-2 representing the transport of fissile material bearing colloids into the far-fields unsaturated 
zone. The upper branch represents that fissile material bearing colloids are not transported to the 
far-field and the lower branch represents that they are. Only the lower branch of this top event is 
activated to initiate the evaluation of this far-field configuration class. Therefore, /MS-FF-16 
and MS-FF-16 are each assigned a value of 1.00. 
6.4.2.11.2 Top Event MS-FF-17 
The branching of top event MS-FF-17 determines whether the fissile material bearing colloids 
entering the unsaturated zone environment are hydrodynamically or chromatographically 
separated from the neutron absorber materials of the waste package or waste form. The upper 
branch indicates that the fissile material is not separated from the neutron absorber materials by 
the unsaturated zone environment. The remaining two branches represent the separation of the 
fissile materials from the neutron absorber materials and initiate the evaluation of the FF-2 
configuration subclasses. The second branch from the top directs the evaluation of configuration 
subclass FF-2A and the third branch directs the evaluation of configuration subclasses FF-2B 
and FF-2C. The processing of the bottom two branches of this top event are accessed by 
assigning MS-FF-17[1] and MS-FF-17[2] a value of 1.00. To prevent evaluation of the upper 
branch of this top event, /MS-FF-17 will also be assigned a value of 1.00 (i.e., the complement of 
0.00). 
6.4.2.11.3 Top Event MS-FF-18 
The branching of top event MS-FF-18 represents far-field configuration subclass FF-2A that is 
defined as the trapping of fissile material bearing colloids in altered TSbv. The upper branch of 
this top event indicates that fissile material bearing colloids are not trapped and the lower branch 
indicates that they are. Because there are no known mechanisms for trapping and accumulating 
any appreciable quantities of fissile material bearing colloids in altered TSbv 
(Assumption 5.5.2), only the top branch of this top event is activated. Therefore, /MS-FF-18 and 
MS-FF-18 are each assigned a value of 0.00. 
6.4.2.11.4 Top Event MS-FF-19 
The branching of top event MS-FF-19 represents the transport of fissile material containing 
colloids to altered TSbv. The upper branch of this top event indicates that fissile material 
containing colloids are not transported and the lower two branches indicate that they are. The 
second and third branches of this top event initiate the evaluation of far-field configuration 
subclasses FF-2B and FF-2C, respectively. In order to allow for the evaluation of these far-field 
configuration subclasses, the lower two branches of this top event are selected. Therefore, /MS-
FF-19, MS-FF-19[1], and MS-FF-19[2] are each assigned a value of 1.00. 
6.4.2.11.5 Top Event MS-FF-20 
The branching of top event MS-FF-20 represents formation of the far-field configuration 
subclass FF-2B, which is defined as the sorption of fissile material containing colloids on clays 

and zeolites in the altered TSbv. The upper branch of this top event indicates that fissile 
materials are not sorbed and the lower branch of this top event indicates that they are. Because 
the known quantities of clays and zeolites in the unsaturated zone will not result in any 
appreciable sorption of fissile materials containing colloids (Assumption 5.5.4), the upper branch 
of this top event is selected. Therefore, /MS-FF-20 and MS-FF-20 are each assigned a value of 
0.00. 
6.4.2.11.6 Top Event MS-FF-21 
The branching of top event MS-FF-21 represents the formation of far-field configuration 
subclass FF-2C, which is defined as the filtration and accumulation of fissile material containing 
colloids in topographical low above altered TSbv. The upper branch of this top event indicates 
that fissile material containing colloids are not filtered and accumulated and the lower branch of 
this top event indicates that they are. Because there are no known fissile material accumulation 
mechanisms in the altered TSbv (Assumption 5.5.2), the upper branch of this top event is 
selected. Therefore, /MS-FF-21 and MS-FF-21 are each assigned a value of 0.00. 
6.4.2.12 Quantification of Event Tree CONFIG-FF3 
The following subsections provide justification for the probabilities assigned to the events used 
in the quantification of the far-field event tree CONFIG-FF3 (Figure B-23 of Appendix B). 
This event tree initiates the evaluation of the far-field configuration class FF-3 representing the 
accumulation of fissile material into potentially critical configurations in the far-field saturated 
zone. This event tree consists of nine top events, all of which are required for the evaluation of 
far-field configuration class FF-3 for the seismic disruptive event. Table 6.4-19 summarizes the 
event probability assignments discussed below. 

Table 6.4-19. Event Probability Assignment for the CONFIG-FF-3 Event Tree for the Seismic Disruptive 
Event Criticality FEPs SAPHIRE Analyses 
Event Name and Description 
Probability 
Value 
SAPHIRE Assigned 
Event Valuea 
(per waste package) Justification 
Initiate evaluation of far-field configuration class Section 6.4.2.12.1 
FF-3 subclasses 
/CONFIG-SCEN False a 1.00 
CONFIG-SCEN[1] (configuration class FF-3A) True 1.00 
CONFIG-SCEN[2] (configuration class FF-3B) True 1.00 
CONFIG-SCEN[3] (configuration class FF-3C) True 1.00 
CONFIG-SCEN[4] (configuration class FF-3D) True 1.00 
CONFIG-SCEN[5] (configuration class FF-3E) True 1.00 
(CONFIG-SCEN top event) 
Fissile material precipitates in upwell zone of Section 6.4.2.12.2 
hydrothermal fluids at faults or in fractures 
(configuration class FF-3A) True a 0.00 
/MS-FF-4 False 0.00 
MS-FF-4 
(MS-FF-4 top event) 
Contaminant plume mixes below redox front Section 6.4.2.12.3 
(configuration class FF-3B) 
/MS-FF-5 False a 1.00 
MS-FF-5 True 1.00 
(MS-FF-5 top event) 
Precipitation of fissile material (configuration class Section 6.4.2.12.4 
FF-3B) 
/MS-FF-6 True a 0.00 
MS-FF-6 False 0.00 
(MS-FF-6 top event) 
Fissile material precipitates at reducing zone Section 6.4.2.12.5 
(configuration class FF-3C) 
/MS-FF-7 True a 0.00 
MS-FF-7 False 0.00 
(MS-FF-7 top event) 
Fissile material precipitates at organic reducing Section 6.4.2.12.6 
zone at pinchout of tuff aquifer (configuration class 
FF-3D) 
/MS-FF-8 True a 0.00 
MS-FF-8 False 0.00 
(MS-FF-8 top event) 

Table 6.4-19. Event Probability Assignment for the CONFIG-FF-3 Event Tree for the Seismic Disruptive 
Event Criticality FEPs SAPHIRE Analyses (Continued) 
Event Name and Description 
Probability 
Value 
SAPHIRE Assigned 
Event Valuea 
(per waste package) Justification 
Fissile material solutes are transported to Franklin Section 6.4.2.12.7 
Lake Playa (configuration class FF-3E) 
/MS-FF-9 False a 1.00 
MS-FF-9 True 1.00 
(MS-FF-9 top event) 
Fissile material solutes precipitate in organic-rich Section 6.4.2.12.8 
zones of Franklin Lake Playa (configuration class 
FF-3E) 
/MS-FF-10 False a 1.00 
MS-FF-10 True 1.00 
(MS-FF-9 top event) 
Criticality potential of configuration class FF-3E Section 6.4.2.12.9 
/CRIT-POT-WF True a 0.00 
CRIT-POT-WF False 0.00 
(CRIT-POT-WF top event) 
NOTE: a For events prefixed by a slash / the actual event probability used in processing the SAPHIRE logic model is 
the complement (i.e., 1  value) of the assigned value 
6.4.2.12.1 Top Event CONFIG-SCEN 
The branching of top event CONFIG-SCEN establishes the evaluation of the five subclasses of 
far-field configuration class FF-3 defined as the transport of fissile material into the saturated 
zone. The upper branch is not utilized in these analyses and is included only as a modeling 
convenience. The five far-field configuration subclasses are represented by the second through 
sixth branches from the top of this top event. These five branches direct the evaluation of 
configuration subclass FF-3A, FF-3B, FF-3C, FF-3D, and FF-3E, respectively. The processing 
of the bottom five branches of this top event are initiated by assigning CONFIG-SCEN[1], 
CONFIG-SCEN[2], CONFIG-SCEN[3], CONFIG-SCEN[4], and CONFIG-SCEN[5] a value of 
1.00. 
6.4.2.12.2 Top Event MS-FF-4 
The branching of top event MS-FF-4 initiates the evaluation of far-field configuration subclass 
FF-3A defined as the precipitation of fissile material in the upwell zone of hydrothermal fluids at 
faults or in fractures. The upper branch indicates that fissile material is not precipitated and the 
lower branch indicates that they are. Because no known mechanism exists for the appreciable 
precipitation of fissile material in the saturated zone (Assumption 5.5.3), only the upper branch 
of this top event is activated. Therefore, /MS-FF-4 and MS-FF-4 are each assigned a value of 
0.00. 

6.4.2.12.3 Top Event MS-FF-5 
The branching of top event MS-FF-5 represents the mixing of the fissile material containing 
contaminant plume below the redox front. The effects of pH and pCO2 in the UZ on uranium 
can lead to precipitation through reduction in the uranium solubility (Assumption 5.5.3). The 
upper branch indicates that mixing does not occur and the lower branch indicates that it does. In 
order to allow for the processing of far-field configuration subclass FF-3B, only the lower branch 
of this top event is activated. Therefore, /MS-FF-5 and MS-FF-5 are each assigned a value of 
1.00. 
6.4.2.12.4 Top Event MS-FF-6 
The branching of top event MS-FF-6 initiates the evaluation of far-field configuration subclass 
FF-3B defined as the precipitation of fissile material as the contaminant plume mixes below the 
redox front. The upper branch indicates that fissile material is not precipitated and the lower 
branch indicates that they are. Because no known mechanism exists for the appreciable 
precipitation of fissile material in the saturated zone (Assumption 5.5.3), only the upper branch 
of this top event is activated. Therefore, /MS-FF-6 and MS-FF-6 are each assigned a value of 
0.00. 
6.4.2.12.5 Top Event MS-FF-7 
The branching of top event MS-FF-7 initiates the evaluation of far-field configuration subclass 
FF-3C defined as the precipitation of fissile materials at the reducing zone (i.e., the remains of 
organic materials). The upper branch indicates that fissile material is not precipitated and the 
lower branch indicates that it is. Because organic material is not known to exist in the saturated 
zone in any appreciable quantity, precipitation of fissile material is unlikely (Assumption 5.5.5). 
Therefore, only the upper branch of this top event is activated and /MS-FF-7 and MS-FF-7 are 
each assigned a value of 0.00. 
6.4.2.12.6 Top Event MS-FF-8 
The branching of top event MS-FF-8 initiates the evaluation of far-field configuration subclass 
FF-3D defined as the precipitation of fissile materials at the reducing zone of a pinchout of the 
tuff aquifer. The upper branch indicates that fissile material is not precipitated and the lower 
branch indicates that it is. Because organic material is not known to exist in the saturated zone in 
any appreciable quantity, precipitation of fissile material is unlikely (Assumption 5.5.5). 
Therefore, only the upper branch of this top event is activated and /MS-FF-8 and MS-FF-8 are 
each assigned a value of 0.00. 
6.4.2.12.7 Top Event MS-FF-9 
The branching of top event MS-FF-9 represents the transport of fissile material containing 
solutes to Franklin Lake Playa. The upper branch indicates that transport does not occur and the 
lower branch indicates that it does. In order to allow for the processing of far-field configuration 
subclass FF-3E, only the lower branch of this top event is activated. Therefore, /MS-FF-9 and 
MS-FF-9 are each assigned a value of 1.00. 

6.4.2.12.8 Top Event MS-FF-10 
The branching of top event MS-FF-10 represents the precipitation of fissile material containing 
solutes in organic-rich zones of Franklin Lake. The upper branch indicates that precipitation 
does not occur and the lower branch indicates that it does. It is assumed (Assumption 5.5.1) that 
if fissile material is transported to Franklin Lake, organic-rich reducing zones within the lake 
will allow for the precipitation and accumulation of fissile materials. Therefore, only the lower 
branch of this top event is activated and /MS-FF-10 and MS-FF-10 are each assigned a value of 
1.00. 
6.4.2.12.9 Top Event CRIT-POT-WF 
The branching of top event CRIT-POT-WF represents the criticality potential of the precipitated 
fissile material in the organic-rich zones of Franklin Lake. The upper branch indicates that 
precipitated material does not have a criticality potential and the lower branch indicates that it 
does. It is assumed that, over the regulatory period, insufficient fissile material could be 
transported and accumulated in the organic-rich zones of Franklin Lake to result in a potentially 
critical configuration (Assumption 5.5.1). Therefore, only the upper branch of this top event is 
activated and /CRIT-POT-WF and CRIT-POT-WF are each assigned a value of 0.00. 
6.4.3 External Criticality Analysis Results for Seismic Disruptive Event 
The minimum critical mass required to be accumulated in the invert has been calculated for a 
range of 235U enrichments in Critical Mass Search Calculation in the Invert (BSC 2004 [DIRS 
170060]). The critical mass results from this calculation are summarized in Table 6.4-20. 
Critical Mass Search Calculation in the Invert (BSC 2004 [DIRS 170060]) calculates that less 
than 11 kg of uranium will accumulate in the invert under a waste package. Based on the values 
presented in Table 6.4-20, 11 kg of uranium in the invert will not have criticality potential. 
Table 6.4-20. Minimum 235U Critical Mass 
Invert Void 
Fraction 
(percent) 
Waste Form 235U Enrichment 
(weight percent) 
5 15 25 50 75 100 
27 N/A 20.85 kg 19.39 kg 17.63 kg 16.63 kg 16.23 kg 
39 29.00 kg 29.19 kg 27.28 kg 25.50 kg 23.00 kg 21.83 kg 
Source: BSC 2004 [DIRS 170060] 
Note: N/A  not applicable; insufficient fissile material to result in a critical mass 
6.4.4 Seismic Disruptive Event Criticality FEPs Analysis Results 
Tables 6.4-21 and 6.4-22 summarize the SAPHIRE seismic disruptive event results of per waste 
package type criticality probabilities for seismic ground motion and faulting induced waste 
package damage, respectively. 
The per waste package type criticality probabilities for seismic induced waste package damage 
due to ground motion are applicable to the entire population of these waste package types as the 

entire repository experiences the seismic event. However, the per waste package type criticality 
probabilities for seismic induced waste package damage due to faulting is only applicable to 
those waste packages located on the faults. 
6.4.4.1 Probability of Waste Package Damage Due to Seismic Ground Motion 
Because seismic induced waste package damage due to ground motion is applicable to the entire 
population of waste package, it is acceptable to use a binomial distribution analysis to determine 
the probability of criticality for each waste package type based on its total population. Using the 
binomial distribution equation (Equation 6.4-3) (Walpole, et al. 1998 [DIRS 152180], 
Section 5.3), the total probability of criticality for each waste package type can then be 
calculated. 
-
x
...
...
x 
xn
p n x b )
(,, 
=
(1
-
p
)
p
n
..
(Eq. 6.4-3) 
where: 
x = number of waste packages with criticality potential 
n = number of the waste package type being evaluated 
p = per waste package probability of criticality for the waste package type being evaluated 
A binomial distribution analysis can be used to calculate the probability of the occurrence of a 
criticality in one, two, three,  through x waste packages. However, Table 6.4-22 indicates that 
the per waste package probability of criticality is zero for all waste package types. Therefore, a 
binomial distribution analysis is not necessary for the determination of the total probability of 
criticality due to seismic ground motion for each waste package type. 
6.4.4.2 Probability of Waste Package Damage Due to Seismic Fault Displacement 
Seismic fault displacement is considered to have the potential to damage waste packages placed 
on the fault line. Multiple faults are in the vicinity of the Yucca Mountain repository and some 
intersect the drifts in a number of places. Within this latter group of faults, the Drill Hole, 
Pagany, Sever, Sundance, and 7a/8a faults have a sufficient displacement probability with 
sufficiently severe seismic events to damage waste packages lying on the fault lines. (Note that 
7a/8a are generic locations that include hypothetical small faults with 2-meter offsets (BSC 2004 
[DIRS 169183], Section 6.7.3)). Potential waste package damage from seismic faulting is 
dependent upon 1) the amount of clearance between the top of a waste package and the bottom 
of the drip shield, and 2) the amount of fault displacement. Damage to a waste package is 
considered possible when the fault displacement exceeds the clearance between a waste package 
located on the fault and drip shield. The clearance between the top of a waste package and the 
bottom of the drip shield is a function of the waste package diameter (Section 4.1.9). The 
amount of fault displacement is a function of the severity of the seismic event causing the fault 
displacement. Results from Seismic Consequence Abstraction (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169183]), 
based on hazard curves, identify what seismic event exceedance frequency is required to 
potentially damage commercial SNF, DOE, and NNPP waste package types (BSC 2004 [DIRS 
169183], Section 6.7.3). 

The probability of having one of p waste packages of a given type located at any one fault 
intersection for a total of n waste packages, is given by: 
. n - 1 . 
.. 
P (1;n p ) = ..
. 
p - 1. 
, 
. n . 
..
.. 
p 
.. (Eq. 6.4-4) 
where the numerator and denominator indicate binomial coefficients. 
Equation 6.4-4 reduces to 
P (1;n p ) = p 
, 
n . (Eq. 6.4-5) 
As the identified faults that can potentially cause damage to waste packages have a number of 
intersections with the drifts, multiple fault intersections need to be considered. The probability 
of multiple waste packages of a particular type being on multiple fault intersections is the union 
of multiple events that is given by the sum of the individual probabilities minus the sum of the 
probability of (counting type) intersections. For two such events, this probability is given by: 
P(A . B) = P(A) + P(B)  P(AB) (Eq. 6.4-6) 
For three events, the probability is given by 
P(A . B . C) = P(A) + P(B) + P(C) - P(AB) - P(AC) - P(BC) + P(ABC) (Eq. 6.4-7) 
The sequence can be extended by induction. 
Similarly, the probability that two units of a given waste package type are both on fault 
intersections is a conditional probability calculation. Given that one waste package is on one 
fault intersection, the probability that a second one is also on a fault intersection is given by: 
P(2; p, n) = p/n  (p-1)/(n-1) (Eq. 6.4-8) 
In a similar manner, the probability that three units of a waste package type are all on fault 
intersections is given by 
P(3; p, n) = p/n  (p-1)/(n-1)  (p-2)/(n-2) (Eq. 6.4-9) 
In general, the probability that exactly j units of a waste package type are all on fault 
intersections is given by: 
P(j; p, n) = . {(p-k)/(n-k)}, k = 0, j-1; j = Number of fault intersections (Eq. 6.4-10) 
Note that Equation 6.4-10 provides the intersection terms in Equations 6.4-6 and 6.4-7. 

However, the mean number of waste packages of any given type residing on faults can be 
calculated using the hypergeometric distribution given in Equation 6.4-11 (Evans, et al., 1993 
[DIRS 112115], p. 85). 
P(n; X, N) = nX/N (Eq. 6.4-11) 
where 
X is the number of faults 
n is the number of waste package of a given type 
N is the total number of waste packages in the repository inventory 
From Seismic Consequence Abstraction (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169183], Section 6.7.4), the number 
of faults that could impact the commercial SNF, NNPP, and 2-MCO/2-DHLW waste package 
types is 22 (Sundance, Drill Hole, Sever, and Pagany faults). The number of faults that could 
potentially impact 5-DHLW/DOE Long and 5-DHLW-DOE Short waste package types is 142 
(Sundance, Drill Hole, Sever, Pagany, 7a, and 8a faults). The mean fractional waste package 
population residing on damaging inducing faults for any given waste package type is presented 
in Table 6.4-23. 
The total probability of criticality for each waste package type is then estimated by multiplying 
the mean fractional number of waste packages and the total per waste package probability of 
criticality from Table 6.4-22. A more exact solution of this calculation could be performed using 
the binomial distribution of Equation 6.4-3. However, given the waste package type population 
numbers that include fractional populations of less than one, the binomial distribution is not 
applied because the product method is a sufficiently close approximation. 

Table 6.4-21. Per Waste Package Criticality Probabilities Resulting from Seismic Ground Motion Induced 
Damage from SAPHIRE Analysis of Seismic Disruptive Event Criticality FEPs 
Waste Package Type 
Number of 
Waste 
Packagesa 
Per Waste Package Probability of Criticalityb 
TotalIntact 
In-Package 
Degraded 
In-Package Near-Field Far-Field 
21-PWR Absorber Plate 4299 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
21-PWR Control Rod 95 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
12-PWR Absorber Plate 163 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
24-BWR Absorber Plate 84 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
44-BWR Absorber Plate 2831 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF Short w/ MOX 5 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF Long w/ MOX 61 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF Short w/ U-Zr Hx 165 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF Short w/ U-Metal 16 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF Long w/ U-Metal 4 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF MCO w/ U-Metal 220 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF Short w/ HEU Oxide 655 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF Long w/ HEU Oxide 42 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF Short w/ U/Th Oxide 20 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF Long w/ U/Th Oxide 73 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF Long w/ U/Th Carbide 605 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF Short w/ Aluminum Based 1226 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF Long w/ Aluminum Based 1 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF Short w/ U-Zr/U-Mo Alloy 14 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF Long w/ U-Zr/U-Mo Alloy 19 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF Short w/ LEU Oxide 8 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF Long w/ LEU Oxide 344 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
a
Source: Values from Table 4.1-3 
b 
SAPHIRE V. 7.18 (BSC 2002 [DIRS 160873]) analysis results (Appendix B, Section B.24) and 
Microsoft EXCEL spreadsheet endstate.xls. (Probability values below the screening criterion are set to 
0.0.) 

Table 6.4-22. Per Waste Package Criticality Probabilities Resulting from Seismic Faulting Induced 
Damage from SAPHIRE Analysis of Seismic Disruptive Event Criticality FEPs 
Waste Package Type 
Number of 
Waste 
Packagesa 
Per Waste Package Probability of Criticalityb 
TotalIntact 
In-Package 
Degraded 
In-Package Near-Field Far-Field 
21-PWR Absorber Plate 4299 0.00E+00 4.65E-11 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 4.65E-11 
21-PWR Control Rod 95 0.00E+00 2.61E-10 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 2.61E-10 
12-PWR Absorber Plate 163 0.00E+00 3.29E-13 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 3.29E-13 
24-BWR Absorber Plate 84 0.00E+00 3.29E-13 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 3.29E-13 
44-BWR Absorber Plate 2831 0.00E+00 3.28E-13 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 3.28E-13 
DOE SNF Short w/ MOX 5 0.00E+00 8.44E-11 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 8.44E-11 
DOE SNF Long w/ MOX 61 0.00E+00 8.44E-11 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 8.44E-11 
DOE SNF Short w/ U-Zr Hx 165 0.00E+00 3.32E-13 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 3.32E-13 
DOE SNF Short w/ U-Metal 16 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF Long w/ U-Metal 4 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF MCO w/ U-Metal 220 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF Short w/ HEU Oxide 655 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF Long w/ HEU Oxide 42 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF Short w/ U/Th Oxide 20 0.00E+00 2.23E-10 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 2.23E-10 
DOE SNF Long w/ U/Th Oxide 73 0.00E+00 2.23E-10 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 2.23E-10 
DOE SNF Long w/ U/Th Carbide 605 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF Short w/ Aluminum Based 1226 0.00E+00 3.32E-13 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 3.32E-13 
DOE SNF Long w/ Aluminum Based 1 0.00E+00 3.32E-13 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 3.32E-13 
DOE SNF Short w/ U-Zr/U-Mo Alloy 14 0.00E+00 2.23E-10 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 2.23E-10 
DOE SNF Long w/ U-Zr/U-Mo Alloy 19 0.00E+00 2.23E-10 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 2.23E-10 
DOE SNF Short w/ LEU Oxide 8 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF Long w/ LEU Oxide 344 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
a
Source: Values from Table 4.1-3 
b 
SAPHIRE V. 7.18 (BSC 2002 [DIRS 160873]) analysis results (Appendix B, Section B.24) and 
Microsoft EXCEL spreadsheet endstate.xls. (Probability values below the screening criterion are set to 
0.0.) 

Table 6.4-23. Per Waste Package Type Total Probability of Criticality Resulting from Seismic Induced 
Faulting Damage 
Waste Package Type 
Number of 
Waste 
Packagesa 
Number on 
Damaging 
Inducing 
Faults b 
Mean 
Fractional 
Waste 
Package 
Population 
Residing on 
Damaging 
Inducing 
Faults c 
Per Waste 
Package 
Probability of 
Criticality d 
Waste 
Package Type 
Total 
Probability of 
Criticality Due 
to Seismic 
Faulting 
21-PWR Absorber Plate 4,299 22 8.407 4.65E-11 3.91E-10 
21-PWR Control Rod 95 22 0.186 2.61E-10 4.84E-11 
12-PWR Absorber Plate 163 22 0.319 3.29E-13 1.05E-13 
24-BWR Absorber Plate 84 22 0.164 3.29E-13 5.40E-14 
44-BWR Absorber Plate 2,831 22 5.536 3.28E-13 1.82E-12 
DOE SNF Short w/ MOX 5 142 0.063 8.44E-11 5.32E-12 
DOE SNF Long w/ MOX 61 142 0.770 8.44E-11 6.50E-11 
DOE SNF Short w/ U-Zr Hx 165 142 2.083 3.32E-13 6.92E-13 
DOE SNF Short w/ U-Metal 16 142 0.202 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF Long w/ U-Metal 4 142 0.050 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF MCO w/ U-Metal 220 22 0.430 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF Short w/ HEU Oxide 655 142 8.268 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF Long w/ HEU Oxide 42 142 0.530 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF Short w/ U/Th Oxide 20 142 0.252 2.23E-10 5.62E-11 
DOE SNF Long w/ U/Th Oxide 73 142 0.921 2.23E-10 2.05E-10 
DOE SNF Long w/ U/Th Carbide 605 142 7.636 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF Short w/ Aluminum Based 1,226 142 15.475 3.32E-13 5.14E-12 
DOE SNF Long w/ Aluminum Based 1 142 0.013 3.32E-13 4.19E-15 
DOE SNF Short w/ U-Zr/U-Mo Alloy 14 142 0.177 2.23E-10 3.94E-11 
DOE SNF Long w/ U-Zr/U-Mo Alloy 19 142 0.240 2.23E-10 5.34E-11 
DOE SNF Short w/ LEU Oxide 8 142 0.101 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF Long w/ LEU Oxide 344 142 4.342 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
TOTAL 11,250 8.71E-10 
a
Source: Values from Table 4.1-3 
b 
BSC 2004 [DIRS 169183], Section 6.7.4 
c 
calculated using Equation 6.4-11 
d 
column 7 of Table 6.4-22 (Probability values below the screening criterion are set to 0.0.) 

6.5 ANALYSIS OF ROCK FALL DISRUPTIVE EVENT CRITICALITY FEPS 
Rock fall disruptive event criticality FEPs are presented in Table 6.5-1. 
Table 6.5-1. Rock Fall Disruptive Event Criticality FEPs 
FEP Number FEP Title FEP Description 
2.1.14.21.0A 
In-package 
criticality resulting 
from rock fall 
(intact 
configuration) 
The waste package internal structures and the waste form remain intact 
either during or after a rock fall event. If there is a breach (or are 
breaches) in the waste package which allows water to either accumulate or 
flow-through the waste package then criticality could occur in situ. 
2.1.14.22.0A 
In-package 
criticality resulting 
from rock fall 
(degraded 
configurations) 
Either during, or as a result of, a rock fall event, the waste package internal 
structures and the waste form may degrade. If a critical configuration 
develops, criticality could occur in situ. Potential in situ critical 
configurations are defined in Figures 3.2a and 3.2b of Disposal Criticality 
Analysis Methodology Topical Report (YMP 2003 [DIRS 165505]). 
2.1.14.23.0A 
Near-field criticality 
resulting from rock 
fall 
Either during, or as a result of, a rock fall event, near-field criticality could 
occur if fissile material-bearing solution from the waste package is 
transported into the drift and the fissile material is precipitated into a critical 
configuration. Potential near-field critical configurations are defined in 
Figure 3.3a of Disposal Criticality Analysis Methodology Topical Report 
(YMP 2003 [DIRS 165505]). 
2.2.14.11.0A 
Far-field criticality 
resulting from rock 
fall 
Either during, or as a result of, a rock fall event, far-field criticality could 
occur if fissile material-bearing solution from the waste package is 
transported beyond the drift and the fissile material is precipitated into a 
critical configuration. Potential far-field critical configurations are defined in 
Figure 3.3b of Disposal Criticality Analysis Methodology Topical Report 
(YMP 2003 [DIRS 165505]). 
Source: Table 6.1-1 
6.5.1 Rock Fall Impacts on Waste Packages and Waste Forms 
Rock fall disruptive event criticality FEPs 2.1.14.21.0A, 2.1.14.22.0A, 2.1.14.23.0A, and 
2.2.14.11.0A require an assessment of the probability of criticality due to rock fall. A rock fall 
event can occur as result of normal drift degradation, as well as the result of a seismic event. 
Because the frequency of rock fall due to static drift degradation cannot be readily predicted, the 
probability of this disruptive event should be assigned a value of 1.00. However, because the 
rock fall SAPHIRE analysis will not result in the generation of any unique results beyond those 
generated for the base case, an initiating event probability of 0.0 is assigned to this disruptive 
event. 
A rock fall event could potentially result in drip shield damage depending on the size of the rock 
fall, the impact velocity and drip shield impact location. Because the drip shield covers the 
waste package, no waste package damage is predicted due to a rock fall event. However, for the 
rock fall disruptive event, the probability of drip shield damage does not correlate to the 
probability of drip shield failure. Drip shield failure is defined as the failure of the drip shield to 
perform its primary function  to prevent advective flow from contacting the waste package. 
Drip shield failure may be the result of a stress corrosion crack or complete structural failure. 
Although rock fall will result in stress corrosion cracking of the drip shield, the resulting cracks 
are predicted to be plugged with corrosion products or precipitates (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169985], 
Section 6.3.7) causing the probability of advective flow through the cracks to approach zero 

(BSC 2004 [DIRS 169985], Section 6.3.7). Therefore, the probability of drip shield failure 
resulting from a rock fall disruptive event is negligible. This is the same value assigned to this 
drip shield failure mechanism for the quantification of top event MS-IC-2 in the base case. 
Seepage flux is not predicted to be influenced by a rock fall disruptive event. Therefore, the 
seepage probabilities are also unchanged from that calculated for the base case. 
As was stated in the base case in Section 6.3.3.1.4, condensation does not occur on the underside 
of the drip shield and, therefore, is unavailable to enter a failed waste package. In addition, 
because rock fall does not cause drip shield failure, no advective flow path is created for 
condensation on the drift walls to enter a failed waste package. Therefore, the event probability 
for condensation calculated for the base case is also valid for the rock fall disruptive event. 
Finally, since rock fall does not impact the waste package, the only viable waste package failure 
mechanism during the rock fall disruptive event results from fabrication errors and localized 
corrosion  the same failure mechanisms identified for the base case. 
6.5.2 SAPHIRE Event Probability Modifications for Rock Fall Analysis 
Based on the information previously presented, it is not necessary to modify any event 
probabilities for the rock fall criticality FEPs SAPHIRE analysis from those specified for the 
base case analysis. 
6.5.3 Rock Fall Criticality FEPs Analysis Results 
Because it is not necessary to modify any event probabilities from those specified for the base 
case, the SAPHIRE results that would be calculated for the rock fall disruptive event SAPHIRE 
analysis are the same as those that have been reported for the base case analysis. For this reason, 
no evaluation of the rock fall disruptive event is necessary and the probability of criticality 
resulting from a rock fall disruptive event is negligible. 
6.6 ANALYSIS OF IGNEOUS DISRUPTIVE EVENT CRITICALITY FEP 
The igneous disruptive event criticality FEPs are presented in Table 6.6-1. 

Table 6.6-1. Igneous Disruptive Event Criticality FEPs 
FEP Number FEP Name FEP Description 
2.1.14.24.0A 
In-package 
criticality resulting 
from an igneous 
event (intact 
configuration) 
The waste package internal structures and the waste form remain intact 
either during or after an igneous disruptive event. If there is a breach (or are 
breaches) in the waste package which allows water to either accumulate or 
flow-through the waste package then criticality could occur in situ. 
2.1.14.25.0A 
In-package 
criticality resulting 
from an igneous 
event (degraded 
configurations) 
Either during, or as a result of, an igneous disruptive event, the waste 
package internal structures and the waste form may degrade. If a critical 
configuration develops, criticality could occur in situ. Potential in situ critical 
configurations are defined in Figures 3.2a and 3.2b of Disposal Criticality 
Analysis Methodology Topical Report (YMP 2003 [DIRS 165505]). 
2.1.14.26.0A 
Near-field 
criticality resulting 
from an igneous 
event 
Either during, or as a result of, an igneous disruptive event, near-field 
criticality could occur if fissile material-bearing solution from the waste 
package is transported into the drift and the fissile material is precipitated 
into a critical configuration. Potential near-field critical configurations are 
defined in Figure 3.3a of Disposal Criticality Analysis Methodology Topical 
Report (YMP 2003 [DIRS 165505]). 
2.2.14.12.0A 
Far-field criticality 
resulting from an 
igneous event 
Either during, or as a result of, an igneous disruptive event, far-field criticality 
could occur if fissile material-bearing solution from the waste package is 
transported beyond the drift and the fissile material is precipitated into a 
critical configuration. Potential far-field critical configurations are defined in 
Figure 3.3b of Disposal Criticality Analysis Methodology Topical Report 
(YMP 2003 [DIRS 165505]). 
Source: Table 6.1-1 
The igneous disruptive event (intersection of the LA repository footprint by a volcanic dike) is 
described in Characterize Framework for Igneous Activity at Yucca Mountain, Nevada (BSC 
2004 [DIRS 169989], Section 6.5.3.1 and Table 7-1) as having a frequency of 1.710-8 per year. 
This frequency corresponds to a probability of 1.710-4 for the 10,000-year regulatory 
postclosure period. Two different igneous disruption scenarios have been evaluated. The first is 
an intrusion scenario where an igneous basaltic dike intersects one or more repository drifts, 
followed by effusive (liquid) magma flow or pyroclastic flow (clots of melt in a stream of gas) 
into the drifts (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169960], Section 6.1.3.2). The second igneous scenario is a 
violent Strombolian basaltic volcanic eruption through the repository that carries radioactive 
waste to the ground surface and into the atmosphere (BSC 2004 [DIRS 170026], Section 5.2.4). 
Given an igneous intrusion into the repository, there is an estimated 78 percent probability (BSC 
2004 [DIRS 169989], Table 7-1), or a frequency of 1.310-8 per year, of at least one eruptive 
center will form within the repository boundary (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169989], Table 7-1). 
Evaluation of the probability of a criticality resulting from an igneous event accounts for the 
probability of immediate or delayed waste package damage, presence of a moderator during the 
event or upon magma cooling, separation of fissionable material from the neutron absorber 
material during magma transport, and the accumulation of a critical mass of fissionable material 
from, or within, the transporting magma. 
Eruptive Scenario 
The eruptive scenario at Yucca Mountain is based on the observation that most basaltic eruptions 
begin as fissure eruptions, discharging magma where a dike intersects the earths surface, and 
rapidly become focused into roughly cylindrical conduit eruptions (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169980], 

Section 6.3.1.1). From Number of Waste Packages Hit by Igneous Intrusion (BSC 2004 [DIRS 
170001], Section 6.4), the number of conduits that may be formed during the eruptive igneous 
scenario ranges from zero through 13, with one being the most likely number. As stated in 
Atmospheric Dispersal and Deposition of Tephra from a Potential Volcanic Eruption at Yucca 
Mountain, Nevada (BSC 2004 [DIRS 170026], Section 1.3), the volcanic eruption is assumed 
conservatively to have both effusive and pyroclastic phases lasting throughout the duration of the 
event (Assumption 5.4.5). Such volcanic activity typically consists of gas and effusive 
Strombolian and violent Strombolian phases. In a violent Strombolian eruption, rapid exsolution 
of gas from liquid magma creates a rapidly expanding and rising magma-gas mixture that erupts 
from a conduit vent, rises in a convective eruption column, and disperses by prevailing winds. 
The waste packages within the conduit are assumed to be completely destroyed and the waste 
form pulverized (BSC 2004 [170026], Section 5.2.4). Consideration is given here to the unlikely 
scenario that the dispersed fissionable materials become mobilized by future precipitation and 
accumulated in a potentially critical configuration. 
As noted, eruptive conduits begin with fissure eruptions from igneous dikes. Hence, in the 
eruptive scenario, one or more dikes have intersected emplacement drifts and filled the affected 
drifts with effusive magma or pyroclastic material before the conduit forms and the violent 
eruption begins. Although the melting temperatures of waste package materials (cask or 
canister) are higher than expected magma temperatures, the materials nevertheless would weaken 
at the elevated temperatures and likely deform, leading to waste package failure Dike/Drift 
Interactions (BSC 2004 [DIRS 170028] Section 6.4.8.1). However, because the waste packages 
are expected to deform rather than disintegrate in the presence of magma, and because the waste 
packages are more dense than the magma, it is assumed that the non-vitrified waste packages 
adjacent to the conduit will remain in place and not be entrained in the eruptive conduit 
(Assumption 5.4.6, and Assumption 5.3 (BSC 2004 [DIRS 170001], Section 5.3). Thus, it is 
reasonable to assume that the waste packages that are adjacent to the conduit will remain in place 
in the magma-filled drift and will not be captured by the ascending magma in the eruption 
conduit (Assumption 5.4.6). Therefore, the number of waste packages destroyed in an eruption 
is limited to the number of waste packages intersected by conduits (BSC 2004 [DIRS 170001], 
Section 5.3). Using probability distributions for the number, location, and diameter of conduits, 
the layout of the waste emplacement drifts, and the average density of waste packages in the 
waste emplacement drifts, the median number of waste packages destroyed in a volcanic 
eruption is calculated to be six (BSC 2004 [DIRS 170001, Section 7.2). 
Intrusion Scenario 
It is expected for igneous intrusion events that the drip shields, invert and waste packages of the 
affected drifts are compressed and damaged and that magma or pyroclastic debris will occupy 
the entire emplacement drift volume (BSC 2004 [DIRS 170028] Section 6.4.7.5). The waste 
packages within the drift could be severely damaged through material softening, creeping, and 
intergranular breakdown due to the intrusive igneous materials temperature and entry force. 
Potentially critical configurations could be generated internal to or external to the waste package 
upon the reintroduction of seepage and the subsequent degradation of the waste package and 
waste form, transport of the fissionable material out of the waste package, and accumulation of 
the fissionable material in the near-field or far-field environments. 

The intruding magma or pyroclastic flow is predicted to have a maximum temperature between 
1050 to 1100C. This is based on an expected water content of 4.0 weight percent or less of the 
intruding material (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169980], Section 6.3.2.2). As stated in Dike/Drift 
Interactions (BSC 2004 [DIRS 170028], Section 6.4.8.1), at these temperatures the tensile 
strength of the waste package and internal components are decreased significantly and the 
materials are expected to creep readily and fail by mechanical rupture under very small loads, 
such as the static load from the intrusive material-filled drifts. It is expected that the creep 
failures will not be limited to the upper portions of the waste package, but as the upper portions 
collapse, the load imparted on the internals are sufficient to cause rupture of the waste packages 
lower half. Because the magma is expected to maintain these elevated temperatures for several 
months (BSC 2004 [DIRS 170028] Section 6.7.1.2), the waste package internals would attain 
these temperatures and similar creep failure of the internal components would occur. This 
slumping of the waste package and internals would result in the elimination of most of the waste 
packages internal void spaces. This would include the interstitial space between fuel rods of 
waste form assemblies as well as the voids within the waste package basket assembly cells. 
Although the internal components are expected to fail and slump, there is no expectation that any 
of the components or materials will relocate from their locations relative to each other. This is 
reasonable given that intrusion temperatures do not exceed the melt temperatures of any of the 
waste package or waste form component materials. 
Possible effects of magma intrusion into a drift on waste package internals in addition to those 
described above include accelerated corrosion of Zircaloy components and the formation of Zr-
Fe and Zr-Ni liquid eutectics (BSC 2004 [170028], Section 6.4.8.3). The accelerated corrosion 
of Zircaloy is caused by the presence of magmatic gases that enter the drift in association with 
the magma intrusion and make contact with the Zircaloy while temperatures are around 1100C. 
The liquid eutectics begin to form around 940C but, in addition, require contact between the 
materials. 
As discussed in this section, while the waste packages and waste forms are expected to fail from 
the magma intrusion, components and materials are not expected to relocate significantly. The 
presence of the magmatic gases could excerbate cladding damage and mineral transformation of 
the fissile material but not significantly affect the absorber material distribution. Similarly, the 
design for the DOE and commercial waste package basket assemblies (BSC 2004 
[DIRS 170803], Section 4.1.1.1.3) consists, in part, of a carbon steel guide tube separating the 
Ni-Gd absorber plates from the fuel assembly Zircaloy components preventing formation of 
significant amounts of the Zr-Ni eutectic that could lead to relocation of the neutron absorbing 
material. 
For magmatic intrusions, the waste package pallet would also be expected to fail at the elevated 
temperatures. This would result in the slumping and flattening of the waste package onto the 
invert surface. It is expected that the magma underneath the waste package would be displaced 
by the slumping waste package. This is expected since 100 percent deformation of the waste 
package materials would occur within 1000 hours of the intrusive event and stresses of 2 Mpa, 
based on creep data available for Hastelloy X (Haynes International [DIRS 170316]). 
Radionuclides in the waste could be incorporated into crystallizing silicate mineral phases, or 
form higher oxide phases (BSC 2004 [DIRS 170028], Section 6.4.8.3). The thermodynamic 

stability of secondary phases likely to form in cooling basalt is poorly known and it is difficult to 
predict which phases, if any, might form. Fission products (cesium, technetium, etc.) may also 
be incorporated into new mineral phases, with the size and charge of fission-product ions 
exerting primary control as to the resulting minerals that might contain them. Because of the 
uncertainty in the formation of mineral or oxide phases, the waste is conservatively treated as 
unchanged in TSPA-LA calculations. 
For pyroclastic intrusions, the intrusive material is not fluid. Under this condition, the intrusive 
material underneath the waste package would not be displaced as the waste package slumps. 
Rather the waste package would slump into itself, also resulting in the elimination of the waste 
package internal void spaces. 
However, for either magma or pyroclastic intrusion events, the waste package surface is 
expected to fail. After the magma cools sufficiently to allow seepage to return, it will not be 
possible to create and maintain a bathtub configuration (forming a pool or closed-bottom 
container) due to the waste package surface failure. It is also unlikely that any appreciable 
quantity of water could be accumulated within the waste package due to the barrier failure and 
the collapse of the internal void spaces. 
The number of waste packages potentially affected by an igneous intrusion is assessed in the 
model report, Number of Waste Packages Hit by Igneous Intrusion (BSC 2004 [DIRS 170001]). 
The assessment is based on probability distributions for the number, length, spacing, and azimuth 
of intruding igneous dikes, the layout of the waste emplacement drifts, and the average linear 
density of waste packages in the waste emplacement drifts. The number of affected waste 
packages ranges from zero to nearly the entire waste package inventory, with a median value of 
1612 (BSC 2004 [DIRS 170001], Section 6.3.4). 
6.6.1 Igneous Impacts on Zone 2 Waste Packages and Waste Forms 
The TSPA-LA approach to implementing the models for waste package and waste form response 
during igneous intrusion considers two impact regions: (1) Zone 1, which includes the 
emplacement drifts directly contacted by the eruptive conduits and intrusive dikes; and (2) 
Zone 2, which includes the emplacement drift adjacent to the directly impacted drifts (BSC 2004 
[DIRS 170028], Section 6.6.1). 
The waste package damage scenarios resulting from a Zone 1 eruptive or intrusive event are 
discussed above. Analyses of possible impacts from thermal and volatile gas migration from 
Zone 1 to Zone 2 (adjacent drifts) have been performed. The analyses indicate that these gases 
do not migrate between Zone 1 and 2 drifts (BSC 2004 [DIRS 170028], Section 6.6.6). Thus, 
they do not provide the potential for elevated corrosion rates due to a deleterious environment. 
From the spatial and temporal heat conduction simulations and analyses, the high temperatures 
after a magma event attenuate rapidly with distance. The maximum temperature rise in an 
adjacent drift is small (less than 10C), and the rock provides effective thermal insulation to the 
impacts of high temperature (BSC 2004 [DIRS 170028] Section 6.7.1.2). From the gas transport 
simulations, the maximum gas concentrations entering the Zone 2 emplacement drifts are 
extremely low. It is concluded that there are no impacts from thermal or volatile gases on waste 
packages and waste forms in Zone 2 (BSC 2004 [DIRS 170028], Sections 6.6.6 and 6.7.1.2). 

Since the drip shields, waste packages, and fuel cladding in Zone 2 remain intact during an 
igneous event, criticality evaluation of the waste packages and waste forms in Zone 2 are not 
required as these results would be encompassed by the base case analysis of Section 6.3. 
6.6.2 SAPHIRE Event Probability Assignment for Igneous Scenarios 
Assignment of the event probabilities for the igneous SAPHIRE criticality FEPs evaluation is 
presented in the following sections. The events presented in these sections are used to quantify: 
 
The igneous event trees IGNEOUS, IG-ERUPTIVE, IG-INTRUSIVE, and IGINTRUSIVE2 
(Appendix B, Figures B-24 through B-28) 
 
The near-field event trees CONFIG-NF-F, CONFIG-NF1, CONFIG-NF2, and 
CONFIG-NF3 (Appendix B, Figures B-14 through B-17) 
 
The far-field event trees CONFIG-FF-J, CONF-FF-K and CONFIG-FF3 
(Appendix B, Figures B-21 through B23). 
Justification for the probability values assigned to these events are, in part, based on the 
information presented in the discussions above. 
6.6.2.1 Quantification of Event Tree IGNEOUS 
The following subsections provide justification for the probabilities assigned to the events used 
in the quantification of event tree IGNEOUS (Figure B-24 of Appendix B). This event tree is 
accessed as part of the igneous disruptive event and directs the evaluation of the eruptive and 
intrusive igneous scenarios. All three top events of this event tree are required to quantify the 
igneous phenomenological processes. Table 6.6-2 summarizes the event probability assignments 
discussed below. 

Table 6.6-2. Event Probability Assignment for the IGNEOUS Event Tree for the Igneous Disruptive 
Event Criticality FEPs SAPHIRE Analyses 
Event Name and Description Probability 
Values 
SAPHIRE Assigned 
Event Valuea 
Justification 
(per waste package) 
Type of igneous event 
/IG-EVENT-TYPE 0.78 0.22 
IG-EVENT-TYPE True 1.00 Section 6.6.2.1.1 
(IG-EVENT TYPE top event) 
Initial waste package location (for either eruptive or 
intrusive igneous events) 
/IG-WP-LOC 
IG-WP-LOC 
True a 
True 
0.00 
1.00 Section 6.6.2.1.2 
(IG-WP-LOC top event) 
Final waste package location for waste packages 
beyond conduit intersection point during an eruptive 
event 
/IG-WP-RELOC True a 0.00 Section 6.6.2.1.3 
IG-WP-RELOC False 0.00 
(IG-WP-RELOC top event) 

Event Name and Description Probability 
Values 
SAPHIRE Assigned 
Event Valuea 
Justification 
(per waste package) 
Probability of neutron absorber material misload in the 
waste package or waste form 
For the 21-PWR Control Rod waste package type 
/NA-MISLOAD ~1 3.758E-9 
NA-MISLOAD 3.758E-9 3.758E-9 
For the 21-PWR Absorber Plate waste package type 
/NA-MISLOAD ~1 4.576E-8 
NA-MISLOAD 4.576E-8 4.576E-8 
For the 12-PWR Absorber Plate waste package type 
/NA-MISLOAD ~1 6.217E-11 
NA-MISLOAD 6.217E-11 6.217E-11 
For the 44-BWR Absorber Plate waste package type 
/NA-MISLOAD ~1 6.217E-11 
NA-MISLOAD 6.217E-11 6.217E-11 
For the 24-BWR Absorber Plate waste package type 
/NA-MISLOAD ~1 6.217E-11 
NA-MISLOAD 6.217E-11 6.217E-11 
Section 6.6.2.1.4 
For DOE SNF Group 1 waste package types with 
neutron absorber materials in the canister basket b 
/NA-MISLOAD ~1 6.217E-11 
NA-MISLOAD 6.217E-11 6.217E-11 
For DOE SNF Group 2 waste package types with 
neutron absorber materials in filler c 
/NA-MISLOAD ~1 3.906E-8 
NA-MISLOAD 3.906E-8 3.906E-8 
For DOE SNF Group 3 waste package types with 
neutron absorber materials in canister basket and 
filler d 
/NA-MISLOAD ~1 3.912E-8 
NA-MISLOAD 3.912E-8 3.912E-8 
For DOE SNF waste package types without neutron 
absorber materials e 
/NA-MISLOAD True a 0.00 
NA-MISLOAD False 0.00 
(MS-IC-3B top event) 
NOTES: a For event names prefixed by a slash /, the actual event probability used in processing the 
SAPHIRE logic model is the complement (i.e., 1-value) of the assigned value.
b 
Aluminum Based, MOX, and U-Zr Hx DOE SNF waste forms with neutron absorber materials in the 
canister basket assembly 
c 
U/Th Oxide DOE SNF waste form with neutron absorber material in the canister filler materials 
d 
U-Zr/U-Mo Alloy DOE SNF waste form with neutron absorber material in the canister basket and filler 
materials 
e 
HEU Oxide, LEU Oxide, U-Metal, and U/Th Carbide DOE SNF waste forms without neutron 
absorber materials 
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01 6-121 October 2004 

6.6.2.1.1 Top Event IG-EVENT-TYPE 
The upper branch of the IG-EVENT-TYPE top event represents the eruptive igneous scenario. 
There is a 0.78 probability of having at least one eruptive conduit given an igneous event at the 
repository (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169989], Table 7-1). The complement of an eruptive events 
probability of occurrence is calculated to be 0.22 (i.e., 1-0.78=0.22). Therefore, /IG-EVENT-
TYPE is assigned a value of 0.22. 
The lower branch of the IG-EVENT-TYPE top event represents the intrusive igneous scenario. 
Given an igneous event, an intrusive scenario is expected to occur (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169989], 
Table 7-1). Therefore, IG-EVENT-TYPE is assigned a value of 1.00. 
6.6.2.1.2 Top Event IG-WP-LOC 
The branches of the IG-WP-LOC top event directs the evaluation of waste packages at the dike 
(intrusive event) or conduit (eruptive event) intersection point. The upper branch of this top 
event directs the evaluation of a waste package at the dike or conduit intersection points. The 
lower branch of this top event directs the evaluation of waste packages beyond the dike or 
conduit intersection points. Both waste package locations are evaluated in this analysis. This is 
accomplished by assigning /IG-WP-LOC a value of 0.00 (i.e., the complement of 1.00) and IG-
WP-LOC a value of 1.00. 
6.6.2.1.3 Top Event IG-WP-RELOC 
The purpose of this top event is to represent the possibility that, for an eruptive igneous scenario, 
waste packages initially beyond the conduit intersection point may at some point get pulled into 
the conduit. As stated in Number of Waste Packages Hit by Igneous Intrusion (BSC 2004 [DIRS 
170001], Section 5.3), waste packages that are adjacent to the conduit will remain in place in the 
magma-filled drift and will not be captured by the ascending magma in the eruption conduit. 
Since waste packages beyond the conduit intersection will remain in the drift, only the upper 
branch of this top event is activated. Therefore, /IG-WP-RELOC and IG-WP-RELOC are each 
assigned a value of 0.00. 
6.6.2.1.4 Top Event NAMISLOAD 
The presence of neutron absorber materials in a waste package is important to criticality control 
during the regulatory period for the majority of the waste forms proposed for disposal in the 
repository. Misload of the neutron absorber materials is associated with top event NA 
MISLOAD of the MSLET2 event tree (Figure B-5 of Appendix B). The lower branch of this 
top event indicates the occurrence of a misload of neutron absorber materials in the waste 
package or waste form and the upper branch indicates that no misload occurred. This top event 
is queried for this event tree only for waste package diffusive failure conditions. 
Neutron absorber material misloads can occur as the result of several mechanisms during the 
waste package fabrication and loading processes. These processes include the use of wrong 
materials, failure to load the neutron absorber materials into the waste package or waste form, 
and selection of the wrong waste package type. The probabilities necessary to quantify the NA 

MISLOAD top event for each of the waste package/waste form types are the same as those 
presented in Section 6.3.3.1.8. 
Assessment of the neutron absorber material misload event only accounts for the potential to 
load no neutron absorber material or less than the designed mass. No penalty is assigned for 
loading additional neutron absorber materials into a waste package or waste form. 
6.6.2.2 Quantification of Event Tree IG-ERUPTIVE 
The following subsections provide justification for the probabilities assigned to the events used 
in the quantification of event tree IG-ERUPTIVE (Figure B-25 of Appendix B). This event 
tree is accessed as part of the evaluation of an eruptive igneous scenario for those waste packages 
intersected by the eruptive conduit or those waste packages that are initially beyond the conduit, 
but are subsequently pulled into the conduit. Although this event tree has seven top events, the 
eruptive event phenomenological process only requires the quantification of three of these top 
events. Table 6.6-3 summarizes the event probability assignments discussed below. 
Table 6.6-3. Event Probability Assignment for the IG-ERUPTIVE Event Tree for the Igneous Disruptive 
Event Criticality FEPs SAPHIRE Analyses 
Event Name and Description 
Probability 
Values 
SAPHIRE Assigned 
Event Valuea 
(per waste package) Justification 
Waste package configuration on surface after 
an eruptive event 
/IG-CONFIG 
IG-CONFIG 
True a 
False 
0.00 
0.00 Section 6.6.2.2.1 
(IG-CONFIG top event) 
Rainfall Occurs after an eruptive event 
/IG-RAINFALL False a 1.00 
IG-RAINFALL True 1.00 Section 6.6.2.2.2 
(IG-RAINFALL top event) 
Fissile material accumulates in sufficient 
quantity after rainfall 
/IG-FM-ACCUM 
IG-FM-ACCUM 
True a 
False 
0.00 
0.00 Section 6.6.2.2.3 
(IG-FM-ACCUM top event) 
a
NOTE: For event names prefixed by a slash / the actual event probability used in processing the SAPHIRE logic model 
is the complement (i.e., 1  value) of the assigned value 
6.6.2.2.1 Top Event IG-CONFIG 
The IG-CONFIG top event establishes the configuration of the waste packages ejected from the 
repository during an eruptive igneous event. Waste packages in the eruptive conduit can be 
either destroyed and the waste form pulverized during the eruptive process and the remains 
ejected and dispersed across the surface (the branch of this top event) or it can be ejected 

breached, but relatively intact and lying on the surface (the failure branch of this top event). In a 
violent Strombolian eruption, rapid exsolution of gas from liquid magma creates a rapidly 
expanding and rising magma-gas mixture that erupts from a conduit vent, rises in a convective 
eruption column, and disperses by prevailing winds. According to Atmospheric Dispersal and 
Deposition of Tephra from a Potential Volcanic Eruption at Yucca Mountain, Nevada (BSC 
2004 [DIRS 170026], Section 5.2.4), the waste packages within the conduit are assumed to be 
destroyed completely and the waste form pulverized (Assumption 5.4.10). Therefore, /IGCONFIG 
and IG-CONFIG are each assigned a value of 0.00. 
6.6.2.2.2 Top Event IG-RAINFALL 
The purpose of top event IG-RAINFALL is to determine the probability that rainfall occurs at 
some point in time after an eruptive event. The upper branch of this top event indicates that 
rainfall does not occur and the lower branch indicates that it does. It is expected that rainfall will 
occur and, therefore, /IG-RAINFALL and IG-RAINFALL are each assigned a value of 1.00. 
6.6.2.2.3 Top Event IG-FM-ACCUM 
The purpose of this top event is to represent the possibility that, after an eruptive igneous event 
disperses the waste form on the surface, subsequent rainfall mobilizes the waste form and it 
accumulates into a potentially critical configuration. As stated in Atmospheric Dispersal and 
Deposition of Tephra from a Potential Volcanic Eruption at Yucca Mountain, Nevada (BSC 
2004 [DIRS 170026], Figures 1-1 and 7-3), the eruptive debris, including the waste form, is 
scattered over a wide area with decreasing deposition depth with distance. It is highly 
improbable that given the dispersal area of the waste form that any appreciable quantity of fissile 
material could be mobilized and accumulated into a potentially critical configuration. Therefore, 
only the upper branch of this top event is activated and /IG-FM-ACCUM and IG-FM-ACCUM 
are each assigned a value of 0.00. 
6.6.2.3 Quantification of Event Tree IG-INTRUSIVE 
The following subsections provide justification for the probabilities assigned to the events used 
in the quantification of event tree IG-INTRUSIVE (Figure B-26 of Appendix B). This event 
tree is accessed as part of the eruptive and intrusive igneous scenario evaluations for those waste 
packages that are in the drift beyond the eruptive conduit or for those waste packages that are at 
or beyond the dike intersection point. Although this event tree has eight top events, the intrusive 
phenomenological process only requires the quantification of three of these top events. 
Table 6.6-4 summarizes the event probability assignments discussed below. 

Table 6.6-4. Event Probability Assignment for the IG-INTRUSIVE Event Tree for the Igneous Disruptive 
Event Criticality FEPs SAPHIRE Analyses 
Event Name and Description 
Probability 
Values 
SAPHIRE Assigned 
Event Value a 
(per waste package) 
Justification 
Waste package destroyed during intrusive event 
/IG-WP-DESTRYD True a 0.00 
IG-WP-DESTRYD False 0.00 Section 6.6.2.3.1 
(IG-WP-DESTRYD top event) 
Waste Package completely slumped 
/IG-WP-SLUMP (no slumping) False a 1.00 
IG-WP-SLUMP[1] (partially slumped) 
IG-WP-SLUMP[2] (completely slumped) 
False 
True 
0.00 
1.00 
Section 6.6.2.3.2 
(IG-WP-SLUMP top event) 
Magma intrusion into breached waste package 
/IG-MAGMA-INT True a 0.00 
IG-MAGMA-INT False 0.00 Section 6.6.2.3.3 
(IG-MAGMA-INT top event) 
a
NOTE: For event names prefixed by a slash / the actual event probability used in processing the SAPHIRE logic 
model is the complement (i.e., 1  value) of the assigned value 
6.6.2.3.1 Top Event IG-WP-DESTRYD 
This top event quantifies the probability that the waste package is destroyed as a result of the 
entry force of intrusive material. Separate consideration is given for those waste packages at the 
dike intersection point where the forces would be greatest versus those waste packages lying 
beyond the dike or conduit intersection points. According to Dike/Drift Interactions (BSC 2004 
[DIRS 170028], Section 6.4.8.1), under intrusive conditions, even at the dike intersection point, 
the waste packages are expected to deform rather than disintegrate in the presence of magma. 
Therefore, only the upper branch of this top event is activated and /IG-WP-DESTRYD and IG-
WP-DESTRYD are each assigned a value of 0.00. 
6.6.2.3.2 Top Event IG-WP-SLUMP 
The IG-WP-SLUMP top event evaluates whether the waste package will remain intact (upper 
branch), partially slump (middle branch), or completely slump (lower branch) as a result of the 
high temperatures of the intruding materials. Because the intruding materials will maintain their 
elevated temperatures for a substantial period (up to approximately two months (BSC 2004 
[DIRS 170028], Appendix D), it is reasonable to expect that the temperature of the waste 
package and its internals will approach the intrusive materials temperature. As stated in 
Dike/Drift Interactions (BSC 2004 [DIRS 170028], Section 6.4.8.1), at these temperatures the 
tensile strength of the waste package and internal components would be decreased significantly 
and the materials are expected to creep readily and fail by mechanical rupture under very small 
load. This would result in the slumping and flattening of the waste package. Given the materials 

used in waste package and internal component construction, 100 percent deformation of the 
waste package materials would occur within 1000 hours of the intrusive event and under stresses 
of 2 MPa based on creep data available for Hastelloy X (Haynes International [DIRS 170316]). 
Since the waste package is expected to completely slump as a result of igneous intrusive 
conditions, only the bottom branch of top event IG-WP-SLUMP is activated. Therefore, /IG-
WP-SLUMP and IG-WP-SLUMP[2] are each assigned a value of 1.00 and IG-WP-SLUMP[1] is 
assigned a value of 0.00. 
6.6.2.3.3 Top Event IG-MAGMA-INT 
The purpose of this top event is to quantify the possibility that, because of waste package breach 
following an intrusive igneous event, intrusive material can enter the breached waste package. 
The upper branch represents that magma does not intrude into the waste package upon its failure 
and the lower branch represents that it does. It is assumed that a limited quantity of magma may 
enter the waste package through the breach area but that no flushing (flow-through) occurs 
(Assumption 5.4.7). Initial waste package breach is expected to occur soon after the intrusion 
event because of the elevated temperature of the waste package and the external pressure being 
exerted on the waste package surface by the intrusive material filling the drifts. However, the 
waste temperature quickly exceeds the yield point of the waste package materials. As the waste 
package/waste form deforms and slumps, the internal void areas are collapsed, thereby 
preventing the intrusion of any additional magma. Therefore, only the upper branch of this top 
event is activated and /IG-MAGMA-INT and IG-MAGMA-INT are each assigned a value of 
0.00. 
6.6.2.4 Quantification of Event Tree IG-INTRUSIVE2 
The following subsections provide justification for the probabilities assigned to the events used 
in the quantification of event tree IG-INTRUSIVE2 (Figure B-27 of Appendix B). This event 
tree is a continuation of the evaluation of an intrusive igneous event for those waste packages not 
destroyed by the force of the intrusive event. This event tree consists of seven top events, all of 
which are required for the quantification of this scenario. Table 6.6-5 summarizes the event 
probability assignments discussed below. 

Table 6.6-5. Event Probability Assignment for the IG-INTRUSIVE2 Event Tree for the Igneous 
Disruptive Event Criticality FEPs SAPHIRE Analysis 
Event Name and Description 
Probability 
Values 
SAPHIRE Assigned 
Event Value a 
(per waste package) Justification 
Magma cooled 
/IG-MAGMA-COOL True a 0.00 
IG-MAGMA-COOL True 1.00 Section 6.6.2.4.1 
(IG-MAGMA-COOL top event) 
Magma fractures after cooling 
/IG-MAGMA-FRAC False a 1.00 
IG-MAGMA-FRAC True 1.00 Section 6.6.2.4.2 
(IG-MAGMA-FRAC top event) 
Seepage returns after magma cools 
For the lithophysal zone: 
/IG-SEEPAGE-NWL (no seepage scenario) 5.184E-1 4.816E-1 
IG-SEEPAGE-LL (lower-bound seepage scenario) 4.622E-2 4.622E-2 
IG-SEEPAGE-ML (mean seepage scenario) 2.111E-1 2.111E-1 
IG-SEEPAGE-UL (upper-bound seepage scenario) 2.243E-1 2.243E-1 
Section 6.6.2.4.3 
For the nonlithophysal zone: 
/IG-SEEPAGE-NWNL (no seepage scenario) 2.629E-1 7.371E-1 
IG-SEEPAGE-LNL (lower-bound seepage scenario) 1.062E-1 1.062E-1 
IG-SEEPAGE-MNL (mean seepage scenario) 3.244E-1 3.244E-1 
IG-SEEPAGE-UNL (upper-bound seepage scenario) 3.065E-1 3.065E-1 
(IG-SEEPAGE top event) 
Waste package bathtub configuration formed 
/IG-BATHTUB True a 0.00 
IG-BATHTUB False 0.00 Section 6.6.2.4.4 
(IG-BATHTUB top event) 
Fissile material transported from breached waste package 
/IG-FM-TRANSPT 
IG-FM-TRANSPT True a 0.00 Section 6.6.2.4.5 
True 1.00 
(IG-FM-TRANSPT top event) 

Table 6.6-5. Event Probability Assignment for the IG-INTRUSIVE2 Event Tree for the Igneous Disruptive 
Event Criticality FEPs SAPHIRE Analysis (Continued) 
Event Name and Description 
Probability 
Values 
SAPHIRE Assigned 
Event Value a 
(per waste package) Justification 
Probability of waste package misload: 
For the 21-PWR Absorber Plate waste package 
/WF-MISLOAD ~1 1.18E-5 
WF-MISLOAD 1.18E-5 1.18E-5 
For the 21-PWR Control Rod waste package 
/WF-MISLOAD 1.0 0.0 
WF-MISLOAD 0.0 0.0 
For the 12-PWR Absorber Plate waste package 
/WF-MISLOAD True a 0.00 
WF-MISLOAD False 0.00 
For the 44-BWR Absorber Plate waste package 
/WF-MISLOAD True a 0.00 Section 6.6.2.4.6 
WF-MISLOAD False 0.00 
For the 24-BWR Absorber Plate waste package 
/WF-MISLOAD True a 0.00 
WF-MISLOAD False 0.00 
For DOE waste package types with misload potential b 
/WF-MISLOAD ~1 1.475E-5 
WF-MISLOAD 1.475E-5 1.475E-5 
For DOE waste package types without misload potential c 
/WF-MISLOAD True a 0.00 
WF-MISLOAD False 0.00 
(WF-MISLOAD top event) 

Table 6.6-5. Event Probability Assignment for the IG-INTRUSIVE2 Event Tree for the Igneous Disruptive 
Event Criticality FEPs SAPHIRE Analysis (Continued) 
Event Name and Description 
Probability 
Values 
SAPHIRE Assigned 
Event Value a 
(per waste package) Justification 
Criticality potential of waste package dry diffusion Section 6.6.2.4.7 
configuration 
For all non-misload scenarios (neutron absorber material 
nor waste form) 
/CRIT-POT-WF True a 0.00 
CRIT-POT-WF False 0.00 
For neutron absorber material or DOE SNF misload 
scenarios 
/CRIT-POT-WF False a 1.00 
CRIT-POT-WF True 1.00 
For commercial SNF misload scenarios 
/CRIT-POT-WF ~1 2.480E-5 d 
CRIT-POT-WF 2.480E-5 2.480E-5 
(CRIT-POT-WF top event) 
NOTES: a For event names prefixed by a slash / the actual event probability used in processing the SAPHIRE 
logic model is the complement (i.e., 1  value) of the assigned value 
b 
MOX DOE SNF waste form with misload potential 
c 
Aluminum Based, HEU Oxide, LEU Oxide, U-Metal, U/Th Carbide, U/Th Oxide, and U-Zr Hx, and U-
Zr/U-Mo Alloy DOE SNF waste forms without misload potential 
d 
Conservative value, i.e., probability of criticality from a misload in a 21-PWR Absorber Plate waste 
package is calculated as 7.80E-6 in Probability of Assembly Compensation for a Misloaded Waste 
Package (BSC 2004 [DIRS 171622], Section 6). 
6.6.2.4.1 Top Event IG-MAGMA-COOL 
The branching of top event IG-MAGMA-COOL establishes the temperature of the intrusive 
material. The upper branch indicates that the temperature is above 100C. The lower branch 
indicates that the temperature is below 100C. Both branches of this top event are processed for 
the determination of the waste packages pre- and post-cooling criticality potential. In order to 
process both branches of this top event, /IG-MAGMA-COOL is assigned a value of 0.00 (i.e., 
the complement of 1.00) and IG-MAGMA-COOL is assigned a value of 1.00. 
6.6.2.4.2 Top Event IG-MAGMA-FRAC 
The branching of top event IG-MAGMA-FRAC indicates whether or not the intrusive material 
fractures upon cooling. The upper branch of this top event indicates that no fracturing of the 
intrusive material occurs and the bottom branch indicates that fracturing does occur. According 
to Dike/Drift Interactions (BSC 2004 [DIRS 170028], Section 5.4.2), the cooled intrusive basalt 
will likely fracture into blocks on the order of a meter in size. Given the expected fracturing of 
the intrusive material, only the bottom branch is activated and, therefore, /IG-MAGMA-FRAC 
and IG-MAGMA-FRAC are each assigned a value of 1.00. 

6.6.2.4.3 Top Event IG-SEEPAGE 
The purpose of top event IG-SEEPAGE is to represent the possibility that, after the cooling and 
fracturing of the intrusive material, seepage returns and enters the breached waste package. The 
upper branch of this top event indicates that seepage does not occur and the bottom three 
branches indicates that seepage does occur for the lower-bound, mean and upper-bound seepage 
scenarios, respectively. According to Abstraction of Drift Seepage (BSC 2003 [DIRS 169131], 
Section 6.5.1.7), given the uncertainty about in drift conditions after an igneous event, use of the 
more conservative seepage estimates for collapsed rubble-filled drifts are recommended. A 
Latin Hypercube Sampling process of the information provided in 
DTN: LB0310AMRU0120.002 [DIRS 166116] was performed for 20,000 realizations to 
quantify the seepage scenario branch probabilities. The results of the sampling process are 
documented in Appendix C, Sections C.3 and C.5 for the lithophysal and nonlithophysal 
geological zones, respectively. Because of differences in the seepage abstraction for the 
lithophysal and nonlithophysal geologic zones, it is necessary to perform Latin Hypercube 
sampling for each zone. 
The results reported in Appendix C, Sections C.3 and C.5 are the drift fractional probability of 
seepage given the specified seepage scenario (i.e., lower-bound, mean, or upper-bound). The 
probability of the individual seepage scenarios is specified in Analysis of Infiltration Uncertainty 
(BSC 2003 [DIRS 165991], Table 7-1). The seepage scenario probability is calculated by taking 
the seepage fraction for each scenario (i.e., lower-bound, mean, and upper-bound) and 
multiplying it to the probability of being in that seepage scenario. This calculation has been 
performed in the EXCEL spreadsheet Probability of Seepage (Appendix G). The appropriate 
seepage probability is then substituted into the SAPHIRE analysis based on the sequence 
branching of top event DRIFT-ZONE of the YMP-INIT-EVENT event tree. The results of 
this calculation are assigned as follows: 
Lithophysal Zone Igneous Seepage Probabilities 
/IG-SEEPAGE-NWL = 4.816E-1 (no seepage probability  SAPHIRE takes the 
complement of this value) 
IG-SEEPAGE-LL = 4.622E-2 (lower-bound seepage scenario probabilities) 
IG-SEEPAGE-ML = 2.111E-1 (mean seepage scenario probabilities) 
IG-SEEPAGE-UL = 2.243E-1 (upper-bound seepage scenario probabilities) 
Nonlithophysal Zone Igneous Seepage Probabilities 
/IG-SEEPAGE-NWNL = 7.371E-1 (no seepage probability  SAPHIRE takes the 
complement of this value) 
IG-SEEPAGE-LNL = 1.062E-1 (lower-bound seepage scenario probabilities) 
IG-SEEPAGE-MNL = 3.244E-1 (mean seepage scenario probabilities) 
IG-SEEPAGE-UNL = 3.065E-1 (upper-bound seepage scenario probabilities) 

6.6.2.4.4 Top Event IG-BATHTUB 
The purpose of top event IG-BATHTUB is to represent the possibility that, after the cooling and 
fracturing of the intrusive material and seepage returns and enters the breached waste package, a 
bathtub configuration is formed within the waste package. The upper branch of this top event 
indicates that a bathtub configuration does not form and the lower branch indicates that it does. 
It is expected that failure of the waste package will not be limited to the upper portions of the 
waste package since the waste package will be immersed in magma and failures are non-
directional (Assumption 5.4.7). Given this expectation, only the upper branch of this top event is 
activated. Therefore, /IG-BATHTUB and IG-BATHTUB are each assigned a value of 0.00. 
6.6.2.4.5 Top Event IG-FM-TRANSPT 
The branching of top event IG-FM-TRANSPT establishes whether fissile material remains 
internal to the waste package or is transported external to the waste package to the near-field 
environment. The upper branch indicates the evaluation of fissile material remaining in the 
waste package. The lower branch indicates that the fissile material is transported external to the 
waste package. Both scenarios are evaluated in this analysis as being equiprobable for the 
determination of each configurations criticality potential. In order to process both branches of 
this top event, /IG-FM-TRANSPT is assigned a value of 0.00 (i.e., the complement of 1.00) and 
IG-FM-TRANSPT is assigned a value of 1.00. 
6.6.2.4.6 Top Event WF-MISLOAD 
The WF-MISLOAD top event represent the probability that a waste form was incorrectly placed 
into a waste packaged during the preclosure loading process. The quantification of this top event 
is identical to the quantification in Section 6.3.3.1.9. As stated in Section 6.3.3.1.9, the 
probability of waste package misload is dependent on the waste form being evaluated. 
6.6.2.4.7 Top Event CRIT-POT-WF 
Quantification of the CRIT-POT-WF top event establishes the criticality potential of a given 
igneous configuration. Activation of the upper branch indicates that the configuration has no 
criticality potential and activation of the lower branch indicates that there is criticality potential. 
As discussed below in Section 6.6.3, for waste packages that are not misloaded (either waste 
form or neutron absorber material), pre- and post-cooling igneous configurations without 
misloads have been determined to have no criticality potential. Therefore, for no misload 
scenarios, only the upper branch of this top event is activated and /CRIT-POT-WF and CRIT-
POT-WF are each assigned a value of 0.00. 
For neutron absorber material misloads, the resulting scenario is assumed to have criticality 
potential (Assumption 5.1.16). Therefore, only the lower branch of this top event is activated 
and /CRIT-POT-WF and CRIT-POT-WF are each assigned a value of 1.00. 
Evaluation of commercial SNF misload scenarios calculate a mean probability of 2.48010-5 
{Table 6.6-5, conservative preliminary value (BSC 2004 [DIRS 171622], Section 6)}that the 
resulting misloaded configuration has criticality potential (BSC 2004 [DIRS 171622]). 

Therefore, for commercial SNF misload scenarios, /CRIT-POT-WF and CRIT-POT-WF are each 
assigned a value of 2.48010-5. 
For the misload of DOE SNF, the resulting scenario is evaluated as having criticality potential. 
Therefore, only the lower branch of this top event is activated and /CRIT-POT-WF and CRIT-
POT-WF are each assigned a value of 1.00. 
6.6.2.5 Quantification of Event Tree CONFIG-NF-F 
The following subsections provide justification for the probabilities assigned to the events used 
in the quantification of the near-field event tree CONFIG-NF-F (Figure B-14 of Appendix B). 
This event tree initiates the evaluation of the near-field configurations for the formation of 
potentially critical configurations. This event tree consists of four top events, all of which are 
required for the evaluation of near-field configurations. Table 6.6-6 summarizes the event 
probability assignments discussed below. 
Table 6.6-6. Event Probability Assignment for the CONFIG-NF-F Event Tree for the Igneous Disruptive 
Event Criticality FEPs SAPHIRE Analyses 
Event Name and Description 
Probability 
Value 
SAPHIRE Assigned 
Event Value a 
(per waste package) Justification 
Near-field configuration class 
/CONFIG-SCEN False a 1.00 
CONFIG-SCEN[1] True 1.00 
CONFIG-SCEN[2] True 1.00 Section 6.6.2.5.1 
CONFIG-SCEN[3] True 1.00 
(CONFIG-SCEN top event) 
Initiate processing of near-field configuration class 
NF-1 
/MS-NF-6 
MS-NF-6 
False a 
True 
1.00 
1.00 Section 6.6.2.5.2 
(MS-NF-6 top event) 
Initiate processing of near -field configuration class 
NF-2 
/MS-NF-7 
MS-NF-7 False a 1.00 Section 6.6.2.5.3 
True 1.00 
(MS-NF-7 top event) 
Initiate processing of near -field configuration class 
NF-3 
/MS-NF-8 
MS-NF-8 
False a 
True 
1.00 
1.00 Section 6.6.2.5.4 
(MS-NF-8 top event) 
a
NOTE: For event names prefixed by a slash / the actual event probability used in processing the SAPHIRE 
logic model is the complement (i.e., 1  value) of the assigned value
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01 6-132 October 2004 

6.6.2.5.1 Top Event CONFIG-SCEN 
The branching of top event CONFIG-SCEN establishes the evaluation of three of the five near-
field configuration classes  NF-1, NF-2, and NF-3. These configuration classes are represented 
by the second, third, and fourth branches from the top of this top event. The upper branch is not 
utilized in these analyses and is included as a modeling convenience. The processing of all three 
configuration class branches of this top event are initiated by assigning CONFIG-SCEN[1], 
CONFIG-SCEN[2], and CONFIG-SCEN[3] a value of 1.00. 
6.6.2.5.2 Top Event MS-NF-6 
The branching of top event MS-NF-6 directs the evaluation of near-field configuration class 
NF-1. The upper branch of this top event indicates that this configuration class is not to be 
evaluated and the lower branch indicates that this configuration class is evaluated. Selection of 
the lower branch results in a transfer to the CONFIG-NF1 event tree. The NF-1 configuration 
class is to be evaluated for the igneous disruptive event and, therefore, /MS-NF-6 and MS-NF-6 
are each assigned a value of 1.00. 
6.6.2.5.3 Top Event MS-NF-7 
The branching of top event MS-NF-7 directs the evaluation of near-field configuration class 
NF-2. The upper branch of this top event indicates that this configuration class is not to be 
evaluated and the lower branch indicates that this configuration class is evaluated. Selection of 
the lower branch results in a transfer to the CONFIG-NF2 event tree. The NF-2 configuration 
class is to be evaluated for the igneous disruptive event and, therefore, /MS-NF-7 and MS-NF-7 
are each assigned a value of 1.00. 
6.6.2.5.4 Top Event MS-NF-8 
The branching of top event MS-NF-8 directs the evaluation of near-field configuration class 
NF-3. The upper branch of this top event indicates that this configuration class is not to be 
evaluated and the lower branch indicates that this configuration class is evaluated. Selection of 
the lower branch results in a transfer to the CONFIG-NF3 event tree. The NF-3 configuration 
class is to be evaluated for the igneous disruptive event and, therefore, /MS-NF-8 and MS-NF-8 
are each assigned a value of 1.00. 
6.6.2.6 Quantification of Event Tree CONFIG-NF1 
The following subsections provide justification for the probabilities assigned to the events used 
in the quantification of the near-field event tree CONFIG-NF1 (Figure B-15 of Appendix B). 
This event tree initiates the evaluation of the near-field configuration class NF-1 representing the 
near-field accumulation of fissile materials into potentially critical configurations resulting from 
solution effluent discharges from the waste package. This event tree consists of five top events, 
four of which are required for the evaluation of this near-field configuration class. Table 6.6-7 
summarizes the event probability assignments discussed below. 

Table 6.6-7. Event Probability Assignment for the CONFIG-NF1 Event Tree for the Igneous Disruptive 
Event Criticality FEPs SAPHIRE Analyses 
Event Name and Description 
Probability 
Value 
SAPHIRE Assigned 
Event Value a 
(per waste package) Justification 
Transport of solution effluent from waste package 
into invert for the formation of near-field 
configuration class NF-1 subclasses 
/MS-NF-9 False a 1.00 
MS-NF-9[1] (configuration class NF-1A) 
MS-NF-9[2] (configuration class NF-1B) 
True 
True 
1.00 
1.00 Section 6.6.2.6.2 
MS-NF-9[3] (configuration class NF-1C) True 1.00 
MS-NF-9[4] (transfer to far-field) True 1.00 
(MS-NF-9 top event) 
Initiate processing of near-field configuration class 
NF-1A 
/MS-NF-10 
MS-NF-10 
True a 
False 
0.00 
0.00 Section 6.6.2.6.3 
(MS-NF-10 top event) 
Initiate processing of near-field configuration class 
NF-1B 
/MS-NF-11 
MS-NF-11 
True a 
False 
0.00 
0.00 Section 6.6.2.6.4 
(MS-NF-11 top event) 
Initiate processing of near-field configuration class 
NF-1C 
/MS-NF-12 True a 0.00 
MS-NF-12 False 0.00 Section 6.6.2.6.5 
(MS-NF-12 top event) 
a
NOTE: For event names prefixed by a slash / the actual event probability used in processing the SAPHIRE logic 
model is the complement (i.e., 1  value) of the assigned value 
6.6.2.6.1 Top Event MS-NF-9 
The branching of top event MS-NF-9 directs the evaluation of the three configuration subclasses 
of configuration class NF-1  NF-1A, NF-1B, and NF-1C. These configuration classes are 
represented by the second, third, and fourth branches from the top of this top event. The top 
branch is not utilized in these analyses and is included for completeness. The bottom, or fifth, 
branch of this top event represents the transport of fissile material from the near-field to the far-
field. This branch immediately transfers to the CONFIG-FF-J event tree for far-field evaluation. 
The processing of all three configuration subclass branches and the far-field transfer of this top 
event are initiated by assigning MS-NF-9[1], MS-NF-9[2], MS-NF-9[3], and MS-NF-9[4] a 
value of 1.00. To prevent further evaluation of the top branch of this top event, /MS-NF-9 is also 
assigned a value of 1.00 (the complement of 0.00). 

6.6.2.6.2 Top Event MS-NF-10 
The branching of top event MS-NF-10 directs the evaluation of near-field configuration class 
NF-1A. The upper branch of this top event indicates that fissile materials are not sorbed into the 
invert materials and the lower branch indicates that fissile materials are sorbed in the invert 
materials. It is assumed that the post-igneous water chemistry in the drift invert does not support 
this fissile material accumulation mechanism (Assumption 5.4.12). Therefore, /MS-NF-10 and 
MS-NF-10 are each assigned a value of 0.00. 
6.6.2.6.3 Top Event MS-NF-11 
The branching of top event MS-NF-11 directs the evaluation of near-field configuration class 
NF-1B. The upper branch of this top event indicates that fissile materials do not precipitate in 
the invert and the lower branch indicates that fissile materials do precipitate in the invert. It is 
assumed that the post-igneous water chemistry in the drift invert does not support this fissile 
material accumulation mechanism (Assumption 5.4.12). Therefore, /MS-NF-11 and MS-NF-11 
are each assigned a value of 0.00. 
6.6.2.6.4 Top Event MS-NF-12 
The branching of top event MS-NF-12 directs the evaluation of near-field configuration class 
NF-1C. The upper branch of this top event indicates that fissile materials are not transported 
from one or more waste packages and deposited at an invert low point. The lower branch 
indicates that fissile materials are transported and deposited at an invert low point. Engineered 
Barrier Systems Features, Events and Processes (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169898], Section 6.2.40) 
indicates that, because of the porosity of the invert, pooling in the invert cannot occur. In 
addition, it is assumed that the post-igneous water chemistry in the drift invert does not support 
this fissile material accumulation mechanism (Assumption 5.4.12). Therefore, /MS-NF-12 and 
MS-NF-12 are each assigned a value of 0.00. 
6.6.2.7 Quantification of Event Tree CONFIG-NF2 
The following subsections provide justification for the probabilities assigned to the events used 
in the quantification of the near-field event tree CONFIG-NF2 (Figure B-16 of Appendix B). 
This event tree initiates the evaluation of the near-field configuration class NF-2 representing the 
near-field accumulation of fissile materials into potentially critical configurations resulting from 
slurry effluent discharges from the waste package. This event tree consists of three top events, of 
which only one is required for the evaluation of this near-field configuration class. Table 6.6-8 
summarizes the event probability assignments discussed below. 

Table 6.6-8. Event Probability Assignment for the CONFIG-NF2 Event Tree for the Igneous Disruptive 
Event Criticality FEPs SAPHIRE Analyses 
Event Name and Description Probability 
Value 
SAPHIRE Assigned 
Event Value a 
(per waste package) 
Justification 
Slurry effluent flows to conform to invert surface Section 6.6.2.7.1 
/MS-NF-13 True a 0.00 
MS-NF-13 False 0.00 
(MS-NF-13 top event) 
a
NOTE: For event names prefixed by a slash / the actual event probability used in processing the SAPHIRE
logic model is the complement (i.e., 1  value) of the assigned value
6.6.2.7.1 Top Event MS-NF-13 
The branching of top event MS-NF-13 directs the evaluation of near-field configuration class 
NF-2A. The upper branch of this top event indicates that fissile material containing slurry 
effluent do not flow and conform to the invert surface. The lower branch indicates that the slurry 
effluent does flow to conform to the invert surface. Because the intrusive magma fills the drift 
(BSC 2004 [DIRS 170028], Section 6.4.7.5), no volume is available between the failed waste 
package and the surface of the drift to allow for the accumulation of the slurry effluent. Because 
of this, only the upper branch of this top event is activated and, therefore, /MS-NF-13 and 
MS-NF-13 are each assigned a value of 0.00. 
6.6.2.8 Quantification of Event Tree CONFIG-NF3 
The following subsections provide justification for the probabilities assigned to the events used 
in the quantification of the near-field event tree CONFIG-NF3 (Figure B-17 of Appendix B). 
This event tree initiates the evaluation of the near-field configuration class NF-3 representing the 
near-field accumulation of fissile material bearing colloids into potentially critical 
configurations. This event tree consists of seven top events, all of which are required for the 
evaluation of this near-field configuration class. Table 6.6-9 summarizes the event probability 
assignments discussed below. 

Table 6.6-9. Event Probability Assignment for the CONFIG-NF3 Event Tree for the Igneous Disruptive 
Event Criticality FEPs SAPHIRE Analyses 
Event Name and Description 
Probability 
Value 
SAPHIRE Assigned 
Event Value a 
(per waste package) 
Justification 
Initiate evaluation of near-field configuration class 
NF-3 subclasses 
/CONFIG-SCEN 
CONFIG-SCEN[1] (configuration class NF-3A) 
CONFIG-SCEN[2] (configuration classes NF-3B 
False a 
True 
True 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 Section 6.6.2.8.1 
and NF-3C) 
(CONFIG-SCEN top event) 
Filtration and concentration of colloids on top of 
invert trapped by waste package corrosion 
products 
/MS-NF-15 True a 0.00 Section 6.6.2.8.2 
MS-NF-15 (configuration class NF-3A) False 0.00 
(MS-NF-15 top event) 
Transport of colloids into invert 
/MS-NF-16 
MS-NF-16[1] (configuration class NF-3B and False a 1.00 
NF-3C True 1.00 Section 6.6.2.8.3 
MS-NF-16[2] (transfer to far-field) 
True 1.00 
(MS-NF-16 top event) 
Degradation of invert material 
/MS-NF-19 
MS-NF-19 0.10 0.90 Section 6.6.2.8.4 
0.90 0.90 
(MS-NF-19 top event) 
Hydrodynamic/chromatographic separation of 
fissile material colloids from neutron absorber 
materials 
/MS-NF-17 (configuration class NF-3B) True a 0.00 Section 6.6.2.8.5 
MS-NF-17 (configuration class NF-3C) False 0.00 
(MS-NF-17 top event) 
Filtration and concentration of colloids in the invert 
/MS-NF-18 
MS-NF-18 
True a 
False 
0.00 
0.00 Section 6.6.2.8.6 
(MS-NF-18 top event) 
a
NOTE:For event names prefixed by a slash / the actual event probability used in processing the SAPHIRE logic 
model is the complement (i.e., 1  value) of the assigned value 
6.6.2.8.1 Top Event CONFIG-SCEN 
The branching of top event CONFIG-SCEN establishes the evaluation of the three subclasses of 
near-field configuration class NF-3 and the transport of fissile material containing colloids from 
the near-field to far-field environments. The upper branch is not utilized in these analyses and is 
included only as a modeling convenience. The three near-field configuration subclasses are 
represented by the second and third branches from the top of this top event. The second branch 
directs the evaluation of configuration subclass NF-3A and the third branch directs the 
evaluation of subclasses NF-3B and NF-3C. The bottom, or fourth, branch of this top event 

represents the transport of fissile material through the near-field environment to the far-field 
environment. The fourth branch immediately transfers to the CONFIG-FF-K event tree for 
far-field configuration evaluation. The processing of the bottom three branches of this top event 
are initiated by assigning CONFIG-SCEN[1], CONFIG-SCEN[2], and CONFIG-SCEN[3] a 
value of 1.00. 
6.6.2.8.2 Top Event MS-NF-15 
The branching of top event MS-NF-15 directs the evaluation of near-field configuration subclass 
NF-3A. The upper branch of this top event indicates that fissile material containing colloids are 
not filtered and concentrated on top of the invert, trapped by corrosion products. The lower 
branch indicates that the colloids are trapped on the invert surface. Because the intrusive igneous 
material completely fills the drift from the top of the invert to the crown of the drift (BSC 2004 
[DIRS 170028], Section 6.4.7.5), no volume is available between the failed waste package and 
the surface of the drift to allow for the accumulation of the colloids. Because of this, only the 
upper branch of this top event is activated. Therefore, /MS-NF-15 and MS-NF-15 are each 
assigned a value of 0.00. 
6.6.2.8.3 Top Event MS-NF-16 
The branching of top event MS-NF-16 determines whether fissile material containing colloids 
are transported into the invert. Activation of the upper branch of this top event indicates that 
fissile material containing colloids are not transported into the invert. The activation of the 
second branch indicates that fissile material containing colloids are transported into the invert. 
In order to evaluate near-field configuration subclasses NF-3B and NF-3C, the second branch of 
this event is activated. The third branch is activated, which allows the fissile material colloids 
are transported into the far-field. Therefore, /MS-NF-16 and MS-NF-16[1] and MS-NF-[2] are 
each assigned a value of 1.00. 
6.6.2.8.4 Top Event MS-NF-19 
The branching of top event MS-NF-19 directs the evaluation of near-field configuration 
subclasses NF-3B and NF-3C. The upper branch of this top event evaluates configuration 
subclass NF-3B and indicates that the invert materials have not degraded prior to the release of 
the waste form materials following a seismic event. The lower branch evaluates near-field 
configuration subclass NF-3C and indicates that the invert materials have degraded prior to the 
release of waste form materials following an igneous event. The degradation of the drift invert 
materials will likely occur within several hundred years of repository closure due to the highly 
oxidizing drift environment. If it is assumed that drift material degradation does not occur for 
1000 years (Assumption 5.2.5), the probability of fissile material being released to the invert due 
to an igneous event prior to drift degradation is calculated to be 0.10 (i.e., 1000 years to degrade 
drift divided by 10,000-year regulatory period) and the probability of release after drift 
degradation is 0.90. Therefore, /MS-NF-19 is assigned a value of 0.90 (i.e., the complement of 
0.10) and MS-NF-19 is assigned a value of 0.90. 

6.6.2.8.5 Top Event MS-NF-17 
The branching of top event MS-NF-17 evaluates the likelihood of hydrodynamic or 
chromatographic separation of fissile material containing colloids from the neutron absorber 
materials for both near-field configuration subclasses NF-3B and NF-3C. The upper branch of 
this top event indicates that fissile material containing colloids are not separated from the neutron 
absorber materials and the lower branch indicates that they are. Because the intrusive igneous 
material completely fills the drift from the top of the invert to the crown of the drift (BSC 2004 
[DIRS 170028], Section 6.4.7.5), no volume is available between the failed waste package and 
the surface of the drift to allow for the accumulation of the colloids. Because of this, only the 
upper branch of this top event is activated. Therefore, /MS-NF-17 and MS-NF-17 are each 
assigned a value of 0.00. 
6.6.2.8.6 Top Event MS-NF-18 
The branching of top event MS-NF-18 directs the evaluation of near-field configuration subclass 
NF-3A. The upper branch of this top event indicates that fissile material containing colloids are 
not filtered and concentrated on top of the invert. The lower branch indicates that the colloids 
are trapped on the invert surface. Because the intrusive igneous material completely fills the 
drift from the top of the invert to the crown of the drift (BSC 2004 [DIRS 170028], Section 
6.4.7.5), no volume is available between the failed waste package and the surface of the drift to 
allow for the accumulation of the colloids. Because of this, only the upper branch of this top 
event is activated. Therefore, /MS-NF-18 and MS-NF-18 are each assigned a value of 0.00. 
6.6.2.9 Quantification of Event Tree CONFIG-FF-J 
The following subsections provide justification for the probabilities assigned to the events used 
in the quantification of the far-field event tree CONFIG-FF-J (Figure B-21 of Appendix B). 
This event tree initiates the evaluation of the far-field configuration class FF-1 representing the 
far-field accumulation of fissile material bearing solutes into potentially critical configurations. 
This event tree consists of nine top events, of which only seven are required for the evaluation of 
this far-field configuration class for the igneous disruptive event. Table 6.6-10 summarizes the 
event probability assignments discussed below. 

Table 6.6-10. Event Probability Assignment for the CONFIG-FF-J Event Tree for the Igneous Disruptive 
Event Criticality FEPs SAPHIRE Analyses 
Event Name and Description 
Probability 
Value 
SAPHIRE Assigned 
Event Value a 
(per waste package) Justification 
Transport of fissile material solutes to far-field in 
carrier plume 
/MS-FF-1 
MS-FF-1 
False a 
True 
1.00 
1.00 Section 6.6.2.9.1 
(MS-FF-1 top event) 
Separation of fissile material from neutron absorber 
initiating formation of far-field configuration class 
subclasses 
/MS-FF-2 False a 1.00 
MS-FF-2[1] (configuration class FF-1A) True 1.00 Section 6.6.2.9.2 
MS-FF-2[2] (configuration class FF-1B) True 1.00 
MS-FF-2[3] (transfer to configuration class FF-3) True 1.00 
(MS-FF-2 top event) 
Fissile material solutes are transported to the water 
table (transfer to far-field event tree CONFIG-FF3) 
/MS-FF-3 
MS-FF-3 False a 1.00 Section 6.6.2.9.3 
True 1.00 
(MS-FF-3 top event) 
Precipitation of fissile material as carrier plume is 
altered by rocks (far-field configuration class FF-1A) 
/MS-FF-11 
MS-FF-11 True a 0.00 Section 6.6.2.9.4 
False 0.00 
(MS-FF-11 top event) 
Transport of fissile material solutes to altered TSbv 
/MS-FF-12 
MS-FF-12[1] (configuration class FF-1B) 
MS-FF-12[2] (configuration class FF-1C) 
False a 
True 
1.00 
1.00 Section 6.6.2.9.5 
True 1.00 
(MS-FF-12 top event) 
Sorption of fissile material on clays and zeolites in 
altered TSbv (configuration class FF-1B) 
/MS-FF-13 
MS-FF-13 
True a 
False 
0.00 
0.00 Section 6.6.2.9.6 
(MS-FF-13 top event) 
Accumulation of fissile material solute in topographic 
lows above altered TSbv (configuration class FF-1C) 
/MS-FF-14 
MS-FF-14 True a 0.00 Section 6.6.2.9.7 
False 0.00 
(MS-FF-14 top event) 
a
NOTE: For event names prefixed by a slash / the actual event probability used in processing the SAPHIRE 
logic model is the complement (i.e., 1  value) of the assigned value
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01 6-140 October 2004 

6.6.2.9.1 Top Event MS-FF-1 
The branching of top event MS-FF-1 initiates the evaluation of far-field configuration class FF-1 
representing the transport of fissile material containing solutes into the far-fields saturated and 
unsaturated zones. Only the lower branch of this top event is activated to initiate the evaluation 
of this far-field configuration class. Therefore, /MS-FF-1 and MS-FF-1 are each assigned a 
value of 1.00. 
6.6.2.9.2 Top Event MS-FF-2 
The branching of top event MS-FF-2 determines whether the fissile materials entering the far-
field environment are separated from the neutron absorber materials of the waste package or 
waste form. The upper branch indicates that the fissile material is not separated from the neutron 
absorber materials by the far-field environment. The remaining three branches evaluate far-field 
configuration classes for the separation of the fissile materials from the neutron absorber 
materials. The second branch from the top directs the evaluation of configuration subclass FF1A 
and the third branch directs the evaluation of subclasses FF-1B and FF-1C. The fourth, or 
bottom branch of this top event represents the transport of fissile material through the 
unsaturated zone and into the water table for the evaluation of configuration class FF-3. The 
fourth branch immediately transfers to the CONFIG-FF3 event tree. The processing of the 
bottom three branches of this top event are equiprobable and are accessed by assigning 
MS-FF-2[1], MS-FF-2[2], and MS-FF-2[3] a value of 1.00. To prevent further evaluation of the 
upper branch of this top event, /MS-FF-2 will also assigned a value of 1.00 (the complement of 
0.00). 
6.6.2.9.3 Top Event MS-FF-3 
The branching of top event MS-FF-3 represents the transport of fissile materials through the 
unsaturated zone to the water table. The upper branch of this top event indicates that fissile 
material is not transported to the water table. The lower branch of this top event indicates that 
fissile materials are transported directly to the water table. In order to allow for the evaluation of 
far-field configuration class FF-3, the lower branch of this top event is selected. Therefore, /MS-
FF-3 and MS-FF-3 are each assigned a value of 1.00. 
6.6.2.9.4 Top Event MS-FF-11 
The branching of top event MS-FF-11 represents the precipitation of fissile material as the 
chemistry of the fissile material containing carrier plume is altered by the unsaturated zone host 
rock. This scenario represents far-field configuration subclass FF-1A. The upper branch of this 
top event indicates that fissile material is not precipitated and the lower branch of this top event 
indicates that it is precipitated. It is assumed that there are no mechanisms that would cause any 
appreciable precipitation and accumulation of fissile material in the unsaturated zone 
(Assumption 5.5.3). Therefore, /MS-FF-11 and MS-FF-11 are each assigned a value of 0.00. 
6.6.2.9.5 Top Event MS-FF-12 
The branching of top event MS-FF-12 represents the transport of fissile material containing 
solutes to altered TSbv. The upper branch of this top event indicates that the fissile material is 

not transported to the altered TSbv. The second and third branches of this top event indicate that 
fissile materials are transported to the altered TSbv and initiate the evaluation of far-field 
configuration subclasses FF-1B and FF-1C, respectively. In order to allow for the evaluation of 
far-field configuration subclass FF-1B and FF-1C, the lower two branches of this top event are 
selected. Therefore, /MS-FF-12, MS-FF-12[1], and MS-FF-12[2] are each assigned a value of 
1.00. 
6.6.2.9.6 Top Event MS-FF-13 
The branching of top event MS-FF-13 represents formation of the far-field configuration 
subclass FF-1B, which is defined as the sorption of fissile material in clays and zeolites in the 
altered TSbv. The upper branch of this top event indicates that fissile materials are not sorbed 
and the lower branch of this top event indicates that they are. Because the known quantities of 
clays and zeolites in the unsaturated zone will not result in any appreciable sorption of fissile 
materials (Assumption 5.5.4), the upper branch of this top event is selected. Therefore, /MS-FF-
13 and MS-FF-13 are each assigned a value of 0.00. 
6.6.2.9.7 Top Event MS-FF-14 
The branching of top event MS-FF-14 represents the formation of far-field configuration 
subclass FF-1C, which is defined as the accumulation of fissile material containing solutes in 
topographical lows above altered TSbv. The upper branch of this top event indicates that fissile 
material containing solutes are not accumulated and the lower branch of this top event indicates 
that they are. Because there are no known fissile material accumulation mechanisms in the 
altered TSbv (Assumption 5.5.2), the upper branch of this top event is selected. Therefore, /MS-
FF-14 and MS-FF-14 are each assigned a value of 0.00. 
6.6.2.10 Quantification of Event Tree CONFIG-FF-K 
The following subsections provide justification for the probabilities assigned to the events used 
in the quantification of the far-field event tree CONFIG-FF-K (Figure B-22 of Appendix B). 
This event tree initiates the evaluation of the far-field configuration class FF-2 representing the 
far-field accumulation of fissile material bearing colloids into potentially critical configurations. 
This event tree consists of seven top events, of which only six are required for the evaluation of 
this far-field configuration class for the igneous disruptive event. Table 6.6-11 summarizes the 
event probability assignments discussed below. 

Table 6.6-11. Event Probability Assignment for the CONFIG-FF-K Event Tree for the Igneous Disruptive 
Event Criticality FEPs SAPHIRE Analysis 
Event Name and Description 
Probability 
Values 
SAPHIRE Assigned 
Event Value a 
(per waste package) Justification 
Transport of fissile material solutes to TSw in 
carrier plume 
/MS-FF-16 
MS-FF-16 
False a 
True 
1.00 
1.00 Section 6.6.2.10.1 
(MS-FF-16 top event) 
Hydrodynamic/chromatographic separation of 
fissile material colloids from neutron absorber 
materials 
/MS-FF-17 False a 1.00 
MS-FF-17[1] (configuration class FF-2A) True 1.00 Section 6.6.2.10.2 
MS-FF-17[2] (configuration classes FF-2B and True 1.00 
FF-2C) 
(MS-FF-17 top event) 
Trapping of fissile material colloids in dead-end 
fractures at boundary stress-relief zone 
(configuration class FF-2A) 
/MS-FF-18 True a 0.00 Section 6.6.2.10.3 
MS-FF-18 False 0.00 
(MS-FF-18 top event) 
Transport of fissile material colloids to altered 
TSbv 
/MS-FF-19 False a 1.00 
MS-FF-19[1] (configuration class FF-2B) True 1.00 Section 6.6.2.10.4 
MS-FF-19[2] (configuration class FF-2C) True 1.00 
(MS-FF-19 top event) 
Sorption of colloids on clays and zeolites in altered 
TSbv (configuration class FF-2B) 
/MS-FF-20 
MS-FF-20 
True a 
False 
0.00 
0.00 Section 6.6.2.10.5 
(MS-FF-20 top event) 
Filtration of colloids in topographic lows above 
TSbv (configuration class FF-2C) 
/MS-FF-21 
MS-FF-21 
True a 
False 
0.00 
0.00 Section 6.6.2.10.6 
(MS-FF-21 top event) 
a
NOTE: For event names prefixed by a slash / the actual event probability used in processing the SAPHIRE 
logic model is the complement (i.e., 1  value) of the assigned value
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01 6-143 October 2004 

6.6.2.10.1 Top Event MS-FF-16 
The branching of top event MS-FF-16 initiates the evaluation of far-field configuration class 
FF-2 representing the transport of fissile material bearing colloids into the far-fields unsaturated 
zone. Only the lower branch of this top event is activated to initiate the evaluation of this far-
field configuration class. Therefore, /MS-FF-16 and MS-FF-16 are each assigned a value of 
1.00. 
6.6.2.10.2 Top Event MS-FF-17 
The branching of top event MS-FF-17 determines whether the fissile material bearing colloids 
entering the unsaturated zone environment are hydrodymically or chromatographically separated 
from the neutron absorber materials of the waste package or waste form. The upper branch 
indicates that the fissile material is not separated from the neutron absorber materials by the 
unsaturated zone environment. The remaining two branches represent the separation of the 
fissile materials from the neutron absorber materials and initiate the evaluation of the FF-2 
configuration subclasses. The second branch from the top directs the evaluation of configuration 
subclass FF-2A and the third branch directs the evaluation of configuration subclasses FF-2B 
and FF-2C. The processing of the bottom two branches of this top event are equiprobable and 
are activated by assigning MS-FF-17[1] and MS-FF-17[2] a value of 1.00. To prevent 
evaluation of the upper branch of this top event, /MS-FF-17 will also be assigned a value of 1.00 
(the complement of 0.00). 
6.6.2.10.3 Top Event MS-FF-18 
The branching of top event MS-FF-18 represents far-field configuration subclass FF-2A that is 
defined as the trapping of fissile material bearing colloids in altered TSbv. The upper branch of 
this top event indicates that fissile material bearing colloids are not trapped and the lower branch 
indicates that they are. Because there are no known mechanisms for trapping and accumulating 
any appreciable quantities of fissile material bearing colloids in altered TSbv 
(Assumption 5.5.2), only the top branch of this top event is activated. Therefore, /MS-FF-18 and 
MS-FF-18 are each assigned a value of 0.00. 
6.6.2.10.4 Top Event MS-FF-19 
The branching of top event MS-FF-19 represents the transport of fissile material containing 
colloids to altered TSbv. The upper branch of this top event indicates that fissile material 
containing colloids are not transported and the lower two branches indicate that they are. The 
second and third branches of this top event initiate the evaluation of far-field configuration 
subclasses FF-2B and FF-2C, respectively. In order to allow for the evaluation of these far-field 
configuration subclasses, the lower two branches of this top event are selected. Therefore, /MS-
FF-19, MS-FF-19[1], and MS-FF-19[2] are each assigned a value of 1.00. 
6.6.2.10.5 Top Event MS-FF-20 
The branching of top event MS-FF-20 represents formation of the far-field configuration 
subclass FF-2B which is defined as the sorption of fissile material containing colloids on clays 
and zeolites in the altered TSbv. The upper branch of this top event indicates that fissile 

materials are not sorbed and the lower branch of this top event indicates that they are. Because 
the known quantities of clays and zeolites in the unsaturated zone will not result in any 
appreciable sorption of fissile materials containing colloids (Assumption 5.5.4), the upper branch 
of this top event is activated. Therefore, /MS-FF-20 and MS-FF-20 are each assigned a value of 
0.00. 
6.6.2.10.6 Top Event MS-FF-21 
The branching of top event MS-FF-21 represents the formation of far-field configuration 
subclass FF-2C, which is defined as the filtration and accumulation of fissile material containing 
colloids in topographical lows above altered TSbv. The upper branch of this top event indicates 
that fissile material containing colloids are not filtered and accumulated and the lower branch of 
this top event indicates that they are. Because there are no known fissile material accumulation 
mechanisms in the altered TSbv (Assumption 5.5.2), the upper branch of this top event is 
selected. Therefore, /MS-FF-21 and MS-FF-21 are each assigned a value of 0.00. 
6.6.2.11 Quantification of Event Tree CONFIG-FF3 
The following subsections provide justification for the probabilities assigned to the events used 
in the quantification of the far-field event tree CONFIG-FF3 (Figure B-23 of Appendix B). 
This event tree initiates the evaluation of the far-field configuration class FF-3 representing the 
accumulation of fissile material into potentially critical configurations in the far-field saturated 
zone. This event tree consists of nine top events, all of which are required for the evaluation of 
far-field configuration class FF-3 for the igneous disruptive event. Table 6.6-12 summarizes the 
event probability assignments discussed below. 
Table 6.6-12. Event Probability Assignment for the CONFIG-FF3 Event Tree for the Igneous Disruptive 
Event Criticality FEPs SAPHIRE Analyses 
Event Name and Description 
Probability 
Values 
SAPHIRE Assigned 
Event Value a 
(per waste package) Justification 
Initiate evaluation of far-field configuration class FF-3 Section 6.6.2.11.1 
subclasses 
/CONFIG-SCEN False a 1.00 
CONFIG-SCEN[1] (configuration class FF-3A) True 1.00 
CONFIG-SCEN[2] (configuration class FF-3B) True 1.00 
CONFIG-SCEN[3] (configuration class FF-3C) True 1.00 
CONFIG-SCEN[4] (configuration class FF-3D) True 1.00 
CONFIG-SCEN[5] (configuration class FF-3E) True 1.00 
(CONFIG-SCEN top event) 
Fissile material precipitates in upwell zone of Section 6.6.2.11.2 
hydrothermal fluids at faults or in fractures 
(configuration class FF-3A) 
/MS-FF-4 True a 0.00 
MS-FF-4 False 0.00 
(MS-FF-4 top event) 

Table 6.6-12. Event Probability Assignment for the CONFIG-FF3 Event Tree for the Igneous Disruptive 
Event Criticality FEPs SAPHIRE Analyses (Continued) 
Event Name and Description 
Probability 
Values 
SAPHIRE Assigned 
Event Value a 
(per waste package) Justification 
Contaminant plume mixes below redox front Section 6.6.2.11.3 
(configuration class FF-3B) 
/MS-FF-5 False a 1.00 
MS-FF-5 True 1.00 
(MS-FF-5 top event) 
Precipitation of fissile material (configuration class FF-Section 6.6.2.11.4 
3B) True a 0.00 
/MS-FF-6 False 0.00 
MS-FF-6 
(MS-FF-6 top event) 
Fissile material precipitates at reducing zone Section 6.6.2.11.5 
(configuration class FF-3C) 
/MS-FF-7 True a 0.00 
MS-FF-7 False 0.00 
(MS-FF-7 top event) 
Fissile material precipitates at organic reducing zone at Section 6.6.2.11.6 
pinchout of tuff aquifer (configuration class FF-3D) 
/MS-FF-8 True a 0.00 
MS-FF-8 False 0.00 
(MS-FF-8 top event) 
Fissile material solutes are transported to Franklin Section 6.6.2.11.7 
Lake Playa (configuration class FF-3E) 
/MS-FF-9 False a 1.00 
MS-FF-9 True 1.00 
(MS-FF-9 top event) 
Fissile material solutes precipitate in organic-rich zones Section 6.6.2.11.8 
of Franklin Lake Playa (configuration class FF-3E) 
/MS-FF-10 
MS-FF-10 False a 1.00 
True 1.00 
(MS-FF-9 top event) 
Criticality potential of configuration class FF-3E Section 6.6.2.11.9 
/CRIT-POT-WF True a 0.00 
CRIT-POT-WF False 0.00 
(CRIT-POT-WF top event) 
NOTE: a For event names prefixed by a slash / the actual event probability is the complement 
(i.e., 1  value) of the assigned value 
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01 6-146 October 2004 

6.6.2.11.1 Top Event CONFIG-SCEN 
The branching of top event CONFIG-SCEN establishes the evaluation of the five subclasses of 
far-field configuration class FF-3 defined as the transport of fissile material into the saturated 
zone. The upper branch is not utilized in these analyses and is included only as a modeling 
convenience. The five far-field configuration subclasses are represented by the second through 
sixth branches from the top of this top event. These five branches direct the evaluation of 
configuration subclass FF-3A, FF-3B, FF-3C, FF-3D, and FF-3E, respectively. The processing 
of the bottom five branches of this top event are initiated by assigning CONFIG-SCEN[1], 
CONFIG-SCEN[2], CONFIG-SCEN[3], CONFIG-SCEN[4], and CONFIG-SCEN[5] a value of 
1.00. 
6.6.2.11.2 Top Event MS-FF-4 
The branching of top event MS-FF-4 initiates the evaluation of far-field configuration subclass 
FF-3A defined as the precipitation of fissile material in the upwell zone of hydrothermal fluids at 
faults or in fractures. The upper branch indicates that fissile material is not precipitated and the 
lower branch indicates that they are. Because no known mechanism exists for the appreciable 
precipitation of fissile material in the saturated zone (Assumption 5.5.3), only the upper branch 
of this top event is activated. Therefore, /MS-FF-4 and MS-FF-4 are each assigned a value of 
0.00. 
6.6.2.11.3 Top Event MS-FF-5 
The branching of top event MS-FF-5 represents the mixing of the fissile material containing 
contaminant plume below the redox front. The effects of pH and pCO2 in the UZ on uranium 
can lead to precipitation through reduction in the uranium solubility (Assumption 5.5.3). The 
upper branch indicates that mixing does not occur and the lower branch indicates that it does. In 
order to allow for the processing of far-field configuration subclass FF-3B, only the lower branch 
of this top event is activated. Therefore, /MS-FF-5 and MS-FF-5 are each assigned a value of 
1.00. 
6.6.2.11.4 Top Event MS-FF-6 
The branching of top event MS-FF-6 initiates the evaluation of far-field configuration subclass 
FF-3B defined as the precipitation of fissile material as the contaminant plume mixes below the 
redox front. The upper branch indicates that fissile material is not precipitated and the lower 
branch indicates that they are. Because no known mechanism exists for the appreciable 
precipitation of fissile material in the saturated zone (Assumption 5.5.3), only the upper branch 
of this top event is activated. Therefore, /MS-FF-6 and MS-FF-6 are each assigned a value of 
0.00. 
6.6.2.11.5 Top Event MS-FF-7 
The branching of top event MS-FF-7 initiates the evaluation of far-field configuration subclass 
FF-3C defined as the precipitation of fissile materials at the reducing zone (i.e., the remains of 
organic materials). The upper branch indicates that fissile material is not precipitated and the 
lower branch indicates that it is. Because organic material is not known to exist in the saturated 

zone in any appreciable quantity, precipitation of fissile material is unlikely (Assumption 5.5.5). 
Therefore, only the upper branch of this top event is activated and /MS-FF-7 and MS-FF-7 are 
each assigned a value of 0.00. 
6.6.2.11.6 Top Event MS-FF-8 
The branching of top event MS-FF-8 initiates the evaluation of far-field configuration subclass 
FF-3D defined as the precipitation of fissile materials at the reducing zone of a pinchout of the 
tuff aquifer. The upper branch indicates that fissile material is not precipitated and the lower 
branch indicates that it is. Because organic material is not known to exist in the saturated zone in 
any appreciable quantity, precipitation of fissile material is unlikely (Assumption 5.5.5). 
Therefore, only the upper branch of this top event is activated and /MS-FF-8 and MS-FF-8 are 
each assigned a value of 0.00. 
6.6.2.11.7 Top Event MS-FF-9 
The branching of top event MS-FF-9 represents the transport of fissile material containing 
solutes to Franklin Lake Playa. The upper branch indicates that transport does not occur and the 
lower branch indicates that it does. In order to allow for the processing of far-field configuration 
subclass FF-3E, only the lower branch of this top event is activated. Therefore, /MS-FF-9 and 
MS-FF-9 are each assigned a value of 1.00. 
6.6.2.11.8 Top Event MS-FF-10 
The branching of top event MS-FF-10 represents the precipitation of fissile material containing 
solutes in organic-rich zones of Franklin Lake. The upper branch indicates that precipitation 
does not occur and the lower branch indicates that it does. It is assumed (Assumption 5.5.1) that 
if fissile material is transported to Franklin Lake, organic-rich reducing zones within the lake 
will allow for the precipitation and accumulation of fissile materials. Therefore, only the lower 
branch of this top event is activated and /MS-FF-10 and MS-FF-10 are each assigned a value of 
1.00. 
6.6.2.11.9 Top Event CRIT-POT-WF 
The branching of top event CRIT-POT-WF represents the criticality potential of the precipitated 
fissile material in the organic-rich zones of Franklin Lake. The upper branch indicates that 
precipitated material does not have a criticality potential and the lower branch indicates that it 
does. 
It is assumed that, over the regulatory period, amount of fissile material that could be transported 
and accumulated in the organic-rich zones of Franklin Lake would be insufficient to result in a 
potential critical configuration (Assumption 5.5.1). Therefore, only the upper branch of this top 
event is activated and /CRIT-POT-WF and CRIT-POT-WF are each assigned a value of 0.00. 

6.6.3 Internal and External Criticality Analysis Results 
Criticality calculations were performed for igneous intrusion scenarios in Criticality Potential of 
Waste Packages Affected by Igneous Intrusion (BSC 2004 [DIRS 171690]). Waste packages for 
two types of DOE SNF were considered in these calculations  U-Zr/U-Mo Alloy and U-Zr Hx. 
The calculation considers three different waste package damage configurations: (1) intact 
configuration; (2) partial slump configuration; and (3) complete slump configuration. In all three 
configurations, the DHLW glass liquefies due to the igneous intrusion temperatures and is 
capable of migrating from its original location within the waste package. In the intact 
configuration, the waste package has not breached or deformed. In the partial slump 
configuration, the waste package has deformed under the weight of the surrounding magma until 
the voids in the waste package are eliminated. In the complete slump case, the waste package is 
assumed to have breached, and some of the DHLW glass has been forced out of the waste 
package. Calculations were also performed with the waste package outer barrier and/or the 
DHLW glass removed to simulate magma entering and filling the waste package. 
In addition, a range of variables is examined in this calculation, including: 
 
Magma temperature (from maximum intrusion temperature and cooled to ambient), and 
 
Water concentration of the intruding magma (from 0.5 to 4.0 weight percent). 
Intact waste package configurations utilizing fresh fuel, degraded flow-through configurations, 
and degraded bathtub configurations were also analyzed. The maximum predicted keff calculated 
from these analyses is lower than the calculated critical limit. 
6.6.4 Igneous Criticality FEPs Analysis Results 
The quantification of the SAPHIRE igneous disruptive event resulted in the calculation of the 
waste package fractional probabilities presented in Table 6.6-13. These fractional probabilities 
are summarized from the SAPHIRE results presented in Appendix B, Section B.5. Because the 
keff values for the likely igneous scenarios internal to the waste package are calculated to be 
below the predicted critical limit, the probability of criticality is insignificant. For external 
igneous scenarios, it is assumed (Assumptions 5.4.12, 5.5.1, 5.5.2, 5.5.3, 5.5.4, and 5.5.5) that 
there are no mechanisms to allow for significant accumulation of fissile material in the near-field 
or far-field environments (i.e., accumulation is below critical mass required). Therefore, the 
probability of criticality is also insignificant for scenarios external to the waste package. These 
results are applicable to all igneous criticality FEPs regardless of analysis location (internal or 
external to the waste package) or waste form/waste package type. 
The total criticality probability of each waste package type is dependent on the number of each 
waste package type that are involved in the igneous event. For an igneous eruptive event, the 
mean number of waste packages within the eruptive conduit is six (BSC 2004 [DIRS 170001], 
Section 7.2). For an igneous intrusion event, the number of waste packages in drifts intersected 
by intrusive dikes ranges from zero to nearly the entire waste package inventory with a median 
value of 1612 (BSC 2004 [DIRS 170001], Section 6.3.4). From the SAPHIRE results reported 
in Table B-2 of Appendix B, the per waste package criticality probabilities for all igneous 

induced waste package damage results from intrusion scenarios as indicated by igneous intrusive 
configuration class end state suffixes IGI1 and IGI2. 
The mean number of waste packages of any given type that are potentially impacted by an 
igneous intrusion event can be calculated using the hypergeometric distribution of 
Equation 6.6-1 which is a reiteration of Equation 6.4-11 (Evans, et al., 1993 [DIRS 112115], 
p. 85).
P(n; X, N) = nX/N (Eq. 6.6-1) 
where 
X is the number of waste packages impacted by an igneous intrusion event 
n is the number of waste package of a given type 
N is the total number of waste packages in the repository inventory 
Using this equation, the fraction number of waste packages impacted by an igneous intrusion 
event is presented in Table 6.6-14. The total probability of criticality for each waste package 
type is then estimated by multiplying the mean fractional number of waste packages and the total 
per waste package probability of criticality from Table 6.6-13. A more exact solution of this 
calculation could be performed using the binomial distribution of Equation 6.4-3. However, 
given the waste package type population numbers that include fractional populations of less than 
one, the binomial distribution is not applied because the product method is a sufficiently close 
approximation. 

Table 6.6-13. Per Waste Package Criticality Probabilities from SAPHIRE Analysis of Igneous Disruptive 
Event Criticality FEPs 
Waste Package Type 
Number of 
Waste 
Packagesa 
Per Waste Package Probability of Criticalityb 
TotalIntact 
In-Package 
Degraded 
In-Package Near-Field Far-Field 
21-PWR Absorber Plate 4299 0.00E+00 3.84E-12 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 3.84E-12 
21-PWR Control Rod 95 0.00E+00 2.15E-11 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 2.15E-11 
12-PWR Absorber Plate 163 0.00E+00 2.64E-14 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 2.64E-14 
24-BWR Absorber Plate 84 0.00E+00 2.64E-14 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 2.64E-14 
44-BWR Absorber Plate 2831 0.00E+00 2.64E-14 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 2.64E-14 
DOE SNF Short w/ MOX 5 0.00E+00 6.97E-12 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 6.97E-12 
DOE SNF Long w/ MOX 61 0.00E+00 6.97E-12 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 6.97E-12 
DOE SNF Short w/ U-Zr Hx 165 0.00E+00 2.64E-14 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 2.64E-14 
DOE SNF Short w/ U-Metal 16 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF Long w/ U-Metal 4 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF MCO w/ U-Metal 220 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF Short w/ HEU Oxide 655 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF Long w/ HEU Oxide 42 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF Short w/ U/Th Oxide 20 0.00E+00 1.84E-11 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 1.84E-11 
DOE SNF Long w/ U/Th Oxide 73 0.00E+00 1.84E-11 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 1.84E-11 
DOE SNF Long w/ U/Th Carbide 605 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF Short w/ Aluminum Based 1226 0.00E+00 2.64E-14 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 2.64E-14 
DOE SNF Long w/ Aluminum Based 1 0.00E+00 2.64E-14 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 2.64E-14 
DOE SNF Short w/ U-Zr/U-Mo Alloy 14 0.00E+00 1.84E-11 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 1.84E-11 
DOE SNF Long w/ U-Zr/U-Mo Alloy 19 0.00E+00 1.84E-11 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 1.84E-11 
DOE SNF Short w/ LEU Oxide 8 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF Long w/ LEU Oxide 344 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
a
Source: Values from Table 4.1-3 
b 
SAPHIRE V. 7.18 (BSC 2002 [DIRS 160873]) analysis results (Appendix B, Section B.24) and 
Microsoft EXCEL spreadsheet endstate.xls. (Probability values below the screening criterion are set to 0.0.) 

Table 6.6-14. Per Waste Package Type Total Probability of Criticality Resulting from an Igneous Event 
Waste Package Type 
Total 
Number of 
Waste 
Packages 
in 
Repository 
Inventorya 
Total 
Number of 
Waste 
Package 
Impacted 
by an 
Igneous 
Intrusion 
Event b 
Mean 
Fractional 
Waste 
Package 
Population 
Impacted 
by an 
Igneous 
Intrusion 
Event c 
Total Per 
Waste 
Package 
Probability of 
Criticality 
Due to an 
Igneous 
Event d 
Waste 
Package Type 
Total 
Probability of 
Criticality Due 
to an Igneous 
Event 
21-PWR Absorber Plate 4299 1612 616.00 3.84E-12 2.37E-09 
21-PWR Control Rod 95 1612 13.61 2.15E-11 2.93E-10 
12-PWR Absorber Plate 163 1612 23.36 2.64E-14 6.17E-13 
24-BWR Absorber Plate 84 1612 12.04 2.64E-14 3.18E-13 
44-BWR Absorber Plate 2831 1612 405.65 2.64E-14 1.07E-11 
DOE SNF Short w/ MOX 5 1612 0.72 6.97E-12 4.99E-12 
DOE SNF Long w/ MOX 61 1612 8.74 6.97E-12 6.09E-11 
DOE SNF Short w/ U-Zr Hx 165 1612 23.64 2.64E-14 6.25E-13 
DOE SNF Short w/ U-Metal 16 1612 2.29 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF Long w/ U-Metal 4 1612 0.57 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF MCO w/ U-Metal 220 1612 31.52 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF Short w/ HEU Oxide 655 1612 93.85 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF Long w/ HEU Oxide 42 1612 6.02 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF Short w/ U/Th Oxide 20 1612 2.87 1.84E-11 5.27E-11 
DOE SNF Long w/ U/Th Oxide 73 1612 10.46 1.84E-11 1.92E-10 
DOE SNF Long w/ U/Th Carbide 605 1612 86.69 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF Short w/ Aluminum Based 1226 1612 175.67 2.64E-14 4.64E-12 
DOE SNF Long w/ Aluminum Based 1 1612 0.14 2.64E-14 3.79E-15 
DOE SNF Short w/ U-Zr/U-Mo Alloy 14 1612 2.01 1.84E-11 3.69E-11 
DOE SNF Long w/ U-Zr/U-Mo Alloy 19 1612 2.72 1.84E-11 5.01E-11 
DOE SNF Short w/ LEU Oxide 8 1612 1.15 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF Long w/ LEU Oxide 344 1612 49.29 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
TOTAL 11,250 3.08E-09 
a
Source: Values from Table 4.1-3 
b 
BSC 2004 [DIRS 170001], Section 6.3.4 
c 
calculated using Equation 6.6-1 
d 
column 7 of Table 6.6-13. (Probability values below the screening criterion are set to 0.0.) 
6.7 CRITICALITY FEPS RESULTS 
Evaluation of SAPHIRE event trees for the base case events, seismic disruptive event, rock fall 
disruptive event, and igneous disruptive event resulted in the generation of the per waste package 

probabilities presented in Table 6.7-1. Table 6.7-1 summarizes the SAPHIRE analysis results 
presented in Tables 6.3-11, 6.4-23, and 6.6-14. The total per waste package probability of 
criticality results of Table 6.7-1 is the sum of the initiating event per waste package criticality 
probabilities for each waste package type (i.e., Total = Base Case + Seismic + Rock Fall + 
Igneous). 
The NNPP is responsible for assessing the criticality potential of the naval SNF waste package 
types that is provided in their Technical Support Document for License Application (McKenzie 
2004 [DIRS 170742]) as the total probability of criticality for the NNPP long waste package type 
as 4.4  10-9 and for the NNPP short waste package type as 6.0  10-9. Accounting for these 
additional factors, the total probability of criticality is still calculated to be below the regulatory 
probability criterion at 1.44  10-8. 
Table 6.7-1. Total Per Waste Package Probability of Criticality of Each Waste Package Type for Each 
Criticality FEPs Case 
Waste Package Type 
Per Case Total Probability of Criticality Total 
Probability 
of CriticalityBase Casea Seismicb Rock Fall c Igneousd 
21-PWR Absorber Plate 0.00E+00 3.91E-10 0.00E+00 2.37E-09 2.76E-09 
21-PWR Control Rod 0.00E+00 4.84E-11 0.00E+00 2.93E-10 3.42E-10 
12-PWR Absorber Plate 0.00E+00 1.05E-13 0.00E+00 6.17E-13 7.22E-13 
24-BWR Absorber Plate 0.00E+00 5.40E-14 0.00E+00 3.18E-13 3.72E-13 
44-BWR Absorber Plate 0.00E+00 1.82E-12 0.00E+00 1.07E-11 1.25E-11 
DOE SNF Short w/ MOX 0.00E+00 5.32E-12 0.00E+00 4.99E-12 1.03E-11 
DOE SNF Long w/ MOX 0.00E+00 6.50E-11 0.00E+00 6.09E-11 1.26E-10 
DOE SNF Short w/ U-Zr Hx 0.00E+00 6.92E-13 0.00E+00 6.25E-13 1.32E-12 
DOE SNF Short w/ U-Metal 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF Long w/ U-Metal 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF MCO w/ U-Metal 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF Short w/ HEU Oxide 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF Long w/ HEU Oxide 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF Short w/ U/Th Oxide 0.00E+00 5.62E-11 0.00E+00 5.27E-11 1.09E-10 
DOE SNF Long w/ U/Th Oxide 0.00E+00 2.05E-10 0.00E+00 1.92E-10 3.97E-10 
DOE SNF Long w/ U/Th Carbide 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF Short w/ Aluminum Based 0.00E+00 5.14E-12 0.00E+00 4.64E-12 9.79E-12 
DOE SNF Long w/ Aluminum Based 0.00E+00 4.19E-15 0.00E+00 3.79E-15 7.98E-15 
DOE SNF Short w/ U-Zr/U-Mo Alloy 0.00E+00 3.94E-11 0.00E+00 3.69E-11 7.63E-11 
DOE SNF Long w/ U-Zr/U-Mo Alloy 0.00E+00 5.34E-11 0.00E+00 5.01E-11 1.04E-10 
DOE SNF Short w/ LEU Oxide 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
DOE SNF Long w/ LEU Oxide 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
Naval Short 0.00E+00 6.0E-09 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 6.0E-09 
Naval Long 0.00E+00 4.4E-09 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 4.4E-09 
TOTAL 1.44E-08 
Table 6.6-14 (Probability values below the screening criterion are set to 0.0.) 
a
Source: Table 6.3-12 
b 
Table 6.4-23 
c 
Section 6.5 
d 

6.8 CRITICALITY FEATURES, EVENTS AND PROCESSES SCREENING 
DOCUMENTATION 
Documentation of the screening decisions for each of the sixteen criticality FEPs is contained in 
the following sections. 
6.8.1 In-Package Criticality (Intact Configuration) (FEP 2.1.14.15.0A) 
FEP Description: The waste package internal structures and the waste form remain intact. 
If there is a breach (or are breaches) in the waste package which allows 
water to either accumulate or flow-through the waste package then 
criticality could occur in situ. In-package criticality resulting from 
disruptive events is addressed in separate FEPs. 
Screening Decision: Excluded - Low Probability. 
Screening Argument: For a criticality event to occur, the proper combination of materials 
(neutron moderators, neutron absorbers, fissile materials) and 
geometric configuration must exist. A critical system for the geological 
repository is defined as one having an effective neutron multiplication 
factor (keff), larger than the critical limit. The critical limit is the value 
of keff at which a system (configuration of fissile material) is considered 
critical as characterized by statistical tolerance limits (BSC 2004 [DIRS 
168553], Section 6.3.1). 
Waste form criticality analyses demonstrate that an intact, fully flooded 
with water (a neutron moderator), waste package configuration will not 
achieve criticality (CRWMS M&O 1999 [DIRS 125206], CRWMS 
M&O 2000 [DIRS 147650], CRWMS M&O 2000 [DIRS 147651], 
BSC 2004 [DIRS 171414], CRWMS M&O 2000 [DIRS 151742], 
CRWMS M&O 2000 [DIRS 151743], CRWMS M&O 2001 [DIRS 
154194], BSC 2001 [DIRS 157733], BSC 2001 [DIRS 157734], BSC 
2004 [DIRS 169963], BSC 2004 [DIRS 168935]). Additionally, intact, 
fully loaded, fully flooded waste packages are precluded from 
achieving criticality by design to satisfy a preclosure operations 
requirement that the MGR provides means to ensure criticality control 
during SNF/HLW handling operations, including waste package 
loading (Curry 2004 [DIRS 170557], Requirement 1.1.6-4). 
Therefore, the probability of criticality for a nominal waste package 
configuration is zero. This result is applicable for all waste form/waste 
package types. 
TSPA-LA Disposition: Not Applicable 
Supporting Reports: Not Applicable 

6.8.2 In-Package Criticality (Degraded Configuration) (FEP 2.1.14.16.0A) 
FEP Description: The waste package internal structures and the waste form may 
degrade. If a critical configuration (sufficient fissile material, neutron 
moderator and reduction in neutron absorbers) develops, criticality 
could occur in situ. Potential in situ critical configurations are defined 
in Figures 3.2a and 3.2b of Disposal Criticality Analysis Methodology 
Topical Report (YMP 2003 [DIRS 165505]). In-package criticality 
resulting from disruptive events is addressed in separate FEPs. 
Screening Decision: Excluded  Low Probability. 
Screening Argument: For a criticality event to occur, the proper combination of materials 
(neutron moderators, neutron absorbers, fissile materials) and 
geometric configuration must exist. A critical system for the 
geological repository is defined as one having an effective neutron 
multiplication factor (keff), larger than the critical limit. The critical 
limit is the value of keff at which a system (configuration of fissile 
material) is considered critical as characterized by statistical tolerance 
limits (BSC 2004 [DIRS 168553], Section 6.3.1). 
All postclosure criticality FEPs, internal and external, require water 
infiltration to degrade the waste package internals and waste form. 
Neutron absorber material loss and a flooded waste package condition 
for neutron moderation is the scenario that could most likely result in 
a potentially critical configuration in any of the in-situ criticality 
FEPs. Seepage flow-through and humid air conditions internal to the 
waste package may degrade waste package internal components and 
waste forms. However, sufficient neutron absorber material loss 
(Assumption 5.1.9) and adequate neutron moderation are unlikely 
under these conditions and the generation of an internal criticality 
configuration is improbable. 
Water, silica, and carbon are the only potential moderating materials 
for internal configurations available within the repository. Water, 
which can enter the waste package as seepage flow or be present in the 
pores of the rock, is the most effective neutron-moderating material. 
Silica is present in appreciable quantities in the high-level radioactive 
waste glass canisters and in the repository rock. Silica can also be 
introduced into the waste package through entrainment in and 
precipitation from the seepage flow. Carbon is present in less than 20 
percent of the DOE SNF waste package types (DOE 2004 [DIRS 
170071]) and then in only limited amounts. Carbon, therefore, has a 
limited impact on the potential for criticality. The loading of the 
DOE-standardized SNF canisters, the design of the basket structure 
inside the canisters, and the addition of neutron absorber materials 
take into account the presence and effect of degraded glass in DOE 

SNF waste packages. Silica from the degradation of high-level 
radioactive waste glass, therefore, has no impact on the potential for 
criticality in DOE SNF waste packages. 
Silica is a much less effective moderator than water and its 
introduction into commercial SNF waste packages from seepage 
infiltration will displace water and effectively reduce the reactivity of 
the system, thus reducing the potential for criticality. Additionally, 
silica can act as a neutron reflector. However, inside the waste 
package its reflector effects, which increase reactivity, are secondary 
to its water displacement effects, which decrease reactivity. 
In addition, criticality without water infiltration is unlikely for the 
repository because the waste package is designed such that a criticality 
event in an intact waste package configuration is not possible. This 
results from satisfying a preclosure operations requirement that the 
MGR provide means to ensure criticality control during SNF/HLW 
handling operations, including waste package loading (Curry 2004 
[DIRS 170557], Requirement 1.1.6-4). 
Some of the DOE SNF waste forms have potential to support 
unmoderated (fast) criticality if (1) the fissile material is concentrated 
beyond its design concentration in the waste form, and (2) the neutron 
absorber materials are removed. Concentration of the fissile material 
beyond its design concentration could result from either the 
degradation of the waste form resulting from water infiltration or a 
disruptive event. However, removal of the neutron absorber materials 
from a DOE SNF waste package would require a breach of the waste 
package and a removal mechanism. The most likely neutron absorber 
material removal mechanism is through water infiltration resulting in 
degradation of the waste package internal components, dissolving of 
the neutron absorber material in the water, and flushing of the material 
from the waste package. Since water infiltration does not occur for 
base case criticality FEPs conditions, the concentration of sufficient 
fissile material from DOE SNF waste forms to support unmoderated 
criticality is improbable and unmoderated criticality can be excluded 
based on low probability. 
The methodology for determining the probability of criticality 
accounts for factors such as early failures, manufacturing defects, fuel 
assembly misloads, neutron absorber material misloads, etc. 
However, it may not be necessary to directly account for these factors 
if the total probability of criticality is calculated to be sufficiently 
below the regulatory probability criterion without utilizing them. For 
example, if the calculated waste package flooding probability were 
below the regulatory probability criterion, incorporation of the 
probability of a waste package misload would only result in a lower 

probability of criticality than has already been calculated. 
Fuel assembly misloads (enrichment and/or burnup) could result in 
more (or less) fissile material being loaded into the waste package 
than permitted by the design loading curves. Additional fissile 
material in the waste package results in a higher criticality potential of 
the in-package degraded configurations. However, because no water 
(i.e., neutron moderator) enters the waste package for base case 
criticality FEP conditions, the additional fissile material that could 
result from a fuel assembly misload cannot result in the formation of a 
critical configuration (CRWMS M&O 1999 [DIRS 125206], CRWMS 
M&O 2000 [DIRS 147650], CRWMS M&O 2000 [DIRS 147651], 
BSC 2004 [DIRS 171414], CRWMS M&O 2000 [DIRS 151742], 
CRWMS M&O 2000 [DIRS 151743], CRWMS M&O 2001 [DIRS 
154194], BSC 2001 [DIRS 157733], BSC 2001 [DIRS 157734], BSC 
2004 [DIRS 169963], BSC 2004 [DIRS 168935]). This is especially 
true for low enriched uranium systems such as the commercial SNF 
waste packages (BSC 2004 [DIRS 171414] and BSC 2004 [DIRS 
169963]). 
Ten percent of the waste packages in the base case scenario are 
assumed to fail as a result of early waste package failure mechanisms 
(BSC 2004 [DIRS 170024]) and localized corrosion 
(Assumption 5.1.1). However, the probability function for drip shield 
damage area is zero for the base case (i.e., no drip shield failures) and 
there is no advective flow path into the waste package. Without an 
advective flow path through the drip shield, the only other potential 
source of water infiltration into a failed waste package would be 
condensation on the underside of the drip shield. However, 
condensation infiltration into a failed waste package has been 
determined to be improbable (BSC 2004 [DIRS 164327], 
Section 6.3.7.2.3). Therefore, without water infiltration into a failed 
waste package, the probability of criticality for this base case FEP is 
zero. Based on assumptions requiring confirmation, this result is 
applicable for all waste form/waste package types. 
TSPA-LA Disposition: Not Applicable 
Supporting Reports: Not Applicable 
6.8.3 Near-Field Criticality (FEP 2.1.14.17.0A) 
FEP Description: Near-field criticality could occur if fissile material-bearing solution 
from the waste package is transported into the drift and the fissile 
material is precipitated into a critical configuration. Potential near-field 

Screening Decision: 
Screening Argument: 
TSPA-LA Disposition: 
Supporting Reports: 
critical configurations are defined in Figure 3.3a of Disposal Criticality 
Analysis Methodology Topical Report (YMP 2003 [DIRS 165505]). 
Near-field criticality resulting from disruptive events is addressed in 
separate FEPs. 
Excluded  Low Probability. 
Near-field criticality cannot occur unless the waste package and waste 
form are degraded (as discussed previously in Section 6.8.2). It then 
follows that the probability of near-field criticality must be less than the 
probability of water entering the waste package. This is because, in 
addition to the events evaluated to calculate the probability of water 
infiltrating a failed waste package, the probability of the following 
events must also be considered for near-field external criticality: 
 
Waste form degrading during the regulatory period 
 
Removing the fissile materials from the waste package 
 
Accumulating sufficient fissile material into a potentially critical 
configuration in the near-field environment 
 
Having sufficient neutron moderator available. 
Ten percent of the waste packages in the base case scenario are 
assumed to fail as a result of early waste package failure mechanisms 
(BSC 2004 [DIRS 170024]) and localized corrosion 
(Assumption 5.1.1). However, the probability function for drip shield 
damage area is zero for the base case (i.e., no drip shield failures) and 
there is no advective flow path into the waste package. Without an 
advective flow path through the drip shield, the only other potential 
source of water infiltration into a failed waste package would be 
condensation on the underside of the drip shield. However, 
condensation infiltration into a failed waste package has been 
determined to be improbable (BSC 2004 [DIRS 164327], 
Section 6.3.7.2.3). Therefore, without water infiltration into a failed 
waste package, the probability of criticality for this base case FEP is 
zero. Based on assumptions requiring confirmation, this result is 
applicable for all waste form/waste package types. 
Not Applicable 
Not Applicable 

6.8.4 Far-Field Criticality (FEP 2.2.14.09.0A) 
FEP Description: Far-field criticality could occur if fissile material-bearing solution from 
the waste package is transported beyond the drift and the fissile 
material is precipitated into a critical configuration. Potential far-field 
critical configurations are defined in Figure 3.3b of Disposal Criticality 
Analysis Methodology Topical Report (YMP 2003 [DIRS 165505]). 
Far-field criticality resulting from disruptive events is addressed in 
separate FEPs. 
Screening Decision: Excluded  Low Probability. 
Screening Argument: Like near-field criticality, far-field criticality cannot occur unless the 
waste package and waste form are degraded (as discussed previously in 
Section 6.8.2). Given an advective flow path into the waste package, 
fissile material can be transported into the near-field environment and, 
to a certain extent, continue into the far-field environment. However, it 
is unlikely that fissile material can accumulate in the far-field 
environment in any appreciable quantities due to a lack of 
accumulation mechanisms (Assumptions 5.5.1 through 5.5.5). 
Ten percent of the waste packages in the base case scenario are 
assumed to fail as a result of early waste package failure mechanisms 
(BSC 2004 [DIRS 170024]) and localized corrosion 
(Assumption 5.1.1). However, the probability function for drip shield 
damage area is zero for the base case (i.e., no drip shield failures) and 
there is no advective flow path into the waste package. Without an 
advective flow path through the drip shield, the only other potential 
source of water infiltration into a failed waste package would be 
condensation on the underside of the drip shield. However, 
condensation infiltration into a failed waste package has been 
determined to be improbable (BSC 2004 [DIRS 164327], 
Section 6.3.7.2.3). Therefore, without water infiltration into a failed 
waste package, the probability of criticality for this base case FEP is 
zero. Based on assumptions requiring confirmation, this result is 
applicable for all waste form/waste package types. 
TSPA-LA Disposition: Not Applicable 
Supporting Reports: Not Applicable 
6.8.5 In-Package Criticality Resulting from a Seismic Event (Intact Configuration) (FEP 
2.1.14.18.0A) 
FEP Description: The waste package internal structures and the waste form remain intact 
either during or after a seismic disruptive event. If there is a breach (or 

are breaches) in the waste package which allows water to either 
accumulate or flow-through the waste package then criticality could 
occur in situ. 
Screening Decision: Excluded  Low Probability. 
Screening Argument: As discussed previously in Section 6.8.1, waste form criticality 
analyses demonstrate that an intact, fully flooded with water (a neutron 
moderator), waste package configurations will not achieve criticality. 
Additionally, intact, fully loaded, fully flooded waste packages are 
precluded from achieving criticality by design to satisfy a preclosure 
operations requirement that the MGR provide means to ensure 
criticality control during SNF/HLW handling operations, including 
waste package loading (Curry 2004 [DIRS 170557], 
Requirement 1.1.6-4). 
Therefore, the probability of criticality for an intact waste package 
configuration for the seismic disruptive event is zero. This result is 
applicable for all waste form/waste package types. 
TSPA-LA Disposition: Not Applicable 
Supporting Reports: Not Applicable 
6.8.6 In-Package Criticality Resulting from a Seismic Event (Degraded Configuration) 
(FEP 2.1.14.19.0A) 
FEP Description: Either during, or as a result of, a seismic disruptive event, the waste 
package internal structures and the waste form may degrade. If a 
critical configuration develops, criticality could occur in situ. Potential 
in situ critical configurations are defined in Figures 3.2a and 3.2b of 
Disposal Criticality Analysis Methodology Topical Report (YMP 2003 
[DIRS 165505]). 
Screening Decision: Excluded  Low Probability. 
Screening Argument: As previously discussed in Section 6.8.2, without water infiltration into 
a failed waste package, the probability of criticality for all degraded 
waste package / waste form types is zero. Seismic events may alter the 
conditions described in the base case. 
Vibratory ground motion and rock fall induced by a seismic event have 
been conjectured as initiating events that could cause drip shield failure 
through separation and/or corrosion leading to subsequent waste 
package failure. Such failures may allow the influx of seepage (either 
advective or diffusive) into the waste package, which, in turn, has the 

potential to cause a criticality. These failure mechanisms have been 
determined not to affect the criticality potential of the repository since 
there is no mechanism for them to occur and thus no contribution to the 
criticality potential for the repository since neither drip shield 
separation due to seismic events (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169183], Section 
6.5.4) nor corrosion related mechanisms for drip shield failure resulting 
in advective flow paths (Section 6.3.4) are expected to occur. 
A seismic event can, however, induce fault displacement that can 
potentially lead to drip shield and waste package failure for those 
structures intersecting the fault, which can then potentially allow 
advective or diffusive flow into the waste package and lead to 
conditions conducive to criticality. Additionally, new fractures that 
intersect the drift segments and the collapsing of the drift due to a 
seismic event will have an affect on the seepage as to both location and 
rate. However, these changes in seepage have no impact on the 
repositorys potential for criticality without drip shield failure resulting 
from fault displacement. Thus, fault displacement (Section 6.4.4.1) is 
the only seismic disruptive event affecting the criticality potential of 
the repository. 
However, the probability of criticality for these configurations is 
determined to be below the regulatory threshold and this seismic 
disruptive event criticality FEP can be excluded based on low 
probability. Based on assumptions requiring confirmation, this result is 
applicable to all waste form/waste package types. 
TSPA-LA Disposition: Not Applicable 
Supporting Reports: Not Applicable 
6.8.7 Near-Field Criticality Resulting from a Seismic Event (FEP 2.1.14.20.0A) 
FEP Description: Either during, or as a result of, a seismic disruptive event, near-field 
criticality could occur if fissile material-bearing solution from the waste 
package is transported into the drift and the fissile material is 
precipitated into a critical configuration. Potential near-field critical 
configurations are defined in Figure 3.3a of Disposal Criticality 
Analysis Methodology Topical Report (YMP 2003 [DIRS 165505]). 
Screening Decision: Excluded  Low Probability. 
Screening Argument: Near-field criticality cannot occur unless the waste package and waste 
form are degraded (as discussed previously in Sections 6.8.3 and 6.8.6). 
Based on Seismic Consequence Abstraction (BSC 2004 [DIRS 
169183], Section 6.5.7.3), the cladding of all commercial SNF is 

damaged during seismic events with annual exceedance frequencies 
less than 510-5 per year. Exposure of the fuel will increase its 
availability for transport to locations external to the waste package. 
However, it is calculated that less than 11 kg of uranium will 
accumulate in the near-field under a waste package, less than the 
uranium mass required for a criticality in those configurations (BSC 
2004 [DIRS 170060]). 
Given the considerations listed above, criticality in the near-field 
environment is improbable. Therefore, the seismic disruptive event 
FEP can be excluded based on low probability. Based on assumptions 
requiring confirmation, this result is applicable for all waste form/waste 
package types. 
TSPA-LA Disposition: Not Applicable 
Supporting Reports: Not Applicable 
6.8.8 Far-Field Criticality Resulting from a Seismic Event (FEP 2.2.14.10.0A) 
FEP Description: Either during, or as a result of, a seismic disruptive event, far-field 
criticality could occur if fissile material-bearing solution from the waste 
package is transported beyond the drift and the fissile material is 
precipitated into a critical configuration. Potential far-field critical 
configurations are defined in Figure 3.3b of Disposal Criticality 
Analysis Methodology Topical Report (YMP 2003 [DIRS 165505]). 
Screening Decision: Excluded  Low Probability. 
Screening Argument: Like near-field criticality, far-field criticality cannot occur unless the 
waste package and waste form are degraded (as discussed previously in 
Sections 6.8.4 and 6.8.6). As a result of seismic events that create 
advective flow paths into the waste package, fissile material is 
transported into the near-field environment and, to a certain extent, 
continued on into the far-field environment. However, it is unlikely 
that fissile material can accumulate in the far-field environment in any 
appreciable quantities due to a lack of accumulation mechanisms 
(Assumptions 5.5.1 through 5.5.5). Therefore, for the seismic 
disruptive event, this far-field criticality FEP can be excluded based on 
low probability. Based on assumptions requiring confirmation, this 
result is applicable for all waste form/waste package types. 
TSPA-LA Disposition: Not Applicable 
Supporting Reports: Not Applicable 

6.8.9 In-Package Criticality Resulting from Rock Fall (Intact Configuration) (FEP 
2.1.14.21.0A) 
FEP Description: The waste package internal structures and the waste form remain intact 
either during or after a rock fall event. If there is a breach (or are 
breaches) in the waste package which allows water to either accumulate 
or flow-through the waste package then criticality could occur in situ. 
Screening Decision: Excluded  Low Probability. 
Screening Argument: As discussed previously in Section 6.8.1, waste form criticality 
analyses demonstrate that an intact, fully flooded with water (a neutron 
moderator), waste package configuration cannot achieve criticality. 
Additionally, intact, fully loaded, fully flooded waste packages are 
precluded from achieving criticality by design to satisfy a preclosure 
operations requirement that the MGR provide means to ensure 
criticality control during SNF/HLW handling operations, including 
waste package loading (Curry 2004 [DIRS 170557], 
Requirement 1.1.6-4). Waste package failure due to rockfall is not 
credible since drip shield failures are not expected to occur, thus, waste 
package flooding can not occur (Section 6.3.3.1.5). 
Therefore, the probability of criticality for a nominal waste package 
configuration during a rock fall disruptive event is zero. This result is 
applicable for all waste form/waste package types 
TSPA-LA Disposition: Not Applicable 
Supporting Reports: Not Applicable 
6.8.10 In-Package Criticality Resulting from Rock Fall (Degraded Configuration) (FEP 
2.1.14.22.0A) 
FEP Description: Either during, or as a result of, a rock fall event, the waste package 
internal structures and the waste form may degrade. If a critical 
configuration develops, criticality could occur in situ. Potential in situ 
critical configurations are defined in Figures 3.2a and 3.2b of Disposal 
Criticality Analysis Methodology Topical Report (YMP 2003 [DIRS 
165505]). 
Screening Decision: Excluded  Low Probability. 
Screening Argument: The degraded waste package and waste form base case in-package 
criticality is previously discussed in Section 6.8.2. Rock fall disruptive 

events do not create advective flow paths, which allow water to 
penetrate through the drip shield and into the waste package since 
there is no mechanism for drip shield failure due to this event. Without 
an advective flow path through the drip shield, the only other potential 
source of waste infiltration into a failed waste package would be 
condensation on the underside of the drip shield. However, 
condensation infiltration into a failed waste package has been 
determined to be improbable (BSC 2004 [DIRS 164327], Section 
6.3.7.2.3). Ten percent of the waste packages in the base case scenario 
are assumed to fail as a result of early waste package failure 
mechanisms (BSC 2004 [DIRS 170024]) and localized corrosion 
(Assumption 5.1.1). However, without water infiltration, the 
probability of criticality for this rock fall disruptive event FEP is zero. 
The screening argument for the rock fall disruptive event is the same as 
for the base case criticality FEP 2.1.14.16.0A. Based on assumptions 
requiring confirmation, this result is applicable for all waste form/waste 
package types. 
TSPA-LA Disposition: Not Applicable 
Supporting Reports: Not Applicable 
6.8.11 Near-Field Criticality Resulting from Rock Fall (FEP 2.1.14.23.0A) 
FEP Description: Either during, or as a result of, a rock fall event, near-field criticality 
could occur if fissile material-bearing solution from the waste package 
is transported into the drift and the fissile material is precipitated into a 
critical configuration. Potential near-field critical configurations are 
defined in Figure 3.3a of Disposal Criticality Analysis Methodology 
Topical Report (YMP 2003 [DIRS 165505]). 
Screening Decision: Excluded  Low Probability. 
Screening Argument: The degraded waste package and waste form base case near-field 
criticality is previously discussed in Section 6.8.3. Rock fall disruptive 
events do not create advective flow paths from the drift through the 
drip shield (i.e., no drip shield failures) and into the failed waste 
package. Moreover, condensation infiltration into a failed waste 
package has been determined to be improbable (BSC 2004 [DIRS 
164327], Section 6.3.7.2.3). The probability of water infiltrating and 
flooding a failed waste package is zero for this rock fall disruptive 
event, near-field criticality FEP. Without water to enter the failed 
waste packages, there is no mechanism to degrade the waste package 
internals and waste form, and transport fissile material into the near-
field environment for accumulation and the formation of a potentially 
critical configuration. Therefore, the probability of criticality for this 

rock fall disruptive event, near-field criticality FEP is zero. Based on 
assumptions requiring confirmation, this result is applicable for all 
waste form / waste package types. 
TSPA-LA Disposition: Not Applicable 
Supporting Reports: Not Applicable 
6.8.12 Far-Field Criticality Resulting from Rock Fall (FEP 2.2.14.11.0A) 
FEP Description: Either during, or as a result of, a rock fall event, far-field criticality 
could occur if fissile material-bearing solution from the waste package 
is transported beyond the drift and the fissile material is precipitated 
into a critical configuration. Potential far-field critical configurations 
are defined in Figure 3.3b of Disposal Criticality Analysis Methodology 
Topical Report (YMP 2003 [DIRS 165505]). 
Screening Decision: Excluded  Low Probability. 
Screening Argument: The degraded waste package and waste form base case far-field 
criticality is previously discussed in Section 6.8.4. Rock fall disruptive 
events do not create advective flow paths from the drift through the 
drip shield (i.e., no drip shield failures) and into the failed waste 
package. Moreover, condensation infiltration into a failed waste 
package has been determined to be improbable (BSC 2004 [DIRS 
164327], Section 6.3.7.2.3). The probability of water infiltrating and 
flooding a failed waste package is zero for this rock fall disruptive 
event, far-field criticality FEP. Without water to enter the failed waste 
packages, there is no mechanism to degrade the waste package internals 
and waste form, and transport fissile material into the near-field and 
far-field environments. In addition, it is unlikely that fissile material 
can accumulate in the far-field environment in any appreciable 
quantities due to a lack of accumulation mechanisms 
(Assumptions 5.5.1 through 5.5.5). Therefore, the probability of 
criticality for this rock fall disruptive event, far-field criticality FEP is 
zero. Based on assumptions requiring confirmation, this result is 
applicable for all waste form / waste package types. 
TSPA-LA Disposition: Not Applicable 
Supporting Reports: Not Applicable 

6.8.13 In-Package Criticality Resulting from an Igneous Event (Intact Configuration) 
(FEP 2.1.14.24.0A) 
FEP Description: The waste package internal structures and the waste form remain intact 
either during or after an igneous disruptive event. If there is a breach 
(or are breaches) in the waste package which allows water to either 
accumulate or flow-through the waste package then criticality could 
occur in situ. 
Screening Decision: Excluded  Low Probability. 
Screening Argument: As discussed previously in Section 6.8.1, waste form criticality 
analyses demonstrate that an intact, fully flooded with water (a neutron 
moderator), waste package configuration cannot achieve criticality. 
Additionally, intact, fully loaded, fully flooded waste packages are 
precluded from achieving criticality by design to satisfy a preclosure 
operations requirement that the MGR provide means to ensure 
criticality control during SNF/HLW handling operations, including 
waste package loading (Curry 2004 [DIRS 170557], 
Requirement 1.1.6-4). 
For the igneous disruptive event, waste packages have been segregated 
into two zones defined by the impact of the igneous event (refer to 
Section 6.6.1 of this report). In Zone 1, consisting of the drift(s) 
intersected by the volcanic dike, the waste packages within the conduit 
are assumed to be completely disassembled (Section 6.6). The 
remaining waste packages in zone 1 are expected to deform rather than 
disintegrate, allowing the waste packages to slump and flatten onto the 
invert. All waste packages in zone 1 outside the conduit area are 
presumed to have failed allowing seepage water access to the waste 
packages when the drifts have cooled sufficiently (Section 6.8.14). 
However, for intact configurations, the absorber material remains in 
place and, thus, the probability of criticality is zero. 
In Zone 2, the igneous event does not impact the waste packages which 
remain intact (nominal waste package configuration) (BSC 2004 [DIRS 
170028], Section 8.2.3). Therefore, for Zone 2 waste packages, the 
probability of criticality is zero. 
The igneous disruptive event criticality FEP can be excluded based on 
low probability. This result is applicable for all waste form / waste 
package types. 
TSPA-LA Disposition: Not Applicable 
Supporting Reports: Not Applicable 

6.8.14 In-Package Criticality Resulting from an Igneous Event (Degraded Configuration) 
(FEP 2.1.14.25.0A) 
FEP Description: Either during, or as a result of, an igneous disruptive event, the waste 
package internal structures and the waste form may degrade. If a 
critical configuration develops, criticality could occur in situ. Potential 
in situ critical configurations are defined in Figures 3.2a and 3.2b of 
Disposal Criticality Analysis Methodology Topical Report (YMP 2003 
[DIRS 165505]). 
Screening Decision: Excluded  Low Probability. 
Screening Argument: The degraded waste package and waste form base case in-package 
criticality is previously discussed in Section 6.8.2. Expanding the base 
case for the igneous disruptive event, waste packages are segregated 
into two zones defined by the impact of the igneous event. In Zone 1, 
the waste packages are in drifts that are directly involved in the igneous 
event. In Zone 2, the waste packages are in drifts that are not directly 
involved in the igneous event. The performance of Zone 2 waste 
packages has been determined to remain intact with no adverse short-
term or long-term impacts resulting from the igneous (BSC 2004 
[DIRS 170028], Section 8.2.3). 
Zone 1 waste packages can be impacted by one of two igneous 
scenarios. The first scenario is a violent Strombolian basaltic volcanic 
eruption through the repository. The waste packages that are 
intersected by the eruptive conduit are completely pulverized and the 
radioactive waste form carried to the surface, ejected into the 
atmosphere, and dispersed by the prevailing winds (BSC 2004 
[DIRS 170026], Section 5.2.4 and Assumption 5.4.10). Once 
dispersed, it is highly unlikely that sufficient fissile material can be 
accumulated into a critical configuration. 
The second igneous scenario is an igneous basaltic dike intersecting 
one or more emplacement drifts followed by the intrusion of effusive 
(liquid) magma flow or pyroclastic flow (clots of melt in a stream of 
gas) into the drifts. The intrusive material is expected to enter and fill 
the drifts at temperatures of about 1100C. Although the intrusive 
temperature is below the melting points of the waste package barrier 
materials, these materials are severely damaged at the intrusion 
temperature through softening and creep deformation. The drifts are 
expected to remain at this elevated temperature for several months, 
allowing adequate time for the complete slumping of the waste package 
barriers and internals. The waste package outer barrier is expected to 
be sufficiently fractured along its entire surface that, once the intrusive 

material cools and seepage returns, the slumped configuration is 
incapable of capturing and retaining appreciable quantities of water. 
Criticality is not possible for Zone 1 waste packages in an eruptive 
conduit. The waste packages in the eruptive conduit are completely 
disassembled and the waste form ejected from the conduit and 
dispersed by the prevailing winds. Criticality for this igneous scenario 
is not possible because of the low probability to reaccumulate sufficient 
fissile material into a critical configuration once it has been dispersed. 
For Zone 1 waste packages during an intrusive event, the waste 
packages are completely slumped into a configuration that cannot retain 
water while the neutron absorber materials are retained among the 
waste form. Liquid eutectics can be formed from Zr-Fe and, possibly, 
Zr-Ni but are not expected to provide any mechanisms causing 
appreciable removal of the neutron absorber materials from the waste 
form. Criticality, slow or fast, is determined to be unlikely for this 
igneous scenario. This determination is based on insufficient water 
being retained within the waste package for moderation and the 
retention of sufficient neutron absorber materials. 
In Zone 2, the waste packages remain intact and the screening 
argument of FEP 2.1.14.24.0A applies. The igneous disruptive event 
criticality FEP can be excluded based on low probability. This result is 
applicable for all waste form / waste package types. 
TSPA-LA Disposition: Not Applicable 
Supporting Reports: Not Applicable 
6.8.15 Near-Field Criticality Resulting from an Igneous Event (FEP 2.1.14.26.0A) 
FEP Description: Either during, or as a result of, an igneous disruptive event, near-field 
criticality could occur if fissile material-bearing solution from the waste 
package is transported into the drift and the fissile material is 
precipitated into a critical configuration. Potential near-field critical 
configurations are defined in Figure 3.3a of Disposal Criticality 
Analysis Methodology Topical Report (YMP 2003 [DIRS 165505]). 
Screening Decision: Excluded  Low Probability. 
Screening Argument: Near-field criticality cannot occur unless the waste package and waste 
form are degraded (as discussed previously in Sections 6.8.3 and 
6.8.14). Once the drifts cool, and seepage returns, the in-package and 
near-field water chemistries are dominated by the igneous material such 
that it is unlikely that any fissile material that is transported from the 

waste package slumped mass can be accumulated in the invert. Given 
the lack of accumulation mechanisms (Assumption 5.4.12), it is 
improbable that a critical configuration could form in the near-field 
environment. Therefore, this igneous disruptive event, near-field 
criticality FEP can be excluded based on low probability. Based on 
assumptions requiring confirmation, this result is applicable for all 
waste form/waste package types. 
TSPA-LA Disposition: Not Applicable 
Supporting Reports: Not Applicable 
6.8.16 Far-Field Criticality Resulting from an Igneous Event (FEP 2.2.14.12.0A) 
FEP Description: Either during, or as a result of, an igneous disruptive event, far-field 
criticality could occur if fissile material-bearing solution from the waste 
package is transported beyond the drift and the fissile material is 
precipitated into a critical configuration. Potential far-field critical 
configurations are defined in Figure 3.3b of Disposal Criticality 
Analysis Methodology Topical Report (YMP 2003 [DIRS 165505]). 
Screening Decision: Excluded  Low Probability. 
Screening Argument: Like near-field criticality, far-field criticality cannot occur unless the 
waste package and waste form are degraded (as discussed previously in 
Sections 6.8.4 and 6.8.14). The flow-through condition of a waste 
package following an intrusive event will allow fissile material to be 
transported into the near-field environment. Given the lack of invert 
accumulation mechanisms, the fissile material will continue into the 
far-field environment. However, it is unlikely that fissile material can 
accumulate in the far-field environment in any appreciable quantities 
due to a lack of accumulation mechanisms (Assumptions 5.5.1 through 
5.5.5) in the far-field environment. Therefore, this igneous disruptive 
event, far-field criticality FEP can be excluded based on low 
probability. Based on assumptions requiring confirmation, this result is 
applicable for all waste form / waste package types. 
TSPA-LA Disposition: Not Applicable 
Supporting Reports: Not Applicable 

INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

7. CONCLUSIONS
Using the available geologic repository and engineered barrier systems information and several 
assumptions requiring confirmation, criticality can be screened from further consideration in 
TSPA-LA on the sole basis of the low probability. The results of this analysis indicate that, for 
all waste package types, the calculated total probability of criticality is below the regulatory 
probability criterion for inclusion of events of at least one chance in 10,000 of occurring over 
10,000 years (10 CFR 63.114(d) [DIRS 156605]). 
Information currently being updated that could influence the results of this analysis include the 
failure potential of the drip shield and waste package due to the various corrosion mechanisms 
(i.e., general, localized, and stress corrosion cracking). Although the models for these failure 
mechanisms have been developed, evaluation of these models is dependent on the drift 
environment to be modeled in the TSPA-LA analyses. Future results in these areas have the 
potential to impact the analysis results. Also having the potential to impact the analysis results 
are updates to the qualified data, product outputs and technical information used in this analysis 
and the results from the activities required for the confirmation of assumptions in Section 5, e.g., 
testing, design, and analysis. 
7.1 SUMMARY 
The safety strategy for the geological repository relies on a multiple barrier system for the long-
term isolation of the emplaced waste packages from the general environment. Over time, waste 
packages emplaced in the geological repository as part of the engineered barrier systems can 
undergo various degradation processes that modify the waste package structural and mineral 
content and, thus, affect the potential for a criticality event. These degradation processes have 
major effects on the waste packages radionuclide content (through flushing) and spatial 
distribution of the waste form within the affected waste package (through component 
degradation). Separation of neutron absorbers from fissile material, volume changes, shape 
changes, loss of fissile and/or absorber material from the waste package, and rearrangement of 
degraded components are potential effects of the degradation processes. 
This screening analysis report: 
1. 
Contributes to the Yucca Mountain scenario development methodology by screening 
the FEPs related to criticality. 
2. 
Develops screening arguments for these FEPs. 
3. 
Provides information for the YMP FEP database and guidance to TSPA-LA analyses 
applicable to the license application document. 
Screening decisions reached in this report are summarized in Table 7.2-1. 

7.2 CRITICALITY FEPS SCREENING RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE LICENSE 
APPLICATION 
Screening decisions recommended for the criticality FEPs and their reference sections are 
provided in Table 7.2-1. These recommendations for the base case in situ and external criticality 
FEPs evaluations are applicable to all waste package/waste form combinations. This is because 
the probability of water entering any waste package during the regulatory period is negligible for 
all base case criticality FEPs because there are no drip shield failures predicted during the 
regulatory period. 
The evaluation of the rock fall and igneous disruptive event criticality FEPs are applicable to all 
waste package/waste form combinations. This is because the probability of water entering any 
waste package during the regulatory period is negligible for the rock fall disruptive event (no 
drip shield failures) and because it is improbable that a critical configuration could be formed 
during an igneous disruptive event. 
For the evaluation of the seismic disruptive event criticality FEPs, it is necessary to calculate the 
results for the individual commercial and DOE SNF waste package types. This is because of the 
differences in the internal configurations and compositions of the waste package design variants 
that degrade at different rates. The result of the FEPs evaluation is the calculation of a total 
probability of waste package flooding and of neutron absorber material removal that is below the 
regulatory probability criterion for inclusion of events [10 CFR 63.114(d)] [DIRS 156605]. 
Because the total probability of flooding and degrading the waste package internals is below the 
regulatory probability criterion, the total probability of criticality, which cannot exceed the 
causative probabilities, is also below the regulatory probability criterion. 
The NNPP is responsible for the assessment of criticality potential of the naval SNF Short and 
naval SNF Long waste package types in their Technical Support Document for the License 
Application (McKenzie 2004 [DIRS 170742]). 
The conclusions from this document (FEP Screening Decision, TSPA Disposition for included 
FEPs, or Screening Argument for excluded FEPs), is incorporated in the Yucca Mountain TSPALA 
FEP database. The FEP database will contain all Yucca Mountain FEPs considered for 
TSPA-LA with FEP Number, Name, Description, and relevant FEP AMRs where the 
documentation of the screening of specific FEPs is summarized. The FEP database will also 
contain Screening Decisions (Include or Exclude), Screening Arguments, and TSPA Dispositions 
quoted from this and all other FEP AMRs. 
All FEP information, including the 16 criticality FEPs considered in this report, is submitted to 
Technical Data Management System by the Yucca Mountain FEP database team as a final LA 
FEP list represented by a Data Tracking Number (DTN). Documentation of the FEP database is 
given in a separate technical report, The Development of the Total System Performance 
Assessment License Application Features, Events, and Processes (BSC 2004 [DIRS 168706]). 
These final data are qualified as Technical Product Output from the referenced LP-3.11Q-BSC 
report. The final LA FEP list DTN will supersede all of the previous DTNs (e.g., DTN: 
MO0407SEPFEPLA.000 DIRS [170760]). 

Table 7.2-1. Summary of Criticality FEPs Screening Decisions 
FEP Number FEP Name 
TSPA-LA 
Screening Decision 
Section 
Screening 
Addressed 
2.1.14.15.0A In-package criticality (intact configuration) Excluded  Low Probability Section 6.8.1 
2.1.14.16.0A In-package criticality (degraded 
configurations) Excluded  Low Probability Section 6.8.2 
2.1.14.17.0A Near-field criticality Excluded  Low Probability Section 6.8.3 
2.2.14.09.0A Far-field criticality Excluded  Low Probability Section 6.8.4 
2.1.14.18.0A In-package criticality resulting from a 
seismic event (intact configuration) Excluded  Low Probability Section 6.8.5 
2.1.14.19.0A In-package criticality resulting from a 
seismic event (degraded configurations) Excluded  Low Probability Section 6.8.6 
2.1.14.20.0A Near-field criticality resulting from a 
seismic event Excluded  Low Probability Section 6.8.7 
2.2.14.10.0A Far-field criticality resulting from a seismic 
event Excluded  Low Probability Section 6.8.8 
2.1.14.21.0A In-package criticality resulting from rock 
fall (intact configuration) Excluded  Low Probability Section 6.8.9 
2.1.14.22.0A In-package criticality resulting from rock 
fall (degraded configurations) Excluded  Low Probability Section 6.8.10 
2.1.14.23.0A Near-field criticality resulting from rock fall Excluded  Low Probability Section 6.8.11 
2.2.14.11.0A Far-field criticality resulting from rock fall Excluded  Low Probability Section 6.8.12 
2.1.14.24.0A In-package criticality resulting from an 
igneous event (intact configuration) Excluded  Low Probability Section 6.8.13 
2.1.14.25.0A In-package criticality resulting from an 
igneous event (degraded configurations) Excluded  Low Probability Section 6.8.14 
2.1.14.26.0A Near-field criticality resulting from an 
igneous event Excluded  Low Probability Section 6.8.15 
2.2.14.12.0A Far-field criticality resulting from an 
igneous event Excluded  Low Probability Section 6.8.16 
Source: Section 6.8 
7.3 UNCERTAINTIES AND RESTRICTIONS 
The conclusions of this document may be affected by technical product input information that 
requires confirmation. Any changes to the document that may occur as a result of completing 
the confirmation activities is reflected in subsequent revisions. The status of the input 
information quality may be confirmed by review of the Document Input Reference System 
(DIRS) database. 

7.3.1 Restriction #1: This Screening Analysis is a Draft Demonstration of the Screening 
Methodology 
Waste package specific information has been utilized for the evaluation of 21PWR Absorber 
Plate, 12PWR Absorber Plate, 44BWR Absorber Plate, 24BWR Absorber Plate, and 
5-DHLW/DOE Short waste package types. 
Although assumptions have been made extending other waste package type information inputs to 
the 5DHLW/DOE Long and 2MCO/2DHLW waste package types (Assumption 5.1.13) and 
additional assumptions have been made regarding the 21PWR Control Rod waste package type 
(Assumptions 5.1.3 and 5.1.6), these assumptions require confirmation through additional 
analysis. 
7.3.2 Restriction #2: Time-Dependent Corrosion will not be Available until the TSPA-LA 
is Performed 
Because of the use of corrosion-resistant materials, it is important to assume for this screening 
analysis, corrosion damage to the drip shields and the waste packages is caused only by an early 
failure mechanism (improper heat treatment) and not by the time-dependent corrosion 
mechanisms typically resulting from water dripping onto the drip shield and the waste package 
(Assumptions 5.1.1, 5.1.12, and 5.2.7). Additionally, the detailed time-dependent corrosion 
information for (1) general corrosion, (2) localized corrosion (crevice corrosion and pitting 
corrosion), and (3) stress corrosion cracking, will not be available until the TSPA-LA is 
performed. 
This assumption requires further verification and confirmation when the TSPA-LA calculations 
are published. 

8. INPUTS AND REFERENCES 
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Radioactive Waste Management. ACC: DOC.20040907.0002. 
171622 BSC 2004. Probability of Assembly Compensation for a Misloaded Waste Package. 
CAL-DSU-NU-000009 REV00A. Las Vegas, Nevada: Bechtel SAIC Company. 
ACC: DOC.20040930.0006. 
171690 BSC 2004. Criticality Potential of Waste Packages Affected by Igneous Intrusion. 
CAL-DS0-NU-000005 REV 00A. Las Vegas, Nevada: Bechtel SAIC Company. 
ACC: DOC.20040929.004. 
8.2 CODES, STANDARDS, REGULATIONS, AND PROCEDURES 
156605 10 CFR 63. Energy: Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Wastes in a Geologic 
Repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. Readily available. 
168403 ASTM B 932-04. 2004. Standard Specification for Low-Carbon Nickel-Chromium-
Molybdenum-Gadolinium Alloy Plate, Sheet, and Strip. West Conshohocken, 
Pennsylvania: American Society for Testing and Materials. TIC: 255846. 

AP-2.22Q, Rev. 1, ICN 1. Classification Analyses and Maintenance of the Q-List. 
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste 
Management. ACC: DOC.20040714.0002. 
AP-3.15Q, Rev. 4, ICN 5. Managing Technical Product Inputs. Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management. 
ACC: DOC.20040812.004. 
AP-SIII.9Q, Rev. 1, ICN 7. Scientific Analyses. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department 
of Energy, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management. ACC: 
DOC.20040920.0001. 
AP-SV.1Q, Rev. 1, ICN 1. Control of the Electronic Management of Information. 
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste 
Management. ACC: DOC.20040308.0001. 
LP-SI.11Q-BSC, Rev. 0, ICN 1. Software Management. Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Department of Energy, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management. ACC: 
DOC.20041005.0008. 
8.3 SOURCE DATA, LISTED BY DATA TRACKING NUMBER 
163687 LB0304SMDCREV2.002. Seepage Modeling for Performance Assessment, 
Including Drift Collapse: Summary Plot Files and Tables. Submittal date: 
04/11/2003. 
163906 LB0104AMRU0185.012. Section 6.4.2 Focusing and Discrete Flow Paths in the 
TSW - Data Summary. Submittal date: 05/15/2001. 
164337 LB0307SEEPDRCL.002. Seepage Into Collapsed Drift: Data Summary. Submittal 
date: 07/21/2003. 
165891 LA0310AM831341.002. Saturated Zone Distribution Coefficients (Kds) for U, Np, 
Pu, Cs, Am, Pa, SR, Th, Ra, C, Tc, and I. Submittal date: 10/21/2003. 
166116 LB0310AMRU0120.002. Mathcad 11 Spreadsheets for Probabilistic Seepage 
Evaluation. Submittal date: 10/23/2003. 
171833 MO0409SPACALSS.005. Computational Algorithm for the Seismic Scenario for 
TSPA. Submittal date: 09/22/2004. 
170760 MO0407SEPFEPLA.000. LA FEP List. Submittal date: 07/20/2004. 
8.4 SOFTWARE CODES 
160873 BSC 2002. Software Code: SAPHIRE. V7.18. PC - Windows 2000/NT 4.0. 
10325-7.18-00. 

INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

9. APPENDICES 
Appendix Title 
A Glossary 
B SAPHIRE Model Used for Criticality FEPs Screening Analysis 
Seepage Analysis Spreadsheets (Output from MATHCAD Files) 
D Waste Package Filling Probabilities (Output from MATHCAD File) 
E Description of Event Tree Top Events 
F Listing of Files on CD-ROM 
G Read-Only Compact Disc (CD-ROM) 

INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

APPENDIX A
GLOSSARY

INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Absorption 
Advection 
Aleatory 
Burnup1 
Chain reaction1 
Cladding1 
Critical condition 
Critical limit 
Criticality1 
APPENDIX A - GLOSSARY 
(1) 
To take in and make part of an existent whole. 
(2) 
To receive without recoil. 
(1) 
The usually horizontal movement of a mass of fluid (as air or an 
ocean current). 
(2) 
The process in which solutes are transported by groundwater 
movement. 
Having a random character, in the sense that the likelihood of taking 
place over various intervals of time can be estimated, but it is not 
possible to determine whether or not, they will actually occur. See 
epistemic. 
A measure of nuclear reactor fuel consumption expressed either as the 
percentage of fuel atoms that have undergone fission or as the amount of 
energy produced per unit weight of fuel. 
A continuing series of nuclear fission events. Neutrons produced by a 
split nucleus collide with and split other nuclei causing a chain of fission 
events. 
The metal outer sheath of a fuel rod generally made of a zirconium alloy, 
and in the early nuclear power reactors, of stainless steel. Intended to 
protect the uranium dioxide pellets, which are the nuclear fuel, from 
dissolution by exposure to high temperature water under operating 
conditions in a reactor. 
A self-sustaining nuclear fission chain reaction: When the number of 
neutrons resulting from fission in each generation equals the number of 
neutrons lost by both absorption and leakage in the preceding generation. 
In this circumstance the effective neutron multiplication factor equals 
one (keff= 1). 
The value of keff at which a configuration is considered potentially 
critical, as characterized by statistical tolerance limits. 
(1) A condition that would require the original waste form, which is part 
of the waste package, to be exposed to degradation, followed by 
conditions that would allow concentration of sufficient nuclear fuel, the 
presence of neutron moderators, the absence of neutron absorbers, and 
favorable geometry. (2) The condition in which a fissile material 
sustains a chain reaction. It occurs when the number of neutrons present 
in one generation cycle equals the number generated in the previous 
cycle. The state is considered critical when a self-sustaining nuclear 
chan reaction is ongoing. 

Criticality analysis 
Criticality control 
Criticality, fast 
Criticality, thermal 
Disposal2 
Disruptive event1 
Drift1 
Effective neutron 
multiplication factor 
Engineered barrier system2 
Epistemic 
A mathematical analysis, usually performed with a computer, of the 
neutron multiplication factor of a system or configuration that contains 
material capable of undergoing a self-sustaining chain reaction. 
The suite of measures taken to control the occurrence of self-sustaining 
nuclear chain reactions in fissionable materials, including spent nuclear 
fuel. For postclosure disposal applications, criticality control is ensuring 
that the probability of a criticality event is so small that the occurrence is 
unlikely, and the risk that any criticality will violate repository 
performance objectives is negligible. 
A critical condition where fast (high-energy) neutrons sustain the fission 
process. 
A critical condition where thermal (low-energy) neutrons sustain the 
fission process. 
The emplacement of radioactive waste in a geological repository with the 
intent of leaving it in there permanently. 
An off-normal event that, in the case of the repository, includes volcanic 
activity, seismic activity, and nuclear criticality. Disruptive events have 
two possible effects: (1) direct release of radioactivity to the surface, or 
(2) alteration of the nominal behavior of the system. For the purposes of 
screening features, events, and processes for total system performance 
assessment, a disruptive event is defined as an event that has a significant 
effect on the expected annual dose and that has a probability of 
occurrence during the 10,000 year period of performance less than 1.0, 
but greater than a cutoff of 0.0001. 
From mining terminology, a horizontal, underground, passage. The 
nearly horizontal underground passageways from the shaft(s) to the 
alcoves and rooms. Drifts includes excavations for emplacement 
(emplacement drifts) and access (access mains). 
See critical condition. 
The waste packages, including engineered components and systems other 
than the waste package (e.g., drip shields), and the underground facility. 
Refers to the state of knowledge about a parameter because the data may 
be limited or because there may be alternative interpretations of the 
available data. The state of knowledge about the exact value of the 
parameter can increase through testing and data collection such that the 
uncertainty is reducible. See aleatory. 

Events1 
Far-field 
Far-field for criticality 
Features1 
Fissile materials 
Fissionable materials 
High-level waste 
High-level radioactive waste 
Initiating event2 
keff 
License application1 
(1) Occurrences that have a specific starting time and, usually, a duration 
shorter than the time being simulated in a model. (2) Uncertain 
occurrences that take place within a short time relative to the time frame 
of the model. For the purposes of screening features, events, and 
processes for total system performance assessment, an event is defined to 
be a natural or human-caused phenomenon that has a potential to affect 
disposal system performance and that occurs during an interval that is 
short compared with the period of performance. 
With reference to processes, those occurring at the scale of the mountain. 
The area of the geosphere and biosphere far enough away from the 
geological repository that, when numerically modeled, represents 
releases from the geological repository as a homogeneous, single-source 
effect. 
Far-field for criticality is defined as the space beyond the drift wall (i.e., 
in the host rock of the geological repository). 
Physical, chemical, thermal or temporal characteristics of the site or 
repository system. For the purpose of screening features, events, and 
processes for total system performance assessment, a feature is defined 
to be an object, structure or condition that has a potential to affect 
disposal system performance. 
Fissile materials are those materials that will undergo fission with 
thermal (slow) neutrons. The three primary fissile materials are 
uranium-233, uranium-235, and plutonium-239. 
Fissionable materials are those materials that will undergo fission by 
neutrons with sufficient energy. Note that while all fissile materials are 
fissionable, the reverse is not true. Although fissile, rather than 
fissionable, is used in most places in this report, fissionable may be 
applicable in some configurations. 
See high-level radioactive waste. 
(1) 
The highly radioactive material resulting from the reprocessing of 
spent nuclear fuel, including liquid waste produced directly in 
reprocessing, and any solid material derived from such liquid waste 
that contains fission products in sufficient concentration. 
(2) 
Other highly radioactive materials that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, consistent with existing law, determines by rule require 
permanent isolation. 
A natural or human induced event that causes an event sequence. 
Effective neutron multiplication factor. 
An application to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission for a license 
to construct and operate a repository. 

Lithophysae 
Lithophysal 
Near-field1 
Near-field for criticality 
Neutron, fast 
Neutron, thermal 
Neutron leakage 
Neutron moderator 
Nuclear fission 
Performance assessment2 
Period of performance 
Permanent closure2 
Voids having concentric shells of finely crystalline alkali feldspar, 
quartz, and other materials that were formed by entrapped gas that later 
escaped. 
Pertaining to tuff units with lithophysae. 
The area and conditions within the geological repository including the 
drifts and waste packages and the rock immediately surrounding the 
drifts. The region around the repository where the natural hydrogeologic 
system has been significantly impacted by the excavation of the 
repository and the emplacement of waste. 
The area outside the waste package and inside the drift wall (including 
the drift liner and invert). 
A neutron with kinetic energy greater than its surroundings when 
released during fission. 
A neutron that has (by collision with other particles) been slowed to an 
energy state equal to that of its surroundings, typically on the order of 
0.025 eV (electron volts) and having a velocity of approximately 
2,200 m/s. 
The fraction of neutrons lost as result of escape from a fissile system. 
A material such as ordinary water, heavy water, or graphite that is used 
to slow down fast (high-energy) neutrons to thermal (low-energy) 
neutrons, thus increasing the likelihood of fission. 
The act of splitting a nucleus into two or more nuclei, resulting in the 
release of two or more neutrons and a relatively large amount of energy. 
A probabilistic analysis that: 
(1) 
Identifies the features, events, and processes that might affect the 
performance of the geological repository; 
(2) 
Examines the effects of those features, events, and processes on the 
performance of the geological repository; and 
(3) 
Estimates the consequences (e.g., radiological exposures to the 
reasonably maximally exposed individual, radionuclide releases to 
the accessible environment) of releases from the geologic repository. 
10,000 years after permanent closure of the geologic repository. 
Final back-filling of the main access drifts of the underground facility, if 
appropriate, and the sealing of shafts, ramps, and boreholes. 

Probabilistic1 
Probability1 
Probability distribution1 
Processes1 
Pyroclastic 
Safety analysis, preclosure2 
Saturated zone2 
Scenario1 
Scenario class1 
(1) Based on or subject to probability. (2) Involving a variate, such as 
temperature or porosity. At each instance of time, the variate may take 
on any of the values of a specified set with a certain probability. Data 
from a probabilistic process are an ordered set of observations, each of 
which is one item from a probability distribution. 
The chance that an outcome will occur from the set of possible 
outcomes. Statistical probability examines actual events and can be 
verified by observation or sampling. Knowledge of the exact probability 
of an event is usually limited by the inability to know, or compile, the 
complete set of possible outcomes over time or space, a degree of belief. 
The set of outcomes (values) and their corresponding probabilities for a 
random variable. 
Phenomena and activities that have gradual, continuous interactions with 
the system being modeled. For purposes of screening features, events, 
and processes for total system performance assessment, a process is 
defined as a natural or human-caused phenomenon that has a potential to 
affect disposal system performance and that operates during all or a 
significant part of the period of performance. 
Of or relating to individual particles or fragments of clastic rock material 
of any size formed by volcanic explosion or ejected from a volcanic vent. 
A systematic examination of the site; the design; and the potential 
hazards, initiating events, and event sequences and their consequences 
(e.g., radiological exposures to workers and the public). The analysis 
identifies structures, systems, and components important to safety. 
That part of the earths crust beneath the regional water table in which all 
voids, large and small, are ideally filled with water under pressure 
greater than atmospheric. See also unsaturated zone. 
A well-defined, connected sequence of features, events, and processes 
that can be thought of as an outline of a future condition of the repository 
system. Scenarios can be undisturbed, in which case the performance 
would be expected, or nominal, behavior for the system. Scenarios can 
also be disturbed, if altered by disruptive events such as human intrusion 
or natural phenomena such as volcanism or nuclear criticality. 
A set of related scenarios that share sufficient similarities that they can 
usefully be aggregated for the purposes of screening or analysis. The 
number and breadth of scenario classes depends on the resolution at 
which scenarios have been defined. Coarsely defined scenarios result in 
fewer, broad scenario classes, whereas narrowly defined scenarios result 
in many narrow scenario classes. Scenario classes (and scenarios) 
should be aggregated at the coarsest level at which a technically sound 
argument can be made, while still retaining adequate detail for the 
purposes of analysis. 

Seepage1 
Seismic1 
Spent nuclear fuel1 
Uncertainty1 
Unsaturated zone2 
Variability (statistical)1 
Waste form2 
Water table2 
The inflow of groundwater moving in fractures or pore spaces of 
permeable rock to an open space in the rock such as a drift. Seepage rate 
is the percolation flux that enters the drift. Seepage is an important 
factor in waste package degradation and mobilization and migration of 
radionuclides out of the repository. 
Pertaining to, characteristic of, or produced by earthquakes or earth 
vibrations. 
Fuel that has been withdrawn from a nuclear reactor following 
irradiation, the constituent elements of which have not been separated by 
reprocessing. Spent fuel that has been burned (irradiated) in a reactor to 
the extent that it no longer makes an efficient contribution to a nuclear 
chain reaction. This fuel is more radioactive than it was before 
irradiation, and releases significant amounts of heat from the decay of its 
fission product radionuclides. See burnup. 
A measure of how much a calculated or estimated value varies from the 
unknown true value. 
The zone between the land surface and the regional water table. 
Generally, fluid pressure in this zone is less than atmospheric pressure, 
and some of the voids may contain air or other gases at atmospheric 
pressure. Beneath flooded areas or in perched water bodies, the fluid 
pressure locally may be greater than atmospheric. 
A measure of how a quantity varies over time or space. 
The radioactive waste materials and any encapsulating or stabilizing 
matrix. 
That surface in a groundwater body, separating the unsaturated zone 
from the saturated zone, at which the water pressure is atmospheric. 
1 
Definition cited from glossary of Yucca Mountain Review Plan (NRC 2003 [DIRS 163274]). 
2 
Definition cited from 10 CFR 63.2 (10 CFR 63 [DIRS 156605]). 

APPENDIX B
SAPHIRE ANALYSIS USED FOR CRITICALITY FEPS SCREENING ANALYSIS

INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

APPENDIX B - SAPHIRE ANALYSIS USED FOR CRITICALTY 
FEPS SCREENING ANALYSIS 
The SAPHIRE analysis used for the evaluation of the criticality FEPs screening analysis is based 
on the configuration generator (BSC 2004 [DIRS 168552]). The event trees used in the 
SAPHIRE criticality FEPs analysis are presented and discussed in Section B.1. The logic rules 
used to assign the basic event probabilities and direct the evaluation of the event trees are 
presented in Sections B.2 through B.22 The basic event values used in this analysis are 
presented in Section B.23 and the SAPHIRE-calculated end-state results are presented in 
Section B.24. 
B.1 SAPHIRE EVENT TREES 
Figures B-1 through B-27, taken from Attachment I of Configuration Generator Model (BSC 
2004 [DIRS 168552]), present the event trees used in the criticality FEPs screening analysis. 
Figure B-1 presents the WPWF event tree used for determining the waste form and waste 
package type inventory fraction. Figure B-2 presents the WP01-21-PWR-AP event tree used 
to initiate the criticality FEPs screening analysis of the 21-PWR Absorber Plate waste package 
type. This event tree is an example of the 22 waste package type event trees defined in 
Table 6.2-2. Figure B-3 presents the YMPINITEVENTS event tree for directing the 
SAPHIRE evaluation of the criticality FEPs cases  base case, seismic disruptive event, rock fall 
disruptive event, and the igneous disruptive event. Figures B-4 and B-5 presents the MSLET 
and MSLET2 event trees for initiating the evaluation of the configuration classes of the 
master scenario list (YMP 2003 [DIRS 165505], Section 3.3). The event trees of Figures B-6 
through B-13 detail the events and processes necessary for the formation and evaluation of in-
package configuration classes. The event trees of Figures B-14 through B-20 detail the events 
and processes necessary for the formation and evaluation of near-field configuration classes. 
The event trees of Figures B-21 through B-23 detail the events and processes necessary for the 
formation and evaluation of far-field configuration classes. Finally, Figures B-24 through B-27 
present the event trees required for the formation and evaluation of configuration classes 
resulting from an igneous disruptive event. 

Screening Analysis of Criticality Features, Events, and Processes for License Application 
WP 
ion 
#WP-TYPE 
Waste Package Type 
Percentages 
WF-TYPE-PERC 
Waste Form 
Type Percentages 
WF-SOURCE 
Waste Form Source 
Percentages 
Waste Package 
FractEND-STATE Frequency 
WP-21-PWR-AP 3.822E-001 
WP-21-PWR-CR 8.426E-003 
WP-12-PWR-AP 1.450E-002 
WP-44-BWR-AP 2.516E-001 
WP-24-BWR-AP 7.462E-003 
WP-DOE-1-SHORT 4.453E-004 
WP-DOE-1-LONG 5.430E-003 
WP-DOE-2-SHORT 1.466E-002 
WP-DOE-3-SHORT 1.423E-003WP-DOE-3-LONG 3.563E-004WP-DOE-3-MCO 1.956E-002WP-DOE-4-SHORT 5.823E-002WP-DOE-4-LONG 3.736E-003WP-DOE-5-SHORT 1.776E-003WP-DOE-5-LONG 6.480E-003WP-DOE-6-LONG 5.380E-002WP-DOE-7-SHORT 1.090E-001WP-DOE-7-LONG 8.727E-005WP-DOE-8-SHORT 1.246E-003WP-DOE-8-LONG 1.691E-003WP-DOE-9-SHORT 7.103E-004WP-DOE-9-LONG 3.058E-002WP-NAVAL-SHORT 1.282E-002WP-NAVAL-LONG 1.388E-002 
21-PWR Absorber Plate (38.21% of inventory) 
1PWR (40.51% of inventory) 
21-PWR Control Rod (0.84% of inventory) 
2
Commercial SNF (66.42% of inventory) 
12-PWR Absorber Plate (1.45% of inventory) 
3
44-BWR Absorber Plate (25.16% of inventory) 
BWR (25.91% of total inventory) 
4
24-BWR Absorber Plate (0.75% of inventory) 
5DOE Short (0.04% of inventory) 
Mixed Oxide (0.59% of inventory) 
6
DOE Long (0.54% of inventory) 
7
Uranium-Zirconium Hydride 
(1.47% of inventory) DOE Short (1.47% of inventory) 
8
DOE Short (0.14% of inventory) 
9
Uranium Metal (2.13% of inventory) 
DOE Long (0.04% of inventory) 
10 
DOE MCO (1.96% of inventory) 
11 
High-Enriched Uranium Oxide DOE Short (5.82% of inventory) 
(6.20% of inventory) 
12 
DOE Long (0.37% of inventory) 
Waste Package Fraction 
13 
DOE SNF (30.91% of inventory) Uranium/Thorium Oxide DOE Short (0.18% of inventory) 
(0.83% of inventory) 
14 
DOE Long (0.65% of inventory) 
15
Uranium/Thorium Carbide 
(5.38% of inventory) DOE Long (5.38% of inventory) 
16 
DOE Short (10.90% of inventory) 
Aluminum Based (10.91% of inventory) 
17 
DOE Long (0.01% of inventory) 
18 
DOE Short (0.12% of inventory) 
Uranium-Zirconium/Uranium-Molybdenum 
19 
(0.29% of inventory) 
DOE Long (0.17% of inventory) 
20 
DOE Short (0.07% of inventory) 
Low-Enriched Uranium Oxide 
21 
(3.13% of inventory) 
DOE Long (3.06% of inventory) 
22 
Naval Short (1.28% of inventory) 
Naval SNF (2.67% of inventory) 
23 
Naval Long (1.39% of inventory) 
24 
Figure B-1. Waste Form and Waste Package Type Inventory Fraction Event Tree  WP-WF 
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01 B-4 of B-104 October 2004 

PASS THROUGHi# END-STATE 
1 TPASS WP01-21-PWR-AP 
Initiatng Event of 
21-PWR Absorber Plate 
Waste Package Type 
YMP-INIT-EVENTS 
Figure B-2. Example of Waste Package Type Event Tree  WP01-21-PWR-AP 
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01 B-5 of B-104 October 2004 

Screening Analysis of Criticality Features, Events, and Processes for License Application 
ilof EmplSeiies 
il 
iii#DRIFT-ZONE 
Geologca Zone 
acement 
Drifts 
SEIS-DAMAGE 
Seismic Event 
Damage Type 
SEIS-RANGE 
smic FrequencBrokennto Decade 
Ranges 
INIT-EVENT 
Different PotentiaInitiatng Events 
YMP-INIT-EVENTS 
Incomng Waste 
Package Type 
Identfier 
END-STATE 
MSL-ET 
MSL-ET 
MSL-ET 
MSL-ET 
MSL-ET 
MSL-ET 
MSL-ET 
MSL-ET 
MSL-ET 
MSL-ET 
MSL-ET 
MSL-ET 
MSL-ET 
MSL-ET 
MSL-ET 
MSL-ET 
MSL-ET 
MSL-ET 
IGNEOUS 
IGNEOUS 
Base Case Nonlithophysal 
1T
Lithophysal 
2T
Ground Motion Nonlithophysal 
3TSeismic Frequency 
1E-8 to 2E-8 Lithophysal 
4T
Nonlithophysal 
5T
Faulting 
Lithophysal 
6T
Ground Motion Nonlithophysal 
7TSeismic Frequency 
2E-8 to 6E-8 Lithophysal 
8T
Nonlithophysal 
9TSeismic Disruptive Event Faulting 
Lithophysal
WP Type 
10 T
Ground Motion Nonlithophysal 
11 TSeismic Frequency 
Lithophysal
6E-8 to 2E-7 
12 T
Nonlithophysal 
13 T
Faulting 
Lithophysal 
14 TSeismic Frequency 
2E-7 to 1E-4 Nonlithophysal 
15 T
Lithophysal 
16 T
Rock Fall Disruptive Event Nonlithophysal 
17 T
Lithophysal 
18 T
Igneous Disruptive Event Nonlithophysal 
19 T
Lithophysal 
20 T
Figure B-3. Criticality FEPs Case Assignment Event Tree  YMP-INIT-EVENTS 
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01 B-6 of B-104 October 2004 

Iliipdriily 
Infi 
(l 
ilios) 
# 
1 T 
2 T 
3 T 
4 T 
5 T 
6 T 
7 T 
8 T 
9 TNO 
NO 
(lil) 
NO 
NO 
NO 
) 
il) 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
) 
NO 
) 
NO 
NO 
) 
MS-IC-1B 
Condensation 
water reaches 
waste package 
MSC-
2 
Drip Shield Faiure 
Allowng Water to dron Waste Package 
MS-NF-T 
Water that reaches 
ft flows drectto invert 
MS-IC-1A 
ltration water 
reaches drift 
MSL-ET 
Master Scenario 
Listpotentiacritca scenar 
END-STATE 
MSL-ET2 
MSL-ET2 
MSL-ET2 
MSL-ET2 
MSL-ET2 
MSL-ET2 
CONFIG-NF4 
MSL-ET2 
MSL-ET2 
10 T MSL-ET2 
11 T MSL-ET2 
12 T CONFIG-NF4 
13 T MSL-ET2 
14 T MSL-ET2 
15 T MSL-ET2 
16 T MSL-ET2 
17 T CONFIG-NF4 
Master Scenario List 
YES 
ower bound 
inftrationYES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
(mean infiltrationYES 
(upper bound 
inftrationYES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES (NF-4 TRANSFERYES (NF-4 TRANSFERYES (NF-4 TRANSFER
Figure B-4. Master Scenario List Event Tree  MSL-ET 
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01 B-7 of B-104 October 2004 

Screening Analysis of Criticality Features, Events, and Processes for License Application 
ial ofMisload 
isload 
LiiConfi#CRIT-POT-WF 
Criticality 
PotentWaste Form 
WF-MISLOAD 
Waste Form 
NA-MISLOAD 
Neutron 
Absorber 
Material MMS-IC-4 
qud Fills 
Waste Package 
MS-IC-3B 
Bathtub 
guration 
Forms 
MS-IC-3A 
Waste Package 
Penetration 
MSL-ET2 
Transfer from 
MSL-ET 
END-STATE 
@END-ANALYSIS 
@END-ANALYSIS 
IP-DRY 
@END-ANALYSIS 
IP-DRY 
@END-ANALYSIS 
IP-DRY 
@END-ANALYSIS 
IP-DRY 
CONFIG-NOBATH 
CONFIG-NOBATH 
CONFIG-BATH 
CONFIG-BATH 
CONFIG-BATH 
CONFIG-BATH 
CONFIG-BATH 
CONFIG-BATH 
CONFIG-BATH 
CONFIG-BATH 
NO 
1NO POTENTIAL 
2NO YES POTENTIAL 
3NO NO POTENTIAL 
4YES YES POTENTIAL 
YES (diffusive) 
5NO POTENTIAL 
6NO YES POTENTIAL 
7YES NO POTENTIAL 
8YES YES POTENTIAL 
9
Flow-Through NO 
10 TConfiguration 
YES 
11 T
NO 
12 TNO
YES (advective) 
YES 
13 T
YES 
(lower bound 
infiltration) NO 
14 T
YES
Bathtub 
15 T
Configuration
YES
(mean infiltration) NO 
16 T
YES 
17 T
YES 
(upper bound 
infiltration) NO 
18 T
YES 
19 T
Figure B-5. Master Scenario List Event Tree  Continued  MSL-ET2 
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01 B-8 of B-104 October 2004 

Screening Analysis of Criticality Features, Events, and Processes for License Application 
lity 
l of 
Ili liis 
iIlIilIlliii# 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
11 
14 
16 
18 
20 
NO 
IIINO 
(If) 
I) 
YES () 
I(I) 
IYES () 
fig 
ial 
ial 
ial 
ial 
ial 
ial 
ial 
ial 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO2004/07/09 
CRIT-POT-WF 
CriticaPotentiaWaste Form 
WF-MSLOAD 
Waste Form 
Misoad 
MS-IC-12 
Waste package 
bottom fails, 
draningquid 
MS-IC-11 
Degraded WF 
mobilized, separatng 
from intact 
neutron absorbers 
MS-IC-10 
Waste package 
internal structures 
degrade 
MSC-
9 
Waste form 
degrades in 
place 
MS-IC-8 
Waste Package 
interna structures 
degrade faster than 
waste form 
MSC-
7 
Waste Package 
nterna structures 
degrade at same 
rate as WF 
MSC-
6 
Waste Package 
interna structures 
degrade sower than 
waste form 
CONFIG-SCEN 
Confguration 
Scenaro Set Up 
CONFIG-BATH 
Bathtub 
Configuratons 
END-STATE 
@END-ANALYSIS 
@END-ANALYSIS 
@END-ANALYSIS 
@END-ANALYSIS 
IP-1A 
@END-ANALYSIS 
IP-1A 
@END-ANALYSIS 
@END-ANALYSIS 
10 IP-1B@END-ANALYSIS 
12 IP-1B 
13 T CONFIG-NF-F@END-ANALYSIS 
15 T CONFIG-IP2-D@END-ANALYSIS 
17 T CONFIG-IP4-A@END-ANALYSIS 
19 T CONFIG-IP2-D@END-ANALYSIS 
21 T CONFIG-IP3 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES (P-1) 
YES (P-1) 
YES (P-4) 
YESP-2 Transer DYES (P-3 TransferIP-1AYES (P-1B) 
YES P-4 Transfer AYES (P-2) 
IP-2 Transfer DBathtub ConNo PotentYes PotentNo PotentYes PotentYES (NF Transfer F) 
No PotentNo PotentYes PotentYes PotentYES 
YES 
CONFIG-BATH - Bathtub Configuration Event Tree 
Figure B-6. Bathtub Configuration Event Tree  CONFIG-BATH 
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01 B-9 of B-104 October 2004 

i# 
1 
2 
3 T 
4 
5 T 
6 
7 TNO 
) 
NO 
) 
NO 
NO 
MS-IC-31 
Waste Package 
internal structures 
degrade faster than 
waste form 
MS-IC-30 
Waste Package 
internal structures 
degrade at same 
rate as WF 
MS-IC-29 
Waste Package 
internal structures 
degrade slower than 
waste form 
CONFIG-SCEN 
Configuraton 
Scenario Set Up 
CONFIG-NOBATH 
No Bathtub 
Configurations 
END-STATE 
@END-ANALYSIS 
@END-ANALYSIS 
CONFIG-IP4-A 
@END-ANALYSIS 
CONFIG-IP5-B 
@END-ANALYSIS 
CONFIG-IP6-C 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES (IP-4 Transfer AYES (IP-5 Transfer B) 
YES (IP-6 Transfer CNo Bathtub Config 
Figure B-7. Flow-Through Configuration Event Tree  CONFIG-NOBATH 
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01 B-10 of B-104 October 2004 

Screening Analysis of Criticality Features, Events, and Processes for License Application 
liial ofli liquid 
lflcolliiCli) 
#CRIT-POT-WF 
Criticaty 
PotentWaste Form 
WF-MISLOAD 
Waste Form 
Misoad 
MS-IC-15 
Waste package 
bottom fails, 
draningMS-IC-14 
Solube neutron 
absorbers 
ushed from 
waste package 
MS-IC-13 
Degraded WF and 
WP components 
ect at bottom 
of waste package 
CONFIG-IP2-D 
Confguraton 
ass IP-2 Process 
(transfer pont DEND-STATE 
@END-ANALYSIS 
@END-ANALYSIS 
@END-ANALYSIS 
IP-2A 
@END-ANALYSIS 
IP-2A 
@END-ANALYSIS 
CONFIG-IP5-B 
CONFIG-IP2-D - Configuration IP-2 Transfer Point D 2004/07/09 
NO 
YES (IP-2) 
IP-2 (Transfer D) 
YES (IP-2A) 
YES (IP-5) 
1 
2
NO POTENTIAL 
3
NO 
YES POTENTIAL 
4
NO POTENTIAL 
5
YES 
YES POTENTIAL 
6 
7
YES (IP-5 Transfer B) 
8T
Figure B-8. Configuration Class IP-2 Event Tree  CONFIG-IP2-D 
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01 B-11 of B-104 October 2004 

Screening Analysis of Criticality Features, Events, and Processes for License Application 
llining liillSiifiliiii#
1IS 
2IS 
3IS 
45IS 
67IS 
8IS 
9NO 
NO 
) 
) 
NO 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
fINO 
IIIIINO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO2004/07/09 
CRIT-POT-WF 
Criticaity 
Potential of 
Waste Form 
WF-MISLOAD 
Waste Form 
Misoad 
MS-IC-24 
Waste Package 
bottom fails, 
draquid 
MS-IC-23 
Waste Package 
nternal structures 
mechanicay collapse 
and degrade 
MS-IC-22 
gncant neutron 
absorber degradation 
before structural 
collapse 
MS-IC-18 
Soluble neutron 
absorbers fushed 
from degraded 
porton of basket 
MS-IC-17 
Structures 
containing 
neutron absorbers 
fully degrade 
MS-IC-16 
Basket structure 
supports 
mechanically 
collapse 
CONFIG-SCEN 
Confguraton 
Scenario Set Up 
CONFIG-IP3 
Configuraton 
Class IP-3 
END-STATE 
@END-ANALYS 
@END-ANALYS 
@END-ANALYS 
IP-3A 
@END-ANALYS 
IP-3A 
@END-ANALYS 
@END-ANALYS 
IP-3B 
10 @END-ANALYSIS 
11 IP-3B 
12 @END-ANALYSIS 
13 T CONFIG-IP3-G 
14 @END-ANALYSIS 
15 @END-ANALYSIS 
16 IP-3D 
17 @END-ANALYSIS 
18 IP-3D 
19 @END-ANALYSIS 
20 T CONFIG-IP3-G 
21 @END-ANALYSIS 
22 T CONFIG-IP6-C 
YES 
YES (IP-3YES (IP-3C Transfer GYES 
YES (IP-3DYES (IP-3YES (IP-3C Transfer GYES (IP-6YES (IP-6 Transfer CYES (IP-3AYES (IP-3YES (IP-3BIP-3 (Transer) 
NO POTENTIAL 
YES POTENTAL 
YES 
NO POTENTIAL 
NO POTENTIAL 
NO POTENTIAL 
NO POTENTIAL 
NO POTENTIAL 
YES POTENTAL 
YES POTENTAL 
YES POTENTAL 
YES POTENTAL 
YES POTENTAL 
YES 
YES 
CONFIG-IP3 - Configuration IP-3 Sub Event Tree 
Figure B-9. Configuration Class IP-3 Event Tree  CONFIG-IP3 
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01 B-12 of B-104 October 2004 

Screening Analysis of Criticality Features, Events, and Processes for License Application 
liloadil 
liquid 
lizing 
ll 
lliiiii() 
# 
Confi2004/07/09 
CRIT-POT-WF 
Criticaty 
Potential of 
Waste Form 
WF-MISLOAD 
Waste Form 
MisMS-IC-21 
Waste Package 
bottom fas, 
drainingMS-IC-20 
Waste Form 
degrades mobifissie materiaMS-IC-19 
Souble neutron 
absorbers fushed 
from waste 
package 
CONFIG-SCEN 
Confguraton 
Scenaro Set Up 
CONFIG-IP3-G 
Confguraton 
Class IP-3 
transfer point G 
END-STATE 
@END-ANALYSIS 
@END-ANALYSIS 
@END-ANALYSIS 
IP-3C 
@END-ANALYSIS 
IP-3C 
@END-ANALYSIS 
CONFIG-IP2-D 
@END-ANALYSIS 
CONFIG-IP6-C 
CONFIG-IP3-G -guration IP-3 Transfer Point G 
NO 
1
2
NO POTENTIAL 
YES (IP-3) 
3
NO
YES POTENTIAL 
4
YES (IP-3C) 
NO POTENTIAL 
IP-3C (Transfer G) 
5
YES 
YES POTENTIAL 
6
7
YES (IP-2) 
YES (IP-2 Transfer D) 
8T
9
YES (IP-6) 
YES (IP-6 Transfer C) 
10 T
Figure B-10. Continuation of Configuration Class IP-3 Event Tree  CONFIG-IP3-G 
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01 B-13 of B-104 October 2004 

Screening Analysis of Criticality Features, Events, and Processes for License Application 
Misload 
Iis 
liiiIiIiialiiiiiiCl(i) 
#
i2004/06/28 
CRIT-POT-WF 
Criticality 
Potential of 
Waste Form 
WF-MISLOAD 
Waste Form 
MSC-
34 
Degraded WF 
mobized, separatng 
from neutron 
absorbers and hydratng 
MSC-
33 
Waste Package 
nternal structures 
degrade 
MSC-
32 
Waste Form 
degradaton 
products hydrate 
in init locaton 
CONFIG-SCEN 
Confguraton 
Scenaro Set Up 
CONFIG-IP4-A 
Confguraton 
ass IP-4 Process 
transfer pont A 
END-STATE 
@END-ANALYSIS 
@END-ANALYSIS 
@END-ANALYSIS 
IP-4A 
@END-ANALYSIS 
IP-4A 
@END-ANALYSIS 
@END-ANALYSIS 
IP-4B 
@END-ANALYSIS 
IP-4B 
@CONFIG-NF-F 
@END-ANALYSIS 
CONFIG-IP5-B 
CONFIG-IP4-A - Confguration IP-4 Transfer Point A 
NO 
1
NO 
2
No Potential 
3
YES 
NO
Yes Potential 
4
YES (IP-4A) 
No Potential 
5
YES 
Yes Potential 
6
NO
IP-4 (Transfer A) 
7
No Potential 
8
NO 
Yes Potential 
9
YES (IP-4B) 
YES 
No Potential 
10
YES 
Yes Potential 
11
YES (NF Transfer F) 
12
NO 
13
YES 
YES (IP-5 Transfer B) 
14 T
Figure B-11. Configuration Class IP-4 Event Tree  CONFIG-IP4-A 
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01 B-14 of B-104 October 2004 

Screening Analysis of Criticality Features, Events, and Processes for License Application 
CrilIFlflilIllect 
ii) 
#
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 T 
NO 
) 
NO 
2004/06/28 
CRIT-POT-WF 
ticality 
Potential of 
Waste Form 
WF-MISLOAD 
Waste Form 
Misoad 
MSC-
36 
ow-through 
ushng removes 
souble neutron 
absorbers 
MSC-
35 
Hydrated WF and 
WP degraded internal 
components coat bottom of WP 
CONFIG-IP5-B 
Configuraton 
Class IP-5 Process 
(transfer pont B 
END-STATE 
@END-ANALYSIS 
@END-ANALYSIS 
@END-ANALYSIS 
IP-5A 
@END-ANALYSIS 
IP-5A 
CONFIG-NF-F 
YES (IP-5) 
IP-5 (Transfer B) 
YES (IP-5A) 
YES (NF Transfer FNO POTENTIAL 
YES POTENTIAL 
NO POTENTIAL 
YES POTENTIAL 
YES 
CONFIG-IP5-B - Configuration IP-5 Transfer Point B 
Figure B-12. Configuration Class IP-5 Event Tree  CONFIG-IP5-B 
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01 B-15 of B-104 October 2004 

Screening Analysis of Criticality Features, Events, and Processes for License Application 
CritiMisloadlwhilllizing fiile 
l 
Flfllimixed wiiiiCl() 
# 
ConfiCRIT-POT-WF 
cality 
Potential of 
Waste Form 
WF-MISLOAD 
Waste Form 
MS-IC-40 
Waste package 
mosty degrades 
e waste form 
largey intact 
MS-IC-39 
Waste form 
degrades 
mobissmateriaMS-IC-38 
ow-through 
ushing removes 
souble neutron 
absorbers 
MS-IC-37 
Intact WF settles 
n bottom of WP, 
th hydrated 
WP corroson products 
CONFIG-IP6-C 
Confguraton 
ass IP-6 Process 
transfer point CEND-STATE 
@END-ANALYSIS 
@END-ANALYSIS 
@END-ANALYSIS 
IP-6A 
@END-ANALYSIS 
IP-6A 
CONFIG-NF-F 
@END-ANALYSIS 
CONFIG-IP5-B 
@END-ANALYSIS 
CONFIG-NF5-I 
CONFIG-IP6-C -guration IP-6 Transfer Point C 2004/06/28 
NO 
1
NO 
2
NO POTENTIAL 
YES (IP-6) 
3
NO 
YES POTENTIAL 
4
YES (IP-6A) 
NO POTENTIAL 
5
YES 
IP-6 (Transfer C) 
YES POTENTIAL 
6
YES (NF Transfer F) 
7T
NO 
8
YES (IP-5) 
YES (IP-5 Transfer B) 
9T
NO 
10
YES (NF) 
YES (NF Transfer I) 
11 T
Figure B-13. Configuration Class IP-6 Event Tree  CONFIG-IP6-C 
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01 B-16 of B-104 October 2004 

l 
liillifil 
lifiial 
ill 
# 
1 
2 
3 T 
4 
5 T 
6 
7 TNO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
MS-NF-8 
Fissile materiacolloids in 
qud effeuent 
MS-NF-7 
Slurry effuent 
from waste 
package wth 
ssile materiaMS-NF-6 
Solution effuent 
from waste 
package wth 
ssile materCONFIG-SCEN 
Separate Near 
Field Confgurations 
(NF-1 through 3) 
CONFIG-NF-F 
Near Field 
Externa Criticality 
Potentia 
END-STATE 
@END-ANALYSIS 
@END-ANALYSIS 
CONFIG-NF1 
@END-ANALYSIS 
CONFIG-NF2 
@END-ANALYSIS 
CONFIG-NF3 
YES (NF-1 Transfer) 
YES (NF-2 Transfer) 
YES (NF-3 Transfer) 
YES 
YES 
YES 
Near Field Config. 
Figure B-14. Initial Near-Field Configuration Class Event Tree  CONFIG-NF-F 
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01 B-17 of B-104 October 2004 

liiiion of 
fiial 
ion of 
fiili# 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 NF-1CNO 
YES 
YES 
) 
YES 
YES (
) 
) 
l 
l 
l 
NO 
NO 
NO 
CRIT-POT-WF 
Criticaity 
Potental of 
Waste Form 
MS-NF-12 
Transport of fssile 
materal from one 
or more waste 
packages to low point 
MS-NF-11 
Precipitatssile materin invert 
MS-NF-10 
Sorptssile material 
solutes in invert 
MS-NF-9 
Transport from 
waste package 
into invert 
CONFIG-NF1 
Near Feld 
Externa Criticality 
Potental (NF-1) 
END-STATE 
@END-ANALYSIS 
@END-ANALYSIS 
@END-ANALYSIS 
NF-1A 
@END-ANALYSIS 
@END-ANALYSIS 
NF-1B 
@END-ANALYSIS 
@END-ANALYSIS 
11 T CONFIG-FF-J 
YES (NF-1A) 
YES (NF-1BNF-1C) 
YES (FF Transfer JNF-1 (TransferNo PotentiaNo PotentiaNo PotentiaYes Potential 
Yes Potential 
Yes Potential 
Figure B-15. Near-Field Configuration Class NF-1 Event Tree  CONFIG-NF1 
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01 B-18 of B-104 October 2004 

ility 
fiial 
llield 
# 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
No Potential 
No Potential 
NO 
YES 
NO 
CRIT-POT-WF 
CrticaPotential of 
Waste Form 
MS-NF-14 
Absorbers and 
ssile materseparate 
MS-NF-13 
Effuent fows to 
conform to 
invert surface 
CONFIG-NF2 
Near FExternal Criticality 
Potential (NF-2) 
END-STATE 
@END-ANALYSIS 
@END-ANALYSIS 
NF-2A 
@END-ANALYSIS 
NF-2A 
NF-2 (Transfer) 
Yes Potential 
Yes Potential 
YES 
Figure B-16. Near-Field Configuration Class NF-2 Event Tree  CONFIG-NF2 
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01 B-19 of B-104 October 2004 

Screening Analysis of Criticality Features, Events, and Processes for License Application 
ilityii/ 
iion of 
l 
Fiillof iConfiiiiii) 
#CRIT-POT-WF 
CrticaPotential of 
Waste Form 
MS-NF-18 
Filtraton and 
concentration of 
collods in the 
invert 
MS-NF-17 
Hydrodynamicchromatographc sep. 
of FM colloids from 
neutron absorbers 
MS-NF-19 
Degradatinvert materiaMS-NF-16 
Transport of 
colloids into 
invert 
MS-NF-15 
ltraton and conc. 
of cooids on top 
nvert trapped by 
WP corros. prod. 
CONFIG-SCEN 
guraton 
Scenaro Set Up 
CONFIG-NF3 
Near Feld 
External Critcality 
Potental (NF-3 
END-STATE 
@END-ANALYSIS 
@END-ANALYSIS 
@END-ANALYSIS 
NF-3A 
@END-ANALYSIS 
@END-ANALYSIS 
@END-ANALYSIS 
NF-3B 
@END-ANALYSIS 
@END-ANALYSIS 
NF-3B 
@END-ANALYSIS 
@END-ANALYSIS 
NF-3C 
@END-ANALYSIS 
@END-ANALYSIS 
NF-3C 
CONFIG-FF-K 
NO 
1
NO 
2
YES (NF-3A) 
No Potential 
YES (NF-3A) 
3
Yes Potential 
4
NO 
5
NO 
6
No Potential 
NO 
7
YES 
Yes Potential
YES (NF-3B and NF-3C) 
NO (NF-3B) 
8
NO
NF-3 (Transfer) 
9
No Potential 
YES 
10
YES 
Yes Potential 
11
YES 
NO 
12
No Potential 
NO 
13
YES 
Yes Potential 
YES (NF-3C) 
14
NO 
15
No Potential 
YES 
16
YES 
Yes Potential 
17
YES (FF Transfer K) 
18 T
Figure B-17. Near-Field Configuration Class NF-3 Event Tree  CONFIG-NF3 
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01 B-20 of B-104 October 2004 

Screening Analysis of Criticality Features, Events, and Processes for License Application 
ial of 
lFil 
Iiliidriiing 
ield 
lial (
#CRIT-POT-WF 
Criticality 
PotentWaste Form 
MS-NF-DD 
Accumuation of 
ssile Materia Onto 
thenvert Surface 
By Dry Diffuson 
MS-NF-5 
WF and basket 
degradation mobizes 
FM and neutron 
absorbers 
MS-NF-4 
Container 
bottom breaches 
MS-NF-3 
Aqueous corroson 
of waste package 
MS-NF-2 
Water ponds on 
ft floor due 
to sealng and/or 
dammCONFIG-NF4 
Near FExterna Criticality 
PotentNF-4) 
END-STATE 
@END-ANALYSIS 
@END-ANALYSISNF-DD 
@END-ANALYSIS 
@END-ANALYSISNF-DD 
@END-ANALYSIS 
@END-ANALYSIS 
CONFIG-NF4-E 
NO 
1
NO 
NO POTENTIAL 
2
YES 
YES POTENTIAL 
3 
NF-4 Config. 
NO 
4
NO 
NO POTENTIAL 
5
YES 
YES POTENTIAL 
6 
YES 
NO 
7
YES 
NO 
8
YES 
YES 
9T
Figure B-18. Near-Field Configuration Class NF-4 Event Tree  CONFIG-NF4 
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01 B-21 of B-104 October 2004 

Screening Analysis of Criticality Features, Events, and Processes for License Application 
CriiflMS-NF-24 
ial 
lMS-NF-23 
ial 
pond 
ili) 
# 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
iNO 
() 
NO 
NO 
NO 
CRIT-POT-WF 
ticality 
Potential of 
Waste Form 
MS-NF-25 
Non-fssile 
bearing water 
ushes neutron 
absorbers 
Fissile Materaccumuates in 
clays at bottom 
of pool 
Basin effectively 
sealed 
MS-NF-22 
Fissile Materand absorbers 
accumulate in 
CONFIG-NF4-E 
Near Feld 
Externa Criticality 
Potental (NF-4AEND-STATE 
@END-ANALYSIS 
@END-ANALYSIS 
@END-ANALYSIS 
@END-ANALYSIS 
@END-ANALYSIS 
NF-4A 
NF-4A Confg. 
YES 
YESNF-4ANo Potential 
Yes Potential 
YES 
YES 
Figure B-19. Near-Field Configuration Class NF-4 Event Tree  Continued  CONFIG-NF4-E 
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01 B-22 of B-104 October 2004 

MS-NF-26 
driield 
#CRIT-POT-WF 
Criticality 
Potential of 
Waste Form 
Intact waste form 
sits in pond on 
ft floor 
CONFIG-NF5-I 
Near FExternal Criticality 
Potential (NF-5) 
END-STATE 
@END-ANALYSIS 
@END-ANALYSIS 
NF-5A 
NO 
1 
NF-5 (Transfer) 
No Potential 
2 
YES (NF-5A) 
Yes Potential 
3 
Figure B-20. Near-Field Configuration Class NF-5 Event Tree  CONFIG-NF5-I 
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01 B-23 of B-104 October 2004 

Screening Analysis of Criticality Features, Events, and Processes for License Application 
liiilil ialiile 
ilalfiial 
lfissill 
i is 
ial 
le 
fiial 
fissile 
l soliield 
lial 
() 
# 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
13NO 
NO 
(
NO 
() 
(
NO 
l 
( 
() 
) 
ial 
ial 
ial 
ial 
ial 
ial 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
CRIT-POT-WF 
Criticaty 
Potential of 
Waste Form 
MS-FF-15 
Chemcal changes 
n perched water 
precipitates FM 
MS-FF-14 
Accumuaton of FM 
souten topographic 
lows above 
tered TSbv 
MS-FF-13 
Sorpton of fissmateral on cays 
and zeolites in 
tered TSbv 
MS-FF-12 
Transport of 
ssile matersolutes to atered 
TSbv 
MS-FF-11 
Precipitation of 
e materiaas 
carrer plumealtered by rocks 
MS-FF-3 
Fissile matersolutes are 
transported to 
water tabMS-FF-2 
Separation of 
ssile materrom neutron 
absorbers 
MS-FF-1 
Transport of fmateriautes 
to Tsw units in 
carrer plume 
CONFIG-FF-J 
Far FExterna Criticality 
PotentFF-1 and FF-3 
END-STATE 
@END-ANALYSIS 
@END-ANALYSIS 
@END-ANALYSIS 
@END-ANALYSIS 
FF-1A 
@END-ANALYSIS 
@END-ANALYSIS 
@END-ANALYSIS 
FF-1B 
10 @END-ANALYSIS 
11 @END-ANALYSIS 
12 @END-ANALYSIS 
FF-1C 
14 @END-ANALYSIS 
15 T CONFIG-FF3 
YES 
YESFF-1) 
YESFF-1AYESFF-1) 
YES 
YES 
Far Fied Config. 
YESFF-3) 
YES (FF-1B) 
YESFF-1CYES (FF-3 TransferNo PotentNo PotentNo PotentYes PotentYes PotentYes PotentYES 
Figure B-21. Far-Field Configuration Class FF-1 Event Tree  CONFIG-FF-J 
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01 B-24 of B-104 October 2004 

Screening Analysis of Criticality Features, Events, and Processes for License Application 
Filtopographic llloiliin 
iliiliic/ 
iile 
ialilield 
l) 
# 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
12NO 
NO 
YES 
YES 
NO 
) 
) 
YES () 
NO 
NO 
NO 
CRIT-POT-WF 
Criticality 
Potential of 
Waste Form 
MS-FF-21 
tration of 
colloids in 
ows 
above TSbv 
MS-FF-20 
Sorption of 
cods on cays 
and zeoltes 
altered TSbv 
MS-FF-19 
Transport of 
fisse material 
colloids to 
altered TSbv 
MS-FF-18 
Trappng of FM colloids 
n dead-end fractures 
at boundary 
stress-reef zone 
MS-FF-17 
Hydrodynamchromatographc sep. 
of FM colloids from 
neutron absorbers 
MS-FF-16 
Transport of fissmater colloids to 
TSw units in 
carrer pume 
CONFIG-FF-K 
Far FExterna Criticality 
Potential (FF-2END-STATE@END-ANALYSIS@END-ANALYSIS@END-ANALYSIS@END-ANALYSISFF-2A@END-ANALYSIS@END-ANALYSIS@END-ANALYSISFF-2B 
10 @END-ANALYSIS 
11 @END-ANALYSIS 
FF-2C 
YES 
YES 
YES 
Far Field Config. 
YES (FF-2AYES (FF-2BFF-2CNo Potential 
No Potential 
No Potential 
Yes Potential 
Yes Potential 
Yes Potential 
Figure B-22. Far-Field Configuration Class FF-2 Event Tree  CONFIG-FF-K 
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01 B-25 of B-104 October 2004 

Screening Analysis of Criticality Features, Events, and Processes for License Application 
lililiiiipii) 
iissilimilupwellids 
l iild 
l) 
# 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
11 
14 
18NO 
i) 
) 
() 
) 
ial 
ial 
ial 
ial 
ial 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
CRIT-POT-WF 
Criticaity 
Potential of 
Waste Form 
MS-FF-10 
FM solutes 
precipitate in 
organic-rch zones 
of Frankn Lake 
MS-FF-9 
FM soutes are 
transported to 
Franklin Lake 
Playa 
MS-FF-8 
FM preciptates at 
organc reducing 
zone at pinchout of 
tuff aqufer 
MS-FF-7 
FM prectates 
at reducing zone 
(eg. remans of 
organic matterMS-FF-6 
Precipitaton 
of fe material 
MS-FF-5 
Contanment plume 
xes beow 
redox front (-200m) 
MS-FF-4 
FM precipitates in 
zone of 
hydrothermal fluat fauts orn fract. 
CONFIG-SCEN 
Configuration 
Scenaro Set Up 
CONFIG-FF3 
Far FieExterna Criticality 
Potential (FF-3END-STATE@END-ANALYSIS@END-ANALYSIS@END-ANALYSISFF-3A@END-ANALYSIS@END-ANALYSIS@END-ANALYSISFF-3B@END-ANALYSIS 
10 @END-ANALYSIS 
FF-3C 
12 @END-ANALYSIS 
13 @END-ANALYSIS 
FF-3D 
15 @END-ANALYSIS 
16 @END-ANALYSIS 
17 @END-ANALYSIS 
FF-3E 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
FF-3 Confg. 
YES (FF-3AYES (FF-3BYESFF-3CYES (FF-3DYES (FF-3E) 
No PotentNo PotentNo PotentNo PotentNo PotentYes Potential 
Yes Potential 
Yes Potential 
Yes Potential 
Yes Potential 
YES 
YES 
Figure B-23. Far-Field Configuration Class FF-3 Event Tree  CONFIG-FF3 
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01 B-26 of B-104 October 2004 

ialRelion 
IGNEOUS # 
1 T 
2 T 
3 T 
4 T 
5 T 
6 T 
7 T 
8 T 
9 T 
it 
iiiNO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
2004/07/09 
NA-MISLOAD 
Neutron 
Absorber 
Mater Misload 
IG-WP-RELOC 
Waste Package 
ocatIG-WP-LOC 
Waste 
Package 
Location 
IG-EVENT-TYPE 
Type of 
Igneous Event 
Igneous 
Event 
END-STATE 
IG-ERUPTIVE 
IG-ERUPTIVE 
IG-INTRUSIVE 
IG-INTRUSIVE 
IG-ERUPTIVE 
IG-ERUPTIVE 
IG-INTRUSIVE 
IG-INTRUSIVE 
IG-INTRUSIVE 
10 T IG-INTRUSIVE 
Eruptive 
At ConduIntersection Point 
Beyond Conduit 
Intersection Point 
WP In Conduit 
WP Remans 
in Drift 
At Dike 
Intersection Point 
Beyond Dike 
Intersection Point 
Intrusive 
WP Remans 
in Drift 
WP Remans 
in Drift 
WP Pulled 
Into Conduit 
Igneous 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
IGNEOUS - Igneous Event Tree 
Figure B-24. Initial Igneous Event Tree  IGNEOUS 
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01 B-27 of B-104 October 2004 

Screening Analysis of Criticality Features, Events, and Processes for License Application 
iMislilial 
lFiial 
ii/ 
ii#CRIT-POT-WF 
Critical 
Confguration 
WF-MISLOAD 
Waste Form 
oad 
IG-FM-ACCUM 
Fisse MaterAccumuates 
IG-FM-TRANS 
ssile MaterTransported from 
Waste Package 
IG-BATHTUB 
Waste Package 
Bathtub 
Confguraton 
IG-RAINFALL 
Rainfall 
Occurs 
IG-CONFIG 
Waste Package 
Waste Form 
Confguraton 
IG-ERUPTIVE 
Igneous 
Eruptive Event 
END-STATE 
@END-ANALYSIS 
@END-ANALYSIS 
@END-ANALYSIS 
IG-E1 
@END-ANALYSIS 
@END-ANALYSIS 
IG-E2 
@END-ANALYSIS 
IG-E2 
@END-ANALYSIS 
@END-ANALYSIS 
IG-E3 
@END-ANALYSIS 
IG-E4 
@END-ANALYSIS 
IG-E4 
Eruptive Config 
Destroyed 
WP/WF Scatterd 
Over Surface 
Intact or 
Breached WP 
Lying on Surface 
NO 
1
NO 
2
NO POTENTIAL 
YES 
3
YES 
YES POTENTIAL 
4
NO 
5
NO POTENTIAL 
6
NO 
YES POTENTIAL 
7
NO 
NO POTENTIAL 
8
YES 
YES POTENTIAL 
FLOW-THRU 
9
NO 
10
NO POTENTIAL 
YES 
11
YES 
YES POTENTIAL 
YES 
12
NO POTENTIAL 
13
NO 
YES POTENTIAL 
14
BATHTUB 
NO POTENTIAL 
15
YES 
YES POTENTIAL 
16
Figure B-25. Eruptive Scenario Igneous Event Tree  IG-ERUPTIVE 
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01 B-28 of B-104 October 2004 

Screening Analysis of Criticality Features, Events, and Processes for License Application 
Cril 
ConfiFiilial 
ieldiSli# 
1 
2 T 
3 T 
4 T 
5 T 
6 
7 
8 T 
9 
10 
12 
13 
14 
16 
17 
19 
20NO 
NO 
iion) 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
IIINO 
NO 
NO 
iig 
infiion) 
iion) 
NO 
NO 
IICRIT-POT-WF 
ticaguration 
IG-FM-TRANSPT 
sse MaterTransported to the 
Near-FIG-SEEPAGE 
Seepage 
Returns 
IG-MAGMA-FRAC 
Magma 
Fractures 
After Coolng 
IG-MAGMA-COOL 
Magma 
Cooled 
IG-MAGMA-INT 
Magma Intrusion 
Into Waste 
Package 
IG-WP-SLUMP 
Waste Package 
umps and 
Breaches 
IG-WP-DESTRYD 
Waste Package 
Destroyed 
IG-INTRUSIVE 
Igneous 
Intrusve 
Event 
END-STATE 
@END-ANALYSIS 
IG-INTRUSIVE2 
IG-INTRUSIVE2 
IG-INTRUSIVE2 
IG-INTRUSIVE2 
@END-ANALYSIS 
IG-I4 
CONFIG-NF-F 
@END-ANALYSIS 
IG-I5 
11 T CONFIG-NF-F 
@END-ANALYSIS 
@END-ANALYSIS 
IG-I6 
15 T CONFIG-NF-F 
@END-ANALYSIS 
IG-I6 
18 T CONFIG-NF-F 
@END-ANALYSIS 
IG-I6 
21 T CONFIG-NF-F 
YES 
YES 
YES 
(lower bound 
infltratYES 
YES 
YES 
NO POTENTIAL 
YES POTENTAL 
YES POTENTAL 
YES POTENTAL 
NO POTENTIAL 
NO POTENTIAL 
INTACT 
PARTIAL 
SLUMP 
COMPLETE 
SLUMP 
YES 
YES 
YES 
Intrusve ConfYES 
(meanltratYES 
(upper bound 
infltratYES 
YES 
NO POTENTIAL 
NO POTENTIAL 
YES POTENTAL 
YES POTENTAL 
Figure B-26. Intrusive Scenario Igneous Event Tree  IG-INTRUSIVE 
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01 B-29 of B-104 October 2004 

Screening Analysis of Criticality Features, Events, and Processes for License Application 
FiialSeepage 
(
# 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
12 
13 
14 
15 
17 
18 
19 
20 
22 
23 
24 
25 
27 
28 
29 
30 
32 
33 
34 
35NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
i) 
iig (
li) 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
CRIT-POT-WF 
Critical 
Configuration 
WF-MISLOAD 
Waste Form 
Misload 
IG-FM-TRANSPT 
ssile MaterTransported From 
Waste Package 
IG-BATHTUB 
Bathtub 
Configuration 
Formed 
IG-SEEPAGE 
Returns 
IG-MAGMA-FRAC 
Magma 
Fractures 
After Cooling 
IG-MAGMA-COOL 
Magma 
Cooled 
IG-INTRUSIVE2 
Igneous 
Intrusion Scenario 
continued) 
END-STATE 
@END-ANALYSIS 
IG-I1 
@END-ANALYSIS 
IG-I1 
@END-ANALYSIS 
@END-ANALYSIS 
@END-ANALYSIS 
IG-I2 
@END-ANALYSIS 
IG-I2 
11 T CONFIG-NF-F 
@END-ANALYSIS 
IG-I3 
@END-ANALYSIS 
IG-I3 
16 T CONFIG-NF-F 
@END-ANALYSIS 
IG-I2 
@END-ANALYSIS 
IG-I2 
21 T CONFIG-NF-F 
@END-ANALYSIS 
IG-I3 
@END-ANALYSIS 
IG-I3 
26 T CONFIG-NF-F 
@END-ANALYSIS 
IG-I2 
@END-ANALYSIS 
IG-I2 
31 T CONFIG-NF-F 
@END-ANALYSIS 
IG-I3 
@END-ANALYSIS 
IG-I3 
36 T CONFIG-NF-F 
NO POTENTIAL 
NO POTENTIAL 
NO POTENTIAL 
NO POTENTIAL 
NO POTENTIAL 
NO POTENTIAL 
YES POTENTIAL 
YES POTENTIAL 
YES POTENTIAL 
YES POTENTIAL 
YES POTENTIAL 
YES POTENTIAL 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
(lower bound 
infltrationYES 
YES 
Intrusve Confcon't) 
YES 
(mean infitration) 
YES 
(upper bound 
infltrationNO POTENTIAL 
NO POTENTIAL 
NO POTENTIAL 
NO POTENTIAL 
NO POTENTIAL 
NO POTENTIAL 
NO POTENTIAL 
NO POTENTIAL 
YES POTENTIAL 
YES POTENTIAL 
YES POTENTIAL 
YES POTENTIAL 
YES POTENTIAL 
YES POTENTIAL 
YES POTENTIAL 
YES POTENTIAL 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
Figure B-27. Intrusive Scenario Igneous Event Tree - Continued  IG-INTRUSIVE2 
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01 B-30 of B-104 October 2004 

B.2 LINKAGE RULES FOR THE WP-WF EVENT TREE (FIGURE B-1) 
The following linkage rules are used to assign the event values representing the percentage of 
total waste package inventory for the various waste form types, waste form subtypes, and waste 
package types. 
|
| Top Event WF-SOURCE| waste form source fractions|
if always then|
| assign CSNF, DOE SNF, and NAVAL waste form fractions|
/WF-SOURCE = WF-SOURCE-CSNF;
WF-SOURCE[1] = WF-SOURCE-DSNF;
WF-SOURCE[2] = WF-SOURCE-NSNF;
|
endif;
||
| Top Event WF-TYPE-PERC| waste form type fractions|
if /WF-SOURCE then|
| individual CSNF type assignment|
/WF-TYPE-PERC = WF-TYPE-PWR;
WF-TYPE-PERC = WF-TYPE-BWR;
elsif WF-SOURCE[1] then|
| individual DOE waste form type assignment|
/WF-TYPE-PERC = WF-TYPE-FFTF;
WF-TYPE-PERC[1] = WF-TYPE-TRIGA;
WF-TYPE-PERC[2] = WF-TYPE-NREACT;
WF-TYPE-PERC[3] = WF-TYPE-SHPWR;
WF-TYPE-PERC[4] = WF-TYPE-SHLWBR;
WF-TYPE-PERC[5] = WF-TYPE-FSV;
WF-TYPE-PERC[6] = WF-TYPE-MD;
WF-TYPE-PERC[7] = WF-TYPE-FERMI;
WF-TYPE-PERC[8] = WF-TYPE-TMI;
|
endif;
||
| Top Event WP-TYPE| waste package type fractions|
if /WF-SOURCE-CSNF * /WF-TYPE-PWR then|
| 21-PWR AP, 21-PWR CR, and 12-PWR assignment 

|
/WP-TYPE = WP-TYPE-21PWRAP;
WP-TYPE[1] = WP-TYPE-21PWRCR;
WP-TYPE[2] = WP-TYPE-12PWRAP;
|
endif;
|
if /WF-SOURCE-CSNF * WF-TYPE-BWR then|
| 44-BWR and 24-BWR assignment|
/WP-TYPE = WP-TYPE-44BWR;
WP-TYPE = WP-TYPE-24BWR;
|
endif;
|
if WF-SOURCE-DSNF * /WF-TYPE-FFTF then|
| FFTF short and long assignment|
/WP-TYPE = WP-TYPE-FFTFSH;
WP-TYPE = WP-TYPE-FFTFL;
|
endif;
|
if WF-SOURCE-DSNF * WF-TYPE-NREACT then 
|
| N Reactor short, long, and mco assignment|
/WP-TYPE = WP-TYPE-NREACTSH;
WP-TYPE[1] = WP-TYPE-NREACTL;
WP-TYPE[2] = WP-TYPE-NREACTMCO;
|
endif;
|
if WF-SOURCE-DSNF * WF-TYPE-SHPWR then 
|
| Shippingport LWR short and long assignment|
/WP-TYPE = WP-TYPE-SHPWRSH;
WP-TYPE = WP-TYPE-SHPWRL;
|
endif;
|
if WF-SOURCE-DSNF * WF-TYPE-SHLWBR then 
|
| Shippingport LWBR short and long assignment|
/WP-TYPE = WP-TYPE-SHLWBRSH;
WP-TYPE = WP-TYPE-SHLWBRL;
|
endif;
|
if WF-SOURCE-DSNF * WF-TYPE-MD then 
|
| Aluminum Based melt & dilute short and long assignment| 

/WP-TYPE = WP-TYPE-MDSH;
WP-TYPE = WP-TYPE-MDL;
|
endif;
|
if WF-SOURCE-DSNF * WF-TYPE-FERMI then 
|
| Enrico Fermi short and long assignment|
/WP-TYPE = WP-TYPE-FERMISH;
WP-TYPE = WP-TYPE-FERMIL;
|
endif;
|
if WF-SOURCE-DSNF * WF-TYPE-TMI then 
|
| Three Mile Island II Short and Long assignment|
/WP-TYPE = WP-TYPE-TMISH;
WP-TYPE = WP-TYPE-TMIL;
|
endif;
|
if WF-SOURCE-NSNF then 
|
| Naval short and long assignment|
/WP-TYPE = WP-TYPE-NAVALSH;
WP-TYPE = WP-TYPE-NAVALL;
|
endif; 

INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

B.3 LINKAGE RULES FOR THE YMP-INIT-EVENT EVENT TREE 
(FIGURE B-3) 
The following linkage rules are used to substitute the event values for the four criticality FEPs 
cases considered in the SAPHIRE analysis  (1) Base Case, (2) Seismic Disruptive Event; 
(3) Rock Fall Disruptive Event, and (4) Igneous Disruptive Event. This event tree also assigns 
values for the fraction of lithophsysal and nonlithophysal geologic zones of the repository. 
|
if always then|
| Top Event INIT-EVENT| initiate process of criticality FEPs cases|
/INIT-EVENT = BASE-CASE;
INIT-EVENT[1] = SEISMIC-EVENT;
INIT-EVENT[2] = ROCKFALL-EVENT;
INIT-EVENT[3] = IGNEOUS-EVENT;
|
| Top Event SEIS-RANGE| probability of seismic exceedance frequency ranges|
/SEIS-RANGE = SEIS-2E-8TO1E-8;
SEIS-RANGE[1] = SEIS-6E-8TO2E-8;
SEIS-RANGE[2] = SEIS-2E-7TO6E-8;
SEIS-RANGE[3] = SEIS-1E-4TO2E-7;
|
| Top Event SEIS-DAMAGE| seismic damage due to ground motion|
/SEIS-DAMAGE = SEIS-GROUND;
|
| Top Event DRIFT-ZONE| fraction of repository in lithophysal and nonlithophysal|
/DRIFT-ZONE = DRIFT-ZONE-NONL;
DRIFT-ZONE = DRIFT-ZONE-LITH;
|
endif;
|
| Top Event SEIS-DAMAGE| seismic damage due to faulting|
if (/SEIS-RANGE + SEIS-RANGE[1] + (SEIS-RANGE[2] *
(~init(WP01-21-PWR-AP) + ~init(WP02-21-PWR-CR) +
~init(WP03-12-PWR-AP) + ~init(WP04-24-BWR-AP) +
~init(WP05-44-BWR-AP))))then
|
| potential faulting damage for all waste package types| in these seismic ranges (exceptions follow)
| 
SEIS-DAMAGE = SEIS-FAULT-1;
| 

elsif (SEIS-RANGE[2] * (init(WP01-21-PWR-AP) + init(WP02-21-PWR-CR) +
init(WP03-12-PWR-AP) + init(WP04-24-BWR-AP) +
init(WP05-44-BWR-AP))) then|
| no faulting damage for 21-PWR AP, 21-PWR CR, 12-PWR CR,44-BWR AP,
| and 24-BWR AP waste package types in this seismic range| 
SEIS-DAMAGE = SEIS-FAULT-0;
|
endif; 

B.4 LINKAGE RULES FOR THE MSL-ET EVENT TREE (FIGURE B-4) 
The following linkage rules are used to substitute the values for the events and processes that 
initiate the formation of potentially critical configurations. The events and processes defined by 
this event tree include seepage infiltration, condensation and drip shield failure. 
||||
| Top Event MS-IC-1A| probability of no, lower-bound, mean, and upper-bound seepage scenarios|
if (/BASE-CASE + ROCKFALL-EVENT) * DRIFT-ZONE then|
| seepage probability for base case and rock fall events, lithophysal|
/MS-IC-1A = MS-IC-1A-NOM-NWL;
MS-IC-1A[1] = MS-IC-1A-NOM-LL;
MS-IC-1A[2] = MS-IC-1A-NOM-ML;
MS-IC-1A[3] = MS-IC-1A-NOM-UL;
|
elsif (/BASE-CASE + ROCKFALL-EVENT)* /DRIFT-ZONE then|
| seepage probability for base case and rock fall events, nonlithophysal|
/MS-IC-1A = MS-IC-1A-NOM-NWNL;
MS-IC-1A[1] = MS-IC-1A-NOM-LNL;
MS-IC-1A[2] = MS-IC-1A-NOM-MNL;
MS-IC-1A[3] = MS-IC-1A-NOM-UNL;
|
elsif SEISMIC-EVENT * DRIFT-ZONE then 
|
| seepage probability for seismic event, lithophysal|
/MS-IC-1A = MS-IC-1A-SEIS-NWL;
MS-IC-1A[1] = MS-IC-1A-SEIS-LL;
MS-IC-1A[2] = MS-IC-1A-SEIS-ML;
MS-IC-1A[3] = MS-IC-1A-SEIS-UL;
|
elsif SEISMIC-EVENT * /DRIFT-ZONE then|
| seepage probability for seismic event, nonlithophysal|
/MS-IC-1A = MS-IC-1A-SEIS-NWNL;
MS-IC-1A[1] = MS-IC-1A-SEIS-LNL;
MS-IC-1A[2] = MS-IC-1A-SEIS-MNL;
MS-IC-1A[3] = MS-IC-1A-SEIS-UNL;
|
endif;
||
| Top Event MS-NF-T| transfer to near-field event tree| 

if always then|
/MS-NF-T = MS-NF-T-0;
MS-NF-T = MS-NF-T-1;
|
endif;
||
| Top Event MS-IC-2| probability of drip shield failure|
if /BASE-CASE + ROCKFALL-EVENT + /SEIS-GROUND + ~SEIS-DAMAGE then|
| for base case, rock fall, and seismic ground motion events|
/MS-IC-2 = MS-IC-2-BC;
MS-IC-2 = MS-IC-2-BC;
|
elsif SEIS-FAULT-1 then 
|
| for seismic faulting events|
/MS-IC-2 = MS-IC-2-DE;
MS-IC-2 = MS-IC-2-DE;
|
endif;
||
| Top Event MS-IC-1B| probability of condensation|
if always then|
| no condensation|
/MS-IC-1B = MS-IC-1B-0;
MS-IC-1B = MS-IC-1B-0;
|
endif; 

B.5 LINKAGE RULES FOR THE MSL-ET2 EVENT TREE (FIGURE B-5) 
This event tree is a continuation of the MSL-ET event tree. The following linkage rules are 
used to substitute the values for additional events and processes that initiate the formation of 
potentially critical configurations. The events and processes defined by this event tree include 
waste package failure, bathtub configuration formation, waste package overfill, as well as events 
necessary to define and evaluate the criticality potential of a dry waste package configuration. 
|
||
| SET VARIABLES|
DOE-SHORT = (init(WP06-DOE1-SHORT) + init(WP08-DOE2-SHORT) +
init(WP09-DOE3-SHORT) + init(WP12-DOE4-SHORT) +
init(WP14-DOE5-SHORT) + init(WP17-DOE7-SHORT) +
init(WP19-DOE8-SHORT) + init(WP21-DOE9-SHORT));
|
DOE-LONG = (init(WP07-DOE1-LONG) + init(WP10-DOE3-LONG) +
init(WP13-DOE4-LONG) + init(WP15-DOE5-LONG) +
init(WP16-DOE6-LONG) + init(WP18-DOE7-LONG) +
init(WP20-DOE8-LONG) + init(WP22-DOE9-LONG));
|
DOE-MCO = init(WP11-DOE3-MCO);
|
DOE-NAM1 = (init(WP06-DOE1-SHORT) + init(WP07-DOE1-LONG) + 
init(WP08-DOE2-SHORT) + init(WP17-DOE7-SHORT) +
init(WP18-DOE7-LONG));
|
DOE-NAM2 = (init(WP14-DOE5-SHORT) + init(WP15-DOE5-LONG));
|
DOE-NAM3 = (init(WP19-DOE8-SHORT) + init(WP20-DOE8-LONG));
|
DOE-NONAM = (init(WP09-DOE3-SHORT) + init(WP10-DOE3-LONG) + 
init(WP11-DOE3-MCO) + init(WP12-DOE4-SHORT) +
init(WP13-DOE4-LONG) + init(WP16-DOE6-LONG) + 
init(WP21-DOE9-SHORT) + init(WP22-DOE9-LONG));
|
DOE-MISLOAD = (init(WP06-DOE1-SHORT) + init(WP07-DOE1-LONG));
|
DOE-NOMIS = (init(WP08-DOE2-SHORT) + init(WP09-DOE3-SHORT) +
init(WP10-DOE3-LONG) + init(WP11-DOE3-MCO) + 
init(WP12-DOE4-SHORT) + init(WP13-DOE4-LONG) + 
init(WP14-DOE5-SHORT) + init(WP15-DOE5-LONG) + 
init(WP16-DOE6-LONG) + init(WP17-DOE7-SHORT) +
init(WP18-DOE7-LONG) + init(WP19-DOE8-SHORT) +
init(WP20-DOE8-LONG) + init(WP21-DOE9-SHORT) +
init(WP22-DOE9-LONG));
||
| Top Event MS-IC-3A| probability of waste package failure|
if (/BASE-CASE * (/MS-IC-1A + /MS-IC-2)) then|
| for base case with no seepage or no drip shield failure scenarios 

| 10% waste packages have diffusive flowpath due to deliquesence| induced localized corrosion|
/MS-IC-3A = MS-IC-3A-D1;
MS-IC-3A[1] = MS-IC-3A-D1;
MS-IC-3A[2] = MS-IC-3A-0;
|
elsif ((/SEIS-GROUND + ~SEIS-DAMAGE) * (/MS-IC-1A + /MS-IC-2)) then|
| for seismic event with no seepage or no drip shield failure| 100% diffusive flowpath due to ground motion induced damage|
/MS-IC-3A = MS-IC-3A-D3;
MS-IC-3A[1] = MS-IC-3A-D3;
MS-IC-3A[2] = MS-IC-3A-0;
|
elsif (SEIS-FAULT-1 * ~/MS-IC-1A) then|
| for seismic faulting with seepage scenarios| 100% of impacted waste packages have advective flowpath|
/MS-IC-3A = MS-IC-3A-A1;
MS-IC-3A[1] = MS-IC-3A-0;
MS-IC-3A[2] = MS-IC-3A-A1;
|
endif;
|
| Top Event MS-IC-3B| probability of bathtub formation|
if SEISMIC-EVENT then 
|
| for all seismic events resulting in waste package advective flow path|
/MS-IC-3B = MS-IC-3B-1;
MS-IC-3B = MS-IC-3B-1;
|
else 
|
| all other cases|
/MS-IC-3B = MS-IC-3B-0;
MS-IC-3B = MS-IC-3B-0;
|
endif;
|
| Top Event MS-IC-4| probability of overfilling waste package|
| for 21-PWR Absorber Plate Waste Package|
if (SEIS-FAULT-1 * DRIFT-ZONE * MS-IC-1A[1] * init(WP01-21-PWR-AP)) then|
| for seismic faulting event, lithophysal zone,
| lower-bound seepage scenario|
/MS-IC-4 = MS-IC-4-SE-LL-21AP; 

MS-IC-4[1] = MS-IC-4-SE-LL-21AP;
MS-IC-4[2] = MS-IC-4-0;
MS-IC-4[3] = MS-IC-4-0;
|
elsif (SEIS-FAULT-1 * DRIFT-ZONE * MS-IC-1A[2] * init(WP01-21-PWR-AP)) then|
| for seismic faulting event, lithophysal zone,
| mean seepage scenario|
/MS-IC-4 = MS-IC-4-SE-ML-21AP;
MS-IC-4[1] = MS-IC-4-0;
MS-IC-4[2] = MS-IC-4-SE-ML-21AP;
MS-IC-4[3] = MS-IC-4-0;
|
elsif (SEIS-FAULT-1 * DRIFT-ZONE * MS-IC-1A[3] * init(WP01-21-PWR-AP)) then|
| for seismic faulting event, lithophysal zone,
| upper-bound seepage scenario|
/MS-IC-4 = MS-IC-4-SE-UL-21AP;
MS-IC-4[1] = MS-IC-4-0;
MS-IC-4[2] = MS-IC-4-0;
MS-IC-4[3] = MS-IC-4-SE-UL-21AP;
|
elsif (SEIS-FAULT-1 * /DRIFT-ZONE * MS-IC-1A[1] * init(WP01-21-PWR-AP)) then|
| for seismic faulting event, nonlithophysal zone,
| lower-bound seepage scenario|
/MS-IC-4 = MS-IC-4-SE-LNL-21AP;
MS-IC-4[1] = MS-IC-4-SE-LNL-21AP;
MS-IC-4[2] = MS-IC-4-0;
MS-IC-4[3] = MS-IC-4-0;
|
elsif (SEIS-FAULT-1 * /DRIFT-ZONE * MS-IC-1A[2] * init(WP01-21-PWR-AP)) then|
| for seismic faulting event, nonlithophysal zone,
| mean seepage scenario|
/MS-IC-4 = MS-IC-4-SE-MNL-21AP;
MS-IC-4[1] = MS-IC-4-0;
MS-IC-4[2] = MS-IC-4-SE-MNL-21AP;
MS-IC-4[3] = MS-IC-4-0;
|
elsif (SEIS-FAULT-1 * /DRIFT-ZONE * MS-IC-1A[3] * init(WP01-21-PWR-AP)) then|
| for seismic faulting event, nonlithophysal zone,
| upper-bound seepage scenario|
/MS-IC-4 = MS-IC-4-SE-UNL-21AP;
MS-IC-4[1] = MS-IC-4-0;
MS-IC-4[2] = MS-IC-4-0;
MS-IC-4[3] = MS-IC-4-SE-UNL-21AP;
|
endif;
|
| for 21-PWR Control Rod Waste Package Type 

|
if (SEIS-FAULT-1 * DRIFT-ZONE * MS-IC-1A[1] * init(WP02-21-PWR-CR)) then|
| for seismic faulting event, lithophysal zone,
| lower-bound seepage scenario|
/MS-IC-4 = MS-IC-4-SE-LL-21CR;
MS-IC-4[1] = MS-IC-4-SE-LL-21CR;
MS-IC-4[2] = MS-IC-4-0;
MS-IC-4[3] = MS-IC-4-0;
|
elsif (SEIS-FAULT-1 * DRIFT-ZONE * MS-IC-1A[2] * init(WP02-21-PWR-CR)) then|
| for seismic faulting event, lithophysal zone,
| mean seepage scenario|
/MS-IC-4 = MS-IC-4-SE-ML-21CR;
MS-IC-4[1] = MS-IC-4-0;
MS-IC-4[2] = MS-IC-4-SE-ML-21CR;
MS-IC-4[3] = MS-IC-4-0;
|
elsif (SEIS-FAULT-1 * DRIFT-ZONE * MS-IC-1A[3] * init(WP02-21-PWR-CR)) then|
| for seismic faulting event, lithophysal zone,
| upper-bound seepage scenario|
/MS-IC-4 = MS-IC-4-SE-UL-21CR;
MS-IC-4[1] = MS-IC-4-0;
MS-IC-4[2] = MS-IC-4-0;
MS-IC-4[3] = MS-IC-4-SE-UL-21CR;
|
elsif (SEIS-FAULT-1 * /DRIFT-ZONE * MS-IC-1A[1] * init(WP02-21-PWR-CR)) then|
| for seismic faulting event, nonlithophysal zone,
| lower-bound seepage scenario|
/MS-IC-4 = MS-IC-4-SE-LNL-21CR;
MS-IC-4[1] = MS-IC-4-SE-LNL-21CR;
MS-IC-4[2] = MS-IC-4-0;
MS-IC-4[3] = MS-IC-4-0;
|
elsif (SEIS-FAULT-1 * /DRIFT-ZONE * MS-IC-1A[2] * init(WP02-21-PWR-CR)) then|
| for seismic faulting event, nonlithophysal zone,
| mean seepage scenario|
/MS-IC-4 = MS-IC-4-SE-MNL-21CR;
MS-IC-4[1] = MS-IC-4-0;
MS-IC-4[2] = MS-IC-4-SE-MNL-21CR;
MS-IC-4[3] = MS-IC-4-0;
|
elsif (SEIS-FAULT-1 * /DRIFT-ZONE * MS-IC-1A[3] * init(WP02-21-PWR-CR)) then|
| for seismic faulting event, nonlithophysal zone,
| upper-bound seepage scenario|
/MS-IC-4 = MS-IC-4-SE-UNL-21CR; 

MS-IC-4[1] = MS-IC-4-0;
MS-IC-4[2] = MS-IC-4-0;
MS-IC-4[3] = MS-IC-4-SE-UNL-21CR;
|
endif;
|
| for 12-PWR Absorber Plate Waste Package Type|
if (SEIS-FAULT-1 * DRIFT-ZONE * MS-IC-1A[1] * init(WP03-12-PWR-AP)) then|
| for seismic faulting event, lithophysal zone,
| lower-bound seepage scenario|
/MS-IC-4 = MS-IC-4-SE-LL-12AP;
MS-IC-4[1] = MS-IC-4-SE-LL-12AP;
MS-IC-4[2] = MS-IC-4-0;
MS-IC-4[3] = MS-IC-4-0;
|
elsif (SEIS-FAULT-1 * DRIFT-ZONE * MS-IC-1A[2] * init(WP03-12-PWR-AP)) then|
| for seismic faulting event, lithophysal zone,
| mean seepage scenario|
/MS-IC-4 = MS-IC-4-SE-ML-12AP;
MS-IC-4[1] = MS-IC-4-0;
MS-IC-4[2] = MS-IC-4-SE-ML-12AP;
MS-IC-4[3] = MS-IC-4-0;
|
elsif (SEIS-FAULT-1 * DRIFT-ZONE * MS-IC-1A[3] * init(WP03-12-PWR-AP)) then|
| for seismic faulting event, lithophysal zone,
| upper-bound seepage scenario|
/MS-IC-4 = MS-IC-4-SE-UL-12AP;
MS-IC-4[1] = MS-IC-4-0;
MS-IC-4[2] = MS-IC-4-0;
MS-IC-4[3] = MS-IC-4-SE-UL-12AP;
|
elsif (SEIS-FAULT-1 * /DRIFT-ZONE * MS-IC-1A[1] * init(WP03-12-PWR-AP)) then|
| for seismic faulting event, nonlithophysal zone,
| lower-bound seepage scenario|
/MS-IC-4 = MS-IC-4-SE-LNL-12AP;
MS-IC-4[1] = MS-IC-4-SE-LNL-12AP;
MS-IC-4[2] = MS-IC-4-0;
MS-IC-4[3] = MS-IC-4-0;
|
elsif (SEIS-FAULT-1 * /DRIFT-ZONE * MS-IC-1A[2] * init(WP03-12-PWR-AP)) then|
| for seismic faulting event, nonlithophysal zone,
| mean seepage scenario|
/MS-IC-4 = MS-IC-4-SE-MNL-12AP;
MS-IC-4[1] = MS-IC-4-0;
MS-IC-4[2] = MS-IC-4-SE-MNL-12AP;
MS-IC-4[3] = MS-IC-4-0;

|
elsif (SEIS-FAULT-1 * /DRIFT-ZONE * MS-IC-1A[3] * init(WP03-12-PWR-AP)) then|
| for seismic faulting event, nonlithophysal zone,
| upper-bound seepage scenario|
/MS-IC-4 = MS-IC-4-SE-UNL-12AP;
MS-IC-4[1] = MS-IC-4-0;
MS-IC-4[2] = MS-IC-4-0;
MS-IC-4[3] = MS-IC-4-SE-UNL-12AP;
|
endif;
|
| for 24-BWR Absorber Plate Waste Package Type|
if (SEIS-FAULT-1 * DRIFT-ZONE * MS-IC-1A[1] * init(WP04-24-BWR-AP)) then|
| for seismic faulting event, lithophysal zone,
| lower-bound seepage scenario|
/MS-IC-4 = MS-IC-4-SE-LL-24AP;
MS-IC-4[1] = MS-IC-4-SE-LL-24AP;
MS-IC-4[2] = MS-IC-4-0;
MS-IC-4[3] = MS-IC-4-0;
|
elsif (SEIS-FAULT-1 * DRIFT-ZONE * MS-IC-1A[2] * init(WP04-24-BWR-AP)) then|
| for seismic faulting event, lithophysal zone,
| mean seepage scenario|
/MS-IC-4 = MS-IC-4-SE-ML-24AP;
MS-IC-4[1] = MS-IC-4-0;
MS-IC-4[2] = MS-IC-4-SE-ML-24AP;
MS-IC-4[3] = MS-IC-4-0;
|
elsif (SEIS-FAULT-1 * DRIFT-ZONE * MS-IC-1A[3] * init(WP04-24-BWR-AP)) then|
| for seismic faulting event, lithophysal zone,
| upper-bound seepage scenario|
/MS-IC-4 = MS-IC-4-SE-UL-24AP;
MS-IC-4[1] = MS-IC-4-0;
MS-IC-4[2] = MS-IC-4-0;
MS-IC-4[3] = MS-IC-4-SE-UL-24AP;
|
elsif (SEIS-FAULT-1 * /DRIFT-ZONE * MS-IC-1A[1] * init(WP04-24-BWR-AP)) then|
| for seismic faulting event, nonlithophysal zone,
| lower-bound seepage scenario|
/MS-IC-4 = MS-IC-4-SE-LNL-24AP;
MS-IC-4[1] = MS-IC-4-SE-LNL-24AP;
MS-IC-4[2] = MS-IC-4-0;
MS-IC-4[3] = MS-IC-4-0;
|
elsif (SEIS-FAULT-1 * /DRIFT-ZONE * MS-IC-1A[2] * init(WP04-24-BWR-AP)) then| 

| for seismic faulting event, nonlithophysal zone,
| mean seepage scenario
|
/MS-IC-4 = MS-IC-4-SE-MNL-24AP;
MS-IC-4[1] = MS-IC-4-0;
MS-IC-4[2] = MS-IC-4-SE-MNL-24AP;
MS-IC-4[3] = MS-IC-4-0;
|
elsif (SEIS-FAULT-1 * /DRIFT-ZONE * MS-IC-1A[3] * init(WP04-24-BWR-AP)) then|
| for seismic faulting event, nonlithophysal zone,
| upper-bound seepage scenario|
/MS-IC-4 = MS-IC-4-SE-UNL-24AP;
MS-IC-4[1] = MS-IC-4-0;
MS-IC-4[2] = MS-IC-4-0;
MS-IC-4[3] = MS-IC-4-SE-UNL-24AP;
|
endif;
|
| for 44-BWR Absorber Plate Waste Package Type|
if (SEIS-FAULT-1 * DRIFT-ZONE * MS-IC-1A[1] * init(WP05-44-BWR-AP)) then|
| for seismic faulting event, lithophysal zone,
| lower-bound seepage scenario|
/MS-IC-4 = MS-IC-4-SE-LL-44AP;
MS-IC-4[1] = MS-IC-4-SE-LL-44AP;
MS-IC-4[2] = MS-IC-4-0;
MS-IC-4[3] = MS-IC-4-0;
|
elsif (SEIS-FAULT-1 * DRIFT-ZONE * MS-IC-1A[2] * init(WP05-44-BWR-AP)) then|
| for seismic faulting event, lithophysal zone,
| mean seepage scenario|
/MS-IC-4 = MS-IC-4-SE-ML-44AP;
MS-IC-4[1] = MS-IC-4-0;
MS-IC-4[2] = MS-IC-4-SE-ML-44AP;
MS-IC-4[3] = MS-IC-4-0;
|
elsif (SEIS-FAULT-1 * DRIFT-ZONE * MS-IC-1A[3] * init(WP05-44-BWR-AP)) then|
| for seismic faulting event, lithophysal zone,
| upper-bound seepage scenario|
/MS-IC-4 = MS-IC-4-SE-UL-44AP;
MS-IC-4[1] = MS-IC-4-0;
MS-IC-4[2] = MS-IC-4-0;
MS-IC-4[3] = MS-IC-4-SE-UL-44AP;
|
elsif (SEIS-FAULT-1 * /DRIFT-ZONE * MS-IC-1A[1] * init(WP05-44-BWR-AP)) then|
| for seismic faulting event, nonlithophysal zone,
| lower-bound seepage scenario| 

/MS-IC-4 = MS-IC-4-SE-LNL-44AP;
MS-IC-4[1] = MS-IC-4-SE-LNL-44AP;
MS-IC-4[2] = MS-IC-4-0;
MS-IC-4[3] = MS-IC-4-0;
|
elsif (SEIS-FAULT-1 * /DRIFT-ZONE * MS-IC-1A[2] * init(WP05-44-BWR-AP)) then|
| for seismic faulting event, nonlithophysal zone,
| mean seepage scenario|
/MS-IC-4 = MS-IC-4-SE-MNL-44AP;
MS-IC-4[1] = MS-IC-4-0;
MS-IC-4[2] = MS-IC-4-SE-MNL-44AP;
MS-IC-4[3] = MS-IC-4-0;
|
elsif (SEIS-FAULT-1 * /DRIFT-ZONE * MS-IC-1A[3] * init(WP05-44-BWR-AP)) then|
| for seismic faulting event, nonlithophysal zone,
| upper-bound seepage scenario|
/MS-IC-4 = MS-IC-4-SE-UNL-44AP;
MS-IC-4[1] = MS-IC-4-0;
MS-IC-4[2] = MS-IC-4-0;
MS-IC-4[3] = MS-IC-4-SE-UNL-44AP;
|
endif;
|
| for DOE SNF Short Waste Package Type|
if (SEIS-FAULT-1 * DRIFT-ZONE * MS-IC-1A[1] * DOE-SHORT) then|
| for seismic faulting event, lithophysal zone,
| lower-bound seepage scenario|
/MS-IC-4 = MS-IC-4-SE-LL-DOES;
MS-IC-4[1] = MS-IC-4-SE-LL-DOES;
MS-IC-4[2] = MS-IC-4-0;
MS-IC-4[3] = MS-IC-4-0;
|
elsif (SEIS-FAULT-1 * DRIFT-ZONE * MS-IC-1A[2] * DOE-SHORT) then|
| for seismic faulting event, lithophysal zone,
| mean seepage scenario|
/MS-IC-4 = MS-IC-4-SE-ML-DOES;
MS-IC-4[1] = MS-IC-4-0;
MS-IC-4[2] = MS-IC-4-SE-ML-DOES;
MS-IC-4[3] = MS-IC-4-0;
|
elsif (SEIS-FAULT-1 * DRIFT-ZONE * MS-IC-1A[3] * DOE-SHORT) then|
| for seismic faulting event, lithophysal zone,
| upper-bound seepage scenario|
/MS-IC-4 = MS-IC-4-SE-UL-DOES;
MS-IC-4[1] = MS-IC-4-0;
MS-IC-4[2] = MS-IC-4-0;

MS-IC-4[3] = MS-IC-4-SE-UL-DOES;
|
elsif (SEIS-FAULT-1 * /DRIFT-ZONE * MS-IC-1A[1] * DOE-SHORT) then|
| for seismic faulting event, nonlithophysal zone,
| lower-bound seepage scenario|
/MS-IC-4 = MS-IC-4-SE-LNL-DOES;
MS-IC-4[1] = MS-IC-4-SE-LNL-DOES;
MS-IC-4[2] = MS-IC-4-0;
MS-IC-4[3] = MS-IC-4-0;
|
elsif (SEIS-FAULT-1 * /DRIFT-ZONE * MS-IC-1A[2] * DOE-SHORT) then|
| for seismic faulting event, nonlithophysal zone,
| mean seepage scenario|
/MS-IC-4 = MS-IC-4-SE-MNL-DOES;
MS-IC-4[1] = MS-IC-4-0;
MS-IC-4[2] = MS-IC-4-SE-MNL-DOES;
MS-IC-4[3] = MS-IC-4-0;
|
elsif (SEIS-FAULT-1 * /DRIFT-ZONE * MS-IC-1A[3] * DOE-SHORT) then|
| for seismic faulting event, nonlithophysal zone,
| upper-bound seepage scenario|
/MS-IC-4 = MS-IC-4-SE-UNL-DOES;
MS-IC-4[1] = MS-IC-4-0;
MS-IC-4[2] = MS-IC-4-0;
MS-IC-4[3] = MS-IC-4-SE-UNL-DOES;
|
endif;
|
| for DOE SNF LONG Waste Package Type|
if (SEIS-FAULT-1 * DRIFT-ZONE * MS-IC-1A[1] * DOE-LONG) then|
| for seismic faulting event, lithophysal zone,
| lower-bound seepage scenario|
/MS-IC-4 = MS-IC-4-SE-LL-DOEL;
MS-IC-4[1] = MS-IC-4-SE-LL-DOEL;
MS-IC-4[2] = MS-IC-4-0;
MS-IC-4[3] = MS-IC-4-0;
|
elsif (SEIS-FAULT-1 * DRIFT-ZONE * MS-IC-1A[2] * DOE-LONG) then|
| for seismic faulting event, lithophysal zone,
| mean seepage scenario|
/MS-IC-4 = MS-IC-4-SE-ML-DOEL;
MS-IC-4[1] = MS-IC-4-0;
MS-IC-4[2] = MS-IC-4-SE-ML-DOEL;
MS-IC-4[3] = MS-IC-4-0;
|
elsif (SEIS-FAULT-1 * DRIFT-ZONE * MS-IC-1A[3] * DOE-LONG) then 

|
| for seismic faulting event, lithophysal zone,
| upper-bound seepage scenario|
/MS-IC-4 = MS-IC-4-SE-UL-DOEL;
MS-IC-4[1] = MS-IC-4-0;
MS-IC-4[2] = MS-IC-4-0;
MS-IC-4[3] = MS-IC-4-SE-UL-DOEL;
|
elsif (SEIS-FAULT-1 * /DRIFT-ZONE * MS-IC-1A[1] * DOE-LONG) then|
| for seismic faulting event, nonlithophysal zone,
| lower-bound seepage scenario|
/MS-IC-4 = MS-IC-4-SE-LNL-DOEL;
MS-IC-4[1] = MS-IC-4-SE-LNL-DOEL;
MS-IC-4[2] = MS-IC-4-0;
MS-IC-4[3] = MS-IC-4-0;
|
elsif (SEIS-FAULT-1 * /DRIFT-ZONE * MS-IC-1A[2] * DOE-LONG) then|
| for seismic faulting event, nonlithophysal zone,
| mean seepage scenario|
/MS-IC-4 = MS-IC-4-SE-MNL-DOEL;
MS-IC-4[1] = MS-IC-4-0;
MS-IC-4[2] = MS-IC-4-SE-MNL-DOEL;
MS-IC-4[3] = MS-IC-4-0;
|
elsif (SEIS-FAULT-1 * /DRIFT-ZONE * MS-IC-1A[3] * DOE-LONG) then|
| for seismic faulting event, nonlithophysal zone,
| upper-bound seepage scenario|
/MS-IC-4 = MS-IC-4-SE-UNL-DOEL;
MS-IC-4[1] = MS-IC-4-0;
MS-IC-4[2] = MS-IC-4-0;
MS-IC-4[3] = MS-IC-4-SE-UNL-DOEL;
|
endif;
|
| for DOE SNF MCO Waste Package Type|
if (SEIS-FAULT-1 * DRIFT-ZONE * MS-IC-1A[1] * DOE-MCO) then|
| for seismic faulting event, lithophysal zone,
| lower-bound seepage scenario|
/MS-IC-4 = MS-IC-4-SE-LL-DOEM;
MS-IC-4[1] = MS-IC-4-SE-LL-DOEM;
MS-IC-4[2] = MS-IC-4-0;
MS-IC-4[3] = MS-IC-4-0;
|
elsif (SEIS-FAULT-1 * DRIFT-ZONE * MS-IC-1A[2] * DOE-MCO) then|
| for seismic faulting event, lithophysal zone,
| mean seepage scenario 

|
/MS-IC-4 = MS-IC-4-SE-ML-DOEM;
MS-IC-4[1] = MS-IC-4-0;
MS-IC-4[2] = MS-IC-4-SE-ML-DOEM;
MS-IC-4[3] = MS-IC-4-0;
|
elsif (SEIS-FAULT-1 * DRIFT-ZONE * MS-IC-1A[3] * DOE-MCO) then|
| for seismic faulting event, lithophysal zone,
| upper-bound seepage scenario|
/MS-IC-4 = MS-IC-4-SE-UL-DOEM;
MS-IC-4[1] = MS-IC-4-0;
MS-IC-4[2] = MS-IC-4-0;
MS-IC-4[3] = MS-IC-4-SE-UL-DOEM;
|
elsif (SEIS-FAULT-1 * /DRIFT-ZONE * MS-IC-1A[1] * DOE-MCO) then|
| for seismic faulting event, nonlithophysal zone,
| lower-bound seepage scenario|
/MS-IC-4 = MS-IC-4-SE-LNL-DOEM;
MS-IC-4[1] = MS-IC-4-SE-LNL-DOEM;
MS-IC-4[2] = MS-IC-4-0;
MS-IC-4[3] = MS-IC-4-0;
|
elsif (SEIS-FAULT-1 * /DRIFT-ZONE * MS-IC-1A[2] * DOE-MCO) then|
| for seismic faulting event, nonlithophysal zone,
| mean seepage scenario|
/MS-IC-4 = MS-IC-4-SE-MNL-DOEM;
MS-IC-4[1] = MS-IC-4-0;
MS-IC-4[2] = MS-IC-4-SE-MNL-DOEM;
MS-IC-4[3] = MS-IC-4-0;
|
elsif (SEIS-FAULT-1 * /DRIFT-ZONE * MS-IC-1A[3] * DOE-MCO) then|
| for seismic faulting event, nonlithophysal zone,
| upper-bound seepage scenario|
/MS-IC-4 = MS-IC-4-SE-UNL-DOEM;
MS-IC-4[1] = MS-IC-4-0;
MS-IC-4[2] = MS-IC-4-0;
MS-IC-4[3] = MS-IC-4-SE-UNL-DOEM;
|
endif;
||
| Top Event NA-MISLOAD| probability of neutron absorber misload|
if init(WP01-21-PWR-AP) then|
| for the 21-PWR Absorber Plate Waste Package|
/NA-MISLOAD = NA-MISLOAD-21AP; 

NA-MISLOAD = NA-MISLOAD-21AP;
|
elsif init(WP02-21-PWR-CR) then|
| for the 21-PWR Control Rod Waste Package|
/NA-MISLOAD = NA-MISLOAD-21CR;
NA-MISLOAD = NA-MISLOAD-21CR;
|
elsif (init(WP03-12-PWR-AP) + init(WP04-24-BWR-AP) +
init(WP05-44-BWR-AP) + DOE-NAM1)then|
| for the 12-PWR, 24-BWR, and 44-BWR Absorber Plate Waste Packages| and FFTF, TRIGA, and Aluminum Based DOE SNF waste forms|
/NA-MISLOAD = NA-MISLOAD-12AP;
NA-MISLOAD = NA-MISLOAD-12AP;
|
elsif DOE-NAM2 then 
|
| for Shippingport LWBR DOE SNF waste form|
/NA-MISLOAD = NA-MISLOAD-DOE-NAM2;
NA-MISLOAD = NA-MISLOAD-DOE-NAM2;
|
elsif DOE-NAM3 then 
|
| for Enrico Fermi DOE SNF waste form|
/NA-MISLOAD = NA-MISLOAD-DOE-NAM3;
NA-MISLOAD = NA-MISLOAD-DOE-NAM3;
|
elsif DOE-NONAM then 
|
| for the Fort St. Vrain, N Reactor, Shippingport PWR, and TMI II| DOE SNF waste forms|
/NA-MISLOAD = NA-MISLOAD-DOE-NONAM;
NA-MISLOAD = NA-MISLOAD-DOE-NONAM;
|
endif;
||
| Top Event WF-MISLOAD| probability of misloading waste form into waste package / canister|
if init(WP01-21-PWR-AP) then|
| for the 21-PWR Absorber Plate Waste Package|
/WF-MISLOAD = WF-MISLOAD-21AP;
WF-MISLOAD = WF-MISLOAD-21AP;
|
elsif init(WP02-21-PWR-CR) then|
| for the 21-PWR Control Rod Waste Package| 

/WF-MISLOAD = WF-MISLOAD-21CR;
WF-MISLOAD = WF-MISLOAD-21CR;
|
elsif (init(WP03-12-PWR-AP) + init(WP05-44-BWR-AP) +
init(WP04-24-BWR-AP) + DOE-NOMIS) then|
| misload probability for 12-PWR and 24-BWR Absorber Plate and the| Aluminum Based, Enrico Fermi, Fort St. Vrain, N Reactor, Shippingport PWR,
| Shippingport LWBR, TMI II and TRIGA DOE SNF waste forms|
/WF-MISLOAD = WF-MISLOAD-12AP;
WF-MISLOAD = WF-MISLOAD-12AP;
|
elsif DOE-MISLOAD then 
|
| misload probability for the FFTF DOE SNF waste form|
/WF-MISLOAD = WF-MISLOAD-DOE;
WF-MISLOAD = WF-MISLOAD-DOE;
|
endif;
||
| Top Event CRIT-POT-WF| criticality potential of configuration|
if (MS-IC-3A[1]) then|
| if diffusive waste package failures (dry configurations)
|
/CRIT-POT-WF = CRIT-POT-WF-NONE;
CRIT-POT-WF = CRIT-POT-WF-NONE;
|
endif; 

INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

B.6 LINKAGE RULES FOR THE CONFIG-BATH EVENT TREE (FIGURE B-6) 
The following linkage rules are used to substitute the values for the events and processes that 
define the formation of potentially critical configurations for a waste package bathtub 
configuration of the CONFIG-BATH event tree. 
|
| SET VARIABLES||
DOE-MISLOAD = (init(WP06-DOE1-SHORT) + init(WP07-DOE1-LONG));
|
DOE-NOMIS = (init(WP08-DOE2-SHORT) + init(WP09-DOE3-SHORT) +
init(WP10-DOE3-LONG) + init(WP11-DOE3-MCO) + 
init(WP12-DOE4-SHORT) + init(WP13-DOE4-LONG) + 
init(WP14-DOE5-SHORT) + init(WP15-DOE5-LONG) + 
init(WP16-DOE6-LONG) + init(WP17-DOE7-SHORT) +
init(WP18-DOE7-LONG) + init(WP19-DOE8-SHORT) +
init(WP20-DOE8-LONG) + init(WP21-DOE9-SHORT) +
init(WP22-DOE9-LONG));
||
if always then|
| Top Event CONFIG-SCEN| evaluate all success branches|
/CONFIG-SCEN = MS-IC-TOP-NO-0;
CONFIG-SCEN[1] = MS-IC-TOP-YES-1;
CONFIG-SCEN[2] = MS-IC-TOP-YES-1;
CONFIG-SCEN[3] = MS-IC-TOP-YES-1;
||
| Top Event MS-IC-6| evaluate all success branches|
/MS-IC-6 = MS-IC-TOP-NO-0;
MS-IC-6[1] = MS-IC-TOP-YES-1;
MS-IC-6[2] = MS-IC-TOP-YES-1;
MS-IC-6[3] = MS-IC-TOP-YES-1;
MS-IC-6[4] = MS-IC-TOP-YES-1;
||
| Top Event MS-IC-7| waste package internals do not degrade at same rate as waste form|
/MS-IC-7 = MS-IC-TOP-NO-1;
MS-IC-7 = MS-IC-TOP-YES-0;
||
| Top Event MS-IC-8| waste package internals do not degrade faster than waste form|
/MS-IC-8 = MS-IC-TOP-NO-1;
MS-IC-8 = MS-IC-TOP-YES-0;
| 

|
| Top Event MS-IC-9| waste form does degrade in place|
/MS-IC-9 = MS-IC-9-1;
MS-IC-9 = MS-IC-9-1;
|
| Top Event MS-IC-10| waste package internals do not degrade during performance period|
/MS-IC-10 = MS-IC-TOP-NO-1;
MS-IC-10 = MS-IC-TOP-YES-0;
|
endif;
|
| Top Event MS-IC-11| degraded waste form is mobilized, neutron absorber separation|
if /MS-IC-4 then|
| if waste package does not fill| 
/MS-IC-11 = MS-IC-11-0;
MS-IC-11[1] = MS-IC-11-1;
MS-IC-11[2] = MS-IC-11-2A;
|
elsif ( MS-IC-4[1] + MS-IC-4[2] + MS-IC-4[3]) then|
| if waste package overfills - MS-IC-4[1] or MS-IC-4[2] or MS-IC-4[3]
| 
/MS-IC-11 = MS-IC-11-0;
MS-IC-11[1] = MS-IC-11-1;
MS-IC-11[2] = MS-IC-11-2B;
|
endif;
||
| Top Event MS-IC-12| waste package bottom does not fail during performace period|
if always then|
/MS-IC-12 = MS-IC-TOP-NO-0;
MS-IC-12 = MS-IC-TOP-YES-1;
|
endif;
||
| Top Event WF-MISLOAD| probability of misloading waste form into waste package / canister|
if init(WP01-21-PWR-AP) then|
| for the 21-PWR Absorber Plate Waste Package|
/WF-MISLOAD = WF-MISLOAD-21AP;
WF-MISLOAD = WF-MISLOAD-21AP;

|
elsif init(WP02-21-PWR-CR) then|
| for the 21-PWR Control Rod Waste Package|
/WF-MISLOAD = WF-MISLOAD-21CR;
WF-MISLOAD = WF-MISLOAD-21CR;
|
elsif (init(WP03-12-PWR-AP) + init(WP05-44-BWR-AP) +
init(WP04-24-BWR-AP) + DOE-NOMIS) then|
| misload probability for 12-PWR and 24-BWR Absorber Plate and the| Aluminum Based, Enrico Fermi, Fort St. Vrain, N Reactor, Shippingport PWR,
| Shippingport LWBR, TMI II and TRIGA DOE SNF waste forms|
/WF-MISLOAD = WF-MISLOAD-12AP;
WF-MISLOAD = WF-MISLOAD-12AP;
|
elsif DOE-MISLOAD then 
|
| misload probability for the FFTF DOE SNF waste form|
/WF-MISLOAD = WF-MISLOAD-DOE;
WF-MISLOAD = WF-MISLOAD-DOE;
|
endif;
||
| Top Event CRIT-POT-WF| criticality potential of configuration|
| for configuration classes IP-1A and IP-1B without any type of misload|
if (/NA-MISLOAD * /WF-MISLOAD * (MS-IC-6[1] + MS-IC-6[2])) then|
| for no waste package misload|
/CRIT-POT-WF = CRIT-POT-WF-NONE;
CRIT-POT-WF = CRIT-POT-WF-NONE;
|
elsif ((NA-MISLOAD + (WF-MISLOAD * DOE-MISLOAD)) *
(MS-IC-6[1] + MS-IC-6[2])) then|
| for waste package neutron absorber material or DOE SNF misloads|
/CRIT-POT-WF = CRIT-POT-WF-YES;
CRIT-POT-WF = CRIT-POT-WF-YES;
|
elsif (WF-MISLOAD * /NA-MISLOAD * (MS-IC-6[1] + MS-IC-6[2]) *
(init(WP01-21-PWR-AP) + init(WP02-21-PWR-CR))) then|
| for waste package waste form 21-PWR misloads only|
/CRIT-POT-WF = CRIT-POT-WF-MISL;
CRIT-POT-WF = CRIT-POT-WF-MISL;
|
endif; 

B.7 LINKAGE RULES FOR THE CONFIG-IP3 EVENT TREE (FIGURE B-9) 
The following linkage rules are used to substitute the values for the events and processes that 
define the formation of configuration class IP-3 of the CONFIG-IP3 event tree. 
|
| SET VARIABLES||
DOE-MISLOAD = (init(WP06-DOE1-SHORT) + init(WP07-DOE1-LONG));
|
DOE-NOMIS = (init(WP08-DOE2-SHORT) + init(WP09-DOE3-SHORT) +
init(WP10-DOE3-LONG) + init(WP11-DOE3-MCO) + 
init(WP12-DOE4-SHORT) + init(WP13-DOE4-LONG) + 
init(WP14-DOE5-SHORT) + init(WP15-DOE5-LONG) + 
init(WP16-DOE6-LONG) + init(WP17-DOE7-SHORT) +
init(WP18-DOE7-LONG) + init(WP19-DOE8-SHORT) +
init(WP20-DOE8-LONG) + init(WP21-DOE9-SHORT) +
init(WP22-DOE9-LONG));
||
if always then|
| Top Event CONFIG-SCEN|
/CONFIG-SCEN = MS-IC-TOP-NO-0;
CONFIG-SCEN[1] = MS-IC-TOP-YES-1;
CONFIG-SCEN[2] = MS-IC-TOP-YES-1;
|
| Top Event MS-IC-16|
/MS-IC-16 = MS-IC-16-0;
MS-IC-16[1] = MS-IC-16-1;
MS-IC-16[2] = MS-IC-16-2;
MS-IC-16[3] = MS-IC-16-3;
|
| Top Event MS-IC-17|
/MS-IC-17 = MS-IC-TOP-NO-0;
MS-IC-17 = MS-IC-TOP-YES-1;
|
| Top Event MS-IC-18|
/MS-IC-18 = MS-IC-18-0;
MS-IC-18 = MS-IC-18-1;
|
| Top Event MS-IC-22|
/MS-IC-22 = MS-IC-TOP-NO-0;
MS-IC-22[1] = MS-IC-22-1;
MS-IC-22[2] = MS-IC-22-2;
MS-IC-22[3] = MS-IC-22-3;
|
| Top Event MS-IC-23| 

/MS-IC-23 = MS-IC-TOP-NO-0;
MS-IC-23 = MS-IC-TOP-YES-1;
|
| Top Event MS-IC-24|
/MS-IC-24 = MS-IC-TOP-NO-0;
MS-IC-24 = MS-IC-TOP-YES-1;
|
endif;
||
| Top Event WF-MISLOAD| probability of misloading waste form into waste package / canister|
if init(WP01-21-PWR-AP) then|
| for the 21-PWR Absorber Plate Waste Package|
/WF-MISLOAD = WF-MISLOAD-21AP;
WF-MISLOAD = WF-MISLOAD-21AP;
|
elsif init(WP02-21-PWR-CR) then|
| for the 21-PWR Control Rod Waste Package|
/WF-MISLOAD = WF-MISLOAD-21CR;
WF-MISLOAD = WF-MISLOAD-21CR;
|
elsif (init(WP03-12-PWR-AP) + init(WP05-44-BWR-AP) +
init(WP04-24-BWR-AP) + DOE-NOMIS) then|
| misload probability for 12-PWR and 24-BWR Absorber Plate and the| Aluminum Based, Enrico Fermi, Fort St. Vrain, N Reactor, Shippingport PWR,
| Shippingport LWBR, TMI II and TRIGA DOE SNF waste forms|
/WF-MISLOAD = WF-MISLOAD-12AP;
WF-MISLOAD = WF-MISLOAD-12AP;
|
elsif DOE-MISLOAD then 
|
| misload probability for the FFTF DOE SNF waste form|
/WF-MISLOAD = WF-MISLOAD-DOE;
WF-MISLOAD = WF-MISLOAD-DOE;
|
endif;
||
| Top Event CRIT-POT-WF| criticality potential of configuration|
| for configuration classes IP-3A, IP-3B, and IP-3C without any type ofmisload 
|
if (/NA-MISLOAD * /WF-MISLOAD * (MS-IC-16[1] + MS-IC-18 + MS-IC-22[1])) then|
| for no waste package misload 

|
/CRIT-POT-WF = CRIT-POT-WF-NONE;
CRIT-POT-WF = CRIT-POT-WF-NONE;
|
elsif ((NA-MISLOAD + (WF-MISLOAD * DOE-MISLOAD)) *
(MS-IC-16[1] + MS-IC-18 + MS-IC-22[1])) then|
| for waste package neutron absorber material or DOE SNF misload|
/CRIT-POT-WF = CRIT-POT-WF-YES;
CRIT-POT-WF = CRIT-POT-WF-YES;
|
elsif (WF-MISLOAD * /NA-MISLOAD * (MS-IC-16[1] + MS-IC-18 + MS-IC-22[1]) *
(init(WP01-21-PWR-AP) + init(WP02-21-PWR-CR))) then|
| for waste package waste form 21-PWR misloads only|
/CRIT-POT-WF = CRIT-POT-WF-MISL;
CRIT-POT-WF = CRIT-POT-WF-MISL;
|
endif; 

B.8 LINKAGE RULES FOR THE CONFIG-IP4-A EVENT TREE (FIGURE B-11) 
The following linkage rules are used to substitute the values for the events and processes that 
define the formation of configuration class IP-4 of the CONFIG-IP4-A event tree. 
|
| SET VARIABLES||
DOE-MISLOAD = (init(WP06-DOE1-SHORT) + init(WP07-DOE1-LONG));
|
DOE-NOMIS = (init(WP08-DOE2-SHORT) + init(WP09-DOE3-SHORT) +
init(WP10-DOE3-LONG) + init(WP11-DOE3-MCO) + 
init(WP12-DOE4-SHORT) + init(WP13-DOE4-LONG) + 
init(WP14-DOE5-SHORT) + init(WP15-DOE5-LONG) + 
init(WP16-DOE6-LONG) + init(WP17-DOE7-SHORT) +
init(WP18-DOE7-LONG) + init(WP19-DOE8-SHORT) +
init(WP20-DOE8-LONG) + init(WP21-DOE9-SHORT) +
init(WP22-DOE9-LONG));
|
if always then||
| Top Event CONFIG-SCEN|
/CONFIG-SCEN = MS-IC-TOP-NO-0;
CONFIG-SCEN[1] = MS-IC-TOP-YES-1;
CONFIG-SCEN[2] = MS-IC-TOP-YES-1;
CONFIG-SCEN[3] = MS-IC-TOP-YES-1;
|
| Top Event MS-IC-32|
/MS-IC-32 = MS-IC-TOP-NO-0;
MS-IC-32 = MS-IC-32-1;
||
| Top Event MS-IC-33|
/MS-IC-33 = MS-IC-TOP-NO-0;
MS-IC-33 = MS-IC-TOP-YES-1;
||
| Top Event MS-IC-34|
/MS-IC-34 = MS-IC-TOP-NO-0;
MS-IC-34[1] = MS-IC-TOP-YES-0;
MS-IC-34[2] = MS-IC-TOP-YES-1;
endif 
||
| Top Event WF-MISLOAD| probability of misloading waste form into waste package / canister|
if init(WP01-21-PWR-AP) then| 

| for the 21-PWR Absorber Plate Waste Package|
/WF-MISLOAD = WF-MISLOAD-21AP;
WF-MISLOAD = WF-MISLOAD-21AP;
|
elsif init(WP02-21-PWR-CR) then|
| for the 21-PWR Control Rod Waste Package|
/WF-MISLOAD = WF-MISLOAD-21CR;
WF-MISLOAD = WF-MISLOAD-21CR;
|
elsif (init(WP03-12-PWR-AP) + init(WP05-44-BWR-AP) +
init(WP04-24-BWR-AP) + DOE-NOMIS) then|
| misload probability for 12-PWR and 24-BWR Absorber Plate and the| Aluminum Based, Enrico Fermi, Fort St. Vrain, N Reactor, Shippingport PWR,
| Shippingport LWBR, TMI II and TRIGA DOE SNF waste forms|
/WF-MISLOAD = WF-MISLOAD-12AP;
WF-MISLOAD = WF-MISLOAD-12AP;
|
elsif DOE-MISLOAD then 
|
| misload probability for the FFTF DOE SNF waste form|
/WF-MISLOAD = WF-MISLOAD-DOE;
WF-MISLOAD = WF-MISLOAD-DOE;
|
endif;
||
| Top Event CRIT-POT-WF| criticality potential of configuration|
| for configuration classes IP-4A and IP-4B without any type of misload|
if (/NA-MISLOAD * /WF-MISLOAD * (MS-IC-32 + MS-IC-34[1])) then|
| for no waste package misload|
/CRIT-POT-WF = CRIT-POT-WF-NONE;
CRIT-POT-WF = CRIT-POT-WF-NONE;
|
elsif ((NA-MISLOAD + (WF-MISLOAD * DOE-MISLOAD)) *
(MS-IC-32 + MS-IC-34[1])) then|
| for waste package neutron absorber material or DOE SNF misload|
/CRIT-POT-WF = CRIT-POT-WF-YES;
CRIT-POT-WF = CRIT-POT-WF-YES;
|
elsif (WF-MISLOAD * /NA-MISLOAD * (MS-IC-32 + MS-IC-34[1]) *
(init(WP01-21-PWR-AP) + init(WP02-21-PWR-CR))) then|
| for waste package waste form 21-PWR misloads only| 

/CRIT-POT-WF = CRIT-POT-WF-MISL;
CRIT-POT-WF = CRIT-POT-WF-MISL;
|
endif; 

B.9 LINKAGE RULES FOR THE CONFIG-IP5-B EVENT TREE (FIGURE B-12) 
The following linkage rules are used to substitute the values for the events and processes that 
define the formation of configuration class IP-5 of the CONFIG-IP5-B event tree. 
|
if always then|
| Top Event MS-IC-35|
/MS-IC-35 = MS-IC-TOP-NO-0;
MS-IC-35[1] = MS-IC-TOP-YES-0;
MS-IC-35[2] = MS-IC-TOP-YES-1;
|
endif; 

B.10 LINKAGE RULES FOR THE CONFIG-NF-F EVENT TREE (FIGURE B-14) 
The following linkage rules are used to substitute the values for the events and processes that 
initiate the formation of near-field configuration classes of the CONFIG-NF-F event tree. 
|
| for seismic and igneous disruptive events|
if (SEISMIC-EVENT + IGNEOUS-EVENT) then|
| Top Event CONFIG-SCEN| direct processing of near-field configuration classes NF-1, NF-2, & NF-3|
/CONFIG-SCEN = MS-IC-TOP-NO-0;
CONFIG-SCEN[1] = MS-IC-TOP-YES-1;
CONFIG-SCEN[1] = MS-IC-TOP-YES-1;
CONFIG-SCEN[1] = MS-IC-TOP-YES-1;
|
| Top Event MS-NF-6| initiate processing of near-field configuration class NF-1|
/MS-NF-6 = MS-IC-TOP-NO-0;
MS-NF-6 = MS-IC-TOP-YES-1;
|
| Top Event MS-NF-8| initiate processing of near-field configuration class NF-3|
/MS-NF-8 = MS-IC-TOP-NO-0;
MS-NF-8 = MS-IC-TOP-YES-1;
|
endif;
||
| Top Event MS-NF-7|
if MS-IC-12 + IG-FM-TRANSPT then 
|
| initiate processing of near-field configuration class NF-2 only| if bottom waste package failure or igneous event occurs|
/MS-NF-7 = MS-IC-TOP-NO-0;
MS-NF-7 = MS-IC-TOP-YES-1;
|
else 
|
/MS-NF-7 = MS-IC-TOP-NO-1;
MS-NF-7 = MS-IC-TOP-YES-0;
|
endif; 

B.11 LINKAGE RULES FOR THE CONFIG-NF1 EVENT TREE (FIGURE B-15) 
The following linkage rules are used to substitute the values for the events and processes that 
define the formation of near-field configuration class NF-1 of the CONFIG-NF1 event tree. 
|
| Top Event CONFIG-SCEN| direct processing of near-field configuration subclasses NF-1A,
| NF-1B and NF-1C|
if (SEISMIC-EVENT + IGNEOUS-EVENT) then|
| for seismic and igneous disruptive events|
/MS-NF-9 = MS-NF-TOP-NO-0;
MS-NF-9[1] = MS-NF-TOP-YES-1;
MS-NF-9[2] = MS-NF-TOP-YES-1;
MS-NF-9[3] = MS-NF-TOP-YES-1;
MS-NF-9[4] = MS-NF-TOP-YES-1;
|
endif;
|
| for seismic disruptive events only|
if SEISMIC-EVENT then 
|
| Top Event MS-NF-10| initiate processing of near-field configuration subclass NF-1A|
/MS-NF-10 = MS-NF-TOP-NO-0;
MS-NF-10 = MS-NF-10-1;
|
| Top Event MS-NF-11| initiate processing of near-field configuration subclass NF-1B|
/MS-NF-11 = MS-NF-TOP-NO-0;
MS-NF-11 = MS-NF-11-1;
|
| Top Event MS-NF-10| initiate processing of near-field configuration subclass NF-1C|
/MS-NF-12 = MS-NF-TOP-NO-0;
MS-NF-12 = MS-NF-12-1;
|
endif;
|
| Top Event CRIT-POT-WF| criticality potential of near-field configurations|
if (MS-NF-10 + MS-NF-11 + MS-NF-12) then|
| for near-field configuration subclasses NF-1A, NF-1B, & NF-1C|
/CRIT-POT-WF = CRIT-POT-WF-NONE;
CRIT-POT-WF = CRIT-POT-WF-NONE;

|
endif;
|
| for igneous disruptive events only|
if IGNEOUS-EVENT then 
|
| Top Event MS-NF-10| initiate processing of near-field configuration subclass NF-1A|
/MS-NF-10 = MS-NF-TOP-NO-1;
MS-NF-10 = MS-NF-TOP-YES-0;
|
| Top Event MS-NF-11| initiate processing of near-field configuration subclass NF-1B|
/MS-NF-11 = MS-NF-TOP-NO-1;
MS-NF-11 = MS-NF-TOP-YES-0;
|
| Top Event MS-NF-10| initiate processing of near-field configuration subclass NF-1C|
/MS-NF-12 = MS-NF-TOP-NO-1;
MS-NF-12 = MS-NF-TOP-YES-0;
|
endif; 

B.12 LINKAGE RULES FOR THE CONFIG-NF2 EVENT TREE (FIGURE B-16) 
The following linkage rules are used to substitute the values for the events and processes that 
define the formation of near-field configuration class NF-2 of the CONFIG-NF2 event tree. 
|
| for seismic disruptive events|
if SEISMIC-EVENT then 
|
| Top Event MS-NF-13| initiate evaluation of near-field configuration subclass NF-2A|
/MS-NF-13 = MS-NF-TOP-NO-0;
MS-NF-13 = MS-NF-13-1;
|
| Top Event MS-NF-14| neutron absorber and fissile materials separate|
/MS-NF-14 = MS-NF-TOP-NO-1;
MS-NF-14 = MS-NF-TOP-YES-1;
|
endif;
|
| Top Event CRIT-POT-WF| criticality potential of near-field configuration subclass NF-2A|
if MS-NF-13 then 
|
/CRIT-POT-WF = CRIT-POT-WF-NONE;
CRIT-POT-WF = CRIT-POT-WF-NONE;
|
endif;
|
| for igneous disruptive events|
if IGNEOUS-EVENT then 
|
| Top Event MS-NF-13| initiate evaluation of near-field configuration subclass NF-2A|
/MS-NF-13 = MS-IC-TOP-NO-1;
MS-NF-13 = MS-IC-TOP-YES-0;
|
endif; 

B.13 LINKAGE RULES FOR THE CONFIG-NF3 EVENT TREE (FIGURE B-17) 
The following linkage rules are used to substitute the values for the events and processes that 
define the formation of near-field configuration class NF-3 of the CONFIG-NF3 event tree. 
|
| Top Event MS-NF-16| directs the evaluation of near-field configuration subclases NF-3A,
| NF-3B, and NF-3C|
if SEISMIC-EVENT + IGNEOUS-EVENT then 
|
| for seismic and igneous disruptive events|
/CONFIG-SCEN = MS-NF-TOP-NO-0;
CONFIG-SCEN[1] = MS-NF-TOP-YES-1;
CONFIG-SCEN[2] = MS-NF-TOP-YES-1;
|
endif;
|
| for seismic disruptive events|
if SEISMIC-EVENT then 
|
| Top Event MS-NF-15| initiate evaluation of near-field configuration subclass NF-3A|
/MS-NF-15 = MS-NF-TOP-NO-0;
MS-NF-15 = MS-NF-15-1;
|
| Top Event MS-NF-16| initiate evaluation of near-field configuration subclasses| NF-3B and NF-3C|
/MS-NF-16 = MS-NF-TOP-NO-0;
MS-NF-16[1] = MS-NF-TOP-YES-1;
MS-NF-16[2] = MS-NF-TOP-YES-1;
|
| Top Event MS-NF-19| degradation of invert material|
/MS-NF-19 = MS-NF-19-90;
MS-NF-19 = MS-NF-19-90;
|
| Top Event MS-NF-17| separation of neutron absorber and fissile material containing colloids|
/MS-NF-17 = MS-NF-TOP-NO-1;
MS-NF-17 = MS-NF-TOP-YES-1;
|
| Top Event MS-IC-18| filtration and concentration of colloids|
/MS-NF-18 = MS-NF-TOP-NO-0;
MS-NF-18 = MS-NF-TOP-YES-1;

|
endif;
|
| Top Event CRIT-POT-WF| criticality potential of near-field configuration| subclasses NF-3A, NF-3B, and NF-3C|
if (MS-NF-15 + MS-NF-16[1]) then|
/CRIT-POT-WF = CRIT-POT-WF-NONE;
CRIT-POT-WF = CRIT-POT-WF-NONE;
|
endif;
|
| for igneous disuptive events|
if IGNEOUS-EVENT then 
|
| Top Event MS-NF-15| initiate evaluation of near-field configuration subclass NF-3A|
/MS-NF-15 = MS-NF-TOP-NO-1;
MS-NF-15 = MS-NF-TOP-YES-0;
|
| Top Event MS-NF-16| initiate evaluation of near-field configuration subclasses| NF-3B and NF-3C|
/MS-NF-16 = MS-NF-TOP-NO-0;
MS-NF-16[1] = MS-NF-TOP-YES-1;
MS-NF-16[2] = MS-NF-TOP-YES-1;
|
| Top Event MS-NF-19| degradation of invert material|
/MS-NF-19 = MS-NF-19-90;
MS-NF-19 = MS-NF-19-90;
|
| Top Event MS-NF-17| separation of neutron absorber and fissile material containing colloids|
/MS-NF-17 = MS-NF-TOP-NO-1;
MS-NF-17 = MS-NF-TOP-YES-0;
|
| Top Event MS-IC-18| filtration and concentration of colloids|
/MS-NF-18 = MS-NF-TOP-NO-1;
MS-NF-18 = MS-NF-TOP-YES-0;
|
endif; 

B.14 LINKAGE RULES FOR THE CONFIG-NF4 EVENT TREE (FIGURE B-18) 
The following linkage rules are used to substitute the values for the events and processes that 
define the formation of near-field configuration class NF-4 of the CONFIG-NF4 event tree. 
|
| event tree accessed for base case, seismic and rock-fall disruptive events|
| Top Event MS-NF-2| initiation near-field configuration class NF-4|
if always then|
/MS-NF-2 = MS-NF-TOP-NO-1;
MS-NF-2 = MS-NF-TOP-YES-0;
|
endif;
|
| Top Event MS-NF-DD| probability of dry diffusion accumulation in the invert|
if always then|
/MS-NF-DD = MS-NF-TOP-NO-1;
MS-NF-DD = MS-NF-TOP-YES-0;
|
endif; 

B.15 LINKAGE RULES FOR THE CONFIG-FF-J EVENT TREE (FIGURE B-21) 
The following linkage rules are used to substitute the values for the events and processes that 
define the formation of far-field configuration class FF-1 of the CONFIG-FF-J event tree. 
|
| for seismic and igneous disrupt events|
if (SEISMIC-EVENT + IGNEOUS-EVENT) then|
| Top Event MS-FF-1| transport of fissile material to the far-field - initiates the| evaluation of far-field configuration class FF-1|
/MS-FF-1 = MS-FF-TOP-NO-0;
MS-FF-1 = MS-FF-TOP-YES-1;
|
| Top Event MS-FF-2| directs the evaluation of far-field configuration subclasses| FF-1A, FF-1B, and FF-1C|
/MS-FF-2 = MS-IC-TOP-NO-0;
MS-FF-2[1] = MS-IC-TOP-YES-1;
MS-FF-2[2] = MS-IC-TOP-YES-1;
MS-FF-2[3] = MS-IC-TOP-YES-1;
|
| Top Event MS-FF-3| transport of fissile material to the water table - transfer to| CONFIG-FF3 event tree for evaluation of far-field configuration| class FF-3|
/MS-FF-3 = MS-IC-TOP-NO-0;
MS-FF-3 = MS-IC-TOP-YES-1;
|
| Top Event MS-FF-11| precipitation of fissile material in the unsaturated zone | 
far-field configuration subclass FF-1A|
/MS-FF-11 = MS-IC-TOP-NO-1;
MS-FF-11 = MS-IC-TOP-YES-0;
|
| Top Event MS-FF-12| transport of fissile materials to altered TSbv - initiates| evaluation of far-field configuration subclasses FF-1B and FF-1C|
/MS-FF-12 = MS-IC-TOP-NO-0;
MS-FF-12[1] = MS-IC-TOP-YES-1;
MS-FF-12[2] = MS-IC-TOP-YES-1;
|
| Top Event MS-FF-13| sorption of fissile material in clays and zeolites in the altered TSbv | 
far-field configuration subclass FF-1B|
/MS-FF-13 = MS-FF-TOP-NO-1;
MS-FF-13 = MS-FF-TOP-YES-0;

|
| Top Event MS-FF-14| accumulation of fissile material in topographical low above altered TSbv | 
far-field configuration subclass FF-1C|
/MS-FF-14 = MS-FF-TOP-NO-1;
MS-FF-14 = MS-FF-TOP-YES-0;
|
endif; 

B.16 LINKAGE RULES FOR THE CONFIG-FF-K EVENT TREE (FIGURE B-22) 
The following linkage rules are used to substitute the values for the events and processes that 
define the formation of far-field configuration class FF-2 of the CONFIG-FF-K event tree. 
|
| for seismic and igneous disruptive events|
if SEISMIC-EVENT + IGNEOUS-EVENT then 
|
| Top Event MS-FF-16| transport of colloids to TSw - directs evaluation of far-field| configuratin class FF-2|
/MS-FF-16 = MS-FF-TOP-NO-0;
MS-FF-16 = MS-FF-TOP-YES-1;
|
| Top Event MS-FF-17| separation of neutron absober and fissile materials - directs| evaluation of far-field configuration subclasses FF-2A, FF-2B and FF-2C|
/MS-FF-17 = MS-FF-TOP-NO-0;
MS-FF-17[1] = MS-FF-TOP-YES-1;
MS-FF-17[2] = MS-FF-TOP-YES-1;
|
| Top Event MS-FF-18| colloids trapped in dead-end fractures - far-field configuration| subclass FF-2A|
/MS-FF-18 = MS-FF-TOP-NO-1;
MS-FF-18 = MS-FF-TOP-YES-0;
|
| Top Event MS-FF-19| transport of colloids to altered TSbv - initiates evaluation| of far-field configuration subclasses FF-2B and FF-2C|
/MS-FF-19 = MS-FF-TOP-NO-0;
MS-FF-19[1] = MS-FF-TOP-YES-1;
MS-FF-19[2] = MS-FF-TOP-YES-1;
|
| Top Event MS-FF-20| sorption of colloids on clays and zeolites in altered TSbv | 
far-field configuration subclass FF-2B|
/MS-FF-20 = MS-FF-TOP-NO-1;
MS-FF-20 = MS-FF-TOP-YES-0;
|
| Top Event MS-FF-21| filtration of colloids in topographic lows above altered TSbv | 
far-field configuration subclass FF-2C|
/MS-FF-21 = MS-FF-TOP-NO-1;
MS-FF-21 = MS-FF-TOP-YES-0;
endif; 

B.17 LINKAGE RULES FOR THE CONFIG-FF3 EVENT TREE (FIGURE B-23) 
The following linkage rules are used to substitute the values for the events and processes that 
define the formation of near-field configuration class FF-3 of the CONFIG-FF3 event tree. 
|
| for seismic and igneous disruptive events|
if (SEISMIC-EVENT + IGNEOUS-EVENT) then|
| Top Event CONFIG-SCEN| directs the evaluation of far-field configuration class FF-3|
/CONFIG-SCEN = MS-FF-TOP-NO-0;
CONFIG-SCEN[1] = MS-FF-TOP-YES-1;
CONFIG-SCEN[2] = MS-FF-TOP-YES-1;
CONFIG-SCEN[3] = MS-FF-TOP-YES-1;
CONFIG-SCEN[4] = MS-FF-TOP-YES-1;
CONFIG-SCEN[5] = MS-FF-TOP-YES-1;
|
| Top Event MS-FF-4| fissile material precipitates in upwell zone - far-field| configuration subclass FF-3A|
/MS-FF-4 = MS-FF-TOP-NO-1;
MS-FF-4 = MS-FF-TOP-YES-0;
|
| Top Event MS-FF-5| containment plume mixes below redox front|
/MS-FF-5 = MS-FF-TOP-NO-0;
MS-FF-5 = MS-FF-TOP-YES-1;
|
| Top Event MS-FF-6| fissile material precipitiate below redox front - far-field| configuration subclass FF-3B|
/MS-FF-6 = MS-FF-TOP-NO-1;
MS-FF-6 = MS-FF-TOP-YES-0;
|
| Top Event MS-FF-7| fissile material precipitates at reducing zone - far-field| configuration subclass FF-3C|
/MS-FF-7 = MS-FF-TOP-NO-1;
MS-FF-7 = MS-FF-TOP-YES-0;
|
| Top Event MS-FF-8| fissile materials precipitate at pinchout of tuff aquifer | 
far-field configuration subclass FF-3D|
/MS-FF-8 = MS-FF-TOP-NO-1;
MS-FF-8 = MS-FF-TOP-YES-0;
|
| Top Event MS-FF-9 

| fissile materials transported to Franklin Lake|
/MS-FF-9 = MS-FF-TOP-NO-0;
MS-FF-9 = MS-FF-TOP-YES-1;
|
| Top Event MS-FF-10| fissile material precipitate in Franklin Lake - far-field| configuration subclass FF-3E|
/MS-FF-10 = MS-FF-TOP-NO-0;
MS-FF-10 = MS-FF-10-1;
|
endif;
|
| Top Event CRIT-POT-WF| criticality potential of far-field configuration subclasses| FF-3A, FF-3B, FF-3C, FF-3D, and FF-3E|
if (MS-FF-4 + MS-FF-6 + MS-FF-7 + MS-FF-8 + MS-FF-10) then|
/CRIT-POT-WF = CRIT-POT-WF-NONE;
CRIT-POT-WF = CRIT-POT-WF-NONE;
|
endif; 

B.18 LINKAGE RULES FOR THE IGNEOUS EVENT TREE (FIGURE B-24) 
The following linkage rules are used to substitute the values for the events and processes that 
initiate the formation of igneous configurations of the IGNEOUS event tree. 
|
| SET VARIABLES|
DOE-NAM1 = (init(WP06-DOE1-SHORT) + init(WP07-DOE1-LONG) + 
init(WP08-DOE2-SHORT) + init(WP17-DOE7-SHORT) +
init(WP18-DOE7-LONG));
|
DOE-NAM2 = (init(WP14-DOE5-SHORT) + init(WP15-DOE5-LONG));
|
DOE-NAM3 = (init(WP19-DOE8-SHORT) + init(WP20-DOE8-LONG));
|
DOE-NONAM = (init(WP09-DOE3-SHORT) + init(WP10-DOE3-LONG) + 
init(WP11-DOE3-MCO) + init(WP12-DOE4-SHORT) +
init(WP13-DOE4-LONG) + init(WP16-DOE6-LONG) + 
init(WP21-DOE9-SHORT) + init(WP22-DOE9-LONG));
||
| for igneous disruptive events only|
if IGNEOUS-EVENT then 
|
| Top Event IG-EVENT-TYPE| type of igneous event|
/IG-EVENT-TYPE = IG-EVENT-TYPE-ERUP;
IG-EVENT-TYPE = IG-EVENT-TYPE-INT;
|
| Top Event IG-WP-LOC| initial waste package location|
/IG-WP-LOC = IG-TOP-NO-1;
IG-WP-LOC = IG-TOP-YES-1;
|
endif;
||
| Top Event IG-WP-RELOC| final waste package location - for eruptive scenario only for| waste package beyond the conduit intersection point|
if (/IG-EVENT-TYPE * IG-WP-LOC) then|
/IG-WP-RELOC = IG-TOP-NO-1;
IG-WP-RELOC = IG-TOP-YES-0;
|
endif;
||
| Top Event NA-MISLOAD| probability of neutron absorber misload 

|
if init(WP01-21-PWR-AP) then|
| for the 21-PWR Absorber Plate Waste Package|
/NA-MISLOAD = NA-MISLOAD-21AP;
NA-MISLOAD = NA-MISLOAD-21AP;
|
elsif init(WP02-21-PWR-CR) then|
| for the 21-PWR Control Rod Waste Package|
/NA-MISLOAD = NA-MISLOAD-21CR;
NA-MISLOAD = NA-MISLOAD-21CR;
|
elsif (init(WP03-12-PWR-AP) + init(WP04-24-BWR-AP) +
init(WP05-44-BWR-AP) + DOE-NAM1)then|
| for the 12-PWR, 24-BWR, and 44-BWR Absorber Plate Waste Packages| and FFTF, TRIGA, and Aluminum Based DOE SNF waste forms|
/NA-MISLOAD = NA-MISLOAD-12AP;
NA-MISLOAD = NA-MISLOAD-12AP;
|
elsif DOE-NAM2 then 
|
| for Shippingport LWBR DOE SNF waste form|
/NA-MISLOAD = NA-MISLOAD-DOE-NAM2;
NA-MISLOAD = NA-MISLOAD-DOE-NAM2;
|
elsif DOE-NAM3 then 
|
| for Enrico Fermi DOE SNF waste form|
/NA-MISLOAD = NA-MISLOAD-DOE-NAM3;
NA-MISLOAD = NA-MISLOAD-DOE-NAM3;
|
elsif DOE-NONAM then 
|
| for the Fort St. Vrain, N Reactor, Shippingport PWR, and TMI II| DOE SNF waste forms|
/NA-MISLOAD = NA-MISLOAD-DOE-NONAM;
NA-MISLOAD = NA-MISLOAD-DOE-NONAM;
|
endif; 

B.19 LINKAGE RULES FOR THE IG-ERUPTIVE EVENT TREE (FIGURE B-25) 
The following linkage rules are used to substitute the values for the events and processes that 
define the formation of igneous eruptive configuration classes IG-E1 through IG-E4 of the IGERUPTIVE 
event tree. 
|
| SET VARIABLES||
DOE-MISLOAD = (init(WP06-DOE1-SHORT) + init(WP07-DOE1-LONG));
|
DOE-NOMIS = (init(WP08-DOE2-SHORT) + init(WP09-DOE3-SHORT) +
init(WP10-DOE3-LONG) + init(WP11-DOE3-MCO) + 
init(WP12-DOE4-SHORT) + init(WP13-DOE4-LONG) + 
init(WP14-DOE5-SHORT) + init(WP15-DOE5-LONG) + 
init(WP16-DOE6-LONG) + init(WP17-DOE7-SHORT) +
init(WP18-DOE7-LONG) + init(WP19-DOE8-SHORT) +
init(WP20-DOE8-LONG) + init(WP21-DOE9-SHORT) +
init(WP22-DOE9-LONG));
|
| for igneous disruptive events only - eruptive scenario for waste| packages initially in the conduit or that are later sucked into conduit|
if (IGNEOUS-EVENT * /IG-EVENT-TYPE * (/IG-WP-LOC + IG-WP-RELOC)) then 
|
| Top Event IG-CONFIG| waste package configuration on surface|
/IG-CONFIG = IG-CONFIG-0;
IG-CONFIG = IG-TOP-YES-0;
||
| Top Event IG-RAINFALL| probability of rainfall|
/IG-RAINFALL = IG-TOP-NO-0;
IG-RAINFALL = IG-TOP-YES-1;
|
endif;
||
| TOP EVENT IG-FM-ACCUM| fissile material accumulates after rainfall|
if (IGNEOUS-EVENT * /IG-CONFIG * IG-RAINFALL) then|
/IG-FM-ACCUM = IG-FM-ACCUM-0;
IG-FM-ACCUM = IG-TOP-YES-0;
|
endif;
||
| Top Event WF-MISLOAD| probability of misloading waste form into waste package / canister| 

if init(WP01-21-PWR-AP) then|
| for the 21-PWR Absorber Plate Waste Package|
/WF-MISLOAD = WF-MISLOAD-21AP;
WF-MISLOAD = WF-MISLOAD-21AP;
|
elsif init(WP02-21-PWR-CR) then|
| for the 21-PWR Control Rod Waste Package|
/WF-MISLOAD = WF-MISLOAD-21CR;
WF-MISLOAD = WF-MISLOAD-21CR;
|
elsif (init(WP03-12-PWR-AP) + init(WP05-44-BWR-AP) +
init(WP04-24-BWR-AP) + DOE-NOMIS) then|
| misload probability for 12-PWR and 24-BWR Absorber Plate and the| Aluminum Based, Enrico Fermi, Fort St. Vrain, N Reactor, Shippingport PWR,
| Shippingport LWBR, TMI II and TRIGA DOE SNF waste forms|
/WF-MISLOAD = WF-MISLOAD-12AP;
WF-MISLOAD = WF-MISLOAD-12AP;
|
elsif DOE-MISLOAD then 
|
| misload probability for the FFTF DOE SNF waste form|
/WF-MISLOAD = WF-MISLOAD-DOE;
WF-MISLOAD = WF-MISLOAD-DOE;
|
endif;
||
| Top Event CRIT-POT-WF| criticality potential of igneous configuration|
if (IG-FM-ACCUM + /WF-MISLOAD) then|
| if fissile material accumulation and no misload, no criticality potential|
/CRIT-POT-WF = CRIT-POT-WF-NONE;
CRIT-POT-WF = CRIT-POT-WF-NONE;
|
elsif WF-MISLOAD then 
|
| if waste package misloaded, criticality potential yes|
/CRIT-POT-WF = CRIT-POT-WF-NONE;
CRIT-POT-WF = CRIT-POT-WF-NONE;
|
endif;
||
| Top Event CRIT-POT-WF|
if IG-FM-ACCUM then 

|
| criticality potential of igneous configurations IG-E1 and IG-E3| fissile material accumulation external to waste package,
| no criticality potential|
/CRIT-POT-WF = CRIT-POT-WF-NONE;
CRIT-POT-WF = CRIT-POT-WF-NONE;
|
elsif (IG-CONFIG * (NA-MISLOAD + (WF-MISLOAD * DOE-MISLOAD))) then|
| criticality potential of igneous configurations IG-E2 and IG-E4| igneous event, waste package not destroyed, neutron absorber material| of DOE SNF misload|
/CRIT-POT-WF = CRIT-POT-WF-YES;
CRIT-POT-WF = CRIT-POT-WF-YES;
|
elsif (IGNEOUS-EVENT * /IG-WP-DESTRYD * WF-MISLOAD * /NA-MISLOAD *
(init(WP01-21-PWR-AP) + init(WP02-21-PWR-CR))*
(init(WP01-21-PWR-AP) + init(WP02-21-PWR-CR))) then|
| criticality potential of igneous configurations IG-E2 and IG-E4| igneous event, waste package not destroyed, waste form 21-PWR misload only|
/CRIT-POT-WF = CRIT-POT-WF-MISL;
CRIT-POT-WF = CRIT-POT-WF-MISL;
|
endif; 

B.20 LINKAGE RULES FOR THE IG-INTRUSIVE EVENT TREE (FIGURE B-26) 
The following linkage rules are used to substitute the values for the events and processes that 
define the formation of igneous intrusive configuration classes IG-I4, IG-I5, and IG-I6 of the 
IG-INTRUSIVE event tree. 
|
| for igneous disruptive events only - intrusive scenario and| eruptive scenario for waste packages beyond conduit that remain in drift|
if (IGNEOUS-EVENT * (IG-EVENT-TYPE + /IG-WP-RELOC)) then|
| Top Event IG-WP-DESTRYD| probability that intrusive event will destroy waste package|
/IG-WP-DESTRYD = IG-WP-DESTRYD-0;
IG-WP-DESTRYD = IG-TOP-YES-0;
|
| Top Event IG-WP-SLUMP| probability of waste package slump|
/IG-WP-SLUMP = IG-TOP-NO-0;
IG-WP-SLUMP[1] = IG-TOP-YES-0;
IG-WP-SLUMP[2] = IG-TOP-YES-1;
|
| Top Event IG-MAGMA-INT| probability of magma intrusion into waste package|
/IG-MAGMA-INT = IG-TOP-NO-1;
IG-MAGMA-INT = IG-TOP-YES-0;
|
endif;
||
| Top Event CRIT-POT-WF| criticality potential of igneous configurations IG-I4, IG-I5, and| IG-I6|
if (IGNEOUS-EVENT * IG-WP-DESTRYD * /IG-FM-TRANSPT) then|
| igneous event, waste package destroyed, fissile material not| relocated to the near-field|
/CRIT-POT-WF = CRIT-POT-WF-NONE;
CRIT-POT-WF = CRIT-POT-WF-NONE;
|
endif; 

B.21 LINKAGE RULES FOR THE IG-INTRUSIVE2 EVENT TREE (FIGURE B-27) 
The following linkage rules are used to substitute the values for the events and processes that 
define the formation of igneous intrusive configuration classes IG-I1, IG-I2, and IG-I3 of the 
IG-INTRUSIVE2 event tree. 
|
| SET VARIABLES||
DOE-MISLOAD = (init(WP06-DOE1-SHORT) + init(WP07-DOE1-LONG));
|
DOE-NOMIS = (init(WP08-DOE2-SHORT) + init(WP09-DOE3-SHORT) +
init(WP10-DOE3-LONG) + init(WP11-DOE3-MCO) + 
init(WP12-DOE4-SHORT) + init(WP13-DOE4-LONG) + 
init(WP14-DOE5-SHORT) + init(WP15-DOE5-LONG) + 
init(WP16-DOE6-LONG) + init(WP17-DOE7-SHORT) +
init(WP18-DOE7-LONG) + init(WP19-DOE8-SHORT) +
init(WP20-DOE8-LONG) + init(WP21-DOE9-SHORT) +
init(WP22-DOE9-LONG));
||
| for igneous disruptive events only - intrusive scenario, waste packages| in drift, not destroyed, but slumped partially or completely|
if always then|
| Top Event IG-MAGMA-COOL| evaluation before and after magma cooling|
/IG-MAGMA-COOL = IG-MAGMA-COOL-0;
IG-MAGMA-COOL = IG-MAGMA-COOL-1;
|
| Top Event IG-MAGMA-FRAC| probability that magma fractures after cooling|
/IG-MAGMA-FRAC = IG-TOP-NO-0;
IG-MAGMA-FRAC = IG-MAGMA-FRAC-1;
|
| Top Event IG-BATHTUB| probability of formation of bathtub configuration given seepage| after magma cooling|
/IG-BATHTUB = IG-BATHTUB-0;
IG-BATHTUB = IG-TOP-YES-0;
|
| Top Event IG-FM-TRANSPT| probability of fissile material transport to the invert|
/IG-FM-TRANSPT = IG-FM-TRANSPT-0;
IG-FM-TRANSPT = IG-FM-TRANSPT-1;
endif 
||
| Top Event IG-SEEPAGE| probability of no, lower-bound, mean, and upper-bound 

| seepage scenarios|
if (IGNEOUS-EVENT * IG-MAGMA-COOL * IG-MAGMA-FRAC * DRIFT-ZONE) then|
| igneous event, magma cooled, lithophysal zone|
/IG-SEEPAGE = IG-SEEPAGE-NWL;
IG-SEEPAGE[1] = IG-SEEPAGE-LL;
IG-SEEPAGE[2] = IG-SEEPAGE-ML;
IG-SEEPAGE[3] = IG-SEEPAGE-UL;
|
elsif (IGNEOUS-EVENT * IG-MAGMA-COOL * IG-MAGMA-FRAC * /DRIFT-ZONE) then|
| igneous event, magma cooled and fractured, nonlithophysal|
/IG-SEEPAGE = IG-SEEPAGE-NWNL;
IG-SEEPAGE[1] = IG-SEEPAGE-LNL;
IG-SEEPAGE[2] = IG-SEEPAGE-MNL;
IG-SEEPAGE[3] = IG-SEEPAGE-UNL;
|
endif;
||
| Top Event WF-MISLOAD| probability of misloading waste form into waste package / canister|
if init(WP01-21-PWR-AP) then|
| for the 21-PWR Absorber Plate Waste Package|
/WF-MISLOAD = WF-MISLOAD-21AP;
WF-MISLOAD = WF-MISLOAD-21AP;
|
elsif init(WP02-21-PWR-CR) then|
| for the 21-PWR Control Rod Waste Package|
/WF-MISLOAD = WF-MISLOAD-21CR;
WF-MISLOAD = WF-MISLOAD-21CR;
|
elsif (init(WP03-12-PWR-AP) + init(WP05-44-BWR-AP) +
init(WP04-24-BWR-AP) + DOE-NOMIS) then|
| misload probability for 12-PWR and 24-BWR Absorber Plate and the| Aluminum Based, Enrico Fermi, Fort St. Vrain, N Reactor, Shippingport PWR,
| Shippingport LWBR, TMI II and TRIGA DOE SNF waste forms|
/WF-MISLOAD = WF-MISLOAD-12AP;
WF-MISLOAD = WF-MISLOAD-12AP;
|
elsif DOE-MISLOAD then 
|
| misload probability for the FFTF DOE SNF waste form|
/WF-MISLOAD = WF-MISLOAD-DOE;
WF-MISLOAD = WF-MISLOAD-DOE;
| 

endif;
||
| Top Event CRIT-POT-WF| criticality potential of igneous configurations IG-I1, IG-I2, and| IG-I3|
if (IGNEOUS-EVENT * /IG-WP-DESTRYD * /NA-MISLOAD * /WF-MISLOAD) then|
| igneous event, waste package not destroyed, no misload of any type|
/CRIT-POT-WF = CRIT-POT-WF-NONE;
CRIT-POT-WF = CRIT-POT-WF-NONE;
|
elsif (IGNEOUS-EVENT * /IG-WP-DESTRYD *
(NA-MISLOAD + (WF-MISLOAD * DOE-MISLOAD))) then|
| igneous event, waste package not destroyed, neutron absorber material| or DOE SNF misload|
/CRIT-POT-WF = CRIT-POT-WF-YES;
CRIT-POT-WF = CRIT-POT-WF-YES;
|
elsif (IGNEOUS-EVENT * /IG-WP-DESTRYD * WF-MISLOAD * /NA-MISLOAD *
(init(WP01-21-PWR-AP) + init(WP02-21-PWR-CR))) then|
| igneous event, waste package not destroyed, waste form 21-PWR misloads only|
/CRIT-POT-WF = CRIT-POT-WF-MISL;
CRIT-POT-WF = CRIT-POT-WF-MISL;
|
endif; 

B.22 PROJECT PARTITION RULES 
The following partition rules are used to create encoded end states for the FEPS event tree 
sequences that result in either a bathtub or flow-through configuration. These encoded end states 
represent sequences for the three SAPHIRE evaluated criticality FEPs cases (igneous disruptive 
event not evaluated in SAPHIRE), eight of the ten waste package types (naval waste package 
types are not considered in this evaluation), and the two geological zones (lithophysal and 
nonlithophysal) considered in this analysis. 
|
|
| Set Criticality FEPs Case
|
if /BASE-CASE then 
GlobalPartition = "BC";
|
elsif (SEISMIC-EVENT * SEIS-FAULT-1) then 
GlobalPartition = "SF";
|
elsif (SEISMIC-EVENT * (/SEIS-GROUND + ~SEIS-DAMAGE)) then 
GlobalPartition = "SG";
|
elsif ROCKFALL-EVENT then 
GlobalPartition = "RF";
|
elsif (IGNEOUS-EVENT * /IG-EVENT-TYPE-ERUP) then 
GlobalPartition = "IE";
|
elsif (IGNEOUS-EVENT * IG-EVENT-TYPE-INT) then 
GlobalPartition = "II";
|
endif;
|
| Set Waste Package / Waste Form Type
|
if init(WP01-21-PWR-AP) then 
GlobalPartition = "??-WP01";
|
elsif init(WP02-21-PWR-CR) then 
GlobalPartition = "??-WP02";
|
elsif init(WP03-12-PWR-AP) then 
GlobalPartition = "??-WP03";
|
elsif init(WP04-24-BWR-AP) then 
GlobalPartition = "??-WP04";
|
elsif init(WP05-44-BWR-AP) then 
GlobalPartition = "??-WP05";
|
elsif init(WP06-DOE1-SHORT) then 
GlobalPartition = "??-WP06";
|
elsif init(WP07-DOE1-LONG) then 
GlobalPartition = "??-WP07";
|
elsif init(WP08-DOE2-SHORT) then 
GlobalPartition = "??-WP08";
|

elsif init(WP09-DOE3-SHORT) then 
GlobalPartition = "??-WP09";
|
elsif init(WP10-DOE3-LONG) then 
GlobalPartition = "??-WP10";
|
elsif init(WP11-DOE3-MCO) then 
GlobalPartition = "??-WP11";
|
elsif init(WP12-DOE4-SHORT) then 
GlobalPartition = "??-WP12";
|
elsif init(WP13-DOE4-LONG) then 
GlobalPartition = "??-WP13";
|
elsif init(WP14-DOE5-SHORT) then 
GlobalPartition = "??-WP14";
|
elsif init(WP15-DOE5-LONG) then 
GlobalPartition = "??-WP15";
|
elsif init(WP16-DOE6-LONG) then 
GlobalPartition = "??-WP16";
|
elsif init(WP17-DOE7-SHORT) then 
GlobalPartition = "??-WP17";
|
elsif init(WP18-DOE7-LONG) then 
GlobalPartition = "??-WP18";
|
elsif init(WP19-DOE8-SHORT) then 
GlobalPartition = "??-WP19";
|
elsif init(WP20-DOE8-LONG) then 
GlobalPartition = "??-WP20";
|
elsif init(WP21-DOE9-SHORT) then 
GlobalPartition = "??-WP21";
|
elsif init(WP22-DOE9-LONG) then 
GlobalPartition = "??-WP22";
|
endif;
|
| Set Configuration Class
|
if (MS-IC-3A-D1 + MS-IC-3A-D2 + MS-IC-3A-D3) then 
GlobalPartition = "???????-IPDRY";
|
elsif MS-IC-9-1 then 
GlobalPartition = "???????-IP1A";
|
elsif MS-IC-11-1 then 
GlobalPartition = "???????-IP1B";
|
elsif MS-IC-14-1 then 
GlobalPartition = "???????-IP2A";
|
elsif MS-IC-16-1 then 
GlobalPartition = "???????-IP3A";
|
elsif MS-IC-18-1 then 
GlobalPartition = "???????-IP3B";
|

elsif MS-IC-19-1 then 
GlobalPartition = "???????-IP3C";
|
elsif MS-IC-22-1 then 
GlobalPartition = "???????-IP3D";
|
elsif MS-IC-32-1 then 
GlobalPartition = "???????-IP4A";
|
elsif MS-IC-34-1 then 
GlobalPartition = "???????-IP4B";
|
elsif MS-IC-36-1 then 
GlobalPartition = "???????-IP5A";
|
elsif MS-IC-38-1 then 
GlobalPartition = "???????-IP6A";
|
elsif MS-NF-10-1 then 
GlobalPartition = "???????-NF1A";
|
elsif MS-NF-11-1 then 
GlobalPartition = "???????-NF1B";
|
elsif MS-NF-12-1 then 
GlobalPartition = "???????-NF1C";
|
elsif MS-NF-13-1 then 
GlobalPartition = "???????-NF2A";
|
elsif MS-NF-15-1 then 
GlobalPartition = "???????-NF3A";
|
elsif (/MS-NF-19-1 + /MS-NF-19-90) then 
GlobalPartition = "???????-NF3B";
|
elsif (MS-NF-19-1 + MS-NF-19-90) then 
GlobalPartition = "???????-NF3C";
|
elsif MS-NF-DD-1 then 
GlobalPartition = "???????-NFDD";
|
elsif MS-NF-25-1 then 
GlobalPartition = "???????-NF4A";
|
elsif MS-NF-26-1 then 
GlobalPartition = "???????-NF5A";
|
elsif MS-FF-11-1 then 
GlobalPartition = "???????-FF1A";
|
elsif MS-FF-13-1 then 
GlobalPartition = "???????-FF1B";
|
elsif MS-FF-15-1 then 
GlobalPartition = "???????-FF1C";
|
elsif MS-FF-18-1 then 
GlobalPartition = "???????-FF2A";
|
elsif MS-FF-20-1 then 
GlobalPartition = "???????-FF2B";
|
elsif MS-FF-21-1 then

GlobalPartition = "???????-FF2C";
|
elsif MS-FF-4-1 then 
GlobalPartition = "???????-FF3A";
|
elsif MS-FF-6-1 then 
GlobalPartition = "???????-FF3B";
|
elsif MS-FF-7-1 then 
GlobalPartition = "???????-FF3C";
|
elsif MS-FF-8-1 then 
GlobalPartition = "???????-FF3D";
|
elsif MS-FF-10-1 then 
GlobalPartition = "???????-FF3E";
|
elsif (/IG-CONFIG-0 * IG-FM-ACCUM-1) then 
GlobalPartition = "???????-IGE1";
|
elsif (IG-CONFIG-1 * /IG-FM-TRANSPT-0)then 
GlobalPartition = "???????-IGE2";
|
elsif (IG-CONFIG-1 * IG-FM-TRANSPT-1) then 
GlobalPartition = "???????-IGE3";
|
elsif (IG-CONFIG-1 * IG-BATHTUB-1) then 
GlobalPartition = "???????-IGE4";
|
elsif (IG-WP-DESTRYD-1 * /IG-MAGMA-COOL-0 * /IG-FM-TRANSPT-0) then 
GlobalPartition = "???????-IGI4";
|
elsif (IG-WP-DESTRYD-0 * /IG-MAGMA-COOL-0 * /IG-MAGMA-FRAC-0 * 
/IG-FM-TRANSPT-0) then 
GlobalPartition = "???????-IGI5";
|
elsif (IG-WP-DESTRYD-1 * IG-MAGMA-COOL-1 * IG-MAGMA-FRAC-1 * 
/IG-FM-TRANSPT-0) then 
GlobalPartition = "???????-IGI6";
|
elsif (/IG-WP-DESTRYD-0 * /IG-MAGMA-COOL-0) then 
GlobalPartition = "???????-IGI1";
|
elsif (/IG-WP-DESTRYD-0 * IG-MAGMA-COOL-1 * /IG-BATHTUB-0) then 
GlobalPartition = "???????-IGI2";
|
elsif (/IG-WP-DESTRYD-0 * IG-MAGMA-COOL-1 * IG-BATHTUB-1) then 
GlobalPartition = "???????-IGI3";
|
endif;

B.23 
BASIC EVENTS FOR SAPHIRE ANALYSIS 
Table B-1 lists the basic event values used in the Criticality FEPs evaluations. 
Table B-1. Basic Event Assignments For SAPHIRE Criticality FEPs Analysis 
Name Description Probability 
BASIC EVENTS FOR CRITICALITY POTENTIAL TOP EVENT  CRIT-POT-WF 
CRIT-POT-WF CRITICALITY POTENTIAL OF WASTE FORM 1.000E+000 
CRIT-POT-WF-MISL WASTE FORM MISLOAD CONFIGURATION HAS CRITICALITY 
POTENTIAL 2.480E-005 
CRIT-POT-WF-NONE CONFIGURATION HAS NO CRITICALITY POTENTIAL 0.000E+000 
CRIT-POT-WF-YES CONFIGURATION HAS CRITICALITY POTENTIAL 1.000E+000 
BASIC EVENTS FOR DRIFT GEOLOGIC ZONE TOP EVENT  DRIFT-ZONE 
DRIFT-ZONE REPOSITORY DRIFT ZONE 1.000E+000 
DRIFT-ZONE-LITH Developed Event (top event substitution for drift-zone) 8.500E-001 
DRIFT-ZONE-NONL Developed Event (top event substitution for drift-zone) 8.500E-001 
BASIC EVENT LISTING FOR IGNEOUS CONFIGURATION EVENT TREES 
IG-BATHTUB BATHTUB CONFIGURATION DURING IGNEOUS EVENT 0.000E+000 
IG-BATHTUB-0 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR IGBATHTUB) 
0.000E+000 
IG-BATHTUB-1 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR IGBATHTUB) 
1.000E+000 
IG-CONFIG WASTE PACKAGE/WASTE FORM CONFIGURATION 1.000E+000 
IG-CONFIG-0 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR IG-CONFIG) 0.000E+000 
IG-CONFIG-1 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR IG-CONFIG) 1.000E+000 
IG-EVENT-TYPE TYPE OF IGNEOUS EVENT 1.000E+000 
IG-EVENT-TYPE-ERUP Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR IG-EVENT-
TYPE) 2.200E-001 
IG-EVENT-TYPE-INT Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR IG-EVENT-
TYPE) 1.000E+000 
IG-FM-ACCUM FISSILE MATERIAL ACCUMULATES 1.000E+000 
IG-FM-ACCUM-0 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR IG-FM-
ACCUM) 0.000E+000 
IG-FM-ACCUM-1 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR IG-FM-
ACCUM) 1.000E+000 
IG-FM-TRANS FISSILE MATERIAL TRANSPORTED FROM WASTE PACKAGE 1.000E+000 
IG-FM-TRANSPT FISSILE MATERIAL TRANSPORTED FROM WASTE PACKAGE 
TO THE NEAR-1.000E+000 
IG-FM-TRANSPT-0 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR IG-FM-
TRANSPT) 0.000E+000 
IG-FM-TRANSPT-1 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR IG-FM-
TRANSPT) 1.000E+000 
IG-MAGMA-COOL MAGMA COOLED 1.000E+000 
IG-MAGMA-COOL-0 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR IG-MAGMA-0.000E+000 

Table B-1. Basic Event Assignments For SAPHIRE Criticality FEPs Analysis 
Name Description Probability 
COOL) 
IG-MAGMA-COOL-1 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR IG-MAGMA-
COOL) 1.000E+000 
IG-MAGMA-FRAC MAGMA FRACTURES AFTER COOLING 1.000E+000 
IG-MAGMA-FRAC-0 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR IG-MAGMA-
FRAC) 0.000E+000 
IG-MAGMA-FRAC-1 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR IG-MAGMA-
FRAC) 1.000E+000 
IG-MAGMA-INT MAGMA INTRUSION INTO WASTE PACKAGE 1.000E+000 
IG-RAINFALL RAINFALL OCCURS 1.000E+000 
IG-SEEPAGE SEEPAGE RETURNS 1.000E+000 
IG-SEEPAGE-LL Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR IG-SEEPAGE 
LITH) 4.622E-002 
IG-SEEPAGE-LNL Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR IG-SEEPAGE 
NONLI 1.062E-001 
IG-SEEPAGE-ML Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR IG-SEEPAGE 
LITH) 2.111E-001 
IG-SEEPAGE-MNL Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR IG-SEEPAGE 
NONLI 3.244E-001 
IG-SEEPAGE-NWL Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR /IGSEEPAGE 
LITH 4.816E-001 
IG-SEEPAGE-NWNL Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR /IGSEEPAGE 
NONL 7.371E-001 
IG-SEEPAGE-UL Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR IG-SEEPAGE 
LITH) 2.243E-001 
IG-SEEPAGE-UNL Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR IG-SEEPAGE 
NONLI 3.065E-001 
IG-TOP-NO-0 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR NO = 0.0) 1.000E+000 
IG-TOP-NO-1 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR NO = 1.0) 0.000E+000 
IG-TOP-YES-0 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR YES = 0.0) 0.000E+000 
IG-TOP-YES-1 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR YES = 1.0) 1.000E+000 
IG-WP-DESTRYD WASTE PACKAGE DESTROYED 1.000E+000 
IG-WP-DESTRYD-0 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR IG-WP-
DESTRYD) 0.000E+000 
IG-WP-DESTRYD-1 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR IG-WP-
DESTRYD) 1.000E+000 
IG-WP-LOC WASTE PACKAGE LOCATION 1.000E+000 
IG-WP-RELOC WASTE PACKAGE RELOCATION 1.000E+000 
IG-WP-SLUMP WASTE PACKAGE SLUMPS AND BREACHES 1.000E+000 
BASIC EVENTS FOR IN-PACKAGE CONFIGURATION EVENT TREES 
MS-IC-1A INFILTRATION WATER REACHES DRIFT 1.000E+000 
MS-IC-1A-NOM-LL Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR MS-IC-1A 1.104E-002 

Table B-1. Basic Event Assignments For SAPHIRE Criticality FEPs Analysis 
Name Description Probability 
BASE CA 
MS-IC-1A-NOM-LNL Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR MS-IC-1A 
BASE CA 3.518E-002 
MS-IC-1A-NOM-ML Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR MS-IC-1A 
BASE CA 1.007E-001 
MS-IC-1A-NOM-MNL Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR MS-IC-1A 
BASE CA 2.127E-001 
MS-IC-1A-NOM-NWL Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR /MS-IC-1A 
BASE C 2.395E-001 
MS-IC-1A-NOM-NWNL Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR /MS-IC-1A 
BASE C 4.830E-001 
MS-IC-1A-NOM-UL Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR MS-IC-1A 
BASE CA 1.278E-001 
MS-IC-1A-NOM-UNL Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR MS-IC-1A 
BASE CA 2.351E-001 
MS-IC-1A-SEIS-LL Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR MS-IC-1A 
SEISMIC 4.622E-002 
MS-IC-1A-SEIS-LNL Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR MS-IC-1A 
SEISMIC 3.701E-002 
MS-IC-1A-SEIS-ML Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR MS-IC-1A 
SEISMIC 2.111E-001 
MS-IC-1A-SEIS-MNL Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR MS-IC-1A 
SEISMIC 2.146E-001 
MS-IC-1A-SEIS-NWL Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR /MS-IC-1A 
SEISMI 4.816E-001 
MS-IC-1A-SEIS-NWNL Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR /MS-IC-1A 
SEISMI 4.867E-001 
MS-IC-1A-SEIS-UL Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR MS-IC-1A 
SEISMIC 2.243E-001 
MS-IC-1A-SEIS-UNL Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR MS-IC-1A 
SEISMIC 2.351E-001 
BASIC EVENTS FOR THE CONDENSATION TOP EVENT  MS-IC-1B 
MS-IC-1B CONDENSATION WATER REACHES WASTE PACKAGE 0.000E+000 
MS-IC-1B-0 Probability of No Condensation 0.000E+000 
BASIC EVENTS FOR THE DRIP SHIELD FAILURE TOP EVENT  MS-IC-2 
MS-IC-2 WATER DRIPS ON WASTE PACKAGE 1.000E+000 
MS-IC-2-BC Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR MS-IC-2 
BASE CAS 0.000E+000 
MS-IC-2-DE Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR MS-IC-2 
DISRUPTI 1.000E+000 
BASIC EVENTS FOR THE WASTE PACKAGE FAILURE TOP EVENT  MS-IC-3A 
MS-IC-3A WASTE PACKAGE PENETRATION 1.000E+000 
MS-IC-3A-0 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR MS-IC-3A NO 
FAIL 0.000E+000 

Table B-1. Basic Event Assignments For SAPHIRE Criticality FEPs Analysis 
Name Description Probability 
MS-IC-3A-A1 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR MS-IC-3A 
ADVECTI 1.000E+000 
MS-IC-3A-A2 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR MS-IC-3A 
ADVECTI 1.000E-001 
MS-IC-3A-D1 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR MS-IC-3A 
DIFFUSI 1.000E-001 
MS-IC-3A-D2 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR MS-IC-3A 
DIFFUSI 9.000E-001 
MS-IC-3A-D3 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR MS-IC-3A 
DIFFUSI 1.000E-000 
MS-IC-3A-NF Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR MS-IC-3A NO 
FAIL 1.000E+000 
BASIC EVENTS FOR THE BATHTUB CONFIGURATION TOP EVENT  MS-IC-3B 
MS-IC-3B BATHTUB CONFIGURATION FORMS 1.000E+000 
MS-IC-3B-0 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR MS-IC-3B NO 
BATH 0.000E+000 
MS-IC-3B-1 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR MS-IC-3B 
BATHTUB 1.000E+000 
BASIC EVENTS FOR FAR-FIELD CONFIGURATION EVENT TREES 
MS-FF-1 TRANSPORT OF FM SOLUTES TO Tsw UNITS IN CARRIER 
PLUME 1.000E+000 
MS-FF-10 FFM SOLUTES PRECIPITATE IN ORGANIC-RICH ZONES OF 
FRANKLIN L 1.000E+000 
MS-FF-10-1 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR MS-FF-10) 1.000E+000 
MS-FF-11 PRECIPITATION OF FM AS CARRIER PLUME IS ALTERED BY 
ROCKS 1.000E+000 
MS-FF-11-1 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR MS-FF-11) 1.000E+000 
MS-FF-12 TRANSPORT OF FM SOLUTES TO ALTERED TSbv 1.000E+000 
MS-FF-13 SORPTION OF FM ON CLAYS AND ZEOLITES IN ALTERED TSbv 1.000E+000 
MS-FF-13-1 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR MS-FF-13) 1.000E+000 
MS-FF-14 ACCUMULATION OF FM SOLUTE IN TOPOGRAPHIC LOWS 
ABOVE TSbv 1.000E+000 
MS-FF-15 CHEMICAL CHANGES IN PERCHED WATER PRECIPITATES FM 1.000E+000 
MS-FF-15-1 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR MS-FF-15) 1.000E+000 
MS-FF-16 TRANSPORT OF FM COLLOIDS TO TSw UNITS IN CARRIER 
PLUME 1.000E+000 
MS-FF-17 HYDRODYNAMIC/CHROMATOGRAPHIC SEP OF FM COLLOIDS 
FROM NEUTRON 1.000E+000 
MS-FF-18 Developed Event 1.000E+000 
MS-FF-18-0 TRAPPING OF FM COLLOIDS IN DEAD-END FRACTURES AT 
BOUNDARY 1.000E+000 
MS-FF-18-1 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR MS-FF-18) 1.000E+000 
MS-FF-19 TRANSPORT OF FISSILE MATERIAL COLLOIDS TO ALTERED 
TSbv 1.000E+000 
MS-FF-2 SEPARATION OF FISSILE MATERIAL FROM NEUTRON 
ABSORBERS 1.000E+000 

Table B-1. Basic Event Assignments For SAPHIRE Criticality FEPs Analysis 
Name Description Probability 
MS-FF-20 SORPTION OF COLLOIDS IN CLAYS AND ZEOLITES IN 
ALTERED TSbv 1.000E+000 
MS-FF-20-1 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR MS-FF-20) 1.000E+000 
MS-FF-21 FITRATION OF COLLOIDS IN TOPOGRAPHIC LOWS ABOVE 
TSbv 1.000E+000 
MS-FF-21-1 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR MS-FF-21) 1.000E+000 
MS-FF-3 FM SOLUTES ARE TRANSPORTED TO WATER TABLE 1.000E+000 
MS-FF-4 FM PRECIPITATES IN UPWELL ZONE OF HYDROTHERMAL 
FLUIDS AT FAU 1.000E+000 
MS-FF-4-1 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR MS-FF-4) 1.000E+000 
MS-FF-5 CONTAINMENT PLUME MIXES BELOW REDOX FROM (~200 m) 1.000E+000 
MS-FF-6 PRECIPITATION OF FISSILE MATERIAL 1.000E+000 
MS-FF-6-1 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR MS-FF-6) 1.000E+000 
MS-FF-7 FM PRECIPITATES AT REDUCING ZONE (eg REMAINS OF 
ORGANINC MAT 1.000E+000 
MS-FF-7-1 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR MS-FF-7) 1.000E+000 
MS-FF-8 FM PRECIPITATES AT ORGANIC REDUCING ZONE AT 
PINCHOUT OF TUFF 1.000E+000 
MS-FF-8-1 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR MS-FF-8) 1.000E+000 
MS-FF-9 FM SOLUTES ARE TRANSPORTED TO FRANKLIN LAKE PLAYA 1.000E+000 
MS-FF-TOP-NO-0 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR NO = 0.0) 1.000E+000 
MS-FF-TOP-NO-1 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR NO = 1.0) 0.000E+000 
MS-FF-TOP-YES-0 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR YES = 0.0) 0.000E+000 
MS-FF-TOP-YES-1 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR YES = 1.0) 1.000E+000 
BASIC EVENTS FOR IN-PACKAGE CONFIGURATION EVENT TREES 
CONFIG-SCEN CONFIGURATION SCENARIO SET UP 1.000E+000 
MS-IC-10 WASTE PACKAGE INTERNAL STRUCTURES DEGRADE 0.000E+000 
MS-IC-11 DEGRADED WF IS MOBILIZED 1.000E+000 
MS-IC-11-0 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR MS-IC-11) 1.000E+000 
MS-IC-11-1 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR MS-IC-11) 1.000E+000 
MS-IC-11-2A Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR MS-IC-11) 0.000E+000 
MS-IC-11-2B Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR MS-IC-11) 1.000E+000 
MS-IC-12 WASTE PACKAGE BOTTOM FAILS DRAINING LIQUID 0.000E+000 
MS-IC-13 DEGRADED WF AND WP COMPONENTS COLLECT AT BOTTOM 
OF WP 0.000E+000 
MS-IC-14 SOLUBLE NEUTRON ABSORBERS FLUSHED FROM WASTE 
PACKAGE 0.000E+000 
MS-IC-14-1 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR MS-IC-14) 1.000E+000 
MS-IC-15 WASTE PACKAGE BOTTOM FAILS DRAINING LIQUID 0.000E+000 
MS-IC-16 BASKET STRUCTURAL SUPPORTS MECHANICALLY COLLAPSE 0.000E+000 
MS-IC-16-0 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR /MS-IC-16) 1.000E+000 
MS-IC-16-1 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR MS-IC-16[1]) 1.000E+000 

Table B-1. Basic Event Assignments For SAPHIRE Criticality FEPs Analysis 
Name Description Probability 
MS-IC-16-2 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR MS-IC-16[2]) 1.000E+000 
MS-IC-16-3 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR MS-IC-16[3]) 1.000E+000 
MS-IC-17 STRUCTURES CONTAINING NEUTRON ABSORBERS FULLY 
DEGRADE 0.000E+000 
MS-IC-18 SOLUBLE NEUTRON ABSORBERS FLUSHED FROM 
DEGRADED PORTION OF B 0.000E+000 
MS-IC-18-0 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR MS-IC-18) 1.000E+000 
MS-IC-18-1 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR MS-IC-18) 1.000E+000 
MS-IC-19 SOLUBLE NEUTRON ABSORBERS FLUSHED FROM WASTE 
PACKAGE 0.000E+000 
MS-IC-19-1 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR MS-IC-18) 1.000E+000 
MS-IC-20 WASTE FORM DEGRADES MOBILIZING FISSILE MATERIAL 0.000E+000 
MS-IC-21 WASTE PACKAGE BOTTOM FAILS DRAINING LIQUID 0.000E+000 
MS-IC-22 SIGNIFICANT NEUTRON ABSORBER DEGRADATION BEFORE 
STRUCTURAL C 0.000E+000 
MS-IC-22-1 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR MS-IC-22[1]) 1.000E+000 
MS-IC-22-2 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR MS-IC-22[2]) 1.000E+000 
MS-IC-22-3 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR MS-IC-22[3]) 1.000E+000 
MS-IC-23 WASTE PACKAGE INTERNAL STRUCTURES MECHANICALLY 
COLLAPSE AND 0.000E+000 
MS-IC-24 WASTE PACKAGE BOTTOM FALLS DRAINING LIQUID 0.000E+000 
MS-IC-29 WP INTERNAL STRUCTURES DEGRADE SLOWER THAN WF 0.000E+000 
MS-IC-30 WP INTERNAL STRUCTURES AND WF DEGRADE AT SIMILAR 
RATES 0.000E+000 
MS-IC-31 WP INTERNAL STRUCTURES DEGRADE FASTER THAN WF 0.000E+000 
MS-IC-32 WF DEGRADATION PRODUCTS HYDRATE IN INITIAL 
LOCATION 1.000E+000 
MS-IC-32-1 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR MS-IC-32) 1.000E+000 
MS-IC-33 WASTE PACKAGE INTERNAL STRUCTURES DEGRADE 0.000E+000 
MS-IC-34 DEGRADATION WF IS MOBILIZED SEPARATING FROM 
NEUTRON ABSORBE 0.000E+000 
MS-IC-34-1 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR MS-IC-34[1]) 1.000E+000 
MS-IC-34-2 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR MS-IC-34[2]) 1.000E+000 
MS-IC-35 HYDRATED WF AND INTERNAL COMPONENT DEGRADATION 
PRODUCTS COLL 0.000E+000 
MS-IC-36 FLOW-THROUGH FLUSHING REMOVES SOLUBLE NEUTRON 
ABSORBERS 0.000E+000 
MS-IC-36-1 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR MS-IC-36) 1.000E+000 
MS-IC-37 INTACT WF SETTLES IN BOTTOM OF WP MIXED WITH 
HYDRATED CORRO 0.000E+000 
MS-IC-38 FLOW-THROUGH FLUSHING REMOVES SOLUBLE NEUTRON 
ABSORBERS 0.000E+000 
MS-IC-38-1 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR MS-IC-38) 1.000E+000 
MS-IC-39 WASTE FORM DEGRADES MOBILIZING FISSILE MATERIAL 0.000E+000 

Table B-1. Basic Event Assignments For SAPHIRE Criticality FEPs Analysis 
Name Description Probability 
MS-IC-40 WASTE PACKAGE MOSTLY DEGRADES WHILE WF LARGELY 
INTACT 0.000E+000 
MS-IC-6 WASTE PACKAGE INTERNAL STRUCTURES DEGRADE 
SLOWER THAN WASTE 0.000E+000 
MS-IC-7 WASTE PACKAGE INTERNAL STRUCTURES DEGRADE AT 
SAME RATE AS WF 0.000E+000 
MS-IC-8 WASTE PACKAGE INTERNAL STRUCTURES DEGRADE 
FASTER THAN WF 0.000E+000 
MS-IC-9 WASTE FORM DEGRADES IN PLACE 1.000E+000 
MS-IC-9-1 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR MS-IC-9) 1.000E+000 
MS-IC-TOP-NO-0 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR NO = 0.0) 1.000E+000 
MS-IC-TOP-NO-1 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR NO = 1.0) 0.000E+000 
MS-IC-TOP-YES-0 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR YES = 0.0) 0.000E+000 
MS-IC-TOP-YES-1 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR YES = 1.0) 1.000E+000 
BASIC EVENTS FOR WASTE PACKAGE FILLING PROBABILITY TOP EVENT  MS-IC-4 
MS-IC-4 LIQUID ACCUMULATES IN WASTE PACKAGE 1.000E+000 
MS-IC-4-0 TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION TO HANDLE LOGIC 0.000E+000 
MS-IC-4-SE-LL-12AP Seismic faulting event; lower-bound seepage; litho; 12-PWR AP 1.129E-001 
MS-IC-4-SE-LL-21AP Seismic faulting event; lower-bound seepage; litho; 21-PWR AP 1.771E-001 
MS-IC-4-SE-LL-21CR Seismic faulting event; lower-bound seepage; litho; 21-PWR CR 1.771E-001 
MS-IC-4-SE-LL-24AP Seismic faulting event; lower-bound seepage; litho; 24-BWR AP 1.162E-001 
MS-IC-4-SE-LL-44AP Seismic faulting event; lower-bound seepage; litho; 44-BWR AP 1.760E-001 
MS-IC-4-SE-LL-DOEL Seismic faulting event; lower-bound seepage; litho; DOE LONG 6.364E-001 
MS-IC-4-SE-LL-DOEM Seismic faulting event; lower-bound seepage; litho; DOE MCO 3.225E-001 
MS-IC-4-SE-LL-DOES Seismic faulting event; lower-bound seepage; litho; DOE SHORT 6.816E-001 
MS-IC-4-SE-LNL-12AP Seismic faulting event; lower-bound seepage; nonlitho; 12-PWR AP 1.027E-01 
MS-IC-4-SE-LNL-21AP Seismic faulting event; lower-bound seepage; nonlitho; 21-PWR AP 1.581E-01 
MS-IC-4-SE-LNL-21CR Seismic faulting event; lower-bound seepage; nonlitho; 21-PWR CR 1.581E-01 
MS-IC-4-SE-LNL-24AP Seismic faulting event; lower-bound seepage; nonlitho; 24-BWR AP 1.066E-01 
MS-IC-4-SE-LNL-44AP Seismic faulting event; lower-bound seepage; nonlitho; 44-BWR AP 1.568E-01 
MS-IC-4-SE-LNL-DOEL Seismic faulting event; lower-bound seepage; nonlitho; DOE LONG 5.579E-01 
MS-IC-4-SE-LNL-DOEM Seismic faulting event; lower-bound seepage; nonlitho; DOE MCO 2.890E-01 
MS-IC-4-SE-LNL-DOES Seismic faulting event; lower-bound seepage; nonlitho; DOE 
SHORT 6.108E-01 
MS-IC-4-SE-ML-12AP Seismic faulting event; mean seepage; litho; 12-PWR AP 1.415E-01 
MS-IC-4-SE-ML-21AP Seismic faulting event; mean seepage; litho; 21-PWR AP 2.314E-01 
MS-IC-4-SE-ML-21CR Seismic faulting event; mean seepage; litho; 21-PWR CR 2.314E-01 
MS-IC-4-SE-ML-24AP Seismic faulting event; mean seepage; litho; 24-BWR AP 1.428E-01 
MS-IC-4-SE-ML-44AP Seismic faulting event; mean seepage; litho; 44-BWR AP 2.310E-01 
MS-IC-4-SE-ML-DOEL Seismic faulting event; mean seepage; litho; DOE LONG 8.644E-01 
MS-IC-4-SE-ML-DOEM Seismic faulting event; mean seepage; litho; DOE MCO 4.181E-01 

Table B-1. Basic Event Assignments For SAPHIRE Criticality FEPs Analysis 
Name Description Probability 
MS-IC-4-SE-ML-DOES Seismic faulting event; mean seepage; litho; DOE SHORT 8.830E-01 
MS-IC-4-SE-MNL-12AP Seismic faulting event; mean seepage; nonlitho; 12-PWR AP 1.378E-01 
MS-IC-4-SE-MNL-21AP Seismic faulting event; mean seepage; nonlitho; 21-PWR AP 2.242E-01 
MS-IC-4-SE-MNL-21CR Seismic faulting event; mean seepage; nonlitho; 21-PWR CR 2.242E-01 
MS-IC-4-SE-MNL-24AP Seismic faulting event; mean seepage; nonlitho; 24-BWR AP 1.394E-01 
MS-IC-4-SE-MNL-44AP Seismic faulting event; mean seepage; nonlitho; 44-BWR AP 2.237E-01 
MS-IC-4-SE-MNL-DOEL Seismic faulting event; mean seepage; nonlitho; DOE LONG 8.339E-01 
MS-IC-4-SE-MNL-DOEM Seismic faulting event; mean seepage; nonlitho; DOE MCO 4.055E-01 
MS-IC-4-SE-MNL-DOES Seismic faulting event; mean seepage; nonlitho; DOE SHORT 8.565E-01 
MS-IC-4-SE-UL-12AP Seismic faulting event; upper-bound seepage; litho; 12-PWR AP 1.486E-01 
MS-IC-4-SE-UL-21AP Seismic faulting event; upper-bound seepage; litho; 21-PWR AP 2.447E-01 
MS-IC-4-SE-UL-21CR Seismic faulting event; upper-bound seepage; litho; 21-PWR CR 2.447E-01 
MS-IC-4-SE-UL-24AP Seismic faulting event; upper-bound seepage; litho; 24-BWR AP 1.494E-01 
MS-IC-4-SE-UL-44AP Seismic faulting event; upper-bound seepage; litho; 44-BWR AP 2.445E-01 
MS-IC-4-SE-UL-DOEL Seismic faulting event; upper-bound seepage; litho; DOE LONG 9.205E-01 
MS-IC-4-SE-UL-DOEM Seismic faulting event; upper-bound seepage; litho; DOE MCO 4.416E-01 
MS-IC-4-SE-UL-DOES Seismic faulting event; upper-bound seepage; litho; DOE SHORT 9.325E-01 
MS-IC-4-SE-UNL-12AP Seismic faulting event; upper-bound seepage; nonlitho; 12-PWR AP 1.464E-01 
MS-IC-4-SE-UNL-21AP Seismic faulting event; upper-bound seepage; nonlitho; 21-PWR AP 2.404E-01 
MS-IC-4-SE-UNL-21CR Seismic faulting event; upper-bound seepage; nonlitho; 21-PWR CR 2.404E-01 
MS-IC-4-SE-UNL-24AP Seismic faulting event; upper-bound seepage; nonlitho; 24-BWR AP 1.474E-01 
MS-IC-4-SE-UNL-44AP Seismic faulting event; upper-bound seepage; nonlitho; 44-BWR AP 2.401E-01 
MS-IC-4-SE-UNL-DOEL Seismic faulting event; upper-bound seepage; nonlitho; DOE LONG 9.019E-01 
MS-IC-4-SE-UNL-DOEM Seismic faulting event; upper-bound seepage; nonlitho; DOE MCO 4.341E-01 
MS-IC-4-SE-UNL-DOES Seismic faulting event; upper-bound seepage; nonlitho; DOE 
SHORT 9.167E-01 
BASIC EVENTS FOR NEAR-FIELD CONFIGURATION EVENT TREES 
MS-NF-10 SORPTION OF FISSILE MATERIAL SOLUTES IN TUFF 1.000E+000 
MS-NF-10-1 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR MS-NF-10) 1.000E+000 
MS-NF-11 PRECIPITATION OF FISSILE MATERIAL BY TUFF 1.000E+000 
MS-NF-11-1 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR MS-NF-11) 1.000E+000 
MS-NF-12 TRANSPORT OF FM FROM ONE OR MORE WPs TO LOW POINT 1.000E+000 
MS-NF-12-1 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR MS-NF-12) 1.000E+000 
MS-NF-13 EFFLUENT FLOWS TO CONFORM TO INVERT SURFACE 1.000E+000 
MS-NF-13-1 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR MS-NF-13) 1.000E+000 
MS-NF-14 ABSORBERS AND FISSILE MATERIAL SEPARATE 1.000E+000 
MS-NF-15 FILTRATION AND CONC OF COLLOIS ON TOP OF INVERT BY 
WP CORR P 1.000E+000 
MS-NF-15-1 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR MS-NF-15) 1.000E+000 
MS-NF-16 TRANSPORT OF COLLOIDS INTO INVERT 1.000E+000 

Table B-1. Basic Event Assignments For SAPHIRE Criticality FEPs Analysis 
Name Description Probability 
MS-NF-17 HYDRODYNAMIC/CHROMATOGRAPHIC SEP OF FM COLLOIDS 
FROM NEUT AB 1.000E+000 
MS-NF-18 FILTRATION AND CONCENTRATION OF COLLOIDS IN 
FRACTURES 1.000E+000 
MS-NF-19 DEGRADATION OF INVERT MATERIAL 1.000E+000 
MS-NF-19-1 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR MS-NF-19 
fail) 1.000E+000 
MS-NF-19-90 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR MS-NF-19) 9.000E-001 
MS-NF-2 WATER PONDS ON DRIFT FLOOR DUE TO SEALING AND/OR 
DAMMING 0.000E+000 
MS-NF-22 FM AND ABSORBERS ACCUMULATE IN POND 1.000E+000 
MS-NF-23 BASIN EFFECTIVELY SEALED 1.000E+000 
MS-NF-24 FM ACCUMULATES IN CLAYS AT BOTTOM OF POOL 1.000E+000 
MS-NF-25 NON-FISSILE BEARING WATER FLUSHES NEUTRON 
ABSORBERS 1.000E+000 
MS-NF-25-1 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR MS-NF-25) 1.000E+000 
MS-NF-26 INTACT WASTE FORM SITS IN POND ON DRIFT FLOOR 1.000E+000 
MS-NF-26-1 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR MS-NF-26) 1.000E+000 
MS-NF-3 AQUEOUS CORROSION OF WASTE PACKAGE 1.000E+000 
MS-NF-4 CONTAINER BOTTOM BREACHES 1.000E+000 
MS-NF-5 WF AND BASKET DEGRADATION MOBILIZES FM AND 
NEUTRON ABSORBER 1.000E+000 
MS-NF-6 SOLUTION EFFLUENT FROM WP WITH FISSILE MATERIAL 1.000E+000 
MS-NF-7 SLURRY EFFLUENT FROM WASTE PACKAGE WITH FISSILE 
MATERIAL 1.000E+000 
MS-NF-8 FISSILE MATERIAL COLLOIDS IN LIQUID EFFLUENT 1.000E+000 
MS-NF-9 TRANSPORT FROM WASTE PACKAGE TO INVERT 1.000E+000 
MS-NF-DD Accumulation of FM in invert due to dry diffusion 1.000E+000 
MS-NF-DD-1 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR MS-NF-DD) 1.000E+000 
MS-NF-TOP-NO-0 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR NO = 0.0) 1.000E+000 
MS-NF-TOP-NO-1 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR NO = 1.0) 0.000E+000 
MS-NF-TOP-YES-0 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR YES = 0.0) 0.000E+000 
MS-NF-TOP-YES-1 Developed Event (TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR YES = 1.0) 1.000E+000 
BASIC EVENTS FOR THE NEAR-FIELD TRANSFER TOP EVENT  MS-NF-T 
MS-NF-T TRANSFER FROM NEAR FIELD 1.000E+000 
MS-NF-T-0 No Transfer to Near Field 0.000E+000 
MS-NF-T-1 Transfer to Near Field 1.000E+000 
BASIC EVENTS FOR THE NEUTRON ABSORBER MATERIAL MISLOAD TOP EVENT  NA-MISLOAD 
NA-MISLOAD NEUTRON ABSORBER MISLOAD 1.000E+000 
NA-MISLOAD-12AP TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR 12-PWR AP (NA-MISLOAD) 6.217E-011 
NA-MISLOAD-21AP TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR 21-PWR AP (NA-MISLOAD) 3.758E-009 

Table B-1. Basic Event Assignments For SAPHIRE Criticality FEPs Analysis 
Name Description Probability 
NA-MISLOAD-21CR TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR 21-PWR CR (NA-MISLOAD) 4.576E-008 
NA-MISLOAD-DOE-NAM2 TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR DOE SNF w/ NAM (NAMISLOAD) 
G2 3.906E-008 
NA-MISLOAD-DOE-NAM3 TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR DOE SNF w/ NAM (NAMISLOAD) 
G3 3.912E-008 
NA-MISLOAD-DOE-
NONAM 
TOP EVENT SUBSTITUTION FOR DOE SNF w/o NAM (NAMISLOAD) 
0.000E+000 
CRITICALITY FEPS CASE PROBABILITIES 
INIT-EVENT DIFFERENT POTENTIAL INITIATING EVENTS 1.000E+000 
BASE-CASE BASE CASE EVENT 0.000E+000 
SEISMIC-EVENT SEISMIC DISRUPTIVE EVENT 1.000E+000 
ROCKFALL-EVENT ROCKFALL DISRUPTIVE EVENT 0.000E+000 
IGNEOUS-EVENT IGNEOUS DISRUPTIVE EVENT 1.740E-004 
BASIC EVENTS FOR DEFINING THE SEISMIC DISRUPTIVE EVENT 
SEIS-RANGE SEISMIC FREQUENCIES BROKEN INTO DECADE RANGES 1.000E+000 
SEIS-2E-8TO1E-8 seismic event with frequencies ranging from 2e-8 to 1e-8 9.999E-001 
SEIS-6E-8TO2E-8 seismic event with frequencies ranging from 6e-8 to 2e-8 3.999E-004 
SEIS-2E-7TO6E-8 seismic event with frequencies ranging from 2e-7 to 6e-8 1.399E-003 
SEIS-1E-4TO2E-7 seismic event with frequencies ranging from 1e-4 to 2e-7 6.313E-001 
SEIS-DAMAGE SEISMIC EVENT TIMING 1.000E+000 
SEIS-GROUND seismic damage due to ground motion 0.000E+000 
SEIS-FAULT seismic damage due to faulting 1.000E+000 
SEIS-FAULT-0 no seismic damage due to faulting 0.000E+000 
SEIS-FAULT-1 seismic damage due to faulting 1.000E+000 
BASIC EVENTS FOR THE WASTE FORM MISLOAD TOP EVENT  WF-MISLOAD 
WF-MISLOAD WASTE FORM MISLOAD 1.000E+000 
WF-MISLOAD-12AP Developed Event (top event substitution for 12-PWR AP WF-MIS 0.000E+000 
WF-MISLOAD-21AP Developed Event (top event substitution for 21-PWR AP WF-MIS 1.180E-005 
WF-MISLOAD-21CR Developed Event (top event substitution for 21-PWR CR WF-MIS 0.000E+000 
WF-MISLOAD-44AP Developed Event (top event substitution for 44-BWR AP WF-MIS 0.000E+000 
WF-MISLOAD-DOE Developed Event (top event substitution for FFTF WF-MISLOAD) 1.475E-008 
BASIC EVENTS FOR THE WASTE FORM SOURCE TOP EVENT  WF-SOURCE 
WF-SOURCE WASTE FORM SOURCE PERCENTAGES 1.000E+000 
WF-SOURCE-CSNF Developed Event (top event substitution for WF-SOURCE (CSNF) 3.358E-001 
WF-SOURCE-DSNF Developed Event (top event substitution for WF-SOURCE (DSNF) 3.092E-001 
WF-SOURCE-NSNF Developed Event (top event substitution for WF-SOURCE (NSNF) 2.670E-002 

Table B-1. Basic Event Assignments For SAPHIRE Criticality FEPs Analysis 
Name Description Probability 
BASIC EVENTS FOR THE WASTE FORM TYPE FRACTION TOP EVENT  WF-TYPE-PERC 
WF-TYPE-PERC WASTE FORM PERCENTAGES 1.000E+000 
WF-TYPE-PWR Developed Event (top event substitution for WF-TYPE (PWR) 3.901E-001 
WF-TYPE-BWR Developed Event (top event substitution for WF-TYPE (BWR) 3.901E-001 
WF-TYPE-FFTF Developed Event (top event substitution for WF-TYPE (FFTF) 9.810E-001 
WF-TYPE-TRIGA Developed Event (top event substitution for WF-TYPE (TRIGA) 4.740E-002 
WF-TYPE-NREACT Developed Event (top event substitution for WF-TYPE (NREACT) 6.900E-002 
WF-TYPE-SHPWR Developed Event (top event substitution for WF-TYPE (SHPWR) 2.004E-001 
WF-TYPE-FSV Developed Event (top event substitution for WF-TYPE (FSV) 1.740E-001 
WF-TYPE-MD Developed Event (top event substitution for WF-TYPE (MD) 3.528E-001 
WF-TYPE-FERMI Developed Event (top event substitution for WF-TYPE (FERMI) 9.500E-003 
WF-TYPE-SHLWBR Developed Event (top event substitution for WF-TYPE (SHLWBR) 2.670E-002 
WF-TYPE-TMI Developed Event (top event substitution for WF-TYPE (TMI) 1.012E-001 
BASIC EVENTS FOR THE WASTE PACKAGE TYPE TOP EVENT  WP-TYPE 
WP-TYPE WASTE PACKAGE TYPE PERCENT BREAKDOWN 1.000E+000 
WP-TYPE-21PWRAP Developed Event (top event substitution for WP-TYPE (21PWRAP 5.660E-002 
WP-TYPE-21PWRCR Developed Event (top event substitution for WP-TYPE (21PWRCR 2.080E-002 
WP-TYPE-12PWRAP Developed Event (top event substitution for WP-TYPE (12PWRAP 3.580E-002 
WP-TYPE-44BWR Developed Event (top event substitution for WP-TYPE (44BWRAP 2.880E-002 
WP-TYPE-24BWR Developed Event (top event substitution for WP-TYPE (24BWRAP 2.880E-002 
WP-TYPE-FFTFSH Developed Event (top event substitution for WP-TYPE (FFTFSH) 9.242E-001 
WP-TYPE-FFTFL Developed Event (top event substitution for WP-TYPE (FFTFL) 9.242E-001 
WP-TYPE-NREACTSH Developed Event (top event substitution for WP-TYPE (NREACTS 9.333E-001 
WP-TYPE-NREACTL Developed Event (top event substitution for WP-TYPE (NREACTL 1.670E-002 
WP-TYPE-NREACTMCO Developed Event (top event substitution for WP-TYPE (NREACTM 9.167E-001 
WP-TYPE-SHPWRSH Developed Event (top event substitution for WP-TYPE (SHPWRSH 6.030E-002 
WP-TYPE-SHPWRL Developed Event (top event substitution for WP-TYPE (SHPWRL) 6.030E-002 
WP-TYPE-SHLWBRSH Developed Event (top event substitution for WP-TYPE (SHLWBRS 7.849E-001 
WP-TYPE-SHLWBRL Developed Event (top event substitution for WP-TYPE (SHLWBRL 7.849E-001 
WP-TYPE-MDSH Developed Event (top event substitution for WP-TYPE (MDSH) 8.000E-004 
WP-TYPE-MDL Developed Event (top event substitution for WP-TYPE (MDL) 8.000E-004 
WP-TYPE-FERMISH Developed Event (top event substitution for WP-TYPE (FERMISH 5.758E-001 
WP-TYPE-FERMIL Developed Event (top event substitution for WP-TYPE (FERMIL) 5.758E-001 
WP-TYPE-TMISH Developed Event (top event substitution for WP-TYPE (TMISH) 9.773E-001 
WP-TYPE-TMIL Developed Event (top event substitution for WP-TYPE (TMIL) 9.773E-001 
WP-TYPE-NAVALSH Developed Event (top event substitution for WP-TYPE (NAVALSH 5.200E-001 
WP-TYPE-NAVALL Developed Event (top event substitution for WP-TYPE (NAVALL) 5.200E-001 

Table B-1. Basic Event Assignments For SAPHIRE Criticality FEPs Analysis 
Name Description Probability 
INITIATING EVENTS FOR THE WASTE PACKAGE TYPE EVENT TREES 
WP01-21-PWR-AP 21-PWR with Absorber Plates Waste Package 1.000E+000 
WP02-21-PWR-CR 21-PWR with Control Rods Waste Package 1.000E+000 
WP03-12-PWR-AP 12-PWR with Absorber Plates Waste Package 1.000E+000 
WP04-24-BWR-AP 24-BWR with Absorber Plates Waste Package 1.000E+000 
WP05-44-BWR-AP 44-BWR with Absorber Plates Waste Package 1.000E+000 
WP06-DOE1-SHORT 5 DHLW/DOE Short Waste Package with FFTF Fuel 1.000E+000 
WP07-DOE1-LONG 5 DHLW/DOE Long Waste Package with FFTF Fuel 1.000E+000 
WP08-DOE2-SHORT 5 DHLW/DOE Short Waste Package with TRIGA Fuel 1.000E+000 
WP09-DOE3-SHORT 5 DHLW/DOE Short Waste Package with N Reactor Fuel 1.000E+000 
WP10-DOE3-LONG 5 DHLW/DOE Long Waste Package with N Reactor Fuel 1.000E+000 
WP11-DOE3-MCO 2-MCO/2-DHLW Waste Package with N Reactor Fuel 1.000E+000 
WP12-DOE4-SHORT 5 DHLW/DOE Short Waste Package with Shippingport PWR 1.000E+000 
WP13-DOE4-LONG 5 DHLW/DOE Long Waste Package with Shippingport PWR 1.000E+000 
WP14-DOE5-SHORT 5 DHLW/DOE Short Waste Package with Shippingport LWBR 1.000E+000 
WP15-DOE5-LONG 5 DHLW/DOE Long Waste Package with Shippingport LWBR 1.000E+000 
WP16-DOE6-LONG 5 DHLW/DOE Long Waste Package with Fort St. Vrain Fuel 1.000E+000 
WP17-DOE7-SHORT 5 DHLW/DOE Short Waste Package with Melt & Dilute Fuel 1.000E+000 
WP18-DOE7-LONG 5 DHLW/DOE Long Waste Package with Melt & Dilute Fuel 1.000E+000 
WP19-DOE8-SHORT 5 DHLW/DOE Short Waste Package with Fermi Fuel 1.000E+000 
WP20-DOE8-LONG 5 DHLW/DOE Long Waste Package with Fermi Fuel 1.000E+000 
WP21-DOE9-SHORT 5 DHLW/DOE Short Waste Package with TMI II Fuel 1.000E+000 
WP22-DOE9-LONG 5 DHLW/DOE Long Waste Package with TMI II Fuel 1.000E+000 

B.24 
SAPHIRE END STATE RESULTS FOR CRITICALITY FEPS ANALYSIS 
Table B-2 presents the criticality FEPs analysis probability results as calculated by SAPHIRE. 
The 11- to 12-character end-state names are encoded to capture the following information: 
1. 
The criticality FEPs analysis cases 
 
BC  base case 
 
SG  seismic disruptive event, ground motion scenario 
 
SF  seismic disruptive event, faulting scenario 
 
RF  rock fall disruptive event 
 
IE  igneous disruptive event, eruptive scenario 
 
II  igneous disruptive event, intrusive scenario 
2. 
The waste package/waste form type 
 -WP01  21PWR Absorber Plate waste package 
 -WP02  21PWR Control Rod waste package 
 -WP03  12PWR Absorber Plate waste package 
 -WP04  24BWR Absorber Plate waste package 
 -WP05  44BWR Absorber Plate waste package 
 -WP06  Mixed Oxide 5DHLW/DOE Short waste package 
 -WP07  Mixed Oxide 5DHLW/DOE Long waste package 
 -WP08  Uranium-Zirconium Hydride 5DHLW/DOE Short waste package 
 -WP09  Uranium Metal 5DHLW/DOE Short waste package 
 -WP10  Uranium Metal 5DHLW/DOE Long waste package 
 -WP11  Uranium Metal 2MCO/2DHLW MCO waste package 
 -WP12  High-Enriched Uranium Oxide 5DHLW/DOE Short waste package 
 -WP13  High-Enriched Uranium Oxide 5DHLW/DOE Long waste package 
 -WP14  Uranium/Thorium Oxide 5DHLW/DOE Short waste package 
 -WP15  Uranium/Thorium Oxide 5DHLW/DOE Long waste package 
 -WP16  Uranium/Thorium Carbide 5DHLW/DOE Long waste package 
 -WP17  Aluminum Based 5DHLW/DOE Short waste package 
 -WP18  Aluminum Based 5DHLW/DOE Long waste package 
 -WP19  Uranium-Zirconium/Uranium-Molybdenum 5DHLW/DOE Short waste 
package
 -WP20  Uranium-Zirconium/Uranium-Molybdenum 5-DHLW/DOE Long waste
package
 -WP21  Low-Enriched Uranium Oxide 5DHLW/DOE Short waste package
 -WP22  Low-Enriched Uranium Oxide 5DHLW/DOE Long waste package
3. The configuration class 
 -IPDRY  in-package, configuration class IP-DRY 
 -IP1A  in-package, configuration class IP-1A 
 -IP1B  in-package, configuration class IP-1A 
 -IP2A  in-package, configuration class IP-1A 
 -IP3A  in-package, configuration class IP-1A 

 -IP3B  in-package, configuration class IP-1A 
 -IP3C  in-package, configuration class IP-1A 
 -IP3D  in-package, configuration class IP-1A 
 -IP4A  in-package, configuration class IP-1A 
 -IP4B  in-package, configuration class IP-1A 
 -IP5A  in-package, configuration class IP-1A 
 -IP6A  in-package, configuration class IP-6A 
 -NF1A  near-field, configuration class NF-1A 
 -NF1B  near-field, configuration class NF-1B 
 -NF1C  near-field, configuration class NF-1C 
 -NFDD  near-field, configuration class NF-DD 
 -NF4A  near-field, configuration class NF-4A 
 -NF5A  near-field, configuration class NF-5A 
 -FF1A  far-field, configuration class FF-1A 
 -FF1B  far-field, configuration class FF-1B 
 -FF1C  far-field, configuration class FF-1C 
 -FF2A  far-field, configuration class FF-2A 
 -FF2B  far-field, configuration class FF-2B 
 -FF3A  far-field, configuration class FF-3A 
 -FF3B  far-field, configuration class FF-3B 
 -FF3C  far-field, configuration class FF-3C 
 -FF3D  far-field, configuration class FF-3D 
 -FF3E  far-field, configuration class FF-3E 
 -IGE1  igneous eruptive, configuration class IG-E1 
 -IGE2  igneous eruptive, configuration class IG-E2 
 -IGE3  igneous eruptive, configuration class IG-E3 
 -IGE4  igneous eruptive, configuration class IG-E4 
 -IGI1  igneous intrusive, configuration class IG-I1 
 -IGI2  igneous intrusive, configuration class IG-I2 
 -IGI3  igneous intrusive, configuration class IG-I3 
 -IGI4  igneous intrusive, configuration class IG-I4 
 -IGI5  igneous intrusive, configuration class IG-I5 
 -IGI6  igneous intrusive, configuration class IG-I6 
The end states are assigned to each event tree sequence based on the project partition rules 
documented in Section B.22. 

Table B-2. SAPHIRE End State Probabilities 
End State Name Configuration Class Probability 
Igneous Disruptive Event Results, Eruptive Scenario 
IE-WP01-IGI1 1.109E-12 
IE-WP01-IGI2 5.754E-13 
IE-WP02-IGI1 6.211E-12 
IE-WP02-IGI2 3.229E-12 
IE-WP03-IGI1 8.438E-15 
IE-WP03-IGI2 3.109E-15 
IE-WP04-IGI1 8.438E-15 
IE-WP04-IGI2 3.109E-15 
IE-WP05-IGI1 8.438E-15 
IE-WP05-IGI2 3.109E-15 
IE-WP06-IGI1 2.010E-12 
IE-WP06-IGI2 1.044E-12 
IE-WP07-IGI1 2.010E-12 
IE-WP07-IGI2 1.044E-12 
IE-WP08-IGI1 8.438E-15 
IE-WP08-IGI2 3.109E-15 
IE-WP14-IGI1 5.301E-12 
IE-WP14-IGI2 2.756E-12 
IE-WP15-IGI1 5.301E-12 
IE-WP15-IGI2 2.756E-12 
IE-WP17-IGI1 8.438E-15 
IE-WP17-IGI2 3.109E-15 
IE-WP18-IGI1 8.438E-15 
IE-WP18-IGI2 3.109E-15 
IE-WP19-IGI1 5.309E-12 
IE-WP19-IGI2 2.761E-12 
IE-WP20-IGI1 5.309E-12 
IE-WP20-IGI2 2.761E-12 
Igneous Disruptive Event Results, Intrusive Scenario 
II-WP01-IGI1 1.421E-12 
II-WP01-IGI2 7.381E-13 
II-WP02-IGI1 7.962E-12 
II-WP02-IGI2 4.140E-12 
II-WP03-IGI1 1.088E-14 
II-WP03-IGI2 3.997E-15 
II-WP04-IGI1 1.088E-14 
II-WP04-IGI2 3.997E-15 
II-WP05-IGI1 1.088E-14 
II-WP05-IGI2 3.997E-15 
II-WP06-IGI1 2.577E-12 
II-WP06-IGI2 1.338E-12 
II-WP07-IGI1 2.577E-12 

Table B-2. SAPHIRE End State Probabilities 
End State Name Configuration Class Probability 
II-WP07-IGI2 1.338E-12 
II-WP08-IGI1 1.088E-14 
II-WP08-IGI2 3.997E-15 
II-WP14-IGI1 6.797E-12 
II-WP14-IGI2 3.534E-12 
II-WP15-IGI1 6.797E-12 
II-WP15-IGI2 3.534E-12 
II-WP17-IGI1 1.088E-14 
II-WP17-IGI2 3.997E-15 
II-WP18-IGI1 1.088E-14 
II-WP18-IGI2 3.997E-15 
II-WP19-IGI1 6.807E-12 
II-WP19-IGI2 3.539E-12 
II-WP20-IGI1 6.807E-12 
II-WP20-IGI2 3.539E-12 
Seismic Disruptive Event Results, Faulting Scenario 
SF-WP01-IP1A 1.550E-11 
SF-WP01-IP1B 1.550E-11 
SF-WP01-IP4A 1.550E-11 
SF-WP02-IP1A 8.690E-11 
SF-WP02-IP1B 8.690E-11 
SF-WP02-IP4A 8.690E-11 
SF-WP03-IP1A 1.097E-13 
SF-WP03-IP1B 1.097E-13 
SF-WP03-IP4A 1.097E-13 
SF-WP04-IP1A 1.096E-13 
SF-WP04-IP1B 1.096E-13 
SF-WP04-IP4A 1.096E-13 
SF-WP05-IP1A 1.093E-13 
SF-WP05-IP1B 1.093E-13 
SF-WP05-IP4A 1.093E-13 
SF-WP06-IP1A 2.812E-11 
SF-WP06-IP1B 2.812E-11 
SF-WP06-IP4A 2.812E-11 
SF-WP07-IP1A 2.812E-11 
SF-WP07-IP1B 2.812E-11 
SF-WP07-IP4A 2.812E-11 
SF-WP08-IP1A 1.108E-13 
SF-WP08-IP1B 1.108E-13 
SF-WP08-IP4A 1.108E-13 
SF-WP14-IP1A 7.417E-11 
SF-WP14-IP1B 7.417E-11 
SF-WP14-IP4A 7.417E-11 
SF-WP15-IP1A 7.417E-11 
SF-WP15-IP1B 7.417E-11 
SF-WP15-IP4A 7.417E-11 

Table B-2. SAPHIRE End State Probabilities 
End State Name Configuration Class Probability 
SF-WP17-IP1A 1.108E-13 
SF-WP17-IP1B 1.108E-13 
SF-WP17-IP4A 1.108E-13 
SF-WP18-IP1A 1.107E-13 
SF-WP18-IP1B 1.107E-13 
SF-WP18-IP4A 1.107E-13 
SF-WP19-IP1A 7.429E-11 
SF-WP19-IP1B 7.429E-11 
SF-WP19-IP4A 7.429E-11 
SF-WP20-IP1A 7.429E-11 
SF-WP20-IP1B 7.429E-11 
SF-WP20-IP4A 7.429E-11 
TOTALS = 1.482E-09 

APPENDIX C
SEEPAGE ANALYSIS SPREADSHEETS (OUTPUT FROM MATHCAD FILES)

INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

APPENDIX C - SEEPAGE ANALYSIS SPREADSHEETS 
(OUTPUT FROM MATHCAD FILES) 
The following sections presents the Mathcad analysis for the lower, mean, and upper seepage 
infiltration rates of the glacial transition climate in both the lithophysal and nonlithophysal zones. 
The following sections are broken into nominal seepage infiltration rates, seismic infiltration 
rates, and finally igneous infiltration rates in both the lithophysal and nonlithophysal zones. 
C.1 NOMINAL SEEPAGE ANALYSIS FOR INFILTRATION RATE AND SEEPAGE 
FRACTION IN THE LITHOPHYSAL ZONE 
This section presents the Mathcad analysis for calculating the nominal seepage fraction and 
nominal seepage infiltration rates (i.e., lower bound, mean, and upper bound) for the lithophysal 
zone during the glacial transition period. The seepage information used in the analysis was 
obtained from Abstraction of Drift Seepage (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169131], Section 6.7.1.1). The 
information contained in this section has been abstracted from the LA seepage glac Tptpll 
weibull.mcd Mathcad file of Appendix G. 

Seepage Flux and Seepage Fraction Calculation using Abstraction of Drift Seepage 
(BSC 2004 [DIRS 169131], Section 6.7.1.1) 
Latin Hypercube Sampling Routine to Generate Random Numbers 
size of the sampling: n := 20000 
i := 1.. n 
- ( - (
RD:= i RDi1, 1 
:= rnd 1.0) RDi1, 2 
:= rnd 1.0) RDi1, 3 
:= rnd 1.0)
i1, 0 - ( -
- 
:= rnd 1.0) RDi1, 5 := rnd 1.0) := rnd 1.0)
(
-
RDi1, 4( - ( RDi1, 6 
RK's are matrixes in which the first column contain a permutation on the integers on the 
interval [1,n]. 
RK1 := csort (RD 1) RK2 := csort (RD 2) RK3 := csort (RD 3)
,,, 
RK4 := csort (RD 4) RK5 := csort (RD 5) RK6 := csort (RD 6)
,,, 
Define sets of random values. Each random value is selected within one of the equiprobable n 
intervals that partition [0,1]. One set for each random variable. 
<> <> <>
<> <> <>
X0:= 
RK1 0- 1 + runif(n , 0, 1) 
X1:= 
RK2 0- 1 + runif(n , 0, 1) 
X2:= 
RK3 0- 1 + runif(n , 0, 1) 
nnn 
<> <> <>
<> <> <>
X3:= 
RK4 0- 1 + runif(n , 0, 1) 
X4:= 
RK5 0- 1 + runif(n , 0, 1) 
X5:= 
RK6 0- 1 + runif(n , 0, 1) 
nnn 
i := 0n - 1
.. 
Capillary Strength 1/ a in (Pa) 
:= 402 a1ub := 780 a1 := 591 spatial variability follows a uniform distribution
a1lb 
.a1l - := 105 .a1 := 0 .a1u := 105 uncertainty follows a triangular distribution 
Sampling from spatial variability to obtain the 1/ a value 
a1i := qunif ( Xi0,a1lb ,a1ub ) 1/a value 
, 
Sample from uncertainty triangular distribution to obtain . 1/a 
Determine which equation to use: 
if Random Number < RN .a1 then use Equation 1 ( .a1eq1) 
if Random Number > RN .a1 then use Equation 2 ( .a1eq2) 
(.a1- .a1l)2 
RN.a1 := 
 
(.a1- .a1l)(.a1- .a1l)
u  
.a1eq1i 
:= .a1l + ( )( ).a1u - .a1l  .a1 -.a1l
Xi1
, 
.a1eq2i 
:= .a1u -()( )( )1 - Xi1 .a1u - .a1l  .a1u - .a1
, 
.a1i := if.( Xi1= RN.a1),.a1eq1i,.a1eq2i 
.. 1/a value
,.
. 

Overall Capillary Strength 1/ a + . 1/a 
:= a1i + .a1i 1/a value
T1ai 
Permeability k in Tptpll Unit (in log 10) 
kTl - := 11.5mean of lognormal distribution 
:= 0.47 standard deviation of lognormal distribution
skTl 
kTli 
:= ln qlnorm Xi2,kTl,skTl))
( (, 
mean kTl) - = 11.5
( 
Stdev kTl)= 0.47
( 
Permeability . k in Tptpll Unit (in log 10) 
- := 0.92.kTl := 0 := 0.92 uncertainty follows a triangular distribution
.kTll .kTlu 
Sample from uncertainty triangular distribution to obtain . k 
Determine which equation to use: 
if Random Number < RN.kT then use Equation 1 ( . kTleq1)
lif Random Number > RN.kTl then use Equation 2 ( . kTleq2) 
(.kTl-.kTll)2 
:= 
 
RN.kTl (.kTlu -.kTll) (.kTl-.kTll)
.kTleq1i 
:= .kTll + Xi3(.kTlu -.kTll)(.kTl-.kTll)
, 
.kTleq2i 
:= .kTlu -(1 - Xi3)(.kTlu -.kTll)(.kTlu -.kTl)
, 
.kTli 
:= if.( Xi3= RN.kTl),.kTleq1i,.kTleq2i.. 
. k value
,
. 
Overall Permeability k + . k 
T1kTli 
:= kTli 
+.kTli 
Permeability must lie between -14 and -10 (bounds of SMPA simulations) 
TkTli 
:= if. T1kTli 
- = 10- , 10, if. T1kTli 
- = 14- , 14, T1kTli 
.. 
.. .. k value 
Flow Focusing Factor 
4 32
( 
fx) := -0.3137x + 5.4998 x - 35.66 x + 102.3 x - 11.434 
ffi := root f x, . () -100), x, 0, 6. 
.( Xi4. 
Percolation Flux (mm/yr) 
The percolation flux used here is for the glacial transition period only. The percolation flux is based on 
sampling from the lower bound (TSPA repository location). DTN: LB0310AMRU0120.002 [DIRS 166116] 
nnn := 0.. 468 number of data points 

Lower Bound Percolation Flux Mean Bound Percolation Flux Upper Bound Percolation Flux 
PF1l := 
PF1m := 
PF1u := 
0 
0 3.68 
1 2.65 
2 2.41 
3 2.13 
4 2.41 
5 2.4 
6 2.12 
7 2.76 
8 1.4 
9 2.21 
0 
0 15.97 
1 19.87 
2 14.2 
3 7.59 
4 16.94 
5 17.76 
6 10.45 
7 27.77 
8 8.95 
9 16.02 
0 
0 40 
1 36.19 
2 35.73 
3 27.83 
4 30.74 
5 40.03 
6 31.86 
7 57.08 
8 18.33 
9 27.91 
PFtl:= PF1lnnn 0 
PFtm:= PF1mnnn 0 
PFtu:= PF1unnn 0
nnn , nnn , nnn ,
<> 
(( ,Z0:= round runif n 0 , 468)) 
PFli 
:= PFtl Zi0PFmi 
:= PFtm Zi0PFui 
:= PFtu Zi0
(,) (,) (,)
Adjusted Percolation Flux 
Take the flow focusing factor and multiply it to the percolation flux, which will be used to obtain the 
seepage rate, seepage fraction, and seepage percentage. 
q1pffi 
:= PFli 
ffi qmpffi 
:= PFmi 
ffi qupffi 
:= PFui 
ffi 
qpff := augment q1pff , qmpff , qupff)
( 
Percolation Flux must lie between 1 and 1000 mm/yr (bounds of SMPA simulations) 
j := 0.. 2
..
qpffij:= if qpffij= 1, 1, if qpffij= 1000, 1000, qpffij.. ,., ., ,.. 
Seepage Information from SMPA analysis SMPAdata<0> is permeability value log(k [m^2]) 
SMPAdata<1> is capillary strength 1/alpha [Pa] 
m := 2549 data points SMPAdata<2> is local percolation flux (mm/yr) 
SMPAdata<3> is Mean Seepage [kg/yr/WP] 
SMPAdata<4> is Std. Dev. Seepage [kg/yr/WP] 
SMPAdata<5> is Mean Seepage [%] 
SMPAdata<6> is Std. Dev. Seepage [%] 

SMPAdata := 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
0 -14 100 1 27.73 4.09 98.86 14.59 
1 -14 100 5 138.92 20.55 99.05 14.65 
2 -14 100 10 277.9 41.19 99.07 14.68 
3 -14 100 20 555.87 82.54 99.09 14.71 
4 -14 100 50 1391.67 205.57 99.23 14.66 
5 -14 100 100 2793.55 406.7 99.59 14.5 
6 -14 100 200 5610 785 100 14 
7 -14 100 300 8415 1178 100 14 
8 -14 100 400 11220 1570 100 14 
9 -14 100 500 14025 1963 100 14 
10 -14 100 600 16830 2356 100 14 
11 -14 100 700 19635 2748 100 14 
12 -14 100 800 22440 3141 100 14 
13 -14 100 900 25245 3590 100 14 
14 -14 100 1000 28050 3989 100 14 
15 -14 200 1 26.14 4.21 93.21 15 
Set up routine to pick out correct mean seepage flux and seepage flux standard deviation 
based on sampled value of 1/ a, k, percolation flux. 
nx := 14 ny := 9 nz := 16 
ii := 0.. nx 
x:= SMPAdataii 2 
xi:= ii
ii ii
, 
jj := 0.. ny 
:=
yjj 
100 jj 
kk := 0.. nz 

+ 100 yjjj := jj 

kk 0.25 
loc represents the location within the matrix of which value to pick for the interpolation process. 
-14
zkkk := kk
z:=
kk
+ 
, 
loc1ij:= 
floor linterpx xi , 
, 
, 
, 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
+ 
floor linterp z zk 
TkTli 
( + 1) 
( + 1)
,.. 
..
floor linterp y yj
,
T1ai 
.. 
.. 

( + 1)
.. 
.. 
+
nx

ny nx 
... 
.. 
..
, 
qpffij
, 
:= SMPAdataloc1
ij
, 
, 
, 
sms1ijsmsd1ijloc2ij:= 
, 3 
, 
:= SMPAdataloc1
ij
, 4 
, 
, 
, 
, 
, 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
+ 
floor linterp z zk 
ceil linterp x xi qpffij
TkTli 
( + 1)
..
( + 1)
+
,.. 
..
floor linterp y yj
,
T1ai 
.. 
..
( + 1)
.. 
.. 

nx

ny

nx 
... 
.. 
.. 
ij, 
, 
, 
, 
sms2ijsmsd2ij
ij
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01 C-7 of C-78 October 2004 
:= SMPAdataloc2
, 3 
:= SMPAdataloc2
, 4 

loc3ij:= 
, 
floor linterp z zk 
ceil linterp x xi 
, 
, 
,.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
+ 
TkTli 
( + 1) 
( + 1)
+
ceil linterp y yj
,.. 
..
,
T1ai 
.. 
.. 

( + 1)
.. 
.. 

nx

ny nx 
... 
.. 
..
qpffij
, 
, 
3, 
:= SMPAdataloc3
ij
, 
sms3ijsmsd3ijloc4ij:= 
, 
, 
, 
:= SMPAdataloc3
ij
, 
, 4 
floor linterp z zk 
floor linterp x xi 
, 
, 
, 
, 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
+ 
TkTli 
( + 1) 
( + 1) 
ceil linterp y yj
,.. 
..
,
T1ai 
.. 
..
( + 1)
.. 
.. 
+

nx

ny

nx 
... 
qpffij
.. 
..
, 
:= SMPAdataloc4
ij
, 
sms4ijsmsd4ijloc5ij:= 
, 
, 
, 
, 3 
:= SMPAdataloc4
ij
, 
, 4 
ceil linterp z zk 
floor linterp x xi 
, 
, 
, 
, 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
+ 
TkTli 
( + 1) 
( + 1)
..
,.. 
..
floor linterp y yj
,
T1ai 
( + 1)
.. 
.. 

.. 
.. 
+
nx

ny

nx 
... 
qpffij
.. 
..
, 
:= SMPAdataloc5
ij
, 
sms5ijsmsd5ijloc6ij:= 
, 
, 
, 
, 3 
:= SMPAdataloc5
ij
, 
, 4 
ceil linterp z zk 
ceil linterp x xi 
, 
, 
, 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
+ 
TkTli 
( + 1) 
( + 1)
,.. 
..
floor linterp y yj
,
T1ai 
( + 1)
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
+

nx

ny

nx 
... 
.. 
..
, 
qpffij
, 
, 3 
, 
:= SMPAdataloc6
ij
sms6ijsmsd6ijloc7ij:= 
, 
, 
, 
, 
:= SMPAdataloc6
ij
, 4 
, 
, 
, 
.. 
.. 
.. 
..
ceil linterp z zk 
.. 
+
ceil linterp x xi 
TkTli 
( + 1)
..
( + 1)
+
,.. 
..
ceil linterp y yj 
T1ai 
( + 1)
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 

nx

ny

nx
,
... 
.. 
..
, 
,
qpffij, 3 
, 
:= SMPAdataloc7
ij
, 
, 
, 
sms7ijsmsd7ijloc8ij:= 
, 
:= SMPAdataloc7
ij
, 4 
floor linterpx xi , 
,
,.. 
,.. 
.. 
.. 
+ 
ceil linterp z zk 
TkTli 
( + 1) 
( + 1)
,.. 
..
ceil linterp y yj
,
T1ai 
( + 1)
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 

+

nx

ny nx 
... 
.. 
..
, 
qpffij
:= SMPAdataloc8
ij, 
, 
, 
, 
sms8ijsmsd8ij:= SMPAdataloc8
ij
, 3 
, 4 

Develop the upper and lower bound for permeability (k) for Tptpll Unit 
qqi := -1TkTli 
( ()
mantissa x) := x - floor qq
tti := floor qqi)
( 
rr := round mantissa qq,
( () 2)
yy1i := if rri = 0.25, 0, if 0.25 < rri = 0.5, 0.25, rri))
(( 
zz1i := if yy1i = 0.5, yy1i, if 0.5 < yy1i = 0.75, 0.5, 0.75))
(( 
TkTl2i 
:= -1(tti + zz1i) 
yy2i := if rri = 0.25, 0.25, if 0.25 < rri = 0.5, 0.5, rri))
(( 
zz2i := if yy2i = 0.5, yy2i, if 0.5 < yy2i = 0.75, 0.75, 1))
(( 
TkTl1i 
:= -1(tti + zz2i) 
Develop the upper and lower bound for capillary strength (1/ a). 
. T1ai 
.
hh1i := floor.
. 100 . 
T1a1i 
:= (hh1i 100) 
. T1ai 
.
hh2i := ceil.
. 100 . 
T1a2i 
:= (hh2i 100) 
Lower Bound value adjusted percolation flux (q pff). 
aaa1ij:= if qpffij= 1, 1, if 1 < qpffij= 5, 1, qpffij.. 
,.,. , ,..
bbb1ij:= if aaa1ij= 5, aaa1ij, if 5 < aaa1= 10, 5, aaa1ij))
.. 
,
,(, ,( ij, 
ccc1ij:= if bbb1ij= 10, bbb1ij, if 10 < bbb1= 20, 10, bbb1ij))
,
,(, ,( ij, 
ddd1ij:= if ccc1ij= 20, ccc1ij, if 20 < ccc1= 50, 20, ccc1ij))
,
,(, ,( ij, 
eee1ij:= if ddd1ij= 50, ddd1ij, if 50 < ddd1= 100, 50, ddd1ij))
,
,(, ,( ij, 
fff1ij:= if eee1ij= 100, eee1ij, if 100 < eee1= 200, 100, eee1ij))
,
,(, ,( ij, 
ggg1ij:= if fff1ij= 200, fff1ij, if 200 < fff1= 300, 200, fff1ij))
,
, (, ,( ij, 
hhh1:= if ggg1ij= 300, ggg1ij, if 300 < ggg1ij= 400, 300, ggg1ij))
,
ij(,,(, , 
iii1ij:= if hhh1ij= 400, hhh1ij, if 400 < hhh1= 500, 400, hhh1ij))
,
,(, ,( ij,
jjj1ij:= if iii1ij= 500, iii1ij, if 500 < iii1= 600, 500, iii1ij))
,, (, ,( ij, 
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01 C-9 of C-78 October 2004 

kkk1:= if jjj1ij= 600, jjj1ij, if 600 < jjj1ij= 700, 600, jjj1ij))
,
ij(,,(, , 
mmm1:= if kkk1ij= 700, kkk1ij, if 700 < kkk1= 800, 700, kkk1ij))
,,
ij(, ,( ij, 
qpff1ij:= if mmm1ij= 800, mmm1ij, if 800 < mmm1= 900, 800, 900))
,
(, ,( ij
, 
Upper Bound value adjusted percolation flux (q pff). 
aaa2ij:= if qpffij= 1, 5, if 1 < qpffij= 5, 5, qpffij..
.. 
,.,. , ,.. 
bbb2:= if aaa2ij= 5, aaa2ij, if 5 < aaa2= 10, 10, aaa2ij))
,,
ij(, ,( ij, 
ccc2:= if bbb2ij= 10, bbb2ij, if 10 < bbb2= 20, 20, bbb2ij))
,,
ij(, ,( ij, 
ddd2:= if ccc2ij= 20, ccc2ij, if 20 < ccc2= 50, 50, ccc2ij))
,,
ij(, ,( ij, 
eee2:= if ddd2ij= 50, ddd2ij, if 50 < ddd2= 100, 100, ddd2ij))
,,
ij(, ,( ij, 
fff2:= if eee2ij= 100, eee2ij, if 100 < eee2= 200, 200, eee2ij))
,,
ij(, ,( ij, 
ggg2ij:= if fff2ij= 200, fff2ij, if 200 < fff2= 300, 300, fff2ij))
,
, (, ,( ij, 
hhh2:= if ggg2ij= 300, ggg2ij, if 300 < ggg2ij= 400, 400, ggg2ij))
,
ij(,,(, , 
iii2:= if hhh2ij= 400, hhh2ij, if 400 < hhh2= 500, 500, hhh2ij))
,,
ij(, ,( ij, 
jjj2ij:= if iii2ij= 500, iii2ij, if 500 < iii2= 600, 600, iii2ij))
,
, (, ,( ij, 
kkk2:= if jjj2ij= 600, jjj2ij, if 600 < jjj2ij= 700, 700, jjj2ij))
,
ij(,,(, , 
mmm2:= if kkk2ij= 700, kkk2ij, if 700 < kkk2= 800, 800, kkk2ij))
,,
ij(, ,( ij, 
qpff2ij:= if mmm2ij= 800, mmm2ij, if 800 < mmm2= 900, 900, 1000))
,
(, ,( ij
, 
Interpolate (Solve) for seepage flux (Tptpll Unit) 
T1ai 
- T1a1i 
TkTli 
- TkTl1i 
qpffij- qpff1ij
,,
:=:= := 
, 
uT1ai T1a2i 
- T1a1i 
vTkTli TkTl2i 
- TkTl1i 
tqpffijqpff2ij- qpff1ij
,, 
- --
spfluxTlmij:= . 1tqpffij.. 1uT1ai 
.. 1vTkTli 
.sms1ij...
,. ,.... .,
- -  ...
+. tqpffij.. 1uT1ai 
.. 1vTkTli 
. sms2ij
.,.. .. ., 
+. 
tqpffij.. uT1ai 
.. 1vTkTli 
. sms3ij
+. 
1tqpffij.. uT1ai 
.. 1vTkTli 
. sms4ij
+. 
1tqpffij.. 1uT1ai 
.. vTkTli 
. sms5ij
-  ... 
. ,.... . , 
-  - ... 
. ,.... . , 
- - ... 
. ,.. ... , 
- ...
+. tqpffij.. 1uT1ai 
.. vTkTli 
. sms6ij
. ,.. ... , 
 ...
+. tqpffij.. uT1ai 
.. vTkTli 
. sms7ij
. ,.... . , 
+. 1tqpffij.. uT1ai 
.. vTkTli 
. sms8ij
-   
. ,.... . , 

...
smsd1ij
...
smsd2ij
, 
, 

.. 
1vTkTli 
1vTkTli 
.. 
- 
-
 
1uT1ai 
1uT1ai 
.. 
.. 
- 
- 
.. 
.. 
 
 
.. 
.. 

1tqpffijtqpffij
, 
, 
- 
.. 
.. 
.. 
 
..
spfluxTlsdij:= 
, 
+ 
(
mean QTllspr 
Determine the seepage fraction for Tptpll Unit (lower bound) within the repository and then fit 
the output data to distribution. 
Seepage fraction represents the non-zero seepage rates based on the LHS sampling of all of the parameters. 
spfluxTlmi0
if QTl1lspmi
QTl2lspmi
100 
:= Equation to calculate seepage percent based on seepage rate (see SMPAQT2lperci qpffi028.05
, 
data table) (based on DTN: LB0310AMRU0120.002 [DIRS 166116]). , 
.. 
.. 
.. 
num1li 
if QTllspri 
... 
... 
1vTkTli 
1tqpffijuT1ai 
1vTkTli 
- 
- 
, 
- 
.. 
..
,
= 100, 100 
, 

QT3lperci 
qpffi0= 0.415 Mean Seepage Flux (kg/yr/WP) 
smsd3ijsmsd4ij
, 
,
..
 
..
smsd5ij
...
smsd6ij
, 
, 
1tqpffijsmsd8ij
Calculate mean seepage for (lower bound) Tptpll Unit. 
,
, 
- 
smsd7ijvTkTli 
,
 
 

.. 
-. 
n1
 
..
..
1uT1ai 
1uT1ai 
vTkTli 
- 
- 
 
..
.. 
.. 
.. 
 
.. 
..
if QT2lperci 
28.05 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
 
 
 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
 
 
.. 
.. 
tqpffijuT1ai
, 
.. 
.. 
 
.. 
.. 
 
 
1tqpffijtqpffij
, .. 
..
, 
- 
.. 
.. 
- , 0.00001QTllstdli 
, 
 
tqpffijuT1ai
, 
.. 
.. 
, 
 
spfluxTlsdi01.7321 spfluxTlsdi00 
, 
, 
 
, 
100 
,
if QT2lperci 
= 0, 0
.. 
 
 
+ 
if QTl1lstdli 
.. 
qunif
,
X
i5
, 
:= -1.7321
QTl1lstdli 
 
..
+ 
..
+ 
..
+ 
..
+ 
..
+ 
..
+ 
..
) 
=
)(
sort QTllspr 
Check seepage percent to be above 
100% and then adjusted back. 
Number of seepage rates 
greater than zero. 
> 0, 1, 0 
QT2lperci 
... 
... 
num1li 
vTkTli 
:= 
vTkTli 
numl := 
QTl1lstdli 
= 0.1, 0 
QTl1lspmi 
QTl1lstdui 
uT1ai 
0 
0 0 
1 0 
2 0 
3 0 
4 0 
QTllstdi 
:=
QTl1lstdui 
:=
QTllstdli 
:= 
:= 
:= 
:=
QTllstdi 
QTllspri 
:= 
QTl1lspmi 
QTl2lspmi 
QT3lperci 
0 
:=
nlTl 
( 
numl 
nlTl = 19079 
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01 C-11 of C-78 October 2004 
=
i 
-
-
n1) 

numlspfrclTl := spfrclTl = 0.046 
n 
+ 1 
sort QTllspr 
reverse Q11lTl 
ab := 0.. n1lTl 
) 
)( 
( 
(
(
n1lTl n1)
--
:= 
nlTl 
= 919
n1lTl 
)
Q11lTl 
:= 
Q1lTl 
:= 
Q2lTlab 
:=
...
1 
1 

Q1lTlab 
..
sort Q2lTl 
mean QlTl1 = 9.025 
(ab + 1) - 0.375 
+ 1
) 
) 
)
( 
( 
( 
QlTl 
:= 
:=
CDFlTlab 
n1lTl + 0.25 
Fit the seepage rates to a Weibull distribution. 
The following equations are fromWhat Every Engineer Should Know About Reliability and 
Risk Analysis (Modarres, M, [DIRS 104667], p. 109). 
.. 
.. 
.. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
.. 
.. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
.. 
..
.
. 
..
.
. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
..
, r 
.. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
.. 
, 0.1, 4 
l = 0.534 
n1lTl 
..
.
 
r 
ln QlTli 
..
QlTli 
..
..
-
... 
.. 
.. 
n1lTl 
-
...
1 
r 
1
.
i
=
0
..
.
ln QlTli 
l 
:= root
 
n1lTl
n1lTl
.
i
=
0
r
..
.
QlTli 
..
i
=
0 
1 
 l 
:= 
.. 
. 
. 
..
.
. 
. 
. 
.. 
 l
QlTli 
n1lTl 
..
.
i
=
0 
..
al 
al = 4.237 
n1lTl 
, 
Plot of raw data versus Weibull distribution 
ji := 0.. 
n1lTl 
PFdataji := QlTlji 
CDFdataji 2 := 
CDFlTlji 
.. 
.. 
CDFw1ji := 1 exp 
.
. 
.. 
 l
PFdata 
ji
.. 
.. 
- 
. 
- 
al
. 
, 
CDFw:= CDFw1
ji 0 ji 

Seepage Rate (lower) data and fit
1 
0.5 
0.75cumulative density functionCDFdata 2<> 
CDFw 
0.25 
0
0.1 1 10100 
PFdata 
Seepage Rate (l/yr) 
. 
Calculate mean seepage for (mean) Tptpll Unit. 
:= -1.7321
QTl1mstdli 

spfluxTlsdi1, 
, 
1.7321 spfluxTlsdi10 

:=
QTl1mstdui 
:=
QTlmstdli 
if QTl1mstdli 
qunif 
.. 
QTlmstdi 
- , 0.00001, 
QTlmstdli 
QTl1mstdli 
.. 
, 
X
i5
QTl1mstdui 
..
..
:=
,, 
, 
,
..
spfluxTlmi1
if QTl1mspmi
QTl2mspmi
100 
:= Equation to calculate seepage percent based on seepage rate (see SMPAQT2mperci qpffi128.052 data table) (based on DTN: LB0310AMRU0120.002 [DIRS 166116]). 
QTl1mspmi 
QTlmstdi 
:=
+ 
QTl2mspmi 
= 0.1, 0 
QTl1mspmi 
..
:=
, 
Check seepage percent to be 
above 100% and then adjusted 
back. 
:=
QT3mperci 
..
if QT2mperci 
= 0, 0
..

if QT2mperci 
2 28.05 
100 Mean Seepage Flux (kg/yr/WP) 
,
= 100, 100 
QT2mperci 
.. 
..
, 
QTlmspri 
:= 
, 

QT3mperci 
qpffi1= 33.425 
 
)
(
mean QTlmspr 
Determine the seepage fraction for Tptpll Unit (mean) within the repository and then fit the 
output data to distribution. 
Seepage fraction represents the non-zero seepage rates based on the LHS sampling of all of the parameters. 

:=
num1mi 
if QTlmspri 
.. 
> 0, 1, 0
..
Number of seepage rates 
greater than zero. 
0 
0 0 
1 0 
2 0 
3 0 
4 0 
sort QTlmspr 
=
)(
n1
-.
num1mi 
numm := 
i
=
0 
:=
nmTl 
(
n1)
--
numm 
nmTl = 15088 
nummspfrcmTl := spfrcmTl = 0.246 
n 
n1)
--
(
nmTl + 1
)
(
n1mTl

3
10
:= 
n1mTl
=
4.91 
sort QTlmspr
)(
Q11mTl 
:= 
reverse Q11mTl 
ab := 0.. n1mTl 
)(
Q1mTl 
:= 
:=
Q2mTlab 
...
1 
1 

Q1mTlab 
..
sort Q2mTl 
= 136.122 
)(
QmTl 
:= 
mean QmTl1 
CDFmTlab 
:= 
)( 
(ab + 1) - 0.375 
+ 1
)(
n1mTl + 0.25 
Fit the seepage rates to a Weibull distribution. 
The following equations are fromWhat Every Engineer Should Know About Reliability and 
Risk Analysis (Modarres, M [DIRS 104667], p. 109). 
.. 
.. 
.. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
.. 
.. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
.. 
n1mTl 
..
.
. 
..
.
. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
..
, r 
.. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
.. 
, 0.1, 4 
.. 
r 
ln QmTli 
..
.
QmTli 
..
 
..
-
... 
.. 
.. 
n1mTl
...
1 
r 
1
i
=
0
.
..
.
ln QmTli 
m
-
:= root
 
m = 0.438
n1mTl
n1mTl
.
i
=
0 
..
.
r
QmTli 
..
i
=
0 
1 

m 
:= 
.. 
. 
. 
..
n1mTl 
..
.
i
=
0 
.
. 
. 
. 
.. 
QmTli 
m
 
..
am 
1
10
am 4.56

n1mTl 
= 
, 
Plot of raw data versus Weibull distribution 
ji := 0.. 
n1mTl 
PFdataji := QmTlji 
CDFdataji 2 := 
CDFmTlji 

Screening Analysis of Criticality Features, Events, and Processes for License Application 
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01C-15 of C-78October 2004Seepage fraction represents the non-zero seepage rates based on the LHS sampling of all of the parameters.
Determine the seepage fraction for Tptpll Unit (upper bound) within the repository and then fit 
the output data to distribution.
meanQTluspr()104.665=
Mean Seepage Flux (kg/yr/WP)QTluspriQT3uperciqpffi2,
228.05
100:=
Check seepage percent to be 
above 100% and then adjusted 
back.
QT3uperciifQT2uperci0=0,ifQT2uperci100=100,QT2uperci,..
..
,..
..
:=
Equation to calculate seepage percent based on seepage rate (see SMPA 
data table) (based on DTN: LB0310AMRU0120.002 [DIRS 166116]).
QT2uperciQTl2uspmi100
qpffi2,28.052
:=
QTl2uspmiifQTl1uspmi0.1=0,QTl1uspmi,..
..:=
QTl1uspmispfluxTlmi2,
QTlustdi+:=
QTlustdiqunifXi5,QTlustdli,QTl1ustdui,..
..
:=
QTlustdliifQTl1ustdli00.00001-,QTl1ustdli,..
..
:=
QTl1ustdui1.7321spfluxTlsdi2,
:=
QTl1ustdli1.7321-spfluxTlsdi2,
:=
Calculate mean seepage for (upper bound) Tptpll Unit.
.0.11101001.1031.10400.51Mean Seepage Flux (l/yr) data and fitSeepage Flux (l/yr)
cumulative density functionCDFdata2<>
CDFwPFdataCDFwji0,CDFw1ji:=CDFw1ji1expPFdatajiam....
.
.
m-
....
.
...
-:=

:=
num1ui 
if QTluspr i 
.. 
> 0, 1, 0
..
Number of seepage rates 
greater than zero. 
0 
0 0 
1 0 
2 0 
3 0 
4 0 
sort QTlmspr 
=
)(
n1
-.
num1ui 
numu := 
i
=
0 
:=
nuTl 
(
n1)
--
numu 
nuTl 
= 12696 
numuspfrcuTl := spfrcuTl = 0.365 
n 
+ 1 
sort QTluspr 
reverse Q11uTl 
) 
)( 
( 
(
(
n1uTl n1)
--
3
10
:= 
nuTl 
n1uTl 7.302

= 
)
Q11uTl 
:= 
Q1uTl 
:= 
ab := 0.. n1uTl 
1 
:=
Q2uTlab 
...
.. 

Q1uTlab
1 
sort Q2uTl 
mean QuTl1 = 286.636 
(ab + 1) - 0.375 
+ 1
) 
) 
)
( 
(
(
QuTl 
:= 
:=
CDFuTlab 
n1uTl + 0.25 
Fit the seepage rates to a Weibull distribution. 
The following equations are fromWhat Every Engineer Should Know About Reliability and 
Risk Analysis (Modarres, M [DIRS 104667], p. 109). 
.. 
.. 
.. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
.. 
.. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
.. 
n1uTl 
..
.
. 
..
.
. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
..
, r 
.. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
.. 
, 0.1, 4 

.. 
r 
ln QuTli 
..
.
QuTli 
..
-
... 
.. 
.. 
n1uTl
1 
r 
..
1
i
=
0
...
.
..
.
ln QuTli 
u
-
:= root
 
u = 0.445
n1uTl
n1uTl
.
i
=
0 
..
.
r
QuTli 
..
i
=
0 
1 

u 
:= 
.. 
. 
. 
..
n1uTl 
..
.
i
=
0 
.
. 
. 
. 
.. 
QuTli 
u
 
..
au 
2
10
au 
1.064

n1uTl 
= 
Plot of raw data versus Weibull distribution 
ji := 0.. 
n1uTl
PFdataji := QuTlji

Screening Analysis of Criticality Features, Events, and Processes for License Application 
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01C-17 of C-78October 2004Data Set MeanmeanQTluspr()104.665=meanQTlmspr()33.425=meanQTllspr()0.415=
Seepage FractionspfrcuTl3.651101-=spfrcmTl2.455101-=spfrclTl4.6102-=
u4.45101-=m4.381101-=l5.339101-=
au1.064102=am4.56101=al4.237=
Upper Bound ResultsMean ResultsLower Bound ResultsOverall Final Results0.11101001.1031.10400.250.50.751Seepage Rate (Upper) data and fitSeepage Rate (l/yr)
cumulative density functionCDFdata2<>
CDFwPFdataCDFwji0,CDFw1ji:=
CDFw1ji1expPFdatajiau....
.
.
u-
....
.
...
-:=
CDFdataji2,CDFuTlji:=

C.2 NOMINAL SEEPAGE ANALYSIS FOR INFILTRATION RATE AND SEEPAGE 
FRACTION IN THE NONLITHOPHYSAL ZONE 
This section presents the Mathcad analysis for calculating the nominal seepage fraction and 
nominal seepage infiltration rates (i.e., lower bound, mean, and upper bound) for the 
nonlithophysal zone during the glacial transition period. The seepage information used in the 
analysis was obtained from Abstraction of Drift Seepage (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169131], 
Section 6.7.1.1). The information contained in this section has been abstracted from the LA 
seepage glac Tptpmn weibull.mcd Mathcad file of Appendix G. 

Seepage Flux and Seepage Fraction Calculation using Abstraction of Drift Seepage 
(BSC 2004 [DIRS 169131], Section 6.7.1.1) 
Latin Hypercube Sampling Routine to Generate Random Numbers 
size of the sampling: n := 20000 
i := 1.. n 
- ( - (
RD:= i RDi1, 1 
:= rnd 1.0) RDi1, 2 
:= rnd 1.0) RDi1, 3 
:= rnd 1.0)
i1, 0 - ( -
- 
:= rnd 1.0) RDi1, 5 := rnd 1.0) := rnd 1.0)
(
-
RDi1, 4( - ( RDi1, 6 
RK's are matrixes in which the first column contain a permutation on the integers on the 
interval [1,n]. 
RK1 := csort (RD 1) RK2 := csort (RD 2) RK3 := csort (RD 3)
,,, 
RK4 := csort (RD 4) RK5 := csort (RD 5) RK6 := csort (RD 6)
,,, 
Define sets of random values. Each random value is selected within one of the equiprobable n 
intervals that partition [0,1]. One set for each random variable. 
<> <> <>
<> <> <>
X0:= 
RK1 0- 1 + runif(n , 0, 1) 
X1:= 
RK2 0- 1 + runif(n , 0, 1) 
X2:= 
RK3 0- 1 + runif(n , 0, 1) 
nnn 
<> <> <>
<> <> <>
X3:= 
RK4 0- 1 + runif(n , 0, 1) 
X4:= 
RK5 0- 1 + runif(n , 0, 1) 
X5:= 
RK6 0- 1 + runif(n , 0, 1) 
nnn 
i := 0n - 1
.. 
Capillary Strength 1/ a in (Pa) 
:= 402 a1ub := 780 a1 := 591 spatial variability follows a uniform distribution
a1lb 
.a1l - := 105 .a1 := 0 .a1u := 105 uncertainty follows a triangular distribution 
Sampling from spatial variability to obtain the 1/ a value 
a1i := qunif ( Xi0,a1lb ,a1ub ) 1/a value 
, 
Sample from uncertainty triangular distribution to obtain . 1/a 
Determine which equation to use: 
if Random Number < RN .a1 then use Equation 1 ( .a1eq1) 
if Random Number > RN .a1 then use Equation 2 ( .a1eq2) 
(.a1- .a1l)2 
RN.a1 := 
 
(.a1- .a1l)(.a1- .a1l)
u  
.a1eq1i 
:= .a1l + ( )( ).a1u - .a1l  .a1 -.a1l
Xi1
, 
.a1eq2i 
:= .a1u -()( )( )1 - Xi1 .a1u - .a1l  .a1u - .a1
, 
.a1i := if.( Xi1= RN.a1),.a1eq1i,.a1eq2i 
.. 1/a value
,.
. 

Overall Capillary Strength 1/ a + . 1/a 
:= a1i + .a1i 1/a value
T1ai 
Permeability k in Tptpmn Unit (in log 10) 
kTn - := 12.2mean of lognormal distribution 
:= 0.34 standard deviation of lognormal distribution
skTn 
kTni 
:= ln qlnorm Xi2,kTn ,skTn))
( (, 
mean kTn) - = 12.2
( 
Stdev kTn)= 0.34
( 
Permeability . k in Tptpmn Unit (in log 10) 
- := 0.68.kTn := 0 := 0.68 uncertainty follows a triangular distribution
.kTnl .kTnu 
Sample from uncertainty triangular distribution to obtain . k 
Determine which equation to use: 
if Random Number < RN.kTn then use Equation 1 ( . kTneq1) 
if Random Number > RN.kTn then use Equation 2 ( . kTneq2) 
(.kTn-.kTnl)2 
:= 
 
RN.kTn (.kTnu -.kTnl) (.kTn-.kTnl) 
.kTneq1i 
:= .kTnl + Xi3(.kTnu -.kTnl)(.kTn-.kTnl)
, 
.kTneq2i 
:= .kTnu -(1 - Xi3)(.kTnu -.kTnl)(.kTnu -.kTn)
, 
.kTni 
:= if.( Xi3= RN.kTn),.kTneq1i,.kTneq2i.. 
. k value
,
. 
Overall Permeability k + . k 
T1kTni 
:= kTni 
+.kTni 
Permeability must lie between -14 and -10 (bounds of SMPA simulations) 
TkTni 
:= if. T1kTni 
- = 10- , 10, if. T1kTni 
- = 14- , 14, T1kTni 
.. 
.. .. k value 
Flow Focusing Factor 
4 32
( 
fx) := -0.3137x + 5.4998 x - 35.66 x + 102.3 x - 11.434 
ffi := root f x, . () -100), x, 0, 6. 
.( Xi4. 
Percolation Flux (mm/yr) 
The percolation flux used here is for the glacial transition period only. The percolation flux is based on 
sampling from the lower bound (TSPA repository location). DTN: LB0310AMRU0120.002 [DIRS 166116] 

nnn := 0.. 468 number of data points 
Lower Bound Percolation Flux Mean Bound Percolation Flux Upper Bound Percolation Flux 
PF1l := 
PF1m := 
PF1u := 
0 
0 3.676 
1 2.6504 
2 2.4144 
3 2.1296 
4 2.4089 
5 2.3999 
6 2.117 
7 2.7623 
8 1.397 
9 2.2144 
0 
0 15.9704 
1 19.8733 
2 14.1961 
3 7.5897 
4 16.9397 
5 17.7583 
6 10.4511 
7 27.7684 
8 8.9546 
9 16.0195 
0 
0 40.0021 
1 36.1863 
2 35.7337 
3 27.828 
4 30.7394 
5 40.0292 
6 31.8601 
7 57.0835 
8 18.3271 
9 27.9133 
PFtl:= PF1lnnn 0 
PFtm:= PF1PFtu:= PF1,,
nnn , nnn mnnn 0 nnn unnn 0 
<> 
(( ,Z0:= round runif n 0 , 468)) 
PFli 
:= PFtlZi0PF:= PFt
,,
( ,) mi m( Zi0) PFui 
:= PFtu( Zi0) 
Adjusted Percolation Flux 
Take the flow focusing factor and multiply it to the percolation flux, which will be used to obtain the 
seepage rate, seepage fraction, and seepage percentage. 
q1pffi 
:= PFli 
ffqmpffi 
:= PFffqupffi 
:= PFff
i mii uii 
qpff := augment q1pff , qmpff , qupff)
( 
Percolation Flux must lie between 1 and 1000 mm/yr (bounds of SMPA simulations) 
j := 0.. 2 
qpffij:= if qpffij= 1, 1, if qpffij= 1000, 1000, qpffij..
.. 
,., ., , .. 
Seepage Information from SMPA analysis SMPAdata<0> is permeability value log(k [m^2]) 
m := 2549 data points SMPAdata<1> is capillary strength 1/alpha [Pa] 
SMPAdata<2> is local percolation flux (mm/yr) 
SMPAdata<3> is Mean Seepage [kg/yr/WP] 
SMPAdata<4> is Std. Dev. Seepage [kg/yr/WP] 
SMPAdata<5> is Mean Seepage [%] 
SMPAdata<6> is Std. Dev. Seepage [%] 

SMPAdata := 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
0 -14 100 1 27.73 4.09 98.86 14.59 
1 -14 100 5 138.92 20.55 99.05 14.65 
2 -14 100 10 277.9 41.19 99.07 14.68 
3 -14 100 20 555.87 82.54 99.09 14.71 
4 -14 100 50 1391.67 205.57 99.23 14.66 
5 -14 100 100 2793.55 406.7 99.59 14.5 
6 -14 100 200 5610 785 100 14 
7 -14 100 300 8415 1178 100 14 
8 -14 100 400 11220 1570 100 14 
9 -14 100 500 14025 1963 100 14 
10 -14 100 600 16830 2356 100 14 
11 -14 100 700 19635 2748 100 14 
12 -14 100 800 22440 3141 100 14 
13 -14 100 900 25245 3590 100 14 
14 -14 100 1000 28050 3989 100 14 
15 -14 200 1 26.14 4.21 93.21 15 
Set up routine to pick out correct mean seepage, seepage standard deviation, seepage percent, 
and seepage percent standard deviation based on sampled value of 1/ a, k, percolation flux.
nx := 14 ny := 9 nz := 16
ii := 0.. nx
x:= SMPAdataii 2 
xi:= ii
ii ii
, 
jj := 0.. ny 
:=
yjj 
100 jj 
kk := 0.. nz 

+ 100 yjjj := jj 

kk 0.25 
loc represents the location within the matrix of which value to pick for the interpolation process. 
-14
zkkk := kk
z:=
kk
+ 
, 
loc1ij:= 
floor linterpx xi , 
, 
, 
, 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
+ 
floor linterp z zk 
TkTni 
( + 1) 
( + 1)
,.. 
..
floor linterp y yj
,
T1ai 
.. 
.. 

( + 1)
.. 
.. 
+
nx

ny nx 
... 
.. 
..
, 
qpffij
, 
:= SMPAdataloc1ij
, 
, 
, 
sms1ijsmsd1ijloc2ij:= 
, 3 
, 
:= SMPAdataloc1ij
, 4 
, 
, 
, 
,
, 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
+ 
floor linterp z zk 
ceil linterp x xi qpffij
TkTni 
( + 1)
..
( + 1)
+
,.. 
..
floor linterp y yj
,
T1ai 
.. 
..
( + 1)
.. 
.. 

nx

ny

nx 
... 
.. 
.. 
ij, 
, 
, 
, 
sms2ijsmsd2ij
ij
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01 C-22 of C-78 October 2004 
:= SMPAdataloc2
, 3 
:= SMPAdataloc2
, 4 

loc3ij:= 
, 
floor linterp z zk 
ceil linterp x xi 
, 
, 
,.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
+ 
TkTni 
( + 1) 
( + 1)
+
ceil linterp y yj
,.. 
..
,
T1ai 
.. 
.. 

( + 1)
.. 
.. 

nx

ny nx 
... 
.. 
..
qpffij
, 
, 
3, 
:= SMPAdataloc3
ij
, 
sms3ijsmsd3ijloc4ij:= 
, 
, 
, 
:= SMPAdataloc3ij
, 
, 4 
floor linterp z zk 
floor linterp x xi 
, 
, 
, 
, 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
+ 
TkTni 
( + 1) 
( + 1) 
ceil linterp y yj
,.. 
..
,
T1ai 
( + 1)
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
+

nx

ny

nx 
... 
qpffij
.. 
..
, 
:= SMPAdataloc4
sms4ijij
smsd4ij:= SMPAdataloc4ij
, 
, 
, 
,
, 3 
, 4 
loc5ij:= 
, 
ceil linterp z zk 
floor linterp x xi 
, 
, 
, 
, 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
+ 
TkTni 
( + 1) 
( + 1)
..
,.. 
..
floor linterp y yj 
T1ai 
( + 1)
.. 
.. 

.. 
.. 
+
nx

ny

nx
,
... 
qpffij
.. 
..
, 
:= SMPAdataloc5
sms5ijij
smsd5ij:= SMPAdataloc5ij
, 
, 
, 
,
, 3 
, 4 
loc6ij:= 
, 
ceil linterp z zk 
ceil linterp x xi 
, 
, 
, 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
+ 
TkTni 
( + 1) 
( + 1)
,.. 
..
floor linterp y yj
,
T1ai 
( + 1)
.. 
.. 

.. 
.. 
+
nx

ny

nx 
... 
.. 
..
, 
,
qpffij, 3 
, 
:= SMPAdataloc6
ij
sms6ijsmsd6ij
, 
loc:=7ij
, 
, 
, 
:= SMPAdataloc6ij
, 4 
, 
, 
, 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
+ 
ceil linterp z zk 
ceil linterp x xi 
TkTni 
( + 1)
..
( + 1)
+
,.. 
..
ceil linterp y yj 
T1ai 
( + 1)
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 

nx

ny

nx
,
... 
.. 
..
, 
,
qpffij, 3 
, 
:= SMPAdataloc7
ij
, 
, 
, 
sms7ijsmsd7ijloc8ij:= 
, 
:= SMPAdataloc7ij
, 4 
floor linterpx xi , 
,
,.. 
,.. 
.. 
.. 
+ 
ceil linterp z zk 
TkTni 
( + 1) 
( + 1)
,.. 
..
ceil linterp y yj
,
T1ai 
( + 1)
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 

+

nx

ny nx 
... 
.. 
..
, 
qpffij
:= SMPAdataloc8
ij, 
, 
, 
, 
sms8ij
smsd8ij:= SMPAdataloc8ij
, 3 
, 4 

Develop the upper and lower bound for permeability (k) for Tptpmn Unit 
qqi := -1TkTni 
( ()
mantissa x) := x - floor qq
tti := floor qqi)
( 
rr := round mantissa qq,
( () 2)
yy1i := if rri = 0.25, 0, if 0.25 < rri = 0.5, 0.25, rri))
(( 
zz1i := if yy1i = 0.5, yy1i, if 0.5 < yy1i = 0.75, 0.5, 0.75))
(( 
TkTn2i 
:= -1(tti + zz1i) 
yy2i := if rri = 0.25, 0.25, if 0.25 < rri = 0.5, 0.5, rri))
(( 
zz2i := if yy2i = 0.5, yy2i, if 0.5 < yy2i = 0.75, 0.75, 1))
(( 
TkTn1i 
:= -1(tti + zz2i) 
Develop the upper and lower bound for capillary strength (1/ a). 
. T1ai 
.
hh1i := floor.
. 100 . 
T1a1i 
:= (hh1i 100) 
. T1ai 
.
hh2i := ceil.
. 100 . 
T1a2i 
:= (hh2i 100) 
Lower Bound value adjusted percolation flux (q pff). 
aaa1ij:= if qpffij= 1, 1, if 1 < qpffij= 5, 1, qpffij.. 
,.,. , ,..
bbb1ij:= if aaa1ij= 5, aaa1ij, if 5 < aaa1= 10, 5, aaa1ij))
.. 
,
,(, ,( ij, 
ccc1ij:= if bbb1ij= 10, bbb1ij, if 10 < bbb1= 20, 10, bbb1ij))
,
,(, ,( ij, 
ddd1ij:= if ccc1ij= 20, ccc1ij, if 20 < ccc1= 50, 20, ccc1ij))
,
,(, ,( ij, 
eee1ij:= if ddd1ij= 50, ddd1ij, if 50 < ddd1= 100, 50, ddd1ij))
,
,(, ,( ij, 
fff1ij:= if eee1ij= 100, eee1ij, if 100 < eee1= 200, 100, eee1ij))
,
,(, ,( ij, 
ggg1ij:= if fff1ij= 200, fff1ij, if 200 < fff1= 300, 200, fff1ij))
,
, (, ,( ij, 
hhh1:= if ggg1ij= 300, ggg1ij, if 300 < ggg1ij= 400, 300, ggg1ij))
,
ij(,,(, , 
iii1ij:= if hhh1ij= 400, hhh1ij, if 400 < hhh1= 500, 400, hhh1ij))
,
,(, ,( ij,
jjj1ij:= if iii1ij= 500, iii1ij, if 500 < iii1= 600, 500, iii1ij))
,, (, ,( ij, 
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01 C-24 of C-78 October 2004 

kkk1:= if jjj1ij= 600, jjj1ij, if 600 < jjj1ij= 700, 600, jjj1ij))
,
ij(,,(, , 
mmm1:= if kkk1ij= 700, kkk1ij, if 700 < kkk1= 800, 700, kkk1ij))
,,
ij(, ,( ij, 
qpff1ij:= if mmm1ij= 800, mmm1ij, if 800 < mmm1= 900, 800, 900))
,
(, ,( ij
, 
Upper Bound value adjusted percolation flux (q pff). 
aaa2ij:= if qpffij= 1, 5, if 1 < qpffij= 5, 5, qpffij..
.. 
,.,. , ,.. 
bbb2:= if aaa2ij= 5, aaa2ij, if 5 < aaa2= 10, 10, aaa2ij))
,,
ij(, ,( ij, 
ccc2:= if bbb2ij= 10, bbb2ij, if 10 < bbb2= 20, 20, bbb2ij))
,,
ij(, ,( ij, 
ddd2:= if ccc2ij= 20, ccc2ij, if 20 < ccc2= 50, 50, ccc2ij))
,,
ij(, ,( ij, 
eee2:= if ddd2ij= 50, ddd2ij, if 50 < ddd2= 100, 100, ddd2ij))
,,
ij(, ,( ij, 
fff2:= if eee2ij= 100, eee2ij, if 100 < eee2= 200, 200, eee2ij))
,,
ij(, ,( ij, 
ggg2ij:= if fff2ij= 200, fff2ij, if 200 < fff2= 300, 300, fff2ij))
,
, (, ,( ij, 
hhh2:= if ggg2ij= 300, ggg2ij, if 300 < ggg2ij= 400, 400, ggg2ij))
,
ij(,,(, , 
iii2:= if hhh2ij= 400, hhh2ij, if 400 < hhh2= 500, 500, hhh2ij))
,,
ij(, ,( ij, 
jjj2ij:= if iii2ij= 500, iii2ij, if 500 < iii2= 600, 600, iii2ij))
,
, (, ,( ij, 
kkk2:= if jjj2ij= 600, jjj2ij, if 600 < jjj2ij= 700, 700, jjj2ij))
,
ij(,,(, , 
mmm2:= if kkk2ij= 700, kkk2ij, if 700 < kkk2= 800, 800, kkk2ij))
,,
ij(, ,( ij, 
qpff2ij:= if mmm2ij= 800, mmm2ij, if 800 < mmm2= 900, 900, 1000))
,
(, ,( ij
, 
Solve for seepage flux (Tptpmn Unit) 
T1ai 
- T1a1i 
TkTni 
- TkTn1i 
qpffij- qpff1ij
,,
:=:= := 
, 
uT1ai T1a2i 
- T1a1i 
vTkTni TkTn2i 
- TkTn1i 
tqpffijqpff2ij- qpff1ij
,, 
- --
spfluxTnmij:= . 1tqpffij.. 1uT1ai 
.. 1vTkTni 
.sms1ij... 
,. ,.... ., 
- -  ...
+. tqpffij.. 1uT1ai 
.. 1vTkTni 
. sms2ij
.,.. .. ., 
+. 
tqpffij.. uT1ai 
.. 1vTkTni 
. sms3ij
+. 
1tqpffij.. uT1ai 
.. 1vTkTni 
. sms4ij
+. 
1tqpffij.. 1uT1ai 
.. vTkTni 
. sms5ij
-  ... 
. ,.... . , 
-  - ... 
. ,.... . , 
- - ... 
. ,.. ... , 
- ...
+. tqpffij.. 1uT1ai 
.. vTkTni 
. sms6ij
. ,.. ... , 
 ...
+. tqpffij.. uT1ai 
.. vTkTni 
. sms7ij
. ,.... . , 
+. 1tqpffij.. uT1ai 
.. vTkTni 
. sms8ij
-  
. ,.... . , 

...
smsd1ij
...
smsd2ij
, 
, 

.. 
1vTkTni 
1vTkTni 
.. 
- 
-
 
1uT1ai 
1uT1ai 
.. 
.. 
- 
- 
.. 
.. 
 
 
.. 
.. 

1tqpffijtqpffij
, 
, 
- 
.. 
.. 
.. 
 
..
spfluxTnsd ij:= 
, 
+ 
spfluxTnmi0
if QTn1lspmi
QTn2lspmi
100 
, 
:= Equation to calculate seepage percent based on seepage rate (see SMPAQT2lperci qpffi028.05 
data table) (based on DTN: LB0310AMRU0120.002 [DIRS 166116]). 
,
..
..
if QT2lperci 
28.05 
Mean Seepage Flux (kg/yr/WP) 
(
mean QTnlspr 
Determine the seepage fraction for Tptpmn Unit (lower bound) within the repository and then fit 
the output data to distribution. 
Seepage fraction represents the non-zero seepage rates based on the LHS sampling of all of the parameters. 
... 
... 
smsd3ijsmsd4ij
, 
,
..
smsd5ij
...
smsd6ij
, 
, 
.. 
.. 
smsd7ijvTkTni 
, 
1tqpffijsmsd8ij
Calculate mean seepage for Tptpmn Unit (lower bound). 
,
, 
- 
 

..
,
= 100, 100 
1vTkTni 
1tqpffijuT1ai 
1vTkTni 
- 
- 
, 
- 
 

..
 
..
..
1uT1ai 
1uT1ai 
vTkTni 
- 
- 
.. 

..
..
.. 
.. 
 
..
.. 
.. 
num1li 
if QTnlspri 
-. 
n1
i 
.. 
.. 
 
.. 
.. 
 
.. 
.. 
 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
 
 
tqpffijuT1ai
, 
tqpffijuT1ai
, 
- , 0.00001QTnlstdli 
, 
, 
.. 
.. 
 
.. 
.. 
 
.. 
.. 
 
1tqpffijtqpffij
, .. 
..
, 
- 
.. 
.. 
 
 
.. 
.. 
 
.. 
+ 
..
+ 
..
+ 
..
+ 
spfluxTnsd i01.7321 spfluxTnsdi00 
, 
, 
 
100 
, 
, 
 
+ 
if QTn1lstdli 
qunif 
.. 
,
X
i5
, 
:= -1.7321
QTn1lstdli 
 
, 
 
if QT2lperci 
.. 
QT3lperci 
qpffi0= 1.579 
..
+ 
..
+ 
..
=
)(
sort QTnlspr 
)
Check seepage percent to be above 
100% and then adjusted back. 
Number of seepage rates 
greater than zero. 
QT2lperci 
> 0, 1, 0 
... 
... 
num1li 
0 
vTkTni 
:= 
vTkTni 
QTn1lstdli 
QTn1lspmi 
numl := 
uT1ai 
QTn1lstdui 
QTnlstdi 
0 
0 0 
1 0 
2 0 
3 0 
4 0 
= 0.1, 0 
= 0, 0 
:=
QTn1lstdui 
:= 
:=
QTnlstdli 
:= 
:=
QTnlstdi 
QTn1lspmi 
QTn2lspmi 
QT3lperci 
:= 
QTnlspri 
:= 
:=
nlTn 
( 
numl 
nlTn = 17066 
numl
spfrclTn := spfrclTn = 0.147
n
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01 C-26 of C-78 October 2004 
= 
-
-
n1) 

n1)
--
(
(
n1lTn 
n1lTn
=
2.932

3
10
:= 
nlTn 
)
Q11lTn 
:= 
Q1lTn 
:= 
+ 1 
sort QTnlspr 
reverse Q11lTn 
) 
)( 
( 
ab := 0.. n1lTn 
:=
Q2lTnab 
..
Q1lTnab 
..
sort Q2lTn 
= 10.77 
)(
QlTn 
:= 
mean QlTn
)( 
(ab + 1) - 0.375 
+ 1
)(
:=
CDFlTnab 
n1lTn + 0.25 
Fit the seepage rates to a Weibull distribution. 
The following equations are fromWhat Every Engineer Should Know About Reliability and 
Risk Analysis (Modarres, M, [DIRS 104667], p. 109). 
.. 
.. 
.. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
.. 
.. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
.. 
n1lTn 
..
.
. 
..
.
. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
..
, r 
.. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
.. 
, 0.1, 4 
..
.
 
r 
ln QlTni 
..
QlTni 
..
1 
r 
..
-
... 
.. 
.. 
1 
n1lTn 
n1lTn
i
=
0
-
...
.
..
.
ln QlTni 
l 
:= root
 
l = 0.528
n1lTn
.
i
=
0 
..
.
r
QlTni 
..
i
=
0 
1 
 l
.. 
. 
. 
..
n1lTn 
..
.
i
=
0 
.
. 
. 
. 
.. 
 l
QlTni 
..
al := 
al = 4.936 
n1lTn 
, 
Plot of raw data versus Weibull distribution 
ji := 0.. 
n1lTn 
PFdataji := QlTnji 
CDFdataji 2 := 
CDFlTnji 
.. 
.. 
CDFw1ji := 1 exp 
.
. 
.. 
 l
PFdata 
ji
.. 
.. 
- 
. 
- 
al
. 
, 
CDFwji 0 := CDFw1
ji 

Screening Analysis of Criticality Features, Events, and Processes for License Application 
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01C-28 of C-78October 2004Seepage fraction represents the non-zero seepage rates based on the LHS sampling of all of the parameters.
Determine the seepage fraction for Tptpmn Unit (mean) within the repository and then fit the 
output data to distribution.
meanQTnmspr()92.669=
Mean Seepage Flux (kg/yr/WP)QTnmspriQT3mperciqpffi1,
28.05100:=
Check seepage percent to be above 
100% and then adjusted back.
QT3mperciifQT2mperci0=0,ifQT2mperci100=100,QT2mperci,....
,..
..
:=
Equation to calculate seepage percent based on seepage rate (see SMPA 
data table) (based on DTN: LB0310AMRU0120.002 [DIRS 166116]).
QT2mperciQTn2mspmi100
qpffi1,28.05
:=
QTn2mspmiifQTn1mspmi0.1=0,QTn1mspmi,..
..
:=
QTn1mspmispfluxTnmi1,
QTnmstdi+:=
QTnmstdiqunifXi5,QTnmstdli,QTn1mstdui,..
..
:=
QTnmstdliifQTn1mstdli00.00001-,QTn1mstdli,..
..
:=
QTn1mstdui1.7321spfluxTnsdi1,
:=
QTn1mstdli1.7321-spfluxTnsdi1,
:=
Calculate mean seepage for Tptpmn Unit (mean). 
0.11101001.10300.250.50.751Seepage Flux (Tptpmn) data and fitSeepage Flux (l/yr)
cumulative density functionCDFdata2<>
CDFwPFdata

num1mi 
:= if QTnmspri 
.. 
> 0, 1, 0
..
Number of seepage rates 
greater than zero. 
0 
0 0 
1 0 
2 0 
3 0 
4 0 
sort QTnmspr 
=
)(
n1
-.
num1mi 
numm := 
i
=
0 
:=
nmTn 
(
n1)
--
numm 
nmTn 
= 9624 
nummspfrcmTn := spfrcmTn = 0.519 
n 
n1)
--
(
nmTn + 1
)
(
n1mTn 
4
10
:= 
n1mTn 1.037

= 
sort QTnmspr
)(
Q11mTn 
:= 
reverse Q11mTn 
ab := 0.. n1mTn 
)(
Q1mTn 
:= 
:=
Q2mTnab 
..
Q1mTnab 
..
sort Q2mTn 
= 178.639 
)(
QmTn 
:= 
mean QmTn 
CDFmTnab 
:= 
)( 
(ab + 1) - 0.375 
+ 1
)(
n1mTn + 0.25 
Fit the seepage rates to a Weibull distribution. 
The following equations are fromWhat Every Engineer Should Know About Reliability and 
Risk Analysis (Modarres, M, [DIRS 104667], p. 109). 
.. 
.. 
.. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
.. 
.. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
.. 
n1mTn 
..
.
. 
..
.
. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
..
, r 
.. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
.. 
, 0.1, 4 
.. 
r 
ln QmTni 
..
.
QmTni 
..
 
..
-
... 
.. 
.. 
n1mTn
...
1 
r 
1
i
=
0
.
..
.
ln QmTni 
m
-
m = 0.468
:= root
 
n1mTn
n1mTn
.
i
=
0 
..
.
r
QmTni 
..
i
=
0 
1 

m
.. 
. 
. 
..
n1mTn 
..
.
i
=
0 
.
. 
. 
. 
.. 
QmTni 
m
 
..
1
10
am 
:= 
am 7.394

= 
n1mTn 
, 
Plot of raw data versus Weibull distribution 
ji := 0.. 
n1mTn 
PFdataji := QmTnji 
CDFdataji 2 := 
CDFmTnji 

Screening Analysis of Criticality Features, Events, and Processes for License Application 
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01C-30 of C-78October 2004Determine the seepage fraction for Tptpmn Unit (lower bound) within the repository and then fit 
the output data to distribution.
meanQTnuspr()263.501=
Mean Seepage Flux (kg/yr/WP)QTnuspriQT3uperciqpffi2,
28.05100:=
Check seepage percent to be above 
100% and then adjusted back.
QT3uperciifQT2uperci0=0,ifQT2uperci100=100,QT2uperci,..
..
,..
..
:=
Equation to calculate seepage percent based on seepage rate (see SMPA 
data table) (based on DTN: LB0310AMRU0120.002 [DIRS 166116]).
QT2uperciQTn2uspmi100
qpffi2,28.05
:=
QTn2uspmiifQTn1uspmi0.1=0,QTn1uspmi,..
..
:=
QTn1uspmispfluxTnmi2,
QTnustdi+:=
QTnustdiqunifXi5,QTnustdli,QTn1ustdui,..
..
:=
QTnustdliifQTn1ustdli00.00001-,QTn1ustdli,..
..
:=
QTn1ustdui1.7321spfluxTnsdi2,
:=
QTn1ustdli1.7321-spfluxTnsdi2,
:=
Calculate mean seepage for Tptpmn Unit (upper bound). 
0.11101001.1031.10400.250.50.751Mean Seepage Flux (l/yr) data and fitSeepage Flux (l/yr)
cumulative density functionCDFdata2<>
CDFwPFdataCDFwji0,CDFw1ji:=CDFw1ji1expPFdatajiam....
.
.
m-
....
.
...
-:=

Seepage fraction represents the non-zero seepage rates based on the LHS sampling of all of the parameters. 
:= 
> 0, 1, 0 
Number of seepage rates 
0 
0 0 
1 0 
2 0 
3 0 
4 0 
num1ui 
if QTnuspr i 
.. 
..
greater than zero. 
sort QTnuspr 
=
)(
n1
-.
num1ui 
numu := 
i
=
0 
:=
nuTn 
(
n1)
--
numu 
nuTn 
= 6567 
numuspfrcuTn := spfrcuTn = 0.672 
n 
4
10
n1)
--
(
nuTn + 1
)
(
n1uTn 
n1uTn
=
1.343
:=
 
sort QTnuspr 
reverse Q11uTn 
ab := 0.. n1uTn 
( 
(
)
Q11uTn 
:= 
)
Q1uTn 
:= 
1
Q2uTnab 
:=
...
..
Q1uTnab 
 
1 
sort Q2uTn 
mean QuTn 1 = 392.348 
(ab + 1) - 0.375 
)
+ 1 
)
( 
( 
( 
)
QuTn 
:= 
:=
CDFuTnab 
+ 0.25
n1uTn 
Fit the seepage rates to a Weibull distribution. 
The following equations are fromWhat Every Engineer Should Know About Reliability and 
Risk Analysis (Modarres, M, [DIRS 104667], p. 109). 
.. 
.. 
.. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
.. 
.. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
.. 
n1uTn
.
. 
..
.
. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
..
, r 
.. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
.. 
, 0.1, 4 
..
.

.. 
r 
ln QuTni
QuTni 
..
..
...
1 
r 
..
-
... 
.. 
.. 
n1uTn
1
i
=
0
.
..
.
ln QuTni 
u
-
:= root
 
u = 0.493
n1uTn
n1uTn
.
i
=
0
r
..
.
QuTni 
..
i
=
0 
1 

u
.. 
. 
. 
..
n1uTn 
..
.
i
=
0 
.
. 
. 
. 
.. 
QuTni 
u
 
..
2
10
au := 
au 
1.902

= 
n1uTn 
Plot of raw data versus Weibull distribution 
ji := 0.. 
n1uTn 
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01 C-31 of C-78 October 2004 

Screening Analysis of Criticality Features, Events, and Processes for License Application 
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01C-32 of C-78October 2004Data Set MeanmeanQTnuspr()263.501=meanQTnmspr()92.669=meanQTnlspr()1.579=
Seepage FractionspfrcuTn6.716101-=spfrcmTn5.188101-=spfrclTn1.466101-=
u4.932101-=m4.677101-=l5.282101-=
au1.902102=am7.394101=al4.936100=
Upper Bound ResultsMean ResultsLower Bound ResultsOverall Final Results for Tptpmn Zone.
0.11101001.1031.10400.250.50.751Seepage Flux (Tptpmn) data and fitSeepage Flux (l/yr)
cumulative density functionCDFdata2<>
CDFwPFdataCDFwji0,CDFw1ji:=CDFw1ji1expPFdatajiau....
.
.
u-
....
.
...
-:=
CDFdataji2,CDFuTnji:=
PFdatajiQuTnji:=

C.3 SEISMIC SEEPAGE ANALYSIS FOR INFILTRATION RATE AND SEEPAGE 
FRACTION IN THE LITHOPHYSAL ZONE 
This section presents the Mathcad analysis for calculating the seepage fraction and seepage 
infiltration rates (i.e., lower bound, mean, and upper bound) in the lithophysal zone given a 
seismic event. The seepage calculation is for the glacial transition period only. The seepage 
calculation utilizes the drift collapse seepage model (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169131], Section 6.7.1.1). 
The seepage information and the process used in the analysis was obtained from Abstraction of 
Drift Seepage (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169131], Section 6.7.1.1). The information contained in this 
section has been abstracted from the LA seepage glac Tptpll collapse-seismic.mcd Mathcad 
file of Appendix G. 

Seepage Flux and Seepage Fraction Calculation using Abstraction of Drift Seepage 
(BSC 2004 [DIRS 169131], Section 6.7.1.1) 
Latin Hypercube Sampling Routine to Generate Random Numbers 
size of the sampling: n := 20000 
i := 1.. n 
- ( - (
RD:= i RDi1, 1 
:= rnd 1.0) RDi1, 2 
:= rnd 1.0) RDi1, 3 
:= rnd 1.0)
i1, 0 - ( -
- 
:= rnd 1.0) RDi1, 5 := rnd 1.0) := rnd 1.0)
(
-
RDi1, 4( - ( RDi1, 6 
RK's are matrixes in which the first column contain a permutation on the integers on the 
interval [1,n]. 
RK1 := csort (RD 1) RK2 := csort (RD 2) RK3 := csort (RD 3)
,,, 
RK4 := csort (RD 4) RK5 := csort (RD 5) RK6 := csort (RD 6)
,,, 
Define sets of random values. Each random value is selected within one of the equiprobable n 
intervals that partition [0,1]. One set for each random variable. 
<> <> <>
<> <> <>
X0:= 
RK1 0- 1 + runif(n , 0, 1) 
X1:= 
RK2 0- 1 + runif(n , 0, 1) 
X2:= 
RK3 0- 1 + runif(n , 0, 1) 
nnn 
<> <> <>
<> <> <>
X3:= 
RK4 0- 1 + runif(n , 0, 1) 
X4:= 
RK5 0- 1 + runif(n , 0, 1) 
X5:= 
RK6 0- 1 + runif(n , 0, 1) 
nnn 
i := 0n - 1
.. 
Capillary Strength 1/ a in (Pa) 
:= 402 a1ub := 780 a1 := 591 spatial variability follows a uniform distribution
a1lb 
.a1l - := 105 .a1 := 0 .a1u := 105 uncertainty follows a triangular distribution 
Sampling from spatial variability to obtain the 1/ a value 
a1i := qunif ( Xi0,a1lb ,a1ub ) 1/a value 
, 
Sample from uncertainty triangular distribution to obtain . 1/a 
Determine which equation to use: 
if Random Number < RN .a1 then use Equation 1 ( .a1eq1) 
if Random Number > RN .a1 then use Equation 2 ( .a1eq2) 
(.a1- .a1l)2 
RN.a1 := 
 
(.a1- .a1l)(.a1- .a1l)
u  
.a1eq1i 
:= .a1l + ( )( ).a1u - .a1l  .a1 -.a1l
Xi1
, 
.a1eq2i 
:= .a1u -()( )( )1 - Xi1 .a1u - .a1l  .a1u - .a1
, 
.a1i := if.( Xi1= RN.a1),.a1eq1i,.a1eq2i 
.. 1/a value
,.
. 

Overall Capillary Strength 1/ a + . 1/a 
:= a1i + .a1i 1/a value
T1ai 
Permeability k in Tptpll Unit (in log 10) 
kTl - := 11.5mean of lognormal distribution 
:= 0.47 standard deviation of lognormal distribution
skTl 
kTli 
:= ln qlnorm Xi2,kTl,skTl))
( (, 
mean kTl) - = 11.5
( 
Stdev kTl)= 0.47
( 
Permeability . k in Tptpll Unit (in log 10) 
- := 0.92.kTl := 0 := 0.92 uncertainty follows a triangular distribution
.kTll .kTlu 
Sample from uncertainty triangular distribution to obtain . k 
Determine which equation to use: 
if Random Number < RN.kT then use Equation 1 ( . kTleq1)
lif Random Number > RN.kTl then use Equation 2 ( . kTleq2) 
(.kTl-.kTll)2 
:= 
 
RN.kTl (.kTlu -.kTll) (.kTl-.kTll)
.kTleq1i 
:= .kTll + Xi3(.kTlu -.kTll)(.kTl-.kTll)
, 
.kTleq2i 
:= .kTlu -(1 - Xi3)(.kTlu -.kTll)(.kTlu -.kTl)
, 
.kTli 
:= if.( Xi3= RN.kTl),.kTleq1i,.kTleq2i.. 
. k value
,
. 
Overall Permeability k + . k 
T1kTli 
:= kTli 
+.kTli 
Permeability must lie between -14 and -10 (bounds of SMPA simulations) 
TkTli 
:= if. T1kTli 
- = 10- , 10, if. T1kTli 
- = 14- , 14, T1kTli 
.. 
.. .. k value 
Flow Focusing Factor 
4 32
( 
fx) := -0.3137x + 5.4998 x - 35.66 x + 102.3 x - 11.434 
ffi := root f x, . () -100), x, 0, 6. 
.( Xi4. 
Percolation Flux (mm/yr) 
The percolation flux used here is for the glacial transition period only. The percolation flux is based on 
sampling from the lower bound (TSPA repository location). DTN: LB0310AMRU0120.002 [DIRS 166116] 
nnn := 0.. 468 number of data points 

Lower Bound Percolation Flux Mean Bound Percolation Flux Upper Bound Percolation Flux 
PF1l := 
PF1m := 
PF1u := 
0 
0 3.68 
1 2.65 
2 2.41 
3 2.13 
4 2.41 
5 2.4 
6 2.12 
7 2.76 
8 1.4 
9 2.21 
0 
0 15.97 
1 19.87 
2 14.2 
3 7.59 
4 16.94 
5 17.76 
6 10.45 
7 27.77 
8 8.95 
9 16.02 
0 
0 40 
1 36.19 
2 35.73 
3 27.83 
4 30.74 
5 40.03 
6 31.86 
7 57.08 
8 18.33 
9 27.91 
PFtl:= PF1lnnn 0 
PFtm:= PF1mnnn 0 
PFtu:= PF1unnn 0
nnn , nnn , nnn ,
<> 
(( ,Z0:= round runif n 0 , 468)) 
PFli 
:= PFtl Zi0PFmi 
:= PFtm Zi0PFui 
:= PFtu Zi0
(,) (,) (,)
Adjusted Percolation Flux 
Take the flow focusing factor and multiply it to the percolation flux, which will be used to obtain the 
seepage rate, seepage fraction, and seepage percentage. 
q1pffi 
:= PFli 
ffi qmpffi 
:= PFmi 
ffi qupffi 
:= PFui 
ffi 
qpff := augment q1pff , qmpff , qupff)
( 
Percolation Flux must lie between 1 and 1000 mm/yr (bounds of SMPA simulations) 
j := 0.. 2
..
qpffij:= if qpffij= 1, 1, if qpffij= 1000, 1000, qpffij.. ,., ., ,.. 
Seepage Information from SMPA analysis SMPAdata<0> is permeability value log(k [m^2]) 
SMPAdata<1> is capillary strength 1/alpha [Pa] 
m := 2549 data points SMPAdata<2> is local percolation flux (mm/yr) 
SMPAdata<3> is Mean Seepage [kg/yr/WP] 
SMPAdata<4> is Std. Dev. Seepage [kg/yr/WP] 
SMPAdata<5> is Mean Seepage [%] 
SMPAdata<6> is Std. Dev. Seepage [%] 

SMPAdata := 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
0 -14 100 1 56.44 5.47 100.6 9.75 
1 -14 100 5 282.63 27.5 100.76 9.8 
2 -14 100 10 566.16 55.13 100.92 9.83 
3 -14 100 20 1135.12 109.85 101.17 9.79 
4 -14 100 50 2849.95 272.25 101.6 9.71 
5 -14 100 100 5726.78 535.98 102.08 9.55 
6 -14 100 200 11523.63 1064.22 102.71 9.49 
7 -14 100 300 17369.22 1583.08 103.2 9.41 
8 -14 100 400 23241.94 2086.65 103.57 9.3 
9 -14 100 500 29154.54 2552.38 103.94 9.1 
10 -14 100 600 35097.8 2992.46 104.27 8.89 
11 -14 100 700 41099.26 3411.36 104.66 8.69 
12 -14 100 800 47084.03 3860.77 104.91 8.6 
13 -14 100 900 53190.45 4145.2 105.35 8.21 
14 -14 100 1000 59206.88 4520.61 105.54 8.06 
15 -14 200 1 55.25 5.44 98.48 9.69 
Set up routine to pick out correct mean seepage flux and seepage flux standard deviation 
based on sampled value of 1/ a, k, percolation flux. 
nx := 14 ny := 9 nz := 16 
ii := 0.. nx 
x:= SMPAdataii 2 
xi:= ii
ii ii
, 
jj := 0.. ny 
:=
yjj 
100 jj 
kk := 0.. nz 

+ 100 yjjj := jj 

kk 0.25 
loc represents the location within the matrix of which value to pick for the interpolation process. 
-14
zkkk := kk
z:=
kk
+ 
, 
loc1ij:= 
floor linterpx xi , 
, 
, 
, 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
+ 
floor linterp z zk 
TkTli 
( + 1) 
( + 1)
,.. 
..
floor linterp y yj
,
T1ai 
.. 
.. 

( + 1)
.. 
.. 
+
nx

ny nx 
... 
.. 
..
, 
qpffij
, 
:= SMPAdataloc1ij
, 
, 
, 
sms1ijsmsd1ijloc2ij:= 
, 3 
, 
:= SMPAdataloc1ij
, 4 
, 
, 
, 
,
, 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
+ 
floor linterp z zk 
ceil linterp x xi qpffij
TkTli 
( + 1)
..
( + 1)
+
,.. 
..
floor linterp y yj
,
T1ai 
.. 
..
( + 1)
.. 
.. 

nx

ny

nx 
... 
.. 
.. 
ij, 
, 
, 
, 
sms2ijsmsd2ij
ij
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01 C-37 of C-78 October 2004 
:= SMPAdataloc2
, 3 
:= SMPAdataloc2
, 4 

loc3ij:= 
, 
floor linterp z zk 
ceil linterp x xi 
, 
, 
,.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
+ 
TkTli 
( + 1) 
( + 1)
+
ceil linterp y yj
,.. 
..
,
T1ai 
.. 
.. 

( + 1)
.. 
.. 

nx

ny nx 
... 
.. 
..
qpffij
, 
, 
3, 
:= SMPAdataloc3
ij
, 
sms3ijsmsd3ijloc4ij:= 
, 
, 
, 
:= SMPAdataloc3ij
, 
, 4 
floor linterp z zk 
floor linterp x xi 
, 
, 
, 
, 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
+ 
TkTli 
( + 1) 
( + 1) 
ceil linterp y yj
,.. 
..
,
T1ai 
.. 
..
( + 1)
.. 
.. 
+

nx

ny

nx 
... 
qpffij
.. 
..
, 
:= SMPAdataloc4
ij
, 
sms4ijsmsd4ijloc5ij:= 
, 
, 
, 
, 3 
:= SMPAdataloc4ij
, 
, 4 
ceil linterp z zk 
floor linterp x xi 
, 
, 
, 
, 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
+ 
TkTli 
( + 1) 
( + 1)
..
,.. 
..
floor linterp y yj
,
T1ai 
( + 1)
.. 
.. 

.. 
.. 
+
nx

ny

nx 
... 
qpffij
.. 
..
, 
:= SMPAdataloc5
ij
, 
sms5ijsmsd5ijloc6ij:= 
, 
, 
, 
, 3 
:= SMPAdataloc5ij
, 
, 4 
ceil linterp z zk 
ceil linterp x xi 
, 
, 
, 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
+ 
TkTli 
( + 1) 
( + 1)
,.. 
..
floor linterp y yj
,
T1ai 
( + 1)
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
+

nx

ny

nx 
... 
.. 
..
, 
qpffij
, 
, 3 
, 
:= SMPAdataloc6
ij
sms6ijsmsd6ijloc7ij:= 
, 
, 
, 
, 
:= SMPAdataloc6ij
, 4 
, 
, 
, 
.. 
.. 
.. 
..
ceil linterp z zk 
.. 
+
ceil linterp x xi 
TkTli 
( + 1)
..
( + 1)
+
,.. 
..
ceil linterp y yj 
T1ai 
( + 1)
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 

nx

ny

nx
,
... 
.. 
..
, 
,
qpffij, 3 
, 
:= SMPAdataloc7
ij
, 
, 
, 
sms7ijsmsd7ijloc8ij:= 
, 
:= SMPAdataloc7ij
, 4 
floor linterpx xi , 
,
,.. 
,.. 
.. 
.. 
+ 
ceil linterp z zk 
TkTli 
( + 1) 
( + 1)
,.. 
..
ceil linterp y yj
,
T1ai 
( + 1)
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 

+

nx

ny nx 
... 
.. 
..
, 
qpffij
:= SMPAdataloc8
ij, 
, 
, 
, 
sms8ij
smsd8ij:= SMPAdataloc8ij
, 3 
, 4 

Develop the upper and lower bound for permeability (k) for Tptpll Unit 
qqi := -1TkTli 
( ()
mantissa x) := x - floor qq
tti := floor qqi)
( 
rr := round mantissa qq,
( () 2)
yy1i := if rri = 0.25, 0, if 0.25 < rri = 0.5, 0.25, rri))
(( 
zz1i := if yy1i = 0.5, yy1i, if 0.5 < yy1i = 0.75, 0.5, 0.75))
(( 
TkTl2i 
:= -1(tti + zz1i) 
yy2i := if rri = 0.25, 0.25, if 0.25 < rri = 0.5, 0.5, rri))
(( 
zz2i := if yy2i = 0.5, yy2i, if 0.5 < yy2i = 0.75, 0.75, 1))
(( 
TkTl1i 
:= -1(tti + zz2i) 
Develop the upper and lower bound for capillary strength (1/ a). 
. T1ai 
.
hh1i := floor.
. 100 . 
T1a1i 
:= (hh1i 100) 
. T1ai 
.
hh2i := ceil.
. 100 . 
T1a2i 
:= (hh2i 100) 
Lower Bound value adjusted percolation flux (q pff). 
aaa1ij:= if qpffij= 1, 1, if 1 < qpffij= 5, 1, qpffij.. 
,.,. , ,..
bbb1ij:= if aaa1ij= 5, aaa1ij, if 5 < aaa1= 10, 5, aaa1ij))
.. 
,
,(, ,( ij, 
ccc1ij:= if bbb1ij= 10, bbb1ij, if 10 < bbb1= 20, 10, bbb1ij))
,
,(, ,( ij, 
ddd1ij:= if ccc1ij= 20, ccc1ij, if 20 < ccc1= 50, 20, ccc1ij))
,
,(, ,( ij, 
eee1ij:= if ddd1ij= 50, ddd1ij, if 50 < ddd1= 100, 50, ddd1ij))
,
,(, ,( ij, 
fff1ij:= if eee1ij= 100, eee1ij, if 100 < eee1= 200, 100, eee1ij))
,
,(, ,( ij, 
ggg1ij:= if fff1ij= 200, fff1ij, if 200 < fff1= 300, 200, fff1ij))
,
, (, ,( ij, 
hhh1:= if ggg1ij= 300, ggg1ij, if 300 < ggg1ij= 400, 300, ggg1ij))
,
ij(,,(, , 
iii1ij:= if hhh1ij= 400, hhh1ij, if 400 < hhh1= 500, 400, hhh1ij))
,
,(, ,( ij,
jjj1ij:= if iii1ij= 500, iii1ij, if 500 < iii1= 600, 500, iii1ij))
,, (, ,( ij, 
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01 C-39 of C-78 October 2004 

kkk1:= if jjj1ij= 600, jjj1ij, if 600 < jjj1ij= 700, 600, jjj1ij))
,
ij(,,(, , 
mmm1:= if kkk1ij= 700, kkk1ij, if 700 < kkk1= 800, 700, kkk1ij))
,,
ij(, ,( ij, 
qpff1ij:= if mmm1ij= 800, mmm1ij, if 800 < mmm1= 900, 800, 900))
,
(, ,( ij
, 
Upper Bound value adjusted percolation flux (q pff). 
aaa2ij:= if qpffij= 1, 5, if 1 < qpffij= 5, 5, qpffij..
.. 
,.,. , ,.. 
bbb2:= if aaa2ij= 5, aaa2ij, if 5 < aaa2= 10, 10, aaa2ij))
,,
ij(, ,( ij, 
ccc2:= if bbb2ij= 10, bbb2ij, if 10 < bbb2= 20, 20, bbb2ij))
,,
ij(, ,( ij, 
ddd2:= if ccc2ij= 20, ccc2ij, if 20 < ccc2= 50, 50, ccc2ij))
,,
ij(, ,( ij, 
eee2:= if ddd2ij= 50, ddd2ij, if 50 < ddd2= 100, 100, ddd2ij))
,,
ij(, ,( ij, 
fff2:= if eee2ij= 100, eee2ij, if 100 < eee2= 200, 200, eee2ij))
,,
ij(, ,( ij, 
ggg2ij:= if fff2ij= 200, fff2ij, if 200 < fff2= 300, 300, fff2ij))
,
, (, ,( ij, 
hhh2:= if ggg2ij= 300, ggg2ij, if 300 < ggg2ij= 400, 400, ggg2ij))
,
ij(,,(, , 
iii2:= if hhh2ij= 400, hhh2ij, if 400 < hhh2= 500, 500, hhh2ij))
,,
ij(, ,( ij, 
jjj2ij:= if iii2ij= 500, iii2ij, if 500 < iii2= 600, 600, iii2ij))
,
, (, ,( ij, 
kkk2:= if jjj2ij= 600, jjj2ij, if 600 < jjj2ij= 700, 700, jjj2ij))
,
ij(,,(, , 
mmm2:= if kkk2ij= 700, kkk2ij, if 700 < kkk2= 800, 800, kkk2ij))
,,
ij(, ,( ij, 
qpff2ij:= if mmm2ij= 800, mmm2ij, if 800 < mmm2= 900, 900, 1000))
,
(, ,( ij
, 
Interpolate (Solve) for seepage flux (Tptpll Unit) 
T1ai 
- T1a1i 
TkTli 
- TkTl1i 
qpffij- qpff1ij
,,
:=:= := 
, 
uT1ai T1a2i 
- T1a1i 
vTkTli TkTl2i 
- TkTl1i 
tqpffijqpff2ij- qpff1ij
,, 
- --
spfluxTlmij:= . 1tqpffij.. 1uT1ai 
.. 1vTkTli 
.sms1ij...
,. ,.... .,
- -  ...
+. tqpffij.. 1uT1ai 
.. 1vTkTli 
. sms2ij
.,.. .. ., 
+. 
tqpffij.. uT1ai 
.. 1vTkTli 
. sms3ij
+. 
1tqpffij.. uT1ai 
.. 1vTkTli 
. sms4ij
+. 
1tqpffij.. 1uT1ai 
.. vTkTli 
. sms5ij
-  ... 
. ,.... . , 
-  - ... 
. ,.... . , 
- - ... 
. ,.. ... , 
- ...
+. tqpffij.. 1uT1ai 
.. vTkTli 
. sms6ij
. ,.. ... , 
 ...
+. tqpffij.. uT1ai 
.. vTkTli 
. sms7ij
. ,.... . , 
+. 1tqpffij.. uT1ai 
.. vTkTli 
. sms8ij
-   
. ,.... . , 

...
smsd1ij
...
smsd2ij
, 
, 

.. 
1vTkTli 
1vTkTli 
.. 
- 
-
 
1uT1ai 
1uT1ai 
.. 
.. 
- 
- 
.. 
.. 
 
 
.. 
.. 
 
.. 
.. 
1tqpffijtqpffij
, 
, 
- 
.. 

+
..
spfluxTlsdij:= 
, 
Equation to calculate seepage percent based on seepage rate (see SMPA 
data table) (based on DTN: LB0310AMRU0120.002 [DIRS 166116]). 
Check seepage percent to be above 
100% and then adjusted back. 
Number of seepage rates 
greater than zero. 
QT2lperci 
> 0, 1, 0 
... 
... 
num1li 
vTkTli 
:= 
QTl1lstdli 
vTkTli 
= 0.1, 0 
QTl1lspmi 
numl := 
uT1ai 
QTl1lstdui 
0 
0 0 
1 0 
2 0 
3 0 
4 0 
QTllstdi 
= 0, 0 
:=
QTl1lstdui 
:=
QTllstdli 
:= 
:= 
:= 
:=
QTllstdi 
QTllspri 
:= 
QTl1lspmi 
QTl2lspmi 
QT2lperci 
QT3lperci 
(
mean QTllspr 
Determine the seepage fraction for Tptpll Unit (lower bound) within the repository and then fit 
the output data to distribution. 
Seepage fraction represents the non-zero seepage rates based on the LHS sampling of all of the parameters. 
.. 
.. 
num1li 
if QTllspri 
.. 
.. 
... 
... 
.. 

,
qpffi028.05 
 
, 
if QT2lperci 
if QT2lperci 
.. 
:= 
 
2 28.05QT3qlpercpffii0
= 4.377 Mean Seepage Flux (kg/yr/WP) 
1vTkTli 
1tqpffijuT1ai 
1vTkTli 
- 
- 
, 
- 
smsd3ijsmsd4ij
, 
,
..
 
smsd5ij
...
smsd6ij
, 
, 
1tqpffijsmsd8ij
Calculate mean seepage for (lower bound) Tptpll Unit. 
,
, 
- 

..
 

.. 
smsd7ijvTkTli 
, 
,
= 100, 100 
 
..
..
-. 
n1
1uT1ai 
1uT1ai 
vTkTli 
- 
- 
 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
 
 
 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
..
, 
 
 
tqpffijuT1ai
, 
- , 0.00001QTllstdli 
, 
tqpffijuT1ai
, 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
100 
 
 
 
spfluxTlsdi01.7321 spfluxTlsdi00 
, 
, 
 
, 
, 
.. 
.. 
 
1tqpffijtqpffij
, .. 
..
, 
- 
.. 
.. 
 
 
 
2 
spfluxTlmi0if QTl1lspmi 
QTl2lspmi 
100 
,
..
+ 
if QTl1lstdli 
.. 
qunif
, 
..
+ 
..
+ 
..
+ 
..
+ 
X
i5
, 
..
+ 
..
+ 
:= -1.7321
QTl1lstdli 
 
..
) 
=
)(
sort QTllspr 
0 
:=
nlTl 
( 
numl 
nlTl = 16147 
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01 C-41 of C-78 October 2004 
=
i 
-
-
n1) 

numlspfrclTl := spfrclTl = 0.193 
n 
+ 1 
sort QTllspr 
reverse Q11lTl 
ab := 0.. n1lTl 
) 
)( 
( 
(
(
n1lTl n1)
--
n1lTl
=
3.851

3
10
:= 
nlTl 
)
Q11lTl 
:= 
Q1lTl 
:= 
Q2lTlab 
:=
...
1 
1 

Q1lTlab 
..
sort Q2lTl 
mean QlTl1 = 22.727 
(ab + 1) - 0.375 
+ 1
) 
) 
)
( 
( 
( 
QlTl 
:= 
:=
CDFlTlab 
n1lTl + 0.25 
Fit the seepage rates to a Weibull distribution. 
The following equations are fromWhat Every Engineer Should Know About Reliability and 
Risk Analysis (Modarres, M, [DIRS 104667], p. 109). 
.. 
.. 
.. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
.. 
.. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
.. 
n1lTl 
..
.
. 
..
.
. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
..
, r 
.. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
.. 
, 0.1, 4 
l = 0.495 
..
.
 
r 
ln QlTli 
..
QlTli 
..
..
-
... 
.. 
.. 
n1lTl 
-
...
1 
r 
1
.
i
=
0
..
.
ln QlTli 
l 
:= root
 
n1lTl
n1lTl
.
i
=
0
r
..
.
QlTli 
..
i
=
0 
1 
 l 
:= 
.. 
. 
. 
..
n1lTl 
..
.
i
=
0 
.
. 
. 
. 
.. 
 l
QlTli 
..
al 
al = 9.303 
n1lTl 
, 
Plot of raw data versus Weibull distribution 
ji := 0.. 
n1lTl 
PFdataji := QlTlji 
CDFdataji 2 := 
CDFlTlji 
.. 
.. 
CDFw1ji := 1 exp 
.
. 
.. 
 l
PFdata 
ji
.. 
.. 
- 
. 
- 
al
. 
, 
CDFw:= CDFw1
ji 0 ji 

Screening Analysis of Criticality Features, Events, and Processes for License Application 
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01C-43 of C-78October 2004Seepage fraction represents the non-zero seepage rates based on the LHS sampling of all of the parameters.
Determine the seepage fraction for Tptpll Unit (mean) within the repository and then fit the 
output data to distribution.
meanQTlmspr()186.288=
Mean Seepage Flux (kg/yr/WP)QTlmspriQT3mperciqpffi1,
228.05
100:=
Check seepage percent to be 
above 100% and then adjusted 
back.
QT3mperciifQT2mperci0=0,ifQT2mperci100=100,QT2mperci,..
..
,..
..
:=
Equation to calculate seepage percent based on seepage rate (see SMPA 
data table) (based on DTN: LB0310AMRU0120.002 [DIRS 166116]).
QT2mperciQTl2mspmi100
qpffi1,28.052
:=
QTl2mspmiifQTl1mspmi0.1=0,QTl1mspmi,..
..
:=
QTl1mspmispfluxTlmi1,
QTlmstdi+:=
QTlmstdiqunifXi5,QTlmstdli,QTl1mstdui,..
..
:=
QTlmstdliifQTl1mstdli00.00001-,QTl1mstdli,..
..
:=
QTl1mstdui1.7321spfluxTlsdi1,
:=
QTl1mstdli1.7321-spfluxTlsdi1,
:=
Calculate mean seepage for (mean) Tptpll Unit.
.0.111010000.250.50.751Seepage Rate (lower) data and fitSeepage Rate (l/yr)
cumulative density functionCDFdata2<>
CDFwPFdata

:=
num1mi 
if QTlmspri 
.. 
> 0, 1, 0
..
Number of seepage rates 
greater than zero. 
sort QTlmspr 
=
)( 
0 
0 0 
1 0 
2 0 
3 0 
4 0 
n1
-.
num1mi 
numm := 
i
=
0 
:=
nmTl 
(
n1)
--
numm 
nmTl = 9701 
nummspfrcmTl := spfrcmTl = 0.515 
n 
n1)
--
(
nmTl + 1
)
(
n1mTl 
1.03

4
10
:= 
n1mTl
= 
sort QTlmspr
)(
Q11mTl 
:= 
reverse Q11mTl 
ab := 0.. n1mTl 
)(
Q1mTl 
:= 
:=
Q2mTlab 
...
1 
1 

Q1mTlab 
..
sort Q2mTl 
= 361.795 
)(
QmTl 
:= 
mean QmTl1 
CDFmTlab 
:= 
)( 
(ab + 1) - 0.375 
+ 1
)(
n1mTl + 0.25 
Fit the seepage rates to a Weibull distribution. 
The following equations are fromWhat Every Engineer Should Know About Reliability and 
Risk Analysis (Modarres, M [DIRS 104667], p. 109). 
.. 
.. 
.. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
.. 
.. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
.. 
n1mTl 
..
.
. 
..
.
. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
..
, r 
.. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
.. 
, 0.1, 4 
.. 
r 
ln QmTli 
..
.
QmTli 
..
 
-
... 
.. 
.. 
n1mTl
1 
r 
..
1
i
=
0
...
.
..
.
ln QmTli 
m
-
:= root
 
m = 0.456
n1mTl
n1mTl
.
i
=
0 
..
.
r
QmTli 
..
i
=
0 
1 

m 
:= 
.. 
. 
. 
..
n1mTl 
..
.
i
=
0 
.
. 
. 
. 
.. 
QmTli 
m
 
..
am 
2
10
am 1.455

n1mTl 
= 
, 
Plot of raw data versus Weibull distribution 
ji := 0.. 
n1mTl 
PFdataji := QmTlji 
CDFdataji 2 := 
CDFmTlji 

Screening Analysis of Criticality Features, Events, and Processes for License Application 
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01C-45 of C-78October 2004Seepage fraction represents the non-zero seepage rates based on the LHS sampling of all of the parameters.
Determine the seepage fraction for Tptpll Unit (upper bound) within the repository and then fit 
the output data to distribution.
meanQTluspr()511.571=
Mean Seepage Flux (kg/yr/WP)QTluspriQT3uperciqpffi2,
228.05
100:=
Check seepage percent to be 
above 100% and then adjusted 
back.
QT3uperciifQT2uperci0=0,ifQT2uperci100=100,QT2uperci,..
..
,..
..
:=
Equation to calculate seepage percent based on seepage rate (see SMPA 
data table) (based on DTN: LB0310AMRU0120.002 [DIRS 166116]).
QT2uperciQTl2uspmi100
qpffi2,28.052
:=
QTl2uspmiifQTl1uspmi0.1=0,QTl1uspmi,..
..:=
QTl1uspmispfluxTlmi2,
QTlustdi+:=
QTlustdiqunifXi5,QTlustdli,QTl1ustdui,..
..
:=
QTlustdliifQTl1ustdli00.00001-,QTl1ustdli,..
..
:=
QTl1ustdui1.7321spfluxTlsdi2,
:=
QTl1ustdli1.7321-spfluxTlsdi2,
:=
Calculate mean seepage for (upper bound) Tptpll Unit.
.0.11101001.1031.10400.51Mean Seepage Flux (l/yr) data and fitSeepage Flux (l/yr)
cumulative density functionCDFdata2<>
CDFwPFdataCDFwji0,CDFw1ji:=CDFw1ji1expPFdatajiam....
.
.
m-
....
.
...
-:=

:=
num1ui 
if QTluspr i 
.. 
> 0, 1, 0
..
Number of seepage rates 
greater than zero. 
sort QTlmspr 
=
)( 
0 
0 0 
1 0 
2 0 
3 0 
4 0 
n1
-.
num1ui 
numu := 
i
=
0 
:=
nuTl 
(
n1)
--
numu 
nuTl 
= 7183 
numuspfrcuTl := spfrcuTl = 0.641 
n 
+ 1 
sort QTluspr 
reverse Q11uTl 
) 
)( 
( 
(
(
n1uTl n1)
--
4
10
:= 
nuTl 
n1uTl 1.282

= 
)
Q11uTl 
:= 
Q1uTl 
:= 
ab := 0.. n1uTl 
1 
:=
Q2uTlab 
...
.. 

Q1uTlab
1 
sort Q2uTl 
mean QuTl1 = 798.332 
(ab + 1) - 0.375 
+ 1
) 
) 
)
( 
(
(
QuTl 
:= 
:=
CDFuTlab 
n1uTl + 0.25 
Fit the seepage rates to a Weibull distribution. 
The following equations are fromWhat Every Engineer Should Know About Reliability and 
Risk Analysis (Modarres, M [DIRS 104667], p. 109). 
.. 
.. 
.. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
.. 
.. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
.. 
n1uTl 
..
.
. 
..
.
. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
..
, r 
.. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
.. 
, 0.1, 4 

.. 
r 
ln QuTli 
..
.
QuTli 
..
..
-
... 
.. 
.. 
n1uTl
...
1 
r 
1
i
=
0
.
..
.
ln QuTli 
u
-
:= root
 
u = 0.486
n1uTl
n1uTl
.
i
=
0 
..
.
r
QuTli 
..
i
=
0 
1 

u 
:= 
.. 
. 
. 
..
n1uTl 
..
.
i
=
0 
.
. 
. 
. 
.. 
QuTli 
u
 
..
au 
2
10
au 
3.81

n1uTl 
= 
Plot of raw data versus Weibull distribution 
ji := 0.. 
n1uTl
PFdataji := QuTlji

Screening Analysis of Criticality Features, Events, and Processes for License Application 
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01C-47 of C-78October 2004Data Set MeanmeanQTluspr()511.571=meanQTlmspr()186.288=meanQTllspr()4.377=
Seepage FractionspfrcuTl6.408101-=spfrcmTl5.149101-=spfrclTl1.926101-=
u4.858101-=m4.561101-=l4.95101-=
au3.81102=am1.455102=al9.303=
Upper Bound ResultsMean ResultsLower Bound ResultsOverall Final Results0.11101001.1031.10400.250.50.751Seepage Rate (Upper) data and fitSeepage Rate (l/yr)
cumulative density functionCDFdata2<>
CDFwPFdataCDFwji0,CDFw1ji:=
CDFw1ji1expPFdatajiau....
.
.
u-
....
.
...
-:=
CDFdataji2,CDFuTlji:=

C.4 SEISMIC SEEPAGE ANALYSIS FOR INFILTRATION RATE AND SEEPAGE 
FRACTION IN THE NONLITHOPHYSAL ZONE 
This section presents the Mathcad analysis for calculating the seepage fraction and seepage 
infiltration rates (i.e., lower bound, mean, and upper bound) in the nonlithophysal zone given a 
seismic event. The seepage calculation is for the glacial transition period only. The seepage 
calculation utilizes the nominal seepage model (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169131], Section 6.7.1.1) but 
increases the results by 20 percent. The seepage information and the process used in the analysis 
was obtained from Abstraction of Drift Seepage (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169131], Section 6.7.1.1). 
The information contained in this section has been abstracted from the LA seepage glac Tptpmn 
seismic 1_2.mcd Mathcad file of Appendix G. 

Seepage Flux and Seepage Fraction Calculation using Abstraction of Drift Seepage 
(BSC 2004 [DIRS 169131], Section 6.7.1.1) 
Latin Hypercube Sampling Routine to Generate Random Numbers 
size of the sampling: n := 20000 
i := 1.. n 
- ( - (
RD:= i RDi1, 1 
:= rnd 1.0) RDi1, 2 
:= rnd 1.0) RDi1, 3 
:= rnd 1.0)
i1, 0 - ( -
- 
:= rnd 1.0) RDi1, 5 := rnd 1.0) := rnd 1.0)
(
-
RDi1, 4( - ( RDi1, 6 
RK's are matrixes in which the first column contain a permutation on the integers on the 
interval [1,n]. 
RK1 := csort (RD 1) RK2 := csort (RD 2) RK3 := csort (RD 3)
,,, 
RK4 := csort (RD 4) RK5 := csort (RD 5) RK6 := csort (RD 6)
,,, 
Define sets of random values. Each random value is selected within one of the equiprobable n 
intervals that partition [0,1]. One set for each random variable. 
<> <> <>
<> <> <>
X0:= 
RK1 0- 1 + runif(n , 0, 1) 
X1:= 
RK2 0- 1 + runif(n , 0, 1) 
X2:= 
RK3 0- 1 + runif(n , 0, 1) 
nnn 
<> <> <>
<> <> <>
X3:= 
RK4 0- 1 + runif(n , 0, 1) 
X4:= 
RK5 0- 1 + runif(n , 0, 1) 
X5:= 
RK6 0- 1 + runif(n , 0, 1) 
nnn 
i := 0n - 1
.. 
Capillary Strength 1/ a in (Pa) 
:= 402 a1ub := 780 a1 := 591 spatial variability follows a uniform distribution
a1lb 
.a1l - := 105 .a1 := 0 .a1u := 105 uncertainty follows a triangular distribution 
Sampling from spatial variability to obtain the 1/ a value 
a1i := qunif ( Xi0,a1lb ,a1ub ) 1/a value 
, 
Sample from uncertainty triangular distribution to obtain . 1/a 
Determine which equation to use: 
if Random Number < RN .a1 then use Equation 1 ( .a1eq1) 
if Random Number > RN .a1 then use Equation 2 ( .a1eq2) 
(.a1- .a1l)2 
RN.a1 := 
 
(.a1- .a1l)(.a1- .a1l)
u  
.a1eq1i 
:= .a1l + ( )( ).a1u - .a1l  .a1 -.a1l
Xi1
, 
.a1eq2i 
:= .a1u -()( )( )1 - Xi1 .a1u - .a1l  .a1u - .a1
, 
.a1i := if.( Xi1= RN.a1),.a1eq1i,.a1eq2i 
.. 1/a value
,.
. 

Overall Capillary Strength 1/ a + . 1/a 
:= a1i + .a1i 1/a value
T1ai 
Permeability k in Tptpmn Unit (in log 10) 
kTn - := 12.2mean of lognormal distribution 
:= 0.34 standard deviation of lognormal distribution
skTn 
kTni 
:= ln qlnorm Xi2,kTn ,skTn))
( (, 
mean kTn) - = 12.2
( 
Stdev kTn)= 0.34
( 
Permeability . k in Tptpmn Unit (in log 10) 
- := 0.68.kTn := 0 := 0.68 uncertainty follows a triangular distribution
.kTnl .kTnu 
Sample from uncertainty triangular distribution to obtain . k 
Determine which equation to use: 
if Random Number < RN.kTn then use Equation 1 ( . kTneq1) 
if Random Number > RN.kTn then use Equation 2 ( . kTneq2) 
(.kTn-.kTnl)2 
:= 
 
RN.kTn (.kTnu -.kTnl) (.kTn-.kTnl) 
.kTneq1i 
:= .kTnl + Xi3(.kTnu -.kTnl)(.kTn-.kTnl)
, 
.kTneq2i 
:= .kTnu -(1 - Xi3)(.kTnu -.kTnl)(.kTnu -.kTn)
, 
.kTni 
:= if.( Xi3= RN.kTn),.kTneq1i,.kTneq2i.. 
. k value
,
. 
Overall Permeability k + . k 
T1kTni 
:= kTni 
+.kTni 
Permeability must lie between -14 and -10 (bounds of SMPA simulations) 
TkTni 
:= if. T1kTni 
- = 10- , 10, if. T1kTni 
- = 14- , 14, T1kTni 
.. 
.. .. k value 
Flow Focusing Factor 
4 32
( 
fx) := -0.3137x + 5.4998 x - 35.66 x + 102.3 x - 11.434 
ffi := root f x, . () -100), x, 0, 6. 
.( Xi4. 
Percolation Flux (mm/yr) 
The percolation flux used here is for the glacial transition period only. The percolation flux is based on 
sampling from the lower bound (TSPA repository location). DTN: LB0310AMRU0120.002 [DIRS 166116] 

nnn := 0.. 468 number of data points 
Lower Bound Percolation Flux Mean Bound Percolation Flux Upper Bound Percolation Flux 
PF1l := 
PF1m := 
PF1u := 
0 
0 3.676 
1 2.6504 
2 2.4144 
3 2.1296 
4 2.4089 
5 2.3999 
6 2.117 
7 2.7623 
8 1.397 
9 2.2144 
0 
0 15.9704 
1 19.8733 
2 14.1961 
3 7.5897 
4 16.9397 
5 17.7583 
6 10.4511 
7 27.7684 
8 8.9546 
9 16.0195 
0 
0 40.0021 
1 36.1863 
2 35.7337 
3 27.828 
4 30.7394 
5 40.0292 
6 31.8601 
7 57.0835 
8 18.3271 
9 27.9133 
PFtl:= PF1lnnn 0 
PFtm:= PF1PFtu:= PF1,,
nnn , nnn mnnn 0 nnn unnn 0 
<> 
(( ,Z0:= round runif n 0 , 468)) 
PFli 
:= PFtlZi0PF:= PFt
,,
( ,) mi m( Zi0) PFui 
:= PFtu( Zi0) 
Adjusted Percolation Flux 
Take the flow focusing factor and multiply it to the percolation flux, which will be used to obtain the 
seepage rate, seepage fraction, and seepage percentage. 
q1pffi 
:= PFli 
ffqmpffi 
:= PFffqupffi 
:= PFff
i mii uii 
qpff := augment q1pff , qmpff , qupff)
( 
Percolation Flux must lie between 1 and 1000 mm/yr (bounds of SMPA simulations) 
j := 0.. 2 
qpffij:= if qpffij= 1, 1, if qpffij= 1000, 1000, qpffij..
.. 
,., ., , .. 
Seepage Information from SMPA analysis SMPAdata<0> is permeability value log(k [m^2]) 
m := 2549 data points SMPAdata<1> is capillary strength 1/alpha [Pa] 
SMPAdata<2> is local percolation flux (mm/yr) 
SMPAdata<3> is Mean Seepage [kg/yr/WP] 
SMPAdata<4> is Std. Dev. Seepage [kg/yr/WP] 
SMPAdata<5> is Mean Seepage [%] 
SMPAdata<6> is Std. Dev. Seepage [%] 

SMPAdata := 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
0 -14 100 1 27.73 4.09 98.86 14.59 
1 -14 100 5 138.92 20.55 99.05 14.65 
2 -14 100 10 277.9 41.19 99.07 14.68 
3 -14 100 20 555.87 82.54 99.09 14.71 
4 -14 100 50 1391.67 205.57 99.23 14.66 
5 -14 100 100 2793.55 406.7 99.59 14.5 
6 -14 100 200 5610 785 100 14 
7 -14 100 300 8415 1178 100 14 
8 -14 100 400 11220 1570 100 14 
9 -14 100 500 14025 1963 100 14 
10 -14 100 600 16830 2356 100 14 
11 -14 100 700 19635 2748 100 14 
12 -14 100 800 22440 3141 100 14 
13 -14 100 900 25245 3590 100 14 
14 -14 100 1000 28050 3989 100 14 
15 -14 200 1 26.14 4.21 93.21 15 
Set up routine to pick out correct mean seepage, seepage standard deviation, seepage percent, 
and seepage percent standard deviation based on sampled value of 1/ a, k, percolation flux.
nx := 14 ny := 9 nz := 16
ii := 0.. nx
x:= SMPAdataii 2 
xi:= ii
ii ii
, 
jj := 0.. ny 
:=
yjj 
100 jj 
kk := 0.. nz 

+ 100 yjjj := jj 

kk 0.25 
loc represents the location within the matrix of which value to pick for the interpolation process. 
-14
zkkk := kk
z:=
kk
+ 
, 
loc1ij:= 
floor linterpx xi , 
, 
, 
, 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
+ 
floor linterp z zk 
TkTni 
( + 1) 
( + 1)
,.. 
..
floor linterp y yj
,
T1ai 
.. 
.. 

( + 1)
.. 
.. 
+
nx

ny nx 
... 
.. 
..
, 
qpffij
, 
:= SMPAdataloc1ij
, 
, 
, 
sms1ijsmsd1ijloc2ij:= 
, 3 
, 
:= SMPAdataloc1ij
, 4 
, 
, 
, 
,
, 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
+ 
floor linterp z zk 
ceil linterp x xi qpffij
TkTni 
( + 1)
..
( + 1)
+
,.. 
..
floor linterp y yj
,
T1ai 
.. 
..
( + 1)
.. 
.. 

nx

ny

nx 
... 
.. 
.. 
ij, 
, 
, 
, 
sms2ijsmsd2ij
ij
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01 C-52 of C-78 October 2004 
:= SMPAdataloc2
, 3 
:= SMPAdataloc2
, 4 

loc3ij:= 
, 
floor linterp z zk 
ceil linterp x xi 
, 
, 
,.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
+ 
TkTni 
( + 1) 
( + 1)
+
ceil linterp y yj
,.. 
..
,
T1ai 
.. 
.. 

( + 1)
.. 
.. 

nx

ny nx 
... 
.. 
..
qpffij
, 
, 
3, 
:= SMPAdataloc3
ij
, 
sms3ijsmsd3ijloc4ij:= 
, 
, 
, 
:= SMPAdataloc3ij
, 
, 4 
floor linterp z zk 
floor linterp x xi 
, 
, 
, 
, 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
+ 
TkTni 
( + 1) 
( + 1) 
ceil linterp y yj
,.. 
..
,
T1ai 
( + 1)
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
+

nx

ny

nx 
... 
qpffij
.. 
..
, 
:= SMPAdataloc4
sms4ijij
smsd4ij:= SMPAdataloc4ij
, 
, 
, 
,
, 3 
, 4 
loc5ij:= 
, 
ceil linterp z zk 
floor linterp x xi 
, 
, 
, 
, 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
+ 
TkTni 
( + 1) 
( + 1)
..
,.. 
..
floor linterp y yj 
T1ai 
( + 1)
.. 
.. 

.. 
.. 
+
nx

ny

nx
,
... 
qpffij
.. 
..
, 
:= SMPAdataloc5
sms5ijij
smsd5ij:= SMPAdataloc5ij
, 
, 
, 
,
, 3 
, 4 
loc6ij:= 
, 
ceil linterp z zk 
ceil linterp x xi 
, 
, 
, 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
+ 
TkTni 
( + 1) 
( + 1)
,.. 
..
floor linterp y yj
,
T1ai 
( + 1)
.. 
.. 

.. 
.. 
+
nx

ny

nx 
... 
.. 
..
, 
,
qpffij, 3 
, 
:= SMPAdataloc6
ij
sms6ijsmsd6ij
, 
loc:=7ij
, 
, 
, 
:= SMPAdataloc6ij
, 4 
, 
, 
, 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
+ 
ceil linterp z zk 
ceil linterp x xi 
TkTni 
( + 1)
..
( + 1)
+
,.. 
..
ceil linterp y yj 
T1ai 
( + 1)
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 

nx

ny

nx
,
... 
.. 
..
, 
,
qpffij, 3 
, 
:= SMPAdataloc7
ij
, 
, 
, 
sms7ijsmsd7ijloc8ij:= 
, 
:= SMPAdataloc7ij
, 4 
floor linterpx xi , 
,
,.. 
,.. 
.. 
.. 
+ 
ceil linterp z zk 
TkTni 
( + 1) 
( + 1)
,.. 
..
ceil linterp y yj
,
T1ai 
( + 1)
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 

+

nx

ny nx 
... 
.. 
..
, 
qpffij
:= SMPAdataloc8
ij, 
, 
, 
, 
sms8ij
smsd8ij:= SMPAdataloc8ij
, 3 
, 4 

Develop the upper and lower bound for permeability (k) for Tptpmn Unit 
qqi := -1TkTni 
( ()
mantissa x) := x - floor qq
tti := floor qqi)
( 
rr := round mantissa qq,
( () 2)
yy1i := if rri = 0.25, 0, if 0.25 < rri = 0.5, 0.25, rri))
(( 
zz1i := if yy1i = 0.5, yy1i, if 0.5 < yy1i = 0.75, 0.5, 0.75))
(( 
TkTn2i 
:= -1(tti + zz1i) 
yy2i := if rri = 0.25, 0.25, if 0.25 < rri = 0.5, 0.5, rri))
(( 
zz2i := if yy2i = 0.5, yy2i, if 0.5 < yy2i = 0.75, 0.75, 1))
(( 
TkTn1i 
:= -1(tti + zz2i) 
Develop the upper and lower bound for capillary strength (1/ a). 
. T1ai 
.
hh1i := floor.
. 100 . 
T1a1i 
:= (hh1i 100) 
. T1ai 
.
hh2i := ceil.
. 100 . 
T1a2i 
:= (hh2i 100) 
Lower Bound value adjusted percolation flux (q pff). 
aaa1ij:= if qpffij= 1, 1, if 1 < qpffij= 5, 1, qpffij.. 
,.,. , ,..
bbb1ij:= if aaa1ij= 5, aaa1ij, if 5 < aaa1= 10, 5, aaa1ij))
.. 
,
,(, ,( ij, 
ccc1ij:= if bbb1ij= 10, bbb1ij, if 10 < bbb1= 20, 10, bbb1ij))
,
,(, ,( ij, 
ddd1ij:= if ccc1ij= 20, ccc1ij, if 20 < ccc1= 50, 20, ccc1ij))
,
,(, ,( ij, 
eee1ij:= if ddd1ij= 50, ddd1ij, if 50 < ddd1= 100, 50, ddd1ij))
,
,(, ,( ij, 
fff1ij:= if eee1ij= 100, eee1ij, if 100 < eee1= 200, 100, eee1ij))
,
,(, ,( ij, 
ggg1ij:= if fff1ij= 200, fff1ij, if 200 < fff1= 300, 200, fff1ij))
,
, (, ,( ij, 
hhh1:= if ggg1ij= 300, ggg1ij, if 300 < ggg1ij= 400, 300, ggg1ij))
,
ij(,,(, , 
iii1ij:= if hhh1ij= 400, hhh1ij, if 400 < hhh1= 500, 400, hhh1ij))
,
,(, ,( ij,
jjj1ij:= if iii1ij= 500, iii1ij, if 500 < iii1= 600, 500, iii1ij))
,, (, ,( ij, 
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01 C-54 of C-78 October 2004 

kkk1:= if jjj1ij= 600, jjj1ij, if 600 < jjj1ij= 700, 600, jjj1ij))
,
ij(,,(, , 
mmm1:= if kkk1ij= 700, kkk1ij, if 700 < kkk1= 800, 700, kkk1ij))
,,
ij(, ,( ij, 
qpff1ij:= if mmm1ij= 800, mmm1ij, if 800 < mmm1= 900, 800, 900))
,
(, ,( ij
, 
Upper Bound value adjusted percolation flux (q pff). 
aaa2ij:= if qpffij= 1, 5, if 1 < qpffij= 5, 5, qpffij..
.. 
,.,. , ,.. 
bbb2:= if aaa2ij= 5, aaa2ij, if 5 < aaa2= 10, 10, aaa2ij))
,,
ij(, ,( ij, 
ccc2:= if bbb2ij= 10, bbb2ij, if 10 < bbb2= 20, 20, bbb2ij))
,,
ij(, ,( ij, 
ddd2:= if ccc2ij= 20, ccc2ij, if 20 < ccc2= 50, 50, ccc2ij))
,,
ij(, ,( ij, 
eee2:= if ddd2ij= 50, ddd2ij, if 50 < ddd2= 100, 100, ddd2ij))
,,
ij(, ,( ij, 
fff2:= if eee2ij= 100, eee2ij, if 100 < eee2= 200, 200, eee2ij))
,,
ij(, ,( ij, 
ggg2ij:= if fff2ij= 200, fff2ij, if 200 < fff2= 300, 300, fff2ij))
,
, (, ,( ij, 
hhh2:= if ggg2ij= 300, ggg2ij, if 300 < ggg2ij= 400, 400, ggg2ij))
,
ij(,,(, , 
iii2:= if hhh2ij= 400, hhh2ij, if 400 < hhh2= 500, 500, hhh2ij))
,,
ij(, ,( ij, 
jjj2ij:= if iii2ij= 500, iii2ij, if 500 < iii2= 600, 600, iii2ij))
,
, (, ,( ij, 
kkk2:= if jjj2ij= 600, jjj2ij, if 600 < jjj2ij= 700, 700, jjj2ij))
,
ij(,,(, , 
mmm2:= if kkk2ij= 700, kkk2ij, if 700 < kkk2= 800, 800, kkk2ij))
,,
ij(, ,( ij, 
qpff2ij:= if mmm2ij= 800, mmm2ij, if 800 < mmm2= 900, 900, 1000))
,
(, ,( ij
, 
Solve for seepage flux (Tptpmn Unit) 
T1ai 
- T1a1i 
TkTni 
- TkTn1i 
qpffij- qpff1ij
,,
:=:= := 
, 
uT1ai T1a2i 
- T1a1i 
vTkTni TkTn2i 
- TkTn1i 
tqpffijqpff2ij- qpff1ij
,, 
- --
spfluxTnmij:= . 1tqpffij.. 1uT1ai 
.. 1vTkTni 
.sms1ij... 
,. ,.... ., 
- -  ...
+. tqpffij.. 1uT1ai 
.. 1vTkTni 
. sms2ij
.,.. .. ., 
+. 
tqpffij.. uT1ai 
.. 1vTkTni 
. sms3ij
+. 
1tqpffij.. uT1ai 
.. 1vTkTni 
. sms4ij
+. 
1tqpffij.. 1uT1ai 
.. vTkTni 
. sms5ij
-  ... 
. ,.... . , 
-  - ... 
. ,.... . , 
- - ... 
. ,.. ... , 
- ...
+. tqpffij.. 1uT1ai 
.. vTkTni 
. sms6ij
. ,.. ... , 
 ...
+. tqpffij.. uT1ai 
.. vTkTni 
. sms7ij
. ,.... . , 
+. 1tqpffij.. uT1ai 
.. vTkTni 
. sms8ij
-  
. ,.... . , 

...
smsd1ij
...
smsd2ij
, 
, 

.. 
1vTkTni 
1vTkTni 
.. 
- 
-
 
.. 
.. 

1uT1ai 
1uT1ai 
.. 
.. 
- 
-
 
.. 
.. 

1tqpffijtqpffij
, 
, 
- 
.. 
.. 
.. 

+
..
spfluxTnsd ij:= 
, 
... 
... 
smsd3ijsmsd4ij
, 
,
..
 
if QTn1lspmi
QTn2lspmi
100 
:= Equation to calculate seepage percent based on seepage rate (see SMPAQT2lperci qpffi028.05 
data table) (based on DTN: LB0310AMRU0120.002 [DIRS 166116]). 
,
..
..
if QT2lperci 
28.05 
Mean Seepage Flux (kg/yr/WP) 
.. 
.. 
.. 
1vTkTni 
1tqpffijuT1ai 
1vTkTni 
- 
- 
, 
- 
smsd5ij
...
smsd6ij
, 
, 
1tqpffijsmsd8ij
Calculate mean seepage for Tptpmn Unit (lower bound). 
,
, 
- 
 

.. 
(
mean QTnlspr 
Determine the seepage fraction for Tptpmn Unit (lower bound) within the repository and then fit 
the output data to distribution. 
Seepage fraction represents the non-zero seepage rates based on the LHS sampling of all of the parameters. 
.. 
.. 
num1li 
if QTnlspri 

..
1uT1ai 
1uT1ai 
vTkTni 
- 
- 
.. 
.. 
..
 
smsd7ijvTkTni 
, 
,
= 100, 100 
-. 
n1

..
i 
.. 
 
..
..
..
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
 
 
 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
 
- , 0.00001QTnlstdli 
, 
 
tqpffijuT1ai
, 
tqpffijuT1ai
, 
, 
spfluxTnsd i01.7321 spfluxTnsdi00 
, 
, 
 
spfluxTnmi0= 0.1, 0 
, 
100 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
, 
+
 
 
 
, 
1tqpffijtqpffij
, .. 
..
, 
- 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
 
 
 
 
if QTn1lstdli 
qunif 
.. 
, 
:= -1.7321
QTn1lstdli 
 
..
+ 
..
+ 
, 
 
if QT2lperci 
.. 
QT3lperci 
qpffi0= 1.827 
..
+ 
..
+ 
..
+ 
..
X
i5
, 
+ 
1.2
.. 
 
..
=
)(
sort QTnlspr 
)
Check seepage percent to be above 
100% and then adjusted back. 
Number of seepage rates 
greater than zero. 
> 0, 1, 0 
... 
... 
QT2lperci 
num1li 
0 
vTkTni 
:= 
numl := 
QTn1lstdli 
vTkTni 
QTn1lspmi 
uT1ai 
QTn1lstdui 
QTnlstdi 
0 
16914 0 
16915 0 
16916 0.1 
16917 0.1 
16918 0.101
= 0, 0 
:=
QTn1lstdui 
:=
QTnlstdli 
:= 
:= 
:=
QTnlstdi 
QT3lperci 
:= 
QTnlspri 
:= 
QTn1lspmi 
QTn2lspmi 
:=
nlTn 
( 
numl 
nlTn = 16915 
numl
spfrclTn := spfrclTn = 0.154
n
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01 C-56 of C-78 October 2004 
= 
-
-
n1) 

n1)
--
(
(
n1lTn 
n1lTn
=
3.026

3
10
:= 
nlTn 
)
Q11lTn 
:= 
Q1lTn 
:= 
+ 1 
sort QTnlspr 
reverse Q11lTn 
) 
)( 
( 
ab := 0.. n1lTn 
:=
Q2lTnab 
..
Q1lTnab 
..
sort Q2lTn 
= 12.515 
)(
QlTn 
:= 
mean QlTn
)( 
(ab + 1) - 0.375 
+ 1
)(
:=
CDFlTnab 
n1lTn + 0.25 
Fit the seepage rates to a Weibull distribution. 
The following equations are fromWhat Every Engineer Should Know About Reliability and 
Risk Analysis (Modarres, M, [DIRS 104667], p. 109). 
.. 
.. 
.. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
.. 
.. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
.. 
n1lTn 
..
.
. 
..
.
. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
..
, r 
.. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
.. 
, 0.1, 4 
..
.
 
r 
ln QlTni 
..
QlTni 
..
1 
r 
..
-
... 
.. 
.. 
1 
n1lTn 
n1lTn
i
=
0
-
...
.
..
.
ln QlTni 
l 
:= root
 
l = 0.518
n1lTn
.
i
=
0 
..
.
r
QlTni 
..
i
=
0 
1 
 l
.. 
. 
. 
..
n1lTn 
..
.
i
=
0 
.
. 
. 
. 
.. 
 l
QlTni 
..
al := 
al = 5.512 
n1lTn 
, 
Plot of raw data versus Weibull distribution 
ji := 0.. 
n1lTn 
PFdataji := QlTnji 
CDFdataji 2 := 
CDFlTnji 
.. 
.. 
CDFw1ji := 1 exp 
.
. 
.. 
 l
PFdata 
ji
.. 
.. 
- 
. 
- 
al
. 
, 
CDFwji 0 := CDFw1
ji 

Screening Analysis of Criticality Features, Events, and Processes for License Application 
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01C-58 of C-78October 2004Seepage fraction represents the non-zero seepage rates based on the LHS sampling of all of the parameters.
Determine the seepage fraction for Tptpmn Unit (mean) within the repository and then fit the 
output data to distribution.
meanQTnmspr()108.73=
Mean Seepage Flux (kg/yr/WP)QTnmspriQT3mperciqpffi1,
28.05100:=
Check seepage percent to be above 
100% and then adjusted back.
QT3mperciifQT2mperci0=0,ifQT2mperci100=100,QT2mperci,....
,..
..
:=
Equation to calculate seepage percent based on seepage rate (see SMPA 
data table) (based on DTN: LB0310AMRU0120.002 [DIRS 166116]).
QT2mperciQTn2mspmi100
qpffi1,28.05
:=
QTn2mspmiifQTn1mspmi0.1=0,QTn1mspmi,..
..
:=
QTn1mspmi1.2spfluxTnmi1,
QTnmstdi+..
..
:=
QTnmstdiqunifXi5,QTnmstdli,QTn1mstdui,..
..
:=
QTnmstdliifQTn1mstdli00.00001-,QTn1mstdli,..
..
:=
QTn1mstdui1.7321spfluxTnsdi1,
:=
QTn1mstdli1.7321-spfluxTnsdi1,
:=
Calculate mean seepage for Tptpmn Unit (mean). 
0.11101001.10300.250.50.751Seepage Flux (Tptpmn) data and fitSeepage Flux (l/yr)
cumulative density functionCDFdata2<>
CDFwPFdata

num1mi 
:= if QTnmspri 
.. 
> 0, 1, 0
..
Number of seepage rates 
greater than zero. 
0 
0 0 
1 0 
2 0 
3 0 
4 0 
sort QTnmspr 
=
)(
n1
-.
num1mi 
numm := 
i
=
0 
:=
nmTn 
(
n1)
--
numm 
nmTn 
= 9544 
nummspfrcmTn := spfrcmTn = 0.523 
n 
n1)
--
(
nmTn + 1
)
(
n1mTn 
4
10
:= 
n1mTn 1.045

= 
sort QTnmspr
)(
Q11mTn 
:= 
reverse Q11mTn 
ab := 0.. n1mTn 
)(
Q1mTn 
:= 
:=
Q2mTnab 
..
Q1mTnab 
..
sort Q2mTn 
= 210.55 
)(
QmTn 
:= 
mean QmTn 
CDFmTnab 
:= 
)( 
(ab + 1) - 0.375 
+ 1
)(
n1mTn + 0.25 
Fit the seepage rates to a Weibull distribution. 
The following equations are fromWhat Every Engineer Should Know About Reliability and 
Risk Analysis (Modarres, M, [DIRS 104667], p. 109). 
.. 
.. 
.. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
.. 
.. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
.. 
n1mTn 
..
.
. 
..
.
. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
..
, r 
.. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
.. 
, 0.1, 4 
.. 
r 
ln QmTni 
..
.
QmTni 
..
 
..
-
... 
.. 
.. 
n1mTn
...
1 
r 
1
i
=
0
.
..
.
ln QmTni 
m
-
m = 0.464
:= root
 
n1mTn
n1mTn
.
i
=
0 
..
.
r
QmTni 
..
i
=
0 
1 

m
.. 
. 
. 
..
n1mTn 
..
.
i
=
0 
.
. 
. 
. 
.. 
QmTni 
m
 
..
1
10
am 
:= 
am 8.627

= 
n1mTn 
, 
Plot of raw data versus Weibull distribution 
ji := 0.. 
n1mTn 
PFdataji := QmTnji 
CDFdataji 2 := 
CDFmTnji 

Screening Analysis of Criticality Features, Events, and Processes for License Application 
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01C-60 of C-78October 2004Determine the seepage fraction for Tptpmn Unit (lower bound) within the repository and then fit 
the output data to distribution.
meanQTnuspr()307.199=
Mean Seepage Flux (kg/yr/WP)QTnuspriQT3uperciqpffi2,
28.05100:=
Check seepage percent to be above 
100% and then adjusted back.
QT3uperciifQT2uperci0=0,ifQT2uperci100=100,QT2uperci,..
..
,..
..
:=
Equation to calculate seepage percent based on seepage rate (see SMPA 
data table) (based on DTN: LB0310AMRU0120.002 [DIRS 166116]).
QT2uperciQTn2uspmi100
qpffi2,28.05
:=
QTn2uspmiifQTn1uspmi0.1=0,QTn1uspmi,..
..
:=
QTn1uspmi1.2spfluxTnmi2,
QTnustdi+..
..:=
QTnustdiqunifXi5,QTnustdli,QTn1ustdui,..
..
:=
QTnustdliifQTn1ustdli00.00001-,QTn1ustdli,..
..
:=
QTn1ustdui1.7321spfluxTnsdi2,
:=
QTn1ustdli1.7321-spfluxTnsdi2,
:=
Calculate mean seepage for Tptpmn Unit (upper bound). 
0.11101001.1031.10400.250.50.751Mean Seepage Flux (l/yr) data and fitSeepage Flux (l/yr)
cumulative density functionCDFdata2<>
CDFwPFdataCDFwji0,CDFw1ji:=CDFw1ji1expPFdatajiam....
.
.
m-
....
.
...
-:=

Seepage fraction represents the non-zero seepage rates based on the LHS sampling of all of the parameters. 
:= 
> 0, 1, 0 
Number of seepage rates 
0 
0 0 
1 0 
2 0 
3 0 
4 0 
num1ui 
if QTnuspr i 
.. 
..
greater than zero. 
sort QTnuspr 
=
)(
n1
-.
num1ui 
numu := 
i
=
0 
:=
nuTn 
(
n1)
--
numu 
nuTn 
= 6520 
numuspfrcuTn := spfrcuTn = 0.674 
n 
4
10
n1)
--
(
nuTn + 1
)
(
n1uTn 
n1uTn
=
1.348
:=
 
sort QTnuspr 
reverse Q11uTn 
ab := 0.. n1uTn 
( 
(
)
Q11uTn 
:= 
)
Q1uTn 
:= 
1
Q2uTnab 
:=
...
..
Q1uTnab 
 
1 
sort Q2uTn 
mean QuTn 1 = 462.2 
(ab + 1) - 0.375 
)
+ 1 
)
( 
( 
( 
)
QuTn 
:= 
:=
CDFuTnab 
+ 0.25
n1uTn 
Fit the seepage rates to a Weibull distribution. 
The following equations are fromWhat Every Engineer Should Know About Reliability and 
Risk Analysis (Modarres, M, [DIRS 104667], p. 109). 
.. 
.. 
.. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
.. 
.. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
.. 
n1uTn
.
. 
..
.
. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
..
, r 
.. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
.. 
, 0.1, 4 
..
.

.. 
r 
ln QuTni
QuTni 
..
..
...
1 
r 
..
-
... 
.. 
.. 
n1uTn
1
i
=
0
.
..
.
ln QuTni 
u
-
:= root
 
u = 0.492
n1uTn
n1uTn
.
i
=
0
r
..
.
QuTni 
..
i
=
0 
1 

u
.. 
. 
. 
..
n1uTn 
..
.
i
=
0 
.
. 
. 
. 
.. 
QuTni 
u
 
..
2
10
au := 
au 
2.245

= 
n1uTn 
Plot of raw data versus Weibull distribution 
ji := 0.. 
n1uTn 
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01 C-61 of C-78 October 2004 

Screening Analysis of Criticality Features, Events, and Processes for License Application 
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01C-62 of C-78October 2004Data Set MeanmeanQTnuspr()307.199=meanQTnmspr()108.73=meanQTnlspr()1.827=
Seepage FractionspfrcuTn6.716101-=spfrcmTn5.234101-=spfrclTn1.542101-=
u4.932101-=m4.619101-=l5.135101-=
au2.232102=am8.414101=al5.099100=
Upper Bound ResultsMean ResultsLower Bound ResultsOverall Final Results for Tptpmn Zone (1.2 times nominal)
.0.11101001.1031.10400.250.50.751Seepage Flux (Tptpmn) data and fitSeepage Flux (l/yr)
cumulative density functionCDFdata2<>
CDFwPFdataCDFwji0,CDFw1ji:=CDFw1ji1expPFdatajiau....
.
.
u-
....
.
...
-:=
CDFdataji2,CDFuTnji:=
PFdatajiQuTnji:=

C.5 IGNEOUS SEEPAGE ANALYSIS FOR INFILTRATION RATE AND SEEPAGE 
FRACTION IN THE NONLITHOPHYSAL ZONE 
This section presents the Mathcad analysis for calculating the seepage fraction and seepage 
infiltration rates (i.e., lower bound, mean, and upper bound) in the nonlithophysal zone given an 
igneous event. The seepage calculation is for the glacial transition period only. The seepage 
calculation utilizes the collapsed seepage model (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169131], Section 6.5.1.7). 
The seepage information and the process used in the analysis was obtained from Abstraction of 
Drift Seepage (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169131], Section 6.7.1.1). The information contained in this 
section has been abstracted from the LA seepage glac Tptpmn collapse-igneous.mcd Mathcad 
file of Appendix G. 

Seepage Flux and Seepage Fraction Calculation using Abstraction of Drift Seepage 
(BSC 2004 [DIRS 169131], Section 6.7.1.1) 
Latin Hypercube Sampling Routine to Generate Random Numbers 
size of the sampling: n := 20000 
i := 1.. n 
- ( - (
RD:= i RDi1, 1 
:= rnd 1.0) RDi1, 2 
:= rnd 1.0) RDi1, 3 
:= rnd 1.0)
i1, 0 - ( -
- 
:= rnd 1.0) RDi1, 5 := rnd 1.0) := rnd 1.0)
(
-
RDi1, 4( - ( RDi1, 6 
RK's are matrixes in which the first column contain a permutation on the integers on the 
interval [1,n]. 
RK1 := csort (RD 1) RK2 := csort (RD 2) RK3 := csort (RD 3)
,,, 
RK4 := csort (RD 4) RK5 := csort (RD 5) RK6 := csort (RD 6)
,,, 
Define sets of random values. Each random value is selected within one of the equiprobable n 
intervals that partition [0,1]. One set for each random variable. 
<> <> <>
<> <> <>
X0:= 
RK1 0- 1 + runif(n , 0, 1) 
X1:= 
RK2 0- 1 + runif(n , 0, 1) 
X2:= 
RK3 0- 1 + runif(n , 0, 1) 
nnn 
<> <> <>
<> <> <>
X3:= 
RK4 0- 1 + runif(n , 0, 1) 
X4:= 
RK5 0- 1 + runif(n , 0, 1) 
X5:= 
RK6 0- 1 + runif(n , 0, 1) 
nnn 
i := 0n - 1
.. 
Capillary Strength 1/ a in (Pa) 
:= 402 a1ub := 780 a1 := 591 spatial variability follows a uniform distribution
a1lb 
.a1l - := 105 .a1 := 0 .a1u := 105 uncertainty follows a triangular distribution 
Sampling from spatial variability to obtain the 1/ a value 
a1i := qunif ( Xi0,a1lb ,a1ub ) 1/a value 
, 
Sample from uncertainty triangular distribution to obtain . 1/a 
Determine which equation to use: 
if Random Number < RN .a1 then use Equation 1 ( .a1eq1) 
if Random Number > RN .a1 then use Equation 2 ( .a1eq2) 
(.a1- .a1l)2 
RN.a1 := 
 
(.a1- .a1l)(.a1- .a1l)
u  
.a1eq1i 
:= .a1l + ( )( ).a1u - .a1l  .a1 -.a1l
Xi1
, 
.a1eq2i 
:= .a1u -()( )( )1 - Xi1 .a1u - .a1l  .a1u - .a1
, 
.a1i := if.( Xi1= RN.a1),.a1eq1i,.a1eq2i 
.. 1/a value
,.
. 

Overall Capillary Strength 1/ a + . 1/a 
:= a1i + .a1i 1/a value
T1ai 
Permeability k in Tptpmn Unit (in log 10) 
kTn - := 12.2mean of lognormal distribution 
:= 0.34 standard deviation of lognormal distribution
skTn 
kTni 
:= ln qlnorm Xi2,kTn ,skTn))
( (, 
mean kTn) - = 12.2
( 
Stdev kTn)= 0.34
( 
Permeability . k in Tptpmn Unit (in log 10) 
- := 0.68.kTn := 0 := 0.68 uncertainty follows a triangular distribution
.kTnl .kTnu 
Sample from uncertainty triangular distribution to obtain . k 
Determine which equation to use: 
if Random Number < RN.kTn then use Equation 1 ( . kTneq1) 
if Random Number > RN.kTn then use Equation 2 ( . kTneq2) 
(.kTn-.kTnl)2 
:= 
 
RN.kTn (.kTnu -.kTnl) (.kTn-.kTnl) 
.kTneq1i 
:= .kTnl + Xi3(.kTnu -.kTnl)(.kTn-.kTnl)
, 
.kTneq2i 
:= .kTnu -(1 - Xi3)(.kTnu -.kTnl)(.kTnu -.kTn)
, 
.kTni 
:= if.( Xi3= RN.kTn),.kTneq1i,.kTneq2i.. 
. k value
,
. 
Overall Permeability k + . k 
T1kTni 
:= kTni 
+.kTni 
Permeability must lie between -14 and -10 (bounds of SMPA simulations) 
TkTni 
:= if. T1kTni 
- = 10- , 10, if. T1kTni 
- = 14- , 14, T1kTni 
.. 
.. .. k value 
Flow Focusing Factor 
4 32
( 
fx) := -0.3137x + 5.4998 x - 35.66 x + 102.3 x - 11.434 
ffi := root f x, . () -100), x, 0, 6. 
.( Xi4. 
Percolation Flux (mm/yr) 
The percolation flux used here is for the glacial transition period only. The percolation flux is based on 
sampling from the lower bound (TSPA repository location). DTN: LB0310AMRU0120.002 [DIRS 166116] 

nnn := 0.. 468 number of data points 
Lower Bound Percolation Flux Mean Bound Percolation Flux Upper Bound Percolation Flux 
PF1l := 
PF1m := 
PF1u := 
0 
0 3.676 
1 2.6504 
2 2.4144 
3 2.1296 
4 2.4089 
5 2.3999 
6 2.117 
7 2.7623 
8 1.397 
9 2.2144 
0 
0 15.9704 
1 19.8733 
2 14.1961 
3 7.5897 
4 16.9397 
5 17.7583 
6 10.4511 
7 27.7684 
8 8.9546 
9 16.0195 
0 
0 40.0021 
1 36.1863 
2 35.7337 
3 27.828 
4 30.7394 
5 40.0292 
6 31.8601 
7 57.0835 
8 18.3271 
9 27.9133 
PFtl:= PF1lnnn 0 
PFtm:= PF1PFtu:= PF1,,
nnn , nnn mnnn 0 nnn unnn 0 
<> 
(( ,Z0:= round runif n 0 , 468)) 
PFli 
:= PFtlZi0PF:= PFt
,,
( ,) mi m( Zi0) PFui 
:= PFtu( Zi0) 
Adjusted Percolation Flux 
Take the flow focusing factor and multiply it to the percolation flux, which will be used to obtain the 
seepage rate, seepage fraction, and seepage percentage. 
q1pffi 
:= PFli 
ffqmpffi 
:= PFffqupffi 
:= PFff
i mii uii 
qpff := augment q1pff , qmpff , qupff)
( 
Percolation Flux must lie between 1 and 1000 mm/yr (bounds of SMPA simulations) 
j := 0.. 2 
qpffij:= if qpffij= 1, 1, if qpffij= 1000, 1000, qpffij..
.. 
,., ., , .. 
Seepage Information from SMPA analysis SMPAdata<0> is permeability value log(k [m^2]) 
m := 2549 data points SMPAdata<1> is capillary strength 1/alpha [Pa] 
SMPAdata<2> is local percolation flux (mm/yr) 
SMPAdata<3> is Mean Seepage [kg/yr/WP] 
SMPAdata<4> is Std. Dev. Seepage [kg/yr/WP] 
SMPAdata<5> is Mean Seepage [%] 
SMPAdata<6> is Std. Dev. Seepage [%] 

SMPAdata := 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
0 -14 100 1 56.44 5.47 100.6 9.75 
1 -14 100 5 282.63 27.5 100.76 9.8 
2 -14 100 10 566.16 55.13 100.92 9.83 
3 -14 100 20 1135.12 109.85 101.17 9.79 
4 -14 100 50 2849.95 272.25 101.6 9.71 
5 -14 100 100 5726.78 535.98 102.08 9.55 
6 -14 100 200 11523.63 1064.22 102.71 9.49 
7 -14 100 300 17369.22 1583.08 103.2 9.41 
8 -14 100 400 23241.94 2086.65 103.57 9.3 
9 -14 100 500 29154.54 2552.38 103.94 9.1 
10 -14 100 600 35097.8 2992.46 104.27 8.89 
11 -14 100 700 41099.26 3411.36 104.66 8.69 
12 -14 100 800 47084.03 3860.77 104.91 8.6 
13 -14 100 900 53190.45 4145.2 105.35 8.21 
14 -14 100 1000 59206.88 4520.61 105.54 8.06 
15 -14 200 1 55.25 5.44 98.48 9.69 
Set up routine to pick out correct mean seepage, seepage standard deviation, seepage percent, 
and seepage percent standard deviation based on sampled value of 1/ a, k, percolation flux.
nx := 14 ny := 9 nz := 16
ii := 0.. nx
x:= SMPAdataii 2 
xi:= ii
ii ii
, 
jj := 0.. ny 
:=
yjj 
100 jj 
kk := 0.. nz 

+ 100 yjjj := jj 

kk 0.25 
loc represents the location within the matrix of which value to pick for the interpolation process. 
-14
zkkk := kk
z:=
kk
+ 
, 
loc1ij:= 
floor linterpx xi , 
, 
, 
, 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
+ 
floor linterp z zk 
TkTni 
( + 1) 
( + 1)
,.. 
..
floor linterp y yj
,
T1ai 
.. 
.. 

( + 1)
.. 
.. 
+
nx

ny nx 
... 
.. 
..
, 
qpffij
, 
:= SMPAdataloc1ij
, 
, 
, 
sms1ijsmsd1ijloc2ij:= 
, 3 
, 
:= SMPAdataloc1ij
, 4 
, 
, 
, 
,
, 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
+ 
floor linterp z zk 
ceil linterp x xi qpffij
TkTni 
( + 1)
..
( + 1)
+
,.. 
..
floor linterp y yj
,
T1ai 
.. 
..
( + 1)
.. 
.. 

nx

ny

nx 
... 
.. 
.. 
ij, 
, 
, 
, 
sms2ijsmsd2ij
ij
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01 C-67 of C-78 October 2004 
:= SMPAdataloc2
, 3 
:= SMPAdataloc2
, 4 

loc3ij:= 
, 
floor linterp z zk 
ceil linterp x xi 
, 
, 
,.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
+ 
TkTni 
( + 1) 
( + 1)
+
ceil linterp y yj
,.. 
..
,
T1ai 
.. 
.. 

( + 1)
.. 
.. 

nx

ny nx 
... 
.. 
..
qpffij
, 
, 
3, 
:= SMPAdataloc3
ij
, 
sms3ijsmsd3ijloc4ij:= 
, 
, 
, 
:= SMPAdataloc3ij
, 
, 4 
floor linterp z zk 
floor linterp x xi 
, 
, 
, 
, 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
+ 
TkTni 
( + 1) 
( + 1) 
ceil linterp y yj
,.. 
..
,
T1ai 
( + 1)
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
+

nx

ny

nx 
... 
qpffij
.. 
..
, 
:= SMPAdataloc4
sms4ijij
smsd4ij:= SMPAdataloc4ij
, 
, 
, 
,
, 3 
, 4 
loc5ij:= 
, 
ceil linterp z zk 
floor linterp x xi 
, 
, 
, 
, 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
+ 
TkTni 
( + 1) 
( + 1)
..
,.. 
..
floor linterp y yj 
T1ai 
( + 1)
.. 
.. 

.. 
.. 
+
nx

ny

nx
,
... 
qpffij
.. 
..
, 
:= SMPAdataloc5
sms5ijij
smsd5ij:= SMPAdataloc5ij
, 
, 
, 
,
, 3 
, 4 
loc6ij:= 
, 
ceil linterp z zk 
ceil linterp x xi 
, 
, 
, 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
+ 
TkTni 
( + 1) 
( + 1)
,.. 
..
floor linterp y yj
,
T1ai 
( + 1)
.. 
.. 

.. 
.. 
+
nx

ny

nx 
... 
.. 
..
, 
,
qpffij, 3 
, 
:= SMPAdataloc6
ij
sms6ijsmsd6ij
, 
loc:=7ij
, 
, 
, 
:= SMPAdataloc6ij
, 4 
, 
, 
, 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
+ 
ceil linterp z zk 
ceil linterp x xi 
TkTni 
( + 1)
..
( + 1)
+
,.. 
..
ceil linterp y yj 
T1ai 
( + 1)
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 

nx

ny

nx
,
... 
.. 
..
, 
,
qpffij, 3 
, 
:= SMPAdataloc7
ij
, 
, 
, 
sms7ijsmsd7ijloc8ij:= 
, 
:= SMPAdataloc7ij
, 4 
floor linterpx xi , 
,
,.. 
,.. 
.. 
.. 
+ 
ceil linterp z zk 
TkTni 
( + 1) 
( + 1)
,.. 
..
ceil linterp y yj
,
T1ai 
( + 1)
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 

+

nx

ny nx 
... 
.. 
..
, 
qpffij
:= SMPAdataloc8
ij, 
, 
, 
, 
sms8ij
smsd8ij:= SMPAdataloc8ij
, 3 
, 4 

Develop the upper and lower bound for permeability (k) for Tptpmn Unit 
qqi := -1TkTni 
( ()
mantissa x) := x - floor qq
tti := floor qqi)
( 
rr := round mantissa qq,
( () 2)
yy1i := if rri = 0.25, 0, if 0.25 < rri = 0.5, 0.25, rri))
(( 
zz1i := if yy1i = 0.5, yy1i, if 0.5 < yy1i = 0.75, 0.5, 0.75))
(( 
TkTn2i 
:= -1(tti + zz1i) 
yy2i := if rri = 0.25, 0.25, if 0.25 < rri = 0.5, 0.5, rri))
(( 
zz2i := if yy2i = 0.5, yy2i, if 0.5 < yy2i = 0.75, 0.75, 1))
(( 
TkTn1i 
:= -1(tti + zz2i) 
Develop the upper and lower bound for capillary strength (1/ a). 
. T1ai 
.
hh1i := floor.
. 100 . 
T1a1i 
:= (hh1i 100) 
. T1ai 
.
hh2i := ceil.
. 100 . 
T1a2i 
:= (hh2i 100) 
Lower Bound value adjusted percolation flux (q pff). 
aaa1ij:= if qpffij= 1, 1, if 1 < qpffij= 5, 1, qpffij.. 
,.,. , ,..
bbb1ij:= if aaa1ij= 5, aaa1ij, if 5 < aaa1= 10, 5, aaa1ij))
.. 
,
,(, ,( ij, 
ccc1ij:= if bbb1ij= 10, bbb1ij, if 10 < bbb1= 20, 10, bbb1ij))
,
,(, ,( ij, 
ddd1ij:= if ccc1ij= 20, ccc1ij, if 20 < ccc1= 50, 20, ccc1ij))
,
,(, ,( ij, 
eee1ij:= if ddd1ij= 50, ddd1ij, if 50 < ddd1= 100, 50, ddd1ij))
,
,(, ,( ij, 
fff1ij:= if eee1ij= 100, eee1ij, if 100 < eee1= 200, 100, eee1ij))
,
,(, ,( ij, 
ggg1ij:= if fff1ij= 200, fff1ij, if 200 < fff1= 300, 200, fff1ij))
,
, (, ,( ij, 
hhh1:= if ggg1ij= 300, ggg1ij, if 300 < ggg1ij= 400, 300, ggg1ij))
,
ij(,,(, , 
iii1ij:= if hhh1ij= 400, hhh1ij, if 400 < hhh1= 500, 400, hhh1ij))
,
,(, ,( ij,
jjj1ij:= if iii1ij= 500, iii1ij, if 500 < iii1= 600, 500, iii1ij))
,, (, ,( ij, 
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01 C-69 of C-78 October 2004 

kkk1:= if jjj1ij= 600, jjj1ij, if 600 < jjj1ij= 700, 600, jjj1ij))
,
ij(,,(, , 
mmm1:= if kkk1ij= 700, kkk1ij, if 700 < kkk1= 800, 700, kkk1ij))
,,
ij(, ,( ij, 
qpff1ij:= if mmm1ij= 800, mmm1ij, if 800 < mmm1= 900, 800, 900))
,
(, ,( ij
, 
Upper Bound value adjusted percolation flux (q pff). 
aaa2ij:= if qpffij= 1, 5, if 1 < qpffij= 5, 5, qpffij..
.. 
,.,. , ,.. 
bbb2:= if aaa2ij= 5, aaa2ij, if 5 < aaa2= 10, 10, aaa2ij))
,,
ij(, ,( ij, 
ccc2:= if bbb2ij= 10, bbb2ij, if 10 < bbb2= 20, 20, bbb2ij))
,,
ij(, ,( ij, 
ddd2:= if ccc2ij= 20, ccc2ij, if 20 < ccc2= 50, 50, ccc2ij))
,,
ij(, ,( ij, 
eee2:= if ddd2ij= 50, ddd2ij, if 50 < ddd2= 100, 100, ddd2ij))
,,
ij(, ,( ij, 
fff2:= if eee2ij= 100, eee2ij, if 100 < eee2= 200, 200, eee2ij))
,,
ij(, ,( ij, 
ggg2ij:= if fff2ij= 200, fff2ij, if 200 < fff2= 300, 300, fff2ij))
,
, (, ,( ij, 
hhh2:= if ggg2ij= 300, ggg2ij, if 300 < ggg2ij= 400, 400, ggg2ij))
,
ij(,,(, , 
iii2:= if hhh2ij= 400, hhh2ij, if 400 < hhh2= 500, 500, hhh2ij))
,,
ij(, ,( ij, 
jjj2ij:= if iii2ij= 500, iii2ij, if 500 < iii2= 600, 600, iii2ij))
,
, (, ,( ij, 
kkk2:= if jjj2ij= 600, jjj2ij, if 600 < jjj2ij= 700, 700, jjj2ij))
,
ij(,,(, , 
mmm2:= if kkk2ij= 700, kkk2ij, if 700 < kkk2= 800, 800, kkk2ij))
,,
ij(, ,( ij, 
qpff2ij:= if mmm2ij= 800, mmm2ij, if 800 < mmm2= 900, 900, 1000))
,
(, ,( ij
, 
Solve for seepage flux (Tptpmn Unit) 
T1ai 
- T1a1i 
TkTni 
- TkTn1i 
qpffij- qpff1ij
,,
:=:= := 
, 
uT1ai T1a2i 
- T1a1i 
vTkTni TkTn2i 
- TkTn1i 
tqpffijqpff2ij- qpff1ij
,, 
- --
spfluxTnmij:= . 1tqpffij.. 1uT1ai 
.. 1vTkTni 
.sms1ij... 
,. ,.... ., 
- -  ...
+. tqpffij.. 1uT1ai 
.. 1vTkTni 
. sms2ij
.,.. .. ., 
+. 
tqpffij.. uT1ai 
.. 1vTkTni 
. sms3ij
+. 
1tqpffij.. uT1ai 
.. 1vTkTni 
. sms4ij
+. 
1tqpffij.. 1uT1ai 
.. vTkTni 
. sms5ij
-  ... 
. ,.... . , 
-  - ... 
. ,.... . , 
- - ... 
. ,.. ... , 
- ...
+. tqpffij.. 1uT1ai 
.. vTkTni 
. sms6ij
. ,.. ... , 
 ...
+. tqpffij.. uT1ai 
.. vTkTni 
. sms7ij
. ,.... . , 
+. 1tqpffij.. uT1ai 
.. vTkTni 
. sms8ij
-  
. ,.... . , 

...
smsd1ij
...
smsd2ij
, 
, 

.. 
1vTkTni 
1vTkTni 
.. 
- 
-
 
1uT1ai 
1uT1ai 
.. 
.. 
- 
- 
.. 
.. 
 
 
.. 
.. 

1tqpffijtqpffij
, 
, 
- 
.. 
.. 
.. 
 
..
spfluxTnsd ij:= 
, 
+ 
spfluxTnmi0
if QTn1lspmi
QTn2lspmi
100 
, 
:= Equation to calculate seepage percent based on seepage rate (see SMPAQT2lperci qpffi028.052 
data table) (based on DTN: LB0310AMRU0120.002 [DIRS 166116]). 
,
..
..
if QT2lperci 
Mean Seepage Flux (kg/yr/WP) 
(
mean QTnlspr 
Determine the seepage fraction for Tptpmn Unit (lower bound) within the repository and then fit 
the output data to distribution. 
Seepage fraction represents the non-zero seepage rates based on the LHS sampling of all of the parameters. 
... 
... 
smsd3ijsmsd4ij
, 
,
..
smsd5ij
...
smsd6ij
, 
, 
.. 
.. 
smsd7ijvTkTni 
, 
1tqpffijsmsd8ij
Calculate mean seepage for Tptpmn Unit (lower bound). 
,
, 
- 
 

..
,
= 100, 100 
1vTkTni 
1tqpffijuT1ai 
1vTkTni 
- 
- 
, 
- 
 

..
 
..
..
1uT1ai 
1uT1ai 
vTkTni 
- 
- 
.. 

..
..
.. 
.. 
 
..
.. 
.. 
num1li 
if QTnlspri 
-. 
n1
i 
.. 
.. 
 
.. 
.. 
 
.. 
.. 
 
.. 
.. 
 
.. 
.. 
- , 0.00001QTnlstdli 
, 
 

28.05 2 
100 
tqpffijuT1ai
, 
tqpffijuT1ai
, 
, 
spfluxTnsd i01.7321 spfluxTnsdi00 
, 
, 
 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
, 
 
 
 
, 
1tqpffijtqpffij
, .. 
..
, 
- 
.. 
.. 
 
 
.. 
.. 
 
 
+ 
, 
 
if QT2lperci 
.. 
QT3lperci 
qpffi0= 12.942 
if QTn1lstdli 
qunif 
.. 
,
X
i5
, 
..
+ 
..
+ 
..
+ 
..
+ 
:= -1.7321
QTn1lstdli 
 
..
+ 
..
+ 
..
=
)(
sort QTnlspr 
)
Check seepage percent to be above 
100% and then adjusted back. 
Number of seepage rates 
greater than zero. 
QT2lperci 
> 0, 1, 0 
... 
... 
num1li 
0 
vTkTni 
:= 
vTkTni 
QTn1lstdli 
QTn1lspmi 
numl := 
uT1ai 
QTn1lstdui 
QTnlstdi 
0 
0 0 
1 0 
2 0 
3 0 
4 0 
= 0.1, 0 
= 0, 0 
:=
QTn1lstdui 
:= 
:=
QTnlstdli 
:= 
:=
QTnlstdi 
QTn1lspmi 
QTn2lspmi 
QT3lperci 
:= 
QTnlspri 
:= 
:=
nlTn 
( 
numl 
nlTn = 11151 
numl
spfrclTn := spfrclTn = 0.442
n
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01 C-71 of C-78 October 2004 
= 
-
-
n1) 

n1)
--
(
(
n1lTn 
n1lTn
=
8.847

3
10
:= 
nlTn 
)
Q11lTn 
:= 
Q1lTn 
:= 
+ 1 
sort QTnlspr 
reverse Q11lTn 
) 
)( 
( 
ab := 0.. n1lTn 
:=
Q2lTnab 
..
Q1lTnab 
..
sort Q2lTn 
= 29.255 
)(
QlTn 
:= 
mean QlTn
)( 
(ab + 1) - 0.375 
+ 1
)(
:=
CDFlTnab 
n1lTn + 0.25 
Fit the seepage rates to a Weibull distribution. 
The following equations are fromWhat Every Engineer Should Know About Reliability and 
Risk Analysis (Modarres, M, [DIRS 104667], p. 109). 
.. 
.. 
.. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
.. 
.. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
.. 
n1lTn
.
. 
..
.
. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
..
, r 
.. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
.. 
, 0.1, 4 
..
.
 
r 
ln QlTni 
..
QlTni 
..
..
1 
r 
..
-
... 
.. 
.. 
1 
n1lTn 
n1lTn
i
=
0
-
...
.
..
.
ln QlTni 
l 
:= root
 
l = 0.523
n1lTn
.
i
=
0 
..
.
r
QlTni 
..
i
=
0 
1 
 l
.. 
. 
. 
..
n1lTn 
..
.
i
=
0 
.
. 
. 
. 
.. 
 l
QlTni 
..
al := 
al = 13.947 
n1lTn 
, 
Plot of raw data versus Weibull distribution 
ji := 0.. 
n1lTn 
PFdataji := QlTnji 
CDFdataji 2 := 
CDFlTnji 
.. 
.. 
CDFw1ji := 1 exp 
.
. 
.. 
 l
PFdata 
ji
.. 
.. 
- 
. 
- 
al
. 
, 
CDFwji 0 := CDFw1
ji 

Screening Analysis of Criticality Features, Events, and Processes for License Application 
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01C-73 of C-78October 2004Seepage fraction represents the non-zero seepage rates based on the LHS sampling of all of the parameters.
Determine the seepage fraction for Tptpmn Unit (mean) within the repository and then fit the 
output data to distribution.
meanQTnmspr()396.869=
Mean Seepage Flux (kg/yr/WP)QTnmspriQT3mperciqpffi1,
28.052
100:=
Check seepage percent to be above 
100% and then adjusted back.
QT3mperciifQT2mperci0=0,ifQT2mperci100=100,QT2mperci,....
,..
..
:=
Equation to calculate seepage percent based on seepage rate (see SMPA 
data table) (based on DTN: LB0310AMRU0120.002 [DIRS 166116]).
QT2mperciQTn2mspmi100
qpffi1,28.052
:=
QTn2mspmiifQTn1mspmi0.1=0,QTn1mspmi,..
..
:=
QTn1mspmispfluxTnmi1,
QTnmstdi+:=
QTnmstdiqunifXi5,QTnmstdli,QTn1mstdui,..
..
:=
QTnmstdliifQTn1mstdli00.00001-,QTn1mstdli,..
..
:=
QTn1mstdui1.7321spfluxTnsdi1,
:=
QTn1mstdli1.7321-spfluxTnsdi1,
:=
Calculate mean seepage for Tptpmn Unit (mean). 
0.11101001.10300.250.50.751Seepage Flux (Tptpmn) data and fitSeepage Flux (l/yr)
cumulative density functionCDFdata2<>
CDFwPFdata

num1mi 
:= if QTnmspri 
.. 
> 0, 1, 0
..
Number of seepage rates 
greater than zero. 
0 
0 0 
1 0 
2 0 
3 0 
4 0 
sort QTnmspr 
=
)(
n1
-.
num1mi 
numm := 
i
=
0 
:=
nmTn 
(
n1)
--
numm 
nmTn 
= 4172 
nummspfrcmTn := spfrcmTn = 0.791 
n 
n1)
--
(
nmTn + 1
)
(
n1mTn 
4
10
:= 
n1mTn 1.583

= 
sort QTnmspr
)(
Q11mTn 
:= 
reverse Q11mTn 
ab := 0.. n1mTn 
)(
Q1mTn 
:= 
:=
Q2mTnab 
..
Q1mTnab 
..
sort Q2mTn 
= 501.509 
)(
QmTn 
:= 
mean QmTn 
CDFmTnab 
:= 
)( 
(ab + 1) - 0.375 
+ 1
)(
n1mTn + 0.25 
Fit the seepage rates to a Weibull distribution. 
The following equations are fromWhat Every Engineer Should Know About Reliability and 
Risk Analysis (Modarres, M, [DIRS 104667], p. 109). 
.. 
.. 
.. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
.. 
.. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
.. 
n1mTn 
..
.
. 
..
.
. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
..
, r 
.. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
.. 
, 0.1, 4 
.. 
r 
ln QmTni 
..
.
QmTni 
..
 
..
-
... 
.. 
.. 
n1mTn
...
1 
r 
1
i
=
0
.
..
.
ln QmTni 
m
-
m = 0.527
:= root
 
n1mTn
n1mTn
.
i
=
0 
..
.
r
QmTni 
..
i
=
0 
1 

m
.. 
. 
. 
..
n1mTn 
..
.
i
=
0 
.
. 
. 
. 
.. 
QmTni 
m
 
..
2
10
am 
:= 
am 2.725

= 
n1mTn 
, 
Plot of raw data versus Weibull distribution 
ji := 0.. 
n1mTn 
PFdataji := QmTnji 
CDFdataji 2 := 
CDFmTnji 

Screening Analysis of Criticality Features, Events, and Processes for License Application 
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01C-75 of C-78October 2004Determine the seepage fraction for Tptpmn Unit (lower bound) within the repository and then fit 
the output data to distribution.
meanQTnuspr()990.107=
Mean Seepage Flux (kg/yr/WP)QTnuspriQT3uperciqpffi2,
28.052
100:=
Check seepage percent to be above 
100% and then adjusted back.
QT3uperciifQT2uperci0=0,ifQT2uperci100=100,QT2uperci,..
..
,..
..
:=
Equation to calculate seepage percent based on seepage rate (see SMPA 
data table) (based on DTN: LB0310AMRU0120.002 [DIRS 166116]).
QT2uperciQTn2uspmi100
qpffi2,28.052
:=
QTn2uspmiifQTn1uspmi0.1=0,QTn1uspmi,..
..
:=
QTn1uspmispfluxTnmi2,
QTnustdi+:=
QTnustdiqunifXi5,QTnustdli,QTn1ustdui,..
..
:=
QTnustdliifQTn1ustdli00.00001-,QTn1ustdli,..
..
:=
QTn1ustdui1.7321spfluxTnsdi2,
:=
QTn1ustdli1.7321-spfluxTnsdi2,
:=
Calculate mean seepage for Tptpmn Unit (upper bound). 
0.11101001.1031.10400.250.50.751Mean Seepage Flux (l/yr) data and fitSeepage Flux (l/yr)
cumulative density functionCDFdata2<>
CDFwPFdataCDFwji0,CDFw1ji:=CDFw1ji1expPFdatajiam....
.
.
m-
....
.
...
-:=

Seepage fraction represents the non-zero seepage rates based on the LHS sampling of all of the parameters. 
:= 
> 0, 1, 0 
Number of seepage rates 
0 
0 0 
1 0 
2 0 
3 0 
4 0 
num1ui 
if QTnuspr i 
.. 
..
greater than zero. 
sort QTnuspr 
=
)(
n1
-.
num1ui 
numu := 
i
=
0 
:=
nuTn 
(
n1)
--
numu 
nuTn 
= 2483 
numuspfrcuTn := spfrcuTn = 0.876 
n 
4
10
n1)
--
(
nuTn + 1
)
(
n1uTn 
n1uTn
=
1.752
:=
 
sort QTnuspr 
reverse Q11uTn 
ab := 0.. n1uTn 
( 
(
)
Q11uTn 
:= 
)
Q1uTn 
:= 
1 
:=
...
..
Q2uTnab 
Q1uTnab 
 
1 
sort Q2uTn 
1.131 
(
)
QuTn 
:= 
3
10
mean QuTn 1 
(ab + 1) - 0.375 
)
+ 1 
)
(
(

= 
:=
CDFuTnab 
+ 0.25
n1uTn 
Fit the seepage rates to a Weibull distribution. 
The following equations are fromWhat Every Engineer Should Know About Reliability and 
Risk Analysis (Modarres, M, [DIRS 104667], p. 109). 
.. 
.. 
.. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
.. 
.. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
.. 
n1uTn
.
. 
..
.
. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
..
, r 
.. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
.. 
, 0.1, 4 
..
.

.. 
r 
ln QuTni
QuTni 
..
..
...
1 
r 
..
-
... 
.. 
.. 
n1uTn
1
i
=
0
.
..
.
ln QuTni 
u
-
:= root
 
u = 0.59
n1uTn
n1uTn
.
i
=
0
r
..
.
QuTni 
..
i
=
0 
1 

u
.. 
. 
. 
..
n1uTn 
..
.
i
=
0 
.
. 
. 
. 
.. 
QuTni 
u
 
..
2
10
au := 
au 
7.414

= 
n1uTn 
Plot of raw data versus Weibull distribution 
ji := 0.. 
n1uTn 
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01 C-76 of C-78 October 2004 

Screening Analysis of Criticality Features, Events, and Processes for License Application 
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01C-77 of C-78October 2004Data Set MeanmeanQTnuspr()990.107=meanQTnmspr()396.869=meanQTnlspr()12.942=
Seepage FractionspfrcuTn8.758101-=spfrcmTn7.913101-=spfrclTn4.424101-=
u5.902101-=m5.269101-=l5.233101-=
au7.414102=am2.725102=al1.395101=
Upper Bound ResultsMean ResultsLower Bound ResultsOverall Final Results for Tptpmn Zone.
0.11101001.1031.10400.250.50.751Seepage Flux (Tptpmn) data and fitSeepage Flux (l/yr)
cumulative density functionCDFdata2<>
CDFwPFdataCDFwji0,CDFw1ji:=CDFw1ji1expPFdatajiau....
.
.
u-
....
.
...
-:=
CDFdataji2,CDFuTnji:=
PFdatajiQuTnji:=

INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

APPENDIX D 
WASTE PACKAGE FILLING PROBABILITY 
(OUTPUT FROM MATHCAD FILE) 

INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Fault Displacement Damage due to Seismic Event 
This calculation is to evaluate drip shield and waste package damage due to a fault 
displacement due to seismic events that has the potential to allow advective flow to reach 
the waste package. 
Latin Hypercube Sampling Routine for Evaluation of Fault Displacement 
The PGV values and damaged areas are all obtained using Latin Hypercube Sampling. 
n:= 50000 sample size
s
()
i := 1.. ns Seed 1
RDi1, 0 := i RDi1, 1 := rnd 1.0) RDi1, 2 := rnd 1.0)
(
-- ( - 
RK# are matrixes whose first column contain a permutation on the integers on the 
interval [1,n s]. 
RK1 := csort RD 1) RK2 := csort RD 2)
( , ( , 
Define sets of random values. Each random value is selected within one of the 
equiprobable n s intervals that partition [0,1]. One set for each random variable. 
<>
RK1 0- 1 + runif ns , 0, 1) RK2 0- 1 + runif ns , 0, 1)
<> ( <>
<>(
X0:= X1:=
nn
ss 
1E-8 to 2E-7 Exceedance Frequency Range 
Seismic exceedance frequencies and time to first occurrance of seismic event 
follow uniform distributions (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169183], Section 6.9.2). 
- 8 - 7 The upper and lower bounds are from BSC
IEl := 110 IEu := 210 2004 ([DIRS 169183], Section 6.9.2).
The lower bound is 1 year based on closure of
Tl := 1 := 10000 repository and the upper bound is 10,000 years based
Tu 
on regulatory period (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169183], 
Section 6.9.2) . 
Calculate a set of sample values for each of the random variables (i.e., seismic
exceedance frequency and time to first seismic event).
i := 0ns - 1
.. 
IE:= qunif Xi0, IEl, IEu) Sample mean annual seismic exceedance frequency
si (, 
T:= qunif Xi1, Tl, Tu) Sample time (when first seismic event occurred)
si (, 
ANL-EBS-NU-000008 REV 01 D-3 of D-9 October 2004 

Waste Package Damage due to Fault Displacement 
if
=
- 8 - 12
610 110 


... 
..
IEsi 
, 1
,
:=
WP21APi 
...
- 8 - 12
410 110 


..
if 
IEsi 
=
, 1
:=
WP12APi
, 
... 
- 8 - 12
610 110 


..
if 
IEsi 
=
, 1
:=
WP44APi
, 
... 
- 8 - 12
410 110 


..
if 
IEsi 
=
, 1
:=
WP24APi
, 
... 
- 7 - 12
210 110 


..
if 
IEsi 
=
, 1
:=
WPDOEsi
, 
... 
- 7 - 12
210 110 


..
if 
IEsi 
=
, 1
:=
WPDOELi
, 
... 
IEsi 
- 7 - 12
110 110 


..
if
WPDOEmcoi 
=
, 1
:=
, 
License Application Seepage Flux Rates 
The seepage distributions are based on the License Application (LA) seepage 
abstraction model Abstraction of Drift Seepage (BSC 2004 [DIRS 169131]). The outputs 
were fit to Weibull distributions based on the sampling process developed to obtain the 
seepage rates for the low, mean, and upper glacial transition climate cases. The 
distributions are for both the Tptpll and Tptpmn zones (see Appendix C). The Tptpll 
zone uses the collapsed drift seepage rates, while the Tptpmn zone increases the 
nominal seepage rates by 20%. 
Tptpll Seepage (m 3/yr) (Drift Collapse) Tptpmn Seepage (m 3/yr) (Drift Degraded {1.2}) 
...
0.495
.
..
...
0.5135
.
.. 
... 
..
...
..
r 
9.303 
r 
5.099 
STlptl(r) 1
-
-
STlptn(r) 1
--
:= 
:=
exp 
exp 
...
0.4561
.
..
...
0.4619
.
.. 
... 
..
...
..
r 
145.5 
r 
84.14 
STmptl(r) 1
--
STmptn(r) 1
--
:= 
:=
exp 
exp 
...
0.4858
.
..
...
0.4932
.
.. 
... 
r 
381 
..
...
..
r 
223.2 
STuptl(r) 1
-
-
STuptn(r) 1
--
:= 
:=
exp 
exp 

Free volume input parameters for the Commercial waste packages in order to 
calculate the flow rate required to fill the waste package within the regulatory 
period of 10,000 years. 
:= 4685 Vr12pwr := 3280 Free volume of a Commercial WPs (liters) BoronVr21pwr 
Loss from CSNF Waste Packages (BSC 2003 
:= 4850 Vr24bwr := 2700 [DIRS 165890], Sections 4 and 6).
Vr44bwr 
:= 4411 Free volume of a DOE Short WP (liters) Impacts of Updated Design and
VrDOEs 
Rates on EQ6 Calculations for Chemical Degradation of Fermi and 
:= 4638 TRIGA Codisposal Waste Packages (BSC 2004 [DIRS 171809], Section
VrDOEmco 
5.1.1). VrDOEMCO and VrDOEL derived in DOE MCO.04.xls and DOE 
:= 6320 long.04.xls
VrDOEL 
Time to fill waste package is based on time of seismic event (i.e., 10,000 years minus 
time seismic event occurred. 
t1i := 10000 - 
Tsi 
Seepage rate (l/yr) required to fill the waste package types within regulatory period 
Vr21pwr Vr12pwr Vr44bwr Vr24bwr
V21pwrdri 
:= V12pwrdri 
:= V44bwrdri 
:= V24bwrdri 
:= 
t1t1t1t1
iiii 
VrDOEmco VrDOEL VrDOEs
VDOEmcodri 
:= VDOELdri 
:= VDOEsdri 
:= 
t1t1t1
i ii 
reqdr 21pwri 
:= V21pwrdri 
reqdr 12pwri 
:= V12pwrdri 
reqdr 44bwri 
:= V44bwrdri 
reqdr DOEsi 
:= VDOEsdri 
reqdr DOEmcoi 
:= VDOEmcodri 
reqdr DOELi 
:= VDOELdri 
reqdr 24bwri 
:= V24bwrdri 
Seepage Filling based on Waste Package Damage from Faulting 
Seepage flux at the drift required to 
fill waste package based on damage 
to drip shield and waste package in 
Lithophysal Zone (Localized Corrosion 
Seepage only). 
Seepage flux at the drift required to fill 
waste package based on damage to 
drip shield and waste package in 
Nonlithophysal Zone (Localized 
Corrosion Seepage only) . 
reqdr 21pwri 
reqdr 21pwridr21pwrptli 
:= 
. WP21APi 
. 
dr21pwr ptn i 
:= 21-PWR 
. WP21APi 
. 
.. .. 
reqdr 12pwri 
reqdr 12pwridr12pwrptli 
:= 
. WP12APi 
. 
dr12pwr ptn i 
:= 
. WP12APi 
. 12-PWR 
.. .. 

reqdr 44bwri 
reqdr 44bwri 
:= :=
dr44bwrptli 
dr44bwrptni 
44-BWR
..
WP44APi 
..
..
WP44APi 
..
reqdr 24bwri 
reqdr 24bwri
dr24bwrptli 
:= 
dr24bwrptni 
:= 
24-BWR
..
WP24APi 
..
..
WP24APi 
..
reqdr DOEsi 
reqdr DOEsi 
:= DOE Short
drDOEsptni 
drDOEsptli 
:= 
WPDOEsi 
..
..
WPDOEsi 
.. 
.. 
reqdr DOEmcoi 
reqdr DOEmcoi 
:= DOE MCO
drDOEmcoptli 
drDOEmcoptni 
:= 
..
WPDOEmcoi 
..
..
WPDOEmcoi 
..
reqdr DOELi 
reqdr DOELi 
DOE Long
drDOELptni 
drDOELptli 
:= 
:= 
..
WPDOELi 
..
..
WPDOELi 
..
Using the seepage flux calculated above, the probability of having at least, x, 
seepage flux or greater flowing into the damaged waste package are calculated 
using the developed Weibull distributions. 
Lithophysal Zone Nonlithophysal Zone 
P21pwrptlli 
1
-
.. 
- 
STlptl dr21pwrptli 
P21pwrpnlli 
1
-
STlptn 
dr21pwrptni 
..
..
..
:= 
:= 
P21pwrptlmi 
1 
STmdr21pwrptlptli 
.. 
.. 
.. 
STuptl dr21pwrptli 
P21pwrpnlmi 
1
-
STmptn 
dr21pwrptni 
..
..
..
:= 
:= 
21-PWR 
P21pwrptlui 
1
-
P21pwrpnlui 
1
-
STuptn 
dr21pwrptni 
..
..
:= 
:= 
P12pwrptlli 
1
- 
.. 
.. 
- 
STlptl dr12pwrptli 
STmptl dr12pwrptli 
P12pwrpnlli 
1
-
STlptn 
dr12pwrptni 
..
..
..
:= 
:= 
P12pwrptlmi 
1 
P12pwrpnlmi 
1
-
STmptn 
dr12pwrptni 
..
..
..
:= 
:= 
12-PWR 
P12pwrptlui 
1
-
.. 
.. 
STuptl dr12pwrptli 
P12pwrpnlui 
1
-
STuptn 
dr12pwrptni 
..
..
:= 
:= 
P44bwrptlli 
1
-
STlptl 
dr44bwrptli 
..
P44bwrpnlli 
1
-
STlptn 
dr44bwrptni 
..
..
..
:= 
:= 
P44bwrptlmi 
1
-
STmptl
..
dr44bwrptli 
P44bwrpnlmi 
1
-
STmptn 
dr44bwrptni 
..
..
..
:= 
:= 
44-BWR 
P44bwrptlui 
1
:=
-
STuptl
..
dr44bwrptli 
..
P44bwrpnlui 
1
:=
-
STuptn
..
dr44bwrptni 
..

P24bwrptlli 
1
-
STlptl 
dr24bwrptli 
..
P24bwrpnlli 
1
-
STlptn 
dr24bwrptni 
..
..
..
:= 
:= 
P24bwrptlmi 
1
-
STmptl 
dr24bwrptli 
P24bwrpnlmi 
1
-
STmptn 
dr24bwrptni 
:= 
:= 
24-BWR
..
..
..
..
1
-
STuptl
..
dr24bwrptli 
P24bwrpnlui 
1
-
STuptn
..
dr24bwrptni
P24bwrptlui 
:=
..
..
:= 
PDOEsptlli 
1
-
STlptl 
drDOEsptli 
..
PDOEspnlli 
1 
STlptn drDOEsptni 
-.. 
.. 
..
:= 
:= 
PDOEsptlmi 
1
-
STmptl
..
drDOEsptli 
PDOEspnlmi 
1
-
STmptn
..
drDOEsptni 
..
..
:= 
:= 
DOE Short 
PDOEsptlui 
1
-
STuptl 
drDOEsptli 
PDOEspnlui 
1
-
STuptn 
drDOEsptni 
..
..
..
..
:= 
:= 
PDOEmcoptlli 
1
-
STlptl 
drDOEmcoptli 
PDOEmcopnlli 
1
-
STlptn 
drDOEmcoptni 
..
..
..
..
:= 
:= 
PDOEmcoptlmi 
1
-
STmptl 
drDOEmcoptli 
PDOEmcopnlmi 
1
-
STmptn 
drDOEmcoptni 
..
..
..
..
:= 
:= 
DOE MCO 
PDOEmcoptlui 
1
-
STuptl 
drDOEmcoptli 
PDOEmcopnlui 
1
-
STuptn 
drDOEmcoptni 
..
..
..
..
:= 
:= 
PDOELptlli 
1
-
STlptl 
drDOELptli 
PDOELpnlli 
1
-
STlptn 
drDOELptni 
..
..
..
..
:= 
:= 
PDOELptlmi 
1
-
STmptl 
drDOELptli 
PDOELpnlmi 
1
-
STmptn 
drDOELptni 
..
..
..
..
:= 
:= 
DOE Long 
PDOELptlui 
1
-
STuptl
..
drDOELptli 
PDOELpnlui 
1
-
STuptn
..
drDOELptni 
..
..
:= 
:= 
The mean probability of at least, x, seepage flux or greater entering a damaged 
waste package due to localized corrosion (seepage only) in order to fill the free 
volume within 10,000 years is listed below. 
per 21-PWR WP per 21-PWR WP 
(Lithophysal Zone) (Nonlithophysal Zone) 
- 1
10 
- 1
10
)
mean P21pwrptll 1.771
(
)(
mean P21pwrpnll 1.581

== 
- 1
10 
- 1
10
)
) 
(
( 
mean P21pwrptlm 
mean P21pwrptlu 
)
) 
(
( 
mean P21pwrpnlm 
mean P21pwrpnlu 
2.314 
2.242

== 
- 1
10 
- 1
10
2.447 
2.404

== 
per 12-PWR WP per 12-PWR WP 
(Lithophysal Zone) (Nonlithophysal Zone) 
- 1
10 
- 1
10
)(
mean P12pwrptll 1.129
)(
mean P12pwrpnll 1.027

== 
- 1
10 
- 1
10
)
) 
(
( 
mean P12pwrptlm 
mean P12pwrptlu 
)
) 
(
( 
mean P12pwrpnlm 
mean P12pwrpnlu 
1.415 
1.378

== 
- 1
10 
- 1
10
1.486 
1.464

== 

per 44-BWR WP per 44-BWR WP 
(Lithophysal Zone) (Nonlithophysal Zone) 
- 1 (- 1
mean P44bwrptll)= 1.76  10 mean P44bwrpnll)= 1.568  10 
- 1 (- 1 
( 
mean P44bwrptlm)= 2.31  10 mean P44bwrpnlm)= 2.237  10 
- 1 (- 1 
( 
mean P44bwrptlu)= 2.445  10 mean P44bwrpnlu)= 2.401  10
( 
per 24-BWR WP per 24-BWR WP 
(Lithophysal Zone) (Nonlithophysal Zone) 
- 1 (- 1
mean P24bwrptll)= 1.162  10 mean P24bwrpnll)= 1.066  10 
- 1 (- 1 
( 
mean P24bwrptlm)= 1.428  10 mean P24bwrpnlm)= 1.394  10 
- 1 (- 1 
( 
mean P24bwrptlu)= 1.494  10 mean P24bwrpnlu)= 1.474  10
( 
per DOE Short WP per DOE Short WP 
(Lithophysal Zone) (Nonlithophysal Zone) 
- 1 (- 1
mean PDOEsptl l)= 6.816  10 mean PDOEspnl l)= 6.108  10 
- 1 (- 1 
( 
mean PDOEsptl m)= 8.83  10 mean PDOEspnl m)= 8.565  10 
- 1 (- 1 
( 
mean PDOEsptl u)= 9.325  10 mean PDOEspnl u)= 9.167  10
( 
per DOE MCO WP per DOE MCO WP 
(Lithophysal Zone) (Nonlithophysal Zone) 
- 1 (- 1
mean PDOEmcoptll)= 3.191  10 mean PDOEmcopnll)= 2.849  10 
- 1 (- 1 
( 
mean PDOEmcoptlm)= 4.167  10 mean PDOEmcopnlm)= 4.038  10 
- 1 (- 1 
( 
mean PDOEmcoptlu)= 4.407  10 mean PDOEmcopnlu)= 4.33  10
( 
per DOE Long WP per DOE Long WP 
(Lithophysal Zone) (Nonlithophysal Zone) 
- 1 (- 1
mean PDOELptll)= 6.364  10 mean PDOELpnll)= 5.579  10 
- 1 (- 1 
( 
mean PDOELptlm)= 8.644  10 mean PDOELpnlm)= 8.339  10 
- 1 (- 1 
( 
mean PDOELptlu)= 9.205  10 mean PDOELpnlu)= 9.019  10
( 

INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

APPENDIX E
DESCRIPTION OF EVENT TREE TOP EVENTS

INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

APPENDIX E - DESCRIPTION OF EVENT TREE TOP EVENTS
The first event tree (Appendix B, Figure B-1) defines the fractional breakdown of the waste forms and waste 
package types proposed for disposal in the repository. This event tree is a stand-alone tree (i.e., none of its end 
states transfer to a sub-event tree). Its purpose is to graphically identify the fraction of total waste package inventory 
for each waste form and waste package type, including naval waste package types. 
The 22 commercial and DOE SNF waste package types listed in Figure B-1 are utilized as the initiating event in 22 
separate event trees. The sole purpose of these event trees is to transfer to the event tree that initiates the evaluation 
of the four criticality FEPs cases. The YMP-INIT-EVENTS end state name in the END-STATE column of 
Figure B-2 indicates the name of the event tree to which the transfer occurs. 
The YMP-INIT-EVENTS event tree is presented in (Appendix B, Figure B-3. This event tree directs the 
evaluation of the four criticality FEPs cases  (1) Base Case, (2) Seismic Disruptive Event, (3) Rock Fall 
Disruptive Event, and (4) Igneous Disruptive Event. These cases are respectively represented by the four branches 
of the first top event  INIT-EVENT. 
As indicated by the top event SEIS-RANGE, the seismic disruptive event has been divided into four sub-events, 
each representing a seismic frequency range. Top event SEIS-DAMAGE further subdivides the top three seismic 
frequency ranges based on whether the seismic induced damage results from ground motion or faulting. 
The top three branches of top event SEIS-RANGE are further subdivided to account for the waste package failure 
dependency on seismic induced ground motions and faulting. The lower branch of top event SEIS-RANGE is not 
subdivided because seismic faulting is not predicted to result in any waste package failures for this annual 
exceedance frequency range. The event GROUND MOTION defines the upper branch of the SEIS-DAMAGE top 
event and is used to evaluate the potential of waste package failure due to seismic induced ground motions. The 
event FAULTING represents the lower branch of the SEIS-DAMAGE top event and is used to evaluate the potential 
of waste package failure due to seismic induced faulting. 
The rock fall disruptive event is represented by the third branch of top event INIT-EVENT. The basic event for this 
criticality FEPs case is ROCKFALL-EVENT. Rock fall is the result of natural drift degradation phenomena and is 
expected to occur throughout the postclosure period without any predictable frequency. The rock fall disruptive 
event is differentiated from rock fall that may occur during a seismic disruptive event. 
The igneous disruptive event case is represented by the fourth branch of the INIT-EVENT top event. Its basic event 
is IGNEOUS-EVENT. 
The DRIFT top event of the YMP-INIT-EVENTS event tree is used to split the criticality FEP evaluations 
between the two geological zones of the drifts  lithophysal and nonlithophysal. It is important to distinguish 
between the two geological units to account for their different impacts on seepage, drip shield damage, and waste 
package damage. 
The sequences of the YMP-INIT-EVENTS event tree of Figure B-3 automatically transfer to another event tree. 
An event tree transfer is indicated by the T after the sequence numbers in the # column. The MSL-ET end 
state name in the END-STATE column for the first ten sequences indicates the name of the event tree to which the 
transfer occurs. The MSL-ET event tree (shown in Figure B-4) performs the probability evaluation for 
availability of seepage, drip shield and waste package failure, availability of condensation, seepage accumulation in 
the waste package (i.e., formation of a bathtub or flow-through configuration), and neutron absorber material 
misload. 
The end state names for the remaining two sequences indicates a transfer to the IGNEOUS event tree. The 
IGNEOUS event tree directs the probability evaluation of potentially critical configurations during an igneous 
event. 
As presented in the MSL-ET event tree and its continuation event tree MSL-ET2, nine top events are used to 
define the events and processes necessary for the formation of a waste package bathtub or flow-through 
configuration. The purpose of the first top event, MS-IC-1A, is to evaluate the probability of infiltration water or 
seepage reaching the drift. This top event is separated into four branches. The first branch represents the no 

seepage case. The second through fourth branches represent lower-bound, mean, and upper-bound seepage rates, 
respectively. 
If seepage is predicted to occur (i.e., one of the bottom three branches), then top event MS-NF-T is queried. The 
purpose of this top event is to account for the availability of water in the drift invert, or near-field. Water in the 
invert provides a transport mechanism of fissile material to the far-field in the event of waste package breach and its 
release of the waste form. Water in the invert may also provide a reducing environment that causes the deposition 
and accumulation of fissile material in the near-field. The upper branch, of this top event accounts for the 
availability of water to enter a failed waste package. The lower branch accounts for seepage water in the invert. 
The lower branch transfers directly to the near-field event tree CONFIG-NF4 for further evaluation. 
Top event MS-IC-2 evaluates the probability that, given seepage in the drift, the drip shield is failed in such a 
manner to allow water to pass through to the waste package. Regardless of whether the drip shield is failed (i.e., 
branching goes down) or not (i.e., branching goes up), top event MS-IC-1B is queried. If the drip shield is failed, 
the query of top event MS-IC-1B is performed to determine if, in addition to seepage, condensation water flux is 
available to enter a waste package. If the drip shield is not failed, the query of the condensation top event is 
performed to determine if any water flux is available to enter a waste package. 
Other than those sequences of top event MS-NF-T that transfer to the CONFIG-NF4 event tree, all sequences of 
the MSL-ET event tree transfer to its continuation event tree MSL-ET2. 
There are six top events in the MSL-ET2 event tree to complete the master scenario list initiation. The first top 
event to be queried is MS-IC-3A. Top event MS-IC-3A evaluates the probability of a waste package failure. The 
branching of this top event allows for both advective and diffusive failures of the waste package as well as no waste 
package failures. The middle branch of this top event represents a diffusive failure of the waste package. The 
bottom branch of this top event represents a waste package failure that allows advective flow of water to enter and 
support the generation of a potentially critical configuration. If the waste package is not failed (i.e., branching goes 
up), then the analysis is terminated. Termination of sequence evaluation is indicated by the @END-ANALYSIS end 
state name (the @ symbol prefixing an end state name indicates to SAPHIRE to stop processing). 
Top event MS-IC-3B evaluates the probability that, given an advective flow path into the waste package (bottom 
branch of top event MS-IC-3A), either a flow-through or a bathtub configuration is formed. A flow-through 
configuration results from a failure of both the top and bottom of the waste package, allowing the water to flow in 
through the top of the waste package and out through the bottom. This configuration is represented by the upper 
branch of this top event. A bathtub configuration is formed when only a top failure of the waste package occurs. 
The bathtub waste package configuration is represented by the bottom branch of this top event. If a flow-through 
waste package configuration is formed, the next top event queried is NA-MISLOAD. If a bathtub waste package 
configuration is formed, then top event MS-IC-4 is queried. 
Top event MS-IC-4 evaluates the probability that, given its availability to enter a failed waste package, water 
accumulates in and fills the waste package creating a potentially critical configuration. The probability value for 
water accumulation and waste package filling is dependent on the seepage scenario of top event MS-IC-1A of event 
MSL-ET. Therefore, separate branches are provided in top event MS-IC-4 that reflect the branching of MS-IC-
1A for the lower-bound, mean, and upper-bound seepage scenarios. The second through fourth branches from the 
top of this top event respectively represents these seepage scenarios. The upper branch of this top event represents 
the probability that water does not accumulate in sufficient quantity to fill the waste package. 
The accumulation and retention of water in the waste package is referred to as a bathtub configuration and is 
represented on the event tree as a downward branch for top event MS-IC-3B. It is also possible for water to enter 
the waste package, but does not accumulate due to a breach in the waste package bottom. This condition is referred 
to as a flow-through configuration and is represented on the event tree as an upward branch for top event MS-IC-3B. 
Potentially critical configurations could result from either condition through the degradation of the waste package 
internals and the separation or removal of neutron absorber and/or fissile materials. 
Another possible configuration is one in which a breach in the top and bottom of the waste package exists, but that 
the bottom hole is much smaller than the top hole so more water could enter the waste package through the top than 
could exit through the bottom. This configuration is not explicitly considered in this analysis because the low 
seepage rates predicted in the repository would preclude this configuration from occurring. In addition, this waste 
package configuration can be considered a subset of the bathtub configuration. 

The next top event evaluated for the MSL-ET2event tree is NA-MISLOAD. This top event is queried for either 
waste package diffusive or advective (both bathtub and flow-through configurations) failure branches of the all 
branches of the MS-IC-3A and MS-IC-3B top events. The NA-MISLOAD top event evaluates the probability that 
neutron absorber material is not loaded as designed into the waste package or waste form. Evaluation of neutron 
absorber material misload is an important consideration for the determination of a configurations criticality 
potential. Dependent on the top event MS-IC-4 branching, both misload and no misload branches transfer to the 
appropriate CONFIG-BATH and CONFIG-NOBATH event trees for further criticality potential evaluation. 
If the NA-MISLOAD top event is queried following a diffusive failure of the waste package (middle branch of top 
event MS-IC-3A), then the processing of these sequences proceeds to the evaluation of top events WF-MISLOAD 
and CRIT-POT-WF. The WF-MISLOAD misload top event queries the potential for misloading the waste 
packages waste form and top event CRIT-POT-WF evaluates the criticality potential of the resulting configuration. 
The upper branch of the CRIT-POT-WF top event indicates that this configuration does not have any criticality 
potential and processing of this sequence is terminated. The lower branch of this top event indicates that the 
configuration has a criticality potential and the probability associated with that potential is assigned to end state IPDRY. 
E.1 DISCRIPTION OF EVENT TREES MSL-ET AND MSL-ET2 
The following subsections provide description of the top events of the event tree MSL-ET event tree (Appendix B, 
Figure B-4) and its continuation event tree MSL-ET2 (Appendix B, Figure B-5). This event tree consists of 10 
top events. 
Six events and processes are required to define the formation of a waste package bathtub or flow-through 
configuration. These events are listed as top events of the MSL-ET event tree and its continuation event tree 
MSL-ET2. These events are: 
(1) 
The probability that seepage flux is available to enter a waste package (top event MS-IC-1A) 
(2) 
The probability of drip shield failure (top event MS-IC-2) 
(3) 
The probability that condensation flux is available to enter a waste package (top event MS-IC-1B) 
(4) 
The probability of waste package failure (top event MS-IC-3A) 
(5) 
The probability that the waste package failure will allow for the formation of a bathtub configuration (top 
event MS-IC-3B) 
For bathtub configurations only: 
(6) 
The probability of sufficient seepage to fill and overflow the waste package during the regulatory period 
(top event MS-IC-4). 
In addition, event trees MSL-ET and MSL-ET2 contain four other top events necessary to define the internal 
and external configuration classes. The first of these is top event MS-NF-T that defines whether seepage that 
reaches the drift flows directly to the invert and is available to influence the formation of near-field configuration 
classes. The second top event, NA-MISLOAD, helps define the internal waste package conditions by querying 
whether the waste packages or waste forms neutron absorber material was misloaded. The third top event, WFMISLOAD, 
defines the probability that a waste form has been misloaded into a waste package. Finally, the fourth 
top event determines the criticality potential for failed waste packages under dry diffusion conditions. 
The following subsections provide descriptions of event trees MSL-ET and MSL-ET2 for the base case 
criticality FEPs analysis. This event tree consists of 10 top events. 
E.1.1 Top Event MSIC1A 
Seepage reaching the drift is an important factor in waste package degradation and criticality potential. Two 
parameters characterize the seepage into the emplacement drifts  the seepage fraction (location within the drifts that 
see seepage) and the seepage rate (the volume of water entering the drift on an annual basis). The purpose of top 
event MS-IC-1A is to represent the possibility that seepage is available in a drift to enter a breached waste package. 
The upper branch of this top event indicates that seepage does not occur and the bottom three branches indicates that 

seepage does occur: branch 1  lower-bound seepage scenario, branch 2  mean seepage scenario and branch 3  
upper-bound seepage scenario. 
The appropriate seepage probability is then substituted into the SAPHIRE analysis based on the sequence branching 
of top event DRIFT-ZONE of the YMP-INIT-EVENT event tree 
E.1.2 Top Event MSNF-T 
The branching of top event MS-NF-T represents the availability of seepage to flow directly into the invert. The 
upper branch indicates that seepage does not flow into the invert and the lower branch indicates that it is available. 
If seepage is available to flow directly into the invert, the sequence transfers to the CONFIG-NF4 event tree for 
the evaluation of near-field configuration class NF-4. 
E.1.3 Top Event MSIC2 
The probability of water passing through the drip shield to a failed waste package is an important factor in waste 
package degradation and criticality. This event is associated with top event MSIC2 of the MSLET event tree 
(Appendix B, Figure B-4). The upper branch represents no drip shield failure and the lower branch represents that 
the drip shield has failed. 
Water pathways through the drip shield can be created by corrosion and/or gaps caused by the drip shield response 
to events such as seismic activity and emplacement errors. Drip shield failures can be categorized as being caused 
by either time-dependent or time-independent mechanisms. Corrosion failure mechanisms are time-dependent and 
may be active or inactive during the performance evaluation period. 
Time-independent drip shield failure mechanisms are defined as those failure mechanisms that can occur randomly 
from the time of initial emplacement. Drip shield emplacement errors, rock fall, or seismic events are types of time-
independent failure mechanisms that can potentially result in immediate creation of an advective pathway through 
the drip shield. In certain cases, such as fabrication errors, the failure mechanism is an initiator that exacerbates 
corrosion (a time-dependent mechanism). 
E.1.4 Top Event MSIC1B 
The availability of condensation water to enter a failed waste package is an important factor in waste package 
degradation and criticality and is associated with top event MSIC1B of the MSLET event tree (Appendix B, 
Figure B-4). The upper branch of this top event represents the unavailability of condensation to enter a failed waste 
package. The lower branch represents that condensation is available to enter a failed waste package. 
E.1.5 Top Event MSIC3A 
The ability for water to enter a waste package is an important factor in waste package degradation and criticality and 
is associated with top event MSIC3A of the MSLET2 event tree. Water pathways into the waste package can 
be created by corrosion and/or failures caused by the waste package response to events such as seismic activity and 
fabrication errors. Waste package failures can be categorized as being caused by either time-dependent or time-
independent mechanisms. Corrosion failure mechanisms are time-dependent and may be active or inactive during 
the performance evaluation period. 
Time-independent waste package failure mechanisms are defined as those failure mechanisms that can occur 
randomly from the time of initial emplacement. A seismic event is a type of time-independent failure mechanism 
that can potentially result in immediate creation of an advective pathway into the waste package. In certain cases, 
such as fabrication errors, the failure mechanism is an initiator that exacerbates corrosion (a time-dependent 
mechanism). 
Waste package failure is defined as those waste package damage mechanisms that can result in either a diffusive or 
advective flow path into the waste package. The upper branch of this top event represents the probability of no 
waste package failures. The second and third branches respectively represent the probability of a diffusive or 
advective waste package failure. Waste package failure could be the result of a crack in the waste package surface 
or from the catastrophic failure of the complete waste package. As will be discussed, not all waste package damage 
mechanisms results in an advective failure of the waste package. 

E.1.6 Top Event MSIC3B 
The branching of top event MS-IC-3B represents the probability that waste package failure will result in the 
formation of a bathtub or flow-through configuration. The upper branch indicates the formation of a flow-through 
waste package configuration and the lower branch indicates that a bathtub configuration is formed. 
E.1.7 Top Event MS-IC-4 
The availability of sufficient water to fill and overflow a waste package in a bathtub configuration is associated with 
top event MS-IC-4 of the MSL-ET2 event tree. The upper branch of this top event represents that there is 
insufficient seepage to fill and overflow a failed waste package during the regulatory period. The second, third, and 
fourth branches represent the probability of sufficient seepage to fill and overflow a failed waste package for the 
lower-bound, mean, and upper-bound seepage scenarios, respectively. 
E.1.8 Top Event NAMISLOAD 
The presence of neutron absorber materials in a waste package is important to criticality control during the 
regulatory period for the majority of the waste forms proposed for disposal in the repository. Misload of the neutron 
absorber materials is associated with top event NAMISLOAD of the MSLET2 event tree. The upper branch of 
this top event indicates that there is no neutron absorber material misload and the lower branch indicates that there is 
a misload. 
Neutron absorber material misload can occur as the result of several mechanisms during the waste package 
fabrication and loading processes. These processes include the use of wrong materials, failure to load the neutron 
absorber materials into the waste package or waste form, and selection of the wrong waste package type. 
Assessment of the neutron absorber material misload event only accounts for the potential to load no or less than the 
designed mass of neutron absorber material. No penalty is assigned for loading additional neutron absorber 
materials into a waste package or waste form. 
E.1.9 Top Event WFMISLOAD 
The WFMISLOAD top event represent the probability that a waste form was incorrectly placed into a waste 
package or DOE standardized SNF canister during the preclosure loading process. The lower branch of this top 
event indicates the occurrence of a waste form misload and the upper branch indicates that no misload occurred. 
E.1.10 Top Event CRIT-POT-WF 
The branching of top event CRIT-POT-WF represents the criticality potential of a waste package with a diffusive 
failure. The upper branch indicates that this configuration does not have any criticality potential and the lower 
branch indicates that it does. 
E.2 DESCRIPTION OF EVENT TREE CONFIGBATH 
The following subsections provide description of the top events of the event tree CONFIGBATH (Appendix B, 
Figure B-6). This event tree consists of 11 top events. 
E.2.1 Top Event CONFIG-SCEN 
The branching of top event CONFIG-SCEN is used to configure the in-package, bathtub configuration classes IP-1, 
IP-2, and IP-3 for evaluation. The upper branch is not utilized in these analyses and is included only as a modeling 
convenience. The three in-package, bathtub configuration classes are represented by the second through fourth 
branches from the top of this top event. These three branches direct the evaluation of configuration subclass IP-1, 
IP-2, and IP-3, respectively. 

E.2.2 Top Event MS-IC-6 
The branching of top event MS-IC-6 initiates the evaluation of in-package configuration class IP-1 defined as the 
scenario in which the waste package internal structures degrade at a slower rate than the waste form. This top event 
has five branches that are accessed by the second branch of top event CONFIG-SCEN. The upper branch indicates 
that waste package internal structures do not degrade slower than the waste form and the lower four branches 
indicate that they do. 
E.2.3 Top Event MS-IC-7 
The branching of top event MS-IC-7 represents the in-package scenario of the waste package internal structures 
degrading at the same rate as the waste form and the subsequent transfer of the SAPHIRE evaluation to event tree 
CONFIG-IP2-D. This top event is queried by the third branch of top event CONFIG-SCEN. The upper branch 
indicates that the waste package internal structures do not degrade at the same rate as the waste form and the lower 
branch indicates that they do. 
E.2.4 Top Event MS-IC-8 
The branching of top event MS-IC-8 represents the in-package scenario of the waste package internal structures 
degrading faster than the waste form and the subsequent transfer of the SAPHIRE evaluation to event tree 
CONFIG-IP3. This top event is queried by the fourth branch of top event CONFIG-SCEN. The upper branch 
indicates that the waste package internal structures do not degrade faster than the waste form and the lower branch 
indicates that they do. 
E.2.5 Top Event MS-IC-9 
The branching of top event MS-IC-9 represents the waste form degrading in-place for the evaluation of 
configuration subclass IP-1A. This top event is queried by the second branch of top event MS-IC-6. The upper 
branch indicates that the waste form does not degrade in-place and the lower branch indicates that it does. 
E.2.6 Top Event MS-IC-10 
The branching of top event MS-IC-10 evaluates whether waste package internal structures degrade at some point 
during the regulatory period thereby transforming configuration class IP-1 into IP-2. This top event is queried by 
the third branch of top event MSIC6. The upper branch indicates that the waste package internal components do 
not degrade and the lower branch indicates that they do. 
E.2.7 Top Event MS-IC-11 
The branching of top event MS-IC-11 represents the mobilization of the degraded waste form and its separation 
from any intact neutron absorber material. The upper branch indicates that the degraded waste form is not separated 
from any intact neutron absorber materials and the lower two branches indicate that it does. The second branch of 
this top event evaluates configuration subclass IP-1B. The third, or bottom, branch of this top event represents the 
flushing of the mobilized waste form into the near-field environment via this sequences immediate transfer to the 
CONFIG-NF-F event tree. 
E.2.8 Top Event MS-IC-12 
The branching of top event MS-IC-12 evaluates whether waste package bottom fails at some point during the 
regulatory period thereby transforming configuration class IP-1 into IP-4. This top event is queried by the fourth 
branch of top event MS-IC-6. The upper branch indicates that the waste package bottom does not fail and the lower 
branch indicates that they do. 

E.2.9 Top Event WF-MISLOAD 
The WF-MISLOAD top event represents the probabilty that a waste form was incorrectly placed into a waste 
package or DOE standardized SNF canister during the preclosure loading process. The lower branch of this top 
event indicates the occurrence of a waste form misload and the upper branch indicates that no misload occurred. 
E.2.10 Top Event CRIT-POT-WF 
The branching of top event CRIT-POT-WF represents the criticality potential of configuration. The upper branch 
indicates that configuration does not have a criticality potential and the lower branch indicates that it does. 
E.3 DESCRIPTION OF EVENT TREE CONFIGNOBATH 
The following subsections provide description of the top events of the event tree CONFIGNOBATH 
(Appendix B, Figure B-7). This event tree consists of four top events. 
E.3.1 Top Event CONFIG-SCEN 
The branching of top event CONFIG-SCEN is used to configure the in-package, flow through configuration classes 
IP-4, IP-5, and IP-6 for evaluation. The upper branch is not utilized in these analyses and is included only as a 
modeling convenience. The three in-package, flow through configuration classes are represented by the second 
through fourth branches from the top of this top event. These three branches direct the evaluation of configuration 
subclass IP-4, IP-5, and IP-6, respectively. 
E.3.2 Top Event MC-IC-29 
The branching of top event MS-IC-31 represents the in-package scenario of the waste package internal structures 
degrading slower than the waste form and the subsequent transfer of the SAPHIRE evaluation to event tree 
CONFIG-IP4-A. This top event is queried by the second branch of top event CONFIG-SCEN. The upper branch 
indicates that the waste package internal structures do not degrade slower than the waste form and the lower branch 
indicates that they do. 
E.3.3 Top Event MS-IC-30 
The branching of top event MS-IC-30 represents the in-package scenario of the waste package internal structures 
degrading at the same rate as the waste form and the subsequent transfer of the SAPHIRE evaluation to event tree 
CONFIG-IP5-B. This top event is queried by the third branch of top event CONFIG-SCEN. The upper branch 
indicates that the waste package internal structures do not degrade at the same rate as the waste form and the lower 
branch indicates that they do. 
E.3.4 Top Event MS-IC-31 
The branching of top event MS-IC-31 represents the in-package scenario of the waste package internal structures 
degrading faster than the waste form and the subsequent transfer of the SAPHIRE evaluation to event tree 
CONFIG-IP6-C. This top event is queried by the fourth branch of top event CONFIG-SCEN. The upper branch 
indicates that the waste package internal structures do not degrade faster than the waste form and the lower branch 
indicates that they do. 
E.4 DESCRIPTION OF EVENT TREE CONFIGIP2-D 
The following subsections provide description of the top events of the event tree CONFIGIP2-D. This event tree 
consists of four top events. 

E.4.1 Top Event MS-IC-13 
The branching of top event MS-IC-13 determines whether the degraded waste form and waste package 
components collect at the bottom of the waste package. The upper branch indicates that the waste form and waste 
package components do not collect at bottom of waste package and bottom two branches indicate that they do. 
E.4.2 Top Event MS-IC-14 
Top event MS-IC-14 is queried as part of configuration IP-2 to determine whether soluble neutron absorbers are 
flushed from waste package. The upper branch indicates that soluble neutron absorbers are not flushed from waste 
package and the bottom branch indicates that they are. 
E.4.3 Top Event MS-IC-15 
Top event MS-IC-15 is queried as part of configuration class IP-5 to determine whether waste package bottom 
fails draining liquid. The upper branch indicates that waste package bottom does not fail draining liquid and the 
bottom branch indicates that it does. 
E.4.4 Top Event WF-MISLOAD 
The WF-MISLOAD top event represents the probabilty that a waste form was incorrectly placed into a waste 
package or DOE standardized SNF canister during the preclosure loading process. The lower branch of this top 
event indicates the occurrence of a waste form misload and the upper branch indicates that no misload occurred. 
E.4.5 Top Event CRIT-POT-WF 
The branching of top event CRIT-POT-WF represents the criticality potential of configuration. The upper branch 
indicates that configuration does not have a criticality potential and the lower branch indicates that it does. 
E.5 DESCRIPTION OF EVENT TREE CONFIGIP3 
The following subsections provide a description of the top events of the event tree CONFIGIP3 Appendix B, 
Figure B-9). This event tree consists of nine top events. 
E.5.1 Top Event CONFIG-SCEN 
The branching of top event CONFIG-SCEN is used to configure the in-package, bathtub configuration classes IP-3. 
The upper branch is not utilized in these analyses and is included only as a modeling convenience. The two in-
package, bathtub configuration classes are represented by the second through fourth branches from the top of this 
top event. These three branches direct the evaluation of configuration subclass IP-3, IP-5, and IP-6. 
E.5.2 Top Event MS-IC-16 
The branching of top event MS-IC-16 determines whether the basket structure supports mechanically collapse. 
The top branch indicates that they do not the bottom three branches indicate that they do. 
E.5.3 Top Event MS-IC-17 
Top event MS-IC-17 is queried as part of IP-3 to determine whether structures containing neutron absorbers fully 
degrade. The top branch indicates that they do not and the bottom branch indicates that they do. 
E.5.4 
Top Event MS-IC-18 
Top event MS-IC-18 is queried as part of IP-3 to determine whether soluble neutron absorbers are flushed from 
degraded portion of basket. The top branch indicates that they are not and the bottom branch indicates that they are. 

E.5.5 
Top Event MS-IC-22 
The branching of top event MS-IC-22 determines whether significant neutron absorber degradation occurs before 
structural collapse. The top branch indicates that it does not and the bottom three branches indicate that it does. 
E.5.6 Top Event MS-IC-23 
Top event MS-IC-23 is queried as part of IP-3 to determine whether waste package internal structures 
mechanically collapse and degrade. The top branch indicates that they do not and the bottom branch indicates that 
they do. 
E.5.7 Top Event MS-IC-24 
Top event MS-IC-24 is queried as part of IP-6 to determine whether waste package bottom fails and drains liquid. 
The top branch indicates that it does not and the bottom branch indicates that it does. 
E.5.8 Top Event WF-MISLOAD 
The WF-MISLOAD top event represents the probabilty that a waste form was incorrectly placed into a waste 
package or DOE standardized SNF canister during the preclosure loading process. The lower branch of this top 
event indicates the occurrence of a waste form misload and the upper branch indicates that no misload occurred. 
E.5.9 Top Event CRIT-POT-WF 
The branching of top event CRIT-POT-WF represents the criticality potential of configuration. The upper branch 
indicates that configuration does not have a criticality potential and the lower branch indicates that it does. 
E.6 DESCRIPTION OF EVENT TREE CONFIGIP3-G 
The following subsections provide description of the top events of the event tree CONFIGIP3-G (Appendix B, 
Figure B-10). This event tree consists of six top events. 
E.6.1 Top Event CONFIG-SCEN 
The branching of top event CONFIG-SCEN is used to configure the in-package, bathtub configuration classes IP3-G 
for evaluation. The upper branch is not utilized in these analyses and is included only as a modeling convenience. 
The three in-package, bathtub configuration classes are represented by the second through fourth branches from the 
top of this top event. These three branches direct the evaluation of configuration subclass IP3-G. 
E.6.2 Top Event MS-IC-19 
Top event MS-IC-19 is queried as part of IP-3 to determine whether soluble neutron absorbers are flushed from 
waste package. The top branch indicates they are not and the bottom branch indicates they are. 
E.6.3 Top Event MS-IC-20 
Top event MS-IC-20 is queried as part of IP-2 to determine whether waste form degrades mobilizing fissile 
material. The top branch indicates it does not and the bottom branch indicates it does. 
E.6.4 
Top Event MS-IC-21 
Top event MS-IC-21 is queried as part of IP-6 to determine whether waste package bottom fails and drains liquid. 
The top branch indicates it does not and the bottom branch indicates it does. 

E.6.5 
Top Event WF-MISLOAD 
The WF-MISLOAD top event represents the probabilty that a waste form was incorrectly placed into a waste 
package or DOE standardized SNF canister during the preclosure loading process. The lower branch of this top 
event indicates the occurrence of a waste form misload and the upper branch indicates that no misload occurred. 
E.6.6 Top Event CRIT-POT-WF 
The branching of top event CRIT-POT-WF represents the criticality potential of configuration. The upper branch 
indicates that configuration does not have a criticality potential and the lower branch indicates that it does. 
E.7 DESCRIPTION OF EVENT TREE CONFIGIP4-A 
The following subsections provide description of the top events of the event tree CONFIGIP4-A (Appendix B, 
Figure B-11). This event tree initiates the evaluation of the internal waste package configuration subclasses IP-4A 
and IP-4B. This event tree consists of six top events. 
E.7.1 Top Event CONFIG-SCEN 
The branching of top event CONFIG-SCEN is used to configure the in-package, flow-through configuration 
subclasses IP-4A and IP-4B. The upper branch is not utilized in these analyses and is included only for modeling 
convienence. The three in-package, flow-through configuration subclasses are represented by the second and third 
branches from the top of this top event. These two branches direct the evaluation of configuration subclass IP-4A 
and IP-4B, respectively. The bottom, or fourth, branch initiates a transfer to the processing of configuration class 
IP-5. 
E.7.2 Top Event MS-IC-32 
The branching of top event MS-IC-32 initiates the evaluation of in-package configuration subclass IP-4A defined as 
the scenario in which the waste form degradation products hydrate in their initial location. This top event is queried 
by the second branch of top event CONFIG-SCEN. The upper branch indicates that waste form degradation 
products do not hydrate in their initial location and the lower branch indicates that they do. 
E.7.3 Top Event MS-IC-33 
The branching of top event MS-IC-33 represents the degradation of the waste package internal structures. This top 
event is queried by the third branch of top event CONFIG-SCEN. The upper branch indicates that the waste 
package internal structures do not degrade and the lower branch indicates that they do. Activation of the lower 
branch of this top event initiates a transfer to the CONFIG-IP5-B event tree. 
E.7.4 Top Event MS-IC-34 
The branching of top event MS-IC-34 represents the mobilization and hydration of the degraded waste form and its 
separation from the neutron absorber materials of the waste package. This top event is queried by the third branch 
of top event CONFIG-SCEN. The upper branch of this top event indicates that the waste form is not mobilized and 
separated from the neutron absorber materials and the bottom two branches indicate that it is. The second branch 
represents the waste form mobilization and separation internal to the waste package to initiate the evaluation of 
configuration subclass IP-4B. The bottom, or third, branch represent the transport of the mobilized waste form to 
the near-field environment as indicated by the transfer to the CONFIG-NF-F event tree. 
E.7.5 Top Event WF-MISLOAD 
The WF-MISLOAD top event represents the probabilty that a waste form was incorrectly placed into a waste 
package or DOE standardized SNF canister during the preclosure loading process. The lower branch of this top 
event indicates the occurrence of a waste form misload and the upper branch indicates that no misload occurred. 

E.7.6 Top Event CRIT-POT-WF 
The branching of top event CRIT-POT-WF represents the criticality potential of configuration. The upper branch 
indicates that configuration does not have a criticality potential and the lower branch indicates that it does. 
E.8 DESCRIPTION OF EVENT TREE CONFIGIP5-B 
The following subsections provide description of the top events of the event tree CONFIGIP5-B (Appendix B, 
Figure B-12). This event tree initiates the evaluation of the internal waste package configuration subclass IP-5B. 
This event tree consists of four top events. 
E.8.1 Top Event MS-IC-35 
The branching of top event MS-IC-35 represents the accumulation of the hydrated waste form and waste package 
degraded internal components at the bottom of the waste package. The upper branch of this top event indicates that 
the waste form and degraded components do not collect on the bottom of the waste package and the bottom two 
branches indicate that it does. The second branch initiates the evaluation of configuration subclass IP-5B. The 
bottom, or third, branch represent the transport of the hydrated waste form and degraded internal components to the 
near-field environment as indicated by the transfer to the CONFIG-NF-F event tree. 
E.8.2 Top Event MS-IC-36 
Top event MS-IC-36 is queried as part of IP-5 to determine whether flow through flushing removes soluble 
neutron absorbers. The top branch indicates it does not and the bottom branch indicates it does. 
E.8.3 Top Event WF-MISLOAD 
The WF-MISLOAD top event represents the probabilty that a waste form was incorrectly placed into a waste 
package or DOE standardized SNF canister during the preclosure loading process. The lower branch of this top 
event indicates the occurrence of a waste form misload and the upper branch indicates that no misload occurred. 
E.8.4 Top Event CRIT-POT-WF 
The branching of top event CRIT-POT-WF represents the criticality potential of configuration. The upper branch 
indicates that configuration does not have a criticality potential and the lower branch indicates that it does. 
E.9 DESCRIPTION OF EVENT TREE CONFIGIP6-C 
The following subsections provide description of the top events of the event tree CONFIGIP6-C (Appendix B, 
Figure B-13). This event tree initiates the evaluation of the internal waste package configuration subclass IP-6C. 
This event tree consists of six top events. 
E.9.1 Top Event MS-IC-37 
The branching of top event MS-IC-37 determines whether the intact waste form settles in the bottom of the waste 
package and mixes with hydrated waste package corrosion products. The top branch indicates it does not and the 
bottom four branches indicate that it does. 
E.9.2 Top Event MS-IC-38 
Top event MS-IC-38 is queried as part of IP-6 to determine whether flow through flushing removes soluble 
neutron absorbers. The top branch indicates it does not and the bottom branch indicates it does. 
E.9.3 
Top Event MS-IC-39 
Top event MS-IC-39 is queried as part of IP-5 to determine whether waste form degrades mobilizing fissile 
material. The top branch indicates it does not and the bottom branch indicates it does. 

E.9.4 
Top Event MS-IC-40 
Top event MS-IC-40 is queried as part of near-field configuration classes to determine whether waste package 
mostly degrades while waste form stays largely intact. The top branch indicates it does not and the bottom branch 
indicates it does. 
E.9.5 Top Event WF-MISLOAD 
The WF-MISLOAD top event represents the probabilty that a waste form was incorrectly placed into a waste 
package or DOE standardized SNF canister during the preclosure loading process. The lower branch of this top 
event indicates the occurrence of a waste form misload and the upper branch indicates that no misload occurred. 
E.9.6 Top Event CRIT-POT-WF 
The branching of top event CRIT-POT-WF represents the criticality potential of configuration. The upper branch 
indicates that configuration does not have a criticality potential and the lower branch indicates that it does. 
E.10 DESCRIPTION OF EVENT TREE CONFIG-NF-F 
The following subsections provide description of the top events of the event tree CONFIGNF-F (Appendix B, 
Figure B-14). This event tree initiates the evaluation of the near-field configurations for the formation of potentially 
critical configurations. This event tree consists of four top events. 
E.10.1 Top Event CONFIG-SCEN 
The branching of top event CONFIG-SCEN establishes the evaluation of three of the five near-field configuration 
classes  NF-1, NF-2, and NF-3. These configuration classes are represented by the second, third and fourth 
branches from the top of this top event. The top branch is not utilized in these analyses and is included as a 
modeling convenience. 
E.10.2 Top Event MS-NF-6 
The branching of top event MS-NF-6 directs the evaluation of near-field configuration class NF-1. The upper 
branch of this top event indicates that this configuration class is not to be evaluated and the lower branch indicates 
that this configuration class will be evaluated. Selection of the lower branch results in a transfer to the CONFIGNF1 
event tree. This near-field configuration class represents the transport of fissile material bearing solutes from 
the waste package to the near-field environment. The NF-1 configuration class is to be evaluated for either a waste 
package overflow or bottom breach scenario. 
E.10.3 Top Event MS-NF-7 
The branching of top event MS-NF-7 directs the evaluation of near-field configuration class NF-2. The upper 
branch of this top event indicates that this configuration class is not to be evaluated and the lower branch indicates 
that this configuration class will be evaluated. Selection of the lower branch results in a transfer to the CONFIGNF2 
event tree. Configuration class NF-2 represents the transport of fissile material bearing slurry effluent from the 
waste package into the near-field environment. A slurry effluent can only result from a bottom breach of the waste 
package. 
E.10.4 Top Event MS-NF-8 
The branching of top event MS-NF-8 directs the evaluation of near-field configuration class NF-3. The upper 
branch of this top event indicates that this configuration class is not to be evaluated and the lower branch indicates 
that this configuration class will be evaluated. Selection of the lower branch results in a transfer to the CONFIGNF3 
event tree. This near-field configuration class represents the transport of fissile material bearing colloids from 
the waste package to the near-field environment. The NF-3 configuration class is to be evaluated either for a waste 
package overflow or bottom breach scenario. 

E.11 DESCRIPTION OF EVENT TREE CONFIG-NF1 
The following subsections provide description of the top events of the event tree CONFIGNF1 (Appendix B, 
Figure B-15). This event tree initiates the evaluation of the near-field configuration class NF-1 representing the 
near-field accumulation of fissile materials into potentially critical configurations resulting from solution effluent 
discharges from the waste package. This event tree consists of five top events. 
E.11.1 Top Event MS-NF-9 
The branching of top event MS-NF-9 directs the evaluation of the three configuration subclasses of configuration 
class NF-1  NF-1A, NF-1B, and NF-1C. These configuration classes are represented by the second, third and 
fourth branches from the top of this top event. The upper branch is not utilized in these analyses and is included for 
modeling convenience. The lower branch of this top event represents the transport of fissile material from the near-
field to the far-field. This branch immediately transfers to the CONFIG-FF-J event tree for far-field evaluation. 
E.11.2 Top Event MS-NF-10 
The branching of top event MS-NF-10 directs the evaluation of near-field configuration class NF-1A. The upper 
branch of this top event indicates that fissile materials are not sorbed into the invert materials and the lower branch 
indicates that fissile materials are sorbed in the invert materials. The criticality potential of near-field configuration 
class NF-1A will be evaluated for the seismic disruptive event. 
E.11.3 Top Event MS-NF-11 
The branching of top event MS-NF-11 directs the evaluation of near-field configuration class NF-1B. The upper 
branch of this top event indicates that fissile materials do not precipitate in the invert and the lower branch indicates 
that fissile materials do precipitate in the invert. The criticality potential of near-field configuration class NF-1B 
will be evaluated for the seismic disruptive event. 
E.11.4 Top Event MS-NF-12 
The branching of top event MS-NF-12 directs the evaluation of near-field configuration class NF-1C. The upper 
branch of this top event indicates that fissile materials are not transported from one or more waste packages and 
deposited at an invert low point. The lower branch indicates that fissile materials are transported and deposited at an 
invert low point. The criticality potential of near-field configuration class NF-1C will be evaluated for the seismic 
disruptive event. 
E.11.5 Top Event CRIT-POT-WF 
The branching of top event CRIT-POT-WF represents the criticality potential of a waste package with an advective 
failure. The cladding of a waste form in such a waste package is assumed to have breached and the waste form 
converted (degraded) into a more reactive configuration that has been flushed from the breached waste package. 
The upper branch indicates that this configuration does not have any criticality potential and the lower branch 
indicates that it does. This top event is queried for this event tree only for waste package advective failure 
conditions. 
E.12 DESCRIPTION OF EVENT TREE CONFIG-NF2 
The following subsections provide description of the top events of the event tree CONFIGNF2 (Appendix B, 
Figure B-16). This event tree initiates the evaluation of the near-field configuration class NF-2 representing the 
near-field accumulation of fissile materials into potentially critical configurations resulting from slurry effluent 
discharging from the waste package. This event tree consists of three top events. 
E.12.1 Top Event MS-NF-13 
The branching of top event MS-NF-13 directs the evaluation of near-field configuration class NF-2A. The upper 
branch of this top event indicates that fissile material contained in the slurry effluent does not flow and conform to 

the invert surface. The lower branch indicates that the slurry effluent does flow to conform to the invert surface. In 
order to evaluate near-field configuration subclass NF-2A, only the lower branch of this top event will be evaluated 
 slurry effluent does flow to conform to the invert surface. 
E.12.2 Top Event MS-NF-14 
The branching of top event MS-NF-14 evaluates whether the neutron absorber and fissile materials separate as the 
slurry effluent flows to conform to the invert surface. The upper branch of this top event indicates that the neutron 
absorber and fissile materials do not separate and the lower branch indicates that they do. Both branches of this top 
event will be evaluated in order to assess the criticality potential of the slurry effluent with and without neutron 
absorber materials. 
E.12.3 Top Event CRIT-POT-WF 
The branching of top event CRIT-POT-WF represents the criticality potential of near-field configuration subclass 
NF-2A - a slurry effluent from the waste package is assumed to flow and conform to the invert surface with and 
without neutron absorber material separation. The upper branch indicates that this configuration does not have any 
criticality potential and the lower branch indicates that it does. 
E.13 DESCRIPTION OF EVENT TREE CONFIG-NF3 
The following subsections provide description of the top events of the event tree CONFIGNF3 (Appendix B, 
Figure B-17). This event tree initiates the evaluation of the near-field configuration class NF-3 representing the 
near-field accumulation of fissile material bearing colloids into potentially critical configurations. This event tree 
consists of seven top events. 
E.13.1 Top Event CONFIG-SCEN 
The branching of top event CONFIG-SCEN establishes the evaluation of the three subclasses of near-field 
configuration class NF-3 and the transport of fissile material containing colloids from the near-field to the far-field 
environments. The upper branch is not utilized in these analyses and is included only as a modeling convenience. 
The three near-field configuration subclasses are represented by the second and third branches from the top of this 
top event. The second branch directs the evaluation of configuration subclass NF-3A and the third branch directs 
the evaluation of subclasses NF-3B and NF-3C. The fourth, or bottom, branch of this top event represents the 
transport of fissile material through the near-field environment to the far-field environment. The fourth branch 
immediately transfers to the CONFIG-FF-K event tree for far-field configuration evaluation. 
E.13.2 Top Event MS-NF-15 
The branching of top event MS-NF-15 directs the evaluation of near-field configuration subclass NF-3A. The upper 
branch of this top event indicates that fissile material containing colloids are not filtered and concentrated on top of 
the invert, trapped by corrosion products. The lower branch indicates that the colloids are trapped on the invert 
surface. In order to evaluate near-field configuration subclass NF-3A, only the lower branch of this top event will 
be evaluated. 
E.13.3 Top Event MS-NF-16 
The branching of top event MS-NF-16 determines whether fissile material containing colloids are transported into 
the invert. Activation of the upper branch of this top event indicates that fissile material containing colloids are not 
transported into the invert. The activation of the second branch indicates that fissile material containing colloids are 
transported into the invert. In order to evaluate near-field configuration subclasses NF-3B and NF-3C, the second 
branch of this event is activated. The third branch is activated, which allows the fissile material colloids to be 
transported into the far-field. 

E.13.4 Top Event MS-NF-19 
The branching of top event MS-NF-19 directs the evaluation of near-field configuration subclasses NF-3B and NF3C. 
The upper branch of this top event evaluates configuration subclass NF-3B and indicates that the invert 
materials have not degraded prior to the release of the waste form materials following a seismic event. The lower 
branch evaluates near-field configuration subclass NF-3C and indicates that the invert materials have degraded prior 
to the release of waste form materials following a seismic event. 
E.13.5 Top Event MS-NF-17 
The branching of top event MS-NF-17 evaluates the likelihood of hydrodynamic or chromatographic separation of 
fissile material containing colloids from the neutron absorber materials for both near-field configuration subclasses 
NF-3B and NF-3C. The upper branch of this top event indicates that fissile material containing colloids are not 
separated from the neutron absorber materials and the lower branch indicates that they are. Although no known 
mechanism exists to separate the fissile materials from the neutron absorber materials, both branches of this top 
event will be evaluated. 
E.13.6 Top Event MS-NF-18 
The branching of top event MS-NF-18 represents the filtration and concentration of the fissile material containing 
colloids in the invert for both configuration subclasses NF-3B and NF-3C. The upper branch of this top event 
indicates that fissile material containing colloids are not filtered and concentrated in the invert and the lower branch 
indicates that they are. In order to evaluate both configuration classes, only the lower branch of this top event will 
be activated. 
E.13.7 Top Event CRIT-POT-WF 
The branching of top event CRIT-POT-WF represents the criticality potential of near-field configuration subclasses 
NF-3A, NF-3B, and NF-3C.  scenarios for the filtration and concentration of fissile material containing colloids in 
the near-field. The upper branch indicates that this configuration does not have any criticality potential and the 
lower branch indicates that it does. 
E.14 DESCRIPTION OF EVENT TREE CONFIG-NF4 
The following subsections provide description of the top events of the event tree CONFIGNF4 (Appendix B, 
Figure B-18). This event tree initiates the evaluation of the near-field configuration class NF-4. This event tree 
consists of six top events. 
E.14.1 Top Event MS-NF-2 
The branching of top event MS-NF-2 determines whether seepage water ponds on the drift floor due to sealing or 
damming. The upper branch of this top event indicates that ponding does not occur and the lower branch indicates 
that it does. 
E.14.2 Top Event MS-NF-3 
Top event MS-NF-3 is queried to determine whether aqueous corrosion of waste package occurs. The top branch 
indicates it does not and the bottom branch indicates it does. 
E.14.3 
Top Event MS-NF-4 
Top event MS-NF-4 is queried to determine whether container bottom breaches. The top branch indicates it does 
not and the bottom branch indicates it does. 

E.14.4 
Top Event MS-NF-5 
Top event MS-NF-5 is queried to determine whether waste form and basket degradation mobilizes fissile material 
and neutron absorber. The top branch indicates it does not and the bottom branch indicates it does. 
E.14.5 Top Event MS-NF-DD 
The branching of top event MS-NF-DD determines whether fissile material can accumulate on the invert surface due 
to dry transport mechanisms from a failed waste package that does not experience advective flow. The upper branch 
of this top event indicates that fissile material does not accumulate on the invert surface and the lower branch 
indicates that it does. 
E.14.6 Top Event CRIT-POT-WF 
The branching of top event CRIT-POT-WF represents the criticality potential of near-field configuration subclasses 
NF-3A, NF-3B, and NF-3C (scenarios for the filtration and concentration of fissile material containing colloids in 
the near-field.) The upper branch indicates that this configuration does not have any criticality potential and the 
lower branch indicates that it does. 
E.15 DESCRIPTION OF EVENT TREE CONFIG-NF4-E 
The following subsections provide description of the top events of the event tree CONFIGNF4-E (Appendix B, 
Figure B-19). This event tree initiates the evaluation of the near-field configuration class NF-4. This event tree 
consists of five top events. 
E.15.1 Top Event MS-NF-22 
Top event MS-NF-22 is queried to determine whether fissile material and absorbers accumulate in pond. The top 
branch indicates they do not and the bottom branch indicates they do. 
E.15.2 Top Event MS-NF-23 
Top event MS-NF-23 is queried to determine whether the basin is effectively sealed. The top branch indicates it 
is not and the bottom branch indicates it is. 
E.15.3 Top Event MS-NF-24 
Top event MS-NF-24 is queried to determine whether fissile material accumulates in clays at the bottom of the 
pool. The top branch indicates it does not and the bottom branch indicates it does. 
E.15.4 Top Event MS-NF-25 
Top event MS-NF-25 is queried to determine whether non-fissile bearing water flushes neutron absorbers. The 
top branch indicates it does not and the bottom branch indicates it does. 
E.15.5 Top Event CRIT-POT-WF 
The branching of top event CRIT-POT-WF represents the criticality potential of near-field configuration subclass 
NF-5A. The upper branch indicates that this configuration does not have any criticality potential and the lower 
branch indicates that it does. 
E.16 DESCRIPTION OF EVENT TREE CONFIG-NF5-I 
The following subsections provide description of the top events of the event tree CONFIGNF5-I (Appendix B, 
Figure B-20). This event tree initiates the evaluation of the near-field configuration class NF-5. This event tree 
consists of two top events. 

E.16.1 Top Event MS-NF-26 
Top event MS-NF-26 is queried to determine whether intact waste form sits in pond on drift floor. The top branch 
indicates it does not and the bottom branch indicates it does. 
E.16.2 Top Event CRIT-POT-WF 
The branching of top event CRIT-POT-WF represents the criticality potential of near-field configuration subclass 
NF-5 (scenario for intact waste form to sit in a pond on drift floor.) The upper branch indicates that this 
configuration does not have any criticality potential and the lower branch indicates that it does. 
E.17 DESCRIPTION OF EVENT TREE CONFIG-FF-J 
The following subsections provide description of the top events of the event tree CONFIGFF-J (Appendix B, 
Figure B-21). This event tree initiates the evaluation of the far-field configuration class FF-1 representing the far-
field accumulation of fissile material bearing solutes into potentially critical configurations. This event tree consists 
of nine top events. 
E.17.1 Top Event MS-FF-1 
The branching of top event MS-FF-1 initiates the evaluation of far-field configuration class FF-1 representing the 
transport of fissile material containing solutes into the far-fields saturated and unsaturated zones. The upper branch 
represents that the fissile material bearing solutes are not transported to the far-field and the lower branch represents 
that they are. Only the lower branch of this top event is activated to initiate the evaluation of this far-field 
configuration class. 
E.17.2 Top Event MS-FF-2 
The branching of top event MS-FF-2 determines whether the fissile materials entering the far-field environment are 
separated from the neutron absorber materials of the waste package or waste form. The upper branch indicates that 
the fissile material is not separated from the neutron absorber materials by the far-field environment. The remaining 
three branches evaluate far-field configuration classes for the separation of the fissile materials from the neutron 
absorber materials. The second branch from the top directs the evaluation of configuration subclass FF-1A and the 
third branch directs the evaluation of subclasses FF-1B and FF-1C. The fourth, or bottom, branch of this top event 
represents the transport of fissile material through the unsaturated zone and into the water table for the evaluation of 
configuration class FF-3. The fourth branch immediately transfers to the CONFIG-FF3 event tree. 
E.17.3 Top Event MS-FF-3 
The branching of top event MS-FF-3 represents the transport of fissile materials through the unsaturated zone to the 
water table. The upper branch of this top event indicates that fissile material is not transported to the water table. 
The lower branch of this top event indicates that fissile materials are transported directly to the water table. 
E.17.4 Top Event MS-FF-11 
The branching of top event MS-FF-11 represents the precipitation of fissile material as the chemistry of the fissile 
material containing carrier plume is altered by the unsaturated zone host rock. This scenario represents far-field 
configuration subclass FF-1A. The upper branch of this top event indicates that fissile material is not precipitated 
and the lower branch of this top event indicates that it is. 
E.17.5 Top Event MS-FF-12 
The branching of top event MS-FF-12 represents the transport of fissile material containing solutes to altered TSbv. 
The upper branch of this top event indicates that the fissile material is not transported to the altered TSbv. The 
second and third branches of this top event indicate that fissile materials are transported to the altered TSbv and 
initiate the evaluation of far-field configuration subclasses FF-1B and FF-1C, respectively. 

E.17.6 Top Event MS-FF-13 
The branching of top event MS-FF-13 represents formation of the far-field configuration subclass FF-1B, which is 
defined as the sorption of fissile material in clays and zeolites in the altered TSbv. The upper branch of this top 
event indicates that fissile materials are not sorbed and the lower branch of this top event indicates that they are. 
E.17.7 Top Event MS-FF-14 
The branching of top event MS-FF-14 represents the formation of far-field configuration subclass FF-1C, which is 
defined as the accumulation of fissile material containing solutes in topographical lows above altered TSbv. The 
upper branch of this top event indicates that fissile material containing solutes are not accumulated and the lower 
branch of this top event indicates that they are accumulated. 
E.17.8 Top Event MS-FF-15 
The branching of top event MS-FF-14 represents the formation of far-field configuration subclass FF-1C, which is 
defined as the chemical changes in perched water precipitating fissile material. The upper branch of this top event 
indicates that there are no chemical changes and the lower branch of this top event indicates that there are. 
E.17.9 Top Event CRIT-POT-WF 
The branching of top event CRIT-POT-WF represents the criticality potential of near-field configuration subclass 
FF-1 (scenario representing the far-field accumulation of fissile material bearing solutes into potentially critical 
configurations.) The upper branch indicates that this configuration does not have any criticality potential and the 
lower branch indicates that it does. 
E.18 DESCRIPTION OF EVENT TREE CONFIG-FF-K 
The following subsections provide description of the top events of the event tree CONFIGFF-K (Appendix B, 
Figure B-22). This event tree initiates the evaluation of the far-field configuration class FF-2 representing the far-
field accumulation of fissile material bearing colloids into potentially critical configurations. This event tree 
consists of seven top events. 
E.18.1 Top Event MS-FF-16 
The branching of top event MS-FF-16 initiates the evaluation of far-field configuration class FF-2 representing the 
transport of fissile material bearing colloids into the far-fields unsaturated zone. The upper branch represents that 
fissile material bearing colloids are not transported to the far-field and the lower branch represents that they are. 
E.18.2 Top Event MS-FF-17 
The branching of top event MS-FF-17 determines whether the fissile material bearing colloids entering the 
unsaturated zone environment are hydrodynamically or chromatographically separated from the neutron absorber 
materials of the waste package or waste form. The upper branch indicates that the fissile material is not separated 
from the neutron absorber materials by the unsaturated zone environment. The remaining two branches represent 
the separation of the fissile materials from the neutron absorber materials and initiate the evaluation of the FF-2 
configuration subclasses. The second branch from the top directs the evaluation of configuration subclass FF-2A 
and the third branch directs the evaluation of configuration subclasses FF-2B and FF-2C. 
E.18.3 Top Event MS-FF-18 
The branching of top event MS-FF-18 represents far-field configuration subclass FF-2A that is defined as the 
trapping of fissile material bearing colloids in altered TSbv. The upper branch of this top event indicates that fissile 
material bearing colloids are not trapped and the lower branch indicates that they are. 

E.18.4 Top Event MS-FF-19 
The branching of top event MS-FF-19 represents the transport of fissile material containing colloids to altered TSbv. 
The upper branch of this top event indicates that fissile material containing colloids are not transported and the 
lower two branches indicate that they are. The second and third branches of this top event initiate the evaluation of 
far-field configuration subclasses FF-2B and FF-2C, respectively. 
E.18.5 Top Event MS-FF-20 
The branching of top event MS-FF-20 represents formation of the far-field configuration subclass FF-2B, which is 
defined as the sorption of fissile material containing colloids on clays and zeolites in the altered TSbv. The upper 
branch of this top event indicates that fissile materials are not sorbed and the lower branch of this top event indicates 
that they are. 
E.18.6 Top Event MS-FF-21 
The branching of top event MS-FF-21 represents the formation of far-field configuration subclass FF-2C, which is 
defined as the filtration and accumulation of fissile material containing colloids in topographical low above altered 
TSbv. The upper branch of this top event indicates that fissile material containing colloids are not filtered and 
accumulated and the lower branch of this top event indicates that they are. 
E.18.7 Top Event CRIT-POT-WF 
The branching of top event CRIT-POT-WF represents the criticality potential of near-field configuration subclass 
FF-2 (scenario representing the far-field accumulation of fissile material bearing colloids into potentially critical 
configurations.) The upper branch indicates that this configuration does not have any criticality potential and the 
lower branch indicates that it does. 
E.19 DESCRIPTION OF EVENT TREE CONFIG-FF3 
The following subsections provide description of the top events of the event tree CONFIGFF3 (Appendix B, 
Figure B-23). This event tree initiates the evaluation of the far-field configuration class FF-3 representing the 
accumulation of fissile material into potentially critical configurations in the far-field saturated zone. This event tree 
consists of nine top events. 
E.19.1 Top Event CONFIG-SCEN 
The branching of top event CONFIG-SCEN establishes the evaluation of the five subclasses of far-field 
configuration class FF-3 defined as the transport of fissile material into the saturated zone. The upper branch is not 
utilized in these analyses and is included only as a modeling convenience. The five far-field configuration 
subclasses are represented by the second through sixth branches from the top of this top event. These five branches 
direct the evaluation of configuration subclass FF-3A, FF-3B, FF-3C, FF-3D, and FF-3E, respectively. 
E.19.2 Top Event MS-FF-4 
The branching of top event MS-FF-4 initiates the evaluation of far-field configuration subclass FF-3A defined as the 
precipitation of fissile material in the upwell zone of hydrothermal fluids at faults or in fractures. The upper branch 
indicates that fissile material is not precipitated and the lower branch indicates that they are. 
E.19.3 Top Event MS-FF-5 
The branching of top event MS-FF-5 represents the mixing of the fissile material containing contaminant plume 
below the redox front. The upper branch indicates that mixing does not occur and the lower branch indicates that it 
does. 

E.19.4 Top Event MS-FF-6 
The branching of top event MS-FF-6 initiates the evaluation of far-field configuration subclass FF-3B defined as the 
precipitation of fissile material as the contaminant plume mixes below the redox front. The upper branch indicates 
that fissile material is not precipitated and the lower branch indicates that they are. 
E.19.5 Top Event MS-FF-7 
The branching of top event MS-FF-7 initiates the evaluation of far-field configuration subclass FF-3C defined as the 
precipitation of fissile materials at the reducing zone (i.e., the remains of organic materials). The upper branch 
indicates that fissile material is not precipitated and the lower branch indicates that it is. 
E.19.6 Top Event MS-FF-8 
The branching of top event MS-FF-8 initiates the evaluation of far-field configuration subclass FF-3D defined as the 
precipitation of fissile materials at the reducing zone of a pinchout of the tuff aquifer. The upper branch indicates 
that fissile material is not precipitated and the lower branch indicates that it is. 
E.19.7 Top Event MS-FF-9 
The branching of top event MS-FF-9 represents the transport of fissile material containing solutes to Franklin Lake 
Playa. The upper branch indicates that transport does not occur and the lower branch indicates that it does. 
E.19.8 Top Event MS-FF-10 
The branching of top event MS-FF-10 represents the precipitation of fissile material containing solutes in organic-
rich zones of Franklin Lake. The upper branch indicates that precipitation does not occur and the lower branch 
indicates that it does. 
E.19.9 Top Event CRIT-POT-WF 
The branching of top event CRIT-POT-WF represents the criticality potential of the precipitated fissile material in 
the organic-rich zones of Franklin Lake. The upper branch indicates that precipitated material does not have a 
criticality potential and the lower branch indicates that it does. 
E.20 DESCRIPTION OF EVENT TREE IGNEOUS 
The following subsections provide description of the top events of the event tree IGNEOUS (Appendix B, 
Figure B-24). This event tree is accessed as part of the igneous disruptive event and directs the evaluation of the 
eruptive and intrusive igneous scenarios. This event tree consists of four top events. 
E.20.1 Top Event IG-EVENT-TYPE 
The upper branch of the IG-EVENT-TYPE top event represents the eruptive igneous scenario. The lower branch of 
the IG-EVENT-TYPE top event represents the intrusive igneous scenario. Given an igneous event, an intrusive 
scenario is expected to occur. 
E.20.2 Top Event IG-WP-LOC 
The branches of the IG-WP-LOC top event directs the evaluation of waste packages at the dike (intrusive event) or 
conduit (eruptive event) intersection point. The upper branch of this top event directs the evaluation of a waste 
package at the dike or conduit intersection points. The lower branch of this top event directs the evaluation of waste 
packages beyond the dike or conduit intersection points. 
E.20.3 
Top Event IG-WP-RELOC 
The purpose of this top event is to represent the possibility that, for an eruptive igneous scenario, waste packages 
initially beyond the conduit intersection point may at some point may get pulled into the conduit. 

E.20.4 
Top Event NAMISLOAD 
The presence of neutron absorber materials in a waste package is important to criticality control during the 
regulatory period for the majority of the waste forms proposed for disposal in the repository. Misload of the neutron 
absorber materials is associated with top event NAMISLOAD of the MSLET2 event tree (Appendix B, Figure 
B-5). The lower branch of this top event indicates the occurrence of a misload of neutron absorber materials in the 
waste package or waste form and the upper branch indicates that no misload occurred. 
E.21 DESCRIPTION OF EVENT TREE IG-ERUPTIVE 
The following subsections provide description of the top events of the event tree IG-ERUPTIVE (Appendix B, 
Figure B-25). This event tree is accessed as part of the evaluation of an eruptive igneous scenario for those waste 
packages intersected by the eruptive conduit or those waste packages that are initially beyond the conduit, but are 
subsequently pulled into the conduit. This event tree consists of seven top events. 
E.21.1 Top Event IG-CONFIG 
The IG-CONFIG top event establishes the configuration of the waste packages ejected from the repository during an 
eruptive igneous event. Waste packages in the eruptive conduit can be either destroyed and the waste form 
pulverized during the eruptive process and the remains ejected and dispersed across the surface (the branch of this 
top event) or it can be ejected breached, but relatively intact and lying on the surface (the failure branch of this top 
event). 
E.21.2 Top Event IG-RAINFALL 
The purpose of top event IG-RAINFALL is to determine the probability that rainfall occurs at some point in time 
after an eruptive event. The upper branch of this top event indicates that rainfall does not occur and the lower 
branch indicates that it does. 
E.21.3 Top Event IG-BATHTUB 
Top event IG-BATHTUB is queried to determine whether waste package bathtub configuration forms. The top 
branch indicates that a flow-through configuration forms and the bottom branch indicates that a bathtub 
configuration occurs. 
E.21.4 Top Event IG-FM-TRANS 
Top event IG-FM-TRANS is queried to determine whether fissile material is transported from the waste package. 
The top branch indicates it is not and the bottom branch indicates it is. 
E.21.5 Top Event IG-FM-ACCUM 
The purpose of this top event is to represent the possibility that, after an eruptive igneous event disperses the waste 
form on the surface, subsequent rainfall mobilizes the waste form and it accumulates into a potentially critical 
configuration. 
E.21.6 Top Event WF-MISLOAD 
The WF-MISLOAD top event represent the probability that a waste form was incorrectly placed into a waste 
packaged during the preclosure loading process. 
E.21.7 
Top Event CRIT-POT-WF 
The branching of top event CRIT-POT-WF represents the criticality potential of configuration. The upper branch 
indicates that configuration does not have a criticality potential and the lower branch indicates that it does. 

E.22 
DESCRIPTION OF EVENT TREE IG-INTRUSIVE 
The following subsections provide description of the top events of the event tree IG-INTRUSIVE (Appendix B, 
Figure B-26). This event tree is accessed as part of the eruptive and intrusive igneous scenario evaluations for those 
waste packages that are in the drift beyond the eruptive conduit or for those waste packages that are at or beyond the 
dike intersection point. This event tree consists of eight top events. 
E.22.1 Top Event IG-WP-DESTRYD 
This top event quantifies the probability that the waste package is destroyed as a result of the entry force of intrusive 
material. Separate consideration is given for those waste packages at the dike intersection point where the forces 
would be greatest versus those waste packages lying beyond the dike or conduit intersection points. 
E.22.2 Top Event IG-WP-SLUMP 
The IG-WP-SLUMP top event evaluates whether the waste package will remain intact (upper branch), partially 
slump (middle branch), or completely slump (lower branch) as a result of the high temperatures of the intruding 
materials. 
E.22.3 Top Event IG-MAGMA-INT 
The purpose of this top event is to quantify the possibility that, because of waste package breach following an 
intrusive igneous event, intrusive material can enter the breached waste package. The upper branch represents that 
magma does not intrude into the waste package upon its failure and the lower branch represents that it does. 
E.22.4 Top Event IG-MAGMA-COOL 
Top event IG-MAGMA-COOL is queried to determine whether the magma has cooled. The top branch indicates 
it has not and the bottom branch indicates it has. 
E.22.5 Top Event IG-MAGMA-FRAC 
Top event IG-MAGMA-FRAC is queried to determine whether the magma fractures after cooling. The top 
branch indicates it does not and the bottom branch indicates it does. 
E.22.6 Top Event IG-MAGMA-SEEPAGE 
The purpose of top event IG-MAGMA-SEEPAGE is to represent the possibility that, after the cooling and fracturing 
of the intrusive material, seepage returns and enters the breached waste package. The upper branch of this top event 
indicates that seepage does not occur and the bottom three branches indicates that seepage does occur for the lower-
bound, mean and upper-bound seepage scenarios, respectively. 
E.22.7 Top Event IG-FM-TRASPT 
Top event IG-FM-TRASPT is queried to determine whether fissile material transports to the near-field. The top 
branch indicates it does not and the bottom branch indicates it does. 
E.22.7 Top Event CRIT-POT-WF 
The branching of top event CRIT-POT-WF represents the criticality potential of configuration. The upper branch 
indicates that configuration does not have a criticality potential and the lower branch indicates that it does. 
E.23 DESCRIPTION OF EVENT TREE IG-INTRUSIVE2 
The following subsections provide description of the top events of the event tree IG-INTRUSIVE2 (Appendix B, 
Figure B-27). This event tree is a continuation of the evaluation of an intrusive igneous event for those waste 
packages not destroyed by the force of the intrusive event. This event tree consists of seven top events. 

E.23.1 Top Event IG-MAGMA-COOL 
The branching of top event IG-MAGMA-COOL establishes the temperature of the intrusive material. The upper 
branch indicates that the temperature is above 100C. The lower branch indicates that the temperature is below 
100C. Both branches of this top event are processed for the determination of the waste packages pre-and post-
cooling criticality potential. 
E.23.2 Top Event IG-MAGMA-FRAC 
The branching of top event IG-MAGMA-FRAC indicates whether or not the intrusive material fractures upon 
cooling. The upper branch of this top event indicates that no fracturing of the intrusive material occurs and the 
bottom branch indicates that fracturing does occur. 
E.23.3 Top Event IG-SEEPAGE 
The purpose of top event IG-SEEPAGE is to represent the possibility that, after the cooling and fracturing of the 
intrusive material, seepage returns and enters the breached waste package. The upper branch of this top event 
indicates that seepage does not occur and the bottom three branches indicates that seepage does occur for the lower-
bound, mean and upper-bound seepage scenarios, respectively. 
E.23.4 Top Event IG-BATHTUB 
The purpose of top event IG-BATHTUB is to represent the possibility that, after the cooling and fracturing of the 
intrusive material and seepage returns and enters the breached waste package, a bathtub configuration is formed 
within the waste package. The upper branch of this top event indicates that a bathtub configuration does not form 
and the lower branch indicates that it does. 
E.23.5 Top Event IG-FM-TRANSPT 
The branching of top event IG-FM-TRANSPT establishes whether fissile material remains internal to the waste 
package or is transported external to the waste package to the near-field environment. The upper branch indicates 
the evaluation of fissile material remaining in the waste package. The lower branch indicates that the fissile material 
is transported external to the waste package. 
E.23.6 Top Event WF-MISLOAD 
The WF-MISLOAD top event represent the probability that a waste form was incorrectly placed into a waste 
packaged during the preclosure loading process. 
E.23.7 Top Event CRIT-POT-WF 
Quantification of the CRIT-POT-WF top event establishes the criticality potential of a given igneous configuration. 
Activation of the upper branch indicates that the configuration has no criticality potential and activation of the lower 
branch indicates that there is criticality potential. 

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APPENDIX F
LISTING OF FILES ON CD-ROM

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The directory of files on the electronic media (compact disk, Appendix G) for this analysis report 
is given in the following table. File names, their size in bytes, and the date and time of last 
update as given in the directory on the originating PC hardware are listed in the table. Files 
identified with a .xls suffix are all in Excel spreadsheet format and files identified with a 
.mcd suffix are Mathcad output files. Files in the SAPHIRE directory must be copied to a 
local drive unit, unzipped, and converted to a read/write status before using them with the 
SAPHIRE software. 
EXCEL Directory 
File Name Date Time Size (bytes) 
SAPHIRE Event Probability Files 
Probability of Seepage.xls 08/23/2004 10:22p 20,480 
Probability of Seepage-R1.xls 08/21/2004 12:55p 18,944 
Probability of Waste Package Filling.xls 06/19/2004 04:28p 19,456 
waste package percentages.xls 06/22/2004 09:32a 29,696 
endstate.xls 07/21/2004 11:45a 31,744 
endstate-2.xls 09/30/2004 10:20a 31,744 
per waste package type criticality probabilities.xls 08/27/2004 11:12a 27,648 
probability of criticality.xls 08/27/2004 10:53a 29,184 
FEP Results Binomial Distribution Files 
Binom Dist.xls 08/05/2004 08:51a 62,464 
Waste Package Void Volume 
DOE long.04.xls 10/13/2004 01:22p 31,744 
DOE MCO.04.xls 10/13/2004 01:22p 32,256 
MATHCAD Directory 
File Name Date Time Size (bytes) 
Probability of Seepage 
LA seepage glacTptpll collapse-seismic.mcd 10/13/2004 10:54p 300,534 
LA seepage glac Tptpll weibull.mcd 10/13/2004 10:53p 300,505 
LA seepage glac Tptpmn collapse-igneous.mcd 10/13/2004 11:02p 300,003 
LA seepage glac Tptpmn seismic 1_2.mcd 10/13/2004 11:05p 299,981 
LA seepage glac Tptpmn weibull.mcd 10/13/2004 10:24p 299,849 
Waste Package Filling Probability 
Localizedcorrosion_seismic_commercial_updated.mcd 08/26/2004 08:59a 119,153 
Localizedcorrosion_seismic_commercial.mcd 08/26/2004 07:22a 99,509 
Fault Displacement Probability 
Fault_displacement_commercial.mcd 10/13/2004 04:47p 62,344 
SAPHIRE Directory 
File Name Date Time Size (bytes) 
criticality-feps-rev01c-model.zip 08/27/2004 10:18a 389,985 
criticality-feps-rev01-model.zip 06/30/2004 09:34a 558,369 

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